Title: Godshall v. Unigard Insurance Company

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

281 So. 2d 499 (1973)
Walter L. GODSHALL, Petitioner,
v.
UNIGARD INSURANCE COMPANY, Etc. and Jean Rumsey, Etc., Respondents.
No. 43066.

Supreme Court of Florida.
June 27, 1973.
Rehearing Denied September 13, 1973.
*500 S. Victor Tipton, Orlando, for petitioner.
J. Thomas Cardwell of Akerman, Senterfitt, Eidson & Wharton, Orlando, for respondents.
BOYD, Justice.
This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reported at 267 So. 2d 383. Our jurisdiction is based on conflict between the decision sought to be reviewed and Stecher v. Pomeroy.[1]
Plaintiff, petitioner herein, brought suit for injuries allegedly resulting from a traffic accident. The defendant and her liability insurance company, respondent herein, were joined as defendants. Subsequently, over plaintiff's opposition, defendant insurance company was severed from the case. The jury returned a verdict for defendant, and, on appeal, the District Court affirmed, without opinion, the judgment for the defendant.[2]
On petition for writ of certiorari to this Court, conflict was found between the decision of the District Court and Stecher v. Pomeroy, supra. This Court quashed the District Court's opinion, and remanded for reconsideration in the light of this Court's decision in Stecher v. Pomeroy, supra. The previous decision of this Court in this cause,[3] emphasizes the following statement from the Stecher opinion:
On remand, the District Court, in the decision presently sought to be reviewed, held that the error of the trial court in severing the insurance company was "harmless" and again affirmed the judgment below, holding:
Petitioner contends that the foregoing decision of the District Court creates conflict with Stecher v. Pomeroy, supra, and the previous opinion of this Court in the instant case.[6] We agree. In Stecher, this Court recognized that the jury was entitled to be aware of an insurer as a real party in interest, "so as to reflect the presence of financial responsibility which should be left apparent before the jury... ."[7].
Further, the Stecher opinion stated:
In this Court's first opinion in this matter, we remanded for reconsideration in the light of Stecher, setting out the rule that a severance should NOT be granted "absent a justiciable issue relating to insurance, such as the question of coverage or of the applicability or interpretation of the insurance policy... ."[9]
The District Court, in the opinion under review, refuses to consider the plaintiff's interest in retaining the insurer as a real party in interest "so as to reflect the presence of financial responsibility" as we said in Stecher, as a legitimate purpose to be served by joining an insurance carrier. On this basis, severance of the insurer was found by the District Court to be harmless error.
We cannot agree. Again, we must return to the principles enunciated in Stecher:
*502 The interest which plaintiff has in presenting to the jury the truest possible picture of the existence of financial responsibility is much too important to allow the loss of that interest, through the granting of severance for any reason except those enumerated in Stecher and repeated in this Court's first opinion in this cause, to be dismissed as "harmless error."
For that reason, we hold that if the trial court grants severance absent a justiciable issue relating to insurance, such as a question of coverage or of the applicability or interpretation of the insurance policy or other such valid dispute on the matter of insurance coverage, such court commits harmful error. We hold that such error was committed in the court below.
Accordingly, the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, is quashed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
It is so ordered.
ROBERTS, Acting C.J., and ERVIN, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
[1]  253 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1971).
[2]  252 So. 2d 875 (Fla.App. 4th 1971).
[3]  255 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1971).
[4]  Id. at 681, quoting from Stecher v. Pomeroy, supra, 253 So. 2d  at 424. (Emphasis appearing in both opinions.)
[5]  267 So. 2d  at 386-387. (Citations omitted.)
[6]  See note 3, supra.
[7]  253 So. 2d  at 424.
[8]  Id. at 423.
[9]  255 So. 2d  at 681.
[10]  253 So. 2d  at 424. (Emphasis supplied.)