Title: State v. Sanchez

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

110 Ariz. 214 (1973) 516 P.2d 1226 The STATE of Arizona, Plaintiff, v. Max Moisa SANCHEZ, Defendant. No. 2786. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. December 6, 1973. *215 Moise Berger, Maricopa County Atty. by Edwin F. Cathcart, Jr., Deputy County Atty., Phoenix, for plaintiff. Marks & Marks by Philip J. Shea, Phoenix, for defendant. CAMERON, Vice Chief Justice. This is a certification of two questions pursuant to Rule 346 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S., in force and effect at the time this matter was considered. The two questions are certified as follows: The facts necessary for a determination of this matter on appeal are stated in the defendant's Memorandum as follows: "The defendant was tried in the Superior Court of Maricopa County on January 31, 1973, on an information charging him with `D.W.I. While License Suspended, Revoked or Refused, a felony * * *.' This charge was based on § A.R.S. 28-692.02, a statute added to the motor vehicle Code in 1972 for the purpose of rendering drunk driving a felony, rather than a misdemeanor, for a certain class of citizens. "The State duly proved that the defendant's license was indeed revoked when he was arrested for drunk driving on October 6, 1972. The evidence of license revocation was presented through Gerald Kline, a Motor Vehicle Division official who identified government records evidencing the revocation. * * * Mr. Kline explained that the revocation by the Motor Vehicle Division was based solely on Court records of DWI convictions. These records show that the convictions which relate to the revocation were based on guilty pleas. They do not reveal whether he was at any time represented by counsel, or whether he was advised of his right to counsel, or whether he was advised of any right whatever. * * * At the end of the State's case the defendant moved that the information be dismissed on the grounds that the felony charge was based on prior misdemeanor convictions which the State did not show were constitutionally obtained. * * * The motion was taken under advisement. * * * *216 "The defendant testified that he had been convicted of DWI but that in every case he did so only because he did not have counsel because he could not afford one and that he had never been advised of his right to have counsel appointed for him. * * *." QUESTION 1: REVOCATION OF THE LICENSE BASED UPON PRIOR CONVICTIONS OBTAINED WITHOUT REPRESENTATION OF COUNSEL At the outset we note that the United States Supreme Court, in overruling the case of City of Cincinnati v. Berry, 34 Ohio St.2d 106, 296 N.E.2d 532 (1973), has held that the case of Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1972), is to be given retroactive effect. Berry v. City of Cincinnati, Ohio, 414 U.S. 29, 94 S. Ct. 193, 38 L. Ed. 2d 187, 5 November 1973. Therefore, we must first consider whether the two prior driving while intoxicated convictions, obtained when the defendant was not represented by counsel, are valid. The United States Supreme Court in Argersinger, supra, stated: The holding in Argersinger, supra, requires an attorney or a knowing and intelligent waiver thereof as a condition precedent to imprisonment no matter how petty the offense. Conversely, it does not require an attorney whenever loss of liberty is not involved. It follows that the civil revocation of a license pursuant to § 28-692.01 A.R.S., may be based upon a conviction for driving while intoxicated obtained as a result of a proceeding in which the defendant was not represented by counsel, and a person whose license has been thus validly revoked can be convicted under § 28-692.02 A.R.S. for driving while under the influence with a revoked license. We agree with the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals which recently stated: The answer to the first part of Certified Question Number 1 is Yes the Motor Vehicle Department may revoke a person's driver's license based upon a driving while intoxicated conviction obtained when the driver was not represented by counsel and had not waived same. QUESTION 2: IS § 28-692.02 A.R.S. UNCONSTITUTIONAL? Section 28-692.02 A.R.S. reads as follows: The purpose of this statute is quite clear. It is to deter those people, whose driving habits are such that their license has been revoked or suspended or who, because of other reasons, have been properly refused a license, from driving, and to provide severe punishment for those who do. It is obvious from this statute that a class of persons is created which is subject to severe prosecution, a felony, if they should drive while intoxicated. We do not, however, believe that the class is arbitrarily or unreasonably defined, and we believe the State has a valid and continuing interest in attempting to bar from the public highways those people in a rationally defined class whose driving habits have merited the attention from the State that the defendant and others similarly classified require. In Uhlmann v. Wren, 97 Ariz. 366, 401 P.2d 113 (1965), we cited the United States Supreme Court in its clear statement concerning the equal protection clause: *218 The United States Supreme Court has more recently stated: The answer to Certified Question Number 2 is No. HAYS, C.J., and STRUCKMEYER, LOCKWOOD and HOLOHAN, JJ., concur.