Title: 2200 Carnegie, LLC v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Revision

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
2200 Carnegie, L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5691.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-5691 
2200 CARNEGIE, L.L.C., APPELLEE, v . CUYAHOGA COUNTY BOARD OF 
REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES; CLEVELAND MUNICIPAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
BOARD OF EDUCATION, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as 2200 Carnegie, L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip 
Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5691.] 
(No. 2011-2147—Submitted August 22, 2012—Decided December 6, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 96646, 195 Ohio 
App.3d 713, 2011-Ohio-5397. 
____________________ 
CUPP, J. 
{¶ 1} When a complaint has been filed that contests the county auditor’s 
valuation of a particular parcel, and when that complaint asks for a value increase 
or reduction of $17,500 or more, R.C. 5715.19(B) requires that “[w]ithin thirty 
days after the last date such complaints may be filed, the auditor shall give notice 
of [the] complaint” to the other affected party that did not file the complaint—be 
it the property owner or the board of education.  That notice affords the recipient 
the opportunity to file a countercomplaint and make itself a party to the 
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proceedings.  Id.  This case presents the question whether that notification is a 
jurisdictional prerequisite to further proceedings before the board of revision and, 
if so, whether the 30-day deadline itself is jurisdictional. 
{¶ 2} We hold that, under R.C. 5715.19(B), the notification itself is 
jurisdictional, but the 30-day requirement is not.  As a result, the original failure 
of the auditor in this case to give notice (or to prove that notice had been given) 
was cured when notice was later given after remand by the court of common 
pleas.  Because the Eighth District Court of Appeals held the contrary, we reverse 
its decision. 
Facts 
{¶ 3} On March 27, 2007, appellant, the Cleveland Municipal School 
District Board of Educaton (“school board”) filed a valuation complaint seeking 
an increase in the value of the property of appellee 2200 Carnegie, L.L.C., for tax 
year 2006 on account of a recent arm’s-length sale.  The true-value increase 
sought by the school board was $97,800. 
{¶ 4} The record shows a letter dated April 27, 2007, from the auditor to 
the property owner, informing 2200 Carnegie of the filing of the complaint.  
Pursuant to R.C. 5715.02, the auditor is a member of the Cuyahoga County Board 
of Revision, also an appellee.  Although the face of the letter indicates certified 
mailing, the record does not contain the documentation of the mailing.  2200 
Carnegie asserts that it never received the notification, the school board does not 
contend otherwise, and the tribunals below accepted as the premise for deciding 
the case that the notice required by R.C. 5715.19(B) had not been given. 
{¶ 5} But 2200 Carnegie did receive notification of the hearing on the 
complaint pursuant to R.C. 5715.19(C) to be held on August 30, 2007.  On that 
date, it filed a motion to dismiss.  Attached to the motion was an affidavit 
attesting that the owner had not received any notification that the complaint had 
been filed.  The motion argued that because the owner had not received 
January Term, 2012 
 
3
notification of the filing of the complaint, R.C. 5715.19(B) had been violated, and 
therefore, the board was forever without jurisdiction to proceed on the complaint.  
For those reasons, 2200 Carnegie urged that the case be dismissed. 
{¶ 6} The board of revision nevertheless conducted the hearing and, 
implicitly overruling 2200 Carnegie’s motion to dismiss, the board issued an 
order dated October 11, 2007 that increased the property’s value to its recent sale 
price.  2200 Carnegie appealed to the common pleas court from the board’s 
decision, and on September 6, 2008, the common pleas court remanded with 
instruction that notification of the complaint be given to 2200 Carnegie under 
R.C. 5715.19(B) and that further proceedings be held.  On remand, notification 
was issued, another hearing was held, and by order dated August 6, 2009, the 
board once again increased the property’s value to the sale price. 
{¶ 7} 2200 Carnegie again appealed to the common pleas court, which 
affirmed the board’s increase of value on March 9, 2011.  Next, 2200 Carnegie 
appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals. 
{¶ 8} On October 20, 2011, the court of appeals issued its decision.  
2200 Carnegie, L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 195 Ohio App.3d 713, 
2011-Ohio-5397, 961 N.E.2d 726.  The majority of a divided panel agreed with 
2200 Carnegie that the failure of the auditor to give notice within the 30-day time 
frame prescribed by the statute permanently barred jurisdiction to hear the 
complaint, and the defect, being jurisdictional, was not curable.  Id. at ¶ 13.  A 
dissenting opinion relied on Knickerbocker Properties, Inc. XLII v. Delaware Cty. 
Bd. of Revision, 119 Ohio St.3d 233, 2008-Ohio-3192, 893 N.E.2d 457, ¶ 13, in 
concluding that (1) compliance with R.C. 5715.19(B) is not jurisdictional and (2) 
a failure to notify may be cured by ordering that the requisite notice be given. 
{¶ 9} We accepted the school board’s motion for discretionary appeal, 
2200 Carnegie, L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 131 Ohio St.3d 1483, 
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2012-Ohio-1143, 963 N.E.2d 824, and we now reverse the judgment of the court 
of appeals. 
Analysis 
{¶ 10} This appeal calls upon the court to determine whether R.C. 
5715.19(B)’s requirement of notification within 30 days of the last day for filing 
valuation complaints is a prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction by the board 
of revision.  In the area of administrative procedure, jurisdictional issues that call 
for construction of the statutes present questions of law that we review de novo on 
appeal.  Akron Centre Plaza, L.L.C. v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Revision, 128 Ohio 
St.3d 145, 2010-Ohio-5035, 942 N.E.2d 1054, ¶ 10. 
I 
{¶ 11} An owner or a board of education that is dissatisfied with the value 
found by the auditor for a particular tax year may challenge that valuation before 
the board of revision by filing a complaint.  The complaint must be filed pursuant 
to R.C. 5715.19(A) by March 31 of the “ensuing tax year” after the tax year at 
issue, and the filing of that complaint must be in accordance with the statutory 
requirements for the board of revision to exercise jurisdiction.  Compare Am. 
Restaurant & Lunch Co. v. Glander, 147 Ohio St. 147, 151, 70 N.E.2d 93 (1946) 
(“It must be conceded that the filing of the required notice of appeal [from the tax 
commissioner’s determination to the BTA] must be within the time prescribed by 
the statute* * *”); accord Worthington City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. 
Bd. of Revision, 127 Ohio St.3d 27, 2009-Ohio-5932, 918 N.E.2d 972, ¶ 17 
(“[W]e have consistently treated full compliance with R.C. 5717.19 as an 
indispensible prerequisite for the exercise of jurisdiction by a board of revision”). 
{¶ 12} Other divisions of R.C. 5715.19(A) set forth additional 
requirements that govern proceedings before the boards of revision.  Most 
importantly for this case, as previously mentioned, R.C. 5715.19(B) requires the 
board of revision to notify certain property owners, like appellee, that a complaint 
January Term, 2012 
 
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has been filed.  That notice is to be provided within 30 days of the last day for 
filing valuation complaints—i.e., the end of April of the year following the tax 
year at issue.  See R.C. 5715.19(A)(1).  Next, R.C. 5715.19(C) requires the board 
of revision to provide notice of the hearing to the complainant and to the owner (if 
different) no fewer than 10 days before the scheduled hearing. 
{¶ 13} The parties recognize that our decision in Knickerbocker, 119 Ohio 
St.3d 233, 2008-Ohio-3192, 893 N.E.2d 457, is crucial to the proper resolution of 
this case.  Knickerbocker addresses both R.C. 5715.19(B), which provides for 
notification of the complaint, and 5715.19(C), which provides for notification of 
the hearing.  The property owner had argued that the board of education’s 
valuation complaint was jurisdictionally defective on two grounds.  First, the 
owner claimed that the complaint was defective because it set forth the wrong 
address for the owner, and as a result, the board of revision had sent the complaint 
notification to the wrong address.  Second, the owner contended that it had not 
been notified of the hearing under R.C. 5715.19(C), because that notification had 
also been sent to the wrong address. 
{¶ 14} With 
respect 
to 
the 
notification 
of 
the 
filing                               
of the complaint under R.C. 5715.19(B), we held that placing the proper address 
on the valuation complaint did not constitute a jurisdictional prerequisite because 
R.C. 5715.19(B) made it the auditor’s duty to ascertain the property owner’s 
address and send the complaint to the proper address.  Id. at ¶ 10, 12, 14.  
Moreover, we noted that there was no actual default under R.C. 5715.19(B), 
because the notification had been forwarded by the recipient to the owner within 
the statutory time frame.  The owner had had the time to file a countercomplaint 
and did in fact timely ask for a continuance of the hearing.  Id. at ¶ 4, 16, fn. 2. 
{¶ 15} As for the owner’s argument that it had not been timely notified of 
the board of revision hearing, we held that the failure to notify of the hearing as 
required by R.C. 5715.19(C) did involve a jurisdictional defect.  Id. at ¶ 18.  The 
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hearing had been held with no appearance by the owner, and the board of revision 
issued its decision, sending it first to the wrong address, then to the correct 
address.  When the owner appealed to the BTA, that board rejected its 
jurisdictional argument and adopted the board of education’s proposed valuation.  
On appeal we reversed, holding that lack of notice of the board of revision 
hearing was a jurisdictional defect, but that it could be corrected on remand.  Id. at 
¶ 18, 24. 
{¶ 16} Against this backdrop 2200 Carnegie argues that R.C. 5715.19(B) 
is jurisdictional, both with regard to giving notification of the filing of the 
complaint, and with regard to the 30-day timeframe for doing so.  The school 
board argues that neither the notification nor the timing is jurisdictional.  In the 
alternative, the school board argues that the time limit is not jurisdictional even if 
the notification requirement is. 
II 
{¶ 17} R.C. 5715.19(B) provides, “within thirty days after the last date 
such complaints can be filed”—i.e., the end of April, since complaints for the 
preceding year’s assessment must be filed no later than March 31 of the ensuing 
year, R.C. 5715.19(A)(1)—the auditor “shall give notice of each complaint in 
which 
the 
stated 
amount 
of 
overvaluation, 
discriminatory 
valuation, 
undervaluation, illegal valuation, or incorrect determination is at least seventeen 
thousand five hundred dollars.”  That notice must be given to the owner if the 
owner did not file the original complaint, and it must be given to each school 
board whose district “may be affected by the complaint.”  Id.  The section next 
authorizes, “[w]ithin thirty days after receiving such notice,” the filing of another 
complaint—a countercomplaint—disputing the original complaint; by filing that 
countercomplaint, the filer becomes a “complainant” and a “party” who is entitled 
to participation and to notice in the proceedings.  R.C. 5715.19(C) requires that 
notice of the board of revision hearing be provided to the owner and to every 
January Term, 2012 
 
7
complainant.  R.C. 5715.20 mandates that the board of revision’s decision be 
transmitted to the owner and to the complainant. 
{¶ 18} On its face, then, the statute shows the purpose of the notification 
requirement:  to run the time for filing a countercomplaint, the filing of which 
makes the countercomplainant a party to the case.  Notice must be timely, so that 
the affected entity has a meaningful opportunity to file a countercomplaint. 
{¶ 19} Under the most sweeping version of its argument, the school board 
contends that division (B)’s requirement are not jurisdictional because division 
(C) assures that notice will be given of the hearing at the board of revision 
regardless of whether an affected party has received notice of the filing of the 
complaint.  The school board cites our disposition of the R.C. 5715.19(B) issue in 
Knickerbocker for the proposition that the notification of the filing of the 
complaint is not jurisdictionally essential. 
{¶ 20} We disagree.  In Knickerbocker, we found no jurisdictional defect 
under R.C. 5715.19(B) even though the notice was sent to the wrong address—
but in that case, the address error had proved harmless, because the record showed 
that the mailing had been timely forwarded to the property owner.  
Knickerbocker, 119 Ohio St.3d 233, 2008-Ohio-3192, 893 N.E.2d 457, ¶ 4.  
Knickerbocker does not address a situation like this one, where the record lacks 
evidence of mailing and indicates that the mailing was never in fact received. 
{¶ 21} Moreover, although R.C. 5715.19(C) does require that an owner 
receive notice of a board of revision hearing whether or not the owner has filed a 
complaint, the same is not true of a board of education.  As a result, if an owner 
files a complaint seeking a decrease of more than $17,500 in value, the only way 
a board of education can be assured of notice of the hearing is to first receive 
notice of the complaint, so that it can file a countercomplaint and thereby become 
a party to the proceeding. 
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{¶ 22} Additionally, status as a complainant is essential for a board of 
education to be entitled to receive notice of the BOR’s decision under R.C. 
5715.20.  And if an owner files an appeal at the BTA or in a common pleas court, 
status as a party before the board of revision is essential for a board of education 
to receive notice of the filing of that appeal as well.  R.C 5717.01 (appeal to the 
Board of Tax Appeals); 5717.05 (appeal to the court of common pleas). 
{¶ 23} While most essential when the owner is the complainant, the 
notification under R.C. 5715.19(B) is also extremely useful when the board of 
education is the complainant.  For even though a property owner is entitled to 
notice of hearings and decisions connected with its property regardless of whether 
it has filed a complaint, the property owner itself is better equipped to defend a 
valuation case if it receives early notice of the complaint and has the opportunity 
to file a countercomplaint. 
{¶ 24} For all these reasons, we hold that the notification requirement of 
R.C. 5715.19(B) is jurisdictional because it “runs to the core of procedural 
efficiency” by furnishing the basic notice that is essential to the proper conduct of 
the administrative proceedings.  See Salem Med. Arts & Dev. Corp., 80 Ohio 
St.3d at 623, 687 N.E.2d 746.  Our decision accords with Knickerbocker in that 
we held that the failure to give proper hearing notice under R.C. 5715.19(C) 
required that the case be remanded for a “do-over” of the notification and the 
hearing.  Id., ¶ 24. 
III 
{¶ 25} We now turn to the more modest, alternative argument advanced 
by the school board:  that the notification itself is essential and jurisdictional, but 
that the 30-day requirement is not.  With this assertion we agree. 
{¶ 26} Our holding that the notification of the complaint under R.C. 
5715.19(B) is jurisdictional does not mean that the prescribed time for performing 
the notification is also jurisdictional.  Indeed, unlike the need for a party to perfect 
January Term, 2012 
 
9
its appeal within a prescribed period, we have typically held that statutory time 
requirements imposed on administrative officials or agencies are “directory” 
rather than “mandatory.”   See Hardy v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Revision, 106 Ohio 
St.3d 359, 2005-Ohio-5319, 835 N.E.2d 348, ¶ 22 (“Yet, ‘ “[a]s a general rule, a 
statute providing a time for performance of an official duty will be construed as 
directory so far as time for performance is concerned, especially where the statute 
fixes the time simply for convenience of orderly procedure” ’ ”), quoting State ex 
rel. Ragozine v. Shaker, 96 Ohio St.3d 201, 2002-Ohio-3992, 772 N.E.2d 1192, ¶ 
13, quoting State ex rel. Jones v. Farrar, 146 Ohio St. 467, 66 N.E.2d 531 (1946), 
paragraph three of the syllabus.  The difference between a directory requirement 
and a mandatory one is that a violation of the directory requirement does not 
constitute a jurisdictional defect.  Hardy, ¶ 22; Ragozine, ¶ 11-14 (failure to 
comply with a requirement that the trial court hold a hearing within 30 days of the 
filing of the complaint did not deprive the court of jurisdiction to act). 
{¶ 27} In concluding that the board of revision lacked jurisdiction, the 
Eighth District Court of Appeals confused the concededly jurisdictional timeline 
for perfecting an appeal with the nonjurisdictional 30-day requirement of R.C. 
5715.19(B).  Determining whether a deadline is jurisdictional involves “a 
consideration of the entire act, its nature, its effect and the consequences which 
would result from construing it one way or another.”  Jones, 146 Ohio St. at 472, 
66 N.E.2d 531.  In this regard, conferring jurisdictional significance on the 30-day 
time limit would violate basic fairness, given that an administrative official is the 
one required to act.  Unlike the requirement that an administrative proceeding be 
timely instituted, which is an act within the control of the instigating party, the 
timeliness of the auditor’s action in the present case lies outside the control of 
either the owner or the school board. 1   
                                                 
1 It is true that the auditor and the board of revision may themselves ultimately become parties to 
the proceedings instituted through the filing of a valuation complaint under R.C. 5715.19.  See 
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{¶ 28} It would be manifestly unjust to the complaining party (be that the 
school board, as in this case, or the owner) to deprive it of a hearing before the 
board of revision on account of a default by the auditor, whose actions and 
omissions the complainant does not control.  While we do not condone any 
departure from the duties imposed by R.C. 5715.19(B), we decline to “find or 
enforce jurisdictional barriers not clearly statutorily or constitutionally mandated, 
which tend to deprive a supplicant of a fair review of his complaint on the 
merits.” 
{¶ 29} Nucorp Inc. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Revision, 64 Ohio St.2d 20, 
22, 412 N.E.2d 947 (1980). 
Conclusion 
{¶ 30} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the court of appeals erred 
when it ordered that the school board’s complaint should have been dismissed.  
We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and thereby reinstate 
the decision of the common pleas court. 
 
 
 
 
    Judgment reversed. 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., 
concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER, J. dissent. 
____________________________ 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 31} Pursuant to the plain language of R.C. 5715.19(B), the auditor 
must notify the property owner and the board of education of a tax-assessment 
                                                                                                                                     
R.R.Z. Assoc. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 38 Ohio St.3d 198, 200-201, 527 N.E.2d 874 
(1988) (board of revision and auditor may present evidence and advance arguments as parties at 
the Board of Tax Appeals); R.C. 5717.01 (auditor may appeal a board of revision determination to 
the BTA).  But for purposes of his duties pursuant to R.C. 5715.19(B), the auditor functions 
primarily as the tax assessor and as the secretary of the board of revision, which is the agency that 
adjudicates the valuation complaint.  R.C. 5715.01(B) (county auditor is the real property tax 
assessor); 5715.09 (auditor is secretary of the board of revision).  
January Term, 2012 
 
11
complaint filed under R.C. 5715.19(A)(1).  Because the auditor failed to notify 
2200 Carnegie, L.L.C. within 30 days of the last date that complaints could be 
filed, the board of revision was without jurisdiction to consider the complaint.  I 
would affirm the judgment consistent with the reasoning of the court of appeals.  I 
dissent. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
 
____________________________ 
 
Zukerman, Daiker & Lear Co., L.P.A., S. Michael Lear and Larry W. 
Zukerman, for appellee 2200 Carnegie L.L.C. 
 
Hewitt Law L.L.C., and James H. Hewitt III, for appellant. 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor 
General, Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor, and Daniel W. Fausey, 
Assistant Attorney General, urging reversal for amicus curiae state of Ohio. 
____________________________