Title: In re N.B.

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Opinion filed May 18, 2000.
JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
The State of Illinois petitioned the circuit court of Du Page County to 
make N.B. and C.R., the minor children of respondent Ca. R. (respondent), wards 
of the court. The State alleged that the minors were neglected, as that term is 
defined by the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. 
(West 1998)), because they were subjected to an "environment *** injurious to 
[their] welfare." 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 1998). Following an evidentiary 
hearing, the circuit court found that the children were neglected. 705 ILCS 
405/2-18 (West 1998). At a subsequent hearing, the court ruled that the children 
should be made wards of the court. 705 ILCS 405/2-21 (West 1998). Respondent 
appealed from the findings of neglect. The appellate court affirmed with one 
justice dissenting. Nos. 2-98-0653, 2-98-0656 cons. (unpublished order under 
Supreme Court Rule 23). The appeal is before this court pursuant to Illinois 
Supreme Court Rule 315 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315). We reverse.
BACKGROUND
On April 17, 1997, the State of Illinois filed separate, original neglect 
petitions in the circuit court of Du Page County, on behalf of minors C.R. 
and N.B. At the time the petitions were filed, C.R. and N.B. were ages four 
years and three months, respectively. The petitions named S.B. and respondent as 
the parents of N.B., and R.R. and respondent as the parents of C.R. The State 
asserted that N.B. and C.R. were "neglected minors," as defined in the Juvenile 
Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 1998)), in that they were under 
the age of 18 years and that their "environment is injurious to [their] 
welfare." The petitions stated that it was in the best interest of N.B. and C.R. 
and of the public that N.B. and C.R. be made wards of the court.
On February 3 and March 13, 1998, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing 
on the State's petitions. The State introduced evidence regarding the incidents 
that prompted the petitions for a finding of neglect. Witnesses testifying on 
the State's behalf averred that, while at a Du Page County health 
department (health department) facility on April 7, 1997, respondent became 
enraged when she was informed that the coupons she wished to redeem for milk for 
her children could only be redeemed for powdered milk, and were not redeemable 
for liquid milk. Health department regulations precluded giving liquid milk to 
anyone, like respondent, who lacked a permanent address. One witness described 
respondent's behavior as a "tantrum" and stated that, during her confrontations 
with health department employees, respondent threw her milk coupons, jacket and 
diaper bag into some chairs in the room where the outburst occurred. According 
to the witnesses, respondent thereafter decided to leave. She picked up the 
handheld baby carrier, containing N.B., that was at respondent's feet, and as 
she picked up the baby carrier, respondent's arm swung far from her body so that 
the baby carrier hit a wall. The witnesses maintained that respondent did not 
check to see if N.B. was harmed.
The State adduced additional evidence that, one week later, respondent and 
N.B. returned to the health department facility for an examination. The 
examination room contained a camera. Respondent refused to enter the exam room 
until the camera was covered. A social service caseworker also testified that 
she had weekly contact with respondent between December 1995 and June 1996. In 
that time period, the caseworker testified, she saw no signs of child abuse and 
that respondent satisfied the requirements set for her by state social services. 
Respondent presented no evidence on her own behalf. The circuit court found that 
the State proved the existence of an injurious environment to the minors and, at 
a subsequent dispositional hearing, ordered that the children be made wards of 
the court. Respondent appealed.
The appellate court consolidated the appeals from the separate findings of 
neglect as to C.R. and N.B. The appellate court affirmed the finding of neglect. 
Nos. 2-98-0653, 2-98-0656 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). A 
majority of the appellate panel held that the trial court's finding of neglect 
arising from an "injurious environment" was not against the manifest weight of 
the evidence. The majority also held that the circuit court applied the correct 
standard in determining whether the State met its burden of proof at the neglect 
hearing. The dissenting justice disagreed that the evidence supported a finding 
of neglect. According to the dissent, respondent only directed her anger toward 
"bureaucratic functionaries." The dissent maintained that an isolated display of 
anger by respondent, during which the children were unharmed, did not justify 
stripping respondent of the custody of her children.
We granted respondent's petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme 
Court Rule 315 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315).
ANALYSIS
The finding of neglect entered by the circuit court in this case was just one 
step in a multistep process that determines whether children should be removed 
from their parent or parents and become wards of the court. The process is 
prescribed by the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. 
(West 1998)). A finding of abuse, neglect or dependence is a necessary 
predicate to an adjudication of wardship of a child. 705 ILCS 405/2-21 (West 
1998); In re K.G., 288 Ill. App. 3d 728, 735 (1997). The State bears 
the burden of proving neglect, dependence or abuse by a preponderance of the 
evidence, meaning proof that makes the condition more probable than not. In 
re K.G., 288 Ill. App. 3d at 735; In re B.C., 262 Ill. App. 3d 
906, 909 (1994); In re C.C., 224 Ill. App. 3d 207, 215 (1991).
If the State fails to prove the allegations of abuse, neglect or dependence 
by a preponderance of the evidence, the court must dismiss the petition. 705 
ILCS 405/2-21(1) (West 1998); see also In re M.B., 235 Ill. App. 3d 
352, 377 (1992), quoting In re Shawn B., 218 Ill. App. 3d 374, 380 
(1991) (a finding of abuse, neglect or dependence is jurisdictional, "without 
[which] the trial court lacks jurisdiction to proceed to an adjudication of 
wardship"). If the State meets its burden, the court must proceed to a second 
adjudicatory stage, in which the court determines whether "it is consistent with 
the health, safety and best interests of the minor and the public that he be 
made a ward of the court." 705 ILCS 405/2-21(2) (West 1998). In any proceeding 
initiated pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, including an adjudication 
of wardship, the "paramount consideration" is the best interest of the 
child. In re K.G., 288 Ill. App. 3d at 734-35; see In re A.P., 
179 Ill. 2d 184, 197 (1997); In re Stilley, 66 Ill. 2d 515, 520-21 
(1977); In re Z.R., 274 Ill. App. 3d 422, 428 (1995); In re 
D.M., 258 Ill. App. 3d 669, 672 (1994).
I. Whether the Circuit Court Employed an Incorrect Standard to 
Determine if the State Satisfied Its Burden of Proof
Respondent argues that the circuit court failed to hold the State to the 
correct burden of proof when the court ruled that C.R. and N.B. had been 
neglected by their mother. Respondent maintains that the circuit court grounded 
its ruling on what was in the "best interests" of the children, rather than 
deciding whether the State proved its case by a preponderance of the evidence. 
For this reason, respondent requests that this court reverse the circuit court's 
adjudication of neglect.
At the conclusion of the hearing on March 13, 1998, the circuit court recited 
in detail the basis for its ruling. During the course of its oral remarks, the 
court stated: "Now ultimately, the finding that I must make must be in the 
child's best interest, and this is what the ultimate burden of standard is." 
Later, the court stated: "Based on the evidence, I'm making an adjudication at 
this time. The first question in the hearing, whether or not the petition has 
been sustained by the evidence, my conclusion for the reasons I have indicated, 
the court's observations, the K.G. [288 Ill. App. 3d 728] case, every 
case must be determined on its own facts. The evidence does support that 
finding."
We do not agree with respondent that the circuit court's passing reference to 
the "best interests" of the minors indicates that the court applied an erroneous 
standard. As an initial matter, the court referred to the best interest 
consideration as "the ultimate burden of standard." This phrase is nonsensical, 
so we cannot be precisely sure what the circuit court meant by this. However, 
the record on appeal reveals that throughout the proceedings, the circuit court 
understood the several steps involved in the adjudication of wardship, and the 
principles of law to be applied at each stage. For example, in making its 
finding of neglect, the circuit court indicated its awareness that another step 
remained in the wardship proceedings by stating, "Now the next step of the 
proceedings will be to schedule a dispositional hearing." The court's reference 
to the best interests of the minors may simply be an acknowledgment by the court 
that, should the proceedings reach the adjudication of wardship stage, it would 
have to determine the best interests of the minors. 705 ILCS 405/2-21(2) (West 
1998).
The totality of the circuit court's remarks illustrates that the court ruled 
in the State's favor only after the court found that the State proved the 
allegations of neglect asserted in the State's petition. Although the court 
failed to expressly note that it was applying a preponderance of the evidence 
standard, such a statement is not necessary. People v. Hoots, 228 Ill. 
App. 3d 42, 53 (1992). The circuit court is presumed to know the law and apply 
it properly, absent an affirmative showing to the contrary in the record. 
People v. Kluxdal, 225 Ill. App. 3d 217, 223 (1991). Our review of the 
circuit court's findings leads us to conclude that the court understood the 
State's burden to prove the allegations of neglect by a preponderance of the 
evidence, and entered its adjudication of neglect based on that standard. 
Hoots, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 53 ("In determining the sufficiency of a 
judgment, the entire record may be searched to support the judgment").
II. Whether the Circuit Court's Adjudication of Neglect Was 
Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence
Respondent next argues that the circuit court's adjudication of neglect was 
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Respondent asserts that the circuit 
court errantly based its decision on a single incident of anger displayed by 
respondent, in which her temper was not directed at her children, and that the 
court ignored countervailing proof that respondent did not raise her children in 
an "injurious environment."
The State alleged that N.B. and C.R. were neglected pursuant to the following 
provisions of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987:
In People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 624 (1952), the 
supreme court defined "neglect" as the "failure to exercise the care that 
circumstances justly demand." The Wallace court also said:
In re Stilley, 66 Ill. 2d  at 520; In re K.G., 288 Ill. App. 
3d at 735.
Further, an " '[i]njurious environment' " is an " 'amorphous 
concept which cannot be defined with particularity.' " In re M.Z., 
294 Ill. App. 3d 581, 593 (1998), quoting In re M.K., 271 Ill. App. 3d 
820, 826 (1995); In re Z.R., 274 Ill. App. 3d at 427. 
Each petition alleging an injurious environment is unique, and must be decided 
according to the circumstances of that case. In re K.G., 288 Ill. App. 
3d at 735. Generally, however, our courts have interpreted "injurious 
environment" to include the breach of a parent's duty to ensure a "safe and 
nurturing shelter" for his or her children. In re M.K., 271 Ill. App. 
3d at 826.
These rules of law illustrate the fact-driven nature of neglect and injurious 
environment rulings. Accordingly, we will reverse a finding of neglect only if 
it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Z.R., 274 Ill. 
App. 3d at 427. A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence if the 
facts clearly demonstrate that the court should have reached the opposite 
result. In re Z.R., 274 Ill. App. 3d at 427, quoting In re 
T.B., 215 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 1062 (1991).
On the issue of neglect in the case at bar, the circuit court heard testimony 
from Cindy Anderson, who is employed as a dietician by the health department. 
Anderson testified that, on April 7, 1997, while at a health department 
facility, she was summoned by a coworker to respond to respondent's refusal to 
accept powdered milk for her children, in lieu of liquid milk. Anderson went to 
a waiting room where she found respondent sitting in a chair. A small boy about 
four years old (C.R.) was standing approximately five feet from respondent, and 
a baby carrier, covered with a blanket, was at respondent's feet. N.B. was in 
the baby carrier. Anderson began to explain health department rules regarding 
milk subsidies to respondent. Anderson stated that she was no more than two 
sentences into her explanation when respondent began to scream and throw a 
tantrum. According to Anderson, respondent threw a jacket, a diaper bag and her 
coupons into some chairs near her. She also kicked a chair. Anderson stated that 
respondent did not throw anything at Anderson.
After respondent kicked the chair, she started gathering her belongings to 
leave. She picked up the baby carrier and, as she turned, she swung the baby 
carrier into a wall. Respondent was holding the carrier parallel to her 
shoulder. Anderson shouted, "Watch the baby!"
Anderson stated that respondent did not check the baby after the carrier hit 
the wall, although she did say, "My baby is fine." Because the carrier was 
covered with a blanket, Anderson could not see N.B. She conceded that she did 
not hear N.B. cry when the carrier hit the wall, and that Anderson saw no damage 
to the carrier or the wall as a result of the carrier striking it.
Anderson testified that respondent screamed at Anderson and said that if 
Anderson said another word to her, she was "going to go ballistic on 
[Anderson]." Anderson testified that respondent's anger was directed at Anderson 
"and the people and the surrounding and the kids were in the surrounding."
Anderson admitted that the children appeared to be adequately clothed. 
Anderson did not have the opportunity to assess the minors' "nutritional 
status." C.R. tugged at Anderson's lab jacket and said, "Look what you did to my 
mommy."
Becky Elbrecht is also employed by the health department. On April 7, 1997, 
Elbrecht was at the health department facility. She heard a commotion from a 
waiting room on the floor beneath her and went to investigate. She found 
respondent and health department employees in an argument.
Elbrecht talked to respondent after respondent's confrontation with Anderson. 
Elbrecht described respondent as initially agitated and upset, but she responded 
to Elbrecht's attempts to calm her down. Respondent asked if she could use a 
telephone. Elbrecht said that respondent then left abruptly and said nothing to 
Elbrecht as she left.
Elbrecht testified that respondent never struck her children in Elbrecht's 
presence. During the initial confrontation in the waiting room, C.R. appeared 
agitated. Elbrecht said C.R. was not crying, but was "upset by the 
situation."
The court also received testimony from Catherine Maney. Maney stated that, on 
April 15, 1997, she was doing "outreach casework" for the health department. 
Respondent, accompanied by N.B., was at the facility, apparently for an 
examination by a physician. Respondent refused to enter an exam room until Maney 
covered a camera that was in the exam room. Maney said that respondent 
alternated between anger and crying during this encounter. The encounter lasted 
about 15 minutes.
Maney next saw respondent in May 1997, at which time she was angry with 
Maney. Respondent said Maney was the reason her children were taken from 
her.
Testimony was also given by Katherine Dello, who is employed by Metropolitan 
Family Services as a clinical social worker. In December 1995, Dello was working 
with a program called "Family Preservation." The program performs in-home 
counseling and other services for families that the Illinois Department of 
Children and Family Services has "indicated" for child abuse or neglect.
Beginning in December 1995, Dello saw respondent at least once a week for 
approximately six months. Dello would meet with respondent either at her 
apartment or at an agreed place. They would discuss respondent's "stabilizing 
her lifestyle" and taking care of her child. (This was prior to N.B.'s 
birth.)
Dello said she saw C.R. with his mother at least every other week. The child 
always appeared to be well taken care of and properly clothed. Dello observed 
respondent get frustrated with her son, but Dello never saw her strike or abuse 
the boy in any way. Dello described respondent's frustration as "acting like a 
typical parent who is tired and trying very hard to do what's best for a child. 
And kids don't always do what they're told."
Dello testified that respondent was always very cooperative with Dello 
concerning their meetings. Respondent made "satisfactory progress" on everything 
Dello asked her to do. Dello's visits with respondent ended in June 1996 because 
she made adequate progress and there was no further need for Dello's 
services.
After the court heard the testimony of Anderson, Elbrecht, Maney and Dello, 
the State rested its case. Respondent presented no evidence on her own 
behalf.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court ruled that the April 7 
and April 15, 1997, incidents at the health facility indicated that the minors 
were living in an injurious environment. The court stated, "[I] do think it is 
an ... injurious aspect of a child's environment if the child is subject to 
anger, and to excessive emotion which renders adult supervisors in the child's 
life out of control." The court also found that respondent's anger "got away 
with [her]," and, "What is indicated here is ... some type of emotional disorder 
in which the child may not be subject to proper supervision."
The circuit court acknowledged that certain evidence of respondent's behavior 
did not support a finding that the children were exposed to an injurious 
environment. Concerning the April 15, 1997, incident at the health facility, 
when respondent insisted that the camera in the exam room be covered, the court 
acknowledged that the incident posed no threat to C.R., the child with 
respondent at the time. As for Dello's interactions with respondent over a 
six-month period, the circuit court said that nothing "adverse" could be drawn 
from the evidence, but for the fact of respondent's prior involvement with 
health counselors.
Critically, the court ruled that respondent demonstrated concern for her 
children, and that there was "no clear proof" that N.B. or C.R. lacked food, 
clothing, medical assistance, or a proper home.
Based upon the evidence of record, we hold that the court's determination 
that N.B. and C.R. were subjected to an injurious environment is against the 
manifest weight of the evidence. The evidence adduced is devoid of any instance 
in which respondent abused or mistreated her children in anyway. In fact, quite 
the opposite was shown to be true. Dello testified that C.R. always appeared 
well cared for in the six months that she saw C.R. Anderson had no criticisms of 
the children's appearance on April 7, 1997, and she had no reason to believe 
that they were undernourished. Although Anderson and her coworkers were 
concerned for N.B.'s well-being when the baby carrier struck the wall, the baby 
did not cry, and no one saw any harm to the child as a result. And while 
Anderson maintained that respondent showed no concern for N.B. after the carrier 
hit the wall, Anderson admitted that respondent said, "My baby is fine." 
Inasmuch as N.B. did not cry, and no one could see any injury to N.B., 
respondent's statement was no less valid than Anderson's speculation to the 
contrary.
There was no evidence that respondent's temper, though admittedly strong, 
posed any harm to her children. Dello testified that when respondent showed 
signs of frustration with C.R., the frustration was consistent with any parent's 
reactions to a three-year-old child. Nor does the proof adduced at the 
adjudicatory hearing support the inferential leap that when respondent loses her 
temper, she becomes blinded to the well-being of her children. In sum, the 
circuit court's ruling turned on two incidents in which respondent displayed 
anger at persons not her children, and in which there was no proof of actual 
harm to her children. When coupled with Dello's testimony, which indicated 
acceptable parenting by respondent, we find no evidence to suggest that 
respondent breached her duty to provide a "safe and nurturing shelter" for C.R. 
and N.B. In re M.K., 271 Ill. App. 3d at 826.
The State contends that, as a matter of law, exposure to "uncontrolled anger" 
is sufficient to establish an injurious environment. However, the cases cited by 
the State are readily distinguishable from the instant case. In In 
re M.K., 271 Ill. App. 3d 820 (1995), the trial court found 
that the minor M.K. was subject to an injurious environment in part because 
M.K's mother's paramour, McDuffie, had a bad temper. In re M.K., 271 
Ill. App. 3d at 827. However, the court also relied on the fact that one of 
McDuffie's own children had been removed from McDuffie's custody because 
McDuffie abused the child. Also, M.K.'s mother continued to allow McDuffie 
access to M.K. despite warnings of McDuffie's past abusive behavior and warnings 
that continued exposure to McDuffie might cause the mother to lose custody of 
M.K. The risk of harm to M.K. was substantial enough to support a finding of 
neglect. In re M.K., 271 Ill. App. 3d at 827.
The next case relied upon by the State, In re Marriage of 
Johnson, 245 Ill. App. 3d 545 (1993), disposed of a custody dispute arising 
from the dissolution of a marriage. Relying on the Illinois Marriage and 
Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/101 et seq. (West 1992)), the 
trial court in Johnson terminated joint custodial responsibilities 
shared by a divorced couple and transferred sole custody of the couple's 
children to the father of the children. The circuit court determined that the 
children's mother was prone to uncontrolled rages directed at the father, 
rendering the joint custody arrangement "unworkable." Johnson, 245 Ill. 
App. 3d at 551-52. The evidence included instances where, in the presence of the 
children, the mother attempted to fire a loaded gun at the father, physically 
attacked a friend of the father, and pounded on the windows of the father's home 
and screamed at him while the children were in the home. Johnson, 245 
Ill. App. 3d at 548-49, 552. The custodial hearing also yielded evidence that 
the mother felt she was unable to control the behavior of the oldest child and 
on several occasions struck him, once with a yardstick. She also struck another 
child. Johnson, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 552-53. The appellate court 
affirmed the trial court's findings that the couple's children were in an 
environment that could "endanger seriously [their] physical, mental, moral or 
emotional health." Johnson, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 549, 554.
In contrast to In re M.K., 271 Ill. App. 3d 820, 
there is no proof in this case that respondent ever exposed her children to any 
source of physical abuse. Unlike In re Marriage 
of Johnson, 245 Ill. App. 3d 545, moreover, there is no 
evidence that respondent's temper has ever assumed the form of assault with a 
deadly weapon, physical attacks on another person, or physical attacks on her 
children.
The State also insists that the court did not have to wait until N.B. and 
C.R. suffered actual abuse before the court could find an injurious environment. 
In re S.D., 220 Ill. App. 3d 498, 504 (1991). Again, the decisions upon 
which the State relies are inapposite to the facts here. In two of the cases, 
actual abuse visited upon another member of the household provided concrete 
proof of an injurious environment that warranted removing the threatened minor 
from the adult's custody. See In re Z.R., 274 Ill. 
App. 3d 422 (1995) (an adult in the minor's household abused at least one other 
child in the home); In re A.D.R., 186 Ill. App. 3d 
386 (1989) (the father repeatedly beat the minor's mother). Further, In re 
J.W., 289 Ill. App. 3d 613 (1997), is distinguishable because the minor in 
that case was an infant born prematurely whose special medical needs required 
home monitoring and regular visits by a public nurse. The mother's history of 
alcohol abuse and inability to furnish health care workers with a permanent 
address placed the minor's physical well-being in jeopardy and furnished 
adequate proof that the mother subjected the child to an injurious 
environment. In re J.W., 289 Ill. App. 3d at 619.
At bar, the State's evidence consisted of two displays of temper not directed 
to the children or another member of their household. The State failed to show 
anger of a frequency, duration or quality that would indicate that the children 
lived in an environment that exposed them to, or threatened them with, emotional 
or physical injury. While we may not approve of respondent's behavior before her 
children, we must conclude, on the record before us, that the finding of neglect 
was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court 
and reverse the trial court's order adjudicating N.B. and C.R. neglected 
pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 
405/2-3(1)(b) (West 1998)). We order that the State's petitions for neglect be 
dismissed.
Appellate court reversed;
circuit court reversed.