Title: WILLISTON BASIN INTERSTATE PIPELINE CO. v. WYOMING PSC

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

WILLISTON BASIN INTERSTATE PIPELINE CO. v. WYOMING PSC2000 WY 16996 P.2d 663Case Number: 98-300Decided: 02/09/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming

WILLISTON BASIN INTERSTATE PIPELINE COMPANY, Appellant 
(Petitioner),

v.

WYOMING PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, STEVE ELLENBECKER 
and KRISTIN LEE,

in their official capacities as Commissioners of the 
Wyoming Public Service Commission; and NG TRANSMISSION and WYOMING GAS COMPANY, 
Appellees (Respondents).

 

                                

W.R.A.P 12.09(b) Certification 
from the District Court of

Laramie County Honorable 
Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge.

  

 

    Bruce S. Asay of Associated 
Legal Group, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming, Robert T. Hall, III, of Thelen Reid & 
Priest, LLP, Washington, D.C. Argument by Mr. Asay, representing 
appellant.

     
Dale W. Cottam and Thomas A. Nicholas, III, of Hirst & Applegate, 
P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Cottam, representing appellees NG 
Transmission and Wyoming Gas Company.

     
Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney 
General; Harry D. Ivey, Assistant Attorney General, Argument by Mr. Ivey, 
representing appellee Wyoming Public Service 
Commission.

  

    
Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and HILL, 
JJ.

 

    
THOMAS, Justice.

 [¶1]         The primary issue presented by 
Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Company (Williston) is whether the Wyoming 
Public Service Commission (PSC) lacked authority under the law to issue a 
certificate of public convenience and necessity for an intrastate pipeline 
constructed before any application for the certificate. Other issues are raised 
relating to the rate approved for transmission of natural gas through the 
pipeline; the sufficiency of procedural due process concerning a pre-hearing 
procedural order; the sufficiency of the evidence to support the approval of the 
pipeline application; and error in allegedly refusing to review a cost study 
produced in response to an interim order of the PSC. Williston perceives the 
respondent to be the PSC, but NG Transmission (NGT) and Wyoming Gas Company 
(WGC) appear as respondents although both are simply divisions of Natural Gas 
Processing Company (NGP). We are satisfied that the PSC is not foreclosed from 
granting a certificate of public convenience and necessity under these 
circumstances, and the record in this case supports none of the other claims of 
error.  The Memorandum Opinion, 
Findings and Order, issued by the PSC on June 29, 1998, is affirmed in all 
respects.

 

                               
ISSUES

 

 [¶2]        This statement of the issues is 
found in Williston's Brief of Petitioner:

 

ISSUE ONE: Is the Commission's approval of a 
certificate of public convenience and necessity for NG Transmission contrary to 
statutory requirements?

 

a. The construction of a natural gas pipeline by NG 
Transmission without Commission authority was             
contrary to law.

 

b. The construction of natural gas pipelines by NG 
Transmission was unnecessary and duplicative.

 

    
        
c. Approval of the certificate was not in the best interest of the 
public.

 

ISSUE TWO: Were the transportation rates approved for 
NG Transmission by the Wyoming Public Service Commission excessive, unreasonable 
and not supported by substantial evidence?

 

a. It was unlawful for the Commission to 
retroactively approve a rate for the period March 1, 1995 B December 31, 
1996.

 

b. The Commission incorrectly accepted NG 
Transmission's proposed $0.50 rate from January 1, 1997 
forward.

 

c. The Commission erred in its apparent acceptance of 
cost figures from NGT based on unsupported cost figures of $7,000 per 
month.

 

d. The Commission erred in its apparent acceptance of 
NG Transmission's use of an 11.3% rate of return.

 

e. The Commission erred in its apparent acceptance of 
NG Transmission's proposed depreciation rate.

 

ISSUE THREE: Was the decision by the Commission in 
approving the application of NG Transmission supported in the 
record?

 

ISSUE FOUR: Did the Commission's pre-hearing 
procedural order deprive Williston Basin of procedural due 
process?

 

ISSUE FIVE: Did the Commission err in refusing to 
review the cost study produced in response to the interim 
order?

 

  This Statement of the Issues is found in 
the Brief of Respondents NG Transmission and Wyoming Gas 
Company:

 

A. Is the scope of review sought by WBI permitted 
under the Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act, the Wyoming Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, and Wyoming case law?

 

B. Was the Public Service Commission's decision to 
award NG Transmission a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity in 
accordance with Wyoming law and supported by substantial 
evidence?

 

C. Is NG Transmission's natural gas transportation 
rate of $.50 per dekatherm fair and reasonable, and is there substantial 
evidence to support such a rate?

 

D. Was the contested case procedure and two-day 
hearing conducted in accordance with Wyoming law?

 

  This Statement of the Issues is found in 
the Brief of Respondent Wyoming Public Service Commission:

  

1. Whether the Commission's issuance of a certificate 
of convenience and necessity was in accordance with Wyoming 
law?

 

2. Were the rates approved by the Commission just and 
reasonable and supported by substantial evidence?

 

3. Did the Commission correctly enter findings of 
fact and conclusions of law in its Memorandum Opinion, Findings and Order issued 
June 29, 1998?

 

4. Whether Williston Basin was provided all of the 
due process required by law?

 

5. Whether substantial evidence exists to support the 
Commission's factual findings?

 

  
Williston raises no additional issues in its reply 
brief.

 

                                
FACTS

 

[¶3]          Williston is an interstate 
natural gas pipeline engaged in the production, distribution, transportation, 
and storage of natural gas in Wyoming, Montana, and the Dakotas. NGP is a 
Wyoming corporation consisting of four divisions. The two divisions of NGP 
involved here are WGC, a natural gas distributor, and NGT, a   natural 
gas gathering and transmission company.

 

[¶4]          Historically, WGC purchased 
natural gas from Williston, which it then sold to its customers. To eliminate 
its reliance on Williston and ensure a continuous supply of natural gas, NGP 
constructed a pipeline to deliver gas directly from producers to WGC. NGP did 
not seek approval from the PSC before construction, as required by Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 37-2-205 (LEXIS 1999).1

 

 [¶5]        In December 1996, NGP established 
a new division, NGT, to "establish a transmission entity to seek PSC authority 
to operate intrastate transmission pipelines." NGT filed an application with the 
PSC for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for the operation of 
the pipeline. On January 6, 1997, WGC requested approval of a natural gas rate 
increase retroactive to March 1, 1995. Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 37-3-106(c) 
(LEXIS 1999),2 the PSC suspended the proposed 
actions for six months, to allow for investigation. The PSC consolidated the 
applications and scheduled a public hearing on them for April 1, 1997. Williston 
filed a Motion to Intervene in the application proceedings, and filed a Motion 
to Expedite Discovery Response, both of which the PSC granted on March 
21.

 

[¶6]          Williston filed a Motion to 
Compel Discovery and Continue Hearing on March 27. At the start of the hearing, 
the PSC heard arguments on that motion and elected to proceed as scheduled, 
reserving the option to grant a continuance if the evidence warranted it. The 
PSC heard testimony on April 1 and April 11. It released an Interim Order 
Issuing Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity on September 8, 1997. 
That order granted the original requests of NGT and WGC, and ordered NGT to file 
"a full cost of service study based on actual data from 1997 
operations."

 

 [¶7]        On June 29, 1998, the PSC issued 
its finalized Memorandum Opinion, Findings and Order. That document confirmed 
the interim order, and included a recitation of the PCS's findings and 
conclusions, plus a summary of the evidence presented. Williston filed a timely 
Petition for Review in the district court. The district court, on Williston's motion, certified the 
case to this Court, pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09.

 

         
                STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶8]          We review appeals certified 
to this Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09 with the same standard of review 
applicable in the district court. Union Telephone Co., Inc. v. Wyo. Public Serv. 
Comm'n, 907 P.2d 340, 341-42 (Wyo. 1995). That standard is found in Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (Lexis 1999), which provides the reviewing court 
shall:

 

(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings and conclusions found to be:

 

(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or 
otherwise not in accordance with law;

 

      *  *  
*

 

(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or 
limitations or lacking statutory right;

 

      (D) Without 
observance of procedure required by law; or

 

(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case 
reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by 
statute.

 

Speaking specifically of the 
PSC, we have said:

 

The PSC, in exercising its statutory powers to 
regulate and supervise public utilities * * * is required to give paramount 
consideration to the public interest, the desires of the utility being 
secondary. This court cannot usurp the legislative function delegated to the PSC 
in setting appropriate rates, but will defer to the agency discretion so long as 
the results are fair, reasonable, uniform and not unduly 
discriminatory.

 

Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. 
Wyo. Public Serv. Comm'n, 662 P.2d 878, 883 (Wyo. 1983) (citations omitted). In 
recognition of the limited nature of our review, we said, "[t]he judicial 
function is exhausted when we can find from the evidence a rational view for the 
conclusions of the PSC." Telstar Communications, Inc. v. Rule Radiophone Serv., 
Inc., 621 P.2d 241, 246 (Wyo. 1980).

 

                             
DISCUSSION

 

[¶9]          In its first and primary 
assignment of error, Williston challenges the PSC's award of a Certificate of 
Public Convenience and Necessity as contrary to law. Williston specifically 
claims NGT constructed the pipeline without PSC approval, and it is therefore 
illegal. There is no dispute among the parties that NGT constructed the pipeline 
without PSC approval. Williston argues that the PSC should therefore forever bar 
NGT from using its pipeline. In response, NGT argues that it was not required to 
obtain preconstruction approval because it was not a public utility at the time 
of construction as the pipeline delivered gas only to WGC and not directly to 
customers. Disagreeing with both, the PSC found the pipeline "should have been 
subject to Commission approval prior to commencement of construction," but 
granted the certificate nonetheless. The PSC correctly points out that Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 37-2-205 neither requires it to reject untimely applications, nor 
provides any penalty for them.  
Therefore, the PSC reasons that sanctions, if any, for untimely 
applications are within its own discretion. We agree, and hold that if an 
untimely application is acceptable in all other respects, the PSC may grant it 
and may impose sanctions or not, at its discretion.

 

 [¶10]     To determine whether an 
application is, in fact, acceptable in all other respects, we turn to the 
three-part standard by which the PSC is to decide applications for certificates. 
The legislature has set forth that standard in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 37-2-205(c) 
(LEXIS 1999), which provides in relevant part:

 

The commission shall have power, after hearing 
involving the financial ability and good faith of the applicant and the 
necessity of additional service in the community, to issue said certificate, 
as prayed for, or to refuse to issue the same * * *.

 

(Emphasis added.) Therefore, 
we will proceed to determine whether substantial evidence was presented at the 
hearing to establish the financial ability of NGT, the good faith of NGT, and 
the necessity of additional service.

 

 [¶11]     This Court has previously accepted 
corporate financial records and the testimony of corporate officers as evidence 
of financial ability. Western Radio Communications, Inc. v. Two-Way Radio Serv., 
Inc., 718 P.2d 15, 18 (Wyo. 1986). In the case at hand, NGT provided the cost of 
service study ordered by the PSC, which included a balance sheet, income 
statement, statement of cash flows, statement of operating revenues, and several 
other documents. The controller of NGP testified that NGT would require no 
external financing, and that NGP has the resources to operate NGT and fund 
foreseeable expansion. Therefore, substantial evidence supports a conclusion 
that NGT has the required financial ability.

 

 [¶12]     Showing good faith is a very 
different proposition from showing financial ability because good faith evades 
accurate measurement.  This Court 
has not had occasion to declare precisely what "good faith" means in the context 
of the statute in question here.  
Several other states use the same three-part analysis in regulating public utilities, but none of their 
reported decisions define "good faith" either. See Idaho Code § 61-528 (Michie 
1994); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 278.020 (Michie Supp. 1998); Miss. Code Ann. § 
77-3-13 (LEXIS Supp. 1999); Tenn. Code Ann. § 65-4-202 (Michie Supp. 1999); 
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 80.28.190 (West 1991).

 

[¶13]       Turning to this Court's 
discussions of "good faith" in other contexts, we see  definitions that match what most people 
probably think of when they hear the term.3  In a chattel mortgage case over a 
century ago, we adopted this definition of good faith: "Good faith consists in 
an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of 
another, even through the forms or technicalities of law, together with an 
absence of all information or belief of facts which would render the transaction 
unconscientious." Cone v. Ivinson, 4 Wyo. 203, 216, 33 P. 31, 34 (Wyo. 1893). 
Many years later, we defined good faith as:

 

being honest, lawful intent, and the condition of 
acting without knowledge of fraud and without interest to assist in fraudulent 
or otherwise unlawful scheme, together with the definition set out in 
[Cone].

 

Blake v. Rupe, 651 P.2d 1096, 1110 (Wyo. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1208 (1983). In a more recent 
case examining the conduct of police officers we said, "Our definition of good 
faith is that it encompasses an honest, lawful intent, and actions taken without 
knowledge of fraud and without any intent to assist in any fraudulent or 
otherwise unlawful scheme." Brown v. Avery, 850 P.2d 612, 617 (Wyo. 1993) 
(Thomas, J., specially concurring).

 

[¶14]       NGT points to evidence of 
good faith in the record. The president of NGP testified at length regarding the 
reasons for constructing the new pipeline. He described the pipeline as his 
company's attempt to "control its destiny." He further explained the company had 
been reliant on Williston, which had lost much of its gas supply, and frequently 
increased its prices. Despite extensive negotiations, Williston would not 
decrease its rates, so NGP ultimately decided to build the pipeline to ensure a 
reliable supply of gas at reasonable prices.

 

[¶15]       The above explanation, says 
NGT, demonstrates that it acted in good faith. We agree. Williston argues, 
essentially, that NGT acted in bad faith by trying to improve its financial 
position to Williston's probable detriment. However, we see nothing 
unconscionable in a company trying to buy products at a better price or win over 
customers from a competitor. Because there is credible evidence from which the 
PSC could have found good faith on the part of NGT, we need look no 
further.

 

 [¶16]     Williston rephrases the third part 
of our standard, the necessity of additional service in the community, by 
contending the pipeline was unnecessary and duplicative, and PSC approval of it 
was not in the best interest of the public. It bases that contention on the 
prior existence of its own natural gas pipeline that is capable of serving WGC 
and had been WGC's sole source of supply. At the hearing, an officer of NGP 
testified the NGT pipeline would provide services previously unavailable to 
WGC.  That officer also testified 
the NGT facility "was in the public interest since the customers of [WGC] would 
have expanded access to the natural gas market and it would greatly reduce 
[WGC's] historical dependence upon the rates and business decisions of Williston 
Basin." Williston invites us to ignore our substantial evidence standard and 
reevaluate the evidence. We decline that invitation because "it is well 
established that the weight and credibility of evidence is for the 
administrative agency to determine based on its expertise and experience." 
Western Radio, 718 P.2d  at 20. NGT presented evidence, which the PSC found 
credible and persuasive, that the pipeline was not duplicative and was in the 
best interest of the community. Because substantial evidence supports the 
conclusion that NGT has satisfied the three part standard, we will not disturb 
the PSC's findings in that regard.

 

[¶17]       In its second issue, 
Williston claims the rates approved by the PSC are excessive, unreasonable, and 
not supported by substantial evidence. Williston restates, in great detail, 
evidence that it presented at the hearing, and asks us to conclude the PSC erred 
by preferring the competing evidence of NGT. Requests for us to re-try rate 
cases are not new, nor is our refusal to do so.  Natural Gas Consumers v. Northern Utils. 
Co., 70 Wyo. 225, 255, 247 P.2d 767, 783 (1952). Instead, we will abide by our 
established practice of affirming PSC decisions that are supported by 
substantial evidence. Id. at 254, 247 P.2d  at 782; Telstar Communications, 621 P.2d  at 244-45.

 

[¶18]       In its findings and 
conclusions, the PSC acknowledged that the parties presented conflicting 
evidence about the reasonableness of the proposed rate. That evidence included 
an exhibit and testimony of an official of NGT, both to the effect that an even 
higher rate was supportable. The PSC reviewed the evidence presented 
at the hearing and also indicated its consideration of the cost of service study 
it ordered NGT to prepare. Because it is the PCS's province to evaluate the 
evidence, and because substantial evidence supports its findings, we hold the 
rate approved is neither excessive nor unreasonable.

 

[¶19]       In the third issue, 
Williston argues the PSC's Memorandum Opinion, Findings and Order does not 
conform to applicable statutes. The essence of Williston's contention on this 
issue is that the PSC did not use the prescribed format and did not support its 
conclusions of law with factual findings. We begin our analysis by agreeing with 
Williston that this was a contested case pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-3-101(b)(ii) (LEXIS 1999),4 and therefore subject to the 
requirements of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act (WAPA), including Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-110 (LEXIS 1999).5 That statute, however, is not in 
perfect harmony with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 37-2-212 (LEXIS 1999),6 which pertains only to the PSC. The 
word "may" in that statute makes a written explanation optional in PSC orders. 
In accordance with our rule that a more specific statute controls over a general 
one, we will give effect to the statute specific to the PSC when it conflicts 
with the WAPA, which applies to all state administrative agencies. L.U. Sheep 
Co. v. Bd. Of County Comm'rs, 790 P.2d 663, 674 (Wyo. 1990). Therefore, we will 
hold the PSC opinion to the less rigid standards prescribed in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
37-2-212.

 

 [¶20]     We agree with Williston that the 
purpose of requiring well-articulated findings and conclusions is to provide a 
rational basis for judicial review. Svilar Light & Power v. Riverton Valley 
Elec. Ass'n., 355 P.2d 52, 54 (Wyo. 1960); Larsen v. Oil & Gas Conservation 
Comm'n, 569 P.2d 87, 90 (Wyo. 1977). Therefore, rather than delving into minutia 
and reversing for technical non-compliance, we will examine the PSC's decision 
to see whether it affords us a sufficient basis for review. See Gore v. John, 61 
Wyo. 246, 273, 157 P.2d 552, 561 (Wyo. 1945) ("[I]t is not the practice of this 
court to allow mere form to defeat substantial justice, or to disregard 
pertinent matter for want of proper labeling."); Grams v. Environmental Quality 
Council, 730 P.2d 784, 787 (Wyo. 1986) ("[A]n error must be prejudicial and 
affect the substantial rights of the appellant to warrant 
reversal.").

 

[¶21]      The PSC's Memorandum Opinion, 
Findings and Order is eleven pages long and contains sections that identify the 
parties, trace the procedural history, summarize the applications, detail the 
evidence presented, and pronounce the findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
These sections allow the reader to understand the issues and evidence before the 
PSC, and its reasons for ruling as it did. This Court was able to discern which 
evidence was relied on and which was rejected. While we must concede the 
memorandum could have been more artfully written and the reasoning more 
explicitly stated, as a whole it is a sufficient basis for rational review. 
Therefore, Williston's argument on this issue is not 
availing.

 

[¶22]      In its fourth claim of error, 
Williston asserts the PSC's pre-hearing procedural orders deprived it of 
procedural due process.  That 
contention is grounded in the PSC's refusal to grant Williston a continuance. 
Williston argues it needed the continuance because NGT had not fully complied 
with discovery requests. Without additional time, Williston reasons, it could 
not obtain necessary information. Without that information, it was unable to 
develop its case, thus depriving it of an opportunity to be heard in a 
meaningful manner.

 

 [¶23]     A refusal to grant a continuance 
in an administrative matter is reviewed under our abuse of discretion standard. 
Grams, 730 P.2d  at 788. We recently had occasion to clarify precisely what this 
Court means by "abuse of discretion." Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 
1998). In Vaughn we ratified our adoption, in Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 
(Wyo. 1986), of the following standard:

 

Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, 
among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound 
judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and 
without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.  Byerly v. Madsen, 41 Wn. App. 495, 704 P.2d 1236 (1985).

 

Vaughn, 962 P.2d  at 151. 
With that definition in mind, we must determine whether the PSC acted  appropriately under the 
circumstances.

 

[¶24]       The PSC heard arguments from 
both sides on the continuance motion and decided to proceed with the hearing. 
Although Williston's arguments in favor of a continuance were cogent and well 
reasoned, they were not the only factors for the PSC to weigh in its decision on 
the motion. NGT also presented arguments, which the PSC apparently found more 
persuasive.  One major consideration 
for the PSC was that the hearing had been scheduled for six weeks. Williston 
requested the continuance only five days before the hearing was scheduled to 
begin. Under the circumstances, we see no abuse of the PSC's discretion in 
denying the motion for a continuance.

 

 [¶25]     In its fifth and final assignment 
of error, Williston claims the PSC erred in refusing to review the cost of 
service study prepared by NGT in response to the interim order. Williston 
presents no statutory or case law in support of its position, likely because 
there is none to be found. More accurately stated, its position is that the PSC 
did not draw the same conclusion from the study as did Williston, and therefore 
must be wrong. Its bold assertion that the PSC did not review the study is based 
on nothing more than diametrical opposition to the PSC's findings.  This Court has made it quite clear in 
the past that an appellant of a PSC decision "carries the heavy burden of making 
a convincing showing that it is invalid because it is unjust and unreasonable in 
its consequences." Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 
698 P.2d 627, 636 (Wyo. 1985) (quoting Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas 
Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602, 64 S. Ct. 281, 287-288, 88 L. Ed. 333 (1944)).  Unsupported assertions cannot shoulder 
that heavy burden, and Williston must fail in this claim, as in all the 
others.

 

[¶26]       Because the PSC was within 
its discretion in granting the certificate requested by NGT, its findings were 
supported by substantial evidence, and the procedures followed were in 
accordance with applicable statutes, we affirm the final 
order.

 

    

FOOTNOTES

1 Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 37-2-205 reads in relevant part:

 

(a) No 
public utility shall begin construction of a line, plant, or system or of any 
extension of a line, plant, or system without having first obtained from the 
commission a certificate that the present or future public convenience and 
necessity require or will require such construction.

 

 

2 Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 37-3-106(c) reads:

 

Whenever 
there is filed with the commission by any public utility any application or 
tariff proposing a new rate or rates, the commission may, either upon complaint 
or upon its own 
initiative, initiate an investigation, hearing, or both, concerning the 
lawfulness of such rate or rates.  
Pending its decision thereon, the commission may suspend such rate or 
rates, before they become effective but not for a longer initial period than six 
(6) months beyond the time 
when such rate or rates would otherwise go into effect.  If the commission shall thereafter find 
that a longer time will be required, the commission may extend the period of 
suspension for an additional period or periods not exceeding in the aggregate, 
three (3) months.

 

        

 

 

3 These 
definitions closely track that found in one of the premier sources of legal 
definitions: Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical 
meaning or statutory definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an 
honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or to 
seek an unconscionable advantage, . . . An honest intention 
to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even through 
technicalities of law, . . . In common usage this term is ordinarily used to 
describe that state of mind denoting honesty of purpose, freedom from intention 
to defraud, and, generally speaking, means being faithful to one's duty or 
obligation. Black's Law Dictionary 693 (6th ed. 1990).

 

 

4 Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-101(b)(ii) reads:

 

"Contested 
case" means a proceeding including but not restricted to rate making, price 
fixing and licensing, in which legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are 
required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing 
but excludes designations under     W.S. 
9-2-1022(h)(i).

 

 

5 Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-110 reads in relevant part:

 

A final 
decision or order adverse to a party in a contested case shall be in writing or 
dictated into the record. The final decision shall include findings of fact and 
conclusions of law separately stated. Findings of fact if set forth in statutory 
language, shall be accompanied by a concise and explicit statement of the 
underlying facts supporting the findings.

 

 

6 Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 37-2-212 reads in relevant part:

 

Every 
order of the commission shall be in writing and in cases of importance may be 
accompanied by an opinion setting forth in brief the facts on which the 
commission has based its 
order.