Title: State v. Glaspey

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  November 18, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
JAMES LEWIS GLASPEY,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 00FE0217AB; CA A112752; SC S50105)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 8, 2004.
Rankin Johnson IV, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review.  With him on
the brief were Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director, Office of
Public Defense Services, and Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender.
Katherine H. Waldo, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. 
With her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and
Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.**
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
*Appeal from Deschutes County Circuit Court, Alta J. Brady, Judge. 184 Or App 170, 53 P3d 562 (2002).
**Kistler, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
GILLETTE, J.
In this criminal action, defendant seeks review of a
Court of Appeals decision affirming his convictions on two counts
of felony assault in the fourth degree.  Defendant contends that
the conduct and circumstances underpinning the convictions cannot
support two separate felony convictions.  We agree with defendant
and, accordingly, reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Defendant was charged with two counts of fourth-degree
assault, ORS 163.160, based on a single incident of "caus[ing]
physical injury" to a single person -- his wife. (1)
  Fourth-degree assault ordinarily is a Class A misdemeanor.  ORS
163.160(2).  However, the legislature has categorized fourth-degree assault as a Class C felony if the offense is committed
under certain specified circumstances, including when
"[t]he assault is committed in the immediate
presence of, or is witnessed by, the person's or the
victim's minor child or stepchild or a minor child
residing within the household of the person or the
victim."
ORS 163.160(3).
In the present case, the couple's two children
witnessed defendant's assault on his wife.  That fact prompted
the district attorney to charge defendant with two counts of
felony fourth-degree assault on the theory that each of the two
child witnesses was a victim of the crime and that defendant had
committed a separate felony offense with respect to each child. 
That theory relies on ORS 161.067(2), which provides:
"When the same conduct or criminal episode, though
violating only one statutory provision involves two or
more victims, there are as many separately punishable
offenses as there are victims." 
Defendant did not object to the indictment on any
ground and, in fact, pleaded no contest to both charges. 
However, at sentencing, defendant argued that the two counts must
"merge for sentencing purposes."  The trial court overruled that
objection, entered both convictions, and imposed two separate but
concurrent sentences.  
Defendant appealed, assigning error to the trial
court's decision to enter two convictions for a single assault. 
Defendant argued, in particular, that the two child witnesses
were not "victims," either for purposes of the crime that ORS
163.160(3)(c) defines or for purposes of ORS 161.067(2).  A
majority of the Court of Appeals disagreed, finding evidence in
the text and context of those two statutes that the legislature
intended   
"that children who witness a domestic assault be
considered victims for purposes of determining whether
the defendant may be separately punished for each
conviction arising from the assault."
State v. Glaspey, 184 Or App 170, 180, 55 P3d 562 (2002). (2)
 
We allowed defendant's petition for review.  
Before this court, defendant contends that the Court of
Appeals misconstrued the legislative intent behind ORS 163.160
and ORS 161.067(2).  Defendant argues that, at least for purposes
of determining whether a defendant may be convicted of multiple
offenses of fourth-degree assault under ORS 163.160(3)(c) based
on a single act of assault against a single person, the only
"victim" is the direct victim, i.e., the person who is physically
injured.  The merits of defendant's argument resolve into a
single question of statutory construction -- whether an assault
like the one in the present case involves "two or more victims"
within the meaning of ORS 161.067(2).  That question reduces even
further to the following question:  Who qualifies as a "victim"
in the relevant statutory scheme? (3)
   
The parties focus their analyses in that regard on
different statutes.  Defendant contends that the focus must be on
determining whether the legislature intended to include the child
witnesses described in ORS 163.160(3)(c) as victims of the crime 
that that statute defines.  That is so, defendant argues, because
the term "victims" in ORS 161.067(2) does not itself create a
separate and distinct class of victims of crime.  Instead,
defendant asserts, the statute necessarily refers to the class of
persons who are victims for purposes of the substantive statute
defining the relevant crime.  In that regard, defendant contends
that it is clear that the only victim of the crime that ORS
163.160(3)(c) defines (and, thus, the only victim for purposes of
ORS 161.067(2) in this context) is the person whom the defendant
directly and physically harmed. 
The state contends, to the contrary, that the primary
question for consideration is whether child witnesses like the
ones in this case are "victims" within the meaning of ORS
161.067(2).  The state asserts that the substantive definition of
felony fourth-degree assault at ORS 163.160(3)(c) is relevant
only if that definition conveys an affirmative legislative intent
to exclude child witnesses from being considered victims for
purposes of ORS 161.067(2).  Applying that analysis to the
statutes, the state proposes that we read the term "victim" in
ORS 161.067(2) to include any person whom a criminal act harms
and then further proposes that nothing in ORS 163.160(3)(c)
suggests a legislative intent to exclude child witnesses, as
described in the statute, from that category.
We approach those questions of statutory construction
using the analytical template set out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor
and Industries, 317 Or 606, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).  Under that
template, we first consider the text and context of the statute,
and proceed to other interpretive sources (specifically, to the
statute's legislative history and, in the event that legislative
history is unhelpful, to general maxims of statutory
construction) only if legislature's intent is not clear at that
first level.  Id. at 610-12. 
We turn first to the statute on which the state relies, 
ORS 161.067(2).  When we do so, we find that the specific wording
of that statute does not support the state's reading.  When the
statute speaks of criminal conduct that "violate[s] only one
statutory provision," it necessarily refers to, and depends upon,
some statute other than itself.  That is, it refers to the
substantive criminal laws that define particular criminal
offenses.  It follows that the statutory reference to "victims"
in the phrase "[w]hen the same conduct * * * involves two or more
victims" also must refer to victims within the meaning of the
substantive statute that defines the relevant crime.
Because the statute's text does not support the state's
argument (and nothing about that text when considered in context
alters that conclusion), we need not pursue our PGE paradigm
further.  We conclude that ORS 161.067(2) uses the term "victims"
to describe the category of persons who are victims within the
meaning of the specific substantive statute defining the relevant
offense. 
It follows that the proper focus of our analysis is on
the substantive statute defining the crime of fourth-degree
assault -- ORS 163.160.  Specifically, we must determine whether
the child witnesses described in ORS 163.160(3)(c) are victims of
the crime that that statute defines. 
ORS 163.160 provides, in part:  
(1) A person commits the crime of assault in the
fourth degree if the person:
"(a) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes
physical injury to another; or
"(b) With criminal negligence causes physical
injury to another by means of a deadly weapon.
"(2) Assault in the fourth degree is a Class A
misdemeanor.
"(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2) of this
section, assault in the fourth degree is a Class C
felony if the person commits the crime of assault in
the fourth degree and:
"(a) The person has previously been convicted of
assaulting the same victim;
"* * * * *  
"(c) The assault is committed in the immediate
presence of, or is witnessed by, the person's or the
victim's minor child or stepchild or a minor child
residing withing the household of the person or victim.
"(4) For the purposes of subsection (3) of this
section, an assault is witnessed if the assault is seen
or directly perceived in any other manner by the
child."
The state contends that it is only a matter of semantic
convenience and is not indicative of a real legislative choice in
the matter that ORS 163.160(3)(c) uses the term "victim" to refer
to the assaulted person and a different term –- "minor child" –-
to refer to a child witness.  The state argues that, instead of
focusing on the word "victim" as it is used in ORS 163.160(3)(c),
we should focus on the fact that the ordinary, dictionary meaning
of the word would include persons who suffer all varieties of
harm, (4)
 including the psychological harm that the children
described in subsection (3)(c) likely would suffer after
witnessing an assault.  The state contends that child witnesses
of a domestic assault may and often do suffer psychological
injury from their exposure to that conduct and thus are
additional victims of the crime.  
We can accept the state's underlying premise, which is
that the legislature could choose to utilize the broad,
"ordinary" definition of the term "victim" in creating a criminal
statutory scheme.  But we are dealing here with a specific
criminal statute that defines a particular criminal offense for
purposes of prosecution, and we therefore must focus on the words
that the legislature chose to use in that statute. 
Nothing in ORS 163.160 directly addresses the question 
whether child witnesses are victims under that statute.  However,
we think that the statute can be read sensibly only if the
"victim" of fourth-degree assault is the person who is directly
and physically injured by an assault.  Subsection (3)(a), for
example, elevates fourth-degree assault from a misdemeanor to a
felony if the person "has previously been convicted of assaulting
the same victim."  (Emphasis added.)  That usage indicates that a
"victim," for purposes of the statute, is a person who has
suffered direct physical harm as a result of the assaultive
conduct.  Similarly, in subsection (3)(c) (at issue in the
present case), a fourth-degree assault becomes a felony if the
assault is committed "in the immediate presence of, or is
witnessed by, the person's or the victim's minor child or
stepchild or a minor child residing within the household of the
person or victim."  (Emphasis added.)  That usage of the term
"victim" is in direct contrast to the various terms describing
the child witness.  The premise of subsection (c) is that the
child has a particular relationship to an act (assault) that
transpires between others.  That relationship (witness) makes the
assault more "serious," but it does not make the child a victim
of assault.  It follows from the text of the statute and as a
matter of simple English that, at least for the purposes of ORS
163.160, the terms "victim" and "child" cannot be synonymous. 
Thus, for purposes of the felony treatment that ORS 163.160(3)(c)
authorizes, a child witness, as described in subsection (3)(c),
is not a "victim."
Although our reading of the text alone appears
conclusive, context confirms that reading:  Our holding is
consistent with the use of the term "victim" throughout the
substantive part of the criminal code.  Ordinarily, when the term
"victim" is used in a statute that defines a criminal offense, it
is used in the precise sense of a person who suffers harm that is
an element of the offense.  For example, when the statute
defining aggravated murder refers to the "victim" of the murder,
it is clear that it is referring only to a person who has
suffered the particular harm -- death -- that is the gravamen of
the crime of murder.  See ORS 163.095(1)(e), (f), and (2)(a)
(defining aggravated murder as murder committed under certain
circumstances, including that murder occurred in course of
"intentional maiming or torture of the victim," that "the victim
of the intentional homicide was a person under the age of 14
years," and that "the victim" was correctional or police officer, 
witness, etc.).  See also ORS 163.150(1)(a) (in sentencing
proceeding for aggravated murder, "evidence may be presented as
to any matter * * * including * * * victim impact evidence
relating to the personal characteristics of the victim or the
impact of the crime on the victim's family").  Similarly, ORS
163.235, the statute defining first-degree kidnapping, uses the
term "victim" in a way that clearly refers to a person who has
suffered the harm that the essence of the crime of kidnapping -–
unconsented and unauthorized confinement or transportation.  See
ORS 163.235(1)(b), (c), and (d) (person commits crime of first-degree kidnapping if person takes or secretly confines another
without consent or authority, with purpose of "hold[ing] the
victim as a shield or hostage," "caus[ing] physical injury to the
victim," or "terroriz[ing] the victim or another person"). (5)
 
 
The use of the term "victim" in the substantive
statutes that define various criminal offenses properly may be
considered as context for purposes of the question of legislative
intent that is before us.  That context, coupled with our
analysis of the wording of ORS 163.160 itself, confirms that the
legislature did not intend that child witnesses of domestic
assaults be viewed as victims of the crime defined by that
statute.    
The state appears to believe that the status of child
witnesses as victims need not be spelled out, but can be implied
from certain other aspects of the statute.  In that regard, the
state suggests that it is enough to show that ORS 163.160(3)(c)
reflects a concern that domestic violence is harmful to child
witnesses and evidences a purpose of attaching consequences to
conduct that has the potential to cause such harm.  In its
opinion below, the Court of Appeals majority expressed the same
belief, i.e., that a legislative judgment that exposure to
domestic violence harms children and, thus, that children so
exposed should be considered victims, is obvious on the face of
ORS 163.160(3)(c):   
"If the legislature had not been concerned that
children exposed to assaults by or against a parent are
harmed by such conduct and, thus, are additional
victims of the conduct, it would have had no reason to
enhance the seriousness of the offense from a
misdemeanor to felony status based on children's
witnessing of the conduct." 
Glaspey, 184 Or App at 175-76.  In other words (the state
argues), once we accept the modest and obvious point that ORS
163.160(3)(c) reflects a legislative concern respecting the
psychological harm that domestic assaults may cause to the
children who witness them, the discussion is over:  We must
conclude that the legislature views those children as victims for
purposes of that statute.  
The difficulty with that theory is that it depends on
our accepting the same general concept of victim that the state
has been advancing all along, viz., that harm of any sort, and
even the mere potential for harm, means that the legislature
intended for all such persons who may suffer such harm to be
deemed "victims."  But, for the reasons discussed above, we do
not perceive such a legislative purpose in the wording of ORS
163.160(3)(c).
We have determined that ORS 161.067(2), which provides
that there are "as many separately punishable offenses as there
are victims," invests the term "victim" with the same meaning
that it has for the relevant substantive statutory provision that
defines the offense.  We also have determined that the child
witnesses of domestic assault described in ORS 163.160(3)(c) are
not victims of the crime that that statute defines.  The fact
that two or more children may witness an assault may be grounds
for felony treatment under ORS 163.160(3)(c), but it does not
support entry of a separate judgment of conviction for each
child.  The contrary conclusion of the Court of Appeals' majority
was error. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
1. ORS 163.160(1) provides that a person commits the crime
of fourth degree assault if the person 
"(a) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes
physical injury to another; or 
"(b) With criminal negligence causes physical
injury to another by means of a deadly weapon."
2. Judge Armstrong dissented, arguing that child
witnesses to a fourth-degree assault are not "victims"
for purposes of either of the relevant statutes. 
Glaspey, 184 Or App at 180-89.  
3. The state raises two preliminary procedural
issues -- mootness and preservation -- neither of which
is well taken nor requires discussion here.
4. The state directs our attention to a
definition of "victim" that appears in Webster's Third
New Int'l Dictionary 2550 (unabridged ed 1993):  "a
person subjected to oppression, deprivation, or
suffering."
5. See also the similar usage of the term
"victim" in the statutes defining first-degree rape,
ORS 163.375, first-degree sodomy, ORS 163.405, first-degree unlawful sexual penetration, ORS 163.411, first-degree sexual abuse, ORS 163.427, and stalking, ORS
163.732.