Title: Fletcher v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
ANTONIO FLETCHER,                      
           
Defendant Below- 
Appellant,   
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
     
 
 
     
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
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   No. 445, 2004 
 
   Court Below---Superior Court 
   of the State of Delaware, 
   in and for Sussex County  
   Cr. A. Nos. S04-02-0067 thru  
                      0069
 
Submitted: March 7, 2005  
   Decided: May 19, 2005    
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 19th day of May 2005, upon consideration of the appellant’s brief 
filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney’s motion to 
withdraw, and the State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Antonio Fletcher, was found guilty by 
a Superior Court jury of Robbery in the First Degree, Possession of a 
Firearm During the Commission of a Felony and Conspiracy in the Second 
Degree.  He was sentenced to a total of 18 years incarceration at Level V, to 
be suspended after 8 years for decreasing levels of probation.  This is 
Fletcher’s direct appeal.   
 
 
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(2) 
Fletcher’s trial counsel has filed a brief and a motion to 
withdraw pursuant to Rule 26(c).  The standard and scope of review 
applicable to the consideration of a motion to withdraw and an 
accompanying brief under Rule 26(c) is twofold: (a) the Court must be 
satisfied that defense counsel has made a conscientious examination of the 
record and the law for claims that could arguably support the appeal; and (b) 
the Court must conduct its own review of the record and determine whether 
the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it 
can be decided without an adversary presentation.1 
 
(3) 
Fletcher’s counsel asserts that, based upon a careful and 
complete examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  
By letter, Fletcher’s counsel informed Fletcher of the provisions of Rule 
26(c) and provided him with a copy of the motion to withdraw, the 
accompanying brief and the complete trial transcript.  Fletcher also was 
informed of his right to supplement his attorney’s presentation.  Fletcher has 
responded with a brief that raises one issue for this Court’s consideration.  
The State has responded to the position taken by Fletcher’s counsel, as well 
                                                 
1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 
U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
 
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as to the issue raised by Fletcher, and has moved to affirm the Superior 
Court’s judgment.   
 
(4) 
Fletcher claims that there was insufficient evidence presented at 
trial to support his convictions.2  The grounds for Fletcher’s claim are that 
his fingerprints were not found on the telephone used in conjunction with the 
robbery and that his taped statement to the police regarding an earlier 
robbery was improperly introduced at trial to prove his involvement in the 
robbery with which he was charged.      
 
(5) 
The evidence at trial established the following:  On January 12, 
2004, Fletcher drove with a group of people, including Sterling Anderson 
and Rodney Gladden, to Domino’s Pizza in Harrington, Delaware.  
Anderson went inside the store to pick up a job application and, when he 
returned, told the group that he was going to rob the store.  The group then 
drove to 1697 Butler Road in Harrington and, using a cell phone, ordered 
some food from Domino’s to be delivered to that address.  When the 
deliveryman showed up, Anderson met him in the roadway.  The others 
remained in the car, except for Gladden, who stood outside the car with a 
                                                 
2 Because Fletcher’s claim was not raised at trial in the form of a motion for judgment of 
acquittal, we review it in this appeal for plain error.  Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 
1100 (Del. 1986) (Under the plain error standard of review, the error complained of must 
be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of 
the trial process). 
 
 
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firearm at his side.   Anderson punched the deliveryman and the group fled 
with the food before obtaining the deliveryman’s money.     
 
(6) 
The next evening, after an aborted attempt by Fletcher and 
Gladden to rob a Domino’s Pizza deliveryman at Fletcher’s cousin’s house 
in Harrington, Delaware, the group, at Fletcher’s suggestion, drove to 
Mobile Gardens Trailer Park in Seaford, Delaware.  Arthur Warren, a friend 
of Fletcher’s, lived there.  Once there, Fletcher used a cell phone to call 
Domino’s Pizza in Seaford.  When the deliveryman, whose name was James 
Spencer, arrived, he saw two men standing outside one of the trailers.  As 
Spencer approached the two men, one of them pointed a handgun at him and 
the other man picked up a rifle or shotgun that resembled an assault weapon.   
 
(7) 
The man with the handgun told Spencer to put the pizza box 
down and place his money on top of it.  After he did so, the men took 
Spencer behind the trailer and forced him to lie face down on the ground.  
Spencer testified that the men threatened to kill him.  After a time, Spencer 
heard a car pull up and drive away with the two men.   
 
(8) 
On January 23, 2004, Fletcher was arrested at Gladden’s 
residence in Maryland.  Fletcher told the arresting officers that the weapons 
used in the Seaford robbery were behind Gladden’s house.  Fletcher also 
 
 
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stated that he had witnessed Spencer being robbed by Anderson and Gladden 
and believed they were going to kill him.  The police searched the wooded 
area behind the house and located a BB gun and a rifle that had been 
modified to look like a machine gun.  At trial, Spencer identified the 
weapons as those he had observed during the robbery.        
 
(9) 
In reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, this Court 
determines whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.3  In so doing, we make no distinction 
between direct and circumstantial evidence.4  Moreover, it is for the jury to 
weigh the relative credibility of the witnesses and reconcile any conflicting 
testimony.5 
 
(10) The State was not required to prove that Fletcher’s fingerprints 
were on the telephone in Warren’s trailer in order to sustain its burden of 
proof at trial.  The evidence presented at trial was more than sufficient to 
support Fletcher’s conviction of Robbery in the First Degree6 and Possession 
                                                 
3 Barnett v. State, 691 A.2d 614, 618 (Del. 1997). 
4 Skinner v. State, 575 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Del. 1990). 
5 Chao v. State, 604 A.2d 1351, 1363 (Del. 1992). 
6 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 832(a) (2) (2001) (“A person is guilty of robbery in the first 
degree when the person commits the crime of robbery in the second degree and . . . 
displays what appears to be a deadly weapon . . . .”) 
 
 
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of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony7 under an accomplice 
theory of liability,8 and his conviction of Conspiracy in the Second Degree.9  
We, thus, find no error, plain or otherwise, on the part of the Superior Court 
with respect to this claim.   
 
(11) Moreover, we find no error or abuse of discretion on the part of 
the Superior Court in permitting the State to present Fletcher’s taped 
statement to the police concerning his role in the earlier Harrington robbery 
in order to prove Fletcher’s knowledge, intent and lack of mistake with 
respect to the Seaford robbery.  The record reflects that, before permitting 
the State to introduce the evidence, the Superior Court properly weighed the 
probative value of the evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice.10  The 
Court also properly instructed the jury, both before the tape was played and 
at the close of the evidence, that they were to consider the evidence only for 
the limited purpose of determining Fletcher’s knowledge, intent and lack of 
                                                 
7 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1447A (2001). 
8 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 271 (2) (2001) (“A person is guilty of an offense committed by 
another person when . . . [i]ntending to . . . facilitate the commission of the offense the 
person . . . [a]ids . . . the other person in planning or committing it . . . .) 
9 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 512 (2) (2001) (“A person is guilty of conspiracy in the second 
degree when, intending to . . . facilitate the commission of a felony, the person . . . 
[a]grees to aid another person . . . in the planning or commission of the felony . . . .”) 
10 D.R.E. 403. 
 
 
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mistake with respect to the Seaford robbery and not as proof of Fletcher’s 
character generally.11 
 
(12) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Fletcher’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Fletcher’s counsel has made a 
conscientious effort to examine the record and has properly determined that 
Fletcher could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
The motion to withdraw is moot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726, 734 (Del. 1988).