Title: City of Huntsville, Alabama v. Stove House 5, Inc.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 05/30/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1070353
_________________________
City of Huntsville
v.
Stove House 5, Inc.
Appeal from Madison Circuit Court
(CV–04-240)
LYONS, Justice.
The City of Huntsville ("Huntsville"), the plaintiff in
a declaratory-judgment action, appeals from a summary judgment
in favor of Stove House 5, Inc. ("Stove House").  We affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
1070353
2
Huntsville experienced significant economic growth and
geographic expansion in the 1950s.  In 1956 the Alabama
Legislature passed Act No. 86, the stated purpose of which was
"[t]o alter, extend, re-arrange, and re-define the boundaries
and corporate limits of the City of Huntsville, annexing
certain territory to the city, and making provision for the
assessment and collection of municipal taxes."  Act No. 86,
Ala. Acts 1956 (Second Special Session).  This act annexed
approximately 
14,000 
acres 
into 
Huntsville's 
corporate 
limits,
but also expressly excluded six tracts of land where
industries had originally located outside the corporate
limits.  
These six tracts of unincorporated land became known as
"tax islands" because they are now surrounded by land that is
within Huntsville's corporate limits.  Although no tax revenue
for Huntsville is generated from the tax islands because the
land is situated outside Huntsville's corporate limits,
Huntsville has provided fire and police protection and
sanitary sewer service to the tax islands since 1956.  Stove
House asserts that in 1956 Huntsville and the owners of land
situated on the tax islands agreed that the tax islands would
1070353
The two other tax islands are the Mallory Plant tax
1
island and the John Blue tax island.  The John Blue tax island
was annexed before this litigation began, and the Mallory
Plant tax island was not included in this litigation.
3
receive city services in exchange for the owners not opposing
the passage of Act No. 86.
From 1956 until 1991, the tax islands were outside the
corporate limits of Huntsville, but within the police
jurisdiction of Huntsville pursuant to § 11-40-10(a), Ala.
Code 1975 ("The police jurisdiction in cities having 6,000 or
more inhabitants shall cover all adjoining territory within
three miles of the corporate limits ....").  In 1991 voters
ratified Amendment No. 531 to the Alabama Constitution of 1901
(now included in Local Amendments, Madison County § 9 (Off.
Recomp.)), which effectively excluded the tax islands from the
police jurisdiction of Huntsville.  Amendment No. 531
provides: "In Madison county, no police jurisdiction nor any
planning or zoning regulation of a municipality located wholly
or partially within Madison county shall extend beyond the
corporate limits of the municipality."  
On January 27, 2004, Huntsville sued the owners of land
situated on the tax islands known as Martin Stove, Lincoln
Mill, Lowe Mill, and Merrimack Mill ("the landowners"),1
1070353
4
seeking a judgment declaring that Huntsville has no duty under
Alabama law to continue providing city services, namely fire
and police protection and sanitary sewer services, to these
landowners.  Huntsville further sought a declaration that
because, it says, it has no duty to provide such city services
to the landowners, it could lawfully cease providing such
services to the landowners.  Huntsville named the following
individuals and entities as defendants: Reliance Agents, Inc.;
John H. Ebaugh; Marguerite W. Ebaugh; Robin Ebaugh; Lowe Mill
Properties, LLC; Storage Equities; PS Partners VI, Ltd.; and
Stove House.
Huntsville voluntary dismissed the action as it related
to Storage Equities and PS Partners VI, Ltd., after Huntsville
annexed land on the tax island known as Merrimack Mill.
Huntsville and the Ebaughs jointly moved in the trial court
for the entry of a consent judgment evidencing their
settlement, which provided, in part, that Huntsville would
annex land on the tax island known as Lincoln Mill.  The trial
court granted the motion and entered the consent judgment.
Huntsville and Lowe Mill Properties jointly stipulated to the
dismissal of the action as it related to Lowe Mill Properties,
1070353
Stove House did not assert the affirmative defense of
2
laches in its answer to Huntsville's complaint; therefore,
the defense would ordinarily be deemed to have been waived.
See Wallace v. Alabama Ass'n of Classified Sch. Employees, 463
So. 2d 135, 137 (Ala. 1984) (quoting Funding Sys. Leasing
Corp. v. Pugh, 530 F.2d 91, 96 (5th Cir. 1976) ("a defendant
'cannot revive [the waived affirmative defense] in a
memorandum in support of a motion for summary judgment'")).
However, the defense is not waived here because Stove House
raised the defense of laches in its summary-judgment motion
without objection from Huntsville.  Huntsville even addressed
the merits of the defense in its brief in opposition to Stove
House's summary-judgment motion.  See Smith v. Sushka, 117
F.3d 965, 969 (6th Cir. 1997) ("Failure to raise an
affirmative defense by responsive pleading does not always
result in waiver.  The purpose of Rule 8(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is to give the opposing party notice
of the affirmative defense and a chance to respond." (internal
citation omitted)); Alexander v. Consumers Illinois Water Co.,
358 Ill. App. 3d 774, 780, 838 N.E. 2d 963, 968, 298 Ill. Dec.
70, 76 (2005) ("an affirmative defense is not waived, despite
the fact that it was not raised in an answer to a complaint,
if the defense is subsequently raised without objection in a
motion for summary judgment").
5
and the trial court dismissed the action as to Lowe Mill
Properties without prejudice.  Reliance Agents, Inc., and
Stove House were the remaining defendants.
Stove House and Huntsville each moved for a summary
judgment.  Stove House asserted two alternative bases for its
summary-judgment motion.  Stove House first contended that the
doctrine of laches  bars Huntsville's declaratory-judgment
2
action because, it argued, Huntsville's lengthy delay in
filing the action has prejudiced it.  Stove House specifically
1070353
6
argued that because more than 50 years had passed since
Huntsville agreed to provide city services to the landowners
it was impossible to identify witnesses who had knowledge of
the creation of the tax islands in 1956 and of any agreements
between Huntsville and the landowners.  
As an alternative basis for summary judgment, Stove House
contended that Huntsville had agreed in 1956 to provide city
services to the tax islands and that that agreement still
exists.  Stove House asserted that Huntsville had admitted the
existence of an agreement between Huntsville and the
landowners and that Huntsville's course of performance over
the last 50 years evidences its intent to provide city
services to the landowners.  Stove House then stated, in its
brief in support of its motion for a summary judgment:
  
"To further bolster this contract, the law of
Alabama 
has 
established 
that 
'a 
municipal
corporation may be held liable on an implied
contract' whether implied from corporate acts or
implied 
by 
law, 
especially 
'to 
prevent 
the
municipality from enriching itself by accepting and
retaining benefits without paying just compensation
therefor.'  Bethune v. City of Mountain Brook, [293
Ala. 89,] 300 So. 2d 350 (Ala. 1974), also citing
Gresson Mfg. Co. v. County Bd. of Ed., [217 Ala.
565,] 117 So. 163 (Ala. 1928)[.] [Huntsville] was
greatly enriched by annexation of 21 ½ square miles
without vote of those affected.  The benefits to
1070353
7
[Huntsville] continue to this day, as does [its]
obligation under the Agreement."
(Emphasis added.)
In its brief in opposition to Stove House's summary-
judgment motion, Huntsville contended that all Stove House's
arguments "fall flat" because, it said, there is no formal
contract between Huntsville and the landowners.  Huntsville
contended that controlling caselaw plainly states that a
municipality has no duty to provide municipal services outside
its corporate boundaries in the absence of a formal contract.
See City of Attalla v. Dean Sausage, Inc.,  889 So. 2d 570
(Ala. Civ. App. 2003).  Huntsville further noted that § 11-47-
5, Ala. Code 1975, provides that "[c]ontracts entered into by
a municipality shall be in writing" and that there is no
evidence indicating that a written contract between Huntsville
and the landowners exists.  Similarly, in its summary-judgment
motion Huntsville argued that it lacks any duty under Alabama
law to continue providing city services to the tax islands and
that, therefore, Huntsville can lawfully cease providing city
services to the tax islands.
The trial court denied Huntsville's motion for a summary
judgment, granted Stove House's motion for a summary judgment,
1070353
8
and entered a summary judgment in favor of Stove House.  The
trial court in its order did not provide any rationale for its
decision.  Huntsville then filed a motion to amend, alter, or
vacate the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P.,
and a motion to strike certain evidentiary material submitted
by Stove House in opposition to Huntsville's motion for a
summary judgment.  The trial court denied both motions. 
Huntsville and Reliance Agents, Inc., then jointly
stipulated to the dismissal of Huntsville's claims against
Reliance Agents, Inc.  The trial court dismissed the action as
it related to Reliance Agents without prejudice.  Huntsville
then appealed to this Court.  Stove House is the only
remaining defendant and the only appellee.
II. Standard of Review 
The standard by which this Court will review a ruling on
a motion for summary judgment is well established:
"'The principles of law applicable to
a motion for summary judgment are well
settled.  To grant such a motion, the trial
court must determine that the evidence does
not create a genuine issue of material fact
and that the movant is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.  Rule
56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P.  When the movant
makes a prima facie showing that those two
conditions are satisfied, the burden shifts
1070353
9
to the nonmovant to present "substantial
evidence" creating a genuine issue of
material fact.  Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of
Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794, 797-98
(Ala. 1989); § 12-21-12(d)[,] Ala. Code
1975.  Evidence is "substantial" if it is
of 
"such 
weight 
and 
quality 
that
fair-minded persons in the exercise of
impartial judgment can reasonably infer the
existence of the fact sought to be proved."
West v. Founders Life Assur. Co. of
Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989).
"'In our review of a summary judgment,
we apply the same standard as the trial
court.  Ex parte Lumpkin, 702 So. 2d 462,
465 (Ala. 1997).  Our review is subject to
the caveat that we must review the record
in a light most favorable to the nonmovant
and must resolve all reasonable doubts
against the movant.  Hanners v. Balfour
Guthrie, Inc., 564 So. 2d 412 (Ala.
1990).'"
Payton v. Monsanto Co., 801 So. 2d 829, 832-33 (Ala. 2001)
(quoting Ex parte Alfa Mut. Gen. Ins. Co., 742 So. 2d 182, 184
(Ala. 1999)). 
III. Analysis
Huntsville argues that the trial court improperly entered
a summary judgment for Stove House because, it contends,
settled Alabama law provides that when a municipality does not
collect taxes from the owners of property outside the
municipality's corporate limits, the municipality is not
1070353
10
required to provide city services to these owners.  Huntsville
relies heavily on the Court of Civil Appeals' holding in Dean
Sausage, that "any municipal services being provided in a
police jurisdiction without a formal contract or agreement
'"may be prospectively altered in scope or terminated, after
appropriate prior public notice."'"  889 So. 2d at 570
(quoting City of Prattville v. Joyner, 698 So. 2d 122, 125
(Ala. 1997) ("Joyner") quoting in turn the amicus brief of the
attorney general) (emphasis added).  Simply, Huntsville
contends that it has no duty to provide city services to
nonresident landowners such as Stove House because, it says,
there is no evidence indicating that Huntsville agreed,
pursuant to a formal contract, to provide these services.
Huntsville further contends that absent a formal contract
between it and the landowners, neither equitable estoppel nor
any other equitable principles prevent it from terminating
city services to the tax islands.  First, Huntsville notes
that this Court has repeatedly held that "'[e]quitable
estoppel is to be applied against a governmentality only with
extreme caution or under exceptional circumstances.'"  Joyner,
698 So. 2d at 126 (quoting  State Highway Dep't v. Headrick
1070353
11
Outdoor Adver., Inc., 594 So. 2d 1202, 1204 (Ala. 1992).
Huntsville further notes that in Dean Sausage the Court of
Civil Appeals construed the holding in Joyner to be based on
the 
rationale 
that 
"residents 
in 
a 
municipal 
police
jurisdiction acquire no vested interest or entitlement to the
continued provision of municipal services by reliance or
estoppel."  889 So. 2d at 570.  In accordance with Joyner and
Dean Sausage, Huntsville contends that it is not estopped from
terminating city services to the landowners because, as
nonresidents of Huntsville, the landowners do not have a
vested interest in the provision of the city services.
Huntsville also argues that the doctrine of laches is
inapplicable to this case because, it says, Stove House cannot
show that it was disadvantaged, harmed, or prejudiced by the
passage of time.  Huntsville relies on Touchstone v. Peterson,
443 So. 2d 1219, 1226 (Ala. 1983), in which this Court stated:
"To be affected by laches, the delay must have been
with notice of the existence of the right, resulting
in disadvantage, harm, or prejudice to another, or
have operated to bring about changes in conditions
and circumstances so that there can no longer be a
safe determination of the controversy."  
Huntsville further contends that the doctrine of laches is
irrelevant because, it says, there is no evidence indicating
1070353
12
that a formal contract between Huntsville and the landowners
exists and under the authority of Dean Sausage, absent a
formal contract, it may terminate city services to the tax
islands.  In other words, Huntsville asserts that even if it
had brought this action 50 years earlier, there still would
not have been any evidence of a formal contract between
Huntsville and the landowners.  Lastly, Huntsville notes that
the underlying concept behind the doctrine of laches and
equitable estoppel are the same -– that one party's delay in
asserting rights cannot be allowed to prejudice another party
-- and because Dean Sausage held that equitable estoppel
cannot prevent a municipality from terminating city services
to 
nonresidents, 
the 
doctrine 
of 
laches 
is 
likewise
inapplicable to nonresidents.
Stove House argues that the trial court properly entered
a summary judgment in its favor because, it says, the oral
agreement between Huntsville and the landowners is enforceable
under the implied-contract theory set out in Bethune  v. City
of Mountain Brook, 293 Ala. 89, 300 So. 2d 350 (1974).  Stove
House 
also 
asserts 
that 
this 
Court 
cannot 
consider
Huntsville's arguments as to why the implied-contract theory
1070353
13
should not apply because, it says, Huntsville failed to
present these arguments in the trial court.  Stove House
further contends that, to the extent the trial court may have
relied upon the doctrines of equitable estoppel and laches,
the trial court properly entered a summary judgment in its
favor.
Because affirmative defenses are threshold issues, we
must determine the applicability of the doctrines of equitable
estoppel and laches before we address the merits of whether
Huntsville has a duty to provide city services to the tax
islands and whether it may terminate those services.  First,
we conclude that equitable estoppel does not prevent
Huntsville from terminating city services to the landowners
because the landowners have no vested rights to city services.
See Dean Sausage, 889 So. 2d at 570 (quoting Joyner, 698 So.
2d at 125).  We also conclude that laches should not be
applied against Huntsville because the defense should not be
applied against municipalities.  In King v. Campbell, [Ms.
1060804 Nov. 30, 2007] __ So. 2d __(Ala. 2007), this Court
quoted from Greenwood v. State ex rel. Bailes, 230 Ala. 405,
407, 161 So. 498, 499 (1935), as follows:
1070353
14
"'Reduced to the last analysis, the defense
sought to be interposed is in the nature of an
estoppel. But this court in State ex rel. Lott v.
Brewer, 64 Ala. 287, [298 (1879),] declared that
estoppels against the state cannot be favored, and
that though they may arise in some instances, yet,
upon the broad ground of public policy, they cannot
arise, certainly as to the exercise of governmental
functions, "from the laches of its officers."'"
This Court has applied this rule to the actions of municipal
officials.  See State v. City of Gadsden, 216 Ala. 243, 113
So. 6 (1927).  We therefore reject Stove House's defense of
laches.  Moreover, Stove House's defense of laches based upon
failing memories as to the terms of the oral agreement is
inherently inconsistent with Stove House's alternative theory
of the existence of an implied contract. 
We now turn to Stove House's alternative contention that
an implied contract exists between Huntsville and the
landowners.  In its brief to this Court Huntsville asserts
that Stove House may attempt to argue that Bethune allows a
party seeking to enforce an oral agreement with a municipality
to succeed on an implied-contract theory, even though § 11-47-
5 provides that "[c]ontracts entered into by a municipality
shall be in writing, signed and executed in the name of the
city or town by the officers authorized to make the same and
1070353
15
by the party contracting."  Huntsville then attempts to
distinguish Bethune from the present case.  Huntsville
concludes that any alleged oral agreement between Huntsville
and the landowners remains executory in nature, that Bethune
is distinguishable because it did not deal with an executory
contract, and that, therefore, any implied contract in the
present case is unenforceable. 
Stove House responds by first contending that this Court
cannot 
consider 
Huntsville's 
arguments 
attempting 
to
distinguish Bethune because, it asserts, those arguments are
raised for the first time on appeal.  Stove House asserts that
Huntsville so heavily relied upon the Court of Civil Appeals'
holding in Dean Sausage that it failed to provide the trial
court with any reason why the law of implied contract set out
in Bethune, and clearly argued by Stove House in its brief in
support of its summary-judgment motion, should not apply.
Stove House then notes the well-established law that "[t]his
Court cannot put a trial court in error for failing to
consider evidence or accept arguments that, according to the
record, were not presented to it."  Gotlieb v. Collat, 567 So.
2d 1302, 1304 (Ala. 1990).
1070353
16
As previously noted, Stove House, in its motion for a
summary judgment, quoted Bethune, 300 So. 2d at 352, for the
proposition that a "municipal corporation may be held liable
on an implied contract."  Although Huntsville's brief in
opposition to Stove House's summary-judgment motion noted that
Stove House alluded to an implied agreement between the
parties, Huntsville wholly failed to rebut Stove House's
assertion of the applicability of the implied-contract theory
or to distinguish this case from Bethune.  Simply stated,
Huntsville made no mention of Bethune, a decision of this
Court, in the trial court.  Huntsville stated only that 
"the appellate court [the Court of Civil Appeals] in
Dean Sausage spoke in terms of a 'formal contract or
agreement,' not an implied contract or an uncertain
agreement 
or 
understanding. 
 
Because 
it 
is
undisputable that there is no formal contract for the
provision of municipal services to tax islands,
[Huntsville] has no duty to provide same to the tax
islands."
Stove House attached exhibits to its motion for  a summary
judgment indicating that Huntsville had provided city services
to the landowners since 1956 and that it was doing so pursuant
to an oral agreement entered into by Huntsville and the
landowners.  Huntsville's brief in opposition to Stove House's
summary-judgment motion asserted that Stove House had offered
1070353
17
no evidence of an implied agreement.  Huntsville there
asserted 
that 
the 
previous 
and 
current 
attorneys 
for
Huntsville "have no knowledge of any contract at all between
the owners of the tax islands and [Huntsville]."  In its
principal brief before this Court, Huntsville notes that the
city attorney acknowledged the existence of "an informal
understanding 
between 
the 
original 
manufacturers 
and
industrialists located on the tax islands at the time of their
formation and [Huntsville] in or around the time of the
annexation in 1956."  Huntsville's brief at p. 42 (emphasis in
original).  This Court recognizes that "[a]n implied contract
arises where there are circumstances which, according to the
ordinary course of dealing and common understanding, show a
mutual intent to contract ...."  Broyles v. Brown Eng'g Co.,
275 Ala. 35, 38, 151 So. 2d 767, 770 (1963).  The materiality
of factual disputes as to the terms of any implied contract
between 
Huntsville 
and 
the 
landowners 
turns 
on 
the
availability 
to 
Huntsville 
of 
arguments 
that 
support
distinguishing Bethune. 
Huntsville's motion to alter, amend, or vacate the trial
court's order entering a summary judgment for Stove House and
1070353
18
denying its motion for a summary judgment also failed to
address Stove House's argument that a municipality may enter
into 
an 
implied 
contract. 
 
Huntsville 
reiterated 
its
contention that, absent a formal contract, it owed no duty to
the landowners to provide them city services and further
contended that the trial court erred to the extent it might
have relied upon the minutes of the Huntsville City Council
meetings as evidence of an agreement obligating Huntsville to
provide the landowners city services.  Once again, Huntsville
failed to address the import of this Court's decision in
Bethune.
Huntsville contends that Stove House's treatment of
Bethune in the trial court was confined to a single sentence.
We previously quoted that sentence; suffice it so say that its
brevity does not deprive it of clarity.  It unquestionably
afforded the trial court enough information to permit it to
base a decision on an implied contract.  Further, Bethune's
problems for the position taken by Huntsville are neither
subtle nor abstract.  In Bethune this Court noted the
predecessor 
to 
§ 
11-47-5, 
strenuously 
relied 
upon 
by
Huntsville in the trial court and providing that "contracts
1070353
19
entered into by a municipality shall be in writing, signed and
executed in the name of the city or town," but then stated
that "[w]e cannot accept the City's argument that any
agreement made by a city which are [sic] not in writing are
[sic] void."  293 Ala. at 93, 300 So. 2d at 352. 
Huntsville further attempts to excuse its disregard of the
well-established law that an appellant may present this Court
only with arguments that it presented to the trial court.
Huntsville states:
"[Huntsville] would have never discussed [in its
principal brief to this Court] whether any alleged
contract between it and the former owners of the tax
islands was executory if Stove House had not raised
the implied-contract defense in Bethune in the trial
court in the first place.  As such, it would be
fundamentally unfair to hold that [Huntsville] is
procedurally barred from arguing that Stove House's
implied-contract defense does not apply.  Not only
was 
this 
defense, 
in 
actuality, 
given 
little
attention by Stove House at the trial court level,
but [Huntsville] has no idea whether the trial court
actually relied upon this defense in ruling in Stove
House's favor because the summary-judgment order
contains no rationale." 
Huntsville's reply brief at p. 29 (citations to the record
omitted).  
Huntsville thus argues that it raised the Bethune issue
in its principal brief before this Court only because Stove
1070353
20
House had raised it in the trial court.  However, it is
fundamentally unfair to reverse the judgment of the trial
court by distinguishing Bethune as Huntsville, for the first
time on appeal, argues we should do.  "[T]he appellate court
can consider an argument against the validity of a summary
judgment only to the extent that the record on appeal contains
material from the trial court record presenting that argument
to the trial court before or at the time of submission of the
motion for summary judgment."  Ex parte Ryals, 773 So. 2d
1011, 1013 (Ala. 2000); see also Andrews v. Merritt Oil Co.,
612 So. 2d 409, 410 (Ala. 1992) ("This Court cannot consider
arguments raised for the first time on appeal; rather, our
review is restricted to the evidence and arguments considered
by the trial court.").  Because Huntsville made no attempt to
distinguish Bethune before the trial court, it is now
precluded from seeking reversal of the summary judgment on its
theory that Bethune is inapplicable, and we must affirm.  We,
of course, express no opinion on the merits of the question
whether 
Bethune 
is 
distinguishable 
on 
the 
facts 
here
presented. 
IV. Conclusion
1070353
21
We affirm the trial court's summary judgment in favor of
Stove House.
AFFIRMED.
See, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, and Bolin, JJ., concur.
Parker and Murdock, JJ., concur in the result.
Cobb, C.J., dissents.
1070353
22
COBB, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.  This case involves  "tax islands"
in which the businesses and residents located therein have
received services from the City of Huntsville without cost for
more than 50 years, all without benefit of any written
agreement.  The gist of the majority's opinion that Huntsville
is nonetheless bound to continue its service to the tax island
in question is based upon its conclusion that Huntsville
failed to advocate to the trial court that the case of Bethune
v. City of Mountain Brook, 293 Ala. 89, 300 So. 2d 350 (1974),
is distinguishable.  This is not a situation in which the
legal rationale of Bethune was not presented to the trial
court.  Rather, the majority holds that because Huntsville did
not advocate that the rationale of Bethune was inapplicable to
its situation, the judgment of the trial court may not be
reversed based on the trial court's failure to discern that
fact for itself.  If the majority opinion is properly regarded
by this Court as precedent, it would seem that henceforth this
Court may not reverse summary judgment when the trial court
had misapplied the rationale of an appellate opinion to reach
1070353
23
its conclusion and the nonmovant fails to demonstrate that it
has argued that misapplication  to the trial court.  
For example, consider a case where a plaintiff sues a
defendant 
chemical 
company 
for 
damage 
caused 
by 
the
plaintiff's contact with chemicals manufactured by the
company, and the company moves for a summary judgment based on
the statute of limitations because, under Garrett v. Raytheon
Co., 368 So. 2d 516 (Ala. 1979), the period between the date
of the plaintiff's last exposure and the date of filing the
action exceeded the limitations period.  If the trial court
enters a summary judgment for the defendant and the plaintiff
cannot show that it argued that Garrett has no application
because this Court overruled it in Griffin v. Unocal Corp.,
[Ms. 1061214, Jan. 25, 2008] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. 2008), the
rationale of the majority opinion suggests that this Court
must nonetheless affirm the summary judgment.  That rationale
is wrong.
I believe that the majority's reliance here on the well-
settled rule that this Court will not reverse a judgment of a
trial court on an issue not first presented to the trial
court, see Ex parte Ryals, 773 So. 2d 1011, 1013 (Ala. 2000),
1070353
24
and Andrews v. Merritt Oil Co., 612 So. 2d 409, 410 (Ala.
1992), is based upon a false premise.  In fact, the issue
before the trial court, presented by Stove House, was whether
Bethune warranted a holding that an implied contract for
services existed between Huntsville and Stove House as a
matter of law.  Accordingly, I believe that it is well within
the province of this Court to examine the applicability of
Bethune to the facts presented here.  Our law is well settled
that the trial court is presumed to know the law, a concept
that surely includes the trial court's correct application of
caselaw.  Ex parte Atchley, 936 So. 2d 513 (Ala. 2006),
Apicella v. State, 945 So. 2d 485, (Ala. Crim. App 2006), and
Carter v. Carter, 666 So. 2d 28 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995).  The
issue presented by Bethune, i.e., whether there were facts to
show an implied contract between Stove House and Huntsville as
a matter of law, was presented to the trial court, and it is
this Court's responsibility to consider whether the trial
court reached the correct result.  That is, it is also settled
law that this Court reviews the trial court's decisions on
questions of law de novo, and it is this Court's obligation as
an appellate court to undertake that review.  Board of Trs. of
1070353
25
Univ. of Alabama v. American Res. Ins. Co., [Ms. 1061492, May
2, 2008] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. 2008), Special Assets, L.L.C. v.
Chase Home Fin., L.L.C., [Ms. 1060083, Dec. 21, 2007] ___ So.
2d ___ (Ala. 2007), and Pinkerton Sec. & Investigation Servs.,
Inc. v. Chamblee, 961 So. 2d 97 (Ala. 2006).
Finally, I note that this case ultimately represents a
waste of both judicial resources and the resources of the
parties.  For all that appears in the opinion, Huntsville may
simply refile its action for a judgment declaring that it is
not obligated to provide further city services to Stove House
and this time argue the inapplicability of Bethune.  The
majority opinion achieves neither justice nor economy.