Title: State v. Lemberger

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2017 WI 39 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP1452-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Gary F. Lemberger, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 369 Wis. 2d 224, 880 N.W.2d 183 
(Ct. App. 2016 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 20, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 17, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
William E. Hanrahan 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. concurs, joined by BRADLEY, A. 
W., J. and KELLY, J. (opinion filed). 
KELLY, J. concurs (opinion filed).  
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there was a brief 
by Robert J. Eddington and Eddington Law Office LLC., Milwaukee, 
and oral argument by Robert J. Eddington. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
Michael C. Sanders, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
 
2017 WI 39
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP1452-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2014CT463) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Gary F. Lemberger, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
APR 20, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished 
decision 
of 
the 
court 
of 
appeals, 
State 
v. 
Lemberger, No. 2015AP1452-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. 
App. Apr. 14, 2016), which affirmed the Dane County circuit 
court's1 judgment of conviction of defendant Gary Lemberger 
("Lemberger") 
and 
order 
denying 
Lemberger's 
motion 
for 
postconviction relief.  
                                                 
1 The Honorable William E. Hanrahan presided. 
No. 
2015AP1452-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
In 2014 Lemberger was convicted of the crime of 
operating 
a 
motor 
vehicle 
while 
intoxicated——4th 
offense2 
following a jury trial during which the prosecutor repeatedly 
referenced the fact that Lemberger had refused to submit to a 
breathalyzer test following his arrest for drunk driving.  
Postconviction, Lemberger requested a new trial, arguing that 
his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel 
had been violated.  Lemberger claimed his trial attorney should 
have objected to the prosecutor's comments because Lemberger 
possessed a constitutional right to refuse to take a warrantless 
breathalyzer test such that the prosecutor was not permitted to 
seek an inference of guilt from the refusal.  The circuit court 
rejected this argument and the court of appeals affirmed. 
¶3 
We conclude that Lemberger did not receive ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  The law was settled at the time of 
Lemberger's trial that, upon his lawful arrest for drunk 
driving, Lemberger had no constitutional or statutory right to 
refuse to take the breathalyzer test, and that the State could 
comment at trial on Lemberger's improper refusal to take the 
test. 
 
Lemberger's 
attorney 
did 
not 
render 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
counsel 
in 
failing 
to 
argue 
contrary 
to 
controlling precedent.  Consequently, the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion in denying Lemberger's 
                                                 
2 See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§  346.63(1)(a); 
346.65(2)(am)4.; 
343.307(1) 
(2013-14). 
 
All 
subsequent 
references 
to 
the 
Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2013-14 version unless otherwise 
indicated. 
No. 
2015AP1452-CR   
 
3 
 
postconviction motion without a hearing.  We affirm the decision 
of the court of appeals. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶4 
On April 5, 2014, at about 4:50 p.m., Officer Andrew 
Naylor ("Officer Naylor") of the City of Madison Police 
Department responded to multiple reports of an "erratic driver" 
on a highway in Dane County, "somebody who was yelling and 
swerving."  Officer Naylor located the vehicle that had been 
described to him and followed it for about two minutes, but did 
not observe any unusual behavior other than the fact that "the 
driver had his hand out the window" and the hand "seemed to be 
moving in a waving manner."  Officer Naylor activated his 
emergency lights and both vehicles pulled to the side of the 
road.   
¶5 
When Officer Naylor spoke with the vehicle's driver, 
Lemberger, he "immediately noticed a strong odor of intoxicants 
coming from [Lemberger's] breath," "saw that [Lemberger] had 
bloodshot as well as glassy eyes," and observed that Lemberger 
"was speaking with a slurred speech and speaking slowly."  
Additionally, Lemberger was "belligerent to a certain extent" 
when speaking about a driver on the road and exhibited a 
"pattern of up and down, from agitated to compliant one minute 
to the next minute," a pattern Officer Naylor "experience[d] 
with intoxicated people in general."  Lemberger performed field 
sobriety tests in Officer Naylor's presence.   
¶6 
Officer Naylor then concluded on the evidence before 
him that Lemberger was operating a vehicle while impaired. He 
No. 
2015AP1452-CR   
 
4 
 
arrested Lemberger, placed him in the back of Officer Naylor's 
vehicle, and read him the Informing the Accused form.3 "[W]hen 
asked to submit to a chemical test," Lemberger responded 
"[Y]ep."  Officer Naylor took Lemberger to "the intoximeter 
room" at the West District of the City of Madison Police 
Department. 
 
In 
the 
intoximeter 
room, 
Officer 
Naylor 
"conduct[ed] [a] 20-minute observation."  He perceived that 
Lemberger "still had a strong odor of intoxicants coming from 
his breath" and that Lemberger's speech was slurred.  Lemberger 
stated, contrary to his earlier representation, that "he was not 
going to submit to a breath test."  After the 20-minute 
observation was complete, Officer Naylor read the Informing the 
Accused form to Lemberger a second time.  Lemberger refused to 
submit to a breathalyzer test. 
II.  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶7 
On May 6, 2014, a criminal complaint was filed against 
Lemberger in Dane County circuit court charging him with 
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated——4th offense, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. §§  346.63(1)(a).  On November 5, 2014, a 
refusal hearing occurred.  At the end of the hearing, the 
circuit court concluded as follows: 
I find that the officer had probable cause to 
arrest the defendant and to request submission to the 
primary method by which this type of evidence is 
gathered: the breath test. The officer read the 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., State v. Luedtke, 2015 WI 42, ¶11 & n.11, 362 
Wis. 2d 1, 863 N.W.2d 592. 
No. 
2015AP1452-CR   
 
5 
 
Informing the Accused . . . in the police squad car. 
The defendant answered in the affirmative that he 
would 
take 
the 
test. 
 
However, 
after 
he 
was 
transported to the district station, he had a change 
of heart after the Informing the Accused was read 
verbatim a second time . . . .  
I find that under those circumstances the officer 
complied with what's required, that the refusal to 
take the test offered by the officer was improper, and 
the State may comment upon that during the course of 
trial. 
¶8 
Immediately following the refusal hearing, Lemberger's 
case was tried before a jury.  During the trial the State 
repeatedly informed the jury that Lemberger had refused to take 
a breath test, arguing that Lemberger's refusal stemmed from "a 
guilty conscience" and constituted "proof positive that he knew 
he had been drinking."  The circuit court also instructed the 
jury as to how it should consider Lemberger's refusal: 
Testimony has been received that the defendant 
refused to furnish a breath sample for chemical 
analysis. You should consider this evidence along with 
all other evidence in this case, giving to it the 
weight you decide that it's entitled to receive.4 
The jury ultimately rendered a guilty verdict later that day. 
Lemberger's sentence included 12 months in jail, a 36-month 
revocation period, a fine, and costs.  On November 6, 2014, a 
judgment of conviction was entered.5 
¶9 
On June 5, 2015, Lemberger filed a postconviction 
motion for a new trial.  Lemberger contended that the State 
                                                 
4 See also Wis JI——Criminal 2663B. 
5 On February 11, 2015, an amended judgment of conviction 
was entered.  
No. 
2015AP1452-CR   
 
6 
 
"violated [his] constitutional rights at trial by seeking an 
inference of guilt on an element of the offense charged based on 
[his] 
exercise 
of 
his 
constitutional 
right 
to 
refuse 
a 
warrantless search in the form of a breathalyzer test" and that 
Lemberger "received ineffective assistance of counsel, as 
evident from trial counsel's failure to object to the State's 
comments and arguments on [his] refusal." 
¶10 On June 26, 2015, the circuit court denied Lemberger's 
motion without a hearing, characterizing Lemberger's claim that 
the State had violated Lemberger's constitutional rights as 
"wholly unsupported by Wisconsin law."  With regard to the 
postconviction motion itself, the circuit court added that 
defense counsel's "fail[ure] to address controlling legal 
authority" on the issue presented was "[b]reathtaking[]."  On 
July 16, 2015, Lemberger filed a notice of appeal.  On April 14, 
2016, the court of appeals affirmed.  Lemberger, unpublished 
slip op. at ¶1.  The court of appeals noted that "this time, 
unlike in the circuit court, Lemberger briefly addresse[d] the 
authority identified by the circuit court as controlling on the 
breathalyzer issue."  Id., ¶5.  Nevertheless, the court of 
appeals concluded that Lemberger had forfeited these arguments  
No. 
2015AP1452-CR   
 
7 
 
"by failing to preserve them before the circuit court."  Id., 
¶6.6  
¶11 On May 16, 2016, Lemberger filed a petition for review 
in this court.  On October 11, 2016, we granted the petition. 
III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶12 This case involves a circuit court's denial, without a 
hearing, of a defendant's postconviction motion asserting an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  Lemberger asks this 
court to reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand 
the case to the circuit court for a Machner hearing.7   
¶13 "[I]f the record conclusively demonstrates that the 
defendant is not entitled to relief, the circuit court has the 
discretion to grant or deny a hearing."  State v. Allen, 2004 WI 
106, ¶9, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433.  Whether the record 
conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to 
relief is a question of law for our independent review.  State 
v. Sulla, 2016 WI 46, ¶23, 369 Wis. 2d 225, 880 N.W.2d 659.  But 
"[w]e review a circuit court's discretionary decisions under the 
                                                 
6 The court of appeals also remarked that it likely would 
have affirmed even if it had addressed the merits of Lemberger's 
contentions 
because 
it 
"lack[ed] 
authority 
to 
apply 
interpretations that would appear to conflict with" controlling 
case law which Lemberger had failed otherwise to rebut.  State 
v. Lemberger, No. 2015AP1452-CR, unpublished slip op. at ¶¶10-11 
(Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2016) (citing Cook v. Cook, 208 
Wis. 2d 166, 189, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997)). 
7 See State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. 
App. 1979). 
No. 
2015AP1452-CR   
 
8 
 
deferential erroneous exercise of discretion standard."  Allen, 
274 Wis. 2d 568, ¶9. 
¶14 "A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a 
mixed question of fact and law. We will uphold the circuit 
court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous," but 
"the ultimate determination of whether counsel's assistance was 
ineffective is a question of law, which we review de novo."  
State v. Carter, 2010 WI 40, ¶19, 324 Wis. 2d 640, 782 
N.W.2d 695 (citations omitted). 
¶15 Finally, we "review[] constitutional questions, both 
state and federal, de novo."  State v. Lagrone, 2016 WI 26, ¶18, 
368 Wis. 2d 1, 878 N.W.2d 636 (quoting State v. Schaefer, 2008 
WI 25, ¶17, 308 Wis. 2d 279, 746 N.W.2d 457).8 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
¶16 "Under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution, a criminal defendant is guaranteed 
the right to effective assistance of counsel."  State v. 
Balliette, 2011 WI 79, ¶21, 336 Wis. 2d 358, 805 N.W.2d 334 
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984)).  
                                                 
8 The State "does not ask [us] to decide the case on the 
forfeiture issue" pertaining to Lemberger's failure to cite 
pertinent case law in his postconviction motion, and we do not 
address the issue further.  See Phelps v. Physicians Ins. Co. of 
Wis. Inc., 2009 WI 74, ¶61 n.15, 319 Wis. 2d 1, 768 N.W.2d 615 
("This court has the discretion to review an issue that has been 
waived when it involves a question of law, has been briefed by 
the opposing parties, and is of sufficient public interest to 
merit a decision." (quoting Gumz v. N. States Power Co., 2007 WI 
135, ¶73, 305 Wis. 2d 263, 742 N.W.2d 271)). 
No. 
2015AP1452-CR   
 
9 
 
The same right is guaranteed under Article I, section 7 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  E.g., State v. Domke, 2011 WI 95, ¶34, 
337 Wis. 2d 268, 805 N.W.2d 364.  "Counsel will be said to have 
provided 
constitutionally 
inadequate 
representation 
if 
the 
defendant can show that counsel performed deficiently and that 
such deficient performance prejudiced the defendant."  Id. 
(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).  As will be explained 
below, we conclude that Lemberger's attorney did not perform 
deficiently; consequently, we need only address that prong of 
the Strickland test in our analysis.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 697. 
¶17 "The proper measure of attorney performance remains 
simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms."  Id. 
at 688.  Our application of this standard "must be highly 
deferential."  Id. at 689.  "[C]ounsel's performance need not be 
perfect, nor even very good, to be constitutionally adequate."  
State v. Shata, 2015 WI 74, ¶56, 364 Wis. 2d 63, 868 N.W.2d 93 
(quoting Carter, 324 Wis. 2d 640, ¶22).  Additionally, "[t]here 
are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given 
case."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
¶18 Particularly relevant to this case:  
As a general matter, "[c]ounsel's failure to 
raise 
[a] 
novel 
argument 
does 
not 
render 
his 
performance constitutionally ineffective."  Anderson 
v. United States, 393 F.3d 749, 754 (8th Cir. 2005).  
"While the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 
a competent attorney, it 'does not insure that defense 
counsel will recognize and raise every conceivable 
constitutional claim.'"  Id. (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 
456 U.S. 107, 134 (1982)). . . . "[F]ailure to raise 
No. 
2015AP1452-CR   
 
10 
 
arguments that require the resolution of unsettled 
legal questions generally does not render a lawyer's 
services 'outside the wide range of professionally 
competent assistance' sufficient to satisfy the Sixth 
Amendment."  New v. United States, 652 F.3d 949, 952 
(8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). 
Basham v. United States, 811 F.3d 1026, 1029 (8th Cir. 2016). 
¶19 These considerations resolve Lemberger's ineffective 
assistance claim in the State's favor.  Lemberger argues that 
the State violated his constitutional right against self-
incrimination and his constitutional right to due process of law 
"by repeatedly asking the jury during his trial for drunk 
driving to infer guilt based on his refusal to submit to a 
warrantless breathalyzer test."  However, the law was settled at 
the time of Lemberger's trial that, upon his lawful arrest for 
drunk driving, Lemberger had no constitutional or statutory 
right to refuse to take the breathalyzer test and that the State 
could comment at trial on Lemberger's improper refusal to take 
the test.   
¶20 In State v. Albright, decided over three decades ago, 
a defendant refused to take a breathalyzer test after he was 
pulled over for drunk driving and informed of the implied 
consent law.  State v. Albright, 98 Wis. 2d 663, 667, 298 
N.W.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1980).  The court of appeals explained that  
use of test refusal evidence for the purpose of 
showing consciousness of guilt is constitutionally 
permissible. 
 
The 
only 
rationale 
for 
a 
rule 
prohibiting comment on a refusal would be that there 
is a right to refuse the test.  Wisconsin drivers have 
No. 
2015AP1452-CR   
 
11 
 
no 
constitutional 
right 
to 
refuse 
to 
take 
the 
breathalyzer. 
Id. at 669 (footnote omitted).9   
¶21 Albright was decided just a few years before the 
Supreme Court's decision in South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 
553 (1983).  Neville involved a defendant's refusal to comply 
with a blood-alcohol test under South Dakota's implied consent 
law.  Neville, 459 U.S. at 554-59.  In Neville the Supreme Court 
examined whether "admission into evidence of a defendant's 
refusal to submit to [a blood-alcohol] test . . . offend[s] the 
right against self incrimination."  Id. at 554.  It concluded 
that it did not.  Id.  The Court also addressed whether 
admission of such evidence violated the defendant's right to due 
process of law because he "was not fully warned of the 
consequences of refusal."  Id. at 564.  Again, the Court found 
no constitutional violation, noting that the defendant's "right 
to refuse the blood-alcohol test . . . is simply a matter of 
grace bestowed by the South Dakota Legislature."  Id. at 565.  
¶22 Following on the heels of Neville were a series of 
decisions by this court that addressed various questions related 
to use of refusal evidence at trial.  But each time, this court 
approved the practice.  In State v. Bolstad, for example, the 
                                                 
9 We observe that earlier in the year, the court of appeals 
(indeed, the same three-judge panel of the court of appeals) had 
stated in Milwaukee County v. Proegler that "the taking of a 
breath sample is a search . . . within the meanings of the 
United States and Wisconsin Constitutions."  Milwaukee Cty. v. 
Proegler, 95 Wis. 2d 614, 623, 291 N.W.2d 608 (Ct. App. 1980). 
No. 
2015AP1452-CR   
 
12 
 
defendant argued that the trial court had erred in barring him 
from offering evidence of his reasons for refusing to submit to 
a blood test.  State v. Bolstad, 124 Wis. 2d 576, 578, 370 
N.W.2d 257 (1985).  We agreed, but in so doing affirmed the 
general use of refusal evidence at trial: 
The 
state 
may 
submit 
the 
relevant 
and, 
hence, 
admissible evidence that Bolstad refused the test for 
blood alcohol content.  That refusal evidence is 
relevant, because it makes more probable the crucial 
fact of intoxication, because, as State v. Albright, 
[98 Wis. 2d] at 668, said, "A reasonable inference 
from refusal to take a mandatory [blood alcohol] test 
is consciousness of guilt."  Thus, the inference to be 
drawn 
is 
closely 
akin 
to 
an 
admission 
against 
interest.  The inference——if one is in fact drawn——
that a defendant was conscious of his guilt of 
intoxication tends to make more probable a fact that 
is of consequence in this criminal action, the fact of 
intoxication. 
 
Unrebutted, 
it 
could 
be 
deemed, 
inferentially at least, proof of intoxication. 
Bolstad, 124 Wis. 2d at 578, 585.  
¶23 Crandall involved a state constitutional challenge to 
the admission of refusal evidence at trial.  State v. Crandall, 
133 Wis. 2d 251, 253, 394 N.W.2d 905 (1986).  The defendant 
contended that the due process clause of Article I, section 8 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution "requires that a defendant accused of 
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated be warned that a 
refusal to submit to a chemical breath test can be used against 
her as evidence at trial."  Id. at 252-53.  In other words, the 
defendant was relitigating, under the Wisconsin Constitution, 
one of the questions presented in Neville.  See id. at 254, 260.   
¶24 In dismissing this argument and concluding that "the 
necessity of due process and fairness under the Wisconsin 
No. 
2015AP1452-CR   
 
13 
 
Constitution [does not] require[] more safeguards or warnings 
than the United States Supreme Court required to satisfy federal 
due process in South Dakota v. Neville," we emphasized that 
"[i]n Wisconsin there is no constitutional or statutory right to 
refuse a breathalyzer test. . . . The Wisconsin implied consent 
statute . . . '[c]learly does not recognize a right to refuse 
the test.'"  Id. at 255, 257, 260 (quoting Albright, 98 Wis. 2d 
at 671). 
¶25 In Zielke we again recognized that "the fact of the 
defendant's refusal to submit to a test may be introduced at 
trial on the substantive drunk driving offense as a means of 
showing 
consciousness 
of 
guilt." 
 
State 
v. 
Zielke, 
137 
Wis. 2d 39, 
49, 
403 
N.W.2d 427 
(1987). 
 
Our 
subsequent 
discussion referenced Albright, Neville, Bolstad, and Crandall.  
Id. at 49-51. 
¶26 Our decision in State v. Reitter required this court 
to determine "whether a police officer is required to advise a 
custodial defendant, charged with operating a motor vehicle 
while intoxicated, that the right to counsel does not apply to 
the administration of a chemical test under Wisconsin's implied 
consent statute" and "whether the due process clause of the 
Wisconsin Constitution imposes an affirmative duty upon police 
officers to advise defendants that the right to counsel does not 
attach to the implied consent statute."  State v. Reitter, 227 
Wis. 2d 213, 217, 595 N.W.2d 646 (1999).   
¶27 We concluded that "officers are under no affirmative 
duty to advise custodial defendants about rights for which the 
No. 
2015AP1452-CR   
 
14 
 
statute makes no provision."  Id. at 218.  We also concluded 
that 
"because 
the 
implied 
consent 
law 
creates 
statutory 
privileges, not constitutional rights, no due process violation 
occurs when an officer does not inform a defendant that the 
right to counsel does not attach to the stages preceding 
administration of a chemical test."  Id.  Relevant here, we 
observed with regard to the due process issue, "[T]he right of 
refusal, 
if 
granted 
by 
the 
legislature, 
is 
a 
statutory 
privilege, not a constitutional right.  Unlike similar laws in 
other 
states, 
the 
Wisconsin 
implied 
consent 
statute . . . creates no such statutory privilege."  Id. at 239 
(citations omitted).10 
¶28 More recently, in Missouri v. McNeely, a plurality of 
the Supreme Court noted that:  
States have a broad range of legal tools to enforce 
their drunk-driving laws and to secure BAC [blood 
alcohol concentration] evidence without undertaking 
warrantless nonconsensual blood draws. For example, 
all 50 States have adopted implied consent laws that 
require motorists, as a condition of operating a motor 
vehicle within the State, to consent to BAC testing if 
they are arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion 
of 
a 
drunk-driving 
offense. 
Such 
laws 
impose 
significant consequences when a motorist withdraws 
consent; typically the motorist's driver's license is 
immediately suspended or revoked, and most States 
allow the motorist's refusal to take a BAC test to be 
                                                 
10 State v. Albright, 98 Wis. 2d 663, 298 N.W.2d 196 (Ct. 
App. 1980); State v. Bolstad, 124 Wis. 2d 576, 370 N.W.2d 257 
(1985); State v. Crandall, 133 Wis. 2d 251, 394 N.W.2d 905 
(1986); State v. Zielke, 137 Wis. 2d 39, 403 N.W.2d 427 (1987); 
and State v. Reitter, 227 Wis. 2d 213, 595 N.W.2d 646 (1999), 
were all decided unanimously, with no separate writings. 
No. 
2015AP1452-CR   
 
15 
 
used as evidence against him in a subsequent criminal 
prosecution. 
Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1566 (2013) 
(plurality opinion) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  Also 
instructive is the Supreme Court's decision in Birchfield v. 
North Dakota, 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016); though 
decided after Lemberger's trial, it confirmed that McNeely and 
Neville "referred approvingly to the general concept of implied-
consent laws that impose civil penalties and evidentiary 
consequences on motorists who refuse to comply."  Birchfield, 
136 S. Ct. at 2185 (first citing McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1565-66 
(plurality opinion); then citing Neville, 459 U.S. at 560). 
¶29 Thus, the law was settled at the time of Lemberger's 
trial that, upon his lawful arrest for drunk driving, Lemberger 
had no constitutional or statutory right to refuse to take the 
breathalyzer test and that the State could comment at trial on 
Lemberger's improper refusal to take the test.  The jury 
instructions used in Lemberger's case bear that conclusion out.  
See Wis JI——Criminal 2663B ("Testimony has been received that 
the defendant refused to furnish a (breath) . . . sample for 
chemical analysis. . . . You should consider this evidence along 
with all the other evidence in this case, giving to it the 
weight you decide it is entitled to receive."). 
¶30 Lemberger argues that Albright, Bolstad, and Crandall 
"should be overruled and no longer followed" due to "subsequent 
developments in the law."  In particular, Lemberger claims that 
decisions by the court of appeals in State v. Banks, 2010 WI App 
No. 
2015AP1452-CR   
 
16 
 
107, 328 Wis. 2d 766, 790 N.W.2d 526; State v. Padley, 2014 WI 
App 65, 354 Wis. 2d 545, 849 N.W.2d 867; and State v. Blackman, 
2016 WI App 69, 371 Wis. 2d 635, 886 N.W.2d 94, petition for 
rev. granted, 2016 WL 8230599 (table) (Dec. 19, 2016), have 
undermined their authority, and that in the wake of Padley and 
Blackman, Article I, section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution, 
Wisconsin's counterpart to the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, "entitled Lemberger to refuse to consent to 
the breath test in this case."   
¶31 In Padley and Blackman the court of appeals drew a 
distinction between "implied consent" under the implied consent 
law and "actual consent."  E.g.,  Padley, 354 Wis. 2d 545, ¶37; 
Blackman, 371 Wis. 2d 635, ¶10.  In Banks the court of appeals 
concluded 
that 
the 
defendant's 
attorney 
had 
performed 
deficiently by failing to object when the State both "introduced 
testimony regarding [the defendant's] refusal to voluntarily 
submit a DNA sample" and "commented on [the defendant's] refusal 
during 
closing, 
suggesting 
his 
refusal 
demonstrated 
consciousness of guilt."  Banks, 328 Wis. 2d 766, ¶25. 
¶32 We need not address the merits of Lemberger's argument 
that these three cases somehow affect the long line of decisions 
of this court discussed above because the question before this 
court is not the substantive validity of Lemberger's argument 
but instead whether trial counsel was required to make it in 
order for Lemberger to have received constitutionally effective 
assistance of counsel.   
No. 
2015AP1452-CR   
 
17 
 
¶33 The answer to this question is no.  As an initial 
matter, the court of appeals in Banks, Padley, and Blackman 
would have had no authority to "overrule, modify or withdraw 
language from a previous supreme court case."  Cook v. Cook, 208 
Wis. 2d 166, 189, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997).  Nor has Lemberger 
demonstrated that controlling law——Supreme Court case law or a 
statutory amendment, for example——overruled any of the cases 
cited in this analysis.11  At the absolute best, then, Lemberger 
was faced with an unsettled legal question at trial.  "We think 
ineffective assistance of counsel cases should be limited to 
situations where the law or duty is clear such that reasonable 
counsel should know enough to raise the issue."  State v. 
McMahon, 186 Wis. 2d 68, 85, 519 N.W.2d 621 (Ct. App. 1994).  As 
noted above, "failure to raise arguments that require the 
resolution of unsettled legal questions generally does not 
render 
a 
lawyer's 
services 
'outside 
the 
wide 
range 
of 
professionally competent assistance' sufficient to satisfy the 
Sixth Amendment."  Basham, 811 F.3d at 1029 (quoting New, 652 
F.3d at 952). 
                                                 
11 Lemberger seems to suggest that Missouri v. McNeely, 569 
U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), affected the law cited in this 
opinion.  McNeely addressed only the exigent circumstances 
exception to the warrant requirement, which is not at issue 
here.  See, e.g., Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. ___, 136 
S. Ct. 2160, 2174 (2016) (explaining that the McNeely Court 
"pointedly did not address any potential justification for 
warrantless testing of drunk-driving suspects except for the 
exception 'at issue in th[e] case,' namely, the exception for 
exigent circumstances" (quoting McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1558)). 
No. 
2015AP1452-CR   
 
18 
 
¶34 We must add to what has already been discussed that, 
in the time since Lemberger's trial, the Supreme Court has 
clarified in Birchfield that "the Fourth Amendment permits 
warrantless breath tests incident to arrests for drunk driving."  
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2184.12  That is, the Supreme Court has 
explained 
that 
"the 
categorical 
search-incident-to-arrest 
doctrine," whereby "the mere 'fact of the lawful arrest' 
justifies 'a full search of the person,'" applies to the very 
circumstances present in this case.  Id. at 2176, 2180 (quoting 
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)).  Thus 
Birchfield provides an additional reason why defendants lawfully 
arrested for drunk driving have "no right to refuse" a breath 
test.  Id. at 2186.13 
                                                 
12 In contrast, the Court concluded that a blood test could 
not "be administered as a search incident to a lawful arrest for 
drunk driving."  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2185. 
13 Lemberger urges us to interpret Article I, section 11 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution to "[p]rovide [b]roader [p]rotection" 
than offered by the Fourth Amendment.  "We generally interpret 
the search and seizure provision of our state constitution 
consistent with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation 
of the Fourth Amendment.  State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶29 
n.17, 359 Wis. 2d 421, 857 N.W.2d 120 (citing State v. Robinson, 
2010 WI 80, ¶24 n.11, 327 Wis. 2d 302, 786 N.W.2d 463).  Given 
that our task is "to say what the law is," Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), Lemberger must demonstrate that 
the text of the Wisconsin Constitution dictates a different 
result than would obtain under the United States Constitution.  
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP1452-CR   
 
19 
 
¶35 The bottom line is that although Lemberger's trial 
counsel might have attempted to raise below the arguments 
Lemberger 
now 
advances, 
his 
failure 
to 
do 
so 
was 
not 
"[un]reasonable[] under prevailing professional norms" given the 
current state of the law.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.  
Lemberger did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶36 We conclude that Lemberger did not receive ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  The law was settled at the time of 
Lemberger's trial that, upon his lawful arrest for drunk 
driving, Lemberger had no constitutional or statutory right to 
refuse to take the breathalyzer test and that the State could 
comment at trial on Lemberger's improper refusal to take the 
test. 
 
Lemberger's 
attorney 
did 
not 
render 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
counsel 
in 
failing 
to 
argue 
contrary 
to 
controlling precedent.  Consequently, the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion in denying Lemberger's 
                                                                                                                                                             
Lemberger's 
request 
rests 
largely 
on 
a 
handful 
of 
generalized policy arguments (for example, that Officer Naylor 
could have, and therefore should have, obtained a warrant, or 
that using different legal analyses for breath and blood tests 
would be confusing) that do not specifically grapple with the 
text of the Wisconsin Constitution or the basic legal premises 
supporting 
the 
search-incident-to-arrest 
doctrine 
and 
Wisconsin's implied consent law.  We decline specifically to 
address and reject each of Lemberger's arguments here; suffice 
it to say that Lemberger does not adequately establish that 
Article I, section 11 possesses a different meaning than the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution in this 
context.  
No. 
2015AP1452-CR   
 
20 
 
postconviction motion without a hearing.  We affirm the decision 
of the court of appeals. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2015AP1452-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶37 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
The 
defendant argues in the instant case that his constitutional 
right against self-incrimination and his constitutional right to 
due process of the law were violated by the prosecutor's 
repeated comments to the jurors that they could infer the 
defendant's guilt for drunk driving from his refusal to submit 
to a warrantless breathalyzer test.   
¶38 I agree with the majority opinion that the defendant's 
constitutional rights were not violated by the prosecutor's 
comments and that the defendant did not receive ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  I disagree with the defendant that long-
standing Wisconsin law permitting comment on the defendant's 
refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test has been abrogated.     
¶39 I write separately because the majority opinion's 
refrain, repeated in the instant case five times and in other 
decisions, 
that 
the 
defendant 
"had 
no 
constitutional 
or 
statutory right to refuse to take the breathalyzer test" states 
the law too broadly and veers toward being misleading.  See, 
e.g., majority op., ¶¶3, 19, 24, 29, 36.     
¶40 A more correct statement of the law, in my opinion, is 
that a driver who refuses to take a breath test that is lawfully 
administered to the driver for a drunk driving offense may 
suffer consequences for refusal.    
¶41 With regard to constitutional rights pertaining to 
drunk driving, namely an individual's Fourth Amendment right to 
be secure against unreasonable search and seizure, a warrantless 
breath 
test 
and 
a 
warrantless 
blood 
test 
are 
treated 
No.  2015AP1452-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
differently.  The instant case involves a breath test, not a 
blood test.   
¶42 The "Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath tests 
incident to arrests for drunk driving."  Birchfield v. North 
Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2184 (2016).  In contrast, as a general 
rule, the Fourth Amendment does not permit warrantless blood 
draws incident to lawful drunk driving arrests.  Birchfield, 136 
S. Ct. at 2185.   
¶43 Numerous cases demonstrate that drivers can and do 
refuse to take breath tests incident to arrest for drunk 
driving, that law enforcement officers cannot and do not force a 
driver to take a breath test,1 and that the driver may suffer 
consequences (under state law) as a result of the refusal. 
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2168-69.2    
¶44 With regard to statutory rights pertaining to drunk 
driving, the Wisconsin legislature has regulated breath tests 
for drunk drivers.  See Wisconsin Implied Consent Law, Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305.   
¶45 The Wisconsin Implied Consent Law does not empower law 
enforcement officers to take a sample of a driver's breath 
forcibly (if that is even possible).  To acquire a driver's 
                                                 
1 A 
breath 
test 
requires 
driver 
participation 
and 
cooperation.  Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2168 
(2016).  
2 See, e.g., Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2185 ("Our prior 
opinions have referred approvingly to the general concept of 
implied-consent laws that impose civil penalties and evidentiary 
consequences on motorists who refuse to comply.").   
No.  2015AP1452-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
participation and cooperation in the administration of a breath 
test, the Implied Consent Law requires a law enforcement officer 
to advise the driver that the officer is requesting a breath 
test and that if the driver refuses to take the breath test, 
there will be adverse consequences for the driver.   
¶46 The Law sets forth an "Informing the Accused Form," 
which a law enforcement officer is required to read verbatim to 
a driver.  The Form is read "[a]t the time that a chemical test 
specimen is requested" under the Wisconsin Implied Consent Law.  
The text of the reading explicitly advises a driver that he or 
she may refuse to give a breath sample but that a refusal has 
consequences, including revocation of operating privileges and 
use of the refusal against the driver in court:  
You have either been arrested for an offense that 
involves driving or operating a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both, or 
you are the operator of a vehicle that was involved in 
an accident that caused the death of, great bodily 
harm to, or substantial bodily harm to a person, or 
you are suspected of driving or being on duty time 
with respect to a commercial motor vehicle after 
consuming an intoxicating beverage. 
This law enforcement agency now wants to test one or 
more samples of your breath, blood or urine to 
determine the concentration of alcohol or drugs in 
your system.  If any test shows more alcohol in your 
system than the law permits while driving, your 
operating privilege will be suspended.  If you refuse 
to take any test that this agency requests, your 
operating privilege will be revoked and you will be 
subject to other penalties.  The test results or the 
fact that you refused testing can be used against you 
in court. 
No.  2015AP1452-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) (emphasis added).3   
¶47 The State apparently agrees that under the Implied 
Consent Law a driver may refuse to take a breath test but that 
the driver suffers consequences.  The State's brief explains:  
"[T]here is no right to refuse a breath test under the implied 
consent law without consequences."4  
¶48 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
¶49 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and DANIEL KELLY join this concurring opinion. 
                                                 
3 Other provisions of the Implied Consent Law also connote 
that a driver has a choice to submit to or refuse to submit to a 
test.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 343.305(5)(a) ("If the person 
submits to a test under this section, the officer shall direct 
the 
administering 
of 
the 
test."); 
§ 343.305(9) 
(entitled 
"Refusals; Notice and Court Hearing"; directing law enforcement 
and judicial action when the driver refuses to take a breath 
test). 
4 See Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent (State of Wisconsin) at 
24 (emphasis added). 
The notion that a driver has a right to refuse to take a 
breath test and face adverse consequences is similar to the 
doctrine in contract law that a party to a contract has a right 
to breach a contract and suffer the consequences.  See, e.g., 
Stop-N-Go of Madison, Inc. v. Uno-Ven Co., 184 F.3d 672, 680 
(7th Cir. 1999) (discussing efficient breaches of contract) 
(citing E. Allen Farnsworth, Contracts § 12.8 at 194-95 (2d ed. 
1990) ("Most courts have not infringed on the freedom to keep or 
break a contract traditionally afforded a party by the common 
law and endorsed by the notion of efficient breach.")). 
No.  2015AP1452-CR.dk 
 
1 
 
¶50 DANIEL KELLY, J.   (concurring).  I join the mandate 
of the court and the majority opinion to the extent it is not 
inconsistent with Justice ABRAHAMSON's concurrence, and I also 
join Justice ABRAHAMSON's concurrence. 
 
No.  2015AP1452-CR.dk 
 
1