Title: Abner A. v. Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13224 
 
ABNER A.1 & another2  vs.  MASSACHUSETTS INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC 
ASSOCIATION. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     April 6, 2022. – August 29, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Civil, Action in nature of certiorari, Preliminary 
injunction, Moot case.  Injunction.  Moot Question. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
September 10, 2021. 
 
A motion for a preliminary injunction was heard by Michael 
P. Doolin, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Kay H. Hodge (John M. Simon also present) for the 
defendant. 
Andrew R. Hamilton (Adam M. Hamel also present) for the 
plaintiffs. 
 
 
 
1 A pseudonym. 
 
 
2 The private school that Abner was attending. 
2 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  The Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic 
Association (MIAA) declared a high school senior, who had 
repeated his junior year and had played a total of four prior 
years on his schools' interscholastic teams, ineligible to play 
a fifth year of interscholastic football and basketball, and 
denied his request for an exception, as permitted under MIAA 
rules.  The student then challenged the MIAA's eligibility 
determination through a complaint in the Superior Court in the 
nature of certiorari, posing the novel question of the standard 
of review courts should apply in reviewing such claims.  We 
conclude that a reviewing court should examine a challenge to an 
MIAA eligibility determination only to determine whether the 
decision was arbitrary and capricious.  Applying that standard 
of review to the facts of this case, we conclude that the MIAA's 
decision not to grant the student his requested exception was 
not arbitrary and capricious. 
 
1.  Background.  We recite the facts based on the evidence 
presented to the MIAA at a hearing on the student's request for 
an exception to the four-year rule for eligibility to 
participate in the school's interscholastic football and 
basketball programs. 
 
The plaintiff student attended a public high school in the 
Commonwealth for three school years; the public school was a 
member of the MIAA.  Each year, the student played on that 
3 
 
school's interscholastic football and basketball teams.  During 
the football seasons, the football coach allegedly bullied him 
often and treated him unfairly.  As a result of these 
interactions, the student developed anxiety and depression, 
challenges that were compounded by the circumstances of remote 
schooling during the COVID-19 pandemic.  Having noticed their 
son's symptoms of emotional distress, his parents met with the 
school administration to express concerns about the coach's 
treatment, but the alleged bullying continued.  The student and 
his parents then decided that it would be best for him to 
transfer to another school.  When he enrolled in the new school 
at the age of seventeen, the student and his parents determined, 
based in part on the struggles he had had with learning at the 
public school, that the student should repeat his junior year at 
the new, private school.  During his repeated junior year, the 
student played football and basketball on his new school's 
interscholastic teams.  That school was at all relevant times a 
member of the MIAA.  He also received treatment by a 
psychologist.  The student's mental state and physical health 
improved, as did his grades. 
 
As the student had participated in interscholastic team 
sports for four years, under MIAA Rule 59.1, which restricts 
student-athlete eligibility to four years, the student was 
ineligible to play a fifth year of interscholastic high school 
4 
 
sports.  The school sought an eligibility waiver from the MIAA, 
according to the procedures the MIAA has established for 
submission of requests for waivers.  The request for a waiver 
was accompanied by a letter from the student's therapist, as 
well as one from the school's director of athletics.  The MIAA's 
assistant executive director denied the application.  The school 
challenged the denial under MIAA Rule 87, which establishes the 
procedures by which a student may appeal from an adverse 
eligibility determination to the MIAA's eligibility appeal board 
(EAB). 
 
In August of 2021, at the beginning of the student's senior 
year, the EAB held a hearing with five panelists present.  
Because one of the panelists left during the course of the 
hearing, the EAB no longer had a quorum.  The EAB subsequently 
held a second hearing on September 7, 2021, with a board 
composed of five different panelists.  At that hearing, the EAB 
heard testimony from the plaintiff school's athletic director 
and from the student's father.  The EAB also reviewed notes 
taken by the panelists who had been present at the first 
hearing, and it considered documentary evidence that had been 
submitted with the school's application for an exception; these 
documents included a letter by the school's athletic director 
and a report by the student's therapist.  On September 9, 2021, 
5 
 
the EAB unanimously voted to deny the waiver request, and it 
issued a decision briefly explaining its reasoning. 
 
On September 10, 2021, hours before the school's first 
football game that season, the school and the student jointly 
commenced this action in the nature of certiorari in the 
Superior Court, pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4; in their 
complaint, they also requested injunctive relief enjoining the 
MIAA from enforcing its decision declaring the student 
ineligible to participate in interscholastic high school sports 
for a fifth academic year.  The student argued that, if he were 
unable to play, he would experience substantial harm to his 
mental health and risk the loss of the progress he had made in 
his junior year at the school.  Following a hearing that day, a 
Superior Court judge allowed the emergency motion, after he 
concluded that the plaintiffs had met their burden to 
demonstrate they were entitled to such an injunction.  The judge 
issued a temporary restraining order, effective for ten days, 
stating that "[t]he MIAA shall be temporarily restrained from 
enforcing its decisions denying the eligibility waiver appeal of 
[the plaintiffs]," and "[the plaintiff student] shall be 
temporarily allowed to participate in all practices and compete 
in all interscholastic competitions for the [plaintiff school] 
football team."  A second hearing was held on September 20, 
2021, to determine whether a preliminary injunction should 
6 
 
issue; in advance of that hearing, the MIAA filed a motion for 
reconsideration of the issuance of the temporary restraining 
order.  After the second hearing, the judge denied the MIAA's 
motion for reconsideration and allowed the motion for a 
preliminary injunction, permitting the temporary restraining 
order to remain in place.  We allowed the MIAA's application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Mootness.  Because the student 
participated in his school's interscholastic team sports under 
the terms of the preliminary injunction while the MIAA's appeal 
was pending, and the student has now graduated from high school, 
the plaintiffs ask us to dismiss the matter as moot.  
Emphasizing a need for clarity concerning the proper standard of 
review for challenges pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4, of its 
eligibility determinations, the MIAA opposes the request for 
dismissal.  As we do not agree that the matter is moot, and as 
mootness alone does not necessarily mean that a matter should be 
dismissed, because it may be "capable of repetition, yet evading 
review," Seney v. Morhy, 467 Mass. 58, 61 (2014), quoting Wolf 
v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 367 Mass. 293, 298 (1975), we 
decline the request that the matter be dismissed as moot. 
 
With respect to the school, MIAA rules allow the MIAA to 
impose retroactive penalties upon the school.  Specifically, 
MIAA Rule 29.2 provides that "any contest in which an ineligible 
7 
 
student or coach participates under court order will be 
forfeited if the order is dissolved or the plaintiff ultimately 
fails to prevail."  Because enforcement of this rule (which is 
prohibited under the terms of the preliminary injunction) would 
have an impact on the school's record of wins and losses for its 
football and basketball seasons, the school retains a personal 
stake in the outcome of this litigation.  See, e.g., Wiley v. 
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 612 F.2d 473, 475-476 (10th 
Cir. 1979), cert. denied 446 U.S. 943 (1980) (case was not moot 
where athletic association's rules allowed it to impose 
retroactive penalties on plaintiff); Indiana High Sch. Athletic 
Ass'n. v. Cade, 51 N.E.3d 1225, 1234-1235 (Ind. App. 2016) 
(schools retained personal stake in litigation where association 
could require forfeiture of team records). 
 
With respect to the student, he has completed his senior 
year in high school and will not be participating further in 
high school athletics.  The record does not indicate that he 
received any awards or anything else tangible that retroactive 
enforcement might place at risk of forfeiture.  See, e.g., 
Johnson v. Florida High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 102 F.3d 1172, 
1173 (11th Cir. 1997) (case was moot because "football season 
and wrestling season [had] concluded with [the student] having 
participated in football, and he intend[ed] no further 
participation in high school athletics"; prospect of penalties 
8 
 
for school were irrelevant because school was not party in 
case); Jordan v. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 16 F.3d 785, 
787-789 (7th Cir. 1994) (case dismissed as moot where school was 
no longer party to litigation, and nothing in record suggested 
athletic association could take action which "would have any 
adverse effect of substantial significance" on student); Paige 
v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 2013-Ohio-4713 ¶13 (Ohio App.) 
(case dismissed as moot as to student because there was "no 
indication in the record or the parties' briefs that [the 
student] set any records or won any awards while participating 
under the injunction"). 
 
Nonetheless, although this student will have no further 
participation in interscholastic high school sports,3 similar 
requests for review of MIAA eligibility determinations have been 
made by other students, and are virtually certain to be filed in 
the future.  See, e.g., Foskett vs. Massachusetts 
Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, Mass. Sup. Ct., No. 2177CV00021B 
(Essex County Jan. 22, 2021).  In addition to being capable of 
repetition, these claims are likely to evade review because, as 
evident in the circumstances here, the process of appellate 
review likely would extend well beyond the length of a high 
 
 
3 But see Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 
F.3d 1026, 1029-1030 (6th Cir. 1995) (students have interest in 
preventing athletic association from "erasing their teams' 
victories and their own performances"). 
9 
 
school athletic season, which generally spans only a few months.  
See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Haufler, 377 Mass. 209, 211 
(1979). 
 
Accordingly, we turn to the Superior Court judge's decision 
to issue the preliminary injunction.  An understanding of the 
rules governing the MIAA is essential to this analysis. 
 
b.  Structure of the MIAA and its rules.  The MIAA is "an 
association that regulates competitive interschool athletic 
programs as the authorized representative of its member school 
committees."  Mancuso v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic 
Ass'n, 453 Mass. 116, 118-119 (2009).  Its authority to do so 
stems from G. L. c. 71, § 47, which permits a school committee 
"directly or through an authorized representative [to] determine 
under what conditions [its school's athletic organizations] may 
compete with similar organizations in other schools."  Although 
membership in the MIAA is voluntary, "[v]irtually all public 
secondary schools in the Commonwealth are members of MIAA."  
Mancuso, supra at 118 n.5, quoting Attorney Gen. v. 
Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 378 Mass. 342, 345 
(1979).  "Some private secondary schools are likewise members 
and enter into the same competition."  Attorney Gen., supra.  
"All member schools undertake to submit to the rules promulgated 
by MIAA; they pay dues to MIAA in proportion to their student 
populations."  Id. 
10 
 
 
The MIAA imposes limits on the eligibility of students at 
its member schools to compete in interscholastic athletic 
programs.  For instance, MIAA Rule 59.1 provides that "[a] 
student shall be eligible for interscholastic competition for no 
more than four consecutive years after initially entering 
Grade 9.  This limitation shall apply without regard to actual 
participation or attempt to participate." 
 
A student who is ineligible to compete under MIAA Rule 59.1 
may petition the MIAA for an "eligibility waiver," i.e., a 
decision by the MIAA to set aside the effect of any rule bearing 
on the student's eligibility to participate in interscholastic 
high school sports.  MIAA Rule 87.2.  The process for obtaining 
an eligibility waiver is governed by MIAA Rule 87.  Any request 
for waiver of an eligibility rule must be made by a school 
principal on behalf of an individual student.  MIAA Rule 87.1.  
Once such a request has been made,  
"[t]he MIAA Executive Director or his/her designee shall 
have the authority to set aside the effect of any 
eligibility rule upon an individual student if (1) the rule 
works an undue hardship on the student, (2) granting the 
waiver will not result in an unfair competitive advantage, 
(3) the waiver addresses how this waiver will impact the 
home school student body, and (4) the waiver would not be 
in conflict with the general well-being of MIAA 
interscholastic athletic objectives." 
 
MIAA Rule 87.2.  An adverse eligibility determination may be 
appealed to the EAB, which consists of five to nine 
representatives from MIAA member schools.  See MIAA Rules 87.4, 
11 
 
87.5.  In reviewing a student's appeal, the EAB weighs the four 
factors set forth in MIAA Rule 87.5:  (1) that the four-year 
rule imposes an undue hardship on the student; (2) that waiver 
of the rule will not result in an unfair competitive advantage; 
(3) that the waiver application addresses the manner in which 
allowance of a waiver would affect the student body of the 
applicant's school; and (4) that a waiver would not be in 
conflict with the MIAA's general interscholastic objectives. 
 
While it is a membership organization composed of both 
private and public members, the MIAA has been deemed a "State 
actor" for legal purposes.  Mancuso, 453 Mass. at 123, 134.  See 
id. at 123, citing Attorney Gen., 378 Mass. at 349 & n.18 ("[the 
MIAA's rules] must be viewed as 'State action' for legal 
purposes").  See Scott v. Oklahoma Secondary Sch. Activities 
Ass'n, 313 P.3d 891, 899 (Okla. 2013) ("The [athletic 
association] is not truly a voluntary association. . . .  [M]ost 
public and private schools . . . are members of the [athletic 
association]").4  Cf. Meyer v. Veolia Energy N. Am., 482 Mass. 
 
 
4 Some State courts, by contrast, have viewed State athletic 
associations similar to the MIAA as fundamentally private, 
voluntary associations and, on that ground, have applied a 
principle of judicial noninterference in the internal affairs of 
voluntary associations.  See, e.g., Crane v. Indiana High Sch. 
Athletic Ass'n, 975 F.2d 1315, 1319-1320 (7th Cir. 1992); Hebert 
v. Ventetuolo, 480 A.2d 403, 407 (R.I. 1984); Anderson v. South 
Dakota High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 247 N.W.2d 481, 484 (S.D. 
1976). 
12 
 
208, 222 n.13 (2019) (defining "quasi-public corporation" such 
as railway as "private corporation that has been given certain 
powers of a public nature, such as the power of eminent domain, 
in order to enable it to discharge its duties for the public 
benefit" [citation omitted]); Commonwealth v. Biagiotti, 451 
Mass. 599, 607 (2008) (term "corporation" included "public or 
quasi-public corporation such as" Massachusetts Port Authority); 
Phillips v. Youth Dev. Program, Inc., 390 Mass. 652, 654 (1983), 
quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 
(1974) ("If a nominally private entity is performing a function 
that is 'traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State,' 
then all the acts of that entity are State action"); Luke v. 
Massachusetts Turnpike Auth., 337 Mass. 304, 308 (1958) 
(Massachusetts Turnpike Authority "is not 'essentially a private 
company.'  It is a 'public corporation'"). 
 
c.  Preliminary injunction.  The MIAA argues that the judge 
abused his discretion by allowing the motion for a preliminary 
injunction enjoining the MIAA from enforcing its decision 
declaring the student ineligible to play interscholastic 
football and basketball for a fifth year. 
 
"We review the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction 
to determine whether the judge abused his discretion, that is, 
whether the judge applied proper legal standards and whether 
there was reasonable support for his evaluation of factual 
13 
 
questions."  Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 452 Mass. 733, 
741 (2008).  To be entitled to a preliminary injunction, the 
moving party must show "first, that success is likely on the 
merits; second, that if the injunction is denied, the moving 
party faces a substantial risk of irreparable harm; and third, 
that this risk of irreparable harm, considered in light of the 
moving party's chances of prevailing on the merits, outweighs 
the nonmoving party's probable harm."  Foster v. Commissioner of 
Correction, 488 Mass. 643, 650 (2021), and cases cited.  "Where 
a party seeks to enjoin government action, the judge also must 
determine that the requested order promotes the public interest, 
or, alternatively, that the equitable relief will not adversely 
affect the public" (quotation and citation omitted).  Garcia v. 
Department of Hous. & Community Dev., 480 Mass. 736, 747 (2018). 
 
"Among the factors the motion judge must consider to 
determine whether a preliminary injunction should issue, 
likelihood of success on the merits is especially important."  
Foster, 488 Mass. at 650.  "[T]he preliminary injunction cannot 
survive if the plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the 
merits."  Garcia, 480 Mass. at 754, quoting Fordyce v. Hanover, 
457 Mass. 248, 266-267 (2010).  Nonetheless, "[i]f the judge is 
convinced that failure to issue the injunction would subject the 
moving party to a substantial risk of irreparable harm, the 
judge must then balance this risk against any similar risk of 
14 
 
irreparable harm which granting the injunction would create for 
the opposing party.  What matters as to each party is not the 
raw amount of irreparable harm the party might conceivably 
suffer, but rather the risk of such harm in light of the party's 
chance of success on the merits.  Only where the balance between 
these risks cuts in favor of the moving party may a preliminary 
injunction properly issue" (footnote omitted).  Packaging Indus. 
Group, Inc. v. Cheney, 380 Mass. 609, 617 (1980). 
 
Here, assessing the likelihood of success on the merits 
first requires consideration of the proper standard of review. 
 
i.  Standard of review for challenge to MIAA eligibility 
determination.  As stated, the plaintiffs challenged the MIAA's 
denial of their waiver request in a complaint in the nature of 
certiorari.  See Mancuso, 453 Mass. at 134; G. L. c. 249, § 4.  
At the hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction, the 
plaintiffs and the MIAA asserted, and the judge agreed, that the 
proper standard of review was "arbitrary and capricious," albeit 
that the MIAA suggested a unique interpretation of what that 
standard entailed. 
 
"Certiorari is a 'limited procedure reserved for correction 
of substantial errors of law apparent on the record created 
before a judicial or quasi judicial tribunal."  Langan v. Board 
of Registration in Med., 477 Mass. 1023, 1025 (2017), quoting 
Indeck v. Clients' Sec. Bd., 450 Mass 379, 385 (2008).  See 
15 
 
School Comm. of Hudson v. Board of Educ., 448 Mass. 565, 575-576 
(2007).  The purpose of an action in the nature of certiorari is 
"to relieve aggrieved parties from the injustice arising from 
errors of law committed in proceedings affecting their 
justiciable rights when no other means of relief are open."  
Frawley v. Police Comm'r of Cambridge, 473 Mass. 716, 726 
(2016), quoting Figgs v. Boston Hous. Auth., 469 Mass. 354, 361 
(2014).  Review of an action in the nature of certiorari 
"extends to the entire record of the proceedings that are the 
subject of the complaint for relief in the nature of certiorari, 
or to such portions of the record as the parties agree are 
necessary."  State Bd. of Retirement v. Woodward, 446 Mass. 698, 
704 (2006). 
 
In an action in the nature of certiorari, "the standard of 
review may vary according to the nature of the action for which 
review is sought."  Forsyth Sch. for Dental Hygienists v. Board 
of Registration in Dentistry, 404 Mass. 211, 217 (1989).  See 
Pollard v. Conservation Comm'n of Norfolk, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 
340, 348 (2008) (standard of review pursuant to certiorari 
statute "accommodates to the kind of administration decision 
involved" [citation omitted]).  While "the proper standard of 
review under the certiorari statute is flexible and case 
specific, . . . as with review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, the 
disposition . . . ultimately [must] turn on whether the agency's 
16 
 
decision was arbitrary and capricious, unsupported by 
substantial evidence, or otherwise an error of law" (alteration 
omitted).  Langan, 477 Mass. at 1025, quoting Hoffer v. Board of 
Registration in Med., 461 Mass. 451, 458 n.9 (2012). 
 
Where an agency decision implicates the exercise of 
administrative discretion, "[a]n appeal under G. L. c. 249, § 4, 
through an action in the nature of certiorari, is not generally 
available . . . except to determine whether the board acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously."  Forsyth, 404 Mass. at 217.  
Given the MIAA's status as a quasi governmental agency, see 
Mancuso, 453 Mass. at 134, in determining whether to apply the 
arbitrary and capricious standard of review, we consider whether 
the issuance of an eligibility waiver is an exercise of 
administrative discretion.  See Scott, 313 P.3d at 902 ("While 
the [athletic association] is not a [S]tate agency subject to 
the provisions of the [Administrative Procedures Act (APA)], it 
is similar enough in character and in reach that courts should 
apply the standard of review provided by the APA"). 
 
Although there is a constitutional right to a public 
education, see McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of 
Educ., 415 Mass. 545, 621 (1993), this right "is not synonymous 
with the right to participate in extracurricular activities, 
such as interscholastic athletics."  Mancuso, 453 Mass. at 125.  
"[S]uch activities may serve as a beneficial supplement to 
17 
 
required physical education, [but] they are by their nature 
separate from that curriculum."  Id.  A student seeking 
eligibility to participate in a fifth year of high school 
interscholastic athletics "has no right to the protection of the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [to the United 
States Constitution]."  Id. at 127.  Similarly, "[t]he 
provisions of G. L. c. 71 do not confer an individual right to 
participate in interscholastic athletics" and set forth no 
procedures to regulate the issuance of eligibility waivers.  Id. 
at 125.  Thus, a determination whether a student is eligible to 
participate in interscholastic sports for MIAA member schools is 
a matter that remains committed to the MIAA's discretion.  See 
id. at 127 n.23 ("Once the period of eligibility had elapsed, it 
is clear that the MIAA possessed considerable discretion whether 
to grant a waiver"). 
 
Accordingly, the proper standard of review of an 
eligibility determination by the MIAA is, as the motion judge 
held, the arbitrary and capricious standard.  See Indiana High 
Sch. Athletic Ass'n. v. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222, 231 (Ind. 
1997) ("we do find substantial justification for our long-
standing use of the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard of 
review in the analogy between [a high school athletic 
association's] decisions and government agency action"). 
18 
 
 
ii.  Application.  The plaintiffs argue that the judge was 
within his discretion to conclude that the MIAA acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously in rejecting their application for 
a waiver.  The plaintiffs contend that the EAB failed to 
consider evidence of the student's mental health issues and the 
harm to his mental health that could result from being unable to 
play interscholastic football and basketball; in particular, the 
plaintiffs point to a report by the student's therapist in which 
the therapist discussed some of the student's interactions with 
the prior coach at his former school, the bullying and 
harassment the student experienced from the coach and other 
students, and the improvements in his mental health that the 
student has experienced in his role on his new team.  The 
plaintiffs also asserted, in their verified complaint, that 
during the father's testimony at the EAB hearing, he explained 
that his "biggest fear" was that if his son "can't do sports, we 
will lose him again" due to mental health issues. 
 
MIAA Rule 87.5 enumerates four factors that the MIAA must 
consider in determining whether to approve a request for a 
waiver on appeal:  (1) whether "[t]he rule works an undue 
hardship on the student"; (2) whether "[g]ranting the waiver 
will not result in an unfair competitive advantage"; (3) "how 
this waiver will impact the home school student body"; and (4) 
whether "[t]he waiver would not be in conflict with the general 
19 
 
well-being of MIAA interscholastic athletic objectives."  The 
EAB's decision after the second hearing on the student's and the 
school's request for a waiver cited MIAA Rule 87.5, and the 
decision addressed each of the four factors using evidence 
introduced at the hearing and documents submitted during the 
course of the appeal. 
 
With respect to the first of the four factors, the EAB 
found that the denial of a waiver would "not result in an undue 
hardship to [the student]," because, the EAB reasoned, he 
"already had the opportunity to participate in four consecutive 
years of interscholastic competition, including four years of 
high school football and basketball."  The decision acknowledged 
the evidence presented at the hearing regarding the student's 
mental health challenges stemming from his experiences on the 
football team at the public school,5 but the decision also noted 
that "[a]t the Hearing, [the student] and his family stated that 
 
 
5 In discussing the student's experiences at his former 
school, the EAB's decision stated: 
 
"During the hearing, the [family] alleged that [the 
student] was bullied by the [public school's] football 
coach and his teammates.  They further argued that this 
alleged bullying negatively impacted [the student's] mental 
health.  In addition, the family cited the difficulty that 
remote learning caused [the student] as a result of the 
pandemic.  A Confidential report of Emotional 
Assessment, . . . submitted by the family cited to the 
impact that the pandemic had on [the student] causing him 
to lose out on the full potential of his academic year." 
20 
 
he remained on the football team during the 2019 season, and the 
negative experience he had on the football team did not roll 
over into basketball."6 
 
Addressing the second and third factors, whether an 
eligibility waiver would give the school an unfair competitive 
advantage over other schools, and how a potential waiver would 
impact the school's student body, the decision concluded that 
issuance of a waiver would 
"result in an unfair competitive advantage for [the 
school].  During the hearing, [the student] was identified 
as a projected starter and impact player, earning 
recognition last year . . . in both football and 
basketball. . . .  Allowing him to participate in a fifth 
year of football and basketball, as an impact player, will 
give [the school] an unfair competitive advantage over its 
competition.  The vast majority of the student athletes 
that [the student] will be competing against will not have 
the benefit of a fifth year of eligibility. 
 
"The [EAB] also found that allowing a Rule 59 waiver would 
negatively impact the [school's] student body.  As an 
impact player, [the student] will be taking playing time 
away from another student athlete.  With regard to 
basketball, where only five players play at one time, this 
is especially true.  As a result of this displacement, the 
[EAB] determined that a waiver would negatively impact the 
[school's] student body." 
 
 
6 The EAB decision also noted that "[the student] described 
his basketball season in the 2019/2020 year as a breath of fresh 
air."  In addition, the decision discussed and credited the 
negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the student's mental 
health, but then went on to note that the student "is no 
different than most student-athletes across Massachusetts.  The 
pandemic caused significant academic and general disruption to 
all students across Massachusetts."  The decision also commented 
that the denial of the request for a waiver would "not prevent 
[the student] from practicing with his teammates at [the 
school]." 
21 
 
 
 
Lastly, the EAB decision considered the fourth factor under 
MIAA Rule 87.5, whether the waiver would conflict with the 
MIAA's interscholastic objectives.  The decision emphasized that 
the MIAA is "primarily dedicated to all student-athletes across 
Massachusetts pursuing their education and providing those 
student-athletes with a level playing field."  The EAB observed 
that the student's family "were aware of Rule 59 when [the 
student] transferred" schools, and the family "made the decision 
[that the student] repeat his junior year, despite the fact that 
[the student] passed all of his classes during his junior year 
at [the public school]."  The decision not only acknowledged 
that "the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on high school 
student-athletes across Massachusetts cannot be understated," 
but also discussed the EAB's concern with allowing a waiver for 
one student on any ground involving the pandemic, as it would 
set "a precedent that all student-athletes across Massachusetts 
should be granted a fifth year of eligibility because of the 
pandemic."  Thus, the EAB concluded that allowing the student to 
play a fifth year of interscholastic athletics would conflict 
with the general well-being of the MIAA's interscholastic 
objectives. 
 
As is clear from the language of the decision, the EAB 
considered each of the four factors enumerated in MIAA Rule 87.5 
22 
 
regarding whether a waiver should issue, and it anchored its 
analysis of each factor in the evidence presented at the second 
hearing and the documentary evidence submitted in advance of 
that hearing.  As discussed, the decision did recognize and 
credit the evidence of the student's mental health difficulties, 
and the student's allegations concerning the bullying at his 
former school and its impact on his mental health.  Nonetheless, 
the decision placed greater emphasis on other facts, such as the 
student's having played on interscholastic teams for four years 
in two different sports and the potential opportunities which, 
in the EAB's view, some other student likely would miss if the 
student were allowed to play.  In this regard, while noting that 
the school had indicated that it would not cut anyone from 
either team if the student returned for a final senior year, the 
EAB emphasized that the student would likely take playing time 
that otherwise would have gone to other students, given his 
recognized athletic abilities. 
 
The record contains adequate evidentiary support for the 
EAB's positions.  It is clear from the testimony and the 
questions asked at the hearing that the EAB was extremely 
concerned and very focused on the concept of a "level playing 
field," and treating all "230,000" student athletes in 
Massachusetts equally.  While the plaintiffs' attorney argued 
that the student's was a "unique" situation, and that playing on 
23 
 
the interscholastic teams was helping to heal the student's 
mental health issues still remaining from the trauma of the 
events at the public school, the EAB emphasized that it wanted 
each student athlete in the Commonwealth to be treated equally, 
and that many others have missed out on classes and sports as a 
result of the COVID-19 pandemic, but they were not seeking 
waivers.  Because the EAB decision addressed and analyzed each 
of the factors in the MIAA rule on granting waivers, and reached 
conclusions based on the evidence at the hearings, the decision 
was not arbitrary and capricious.  See Garrity, 462 Mass. at 792 
("A decision is not arbitrary and capricious unless there is no 
ground which reasonable [persons] might deem proper to support 
it" [quotation and citation omitted]).  Accordingly, the 
Superior Court judge erred in deciding that the plaintiffs were 
likely to prevail in their complaint, and thus that the 
preliminary injunction should issue.  See Fremont Inv. & Loan, 
452 Mass. at 741 ("Before issuing a preliminary injunction, the 
judge must determine that the plaintiff has shown a likelihood 
of success on the merits of the case at trial"). 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The order allowing the preliminary 
injunction is vacated and set aside, and the matter is remanded 
to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with 
this decision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.