Title: Clark v. Alexander

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Clark v. Alexander1998 WY 16953 P.2d 145Case Number: 96-298Decided: 02/19/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

K.C. 
CLARK, f/k/a K.K. Alexander, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

Clifford Graham ALEXANDER, 
Appellee (Defendant).

 

Appeal from the District Court, 
Park County, Hunter Patrick, J.

 

Sue Davidson of Aspen Ridge 
Law Office, P.C., Cheyenne, for Appellant.

Chris Edwards of Simpson, 
Kepler & Edwards, LC, Cody, for Appellee.

Diane B. Walsh, Cody, 
Guardian ad Litem.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

 

TAYLOR, 
Chief Justice.

 

[¶1] Appellant challenges 
the admission of tape recordings of her telephone conversations with her 
children at a modification of custody and child support hearing. Appellant also 
asserts the district court erred in allowing the guardian ad litem to testify 
while actively participating as counsel for the minor children. We find the 
district court erred in admitting the tape recordings through the testimony of 
the guardian ad litem, but that the error was harmless regarding the custody 
determination. We reverse and remand, however, the district court's order that 
appellant pay all fees and costs for appellee's attorney and those of the 
guardian ad litem.

 

                                             
I. ISSUES

 

[¶2] The parties presented a 
total of fourteen issues for review which are consolidated as 
follows:

 

1. 
Whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting intentionally 
recorded tapes in violation of state and federal wiretap 
laws.

 

2. 
Whether the district court abused its discretion in allowing the guardian ad 
litem to testify while participating as advocate for the parties' minor 
children.

 

3. 
Whether the district court abused its discretion in ordering appellant to pay 
all fees and costs of the guardian ad litem and of the attorney for 
appellee.

 

                                             
II. FACTS

 

[¶3] Appellant, K.C. Clark 
(Mother), and appellee, Clifford Graham Alexander (Father), married in 1981 and 
had three children. On February 2, 1993, the district court granted a divorce 
and provided that the parties would have joint custody of the children, with 
Father having residential custody subject to a liberal visitation schedule for 
Mother.

 

[¶4] On October 11, 1994, 
Mother filed a "Verified Petition for Modification of Child Custody," alleging a 
change of circumstances engendered by Father's relocation with the two younger 
children to a trailer home and the oldest child residing with "grandfather" in a 
house on the same property. Mother's petition was accompanied by a request for 
the appointment of a guardian ad litem.

 

[¶5] An order appointing the 
guardian ad litem was entered January 8, 1996 and made retroactive to November 
23, 1994 to reflect the parties' consent to the active participation of the 
guardian ad litem from that date. The guardian ad litem visited the children in 
person and by telephone, conducted in-home visits and interviews with both 
parents, stepfather, and grandfather, and interviewed other family members, 
teachers, neighbors, and clergy.

 

[¶6] In the spring of 1995, 
Father informed the guardian ad litem of his concern that Mother was 
inappropriately involving the children in the custody dispute during telephone 
visits. The guardian ad litem responded that she would like to hear tape 
recordings of such conversations. Father informed her that his lawyer had 
advised against taping, and the guardian ad litem agreed Father must follow his 
attorney's advice.

 

[¶7] Taping was not further 
discussed until Father's attorney telephoned the guardian ad litem and stated 
Father had inadvertently taped a conversation between Mother and the two younger 
children on September 23, 1995. On the tape recording, Mother and stepfather 
spoke with the nine-year-old daughter about their frustration with the custody 
proceeding and indicated Father was to blame for the delay. During the 
conversation, the child was urged to telephone the guardian ad litem to report 
that Father often left the children unsupervised, that the delay was upsetting, 
and to convey her preference for residing with her mother.

 

[¶8] Shortly after listening 
to the tape recording, the guardian ad litem told Mother's attorney of the tape 
recording's existence and recommended Mother refrain from involving the children 
in the custody dispute. The guardian ad litem also consented, without informing 
Mother, to the continued taping of Mother's conversations due to concerns that 
Mother would further involve the children during telephone visits. Father 
proceeded to record Mother's telephone conversations with the children, but only 
two subsequent conversations, one on October 8, 1995 and one on October 28, 
1995, were submitted to the guardian ad litem.

 

[¶9] On November 21, 1995, 
the guardian ad litem issued a report recommending primary residential custody 
remain with Father. This recommendation was based in large part on the substance 
of the taped conversations between Mother and the children. On December 21, 
1995, Mother filed a "Motion for Removal of the Guardian Ad Litem and For 
Protective Order Regarding Evidence Illegally Obtained." The next day, Mother 
filed a "Motion in Limine" seeking to preclude admission of the tape recordings 
at the custody modification hearing because they were obtained in violation of 
state and federal wiretap laws. An unreported hearing was held on these motions 
on January 2, 1996.

 

[¶10] On January 7, 1996, 
the guardian ad litem submitted a supplemental report addressing the 
circumstances leading to her consent to the taping. The supplemental report also 
stated that during a telephone conversation with Mother, Mother said she knew 
she was being taped while speaking with the children. A four-day custody 
modification hearing commenced on January 8, 1996. The same day, the district 
court issued its Order Nunc Pro Tunc appointing the guardian ad litem and an 
order denying Mother's Motion in Limine. The district court held that the tape 
recordings were not procured in violation of the wiretap laws because the first 
tape recording was inadvertently obtained and the vicarious consent of both 
Father and the guardian ad litem on behalf of the children removed the 
subsequent tapes from the wiretap prohibitions. The district court also found 
Mother's admission that she knew the conversations were taped indicated her 
consent as well.

 

[¶11] At the modification 
hearing, Father called the guardian ad litem as his first witness. Through her 
testimony, the tapes recorded September 23, 1995 and October 8, 1995 were 
received into evidence, as well as both the guardian ad litem reports. Mother's 
continuing objection to the admission of the tape recordings was noted; however, 
no objection was made to the guardian ad litem's testimony or the admission of 
the reports. 

 

[¶12] At the close of the 
proceeding, the district judge orally ruled that the best interests of the 
children would be served by recognizing that the initial provision of joint 
custody was a misnomer and, in fact, awarded sole custody to Father as 
residential custodian of the children. The district court, therefore, granted 
Father continued sole custody. The district court also ordered Mother, Father, 
and children to receive counseling, and the parents to cease pressuring the 
children regarding custody issues. The district court further ordered that the 
parties not disclose to the children the testimony at trial nor the fact that 
their conversations with Mother had been taped, and would continue to be taped 
for six months.

 

[¶13] The district court 
followed its oral ruling with a decision letter, stating in 
part:

 

In 
view of the extreme circumstances of this case, the Court will further order 
that [Mother] is to pay the fees and expenses of the Guardian ad Litem and is 
further to pay the fees and expenses of [Father's] attorney * * 
*.

 

The final "Order for 
Modification of Child Support and Child Visitation and for Reimbursement of 
Expenses" was filed on June 26, 1996. This timely appeal 
followed.

 

                                      
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

[¶14] While several issues 
are raised on appeal, the ultimate issue in this case is the district court's 
determination of custody. The party seeking a modification of the custody 
provisions of a divorce decree has the burden of showing that a material and 
substantial change of circumstances has occurred, after the entry of the initial 
decree, and that modification is in the best interests of the children. Semler 
v. Semler, 924 P.2d 422, 424 (Wyo. 1996). An appellate court will not interfere 
with the trial court's decision regarding modification of custody absent a 
procedural error or a clear abuse of discretion. Id. "`Judicial discretion is a 
composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria * * *.'" Mintle v. Mintle, 764 P.2d 255, 257 (Wyo. 1988) (quoting 
Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986)). Our assessment of the 
circumstances in the context of an alleged abuse of discretion is tantamount to 
an evaluation of whether the evidence is sufficient to support the decision of 
the district court. In review of the evidence, we accept the successful party's 
submissions, granting them every favorable inference fairly to be drawn and 
leaving out of consideration conflicting evidence presented by the unsuccessful 
party.

 

Basolo v. Basolo, 907 P.2d 348, 353 (Wyo. 
1995).

 

[¶15] Decisions concerning 
the admissibility of evidence are within the sound discretion of the trial court 
and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion, i.e., when the 
trial court acts outside the bounds of reason or commits an error of law. Hayes 
v. State, 935 P.2d 700, 702 (Wyo. 1997); Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of 
Commerce, 933 P.2d 1098, 1107 (Wyo. 1997). The burden is upon the appellant to 
demonstrate such abuse. Blake v. State, 933 P.2d 474, 477 (Wyo. 1997); Vit v. 
State, 909 P.2d 953, 956-57 (Wyo. 1996).

 

                                          
IV. DISCUSSION

 

[¶16 Among several issues on 
appeal, Mother devotes the majority of her argument to the alleged 
inadmissibility of the taped conversations under the federal and state wiretap 
laws.1 This was the subject of the 
unrecorded hearing on January 2, 1996. Mother has made no attempt to reconstruct 
what occurred at the hearing pursuant to W.R.A.P. 3.03. We are, therefore, asked 
to resolve an issue of first impression in Wyoming without benefit of any record 
of the proceedings. 

 

[¶17] The intrusion into a 
parent's relationship with a child through clandestine interception of telephone 
conversations causes great concern. Given the future impact of an appellate 
decision and the availability of a collateral action under the wiretap statutes, 
we decline to address this issue at this time. Because we find that the tape 
recordings were not properly before the district court on other grounds, we 
defer consideration of the parameters of the wiretap statute until such time as 
a complete record provides the proper foundation for our 
determination.

 

A. ROLE OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM

 

[¶18] The role of the 
attorney/guardian ad litem during the proceedings is central to the disposition 
of this case. Mother claims that because the guardian ad litem actively 
participated as the children's attorney, it was improper to allow her to testify 
at the modification hearing. Father and the guardian ad litem respond that 
Mother failed to preserve this issue when no objection was lodged with the 
district court.

 

[¶19] Generally, we will not 
address an issue raised for the first time on appeal absent special 
circumstances. Rowan v. Rowan, 786 P.2d 886, 889 (Wyo. 1990). However, "[t]he 
definition of the precise roles of the attorney and the guardian ad litem for 
children is still evolving and not without difficulty." S.S. v. D.M., 597 A.2d 870, 877 (D.C.App. 1991).2 In Wyoming, the role of an attorney 
or guardian ad litem in custody cases is not addressed by statute, and like many 
jurisdictions, case law has failed to clearly delineate the parameters of the 
duties incumbent upon appointment. Moreover, the juxtaposition of the separate 
roles of attorney and guardian ad litem into one "attorney/guardian ad litem," 
appears especially problematic.3 Given the lack of clear direction 
provided to those who must fulfill this role in Wyoming, and our certainty that 
the issues in this case will reappear in the future, we speak to those issues 
here. In providing guidance to the role of an attorney appointed to represent a 
child while at the same time acting as guardian ad litem, we do not intend to 
usurp the role of the district court in appointing individuals to act solely as 
an attorney or as guardian ad litem. It is imperative, however, that the 
appointee request clarification from the appointing court if questions regarding 
the duties arise.

 

[¶20] The guardian ad 
litem's role has been characterized as investigator, monitor, and champion for 
the child. Ann M. Haralambie and Deborah L. Glaser, Practical and Theoretical 
Problems with the AAML Standards for Representing "Impaired" Children, 13 J. Am. 
Acad. Matrim. Law. 57, 73-74 (Summer 1995). The traditional role of a guardian 
ad litem in custody proceedings has been described as 
follows:

 

[I]n custody matters, the guardian ad litem has 
traditionally been viewed as functioning as an agent or arm of the court, to 
which it owes its principal duty of allegiance, and not strictly as legal 
counsel to a child client. * * * In essence, the guardian ad litem role fills a 
void inherent in the procedures required for the adjudication of custody 
disputes. Absent the assistance of a guardian ad litem, the trial court, charged 
with rendering a decision in the "best interests of the child," has no practical 
or effective means to assure itself that all of the requisite information 
bearing on the question will be brought before it untainted by the parochial 
interests of the parents. Unhampered by the ex parte and other restrictions that 
prevent the court from conducting its own investigation of the facts, the 
guardian ad litem essentially functions as the court's investigative agent, 
charged with the same ultimate standard that must ultimately govern the court's 
decision - i.e., the "best interests of the child." Although the child's 
preferences may, and often should, be considered by the guardian ad litem in 
performing this traditional role, such preferences are but one fact to be 
investigated and are not considered binding on the guardian. * * * Thus, the 
obligations of a guardian ad litem necessarily impose a higher degree of 
objectivity on a guardian ad litem than is imposed on an attorney for an 
adult.

 

State ex rel. Bird v. 
Weinstock, 864 S.W.2d 376, 384 (Mo. App. 1993); Berndt by Peterson v. Molepske, 
211 Wis.2d 572, 565 N.W.2d 549, 553 (1997); see also McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 
148, 937 P.2d 1222, 1230 (1997) (noting traditional role of guardian ad litem as 
arm of the court). In many jurisdictions, the guardian ad litem is required to 
oversee the progress of proceedings involving the child and, after reaching an 
independent conclusion, to recommend to the court the outcome which the guardian 
ad litem believes to be in the child's best interests. See Ann M. Haralambie and 
Deborah L. Glaser, supra, 13 J. Am. Acad. Matrim. Law. at 70-72, nn. 55-57 
(listing guardian ad litem duties in various 
jurisdictions).

 

[¶21] In contrast, the 
traditional role of an attorney is that of advisor, advocate, negotiator and 
intermediary. Wyo. R. Prof. Cond., Preamble. Counsel appointed to represent a 
child must, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer 
relationship with the child, Wyo. R. Prof. Cond. 1.14, and "abide by a client's 
decisions concerning the objectives of representation * * *." Wyo. R. Prof. 
Cond. 1.2. Thus, counsel for a child is not free to independently determine and 
advocate the child's "best interests" if contrary to the preferences of the 
child.

 

[¶22] Wyo. Stat. § 14-3-211 
(1997), addressing the appointment of counsel to represent children in abuse and 
neglect proceedings, distinguishes the role of guardian ad litem from the role 
of "counsel for the child," but combines the two if no guardian ad litem is 
appointed.4 Although the statute does not 
address custody proceedings, in Moore v. Moore, 809 P.2d 261, 264 (Wyo. 1991), 
we applied the statutory language regarding "representation" of the child to 
custody cases, and held that an attorney appointed as guardian ad litem may not 
engage in ex parte communications with the trial court. We stated that the 
attorney/guardian ad litem acts as an advocate for the child and "has the same 
ethical responsibilities in the proceeding as any other attorney." See also In 
Interest of MFB, 860 P.2d 1140, 1152 (Wyo. 1993) (the attorney/guardian ad litem 
"must act with reasonable diligence in the role of an advocate for the child, 
Wyo.R.Prof.Cond. 1.3, and participate as necessary in all phases of the process 
* * * Wyo.R.Prof.Cond. 1.14.").

 

[¶23] Our decision in Moore, 
809 P.2d 261, however, did not address other situations where the attorney's 
ethical duties under the Rules of Professional Conduct may not coincide with the 
duties expected of the guardian ad litem. The circumstances of this case clearly 
illustrate several examples of the problems which may arise. Here, the 
attorney/guardian ad litem represented three siblings, two of whom expressed 
conflicting preferences regarding custody. A guardian ad litem, not bound by the 
expressed preferences of the child, has no conflict in this situation. On the 
other hand, the Rules of Professional Conduct require the attorney to zealously 
represent the client's interests. Therefore, the attorney must discontinue 
representation when two clients' interests, and thereby the attorney's duty, 
diverge. Wyo. R. Prof. Cond. 1.2 and 1.7. Similarly, a conflict is present when 
the attorney/guardian ad litem does not believe the child's expressed interest 
is in the child's best interest.

 

[¶24] The guardian ad litem 
is also required to inform the court of all relevant information. This 
expectation may often collide with Wyo. R. Prof. Cond. 1.6, which requires the 
attorney to maintain confidentiality unless the client consents to disclosure. 
In this case, Father's recording of the children's conversations with Mother 
also included a recording of one child's telephone call to the guardian ad 
litem. The attorney/guardian ad litem allowed this conversation to be admitted 
into evidence without objection and without the consent of the 
child.

 

[¶25] Finally, the 
attorney/guardian ad litem is expected to actively participate as legal counsel 
for the children, i.e., presenting opening and closing statements and examining 
witnesses. In contrast, Wyo. R. Prof. Cond. 3.7 prohibits an attorney from 
participating as an advocate in a case where it is likely that he or she will be 
called to testify to a matter of import at the proceeding.  In this case, the attorney/guardian ad 
litem not only testified regarding the ultimate issue in the case, but was the 
vehicle through which the taped conversations were 
admitted.

 

[¶26] In those cases where 
the facts relevant to the children's best interests may not be otherwise 
presented to the court, the traditional role of guardian ad litem is essential. 
It is equally apparent that the skills of a legal advocate are invaluable to the 
child caught within a contentious custody dispute. With counsel, the child has 
an unbiased adult who can explain the process, inform the court of the child's 
viewpoint, and ensure an expeditious resolution. See J.A.R. v. Superior Court in 
and for County of Maricopa, 179 Ariz. 267, 877 P.2d 1323, 1331 (1994) ("a mental 
health professional * * * simply cannot assure that * * * all relevant 
information is properly investigated and introduced in an admissible fashion at 
trial, or that irrelevant or biased information is either kept out or 
cross-examined.").

 

[¶27] While some 
jurisdictions have required the separation of these roles, a number of courts 
have declared the role a "hybrid," which necessarily excuses strict adherence to 
some rules of professional conduct. In Interest of J.P.B., 419 N.W.2d 387, 
391-92 (Iowa 1988); In re Marriage of Rolfe, 216 Mont. 39, 699 P.2d 79, 86-87 
(1985), aff'd 234 Mont. 294, 766 P.2d 223 (1988). We believe that the costs 
attending the appointment of both an attorney and a guardian ad litem would 
often be prohibitive and would in every case conscript family resources better 
directed to the children's needs outside the litigation process. Thus, we too 
acknowledge the "hybrid" nature of the role of attorney/guardian ad litem which 
necessitates a modified application of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct.

 

[¶28] Contrary to the 
ethical rules, the attorney/guardian ad litem is not bound by the client's 
expressed preferences, but by the client's best interests. If the 
attorney/guardian ad litem determines that the child's expressed preference is 
not in the best interests of the child, both the child's wishes and the basis 
for the attorney/guardian ad litem's disagreement must be presented to the 
court. In re Marriage of Rolfe, 699 P.2d  at 86-87.

 

[¶29] In the same light, the 
confidentiality normally required in the attorney-client relationship must be 
modified to the extent that relevant information provided by the child may be 
brought to the district court's attention. While it is always best to seek 
consent prior to divulging otherwise confidential information, an 
attorney/guardian ad litem is not prohibited from disclosure of client 
communications absent the child's consent. As legal counsel to the child, the 
attorney/guardian ad litem is obligated to explain to the child, if possible, 
that the attorney/guardian ad litem is charged with protecting the child's best 
interest and that information may be provided to the court which would otherwise 
be protected by the attorney-client relationship. Wyo. R. Prof. Cond. 1.2, 1.4 
and 1.14.5

 

[¶30] Although the above 
rules require compromise in order to effect the dual roles of attorney and 
guardian ad litem, we do not find the same need applies to Wyo. R. Prof. Cond. 
3.7. Our holding in Moore, 809 P.2d 261 clearly mandates that the 
attorney/guardian ad litem is to be an advocate for the best interests of the 
child and actively participate at the proceedings. As counsel, the 
attorney/guardian ad litem has the opportunity and the obligation to conduct all 
necessary pretrial preparation and present all relevant information through the 
evidence offered at trial. Recommendations can be made to the court through 
closing argument based on the evidence received. It is, therefore, unnecessary 
to allow the attorney/guardian ad litem to place his or her own credibility at 
issue.  Consequently, we join those 
jurisdictions which hold that an attorney/guardian ad litem may not be a fact 
witness at a custody hearing. Colo. Rev. Stat. 14-10-116(2)(a) (1997); S.S., 597 A.2d  at 877; Hollister v. Hollister, 173 Wis.2d 413, 496 N.W.2d 642, 
644-45 (1992).

 

[¶31] This is not to say 
that the attorney/guardian ad litem may not submit a written report to the 
parties. A detailed report which timely informs the parties of the relevant 
facts and the basis of the guardian ad litem's recommendation may facilitate 
agreement prior to trial. If the parties so stipulate, the report may be 
presented to the court. However, the report should not be filed with the court 
or received into evidence without the express agreement of the parties. To the 
extent that prior Wyoming cases may conflict with this holding, they are here overruled.6

 

[¶32] We find that the 
district court erred in admitting the testimony of the attorney/guardian ad 
litem. In turn, all evidence presented through this witness was also erroneously 
before the district court. Identification of the ethical impropriety surrounding 
the admission of this testimony does not, however, automatically require 
reversal. In Moore, 809 P.2d  at 264, we held that an ethical violation, not 
brought about by the prevailing party, will be reversed only if it resulted in 
manifest injustice. In many district courts, it is not uncommon to allow the 
testimony of an attorney/guardian ad litem. Thus, in the absence of objection to 
the district court, we cannot say that the prevailing party in this case was 
responsible for the ethical violation. Therefore, we must determine whether the 
admission of the attorney/guardian ad litem's testimony and reports, as well as 
the tape recordings, resulted in manifest injustice under the totality of the 
circumstances. Moore, 809 P.2d  at 264.

 

[¶33] Manifest injustice 
"contemplate[s] a situation that is unmistakable or indisputable, was not 
foreseeable, and affects the substantial rights of a party." McCarthy v. State, 
945 P.2d 775, 777 (Wyo. 1997). Here, the testimony of the guardian ad litem was 
clearly foreseeable. Father's pretrial memorandum designated the 
attorney/guardian ad litem to be called as a witness to testify "about all 
matters concerning custody * * *." Mother had received the initial report over a 
month before the trial, had sufficient time to prepare for the testimony, and 
made no objection to the designation or to the testimony at the 
hearing.

 

[¶34] Further, the 
attorney/guardian ad litem was but one witness in a proceeding that continued 
for four days. Other than opinion testimony, her testimony was largely 
cumulative and involved her personal observations, as distinct from 
conversations with third parties. The testimony was also subject to 
cross-examination.

 

[¶35] What is more difficult 
to assess is whether the lay opinion testimony of the guardian ad litem on the 
ultimate issues in the case was enhanced in the eyes of the district judge 
because she had served as advocate for the children's best interests. Indeed, 
the district judge specifically found that the testimony of the guardian ad 
litem, in every instance, was more credible than that of Mother.  Our review is further complicated by the 
fact that the taped conversations, evidence which the district judge found 
"shocking," were admitted through this witness.

 

[¶36] After careful review 
of the record, and eliminating from consideration the opinions of the guardian 
ad litem and the contents of the tape recordings, we find that the record 
clearly supports the district court's determination that the best interests of 
the children were served by Father's continuing custody. In reaching his 
decision, the district judge noted specific examples of Mother's inability to 
cope with the eldest child during visitations and her refusal to credit Father's 
cooperation in scheduling visitations. The district judge also noted testimony 
that Father helped the youngest child write letters to Mother and permitted the 
children to telephone Mother long distance at Father's expense. The testimony of 
teachers and relatives established that the children were performing well in 
school and appeared to be happy in their present situation. On the other hand, 
Mother's witnesses equivocated on whether all the children would be better 
served by moving to Mother's residence. We find that the admission of the 
testimony of the attorney/guardian ad litem did not result in manifest injustice 
and, therefore, does not warrant reversal of the district court's custody 
determination.

 

B. COSTS AND FEES

 

[¶37] Unlike the custody 
determination, we find no support in the record for the district court's order 
that Mother pay the costs and fees of Father's attorney and those of the 
guardian ad litem. The district court stated that the award of fees was based on 
"the extreme circumstances of this case * * *." Our review of the record leads 
to the firm conviction that the district court's determination as to fees and 
costs was founded solely on the contents of the tape recorded  conversations. Because the tape 
recordings were not properly before the district court, and there is no other 
basis in the record to support the conclusion that Mother pay all fees, we 
reverse and remand this portion of the district court's order for 
reconsideration.

 

                                     
     V. 
CONCLUSION

 

[¶38] The district court 
erred in admitting the testimony of the attorney/guardian ad litem. The error, 
however, does not warrant reversal of the district court's determination that 
Mother failed to show a change in circumstances which justified modification of 
custody.  While the record before us 
substantiates the district court's decision regarding custody, the district 
court's award of fees is not supported. We, therefore, affirm the district 
court's award of custody and reverse and remand the issue of fees for 
reconsideration.

 

          
                                                  

FOOTNOTES

1Wyo. 
Stat. § 7-3-602 (1997) prohibits the willful interception or disclosure of wire, 
oral or electronic communications and provides for civil penalties upon proof of 
a violation of the statute. Subsection (b) of this section removes liability for 
interceptions made with the prior consent of one of the parties to the 
communication. Wyo. Stat. § 7-3-606(p) (1997) states that "[t]he contents of any 
intercepted wire, oral or electronic communication or evidence derived therefrom 
shall not be admitted as evidence in any trial, hearing or other proceeding in 
this state unless the interception was performed in accordance with this 
act."

  

2Our 
decision here does not address many areas of chronic confusion in the 
appointment of a guardian ad litem, e.g., when an appointment is necessary, the 
necessary qualifications to serve as guardian ad litem, and the timeliness of 
the court's communication of the specific duties expected by the court. In 
recognition of the need for clarification and the lack of uniformity throughout 
our state, we urge our courts, legislators, professionals, and concerned 
citizens to undertake a consolidated effort to address the appointment of 
counsel and guardians ad litem for Wyoming's children.   See In re Jeffrey R.L., 190 W. Va. 
24, 435 S.E.2d 162, 178-80 App. A (1993); Minnesota Rules of Guardian Ad Litem 
Procedure (adopted August 27, 1997); Colo. Rev. Stat. 14-10-116 (effective July 
1, 1997); Michigan Guidelines for Advocates for Children (submitted by the State 
Bar of Michigan's Children's Task Force); Missouri Supreme Court Standards for 
Guardians Ad Litem (Sept. 17 1996); Virginia Standards to Govern the Appointment 
of Guardians Ad Litem, Va.Code 16.1-266.1 (effective Jan. 1, 1995); ABA Proposed 
Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who Represent Children In Abuse and Neglect 
Cases (approved by the Council of the Family Law Section August 5, 1995), 29-3 
Fam. L.Quart. 375 (1995); Representing Children: Standards for Attorneys and 
Guardians Ad Litem in Custody or Visitation Proceedings, 13 J. Am. Acad. Matrim. 
Law. 1 (Summer 1995); and Renee Goldenberg and Nancy S. Palmer, Guardian Ad 
Litem Programs: Where They Have Gone and Where They Are Going, 69-Dec. Fla. B.J. 
83 (1995) (discussing recent amendments to Florida statutes regarding guardian 
ad litem practice).

  

3See 
Leary v. Leary, 97 Md. App. 26, 627 A.2d 30, 37 (1993) ("A dichotomy exists 
between the attorney as guardian and the attorney as advocate, and the lines 
become very easily blurred."); Ann Haralambie, The Role of the Child's Attorney 
in Protecting the Child Throughout the Litigation Process, 71 N.D.L.Rev. 939, 
941 (1995) ("Courts and legislatures have not provided much assistance and have 
often required attorneys to assume dual and potentially inconsistent roles."); 
Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Representation of Children, 64 
Fordham L.Rev. 1819, 1842 (1996) ("[A] more common example of a possible 
conflict arising from duties * * * is the lawyer in a child custody * * * case 
who serves both as the child's attorney and as guardian ad litem.") (emphasis in 
original); and Roy T. Stuckey, Guardians Ad Litem as Surrogate Parents: 
Implications for Role Definition and Confidentiality, 64 Fordham L.Rev. 1785, 
1786 (1996) ("Role definition and confidentiality issues can arise whenever 
attorneys are appointed to serve as guardians ad litem; however, they become 
even more complex when an attorney is appointed to serve as both the attorney 
and the guardian ad litem for a child.").

  

4Wyo. 
Stat. § 14-3-211 provides:

           
(a) The court shall appoint counsel to represent any child in a court 
proceeding in which the child is alleged to be abused or neglected. Any attorney 
representing a child under this section shall also serve as the child's guardian 
ad litem unless a guardian ad litem has been appointed by the court. The 
attorney or guardian ad litem shall be chargedwith representation of the child's 
best interest.

           
(b) The court may appoint counsel for any party when necessary in the 
interest of justice.

  

5We 
recognize that in some instances a child may be too young to understand the 
purpose of the proceedings or the role of the attorney/guardian ad litem. 
However, in most cases, the information may be conveyed in an age-appropriate 
manner.

  

6Wilcox-Elliott 
v. Wilcox, 924 P.2d 419 (Wyo. 1996); Matter of Parental Rights to ARW, 716 P.2d 353 (Wyo. 1986); Matter of Parental Rights of PP, 648 P.2d 512 (Wyo. 1982).