Title: Ex Parte Waldrop

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

459 So. 2d 959 (1984)
Ex parte: Billy Wayne WALDROP.
(Re Billy Wayne Waldrop v. State of Alabama).
83-701.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 28, 1984.
Rehearing Denied November 9, 1984.
Dennis N. Balske, Montgomery, for appellant.
*960 Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and William D. Little, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
FAULKNER, Justice.
Petitioner Billy Wayne Waldrop was convicted and sentenced to death for robbery-murder in violation of § 13A-5-40, Code of Alabama (1975). The facts are set out in Appendix "A" to the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals, Waldrop v. State, 459 So. 2d 953 (Ala.Crim.App.1983). Stated briefly, Waldrop, along with two other men, Eugene Singleton and Henry Mayes, conspired to rob and murder, if necessary, the victim, Thurman Macon Donahoo. On the night of June 2, 1982, the three men broke into Donahoo's home and robbed him of a five-carat diamond ring, along with other items of value. Before leaving the scene of the crime, Waldrop and his accomplices killed the victim and set fire to the victim's house. The house was completely destroyed by the fire, and Donahoo was burned almost beyond recognition.
Waldrop was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. The Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed the conviction, and, after independently determining that the death sentence was appropriate, affirmed Waldrop's conviction and sentence. We granted the petition for writ of certiorari pursuant to Rule 39(c), A.R.A.P. After careful review of that opinion, the record, and the briefs of the respective parties, we affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
In this Court, Waldrop raises additional issues not addressed by the Court of Criminal Appeals. Waldrop claims, inter alia, that he was denied a fundamentally fair trial because the prosecutor injected improper and prejudicial comments into the closing argument during both the guilt and the sentencing phases of trial.
In all death penalty cases, this Court pursuant to Rule 39(k), A.R.A.P., "may notice any plain error or defect in the proceeding under review, whether or not brought to the attention of the trial court, and take appropriate appellate action by reason thereof, whenever such error has or probably has adversely affected the substantial rights of the petitioner." In this case, Waldrop's failure to raise a claim of error regarding the prosecutor's arguments at trial, "while weighing against Defendant as to any possible claim of prejudice, serves as no impediment to our scope of review pursuant to the `plain error' mandate in death penalty cases." Bush v. State, 431 So. 2d 563 (Ala.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S. Ct. 200, 78 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1983).
Accordingly, having carefully scrutinized the entire proceeding, both at the guilt and sentencing phases, we conclude that the prosecution did not exceed the permissible bounds of argument, and that none of Waldrop's substantive rights were violated.
Waldrop initially claims that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of his law enforcement witnesses by arguing:
This portion of the argument objected to was made during the guilt phase of trial, in reference to the prosecutor's explanation of the four links in the chain of justice: the witnesses; the police officers; the D.A.'s office; and the jury.
*961 Waldrop claims that again in the sentencing phase the prosecutor improperly encouraged the jury to rely on him, as well as on his trusted police investigators. The prosecutor argued: "Well, I'll just tell you this. I have done my job, Mr. King [the Assistant District Attorney] has done his job and the police officers have done their jobs...."
Waldrop asserts that these arguments were highly improper in that they bolstered the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses, and also injected the personal opinion of the District Attorney into the fray.
Contrary to Waldrop's contentions, however, we do not agree that the State deliberately attempted to bolster the witnesses by vouching for their credibility. In Brown v. State, 393 So. 2d 513 (Ala.Crim. App.1981), the Court of Criminal Appeals observed:
In Brown, the prosecutor, commenting on the defendant's claim that his confession was not voluntary, argued: "[H]e gets up here now when he is on trial for this crime and testifies that he didn't know what he was doing. That is not anything unusual. I see it all the time." In comparison, in the instant case the prosecutor was merely commenting on the investigation conducted by the police officers. That they did a good job in their investigation is a reasonable inference which was properly drawn from the evidence presented at trial. Moreover, the prosecutor was not injecting his own knowledge or experience into the argument, nor was he indicating a personal belief in the veracity of the witnesses' statements. "During closing argument, the prosecutor as well as defense counsel has a right to present his impressions from the evidence, if reasonable, and may argue every legitimate inference." Milton v. State, 417 So. 2d 620 (Ala.Crim.App.1982).
Waldrop next claims error in that the prosecutor argued a patriotic pitch directed at motivating the jurors to impose the death penalty in order to protect society. The first statement complained of occurred during the guilt phase of the trial, as follows:
In the same vein, Waldrop asserts that during the sentencing hearing, the prosecution improperly encouraged the jury to join the war against crime, Hance v. Zant, 696 F.2d 940 (11th Cir.1983), when he argued as follows:
In Alabama, the rule is that a district attorney in closing argument may make a general appeal for law enforcement. Embrey v. State, 283 Ala. 110, 118, 214 So. 2d 567 (1968).
This line of argument is "within the latitude allowed prosecutors in their exhortations to the jury to discharge their duties in such a manner as, not only to punish crime, but to protect the public from like offenses and as an example to deter others from committing like offenses." Varner v. State, 418 So. 2d 961 (Ala.Crim.App.1982); Cook v. State, 369 So. 2d 1243 (Ala.Crim. App.1977), affirmed in part, reversed in part on other grounds, 369 So. 2d 1251 (Ala. 1978). The argument complained of in the instant case is similar to that made by the prosecutor in Cook, supra. In Cook, originally brought under the 1975 Alabama Death Penalty Act, the prosecutor made the following comment during closing argument:
369 So. 2d  at 1247.
In discussing the scope of legitimate appeals for law enforcement, this Court noted, quoting Blalock v. State, 8 Ala.App. 349, 63 So. 26 (1913):
Cook, supra, 369 So. 2d  at 1254-55.
As in Cook, the closing argument in the instant case did not imply that the defendant himself would commit illegal acts in the future, nor did the prosecutor seek by inflammatory appeal to arouse in the jurors a personal hostility towards, or fear of, the defendant. Accordingly, the prosecutor's comments properly argued the necessity of law enforcement as a deterrent to crime and as a protection of society.
Finally, the defendant argued that the following statement made by the prosecutor during the sentencing hearing was improper:
In view of the above discussion, we find that the errors complained of in closing argument had no improper impact or influence upon the jury's determination. Furthermore, pursuant to § 13A-5-53 Alabama Code (1975), we find no error adversely affecting the rights of the defendant in the conviction or sentencing proceedings. Likewise, upon review, we conclude that death was the proper sentence in this case. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, JONES, ALMON, SHORES, EMBRY, BEATTY and ADAMS, JJ., concur.