Title: O'Connor v DFS Oland v. DFS

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DOROTHY O’CONNER,1 
 
Respondent Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES FOR 
CHILDREN, YOUTH AND THEIR 
FAMILIES, DIVISION OF FAMILY 
SERVICES, 
 
Petitioner Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 276, 2013 
§ 
§  Court Below—Family Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  File No. 13-01-03TN 
§  Petition No. 13-01347 
§   
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
DARRYL OLAND, 
 
Respondent Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES FOR 
CHILDREN, YOUTH AND THEIR 
FAMILIES, DIVISION OF FAMILY 
SERVICES, 
 
Petitioner Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 288, 2013 
§ 
§  Court Below—Family Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  File No. 13-01-03TN 
§  Petition No. 13-01347 
§   
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
       Submitted:  November 4, 2013 
          Decided:  December 5, 2013 
                                                 
1 The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the appellants pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 7(d) and consolidated these appeals for consideration.  The Court also uses 
pseudonyms for the children throughout this Order. 
 
2
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 5th day of December 2013, upon consideration of the appellants’ 
joint opening brief filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26.1(c), their 
respective attorneys’ motions to withdraw, and the responses filed by the 
Division of Family Services (DFS) and the Guardians ad Litem (GALs), it 
appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The respondents-appellants, Dorothy O’Conner (“Mother”), 
and Darryl Oland II (“Father”), filed these appeals from the Family Court’s 
order, dated May 1, 2013, which terminated their parental rights with respect 
to their three minor children, Ginny (born November 1, 2001), Valerie (born 
October 28, 2003), and Darryl III (born September 21, 2010).  Mother and 
Father’s appointed attorneys on appeal have filed a joint brief and motions to 
withdraw pursuant to Rule 26.1(c).  Counsel asserts that they have made a 
conscientious review of the record and the law and can find no arguable 
grounds for appeal.  Father did not respond to his counsel’s motion and brief 
and thus has not raised any issues for this Court’s consideration on appeal.  
Mother has enumerated several points for the Court’s consideration on 
appeal.  DFS and the GALs have filed responses to the brief and have moved 
to affirm the judgment below. 
 
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(2) 
On December 28, 2011, DFS filed an emergency petition for 
custody of the children, alleging that the children were dependent and/or 
neglected in their parents’ care.  A preliminary protective hearing was held 
on January 4, 2012 and an adjudicatory hearing was held on January 27, 
2012.  Custody of the children was continued with DFS. Thereafter, the 
Family Court held two dispositional hearing and three review hearings.  On 
January 8, 2013, the Family Court held a permanency hearing at which time 
the goal was changed to termination of parental rights (TPR) with a 
concurrent goal of reunification.  The TPR hearing was held on March 22, 
2013 and April 16, 2013.  At the hearing, DFS presented the testimony of 
numerous witnesses familiar with the children and their case, including 
Mother and Father, two therapists from SODAT, DFS workers, a therapist, 
parent aides, the foster mother for Valerie and Darryl, and the foster mother 
for Ginny.   
(3) 
The testimony established that Ginny and Valerie first came 
into DFS’s care in 2006 as a result of criminal charges that were filed 
against Mother for punching Ginny in the face.  Father was incarcerated at 
the time.  Mother ultimately pled guilty to Assault in the Third Degree.  In 
July 2007, the children were returned to their parents’ care.  Thereafter, the 
parties continued to move around frequently and were unable to maintain 
 
4
steady employment. They drifted from homeless shelters to family 
members’ homes to motel rooms for lack of a permanent residence.  Father 
was arrested in March 2011 and again in June 2011.  In December 2011, 
Mother voluntarily contacted DFS for help.  The parents stipulated to a 
probable cause finding of dependency due to their financial situation and 
lack of housing.  The children were placed in foster care, where it was 
discovered that Valerie, then eight-years-old, had tattoos on five different 
body parts including her buttocks.  Both girls had sexual knowledge that was 
inappropriate for their tender ages and reported viewing pornographic 
videos, one involving children, on Mother’s cell phone. 
(4) 
DFS developed similar case plans for Mother and Father 
requiring each to maintain stable finances, attend the children’s medical 
appointments, attend parenting classes, have substance abuse and mental 
health evaluations and follow any recommendations for treatment, obtain 
stable housing, and attend therapy with the children if recommended.  Father 
also was required to comply with his court-ordered probation.  The record 
reflects that Father had been released from the VOP Center on May 8, 2012 
only to be rearrested on May 10 at the New Castle County Courthouse for 
disorderly conduct, a charge to which he later pled guilty.  Mother pled 
 
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guilty in September 2012 to endangering the welfare of a child for having 
Valerie tattooed.   
(5) 
As of the second day of the TPR hearing in April 2013, Father 
had a job in a restaurant but Mother was unemployed.  Father testified that 
he had secured a new apartment starting in May but provided no proof of 
such.  Moreover, Father had a new pending criminal charge for unauthorized 
use of a credit card, which was a violation of his probation and could result 
in his incarceration and loss of employment.  Father’s probation officer 
testified that he had not complied with the terms of his probation or 
treatment.  Neither parent had completed the required parenting classes or 
been consistent in their mental health or substance abuse treatment.   
(6) 
Following the hearing, the Family Court found clear and 
convincing evidence that there was a statutory basis for termination because 
both Mother and Father had failed to adequately plan for their children’s 
emotional and physical needs and that termination of both Mother’s and 
Father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests.2  Among other 
things, the Family Court found that the children had been in DFS’ care for 
more than one year,3 that there was a history of neglect, abuse or lack of 
                                                 
2 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103(a)(5) (2009). 
3 Id. § 1103(a)(5)a1. 
 
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care,4 that the parties were incapable of discharging their parental 
responsibilities due to repeated incarceration,5 that neither parent was able to 
assume custody of the children and support them financially,6 and that 
failure to terminate the parental relationships would result in continued 
emotional instability and physical risk to the children.7 These appeals 
followed. 
(7) 
In response to her counsel’s motion to withdraw, Mother filed a 
reply enumerating five points for consideration.  First, she contends that 
DFS did nothing to help her find housing.  Second, she asserts that she had 
shelter at the Sunday Breakfast Mission but DFS did not approve.  Third, she 
contends that she did everything that DFS asked her to do but unfairly had 
her parental rights terminated because of a lack of housing.  Fourth, she 
states that she has a close bond with her children, which is reflected in her 
decision to voluntarily contact DFS when she could not find appropriate 
housing for them during the winter.  Finally, she asserts that she now has a 
stable job and housing and is able to care for her children. 
                                                 
4 Id. § 1103(a)(5)a2. 
5 Id. § 1103(a)(5)a3. 
6 Id. § 1103(a)(5)a4. 
7 Id. § 1103(a)(5)a5. 
 
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(8) 
This Court’s review of a Family Court decision to terminate 
parental rights entails consideration of the facts and the law as well as the 
inferences and deductions made by the Family Court.8  To the extent that the 
Family Court’s rulings of law are implicated, our review is de novo.9 To the 
extent that the issues on appeal implicate rulings of fact, we conduct a 
limited review of the factual findings of the trial court to assure that they are 
sufficiently supported by the record and are not clearly wrong.10  If the trial 
judge has correctly applied the law, our review is limited to abuse of 
discretion.11 
(9) 
In reviewing a petition for termination of parental rights, the 
Family Court must employ a two-step analysis.12  First, the court must 
determine, by clear and convincing evidence, whether a statutory basis exists 
for termination.13  Second, the court must determine, by clear and 
convincing evidence, whether termination of parental rights is in the child’s 
best interests.14 
                                                 
8 Wilson v. Div. of Family Serv., 988 A.2d 435, 439-40 (Del. 2010). 
9 Id. at 440. 
10 Powell v. Dep’t of Serv. for Children, Youth & Their Families, 963 A.2d 724, 731 (Del. 
2008). 
11 Id. 
12 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103(a) (2009). 
13 Shepherd v. Clemens, 752 A.2d 533, 537 (Del. 2000). 
14 Id. 
 
8
(10) In this case, we have reviewed the parties’ positions and the 
record below very carefully.  We conclude that there is ample evidence on 
the record to support the Family Court’s termination of both Mother’s and 
Father’s parental rights on the statutory basis that they had failed to plan 
adequately for their children and because termination was clearly in the 
children’s best interests.  We find no abuse of discretion in the Family 
Court’s factual findings and no error in its application of the law to the facts. 
Accordingly, the judgment below shall be affirmed. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Family Court is AFFIRMED.  The motions to withdraw are moot. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice