Title: State v. Ramey

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Ramey, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-2904.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-2904 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. RAMEY, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State v. Ramey, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-2904.] 
Criminal law—R.C. 2945.72—Speedy trial—Reasonable continuance granted 
other than upon the accused’s motion tolls time for trial—Determination 
of reasonableness must be made based upon the existing record. 
(No. 2011-0597—Submitted March 20, 2012—Decided June 28, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Clark County,  
No. 10 CA 19, 2011-Ohio-1288. 
__________________ 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
{¶ 1} The issue presented in this appeal is whether the filing of a pretrial 
motion to suppress by a co-defendant automatically tolls the time within which a 
defendant must be brought to trial.  We hold that it does not.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the court of appeals’ judgment.  And for the reasons explained herein, we 
remand this case to the court of appeals to determine whether the setting of the 
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trial date beyond the statutory time period was reasonable, as required by R.C. 
2945.72(H). 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
{¶ 2} On October 7, 2009, Keith Ramey and Jonathan Keeton were 
arrested for breaking and entering into Nasty N8s, a tattoo parlor, the previous 
night.  They were also accused of using a pistol to beat and rob Howard Fannon, 
whom they had encountered on the street shortly after midnight on October 7.  A 
joint indictment handed down against the two men six days later contained two 
counts of aggravated robbery with firearm specifications, two counts of felonious 
assault with firearm specifications, and one count of breaking and entering.  After 
both entered not-guilty pleas, Keeton posted bond and was released from jail.  
Ramey was unable to post bond and therefore remained in jail pending trial. 
{¶ 3} On December 9, 2009, the court held a pretrial hearing during 
which counsel for both defendants represented that they intended to file motions 
to suppress and sever the trials.  That same day, the trial court scheduled a hearing 
on the motions for January 5, 2010, and advised the parties that it anticipated 
“assigning the matter for jury trial shortly thereafter.” 
{¶ 4} The following day, Keeton filed a motion to suppress physical 
evidence seized from his father’s house and statements he had made when he was 
arrested.  On December 21, 2009, the state filed a second, related indictment that 
charged the two with having a weapon under disability.  On December 29, 2009, 
Keeton filed a supplemental motion that challenged his identification through law 
enforcement’s use of a photo array. 
{¶ 5} Ramey did not file any pretrial motions. 
{¶ 6} The trial court held the motions hearing on January 5, 2010, as 
scheduled.  At the close of the hearing, Keeton abandoned portions of his motions 
and the trial court denied what remained.  On January 6, 2010, the trial court 
issued a scheduling order that set a deadline for the acceptance of a plea offer.  
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That entry also stated, “In the event that the defendants do not accept said plea 
offers, Counsel have indicated their respective availability for trial to commence 
at 9:00 o’clock a.m. on February 1, 2010.”  The court later continued the trial one 
additional day because the courtroom was unavailable on February 1, 2010. 
{¶ 7} On February 1, 2010, Ramey moved to dismiss both indictments 
on the ground that the state failed to prosecute him within 90 days after his arrest, 
as mandated by Ohio’s speedy-trial statute, R.C. 2945.71.  That same day, the 
trial court presided over a status conference, during which it denied Ramey’s 
motion “[b]ecause of the motions and the agreed hearing dates by counsel.”  The 
court also explained that, in its view, the motion to dismiss did not have merit 
because the parties had agreed to set certain dates to reconsider the status of the 
case and, “otherwise, the Court was well within its ability to set a trial date within 
what would have been the 90 days under R.C. 2945.71.”  The trial court thereafter 
issued a written decision that denied Ramey’s motion on the basis that the matter 
had been continued by agreement of the parties. 
{¶ 8} After a three-day trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts against 
Ramey on two counts of aggravated robbery with firearm specifications, one 
count of felonious assault, and one count of having a weapon under disability.  
The jury found Ramey not guilty of one count of felonious assault and one count 
of breaking and entering.  When sentencing Ramey, the trial court merged the 
aggravated-robbery counts and sentenced Ramey to an aggregate term of 
imprisonment of 11 years. 
{¶ 9} The Second District Court of Appeals affirmed Ramey’s 
convictions of aggravated robbery and felonious assault, which were charged in 
the first indictment, but reversed and vacated his conviction of having a weapon 
under disability, which was charged in the second indictment.  It did so because it 
concluded that Ramey was timely tried on the first indictment but not on the 
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second, because events that tolled the time for trial on the first indictment did not 
toll the time for trial on the second indictment. 
{¶ 10} As a starting point, the court of appeals explained that the time 
within which to bring Ramey to trial on all the charges began to run on the date of 
his initial arrest because the charge contained in the second indictment arose from 
the same facts as the charges contained in the first indictment.  The court of 
appeals then held that the time to bring Ramey to trial was tolled when Keeton 
filed his first motion to suppress and thus Ramey was tried timely on the first 
indictment, with three days to spare. 
{¶ 11} With respect to the second indictment, the court of appeals held 
that Keeton’s first suppression motion did not toll Ramey’s speedy-trial time 
because Keeton filed that motion before the second indictment was handed down.  
But Keeton’s supplemental motion to suppress, which he filed after the second 
indictment, automatically extended the time within which to bring Ramey to trial.  
Even so, the court of appeals concluded that the state failed to bring Ramey to 
trial on the charge in the second indictment within the statutory period, and thus it 
vacated Ramey’s conviction for having a weapon under disability.  Because the 
sentence on that count was to be served concurrently with the sentences that were 
affirmed, Ramey’s aggregate sentence remained the same. 
{¶ 12} We accepted jurisdiction over Ramey’s discretionary appeal.  State 
v. Ramey, 129 Ohio St.3d 1478, 2011-Ohio-4751, 953 N.E.2d 844. 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
{¶ 13} The sole proposition of law before us asserts: “The filing of a 
motion to suppress by a co-defendant does not, by itself, automatically toll the 
other co-defendant’s speedy trial time.” 
 
 
January Term, 2012 
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ANALYSIS 
The Right to a Speedy Trial 
{¶ 14} The right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right of a criminal 
defendant that is guaranteed by the United States and Ohio Constitutions.  Sixth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 10.  
See also State v. Hughes, 86 Ohio St.3d 424, 425, 715 N.E.2d 540 (1999).  States 
have the authority to prescribe reasonable periods in which a trial must be held 
that are consistent with constitutional requirements.  Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 
514, 523, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).  “In response to this authority, 
Ohio enacted R.C. 2945.71, which designates specific time requirements for the 
state to bring an accused to trial.”  Hughes at 425.  The prosecution and the trial 
courts have a mandatory duty to try an accused within the time frame provided by 
the statute.  State v. Singer, 50 Ohio St.2d 103, 105, 362 N.E.2d 1216 (1977); see 
also State v. Cutcher, 56 Ohio St.2d 383, 384, 384 N.E.2d 275 (1978).  Strict 
compliance with the statute is required.  State v. Davis, 46 Ohio St.2d 444, 448, 
349 N.E.2d 315 (1976). 
{¶ 15} A defendant charged with a felony “[s]hall be brought to trial 
within two hundred seventy days after the person’s arrest.”  R.C. 2945.71(C)(2).  
For purposes of calculating speedy-trial time, “each day during which the accused 
is held in jail in lieu of bail on the pending charge shall be counted as three days.”  
R.C. 2945.71(E).  Thus, subject to certain tolling events, a jailed defendant must 
be tried within 90 days.  Id. 
{¶ 16} Ramey, who was jailed pending trial, was not tried within 90 days 
after his arrest.  Instead, trial commenced 118 days after Ramey’s arrest.  The 
state argues both that the time in which to bring Ramey to trial was tolled by his 
own actions and that the time was tolled by the filing of his co-defendant’s motion 
to suppress. 
 
 
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Waiver of the Right to a Speedy Trial 
{¶ 17} The state contends that the time in which Ramey was to be brought 
to trial was tolled because Ramey’s counsel indicated at a pretrial conference that 
he would file motions to suppress and to sever and then failed to object to the trial 
date.  We disagree. 
{¶ 18} A criminal defendant may waive speedy trial rights.  See, e.g., 
State v. King, 70 Ohio St.3d 158, 637 N.E.2d 903 (1994), syllabus; State v. 
O’Brien, 34 Ohio St.3d 7, 9, 519 N.E.2d 218 (1987), citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 
529, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101.  “To be effective, an accused’s waiver of his 
or her constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial must be expressed in 
writing or made in open court on the record.”  King, syllabus. 
{¶ 19} In King, the defendant was charged with and pled not guilty to 
telephone harassment, a first-degree misdemeanor.  The court set the trial date, 
which King sought to continue.  The state did not oppose King’s motion, and the 
trial was continued.  Even though the continuance tolled the speedy-trial period 
because it was entered at the defendant’s request, the prosecutor and the court 
were nonetheless under the impression that King would execute a written waiver 
of her speedy-trial rights.  There was a dispute whether the prosecutor conditioned 
his approval of the continuance on King’s agreement to sign a speedy-trial waiver 
and there was disagreement whether defense counsel promised the judge’s 
secretary to forward a signed time waiver to the court.  In any event, no waiver 
was ever filed. 
{¶ 20} Thereafter, the trial court, on its own motion, continued King’s 
trial date by an additional two months.  Before trial commenced, King sought 
dismissal of the charges based on a violation of her right to a speedy trial.  In 
denying the motion, the trial court reasoned that King waived her speedy-trial 
rights, through her attorney’s oral representations to court staff and the 
prosecutor, in exchange for being granted the first continuance.  It further 
January Term, 2012 
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reasoned that it reasonably relied on King’s oral waiver in further continuing the 
trial date.  King entered a plea of no contest and was convicted.  The court of 
appeals vacated King’s conviction because it concluded that the oral waiver was 
ineffective. 
{¶ 21} We held that King’s alleged oral waiver of speedy-trial rights was 
not effective because it did not appear in the record.  We closely reviewed the 
record and determined that neither King nor her trial counsel made an express 
written waiver or waived her right to speedy trial in open court on the record.  For 
that reason, we concluded that King’s right to a speedy trial was intact when she 
moved for dismissal under R.C. 2945.73. 
{¶ 22} In this case as well, there is no definitive evidence of waiver.  
Neither Ramey nor his trial counsel executed a written waiver of speedy-trial 
rights or expressly waived his rights in open court on the record.  Instead, the state 
essentially asks us to find that Ramey and his counsel impliedly waived Ramey’s 
right to a speedy trial.  To do so would require us to ignore the unequivocal nature 
of our holding in King. 
{¶ 23} Ramey had not waived his right to a speedy trial when he filed his 
motion to dismiss.  Therefore, we must now determine whether the time in which 
Ramey had to be brought to trial was tolled. 
Tolling of the Speedy-Trial Clock 
{¶ 24} Because the General Assembly recognized that some degree of 
flexibility is necessary, it allowed for extensions of the time limits for bringing an 
accused to trial in certain circumstances.  State v. Lee, 48 Ohio St.2d 208, 209, 
357 N.E.2d 1095 (1976).  Accordingly, R.C. 2945.72 contains an exhaustive list 
of events and circumstances that extend the time within which a defendant must 
be brought to trial.  In addition to meticulously delineating the tolling events, the 
General Assembly jealously guarded its judgment as to the reasonableness of 
delay by providing that time in which to bring an accused to trial “may be 
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extended only by” the events enumerated in R.C. 2945.72(A) through (I).  See, 
e.g., Singer, 50 Ohio St.2d at 109, 362 N.E.2d 1216.  “These extensions are to be 
strictly construed, and not liberalized in favor of the state.”  Id. 
{¶ 25} R.C. 2945.72 does not include the filing of pretrial motions by a 
co-defendant as an event that automatically extends a defendant’s speedy-trial 
time.  In construing a statute, we may not add or delete words.  State ex rel. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co. v. Indus. Comm., 52 Ohio St.3d 144, 148, 556 N.E.2d 467 (1990).  
We are, therefore, compelled to conclude that a co-defendant’s filing of pretrial 
motions does not automatically toll the time in which a defendant must be brought 
to trial. 
Remand for application of R.C. 2945.72(H) 
{¶ 26} The Second District Court of Appeals concluded that Keeton’s 
motions to suppress tolled the time in which Ramey was to be brought to trial by 
relying on and expanding its own decision in State v. Smith, 2d Dist. No. 03-CA-
93, 2004-Ohio-6062.  In Smith, the Second District held that “[a] motion by a co-
defendant may operate to extend speedy trial time for another.”  Id. at ¶ 20.  The 
Smith court cited, without analyzing, R.C. 2945.72(H) as the relevant statutory 
authority. 
{¶ 27} R.C. 2945.72(H) permits the speedy-trial clock to be tolled for the 
“period of any continuance granted on the accused’s own motion, and the period 
of any reasonable continuance granted other than upon the accused’s own 
motion.”  (Emphasis added.)  
{¶ 28} When a trial court exercises its discretion to continue the period for 
trial beyond the statutory limit, the continuance is entered under the second clause 
of subsection (H) and, therefore, the period of continuance must be reasonable.  
State v. Davis, 46 Ohio St.2d 444, 449, 349 N.E.2d 315 (1976), and syllabus. 
{¶ 29} In Davis, the trial court failed to commence trial of a jailed 
defendant within the statutorily prescribed 90 days.  At a pretrial conference, 
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however, the defendant’s counsel had acquiesced in the trial date.  On the day of 
trial, the defendant moved to dismiss for failure to bring him to trial as required 
by R.C. 2945.71.  At the same time, defense counsel informed the court that if the 
motion was denied, he intended to request leave to file a notice of alibi and to 
request additional time to locate alibi witnesses.  The trial court dismissed the 
charges based on a speedy-trial violation, explaining that under R.C. 2945.73, it 
had no discretion in the matter.  The court of appeals reversed on the basis that the 
continuance was entered on the defendant’s own motion because defense counsel 
had agreed to the trial date.  In doing so, it concluded that the period of delay was 
excluded from the statutory time in which to bring the  defendant to trial on the 
authority of the first clause of R.C 2945.72(H). 
{¶ 30} But this court held that when defense counsel merely acquiesces in 
a trial date but does not affirmatively lodge a motion for a continuance, the 
continuance is entered “other than upon the accused’s own motion” and, under the 
second clause of R.C. 2945.72(H), must be reasonable.  Id. at 449.  Accordingly, 
we remanded the case for a determination as to the reasonableness of the 
continuance in light of defense counsel’s representation that he was not prepared 
to proceed with the trial as scheduled.  Id. at syllabus and 449. 
{¶ 31} In this case, Ramey’s counsel similarly merely acquiesced in the 
trial date.  Accordingly, the trial court had discretion to extend the trial date 
beyond the statutory time limit, if the continuance was reasonable, as required by 
the second clause of subsection (H).  Id.; see also McRae, 55 Ohio St.2d 149, 152, 
378 N.E.2d 476 (1978), fn. 3 and 4. 
{¶ 32} Ideally, “[w]hen sua sponte granting a continuance under R.C. 
2945.72(H), the trial court must enter the order of continuance and the reasons 
therefor by journal entry prior to the expiration of the time limit prescribed in 
R.C. 2945.71 for bringing a defendant to trial.”  State v. Mincy, 2 Ohio St.3d 6, 
441 N.E.2d 571 (1982), syllabus.  Here, the trial court did not comply with the 
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Mincy rule because it acted upon the mistaken belief that the time for trial was 
automatically extended by both Keeton’s filing of pretrial motions to suppress and 
Ramey’s counsel’s acquiescence in the trial date.  In doing so, like the trial court 
in Davis, it failed to recognize that the extension was properly granted only under 
the second clause of R.C. 2945.72(H). 
{¶ 33} On several occasions, we have found it necessary to address trial 
courts’ imperfect handling of continuances under R.C. 2945.72(H), such as 
occurred here.  See, e.g., McRae at 152.  We have recognized that an appellate 
court may affirm a conviction challenged on speedy-trial grounds even if the trial 
court did not expressly enumerate any reasons justifying the delay when the 
reasonableness of the continuance is otherwise affirmatively demonstrated by the 
record.  Id. 
{¶ 34} Because the court of appeals failed to undertake the requisite 
inquiry, we must remand this case to the court of appeals to determine whether 
the setting of the trial date beyond the statutory time period was reasonable, as 
required by R.C. 2945.72(H).  In doing so, we reaffirm the principle of law that 
the determination of reasonableness must be made on the existing record.  See 
McRae at 153 (the existing record must affirmatively demonstrate the 
reasonableness of the delay); Mincy at 8 (condemning after-the-fact justifications 
of continuances). 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 35} The time in which to bring Ramey to trial was not automatically 
tolled when his co-defendant filed pretrial motions to suppress.  Therefore, the 
court of appeals’ judgment is reversed, and this case is remanded to the court of 
appeals to determine, as R.C. 2945.72(H) states, whether the setting of the trial 
date beyond the statutory time period was reasonable. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
January Term, 2012 
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PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, CUPP, and 
MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
D. Andrew Wilson, Clark County Prosecuting Attorney, and Andrew R. 
Picek, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick, 
Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. 
Thomas Sartini, Ashtabula County Prosecuting Attorney, and Shelley 
Pratt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio 
Prosecuting Attorneys Association. 
______________________