Title: Hirschfield v. Board of County Com'rs of County of Teton

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Hirschfield v. Board of County Com'rs of County of Teton1997 WY 109944 P.2d 1139Case Number: 96-203Decided: 09/11/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

ALAN J. HIRSCHFIELD; 
BERTE E. HIRSCHFIELD; MARGARET K. JONES; DOYEN McINTOSH; OBERT MACLEAN; MARY 
ANNA MACLEAN; LESTER S. MORSE, JR.; ENID W. MORSE; RICHARD P. MORSE; STANLEY 
SEIDLER; PIKE A. SULLIVAN; SUSAN W. SULLIVAN; RICHARD VAUGHN; MARY M. VAUGHN; 
WILLIAM WILSON III; and PAT WILSON, 

Appellants (Plaintiffs), 

 

v. 

 

BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF TETON, a political subdivision of the State of 
Wyoming; and THOMAS M. FALCEY, Chapter 11 trustee of the estate of Rivermeadows 
Associates, Ltd., a California limited partnership,  

Appellees 
(Defendants).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Teton County

The 
Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellants: 

William P. Schwartz and Timothy C. Day of Ranck, 
Schwartz & Day, LLC, Jackson.

 Representing 
Appellees: 

Donn J. McCall and Jon B. Huss of Brown, Drew, Massey 
& Sullivan, Casper, for Appellee Thomas M. Falcey, Chapter 11 Trustee of the 
Estate of Rivermeadows Associates, Ltd.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellants are 
adjoining property owners (homeowners) seeking a declaratory judgment that 
appellees, the Board of County Commissioners of Teton County (Board), rejected 
Rivermeadows Associates, Ltd. (Rivermeadows) concept plan for a proposed 
subdivision when its vote ended in a tie, and the Board acted beyond its 
authority in voting again on the matter and unanimously approving it. The 
district court ruled the Board's regulations permitted it to vote again and 
approve the plan and granted summary judgment to the 
Board.

 

[¶2]      We affirm the 
district court's order.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      Homeowners 
present this single issue:

 

1. Whether the District Court erroneously held as a 
matter of law that the 2 to 2 tie vote by the Board of County Commissioners on 
the development application of Rivermeadows Associates, Ltd. resulted in "no 
action" subject to reconsideration, instead of concluding that the tie vote 
resulted in the denial of the application pursuant to the common law, Wyoming 
statute, and the Board's own regulations.

 

[¶4]      The Board did not 
file a brief. The court ordered the substitution of Thomas M. Falcey, Chapter 11 
Trustee of the Estate of Rivermeadows, as defendant. Trustee presents two issues 
for our review:

 

1. Whether the trial court had, or this Court has, 
subject matter jurisdiction over the action.

2. Whether the trial court erred in determining that 
the Board of County Commissioners of Teton County properly approved the 
application of Rivermeadows Associates, Ltd. for concept plan 
approval.

 

FACTS

 

[¶5]      The facts are not 
in dispute. Homeowners own property in a subdivision developed by Rivermeadows. 
As property owners, the homeowners were granted access rights to nearby fishing 
creeks. In 1992, Rivermeadows requested approval to add sixty additional homes 
to the subdivision in accordance with the Teton County Comprehensive Plan and 
Implementation Program administered by the Board. As required by the plan, 
Rivermeadows' proposal was first evaluated by the Board's planning commission. A 
new comprehensive county zoning plan which would have limited the number to 
thirty homes was scheduled for consideration on May 2, 1994, and if adopted was 
scheduled to go into effect May 9, 1994. In March of 1994, the planning 
commission recommended that the Board of County Commissioners for Teton County 
approve the Rivermeadows concept plan with conditions and on April 26, 1994, the 
Board met to consider the concept plan and to take public 
comment.

 

[¶6]      After discussion 
and public comment, the Board voted on a motion to approve the concept plan with 
a number of conditions. The vote resulted in a two to two tie. Uncertain about 
the effect of a tie vote and wanting to continue the discussion, the Board ran 
short of time and decided to continue the meeting to May 2, 1994. On May 2, the 
concept plan was approved with four commissioners in favor and one abstaining. 
That afternoon, the Board adopted the new comprehensive 
plan.

 

[¶7]      The homeowners 
did not file a petition for review of the administrative action. Almost three 
months later, homeowners filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a 
declaration that the Board's approval was invalid and that the concept plan had 
to be processed under the new comprehensive county zoning plan. On homeowners' 
motion for summary judgment and Rivermeadows' cross-motion for summary judgment, 
the district court ruled that it had subject matter jurisdiction based upon WYO. 
R.APP. P. 12.12. The trial court affirmed the Board's approval because the 
applicable land use development regulations of the comprehensive plan allowed 
the Board to table the issue until the May 2, 1994, meeting. The district court 
granted summary judgment to Rivermeadows, and this appeal 
followed.

 

DISCUSSION

 

Standard of Review

 

[¶8]      Summary judgment 
is proper if there are no genuine issues of material fact and movant is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. WYO. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Mountain Cement Co. v. Johnson, 884 P.2d 30, 32 (Wyo. 1994). A court considers the summary judgment record in the light 
most favorable to the party opposing the motion and gives that party the benefit 
of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the record. We use 
the same materials and standards as the district court, accord no deference to 
the district court's decisions on issues of law, and may affirm the summary 
judgment on any legal grounds appearing in the record. State ex rel. Bayou Liquors, Inc. v. City of 
Casper, 906 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Wyo. 1995).

 

[¶9]      In this appeal, 
homeowners contend that the effect of the tie vote is controlled by common law 
which holds that a tie vote constitutes a rejection of the proposal and that the 
Board acted beyond its authority in reconsidering and voting again on the 
concept plan. Trustee contends that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction 
because homeowners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, the subject 
matter is not a proper one for declaratory judgment under Rule 12.12, and a 
justiciable controversy is not presented.

 

[S]ubject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. Cotton v. Brow, 903 P.2d 530, 531 (Wyo. 
1995); Brunsvold v. State, 864 P.2d 34, 36 (Wyo. 1993). "The first and fundamental question on every appeal is that 
of jurisdiction; this question cannot be waived; it is open for consideration by 
the reviewing court whenever it is raised by any party, or it may be raised by 
the court of its own motion."

Pawlowski v. Pawlowski, 925 P.2d 240, 243 (Wyo. 1996) (quoting Gookin v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Ins. 
Co., 826 P.2d 229, 232 (Wyo. 1992)). 

 

Availability of Declaratory 
Judgment

 

[¶10]   "The purpose of declaratory 
judgment actions is to render disputes concerning the legal rights and duties of 
parties justiciable without proof of a wrong committed by one party against 
another, and thus facilitate the termination of controversies." Millett v. Hoisting Engineers' Licensing 
Div., 119 R.I. 285, 377 A.2d 229, 233 (1977) (citing 1 ANDERSON, ACTIONS FOR 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS § 4 (2d ed. 1951)). Wyoming's declaratory judgment statute 
states that it is remedial and should be liberally construed and administered. 
WYO. STAT. § 1-37-114 (1997). We do not interpret it in a narrow or technical 
sense, and there remains the prerequisite that the party seeking declaratory 
relief present the court with an actual controversy. Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n v. 
State, 645 P.2d 1163, 1168 (Wyo. 1982). Trial judges may not dispense with 
the traditional rules prohibiting them from rendering advisory opinions or 
adjudicating hypothetical issues. An action for declaratory judgment cannot be a 
substitute for an appeal from administrative decisions but is available even 
though there is a statutory method of appeal if it concerns the validity and 
construction of agency regulations, or if it concerns the constitutionality or 
interpretation of a statute upon which the administrative action is, or is to be 
based. Id.; M & B Drilling and 
Constr. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 706 P.2d 243, 246 (Wyo. 
1985).

 

[¶11]   As directed by the statute, our 
past decisions have liberally construed the availability of an action for 
declaratory judgment to consider issues arising from agencies' interpretations 
of statutes. State Bd. of Equalization v. 
Jackson Hole Ski Corp., 737 P.2d 350, 354-55 (Wyo. 1987), modified on other grounds, 745 P.2d 58 (Wyo. 1987); State v. Kraus, 706 P.2d 1130, 1133 (Wyo. 1985); Rocky 
Mountain Oil, 645 P.2d  at 1166-69. Our decision in Rocky Mountain Oil determined that some 
decisions by an administrative agency are not subject to a declaratory judgment 
action. We have also held that while non-legislative decisions by county 
commissioners are reviewable under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, 
amendments to zoning laws are legislative acts and, as such, are not reviewable. 
Holding's Little America v. Bd. of Cty. 
Comm'rs of Laramie Cty., 670 P.2d 699, 703 (Wyo. 1983); McGann v. City Council of City of 
Laramie, 581 P.2d 1104, 1106 (Wyo. 1978). We have said that the approval of 
a planning unit development plat is tantamount to amending zoning regulations 
and is, therefore, a legislative act that is not reviewable under the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act. McGann, 
581 P.2d  at 1107. This case questions a decision by the agency with respect to 
the application of a rule of parliamentary procedure. We have not previously had 
occasion to consider whether the application of rules of parliamentary procedure 
is a proper subject for a decision under the declaratory judgment act. The 
homeowners are not seeking a determination as to whether or not Rivermeadows' 
development application should have been granted or denied on its merits, as 
that is for the Board to decide. The homeowners seek instead review of the 
Board's parliamentary procedural decision that a tie vote constitutes no action 
and the Board can vote again in a meeting which was continued until the next 
week. The present action thus involves the Board's procedures and its authority 
to engage in the actions at issue which present questions of 
law.

 

[¶12]   Trustee asserts that homeowners 
have not presented a justiciable controversy because they do not have standing 
or a tangible interest at stake.

 

The jurisprudential principles underlying the 
standing, ripeness, and mootness doctrines are embodied in the definition of a 
justiciable controversy adopted in Brimmer [v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 578 
(Wyo. 1974)]. The Brimmer court 
identified the following four elements as being necessary to establish a 
justiciable controversy under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments 
Act:

1. 
The parties must have existing and genuine, as distinguished from theoretical, 
rights or interests.

2. 
The controversy must be one upon which the judgment of the court may effectively 
operate, as distinguished from a debate or argument evoking a purely political, 
administrative, philosophical or academic conclusion. 

3. 
It must be a controversy the judicial determination of which will have the force 
and effect of a final judgment in law or decree in equity upon the rights, 
status or other legal relationships of one or more of the real parties in 
interest, or, wanting these qualities to be of such great and overriding public 
moment as to constitute the legal equivalent of all of 
them.

4. 
The proceedings must be genuinely adversary in character and not a mere 
disputation, but advanced with sufficient militancy to engender a thorough 
research and analysis of the major issues.

Reiman Corp. v. City of Cheyenne, 838 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Wyo. 1992); Brimmer, 521 P.2d  at 
578.

 

[¶13]   "Standing is a concept utilized to 
determine if a party is sufficiently affected to insure that a justiciable 
controversy is presented to the court." Memorial Hosp. of Laramie Cty. v. Dept. of 
Revenue & Taxation, 770 P.2d 223, 226 (Wyo. 1989) (quoting Washakie County School District No. 1. v. 
Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 316 (Wyo. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1980)). "A plaintiff has standing only if he has a tangible 
and legally protectible interest at stake in the litigation; his interest must 
be injured or threatened with injury by the administrative action of which he 
complains." Memorial Hosp., 770 P.2d  
at 226. We have held that an adjoining landowner has standing when the effect of 
the board's decision will be to double the density previously permitted. Hoke v. Moyer, 865 P.2d 624, 628 (Wyo. 
1993). Doubling the density of adjacent property raises a number of perceptible 
harms for a property owner which are different from the harm to the general 
public, such as increased traffic and congestion. Id. In this case, a decision in favor of 
the homeowners would hold that the tie vote constituted a rejection of the 
concept plan to add sixty more homes to the subdivision. Rivermeadows would then 
be required to request reconsideration of its proposal under the new zoning plan 
which would limit the number of homes to thirty. The homeowners' interest at 
stake is the density of the addition to the subdivision which will affect their 
access rights to the fishing creeks, and we hold they do have standing to bring 
this declaratory judgment action.

 

Authority To Continue 
Consideration

 

[¶14]   The statute governing the adoption 
of planning recommendations by a board of county commissioners is WYO. STAT. § 
18-5-202(c) (1997) which provides (emphasis added):

 

The planning and zoning commission shall prepare 
recommendations to effectuate the planning and zoning purposes and certify its 
recommendations to the board of county commissioners. Before adopting the 
recommendations the board shall hold at least one (1) public hearing. Notice of 
the time and place of hearing shall be given by one (1) publication in a 
newspaper of general circulation in the county at least fourteen (14) days 
before the date of the hearing. After public hearing has been held, the board 
shall vote upon the adoption of the planning or zoning recommendation. No planning or zoning recommendation shall 
be adopted unless a majority of the board votes in favor 
thereof.

 

[¶15]   The Teton County Comprehensive Plan 
in effect at the time the tie vote was taken states (emphasis 
added):

b. SECOND: After the preapplication conference a 
CONCEPT PLAN shall be required. The Planning Commission shall review the concept 
plan and its supporting materials. Withing thirty days the Commission shall 
recommend approval to the Board of County Commissioners, recommend disapproval, 
or table the request for additional information, different design solutions, or 
different categories of uses. The Board of County Commissioners, considering the 
recommendation of the Planning Commission, shall review the application and approve, disapprove, or table the 
proposal for specific additional information or solutions. Conditions of 
approval may be attached by either the Planning Commission or the Board of 
County Commissioners.

 

[¶16]   Homeowners contend that, under the 
statute, the tie vote could not result in the required majority, and the concept 
plan was disapproved. They further contend that the Board's decision to continue 
the meeting and vote again was an attempt to table the motion which was 
ineffective because the tie vote was a disapproval and must stand as a final 
decision. In their view, the Board lacked the authority to vote again. Trustee 
contends that nothing in the statute or the regulation prevents the Board from 
voting again during the same session. He characterizes the meeting held a week 
later as the same session because it was continued and presents several 
decisions by other jurisdictions stating that a session can occur on several 
different days.

 

[¶17]   Plainly, neither the statute nor 
the regulation speak to the effect of either a tie vote or multiple votes in the 
same session. In the absence of a contrary provision, the Board's deliberations 
are to be governed by generally accepted rules of parliamentary procedure, and 
we, therefore, accept homeowners' contention that common law or parliamentary 
law regards a tie vote on an affirmative resolution or action as a rejection. Lecht v. Stewart, 483 A.2d 1079, 1081 
(R.I. 1984) (citing Felice v. Swezey, 
278 A.D. 958, 105 N.Y.S.2d 486, 488-89 (1951)); 59 AM. JUR.2D Parliamentary Law §§ 3, 14 (1987). 
Trustee contends that even if we accept that the tie vote was a rejection, 
parliamentary law allows a deliberating body the right, during its session, to 
reconsider its proceedings. Byron v. 
Timberlane Regional School Dist., 113 N.H. 449, 309 A.2d 218 (1973), states 
that unless otherwise provided by law all public bodies have the right during 
any particular session to reconsider such action taken by them as they believe 
is proper and that it is only the final result that should be regarded as the 
thing done. Id. at 221; 59 AM.JUR.2D 
Parliamentary Law, § 15 (1987). This 
is true even when a final resolution has been passed. Board of Cty. Comm'rs of Sarasota County v. 
Webber, 658 So. 2d 1069, 1071-72 (Fla.App. 2 Dist. 1995). A public board may 
reconsider its decisions in the same session, even if the "session" occurs on 
several different days. Toffolon v. 
Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Plainville, 155 Conn. 558, 236 A.2d 96, 99 (1967). A "session" is a meeting which, though it may last for days, is 
virtually one meeting. Roberts Rules of Order (Revised) § 8 at 83 (Revised 
1990).1

 

[¶18]   In Toffolon, a zoning board met on the same 
matter on three different days, weeks apart. Toffolon, 236 A.2d  at 99. The court held 
it constituted but one continuing "session" because at the end of the first two 
meetings, the board did not adjourn, did not announce its initial decision, and 
no rights of third parties intervened. Id. At the end of the first two sessions 
the board merely recessed until the next meeting for further deliberations on 
the same matter. Id. When they 
recessed, the board members "were aware that no final decision had been reached 
. . . and that there would be further deliberations on that matter." Id. According to the 
court,

[t]he rule in such situations is that, unless some 
right of a third person intervenes, all deliberative bodies have a right to 
reconsider their proceedings during a session as often as they think proper, 
when not otherwise provided by law, and it is the final result only which is to 
be regarded as the thing done.

* 
* *

The several votes were but steps taken toward a 
single, final decision.

Id., 236 A.2d  at 99-100 (citations omitted).

 

[¶19]   In Appel v. State ex rel. Shutter-Cottrell, 
9 Wyo. 187, 61 P. 1015 (Wyo. 1900), an attorney presented a claim for 
payment which was rejected by the board of county commissioners. In a later 
meeting, the board reconsidered and approved the payment. In an action for 
mandamus to order the chairman to pay the bill, the court considered whether the 
board had the power to reconsider its action and approve payment having once 
rejected relator's claim. Appel, 9 
Wyo. at 203, 61 P.  at 1019. We held that "it is settled that at any time before 
the rights of third persons have become vested which would be interfered with by 
a reconsideration, a corporate board may, if not inconsistent with its charter 
or the law creating and governing it, and its rules of action, reconsider and 
rescind previous votes and orders." Id. 
Appel's ruling precisely states parliamentary law.

 

[¶20]   Homeowners list three of our later 
decisions which hold that a political subdivision does not have the inherent 
authority to reconsider final decisions and the power to reconsider must be 
granted by the state: Jackson Paint & 
Glass, Inc., v. Town of Jackson Bd. of Adjustment, 811 P.2d 293, 295 (Wyo. 
1991); Rosenberger v. City of Casper Bd. 
of Adjustment, 765 P.2d 367, 369 (Wyo. 1988); Hupp v. Employment Security Comm'n, 715 P.2d 223, 225 (Wyo. 1986). Homeowners assert that this situation is not any 
different and must be decided the same. Involved in those decisions was the 
issue of whether an agency could grant rehearing of a final decision without 
express statutory authority. Jackson 
clarified that, generally, an agency's enabling statute provides the 
authority to adopt rules allowing rehearing and express statutory authority is 
not necessary. Jackson, 811 P.2d  at 
295. We agree with Trustee that, in this case, because the Board chose to 
continue its meeting and did not adjourn, the session continued and the 
rejection of the proposal by a tie vote was not a final decision. The rule 
stated in Jackson, therefore, does 
not answer the precise issue in this case.

 

[¶21]   After the tie vote, the board 
decided to continue the April 26 meeting until May 2 for further deliberations 
on the concept plan because of a lack of time, to further consider conditions, 
and to seek a majority vote. On May 2, the record shows that the Board 
considered the meeting to be a continuation and acted accordingly. At that 
meeting, the conditions imposed were revised, and the concept plan then received 
approval by a unanimous vote. The precise issue presented then is whether the 
Board can reconsider an action in the same session. Our rule in Appel remains applicable. The Board can 
reconsider an action in the same session unless statute or its own regulations 
say otherwise.

 

[¶22]   The decision of the district court 
is affirmed.

 

Footnotes

1 Roberts Rules of Order are a widely 
accepted codification of parliamentary law. Lecht, 483 A.2d  at 
1081.