Title: The People v. Darrell Williams

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

=================================================================
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
No. 11  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Darrell Williams,
            Appellant.
--------------------------------
No. 12  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Efrain Hernandez,
            Appellant.
--------------------------------
No. 13  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Craig Lewis,
            Appellant.
--------------------------------
No. 14  
In the Matter of Danny 
Echevarria,
            Appellant,
        v.
Patricia D. Marks, Monroe County 
Court Judge,
            Respondent.
--------------------------------
No. 15  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Edwin Rodriguez,
            Appellant.
Case No. 11:  
Mark W. Zeno, for appellant.
David M. Cohn, for respondent.
- 1 -
Case No. 12:
Barbara Zolot, for appellant.
Martin J. Foncello, for respondent.
Case No. 13:
Carl S. Kaplan, for appellant.
Martin J. Foncello, for respondent.
Case No. 14:
Brian Shiffrin, for appellant.
Rajit S. Dosanjh, for respondent.
The Legal Aid Society, amicus curiae.
Case No. 15:
Mark W. Zeno, for appellant.
Martin J. Foncello, for respondent.
GRAFFEO, J.:
In 1998, as part of Jenna's Law, the Legislature
adopted Penal Law § 70.45, which directs that postrelease
supervision is a mandatory component of all determinate prison
sentences.  We subsequently held that a sentencing court's
- 2 -
Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15 
- 2 -
failure to pronounce postrelease supervision during sentencing
proceedings results in an illegal sentence that cannot be
administratively corrected by the Department of Correctional
Services (see Matter of Garner v New York State Dept. of
Correctional Servs., 10 NY3d 358, 360 [2008]).  The Legislature
responded in 2008 by enacting Correction Law § 601-d to provide a
mechanism for courts to consider resentencing defendants serving
determinate sentences without court-ordered postrelease
supervision terms.  In these appeals, we consider whether there
are statutory or constitutional impediments to imposing
postrelease supervision at resentencing on defendants who have
completed their terms of imprisonment and been released into the
community.
I.  The History of Postrelease Supervision
The intent of the Legislature in adopting Jenna’s Law
was to abolish parole and institute determinate terms of
imprisonment for certain felony offenses (see L 1998, ch 1).  A
major component of this statutory scheme required that every
determinate sentence must also provide for postrelease
supervision (PRS) (see Penal Law § 70.45 [1]).  The
implementation of mandatory PRS spurred a series of cases in this
Court, beginning with People v Catu (4 NY3d 242 [2005]), in which
we held that where PRS is a “direct consequence” of a conviction,
a defendant seeking to plead guilty must be informed that a
period of PRS constitutes part of his sentence if the plea is to
- 3 -
Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15 
- 3 -
be valid under the knowing, voluntary and intelligent standard
(see id. at 244-245).  Thus, a defendant who was not advised
about a term of PRS prior to pleading guilty may seek vacatur of
the plea.
Shortly after Catu, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit declared in Earley v Murray (451 F3d 71
[2006], cert denied sub nom. Burhlre v Early, 551 US 1159 [2007])
that a defendant is entitled to habeas corpus relief in federal
court if correction officials administratively imposed PRS that
was not ordered by a court.  A few weeks later, our decision in
People v Van Deusen (7 NY3d 744 [2006]) dealt with a defendant
who requested the withdrawal of her plea prior to sentencing
because she had not been told about PRS as part of her negotiated
plea bargain.  The sentencing court had attempted to correct this
oversight by combining the five-year mandatory term of PRS with a
reduced prison sentence so that the total prison term would be
less than the maximum 15-year sentence that the defendant had
been promised.  We rejected this corrective action, determining
that a Catu error could not be rectified in this manner because,
when the defendant pleaded guilty, “she did not possess all the
information necessary for an informed choice among different
possible courses of action” and, therefore, her plea was
involuntary (id. at 746).
Then, in People v Louree (8 NY3d 541 [2007]), we
recognized that a Catu error may be raised on direct appeal even
- 4 -
Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15 
- 4 -
if a defendant did not preserve the issue by moving to withdraw a
plea prior to sentencing (as Van Deusen had done) or seeking
vacatur of the conviction after sentencing (see id. at 545-546). 
And in People v Hill (9 NY3d 189 [2007], cert denied __ US __,
128 S Ct 2430 [2008]), we reiterated that a Catu error requires
vacatur of a defective guilty plea since the error affects the
defendant’s due process rights (see id. at 193).
In April 2008, we issued the decisions in Matter of
Garner v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs. (10 NY3d
358) and People v Sparber (10 NY3d 457).  These cases dealt with
the legality of the administrative imposition of PRS by the
Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) in situations where
the sentencing courts had not pronounced PRS as part of the
sentences.  In Garner, we ruled that DOCS did not have the
authority to add PRS to an inmate's sentence because “CPL 380.20
and 380.40 collectively provide that only a judge may impose a
PRS sentence” (10 NY3d at 360).  And in Sparber, we held that
imprisoned defendants who raised the pronouncement issue on
direct appeal, but did not seek vacatur of their pleas, were not
entitled to have PRS expunged from their sentences as this would
result in non-PRS sentences that contravened the statutory
mandate for determinate sentences (see Penal Law § 70.45 [1]). 
Consequently, we concluded that the appropriate remedy for
defendants like Sparber was a resentencing proceeding that could
provide for the proper inclusion of PRS (see 10 NY3d at 471-472).
- 5 -
Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15 
- 5 -
In the aftermath of these cases, the Legislature sought
to deal with the significant number of incarcerated individuals
whose status had been affected by the Catu and Garner/Sparber
decisions.  Section 70.85 was enacted (L 2008, ch 141, § 2) to
address "cases in which a determinate sentence was imposed . . .
and was required by law to include a term of postrelease
supervision, but the court did not explicitly state such a term
when pronouncing sentence."  The statute allows a resentencing
court to reimpose the originally pronounced determinate prison
sentence without PRS if the District Attorney so consents.  The
purpose of this statute was to "avoid the need for pleas to be
vacated when the District Attorney consents to re-sentencing
without a term of PRS" (Governor’s Approval Mem, Bill Jacket,   
L 2008, ch 141, at 13-14, reprinted in 2008 McKinney’s Session
Laws of NY, at 1653).  In addition, section 601-d of the
Correction Law was added to permit DOCS to notify sentencing
courts that PRS had not been properly imposed in certain cases
(these defendants are referred to as "designated persons") and to
have these defendants returned to the original sentencing courts
for modification of their sentences to include PRS.
Most recently, in May 2009, we decided another case
where the defendant pleaded guilty but was not adequately
informed about PRS.  In People v Boyd (12 NY3d 390), the People
mentioned PRS at the plea proceeding but the court stated that it
did not have to order it because PRS was a mandatory part of the
- 6 -
Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15 
- 6 -
sentence.  The court then asked the defendant if he understood
that PRS was mandatory and the defendant responded in the
affirmative.  However, the defendant was not advised of the
specific duration of his PRS term at the time of his plea, nor
did the court formally impose a term of PRS as part of the
sentence.  We determined that these deficiencies rendered the
plea involuntary and that defendant did not need to preserve this
issue by a post-allocution motion to withdraw his plea (see id.
at 393).  Although the People requested that the defendant be
resentenced without PRS under the procedure adopted in Penal Law
§ 70.85 in order to avoid vacatur of the guilty plea, we declined
to approve this remedy in Boyd, finding it premature.  We
explained:
“This corrective action should not be
entertained at this time because the
constitutionality of this new provision and
its applicability to this case have not been
sufficiently developed for our review. . . . 
the issue of whether the deficiency in the
plea allocution can be rectified by granting
defendant specific performance of the plea
agreement –- a determinate sentence without
imposing a term of PRS –- should be
determined by Supreme Court in the first
instance.  We therefore remit this case to
Supreme Court to give the People the
opportunity to litigate their argument
regarding the applicability of Penal Law    
§ 70.85 and for defendant to assert any
constitutional challenges to the operation of
the statute” (id. at 394).
Unlike the defendant in Boyd who requested vacatur of
his plea, we now have before us five defendants who are not
challenging the validity of their convictions but instead raise a
- 7 -
Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15 
- 7 -
variety of statutory and constitutional issues regarding
resentencing under Correction Law § 601-d.  In each of these
cases, defendants received determinate sentences that did not
include a term of PRS.  Following our decisions in Garner and
Sparber, DOCS initiated resentencing proceedings under Correction
Law § 601-d so that PRS could be formally pronounced in each
case.  The defendants here do not seek reversal of their
convictions because they have completed their originally-imposed
prison sentences and have been released from custody by DOCS. 
Before addressing their contentions, we review the pertinent
facts of each case.
II.  The Defendants
People v Darrell Williams
In 2004, defendant Darrell Williams agreed to enter a
guilty plea to assault in the second degree in exchange for a
promised prison sentence of three years, to be followed by three
years of PRS.  The plea was accepted by Supreme Court but the
court did not formally pronounce the term of PRS during the
sentencing proceeding.  DOCS nevertheless conditionally released
Williams to PRS in September 2006.
In May 2007, Williams was reincarcerated for violating
PRS.  Following our decision in Garner, DOCS notified the
sentencing court of its failure to properly impose PRS.  Williams
claimed that resentencing exceeded the court's jurisdiction and
would violate his Double Jeopardy and Due Process protections. 
- 8 -
Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15 
- 8 -
Supreme Court concluded that it had the inherent authority to
correct the original sentence because it was illegal in the
absence of a period of PRS.  The court did, however, order that
Williams be immediately released from custody on the rationale
that he could not have violated PRS before it was a proper
component of his sentence.  The Appellate Division affirmed (59
AD3d 172 [1st Dept 2009]) and a Judge of this Court granted
Williams leave to appeal (12 NY3d 823 [2009]).
People v Efrain Hernandez
Defendant Efrain Hernandez pleaded guilty to burglary
in the second degree and was sentenced to seven years
imprisonment.  PRS was not discussed during the plea proceeding
or at sentencing.  DOCS administratively imposed five years of
PRS and Hernandez was conditionally released from prison in
December 2005.
Hernandez violated PRS and was sent back to prison. 
After the enactment of Correction Law § 601-d, DOCS notified the
sentencing court that Hernandez was a designated person for the
purpose of resentencing.  Hernandez opposed resentencing on
statutory and constitutional grounds.
Supreme Court determined that there were no legal
impediments to the resentencing procedure under Correction Law  
§ 601-d because the original sentence was illegal without a term
of PRS and Hernandez could not have had a reasonable expectation
of finality in that sentence once DOCS informed him that PRS was
- 9 -
Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15 
- 9 -
required.  At resentencing, in lieu of PRS, the court offered
Hernandez the option to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to
trial, but he declined this offer and was resentenced to the
original prison term plus five years of PRS.
The Appellate Division affirmed (59 AD3d 180 [1st Dept
2009]), holding that a sentencing court has the inherent power to
correct an illegal sentence even if the correction occurs more
than one year after conviction.  The court also determined that a
defendant cannot have a legitimate expectation of finality in an
illegal sentence and that the imposition of PRS was not
fundamentally unfair.  A Judge of this Court granted Hernandez
leave to appeal (12 NY3d 817 [2009]).
People v Craig Lewis
Defendant Craig Lewis was indicted for burglary,
assault and criminal contempt after he assaulted his ex-
girlfriend and subsequently entered her home without permission
in violation of an order of protection.  Unlike the other
defendants in these appeals, Lewis declined to plead guilty and
exercised his right to a jury trial.  Although the jury acquitted
Lewis of assault, he was convicted of burglary and two counts of
criminal contempt.  The sentencing court ordered an aggregate
prison sentence of five years but did not impose PRS.
DOCS administratively added PRS and, after Lewis was
released from confinement, the sentencing court was notified that
Lewis was a designated person qualifying for resentencing
- 10 -
Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15 
- 10 -
pursuant to Correction Law § 601-d.  Lewis interposed various
objections to resentencing, which were rejected by the court that
resentenced defendant to five years of PRS.  The Appellate
Division affirmed (60 AD3d 425 [1st Dept 2009]), and a Judge of
this Court granted Lewis leave to appeal (12 NY3d 818 [2009]).
Matter of Echevarria v Marks
Petitioner Danny Echevarria pleaded guilty to first-
degree rape and other offenses in return for an aggregate prison
sentence of five years.  PRS was not discussed during the plea
proceeding and it was not made part of the sentence, although
defense counsel referenced PRS during the sentencing proceeding. 
Before Echevarria was released from prison, he signed a DOCS
certificate acknowledging a term of PRS.  Thereafter, he violated
the terms of PRS on several occasions and was returned to prison. 
Since People v Sparber (10 NY3d 457 [2008]) was decided while
Echevarria was in custody for a PRS violation, DOCS notified the
sentencing court that Echevarria should be resentenced.
Petitioner commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding
against the sentencing judge (respondent Marks), seeking relief
in the nature of prohibition to preclude resentencing on
jurisdictional and constitutional grounds.  In dismissing the
petition, the Appellate Division reasoned that, even if
resentencing was beyond the court's jurisdiction, Echevarria
could not pursue discretionary prohibition relief because he had
an adequate remedy at law -- a direct appeal from his
- 11 -
Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15 
1 We use this term to refer to all of the appellants in
these cases, including petitioner Echevarria.
- 11 -
resentencing (57 AD3d 1479 [4th Dept 2008]).  We granted leave to
appeal (12 NY3d 828 [2009]).
People v Edwin Rodriguez
Defendant Edwin Rodriguez pleaded guilty to second-
degree burglary in exchange for seven years imprisonment.  PRS
was not discussed during his plea allocution or at sentencing. 
DOCS later informed Rodriguez that he was required to serve five
years of PRS and he was conditionally released from prison in
early 2007.  Later that year, Rodriguez was arrested for
violating PRS.
DOCS identified Rodriguez as a designated person and
initiated the resentencing process.  Rodriguez rejected the
court's offer to withdraw his guilty plea, raised no objection to
the imposition of PRS and was resentenced to the original prison
term, with a five-year term of PRS.  The Appellate Division
affirmed (60 AD3d 452 [1st Dept 2009]) and a Judge of this Court
granted leave to appeal (12 NY3d 928 [2009]).
III.  Statutory Challenges to the Imposition 
of PRS at Resentencing
   
In these appeals, defendants1 -- who have completed
serving their sentences of imprisonment and have been released
from prison -- assert several statutory challenges to the
imposition of PRS in a resentencing proceeding.  Although they
- 12 -
Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15 
- 12 -
recognize that courts have the "inherent power" to correct
illegal sentences, defendants contend that this authority cannot
be exercised more than one year after the declaration of the
original sentence under CPL 440.40.  Defendants claim that such
resentencings are further subject to the prohibition in CPL
380.30 against unreasonable delays.  They also argue, in the
alternative, that Correction Law § 601-d allows a resentencing
court the option to decline to resentence a defendant, even if
the People do not so consent, and that the failure of a
sentencing court to consider this option constitutes an abuse of
discretion requiring the nullification of PRS.
As a general principle, a sentence cannot be changed
once a defendant begins to serve it; however, this applies only
if the "sentence is in accordance with law" (CPL 430.10).  Our
precedent has long recognized that courts have the inherent
authority to correct illegal sentences (see e.g. People v
Richardson, 100 NY2d 847, 852-853 [2003]; People v Minaya, 54
NY2d 360, 364 [1981], cert denied 455 US 1024 [1982], quoting
Bohlen v Metropolitan El. Ry. Co., 121 NY 546, 550-551 [1890]). 
Because PRS is a mandatory component of a sentence for a crime
punishable by a determinate prison term (see Penal Law § 70.45
[1]), there is no dispute that defendants' original sentences
that omitted the imposition of terms of PRS were illegal.
Contrary to defendants' assertions, CPL 440.40 -- which
allows the People to move to set aside an invalid sentence within
- 13 -
Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15 
- 13 -
one year of its imposition -- does not impose a one-year
limitation on a court's authority to rectify an illegal sentence. 
As we stated in People v Wright (56 NY2d 613, 615 [1982]), CPL
440.40 "is designed to restrict the People's ability to move to
set aside an illegal sentence" and the text of this statute does
not "place a similar restriction on the court's inherent ability
to correct its own errors."  Defendants object to this precedent
but the cases on which they rely -- Carlisle v United States (517
US 416 [1996]) and United States v Smith (331 US 469 [1947]) --
address specific time limits contained in the federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure that do not pertain to the inherent ability of
New York courts to modify illegal sentences.  In any event, we
recently reaffirmed Wright in People v Sparber (10 NY3d at 471 n
6).  Consequently, these resentencing proceedings were not barred
by virtue of the fact that they occurred more than one year after
defendants were initially sentenced.
 
We also reject the claim that resentencing courts have
the option of declining to impose PRS regardless of whether the
People consent to that disposition.  Penal Law § 70.85 specifies
that in cases where PRS was required but not explicitly
pronounced at sentencing, the matter may be returned for
resentencing pursuant to Correction Law § 601-d, and the court
may decide to reimpose the original determinate sentence without
PRS "only on consent of the district attorney" (Penal Law       
§ 70.85).  Hence, a court may decline to impose PRS during
- 14 -
Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15 
- 14 -
resentencing only when the People issue the statutorily required
consent under Penal Law § 70.85.
Finally, defendants submit that the sentencing courts
in these cases lost jurisdiction to resentence them under CPL
380.30 due to the length of the delays between the original
sentencings and the resentencing proceedings.  Certainly, the
statute requires that sentences must be imposed "without
unreasonable delay" (CPL 380.30 [1]), and in furtherance of that
statutory directive, we have held that an unexplained delay of
several years between conviction and sentencing results in the
loss of jurisdiction over a defendant (see People v Drake, 61
NY2d 359, 366 [1984]; People ex rel. Harty v Fay, 10 NY2d 374,
379 [1961]).  Here, even assuming that CPL 380.30 applies, there
was no violation of the statute because defendants were
resentenced within a reasonable time after DOCS notified the
courts that these defendants were "designated persons" under
Correction Law § 601-d.
Accordingly, defendants have identified no statutory
barriers to the correction of the illegal sentences that were
originally imposed.
IV.  Constitutional Claims
Defendants next challenge the imposition of PRS as a
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the federal
constitution because the resentencing proceedings occurred after
they were released from prison after completing their terms of
- 15 -
Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15 
- 15 -
imprisonment.  According to defendants, once they were freed from
confinement, they were entitled to a "legitimate expectation of
finality" in the sentences that had been originally issued by the
sentencing courts.  And if a legitimate expectation of finality
attached, further governmental supervision in the form of PRS
amounted to the imposition of multiple punishments, which is
prohibited by the Fifth Amendment.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment
states that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."  The United States
Supreme Court has construed this language to cover three distinct
protections:  (1) the right to be free from a second trial
following an acquittal for the same crime; (2) the right to be
free from a second trial following a conviction for the same
offense; and (3) the right not to be punished more than once for
the same crime (see e.g. United States v DiFrancesco, 449 US 117,
129 [1980]; see also People v Biggs, 1 NY3d 225, 228-229 [2003]). 
The third category -- referred to as the "multiple punishments"
doctrine -- is relevant in these cases.
One of the first cases regarding the protection against
multiple punishments was Ex Parte Lange (18 Wall [85 US] 163
[1873]).  Defendant Lange had been sentenced to a year in jail
and a $200 fine despite the fact that the crime was punishable by
either imprisonment up to one year or a fine between $10 and
$200.  Once the defendant paid the fine, he sought a writ of
- 16 -
Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15 
- 16 -
habeas corpus but the sentencing court resentenced him instead to
one year in jail without any fine.  The US Supreme Court ruled
that the imposition of the second sentence violated the Double
Jeopardy Clause because, after paying the fine specified in the
original sentence, no other penalty could be legally imposed on
the defendant.  The Court reasoned that requiring him to continue
serving jail time resulted in more than one punishment for the
same offense (id. at 176).
Following Ex Parte Lange, it was unclear whether double
jeopardy prevented a sentence from being increased after a
defendant began a prison term (see generally DeMaggio v Coxe, 70
F2d 840, 840 [2d Cir 1934]).  Bozza v United States (330 US 160,
167 [1947]) clarified that the commencement of an illegal
sentence did not prevent a court from correcting the illegality
by increasing the total sentence.  In Bozza, the sentencing error
was promptly corrected the same day the original sentence was
declared.
The US Supreme Court subsequently extended this rule
beyond same-day corrections in United States v DiFrancesco (449
US 117 [1980]).  There, the Court held that the protection
against multiple punishments prevents a sentence from being
increased once the defendant has a legitimate expectation in the
finality of the sentence (see id. at 135-136).  Because federal
law allowed the government to request that the sentence be set
aside on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the defendant's
- 17 -
Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15 
- 17 -
legitimate expectation of finality did not attach "until the
[government's] appeal is concluded or the time to appeal has
expired" (id. at 136).  Until then, the defendant is on notice
that the sentence may be increased at any time before those
events occur (see id.).
In the cases before us, the correction of the illegal
sentences did not occur until well after the expiration of the
People's time to seek a statutory remedy (see CPL 440.40 [1];
460.10 [1] [a], [c]).  Although the US Supreme Court has yet to
weigh the legitimate expectation of finality principle in a
situation akin to the matters presented in these appeals, the
federal Courts of Appeals have considered similar issues in a
context analogous to PRS.  In United States v Rourke (984 F2d
1063 [10th Cir 1992]) and United States v Warner (690 F2d 545,
555 [6th Cir 1982]), for example, the defendants were required to
serve a period of "special parole" after release from prison. 
The failure to impose special parole at sentencing resulted in
illegal sentences.  Once these errors were corrected via
resentencing, the defendants raised Double Jeopardy challenges to
the imposition of the more severe sentences on the ground that
they had a legitimate expectation of finality in the original
sentences.  The federal courts rejected this argument by
defendants who had not completed their sentences when the
resentencing proceedings were brought, reasoning that these
individuals "cannot acquire a legitimate expectation of finality
- 18 -
Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15 
- 18 -
in a sentence which is illegal, because such a sentence remains
subject to modification" (United States v Rourke, 984 F2d at
1066; see also United States v Warner, 690 F2d at 555 [collecting
cases]).
But a different rationale has been applied by the
federal courts where defendants have completed their original
sentences of imprisonment.  Some courts have held that a
reasonable expectation of finality arises upon completion of the
imposed sentence, resulting in the attachment of jeopardy
precluding resentencing (see e.g. United States v Silvers, 90 F3d
95, 101 [4th Cir 1996] ["once a defendant fully serves a sentence
for a particular crime, the Double Jeopardy Clause's bar on
multiple punishments prevents any attempt to increase thereafter
a sentence for that crime"]; United States v Daddino, 5 F3d 262,
265 [7th Cir 1993] [completion of incarceration portion of
sentence precluded any increase of it]; United States v
Arrellano-Rios, 799 F2d 520, 524-525 [9th Cir 1986]; Oksanen v
United States, 362 F2d 74, 80 [8th Cir 1966] [applying the rule
to a completed term of probation]; see also Hernandez v
Quarterman, 340 Fed Appx 210, 215 [5th Cir 2009]), unless the
government's time to seek correction of the sentence remains
pending at the time of release (see United States v Rico, 902 F2d
1065, 1068-1069 [2d Cir 1990], cert denied sub nom. Baron v
United States, 498 US 943 [1990]; see also United States v Cook,
890 F2d 672, 675 [4th Cir 1989]).  Other federal courts have
- 19 -
Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15 
2 Some state courts have indicated that the Double Jeopardy
Clause applies in similar situations (see State v Hardesty, 129
Wash 2d 303, 314-315, 915 P2d 1080, 1086 [1996]; March v State,
109 NM 110, 112, 782 P2d 82, 84 [1989]; State ex rel. Hill v
Parsons, 194 W Va 688, 692, 461 SE2d 194, 198 [1995]; Maybin v
State, 884 So 2d 1174, 1175 [Fla Ct App 2004]; cf. State v
Pascal, 108 Wash 2d 125, 135, 736 P2d 1065, 1071 [1987] [no
expectation of finality in completed sentence because the state
appealed the below guidelines, 90-day jail sentence]).  In
addition, the Ohio Supreme Court -- in a situation somewhat
comparable to PRS -- has held that the failure to impose a
mandatory term of "postrelease control" may be corrected through
resentencing if the error is discovered before the original
sentence has been completed (see State ex rel. Cruzado v Zaleski,
111 Ohio St 3d 353, 358, 856 NE2d 263, 268 [2006]; State v
Bloomer, 122 Ohio St 3d 200, 206, 909 NE2d 1254, 1261 [2009]
[resentencing prior to completion of original illegal sentence
does not violate Double Jeopardy or Due Process]), but cannot be
rectified after a defendant has finished serving the sentence
originally imposed by the court (see Hernandez v Kelly, 108 Ohio
St 3d 395, 401, 844 NE2d 301, 306 [2006]; see also State v Bezak,
114 Ohio St 3d 94, 97, 868 NE2d 961, 964 [2007]; State v
Simpkins, 117 Ohio St 3d 420, 429, 884 NE2d 568, 578 [2008]
[reserving judgment on applicability of the Double Jeopardy
Clause to completed sentences], cert denied __ US __, 129 S Ct
463 [2008]).
- 19 -
suggested that the resentencing of a defendant who has been
released from confinement would be unconstitutional (see e.g.
DeWitt v Ventetoulo, 6 F3d 32, 35-36 [1st Cir 1993], cert denied
511 US 1032 [1994]; United States v Lundien, 769 F2d 981, 986-987
[4th Cir 1985], cert denied 474 US 1064 [1986]; Breest v
Helgemoe, 579 F2d 95, 101 [1st Cir 1978], cert denied 439 US 933
[1978]).2
We find this federal precedent persuasive and conclude
that, after release from prison, a legitimate expectation in the
finality of a sentence arises and the Double Jeopardy Clause
- 20 -
Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15 
- 20 -
prevents reformation to attach a PRS component to the original
completed sentence.  As we have noted, New York courts have the
inherent authority to correct illegal sentences and this power
extends beyond the one-year period for the People to seek
resentencing in the court of original jurisdiction (see section
III, supra).  Moreover, the People are allowed to move to set
aside or appeal a sentence on the ground that it is not
authorized by law, which may delay final consideration of a case
well beyond the one-year term specified in CPL 440.40.  Since
criminal defendants are charged with knowledge of the relevant
laws that apply to them (see e.g. United States v DiFrancesco,
449 US at 136), they are presumed to be aware that a determinate
prison sentence without a term of PRS is illegal and, thus, may
be corrected by the sentencing court at some point in the future
(see generally People v Sparber, 10 NY3d at 471 [remedy for an
imprisoned defendant upon whom PRS was not imposed is
resentencing for pronouncement of a legal sentence]).  So long as
an illegal sentence is subject to correction, a defendant cannot
claim a legitimate expectation that the originally-imposed,
improper sentence is final for all purposes (see United States v
Fogel, 829 F2d 77, 87 [DC Cir 1987]).
Yet, there must be a temporal limitation on a court's
ability to resentence a defendant (see generally DeWitt v
Ventetoulo, 6 F3d at 34-35) since criminal courts do not have
perpetual jurisdiction over all persons who were once sentenced
- 21 -
Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15 
- 21 -
for criminal acts.  Even where a defendant's sentence is illegal,
there is a legitimate expectation of finality once the initial
sentence has been served and the direct appeal has been completed
(or the time to appeal has expired).  In these situations, the
sentences are beyond the court's authority and an additional term
of PRS may not be imposed.  With the caveats we have identified,
in a case where PRS was not formally pronounced by the sentencing
court pursuant to CPL 380.20, we hold that the Double Jeopardy
Clause prohibits a court from resentencing the defendant to the
mandatory term of PRS after the defendant has served the
determinate term of imprisonment and has been released from
confinement by DOCS.
The People argue that this principle should not apply
in these cases because defendants were released from custody
after serving only 6/7ths of their terms of imprisonment (as
contemplated by the statutory scheme of PRS, which withholds
credit for the unserved portion of a prison term until PRS is
successfully completed) (see Penal Law § 70.45 [5] [a]).  They
further contend that, before defendants were released from
prison, defendants were aware that they had to serve PRS -- as
evidenced by written acknowledgments executed regarding PRS
requirements (see Penal Law § 70.45 [3]; Executive Law § 259-g
[2]; 9 NYCRR 8003.1 [c]) -- so any expectations defendants may
have had regarding the finality of the originally-imposed illegal
sentences were neither legitimate nor reasonable.  The People
- 22 -
Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15 
- 22 -
also note that defendant Williams agreed at the time he pleaded
guilty that he would have to serve three years of PRS, further
undermining his expectation of finality.  
It is true that defendants were released from prison
after serving less than the entire term of their determinate
sentences and the records in these cases reveal that some of the
defendants did sign documents pertaining to PRS before their
release.  Nevertheless, these facts do not alter our analysis. 
Garner (10 NY3d 358 [2008]) and Sparber (10 NY3d 457 [2008]) were
both premised on the fundamental notion that "sentencing is a
uniquely judicial responsibility" (id. at 470).  Thus, the
administrative imposition by DOCS of any additional penalty other
than that issued by the sentencing court is a nullity (see
Garner, 10 NY3d at 362) and cannot negate a defendant's
reasonable expectation that, once completed, the imposed sentence
will not be increased.  State law permitted defendants' release
after having served substantial portions of their determinate
prison terms.  At that point, they could not have been
reincarcerated for a potential violation of PRS because PRS had
not been validly required by a court in the first instance (see
e.g. People ex rel. Lewis v Warden, Otis Baum Correctional Ctr.,
51 AD3d 512, 513 [1st Dept 2008]; People ex rel. Gerard v Kralik,
51 AD3d 1045, 1046 [2d Dept 2008]; Matter of State of New York v
Randy M., 57 AD3d 1157, 1159 [3d Dept 2008], lv denied 11 NY3d
921 [2009]; People ex rel. Foote v Piscotti, 51 AD3d 1407, 1408
- 23 -
Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15 
3 This analysis has no application to a person who, for
example, is erroneously released early by DOCS.
- 23 -
[4th Dept 2008]).3  This is equally true for defendant Williams,
notwithstanding his acknowledgment of PRS during his plea
proceeding, because the court did not include PRS in its
pronounced sentence.  Here, defendants' release from
incarceration erected a Double Jeopardy Clause barrier to any
subsequent upward modifications of their original sentences.
Our dissenting colleague, Judge Smith, believes that
DiFrancesco virtually "eliminate[d] the applicability of the
[Double Jeopardy] clause to sentencing proceedings" (Smith, J.,
dissenting op at 3).  As we have demonstrated, however, this
position has been rejected by most courts that have considered
DiFrancesco (see supra, at 18-19).  In addition, Judge Pigott's
dissent relies on Bozza for the proposition that a defendant can
never have a legitimate expectation of finality in an illegal
sentence.  To the contrary, the defendant in Bozza was
resentenced on the same day the illegal sentence had been
imposed, not years later after having served the originally-
imposed sentence, as defendants in these cases have done.  Judge
Pigott's reliance on Thompson v United States (495 F2d 1304 [1st
Cir 1974]), Caille v United States (487 F2d 614 [5th Cir 1973])
and United States v Rourke (984 F2d 1063 [10th Cir 1992]), as
well as People v Minaya (54 NY2d 360 [1981]) (see Pigott, J.,
dissenting op at 3 and n 1), is similarly misplaced since none of
- 24 -
Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15 
4 It is also inaccurate for this dissent to characterize the
legitimate expectation of finality as accruing as soon as the
one-year period for the People to move to set aside the sentence
expires (see Pigott, J., dissenting op at 5), especially since we
have previously rejected such a time restriction on two occasions
(see Matter of Garner, 10 NY3d at 471 n 6; People v Wright, 56
NY2d at 615).
5 Because defendants have asserted a meritorious Double
Jeopardy claim, it is unnecessary for us to address their
arguments premised on the Due Process and Ex Post Facto Clauses,
or the state constitution.  In addition, we note that the
constitutional issue identified in People v Boyd (12 NY3d at 394)
is not at issue in these appeals. 
- 24 -
those defendants had served their sentences and been released
from confinement.  Simply put, none of the precedent cited in
this dissent involves persons who were released from
incarceration after having served their sentences and were later
hauled back into court to face an increase in sentence, not as a
result of anything they did, but because of errors committed by
the sentencing courts years earlier.4
To summarize, once a defendant is released from custody
and returns to the community after serving the period of
incarceration that was ordered by the sentencing court, and the
time to appeal the sentence has expired or the appeal has been
finally determined, there is a legitimate expectation that the
sentence, although illegal under the Penal Law, is final and the
Double Jeopardy Clause prevents a court from modifying the
sentence to include a period of postrelease supervision.5
V.  Remaining Issues
There remain a few additional points to address. 
- 25 -
Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15 
- 25 -
Defendant Rodriguez failed to raise any objections at his
resentencing.  As a result, his Double Jeopardy argument is not
preserved for review.  He nevertheless believes that the issue
may be considered by us because a resentencing proceeding that
contravenes the Double Jeopardy Clause results in a mode of
proceedings error or the imposition of an illegal sentence, both
of which are exempt from the preservation requirement.  Rodriguez
alternatively maintains that defense counsel's failure to
challenge the court's authority to conduct the resentencing
proceeding resulted in a deprivation of his right to the
effective assistance of counsel.
We have recognized a narrow exception to preservation
where a mode of proceedings error affects a court's jurisdiction
and power over a defendant (see e.g. People v Grey, 86 NY2d 10,
21 [1995]).  Constitutional Double Jeopardy violations generally
constitute mode of proceedings errors (see e.g. People v Biggs, 1
NY3d at 231) but that rule is most often applied where the People
attempt to initiate a second prosecution following an acquittal
or conviction.  
The People urge that preservation is necessary under
People v Gonzalez (99 NY2d 76 [2002]), where we concluded that an
argument premised on the multiple punishments doctrine must be
preserved.  The issue in Gonzalez was whether the defendant could
be convicted and receive concurrent sentences for more than one
offense based on a single act.  Our determination rested solely
- 26 -
Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15 
6 In light of this conclusion, it is unnecessary for us to
consider his alternative argument that he was deprived of his
right to the effective assistance of counsel at the resentencing
proceeding.
- 26 -
on an examination of the relevant Penal Law statutes to assess
whether the Legislature intended to authorize cumulative
punishments in that situation.  Because there were no fundamental
jurisdictional overtones to this inquiry, we determined that the
claimed deficiency was not a mode of proceedings error (see id.
at 82; see also People v Biggs, 1 NY3d at 231 [recognizing that a
statutory Double Jeopardy claim is not exempt from
preservation]).
In light of the fact that we are deciding in these
appeals that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects a defendant from
being resentenced to a more severe punishment after serving the
sentence of imprisonment and being released into the community,
it necessarily follows that the resentencing courts did not
retain jurisdiction to modify the original judgments that were
entered in these cases.  Because Rodriguez's Double Jeopardy
claim implicates a fundamental mode of proceedings, it is
reviewable absent preservation.6
Petitioner Echevarria, unlike the other defendants,
sought to prevent resentencing by commencing an article 78
proceeding seeking prohibition relief.  DOCS requested that the
court schedule a hearing in order to provide the parties an
opportunity to be heard on the issue prior to the court
- 27 -
Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15 
- 27 -
considering whether it would be appropriate to resentence
Echevarria.  
Prohibition may be used to preclude a government
officer from acting in excess of the officer's jurisdiction (see
e.g. Matter of Rush v Mordue, 68 NY2d 348, 354 [1986]) and it is
an "extraordinary remedy" that is ordinarily unavailable if a
"grievance can be redressed by ordinary proceedings at law or in
equity or merely to prevent error which may be readily corrected
on appeal" (Matter of Lee v County Ct. of Erie County, 27 NY2d
432, 437 [1971] [internal quotation marks omitted], cert denied
404 US 823 [1971]; see also Garner, 10 NY3d at 362).  It is also
generally inapplicable if the petition raises nonjurisdictional
issues, even if they are otherwise unreviewable (see Matter of
Pirro v Angiolillo, 89 NY2d 351, 355 [1996]).
Although Echevarria raises a Double Jeopardy claim to
resentencing premised on the sentencing court acting in excess of
its jurisdiction, the record in this case does not indicate that
the judge had considered whether it was appropriate to impose a
term of PRS.  Here, the court's order scheduled this matter "for
consideration of whether the inmate should be re-sentenced, and
that the Clerk arrange for counsel for both parties to appear" on
a specific date.  Based on these facts, there was no need to seek
prohibition relief before the court determined "the lawfulness of
the sentence that was imposed" or whether it would accept the
served sentence without a term of PRS.  Echevarria's article 78
- 28 -
Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15 
- 28 -
petition should therefore be dismissed.
*  *  *
In conclusion, in People v Williams, People v
Hernandez, People v Lewis and People v Rodriguez, the Double
Jeopardy Clause afforded defendants protection against more
severe sentences after they had satisfied the original judgments
of the respective sentencing courts and been released from
incarceration at the termination of their sentences of
imprisonment.  The imposition of PRS at resentencing was
impermissible and they are entitled to be discharged from PRS. 
In Matter of Echevarria v Marks, the courts below properly
dismissed the article 78 petition.
Accordingly, in cases 11, 12, 13 and 15, the orders of
the Appellate Division should be reversed, the resentences
vacated and the original sentences reinstated.  In case 14, the
judgment of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, without
costs.
- 1 -
People v Darrell Williams 
People v Efrain Hernandez 
People v Craig Lewis 
Matter of Echevarria v Marks 
People v Edwin Rodriguez
Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15
SMITH, J. (dissenting in Williams, Hernandez, Lewis and
Rodriguez, and concurring in Echevarria):
I agree with Judge Pigott that the addition of
postrelease supervision (PRS) terms to defendants' sentences did
not violate either the State or federal Double Jeopardy Clause
(NY Const Art I, § 6 ["No person shall be subject to be twice put
in jeopardy for the same offense"]; US Const, Amendment V ["nor
shall any person for the same offense be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb"]).  I disagree both with Judge Pigott and the
majority in that I do not think the decisive question is whether
defendants had a "legitimate expectation of finality" in the
sentences they originally received.  That, to me, is a circular
question: the prisoners' expectations were legitimate if
protected by the Double Jeopardy Clauses, and not otherwise.  I
find more useful guidance in the Supreme Court's leading decision
on the application of double jeopardy principles to sentencing,
United States v DiFrancesco (449 US 117 [1980]), which convinces
me that the Double Jeopardy Clauses have no application to the
sort of case now before us.
- 2 -
No. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15
- 2 -
My colleagues take the DiFrancesco decision as creating
a "legitimate expectation of finality" test for double jeopardy
upon resentencing (maj op at 16; op of Pigott, J. at 4).  (They
evidently assume, and I join them in assuming, that we should
follow DiFrancesco in interpreting both the State and federal
Double Jeopardy Clauses.) I think they read something into the
case that is not there.  In fact, DiFrancesco never uses the
precise phrase "legitimate expectation of finality".  It does say
that a sentenced prisoner has no "expectation of finality" when
his sentence is, by statute, subject to a prosecutor's appeal
(449 US at 136, 139), and that his "legitimate expectations are
not defeated" when such an appeal results in an increased
sentence (id. at 137); but these are observations about the
situation the Court faced in DiFrancesco, not formulations of a
general rule.  DiFrancesco never says or implies that "legitimate
expectation of finality" is the test for deciding when a
resentencing violates double jeopardy. 
Much more important to the DiFrancesco decision than
any catchphrase is the Court's explanation of the very limited
effect that the Double Jeopardy Clause has on the power of courts
to increase sentences.  The essence of the Court's holding is
that sentences and acquittals are different for double jeopardy
purposes; the Double Jeopardy Clause does not render a sentence
final and unreviewable, as it does an acquittal.  "[A] sentence
does not have the qualities of constitutional finality that
- 3 -
No. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15
- 3 -
attend an acquittal" (id. at 134).  The Double Jeopardy Clause as
interpreted in DiFrancesco "does not provide the defendant with
the right to know at any specific moment in time what the exact
limit of his punishment will turn out to be" (id. at 137
[emphasis added]). 
The DiFrancesco Court identified only one double-
jeopardy limitation on sentences: "a defendant may not receive a
greater sentence than the legislature has authorized" (id. at
139).  The Court found this principle to be established by Ex
parte Lange (85 US 163 [1873]).  In Lange, the petitioner was
granted relief because he had been sentenced to both a fine and
imprisonment, though the applicable statute permitted only one or
the other.  The DiFrancesco Court said the Lange holding is "not
susceptible of general application" (449 US at 139). 
Nothing in DiFrancesco suggests that the Double
Jeopardy Clause itself has "general application" to sentencing
outside of the rare Lange-type situation.  Justice Brennan,
dissenting in DiFrancesco, seemingly read that case, as I do,
nearly to eliminate the applicability of the clause to sentencing
proceedings.  Indeed, Justice Brennan found implicit in the
DiFrancesco majority's holding a rejection of the idea that
completion of a defendant's originally-imposed sentence is
critical for double jeopardy purposes - an idea espoused by the
majority here.  "Under the Court's view, there is no double
jeopardy bar to imposition of additional punishment by an
- 4 -
No. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15
- 4 -
appellant [sic] court after the defendant has completed service
of the sentence imposed by the trial court" (id. at 152 n15
[Brennan, J., dissenting] [emphasis in original]).
In short, my colleagues and I read DiFrancesco very
differently.  There is (non-binding) precedent for both readings. 
Some courts have, like today's majority and Judge Pigott, found a
"legitimate expectation of finality" test in DiFrancesco (United
States v Silvers, 90 F3d 95, 101 [4th Cir 1996]; United States v
Arellano-Rios, 799 F2d 520, 523-24 [9th Cir 1986]); others have
read DiFrancesco as largely eliminating double jeopardy issues in
resentencing cases (DeWitt v Ventetoulo, 6 F3d 32, 34 [1st Cir
1993]; United States v Lundien, 769 F2d 981, 986 [4th Cir 1985]). 
I think the latter cases read DiFrancesco correctly.
In concluding that the Double Jeopardy Clauses are largely
irrelevant to a situation like the present one, I do not imply that
either the State or federal Constitution gives courts carte blanche
to increase defendants' sentences whenever they choose, up to the
maximum permitted by statute.  Rather, I follow the DeWitt and
Lundien courts in concluding that due process, not double jeopardy,
sets limits - though not narrow or rigid ones - on courts'
resentencing power.  The flexible approach that courts customarily
use in interpreting Due Process Clauses - avoiding arbitrary cut-
offs, but addressing "the familiar due process question of how much
is too much" (DeWitt, 6 F3d at 36) - is better suited than double
jeopardy analysis to identifying and correcting the few cases in
- 5 -
No. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15
- 5 -
which a belated sentencing enhancement is inconsistent with
fundamental fairness.  Such a case will be "the very rare exception
to the general rule that courts can, after sentence, revise sentences
upward to correct errors" (id.).
If the issue is understood as one of fundamental fairness, the
cases now before us are easy ones.  There is nothing fundamentally
unfair about what happened to these defendants.  Their sentences were
enhanced, not by increasing their prison terms, but by adding terms
of PRS required by state statute - components of their sentences
inadvertently omitted when the sentences were pronounced.  Those who
did not know before they were originally sentenced that they were
supposed to be subject to PRS soon found out, or at least had ample
opportunity to do so.  As Judge Pigott demonstrates, "[a]ll the
evidence suggests that from the moment they entered the prison
system, if not before, defendants expected to serve postrelease
supervision" (op of Pigott, J. at 6).  None of them, so far as the
record shows, complained or expressed surprise when they were
(illegally) subjected to PRS on their release.  None of these
defendants is remotely comparable to the petitioner whose due process
claim was upheld in DeWitt.  DeWitt had been granted a suspension of
his life imprisonment sentence, had been released on parole, and had
established a business and personal relationships in the community,
only to be given the completely unexpected news that the suspension
was a mistake and he was subject to a life sentence after all.
Since the resentencings of defendants in People v Williams,
- 6 -
No. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15
- 6 -
People v Hernandez, People v Lewis and People v Rodriguez violated
neither their double jeopardy nor their due process rights, I would
affirm the orders from which they appeal.  In Echevarria v Marks, I
concur in the result.
- 1 -
People v Darrell Williams
People v Efrain Hernandez
People v Craig Lewis
Matter of Echevarria v Marks
People v Edwin Rodriguez
Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15
PIGOTT, J. (dissenting in Williams, Hernandez, Lewis and 
Rodriguez, and concurring in Echevarria):
According to the majority, a defendant who knows that 
the sentence he received is illegal, because it contravenes Penal 
Law § 70.45, nevertheless acquires a legitimate expectation in 
the finality of his sentence simply by virtue of being released 
from prison.  Because that holding conflicts with United States
Supreme Court jurisprudence, I dissent.
To begin with, I agree with the majority that there was 
no statutory impediment to the imposition of postrelease 
supervision on the defendants in these cases, after they had
completed their terms of imprisonment (see maj opn at 14).  But I
cannot accept the majority's conclusion that imposing postrelease
supervision on defendants in Correction Law § 601-d resentencing
proceedings violates their rights under the Double Jeopardy 
Clause of the United States Constitution.  
The majority concedes that, "[s]ince criminal 
defendants are charged with knowledge of the relevant laws that 
apply to them, they are presumed to be aware that a determinate
- 2 -
No. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15
- 2 -
prison sentence without a term of [postrelease supervision] is
illegal and, thus, may be corrected by the sentencing court at 
some point in the future" (maj opn at 20 [citation omitted]).  
But the majority fails to follow these propositions to their 
logical conclusion.  A defendant who knows that the sentence he 
was given is illegal and is subject to correction cannot claim 
to have a legitimate expectation that the sentence will remain
uncorrected.  There can be no reasonable expectation of finality 
in a sentence that is less severe than required by the law.
The Supreme Court expressly held in Bozza v United
States (330 US 160 [1947]), that a defendant has no legitimate
expectation of finality in an unlawful sentence.  In Bozza, the 
Court ruled that a court does not violate a defendant's double
jeopardy protections when it merely "set[s] aside what it had no
authority to do and substitute[s] directions required by the law" 
(330 US at 167).  Bozza was convicted of operating an illegal 
still, a crime carrying a mandatory sentence of a $100 fine and a 
term in prison.  The trial court originally sentenced the 
defendant only to the term of imprisonment.  When the court 
realized its mistake, it resentenced defendant, imposing the $100 
fine as well as the prison term.  The Supreme Court charged the
defendant with knowledge that the court lacked the authority to 
impose only imprisonment, and held that he had no legitimate
expectation of finality in the original, illegal sentence (id.).  
"The Constitution does not require that sentencing should be a 
- 3 -
No. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15
1 Although the majority suggests that Bozza should be
limited to situations in which the error is "promptly" corrected
(maj opn at 16; see also maj opn at 23), federal courts have
given Bozza a much wider interpretation.  "The full import of
Bozza is that a trial court not only can alter a
statutorily-invalid sentence in a way which might increase its
severity, but must do so when the statute so provides" (Thompson
v United States, 495 F2d 1304, 1306 [1st Cir 1974] [omission of
statutorily mandated special parole term from sentence raised
during appeal process]; see also e.g. Caille v United States, 487
F2d 614, 615 [5th Cir 1973] [same]; United States v Rourke, 984
F2d 1063, 1066 [10th Cir 1992] [same]).
- 3 -
game in which a wrong move by the judge means immunity for the
prisoner" (330 US at 166-167; see also Jones v Thomas, 491 US 
376, 387 [1989]).1
Applying Bozza, it follows that the defendants in the 
cases before us cannot claim a legitimate expectation of finality 
in their sentences.  All are, as the majority concedes, presumed 
to be aware that their determinate prison sentence lacking 
postrelease supervision are illegal and, thus, subject to 
correction (see maj opn at 20).  Therefore, none may claim 
objectively good reason to believe that his sentence would not be
corrected.  And defendant Williams can have had no expectation of
finality, for another reason; he acknowledges that he agreed in 
his plea agreement to serve postrelease supervision.  A defendant 
who was "mistakenly sentenced to a lesser term than he agreed to" 
does not "acquire a vested interest in the error so that it would 
be unfair, under the double jeopardy clause, to correct the error 
and make the defendant serve out the term of his own sentencing
agreement" (People v Minaya, 54 NY2d 360, 366 [1981]; see also 
- 4 -
No. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15
- 4 -
People v Woodrow Williams, 87 NY2d 1014, 1015 [1996]).
In United States v DiFrancesco (449 US 117 [1980]), the
Supreme Court held that a defendant was charged with knowledge 
that his sentence was subject to appeal by the government -- 
under a federal statute permitting sentence enhancement of 
"dangerous special offenders" -- and therefore could not have a
legitimate expectation of finality (DiFrancesco, 449 US at 136, 
139).  DiFrancesco did not involve correction of an illegal 
sentence, but its rationale applies here, where the defendants 
are charged with knowledge that their sentences, if illegally 
imposed, are subject to correction (see generally United States v
Crawford, 769 F2d 253, 257 [5th Cir 1985]).  
Given the Supreme Court's holdings in Bozza and 
DiFrancesco, it is clear that a defendant has a legitimate 
expectation in the finality of his sentence – that is, a 
reasonable expectation that the sentence he received will not be
modified so as to become more severe – only when he has objective
reason to believe that it will not be changed or corrected.  The
majority’s holding that “there is a legitimate expectation of 
finality once the initial sentence has been served and the direct
appeal has been completed (or the time to appeal has expired)” 
(maj opn at 21) fundamentally misunderstands the concept of an
expectation of finality in double jeopardy jurisprudence.  A 
defendant cannot acquire a legitimate expectation of finality 
from the mere fact that he has been released from prison.  
- 5 -
No. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15
- 5 -
Factual or legal circumstances may exist that would undermine a
reasonable person’s expectation in the finality of the sentence
imposed, even after release.
Moreover, the majority's requirement of two conditions 
for the attachment of a legitimate expectation of finality -- 
the completion of "the initial sentence" and the completion of 
the direct appeal or time to appeal (maj opn at 21) -- implies 
that an incarcerated defendant cannot acquire a legitimate 
expectation of finality until his prison sentence is complete.  
This is also incorrect.  Where circumstances do not undermine the
expectation, a defendant will acquire a legitimate expectation of
finality in his sentence as soon as the appeal process is 
complete and the one-year period has expired during which the 
People may move to set aside his sentence as invalid under CPL 
440.40 (compare DiFrancesco, 449 US at 136 [expectation of 
finality attaches when time for government appeal has expired]).
That period may expire before he is released.
The practical aspects of the litigation before us 
support the view that the defendants had no expectations of 
finality in their sentences.  It is noteworthy that not one 
defendant has alleged that he was not informed of the postrelease
supervision component of his sentence upon commencement of his
imprisonment (see Correction Law 803 [d]), and not one denies 
that he was informed of the postrelease supervision before being
conditionally released (see Penal Law 70.45 [3]; Executive Law 
- 6 -
No. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15
- 6 -
259-g [2]).  Yet, defendants did not seek to challenge their
postrelease supervision when their prison sentences started or 
even when they were released.  All the evidence suggests that 
from the moment they entered the prison system, if not before,
defendants expected to serve postrelease supervision.
The majority insists that "there must be a temporal
limitation on a court's ability to resentence a defendant," 
citing DeWitt v Ventetoulo (6 F3d 32, 34-35 [1st Cir 1993]) 
(maj opn at 20-21).  But DeWitt did not involve double jeopardy
protections at all.  That case held that a tardy, procedurally 
unique reinstatement of a life sentence, six years after it was
suspended, violated a defendant's due process rights, and the 
First Circuit went out of its way to note that although "notions 
of fundamental fairness do place some temporal limit on later
increases in sentence . . . [o]nly in the extreme case can a 
court properly say that the later upward revision of a sentence, 
made to correct an earlier mistake, is so unfair that it must be
deemed inconsistent with fundamental notions of fairness embodied 
in the Due Process Clause" (6 F3d at 35 [emphasis added]).  The
majority does not reach defendants' due process arguments, and I 
will not address them here, except to say that if the majority
believes that notions of fundamental fairness embodied in the Due
Process Clause mandate that an expectation of finality originates 
as soon as a defendant's initial sentence has been served, it 
should say so.
- 7 -
No. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15
- 7 -
In any case, the statement that "there must be a 
temporal limitation on a court's ability to resentence a 
defendant” (maj opn at 20) again misconstrues the notion of 
legitimate expectation of finality, which is constrained not by 
time, but by whether or not it would be reasonable for defendant 
to believe that his sentence will not be modified.  If, in a
particular case, a defendant cannot be hauled back to prison ten 
years after he has been released, on the ground of an error in 
his sentence, that may be because defendant cannot reasonably be
charged with having known that his sentence was in any way 
defective.  Or, more likely, it may be because of fundamental 
fairness considerations embodied in due process rights.  It is 
never merely because of a temporal limitation on resentencing 
that emerges from double jeopardy protections.  
Selecting a defendant's conditional release date to be 
the time when an expectation of finality attaches is simply 
arbitrary.  "The Double Jeopardy Clause does not provide the 
defendant with the right to know at any specific moment in time 
what the exact limit of his punishment will turn out to be.  
Congress has established many types of criminal sanctions under 
which the defendant is unaware of the precise extent of his 
punishment for significant periods of time, or even for life, yet
these sanctions have not been considered to be violative of the
Clause."  (DiFrancesco, 449 US at 137.)  
Finally, the Supreme Court has often had occasion to 
- 8 -
No. 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15
- 8 -
repeat that "a sentence does not have the qualities of 
constitutional finality that attend an acquittal" (DiFrancesco, 
449 US at 134, citing Chaffin v Stynchcombe, 412 US 17 [1973]; 
North Carolina v Pearce, 395 US 711 [1969]; Bozza; and Stroud v
United States, 251 US 15 [1919]; see also Caspari v Bohlen, 510 
US 383, 391-392 [1994]).  Resentencing "does not involve a 
retrial or approximate the ordeal of a trial on the basic issue 
of guilt or innocence" (DiFrancesco, 449 US at 136).  We should 
be more cautious before we deviate from the Supreme Court's
"traditional refusal to extend the Double Jeopardy Clause to
sentencing" (Caspari, 510 US at 392).  
For these reasons, I dissent in People v Williams, 
People v Hernandez, People v Lewis, and People v Rodriguez, and I
concur in result in Matter of Echevarria v Marks.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   * 
Case Nos. 11, 12, 13, 15:  Order reversed, resentence vacated and
defendant's original sentence reinstated.  Opinion by Judge 
Graffeo.  Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Read and Jones
concur.  Judge Smith dissents and votes to affirm in an opinion. 
Judge Pigott dissents in a separate opinion.
Case No. 14:  Judgment affirmed, without costs.  Opinion by Judge
Graffeo.  Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Read and Jones
concur.  Judge Smith concurs in result in an opinion.  Judge Pigott
concurs in result in a separate opinion.
Decided February 23, 2010