Title: PAUL RALPH SMITH, WILLIAM BURNS SMITH, A MINOR BY AND THROUGH HIS FATHER AND NEXT BEST FRIEND, CLARK A. SMITH, AND CLARK A. SMITH v. JOHN UHRICH

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

PAUL RALPH SMITH, WILLIAM BURNS SMITH, A MINOR BY AND THROUGH HIS FATHER AND NEXT BEST FRIEND, CLARK A. SMITH, AND CLARK A. SMITH v. JOHN UHRICH1985 WY 105704 P.2d 698Case Number: 84-201Decided: 08/08/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
PAUL RALPH SMITH, WILLIAM 
BURNS SMITH, A MINOR BY AND THROUGH HIS FATHER AND NEXT BEST FRIEND, CLARK A. 
SMITH, AND CLARK A. SMITH, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS), 

v. 

JOHN UHRICH, APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Alan B. Johnson, 
J.

 
 
Vincent A. Ross 
of Ross & Ross, Cheyenne, for appellants.

Maxwell E. 
Osborn, Cheyenne, for appellees.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROSE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     In the case at bar the 
plaintiffs were: Paul Ralph Smith, driver of the vehicle which collided with an 
automobile driven by the defendant John Uhrich; William Burns Smith, a minor 
("by and through his father and next best friend, Clark A. Smith"), who was a 
passenger in the vehicle driven by his brother, Paul Ralph Smith; and Clark A. 
Smith, father of Paul and William and owner of the plaintiff vehicle. Clark A. 
Smith was not in the plaintiff vehicle at the time of the accident. 

[¶2.]     Plaintiff Paul claimed 
damages for pain and suffering plus $140 stipulated medical bills; plaintiff 
William, through his next friend, claimed damages for pain and suffering and a 
stipulated $45 medical bill; Clark A. Smith claimed damages to his motor vehicle 
and loss of use of the automobile.

[¶3.]     The record contains 
extensive evidence of pain and suffering which was experienced by both Paul and 
William Smith. The testimony of various witnesses was that Paul injured his knee 
in the accident; that he was in shock for some time after impact; that his knee 
pained him so that it was necessary for him to consult a doctor; that the knee 
was swollen and red; that he continues to have the sensation of someone putting 
pins and needles in his knee; that the knee cap was out of place after the 
impact and he continues to have problems with it; that he continues to have 
trouble moving the knee and it hurts when he tries to walk, and that this caused 
him to limp for some time after the accident. Before the accident he jogged and 
skied extensively, but since then he has not been able to engage in these 
activities because it feels as though his knee will give out, and at various 
times it feels as though his knee is locking when he walks or exercises. He 
takes pain medications to alleviate the discomfort, and he gives himself hot-tub 
treatments to relieve the pain in his knee. The plaintiff describes continuing 
sensations of sharp pain which inhibit his normal 
activities.

[¶4.]     The testimony of 
William Smith, corroborated by the doctor who treated him after the accident, 
was that he injured his right wrist at or near the base of his little finger; he 
was forced to put an ice pack on his wrist and it pained him for at least a 
month and a half.

[¶5.]     The testimony of Ann 
Smith, the mother of the two boys, was that they both appeared to be in shock 
for some time after the accident, and both complained of pain in various areas 
of their bodies.

[¶6.]     The jury returned the 
following verdict:

"SPECIAL 
VERDICT

"We, the jury, present 
the following answers to the questions submitted by the 
Court:

"1. At the time and place 
of the incident, was the Defendant, John Uhrich, 
negligent?

X 
Yes

____ 
No

"2. If you answered `Yes' 
to question No. 1 was the negligence of the defendant a direct cause of personal 
injury and damage to the plaintiffs?

X 
Yes

____ 
No

"3. State the amount of 
damage, if any, sustained by each plaintiff as a direct result of the motor 
vehicle collision:

"Paul Ralph Smith                 
$140.00 

"William Burns Smith 
                       
$  45.00 

"Clark A. Smith                                  
$500.00"

[¶7.]     When the verdict was 
returned and before the jury was discharged, the plaintiffs' attorney lodged the 
following objection:

"MR. ROSS: May we 
approach the bench, Your Honor?

"(Whereupon, the 
following bench proceeding was had outside the hearing of the 
jury.)

"MR. ROSS: I think the 
Court has to instruct the jury, in view of the fact they have found the special 
verdict, they have to find for pain and suffering or any of that other stuff, 
the disability or - and they can't just find special and not any more. I think 
they misunderstood the instruction. I move that the Court instruct the jury to 
find - to have them come in and return something for pain and suffering, either 
nothing or $1 or something."

The motion was 
objected to and was denied by the trial judge.

[¶8.]     The dispositive issue 
in this case asks whether the trial court erred in not returning the jury to 
continue their deliberations for the purpose of assessing general damages. 

[¶9.]     We will hold that error 
was committed in refusing to return the jury for further deliberations, and will 
reverse and remand for a new trial on the issue of general damages concerning 
the claims of Paul Ralph Smith and Clark A. Smith as the next friend of William 
Burns Smith.1

Decision

The Verdict Was an 
Improper and Irregular Verdict

[¶10.]  We held in DeWitty v. Decker, Wyo., 383 P.2d 734 
(1963), that a verdict awarding special damages for medical and hospital 
expenses and failing to award any general damages, where there was evidence of 
general-damage proof, was an improper and irregular 
verdict.

[¶11.]  We said, in DeWitty, 383 P.2d at 
736:

"As a general rule, the 
failure of a jury to award general damages, in the face of an award for 
substantial medical and hospital expense, results at least in an improper or 
irregular verdict. The authorities that we have examined on the subject are 
practically unanimous in so holding. Webster v. City of Colfax, 250 Iowa 181, 
93 N.W.2d 91, 92; Vittitow v. Carpenter, 
Ky., 291 S.W.2d 34, 35; Davidson v. 
Schneider, Mo., 349 S.W.2d 908, 913; Hallford v. Schumacher, Okla., 323 P.2d 989, 992; Edmonds v. Erion, 221 Or. 
104, 350 P.2d 700; Cohen v. Food Fair 
Stores, Inc., 190 Pa. Super. 620, 155 A.2d 441, 444; and Smith v. Bullock, Tex.Civ.App., 317 S.W.2d 232, 234. See also Annotation 20 A.L.R. 276."

[¶12.]  In Davidson v. Schneider, Mo., 349 S.W.2d 908, 913 (1961), the Supreme Court of Missouri said that it has become the 
generally accepted view that awards of medical expense only, the jury failing to 
award any sum for pain and suffering, are invalid and set aside almost as a 
matter of course. See also Cooper v. 
Christensen, 29 Mich. App. 181, 185 N.W.2d 97 (1971); Fordon v. Bender, 363 
Mich. 124, 108 N.W.2d 896 (1961); Franco v. Graham, Tex.Civ.App., 470 S.W.2d 429 (1971); and Rice v. Rizk, 
Ky., 453 S.W.2d 732 
(1970).

[¶13.]  We observed, in DeWitty, that even though there was a 
substantial award of special damages for doctor and hospital expense, when the 
jury refused to award general damages, even though adequately supported by the 
evidence, the verdict was inconsistent on its face.2 Even though the jury's failure to 
award general damages was a substantial prejudice to the plaintiff's legal 
rights, we would not disturb the verdict because the plaintiff was foreclosed by 
§ 1-11-213, W.S. 19773 from raising the issue once the 
jury had been discharged.

[¶14.]  In the case at bar, as we have previously 
indicated, the plaintiffs' lawyer did object to the inconsistent verdict before 
the jury was discharged, and the trial judge denied the motion to return the 
jury to the jury room to correct its verdict. This was error on the part of the 
trial court.

[¶15.]  In Smith v. Blair, Wyo., 
521 P.2d 581 (1974), the jury awarded damages for medical and hospital bills, 
and, under DeWitty, we found the verdict to be "irregular and improper." We 
noted that there had been testimony pertaining to pain and suffering, and 
concluded that if special damages resulted from the trauma, then general damages 
resulted also, 

"* * * and the jury was 
wrong in not making an award for general damages." Smith v. Blair, 521 P.2d  at 
583.

We called 
attention with approval to Wall v. Van 
Meter, 311 Ky. 198, 223 S.W.2d 734, 736 (1949), a case 
which is remarkably similar to the case at bar. In Wall, the jury returned a 
general verdict for plaintiff in the exact amount he had expended for medical 
expenses, with nothing for pain and suffering, even though the jury had been 
instructed that it should take plaintiff's physical and mental suffering into 
account.4 The appellate court reversed on the 
ground that the jury had ignored the instructions of the trial 
court.

[¶16.]  In Smith v. Blair, 521 P.2d  at 583, we 
looked with approval on LoBianco v. 
Willgrubs, Pa., 52 Dauph Co. 358 (1942), where the Pennsylvania court said 
that under no theory of law could the plaintiff be entitled to recover for 
medical expense while being barred from recovering such items of damages as loss 
of earnings and pain and suffering. We went on to hold that, the verdict being 
improper for the reasons stated, the case must be returned for retrial on the 
damage issue.

[¶17.]  Smith v. Blair, supra, controls the case 
at bar, and we therefore reverse and remand for retrial of damages only in the 
claims of Paul Ralph Smith and Clark A. Smith as the "father and next best 
friend" of William Burns Smith, a minor.

1 There is no appeal from 
the jury's verdict returned upon the claim of Clark A. Smith for damage to and 
loss of use of his vehicle.

2 The jury, in DeWitty, returned a verdict in favor of 
plaintiffs and assessed damages as follows:

"Appellant's General 
Damages                               
None 

"Appellant's Special 
Damages                               
$1,637.00 

"Joint Property Damage 
(Car)                                
     334.72 

"Total $1,971.72" 

383 P.2d  at 
735.

3 Section 1-11-213, W.S. 
1977, provides:

"If a jury disagrees, or 
if when the jury is polled a juror answers in the negative, or if the verdict is 
defective in substance, the jury shall be sent out again for further 
deliberation and either party may require the jury to be polled by the clerk or 
court asking each juror if it is his verdict."

4 The damage instruction 
in the case at bar reads as follows:

"If you decide for the 
plaintiff on the question of liability, you must then fix the amount of money 
which will reasonably and fairly compensate him for those elements of damage 
proved by the evidence to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, 
taking into consideration the nature, extent and duration of the 
injury.

"The claimed elements of 
damage are:

"(a) The pain and 
suffering experienced as a result of the injuries (and those reasonably certain 
to be experienced in the future).

"(b) Disability (and that 
reasonably certain to be experienced in the future).

"(c) Loss of enjoyment of 
life. The award for this specific element should not duplicate the award given 
for any other element of damage. (And any loss of enjoyment of life reasonably 
certain to be experienced in the future).

"(d) Permanent pain and 
suffering and disability.

"(e) Medical expenses, 
which are stipulated to be the sum of $45 for treatment furnished to William 
Barnes Smith and $140 for treatment furnished to Paul Ralph 
Smith.

"Whether any of these 
elements have been proved is for you to determine."

ROONEY, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶18.]  I do not consider the medical and 
hospital expenses of $140.00 to Paul Smith and $45.00 to William Smith to be of 
sufficient substance to require an award for general damages. The rule in DeWitty v. Decker, Wyo., 383 P.2d 734 (1963) 
(see quotation in majority opinion), requires a general damage award only when 
there is "substantial" medical and hospital expense.

[¶19.]  Normally, we assume the evidence in favor 
of the successful party to be true, leave out of consideration entirely 
conflicting evidence of the unsuccessful party, and give to the successful party 
every favorable inference which can reasonably be drawn from his evidence. 
Anderson v. Bauer, 
Wyo., 681 P.2d 1316, 1319 (1984); Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, Wyo., 
677 P.2d 814, 818 (1984). In this case, there was no direct evidence of lack of 
pain and suffering on the part of the successful party (appellee) in respect to 
this issue. However, it is difficult to discern any evidence which could be 
available for such purpose. As already noted, the inference from the 
unsubstantial amount of hospital and medical expenses is that there were no 
general damages. Since we disregard all evidence in conflict therewith, we would 
normally affirm on that basis.

[¶20.]  However, when nonconflicting evidence 
admits of only one conclusion, a contrary conclusion cannot stand. Wyoming Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company 
v. May, Wyo., 434 P.2d 507 (1967); In re Stringer's Estate, 80 Wyo. 389, 343 P.2d 508, 
reh. denied 80 Wyo. 389, 345 P.2d 786 (1959); 
see Steadman v. Topham, 80 Wyo. 63, 338 P.2d 820 
(1959). 

[¶21.]  Of course, the jury may have simply not 
believed testimony as to pain and suffering in this case. The medical witness 
was not asked his opinion on the point. He did testify to "tenderness," to an 
abrasion, and to "swelling," and it is difficult to conclude that the jury did 
not believe such testimony from an impartial witness.

[¶22.]  This evidence was sufficient to make the 
verdict one in which only one conclusion could be reached on the point, i.e., 
some pain and suffering occurred. When the objection was made to the jury, the 
judge should have directed the jury to return to their deliberation for the 
purpose of ascertaining the amount of compensation for pain and suffering, be it 
a small amount or a large amount. Inasmuch as this course of action was 
available and not utilized, I will concur in the result reached by the majority 
opinion.

BROWN, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶23.]  I cannot agree with the majority's 
disposition of this case. The majority determined that Smith v. Blair, Wyo., 521 P.2d 581 
(1974), controlled the disposition of the present case. In Smith, this court 
said:

"We recently had occasion 
to say, in DeWitty v. Decker, Wyo., 
383 P.2d 734, 736, as a general rule, the failure of a jury to award general 
damages, in the face of an award for substantial medical and hospital expenses, 
results at least in an improper or irregular verdict. * * *" (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶24.]  In Smith v. Blair, supra, the substantial medical and hospital 
expenses were $2,015.15. In the case before us the medical expense, with respect 
to appellant William Burns Smith, was $45. By no stretch of the imagination can 
it be said that $45 is a substantial medical expense. The majority solves the 
substantial medical expense requirement of DeWitty and Smith by ignoring it. If $45 is a 
substantial medical expense, then only a tiny step is required to determine that 
$.98, the cost of a tin of Bayer aspirin, is likewise a substantial medical 
expense. The majority has effectively eliminated the requirement that 
substantial medical expense need be shown.

[¶25.]  Frequently a court will develop or adopt 
a sensible and rational rule; later that same court, perhaps with new members, 
will whittle away at the rule, eventually distorting it beyond recognition. The 
distortion of the DeWitty rule is 
nearly complete.

[¶26.]  The jury was adequately instructed on 
compensation for pain and suffering, and counsel adequately argued these items 
of damages to the jury. We cannot assume that the jury disregarded the court's 
instructions on pain and suffering or was confused about that item of damage. 
Considering the trifling medical expense with respect to William Burns Smith, it 
is not illogical to assume the jury just did not believe his pain and suffering 
was compensable. This case suggests that the jury is required to award 
compensation for pain and suffering even if it does not believe a plaintiff or 
believes he has "hyped" his damages.

[¶27.]  I would affirm the trial 
court.