Title: ARCHIE LAVERNE RANDOLPH, JR. v. GILPATRICK CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., A Wyoming Corporation; STATE OF WYOMING AND THE STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ARCHIE LAVERNE RANDOLPH, JR. v. GILPATRICK CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., A Wyoming Corporation; STATE OF WYOMING AND THE STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION OF WYOMING1985 WY 77702 P.2d 142Case Number: 84-180Decided: 06/26/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
ARCHIE LAVERNE RANDOLPH, 
JR., APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

GILPATRICK CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION; STATE OF WYOMING AND THE STATE HIGHWAY 
COMMISSION OF WYOMING, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

Rehearing Denied August 
26, 1985.

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, FremontCounty, Robert B. Ranck, 
J.

 
 
Daniel E. White, 
Cheyenne, for appellant. 

Cameron S. 
Walker of Schwartz, Bon, McCrary & Walker, Casper, for appellee Gilpatrick Const. Co., 
Inc.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., and Lawrence A. Bobbitt, III, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee State of 
Wyo.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal results 
from a summary judgment granted in favor of appellees in a negligence action 
which arose from a single car accident in a construction area. Appellant Archie 
Laverne Randolph, Jr., was injured when his car went out of control and struck a 
pile of railroad ties while he was driving through a bridge construction area on 
November 21, 1976.

[¶2.]     Appellant initially 
filed suit on November 19, 1980, against Michael Hays, a Riverton police 
officer, the City of Riverton, Gilpatrick 
Construction Company, Inc., and the State of Wyoming, alleging liability for property 
damage and personal injuries sustained in the car accident. The state was 
dismissed by stipulation on January 19, 1981. The trial court dismissed the 
complaint against the remaining defendants on September 20, 1982, finding that 
appellant had failed to prosecute the case for a period in excess of six months. 
Appellant sought review of the dismissal in this court, and we reinstated the 
case in Randolph v. Hays, Wyo., 665 P.2d 500 
(1983).

[¶3.]     In 1982, the Wyoming legislature 
waived sovereign immunity to permit appellant to bring his action against the 
state by special act. Ch. 24, 
S.L. of Wyoming, 1982. Appellant subsequently filed a 
new complaint on May 6, 1983, against the State of Wyoming and the Wyoming 
Highway Commission (hereinafter collectively referred to as the state). This 
action was joined with appellant's suit against Officer Michael Hays, the City 
of Riverton, and 
Gilpatrick Construction Company pursuant to court order on October 13, 1983. 
Gilpatrick Construction Company, the state and the City of Riverton all moved for 
summary judgment. The motions were granted by the trial court on April 2, 
1984.

[¶4.]     Trial was had against 
the remaining defendant, Officer Michael Hays, on May 22, 1984. The jury found 
that Officer Hays had acted negligently, but that such negligence was not the 
proximate cause of appellant's accident and resultant 
injuries.

[¶5.]     Appellant seeks review 
of the summary judgment granted in favor of appellees Gilpatrick Construction 
Company and the state, and raises this single issue:

"Whether or not the trial 
court erred in granting the motions for summary judgment filed by the 
appellees."

We will 
affirm.

[¶6.]     The facts show that on 
the evening of November 20, 1976, appellant and two friends, Greg Conner and 
John Burton, were "celebrating" in Riverton, Wyoming. The three companions visited several 
bars in Riverton and continued such activity until about 2:30 a.m. on November 
21, 1976. Sometime after 3:00 a.m. on November 21, the three were spotted by 
Officer Michael Hays proceeding west out of Riverton toward Dubois, Wyoming, in appellant's car, a 1968 Chevrolet 
Camero. Officer Hays clocked appellant's vehicle at 90 miles per hour. Officer 
Hays pursued the vehicle west through the bridge construction detour and stopped 
the vehicle on the west end of the detour.

[¶7.]     After Officer Hays 
stopped the vehicle, a dispute ensued between the officer and the three 
companions as to how fast the vehicle was actually going and the accuracy of the 
officer's radar gun. Mr. Conner then suggested that a speed test be conducted to 
check the accuracy of the radar in Officer Hays' patrol car. Officer Hays agreed 
to this test even though there was no operating speedometer in appellant's car 
by which to check the radar. Mr. Conner and Officer Hays sat in the patrol car 
as appellant and Mr. Burton sped off westbound in appellant's car and reached a 
speed in excess of 90 miles per hour on the radar. The car then turned around, 
heading back east-bound in the direction of the patrol car and the bridge 
construction detour. It is unclear how fast appellant's vehicle was traveling 
when it passed the patrol car the second time. The radar in the patrol car 
indicated appellant's speed was at least 100 miles per hour. Mr. Conner recalled 
the vehicle was going too fast to negotiate the detour. Mr. Dick Mabie, one of 
appellees' expert witnesses, stated in his affidavit that appellant's "most 
probable speed * * was 90 m.p.h., giving [appellant] the benefit of any doubt 
with a minimum of 70 m.p.h." At the summary judgment hearing, appellant's 
counsel agreed that appellant's speed was somewhere between 60 and 103 miles per 
hour. In any event, appellant was unable to slow the car down to safely drive 
through the detour. The car crashed through a pile of railroad ties and traveled 
81 feet until it stopped in or near a canal. Mr. Burton died as a result of the 
injuries he sustained in the accident and appellant suffered serious 
injury.

[¶8.]     As stated earlier, 
appellant's only issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting 
summary judgment in favor of appellees Gilpatrick Construction Company, Inc. and 
the state. When reviewing summary judgment on appeal, we examine the judgment in 
the same light as the district court, using the same information. Lane Company v. Busch Development, Inc., 
Wyo., 662 P.2d 419 (1983). The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing 
there is no genuine issue of material fact. Dudley v. East Ridge Development 
Company, Wyo., 694 P.2d 113 (1985). A material fact is 
one which, if proved, would have the effect of establishing or refuting one of 
the essential elements of the cause of action or defense asserted by the 
parties. Samuel Mares Post No. 8, 
American Legion, Department of Wyoming v. Board of County Commissioners of the 
County of Converse, Wyo., 697 P.2d 1040 (1985). When examining the record on 
summary judgment, we view the record from the vantage point most favorable to 
the party opposing the motion, giving to him all favorable inferences which may 
be drawn from the facts. Bancroft v. 
Jagusch, Wyo., 
611 P.2d 819 (1980).

[¶9.]     In support of their 
motions for summary judgment, appellees filed affidavits of four civil 
engineers. All the engineers testified that the road signs and detour in the 
bridge construction area were in substantial compliance with law as required by 
§ 31-5-112, W.S. 1977 (November 1984 Replacement), which 
reads:

"The commission shall 
adopt a manual and specifications for a uniform system of traffic-control 
devices consistent with this act for use upon highways within this state. The 
uniform system shall correlate with and so far as possible conform to the system 
set forth in the most recent edition of the `Manual on Uniform Traffic Control 
Devices for Streets and Highways' and other standards issued or endorsed by the 
federal highway administrator."1

[¶10.]  Typical of the engineers' testimony is 
the affidavit of George A. Dale, a civil engineer for the State Highway 
Department. He concluded the signs used at the detour were in substantial 
accordance with law and not the cause of the accident:

"4. Your affiant is 
familiar with the construction detour and traffic control devices in use at a 
bridge reconstruction site West of Riverton, Wyoming - Project Number TQF-030-3 
(11).

"5. Your affiant is 
familiar with the rationale and installation of construction 
detours.

"6. The detour in place 
had to be designed to fit field conditions because of existing approaches to 
homes or semi-rural businesses and groups of trees, making it impossible to 
obtain a clear area of 500 feet on both ends of the bridge to be replaced. 

"7. The 500 feet, we 
feel, is irrelevant because of the speed actually being driven by the plaintiff, 
which far exceeded the legal speed limit.

"8. Since the state 
standard plan was not totally applicable, the resident engineer and contractor 
used as a guide, the typical traffic control plan as outlined in the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control 
Devices for a two-lane detour around a bridge to be replaced which matched 
the field conditions almost exactly. , figure 6-2 1971 Edition. This Manual has 
been adopted by the State Highway Commission for use on all public highways 
within the State as mandated by State Statute (W.S. 
36-5-113).

"9. Your affiant states 
that the only applicable deviation from state or federal standards was in the 
use of a curve warning sign rather than a turn warning sign with a recommended 
driving speed of under 30 M.P.H. In my opinion, this minor deviation would have 
no effect on the accident.

"10. The flashboards or 
barrels as shown on the state standard are taken care of in the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control 
Devices standard by a large far side arrow which was installed, but was not 
intended for an east-bound vehicle and therefore, in my opinion, was correctly 
installed and would have had no effect on the accident."

To the same 
effect is the affidavit of John W. Karhu, also a civil engineer for the State 
Highway Department, who testified:

"5. Your affiant 
inspected the detour Friday November 19, 1976 and detour was found to be in 
compliance to current `Manual On Uniform Traffic Control Devices For Streets 
& Highways' and in accordance to the 1974 Specifications For Road and Bridge 
Construction. Because of the confined conditions at construction area, affiant 
adjusted barricade spacing to fit field conditions. Affiant also had additional 
WC-4 barricades placed on west side of structure because of the sixty-six foot 
roadway width being barricaded. Portable flashers were installed on barricades 
at west side of structure.

"6. Affiant states that 
large arrows were installed in lieu of flashcards or barrels since they meet 
`Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices For Streets & Highways' standards 
and were less likely to be removed by vandalism, a common occurrence on urban 
type projects.

"7. Affiant inspected 
project site November 22, 1976 with District Traffic Engineer, Jay Gould and 
Mike McDonald, Safety Supervisor for Gilpatrick Construction Company. At this 
time additional devices were recommended to be installed that exceeded standard 
detour signing. This upgrading was done to insure that additional accidents did 
not occur at this location.

"8. Additional signing 
included installation of a 45 M.P.H. and 35 M.P.H. advisory speed limit signs on 
the west end of the detour site; fluorescent barrel with arrows on west side 
taper to detour; and permanent 12" flashing warning lights at detour sign 
locations.

"9. Your affiant, in his 
opinion, states that the minor deviation in the curve warning sign with a 15 
M.P.H. had no effect on the accident that occurred at speeds far exceeding legal 
limits."

[¶11.]  In support of his opposition to the 
motions for summary judgment, appellant filed the affidavit of Howard L. 
Anderson, a civil engineer from Alabama. In his affidavit, Mr. Anderson 
testified that in his opinion there were various defects in the way the signs 
were placed in the detour, etc. However, by his own admission Mr. Anderson 
stated he did not have all the relevant information before 
him:

"3. I have not yet had an 
opportunity to review: (1) the entire plans and specifications for the project; 
(2) the final `as-constructed' plans for the project; (3) the police reports for 
the accident; (4) the construction contract for the project entered into by the 
State Highway Commission and Gilpatrick Construction Company; and (5) State 
standard plans or design criteria adopted by the Wyoming State Highway 
Commission for projects of this type."

 

[¶12.]  We therefore must conclude, as did the 
trial court, that summary judgment is proper inasmuch as we find an absence of 
any genuine issue of material fact. There is no competent evidence upon which to 
base any conclusion of negligence on the part of the appellees. All of 
appellees' experts testified that the signs and the detour were in substantial 
compliance with the "Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and 
Highways" as required by § 31-5-112, W.S. 1977 (November 1984 Replacement). See, 
e.g., Fanning v. City of Laramie, Wyo., 402 P.2d 460 (1965). We note that the statute only 
requires compliance with the manual "so far as possible"; strict compliance is 
not mandated. Appellee Gilpatrick Construction Company, Inc., erected the signs 
and detour according to the Highway Department's plans.2 See, e.g., Phelan v. Read 
Construction Company, Wyo., 379 P.2d 829 (1963). In any event, it 
would be difficult at best to find any minor deviations in the detour signs as 
being the proximate cause of the accident when appellant knew the lay-out of the 
detour from having driven through it minutes before the accident, and was 
traveling at a speed which exceeded all legal limits.

[¶13.]  As a general proposition, summary 
judgments are not favored in actions sounding in negligence. Dubus v. Dresser Industries, Wyo., 649 P.2d 198 
(1982). But where there is a nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fact, 
summary judgments have been upheld in numerous actions sounding in tort. Seamster v. Rumph, Wyo., 698 P.2d 103 
(1985); Hurst v. State, Wyo., 698 P.2d 1130 (1985); McMurry v. Howard 
Publications, Inc., Wyo., 612 P.2d 14 (1980); Bancroft v. Jagusch, supra; Keller v. Anderson, Wyo., 554 P.2d 1253 
(1976); Bluejacket v. Carney, Wyo., 
550 P.2d 494 (1976); Apperson v. Kay, 
Wyo., 546 P.2d 995 (1976); Wells v. Jeep 
Corporation, Wyo., 532 P.2d 595 (1975); Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry 
Company, Wyo., 527 P.2d 832 (1974); Clouser v. Spaniol Ford, Inc., Wyo., 522 P.2d 1360 (1974); LeGrande v. Misner, 
Wyo., 490 P.2d 1252 (1971); Parker v. 
Heasler Plumbing & Heating Company, Wyo., 388 P.2d 516 (1964); Lieuallen v. Northern Utilities Company, 
Wyo., 368 P.2d 949 (1962). Where there is no genuine issue of material fact, 
movants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of 
law.

"* * * The judgment 
sought [by a motion for summary judgment] shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. * * *" Rule 56(c), Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure.

[¶14.]  We find that the trial court was correct 
in granting summary judgment in favor of the appellees in this 
case.

[¶15.]  Affirmed.

1 This statute has been 
amended since the accident happened. The changes have been minor as evidenced by 
the wording of the statute in effect at the time of the accident, which 
read:

"The state highway 
commission shall adopt a manual and specifications for a uniform system of 
traffic-control devices consistent with the provisions of this act for use upon 
highways within this state. Such a uniform system shall correlate with and so 
far as possible conform to the system set forth in the most recent edition of 
the `Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways.'" 
Section 31-5-113, W.S. 1977.

2 There was a very minor 
deviation in the "15 miles per hour turn sign" originally planned for use by the 
Highway Department in the construction area. But it is highly unlikely this had 
anything to do with the cause of the accident when appellant had personal 
knowledge of the curve, having driven through it minutes earlier, and yet chose 
to attempt to negotiate the curve at a speed greatly exceeding the posted 15 
miles per hour.