Title: Ex parte Demarlos Mentrel Davis. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Demarlos Mentrel Davis v. State of Alabama)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 09/04/2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2009
____________________
1080515
____________________
Ex parte Demarlos Mentrel Davis
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: Demarlos Mentrel Davis
v.
State of Alabama)
(Houston Circuit Court, CC-99-473;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-06-1997)
SMITH, Justice.
Demarlos Mentrel Davis was convicted of attempted first-
degree rape and was sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment.
Davis's conviction occurred at his third trial; his two
earlier trials had resulted in mistrials.  In an unpublished
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memorandum, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Davis's
conviction and sentence.  Davis v. State (No. CR-06-1997, Oct.
24, 2008), ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2008) (table).  We
granted Davis's petition for a writ of certiorari to determine
whether Davis's request for transcripts of his two previous
trials, which was denied, should have been granted. 
Facts and Procedural History
On August 27, 1997, a man entered Andrews Bridal Shop in
Dothan.  After speaking with the sales clerk, A.D., for
several minutes about getting a tuxedo for a wedding, the man
grabbed A.D. from behind and attempted to force her into a
back room of the store. A.D. fought back and eventually freed
herself, ran to the back room, and locked the door, leaving
the man to flee from the front of the store.  The Dothan
Police Department conducted an investigation and collected
items found in the store believed to have been left behind by
the perpetrator.  The Dothan Police Department also conducted
several photographic lineups, but A.D. was unable to identify
the perpetrator.
On 
September 
29, 
1997, 
an 
investigator 
with 
the
Birmingham Police Department contacted Sgt. Buren Wambles of
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the Dothan Police Department and informed him that Davis had
been arrested in Birmingham for first-degree rape and first-
degree sodomy.  Davis had given the Birmingham investigator a
Dothan address.  The Birmingham investigator inquired about
whether Dothan had any unsolved sex crimes. On September 30,
Sgt. Wamble and Sgt. Roy Woodham traveled to Birmingham to
interview Davis.  They returned to Dothan with a photograph of
Davis and presented it to A.D. in a photographic lineup
containing six photographs.  A.D. identified Davis as her
attacker. 
Davis was indicted on March 13, 1998, by the Houston
County grand jury on the charge of attempted first-degree
rape.  His first trial ended in a mistrial on September 16,
1999; his second trial ended in mistrial on May 10, 2001.
James Parkman III represented Davis at both trials.  On
February 6, 2007, Davis, represented by new counsel, requested
a copy of the transcripts of each of his prior trials, stating
that he was indigent and had been granted permission to
proceed in forma pauperis.  The trial court denied Davis's
motion the following day, without a hearing.  A third trial
was held, and on May 23, 2007, the jury found Davis guilty of
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attempted first-degree rape, a violation of § 13A-4-2 and §
13A-6-61, Ala. Code 1975.  Davis was sentenced to 30 years'
imprisonment, pursuant to Alabama's Habitual Felony Offender
Act, § 13A-5-9 et seq., Ala. Code 1975.
Davis appealed his conviction to the Court of Criminal
Appeals, which affirmed his conviction in an unpublished
memorandum.  In his petition to this Court for a writ of
certiorari, Davis argued that the decision of the Court of
Criminal Appeals ignored the United States Supreme Court's
holding in Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 228 (1971),
regarding the circumstances under which an indigent defendant
must be provided with the transcripts of a prior trial that
ended in a mistrial.  Davis also cited the holding in Zeigler
v. State, 426 So. 2d 526, 527 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983), that, in
the absence of a showing by the State that there are adequate
alternatives to the defendant's receiving a copy of the trial
transcript, the trial court must provide an indigent defendant
with a copy of the transcript of the trial.
Discussion
In Britt v. North Carolina, the United States Supreme
Court stated that "there can be no doubt that the State must
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provide an indigent defendant with a transcript of prior
proceedings when that transcript is needed for an effective
defense or appeal."  404 U.S. at 227.  The Court identified
two factors that are relevant to determining an indigent
defendant's need for a free transcript of a previous trial:
"(1) the value of the transcript to the defendant in
connection with the appeal or trial for which it is sought,
and (2) the availability of alternative devices that would
fulfill the same functions as a transcript."  Id.  
The Court of Criminal Appeals held in its unpublished
memorandum that Davis failed to prove either of the factors
identified by the United States Supreme Court in Britt.  Davis
contends that the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals
conflicts 
with 
Britt, 
supra, 
and 
with 
Alabama 
cases
interpreting and applying Britt. 
As to the first factor under Britt, the Court of Criminal
Appeals stated in its unpublished memorandum:
"Davis made broad and vague arguments about the
times of his trials ... stating that his demand for
the transcripts displayed that they were obviously
needed. His statement that 'necessity of transcripts
to an effective defense' should be presumed ... is
speculative and is not sufficient grounds [on which]
to grant relief. Davis failed to show how he was
prejudiced 
by 
not 
having 
the 
prior 
trial
transcripts. ... Davis with no specificity has
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pointed to how his defense was weakened by the
absence of the transcripts. Therefore, this court
affirms the trial court's judgment."
In Britt, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court's judgment denying an indigent defendant's motion
for a free transcript of his prior trial, which had ended in
a mistrial.  However, the Court's decision rested on the
second factor of the analysis for determining need, not the
first factor regarding the value of the transcript to the
defendant.  In support of its holding, the Court stated:
"[T]here would be serious doubts about the decision
below if it rested on petitioner's failure to
specify how the transcript might have been useful to
him. Our cases have consistently recognized the
value to a defendant of a transcript of prior
proceedings, without requiring a showing of need
tailored to the facts of the particular case. ...
Even in the absence of specific allegations it can
ordinarily be assumed that a transcript of a prior
mistrial would be valuable to the defendant in at
least two ways: as a discovery device in preparation
for trial, and as a tool at the trial itself for the
impeachment of prosecution witnesses." 
404 U.S. at 228 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).  This
language from Britt indicates that a defendant ordinarily does
not have to demonstrate with specificity that a transcript of
a prior proceeding is valuable to his or her defense. 
In support of its holding that Davis was required to
demonstrate specifically how the requested transcripts would
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7
assist his defense, the Court of Criminal Appeals in its
unpublished memorandum cites McKinney v. State, 665 So. 2d 209
(Ala. Crim. App. 1995).  In McKinney, the Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendant's
motion for a free transcript of his juvenile transfer hearing,
stating: 
"[T]he appellant made no argument to the trial court
as to how the transcript of the juvenile proceedings
would assist his defense in his criminal trial. Nor
has the appellant, on appeal, made any showing of
how his defense was weakened due to the absence of
a transcript of the juvenile proceedings."
665 So. 2d at 211.  The Court of Criminal Appeals apparently
concluded that this statement from McKinney suggests that the
defendant has the burden of affirmatively demonstrating that
his request for a transcript of a prior proceeding satisfies
the first factor under Britt.  McKinney, however, turned on
circumstances different from those in Davis's case.  
In McKinney, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a
showing of how the requested transcript would assist the
defendant was necessary because the requested transcript was
of a prior juvenile proceeding.  Specifically, the court
stated:
"Although Britt provides that the value to the
defense of a transcript of prior proceedings may
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8
usually be presumed, this court has not extended the
rationale of Britt so far as to recognize the value
that a transcript of proceedings in juvenile court
may have in every case where a defendant is
transferred to circuit court for trial as an adult."
665 So. 2d at 211.  Thus, although the McKinney court
recognized the general presumption from Britt stated above
regarding the value to a defendant of a transcript of a prior
trial that ended in a mistrial, the court in McKinney declined
to extend that presumption to requests for transcripts of a
prior juvenile transfer hearing.  The court cited, in support
of its decision, precedent establishing that "[a]n indigent
defendant is not entitled to a free transcript of the
testimony taken at his preliminary hearing," 665 So. 2d at 211
(citing Leonard v. State, 369 So. 2d 873, 875 (Ala. Crim. App.
1979)), and reasoned that "[a] juvenile transfer hearing is in
the nature of a preliminary hearing," 665 So. 2d at 211
(citing O.M. v. State, 595 So. 2d 514, 517 (Ala. Crim. App.
1991)).  The McKinney court explained the difference between
a transcript of a defendant's earlier mistrial, as in Britt,
and a transcript of a juvenile proceeding, as in McKinney:
"It would set a dangerous precedent to hold, based
on nothing more than a defendant's bare assertion of
need, that a transcript of proceedings in juvenile
court is always necessary to a defense in a criminal
trial, particularly in light of the fact that the
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9
record of the proceedings in juvenile court is
required to be preserved only until the time for
appeal has expired."
665 So. 2d at 211.  Finally, the McKinney court noted that
McKinney 
did 
not 
appeal 
the 
juvenile 
court's 
order
transferring him to the circuit court to be tried as an adult.
McKinney, 665 So. 2d at 210. 
Thus, McKinney held that because the presumption in Britt
regarding the value to a defendant of a transcript of a prior
trial did not apply to a defendant's request for a transcript
of his earlier juvenile transfer hearing, the defendant was
required to make a specific showing of his need for a
transcript of a juvenile transfer hearing.  That holding in
McKinney, however, has no application to Davis's request in
the present case for the transcripts of his earlier mistrials.
In his brief to the Court of Criminal Appeals and his
brief to this Court, Davis cites Grayson v. State, 824 So. 2d
804 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999), in support of his argument that a
showing of a defendant's need for a transcript of an earlier
proceeding may be satisfied without a specific showing of that
need.  The defendant in Grayson was convicted of capital
murder.  He argued on appeal that the trial court committed
reversible error by refusing to supply defense counsel with
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10
copies of the transcripts from the trials of his codefendants.
Rejecting his argument, the court stated:
"'"We 
do 
not 
believe 
a 
contention 
that 
the
transcript of the trial of a third person is needed
before an effective defense can be rejected out of
hand merely by saying that no case has so held.
Instead, the two-pronged test of necessity set forth
in Britt must be applied to the facts. However, the
first prong of the test, the value to the defendant,
cannot be assumed as it was in Britt."'"
Grayson, 824 So. 2d at 825 (quoting People v. Brown, 126 Mich.
App. 763, 768, 337 N.W.2d 915, 918 (1983), quoting in turn
State v. Razinha, 123 Ariz. 355, 358, 599 P.2d 808, 811 (Ct.
App. 1979)).  The Grayson court, however, acknowledged that
although the first prong of the necessity test would not be
presumed when the requested transcript was the transcript of
the trial of a codefendant, the "value of the transcript to
the defendant" would be presumed in situations where the
indigent defendant requested transcripts of his own prior
mistrial, as in Britt. 
The State cites Quick v. State, 825 So. 2d 246 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2001), as an example of a case where, it says, a
defendant "met his burden of showing prejudice."  In Quick,
the defendant's first capital-murder trial ended in a
mistrial.  Before his second trial, the indigent defendant
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11
requested a free copy of the transcript of his mistrial.  The
defendant's motion for a free trial transcript was denied, and
the defendant was convicted of capital murder.  At the second
trial, counsel for the defendant attempted to use his notes
and memory from the previous trial to impeach witnesses
concerning their testimony at the previous trial, but each
time he attempted to do so, the trial court refused to permit
it, stating:
"'[T]here may be one in a million [occasions] where
it becomes necessary [to impeach a witness pursuant
to prior testimony], but you may do it from a
transcript. But if it is done from your notes or
from your recollection, then in the Court's opinion
and in the Court's finding, then you are pitting
your memory against the witness's .... He can't pit
his notes-–unless they are notes taken before this
jury. This jury, not another jury or reporter,
unless it is an official transcript.'"
Quick, 825 So. 2d at 254 (quoting the trial court).  On
appeal, the defendant argued that his constitutional rights
had been violated because, he said, as an indigent defendant,
he should have been provided a free transcript of his first
trial.  Citing Britt, the court in Quick stated that "'"the
availability of alternative devices that would fulfill the
same functions as a transcript" ... provides an adequate
substitute for a transcript in many cases.'"  Quick, 825 So.
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2d at 261 (quoting Nickerson v. State, 523 So. 2d 504, 506
(Ala. Crim. App. 1987)).  However, the court went on to say:
"[I]n the present case, the trial court refused to
allow defense counsel to use his notes from the
prior trial or his memory in order to impeach the
witnesses. 
Thus, 
there 
were 
no 
alternatives
available to the appellant. 
".... 
"... [B]ecause the appellant, as an indigent,
was entitled to the transcript of his prior mistrial
of this case, or the use of an adequate alternative,
... the judgment is due to be reversed and the cause
remanded for a new trial." 
825 So. 2d at 261-62. 
The decision in Quick is not, however, inconsistent with
the general rule stated in Britt that the "value of the
transcript to the defendant" may ordinarily be presumed.
Rather, in Quick, the defendant demonstrated that the trial
court 
had 
prevented 
him 
from 
using 
other 
available
alternatives to the requested transcript.
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, under Britt the
value to the defendant of a requested transcript ordinarily
may be presumed.  Thus, an indigent defendant requesting a
transcript of a prior mistrial generally is not required to
specify how the trial transcript would be useful to the
defendant.  The State has not demonstrated that the
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presumption outlined in Britt should not apply here.
Therefore, in Davis's case, the first factor under Britt has
been satisfied.
The second factor identified in Britt relevant to the
determination of the defendant's need for a free transcript is
the availability of alternative devices that would fulfill the
same functions as the transcript.  In McKinney, the Court of
Criminal Appeals listed several alternatives available to the
defendant that would have served the same function as the
requested trial transcript, including defense counsel's
recollections, access to the court reporter's notes, and
calling the court reporter from the previous trial to testify
as to what happened at the previous trial.  McKinney, 665 So.
2d at 210.  Citing McKinney, the Court of Criminal Appeals in
its unpublished memorandum in the present case held that,
because Davis did not attempt to contact his former attorney
or the court reporter from the two previous mistrials, he did
not "avail himself of adequate existing alternatives to
support his defense" and thus was not entitled to a free trial
transcript.  
Davis contends, however, that the State has the burden of
proving the existence of adequate alternatives and that the
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14
alternatives identified by the Court of Criminal Appeals here
were not adequate.  He argues, therefore, that the State has
not met its burden of proving that adequate alternatives to
the trial transcripts exist.  We agree.
In Britt, the United States Supreme Court stated:  "A
defendant who claims the right to a free transcript does not,
under our cases, bear the burden of proving inadequate such
alternatives as may be suggested by the State or conjured up
by a court in hindsight."  Britt, 404 U.S. at 230.  Further,
in Zeigler, supra, the Court of Criminal Appeals recognized
that a defendant does not have the burden of proving that
there were no adequate alternatives to the transcripts of his
two prior trials available to him.
In Zeigler, the indigent defendant sought to have his
second-degree-forgery conviction overturned.  436 So. 2d at
526.  The defendant's first two trials had resulted in
mistrials, and his conviction was the result of a third trial.
Consistent with Britt, the court in Zeigler recognized that
the State has the burden of showing that an indigent defendant
had adequate alternatives to the trial transcript:
"In view of the holding in Britt v. North
Carolina, supra, and in the absence of some showing
by 
the 
State 
that 
there 
[were] 
available
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'alternative devices that would fulfill the same
functions as a transcript' the trial court was
obligated 
to 
provide 
a 
transcript 
of 
those
proceedings."
426 So. 2d at 527 (emphasis added). 
Here, the Court of Criminal Appeals improperly shifted
the burden to Davis to prove that he had availed himself of
all adequate alternatives before he was entitled to free
transcripts of his prior trials.  Under both Britt and
Zeigler, the burden is on the State to show that the defendant
had 
adequate 
alternatives to the requested transcript
available.  Absent such a showing by the State, an indigent
defendant is entitled to receive the requested trial
transcripts.
In the present case, Davis's first mistrial took place
nearly eight years before the trial in which he was convicted,
and his second mistrial occurred almost six years before his
conviction.  Davis's attorney at his third trial was not the
attorney who had represented him at his two mistrials.
Further, the judge presiding over Davis's first trial was not
the same judge who presided over Davis's second and third
trials. 
In Britt, the time between the mistrial and the second
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16
trial was only a month, and the evidence indicated that the
court reporter for the mistrial was a good friend of all the
local attorneys and would have at any time before the second
trial provided defendant's counsel with notes from the
mistrial. Britt, 404 U.S. at 229.  Because the defendant
conceded that he "could have obtained from the court reporter
far more assistance than that available to the ordinary
defendant" and thus had an informal alternative available to
him that was "substantially equivalent to a transcript," the
Court in Britt found that the trial court did not err in
denying the defendant's motion for a free transcript of his
earlier trial. However, the Court made it clear that its
holding applied only "in the narrow circumstances of this
case" in which the defendant conceded that he had an adequate
alternative to the trial transcript.  404 U.S. at 227.  Here,
Davis has not conceded or suggested that he had any
alternatives available to him that would have served the same
function as the requested transcripts.
In its brief to this Court, the State cites the following
from Nickerson v. State, supra: 
"Although 'the State must provide an indigent
defendant with a transcript of prior proceedings
when that transcript is needed for an effective
1080515
17
defense or appeal,' ... 'the availability of
alternative devices that would fulfill the same
functions as a transcript' ... provides an adequate
substitute for a transcript in many cases."
523 So. 2d at 506 (quoting Britt, 404 U.S. at 227).  The State
argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals listed several
alternatives in its unpublished memorandum of which Davis did
not avail himself that would have provided a substitute for
the transcripts.  However, a defendant does not have to prove
inadequate "such alternatives as may be suggested by the State
or conjured up by a court in hindsight."  Britt, 404 U.S. at
230.  Further, a review of Nickerson demonstrates that Davis
did not have available to him the same alternatives as did the
defendant in Nickerson.  There, the indigent defendant claimed
that the trial court erred in refusing to provide him with a
free transcript of his pretrial suppression hearings.  523 So.
2d at 506.  In finding that the defendant had adequate
alternatives available to him, the Court of Criminal Appeals
stated:
"The suppression hearings in the present case, like
the prior proceedings in Britt v. North Carolina,
were conducted by the same judge and with the same
defense counsel as those who appeared at trial,
which took place within three months of the pre-
trial suppression hearings."
523 So. 2d at 506.  Here, however, not only did Davis's third
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trial occur several years after his first and second trials,
but it is also undisputed that Davis's attorney at his third
trial was not the same attorney who represented him at his
first two trials.  The State cites the following statement
from the Court of Criminal Appeals' unpublished memorandum:
"There is nothing in the record to demonstrate that Davis's
trial counsel, Attorney [Billy J.] Sheffield [II], was
prevented from, or even attempted to contact Attorney James
Parkman III to obtain his notes and recollections of the first
two trials."  However, there likewise is nothing in the record
indicating that an attempt by Sheffield to obtain Parkman's
notes and recollections would have resulted in an adequate
alternative to the requested transcripts.  Under the
authorities 
discussed, 
the 
State 
had 
the 
burden 
of
demonstrating the existence of an adequate alternative, and
the State did not, under the circumstances of this case, meet
its burden. 
Accordingly, the presumption of Britt as to the value of
a trial transcript to an indigent defendant applies here, and
because the State did not demonstrate that Davis had available
adequate alternatives that would serve the same function as
1080515
Justice Shaw was a member of the Court of Criminal
*
Appeals when that court considered this case.
19
the transcripts of his prior two trials, the second factor in
Britt relevant to the determination of need is satisfied.
Thus, Davis was entitled to a free transcript of his earlier
trials. 
Conclusion
The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is
reversed, and the cause is remanded for that court to remand
the cause to the trial court for a new trial. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Bolin, Parker,
and Murdock, JJ., concur.  
Shaw, J., recuses himself.*