Title: Oxenham v. Martin

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present: All the Justices 
THE HONORABLE A. ELISABETH OXENHAM, 
JUDGE OF THE JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC 
RELATIONS DISTRICT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY 
 
v.  Record No. 980437  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           June 5, 1998 
J.S.M., ETC., ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY 
James E. Kulp, Judge 
 
 
 
On January 9, 1998, the Circuit Court of Henrico 
County issued a writ of prohibition against the Honorable 
A. Elisabeth Oxenham, Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic 
Relations District Court of Henrico County (Judge Oxenham).  
Under the terms of the circuit court’s order, Judge Oxenham 
could not prevent Robert H. Martin (Robert) from retaining 
an attorney to represent his minor son on a petition 
charging assault and battery filed by the child’s mother.  
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether Judge 
Oxenham had jurisdiction to adjudicate the disposition of 
the petition and, in doing so, had authority to appoint 
counsel to represent the child.  We conclude that she had 
both the jurisdiction and authority to act and will, 
therefore, reverse the judgment of the circuit court. 
I. 
On August 18, 1997, Olivia Lee Ligon Martin (Olivia)  
filed a petition against J.S.M.,1 her ten-year-old son, 
alleging that he committed assault and battery against her 
on July 2, 1997, in violation of Code § 18.2-57.2.  At the 
initial hearing on the petition before Judge Oxenham, a 
dispute arose between the parents regarding who should 
represent J.S.M. on the pending assault and battery charge.  
At that time, J.S.M.’s parents were involved in divorce and 
custody proceedings.  Olivia had sole custody of J.S.M., 
and Robert’s visitation rights with J.S.M. had been 
temporarily suspended.  Robert stated that he had retained 
the counsel representing him in the divorce proceedings to 
defend J.S.M.  Olivia, however, wanted the attorney 
representing her in the divorce case to serve as her son’s 
counsel or, in the alternative, to have the court appoint 
an attorney for J.S.M.2  The issue of legal representation 
for J.S.M. remained unresolved at the conclusion of the 
hearing. 
On October 31, 1997, J.S.M., individually and by his 
next friend, Robert, filed a motion requesting Judge 
Oxenham to recuse herself from hearing the pending petition 
                     
1  Full name of the minor deleted by this Court. 
 
2  Olivia’s attorney later wrote Judge Oxenham and 
stated that due to his involvement in the pending divorce 
proceedings between Robert and Olivia, he could not 
represent J.S.M. 
 
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against J.S.M. or, in the alternative, to permit Robert to 
choose counsel for J.S.M.  In a November 6, 1997 letter 
opinion, Judge Oxenham denied the motion and appointed 
defense counsel and a guardian ad litem for J.S.M.  Judge 
Oxenham based her decision on the unusual degree of 
animosity between J.S.M.’s parents and on Olivia's request 
for the court to appoint an attorney to represent J.S.M. 
since she could not afford to retain counsel for him.  
Judge Oxenham concluded that it was in J.S.M.’s best 
interests to have a court-appointed defense attorney as 
well as a guardian ad litem. 
In response to Judge Oxenham’s decision, Robert and 
J.S.M. filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the 
circuit court.3  The petition requested, inter alia, the 
court to compel Judge Oxenham to allow Robert to select his 
son’s counsel.  The circuit court held a hearing on the 
matter during which J.S.M.’s guardian ad litem stated that 
he had not asked J.S.M. whether he preferred to have a 
court-appointed attorney or private counsel.  However, the 
guardian ad litem stated that J.S.M. did not “express . . . 
to me an opposition” to his court-appointed attorney and  
                     
3  The petition for a writ of mandamus was filed by 
Robert, individually, and by J.S.M., individually and by 
his next friend Robert. 
 
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“appeared to be pleased” with his current legal 
representation.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the 
court stated that it “[was] going to treat the petition for 
mandamus as a petition for writ of prohibition.”  The court 
then granted the writ of prohibition.  Judge Oxenham filed 
a motion to reconsider, which the circuit court denied.  
Judge Oxenham appeals. 
II. 
 
The law concerning writs of prohibition is well-
established and provides the framework for deciding this 
case.  “A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy 
employed ‘to redress the grievance growing out of an 
encroachment of jurisdiction.’”  Elliott v. Great Atlantic 
Management Co., Inc., 236 Va. 334, 338, 374 S.E.2d 27, 29 
(1988) (quoting James v. Stokes, 77 Va. 225, 229 (1883)).  
In Grief v. Kegley, 115 Va. 552, 79 S.E. 1062 (1913), we 
stated the well-settled principle that: 
[T]he writ of prohibition does not lie to correct 
error, but to prevent the exercise of the jurisdiction 
of the court by the judge to whom it is directed, 
either where he has no jurisdiction at all, or is 
exceeding his jurisdiction.  If the court or judge has 
jurisdiction to enter any order in the proceeding 
sought to be prohibited, the writ does not lie. 
 
Id. at 557, 79 S.E. at 1064; see also Elliott, 236 Va. at 
338, 374 S.E.2d at 29; In re Department of Corrections, 222 
Va. 454, 461, 281 S.E.2d 857, 861 (1981); County School Bd. 
 
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of Tazewell County v. Snead, 198 Va. 100, 107, 92 S.E.2d 
497, 503 (1956). 
Jurisdiction is “‘the power to adjudicate a case upon 
the merits and dispose of it as justice may require.’”  Id. 
at 104-05, 92 S.E.2d at 501 (quoting Southern Sand and 
Gravel Co., Inc. v. Massaponax Sand and Gravel Corp., 145 
Va. 317, 332, 133 S.E. 812, 816 (1926) (Burks, J., 
concurring)); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 853 (6th ed. 
1990).  Accordingly, a writ of prohibition does not lie 
against Judge Oxenham if she had jurisdiction to adjudicate 
the disposition of the petition charging J.S.M. with 
assault and battery, and in doing so, had authority to 
appoint counsel to represent him.  We find that Judge 
Oxenham acted within her jurisdiction and that the circuit 
court, therefore, erred in issuing the writ of prohibition. 
 
Under Code § 16.1-241(J), the juvenile and domestic 
relations district court has exclusive original 
jurisdiction over “[a]ll offenses in which one family or 
household member is charged with an offense in which 
another family or household member is the victim . . . .”  
The court also has exclusive original jurisdiction 
regarding the disposition of a child who is alleged to be 
 
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delinquent.4  Code § 16.1-241(A)(1).  In regard to the 
appointment of counsel for a child charged with a 
delinquent act, Code § 16.1-266(B) provides as follows: 
Prior to the detention review hearing or the 
adjudicatory or transfer hearing by the court of 
any case involving a child who is alleged to be 
. . . delinquent, such child and his or her 
parent, guardian, legal custodian or other person 
standing in loco parentis shall be informed by a 
judge, clerk or probation officer of the child’s 
right to counsel . . . and be given an 
opportunity to: 
 
  1. Obtain and employ counsel of the child’s own 
choice . . . .5
 
Finally, subsection D of Code § 16.1-266 provides that 
“[i]n all other cases which in the discretion of the court 
require counsel or a guardian ad litem to represent the 
interests of the child . . . , a discreet and competent 
attorney-at-law may be appointed by the court.” 
 
As a judge of the juvenile and domestic relations 
district court, Judge Oxenham clearly had jurisdiction 
under Code § 16.1-241 to adjudicate the disposition of the 
petition charging J.S.M. with assault and battery.  In 
                     
4  A “delinquent act” means “an act designated a crime 
under the law of this Commonwealth . . . .”  Code § 16.1-
228.  
 
5  Subsection B(2) of Code § 16.1-266 provides that if 
a child is indigent, a statement of indigence and a 
financial statement shall be filed, and the court shall 
appoint an attorney to represent the child.  A third 
 
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doing so, Judge Oxenham also had authority under Code 
§ 16.1-266 to appoint counsel to represent J.S.M.  
Exercising the discretion granted her in Code § 16.1-266, 
Judge Oxenham correctly concluded that J.S.M.’s age as well 
as the open animosity between his parents prevented J.S.M. 
from choosing his own counsel.  At that time, J.S.M.'s 
parents were still embroiled in divorce and custody 
proceedings, and Robert's visitation rights had been 
temporarily suspended.  Furthermore, J.S.M.’s parents could 
not agree on an attorney to represent their son.  Given 
these ongoing conflicts, Judge Oxenham determined that it 
was in J.S.M.'s best interests to be represented by an 
attorney who was not involved in the legal proceedings 
between his parents.  Cf. Stanley v. Fairfax Co. Dep’t of 
Soc. Services, 10 Va. App. 596, 601, 395 S.E.2d 199, 202 
(1990), aff’d, 242 Va. 60, 405 S.E.2d 621 (1991) 
(recognizing that rights of child are often separate and 
distinct from those of other parties to litigation and are 
best protected by independent counsel). 
 
Nevertheless, Robert and J.S.M. argue that Judge 
Oxenham did not follow the necessary procedural steps for 
appointing counsel under Code § 16.1-266 and thus violated 
_________________ 
alternative is waiver of the right to be represented by an 
attorney.  Code § 16.1-266(B)(3). 
 
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J.S.M.'s Sixth Amendment right to counsel guaranteed by the 
United States Constitution.  They contend that Judge 
Oxenham should not have imposed her choice of counsel on 
J.S.M. without first making an actual finding, after notice 
and hearing, that a conflict exists between J.S.M. and his 
father and that J.S.M. is incapable of choosing his own 
attorney.  In other words, they assert that Judge Oxenham 
had to give J.S.M. and his father the opportunity to obtain 
and employ counsel of J.S.M.’s own choice before she could 
appoint an attorney for J.S.M.  Thus, according to Robert 
and J.S.M., Judge Oxenham lost whatever jurisdiction she 
initially had by preempting J.S.M.’s right to select his 
attorney. 
 
We disagree with their argument and note that the 
cases upon which Robert and J.S.M. rely are habeas corpus 
cases in which we addressed the statutory requirement 
regarding the appointment of a guardian ad litem for a 
child who appears in court without representation by either 
a parent or an attorney.  See Pruitt v. Peyton, 209 Va. 
532, 535, 165 S.E.2d 288, 290 (1969); Gogley v. Peyton, 208 
Va. 679, 682, 160 S.E.2d 746, 748 (1968); Gregory v. 
Peyton, 208 Va. 157, 160, 156 S.E.2d 624, 625-26 (1967).  
In each of these cases, we held that the juvenile court's 
failure to appoint a guardian ad litem for the child 
 
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rendered the subsequent proceedings or convictions void.  
Those cases, however, are not relevant to this appeal since 
Judge Oxenham did not fail to appoint an attorney to 
represent J.S.M.  Further, if she omitted any procedural 
step required by Code § 16.1-266(B) regarding the 
appointment of counsel for a child charged with committing 
a delinquent act, such an omission was merely a procedural  
error and did not result in a loss of jurisdiction.  A writ 
of prohibition does not lie to correct errors.  Grief, 115 
Va. at 557, 79 S.E. at 1064. 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court and dismiss the writ of prohibition. 
Reversed and dismissed. 
 
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