Title: In re Disqualification of Huffman

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as In re Disqualification of Huffman, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2013-Ohio-1615.] 
 
 
IN RE DISQUALIFICATION OF HUFFMAN. 
THE STATE OF OHIO v. LEET. 
[Cite as In re Disqualification of Huffman, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 
2013-Ohio-1615.] 
Judges—Affidavit of disqualification—R.C. 2701.03—Judge’s comments at 
affiant’s sentencing hearing did not demonstrate the appearance of bias or 
prejudice—No reasonable and well-informed observer would harbor 
serious doubts about judge’s impartiality or question judge’s ability to 
preside fairly over the new trial—Affidavit denied. 
(No. 13-AP-024—Decided April 2, 2013.) 
ON AFFIDAVIT OF DISQUALIFICATION in Montgomery County  
Court of Common Pleas Case No. 2010-CR-00635. 
__________________ 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
{¶ 1} Gregory Leet, the defendant in the underlying proceeding, has filed 
an affidavit with the clerk of this court under R.C. 2701.03 seeking to disqualify 
Judge Mary Katherine Huffman from presiding over any further proceedings in 
case No. 2010-CR-00635, now pending for a new trial in the Court of Common 
Pleas of Montgomery County. 
{¶ 2} Leet alleges that during his first trial, Judge Huffman exhibited 
bias against him in “the manner in which she treated the State’s witnesses as 
opposed to the way she treated [Leet’s] witnesses.”  Leet also asserts that Judge 
Huffman’s comments at his initial sentencing hearing show her belief that he is 
“racist” and “clearly guilty of the charges.”  Based on these comments, Leet does 
not believe that Judge Huffman can set aside her feelings against him and preside 
fairly and impartially over his new trial. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 3} Judge Huffman has responded in writing to the allegations in 
Leet’s affidavit and has submitted a video of the initial sentencing hearing.  Judge 
Huffman disclaims any bias against Leet and further explains that her comments 
at the initial sentencing hearing were made after the jury found Leet guilty and 
while she was considering the seriousness of his conduct and the likelihood of 
recidivism, as required by R.C. 2929.12. 
{¶ 4} For the following reasons, no basis has been established to order 
the disqualification of Judge Huffman. 
{¶ 5} First, Leet has failed to substantiate his claim that Judge Huffman 
treated his witnesses differently than the state’s witnesses.  In affidavit-of-
disqualification proceedings, the burden falls on the affiant to submit sufficient 
evidence and argument demonstrating that disqualification is warranted.  See R.C. 
2701.03(B)(1).  Here, Leet has not identified these alleged witnesses or explained 
how Judge Huffman treated them differently.  Vague or unsubstantiated 
allegations—such as those here—are insufficient to establish bias or prejudice.  In 
re Disqualification of Walker, 36 Ohio St.3d 606, 522 N.E.2d 460 (1988).  See 
also In re Disqualification of Mitrovich, 101 Ohio St.3d 1214, 2003-Ohio-7358, 
803 N.E.2d 816, ¶ 4 (“An affidavit must describe with specificity and particularity 
those facts alleged to support the claim of bias or prejudice”). 
{¶ 6} Second, 
Judge 
Huffman’s 
sentencing 
comments 
do 
not 
demonstrate a bias or prejudice mandating disqualification.  Because a sentencing 
judge must ordinarily explain the reasons for imposing a sentence, judicial 
comments during sentencing, even if disapproving, critical, or heavy-handed, do 
not typically give rise to a cognizable basis for disqualification.  See Flamm, 
Judicial Disqualification, Section 16.4, 450-463 (2d Ed.2007).  As other courts 
have explained, “ ‘[i]t is the court’s prerogative, if not its duty, to assess the 
defendant’s character and crimes at sentencing, after * * * guilt has been 
decided.’ ”  Connecticut v. Rizzo, 303 Conn. 71, 128-129, 31 A.3d 1094 (2011), 
January Term, 2013 
3 
 
quoting United States v. Pearson, 203 F.3d 1243, 1278 (10th Cir.2000), cert. 
denied, 530 U.S. 1268, 120 S.Ct. 2734, 147 L.Ed.2d 995 (2000).  “Furthermore, 
‘[t]o a considerable extent a sentencing judge is the embodiment of public 
condemnation and * * * [a]s the community’s spokesperson * * * can lecture a 
defendant as a lesson to that defendant and as a deterrent to others.’ ”  Id., quoting 
United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 740 (4th Cir.1991).  As the United States 
Supreme Court has explained:   
 
The judge who presides at trial may, upon completion of 
the evidence, be exceedingly ill disposed towards the defendant, 
who has been shown to be a thoroughly reprehensible person.  But 
the judge is not thereby recusable for bias or prejudice, since his 
knowledge and opinion it produced were properly and necessarily 
acquired in the course of the proceedings, and are indeed 
sometimes (as in a bench trial) necessary to completion of the 
judge’s task. 
 
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 550-551, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 
(1994).  Accordingly, a trial judge’s harsh comments to a defendant during 
sentencing will not ordinarily lead to disqualification. 
{¶ 7} On the other hand, there are circumstances in which a judge’s 
disqualification is necessary to avoid an appearance of impropriety.  See In re 
Disqualification of Winkler, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2013-Ohio-890, __ N.E.2d __, 
¶ 11-14 (appearance of impropriety created by judge’s sentencing comments).  
Leet has not established that Judge Huffman’s comments create an appearance of 
partiality.  During the initial sentencing hearing, Judge Huffman stated that Leet’s 
conduct was “racially motivated” and that Leet has “disdain for people who have 
a skin color different than [his].”  She also commented on Leet’s lack of remorse, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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such as “You absolutely take no responsibility for your behavior” and “[Y]ou 
don’t seem to care about any human life but your own.”  Judge Huffman explains 
that she made these comments based on testimony she heard during the trial, after 
the jury found Leet guilty, and in consideration of the seriousness and recidivism 
factors listed in R.C. 2929.12.  See also R.C. 2929.12(B)(8) (sentencing court 
shall consider whether offender was motivated by prejudice based on race) and 
R.C. 2929.12(D)(5) (sentencing court shall consider whether offender shows 
genuine remorse for offense).  Judge Huffman also avers that she understands that 
Leet is “entitled to a new trial and that he is clothed in the presumption of 
innocence.”  Based on this record, no reasonable and well-informed observer 
would harbor serious doubts about Judge Huffman’s impartiality or question her 
ability to put aside her previous opinions and preside fairly over the new trial.  See 
In re Disqualification of Lewis, 117 Ohio St.3d 1227, 2004-Ohio-7359, 884 
N.E.2d 1082, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 8} In conclusion, “[a] judge is presumed to follow the law and not to 
be biased, and the appearance of bias or prejudice must be compelling to 
overcome these presumptions.”  In re Disqualification of George, 100 Ohio St.3d 
1241, 2003-Ohio-5489, 798 N.E.2d 23, ¶ 5.  Leet’s speculation about Judge 
Huffman’s prejudice is insufficient to overcome these presumptions. 
{¶ 9} For the reasons stated above, the affidavit of disqualification is 
denied.  The case may proceed before Judge Huffman. 
______________________