Title: McGuire v. Seltsam

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

138 S.W.3d 718 (2004)
Susan O. McGUIRE, Appellant,
v.
Darrell K. SELTSAM and
Gene Sandner, Respondents.
No. SC 85988.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.
July 1, 2004.
Rehearing Denied August 3, 2004.
*719 William D. Rotts, Columbia, MO, for Appellant.
Susan Ford Robertson, Columbia, MO, for Respondents.
PER CURIAM.[1]
Susan McGuire was involved in a traffic accident when struck by a tractor-trailer truck owned by S & S (Seltsam and Sandner) Seed Farms. McGuire's injuries were treated at a hospital. McGuire sued, alleging S & S was vicariously liable for the tractor-trailer driver's negligent operation. After trial, McGuire received a judgment of $45,000. Because S & S's expert witness' testimony did not meet the statutory standard, the judgment is reversed and the case is remanded.
McGuire's sole point on appeal contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence Dr. Elizabeth Pribor's testimony. Dr. Pribor, S & S's expert witness, is a forensic psychiatrist. She testified McGuire had a somatization disorder. This diagnosis was based on review of some of McGuire's medical records, but without examining or interviewing McGuire. As described by Dr. Pribor:
McGuire argues that Dr. Pribor's testimony was improperly admitted under section 490.065[2] because her diagnosis was based upon "assumption, surmise and incompetent facts in assuming there to be medical records indicating a history of affliction before 30 years of age even though there were no such facts in the record."[3]
Generally, it is within the trial court's sound discretion to admit or exclude an expert's testimony. Johnson v. State, 58 S.W.3d 496, 499 (Mo. banc 2001). A trial court will be found to have abused its discretion when a ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration. State v. Rutter, 93 S.W.3d 714, 729 (Mo. banc 2002).
Section 490.065 is the standard for admitting expert testimony in civil cases. State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d 146, 153 *721 (Mo. banc 2003). That section requires the court to consider whether experts in the field reasonably rely on the type of facts and data used by the expert or if the methodology is otherwise reasonably reliable. If not, the testimony is inadmissible. Id. at 157. Whether expert opinion testimony satisfies the requirements of section 490.065 is a matter of trial court discretion. Bailey v. Cameron Mut. Ins. Co., 122 S.W.3d 599, 603 (Mo.App.2003).
Dr. Pribor was questioned prior to offering testimony as to her diagnosis of somatization disorder. She acknowledged that, under the standards recognized in her profession, in order for a person to be diagnosed with somatization disorder, the person must have begun having somatic complaints that are not substantiated by an organic cause prior to age 30. She further definitively testified that "[y]ou have to have evidence of some psychosomatic complaints before the age of 30" in order to make the diagnosis.
When asked what evidence she had found that McGuire had somatic complaints prior to age 30 that did not have any organic cause, Dr. Pribor offered the following testimony:
As previously noted, section 490.065 requires "that the facts or data on which an expert bases an opinion or inference `must be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject' and that these facts and data `must be otherwise reasonably reliable.'" McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d  at 156. Medical opinions based upon assumptions not supported in the evidence should not be admitted into evidence. Hobbs v. Harken, 969 S.W.2d 318, 322 (Mo.App.1998).
Dr. Pribor's assumption, that McGuire's medical records prior to 1988 would have contained evidence of somatic complaints and supported her diagnosis, is based upon speculation and conjecture. The records reviewed by Dr. Pribor in considering her diagnosis simply do not contain evidence from which Dr. Pribor could reasonably have made that assumption. Indeed, it appears that Dr. Pribor was making that assumption based upon her diagnosis and making her diagnosis, in part, based upon that assumption. This type of circular logic cannot form a reliable basis for an expert opinion. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the facts and data upon which Dr. Pribor based her diagnosis were reasonably reliable and in admitting her testimony into evidence.
S & S argues that McGuire failed to establish that she suffered sufficient prejudice to warrant reversal. A determination of prejudice by the erroneous admission of evidence depends largely upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The appropriate question is whether the erroneously admitted evidence had any reasonable tendency to influence the verdict of the jury. Chester v. Shockley, 304 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Mo.1957).
The credibility of McGuire was the paramount issue in this case. Indeed, S & S's closing argument focused almost entirely upon that issue.[4] Dr. Pribor's testimony had a reasonable tendency to influence the jury's assessment of the credibility of McGuire's physical complaints and its award of damages. Under the facts of this case, Dr. Pribor's improperly admitted testimony had a reasonable tendency to influence the verdict of the jury.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded.
All concur.
[1]  This Court transferred this case after opinion by the Court of Appeals, Western District, authored by the Honorable Joseph M. Ellis. Mo. Const. article V, section 10. Parts of that opinion are incorporated without further attribution.
[2]  All statutory references are to RSMo 2000 unless otherwise noted.

Section 490.065 provides:
1. In any civil action, if scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
2. Testimony by such an expert witness in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
3. The facts or data in a particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing and must be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject and must be otherwise reasonably reliable.
4. If a reasonable foundation is laid, an expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give the reasons therefor without the use of hypothetical questions, unless the court believes the use of a hypothetical question will make the expert's opinion more understandable or of greater assistance to the jury due to the particular facts of the case.
[3]  McGuire also argues that Dr. Pribor's testimony should have been excluded under the standards established in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923), and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993). Neither of these cases, however, governs the admission of expert testimony in Missouri civil cases  section 490.065 is controlling. State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d 146, 153 (Mo. banc 2003).
[4]  S & S's closing argument focused on the nature and extent of McGuire's injuries, and counsel repeatedly stressed that the issues of causation and damages hinged upon the truthfulness and accuracy of the symptoms reported by McGuire. S & S's counsel told the jury, "You cannot rely on the accuracy and the truthfulness of what she reports about her symptoms." Counsel repeatedly accused McGuire of exaggerating her symptoms and made reference to her "psychiatric condition" in asserting that she was fabricating some of her testimony.