Title: White v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
WAVERLY WHITE, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 354, 2002 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for Sussex County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. ID No. 0110013949 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  January 14, 2003 
Decided:  February 6, 2003 
 
Before WALSH, HOLLAND and STEELE, Justices. 
 
 
Appeal from Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Timothy G. Willard, Fuqua and Yori, P.A., Georgetown, Delaware, for 
Appellant. 
 
 
Kim Ayvazian, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, 
Georgetown, Delaware, for Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STEELE, Justice: 
 
2
In April 2002, a Superior Court jury found the Appellant, Waverly White, 
guilty of Robbery in the First Degree,1 Assault in the Third Degree,2 and 
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.3  In this appeal, White asserts three grounds of 
error: (i) the State’s untimely disclosure of a witness’ criminal record denied him 
the right to a fair trial; (ii) the prosecutor’s comments regarding the victim’s 
absence from trial amounted to plain error; and (iii) the trial judge erred by 
denying his motion for judgment of acquittal.     
I. 
White and co-defendant, Kathy Dottery, allegedly encountered three men 
outside a tavern.  One of the three men, Steve Swift, was wearing silver necklaces.  
White allegedly pushed Swift to the ground, grabbed Swift’s chains, and walked 
off.   
Swift’s companion, Frank Petroccitto, allegedly chased after White and 
demanded the return of the necklaces.  Petroccitto testified to grabbing White in an 
attempt to neutralize him.  White then punched Petroccitto and threw Petroccitto to 
the ground.  Petroccitto again chased after White and caught him from behind.  
White allegedly brandished a semi-automatic weapon, struggled with Petroccitto, 
and ran into the woods.  
                                          
 
1 11 Del. C. § 832(a)(1). 
2 11 Del. C. § 611(1). 
3 16 Del. C. § 4771. 
 
3
The police arrived at the scene within minutes and soon apprehended White 
and Dottery.  The police drove Petroccitto to the area and he identified White and 
Dottery as the attackers.  The police searched White and found a crack pipe.  The 
necklaces and gun were never located.   
II. 
White asserts that the State’s disclosure of Petroccitto’s criminal history a 
week before trial should be considered an untimely discovery disclosure, and 
therefore, a Brady4 violation.  In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that 
the State cannot suppress evidence favorable to a defendant if that evidence is 
material either to guilt or to punishment.5  If the evidence is both favorable and 
material, a determination must be made whether its “delayed disclosure precluded 
… effective use of the information at trial.”6  When “a defendant is confronted 
with delayed disclosure of Brady material, reversal will be granted only if the 
defendant was denied the opportunity to use the material effectively.”7   
Here, defense counsel had the opportunity to object to any untimely 
disclosure or assert a Brady violation before trial, but chose not to do so.  In 
addition, defense counsel had a week to decide how to use the criminal history the 
                                          
 
4 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).   
5 373 U.S. at 83. 
6 Atkinson v. State, 778 A.2d 1058, 1062 (Del. 2001) (quoting Lilly v. State, 649 A.2d 1055, 1057 
(1994)). 
7 Atkinson, 778 A.2d at 1062 (quoting Rose v. State, 542 A.2d 1196, 1199 (1988)). 
 
4
State did disclose.  At trial, defense counsel questioned Petroccitto outside the 
presence of the jury and after hearing Petroccitto’s responses, voluntarily chose not 
to use the criminal history during cross-examination before the jury.  Defense 
counsel claims the delayed disclosure resulted in the inability to subpoena any 
further criminal records.  Defense counsel, however, neither asked for a 
continuance nor objected at trial.  This untimely disclosure did not deny defense 
counsel an opportunity to use the criminal history effectively and therefore does 
not constitute a Brady violation.   
III. 
In a related and almost synonymous argument, White also asserts that the 
untimely disclosure denied him the right to cross-examine Petroccitto effectively 
about multiple arrests for falsely reporting an incident.  The record reveals that 
defense counsel never attempted to cross-examine Petroccitto in front of the jury 
about his criminal record, and agreed to the State’s suggestion that voir dire 
examination take place outside the presence of the jury.  Defense counsel merely 
asked to clarify Petroccitto’s record, and after doing so, chose not to make a further 
inquiry. Although Petroccitto’s credibility was an important issue, accepting 
White’s argument would require the trial judge to ask the questions for counsel.  
The disclosure, although untimely, provided enough information for defense 
 
5
counsel to make an inquiry.  Accordingly, White cannot establish a Brady violation 
on the theory that his trial tactics were driven by untimely disclosure.  
IV. 
White next asserts plain error occurred when the prosecutor explained why 
Swift did not appear at trial.  At trial, Petroccitto testified that Swift moved to 
Chicago for work-related reasons.  Defense counsel argued during his summation 
that the State’s case hinged on the robbery charge and that the State’s case was 
weak because the jury had “not heard from the robbery victim.”8  He repeated the 
argument about the missing robbery victim later in his summation.9  The 
prosecutor responded in rebuttal as follows: 
Mr. Swift is another part of this case.  There is again no law or rule, 
although the innuendo is such from [defense counsel] that he would 
have to have Mr. Swift here for there to be a good case, when you’ve 
got Mr. Petroccitto and Kathy Dottery both as eyewitnesses, seeing 
that man snatch this silver necklace of Mr. Swift.  You don’t need Mr. 
Swift here.  And you were even given testimony as to where Mr. 
Swift is; Chicago with a new job.10   
 
Although White did not object to this remark, he now argues the State 
improperly bolstered Petroccitto’s testimony by implying that Swift’s testimony 
would support the State’s position.  He also argues that the reference to Chicago 
“implied Swift’s cooperation but for the distance needed to return to testify in 
                                          
 
8 Appendix to Appellant’s Opening Brief at 108 (defense counsel’s closing argument).  
9 Id. at 122. 
10 Id. at 123. 
 
6
Delaware.”11  Improper vouching occurs when the prosecutor implies some 
personal superior knowledge, beyond that logically inferred from the evidence at 
trial, that the witness has testified truthfully.12  When analyzing the impact of 
prosecutorial vouching, this Court has approved the three-prong test formulated in 
Hughes v. State.13  However, we need not analyze the “impact” of the vouching 
because the prosecutor’s remarks here were appropriate.  The prosecutor merely 
repeated Petrocitto’s testimony about Swift’s whereabouts, defense counsel’s 
contention from his summation, and argued that the jury should rely on testimony 
they had heard from witnesses who had been subject to cross examination.  The 
explanation for Swift’s absence, given by a witness subject to cross, was neither 
corroborated nor made more credible simply by the prosecutor’s reference to it 
during rebuttal summation.  No vouching occurred.   
V. 
Finally, White asserts that the trial judge improperly denied the motion for 
judgment of acquittal on the charge of Robbery in the First Degree.  White 
contends that the robbery was completed after he allegedly grabbed the necklaces 
from Swift’s neck.  Thus, according to the White, Petroccitto’s later acts to retrieve 
the necklaces constituted a form of self-help that occurred after the robbery.  White 
                                          
 
11 Appellant’s Opening Brief at 18. 
12 Miller v. State, 2000 WL 313484 *4 (Del. Supr.). 
13 437 A.2d 599 (1981). 
 
7
theorizes that Robbery in the First Degree requires an injury to the victim as a 
result of the theft.  White asserts that the injury here occurred after the robbery; 
thus, although a conviction for Robbery in the Second Degree could stand, the 
Robbery in the First Degree conviction must be vacated. 
White relies on Yocum v. State14 in support of his argument.  In Yocum, a 
defendant believed that certain guests at his house stole $50.  The defendant, 
brandishing a gun, chased after the victims and forced the victims to return to the 
house so a search could be conducted.  The defendant argued that the trial judge 
erroneously refused to instruct the jury on the defense of justification.  We held 
that the use of force in the protection of property does not extend to efforts to 
retrieve the property after the theft is accomplished.15   
This case is distinguishable from Yocum because the robbery statutes 
contemplate potential resistance from the victim and seek to enhance punishment 
for any perpetrator whose acts injure any person not involved in the offense itself.  
Robbery in the Second Degree provides:  
(a) A person is guilty of robbery in the second degree when, in the 
course of committing theft, the person uses or threatens the immediate 
use of force upon another with the intent to: 
 
(1) Prevent or overcome resistance to the take of the property 
or the retention therefore immediately after the taking …16 
                                          
 
14 777 A.2d 782 (Del. 2001). 
15 Id. at 784. 
16 11 Del. C. § 831 (emphasis added). 
 
8
 
Robbery in the First Degree provides:  
(a) A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when the person 
commits the crime of robbery in the second degree and when, in the 
course of the commission of the crime or of immediate flight 
therefrom, the person or another participant in the crime:  
 
(1) Causes physical injury to any person who is not a 
participant in the crime; or  
(2) Displays what appears to be a deadly weapon; …17 
 
Petroccitto confronted White as White left the area.  White then used force 
to escape with the stolen property when he punched Petroccitto in the face.  The 
robbery statute contemplates a factual scenario where the robbery itself might 
provoke physical injury to any person, not necessarily the victim of the robbery, 
who does not participate in the crime.  White’s argument, if adopted, would shield 
a person who commits a robbery from conviction of First Degree Robbery merely 
because a brave or foolhardy eyewitness intervenes.  The broad language chosen 
by the General Assembly, “any person who is not a participant” is properly 
consistent with a clear public purpose to protect all persons who may be injured 
arising out of the commission of a robbery, not just the victim.  Accordingly, 
White’s argument is without merit.  
The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
                                          
 
17 11 Del. C. § 832 (emphasis added).