Title: Brock v. State

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

530 So. 2d 146 (1988) Leonardo BROCK v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 57662. Supreme Court of Mississippi. August 3, 1988. Rehearing Denied August 24, 1988. *148 Jack R. Jones, III, Taylor, Jones, Alexander, Greenlee, Seale & Ryan, Southaven, for appellant. Edwin Lloyd Pittman and Mike Moore, Attys. Gen. by Leyser Q. Morris, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. Before ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and SULLIVAN and GRIFFIN, JJ. SULLIVAN, Justice, for the Court: Leonardo Brock was tried and convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon. The jury being unable to affix a penalty, Brock was sentenced by the trial judge to a mandatory term of ten (10) years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, to be served consecutively with his prior conviction of kidnapping. Aggrieved at the decision of the Circuit Court of DeSoto County, Mississippi, Brock now files this appeal. Brock was previously convicted for this crime, but that conviction was reversed. For a narrative of the facts as they were given by Presiding Justice Hawkins see Brock v. State, 483 So. 2d 358 (Miss. 1986). The circumstances surrounding this case involve several crimes only one of which was Brock on trial for, armed robbery. Prior to the trial, Brock filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of, or reference to, the alleged rape of his victim. The evidence was ruled admissible by the trial judge. Brock now argues that allowing the evidence of the alleged rape was error on the basis that the crime of rape is separate from the crime of armed robbery for which he is on trial and therefore, has no probative value. Eubanks v. State, 419 So. 2d 1330 (Miss. 1982), is the only support cited by Brock and his reliance upon Eubanks is misplaced. We have noted that, as a general rule, evidence of other crimes separate from that for which the defendant is on trial is inadmissible but that the rule has many exceptions. Eubanks v. State, 419 So. 2d 1330, 1331 (Miss. 1982). This case is clearly an exception because the offenses are so interconnected that it is impossible to separate them. As we said in Brown v. State, 483 So. 2d 328, 330 (Miss. 1986): We most recently repeated these principles in Shaw v. State: Shaw v. State, 513 So. 2d 916, 918 (Miss. 1987). Finally, in Brock v. State, 483 So. 2d 358, 362 (Miss. 1986), this Court held on the same facts that the entire proof presented in the record was relevant to and admissible as to the kidnapping offense. It would therefore be relevant and admissible as to the armed robbery offense. This assignment is without merit. Brock contends that his kidnapping conviction arose from the same facts and circumstances as the present appeal. See Brock v. State, 483 So. 2d 358 (Miss. 1986). Prior to trial, Brock filed a "Motion to Dismiss," arguing that his former conviction of kidnapping constitutes the basis for a plea of double jeopardy. He contends that the kidnapping conviction would serve as a bar to prosecution for robbery with a deadly weapon first, because the facts and circumstances were the same for each case, second, that the two offenses are the same in law and fact, and third, that kidnapping is a lesser included offense for armed robbery. This assignment is controlled by the principles set forth in Smith v. State, 429 So. 2d 252 (Miss. 1983). Smith was appealing a burglary conviction which arose from the same set of facts which had resulted in a prior conviction of rape. See Smith v. State, 405 So. 2d 95 (Miss. 1981). Smith argued that the conviction on the burglary charge exposed him to double jeopardy. After a detailed analysis of Mississippi case law, U.S. Supreme Court decisions and law from other jurisdictions, this Court held that the prosecution was justified, legally and constitutionally, in indicting, trying, and convicting Smith of both offenses even though the testimony in both trials was essentially the same because the essential elements of the crimes in each statute were different. The court noted the applicable law on this question as follows: Smith v. State, 429 So. 2d 252, 253-54 (Miss. 1983). It is clear from the applicable statutes that the crimes of armed robbery and kidnapping require different elements of proof: There is no merit to Brock's double jeopardy claim. Thomas Pierce testified during trial as follows: Brock objected on the basis of hearsay. The objection was initially sustained but was later overruled after Pierce testified that the statement was made in the presence of Brock. Pierce also testified that after the victim told them she had been raped and shot that she pointed at Brock and said "And that's the man that did it right there." No objection was made by defense counsel to this statement. The original rule regarding this question was announced in Anderson v. State, 82 Miss. 784, 788, 35 So. 202, 203 (1903), wherein we held: In Cunningham v. State, 467 So. 2d 902, 906 (Miss. 1985), this Court modified that rule as follows: The statements were admissible under the original Anderson rule and are clearly admissible under the rule as modified by Cunningham. The statements were spontaneous. The victim had just emerged from the woods where she had been shot. It is unlikely that a statement made under those circumstances was manufactured. Further, Mississippi Rules of Evidence, Rule 803(2) provides an exception for an excited utterance described as "a statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition." Pierce's testimony was admissible as a hearsay exception. This assignment is without merit. The evidence description list was received into evidence during the testimony of M.J. Montgomery and used by Montgomery to refresh his memory. Montgomery was an agent with the Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics and often delivered evidence from law enforcement officers to the Mississippi Crime Lab in Batesville. Montgomery's testimony was used to authenticate and identify the bullet fragments taken from the victim's body. Defense counsel objected to the "evidence description list" on the grounds of hearsay and Rule 4.06, Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice. Defense counsel claimed that the list had never been provided by the State as required by Rule 4.06 and, therefore, the evidence should have been excluded. The prosecution contends that the list was provided to the defense and that even if it was not, the point is irrelevant since defense counsel filed no written discovery in this case. Under the rule and the case law, a discovery request must be made in writing in the absence of a discovery order. Morris v. State, 436 So. 2d 1381, 1387-88 (Miss. 1983).[1] No discovery order was entered on this record. This is exactly the situation which exhibits the practicality of the Morris rule. Because the prosecution contends the list was provided and the defense contends it was not it is impossible for this Court to determine who is mistaken in the absence of written discovery. Brock further assigns as error the use of his prior conviction for impeachment purposes because the prior conviction was not provided pursuant to Rule 4.06. Again, absent a discovery order and a written request, this argument fails. The prosecution argues that even if the court should hold that the written discovery in Brock's prior trial is binding in the subsequent trial the argument still fails because subsection (3) of Rule 4.06 was not added to the rule until after Brock's first trial and, therefore, the prosecution was not required to produce *152 that information. If the discovery request at the first trial is binding upon this trial, then the State would have to comply with the rule as amended. However, we are of the opinion that requests for written discovery in the prior trial do not carry over to the new trial and, because there was no written request in the second trial, this assignment of error must fail. After the prosecution's direct examination of the victim, defense counsel made a request for copies of any statement she may have made for cross-examination purposes. The request was made pursuant to Rule 4.06 of the Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice. The court reviewed the statements in camera and found no material inconsistencies with the in court testimony of the victim. The statements were sealed for review by this Court. We have reviewed the statements and we are satisfied neither statement was substantially inconsistent with the in court testimony of the victim. In light of this, and the discretion afforded a trial judge on these questions, this assignment is without merit. It would have been better practice for the trial court to have followed the concurring opinion in Barnes v. State, 471 So. 2d 1218 (Miss. 1985), in which Justice Anderson suggested a proposed new rule 4.06 on discovery. Barnes v. State, 471 So. 2d 1218, 1222 (Miss. 1985) [Anderson concurring].[2] We are of the opinion that it is not error in this case, but that after the publication of this case, Rule 4.06 should be amended to comply with Justice Anderson's concurring opinion in Barnes as five members of this Court joined in that opinion. Instruction S-1 reads as follows: *153 Brock argues that the record contains no proof that he took anything from the victim's presence and, therefore, the granting of Instruction S-1 constituted error. This assignment is controlled by our decision in Cooper v. State, 386 So. 2d 1115, 1116 (Miss. 1980), and is therefore without merit. Instruction S-2 reads as follows: Brock contends that the granting of this instruction was error because he explained his departure. See Pannell v. State, 455 So. 2d 785 (Miss. 1984). We point out that, on the facts of this case, flight would be highly probative. It is equally clear from Brock's "version" that he explained his flight; however, his explanation is contradicted and has no support outside his own testimony. The case simply does not support Brock's argument. Brock further complains that the court erred in giving instruction C-1 which provides: Instruction C-1 was highly proper in that it was necessary to remind the jury that Brock was being tried for armed robbery only. Had this instruction not been given, its refusal would have constituted a reversible error. The instruction does not, as Brock argues, assume that the allegations are true. It merely notes that evidence has been offered that Brock committed other crimes. No objection was made to the court's instructions. Therefore, the matter is not properly before this Court. Brock is barred from complaining of this instruction on appeal. Gray v. State, 487 So. 2d 1304 (Miss. 1986). This assignment is without merit. Brock requested an instruction on the lesser included offense of aggravated assault and argues that the court's refusal to give the instruction constituted reversible error. Brock bases this argument solely on his contention that there was no taking from the presence of the victim. We have already disposed of the fallacy of this argument, and there is no merit to this assignment. Brock argues that the proof in this case failed to establish a case of armed robbery, and that it was error for the trial judge to deny (1) his motion for directed verdict at the conclusion of the evidence, (2) his request for a peremptory instruction, and (3) his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The correct rule regarding directed verdicts and peremptory instructions is: Gill v. State, 485 So. 2d 1047, 1049 (Miss. 1986). Furthermore we point out that: Temple v. State, 498 So. 2d 379, 381 (Miss. 1986). It is clear in light of the preceding law that the trial judge properly overruled the above motions. During closing arguments the prosecutor made the following comments: The trial judge sustained Brock's objection to the remarks, but overruled his motion for a mistrial. The jury was not admonished as requested by Brock, and Brock now assigns this as error. Prosecutorial comments on a defendant's failure to call witnesses on his own behalf have constituted reversible error in Griffin v. State, 504 So. 2d 186, 193-194 (Miss. 1987); Madlock v. State, 440 So. 2d 315 (Miss. 1983); Collins v. State, 408 So. 2d 1376 (Miss. 1982); and Morgan v. State, 388 So. 2d 495 (Miss. 1980). Morgan v. State, 388 So. 2d 495, 497-98 (Miss. 1980). During closing argument in Collins, the prosecutor commented on the defendant's failure to call witnesses, and several objections to such comments were sustained and the jury admonished. The prosecutor also made several improper comments during the course of that trial. This Court reversed, finding that the cumulative effect of the prosecutor's behavior was to prejudice the jury against the defendant. Collins at 1380. This Court also found error in the following statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument in Morgan v. State: Morgan v. State, 388 So. 2d 495, 498. In both the above cases the court noted that the evidence was close as to intent in Morgan and as to guilt in Collins. In Collins the court noted that the jury is *155 more likely prejudiced in such a case. Collins at 1380. When we consider the substantial evidence of Brock's guilt, the fact that the trial judge sustained the objection to the improper statement but did not admonish the jury when requested to do so, and the applicable case law, we reach the inescapable conclusion that the comment of the prosecutor, while clearly error, was harmless. Brock further argues that the following statement made by the prosecutor during closing arguments warrants reversal under Acevedo v. State, 467 So. 2d 220 (Miss. 1985): An objection was made and the trial judge warned the prosecutor as follows, "I will restrict argument to matters that's in evidence and logical inferences that can be drawn from those matters in evidence." Brock's subsequent motion for mistrial was overruled. Brock's reliance on Acevedo is misplaced. The misconduct in Acevedo was the prosecutor's comments, for impeachment purposes, that a witness' relatives and friends had prior convictions, comments on the sentences received by the defendant on prior convictions, and discussion during closing argument of the grand jury proceedings resulting in Acevedo's conviction. Acevedo v. State, 467 So. 2d 220 (Miss. 1985). Furthermore, the defense counsel never requested that the jury be admonished. This Court has held that "where an objection to a question is sustained and no request is made that the jury be instructed to disregard the question, there is no error." Gardner v. State, 455 So. 2d 796, 800 (Miss. 1984). The same rationale applies to objections made during closing argument unless a fundamental right is clearly involved. This assignment has no merit. CONVICTION OF ROBBERY WITH A DEADLY WEAPON AND MANDATORY SENTENCE OF TEN (10) YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS TO BE SERVED CONSECUTIVELY WITH HIS PRIOR CONVICTION OF KIDNAPPING ARE THEREFORE AFFIRMED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, ANDERSON, GRIFFIN and ZUCCARO, JJ., concur. [1] Note that this case was tried in 1986; Morris' application is prospective only. Morris v. State, 436 So. 2d 1381, 1388 (Miss. 1983). [2] The language to which he refers is that portion of the rule that provides for in camera inspection of prior statements.