Title: McMillion v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
MARVIN McMILLION,
§
§
No.  220, 2004
Defendant Below,
§
Appellant,
§
Court Below–Superior Court
§
of the State of Delaware, in and
v.
§
for Sussex County in S93-
§
1206-93-R2.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
§
§
Plaintiff Below,
§
Appellee.
§
Def.  ID No.  9312012871
Submitted:  July 30, 2004
Decided:  December 6, 2004
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices.
O R D E R
This 6  day of December 2004, upon consideration of the appellant’s
th
opening brief and appendix and the appellee’s motion to affirm, it appears to
the Court that:
(1)
The appellant, Marvin McMillion, has appealed from the Superior
Court’s order of May 11, 2004, that denied his second motion for
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61").
The State has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the basis that
the appeal is without merit.  We agree and affirm.
It appears from the record that two other counts, Burglary in the Third Degree and
1
Theft, were severed by stipulation prior to trial.
See McMillion v.  State, 1995 WL 319121 (Del.  Supr.)  (affirming judgment on
2
direct appeal).
2
(2)
In 1994, McMillion was charged with having committed
Attempted Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree, Robbery in the
First Degree, Burglary in the Second Degree, Unlawful Sexual Penetration in
the Third Degree and Criminal Mischief.   Following a jury trial in the Superior
1
Court, McMillion was convicted as charged.  He was sentenced to fifty-seven
years and one day at Level V imprisonment, suspended after forty-one years,
for six months at Level IV followed by decreasing levels of probation. 
(3)
On direct appeal, McMillion alleged that there was insufficient
evidence to sustain the conviction for Attempted Unlawful Sexual Intercourse
in the First Degree.  This Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment,
concluding that there was “ample evidence whereby a jury could rationally
infer that McMillion intended to engage in sexual intercourse with the victim.”2
(4)
In 1997, McMillion filed his first motion for postconviction relief.
McMillion raised two issues:  insufficient evidence and ineffective assistance
of counsel.  Applying the procedural bars of Rule 61, the Superior Court denied
See Super.  Ct.  Crim.  R.  61(i)(4) (providing that “[a]ny ground for relief that was
3
formerly adjudicated . . . is thereafter barred, unless reconsideration of the claim is warranted
in the interest of justice.”). 
See McMillion v.  State, 1998 WL 67727 (Del.  Supr.)  (affirming denial of first
4
postconviction motion).
McMillion’s contention appears to arise from an entry in the Superior Court docket
5
that his bond was revoked “as to Robbery 1  Degree and Unlawful Sexual Intercourse 1
st
st
Degree.”  State v.  McMillion, Del.  Super., Def.  ID No.  9312012871, Dkt.  No.  29.     
According to McMillion, the two offenses canceled each other out.
6
3
McMillion’s insufficient evidence claim as formerly adjudicated.   The
3
Superior Court denied McMillion’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim on
its merits.  On appeal, this Court affirmed the denial of McMillion’s motion.4
(5)
In May 2004, McMillion filed his second motion for
postconviction relief.  McMillion again raised insufficient evidence and
ineffective assistance of counsel.  Moreover, McMillion alleged that he was
wrongfully charged with having committed both Attempted Unlawful Sexual
Intercourse in the First Degree and Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First
Degree.   He also alleged that he was wrongfully charged with both Attempted
5
Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree and Unlawful Sexual
Penetration in the Third Degree.   By order dated May 11, 2004, the Superior
6
See Super.  Ct. Crim.  R. 61(i)(1) (providing that “[a] motion for postconviction
7
relief may not be filed more than three years after the judgment of conviction is final”).
See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2) (providing that “[a]ny ground for relief that was not
8
asserted in a prior postconviction proceeding . . . is thereafter barred, unless consideration
of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice.”).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
9
Somerville v.  State, 703 A.2d 629, 631 (Del.  1997).
10
See Hamilton v.  State, 2004 WL 1097703 (Del.  Supr.)  (citing Bailey v.  State, 588
11
A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del.  1991) (providing that the Superior Court must apply the procedural
bars of Rule 61 before reaching the merits of the claims)).
Super. Ct.  Crim.  R.  61(i)(1).  McMillion’s conviction became final in June 1995,
12
after this Court’s issuance of the mandate.  Jackson v.  State, 654 A.2d 829, 832-33 (Del.
1995).
4
Court summarily denied McMillion’s second postconviction motion as
untimely,  repetitive,  and as formerly adjudicated.   This appeal followed.
7
8
9
(6)
In his opening brief on appeal, McMillion does not challenge the
Superior Court’s decision on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Accordingly, the claim is waived and will not be addressed by the Court.   
10
(7)
Having considered McMillion’s claims, as set forth in his opening
brief, and the State’s motion to affirm, we conclude that the Superior Court did
not err when it denied McMillion’s second motion for postconviction relief on
procedural grounds.   It is clear that McMillion’s motion is time-barred, as it
11
was filed more than three years after the judgment of conviction became final.12
Super.  Ct.  Crim.  R.  61(i)(2).
13
Super.  Ct.  Crim.  R.  61(i)(4).  
14
Id.
15
See 
Super. Ct. Crim. R.  61(i)(5) (providing that the bars to relief are inapplicable
16
to a jurisdictional claim or to a colorable claim “of a constitutional violation that undermined
the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity of fairness of the proceedings leading to the
judgment of conviction.”).
5
Also, the motion is repetitive  and, as to the insufficient evidence claim, it is
13
formerly adjudicated.   McMillion has offered no reason why reconsideration
14
of the formerly adjudicated claim is warranted in the interest of justice.15
Moreover, McMillion has not overcome the three-year time bar by showing
either that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction or that there was a colorable
claim of a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation.16
(8)
It is manifest on the face of McMillion’s opening brief that this
appeal is without merit.  The issues presented on appeal are controlled by
settled Delaware law.  To the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, there
was no abuse of discretion.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is
GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Myron T. Steele
Chief Justice