Title: RONALD ANDREW ROMERO V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RONALD ANDREW ROMERO V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 84Case Number: S-09-0210Decided: 06/24/2010NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

RONALD 
ANDREW ROMERO,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Michael K. Davis, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. 
Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; John 
S. Burbridge, Senior Assistant Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
Ronald 
Romero challenges the sentence he received after being convicted on a felony 
charge of a third battery against a household member.  He claims the State failed to prove that 
one of his prior convictions was against a household member.  Satisfied that the proof was sufficient, 
we will affirm Mr. Romero's sentence.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 

[¶2]        
Mr. 
Romero presents one issue:  "Did the 
State prove that Mr. Romero was subject to felony punishment under Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-2-501(f)(ii)?"

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
On 
March 3, 2009, a jury found Mr. Romero guilty of battery against a 
household member.  Following a 
procedure previously agreed to by the parties, the district court dismissed the 
jury, then allowed the State to present evidence of two of Mr. Romero's 
prior convictions.  The State 
offered Exhibit 15, which was an authenticated copy of a Judgment and Sentence 
entered against Mr. Romero in 2007, and Exhibit 16, an authenticated copy of an 
Amended Judgment and Sentence entered against Mr. Romero in 2000.  Mr. Romero offered no objection, 
and the district court received Exhibits 15 and 16 into evidence "for purposes 
of sentencing."  The district court 
then ordered the preparation of a Presentence Investigation Report for Mr. 
Romero.

 
 

[¶4]        
At 
the sentencing hearing, Mr. Romero's defense counsel indicated that they had 
received and reviewed the Presentence Investigation Report, and had a single 
objection.  The Report indicated 
that Mr. Romero had been convicted of misdemeanor harassment in 2003.  Mr. Romero contended that this charge 
had been dismissed, and did not result in a conviction.  The district court agreed to disregard 
that information.  Defense counsel 
stated that Mr. Romero had "no material corrections to make" to any of the other 
information contained in the Report.  
After Mr. Romero offered several witnesses who spoke on his behalf, the 
district court, at Mr. Romero's request, continued the sentencing hearing 
to allow Mr. Romero an opportunity to complete his efforts to gain 
acceptance into a community corrections or alcohol treatment 
program.

 
 

[¶5]        
When 
the sentencing hearing was later reconvened, the district court heard from the 
victim, and from Mr. Romero himself.  
The district court stated, however, that its "focus" in sentencing would 
be "on the information that has come out through the Presentence Investigation 
Report."  Mr. Romero made no 
objection.  The district court then 
pronounced that, "With regard to the charge of battery, third offense domestic, 
under Wyoming Statute 6-2-501(b)(f)(ii), I will impose a sentence of not less 
than three, nor more than five years of confinement by the Wyoming Department of 
Corrections."  Mr. Romero has 
appealed that sentencing decision.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶6]        
Mr. 
Romero's issue is best characterized as a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence.

 
 
When 
we review a criminal conviction for sufficiency of the evidence, we view facts 
in the light most favorable to the State.  
Downs v. State, 581 P.2d 610, 
614 (Wyo. 1978).  We leave out any 
conflicting evidence of the defendant, and draw every reasonable inference in 
the State's favor.  Id.  The question we must answer is whether a 
reasonable and rational jury could have convicted the defendant of the crime 
based upon the evidence that was presented at trial.  Horn v. State, 554 P.2d 1141, 1145 (Wyo. 
1976).

 
 

Guy 
v. State, 
2008 WY 56, ¶ 37, 184 P.3d 687, 698 (Wyo. 2008).  We apply the same standard to a decision 
made by the court rather than a jury.  
Fitzgerald v. State, 599 P.2d 572, 574 (Wyo. 1979) ("The function of the finder of fact in cases tried to a 
court is identical to that in cases tried to juries, and the same rules are 
applicable with respect to the standards and principles applied in appellate 
review.").

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶7]        
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501 (LexisNexis 2007) provided,1 in pertinent 
part:

 
 
(b)       A person is 
guilty of battery if he unlawfully touches another in a rude, insolent or angry 
manner or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another 
. . . .

 
 
(f)        A 
household member as defined by W.S. 35-21-102 who commits a second or subsequent 
battery against any other household member shall be punished as follows: . . 
.

 
 

(ii)          
 A person convicted upon a plea of guilty 
or no contest or found guilty of a third or subsequent offense under this 
subsection against any other household member, after having been convicted upon 
a plea of guilty or no contest or found guilty of a violation of W.S. 
6-2-501(a), (b), (e) or (f), 6-2-502, 6-2-503, 6-2-504 or other substantially 
similar law of this or any other state, tribe or territory against any other 
household member within the previous ten (10) years is guilty of a felony 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, a fine of not more 
than two thousand dollars ($2,000.00), or both.

 
 
The 
term "household member" is defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-21-102(a)(iv) to 
include:

 
 

(A)    
Persons 
married to each other;

(B)    
Persons 
living with each other as if married;

(C)    
Persons 
formerly married to each other;

(D)    
Persons 
formerly living with each other as if married;

(E)    
Parents 
and their adult children;

(F)    
Other 
adults sharing common living quarters;

(G)    
Persons 
who are the parents of a child but who are not living with each other; 
and

(H)    
Persons 
who are in, or have been in, a dating relationship.

 
 

[¶8]        
Mr. 
Romero was charged under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501(b) and (f)(ii), which 
applies only to third or subsequent convictions of battery (or other specified 
crime) against a household member.  
Fall v. State, 963 P.2d 981, 984 (Wyo. 1998).  We have recognized 
that this statute does not create a new offense, but is merely a sentence 
enhancement provision.  Id.; Spinner v. State, 2003 WY 106, 
¶ 28, 75 P.3d 1016, 1027 (Wyo. 2003).  
Accordingly, Mr. Romero's prior crimes against 
household members were not elements of the crime to be proved at trial, but 
instead facts to be considered by the district court when sentencing Mr. 
Romero.  Fall, 963 P.2d  at 984.2

 
 

[¶9]        
To 
document Mr. Romero's prior crimes against household members, the State 
entered Exhibits 15 and 16 into evidence.  
Mr. Romero made no objection to either exhibit.  Exhibit 15 established that Mr. 
Romero was convicted of battery in 2007.  
Mr. Romero 
concedes that the text of this exhibit proves that the victim of his battery was 
a household member.  Exhibit 16 
established that Mr. Romero was convicted of battery and aggravated assault in 
2000.  Mr. Romero contends that 
Exhibit 16 does not prove that the victim was a household 
member.

 
 

[¶10]     
Our 
review of Exhibit 16 confirms that it does not explicitly show that the victim 
of his crimes in 2000 was a household member.  It states that Mr. Romero was convicted 
of battery and "Aggravated Assault on a Pregnant Woman."  However, it does not identify the 
pregnant woman.  It does not say 
that she was a household member, and it does not contain any other facts from 
which that determination could be made explicitly.

 
 

[¶11]     
Under 
the applicable standard of review, however, we must draw every reasonable 
inference in the State's favor.  The 
State asserts that Exhibit 16 is sufficient, under this standard, to establish 
that the pregnant victim was a household member.  The State points out that Exhibit 16 
includes as a condition of probation that Mr. Romero "shall not live with 
[A.G.], until it is deemed appropriate by his counselor and his probation 
agent."  According to the State, 
this information gives rise to an inference that Mr. Romero had been living 
with A.G. prior to his conviction, and thus, that A.G. was a household 
member.  Similarly, the State points 
out that Exhibit 16 ordered Mr. Romero to "attend the Batterer's 
Re-education program and follow all recommendations."  According to the State, this information 
gives rise to an inference that Mr. Romero had engaged in domestic 
violence.  

 
 

[¶12]     
If 
our review were limited solely to the contents of Exhibit 16, we would question 
whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that the conviction reflected 
in Exhibit 16 involved a household member.  The document does not identify A.G. as 
the victim of the crime, and it does not indicate that the "Batterer's 
Re-education program" was limited to those convicted of battering a household 
member.  Exhibit 16 is not, however, 
the only evidence relied upon by the State.

 
 

[¶13]     
The 
State contends that, even if Exhibit 16 is insufficient, the information 
contained in Mr. Romero's Presentence Investigation Report is adequate to 
demonstrate that the victim of Mr. Romero's 2000 crime was a household 
member.  That Report plainly states 
that the "current/pending offense of Battery  Domestic Violence is the third 
type of charge in the Defendant's history."  It confirms that A.G. was the victim of 
Mr. Romero's crime, that she is the mother of his child, and that the 
program Mr. Romero was ordered to participate in was the "Family 
Violence/Batterer's ReEducation Program."  
This information, together with Exhibit 16, is sufficient to 
establish that the victim of Mr. Romero's 2000 crime was a household 
member.  The remaining question, 
though, is whether the district court could properly rely on this information 
from the Presentence Investigation Report.  

 
 

[¶14]     
Mr. 
Romero's primary challenge to the district court's reliance on the information 
from the Presentence Investigation Report is based on our recent decision in Duke v. State, 2009 WY 74, ¶ 21, 
209 P.3d 563, 571 (Wyo. 2009).  In 
that case, we held that the preparer of a Presentence Investigation Report is 
not an agent of the prosecution, but an agent of the court.  "Because the presentence report was not 
prepared and submitted by an agent of the prosecution," Mr. Romero contends, "it 
cannot be considered as evidence to meet the prosecution's burden of proving the 
[sentence] enhancement elements."  

 
 

[¶15]     
We 
are not persuaded by this argument.  
There are established procedures to ensure that a district court will 
rely only on accurate and reliable information from a Presentence Investigation 
Report.  W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(3)(A) 
requires that, "At least 10 days before imposing sentence, unless this minimum 
period is waived by the defendant, the court shall provide the defendant and the 
defendant's counsel with a copy of the report of the presentence 
investigation."  This rule also 
requires that, "The court shall afford the defendant and the defendant's counsel 
an opportunity to comment on the report and, in the discretion of the court, to 
introduce testimony or other information relating to any alleged factual 
inaccuracy contained in it."  Rule 
32(a)(3)(C) further specifies that:

 
 
If 
the comments of the defendant and the defendant's counsel or testimony or other 
information introduced by them allege any factual inaccuracy in the presentence 
investigation report or the summary of the report or part thereof, the court 
shall, as to each matter controverted, make:

 
 

(i)    
 A finding as to the allegation; 
or

 
 

(ii)  
 A determination that no such finding is 
necessary because the matter controverted will not be taken into account in 
sentencing.  A written record of 
such findings and determinations shall be appended to and accompany any copy of 
the presentence investigation report thereafter made available to penal 
institutions.

 
 
We 
have explained the workings of these provisions (or their predecessors) as 
follows:

 
 
In 
Christy [v. State], 731 P.2d [1204,] 1207-08 
[(Wyo. 1987)], we determined that the trial court may consider "filed reports 
and information" at sentencing, so long as the defendant is given the 
opportunity "to deny, dispute, or disprove."  Two years later, in Smallwood [v. State], 771 P.2d [798,] 802 [(Wyo. 
1989)], we described this as "an opportunity to rebut pre-sentence information 
which is materially false or which furnishes invalid premises for the sentence 
which the judge is imposing."  In Clouse [v. State], 776 P.2d [1011,] 1015 [(Wyo. 
1989)], we made clear that it is the defendant's obligation to object to any 
sentencing information he contends is inaccurate.

 
 

Bitz 
v. State, 
2003 WY 140, ¶ 14, 78 P.3d 257, 260 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 

[¶16]     
Because 
these procedures provide the defendant a full and fair opportunity to respond to 
the information contained in a Presentence Investigation Report, they help to 
ensure that the district court will not base sentencing decisions on faulty 
information.  Accordingly, we have 
"specifically determine[d] that filed [presentence investigation] reports and 
information are evidence for the exercise of sentencing discretion, subject only 
to the rights of the convicted individual to deny, dispute or disprove."  Christy, 731 P.2d  at 
1207-08.

 
 

[¶17]     
The 
record establishes that Mr. Romero was afforded an opportunity to deny, dispute, 
or disprove the information contained in his Presentence Investigation 
Report.  He took advantage of that 
opportunity, and denied one reported conviction.  The district court stated that it would 
not rely on that information in making its sentencing decision.  Mr. Romero never disputed the 
information from the Presentence Investigation Report establishing that the 
victim in his battery and aggravated assault conviction was a household 
member.  Even now, on appeal, he does not claim 
that this evidence is false.  

 
 

[¶18]     
In 
previous decisions, we determined that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501(f)(ii) is 
a sentence enhancement provision.  
Fall, 963 P.2d  at 984; Spinner, ¶ 28, 75 P.3d  at 
1027.  We have also said that, 
"in 
imposing sentence, the trial court is given broad discretion to consider a wide 
variety of factors about the defendant and his crimes."  Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1115 
(Wyo. 1993).  In Craig, ¶ 15, 163 P.3d  at 832, we 
found no error when the district court determined, during the sentencing 
hearing, that Mr. Craig had two previous convictions of crimes against household 
members.  Based on these precedents, 
we cannot conclude that 
the district court erred when it considered, during the sentencing hearing, the 
information contained in Mr. Romero's Presentence Investigation Report.  Based on that information, together with 
the State's Exhibits 15 and 16, the district court had sufficient evidence to 
support its decision that Mr. Romero was subject to felony punishment under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501(f)(ii) for a third offense of battery against a 
household member.

 
 

[¶19]     
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The Wyoming 
legislature amended this statute during its 2009 session, but in ways that do 
not affect this appeal.  See 2009 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 
124.

 
 

2Mr. 
Romero has never claimed, either at trial or on appeal, that the jury, rather 
than the district court, should have determined if the victims of his prior 
crimes were household members.  See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 
490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2362-63, 147 L.Ed.2d  
435 (2000) ("[O]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must 
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.").  As we have noted before, however, "Even 
should these circumstances fall within tenets of Apprendi, the right to a jury trial, as 
critical and fundamental as it is, can be waived."  Craig v. State, 2007 WY 122, ¶ 13, 
163 P.3d 828, 832 (Wyo. 2007).  
Because Mr. Romero has never raised this issue, we will not consider 
it.