Title: Phelan v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  Lemons, C.J., Mims, McClanahan, Powell, Kelsey, and Roush, JJ., and Koontz, S.J. 
 
CHERYL ANN PHELAN 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 150591 
JUSTICE CLEO E. POWELL 
 
 
 
FEBRUARY 12, 2016 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SOUTHAMPTON COUNTY 
Carl E. Eason, Jr., Judge 
 
 
Cheryl Ann Phelan (“Phelan”) appeals the decision of the trial court granting the 
Commonwealth’s special plea in bar of sovereign immunity because she failed to meet the 
statutory notice requirements of the Virginia Tort Claims Act (“VTCA”), Code §§ 8.01-195.1 
through -195.9. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
Phelan was an inmate incarcerated at the Deerfield Correctional Center.  On April 26, 
2013, Phelan allegedly slipped on a zucchini and injured her knee while working in the canning 
department of the Southampton complex. 
 
On March 26, 2014, Phelan sent a notice of claim to the Attorney General purporting to 
give notice of her claim against the Commonwealth for her injuries.  In her notice of claim, 
Phelan specifically identified herself as an inmate at the Deerfield Correctional Center and 
alleged that she sustained her injuries while she was working in the canning department in the 
Southampton complex.  Phelan further claimed that her injuries occurred due to the negligence 
of Lakeyta Lee (“Lee”) and Assistant Warden Willette S. Copeland (“Copeland”). 
 
On November 7, 2014, Phelan filed a complaint against Copeland, Lee, and the 
Commonwealth of Virginia.  In response, Copeland and Lee filed a special plea in bar, asserting 
that Phelan’s action was barred by the statute of limitations.  Phelan subsequently conceded that 
 
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her action against Copeland and Lee was barred by the statute of limitations.  As a result, the trial 
court sustained the plea in bar and dismissed the action against Copeland and Lee. 
 
The Commonwealth also filed a special plea in bar asserting that Phelan’s action was 
barred by sovereign immunity because Phelan failed to fulfill the statutory notice requirements 
of the VTCA.  The Commonwealth noted that Phelan failed to state the agency that was 
allegedly liable for her injuries in her notice of claim.  After considering the matter, the trial 
court agreed that Phelan’s notice of claim was insufficient as a matter of law and sustained the 
Commonwealth’s plea in bar. 
 
Phelan appeals. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
On appeal, Phelan argues that the trial court erred in sustaining the plea in bar because 
her notice of claim reasonably identifies the Department of Corrections as the agency allegedly 
liable for her injuries.  Phelan concedes that she did not expressly identify the Department of 
Corrections as the agency allegedly liable in her notice of claim, but she contends that her notice 
made it readily apparent as to which agency she was referring. 
 
This Court has repeatedly held that “the doctrine of sovereign immunity is alive and well 
in Virginia.”  Niese v. City of Alexandria, 264 Va. 230, 238, 564 S.E.2d 127, 132 (2002).  
Therefore, “[i]n the absence of express statutory or constitutional provisions waiving immunity, 
the Commonwealth and its agencies are immune from liability for the tortious acts or omissions 
of their agents and employees.”  Melanson v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 178, 181, 539 S.E.2d 
433, 434 (2001).  However, through the enactment of the VTCA, the General Assembly has 
provided an “express but limited waiver of the Commonwealth's immunity from tort claims.”  Id.  
As the VTCA is in derogation of the common law, “strict compliance with all of its provisions is 
 
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required.”  Halberstam v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 248, 251, 467 S.E.2d 783, 784 (1996).  
Furthermore, 
For this Court to place any limitation on the clear and 
comprehensive language of the statute, or to create an exception 
where none exists under the guise of statutory construction, would 
be to defeat the purpose of the enactment and to engage in judicial 
legislation. 
Melanson, 261 Va. at 184, 539 S.E.2d at 436 (quoting Town of Crewe v. Marler, 228 Va. 109, 
114, 319 S.E.2d 748, 750 (1984)) (emphasis added). 
 
The portion of the VTCA at issue in the present case is the notice requirement, found in 
Code § 8.01-195.6.  That statute states, in relevant part, 
Every claim cognizable against the Commonwealth . . . shall be 
forever barred unless the claimant or his agent, attorney or 
representative has filed a written statement of the nature of the 
claim, which includes the time and place at which the injury is 
alleged to have occurred and the agency or agencies alleged to be 
liable, within one year after such cause of action accrued. 
Code § 8.01-195.6(A). 
 
We have previously addressed what constitutes sufficient notice under Code § 8.01-
195.6.  In Halberstam, 251 Va. at 251, 467 S.E.2d at 785, the plaintiff’s notice of claim stated 
that her injury occurred in “the school parking lot” of George Mason University (“GMU”).  
Noting that GMU “has a number of parking lots and more than one campus” and the plaintiff 
“did not specify in which parking lot of which GMU campus she was injured,” this Court held 
that the notice of claim was insufficient because it did not include the specific location where the 
injury occurred.*  Id. 
                                                 
 
* The Court further explained that, although the Commonwealth has actual notice 
regarding the specific location where the injury occurred, such notice did not “obviate [a 
plaintiff’s] duty to strictly comply with the [VTCA’s] notice provisions.”  Halberstam, 251 Va. 
at 252, 467 S.E.2d at 785. 
 
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We again addressed the matter of sufficient notice in Bates v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 
387, 394, 593 S.E.2d 250, 254 (2004).  In Bates, we held that the plaintiff was only required to 
identify the University of Virginia Hospital as the place where the injury occurred; she was not 
required to narrow the identification to a specific “floor and room within the hospital.”  Id. at 
394-95, 593 S.E.2d at 254-55.  We explained that a notice of claim does not need to identify the 
exact location where the injury occurred, but it does need to reasonably identify the location 
where the injury occurred with sufficient specificity such “that the Commonwealth is in the 
position to investigate and evaluate [the] claim.”  Id. at 394, 593 S.E.2d at 254. 
 
In making her argument, Phelan relies heavily on our holding in Bates.  However, Bates 
is distinguishable from the present case in that the notice of claim in Bates actually included the 
place where the injury occurred and the issue before the Court was whether the notice included 
the requisite specificity.  The same cannot be said in the present case.  Phelan admitted that her 
notice of claim failed to include any direct mention of the specific agency that might be liable for 
her injuries.  Thus, the present case does not involve the reasonable identification of the correct 
state agency; rather, it involves the absence of any attempt to meet one of the VTCA’s specific 
notice requirements. 
 
We recognize that Phelan’s notice of claim leads to the logical inference that the 
Department of Corrections is the agency that Phelan was alleging to be responsible for her 
injuries.  Indeed, it is this inference that Phelan relies on in arguing that her notice of claim meets 
the reasonable identification standard of Bates.  We note, however, that the plain language of the 
VTCA requires that a claimant’s notice of claim “include[] . . . the agency or agencies alleged to 
be liable.”  Code § 8.01-195.6(A).  To allow Phelan to rely on such an inference, no matter how 
obvious or logical, would create an exception to the plain language of Code § 8.01-195.6(A).  As 
 
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previously noted, the VTCA is in derogation of the common law and, therefore, “strict 
compliance with all of its provisions is required.”  Halberstam, 251 Va. at 251, 467 S.E.2d at 
784.  Therefore, the notice requirement must be applied in the form adopted by the General 
Assembly.  Accordingly, we hold that a notice of claim that does not explicitly include the 
agency or agencies alleged to be liable is insufficient, even where such information is easily 
inferred from the notice of claim. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
Unlike in Bates and Halberstam, where the claimants at least attempted (with varying 
degrees of success) to meet the notice requirements of the VTCA, in the present case, Phelan has 
made no attempt to explicitly include the identity of the agency or agencies alleged to be liable in 
her notice of claim.  As her reliance on inference does not meet the express notice requirements 
under Code § 8.01-195.6, her claim is barred by sovereign immunity.  Accordingly, we will 
affirm the decision of the trial court. 
Affirmed.