Title: Rjm v. Dept. of Health and Soc. Serv.

State: alaska

Issuer: Alaska Supreme Court

Document:

973 P.2d 79 (1999) R.J.M., Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES, Appellee. P.M., Appellant, v. State of Alaska, Department of Health and Social Services, Appellee. No. S-8525. Supreme Court of Alaska. January 29, 1999. *80 John J. Connors and David G. Parry, Birch, Horton, Bittner & Cherot, Fairbanks, for Appellant R.J.M. Bonnie J. Coghlan, Fairbanks, for Appellant P.M. Nora King, Assistant Attorney General, Fairbanks, and Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellee. Before MATTHEWS, Chief Justice, COMPTON, EASTAUGH, FABE, and BRYNER, Justices. EASTAUGH, Justice. The superior court found R.J.M. and P.M. unwilling to care for their son J.M. and under the child in need of aid (CINA) statute, terminated their parental rights. Because P.M.'s failure to seek treatment for her mental illness constitutes unwillingness to provide care, we affirm the termination of her parental rights. Because the superior court did not clearly err in finding that R.J.M. was unwilling to care for J.M., we affirm the termination of R.J.M.'s parental rights. We also affirm the trial court's refusal to consider changed circumstances, and reject R.J.M.'s due process claim. This case is again before us. In R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855 (Alaska 1997), we ruled that a finding of emotional neglect could not justify termination of parental rights under AS 47.10.010(a)(2)(F).[1] Our opinion described the facts at that time as follows: The superior court, in light of the preceding facts, found the children to be CINA under AS 47.10.010(a)(2)(F),[3] which allows state custody of children suffering "substantial physical abuse or neglect."[4] The superior court did not find the children to have been physically neglected. Rather, it read "physical" as modifying only the word "abuse," and held the phrase to include emotional as well as physical neglect.[5] Accordingly, it terminated parental rights over J.M.[6] Because S.M. was already fifteen years old at the time of trial, the superior court denied termination of parental rights over her, but granted CINA custody to the state.[7] P.M. and R.J.M. appealed the ruling as it related to J.M.[8] We held that the provision cited by the superior court covers only physicaland not emotionalneglect.[9] We did not, however, dismiss the CINA proceeding in its entirety. *84 Alaska Statute 47.10.010(a)(2)(A)[10] allows CINA jurisdiction if no available person is "caring or willing to provide care" for the child.[11] The superior court had reluctantly held subsection (a)(2)(A) inapplicable because both parents had expressed a willingness to care for their children.[12] While R.J.M.'s first appeal was pending, however, we issued O.R. v. State, 932 P.2d 1303 (Alaska 1997). We there held that mere words are not enough to show willingness to care for one's children in the CINA context: In light of O.R., we remanded R.J.M. to the superior court for a determination of whether R.J.M. and P.M. were objectively willing to provide care for J.M. irrespective of their stated willingness.[14] The superior court found on remand that neither parent was willing to care for J.M. Applying AS 47.10.010(a)(2)(A) and .080(c)(3), the court terminated their parental rights. R.J.M. and P.M. appeal. In a CINA case, we will overturn the superior court's finding of facts if they are clearly erroneous.[15] Findings are clearly erroneous if a review of the entire record leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.[16] We apply our independent judgment in reviewing questions of statutory interpretation.[17] Whether the trial court's findings comport with the requirements of the CINA statutes and rules is a question of law which we review de novo.[18] The adequacy of the notice afforded a litigant in child custody proceedings is a due process issue which is a question of law.[19] We review due process issues de novo.[20] As noted above, AS 47.10.010(a)(2)(A) provides that a court can find a minor a child in need of aid if there is no available person "caring or willing to provide care" for the child. Care in this context means providing *85 "for the physical, emotional, mental, and social needs of the child."[21] The superior court found on remand that P.M. was unwilling to care for J.M. It stated its rationale: Moreover, the court cited P.M.'s failure to fully exercise her visitation rights to support its conclusion: The state follows the superior court's reasoning, arguing that P.M. demonstrated her unwillingness to care principally through her unwillingness to seek treatment. P.M. claims that the state's case against her is based on questions of ability and not willingness. To this end, she argues that her words and actions demonstrate her willingness to care for her children. Moreover, P.M. argues that the superior court conceded she could not be treated. This, she argues, makes her unwillingness to undergo treatment immaterial to her willingness to care for J.M. But Judge Greene's rulings, both initially and on remand, indicate that the court had concluded that P.M. was treatable. Judge Greene stated in her first ruling: And on remand, she found that P.M. saw a set of psychologists for brief visits, but apparently never entered into any consistent or continuing form of therapy. Her failure to do so directly contravened the advice of at least two of her doctors. Furthermore, P.M. was on notice that improvement of her mental condition was a condition of her continued parental rights. We therefore hold that P.M.'s refusal to pursue psychological help in a genuine, constructive, and committed fashion is evidence of her unwillingness to care for her son. The superior court did not err by finding that P.M. was unwilling to provide care for J.M. within the meaning of AS 47.10.010(a)(2)(A). On remand, the superior court also found R.J.M. unwilling to care for J.M. The court found that R.J.M. demonstrated his unwillingness through his absenteeism before and after the divorce, his emotional neglect of his son, his refusal to accept physical custody of J.M. in January 1994, his involvement of J.M. in his conflicts with P.M. and the state, and his refusal "to surrender any ground for his son's benefit." R.J.M. argues that he has shown his willingness to care by repeated efforts to work within the system to obtain custody of J.M., and he cites testimony to support this claim. R.J.M. further argues that he has devoted considerable time and energy to developing a parenting plan, which he argues is proof that *86 he is willing to care for J.M. He explains his reluctance to accept custody in January 1994 as a temporary move to put off custody until he could arrange for a new nanny.[22] The state argues that R.J.M.'s attempts to participate in treatment and services to improve his parenting were "superficial" and used "largely as ammunition in the legal process rather than vehicles for true change or growth." We note the potential problems inherent in allowing termination of parental rights for emotional neglect alone. Emotional neglect defies easy characterization; one person's emotional neglect may be, after all, another person's reserve or shyness. In this case, however, there is evidence of more than simple coldness. Among the most significant conduct providing evidence on the issue of R.J.M.'s willingness to care for J.M. is the evidence that R.J.M. refused to accept custody of J.M. in January 1994.[23] We also note that R.J.M. stipulated in 1993 to CINA jurisdiction.[24] It was not clearly erroneous for the superior court to interpret these objective acts, combined with R.J.M.'s other behavior, as proof that R.J.M. was unwilling to care for J.M. On remand, the superior court considered only the factual information that had been available to it at the trial in 1995-96. R.J.M. argues that any change in conditions over the two years since that trial were relevant to J.M.'s best interests, and that the court erred in not considering them.[25] The state argues that the parents' willingness to care for J.M. was the only issue on remand, and that the superior court was under no obligation to reopen the remainder of the case at trial. We have held that a trial court "has no authority to deviate from a specific mandate of the supreme court but may take actions not inconsistent with [the supreme court's] decision."[26] We have also held that In this case, we remanded to the superior court "to allow the trial court to reconsider, in light of O.R., its finding on the issue of willingness to provide care."[28] We did not expressly call for a new trial or evidentiary hearing. Although the superior court could have considered changed circumstances, it did not abuse its discretion in not doing so. For this reason, we affirm the superior court's refusal to consider any events occurring during the period between the trial and adjudication on remand. R.J.M. asserts that AS 47.10.010(a)(2)(A) is unconstitutionally vague. He argues that allowing the state to remove a child if the *87 parent "lack[s] empathy" or fails to satisfy a "subjective" standard of willingness to care would deprive the parent of due process. The words of the United States Supreme Court on vagueness and due process in the criminal law context are instructive here: More directly, we have stated that a statute can be unconstitutionally vague for any of three reasons: (1) it chills First Amendment speech; (2) it fails to give adequate notice of prohibited conduct; and (3) its imprecision "encourages arbitrary enforcement."[30] R.J.M. argues that AS 47.10.010(a)(2)(A) violates the second and third prongs of this vagueness test because the statute provides inadequate notice of what conduct is prohibited and encourages arbitrary enforcement. R.J.M. cannot prevail on his claim that the statute impermissibly encourages arbitrary enforcement, because he has provided no evidence that the state has arbitrarily enforced this statute. We have held that "we will not invalidate a statute on vagueness grounds absent evidence of a history of arbitrary or capricious enforcement."[31] Neither can R.J.M. prevail on his claim that the statute gives inadequate notice of prohibited conduct. Alaska Statute 47.10.010(a)(2)(A) limits intervention to cases in which the state can prove an ongoing, objectively demonstrated failure to provide basic parental care that reflects unwillingness to serve as a parent. It provides sufficient notice of the grounds for CINA jurisdiction. Accordingly, we reject R.J.M.'s claim that the statute is unconstitutionally vague. The superior court did not err in finding that neither parent was willing to care for J.M. The judgment is AFFIRMED. [1] See R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855, 867 (Alaska 1997). [2] R.J.M., 946 P.2d at 857-60 (citations omitted). [3] Now AS 47.10.010(a)(6). At the time of trial in this case, CINA status was defined in subsections (a)(2)(A)-(F) of AS 47.10.010. The legislature later repealed subsection (a)(1) of the statute; the provisions of subsections (a)(2)(A)-(F) were retained verbatim but were renumbered as AS 47.10.010(a)(1)-(6). AS 42.10.010(a)(6) is thus the current counterpart of former AS 47.10.010(a)(2)(F). We use the former statutory numbering, which governed here. Cf. R.J.M., 946 P.2d at 857 n. 1. [4] See R.J.M., 946 P.2d at 860. [5] See id. at 862. [6] See id. at 860. [7] See id. [8] See id. [9] See id. at 867. [10] Now AS 47.10.010(a)(1). [11] The relevant text of the statutesince renumbered but otherwise identical to the older versionthen read: (a) Proceedings relating to a minor under 18 years of age residing or found in the state are governed by this chapter ... when the court finds the minor .... (2) to be a child in need of aid as a result of (A) the child being habitually absent from home or refusing to accept available care, or having no parent, guardian, custodian, or relative caring or willing to provide care, including physical abandonment by (i) both parents, (ii) the surviving parent, or (iii) one parent if the other parent's rights and responsibilities have been terminated under AS 25.13.180(c) or AS 47.10.080 or voluntarily relinquished.... [12] See R.J.M., 946 P.2d at 867. See also In re S.A., 912 P.2d 1235, 1238-42 (Alaska 1996) (denying CINA status where mother was willing to provide care). [13] O.R. v. State, 932 P.2d 1303, 1310 (Alaska 1997). [14] See R.J.M., 946 P.2d at 869. [15] See In re S.A., 912 P.2d at 1237. [16] See id. at 1237. [17] See R.R. v. State, 919 P.2d 754, 756 n. 3 (Alaska 1996). [18] See E.M. v. State, 959 P.2d 766, 768 (Alaska 1998). [19] See Lashbrook v. Lashbrook, 957 P.2d 326, 328 (Alaska 1998). [20] See id. [21] AS 47.10.990(1). [22] R.J.M. also argues that O.R. v. State, 932 P.2d 1303 (Alaska 1997), (and its invalidation of "willingness by declaration only") is inapplicable as precedent, because O.R. involved physical abandonment. But we remanded the case at hand with direct instructions to consider O.R. See R.J.M., 946 P.2d at 869. [23] See R.J.M., 946 P.2d at 859. [24] See id. at 858. [25] R.J.M. has had no contact with his son since December 1995, and he relies on conjecture and DFYS documents to support his contention that the child's circumstances have changed. [26] A.M. v. State, 945 P.2d 296, 300-01 (Alaska 1997) (footnote omitted). [27] Murray v. Murray, 856 P.2d 463, 466 (Alaska 1993) (footnote omitted). [28] R.J.M., 946 P.2d at 869. [29] Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49-50, 96 S. Ct. 243, 46 L. Ed. 2d 185 (1975) (citations omitted); see also Anderson v. State, 562 P.2d 351, 356 n. 10 (Alaska 1977). [30] R.R. v. State, 919 P.2d 754, 758 (Alaska 1996) (citing Summers v. Anchorage, 589 P.2d 863, 866-67 (Alaska 1979)). [31] Levshakoff v. State, 565 P.2d 504, 507 (Alaska 1977).