Title: ROSE VELASQUEZ, MIKE VELASQUEZ, MARY VELASQUEZ and ERNESTINO VELASQUEZ, Land Owners V. LARRY CHAMBERLAIN and NOREEN CHAMBERLAIN, Husband and Wife; LARRY CHAMBERLAIN and NOREEN CHAMBERLAIN, Husband and Wife V. ROSE VELASQUEZ, MIKE VELASQUEZ, MARY VELASQUEZ and ERNESTINO VELASQUEZ, Land Owners

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ROSE VELASQUEZ, MIKE VELASQUEZ, MARY VELASQUEZ and ERNESTINO VELASQUEZ, Land Owners V. LARRY CHAMBERLAIN and NOREEN CHAMBERLAIN, Husband and Wife; LARRY CHAMBERLAIN and NOREEN CHAMBERLAIN, Husband and Wife V. ROSE VELASQUEZ, MIKE VELASQUEZ, MARY VELASQUEZ and ERNESTINO VELASQUEZ, Land Owners2009 WY 80209 P.3d 888Case Number: S-08-0043, S-08-0044Decided: 06/18/2009
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
ROSE 
VELASQUEZ, MIKE VELASQUEZ, MARY VELASQUEZ and ERNESTINO VELASQUEZ, Land 
Owners,Appellants(Plaintiffs),v.LARRY CHAMBERLAIN 
and NOREEN CHAMBERLAIN, Husband and 
Wife,Appellees(Defendants).

LARRY 
CHAMBERLAIN and NOREEN CHAMBERLAIN, Husband and 
Wife,Appellants(Plaintiffs),v.ROSE VELASQUEZ, MIKE 
VELASQUEZ, MARY VELASQUEZ and ERNESTINO VELASQUEZ, Land 
Owners,Appellees(Defendants).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Converse County

The 
Honorable John C. Brooks, Judge

 
 
 
 

Representing 
Rose Velasquez, Mike Velasquez, Mary Velasquez, and Ernestino 
Velasquez:

Patrick 
Dixon of Casper, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Larry Chamberlain and Noreen Chamberlain:

Heather 
A. Jacobson of Jacobson Law Office, LLC, Douglas, Wyoming 

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      These two 
consolidated appeals arise from a dispute between neighboring landowners.  The Chamberlains own certain water 
rights.  Traditionally, the water 
had been carried to their property through an established ditch running through 
property currently owned by the Velasquezes.  Prior to the Velasquezes' purchase of 
the property, the ditch failed, and the Chamberlains replaced it with a 
pipeline, running on a different course from the ditch.  When the Velasquezes bought the 
property, they claimed the Chamberlains had not received proper permission to 
install or maintain the pipeline and proceeded to effectively destroy the 
pipeline as it ran through their property.  
The resulting legal action included multiple claims for damages on both 
sides and a petition for a restraining order against the Velasquezes allowing 
the Chamberlains to go on their property and fix the pipeline.  

 
 
[¶2]      The district 
court determined the Chamberlains legally had the unencumbered right to convey 
their water through the pipeline.  
In appeal No. S-08-0043, the Velasquezes appeal the district court's 
order allowing the Chamberlains to maintain and use the pipeline as it crosses 
their property, as well as the district court's refusal to grant them 
damages.  In appeal No. S-08-0044, 
the Chamberlains appeal the amount they were granted in damages, alleging the 
evidence supported a larger amount.  
We affirm the district court in No. S-08-0043.  We reverse the district court's 
determination of damages in No. S-08-0044.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]      In appeal No. 
S-08-0043, the Velasquezes state the issues as:

 
 
a.         
Was the District Court in error in concluding that the pipeline is 
legally in place and that Appellees are entitled to the same rights in the 
pipeline that they were entitled to in the Powell No. 1 Ditch; 
specifically:

 
 
1.         
Did Appellees comply with Wyoming law in changing the means of conveyance 
of their appropriation?

 
 
2.         
Was the Agreement by which the pipeline was legally installed legally 
enforceable?

 
 
b.         
Did Appellants fail to prove that they sustained damages as a result of 
multiple trespasses by Appellees?

 
 
 
 
[¶4]      In appeal No. 
S-08-0044, the Chamberlains ask this Court to determine "whether the District 
Court erred in finding that Appellants' damages were limited to Four Thousand, 
Three Hundred Dollars ($4,300)?"

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶5]      The appellants, 
Rose, Mike, Mary, and Ernestino Velasquez, own certain ranch property.  Mary and Ernestino Velasquez are the 
parents of Mike and Rose Velasquez.  
Of the four, only Rose Velasquez resides on the property.  

 
 
[¶6]      The appellees, 
Larry and Noreen Chamberlain, own neighboring property on which they run farming 
and ranching operations.  Larry 
generally manages the day-to-day operations.    

 
 
[¶7]      In 1999, Dave and 
Cindy Lozier (husband and wife) bought the property that is now owned by the 
Velasquezes under a contract for deed.  
In 2000, because Dave and Cindy Lozier were unable to meet their 
obligations under the contract for deed, the property was sold to Guy Lozier, 
Dave's brother. Guy never lived on the property.  Rather, Dave and Cindy continued to live 
on and manage the property.  Over 
the years, Dave and Larry entered into various agreements, including agreements 
allowing Larry to use portions of Guy's property such as a feed lot and stack 
yard.  

 
 
[¶8]      The Chamberlains 
own certain water rights from the LaPrele Creek.  The water had traditionally been carried 
to the Chamberlains' property from the LaPrele Creek through the Powell Number 
One Ditch, which crosses the property now owned by the Velasquezes.  A portion of the ditch failed, leaving 
the Chamberlains with little, if any, of the water to which they were legally 
entitled.  Consequently, on February 
28, 2005, Dave and Larry entered into a written agreement (the "Agreement") 
allowing Larry to lay a buried water pipeline across Guy's property for the 
transportation of water in exchange for Dave receiving water from the 
pipeline.  Guy did not sign the 
Agreement.  

 
 
[¶9]      The pipeline was 
installed shortly after the Agreement, in March 2005.  Guy was on the property after the 
pipeline went in and was able to observe the scar on the land left by the 
installation.  Guy never said 
anything to Larry about the pipeline.  
Neither Guy nor Dave ever told Larry to remove the pipeline. 

 
 
[¶10]   Rose Velasquez is Cindy Lozier's 
sister.  Dave and Cindy had allowed 
Rose to run some cows on the property while they lived there.  As a result, Rose had lived on the 
property with Dave and Cindy for a couple of months each year during calving 
season.  Rose also visited the 
property on weekends.  While Rose 
did not see the pipeline going in, she was aware of the pipeline from her time 
spent on the property.  When Dave 
and Cindy announced they were moving, Rose related her desire to buy the 
property.  Since Dave had always run 
the place as if he owned it, Rose talked to him first.  Dave referred Rose to Guy.  This was the first time Rose became 
aware that Guy owned the property and not Dave and Cindy.  

 
 
[¶11]   The Velasquezes bought the property 
from Guy in November 2005.  After 
the purchase, they never requested the Chamberlains remove the pipeline.  They believed the Agreement was invalid, 
and therefore the pipeline was their personal property.  In January 2006, alleging the pipeline 
leaked, they destroyed two separate sections of the pipeline as it crossed their 
property.  They never informed Larry 
of their actions, either before, during or after.  Thus began the instant litigation.  

 
 
[¶12]   Initially, the Chamberlains 
petitioned for a temporary restraining order and permanent injunction against 
the Velasquezes so they could go on the Velasquez property and repair the 
pipeline.  The Chamberlains also 
sought damages in the amount necessary to repair the pipeline and for their hay 
crop losses due to the resulting lack of irrigation.  The Velasquezes answered and 
counterclaimed for a declaration that the Agreement was invalid and sought 
damages for various alleged trespasses including trespass caused by the 
existence of the pipeline, trespass for Larry using the feedlot, trespass by 
Larry driving through the feedlot area on his way to and from his hayfield; and 
alleged damages caused by leaks in the pipeline.1

 
 
[¶13]   After a bench trial, the district 
court ruled generally in favor of the Chamberlains.  The district court ruled the pipeline 
was legally in place on the Velasquez property and the Chamberlains had full 
rights in it.  The district court 
additionally determined all claims for damages on both sides were speculative, 
being unsupported by the evidence presented.  The lone exception was the claim by the 
Chamberlains for damages in the amount of the costs incurred in repairing the 
pipeline.  As to this issue, the 
Chamberlains submitted a bill from the company that did the repairs in the 
amount of $11,540.  Evidence 
presented at trial indicated the Chamberlains had paid only $4,300 at the time 
of trial.  Larry testified he still 
owed the remainder of the amount to the company.  The district court ruled the 
Chamberlains were only entitled to the $4,300 they had already paid.  Both parties 
appealed.

 
 
APPEAL 
NO. S-08-0043

 
 
Discussion

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶14]   As regularly 
stated:

 
 
This 
Court applies a clearly erroneous standard when reviewing findings of fact made 
by the district court after a bench trial.  
A finding is clearly erroneous when, even though substantial evidence 
supports it, the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake was made.  

 
 
            
We do not substitute ourselves for the trial court as a finder of facts; 
instead, we defer to the trial court's findings unless they are unsupported by 
the record or erroneous as a matter of law.  Although the factual findings of a trial 
court are not entitled to the limited review afforded a jury verdict, the 
findings are presumptively correct.  

 
 
            
This Court may examine all of the properly admissible evidence in the 
record, but we do not reweigh the evidence.  Due regard is given to the opportunity 
of the trial judge to assess the credibility of the witnesses.  We accept the prevailing party's evidence 
as true and give to that evidence every favorable inference which may fairly and 
reasonably be drawn from it.  
Findings may not be set aside because we would have reached a different 
result.  

 
 

Snelling 
v. Roman, 
2007 WY 49, ¶¶ 7-8, 154 P.3d 341, 345 (Wyo. 2007) (citations omitted).  See also Garrison v. CC Builders, Inc., 
2008 WY 34, ¶ 22, 179 P.3d 867, 873-74 (Wyo. 2008). We review legal conclusions 
de novo.  Campbell County School Dist. v. State, 
2008 WY 2, ¶ 10, 181 P.3d 43, 49 (Wyo. 2008); Mullinnix LLC v. HKB Royalty Trust, 2006 
WY 14, ¶ 12, 126 P.3d 909, 916 (Wyo. 2006). 

 
 

Estate 
of Jedrzejewski ex rel. Severn v. Bierma, 
2008 WY 151, ¶ 9, 197 P.3d 1254, 1256 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
Statutory 
Compliance

 
 
[¶15]   The Velasquezes' first argument is 
that the Chamberlains violated Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-3-114 in changing the flow 
of water from the established ditch to a pipeline.  Section 41-3-114 
reads:

§ 
41-3-114. Petition to change point of diversion or means of 
conveyance.

 
 
(a) 
Any person entitled to the beneficial use of water, whether under a permit 
issued by the state engineer or a certificate of appropriation issued by the 
board of control pursuant to W.S. 41-4-511, who desires to change the point of 
diversion or means of conveyance, or both, shall file a petition 
with:

(i) 
The board of control if the use of the water has been adjudicated under a 
certificate of appropriation;

(ii) 
The state engineer in all other cases.  
The state engineer may consider a petition even if water has not been 
applied to beneficial use however, any change in point of diversion granted by 
the state engineer shall be in the vicinity of the original diversion, and 
provided:

            
(A) The change shall not alter the original project concept; 
and

            
(B) The water shall be diverted from the same source of supply described 
in the original permit.

 
 
(b) 
Petitions for change in point of diversion shall be in affidavit form and shall 
set forth the name and address of the petitioner, the name of the ditch, 
pipeline, or other facility, the stream from which water is appropriated, the 
date of priority and the amount of the appropriation to be changed, permit 
number, ownership of appropriation, and the location of the present and the 
proposed new point of diversion by course and distance from a corner of the 
public land survey.  If for 
irrigation, petitions shall describe the acreage irrigated in each legal 
subdivision, the reason for the proposed change, and state whether any other 
appropriator from the same source will be injured in any way, and whether the 
consent of all owners of intervening diversions has been obtained.  The petition shall be accompanied by 
satisfactory evidence of ownership of the appropriation to be 
changed.

 
 
(c) 
If the petition is for a change in point of diversion and means of conveyance 
for all or a part of an appropriation, it shall include, in addition to the 
foregoing, the name, permit number and date of priority of the ditch or facility 
to which it is to be changed, and whether the petitioner is the sole owner of 
both facilities involved or has the consent of the other owners of both ditches 
or facilities.

            

            
(d) Such petitions shall be accompanied by maps in duplicate, one (1) of 
which shall be on tracing linen of a size required by the state engineer and 
state board of control, prepared under certificate of a registered land 
surveyor, and showing accurately the location of the stream, the location of the 
ditch or ditches involved, location of any intervening diversions, and if for 
irrigation, the location of the lands changed or affected by such 
change.

 
 
(e) 
In event that written consents of owners of appropriations which divert between 
the old and new points of diversion or the owners of ditches or facilities 
involved in the proposed change are not secured and attached to the petition, 
the petition shall be referred to:

(i) 
The superintendent of the water division in which the change is proposed, if the 
right is adjudicated; or

(ii) 
To the state engineer if the right is unadjudicated.

 
 
(f) 
The state engineer or the superintendent shall set a hearing on the petition and 
give thirty (30) days notice by registered mail of the time and place of the 
hearing to the petitioner and any owners of appropriations which divert between 
the old and new points of diversion and any owners or users of ditches or 
facilities to be affected by the proposed change.  The petitioner shall provide the 
superintendent with a record of the proceedings which shall be transmitted to 
the state board of control with the superintendent's report.  The state board of control or the state 
engineer may make such other regulations as may be found necessary.  No petition shall be granted if the 
right of other appropriators will be injuriously affected.  The attorney general shall represent the 
state board of control or the state engineer in any 
appeal.

 
 
(g) 
A decision by the state engineer granting or denying a petition under paragraph 
(a)(ii) of this section may be appealed to the board of control.  An appeal may be taken to the district 
court pursuant to W.S. 16-3-101 through 16-3-115 from an order of the board of 
control:

(i) 
Affirming, modifying or reversing a decision of the state engineer appealed to 
the board under this subsection; or

(ii) 
Granting, modifying or denying a petition under paragraph (a)(i) of this 
section. 

 
 
[¶16]   We decline to address the 
argument.  From the record 
designated to us by the parties, it is unclear whether the issue was raised at 
the trial below.  During trial no 
questions were asked, nor evidence produced, directly on point.  This Court has not been supplied with 
opening or closing trial statements from either side so we do not know if the 
subject was broached by either side during argument.  Nothing in the district court's trial 
comments, decision letter, or final order indicate it considered the issue.  Lacking any more conspicuous indication 
to the contrary, we consider the issue raised for the first time on appeal.  Per our usual rule, we therefore will 
not consider it.  Wyoming Bd. of Land Comm'rs v. Antelope Coal 
Co., 2008 WY 60, ¶ 16, 185 P.3d 666, 670 (Wyo. 2008); Yates v. Yates, 2003 WY 161, ¶ 13, 81 P.3d 184, 188 (Wyo. 2003).  

 
 
[¶17]   In addition, the argument on the 
issue presented by the Velasquezes in their brief is wholly inadequate.  In their terse argument, they make no 
attempt at statutory analysis.  
Neither do they present any pertinent authority.  They simply allege the statute applies 
to this situation, it was violated, and the violation results in the pipeline 
becoming their personal property.  
In other words, according to the Velasquezes, the Chamberlains have no 
legal right to ownership or even use of the pipeline because of what the 
Velasquezes claim to be a statutory violation.  We will not undertake the Velasquezes' 
task of finding legal support for this fiat.  

 
 
[¶18]   Given the considerable doubt that 
exists as to whether the issue was adequately raised below and barring any legal 
analysis supporting the argument made by the Velasquezes, we find the issue not 
appropriately before us.

 
 
Validity 
of the Contract

 
 
[¶19]   The Velasquezes present several 
subarguments under this issue.2  First, they question the validity of the 
Agreement in general.  They question 
whether Dave was authorized to enter into the Agreement on behalf of Guy.  The district court determined that Dave 
had apparent authority to enter into the Agreement.  Apparent authority exists when a 
principal has intentionally or inadvertently induced third persons to believe 
that such a person was his agent:

            
Apparent authority is created when the principal holds the agent out as 
possessing the authority to bind the principal or when the principal allows the 
agent to claim such authority.  Id.  [Ulen v. Knecttle, 50 Wyo. 94, 103-04, 58 P.2d 446, 449 (1936)]  To bind the 
principal under a theory of apparent authority, a third party must establish 
personal knowledge of, and reliance on, the apparent authority of the 
agent.  Id.  In Herbert Const. Co. v. Continental Ins. 
Co., 931 F.2d 989, 993-94 (2nd Cir. 1991), the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals articulated that test:

 
 
            
To recover on this theory [apparent authority] the third party must 
establish two facts: (1) the principal "was responsible for the appearance of 
authority in the agent to conduct the transaction in question," Ford, [v. Unity Hospital,] 32 N.Y.2d [464,] at 
473, 346 N.Y.S.2d [238] at 244, 299 N.E.2d [659] at 664 [(1973)] (citation 
omitted), and (2) the third party reasonably relied on the representations of 
the agent, Hallock, [v. State,] 64 N.Y.2d [224,] at 231, 485 
N.Y.S.2d [510,] at 513, 474 N.E.2d [1178,] at 1181 [(1984)].  

 
 
This 
statement essentially modernizes our holding in Ulen.   Apparent authority in agency cases 
will be determined according to this two-prong test.

 
 

Cargill, 
Inc. v. Mountain Cement Co., 
891 P.2d 57, 62-63 (Wyo. 1995).  

 
 
[¶20]   Our first query, then, is whether 
Guy was responsible for the appearance of authority in Dave to enter into the 
Agreement.  The evidence supports 
the district court's positive finding on this issue.  Dave and Cindy initially owned the 
property.  After Guy bought the 
property, Guy never lived there, but rather allowed Dave and Cindy to maintain 
their residence there.  There was no 
change in the way Dave managed the property.  Dave's dealings with Larry did not 
change.  Guy and Larry had periodic 
contact over the years but Guy never told Larry that Dave did not have authority 
to make decisions about the management and use of the property.  Guy was on the property intermittently 
but never complained to Larry about anything.  Given these facts, we cannot say it was 
clearly erroneous for the district court to conclude that Guy was responsible 
for giving Dave the appearance of authority to act as Guy's agent in making 
decisions concerning the property.3

 
 
[¶21]   The second query is whether Larry's 
reliance on representations of Dave's authority in entering into the Agreement 
was reasonable.  The Velasquezes 
argue Larry could not reasonably believe Dave had the authority to enter into 
the Agreement because Larry knew Guy was the legal owner of the property.  The reasonableness in question, however, 
is whether Larry reasonably believed Dave had authority to act as an agent on 
behalf of Guy.  For the same reasons 
stated immediately above, we agree with the district court that it was 
reasonable.  According to the 
evidence, to the extent of Larry's knowledge, Dave managed the property without 
any input from Guy.  The Agreement 
regarded a subject that fell directly in line with Dave's apparent 
authority.  Again, under these 
facts, we cannot say it was clearly erroneous for the district court to conclude 
that it was reasonable for Larry to accept that Dave had authority to enter into 
the Agreement.

 
 
[¶22]   Finally, the district court found 
that, even if Dave did not have apparent authority to bind Guy, Guy ratified the 
Agreement.  Ratification is an 
agency concept that "retroactively 
creates the effects of actual authority."  
Restatement (Third) of Agency (ALI) § 4.02 (2006).  According to Restatement (Third) 
of Agency (ALI) § 4.01 (2006):

 
 
(1) 
Ratification is the affirmance of a prior act done by another, whereby the act 
is given effect as if done by an agent acting with actual 
authority.

 
 
(2) 
A person ratifies an act by

 
 
            
(a) manifesting assent that the act shall affect the person's legal 
relations, or

 
 

            
(b) conduct that justifies a reasonable assumption that the person so 
consents. 

 
 
In 
other words, ratification can be either express or implied.  

 
 
[¶23]   In this case, ratification is 
implied by Guy's silence in the face of knowledge of the pipeline.  The Velasquezes argue there is no direct 
evidence of Guy's intent to ratify the Agreement because Guy did not 
testify.  Direct evidence, however, 
is not necessary.  In our appellate 
review we accept Larry's evidence as true and give to that evidence every 
favorable inference that may fairly and reasonably be drawn from it.  The evidence supports a reasonable 
inference that Guy was aware of the pipeline as evidenced by a remaining scar on 
the ground from the excavation work.  
It also can be reasonably inferred that, by not objecting to Larry in any 
manner over a period of almost six months, Guy ratified the 
Agreement.

 
 
[¶24]   The Velasquezes move on to 
challenge the validity of the Agreement as against them.  They argue the Agreement does not 
constitute an easement, license, or covenant running with the land.  It thus expired upon the sale of the 
property.  

 
 
[¶25]   The Velasquezes argument misses the 
mark.  Under these circumstances, 
the focus, for analytical purposes, must be on the subject of the Agreement  
the buried water pipeline.  The 
pipeline replaces a portion of the Powell Number One Ditch, transporting the 
water appropriation of the Chamberlains to their property.  This function is critical to our 
analysis because water rights encompass the right to convey water.  "If a person has a right to convey water 
through a ditch, he owns an interest in that ditch or a share of the ditch to 
the extent of the water right he is entitled to convey through it."  Bard Ranch, Inc. v. Weber, 538 P.2d 24, 
34 (Wyo. 1975).  More simply, "the 
ditch follows the right."  Rennard v. Vollmar, 977 P.2d 1277, 1280 
(Wyo. 1999).   Although the 
language so far has been in terms of "ditch" rights, the rights apply to any 
means of transporting water:

 
 
a 
water right becomes appurtenant to the land upon which the water is used, and 
the ditch, water pipe, or other conduit for the water becomes attached to the 
land, either as appurtenant or incident to the land, and necessary to its 
beneficial enjoyment, and therefore becomes part and parcel of the realty. 

 
 

Frank 
v. Hicks, 
4 Wyo. 502, 531, 35 P. 475, 484 (1894).

 
 
[¶26]   Consequently, the ownership 
interest of the Chamberlains in the buried water pipeline remains unaltered 
regardless of who owns the property through which the pipeline runs.  See Bard Ranch, 538 P.2d  at 34 (property 
cannot be conveyed in derogation of rights of ditch owner).  The only question might be whether the 
adjustment of the water flow from the Powell Number One Ditch to the pipeline in 
any way alters the rights of the Chamberlains.  Our precedent convincingly answers this 
question in the negative.  In Bard Ranch, water ran through a ditch 
known as the Cooley Ditch.  The 
Cooley Ditch was relocated and lined with concrete.  Subsequent owners of the land through 
which the modified Cooley Ditch ran claimed ownership of the ditch because of 
the alterations.  The Bard Ranch Court 
held:

 
 
The 
record in this case . . . demonstrates that the rebuilding and concreting of the 
Cooley Ditch was done by mutual consent of the landowners involved.  Under those circumstances the mere 
relocation of the right-of-way would not alter the rights of the respective 
owners.  Wallace Ranch Water Co. v. Foothill 
Ditch Co., 5 Cal. 2d 103, 53 P.2d 929 (1935); Babcock v. Gregg, 55 Mont. 317, 178 P. 284 (1918).  The new concrete ditch 
would be considered in the same light as the old earthen ditch, and the rights 
of the parties in it would be exactly the same.  

 
 

Bard 
Ranch, 
538 P.2d  at 34.  The Velasquezes 
make no attempt on appeal to distinguish Bard Ranch.  We find it directly applicable to the 
facts of this case.  We have already 
determined that the Agreement is valid and as such demonstrates mutual consent 
between the Chamberlains and Guy Lozier for the installation of the buried water 
pipeline.  The Velasquezes thus have 
no right to interfere with the use of the pipeline by the 
Chamberlains.

 
 
Damages

 
 
[¶27]   The Velasquezes point to several 
instances of alleged trespass on the part of the Chamberlains.  The district court held that no damages 
were proven.  The district court's 
decision on the amount of damages to award involves a question of fact.  Carroll v. Bergen, 2002 WY 166, ¶ 26, 57 P.3d 1209, 1217-18 (Wyo. 2002).  We 
review findings of fact after a bench trial under the clearly erroneous standard 
described above.

 
 
[¶28]   One allegation of trespass is the 
very presence of the buried water pipeline.  This allegation has been effectively 
disposed of by our ruling that the pipeline was legally in place.  The Velasquezes also complain about the 
entrance of the Chamberlains onto their property to repair the pipeline without 
a court order.  Again, the pipeline 
was legally in place, and the Chamberlains have the right to repair and maintain 
the pipeline as reasonably necessary.

 
 
[¶29]   Another allegation of trespass was 
the use of the Velasquezes' feedlot by the Chamberlains.  Larry did not dispute he used the 
feedlot, as he had in the past with Dave's permission.  The record, however, supports the 
district court's finding that the amount of damages caused by this use of the 
feedlot by Larry was not adequately proven.  The Velasquezes' only witness as to 
damages was Neil Hilsten.  Mr. 
Hilsten is a ranch real estate broker and appraiser.  He testified he based his valuation of 
damages on information supplied to him by the Velasquezes' attorney.  He was told there were seventy-two head 
on the property for 2.75 months.  He 
thus determined there were 198 animal unit months (AUMs).  He then looked up the average grazing 
fee from the USDA Grazing Lease Report to come up with twenty dollars per 
AUM.  

 
 
[¶30]   The obvious initial problem is the 
lack of foundation for the damage assessment.  Neither Larry nor Rose testified as to 
the number of head Larry had on the feedlot.  There is no indication the attorney had 
first hand knowledge of the figures.  
The second problem is that an AUM is generally described as the amount of 
grazing it would take to support one cow/calf pair for one month.  Mr. Hilsten had no information as to the 
age or weight of the cattle on the feedlot area.  Taken together, we do not believe the 
evidence presented was sufficiently credible to justify overturning the district 
court.

 
 
[¶31]   Yet another allegation of trespass 
concerned water flooding part of a pasture.  The Velasquezes claim the water came 
from a leak in the water pipeline.  
The Chamberlains respond by pointing out the pipeline was brand new and 
they had no indication of a leak.  
There was testimony raising the possibility that the water was coming 
from a different neighbor.  Most 
importantly, though, is again the insufficient proof of damages.  The evidence on damages came once more 
from Mr. Hilsten.  The basis for his 
opinion on damages came from a time when "the attorney and I went out and looked 
at [the pasture land] and he said that he thought Rose had told him it was 35 
acres they were having problems haying."  
He made no independent evaluation of the claim.  His damage assessment reflected the 
value of a total loss of hay on thirty-five acres.

 
 
[¶32]   Rose testified thirty to 
thirty-five acres were affected.  
Crucially, however, she testified that neither she nor Dave before her 
ever used the pasture for haying.  
She did not use it at all and Dave had only used it for grazing.  Rose never testified she wanted to use 
the property for hay production.  
Thus, even if a loss of use was occasioned by actions of the 
Chamberlains, a proposition already in doubt, the measure of damages presented 
bears no relation to any loss of use of the property.  Our review reveals nothing suggesting 
that the district court's determination on this issue is clearly 
erroneous.

 
 
[¶33]   Finally, the Velasquezes argue the 
Chamberlains conduct in general amounted to bullying and intimidation.  The Velasquezes claim, as a consequence, 
even if they haven't proven damages for trespass, they still should be awarded 
at least nominal damages to deter such future conduct.  They cite no Wyoming authority for this 
proposition.  We also have no 
indication that this issue was raised below.  We will not address it. 

 
 
Conclusion

 
 
[¶34]   The Agreement was a valid contract 
between neighboring landowners to alter the course and method of water flowing 
from the LaPrele Creek to the Chamberlain property.  The Chamberlains maintained the same 
ownership interest in the buried water pipeline as they had in the Powell Number 
One Ditch.  Further, the damages 
claimed by the Velasquezes were not supported by adequate evidence.  The district court's order is affirmed 
with regard to the challenges presented in this appeal.

 
 
APPEAL 
NO. S-08-0044

 
 
Discussion

 
 
[¶35]   In this appeal, the Chamberlains 
question whether the district court erred when it awarded only $4,300 for repair 
costs to the pipeline.  The district 
court's decision on the amount of damages to award involves a question of 
fact.  Carroll v. Bergen, 2002 WY 166, ¶ 26, 57 P.3d 1209, 1217-18 (Wyo. 2002).  We 
review findings of fact after a bench trial under the clearly erroneous standard 
described in our discussion in Appeal No. S-08-0043.

 
 
[¶36]   The pertinent evidence includes an 
invoice in the amount of $11,540 for "[r]epair 12-inch Water line as per quote;" 
Larry's testimony that the invoice was for repair to the pipeline from damage 
caused by the Velasquezes; Larry's testimony that he has only paid $4,300 on the 
bill; and Larry's testimony that he still owes the remainder of the bill.  There was no contradictory 
evidence.  

 
 
[¶37]   The only reason given by the 
district court for not allowing additional damages was that further damages had 
not been proven.  We must disagree 
with this conclusion.  Larry's 
testimony that he stilled owed the remainder of the money indicated on the 
invoice was never challenged.  After 
reading the entire record, we find no basis for any doubt as to the credibility 
of Larry's testimony on the issue.  
An award of the full amount of the invoice should have been 
granted.

 
 
Conclusion

 
 
[¶38]   The Chamberlains introduced 
adequate evidence to support their claim for damages in the amount of 
$11,540.  The case is remanded with 
instructions to the district court to enter a new order reflecting the 
same.

 
 
 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1There was also a claim for reformation of deed, which was granted, and is 
not at issue in this appeal.

 
 

2For instance, the Velasquezes claim the Agreement lacks 
consideration.  This is belied by 
the language of the Agreement, which provides in part that Dave could draw water 
as needed.

 
 

3Although 
not directly pertinent, it is telling that Rose, who ran cows on the property 
and stayed there for extended periods of time, was unaware of the fact that Dave 
and Cindy did not own the property.