Title: Attorney Grievance v. Kreamer

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

In the Circuit Court for Harford County
Case No. 12-C-06-1636
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 18
September Term, 2006
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v.
BARBARA OSBORN KREAMER
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Wilner, Alan M. (Retired, Specially
Assigned)
Cathell, Dale R. (Retired, Specially
Assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Greene, J.
Filed: April 17, 2008
1 Maryland Rule 16-751 (a) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Commencement of disciplinary or remedial action. (1) Upon
approval of [the Attorney Grievance] Commission.  Upon approval of
the [the Attorney Grievance] Commission, Bar Counsel shall file a
Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals.
2 Bar Counsel filed an amended petition with this Court on June 8, 2007.
3  MRPC 1.1 provides:
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.
4 MRPC 1.2 provides in relevant part:
(a) Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client's
decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and, when
appropriate, shall consult with the client as to the means by which
(continued...)
The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, acting through Bar Counsel and
pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751 (a),1 filed a Petition For Disciplinary or Remedial Action
against Respondent Barbara Osborn Kreamer on June 22, 2006.2  The Petition alleged that
Respondent violated multiple provisions of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct in
her representation of six former clients: Patricia Goodwin, Courtney Anderson, David
Ferrara, Gregory Dudok, Michael Boone, and Sarah Caldarelli.  Bar Counsel alleged that
Respondent violated most of the same rules in the six individual cases: Rule 1.1
(Competence),3 Rule 1.2 (Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between
Client and Lawyer),4 Rule 1.3 (Diligence), 5 Rule 1.4 (Communication),6 Rule 1.5 (Fees),7
4(...continued)
they are to be pursued.  A lawyer may take such action on behalf of
the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation.  A
lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to settle a matter.  In
a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after
consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to
waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.
5  MRPC 1.3 provides:
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client.
6 MRPC 1.4 provides:
a) A lawyer shall:
(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with
respect to which the client's informed consent . . . is required by these
Rules;
(2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;
(3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information;
(4) consult with the client about any relevant limitations on the
lawyer’s conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects
assistance not permitted by the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of
Professional Conduct or other law.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary
to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation.
7 MRPC 1.5 (a) provides:
A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an
unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses.  The
factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee
include the following: 
(continued...)
-2-
(...continued)
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly; 
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the
particular employment will preclude other employment of the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the 
client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
8 MRPC 1.15 provides:
(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in
a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation separate
from the lawyer’s own property.  Funds shall be kept in a separate
account maintained pursuant to Title 16, Chapter 600 of the Maryland
Rules. Other property shall be identified as such and appropriately
safeguarded.  Complete records of such account funds and of other
property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a
period of five years after termination of the representation.
(b)Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third
person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or
third person.  Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by
(continued...)
-3-
Rule 1.15 (Declining or Terminating Representation), 8 Rule 8.1 (Bar Admission and
8(...continued)
law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver
to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client
or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or
third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such
property.
(c) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of
property in which both the lawyer and another person claim interests,
the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until there is an
accounting and severance of their interests.  If a dispute arises
concerning their respective interests, the portion in dispute shall be
kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved.
9 MRPC 8.1 provides:
An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or a lawyer in
connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a
disciplinary matter, shall not:
(a) knowingly make a false statement or material fact; or
(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension
known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to
respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or
disciplinary authority, except that this Rule does not require disclosure
of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.
10 MRPC 3.3 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal or fail
to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to
the tribunal by the lawyer;
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is
(continued...)
-4-
Disciplinary Matters),9 Rule 3.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal),10 and Rule 8.4
10(...continued)
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;
(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling
jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position
of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has
offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer
shall take reasonable remedial measures.
11 MRPC 8.4 provides:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct,
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts
of another;
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice;
(e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government
agency or official; or,
(f) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a
violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law. 
12 Maryland Rule 16-752 (a) states:
(a) Order.  Upon the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial
(continued...)
-5-
(Misconduct)11.  Pursuant to Maryland Rules 16-752 (a)12 and 16-757 (c),13 we referred the
12(...continued)
Action, the Court of Appeals may enter an order designating a judge
of any circuit court to hear the action and the clerk responsible for
maintaining the record.  The order of designation shall require the
judge, after consultation with Bar Counsel and the attorney, to enter
a scheduling order defining the extent of discovery and setting dates
for the completion of discovery, filing of motions, and hearing.
13 Maryland Rule 16-757 (c) states in pertinent part:
(c) Findings and conclusions.  The judge shall prepare and file or
dictate into the record a statement of the judge’s findings of fact,
including findings as to any evidence regarding remedial action, and
conclusions of law.
14 Pursuant to Md. Rule 16-758, either party may file post-hearing written exceptions
to the findings and conclusions of the hearing judge.  If no exceptions are filed by either
party, we “treat the findings of fact as established for the purposes of determining appropriate
sanctions, if any.”  Maryland Rule 16-759(b)(2)(A).   If exceptions are filed, however,
Maryland Rule 16-759(b)(2)(B) provides that this Court “shall determine whether the
findings of fact have been proven by [clear and convincing evidence,] the requisite standard
of proof set out in Rule 16-757 (b).”  In addition, “we may confine [our] review to the
findings of fact challenged by the exceptions.”  Id.
-6-
matter to the Honorable Emory A. Plitt, Jr., of the Circuit Court for Harford County to
conduct an evidentiary hearing and to submit to this Court proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law.  After hearing evidence over a 6-day period, Judge Plitt filed a 31-page
opinion in which he made detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law, culminating in
a determination that Respondent violated Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.16, 8.4 (a), (c), and
(d).  Respondent filed written exceptions to several of the hearing judge’s findings of fact
and conclusions of law.14  Bar Counsel filed no exceptions. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
15 Maryland Rule 16-759 (b)(2) provides: 
(b) Review by Court of Appeals. 
* * * 
(2) Findings of Fact. (A) If no exceptions are filed.  If no exceptions
are filed, the Court may treat the findings of fact as established for the
purpose of determining appropriate sanctions, if any.
(B) If exceptions are filed.  If exceptions are filed, the Court of
Appeals shall determine whether the findings of fact have been
proven by the requisite standard of proof set out in Rule 16-757 (b).
The Court may confine its review to the findings of fact challenged by
the exceptions.  The Court shall give due regard to the opportunity of
the hearing judge to assess the credibility of witnesses
-7-
“In proceedings involving attorney discipline, this Court has original and complete
jurisdiction and conducts an independent review of the record.”  
Attorney Grievance Comm’n
v. Cherry-Mahoi, 388 Md. 124, 152, 879 A.2d 58, 76 (2005).  “In our review of the record,
the hearing judge’s findings of fact generally will be accepted unless they are clearly
erroneous.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harris, 403 Md. 142, 155-56, 939 A.2d 732, 740
(2008).  See also Maryland Rule 16-759 (b)(2).15  As we noted in Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Mahone, 398 Md. 257, 266, 920 A.2d 458, 463 (2007): 
As to the scope of our review, we take into consideration whether the
findings of fact have been proven by the requisite standard of proof
set out in Rule 16-757(b).  This Rule provides that Bar Counsel has
the burden of proving the averments of the petition by clear and
convincing evidence, and the attorney who asserts an affirmative
defense or a matter of mitigation or extenuation has the burden of
proving the defense or matter of mitigation or extenuation by a
preponderance of the evidence.  Weighing the credibility of witnesses
and resolving any conflict in the evidence are tasks proper for the fact
finder.
-8-
(Internal citations and quotations omitted.)  “As to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law,
such as whether the provisions of the MRPC were violated, our consideration is essentially
de novo.”  Harris, 403 Md. at 156, 939 A.2d at 740.  See also Maryland Rule 16-759 (b)(1).
I.
EXCEPTION TO THE BACKGROUND SECTION OF HEARING JUDGE’S
OPINION
Respondent first excepts to the Background section of the hearing judge’s written
opinion.  In this section, the hearing judge writes:
This is the fourth "formal" disciplinary action brought against
Respondent by the Attorney Grievance Commission.  On February 2,
1999, she was indefinitely suspended.  See Attorney Grievance
Commission v. Kreamer, 353 Md. 85, 724 A.2d 666 (1999).  She was
reinstated by the Court of Appeals on June 10, 1999.  On November
19, 2002, she was issued a public reprimand.  By Opinion of June 21,
2005, she was indefinitely suspended from the practice of law with the
right to apply for reinstatement within six months.  See Attorney
Grievance Commission v. Kreamer, 387 Md. 503, 876 A.2d 79
(2005).  She has never been reinstated and has remained indefinitely
suspended since the Petition in this case was filed on June 22, 2006.
Respondent was admitted to practice before the Court of
Appeals on December 18, 1991.  Respondent resides in Harford
County at 701 Beards Hill Road, Aberdeen, Maryland 21001, and
conducted her practice of law from her home.  The Petition for
Disciplinary Action, sub judice involves complaints made to the
Attorney Grievance Commission by six former clients of Respondent:
Patricia Goodwin; Courtney Anderson; David Ferrara; Gregory
Dudok; Michael Boone; and Sarah Caldarelli.  From the evidence
presented during the course of trial, the events involved in these six
complaints all occurred prior to Respondent's indefinite suspension.
Respondent is charged with violating multiple provisions of the
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct in these six complaints
from former clients.  For the most part, she is charged with violating
most of the same rules in the six individual cases.  For ease of
-9-
reference, I first set out in full the rules which she is alleged to have
violated in these complaints.  I thereafter treat each complaint
individually and relate it back to the particular rules at issue.
Respondent complains that this section “does not seem to be directed to any factual
issues relevant to determining violations vel non by Respondent of any MRPC rules,” but
rather focuses on her disciplinary history.  Specifically, Respondent “suggests that the
content of this section might well be taken by a disinterested reader as placing Respondent
in a decidedly unfavorable light, particularly when asserted so early in the hearing judge’s
submission and prior to any consideration therein of the merits of the respective positions of
the parties.”  Respondent asks this Court to not consider the Background section when it
“determines whether or not any act or omission on Respondent’s part alleged in the [hearing
judge’s opinion] violated any MRPC rule charged therein.”
We overrule Respondent’s first exception.  It is clear from the entirety of the hearing
judge’s opinion that the judge’s decision to include a preliminary section describing
Respondent’s previous disciplinary encounters with this Court did not influence his findings
of fact or conclusions of law with regard to the six complaints against Respondent.  The
analysis utilized by the hearing judge in finding that Respondent violated the MRPC does not
include any mention of Respondent’s disciplinary history.  Therefore, there is nothing in the
opinion to suggest that the inclusion of a section describing Respondent’s disciplinary history
in any way influenced the outcome of the circuit court proceeding.  
Moreover, in Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Harris, 403 Md. 142, 157, 939 A.2d 732,
-10-
741 (2008), we previously overruled and addressed a similar exception.  In Harris, the
attorney excepted to the hearing judge’s finding that the attorney had been suspended from
the practice of law in 2002 and had not been reinstated as of the date of the hearing judge’s
opinion.  Id.  The attorney argued that the finding was “immaterial and irrelevant to any
alleged violation of the MRPC.”  Id.  We overruled the attorney’s exception, stating: 
The issue of this finding's relevancy is dictated by Rule 16-757(c),
which states that the hearing judge “shall prepare and file or dictate
into the record a statement of the judge's findings of fact, including
findings as to any evidence regarding remedial action, and
conclusions of law.”  It is clear that findings regarding Respondent's
status as an attorney are relevant and material to any “remedial
action.”  Respondent admitted, when he testified, that he has been
suspended from the practice of law since 2002.  We, therefore,
conclude that the hearing judge's factual findings are supported by
clear and convincing evidence and overrule this exception.
Id.  In the case sub judice, Respondent’s disciplinary history is a matter of public record, see
Maryland Rule 16-723 (c), and is relevant to any “remedial action” that might be undertaken
by this Court.  See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kreamer, 387 Md. 503, 876 A.2d 79
(2005).  Thus, Respondent’s exception is overruled. 
II.
THE COMPLAINT OF GREGORY M. DUDOK
The hearing judge made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law
concerning the complaint of Gregory M. Dudok: 
With regard to the complaint of Gregory Dudok, Ms. Kreamer
is charged with violating Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.16, 8.1, and 8.4.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Gregory Dudok was the Vice President of a corporation known
16 An engagement fee is considered the same as a general retainer or an “availability
fee.”  See In re Gray's Run Technologies, Inc., 217 B.R. 48, 53 (Bnkr.M.D.Pa. 1997); In re
Printing Dimensions, Inc., 153 B.R. 715, 719 (Bankr.D.Md.1993).  In In re Gray’s Run
Technologies, Inc., the court described this type of named retainer “as a sum of money paid
by a client to secure an attorney's availability over a given period of time.”  217 B.R. at 53
(quotation and citation omitted).  The court continued: “This type of retainer binds a lawyer
to represent a particular client while foreclosing that attorney from appearing on behalf of
an adverse party. [This] fee is generally considered “earned upon receipt” or
“non-refundable.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
-11-
as The Broken Spoke Family Association, Inc.  On or about March 25,
2003, Mr. Dudok retained Ms. Kreamer to dissolve the corporation.
He paid her a retainer fee of $300.00.  Also on that date, Mr. Dudok
signed a retainer/engagement agreement.  The agreement provided
that Ms. Kreamer would perform all necessary legal services to
dissolve the corporation.  Ms. Kreamer also agreed to keep Mr. Dudok
appraised of all developments in the case.  The agreement provided
that $100.00 of the $300.00 retainer was to be considered as a
non-refundable engagement fee.[16]  The fee arrangement was on an
hourly basis at the rate of $150.00 plus expenses.  The agreement also
provided that Ms. Kreamer would render bills on a monthly or
quarterly basis ''as applicable."  Ms. Kreamer also agreed that she
would "make every effort to expedite client's case promptly and
efficiently according to the highest legal and ethical standards."  The
$300.00 fee was deposited in her escrow account on March 25, 2003.
She withdrew the $100.00 "engagement fee" from her escrow account
on March 25, 2003.  On the same date that he engaged Ms. Kreamer
to perform the dissolution, he turned over to her the corporate books
and papers for her use. 
Simply stated, after March 25, 2003, Ms. Kreamer did
absolutely nothing to perform the services requested by Mr. Dudok.
After waiting over one year for Ms. Kreamer to  follow through, Mr.
Dudok attempted to contact her.  She received Mr. Dudok's messages.
Ms. Kreamer, however, never contacted Mr. Dudok in response to the
messages that he had left until Saturday night, September 4, 2004 at
approximately 9:00 p.m.  Ultimately Mr. Dudok contacted the State
Department of Assessment and Taxation about trying to dissolve the
corporation.  Some unidentified but practical employee of the
department suggested to Mr. Dudok that he might just want to let the
-12-
corporate charter lapse rather than go through the trouble of
dissolving it which is exactly what Mr. Dudok did.
After receiving no response to his attempts to contact Ms.
Kreamer, Mr. Dudok filed a complaint with the Attorney Grievance
Commission.  It was only after the complaint was filed that Ms.
Kreamer contacted Mr. Dudok by letter.  She acknowledged in the
letter that she had received the telephone messages in June.  Ms.
Kreamer also admitted that she did not respond to those inquires.
Ms. Kreamer attempted to defend her actions in this matter by
claiming that she needed Articles or a Resolution of Dissolution
showing that the Board of the Association had taken formal action
approving a dissolution.  However, she never told Mr. Dudok that she
needed any such documentation.  In fact, the first time she ever
mentioned this to Mr. Dudok was in her letter of September 4, 2004.
Despite not having done a single thing to perform the services
requested, Ms. Kreamer offered to complete the work in her letter of
September 4, 2004.  She enclosed with the letter of September 4,
2004, a refund of the $300.00 that Mr. Dudok had paid.
When Mr .Dudok attempted to first track down Ms. Kreamer
in June of 2004, he specifically left messages for her that he needed
back all of the corporate documents which he had originally given her.
She, however, did not respond to that request until September 12,
2004.  Keeping in mind that Ms. Kreamer had all the corporate books
and papers since March 25, 2003, in June of 2004, Mr. Dudok
realized that he needed all of those documents back in order to file tax
returns.  Up to that point, Mr. Dudok had assumed that Ms. Kreamer
had followed through.  He found that she had not followed through
when he contacted the State Department of Assessments and
Taxation.  Ms. Kreamer could not offer any explanation as to why she
never did anything to follow through and why she did not return Mr.
Dudok's telephone calls nor keep him advised of the status of the
matter.
 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I find by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Kreamer
violated the rules of professional conduct alleged by Petitioner in
conjunction with her engagement by Mr. Dudok.  Ms. Kreamer
incompetently represented Mr. Dudok in violation of Rule 1.1 by not
exhibiting the thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for
the engagement by her failure to prepare and file the necessary
documents to dissolve the association.  Further, Ms. Kreamer never
-13-
orally or in writing told Mr. Dudok that she needed a Corporate
Resolution or Minutes to reflect agreement on dissolving the
corporation.
Her failure to do anything on behalf of Mr. Dudok for over one
year violated Rules 1.2 and 1.3 by her failure to abide by her client's
request that a dissolution be filed on behalf of the corporation and by
failing to act in a reasonable time to conclude the representation.  In
point of fact, as noted in my Findings of Fact, she did absolutely
nothing for over fifteen months.
She also violated Rule 1.4 by failing to communicate with Mr.
Dudok, as noted, for over one year, and violated Rule 1.16(d) by
failing to advise Mr. Dudok that she had done nothing and had in
essence abandoned her representation.  It should be obvious that if
Mr. Dudok had not contacted her in June of 2004, she would have
continued to do nothing to follow through on her client's direction
concerning the dissolution.
She also violated Rule 8.4(c) by taking the $100.00
non-refundable "engagement fee" upon representation and the
$200.00 retainer and then never contacting Mr. Dudok at all or
keeping him up to date on her progress. Perhaps most telling was her
inability to answer the question posed to her at trial as to when, if
ever, she was going to do anything to follow through. She could not
answer.  She took the money with obviously no intent to pursue the
matter.  Ms. Kreamer's total lack of any follow through for well over
one year, her failure to respond to Mr. Dudok's inquires, and her
failure to return the corporate books until over three months after she
was asked were certainly prejudicial to the administration of justice
in violation of Rule 8.4(d).
(Internal record citations.)
Respondent submits four exceptions to the hearing judge’s factual findings regarding
her representation of Mr. Dudock.  Respondent first complains that the hearing judge erred
in finding that Mr. Dudock “turned over to [Respondent] the corporate books and papers”
for her use.  Respondent contends that this finding “lacks the requisite evidentiary support”
because “the record [ ] seems to indicate that Mr. Dudock gave Respondent a single
17 In addition, Respondent excepts to two other, similar factual findings: (1) “Despite
not having done a single thing to perform the services requested . . . ;” and, (2) “Ms. Kreamer
could not offer any explanation as to why she never did anything to follow through . . . .”  We
shall combine these exceptions and address them together. 
-14-
‘corporate’ book.”  In addition,  Respondent contends that Mr. Dudock did not actually turn
over all necessary documents for the dissolution of the corporation; specifically, he did not
turn over formalized  minutes recording the approval of the dissolution of the corporation.
We find this exception is without merit.  While the hearing judge’s use of the phrase
“corporate books and papers” may not be the most precise phraseology, it nonetheless is
supported by the record.  Mr. Dudock testified that on March 25, 2003, he turned over all
documents of the corporation that were in existence at that time.  The omission of a
formalized record of the vote of the corporation’s board of directors from the notebook does
not render the hearing judge’s finding unsupported by the evidence.  While these papers may
not have been voluminous or numerous, the intent of the hearing judge’s statement is clear,
Mr. Dudock relinquished to Respondent all corporate documents in his possession at the time
he signed the retainer agreement.
Second, Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that “after March 25, 2003,
[Respondent] did absolutely nothing to perform the services requested by Mr. Dudock.”17
Respondent contends that this finding is in error because Respondent testified that after she
met with Mr. Dudock on March 25, 2003, she, at a minimum, researched Maryland statutes
regarding dissolution of corporations.  Respondent’s exception misses the point.  The hearing
-15-
judge found that Respondent did little to no work on the matter which Mr. Dudock hired
Respondent to complete; that is, to bring about the formal dissolution of The Broken Spoke
Family Association, Inc.  According to Mr. Dudock’s testimony, he turned over corporate
documents to Respondent on March 25, 2003.  Mr. Dudock then testified that at no time
afterward did Respondent communicate to him her  need for a formalized record of the vote
of the Board of Directors approving the dissolution of the corporation.  While Respondent
may have researched Maryland statutory law on the dissolution of a corporation, it is clear
from the record that Respondent, in the year that she had the corporate documents, did not
undertake any other steps to effectuate the corporation’s dissolution, including the most basic
step of requesting from Mr. Dudock a formalized record of the vote of the Board of Directors
approving the dissolution of the corporation. The exception is overruled.
III.
THE COMPLAINT OF COURTNEY ANDERSON
 The hearing judge made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law
concerning the complaint of Courtney Anderson:
 
With regard to the complaint of Courtney Anderson, Ms.
Kreamer is charged with violating Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, and 8.4.
FINDINGS OF FACT
On Apri1 24, 2003, Courtney Anderson hired Ms. Kreamer for
representation in her divorce.  Ms. Kreamer and Ms. Anderson signed
a retainer/engagement agreement in which Ms. Anderson agreed to
pay Ms. Kreamer a retainer of $1,200.00, $600.00 of which was
considered to be a non-refundable engagement fee.  On that same
date, Ms. Kreamer deposited the $1,200.00 into her escrow account.
The $1,200.00 was paid on Ms. Anderson' s behalf by her mother,
Jackie Turner.  Ms. Kreamer then removed the $600.00 of the
-16-
$1,200.00 retainer from her escrow account as her "engagement fee".
Prior to retaining Ms. Kreamer, Ms. Anderson and her husband had
already separated and divided marital assets.  Ms. Anderson was
already receiving child support and she told Ms. Kreamer at the outset
of the engagement that there were no issues concerning alimony,
retirement, marital property or child custody as those matters had
previously been resolved between Ms. Anderson and her husband.
Ms. Anderson further told Ms. Kreamer that Mr. Anderson was
agreeable to everything and requested that Ms. Kreamer prepare a
Property/Separation Agreement to memorialize the agreement.
During her first meeting with Ms. Kreamer, Ms. Anderson was
told by Ms. Kreamer that she would "get right on it."  However, after
hiring Ms. Kreamer in April, Ms. Anderson had no contact from Ms.
Kreamer for five months thereafter.  Ms. Anderson attempted to
contact Ms. Kreamer at least once a month for those five months
following her retention but never got any response.  She became so
concerned about the lack of a response that she increased her
telephone calls to Ms. Kreamer's office to weekly.  The first
communication of any kind that Ms. Anderson received from Ms.
Kreamer was a copy of a letter dated September 29, 2003 which Ms.
Kreamer sent to Mr. Anderson advising him that she had been
retained to represent Ms. Anderson. 
Despite having been retained in April, Ms. Kreamer did
nothing more to move the matter along until September 29, 2003,
when she filed a Complaint for a Limited Divorce.  It is absolutely
clear 
that 
Ms. 
Kreamer 
did 
nothing 
to 
work 
on 
the
Property/Separation Agreement until April of 2004, over one year
later.  A Master's hearing was scheduled in June of 2004. Ms.
Kreamer, however, did not inform Ms. Anderson about the Master's
hearing and the first that Ms. Anderson knew about it was when she
received correspondence from Master Frederick Hatem.  The only
explanation Ms. Kreamer could offer was her claim that Ms.
Anderson had changed addresses and it was hard to contact her.  That
explanation is unworthy of belief.  At some point she paid Ms.
Kreamer an additional $468.00 to cover what Ms. Kreamer claimed
to be the cost of the Master's Hearing.  Ultimately, Ms. Anderson did
in fact receive her divorce.
Ultimately when confronted by Ms. Anderson about the delay,
Ms. Kreamer told her that she was "too busy."  Ms. Kreamer never
explained to Ms. Anderson why she was so busy or that she would
-17-
pick up the pace.  Ms. Anderson never agreed to delaying the matter,
and because she had already resolved things with her husband, she did
not think that the matter would be too complicated.  In point of fact,
Ms. Anderson lived down the street from Ms. Kreamer and it would
appear to me that there was no good reason why Ms. Kreamer did not
keep her informed or advise her that she had not gotten to her case. 
Despite Ms. Kreamer having agreed to periodically bill Ms.
Anderson, Ms. Anderson did not receive any bill or accounting until
January 8, 2004, some eight and a half months after the representation
began.  Between the time of her retaining Ms. Kreamer and the billing
of January 8, 2004, Ms. Anderson had no idea as to how the money
she had paid Ms. Kreamer was being used or what, if any, efforts Ms.
Kreamer had made towards moving her matter along.  Evidently
uncertain of the accuracy of the January 8, 2004 bill, four days later
on January 12, 2004, Ms. Kreamer sent Ms. Anderson another invoice
in a different amount. During the course of its investigation, the AGC
obtained certain records from Ms. Kreamer concerning her
representation of Ms. Anderson.  The alleged contemporaneous billing
records are virtually indecipherable. Ms. Kreamer also sent additional
bills to Ms. Anderson on May 25, 2004 and July 19, 2004.
 
Ms. Anderson did not realize that Ms. Kreamer was charging
her for things which should properly be considered as office overhead
such as setting up a file, revising accounting records, etc.  For
example, Ms. Kreamer improperly billed Ms. Anderson 15 minutes
time on September 23, 2003 for what she described as "file
organization and time sheet."  At the time that Ms. Kreamer billed Ms.
Anderson for this, the only documents in her file were her initial notes
and a Financial Statement prepared on April 29, 2003.  This task,
according to Ms. Kreamer, involved merely putting Ms. Anderson's
name on a file and putting documents in a file.  She did nothing more
than take a pre-printed form and place Ms. Anderson's name on it. Ms.
Kreamer also charged Ms. Anderson other billing statements for
"reimbursement of fees and review and revise accounting."  This
involved doing nothing other than filling out a deposit slip and
updating her accounting records.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
I find by clear and convincing evidence that by her conduct,
Ms. Kreamer violated the rules as alleged.  Her failure to prepare the
Separation Agreement on behalf of Ms. Anderson and as Ms.
Anderson requested within a reasonable time after being retained
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demonstrates a lack of diligence in violation of Rule 1.3.  It must be
kept in mind that at the time Ms. Kreamer was retained by Ms.
Anderson, there were no outstanding issues concerning property,
alimony, retirement or custody. Ms. Anderson was already receiving
child support and Mr. Anderson was already agreeable to the terms
they had worked out.  Ms. Kreamer failed to take any action on Ms.
Anderson's behalf until the end of September, 2003, five months after
being retained. 
Ms. Kreamer also violated Rule 1.4 by failing to maintain
communications with Ms. Anderson and failing to return Ms.
Anderson's telephone calls during the five month lapse between the
time she was retained by Ms. Anderson and the first letter she sent to
Mr. Anderson.  Despite her obligation to do so, Ms. Kreamer failed to
communicate with Ms. Anderson for eight and one-half months about
how the money paid was being used and what Ms. Anderson owed.
She did not send periodic billings to Ms. Anderson as was required by
the retainer agreement.
Ms. Kreamer violated Rule 1.5 by unreasonably charging Ms.
Anderson for such things as file organization, time sheet maintenance,
reimbursement of fees and review and revise accounting.  These are
matters of overhead in any law office.  One is left to wonder what, if
anything, she did to revise accounting because, as noted, her time
sheets are totally unintelligible.
Her failure to diligently pursue Ms. Anderson's Separation
Agreement and divorce, unreasonably charging her for administrative
overhead as well as failing to maintain communications with Ms.
Anderson, keeping her posted as to what was going on and not
moving forward promptly is conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(d).
(Internal record citations.)
Respondent excepts to the following statement made by the hearing judge:  “Despite
having been retained in April [of 2003], [Respondent] did nothing more to move the matter
along until September 29, 2003.  It is absolutely clear that [Respondent] did nothing to work
on the Property/Settlement Agreement until April of 2004, over one year later.”  Respondent
-19-
contends this finding is clearly erroneous, arguing:
The time interval referred to by the hearing judge in this
finding was not inordinate, the complaint for divorce having been
filed within four or five months of Respondent’s entry into this matter.
Although the complaint sought only limited divorce, so that it could
have been filed earlier, in the interim, Ms. Anderson appeared to be
comfortable with her situation in that she had been and still was
talking with her husband about their martial situation and was
receiving support money from him, including child support in an
amount in excess of what she likely would have been awarded under
the guidelines. She was unwilling to bring an action based upon her
husband’s adultery (he was then already involved with another
woman, who was pregnant by him and awaiting the birth of the child
. . .) which would have provided a ground for a much more immediate
absolute divorce.  She was also apparently herself involved with
another man, although in her testimony she denied intimacy.
We overrule Respondent’s exception as it  does not address the underlying facts of the
hearing judge’s findings.  Respondent’s exception merely attempts to shift the responsibility
for Respondent’s failure to undertake steps to effectuate the divorce onto Ms. Anderson.  The
social construction of Ms. Anderson’s and Mr. Anderson’s relationship and their personal
lives outside their marriage does not address or explain Respondent’s failure to complete the
task for which she was hired. 
IV.
THE COMPLAINT OF DAVID A. FERRARA
 As to the complaint of David A. Ferrara, the hearing judge made the following
findings of fact and conclusions of law:
In this matter, Ms. Kreamer is charged with violating Rules
1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.5, and 8.4. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT
On November 12, 2003, Mr. Ferrara retained Ms. Kreamer to
represent him in a divorce and custody matter and paid a $1,500.00
retainer.  $500.00 of the $1,500.00 retainer was considered to be a
non-refundable engagement fee.  The agreement between Mr. Ferrara
and Ms. Kreamer provided that Ms. Kreamer would render bills on a
periodic basis either monthly or quarterly, recapping the services
rendered and itemizing any expenses.  The agreement provided that
Ms. Kreamer would represent Mr. Ferrara on an hourly basis at a rate
of $160 .00 per hour and further that she would "make every effort to
expedite client's case promptly and efficiently according to the highest
legal and ethical standards."
The calculation of child support is governed by 12-201-
12-204, Family Law Article, Maryland Code and Maryland Rule
9-206.  In particular, Rule 9-206 sets forth the worksheets that are to
be used in making child support calculations under two circumstances,
primary physical custody and shared physical custody.  The
worksheets set forth the exact manner in which child support is to be
calculated.  The statute requires the use of the guidelines.  Section
12-203, Family Law Article, provides that the Court of Appeals
mandates standardized worksheet forms to be used which, of course,
is the purpose of Rule 9-206.  On five different occasions during her
representation of Mr. Ferrara, Ms. Kreamer calculated what she
believed to be Mr. Ferrara's child support obligation.  Each time,
despite the information being the same, Ms. Kreamer told Mr. Ferrara
that his child support obligation was a different figure.  In contacts
that Mr. Ferrara had with his wife, he learned that his wife's attorney
had calculated the child support guidelines differently from the many
attempts by Ms. Kreamer.  Mr. Ferrara's wife was represented by H.
Edward Andrews, Esquire.  Concerned about the different figures he
was being given, Mr. Ferrara went to the judiciary's website and
accessed the required worksheet forms. Because of the improper
calculation of the child support guidelines by Ms. Kreamer, Mr.
Ferrara, after completing the forms, realized that there was at least a
$200.00 discrepancy between Ms. Kreamer's calculations and those
of his wife's attorney.
Ms. Kreamer admitted at trial that she improperly calculated
Mr. Ferrara's child support obligations and further admitted that she
used a form that she had created instead of the child support
guidelines worksheet.  It is important to note that although in her
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testimony she claimed to understand what the term "adjusted actual
income" meant, she could not explain it.  Despite instructions from
me, not to look in her client file, she did so and tried to use Mr.
Ferrara's wife's attorney's guidelines worksheet to explain the correct
method of calculation.  Ms. Kreamer ultimately admitted that she had
made mistakes in the calculations.  After discovering these errors, Mr.
Ferrara became very insecure about Ms. Kreamer's method of
calculation which was, of course, critical from his perspective.
Mr. Ferrara told Ms. Kreamer that because of his work and
personal situation, it would be impossible for him to have his children
with him every weekend and that he agreed to his wife having primary
physical custody of their children.  Nevertheless, despite Mr. Ferrara's
explicit instructions to Ms. Kreamer to the contrary, she insisted on
calculating child support guidelines on a shared custody basis and
pursued that with opposing counsel.  Mr. Ferrara was very
straightforward with Ms. Kreamer concerning custody and visitation,
yet she did exactly the opposite of what Mr. Ferrara told her.  Despite
being aware of and having had brought to her attention the errors in
the calculation of child support, Ms. Kreamer nevertheless charged
Mr. Ferrara for the continuing erroneous calculations twice on
November 25, 2003, once on December 1, 2003, once on December
3, 2003, once on December 24, 2003, and once on January 3, 2004.
A Pre- Trial Conference with the court was set for February 13,
2004.  In discussions with Ms. Kreamer, Mr. Ferrara told her that he
would be available on that date. However, Ms. Kreamer was not
available.  Ms. Kreamer then asked the court to reset the conference
for February 20, 2004 but that was on a date that Mr. Ferrara was not
available.  He had told Ms. Kreamer prior thereto that he would not
be available on February 20, 2004.  Ms. Kreamer offered this Court
no explanation as to why she rescheduled the Pre-Trial Conference on
a date when her client was unavailable, despite knowing of his
conflict in advance.  Evidently, that Pre- Trial Conference did not take
place.
Throughout her representation of Mr. Ferrara, he continually
requested periodic invoices from Ms. Kreamer.  That was in fact one
of the conditions of the retainer agreement that she had with Mr.
Ferrara.  Even though the retainer agreement provided for billings to
be done monthly or quarterly ''as appropriate," he did not receive an
invoice until February 11, 2004.  With regard to the issue of the
scheduling of the Pre-Trial Conference, Ms. Kreamer billed Mr.
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Ferrara for rescheduling this.  Beginning on February 11, 2004, Mr.
Ferrara received a number of invoices from Ms. Kreamer respectively
dated March 3, 2004, June 30, 2004, and July 30, 2004.  None of them
agree.  Mr. Ferrara asked to see Ms. Kreamer's detailed billing records
which are totally incomprehensible. One thing is clear from the
detailed time records and the billing statements and that is, like the
other complaints, Ms. Kreamer charged Mr. Ferrara for such
administrative tasks as updating and revising her time sheets, file
preparation, etc.  Despite Mr. Ferrara's requests, Ms. Kreamer did not
provide the requested detailed time sheet information until after Mr.
Ferrara terminated her.
During her representation of Mr. Ferrara, Ms. Kreamer
unreasonably continued to charge Mr. Ferrara for doing her own
accounting. Ms. Kreamer in fact testified that she billed Mr. Ferrara
for the time it took to document money she had received from him and
to write a deposit slip.  She charged Mr. Ferrara 1 hour and 30
minutes on March 3, 2004, for what she described as "accounting and
file organization;" fifteen minutes on November 26, 2003 for
"updating time sheet;" seven minutes on December 8, 2003 for
"update time sheet;" five minutes on December 16, 2003 for "update
time sheet;" and five minutes on January 5, 2004 for "time sheet
update."  In fact, it is questionable whether or not Ms. Kreamer had
any idea at all about how much time she spent.  Instead of keeping
contemporaneous separate time sheets, she calculated the time spent
on the matter by going to her "calendar books" and client files to
figure out what she had done.  It became apparent that some of the
charges that she made for these administrative tasks were for her to
figure out how much time she had spent.
By letter of March 3, 2004 Mr. Ferrara terminated Ms.
Kreamer. His letter to Ms. Kreamer terminating her services is
important in that it sets out in detail the events concerning the
calculation of the child support guidelines and the issues concerning
the scheduling of the Pre-Trial Conference and the bills.  Of particular
interest is the fact that (as verified by the bills) that on March 2, 2004,
Mr. Ferrara paid Ms. Kreamer $500.00, and then the very next day she
told him that he owed her an additional $810.00.  She then changed
that to say that he owed her an additional $1,300.00. Mr. Ferrara
continued to receive bills after he terminated Ms. Kreamer again none
of which agreed.  On June 30, 2004, Ms. Kreamer advised Mr. Ferrara
that she had made some errors in her billing statements and deducted
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$570.00 from the balance he owed but then told him he still owed her
$1,541.00.  Ultimately, the fee dispute between Mr. Ferrara and Ms.
Kreamer was resolved by arbitration and Mr. Ferrara paid an
additional $72.00 over and above what he had previously paid.
One of the most troubling aspects of the Ferrara complaint is
the fact that Mr. Ferrara, at the outset of the representation, asked Ms.
Kreamer if she had ever had any prior disciplinary issues.  It is
absolutely clear to me that Ms. Kreamer misrepresented to Mr. Ferrara
that she had never been in trouble with the bar.  She absolutely knew
when she was asked that question by Mr. Ferrara that she had been
suspended on February 2,1999 and issued a reprimand on November
19, 2002.  Mr. Ferrara later found out the truth by consulting the Court
of Appeals publically available records through the internet.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
There is no doubt by clear and convincing evidence that Ms.
Kreamer has violated the rules of professional conduct as alleged by
AGC.  She incompetently represented Mr. Ferrara in violation of Rule
1.1 by not exhibiting the thoroughness and preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation by her abject failure to understand
and comprehend how to calculate child support.  Although she claims
that the majority of her practice was family law, she had no idea how
or when to deduct child health care insurance costs when calculating
child support.  Furthermore, she did not understand the meaning of
"adjusted actual income" in the calculation of child support.  Had she
understood what that term means and had she consulted the Family
Law Article and the rules, it would not have been necessary to
calculate the child support guidelines on five different occasions
knowing that there was no dispute as to the figures to be "plugged in."
Further, she did not comprehend the use of the required worksheets.
Rather, she used some form that she had created which, as one can
see, is at variance with the required worksheet. 
Mr. Ferrara made it clear to Ms. Kreamer that because of his
personal situation, he could not have the children every weekend yet,
despite those instructions, she continued to propose that and charge
Mr. Ferrara for proceeding in that fashion.  She violated Rule 1.4 by
failing to communicate with Mr. Ferrara throughout the representation
as to how she was billing him, the accuracy of her billings, and how
retainer funds were being used. 
She unreasonably charged Mr. Ferrara for miscalculating the
child support guidelines; for rescheduling the Pre-Trial Conference
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for which she knew he was not available; and for "updating time
sheet" and for updating accounting and reimbursement all in violation
of Rule 1.5.  She unreasonably charged Mr. Ferrara for her mistakes
as well as the cost for running her law office by updating her time
sheets which was really trying to figure out how much time she had
spent on his case, reviewing her accounting, and filling out deposit
slips so that she could reimburse herself the cost of various court fees.
Lastly, Ms. Kreamer clearly violated Rule 8.4(c) by
misrepresenting to Mr. Ferrara that she had never been in trouble with
the bar. When asked that question by Mr. Ferrara she clearly replied
no, knowing full well that there were at least two prior formal
disciplinary actions by the Court of Appeals against her.  It is also
clear beyond any doubt that her conduct throughout the representation
of Mr. Ferrara was conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice
in violation of Rule 8.4(d). 
(Internal record citations omitted.)
Respondent first excepts to two of the hearing judge’s findings: (1) “Ms. Kreamer
ultimately admitted that she had made mistakes in the calculations.  After discovering these
errors, Mr. Ferrara became very insecure about Ms. Kreamer's method of calculation which
was, of course, critical from his perspective.”; and, (2)
Nevertheless, despite Mr. Ferrara's explicit instructions to Ms.
Kreamer to the contrary, she insisted on calculating child support
guidelines on a shared custody basis and pursued that with opposing
counsel.  Mr. Ferrara was very straightforward with Ms. Kreamer
concerning custody and visitation, yet she did exactly the opposite of
what Mr. Ferrara told her.  Despite being aware of and having had
brought to her attention the errors in the calculation of child support,
Ms. Kreamer nevertheless charged Mr. Ferrara for the continuing
erroneous calculations twice on November 25, 2003, once on
December 1, 2003, once on December 3, 2003, once on December 24,
2003, and once on January 3, 2004.
(Internal record citation omitted.)  Respondent argues these findings are in error because “the
-25-
record demonstrates[ ] that Mr. Ferrara continually gave [Respondent] changing information
pertinent to child support guidelines calculations, which [thereafter] required or substantially
contributed to requiring recalculations of child support, with concomitant expense.”  We
overrule Respondent’s exceptions.  
“Consistent with the standard of review for factual findings in attorney discipline
cases, we have iterated that the judge ‘may elect to pick and choose which evidence to rely
upon.’”  Harris, 403 Md. at 158, 939 A.2d at 742 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Harris, 371 Md. 510, 543, 810 A.2d 457, 477 (2002)).  With respect to these exceptions, the
hearing judge did just that.  Although Respondent testified that Mr. Ferrara called or stopped
by Respondent’s office several times to have his child support obligation recalculated by
Respondent, Mr. Ferrara testified that he had Respondent recalculate his child support
obligation on “five different occasions over a period of a month . . . and a half” because,
“with exception of the last [calculation,] they were done incorrectly.”  Mr. Ferrara testified
that through his own research and from conversations with his ex-wife, he learned that
Respondent’s calculations had been incorrectly performed, to Mr. Ferrara’s detriment.
Therefore, the hearing judge chose to believe the testimony of Mr. Ferrara concerning
Respondent’s representation of Mr. Ferrara in his divorce.  We have reviewed the record and
conclude that the hearing judge's factual findings are supported by clear and convincing
evidence.
Respondent next excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that Respondent “had asked
-26-
the court to reset the [pre-trial] conference on a date that Mr. Ferrara was not available . . .
.   [Respondent] offered [the hearing judge] no explanation as to why she rescheduled the
Pre-Trial Conference on a date when her client was unavailable, despite knowing of his
conflict in advance.”  Respondent complains that “the record discloses [that Respondent]
promptly made reasonable efforts to resolve the scheduling problem that arose, including
communicating with the chambers of Judge Carr to reschedule the conference involved, but
unknown to her at the time [as] opposing counsel had gone directly to the Assignment Office
and obtained the February 20, 2004 date.”  Respondent’s exception does not refute the
factual findings in question.  Indeed, the hearing judge’s factual findings are supported by
the evidence.  The testimony of Mr. Ferrara indicates that he informed Respondent of his
unavailability to attend any conferences from February 20 through February 27, 2004.
Respondent, however, failed to confirm with the Assignment Office that the rescheduled
pretrial conference (from February 13, 2004) was not rescheduled on a day which Mr. Ferrara
could not attend.  Respondent contends that opposing counsel contacted the Assignment
Office without her knowledge; however, Respondent should have taken a more proactive
response to the rescheduling of the pre-trial conference. Respondent should have not just
contacted the judge’s chambers to reschedule the originally-scheduled February 13, 2004,
conference, but should have also contacted the Assignment Office.  The exception is
overruled.
V.
THE COMPLAINT OF SARA LOUISE CALDARELLI
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 As to the complaint of Sara Louise Caldarelli, the hearing judge made the following
findings of fact and conclusions of law:
In the matter of the complaint of Mrs. Caldarelli, Ms. Kreamer
is charged with violating Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 8.1, and 8.4.
FINDINGS OF FACT
On March 21, 2003, Mrs. Caldarelli retained Ms. Kreamer for
representation in a divorce case.  It should be noted that prior to
retaining Ms. Kreamer, Mrs. Caldarelli had been represented by
another lawyer, Zoe Lambros, Esquire, who ceased practicing law and
moved out of state.  At the time Mrs. Caldarelli retained Ms. Kreamer,
Mrs. Caldarelli and her husband had already executed a Separation
and Property Settlement Agreement.  Ms. Kreamer used basically the
same retainer/engagement agreement that she used with her other
clients, again in which Ms. Kreamer agreed to "make every effort to
expedite client's case promptly and efficiently according to the highest
legal and ethical standards."  Ms. Caldarelli gave Ms. Kreamer a
$1,300.00 retainer fee.  The Retainer Agreement has a date of July 3,
2003 for Mrs. Caldarelli's signature and a date of March 25, 2003 for
Ms. Kreamer's signature.  Ms. Kreamer made the astounding
statement at trial that she did not consider herself as representing Mrs.
Caldarelli until after July 3, 2003.  She accepted the money and
cashed the check.  On Apri114, 2003, Ms. Kreamer withdrew the
$600.00 engagement fee from her escrow account.  It defies belief for
Ms. Kreamer to allege that she didn't consider herself as representing
Mrs. Caldarelli until after July of 2003.
Long before she retained Ms. Kreamer to represent her, Mrs.
Caldarelli had filed pro se, on August 12, 2002, a Complaint for
Absolute Divorce in this court in Civil No. 12-C-02-2314.  Mr.
Caldarelli filed an Answer to Mrs. Caldarelli' s pro se Complaint on
September 9, 2002, admitting that the parties had been separated for
more than two years and requesting that the court grant the divorce
and that the Separation and Property Settlement Agreement be
incorporated therein but not merged.  Subsequent to that pro se
Answer, another Answer was filed by Mr. Caldarelli through a lawyer
in the State of Georgia identified as T. Jeff Moore.  It was undisputed
that Mr. Moore was not a member of the Maryland Bar and did not
request admission for the purpose of representing Mr. Caldarelli.
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Keep in mind that the subsequent Answer by the Georgia lawyer was
filed five months before Mrs. Caldarelli retained Ms. Kreamer and
was sitting in the court file.  In that subsequent Answer, the Georgia
lawyer on behalf of Mr. Caldarelli challenged service of process,
jurisdiction and the execution of the Separation and Property
Settlement Agreement.  Additionally, the Answer by the Georgia
attorney questioned the 
bona fides of the pro se Answer Mr. Caldarelli
had filed some two months before on September 9th.  There was also
in the court file an Affidavit of Service attesting to service on Mr.
Caldarelli of the Complaint at his address in Georgia.  Also, the
Answer filed by the Georgia lawyer was not signed by Mr. Caldarelli
as required by Maryland Rule 9-202(a). 
There was urgency to the matter at the time that Mrs. Caldarelli
first met with Ms. Kreamer.  Mrs. Caldarelli had received
correspondence from the Georgia lawyer, Mr. Moore, basically stating
that if she didn't move forward with the divorce in M aryland, Mr.
Caldarelli would file in Georgia.  Mrs. Caldarelli retrieved all of the
papers and documents from her prior attorney and gave them to Ms.
Kreamer within a week.  The Georgia lawyer made it clear that unless
the matter was pursued in Maryland he would file in Georgia.  Despite
the urgency of the matter as related to Ms. Kreamer by Mrs.
Caldarelli, from March 20, 2003 until July 22, 2003, Ms. Kreamer did
nothing to advance obtaining a divorce for Mrs. Caldarelli in the
already pending case in this court.  On July 22, 2003, Ms. Kreamer
entered her appearance in the pending case in this court and she says,
reviewed the Maryland court file.  She, however, did nothing further
until at least September 2, 2003.  She never filed a Motion to Strike
the Answer filed by the Georgia lawyer despite the fact that it was
easy to find out that he was not a member of the Maryland bar and
that the Answer was not in proper form.  When confronted with this,
Ms. Kreamer's response was that she "intended" to argue later that the
Answer should be stricken but never filed a Motion making that
request. 
Mr. Caldarelli down in Georgia stopped waiting. On June 27,
2003, Mrs. Caldarelli was served with a Complaint for a divorce and
Summons filed in a Georgia court.  Mrs. Caldarelli immediately gave
the documents to Ms. Kreamer.  There is no doubt that Ms. Kreamer
had them.  Thereafter, for reasons which were never explained, Ms.
Kreamer prepared a pro se Answer for Mrs. Caldarelli to file in the
Georgia divorce case.  Ms. Kreamer does not deny preparing the pro
-29-
se Answer and giving it to Mrs. Caldarelli.  Ms. Kreamer testified that
she had no idea what Mrs. Caldarelli would do with the pro se
Answer.  That is simply unworthy of belief. Ms. Kreamer prepared
that pro se Answer knowing full well that Mrs. Caldarelli was going
to send it to the Georgia court.  Ms. Kreamer did no research on
Georgia law and did not even consider any effect the filing of a pro
se Answer in Georgia might have on the issue of whether or not Mrs.
Caldarelli may have been consenting to the jurisdiction of the Georgia
court.  Ms. Kreamer continued to do absolutely nothing.
After the pro se Answer was filed in the Georgia case, on
August 23, 2003, the Georgia court granted Mr. Caldarelli a divorce.
At no time did Ms. Kreamer attempt to look into obtaining a Georgia
lawyer to represent Mrs. Caldarelli or at least for Mrs. Caldarelli to
consult.  The judgment of the Georgia court did not incorporate the
Property Settlement Agreement and in fact provided that both parties
waived any right to any present or future right of action against the
other with regard to property or debts.  After being confronted with
this fait accompli in Georgia, Ms. Kreamer compounded the problem
by preparing and giving to Mrs. Caldarelli a pro se "Motion to Vacate
the Judgment of Divorce" which Mrs. Caldarelli filed in the Georgia
case.
The Separation and Property Settlement Agreement that Mrs.
Caldarelli and Mr. Caldarelli had entered into and which clearly had
been filed in the Harford County case and would have been, without
objection, incorporated but not merged in a Maryland judgment, gave
Mrs. Caldarelli certain benefits including alimony, the value of some
life insurance policies, her marital portion of Mr. Caldarelli ' s pension
and the marital home.  Ms. Kreamer did nothing else on Mrs.
Caldarelli' s behalf other than to withdraw her appearance in the
Harford County case on September 3, 2004.  The Separation and
Property Settlement Agreement was already in the Harford County
file.  It is inexplicable, knowing that a Georgia divorce had already
been granted, for Ms. Kreamer to request a hearing in the Harford
County case on September 2, 2003 to take divorce testimony.  When
she filed that, the clerk's office recognized that the matter was
contested and so advised her.  The notation by the clerk's office was
that she was to submit a new request which she did on September 8,
2003, again simply asking for a hearing without disclosing the
existence of the Georgia decree. 
Throughout her representing of Mrs. Caldarelli, Ms. Kreamer,
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despite agreeing to and being required to, did not submit billing
statements to Mrs. Caldarelli.  The first statement that Mrs. Caldarelli
received was in September of 2004.  Again, as in other cases, Ms.
Kreamer unreasonably charged Mrs. Caldarelli for such tasks as "file
organization" and "accounting" which was nothing more than Ms.
Kreamer trying to figure out how much to charge.  It is obvious that
Mr. Caldarelli was waiting for Mrs. Caldarelli to finalize the
Maryland case and that he only filed in Georgia when that did not
happen.  Ultimately, Mrs. Caldarelli discharged Ms. Kreamer with
good reason. She then retained J. Richard Moore, Esquire to represent
her and to try to salvage something out of the mess in Georgia.
Through Mr. Moore's efforts, Mrs. Caldarelli was able to get the
house and some value from the life insurance policies.  She, however,
lost the alimony that was payable to her under the agreement and a
marital portion of Mr. Caldarelli 's pension.  Her loss of these things
was a direct result of Ms. Kreamer's abominable handling of her case.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
By clear and convincing evidence, Ms. Kreamer violated the
rules of professional conduct as charged by Petitioner.  She
incompetently represented Mrs. Caldarelli in violation of Rule 1.1 by
not exhibiting the thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary
for the representation, by her failure to move to strike the Answer
prepared by the Georgia lawyer in the Maryland case; by not moving
forward with the Maryland case; by preparing a pro se Answer for
Mrs. Caldarelli to file in the Georgia proceedings without any
consideration or research as to the effect of such a filing and by failing
to do anything on Mrs. Caldarelli's behalf after she found out that the
Georgia divorce had been granted.
Ms. Kreamer violated Rule 1.2 by failing to abide by Mrs.
Caldarelli's objectives in the representation which was to move the
Maryland case forward.  Recall that the case had already been filed
pro se in Maryland months before her retention of Ms. Kreamer.
There was a Property and  Separation Agreement in place and
everything had been worked out.
Ms. Kreamer's failure to purse the Maryland matter on Mrs.
Caldarelli's behalf upon being retained in March of 2003,
demonstrates a clear lack of diligence on her part in violation of Rule
1.3. 
Ms. Kreamer violated Rule 1.4 by failing to provide Mrs.
Caldarelli with accurate billing statements during the representation.
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Ms. Kreamer violated Rule 1.5 by unreasonably charging Mrs.
Caldarelli for things which are part of normal overhead such as file
organization and accounting. 
I additionally find by clear and convincing evidence that Ms.
Kreamer violated Rule 8.4(c) when she misrepresented that her
representation of Mrs. Caldarelli did not begin until July 3, 2003 when
she had previously accepted the retainer fee, withdrawn a portion of
it as a non-refundable engagement fee and had received all of the
documents that Mrs. Caldarelli had.  Her neglect of Mrs. Caldarelli's
case and lack of competence as well as her misrepresentations is also
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule
8.4(d).
(Internal record citations and footnote omitted.)
Respondent raises two exceptions to the hearing judge’s factual findings.  First,
Respondent excepts to the judge’s finding that “[i]t defies belief for [Respondent] to allege
that she did not consider herself representing Mrs. Caldarelli until after July of 2003.”
Respondent contends that while “it may well have been wiser for Respondent to have
refrained until after receipt of a copy of the contract signed by Mrs. Caldarelli before
withdrawing the ‘engagement fee’ portion of the retainer . . . , the withdrawal does not do
away with the need for Mrs. Caldarelli’s signature to create a viable contract in this
instance.”  In other words, Respondent claims that her attorney-client relationship with Mrs.
Caldarelli did not begin until Mrs. Caldarelli signed the retainer agreement on July 3, 2003.
We overrule this exception. 
An attorney-client relationship is formed when:
1) a person manifests to a lawyer the person's intent that the lawyer
provide legal services for the person; and . . . 
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(b) the lawyer fails to manifest lack of consent to do so, and the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person reasonably
relies on the lawyer to provide the services.
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Brooke, 374 Md. 155, 174, 821 A.2d 414, 425 (2003)
(quoting Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 14 (2000)); accord Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Siskind, 401 Md. 41, 72, 930 A.2d 328, 346 (2007)). “An
attorney-client relationship [ ] does not require an explicit agreement.”  Brooke, 374 Md. at
175, 821 A.2d at 425.  Rather, “[t]he relationship may arise by implication from a client's
reasonable expectation of legal representation and the attorney's failure to dispel those
expectations.”  Id.  In the case sub judice, Mrs. Caldarelli manifested her intent that
Respondent provide legal services in Mrs. Caldarelli’s divorce, on or about March 25, 2004,
by (1) handing over to Respondent the documents and papers necessary to the representation,
and (2) remitting the $1,300.00 retainer fee.  While the written retainer agreement was not
signed by Mrs. Caldarelli until July 3, 2003, Mrs. Caldarelli clearly expressed her desire to
have Respondent provide her legal representation in March 2003.  Respondent’s actions in
the acceptance of the papers and fees manifest Respondent’s intent to provide legal
representation to Mrs. Caldarelli.  In addition, Respondent’s withdrawal of the $600 non-
refundable engagement fee on April 14, 2003, further evidences Respondent’s intent to
provide Mrs. Caldarelli legal representation.  Therefore, we hold that the hearing judge was
correct in finding that Respondent had established an attorney-client relationship prior to July
3, 2003. 
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Respondent next excepts to what the Respondent perceives as “attribution to her of
responsibility for activities and events which were initiated and/or occurred long before her
relationship with Mrs. Caldarelli.”  Respondent complains that “[i]t was not [R]espondent
who created all the problems that Mrs. Caldarelli had when she first approached
Respondent.”  Respondent states that she was not the one “who permitted Mrs. Caldarelli’s
deteriorated martial situation to languish, literally for years, without any effective measures
being undertaken;”  who “lost or misplaced a Separation and Property Settlement Agreement
that had been reached between Mrs. Caldarelli and her husband;” or, “who failed to record
a deed for the former Caldarelli marital residence conveying Mr. Caldarelli’s interest therein
to [Mrs. Caldarelli].” 
 Respondent’s exception misses the point of the hearing judge’s findings and instead
attempts to place the responsibility on Mrs. Caldarelli for Respondent’s failure to act
appropriately on Mrs. Caldarelli’s case.  The record shows that, despite accepting Mrs.
Caldarelli’s documents and retainer fee on or about March 25, 2003, and then withdrawing
the $600 non-refundable legal engagement fee on April 14, 2003, Respondent did little to
advance Mrs. Caldarelli’s divorce through the court system.  It was not until July 22, 2003,
that Respondent entered her appearance in the pending divorce case, despite Mrs. Caldarelli
having expressed urgency in resolving the case.  At their initial meeting in March, Mrs.
Caldarelli had informed  Respondent that she had recently received correspondence from Mr.
Caldarelli’s lawyer in Georgia stating that if she did not move the divorce in Maryland
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forward, Mr. Caldarelli would seek a divorce in Georgia.  Nevertheless, Respondent did not
act upon Mrs. Caldarelli’s case.  Accordingly, the exception is overruled.
Respondent next excepts to the hearing judge’s findings that: 
Thereafter, for reasons which were never explained, Ms. Kreamer
prepared a pro se Answer for Mrs. Caldarelli to file in the Georgia
divorce case.  Ms. Kreamer does not deny preparing the pro se
Answer and giving it to Mrs. Caldarelli. Ms. Kreamer testified that
she had no idea what Mrs. Caldarelli would do with the pro se
Answer. That is simply unworthy of belief. Ms. Kreamer prepared that
pro se Answer knowing full well that Mrs. Caldarelli was going to
send it to the Georgia court. Ms. Kreamer did no research on Georgia
law and did not even consider any effect the filing of a pro se Answer
in Georgia might have on the issue of whether or not Mrs. Caldarelli
may have been consenting to the jurisdiction of the Georgia court.
Ms. Kreamer continued to do absolutely nothing.
After the pro se Answer was filed in the Georgia case, on
August 23, 2003, the Georgia court granted Mr. Caldarelli a divorce.
At no time did Ms. Kreamer attempt to look into obtaining a Georgia
lawyer to represent Mrs. Caldarelli or at least for Mrs. Caldarelli to
consult.  The judgment of the Georgia court did not incorporate the
Property Settlement Agreement and in fact provided that both parties
waived any right to any present or future right of action against the
other with regard to property or debts.  After being confronted with
this fait accompli in Georgia, Ms. Kreamer compounded the problem
by preparing and giving to Mrs. Caldarelli a pro se "Motion to Vacate
the Judgment of Divorce" which Mrs. Caldarelli filed in the Georgia
case.
(Internal record citations omitted.)   Respondent claims these findings are in error because
“it is undisputed that [Respondent] promptly told Mrs. Caldarelli that she needed a lawyer
in Georgia.”  Respondent contends that she should not be held responsible for Mrs.
Caldarelli’s failure to obtain legal representation  in Georgia.  Respondent’s exception again
misses the point of the hearing judge’s factual findings.  The hearing judge simply stated that
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he did not believe  Respondent’s testimony that she did not know that Mrs. Caldarelli would
file the pro se Answer in Georgia when she prepared and gave the document to Mrs.
Caldarelli.  As we have previously stated, the hearing judge  “may elect to pick and choose
which evidence to rely upon.” Harris, 403 Md. at 158, 939 A.2d at 742.  In this case, the
hearing judge did not believe Respondent’s version of events.  The exception, therefore, is
overruled.
Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that Respondent sought a hearing
in the Circuit Court for Harford County in order to take testimony with regard to the divorce
complaint filed in that court without disclosing to the Court the existence of the Georgia
divorce decree.  Respondent contends that her “action in requesting a hearing in the
Maryland divorce case is hardly inexplicable” as “she was trying to challenge the Georgia
divorce in Maryland.”  She argues that while such action “may not have been the most
appropriate way to accomplish what she sought to do, . . . and maybe a tactical error, [ ] it
should not be held to constitute unethical behavior.”  Respondent’s exception does not
address the underlying factual finding; rather, it attempts to justify her decision to request a
circuit court hearing after a Georgia court had issued a divorce decree, terminating the
Caldarelli’s marriage.  Thus, the exception is overruled.
Respondent next excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that “[t]he Separation and
Property Settlement Agreement that Mrs. Caldarelli and Mr. Caldarelli had entered into and
which clearly had been filed in the Harford County case and would have been, without
-36-
objection, incorporated but not merged in a Maryland judgment, gave Mrs. Caldarelli certain
benefits including alimony, the value of some life insurance policies, her marital portion of
Mr. Caldarelli's pension and the marital home.”  Specifically, Respondent excepts to the
hearing judge’s use of the phrase “gave Caldarelli certain benefits,” claiming that “it appears
to be an expression of the hearing judge’s opinion or prediction as to what the lower court
would have done with respect to certain provisions of the Caldarelli settlement agreement,
rather than a factual finding.”  The duty of the hearing judge in attorney grievance cases is
to consider the evidence placed before him or her and render an opinion regarding the factual
findings and conclusions of law in that case.  The hearing judge did just that in this case.  We
overrule this exception. 
Last, Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s use of the adjective “abominable”
when referring to Respondent’s handling of the case.  Respondent complains that the
disparaging adjective would tend to put Respondent in an unfavorable light.   In the instant
case, we do not find the hearing judge’s use of “abominable” to be inappropriate or
unreasonable.  In the instant case, Mrs. Caldarelli lost alimony and the martial portion of her
husband’s pension as a result of Respondent’s failure to represent Mrs. Caldarelli in a
competent fashion.  Under the circumstances, the hearing judge’s characterization of
Respondent’s handling of Mrs. Caldarelli’s affairs is both reasonable and consistent with the
facts.  We overrule this exception. 
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VI.
THE COMPLAINT OF MICHAEL D. BOONE
As to the complaint of Michael D. Boone, the hearing judge made the following
findings of fact and conclusions of law:
In the Boone matter, Respondent is charged with violating
Rules 1.1,1.3, 1.4,1.16 and 8.4. 
FINDINGS OF FACT
On May 12,2003, Mr. Boone retained Ms. Kreamer to
represent him in a separation and divorce matter.  He paid Ms.
Kreamer a $2,000.00 retainer of which $600.00 was considered to be
a non-refundable engagement fee.  Thereafter he was to be charged at
the rate of $150.00 per hour plus expenses.  Mr. Boone was to be
billed on a "monthly or quarterly basis as applicable" recapping the
services rendered and expenses advanced.  Ms. Kreamer agreed that
she would make every effort to expedite Mr. Boone's case promptly
and efficiently “according to the highest legal and ethical standards.”
Despite his inquiries, during Ms. Kreamer's representation of Mr.
Boone between May 12, 2003 and March of 2004, he never received
a billing statement.
A Master's Hearing was scheduled for January 22, 2004 at 9:00
a.m. Mr. Boone was present.  Ms. Kreamer, however, failed to appear
in a timely fashion for the Master's Hearing.  She later appeared 30
minutes late.  Her explanation for not appearing timely was that she
was involved in another domestic matter which had been scheduled
for that same morning but which Ms. Kreamer thought was scheduled
for the afternoon. 
On June 12, 2004, Judge Carr issued an Order fixing child
support and a wage lien against Mr. Boone in the amount of $3,000.00
per month.  Mr. Boone had no prior knowledge of that Order and in
fact learned of it from his estranged wife.  Ms. Kreamer did not
provide a copy of the Order to Mr. Boone until September 9, 2004.
He had no idea that the matter was before Judge Carr and was not told
by Ms. Kreamer.  In the interim, between Judge Carr's Order of June
12, 2004 and Mr. Boone's receipt of a copy of the Order on September
9, 2004, he left several messages for Ms. Kreamer asking her to
contact him but none were returned. 
There was some exchange between Mr. Boone and Ms.
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Kreamer and Mrs. Boone and her attorney concerning a possible
settlement.  For reasons which Ms. Kreamer could not explain,
without consulting or reviewing the matter with Mr. Boone, Ms.
Kreamer submitted a proposed Property and Separation Agreement to
opposing counsel.
There was a conference scheduled before Judge Whitfill on
August 11, 2004.  Even though she was still counsel of record, Ms.
Kreamer failed to appear. Mr. Boone appeared pro se.  In point of
fact, Mr. Boone was so disgusted with Ms. Kreamer's actions that he
decided to go to the August 11th conference on his own.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
By clear and convincing evidence, I find that Ms. Kreamer
violated the rules of professional conduct as charged.  She
incompetently represented Mr. Boone in violation of Rule 1.1 by not
exhibiting thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for
representation of Mr. Boone by her failure to timely appear for the
Master's hearing; by failing to advise Mr .Boone of Judge Carr's Order
of June 12, 2004; and by failing to appear at the conference before
Judge Whitfill on August 11, 2004 even though she was still counsel
of record.
In addition, Ms. Kreamer's failure to advise Mr. Boone of
Judge Carr's Order of June 12, 2004, for over three months
demonstrates an appalling lack of diligence in violation of Rule 1.3.
She violated Rule 1.4 by her failure to communicate with Mr.
Boone and keep him informed of the status of the matter, despite Mr.
Boone' s efforts to find out and discuss with Ms. Kreamer the Order
of June 12, 2004, which he learned from his wife.  Further, throughout
the representation, Ms. Kreamer did not provide Mr. Boone with
billing statements on how his retainer was being used.
She violated Rule 1.16(d) by failing to appear at the August 11,
2004 hearing.  She was still counsel of record at that time and had a
duty to appear in court, having been given appropriate notification.
Additionally, her failure to appear in court; her failure to
communicate with Mr. Boone concerning the Order for three months;
and her failure to consult and discuss with Mr. Boone any settlement
proposal before submitting it to opposing counsel was clearly conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4( d).
(Internal record citations omitted.) 
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Respondent first excepts to the hearing judge’s findings that 
A Master's Hearing was scheduled for January 22, 2004 at 9:00 a.m.
Mr. Boone was present. Ms. Kreamer, however, failed to appear in a
timely fashion for the Master's Hearing. She later appeared 30 minutes
late. Her explanation for not appearing timely was that she was
involved in another domestic matter which had been scheduled for
that same morning but which Ms. Kreamer thought was scheduled for
the afternoon. 
Respondent contends that while she was late in arriving at the Master’s hearing on January
22, 2004, because of her confusion over her hearing schedule for that day, she “does not
believe her lateness in any way occasioned any detriment to her client.” Respondent points
out that “[a]t the close of the hearing[,] the [M]aster complimented both counsel for their
presentations.”  Respondent’s exception does not address the factual finding of the hearing
judge; rather, the exception attempts to explain why Respondent’s lateness did not amount
to a violation of Rule 1.1 (Competence).  In fact, Respondent admits to arriving late at the
pre-trial conference on January 22, 2004.  Thus, we overrule the exception. 
Next, Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that Respondent did not
inform Mr. Boone about the June 12, 2004, Order fixing child support and entry of a wage
lien against him in the amount of $3,000.00 per month.  Respondent contends that she
attempted to inform Mr. Boone of the Order in a series of letters dated June 29, July 19, 23,
28, and August 3 and 25, 2004, but that Mr. Boone would not respond to her efforts to
communicate with him. Respondent claims that the court file contains this above-mentioned
correspondence.  It is clear from the opinion that the hearing judge did not believe
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Respondent’s version of the events concerning the June 12, 2004, Order.  Again, it is within
the hearing judge’s province to pick and choose the evidence to believe. The hearing judge
was not required to rely upon the testimony of Respondent.  In this case, the hearing judge
did not believe that Respondent informed or attempted to inform Mr. Boone of the child
support order.  In addition, a review of the record discloses only one letter from Respondent
to Mr. Boone, dated August 25, 2004.  We, therefore, overrule the exception.
Respondent next excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that Respondent, without
consulting or informing Mr. Boone, submitted a proposed Property and Settlement
Agreement to Mrs. Boone and her counsel.  Respondent contends that “[i]f in fact
Respondent submitted to opposing counsel a proposal of which Mr. Boone was not made
aware, the record does not establish that Mr. Boone thereby was adversely affected in any
way.”  Respondent’s exception does not address the factual finding.  The hearing judge did
not make any findings as to whether Mr. Boone was adversely affected by Respondent’s
actions.  Rather, the hearing judge found that Respondent submitted a proposal to opposing
counsel without informing or consulting with Mr. Boone.  Respondent’s explanation does
not contradict this factual finding.  The exception is overruled.
Last, Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that she failed to appear at the
August 11, 2004, conference even though she was still counsel of record.  Respondent
contends that the record indicates that “Mr. Boone had effectively discharged her prior to the
August 11, 2004, conference.”  Respondent’s exception is overruled.  On August 11, 2004,
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Respondent was still counsel of record for Mr. Boone.  The hearing judge made no findings
that Mr. Boone terminated his relationship with Respondent prior to August 11, 2004.  If
Respondent believed that Mr. Boone effectively terminated the attorney-client relationship
prior to August 11, 2004, Respondent should have moved to strike her appearance as his
counsel, prior to the hearing.  She failed to do so.  
VII.
THE COMPLAINT OF PATRICIA GOODWIN
As to the complaint of Patricia Goodwin, the hearing judge made the following
findings of fact and conclusions of law:
With regard to the matter of Patricia Goodwin, Ms. Kreamer
is charged with violating Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 3.3, 8.1, and 8.4.
FINDINGS OF FACT
At the outset it should be noted that the testimony of Mrs.
Goodwin was done by virtue of a de bene esse deposition taken on
June 26, 2007, after appropriate notice.  My findings of fact herein are
based not just on the documents presented, but also the testimony of
Mrs. Goodwin as reflected in her deposition. Mrs. Goodwin is
disabled and cannot drive.  In addition, her husband is very ill.  Mrs.
Goodwin appeared in this court on one of the prior hearing dates
which was continued but could not appear for the rescheduled trial
which began on August 13, 2007 because of her medical condition
and her husband's medical condition. 
On November 2, 2000, Mrs. Goodwin retained Ms. Kreamer
to handle her divorce case.  She paid Ms. Kreamer a retainer of
$650.00 of which $260.00 was considered to be a non-refundable
engagement fee.  Mrs. Goodwin was to be billed on an hourly basis at
the rate of $130.00.  Ms. Kreamer was to submit bills to Mrs.
Goodwin on a monthly or quarterly basis and agreed to “make every
effort to expedite client's case promptly and efficiently according to
the highest legal and ethical standards”.
On November 15, 2000, Ms. Kreamer filed a Complaint for
Absolute Divorce on behalf of Mrs. Goodwin in the Circuit Court for
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Cecil County.  Mr. Goodwin was served on February 13, 2001.  In
March of 2001, Ms. Kreamer prepared a request for Order of Default
to file in the Circuit Court for Cecil County.  However, the request for
Order of Default was never filed with the court by Ms. Kreamer.
When Mrs. Goodwin inquired of Ms. Kreamer as to the status of the
request for Order of Default, Ms. Kreamer misrepresented to her that
she was “waiting on the judge to sign it”.  Not being satisfied with
that explanation, Mrs. Goodwin contacted the Circuit Court for Cecil
County and learned that the Order of Default had never been filed.
When Mrs. Goodwin confronted Ms. Kreamer about why the Order
of Default had never been filed with the court, instead of giving her
a direct answer that she had simply neglected to do it, Ms. Kreamer
told Mrs. Goodwin that another request had to be filed because, as
Ms. Kreamer put it, the date on the March 2001 request was too old.
Instead of immediately proceeding with the Request for Order of
Default, Ms. Kreamer did nothing until August 7, 2001, when she
prepared a second Request for Order of Default.  However, she did
not file that Request for Order of Default with the court until seven
months later on March 13, 2002.
Ms. Kreamer's explanation as to why she was so dilatory in
filing the requests for Orders of Default was that she “wanted to wait”
to see if Mr. Goodwin would sign over his interest in the marital home
to Mrs. Goodwin.  However, that explanation was clearly contradicted
by Mrs. Goodwin as it was paramount to Mrs. Goodwin that the
matter move along promptly so that the matter of the residence could
be resolved.  Ms. Kreamer had to have known that Mr. Goodwin had
been served when she prepared the March 2001 Request for Default.
She later tried to explain that in August of 200l, when she prepared
the second Order of Default, she contacted the court to find out if Mr.
Goodwin had been served.  When she was questioned as to why she
could prepare an Order of Default in March of 200l which, of course,
would require that the Defendant had been served and then turn
around later to find out whether the Defendant had been served, Ms.
Kreamer described it as that she could prepare all the documents
necessary at the beginning of the representation.  That is clearly an
explanation that is unworthy of belief.  Again, when asked why she
choose to prepare a second Order of Default, Ms. Kreamer testified
that she did so because she simply choose to.  Again it must be kept
in mind that even the second Order of Default was not filed until
March 13, 2002.
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Ms. Kreamer's attempted explanation that she held off filing an
Order of Default until March of 2002, that she was trying to get Mr.
Goodwin to sign over the home to Mrs. Goodwin is simply not true.
Ms. Kreamer also testified that she was under the impression that the
parties had reconciled.  That is clearly not true.  On March 14, 2002,
the day after she ultimately filed an Order of Default, she sent a letter
to Mrs. Goodwin explaining that she had “misunderstood” that the
parties had reconciled.  The credible testimony was that there was
never any reconciliation or discussion of reconciliation between Mr.
Goodwin and Mrs. Goodwin since they separated in October of 1999.
While it is true they may have had some incidental contact, there was
clearly never any reconciliation and Ms. Kreamer took no steps to
determine if that was true.  It is also a mystery as to why she even felt
there had been a reconciliation.
One of Mrs. Goodwin's primary concerns was to get the former
marital residence in her name.  A deed to accomplish this was
prepared by Respondent.  On October 14, 2003, the Goodwins
executed the deed conveying Mr. Goodwin' s interest in the marital
home to Mrs. Goodwin.  The Goodwins then took the deed, prepared
by Respondent, to a bank in Rising Sun, Maryland to have it
notarized. The notary did not sign as a witness to either of the
Goodwins' signatures.  Nevertheless, by letter of October 17, 2003,
Mrs. Goodwin sent the deed to Respondent along with a check in the
amount of $275.00 for the preparation of the deed and the cost of
recording.  The Respondent deposited the $275.00 check in her
escrow account on October 22, 2003.  Sometime thereafter, the
Respondent signed as having witnessed both of the Goodwins'
signatures even though she was not present when the deed was
executed.  A substantial period of time passed and ultimately Mrs.
Goodwin contacted Ms. Kreamer to see why the matter had not moved
forward.  In response to her inquiry, Ms. Kreamer told Mrs. Goodwin
that she had not recorded the deed because she had not actually
witnessed them executing the deed and would “get in trouble”.  Ms.
Kreamer told Mrs. Goodwin that another deed would have to be
prepared and executed. Mrs. Goodwin did not receive the "new" deed
to be re-executed by her and her husband until May of 2004.
Ms. Kreamer also told Mrs. Goodwin that not only would the
deed have to be re-executed but that she would need Mr. and Mrs.
Goodwin to execute an exemption certificate to save on recordation
costs. The exemption certificate required Mrs. Goodwin to attest
-44-
under oath that the property would be her principal residence.  There
was in fact no reason for this as the deed was for no consideration
because it was a transfer between spouses and no transfer tax would
be due.  Ms. Kreamer's suggestion that the matter was additionally
delayed because of this Affidavit is simply not credible.  In addition,
Ms. Kreamer knew at the time that Mrs. Goodwin was not living at
that residence and intended to sell it.  Nevertheless, she told Mrs.
Goodwin that such an Affidavit would have to be executed.
Although Ms. Kreamer had prepared another deed, the deed
actually recorded was the first one that had been executed on October
14, 2003.  The deed was not recorded until June 24, 2004 and was
recorded bearing Ms. Kreamer's signature as a witness to the
Goodwins' signatures. Ms. Kreamer's explanation for this was that she
had signed on the wrong line because she is left handed is simply not
credible.
During the time that Ms. Kreamer represented Mrs. Goodwin,
Mrs. Goodwin continually asked Ms. Kreamer for the status of the
divorce matter.  Ms. Kreamer never responded or gave an accurate
answer to Mrs. Goodwin as to why she had never filed the Request for
Order of Default that had been prepared in March of 2001.  In
addition she failed to timely file the second Order of Default in
August of 2001 and likewise failed to respond to Mrs. Goodwin's
request concerning the progress and status of the case.  Ms. Kreamer
also did not timely respond to M rs. Goodwin' s continuing inquiries
as to why the deeds concerning the transfer of the residence had never
been recorded.  Ms. Kreamer also failed to communicate with Mrs.
Goodwin regarding the cancellation of her scheduled hearing.  Mrs.
Goodwin went to the Circuit Court on April 17, 2002 with her mother
as a witness thinking there would be a hearing on the divorce.
Actually the hearing had been cancelled, but Ms. Kreamer never
advised Mrs. Goodwin that it had been cancelled.  Ms. Kreamer's
billings statements show that on April 15, 2002, she called to cancel
the Master's Hearing, however, there is no corresponding
contemporaneous entry that she notified Mrs. Goodwin of that fact.
Ms. Kreamer's own billing statements reflect that on April 17 , 2002,
she in fact got a call from Mrs. Goodwin inquiring as to what
happened with regard to the hearing.
Throughout the some three and one half years that Ms.
Kreamer represented Mrs. Goodwin, she did not submit periodic
billings statements.  The first billing statement that Mrs. Goodwin
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received was dated May 27, 2004, showing a balance due of
$1,627.32. On June 23, 2004, Ms. Kreamer submitted to Mrs.
Goodwin a second invoice which purported to list exactly how much
time was spent for each task.  A careful review of the June 23, 2004
invoice sent by Ms. Kreamer shows several breaks in her
representation of Mrs. Goodwin.  Specifically there was a two month
break between November 15, 2000 and January 10, 2001; a four
month break between March 30, 2001 and August 1, 2001; a four
month break between October 16, 2001 and February 14, 2002; a
three month break between September 20, 2002 and December 10,
2002; a ten month break between January 3, 2003 and October 1,
2003; and a two month break between October 22, 2003, the date she
deposited the $275.00 check in her escrow account for the deed, and
December 19, 2003.  Thereafter there was another five month break
between December 19, 2003 and May 5, 2004, when Ms. Kreamer
finally called Mrs. Goodwin concerning the residence Affidavit that
she insisted had to be executed in order to record the October 14, 2003
deed. 
A careful review of Ms. Kreamer's June 23, 2004, invoice to
Mrs. Goodwin shows that Ms. Kreamer charged Mrs. Goodwin for
accounting services which Ms. Kreamer described as “having an
employee of hers or herself figure out how much time she had spent
representing Mrs. Goodwin.”  She did not keep separate time sheets
for Mrs. Goodwin.  She tried to construct bills from notations she
made in calendars.  For example, she billed Mrs. Goodwin for 35
minutes on October 4, 2004 for accounting.  She included in that
notation attempts to call clients or letters to client but, when asked for
a break down, she was unable to provide it because she did not have
contemporaneous records.  She did the same thing to Mrs. Goodwin
on March 12, 2002 and April 4, 2004, billing her a total of an hour
and five minutes for accounting.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
By her conduct in the Goodwin matter, I find by clear and
convincing evidence that Ms. Kreamer violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4,
and 8.4(a), (c) and (d). It should be noted that Bar Counsel withdrew
the allegations concerning Rules 3.3 and 8.1
Ms. Kreamer incompetently represented Mrs. Goodwin in
violation of Rule 1.1 by not exhibiting the thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation by her failure
to understand what was required in order to transfer the marital home
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to Mrs. Goodwin.  Ms. Kreamer lacked any comprehension about the
fact that the deed was for no consideration because it was an
inter-spousal transfer and that no transfer of taxes would be due.  Ms.
Kreamer insisted that the signatures on the deed were no good and the
deed would have to be re-executed when in fact it had already been
notarized.  She failed to file the March 2001 Request for Order of
Default and the August 2001 Request for Order of Default in any kind
of a timely fashion.  This clearly demonstrates a lack of diligence in
violation of Rule 1.3.
Ms. Kreamer violated Rule 1.4 by failing to maintain
communication with Mrs. Goodwin throughout the representation
concerning the progress of her case and failing to respond to Mrs.
Goodwin's inquiries.  She also failed to advise Mrs. Goodwin
concerning the Master's Hearing which was scheduled for April 17,
2002 and failing to advise her in a timely manner concerning the
situation concerning the deed.  She also failed to submit regular
billings statements to Mrs. Goodwin throughout the representation
even though she was obligated to do so.
She also clearly violated Rule 8.4(c) when she deliberately
misrepresented to Mrs. Goodwin that she was "waiting on a judge to
sign" the March 2001 Request for Order of Default when in fact it had
never been filed.  Her lack of diligence and competence, as well as her
misrepresentations to Mrs. Goodwin, also amount to conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(d).
Respondent submits nine exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings as to Mrs.
Goodwin’s complaint, several of which we shall combine and address togther.
First, Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that she was dilatory in filing
requests for an order of default on behalf of Mrs. Goodwin.  Respondent contends that the
delay in filing the requests for an order of default was not due to her, but rather due to
instructions from Mrs. Goodwin “to refrain from doing anything that might cause Mr.
Goodwin to change his mind” regarding the conveyance of the marital home to Mrs.
Goodwin.  Respondent states: “It took [Respondent] substantial time and effort . . . to even
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send a copy of a default request to Mr. Goodwin and to tell him it would be filed, if he did
not carry out his agreement.” We shall overrule Respondent’s exception. As we have
previously stated and as Respondent points out in her exception, the hearing judge “is
empowered to pick and choose whom and what he will or will not believe and he need not
explain his decision in those regards.” In the instant matter, the hearing judge considered and
accepted the testimony of Mrs. Goodwin over Respondent’s version of the events. 
Next, Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that Respondent signed the
Goodwins’ deed as a witness to either of the Goodwins’ signatures.  The hearing judge stated
that Respondent’s “explanation . . . that she had signed on the wrong line because she is left-
handed is simply not credible.”  Respondent contends that her signature on the witness line
was accidental and her actions after her signing on the witness line support her contention.
Specifically, Respondent asserts that after mistakenly signing the witness line, she told Mrs.
Goodwin that another deed would have to be prepared and executed due to her mistake.  As
we have previously stated, it is within the province of the hearing judge to consider and either
accept or reject the evidence presented before him.  In this matter, the hearing judge did not
accept Respondent’s explanation of the error, especially in light of her knowingly filing the
deed with her signature on the witness line.  Her actions in recording the deed were
inconsistent with her statement that a new deed needed to be prepared. 
Respondent next excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that Respondent wrongly told
Mrs. Goodwin that an exemption certificate would need to be executed so that Mrs. Goodwin
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could save on recordation costs.  The hearing judge explained that there was no need for the
certificate because “the deed was for no consideration because it was a transfer between
spouses and [thus] no transfer tax was due.”  In addition, the hearing judge noted that such
an affidavit could not be used because Mrs. Goodwin was not living at that residence and
intended on selling it as soon as she received the new deed.  We overrule Respondent’s
exception. The hearing judge was correct in asserting that Respondent was wrong with regard
to the requirements for recording a deed between spouses. 
The transfer of the martial home from Mr. Goodwin to Mrs. Goodwin was exempt
from both recordation taxes and transfer taxes under Maryland Tax-Property Article §§ 12-
108 (d) and 13-207 (a)(3), respectively.  Section 12-108 (d), entitled “Transfers between
spouses,” provides:
An instrument of writing that transfers the property between spouses
or former spouses is not subject to recordation taxes. 
Md. Code (1985, 2007 Repl. Vol.).  Section 13-207 (a)(3), entitled “Exemptions parallel to
recordation tax exemptions,” provides that “[a]n instrument of writing is not subject to
transfer tax to the same extent that it is not subject to recordation taxes under[] § 12-108(d)
of this article (Transfer between spouses).”
Under the plain language of these sections, it is clear that Mrs. Goodwin did not need
to execute an affidavit professing her intent to primarily reside in the martial house to be
eligible for the transfer and recordation tax exemption. Indeed, the statutory provision
manifests no other requirement for the exemption than the current or former marriage of the
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transferor and  transferee.  Therefore, it is clear that Respondent’s legal advice concerning
the transfer of the martial home from Mr. Goodwin to Mrs. Goodwin was incorrect. 
Respondent also excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that Respondent did not keep
Mrs. Goodwin informed and provided inaccurate answers as to the status of the divorce
matter. Respondent contends that “there may have been an occasion when Respondent
overlooked reporting an item of information regarding the case, she generally kept Mrs.
Goodwin reasonably appraised of significant developments.” Respondent claims that Mrs.
Goodwin knew Respondent was holding the requests for an order of default pending Mrs.
Goodwin’s consent to file them with the Circuit Court. We have previously addressed
Respondent’s contention. The hearing judge rejected Respondent’s version of the events
concerning the filing of the request for an order of default, which was within his province
to do so.  Therefore,  the exception is overruled.
Last, Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that Respondent did not
submit periodic billing statements to Mrs. Goodwin during the course of her representation.
The hearing judge noted that, according to the retainer agreement between  Respondent and
Mrs. Goodwin, Respondent “was to submit bills to Mrs. Goodwin on a monthly or quarterly
basis.”  The hearing judge then stated the following concerning Respondent’s failure to
submit periodic billing statements to Mrs. Goodwin: 
Throughout the some three and one half years that Ms.
Kreamer represented Mrs. Goodwin, she did not submit periodic
billings statements. The first billing statement that Mrs. Goodwin
received was dated May 27, 2004, showing a balance due of
18   In addition, Respondent argues that the hearing judge should not have complained
about both Respondent’s “breaks in representation” and about Respondent’s failure to submit
statements during those “breaks.”  Respondent points out: “[I]f the intervals alluded to [by
the hearing judge] were in fact “breaks” in representation, there would seem to be no need
(continued...)
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$1,627.32. On June 23, 2004, Ms. Kreamer submitted to Mrs.
Goodwin a second invoice which purported to list exactly how much
time was spent for each task. A careful review of the June 23, 2004
invoice sent by Ms. Kreamer shows several breaks in her
representation of Mrs. Goodwin.  Specifically there was a two month
break between November 15, 2000 and January 10, 2001; a four
month break between March 30, 2001 and August 1, 2001; a four
month break between October 16, 2001 and February 14, 2002; a
three month break between September 20, 2002 and December 10,
2002; a ten month break between January 3, 2003 and October 1,
2003; and a two month break between October 22, 2003, the date she
deposited the $275.00 check in her escrow account for the deed, and
December 19, 2003.  Thereafter there was another five month break
between December 19, 2003 and May 5, 2004, when Ms. Kreamer
finally called Mrs. Goodwin concerning the residence Affidavit that
she insisted had to be executed in order to record the October 14, 2003
deed. 
Respondent contends that while she may not have submitted statements to Mrs. Goodwin as
often as the retainer agreement provided, she did submit billing statements to Mrs. Goodwin
periodically. We find that Respondent’s exception is without merit.  Respondent does not
contest the hearing judge’s findings that she did not submit billing statements as often as she
promised she would do; indeed, she admits to failing to submit billing statements to Mrs.
Goodwin as often as she had promised, according to the terms of the retainer agreement.
Respondent, however, attempts to mitigate her contractual failure by noting that she did
submit at least two billing statements during the course of the representation.18  The
18(...continued)
to submit billings” to Mrs. Goodwin.  We agree that if Respondent did not perform any
services during certain intervals, there would be no reason to issue a billing statement. This
argument, however, does not persuade us to sustain the exception because  Respondent
admits to failing to live up to her contractual obligations to issue Mrs. Goodwin either
monthly or quarterly billing statements. 
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exception is therefore overruled. 
VIII.
EXCEPTION REGARDING HEARING JUDGE’S CONCLUSION THAT
RESPONDENT’S FEES AND BILLING PRACTICES VIOLATE THE M RPC
Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that her billing practices
violated provisions of the MRPC.  The hearing judge concluded that Respondent’s practice
of billing clients for time spent completing her time sheets – what the Respondent referred
to as “accounting services” – violated MRPC 1.5.  The hearing judge opined that “[t]hese are
matters of overhead in any law office.”  Respondent contends that there is “substantial
authority to the effect that a lawyer is entitled (and in some instances even required) to
include in his or her billings time spent in determining the amount of the fee involved and
in preparing his or her request for payment.” 
The issue of whether an attorney may charge a client for “accounting services” is of
first impression in this State.  Indeed, our research indicates that no other court in this
country has published an opinion dealing with this very issue.  Moreover, the American Bar
Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide no specific guidance concerning
attorneys’ ability to charge clients separately for this service. 
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Respondent relies on five cases: Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council
for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546 (1986);  Hensley v. Eckerhard, 461 U.S. 424 (1983); White v.
New Hampshire Dep’t of Employment Services, 455 U.S. 445 (1982); Rum Creek Coal Sales,
Inc. v. Caperton, 31 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 1994); Hendrickson v.  Branstad, 934 F.2d 158 (8th
Cir. 1991).  The cases are inapposite.  They do not speak to the ability of an attorney to bill
clients directly and separately for overhead services or for time spent preparing a billing
statement.  Rather, the cases involve the awarding of attorney’s fees for work performed by
counsel during an administrative proceeding, see Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’
Council for Clean Air, supra, and the awarding of attorney’s fees pursuant to fee shifting
statutes, see  Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, supra; Hensley v. Eckerhard, supra;
White v. New Hampshire Dep’t of Employment Services, supra; Hendrickson v.  Branstad,
supra.  We begin our analysis with a review of MRPC 1.5. 
MRPC 1.5 (a) requires that an attorney charge a client reasonable fees and sets forth
various factors to be considered in determining reasonableness.  The Rule deals not only with
the determination of a reasonable hourly rate but also with the reasonableness of costs and
the total charge billed to the client.  While the Rule clearly allows attorneys to charge for
work performed during the representation and to seek reimbursement for costs of services
or expenses undertaken during the representation, we do not find it reasonable, under the
circumstances presented, for Respondent to separately charge her clients for “accounting
services.”  We view “accounting services” as an overhead expense incidental  to the practice
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of law.  As the American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility expressed in Formal Opinion 93-379, entitled “Billing for Professional Fees,
Disbursements and Other Expenses”:
When a client has engaged a lawyer to provide professional
services for a fee (whether calculated on the basis of the number of
hours expended, a flat fee, a contingent percentage of the amount
recovered or otherwise) the client would be justifiably disturbed if the
lawyer submitted a bill to the client which included, beyond the
professional fee, additional charges for general office overhead.  In
the absence of disclosure to the client in advance of the engagement
to the contrary, the client should reasonably expect that the lawyer’s
cost in maintaining a library, securing malpractice insurance, renting
of office space, purchasing utilities and the like would be subsumed
within the charges the lawyer is making for professional services.
We agree with the sentiment of the ethics opinion and the hearing judge in this matter
– absent advance disclosure to and consent of the client or special circumstances, the client
should reasonably expect that the lawyer’s costs and expenses in maintaining his or her
practice of law would be subsumed within the charges the lawyer is billing for professional
services.  In other words, the ordinary and usual costs of operating a law office – rent,
utilities, accounting and administrative services and the like – should not be individually
billed to the client, in addition to a charge for legal representation, absent some other
extenuating circumstances, which are not present in this case.  It is the attorney’s hourly rate
or case fee that constitutes the professional fee that is charged for all of the services rendered.
In addition, we believe that a lawyer’s billing practices implicate the principles of
trust and confidence which are fundamental to the legal profession.  “The lawyer’s conduct
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should be such as to promote the client’s trust of the lawyer and of the legal profession.” 
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 379 (1993).  Clients hire
attorneys to represent them in legal matters and to solve their legal problems.  Clients do not
hire attorneys with the expectation that they will be charged for the attorney’s time in
preparing a bill for the services rendered.  Administrative tasks, like accounting services, are
best left to the general services the lawyer or his/her staff provides during the representation
of the client. 
Should a lawyer wish to charge clients for overhead costs and expenses, such a
charge, including its method of calculation, ought to be explained to the client prior to the
start of representation, and expressly stated in the written retainer agreement.  Most
importantly, the client must consent in advance to the additional fees and their method of
calculation. 
In the instant matter, the record indicates that Respondent did not receive advance
consent from her clients agreeing to pay additional expenses for “accounting services.”  In
addition, the record indicates no extenuating circumstances justifying the separate charge.
We hold that the practice of charging clients for “accounting services” – that is, billing
clients for time spent completing time sheets and calculating bills therefrom – under these
circumstances, was unreasonable and a violation of MRPC 1.5.  Therefore, the exception is
overruled. 
IX.
THE HEARING JUDGE’S REFUSAL TO ALLOW THOMAS G. BODIE TO
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TESTIFY
Respondent contends that the hearing judge “improperly or improvidently refused to
allow Thomas G. Bodie, the lawyer who represented Respondent during the investigatory
phases of the six complaints,” to testify about a meeting at Bar Counsel’s office and also
improperly refused to receive into evidence a subsequent proffer as to his testimony.
Respondent intended to call Mr. Bodie to testify about a meeting between Respondent, Bar
Counsel, and Mr. Bodie concerning allegations of misconduct alleged in six different
complaints. Respondent wanted to elicit evidence concerning the unfair treatment of
Respondent by Bar Counsel.  Specifically, Respondent intended to establish that Bar Counsel
chose only to prosecute one claim of misconduct in 2005 (the Sporay case) and reserved the
remaining complaints for a later date, after Respondent had received a sanction from this
Court in the Sporay case.  We shall first set forth the series of events leading to the hearing
judge’s exclusion of Mr. Bodie’s testimony. 
 
On August 13 and 14, 2007, the hearing judge considered an objection by Bar Counsel
to Respondent calling Mr. Bodie as a witness in her case.  Bar Counsel asserted that
Respondent had not listed Mr. Bodie’s name or described his proposed testimony in her
answers to relevant interrogatories.  After hearing argument from counsel, the hearing judge
sustained the objection and forbade Respondent from calling Mr. Bodie as a witness.  The
hearing judge explained his reasoning: 
Number one, Mr. Bodie was not named in answers to interrogatories
nor in supplemental answers to interrogatories nor prior to the start of
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these proceedings was there any communication directed to Ms.
Kessler of any kind as to the purpose of calling Mr. Bodie or whatever
information Mr. Bodie may possess with regard to the subject matter
of these six things which form the basis of the petition filed by Bar
Counsel. She is therefore in the dark as to what, if any, information
Mr. Bodie may have with regard to these six clients’ complaints. . . .
Upon further inquiry by me it became clear to me that the
purpose of calling Mr. Bodie however artfully or inartfully explained
to me was to get into the record that there may have been at sometime
in the past a discussion between Mr. Bodie representing [Respondent]
and Mr. Hirschmann or an Assistant Bar Counsel concerning the
possibility of resolving in one proceeding of some kind or another all
outstanding complaints whatever they may have been in the office of
Bar Counsel at the time. And indeed everyone agrees that such a
meeting took place.  However, both parties agree there was never any
agreement and you, Mr. Lipsitz,  have told me three times since I took
the bench after the luncheon recess that there was never any such
agreement. . . . 
The hearing judge also stated that he would not allow Mr. Bodie to testify due to the rule of
evidence on testimony regarding settlement offers.  The judge explained: “To the extent [ ]
that any testimony of Mr. Bodie concerning settlement discussions between the Respondent
and office of Bar Counsel would not be admissible in this case to prove liability or
nonliability for any reason because the rule is what it is and the case rises and falls on its own
merits.”  Last, the hearing judge ruled that Mr. Bodie’s testimony would not be relevant to
the proceeding before him.  Thereafter, counsel for Respondent requested that a proffer about
Mr. Bodie’s testimony be marked for identification and placed in the file.  The hearing judge
allowed the proffer to be placed on the record.
It is well settled in Maryland that the trial judge is entrusted with the role of
administering the discovery rules and, as such, is vested with broad discretion in imposing
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sanctions when a party fails to comply with the rules.  See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Clarke, 400
Md. 39, 56, 926 A.2d 736, 746 (2007); N. River Ins. Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 343 Md. 34,
47, 680 A.2d 480, 486-87 (1996); Starfish Condo. Ass'n v. Yorkridge Serv. Corp., 295 Md.
693, 712, 458 A.2d 805, 815 (1983); Klein v. Weiss, 284 Md. 36, 56, 395 A.2d 126, 137
(1978); Mason v. Wolfing, 265 Md. 234, 236, 288 A.2d 880, 881 (1972).  We will not disturb
a trial court’s decision to impose sanctions on a party unless there has been “a clear showing
that this discretion was abused.”  Mason, 265 Md. at 235, 288 A.2d at 882.  “Thus, we
review the Circuit Court's determination of discovery sanctions under an abuse of discretion
standard.”   Clarke, 400 Md. at 57, 926 A.2d at 747 (citing N. River Ins. Co., 343 Md. at 47,
680 A.2d at 486-87; Starfish Condo. Ass'n, 295 Md. at 712, 458 A.2d at 815). 
In the case sub judice, the discovery violation stems not only from Respondent’s
failure to list Mr. Bodie in her answers to Bar Counsel’s interrogatories, but also from
Respondent’s and her counsel’s failure to make a good-faith attempt at resolving the
discovery dispute with Bar Counsel.  The hearing judge gave Respondent ample time to
provide Bar Counsel with a summary of what Mr. Bodie would testify to in the event he was
called to testify; however, Respondent failed to do so.  The hearing judge, therefore,
determined that, in light of Respondent’s failure to provide the required information to Bar
Counsel, the appropriate sanction was to preclude the testimony of Mr. Bodie. “One form of
sanction authorized by the Maryland Rules is evidence preclusion, which we have affirmed
where there has been a confluence of discovery failures related to such evidence.”  Clarke,
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400 Md. at 66, 926 A.2d at 752; Maryland Rule 2-433 (a)(2).  Respondent’s failure to furnish
Bar Counsel with Mr. Bodie’s name and expected testimony during the discovery process
and her failure to make good faith efforts at correcting the omission, considering the
exceptional leeway given by the hearing judge during the hearing, compels us to overrule this
exception. 
X.
EXCEPTION TO HEARING JUDGE’S CONCLUSION OF LAW THAT
RESPONDENT VIOLATED MRPC 8.4.
Respondent next excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusions in the section of his
opinion entitled “Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice.”  Respondent argues
that the hearing judge merely stated his personal opinion rather than entered a finding of fact
or conclusion of law.  In addition, Respondent contends that “in effect, [she] is being found
to have violated Rule 8.4 because she has been found to have violated other MRPC.” We
overrule Respondent’s exception.  The hearing judge did not conclude Respondent violated
Rule 8.4 because she was found to have violated other rules.  The hearing judge explicitly
said: “For the reasons stated in many complaints, I have found [Respondent] to have violated
by clear and convincing evidence Rule 8.4(d) Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of
Justice.”  In reviewing the basis for the hearing judge’s conclusions of law concerning the
six individual complaints, it is clear that the hearing judge had independent reasons to find
that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(d).  For example, concerning the complaint of Mr.
Dudock, the hearing judge found Respondent violated Rule 8.4(d) due to her “total lack of
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any follow through for well over one year, her failure to respond to Mr. Dudock’s inquiries,
and her failure to return the corporate books until over three months after she was asked.”
The hearing judge concluded that these actions were prejudicial to the administration of
justice.  As to the complaint of Ms. Anderson, the hearing judge found that Respondent’s
“failure to diligently pursue Ms. Anderson's Separation Agreement and divorce [and her]
unreasonably charging her for administrative overhead” as well as failing to maintain
communications with Ms. Anderson amounted to “conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(d).”  As to the complaint of Mr. Ferrara, the hearing judge
found that Respondent’s “conduct throughout the representation of Mr. Ferrara was conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(d).”  As to Mrs.
Caldarelli’s complaint, the hearing judge found that Respondent’s “neglect of Mrs.
Caldarelli’s case and lack of competence as well as her misrepresentations” amounted to
“conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, in violation of Rule 8.4(d).”  As to
Respondent’s representation of Mr. Boone, the hearing judge found that Respondent’s
“failure to appear in court; her failure to communicate with Mr. Boone concerning the Order
for three months; and, her failure to consult and discuss with Mr. Boone any settlement
proposal before submitting it to opposing counsel” amounted to “conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice.”  Last, as to Mrs. Goodwin’s complaint,  the hearing judge found
that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(d) because of “lack of diligence and competence, as well
as her misrepresentations” to the client.  Therefore, we overrule Respondent’s exception. 
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XI.
EXCEPTION TO HEARING JUDGE’S DEMEANOR DURING THE HEARING
Last, Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s demeanor during the hearing.
Specifically, Respondent complains of the hearing judge’s frequent communications directed
at her during the course of the hearing, on and off the witness stand.  Respondent contends,
citing Ricker v. Ricker, 114 Md. App. 583, 691 A.2d 283 (1997),  that 
[H]owever well intentioned the hearing judge’s exchanges with
Respondent may have been (and fully acknowledging the broad
authority allocated to him as sole factfinder in a non-jury case), . . .
the judge’s frequent interventions in the instant case may . . . readily
have had an undesirable chilling effect on Respondent’s presentation
of her evidence and could easily be taken as an indication that her
testimony was being considered by the judge as being, from early in
the hearing, at least suspect, thus again implicating an element of
potential unfairness sufficient to create a violation of the widely
recognized principle that a judicial proceeding must not only be fair,
but also give the appearance of fairness, if due process concerns are
to be avoided.
We overrule Respondent’s exception. 
As Respondent indicates in her exception, the intermediate appellate court in Ricker
v. Ricker, supra, eloquently explained the role of a judge in a trial: 
Judges, under the law, have wide latitude in the conduct of
trials and may, when necessary, interrupt and restrict attorneys in the
presentation of their cases in an attempt to assure a correct
presentation. Gerstein v. State, 10 Md. App. 322, 270 A.2d 331
(1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1009, 91 S.Ct. 2191, 29 L.Ed.2d 431
(1971). It is desirable that judges participate directly in trials: “[T]he
trial judge bears the responsibility for the orderly and fair
administration of a trial and is not to be merely regarded as a referee.”
In re J.A. & L.A., 601 A.2d 69, 76 (D.C.App.1991). Particularly in
non-jury cases, a trial judge is accorded substantial leeway in
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participating in the trial because the judge functions as a trier of fact
as well. Id.
It is often helpful to a litigant in a non-jury case to discover the
direction that the judge is leaning, or to assess the judge's evaluation
of the evidence as it is unfolding. Judges frequently do what juries
cannot do during trials and engage in colloquies with attorneys. Those
colloquies can contribute to a sharpening of the attorneys'
presentations and arguments. Participation by the court in the
questioning of witnesses or in commenting on the evidence can
promote an orderly and efficient use of court resources.
Active involvement by a judge, however, must be done
prudently. Even the most unbiased judge, by actively engaging in the
trial, runs the risk of appearing to lack objectivity and may chill the
attorney's capacity to represent the client's interest most effectively. A
judge who makes comments that devalue a litigant's presentation
midstream may not be forwarding the goals of a fair trial, but instead
may lead the restricted party to believe that the judge is unwilling to
listen. A judge who creates a courtroom atmosphere that appears
unfair to the litigants may unintentionally cause the proceeding to
become unfair. The litigants may react by abandoning a planned
strategy or line of questioning that could affect the result or the
record.  A judge's participation should not overreach and disrupt a
litigant's development of the evidence. Such behavior can transcend
the bounds of proper judicial conduct and can go so far as to deprive
a litigant of the right to a fair trial. Western Maryland Dairy
Corporation, et al. v. Brown, 169 Md. 257, 266, 181 A. 468 (1935).
114 Md. App. 594-95, 691 A.2d 288-89.  In the instant case, we are asked to determine
whether Respondent was  harmed in any way due to the hearing judge’s conduct.  In order
for Respondent to prevail, she must “show some nexus between the alleged improper
comment[s or conduct] and the course of the trial.”  Ricker, 114 Md. App. at 599, 691 A.2d
at 291.  Respondent, however, points to no specific comments in the record for us to review.
Therefore, we overrule the exception.
SANCTION
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Having concluded that Respondent violated Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.16, 8.4 (a),
(c), and (d), we must determine the proper sanction.  Respondent contends that no further
sanction beyond that given in the previous attorney grievance case - Attorney Grievance
Comm’n  v. Kreamer, 387 Md. 503, 876 A.2d 79 (2005) -  is necessary as “Respondent . . .
has already remained indefinitely suspended for more than several years beyond the earliest
date when she could have reapplied.”  Respondent, nonetheless, recommends that the Court
direct her to re-enroll in a remediation program.  She explains: “A strong remedial program,
with appropriate safeguarding conditions should suffice to cure whatever may have been
ailing Respondent and to restore her to service as a practicing lawyer who will be a credit to
the Bar and to herself.”  In the alternative, Respondent suggests that if the Court deems a
period of suspension necessary, the suspension “should be for an interval not greater than the
indefinite suspension awarded in the [prior attorney grievance case,] should include the same
provision for reapplication and should be dated to begin on the same date that [her previous]
indefinite suspension began.”
Bar Counsel recommends disbarment.  In support of this recommendation, Bar
Counsel points to the hearing judge’s finding that Respondent “committed violations of the
Rules of Professional Conduct in connection with her representation of six (6) separate
clients.”  Bar Counsel specifically points out Respondent’s failure to competently and
diligently represent her clients, her misrepresentations to both Mr. Ferrara and Mrs.
Goodwin, and the improper billing of several clients for “accounting services.”  Bar Counsel
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then recounts Respondent’s misconduct as to each of the six complaints.  Finally, Bar
Counsel notes:
The Respondent is unwilling to change the way she practices
and instead of taking responsibility for her actions/inactions, places
the blame on others. The Respondent’s conduct in these six (6)
separate matters is repetitive of prior misconduct for which this Court
has issued sanctions. It appears that the Respondent’s prior three
sanctions by this Court and two year monitor has not caused the
Respondent to improve her practice.  Petitioner submits to this Court
that the Respondent has evidenced, by her actions, a sufficient and
persistent disregard for the Court’s, her clients’ best interest and the
public. Therefore, a disbarment in this matter is necessary to protect
the public from future harm. 
In the previous attorney grievance case involving Respondent, we set forth the
important principles that this Court must adhere to when devising a sanction for an offending
attorney:
[O]ur goal in attorney discipline matters is “to protect the public and
the public’s confidence in the legal profession rather than to punish
the attorney.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Christopher, 383 Md.
624, 639, 861 A.2d 692, 701 (2004). Protecting the integrity of the
legal profession and “deter[ing] other lawyers from engaging in
violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct,” are also reasons for
sanctioning attorneys who violate the rules. Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Cassidy, 362 Md. 689, 698, 766 A.2d 632, 637 (2001).
“Determining the appropriate sanction requires the Court to consider
the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including
consideration of any mitigating factors.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n
v. Post, 379 Md. 60, 71, 839 A.2d 718, 724 (2003). In addition, “‘the
nature and gravity of the violations and the intent with which they
were committed’” are relevant considerations. Id. (quoting Attorney
Grievance Comm’n [ ] v. Awuah, 346 Md. 420, 435, 697 A.2d 446,
454 (1997)). We also have considered “the attorney’s prior grievance
history . . . the attorney’s remorse for the misconduct, and the
likelihood of the conduct being repeated.” Post, 379 Md. at 71 , 839
19 This Court reinstated Respondent on June 10, 1999, and required that she practice
under the supervision of a monitor for two years. 
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A.2d at 724-72 5 (citations omitted).  As stated in Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Monfried, 368 Md. 373, 794 A.2d 92 (2002), to determine
an appropriate sanction we will, examine 
the nature of the misconduct, the lawyer’s state of mind which
underlies the misconduct, actual or potential injury flowing from
the misconduct, the duty of this Court to preserve the integrity
of the profession, the risk to the public in allowing the
respondent to continue in practice, and any mitigating or
aggravating factors. 
Monfried, 368 Md. at 396, 794 A.2d at 105.
Attorney Grievance Comm’n  v. Kreamer, 387 Md. 503, 533-34, 876 A.2d 79, 97-98 (2005).
Respondent has previously been the subject of disciplinary proceedings; indeed, this is
Respondent’s fourth interaction with the Attorney Grievance Commission.  On February 2,
1999, this Court indefinitely suspended Respondent for failing to communicate with her
clients and Bar Counsel, failing to deposit unearned fees  into escrow, and misrepresenting
the status of client matters.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kreamer, 353 Md. 85, 724 A.2d
666 (1999).  On November 19, 2002, Respondent was issued a public reprimand for not
acting with diligence regarding a guardianship matter. 19  Thereafter, on June 21, 2005, this
Court indefinitely suspended Respondent from the practice of law for violations of Rules 1.3,
1.4, 1.15, 1.16, 8.1, Maryland Rule 16-609, and § 10-306 of the Business and Occupations
Article of the Maryland Code.  Kreamer, 387 Md. at 538,  876 A.2d at 100.  In large part, we
found that Respondent had failed to communicate with her client, failed to represent the
client in a diligent manner, and failed to maintain proper bookkeeping practices.  As
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Respondent has asserted, she has not been reinstated to the practice of law since her 2005
indefinite suspension.
“An attorney’s prior disciplinary history  is among the factors this Court considers in
determining the appropriate sanction for misconduct.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mba-
Jones, 402 Md. 334, 346, 936 A.2d 839, 846 (2007); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n
v. Sapero, 400 Md. 461, 490, 929 A.2d 483, 501 (2007); Attorney Grievance Comm’n  v.
Hill, 398 Md. 95, 103, 919 A.2d 1194, 1198 (2007). We note that, in the present matter, the
disciplinary violations are substantially similar to those in Respondent’s previous attorney
grievance cases, especially the most recent 2005 case.  We take into consideration that, to a
certain extent, the time periods of the misconduct involved in the present matter and in the
2005 attorney grievance case overlap.  In this case, a discussion between the hearing judge,
Respondent’s counsel and Bar Counsel at the Circuit Court hearing indicates that the six
present complaints were not fully investigated by Bar Counsel at the time the petition for
disciplinary action, stemming from her misconduct in the representation of Benchamas D.
Sporay, was filed against Respondent.  Ordinarily, given the overlap in the time period and
the substantially similar violations involved, it would not be unreasonable to consider
Respondent’s violations in the six present complaints as a continuation of the misconduct that
lead to her indefinite suspension in 2005.  The instant complaints against Respondent,
however, involve more serious violations, Rules 8.4 (c) and (d), which reflect adversely upon
20 In the instant matter, the hearing judge found that Respondent violated Rules 8.4
(c) and (d) in her representation of Mr. Dudock, Mr. Ferrara, Mrs. Caldarelli, and Mrs.
Goodwin. The hearing judge found a violation of Rule 8.4 (d) with regard to Respondent’s
representation of Mrs. Anderson and  Mr. Boone. 
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Respondent’s fitness to practice law.20 
In addition, we consider “the nature and gravity of the violations and the intent with
which they were committed” when devising a sanction for an offending attorney. Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Robertson, 400 Md. 618, 642, 929 A.2d 576, 590 (2007); Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Awuah, 346 Md. 420, 435, 697 A.2d 446, 454 (1997).  In all six
complaints, Respondent accepted fees and then failed to represent her clients competently
or diligently.  In addition, Respondent billed clients separately for accounting services that
are customarily a part of the operating costs of a law practice, something that should not be
billed individually to a client any more than the client should be billed individually for the
cost of maintaining the lawyer’s office building or the cost of maintaining the lawyer’s
secretary or office manager.  In addition, there were no special circumstances presented in
this case to warrant shifting these kinds of costs to the individual clients. 
Most notably, however, Respondent engaged in conduct that was prejudicial to the
administration of justice.  Respondent’s intentional disregard for her clients’ legal matters
led, for example, to Mrs. Caldarelli losing agreed-upon alimony support payments as well
as her portion of her husband’s pension and her portion of the martial home.   In addition,
Respondent misrepresented to four of her clients the status of their cases, all in an effort to
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hide her incompetence and lack of diligence.  In the complaint of Mrs. Goodwin, for
example, Respondent falsely represented to Mrs. Goodwin that she had filed a request for a
order of default against Mr. Goodwin when she had not yet filed the motion.  Such conduct
is not becoming of a member of the Maryland Bar.  We think Respondent’s misconduct
reflects her disregard for client matters and the rules of professional responsibility.
 In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Wallace, 368 Md. 277, 291, 793 A.2d 535, 544
(2002), we noted the serious  nature of an attorney’s intentional disregard of his clients’ legal
affairs:
In determining the proper course to follow when confronted with an
attorney who has neglected the needs of his clients and failed to
communicate with them, we have consistently regarded neglect and
inattentiveness to a client's interests to be a violation of the Canons of
Ethics warranting the imposition of some disciplinary sanction . . . .
It is clear then that willful and flagrant neglect of a client's affairs is,
in and of itself, the kind of misconduct by an attorney which can lead
to disbarment . . . .  [W]e have noticed too many instances when
lawyers have agreed to represent clients and accepted fees, in part or
in whole, only to completely neglect these same legal problems,
causing the same clients emotional distress, financial loss, or other
varying kinds of inconvenience.
(Quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Manning, 318 Md. 697, 703-05, 569 A.2d 1250,
1253-54 (1990)).  Indeed, we have previously said that “[i]t is well settled, that ‘[d]isbarment
ordinarily should be the sanction for intentional dishonest conduct.” Harris, 403 Md. at 167,
939 A.2d at 747 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Webster, 402 Md. 448, 473, 937
A.2d 161, 175 (2007). “This is so because “[c]andor and truthfulness are two of the most
important moral character traits of a lawyer.”  Harris, 403 Md. at 167, 939 A.2d at 747
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(quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Myers, 333 Md. 440, 449, 635 A.2d. 1315, 1319
(1994)); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 419, 773 A.2d
463, 488 (2001) (affirming the notion that, absent extenuating circumstances, intentional
dishonest conduct implicates an attorney’s basic character and warrants the sanction of
disbarment). 
Having considered the particular facts and circumstances of this case and
Respondent’s prior disciplinary record, we conclude that the appropriate sanction is
disbarment.  See, e.g., Harris, 403 Md. at 165-70, 939 A.2d at 746-48 (“Respondent’s
intentionally dishonest conduct, coupled with his extensive prior disciplinary record,
compels us to state that the public only will be protected by the imposition of a sanction of
disbarment.”).  Respondent has engaged in a pattern of conduct over her legal career which
threatens the public’s confidence and trust in the legal profession.  Respondent’s lack of
competence, lack of diligence, lack of truthfulness and honesty in dealing with her clients,
her failure to communicate with her clients, her misrepresentations to her clients, and her
charging of unreasonable fees all lead to the most severe of sanctions – disbarment. “Only
the most severe sanction of disbarment will provide the protection to the public that this
procedure is supposed to provide.” Wallace, 368 Md. at 293, 793 A.2d at 545.
IT IS SO ORDERED. RESPONDENT SHALL PAY
ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THIS COURT,
INCLUDING THE COST OF TRANSCRIPTS,
PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-761 FOR
WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN
FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE
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COMMISSION AGAINST BARBARA OSBORN
KREAMER.