Title: Van Horn v. Industrial Commission

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

111 Ariz. 86 (1974) 523 P.2d 783 Timothy K. VAN HORN, Petitioner, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Arizona, Respondent, Lyman H. Rollins, Respondent Employer. No. 11485-PR. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. June 26, 1974. Rehearing Denied October 15, 1974. *87 Jerome, Gibson & Mignella, P.C., by Michael Mignella, Phoenix, for petitioner. Richard E. Taylor, Counsel, William C. Wahl, Jr., Former Chief Counsel, The Industrial Commission of Ariz., Phoenix, for respondent. Robert A. Slonaker, Phoenix, for respondent employer. Rehearing Denied October 15, 1974. See 527 P.2d 282. CAMERON, Vice Chief Justice. This is a petition for review of a memorandum decision of the Court of Appeals affirming an award of the Industrial Commission of Arizona which dismissed the claim of the petitioner because of lack of jurisdiction. We are called upon to consider only one question on review and that is whether the Commission had jurisdiction to waive the late filing of a claim by the petitioner. The facts necessary for a determination of the matter on appeal are as follows. Petitioner was hospitalized as the result of injuries sustained in the course and scope of his employment on 25 April 1970. In the same accident his wife was killed. The petitioner testified at the hearing that after he was in the hospital the following happened: Petitioner underwent back surgery and spent almost a month in the hospital. After a period of recuperation and getting used to his back brace, he went back to work for the respondent employer. He worked for about a year when he left. He testified: The petitioner, on or about 28 December 1971, filed a claim with the Industrial Commission of Arizona. The Commission held: At petitioner's request a hearing was held at which time the petitioner testified as indicated above. The respondent employer did not testify. The hearing officer entered findings as follows: The Commission affirmed the decision of the hearing officer. We believe that the decision of the Commission must be set aside for two reasons. First, pursuant to our Constitution, which states in part: The Commission has inherent power under our Constitution to relieve a workman of his failure to file a timely application for compensation when the ends of justice dictate and the legislature may not unduly restrict that right. Secondly, under the facts in the instant case, particularly where we are concerned with a "no insurance award," the employer and the Commission may be estopped to assert the untimeliness of the filing. In a prior case, we stated: In Collins, supra, the workman did not file his claim until more than two years after the injury even though he received accident benefits from the Commission. The rule laid down in Collins v. Industrial Commission, supra, is very narrow. Larson calls it "a very restrictive decision," Larson, § 78.11, Workmen's Compensation Law 1968, Vol. 3, and it would appear that we are the only jurisdiction to take such a harsh view. We have recently stated: We hold, under the facts in this case, that the employer and the Commission may be estopped to claim the untimeliness of the filing as a bar. Anything in the case of Collins v. Industrial Commission, supra, to the contrary is by this opinion overruled. Award set aside. STRUCKMEYER and LOCKWOOD, JJ., concur. HOLOHAN, Justice (dissenting). Prior to the decision of the Court today the law in Arizona was well settled that the failure to file a claim within one year after the injury occurred or became apparent barred a claim for industrial compensation. A.R.S. § 23-1061. The Court of Appeals felt that the law was so clear that they issued their ruling by a memorandum decision. Prior to today's decision, Arizona, along with a number of other states, adopted the position that the provisions of the workmen's compensation law requiring the filing of a claim within a specified period of time was mandatory and jurisdictional. 100 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 468(2) (1958); Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Commission, 43 Ariz. 50, 29 P.2d 142 (1934); McCormick v. Industrial Commission, 96 Ariz. 88, 392 P.2d 299 (1964); Collins v. Industrial Commission, 102 Ariz. 509, 433 P.2d 801 *91 (1967). Since the matter was jurisdictional it could not be waived. Collins v. Industrial Commission, supra. The Court overrules Collins, but in so doing it in effect overrules the clear legislative intent in A.R.S. § 23-1061. The legislature, in 1969, some two years after Collins, substantially revised the Workmen's Compensation Act. The legislature saw fit to retain substantially the same language of A.R.S. § 23-1061 which had been construed in Collins. It seems obvious to me that if the legislature had wished to change the rule in Collins it could have easily done so, but the legislature did not make the change, and under the elementary rules of statutory construction, the Court must presume that the intent of the legislature was to continue the interpretation placed by the courts on the statute. In State v. Superior Court of Pima County, 104 Ariz. 440, 454 P.2d 982 (1969) on the subject of legislative intent the Court stated: In Madrigal v. Industrial Commission, 69 Ariz. 138, 210 P.2d 967 (1949) this Court stated the rule of construction to be: It is also most noteworthy that the Court in Madrigal also cautioned: In the revision of the Workmen's Compensation Act, A.R.S. § 23-1061 continued to provide that the only two exceptions to the time limit within which a claim was to be filed were those set forth in subsection B, neither of which apply to the case at issue. In view of the legislative history and the long uniform interpretation on the meaning of the words it appears that the majority has frustrated the clear meaning of the statute and frustrated the purpose intended by the legislature. In addition to overruling the prior case law and defeating the plain language of the statute the majority opinion also introduces for the first time the concept that the Industrial Commission has somehow become a creation of the Arizona Constitution and that the Industrial Commission has "inherent powers." Needless to say, no authority is suggested for this novel position in which a statutory agency becomes endowed with inherent constitutional powers. Until today's decision this Court on a number of occasions had held that the Industrial Commission was a statutory agency whose powers, rights and duties depended upon the provisions of the statute, and the agency created had no powers other than those that were specifically or impliedly delegated by statute. Industrial Commission v. Arizona Power Co., 37 *92 Ariz. 425, 295 P. 305 (1931); Sims v. Moeur, 41 Ariz. 486, 19 P.2d 679 (1933); Pressley v. Industrial Commission, 73 Ariz. 22, 236 P.2d 1011 (1951). Lastly, the Court's extension of the statute leaves the Commission with no real standard. The Court holds that the Commission may relieve a workman of a failure to file a timely application for compensation when the ends of justice dictate. In the spirit of the federal supreme court we will decide on a case-by-case basis what is meant by the "ends of justice." Do we mean that excusable neglect is part of the ends of justice? Is the concept to be limited to conduct by the employer or insurer which would constitute fraud, coercion, or estoppel? The "judicial intent" which has been substituted for the legislative intent remains obscure under the majority opinion. In amending a statute by interpretation the least the Court could do is be clear in what it means. HAYS, C.J., concurs.