Title: In the Matter of Williams

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-13268 
 
IN THE MATTER OF ABBY R. WILLIAMS. 
 
 
February 23, 2023. 
 
 
Attorney at Law, Disbarment, Misuse of client funds. 
 
 
 
The respondent attorney, Abby R. Williams, appeals from the 
judgment of a single justice of this court disbarring her from 
the practice of law.1  The matter came before the single justice 
on the information and record of proceedings filed by the Board 
of Bar Overseers (board).  The board determined, inter alia, 
that the respondent intentionally misused client trust funds, 
resulting in ongoing deprivation to clients.  The board 
recommended, and the single justice ordered, that the respondent 
be disbarred.  We affirm. 
 
1.  Prior proceedings.  On September 9, 2019, bar counsel 
filed a seven-count petition for discipline against the 
respondent.  Counts one, two, and four alleged that as to three 
sets of clients, the respondent intentionally misrepresented 
costs and intentionally misused client trust funds with ongoing 
deprivation resulting.2  Through counsel, the respondent filed an 
 
1 We have reviewed the respondent's preliminary memorandum 
and appendix, as well as the record that was before the single 
justice.  Pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:23, 471 Mass. 1303 (2015), 
we dispense with further briefing and oral argument. 
 
2 Specifically, as to counts one and two, the petition 
alleged that the respondent's conduct violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 
1.15 (b) (segregation of trust property), 1.15 (c) (prompt 
notice and delivery of trust property to client or third 
person), 1.15 (d) (1) (accounting), 1.15 (d) (2) (accounting), 
and 1.15 (f) (1) (C) (individual client records), as appearing 
 
 
 
2 
answer denying these allegations; these three counts are the 
only counts at issue on appeal.3 
 
 
The matter was referred to a hearing committee of the 
board.  After an evidentiary hearing at which the respondent was 
represented by counsel, the committee filed a report of its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and recommended that the 
respondent be disbarred.  The board thereafter considered the 
respondent's appeal and issued a report generally adopting the 
hearing committee's report and recommendation;4 an information 
 
in 471 Mass. 1380 (2015) and 440 Mass. 1338 (2004); Mass. R. 
Prof. C. 5.1 (a) (managerial authority over lawyers) and 5.1 (b) 
(supervisory authority over lawyers), as appearing in 471 Mass. 
1445 (2015) and 426 Mass. 1405 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.3 (a) 
(managerial authority over nonlawyers) and 5.3 (b) (supervisory 
authority over nonlawyers), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1447 
(2015) and 426 Mass. 1408 (1998); and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c) 
(dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 8.4 (d) 
(conduct prejudicial to administration of justice), and 8.4 (h) 
(fitness to practice law), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1483 
(2015), and as amended, 429 Mass. 1301 (1999).  As to count 
four, the petition alleged violations of the same rules except 
that it did not allege a violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 
1.15 (d) (2); in addition, it alleged violations of Mass. R. 
Prof. C. 1.1, as appearing in 471 Mass. 1311 (2015) 
(competence), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, as appearing in 471 
Mass. 1318 (2015) (diligence). 
 
3 With respect to the remaining counts, the petition alleged 
that the respondent failed to properly make or maintain a three-
way reconciliation of her Interest on Lawyers' Trust Account 
(IOLTA), failed to make or maintain a proper check register for 
her IOLTA, failed to make or maintain individual client ledgers 
and a ledger of personal funds in her IOLTA for fees and 
expenses, failed to cooperate with bar counsel's investigation, 
and failed to comply with the order of administrative suspension 
issued by the single justice.  In an amended answer filed 
shortly before her hearing, the respondent admitted these 
violations. 
 
4 The board did not adopt the hearing committee's conclusion 
with respect to count one that providing a false settlement 
breakdown to a private client was prejudicial to the 
administration of justice in violation of rule 8.4 (d).  That 
finding is not specifically at issue here, and so we do not 
separately address it. 
 
 
 
3 
was filed in the county court.  A single justice of this court 
reviewed the record, accepted the board's recommendation, and a 
judgment of disbarment entered.  The respondent appealed 
pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:23, 471 Mass. 1303 (2015). 
 
2.  Facts found by the committee and adopted by the board.  
We summarize the relevant factual findings of the hearing 
committee, as adopted by the board.  We agree with the single 
justice that the findings are supported by substantial evidence.  
See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 8 (6), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1310 
(2009). 
 
The respondent was admitted to the Massachusetts bar in 
1991, and in 1996 or 1997, she established the law firm "Abigail 
Williams & Associates, P.C.," of which she was the sole owner, 
officer, and managing partner.  In 2015, the respondent 
transitioned the firm to a limited liability company, founding 
"Abigail Williams & Associates, L.L.C."  Respondent retained 
control of the new entity. 
 
From July 2007 to July 2013, the respondent's firm employed 
Ross Annenberg as an associate attorney.  While working for the 
respondent's firm, Annenberg misused client funds for his own 
benefit by inflating costs, among other methods.  By the end of 
July 2013, the respondent had ended Annenberg's employment with 
her firm.  Annenberg was subsequently disbarred and pleaded 
guilty to criminal charges arising from his misconduct.  See 
Matter of Annenberg, 31 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 8, 8 (2015). 
 
Although the respondent contends that Annenberg was 
responsible for the misappropriation of client funds in the 
three cases at issue in counts one, two, and four, the hearing 
committee found that it was the respondent who personally and 
intentionally committed the misconduct.  In addition to the 
case-specific facts described infra, the hearing committee found 
that the respondent's firm suffered serious ongoing financial 
problems and that the respondent borrowed money to pay the 
firm's employees and to cover the firm's other costs.  And while 
Annenberg primarily handled the firm's nonmedical malpractice 
personal injury cases, it was the respondent who primarily 
handled the firm's medical malpractice cases.  Consistent with 
this practice, the respondent, not Annenberg, calculated costs 
for the medical malpractice cases. 
 
a.  Count one.  Count one concerned the respondent's 
representation of two clients in a medical malpractice case.  In 
2012, the lawsuit settled.  Minus a portion of the funds paid to 
 
 
 
4 
a life insurance company and placed in a structured settlement, 
the settlement proceeds were deposited in the respondent's 
Interest on Lawyers' Trust Account, an account for which the 
respondent was the only signatory.  The respondent's firm was 
entitled to $33,392.78 in costs but paid itself $160,000 in 
costs.  The difference of $126,607.22 was never paid to the 
clients.  On appeal, the respondent does not dispute these 
numbers. 
 
When the respondent's firm paid itself in June 2012, it did 
not provide the clients with the contemporaneous accounting 
required under Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15.  Partial payment was made 
to the clients by way of a check, and a copy of this check bore 
the respondent's handwritten notations computing costs in the 
inflated amount of $160,000.  The respondent testified that she 
made these notations at the time of the relevant disbursement.  
In addition, the evidence included an undated worksheet on which 
the respondent made a correction as to the specific amount of 
the costs charged to the clients. 
 
In about February 2013, one of the clients called the firm 
and requested an itemization of the costs.  In answer to this 
request, the respondent signed the cover letter accompanying a 
purported settlement breakdown.  But as to costs, the breakdown 
included only a one-line total of $160,000 and not an 
itemization as the client had requested. 
 
b.  Count two.  In a second case, the respondent 
represented a client individually and as administrator of an 
estate in a medical malpractice case arising out of the death of 
the client's husband, and an administrator de bonis non 
subsequently was appointed for the husband's estate.  In 2012, 
the lawsuit settled as to one of the defendants.  The 
respondent's firm was entitled to $59,736.90 in costs from the 
settlement.  Nevertheless, the respondent later provided the 
administrator with a settlement statement asserting costs in the 
amount of $195,171.17.  The respondent does not dispute the 
proper amount of costs, nor does she dispute that the ultimate 
costs were inflated.  The $135,434.27 difference between the 
proper and inflated costs was never paid to the client. 
 
As the hearing committee determined, the respondent's firm 
improperly billed two specific items as costs, and the 
respondent intended these overcharges.  First, the client was 
billed for a consulting attorney's fees, which were not costs.  
Second, and more pertinent to the issues before this court, the 
client was billed for $11,816.36 in costs associated with a so-
 
 
 
5 
called nonattorney "consultant."  In fact, this person was an 
employee of the respondent's firm who did not receive any 
compensation for her work on the case apart from her ordinary 
wages.  Moreover, the $11,816.36 was not a fee associated with 
legal or consulting work but rather represented the respondent's 
repayment of a loan she personally received from the employee.5 
 
The settlement breakdown that falsely inflated these costs 
was provided to the estate administrator only after the 
administrator made a personal request to the respondent, and 
even then, it was delayed by more than two months.  The 
settlement breakdown contained only a one-line total of the 
costs, and the administrator never received a detailed 
breakdown.  The settlement breakdown was signed by one of the 
respondent's employees as "Legal Assistant to Abigail R. 
Williams." 
 
c.  Count four.  In a third case, the respondent 
represented the personal representative of an estate in a 
medical malpractice action.  The case was settled as to two 
defendants.  After trial, judgment entered in favor of the third 
defendant.  The client did not receive any proceeds from the 
second settlement but believed that, by agreement, the 
respondent was withholding funds to cover the expenses of the 
appeal.  In September 2016, the respondent's firm filed a notice 
of appeal.  The notice was filed thirty-two days after the 
judgment.  A full year after filing of the notice, the client 
inquired about the status of the appeal, and the respondent 
replied, "we are still trying to perfect the record," and "the 
guy working on it with us is almost done with his portion."  But 
nothing substantive was being done to advance the appeal. 
 
In November 2017, the defendant served a motion to dismiss 
the appeal, in part because the notice of appeal was untimely.  
See Mass. R. A. P. 4 (a) (1), as amended, 464 Mass. 1601 (2013) 
(thirty-day deadline).  On January 29, 2018, defense counsel 
filed the motion to dismiss and represented in an affidavit that 
no opposition had been received.  See Rule 9A of the Rules of 
the Superior Court (2016).  The court allowed the motion, and 
the appeal was dismissed on February 1, 2018.  In sum, the 
record reflects that a notice of appeal was filed late and that 
no substantive efforts were made to prosecute the appeal.  The 
respondent never told the client about the dismissal.  The 
client had to learn this fact through others. 
 
5 By the time she was repaid, the employee had ceased 
working for the respondent. 
 
 
 
6 
 
In September and October 2018, seven months after the 
appeal was dismissed, the client asked the respondent multiple 
times for documentation and for payment of settlement funds 
remaining from prior settlements with other defendants in the 
case.  The respondent provided a settlement breakdown that 
contained a total for costs related to the appeal but did not 
include a detailed statement of those costs.  The settlement 
breakdown asserted $18,819.09 in costs related to the failed 
appeal, which costs had been deducted from the client's payment.  
In fact, the true costs related to the failed appeal amounted to 
$8,000.76, a difference of $10,818.33.  The respondent does not 
dispute the proper amount of these costs. 
 
3.  Sufficiency of the evidence of misconduct.  We "review 
the record to determine whether the single justice's decision is 
supported by sufficient evidence, free from errors of law, and 
free from any abuse of discretion."  Matter of Zankowski, 487 
Mass. 140, 144 (2021), quoting Matter of Tobin, 417 Mass. 92, 99 
(1994).  "The subsidiary facts found by the board must be upheld 
'if supported by substantial evidence'" in the record.  Matter 
of Zankowski, supra, quoting S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 8 (6). 
"'Substantial evidence' means such evidence as a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."  Matter of 
Slavitt, 449 Mass. 25, 30 (2007), quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 1 (6).  
Moreover, "[w]e will not disturb the hearing committee's 
credibility determinations," as "[t]he hearing committee . . . 
is the sole judge of credibility, and arguments hinging on such 
determinations generally fall outside the proper scope of our 
review."  Matter of Diviacchi, 475 Mass. 1013, 1018-1019 (2016), 
quoting Matter of McBride, 449 Mass. 154, 161-162 (2007).  As to 
its conclusions regarding the alleged violations, "the hearing 
committee's ultimate findings and recommendations, as adopted by 
the board, are entitled to deference, although they are not 
binding on this court."  Matter of Laroche-St. Fleur, 490 Mass. 
1020, 1023 (2022), quoting Matter of Diviacchi, supra at 1019. 
 
The respondent does not dispute any facts found by the 
board, nor does she dispute the figures determined by the board 
to be the appropriate amount of costs in the cases at issue.  On 
the contrary, the respondent states, "There was no dispute that 
the expenses were inflated.  The question was who inflated them, 
Respondent or Annenberg."  The respondent contends that her 
"inattention to these finances allowed Annenberg to steal client 
funds by improperly inflating the expenses related to the three 
matters at issue."  In sum, the respondent does not dispute the 
facts found by the hearing committee and adopted by the board 
 
 
 
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but argues that they were insufficient to establish that she 
personally and intentionally committed the contested violations. 
 
Drawing on her argument that the evidence was insufficient 
to demonstrate her own culpability, the respondent concludes 
that the single justice improperly shifted the burden of proof.  
She argues that the single justice improperly required that she 
affirmatively demonstrate that it was Annenberg who inflated 
client expenses.  We disagree.  The single justice concluded 
that "there was substantial evidence that it was the respondent 
who intentionally charged inflated expenses on the three matters 
at issue, that she was aware that the expenses were inflated, 
and that she was motivated in part by financial pressures on her 
firm." 
 
This conclusion is supported by ample evidence in the 
record, and we agree with the single justice that the evidence 
warrants the conclusion that the misconduct at issue was 
committed personally and intentionally by the respondent.  See 
Matter of London, 427 Mass. 477, 482-483 (1998) (finding no 
burden shifting, and holding "intent to deprive is a permissible 
inference" from "false accountings").  In particular, the 
respondent, not Annenberg, was responsible for the management 
and calculation of costs for medical malpractice cases.  And as 
to all three disputed counts, the respondent was responsible for 
providing settlement breakdowns that falsely inflated costs.  
See Matter of McBride, 449 Mass. at 162 (finding misleading 
letters drafted at instruction of respondent to be respondent's 
attempt to hide misappropriation of payments owed to clients); 
Matter of London, supra.  With respect to count two, the 
respondent used the inflated costs to repay a loan that she had 
taken.  And although the respondent argues that her "inattention 
to these finances allowed Annenberg to steal client funds," the 
misconduct related to the late-filed appeal in count four did 
not occur until years after Annenberg had left her firm. 
 
Moreover, the respondent's attempts to deflect blame to 
Annenberg largely depended, as the single justice observed, upon 
her own credibility.  But the hearing committee is the sole 
judge of credibility, see Matter of Diviacchi, 475 Mass. at 
1018-1019, and it expressly found the respondent's credibility 
to be lacking on these precise points.  "The hearing committee 
was under no obligation to believe the respondent's version of 
the facts" in the face of all the evidence to the contrary, and 
so there was no "impermissible shift of the burden of proof to 
the respondent."  Matter of London, 427 Mass. at 483.  See 
Matter of Moore, 442 Mass. 285, 291 (2004) ("The disputed 
 
 
 
8 
findings were made on ample evidence and were based in large 
part on the credibility determinations of the hearing 
committee"); Matter of Macero, 27 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 
554, 561-562 (2011) (finding no burden shifting where, as 
between "natural inference" and respondent's "implausible 
testimony . . . to explain away these facts, the committee" 
properly "drew the natural inference").  There was no error in 
the single justice's determination that the respondent engaged 
in the misconduct determined by the board. 
 
4.  Appropriate sanction.  We review de novo the 
disciplinary sanction imposed by the single justice to determine 
whether it "is markedly disparate from judgments in comparable 
cases."  Matter of Slavitt, 449 Mass. at 30, quoting Matter of 
Finn, 433 Mass. 418, 423 (2001).  See Matter of Greene, 476 
Mass. 1006, 1008 (2016).  "When an attorney 'intended to deprive 
the client of funds, permanently or temporarily, or if the 
client was deprived of funds (no matter what the attorney 
intended), the standard discipline is disbarment or indefinite 
suspension.'"  Matter of McBride, 449 Mass. at 163, quoting 
Matter of Schoepfer, 426 Mass. 183, 187 (1997).  Where 
deprivation is ongoing, as the hearing committee and the board 
found that it is with regard to the three disputed counts, the 
presumptive sanction is disbarment.  See Matter of Ablitt, 486 
Mass. 1011, 1017 (2021); Matter of Bryan, 411 Mass. 288, 291-292 
(1991).  And we give deference to the board's recommendation, 
which in this case is disbarment.  Matter of Hoicka, 442 Mass. 
1004, 1006 (2004). 
 
Disbarment is particularly appropriate where the 
misappropriation of client funds is accompanied by presence of 
"numerous aggravating factors" and "the absence of any 
mitigating factors."  Matter of McBride, 449 Mass. at 164.  
Here, the single justice found no mitigating factors and found 
multiple aggravating factors, all of which are supported by 
substantial evidence in the record, including the respondent's 
experience as an attorney and her lack of candor before the 
hearing committee.  The single justice also properly considered 
the cumulative effect of the respondent's multiple violations in 
different cases.  See Matter of Hrones, 457 Mass. 844, 855 
(2010), citing Matter of Saab, 406 Mass. 315, 326-327 (1989). 
 
Another aggravating factor is the respondent's failure to 
recognize her own obligations and her repeated attempts to blame 
others, particularly Annenberg, as described above.  This 
court's admonition in Matter of Ablitt, 486 Mass. at 1019, is 
applicable here: 
 
 
 
9 
 
"A bar discipline proceeding is not a forum best used 
broadly to cast blame or aspersions on others.  It is a 
proceeding with a narrow focus:  to determine whether there 
is a preponderance of evidence that an attorney has 
violated one or more rules of professional conduct and, if 
so, what sanction is warranted.  The respondent's continued 
focus in these proceedings on matters other than the 
charged misconduct does [the respondent] a disservice 
because evidence of misconduct is neither excused nor 
obscured by accusations of misconduct by others." 
 
For all the foregoing reasons, we agree with the single 
justice that disbarment was the appropriate sanction and not 
"markedly disparate from judgments in comparable cases."  Matter 
of Slavitt, 449 Mass. at 30, quoting Matter of Finn, 433 Mass. 
at 423. 
 
5.  Conclusion.  The evidence was sufficient to establish 
that the respondent personally and intentionally misappropriated 
client funds with deprivation resulting.  Disbarment is 
warranted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on the record, accompanied by a 
memorandum of law. 
Alan E. Brown for the respondent.