Title: Commonwealth v. Martinez

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12393 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  BENJAMIN MARTINEZ. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     November 4, 2020. - April 23, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Third-party culprit, Credibility of 
witness, Intoxication, Hearsay.  Witness, Credibility.  
Intoxication.  Practice, Criminal, Exclusion of evidence by 
judge on own motion, Hearsay, Instructions to jury, Capital 
case. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 22, 2014. 
 
The cases were tried before Richard J. Carey, J. 
 
 
Jeffrey L. Baler for the defendant. 
 
Travis H. Lynch, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BUDD, C.J.  On the afternoon of June 9, 2004, the body of 
Caridad Puente was discovered in a closet of her Springfield 
apartment.  In 2017, the defendant, Benjamin Martinez, was 
convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme 
2 
 
atrocity or cruelty in connection with the victim's death.1  On 
appeal, the defendant claims that the judge excluded certain 
evidence the defendant sought to introduce, and omitted certain 
jury instructions, resulting in reversible error.  The defendant 
also argues that the evidence presented at trial was 
insufficient to establish that he committed the offense.  After 
conducting a plenary review of the record and the parties' 
briefs, we affirm the defendant's convictions and decline to 
exercise our extraordinary power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
Background.  We summarize the facts as the jury could have 
found them, reserving certain details for discussion of specific 
issues. 
 
In June 2004, the victim was engaged in selling heroin from 
her apartment where she lived with her two young sons and a male 
known only as "Monster."  At approximately 8:30 A.M. on June 9, 
the victim's sister picked up the victim's older son to take him 
to school.  A witness observed two men leaving the victim's 
apartment between 11:15 A.M. and 12:30 P.M. and another man 
banging on the victim's door around 2:20 P.M.  At approximately 
3:30 P.M., after the victim failed to pick her son up from 
school, the victim's sister went to the apartment to check on 
 
 
1 The defendant also pleaded guilty to possession of heroin, 
a class A controlled substance, which he does not challenge on 
appeal. 
3 
 
her.  Upon arrival, she found the door locked and heard the 
sound of a baby crying inside.  The sister broke one of the 
apartment windows and, upon entering, discovered the victim's 
lifeless body propped up in a sitting position against the back 
wall of a closet in a pool of blood, with her toddler son by her 
side crying.  The victim had suffered thirty-two sharp force 
injuries to her face, neck, and chest. 
In addition to the blood in the closet where the victim's 
body was discovered, blood was found in various locations 
throughout the apartment, including the kitchen, the bathroom, 
and a bedroom.  Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analyses conducted 
on bloodstains in the kitchen as well as on scrapings taken from 
the victim's fingernails eventually2 were matched to the 
defendant's DNA profile.  In December 2014, a grand jury 
indicted the defendant, charging him with murder in the first 
degree and unlawful possession of heroin. 
 
At trial, the defendant testified that he had purchased 
heroin from the victim and that his blood was present in the 
victim's apartment because he accidentally injured himself while 
unsuccessfully injecting heroin.  He claimed that a third party 
was responsible for killing the victim. 
 
 
2 There were no leads in the case until 2014, when an 
inquiry with the Combined DNA Index System (known as CODIS) 
determined that the defendant's DNA profile matched the profiles 
developed from several of the identified bloodstains. 
4 
 
 
On March 8, 2017, a jury found the defendant guilty of 
murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty.  The following day, the defendant pleaded guilty to 
possession of a class A controlled substance.  The trial judge 
sentenced the defendant to a term of life imprisonment on the 
murder conviction and to a concurrent, two-year term on the 
possession conviction.  The defendant timely appealed. 
Discussion.  The defendant argues that the judge 
erroneously excluded third-party culprit and Bowden defense 
evidence, as well as portions of the defendant's proffered 
evidence when he testified in his own defense.  See Commonwealth 
v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 485-486 (1980).  He also challenges 
the jury instructions concerning witness credibility and faults 
the judge for failing to instruct the jury to consider the 
defendant's potential intoxication.  Finally, the defendant 
contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to support 
the jury's verdict and asks this court to exercise its power 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to grant him a new trial or to reduce 
his verdict. 
1.  Exclusion of third-party culprit evidence.  Prior to 
trial, the defendant unsuccessfully moved in limine to admit 
evidence suggesting that the victim might have been killed by 
other individuals.  On appeal, the defendant claims that the 
judge's exclusion of that evidence was reversible error.  As the 
5 
 
exclusion of third-party culprit evidence is an issue of 
constitutional dimension, we examine the defendant's arguments 
on this matter de novo.  Commonwealth v. Conkey, 443 Mass. 60, 
66-67 (2004), S.C., 452 Mass. 1022 (2008).  Third-party culprit 
evidence is admissible if it "tends to show that another person 
committed the crime or had the motive, intent, and opportunity 
to commit it," and if the evidence is "of substantial probative 
value, and will not tend to prejudice or confuse" (citations 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 800-
801 (2009).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 1105 (2021).  Here, we 
conclude that the judge did not err in excluding any of the 
third-party culprit evidence that the defendant sought to admit. 
a.  Rodriguez.  The defendant sought to implicate Alex 
Quinito Rodriguez, a family friend of the victim, by introducing 
evidence that Rodriguez drove a motor vehicle registered to the 
victim and was seen banging on the victim's apartment door on 
the day she was killed.  During the subsequent investigation, 
although investigators spoke with someone purporting to be 
Rodriguez on the telephone, that person refused to meet with 
police. 
These alleged facts, without more, are wholly inadequate to 
be admissible as third-party culprit evidence.  That Rodriguez 
was banging on the victim's apartment door on the day she died 
suggests, at most, that he may have had the opportunity to 
6 
 
commit the murder; it says nothing about motive or intent.3  See 
Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 432 Mass. 578, 589 (2000) (evidence 
that third party appeared at crime scene at around time of 
murder did not constitute substantial link between third party 
and murder).  Further, that Rodriguez may have been 
uncooperative with the investigation is also of little 
consequence.  An individual's decision not to speak with police 
is not itself inculpatory, especially where, as here, Rodriguez 
was believed to be an undocumented immigrant.  See Commonwealth 
v. Chicas, 481 Mass. 316, 322 (2019) (witness's status as 
undocumented immigrant may make witness less likely to cooperate 
with government); Irwin v. Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 834, 852 
(2013) ("An individual who has not been arrested or charged 
. . . may choose not to speak with police for a myriad of 
reasons"). 
b.  Monster.  Similarly, the judge properly excluded the 
defendant's proffered evidence regarding an individual known as 
"Monster."  Because there were no signs of forced entry when the 
victim was found, the defendant sought to introduce the fact 
that Monster lived with the victim at the time of her death, and 
that investigators were unable to locate him following the 
 
 
3 An attempt to attribute intent to kill based on the fact 
that Rodriguez was banging on the victim's door would be 
impermissibly speculative. 
7 
 
murder, as proof that he may have been the killer.  As with the 
evidence concerning Rodriguez, this evidence demonstrates no 
more than Monster's potential opportunity to kill the victim; it 
does not tend to prove that he was in fact the culprit.  See 
O'Brien, 432 Mass. at 589.  Nor does the fact that police could 
not locate Monster following the victim's death tend to prove 
that he killed her.  See Irwin, 465 Mass. at 852. 
c.  The Dominican brothers.  The defendant also argues that 
hearsay evidence demonstrating that a group of four brothers 
from the Dominican Republic (Dominican brothers) had a motive to 
murder the victim was excluded improperly.  The defendant wanted 
to demonstrate that the Dominican brothers had violent 
interactions with Roberto Colon,4 the father of the victim's 
younger son, and also were upset with the victim because she 
told people that they had stolen money and drugs. 
The defendant sought to introduce investigator notes and 
the statements of various detectives, based on an interview with 
Colon during the initial investigation, indicating that the 
Dominican brothers were angry with the victim.  The defendant 
also wanted to introduce statements made to detectives by two 
other individuals who knew the victim:  Ramon Rivera, who told 
 
 
4 Colon told detectives that one of the Dominican brothers 
cut Colon's face and shot him in the leg because of an incident 
in Chicopee. 
8 
 
police that the victim had told him that "they" were in the 
United States and that "people" were telling her to move out; 
and Moises Zapata, who told police that the "word on the street" 
was that the Dominican brothers may have killed the victim in 
retaliation. 
Hearsay offered as third-party culprit evidence is 
admissible, even if it does not fall within a hearsay exception, 
provided that "the evidence is otherwise relevant, will not tend 
to prejudice or confuse the jury, and there are other 
'substantial connecting links' to the crime."  O'Brien, 432 
Mass. at 588, quoting Commonwealth v. Rosa, 422 Mass. 18, 23 
(1996).  Given its widest latitude, the evidence that the 
defendant sought to introduce demonstrates that the Dominican 
brothers may have had a motive to kill the victim.  However, 
motive alone is not enough to demonstrate third-party 
culpability.  See Commonwealth v. Bright, 463 Mass. 421, 440 
(2012).  Accordingly, the trial judge properly excluded the 
hearsay statements at issue here, as they did not establish a 
substantial connecting link between the Dominican brothers and 
the victim's death.  See Commonwealth v. Smith, 461 Mass. 438, 
447 (2012) (victim's fear of third party insufficient to 
constitute substantial connecting link between third party and 
crime).  Contrast Commonwealth v. Keizer, 377 Mass. 264, 267 
(1979) (substantial connecting links between offense charged and 
9 
 
subsequent crime included similar modus operandi by individuals 
of similar description). 
Because the hearsay statements provided no substantial 
connecting links between the Dominican brothers and the victim's 
death, their probative value was substantially outweighed by 
their tendency to confuse the jury.5  See Silva-Santiago, 453 
Mass. at 801 ("the admission of feeble third-party culprit 
evidence poses a risk of unfair prejudice to the Commonwealth, 
because it inevitably diverts jurors' attention away from the 
defendant on trial and onto the third party").  Thus, there was 
no error in excluding the statements.  See O'Brien, 432 Mass. at 
589. 
2.  Bowden evidence.  The defendant also argues that in 
excluding evidence regarding the Dominican brothers, the judge 
deprived him of being able to demonstrate that police had 
information concerning other suspects but failed adequately to 
investigate those leads.  "Defendants have the right to base 
 
5 Moreover, the third-party culprit evidence that the 
defendant sought to introduce regarding Rodriguez, Monster, and 
the Dominican brothers likely would have been confusing to the 
jury, given the defendant's testimony directly implicating Alexi 
Guzman in the victim's death.  See part 3, infra.  Further, 
given that the jury ultimately rejected the defendant's 
testimony directly implicating Guzman as the victim's attacker, 
it is difficult to imagine how he was disadvantaged by the 
exclusion of evidence regarding Rodriguez, Monster, and the 
Dominican brothers, whose involvement was completely 
speculative. 
10 
 
their defense on the failure of police adequately to investigate 
a murder in order to raise the issue of reasonable doubt as to 
the defendant's guilt in the minds of the jury."  Commonwealth 
v. Phinney, 446 Mass. 155, 165-166 (2006), S.C., 448 Mass. 621 
(2007), citing Bowden, 379 Mass. at 486.  See Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 1107. 
Such evidence is admissible where the probative weight of 
the proffered evidence is not substantially outweighed by the 
risk of unfair prejudice to the Commonwealth "from diverting the 
jury's attention to collateral matters."  See Commonwealth v. 
Moore, 480 Mass. 799, 808, 809 n.9 (2018).  The decision to 
exclude such evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.6  
See Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 804 & n.26. 
As discussed supra, there were no connecting links between 
the Dominican brothers and the victim's death.  The evidence 
that the defendant sought to introduce was no more than 
speculation and conjecture.  It therefore did not have 
"sufficient indicia of reliability" such that a jury would have 
reasonably expected further investigation into the lead than was 
conducted.  Id. at 804.  The risk of unfair prejudice in 
 
6 Unlike third-party culprit evidence, the exclusion of 
Bowden evidence does not implicate constitutional rights.  See 
Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 804 n.26.  For this reason, we 
disagree with the defendant's contention that the exclusion of 
Bowden evidence implicated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
11 
 
introducing evidence that the police failed to pursue the 
Dominican brothers as a lead substantially outweighed probative 
value of the evidence.7 
 
3.  The defendant's testimony.  At trial, the defendant 
took the stand in his own defense.  He testified that on the day 
the victim was killed, he went to her apartment to purchase and 
use heroin.  He further claimed that, while there, he saw Alexi 
Guzman argue with the victim and that the argument escalated, 
culminating with Guzman attacking the victim with a kitchen 
knife.  The defendant testified that he himself was injured as 
he attempted to separate them. 
On appeal, the defendant argues that the judge committed 
reversible error by barring the defendant from testifying as to 
statements made by Guzman before and after the attack as 
inadmissible hearsay.  See Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 431 Mass. 
241, 246 (2000) (claims of error preserved at trial reviewed for 
prejudice).  As the Commonwealth concedes (properly) that the 
statements were in fact admissible, we must satisfy ourselves 
that the errors "did not influence the jury, or had but very 
 
 
7 We also note that the judge allowed the portion of the 
defendant's motion seeking to elicit testimony from detectives 
to demonstrate deficiencies in their investigation of Rodriguez 
and Monster as suspects.  See Commonwealth v. Scott, 470 Mass. 
320, 332 (2014) (that judge allowed some but not all Bowden 
evidence defendant sought to admit was factor in abuse of 
discretion calculus). 
12 
 
slight effect" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 
417 Mass. 348, 353 (1994).  Applying this standard, we conclude 
that the exclusion of Guzman's statements was not prejudicial. 
 
First, the Commonwealth objected to the defendant relating 
statements made by Guzman as he argued with the victim.  At 
sidebar, defense counsel proffered that the defendant would 
testify that Guzman made statements such as "Look how much you 
like him; What are you doing; Sleeping with him; things of that 
nature," and argued that the testimony was not being offered for 
the truth, but instead to demonstrate Guzman's state of mind.  
Specifically, the defendant offered these statements to show 
Guzman's animosity towards him and the romantic relationship 
between Guzman and the victim. 
 
We agree that, because Guzman's statements were not offered 
for their truth, they were excluded improperly on hearsay 
grounds.  See Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 410 Mass. 521, 526 
(1991).  The defendant nevertheless was able to testify that he 
felt like he "just got caught by someone's husband with his wife 
at his house."  He further testified that Guzman was "upset" and 
"angry," that "[t]here was animosity" between Guzman and the 
victim, and that they were saying "nasty things" to each other.  
Based on this testimony, the jury readily could have inferred 
that Guzman and the victim were in a relationship and that 
Guzman was angry with the victim because the defendant was in 
13 
 
the apartment.  We therefore conclude that the exclusion of 
Guzman's actual statements was nonprejudicial.  See Commonwealth 
v. Cassidy, 470 Mass. 201, 216 (2014) (erroneous exclusion of 
statements made during telephone call not prejudicial, as jury 
could infer threats were made because defendant fled after 
telephone conversation). 
 
As for the second excluded statement, the defendant 
testified that after the altercation, Guzman spoke to Rodriguez 
on the telephone, but the defendant was not permitted to testify 
that, after the call, Guzman told the defendant that Guzman was 
going to take the victim to a hospital and that Rodriguez was 
going to pick up the defendant to bring the defendant to the 
hospital.  The defendant offered these statements to demonstrate 
both Guzman's alleged intent to deceive the defendant and to 
explain why the defendant would leave a badly injured woman 
alone with her attacker.  Here again, because the statement was 
offered not for its truth, it was not hearsay and was admissible 
to demonstrate state of mind.  See Sullivan, 410 Mass. at 526. 
 
However, as with the earlier statements, the exclusion of 
Guzman's statement after the attack did not prejudice the 
defendant.  On direct examination, the defendant testified that, 
after the altercation, he told Guzman, "[W]e need to go to the 
hospital," and that Guzman then telephoned Rodriguez.  On cross-
examination, the defendant testified that he left the victim 
14 
 
with Guzman in the apartment because he understood that Guzman 
was going to bring the victim to the hospital.  Thus, although 
excluded in error, Guzman's purported statement after the 
altercation would have been cumulative of other evidence that 
was before the jury.  See Commonwealth v. Alammani, 439 Mass. 
605, 611-612 (2003) (even if excluded in error, testimony was 
cumulative of admitted evidence and therefore nonprejudicial). 
The defendant points out that as the excluded testimony 
also pertains to third-party culprit evidence, we must determine 
whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See 
Conkey, 443 Mass. at 70.  Here, the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt because, as discussed supra, the information 
would have been cumulative of the evidence that the jury already 
had before them.  Further, the information would not have 
negated the powerful DNA evidence implicating the defendant.  
See Commonwealth v. Tague, 434 Mass. 510, 515-517 (2001), cert. 
denied, 534 U.S. 1146 (2002) (erroneously excluded third-party 
culprit evidence harmless given overwhelming evidence of 
defendant as coventurer); Commonwealth v. Perrot, 407 Mass. 539, 
549 (1990) ("The essential question is whether the error had, or 
might have had, an effect on the jury and whether the error 
contributed to or might have contributed to the verdicts"). 
 
4.  Jury instructions.  The defendant challenges two 
aspects of the instructions provided to the jury:  he argues 
15 
 
that the judge's instructions regarding witness credibility were 
incomplete, and that the judge failed to inform the jury that 
they could consider intoxication when determining whether the 
crime was committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty.  As the 
defendant failed to raise either of these issues at the time of 
trial, we first must determine whether there was error and, if 
so, whether it created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage 
of justice,8 see Commonwealth v. Vinton, 432 Mass. 180, 188 
(2000), citing Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 681 
(1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014), keeping in mind that "[t]he 
adequacy of instructions must be determined in light of their 
over-all impact on the jury" (citation omitted), Commonwealth v. 
Niemic, 427 Mass. 718, 720 (1998).  We address each issue raised 
in turn. 
a.  Witness credibility.  The judge instructed the jury 
regarding the credibility of a witness largely based on 
Instruction 2.260 of the Criminal Model Jury Instructions for 
Use in the District Court (2009) (District Court Model 
 
 
8 In addition to arguing that the judge erred in omitting 
certain instructions, the defendant also claims that his trial 
counsel was ineffective in failing to insist upon the 
instructions to which he now says he was entitled.  As the 
standard under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, is more favorable to the 
defendant than the standard for ineffective assistance of 
counsel, we review both claims for a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 
678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014). 
16 
 
Instructions) (replaced by Instruction 2.120 in 2019).  He 
explained that it was the jury's duty to decide disputed issues 
of fact, and that they were the sole judges of the credibility 
of the witnesses.9  The defendant contends that the judge erred 
by omitting the following portion of that model instruction: 
"If you do not believe a witness's testimony that something 
happened, of course your disbelief is not evidence that it 
did not happen.  When you disbelieve a witness, it just 
means that you have to look elsewhere for credible evidence 
about that issue." 
 
The defendant argues that the failure to give this portion of 
the model instruction left open the chance that if the jury 
credited neither the defendant's testimony nor that of the 
Commonwealth's witnesses, they may have convicted the defendant 
based on speculation.  We disagree. 
 
To begin, we note that the District Court Model 
Instructions are not sanctioned by, or binding upon, this court.  
See Commonwealth v. Quinn, 439 Mass. 492, 500 n.14 (2003).  
Thus, we decline to evaluate the instruction at issue based on 
 
9 The judge stated: 
 
"It will be your duty to decide any disputed questions of 
fact.  You will have to determine which witnesses to 
believe and how much weight to give their testimony.  You 
should give the testimony of each witness whatever degree 
of belief and importance that you judge it is fairly 
entitled to receive.  You are the sole judges of the 
credibility of the witnesses and if there are any conflicts 
in the testimony, it is your function to resolve those 
conflicts and to determine where the truth lies." 
17 
 
how closely it adhered to the model instruction on witness 
credibility.  Instead, we examine the instruction "in light of 
[its] over-all impact on the jury" to determine whether the jury 
would have been prompted to base their verdict on pure 
speculation (citation omitted).  See Niemic, 427 Mass. at 720. 
 
The judge instructed the jury that the defendant was 
presumed to be innocent unless the Commonwealth met its burden 
to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
properly defined the burden of proof.  He further explained that 
the burden remains with the Commonwealth, and that the defendant 
was not required to present any evidence at all.  Viewing the 
instructions as a whole, it is clear that the over-all message 
was that the jury were not to reach a verdict based on pure 
speculation.  There was no error. 
b.  Voluntary intoxication and extreme atrocity or cruelty.  
In determining whether a homicide was committed with extreme 
atrocity or cruelty, whether and to what extent a defendant's 
mental capacity is impaired is a factor that the jury can 
consider.  Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 478 Mass. 189, 194 (2017).  
Here, as the Commonwealth concedes, because evidence was 
presented that the defendant used heroin on the night of the 
victim's death, he was entitled to an instruction that the jury 
could consider such evidence in determining whether the killing 
was committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty.  See 
18 
 
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 469 Mass. 410, 421-422 (2014), citing 
Commonwealth v. Perry, 385 Mass. 639, 648-649 (1982). 
Nevertheless, we conclude that the error did not result in 
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, as the 
evidence presented at trial did not suggest that the defendant 
was actually intoxicated or otherwise impaired.  Although the 
defendant testified that he had attempted to inject himself with 
heroin while he was at the victim's apartment, he said that he 
was unable to do so successfully.  Further, the defendant did 
not claim that the heroin he attempted to use had any effect on 
his mental capacity.10  Because the evidence did not demonstrate 
that the defendant actually was impaired, the failure to 
instruct on voluntary intoxication in connection with whether 
the defendant killed the victim with extreme atrocity or cruelty 
did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice. 
5.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The defendant next argues 
that the judge erred in failing to allow his motions for a 
required finding of not guilty because the evidence presented 
was insufficient to support his conviction without relying on 
 
10 At any rate, we note that the jury heard testimony that 
the defendant was a long-time heroin addict and that heroin 
addicts frequently build immunity to heroin use. 
19 
 
surmise and conjecture.11  More specifically, the defendant 
argues that the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate that his DNA 
was deposited in the victim's apartment at the time of the 
crime.  In reviewing claims of insufficient evidence, we view 
the evidence presented at trial, together with reasonable 
inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth to determine whether any rational jury could have 
found the defendant guilty of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 
(1979).  In so doing, we conclude that the defendant's argument 
is unavailing. 
The evidence presented at trial was more than sufficient to 
allow a rational fact finder to conclude beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the DNA extracted from the victim's fingernail 
scrapings and from bloodstains in the kitchen, matching the 
defendant's DNA profile, were deposited at the time of the 
crime.  The jury heard testimony from the victim's son and the 
victim's sister regarding the fact that when the former left the 
apartment that morning for school, there was no visible blood 
splattered about, and regarding the state of the apartment when 
 
 
11 The defendant also maintains that the Commonwealth 
presented no evidence of motive for the crime.  However, as 
motive is not an essential element of murder, the Commonwealth 
is not required at all to prove that the defendant had one.  See 
Commonwealth v. Campbell, 378 Mass. 680, 688 n.8 (1979). 
20 
 
the latter entered that afternoon and discovered the victim's 
body.  Moreover, during his testimony, the defendant admitted to 
being present in the apartment when the victim was attacked.12 
This evidence, although circumstantial, was sufficient to 
allow the jury to infer that the defendant attacked the victim 
with a knife and sustained wounds as the victim attempted to 
protect herself.  See Commonwealth v. Mejia, 461 Mass. 384, 392 
(2012) (Commonwealth may rely entirely on circumstantial 
evidence, so long as inferences drawn from it are reasonable and 
possible).  Thus, although the defendant provided an alternative 
explanation for how DNA matching his profile came to be found on 
the victim's body among other places in the apartment, i.e., 
that he was injured as he attempted to stop Guzman's knife 
attack on the victim, where "the evidence lends itself to 
several conflicting interpretations, it is the province of the 
jury to resolve the discrepancy and 'determine where the truth 
lies.'"  Commonwealth v. Platt, 440 Mass. 396, 401 (2003), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Lydon, 413 Mass. 309, 312 (1992).  That 
is exactly what the jury properly did here.  The judge did not 
 
12 The defendant's reliance on Commonwealth v. Morris, 422 
Mass. 254 (1996), and Commonwealth v. Anitus, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 
104 (2018), is misplaced.  In those cases, the convictions were 
overturned because the mere presence of fingerprints in the 
former case and DNA in the latter were insufficient alone to 
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Morris, supra at 
257-258; Anitus, supra at 109. 
21 
 
err in denying the defendant's motions for a required finding of 
not guilty. 
 
6.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Finally, the 
defendant asks us to exercise our extraordinary power under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Upon review of the entire record, we 
discern no error that resulted in a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  Accordingly, we will not exercise our 
extraordinary power under § 33E to order a new trial or to 
reduce the defendant's sentence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.