Title: State v. Taylor

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EDDIE LAMAR TAYLOR
No. 719A05 
FILED: 12 DECEMBER 2008
1.
Constitutional Law--forensics--not recorded or lost–due process
The State’s failure to secure physical evidence in a first-degree murder
prosecution was unintentional and defendant’s due process rights were not violated.  Although
the investigator did not record the location of each piece of evidence within the store where the
robbery and murder occurred and the crime scene photographs were lost, the evidence was of
only speculative exculpatory value and the trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion
to strike the death penalty or to suppress the ballistics evidence. 
2.
Jury--selection--race-based peremptory challenge--no prima facie showing
A first-degree murder defendant did not make a prima facie showing of a race-
based peremptory challenge by the State where there was no pattern of discrimination and the 
prospective juror expressed tremendous hesitation in being able to vote for the death penalty.
3.
Homicide--instructions--second-degree murder as lesser included offense
The trial court did not err by refusing defendant’s request to instruct the jury on
second-degree murder as a lesser included offense of first-degree premeditated and deliberate
murder where defendant’s conduct before, during, and after the murder provides sufficient
positive evidence of premeditation and deliberation.  Neither the absence of evidence of a plan to
commit murder nor evidence that one was not the first to fire in a gunfight negates premeditation
and deliberation. 
4.
Criminal Law--prosecutor’s closing argument--defendant’s credibility--
prosecutor’s personal belief
The trial court did not err by not intervening ex mero motu in the prosecutor’s
closing argument in a first-degree murder prosecution when the prosecutor argued that he did not
believe defendant’s statement.  Given the overall context and the brevity of the remark, it was no
“so grossly improper” as to render the proceeding fundamentally unfair.
5.
Criminal Law--outside contact with juror--mistrial denied
The trial court did not err by denying a first-degree murder defendant’s motion for
a mistrial based on contact between a juror and an outside party.  The trial court questioned all of
the parties, reprimanded and warned the person who allegedly followed the juror, specifically
questioned the two jurors involved in the incident and received their individual assurances of
impartiality, and inquired generally of all jurors and received their assurances of impartiality. 
6.
Robbery--attempted--evidence sufficient
The trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion to dismiss a charge of
attempted armed robbery of one victim arising from a robbery and shooting in a store.   
Defendant’s attempted robbery was complete, despite the fact that defendant moved to an easier
target without taking money from the first.
7.
Evidence--flight--instruction appropriate and not prejudicial
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The trial court did not err in a first-degree murder prosecution by instructing the
jurors that they could consider flight in determining guilt.  There was evidence that defendant
left the scene hurriedly without aiding the victims and sought to avoid apprehension; moreover,
even if the instruction was improper, there was overwhelming evidence of guilt, and the court
correctly instructed the jury that proof of flight was not sufficient by itself to show guilt.
8.
Homicide--felony-murder--jury unanimity
The requirement of unanimity was satisfied in a felony-murder conviction where
there was an armed robbery of two store owners and of a patron, but the trial court did not
specifically instruct the jurors as to which robbery they should consider as the underlying felony
for the purpose of finding felony murder.  Either of the alternative acts established an element of
felony-murder.
9.
Homicide--felony-murder and premeditation--underlying robbery
convictions not arrested
The trial court did not by failing to arrest armed robbery judgments underlying a
felony murder conviction where defendant was convicted on the basis of premeditation and
deliberation and felony murder.
10.
Sentencing--capital--aggravating circumstance--pecuniary gain--armed
robbery
There was no plain error in the court’s instruction on the pecuniary gain
aggravating circumstance in a first-degree murder prosecution in a case which also involved an
armed robbery. The court did not remove the requirement that the jury find that the murder was
motivated by a hope or expectation of pecuniary gain.
11.
Sentencing--capital--aggravating circumstance--pecuniary gain--prosecutor’s
argument
The trial court did not err by failing to intervene ex mero motu during the State’s
closing argument about the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance in a first-degree murder
prosecution.   Although defendant contended that the jurors would have understood the
prosecutor’s statements to mean that the guilty verdicts on armed robbery and conspiracy to
commit robbery automatically required the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance, the
prosecutor distinguished between the State’s contention and what the jury must find, and told the
jurors that they must look to the trial court for explanation and instruction on the aggravating
circumstances.  
12.
Constitutional Law--effective assistance of counsel--concession of
aggravating circumstance
A first-degree murder defendant was not denied the effective assistance of
counsel where defense counsel briefly conceded the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance
before shifting the discussion to mitigating circumstances, which was consistent with an overall
strategy of openness and truthfulness and the abundant evidence that the murder was committed
for pecuniary gain.
13.
Sentencing--capital--mitigating circumstance--no significant criminal activity
The trial court did not err in a capital sentencing proceeding by not submitting the
mitigating circumstance of no significant history of prior criminal activity.  Although defendant
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argues that his witnesses depicted a comprehensive life history without significant criminal
activity, finding the circumstance on this evidence alone would be based upon speculation and
conjecture.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(1).
14.
Sentencing--capital–multiple nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances–shorthand instruction–single peremptory instruction
The trial court did not commit plain error in a capital sentencing proceeding by
giving a shorthand instruction for thirty-two nonstatutory mitigating circumstances and by giving
a single peremptory instruction for all of those nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. 
15.
Sentencing--capital--aggravating circumstance--pecuniary gain--evidence
sufficient
There was sufficient evidence in a capital sentencing proceeding of the
aggravating circumstance of pecuniary gain even where defendant did not personally take money
from the victim and the trial court did not instruct on acting in concert in this context.  
16.
Sentencing--capital--prosecutor’s argument--course of conduct--any
misstatement cured by court
The trial court did not err in a capital sentencing proceeding by not intervening 
ex mero motu during the State’s closing argument on the course of conduct aggravating
circumstance.  The prosecutor distinguished between what the State contended and what the jury
must consider and find, and the court cured any misstatement by correctly instructing the jury.
17.
Sentencing--capital--jurors’ contact with victim’s family--no mistrial
The trial court did not err during a capital sentencing proceeding by denying
defendant’s motion for a mistrial where the victim’s adult children gestured to two jurors with a
flat tire with a can of Fix-A-Flat, but both the jurors and the witnesses left without verbal
communication.  Any contact was at a distance and was nonverbal, fleeting, and unrelated to the
trial.
18.
Sentencing--capital--prosecutor’s argument--weighing aggravating and
mitigating circumstances
The trial court did not err during a capital sentencing proceeding by not
intervening ex mero motu when the prosecutor’s statement about weighing aggravating and
mitigating circumstances was inconsistent with the law.  The trial court properly instructed the
jury, curing any misstatement.
19.
Sentencing--capital--prosecutor’s argument--absence of remorse
The trial court did not err in a capital sentencing proceeding by not intervening ex
mero motu where the prosecutor commented on the absence of any evidence showing remorse. 
20.
Sentencing--capital--prosecutor’s argument--characterization of defense
witness
In a capital sentencing proceeding, the prosecutor’s characterization of
defendant’s mental health expert as a professional witness was not so improper that the court
erred by not intervening ex mero motu, and neither was an inaccurate statement about the
witness’s payment.
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21.
Criminal Law--recross-examination--records used by mental health expert
Any error by the court in sustaining the State’s objection to defendant’s recross-
examination of his mental health expert concerning alteration of the records was not prejudicial. 
The prosecutor did not accuse the witness of falsifying records on cross-examination and did not
open the door to defense counsel’s question. 
22.
Sentencing--capital--prosecutor’s argument--life in prison--beyond the
record
The trial court did not err by not intervening ex mero motu in a capital sentencing
proceeding where the prosecutor argued beyond the record about various prison amenities
defendant would enjoy if sentenced to life in prison.
23.
Sentencing--capital--peremptory instructions not requested--not given
The trial court did not err in a capital sentencing proceeding by not giving
peremptory instructions on three statutory mitigating circumstances which were not requested.    
24.
Sentencing--capital--defense argument--types of murder and death penalty
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in a capital sentencing proceeding by
sustaining the State’s objections to a defense argument about the kinds of murders for which the
death penalty is appropriate.  The court did not sustain objections to all of the comparisons, and
defendant was not prohibited from arguing that the circumstances of his case did not warrant the
imposition of the death penalty.
25.
Sentencing--capital--death sentence--supported by evidence---not arbitrary
The record fully supported the aggravating circumstances found by the jury in a
capital sentencing proceeding, and there was no evidence that the death sentence was imposed
under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary consideration.
26.
Sentencing--capital--proportionate
A sentence of death was not disproportionate where defendant was convicted on
the basis of both premeditation and deliberation and the felony murder rule, the jury found that
the murder was part of a course of conduct that included other violent crimes and was committed
for pecuinary gain, there was no evidence that defendant demonstrated remorse for the murder,
and the case is more similar to cases in which the death sentence was held proportionate.  
Appeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a) from
a judgment imposing a sentence of death entered by Judge Jack A.
Thompson on 24 August 2005 in Superior Court, Harnett County,
upon a jury verdict finding defendant guilty of first-degree
murder.  On 26 February 2007, the Supreme Court allowed
defendant’s motion to bypass the Court of Appeals as to his
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appeal of additional judgments.  Heard in the Supreme Court 12
February 2008.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by William B. Crumpler
and Daniel P. O’Brien, Assistant Attorneys General, for
the state.
Staples Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Anne M. Gomez
and Daniel K. Shatz, Assistant Appellate Defenders, for
defendant-appellant.
MARTIN, Justice.
On 12 January 2004, Eddie Lamar Taylor (defendant) was
indicted for the murder of Talmadge “Mitch” Joseph Faciane, Jr.
(Mr. Faciane or the victim).  Defendant was also indicted for two
counts of robbery with a dangerous weapon, one count of
conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon, one count
of attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon, and three counts of
first-degree kidnapping.  Defendant was tried capitally at the 25
July 2005 session of Superior Court, Harnett County. 
On 17 August 2005, a unanimous jury found defendant
guilty of first-degree murder on the basis of malice,
premeditation, and deliberation, and under the felony murder
rule.  Following a capital sentencing proceeding, the jury
recommended a sentence of death for the first-degree murder
conviction, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly. 
Defendant gave notice of appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a).
The evidence admitted during the guilt-innocence phase
of defendant’s trial tended to show the following:  Mr. Faciane
and his wife Dawn (Mrs. Faciane) owned and operated a community
store known as Mitch’s Grocery in Bunnlevel, North Carolina.  The
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store contained food and various supplies, along with pinball
machines, arcade games, and video poker machines.  The video
poker machines dispensed tickets, which customers could exchange
for cash at the check-out counter.  An envelope under the
register held cash designated for video poker activities.
The check-out counter and cash register were located at
the front of the store.  At the back of the store were two steps,
which led around a corner to the area containing the video poker
machines.  Surveillance cameras monitored both the front counter
area and the video poker area.  A door to the side of the check-
out counter led to a garage where employees performed tire
changes and other automotive repairs.  This door also led to a
side room that the Facianes used for storage and for sleeping on
nights they did not want to drive home after closing.
At approximately 9:00 p.m. on 4 December 2003, the
Facianes were working at their store when two customers, Barry
and Sandra Butts (Mr. and Mrs. Butts or the Buttses), arrived and
began playing the video poker machines.  Shortly thereafter, Mr.
Faciane went into the side room to take a shower while Mrs.
Faciane remained at the front counter.
Minutes later, defendant and Tyrone Crawley (Crawley)
entered the store wearing masks, gloves, and hooded sweatshirts
and carrying guns.  Defendant rounded the corner to the back
where the Buttses were sitting, while Crawley moved towards Mrs.
Faciane at the front.  Crawley came around the front counter,
pointed his gun at Mrs. Faciane, and said, “Give me the money.” 
In response, Mrs. Faciane opened the cash register, and Crawley
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grabbed a handful of twenty dollar bills and receipts and put
them in his pocket.  Crawley began to reach for the ten dollar
bills, but then stated, “No, I want ‘the’ money.”  Mrs. Faciane,
assuming he was referring to the envelope containing cash for the
games, retrieved the envelope from a shelf below the register and
handed it to him.
In the meantime, defendant walked up behind the
Buttses, pointed a gun at them, and ordered them to “stay still.” 
The Buttses raised their arms in the air.  Defendant then asked
if they had anything in their pockets.  Mr. Butts, who could not
reach into his pockets, asked if he should stand, to which
defendant responded, “No.”  Defendant then moved behind Mrs.
Butts, leaned over her with his gun behind her neck, and removed
her billfold from her jacket pocket.  Defendant began looking
through the billfold, which contained a check card, checkbook,
and loose change.
Meanwhile, in the front of the store, Mr. Faciane
appeared in the side doorway holding a twelve-gauge shotgun and
said, “No.”  The next moment, Mrs. Faciane heard a loud noise. 
Mr. Faciane fell forward, no longer holding his gun.  Mr. Faciane
and Crawley then began struggling with each other on the floor,
apparently wrestling over their guns.  Mrs. Faciane grabbed her
own revolver from a shelf behind the counter and fired twice at
Crawley, attempting to hit his back or shoulder.  In response to
the gunfire in the front of the store, defendant stepped around
the corner, saw Crawley and Mr. Faciane wrestling on the floor,
and began firing at Mr. Faciane.
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Mrs. Faciane testified that around this time, “it
seemed like a war broke loose” and “gunshots seemed to be coming
from everywhere.”  Bullets were flying past her from the back of
the store.  Mrs. Faciane saw Mr. Faciane, who had been attempting
to stand up by bracing himself at the counter, fall to the
ground.  As Mrs. Faciane reached down to help Mr. Faciane,
Crawley pumped the shotgun and fired at her, shooting her in the
arm.  He then ran towards the exit, but turned and paused, at
which point Mrs. Faciane, afraid he was going to shoot her again,
fired at him until she ran out of bullets.  Mr. Faciane, who had
since picked up Crawley’s weapon, also fired at Crawley from his
position on the floor.  Defendant ran back in the direction of
the Buttses, circled around some shelves, and left the store.
After defendant and Crawley left, Mr. Faciane told Mrs.
Faciane to call 911 because he had been shot.  Mrs. Faciane
attempted to place Mr. Faciane flat on the floor in order to
determine where he had been shot and report his condition to the
911 operator.  By the time emergency personnel arrived, however,
Mr. Faciane was unconscious and breathing abnormally.  Mr.
Faciane bled to death on the floor of his store.
The Buttses left the store immediately after the
robbery because Mrs. Butts was hyperventilating, and they went to
the Harnett County Sheriff’s Office, where they each gave a
statement.  Too afraid to sleep in their own home, they spent the
night with their adult daughter.
An autopsy revealed that Mr. Faciane was shot two times
and died as a result of blood loss from the wounds.  One bullet
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entered Mr. Faciane’s chest, causing bleeding in his chest
cavity, and exited through his back shoulder blade.  Another
bullet entered his abdomen, causing bleeding there, and exited
through his buttock.  This second bullet lodged in Mr. Faciane’s
underwear and was discovered by the medical examiner who
performed the autopsy.  Lab testing and forensic investigation
revealed that this bullet came from defendant’s gun.
Emergency personnel and law enforcement officers
arrived at the scene within minutes following the shootings. 
They described the store as a chaotic “war zone.”  Bullet
casings, spent projectiles, debris, and shattered glass from
doors and windows were everywhere.  Later investigation showed
that approximately thirty shots had been fired during the
incident, with at least seven of those bullets coming from
defendant’s gun.
When defendant left Mitch’s Grocery, he drove Crawley
to Cape Fear Valley Hospital in Fayetteville.  Defendant told the
hospital security guard that Crawley had been shot in
Fayetteville.  The security guard escorted defendant to a
deputy’s office.  Meanwhile, officers from the Harnett County
Sheriff’s Department who were at Mitch’s Grocery were alerted to
the presence of a possible suspect at Cape Fear Valley Hospital,
and they requested that the deputy keep an eye on defendant until
they arrived.
Crawley died as a result of a single gunshot wound to
the chest.  Hospital personnel discovered an identification card,
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one hundred three dollars, and receipts from Mitch’s Grocery on
Crawley’s person.
When law enforcement officers arrived at the hospital,
they took defendant to a hospital examination room and
administered Miranda warnings.  Defendant agreed to give a
statement, in which he related that he had remained in the car
while Crawley and a third person, whom he described as “B,”
robbed Mitch’s Grocery.  The officers then placed defendant under
arrest for robbery with a dangerous weapon. 
Defendant subsequently left the hospital with the
officers and directed them to an abandoned house near Mitch’s
Grocery, where he claimed his accomplices and he had parked
earlier that evening.  The officers searched a path from the
abandoned house to Mitch’s Grocery and discovered Mrs. Butts’s
billfold on the ground.  The officers then took defendant to the
sheriff’s department.
At the sheriff’s department, defendant gave a second
statement in which he again said he had stayed in the car during
the robbery of Mitch’s Grocery.  This interview was cut short,
however, by an officer who had been viewing the surveillance tape
from the store.  The tape showed defendant coming up behind the
Buttses and the Buttses raising their hands.  It next showed
defendant stepping away from the Buttses, pointing a gun towards
the front of the store, lowering the gun, and raising it up again
while bringing his left hand to it.
Defendant agreed to give a third statement.  He was
shown a photograph from the video surveillance tape at some point
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before or during this third interview.  During the interview,
defendant related that before the robbery, he and Crawley rode
around smoking marijuana.  Crawley had a gun in the back seat,
which looked like a machine gun.  Around 8:45 p.m., the two
picked up “B.”  “B” had a diagram of Mitch’s Grocery that
described in detail the store’s layout.  “B” told defendant and
Crawley that a garage was attached to the store and that the
store owners lived in a room next to the garage.  “B” also said
the store was a “gambling joint” where he had seen people win
$1600 and $2500.  “B” stated that the money was kept in a
specific location behind the counter.  The three proceeded to
Mitch’s Grocery and parked behind an abandoned house near the
store.  “B” pulled out a handgun, and defendant asked “B” for it.
In his statement, defendant admitted he entered the
store, approached the Buttses, and took Mrs. Butts’s billfold
from her pocket.  He also confessed to firing “B”’s gun, claiming
that, upon hearing gunshots in front, he shot three times in the
direction of Crawley and the victim without aiming because he did
not want to hit his friend.  
Defendant offered no evidence in the guilt-innocence
phase of trial.  At the close of the state’s evidence, the trial
court allowed defendant’s motion to dismiss the three kidnapping
charges for insufficient evidence.  In addition to finding
defendant guilty of first-degree murder, the jury also found him
guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon and conspiracy to
commit robbery with a dangerous weapon of the Facianes, robbery
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with a dangerous weapon of Mrs. Butts, and attempted robbery with
a dangerous weapon of Mr. Butts.
Additional facts and descriptions of events at trial,
as necessary to an understanding of defendant’s arguments, are
set forth below.
PRETRIAL ISSUES
[1] Defendant argues the trial court erred by denying
his motion to strike the death penalty as a possible sentence, or
alternatively, to suppress all ballistics evidence collected at
the crime scene because the state failed to preserve certain
evidence. 
Shortly after the murder, the Harnett County Sheriff’s
Department dispatched an investigator to Mitch’s Grocery to
process the crime scene.  The investigator took approximately two
hundred photographs to document the location of various pieces of
evidence.  He also collected shell casings, spent projectiles,
and other evidence, but did not record in writing the specific
location within the store where each item was discovered.  The
crime scene photographs were subsequently lost and unavailable
for trial.
Before trial, defendant moved to strike the death
penalty or to suppress all ballistics evidence recovered at the
crime scene on the ground that the state failed to preserve
evidence potentially exculpatory with respect to his defense. 
Following a hearing, the trial court denied both motions, noting
in part that:  (1) “There was no evidence presented that any
procedures not followed by law enforcement in securing physical
-13-
evidence was intentional on the part of law enforcement . . . .”;
and (2) “There also is no showing by the Defendant that any
errors committed by law enforcement in gathering evidence
resulted in any prejudice to the defendant.”
Defendant argues on appeal that he is entitled to a new
sentencing proceeding because the state’s failure to properly
process the crime scene deprived him of evidence allegedly
favorable with respect to his defense.  In support of this
argument, defendant proposes the following logical sequence:  (1)
proper documentation of the evidence would have revealed that no
shell casings or projectiles were discovered in the back of the
store where the video poker machines were located; (2) this
evidence would have refuted testimony by Mrs. Faciane suggesting
that the first shot was fired from the back of the store; (3)
this in turn would have proved defendant did not fire his weapon
until after shots erupted in the front of the store; (4) this
information ultimately would have resulted in more jurors finding
the nonstatutory mitigating circumstance that defendant “fired
only after others fired shots”; and (5) the jury would have
returned a different verdict at sentencing.  Defendant’s argument
lacks merit.
Whether a failure to make evidence available to a
defendant violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Sections 19 and 23 of the North Carolina Constitution depends in
part on the nature of the evidence at issue.  See Arizona v.
Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57 (1988).  When the evidence is
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exculpatory, that is, “either material to the guilt of the
defendant or relevant to the punishment to be imposed,” the
state’s failure to disclose the evidence violates the defendant’s
constitutional rights irrespective of the good or bad faith of
the state.  California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)
(citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)).  Nonetheless,
when the evidence is only “‘potentially useful’” or when “‘no
more can be said [of the evidence] than that it could have been
subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated
the defendant,’” the state’s failure to preserve the evidence
does not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights unless the
defendant shows bad faith on the part of the state.  State v.
Mlo, 335 N.C. 353, 373, 440 S.E.2d 98, 108 (quoting Youngblood,
488 U.S. at 57-58), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1224 (1994); accord
State v. Hunt, 345 N.C. 720, 725, 483 S.E.2d 417, 420-21 (1997);
State v. Drdak, 330 N.C. 587, 593-94, 411 S.E.2d 604, 608 (1992). 
The United States Supreme Court has noted the difficulties
involved in requiring a state “to take affirmative steps to
preserve evidence on behalf of criminal defendants,” Trombetta,
467 U.S. at 486, and has stated that “police do not have a
constitutional duty to perform any particular tests” on crime
scene evidence or to “use a particular investigatory tool,”
Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58-59 (stating also that the Due Process
Clause does not “impose[] on the police an undifferentiated and
absolute duty to retain and to preserve all material that might
be of conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular
prosecution”).
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In Arizona v. Youngblood, the United States Supreme
Court concluded that the state’s good faith failure to properly
preserve semen samples from the body and clothing of a sexual
assault victim did not violate the defendant’s constitutional
rights, even though the defendant argued the victim had erred in
identifying him as the perpetrator and even though testing of the
samples may have exonerated the defendant.  488 U.S. at 53-54,
56-58.  The Court explained that “[t]he failure of the police to
[preserve] the clothing and to perform tests on the semen samples
can at worst be described as negligent” and “there was no
suggestion of bad faith on the part of the police.”  Id. at 58.  
Similarly, in State v. Hunt, this Court held the
state’s failure to preserve items seized at the defendant’s home
on the day of his arrest did not violate his due process rights,
even though he argued the evidence would have shown he was
intoxicated at the time of the murder.  345 N.C. at 724-25, 483
S.E.2d at 420-21.  In so holding, we observed that “the
exculpatory or impeachment value of the missing evidence [was]
speculative” and “[n]othing in the record suggest[ed] that any
law enforcement officer willfully destroyed the missing
evidence.”  Id. at 725, 483 S.E.2d at 420. 
In the present case, the state failed to preserve
evidence with only speculative exculpatory value.  Even had the
evidence tended to show that defendant did not initiate the
melee, this information was already before the jury from several
sources.  The testimony of both Mr. and Mrs. Butts, as well as
defendant’s own statement to law enforcement, indicated defendant
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did not fire from the video poker area of the store.  In fact,
one or more jurors found the nonstatutory mitigating circumstance
that defendant “fired only after others fired shots.”
Furthermore, the record supports the trial court’s
finding that any failure by law enforcement to follow procedures
in securing physical evidence was unintentional.  Because the
state’s failure to preserve potentially useful evidence from the
crime scene “can at worst be described as negligent” and “there
was no suggestion of bad faith,” defendant’s due process rights
were not violated.  See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58.  Accordingly,
the trial court properly denied defendant’s motions to strike the
death penalty and to suppress ballistics evidence. 
JURY SELECTION
[2] Defendant next argues the trial court erred by
holding that he failed to make a prima facie showing of racial
discrimination when he objected to the state’s peremptory
challenge to an African-American prospective juror.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 26 of
the North Carolina Constitution prohibit race-based peremptory
challenges during jury selection.  Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79, 89 (1986); State v. Nicholson, 355 N.C. 1, 21, 558 S.E.2d
109, 124, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 845 (2002).  In Batson v.
Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court set out a three-part
test for determining whether the state impermissibly excluded a
juror on the basis of race, 476 U.S. at 96-98, and this Court
subsequently adopted that same test, see State v. Augustine, 359
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N.C. 709, 715, 616 S.E.2d 515, 521 (2005) (citing State v.
Barden, 356 N.C. 316, 342, 572 S.E.2d 108, 126 (2002), cert.
denied, 538 U.S. 1040 (2003)), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 925 (2006). 
First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the
state exercised a race-based peremptory challenge.  Augustine,
359 N.C. at 715, 616 S.E.2d at 522 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at
96-97).  If the defendant makes the requisite showing, the burden
shifts to the state to offer a facially valid, race-neutral
explanation for the peremptory challenge.  Id. (citing Batson,
476 U.S. at 97-98).  Finally, the trial court must decide whether
the defendant has proved purposeful discrimination.  Id. (citing
Batson, 476 U.S. at 98); see also Snyder v. Louisiana, __ U.S.
__, __, 128 S. Ct. 1203, 1211-12 (2008) (holding that
prosecutor’s proffered reason for peremptory challenge of
African-American prospective juror was a pretext for purposeful
discrimination when prosecutor accepted white jurors with “shared
characteristic” of expressed concern regarding serving on jury
due to conflicting obligations); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S.
231, 241 (2005) (“If a prosecutor’s proffered reason for striking
a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar
nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to
prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson’s
third step.”).
In the present case, the trial court determined that
defendant failed to make a prima facie showing.  In reviewing
this determination, we are mindful that trial courts, given their
experience in supervising voir dire and their ability to observe
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the prosecutor’s questions and demeanor firsthand, are “well
qualified to ‘decide if the circumstances concerning the
prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges creates a prima facie
case of discrimination.’”  State v. Chapman, 359 N.C. 328, 339,
611 S.E.2d 794, 806 (2005) (alteration omitted) (quoting Batson,
476 U.S. at 97).  The trial court’s findings will be upheld on
appeal unless they are clearly erroneous—that is, unless “‘on the
entire evidence [we are] left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake ha[s] been committed.’”  Id. (quoting
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 369 (1991)).
Several factors are relevant to whether a defendant has
made a prima facie showing of racial discrimination:  the races
of the defendant, the victim, and key witnesses; the prosecutor’s
statements or questions to African-American prospective jurors
that either appear racially motivated or alternatively, tend to
refute an inference of discrimination; the prosecutor’s repeated
use of peremptory challenges against African-Americans in a
manner that tends to establish a pattern of challenges against
African-Americans in the venire; and the prosecutor’s use of a
disproportionate number of peremptory challenges against African-
Americans in a single case.  See, e.g., Augustine, 359 N.C. at
715-16, 616 S.E.2d at 522; Barden, 356 N.C. at 343, 572 S.E.2d at
127; State v. Quick, 341 N.C. 141, 145, 462 S.E.2d 186, 189
(1995) (citing State v. Ross, 338 N.C. 280, 285, 449 S.E.2d 556,
561 (1994)).  Additionally, the state’s acceptance rate of
African-American jurors is a factor that may tend to refute a
showing of discrimination.  See, e.g., State v. Fletcher, 348
-19-
N.C. 292, 318, 320, 500 S.E.2d 668, 683-84 (1998), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 1180 (1999); Quick, 341 N.C. at 145-46, 462 S.E.2d at
189. 
With this legal framework in mind, we observe the
following with regard to the present case:  Defendant is African-
American, while the victim was white.  Mrs. Faciane and the
Buttses were also white.  Janet Monroe, an African-American, was
the sixtieth prospective juror and was called for consideration
as the tenth juror to be seated.  Prior to Ms. Monroe’s being
called for consideration, the state had peremptorily challenged
two African-American prospective jurors and had accepted two
African-American prospective jurors.  The state had peremptorily
challenged seven white prospective jurors.  After the state
utilized its tenth peremptory challenge to excuse Ms. Monroe,
defendant asserted a Batson violation.  
In denying the motion, the trial court first noted that
Ms. Monroe “expressed tremendous hesitation in being able to vote
for the death penalty” and on that basis “the State was entirely
justified in excusing her.”  The trial court also reviewed the
other African-American prospective jurors whom the state
peremptorily challenged and determined there was no “pattern of
discrimination in the exercised peremptory challenges.”  The
trial court thus concluded defendant had failed to make a prima
facie showing that the state peremptorily challenged Ms. Monroe
on the basis of her race.  Ultimately, two African-American and
ten white jurors were chosen to serve, and two African-American
jurors and one white juror were selected as alternates.
-20-
After careful review of the record, we conclude the
trial court properly held that defendant failed to make a prima
facie showing of racial discrimination.  The state’s peremptory
challenges to three African-American prospective jurors do not
establish a pattern of discrimination when viewed in conjunction
with other relevant facts of this case.  When defendant made his
Batson objection, the state had accepted two out of five, or
forty percent, of eligible African-American jurors.  This Court
has previously cited similar acceptance rates as tending to
refute an allegation of discrimination.  See, e.g., Fletcher, 348
N.C. at 320, 500 S.E.2d at 684 (holding defendant failed to
establish a prima facie case when the state peremptorily
challenged three of five eligible minorities, for an acceptance
rate of forty percent); State v. Abbott, 320 N.C. 475, 480-82,
358 S.E.2d 365, 369-70 (1987) (same); see also State v. Gregory,
340 N.C. 365, 397-99, 459 S.E.2d 638, 656-57 (1995) (concluding
defendant failed to make a prima facie showing when minority
acceptance rate was 37.5%), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1108 (1996);
State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 99, 121, 400 S.E.2d 712, 724-25 (1991)
(stating that minority acceptance rate of 42.8% “is some evidence
that there was no discriminatory intent”).
Perhaps more importantly, the evidence of record
supports the trial court’s finding that Ms. Monroe “expressed
tremendous hesitation in being able to vote for the death
penalty.”  Early in the voir dire process, Ms. Monroe stated,
“Well, you know, the death penalty—we don’t have a life to give. 
I mean, God gave us our life, and we really don’t have a life to
-21-
take.”  Later she said, “The death penalty, I tell you, I really
don’t agree with.”  Ms. Monroe made other similar statements
throughout the course of the examination.  See Nicholson, 355
N.C. at 23, 558 S.E.2d at 126 (“The responses of . . .
prospective jurors, even if insufficient to support a challenge
for cause, are relevant to a determination of whether defendant
has made a prima facie showing.” (citations omitted)).  Our
review of the record reveals that the prosecutor’s statements and
questions during voir dire appear evenhanded and not racially
motivated.  See Augustine, 359 N.C. at 715-16, 616 S.E.2d at 522. 
That defendant is African-American and the murder victim was
white does not, standing alone, establish a prima facie case of
discrimination.  See Quick, 341 N.C. at 146, 462 S.E.2d at 189
(noting, in holding the defendant failed to make a prima facie
showing, that “[t]he only circumstance arguably tending to
establish discriminatory intent . . . is the fact that the
victims were white and the defendant was black”).
Accordingly, the trial court properly determined that
defendant failed to establish a prima facie case during his
Batson challenge.
GUILT-INNOCENCE PHASE
[3] Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by
refusing his request to instruct the jury on second-degree murder
as a lesser included offense of first-degree premeditated and
deliberate murder.
When, as here, the state proceeds against a defendant
on theories of both premeditated and deliberate murder and felony
-22-
murder, the trial court “must instruct on all lesser-included
offenses within premeditated and deliberate murder supported by
the evidence,” “irrespective of whether all the evidence would
support felony murder.”  State v. Millsaps, 356 N.C. 556, 565-66,
572 S.E.2d 767, 773-74 (2002).
“An instruction on a lesser-included offense must be
given only if the evidence would permit the jury rationally to
find defendant guilty of the lesser offense and to acquit him of
the greater.”  Id. at 561, 572 S.E.2d at 771.  The trial court
should refrain from “indiscriminately or automatically”
instructing on lesser included offenses.  State v. Strickland,
307 N.C. 274, 286, 298 S.E.2d 645, 654 (1983), overruled in part
on other grounds by State v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 193, 344 S.E.2d
775 (1986).  Such restraint ensures that “‘[t]he jury’s
discretion is . . . channelled so that it may convict a defendant
of [only those] crime[s] fairly supported by the evidence.’” 
State v. Leazer, 353 N.C. 234, 237, 539 S.E.2d 922, 924 (2000)
(quoting Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611 (1982)). 
The standard for determining whether the trial court
must instruct on second-degree murder as a lesser included
offense of first-degree murder is as follows:
If the evidence is sufficient to
fully satisfy the State’s burden of
proving each and every element of
the offense of murder in the first
degree, including premeditation and
deliberation, and there is no
evidence to negate these elements
other than defendant’s denial that
he committed the offense, the trial
judge should properly exclude from
jury consideration the possibility
-23-
of a conviction of second degree
murder.
Millsaps, 356 N.C. at 560, 572 S.E.2d at 771 (quoting Strickland,
307 N.C. at 293, 298 S.E.2d at 658).  Stated differently, the
trial court must determine “whether the State’s evidence is
positive as to each element of [first-degree murder] and whether
there is any conflicting evidence relating to any of these
elements.”  State v. Leroux, 326 N.C. 368, 378, 390 S.E.2d 314,
322, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871 (1990). 
“Premeditation means that the act was thought over
beforehand for some length of time, however short.  Deliberation
means an intent to kill, carried out in a cool state of blood, .
. . and not under the influence of a violent passion or a
sufficient legal provocation.”  Leazer, 353 N.C. at 238, 539
S.E.2d at 925 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Because premeditation and deliberation are ordinarily not
susceptible to proof by direct evidence, they are most often
proved by circumstantial evidence.  Id.  
This Court has identified certain conduct on the part
of a defendant before, during, and after a murder that supports
an inference of premeditation and deliberation.  See, e.g., id. 
Such conduct includes the following:  (1) entering the site of
the murder with a weapon, which indicates the defendant
anticipated a confrontation and was prepared to use deadly force
to resolve it, Leazer, 353 N.C. at 239, 539 S.E.2d at 925; State
v. Larry, 345 N.C. 497, 513-14, 481 S.E.2d 907, 916-17, cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 917 (1997); (2) firing multiple shots, because
“some amount of time, however brief, for thought and deliberation
-24-
must elapse between each pull of the trigger,” State v. Austin,
320 N.C. 276, 295, 357 S.E.2d 641, 653, cert. denied, 484 U.S.
916 (1987); accord State v. Chapman, 359 N.C. 328, 376, 611
S.E.2d 794, 828 (2005); (3) pausing between shots, State v. Ball,
324 N.C. 233, 236, 377 S.E.2d 70, 72 (1989); and (4) attempting
to cover up involvement in the crime, Chapman, 359 N.C. at 376,
611 S.E.2d at 828-29; State v. Trull, 349 N.C. 428, 448, 450, 509
S.E.2d 178, 191-92 (1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 835 (1999).
Here, before the murder, defendant entered Mitch’s
Grocery armed with a semiautomatic weapon and joined by an
accomplice carrying what defendant described as a machine gun. 
That defendant was prepared to fire his weapon in the event of a
confrontation, which the jury could reasonably infer from his
bringing the gun into the store, is evidence of premeditation and
deliberation.  See Leazer, 353 N.C. at 239, 539 S.E.2d at 925;
Larry, 345 N.C. at 514, 481 S.E.2d at 916-17.  Once inside the
store, defendant pointed his gun at two customers in the back and
instructed them to stay still and empty their pockets.  When
shots were fired in the front, defendant stepped around the
corner from the back of the store into the front area.  He then
fired repeatedly towards the front of the store, hitting the
victim and killing him.  Defendant fired at least seven times
with a semiautomatic weapon, a process that required a separate
trigger pull for each shot.  The store’s surveillance camera
recorded him pausing at one point, lowering his gun, and then
raising it again.  Defendant’s actions of stepping around the
corner to the front of the store, pulling the trigger of his gun
-25-
seven times, and pausing at some point to lower his gun and raise
it again provide ample evidence of premeditation and
deliberation.  See Chapman, 359 N.C. at 376, 611 S.E.2d at 828;
Ball, 324 N.C. at 236, 377 S.E.2d at 72; Austin, 320 N.C. at 295,
357 S.E.2d at 653.  
Following the murder, defendant misrepresented the
nature of his involvement in the crimes.  He misled hospital
staff regarding where the shooting occurred and initially told
investigators that he remained in the car during the shooting. 
These attempts to cover up his participation in the murder also
support a finding of premeditation and deliberation.  See
Chapman, 359 N.C. at 376, 611 S.E.2d at 828-29; Trull, 349 N.C.
at 448, 509 S.E.2d at 191-92.  
In sum, defendant’s conduct before, during, and after
the murder provides sufficient positive evidence of premeditation
and deliberation.  Defendant argues that, although the state
produced sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation,
he was nevertheless entitled to an instruction on second-degree
murder because he allegedly lacked a plan to kill the victim and
only fired his weapon after gunfire erupted in the front of the
store.  Neither absence of evidence of a plan to commit murder
nor existence of evidence that one was not the first to fire in a
gunfight negates premeditation and deliberation.  “‘[N]o
particular amount of time is necessary to illustrate that there
was premeditation.’”  State v. Frye, 341 N.C. 470, 500, 461
S.E.2d 664, 679 (1995) (quoting State v. Sierra, 335 N.C. 753,
758, 440 S.E.2d 791, 794 (1994)), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1123
-26-
(1996).  Moreover, a defendant who initiates a situation without
the requisite intent to kill may form such intent in the midst of
the situation.  See, e.g., Larry, 345 N.C. at 513, 481 S.E.2d at
916 (rejecting the contention that, in order to warrant an
instruction on premeditation and deliberation, “the evidence must
support a finding that [defendant] deliberated the specific
intent to kill before the struggle with the victim began”); State
v. Harden, 344 N.C. 542, 555, 476 S.E.2d 658, 664 (1996) (stating
that “[d]eliberation may occur during a scuffle or a quarrel
between the defendant and the victim” (citing State v. Hill, 311
N.C. 465, 470, 319 S.E.2d 163, 167 (1984))), cert. denied, 520
U.S. 1147 (1997).  This Court rejected a claim similar to that of
defendant in State v. Frye, stating that “Defendant’s assertion
that he had the intent only to rob when he arrived at the
victim’s house does not negate or contradict the State’s proof of
premeditation and deliberation” and that “evidence of a struggle
during the commission of a felony does not necessarily entitle a
defendant to an instruction on a lesser charge.”  341 N.C. at
501, 461 S.E.2d at 680.
Furthermore, with respect to evidence tending to show
that defendant was not the first to fire, “[a] defendant is not
entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense merely
because the jury could possibly believe some of the State’s
evidence but not all of it.”  State v. Annadale, 329 N.C. 557,
568, 406 S.E.2d 837, 844 (1991).  For example, in State v. Larry,
this Court held that although evidence regarding the number of
shots fired by the defendant was conflicting (some witnesses
-27-
testified the defendant fired one shot, while others testified he
fired multiple shots), there was other sufficient positive
evidence of premeditation and deliberation such that the trial
court was not required to submit lesser included offenses of
first-degree murder.  345 N.C. at 514, 518, 481 S.E.2d at 917,
919.  
Similarly, in the present case, regardless of whether
defendant was the first to fire his weapon, the state presented
uncontroverted evidence from which the jury could rationally
infer that defendant formed the requisite intent for first-degree
murder at some point during the period in which he heard shots
erupt in the front of the store, stepped around the corner to
observe the action, and fired his weapon multiple times.  See
Chapman, 359 N.C. at 376, 611 S.E.2d at 828; Leazer, 353 N.C. at
239, 539 S.E.2d at 925-26. 
Defendant also contends his statement, as recorded by
law enforcement following the crime, that he “shot three times in
the direction of Tyrone [Crawley] and the [victim] without aiming
because he did not want to hit his friend” entitles him to an
instruction on second-degree murder.
To the contrary, defendant’s admission that he fired
three times in the victim’s direction supports a finding of
premeditation and deliberation because “[p]remeditation and
deliberation may be inferred from the multiple shots fired by
defendant.”  See Chapman, 359 N.C. at 376, 611 S.E.2d at 828; see
also Larry, 345 N.C. at 514, 481 S.E.2d at 917 (holding evidence
that the defendant fired two or more shots with a pause in
-28-
between supported a finding of premeditation and deliberation);
State v. Watson, 338 N.C. 168, 179, 449 S.E.2d 694, 701 (1994)
(stating that “‘some amount of time, however brief, for thought
and deliberation must elapse between each pull of the trigger’”
(quoting Austin, 320 N.C. at 295, 357 S.E.2d at 653)), cert.
denied, 514 U.S. 1071 (1995), overruled in part on other grounds
by State v. Richardson, 341 N.C. 585, 461 S.E.2d 724 (1995);
State v. Ruof, 296 N.C. 623, 637, 252 S.E.2d 720, 729 (1979)
(listing “‘the number of shots fired’” as being among “the
circumstances to be considered in determining whether a killing
is done with premeditation and deliberation” (quoting State v.
Smith, 290 N.C. 148, 164, 226 S.E.2d 10, 20, cert. denied, 429
U.S. 932 (1976))).
Moreover, we will not invent from defendant’s obscure
assertion that he fired in a specific direction without aiming a
scenario in which he shot the victim without the intent to kill. 
In the past, this Court has refused to consider similarly vague
and isolated statements as evidence negating premeditation and
deliberation.  For example, in State v. Chapman, the defendant,
while riding in a car, fired several shots into another car,
killing one of the passengers.  359 N.C. at 337-38, 611 S.E.2d at
804-05.  The defendant argued that his statement just before the
murder that he was “‘about to shoot up this car,’” id. at 337,
611 S.E.2d at 805, suggested he did not intend to kill a human
being and entitled him to an instruction on second-degree murder,
id. at 377-78, 611 S.E.2d at 829.  This Court disagreed and
stated that when the defendant fired multiple shots into the
-29-
victim’s occupied vehicle, “Defendant’s statement that he was
going to shoot ‘the car’ and the fact that these shots were fired
at night and between two moving vehicles in no way negate[d] the
State’s evidence of mens rea.”  Id. at 378, 611 S.E.2d at 829. 
Similarly, in State v. Smith, 347 N.C. 453, 496 S.E.2d
357, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 845 (1998), the defendant was not
entitled to an instruction on second-degree murder when the state
produced evidence that he set fire to an apartment building to
destroy evidence of his earlier mail theft from residents.  Id.
at 463-64, 496 S.E.2d at 363.  This Court held that the
defendant’s “self-serving statement that he set the fire as a
prank,” made shortly after the crime, “was not sufficient to
support an instruction on second-degree murder.”  Id. at 464, 496
S.E.2d at 363; see also State v. Arnold, 329 N.C. 128, 136, 139,
404 S.E.2d 822, 827, 829 (1991) (holding that the state presented
sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation and an
instruction on second-degree murder was not warranted despite the
alleged murder’s purported statement to a friend following the
killing “that he and [the victim] had gotten into a fight and he
wished it had not happened,” when no evidence suggested the
murder occurred during a fight).
Defendant finally argues that Mr. Butts’s testimony
that defendant’s “only objective was to get out of the store”
tends to show defendant did not premeditate and deliberate the
murder.  But defendant has taken Mr. Butts’s statement out of
context.  At trial, Mr. Butts described how defendant approached
-30-
Mrs. Butts and him and took Mrs. Butts’s billfold.  Mr. Butts
then continued: 
Then, there were shots that
were fired in the front of the
store, and whenever the shots were
fired in the front of the store,
the [defendant] went to the front
of the store.  More shots were
fired.  Then the [defendant] came
towards the back of the store and
then went around the counters and
out towards the front door.
. . . .
Q.
When the [defendant] came
back, could you see what he was
doing?
A.   There again, he was—he
came back probably a lot faster
than he went, I think because shots
were being fired again, as I said. 
And it seemed to me that at that
time his only objective was to get
out of the store.
Thus, according to Mr. Butts, defendant decided to “get out of
the store” after he moved to the front of the store and after
much of the gunfight had already occurred.  Furthermore,
defendant himself told investigators that he first heard gunshots
in the front of the store, then fired his weapon several times,
and then ran out the door.  Combined, these statements indicate
it was only after defendant fired multiple shots in the front of
the store that he ran back towards the Buttses and appeared to
Mr. Butts to be focused on leaving the store.  Neither Mr.
Butts’s testimony nor defendant’s leaving the store after
shooting the victim negates premeditation and deliberation.  
[4] Defendant next contends the trial court erred by
failing to intervene ex mero motu during the following portion of
-31-
closing arguments when the prosecutor expressed disbelief of a
statement made by defendant:
Anyway, [defendant] changes his
statement and he says, “It’s pretty
much the way I told you except for
I went in.  I carried a gun into
the store that I got off of ‘B.’”
But he’s still not quite ready
to take all the responsibility
because he says—and I saw some of
you when this statement was read
and I know that you didn’t believe
it, just like I don’t—“I fired
three times without aiming because
I didn’t want to hit my friend.” 
Fired three times without aiming,
in a direction without aiming.”
Defendant did not object to these remarks at trial.  The
prosecutor continued: 
Well, aren’t you just as
likely to hit him without aiming as
you are to hit him with aiming?  I
mean, who fires three times meaning
not to hit somebody without aiming? 
I aimed at the ceiling ‘cause I
didn’t want to hit him.  I aimed at
the side rack ‘cause I didn’t want
to hit him.  I aimed somewhere else
‘cause I didn’t want to hit him. 
But I fired three times without
aiming ‘cause I didn’t want to hit
my friend.
“[W]e will not find error in a trial court’s failure to
intervene in closing arguments ex mero motu unless the remarks
were so grossly improper they rendered the trial and conviction
fundamentally unfair.”  State v. Allen, 360 N.C. 297, 306-07, 626
S.E.2d 271, 280, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 867 (2006).  In
determining whether argument was grossly improper, this Court
considers “the context in which the remarks were made,” State v.
Green, 336 N.C. 142, 188, 443 S.E.2d 14, 41, cert. denied, 513
-32-
U.S. 1046 (1994), as well as their brevity relative to the
closing argument as a whole, see State v. Fletcher, 354 N.C. 455,
484-85, 555 S.E.2d 534, 552 (2001) (reasoning that when “[t]he
offending comment was not only brief, but . . . was made in the
context of a proper . . . argument,” it was not grossly
improper), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 846 (2002).   
Here, the prosecutor’s statement, “I know that you
didn’t believe it, just like I don’t,” was a small part of an
otherwise proper argument that the jury should not believe
defendant’s statement that he fired without aiming because:  (1)
defendant’s version of the events surrounding the murder was not
credible, as evidenced by his changing his story when confronted
with a videotape confirming his presence inside the store; and
(2) the statement was absurd on its face.  Although the
prosecutor should not have indicated his personal disbelief of
defendant’s statement, given the overall context and the brevity
of the remark, it was not “so grossly improper” as to render the
proceeding “fundamentally unfair.”  See Allen, 360 N.C. at 306-
07, 626 S.E.2d at 280.  
[5] Defendant next argues the trial court erred by
denying his motion for mistrial based on an allegedly prejudicial
incident involving contact between a juror and an outside party.
Near the end of the guilt-innocence phase of trial, the
trial court dismissed the jury from the courtroom and called a
person from the gallery forward.  The trial court confronted the
person with a report by a juror that when the juror left the
courthouse on a prior afternoon, the person followed the juror’s
-33-
automobile for some distance.  The person denied the allegation.  
The trial court nevertheless cautioned the person to stay away
from jurors, and the person indicated his understanding.  Later
in the day, after the state rested its case, the trial court
inquired of both the juror who reported the incident and a second
juror who claimed to have witnessed it.  The trial court asked
each juror whether the incident affected that juror’s ability to
be fair and impartial in the trial of the case, and both jurors
responded that it did not.  When the two jurors related that they
had discussed the incident with other jurors, the trial court
brought out all of the jurors and inquired generally as to
whether an alleged incident that occurred during the previous
week affected their ability to be fair and impartial.  All jurors
responded negatively. 
The following day, defendant moved for a mistrial. 
Defendant argued that because the person in question had been
seated with defendant’s family during part of the trial and was
seen with them around the courthouse, the jury might associate
the person’s behavior with defendant, thereby prejudicing
defendant.  The trial court denied the motion, noting that the
jurors had indicated their ability to be fair and impartial and
that “the jurors do not know the identity of the person who
allegedly followed them or what his connection is with any of the
parties.”  On appeal, defendant contends the trial court’s denial
of his motion for mistrial was error and violated his right to a
fair and impartial jury trial.
-34-
A trial court must declare a mistrial “if there occurs
during the trial . . . conduct inside or outside the courtroom
[that results] in substantial and irreparable prejudice to the
defendant’s case.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1061 (2007).  “‘Mistrial is a
drastic remedy, warranted only for such serious improprieties as
would make it impossible to attain a fair and impartial
verdict.’”  State v. Smith, 320 N.C. 404, 418, 358 S.E.2d 329,
337 (1987) (quoting State v. Stocks, 319 N.C. 437, 441, 355
S.E.2d 492, 494 (1987)).  The decision to grant or deny a
mistrial lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and
is “entitled to great deference since [the trial court] is in a
far better position than an appellate court to determine the
effect of any [misconduct] on the jury.”  State v. Thomas, 350
N.C. 315, 341, 514 S.E.2d 486, 502, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1006
(1999).  Absent an abuse of discretion, therefore, the trial
court’s ruling will not be disturbed on appeal.  Id.  An abuse of
discretion occurs when a ruling is “manifestly unsupported by
reason, which is to say it is so arbitrary that it could not have
been the result of a reasoned decision.”  State v. T.D.R., 347
N.C. 489, 503, 495 S.E.2d 700, 708 (1998).    
Here, the trial court properly sought to determine the
effect on the jury of any misconduct by thoroughly questioning
all parties allegedly involved in or affected by the incident. 
The trial court reprimanded and warned the person who allegedly
followed the juror, specifically questioned the two jurors
involved in the incident and received their individual assurances
of impartiality, and inquired generally of all jurors and
-35-
received their assurances of impartiality.  Additionally, there
is no evidence tending to show the jurors were incapable of
impartiality or were in fact partial in rendering their verdict. 
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying defendant’s motion for mistrial. 
[6] Defendant next argues the trial court erred by
denying his motion to dismiss the charge of attempted robbery
with a dangerous weapon of Mr. Butts.  When reviewing a
sufficiency of the evidence claim, this Court considers whether
the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the state and
allowing every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom,
constitutes “substantial evidence of each element of the crime
charged.”  State v. Davis, 340 N.C. 1, 11-12, 455 S.E.2d 627,
632, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 846 (1995).  “Substantial evidence
means that the evidence must be existing and real, not just
seeming or imaginary.”  Id. at 12, 455 S.E.2d at 632 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Clark, 325 N.C. 677,
682, 386 S.E.2d 191, 194 (1989)). 
“‘[A]n attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon occurs
when a person, with the specific intent to unlawfully deprive
another of personal property by endangering or threatening his
life with a dangerous weapon, does some overt act calculated to
bring about this result.’”  Id. (quoting State v. Allison, 319
N.C. 92, 96, 352 S.E.2d 420, 423 (1987)).  The overt act must
“go[] beyond mere preparation but fall[] short of the completed
offense.”  Id.  A defendant may attempt robbery with a dangerous
weapon even when the defendant neither demands nor takes money
-36-
from the victim.  See Davis, 340 N.C. at 12-13, 455 S.E.2d at
632-33.  For example, in State v. Davis, the following facts
amounted to sufficient evidence of attempted robbery with a
dangerous weapon:  the defendants had been in a certain pawn shop
two previous times on the day of the incident; the defendants
entered the pawn shop for a third time just before closing and
drew their pistols; one defendant said to the shop’s proprietor,
“Buddy, don’t even try it”; and the defendants fled the shop
without taking money or valuables when a gunfight erupted among
the three.  Id. at 12, 455 S.E.2d at 632.  This Court determined
the defendants’ actions of drawing their pistols and their words,
“Buddy, don’t even try it,” demonstrated their intent to rob and
constituted an overt act in furtherance thereof.  Id. at 12-13,
455 S.E.2d at 632-33; see also State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 77-
78, 80-81, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169-71 (1980) (holding evidence of
attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon sufficient when the
defendant pointed a gun at a convenience store proprietor and
stated, “Don’t move” and “Don’t put your hands under that
counter,” but fled when a third party drove past the store and
waved at the proprietor).
The instant case is analogous to Davis.  Just as the
defendants in Davis familiarized themselves with the pawn shop
before the robbery, 340 N.C. at 12, 455 S.E.2d at 632, so too
defendant and Crawley reviewed a diagram of Mitch’s Grocery and
were aware that large sums of money were kept on hand there for
video poker games.  These facts tend to support the state’s
contention that defendant intended to rob clientele of the
-37-
store’s video poker machines.  Moreover, in the same way that the
defendants in Davis drew their weapons and warned the victim not
to “try it,” id., defendant in this case approached Mr. Butts
from behind, pointed a gun at him, and indicated he should “stay
still” and empty his pockets.  These words and actions are
evidence of both defendant’s intent to rob Mr. Butts and an
“overt act calculated to bring about” that result.  See id. 
Having manifested an intent to rob Mr. Butts and performed an
overt act in furtherance thereof, defendant’s attempted robbery
with a dangerous weapon was complete, despite the fact that
defendant, without taking money from Mr. Butts, moved on to Mrs.
Butts when she proved an easier target and ran from the store
after the gunfight.  See Davis, 340 N.C. at 12-13, 15, 455 S.E.2d
at 632-34 (holding evidence of robbery with a dangerous weapon
sufficient when, following a gunfight, the defendants fled the
store without taking money).  Accordingly, the state presented
substantial evidence of attempted robbery with a dangerous
weapon, and the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to
dismiss.            
[7] Defendant also argues the trial court erred by
instructing the jurors, over defendant’s objection, that they
could consider evidence of flight in determining whether
defendant committed murder.  “A trial court may properly instruct
on flight where there is some evidence in the record reasonably
supporting the theory that the defendant fled after the
commission of the crime charged.”  State v. Lloyd, 354 N.C. 76,
119, 552 S.E.2d 596, 625 (2001) (internal quotation marks
-38-
omitted) (quoting State v. Allen, 346 N.C. 731, 741, 488 S.E.2d
188, 193 (1997)).  Evidence that the defendant hurriedly left the
crime scene without rendering assistance to the homicide victim
may warrant an instruction on flight.  See, e.g., State v.
Anthony, 354 N.C. 372, 425, 555 S.E.2d 557, 591 (2001) (holding
evidence sufficient to warrant flight instruction when, after
shooting the victim, “defendant immediately entered his car and
quickly drove away from the crime scene without rendering any
assistance to the victims or seeking to obtain medical aid for
them”), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 930 (2002).
In the instant case, the evidence tended to show
defendant left Mitch’s Grocery hurriedly without aiding the
Facianes or the Buttses and sought to avoid apprehension for the
murder.  Defendant himself told law enforcement officers that he
“ran for the door after shooting,” “ran out of the door and threw
the wallet down on the way out,” and “ran to the right when [he]
left the store.”  (emphases added).  At no point did defendant
attempt to provide or obtain medical assistance for the victims. 
Instead, he drove to a hospital in a different county, where he
misled hospital staff regarding the location of the incident and
misled investigating officers regarding his role in the incident. 
Taken together, these actions constitute substantial “evidence .
. . reasonably supporting the theory that the defendant fled
after the commission of the crime charged.”  Lloyd, 354 N.C. at
119, 552 S.E.2d at 625 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Allen, 346 N.C. at 741, 488 S.E.2d at 193). 
-39-
 Even assuming arguendo that the instruction on flight
was improper, it cannot reasonably be said to have prejudiced
defendant.  Evidence that a bullet from defendant’s gun went
through the victim’s abdomen and lodged in his underwear,
combined with defendant’s own confession to law enforcement,
provided overwhelming evidence that defendant committed the
murder.  In addition, the “‘trial court’s instruction correctly
informed the jury that proof of flight was not sufficient by
itself to establish guilt and would not be considered as tending
to show premeditation and deliberation.’”  Id. at 120, 552 S.E.2d
at 626 (quoting State v. Grooms, 353 N.C. 50, 81, 540 S.E.2d 713,
732 (2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 838 (2001)).  Thus,
defendant’s argument is without merit.
[8] Defendant next contends he was deprived of his
right to a unanimous jury verdict because the trial court did not
specifically instruct the jurors as to which robbery with a
dangerous weapon they should consider as the underlying felony
for the purpose of finding felony murder.  The trial court’s
felony murder instructions were implicitly disjunctive, as they
generally referred to the robbery of “a person” without
specifically referring to defendant’s robbery of the Facianes or
Mrs. Butts.
Article I, Section 24 of the North Carolina
Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be convicted of any
crime but by the unanimous verdict of a jury in open court.”  See
also N.C.G.S. § 15A-1237(b) (2007) (“The verdict must be
unanimous . . . .”).  It is well established, however, that “if
-40-
the trial court merely instructs the jury disjunctively as to
various alternative acts which will establish an element of the
offense, the requirement of unanimity is satisfied.”  State v.
Lyons, 330 N.C. 298, 303, 412 S.E.2d 308, 312 (1991) (emphasis
omitted); see also State v. Hartness, 326 N.C. 561, 563, 567, 391
S.E.2d 177, 178, 180-81 (1990) (holding that when a defendant is
charged with “a single offense which may be proved by evidence of
the commission of any one of a number of acts,” an instruction
that does not specify which of those acts the jury should
consider is not fatally ambiguous such that it risks a
nonunanimous verdict).  
The trial court’s instructions here allowed the jury to
find defendant guilty of felony murder if it found he committed
either robbery with a dangerous weapon of the Facianes or robbery
with a dangerous weapon of Mrs. Butts.  Because either of these
alternative acts established an element of felony murder—namely,
the commission of one of the several felonies enumerated in
N.C.G.S. § 14-17—the requirement of jury unanimity was satisfied. 
See Lyons, 330 N.C. at 303, 412 S.E.2d at 312; Hartness, 326 N.C.
at 567, 391 S.E.2d at 180-81; cf. State v. Coleman, 161 N.C. App.
224, 234-35, 587 S.E.2d 889, 896 (2003) (upholding jury finding
of felony murder when the trial court instructed the jury in the
disjunctive as to four separate felonies that could have served
as the predicate felony, even though the trial court’s
instructions were “ambiguous as to what underlying felony formed
the basis of the felony murder charge”).  Accordingly,
defendant’s argument fails.
-41-
[9] In his final guilt-innocence phase argument,
defendant claims the trial court erred by failing to arrest
judgment on the robbery with a dangerous weapon charges
underlying his felony murder conviction.  “‘[W]here defendant is
convicted of first-degree murder based upon both premeditation
and deliberation and felony murder, the underlying felony does
not merge with the murder conviction and the trial court is free
to impose a sentence thereon.’”  State v. Robinson, 342 N.C. 74,
82-83, 463 S.E.2d 218, 223 (1995) (quoting State v. Bell, 338
N.C. 363, 394, 450 S.E.2d 710, 727 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S.
1163 (1995)), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1197 (1996).  Here,
defendant was convicted of first-degree murder both on the basis
of premeditation and deliberation and under the felony murder
rule.  Consequently, neither the robbery with a dangerous weapon
of the Facianes nor the robbery with a dangerous weapon of Mrs.
Butts merged with the murder conviction, and the trial court did
not err in failing to arrest judgment on those charges. 
CAPITAL SENTENCING PROCEEDING
Defendant makes several arguments with respect to the
pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance.  See N.C.G.S. § 15A-
2000(e)(6) (2007) (“The capital felony was committed for
pecuniary gain.”). 
[10] We first consider defendant’s argument that the
trial court’s instruction on the pecuniary gain aggravating
circumstance constituted plain error because it allegedly failed
to state the requirement that the murder must have been for the
-42-
purpose of financial gain.  The trial court instructed the jury
as follows:
[W]as the murder committed for
pecuniary gain?  A murder is
committed for pecuniary gain if the
defendant, when he commits it, has
obtained or intends or expects to
obtain money or some other thing
which can be valued in money,
either as compensation for
committing it or as a result of the
death of the victim.
If you find from the evidence,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that
when the defendant killed the
victim the defendant took money and
other valuable property from the
victim and that he intended or
expected to obtain money or other
things of value that can be valued
in money as a result of the
victim’s death, if you find this
aggravating circumstance you will
so indicate . . . .
Because defendant did not object to the instruction at
trial, we review for plain error.  See State v. Duke, 360 N.C.
110, 138, 623 S.E.2d 11, 29 (2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 855,
(2006); see also N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(4) (allowing for plain
error review of certain unpreserved issues in criminal cases).  A
reversal for plain error is only appropriate in the most
exceptional circumstances and when the defendant establishes that
“absent the error, the jury probably would have reached a
different result.”  State v. Cummings, 352 N.C. 600, 616, 536
S.E.2d 36, 49 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
State v. Sierra, 335 N.C. 753, 761, 440 S.E.2d 791, 796 (1994)),
cert. denied, 532 U.S. 997 (2001).
-43-
“The gravamen of the pecuniary gain aggravating
circumstance is that the killing was for the purpose of getting
money or something of value.”  State v. Chandler, 342 N.C. 742,
754, 467 S.E.2d 636, 643 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting State v. Jennings, 333 N.C. 579, 621, 430 S.E.2d 188,
210, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1028 (1993)), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
875 (1996).  The circumstance applies only when “‘the hope of
pecuniary gain provided the impetus for the murder,’” id.
(quoting State v. Oliver, 302 N.C. 28, 62, 274 S.E.2d 183, 204
(1981)), and not when, for example, “the taking was a mere act of
opportunism committed after a murder was perpetrated for another
reason,” State v. Maske, 358 N.C. 40, 54, 591 S.E.2d 521, 530
(2004).  Thus, an instruction that conveys to the jury that its
“finding of robbery with a dangerous weapon . . . would
automatically mandate the finding of the [pecuniary gain]
aggravator” is erroneous.  State v. Jones, 357 N.C. 409, 419-20,
584 S.E.2d 751, 758 (2003).
In considering jury instructions on the pecuniary gain
aggravating circumstance, this Court has distinguished between
instructions that explain, define, or describe pecuniary gain and
those that “simply direct[] that if the jury [finds] robbery with
a dangerous weapon, then the jury [would] find the pecuniary gain
aggravating circumstance.”  Id. at 419-20, 584 S.E.2d at 758-59. 
For example, in State v. Jones, the trial court committed plain
error by instructing the jury:  “If you find from the evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that when the defendant killed
the victim, the defendant was in the commission of robbery with a
-44-
dangerous weapon, you would find [the pecuniary gain] aggravating
circumstance. . . .”  Id. at 418-20, 584 S.E.2d at 757-58
(emphasis omitted).  Similarly, in State v. Maske, the trial
court erred by instructing the jury:  “If you find from the
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that when the defendant killed
the victim, the defendant took $200 from the victim’s purse, you
would find [the pecuniary gain] aggravating circumstance . . . .” 
358 N.C. at 56-57, 591 S.E.2d at 531-32.  Jones and Maske both
distinguish the pecuniary gain instruction upheld by this Court
in State v. Davis, 353 N.C. 1, 36-37, 539 S.E.2d 243, 266-67
(2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 839 (2001), which read in part: 
If you find, from the evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt, that
when the defendant killed the
victim, that the defendant took
personal property or other items
belonging to [the victim] and that
he intended or expected to obtain
money or property or any other
thing that can be valued in money,
you would find [the pecuniary gain]
aggravating circumstance.
See Maske, 358 N.C. at 56, 591 S.E.2d at 532 (stating that the
instruction in Davis “is distinguishable from the one given
here”); Jones, 357 N.C. at 421, 584 S.E.2d at 759 (citing with
approval the instruction in Davis and indicating it adequately
described pecuniary gain).  
The instruction in the present case was substantially
similar to the instruction upheld by this Court in Davis.  A
side-by-side comparison of the two instructions reveals that both
define and describe pecuniary gain in a similar manner.  The
trial court in Davis instructed the jurors to find the pecuniary
-45-
gain circumstance if they determined “that when the defendant
killed the victim . . . he intended or expected to obtain money
or property or any other thing that can be valued in money.”  353
N.C. at 36, 539 S.E.2d at 266.  Likewise, the trial court in the
instant case instructed the jurors to find the pecuniary gain
circumstance if they determined “that when the defendant killed
the victim . . . he intended or expected to obtain money or other
things of value that can be valued in money as a result of the
victim’s death.”  The instruction did not “simply direct[] that
if the jury found robbery with a dangerous weapon, then the jury
would find the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance,” see
Jones, 357 N.C. at 420, 584 S.E.2d at 758, and it did not remove
from the jury the requirement that it find the murder was
motivated by a hope or expectation of pecuniary gain. 
Accordingly, the instruction was not plain error.
In light of this holding and because defendant, in his
brief to this Court, acknowledges that the trial court’s
instruction on pecuniary gain was “essentially consistent with
the pattern instructions,” we also reject defendant’s argument
that defense counsel’s failure to object to the instruction or to
request a special instruction constituted ineffective assistance
of counsel.
[11] Defendant next argues the trial court erred by
failing to intervene ex mero motu during the state’s closing
argument related to the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance. 
Trial counsel are permitted wide latitude in arguing hotly
contested cases, and the “scope of jury arguments is left largely
-46-
to the control and discretion of the trial court.”  State v.
Peterson, 361 N.C. 587, 606, 652 S.E.2d 216, 229 (2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Allen, 360 N.C. 297, 306, 626
S.E.2d 271, 280, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 867 (2006)), cert.
denied, __ U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 1682 (2008).  “These principles
apply not only to ordinary jury arguments, but also to arguments
made in capital sentencing proceedings, and the boundaries for
jury argument at the capital sentencing proceeding are more
expansive than at the guilt phase.”  State v. Thomas, 350 N.C.
315, 360, 514 S.E.2d 486, 513-14 (citing State v. Bishop, 343
N.C. 518, 552, 472 S.E.2d 842, 860 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
1097 (1997)), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1006 (1999).  
“‘The standard of review for assessing alleged improper
closing arguments that fail to provoke timely objection from
opposing counsel is whether the remarks were so grossly improper
that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to
intervene ex mero motu.’”  State v. McNeill, 360 N.C. 231, 244,
624 S.E.2d 329, 338 (quoting State v. Jones, 355 N.C. 117, 133,
558 S.E.2d 97, 107 (2002)), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct.
396 (2006).  “Under this standard, ‘only an extreme impropriety
on the part of the prosecutor will compel this Court to hold that
the trial judge abused his discretion in not recognizing and
correcting ex mero motu an argument that defense counsel
apparently did not believe was prejudicial when originally
spoken.’”  State v. Anthony, 354 N.C. 372, 427, 555 S.E.2d 557,
592 (2001) (quoting State v. Richardson, 342 N.C. 772, 786, 467
S.E.2d 685, 693, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 890 (1996)), cert.
-47-
denied, 536 U.S. 930 (2002).  The defendant will not prevail on
appeal unless “the sentencing hearing was so infected with
unfairness by the prosecutor’s comments as to violate defendant’s
due process rights.”  State v. Braxton, 352 N.C. 158, 219, 531
S.E.2d 428, 464 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1130 (2001).
Here, the prosecutor argued to the jury:
Now, when considering what the
punishment shall be, you will be
given instructions by His Honor as
to how to proceed with that.  He
will tell you what they are, and he
will instruct you. . . .  You’ll
have two aggravating circumstances
to consider.  The first one is
whether the murder was committed
during a—whether the murder was
committed for pecuniary gain;
pecuniary, money.  Was Mitch’s
death the result of the defendant
getting money, and Jamel Crawley,
from the store?  They accomplished
that, the money and receipts.
Now, I contend that you have
already found that aggravating
circumstance because you have found
the defendant guilty of conspiracy
to commit robbery of the store and
also robbery of the store.  Now,
you must find beyond a reasonable
doubt, and all 12 jurors
unanimously, whether that
aggravating circumstance exists.
Defendant contends the jurors would have understood these
statements to mean that the guilty verdicts on the charges of
robbery with a dangerous weapon and conspiracy to commit robbery
with a dangerous weapon automatically required them to find the
pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance as well.  According to
defendant, the statements were thus grossly improper.
-48-
“A trial court is not required to intervene ex mero
motu where a prosecutor makes comments during closing argument
which are substantially correct shorthand summaries of the law,
even if slightly slanted toward the State’s perspective.”  State
v. Barden, 356 N.C. 316, 366, 572 S.E.2d 108, 140 (2002)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Warren, 347
N.C. 309, 322, 492 S.E.2d 609, 616 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S.
1109 (1998)), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1040 (2003).  Moreover, a
prosecutor’s misstatement of the law may be cured by the trial
court’s subsequent correct instructions.  Id.  In State v.
Barden, we applied these principles to hold that, even when the
defendant timely objected, “[t]he prosecutor’s statement that
armed robbery ‘is’ pecuniary gain was not so wide of the mark as
to constitute reversible error.”  Id. 
In the instant case, the prosecutor distinguished
between what “I [the state] contend” about pecuniary gain on the
one hand and what “you [the jury] must find” about pecuniary gain
on the other hand.  Additionally, the prosecutor told the jurors
they should look to the trial court for explanation and
instruction on the aggravating circumstances, and we have already
concluded the trial court’s instructions on pecuniary gain were
proper.  Therefore, the prosecutor’s remarks were not so grossly
improper that the trial court erred by failing to intervene ex
mero motu.
[12] Defendant also claims he was afforded ineffective
assistance of counsel when defense counsel conceded the existence
of the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance during closing
-49-
argument.  Defense counsel stated as follows:  “[The aggravating
circumstances] are, number one, ‘Was this murder committed for
pecuniary gain?’  Was there a robbery?  As [the prosecutor] said,
you’ve already found that.”
“To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must first show that his counsel’s
performance was deficient and then that counsel’s deficient
performance prejudiced his defense.”  State v. Allen, 360 N.C.
297, 316, 626 S.E.2d 271, 286 (citing Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 867 (2006). 
Performance is “deficient” when counsel’s representation falls
beneath an objective standard of reasonableness, id., or when
counsel’s errors are “so serious that counsel was not functioning
as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment,” State v. Augustine, 359 N.C. 709, 719, 616 S.E.2d
515, 524 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State
v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 562, 324 S.E.2d 241, 248 (1985)),
cert. denied, 548 U.S. 925 (2006).  “[T]o establish prejudice, a
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.”  Allen, 360 N.C. at 316,
626 S.E.2d at 286 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003)).
Here, defense counsel briefly conceded the existence of
the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance before shifting focus
to a lengthy discussion of the mitigating circumstances.  This
concession was consistent with defense counsel’s overall strategy
-50-
throughout the proceedings to exude openness and truthfulness
with the jury and was reasonable in light of the abundant
evidence tending to show the murder was committed for pecuniary
gain.  Defendant’s own statement to law enforcement officers
indicated that he and Crawley entered Mitch’s Grocery armed and
familiar with the specific location behind the counter where
money was kept.  Once inside the store, defendant took a billfold
from a store customer, Mrs. Butts, while Crawley demanded money
from the store’s owner, Mrs. Faciane.  When the victim resisted
the robbery of his store, defendant shot and killed him. 
Defendant then fled the scene with Crawley, who had taken cash
and receipts from the store’s register.  In the face of such
strong evidence suggesting the murder was committed for pecuniary
gain, we cannot say defense counsel’s brief concession was
objectively unreasonable or that, had counsel not so conceded,
the jury probably would have returned a sentence of life
imprisonment.  Thus, defendant’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claim fails.   
[13] Defendant next argues the trial court erred by
failing to submit to the jury the mitigating circumstance that
defendant had no significant history of prior criminal activity. 
See N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(1) (2007).  In support, defendant
relies on the testimony of his two mental health experts,
forensic psychiatrist Dr. Moira Artigues and forensic
psychologist Dr. Brad Fisher, and three of his former
schoolteachers.  Dr. Artigues testified regarding defendant’s
background, particularly as it related to his emotional and
-51-
mental health.  She diagnosed defendant with the following
disorders:  Depressive Disorder Not Otherwise Specified,
Personality Disorder Not Otherwise Specified with Borderline,
Avoidant, and Dependent Traits, Cannabis Dependence, Major
Depressive Disorder by history, Dysthymic Disorder by history,
and Neglected Child by history.  Dr. Fisher agreed in substance
with the diagnoses and opinions of Dr. Artigues.  The testimony
of defendant’s teachers centered primarily on his impoverished
upbringing and learning disabilities.  Defendant offered no
evidence of his criminal record, and defense counsel twice
indicated to the trial court that defendant was not seeking
submission of the (f)(1) mitigating circumstance.  Nevertheless,
defendant now argues he was entitled to an (f)(1) instruction
because the testimony of his sentencing witnesses allegedly
depicted a comprehensive life history from which significant
criminal activity was absent.  Specifically, defendant asserts
that testimony that he had not used drugs besides marijuana, had
not been charged with any alcohol-related offenses, had not been
in many fights at school, and had worked for a brick mason for
many years amounted to substantial evidence that marijuana use
and underage drinking constituted the extent of his criminal
history.
The trial court must submit the (f)(1) mitigating
circumstance “whenever [it] finds substantial evidence on which a
reasonable jury could determine that a defendant has no
significant history of prior criminal activity.”  State v. Hurst,
360 N.C. 181, 197, 624 S.E.2d 309, 322, cert. denied, 549 U.S.
875 (2006).  “The statutory mitigating circumstance of no
-52-
significant history of prior criminal activity is not supported
by the mere absence of any substantial evidence concerning the
defendant’s prior criminal history.”  State v. Gibbs, 335 N.C. 1,
56, 436 S.E.2d 321, 352 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting State v. Laws, 325 N.C. 81, 111, 381 S.E.2d 609, 627
(1989), sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1022 (1990)),
cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1246 (1994).  Thus, “when the record is
silent as to a defendant’s criminal history, no (f)(1)
instruction is appropriate.”  Hurst, 360 N.C. at 198, 624 S.E.2d
at 322. 
Furthermore, mere references to illegal drug use are
insufficient to constitute substantial evidence of a defendant’s
criminal history or lack thereof.  See, e.g., State v. Powell,
340 N.C. 674, 693, 459 S.E.2d 219, 228 (1995), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 1060 (1996); Laws, 325 N.C. at 110-11, 381 S.E.2d at 626-27. 
For example, in State v. Powell, the record did not contain
sufficient evidence to warrant an instruction on the (f)(1)
mitigating circumstance when “[t]he only such evidence consisted
of testimony about defendant’s cocaine use and a passing
reference by a witness to the fact that defendant was temporarily
released from jail to attend his father’s funeral.”  340 N.C. at
693, 459 S.E.2d at 228.  Similarly, in State v. Laws, this Court
rejected the defendant’s argument that a witness’s references to
his marijuana use constituted substantial evidence of his lack of
significant history of criminal activity.  325 N.C. at 110-11,
381 S.E.2d at 626-27.  We concluded that “[a] jury finding of no
significant history of criminal activity, solely upon [the
-53-
witness’s] remarks about marijuana use, would have been based
purely upon speculation and conjecture, not upon substantial
evidence, and unreasonable as a matter of law.”  Id. at 111, 381
S.E.2d at 627; see also State v. Gainey, 355 N.C. 73, 101, 558
S.E.2d 463, 481 (holding testimony by defense witnesses that
defendant “had been in no real or ‘bad trouble’ and had not been
involved with illegal drugs or weapons” was insufficient to
support submission of the (f)(1) mitigating circumstance), cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 896 (2002).
Likewise, in the instant case, testimony that defendant
used marijuana but not other drugs, drank while underage but was
never charged, and did not get in many fights at school is not
substantial evidence that defendant lacked a significant history
of prior criminal activity.  Defendant’s experts, who referenced
defendant’s drug and alcohol use in support of their medical
diagnoses, did not expound upon the criminal aspect of
defendant’s substance abuse, nor did they testify regarding other
crimes or the lack thereof that might have formed the basis of a
determination regarding defendant’s criminal history.  In sum,
the evidence cited by defendant begged further development in
order to support submission of the (f)(1) mitigating
circumstance, and the jury’s finding of the circumstance on the
strength of that evidence alone “would have been based purely
upon speculation and conjecture . . . and unreasonable as a
matter of law.”  Laws, 325 N.C. at 111, 381 S.E.2d at 627. 
Therefore, the trial court did not err in failing to submit the
(f)(1) mitigating circumstance.
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[14] Defendant next contends the trial court committed
plain error by failing to give individualized instructions and
explanations for each of the thirty-two nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances submitted to the jury and by giving a single
peremptory instruction for those mitigating circumstances. 
According to defendant, the trial court’s manner of instructing
the jury improperly suggested the nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances were of less significance than the statutory
mitigating circumstances.  Because defendant did not object to
the instruction at trial, we review for plain error.  See Duke,
360 N.C. at 138, 623 S.E.2d at 29.
This Court rejected an argument similar to that of
defendant in State v. Trull, 349 N.C. 428, 509 S.E.2d 178 (1998),
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 835 (1999).  There, the trial court did
not separately instruct on each of the twenty-four nonstatutory
mitigating circumstances and tendered a single peremptory
instruction for all of them.  Id. at 455, 509 S.E.2d at 195-96. 
Reasoning that “jury instructions should be as clear as
practicable, without needless repetition” and that “jurors are
presumed to pay close attention to the particular language of the
judge’s instructions,” we held the defendant failed to show that
“had the judge repeated the same instructions regarding
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances twenty-four times, the jury
probably would have reached a different verdict.”  Id. at 455-56,
509 S.E.2d at 196.  Moreover, “this Court has repeatedly approved
of trial judges issuing one peremptory instruction for multiple
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.”  Id. at 456, 509 S.E.2d
-55-
at 196 (citing State v. Bonnett, 348 N.C. 417, 447-48, 502 S.E.2d
563, 583 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1124 (1999)).
Here, the trial court clearly instructed the jury to
consider each of the potential nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances.  Furthermore, one or more jurors found thirty of
the thirty-two submitted nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. 
Like the defendant in Trull, defendant here has failed to show
that had the trial court given individualized instruction and
explanation for each of these circumstances, the jury probably
would have reached a different verdict.  See id.  Therefore, the
instruction did not constitute plain error.
[15] Defendant next argues the pecuniary gain
aggravating circumstance was supported by insufficient evidence
because defendant did not personally take money from Mr. Faciane
and the trial court did not instruct on acting in concert in the
context of the pecuniary gain instruction.
“If there is substantial evidence defendant’s motive in
the killing was the gain of something of pecuniary value . . .
the [pecuniary gain] circumstance is properly submitted.”  Allen,
360 N.C. at 312, 626 S.E.2d at 283.  The pecuniary gain
aggravating circumstance “‘requires the jury to consider not
defendant’s actions but his motive’ for killing the victim[].” 
State v. Tirado, 358 N.C. 551, 599, 599 S.E.2d 515, 546 (2004)
(quoting State v. Green, 321 N.C. 594, 610, 365 S.E.2d 587, 597,
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 900 (1988)), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 909
(2005).  Thus, for a murder to be committed “for pecuniary gain,”
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(6), there is no requirement that the
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defendant actually take money from the victim, whether personally
or acting in concert with another.  See State v. Chandler, 342
N.C. 742, 754-56, 467 S.E.2d 636, 643-44 (upholding submission of
the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance when the defendant
did not take money or property from the victim), cert. denied,
519 U.S. 875 (1996).  
Here, substantial evidence tended to show defendant
committed the murder for pecuniary gain.  Defendant and Crawley
possessed a diagram of Mitch’s Grocery and were aware that store
customers sometimes won large sums of money from the video poker
machines.  The two entered the store armed and demanded money
from people inside, including Mrs. Faciane.  When Mr. Faciane
resisted, defendant shot and killed him.  These facts are
sufficient evidence that defendant’s “motive in the killing was
the gain of something of pecuniary value.”  See Allen, 360 N.C.
at 312, 626 S.E.2d at 283.
[16] Defendant also contends the trial court erred by
failing to intervene ex mero motu during the state’s closing
argument related to the course of conduct aggravating
circumstance.  The prosecutor argued as follows:
The second [aggravating
circumstance] is called course of
conduct, whether the murder was
committed while the defendant was
in a course of conduct of robbery
of Sandra Butts and attempted
robbery of Barry Butts.  In fact,
he was back at the back of the
store robbing the two of them and
then came forward and shot Mitch
and shot at Dawn.  And I contend,
the State contends that you have
found that aggravating circumstance
already because you have already
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found the defendant guilty of
robbery with a dangerous weapon of
Sandra Butts and attempted robbery
with a dangerous weapon of Barry
Butts.
But, again, you must consider
that, and all 12 of you find beyond
a reasonable doubt whether that
aggravating circumstance exists. 
A jury should find the course of conduct aggravating
circumstance when the murder “was part of a course of conduct in
which the defendant engaged and which included the commission . .
. of other crimes of violence against another person or persons.” 
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(11) (2007).  Defendant complains that the
prosecutor’s remarks erroneously informed the jurors that the
guilty verdicts on the charges of robbery with a dangerous weapon
and attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon automatically
required them to find the course of conduct aggravating
circumstance as well.
The prosecutor’s closing argument with respect to the
course of conduct aggravating circumstance was similar to his
argument with respect to the pecuniary gain aggravating
circumstance.  Here as well, the prosecutor distinguished between
what “I [the state] contend” about defendant’s course of conduct
on the one hand and what “you [the jury] must consider . . . and
. . . find” about defendant’s course of conduct on the other
hand.  Further, the trial court correctly instructed the jury on
the course of conduct aggravating circumstance, thus curing any
misstatement of law by the prosecutor.  See Barden, 356 N.C. at
366, 572 S.E.2d at 140 (explaining a prosecutor’s misstatement of
law may be cured by the trial court’s subsequent correct
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instructions).  For the same reasons the prosecutor’s remarks
regarding the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance were not
grossly improper, the prosecutor’s remarks regarding the course
of conduct aggravating circumstance were not grossly improper. 
See McNeill, 360 N.C. at 244, 624 S.E.2d at 338 (stating that the
standard of review for assessing allegedly improper closing
arguments to which opposing counsel failed to object is whether
the remarks were so grossly improper that the trial court erred
by not intervening ex mero motu).
[17] Defendant next argues the trial court erred by
denying his motion for mistrial based on an allegedly prejudicial
incident involving contact between two jurors and two state’s
witnesses during the capital sentencing proceeding. 
Before the beginning of jury deliberations on the
morning of 24 August 2005, the state reported the following to
the trial court:  The previous evening after the close of court,
two jurors were outside, and one of their cars had a flat tire. 
The victim’s two adult children, who gave victim impact testimony
during the sentencing proceeding, noticed the flat tire and held
up a can of Fix-A-Flat.  The jurors saw this gesture, but walked
away.  The victim’s children then put down the can of Fix-A-Flat,
got into their car, and drove away.  No verbal communication
occurred during the incident.  After hearing the state’s report,
defense counsel declined the trial court’s invitation to inquire
of the involved jurors and instead moved for a mistrial.
The trial court must declare a mistrial only if conduct
inside or outside the courtroom results in “substantial and
-59-
irreparable prejudice to the defendant’s case.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1061.  The decision whether to grant or deny a mistrial is within
the sound discretion of the trial court and is entitled to great
deference on appeal.  State v. Thomas, 350 N.C. 315, 341, 514
S.E.2d 486, 502, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1006 (1999).  
In support of his contention that the contact between
the jurors and the victim’s children substantially prejudiced his
position at sentencing, defendant cites this Court’s decision in
State v. Bailey, 307 N.C. 110, 296 S.E.2d 287 (1982), in which we
held that prejudicial error resulted from improper contact
between a state’s witness and members of the jury.  Id. at 115,
296 S.E.2d at 290.  In Bailey, a sheriff who testified on behalf
of the state drove three jurors to a restaurant for an evening
meal during a break in the jury’s deliberations.  Id. at 111, 296
S.E.2d at 288.  In granting a new trial, this Court noted the
importance of the sheriff’s testimony at trial and also stated
that our holding was “limited to the particular and peculiar
circumstances of this case.”  Id. at 114-15, 296 S.E.2d at 289-
90.  
The facts of the present case are distinguishable from
those of Bailey.  Furthermore, here, any contact between the
jurors and the two state’s witnesses appears to have occurred at
a distance and was nonverbal, fleeting, and unrelated to
defendant’s trial.  Therefore, we cannot say the trial court
abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for mistrial.
[18] Defendant next asserts the trial court erred by
failing to intervene ex mero motu at several points during the
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state’s sentencing proceeding closing argument.  Defendant did
not object to any of these arguments at trial.
Defendant first claims the prosecutor misstated the law
with regard to the jury’s duty when weighing aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, necessitating the trial court’s ex mero
motu intervention.  After discussing the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances that would be submitted to the jury, the
prosecutor stated the following:  “You then weigh them to
determine whether the mitigating circumstances are insufficient
to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.  That means the State
has to prove that they’re either equal or that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances.”
“Issue Three” on the capital sentencing recommendation
form requires the jury to weigh the mitigating and aggravating
circumstances.  This Court has consistently rejected arguments
that a jury is permitted “to recommend death if it finds that the
mitigating circumstances are of equal weight and value to the
aggravating circumstances found.”  State v. Keel, 337 N.C. 469,
493, 447 S.E.2d 748, 761 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1198
(1995); see also, e.g., Hurst, 360 N.C. at 206, 624 S.E.2d at
327; State v. King, 353 N.C. 457, 491-92, 546 S.E.2d 575, 599-600
(2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1147 (2002); State v. Golphin, 352
N.C. 364, 468-69, 533 S.E.2d 168, 235-36 (2000), cert. denied,
532 U.S. 931 (2001); State v. Hunt, 323 N.C. 407, 433, 373 S.E.2d
400, 416-17 (1988), judgment vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S.
1022 (1990), and overruled in part on other grounds by State v.
Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 483 S.E.2d 396, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900
-61-
(1997).  Thus, the prosecutor’s statement was inconsistent with
the law as articulated by this Court.  Nevertheless, a
prosecutor’s misstatement of law with regard to the manner in
which the jury should consider mitigating and aggravating
circumstances may be cured by the trial court’s subsequent
correct instruction.  See, e.g., Barden, 356 N.C. at 365-66, 572
S.E.2d at 139-40; State v. Braxton, 352 N.C. 158, 218-19, 531
S.E.2d 428, 463-64 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1130 (2001);
State v. Geddie, 345 N.C. 73, 99, 478 S.E.2d 146, 159-60 (1996),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 825 (1997); State v. Buckner, 342 N.C.
198, 238, 464 S.E.2d 414, 437 (1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 828
(1996).  Here, the trial court properly instructed the jury in
accordance with our case law regarding its duty at Issue Three,
thereby curing any misstatement.
[19] Defendant also claims the trial court should have
intervened ex mero motu when the prosecutor commented on the
absence of any evidence showing defendant expressed remorse for
the murder.  After discussing various submitted mitigating
circumstances, the prosecutor stated:  “Nowhere in any of the
testimony during the sentencing phase has remorse been mentioned
about the defendant’s remorse for Mitch’s death.”  Defendant
alleges this statement improperly encouraged the jury to consider
lack of remorse as an aggravating circumstance.
Although lack of remorse may not be submitted as an
aggravating circumstance, a prosecutor may properly draw
attention to a defendant’s failure throughout the capital
proceeding to demonstrate a sense of remorse.  State v. Brown,
-62-
320 N.C. 179, 199, 358 S.E.2d 1, 15, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 970
(1987).  Here, lack of remorse was not “placed before the jury
for consideration as an aggravating [circumstance], either
verbally or on the verdict sheet.”  See id.  Accordingly, the
prosecutor’s remark was not grossly improper, and the trial court
did not err in failing to intervene ex mero motu.
[20] Defendant next asserts the trial court should have
intervened ex mero motu when the prosecutor referred to Dr. Moira
Artigues, defendant’s mental health expert, as a “professional
witness” and incorrectly stated she was paid by the Center for
Death Penalty Litigation.
“‘[I]t is not improper for the prosecutor to impeach
the credibility of an expert during his closing argument.’” 
State v. Roache, 358 N.C. 243, 300, 595 S.E.2d 381, 417 (2004)
(quoting State v. Norwood, 344 N.C. 511, 536, 476 S.E.2d 349, 361
(1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1158 (1997)).  Furthermore, while
a prosecutor should not “‘insinuate that [a] witness would
perjure himself or herself for pay,’” it is entirely proper for
the prosecutor to “‘point[] out that the witness’ compensation
may be a source of bias.’”  Id. at 300, 595 S.E.2d at 418
(quoting State v. Rogers, 355 N.C. 420, 463, 562 S.E.2d 859, 885
(2002)).  This Court has specifically addressed a situation in
which a prosecutor characterized a defense witness as “‘a
professional witness for the defendant’” and determined that such
a characterization, “while inflammatory, was not improper to the
point of being unduly prejudicial to defendant.”  State v.
-63-
Brewer, 325 N.C. 550, 578-79, 386 S.E.2d 569, 585 (1989), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 951 (1990).  
Likewise, in the instant case, the prosecutor’s
characterization of Dr. Artigues as a “professional witness” was
not so grossly improper that the trial court erred by failing to
intervene ex mero motu.  Furthermore, although the prosecutor
improperly stated that Dr. Artigues was paid by the Center for
Death Penalty Litigation, “[t]his inaccuracy in the prosecutor’s
portrayal of the expert’s [source of compensation] . . . did not
so infect the trial with unfairness” as to deprive defendant of a
fair sentencing proceeding.  See State v. Cummings, 352 N.C. 600,
627, 536 S.E.2d 36, 55 (2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 997 (2001).
[21] Defendant further contends the trial court erred
by sustaining the state’s objection to one of defendant’s
questions during redirect examination of Dr. Artigues.  On cross-
examination, the prosecutor elicited extensive testimony from Dr.
Artigues concerning information about defendant’s background
contained in her reports.  The prosecutor then elicited testimony
that Dr. Artigues had testified as an expert in forensic
psychiatry about forty times, but never for the state, that she
had made three presentations to the North Carolina Trial Lawyers
Association Capital College regarding the circumstances under
which defense attorneys should retain mental health experts, and
that she was being paid $275 per hour for her work on defendant’s
case. 
On redirect examination by defense counsel, the
following exchange occurred: 
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[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And the
fact that you’re being paid and
compensated for your time, has that
influenced your opinions at all?
[DR. ARTIGUES]: No, it has
not.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The fact
that you’re being paid for your
time, did that change any of the
records that you received which
corresponded to your opinions in
this case?
[DR. ARTIGUES]: No, it did
not.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You didn’t
doctor any of these records at all
because you’re being paid—
[PROSECUTOR]: Objection.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: —did you?
THE COURT: Well, sustained as
to that question.
According to defendant, the state’s cross-examination of Dr.
Artigues impugned both her character and her diagnoses by
suggesting she was a “hired gun” for capital defendants, thereby
opening the door to defendant’s rebuttal question about whether
Dr. Artigues “doctored” any records.  
“[The] North Carolina Rules of Evidence permit broad
cross-examination of expert witnesses.”  State v. Bacon, 337 N.C.
66, 88, 446 S.E.2d 542, 553 (1994) (citing N.C. R. Evid. 611(b)),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1159 (1995).  “[A] prosecutor’s questions
as to the amount of time [a defense expert] spent working with
criminal cases and the number of cases in which [she has]
testified for the State and for a defendant [are] entirely
appropriate.”  Rogers, 355 N.C. at 455, 562 S.E.2d at 881.  Thus,
-65-
it was proper for the prosecutor to question Dr. Artigues
regarding her forensic practice, the contents of the records to
which she referred on direct examination, her status as a paid
witness, and her potential bias.  
Additionally, “[q]uestions asked on redirect should not
go beyond matters discussed during cross-examination.”  State v.
Skipper, 337 N.C. 1, 39, 446 S.E.2d 252, 273 (1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1134 (1995), superseded on other grounds by
statute, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2002, as recognized in State v. Price,
337 N.C. 756, 448 S.E.2d 827 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1021
(1995).  Our review of the record reveals the prosecutor’s
questions relating to Dr. Artigues’s records were straightforward
without any intimation of wrongdoing.  Certainly the prosecutor
did not accuse Dr. Artigues of falsifying records.  Therefore,
defendant’s contention that the prosecutor’s cross-examination of
Dr. Artigues “opened the door” to defense counsel’s question,
“You didn’t doctor any of these records at all because you’re
being paid, did you?” is without merit.  
We also observe that just before this question, defense
counsel asked Dr. Artigues whether her being paid for her time
“change[d] any of the records that [she] received which
corresponded to [her] opinions in this case,” and Dr. Artigues
responded that it did not.  She also testified that the payment
she received for her time had not influenced her opinion.  In
light of this testimony, the question about doctoring the records
was redundant, and an answer by Dr. Artigues would have added
little to the information already before the jury.  We therefore
-66-
conclude that any error on the part of the trial court in
sustaining the state’s objection did not prejudice defendant. 
[22] Defendant also challenges the prosecutor’s closing
argument references to various prison amenities defendant would
enjoy if sentenced to life imprisonment.  The prosecutor remarked
that defendant would potentially be able to do the following
while in prison:  visit with his mother and sisters, eat his
meals and drink his coffee, watch the sun rise, exercise, watch
television, read, draw, receive an education, and enjoy the fresh
air.  Defendant contends these remarks were grossly improper
because they were irrelevant and stated facts outside the record. 
“[I]t is not improper for the State to argue that ‘the
defendant deserved the penalty of death rather than a comfortable
life in prison.’”  State v. Forte, 360 N.C. 427, 443, 629 S.E.2d
137, 148 (quoting State v. Alston, 341 N.C. 198, 252, 461 S.E.2d
687, 717 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1148 (1996)), cert.
denied, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 557 (2006).  This Court has
previously determined that remarks similar to those made by the
prosecutor here did not rise to the level of gross impropriety,
even when the remarks referenced facts outside the record.  See,
e.g., State v. May, 354 N.C. 172, 179, 552 S.E.2d 151, 156 (2001)
(holding trial court did not err by failing to intervene ex mero
motu when state referenced the defendant playing cards, punching
a punching bag, having a snack, watching television, and
listening to the radio while in prison, even though these facts
were not in the record), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1060 (2002);
State v. Smith, 347 N.C. 453, 467, 496 S.E.2d 357, 365 (holding
-67-
trial court did not err by failing to intervene ex mero motu when
state argued the defendant would spend his time in prison
“comfortably doing things such as playing basketball, lifting
weights, and watching television”), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 845
(1998); State v. Reeves, 337 N.C. 700, 732, 448 S.E.2d 802, 817
(1994) (holding that state’s remarks that the defendant would
have a “‘cozy little prison cell . . . with [a] television set,
air conditioning and three meals a day’” were not so egregious as
to require the trial court to intervene ex mero motu, even if
these facts were not in the record), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1114
(1995).  Similarly, in the present case, “[w]hile the prosecutor
improperly argued facts not in the record, the trial court still
did not abuse its discretion by failing to intervene ex mero
motu.”  See May, 354 N.C. at 179, 552 S.E.2d at 156.
[23] Defendant next argues the trial court committed
plain error by failing to give peremptory instructions on three
statutory mitigating circumstances:  (1) the murder “was
committed while the defendant was under the influence of mental
or emotional disturbance,” N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(2) (2007); (2)
defendant’s capacity “to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was
impaired,” N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(6) (2007); and, (3) defendant’s
age at the time of the crime, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(7) (2007). 
The trial court instructed on each of these mitigating
circumstances without a peremptory instruction and submitted all
three to the jury.  One or more jurors found the (f)(2) and
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(f)(6) mitigating circumstances, but no juror found the (f)(7)
mitigating circumstance.    
“‘If requested, a trial court should give a peremptory
instruction for any statutory or nonstatutory mitigating
circumstance that is supported by uncontroverted and manifestly
credible evidence.’”  Forte, 360 N.C. at 440, 629 S.E.2d at 146
(quoting State v. Bishop, 343 N.C. 518, 557, 472 S.E.2d 842, 863
(1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1097 (1997)).  To be entitled to a
peremptory instruction, however, the defendant must timely
request it.  State v. Gregory, 340 N.C. 365, 415, 459 S.E.2d 638,
667 (1995) (citing State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 47, 77, 257 S.E.2d
597, 618-19 (1979), overruled in part on other grounds by State
v. Williams, 339 N.C. 1, 452 S.E.2d 245 (1994), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 833 (1995), and overruled on other grounds by State v.
Warren, 347 N.C. 309, 492 S.E.2d 609 (1997), cert. denied, 523
U.S. 1109 (1998)), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1108 (1996).  “The
trial court is not required to determine on its own which
mitigating circumstances are deserving of a peremptory
instruction.”  Id. at 415-16, 459 S.E.2d at 667 (citing Johnson,
298 N.C. at 77, 257 S.E.2d at 618-19); see also Skipper, 337 N.C.
at 41, 446 S.E.2d at 274 (“As defendant did not request that
peremptory instructions be given for any other circumstances, the
trial court did not err in not giving such instructions.”).
The record reveals and defendant concedes that
defendant did not request a peremptory instruction on any of the
three submitted statutory mitigating circumstances. 
-69-
Consequently, the trial court did not err in failing to give the
peremptory instructions.
[24] Defendant next contends the trial court erred by
sustaining the state’s objections to defense counsel’s closing
argument regarding the types of murders for which the death
penalty is most appropriate.  According to defendant, the trial
court improperly restricted him from arguing that the facts of
his case did not warrant a death sentence and that his crime was
not “the worst of the worst.”  See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163,
206 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting).
During closing argument, defense counsel urged the
jurors to consider the types of things that come to mind when
they think about a death penalty case.  Counsel first gave as
examples, “Dennis Rader, who is a serial killer,” “Eric Rudolph,
the bomber,” and “Scott Peterson[,] who killed his wife and
unborn daughter.”  Counsel next referred to murders involving
children, at which point the state objected and the trial court
sustained the objection.  Defense counsel then added, “Murder of
the elderly, murder of the handicapped, torture.”  The state
again objected, but defense counsel continued, “Rape or sexual
offense, trophy killings, serial killings, using bombs or weapons
of mass destruction, someone who gets an enjoyment or thrill out
of killing, someone who kills someone in their own family.”  At
this point the state objected for a third time, and the trial
court sustained the objection and allowed the state’s motion to
strike.
-70-
“Control of the jury argument [is] within the sound
discretion of the trial court.”  Braxton, 352 N.C. at 221, 531
S.E.2d at 465.  Furthermore, “‘[u]pon objection, the trial court
has the duty to censor remarks not warranted by the evidence or
law.’”  State v. Wilson, 335 N.C. 220, 225, 436 S.E.2d 831, 834
(1993) (quoting State v. Anderson, 322 N.C. 22, 37, 366 S.E.2d
459, 468, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 975 (1988)).  A defendant may
not “make comparisons between cases and the facts of each case”
in which a determination favorable to a defendant was made, State
v. McNeill, 360 N.C. 231, 248, 624 S.E.2d 329, 340, cert. denied,
__ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 396 (2006), because:  (1) “[t]he facts of
the other cases are not pertinent” to a jury’s consideration of
evidence presented in a particular case, Braxton, 352 N.C. at
222, 531 S.E.2d at 465; and (2) “the circumstances of other
murders, either actual or imagined,” are often “not present in
the record at the time of closing arguments,” McNeill, 360 N.C.
at 248, 624 S.E.2d at 341.  See also N.C.G.S. § 15A-1230(a)
(2007) (“During a closing argument to the jury an attorney may
not . . . make arguments on the basis of matters outside the
record . . . .”).  In State v. McNeill, this Court held the trial
court did not err in sustaining the state’s objections to these
remarks by defense counsel during closing argument:  “[W]hat
would be some examples of murders that would be worse [than the
murder committed by defendant]?” and, “[W]hat [defendant] did is
not the worst first degree murder.  And it has not been committed
by the worst defendant.”  360 N.C. at 247-48, 624 S.E.2d at 340-
41.  
-71-
Here, defense counsel engaged in far more specific
comparisons than did the defense counsel in McNeill.  Defense
counsel listed several specific murderers and several general
types of murder with which he urged the jury to compare the
instant murder.  The trial court sustained objections to only
some of these comparisons.  Moreover, defendant was not
prohibited from arguing that the circumstances of his
case—regardless of the circumstances of other cases—did not
warrant imposition of the death penalty.  For these reasons, we
cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining
the state’s objections. 
PRESERVATION ISSUES
Defendant raises additional issues that have previously
been decided by this Court contrary to his position:  (1) whether
the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for a bill of
particulars; (2) whether the trial court properly overruled
defendant’s objection to the state’s closing argument that the
jury is the community’s voice; (3) whether the short-form
indictment was sufficient to charge first-degree murder; (4)
whether the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to
strike the death penalty from consideration as violative of
defendant’s federal and state constitutional rights; (5) whether
the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion objecting to
the use of the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance on the
ground that the wording of the pecuniary gain statute is
unconstitutionally vague; (6) whether the trial court properly
denied defendant’s motion to prohibit death qualification of the
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jury; (7) whether the trial court properly denied defendant’s
motion for separate juries for the two phases of his trial; (8)
whether the trial court’s instructions on Issue Three were vague
or confusing; (9) whether the trial court’s instruction that at
Issues Three and Four each juror may consider the mitigating
circumstances found by that juror, rather than any mitigating
circumstance found by any juror, was proper; (10) whether the
trial court’s instruction that at Issue Three each juror may,
rather than must, consider the mitigating circumstances found by
that juror was proper; and (11) whether the trial court’s
instruction that the jury must be unanimous to answer “No” to
Issues One, Three, and Four was proper.  We have considered
defendant’s contentions on these issues and find no compelling
reason to depart from our prior holdings.  Therefore, we reject
defendant’s arguments.
PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
[25] Finally, we undertake our statutory duty to
determine:  (1) whether the record supports the aggravating
circumstances found by the jury; (2) whether the death sentence
was imposed “under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any
other arbitrary factor”; and (3) whether the death sentence is
“excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.”  N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(d)(2) (2007).
Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder on the
basis of premeditation and deliberation and under the felony
murder rule.  The jury found both aggravating circumstances
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submitted to exist:  (1) the murder was “committed for pecuniary
gain,” § 15A-2000(e)(6); and (2) the murder was “part of a course
of conduct in which the defendant engaged” and which included
defendant’s commission of “other crimes of violence against
another person or persons,” § 15A-2000(e)(11).
The jury found two statutory mitigating circumstances
to exist:  (1) the murder was committed “while the defendant was
under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance,” § 15A-
2000(f)(2); and (2) defendant’s capacity to “appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law was impaired,” § 15A-2000(f)(6).  The jury
also found the statutory catchall mitigating circumstance to
exist and have mitigating value, § 15A-2000(f)(9).  Additionally,
the jury found thirty of thirty-two submitted nonstatutory
mitigating circumstances to exist and have mitigating value. 
These related generally to the circumstances of the crime and
defendant’s cooperation with law enforcement, defendant’s
impoverished upbringing and neglectful parents, and defendant’s
mental health problems.
Having thoroughly reviewed the record, transcript,
briefs, and oral arguments in this case, we conclude that the
record fully supports the aggravating circumstances found by the
jury.  Further, there is no evidence that the death sentence was
imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other
arbitrary consideration.  We therefore turn to our duty of
proportionality review.  
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[26] At the outset, we reiterate that this Court
accords great deference to a jury’s sentencing recommendation and
will declare a death sentence disproportionate “‘[o]nly in the
most clear and extraordinary situations.’”  State v. Raines, 362
N.C. 1, 25, 653 S.E.2d 126, 142 (2007) (quoting State v.
Chandler, 342 N.C. 742, 764, 467 S.E.2d 636, 648, cert. denied,
519 U.S. 875 (1996)).  We will not “substitute our own notions as
to the appropriateness of the penalty of death in a given case
for those of the jury.”  Chandler, 342 N.C. at 764, 467 S.E.2d at
648. 
Instead of replicating the function of the jury in a
given case, our purpose is “‘to eliminate the possibility that a
person will be sentenced to die by the action of an aberrant
jury.’”  State v. Badgett, 361 N.C. 234, 263, 644 S.E.2d 206, 223
(quoting State v. Hyatt, 355 N.C. 642, 670, 566 S.E.2d 61, 79
(2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1133 (2003)), cert. denied, __
U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 502 (2007).  Thus, in conducting our
proportionality review, we consider whether, under the “‘totality
of the circumstances,’” State v. Kemmerlin, 356 N.C. 446, 489,
573 S.E.2d 870, 898 (2002) (quoting State v. Bondurant, 309 N.C.
674, 694 n.1, 309 S.E.2d 170, 183 n.1 (1983)), the death sentence
is “excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in
similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant,” §
15A-2000(d)(2).  Similarity, however, “merely serves as an
initial point of inquiry” and “is not the last word on the
subject of proportionality.”  State v. Watts, 357 N.C. 366, 381,
584 S.E.2d 740, 751 (2003) (citations and internal quotation
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marks omitted), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 944 (2004).  Rather, a
determination of whether the death penalty is disproportionate in
a given case “‘ultimately rest[s] upon the experienced judgments
of the members of this Court.’”  McNeill, 360 N.C. at 253, 624
S.E.2d at 344 (quoting State v. Garcia, 358 N.C. 382, 426, 597
S.E.2d 724, 754 (2004) (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1156 (2005));
accord Raines, 362 N.C. at 25, 653 S.E.2d at 142; State v.
Cummings, 361 N.C. 438, 478, 648 S.E.2d 788, 812 (2007), cert.
denied, __ U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 1888 (2008).
We begin by observing that several characteristics of
both defendant’s crime and defendant’s conduct have been cited
routinely by this Court as supporting a determination that a
death sentence is not disproportionate.  First, defendant was
convicted of first-degree murder both on the basis of
premeditation and deliberation and under the felony murder rule. 
Although a death sentence may properly be imposed for convictions
based solely on felony murder, see, e.g., Chandler, 342 N.C. at
747, 754, 764, 467 S.E.2d at 639, 643, 648-49; State v. Williams,
305 N.C. 656, 660, 682, 691, 292 S.E.2d 243, 247, 259, 263-64,
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982), “a finding of premeditation
and deliberation indicates a more calculated and cold-blooded
crime” for which the death penalty is more often appropriate,
see, e.g., Badgett, 361 N.C. at 263, 644 S.E.2d at 223 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hyatt, 355 N.C. at 670, 566
S.E.2d at 79).  
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Additionally, the jury in this case found that the
murder was part of a course of conduct that included other
violent crimes, specifically, defendant’s robbery with a
dangerous weapon of Mrs. Butts and attempted robbery with a
dangerous weapon of Mr. Butts, and that the murder was committed
for pecuniary gain.  “‘The course of conduct circumstance is
often present in cases where the jury imposes death instead of
life imprisonment.’”  State v. Guevara, 349 N.C. 243, 263, 506
S.E.2d 711, 724 (1998) (quoting State v. Miller, 339 N.C. 663,
694, 455 S.E.2d 137, 154, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 893 (1995)),
cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1133 (1999).  Furthermore, this Court has
held the course of conduct circumstance, standing alone, see
State v. Hoffman, 349 N.C. 167, 194, 505 S.E.2d 80, 96 (1998),
cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1053 (1999), and the pecuniary gain
circumstance, standing alone, Chandler, 342 N.C. at 760, 764, 467
S.E.2d at 646, 649; State v. Ward, 338 N.C. 64, 124, 129, 449
S.E.2d 709, 743, 746 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1134 (1995),
sufficient to sustain a sentence of death. 
Finally, there is no evidence that defendant
demonstrated remorse for the murder.  This Court has frequently
highlighted a defendant’s display of remorse or lack thereof as a
relevant consideration in proportionality review.  See, e.g.,
State v. Goss, 361 N.C. 610, 630, 651 S.E.2d 867, 879 (2007)
(noting defendant “failed to show any immediate remorse for the
murder”), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 59 (2008); State
v. Elliot, 360 N.C. 400, 426, 628 S.E.2d 735, 752 (noting
“defendant certainly has not shown any remorse for his actions”),
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cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 505 (2006); State v.
Robinson, 355 N.C. 320, 345, 561 S.E.2d 245, 261 (noting
“[d]efendant showed no remorse when telling his accomplice and
others what happened after having shot and killed the victim”),
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1006 (2002); see also Bondurant, 309 N.C.
at 694, 309 S.E.2d at 182 (emphasizing, in determining death
sentence to be disproportionate, that defendant, immediately
after shooting the victim, “exhibited a concern for [the
victim’s] life and remorse for his action” by accompanying the
victim to the hospital).  
In the instant case, defendant drove his injured
accomplice to the hospital, but did not offer aid to or seek
medical assistance for the victim.  Instead, upon arrival at the
hospital, defendant attempted to conceal the location of the
shooting, and he twice told law enforcement officers that he
stayed in the car during the robbery.  Only after officers viewed
a recording of the robbery captured by the surveillance camera at
Mitch’s Grocery did defendant confess to entering the store and
firing his weapon.  See State v. Harris, 338 N.C. 129, 153-54,
449 S.E.2d 371, 382-83 (1994) (noting that “no member of the jury
found mitigating value in the defendant’s purported remorse,”
perhaps because “[w]hile the defendant surrendered himself to the
authorities and cooperated fully, he did so . . . only after
being informed that the victim, prior to his death, had
identified the defendant by name and that police were looking for
him”), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1100 (1995).  Shortly after the
murder, while defendant was incarcerated, he placed a call that
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was recorded and played for the jury at trial.  During this ten-
minute call, defendant expressed no remorse for his actions, even
when the person with whom he was speaking informed him that the
store owner had died at the hospital.  Finally, there is no
evidence that defendant demonstrated a sense of remorse at trial.
We next compare the present case with other cases in
which this Court has ruled on the proportionality issue.  See
Badgett, 361 N.C. at 263, 644 S.E.2d at 223. 
We first consider whether the present case is
substantially similar to any of the eight cases in which this
Court held that the death penalty was disproportionate.  See
Kemmerlin, 356 N.C. at 489, 573 S.E.2d at 898; State v. Benson,
323 N.C. 318, 328, 372 S.E.2d 517, 522 (1988); State v. Stokes,
319 N.C. 1, 27, 352 S.E.2d 653, 668 (1987); State v. Rogers, 316
N.C. 203, 237, 341 S.E.2d 713, 733 (1986), overruled in part on
other grounds by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373
(1988), and by State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 483 S.E.2d 396,
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900 (1997); State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669,
691, 325 S.E.2d 181, 194 (1985); State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465,
479, 319 S.E.2d 163, 172 (1984); Bondurant, 309 N.C. at 694, 309
S.E.2d at 183; State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 46, 305 S.E.2d 703,
717 (1983).  Defendant contends the instant case is particularly
similar to State v. Benson and State v. Stokes.
In Benson, the defendant planned to rob the victim, a
restaurant manager, while the victim was depositing the day’s
receipts at the bank.  323 N.C. at 320-21, 372 S.E.2d at 518.  As
the victim approached the night deposit box with his moneybag,
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the defendant, who had been hiding in the bushes, demanded the
money and shot the victim in the legs.  Id. at 321, 372 S.E.2d at
518.  He then grabbed the moneybag and fled the scene, leaving
the victim to die from blood loss.  Id.  Benson is
distinguishable from the present case in the following
significant respects:  the defendant in Benson pled guilty to
first-degree murder under the felony murder rule only, 323 N.C.
at 320, 372 S.E.2d at 518, while defendant in the present case
was convicted of first-degree murder on the basis of
premeditation and deliberation and under the felony murder rule;
the jury in Benson found only one aggravating circumstance, that
the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, id. at 328, 372
S.E.2d at 522, while the jury in the present case found the
course of conduct aggravating circumstance in addition to the
pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance; and the defendant in
Benson “pleaded guilty during the trial and acknowledged his
wrongdoing before the jury,” id. at 328, 372 S.E.2d at 523, while
defendant in the present case failed to show remorse for his
crime or otherwise acknowledge his wrongdoing before the jury.  
In Stokes, the defendant and several accomplices beat
the victim to death while robbing his warehouse.  319 N.C. at 3,
352 S.E.2d at 654.  Stokes is distinguishable from the present
case in the following significant respects:  the defendant in
Stokes was convicted of first-degree murder under the felony
murder rule only, id. at 4, 352 S.E.2d at 654, while defendant in
the present case was convicted of first-degree murder on the
basis of premeditation and deliberation and under the felony
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murder rule; and the defendant in Stokes was seventeen years old
at the time of the crime, id. at 21, 352 S.E.2d at 664, while
defendant in the present case was twenty-one years old.
Furthermore, in determining the death sentence was
disproportionate in Stokes, this Court emphasized that the
defendant was “not . . . more deserving of death” than his
accomplice, who received a sentence of life imprisonment for
committing “the same crime in the same manner” as the defendant. 
Id. at 20-21, 352 S.E.2d at 664.  No such situation is present
here.
We have also compared the instant case with the other
six cases in which this Court determined the death penalty was
disproportionate and conclude that it is not substantially
similar to any of those cases.  Instead, each of those cases may
be distinguished not only by its general facts, but also by one
or more notable characteristics not present in the instant case. 
In State v. Kemmerlin, the defendant had been subjected to
physical and emotional abuse by the victim; the defendant’s
accomplice, who performed the act of killing the victim, received
a sentence of life imprisonment; and the jury found only one
aggravating circumstance, the pecuniary gain circumstance, which
was supported by weak evidence.  356 N.C. at 451-55, 488-89, 573
S.E.2d at 877-79, 898.  In State v. Rogers, the defendant
mistakenly shot the victim while attempting to shoot someone
else, and the defendant’s accomplice was sentenced to life
imprisonment.  316 N.C. at 211-12, 341 S.E.2d at 718-19.  In
State v. Young, the defendant was nineteen years old at the time
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of the murder, and the jury did not find the course of conduct
aggravating circumstance.  312 N.C. at 686, 688, 325 S.E.2d at
192-93.  In State v. Hill, the evidence surrounding the murder
was “somewhat speculative,” there was no evidence of any motive
for the murder, and the murder was not part of a violent course
of conduct by the defendant.  311 N.C. at 478-79, 319 S.E.2d at
171-72.  In State v. Bondurant, the defendant demonstrated a
sense of remorse immediately after fatally shooting the victim
and accompanied the victim to the hospital to seek medical
assistance.  309 N.C. at 694, 309 S.E.2d at 182.  Finally, in
State v. Jackson, the defendant was convicted only under the
felony murder rule, and there was a general lack of evidence
concerning the details of the murder.  309 N.C. at 43, 46, 305
S.E.2d at 715, 717.
Although we could selectively extrapolate discrete
similarities between the instant case and some of those cases in
which this Court has held the death sentence disproportionate,
our review reveals that, “considering both the crime and the
defendant,” § 15A-2000(d)(2), the instant case is more factually
similar to cases in which this Court has held the death sentence
not disproportionate.  In particular, we have reviewed several
cases that share the following features with the present case: 
the defendant fatally shot an attendant during the perpetration
of an armed robbery of a small business; there was no evidence
indicating the defendant, at the time he entered the store,
planned to kill the attendant; and the defendant was convicted of
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first-degree murder on the basis of premeditation and
deliberation and under the felony murder rule.  
For example, in State v. Robinson, the defendant and an
accomplice planned to rob a Pizza Inn and gathered clothes and
weapons to use during the robbery.  355 N.C. at 325, 561 S.E.2d
at 249.  Later in the evening, with weapons drawn and faces
covered, the two entered the store and approached the cash
register.  Id.  The defendant pointed his weapon at the store
manager and demanded money.  Id.  When the manager replied, “What
are you going to do if I don’t?” the defendant fired his weapon
at the floor.  Id.  Then, when the manager moved forward, the
defendant shot him in the head and fled with his accomplice.  355
N.C. at 325-26, 561 S.E.2d at 249.  The defendant was convicted
of first-degree murder and sentenced to death, and this Court
determined that the death sentence was not disproportionate.  Id.
at 325, 345, 561 S.E.2d at 249, 261. 
In State v. Hoffman, the defendant entered a jewelry
store wearing a ski mask and carrying a gun.  349 N.C. at 173,
505 S.E.2d at 84.  The defendant shot the victim, who was
standing behind the store’s display counter, broke three glass
display cases, and took various items of jewelry.  Id.  Again,
this Court upheld the first-degree murder conviction and the
death sentence.  349 N.C. at 195, 505 S.E.2d at 97.  
In another similar case, State v. Cummings, 346 N.C.
291, 488 S.E.2d 550 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1092 (1998),
the defendant decided to rob a certain convenience store after
observing that the store “‘looked easy to rob’” because an “old
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man” was running it by himself.  Id. at 302, 488 S.E.2d at 557. 
Evidence suggested that when the defendant entered the store and
demanded money, the attendant attempted in some manner to protect
himself and his property with a gun he kept behind the cash
register.  Id. at 300, 302, 488 S.E.2d at 556-57.  The defendant
shot the attendant two times, killing him.  Id. at 303, 488
S.E.2d at 557.  The defendant then took money from the cash
register and left the store.  Id. at 302, 488 S.E.2d at 557.  As
he was leaving, he fired an additional shot in an attempt to
scare the victim’s wife, who, upon hearing gunshots, had run
outside her house, located fifty feet from the store.  Id. at
299-300, 488 S.E.2d at 555.  At trial, the defendant was
convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.  Id. at
300, 488 S.E.2d at 555.  This Court concluded that the death
sentence was not disproportionate.  Id. at 335, 488 S.E.2d at
576.
Cummings is also similar to the present case with
respect to several specific characteristics of the crime and the
defendant’s conduct.  With regard to the crime itself, the jury
in Cummings found that the murder was committed for pecuniary
gain and that the murder was part of a course of conduct
including other violent crimes.  Id. at 333, 488 S.E.2d at 575. 
The jury in the present case found the same two aggravating
circumstances.  With regard to the defendant’s conduct, the
defendant in Cummings initially told law enforcement officers
that he remained outside while the robbery and shooting occurred,
and only later confessed to the version of the story outlined
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above.  Id. at 302, 488 S.E.2d at 556-57.  Likewise, in the
present case, defendant twice told law enforcement officers that
he remained in the car during the robbery of Mitch’s Grocery, and
only in his third statement confessed to being inside the store
and firing his weapon.  Furthermore, in both Cummings and the
present case, the jury recommended a sentence of death despite
finding a significant number of mitigating circumstances—twenty-
eight of the thirty-two submitted in Cummings, id. at 334, 488
S.E.2d at 576, and thirty-three of the thirty-six submitted in
the present case.  See also State v. Thompson, 359 N.C. 77, 82-
85, 130-31, 604 S.E.2d 850, 857-59, 885-86 (2004) (holding death
sentence not disproportionate when the defendant, in the course
of robbing a Domino’s Pizza, fatally shot the store manager two
times and set fire to the building to cover up his crime), cert.
denied, 546 U.S. 830 (2005); State v. Larry, 345 N.C. 497, 507,
534, 481 S.E.2d 907, 913, 929 (holding death sentence not
disproportionate when the defendant, after pointing a gun at a
Food Lion employee and taking money from the safe, fatally shot a
store customer who was also an off-duty police officer when the
officer chased him outside and struggled with him on the ground),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 917 (1997).   
For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the
death sentence is not excessive or disproportionate in this case.
In sum, we hold that defendant received a fair trial
and capital sentencing proceeding free from prejudicial error. 
Consequently, the trial court’s judgment and sentence of death
remain undisturbed.
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NO ERROR.