Title: Boulden v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Sheila Boulden v. State of Maryland, No. 49, September Term 2009. 
CRIMINAL LAW – WAIVER OF RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL – MARYLAND RULE 4-246
– REQUIREMENT IN RULE THAT WAIVER OF RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL BE PLACED
ON THE RECORD PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF TRIAL IS WAIVED FOR
PURPOSES OF APPEAL WHERE DEFENDANT FAILS TO OBJECT WHEN WAIVER
IS CONDUCTED AT THE CLOSE OF THE STATE’S CASE-IN-CHIEF
CRIMINAL LAW – HARMLESS ERROR – WAIVER OF RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL –
MARYLAND RULE 4-246 – WHERE WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL IS OTHERWISE
VALID, A WAIVER PLACED ON THE RECORD MID-TRIAL IS HARMLESS ERROR
Circuit Court for Cecil County 
Case No. 07-K-05-001096
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 49
September Term, 2009
                                                                             
SHEILA BOULDEN
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
                                                                             
 
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
JJ.
                                                                             
Opinion by Harrell, J.
Bell, C.J., and Greene, J., dissent
                                                                             
Filed:   May 14, 2010
We consider here whether a defendant in a criminal case may waive effectively his
or her right to a trial by jury after the commencement of the trial, in this case, at the close of
the State’s case-in-chief.  Petitioner, Sheila Boulden, was charged in the Circuit Court for
Cecil County with Second Degree Child Abuse and Second Degree Assault.  A court trial,
at which Boulden was represented by counsel, commenced on 5 July 2006.  The State rested
at the end of the day’s proceedings. The next morning, the prosecutor observed to the trial
court that Petitioner’s waiver of her right to a jury trial had not been placed on the record as
yet.  This revelation elicited no objection or motion for mistrial from the defense.  The trial
court conducted a waiver colloquy in which Petitioner stated that she understood the nature
of a jury trial, knew she had a constitutional right to a jury trial, and that she wished to waive
that right.  After the colloquy and acceptance of the jury waiver, the defense presented its
case.  The court found Petitioner guilty of both counts.  She appealed to the Court of Special
Appeals challenging, for the first time, the efficacy of her jury trial waiver.  Our intermediate
appellate court colleagues affirmed in an unreported opinion.  We granted Boulden’s petition
for writ of certiorari, 409 Md. 44, 972 A.2d 859 (2009).  We shall affirm.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A Cecil County grand jury indicted Boulden on 20 September 2005 on single counts
of child abuse and second degree assault.  On 4 November 2005, Boulden made her initial
appearance in the Circuit Court where she received an “Initial Appearance and Not Guilty
Form.”  The form stated, in pertinent part, as follows:
Jury or court trial – YOUR CASE WILL BE TRIED BY A
JURY unless you are charged with a violation of probation, or
1It appears from the record that Boulden was not represented by counsel at this time.
you request a court trial, or you are advised otherwise.  
– A jury is composed of 12 citizens of this county chosen at
random from the voters’ and licensed drivers’ lists.  A jury’s
verdict must be unanimous.  In other words all 12 must agree on
finding you guilty by proof beyond a reasonable doubt or
finding you not guilty. 
– A court trial, also called a judge trial, is a trial by a judge of
the circuit court.  The judge cannot find you guilty unless your
guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  You may request a
court trial at any time before your jury trial actually begins and
the first juror is sworn in.
Boulden signed the form, acknowledging that she received a copy of the document and that
she understood the advisement of rights given by the judge.1  
On 5 July 2006, a court trial commenced.  Boulden was represented by counsel.
Although Petitioner’s waiver of her right to trial by jury was not placed on the record at the
outset, the following colloquy between the court and counsel occurred:
THE COURT: Okay.  Is the State ready to proceed?
[STATE]: State’s ready, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: [Defense counsel], are we going forward with a
court trial?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, sir.  We are.  
The State rested its case-in-chief at the end of the day.  At the start of the second day
of trial, the following colloquy ensued between the participants: 
[STATE]: Before we get to motions, Your Honor, it struck me
last night that I don’t believe we put the defendant’s waiver of
jury trial on the record yesterday.
THE COURT: I think you’re absolutely right.  Now that you
mention it, I had assumed that was already done since we were
proceeding by court trial.  If it has not already been done, we
need to do that. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That’s correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay.  Ms. Boulden, would you stand, please?
I have to explain something to you.  Ms. Boulden, you have a
constitutional right to a jury trial in this case because of the
nature of the charges against you.  A jury is twelve citizens
chosen through a process in which you and your lawyer have the
right to participate actively.  That is, you and your lawyer
participate in the selection of twelve citizens.  They are chosen,
again, with the participation of you and your lawyer from a
larger group, sometimes called an array or panel.  The larger
group from which those twelve are chosen at random are from
the voter registration list and the motor vehicle records of Cecil
County.  Because they are chosen at random, those groups, the
array, will over time include all of the different kinds of people
who live in Cecil County.  
In a jury trial the State has the burden of proving its case
beyond a reasonable doubt, just as in a court trial.  In a jury trial
they have to prove the case to the jury.  That is, the twelve
citizens have to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt and
they have to be convinced unanimously.  That means all twelve
of them must vote guilty in order for you to be found guilty.  If
any one of them refuses to vote guilty, then you cannot be
convicted in a jury trial.  Do you understand what a jury is? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you understand what a jury trial is?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that you have a constitutional
right to a jury trial?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.  
THE COURT: Do you wish to waive your constitutional right
to a jury trial and proceed in a court trial?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay.  Do you have any questions about the
rights that I’ve explained to you, the right to a jury trial?
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: Has anybody threatened you in any way or made
you afraid to get you to waive your right to a jury trial?
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: Has anybody offered you anything or promised
you anything to get you to waive your right to a jury trial?
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: You’re doing this voluntarily, freely, of your
own free will?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right.  Then I’m satisfied that the defendant
has waived her right to a jury trial.  
 
Defense counsel then moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the State had
not proven all elements of the child abuse charge.  The delayed jury trial waiver inquiry was
not mentioned.  The court denied the motion and found Boulden guilty of both counts.
On 14 July 2006, defense counsel filed a motion for a new trial alleging multiple
errors.  She did not object, however, to the timing of the jury trial waiver colloquy or validity
2On 4 October 2006, Boulden filed a Petition for Modification and Reduction of
Sentence, which appears as yet unruled on by the trial court.  Stapled to the Petition is the
following note:
M’s Clerk:
Please docket and file the attached Motion for Modification or
Reduction of Sentence but DO NOT submit it to the Court at
this time.  The Defendant will, sometime in the future, direct a
written request to you that the same be submitted to the Court
for its consideration at that time.
of the waiver and its acceptance.  Before the court ruled on the new trial motion, on 6
September 2006, Boulden filed an “amendment” to her motion, alleging that an essential
witness to her case, the victim’s mother, did not testify.  Again, she did not object to the
timing or validity of the jury trial waiver.  After holding a hearing on 12 September 2006,
the court denied the motion and sentenced Petitioner to six years imprisonment, with all but
three years suspended.2  
Boulden filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing, for the first time,
that her waiver of her right to trial by jury was defective because the inquiry, waiver, and
acceptance were conducted after the commencement of trial. The court affirmed in an
unreported opinion.  Relying on its opinion in Valiton v. State, 119 Md. App. 139, 704 A.2d
478 (1998), the intermediate appellate court concluded that Boulden waived her right to
complain about the delayed waiver inquiry because she failed to challenge before the trial
court at any time the timing or validity of the jury trial waiver, despite ample opportunity to
do so.  We issued a writ of certiorari upon Boulden’s petition.  409 Md. 44, 972 A.2d 859
(2009).  Her petition presented the following questions: 
3The Sixth Amendment provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and  cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.   
1. May a criminal defendant effectively waive his or her right to
a trial by jury after the commencement of trial?
2. If not, did the Court of Special Appeals err in concluding that
Petitioner waived her right to complain about the validity of her
jury trial waiver because she did not voice a complaint to the
trial court?
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.  
II. ANALYSIS
A.
The Right to a Jury Trial 
The right to a jury trial in Maryland in qualifying criminal cases is guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution3 and by Articles 5 (“[T]he inhabitants
of Maryland are entitled to . . . trial by jury . . . .”), 21 (“[I]n all criminal prosecutions, every
man hath a right to . . . a speedy trial by an impartial jury, without whose unanimous consent
he ought not to be found guilty.”), and 24 (due process) of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights.  The Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a jury trial is applicable to the States through
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968).  A
defendant may elect to waive this right and instead be tried by the court.  Powell v. State, 394
4Rule 4-246 was subsequently amended to reflect stylistic changes in section (a) and
substantive changes in section (b).  The current rule, effective 1 January 2008, provides: 
(a) Generally.  In the circuit court, a defendant having a right to
trial by jury shall be tried by a jury unless the right is waived
pursuant to section (b) of this Rule.  The State does not have the
right to elect a trial by jury. 
(b) Procedure for acceptance of waiver.  A defendant may
waive the right to a trial by jury at any time before the
commencement of trial.  The court may not accept the waiver
until, after an examination of the defendant on the record in
open court conducted by the court, the State’s Attorney, the
attorney for the defendant, or any combination thereof, the court
determines and announces on the record that the waiver is made
knowingly and voluntarily.
Md. 632, 638, 907 A.2d 242, 246 (2006); Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 316, 893 A.2d
1018, 1033 (2006); Martinez v. State, 309 Md. 124, 132-33, 522 A.2d 950, 954 (1987);
Countess v. State, 286 Md. 444, 449, 408 A.2d 1302, 1304 (1979).  
Maryland Rule 4-246 governs the procedure for the waiver of a jury trial in a criminal
case.  In 2006, at the time of Boulden’s trial, Maryland Rule 4-246 provided:4
(a) Generally.  In the circuit court, a defendant having a right to
trial by jury shall be tried by a jury unless the right is waived
pursuant to section (b) of this Rule.  If the waiver is accepted by
the court, the State may not elect a trial by jury.
(b) Procedure for acceptance of waiver.  A defendant may
waive the right to a trial by jury at any time before the
commencement of trial.  The court may not accept the waiver
until it determines, after an examination of the defendant on the
record in open court conducted by the court, the State’s
Attorney, the attorney for the defendant, or any combination
thereof, that the waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily.
(emphasis added).  Although Rule 4-246 provides the procedures for waiver of the right to
5The Committee Note to Rule 4-246(b), added in 2009, provides guidance to trial
courts when engaging the jury trial waiver colloquy:  
Although the law does not require the court to use a
specific form of inquiry in determining whether a defendant’s
waiver of a jury trial is knowing and voluntary, the record must
demonstrate an intentional relinquishment of a known right.
What questions must be asked will depend upon the facts and
circumstances of the particular case.
In determining whether a waiver is knowing, the court
should seek to ensure that the defendant understands that: (1) the
defendant has the right to a trial by jury; (2) unless the defendant
waives a trial by jury, the case will be tried by a jury; (3) a jury
consists of 12 individuals who reside in the county where the
court is sitting, selected at random from a list that includes
registered voters, licensed drivers, and holders of identification
cards issued by the Motor Vehicle Administration, seated as
jurors at the conclusion of a selection process in which the
defendant, the defendant’s attorney, and the State participate; (4)
all 12 jurors must agree on whether the defendant is guilty or not
guilty and may only convict upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt; (5) if the jury is unable to reach a unanimous decision, a
mistrial will be declared and the State will then have the option
of retrying the defendant; and (6) if the defendant waives a jury
trial, the court will not permit the defendant to change the
election unless the court finds good cause to permit the change.
In determining whether a waiver is voluntary, the court
(continued...)
trial by jury, the ultimate inquiry regarding the validity of a waiver is whether “‘there has
been an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’”  Powell,
394 Md. at 639, 907 A.2d at 246 (quoting Smith v. State, 375 Md. 365, 379, 825 A.2d 1055,
1064 (2003)).  There is no fixed dialogue that must take place with a defendant to affect a
valid outcome, but the court should ensure that the record demonstrates an intentional
relinquishment of a known right.5  Abeokuto, 391 Md. at 317-18, 893 A.2d at 1034; Martinez,
5(...continued)
should consider the defendant’s responses to questions such as:
(1) Are you making this decision of your own free will?; (2) Has
anyone offered or promised you anything in exchange for giving
up your right to a jury trial?; (3) Has anyone threatened or
coerced you in any way regarding your decision?; and (4) Are
you presently under the influence of any medications, drugs, or
alcohol?
(emphasis in original).  
309 Md. at 134, 522 A.2d at 955.  “Whether the waiver is valid depends upon the facts and
totality of the circumstances of each case.”  Abeokuto, 391 Md. at 318, 893 A.2d at 1034. 
B.
The Parties’ Contentions Here
Petitioner argues that a criminal defendant may not waive effectively his or her right
to a jury trial after the commencement of trial.  She looks to the plain language of Rule 4-
246(b) that the waiver of a jury trial occur before the commencement of trial as vital to
ensuring that the waiver is knowing and voluntary.  She also complains that the trial court
failed to inform her that a mistrial would be declared if she did not choose to waive her right
to a jury trial.
The State, conceding that the timing requirement of the Rule was violated on this
record, argues that Boulden waived any claim that her right to jury trial was violated when
the State, in open court, brought the error to her attention before the defense case began and
she failed utterly to voice an objection to the process employed, even in post-verdict motions.
As a result, the State urges also that we hold that the court’s failure to place the waiver on
the record prior to the commencement of trial was harmless because the court corrected
6Rule 8-131(a) provides: 
(a) Generally. The issues of jurisdiction of the trial court over
the subject matter and, unless waived under Rule 2-322, over a
person may be raised in and decided by the appellate court
whether or not raised in and decided by the trial court.
Ordinarily, the appellate court will not decide any other issue
unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or
decided by the trial court, but the Court may decide such an
issue if necessary or desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid
the expense and delay of another appeal.
promptly its error and the totality of the circumstances indicate that Boulden’s waiver of her
right to a jury trial was knowing and voluntary. 
C. 
Petitioner Waived Her Right to Complain About the Timing and Effectiveness
of Her Jury Trial Waiver
We hold that Boulden waived her right to complain about the timing and effectiveness
of the jury trial waiver colloquy.  Pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-131(a),6 our scope of
appellate review is “ordinarily” limited to an issue that was “raised in or decided by the trial
court.”  Rule 8-131(a) has two purposes: ensuring fairness to all parties and the promotion
of the orderly administration of the law.  Robinson v. State, 410 Md. 91, 103, 976 A.2d 1072,
1079 (2009).  We explained in Robinson that those purposes are
advanced by requiring counsel to bring the position of their
client to the attention of the lower court at the trial so that the
trial court can pass upon, and possibly correct any errors in the
proceedings.  For those reasons, Md. Rule 8-131(a) requires an
appellant who desires to contest a court’s ruling or other error on
appeal to have made a timely objection at trial.  The failure to do
so bars the appellant from obtaining review of the claimed error,
as a matter of right.
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  
We may decide, however, an issue that was not raised or decided by the trial court “if
necessary or desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid the expense and delay of another
appeal.”  Md. Rule 8-131(a).  We exercise that discretion only in an appropriate case and
where “doing so furthers, rather than undermines, the purposes of the rule.”  Robinson, 410
Md. at 104, 976 A.2d at 1079.  We may consider an unpreserved issue “only when it is clear
that it will not work an unfair prejudice to the parties or to the [trial] court.” Jones v. State,
379 Md. 704, 714, 843 A.2d 778, 784 (2004).  We stated in Robinson that “[i]t would be
unfair to the trial court and opposing counsel, moreover, if the appellate court were to review
on direct appeal an un-objected to claim of error under circumstances suggesting that the lack
of objection might have been strategic, rather than inadvertent.”  410 Md. at 104, 976 A.2d
at 1080.  This is true even where the complained of error is of Constitutional dimension.  Id.
at 106, 976 A.2d at 1081. 
In Robinson, the defendant complained that his constitutional right to a public trial
was violated because the trial court, believing that defendant’s family was intimidating
witnesses, excluded the family from the courtroom.  The defendant did not object.  We held
that, notwithstanding the alleged violation of his constitutional right to a public trial, he
waived his right to complain about the exclusion.  Id. at 106, 976 A.2d at 1081.  We observed
that the right to a public trial, “though fundamental is not within the ‘narrow band of rights
that courts have traditionally required an individual knowingly and intelligently [to]
relinquish or abandon in order to waive the right or claim.’” Id. at 107, 976 A.2d at 1082
(quoting Hunt v. State, 345 Md. 122, 138, 691 A.2d 1255, 1262 (1997)).  We distinguished
the right to a public trial from, among others, the right to a jury trial, “which [is] absolute and
can only be foregone by the defendant’s affirmative ‘intelligent and knowing’ waiver . . . .”
Id. 
In Taylor v. State, 381 Md. 602, 851 A.2d 551 (2004), the petitioner complained that
his second trial and conviction constituted impermissible double jeopardy after the trial court
declared a mistrial in his first trial.  His first trial ended in a mistrial on 11 September
2001when the courthouse closed due to the events of “9/11.”  Although he objected when the
judge declared a mistrial, he failed to do so on double jeopardy grounds.  He was re-tried and
convicted.  On appeal, he argued that the trial judge declared improperly a mistrial without
Taylor’s consent, and that the mistrial was not based on manifest necessity.  This Court held
that he failed to preserve the double jeopardy issue for appellate review because no
objections or a motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy were made.  Id. at 612, 851 A.2d
at 557.  We noted that Taylor filed several motions after the mistrial, but never complained
in them on double jeopardy grounds.  Id. at 627, 851 A.2d at 565.  We recognized, as we did
in Robinson, that his failure to object may have been based on a strategic choice.  
Instead of raising the issue prior to or during the retrial,
petitioner waited until after an unfavorable judgment had been
made and a sentence rendered, and then only raised it during the
appellate process.  Petitioner thus availed himself of the benefits
of his counsel’s trial tactic of agreeing to the mistrial by
selecting a new jury, i.e., he relieved himself of his counsel’s
concern that the September 11, 2001 jury would not be able to
concentrate on his case due to the national tragedy, and, when
a negative result was procured, only then did he raise the issue
of double jeopardy.
Id. at 626-27, 851 A.2d at 565 (emphasis in original).  We concluded that “[b]ecause no trial
judge ruled on the double jeopardy issue, Md. Rule 8-131(a) provides that the issue is not
properly before this Court.”  Id.    
Petitioner looks to Martinez v. State, 309 Md. 124, 522 A.2d 950 (1987), Mitchell v.
State, 337 Md. 509, 654 A.2d 1309 (1995), and United States v. Saadya, 750 F.2d 1419 (9th
Cir. 1985), for support of her argument that the waiver determination can be made on the
record only before trial commences.  Her reliance on these cases is misplaced, however,
because they involved violations of the defendant’s Constitutional trial rights, not violations
of a purely procedural nature as is the case here.  In Martinez, we considered whether a
defendant may waive the right to a jury trial after the trial has concluded.  The trial court
asked the defendant whether “any person, either inside or outside of this courthouse, made
[him] any promise, or has threatened [him] in anyway in order to have [him] give up [his]
right to a jury trial?”  Id. at 129, 522 A.2d at 952.  The defendant answered, “[y]es.”  Id.  The
transcript also revealed that the defendant was taking several medications to treat psychiatric
conditions and that the affirmative response to the court’s question may have been the result
of a language misunderstanding.  Id. at 127-28, 135, 522 A.2d at 951-52, 955.  The
intermediate appellate court resolved that the waiver was not voluntary and ordered a limited
remand so that Martinez’s responses could be clarified.  Id. at 135, 522 A.2d at 955.  We
reversed, holding that a limited remand to determine whether the defendant waived
voluntarily his right to a jury trial was improper.  We stated that “Rule 4-246 requires that
the defendant’s waiver be on the record before the trial commences.”  Id. (emphasis in
original).  Therefore, we held that he was entitled to a new trial because the record did not
disclose a knowing and voluntary waiver of a jury trial.  Id. at 136, 522 A.2d at 956.  See also
Countess v. State, 286 Md. 444, 457-58, 459, 460-61, 408 A.2d 1302, 1309-10, (1979)
(consolidated appeal in which we held that the failure to establish that a defendant’s waiver
was knowing and voluntary warrants a reversal of the sentence and conviction). 
In Mitchell, the trial court failed to conduct the proper inquiry into whether the
defendant had valid reasons for appearing without counsel on the date set for trial.  The Court
of Special Appeals ordered a limited remand to determine if his reasons were meritorious.
337 Md. at 515, 654 A.2d at 1312.  We held that a limited remand was impermissible
because “[i]nquiry into the merits of a defendant’s reasons for appearing without counsel
must be conducted on the record prior to trial; therefore, Martinez is not distinguishable on
that ground.”  Id. at 517, 654 A.2d at 1313 (emphasis in original).  We explained that if we
affirmed the order of a limited remand, the defendant “would have to reconstruct his actions
[and recall dates and conversations with the Office of the Public Defender].  The potential
prejudice to Mitchell is obvious, and a limited remand in this case would be fundamentally
unfair.”  Id.  We stated further that, “[t]his case is much like Martinez and other cases in
which the knowing and voluntary nature of a jury trial waiver is at issue.  In those cases, our
concern has been that there could be subtle coercion that would not appear on the record.”
Id. at 518, 654 A.2d at 1313.  Therefore, we held that a “[f]ailure to conduct the Rule 4-
215(d) inquiry at the proper time . . . mandates a new trial.”  Id. at 518, 654 A.2d at 1314. 
7Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(a) governs the waiver of a criminal
defendant’s right to a jury trial.  Rule 23(a) provides as follows: 
(a) Jury Trial. If the defendant is entitled to a jury trial, the trial
must be by jury unless:
   (1) the defendant waives a jury trial in writing;
   (2) the government consents; and
   (3) the court approves.
The federal Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in
United States v. Saadya, 750 F.2d 1419 (1985).  In Saadya, the defendants failed to make
both a written waiver, as required by federal Rule 23(a),7 and an oral waiver of their right to
jury trial in open court.  Id. at 1421.  The appellate court refused to hold that the failure to
obtain a waiver from the defendants was a “technical violation” of the rule.  Id. at 1420-21.
It also rejected the government’s suggestion to remand the case to the district court for a
determination of whether appellants and their former counsel reached a decision to waive a
jury trial.  Id. at 1421.  The court concluded that, although the Rule does not include
expressly a time requirement, “[a] defendant’s waiver of his right to jury trial must appear
on the record prior to the time the trial commences.  The absence of a waiver on the record
of the right to trial by jury cannot be remedied by subsequent proceedings on remand.”  Id.
at 1422.
In Valiton v. State, 119 Md. App. 139, 704 A.2d 478 (1998), the Court of Special
Appeals considered virtually the very issue that we consider in the present case.  Valiton was
on trial for escape from the Allegany County Detention Center.  After the close of the State’s
case, the trial court realized that Valiton’s waiver of his right to jury trial had not been placed
on the record.  Defense counsel then placed the waiver on the record in the following
colloquy:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Mr. Valiton, I’ve talked to you at
some length about the options of a court trial as opposed to a
jury trial and at a jury trial I explained to you that you and I
would help select the jurors who are picked from the voter rolls
here in Allegany County.  And I went over with you some of the
strategy and options that were available in either a court trial or
a jury trial and did I to the best of your knowledge explain the
options available to you. 
MR. VALITON: Yes. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And it’s my understanding, since you
relied somewhat on my view of the proceedings, that in light of
my statements to you that you have elected to choose, you
choose to be tried by the Court, is that correct?
MR. VALITON: That’s correct. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And that it [sic] basically I told you
what the options were and suggested that this was a decision you
had to make, is that correct?
MR. VALITON: Correct.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And have you made this decision
voluntarily of your own free will to forego a jury trial and be
tried by His Honor, []?
MR. VALITON: I have.
THE COURT: All right, gentleman, thank you very much.  Just
to follow that up, and perhaps you noted it, but let me do it.  Mr.
Valiton, jury trial, of course, meaning twelve persons selected
at random from Allegany County.  The jury has to conclude
unanimously guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before anyone
can be convicted.  That is the further right of jury trial.  You
understand that through [DEFENSE COUNSEL], is that correct,
sir?
MR. VALITON: Yes.
THE COURT: All right.  Thank you, you may be seated,
gentlemen.  Then the Clerk will note that selection at this point
in time of the Court trial.
Id. at 143-44, 704 A.2d at 479-80.  Over “vigorous defense objection,” the court permitted
the State to amend the dates of the charges to reflect testimony of a detention center official,
but granted to the defense a 28-day continuance.  Id. at 142, 704 A.2d at 479.  On appeal to
the Court of Special Appeals, Valiton claimed that Rule 4-246 requires an on-the-record
colloquy before the commencement of trial before a valid jury trial waiver could be found
to have occurred.  Id. at 145, 704 A.2d at 480.  Therefore, he argued that the jury trial waiver,
conducted in the middle of trial, violated the Rule, and, as a result, he was entitled to a new
trial.  Id. at 145, 704 A.2d at 480-81.  The appellate court conceded that the waiver inquiry
did not comply with the Rule because it was not conducted before trial, but nonetheless
concluded that Valiton waived his right to complain.  Id. at 146, 704 A.2d at 481.  The
intermediate appellate court distinguished Valiton’s case from Martinez.  “Unlike in this
case, the waiver inquiry in Martinez was timely conducted and the appellant did not complain
that the waiver colloquy occurred at a time not prescribed by the rule.  Rather, the appellant
in Martinez argued that his waiver was not voluntary, and the Court of Appeals was
concerned with the ultimate reliability of the jury trial waiver.”  119 Md. App. at 146, 704
A.2d at 481.  The intermediate appellate court acknowledged that we referenced the timing
of the waiver inquiry in Martinez, but found it 
apparent that the Court focused on the validity of the waiver,
and determined only that jury trial waivers are not reliable when
conducted post-trial.  At that stage of the proceedings, shortly
before sentencing, it noted that a defendant may feel inhibited
from asserting that the waiver was involuntary or he may
proceed, hoping to be rewarded by agreeing to the waiver.
Id. at 148, 704 A.2d at 482.  Because the waiver colloquy was conducted at the close of the
State’s case and not at the conclusion of trial, the Valiton court determined that the “case
does not present the precise concerns that are evident in a post-trial waiver situation.”  Id.
Furthermore, unlike in Martinez, where we were concerned with the voluntariness of the
defendant’s waiver, there was no question in Valiton that the waiver was involuntary or
unknowing.  “[T]he record reflect[ed] that appellant was fully informed as to the nature of
a jury trial . . . .”  Id. at 149, 704 A.2d at 482.  The court found “most significant” that
Valiton 
never voiced any complaint to the delayed waiver inquiry.
When the court first realized at the end of the State’s case that
no waiver inquiry had occurred, appellant’s counsel did not
object.  Yet the record is devoid of any suggestion of the
slightest coercion or pressure upon appellant or counsel to avoid
‘rocking the boat’ at that time.
Id.  The court continued, however, stating that 
[p]erhaps appellant’s failure to object immediately, standing
alone, would not convince us that appellant waived his right to
assert a challenge on appeal with respect to the untimeliness of
the jury trial waiver inquiry.  We need not reach that issue,
however.  In this case, a lengthy continuance of the trial
followed the jury trial waiver inquiry.  During the four-week
hiatus, appellant did not lodge any objection or complaint to the
court concerning the jury trial waiver.  Even if appellant was
initially unaware of the content of Rule 4-246, or later had
second thoughts, or felt intimidated or pressured while he was
in court, he certainly could have raised the matter during the
intervening four weeks that preceded the presentation of the
defense case.  Instead, appellant failed to challenge the timing
or validity of the jury trial waiver.  It is appellant’s silence
during the four week continuance that most distinguishes this
case from Martinez.”
Id. at 149-50, 704 A.2d at 483.  Recognizing that the ultimate purpose of the rule is to ensure
that the waiver is knowing and voluntary, the court determined that, under the circumstances
of that case, Valiton waived his right to complain about compliance with the timing of the
waiver colloquy.   Id. at 150, 704 A.2d at 483.  See also State v. Barr, 2008 Ohio 2176 (Ohio
Ct. App. 8 May 2008) (late filing of written jury trial waiver was cured by the court’s
colloquy with the defendant when it realized the error mid-trial and the colloquy established
that the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to jury trial). 
We determine likewise that Boulden waived her right to complain about the tardy jury
trial waiver colloquy.  At the beginning of the trial, Petitioner did not object when asked by
the trial judge “are we going forward with a court trial?”  Instead, defense counsel answered
affirmatively.  Moreover, defense counsel could have objected to the failure to place on the
record Boulden’s waiver of her right to trial by jury when the State brought the error to
everyone’s attention at the close of the State’s case-in-chief and before the defense was to
put on its case.  The defense could have moved for a mis-trial.  Although there was not a 28-
day continuance in Boulden’s case,  as in Valiton, approximately two months passed after
the conclusion of Boulden’s trial until the hearing on her motion for new trial and sentencing.
She filed a motion for a new trial and an amendment to that motion one month after trial
ended, in neither of which was the timing of the jury trial waiver raised.  Petitioner, who was
represented by counsel throughout the trial and post-verdict proceedings, had ample
opportunity to object to the tardy jury trial waiver. 
We agree also with the reasoning in Valiton that a jury trial waiver, that otherwise
complies with Rule 4-246, placed on the record at the close of the State’s case-in-chief, but
before the defense commences its presentation of evidence, is distinguished from Martinez
because the post-trial inquiry process proposed in Martinez implicated the voluntariness of
the defendant’s waiver, not simply a technical rule violation.  In other words, the waiver in
the present case violated the rule of procedure, but the waiver in Martinez violated the
defendant’s core constitutional right to a jury trial.  There is no indication in this record that
Boulden’s trial waiver was anything but knowing and voluntary.  She responded that: she
understood what a jury is; she had a constitutional right to a jury trial; she wished to waive
her constitutional right to a jury trial and proceed in a court trial; no one offered or promised
her anything in exchange for her waiver of a trial by jury; she was waiving her right to trial
by jury voluntarily, freely, and of her own free will; and, she did not have any questions
regarding her right to a jury trial.  The trial court, having the opportunity to view Petitioner’s
demeanor and listen to her responses, was satisfied that she waived her right to a jury trial.
We will not upset that finding based solely on a technical violation of the timing requirement
of the Rule. 
The present case also is readily distinguished from Saadya and Mitchell.  In Saadya,
as in Martinez, there was no otherwise valid waiver on the record at any time to overcome
strict compliance with the procedural requirements of the federal rule.  Similarly, in Mitchell,
the trial court did not conduct a waiver inquiry to determine why the defendant did not
appear with counsel.  Here, the concerns that we and other courts have expressed with a post-
trial inquiry into the waiver of constitutional rights are not present.  The court conducted a
colloquy after the commencement of trial, but before the defense was called upon to present
its case.  If no such colloquy had taken place, or one that did not indicate that Boulden
waived her right to trial by jury knowingly and voluntarily, then a different result would
obtain.  Although the right to trial by jury is absolute, the Constitution requires only that the
waiver be voluntary and knowing.  See Robinson, 410 Md. at 107, 976 A.2d at 1082.  There
is no indication in this record of subtle coercion such as might taint confidence where a post-
trial waiver situation was presented.  We decline to hold that any waiver that occurs after
commencement of trial, but prior to the end of trial, is coercive inherently.  
Moreover, there is the consideration of whether the failure to object to the late waiver
was a matter of trial strategy in the present case.  We stated in Robinson, “if the failure to
object is, or even might be, a matter of strategy, then overlooking the lack of objection
simply encourages defense gamesmanship.”  410 Md. at 104, 976 A.2d at 1080.  Boulden
and her defense counsel may have thought they had a “free look” at the State’s case-in-chief.
We have recognized on several occasions that “‘any experienced lawyer worth his salt in the
trial of criminal matters knows that there are many, many instances where trial before the
court is in the best interest of the accused.’” Martinez, 309 Md. at 132, 522 A.2d at 954
(quoting State v. Zimmerman, 261 Md. at 19, 273 A.2d at 160 (1971)).  There are many
strategic reasons for electing a court trial instead of a jury trial.  For example,
[t]he defendant may want to waive a jury trial when he
feels that a jury panel composed of members of the community
will be prejudiced against his case.  This may be especially true
when the defendant’s alleged crime has received wide publicity
or is particularly gruesome.  The defendant may also feel that a
judge would be less apt than a jury to draw negative conclusions
from the defendant’s appearance or manner of speech.  Or, he
may merely prefer that the arbiter of his fate be one person
trained in the law rather than twelve laymen.  
Abeokuto, 391 Md. at 318, 893 A.2d at 1034 (quoting Zimmerman, 261 Md. at 19, 273 A.2d
at 160).  Such a circumstance may be present where, as here, the defendant is charged with
child abuse.  See id. at 318, 893 A.2d at 1034 (“Being charged with the brutal murder of a
small child might present a basis to [waive the right to a jury trial.]”).  At that crossroad, and
knowing of the violation of the Rule, Petitioner, having evaluated the strength (or weakness)
of the State’s case, chose to remain silent and continue with a court trial, rather than demand
a new jury trial to which she was still entitled.   
D.
The Violation of Rule 4-246 was Harmless Error 
We also conclude that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, the violation
of Rule 4-246 constituted harmless error.  An error is harmless and does not entitle a
defendant to a new trial if the reviewing court is able to determine “beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error in no way influenced the verdict.”  Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659,
350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976).  Although “the rules of procedure are precise rubrics to be strictly
followed . . . [,] [i]t does not follow, however, that the harmless error doctrine has no
application to the Maryland Rules and that a violation of a procedural rule can never be
harmless.  There is no basis in authority or logic for such a holding.” Noble v. State, 293 Md.
549, 557-58, 446 A.2d 844, 848 (1982).  The violations of certain rules, however, “because
of the nature and purpose of these particular rules, can rarely be deemed harmless error.”  Id.
at 558, 446 A.2d at 848.  The right to jury trial and the right to counsel are among such rules.
Id.   
The actual denial of the unwaived right to trial by jury is ordinarily a structural error
and is not subject to harmless error review.  See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281-82
(1993); Harris v. State, 406 Md. 115, 130, 956 A.2d 204, 213 (2008).  A structural error is
one that “amounted to ‘structural defects’ in the trial itself.’” Redman v. State, 363 Md. 298,
304 n.5, 768 A.2d 656, 659 n.5 (2001) (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-08
(1991)).  Clearly, the violation here of Rule 4-246 was error, though not structural.  Thus, we
must determine whether Petitioner was prejudiced by the tardy waiver.  If not, then the error
was harmless and she is not entitled to a new trial.  In Valiton, the intermediate appellate
court stated that it did “not see how the failure to tell appellant that the court did not comply
with the timing of Rule 4-246 affects [a knowing and voluntary waiver], which are at the
heart of the rule.”  119 Md. App. at 150, 704 A.2d at 483.  Here, because Petitioner waived
voluntarily and knowingly her right to trial by jury on the record, albeit mid-trial, we
similarly do not see how the late waiver, when it was otherwise voluntary and knowing, was
prejudicial to Petitioner.  If anything, she received the benefit of hearing the State’s case-in-
chief before deciding whether to waive a jury trial and putting on her defense to the court
alone.  Thus, we conclude that the late waiver was harmless error. 
Petitioner marshals several cases from our sister States to support her argument that
the trial court’s failure to conduct a timely waiver was not harmless error.  Her reliance on
these cases is misplaced.  In Commonwealth v. Pavao, 672 N.E.2d 531 (Mass. 1996), the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered a case with similar, but not identical,
facts.  In Pavao, the trial judge failed to conduct a colloquy with the defendant before
accepting a waiver of his right to trial by jury tendered by his counsel.  Id. at 532.  Defense
counsel did not voice any objection or bring this oversight to the trial court’s attention.  Id.
The trial court realized the error after trial and held a hearing, but found no basis for
questioning the defendant as to the waiver.  Id.  The court declined to make any further
findings at that time, 
except to note that the defendant was well represented by
counsel, that the defendant consulted frequently with defense
counsel during trial, that the result of the trial was “fairly clear”
given the weight of the evidence and defense counsel’s
concession of guilt in closing arguments [regarding several of
the charges], and that “it seems incredible to suggest that [the
defendant’s] waiver was not knowing and voluntary, which, of
course, is the purpose of the colloquy.
Id. at 533.  The Supreme Judicial Court held that “[a] postconviction colloquy would be
ineffective to remedy the omission of the colloquy at the time of waiver.”  Id. at 535.  The
court opined that, “[e]xactly the kind of doubts our rule is intended to avoid would arise,
were we to rely on what a defendant says after a conviction to establish what he knew and
intended at the earlier moment when he waived his rights.”  Id.  Therefore, the court
concluded that a complete failure to conduct a waiver colloquy is not subject to harmless
error.  Id.  “To allow harmless error analysis of this sort is inconsistent with the right to a jury
trial altogether.  Surely if a defendant had asked for a jury trial and it had been denied him,
a conviction could not be saved by this analysis.”  Id.  
Pavao is distinguished readily from the present case because the Pavao trial court
failed to conduct a relevant colloquy at any point during trial.  Here, the trial court conducted
an adequate, although late, colloquy in which Petitioner stated expressly that she wished to
waive her right to a jury trial.  Petitioner was not denied her right to a trial by jury.  When
the State brought the error to the court’s and Petitioner’s attention, Boulden could have asked
for a mistrial at that point, if the failure to request a jury trial was inadvertent and she truly
wished to exercise her right to a jury trial.  Instead, she waived voluntarily and knowingly
her constitutional right to trial by jury and continue the bench trial.
Boulden also relies upon People v. Cook, 285 Mich. App. 420,  __ N.W.2d __ ( 2009),
to convince us not to apply a harmless error analysis.  In Cook, before opening statements
at trial, the court stated that the defendant had agreed to waive his right to a jury trial by
signing a written waiver.  285 Mich. App. at 421, __ N.W.2d at __.  After the court
mentioned the written waiver, the defendant stated, “Your Honor, I did not sign this waiver.”
Id.  In fact, his attorney signed the waiver.  Id. at 422, __ N.W.2d at __.  Defense counsel
then asserted that the defendant agreed to a court trial during a pretrial conference.  Id.  After
defense counsel made that statement, the defendant stated “no.”  Id.  The record did not
contain a transcript of the pretrial conference where the defendant allegedly waived the right.
Id.  The trial court proceeded, nevertheless, with a bench trial.  Id.  The Michigan
intermediate appellate court held that the trial court complied with the Michigan Court Rules,
which require the court to “ascertain . . . that the defendant understands the right to and that
the defendant voluntarily chooses to give up that right and to be tried by the court.”  Mich.
Ct. R. 6.402(B); see 285 Mich. App. at 423, __ N.W.2d at __.  Therefore, the court held that
his waiver was not voluntary.  Id. at 424, __ N.W.2d at __.  The violation was not subject to
harmless error because it constituted more than a mere failure to conform to the procedural
requirements.  Id. at 427, __ N.W.2d at __.  The court determined that the failure to place on
the record the defendant’s jury trial waiver was a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to
a jury trial.  Id. at 426-27, __ N.W.2d at __.  “If we were to conclude that this error was
harmless, we would have to speculate about whether a hypothetical jury would also have
found defendant guilty.”  Id. at 427, __ N.W.2d at __.  Therefore, the court reversed the
conviction and remanded the matter for a new trial.  Id.  
Cook also is distinguished easily from the present case.  In Cook, a jury trial waiver
never was placed on the record.  Here, Boulden waived her right to a jury trial in open court
during her trial.  The facts of the present case are more analogous to a case that the Michigan
Court of Appeals distinguished in Cook, People v. Mosly, 672 N.W.2d 897 (Mich. Ct. App.
2003).  In Mosly, the appellate court determined that the trial court’s failure to conduct an
oral waiver colloquy on the record did not require reversal because “the record establish[ed]
that defendant nonetheless understood that he had a right to a trial by jury and voluntarily
chose to waive that right.”  Id. at 901.  The “defendant executed a written waiver form
wherein he acknowledged having been advised of his constitutional right to a jury trial and
that he was voluntarily waiving it.”  Id.  He contended that he could not read the form, but
testified at a federal habeas corpus proceeding that from his research in the prison library that
he knew he had a right to a jury trial.  Id.  Therefore, the court determined that the record
established that the defendant knew he had a right to a jury trial, thus satisfying the
“knowing” requirement of the rule.  Id.  The court determined that he waived voluntarily the
right because he did not voice an objection when the court trial began.  Id. at 902.  See also
People v. Tooles, 687 N.E.2d 48, 53 (Ill. 1997) (holding that “the failure to procure
defendants’ written jury waivers does not necessitate reversal of their convictions because
the record otherwise evidences that defendants’ jury waivers were understandingly made.”);
Jackson v. State, 76 S.W.3d 798, 803 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (finding harmless error where
defense counsel failed to file written jury trial waiver as required by statute but the record
reflected that she was aware of her right to jury trial prior to commencement of trial);
Loveless v. State, 21 S.W.3d 582, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (holding that a failure to
comply strictly with the jury trial waiver rule was harmless error because “the trial court
clearly instructed and questioned [the defendant] allowing him to contemplate the full impact
a jury trial waiver could have on his rights.”); State v. Redden, 487 S.E.2d 318, 327 (W.Va.
1997) (holding that “when a criminal defendant’s jury trial waiver is personal, knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary as reflected in an on-the-record statement in open court, the failure
to obtain a written waiver signed by the defendant does not in itself make the jury trial waiver
invalid, despite the technical ‘writing’ requirement of Rule 23(a) of the West Virginia Rules
of Criminal Procedure).  Cf. People v. Evans, 611 N.E.2d 1263, 1266-67 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)
8The opinion does not indicate the alleged shortcoming in the colloquy.  
(invoking plain error where defendant did not file written waiver because there was no
indication on record that defendant waived his right to trial by jury); State v. Coita, 568 A.2d
424, 425 (Vt. 1989) (holding that the failure of the trial court to affirmatively indicate on the
written jury trial waiver that the defendant waived the right to trial by jury was reversible
error). 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a mere failure to comply strictly with
federal Rule 23(a) does not warrant automatic reversal where that failure does not violate the
Constitution.  In United States v. Bishop, 291 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2002), the appellant argued
that there was a defect in the trial court’s waiver colloquy.8  The court acknowledged that
“adherence to the dictates of Rule 23(a) creates the presumption that the waiver was
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent” and there was no evidence in the record that “Bishop
suffered from ‘a special disadvantage or disability bearing upon [his] understanding of the
jury waiver.’” Id. at 1113-14 (quoting United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000,
1003 (9th Cir. 1997)).  Therefore, the court held that he was not entitled to a new trial on the
basis of an invalid jury trial waiver.  Id. at 1114.  See also Pool v. United States, 344 F.2d
943, 944 (9th Cir. 1965), where the court held that although the written waiver was not in the
form prescribed by rule, it was nonetheless valid.  The court explained that “[i]n protecting
any defendant’s constitutional rights we do, and should, look beyond form to substance.”
Id. at 944-45.
We disagree with Boulden’s further contention that the trial court’s failure to inform
her that, if she did not waive her right to jury trial, the court would have to declare a mistrial.
As we noted earlier, there is no fixed colloquy or litany that the trial court must recite in
order to elicit a valid waiver.  Abeokuto, 391 Md. at 317-18, 893 A.2d at 1034; Martinez, 309
Md. at 134, 522 A.2d at 955.  Where, under the facts and circumstances of this case, it is
clear that otherwise the waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily, we hold that it is a valid
waiver, even if conducted mid-trial.  The fact that the trial court did not mention that a
mistrial would occur if she chose to exercise her right to a jury trial does not undermine our
confidence in this conclusion.  
We note that harmless error is in play where it may be surmised reasonably from the
record that the failure to complain of the error in the trial court could have been the result of
a strategic or tactical choice. We decline to review the claimed error under a “plain error”
analysis.  “Such review is reserved for those errors that are ‘compelling, extraordinary,
exceptional or fundamental to assure the defendant of [a] fair trial.’” Robinson, 410 Md. at
111, 976 A.2d at 1084 (quoting Rubin v. State, 325 Md. 552, 588, 602 A.2d 677, 694
(1992)).  We explained further in Robinson that 
[w]e will intervene in those circumstances only when the error
complained of was so material to the rights of the accused as to
amount to the kind of prejudice which precluded an impartial
trial.  In that regard, we review the materiality of the error in the
context in which it arose, giving due regard to whether the error
was purely technical, the product of conscious design or trial
tactics or the result of bald inattention.
Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).  As we noted supra, there are many
instances where a defendant would prefer to be tried by the court rather than a jury.  Here,
where one of the charged counts was child abuse, it arguably makes sense that Petitioner
would prefer a court trial.  
Here, it is clear that Boulden’s waiver was voluntary and knowing.  Unlike the waiver
in Martinez where the defendant answered affirmatively when asked whether anyone
threatened him or promised him anything in exchange for his waiver, Petitioner stated
unambiguously in open court that she understood the right and that she wished to waive it.
Moreover, it is not unreasonable to surmise that the failure to object was a matter of strategic
choice.  Thus, harmless error analysis is applicable and we conclude that the late waiver did
not prejudice Boulden.  
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED;
COSTS TO BE PAID BY
PETITIONER.  
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 49
September Term, 2009
SHEILA BOULDEN
v. 
STATE OF MARYLAND.
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
     
                 
JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by Bell, C.J.,  which
Greene, J. joins.
Filed:    May 14, 2010
1 Maryland Rule 4-246 was amended subsequent to Petitioner’s trial.  And so this
dissent will cite to the version which was in effect at the time of Petitioner’s trial.  
I.
Maryland Rule 4-2461 sets out the requirements that must be met in order for a
defendant to forego, i.e., waive, his or her constitutional right to a jury trial.  It provides, in
relevant part:
“(a) Generally.  In the circuit court a defendant having a right to trial by jury
shall be tried by a jury unless the right is waived pursuant to section (b) of this
Rule.  If the waiver is accepted by the court, the State may not elect a trial by
jury.
“(b) Procedure for acceptance of waiver.  A defendant may waive the right to
a trial by jury at any time before the commencement of trial.  The court may
not accept the waiver until it determines, after an examination of the defendant
on the record in open court conducted by the court, the State’s Attorney, the
attorney for the defendant, or any combination thereof, that the waiver is made
knowingly and voluntarily.” 
The question presented in this case is whether a defendant, who, without objecting,
waives her right to jury trial after the trial has commenced, indeed after the State has rested,
also waives her right thereafter to challenge the validity of the waiver of jury trial.  The
majority’s answer is, “yes”: “[the petitioner] waived her right to complain about the timing
and effectiveness of the jury trial waiver colloquy.”  Boulden v. State, ___ Md ___, ____,
___ A.2d ___, ____ (2010) (slip op. at 10 ).  
I disagree.  As we have seen, Rule 4-246 (b) permits a waiver of jury trial “at any time
before the commencement of trial,” and conditions the court’s acceptance of the waiver on
an examination of the defendant sufficient to support a finding that the waiver is made freely
2
and voluntarily.  Thus, the Rule contemplates, because it requires, that both the waiver and
the justifying examination be completed prior to the commencement of the trial.  If that Rule
is to have meaning as something more than a guide, a suggestion, as to the proper and best
practice, as, in fact, one of the “precise rubrics,” Isen v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 259 Md.
564, 570, 270 A.2d 476, 479 (1970), “‘established to promote the orderly and efficient
administration of justice and [which] are to be read and followed,’” id., (citing Brown v.
Fraley, 222 Md. 480, 483, 161 A.2d 128, 130 (1960)), as we have often characterized our
Rules, see e.g., Broadwater v. State, 401 Md. 175, 182, 931 A.2d 1098, 1102 (2007), King
v. State, 400 Md. 419, 445, n. 10, 929 A.2d 169, 184, n. 10 (2007), In re Kaela C., 394 Md.
432, 471, 906 A.2d 915, 938 (2006); GMC v. Seay, 388 Md. 341, 344, 879 A.2d 1049, 1051
(2005), Johnson v. State, 355 Md. 420, 446, 735 A.2d 1003, 1017 (1999); Goins v. State, 293
Md. 97, 109, 442 A.2d 550, 556 (1982), then we must construe it strictly, notwithstanding
that so doing requires reversal of the defendant’s convictions and a new trial, and hold that
Rule 4-246 “means what it says.” Countess v. State, 286 Md. 444, 463, 408 A.2d 1302, 1311
(1979).   This is particularly the case, when, as here, the examination for voluntariness was
conducted as if the waiver were being made pre-trial; there was absolutely no reference to
the fact that Rule 4-246 had been violated or the consequences of that violation, that the
defendant could have, on that account, started afresh.
The facts of this case are as follows.  On July 5, 2006, a bench trial commenced.  The
criminal defendant, the petitioner, Sheila Boulden, however, had not waived her right to a
jury trial:
3
“[THE STATE]:   ...Your Honor, this is State versus Sheila Boulden....
“THE COURT:   Okay.  Is the State ready to proceed?
“[THE STATE]:     State’s ready, Your Honor.
“THE COURT:    Mr. Davis, are we going forward with a court trial?
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:   Yes, sir. We are.” 
The following day, at the conclusion of the State’s case-in-chief, the State brought the
issue of the defendant’s failure to waive a jury trial to the trial judge’s attention.  In an
attempt to correct this error, the following colloquy between the trial judge and Boulden took
place:
“THE COURT:   Are we ready to continue?
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:   Yes, Your Honor.  I believe so.  I think the State
rested on - -
“THE COURT:   The State rested as we adjourned yesterday.
“[THE STATE]:     Before we get to motions, Your Honor, it struck me last
night that I don’t believe we put the defendant’s waiver of jury trial on the
record yesterday.
“THE COURT:    I think you’re absolutely right.  Now that you mention it, I
had assumed that that was already done since we were proceeding by court
trial.   If it has not already been done, we need to do that.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:    That’s correct, Your Honor.
 
“THE COURT:    Okay. Ms. Boulden, would you stand, please?  I have to
explain something to you.  Ms. Boulden, you have a constitutional right to a
jury trial in this case because of the nature of the charges against you.  A jury
is twelve citizens chosen through a process in which you and your lawyer have
the right to participate actively.  That is, you and your lawyer participate in the
selection of twelve citizens.  They are chosen, again, with the participation of
4
you and your lawyer from a larger group, sometimes called an array or panel.
The larger group from which those twelve are chosen at random are from the
voter registration list and the motor vehicle records of Cecil County.  Because
they are chosen at random, those groups, the array, will over time include all
of the different kinds of people who live in Cecil County.
“In a jury trial the State has the burden of proving its case beyond a
reasonable doubt, just as in a court trial.  In a jury trial they have to prove the
case to the jury.  That is, the twelve citizens have to be convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt and they have to be convinced unanimously.  That means all
twelve of them must vote guilty in order for you to be found guilty.  If any one
of them refuses to vote guilty, then you cannot be convicted in a jury trial.  Do
you understand what a jury is?
“THE DEFENDANT:    Yes.
“THE COURT:    Do you understand what a jury trial is?
“THE DEFENDANT:    Yes.
“THE COURT:    Do you understand that you have a constitutional right to a
jury trial? 
“THE DEFENDANT:    Yes.
“THE COURT:    Do you wish to waive your constitutional right to a jury trial
and proceed in a court trial?
“THE DEFENDANT:    Yes.
“THE COURT:    Okay.  Do you have any questions about the rights that I’ve
explained to you, the right to a jury trial. 
“THE DEFENDANT:    No.
“THE COURT:    Has anybody threatened you in any way or made you afraid
to get you to waive your right to a jury trial?
“THE DEFENDANT:    No.
“THE COURT:    You’re doing this voluntarily, freely, of your own will?
5
“THE DEFENDANT:    Yes.
“THE COURT:    All right.  Then I’m satisfied that the defendant has waived
her right to a jury trial.” 
Significantly, the trial court did not advise Boulden that the failure to conduct a
waiver examination before commencing the trial was a procedural default, a consequence of
which could have been the aborting of the trial.  To be sure, that the examination was not
done was brought to the court’s attention in the presence of the petitioner and her counsel
and, therefore, it must be conceded that she knew that it had not been done when required.
It cannot be said, however, that she was aware of its significance.  The State matter-of-factly
brought it to the court’s attention and the court and the petitioner’s counsel, equally matter-of
-factly, treated it as a mere oversight, as if it was not a big deal.
Neither Boulden nor, not surprisingly, her counsel objected to proceeding by way of
a non-jury trial.  After she was convicted of child abuse and assault in the second degree, she
appealed, raising the waiver issue for the first time.  The Court of Special Appeals, in an
unreported opinion, affirmed the trial’s court holding that Boulden “waived her right to
complain,” explaining:
“[Boulden] never voiced any complaint regarding the delayed waiver inquiry
to the trial court.  When the State informed the court after the conclusion of the
State’s case that no waiver inquiry had occurred, defense counsel did not
object.  The record is devoid of any suggestion of the slightest coercion or
pressure upon [Boulden] or her counsel to avoid ‘rocking the boat’ at that
time.”
 II.
6
When a defendant has failed to object below, the issue may still be reviewable “under
the plain error doctrine, or alternatively,...as a violation of the fundamental right of a criminal
defendant...secured by Article [5] of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.”  Rice  v. State, 124
Md. App 218, 222, 720 A.2d 1287, 1289-90 (1998) (footnote omitted). 
“Plain error is ‘error which vitally affects a defendant’s right to a fair and
impartial trial.’  State v. Daughton, 321 Md. 206, 211, 582 A.2d 521, 523
(1990), citing State v. Hutchinson, 287 Md. 198, 202, 411 A.2d 1035, 1037-38
(1980).  We have recognized the boundaries of that error to which we apply
our review as that which is ‘compelling, extraordinary, exceptional or
fundamental to assure the defendant a fair trial.’  Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md.
289, 327, 893 A.2d 1018, 1040 (2006), quoting Richmond v. State, 330 Md.
223, 236, 623 A.2d 630, 636 (1993) (citations omitted).  See also Rubin v.
State, 325 Md. 552, 588, 602 A.2d 677, 694 (1992); Hutchinson, 287 Md. at
203, 411 A.2d at 1038.  We will ‘intervene in those circumstances only when
the error complained of was so material to the rights of the accused as to
amount to the kind of prejudice which precluded an impartial trial.’  Trimble
v. State, 300 Md. 387, 397, 478 A.2d 1143, 1148 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1230, 105 S. Ct. 1231, 84 L. Ed.2d 368 (1985).  In each case, we will ‘review
the materiality of the error in the context in which it arose, giving due regard
to whether the error was purely technical, the product of conscious design or
trial tactics or the result of bald inattention.’  Hutchinson, 287 Md. at 203, 411
A.2d [at]1038.”
Diggs v. State, 409 Md. 260, 286-87, 973 A.2d 796, 811 (2009).  Article 5 of this State’s
Declaration of Rights and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantee
the right of an accused to a jury trial:
“A defendant may elect to waive his or her right to a trial by jury and instead
be tried by the court.  The right to trial by jury is guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and by Articles 5 (entitled to
trial by jury), 21 (in all criminal prosecutions, every man has a right to trial by
an impartial jury and may only be found guilty by unanimous consent of the
jury), and 24 (due process) of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  To waive
properly the constitutionally protected right to trial by jury, the defendant must
7
elect to do so by a knowing and voluntary waiver election.  Smith v. State, 375
Md. 365, 377-80, 825 A.2d 1055, 1063 (2003).”
Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 316, 893 A.2d 1018, 1033-34 (2006)(footnote omitted);
see also  Martinez v. State, 309 Md. 124, 133, 522 A.2d 950, 954 (1987) (“The election to
waive a jury trial may be made at any time before commencement of the trial.”).  
The majority concludes that this Court cannot inquire into the instant matter because
the issue was not preserved, Boulden, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (slip op. at 19-20),
but then conducts a harmless error analysis, holding that “[w]here, under the facts and
circumstances of this case, it is clear that otherwise the waiver was made knowingly and
voluntarily, ... it is a valid waiver, even if conducted mid-trial.” Id. at ___, __ A.2d at ___
(slip op. at 30).  To justify that conclusion, it characterizes the Rule violation in this case as
a purely procedural violation, rather than a constitutional one. Id. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___
(slip op. at 20).  Rejecting, on that basis, the applicability of Martinez v. State, supra;
Mitchell v. State, 337 Md. 509, 654 A.2d 1309 (1995), and United States v. Saadya, 750 F.2d
1419 (9th Cir. 1985), on which Boulden relies,  ___ Md. at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___  (slip op.
at 13), it states:  
“[This case] is distinguish[able] from Martinez
because the post-trial inquiry process proposed in
Martinez implicated the voluntariness of the
defendant’s waiver, not simply a technical rule
violation.  In other words, the waiver in the
present case violated the rule of procedure, but the
waiver in Martinez violated the defendant’s core
constitutional right to a jury trial.  There is no
indication in this record that Boulden’s [jury] trial
waiver was anything but knowing and voluntary.”
8
Id. at ___, ___ A. 2d at ____ (slip op. at 20).   I do not agree.  Indeed, I believe that the
majority’s reasoning exalts form over substance and, in any event, the inquiry conducted into
voluntariness was deficient.
The majority is correct, of course,  the “ultimate inquiry regarding the validity of a
waiver is whether ‘there has been an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege.’” Id. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (slip op. at 8)(citing Powell v. State, 394 Md.
632, 639, 907 A.2d 242, 246 (2006)).  Rule 4-246 prescribes how this determination will be
made and, as important, when it is to be made.  The latter, the timing of the determination,
as the Rule expressly provides, occupies equal status in the Rule as does the examination on
which the determination depends.  Thus, the timing also must be considered when making
the determination whether, indeed, “there has been an intentional relinquishment.”
Consequently, the timing of the determination is not purely technical; instead, it goes to the
very heart of the fundamental right to a jury trial.  Contrary to what the majority concludes,
I believe that Martinez, Mitchell, and Saadya, are very much on point.  Indeed, what the court
in Saadya said on a related point has applicability here:
“While a constitutional guarantee may ordinarily be waived, to argue as the
government does here that a ‘failure to waive constitutes a technicality’ is to
denigrate the very existence of the constitutional right at issue.  If the failure
to waive is only a technicality, the constitutional right can be denied without
the defendant’s consent.  In such case, the right no longer has any meaning.”
Saadya, 750 F.2d at 1420-21.   The failure timely to waive, when required by Rule, is no less
substantive.
2  Some federal courts have held that there is an exception to the writing requirement
of Rule 23(a), “where the record clearly reflects ‘that the defendant ‘personally gave express
consent in open court, intelligently and knowingly.’  See United States v. Reynes, 603 F.2d
69, 71 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting United States v. Guerrero-Peralta, 446 F.2d 876, 877 (9th Cir.
1971)) (both cases addressing the requirements of Rule 23(b) under which a defendant may
proceed with a jury of less than twelve.”).”  United States v. Saadya, 750 F.2d 1419, 1420
(1985).  This Court has not, before today, recognized any exception to Rule 4-246.
9
In Saadya, the court considered the requirements of Rule 23 (a) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure with regard to the conditions that must be met in order for a defendant
to waive his right to a trial by jury.  It provided that “[c]ases required to be tried by jury shall
be so tried unless the defendant waives a jury trial in writing with the approval of the court
and the consent of the government.”  750 F.2d at 1420.  The federal rule expressly prescribed
the prerequisites for a defendant to waive his or her right to a jury trial: (1) the defendant’s
waiver must be in writing;2 (2) the court must approve the waiver; and (3) the government
must consent to the waiver. Id. In Saadya, the record contained neither an oral nor written
waiver of jury trial by the defendants, id., and there was no “approval of any waiver by the
district judge.”  Id. at 1421.  Although the rule did not expressly so provide, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that “[a] defendant’s waiver of his right to jury
trial must appear on the record prior to the time the trial commences.  The absence of a
waiver on the record of the right to trial by jury cannot be remedied by subsequent
proceedings on remand.”  Id. at 1422 (footnote omitted).
The court concluded that requiring a defendant, in a criminal case, to waive his right
to a jury trial before trial commences serves a vital purpose. 750 F.2d at 1422.  It  explained:
3  During the hearing the following colloquy between the court and Martinez took
place:
“THE COURT:
Has any person, either inside or outside of this
courthouse, made you any promise, or has anyone
threatened you in any way in order to have you give up
your right to a jury trial?
“MR. MARTINEZ: Yes.” 
Martinez v. State, 309 Md. 124, 135, 522 A.2d 950, 955. 
10
“In [United States v.] Reyes, [603 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1979)] we said that a post-
trial waiver was not sufficiently reliable and might be based on ‘subtle
coercion [that] is difficult to detect in the appellate record.’  We also said that
it was necessary for the waiver to occur on the record at the time the right was
surrendered for two related reasons: one, so that the defendant would
understand that his waiver was ‘an important step in the trial,’ and, two, so that
the judge might question the defendant and evaluate his responses at the time
the decision was made.”  
750 F.2d at 1422 n. 2. (citations omitted).
Martinez dealt with whether the defendant’s waiver of jury trial was voluntary.3
Martinez argued successfully to this Court that his waiver was not voluntary.  309 Md. at
134, 522 A.2d at 955.  In concluding that the examination of the defendant did not support
the trial court’s ruling that Martinez “voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial,” we
explained that while, “[i]n determining whether the defendant has knowingly and voluntarily
waived his right to a jury trial, the questioner need not recite any fixed incantation[, w]hether
there is an intelligent, competent waiver must depend on the unique facts and circumstances
of each case.” Id.  
Our decision in Parren v. State, discussing waiver of counsel, also is instructive: 
11
“‘The constitutional right of an accused to be represented by counsel invokes,
of itself, the protection of a trial court, in which the accused - whose life or
liberty is at stake - is without counsel.  This protecting duty imposes the
serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of determining whether
there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused.’[]  To discharge
this duty properly in light of the strong presumption against waiver of the
constitutional right to counsel, a judge must investigate as long and as
thoroughly as the circumstances of the case before him demand.  The fact that
an accused may tell him that he is informed of his right to counsel and desires
to waive this right does not automatically end the judge’s responsibility.  To
be valid such waiver must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the
charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable
punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances
in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of
the whole matter.  A judge can make certain that an accused’s professed
waiver of counsel is understandingly and wisely made only from a penetrating
and comprehensive examination of all the circumstances under which such a
plea is tendered.” (emphasis added). 
309 Md. 260, 272-73, 523 A.2d 597, 603 (1987) (quoting Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S.
708, 723-24, 68 S. Ct. 316, 323, 92 L. Ed. 309, 320-21) (plurality opinion) quoting  Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 1467 (1938); Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70, 62 S. Ct. 457, 465, 86 L. Ed. 680, 699 (1942) and citing
Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 270, 63 S. Ct. 236, 237, 87 L. Ed.
268, 270 (1942)); see also Leonard v. State, 302 Md. 111, 120, 486 A.2d 163, 167 (1985).
The trial judge’s inquiry, in the instant case, does not deal with the context in which
it occurred.  “Although the examiner may be the court, the prosecutor, and/or the defense
counsel, it is the trial court that ‘bears the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that the
accused has tendered a valid waiver.’”  Abeoukuto, 391 Md. at 317, 893 A.2d at 1034
quoting Martinez, 309 Md. at 133, n. 9, 522 A.2d at 954, n. 9.  
12
Rule 4-246 was amended in 2007, with the amendments taking effect in 2008.  There
were no substantive changes made, but the Committee did add a Committee Note which
provided examples of inquires and questions that a judge may use to determine whether a
criminal defendant’s waiver is, indeed, voluntary and knowing:
“Although the law does not require the court to use a specific form of inquiry
in determining whether a defendant’s waiver of a jury trial is knowing and
voluntary, the record must demonstrate an intentional relinquishment of a
known right.  What questions must be asked will depend upon the facts and
circumstances of the particular case. 
“In determining whether a waiver is knowing, the court should seek to ensure
that the defendant understands that: (1) the defendant has the right to a trial by
a jury; (2) unless the defendant waives a trial by jury, the case will be tried by
a jury; (3) a jury consists of 12 individuals who reside in the county where the
court is sitting, selected at random from a list that includes registered voters,
licensed drivers, and holders of identification cards issued by the Motor
Vehicle Administration, seated as jurors at the conclusion of a selection
process in which the defendant, the defendant’s attorney, and the State
participate; (4) all 12 jurors must agree on whether the defendant is guilty or
not guilty and may only convict upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt; (5) if
the jury is unable to reach a unanimous decision, a mistrial will be declared
and the State will then have the option of retrying the defendant; and (6) if the
defendant waives a jury trial, the court will not permit the defendant to change
the election unless the court finds good cause to permit the change.
“In determining whether a waiver is voluntary, the court should consider the
defendant’s responses to questions such as: (1) Are you making this decision
of your own free will?; (2) Has anyone offered or promised you anything in
exchange for giving up your right to a jury trial; (3) Has anyone threatened or
coerced you in any way regarding your decision?; and (4) Are you presently
under the influence of any medications, drugs, or alcohol?.”
These questions are largely derived from cases in which this Court has addressed the
kinds of inquiries it has deemed to be appropriate and required under Rule 4-246. See e.g.,
Martinez, 309 Md. at 133, 522 A.2d at 955 (quoting Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464, 58 S. Ct. at
13
1023, 82 L. Ed. at 1466) (“the trial judge must be satisfied that there has been ‘an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’”); Martinez, 309 Md. at 134,
522 A.2d at 955 (“court must be concerned that the waiver is not a product of duress or
coercion”); Dortch v. State, 290 Md. 229, 232, 428 A.2d 1220, 1223 (1981) (the criminal
defendant’s “‘guilt must be found to be beyond a reasonable doubt.’”); Countess, 286 Md.
at 455, 408 A.2d at 1308 (the criminal defendant must be informed that she “has the right to
be tried by a jury of 12 persons or by the court without a jury....”).   The list is, however, by
no means exhaustive and the proper inquiry is dependent upon the “unique facts and
circumstances of each case.”  Martinez, 309 Md. at 133, 522 A.2d at 955.  The questions
hypothesized in the Committee Note relate to, and apply, when the waiver examination is
conducted prior to the start of trial.   That is significant, as “[w]hat questions must be
asked...depend upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case.”  Where one of the
circumstances is, as is the case sub judice, that trial has already begun, something more than
a generic or standard litany, as suggested by the Committee Note, must be required.  The
questions that are routinely asked by a trial judge prior to the start of a criminal trial should
not be the same questions asked once trial has begun and is half complete. A defendant who
does not know that the fact that the trial has commenced is relevant to determining her
options cannot be said to have freely and voluntarily waived a known right, because she will
not have known, and could not have known, so far as the record reveals, the full nature and
extent of the default on the right.  For example, had she known that the defect in procedure
rendered what was done to date voidable, it could have aborted the trial, she could have
14
conditioned her waiver of jury trial on starting anew.  Boulden was never informed that,
although mid-trial, she would be entitled to a new trial because the trial judge failed to
conduct a waiver inquiry prior to commencement of trial.  
  The cases on which the majority relies, Robinson v. State, 410 Md. 91, 976 A.2d
1072 (2009) and Taylor v. State, 381 Md. 602, 851 A.2d 551 (2004), are inapposite. Neither
addressed the timing issue that is at issue in this case.  In Robinson, in fact, the Court
distinguished between those fundamental rights that are “absolute” and cannot be waived
unknowingly or unintelligently and those that can.  410 Md. at 102, 976 A.2d at 1079. In
holding that the “claimed violation of the right to a public trial must be preserved for
appellate review by a timely objection at trial,” 410 Md. at 110, 976 A.2d at 1083, we
explained:
“The right to a public trial, though ‘fundamental,’ is not within the ‘narrow
band of rights that courts have traditionally required an individual knowingly
and intelligently [to] relinquish or abandon in order to waive the right or
claim.’  Hunt v. State, 345 Md. 122, 138, 691 A.2d 1255, 1262 (1997).
Unlike, say, the rights to a jury trial, to counsel, and to require the State to
prove its case, which are absolute and can only be foregone by the defendant’s
affirmative ‘intelligent and knowing’ waiver, the right to a public trial is
subject to the balance of competing concerns.”
410 Md. at 107-08, 976 A.2d at 1082 (footnote omitted). Thus, we affirmed that jury trial can
only be waived if done voluntarily and knowingly.  
As to Taylor, we held “that petitioner failed to preserve the double jeopardy issue for
review because no objections or motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy were raised in
15
the trial court in this case (or in the original case).  The double jeopardy [defense] was first
presented on appellate review.”  381 Md. at 604, 851 A.2d at 552.   The test for waiver is not
the same for double jeopardy and jury trial.  Unlike a right to jury trial, the defense of double
jeopardy is required to be raised by the defense; only if timely raised will the court  conduct
an inquiry to determine its viability.   On the other hand, in the case of jury trial waiver, the
onus is on the trial court to ensure that the defendant has elected a court or jury trial and, if
the former, whether he or she has done so voluntarily and knowingly. See Md. Rule 4-246.
III.
It is the trial judge’s burden to ensure that, when appropriate, there is in the record a
waiver pursuant to, and in compliance with, Rule 4-246.  The majority, by its holding that
“Boulden waived her right to complain about the timing and effectiveness of the jury trial
waiver colloquy,” Boulden, __ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (slip op. at 10), overlooks , if not
disregards, this duty of the trial judge.   The Court reasons:
“We determine...that Boulden waived her right to complain about the tardy
jury trial waiver colloquy.  At the beginning of the trial, Petitioner did not
object when asked by the trial judge ‘are we going forward with a court trial?’
Instead, defense counsel answered affirmatively.  Moreover, defense counsel
could have objected to the failure to place on the record Boulden’s waiver of
her right to a trial by jury when the State brought the error to everyone’s
attention at the close of the State’s case-in-chief and before the defense was to
put on its case.  The defense could have moved for a mistrial....
[A]pproximately two months passed after the conclusion of Boulden’s trial
until the hearing on her motion for new trial and sentencing.  She filed a
motion for a new trial and an amendment to that motion one month after trial
ended, in neither of which was the timing of the jury trial waiver raised.
Petitioner, who was represented by counsel throughout the trial and post-
verdict proceedings, had ample opportunity to object to the tardy jury trial
4It is important to note that we have recognized a number of responsibilities given to
a trial judge that can never be shifted.  See White v. State, 374 Md. 232, 242, 821 A.2d 459,
464 (2003) (“It is the responsibility of the trial judge, not the juror, to make the final
determination as to whether the juror can be impartial.”); Tharp v. State, 362 Md. 77, 101,
763 A.2d 151, 163 (2000) (“[I]n those situations when a trial judge reasonably should
recognize that an apparent or obvious misuse of sequestration may be afoot, the judge has
the right and responsibility, even absent an objection by a party, to inquire and make any
required findings or take action as may be appropriate to the circumstances.”) (emphasis
added); State v. Brown, 342 Md. 404, 431, 676 A.2d 513, 526 (1996) (“The onus ... [was]
not on Respondent to interrupt a discussion between the court and his attorney to offer an
explanation, but rather the responsibility is on the trial judge to ensure that the reason for
requesting dismissal of counsel is explained.”). 
16
waiver.” 
Id. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (slip op. at 19-20).
Rule 4-246, I repeat, places the onus on the trial judge to determine whether the right
to a jury trial has been knowingly and voluntarily waived.4  The major actor, in that regard,
is the trial judge and not the criminal defendant.  The defendant is the recipient of the benefit
that the Rule is intended to confer.  There is no burden on the defendant in that regard.  To
require a defendant to assert an objection to the trial judge’s default or inaction is
impermissibly to  shift the burden from the trial judge to the defendant.  As the New Jersey
Supreme Court explained, “[t]he obligation of the judge...is not satisfied by lip service.  He
is not at liberty to shift to the shoulders of the jury his own responsibility.  Such action
undermines the integrity of the administration of justice.”  New Jersey v. Driver, 183 A.2d
655, 669 (N.J. 1962).  The same reasoning applies when the attempt is to shift the burden to
a criminal defendant.
17
To permit the trial judge “to shift...his own responsibility,” id., onto Boulden would
undermine the very purpose of Rule 4-246.  We should encourage, if not insist, that trial
judges know and follow the Rules promulgated by this Court to ensure the efficient and
orderly processing of cases.  We should be vigilant  to see that they follow through on their
assigned responsibility to ensure the integrity of the administration of justice.  The trial judge
is the responsible person under our Rules for the conduct of trials and for ensuring their
integrity.   Pursuant to Rule 4-246, the trial judge is responsible to see that a defendant’s
election of mode of trial is timely and, when it is a court trial, to ensure that the qualifying
examination of the defendant also is timely and sufficient to assess the voluntariness of that
election.  The trial court abdicated that responsibility in this case.  Rather than address that
abdication, we insist on accusing the defendant, for whose benefit we promulgated the Rules.
The result is to give the trial court no incentive to “get it right.”  The message we send to trial
judges is, “don’t worry, the Rule really does not mean what it says and it will not be strictly
enforced.  If the defendant does not object to your having failed to do what you were required
by the Rule to do, he or she will have waived the violation.”   This message, sadly, in related
contexts, has been and is being sent with increasing frequency.  See Walker v. State, 406 Md.
369, 958 A.2d 915 (2008), Broadwater v. State, 401 Md. 175, 931 A.2d 1098 (2007),
Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 893 A.2d 1018 (2006).  This is no way to run a justice
system.  
I dissent. 
18
Judge Greene joins in the views expressed in this dissenting opinion.