Title: Hunt v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 30  
  September Term, 1996
___________________________________
FLINT GREGORY HUNT
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
___________________________________
    *Murphy, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Bell
Smith, Marvin H. (retired,
(specially assigned)
JJ.
___________________________________
Opinion by Karwacki, J.
Bell, J., dissents
___________________________________
      Filed:  March 18, 1997       
         
*Murphy, C.J., now retired, participated in
the hearing and conference of this case while
an active member of this Court; after being
recalled 
pursuant 
to 
the 
Constitution,
Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated
in the decision and adoption of this opinion.
      His conviction for wearing, carrying, and transporting a handgun was merged
1
into that for use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. See Hunt
v. State, 312 Md. 494, 509-11, 540 A.2d 1125, 1132-33 (1988).
The instant appeal is from the Order of the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City denying the second petition for post-conviction
relief filed by appellant, Flint Gregory Hunt.  This is the fourth
time Hunt has sought our review of his capital conviction and
sentence.  He was convicted by a jury in 1986 of first degree
murder and handgun violations.  His sentence of death was vacated
by us on direct appeal; his murder conviction was affirmed.   Hunt
1
v. State, 312 Md. 494, 540 A.2d 1125 (1988).  A second jury
sentenced Hunt to death following a resentencing hearing.  We
affirmed that judgment, and his petition to the Supreme Court of
United States for writ of certiorari to review that affirmance was
denied.  Hunt v. State, 321 Md. 387, 583 A.2d 218 (1990), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 835, 112 S. Ct. 117, 116 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1991).  He
then filed his first petition for post-conviction relief, which was
denied by the circuit court after an evidentiary hearing.  This
Court denied his application for leave to appeal that denial on
June 25, 1993, by an unreported order.  The Supreme Court denied
discretionary review of that matter.  Hunt v. Maryland, 510 U.S.
1171, 114 S. Ct. 1206, 127 L. Ed. 2d 554 (1994).
Hunt then challenged his conviction and sentence in the United
States District Court for the District of Maryland by filing a
petition for writ of habeas corpus.  His habeas petition was
premised upon his belief that, had he been effectively represented
-2-
      By Chapter 111, §§ 1-3 of the Acts of 1995, the General Assembly provided
2
that, effective October 1, 1995, each convicted criminal would be entitled to only
one post-conviction review.  That statute amended Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl.
Vol., 1994 Cum. Supp.), Article 27, § 645A(a).
by counsel, he would have been convicted of second degree murder,
thus removing the death penalty from the range of sentences to
which he was exposed.  In Hunt v. Smith, 856 F. Supp. 251 (D. Md.
1994), the district court rejected Hunt's claim the he had been
denied effective assistance of counsel.  It also declined to rule
that due process encompasses an absolute right to appeal a circuit
court's denial of post-conviction relief.  His appeal from that
court's decision was subsequently consolidated with a motion to
vacate that judgment.  The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
later affirmed both the district court's denial of habeas corpus
relief and the motion to vacate.  Hunt v. Nuth, 57 F.3d 1327 (4th
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S. Ct. 724, 133 L. Ed.
2d 676 (1996).  Much like the district court, it held that Hunt
neither received ineffective assistance of counsel nor was deprived
of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by virtue
of the lack of the ability to obtain appellate review of a denial
of post-conviction relief as a matter of right.
Hunt's second petition for post-conviction relief, the subject
of the instant appeal, was filed on September 29, 1995.   After an
2
evidentiary hearing on the petition, the circuit court issued an
Order in which it denied the substance of Hunt's claims.  It also
stated that, given its decision, the question of Hunt's possible
-3-
waiver of the issues raised need only be accorded cursory
consideration.  Without deciding whether a right requiring a
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461
(1938), "knowing and intelligent" waiver was involved, see Curtis
v. State, 284 Md. 132, 395 A.2d 464 (1978), the hearing court
simply found as fact that Hunt had not knowingly and intelligently
waived the assignments of error posed in his petition.  Following
rendition of the circuit court's Order, a Warrant of Execution was
obtained.  This Court stayed the execution and granted Hunt leave
to appeal from the circuit court's denial of his petition.  Before
this Court, he seeks a new trial or, in the alternative, a
resentencing hearing.
Prior to a recitation of the issues presented for our
consideration, we shall recount the facts underlying the murder:
"While on patrol the evening of November
18, 1985 at approximately 5:20 p.m., Officer
Vincent Adolfo noticed a new Cadillac with a
missing window covered with plastic.  In
addition to the driver, the vehicle contained
three other occupants.  The officer, following
a routine stolen car inquiry, learned that the
car had been stolen.  He broadcast a
description of the occupants of the car and
noted that the driver was `not breaking any
laws right now.'
Two officers in separate patrol cars,
responding to Officer Adolfo's request for
back-up, attempted to block the path of the
on-coming 
Cadillac. 
 
Upon 
nearing 
the
roadblock, the driver, later identified as
Hunt, jumped out of the car while it was still
moving and ran up a nearby alley.  The
Cadillac then struck one of the parked patrol
-4-
cars and stopped; an officer detained the
three passengers who were still in the car.
Officer Adolfo pursued Hunt into the
alley.  Upon apprehending him, the officer
positioned him against a wall and tried to
handcuff Hunt.  Hunt pushed away, knocking the
officer off balance.  Hunt then pulled a .357
Magnum [single-action revolver] from his
jacket and shot Officer Adolfo in the chest at
close range.  Within seconds, as the officer
reeled from the first shot, Hunt shot him
again, this time in the back.  Hunt fled the
scene of the crime.  Officer Adolfo was
pronounced dead at the hospital at 6 p.m.
In the meantime, Hunt had called his
friend, Angelo Williams, and asked him to keep
the gun for him, saying that he had just shot
a policeman.  Hunt and his girl friend,
Deborah Powell, then went to his sister's
house, only to leave when a television
broadcast indicated that Hunt was being sought
in connection with the murder.  Hunt's sister
later testified at trial that Hunt had seemed
fine at the time, although Ms. Powell said
that Hunt had been taking drugs earlier that
afternoon and appeared `high' when he had left
her.
The next day, Hunt and Powell drove to
Camden, New Jersey.  En route, Hunt admitted
to Powell that he had shot the policeman.
Hunt then boarded a bus to Santa Monica,
California, leaving Powell behind.  He was
apprehended at a Tulsa, Oklahoma bus station
five days later."
Hunt, 312 Md. at 498-99, 540 A.2d at 1126-27.  Further facts will
be recited as we address the individual questions presented.
At this juncture in the proceedings, Hunt mounts a five-
pronged attack upon the circuit court's denial of his petition for
post-conviction relief.  He asks:
-5-
"1.
Whether the Circuit Court erred in
finding Appellant was not deprived of his
right to an impartial jury at his capital
resentencing trial when:
(a) one juror who sat (Diana Void)
failed to disclose, both at the jury
orientation session and on voir
dire, a pending criminal charge that
would have statutorily disqualified
her from jury service under Md. Cts.
& Jud. Proc. Art., § 8-207(b)(5) and
which would have been a basis for an
automatic challenge for cause; and
(b) one juror who sat (Patrick Russ)
intentionally failed to respond to a
question on voir dire that he had
been the victim of a crime of
violence which may have provided
sufficient basis for a challenge for
cause and, at a minimum, created a
presumption of juror bias against
Russ which remained unrebutted by
the State.
2.
(a) Whether the Circuit Court erred in
finding 
that 
the 
reasonable 
doubt
instructions 
given 
at 
Appellant's
guilt/innocence trial and at his capital
resentencing trial did not lower the
State's burden of proof, contrary to this
Court's decision in Wills v. State, 329
Md. 370, 620 A.2d 295 (1993); and
(b) Assuming, arguendo, the reasonable
doubt instructions violated Wills, is
Appellant 
entitled 
to 
retroactive
application of Wills under either Md.
Ann. Code art. 27, § 645A(d) or as a
matter of federal constitutional law?
3.
Whether the Circuit Court erred in its
determination that the State did not
violate Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
150[, 92 S. Ct. 763, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104]
(1972), Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83[,
83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215] (1963),
-6-
and Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264[, 79
S. Ct. 1173, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217] (1959) by
(a) failing to disclose exculpatory
evidence that prior to Appellant's
trial the State promised its key
witness 
on 
premeditation, 
Aaron
McNair, that it would bring his
cooperation to the attention of the
judge sentencing McNair on a pending
assault charge; and
(b) compounding this failure to
disclose by deliberately eliciting
and then failing to correct Aaron
McNair's false testimony about the
promise.
4.
Whether the State violated Giglio and
Napue by eliciting from Aaron McNair
false testimony about Appellant "chasing"
the officer up the alley as he fired a
second shot, or alternatively, whether it
violates due process and the prohibition
against cruel and/or unusual punishment
to carry out an execution when it has
been shown that the conviction and
sentence were premised on materially
false testimony.
5.
Whether 
Appellant's 
trial 
attorneys
rendered 
ineffective 
assistance 
of
counsel when:
(a) they tendered erroneous jury
instructions 
on 
the 
effect 
of
voluntary intoxication and failed to
object to the instructions as given;
and
(b) they failed to object to an
improper and confusing instruction
on the trial court's definition of
first degree murder."
-7-
      Section 645A(c) reads:
3
"When allegation of error deemed to have been
waived. — (1) For the purposes of this subtitle, an
allegation of error shall be deemed to be waived when a
petitioner could have made, but intelligently and
knowingly failed to make, such allegation before trial, at
trial, on direct appeal (whether or not the petitioner
actually took such an appeal), in an application for leave
to appeal a conviction based on a guilty plea, in any
habeas 
corpus 
or 
coram 
nobis 
proceeding 
actually
instituted by said petitioner, in a prior petition under
this subtitle, or in any other proceeding actually
instituted by said petitioner, unless the failure to make
such allegation shall be excused because of special
circumstances.  The burden of proving the existence of
such special circumstances shall be upon the petitioner.
(2) When an allegation of error could have been made
by a petitioner before trial, at trial, on direct appeal
(whether or not said petitioner actually took such an
appeal), in an application for leave to appeal a
conviction based on a guilty plea, in any habeas corpus or
coram nobis proceeding actually instituted by said
petitioner, in a prior petition under this subtitle, or in
any 
other 
proceeding 
actually 
instituted 
by 
said
petitioner, but was not in fact so made, there shall be a
rebuttable presumption that said petitioner intelligently
and knowingly failed to make such allegation."
In response, the State asserts that these issues have been
waived or finally litigated within the meaning of Maryland Code
(1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Article 27, § 645A.  
I.
This Court first addressed the matter of the failure of a
defendant to preserve issues for post-conviction review in Curtis
v. State, supra, 284 Md. 132, 395 A.2d 464.  Specifically, in that
case, we were called upon to determine the scope of Art. 27, §
645A(c) ; that is, whether the Legislature intended that the
3
definition of waiver contained in that subsection resolves the
right of a defendant seeking post-conviction relief to raise an
-8-
issue for the first time in all cases, without regard to procedural
defaults or tactical decisions by counsel.  Id. at 141, 395 A.2d at
469.
Following affirmance of his conviction on charges of first
degree murder, Curtis v. State, 4 Md. App. 499, 243 A.2d 656
(1968), cert. denied, 252 Md. 730(1969), Curtis filed a petition
under the Post Conviction Procedure Act.  He was denied any relief.
He then filed a second such petition, alleging a deprivation of his
Sixth Amendment right to "the genuine and effective representation
of counsel," 284 Md. at 134, 395 A.2d at 466, both at trial and on
direct appeal.  He also alleged a lack of genuine assistance of
counsel by his first post-conviction counsel, in response to the
State's motion to dismiss the petition on grounds of waiver under
Art. 27, § 645A(c).  The circuit court granted the State's motion,
holding, inter alia, that, because Curtis failed to raise the issue
of his counsel's competency at the first post-conviction
proceeding, the matter had not been preserved for review.  On
application to the Court of Special Appeals for leave to appeal,
Curtis argued that the failure to raise the inadequacy of counsel
did not constitute waiver because, under Art. 27, § 645A(c), the
allegations could only be waived if he could have advanced them,
but intelligently and knowingly failed to do so previously.  In the
alternative, he argued that any waiver was excused by the existence
of special circumstances, within the meaning of the statute.
-9-
The Court of Special Appeals granted Curtis's application and
affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of his petition, holding
that there had indeed been a waiver of the issue for post-
conviction review.  Curtis v. State, 37 Md. App. 459, 462, 381 A.2d
1166, 1167 (1977).  The court reasoned that waiver could exist even
if Curtis had not knowingly and intelligently failed to raise the
issue of trial counsel's competency.  Thus, the court continued,
the matter of trial counsel's inadequacy could only be considered
if representation by counsel at Curtis's first post-conviction
proceeding had been constitutionally inadequate, or special
circumstances existed to permit review of the matter.  Finding no
inadequacy on the part of post-conviction counsel or special
circumstances within the meaning of the statute, the court
considered the issue of trial counsel's adequacy waived because it
was not raised in Curtis's first petition for post-conviction
relief.  Id.
On appeal to this Court, we held that the Court of Special
Appeals had erroneously interpreted subsection (c) of Art. 27, §
645A so as to "virtually do[] away with the concept of `waiver' as
an intelligent and knowing failure to raise an issue."  284 Md. at
140, 395 A.2d at 469.  Looking to the language of the first
paragraph of the subsection, Judge Eldridge, for the Court,
discussed its practical interpretation:
"The test for `waiver' which the Legislature
contemplated was clearly the `intelligent and
-10-
      The Court added:  "[T]he concept of a rebuttable presumption that a failure
4
to raise an issue was intelligent and knowing, and the concept of `special
circumstances' excusing an intelligent and knowing waiver, are separate and distinct
matters."  Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 140, 395 A.2d 464, 469 (1978).  
knowing' failure to raise, not the failure of
counsel or an unknowing petitioner to raise an
issue. . . .  [T]he matter of `special
circumstances' only becomes pertinent where
there is an intelligent and knowing failure of
the petitioner to previously raise an issue.
Where the record affirmatively shows that
there was not an intelligent and knowing
failure 
to 
raise, 
there 
is 
nothing 
to
`excuse,' and the presence or absence of
`special circumstances' has no relevance."
Id. at 139, 395 A.2d at 468.  Turning to the second paragraph, the
Court continued:
"The statute does not speak in terms of a
conclusive presumption of waiver, absent
special circumstances, as viewed by the State
and the Court of Special Appeals.  Rather, it
is a presumption of an intelligent and knowing
failure to have raised an issue, which failure
can be rebutted by evidence or stipulated
facts 
showing 
that 
petitioner 
did 
not
`intelligently and knowingly' fail to raise
the issue previously."[4]
Id., 395 A.2d at 469.  
Noting that "the legislative purpose of the Post Conviction
Procedure Act, as amended by Ch. 442 of the Acts of 1965, was to
adopt the concept of `waiver' as set forth by the Supreme Court" in
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.
Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938), and Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439, 83 S.
Ct. 822, 849, 9 L. Ed. 2d 837, 869 (1963), Curtis, 284 Md. at 142,
395 A.2d at 470, we then outlined the Supreme Court's seminal
-11-
explanation of that concept in Johnson v. Zerbst, in which the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel was implicated:  "`A waiver is
ordinarily an intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege.  The determination of whether there has been an
intelligent waiver . . . must depend, in each case, upon the
particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including
the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.'"  Id. at
143, 395 A.2d at 470 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Johnson, 304 U.S.
at 464, 58 S. Ct. at 1023, 82 L. Ed. at 1466).  It was this
standard that was later applied in Fay v. Noia to a defendant's
failure to file a direct appeal from a murder conviction in which
a coerced confession had been introduced against him at trial.  We
noted the Court's language, at 372 U.S. at 439, 83 S. Ct. at 849,
9 L. Ed. 2d at 869:
"`If a habeas applicant, after consultation
with 
competent 
counsel 
or 
otherwise,
understandingly and knowingly forewent the
privilege of seeking to vindicate his federal
claims in the state courts, whether for
strategic, tactical, or any other reasons that
can fairly be described as the deliberate by-
passing of state procedures, then it is open
to the federal court on habeas to deny him all
relief 
if 
the 
state 
courts 
refused 
to
entertain his federal claims on the merits —
though of course only after the federal court
has satisfied itself, by holding a hearing or
by some other means, of the facts bearing upon
the applicant's default.  At all events we
wish it clearly understood that the standard
here put forth depends on the considered
choice of the petitioner.'"
-12-
Curtis, 284 Md. at 144, 395 A.2d at 471 (citation omitted).
Regarded as the most restrictive application of waiver principles,
Fay, in conjunction with the prior Johnson v. Zerbst decision, set
the stage for the General Assembly's enactment of subsection (c) of
§ 645A of the Post Conviction Procedure Act.  Indeed, it is for
this reason that the Supreme Court's differentiation between those
rights to which a knowing and intelligent waiver is required to
bind a criminal defendant by prior action or inaction and those
that may not be vindicated absent a defendant's proper preservation
of the matter is instructive in determining precisely "what type of
situations the [Maryland] Legislature intended to be encompassed by
subsection (c)."  Id. at 142, 395 A.2d at 470.  
Based upon our review of the Supreme Court's holdings on
waiver, we observed, in Curtis:
"It is clear from the . . . cases that
whether one is precluded from asserting a
constitutional right because of what may have
occurred previously, even though the failure
was not `intelligent and knowing,' depends
upon the nature of the right and the
surrounding circumstances.  A defendant may
forego a broad spectrum of rights which are
deemed to fall within the category of tactical
decisions by counsel or involve procedural
defaults.
In the broadest sense of the word, any
tactical decision by counsel, inaction by
counsel, or procedural default, could be
described as a `waiver.'  For example, an
attorney must make numerous decisions in the
course of a trial.  Whenever he makes one,
choosing to take or forego a particular
action, the alternate choice could be said to
-13-
have been waived.  However, with regard to
constitutional 
rights 
in 
a 
criminal
proceeding, in a much narrower sense the term
`waiver' 
could 
be 
said 
to 
connote 
the
intelligent and knowing relinquishment of
certain basic constitutional rights under
circumstances where the courts have held that
only such intelligent and knowing action will
bind the defendant."
Id. at 147-48, 395 A.2d at 473; see State v. Magwood, 290 Md. 615,
621-22, 432 A.2d 446, 449 (1981) ("`Almost without exception, the
requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver has been applied
only to those rights which the Constitution guarantees to a
criminal defendant in order to preserve a fair trial.'" (brackets
omitted) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 237, 93
S. Ct. 2041, 2052-53, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 868 (1973)).  We then
concluded: 
"In our view, the Legislature was using the
word `waiver' in this narrow sense in the
Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act, Art.
27, § 645A.  It intended that the waiver
provision of that Act, with its express
definition of waiver, be applicable only in
those 
situations 
where 
the 
courts 
have
required an `intelligent and knowing' standard
[within the meaning of Johnson v. Zerbst and
Fay v. Noia].  This, we believe, is shown by
the statutory background, the decisions of
this Court, and logic."
Id. at 148, 395 A.2d at 473.  To conclude otherwise, we reasoned,
would be "chaotic."  Id. at 149, 395 A.2d at 474.  That is to say,
if we were to apply the knowing and intelligent standard  
"every time counsel made a tactical decision
or a procedural default, . . . for a criminal
defendant to be bound by his lawyer's actions,
the lawyer would have to interrupt a trial
-14-
repeatedly and go through countless litanies
with his client. . . .  It is hardly
conceivable that the Legislature, in adopting
§ 645A (c), could have intended to use the
word `waiver' in its broadest sense, thereby
requiring that the `intelligent and knowing'
standard apply every time an issue was not
raised before.
. . .  [The Legislature] intended that
subsection (c), with its `intelligent and
knowing' standard, be applicable only in those
circumstances where the waiver concept of
Johnson v. Zerbst and Fay v. Noia [are]
applicable.  Other situations are beyond the
scope of subsection (c), to be governed by
case law or any pertinent statutes or rules.
Tactical decisions, when made by an authorized
competent attorney, as well as legitimate
procedural requirements, will normally bind a
criminal defendant."
Id. at 149-50, 395 A.2d at 474 (citations omitted); see also
Magwood, 290 Md. at 622-23, 432 A.2d at 450 ("Most decisions as to
trial tactics, strategy and procedural maneuvers rest with the
defendant's attorney, for, to require an intelligent and knowing
waiver of every trial right of whatever kind would . . . adversely
alter the role of the trial judge and counsel and disrupt the
orderly workings of a criminal trial already designed to ensure
justice for the accused.").
Thus, the General Assembly contemplated, for purposes of
subsection (c) of the Post Conviction Procedure Act, that waiver
there described assumed the restrictive character to which the
Supreme Court had ascribed it.  This has necessarily led to a dual
framework under which a post-conviction petitioner in Maryland may
-15-
endeavor to assert certain, specific claims or rights not
previously raised.  That is to say, the nature of the right
involved will determine whether the decision is governed by Art.
27, § 645A(c), or pertinent case law, statutes, or rules.  On the
one hand, if a defendant's claim does encompass that narrow band of
rights that courts have traditionally required an individual
knowingly and intelligently relinquish or abandon in order to waive
the right or claim, Walker v. State, 343 Md. 629, 642, 684 A.2d
429, 435 (1996), the failure to do so knowingly and intelligently
will not preclude raising the matter on post-conviction review.
Courts, however, do not apply the same standard of waiver to "the
vast array of trial decisions, strategic and tactical, which must
be made before and during trial."  Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S.
501, 512, 96 S. Ct. 1691, 1697, 48 L. Ed. 2d 126, 135 (1976); see
Fay v. Noia, supra, 372 U.S. at 439, 83 S. Ct. at 849, 9 L. Ed. 2d
at 869; Walker, 343 Md. at 643-44, 684 A.2d at 435-36; Curtis, 284
Md. at 144-48, 395 A.2d at 471-73 (citing, inter alia, Francis v.
Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 96 S. Ct. 1708, 48 L. Ed. 2d 149 (1976);
United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 95 S. Ct. 2160, 45 L. Ed. 2d
141 (1975); Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 93 S. Ct. 1577,
36 L. Ed. 2d 216 (1973)); see also Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201,
215-16, 438 A.2d 1301, 1308 ("[T]he waiver of other rights, which
ordinarily do not require such knowing and voluntary action for a
waiver to be effective, [is] not governed by the definition of
-16-
      We have consistently followed the principles expounded in Curtis.  See
5
Walker v. State, 343 Md. 629, 684 A.2d 429 (1996); Oken v. State, 343 Md. 256, 681
A.2d 30 (1996); McElroy v. State, 329 Md. 136, 617 A.2d 1068 (1993); Trimble v.
State, 321 Md. 248, 582 A.2d 794 (1990); State v. Romulus, 315 Md. 526, 555 A.2d 494
(1989); Martinez v. State, 309 Md. 124, 522 A.2d 950 (1987); State v. Calhoun, 306
Md. 692, 511 A.2d 461 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 910, 107 S. Ct. 1339, 94 L. Ed.
2d 528 (1986); State v. Tichnell, 306 Md. 428, 509 A.2d 1179, cert. denied, 479 U.S.
995, 107 S. Ct. 598, 93 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1986); Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 438
A.2d 1301 (1981); State v. Magwood, 290 Md. 615, 432 A.2d 446 (1981).  
waiver in the Post Conviction Procedure Act.").  Therefore, in the
case of procedural defaults or tactical decisions by litigants or
their counsel, the litigants may be barred from asserting the
right.5
Although these avenues of recourse are mutually exclusive,
each has its own "escape mechanism" by which a waiver, if found to
have occurred, may be excused.  If there has been a knowing and
intelligent relinquishment of the issue presented, the defendant
may allege, and must prove, the existence of special circumstances
excusing the failure to raise a right recognized under Art. 27, §
645A(c).  Otherwise, he or she is without recourse.
In those instances involving "most rights and issues arising
in litigation," Walker, 343 Md. at 643, 684 A.2d at 435, the Court
may review otherwise unpreserved issues under the discretion
granted by Maryland Rule 8-131.  Under that rule, the appellate
courts possess the discretion to excuse the waiver of a right or
claim waivable by less than knowing and voluntary action.  Oken v.
State, 343 Md. 256, 273, 681 A.2d 30, 38 (1996).  In Oken,
revisiting the matter of waiver in the context of a petition for
-17-
post-conviction relief, we rejected the petitioner's contention
that circumstances existed to excuse a default.  Based upon
evidence that appellate counsel's failure to raise the adequacy of
voir dire on appeal was deliberate, the decision not to raise the
matter was "quintessentially a tactical [one]," id. at 271, 681
A.2d at 37, falling without the language of Art. 27, § 645A(c), and
"governed by case law or any pertinent statutes or rules."  Curtis,
284 Md. at 150, 395 A.2d at 474.  Again, in Walker, supra, we
recognized that "in a post conviction proceeding, [we] can excuse
a waiver [under Rule 8-131] based upon an earlier procedural
default if the circumstances warrant such action," 343 Md. at 647-
48, 684 A.2d at 438, but rejected that the attorney's failure to
object to erroneous jury instructions was excusable under the
circumstances because the error did not deprive Walker of a fair
trial, id. at 650, 684 A.2d at 439.
With these principles in mind, we now turn to the questions
presented in Hunt's petition.
II.
A
Diana Void
Hunt posits that he has not waived what he characterizes as
his constitutional right to an impartial jury and, thus, is in a
position to challenge the seating of juror Diana Void on the panel
-18-
      Theft penalties are provided by Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27,
6
§ 342.  Under the charge at issue, Ms. Void was subject to both a fine of up to $500
and imprisonment for up to eighteen months.
      Juror Void has previously been the subject of Hunt's appellate attacks.  On
7
direct appeal from his resentence of death, Hunt alleged that the trial court had
improperly denied his motion to excuse Ms. Void for cause based upon her responses
concerning her predisposition to impose the death penalty. See Hunt v. State, 321
Md. 387, 418-19, 583 A.2d 218, 233 (1990).
that resentenced him in 1988.  Concomitant to this right, he
continues, is the "constitutional right to adequately inquire of
prospective 
jurors 
to 
determine 
if 
cause 
existed 
for
disqualification." (citing Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27, 633 A.2d 867
(1993)).  The cause, he asserts, for disqualifying Ms. Void is a
charge of misdemeanor theft pending against her at the time of the
resentencing.  Under Md. Code (1973, 1995 Repl. Vol., 1996 Supp.),
§ 8-207(b)(5) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (CJ), a
prospective juror is disqualified to serve if "he:  [h]as a charge
pending against him for a crime punishable by a fine of more than
$500, or by imprisonment for more than six months, or both . . .
."    Hunt reads this to contemplate automatic dismissal of any
6
venireperson so charged; the fact of Ms. Void's pending charge
rendered her statutorily disqualified from serving on the jury.  We
hold that Hunt has failed to avail himself of CJ Title 8 in a
timely fashion.  We explain.  
Diana Void  was arrested on October 24, 1988, four days after
7
she completed and returned her Qualification Questionnaire for Jury
Service to the Baltimore City Jury Commissioner.  On it she
truthfully indicated a negative response to the question, "Are you
-19-
      Ms. Void did not testify at the hearing on Hunt's second petition for post-
8
conviction relief; she could not be located.  Testimony was therefore elicited from
Cynthia Harry, an investigator for the Federal Public Defender's Office that was
acting on Hunt's behalf in the federal habeas corpus proceeding, who conducted the
interview of Ms. Void.
presently charged with a crime other than a minor traffic offense?"
Six weeks later, when she was summonsed for service, during an
orientation for all prospective panel members, she was again asked
a number of qualifying questions, including whether she had any
criminal charges pending.  An affirmative response to this question
would have been considered sufficient to warrant excuse from
service.  Ms. Void did not speak up.  During voir dire, the twice-
screened Ms. Void was again asked to indicate whether she had ever
been charged with or convicted of a serious crime.  She failed to
respond.  She went on to sit on the panel that resentenced Hunt to
death.  In the course of an investigation with regard to Hunt's
petition for federal habeas corpus relief, a check of the Judicial
Information Systems's ("CJIS") database revealed Ms. Void's
nondisclosure.  When interviewed  about it, on September 8, 1995,
8
Ms. Void indicated that, "at the time she knew she wasn't guilty,
therefore, it didn't pop into her head to say anything."  Ms. Void
further indicated that she had not misunderstood the question when
it was posed to her during the qualification stages of the
proceedings.
The "`right' to examine potential jurors, inherent in the
constitutional right to a fair trial and impartial jury, translates
-20-
into a defendant's right to have certain questions propounded to
the 
jurors 
. 
. 
. 
`concern[ing] 
a 
specific 
cause 
for
disqualification.'"  Boyd v. State, 341 Md. 431, 436, 671 A.2d 33,
36 (1996) (quoting Hill v. State, 339 Md. 275, 280, 661 A.2d 1164,
1166 (1995)); see also Bedford v. State, 317 Md. 659, 670, 566 A.2d
111, 116 (1989) ("Maryland Declaration of Rights Article XXI
guarantees a defendant the right to examine prospective jurors to
determine 
whether 
any 
cause 
exists 
for 
a 
juror's
disqualification.").  These "causes" may take two forms:
disqualification for bias or disqualification for failure to meet
minimum statutory requirements for jury service.  The distinction
between these two is a critical one in evaluating the case sub
judice.  In uncovering bias, a party seeks "to discover the state
of mind of the juror in respect to the matter in hand or any
collateral matter reasonably liable to unduly influence him."
Davis, 333 Md. at 35-36, 633 A.2d at 871.  This, however, is not
akin to uncovering information concerning the prospective juror's
age, literacy, or criminal background, for which minimum
requirements exist as prerequisites to service.  Moreover, the
identification of a disqualifying trait or bias does not always
warrant automatic dismissal of the offending juror.  Rather, it is
only under certain circumstances and at certain stages in the
proceedings that automatic dismissal is sanctioned.  It is with
-21-
this aspect of the jury selection process that we are concerned in
the instant case.
We must, however, first determine whether the right Hunt
asserts as having been violated — the right to examine potential
jurors, intrinsic to the right to a fair and impartial jury — is of
the kind traditionally considered waivable only by knowing and
intelligent action.  Hunt contends that it is and that he did not
knowingly and intelligently waive this issue because the factual
basis for his challenge was not "reasonably available" in prior
proceedings.  He reasons that, because his attorneys lacked the
time, information, and resources to investigate a possible claim of
juror disqualification/ineligibility, he should not be estopped
from asserting the matter.  The State argues that Hunt proceeds
under an erroneous standard in ascertaining the waivability of the
right.  It is not whether relevant matter is "reasonably available"
to the defense, but rather it entails a "`review of the nature of
[the . . .] right and a consideration of the surrounding
circumstances under which the right arises.'" (Quoting Oken, 342
Md. at 272, 681 A.2d at 38).  Such a review, the State continues,
reveals that a waiver consistent with Johnson v. Zerbst principles
is not required to forego the ability to contest a juror's seating
on the panel.  Indeed, defense counsel's acceptance of the jury
panel was sufficient to bar any subsequent objection thereto.  See
Gilchrist v. State, 340 Md. 606, 617-18, 667 A.2d 876, 881 (1995).
-22-
Because there is no authority for the proposition that the
right to examine prospective jurors requires a knowing and
voluntary waiver, Art. 27, § 645A(c) is not applicable, and we
proceed under the second category of the analysis recited above and
look to pertinent case law, statutes, and rules to determine Hunt's
ability to challenge Ms. Void at this juncture in the proceedings.
See Curtis, 284 Md. at 150, 395 A.2d at 474.  
Juror selection in Maryland is regulated by CJ Title 8,
Subtitle 2.  Lewis v. State, 332 Md. 639, 641, 632 A.2d 1175, 1176
(1993).  Modeled after the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968,
28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1869 (1994), the selection process set forth in
that subtitle necessarily embodies the Sixth Amendment's right to
an impartial jury.  It must be cautioned, however, that, separate
and apart from constitutional considerations, these rights are
statutory in nature.  Ordinarily, their violation may only be
vindicated by invocation of the statutorily-prescribed remedy.  
In achieving an impartial jury, the process commences with an
array composed of a fair cross-section of the community.  See
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S. Ct. 692, 42 L. Ed. 2d 690
(1975).  These individuals are then screened by various mechanisms
put into place by Title 8, Subtitle 2 to determine their
eligibility for jury service.  The guidelines set forth in CJ § 8-
207, which delineate the minimum qualifications for service, are
the means by which the selection of a representative venire is
-23-
effected.  Anyone disqualified thereunder as a result of a response
elicited on the qualification questionnaire or during the juror
orientation is automatically excused from service.  Those remaining
are then "screened" a third time through voir dire examination.
See Boyd, 341 Md. at 441, 671 A.2d at 38 ("Maryland courts screen
juror qualifications on at least three levels:  a statutorily-
required qualification form, appearance before the jury judge or
commissioner at the courthouse, and the trial judge's observance of
each juror during the voir dire.").  The timing and ability of a
party to challenge jurors and the jury selection process are
circumscribed by CJ § 8-211.  Subsection (a) requires that a
challenge to selection procedures in a criminal case be made before
voir dire examination begins, by motion to dismiss the indictment
or stay the proceedings on the ground of substantial failure to
comply with the procedures.  Subsection (e) further delimits the
ability to mount an attack against a particular juror by stating
that the procedures described in CJ § 8-211 are "the exclusive
means by which a person accused of a crime, the State's Attorney,
or a party in a civil case may challenge any jury on the ground
that the jury was not selected in conformity with the provisions of
this title," including CJ § 8-207.  It adds:  "Except as to
constitutional 
questions, 
nothing 
contained 
in 
this 
title
constitutes grounds for postconviction relief under the provisions
of Article 27, §§ 645A-645J of the Code."  Thus, if a party
-24-
interposes a challenge to a juror prior to voir dire based upon a
failure to meet the minimum statutory requirements, the juror must
be excused; the trial court has no discretion to qualify the juror.
If, however, voir dire has commenced, as we shall explain, infra,
any challenge made thereafter ordinarily must be accompanied by a
demonstration of probable bias before the attack will succeed.  The
reason for this is clear:  the statute unambiguously states that,
prior to voir dire, jurors who are not qualified to sit fail to
meet a requirement of CJ § 8-207.  Afterward, the opponent has lost
the statutory remedy and must labor under constitutional or common
law principles.  While we recognize that this narrow statutory
period places a burden upon defendants in mounting post-voir dire
challenges, it ensures that they do not frustrate the goal of
finality in judicial decision-making.  See Davis, 333 Md. at 40,
633 A.2d at 873 (It is the "justice system's obligation to provide
litigants with both an impartial as well as efficient method of
administering justice.").  
We find support for this reasoning in
United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1992).  In that
case, before the defendants were sentenced, but after rendition of
the verdict, it was discovered that the jury foreman was a
convicted felon.  A motion for new trial was denied.  Addressing
the defendants' statutory remedies under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1865-1867,
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit opined that the statute was inapplicable for two reasons:
-25-
time and substance.  The court noted that an objection made after
trial, as in that case, fell outside 28 U.S.C. § 1867(a), which
requires a defendant to object "before the voir dire examination
begins, or within seven days after the defendant discovered or
could have discovered, by the exercise of diligence, the grounds
therefor[], whichever is earlier."  977 F.2d at 633.  Failure to
challenge properly the jury for improper selection waives the
issue.  28 U.S.C. § 1867(e) (Section 1867 procedures are the
"exclusive 
means" 
by 
which 
objections 
may 
be 
lodged.).
Furthermore, the court reasoned, the cited provisions "address a
different problem — the procedures by which the district court
should administer the jury selection process. . . .  [W]hen a juror
fails to disclose his felon status . . . , no defect in the court's
jury selection process occurs."  Id.  The court went on to state
that, to the extent that 28 U.S.C. §§ 1865-1867 were germane, 
"they counsel against any rule that would lead
to automatic reversal.  The statutory scheme
permits a conviction to stand in the face of
an untimely allegation that the district court
allowed a felon juror to serve in violation of
the proper jury selection process.  For
example, if a juror acknowledged his felon
status on the jury qualification form but was
permitted to serve in violation of § 1865,
§ 1867 would bar an untimely challenge to his
service.  See, e.g., United States v. Uribe,
890 F.2d 554, 561 (1st Cir. 1989) ("Like so
many statutory rights, the right to exclude
felons must be affirmatively invoked.").  To
be sure, § 1865 evinces a congressional
purpose to restrict the service of felons on
juries.  The strict procedural limitations of
§ 1867, however, make abundantly clear that
-26-
      The Sixth Amendment is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
9
Amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 20 L. Ed. 2d 491
(1968).
other values, such as judicial efficiency and
finality, tempered Congress'[s] desire to bar
felon-jurors and led Congress to reject a rule
of per se reversal."
Id. 
Normally, therefore, a challenge, as in the case sub judice,
to a prospective juror once voir dire has begun or to an impanelled
juror, does not trigger the provisions of Subtitle 2 of CJ Title 8,
unless the challenge is constitutionally-based.  CJ § 8-211 sets
forth the way in which a defendant may challenge a juror on
statutory grounds — by motion prior to voir dire.  The language is
clear and very specific.  Failure to file such a motion results in
waiver of the statutory remedies provided in CJ § 8-211(d).  
It is undisputed that Hunt made no motion at any time prior to
the commencement of voir dire (or after, for that matter).  He
concededly raises this issue for the first time in his second
petition for post-conviction relief.  He is, therefore, in no
position to avail himself of CJ § 8-207, regardless of the reason
for the delay, and his present reliance on that statutory provision
is misplaced.
The Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a fair trial and impartial
jury is the touchstone of our justice system.   What is required of
9
jurors is that they be without bias or prejudice for or against the
-27-
defendant and that their minds be free to hear and impartially
consider the evidence and render a fair verdict thereon.  Bristow
v. State, 242 Md. 283, 289, 219 A.2d 33, 36 (1966); see also Kujawa
v. Baltimore Transit Co., 224 Md. 195, 201, 167 A.2d 96, 98 (1961);
Baltimore Radio Show, Inc. v. State, 193 Md. 300, 328, 67 A.2d 497,
510 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 912, 70 S. Ct. 252, 94 L. Ed.
562 (1950).  Furthermore, "`[b]ias on the part of prospective
jurors will never be presumed, and the challenging party bears the
burden of presenting facts . . . which would give rise to a showing
of actual prejudice.'  Davis, 333 Md. at 38, 633 A.2d at 873
(emphasis added)(quoting Borman v. State, 1 Md. App. 276, 279, 229
A.2d 440, 441-42 (1967)).  If a criminal defendant undertakes to
challenge a juror on grounds of bias, the attack must be
affirmatively advanced at the time of trial.  It may not be raised
for the first time in a collateral attack upon the conviction
and/or sentence.
Because Hunt has lost his ability to challenge juror Void both
because of the untimeliness of his challenge under CJ § 8-207 and
because of his failure to demonstrate bias at trial, he has waived
consideration of the matter in this proceeding.  We may, however,
and Hunt asks that we do, excuse these procedural defaults under
the discretion granted by Md. Rule 8-131.  We shall decline that
invitation because we are not persuaded that juror Void's presence
on the panel deprived Hunt of a fair trial.  See Walker, supra, 343
-28-
     
 He had also appeared as a State's witness at the trial of the person
10
charged with the housebreaking.
Md. at 648, 649-50, 684 A.2d at 438, 439.  The pending misdemeanor
charge against juror Void does not demonstrate a probability of
bias against Hunt.  Moreover, the fact of juror Void's pending
charge could have been known had Hunt's resentencing counsel
conducted the very investigation undertaken by the federal public
defender.  It is undeniable that defense counsel had access to the
pertinent records from CJIS or the District Court itself at the
time of Hunt's resentencing, and their failure to utilize them to
Hunt's advantage, for whatever reason, is a default that we will
not excuse.
B
Patrick Russ
Prior to being summonsed, Mr. Russ was also required to
complete a Qualification Questionnaire for Jury Service.  On it he
was asked whether he had been the victim of a crime within the
previous year.  He responded in the negative, when, in fact, within
the relevant time period, his house had been burglarized.   Again,
10
on voir dire, he was asked, "[H]as any member of this panel or
their families or their close friends ever been the victim of a
crime of violence?"  Mr. Russ did not respond, either affirmatively
or negatively.  Testifying at the hearing on Hunt's second petition
for post-conviction relief, he explained his nondisclosure:
-29-
"A.
Well, this was -- that was my first
time ever being on a trial and I was nervous,
and 
I 
just 
didn't 
think 
with 
what 
I
responded."
On cross-examination, Mr. Russ conceded that he considered the
crime to have been one of violence, but denied having an ulterior
motive or a desire to hurt anyone in not disclosing the fact of his
victimization.
Hunt challenges Mr. Russ's presence on the panel that
resentenced him, stating that his intentional nondisclosure gives
rise to a presumption of bias.  Specifically, he states, "Juror
Russ's status as a victim of a violent crime reasonably would have
made him harsh on crime."  He adds further that, because the State
failed to produce evidence to rebut this presumption, he is
entitled to a new sentencing hearing.  We disagree.
Under the principles outlined supra, Hunt's ability to
challenge Mr. Russ's presence on the jury is limited by waiver
principles.  Looking, as we must, to pertinent case law, statutes,
and rules, see Curtis, 284 Md. at 150, 395 A.2d at 474, we note
that, in order to mount a successful attack against the juror, Hunt
was required to demonstrate that the fact of Mr. Russ's
victimization would have provided a basis upon which to challenge
him for cause.  He failed to produce any evidence that established
Mr. Russ's predisposition.  Instead, he relied upon the proposition
that nondisclosure automatically begets entitlement to a new
sentencing hearing.  In so doing, he did not satisfy his burden of
-30-
proof.  Thus, as with juror Void, Hunt has waived the right to
raise the issue at this stage in the proceedings.  Further, this
procedural default precludes any consideration of the issue, since,
in the absence of any proof of bias on the part of Mr. Russ, there
was no showing that this default caused any prejudice to Hunt.  See
Walker, 343 Md. at 648, 649-50, 684 A.2d at 438, 439.
We hold that Hunt's failure to avail himself of the various
remedies at his disposal during trial resulted from inexcusable
procedural defaults that provide him with no foundation upon which
to predicate a challenge against jurors Void and Russ in the
instant collateral attack upon his conviction and sentence.
III.
Hunt challenges both the reasonable doubt instruction given at
his trial and that given at his resentencing.  Before we address
Hunt's claims in respect thereto, we shall set forth those
instructions in their entirety.  
During the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, the court
instructed the jury as follows:
"The State has the responsibility to
offer you proof to overcome the presumption of
innocence and to prove that the Defendant is
guilty of the crimes with which he is charged.
The degree of proof that is necessary for the
State to produce is proof that a Defendant is
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  The
Defendant does not have the burden of proving
his innocence or producing any evidence.  The
State must prove or must establish by proof
-31-
every material fact as to the guilt of the
Defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.  This
does not mean that the State must prove a
Defendant guilty beyond all possible doubt or
to an absolute or mathematical certainty.  The
evidence in a criminal case need not be that
certain but it must establish guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.
A reasonable doubt is not a difficult
term to explain and perhaps can best be
defined by attaching to the words reasonable
doubt their ordinary meaning.  A reasonable
doubt is a doubt based on a reason, not on a
doubt which is illogical or capricious or
based on mere speculation but rather a doubt
for which you find there exists a sound and
logical reason.
Reasonable doubt has also been defined as
follows: If after considering all the facts
and the law of the case you can say that you
have an abiding belief that the Defendant is
guilty, a belief such as you would be willing
to act upon in an important matter relating to
the affairs of your own life, then you have no
reasonable doubt.
Stating the same proposition just a
little differently, the evidence is sufficient
to remove a reasonable doubt when it convinces
you as ordinarily prudent people that what the
State is seeking to prove is true to the
degree that you would be willing to act upon
this belief in an important matter in your own
lives.
In the final . . . analysis, in order to
sustain a verdict of guilty the evidence need
not . . . eliminate from your minds every
conceivable doubt based on mere guesswork or
suspicion but must eliminate from your minds
any doubt based on a sound and logical
reason." 
At Hunt's resentencing, the trial court gave this instruction: 
"Reasonable doubt occurs when the evidence is
sufficient to remove a reasonable doubt when
-32-
      That rule mandates, in relevant part: "Objection. — No party may assign as
11
error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless the party objects on
the record promptly after the court instructs the jury, stating distinctly the
matter to which the party objects and the grounds of the objection."
it convinces you as ordinarily prudent people
that what the [S]tate is seeking to prove is
true to the degree that you would be willing
to act upon this belief in an important matter
in your own life.  That is the explanation
with respect to reasonable doubt.  When you
are convinced, as ordinarily prudent people,
that what the [S]tate is seeking to prove is
true to the degree that you would be willing
to act upon this belief in an important matter
in your on [sic] life." 
The "knowing and intelligent" waiver concept is not applicable
to the failure to object to an erroneous jury instruction.  Davis
v. State, 285 Md. 19, 35, 400 A.2d 406, 414 (1979).  Indeed, we
have consistently held that the failure to challenge a jury
instruction in accord with Md. Rule 4-325(e)  will act as a bar to
11
any subsequent assignment of error thereto.  See Walker, supra, 343
Md. at 646-47, 684 A.2d at 437-38, and cases cited therein.  Hunt
concedes that he did not object to the reasonable doubt
instructions following their reading to the respective juries and
that he has not previously presented this issue for appellate
consideration.  He asserts, however, that he has not waived his
right to present these challenges because, prior to rendition of
this Court's decision in Wills v. State, 329 Md. 370, 620 A.2d 295
(1993), there was "no legal basis" upon which to raise this issue
and any such challenge "would not have prevailed under existing
law."  Because Wills allegedly "recognized a `substantive standard
-33-
      That section provides:
12
"Decision that Constitution imposes standard not
heretofore recognized. — For the purposes of this subtitle
and notwithstanding any other provision hereof, no
allegation of error shall be deemed to have been finally
litigated or waived where, subsequent to any decision upon
the merits thereof or subsequent to any proceeding in
which said allegation otherwise may have been waived, any
court whose decisions are binding upon the lower courts of
this State holds that the Constitution of the United
States or of Maryland imposes upon State criminal
proceedings a procedural or substantive standard not
theretofore recognized, which such standard is intended to
be applied retroactively and would thereby affect the
validity of the petitioner's conviction or sentence."
not theretofore recognized,'" within the meaning of Art. 27, §
645A(d),  he continues, his assignment of error with respect to the
12
reasonable doubt instructions may not be deemed to have been
waived.  We perceive no merit in this argument, and explain.
Hunt asserts that an instruction that defines reasonable doubt
in relationship to that kind of evidence upon which the jurors
would be willing to act in important matters in their own lives
allows a jury to predicate a finding of guilt upon less proof than
proof beyond a reasonable doubt; the absence of "without
hesitation" or "without reservation" language rendered the
instructions fatally flawed.  In Wills, while we acknowledged that
"the reasonable doubt standard is difficult to explain," 329 Md. at
382, 620 A.2d at 301, we refused to adopt a boilerplate explanation
of the term so long as, "when an explanation is given to the jury,
it . . . does not tend to confuse, mislead or prejudice the
accused."  Id.  Despite an expressed preference for certain
language we considered useful in explicating the term "reasonable
-34-
      Specifically, the hearing ended November 20, 1992, the decision was handed
13
down on April 13, 1993, and Wills v. State, 329 Md. 370, 620 A.2d 295 (1993), was
filed March 3, 1993.
doubt," we stopped short of holding that phrases such as "without
reservation," "without hesitation," or any other specific language,
or "magic words," must be included in the instruction for it to
pass muster.  Thus, despite Hunt's assertions to the contrary, our
decision in Wills did not alter existing case law with respect to
the criteria under which a challenge to a reasonable doubt
instruction is to be presented.  Consequently, his Art. 27,
§645A(d) argument is unavailing.
Having concluded that Hunt failed to preserve this issue
adequately, we now consider whether we will excuse this procedural
default under Md. Rule 8-131.  We will not.  Hunt had numerous
opportunities to attack the propriety of the now-challenged
instructions: after the jury was charged; on direct appeal from the
conviction or resentencing, respectively; and before the circuit
court in his first petition for post-conviction relief.  Moreover,
even if we were to accept that Wills "impose[d] upon State criminal
proceedings a procedural or substantive standard not theretofore
recognized," which we do not, Hunt has not directed us to a reason
why he did not bring that decision to the circuit court's attention
in a timely fashion.  The decision in Wills was filed after the
hearing in his first petition for post-conviction relief, but
before the circuit court's decision thereon.   Despite having
13
-35-
raised several evidentiary matters for the court's consideration in
that interim, Hunt did not bring to its attention the Wills
decision and the purported impact it had upon his case.  Thus, we
hold that Hunt's failure to challenge the reasonable doubt
instructions previously bars him from presenting this issue for our
consideration in this appeal.  
IV.
State's witness Aaron McNair testified that he saw Hunt shoot
Officer Adolfo once in the chest and then run after him, shooting
him again in the back.  He also denied under oath that any promise
had been made to him by the prosecution in exchange for that
testimony.  In his third and fourth assignments of error, which we
shall address in tandem, Hunt assails the State's procurement and
the substantive truth of McNair's testimony, claiming that it was
both false and obtained in exchange for a promise of leniency in
McNair's own upcoming sentencing.  Hunt contends that the alleged
falsity of McNair's statements under oath, and the State's
concomitant failure to reveal that "false testimony," could have
affected the jury's verdict.  Further, McNair's denial of promises
made to him by the prosecution went to his credibility and, given
the nature of his testimony, the existence of any promise renders
-36-
      McNair was widely regarded as an important witness on the issue of the
14
premeditation vel non of Hunt's actions in shooting Officer Adolfo.
it reasonably likely that the jury would not have relied upon that
testimony in finding premeditation and deliberation.14
McNair's involvement in the instant case began on the night of
the shooting, November 18, 1985, when he identified himself to the
Baltimore City Police Department as an eyewitness.  In January of
1986, charges of assault with intent to murder and the lesser-
included offense of assault were brought against him in the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City.  In May of 1986, he pled guilty to
assault; his sentencing was scheduled for July 16, 1986.  In the
interim, on June 5, 1986, McNair testified at a suppression hearing
brought on Hunt's motion, which sought, among other things, the
disclosure of any impeachment evidence with respect to the State's
witnesses.  There, McNair stated that he had been provided with no
consideration by the Office of the State's Attorney's for his
involvement in the instant case.  Following McNair's testimony,
Assistant State's Attorney Timothy Doory addressed the court:
"For the record, Your Honor, Mr. McNair's
understanding of any promises or agreements is
correct as far as the State is aware.  Nothing
was ever promised to him on his charges other
than a recommendation that he be released on
[his own] recog[nizance] on the charge of
failure to obey." 
This understanding was reiterated to the court by Mr. Doory the
following day.  At trial, on June 19, 1986, upon examination by
Assistant State's Attorney Sam Brave, McNair again testified that
-37-
      McNair testified in a substantially similar manner at Hunt's resentencing.
15
he had not been promised anything in return for his testimony
against Hunt.15
Thereafter, Jack Lesser, the Assistant State's Attorney
prosecuting McNair's case, received a memorandum from Sam Brave,
the prosecutor in Hunt's case, on July 15, 1986.  In toto, it read:
"
OFFICE OF THE STATE'S ATTORNEY
MEMORANDUM
______________________________
TO  :  JACK LESSER, TEAM CAPTAIN, PT. 06
FROM:  SAM BRAVE, TEAM CAPTAIN, PT. 07 [SB]
DATE:  JULY 15TH, 1986
SUBJ: STATE VS. AARON MCNAIR (CASE NO:
28608021)
The above captioned case is scheduled for
disposition on July 16, 1986 before Hon. John
Carroll Byrnes.
It's my understanding that on May 21,
1986 the Defendant, Aaron McNair pled guilty
to the 3rd Count of C.I. 28608021 (Assault)
under a plea bargain in which the State is to
recommend a cap of 18 months, otherwise to
remain silent.
As you are aware, the Defendant, McNair
recently testified for the State in the Flint
Gregory 
Hunt 
Death 
Penalty 
case. 
 
His
testimony 
was 
extremely 
important 
in
establishing premeditation and was given
without any specific promises from the State
except that his cooperation with the State in
this important case would be brought to the
attention of Judge Byrnes at the time of his
disposition on the assault conviction for
-38-
     
 The following day, July 16, 1986, at McNair's sentencing, Judge Byrnes
16
acknowledged receipt of this memorandum.  McNair received a probationary
disposition.
whatever consideration Judge Byrnes feels is
appropriate.  As you recall, Tim Doory and I
had you `on call' in the Hunt case in case it
became necessary to establish these facts.
Defense counsel, Steve Suser, is, of course,
aware of the situation; in fact, Mr. Suser, at
one point located Mr. McNair and instructed
him to contact us.
I am sure Mr. Suser would have no
objection to this information being made part
of the record at disposition.  Should Judge
Byrnes 
feel 
that 
the 
record 
should 
be
amplified by my direct testimony, I will be
available.
cc: Stephen A. Suser, Esq."[16]
Hunt contends that there can be no other interpretation of the
memorandum but that McNair had been assured that his cooperation
would be made known to Judge Byrnes and that McNair lied when he
testified to the lack of any such agreement.  According to Hunt,
the State's failure to reveal the alleged falsity of his denial of
said agreement upon questioning tainted the proceedings.  The jury,
in his estimation, would not have returned a verdict of guilt had
it known that McNair's testimony had been prompted by an interest
in testifying in a manner favorable to the State.  
Before we may remark upon the validity of either averment
presented, we must per force consider the nature of the right and
timing of its assertion to ascertain our ability to entertain these
claims in the first instance.  Hunt acknowledges that he has not
-39-
heretofore advanced the matter of McNair's involvement in his case.
Indeed, during the hearing on Hunt's second petition, his first
post-conviction counsel acknowledged that, in furtherance of that
petition, they made the deliberate decision to pursue claims
related solely to the ineffective assistance of counsel.  Operating
under that frame of reference, McNair's involvement in the case and
his consequent testimony, as well as that of other trial fact
witnesses, was not the focus of their efforts.  When questioned
about the fact of McNair's involvement in the case, one of his
first post-conviction counsel, Mr. Thomas Morrow, indicated that,
"[i]f [he] felt that Mr. McNair would have presented a material
element of the issues which Ms. [Judith] Catterton [his co-counsel]
and [he] were investigating and presenting, [he] certainly would
have found a way to find an investigator" to locate McNair to
interview him.  He then added, "The truth of the matter is with the
resources we had, I had enough . . . digest[ing] the transcript of
the . . . resentencing without attempting to sit and brain storm
[sic] every possible issue that I could see . . . and that's why I
didn't even think to go out and try to raise issues with potential
witnesses."  Rather, what post-conviction counsel did was allege in
the first petition that:
"Petitioner 
was 
denied 
his 
rights
guaranteed under the Fifth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution, the Maryland Declaration of
Rights, and Maryland law by the State's
refusal 
to 
comply 
with 
its 
discovery
obligations in a timely fashion.
-40-
Petitioner's original trial counsel made
timely requests for the following information
regarding a number of witnesses:  1) their
Grand Jury testimony; 2) their prior criminal
records; and 3) any promises of leniency
accorded them by the State in exchange for
their testimony against Petitioner. . . .
With regard to trial counsel's request
that the State provide any promise of leniency
given any of its witnesses in consideration of
their testimony, the State responded by
producing 
these 
witnesses 
to 
testify
immediately before the jury was selected.
Since the State itself would be a party to any
promise given, it was incumbent upon the State
itself to respond and not require defense
counsel to rely upon the understanding and
credibility of the witnesses involved to
remember and recite promises given.  Moreover,
providing this information at the eleventh
hour immediately before jury selection, did
not provide counsel adequate opportunity to
investigate and make use of this information."
At the hearing on the first petition, however, counsel failed to
present any evidence in furtherance of the above claim.  
Hunt's first post-conviction counsel made the tactical
decision not to challenge the memorandum or McNair's testimony with
respect to the existence vel non of an agreement with the State.
Under the analysis recited in Part I., supra, the right alleged to
have been violated — the right not to be convicted on false
testimony — has never been recognized as being of the kind
traditionally considered waivable only by knowing and intelligent
action.  Thus, Hunt is held to have waived it in the ordinary
-41-
course of the litigation for failing to proffer a seasonable
objection thereto.  
As we previously indicated, "[a] defendant may forego a broad
spectrum of rights which are deemed to fall within the category of
tactical decisions [made] by counsel."  Curtis, supra, 284 Md. at
147, 395 A.2d at 473; see also Hardaway v. State, 317 Md. 160, 169,
562 A.2d 1234, 1238 (1989); Magwood, 290 Md. at 622, 432 A.2d at
449-50; Davis, supra, 285 Md. at 35, 400 A.2d at 413-14.  Many
decisions made by authorized and competent counsel during the trial
or appellate process will generally act to bind the defendant.
Walker, 343 Md. at 643, 684 A.2d at 436; Oken, 343 Md. at 270, 681
A.2d at 37; Treece v. State, 313 Md. 665, 672, 547 A.2d 1054, 1057
(1988) (citing Curtis); State v. Calhoun, 306 Md. 692, 703, 511
A.2d 461, 466 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 910, 107 S. Ct. 1339,
94 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1987); see State v. Thomas, 328 Md. 541, 560, 616
A.2d 365, 374-75 (1992) (attorney's decisions during course of
trial were product of professionally reasonable judgment consistent
with defendant's constitutional guarantees of effective assistance
of counsel), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 917, 113 S. Ct. 2359, 124 L.
Ed. 2d 266 (1993); Cherry v. State, 305 Md. 631, 649, 506 A.2d 228,
237 (1986) ("`Under our adversary system, once a defendant has the
assistance of counsel the vast array of trial decisions, strategic
and tactical, . . . rests with the accused and his attorney.'"
(quoting Estelle v. Williams, supra, 425 U.S. at 512, 96 S. Ct. at
-42-
1697, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 135)); Williams, supra, 292 Md. at 216, 438
A.2d at 1308 ("[A] defendant [is] in most situations bound by the
tactical decisions, actions or inactions of his attorney."); see
also Nelson v. California, 346 F.2d 73, 81 (9th Cir.) (counsel is
manager of case), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 964, 86 S. Ct. 452, 15 L.
Ed. 2d 367 (1965).  Indeed, there is "the potential for chaos if
every time counsel made a tactical decision . . . the
`intelligently and knowingly' standard was triggered."  Oken, 343
Md. at 270-71, 681 A.2d at 37.  As we explained in Curtis:
"In the broadest sense of the word, any
tactical decision by counsel[ or] inaction by
counsel . . . , could be described as a
`waiver.'  For example, an attorney must make
numerous decisions in the course of a trial.
Whenever he makes one, choosing to take or
forego a particular action, the alternate
choice could be said to have been waived."
343 Md. at 147-48, 395 A.2d at 473.
Counsel in the first post-conviction case made the deliberate,
tactical decision to remain silent in the face of numerous
opportunities to raise the specter of the memorandum and challenge
McNair's testimony with respect to an agreement with the State.
Hunt, therefore, may only press this matter before us if we
exercise our discretion to excuse its waiver.  Md. Rule 8-131.  We
shall not.  Hunt has made no showing of such prejudice as would
have tainted the fairness of the proceeding.  The "promise," if
any, merely brought to Judge Byrnes's attention the fact that
McNair cooperated in Hunt's case.  The memorandum, therefore, was
-43-
simply corroborative of actual events.  Moreover, in the face of
overwhelming evidence of Hunt's premeditation, the import Hunt
ascribes to McNair's testimony has been greatly exaggerated.
Before the grand jury, McNair testified that he witnessed the
struggle between Hunt and Officer Adolfo, the first shot, and the
chase and subsequent shot.  At trial and at the resentencing
hearing, he testified in a substantially similar manner.  At the
hearing on Hunt's second petition, however, faced with recent
admissions of his apparent mischaracterization of the events that
transpired on the evening of November 18, 1985, McNair invoked his
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  Thereafter,
Hunt called Maurice Bellan and Michael Widenhouse, investigators
for the Office of the Federal Public Defender and the Maryland
Public Defender, respectively, to testify to the substance of their
interviews with McNair, in which he admitted to falsely testifying
to Hunt's agency in firing the second shot.
Mr. Bellan stated that, in late 1995, he had occasion to
interview McNair.  McNair "informed [him] on that day that he was
mistaken when he previously testified that he actually saw the
second shot of the deceased officer that evening."  He continued:
"Mr. McNair indicated that he saw an
individual running up an alley with an officer
following him.  He indicated that he saw this
officer slam this individual up against a wall
near a post.  He indicated that he saw this
individual push off the wall and in kind of
one motion turn around and shoot the officer.
-44-
At that point where he saw that first
shot, he indicated that he went to go grab his
daughter . . . to bring her inside the house .
. . ."
According to Mr. Bellan, McNair heard, but did not see, the second
shot.  On cross-examination, Mr. Bellan acknowledged that McNair
had been plagued by nightmares of Hunt's impeding execution.  Mr.
Widenhouse, who participated in an interview of McNair on February
8, 1996, also indicated that McNair denied having witnessed the
second shot.  While McNair's affidavit stated that he had been
having nightmares about Hunt's execution and sought a commutation
of Hunt's sentence of death to life imprisonment without parole,
Mr. Widenhouse indicated that the matter was not openly discussed
during the interview.
McNair's testimony was elicited at Hunt's trial in order to
provide evidence of Hunt's deliberate and premeditated actions in
shooting Officer Adolfo.  Whatever the parties' characterization of
McNair's past and present recollection of the events leading up to
Officer Adolfo's death, it was but one component of the State's
case establishing that Hunt had the requisite premeditation to
support a conviction for first-degree murder.  That is to say, the
fact that Hunt may or may not have chased the Officer as he fired
the second shot is not dispositive.  It is well-settled that
premeditation may be predicated upon the passage of "any amount of
time sufficient to convince the trier of fact that the purpose to
kill was not `the immediate offspring of rashness and impetuous
-45-
     
 The concept was explained in a little more detail at the resentencing
17
hearing in 1988:
"[S]ingle action means that there is only one mode of
operation that this weapon will fire.  Many revolvers have
temper,' but was the product of a mind `fully conscious of its own
design.'"  Willey v. State, 328 Md. 126, 133, 613 A.2d 956, 959
(1992).  "If the killing results from a choice made as the result
of thought, however short the struggle between the intention and
the act, it is sufficient to characterize the crime as deliberate
and premeditated murder."  Colvin v. State, 299 Md. 88, 108, 472
A.2d 953, 963 (quoting Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 718, 415
A.2d 830, 842 (1980)), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873, 105 S. Ct. 226,
83 L. Ed. 2d 155 (1984).  Thus, even if McNair failed to witness
Hunt fire the second shot, ballistics tests revealed conclusively
that the same gun, a .357 Ruger Blackhawk single-action revolver,
fired both bullets, and it is the firing characteristics of this
type of gun, i.e., its single-action design, that provided a basis
upon which premeditation could be found.  As was explained to the
jury at the guilt/innocence trial: 
"Single action means to operate this weapon,
the hammer must be cocked. . . .  [With] a
single action revolver you must cock the
hammer and then pull the trigger.  To get it
to fire again, you must cock the hammer, the
cylinder revolves and you pull the trigger.
It is the operational mode of this particular
weapon.  The weapon does not function just by
pulling the trigger.  You must cock it then
pull the trigger. . . .  [I]t will hold the
.357 magnum semi-jacketed cartridges, such as
that were fired in this particular case."[17]
-46-
two modes called a single action and a double action.
This particular revolver has a single action.  And what
single action means is the way you go about discharging a
weapon.  Single action in this particular weapon means
that you must pop the hammer back. . . .  The gun is then
cocked.  To release the hammer and fire the weapon, you
pull the trigger.  That is what we refer to as single
action, cocking it and pulling the trigger to fire.
. . . .
The second time [you pull the trigger], nothing will
happen.  The weapon is locked in a locking mode.  You must
pull the hammer back and pull the trigger each time you
want the weapon to fire; pull the hammer back and pull the
trigger.  You can't just pull the trigger and discharge
the weapon."
Hunt would have us believe that the methodical process
undertaken in firing the weapon has no meaning.  Simply stated, we
are not persuaded.  In order to fire the gun, Hunt took several
deliberate and conscious actions to place it in an operational
mode:  He pulled the hammer of the weapon toward him.  He pointed
the weapon at Officer Adolfo, and he pulled the trigger.  We reject
the notion that this weapon, a .357 single-action revolver, may be
fired in any other but a deliberate manner.  Further, this Court
has held that the delay between firing a first and second shot is
enough time for reflection and decision to justify a finding of
premeditation and deliberation.  See Wilson v. State, 261 Md. 551,
276 A.2d 214 (1971); Cummings v. State, 223 Md. 606, 165 A.2d 886
(1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 922, 81 S. Ct. 1098, 6 L. Ed. 2d 243
(1961); Chisley v. State, 202 Md. 87, 95 A.2d 577 (1953).
We hold that Hunt has inexcusably waived his right to
challenge any aspect of McNair's involvement in these proceedings.
-47-
V.
Hunt also decries the ineffectiveness of his attorneys in
their submission of jury instructions that did not represent proper
statements of law.  Specifically, he finds fault with the
instructions submitted on first-degree murder, and its attendant
distinction from second-degree murder, and on the effect of
voluntary intoxication, as it mitigates first-degree murder.  We
shall resolve the issue of both instructions in tandem, following
a recitation of the instructions themselves, the offending parts
emphasized.
At trial, the court gave the following instruction on first-
degree murder: 
"Murder in the first degree is the
willful, deliberate and premeditated killing
of a human being without excuse, justification
or mitigation.
Willful means that the act which caused
the death was done intentionally and with
purpose. 
Deliberate means that there was a full
and conscious knowledge of the intention and
purpose to kill.
Premeditated means that the intention and
purpose to kill preceded the killing by some
appreciable time.
The first element that I have just
defined, the act of killing was intentional,
may be proven by circumstantial evidence.
Very important circumstantial evidence which
you should consider is the act itself which
caused the death.
-48-
If you find the victim's death was caused
by the Defendant's use of a deadly weapon
against a vital part of the body of the
deceased, you may conclude that the Defendant
intended the natural result of such an act,
that is, the death of the deceased.
Intention to kill then may be shown by
proof that the act which caused the death of
the deceased had as its natural consequence,
natural result either death of the deceased or
such serious bodily injury as would naturally
result in death.
The 
second 
element, 
deliberation,
requires proof that the act causing the death
was not committed suddenly but was instead
done after a conscious decision was made to
carry out the act.
The 
third 
element, 
premeditation,
requires 
proof 
that 
the 
conscious 
and
deliberate intention to do the fatal act
existed for an appreciable time before the act
was done.  The law does not require that the
intention to kill existed [sic] for any
considerable length of time before the fatal
act.  It is sufficient if there is time for
the mind to think upon and consider the act
and then determine to do it.
The three words, willful, deliberate and
premeditated connote the same general idea,
the intention to kill.
Applying these definitions to the facts
of this case, if you find that the State has
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the
Defendant intentionally killed the deceased
without excuse and that this intentional
killing was done with deliberation and with
premeditation, then your verdict should be
guilty of murder in the first degree.
On the other hand, if you find that the
State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the Defendant killed the deceased,
the Defendant must be found not guilty.
-49-
However, if you find that the State has proven
beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant
killed the deceased but failed to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the killing was done
intentionally and with deliberation and with
premeditation, then your verdict should be not
guilty of murder in the first degree.  That
then is the definition of first degree murder.
We next go to second degree murder.  I
might say that at this point that if the jury
finds not guilty of first degree murder, the
jury will go to second degree.  If the jury
finds guilty of first degree murder, then the
jury will skip second degree murder and go on
to the last two items that are listed on the
sheet, the verdict sheet.
Second degree murder differs from first
degree 
murder 
only 
by 
the 
absence 
of
deliberation or premeditation.  Therefore, if
you find that the State has proved beyond a
reasonable 
doubt 
that 
the 
Defendant
intentionally killed the deceased without
excuse but has failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the killing was done
with deliberation and with premeditation, then
your verdict should be guilty of murder in the
second degree.  Now, that then is second
degree murder."
The court then instructed as follows with respect to the
mitigating character of voluntary intoxication upon first-degree
murder: 
"Now, let's go back with respect to first
degree murder.  This applies, what I'm telling
now applies to first degree murder.  With
respect to murder in the first degree, one of
the elements which the State must prove is
that the Defendant acted with the requisite
specific intent to commit first degree murder.
I have already instructed you that in
order for a person to be found guilty of an
offense the [S]tate must prove each and every
-50-
element of the offense charged beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The Defendant in this case has been
charged with the crime of first degree murder.
Therefore, one of the elements which the State
must prove is that the Defendant acted with
the requisite specific intent to commit first
degree murder.
Generally, 
voluntary 
intoxication 
by
drugs is no defense to a criminal charge.  The
only exception to this occurs when a defendant
is charged with a crime requiring specific
intent and the Defendant was so intoxicated
that he was unable to formulate the required
specific intent.
The fact that the Defendant may have been
intoxicated at the time of the commission of
the offense may be considered by you as
bearing upon his state of mind.
For voluntary intoxication by drugs to be
a defense to a crime, to a crime requiring
specific intent, the impulse to commit the
crime must arise after the intoxication from
the drugs.
The issue in this case is not whether the
Defendant was intoxicated at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, it is whether
the Defendant was so intoxicated at the time
the act was committed as to be incapable of
forming the specific intent to commit first
degree murder which is a necessary element of
this offense that he's been charged with.
If, after a full and fair consideration
of 
all 
the 
facts 
and 
circumstances 
in
evidence, you find that the Defendant had been
under the influence of drugs to the extent
that he was without, without the capacity to
form the specific intent which is a necessary
element of this offense, then you must find
-51-
      Specifically, the petition read, in relevant part:
18
"18.  Counsel failed to object to the Court's
instructions on murder which failed to properly state the
law.  The Court failed to define malice and failed to
the Defendant not guilty of first degree
murder."
As we have indicated, Hunt's assertions of a denial of
effective assistance of counsel are made in reference to the
submission by his trial counsel of the above-quoted instructions.
He avers that the jury was confused when instructed upon the
separate concepts of willfulness, deliberation, and premeditation,
which were then improperly collapsed into one, i.e., the intent to
kill.  He adds that the jury was erroneously led to believe that
his intoxication could be considered by them in determining whether
he was incapable of forming the requisite specific intent, rather
than being instructed that voluntary intoxication mitigated
deliberate and premeditated action.  According to Hunt, because
"[a]ny reasonably competent attorney practicing criminal law . . .
in Maryland would not have tendered a bad instruction on the effect
of voluntary intoxication and [would] not have failed to object to
the collapsing of the three . . . elements of first degree murder
into one," he is entitled to a new trial.
Hunt previously raised this issue in his first petition for
post-conviction relief.  In it, he maintained that his trial
counsel had been ineffective in failing to ensure that proper
instructions were submitted to the jury.   The circuit court
18
-1-
instruct the jury that malice is a necessary element of
both first and second degree murder.  Further, in defining
unlawful homicide of the first and second degree, the
Court 
failed 
to 
exclude 
killings 
committed 
with
`mitigation.'" 
rejected this contention in his first petition, and this Court
denied Hunt's timely application to appeal from that denial of
relief.  As such, we are hard-pressed to consider this issue as
anything but "finally litigated," within the traditional meaning of
that concept.  A claim of error is considered finally litigated
when this Court or the Court of Special Appeals has rendered a
decision on the merits thereof either on direct appeal or upon
consideration of an application for leave to appeal filed pursuant
to the Post Conviction Procedure Act.  See State v. Thomas, 325 Md.
160, 177, 599 A.2d 1171, 1179 (1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 917,
113 S. Ct. 2359, 124 L. Ed. 2d 266 (1993); Calhoun, supra, 306 Md.
at 726, 511 A.2d at 478; Veney v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary,
259 Md. 437, 453, 271 A.2d 133, 142 (1970); Hall v. Warden of the
Maryland Penitentiary, 244 Md. 731, 732-33, 225 A.2d 273, 274
(1967); Baldwin v. Warden of the Maryland Penitentiary, 243 Md.
326, 328, 221 A.2d 73, 74 (1966); Husk v. Warden of Maryland
Penitentiary, 240 Md. 353, 354, 214 A.2d 139, 140 (1965); Lee v.
Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 240 Md. 721, 724, 214 A.2d 142, 143
(1965); Boucher v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 5 Md. App. 51,
57, 245 A.2d 420, 424 (1968).  Therefore, in the context of the
-2-
instant post-conviction proceeding, Hunt may not raise this issue
again.  See Art. 27, § 645A(b), which provides:
"When allegation of error deemed to be
finally litigated. — For the purposes of this
subtitle, an allegation of error shall be
deemed to be finally litigated when an
appellate court of the State has rendered a
decision on the merits thereof, either upon
direct appeal or upon any consideration of an
application for leave to appeal filed pursuant
to § 645-I of this subtitle; or when a court
of original jurisdiction, after a full and
fair hearing, has rendered a decision on the
merits thereof upon a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus or a writ of error coram nobis,
unless said decision upon the merits of such
petition is clearly erroneous." 
VI.
For the reasons set forth above, we hold that Hunt is not
entitled to relief on any of the claims set forth in his second
petition for post-conviction relief.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 
Dissenting opinion follows next page:
-3-
Dissenting Opinion by Bell, C.J.:
                            
The petitioner, Flint Gregory Hunt, was sentenced to death, in
1988.  Subsequently, it was discovered that two members of the jury
intentionally 
withheld 
information 
pertinent 
to 
their
qualifications to serve on that jury, despite having been  examined
on the voir dire concerning the subject.    One of the jurors,
Diana Void, withheld information  that she had been charged with
misdemeanor theft, which, if known, absolutely and without any
doubt whatever, would have resulted in her disqualification from
service not only in the Hunt case, but in any  case. Ms. Void
withheld the information on two occasions - during the jury
orientation process, at which she was asked whether she was the
subject of any pending charges, and during the voir dire process.
The other juror, Patrick Russ, withheld information that he had
been a victim of a burglary within the past year.  Rather than
being automatically disqualifying, that information rendered Mr.
Russ subject to being stricken for cause.  Because neither Ms. Void
nor Mr. Russ answered the questions honestly, and the petitioner
had no idea that their answers were false, neither  was challenged
by the petitioner and, thus, they were permitted to serve on the
jury that sentenced him to death.
-4-
4
      Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023,
1
82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938).  See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,
439, 83 S. Ct. 822, 849, 9 L.Ed.2d 837, 869 (1963).
The majority holds that the petitioner may not, at this late
date, assert the right to an impartial jury; according to it, that
right being one that does not have to comply with the Johnson v.
Zerbst  standard, i.e., be knowing and voluntary, the petitioner
1
has waived that right, essentially by inaction - by not discovering
the jurors’ lack of candor prior to taking a direct appeal.  It
also holds that, in any event,  in order to be entitled to a new
capital sentencing hearing, the petitioner must prove that jurors
Void and Russ “actually” were biased, which he failed to do.  The
majority is wrong on both accounts.
   
I
Maryland’s post-conviction statute, Maryland Code (1957, 1996
Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, § 645A(c), provides:
When allegation of error deemed to have been waived.--
(1)For the purposes of this subtitle, an allegation of error
shall be deemed to be waived when a petitioner could have
made, but intelligently and knowingly failed to make, such
allegation before trial, at trial, on direct appeal (whether
or not the petitioner actually took such an appeal), in an
application for leave to appeal a conviction based on a guilty
plea, in any habeas corpus or coram nobis proceeding actually
instituted by said petitioner, in a prior petition under this
subtitle, or in any other proceeding actually instituted by
said petitioner, unless the failure to make such an allegation
shall be excused because of special circumstances.  The burden
of proving the existence of such special circumstances shall
be upon petitioner.
(2) When an allegation of error could have been made by
a petitioner before trial, at trial, on direct appeal
(whether or not said petitioner actually took such an
-5-
5
appeal), in an application for leave to appeal a
conviction based on a guilty plea, in any habeas corpus
or coram nobis proceeding actually instituted by said
petitioner, in a prior petition under this subtitle, or
in any other proceeding actually instituted by said
petitioner, but was not in fact so made, there shall be
a 
rebuttable 
presumption 
that 
said 
petitioner
intelligently 
and knowingly 
failed 
to 
make 
such
allegation.
This Court has interpreted this section as only applicable when
fundamental rights are involved.  Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132,
149-50, 395 A.2d 464, 474 (1978).  In that case,  we stated:  
[W]e believe that the Legislature, when it spoke of
‘waiver’ in subsection (c) of Art. 27, § 645A, was using
the term in a narrow sense.  It intended that subsection
(c), with its ‘intelligent and knowing’ standard, be
applicable only in those circumstances where the concept
of Johnson v. Zerbst and Fay v. Noia was applicable.
Other situations are beyond the scope of subsection (c),
to be governed by case law or any pertinent statues or
rules.
Id.  See also State v. Calhoun, 306 Md. 692, 703, 511 A.2d 461, 466
(1986).
 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury.”  This provision is made applicable to the states through its
Fourteenth Amendment.  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342, 83
S.Ct. 792, 795, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (holding “a provision of the
Bill of Rights which is ‘fundamental and essential to a fair trial’
is made obligatory upon the states by the Fourteenth Amendment”).
See also Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642, 6
-6-
6
L.Ed.2d 751, 755 (1961) (stating that the failure to provide an
impartial jury “violates even the minimal standards of due
process”).  In that regard, this Court has stated that “[t]here can
be no doubt that in this country and in this State there is  . . .
the fundamental right to a fair and impartial jury trial. . . .”
Davidson v. Miller, 276 Md. 54, 68-69,  344 A.2d 422, 431-32
(1975).    
Quite clearly, the petitioner is asserting the right to an
impartial jury, a right that is “fundamental and essential to a
fair trial.”  Accordingly, because that is an unquestionably
fundamental right, applying § 645A (c), its waiver cannot be
accomplished unless two elements are met: (1) the petitioner must
have been able to assert the claim previously and (2) he must have
“intelligently” and “knowingly” failed to do so.   Neither element
has been met in this case.  
The petitioner could not have raised this claim previously. It
was not until, as a last ditch effort to save the petitioner, a
Federal Public Defender investigator just happened to run an
unrequired record check on the jurors, that he was made aware that
there was a basis for such a claim.   Surely, this Court cannot
conclude that it is possible for one to assert a right  when he or
she has absolutely no knowledge that it exists.  Only  Ms. Void and
Mr. Russ knew that they had withheld information material to the
voir dire process.  The petitioner simply had no way of knowing
when the jury was impaneled that it was violative of the
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7
fundamental right to an impartial jury.  As soon as  knowledge that
the process was flawed became known to him, he moved, on that
basis, for a new sentencing  hearing.  In short, the petitioner
could not have raised the impartial jury issue prior to his second
post conviction petition.
To hold that the petitioner’s counsel could have found the
information by running a background check on all the jurors using
the same system that the investigator used is preposterous.  Such
a holding would indicate that counsel and defendants can no longer
rely on the integrity of the jury selection process.   
And because the petitioner was completely unaware that his
right to an impartial jury had been infringed, he could not have
“intelligently and knowingly” waived it.  See Curtis, 284 Md. at
139, 395 A.2d at 468-69 (a defendant may not intelligently and
knowingly waive a post conviction claim unless he or she both was
previously aware of, and understood, it); Washington v. Warden, 243
Md. 316, 321-22, 220 A.2d 607, 610 (1966)(facts showing a lack of
comprehension by the petitioner adequately rebuts the presumption
of an intelligent and knowing waiver).
Again, the petitioner was completely ignorant of the fact that
two members of the jury withheld pertinent information pertaining
to their qualifications to serve, during both jury orientation and
voir dire.   A person cannot intelligently and knowingly waive that
which is not known to exist.  To hold otherwise makes a mockery of,
and undermines, the entire justice system.
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8
      In the case of juror Void, it is of some consequence to this
2
discussion that she was the subject of some controversy during the
impanelling of the resentencing jury.  It was the petitioner’s
contention that she was a pro-death juror.  The majority concluded
that, while she was  confused and often inconsistent, she was not
a pro-death juror. Hunt v. State, 321 Md. 387, 418-19, 583 A.2d
218, 233 (1990).
II
Because,  by failing to answer  truthfully all questions put
to them on voir dire, they both knowingly concealed information
bearing on their qualification to serve as jurors in the case being
tried, jurors Void and Russ must be presumed to have been biased as
a matter of law.   In Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 53 S.Ct.
2
465, 77 L.Ed. 993 (1933), the Supreme Court recognized that a
presumption of bias may arise when a juror knowingly conceals
information.  The Court stated, albeit  in dicta, that disingenuous
concealment by a juror or a “willfully evasive or knowingly untrue”
answer furnishes the basis for a finding of bias and for declaring
the trial a “mere sterility.”  Id. at 11, 53 S.Ct. at 468, 77 L.Ed.
at 998.  See United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133, 57 S.Ct.
177, 179, 81 L.Ed. 78, 81-82 (1936)(bias of a juror may and  under
certain circumstances must be presumed as a matter of law); Smith
v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 222, 102 S.Ct. 940, 948, 71 L.Ed.2d 78,
89 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (the implied bias standard
should be applied in appropriate circumstances; “in certain
instances a hearing may be inadequate for uncovering a juror’s
biases, leaving serious question whether the trial court had
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9
     Prior to the decision in McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v.
3
Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1983), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, recognizing
the injustice  that may occur when a juror gives false or
misleading answers during voir dire,  applied a similar test to
reach the same result.  United States v. Bynum, 634 F.2d 768 (4th
Cir. 1980).  In that case, a juror who served on two separate
panels in different criminal cases had a brother who had been
convicted of bank robbery, a sister-in-law convicted of narcotics
violations, and a nephew convicted of bank robbery.  During the
voir dire examination in the first case, the juror did not respond
to the question whether any person to whom he felt close had ever
been a defendant or victim of a crime.   Likewise, in the second
case, he failed to answer, on voir dire, whether he or any close
subjected the defendant to manifestly unjust procedures resulting
in a miscarriage of justice”).  
 In McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S.
548, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984), the Supreme Court
developed a two-part test for determining whether a juror’s
untruthful voir dire responses warranted the grant of a new trial:
[T]o obtain a new trial in such a situation, a party must
first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly
a material question on voir dire, and then further show
that a correct response would have provided a valid basis
for a challenge for cause. 
Id. at 556, 104 S.Ct. at 850, 78 L.Ed.2d at 671.  In a concurring
opinion, Mr. Justice Brennan observed, “[b]ecause the bias of a
juror will rarely be admitted by the juror himself, . . . it
necessarily 
must 
be 
inferred 
from 
surrounding 
facts 
and
circumstances.” Id. at 558, 104 S.Ct. at 851, 78 L.Ed.2d at 673. 
Thus, under McDonough, juror bias is conclusively shown whenever a
juror knowingly fails to disclose material information giving rise
to a challenge for cause.   
3
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10
family relatives  had ever been convicted of a crime or subject to
any criminal investigation.   After guilty verdicts were returned
in both cases,the juror’s failure to disclose came to the court’s
attention and special hearings on the matter were held.  Despite
the juror’s testimony that he did not feel especially close to his
brother, nephew or sister and therefore had responded truthfully to
the questions, the court concluded that the juror knew the
questions required him to at least reveal his brother’s conviction.
Accordingly, it reversed both convictions, reasoning that “when
possible non-objectivity is secreted and compounded by the
deliberate untruthfulness of a potential juror’s answers on voir
dire, the result is deprivation of the defendant’s rights to a fair
trial.” Id at 771.
Several courts have adopted the McDonough standard.  State v.
Thomas, 830 P.2d 243, 245-46 (Utah 1992) (juror bias presumed
because juror failed to disclose prior crime of violence against
her son);  Burton v. Johnson, 948 F.2d 1150, 1158 (10th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Colombo, 869 F.2d 149, 151 (2nd Cir. 1989);
United States v. Scott, 854 F.2d 697, 699-700 (5th Cir. 1988) (a
juror may not conceal material facts disqualifying him simply
because he sincerely believes that he can be fair in spite of
them);  United States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519 (11th Cir. 1984).
See also Burkett v. State, 21 Md.App. 438, 319 A.2d 845 (1974)
(implying that a juror’s intentional withholding of information
during voir dire leads to a presumption of bias).
In the present case, both jurors knowingly withheld
information pertinent to their qualifications to serve as jurors
during the voir dire examination.   Indeed, had they answered the
questions honestly, the petitioner could have moved to exclude
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11
juror Void as a matter of right and sought to have Russ struck for
cause.  
III
Alternatively, in this case, there are two additional,
independent bases upon which the bias of the jurors must be
presumed.
First, Void’s bias must be presumed because the information
she withheld during voir dire  would have disqualified her,
statutorily, from jury service.  By enacting Maryland Code, (1957,
1996 Repl. Vol.) § 8-207 (b)(5) of the Courts & Judicial
Proceedings Article, the Maryland General Assembly has sought to
protect a defendant’s right to trial by an impartial jury by
prohibiting certain categories of persons from sitting on juries.
That section provides:
    (b) Grounds for disqualifications. - A person is
qualified to serve as a juror unless he: 
* * *
(5) Has a charge pending against him for a crime
punishable by a fine of more than $500, or by
imprisonment for more than six months, or both,or has
been convicted of such crime and has received a sentence
of a fine of more than $500, or of imprisonment for more
than six months,or both, and has not been pardoned;
* * *
Courts have recognized that bias must be presumed and a new
trial ordered when an individual who falls within the category of
statutorily disqualified persons serves on a jury and that fact was
not revealed during voir dire.  See Gladhill v. General Motors
-12-
12
Corp., 743 F.2d 1049, 1050-51 (4th Cir. 1984) (new trial ordered
where a juror was legally disqualified from serving on the jury
regardless of the jurors subjective qualifications; showing of
actual bias not required; bias presumed because the law itself
precluded the individual from sitting on the jury); Thomas v.
Texas, 796 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. Crim. 1990) (new trial ordered in
capital murder case without a showing of actual prejudice where
jury 
included 
juror 
who 
was 
statutorily 
disqualified);
Commonwealth v. Kelly, 609 A.2d 175, 251-52 (Pa. Super. 1992)
(defendant entitled to a new trial without showing of actual
prejudice where juror falsely stated that he had never been
convicted of a crime, when in reality he had and was therefore
statutorily disqualified); State v. Williams, 462 A.2d 182 (N.J.
Super. 1983)(new trial granted where statutorily disqualified juror
sat on jury; defendant not required to show actual prejudice).   
This Court, like those just mentioned, should defer to the
legislative determination that persons, like Void, charged with
prescribed criminal conduct, are unfit to sit on a jury and, as a
consequence, grant the petitioner a new capital sentencing hearing.
Indeed, had Void revealed during voir dire  that she had been
charged with theft, she automatically would have been struck, as
she was statutorily disqualified.
A similar result obtains in the case of Russ, who concealed
the fact that he was a victim of a violent crime.  It is well
established that, where there are similarities between the  juror’s
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experiences and the facts at trial, the juror’s bias may be
presumed.  Hunley v. Godinez, 975 F.2d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1992)
(“courts have presumed bias in cases where the prospective juror
has been the victim of a crime or has experienced a situation
similar to the one at issue in the trial.”)  See Burton v. Johnson,
948 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1991) (bias presumed where juror who was
victim of spousal abuse sat in a murder trial and the defendant’s
defense was battered wife syndrome); United States v. Eubanks, 591
F.2d 513, 517 (9th Cir. 1979) (court presumed bias where juror’s
sons were heroin users and in the case being tried defendants were
charged with distributing heroin); United States ex rel. De Vita v.
McCorkle, 248 F.2d 1, 8 (3rd Cir. 1957) (in a robbery case the
court presumed bias where juror was a victim of robbery).
Here, Russ was a victim of a violent crime.  His past
experience, which occurred within only one year of his jury
service, connects Russ to the case in a way that will most likely
prevent him from being impartial.  Moreover, the State has not
offered any evidence to indicate his impartiality.