Title: Commonwealth v. Ashford

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12874 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  LEE W. ASHFORD. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     April 7, 2020. - December 16, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ.1 
 
 
Firearms.  Evidence, Firearm.  Statute, Retroactive application.  
Practice, Criminal, Retroactivity of judicial holding, 
Sentence.  Intentional Conduct.  Wanton or Reckless 
Conduct. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 9, 2010. 
 
Following review by the Appeals Court, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 
1113 (2015), a motion for required findings of not guilty, filed 
on January 28, 2019, was considered by Angel Kelly, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Timothy St. Lawrence for the defendant. 
B. Patrick Nevins, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Jessica LaClair, for Paris Tillery, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
                     
1 Chief Justice Gants participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his death.  Justice Lenk participated in the 
deliberation on this case prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
Michael Tumposky, for Massachusetts Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  When State police troopers attempted to stop 
the defendant's vehicle for speeding, he fled, first in the 
vehicle and then on foot.  After he was apprehended, police 
recovered drugs they saw him throw into a Dumpster as well as a 
loaded gun from a bag on the rear seat of the vehicle.  On 
appeal, the defendant argues that our holding in Commonwealth v. 
Brown, 479 Mass. 600, 601 (2018) -- that the Commonwealth must 
prove he knew that the gun was loaded in order to establish a 
violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n) -- applies retroactively to 
his case on collateral review.  The defendant also asks us to 
consider whether assault and battery by means of a dangerous 
weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b), a crime that can be 
accomplished either intentionally or recklessly, is 
categorically a violent crime, as required to serve as a 
predicate offense under G. L. c. 269, § 10G, the Massachusetts 
armed career criminal act (ACCA or Massachusetts ACCA). 
 
We conclude that Brown, 479 Mass. at 608, did not announce 
a new rule, and therefore it applies retroactively to cases on 
collateral review.  We also conclude that in order for a 
conviction of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon 
to count as a predicate offense for purposes of the ACCA, the 
Commonwealth must use the modified categorical approach to prove 
3 
 
that the defendant was convicted of intentional assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon.  This is so because 
there is substantial ambiguity as to whether the force clause of 
the ACCA encompasses reckless conduct; accordingly, under the 
rule of lenity, the defendant is entitled to the narrower 
reading of the criminal statute. 
 
Background.  1.  Arrest.  Shortly after 9 P.M. on 
February 8, 2010, a State police trooper began following the 
defendant's vehicle as it pulled out of a gasoline station in 
Brockton.  When the vehicle started traveling at thirty-five 
miles per hour in a zone with a speed limit of thirty miles per 
hour, the trooper activated his blue lights and attempted to 
stop the vehicle.  The defendant accelerated, and the trooper 
pursued.  After another police vehicle joined the chase, the 
defendant parked and fled on foot. 
 
The troopers then continued the pursuit on foot, and 
eventually caught up to the defendant, who had his hands in his 
pockets.  When they ordered him to take his hands out of his 
pockets, the defendant "motioned" towards a nearby Dumpster.  
One of the officers testified that something came out of the 
defendant's pocket and went into the container.  The defendant 
was arrested, and an officer later recovered three plastic bags 
from the Dumpster.  The bags contained a substance that 
subsequently was identified as "crack" cocaine.  One of the bags 
4 
 
held two smaller "twists" that had lesser portions of the drug, 
and a third contained fourteen "twists." 
 
Another trooper searched the defendant's vehicle and found 
a plastic bag on the rear seat that contained a pistol, a scale, 
and a bottle of a cologne named "Very Sexy."  A magazine, 
containing four rounds of ammunition, was fully inserted into 
the weapon. 
 
On the drive to the State police barracks, a trooper read 
the defendant his Miranda rights2 and then proceeded to ask him 
what type of cologne he was wearing.  The defendant replied, 
"Very Sexy."  He said that the cologne, drugs, and scale were 
his, but denied all knowledge of a handgun.  He told police that 
he fled because of the drugs. 
 
2.  Prior proceedings.  At a jury trial in the Superior 
Court, the defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a 
firearm, in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); unlawful 
possession of a loaded firearm, in violation of G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (n); and possession of cocaine with the intent to 
distribute, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (c).  Then, in a 
jury-waived trial before the same judge, the defendant was 
convicted of a sentencing enhancement for two prior violent 
crimes under the ACCA.  See G. L. c. 269, § 10G (b).  At the 
                     
 
2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
5 
 
trial on the ACCA charge, the Commonwealth submitted evidence 
that the defendant previously had been convicted of armed 
robbery and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon.  
As to this latter conviction, the Commonwealth's evidence 
consisted of identification testimony by the officer who had 
booked the defendant, and a certified record of the conviction. 
 
In a consolidated judgment on the convictions of unlawful 
possession of a firearm and the ACCA enhancement, the judge 
sentenced the defendant to a term of incarceration of not less 
than ten years and not more than ten years and one day, the 
mandatory minimum under the ACCA.  That sentence was to run 
concurrently with a sentence of not less than two years and not 
more than three years for possessing cocaine in violation of 
G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (c).  In addition, the defendant was 
sentenced to two years of probation on the loaded firearm 
conviction, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n), which was to run from and 
after his ten-year sentence under the ACCA. 
 
The defendant appealed and also filed a motion for a new 
trial; that motion was denied following an evidentiary hearing.  
The Appeals Court consolidated the direct appeal and the appeal 
from the denial of the motion.  See Commonwealth v. Ashford, 87 
Mass. App. Ct. 1113 (2015).  In April 2015, the court affirmed 
both the judgment and the denial of the motion for a new trial.  
Id. 
6 
 
 
In January 2019, the defendant challenged both the loaded 
firearm conviction and the ACCA enhancement in a motion for 
required findings of not guilty, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 
25, as amended, 420 Mass. 1502 (1995), or, in the alternative, 
to vacate an unlawful sentence.  The motion was denied, and we 
granted the defendant's motion for direct appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Possession of a loaded firearm.  a.  
Retroactivity of Brown on collateral review.  In Brown, 479 
Mass. at 601, we held that in order for a defendant to be 
convicted of possessing a loaded firearm under G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (n), the Commonwealth had to prove that the defendant knew 
the weapon was loaded.  The defendant contends that he is 
entitled to the retroactive effect of that decision on 
collateral review.  We agree. 
 
"In general, when we construe a statute, we do not engage 
in an analysis whether that interpretation is given retroactive 
or prospective effect; the interpretation we give the statute 
usually reflects the court's view of its meaning since the 
statute's enactment."  Eaton v. Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n, 462 
Mass. 569, 587 (2012), citing McIntire, petitioner, 458 Mass. 
257, 261 (2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 1012 (2011).  Where the 
statutory interpretation at issue is not constitutionally 
required, however, we retain some discretion to apply the rule 
only prospectively.  See Eaton, supra at 588, quoting 
7 
 
Commonwealth v. Dagley, 442 Mass. 713, 721 n.10 (2004), cert. 
denied, 544 U.S. 930 (2005).  This discretion is guided by 
consideration of the novelty of the interpretation, whether 
retroactivity is consistent with the purposes of the rule 
announced, and whether "hardship or inequity would result from 
retroactive application" (citation omitted).  American Int'l 
Ins. Co. v. Robert Seuffer GmbH & Co. KG, 468 Mass. 109, 121, 
cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1061 (2014).  There must be good reason 
"to disturb the presumptively retroactive application" of a 
statutory interpretation.  Id.  See Eaton, supra (prospective 
effect was given in those "very limited circumstances" because 
retroactive application would have clouded title to thousands of 
property transactions). 
 
We discern no reason here to exercise our discretion and to 
apply the holding in Brown only prospectively.  While Brown 
decided an open question of law, its interpretation was not 
entirely novel.  See Brown, 479 Mass. at 608.  It relied on 
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 461 Mass. 44, 53 (2011), where we held 
that "[a]ll of the required elements of unlawful possession of 
ammunition [including the element of knowledge] were encompassed 
by the elements of unlawful possession of a loaded firearm."  
From that conclusion, it is a logical step to the holding in 
Brown, supra, that the element of knowledge required by the 
lesser included offense must be shown in order to convict a 
8 
 
defendant of the greater offense.  Furthermore, any inequity or 
hardship to the Commonwealth resulting from any lack of warning 
that it was required to prove knowledge is outweighed by our 
concern for the inequity and hardship visited upon a defendant, 
like this one, who might have been convicted and sentenced 
without the Commonwealth proving an essential element of the 
crime.  Thus, as we have held, the holding in Brown that the 
Commonwealth must prove a defendant knew that the gun was loaded 
in order to sustain a conviction under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n), 
applies to cases on collateral review.  See Commonwealth v. 
Silvelo, 486 Mass. 13, 17 (2020), citing Commonwealth v. Paul, 
96 Mass. App. Ct. 263, 265-266 (2019). 
 
b.  Sufficiency.  Having determined that the holding in 
Brown is applicable here, we next must decide whether there was 
sufficient evidence for the jury to have found the defendant 
knew that the gun was loaded.  In reviewing the sufficiency of 
the evidence, we examine "whether, after viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier 
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt" (emphasis in original).  Brown, 479 
Mass. at 608, quoting Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 
677 (1979).  In this case, the evidence was not sufficient.3 
                     
 
3 For this reason, we do not reach the further question 
whether the absence of an instruction on this element created a 
9 
 
 
Where there is no direct evidence that a defendant knew a 
gun was loaded, a jury rationally may infer that fact from 
circumstantial evidence.  Brown, 479 Mass. at 608.  While this 
inference need only be reasonable and possible, not necessary 
and inescapable, Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 469 Mass. 621, 624 
(2014), it is equally true that "no essential element of the 
crime may rest in surmise, conjecture, or guesswork" (citation 
omitted), Commonwealth v. Lopez, 484 Mass. 211, 216 (2020).  The 
"evidence is not sufficient if it requires piling 'inference 
upon inference'" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Merry, 453 
Mass. 653, 661 (2009). 
 
Here, the gun was not found on the defendant's person but 
in his vehicle.  He was not seen handling the weapon, and he 
denied ownership.  This evidence is similar to the evidence of 
knowledge that we deemed insufficient in Brown in two key 
respects:  the gun was not discovered on the defendant's person, 
and one cannot tell whether the firearm was loaded simply by 
looking at it.  See Brown, 479 Mass. at 608.  Contrast Silvelo, 
486 Mass. at 19 ("ammunition [inside revolver] would have been 
clearly visible"). 
 
The Commonwealth's argument that the gun was loaded hinges 
on evidence of the defendant's drug distribution.  The 
                     
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth 
v. Silvelo, 486 Mass. 13, 17 (2020). 
10 
 
Commonwealth argues that the jury could have inferred that the 
gun was loaded because there was testimony that the use of 
"protection" "could be" significant for those involved in 
dealing narcotics, particularly alone at night.  Taking the 
inference one step further, the Commonwealth contends that a 
loaded gun offers better protection than an unloaded one, and 
therefore the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the gun was loaded.  We do not agree. 
 
First, the expert testimony that the defendant would have 
been more likely to carry a loaded weapon was weak.  The 
Commonwealth's expert merely answered, "it could be," when asked 
if "protection" would be important to someone dealing narcotics 
in Brockton. 
 
Second, the inference that drug dealers in general are more 
likely to carry "protection," even if accepted, is too broad, 
free-floating, and speculative to support the required element 
of knowledge that a specific gun was loaded.  And because many 
people carry handguns for protection or self-defense, see 
Commonwealth v. Cooper, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 772, 774 (2020), 
countenancing this inference would vitiate the requirement 
announced in Brown, 479 Mass. at 601, that knowledge is an 
independent element of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n).  It also runs 
counter to the statutory scheme, which clearly contemplates 
11 
 
individuals carrying either loaded or unloaded firearms.  See 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), (n). 
 
Such an inference is especially inadequate where, as here, 
it stands alone, in circumstances where there was no direct 
evidence of the defendant handling the gun or threatening to use 
it.  See Cooper, 97 Mass. App. Ct. at 774 (evidence of knowledge 
was sufficient where "gun was neither holstered, nor concealed, 
but was drawn" and tucked into defendant's armpit area, and 
there also was evidence defendant deliberately had obtained 
weapon); Commonwealth v. Grayson, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 748, 752 
(2019) ("reasonable inference that a person carrying a firearm 
in his [or her] waistband would know whether it was loaded" 
supports inference of knowledge, but, standing alone, is 
insufficient to establish knowledge); Commonwealth v. Resende, 
94 Mass. App. Ct. 194, 200-201 (2018) ("close case" where 
"commonsense inference . . . that a person would check to see if 
the firearm was loaded before putting it in his [or her] 
waistband" plus threats related to using firearm were deemed 
sufficient evidence of knowledge); Commonwealth v. Galarza, 93 
Mass. App. Ct. 740, 742, 747-748 (2018) (evidence of knowledge 
was insufficient where gun was found in console of truck driven 
by defendant but owned by third party).  Here, where the 
defendant was not seen handling the gun or threatening to use 
it, we conclude that the evidence presented was insufficient to 
12 
 
support the conviction of carrying a loaded firearm, G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (n), and that the conviction must be vacated. 
 
2.  Massachusetts ACCA enhancement.  a.  Retroactivity of 
Beal on collateral review.  When an individual is convicted of 
illegally possessing a firearm or ammunition, the ACCA, G. L. 
c. 269, § 10G, imposes harsher sentences based on the number of 
times that the individual previously has been convicted of a 
serious drug offense or "violent crime."  See Commonwealth v. 
Wentworth, 482 Mass. 664, 670 (2019); Commonwealth v. Eberhart, 
461 Mass. 809, 814 (2012).  For purposes of the ACCA, a "violent 
crime" is defined as 
"any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 
one year . . . that:  (i) has as an element the use, 
attempted use or threatened use of physical force or a 
deadly weapon against the person of another; (ii) is 
burglary, extortion, arson or kidnapping; (iii) involves 
the use of explosives; or (iv) otherwise involves conduct 
that presents a serious risk of physical injury to 
another." 
 
G. L. c. 140, § 121.  See G. L. c. 269, § 10G.  This definition 
traditionally was divided into three parts, such that "to 
constitute a violent crime under the ACCA, the crime must fall 
within the scope of either (1) the force clause; (2) the 
enumerated crimes provision; or (3) the residual clause."  
Commonwealth v. Beal, 474 Mass. 341, 349 (2016), citing 
Eberhart, supra at 814–815.  Because the Massachusetts ACCA 
"largely replicates" a nearly identical Federal statute, the 
13 
 
Federal armed career criminal act (Federal ACCA), see 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e), "we often look to the Federal courts for guidance on 
issues relating to the meaning and scope of this statute."4  
Beal, supra. 
 
In Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 597 (2015), the 
United States Supreme Court held that the residual clause of the 
Federal ACCA was unconstitutionally vague.  The residual clause 
violated fundamental principles of due process because it "both 
denie[d] fair notice to defendants and invite[d] arbitrary 
enforcement by judges."  Id.  In Beal, 474 Mass. at 351, we 
adopted the reasoning of Johnson to conclude that the residual 
clause of the Massachusetts ACCA likewise was unconstitutionally 
vague.  See Wentworth, 482 Mass. at 671. 
 
Here, assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, 
one of the defendant's predicate offenses for the ACCA charge, 
is not within the enumerated crimes clause.  See G. L. c. 140, 
§ 121.  Should we conclude, as the defendant argues, that he is 
                     
 
4 The only potentially material difference in the language 
of the Massachusetts and Federal ACCA lies in the force clauses, 
where the phrase "or a deadly weapon" is included in the 
Massachusetts version.  See G. L. c. 140, § 121; 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i).  The potential application of that phrase, 
however, is not at issue in this case.  We note, however, that 
determining whether a crime was violent because it involved 
using a deadly weapon against the person of another must account 
for the fact that deadly weapons are a narrower, more lethal 
subset of dangerous weapons.  See Commonwealth v. Rezendes, 88 
Mass. App. Ct. 369, 372-378 (2015). 
14 
 
entitled to the benefit of Beal, 474 Mass. at 351, then the 
defendant's ACCA enhancement can survive collateral review only 
if the predicate charges fall within the force clause.  See 
Wentworth, 482 Mass. at 671.  Therefore, we first must decide 
whether our holding in Beal applies retroactively to cases on 
collateral review. 
 
The retroactivity of a constitutional rule is governed by 
principles announced by the United States Supreme Court in 
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989), and adopted by this 
court in Commonwealth v. Bray, 407 Mass. 296, 303 (1990).  Under 
the Teague-Bray framework, the initial inquiry is whether a rule 
is "new" or "old" (citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 
466 Mass. 422, 433 (2013), S.C., 473 Mass. 832 (2016).  Unless 
one of two exceptions is implicated, new rules apply only to 
defendants whose cases are pending on direct review; old rules 
are "fully retroactive" and apply both on direct and collateral 
review.  Commonwealth v. Robinson, 408 Mass. 245, 247 & n.2 
(1990), citing Bray, supra.  See Sylvain, supra. 
 
The two exceptions that render a new constitutional rule 
fully retroactive are for rules that are either "substantive" or 
"watershed" rules of criminal procedure.  See Diatchenko v. 
District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 665 
(2013), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 (2015).  For purposes of a Teague-
Bray analysis, a rule is substantive if it "'places a class of 
15 
 
private conduct beyond the power of the State to proscribe,' 
. . . or addresses a constitutional determination 'prohibiting a 
certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because 
of their status or offense."  Diatchenko, supra, quoting Saffle 
v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 494 (1990). 
 
In Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1264-1265 
(2016), the United States Supreme Court used this framework to 
address the retroactive application of its conclusion in 
Johnson, 576 U.S. at 597, that the residual clause of the 
Federal ACCA was unconstitutionally vague.  The Court first 
concluded that Johnson announced a new rule.  See Welch, supra 
at 1264.  It then concluded that the new rule was substantive, 
because "Johnson changed the substantive reach of the [Federal 
ACCA], altering 'the range of conduct or the class of persons 
that the [act] punishes.'"  Id. at 1265, quoting Schriro v. 
Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004). 
 
With respect to the Massachusetts ACCA, we are persuaded by 
the Court's analysis in Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1264-1265.  If 
Johnson announced a new substantive rule under Teague, see 
Welch, supra at 1265, then our decision in Beal, following and 
relying upon Johnson, similarly announced a new substantive rule 
under Teague-Bray.  "[W]hen a new substantive rule of 
constitutional law controls the outcome of a case, the 
Constitution requires [S]tate collateral review courts to give 
16 
 
retroactive effect to that rule."  Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 
S. Ct. 718, 729 (2016).  Thus, our determination that the 
residual clause of the Massachusetts ACCA is unconstitutionally 
vague, see Beal, 474 Mass. at 351, applies retroactively to 
cases on both direct and collateral review.  Therefore, neither 
of the defendant's prior convictions may count as a predicate 
under the residual clause. 
 
b.  Assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon as a 
violent crime under the force clause of the ACCA.  The defendant 
contends that the offense of assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon is not a categorically violent crime under the 
ACCA force clause; he does not challenge the predicate offense 
of armed robbery.  As noted supra, because the defendant is 
entitled to the benefit of Beal, 474 Mass. at 351, and assault 
and battery by means of a dangerous weapon is not among the 
enumerated crimes in the Massachusetts ACCA, his ACCA sentencing 
enhancement based on two predicate crimes, G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10G (b), can survive review only if that offense is within the 
reach of the force clause.  See G. L. c. 140, § 121.  See also 
Wentworth, 482 Mass. at 671. 
 
i.  The categorical and modified categorical approaches.  
Depending on the nature of the criminal statute in question, we 
employ either the "categorical approach" or the "modified 
categorical approach" to determine whether a predicate offense 
17 
 
qualifies as a violent crime within the meaning of the ACCA.  
Wentworth, 482 Mass. at 671-672.  See Eberhart, 461 Mass. at 
815-816. 
 
Where the "statutory definition of the prior offense 
unambiguously qualifies that offense as a predicate conviction," 
we use the categorical approach.  Eberhart, 461 Mass. at 815, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Colon, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 8, 15 (2011).  
The categorical approach "generally requires a court to look 
only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of 
the prior offense."  Wentworth, 482 Mass. at 671, quoting Colon, 
supra.  This is appropriate where the crime is inherently 
violent, i.e., where any course of conduct that would satisfy 
the elements of the crime also would constitute a violent crime 
within the meaning of the ACCA.  See Wentworth, supra at 672; 
Eberhart, supra.  Since, after Beal, 474 Mass. at 351, only the 
force clause is germane, and the residual clause plays no role 
in the analysis, this amounts to looking to the elements of the 
crime and asking whether they include "as an element the use, 
attempted use or threatened use of physical force or a deadly 
weapon against the person of another."  G. L. c. 140, § 121.  
Where a particular crime is categorically a violent crime, a 
certified copy of the prior conviction is sufficient to 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime committed was 
a violent crime.  See Eberhart, supra at 817. 
18 
 
 
On the other hand, "we use the 'modified categorical 
approach' to determine whether a defendant had been convicted of 
a violent crime when the defendant was 'convicted under a broad 
statute that encompasses multiple crimes,' not all of which are 
categorically 'violent crimes.'"  Beal, 474 Mass. at 351, 
quoting Eberhart, 461 Mass. at 816.  Under the modified 
categorical approach, the Commonwealth must submit additional 
evidence, such that the fact finder can conclude that the prior 
crime was a crime of violence within the meaning of the ACCA.  
See Wentworth, 482 Mass. at 672; id. at 674 (admission during 
plea colloquy that defendant "struck his girlfriend at the time 
in the face and shoved her down on the bed" was sufficient to 
show conviction was for crime of violence, namely, harmful 
assault and battery). 
 
Here, the defendant challenges whether assault and battery 
by means of a dangerous weapon, a crime which can be 
accomplished either intentionally or recklessly, is 
categorically a violent crime.  More specifically, he argues 
that the definition of the word "use" (actively to employ 
something) in the force clause of the ACCA, coupled with the 
limiting phrase "against the person of another," denotes a 
degree of intentionality that is incompatible with a mens rea of 
recklessness. 
19 
 
 
ii.  Massachusetts precedent.  As the name suggests, the 
offense of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon 
builds upon the lesser included offense of assault and battery.  
See Commonwealth v. Ford, 424 Mass. 709, 711 (1997).  Existing 
Massachusetts case law determining whether assault and battery 
by means of a dangerous weapon is categorically violent does the 
same.  See Commonwealth v. Widener, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 696, 703 
(2017).  Like simple assault and battery, assault and battery by 
means of a dangerous weapon can be committed either 
intentionally or recklessly.  See Ford, supra.  Intentional 
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon requires an 
"intentional, unjustified touching, however slight, by means of 
[a] dangerous weapon."  Id. at 712, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Appleby, 380 Mass. 296, 306 (1980).  See Commonwealth v. Burno, 
396 Mass. 622, 625 (1986), citing Commonwealth v. McCan, 277 
Mass. 199, 203 (1931).  Reckless assault and battery by means of 
a dangerous weapon is the "intentional commission of a wanton or 
reckless act (something more than gross negligence)[5] causing 
                     
 
5 In Massachusetts, 
 
"[w]anton or reckless conduct is determined based either on 
the defendant's specific knowledge or on what a reasonable 
person should have known in the circumstances.  If based on 
the objective measure of recklessness, the defendant's 
actions constitute 'wanton or reckless conduct . . . if an 
ordinary normal [person] under the same circumstances would 
have realized the gravity of the danger.'  If based on the 
subjective measure, i.e., the defendant's own knowledge, 
20 
 
physical or bodily injury to another" by means of a dangerous 
weapon.  Ford, supra at 711.  See Burno, supra, citing 
Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 400–401 (1944).  While 
the recklessly caused injury need not be permanent, it must have 
"interfered with the health or comfort of the victim" and "have 
been more than transient and trifling."  Burno, supra at 627. 
 
In Eberhart, 461 Mass. at 818, we considered whether simple 
assault and battery -- a crime that includes harmful, reckless, 
and offensive battery -- was categorically violent for purposes 
of the ACCA.  We followed the reasoning of the Appeals Court's 
decision in Colon, 81 Mass. App. Ct. at 17-18, to conclude that 
assault and battery was not categorically violent.  See 
Eberhart, supra at 818-819.  While both harmful and reckless 
battery implicated sufficient "physical force" (defined as 
"violent or substantial force capable of causing pain or 
injury") to fall within the scope of the force clause, offensive 
battery (which could be accomplished by de minimis touching) did 
not.  Id., citing Colon, supra at 18-20. 
                     
'grave danger to others must have been apparent and the 
defendant must have chosen to run the risk rather than 
alter [his or her] conduct so as to avoid the act or 
omission which caused the harm.'" 
 
Commonwealth v. Pugh, 462 Mass. 482, 496-497 (2012), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 398-399 (1944). 
21 
 
 
Since our decision in Eberhart, 461 Mass. at 818-820, we 
unequivocally have stated that reckless assault and battery is a 
violent crime within the meaning of the ACCA.  See Wentworth, 
482 Mass. at 673, quoting Beal, 474 Mass. at 351-352, and G. L. 
c. 140, § 121 ("harmful battery and reckless battery each 
qualify as a 'violent crime' under the force clause because each 
'has as an element the use, attempted use or threatened use of 
physical force'"); Commonwealth v. Rezendes, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 
369, 372 (2015) ("It is undisputed that, if committed by an 
adult, an assault and battery by means of a dangerous 
weapon . . . would constitute a violent crime under the 
Massachusetts ACCA"). 
 
This line of cases, however, addresses a fundamentally 
different argument from that which the defendant raises here.  
The holdings in these cases rest upon a distinction between 
violent force capable of causing pain or injury and de minimis 
touching.  See Wentworth, 482 Mass. at 672, citing Eberhart, 461 
Mass. at 818-819; Beal, 474 Mass. at 352-353; Colon, 81 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 19-20.  See also Commonwealth v. Mora, 477 Mass. 
399, 407 (2017) ("conduct that may be sufficient to meet the 
definition of robbery may not satisfy the [ACCA] definition of 
'violent crime'"). 
 
The defendant does not argue, and indeed could not argue 
reasonably, that reckless conduct cannot produce sufficient 
22 
 
physical force to count as violent.  Rather, his argument hinges 
on a determination whether force properly can be said to be 
"use[d] . . . against the person of another" if it is generated 
recklessly.  Because our cases have addressed only the quantum 
of force necessary to count as violent force, and have not 
substantively engaged with the defendant's argument about the 
intentionality implied by the statutory language,6 we do not 
consider that argument to be foreclosed by existing precedent. 
 
iii.  Federal guidance.  While our cases have not grappled 
thoroughly with whether the language and intent of the ACCA 
preclude crimes committed recklessly from being predicate 
offenses, the issue has been extensively litigated in Federal 
courts.  Because of the nearly identical language, and the fact 
that the Massachusetts ACCA was explicitly modeled on its 
Federal counterpart, we "consider the Federal courts' 
construction of the Federal [ACCA] highly persuasive in 
interpreting [the Massachusetts ACCA]."  Eberhart, 461 Mass. 
at 815, quoting Colon, 81 Mass. App. Ct. at 14.  We therefore 
begin our analysis by reviewing this Federal guidance. 
                     
 
6 In Commonwealth v. Widener, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 696, 702-703 
(2017), the Appeals Court rejected an argument about whether the 
force clause in the ACCA reached reckless conduct, but did so by 
following our statement concerning reckless assault and battery 
in Commonwealth v. Eberhart, 461 Mass. 809, 818-820 (2012), and 
the Appeals Court's decision in Rezendes, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 372. 
23 
 
 
Relevant Federal case law starts with Leocal v. Ashcroft, 
543 U.S. 1 (2004).  There, the United States Supreme Court 
addressed whether a conviction of driving while under the 
influence of alcohol and causing serious bodily harm under 
Florida law constituted a "crime of violence" for purposes of 
Federal immigration law.  Id. at 8.  The relevant language 
defining a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 16) in Leocal, supra, 
is materially identical to the force clauses in both the Federal 
and Massachusetts ACCA.7 
 
In a unanimous decision, relying on precisely the argument 
advanced by the defendant here, the Leocal court concluded that 
the force clause in 18 U.S.C. § 16 did not reach negligent 
conduct.  See Leocal, 543 U.S. at 9.  The Court reasoned that 
"'use' requires active employment.  While one may, in theory, 
actively employ something in an accidental manner, it is much 
less natural to say that a person actively employs physical 
force against another person by accident."  (Citation omitted.)  
Id.  With notable uniformity, eleven United States Courts of 
Appeals relied upon this reasoning to conclude that crimes that 
                     
 
7 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) ("an offense that has as an 
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
force against the person or property of another"), with G. L. 
c. 140, § 121 ("has as an element the use, attempted use or 
threatened use of physical force or a deadly weapon against the 
person of another"), and 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) ("has as an 
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
force against the person of another"). 
24 
 
could be committed recklessly were not categorically violent 
within the meaning of the Federal ACCA or materially identical 
provisions of State statutes.8 
 
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Voisine v. 
United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016), disrupted this judicial 
consensus.  The issue in that case was whether a definition of 
misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence, which required the 
"use . . . of physical force," precluded qualifying reckless 
assaults as predicate offenses in light of Leocal, 543 U.S. 
                     
 
8 See United States v. Fish, 758 F.3d 1, 8-10 (1st Cir. 
2014) (because assault and battery by means of dangerous weapon 
under Massachusetts law can be committed recklessly, it is not 
categorically violent under force clause of Federal ACCA).  See, 
e.g., United States v. Moreno, 821 F.3d 223, 228 (2d Cir. 2016); 
United States v. Boose, 739 F.3d 1185, 1187 (8th Cir. 2014); 
United States v. Ocampo-Cruz, 561 Fed. Appx. 361, 364 (5th Cir. 
2014), citing United States v. Vargas-Duran, 356 F.3d 598, 603 
(5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 965 and 543 U.S. 
995 (2004); United States v. McMurray, 653 F.3d 367, 374-375 
(6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Garcia, 606 F.3d 1317, 1335-
1336, 1336 n.16 (11th Cir. 2010) ("Given the near unanimity of 
the circuit courts on this issue, it is perhaps not surprising 
that the government cites no authority supporting its position 
that a conviction based on recklessness satisfies the 'use of 
physical force' requirement [of materially identical Federal 
sentencing guidelines]"); United States v. Zuniga-Soto, 527 F.3d 
1110, 1124-1125 (10th Cir. 2008), overruled by United States v. 
Bettcher, 911 F.3d 1040, 1045 (10th Cir. 2018); Fernandez-Ruiz 
v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121, 1130 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) ("We 
agree with our sister circuits that the reasoning of Leocal -- 
which merely holds that using force negligently or less is not a 
crime of violence -- extends to crimes involving the reckless 
use of force"); Garcia v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 465, 469 (4th Cir. 
2006); Popal v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 249, 254 (3d Cir. 2005); 
United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370, 372-374 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 924 (1995). 
25 
 
at 9.  Voisine, supra at 2279-2280.  The Court decided that the 
word "use" alone did not preclude the definition from including 
reckless domestic assaults, because "that word is indifferent as 
to whether the actor has the mental state of intention, 
knowledge, or recklessness with respect to the harmful 
consequences of his volitional conduct."  Id. at 2279.  The 
Court also noted that the contrary reading would risk "rendering 
[18 U.S.C.] § 922(g)(9) broadly inoperative in the [thirty-five] 
jurisdictions with assault laws extending to recklessness," and 
that, therefore, Congress must have intended the ban on 
ownership of firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), for those who 
have committed an offense of domestic violence, to encompass 
reckless conduct.  Id. at 2280-2282.  It is worth emphasizing 
that the limiting phrase "against the person of another" is not 
part of the definition interpreted in Voisine.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 921(a)(33)(A). 
 
After Voisine, Federal courts were left with the question 
whether the different context and purpose of the Federal ACCA,9 
along with the inclusion of the phrase "against the person of 
                     
 
9 In United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 162-168 
(2014), the United States Supreme Court had analyzed the 
context, language, and purposes of the Federal ACCA force clause 
and the ban on possession of firearms by those who have been 
convicted of a crime of domestic violence, later at issue in 
Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016), to conclude 
that the word "force" had different meanings in the two 
statutes. 
26 
 
another," were sufficient to distinguish the reasoning of 
Voisine from the previously dominant analysis of Leocal.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Windley, 864 F.3d 36, 38-39 (1st Cir. 
2017) (Voisine contained "grievous ambiguity," and therefore 
rule of lenity required conclusion that assault and battery by 
means of dangerous weapon under Massachusetts statute was not 
categorically violent).  The decision in Voisine explicitly did 
not resolve this question.  See Voisine, 136 S. Ct at 2280 n.4 
("Like Leocal, our decision today concerning § 921[a][33][A]'s 
scope does not resolve whether [the force clause of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 16] includes reckless behavior").  Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
United States Courts of Appeals have come to divergent 
conclusions on this question,10 leading to the United States 
                     
 
10 Several United States Courts of Appeals have relied on 
Voisine, 136 S. Ct. at 2279, to conclude that the force clause 
of the Federal ACCA reaches reckless conduct.  See United States 
v. Burris, 920 F.3d 942, 952 (5th Cir. 2019); Davis v. United 
States, 900 F.3d 733, 736 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. 
Ct. 1374 (2019); United States v. Haight, 892 F.3d 1271, 1280-
1281 (D.C. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 796 (2019); 
United States v. Pam, 867 F.3d 1191, 1207-1208 (10th Cir. 2017); 
United States v. Fogg, 836 F.3d 951, 956 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 2117 (2017).  But see United States v. Orona, 
923 F.3d 1197, 1202-1203 (9th Cir.), rehearing granted, 942 F.3d 
1159 (9th Cir. 2019); United States v. Middleton, 883 F.3d 485, 
497 (4th Cir. 2018) (Floyd, J., concurring); United States v. 
Windley, 864 F.3d 36, 39 (1st Cir. 2017) ("Massachusetts 
reckless [assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon] is 
not a violent felony under the force clause").  See generally 
Turner, Reestablishing a Knowledge Mens Rea Requirement for 
Armed Career Criminal Act "Violent Felonies" Post-Voisine, 72 
Vand. L. Rev. 1717 (2019). 
27 
 
Supreme Court's pending decision in Borden vs. United States, 
No. 19-5410, which was argued and will be decided in this court 
term. 
 
The majority of decisions from the United States District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts -- decided after Voisine 
and specifically considering the offense of assault and battery 
by means of a dangerous weapon under the Massachusetts statute -
- have concluded that the force clause of the Federal ACCA does 
not reach reckless conduct and, therefore, that the offense of 
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon is not 
categorically a violent crime under the Massachusetts ACCA.  See 
United States v. Lattanzio, 232 F. Supp. 3d 220, 226-228 (D. 
Mass. 2017).11 
 
Subsequently, in Windley, 864 F.3d at 39, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit addressed this body of 
jurisprudence in concluding that the Massachusetts offense of 
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon is not 
                     
 
11 See, e.g., United States v. Cruz, 234 F. Supp. 3d 328, 
330 (D. Mass. 2017); Virden vs. United States, U.S. Dist. Ct., 
No. 09-10325-LTS, slip op. at 5 (D. Mass. Feb. 3, 2017); Cruz 
vs. United States, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 09-10104-RWZ, slip op. at 
7-11 (D. Mass. Jan. 26, 2017); United States vs. Ford, U.S. 
Dist. Ct., No. 05-10326-FDS (D. Mass. Nov. 16, 2016); United 
States vs. Windley, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 14-10197-PBS (D. Mass. 
July 6, 2016).  But see United States v. McGregor, 229 F. Supp. 
3d 77, 79 (D. Mass. 2017) (adopting analysis of United States v. 
Webb, 217 F. Supp. 3d 381, 391-397 [D. Mass. 2016], and holding 
that, after Voisine, assault and battery by means of dangerous 
weapon is categorically violent for purposes of Federal ACCA). 
28 
 
categorically violent so as to serve as a predicate offense 
under the Federal ACCA.  The court reached its decision, in 
part, by pointing out that "reckless driving that results in a 
non-trifling injury has led to convictions for Massachusetts 
reckless [assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon]."  
See id. at 38, and cases cited.  Reckless driving bears a 
profound similarity to the conduct the United States Supreme 
Court found was beyond the scope of the force clause in Leocal, 
543 U.S. at 9.  See United States v. Fish, 758 F.3d 1, 8 (1st 
Cir. 2014) (pointing to similarities between reckless assault 
and battery by means of dangerous weapon under Massachusetts 
statute and conduct in Leocal, albeit prior to Voisine).  
Relying on its earlier decision in Bennett v. United States, 868 
F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir.), opinion withdrawn and vacated, 870 F.3d 34 
(1st Cir. 2017),12 the First Circuit concluded that "[t]hese 
[reckless driving cases] are the types of cases that give rise 
to grievous ambiguity as to whether the use of physical force 
against the person of another includes the reckless causation of 
bodily injury."  Windley, supra at 38-39, citing Bennett, supra 
at 18-20.  Accordingly, the rule of lenity required the court to 
                     
 
12 Bennett v. United States, 868 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir.), 
opinion withdrawn and vacated, 870 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2017), was 
withdrawn and vacated because of the death of the defendant.  
Its conclusion and reasoning were fully adopted in Windley, 864 
F.3d at 39. 
29 
 
construe the statute narrowly and in the defendant's favor, such 
that, under the Massachusetts statute, assault and battery by 
means of a dangerous weapon is not categorically violent for 
purposes of the force clause of the Federal ACCA.  See Windley, 
supra at 37-39, citing Bennett, supra at 23. 
 
iv.  Recklessness under the Massachusetts ACCA.  While, in 
interpreting the Massachusetts ACCA, we are not bound by these 
Federal cases, we are persuaded by the detailed analysis in 
Bennett, 868 F.3d at 7-23, adopted and affirmed in Windley, 864 
F.3d at 38-39, that there is "grievous ambiguity" as to whether 
one can use (actively employ) force against the person of 
another when one acts recklessly. 
 
In considering this ambiguity, the United State Supreme 
Court's discussions in Voisine, 136 S. Ct. at 2272, 2279, and 
Leocal, 543 U.S. at 9, are instructive.  In Voisine, supra, the 
Court contemplated an angry husband who recklessly threw a plate 
at a wall near his wife.  The Court concluded that the hurling 
of the plate "counts as a 'use' of force even if the husband did 
not know for certain (or have as an object), but only recognized 
a substantial risk, that a shard from the plate would ricochet 
and injure his wife."  Id.  In Leocal, supra at 9-11, by 
contrast, the Court concluded that the defendant's action of 
driving while under the influence of alcohol, and thereby 
causing bodily injury to another, was not an act involving the 
30 
 
"use . . . of physical force against . . . another" because 
"[i]n no 'ordinary or natural' sense can it be said that a 
person risks having to 'use' physical force against another 
person in the course of operating a vehicle while intoxicated 
and causing injury." 
 
The distinction, in part, lies in how one reads the 
limiting phrase "against the person . . . of another."  As the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit explained: 
"the actor is reckless if he consciously disregard[s] a 
substantial risk that the conduct will cause harm to 
another.  The reckless actor is indifferent, therefore, to 
the substantial possibility that his force will apply to 
the person of another.  Hence he does not consciously 
desire that application; nor, since recklessness does not 
require a 'practical certainty' of harm, can we infer that 
he desires it.  As culpable as the reckless actor might be, 
therefore, he does not volitionally apply force 'against 
the person of another.'"  (Quotation and citations 
omitted.) 
 
United States v. Harper, 875 F.3d 329, 330, 331–332 (6th Cir. 
2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 53 (2018) (arguing that its own 
circuit's binding precedent, United States v. Verwiebe, 872 F.3d 
408 [6th Cir.], amended, 874 F.3d 258 [6th Cir. 2017], was 
wrongly decided). 
 
Ultimately, we need not resolve the statutory ambiguity in 
the Massachusetts ACCA.  Its mere presence is enough to conclude 
that, under the rule of lenity, the defendant is entitled to the 
narrower construction of the criminal statute.  See United 
States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2333 (2019) ("ambiguities 
31 
 
about the breadth of a criminal statute should be resolved in 
the defendant's favor"); Commonwealth v. Constantino, 443 Mass. 
521, 525 (2005), quoting Commonwealth v. Carrion, 431 Mass. 44, 
45–46 (2000) ("it is well established that '[i]f the statutory 
language [could] plausibly be found to be ambiguous, the rule of 
lenity requires the defendant be given the benefit of the 
ambiguity'" [quotations omitted]); Commonwealth v. Connolly, 394 
Mass. 169, 174 (1985) ("We must resolve in favor of criminal 
defendants any reasonable doubt as to the statute's meaning"). 
 
We recognize that the result we reach may seem 
counterintuitive, for intentionally shooting a person without 
killing the individual -- a paradigmatic assault and battery by 
means of a dangerous weapon -- is undoubtedly a crime of 
violence.  We note, however, that it is precisely this sort of 
intuition, the "arbitrariness of hypothesizing the 'ordinary 
case' of any given crime," that rendered the residual clause 
unconstitutionally vague.  Beal, 474 Mass. at 350, quoting 
Johnson, 576 U.S. at 596.  The categorical or modified 
categorical framework requires us to look beyond any sense of a 
typical assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon and 
to follow a strict categorical approach "only when all crimes 
encompassed within that statute are violent crimes."  Eberhart, 
461 Mass. at 817. 
32 
 
 
As a practical matter, unlike the interpretation avoided in 
Voisine, 136 S. Ct. at 2280-2281, our decision today in no way 
vitiates the operation or intention of the ACCA, for, in 
contrast to the Federal system, a Massachusetts defendant has 
the right to a subsequent jury trial on the ACCA charge.  See 
Eberhart, 461 Mass. at 816.  The Commonwealth therefore is 
permitted to submit a much broader class of evidence than the 
so-called Shepard documents permissible in Federal court.  See 
id. ("At this subsequent offender trial, the trial judge may 
admit any evidence that would have been admissible at the 
original trial of the alleged predicate offense" [quotation and 
citation omitted]).  See also Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 
13, 26 (2005).  Therefore, under the modified categorical 
approach, it should not be difficult for the Commonwealth to 
prove that a defendant intentionally has used force or a deadly 
weapon against the person of another, in those instances where 
the defendant actually did do so. 
 
Here, however, the certified copy of the defendant's 
conviction of assault and battery by means of a dangerous 
weapon, the only evidence submitted by the Commonwealth, was 
insufficient to establish that the defendant committed 
intentional rather than reckless assault and battery by means of 
a dangerous weapon.  Further, for the double jeopardy reasons 
elaborated in Beal, 474 Mass. at 353-354, a remand to allow the 
33 
 
Commonwealth to submit additional evidence would be 
inappropriate.13 
 
Conclusion.  The matter is remanded to the Superior Court, 
where the judgment of conviction under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n), 
shall be vacated and set aside and the charge dismissed with 
prejudice.  On the subsequent offender portion of the 
indictment, so much of the judgment of conviction as pertains to 
the predicate offense of assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon must be vacated and set aside.  Judgment shall 
enter under G. L. c. 269, § 10G (a), based on one predicate 
offense, and the defendant shall be resentenced accordingly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
 
13 Because the defendant's conviction under G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (n), must be vacated, we need not decide whether applying 
that provision, and an enhancement pursuant to G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10G, violates the protections against double jeopardy.