Title: Petty-Ray Geophysical, Div. of Geosource, Inc. v. Ludvik

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Petty-Ray Geophysical, Div. of Geosource, Inc. v. Ludvik1986 WY 93718 P.2d 9Case Number: 85-258Decided: 04/22/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
PETTY-RAY GEOPHYSICAL, 
DIVISION OF GEOSOURCE, INC., Appellant (Defendant and Third-Party 
Plaintiff),

v.

James A. LUDVIK, Appellee 
(Plaintiff), Twiford Ranch, Inc., a Wyoming corporation, Appellee (Third-Party 
Defendant).

Appeal from District 
Court, PlatteCounty, William A. Taylor, 
J.

Susan K. 
Overeem, Casper, 
for appellant.

Frank J. Jones 
of Jones & Weaver, P.C., Wheatland, for appellee 
Ludvik.

Stephen N. 
Sherard, Wheatland, for appellee Twiford 
Ranch, Inc.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellee James A. 
Ludvik (hereinafter Ludvik) brought suit against appellant Petty-Ray Geophysical 
(hereinafter Petty-Ray) for actual and punitive damages resulting from 
Petty-Ray's entry upon Ludvik's property without consent and subsequent 
seismographic exploration. Petty-Ray answered and filed a third-party complaint 
against Twiford Ranch, Inc. (hereinafter Twiford) as lessee of the property. 
From a judgment in favor of Ludvik, Petty-Ray now appeals.

[¶2.]     We 
reverse.

[¶3.]     Petty-Ray raises the 
following issues:

"I. In the absence of a 
provision in the lease, is the lessor or the lessee entitled to grant permission 
to the geophysical company for entry and to receive the permit fees for 
entry.

"II. Was Defendant 
Petty-Ray a trespasser as to be liable for punitive 
damages.

"III. Are the damages for 
trespass assessed against Defendant Petty-Ray in actuality punitive damages, 
although ostensibly denominated as compensatory.

"IV. Did the trial court 
err in assessing damages of one-half (1/2) of the permit fees against Defendant 
Petty-Ray in favor of the Plaintiff.

"V. What is the measure 
of actual damages to the lessor's reversionary interest.

"VI. Did the trial court 
err in its assessment of actual damages against Defendant Petty-Ray in favor of 
the Plaintiff."

Ludvik restates 
the issue as follows:

"Was there sufficient 
evidence to support the decision of the trial court?"

[¶4.]     In the fall of 1983, 
Petty-Ray was conducting geophysical exploration in Platte County, Wyoming. An agent of the company contacted 
Twiford to obtain permission to conduct seismographic exploration on his land. 
During the negotiations, Twiford advised the agent that he could give Petty-Ray 
permission to conduct further exploration on land belonging to Ludvik, because 
Twiford held the land under a lease with option to buy. When the discussion 
concluded, Twiford signed a geophysical permit in which he gave Petty-Ray his 
permission to enter and explore. The lands described in the permit included land 
owned by Twiford and land leased to Twiford by Ludvik. The permit also provided 
for payment of an $800-per-mile fee for permission to enter and explore and for 
normal damage resulting from such exploration.

[¶5.]     Pursuant to the permit, 
Petty-Ray entered upon the lands and began exploration in October of 1983. 
Exploration was concluded in February of 1984. Permit fees were paid to Twiford 
in accordance with the agreement. Due to weather conditions, more than the usual 
ruts and grass damage occurred during exploration. As payment for the excess 
damage, Petty-Ray issued a check to Twiford in the sum of 
$4,800.

[¶6.]     Upon discovering the 
ruts and grass damage, Ludvik filed suit against Petty-Ray. In his complaint, 
Ludvik alleged that he was the owner of the described property; that Petty-Ray 
conducted seismographic exploration on the property without his consent; and 
that Petty-Ray's entry, therefore, constituted a trespass. Petty-Ray answered, 
admitting that seismographic exploration had been conducted on the land 
described but denying that it was done without permission. In its third-party 
complaint, Petty-Ray claimed that Twiford had represented to Petty-Ray that he 
was the lessee of the property with the sole legal authority to grant permission 
to enter; that in reliance on Twiford's representations, Petty-Ray entered and 
conducted explorations on the land; that Petty-Ray paid the permit fee and 
additional damage payments to Twiford; and that, therefore, any damages awarded 
to Ludvik against Petty-Ray must be repaid by Twiford to 
Petty-Ray.

[¶7.]     On August 12, 1985, 
Ludvik filed a motion for summary judgment. Thereafter, Petty-Ray and Twiford 
each filed a motion for summary judgment. A hearing on the motions was set for 
September 3, 1985. A summary judgment nunc pro tunc was filed on October 3, 
1985, in which the trial court made the following 
findings:

"1. That Defendant 
Petty-Ray is liable to Plaintiff for actual damages to the subject 
property.

"2. That Third party 
Defendant Twiford was the lessee of the subject property and had the legal right 
to give permission to Defendant Petty-Ray to go upon the property and to receive 
the permit fees of $800 a mile.

"3. That Defendant 
Petty-Ray was not a trespasser and punitive damages do not 
lie.

"4. That there exists a 
question of fact concerning the $4,800.00 payment made to Third Party Defendant 
Twiford by Defendant and Third Party Plaintiff Petty-Ray for repair of extensive 
rutting and grass damage."

On the basis of 
these findings, the trial court issued the following 
order:

"1. That partial Summary 
Judgment be and hereby is granted to Plaintiff Ludvik on the issue of Defendant 
Petty-Ray's liability for actual damage.

"2. Plaintiff's Motion 
for Summary Judgment as the same pertains to the amounts due for actual damage 
be and hereby is denied.

"3. That partial Summary 
Judgment be and hereby is granted to Third Party Defendant Twiford Ranch as to 
the issue of reimbursement to Defendant and Third Party Plaintiff for all sums 
paid for the right to enter upon and conduct seismic operations on the subject 
property which Twiford held under lease.

"4. That Defendant 
Petty-Ray and Third Party Defendant Twiford Motion for Summary Judgment as the 
same pertains to the issue of the $4,800.00 paid and received for repair of 
permanent damage be and hereby is denied.

"5. That partial Summary 
Judgment be and hereby is granted to Defendant Petty-Ray on the issue of 
trespass and liability for punitive damages."

Meanwhile, on 
September 9, 1985, the matters remaining were tried to the court. Judgment was 
entered on September 30, 1985, for Ludvik in the sum of $4,360 plus 
costs.

[¶8.]     We appreciate 
Petty-Ray's carefully detailed statement of the issues but find that, in 
essence, only one issue is before us: Whether the court's assessment of damages 
is sufficiently supported by the evidence.

[¶9.]     In order to determine 
whether the trial court's judgment is correct, it is necessary for this Court to 
examine the record to see if there is evidence to support the $4,360 
award.

[¶10.]  When discussing the sufficiency of the 
evidence, we have said that a judgment will stand if there is any evidence to 
support it. Pine Creek Canal No. 1 v. Stadler, Wyo., 
685 P.2d 13 (1984).

[¶11.]  Ludvik testified that, in his opinion, it 
will cost approximately $28,000 to $30,000 to put the land in the state it was 
in before Petty-Ray went across it, and, of that amount, it would take somewhere 
near $8,000 to restore what he considered to be permanent 
damage.

[¶12.]  Mr. Leach was called as a witness for 
Petty-Ray to testify as to the cost of reclaiming the damaged land of Ludvik. He stated that the total damaged 
area, consisting of approximately one-half acre, could be repaired at a cost of 
$600. He indicated that of this one-half acre only 7,500 square feet were 
permanently damaged.

[¶13.]  Mr. Briggs, a professional appraiser, was 
called as a witness for Petty-Ray to testify as to the value of Ludvik's damaged 
land. He also stated that the total damaged area consisted of approximately 
one-half acre.

[¶14.]  The law is well settled in Wyoming that 
when the cost of restoring permanent damage to real property is great, the 
measure of damage is the difference between the value of the property 
immediately before and the value immediately after the injury. Belle Fourche 
Pipeline Company v. Elmore Livestock Company, Wyo., 669 P.2d 505 (1983); North Central Gas Company v. 
Bloem, Wyo., 376 P.2d 382 (1962); Town Council of Town of Hudson 
v. Ladd, 37 Wyo. 419, 263 P. 703 
(1928).

[¶15.]  Proof of before and after values must be 
by competent and permissible evidence. Energy Transportation Systems, Inc. v. 
Mackey, Wyo., 650 P.2d 1152 (1982). In the case before 
us, there was competent evidence given by Mr. Briggs that the value of Ludvik's 
land immediately before the damage was approximately $125 per acre, but there 
was no testimony as to the value of the land immediately after the permanent 
damage.

[¶16.]  Ludvik contends that not only did the 
trial judge have testimony as to the damages, but he also viewed the premises 
and observed the damages firsthand, and that such gives additional support to 
the judgment.

[¶17.]  It is true that this Court has on 
occasion stated that when a trial court views land in question under certain 
circumstances, we must give special weight to its findings. Pfister v. Brown, 
Wyo., 498 P.2d 1243 (1972); Masek v. Ostlund, Wyo., 358 P.2d 100 (1960); Erickson v. Hudson, 70 Wyo. 317, 249 P.2d 523 
(1952).

In this connection, the 
trial court stated: "* * * I looked at the Ludvik ranch and it's a beautiful 
place. It has a lot of sagebrush and trees and I don't know just what the 
grazing capacity of the place is, but for one thing, it's very 
pretty.

* * * * * 
*

"Certainly there wasn't 
anything allowed for the extra damages for the cats going down the hillside and 
making the extra trails and moving aside the rocks. And it's a very poor 
ecological system there where the topsoil is very thin and subject to 
damage.

* * * * * 
*

"* * * I don't think the 
big areas can ever be repaired without some equipment - I added a thousand 
dollars for that for a total judgment of $4360.

"* * * And I really 
suppose the $400 extra a mile is a little bit of a penalty for Petty-Ray, * * * 
but I have to consider that is their own fault * * *."

[¶18.]  Even if we were to consider these 
statements findings which should be given special consideration, they do very 
little to help Ludvik when applying them to our standard for determining the 
value of the permanent damages to his land.

[¶19.]  It is clear from the above that the trial 
court's assessment of damages of $400 a mile for 8.4 miles, or $3,360, is not 
based on any evidence of permanent damage to Ludvik's land and is, at best, in 
fact, punitive damages for trespass. The record reflects that there was 
sufficient evidence introduced at trial to justify the trial judge's comments 
concerning punitive damages; however, any award for trespass was improper as he 
previously granted a motion for summary judgment for Petty-Ray on this 
question.

[¶20.]  In defense of the trial judge, we note at 
this juncture that, based on the pleadings and affidavits before him at the time 
of hearing the summary judgment motion, he was not unjustified in granting the 
motion. One of the inherent problems in granting a motion on some but not all of 
the issues is that evidence at a trial sometimes comes in indicating, in 
hindsight, the motion may have been improvidently granted. This is one of those 
cases.

[¶21.]  We do not give special consideration to 
the trial judge's opinion of the cost of repairing the permanent damages based 
on his personal observations not only because it would be improper without other 
substantial evidence to support it, but also because it is the improper measure 
of damage in any event.

[¶22.]  As there is nothing in the record to 
indicate the value of the land immediately after being permanently injured, 
there is no way to compute the damage based on the standard previously adopted 
by this Court.

[¶23.]  Reversed.

URBIGKIT, Justice, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part.

[¶24.]  I concur in the decision of this court 
that the proof of damages was not sufficient to sustain the judgment entered by 
the trial court, but would remand the case for retrial on damages only. 
Liability is not now in issue. Likewise not questioned is the fact that some 
damages exist, and that appellant should be liable for actual damages.

[¶25.]  Consequently, I would remand for retrial 
for determination of damages in consonance with the rules of law required by 
this court. Belle Fourche Pipeline Company v. Elmore Livestock Company, 
Wyo., 669 P.2d 505 (1983); Energy 
Transportation Systems, Inc. v. Mackey, 
Wyo., 650 P.2d 1152 (1982); Reynolds v. 
Tice, Wyo., 595 P.2d 1318 (1979). Cf. Anderson v. 
Bauer, Wyo., 681 P.2d 1316 (1984); and Adel v. Parkhurst, Wyo., 681 P.2d 886 
(1984).

THOMAS, Chief Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶26.]  I must dissent from a result of simply 
reversing this case. The majority opinion relies on Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. 
v. Elmore Livestock Co., Wyo., 669 P.2d 505 (1983), in which this court in a 
somewhat similarly awkward situation remanded the case for a new trial. This 
court very appropriately remarked, "Appellees are entitled to something." Belle 
Fourche Pipeline Co. v. Elmore Livestock Co., 669 P.2d  at 514. I believe that to 
be the situation in this case. Many years ago this court noted an exception to 
the general rule with respect to damages to real property to the effect 
that:

"It is true that where 
the damage to real property is of a temporary character, or where it can be 
repaired at a small expense, the cost of the repair has often been held to be 
the measure of damages."

Town Council of 
Town of Hudson v. Ladd, 37 Wyo. 419, 426, 263 P. 703 
(1928). The court has not receded from that dictum.

[¶27.]  In this instance, I agree that it was not 
appropriate for the district court to attempt to apportion the $800 per mile 
trespass fee by awarding $400 a mile to Ludvik. The amount paid for the trespass 
fee really had no relation to Ludvik's damages. On the other hand there was 
testimony before the trial court, concededly provided by the appellant, that the 
permanently damaged area could be repaired at a cost of $600. In the language of 
the quoted exception and in consideration of prices in today's world that cost 
of repair seems a relatively small expense. The district judge enhanced that 
figure by $400, but his actions in so doing would be acceptable in accordance 
with Phelps v. Woodward Construction Co., 66 Wyo. 33, 204 P.2d 179 (1949). I 
would not, therefore, reverse this judgment, nor would I remand the case for a 
new trial on the issue of damages. I would modify the judgment by reducing it to 
the amount of $1,000 and remand the case for entry of judgment in that 
amount.