Title: Roberts v. Klinkosh

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Roberts v. Klinkosh1999 WY 111986 P.2d 153Case Number: 98-179Decided: 07/27/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming

PATRICK C. ROBERTS, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

J. KEITH KLINKOSH, Appellee 
(Defendant).

 

                                 

Appeal from the District Court of Sheridan County 
Honorable

John C. Brackley, Judge.

  

Hardy H. Tate, Sheridan, 
Wyoming; Fredric A. Bremseth and Thomas W. Geng of Doshan & Bremseth, 
Wayzata, Minnesota, representing appellant.

 Jay A. Gilbertz of Yonkee & Toner, Sheridan, 
Wyoming, representing appellee.

 

    Before LEHMAN, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and TAYLOR,* JJ.

   * 
retired November 8, 1998

 

    GOLDEN, 
Justice.

   
[¶1]      A social guest of landlord's tenant was 
bitten and seriously injured by another tenant's pit bull dog, and the guest 
sued landlord for damages. The landlord, Appellee J. Keith Klinkosh (Klinkosh), 
was granted summary judgment when the district court determined that he owed no 
duty to the guest, Appellant Patrick C. 
Roberts (Roberts). Roberts appealed, presenting this Court with the primary 
issue of whether any facts exist which would impose a duty on a landlord who 
allowed a tenant to keep a pit bull dog that bit and seriously injured another 
tenant's guest.

 

  [¶2]      In general, Wyoming does not impose a 
duty of reasonable care upon landlords, although it has recognized several 
exceptions to the general rule of landlord immunity. In this particular case, 
the landlord did not have any knowledge of this dog's dangerous propensities, 
the attack did not occur in an area under the landlord's control, and we hold that knowledge of a 
breed's dangerous propensities will not impose a duty of reasonable care upon a 
landlord unless the landlord had the ability to eliminate the danger by having 
the animal removed or confined. The grant of summary judgment is 
affirmed.

 

                     
          ISSUES

 

  [¶3]      Roberts presents these issues for 
review:

 

1. Whether the District Court erred in finding that 
there is insufficient evidence of record from which a jury could reasonably 
conclude that Appellee Klinkosh knew of the pit bull's propensity for violent 
behavior?

 

2. Whether the District Court erred in concluding as 
a matter of law that a landlord cannot have a greater duty of care than the 
keeper or possessor of an animal?

 

  Klinkosh rephrases the issues 
as:

 

A. Under what circumstances must a landlord protect 
third parties from an attack by a dog kept by a tenant.

 

B. Was there a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding the landlord's knowledge of the violent propensities of the dog kept 
by his tenant.

 

  

                                
FACTS

 

  [¶4]      Klinkosh owned an apartment building 
containing four units.  Although he 
occupied one, Klinkosh worked in Montana and was away from the apartment a great 
deal. He rented the other three units under verbal agreements that did not prohibit pets of 
any kind.  Each unit of the building 
had a separate entrance that opened to a step serving only that apartment. A 
sidewalk ran the entire length in between the front of the building and a 
graveled parking lot. One of Klinkosh's tenants, Rocky Maronick, lived in an end 
unit. He acquired a pit bull dog that was kept chained on the side of the 
building with enough length to allow it on the grounds of the apartment building. Although the exact 
length of the chain was disputed, the dog was able to sit on Maronick's front 
step and go on to the sidewalk in front of Maronick's apartment. The chain was 
attached to at least one tire and rim, and sometimes the dog would drag the tire 
to the parking lot area. The dog attacked and bit a child sometime before the 
attack on Roberts; however, there is no evidence that Klinkosh knew of 
this attack. Klinkosh testified that he 
had made a point of observing the dog when he was home and never saw it act 
aggressively, growl, or even bark. He testified that, after the attack, he 
learned that the dog had lunged at passersby, but before the attack he had one 
complaint from another tenant that the dog had growled at her and frightened 
her.

 

  [¶5]      Roberts was a guest of another tenant. 
Over a seven week period, he also observed that the dog did not bark or act 
aggressively towards him, and he petted the dog on approximately twenty-five 
occasions. On September 28, 1995, he noticed that the dog was entangled in the 
chain and approached it to assist it.  The dog attacked him and seriously injured him. He 
brought suit against Maronick and Klinkosh under negligence and strict liability 
theories.

 

  [¶6]      Klinkosh moved for summary judgment 
alleging that the attack occurred on the step of Maronick's apartment and that 
the separate entrances of the apartments were not under his control as landlord. 
He contended that he had no knowledge that the dog had attacked anyone else and 
that he had personally observed the dog and did not see any threatening 
behavior. Based on these facts, he argued that he did not owe Roberts a duty of 
care because, in Wyoming, landlords do not owe a duty to a tenant's guest when 
the harm does not occur in an area under the landlord's control. He also 
contended that any arguable duty of 
care had not been breached or was 
not the proximate cause of the injuries. Maronick also moved for summary 
judgment.

 

  [¶7]      Roberts opposed the motions. The 
district court found insufficient evidence existed to show that Klinkosh knew of 
the pit bull's propensity for violent behavior and concluded that a landlord 
does not owe duty of care when he does not know of violent propensities. The 
court granted Klinkosh's motion for summary judgment, denied Maronick's, and 
entered a Rule 54(b) certification allowing Roberts to appeal the grant of 
summary judgment to Klinkosh.

 

                             
DISCUSSION

 

  Standard of Review

 

  [¶8]      Summary judgment will be sustained only 
if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the prevailing party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Lyden v. Winer, 878 P.2d 516, 518 (Wyo. 
1994). A material fact is one that establishes or refutes an essential element 
of a cause of action or a defense asserted by a party. Id. If the moving party 
presents supporting summary judgment materials demonstrating no genuine issue of 
material fact exists, the burden is shifted to the non-moving party to present 
appropriate supporting materials posing a genuine issue of a material fact for 
trial. Downen v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 887 P.2d 515, 519 (Wyo. 1994). On appeal, 
this court examines the entire record in the light most favorable to the party 
who opposed the motion, affording to that party all favorable inferences which 
may be drawn from the materials either supporting or opposing the motion. Lyden, 
878 P.2d  at 518. If a dispute exists over a material fact which leads to 
conflicting interpretations or if reasonable minds might differ, then summary 
judgment is improper. Id. Summary 
judgment serves the purpose of eliminating formal trials where only questions of 
law are involved. Blagrove v. JB Mechanical, Inc., 934 P.2d 1273, 1275 (Wyo. 
1997). We review a grant of summary judgment deciding a question of law de novo 
and afford no deference to the district court's ruling. 
Id.

 

  Landlord Liability

 

  [¶9]      In order to state a claim in negligence, 
the plaintiff must prove the defendant was under a duty of care to protect the 
plaintiff from injury; the defendant breached that duty; the plaintiff suffered 
actual injury or loss; and the defendant's breach of the duty proximately caused 
the injury or loss. Downen, 887 P.2d  at 520. The dispositive issue in this case 
is whether any facts exist which would impose a duty of care upon Klinkosh 
to protect Roberts from a foreseeable 
risk of injury.

 

  [¶10] 
  In this appeal, Roberts 
contends that the dog was kept near a common area; argues that there was a 
genuine issue of material fact that Klinkosh knew the dog was dangerous; and 
asserts that Klinkosh's admission that he knew this breed of dog was dangerous 
is sufficient to impose a duty. Klinkosh contends that a duty should be owed 
when a two prong test is met: 1) the injury occurred in a common area under the 
control of the landlord; and 2) the landlord must have had actual knowledge of 
the particular dog's vicious propensities. We decide the existence of a duty as 
a matter of law; if a duty has not been established, there is no actionable negligence. Davis v. Black Hills Trucking, 
Inc., 929 P.2d 532, 534 (Wyo. 1996); Thomas v. South Cheyenne Water and Sewer 
Dist., 702 P.2d 1303, 1307 (Wyo. 1985).

 

  [¶11] 
  Wyoming follows the common 
law rules in landlord and tenant relationships. Ortega v. Flaim, 902 P.2d 199, 
202 (Wyo. 1995).  Under those rules, 
a landlord owes no greater duty to a tenant's guests than the landlord owes to 
the tenant himself. Id.  Generally, 
that duty is nonexistent because landlords enjoy immunity from tort liability. 
Id. When part of the premises is retained under the landlord's control and the 
tenant is permitted to use it, a 
duty of reasonable care is imposed on the landlord.  Lyden, 878 P.2d  at 518. The general rule 
for imposing this duty is:

 

[W]here the owner of the premises leases parts 
thereof to different tenants, and expressly or impliedly reserves other parts 
thereof, such as entrances, halls, stairways, porches, walks, etc., for the 
common use of different tenants, it is his duty to exercise reasonable care to 
keep safe such parts of which he so reserves control, and if he is negligent in 
this regard, and a personal injury results by reason thereof to a tenant or to a person there in the right of the 
tenant, he is liable, provided that the injury occurs while such part of the 
premises is being used in the manner intended.

 

Id. Whether a landlord has 
retained control over a portion of the leased premises is a question of fact, 
and this question or the inferences to be drawn from a fact or facts will not be 
decided upon summary judgment unless reasonable minds could not differ.  Id. at 519. "To show control in the 
landlord there must be evidence from which the trier of fact can infer that the 
tenant surrendered his right to exclusive possession and control." Id. 
(quoting Erhardt v. Lowe, 596 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Mo.App. 1980)).

 

  [¶12] 
  In this case, Roberts' 
deposition established that the dog was on the step of Maronick's apartment when 
it attacked and bit him.  He does 
not contest that the step is property possessed by Maronick and does not claim 
that the step is under the control of the landlord; rather, he contends that the 
dog's proximity to the common areas and 
the dog's occasional roaming of the common areas warrant imposition of a duty. 
These facts do not represent evidence showing that the tenant surrendered his 
right to exclusive possession and control and, therefore, do not suffice to 
impose a duty on the landlord.

 

  [¶13] 
  Roberts contends that 
Klinkosh owed a duty of care because he knew that breed of dog had dangerous 
propensities; he knew that the dog had growled at another tenant; and it is not 
credible that Klinkosh was unaware that 
the dog had lunged at other passersby. Under common law rules, landlords are 
generally not to be held responsible for activities which the tenant carries on 
upon the land after transfer of 
possession, even when they create a nuisance. Clauson v. Kempffer, 477 N.W.2d 257, 259 (S.D. 1991). Assuming that an exception could be based upon a 
landlord's knowledge of a particular vicious animal, the facts of this case do 
not show that this landlord did have any knowledge that the dog was 
vicious.

 

  [¶14] 
  This Court has previously 
addressed when knowledge of a dog's dangerous propensities will result in 
negligence liability and has held that a dog owner without knowledge of the 
dog's dangerous propensities has no duty to a plaintiff injured by the dog and 
the dog owner is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Williams v. Johnson, 781 P.2d 922, 923 (Wyo. 1989). 
Under our summary judgment standards, once Klinkosh showed that he did not know 
the dog had lunged at other people, Roberts was required to come forward with 
evidence that Klinkosh did know of the dog's aggressiveness towards others. 
Downen, 887 P.2d  at 519. Roberts did prove that Klinkosh knew the dog had 
growled at one person, but did not provide any evidence, as was his burden, that 
Klinkosh had any other knowledge. Roberts makes no argument that growling 
behavior is sufficient to put anyone on notice that a particular animal is 
dangerous. Although this state's animals-running-at-large statute, Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 11-31-301(e) (LEXIS 1999), states "[p]roof of the fact that the dog has 
bitten or attacked any person at any 
place . . . is evidence that the dog is vicious within the meaning of this 
section," it is silent about a dog's growling behavior as evidence of dangerous 
propensities. We find that in this case knowledge that the dog had growled at a 
person is insufficient to infer knowledge of the dog's dangerous propensities. 
Under Williams, the dog owner would not be liable under these circumstances, 
and, accordingly, the landlord should not be found to owe a duty to third 
parties. See Krier v. Safeway Stores 46, Inc., 943 P.2d 405, 415 (Wyo. 
1997).  Because the landlord did not 
know that the dog was behaving dangerously, we will not address whether landlord 
immunity should be abrogated when a landlord does have that 
knowledge.

 

  [¶15] 
  Klinkosh did testify that 
he was aware that pit bulls were a dangerous breed. Roberts contends this 
knowledge was sufficient to impose a duty upon him as landlord to protect him 
and others from the potential dangers presented by a pit bull. This Court has 
previously refused to abrogate the common law rule that a landlord owes no duty to the tenant or the tenant's 
guests for dangerous or defective conditions of the premises. Ortega, 902 P.2d  
at 204. Those decisions from other jurisdictions which do impose a duty upon a 
landlord are limited to instances where a landlord had actual knowledge of the 
dog's dangerous propensities, had retained control of the premises, or, because 
of a lease provision, had an ability to eliminate a danger by having the animal removed or confined. Matthews v. 
Amberwood Assoc. Ltd., 719 A.2d 119, 127 (Md. 1998). None of those conditions 
exist here, and we find no basis exists to consider abrogating the common law of 
landlord immunity regarding a dangerous breed of dog.

 

  [¶16] 
  We affirm the grant of 
summary judgment.