Title: State v. David C. Liebnitz

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-2182 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
David C. Liebnitz,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
December 21, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
October 12, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Washington 
 
JUDGE: 
Annette K. Ziegler 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins the dissent. 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs (in 
the court of appeals) by Rex R. Anderegg and Anderegg & 
Mutschler, LLP, Milwaukee and oral argument by Rex R. Anderegg. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Gregory M. Posner-Weber, assistant attorney general with whom 
on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
No. 
98-2182 
 
 
1 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 98-2182 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :  
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
David C. Liebnitz, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Washington 
County, Annette K. Ziegler, Circuit Court Judge.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   Defendant David C. Liebnitz 
(Liebnitz) was charged with multiple felony counts and as a 
habitual criminal (a repeat offender or repeater) pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 939.62 (1991-92).1  Liebnitz and the State of 
                     
1 Wis. Stat. § 939.62 (1991-92) states in relevant part: 
 Increased penalty for habitual criminality.  (1) If the 
actor is a repeater, as that term is defined in sub. (2), and 
the present conviction is for any crime for which imprisonment 
may be imposed (except for an escape under s.  946.42 or a 
failure to report under s. 946.425) the maximum term of 
imprisonment prescribed by law for that crime may be increased 
as follows: 
(a) A maximum term of one year or less may be increased to 
not more than 3 years. 
FILED 
 
DEC 21, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-2182 
 
 
2 
Wisconsin (State) subsequently entered into an agreement in 
which Liebnitz agreed to enter a plea of no contest.  The 
agreement included a sentencing recommendation that could be 
attained only through application of the repeater statute.  The 
circuit court accepted Liebnitz’s no contest plea and imposed 
the recommended penalty. 
¶2 
Liebnitz now contends that the years of incarceration 
attributable to his status as a repeater are void.  To sentence 
                                                                  
(b) A maximum term of more than one year but not more than 
10 years may be increased by not more than 2 years if the prior 
convictions were for misdemeanors and by not more than 6 years 
if the prior conviction was for a felony. 
(c) A maximum term of more than 10 years may be increased 
by not more than 2 years if the prior convictions were for 
misdemeanors and by not more than 10 years if the prior 
conviction was for a felony. 
(2) The actor is a repeater if he was convicted of a felony 
during the 5-year period immediately preceding the commission of 
the crime for which he presently is being sentenced, or if he 
was convicted of a misdemeanor on 3 separate occasions during 
that same period, which convictions remain of record and 
unreversed.  It is immaterial that sentence was stayed, withheld 
or suspended, or that he was pardoned, unless such pardon was 
granted on the ground of innocence.  In computing the preceding 
5-year period, time which the actor spent in actual confinement 
serving a criminal sentence shall be excluded. 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1991-92 text unless otherwise noted. 
Although Wis. Stat. § 939.62 has been amended since 1991-
92, the changes do not impact upon our analysis in this case. 
No. 
98-2182 
 
 
3 
a defendant as a repeater, Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1)2 requires the 
State to prove, or the defendant to admit, any prior convictions 
that form the basis of the defendant’s repeater status.  
Liebnitz contends that § 973.12(1) was not satisfied in his 
case.  We disagree.  The record establishes that Liebnitz fully 
understood the nature of the repeater charge.  Based upon the 
totality of the record, we conclude that Liebnitz’s plea to the 
information constituted an admission under § 973.12.  Therefore, 
we affirm the circuit court order denying his motion to void an 
excess sentence not authorized by law. 
¶3 
The facts in this case are not in dispute.  On August 
27, 1992, Liebnitz was in an automobile collision in which three 
                     
2  Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) provides:  Sentence of a repeater. 
 (1)  Whenever a person charged with a crime will be a repeater 
as defined in s. 939.62 if convicted, any prior convictions may 
be alleged in the complaint, indictment or information or 
amendments so alleging at any time before or at arraignment, and 
before acceptance of any plea.  The court may, upon motion of 
the district attorney, grant a reasonable time to investigate 
possible prior convictions before accepting a plea.  If such 
prior convictions are admitted by the defendant or proved by the 
state, he shall be subject to sentence under s. 939.62 unless he 
establishes that he was pardoned on grounds of innocence for any 
crime necessary to constitute him a repeater.  An official 
report of the F.B.I. or any other governmental agency of the 
United States or of this or any other state shall be prima facie 
evidence of any conviction or sentence therein reported.  Any 
sentence so reported shall be deemed prima facie to have been 
fully served in actual confinement or to have been served for 
such period of time as is shown or is consistent with the 
report.  The court shall take judicial notice of the statutes of 
the United States and foreign states in determining whether the 
prior conviction was for a felony or a misdemeanor. 
 
This statute has been amended since 1991-92.  However, the 
modifications do not impact upon our analysis in this case. 
No. 
98-2182 
 
 
4 
people were killed and two were seriously injured.  Liebnitz was 
also injured in the crash.   
¶4 
On the following day, the State charged Liebnitz with 
three felony counts of homicide by negligent operation of a 
vehicle3 and two counts of causing great bodily harm by negligent 
operation of a vehicle.4  With each of these five counts, the 
criminal complaint charged Liebnitz as a repeat offender under 
Wis. Stat. § 939.62.5  Each repeater charge in the criminal 
complaint set forth the facts supporting its application to 
Liebnitz. 
 
Liebnitz 
does 
not 
challenge 
the 
accuracy 
or 
specificity of the repeater provisions detailed within the 
complaint.  
¶5 
Liebnitz appeared before the Washington County Circuit 
Court for a hearing on August 31, 1992.  At the hearing, 
Liebnitz, through his counsel, received a copy of the criminal 
complaint. 
¶6 
Although Liebnitz’s counsel waived reading of the 
complaint, the circuit court judge proceeded to read the charges 
and the repeater allegations: 
 
THE COURT:  Mr. Liebnitz, what Count 1 says is 
that on August 27, 1992, in the Town of Jackson, in 
                     
3 Wis. Stat. § 940.10 and Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(e).  
4 Wis. Stat. § 346.62 (4) and Wis. Stat. § 346.65(5). 
5 Liebnitz also was charged with one count of possessing a 
controlled substance with intent to deliver, contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 161.14(4)(t) and 161.41(1m)(h)1.  As part of the plea 
agreement, the State agreed to dismiss and read in this charge 
for sentencing purposes.  
No. 
98-2182 
 
 
5 
Washington County, you did feloniously cause the death 
of John Talbot by the negligent operation or handling 
of a vehicle.  Do you understand the nature of the 
charge? 
 
MR. LIEBNITZ:  Yes, I do. 
 
THE COURT:  The penalty, if you are convicted, is 
one for which you could be fined not to exceed 
$10,000.00 or imprisonment not to exceed two years, or 
both.  Do you understand the nature of the penalties? 
 
MR. LIEBNITZ:  Yes. 
 
THE COURT:  I should advise you further that the 
complaint 
further 
alleges 
that 
pursuant 
to 
the 
statutes, you are a repeater in that you were 
convicted of a felony being the delivery of a 
controlled substance contrary to the law in that on 
March 27, 1989, you were in possession with intent to 
deliver 
a 
controlled 
substance 
as 
a 
subsequent 
offender contrary to the law and that on October 17, 
1989, and therefore by virtue of your repeater status 
under the section of the statute, the above penalty is 
enhanced or increased by six years so that the maximum 
possible penalty can be imprisonment for a term not to 
exceed eight years.  Do you understand the possible 
enhancement of the penalty involved here? 
 
MR. LIEBNITZ:  Yes, sir. 
 
THE COURT:  Further, it indicates that on August 
27, 1992 in Count 2 in the Town of Jackson, Washington 
County, you did feloniously cause the death of Dolores 
M. Harrigan by the negligent operation or handling of 
a vehicle.  Do you understand the nature of this 
charge? 
 
MR. LIEBNITZ:  Yes. 
 
THE COURT:  And you should be further advised 
that if you are convicted of this charge, there could 
be a penalty of a fine not to exceed $10,000.00, or 
imprisonment not to exceed two years or both.  Do you 
understand the nature of this charge and the possible 
penalties? 
 
No. 
98-2182 
 
 
6 
MR. LIEBNITZ:  Yes. 
 
THE COURT:  The criminal complaint further says 
with reference to Count 2 that you are a repeater in 
that you were convicted of felonies being the delivery 
of a controlled substance contrary to the section of 
the statutes and alleges that on October 17, 1989 and 
therefore, by virtue of your repeater status under the 
section of the Wisconsin Statutes, the penalty is 
enhanced by six years so that the maximum possible 
imprisonment is for a term not to exceed eight years. 
 Do you understand the increased or enhanced penalty? 
 
MR. LIEBNITZ:  Yes.   
 
THE COURT:  Count 3 says that on August 27, 1992 
in the Town of Jackson, Washington County, Wisconsin, 
you did feloniously cause the death of Mark A. Talbot 
by the negligent operation or handling of a vehicle.  
Do you understand the nature of this charge? 
 
MR. LIEBNITZ:  Yes. 
 
THE COURT:  If you should be found guilty of this 
charge, you could be fined not to exceed $10,000.00 or 
imprisonment not to exceed two years or both under the 
law.  Do you understand those penalties? 
 
MR. LIEBNITZ:  Yes. 
 
THE COURT:  Again with respect to Count 3, it 
goes on to further say and indicate that pursuant to 
the statutes of Wisconsin, you are a repeater in that 
you were convicted of felonies, and again it indicates 
the delivery of a controlled substance contrary to the 
law in that on March 27, 1989, you were in possession 
with intent to deliver a controlled substance as a 
subsequent offender, again contrary to the law in that 
on October 17, 1989, and therefore by virtue of your 
repeater status under the statute, the above penalty 
is enhanced by six years so that the maximum possible 
imprisonment is for a term not to exceed eight years. 
 Do you understand the possible enhanced and increased 
penalty?   
 
MR. LIEBNITZ:  Yes. 
 
No. 
98-2182 
 
 
7 
THE COURT:  Count 4 says that on August 27, 1992, 
in the Town of Jackson, Washington County, you did 
feloniously cause great bodily harm to Merry L. 
Talbot, by the negligent operation of a vehicle.  Do 
you understand the nature of this charge? 
 
MR. LIEBNITZ:  Yes. 
 
THE COURT:  You should know that if you are found 
guilty of this charge, there could be a fine of not 
less that [sic] $600.00 nor more than $2,000.00 and 
you may be imprisoned for not less than 90 days nor 
more 
than 
18 
months 
contrary 
to 
the 
Wisconsin 
statutes.  Do you understand the penalty? 
 
MR. LIEBNITZ:  Yes. 
 
THE 
COURT: 
 
It 
further 
indicates 
that 
in 
connection with Count 4, that you are a repeater in 
that you were convicted of felonies being the delivery 
of a controlled substance contrary to the law on March 
27, 1989 and possession with intent to deliver a 
controlled substance as a subsequent offender on 
October 17, 1989, and the above penalty is enhanced or 
increased by six years to that the maximum possible 
imprisonment is for a term not to exceed 7 years 6 
months.  Do you understand these penalties? 
 
MR. LIEBNITZ:  Yes. 
 
THE COURT:  Further, it alleges in Count 5 that 
on August 27, 1992 in the Town of Jackson, Washington 
County, you did feloniously cause great bodily harm to 
Mary D. Talbot by the negligent operation of a 
vehicle.  Do you understand the nature of this charge? 
 
MR. LIEBNITZ:  Yes. 
 
THE COURT:  The penalty in connection with this, 
if you should be found guilty or convicted, is that 
you could be fined not less than $600.00 nor more than 
$2,000.00, and may be imprisoned for not less than 90 
days nor more than 18 months under the section of the 
Wisconsin Statutes.  Do you understand these possible 
penalties? 
 
MR. LIEBNITZ:  Yes. 
No. 
98-2182 
 
 
8 
 
THE COURT:  Further in connection with Count 5, 
it further indicates that pursuant to a section of the 
Wisconsin Statutes, you are a repeater in that you 
were convicted of felonies being the delivery of a 
controlled substance, that is the delivery of a 
controlled substance, on March 27, 1989 and possession 
with intent to deliver a controlled substance as a 
subsequent offender contrary to the section of the 
statutes and that on October 17, 1989, and therefore 
by virtue of your repeater status under the section of 
the Wisconsin statutes, the above penalty is enhanced 
by six years so that the maximum possible imprisonment 
is for a term not to exceed 7 years 6 months.  Do you 
understand the nature and the enhancement of the 
increased penalty? 
 
MR. LIEBNITZ:  Yes, sir. 
¶7 
An arraignment was held on October 16, 1992.  The 
information was served, filed, and defense counsel acknowledged 
receipt 
of 
a 
copy 
of 
that 
document. 
 
The 
information 
individually listed each count, and its related repeater charge, 
being brought against Liebnitz.  Liebnitz entered a plea of not 
guilty. 
¶8 
Subsequently, the parties reached a plea agreement.  
The written plea agreement, filed with the circuit court on 
February 8, 1993, set forth a sentencing recommendation that 
provided for consecutive, enhanced sentences on counts one 
through three (four years on each count) and consecutive, 
statutory maximum sentences on counts four and five (18 months 
on each count).  On February 26, 1993, Liebnitz completed a 
Request to Enter Plea and Waiver of Rights form and filed it 
with the court.  On the form, Liebnitz acknowledged that he 
understood that the possible maximum penalties that he faced 
No. 
98-2182 
 
 
9 
upon his conviction were eight years each for counts one, two 
and three; seven years, six months each for courts four and 
five; plus fines.  Although the sentence recommended in the 
written plea agreement as well as the maximum penalties 
acknowledged by Liebnitz in the Request to Enter a Plea and 
Waiver of Rights form could be reached only by application of 
the 
repeater 
penalties, 
neither 
specifically 
stated 
that 
Liebnitz was in fact a repeat offender.   
¶9 
Also on February 26, 1993, a plea hearing was held.  
The district attorney described the terms of the plea agreement, 
including 
the 
sentence 
recommendation, 
for 
the 
record.  
Liebnitz, in response to the circuit court judge’s inquiry, 
stated that he joined in the agreement described by the district 
attorney.  The circuit court judge asked Liebnitz to state his 
plea for each of the five counts in the information.  Liebnitz 
pled no contest to each count.  
¶10 As part of the plea colloquy, the judge ascertained 
Liebnitz’s affirmative understanding of the nature of the five 
counts charged against him by the State.  The circuit court 
judge also asked Liebnitz if he had read and understood 
everything contained in the Request to Enter Plea and Waiver of 
Rights form.  Liebnitz answered affirmatively.  Upon the inquiry 
of the circuit court judge, defense counsel stated that he 
believed that Liebnitz understood both the nature of the charges 
against him and the consequences of his plea.  The judge 
concluded that Liebnitz was entering his plea freely and 
voluntarily. 
No. 
98-2182 
 
 
10
¶11 The circuit court judge then found sufficient factual 
basis for Liebnitz’s plea in the facts as outlined in the 
complaint.  The judge asked, “Mr. Liebnitz, is it correct that 
by your pleas you’ve chosen not to contest the allegations 
contained in the complaint that was provided to you when you 
first appeared in court?”  Liebnitz answered in the affirmative. 
 The judge did not, however, advise Liebnitz of the maximum 
penalties he would be facing by entering a plea or ask Liebnitz 
if he was actually a repeat offender.  During this phase of the 
proceedings, the State did not offer any proof to establish 
Liebnitz’s status as a repeat offender.  After the judge 
pronounced Liebnitz guilty, the State requested that the court 
find, as a matter of law, the repeater allegation in the 
complaint.  The judge responded, “the Court will find that he 
apparently is a repeater as defined under Wisconsin statutes.” 
¶12 Sentencing immediately followed the plea hearing.  
Statements made by the State during sentencing referred to the 
penalty enhancement caused by the repeater and its impact on the 
sentence recommendation in the plea agreement.  Defense counsel 
specifically told the circuit court judge, “we’re joining in 
this recommendation for the sentences as set forth in the plea 
agreement, and I think that [the district attorney] has given 
you more than adequate reasons why you should follow the 
recommendation.”  The judge stated that in making the sentencing 
decision, he considered the fact that Liebnitz had two prior 
felony convictions.  The judge also characterized the sentence 
recommendations as, “if he had not had the status as a felon, 
No. 
98-2182 
 
 
11
these are really basically double the statutory maximums.”  
Neither Liebnitz nor his counsel acknowledged or disputed that 
Liebnitz was a repeat offender during sentencing.  The judge 
subsequently gave Liebnitz the sentence recommended in the plea 
agreement. 
¶13 In 1998 Liebnitz brought a motion to void the portion 
of the sentence generated by his repeater status.  It is this 
motion that is the subject of our review.  According to 
Liebnitz, relief is warranted because the requirements of Wis. 
Stat. § 973.12(1) were not satisfied when he was sentenced.  
Liebnitz contends that he did not admit his repeat offender 
status, the State had not proved his status, and therefore the 
penalty enhancements must be vacated as not authorized by law.  
The circuit court denied his motion.  Liebnitz appealed.  The 
court of appeals subsequently certified the following question 
to this court: 
 
When a defendant never disputes the repeater 
allegation, bargains for a sentence enhanced because 
of the repeater allegations and receives the sentence 
he or she bargained for, but there is a failure of 
proof of the repeater allegation, what is the result? 
 
 
Standard of Review 
¶14 The sole issue presented in this case is whether the 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) have been satisfied.  
Application of § 973.12(1) to undisputed facts presents a 
question of law that we review de novo.  State v. Reitter, 227 
No. 
98-2182 
 
 
12
Wis. 2d 213, 223, 595 N.W.2d 646 (1999); State v. Zimmerman, 185 
Wis. 2d 549, 554, 518 N.W.2d 303 (Ct. App. 1994).  Although our 
review of this question of law is independent, we benefit from 
the analyses conducted by the circuit court and court of 
appeals.  Reitter, 227 Wis. 2d at 223.  In our review we 
consider the analysis for certification provided by the court of 
appeals where, as here, the court of appeals has not decided the 
issue.  Id.   
Analysis 
¶15 Under Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1), an individual may be 
sentenced 
as 
a repeater 
if 
he either admits 
the 
prior 
convictions or the convictions are proved by the State.  “‘A 
charge of being a repeater is not a charge of a crime and, if 
proved, only renders the defendant eligible for an increase in 
penalty for the crime of which he is convicted.’”  State v. 
Farr, 119 Wis. 2d 651, 661, 350 N.W.2d 640 (1984) (quoting Block 
v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 205, 212, 163 N.W.2d 196 (1968)).  If the 
requirements of § 973.12 are satisfied, the consequence is that 
“the defendant is subjected to the possibility of a sentence 
longer than the maximum one provided by law for the offense for 
which the defendant is convicted.”  Id.  The State concedes it 
did not prove Liebnitz’s prior convictions.  During the plea 
colloquy, the circuit court judge did not directly ask Liebnitz 
whether he had been convicted of the crimes set forth in the 
repeater allegations.  Nevertheless, based upon the principles 
we applied in State v. Rachwal, 159 Wis. 2d 494, 465 N.W.2d 490 
(1991), we find that the record presents sufficient facts to 
No. 
98-2182 
 
 
13
find that Liebnitz’s plea to the information constitutes an 
admission. 
¶16 In Rachwal, the defendant pled no contest to a 
misdemeanor charge that included a repeater provision.  During 
the plea colloquy the circuit court judge specifically drew the 
defendant’s attention to the repeater provision.  Id. at 502-03. 
 The judge also advised the defendant of the increased penalty 
he would face as a result of being charged as a repeater.  Id.  
In addition, the judge solicited an affirmative response from 
the 
defendant, 
acknowledging 
an 
understanding 
of 
the 
consequences of entering a plea to a repeater charge.  Id.  We 
concluded in Rachwal that the record demonstrated that the 
defendant was cognizant of the potential consequences of 
entering a no contest plea.  Id. at 511.  We stated that 
presumably the defendant chose to enter a no contest plea 
“because he honestly knew the allegations as to his prior 
convictions to be true and because he considered it futile to 
require 
proof 
by 
the 
prosecution.” 
 
Id. 
 
Under 
these 
circumstances the defendant’s plea of no contest to a criminal 
complaint 
containing a 
repeater allegation 
constituted an 
admission of his prior convictions for purposes of Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.12 and Wis. Stat. § 939.62.  Id. at 512-13.   
¶17 We went on to say in Rachwal that “in the future, it 
may be that his plea of guilty or no contest would not 
constitute an admission, e.g., if the judge does not conduct the 
questioning as did the judge here so as to ascertain the 
No. 
98-2182 
 
 
14
defendant’s 
understanding 
of 
the 
meaning 
and 
potential 
consequences of such a plea.”  Id. at 512.   
¶18 Liebnitz contends that the future is now, for in this 
case the circuit court judge at the plea hearing did not 
ascertain Liebnitz’s understanding of the meaning and potential 
consequences of a plea to charges that included a repeater 
provision.  Nevertheless, we find that the record demonstrates, 
as it did in Rachwal, that Liebnitz was fully aware of the 
repeater charge and its consequences. 
¶19 First, the record shows that both the criminal 
complaint and the information charged Liebnitz as a repeat 
offender under Wis. Stat. § 939.62 on all the counts to which he 
subsequently 
pled 
no 
contest. 
 
Both 
the 
complaint 
and 
information set forth in detail the nature of his previous 
convictions, the dates of conviction, the number of years added 
to the underlying charge as a result of his repeater status, and 
the maximum possible term of imprisonment for each count when 
the repeater provision is applied. 
¶20 Second, when Liebnitz appeared in court on August 31, 
1992, the judge read each count and its possible penalties to 
Liebnitz, asked if Liebnitz understood the nature of the charge, 
and received an affirmative answer from Liebnitz.  The judge 
also read the repeater charge associated with each count, 
including the description of when and of what Liebnitz had been 
convicted 
previously, 
and 
explained 
specifically 
how 
the 
repeater charge increased the possible penalties associated with 
the underlying charge.  After reviewing each repeater provision 
No. 
98-2182 
 
 
15
with Liebnitz, the judge asked Liebnitz if he understood the 
possible enhancement of the penalty.  Each time Liebnitz replied 
in the affirmative. 
¶21 Third, we note that unlike Rachwal, in this case a 
plea agreement was reached between Liebnitz and the State.  
Rachwal, 159 Wis. 2d at 503.  Liebnitz completed a plea 
questionnaire and waiver of rights form, and the form was filed 
with the circuit court.  One section of the form, completed and 
initialed by Liebnitz, stated “I acknowledge that a factual 
basis for my plea of no contest is established by the criminal 
complaint and transcript of preliminary exam [sic].”   
¶22 Finally, during the course of accepting Liebnitz’s no 
contest plea and establishing a factual basis for the plea, the 
judge asked Liebnitz, “is it correct that by your pleas you’ve 
chosen not to contest the allegations contained in the complaint 
that was provided to you when you first appeared in court?”  
Liebnitz replied “yes.”  As we stated in Rachwal, it is a well-
established rule “that what is admitted by a guilty or no 
contest plea is all the material facts alleged in the charging 
document.”  Rachwal, 159 Wis. 2d at 509. (collecting cases).  In 
this case the criminal complaint clearly set forth the repeater 
charge attached to each count filed against Liebnitz, and 
Liebnitz specifically stated on the record that he would not 
contest any allegation in the complaint. 
¶23 We note that the question certified in this case is 
analogous to the issue we recently considered in State v. Burns, 
226 Wis. 2d 762, 594 N.W.2d 799 (1999).   In Burns, we affirmed 
No. 
98-2182 
 
 
16
the defendant’s judgment of conviction, even though he did not 
“expressly and personally articulate a plea of no contest on the 
record in open court, because the only inference possible from 
the totality of the facts and circumstances in the record is 
that the defendant intended to plead no contest.”  Id. at 764. 
In this case, the record supports a finding that Liebnitz 
understood the nature and consequences of the charges against 
him and the consequences of his plea.  In Farr we said that for 
the purposes of Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1), an “admission may not by 
statute be inferred nor made by defendant’s attorney, but 
rather, must be a direct and specific admission by the 
defendant.”  Farr, 119 Wis. 2d at 659 (1984).  However, as we 
noted in Rachwal, “Farr’s prescriptive for determining an 
admission is not necessarily exclusive.”  Rachwal, 159 Wis. 2d 
at 508.  In Farr the court was presented with a case in which a 
jury had found the defendant guilty of burglary.  Farr, 119 
Wis. 2d at 655.  The standard set forth in Farr reflected the 
fact that the defendant never admitted all the material facts 
alleged in the charging document. 
¶24 In contrast to Farr, Liebnitz pled no contest, which 
is an admission to all the material facts alleged in the 
complaint.  The complaint, read in whole to Liebnitz, contained 
the repeater allegations.  He responded affirmatively that he 
understood these allegations and, at the taking of the plea, 
stated he would not contest them.  We conclude therefore that 
based upon the totality of the record, Liebnitz’s plea to the 
No. 
98-2182 
 
 
17
information constituted an admission for purposes of Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.12.6  
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed, 
and the cause is remanded. 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
6 Having found the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 973.12 to be 
satisfied, we need not address the State’s arguments regarding 
waiver, estoppel, or invited error. 
98-2182.awb 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶25 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.  (dissenting).   The problem 
with the majority opinion is that in lowering the standard to 
address the actions of this defendant, it lowers the standard 
for us all.  The majority's new standard apparently is that if 
the complaint containing allegations of prior convictions is 
read to the defendant at the initial appearance, then that is 
good enough to establish six months later at the plea hearing a 
direct and specific admission by the defendant to those 
allegations.  Because the majority lowers the standard so low 
that it is essentially devoid of limitation, I dissent.  
 
¶26 The majority, apparently mindful of its race to the 
bottom, makes a glaring omission.  It fails to acknowledge that 
in State v. Rachwal, 159 Wis. 2d 494, 513, 465 N.W.2d 490 (1991), 
this court previously lowered the standard and addressed the 
“absolute bare minimum.”  Now the majority once again lowers the 
standard.  The majority's critical omission can perhaps be best 
understood as a recognition that today’s decision results in an 
unwarranted erosion of the statutory requirement that a defendant 
98-2182.awb 
 
2 
cannot be sentenced as a repeat offender unless the State proves 
the prior convictions or they are admitted by the defendant.7    
¶27 In State v. Farr, the court stated that an "admission 
may not [under § 973.12] be inferred nor made by defendant’s 
attorney, but rather, must be a direct and specific admission by 
the defendant." 119 Wis. 2d 651, 659, 350 N.W.2d 640 (1984).  
Moreover, a defendant’s silence could not constitute an admission 
of his prior conviction, unless it was affirmatively proved by 
the State.  Id. at 660.   
¶28 The court redefined the Farr requirement in Rachwal and 
found that according to the particular circumstances of that 
case, a plea of no contest produced a specific and direct 
admission to a repeater status in satisfaction of Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.12.  159 Wis. 2d at 512-13.  The Rachwal court, recognizing 
that it was lowering the statutory requirement, made clear that 
                     
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.12 (1991-92) provides in relevant 
part: 
(1) Whenever a person charged with a crime will be a 
repeater as defined in s. 939.62 if convicted, any prior 
convictions may be alleged in the complaint, indictment or 
information or amendments so alleging at any time before or at 
arraignment, and before acceptance of any plea. . . . If such 
prior convictions are admitted by the defendant or proved by the 
state, he shall be subject to sentence under s. 939.62 unless he 
establishes that he was pardoned on grounds of innocence for any 
crime necessary to constitute him a repeater . . . .  
 
(emphasis added). 
  
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3 
the particular circumstances verge upon the “absolute bare 
minimum necessary for a valid admission.”  Id. at 513.    
¶29 By finding a direct and specific admission in this 
case, the majority dismisses the limitations of the Rachwal 
decision.  Rachwal made several references to the sufficient and 
detailed plea colloquy, in which the circuit court referenced the 
repeater charges and alerted the defendant to the increased 
penalties flowing from those charges.  The Rachwal court 
incorporated the colloquy into the defendant’s understanding of 
the allegations he was facing and found that the “no contest 
plea, viewed in the context of the record discussion constituted 
an affirmative admission of the allegations contained in the 
complaint.”  Id. at 508.  
 
¶30 The majority endeavors to tailor the facts of the 
present case to address the limitation imposed by Rachwal that a 
direct 
and 
specific 
admission 
cannot 
be 
found 
without 
“questioning . . 
. so 
as 
to ascertain 
the 
defendant’s 
understanding of the meaning and potential consequences of such 
a plea.” 159 Wis. 2d at 512.  The majority notes that at the 
plea hearing, Liebnitz’s attorney stated his belief that 
Liebnitz understood the meaning and consequences of his plea.  
Majority at 10.   Its attempt, however, falls short of the mark. 
¶31 The questioning during Liebnitz’s colloquy did not 
remotely approach the level of questioning by the circuit court 
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4 
in Rachwal.  Furthermore, reliance on defense counsel to 
articulate Liebnitz’s admission undermines the Farr mandate that 
a defendant’s admission cannot be made by his attorney.  119 Wis. 
2d at 659.   
¶32 We must measure a defendant’s understanding of the 
nature of his charge at the time the plea is entered.  State v. 
Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 269, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986).  See also 
State v. Bartelt, 112 Wis. 2d 467, 474 n.2, 334 N.W.2d 91 (1983) 
(“Because the fact that a defendant was told sometime earlier of 
his rights is not necessarily determinative of whether he 
understood those rights at a later time.”).  There is no evidence 
to suggest that at the time of the plea hearing Liebnitz 
understood the significance of his repeat offender charge. 
¶33 Yet the majority concludes that based on the “totality 
of the record,” Liebnitz fully understood the nature of the 
repeater charge at the time he entered his plea.  A review of the 
record cited in the majority opinion, however, underscores the 
frail foundation of the majority’s conclusion. 
¶34 The majority concedes, as it must, that at the plea 
hearing the judge neither asked Liebnitz if he was actually a 
repeat offender nor advised Liebnitz of the maximum penalties he 
would be facing as a repeat offender by entering his plea.  
Majority op. at 10.  The majority also concedes, as it must, 
that at the plea hearing the State did not offer any proof to 
98-2182.awb 
 
5 
establish Liebnitz’s status as a repeat offender.  Majority op. 
at 10.   
¶35 Likewise, the majority acknowledges that neither the 
written 
statement 
of 
the 
plea 
agreement 
nor 
the 
plea 
questionnaire and waiver of rights form specifically stated that 
Liebnitz was a repeat offender.  Majority op. at 9.  Although 
the majority references the record of the sentencing hearing 
that immediately followed the plea hearing, it concedes that 
neither Liebnitz nor his counsel admitted that Liebnitz was a 
repeat offender at the sentencing hearing.  Majority op. at 11. 
 
¶36 The majority’s true focus is not on the “totality of 
the record,” but on Liebnitz’s initial appearance, which took 
place six months prior to the plea hearing and during which the 
court read him the allegations contained in the complaint.  In 
an attempt to fill the void in the record at the critical time 
of the plea hearing and the void during the six-month interval, 
the majority spends nearly one-quarter of its opinion quoting at 
length from the transcript of the initial appearance.  
 
¶37 The 
majority 
opinion 
apparently 
stands 
for 
the 
proposition that even though six months have passed, a reading of 
the complaint at the time of the initial appearance will suffice 
for the conclusion that at the time of the plea hearing Liebnitz 
had entered a direct and specific admission of his prior 
convictions.  Because such a conclusion lowers the standard to 
98-2182.awb 
 
6 
the bottom and renders the legislative mandate meaningless, I 
dissent. 
 
¶38 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
 
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