Title: Rice v. State

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Zeronical RICE v. STATE of Arkansas

97-295                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered October 16, 1997


1.   Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- factors. -- In making the decision
     to retain jurisdiction or to transfer a case to juvenile
     court, the court must consider the following factors: (1) the
     seriousness of the offense and whether violence was employed
     by the juvenile in the commission of the offense; (2) whether
     the offense is part of a repetitive pattern of adjudicated
     offenses that would lead to the determination that the
     juvenile is beyond rehabilitation under existing
     rehabilitation programs as evidenced by past efforts to treat
     and rehabilitate the juvenile and the response to those
     efforts; and (3) the prior history, character traits, mental
     maturity, and any other factor that reflects upon the
     juvenile's prospects for rehabilitation.

2.   Juveniles -- youth services -- appellant eighteen years old -- initial
     commitment cannot commence after eighteenth birthday. -- Where appellant
     was eighteen years old, his potential for rehabilitation
     within the juvenile system was nil; the initial youth-services
     commitment cannot commence after the eighteenth birthday of
     the youth.

3.   Juveniles -- youth services -- statutory extension of commitment
     presupposes commitment before eighteenth birthday. -- Although Ark.
     Code Ann.  9-28-208(d) (Supp. 1995) extends the commitment
     time beyond the age of eighteen in certain circumstances, it
     presupposes that the youth has already been committed to the
     State Division of Youth Services before reaching eighteen.

4.   Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- clear and convincing evidence that
     appellant should be tried as adult. -- Where appellant was beyond
     the age when he could have been rehabilitated in the juvenile
     justice system, and where he confessed to the crime of
     aggravated robbery, which is clearly serious and clearly
     involves the use of violence, the evidence that he should be
     tried as an adult on the charge was clear and convincing.

5.   Jurisdiction -- theft charge dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. -- Where
     theft was not a listed charge under Ark. Code Ann.  9-27-
     318(b)(2) (Supp. 1995), which provided that a juvenile who was
     fourteen or fifteen at the time the delinquent act occurred
     could be charged with certain enumerated crimes, the supreme
     court dismissed the theft charge, holding that the circuit
     court had no jurisdiction to try appellant for a theft charge
     when the alleged act was committed while appellant was
     fifteen; the decision was affirmed as modified.


     Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court; Marion Humphrey, Judge;
affirmed as modified.
     William R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, by:  C. Renae Ford,
Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Vada Berger, Asst. Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

     Robert L. Brown, Justice.
     Appellant Zeronical Rice appeals the denial of his motion to
transfer the criminal charges of aggravated robbery and theft to
juvenile court.  We affirm the trial court's finding on the
aggravated robbery charge but dismiss the theft charge for lack of
jurisdiction in the circuit court.
     At the juvenile-transfer hearing, the prosecutor presented the
testimony of Officer Jeffrey Norman of the Little Rock Police
Department.  Officer Norman testified that on September 5, 1995,
Rice asked his brother, Tyrone Rice, to invite his friend, Steven
Morris, to come over to his house.  Morris used his 1994 Honda
Elite moped as transportation.  When Morris arrived, Rice pointed
a sawed-off twelve gauge shotgun at Morris and ordered him to give
him the keys to his moped.  Morris dropped the keys on the floor. 
Rice picked up the keys and set his shotgun down briefly to gather
some clothes before he left.  While his back was turned, Morris
grabbed the shotgun and ran toward the front door, dropping the
shotgun as he escaped through the door.  Morris contacted the
Little Rock Police Department from a neighbor's house and informed
them about what had happened.  He then watched Rice leave on his
moped.  When Rice was arrested on September 11, 1995, he confessed
to Officer Norman that he had taken Morris's moped at gun point. 
At the time, he was 15 with a date of birth of September 11, 1979. 
Morris's moped was never recovered.
     Other testimony presented by the prosecutor at the juvenile-
transfer hearing revealed that Rice had been implicated in two
other offenses after his arrest for the aggravated robbery
involving Morris.  Officer Paul Childress of the Benton Police
Department testified that he investigated an incident involving
Rice, which occurred on December 8, 1995.  According to the police
officer, Rice and another person went to a residence in Benton and
accused Greg James of being an informant for a drug task force. 
Rice beat James severely with a bottle, a television set, and his
fists.  James was treated at the hospital for his injuries.
     Officer Childress further stated that there was another felony
bench warrant for Rice stemming from an incident that occurred on
December 23, 1995.  According to Officer Childress, Rice and
another person approached Jonathan Caple as he was leaving a bar in
Benton and questioned him about an incident involving Rice and
Caple's brother.  While they were talking, Rice took a semi-
automatic handgun, put a round in the chamber, and pointed the gun
at Caple's head.  Rice told Caple to drop all of his money.  Caple
escaped by retreating back into the bar.
     The only testimony presented by Rice at the juvenile-transfer
hearing was that of a teacher, Sylvia Carter, from whom Rice was
receiving instruction in an effort to obtain his GED.  Ms. Carter
testified that Rice was cooperative and polite.  She explained that
Rice was doing well in his classes except for math which frustrated
him.
     Following the hearing, the motion to transfer was denied.
     For his points on appeal, Rice contends that the trial court
should have granted the motion to transfer to juvenile court
because there was a high likelihood of rehabilitation and the State
presented no countervailing proof regarding his potential for
rehabilitation.  Arkansas Code Ann.  9-27-318 (Supp. 1995),
provides the criteria for a motion to transfer to juvenile court:
          (e) In making the decision to retain jurisdiction or
     to transfer the case, the court shall consider the
     following factors:
          (1) The seriousness of the offense, and whether
     violence was employed by the juvenile in the commission
     of the offense;
          (2) Whether the offense is part of a repetitive
     pattern of adjudicated offenses which would lead to the
     determination that the juvenile is beyond rehabilitation
     under existing rehabilitation programs, as evidenced by
     past efforts to treat and rehabilitate the juvenile and
     the response to such efforts; and 
          (3) The prior history, character traits, mental
     maturity, and any other factor which reflects upon the
     juvenile's prospects for rehabilitation.
          (f) Upon a finding by clear and convincing evidence
     that a juvenile should be tried as an adult, the court
     shall enter an order to that effect.
     We dispense with Rice's rehabilitation argument by focusing on
his age.  At this writing, he is 18, and his potential for
rehabilitation within the juvenile system is nil.  State law and
our cases have made it clear that the initial commitment to the
State Division of Youth Services cannot commence after the
eighteenth birthday of the youth.  Ark. Code Ann.  9-28-208(d)
(Supp. 1995); Jensen v. State, 328 Ark. 349, 944 S.W.2d 820 (1997);
Hansen v. State, 323 Ark. 407, 914 S.W.2d 737 (1996).  Moreover, we
said in Jensen v. State, supra, that although  9-28-208(d) extends
the commitment time beyond 18 in certain circumstances, it
presupposes that the youth has already been committed to the State
Division of Youth Services prior to reaching 18.  See also Hansen
v. State, supra.
     Rice is beyond the age when he can be rehabilitated in the
juvenile justice system.  Furthermore, he confessed to a crime,
aggravated robbery, that is clearly serious and clearly involves
the use of violence.  The evidence that Rice should be tried as an
adult on this charge was clear and convincing.
     Though Rice did not raise the issue, we conclude that the
circuit court does not have jurisdiction over the theft charge. 
State law provides that if a juvenile is 14 or 15 at the time the
delinquent act occurs, the prosecuting attorney may charge him with
certain enumerated crimes, including aggravated robbery.  Ark. Code
Ann.  9-27-318(b)(2) (Supp. 1995).  Theft is not a listed charge. 
As we stated in Banks v. State, 306 Ark. 273, 813 S.W.2d 257
(1991), theft and aggravated robbery may both be charged because
they are separate crimes, having separate elements, even though
they may have been committed at the same time.  See also Butler v.
State, 324 Ark. 476, 922 S.W.2d 685 (1996).  However, we held in
Banks that dismissal of the theft charge was appropriate due to
lack of jurisdiction over the defendant who was 14 at the time the
acts were committed.  The same holds true in the instant case.  The
circuit court has no jurisdiction to try Rice for a theft charge,
even under  9-27-318 as subsequently amended after Banks v. State,
supra, was decided, when the alleged act was committed while Rice
was 15.  The prosecutor could have filed the theft charge in
juvenile court and then moved to transfer it to circuit court as a
charge arising out of the same course of conduct as the aggravated
robbery.  Ark. Code Ann.  9-27-318(c) (Supp. 1995); Butler v.
State, supra.  This was not done.  We dismiss the theft charge for
lack of jurisdiction.
     Affirmed as modified.