Title: Lougee Conservancy v. CitiMortgage, Inc.

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
 
 
 
     
    Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2012 ME 103 
Docket: 
Yor-11-211 
Argued:  
January 11, 2012  
Decided: 
August 2, 2012 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, 
JJ. 
 
 
LOUGEE CONSERVANCY et al. 
 
v. 
 
CITIMORTGAGE, INC. et al. 
 
 
SILVER, J. 
 
[¶1]  The Lougee Conservancy; Eleanor Lougee Chapin, as trustee and 
beneficiary of the Lougee Conservancy; David Lougee, as trustee and beneficiary 
of the Lougee Conservancy; and Arthur “Jim” Lougee, as beneficiary of the 
Lougee Conservancy (collectively, the Lougees) appeal from a summary judgment 
entered in the Superior Court (York County, Fritzsche, J.).  The court granted 
summary judgment in favor of CitiMortgage, Inc. on the Lougees’ complaint for 
common law and statutory trespass, invasion of privacy, conversion, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, punitive damages, and negligence, and in favor of 
Safeguard Properties, LLC, and David and Shelly Alley, d/b/a D&S Properties, 
LLC, on all claims except common law and statutory trespass.  The Lougees’ 
claims arose when an unencumbered home and barn owned by the Lougee 
 
2 
Conservancy were entered and secured as part of CitiMortgage’s foreclosure action 
that pertained to a neighboring property.  We affirm the judgment on the claims for 
invasion of privacy, conversion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 
punitive damages, and vacate on the claim of negligence as to all three defendants. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  We review the facts found in the summary judgment record in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiffs as the nonmoving party.  See Davis v. Dionne, 
2011 ME 90, ¶ 2, 26 A.3d 801. 
[¶3]  The Lougee Conservancy is an irrevocable trust that holds legal title to 
593 acres of land along North Road in Parsonsfield.  Eleanor Lougee Chapin, Jim 
Lougee, and David Lougee are beneficiaries of the trust, and Eleanor and David 
are trustees.  The Conservancy was created by the Lougees’ parents in 1964 to 
conserve and maintain the property for the benefit of the Lougee family.  The 
property includes a house (the Homestead) and a barn.  Since the Lougees’ father 
died in 2005 the Homestead has served as a storage place for family heirlooms and 
for personal items that belonged to the Lougees’ parents.  The property also stores 
some personal possessions of the individual Lougees.  Jim lives on the 
Conservancy property in a separate home about 500 feet from the Homestead.   
[¶4]  In December 2008, CitiMortgage began a foreclosure action against a 
property located four miles from the Homestead on North Road (North Road 
 
3 
property).  In August 2008 the mortgage on the North Road property reached a 
certain delinquency threshold, triggering CitiMortgage to issue an order to 
Safeguard, CitiMortgage’s property preservation services provider, to determine 
whether the home was vacant or abandoned.  Safeguard, through various 
subcontractors, periodically checked on the North Road property and reported to 
CitiMortgage.  In February 2009 Safeguard determined that the North Road 
property had been abandoned and reported this to CitiMortgage.  
[¶5]  Safeguard issued an order to secure and winterize the North Road 
property and assigned the job to one of its subcontractors, D&S Properties.  D&S 
was to confirm that the North Road property was vacant and, if so, secure it.  
Safeguard provided D&S with the correct address of the North Road property to 
complete this task, but D&S was unsure as to which house on North Road was the 
correct house.  The electronic navigation system used by D&S brought them to the 
Conservancy property in the vicinity of the Homestead.  Many homes on the street, 
including the Homestead, lacked street numbers; a neighbor could not confirm the 
correct address; and the Homestead had been winterized, and its driveway was not 
plowed.  D&S sent digital pictures of the Homestead and another nearby house—
not the North Road property—to Safeguard requesting verification of which was 
the correct house.  Although a Safeguard employee responded by stating that 
Safeguard’s inspector had the same photographs as D&S, so she could not 
 
4 
determine which was the right house, D&S believed Safeguard had confirmed that 
the Homestead was the correct house.  
[¶6]  Despite the hundreds of “No Trespassing” signs posted on the 
Conservancy property, D&S entered the Homestead on March 24, 2009.  D&S 
examined, inventoried, and photographed the contents of the home.  While doing 
so, D&S emptied shelves and cupboards and moved items around.  The parties 
dispute whether D&S damaged a door, a doorframe, and an antique desk that 
belonged to Maine’s first governor.  D&S secured the Homestead by putting a 
code-entry lockbox on the side door.  D&S also entered the barn on the 
Conservancy property by prying open a door.  In doing so D&S broke the lock on 
the door.  The parties dispute whether this caused damage to an interior wall.  D&S 
searched, inventoried, and photographed the barn’s interior.  Upon leaving, D&S 
placed a board across the door but did not otherwise protect it from entry.  The 
Lougees have not alleged that D&S removed any items from either the Homestead 
or the barn.   
[¶7]  Eight days later, on April 2, 2009, Jim discovered the lock on the 
Homestead door, which prevented him from entering.  The parties dispute whether 
Jim could have gained immediate access through another door to the home.  Jim 
called Eleanor, who called a deputy sheriff.  The deputy arrived at the Homestead 
and called Safeguard, per a sticker D&S posted near the lockbox with Safeguard’s 
 
5 
contact information.  Safeguard notified D&S, and D&S then gave the deputy the 
access code for the lockbox.  Jim and the deputy were able to enter the home 
immediately.  Jim observed that the contents of the home were in disarray.  D&S 
returned to the Homestead on the same day to change the lock on the Homestead 
and replace the lock on the barn.  Jim did not report any items broken or stolen to 
D&S or the deputy at that time.  
[¶8]  As a direct result of this incident, Jim was left upset and anxious and 
obtained counseling for ten months.  The Lougees allege that his existing 
anxiety-related mental health conditions have been exacerbated.  Eleanor feels 
anxious, defeated, resistant to going to the Homestead, discouraged, offended, 
disgusted, and as though the Homestead has been “dirtied.”  David feels outraged, 
violated, and “greatly upset.”  His “sense of security and isolation at the 
Homestead” has been “destroyed.”  
[¶9]  The Lougees brought suit against CitiMortgage, Safeguard, and D&S 
in the Superior Court as individual beneficiaries and trustees of the Lougee 
Conservancy, claiming (1) common law trespass, (2) statutory trespass pursuant to 
14 M.R.S. § 7551-B (2011), (3) invasion of privacy, (4) conversion, (5) intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, (6) punitive damages, and (7) negligence.  D&S 
and Safeguard filed cross-claims against each other for common law 
indemnification, and D&S filed a cross-claim against Safeguard for common law 
 
6 
contribution.  CitiMortgage moved for summary judgment on all counts on the 
basis that it was not vicariously liable for the actions of Safeguard or D&S.  
Safeguard also moved for summary judgment on all counts.  D&S moved for 
summary judgment on all counts except statutory and common law trespass.  
Safeguard also sought a summary judgment on D&S’s cross-claim for common 
law indemnification.  
[¶10]  The court granted a summary judgment in favor of CitiMortgage on 
all of the claims.  The court denied Safeguard’s motion as to statutory and common 
law trespass, but granted its motion as to invasion of privacy, conversion, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, punitive damages, and negligence.  The 
court granted D&S’s motion as to invasion of privacy, conversion, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, punitive damages, and negligence.  The court 
denied Safeguard’s motion for summary judgment on the cross-claim against D&S.  
Only the statutory and common law trespass claims against Safeguard and D&S 
now remain for trial.  Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 54(b)(1), the court certified the 
summary judgments on the five claims as final to allow the Lougees to pursue this 
interlocutory appeal.1 
                                         
  1  We do not find any error in the court’s certification pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 54(b)(1), and therefore 
need not discuss the issue further. 
 
 
7 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Summary Judgment Standard 
[¶11]  We review a summary judgment de novo.  Stewart-Dore v. Webber 
Hosp. Ass’n, 2011 ME 26, ¶ 8, 13 A.3d 773.  We view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the party against whom judgment has been granted to determine 
whether the record reveals a genuine issue of material fact on any claim.  Id.  “A 
material fact is one that can affect the outcome of the case, and there is a genuine 
issue when there is sufficient evidence for a fact-finder to choose between 
competing versions of the fact.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  “When facts, 
though undisputed, are capable of supporting conflicting yet plausible inferences—
inferences that are capable of leading a rational fact-finder to different outcomes in 
a litigated matter depending on which of them the fact-finder draws—then the 
choice between those inferences is not for the court on summary judgment.”  See 
F.R. Carroll, Inc. v. TD Bank, N.A., 2010 ME 115, ¶ 8, 8 A.3d 646 (quotation 
marks and alterations omitted). 
[¶12]  “To survive a defendant’s motion for a summary judgment, the 
plaintiff must establish a prima facie case for each element of her cause of action.”  
Bonin v. Crepeau, 2005 ME 59, ¶ 8, 873 A.2d 346 (quotation marks omitted).  The 
prima facie evidence standard addresses “the preliminary burden of production of 
evidence; it requires proof only of enough evidence to allow the fact-trier to infer 
 
8 
the fact at issue and rule in the party’s favor.”  Nader v. Me. Democratic Party, 
2012 ME 57, ¶ 34, 41 A.3d 551.  “If the plaintiff presents insufficient evidence on 
an essential element in her cause of action, such that the defendant would be 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on that state of the evidence at a trial, the 
defendant is entitled to a summary judgment.”  Bonin, 2005 ME 59, ¶ 8, 873 A.2d 
346. (quotation marks and alterations omitted).   
B. 
Agency 
[¶13]  CitiMortgage moved for summary judgment on all counts on the basis 
that it is not vicariously liable for the acts of Safeguard or D&S.  Although the 
Lougees alleged in their complaint to the Superior Court and in their appeal to us 
that Safeguard is an agent of CitiMortgage, the defendants argued that, and 
therefore the court focused on whether, Safeguard and D&S are independent 
contractors of CitiMortgage, such that CitiMortgage would not be liable for their 
actions.  See Legassie v. Bangor Publ’g Co., 1999 ME 180, ¶ 5, 741 A.2d 442 
(“Generally, an employer may be vicariously liable for the negligence of its 
employees, but not for the negligence of independent contractors.”).  However, a 
determination that one party is an independent contractor of another is not 
necessarily dispositive on the question whether that party has been retained to act 
as an agent of another party; a principal can be held liable for the acts of an 
independent contractor if the principal controls the contractor’s performance, 
 
9 
thereby making the contractor an agent of the principal.  See Baker Bus Serv., Inc. 
v. Keith, 416 A.2d 727, 730-31 n.2 (Me. 1980).  At this stage then, the proper 
inquiry is whether the Lougees have presented prima facie evidence of the agency 
relationship that they have alleged.  To survive summary judgment on this claim, 
the Lougees must present evidence that (1) Safeguard was authorized to act for 
CitiMortgage, (2) Safeguard consented to so act, and (3) there existed an 
understanding that CitiMortgage was to exert control over Safeguard’s actions.  
See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Koshy, 2010 ME 44, ¶ 16, 995 A.2d 651. 
[¶14]  The summary judgment record demonstrates that the Lougees did 
present admissible evidence to satisfy each element of agency.  First, the record 
shows that Safeguard is authorized to inspect and secure foreclosed homes on 
behalf of CitiMortgage per their Master Services Agreement.  Second, again per 
the Master Services Agreement, the record shows that Safeguard has consented to 
undertake this work.  Finally, the record shows that CitiMortgage exerts some level 
of control over how Safeguard is to carry out the work delegated to it.  This is 
work that CitiMortgage alone is authorized to do pursuant to the mortgage 
agreement on the North Road property.  The mortgage states that if the mortgagee 
abandons the property, “Lender may do and pay for whatever is necessary to 
protect the value of the Property and the Lender’s right in the Property,” which 
specifically includes securing the property.  The Master Services Agreement 
 
10 
describes specific tasks that Safeguard or its subcontractors must perform, and 
CitiMortgage supervises Safeguard’s work and the quality of its work through a 
“Score Cards” system, work updates, and memos. 
[¶15]  The Lougees have met their burden of proffering prima facie evidence 
that Safeguard was acting as CitiMortgage’s agent.  The undisputed facts do not 
establish that Safeguard was an independent contractor so removed from 
CitiMortgage’s control as to entitle CitiMortgage to summary judgment on this 
issue.  Rather, they support competing inferences as to the extent of 
CitiMortgage’s control of Safeguard, which preclude the entry of a summary 
judgment in either party’s favor.  See F.R. Carroll, Inc. v. TD Bank, N.A., 
2010 ME 115, ¶ 8, 8 A.3d 646. 
C. 
Invasion of Privacy 
[¶16]  To survive summary judgment on this claim, the Lougees must 
present evidence of an (1) intentional, (2) physical intrusion (3) upon premises 
occupied privately by a plaintiff for purposes of seclusion, and (4) the intrusion 
must be highly offensive to a reasonable person.  Nelson v. Me. Times, 373 A.2d 
1221, 1223 (Me. 1977) (interpreting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B 
(1977)).  The parties have agreed that the Conservancy cannot maintain a claim for 
invasion of privacy, so the Lougees attempt to pursue it as individual beneficiaries 
of the trust.   
 
11 
[¶17]  Safeguard and D&S argue that the individual Lougees cannot 
maintain this claim because they do not “occupy” the Homestead in a manner that 
would give rise to an expectation of privacy.  As a matter of law, however, the 
Lougees hold equitable title to the Conservancy property as beneficiaries of the 
trust.  See Rose v. Osborne, 133 Me. 497, 501, 180 A. 315 (1935) (stating that a 
duly-executed voluntary trust confers “actual, beneficial or equitable title” to the 
beneficiary) (quotation marks omitted); Norway Sav. Bank v. Merriam, 88 Me. 
146, 150, 33 A. 840 (1895) (“The creation of a trust is but the gift of the equitable 
interest.”); see generally 5 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property ¶ 513[3] 
(Michael A. Wolf, ed., 2000).  Equitable title confers to the Lougees an ownership 
interest in any property owned by the trust.  See 2 Austin W. Scott & William F. 
Fratcher, Scott on Trusts § 130 (4th ed. 1987) (“The beneficiary of a trust has a 
property interest in the subject matter of the trust.  He has a form of ownership.”); 
see also Colquhoun v. Webber, 684 A.2d 405, 409-10 (Me. 1996) (discussing and 
adopting comment C to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 624 (1977), which notes 
that equitable interests are legally-protected interests in land).  Although the parties 
have disputed the nature of the Lougees’ ownership interests in the Conservancy 
property, it is undisputed that the trust holds title to the Homestead, barn, and the 
property stored therein, with the exceptions of the few items owned by the 
individual Lougees in their personal capacities.   
 
12 
[¶18]  Therefore, the Lougees have an ownership interest in the buildings 
and their contents, and this claim does not fail merely because none of the 
individual Lougees lived in the Homestead.  An individual is not required to own 
or live on a premises to be considered its “occupant” or to maintain an expectation 
of privacy within it.  See Knight v. Penobscot Bay Med. Ctr., 420 A.2d 915, 917-18 
(Me. 1980) (discussing a mother’s personal privacy interest in a delivery room at a 
hospital); Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt, 365 A.2d 792, 795 (Me. 1976) (holding 
that it is a violation of privacy to photograph a patient in his hospital room without 
his consent); see also, e.g., United States v. Lyons, 898 F.2d 210, 212-13 
(1st Cir. 1990) (noting that, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, placing items 
in a storage unit manifests a desire to keep them from the public, which gives rise 
to an expectation of privacy).  To hold otherwise would negate the valid 
expectation of privacy that renters have in their rental homes, or that property 
owners maintain in seasonal residences even when they are not currently living in 
them.  In these situations, the physical occupancy necessary to maintain a claim for 
invasion of privacy can be established by virtue of private, personal possessions 
rather than physical presence because the owner maintains a personal privacy 
interest in the possessions even when not physically present.  See Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 652B cmt. b (1977) (stating that “investigation or examination 
into [an individual’s] private concerns, as by opening his private and personal mail, 
 
13 
searching his safe or his wallet, [or] examining his private bank account” 
constitutes an invasion of privacy).  This is the type of occupancy the Lougees 
have established in the Homestead and barn. 
 [¶19]  The remaining question is whether D&S acted with the requisite 
intent.  In the context of a claim for invasion of privacy, “the defendant must 
intend as the result of his conduct that there be an intrusion upon another’s solitude 
or seclusion.”  Knight, 420 A.2d at 918.  The Lougees and D&S agree that D&S 
understood Safeguard to have confirmed that the photograph D&S submitted of the 
Homestead was of the correct house.  Despite that accepted fact, the record also 
shows that Safeguard advised D&S that it could not determine which house was 
the correct one.  Whether D&S believed that it was entering the correct house is a 
dispute of material fact related to the element of intentionality that must be 
determined by the fact-finder.  However, even if that dispute were resolved in 
favor of the Lougees and it was established that D&S was uncertain that it was 
entering the correct house, that finding would not be sufficient to allow a 
fact-finder to determine that D&S entered the Homestead intending to intrude on 
anyone’s privacy.  Even if D&S was uncertain as to whether it was entering the 
correct house, its intention was to enter the correct house.  D&S might have been 
negligent or even reckless, but there is no evidence to support a finding of 
intentionality. 
 
14 
[¶20]  Therefore, summary judgment was proper because the Lougees failed 
to establish a prima facie case as to the intentionality element of this claim.   
D. 
Conversion 
[¶21]  To survive summary judgment on this claim, the Lougees must 
present evidence of a property interest in and the right to possession of the goods at 
the time of the alleged conversion.2  See Withers v. Hackett, 1998 ME 164, ¶ 7, 
714 A.2d 798.  The Lougees have established a prima facie case of both an interest 
in and a right to the goods.  However, as a matter of law, the facts of this case do 
not establish an interference with the Lougees’ interests and rights that is serious 
enough to constitute conversion. 
[¶22]  The crux of a claim for conversion is that the plaintiff’s interest in and 
right to his own property have been, in fact, seriously interfered with.  
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A (1965); Withers, 1998 ME 164, ¶ 7, 
714 A.2d 798; see also Ne. Bank of Lewiston & Auburn v. Murphy, 512 A.2d 344, 
347 (Me. 1986) (stating that conversion requires an intent to exercise dominion 
that “in fact” seriously interferes with the owner’s rights).  This is necessarily a 
fact-specific inquiry and a question of degree.  See Simmons, Zillman & Gregory, 
Maine Tort Law §§ 6.05-6.06 at 6-13, 6-16 to 6-18 (2004 ed.); W. Page Keeton, 
                                         
  2  The parties do not assert that D&S, Safeguard, or CitiMortgage had rightful possession of the goods, 
so the Lougees are not required to show that they made a demand for return of the goods.  See Withers v. 
Hackett, 1998 ME 164, ¶ 7, 714 A.2d 798 (stating that “the person with the right to possession need only 
make a demand if the holder took the property rightfully”). 
 
15 
et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 15 (5th ed. 1984).  To determine 
whether an interference is sufficiently serious as to amount to conversion, the court 
should consider the extent and duration of the actor’s exercise of dominion or 
control; the actor’s good faith; the extent and duration of the resulting interference 
with the other’s right to control; the harm done; and the inconvenience and expense 
caused to the owner.  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A; W. Page Keeton, 
et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 15.  Simply put, conversion 
requires an actual interference with the property owner’s rights beyond a brief and 
ultimately-harmless withholding.  See generally W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser 
and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 15 (distinguishing conversion from trespass 
based on the seriousness of the interference with the owner’s rights). 
[¶23]  Here, the undisputed facts establish that D&S acted in good faith by 
intending to secure a property that it had been instructed and authorized to secure.  
It provided the access code to the lockbox immediately upon notification of the 
error.  Jim was able to gain entry to the Homestead within a matter of hours.  
Cf. Reardon v. Lovely Dev., Inc., 2004 ME 74, ¶¶ 3, 9, 852 A.2d 66 (stating that 
the plaintiff is entitled to damages for conversion for the eight months he was 
deprived of the use of his property); Chiappetta v. LeBlond, 505 A.2d 783, 784-86 
(Me. 1986) (vacating a directed verdict against the plaintiff on a claim for 
conversion where the plaintiff was deprived of the use of his property for thirteen 
 
16 
months); Donnell v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., 109 Me. 500, 503-04, 84 A. 1002 
(1912) (noting that interfering with the plaintiff’s rights for only “a few minutes” 
could amount to conversion where entry is immediately necessary, as in the case of 
a fire).  The damage alleged is minimal and reparable.  Cf. Mitchell v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 2011 ME 133, ¶¶ 2, 19-20, 36 A.3d 876 (holding that a claim for conversion 
could stand where the plaintiff’s lobster traps were “destroyed” and “rendered 
useless”); Withers, 1998 ME 164, ¶ 8, 714 A.2d 798 (upholding a jury’s verdict 
against a defendant on a claim of conversion because the jury could have found 
that the plaintiff’s property was “lost or ruined”).   
[¶24]  This does not constitute conversion.  See W. Page Keeton, et al., 
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 15 (stating that conversion would not 
apply where the “[i]ntention [is] good, the duration brief, the event harmless”).  
Therefore, the claim for conversion must fail as to both the individual Lougees and 
the Conservancy. 
E. 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
[¶25]  To survive summary judgment on this claim, the Lougees must 
present evidence that (1) “the defendant intentionally or recklessly inflicted severe 
emotional distress or was certain or substantially certain that such distress would 
result from the defendant’s conduct”; (2) “the conduct was so extreme and 
outrageous as to exceed all possible bounds of decency and must be regarded as 
 
17 
atrocious, utterly intolerable in a civilized community”; (3) “the actions of the 
defendant caused the plaintiff’s emotional distress”; and (4) “the emotional distress 
suffered by the plaintiff was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected 
to endure it.”  Lyman v. Huber, 2010 ME 139, ¶¶ 16, 21-23, 10 A.3d 707 
(alterations omitted).  
[¶26]  Contrary to the Lougees’ contention, in the context of summary 
judgment on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, “it is for the 
court to determine in the first instance whether the defendant’s conduct may 
reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous to permit recovery.”  
Champagne v. Mid-Me. Med. Ctr., 1998 ME 87, ¶ 16, 711 A.2d 842 (quotation 
marks omitted).  It was within the court’s discretion to decide whether the conduct 
here was so atrocious and intolerable as to permit recovery on this claim, and we 
find no error in the court’s determination.  See id.  Although Jim found the incident 
more distressing than Eleanor or David, to establish liability the Lougees must 
show that the distress caused would be unbearably severe to an ordinarily-sensitive 
plaintiff.  See Lyman, 2010 ME 139, ¶ 21, 10 A.3d 707 (“The fourth element of the 
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress imposes an objective standard of 
proof.”); Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Me., Inc., 534 A.2d 1282, 1284-85 & 
n.8 (Me. 1987) (noting that the “reasonable person” in the context of determining 
the severity of emotional distress is a normally-constituted, ordinarily-sensitive 
 
18 
plaintiff).  Eleanor and David experienced general feelings of upset and defeat that, 
as a matter of law, are not substantial enough to qualify as emotional distress “so 
severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.”  See Schelling v. 
Lindell, 2008 ME 59, ¶¶ 25-26, 942 A.2d 1226.  Therefore, CitiMortgage, 
Safeguard, and D&S are entitled to summary judgment because the Lougees have 
failed to establish a prima facie case as to each element of this claim. 
F. 
Punitive Damages 
[¶27]  To survive summary judgment on this claim the Lougees must present 
evidence that D&S acted with malice or implied malice.  See Shrader-Miller v. 
Miller, 2004 ME 117, ¶ 20, 855 A.2d 1139; Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 
1361 (Me. 1985).  Malice can be implied where the defendant’s deliberate conduct 
is sufficiently “outrageous,” but it cannot be implied “by the defendant’s mere 
reckless disregard of the circumstances.”  Tuttle, 494 A.2d at 1361.   
[¶28]  The Lougees have failed to offer prima facie evidence that the 
behavior here was deliberate and outrageous, rather than reckless.  See id. at 
1361-62.  The Lougees argue that malice can be implied from “the disturbing 
pattern of outrageous and intolerable business practices” that led to the incident 
here.  However, they have failed to present facts establishing a pattern of behavior 
or a systematic disregard for property.  There is nothing in the summary judgment 
record to suggest that D&S, Safeguard, or CitiMortgage secured wrong properties 
 
19 
as a matter of course.  See Dyer v. Dep’t of Transp., 2008 ME 106, ¶ 14, 951 A.2d 
821 (stating that summary judgment on issues of intent is appropriate “if the 
non-moving party rests merely upon conclusory allegations . . . and unsupported 
speculation” (quotation marks omitted)).   
G. 
Negligence 
[¶29]  To survive summary judgment on this claim the Lougees must present 
evidence of (1) a duty owed, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) an injury that is 
proximately caused by a breach of that duty.  Davis v. Dionne, 2011 ME 90, ¶ 8, 
26 A.3d 801. 
[¶30]  CitiMortgage, Safeguard, and D&S owed both the Conservancy, as 
legal title holder, and the Lougees, as the equitable title holders, a duty to act with 
care when identifying and securing mortgaged property in order to avoid securing 
or damaging property that they have no legal right to enter.  See 
Alexander v. Mitchell, 2007 ME 108, ¶ 15, 930 A.2d 1016 (“In a tort analysis, the 
duty is always the same—to conform to the legal standard of reasonable conduct in 
the light of the apparent risk.” (quotation marks omitted)); Mastriano v. Blyer, 
2001 ME 134, ¶ 12, 779 A.2d 951 (naming “otherwise conduct[ing] ourselves or 
our business in ways that do not cause injury to others” as a commonly-recognized 
duty).  There is prima facie evidence that the duty was breached, and that the 
Lougees have suffered harm as a result.   
 
20 
[¶31]  Apparently, the court granted summary judgment on the basis that 
negligence would not entitle the Lougees to any damages in addition to those 
recoverable pursuant to trespass.  However, the Lougees have established a prima 
facie case for each element of negligence.  Their negligence claim is viable and 
they could prevail and recover on negligence alone, even if their trespass claims 
fail.  See State v. Dodge, 397 A.2d 588, 591 (Me. 1979) (noting that, pursuant to 
M.R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2), “any careful civil lawyer would include a negligence claim as 
well as one for an intentional tort”).  The damages to which the Lougees could be 
entitled on this claim is a matter for trial, to be decided in tandem with the damages 
to which they could be entitled for their claims of trespass.  Because the Lougees 
have presented prima facie evidence of negligence, this claim must survive 
summary judgment.    
H. 
Conclusion 
 
[¶32]  The Lougees, as trustees or beneficiaries, have presented prima facie 
evidence of negligence such that the claim must survive summary judgment.  They 
have also presented prima facie evidence that Safeguard was acting as an agent of 
CitiMortgage, and therefore the negligence claim survives as to all three 
defendants.  Because the Lougees have not presented prima facie evidence of 
invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or punitive 
damages, and because their conversion claim fails as a matter of law, summary 
 
21 
judgment on those claims was proper. 
The entry is: 
Judgment vacated as to the Lougees’ claim of 
negligence against CitiMortgage, Safeguard, and 
D&S.  Judgment affirmed as to invasion of 
privacy, conversion, intentional infliction of 
emotional 
distress, 
and 
punitive 
damages.  
Remanded to the Superior Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
Michael A. Cunniff, Esq., and Shaun M. Garry, Esq., McCloskey, Mina & 
Cunniff, LLC, Portland, for appellants The Lougee Conservancy, Eleanor 
Lougee Chapin, David Lougee, and Arther James Lougee 
 
Mark E. Porada, Esq., Pierce Atwood LLP, Portland, for appellees Shelley 
Alley and David Alley 
 
Christopher P. Silva, Esq., Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge LLP, Boston, 
Massachusetts, for appellee Citimortgage, Inc. 
 
 
At oral argument: 
 
Michael A. Cunniff, Esq., for appellants The Lougee Conservancy, Eleanor 
Lougee Chapin, David Lougee, and Arther James Lougee 
 
Mark E. Porada, Esq., for appellees Shelley Alley and David Alley 
 
Christopher P. Silva, Esq., for appellee Citimortgage, Inc. 
 
 
York County Superior Court docket number RE-2009-81 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY