Title: In the Matter of Tariri

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-13370 
 
IN THE MATTER OF BENJAMIN BEHNAM TARIRI. 
 
 
May 25, 2023. 
 
 
Attorney at Law, Disciplinary proceeding, Suspension, Misuse of 
client funds. 
 
 
 
The respondent attorney, Benjamin Behnam Tariri, appeals 
from an order of a single justice of this court temporarily 
suspending him from the practice of law pending further 
disciplinary proceedings before the Board of Bar Overseers 
(board) pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 12A, as appearing in 
425 Mass. 1315 (1997).  He also appeals from the single 
justice's denial of his subsequent motion to stay the order.  We 
affirm.1 
 
 
Background.  On November 21, 2022, bar counsel filed a 
petition for temporary suspension alleging that the respondent 
"poses a threat of substantial harm to clients or prospective 
clients."  S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 12A.2  The petition asserts that 
 
1 After the respondent's appeal was filed in this court, bar 
counsel filed a petition for contempt in the county court.  The 
single justice issued an interim order in connection with that 
petition and, thereafter, an order of contempt.  The respondent 
subsequently failed to comply with the latter order, and on that 
basis, the single justice ordered that the respondent be 
committed to the Suffolk County house of correction for ninety 
days or until such time as the respondent complied fully with 
the terms of the court's contempt order.  Those orders are not 
before us. 
 
2 Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01, § 12A, provides: 
 
 
2 
Tariri had misappropriated hundreds of thousands of dollars of 
client funds to support a gambling addiction and pay personal 
debts.  More specifically, the petition asserted, among other 
things, that Tariri represented a client (client A) with respect 
to client A's residential property purchase; that Tariri held 
certain of client A's funds for that purpose in an Interest on 
Lawyers' Trust Account (IOLTA account); and that Tariri misused 
those funds to purchase lottery tickets.  In the process, Tariri 
allegedly failed to make certain wire transfers in connection 
with client A's property purchase; deposited money from other 
clients in the IOLTA account; and used the money from other 
clients to make the required payments for client A's property 
purchase. 
 
 
In another instance, the petition avers, Tariri repeatedly 
borrowed money from a client (client B) who he had represented 
in a variety of matters.  One of those matters allegedly 
resulted in a monetary settlement between client B and the 
Commonwealth pursuant to which the Commonwealth paid client B a 
set sum.  According to the petition, the amount of money that 
Tariri borrowed from client B was approximately the same amount 
of money that Tariri knew client B had received in the 
settlement.  Tariri subsequently wrote checks to client B to 
repay the loan, but each time he did so, the checks were 
returned for insufficient funds.  Although Tariri allegedly did 
eventually repay some of the loan to client B, the petition 
avers that the loan was never fully repaid and that client B 
eventually filed a complaint against Tariri with the board. 
 
 
The petition also alleges several other instances of Tariri 
borrowing money from current and former clients and of writing 
checks to repay the loans only to have those checks returned for 
 
"Upon the filing with this court of a petition by the bar 
counsel alleging facts showing that a lawyer poses a threat 
of substantial harm to clients or prospective clients 
. . . , this court shall enter an order to show cause why 
the lawyer should not be immediately suspended from the 
practice of law pending final disposition of any 
disciplinary proceeding commenced by the bar counsel.  The 
court or a justice, after affording the lawyer opportunity 
to be heard, may make such order of suspension or 
restriction as protection of the public may make 
appropriate." 
 
 
3 
insufficient funds.3  Ultimately, bar counsel has opened eight 
separate investigations of Tariri, two of which bar counsel 
described in the petition for temporary suspension, four of 
which are already the subject of a petition for discipline, and 
two of which remain under investigation.4 
 
In the county court, an order issued on November 28, 2022, 
to show cause why the respondent should not be immediately 
suspended, as the petition requested, pending disposition of 
disciplinary proceedings against him.  The single justice held a 
hearing on December 19, 2022, and issued an order that same day 
temporarily suspending Tariri from the practice of law in the 
Commonwealth until further order of the court.  The order was 
effective immediately, and the single justice thereafter denied 
Tariri's motion to stay. 
 
 
Discussion.  The case is now before us on Tariri's 
preliminary memorandum, pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:23 (b), 
471 Mass. 1303 (2015).  The rule requires an appellant 
 
"to demonstrate . . . that there has been an error of law 
or abuse of discretion by the single justice; that the 
decision is not supported by substantial evidence; that the 
sanction is markedly disparate from the sanctions imposed 
in other cases involving similar circumstances; or that for 
other reasons the decision will result in a substantial 
injustice." 
 
Tariri has failed to make any such demonstration. 
 
 
3 According to the petition, Tariri's actions have led not 
just to multiple investigations by the board but to criminal 
charges in the District Court as well. 
 
4 The pending petition for discipline charges Tariri with 
violating numerous rules of professional conduct, including 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3 (diligence), as appearing in 471 
Mass. 1318 (2015); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7 (conflict of interest:  
current clients), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1335 (2015); 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (segregation of trust property), 
1.15 (e) (operational requirements for trust accounts), and 
1.15 (f) (required accounts and records), as appearing in 471 
Mass. 1380 (2015); and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c) (dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) and 8.4 (h) (fitness to 
practice law), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1483 (2015). 
 
4 
"[A]n order of temporary suspension may be entered if 
(1) facts, established by a preponderance of the evidence, show 
that the lawyer violated a disciplinary rule of this court and 
(2) on a balance of the harms and consideration of the public 
interest, the lawyer poses a threat of substantial harm to 
present or future clients or in other respects."  Matter of 
Ellis, 425 Mass. 332, 334 (1997).  For purposes of a temporary 
suspension, it is sufficient that the evidence demonstrate that 
"it is more probable than not that the lawyer[] violated 
important provisions" of the rules of professional conduct.  Id. 
at 340. 
 
Tariri makes little argument that he did not violate the 
rules.  In contrast, the petition for temporary suspension was 
accompanied by ample supporting documents, including, among 
other things, a recorded statement made by Tariri in connection 
with the board's ongoing investigations of him; evidence 
regarding the failed wire transfers and returned checks in 
connection with Tariri's misuse of client A's money; and 
evidence related to Tariri's failure to repay client B's loan.  
The petition and its supporting documents, in other words, 
demonstrate that it is more probable than not that Tariri 
violated a number of rules of professional conduct including, 
e.g., Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (e) (operational requirements for 
trust accounts) and 1.15 (f) (required accounts and records), as 
appearing in 471 Mass. 1380 (2015); and Mass. R. Prof. C. 
8.4 (c) (dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) and 
8.4 (h) (fitness to practice law), as appearing in 
471 Mass. 1483 (2015). 
 
In considering whether to temporarily suspend a lawyer from 
the practice of law, the single justice is also "required to 
balance the harm to the attorney against the public interest in 
preventing harm to present and future clients."  Matter of 
Abrams, 436 Mass. 650, 656 (2002), citing Matter of Ellis, 
425 Mass. at 341-342.  In his memorandum, Tariri acknowledges 
that "some of the issues or allegations" that bar counsel raised 
in the petition for temporary suspension have merit, but argues 
that the issues were presented "in a vacuum" without any 
acknowledgment of the underlying causes, including Tariri's 
gambling addiction and certain events in his personal life.  He 
is arguing, in essence, that he did not have an opportunity to 
respond to the allegations, i.e., to defend himself.  His 
arguments are without merit. 
 
In response to the petition for temporary suspension, 
Tariri filed a one-page "memorandum in support of show-cause 
 
5 
hearing," without any supporting affidavits or other documents, 
in which he stated that it would be detrimental for his clients 
and the public if his license were temporarily suspended pending 
the outcome of disciplinary hearings.  He did not, however, 
challenge the facts alleged in the petition, which were 
supported by affidavits.  In the circumstances, his suggestion 
that he did not have an opportunity to present a defense is 
contradicted by the record.  Tariri could have filed a more 
detailed response to the petition -- indeed, the single justice 
granted Tariri's request for a brief continuance of the hearing 
on the petition and rescheduled it for one week later than the 
originally scheduled date -- or challenged its underlying facts.  
Furthermore, although Tariri argues that the single justice 
deferred to bar counsel's recommendation without consideration 
of the underlying circumstances, both bar counsel and Tariri had 
an opportunity to present their respective positions at the 
hearing.  Among other things, the single justice specifically 
asked both bar counsel and Tariri whether there might be some 
action the single justice could take short of ordering a 
temporary suspension, and he discussed various options with both 
parties.  There was, in short, "sufficient evidence . . . from 
which the single justice could have concluded that [Tariri] 
posed a threat to present and potential clients."  Matter of 
Kenney, 399 Mass. 431, 434-435 (1987). 
 
The single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in 
concluding that a temporary suspension was warranted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on the record, accompanied by a 
memorandum of law. 
 
Benjamin Behnam Tariri, pro se.