Title: Laboy v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ARTURO LABOY,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 443, 2009 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 93003649DI 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: September 8, 2009 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: September 28, 2009 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 28th day of September 2009, upon consideration of the 
appellant’s opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to 
Supreme Court Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Arturo Laboy, filed an appeal from 
the Superior Court’s July 14, 2009 order, which adopted the Superior Court 
Commissioner’s June 24, 2009 report and recommendation that Laboy’s 
postconviction motion pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 be 
denied.1  The plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm 
                                                 
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §512(b); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62. 
 
2 
the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face 
of the opening brief that the appeal is without merit.2  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
 The record reflects that, in February 1994, a Superior Court 
jury found Laboy guilty of Assault in the First Degree, Assault in the Second 
Degree, Stalking, Terroristic Threatening, and two related weapon offenses.  
He was sentenced to a total of 41½ years of Level V incarceration, to be 
followed by 2½ years of decreasing levels of probation.  Laboy’s 
convictions and sentences were affirmed by this Court on direct appeal.3  In 
March 2001, the Superior Court denied Laboy’s motion for sentence 
modification.  Laboy did not appeal that decision.  In 2003, the Superior 
Court denied Laboy’s first postconviction motion.  This Court dismissed 
Laboy’s appeal from that denial.4  In 2004, Laboy again moved for 
modification of his sentence.  This Court affirmed the Superior Court’s 
denial of that motion.5 
 
(3) 
In this appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of his second 
postconviction motion, Laboy claims that the Superior Court judge was 
motivated by bias when she denied his 2001 motion for sentence 
modification and that she should have disqualified herself from deciding his 
                                                 
2 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
3 Laboy v. State, Del. Supr., No. 210, 1994, Veasey, C.J. (June 23, 1995). 
4 Laboy v. State, Del. Supr., No. 382, 2003, Steele, J. (Oct. 27, 2003). 
5 Laboy v. State, Del. Supr., No. 481, 2004, Berger, J. (Apr. 11, 2005). 
 
3 
present motion.  Laboy’s claim of judicial bias is based upon the following 
factual background.  In February 2001, a courtesy copy of Laboy’s motion 
for sentence modification was sent to the Superior Court judge who had 
presided over Laboy’s trial, who was about to retire.  That judge, in error, 
granted Laboy’s motion.  Three days later, the Superior Court judge who 
had assumed the retiring judge’s caseload denied the motion.  The State then 
filed a motion to vacate the order that had been granted in error.  The 
Superior Court granted the State’s motion to vacate.  Laboy did not file an 
appeal from that order.   
 
(4) 
This Court has ruled that the procedural requirements of Rule 
61 must first be addressed before the merits of any postconviction claim may 
be considered.6  Under Delaware law, a conviction becomes final on the date 
the mandate issues following a direct appeal.7  As such, Laboy’s conviction 
became final in 1995.  His present postconviction motion, filed in April 
2009, is plainly time-barred.8   
 
(5) 
In addition, Laboy’s motion is procedurally barred as 
previously adjudicated.9  Laboy previously asserted his current claim in his 
                                                 
6 Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del. 1991). 
7 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(m)(2). 
8 The previous version of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(1), which was in effect at 
the time of Laboy’s trial and appeal, required that any motion for postconviction relief be 
filed within three years of the date the conviction became final. 
9 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4). 
 
4 
first postconviction motion and in his second motion for sentence 
modification.10  This Court affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of both of 
those motions, ultimately ruling that Laboy’s claim had been “fully 
litigated” in his first postconviction proceeding and that the disposition of 
that motion had become “the law of the case.”11  We conclude that, in the 
absence of any evidence that Laboy’s claim should be reconsidered “in the 
interest of justice,”12 the judgment of the Superior Court must be affirmed.    
 
(6) 
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented are controlled by settled 
Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, there 
was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State of Delaware’s 
motion to affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is 
AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
     
    
 
                                                 
10 Skinner v. State, 607 A.2d 1170, 1172 (Del. 1992) (barring relitigation of a claim that 
has merely been refined or restated). 
11 Laboy v. State, Del. Supr., No. 481, 2004, Berger, J. (Apr. 11, 2005). 
12 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).