Title: MARRIAGE OF MARTENS

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 81-263 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1981 I N R E T H E MARRIAGE O F MYRNA L. MARTENS, P e t i t i o n e r and Respondent, G E N E P. MARTENS, Respondent and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Nineteenth J u d i c i a l District, I n and f o r t h e County o f Lincoln, The Honorable Robert Holter, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Donald L. S h a f f e r , Libby, Montana For Respondent : David W. Harman, Libby, Montana Submitted on B r i e f s : September 3 , 1981 Decided: a & @ m F i l e d : DEG 1 0 1981 Clerk Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. T h i s is an a p p e a l by t h e husband, Gene P. Martens, from a m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y d i s t r i b u t i o n d e c r e e i s s u e d by t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Nineteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , County of L i n c o l n , on February 17, 1981, i n which t h e w i f e r e c e i v e d two-thirds of t h e e q u i t y i n t h e main m a r i t a l a s s e t , t h e r e s i d e n c e , and t h e husband r e c e i v e d o n e - t h i r d . e a f f i r m t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e c r e e . Myrna and Gene Martens were married f o r twenty-one y e a r s . Myrna Martens is t h i r t y - e i g h t y e a r s o l d and employed a s a m i l l worker. Gene Martens is t h i r t y - s e v e n y e a r s o l d and p r e s e n t l y unemployed. The one c h i l d of t h e m a r r i a g e h a s a t t a i n e d t h e age of m a j o r i t y . On August 28, 1980, Myrna Martens f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r d i s s o l u t i o n of m a r r i a g e . A t r i a l was h e l d on t h e i s s u e of p r o p e r t y d i s t r i b u t i o n on December 11, 1980. A l l of t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s e x c e p t f o r t h e r e s i d e n c e were d i s t r i b u t e d by t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n accordance w i t h agreements made by t h e p a r t i e s . With r e s p e c t t o t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e main m a r i t a l a s s e t , t h e r e s i d e n c e , t h e D i s t r i c t Court made t h e f o l l o w i n g f i n d i n g o f f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n of law: "That t h e m a r r i a g e is of approximately 21 y e a r s d u r a t i o n ; d u r i n g t h a t p e r i o d of time both P a r t i e s have worked and c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e f a m i l y w e l f a r e . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e P e t i t i o n e r h a s been t h e person r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e f a m i l y home. T h a t a t t h e p r e s e n t t i m e t h e w i f e has a l a r g e r income; however, s h e h a s s u c h l a r g e r income b e c a u s e t h e Respondent simply d o e s n o t wish t o work a t h i s p r e v i o u s employment. The w i f e wishes t o k e e p and m a i n t a i n t h e f a m i l y home a s a d w e l l i n g f o r h e r s e l f and it would appear t h a t t h i s is t h e most economical d i r e c t i o n i n which t o proceed. Wife does have a r e t i r e m e n t program w i t h her employer b u t t h e same t y p e of employment was a v a i l a b l e t o Respondent b e f o r e he q u i t . I n o r d e r f o r w i f e t o m a i n t a i n something approaching her p r e v i o u s l i f e s t y l e it is d e s i r a b l e t h a t s h e m a i n t a i n t h e f a m i l y home; on t h e o t h e r hand, Respondent h a s i n d i - c a t e d l i t t l e d e s i r a b i l i t y on h i s p a r t t o m a i n t a i n such s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g . " Finding of F a c t No. 5. " T h a t t h e e q u i t y i n t h e h o u s e , b e i n g $24,222.77, should be d i v i d e d 2/3 t o t h e P e t i t i o n e r and 1/3 t o t h e Respondent. I n t h e e v e n t t h a t t h e P e t i t i o n e r should s e l l s a i d h o u s e , r e m a r r y , and a n y way a s s i g n o r a l i e n a t e her i n t e r e s t t h e r e i n , w i t h i n f i v e y e a r s of t h i s d a t e , s h e s h a l l pay t o t h e Respondent $8,074.36 p l u s i n t e r e s t t h e r e o n a t t h e r a t e of 6% from t h i s d a t e t o such d a t e ; a t t h e end of f i v e y e a r s , and i n t h e e v e n t none of t h e f o r e g o i n g c o n d i t i o n s happen, t h e n t h e P e t i t i o n e r s h a l l pay t o t h e Respondent h i s f u l l v a l u e of e q u i t y s e t f o r t h , a f o r e - going, p l u s i n t e r e s t upon such amount from t h i s d a t e a t t h e r a t e of 6% per annum." Conclusion of Law No. 2. The husband a p p e a l s t h e unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e e q u i t y i n t h e house and p r e s e n t s t h r e e i s s u e s f o r review: 1. Whether t h e f i n d i n g of f a c t s made w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e e q u i t y i n t h e house conform t o t h e evidence p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l . 2. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court f a i l e d t o f o l l o w t h e m a n d a t o r y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA, and t h e r e b y abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n . 3. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d by awarding 6 % i n t e r e s t on t h e w i f e ' s payment of e q u i t y i n t h e house t o t h e husband. A p p e l l a n t was l a i d o f f work i n August 1980. A t t h a t time he went t o e a s t e r n Montana and o b t a i n e d a job working i n t h e o i l f i e l d s f o r about t h i r t y days. A p p e l l a n t t e s t i - f i e d a t t r i a l t h a t he h a s had problems w i t h h i s knee t h a t have hindered h i s a b i l i t y t o do p h y s i c a l work. A p p e l l a n t was r e c a l l e d t o h i s work a s a l i f t t r u c k d r i v e r a t a lumber m i l l i n S t . Regis b u t t e s t i f i e d t h a t he cannot r e t u r n t o this work because of knee problems. Based on the above evidence, the District Court found that appellant "simply does not wish to work at his previous employment." Appellant contends such a finding is rever- sible error since it is not supported by the record. Appellant raises this contention of error in order to contest the unequal distribution of the equity in the residence. The question here, then, is whether the District Court abused its discretion by distributing the equity in the residence unequally, in light of the undisputed testimony of the husband that his ability to do physical work has been hindered by knee problems and in light of the District Court finding that the husband simply does not wish to work. The criteria for reviewing the District Court's discretion is: "Did the district court in the exercise of its discretion act arbitrarily without employment of conscientious judgment, or exceed the bounds of reason in view of all circumstances." Owen v. Owen (1980), Mont. In exercising its discretion to distribute the marital property equitably, the District Court has the duty to consider the following factors: the duration of the marriage; the age, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, and estate of the parties; and the liabilities and needs of the parties. Section 40-4- 202, MCA; In Re Marriage of Aanenson (1979), - Mont. - I 598 P.2d 1120, 1123, 36 St.Rep. 1525; Owen, 609 P.2d at 294. The appellant contends that under Vert v. Vert (1980) I Mont . , 613 P.2d 1020, 37 St.Rep. 1282, the District Court must conform its findings of facts to the evidence. According to the appellant, the District Court made no attempt to conform its findings of facts to the evidence presented and thereby abused its discretion. Appellant's contention is not supported by the record. The finding that the appellant simply does not wish to work conforms to the record in that appellant did receive a recall notice to return to his work at the mill. The District Court did not believe that the appellant's knee problems were so great that he could not work. The record supports the findings by the District Court that the wife has been the person responsible for the family home. She was solely responsible for the payments on the home after the husband left for eastern Montana and made all of the house payments from August 1980 to the time of trial in December 1980. The wife testified at trial that she wishes to keep and maintain the family home. The record does not reflect such a desire on the part of the appellant. The finding by the District Court that appellant did not wish to work does not indicate that the District Court arbitrarily or inequitably awarded an unequal distribution of the equity in the house, since the finding has little, if any, importance in determining how the equity in the residence should be distributed. The distribution of the equity in the house was based on the wife's acceptance of responsibility for it in the months prior to trial, her ability to continue this responsibility, and her desire to continue to do so when the husband did not express such a desire. In light of these considerations, we cannot say that the District Court abused its discretion by dividing t h e e q u i t y i n t h e house unequally. Ivloreover, w e have noted i n a number of c a s e s t h a t mere unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n of m a r i t a l a s s e t s does n o t s u g g e s t t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused its d i s c r e t i o n by f a i l i n g t o a p p l y p r o p e r l y t h e f a c t o r s of s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA. I n Owen, s u p r a , w e noted: '"Although t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t may -- e q u a l l y ---- d i v i d e t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s , such a d i s t r i b u - t i o n is n o t mandated by s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA . . . S e c t i o n 40-4-202 is f l e x i b l e and it v e s t s a good d e a l o f d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court . . . W e have s t a t e d , b e f o r e and a f t e r t h e a d o p t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e , t h a t each c a s e must be looked a t i n d i v i d u a l l y , w i t h an eye t o its unique c i r c u m s t a n c e s . . . ( C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d . ) I n Re Marriage of Aanenson ( 1 9 7 9 ) , - Mont . , 598 P.2d 1120, 1123, 36 St.Rep. 1525." 609 P.2d a t 294. I n l i g h t o f t h e s u b s t a n t i a l evidence s u p p o r t i n g t h e unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e e q u i t y i n t h e r e s i d e n c e , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d i s t r i b u t i o n must s t a n d . The a p p e l l a n t contends n e x t t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d by allowing t h e w i f e t o pay 6% i n t e r e s t on her payments t o him f o r h i s s h a r e of t h e e q u i t y i n t h e house. The a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t s e c t i o n 25-9-205, MCA, p r o v i d e s t h a t i n t e r e s t on a judgment is payable a t 10% p e r annum and t h a t Williams v. Budke ( 1 9 8 0 ) , - Mont. , 606 P.2d 515, 37 St.Rep. 228, allowed t h e 1 0 % r a t e where t h e d e c r e e was s i l e n t on i n t e r e s t . Although s e c t i o n 25-9-205, MCA, h a s been a p p l i e d t o judgments a r i s i n g o u t of a m a r i t a l d i s s o l u t i o n d e c r e e , t h i s s e c t i o n h a s been a p p l i e d o n l y when t h e d e c r e e is s i l e n t a s t o i n t e r e s t . Here t h e d e c r e e is n o t s i l e n t a s t o i n t e r e s t . I n Williams, w e acknowledged t h a t c e r t a i n c a s e s may a r i s e where it is equitable and within its discretion for the District Court to expressly allow - no interest on installment payments. Clearly, Williams did not stand for the proposition that a 10% interest rate must be paid on all marital dissolution judgments. Where it is equitable for the District Court to award a lower rate, it is within the discretionary power to do so. Here, it cannot be said that the District Court abused its discretion by setting the interest rate at 6% per annum. The wife has made a request for attorney fees under Rule 32, M.R.App.Civ.P., claiming the appeal here was frivolous. Where there is a reasonable ground for appeal, a respondent is not entitled to recover damages under Rule 32, M.R.App.Civ.P. Erdman v. C & C Sales, Inc. (1978), 176 Mont. 177, 577 P.2d 55, 59. Here the question of the District Court's abuse of discretion was reasonably in issue and the respondent's request for attorney fees on appeal must be denied. Having found no abuse of discretion, the property ,5 distribution decree of the District ~ $ u ' r t is af firmed. l, / 1r;./yt4 Justice We concur: