Title: In re S.M.M.D.

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

128 Nev., Advance Opinion 2.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

IN THE MATTER OF PARENTAL No. 55541
RIGHTS AS TO SM.M.D. AND T.A.D.

RAENAR, FILED
Appellant,

vs. sn 28 2012
STATE OF NEVADA; TED Rs AND
RABLYNNR., 2
Respondents;

 

Appeal from a district court order denying, based on lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, appellant's petition to vacate its earlier
certification of her relinquishment of parental rights. Third Judicial
District Court, Churchill County; Leon Aberasturi, Judge.

Affirmed,

Donald K. Pope, Reno,
for Appellant.

\d Sharon L. Benson, Deputy

 

Catherine Cortez, Masto, Attorney General
Attorney General, Carson City,
for Respondent State of Nevada.

Ernest E. Adler, Carson City,
for Respondents Ted R. and Raelynn R.

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.

 

12, “02750

 
ome ee

 

OPINION

By the Court, PICKERING, J.:

‘This appeal requires us to decide whether, under section 1919
of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2006), a
tribal-state agreement respecting child custody proceedings may vest a
Nevada district court with subject matter jurisdiction to take a
relinquishment of parental rights under circumstances where section
1911(a) of the ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a), would otherwise lay exclusive
jurisdiction with the tribal court. We conclude that the ICWA, in keeping
with fundamental principles of tribal autonomy, allows for tribal-state
agreements for concurrent jurisdiction even when the tribe would have
exclusive jurisdiction absent an agreement. ‘Therefore, we affirm.

L

‘This case has a long history. In September 2002, the social
services division of the Fallon Paiute Shoshone ‘Tribe (the tribe) removed
S.M.M.D. and T.A.D. (the children) on an emergency basis from their
mother Raena, who lived on the reservation with them and is a member of
the tribe, ‘Tribal social services returned the children to Raena but their
situation did not stabilize. In July 2003, Nevada Department of Child and
Family Services (DCFS) and tribal social services undertook a joint
investigation of the children’s welfare; this culminated in the tribe

removing the children for a second time in December 2003. Because the

  

children did not moot the tribe's then-applicable blood quantum
requirement for membership, tribal social services ceded custodial
oversight to DCFS.

‘The children were returned to Raena but renewed concern for

the children’s welfare led tribal social services and DCFS to conduct a

 
yen Be

second joint investigation. In December 2004, this investigation ended
like the first, with DCFS entering the reservation with the tribe's
permission and taking custody of the children; in January 2005, child
welfare dependency proceedings were brought in state court. DCFS and
the district court established a case plan for Raena but placed the children,
with foster parents Tim and Mayris 'T. of Fallon (the foster parents). ‘The
court held periodic reviews to monitor the children and to measure
Raena’s progress. Each time, the district court reassessed the ICWA’s
applicability and, until January 2006, concluded that the tribe did not
have jurisdiction over the children because they did not meet its blood
quantum requirements for eligibility.

Some time before January 2006,! the tribe changed its blood
quantum requirements. ‘This change made the children eligible for tribal
membership and brought them within the purview of the ICWA. In
January 2006, the district court determined that the children were “Indian
children” subject to the ICWA, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963, and it found that
DCFS decided

 

Raena had failed to make “normal parental adjustments.
to pursue termination of her parental rights,
Coordination between tribal social services and DCFS

continued. DCFS notified the tribe that it was pursuing termination of

 

'The precise date of the change in eligibility requirements is not
clear. However, the evidence indicates that the change occurred at the
latest by January 2006. ‘The district court was aware of the children’s
eligibility by then and DCFS and tribal social services communicated by
letter about the tribe's intentions regarding jurisdiction that month. The
children were enrolled as members of the Paiute Shoshone Tribe of the
Fallon Reservation on March 14, 2006.

 

 
oH

Raena’s parental rights and invited the tribe to intervene. Interim tribal
social services director Melanie Arragon replied that the tribe was willing
to address parental rights but that “if this process ha[d] already begun
with the state the tribal social services would like the process to continue.”
‘The tribal court issued an order in February 2006 declaring the children
wards of the tribe but that the tribe's “legal and physical custody” of the
children was “concurrent with the State of Nevada [and DCFSJ” and “the
current plan and placement of [the children] is appropriate and approved
to address termination of parental rights.”

‘The process continued in state court, with DCFS social worker
Rhonda Felix and tribal social services director Bonnie Rushford
maintaining the state-tribal communication, Felix attended at least two
meetings with the tribe and made several appearances in tribal court. In
June 2006, DCFS notified the district court that “[a] joint decision (had
been} made to continue with the Division of Child and Family Services
maintaining jurisdiction with the Fallon Paiute Shoshone Tribal Social
Services being a co-agent and lending support.”

In December 2006, DCFS petitioned the district court to
terminate Raena’s parental rights over the children. Its petition advised
that “[ulpon a termination of parental rights hearing being set the Fallon
Paiute Shoshone Tribal court will schedule a Status hearing to receive an
And in January 2007—as DCFS
predicted—the tribal court held a status hearing. The tribal court

 

update on what is occurring.

determined that the tribe and state maintained concurrent “legal and
physical custody” over the children and that the “current plan and
placement of [the children] ...is appropriate” and it “approved” the
“termination petition . .. proceeding in the state court.”

 

 
ome ae

 

‘The termination hearing proceeded in state court on March 5,
2007. Raena attended with counsel. Before the hearing concluded and
after consulting with her counsel, Raena elected to voluntarily relinquish
her parental rights. ‘The district court canvassed Raena to ensure that her
relinquishment was knowing, voluntary, and free of undue influence. ‘The
court accepted the voluntary relinquishment, also terminated the father’s
parental rights, and placed the children with DCFS. In June 2007, the
district court ordered that “legal and physical custody of {the children] be
returned to the Fallon Paiute Shoshone Tribal Social Services.” The tribal

 

court then entered an order accepting “all jurisdiction over these
proceedings.”* In March 2008, the tribal court, after a hearing, ordered
the adoption of S.M.M.D. and 7.A.D. to respondents Ted and Raelynn R,

“The record on appeal includes tribal court documents that were not
before the district court. Although this court generally will not consider
documents not part of the record below, Toigo v. Toigo, 109 Nev. 350, 350,
849 P.2d 259, 259 (1993), these documents would be appropriate subjects
for judicial notice, if they were complete and adequately authenticated, see
NRS 47.130, NRS 47.150; Mack v, Estate of Mack, 125 Nev. 80, 91, 206
P.3d 98, 106 (2009), but they are not.

We note in particular the motion to dismiss that asserts that, after
the briefing was completed in this case, the tribal court, on remand from
the tribal appeals court, rejected Raena’s parallel challenge to the state
court's termination order. If established—the record is incomplete—such
ruling would lead us to the same conclusion, albeit on alternative
grounds, to wit: (1) either the state courts are wholly without jurisdiction
to address custody further, the tribe having exercised jurisdiction over it;
or (2) the tribe's decision as to the validity of the parental rights
termination commands full faith and credit, under 25 U.S.C, § 1911(@)
Because the record on appeal of the tribal court decisions and arguments
made there is insufficient for this court to adequately assess these

continued on next page...

 
When Raena relinquished her parental rights, she had
assumed that the children’s foster parents would become their adoptive
parents. Disappointed that they did not, Raena returned to state district,
court and asked that court to set aside her relinquishment under ICWA,
26 USC. § 1914. She maintained that the district court had not had
jurisdiction to take her relinquishment, invalidating it.) The district court,
heard arguments and denied the petition. It found that “Tribal Social
Services and State Social Services were in agreement that the
‘Termination of Parental Rights should proceed in State District Court and
the placement and adoption of the children, if necessary, would proceed in
the Tribal Court.” Ultimately, the district court determined that it wa:
not a court of competent jurisdiction under section 1914 to void the
termination.

Raens

 

ippeals the district court's denial of her petition,
Ik

Raena presents three arguments for invalidating the di

 

rit
court's taking of her relinquishment, First, she argues that the tribe had
jurisdiction under 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a), and there was no tribal-state
agreement to give the state court jurisdiction to take the termination of

~ continued

arguments and further delay and litigation in this matter is unfair to the
participants, especially the children, we affirm based on 25 U.S.C. § 1919.

8She also asserted that her counsel, appointed pursuant to 25 U.S.C,
§ 1912, was ineffective and that her consent was obtained by fraud, see 25
U.S.C. § 1913(@), but she does not advance those arguments here and,
therefore, neither do we.

 

 
her parental rights. Second, she proposes a statutory argument that, even
if a tribal-state agreement existed, such an agreement cannot provide a
state court's sole basis for jurisdiction over Indian children; in essence she
argues that if jurisdiction is exclusive to the tribe under section 1911(a),
the tribe cannot share that jurisdiction with the state under section 1919.
‘Third, she argues that the district court's termination proceeding
disregarded the ICWA‘s tribal and parental notice requirements, see 25
U.S.C. § 1912, and NRS Chapter 62B's ICWA notice requirements.
A

Before reaching the merits of Raena’s arguments, we must
resolve two threshold challenges mounted by the State and the adoptive
parents (collectively, the State).

The State's first challenge is jurisdictional. Citing In re M.M.,
65 Cal. Rptr. 34 273, 281 (Ct. App. 2007), in which a California Court of
Appeal held that it could not hear the appeal from an order transferring
jurisdiction from a state to a tribal court because the transfer divested all
California courts of jurisdiction to amend the order, the State maintains
that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal.

Under the ICWA, state courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction. See State v, Native Village of Tanana, 249 P.3d 734, 738-39
(Alaska 2011). The State's challenge to our jurisdiction fails, however,
because it does not distinguish between jurisdiction to determine
jurisdiction, which a court inherently possesses, see Rosado v. Wyman,
397 US. 397, 403 n.3 (1970) (noting “the truism that a court always has

jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction”), and jurisdiction over the

subject matter of the controversy, which, when absent, means the court

“cannot decide the case on the merits.” In re Orthopedic Products Liab.
itigation, 132 F.3d 152, 155 (3d Cir. 1997).

 

 
‘The State misinterprets In re MM. to apply to the former
while it concerns the latter. The M.M. appeals court held that it lacked
jurisdiction to determine the merits of the transfer order, not that it
lacked jurisdiction to determine whether the California district court had
jurisdiction at the outset, 65 Cal. Rptr. Sd at 284. As such, In re MM. is
inapposite. See Swan v. Swan, 106 Nev. 464, 469, 796 P.2d 221, 224
(1990) (subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be raised in
petition to vacate initial child custody order).

Second, seizing on the children’s initial ineligibility for tribal
membership, the State asserts that the district court's termination
proceeding represented the continuation of the 2005 child welfare
dependency proceedings and so was not even subject to the ICWA. This is
incorrect. While the children may not have initially qualified for tribal

enrollment, it was for the tribe to decide whether the children were

 

enrollable, a question the tribe answered in the affirmative before the
termination hearing occurred.* See Matter of Petition of Phillip A. C., 122
Nev. 1284, 1291, 149 P.3d 51, 56 (2006) (“Whether a person is a member of
a Native American tribe for ICWA purposes is for the tribe itself to
answer ....”); Inre Dependency of E.S., 964 P.2d 404, 410 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1998) (noting that a tribe “may determine at a point in time that a
given child is not enrollable and later change its mind and determine that

We recognize that Raena ultimately relinquished her parental
rights. For consistency, we will refer to the proceedings as termination
proceedings. See In re J.M,, 218 P.8d 1213, 1216-17 (Mont, 2009) (under
the ICWA, relinquishments that began as involuntary termination
proceedings but yield a voluntary termination must still comply with the
ICWA’s involuntary termination procedures)

 

 
 

the child is enrollable,” thus implicating the ICWA even in the middle of
proceedings). Therefore, because the children became “Indian child{ren]”
before the termination occurred, proceedings concerning their custody
were and are subject to the ICWA. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (defining
“Indian child” as “any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is
either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in
an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe”);
see _also id, § 1903(1)(i) (‘termination of parental rights’ proceedings
within the ICWA’s purview). ‘Thus, the ICWA applies but, as discussed
below, we determine that the district court's exercise of termination
jurisdiction was proper under 25 U.S.C. § 1919.
B.

‘The ICWA was enacted to counteract the large-scale
separations of Indian children from their families, tribes, and culture
through adoption or foster care placement, generally in non-Indian homes.
See Mississippi Choctaw Indian Band v, Holvfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32 (1989);
Matter of Petition of Phillip A. C,, 122 Nev. at 1295, 149 P.3d at 58-59,
Surveys conducted in 1969 and 1974 by the Association on American
Indian Affairs showed that 25 to 30 percent of Indian children were being
separated from their families and that fully 85 to 90 percent of these
children were being placed in non-Indian foster care, adoptive homes, or
institutions. H.R. Rep. No. 95-1386, at 9 (1978), reprinted in, 1978
U.S.C.C.AN. 7530, 7531. These separations and placements were found
to be largely unwarranted, resulting from a failure by child welfare
services to understand the cultural differences in Indian child-rearing
practices and other social and economic factors of Indian life. Matter of
Adoption of Crews, 825 P.2d 305, 308-09 (Wash. 1992) (citing H.R. Rep.
No. 95-1386, at 10-12, 1978 U.S.C.C.AN, 7532-35).

9

 
‘The ICWA establishes “minimum Federal standards for the
removal of Indian children from their families.” 25 U.S.C. § 1902. Section
1911 creates a “dual jurisdictional scheme” for Indian child custody
proceedings which was rooted in “pre-ICWA case law in the federal and
state courts.” Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 36, 42. Subsection (a) of section 1911
provides, in part, that “[aJn Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive
‘as to any State over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian
child who resides or is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe,
except where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the State by existing
Federal law.” If the child is a ward of the tribe, exclusive jurisdiction
resides with the tribe regardless of the child’

Subsection (b)
presumptively tribal jurisdiction,” see Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 36; Cohen's
Handbook of Federal Indian Law 829 (5th ed. 2005), which requires

transfer of state court proceedings involving Indian children not

residence and domicile. Id.

 

a relational provision for “concurrent but

 

“domiciled or residing within the reservation.” 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b). This
mandatory transfer may be derailed by objection of either parent,
declination by the tribe, or good cause. Td.

Raena argues that, once the tribe's blood quantum
requirements changed, section 1911(a) vested exclusive jurisdiction to
determine their custody in the tribe. The children were “Indian

 

"The exception in cases “where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested
in the State by existing Federal law,” 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a), is widely held to
be a reference to Public Law 280 states (Minnesota, California, Wisconsin,
Alaska, Nebraska, and Oregon), which obtained near-blanket jurisdiction
over tribal affairs. Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat. 688 (1953) (codified as
amended in 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006)).

 

 

 
child[ren],” 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4), and section 1911(a) gave the tribe
jurisdiction over them, because the record shows that they were domiciled
on the reservation (despite the State's contention that Reena was
incarcerated off reservation). Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 48 (domicile for
children is the domicile of their parents); McCracken v. Murphy, 828 F.
Supp. 2d 530, 582 (ED. Pa, 2004) (an inmate's domicile is the domicile
before incarceration, unless the inmate intends to live elsewhere when he
or she is released), Without more, the tribe would have had exclusive
jurisdiction over the termination proceedings pursuant to section 1911(a).

But section 1911 is not the ICWA’s only jurisdictional
provision, Section 1919(a) authorizes states and tribes to “enter into
agreements . . . respecting . . . jurisdiction over child custody proceedings,
including agreements which may provide for orderly transfer of
jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis and agreements which provide for
concurrent jurisdiction.” The district court’s exercise of subject mattor
jurisdiction over the relinquishment relied on section 1919(a). ‘Thus, it
specifically found: “Tribal Social Services and State Social Services were in
agreement that the Termination of Parental Rights should proceed in
State District Court and the placement and adoption of the children, if
necessary, would proceed in the Tribal Court.”

Hero, DCES, tribal social services, the state court, and the
tribal court all agreed that the termination proceeding would conclude in
Nevada state court, then be transferred to the tribal court for the

adoption. Tribal social services and DCFS collaborated for years to ensure

the necessary players stayed informed, and the district court diligently
assessed the applicability of the ICWA at each step. When the children
became eligible for tribal membership, the district court secured tribal

 

 
approval before proceeding with the termination. Interim tribal social
services director Melanie Arragon notified DCES that the tribe was ready
to move on the termination issue but wanted the state to complete what it
had started.

As DCFS summarized: “A joint decision was made to continue
with the Division of Child and Family Services maintaining jurisdiction
with the Fallon Paiute Shoshone Tribal Social Services being a co-agent
and lending support”; “{ulpon a termination of parental rights hearing
being set the Fallon Paiute Shoshone Tribal court will schedule a Status
hearing to receive an update on what is occurring.” All along, the tribal
court recognized that the children were in concurrent “legal and physical
custody” of the tribe and state and determined that the “current plan and
placement of [the children] is appropriate and approved to address

termination of parental rights...” After the termination was complete,

 

the tribal court recognized the cessation of concurrent jurisdiction on May
7, 2007, when it “accept{ed}” the transfer of jurisdiction and the district
court ordered that “legal and physical custody of [the children] be returned

 

to the Fallon Paiute Shoshone Tribal Social Services.” ‘The cooperation
here and agreement for the state court to exercise termination jurisdiction
can hardly be questioned; therefore, we reject Raena’s argument that the
record does not demonstrate that a section 1919(a) agreement to share
jurisdiction was reached. In fact, it demonstrates the opposite, as the

district court expressly found.®

While the record does not contain an executed agreement between

the tribe and state, Raena points to no authority that such a writing is

required. To add such a requirement would complicate section 1919's
continued on next page

 

 
Also unavailing is Raena's argument that the tribe had
exclusive jurisdiction under section 1911(a) over the termination
proceedings and could not share “exclusive jurisdiction” by a section 1919
agreement. Basically, Raena argues that section 1919 agreements are
only available when concurrent state-tribal jurisdiction exists under
section 1911(b). Without a state's foundational jurisdiction rooted in
section 1911(b), she argues section 1919 cannot apply.

Raena’s reading of the statutory scheme would require an
implausible departure from its language. We “presume that [the]
legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it
says there.” BedRoc Limited. LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183
(2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Connecticut Nat, Bank v. Germain,
503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992). Thus, our inquiry begins with the statutory
text and ends there, if the text is unambiguous. BedRoc Limited, 541 U.S.
at 183. Neither the language of section 1919 nor that of section 1911
supports Raena’s interpretation,

‘The language of section 1919 authorizes jurisdictional

agreements for concurrent jurisdiction where it would not otherwise exist:

continued

 

authorization of transfer and exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by
cooperation on a “case-by-case” basis. See Guidelines for State Courts:
Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584, 67,585 (Nov. 26,
1979) (declining to set forth guidelines for case-by-case transfer of
jurisdiction and jurisdictional agreements because guidelines would
“impose on such agreements restrictions that Congress did not intend
should be imposed”).

 

 
on

States and Indian tribes are authorized to enter

into agreements with each other respecting care

and custody of Indian children and jurisdiction

over child custody proceedings, including

agreements which may provide for orderly

transfer of jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis and

agreements which provide for _ concurrent

agreeme! i
25 U.S.C. § 1919(a) (emphasis added),

As noted above, Raena urges us to interpret section 1919 to
apply only to seetion 1911(b), see supra p. 10. Section 1911(b), though,
covers scenarios in which states and tribes already have concurrent
jurisdiction. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 36. Adopting Raena's interpretation
would render meaningless the “provide for” language in the last clause of
section 1919, which commonly means “to make available.” Webster's New
Universal Unabridged Dictionary 1556 (1996). “This court generally
avoids statutory interpretation that renders language meaningless or
superfluous.” Karcher Firestopping v. Meadow Valley Contr., 125 Nev.
111, 113, 204 P.3d 1262, 1263 (2009); see Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167,
174 (2001) (courts must give effect, if possible, to every clause of a statute).

Section 1911(a)'s reference to the tribe having “exclusive
jurisdiction” does not persuade us to adopt Raena’s view. In permitting
concurrent exercise of jurisdiction by agreement on a case-by-case basis,
section 1919 represents the more specific of the two statutes. In re Resort
at Summerlin Litigation, 122 Nev. 177, 185, 127 P.3d 1076, 1081 (2006)
('[Whhere a general statutory provision and a specific one cover the same
subject matter, the specific provision controls.”). It permits concurrent
jurisdiction that otherwise would not exist, ie., in which exclusive
jurisdiction would otherwise exist. Thus, section 1919(a) permits tribes
and states the freedom to coordinate jurisdiction consensually where, as

4

 

 
here, such coordination is deemed best.” It would be improper to

 

pose
fon such agreements restrictions that Congress did not intend should be
imposed.” Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings,
44 Fed. Reg, 67,584, 67,585 (Nov. 26, 1979) (explaining the BLA's decision
not to provide guidelines to tribal-state agreements under section 1919).
Even assuming, arguendo, that Raena’s reading of sections
1911 and 1919 identifies a colorable ambiguity in their text, her analysis
still fails, While “[rJeliance on legislative history in divining the intent of
Congress is... step to be taken cautiously,” Pi
Industries, 430 U.S. 1, 26 (197), the ICWA’s history confirms our reading
of sections 1911(a) and 1919, not Raena’s, See Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 69-60 (1978) (employing Indian law canons of
construction when statutory language is unclear). ‘The ICWA evinces an
inherent mistrust of state child custody adjudications involving Indian
children, Holyfield, 490 U.
unduly burden tribal autonomy by substituting its judgment for the
tribes’, S. Rep. No, 95-597, at 18 (1977) (section 1919 “give[s] to states and

at 44-45, but Congress was careful not to

 

 

tribes the broadest possible latitude in the types of agreements they may
enter into”), Section 1919 preserves inherent tribal sovereignty to

 

“Legislation permitting tribal-state agreements affecting jurisdiction
is not unusual. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 (2006) (indian Gaming
Regulatory Act requires state-tribal agreements

 

Cohen's Handbook of
Federal Indian Law 590 (th ed. 2005) (“Because of federal supremacy
over Indian affairs, tribes and states may not make agreements altering
the scope of their jurisdiction in Indian country absent congressional
consent” but may alter the scope of their jurisdiction with congressional
consent.); Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U.S. 423, 429-30
«a971).

 

 
determine that state social services and courts—at least on a case-by-case
basis—could be helpful. Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law 120
(th ed. 2005) (“[T]ribal .. . sovereignty {is} preserved unless Congress's
intent to the contrary is clear and unambiguous"). In this case, where the
children initially were not eligible for membership in the tribe then
became eligible, self-determination and governance is best recognized by
upholding the tribe's agreement to yield to state jurisdiction for the
termination proceeding. Here, the tribe determined that Nevada courts
were an appropriate forum to exercise jurisdiction over the termination
proceedings and under section 1919 that determination was the tribe's to
make, We therefore uphold the district court's jurisdiction over Raena’s
relinquishment of parental rights under 25 U.S.C. § 1919,
c

Raena next argues that the state court lacked jurisdiction
because neither she nor the tribe received proper notice of the termination
proceeding. She bases this argument on 25 U.S.C. § 1912,8 which requires
notice “by registered mail with return receipt requested” to the Indian
child's parent and tribe of the “pending [termination] proceedings and of
their right of intervention.”

"Though Raena relinquished her rights, the proceeding began as an
involuntary termination and section 1912's notice provisions apply to
proceedings that begin as involuntary terminations but result in voluntary
terminations. See, eg., In re J.M., 218 P.3d at 1217-18 (holding that a
proceeding which began as an involuntary proceeding but resulted in a
voluntary termination needed to comply with section 1912 but not section
1913); In re Welfare of MG, 201 P.3d 354, 358 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009)
(noting that mother's consent to dependency did not change the initial
involuntary proceeding to a voluntary one).

 

 
on

 

‘This argument fails because both Raena and the tribe had
actual notice of the termination proceeding.® Raena appeared and
participated; the tribe approved of it, agreeing to the state court’s exercise
of jurisdiction. Though notice may not have been sent “by registered mail
with return receipt requested,” 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a), and the record does
not include the document used to provide Raena’s notice, “[w]hen actual
notice of an action has been given, irregularity in the content of the notice
or the manner in which it was given does not render the notice
inadequate.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 8 (1982); see Matter ol
BLE, 422 N.W.2d 597, 599-600 (S.D. 1988) (actual notice sufficient
where there was substantial compliance with the ICWA); Matter of
LAM, 727 P.2d 1057, 1060-61 (Alaska 1986) (actual notice renders
compliance with section 1912's technical “registored mail with return
receipt requested” requirements unnecessary) (dictum); In_re TM, 628

Raena argues that the court lacked jurisdiction because it did not
comply with the notice provisions set forth in NRS 128,023, which in
termination proceedings requires the district court to “[eJause the Indian
child's tribe to be notified in writing in the manner provided in the Indian
Child Welfare Act.” She correctly points out that the record does not
contain a writing from the district court to the tribe. However, because
Nevada's statutes reinforce the ICWA, under which actual notice to the
tribe suffices, the tribe's actual notice from DCFS, rather than the district
court, substantially satisfies NRS 128.023. In re TM, 628 N.W.2d 570, 575
(Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (technical failure in method of notice “does not
invalidate the proceedings if actual notice was achieved through a
comparable method"). Here, there is no indication that NRS 128.023
grants notice rights beyond those delineated by 25 U.S.C. § 1912.
International Game Tech. v. Dist. Ct., 122 Nev. 132, 153, 127 P.3d 1088,
1103 (2006) (when the Legislature patterns a statute after a federal
statute we presume it intended the same construction and operation).

 

Ww

 
 

N.W.2¢ 570, 575 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001); Matter of Welfare of M.S.8, 936
P.2d 36 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997); see also In re D.M,, 686 N.W.2d 768, 771+
72 (S.D. 2004) (holding that continuous contact between state social
services and the tribe over seventeon months substantially complied with
section 1912's notice of right to intervention requirement).

Accordingly, we affirm.

Pickering

 

Parraguirre

18