Title: State v. Gibbons

State: utah

Issuer: Utah Supreme Court

Document:

779 P.2d 1133 (1989) STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Bruce GIBBONS, Defendant and Appellant. No. 860405. Supreme Court of Utah. September 13, 1989. *1134 R. Paul Van Dam, Charlene Barlow, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee. Hans M. Scheffler, Ronald J. Yengich, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant. STEWART, Justice: Bruce Gibbons was charged with two counts of sexual abuse of a child and one count of sodomy on a child. Sexual abuse of a child is a second degree felony. Sodomy on a child is a first degree felony, subject to a minimum mandatory sentence of five, ten, or fifteen years' imprisonment. Initially, Gibbons had pleaded guilty to all three counts and was sentenced to prison for two terms of one to fifteen years for sexual abuse of a child and a minimum mandatory term of fifteen years to life for sodomy on a child, all terms to run consecutively. He then appealed, asserting error by the trial court in failing to determine whether his guilty pleas were made knowingly and voluntarily. He also attacked the constitutionality of Utah's minimum mandatory sentencing provisions. This Court held that the trial judge, by failing to inform Gibbons of the "elements of the crimes charged and the relationship of the law to the facts," failed to comply with standards of due process and Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987). See Utah R.Crim.P. 11(e). See also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1712-13, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274, 279-80 (1969). We remanded the case to the trial court to allow Gibbons to withdraw his guilty pleas but retained jurisdiction for any necessary future action on a remaining issue. Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1310, 1314. Gibbons then withdrew his guilty plea but stood trial. At the conclusion of trial, the jury was unable to reach a verdict. Prior to retrial, Gibbons once again pleaded guilty to all three counts pursuant to a plea bargain. At the sentencing hearing before Judge Gordon J. Low, Gibbons testified in mitigation and asked the court to notice the victim's trial testimony. In addition, two witnesses testified as to Gibbons' sincere desire to change and undergo treatment, and five documents were admitted, all reflecting Gibbons' good behavior since his arrest. The court also referred to a presentence report. As agreed in the plea bargain, the State presented no aggravating circumstances at the sentencing hearing and did not oppose defendant's motion to reduce the offense of sodomy on a child one degree pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (Supp. 1989) so that defendant would no longer be subject to a minimum mandatory prison sentence. The trial court rejected defendant's motion to be sentenced a degree lower. The court sentenced Gibbons to two terms of one to fifteen years for the two counts of sexual abuse of a child and one minimum mandatory term of ten years to life for the offense of sodomy on a child, all three sentences to run concurrently. Gibbons has again appealed and raises two issues in addition to the retained constitutional question of whether the minimum mandatory provisions are unconstitutionally vague. He contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying him probation under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406.5 (Supp. 1989). He also asserts *1135 that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to the minimum mandatory term of ten years, the term of middle severity, rather than the lesser term of five years. We turn first to the claim that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant probation. An appellate court will set aside a sentence imposed by the trial court if the sentence represents an abuse of discretion, State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978), if the trial judge fails to consider all legally relevant factors, State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1989), or if the sentence imposed exceeds the limits prescribed by law. State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 1986); State v. Jolivet, 712 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1986); State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210, 1219 (Utah 1984); State v. Harris, 585 P.2d 450, 453 (Utah 1978). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Gibbons probation. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406.5(2) (Supp. 1989) provides that probation may be granted to a defendant convicted of sodomy on a child if the defendant is the victim's parent, stepparent, adoptive parent, or legal guardian who has lived in the household in the role of a parent for one year and The "circumstances enumerated in Subsections (1)(a) through (l)" are: The trial court examined each of the twelve requirements and discussed defendant's compliance. The court's decision to deny probation was not based on defendant's failure to qualify under the twelve factors listed above. Rather, the trial court held that "the circumstances of the offense, including the nature, frequency, and duration of the conduct," were of controlling importance. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406.5(2) (Supp. 1989). The trial judge was influenced by the nature, frequency, and duration of the sexual abuse as well as other circumstances, such as the young age of the victim. After considering those factors, the trial court decided against granting probation. Quite clearly, the court's decision was based on a careful consideration of relevant legal factors. In sum, the trial court's decision against probation does not constitute an abuse of discretion. Gibbons argues that the trial court mistakenly believed that it lacked the discretion to grant probation under any circumstances. Specifically, he contends that the trial court misinterpreted Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-406 (Supp. 1989), which states: (Emphasis added.) A defendant convicted of a sexual crime against a child can receive probation or reduction of sentence only if he satisfies all the enumerated requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406.5. If a defendant does not meet all the requirements, § 76-3-406 precludes the granting of probation under any other statute. Here, the trial court found that defendant did not meet all the requirements for probation. The trial judge stated: Thereafter, the trial court completed stating the applicable law by quoting the relevant language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406.5 and then stated: The trial court did not misconstrue the law. Gibbons further contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to a ten-year minimum mandatory term. Since only mitigating circumstances were advanced at the sentencing hearing, Gibbons asserts that it was an abuse of discretion to sentence him to the term of middle severity instead of the lesser five-year minimum mandatory term. *1137 Subsections 76-3-201(5)(a), (d), (e), and (6)(b) govern the procedural imposition of the minimum mandatory sentence: (Emphasis added.) State v. Bell, 754 P.2d 55, 60 (Utah 1988), amplified the procedure to be followed in applying § 76-3-201(5) and (6): See also State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 302-03 (Utah 1988). The trial court, in imposing a minimum mandatory sentence, is required by § 76-3-201 and Bell and Schickles to (1) identify the mitigating and aggravating circumstances and (2) state the reasons for whichever minimum mandatory sentence is imposed. Additionally, § 76-3-201(5)(c) states that in determining which term to impose "the court may consider the record in the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, ... statements in aggravation or mitigation submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing." In this case, defendant specifically asked the trial court to consider the child's testimony at trial. The trial court also referred to a psychological evaluation of the victim. All these factors were considered in the trial court's sentencing decision in addition to a presentence report and defendant's proffered mitigating circumstances. Both the presentence report and victim's testimony contained aggravating factors which offset mitigation presented by defendant and justified the ten-year term. The trial court specified the age of the victim, the frequency of the abuse (twice a week), and the duration of the abuse (more than a year) as aggravating factors. The trial court also reviewed the mitigating evidence that defendant had sought and would continue to seek treatment and that defendant did not understand how seriously his actions were condemned by society. The trial court identified and weighed the factors and sentenced defendant to a ten-year minimum mandatory term. This does not, in our view, constitute an abuse of discretion. Lastly, defendant attacks the minimum mandatory sentencing provisions as unconstitutionally vague. This argument was resolved against defendant's position by State v. Bell, 754 P.2d 55 (Utah 1988), and State v. Egbert, 748 P.2d 558 (Utah 1987). Affirmed. HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J., and DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.