Title: State v. Morris

State: new-mexico

Issuer: New Mexico Supreme Court

Document:

406 P.2d 349 (1965) 75 N.M. 475 STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. C.N. (Bill) MORRIS, Defendant, Will Harrison, Respondent-Appellant. No. 7684. Supreme Court of New Mexico. October 4, 1965. Earl E. Hartley, Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, C.M. Neal, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. William C. Marchiondo, David R. Gallagher, Timothy P. Woolston, Arturo G. Ortega, Rolando J. Matteucci, Gene E. Franchini, David W. King, Courtney Vallentine, Irving E. Moore, Joseph L. Smith, Harry E. Stowers, Fred M. Calkins, Jr., Lorenzo A. CHAVEZ, Albuquerque, amici curiae for appellee. Gilbert, White & Gilbert, William Booker Kelly, Santa Fe, for appellant. Seth, Montgomery, Federici & Andrews, Santa Fe, Arthur B. Hanson, Calvin H. Cobb, Jr., Washington, D.C., amici curiae for American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n. Seth, Montgomery, Federici & Andrews, Santa Fe, amici curiae for New Mexico Press Ass'n. Seth, Montgomery, Federici & Andrews, Santa Fe, Royall, Koegel & Rogers, New York City, amici curiae for American Soc. of Newspaper Editors. James D. Sidwell, Paul A. Phillips, William C. Schaab, Albuquerque, amici curiae for New Mexico Civil Liberties Union. *350 COMPTON, Justice. The respondent, Will Harrison, appeals from a judgment finding him guilty of criminal contempt by reason of the publication of certain articles during the pendency of the case, State of New Mexico v. Morris. He was sentenced to serve ten days in the Dona Ana County jail and fined $250.00, the fine being suspended upon payment of $250.00 in court costs. C.N. (Bill) Morris, an assistant district attorney at Carlsbad, New Mexico, was charged with the crime of involuntary manslaughter in the killing of five people in Eddy County on June 22, 1963, while driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Upon the voluntary recusal of judges of the Fifth Judicial District, the Honorable Paul Tackett, Judge of the Second Judicial District, was designated to hear and try the cause, after which change of venue was granted from Eddy County to Dona Ana County. On November 6, 1963, Morris pleaded guilty to the charge against him. After hearing character witnesses on behalf of Morris, the court entered the following order dated December 5, 1963: The appellant has been the author of a column on public affairs widely circulated in the newspapers in New Mexico since 1952. On January 24, 1964, counsel who represented Morris filed an affidavit charging Harrison with contempt of court by reason of six articles appearing in his column between the dates of November 12, 1963 and January 22, 1964, the first of which appeared six days following the plea of guilty by Morris. The respondent admitted authorship of the articles but denied that any of the statements and publications as charged by the affidavit presented clear and present danger to the administration of justice in New Mexico, or that they constituted contempt of court. He further averred that the columns constituted fair comment or, at the least, just criticism of the acts of that court or of the courts of New Mexico; that all of the statements contained in his columns were true, and that the order to show cause was an attempt to infringe upon his right to make and publish such comments, constituting a violation of his constitutional rights of freedom of speech and of the press. The six articles forming the basis of the appellant's conviction of criminal contempt follow: The appellant testified substantially that over the period of time covered between the first and last article in question he devoted only 5.7% of his column to the Morris case, and that he wrote on the basis of continuing developments of public interest in that case. He further stated that he felt that the conduct of public officials who have violated the law, and their consequent treatment before public tribunals, is a subject of wide public interest. At the conclusion of the trial the court found the respondent guilty of contempt. Judgment was entered accordingly, the pertinent portions of which read: The appellant claims that his constitutionally protected rights of free speech and press have been violated, that the trial court erred in determining that the Morris case was pending at the time his articles were published and that it erred in considering evidence of contempt not contained in the affidavit. The appellee, on the other hand, asserts that the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the publications in question constituted a clear and present danger to the administration of justice in the pending case of State v. Morris and, therefore, the conviction should stand. It is readily apparent from the record and the able briefs of counsel and of amici curiae that the crucial issue presented, which should be squarely met, is whether, as a matter of law, the articles set forth, under the circumstances of their publication, presented a clear and present danger to the fair and orderly administration of justice in a pending case. In resolving this issue we will assume, for the sake of argument only, and contrary to the second point raised by the appellant, that State v. Morris was a pending case at the time of the publication of the articles. Consideration of that point, as well as a third point raised, will depend upon our disposition of what we have concluded to be the real and important issue. In criminal contempt cases involving out-of-court statements and publications, where it is charged that the fundamental right of freedom of speech and of the press secured by the First Amendment to the Constitution has been violated, the ever-present question is, where does the right of free speech or of the press end and the right to punish for contempt begin? Recognizing that these contempt charges must be viewed in the light of basic constitutional guaranties for the purpose of fully protecting the equally fundamental rights of freedom of speech and of the press, and the power of the courts to protect the interests of litigants before them in pending judicial proceedings, we think the Supreme Court of the United States has laid down certain controlling principles of law to be applied to the instant case. In view of the exhaustive consideration and treatement given by the Supreme Court of the United States to the various issues presented in this class of cases, including the history of the contempt power of the courts, state and federal, the fundamental rights guaranteed by the First Amendment of the Constitution and made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, and the importance of striking a balance compatible with upholding equally basic rights without one infringing upon *356 the other, it would only be repetitious for us to attempt here to restate in our own words the underlying reasoning embodied in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. Suffice it to say that the courts of New Mexico are limited by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the extent of protection afforded by the First Amendment. Bridges v. State of California, 314 U.S. 252, 62 S. Ct. 190, 86 L. Ed. 192; Pennekamp v. State of Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 66 S. Ct. 1029, 90 L. Ed. 1295; Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 67 S. Ct. 1249, 91 L. Ed. 1546. In Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 470, Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking of constitutional guaranties of the First Amendment, stated that the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done. He continued: Subsequently, in Bridges v. State of California, supra, where the substantive evil sought to be averted by contempt proceedings was the direct interference with or the influencing of the orderly and impartial administration of justice, again the "clear and present danger" test was applied. The court held that under the circumstances of each case the substantive evil must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished." This decision followed Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 61 S. Ct. 810, 85 L. Ed. 1172, which overruled Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 38 S. Ct. 560, 62 L. Ed. 1186, where it had been held that the constitutional freedom of the press will not protect a publisher of newspaper articles concerning a pending case where the articles merely "tend to obstruct" the administration of justice. The "clear and present danger" test was reapplied and reaffirmed in Pennekamp v. State of Florida, supra, and Craig v. Harney, supra. In the Harney case, the court emphasized that the danger sought to be guarded against "must not be remote or even probable; it must immediately imperil." In addition, it was held in the above cases that absent a clear and present danger even the possibility of engendering disrespect for the judiciary as the result of published criticisms of a judge, or of his inclinations and actions, is not such a substantive evil as will justify impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and press. For other cases in which the principles of "clear and present danger" or "serious and imminent peril" have been discussed at some length, or applied, or both, see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686; Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 71 S. Ct. 857, 95 L. Ed. 1137; Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 82 S. Ct. 1364, 8 L. Ed. 2d 569; Smotherman v. United States, U.S.C.A., 10th Cir., 186 F.2d 676; Baltimore Radio Show v. State, 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497; In Re Jameson, 139 Colo. 171, 340 P.2d 423; McGill v. State, 209 Ga. 500, 74 S.E.2d 78; Crudup v. State, 106 Ga. App. 833, 129 S.E.2d 183; Weston v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 175, 77 S.E.2d 405; People v. Hathaway, 27 Ill. 2d 615, 190 N.E.2d 332; Turkington v. Municipal Court, 85 Cal. App. 2d 631, 193 P.2d 795. Compare Evers v. State, 241 Miss. 560, 131 So. 2d 653. See also Vol. 44, No. 3, Nebraska Law Review, pp. 622 et seq.; Vol. 28, Columbia Law Review, pp. 401, 525; and Goldfarb, The Contempt Power (1963), pp. 187 et seq. Except as hereinafter noted in the cited cases from this jurisdiction involving charges of contempt by publications, we perceive no inconsistencies in the underlying principle involved. As early as 1895 it was recognized in In re Hughes, 8 N.M. 225, 43 P. 692, that parties to a pending case have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court, by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by newspaper dictation *357 or popular clamor. State v. New Mexican Printing Co., 25 N.M. 102, 177 P. 751, held that it is the party litigant in a pending case, and not the individual court, that is to be protected and said: See also State v. Kayser, 25 N.M. 245, 181 P. 278; State v. Magee Pub. Co., 29 N.M. 455, 224 P. 1028, 38 A.L.R. 142; and State v. McAllister, 43 N.M. 514, 96 P.2d 1. However, insofar as the use of the contempt power in this jurisdiction has been based upon comments that merely "tend to" interfere with or "tend to" obstruct the administration of justice in a pending case, without a determination of whether the claimed inherent tendency to obstruct amounted to a clear and present danger or imminent peril that the evil result may be accomplished, those cases can no longer serve as precedents in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States since Bridges v. State of California, supra. Applying the foregoing principles, we conclude that the appellee has failed to sustain its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a clear and present danger, or imminent peril, to the administration of justice in the case of State v. Morris. The articles here were concerned with action already taken by the court in deferring the sentencing of Morris for one year and suspending his fine upon the condition of his good behavior and the payment of an equal amount in court costs. The only substantive evil upon which the contempt charges possibly could be based, or seek to avert, would be the direct interference with or influence on the court of the articles when, at the expiration of the deferment period, Morris would again appear for sentencing or other disposition of the charge against him. We find no reference to, or speculation regarding future action by the court was made in the articles. We find no proof of a clear and present danger or imminent peril of that substantive evil. Nor is there anything in the record to indicate that the trial court so concluded. As stated in Pennekamp v. State of Florida, supra, "* * * the danger under this record to fair judicial administration has not the clearness and immediacy necessary to close the door of permissible public comment. * * *" The articles here for the most part were criticism of the actions of the trial court, and naturally were distasteful to him in the furtherance of justice; nevertheless, we think what was said in Smotherman v. United States, supra, is equally appropriate here: It is not amiss to say here that there is a limit beyond which the press may not successfully assert constitutional immunity. In the exercise of good taste and sound judgment in order to avoid what is termed "trial by newspaper," which may well lead to a miscarriage of justice, no less stamina and fairness is expected of the press in preserving its fundamental rights than of a judge in preserving the fundamental rights of litigants in a pending case. The lowering of standards by the press to just *358 within the limits of constitutional immunity is fraught with danger and should be zealously avoided. The conclusion reached obviates our determination of the other points raised for a reversal. The cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to set aside the judgment, and it is so ordered. CARMODY, C.J., and CHAVEZ, NOBLE, and MOISE, JJ., concur.