Title: In Interest of JL

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

In Interest of JL1988 WY 119761 P.2d 985Case Number: C-88-1Decided: 09/23/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
In the 
Interest of JL, a Minor. PL, Appellant (Respondent)

 
 
v.

 
 
JOHNSON COUNTY 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND SOCIAL SERVICES, Appellee 
(Petitioner)

 
 
Mark J. Murphy of Shoumaker and 
Murphy, Sheridan, for Appellant.

 
 
Joseph B. Meyer, Attorney General, 
Peter J. Mulvaney, Deputy Attorney General, and Richard E. Dixon, Assistant 
Attorney General, for Appellee. 

 
 

Before Cardine, C.J., and Thomas, 
Urbigkit, and Macy, JJ., and Brown, J., * Ret.

 
 
*Retired June 30, 
1988.

 
 
Urbigkit, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This appeal is taken 
from an order terminating the parental rights of the mother, PL (appellant), 
with respect to her three-year-old daughter, JL. Upon appeal, appellant 
challenges the procedural and evidentiary sufficiency of those proceedings. She 
presents two issues for review:

 
 
1. Should the trial court be 
reversed because the natural mother was not initially advised of her right to 
counsel and the child was not appointed counsel in the initial juvenile court 
proceeding?

 
 
2. Should the trial court be 
reversed because there was insufficient evidence to establish that an authorized 
agency or mental health professional has been unsuccessful in rehabilitating the 
mother or that the mother refused rehabilitation 
treatment?

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 
I. 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3.]     Embracing distinctly 
unpleasant facts, this record indicates that JL was born in Georgia on November 15, 1984. 
Appellant, herself a product of parental abandonment and foster homes, was 
eighteen and married at the time of the child's birth. Shortly after JL's birth, 
the parents separated and appellant initiated divorce proceedings. For practical 
purposes, with one brief interlude, the father disappeared from this scenario, 
and within a year, appellant and JL moved to California where JL's grandmother lived. 
Shortly after arrival, appellant met JH, a young man from Buffalo, Wyoming. Within two or three days of meeting, 
the three people moved to Buffalo, Wyoming as a culmination of an extremely quick 
romance. Arriving in Buffalo on New Year's Eve 1985, the three moved 
in with JH's parents and stayed until January 24 or 25, 1986, when they 
established a separate residence.1 Apparent subsistence was derived 
from appellant's acquisition of emergency Department of Public Assistance and 
Social Services welfare benefits.

 
 

[¶4.]     In the evening of 
January 27, 1986, appellant took JL to the emergency room of JohnsonCountyMemorialHospital, reporting to medical personnel 
that the baby girl had been "acting ill." The attending physician testified that 
JL had multiple bruises over her entire body, was in shock, dehydrated, in a 
state of cardiovascular collapse and respiratory distress, and had a markedly 
distended abdomen. Police and Johnson County Department of Public Assistance and 
Social Services (Johnson County D-PASS) officials were summoned to investigate 
suspected child abuse. Unpleasantly descriptive photographs of the injuries were 
taken.

 
 

[¶5.]     After JL was 
stabilized, she was flown to Billings, Montana on an emergency life flight, whereupon 
emergency abdominal surgery was performed to repair a perforation of the 
stomach. The initial and final diagnosis of medical personnel in Billings was that the 
injuries were of nonaccidental origin and fit the diagnosis of the "battered 
child syndrome." The treating physician in Billings stated JL "came as close to dying as 
is possible." JL remained hospitalized for over one month, enduring further 
abdominal surgeries, and then was placed in foster care in Billings until August 
1987, in order to receive outpatient medical treatment. In addition to the 
physical injuries, this death's door child evidenced severe emotional harm, 
including an inability to cry or express pain.

 
 

[¶6.]     Appellant was 
interviewed on January 27, 1986 by police and the Johnson County D-PASS 
director. Appellant first reported that the injuries occurred when JL fell out 
of her stroller onto a fireplace hearth while being cared for by JH. Both 
appellant and JH were subsequently arrested and charged with felony child 
abuse.2 A plea agreement was reached with 
appellant wherein the charges against her were reduced to two counts of reckless 
endangerment in return for her agreement to testify against JH. Although 
appellant finally admitted that she may have caused some of the less serious 
injuries,3 the police concluded that JH was 
responsible for the life-threatening injuries. He committed suicide before trial 
and, on her guilty pleas to reckless endangerment, appellant was given a 
probationary sentence of one year.

 
 

[¶7.]     Upon the petition of 
the county attorney's office, an order was entered on January 28, 1986, as the 
day of the injury report and hospitalization, placing JL in the temporary 
protective custody of Johnson County D-PASS. Further orders continuing such 
custody were entered on February 11, 1986 and May 5, 1987. In June 1986, the 
child care agency developed a rehabilitation plan with appellant for the stated 
objective of returning JL to her care. Approximately one month later, however, 
appellant left Buffalo and returned to 
Georgia, effectively ending her 
participation in the treatment plan. Care, custody and control of JL continued 
in the governmental agency. So also ended Chapter I of the life of JL, the baby 
girl, now aged nearly two, who almost totally by accident became a 
responsibility of the State of Wyoming.

 
 

[¶8.]     On February 24, 1987, 
an order was entered by the district court appointing counsel to represent 
appellant; a few months later, a guardian ad litem was appointed for JL. Seeking 
finality of their twenty months of responsibility, the JohnsonCounty and Prosecuting Attorney on behalf 
of Johnson County D-PASS, filed a petition on September 22, 1987 to terminate 
parental rights of both parents. The father voluntarily relinquished. Appellant, 
through appointed counsel, contested. Following trial, the district court 
entered an order terminating appellant's parental rights. In the termination 
order from which this appeal is taken, the district court made the following 
specific findings:

 
 
2. THE COURT FURTHER 
FINDS:

 
 
(a) That the minor child has been in 
the protective custody of the Johnson County Department of Public Assistance and 
Social Services for an extended period, in excess of one 
year;

 
 
(b) That the minor child was 
originally taken into protective custody by the Johnson County Department of 
Public Assistance and Social Services due to severe physical abuse and 
neglect;

 
 
(c) That [PL] has failed to 
contribute, in any significant manner, toward the support and maintenance of the 
minor child since prior to January 27, 1986;

 
 
(d) That all rehabilitative efforts 
have failed;

 
 
(e) That there have been no 
substantive contacts with the minor child by [PL] for a period in excess of one 
year; and,

 
 
(f) That the minor child's health, 
stability and safety would be seriously jeopardized by returning the minor child 
to her natural mother.

 
 
II. PROCEDURAL 
INADEQUACY OF APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

 
 

[¶9.]     Appellant argues that 
the termination proceedings were constitutionally and statutorily defective in 
that, upon initially ordering temporary protective custody of JL, the district 
court neither appointed counsel to represent JL nor advised appellant of her 
right to counsel.

 
 

[¶10.]  In the emerging situation, the district 
court ordered JL placed in temporary protective custody on January 28, 1986,4 and further ordered continued 
protective custody on February 11, 1986 and May 5, 1987. We distinguish the 
care, custody and control status began in January 1986 and thereafter continued 
without contest from the subsequent termination initiated by a petition filed 
twenty months later. See South Carolina Dept. of Social Services v. 
Vanderhorst, 287 S.C. 554, 340 S.E.2d 149, 151 (1986) (two distinct stages 
were involved: the removal and the termination. However, the court found that, 
since the petition to terminate relied on factual findings from the removal 
hearing, the petition to terminate should have been denied when no counsel was 
afforded the parent); Petition of Catholic Charitable Bureau of Archdiocese 
of Boston, Inc., to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 392 Mass. 738, 467 N.E.2d 866, 869 (1984) (discussing "the settled distinction between custody and 
termination proceedings"); Matter of Evans, 81 N.C.App. 449, 344 S.E.2d 325, 327 (1986) (different standards apply to removal rather than termination 
proceedings); and State in Interest of Alexander, 384 So. 2d 1003, 1005 
(La.App. 1980) (a temporary protection order and its expiration did not affect 
separately brought child abuse proceedings).5 The goal of the temporary custodial 
transfer has been explained as:

 
 
"It is not the quality or character 
of parental conduct per se that justifies State intervention on behalf of an 
abused, neglected, or otherwise endangered child. Rather, it is the fact of the 
endangerment itself. As parens patriae the State . . . acts to protect 
endangered children." Petition of the Dep't of Pub. Welfare to Dispense with 
Consent to Adoption, 383 Mass. 573, 591-592, 421 N.E.2d 28 
(1981).

 
 
* * * * The focus of such a 
[termination] proceeding is not whether the parent should be deprived of 
"custody" in order to safeguard the child's well-being, but rather whether "it 
would be in the best interests of the child for all legal relations [with the 
parent] to be ended" (emphasis added). Petition of the Dep't of Social 
Servs. to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 391 Mass. 113, 119, 461 N.E.2d 186 (1984). "Termination denies the natural parents physical custody, as 
well as the rights ever to visit, communicate with, or regain custody of the 
child." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 749, 753, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1392, 1393, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982).

 
 

Petition of Catholic Charitable 
Bureau, 467 N.E.2d  
at 868-69.

 
 

[¶11.]  In a termination adjudication, the rights 
of the parent are implicitly a consideration along with the best interests of 
the child; each of these constitutional interests may diverge. See Matter of 
Welfare of J.J.B., 390 N.W.2d 274 (Minn. 1986); Matter of Welfare of 
D.C., 415 N.W.2d 915, 917 (Minn.App. 1987); Matter of Welfare of 
D.I., 413 N.W.2d 560, 564 (Minn.App. 1987); Matter of Welfare of 
D.F.B., 412 N.W.2d 406, 410 (Minn.App. 1987); and Comment, Minnesota 
Adopts a Best Interests Standard in Parental Rights Termination Proceedings: In 
re J.J.B., 71 Minn. L. Rev. 1263, 1269 (1987). Although the best interests 
of a child would ordinarily be in the custody of his natural parents, 
where

 
 
the record demonstrates a long-term 
placement characterized by a repeated failure of reasonable efforts to reunite 
the family, the trial court should appropriately determine what action most 
readily promotes the best interests of the child. While judicial caution in 
severing the family bonds is imperative, untoward delay of the demonstrated 
inevitable is intolerable.

 
 

Matter of Welfare of 
J.J.B., 390 N.W.2d  
at 280. Different standards are applicable to the two stages since neglect can 
be established prospectively while termination is concerned with past parental 
conduct. In Interest of J.L.P., 416 So. 2d 1250, 1252 n.3 (Fla.App. 1982); 
Matter of Evans, 81 N.C. App. 449, 344 S.E.2d 325. "While custody is 
freely granted for the temporary protection of a child against impending harm, 
termination reflects a decision that no substantial likelihood exists that a 
proper parent-child relationship is capable of being restored in the future." 
Boskey and McCue, Alternative Standards for the Termination of Parental 
Rights, 9 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1, 4 (1978).

 
 
This is an unusual appeal in which 
this Court is being asked to pass upon the sufficiency of evidence to support 
findings of dependency and neglect at the removal, rather than at the 
termination, stage. Respondent makes a very forceful argument, citing the 
termination cases, that the evidence is so scanty in this case that it does not 
rise to the level necessary to support the conclusion of neglect and dependency. 
While we would be inclined to agree with respondent's position if this were a 
termination case, we believe that a different standard applies at the removal 
stage and that the removal was therefore proper.

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
* * * * There is a substantive 
difference between the quantum of adequate proof of neglect and dependency for 
purposes of termination and for purposes of removal. The most significant 
difference is that while parental rights may not be terminated for threatened 
future harm, the DSS may obtain temporary custody of a child when there is a 
risk of neglect in the future. See In re Phifer, 67 N.C.App. 16, 
26, 312 S.E.2d 684, 689 (1984) (emphasis added).

 
 

Matter of Evans, 344 S.E.2d  at 
327.

 
 
A. Guardian ad Litem for the 
Child.

 
 

[¶12.]  We address first the alleged failure to 
timely appoint a guardian ad litem6 for JL.  W.S. 14-2-312 provides, with respect to 
termination proceedings, that:

 
 

After the petition has been 
filed, the court 
shall appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the child unless the court finds 
the interests of the child will be represented adequately by the petitioner or 
another party to the action and are not adverse to that 
party.

 
 
(Emphasis added.) The mandate of the 
above statute was unquestionably satisfied by the appointment of a guardian ad 
litem four months before the petition to terminate was filed. Appellant, 
however, refers us to W.S. 14-3-211, which is found under the statutes governing 
child protection services rather than the termination statutes.  W.S. 14-3-211 
provides:

 
 
(a) The court shall appoint counsel 
to represent any child in a court proceeding in which the child is 
alleged to be abused or neglected. Any attorney representing a child under this 
section shall also serve as the child's guardian ad litem unless a guardian ad 
litem has been appointed by the court. The attorney or guardian ad litem shall 
be charged with representation of the child's best 
interest.

 
 
(b) The court may appoint counsel 
for any party when necessary in the interest of justice.

 
 
(Emphasis added.) "Court proceeding" 
in relation to W.S. 14-3-211(a) is defined in W.S. 14-3-202(a)(v) in this 
manner:

 
 
"Court proceedings" means child 
protective proceedings which have as their purpose the protection of a 
child through an adjudication of whether the child is abused or 
neglected, and the making of an appropriate order of 
disposition.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 

[¶13.]  In Matter of Child X, 617 P.2d 1078, 71 L. Ed. 2d 849 (Wyo. 1980), decided before the enactment of W.S. 
14-2-312, we said that compliance with W.S. 14-3-211(a) is mandatory prior to 
adjudicating the substantive issues and it was improper, therefore, in that case 
to terminate parental rights without appointing counsel to represent the 
child. The concurring opinion in that case questioned whether W.S. 14-3-211(a) 
was intended to apply to termination proceedings brought pursuant to the 
termination statutes then in effect.7 Subsequently, the present 
termination statutes were enacted specifically requiring appointment of a 
guardian ad litem for the child upon the filing of the petition.  W.S. 14-2-312. We need not reach the 
question of whether W.S. 14-3-211 is applicable to a termination hearing, 
however, because the procedure utilized in the instant case fulfilled the 
requirements of both statutes.

 
 

[¶14.]  A guardian ad litem was appointed prior 
to the adjudication of any substantive issues.8 We conclude that, by appointing a 
guardian ad litem four months before the termination petition was filed, the 
district court more than adequately complied with the applicable statutes and 
protected the interests of JL. By this discussion, we do not determine whether a 
court-appointed guardian ad litem should earlier have been appointed, and 
particularly so, if contest existed, with JL at death's door in emergency care 
status in the Billings hospital.9 We conclude that JL's interest in 
the termination proceeding was adequately protected by seasonable appointment of 
a guardian ad litem. This is the best interest of the child concern and 
protective requirement as invoked in the termination statute by request for 
guardian ad litem appointment. W.S. 14-2-312.

 
 
B. Attorney For 
Appellant.

 
 

[¶15.]  We next address appellant's assertion 
that the district court committed reversible error by not initially advising her 
of her right to counsel. This then is the parental right inquiry. For this 
proposition, appellant relies upon W.S. 14-6-222(a), which 
provides:

 
 
At their first appearance before 
the court the child and his parents, guardian or custodian shall be advised 
by the court of their right to be represented by counsel at every stage of the 
proceedings including appeal, and to employ counsel of their own 
choice.

 
 
(Emphasis added.) We first observe 
no actual appearance resulted in connection with the temporary protective 
custody orders. JL was in emergency placement in Montana and appellant was facing felony 
charges that could have included homicide. More important, however, we perceive 
that W.S. 14-6-222(a) is inapplicable to a termination proceeding. Although 
Chapter 6 of Title 14, W.S. 14-6-101 through 14-6-243, encompasses provisions 
dealing with both delinquent and neglected children, W.S. 14-6-222 clearly 
applies to delinquency type proceedings.

 
 

[¶16.]  We rejected an argument similar to 
appellant's in State in Interest of C, 638 P.2d 165 (Wyo. 1981). In that case, 
the mother questioned the jurisdiction of the court to revoke custody of her 
children because of an alleged failure to comply with, inter alia, W.S. 
14-6-209, which requires in subsection (b)(ii) that a child and his parents be 
advised of their right to counsel as provided by W.S. 14-6-222. We held that the 
required advice in W.S. 14-6-209(b) applied only to delinquency proceedings. 
State in Interest of C, 638 P.2d  at 171. The district court has 
discretionary authority to appoint counsel for a parent in termination 
proceedings as separately addressed in W.S. 14-2-318(a), which provides: "the 
court may appoint counsel for any party who is indigent." (Emphasis 
added.) The statute pertaining to the appointment of counsel in neglected child 
status cases is not material to the appropriately provided legal assistance 
evidenced prior to commencement of the termination proceeding.10

 
 

[¶17.]  In the instant case, the district court 
appointed counsel for appellant seven months before initiation of termination 
proceedings. Moreover, the time for appeal regarding any quarrel appellant may 
have had with the appointment of counsel for the dependency aspect of this case 
had long since expired by the time the termination order was entered. Thus, we 
do not decide whether appellant should have been appointed counsel at the 
dependency stage11 or even informed of such a right. 
See Matter of Welfare of J.J.B., 390 N.W.2d  at 281 (the dependency 
hearing had to be appealed within thirty days of the order); Matter of 
Welfare of G.B.N., 412 N.W.2d 415, 417 (Minn.App. 1987); and W.R.A.P. 
2.01.

 
 
III. SUFFICIENCY 
OF THE EVIDENCE

 
 

[¶18.]  Appellant next challenges the sufficiency 
of the evidence supporting the district court's finding that rehabilitative 
efforts had failed. This is clearly and appropriately the substantive challenge 
to the adjudication displaying the external conflict or divergence between best 
interest of the child and the constitutional rights of the parent. Having found 
constitutional due process, we now address sufficiency of the evidence for 
termination.

 
 

[¶19.]  Our standard of evidentiary review in 
termination cases is well established. Application of termination statutes are 
subject to strict scrutiny. In Interest of JG, 742 P.2d 770, 773 (Wyo. 
1987); TR v. Washakie County Dept. of Public Assistance and Social 
Services, 736 P.2d 712 (Wyo. 1987); Matter of Parental Rights of PP, 
648 P.2d 512 (Wyo. 1982). We invoke the strict scrutiny standard because of the 
conflict between the fundamental liberty of familial association and the 
compelling interest of the state in protecting the welfare of the children.  TR, 736 P.2d 712; Matter of 
MLM, 682 P.2d 982 (Wyo. 1984). Under the strict scrutiny 
standard, we require the state to prove its case by clear and convincing 
evidence. In Interest of JG, 742 P.2d 770; Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976 (Wyo. 
1984). At the same time, the concern of an enlightened society for the best 
interest of the defenseless child must predominate.  Matter of MLM, 682 P.2d 982.

 
 

[¶20.]  Although we require clear and convincing 
evidence under the strict scrutiny standard, we examine the evidence in the 
light most favorable to Johnson County D-PASS, assuming favorable evidence to be 
true and leaving out of consideration conflicting evidence presented by the 
unsuccessful party.  TR, 736 P.2d 712; Matter of Parental Rights of PP, 648 P.2d 512. Additionally, we 
give the evidence of the successful party the benefit of every favorable 
inference which may fairly be drawn from it. In Interest of JG, 742 P.2d 770; TR, 736 P.2d 712.

 
 

[¶21.]  W.S. 14-2-309 establishes the grounds for 
the termination of parental rights. In pertinent part, the statute 
provides:

 
 
(a) The parent-child legal 
relationship may be terminated if any one (1) or more of the following facts is 
established by clear and convincing evidence:

 
 
(i) The child has been left in the 
care of another person without provision for the child's support and without 
communication from the absent parent for a period of at least one (1) year. In 
making the above determination, the court may disregard occasional 
contributions, or incidental contacts and communications;

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
(iii) The child has been abused or 
neglected by the parent and efforts by an authorized agency or mental health 
professional have been unsuccessful in rehabilitating the family or the family 
has refused rehabilitative treatment, and it is shown that the child's health 
and safety would be seriously jeopardized by remaining with or returning to the 
parent.

 
 
In order to terminate parental 
rights under W.S. 14-2-309(a)(iii) the state must prove three 
elements:

 
 
(1) abusive treatment or neglect by 
the parent; (2) unsuccessful efforts to rehabilitate the family (i.e., 
termination of parental rights is the least intrusive means to satisfy the 
State's interest); and (3) the child's health and safety would be seriously 
jeopardized by remaining with or returning to the parent.

 
 

Matter of GP, 679 P.2d  at 1005. See also In 
Interest of JG, 742 P.2d  at 773.

 
 

[¶22.]  Appellant narrows her evidentiary 
challenge to the second element of W.S. 14-2-309(a)(iii), i.e., unsuccessful 
efforts to rehabilitate the family. However, it is noted that an alternative 
basis for termination could have been found under W.S. 14-2-309 (a)(i), which 
would be consistent with the findings in the termination order.12 As appellant framed her argument 
and focused our attention on the rehabilitation issue, we need not review, 
therefore, the extensive evidence of abuse and continuing danger established at 
trial.13 With respect to efforts to 
rehabilitate, appellant argues that, rather than assisting in her 
rehabilitation, Johnson County D-PASS created an impossible obstacle course for 
her. The evidence does not support this contention.

 
 

[¶23.]  In June 1986, Johnson County D-PASS 
developed a comprehensive rehabilitation plan with direct input from appellant. 
Pursuant to this plan, appellant agreed, among other things, to complete 
parenting classes, pursue a mental health and treatment program, and to 
establish and maintain regular visitation with JL in her foster home in 
Billings. 
Johnson County D-PASS contracted with NorthernWyomingMentalHealthCenter for counseling 
services. According to the rehabilitation plan, Johnson County D-PASS 
anticipated expenditures of $ 6,500 in completing the plan. Approximately one 
month after signing the plan, appellant abruptly left Buffalo and moved back to Georgia. At the 
time of leaving, appellant had not seen JL since February 1986, although stating 
that she wanted to do so. Appellant, in her brief, implies that it was the 
responsibility of Johnson County D-PASS to ensure appellant fulfilled the 
rehabilitation plan. It is apparently appellant's position that Johnson County 
D-PASS should have tracked her down in Georgia, arranged and paid for services by 
agencies in that state, and sent JL to Georgia for visits.14 There is a limit to be asked of 
the agency in absence of parental cooperation.

 
 

[¶24.]  The utter failure of appellant to fulfill 
her obligations under the plan cannot be attributed to Johnson County D-PASS. We 
have reviewed the extensive record of the active efforts of Johnson County 
D-PASS to assist the parental rehabilitation of appellant and conclude that the 
evidentiary basis of the trial court decision was well established. The 
sufficiency of the evidence attack on this well-documented record fails.15

 
 
IV. 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶25.]  In sum, both JL's and the appellant's 
rights were adequately protected by the appointments of the guardian ad litem 
and counsel well in advance of the termination proceeding. The evidence 
sufficiently demonstrated that the best interests of JL required the termination 
so that this young child, still in her formative years, would not be cast upon 
the sea of "foster care drift."16 We are reminded 
that

 
 
our sympathy for the mother cannot 
blind us to the overriding concern for the welfare of the child. We cannot help 
the one and shall not harm the other.

 
 

In Interest of 
J.L.P., 416 So. 2d  
at 1253.

 
 

[¶26.]  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The file 
suggests that JH was of high school age and the entire sequence of meeting in 
California, immediate relationship, move to Buffalo, child abuse and his 
suicide, has a large measure of near unbelievability in human tragedy for 
everyone involved. Total elapsed time from meeting in California to JH's suicidal death in Wyoming was only about 
two months. It took merely one month for the child abuse to 
occur.

 
 

2We note that 
this societal problem has yielded a great number of interesting and provocative 
law review articles outlining the vast history and possible solutions to this 
dilemma, which was not formally identified until 1962. For examples, see: 
Besharov, "Doing Something" about Child Abuse: The Need to Narrow the Grounds 
for State Intervention, 8 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 539 (1985); Boskey and 
McCue, Alternative Standards for the Termination of Parental Rights, 9 
Seton Hall L. Rev. 1 (1978); Fraser, A Glance at the Past, A Gaze at the 
Present, A Glimpse at the Future: A Critical Analysis of the Development of 
Child Abuse Reporting Statutes, 54 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 641 (1978); Fraser, 
Independent Representation for the Abused and Neglected Child: The Guardian 
Ad Litem, 13 Cal. W.L. Rev. 16 (1976); Ketcham and Babcock, Statutory 
Standards for the Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 29 Rutgers L. 
Rev. 530 (1976); Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal 
of the State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 Geo. L.J. 887 
(1975); and Thomas, Child Abuse and Neglect Part I: Historical Overview, 
Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C.L. Rev. 293 
(1972).

 
 

3There is a 
plethora of authority based on varying statutory language that regardless of 
whether a parent actually inflicts the injuries, that parent's rights can be 
terminated for a failure to protect the child from others. See, for example: 
Matter of MaricopaCounty Juvenile Action Nos. 
JS-4118/JD-529, 134 Ariz. 407, 656 P.2d 1268 (1982); Wood v. State, 248 Ark. 109, 450 S.W.2d 537 (1970); In Re Amos 
L., 124 Cal. App. 3d 1031, 177 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1981); In Re Biggs, 17 Cal. App. 3d 337, 94 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1971); In Re Corrigan, 134 Cal. App. 2d 751, 286 P.2d 32 (1955); In Re Halamuda, 85 Cal. App. 2d 219, 192 P.2d 781 
(1948); People in Interest of C.R. v. E.L., 38 Colo.App. 252, 557 P.2d 1225 (1976); In Interest of D.E.N., 504 So. 2d 514 (Fla.App. 1987); Re 
Interest of R.A.L., 440 So. 2d 473 (Fla.App. 1983); Dornburg v. 
McKellar, 204 Ga. 189, 48 S.E.2d 820 
(1948); Interest of Castro, 102 Idaho 218, 628 P.2d 1052 (1981); In 
Interest of J.R., 130 Ill.App.3d 6, 85 Ill.Dec. 410, 473 N.E.2d 1009 (1985); 
In Interest of Brown, 86 Ill. 2d 147, 56 Ill.Dec. 4, 427 N.E.2d 84 (1981); 
In Interest of Dodge, 8 Kan.App.2d 259, 655 P.2d 135 (1982); Dean v. 
Mizell, 159 La. 975, 106 So. 534 (1925); Matter of 
Rinesmith, 144 Mich.App. 475, 376 N.W.2d 139 (1985); Matter of Welfare of 
Maas, 355 N.W.2d 480 (Minn.App. 1984); In Re Interest of Goodon, 208 
Neb. 256, 303 N.W.2d 278 (1981); Matter of Alyne E., 113 Misc.2d 307, 448 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1982); In Re J.Z., 190 N.W.2d 27 (N.D. 1971); Matter of 
R., 62 Ore. App. 288, 659 P.2d 1027 (1983); Matter of D.A.B., 313 N.W.2d 787 (S.D. 1981); Matter of A.I., 289 N.W.2d 247 (S.D. 1980); and 
A. Haralambie, Handling Child Custody Cases § 13.08 at 71 (1983 & Supp. 
1987). See also In Re S., 66 Misc.2d 683, 322 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1971) for the 
proposition that res ipsa loquitur can apply in the child abuse situation to 
help determine who inflicted the injuries.

 
 
Further, see 
A. Haralambie, supra at § 12.09, describing "medical" neglect which also 
occurred in this case by appellant not seeking medical attention for JL sooner. 
("Parents have 'a "high duty" to recognize symptoms of illness and to seek and 
follow medical advice.' Failure to do so may constitute medical neglect." 
Id. 322 N.Y.S.2d  at 173.)

 
 

4While the 
temporary protective custody provision contained in W.S. 14-3-208(c) only 
envisions the temporary-care time frame of seventy-two hours, appellant has not 
on appeal nor at the trial level challenged the initial temporary protective 
custody order or the two orders which extended the custody as exceeding the time 
period. Thus, we decline to address the propriety of a possible time issue as it 
relates to the three orders.

 
 

5For further 
support of this view see: Boskey and McCue, supra n.2, 9 Seton Hall L. Rev. at 4 
(which contrasts the "custody order" and the termination order relying on the 
point that temporary removal "does not eliminate the parent's residual right to 
reclaim the child at some later date"); Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of 
"Neglected" Children: Standards for Removal of Children from Their Homes, 
Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental 
Rights, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 625 (1976) (some state statutes generate confusion 
by using the term "termination" to describe both temporary and permanent loss of 
parental custody); Comment, Termination of Parental Rights: Putting Love in 
Its Place, 63 N.C.L. Rev. 1177, 1178 n.16 (1985) ("neglect proceedings 
typically precede--and are distinct from--actions for termination of parental 
rights"); Comment, Termination of Parental Rights and The Lesser Restrictive 
Alternative Doctrine, 12 Tulsa L.J. 528 (1977) (where the terms custody 
hearing and termination hearing are used to describe the two steps); Comment, 
Termination of Parental Rights in Adoption Cases: Focusing on the Child, 
14 J. Fam. L. 547, 555 (1975-1976) (the rights of the parent on temporary 
removal are "only temporarily severed and are in effect 'held in abeyance'"); 
Note, Legislative and Judicial Recognition of the Distinction Between Custody 
and Termination Orders in Child Neglect Cases, 7 J. Fam. L. 66 (1967); Note, 
Termination of Parental Rights, 13 Wyo. L.J. 185, 186 (1959) (termination 
is "an additional step"); A. Haralambie, supra at § 12.01; and 4 J. McCahey, M. 
Kaufman, and C. Kraut, Child Custody & Visitation Law and Practice § 
28.01[2] at 28-6 (1988).

 
 

6The 
emergence of the trend of appointing guardians ad litem was sparked by the 
federal legislation of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 5101-07 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), which specifically mandated in 42 
U.S.C. § 5103(b) (2) (G) that for a state to qualify for assistance under this 
subsection, the state shall "provide that in every case involving an abused or 
neglected child which results in a judicial proceeding a guardian ad litem shall 
be appointed to represent the child in such proceedings * * * *." Comment, 
The Non-Lawyer Guardian Ad Litem in Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings: The 
KingCounty, Washington, 
Experience, 58 Wash. L. Rev. 853, 855 (1983). For articles 
which discuss the guardian ad litem's role in the child abuse arena, see Fraser, 
supra n.2, 13 Cal. W.L. Rev. 16 and Comment, Protecting the Interests of 
Children in Custody Proceedings: A Perspective on Twenty Years of Theory and 
Practice in the Appointment of Guardians Ad Litem, 12 Creighton L. Rev. 234 
(1978).

Three 
classifications occur in the jurisdictions regarding this issue; the three 
approaches include: "(1) an absolute right to counsel for the abused child, (2) 
a non-absolute right or discretionary right to appointed counsel, and (3) no 
right to counsel." Note, Domestic Relations--Appointment of Counsel for the 
Abused Child--Statutory Schemes and the New York Approach, 58 Cornell L. Rev. 177, 
180 (1972). The Model Juvenile Court Act § 26 (1985) further supports the view 
that a guardian should be appointed and takes an absolute approach since it 
"contains an absolute counsel provision: 'Counsel must be provided for a child 
not represented by his parent, guardian or custodian. If the interests of 2 or 
more parties conflict separate counsel shall be provided for each of them.' * * 
* * The Model Rules for Juvenile Courts provides for mandatory 
appointment of counsel whenever parent-child conflict is present, as in abuse 
proceedings." (Emphasis in original.) Note, supra, 58 Cornell L. Rev. at 
181.

 
 

7The prior 
termination statutes, W.S. 14-2-301 through 14-2-307 (1978 Replacement), were 
repealed in 1981, and replaced by current W.S. 14-2-308 through 14-2-319. The 
earlier termination provisions did not have an equivalent to W.S. 14-2-312 (1986 
Replacement), requiring appointment of a guardian ad litem after the petition is 
filed.

This area of 
the law can truly be described as "ever changing."

 
 
Child abuse 
legislation, especially the reporting statute, has had a remarkable history. 
Perhaps, no other type of legislation has so quickly gained acceptance, has been 
so widely proclaimed as a panacea, and has been so often amended and rewritten 
in such a short period of time.

 
 
Fraser, 
supra n.2, 54 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. at 
684.

For an 
analysis of Wyoming's metamorphosis, see Arnold and Hurd, Child Protection: A 
Suggested Role For Members of the Wyoming State Bar, IX Land & Water L. 
Rev. 187 (1974); Comment, Family Law--Wyominq's New Termination of Parental 
Rights Statute, XVII Land & Water L. Rev. 621 (1982); Note, Family 
Law--Termination of Parental Rights: Establishing Standards for the Wyoming Law. 
In the Matter of Parental Rights to X, Y, and Z, DS v. Dept. of Public 
Assistance & Social Services, 607 P.2d 911 (Wyo. 1980), XVI Land & 
Water L. Rev. 295 (1981); and Note, Termination of Parental Rights, supra 
n.5, 13 Wyo. L.J. 185.

 
 

8In fact, the 
guardian ad litem was appointed in the same order which requested the home study 
of both parents well before the termination hearing was even 
set.

 
 

9See 
Parker v. Children Services Bd. of Trumbull County, 21 Ohio App.3d 115, 
487 N.E.2d 341, 342 (1984), where the Ohio Court of Appeals found that due 
process did not require the appointment of a guardian ad litem at a temporary 
custody hearing because of the emergency situation which existed with the 
child.

 
 

10The United 
States Supreme Court in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham 
County, North Carolina, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S. Ct. 2153, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640, reh. 
denied 453 U.S. 927, 102 S. Ct. 889, 69 L. Ed. 2d 1023 (1981) held that the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require the appointment of 
counsel in every parental termination proceeding, but left it to the states to 
be more liberal in providing such appointment if desired. For further discussion 
of this issue, see: Catz and Kuelbs, The Requirement of Appointment of 
Counsel for Indigent Parents in Neglect or Termination Proceedings: A Developing 
Area, 13 J. Fam. L. 223 (1973-1974) and Comment, The Indigent Parent's 
Right to Appointed Counsel in Actions to Terminate Parental Rights, 43 U. 
Cin. L. Rev. 635 (1974).

 
 

11The 
jurisdictions have taken many different approaches to this problem of whether an 
indigent parent should be appointed counsel in a dependency hearing. Cf. In 
Interest of D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 87 (Fla. 1980) (where the court held that a 
right to counsel would be allowed when permanent loss of parental custody was 
threatened, however, in all other circumstances a case-by-case approach would be 
taken); Matter of M.D.Y.R., 177 Mont. 521, 582 P.2d 758, 764 (1978) 
(where the Montana Supreme Court found no denial of due process when the mother 
was not appointed counsel in a temporary custody hearing); and State ex rel. 
Juvenile Dept. of Multnomah County v. Grannis, 67 Ore. App. 565, 680 P.2d 660 (1984) (where the court suggested a case-by-case analysis and lists several 
factors to consider in appointing counsel for a parent in a dependency 
proceeding). See also Besharov, Terminating Parental Rights: The Indigent 
Parent's Right to Counsel after Lassiter v. North Carolina, 15 Fam. L.Q. 
205, 210 (1981); Catz and Kuelbs, supra n.10, 13 J. Fam. L. 223; and Note, 
Child Neglect: Due Process for the Parent, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 465, 475-76 
(1970).

 
 

12See In Re 
Conrich, 221 Cal. App. 2d 662, 34 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1963) (for the proposition 
that a child involuntarily taken from his parents may be left with another for a 
time sufficient to constitute abandonment) and Gordon, Terminal Placements of 
Children and Permanent Termination of Parental Rights: The New York Permanent 
Neglect Statute, 46 St. John's L. Rev. 215, 227 (1971) (for the view, 
depending on the behavior and intent of the parent, that it is possible for a 
child placed in foster care to be abandoned).

 
 
The fact 
that a judicial decree has placed custody of the child away from the parents 
does not, however, necessarily prevent or destroy the element of "leaving" 
because nonaction of the parents may convert into a leaving (and, the other 
elements present, into an abandonment) that which initially could not be 
regarded so. * * * * The relevant nonaction of the parents is that of failure to 
contribute to support or to communicate, * * * *, but the conclusion on this 
first point, that of "leaving," is that there may be such leaving even though 
originally a court decree has taken the custody of the child from the 
parents.

 
 
In Re 
Conrich, 
34 Cal. Rptr.  at 661.

 
 

13The report 
from the Yellowstone County, Montana Child Protection Team after approximately 
fourteen months of involvement with JL as written to Johnson County D-PASS, was 
devastating as stating in part:

 
 
The 
recommendations from this C.P.T. were:

 
 
1. Parental 
rights should be terminated for both parents.

a. It was 
felt that [PL] lacks the ability to learn to effectively parent 
[JL].

b. [PL's] 
previous and recent lack of concern about [JL's] health support 
termination.

c. The 
extent of [JL's] injuries at the hands of [PL] and her paramour support 
termination.

d. [The 
father] has never contacted the hospital nor the physician regarding [JL's] 
injuries and health. He has never written nor called the Billings Social Worker 
to inquire about [JL].

e. An 
unknown question remains as to high risk factor for [JL] if she were returned to 
either parent.

2. That [JL] 
remain with the foster parent, * * * *, until:

a. A 
decision has been made regarding permanency.

b. That a 
familiar nurturing environment is needed for [JL] during her hernia repair 
surgery, and recuperation.

c. That [the 
foster parent] remain in contact with [JL] in a grandmother role so that [JL] 
will be able to adjust to her new family.

 
 
Our CPT 
realized that your agency has been working for the best interest of [JL] and we 
support the task your agency faces in petitioning for termination of parental 
rights and permanent custody of [JL].

 
 
The hospital 
staff, physicians, and social workers who have been involved with [JL] from the 
initial surgery to present, currently feel that parental rights should 
definitely be terminated. The need for physical and emotional commitment on the 
part of the parent should definitely be taken into consideration in regards to 
termination over the financial child support 
payments.

 
 

14See In 
Interest of JG, 742 P.2d  at 774 for the proposition that unsuccessful 
efforts to rehabilitate the family in Oklahoma 
could be used as a basis for a termination proceeding in Wyoming.

 
 

15In general, 
minimal efforts of appellant and maximum efforts of Johnson County D-PASS are to 
be seen. For example, appellant never visited JL between February 10, 1986 and 
the November 3, 1987 termination hearing, personally furnished little or no 
support or gifts, and totally failed to pursue the extensive Johnson County 
D-PASS rehabilitation plan. Initially stating an intent to get back together 
with the natural father, after a short re-established relationship, she lived 
with an old-time classmate for a further short time and then was living with a 
third man since returning to Georgia, by whom she was three month's pregnant at 
hearing date.

 
 

16A term used 
to denote the current reflection that although at one time foster care was 
considered "temporary," today it has taken on proportions of a major source of 
custodial uncertainty and instability for the children. See Garrison, Why 
Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 423, 426 (1983); Gordon, supra 
n.12, 46 St. John's L. Rev. at 217; and Note, 
In the Child's Best Interests: Termination of Parental Rights in Minnesota: In re J.J.B., 390 N.W.2d 274 (Minn. 1986), 10 
Hamline L. Rev. 693 (1987). "Legislatures and courts have become increasingly 
cognizant that long-term foster care is not in a child's best interest and 
consequently have recognized a fundamental right of the child to a permanent 
home." Note, supra, 10 Hamline L. Rev. at 713.

 
 
It is 
undisputed that children require secure, stable, long-term, continuous 
relationships with their parents or foster parents. There is little that can be 
as detrimental to a child's sound development as uncertainty over whether he is 
to remain in his current "home," under the care of his parent or foster parents, 
especially when such uncertainty is prolonged.

 
 
Lehman v. 
Lycoming CountyChildren's Services Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 513-14, 102 S. Ct. 3231, 73 L. Ed. 2d 928 (1982).