Title: Floyd v. Bd of Ada County Commissioners

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 45421 
 
 
JAMES ALLEN FLOYD, 
  
               Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
BOARD OF ADA COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS, 
  
               Respondent. 
_______________________________________ 
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Boise, November 2018 
Term 
 
Filed: January 29, 2019 
 
Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Richard D. Greenwood, District Judge. 
 
The district court’s judgment is affirmed.  
 
James A. Floyd, Boise, appellant pro se.  
 
Jan M. Bennetts, Ada County Prosecuting Attorney, Boise, for respondent. 
_____________________ 
 
SUBMITTED ON THE BRIEFS 
BRODY, Justice. 
This appeal arises from the Ada County Board of Commissioners’ decision to direct 
issuance of a tax deed. The property owner, James Allen Floyd, was incarcerated in the county 
jail throughout the proceedings, and alleges that he never received official notice of the pending 
tax deed until a month before his hearing. Despite having his jail address on file, the County 
Treasurer delivered statutory notices to Floyd’s vacant home. However, she also sent Floyd 
letters at the jail apprising him of the tax deed proceedings and delinquent taxes owed. The 
Board of Commissioners determined that Floyd received sufficient due process, and directed the 
tax deed to issue. The district court affirmed, holding that Floyd had actual notice despite the 
Treasurer’s failure to comply with statutory notice requirements. We now affirm the district 
court’s determination because Floyd had actual notice of the pending tax deed.    
 
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I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
James Allen Floyd owned a home located at 9180 W. Yaryan Drive in Boise, Idaho. The 
taxes on the home were unpaid for 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014.  
On August 15, 2014, Floyd was arrested on a criminal matter and remained incarcerated 
in the Ada County jail for several months. On October 9, 2014, the Treasurer sent a reminder 
letter of the 2011 taxes due to Floyd at the jail. She also added Floyd’s jail address to the county 
records, so that future correspondence would be sent there. Floyd wrote back, “I do not dispute 
the taxes owed and I’m fully willing to pay them.” On October 16 and 21, the Treasurer sent 
Floyd additional letters to his jail address explaining that his hardship application had been 
denied, and reminding him of the delinquent amount owed, and the need for full payment by 
March 19, 2015, to halt the tax deed process. She also sent a tax history printout and a request for 
Floyd to contact her on his release from jail. He then began sending out letters to various 
churches and charities in the hopes one would pay his taxes anonymously.  
Over the next several weeks, the Treasurer mailed official notices of the pending tax deed 
to the Yaryan Drive address while Floyd remained incarcerated at the county jail. As the 
undeliverable mail was returned to the Treasurer’s  office, the clerk used a stamp—which said 
“paid” and had the date—to show when the returned mail arrived at the Treasurer’s office. Floyd 
continued his correspondence with the Treasurer. On January 10, 2015, Floyd informed the 
Treasurer that his tenants would pay the taxes by the March deadline. Alternatively, he proposed 
that Ada County forgive the delinquent taxes in exchange for his dismissal of a lawsuit against 
the Ada County jail. In that same letter, Floyd also reminded the Treasurer that he had yet to 
receive notice of the pending tax deed by registered mail, as required by statute.  
On February 10, 2015, a sheriff’s deputy hand-delivered three envelopes to Floyd at the 
jail, with two containing notices of the pending tax deed, each dated from October 27, 2014. On 
the backs of the notices were postal tags indicating they were undeliverable and returned to the 
County Treasurer’s office. In addition, the October notices were stamped “PAID” with the date 
“November 20, 2014” on the upper right hand corner. Floyd claims these were the first official 
notices of the pending tax deed to reach him at the county jail.  
 
Floyd immediately contested the tax deed, arguing that because the notices had a “paid” 
stamp on them, the taxes must have been paid, whether by the churches he wrote to or from 
 
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another anonymous payor. Floyd wrote that he was confused over why he would have to pay 
$2,909.57 by March 19.  
 
Ten days after the hand-delivery, Floyd received another letter from the deputy treasurer 
stating: “The payment that was made last year on 11/20/14, was for payment of delinquent 2010 
Taxes.” However, as Floyd noted in his response letter, the tax history shows that the 2010 taxes 
were paid, not delinquent. The Treasurer later wrote to Floyd to explain that the last tax payment 
came in May 2014 and was applied to the 2011 delinquent taxes. The mistake in the deputy 
treasurer’s recent letter, she explained, was simply an office oversight. She also explained that no 
taxes were paid on November 20, 2014; the notices were simply stamped that way when they 
were returned by the postal service.  
The Ada County Board of Commissioners held the tax deed hearing on March 19, 2015. 
Floyd requested to attend or have counsel appointed, but neither the Board nor the sheriff’s 
department arranged to transport Floyd to the hearing. Floyd submitted a seven page letter and 
several exhibits to the Board, in addition to a grievance for being denied transport to the hearing. 
The Board then gave the documents to the Treasurer and prosecuting attorney. The sheriff’s 
deputy also informed Floyd he could arrange to participate in the hearing over the phone.  
At the hearing, the prosecuting attorney introduced Floyd’s letter and exhibits to the 
Board, stating: “Pursuant to Idaho Code 63-1006, I recommend that you consider the 
correspondence letters and exhibits from Mr. Floyd as an appearance or answer in this matter.” 
The Treasurer then presented evidence to the Board, including the tax history records, notice 
mailings, and an explanation that the “paid” stamp on the back of the returned envelopes was 
used as a date stamp and that the taxes had not actually been paid.  
On March 24, 2015, the Board issued its final decision, ultimately determining that Floyd 
received proper notice pursuant to Idaho Code section 63-1005, and that the 2011 delinquent 
taxes on the Yaryan property remained unpaid. The Board then directed the county tax collector 
to issue the tax deed on the Yaryan property in favor of Ada County. A month later, on April 24, 
2015, Floyd submitted a Petition for Judicial Review and Initial Complaint to the Board. Floyd 
also filed an objection to the Agency Record, claiming several deficiencies and errors, which 
prompted the Board to file a supplemental record. The supplemental record added the Board’s 
meeting agendas, the Treasurer’s Affidavit of Compliance, Floyd’s letter asking about the office 
 
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error over the 2010 taxes, and a letter from the Treasurer explaining the earlier office error and 
Floyd’s still unpaid taxes for 2011–2014.  
On August 26, 2015 Floyd filed his petition and complaint with the district court. The 
Board then filed a motion to dismiss Floyd’s Petition for Judicial Review and Initial Complaint, 
which the district court granted and denied in part. It dismissed Floyd’s complaint without 
prejudice, but permitted Floyd’s Petition for Judicial Review to move forward. The parties 
appeared and argued before the district court on July 17, 2017, with Floyd representing himself.  
On August 31, 2017, the district court issued a decision affirming the Board’s determinations. 
Floyd timely appealed.   
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On reviewing a County Board of Commissioners’ decision to issue a tax deed, the district 
court must confine its review to the county record and can only reverse or modify the Board’s 
decision if substantial rights were prejudiced. I.C. § 63–1006(4). Substantial prejudice occurs 
where the Board’s decisions or conclusions were: “(a) Made upon unlawful procedure; (b) 
Clearly erroneous in view of reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record; or 
(c) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted 
exercise of discretion.” I.C. § 63–1006(4). On appeal, this Court reviews the district court’s 
decision to determine whether the district court correctly decided the issues presented. Chavez v. 
Canyon Cnty., State, ex rel. its Duly Elected Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 152 Idaho 297, 300–01, 271 
P.3d 695, 698–99 (2012).  
This Court exercises free review over due process issues because they are questions of 
law. Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley Cnty., 145 Idaho 121, 127, 176 P.3d 126, 132 
(2007). This Court also exercises free review in determining whether the Board violated a 
statutory provision, which is a matter of law. Salladay v. Bowen, 161 Idaho 563, 565, 388 P.3d 
577, 579 (2017). 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
While Floyd raises nine issues in his pro se appeal, the crux of his case concerns whether 
he received adequate procedural due process before being deprived of his property. In addition to 
those due process arguments, he contends that the paid stamp on the back of the returned 
envelopes proves he paid his taxes and the district court erred in determining the record was 
complete. Finally, he adds that the Board’s determinations were clearly erroneous, arbitrary and 
 
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capricious, and an abuse of discretion. We hold that Floyd received adequate procedural due 
process and the district court correctly decided the issues presented. We affirm the judgment of 
the district court.  
A. Floyd received adequate procedural due process because he had actual notice of 
the pending tax deed, and his submitted evidence established a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard.  
“Procedural due process requires that there must be some process to ensure that the 
individual is not arbitrarily deprived of his rights in violation of the state or federal 
constitutions.” Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 91, 982 P.2d 917, 926 
(1999) (citation omitted). This requires both notice and the opportunity to be heard. Id. Each 
must occur at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, though the exact procedural 
safeguards can vary depending on the situation.  Id.; Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, 292, 221 
P.3d 81, 90 (2009). Floyd received adequate due process because he had: (1) actual notice of the 
pending issuance of the tax deed and the hearing date; and (2) a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard by presenting evidence at the hearing. 
1. Floyd had timely actual notice that issuance of a tax deed was pending.  
Idaho Code section 63-1005 governs the notice requirements the tax collector must 
follow before a tax deed can be issued. While the district court found Floyd did not receive the 
formal notice contemplated by section 63-1005(4) within the required time frame, it ultimately 
concluded that Floyd had actual notice that issuance of a tax deed was pending at least five 
months prior to the hearing. The district court correctly decided this issue. 
Section 63-1005(6) functions as a safe harbor in situations where the tax collector does 
not comply with the notice requirements, but the property owner still has actual notice that 
issuance of a tax deed is pending. It states: “If a record owner or owners or a party in interest 
shall have actual notice of the notice of pending issue of tax deed or that issuance of a tax deed is 
pending, it shall be deemed sufficient notice under this section.” Actual notice occurs where the 
party is informed of the pending proceeding. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 
U.S. 306, 318 (1950); Giacobbi v. Hall, 109 Idaho 293, 296–97, 707 P.2d 404, 407–08 (1985).  
Between October 9 and 21 of 2014, Floyd exchanged correspondence with the Treasurer 
who explained Floyd’s denied tax hardship, the delinquency amount owed, the need for full 
payment by March 19, 2015, to halt the tax deed process, and a tax history printout. Floyd even 
wrote back: “I do not dispute the taxes owed and I’m fully willing to pay them.” Floyd then 
 
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spent the months between the October letter and February notices trying to find someone to pay 
the taxes on his behalf. First he approached several churches, asking them to pay his taxes 
anonymously, and then in January he arranged for his tenants living at the Yaryan house to pay 
the overdue taxes. Finally, he attempted to bargain with Ada County: proposing a dropped law 
suit in exchange for forgiven taxes. The only indication Floyd had the taxes were paid—indeed, 
the only evidence he can present to that effect—is the “paid” date stamp on the October notices 
the deputy hand delivered on February 10, 2015. Only then did he argue that the tax deed should 
not issue.  
These facts demonstrate Floyd’s knowledge of the pending issuance of the tax deed, the 
amount due, the deadline for payment, and ample time to voice any objections or present 
evidence of payment.  As the property owner, Floyd was aware of the approaching tax deed 
proceedings, as well as the means to secure his home, despite the county’s non-compliance with 
each statutory notice requirement. Although the Treasurer’s letter was not formal notice pursuant 
to Idaho Code section 63-1005(a), her October letters apprised Floyd of the proceedings well 
enough to establish notice of both the delinquent taxes and the need for full payment to halt the 
tax deed process. Accordingly, Floyd had actual notice of the pending issue of tax deed, which 
was sufficient notice under Idaho Code section 63-1005(6).   
2. Floyd’s physical presence was not required at the hearing.   
Floyd contends he had a constitutional right—under both the U.S. and Idaho 
constitutions—to physically appear before the Board so he could present, examine, and refute 
evidence at the hearing. The district court disagreed, explaining that while a hearing must occur 
before there is a deprivation of property, Floyd was afforded a full opportunity to appear through 
his letters and presentation of evidence. We agree.  
 “The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.” 
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914). Under Idaho Code section 63-1006(2) a record 
owner can present evidence and witnesses to the county commissioners at the hearing concerning 
the issuance of the tax deed.  
Generally, the right of due process gives a petitioner the opportunity to make an oral 
presentation to the court, as well as confront and cross examine adverse witnesses. Goldberg v. 
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268–69 (1970). For example, in Goldberg v. Kelly, New York City’s 
procedures prohibited welfare recipients from attending hearings that determined their continued 
 
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eligibility. Id. at 268–69.  Instead of making his case verbally, a recipient had to submit a written 
statement explaining why his grant should continue. Id. at 258. The U.S. Supreme Court 
determined that written submissions were unsatisfactory for due process where witness 
credibility and oral presentation are critical to the decision making process. Id. at 268–69. 
However, the Supreme Court has also recognized that writings are acceptable substitutes 
where there is less value in a full evidentiary hearing, and the writings effectively communicate 
the arguments and evidence to the decision maker. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344–45, 
n.28 (1976). For example, in Mathews v. Eldridge, the discontinuation of disability benefits 
turned primarily on standard, unbiased medical reports following physical examinations. Id. at 
344. Likewise, the agency questionnaires and reports filled out by the disability recipient could 
communicate the evidence more effectively than a recipient’s own written documents or 
witnesses. Id. at 345. Thus, the Court determined, the “potential value of an evidentiary hearing, 
or even oral presentation to the decisionmaker, is substantially less in this context than in 
Goldberg.” Id. at 344–45.  
Written submissions may substitute oral presentation as long as the deprived party has the 
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful way. See id. at 333, 343–47, 
n.28.  After all, due process is flexible; it “calls for such procedural protections as the particular 
situation demands.” Id. at 334 (citation omitted). In determining whether such procedures are 
constitutionally sufficient, the court examines three factors: the private interests affected; the risk 
of erroneously depriving that private interest through the procedures used; and the Government’s 
interests, including the administrative and fiscal burdens of additional or substitute procedures. 
Id. at 335.  
We have not previously addressed the right of an incarcerated prisoner to attend his tax 
deed hearing. However, Idaho’s courts have recognized the adequacy of written evidence and 
arguments as a substitute for oral presentation in due process hearings. For instance, In Interest 
of Baby Doe, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the incarcerated father’s presence at the 
hearing to terminate parental rights was not required because he could still ‘appear’ through 
counsel and deposition testimony. 130 Idaho 47, 52, 936 P.2d 690, 695 (Ct. App. 1997). 
Likewise, in Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley County, this Court held that the 
neighbors’ presentations of written evidence and objections for an administrative board’s 
consideration over a proposed residential development were an adequate opportunity to be heard. 
 
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145 Idaho 121, 127–28, 176 P.3d 126, 132–33 (2007). These cases demonstrate the Matthews v. 
Eldridge principle of flexible due process—the plaintiff’s due process rights were met in each 
case because he could present evidence through writing or legal representation, even if he could 
not physically appear at the hearing. See Mathews, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 343–47, n.28.  The query 
then is whether Floyd’s letters established an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in 
a meaningful way before the Board deprived him of his property right.   
Floyd undoubtedly has a vital property right at stake: his home will be saved or lost 
because of the evidence presented at the hearing. However, while Floyd’s incarceration kept him 
from physically attending the hearing, the county provided multiple avenues for Floyd to be 
heard: the county allowed his written submissions, the prosecutor submitted the evidence on 
Floyd’s behalf, the deputy informed Floyd he could participate by phone (which Floyd did not 
arrange), and Floyd could have requested a friend or legal representative to attend on his behalf. 
At the hearing, Floyd submitted a letter and several exhibits to the Board—which were submitted 
by the Prosecutor—but he did not arrange to participate by phone or representation. Thus, unlike 
in Goldberg, the Board here gave Floyd various meaningful opportunities to be heard even if it 
did not provide transportation to the hearing itself.  
In addition, considering that the main queries before the Board were simply to determine 
whether Floyd paid his taxes or received the mailed notices, an oral presentation was not critical 
to the decision making process. Instead, the Board relied on the exhibits and documents from 
both Floyd and the Treasurer, each of whom presented evidence on whether notice was mailed 
and the delinquent taxes had been paid. Floyd’s main pieces of evidence consisted of an empty 
envelope from the Society of St. Vincent de Paul, the use of the “paid” stamp on the October 
notices he received on February 10, 2015, and a letter from the deputy treasurer explaining that 
his November 2014 tax payment was applied to his 2010 taxes (this letter was later explained to 
be an office error). The Treasurer presented the tax records, evidence of mailings, and other 
documents to show that the taxes remained unpaid. These documents were enough to inform the 
Board on whether the taxes were paid and whether Floyd received notice of the pending tax deed 
proceedings.  
Ultimately, Floyd’s writings were acceptable substitutes for attending the hearing 
because his writings effectively communicated his arguments and evidence to the Board, and he 
could have “appeared” through a representative. Like in Mathews v. Eldridge, the potential value 
 
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of an evidentiary hearing, or even oral presentation to the Board, was substantially less in this 
context than in Goldberg. The documents provided by both parties could more effectively 
communicate whether Floyd paid his taxes and received notice than any witness examination or 
oral presentation.  
B. The paid stamp was not evidence of paid taxes.  
Floyd argues that the paid stamp on the undelivered notices was actually a receipt 
indicating payment of his taxes, as required by Idaho Code section 63-1002(3). At the district 
court, he even accused the Treasurer of a conspiracy to hide payment of his taxes as a way to 
pocket the payment. The district court noted that the paid stamp was a “troubling” office 
practice, but found it did not act as a receipt, especially since the Treasurer corrected the 
mistaken impression in her subsequent letter. We agree that the paid stamp did not evidence paid 
taxes.  
Idaho Code section 63-1002(3) requires the tax collector to issue the taxpayer a receipt 
upon payment of delinquency, if requested. A receipt is “a written acknowledgement that 
something has been received.” Receipt, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th Ed. 2004). 
There was no evidence that the stamp acted as a receipt of payment because Floyd knew 
the taxes were unpaid. While the notices arrived with a paid stamp, they came along with the 
additional notice of publication and a letter indicating that the tax deed process continued. Surely 
if Floyd thought someone had paid the taxes back in November 2014, he would not have tried to 
get his tenants to pay, or bargain for Ada County to forgive, the delinquency in exchange for the 
relinquishment of a tort claim. Furthermore, even if the February 10 delivery of the October 
notices was Floyd’s first sign of an anonymous payment, the mistake was tempered by the 
additional documents and then corrected by the Treasurer’s letter two weeks later. Thus, the 
stamp neither frustrated his purposes to pay the taxes, nor signaled to him that payment occurred 
when it clearly had not.  
We do, however, agree with the district court’s assessment that the “paid” stamp is a 
troubling practice. The stamp’s presence appears to have even confused the Treasurer’s office 
staff, which resulted in the deputy treasurer mistakenly informing Floyd of a “November 20” 
payment—the same date as the paid stamp on the returned October notices.  
 
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Nevertheless, the district court correctly determined that the “paid” stamp was not a legal 
impediment to the issuance of the tax deed here, and was—at best—only ambiguous evidence of 
payment.  
C. The district court correctly determined that the record was complete, and the 
lack of a certificate was a harmless error.   
Floyd argues that the record was incomplete on appeal because it did not contain an 
exhibit list pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(f)(1)(b)(v), which would have included 
the letters he sent to the hearing. Essentially, he argues that the record was deficient on appeal 
because of this missing certificate. The county argues that Floyd cannot raise this argument on 
appeal when he did not raise it at the district court, and that he experienced no prejudice from the 
error. While Floyd did not object using the words “deficient record” at the district court, he 
raised several arguments regarding the treasurer’s and Board’s error in not admitting his letters 
for consideration.  
The administrative record must include “a certificate listing all exhibits identified at 
hearing,” and “a table of contents.” I.R.C.P. 84(f)(1)(b)(v–xii), unless otherwise prescribed by 
statute.  However, Rule 61 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure states: “At every stage of the 
proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party’s 
substantial rights.”  
The district court correctly determined that the record was complete. The letter and 
exhibits Floyd submitted to the Board were in the Agency Record, and additional documents 
were added in the supplemental agency record once Floyd made his first objection. In addition, 
the Board examined all the documents Floyd submitted with his letter when making its final 
decision, and added this evidence to their factual findings. Those exhibits are also listed in the 
Agency Record’s Table of Contents, even though both the record and supplemental record lack a 
certificate listing exhibits from the hearing. While several documents were not included in the 
original agency record, their addition through the supplemental record corrected the error and 
presented a complete record to the district court on appeal.  
Floyd’s main contention on appeal is a violation of Rule 84 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure because the record contains a table of contents but not a certificate listing all exhibits 
identified at a hearing. Yet Floyd fails to explain how this minor procedural violation prejudiced 
him or created unfair proceedings when his submitted documents were in the agency record 
before the Board and then the district court. His argument here consists simply of reminding the 
 
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court that everyone must adhere strictly to the rules. Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the error of the missing certificate was a defect, but it did not affect Floyd’s 
substantive rights, nor did it impact the Board’s impartial decision making process. Accordingly, 
the missing certificate was harmless error.  
D. The Board’s decision to direct issuance of the tax deed was not clearly 
erroneous, arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion because it was 
based on substantial evidence. 
Floyd’s last argument states that the Board’s conclusions were clearly erroneous, abuses 
of discretion, and arbitrary and capricious because they were not supported by the evidentiary 
record. We disagree.  
Each standard of review, though similar, uses a slightly different means to ensure the fact 
finder reaches a reasonable conclusion. Clearly erroneous applies where factual findings are not 
supported by substantial and competent evidence. Nw. Farm Credit Servs., FLCA v. Lake 
Cascade Airpark, LLC, 156 Idaho 758, 763, 331 P.3d 500, 505 (2014). An abuse of discretion 
standard examines whether the district court acted within the boundaries of its discretionary 
decision and applicable legal standards, and reached a decision by exercising reason. Wohrle v. 
Kootenai Cnty., 147 Idaho 267, 271, 207 P.3d 998, 1002 (2009). Whereas an arbitrary and 
capricious decision occurs where the decision was reached in an unreasonable manner or based 
on clearly erroneous findings. See Pioneer Irr. Dist. v. City of Caldwell, 153 Idaho 593, 595, 
599, 288 P.3d 810, 812, 816 (2012).  
 
Although the record is convoluted at times, the record by and large establishes that 
Floyd’s taxes remained unpaid and that he was aware of the pending tax deed. Floyd did not 
present evidence that someone paid the taxes anonymously on his behalf. His basis for that 
argument stems from an empty envelope from the Society of St. Vincent—which Floyd admits 
contained only his returned letter—and the office error mix up with the paid stamp. As the 
district court noted, this “troubling practice” was poorly done but did not establish a conspiracy 
to hide Floyd’s money. Moreover, the Board considered Floyd’s submitted letters and exhibits, 
and discussed those facts in its final decision. Because the Board examined all the evidence 
before it and came to a reasonable conclusion, its determination to issue the tax deed was not 
clearly erroneous, arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion.  The district court correctly 
decided this issue. 
E. The Board is not entitled to an award of attorney fees, but is awarded costs.  
 
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The Board argues it is entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-121, which 
“allows the award of attorney fees in a civil action if the appeal merely invites the Court to 
second guess the findings of the lower court.” Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 797, 229 P.3d 
1146, 1159 (2010).  
 
While Floyd’s arguments proved unsuccessful, his appeal was not filed frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation. Floyd’s due process arguments raised several concerns of 
adequate notice and compliance with the Idaho Code. In addition, Floyd’s appeal presented a 
new argument to address whether the Treasurer’s October letters sufficiently established actual 
notice of the pending tax deed proceeding to satisfy Idaho Code section 63-1005(6). Therefore 
we decline to award attorney fees to the Board.  
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
We hereby affirm the district court’s judgment, but decline to award attorney’s fees. 
Costs on appeal are awarded to the Ada County Board of Commissioners. 
 
Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices HORTON, BEVAN and STEGNER CONCUR.