Title: In Re: Hopeman Brothers Inc.

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

VIRGINIA:
 
 
In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court 
Building in the City of Richmond on Wednesday, the 18th day of 
September, 2002. 
 
 
In Re:  Hopeman Brothers, Inc.,  
 
 
 
Petitioner 
 
 
Record No. 020518 
 
 
Upon a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus 
 
 
 
Upon consideration of the petition for writ of mandamus, 
papers filed in this proceeding, and argument of counsel, the Court 
is of opinion that the writ of mandamus shall not issue. 
 
Petitioner is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of 
mandamus because petitioner failed to establish a clear and 
specific legal right to be enforced, or a duty which ought to be 
and can be performed.  As this Court has stated: 
 
"The writ of mandamus, known in England as a high 
prerogative writ, is justly regarded in this country as 
one of the highest writs known to our system of 
jurisprudence; and it only issues when there is a clear 
and specific legal right to be enforced, or a duty which 
ought to be and can be performed, and where there is no 
other specific and adequate legal remedy.  The right 
which it is sought to protect must therefore be clearly 
established, and the writ is never granted in doubtful 
cases." 
 
Hertz v. Times-World Corp., 259 Va. 599, 608, 528 S.E.2d 458, 463 
(2000) (quoting Tyler v. Taylor, 70 Va. (29 Gratt.) 765, 766-67 
(1878)); accord Town of Front Royal v. Front Royal and Warren 
County Indus. Park Corp., 248 Va. 581, 584, 449 S.E.2d 794, 796 
(1994) (right involved and the duty sought to be enforced must be 
clear and certain); Richmond-Greyhound Lines v. Davis, 200 Va. 147, 
151-52, 104 S.E.2d 813, 816 (1958); Hall v. Stuart, 198 Va. 315, 
323-24, 94 S.E.2d 284, 290 (1956); Milliner's Adm'r v. Harrison, 73 
Va. (32 Gratt.) 422, 426 (1879). 
 
Accordingly, the petition for writ of mandamus is dismissed. 
 
JUSTICE LEMONS, with whom JUSTICE LACY joins, dissenting. 
 
The majority dismisses this petition for writ of mandamus, not 
because it approves the actions of the trial judge, but because it 
finds that “petitioner failed to establish a clear and specific 
legal right to be enforced, or a duty which ought to be and can be 
performed.”  I disagree and therefore, dissent. 
This petition involves the consolidation and bifurcation of 
approximately 1,300 cases against 25 defendants concerning tort 
claims arising from the “design, manufacture, sale, distribution or 
installation of asbestos containing products in the Newport News 
Shipyard.”  On June 20, 2000, the trial court found “that 
consolidation of all the cases would adversely affect the rights of 
the parties to a fair trial.”  However, the trial court held that 
“the most appropriate method of docket management in these cases is 
the use of Code § 8.01-374.1.”  Accordingly, the trial court 
directed that “consolidation shall be by categories agreed to by 
the parties or determined by the Court if the parties cannot 
agree.”  Apparently, the parties could not agree upon the 
categories, and at a hearing on July 27, 2000, the trial court 
stated:  “At the next docket call, which will be in September, 
every case that has my name on it is going to be consolidated and 
I’m going to set the trial for the liability.” 
Thereafter, an order was entered setting the “consolidated 
liability trial” for “all asbestos personal injury cases pending 
before this Court in which plaintiff alleges exposure to asbestos-
containing products during the course of their employment at 
Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company and where plaintiff 
is represented by the Law Offices of Peter T. Nicholl” and 
including “the cases of all plaintiffs filed on or before January 
31, 2001, against all defendants served with process on or before 
January 31, 2001.”  The case is currently set for trial beginning 
October 22, 2002. 
According to the record before us and the representations made 
by counsel, neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants wish to 
proceed in this manner.  Efforts by defense counsel to have the 
trial court make findings of commonality of claims and other 
matters relating to statutory and due process rights of all parties 
to a fair trial were rejected by the trial court. 
The trial court is proceeding pursuant to Code § 8.01-374.1 
which, among other things, and under certain circumstances, permits 
consolidation of personal injury and wrongful death claims “alleged 
to have been caused by exposure to asbestos or products for 
industrial use that contain asbestos.”  Code § 8.01-374.1(A).  The 
statute is limited to “actions against manufacturers or suppliers.”  
Id.  Additionally, the court may order consolidation “unless the 
court finds consolidation would adversely affect the rights of the 
parties to a fair trial.”  Id.  Furthermore, subsection “C” 
provides that “[a]ny order entered pursuant to this section shall 
for the purposes of appeal, be an interlocutory order.  Any 
findings of the court or jury in any bifurcated trial shall not be 
appealable until a final order adjudicating all issues on a 
specific claim or consolidated group of claims has been entered.”  
Code § 8.01-374.1(C). 
It should be beyond peradventure that the parties have a right 
to trial consistent with explicit statutory provisions.  In this 
case no consolidation is permitted if the trial court finds that 
consolidation would adversely affect the rights of the parties to a 
fair trial.  The trial court has made such a finding; however, it 
has consolidated all of the cases contrary to the clear mandate of 
the statute.  Counsel for plaintiffs suggested in oral argument 
that the liability trial would consolidate only 10 cases at a time.  
Nothing in the record before us supports such a representation.  
Furthermore, when asked, counsel for plaintiffs could not identify 
the first ten cases set for trial only five weeks from now. 
Additionally, the statute only permits consolidation of cases 
against “manufacturers and suppliers.”  Code § 8.01-374.1(A).  The 
trial court’s consolidation order refers to defendants who were 
“involved in the design, manufacture, sale, distribution or 
installation of asbestos containing products.”  On the record 
before us, it would appear that certain cases or claims may be 
consolidated in violation of the express provisions of Code § 8.01-
374.1. 
In addition to the statutory rights involved, the defendants 
maintain that their rights to due process under the United States 
and Virginia Constitutions are infringed by forcing this enormous 
consolidation to trial.  Consolidation of cases requires 
consideration of common questions of law and fact, ability to 
manage the number of cases, and issues of convenience and 
efficiency for the parties and the judicial system. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
illustrated the due process concerns in Malcolm v. Nat’l Gypsum 
Co., 995 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1993).  In an appeal of one of 48 
consolidated cases against 25 defendants involving asbestos 
exposure, the Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial 
stating, “[t]he benefits of efficiency can never be purchased at 
the cost of fairness.”  Id. at 350.  Noting that consolidation must 
be justified by common issues of law and fact, the Court listed 
numerous issues that trial courts should consider before 
consolidation, such as: 
1. 
the sheer number of plaintiffs; 
2. 
the disease type of a particular plaintiff; 
3. 
the existence of exposure at different worksites; 
4. 
the occupations of the plaintiffs; 
5. 
the duration of exposure; 
6. 
the existence of third party claims; 
7. 
whether the plaintiffs were living or deceased; 
8. 
the status of pretrial discovery. 
Id. at 350-51. 
The Court noted that what precautions were made by the trial 
judge were “feckless in preventing jury confusion.”  Id. at 352.  
Citing the “dizzying amount of evidence” and the “cosmic sweep of 
the factual data that the jury had to absorb,” the Court concluded 
that fundamental concepts of fairness required a new trial.  Id. at 
349.  See In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990); 
Cain v. Armstrong World Indus., 785 F.Supp. 1448 (S.D. Ala. 1992). 
Further, Petitioners in the case before us assert that issues such 
as “duty to warn” and “forseeability” may depend upon the 
occupation or the particular employer of the plaintiff.  It is 
represented to the Court that discovery depositions of plaintiffs 
have been permitted in approximately two dozen of the 1,300 cases. 
In my judgment, we need go no farther than the clear statutory 
violations to find a “clear and specific legal right to be 
enforced.”  Stated simply, both plaintiffs and defendants have a 
right to a trial in accordance with the statutory requirements.  It 
is nothing short of astonishing that the trial court would make a 
finding that consolidation of all of the cases would “adversely 
affect the rights of the parties to a fair trial,” and consolidate 
all of them nonetheless.  The writ of mandamus should issue to 
compel the trial court to comply with the statute.  It is “a duty 
which ought to be and can be performed.” 
While the majority does not address the issue of adequate 
remedy at law (See Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 371, 552 
S.E.2d 67, 71 (2001)), it must be recognized that Defendants may 
proceed to trial and then avail themselves of the right to appeal 
an adverse judgment at the conclusion of the consolidated and 
bifurcated cases.  Given that the plaintiffs object, such a remedy 
would be available for each of them as well.  But, the remedy “must 
be equally as convenient, beneficial and effective as the 
proceeding by mandamus,” Carolina C & O Ry. v. Bd. of Supervisors 
of Scott County, 109 Va. 34, 37, 63 S.E. 412, 413 (1909), and even 
if there may be another legal remedy, “if such remedy be obsolete 
or inoperative, the mandamus will be granted.”  Richmond-Greyhound 
Lines, Inc. v. Davis, 200 Va. 147, 152, 104 S.E.2d 813, 817 (1958) 
(quoting Page v. Clopton, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 145, 146 (1878)). 
Legal literature and appellate opinions are replete with 
examples of trial processes in asbestos litigation that take so 
long that some plaintiffs die before they might have benefited from 
an award.  Defendants “die” as well, as evidenced by bankruptcies 
involving corporations sued in asbestos litigation nationwide.  
Where both plaintiffs and defendants oppose the consolidation, 
shall we wait for years for this litigation to result in an appeal 
that will most likely result in reversal and retrial?  Here, the 
square peg of complex litigation is being forced into the round 
hole of expediency.  The splinters that are flying are the 
statutory and Constitutional rights of both plaintiffs and 
defendants to a fair process for the adjudication of their claims.  
An extraordinary writ is required for these extraordinary 
circumstances.  The writ of mandamus should issue.  I dissent from 
the majority order in this case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Copy, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Teste: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
David B. Beach, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clerk