Title: State ex rel. Baker v. Strange

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

State ex rel. Baker v. Strange1998 WY 82960 P.2d 1016Case Number: 97-72Decided: 07/02/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

The 
STATE of Wyoming, ex rel., Joel BAKER and Bonnie Baker, husband and wife, 
Appellants (Petitioners),

v.

Larry STRANGE, in his capacity as Building Inspector 
for the City of Green River, Appellee (Respondent).

 

Appeal from the District Court, Sweetwater County, 
Jere Ryckman, J.

 

Richard Mathey of Reese 
& Mathey, Green River, for 
Appellants(Petitioners).

Ford T. Bussart of Bussart, 
West, Rossetti, Piaia & Tyler, P.C., Rock Springs, for 
Appellee(Respondent).

 

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and TAYLOR,* JJ.

 * Chief Justice at the time of oral 
argument.

 

THOMAS, Justice.

 [¶1] The only question in this case is whether Joel 
Baker and Bonnie Baker (the Bakers) were foreclosed from the remedy of mandamus 
because they had an adequate remedy at law in the form of judicial review of the 
decision of Larry Strange (Strange), the Building Inspector for the City of 
Green River. The district court denied the Bakers' Petition for a Writ of 
Mandamus on the ground that they did have an adequate remedy at law. The Bakers 
contended that judicial review was not an adequate remedy because the ten day 
period for seeking judicial review under the ordinance of the City of Green 
River expired before they knew of the unlawful nature of Strange's action in granting a building permit to 
their neighbor. We hold that the period for seeking judicial review was governed 
by statute not the Green River ordinance, but that the Bakers failed to pursue 
judicial review within a reasonable time after they knew of the violation. The 
Order of Dismissal entered in the district court is 
affirmed.

 

[¶2] In the Brief of 
Appellants, filed on behalf of the Bakers, the issue is limited to resolution 
under the city ordinance, and is stated in this way:

 

Whether the trial court erred in its interpretation 
of § 1.6(E)(1) of the Zoning Ordinance of the City of Green 
River.

 

This statement of the issues 
is set forth in the Brief of Appellee, filed on behalf of Strange, in his 
capacity as building inspector for the City of Green 
River:

 

1. 
Whether the trial court correctly interpreted the meaning and effect of § 
1.6(E)(1) of the zoning ordinance of the City of Green 
River?

 

2. 
Whether the trial court correctly concluded that mandamus was precluded by 
Appellants' failure to exhaust their administrative 
remedies?

 

3. 
Whether the trial court correctly concluded that Appellants' Petition for Writ 
of Mandamus would not lie due to the availability of an adequate remedy at 
law?

 

Appellants' Reply Brief 
simply recited the issues listed in the Brief of Appellee.

 

[¶3] The Bakers owned a lot 
in Green River across the alley from Bob Lewis (Lewis). On August 29, 1995, 
Strange, the building inspector for the City of Green River, issued a building 
permit to Lewis. The permit authorized Lewis to construct a building on his lot 
provided that the building conformed in all respects to the ordinances of the 
City of Green River. Lewis commenced construction pursuant to the authorization 
of the permit in the fall of 1995. The Bakers monitored the construction of the 
building from September 1995 until it 
was completed.

 

[¶4] The Bakers did not 
suspect any violation of the zoning ordinances until the structure was framed on 
November 21, 1995. They then spent the next five months, until April 11, 1996, 
investigating zoning violations. The Bakers concluded that the structure was in 
violation of at least nine sections of the zoning ordinance of the City of Green 
River. In an attempt to remedy these violations, on April 11, 1996, the Bakers 
wrote to Strange demanding he enforce the zoning ordinance. Other than the 
letter to Strange, the Bakers took no action to resolve the problem before any 
agency of the City of Green River.

 

[¶5] Strange had not 
responded to the Baker's request by July 19, 1996, and they filed a Petition for 
Writ of Mandamus seeking to require him to enforce the zoning ordinance and 
correct the zoning violations. Strange moved to dismiss the Bakers' petition on 
the ground that they had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. In ruling on 
the issues, the district court did not strictly apply the ordinance of the City 
of Green River, but it held that the Bakers could have pursued their 
administrative remedy within ten days after they learned of the 
violation.

 

[¶6] The essential facts 
concerning the attempt by the Bakers to pursue administrative review are not 
disputed by the parties, and whether an adequate remedy at law was available is 
a question of law for the court. It was appropriate for the district court to 
rule on the case as a matter of law. See Board of County Com'rs v. Geringer, 941 P.2d 742, 745 (Wyo. 1997); Hermreck v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 938 P.2d 863, 866 (Wyo. 1997). Our review of rulings of law is plenary. In accomplishing 
that review, we do not accord deference to the district court's determination of 
those issues. V-1 Oil Co. v. State, 934 P.2d 740, 742 (Wyo. 1997); Griess v. 
Office of the Atty. Gen., Div. of 
Criminal Investigation, 932 P.2d 734, 736 (Wyo. 1997); Pete Lien & Sons, 
Inc. v. Ellsworth Peck Const. Co., 896 P.2d 761, 762 (Wyo. 1995); Harbel v. 
Wintermute, 883 P.2d 359, 362 (Wyo. 1994).

 

[¶7] The Bakers' contention 
in the trial court and in their appeal is that they had no adequate remedy at 
law because the period of time for seeking review before the board of adjustment 
had expired before they learned of the violations of the zoning ordinance. The 
ordinance addresses appeals with this language:

 

          
(E) Appeals:

 

(1) Any order or decision of the designated 
enforcement official relating to structures may be appealed to the board of 
adjustment by any person or agency aggrieved by any such order or decision. 
Any such appeal shall be taken within ten (10) days from the date of the 
action appealed from by filing a notice of appeal specifying the grounds for 
the appeal with the secretary of the board and a copy of the notice of appeal 
with the designated enforcement official. Forms shall be provided for this 
purpose. Upon receipt of a notice of appeal, the designated enforcement official 
shall transmit to the board of adjustment all of the original documents, or true 
copies thereof, constituting the record upon which the action           
appealed from was taken.

 

Green River Zoning Ordinance 
App. B § 1.6(E)(1) (1987) (emphasis added). The Bakers argue that the order or 
decision by Strange was the issuance of the building permit on August 29, 1995, 
and they did not learn of the violations of the zoning ordinance until almost 
three months later. If the ordinance were the only articulation of a right to 
seek review of the zoning permit, the position of the Bakers would be 
appealing.

 

[¶8] The right of review 
from a city agency in such instances, however, also is addressed by this 
language in our Wyoming statutes:

 

(a) Any aggrieved person or any officer, department, 
board or bureau of the city or town affected by any decision of the 
administrative officer may appeal to the board. Appeals shall be taken within a 
reasonable time as provided by the rules of the board by filing with the officer 
from whom the appeal is taken and with the board a notice of appeal specifying 
the grounds therefor. The officer from whom the appeal is taken shall 
immediately transmit to the board the complete record of the action from which 
the appeal is taken.

 

WYO. STAT. § 15-1-607(a) 
(1992) (emphasis added). The provisions of the statute and the ordinance are not 
consistent. Under the statute the appeal is to be taken within a reasonable 
time, while that time is limited to ten days by the Green River zoning 
ordinance. The authority of a municipality to adopt a zoning ordinance is 
limited by state statute, and the general grant of power to municipalities to 
adopt zoning laws in the interest of public welfare does not permit the local 
governing bodies to override the state law and the policies supporting it. City 
of Green River v. Debernardi Const. Co., Inc., 816 P.2d 1287, 1290-91 (Wyo. 
1991); Vandehei Developers v. Public Service Com'n of Wyoming, 790 P.2d 1282, 
1286-87 (Wyo. 1990). See also, River Springs Ltd. Liability Co. v. Board of 
County Com'rs of Teton, 899 P.2d 1329, 1337 (Wyo. 1995) (a county may only 
regulate mineral activity in such a way that it does not conflict with state 
regulation). The justification for this rule of law is that municipalities have 
no sovereignty independent from that of the state, and the only power available 
to them is the power that has been delegated to them by the state. City of Green 
River, 816 P.2d  at 1290; K N Energy, Inc. v. City of Casper, 755 P.2d 207, 210 
(Wyo. 1988). The statute takes precedence over the municipal ordinance, and the 
Bakers had the right to appeal to the board of adjustment within a reasonable 
time. In this aspect of the case, we 
agree with the suggestion of the district court that the reasonable time would 
not begin to run until the Bakers learned of the violation; requiring them to 
seek review earlier would not be reasonable.

 

[¶9] We turn then to the 
chronology of the material events. It is clear that the Bakers, after learning 
of the apparent zoning violations, did not take any action with respect to them, 
other than sending a letter to Strange requesting that he remedy the zoning 
violations.  When a plain and 
adequate remedy at law is available, the writ of mandamus is not an appropriate 
remedy. Allendale Water and Sewer Dist. v. State ex rel. Hansuld, 919 P.2d 146, 
149 (Wyo. 1996); LeBeau v. State ex rel. White, 377 P.2d 302, 304 (Wyo. 
1963).  Mandamus is not intended to 
serve the purpose of other remedies, and it is not available as a substitute for 
an appeal. Allendale Water and Sewer 
Dist., 919 P.2d  at 149; State ex rel. Sweetwater County School Dist. No. One v. 
Ohman, 895 P.2d 49, 54 (Wyo. 1995).

 

[¶10] This case is very 
similar to State ex rel. Epp v. Mayor, 894 P.2d 590 (Wyo. 1995). In State ex 
rel. Epp, a member of the town architecture committee sought mandamus against 
town officials seeking to force the removal of a building claimed to have been 
erected in violation of the town zoning ordinances. State ex rel. Epp, 894 P.2d  
at 591. We held in that case that the remedy of mandamus was not appropriate 
because the party had failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not pursuing 
the action through the local board of adjustment. State ex rel. Epp, 894 P.2d  at 
596. In this case, the Bakers made no effort to obtain review of the 
issuance of the permit by the board of 
adjustment. They simply assumed that they were excused from doing that because 
the ten day period under the city ordinance had expired by the time they learned 
of the violations. In light of our holding that they had a reasonable time to 
seek review before the board of adjustments after they learned of the violation, 
however, they are not excused from pursuing the legal remedy. We need not 
address, as the district court did not address under the city ordinance, the 
question of when the reasonable time expired. The pertinent feature in this case 
is that, like the petitioner in State ex rel. Epp, the Bakers made no effort to 
pursue an available administrative remedy. That precludes them from seeking 
relief by way of a petition for writ of mandamus.

 

[¶11] The Order of Dismissal 
entered in the district court is affirmed.