Title: Matter of a Member of the Bar: Sisk

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

In the Matter of a Member §
ofthe Bar of the Supreme Court.  § No. 346, 2012,
of the State of Delaware: §
§
MARK D. SISK, § Board Case No. 2011-0163-B
§ Board Case No. 2011-0164-B
Respondent. § Board Case No. 2011-0165-B
§ — Board Case No. 201 1-0443-B

Submitted: September 5, 2012
Decided: September 25, 2012

Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices.
ORDER

This 25" day of September 2012, it appears to the Court that the
Board on Professional Responsibility has filed a Report on this matter
pursuant to Rule 9(4) of The Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Disciplinary
Procedure. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) filed objections to
the Board's Report, and counsel for Respondent has responded to those
objections. The Court has reviewed the matter pursuant to Rule 9(e) of The
Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Disciplinary Procedure and approves the
Board's Report as to the violations by Respondent but disagrees with the

sanctions recommended therein.
‘NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Report filed by the
Board on Professional Responsibility on June 26, 2012 (copy attached) is
hereby APPROVED as to its findings of violations by Respondent, with the
Court concluding that Respondent's violations were knowing and, while
mitigating factors of personal illness, the death of a parent, and the
dissolution of his law firm were considered, the appropriate sanction is
suspension.

ITIS FURTHER ORDERED that:

1) The Respondent shall be prohibited and suspended from engaging
in the practice of law for a period of six months and one day and receive a
public reprimand;

2) During the suspension, the Respondent shall conduct no act directly
or indirectly constituting the practice of law, including the sharing or receipt,
of any legal fees. The Respondent shall also be prohibited from having any
contact with clients or prospective clients or witnesses or prospective
witnesses when acting as a paralegal, legal assistant, or law clerk under the
supervision of a member of the Delaware Bar, or otherwise;

3) The contents of the Board’s report shall be made public:

4) The Respondent shall fully cooperate with the ODC in its efforts to

monitor his compliance with this Order;
5) This Order shall be disseminated by the ODC in accordance with
Rule 14 of the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Disciplinary Procedure;

6) The ODC is directed to file within ten days of the date of this Order
the costs of the disciplinary proceedings. Thereafter, the Respondent is
directed to have all costs paid within thirty days.

‘The matter is hereby CLOSED.

BY THE COURT:

(s/ Carolyn Berger
Justice
ATTACHMENT
   

EFiled: Jun 26 2012 10:19/
Filing ID 45010441
Caso Number 346,2012
BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

 

In the Matter of )
Member of the Bar of the ) CONFIDENTIAL
Supreme Court of Delaware )
)
MARK D. SISK ) Board Case No. 2011-0163-8
Respondent. ) Board Case No. 2011-0164-8
) Board Case No. 2001-0165.
) Board Case No. 2011-0443-B
REPORT OF THE BOARD ON
PETITION FOR DISCIPLINE

This isthe report on proceedings instituted by a Petition for Discipline fled on
January 6, 2012 (the “Petiton’) by the Office of Discipinary Counsel (ODC"). The
ODE seeks sanctions against Mark D. Sisk (‘Sisk or "Respondent" in four aferent
matters. A hearing was held on Apri 19, 2012 in the Supreme Court Hearing Room,
11” Floor, Carvel State Building, 820 North French Street, Wilmington, Delaware (‘the
Hearing”). The members ofthe pane! for the Board were D. Benjamin Snyder, Esquie,
Mr, John Stafford and Wayne J. Carey, Esquire as Chair (the “Panet), Frederick W.
lobst, Esquire and Joelle E. Polesky, Esquire represented the ODC. Respondent was
represented by Charles Slanina, Esquie.
1. The Claims Against Respondent’

Sisk was admitted to the Bar of the Supreme Court of Delaware in 1979. (AA§/1;
Tr. 87). Duting the period covered by the Petition, Sisk wes engaged in the private
practice of law, and he was affiliated with two fms, most recently Curran & Sisk in
Newark, Delaware. (AAG 2).

Tee bee Suse aa een ean tate ane ee One ty de

 

 
 

During part ofthe relevant period, Respondent suffered some personal problems.
{In March 2010, he underwent surgery for cancer (Tr. 97), taking several months to
‘recover to the point of being able to handle a full workload (Tr. 98). In August 2010, his.
law firm broke up due to @ dispute between his two partners, causing Sisk added and
severe stress (Tr. 96). Last, in February 2011, his father collapsed and died the
following month, leaving Sisk with the grief of that loss and the responsibility of caring
for his mother (Tr. 98).

The Petition alleges “18 violations of ten different rules of professional conduct.”
an?

‘A. Board Case No, 2011-1064.8 (Deborah A, Brennan)
a. Facts

(On August 10, 2010, Deborah A. Brennan retained Sisk to file child custody and
hid support petitons (Tr. 16, 99). Ms. Brennan paid Sisk a retainer of $1500 at the
time of his being hired. (AAG 3: Tr. 16, 9; JX Tab 5%). At that time, Sisk informed Ms,
Brennan that it would take six to eight weeks for the Family Court to schedule an initial
‘meeting on the petitions after they were filed. (AA{]4; Tr. 18, 99).

‘About six weeks went by with Ms. Brennan recelving no status report from
Respondent. So, on September 21, 2010, she called him, seeking confirmation that the
petitions had been filed (Tr. 18, $8). During that phone call, without checking his fle,
but believing that the filing had occurred. Sisk confirmed that the petitions had indeed
been filed (AAS, Tr. 99). Honever, despite this unqualified assurance, the truth was
atone wets rangle ot 19 Hang

* Caton Jan we ow son Eos Sok noms a he Ape 19 Hag, fren oR ao etna
(Soyer et rein Stans

 

 

 

 
 

that the petitions had not been filed (AA {[6; Tr. 100). When Respondent checked his
file in December 2010, he realized the petitions had not been filed (Tr. 123)
Nevertheless, he neglected to notify Ms. Brennan thatthe fling had not been made (AA
V7: Tr. 100)

(On or about January 4, 2011, Ms. Brennan called Sisk and faxed him a letter
terminating his representation because she had not received any copies of any petitions
‘and because a group legal plan through her employer had become avaliable (Tr. 20,
101; JX Tab 6). Sisk left Ms. Brennan a voicemail message informing her for the first
time that he had not filed the petitions, offering his

 

spologies. (AA $10, Tr. 123)
Respondent testified that he gave the retainer check from Brennan to the firm's
bookkeeper (Tr. 120). The retainer was deposited in the escrow account of the firm of
Conaty Curran & Sisk, Respondent's firm at that time (CC&S") (Tr. 100). One-haif of
the retainer was later taken erroneously as an eamed fee.* However, when
Respondent was terminated, he offered to refund Ms. Brennan's full retainer, paying the
$750 taken out of the retainer from his own personal funds so Ms. Brennan would not
hhave to wait for settlement of the receivership that CCS had been put into. (AA $8; Tr.
122), Because of that receivership, Sisk stil has not been reimbursed (Tr. 122)
Petitions were eventually fled on Ms, Brennan's behalf by new counsel in March
2011 (Tr. 25). Ms, Brennan claims she was damaged because had her petition for child
support been filed in September 2010, when she first retained Sisk, she would have
bbeen eligible for support from that fing date (Tr. 24-25). Sisk disputes this, arguing that
“ine ec i aca cn how Bs hgpene gen Bt ro wrk haben doen Ms. rman cee, Sk estes al wat

‘ante gu eames buon spon o the bis soreg secon sath he prea el easy Brno
sees for tos sot

 
‘this was an original petition for child support, she would be entitled to support from the
date of separation with her husband (Tr. 144),

‘At the time she terminated Sisk, Ms. Brennan requested an accounting of any
funds from the retainer that he planned to keep (JX Tab 6; Tr. 101). She followed up
with an email on February 18, 2011 (JX Tab 7). No such accounting was provided (AA
119); however, as noted, a full refund of the retainer was eventually tendered back to Ms,
Brennan, which Ms. Brennan considered to be an accounting (Tr. 23, 27; JX Tab 9)°

Sisk wrote to the ODC on April 6, 2011, in response to its inquiry of March 16,
2011 (JX Tab 8). In his respons

 

‘Sisk explained that, prior to December 2010, he
‘genuinely believed that he had filed the child support petition. He clarified that the delay
in returning her retainer was, at least in part, explained by the fact that his firm was in
‘dissolution and the funds were “in the hands of a third party arbitrator” (Tr. 122). White
Noting his apology to Ms. Brennan, despite the dissolution of his firm, Sisk took full
responsibilty for any delay caused Ms. Brennan and his failure to fle the petition in
Family Court (Tr. 123).
. Counts of the Petition

‘The Petition asserts eight counts against Sisk in the Brennan matter. Counts LIV
and Vill relate to Sisk’s failure to fle the custody and child support petitions and related
representations.

Count | asserts that Sisk failed to provide competent representation in violation of
Rule 1.1 which states an attomey “shall provide competent representation to a cient.

as roan ae have mae ol mais Rte tia wa ly ued. 29,

 

 
 

Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”

Count I alleges violation of Rule 1.2(a) requiring an attomey to abide by
decisions of the client by failing to file the custody and support petitions as requested by
{he client. Count Il states that Sisk violated Rule 1.3 by failing to act with reasonable
dliigence in failing to file the custody and child support petitions. Count IV claims that
Respondent violated Rule 1.4(a)(3) by failing to inform the client that he had not fied the
{custody and child support petitions and by informing her that he had made the requisite
filings when he had not done so. Finally, Count Vill accuses Sisk of violating Rule
8.4(c) when he engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
mmisrepresentation when he advised Ms. Brennan that he had filed the custody and child
‘support petitions when he had not.

Counts V-ViI relate to the handling of the $1500 retainer. Count V asserts that
Sisk violated Rule 1.5(f) by failing to provide Ms. Brennan a written statement of fees
eamed. Counts VI and Vil claim that Sisk violated Rule 1.15(b) and Rule 1.16(d) by
{ailing to deliver a refund of the retainer promptly when requested. Sisk claims that he
offered and made a full refund but that the process took 2 % months because the fim
was in receivership (AA 9124),

Respondent admits Counts I-1V, Vil and Vill. He denies Counts V and VI. (AA
‘W114, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26 and 28; Tr. 104-108).

 
5. Board Case No. id
a. Facts

David P. Higley retained Sisk in November of 2004 to represent him in
‘connection with division of property in a divorce proceeding between Mr. Higley and
Jeanne Higley. (AA $29; Tr. 108). A Stipulation of Settlement was approved by the
Family Court in June of 2006 that required the preparation of two Qualified Domestic
Relations Orders ("QDRO’) in order to divide Jeanne Higley’s two retirement accounts.
(AA 920; Tr. 106)

‘The first QORO was completed on or about March 18, 2008. (AA{31). The
problem arose withthe second QDRO, which Sik admits took more than five years to
complete, However, according to Sisk, “the second QDRO passed through a complex
series of events and thatthe delay in completion ofthe second QDRO] was in part the
‘result of Mr. Higley’ ex-wife moving the funds without notice to cent or counsel” (NA
81).

Me, Higley’s complaint seems to be based on poor communications from Sisk
about the status of the second QDRO and delay in its preparation and completion.” The
(00C led Mr. Higley through numerous witen communications to Sisk seeking status
information, most of which were not responded to (Tr. 36-61; JX Tabs 10-38)

Over the five-year period, Mr. Higley complained, Sisk failed to keep him
informed about the status of the second QORO and failed to timely respond to his

secre le en of pay dre pects craon et Ras

 

6

 

 
 

Inquites. (Petition $31)" For example, on January 17, 2010, a Sunday, Mr. Higley was
served at his home in Delaware with a rule to show cause fled by his ex-wife to show
Wwiny he should not be held in contempt for fang to comply with a November 2000
‘Stipulation regarding an obigation to pay attomeys' fees (Tr. 45; JX Tab 20), Mr. Higley
claimed that he not only never saw the stipulation, but he also never agreed to pay
attomeys' fees. To molify Mr. Higley, Sisk paid the attorneys’ fees of $1250.00 (AA
182) and the rule was dismissed (Tr. 64)

‘On June 15, 2011, Sisk recommended fling a rule to show cause against Joanne
Higley on the grounds that she delayed in providing calculations to sete the amount of
the second QDRO, which fling Mr. Higley approved (Tr. 64; 107), On July 11, 2011,
Mr. Higley sent Sisk an email requesting a copy ofthe rule filed against Jeanne Higley
(7. 108). However, Sisk never made any such fling. (AA 33; Tr. 106). On
September 27, 2011, Mr. Higley authorized Sisk to settle the second QDRO for “a sum
specific” (AA 135). Given the intent to try to sete the amount of the second QDRO,
Sisk testified that he feta rule fled against Ms. Higley would be “counterproductve” (Tr,
129; 141), Sisk also testified that he and Mr, Higley had a conversation during which he
‘explained to Mr. Higley whyy he did not fle the rule (Tr. 143).

‘On October 5, 2011, and hoping the settlement offer had been conveyed, Mr.
Higley requested that Sisk provide him a status report. (AA $36; Tr 108). When no
immediate response was forthcoming, Mr. Higley, on October 7, 2041 sent Sisk an
email urging him to “avoid further delay’. (AA $37). Sisk did not, in fact, convey the

settlement offer to opposing counsel until after the ODC called Sisk on October 14,

Sh we thd ope ial ge nae (187

7

 

 
2011, admonishing him to do so. (AA $38; Tr. 109, 111). The second QDRO was
‘evidently finaly completed and sent to Morgan Stanley, the account holder of Jeanne
Higley's retirement account on or about March 23, 2012.

‘The amount of the IRA to be distributed to Mr. Higley was finally resolved in late
October of 2011 whereby Mr, Higley is to receive $45,600. That amount was fixed as of
that time with Mr. Higley receiving no interest until the amount is formally tendered to
him to an account he holds at Schwab (Tr. 61, 71, 73)

Sisk offered numerous apologies to Mr. Higley for the delays and lack of attention
to his affairs (Tr. 64). He even stopped charging fees to Mr. Higley for at least the last
‘wo years (Tr. 64). Sisk initially explained the delay as being caused by a heavy tral
‘schedule, a personal bout of kidney cancer, which took Mr. Sisk out of work for several
‘months, and the loss of a parent. (Tr. 64 JX Tab 26),

Not all ofthe delay can be laid at Sisk’s door. Some of the delay was caused by
Mr. Higley’s ex-wife, who had the IRA that was the subject of the second QDRO in a
‘Vanguard account at the time of the divorce (Tr. 35, 68, 127-128). At some point, as
(Mr. Sisk, himself discovered, Mr. Higley’s exwife moved the IRA from Vanguard to
‘Morgan Stanley without Mr. Sisk’s or Mr. Higley's knowledge or consent (Tr. 36, 41, 67).
‘This transfer of funds complicated the settlement process because it was believed that
the Vanguard funds had been “hopelessly commingled with the other money Mr
Higley's ex-wife had at Morgan Stanley’ (Tr. 41; 127-128). In addition, in response to
‘questioning from the Panel, Sisk explained difficuties apparently inherent with Morgan
‘Stanley accounts (Tr. 145-146).

 
 

'b. Counts of the Petition

The Higley matter takes up Counts IX-XIll. Count IX alleges Sisk violated Rule
1.1 by failing to provide competent legal representation by not completing the second
QDRO during a five-year period. Count X asserts that Respondent violated Rule 1.2(a)
by failing to abide by his client's decisions when he did not complete the second QDRO
timely, failing to file the rule to show cause against his client's ex-wife and failing to
convey his client's settlement offer for more than two weeks. Count XI claims that Sisk
Violated Rule 1.3 when he failed to act with reasonable diigence and prompiness by
failing to respond to Mr. Higley's inquiries, by failing to complete the second QDRO and
by failing to convey his client's settlement offer for more than two weeks. Count Xil
charges Sisk violated Rule 1.4(a)(3) for falling to keep his client reasonably informed,
Generally over the years and specifically for failing to advise Mr. Higley about the
November 2009 stipulation. Sisk admits that he generally did not keep Mr. Higley
easonably informed. (AA $47). Finally, Count Xill asserts that Sisk violated Rule
1.4(a) (4) by falling to respond promptly to his client's requests for information about the
‘second QDRO.

‘Sisk admits Counts (IX, XI, XII and Xill) (Tr. 109-110). He admits in part and
denies in part Count X. (AA T41, 43, 44, 47 and 49)

©, Board Case No, 2011-0443-8 (Margaret Lindsey)
a. Facts
Margaret Lindsey retained Sisk in or around March 2011 to handle the settlement

‘of a condominium she and her mother were planning to purchase together (TR. 76; Tr.

 

 

_ __|
111) There apparently is @ dispute about the scope of Sisk’s representation. Ms.
Lindsey claims that she and her mother were looking for advice as to how to tile the
‘condominium. She claims she inquired, but Sisk, “Never explained to Ms. Lindsey the
<ifferent ways in which she and her mother could jointly own the condominium and the
legal implications of the different forms of ownership." (Petition $51). Sisk denies that
his representation was to be anything other than to perform the settlement and not to
‘give estate planning advice. (AA $1). Ms. Lindsey conceded at the Hearing that Sisk
‘was not hired to provide any estate planning advice (Tr. 92).

Ms. Lindsey wanted the condominium ttle in her mother's name even though
both she and her mother would live in the unit (Tr. 77). The son of the condominium's
‘seller purportedly advised Sisk of Ms. Lindsey's desire (JX Tab 39). Through his own
due dilgence, Sisk discovered, however, that the condominium had to be titled in the
name of anyone occupying it (Tr. 78, 113-114). Therefore, tiling the condominium
solely in the name of Ms. Lindsey's mother would not work if both Ms. Lindsey and her
‘mother were both to occupy that condominium.

‘The original settlement on the condominium was scheduled in Sisk’s office for
May 5, 2011. Ms. Lindsey arrived at the appointed time only to find Sisk was not there,
ot having the settlement on his calendar due to a scheduling error for which he
apologized profusely. (AA 152: Tr. 78-79; 01, 114-116).

‘The settlement was rescheduled for May 12, 2011. However, because of the
‘problem with the settlement documents complying with the condominium regulations,
‘Sisk needed more time to research the tite issue and see if something could be worked

5 Te Paton ates resets occur ty 2011 (Paton YS). Hower, haces wh te err setaran
toys, Rt be ages ie Peon Peter

 

 

 
out. (AA $53; Tr. 80). Therefore, the settlement was postponed again. The
condominium council was not willing to waive the requirement that the property be titled
in the name of all who were to occupy the condominium (Tr. 90). So Ms. Lindsey
directed Sisk to settle the matter and proceed to settlement (Tr. 91), In Sisk’s view, the
best way to settle was to prepare the deed with both Ms. Lindsey and her mother being
listed as joint owners (Tr, 150).

Ms. Lindsey sent Sisk hand written faxes asking about alternatives to the tite
issue (UX Tabs 41, 42). According the Ms. Lindsey, Sisk never responded to those
inquiries (Tr. 83)

‘The settlement finally did occur on May 25, 2011 (Tr. 80). Ms. Lindsey and her
mother ultimately agreed to have both of their names on the deed, with @ preference
that Ms. Lindsey's ownership percentage be quite small if possible (Tr. 81; 82). Sisk
testified that he believed the condominium council would have viewed such an

arrangement

 

‘an end-run around the condominium document requirements and they
would not have received the sanction ofthe counci for such ting (Tr. 149)."°

There was subsequenty some delay in recording the original deed with Ms
Lindsey making several calls to Sisk’s office to inquire about the status ofthat fling
(Petition 1957-58). Itwas not until September 2011 that she got @ copy ofthe recorded
eed that had been recorded in August, three months after the settlement (Tr. 86). Sisk
explained the delay in completing the recording as being caused by delay in obtaining
an original of the power of attomey needed for the sellers son to sign the deed

Seppe aea me aay ereemeramene ce everett men
SSE ce era aaa
SS SS
Bee

 

 
conveying the property on her behalf (Tr. 130). The ODC offers no rebuttal to that
testimony.

Ms. Lindsey filed her complaint with the ODC on July 25, 2011. Despite her
‘apparent dissatisfaction with Mr. Sisk’s services, Ms. Lindsey did say in a handwritten
fax to Sisk, “Thank you for working 50 hard to get the 2210 Independence Way
purchase set up the way we want (JX Tab 42; Tr. 91).

. Counts of the Petition

‘Counts XIV-XVII of the Pettion apply to the Lindsey matter. Count XIV alleges
failure to provide competent representation as required by Rule 1.1 by not explaining
the different forms of joint ownership and their egal implications and by not appearing at
the originally scheduled settlement, Count XV charges Sisk with violating Rule 1.3 for
falling to exercise reasonable diligence and prompiness for not responding to Ms.
Lindsey's inquiries both before and after settlement, for not eppearing at the originally
scheduled settlement and for not timely recording the deed on Ms. Lindsey's
condominium. Count XVI asserts violation of Rule 1.4(@)(3) for failing to Keep his client
reasonably informed by not discussing the different forms of joint ownership and their
legal implications and by not responding to Ms. Lindsey's pre and post settioment
inguiries, Finally, Count XVII claims Respondent violated Rule 1.4(a)4) by faling to
comply with requests for information when he did net explain the diferent forms of joint
‘ownership and their legal implications and by not responding to Ms. Lindsey's pre and
post settlement inquiries.

Sisk denies all of the allegations against him in the Lindsey matter (AA (N61, 63,
65 and 67).

 

 
D. Board Case No. 2011-0163-8 (Carla Schurga)
a. Facts

In August 2010, Carla Schurga retained Sisk to represent her son, Roman, in
connection with criminal proceedings. (AA $68; Tr. 117). Ms. Schurga complained to
the ODC that during his sixmonth representation of her son, Sisk's communications:
with both her and her son were infrequent. Ms. Schurga further alleged that Sisk was,
‘unprepared for scheduled case reviews relating to her son's case. According the Ms.
‘Schurga, after Roman was sentenced in February 2011, Sisk stopped communication
altogether with her and her son and delayed for over a month in sending a copy of the.
Sentencing order. (Petition $69).

In response to Mr. Sisk’s alleged lack of communication with the Schurgas, Ms,
‘Schurga fled a complaint with the ODC. The ODC forwarded the complaint to Sisk and
Tequested a response by May 13, 2011. (Petition $70). The ODC followed up in writing
‘both on May 25, 2011 and again on June 24, 2011 requesting Sisk’s response, (JX
Tabs 48, 49).

b. Count of the Petition

‘The thrust of the allegation against Sisk in the Schurga matter is that he failed to
‘cooperate with the ODC in its investigation. (Petition {175). Specifically, Count XVII,
the last count of the Petition, asserts Sisk violated Rule 8.1(b) by failing to respond to
inquires from the ODC regarding the Schurga matter. Apparently, the ODC gave Sisk
‘several extensions of time. Yet he took ‘almost eight months after the response was.

ve, even receiving the extensions of time,” before submitting his response (Tr. 118).

B

 
 

‘Sisk blamed part of the delay on IT problems at his fim and having to respond to the
(ODC on other matters (Tr. 132)

UL. STAN F
Allegations of professional misconduct must be established by the ODC by clear
‘and convincing evidence." That burden is satisfied as to Counts I, I ll, IV, VI, Vl, IX,

X in part, XI, Xi, and XIll, which are admitted. As to the remaining counts, we must
‘make our own findings as to whether the ODC met its burden of proof by clear and
convincing evidence.
Ml, FINDINGS OF THE BOARD

‘The Board is guided and bound by the precedents of the Delaware Supreme
Court and the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("ABA Standard or ABA
Standards’)?

A 4-4 ny

‘As noted, Respondent admits violations of Counts IV, Vil and Vill. Therefore,
{8 to the Brennan matter, we are required to address only Counts V and VI

‘Count V alleges that Sisk violated Rule 1.5(0) requiring that an attomey shall give
4 statement of account for fees eamed whenever funds advanced are transferred from

4 trust account to an operating account Paragraph 22 of the Petition alleges that this

 

rule was Violated when Sisk “aed to provide Ms. Brennan a wtten statement of the
fees eamed at the time he deposited the retainer. Given the factual record, this
allegation lacks foundation. The record indicates that the retainer was deposited
ciginaly into CC8S's trust account and not ino the operating account. Therefore, no

by Mater of Tox 375 20507. 1900 nana Loner eo Dn Posture COLRFOPY 15)
wags 682 A288 (ot TO

“

 
fees were claimed to have been eamed at the time the retainer was deposited. Given
that handing ofthe $1500 was consistent with Rule 1.5(), i cannot be said that Sisk
Violated that rua

The only time Rule 1.6(f) may have been violated was when the S750 was
transferred out of the CBS trust account and into the CCS operating accounting.
Sisk insets, and the ODC does not contradict, that he knew nothing about such a
transection (Tr. 120). Accordingly, to hold Sisk personally responsible for that
withdrawal would be unfair. If anyone is responsible, itis CC&S oF its receivership.
However, nether C&S, nor its receivership isa party to this action

‘Count Vi states that Rule 1.15(b) requires that an “attomey shall promplly deliver
{to the client [any] funds or other property that the client [is] entitled to receive and, upon
‘request by the cient] shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.”
(Petition $23). Count VI alleges violation of this rule because Respondent failed to “(1)
Bromptly refund Ms, Brennan the ful amount of her retainer, and (2) provide a full
‘accounting of her retainer” (Petition $724).

Not only is this allegation contrary to the recor, it counteintutive. Fist, the
record is undisputed that Sisk not only refunded the entre retainer of $1500, but he
Used $750 of his personal funds to reimburse Ms. Brennan so that she would not have
to avait the outcome of the CC8S receivership. Instead, Sisk undertook the burden of
awaling the outcome of the CC8S receivership himself and stil awaits reimbursement.

Second, it makes no sense to say that there should be an accounting of a
retainer that is refunded in ful. Full reimbursement isin ise an accounting, full and
complete. Ms. Brennan, herself, admitted the reimbursement was equivalent to an

1s

 
account (Tr. 23, 27). The length of time that it took to complete the refund ideally
‘should have been shorter. However, given that the CC&S trust account from which the
refund was made was in receivership, the delay is understandable,

8. se 1-01

‘As noted, this matter encompasses Counts IX.Xill. Sisk admits violations of
Counts IX and XI-XIIl so we need not address those counts. As to Count X, Sisk admits
it in part and denies itn part.

Count X alleges violation of Rule 1.2(a), which requires an attomey to “abide by a
Client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation’. (Petition $42). More
‘specifically, the Petition states that Rule 1.2(a) was violated () when it took five (5)
years to finish the second QDRO, (i) by failing to convey his client's settlement offer for

‘more than two weeks to

 

‘wife's counsel, and (ji) by not filing the rule to show
cause against his ex-wife (Petition $43). Sisk admits the violation with respect to the
five (6) year delay in completing the QDRO but not in conveying the settlement offer oF
‘ot fling the rule to show cause.

The record indicates that on September 27, 2011, Mr. Higley authorized that the
Settlement offer be conveyed. Mr. Higley followed up on October 5, 2011 and again two
{days later on October 7, 2011, asking Sisk for a status report on the settlement offer. It
was not until October 14, 2011, when the ODC called Sisk admonishing him to extend,
the settlement offer that Sisk did so, eighteen (18) days after being authorized. Given
these facts, we find the ODC has met is burden of showing by clear and convincing
‘evidence that Sisk violated Rule 1.2(a) in delaying to communicate the seitlement offer,

Settlement offers should be communicated prompty after authorization, absent extreme

6

 

 
exigent circumstances not present here. An eighteen (18) day delay does not satisfy
that requirement.

‘As to not fling the rule to show cause against Mr. Higley’s ex-wife, we find no
Violation of Rule 1.2(a). Sisk testified that when he was advised that Mr. Higley and his
excuife were going to discuss setting the second QDRO, he, Sisk, felt that fling a rule
‘would only have a negative effect on the settioment process. In Sisk’s words, such a
filing would be “counterproductive” (Tr, 129).

We agree with Respondent's approach. His decision not to file the rule against
Higley ex-wife was in Higley's best inerest. Moreover, Sisk testified that he discussed
this decision with his client (Tr. 129)."? Accordingly, we find no violation of Rule 1.2(a)
‘wth respect to not filing the rule to show cause.

Board Case No, 2011.0443-8 (Margaret Lindsey}

‘The Lindsey matter involves Counts XIV.XVII, all of which Sisk denies. Count
XIV alleges violation of Rule 1.1, fling to provide competent representation to a cent
through legal knowledge, ski, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for
the representation, by (1) fang to explain to Ms. Lindsey the various forms of jint
‘ownership available and their legal implications and (2) not appearing atthe orginally
scheduled settlement. Rule 1.1, atleast as we read it and cases interpreting that le,
does not apply to either ofthe alleged actions. To the contrary, Rule 1.1 has application
where a lawyer falls to perform the functions for which a lawyer is normally retained,

land the corollaries thereto, with skil, thoroughness and reasonably necessary

ab, Me Go neoprene Mey ant set ane fa Hasan 63

”

 

 
 

preparation."* Not taking time to explain various forms of ownership available and their
legal implications or failing to attend a settlement are not encompassed under the
rubries of Rule 1.1. Accordingly, Sisk cannot be said to have violated Rule 1.1 as to Ms.
Lindsey and as alleged in Count XIV.

This conclusion is further supported by the fact that Sisk was not retained to give
estate planning advice, which Ms. Lindsey conceded (Tr. 92). Sisk was retained by Ms.
Lindsey and her mother to take the condominium purchase to settlement. And he did
just that—representation for which Ms. Lindsey was appreciative when she said, “Thank
you for working so hard to get the 2210 Independence Way purchase set up the way we
want’, (Tr. 91; JX Tab 42)

Count XV asserts violation of Rule 1.3, requiring an attomey “act with reasonable
iligence and promptness in representing a client”, when Sisk (1) falled to “respond to
Ms. Lindsey's inquiries both before and after the settlement’, (2) failed to appear at the:
‘original settiement and (3) failed to timely record the deed on the condominium
purchased by Ms. Lindsey and her mother. Rule 1.3 seems to be applicable in
situations where the attomey is required to act or perform legal services on behalf of the
client. In such cases, the attorney must do so with “reasonable diigence and
prompiness”. Examples would be (1) failure to fle a child support petition which Sisk

 

‘admits in the Brennan matter; (2) missing a statute of imitations; (3) failure to comply

with Court requests or orders:"* or (3) failing to advise clients about a fling deadine

* n,n Ma’ f Tax 578A. 2 607 (On, 198 a1 cry th Cou le Ca ce vt 1, bt
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"Grane! ax TOA 24007 a 990)

 

18

 
 

 

‘such that client was subject to sanctions." Falling to respond to client inquiries or not
‘appearing at the originally scheduled settlement due to a scheduling error are not within
the language of Rule 1.3. Accordingly, Sisk did not violate Rule 1.3 when he did not
respond to Ms. Lindsey's inquiries or when he failed to appear at the settlement.

Not recording the deed promptly is another matter. ifthe record showed by clear
‘and convincing evidence that it was Sisk's procrastination that caused the delay in
Fecording the deed, we would have to find a violation." However, we are not
Persuaded that Sisk violated Rule 1.3 with respect to the delay in recording the deed,
Sisk testified that he was faced with the choice of preparing the deed in compliance with
the condominium council requirements or not settle on the purchase. His client advised
to settle so Sisk went forward by putting both Ms. Lindsey and her mother on the deed
‘asjoint owners. It seems to us that on this issue, Sisk acted in what he thought was the
best interests of his cient and not in violation of Rule 1.3,

‘Sisk testified that the delay in recording the deed was occasioned by the delay in

ot

 

ing the original of the power of attorney authorizing the seller's son to sign the
deed conveying the condominium on behalf of his elderly mother. As Sisk explained,
the Recorder of Deeds will not accept a deed signed under authority of the power of

 

attorney without the original power of attorney being presented (Tr. 130). Given thi
requirement, the ODC did not meet its burden of proving @ violation by clear and

‘convincing evidence,"

Tape 7A Bon TO
inocu coc m do ot cnn te cag dnd ca ne oper marten eu
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19

 
Count XVI claims violation of Rule 1.4(@)(3), requiring that clients be kept
reasonably informed about the status of a matter, when Sisk (1) failed to “respond to
(Ms. Lindsey's inquiries both before and after the settlement” and (2) failed to explain to
(Ms. Lindsey the various forms of joint ownership available and their legal implications,
Rule 1.4(a) (3) does not have application to failing to respond to client inquiries or the
failure to explain tite alternatives.” The clear language of the Rule is a focus on
keeping a client informed about a matters status. There is no clear and convincing
evidence that Sisk did not do this,

Finally, Count XVII charges Mr. Sisk with violating Rule 1.4(a)(4), requiring
‘Prompt compliance with requests for information, when he (1) failed to “respond to Ms,
Lindsey's inquiries both before and after the settlement” and (2) failed to explain to Ms,
Lindsey the various forms of joint ownership available and their legal implications, Rule
1.4(a) (4) is the rule applicable to Sisk’ failure to respond to his clients inquitles. This
is apparent from the very wording of the Rule. Perhaps nothing can be more annoying
to a chent than an unresponsive lawyer. Sisk has been practicing long enough to know
better. We find he did violate Rule 1.4(a) (4) by

 

ling to respond to Ms. Lindsey's
‘inquires and by fling to explain the various forms of joint ownership.

However, we do not find a violation of Rule 1.4(a) (4) for falling to explain the
forms cf ownership. Sisk was simply not retained to do any more than take the matter
to closing, which required compliance with condominium council tting requirements
Sisk,

 

fact, discovered the condominium councis titing requirements through his own

ent Fou 676A 26 Gx 1505

20

a
ddue diigence and acted in accordance with those requirements and therefore in the
best interest of his clients,
‘Board Case No, 2011-0163-8 (Carla Schurga)

‘The Schurga matter is dealt with in Count XVIII and is denied by Sisk. Count
XVIII alleges violation of Rule 8.1(b) for faling to respond to the ODC's request for
information.

In this matter, the ODC is seeking sanctions because it claims Sisk took too long
jn which to respond to an inquiry about the complaint from Ms. Schurga. Sisk
Fepresented Ms. Schurga's son, Roman, in criminal proceedings. (AA $68). Ms.
‘Schurga filed @ complaint with the ODC on April 4, 2011. For reasons unexplained, that
Complaint was not forwarded to Respondent until several weeks later, The petition
alleges that the Schurga complaint was sent on May 13, 2011, about five (5) weeks
afer it was filed with the ODC (AA 970). However, the record reflects 2 letter dated
‘April 29, 2011, purporting to be a cover letter enclosing the Schurga complaint (JX Tab
46).

Hearing nothing from Sisk, the ODC wrote to Respondent on May 25, 2011,
requesting a response to the Schurga complaint by June 3, 2011 (JX Tab 47). On June
10, 2011, Sisk sent an email to ODC confirming a telephone conversation, during which
he explained that his office had suffered IT problems with a hard drive failure. He
requested until June 15, 2011 to respond to the Schurga complaint. The series of
emails continued on June 16, 2011 when Sisk advised ODC that his firm's computer
tech was stil trying to recover the hard drive information. Finally, Sisk and the OD
agreed on an extension to June 23, 2011 (JX Tab 48)

2

be

 
— ss

AA second series of emails was sent on June 23, 2011 when Sisk advised the
00C that the IT problems were not yet resolved so he could not provide a complete
response. He, therefore, requested until June 28, 2011. The ODC responded on June
24, 2011, by saying that he should submit a response, which could be supplemented i
the hard drive recovery produced more information, by “next week" (JX Tab 49; AA
72),

‘The record is void of any further communications between Sisk and the ODC
regarding the Schurga matter until January 3, 2012 when Sisk sent a letier fuly
responding to the Schurga complaint (JX Tab 60). Sisk testified that he should not have
taken so long to respond to the ODC. He admitted that the matter did not get the
Prony it should have because he was, in part, busy with responding to the Lindsey
‘matter, the Brennan matter and the Higley mater (Tr. 132). He was also faced with the
hard drive problem. Nevertheless, Sisk should have sought futher extension of time or
responded sooner.

While we are forced to find against Mr. Sisk on Count XVIll, given the more than
sicmonth delay."we wonder why, since the ODC and Sisk were apparently
communicating regularly on other matters, the ODC did not inquire sometime between
July 2011 and the end of December 2011 as to the status of Sisk’s response in the
‘Schurga matter. Based on the ODC's apparent silence on the Schurga matter, Sisk
‘would not have been entirely unjustified to think thatthe matter di not have a pressing
priority. Nevertheless, the burden of responding to the Schurga complaint was on Sisk.

 

G06 mao pt cnny arom

 
‘The ODG reported at the Hearing that it was taking no further action with respect
to the Schurga complaint (T1214). Therefore, in determining sanctions, we do not
‘attribute much weight to Sisk’s violation of Rule 8.1(b) inthis matter
Vi SANCTIONS
A. Qbiectives and Standards for Imposing Sanctions
“The objectives of the lawyer disciplinary system are to protect the public, 10
Protect the administration of justice, to preserve confidence in the legal profession, and
to deter other lawyers from similar misconduct™™ it is the duty of the Board to
Fecommend @ sanction that will promote those objectives, while remembering the
Supreme Court's admonishment that sanctions are not to be punttve or penal.
In determining the appropriate sanction for lawyer misconduct, the Delaware
Supreme Court follows the ABA Standards:
‘The ABA framework consists of four Key factors to be
considered by the Cour: (a) the ethical duty violated;
(©) the lawyer's mental state; (c) the actual of
potential injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct,
‘and, (4) aggravating and mitigating factors. *
1 ical Duties Vi
Based on his own admissions and the findings of the Panel, Sisk has violated
fourteen different duties. The findings of the Panel, coupled with Sisk’s admissions are
‘summarized on the following chart

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2. The Lawyer's Mental State

There was no testimony to suggest that Respondent suffered fom any
‘mpairment of his mental state that would prevent him from meeting his obligations
under the Rules. Respondent did testy that dung the period at issue he was under
severe stress due to () the breakup of his fm and the ongoing Itgation, (i) his bout
wit cancer and the related treatment, (the death of his father and subsequent care
this mother and handling the settlement of his father’s afar, and (w) the care of his
we who has been ill (Tr. 134). However, we view these matiers to be relevant to
mitigation, which we understand is what Sisk intends by raising the matters (Tr. 206-
208)".

3. Actual or Potential inury

‘The Panel finds that there is limited harm to any of the complainants, Sisk
testified that under Family Court practice, because hers was an original petition, Ms.
Brennan could get child support back to the date of separation. This assertion is
Lunrebutted on the record by any credible evidence. Therefore, although a delay in her
obtaining suppor in self constitutes some degree of harm, it should be curable by a

2 Sen nme gps, HA 2, 0S et 00,

 

 

 
 

 

proper application to Family Court. Such retroactive support should help reimburse Ms,
Brennan for having to sell personal belongings, Ms. Brennan also received her entire
retainer back with Sisk paying half out of his own packet so that Ms. Brennan would not
be forced to become a creditor in the CC&S receivership.

Mr. Higley has reached a settlement from his wife on the second QORO. That
Settlement was reached about five (5) months ago, but has not been consummated yet,
in part because of Sisk’s delay. Therefore, it can be said, Mr. Higley has lot

 

or
possibly lost, depencing onthe type of investment he would have made, the time valve
of his share of the second QDRO since the time of the settement. However, Sisk
testified, and Mr. Higley agreed, that Sisk has not charged Mr. Higley any fees for any of
the work done on his divorce and property settlement for some time, Whether tis is a
complete offset to the loss of potential proft on his share of the second QDRO, we
cannot say, but we do belive tis @ mitgating factor to any injury to Mr. Higley, real or
Potential Finally, with respect tothe rule against Mr. Higley, Sisk, hime paid the cost
ofthe atiomeys' fees. AS such, Mr Higley sutfered no personal oss from the atomneys'
{ee assessment

As to Ms. Lindsey, he

 

settiement was completed and in accordance with the
requirements ofthe condominium counes. Had Sisk not taken the matter to settement
when and in the manner that he di, there may never have been any settlement and
therein was the potential injury to Ms. Lindsey and her mother, ie. loss of the
condominium, which gid nat occur.

Finally, there are no damages in the Schurga matter actual or potential because

‘the only claim is delay in responding to the ODC.

26

 
4. Agaravating and Mitigating Circumstances

After misconduct has been established, aggravating and mitigating
circumstances may be considered in deciding what sanctions to impose.”* “Aggravation
(oF aggravating circumstances are any consideration of factors that may justify an
increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed.”

‘The Panel finds that there are three aggravating factors as set forth in ABA.
Standard 9.22: (1) a pattern of misconduct.” Mr. Sisk, at least in recent years, seems
to have developed a procrastination habit. This is evident from the repeated refrain of
Ms. Brennan and Mr. Higley: (2) multiple offenses.®® The gravamen of the Petition
‘against Sisk is that he delayed in dealing with client matters and was unresponsive to
lent inquiries. He edmits these transgressions in the Brennan and Higley complaints,
‘and we find such an aggravating factor in his violation of Rule 1.4(a) (4) in falling to
respond to Ms. Lindsey's inquiries; (3) substantial experience in the practice of law.2°
Mr. Sisk was admitted to the Delaware Bar more than thirty (30) years ago.

Mitigating factors “are any considerations or factors that may justiy a reduction in
the degree of discipline to be imposed." We find that the mitigating factors are as
follows:

(1) absence of prior disciplinary record,*? The ODC concedes that Mr. Sisk
hhas not been disciplined before this case (Tr. 188); (2) absence of dishonest or selfish

Se samy. 824 A26051 (Oe 209, Gotten, 908, 240408

 

7

 
‘motive. ‘The existence ofthis factor is self-evident by Sisk’s retuming Ms. Brennan's
retainer using his own personal funds and his continuing to work with Mr. Higley without
biling fees; (3) personal or emotional problems. Sisk testified about his own
diagnosis with cancer and its treatment, his father’s death and the stress of having to
take care of his elderly mother, the very stressful breakup of CCS and the subsequent
‘receivership and litigation and his wife's continuing illness; (4) effort to make restitution
‘or rectify consequence of misconduct This factor is evidenced by his use of personal
funds to reimburse Ms. Brennan her retainer and his opting not to bill Mr. Higley for fees.

‘and paying the attorneys’ fe

 

wssessed against Mr. Higley in the rule to show cause;
(6) cooperative attitude toward proceedings.” By all indication, Sisk was professional
‘and cooperative throughout these proceedings (Tr. 206); (6) character or reputation.”
‘The unrebutted testimony of Mr. Ferry was offered to establish this factor (Tr. 164-167);
(7) expression of remorse and cooperation.®* Not only has Mr. Sisk convincingly stated
hhis remorse on the record, he has apologized to his clients. In addition, he has
undertaken, on his own, to seek professional assistance through the Delaware Lawyers,
Assistance Program and has been working with that organization for around a year (Tr.
155). *

‘The Board finds that the aggravating factors are significantly outweighed by the
‘mitigating factors. Nevertheless, a public sanction is justified in order to satisfy the

requirement of protecting the public.

 

‘orton 13)

28

 
Vil. BOARD'S RECOMMENDED DISCIPLINE,

‘The Board's recommendation of an appropriate sanction
is not binding.”

sists the Court, but it

 

‘The Court *has wide latitude in determining the form of discipline, and

{if will review the recommended sanction to ensure that it is appropriate, fair and

consistent with

prior disciplinary decisions." Accordingly, the Board must carefully

‘examine prior disciplinary precedent to the extent possible in recommending sanctions,

The ODE cites to Respondent's multiple violations and advocates that Sisk be

siven a suspension of at least one year (Tr. 188, 190). The ODC relies on the following

decisions:

»

2)

Inte Tyler The sanction imposed was an eighteen (18) month
suspension for professional misconduct in four client matters over a
‘wo year period. The Board recommended a public reprimand and two
years of probation. This was primarily a books and records case, and
Tyler had two prior disciplinary sanctions. Sisk has no prior
disciplinary sanctions in over thirty (30) years of practice. As such, this

‘case provides no good guidance to ut

  

in recommending @ sanction
based on the violations, aggravating and mitigating factors that we
have found to exist

In r0 Foverhske The Court ordered a sanction of a two-year

suspension with the right to seek

 

mission in eighteen (18) months,

The clients in Feverhake were far more seriously harmed than in the

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29

 
3)

4)

 

present case, Six lent cases were dismissed with prejudice because
of the attorney's failure to prosecute, thereby depriving those clients of
the right to pursue their causes, wich serious injury supported @
suspension ofthe attorey, No such inury occurred with any of the
complainants in the present case,

{othe Matter of Hull The sanction imposed was a two-year
probation. Four clent matters were involved in which Hull failed to
‘make timely flings in certain bankruptey proceeds causing his clients
serious injury, missed a statute of imitations and provided inadequate
representation causing the clent's secured creditors to foreciose on
the clent’s home. As in Feverhake, but unlike in the present case,
clients lost ther rights to pursue their cases. These injuries were of
such a severe nature so as to justify suspension. Such severty of
injury does not exist in the present case

In the Matter of Higgins.“* The charges against Higgins related to six
<itferent cant matters, The volaione included () faire to file a name
‘change petition and not informing the client thatthe pettion had not
been fled, (i) fang to respond to Disciplinary Counsel, i) inaction in
1 matter on the Court of Chancery resulted in the matter being
dismissed (again @ loss of a client's right to pursue his cause of
action), (v) failure to fle an appeal in a Family Court order and then

failed to cooperate with substituting counsel, (v) mishandled a matter

Myer A 2197 209,
© GA 24901 Om 18)

30

 
‘such that default judgment was not vacated and a levy of sale was not

uashed and failed to advise client of the result, and (vi) mishandled a

Conflict of interest in a real estate matter. The Court imposed a one

year suspension. A shorter suspension from other cases was imposed

due to the weight of mitigating circumstances. Here the weight of

‘mitigating circumstances warrants a probation, not a suspension,

Respondent's counsel, not surprisingly, advocates for probation. In support of
‘that position, Respondent cites to In Matter of Elgart The respondent in Eigart
mishandled a personal injury case to the financial detriment of his client and was given
‘public reprimand and probation with conditions. As the ODC is quick to point out,
Eigart involved only one client matter (Tr. 213).

‘The one common theme that we discern from the cases cited to us is that the
Sanction is to be more severe as the severity of the injury to clients increases. Here, the
Cents suffered litle injury. By saying this, we do not mean to diminish any harm that
was suffered by the claimants. In other words, we do not equate comparatively small
harm to no harm. No client should have to sutfer the inattention of which Sisk is guilty

‘The ODC argues that Sisk’s actions or misconduct must be found to be knowing
within the meaning of the ABA Standards. Under those ABA Standards,

“Knowledge” is the conscious awareness of the nature or
attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious
‘objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result.

Respondent insists the misconduct is negligent. Under the ABA Standards,

*Negligence' is the failure of a lawyer to heed a substantial
tisk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, which failure

 
is a deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable lawyer
‘would exercise in the situation,

‘The reason for the different definitions is that a under "knowledge" standard,
under ABA Standard 4.42, suspension is called for. Whereas, under a ‘negligence’
test, under ABA Standard 4.49, reprimand Is proposed.
‘Section 4.42 provides: Suspension is generally appropriate when:
(@)a lawyer knowingly falls to perform services for a client and
‘causes injury or potential injury toa client, or
(b) a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect and causes injury or
Potential injury to a client.
Section 4.43 states:
Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent
‘and does not act with reasonable diligence in representing a chent, and
Causes injury or potential injury to a client
‘After careful study of those ABA Standards, we believe “negligence” ie the
definition property applied to Sisk’s misconduct. As the ODC stated, he has been
subject to a certain “paralyé

 

in action and communication” (Tr. 176). It was that
Paralysis that caused Respondent not to heed the circumstances surrounding his failure
to respond.

With respect tothe application of ABA Standards 4.42 and 4.43, we find that 4.43
best fits the circumstances present in this case. Specifically, Sisk was negligent and did
“not act with reasonable diligence in representing” his cients. Given the lack of injury to
the clients, to impose a suspension based on the present admissions and findings, as
well as the aggravating and mitigating factors, would be to cross the line and impose a
punitive sanction, contrary to the dictates of the Delaware Supreme Court”

Fas HY Aa 149 Gara, BSA D4 aL BTS

 

 

 

 
‘As such, and balancing the violations admitted and found by the Panel, along
with the aggravating and mitigating circumstances existing in Mr. Sisk’s situation, we
believe @ public admonition and a two year probation is the proper sanction to be
imposed.* Such a time period should be ample to determine if Sisk has overcome his
Paralysis of action,

‘As additional conditions, during the period of his probation, Si

 

is to continue his
work with the Delaware Lawyers Assistance Program and is to undertake any
Tecommended counseling to deal with his procrastination problems. Next, Sisk is to
have @ practice monitor, satisfactory to the ODC, who shall meet with Sisk regularly and
‘report any problems with how Sisk handles client matters. Finally, Respondent is to
reimburse the ODC for the costs of prosecuting this matter, We believe these sanctions.
Satisfy the stated objections of the lawyer discipline system “to protect the public, to
Protect the administration of justice, to preserve confidence in the legal profession, and

to deter other lawyers from similar misconduct’?

Conclusion and Signature Pages Follow

SSS aces wrresemere oon memes
Sees eee ree
‘ivssece ttre vse ees tage rey cong for moteurs onder 483 nt taper oe 96
Hes

3

 
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, we recommend that the sanctions of public

reprimand, two years’ probation and the stated conditions be imposed.
Respectiully submitted,

/) . -
vat: 45/2 NE 2 ¢ ;
Senden Snyder (0 #4038)

 

 
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, we recommend that the sanctions of public
‘reprimand, two years’ probation and the stated conditions be imposed,

Respectfully submitted,
Dates:

 

. Benjamin Snyder (10 #4038)

 

 

Wayne J. Carey (ID #2041)