Title: PEOPLE OF MI V GERALD LEE BABCOCK

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                          
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 31, 2003  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v
 No. 121310  
GERALD LEE BABCOCK,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
MARKMAN, J.  
We granted leave to appeal in this case to consider  
whether the trial court articulated a substantial and  
compelling 
reason, 
as required under MCL 769.34(3), to justify  
its 
downward 
departure 
from 
the 
statutory 
sentencing  
guidelines.  The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial  
court did not abuse its discretion in departing from the  
guidelines and, thus, affirmed defendant’s sentence.  The  
Court of Appeals concluded that some of the trial court’s  
reasons 
for 
departing 
from 
the 
statutory 
sentencing 
guidelines  
were not objective and verifiable and, therefore, not  
substantial and compelling. Because the Court of Appeals did  
not determine whether the trial court would have departed, and  
would have departed to the same degree, had it not relied on  
these improper factors, we reverse the judgment of the Court  
of Appeals and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for  
further consideration pursuant to this opinion.  
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  
Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of second-degree  
criminal sexual conduct and, in exchange, the prosecutor  
dismissed the single original charge of first-degree criminal  
sexual conduct.  Although the statutory sentencing guidelines  
called for a minimum range of thirty-six to seventy-one  
months, the trial court sentenced defendant to three years’  
probation and one year in jail; however, all but sixty days of  
defendant’s jail term were suspended.  The trial court’s  
reasons for departing from the guidelines consisted of the  
following: (1) defendant had no prior criminal record, (2) the  
crime involved a family member, (3) a three-year minimum was  
too “harsh,” and (4) treatment outside a prison environment  
was more likely to rehabilitate defendant.  In a published  
decision 
(Babcock 
I), the Court of Appeals vacated defendant’s  
sentence, having concluded that the trial court’s reasons for  
2  
  
the departure were not substantial and compelling.1  
On remand, the trial court again sentenced defendant to  
probation and a suspended jail term.  The trial court  
articulated additional reasons for the downward departure,  
including 
the 
following: 
(1) 
the 
probation 
officer 
recommended  
probation, rather than a prison term; (2) defendant’s trial  
counsel, in an affidavit, recommended against a prison term;  
(3) a great portion of the victim’s emotional harm was caused  
by defendant’s uncle who abused her and from separation from  
defendant’s 
grandmother; 
(4) 
letters 
from 
defendant’s  
brother’s special-education teacher and attorney indicated  
that defendant’s brother is severely disabled because of  
cerebral palsy and mental retardation and that defendant is  
his 
brother’s 
primary caregiver; (5) a letter from defendant’s  
physician indicated that defendant suffers from herniated  
discs; and, finally, (6) the fact that defendant’s uncle, who  
has a normal intelligence level, played a much greater role in  
harming the victim than did defendant, who has a “borderline­
to-normal” intelligence level. After remand, in a published  
decision (Babcock II), the Court of Appeals affirmed the  
sentence, having concluded that, although some factors cited  
by the trial court were not objective and verifiable, the  
trial court did not abuse its discretion in departing from the  
1 244 Mich App 64; 624 NW2d 479 (2000).  
3  
 
 
guidelines.2  We granted the prosecutor’s application for  
leave to appeal.3  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation,  
i.e., 
the 
interpretation 
of 
the 
statutory 
sentencing  
guidelines, MCL 769.34, which we review de novo. Veenstra v  
Washtenaw Country Club, 466 Mich 155, 159; 645 NW2d 643  
(2002).  
III. ANALYSIS  
A. HISTORY OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES  
In 1983, this Court concluded that an appellate court has  
the authority to review a trial court’s exercise of discretion  
in sentencing.  People v Coles, 417 Mich 523, 550; 339 NW2d  
440 (1983).  At the time Coles was decided, there were no  
sentencing guidelines; instead, there were merely statutory  
minimums and maximums for certain offenses, and a trial court  
could sentence a convicted person to any period within this  
statutory range.4  In Coles, this Court concluded that the  
2 250 Mich App 463; 648 NW2d 221 (2002).  
3 467 Mich 872 (2002).  
4 At the time, there were also, as there continue to be, 
mandatory sentences for certain offenses.  For example, a  
first-degree murder conviction mandates a sentence of  
imprisonment for life, MCL 750.316, and a conviction for 
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony 
mandates a sentence of imprisonment for two years, MCL 
750.227b. Neither the judicial nor the statutory sentencing 
guidelines would supersede a mandatory sentence.  
4  
appellate court could review a trial court’s selection of a  
sentence within the statutory minimum and maximum; however,  
the appellate court could “afford relief to the defendant only  
if the appellate court finds that the trial court, in imposing  
the sentence, abused its discretion to the extent that it  
shocks the conscience of the appellate court.” Id.  
In 
1983, 
this 
Court 
crafted 
judicial 
sentencing  
guidelines and promulgated these guidelines by administrative  
order.5  As this Court explained in People v Hegwood, 465 Mich  
432, 438; 636 NW2d 127 (2001):  
This 
Court’s 
sentencing 
guidelines 
were  
“mandatory” only in the sense that the sentencing 
court was obliged to follow the procedure of 
“scoring” a case on the basis of the circumstances 
of the offense and the offender, and articulate the 
basis for any departure from the recommended  
sentence range yielded by this scoring.  However, 
because the recommended ranges found in the  
judicial guidelines were not the product of  
legislative action, a sentencing judge was not 
necessarily obliged to impose a sentence within 
those ranges.  
In 1990, this Court overruled the Coles “shocks the  
conscience” test and adopted in its place the “principle of  
proportionality” test, “which requires sentences imposed by  
the trial court to be proportionate to the seriousness of the  
circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.”  
People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). More  
specifically, the Court stated that “the Legislature, in  
5 Administrative Order No. 1983-3, 417 Mich cxxi (1983).  
5 
setting a range of allowable punishments for a single felony,  
intended persons whose conduct is more harmful and who have  
more serious prior criminal records to receive greater  
punishment 
than 
those whose criminal behavior and prior record  
are less threatening to society.” Id. at 651.  
In 1998, the Legislature enacted statutory sentencing  
guidelines, MCL 777.1 et seq.6  As this Court in Hegwood,  
supra at 439, explained:  
Because the new guidelines are the product of 
legislative enactment, a judge’s discretion to 
depart from the range stated in the legislative 
guidelines is limited to those circumstances in 
which 
such 
a 
departure 
is 
allowed 
by 
the  
Legislature.  
Under 
the 
statutory 
sentencing guidelines, a departure is only  
allowed by the Legislature if there is a “substantial and  
compelling 
reason” 
for 
doing 
so.7
 
MCL 
769.34(3).8  
6 The statutory sentencing guidelines are applicable to 
enumerated felonies committed on or after January 1, 1999. 
MCL 769.34(2).  
7 It is only the minimum sentence that must presumptively 
be within the appropriate sentence range.  MCL 769.34(2). The  
maximum sentence is either set by statute, e.g., the maximum 
sentence for extortion is twenty years, MCL 750.213, or it 
falls within the judge’s discretion.  In exercising this 
judicial discretion, the trial court cannot impose a minimum 
sentence that exceeds two-thirds of the maximum sentence.  
People v Tanner, 387 Mich 683, 690; 199 NW2d 202 (1972); MCL 
769.34(2)(b).  
8 
 As explained in Hegwood, supra at 440 n 16: “In MCL  
769.34(3), the Legislature states a rule that makes no 
apparent distinctions between ‘upward departures,’ that  
increase the sentence beyond the length stated in the 
guidelines, and ‘downward departures,’ that decrease the  
6  
 
 
Accordingly, since the enactment of the statutory sentencing  
guidelines, the role of the trial court has necessarily been  
altered.  Before the enactment of these guidelines, the trial  
court was required to choose a sentence within the statutory  
minimum 
and 
maximum 
that was “proportionate to the seriousness  
of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the  
offender.” Milbourn, supra at 636. Following the enactment  
of these guidelines, the trial court is required to choose a  
sentence within the guidelines range, unless there is a  
“substantial and compelling” reason for departing from this  
range.9  Consequently, and as discussed more fully below, the  
role of the Court of Appeals has also changed from reviewing  
the 
trial 
court’s 
sentencing 
decision 
for 
“proportionality” 
to  
sentence below the length stated in the guidelines.”  
9 In at least one circumstance, a sentence may constitute  
a departure, and thus require the articulation of a  
substantial 
and 
compelling reason, even though the sentence is 
within the appropriate sentence range. People v Stauffer, 465  
Mich 633, 636; 640 NW2d 869 (2002).  MCL 769.34(4)(a)  
provides:  
If the upper limit of the recommended minimum 
sentence range for a defendant determined under the 
sentencing guidelines set forth in [MCL 777.1 et  
seq.] is 18 months or less, the court shall impose 
an intermediate sanction unless the court states on  
the record a substantial and compelling reason to 
sentence the individual to the jurisdiction of the 
department of corrections . . . .  
Accordingly, if the upper limit of the appropriate sentence 
range is less than eighteen months, the sentencing court 
cannot impose a prison sentence absent a finding of a 
substantial and compelling reason.  
7  
 
reviewing the trial court’s sentencing decision to determine,  
first, whether it is within the appropriate guidelines range  
and, second, if it is not, whether the trial court has  
articulated a “substantial and compelling” reason for  
departing from such range.10  
B. “SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPELLING REASON”  
The 
statutory 
sentencing 
guidelines, 
provide 
in 
pertinent  
part:  
A court may depart from the appropriate 
sentence range established under the sentencing 
guidelines set forth in [MCL 777.1 et seq.] if the 
court has a substantial and compelling reason for 
that departure and states on the record the reasons 
for departure. [MCL 769.34(3).]  
In People v Fields, 448 Mich 58; 528 NW2d 176 (1995), this  
Court defined “substantial and compelling reasons” in the  
context of departures from mandatory minimum sentences in  
controlled-substance cases.11  This Court stated that “only  
those factors that are objective and verifiable may be used to  
judge whether substantial and compelling reasons exist  
10 This is not to say, however, that proportionality is 
irrelevant under the statutory sentencing guidelines.  See  
part 3(D).  
11 At the time Fields was decided, the controlled­
substances act, MCL 333.7401(4), provided in relevant part:  
The court may depart from the minimum term of 
imprisonment . . . if the court finds on the record 
that there are substantial and compelling reasons 
to do so.  
8  
. . . .”  Id. at 62. 
We further stated that “the reasons  
justifying departure should ‘keenly’ or ‘irresistibly’ grab  
our attention, and we should recognize them as being ‘of  
considerable worth’ in deciding the length of a sentence.”  
Id. at 67. 
Lastly, we stated, “the Legislature intended  
‘substantial and compelling reasons’ to exist only in  
exceptional cases.” Id. at 68.  
“A legal term of art is a technical word or phrase that  
has acquired a particular and appropriate meaning in the law.  
It is, in a statute, to be construed and understood according  
to such meaning.”  People v Law, 459 Mich 419, 425 n 8; 591  
NW2d 20 (1999), citing MCL 8.3a, which provides, “technical  
words and phrases, and such as may have acquired a peculiar  
and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and  
understood according to such peculiar and appropriate  
meaning.”  
The 
phrase “substantial and compelling reason” has,  
in our judgment, acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning  
in the law and, thus, it must be construed according to such  
meaning.  That is, a “substantial and compelling reason” must  
be construed to mean an “objective and verifiable” reason that  
“‘keenly’ or ‘irresistibly’ grabs our attention”; is “of  
‘considerable worth’ in deciding the length of a sentence”;  
and “exists only in exceptional cases.”  Fields, supra at 62,  
9  
 
 
  
67-68.12  
C. “STATES ON THE RECORD”  
The statutory sentencing guidelines, MCL 769.34(3),  
require the trial court to “state[] on the record the reasons  
for departure.”  Therefore, it is not enough that there exists  
some potentially substantial and compelling reason to depart  
from the guidelines range.  Rather, this reason must be  
articulated by the trial court on the record.  Accordingly, on  
review of the trial court’s sentencing decision, the Court of  
Appeals cannot affirm a sentence on the basis that, even  
12 Although 
the 
trial court may depart from the guidelines 
range on the basis that a substantial and compelling reason to 
do so exists, the trial court “shall not base a departure on 
an offense characteristic or offender characteristic already 
taken into account in determining the appropriate sentence 
range unless the court finds . . . that the characteristic has 
been given inadequate or disproportionate weight.”  MCL  
769.34(3)(b).
 Therefore, if the seriousness of the  
defendant’s 
conduct 
and his criminal history have already been 
taken into account in determining the guidelines range, they 
cannot be used to justify the trial court’s departure, unless 
the trial court finds that these factors have been given 
inadequate or disproportionate weight.  
For instance, if a defendant convicted of armed robbery 
is scored 25 points under offense variable one because he 
stabbed his victim, see MCL 777.31, that the defendant stabbed 
his victim probably could not constitute a substantial and 
compelling reason to justify a departure because the  
Legislature 
has 
already determined what effect should be given 
to the fact that a defendant has stabbed his victim and the  
courts must abide by this determination.  However, if the 
defendant stabbed his victim multiple times, or in a manner 
designed to inflict maximum harm, that might constitute a 
substantial and compelling reason for a departure because 
these 
characteristics may have been given inadequate weight in 
determining the guidelines range.  
10  
    
though the trial court did not articulate a substantial and  
compelling reason for departure, one exists in the judgment of  
the panel on appeal.  Instead, in such a situation, the Court  
of Appeals must remand the case to the trial court for  
resentencing or rearticulation.  The obligation is on the  
trial court to articulate a substantial and compelling reason  
for any departure.  As discussed below, the obligation of the  
Court of Appeals is to review the trial court’s determination  
that a substantial and compelling reason exists for  
departure.13  
Further, the trial court must go beyond articulating a  
substantial 
and 
compelling reason for some departure. Rather,  
the trial court can depart from the guidelines range only “if  
the court has a substantial and compelling reason for that  
departure . . . .”  MCL 769.34(3) (emphasis added). 
As we  
explained in Hegwood, supra at 437 n 10:  
In light of such language, we do not believe 
that the Legislature intended, in every case in 
which a minimal upward or downward departure is  
13 Although the trial court must articulate a substantial 
and compelling reason to justify its departure, the trial 
court is not required to use any formulaic or “magic” words in 
doing so. Although the better practice may be for the trial 
court to specifically state that “[t]he substantial and 
compelling reason that justifies my twelve-month departure 
here is . . . ,” something short of this may well suffice as 
long as the trial court has articulated a substantial and 
compelling reason that justifies its departure.  In any event, 
however it is articulated, the quality of the trial court’s 
statement must be sufficient to allow for effective appellate 
review.  
11  
 
 
 
justified 
by 
“substantial 
and 
compelling” 
circumstances, to allow unreviewable discretion to 
depart as far below or as far above the guideline 
range as the sentencing court chooses. Rather, the 
“substantial 
and 
compelling” 
circumstances  
articulated 
by 
the 
court 
must 
justify 
the  
particular departure in a case, i.e., “that  
departure.” [Emphasis in original.]  
Thus, the trial court must articulate on the record a  
substantial and compelling reason to justify the particular  
departure imposed.14  
Because the trial court must articulate on the record a  
substantial and compelling reason to justify the particular  
departure, if the trial court articulates multiple reasons,  
and the Court of Appeals determines that some of these reasons  
are substantial and compelling and some are not, the panel  
must determine the trial court’s intentions.  That is, it must  
determine whether the trial court would have departed and  
would have departed to the same degree on the basis of the  
substantial and compelling reasons alone.15  If the Court of  
14  However, this is not to say that the trial court must 
explain why it chose a twelve-month departure as opposed to an 
eleven-month departure (or indeed as opposed to any one of 
countless other potential departures).  Rather, the trial 
court must simply explain why the actual departure that it 
imposed 
is 
justified 
by the substantial and compelling reasons 
articulated.  
15 When the trial court articulates multiple reasons for 
its departure and possesses doubts regarding whether one of 
these reasons is a substantial and compelling reason, but 
would sentence the defendant the same regardless of this 
reason, the best practice would be for the trial court to 
explicitly state, if it is true, that “I would impose the same 
sentence 
regardless 
of this reason.”  However, something short  
12  
Appeals is unable to determine whether the trial court would  
have departed to the same degree on the basis of the  
substantial and compelling reasons, or determines that the  
trial court would not have departed to the same degree on the  
basis of the substantial and compelling reasons, the Court of  
Appeals must remand the case to the trial court for  
resentencing or rearticulation of its substantial and  
compelling reasons to justify its departure.16  For instance,  
if the trial court departs from the guidelines range by twelve  
months and articulates reasons A, B, and C to justify this  
departure, and if the Court of Appeals determines that reasons  
A and B are not substantial and compelling reasons,17 but that  
C is, the Court of Appeals must determine whether the trial  
of such an explicit statement may well suffice as long as it 
is clear from the record that the trial court would not have  
sentenced defendant differently if it had not relied on this 
improper reason.  
16 On remand, the trial court does not necessarily have 
to impose a different sentence.  It may impose the same 
sentence as long as it articulates a substantial and  
compelling reason that justifies this sentence.  
17 There are several reasons the Court of Appeals may 
determine that a reason is not a substantial and compelling 
reason, such as that it is not “objective and verifiable”; it 
does not “‘keenly’ or ‘irresistibly’ grab our attention”; or 
it is not of “‘considerable worth’” in deciding the length of 
a sentence.” Fields, supra at 62, 67. Additionally, it may 
be concluded that an offense or offender characteristic has  
already been taken into account in determining the guidelines 
range, and that the trial court has not found that the 
characteristic has been given inadequate or disproportionate 
weight. MCL 769.34(3)(b).  
13  
court would have departed from the guidelines range by twelve  
months on the basis of reason C alone.  
D. PROPORTIONALITY  
If the trial court’s sentence is within the appropriate  
guidelines range, the Court of Appeals must affirm the  
sentence unless the trial court erred in scoring the  
guidelines or relied on inaccurate information in determining  
the defendant’s sentence.  MCL 769.34(10).18  However, if the  
sentence is not within the guidelines range, the Court of  
Appeals must determine whether the trial court articulated a  
substantial and compelling reason to justify its departure  
from that range. MCL 769.34(11).19  
In determining whether a sufficient basis exists to  
justify 
a 
departure, 
the 
principle 
of 
proportionality—that 
is,  
18 MCL 769.34(10) provides in relevant part:  
If 
a 
minimum 
sentence 
is 
within 
the  
appropriate guidelines sentence range, the court of 
appeals shall affirm that sentence and shall not 
remand for resentencing absent an error in scoring 
the sentencing guidelines or inaccurate information 
relied 
upon 
in 
determining 
the 
defendant’s  
sentence. . . .  
19 MCL 769.34(11) provides:  
If, upon review of the record, the court of 
appeals finds the trial court did not have a 
substantial and compelling reason for departing 
from the appropriate sentence range, the court 
shall remand the matter to the sentencing judge or 
another trial court judge for resentencing under 
this chapter.  
14  
 
whether the sentence is proportionate to the seriousness of  
the defendant’s conduct and to the defendant in light of his  
criminal record—defines the standard against which the  
allegedly substantial and compelling reasons in support of  
departure 
are 
to 
be 
assessed.20
 
The 
relevancy 
of  
proportionality is obvious.  As in any civilized society,  
punishment should be made to fit the crime and the criminal.  
BMW of North America, Inc, v  Gore, 517 US 559, 576 n 24; 116  
S Ct 1589; 134 L Ed 2d 809 (1996)(“The principle that  
punishment should fit the crime ‘is deeply rooted and  
frequently repeated . . . .’”)(citation omitted); Weems v  
United States, 217 US 349, 367; 30 S Ct 544; 54 L Ed 793  
(1910)(“It is a precept of justice that punishment for crime  
should be graduated and proportioned to the offense.”);  
Thomas 
Jefferson, 
A 
Bill for Proportioning Crimes & Punishment  
in Virginia, 1779 (“[G]overnment would be defective in its  
principal purpose [were it not] a duty in the legislature to  
arrange in a proper scale the crimes which it may be necessary  
for them to repress, and to adjust thereto a corresponding  
gradation 
of 
punishments”); 
Beccaria, 
On 
Crimes 
and  
Punishments (1764)(“Therefore, the means made use of by the  
20 
In 
other 
words, 
while 
“substantial 
and 
compelling” 
sets 
forth the quality of the reasons that must be set forth in 
support of a departure from the guidelines, the principle of 
“proportionality” defines the standard against which the 
decision 
to 
depart, 
and the particular departure imposed, must 
be assessed.  
15  
 
legislature to prevent crimes should be more powerful in  
proportion as they are destructive of the public safety and  
happiness, and as the inducements to commit them are stronger.  
Therefore there ought to be a fixed proportion between crimes  
and punishments.”); Note, Mandatory life sentence without  
parole 
found 
constitutionally 
permissible 
For 
cocaine  
possession-Harmelin v Michigan, 67 Wash L R 713, 714 (1992)  
(“The belief that the punishment should fit the crime is  
deeply rooted in Western civilization.  The proportionality  
concept appears in fundamental social documents such as the  
Bible and the Magna Carta.”) Accordingly, jaywalking is not  
punishable by life imprisonment, first-degree murder is not  
punishable by thirty days in jail, and a person convicted of  
robbery for the fourth time generally faces a more severe  
punishment than a person convicted of robbery for the first  
time.  The premise of our system of criminal justice is that,  
everything else being equal, the more egregious the offense,  
and the more recidivist the criminal, the greater the  
punishment.  
The Legislature has subscribed to this principle of  
proportionality 
in 
establishing 
mandatory 
sentences 
as 
well 
as  
minimum and maximum sentences for certain offenses.  See  
Milbourn, supra at 635-636. It has also subscribed to this  
principle of proportionality in establishing the statutory  
sentencing guidelines.  Under the guidelines, offense and  
16  
prior 
record 
variables are scored to determine the appropriate  
sentence range.  Offense variables take into account the  
severity 
of 
the 
criminal offense, while prior record variables  
take 
into 
account 
the offender’s criminal history.  Therefore,  
the appropriate sentence range is determined by reference to  
the principle of proportionality; it is a function of the  
seriousness of the crime and of the defendant’s criminal  
history.  
Accordingly, in considering whether to depart from the  
guidelines, 
the 
trial court must ascertain whether taking into  
account an allegedly substantial and compelling reason would  
contribute to a more proportionate criminal sentence than is  
available within the guidelines range.  In other words, if  
there are substantial and compelling reasons that lead the  
trial court to believe that a sentence within the guidelines  
range is not proportionate to the seriousness of the  
defendant’s conduct and to the seriousness of his criminal  
history, the trial court should depart from the guidelines.  
Additionally, in departing from the guidelines range, the  
trial 
court 
must 
consider 
whether 
its 
sentence 
is  
proportionate to the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct  
and his criminal history because, if it is not, the trial  
court’s departure is necessarily not justified by a  
substantial and compelling reason.  
17  
 
 
E. STANDARD OF REVIEW OF SENTENCES OUTSIDE GUIDELINES  
In Babcock I, supra at 75-76, the Court of Appeals,  
quoting Fields, supra at 77-78, concluded that  
“the existence or nonexistence of a particular 
factor 
is 
a 
factual 
determination 
for 
the  
sentencing court to determine, and should therefore 
be reviewed by an appellate court for clear error. 
The determination that a particular factor is 
objective and verifiable should be reviewed by the 
appellate court as a matter of law.  A trial  
court’s determination that the objective and  
verifiable factors present in a particular case 
constitute substantial and compelling reasons to 
depart from the statutory minimum sentence shall be 
reviewed for abuse of discretion.”  
We agree.  
In Babcock II, supra at 467 n 3, the Court of Appeals  
concluded that, although it was bound by the above language,  
it “question[ed] the Babcock I holding regarding the abuse of  
discretion standard of review in light of the language in MCL  
769.34(11), which appears to suggest that our review is de  
novo.” MCL 769.34(11) provides:  
If, upon a review of the record, the court of 
appeals finds the trial court did not have a 
substantial and compelling reason for departing 
from the appropriate sentence range, the court 
shall remand the matter to the sentencing judge or 
another trial court judge for resentencing under 
this chapter.  
Defendant contends that the trial court’s decision that  
there is a substantial and compelling reason to depart from  
the guidelines range should be reviewed for an abuse of  
discretion. On the other hand, the prosecutor contends that  
18  
 
 
 
such a decision should be reviewed de novo.  Although we agree  
with Babcock I’s articulation of the applicable standards of  
review—whether a factor exists is reviewed for clear error,  
whether a factor is objective and verifiable is reviewed de  
novo, and whether a reason is substantial and compelling is  
reviewed for abuse of discretion—we take this opportunity to  
clarify the meaning of an abuse of discretion with regard to  
the Court of Appeals review of a trial court’s decision that  
there is a substantial and compelling reason that justifies a  
sentencing departure.  
In Babcock I, the Court of Appeals quoted the abuse of  
discretion test taken from Spalding v Spalding, 355 Mich 382,  
384-385; 94 NW2d 810 (1959), which is that an abuse of  
discretion occurs when the lower court’s decision is “so  
palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it  
evidences not the exercise of will but perversity of will, not  
the exercise of judgment but defiance thereof, not the  
exercise of reason but rather of passion or bias.”  
The Spalding abuse of discretion standard is one that  
entitles the trial court the utmost level of deference.  In  
our judgment, while the Legislature intended to accord  
deference to the trial court’s departure from the sentencing­
guidelines range, it did not intend this determination to be  
entitled to Spalding’s extremely high level of deference.  
19  
 
 
 
  
MCL 769.34(11) clearly states that if “the court of  
appeals finds the trial court did not have a substantial and  
compelling reason for departing from the appropriate sentence  
range, the court shall remand the matter to the sentencing  
judge or another trial court judge for resentencing . . . .”  
“Find” is defined as: “to discover or perceive after  
consideration . . . .”  Random House Webster’s College  
Dictionary (1991). Therefore, if, after consideration, the  
Court of Appeals discovers or perceives that the trial court  
did not have a substantial and compelling reason to justify  
its 
departure, 
the 
Court 
must 
remand 
the 
case 
for  
resentencing.  This statute clearly does not require the Court  
of Appeals, in accord with Spalding, to affirm “unless the  
result [is] so palpably and grossly violative of fact and  
logic that it evidences not the exercise of will but the  
perversity of will,  not the exercise of judgment but defiance  
thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of passion or  
bias.”21 
Spalding, supra at 384-385.  
21 Further, application of Spalding’s abuse of discretion  
standard to the trial court’s finding of a substantial and 
compelling 
reason 
to 
justify its departure from the guidelines 
range would not further the manifest purpose of the statutory 
sentencing guidelines. 
The Legislature adopted these  
guidelines intending to reduce unjustified disparities in 
sentencing.  See 1994 PA 445, § 33(1)(e)(iv)(stating that 
sentencing guidelines shall, “Reduce sentencing disparities 
based on factors other than offense characteristics and  
offender characteristics and ensure that offenders with  
similar 
offense 
and 
offender 
characteristics 
receive  
substantially similar sentences.”)(repealed March 7, 2002).  
20  
  
 
  
That said, some degree of deference is nevertheless owed  
the trial court’s finding, and thus a review de novo would be  
inappropriate.  The structure and content of the sentencing  
guidelines, as well as the organization of the appellate  
system itself, plainly reveal the Legislature’s recognition  
that the trial court is optimally situated to understand a  
criminal case and to craft an appropriate sentence for one  
convicted in such a case. For example, the trial court “may  
depart from the appropriate sentence range established under  
the sentencing guidelines . . . if the court has a substantial  
and compelling reason for that departure. . . .”  MCL  
769.34(3).  Additionally, the trial court may even “base a  
departure 
on 
an 
offense 
characteristic 
or 
offender  
characteristic already taken into account in determining the  
appropriate sentence range” if “the court finds . . . that the  
characteristic has been given inadequate or disproportionate  
weight.” 
MCL 769.34(3)(b).  Finally, the Court of Appeals  
must affirm the trial court’s sentence if it is within the  
appropriate guidelines range, unless the trial court made an  
“Thus, the very premise of the guidelines is that judicial 
discretion will be restricted to a certain degree.” Hegwood,  
supra at 438. 
However, if the trial court is allowed to 
depart from the guidelines unless its decision to do so is “so 
palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it 
evidences not the exercise of will but the perversity of will, 
not the exercise of judgment but defiance thereof, not the 
exercise of reason but rather of passion or bias,” Spalding,  
supra, the Legislature’s intent to reduce unjustified 
disparities in sentencing will be significantly thwarted.  
21  
 
error in scoring the sentencing guidelines or relied on  
inaccurate information in determining the sentence.  MCL  
769.34(10).  
It is clear that the Legislature has imposed on the  
trial court the responsibility of making difficult decisions  
concerning criminal sentencing, largely on the basis of what  
has taken place in its direct observation.  Review de novo is  
a form of review primarily reserved for questions of law, the  
determination of which is not hindered by the appellate  
court’s distance and separation from the testimony and  
evidence produced at trial.  The application of the statutory  
sentencing guidelines to the facts is  
not a generally recurring, purely legal matter, 
such as interpreting a set of legal words, say, 
those of an individual guideline, in order to 
determine their basic intent.  Nor is that question 
readily resolved by reference to general legal 
principles and standards alone. 
Rather, the  
question at issue grows out of, and is bounded by, 
case-specific 
detailed 
factual 
circumstances.  
[Buford v United States, 532 US 59, 65; 121 S Ct 
1276; 149 L Ed 2d 197 (2001).]  
Because of the trial court’s familiarity with the facts and  
its experience in sentencing, the trial court is better  
situated than the appellate court to determine whether a  
departure is warranted in a particular case.  Accordingly,  
review de novo, in which a panel of appellate judges could  
substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court, is  
surely not the appropriate standard by which to review the  
22  
determination that a substantial and compelling reason exists  
to justify a departure from the guidelines range.  Instead,  
the 
appellate 
court 
must accord this determination some degree  
of deference.  
Therefore, 
the 
appropriate standard of review must be one  
that is more deferential than de novo, but less deferential  
than the Spalding abuse of discretion standard. At its core,  
an abuse of discretion standard acknowledges that there will  
be circumstances in which there will be no single correct  
outcome; rather, there will be more than one reasonable and  
principled outcome. See People v Talley, 410 Mich 378, 398;  
301 NW2d 809 (1981)(LEVIN, J., concurring), quoting Langes v  
Green, 282 US 531, 541; 51 S Ct 243; 75 L Ed 520 (1931)(“‘The  
term “discretion” denotes the absence of a hard and fast  
rule.’”).  When the trial court selects one of these  
principled outcomes, the trial court has not abused its  
discretion and, thus, it is proper for the reviewing court to  
defer to the trial court’s judgment. An abuse of discretion  
occurs, however, when the trial court chooses an outcome  
falling outside this principled range of outcomes.  See  
Conoco, Inc, v JM Huber Corp, 289 F3d 819, 826 (CA Fed,  
2002)(“Under an abuse of discretion review, a range of  
reasonable determinations would survive review.”); United  
States v Penny, 60 F3d 1257, 1265 (CA 7, 1995)(“a court does  
not abuse its discretion when its decision ‘is within the  
23  
range of options from which one would expect a reasonable  
trial judge to select’”)(citation omitted). We believe that  
this test more accurately describes the appropriate range of  
the trial court’s discretion with regard to determining  
whether a substantial and compelling reason exists to justify  
its departure from the appropriate sentence range. Further,  
we believe that this test will contribute significantly to  
more consistent sentencing, both by enabling the Court of  
Appeals to more effectively constrain departures from the  
appropriate range of discretion by trial courts and by  
imposing a more consistent standard of review upon the Court  
of Appeals itself.  
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals must determine, upon a  
review of the record, whether the trial court had a  
substantial and compelling reason to depart from the  
guidelines, recognizing that the trial court was in the better  
position to make such a determination and giving this  
determination appropriate deference.  The deference that is  
due is an acknowledgment of the trial court’s extensive  
knowledge of the facts and that court’s direct familiarity  
with the circumstances of the offender.  The Court of Appeals  
is to conduct the thorough review required by MCL 769.34(11),  
honoring the prohibition against departures not grounded in a  
substantial and compelling reason. MCL 769.34(3). In doing  
so, however, the Court must proceed with a caution grounded in  
24  
the inherent limitations of the appellate perspective.  
IV. APPLICATION  
In this case, the Court of Appeals concluded that some of  
the reasons articulated by the trial court were not objective  
and verifiable.  As explained above, if a reason is not  
objective and verifiable, it cannot constitute a substantial  
and compelling reason.22  As also explained above, if the trial  
court articulates multiple reasons, and the Court of Appeals,  
as in this case, determines that some of these reasons are  
substantial and compelling and some are not, and the Court of  
Appeals is unable to determine whether the trial court would  
have departed to the same degree on the basis of the  
substantial and compelling reasons, the Court must remand the  
case to the trial court for resentencing or rearticulation.  
Because the Court of Appeals in this case did not determine  
whether the trial court would have departed, and would have  
departed to the same degree, absent consideration of the  
reasons that the Court of Appeals found to be not objective  
and verifiable,  we reverse its judgment and remand this case  
to the Court of Appeals for further consideration.  
V. CONCLUSION  
For the above reasons, we reverse the judgment of the  
22 While a reason cannot be a substantial and compelling 
reason unless it is objective and verifiable, the opposite is 
not always true.  A reason can be objective and verifiable 
without being substantial and compelling.  
25  
Court of Appeals and remand this case to the Court of Appeals  
for further consideration pursuant to this opinion.  
Stephen J. Markman 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor  
CORRIGAN, C.J.  
I concur in all except parts IIIC and IV.  
Maura D. Corrigan  
CAVANAGH, J.  
I concur in all except part IIIB.  
Michael F. Cavanagh  
APPENDIX  
In order to assist the bench and bar, the following is a  
summary of the responsibilities of the trial court and Court  
of Appeals under the statutory sentencing guidelines:  
1.
 A trial court is required to choose a minimum  
sentence within the guidelines range, unless there is a  
substantial and compelling reason for departing from this  
range. MCL 769.34(2), (3).  
2.  If a trial court’s sentence is within the guidelines  
range, the Court of Appeals must affirm the sentence unless  
the trial court erred in scoring the guidelines or relied on  
inaccurate 
information 
in 
determining 
the 
defendant’s  
sentence. MCL 769.34(10).  
26  
 
3.
 A substantial and compelling reason must be  
“objective and verifiable”; must “‘keenly’ or ‘irresistibly’  
grab our attention”; and must be “of ‘considerable worth’ in  
deciding the length of a sentence.”  Fields, supra at 62, 67.  
4.
 A trial court must articulate on the record a  
substantial 
and 
compelling 
reason 
for 
its 
particular  
departure, and explain why this reason justifies that  
departure.  MCL 769.34(3); People v Daniel, 462 Mich 1, 9; 609  
NW2d 557 (2000).  
5.  A trial court “shall not base a departure on an  
offense characteristic or offender characteristic already  
taken into account in determining the appropriate sentence  
range unless the court finds . . . that the characteristic has  
been given inadequate or disproportionate weight.” 
MCL  
769.34(3)(b).  
6.  In considering whether, and to what extent, to depart  
from the guidelines range, a trial court must ascertain  
whether taking into account an allegedly substantial and  
compelling reason would contribute to a more proportionate  
criminal sentence than is available within the guidelines  
range. MCL 769.34(3).  
7.
 In reviewing sentencing decisions, the Court of  
Appeals may not affirm a sentence on the basis that, although  
the trial court did not articulate a substantial and  
compelling reason for a departure, one nonetheless exists in  
27  
 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals.  Instead, in such a  
situation, the Court of Appeals must remand the case to the  
trial court for resentencing. MCL 769.34(3); MCL 769.34(11).  
8.  If a trial court articulates multiple “substantial  
and compelling” reasons for a departure from the guidelines,  
and the Court of Appeals determines that some of these reasons  
are substantial and compelling and others are not, the panel  
must determine whether the trial court would have departed,  
and would have departed to the same degree, on the basis of  
the substantial and compelling reasons alone.  MCL 769.34(3).  
9. If a trial court departs from the guidelines range,  
and its sentence is not based on a substantial and compelling  
reason 
to 
justify 
the particular departure, i.e., the sentence  
is not proportionate to the seriousness of the defendant’s  
conduct and his criminal history, the Court of Appeals must  
remand to the trial court for resentencing. MCL 769.34(11).  
10.  “‘[T]he existence or nonexistence of a particular  
[sentencing] factor is a factual determination for the  
sentencing court to determine, and should therefore be  
reviewed by an appellate court for clear error.’”  Babcock I,  
supra at 75-76, quoting Fields, supra at 77.  
11. “‘The determination that a particular [sentencing]  
factor is objective and verifiable should be reviewed by the  
appellate court as a matter of law.’”  Babcock I, supra at 76,  
quoting Fields, supra at 78.  
28  
12. “‘A trial court’s determination that the objective  
and 
verifiable 
factors present in a particular case constitute  
substantial and compelling reasons to depart from the  
statutory minimum sentence shall be reviewed for abuse of  
discretion.’” Babcock I, supra at 76, quoting Fields, supra  
at 78.  An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court  
chooses an outcome falling outside the permissible principled  
range of outcomes.  
29  
 
 
____________________________________ 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v 
No. 121310  
GERALD LEE BABCOCK,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
CORRIGAN, C.J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
Although I concur with much of the majority’s analysis  
and its result, I cannot agree with the majority’s analysis of  
the remand requirement. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent  
in part.  
I would limit the requirement of a reviewing court to  
remand for resentencing or rearticulation to that explicitly  
provided by the Legislature in MCL 769.34(11).  Rather than  
interpret the statutory text, the majority creates a new  
remand requirement out of whole cloth.  The majority concludes  
that “if the trial court articulates multiple reasons [for  
departure], and the appellate court . . . determines that some  
of these reasons are substantial and compelling and some are  
not, and the Court of Appeals is unable to determine whether  
  
 
the trial court would have departed to the same degree on the  
basis of the substantial and compelling reasons, the Court  
must remand the case to the trial court for resentencing or  
rearticulation.” 
Ante at 26.  This formulation is found  
nowhere in the text of the sentencing guidelines and imposes  
an 
unnecessary 
burden on both sentencing and reviewing courts.  
MCL 769.34(11) provides:  
If, upon a review of the record, the court of 
appeals finds the trial court did not have a  
substantial and compelling reason for departing 
from the appropriate sentence range, the court 
shall remand the matter to the sentencing judge or 
another trial court judge for resentencing under 
this chapter. [Emphasis added.]  
The 
Legislature 
only 
requires the reviewing court to determine  
whether the trial court had “a substantial and compelling  
reason” for departing from the sentencing range. Therefore,  
under the statute, the Court of Appeals may only remand for  
resentencing or rearticulation if it finds that the trial  
court did not articulate a single substantial and compelling  
reason for the departure.  
In determining whether a trial court articulated a  
substantial and compelling reason for departing from the  
appropriate sentence range, the Court of Appeals must  
necessarily determine whether the trial court met the  
requirements of MCL 769.34(3): (1) did the trial court  
articulate a substantial and compelling reason for that  
2  
particular departure, and (2) did the trial court state that  
substantial and compelling reason on the record.  Provided the  
trial court complied with the requirements of MCL 769.34(3),  
with the result that the Court of Appeals finds at least one  
substantial 
and 
compelling reason for the departure imposed by  
the trial court, then MCL 769.34(11) does not require a  
remand.  
Using the hypothetical example proposed by the majority,  
even if a trial court provides multiple reasons for a  
departure and some of those reasons are later determined not  
to be substantial and compelling, the statute only requires a  
remand if the Court of Appeals finds that the trial court did  
not provide a single substantial and compelling reason for  
that departure from the statutory sentence range.  There is no  
textual support for the majority’s requirement that the Court  
of Appeals must remand any time any reason is determined not  
to be substantial and compelling, no matter how many  
substantial and compelling reasons remain, unless it is clear  
to the reviewing court that the trial court would have imposed  
the same departure on the basis of the remaining reasons.  
Not only is the majority’s analysis without textual  
support, it also renders MCL 769.34(11) superfluous.  It is a  
cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that “effect shall  
be given to every word, phrase, or clause of a statute.”  
3  
Robertson v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 465 Mich 732, 757; 641 NW2d  
567 (2002).  The majority’s interpretation, however, gives no  
meaning to the Legislature’s explicit provision regarding  
appellate review; rather, it simply collapses the appellate  
inquiry into the initial determination to depart under MCL  
739.34(3).
 
In 
doing 
so, 
the 
majority 
ignores 
the  
Legislature’s decision to specify the scope and purpose of  
review by the Court of Appeals in subsection 11.  
Had the Legislature intended to require the Court of  
Appeals to read the mind of the trial court in conducting its  
review, it would have been sufficient to set forth the trial  
court requirements in subsection 3 and omit subsection 11.  
Instead, the Legislature provided for a specific standard of  
review by the Court of Appeals in subsection 11: the Court of  
Appeals shall only remand “[i]f, upon a review of the record,  
the court of appeals finds the trial court did not have a  
substantial and compelling reason for departing from the  
appropriate sentence range.”  If the majority’s analysis is  
correct and the Court of Appeals must remand every time it is  
unable to discern whether the trial court would have made the  
same departure under the existing substantial and compelling  
reasons, this language has no meaning.  
The plain language of subsection 11 requires the Court of  
Appeals to conduct its own inquiry regarding whether the trial  
4  
 
 
court articulated a substantial and compelling reason for  
departing 
from 
the 
guidelines.  Random House Webster’s College  
Dictionary (2d ed, 1997), defines “find” as “to discover or  
perceive after consideration,” “to ascertain by study or  
calculation,” and “to determine after a judicial inquiry.”  
Therefore, subsection 11 requires the Court of Appeals, upon  
reviewing the record provided by the trial court, to  
“discover,” “ascertain,” or “determine” whether the trial  
court had a substantial and compelling reason for departing  
from the guidelines.  This is the entire scope and function of  
the Court of Appeals inquiry. Nothing in the statutory text  
requires the Court of Appeals to “find” that the trial court  
would have departed and departed to the same degree on the  
basis of a substantial and compelling reason, as the majority  
would require. The Legislature provided only that the Court  
of Appeals must determine for itself whether the trial court  
articulated 
at 
least 
one substantial and compelling reason for  
departing from the guidelines, and we are bound by that  
legislative provision. 
The majority’s creation of an  
extratextual remand inquiry renders subsection 11 superfluous  
and usurps legislative authority.  
Further, as a practical matter, the majority’s approach  
will force the Court of Appeals to remand innumerable cases to  
the trial courts for resentencing or rearticulation. In any  
5  
case in which the Court of Appeals is not comfortable with its  
ability to divine the workings of the mind of the sentencing  
judge, it will be forced to remand even though it finds that  
a substantial and compelling reason justifies the departure.  
This extreme level of inefficiency is not required by the  
statutory text and will create needless additional work for an  
already overburdened trial bench. To mitigate the effect of  
the majority’s extratextual requirement, I strongly suggest  
that every trial judge add the following disclaimer to the end  
of every judgment of sentence:  
I am persuaded that the defendant should serve 
the sentence I have rendered and it is my intention 
that this sentence be sustained if an appellate 
court determines that any of my rationales for 
departure survive review.  
Although this disclaimer is not required by the statutory  
text, it is now functionally required by the majority’s  
creation of a new remand inquiry.  
Because I believe we are bound by the statutory language,  
I would hold that a remand is only required under MCL  
769.34(11) if the Court of Appeals, after reviewing the record  
provided by the trial court, determines that there is not a  
single substantial and compelling reason for departing from  
the guidelines, as defined in MCL 769.34(3).  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent in part from the  
majority’s decision.  
6  
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr.  
7 
 
 
___________________________________ 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 121310 
GERALD LEE BABCOCK, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
I agree with the majority except to the extent it continues to utilize the definition 
of “substantial and compelling reasons” from People v Fields, 448 Mich 58; 528 NW2d 
176 (1995).  Ante at 7-8. I remain committed to the Fields dissent and would not 
improperly impose limitations on the types of factors a sentencing court may consider. 
In Fields, this Court addressed “substantial and compelling reasons” necessary 
for departure under the controlled substance act, then in effect, and stated that “only 
those factors that are objective and verifiable may be used to judge whether substantial 
and compelling reasons exist.” Fields at 62. 
The Fields dissent conducted an 
exhaustive review of the case law interpreting “substantial and compelling,” as used in 
the statute at issue, and the Legislature’s intent in enacting the statute.  The dissent also 
 
examined the plain language of the statute at issue and pointed out that the Legislature 
did not specify any limit on the types of factors the sentencing court may consider. 
Fields at 99 (CAVANAGH,J., dissenting).  The Legislature only specified that the reasons 
for a sentencing departure must meet the substantial and compelling threshold.  Id. 
There is nothing in the language of the statute or the legislative history limiting a 
sentencing judge’s consideration to only “objective and verifiable” factors.  Therefore, 
a sentencing court should consider all the factors and circumstances surrounding an 
individual case. 
Additionally, what rises to the level of substantial and compelling is clearly 
subjective.  “It relates to this defendant and to this sentencing judge, who is examining 
this individual and this offense.” Id. at 104 (emphasis in original).  Thus, the weighing 
of all the factors and circumstances before the sentencing court includes inherently 
subjective inquiries. 
Further, as was discussed at length in the Fields dissent, the “objective” 
limitation is unworkable. See, e.g., Id. at 95-96, 101-102, 103-104, 105-106. There are 
certain factors, such as a defendant’s remorse or a defendant’s family support, that 
may be considered objective by one sentencing judge and subjective by another.  The 
dissent in Fields stated, “[t]he better test is whether the sentencing judge is satisfied 
that the nature and extent of the defendant’s remorse [or family support] are 
substantial and compelling reasons to support a sentencing departure.”  Id. at 105. I 
remain committed to the position that the “objective” criteria utilized by this Court is 
unworkable. 
Therefore, while I agree with the remainder of the majority opinion, I must 
2  
dissent to the extent this Court continues to employ the Fields “objective” definition of 
“substantial and compelling reasons.” 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
3  
 
 
____________________________________ 
 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v 
No. 121310  
GERALD LEE BABCOCK,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
WEAVER, J. (dissenting in part and concurring in part).  
I dissent from the majority’s result and opinion and  
would affirm the Court of Appeals decision.  I dissent because  
(1) I continue to believe that the phrase “a substantial and  
compelling reason” does not limit the trial court to  
considering only factors that are “objective and verifiable”  
and (2) I agree with the standard for remand articulated by  
the Chief Justice in her partial dissent rather than with the  
majority’s remand analysis.  I concur only in (1) the  
majority’s basic recognition that the language of MCL  
769.34(3) requires the court to state on the record a  
substantial and compelling reason for departing from the  
guidelines and (2) the majority’s refinement of the abuse of  
discretion standard.  
First, 
pursuant 
to 
the 
legislative 
sentencing 
guidelines, 
 A court may depart from the appropriate 
sentence range established under the sentencing 
guidelines set forth in [MCL 777.1 et seq.] if the 
court has a substantial and compelling reason for 
that departure and states on the record the reasons 
for that departure. All of the following apply to 
a departure:  
(a) The court shall not use an individual’s 
gender, race, ethnicity, alienage, national origin, 
legal 
occupation, 
lack 
of 
employment,  
representation 
by 
appointed 
legal 
counsel, 
appearance in propria persona, or religion to 
depart from the appropriate sentence range.  
(b) The court shall not base a departure on an 
offense characteristic or offender characteristic  
already taken into account in determining the 
appropriate sentence range unless the court finds 
from the facts contained in the court record, 
including the presentence investigation report, 
that the characteristic has been given inadequate 
or disproportionate weight. [MCL 769.34(3).]  
While I concur in the majority’s basic recognition that the  
language of the statute requires the trial court to state on  
the record “a substantial and compelling reason” for its  
departure from the sentencing guidelines, I dissent from the  
rest of the majority’s analysis.  The language of the statute  
is plain and unambiguous, and the majority’s excessive  
interpretation of this language, which is clear on its face,  
is unnecessary.  
Second, I agree with the standard for remand articulated  
by the Chief Justice in her partial concurrence and partial  
2  
dissent, rather than with the majority’s remand analysis.  MCL  
769.34(11) provides: 
 If, upon a review of the record, the court of 
appeals finds the trial court did not have a 
substantial and compelling reason for departing 
from the appropriate sentencing range, the court 
shall remand the matter to the sentencing judge or 
another trial court judge for resentencing under 
this chapter.  
Pursuant to this language, a remand to the trial court is only  
required “if the Court of Appeals, after reviewing the record  
provided by the trial court, determines that there is not a  
single substantial and compelling reason for departing from  
the guidelines, as defined in MCL 769.34(3).”  Ante at 7.  
Further, as the Chief Justice notes, the majority’s approach  
will, as a practical matter, “force the Court of Appeals to  
remand innumerable cases to the trial courts for resentencing  
or rearticulation” and “will create needless additional work  
for an already overburdened trial bench.”  Ante at 6.  
Consequently, I agree with the Chief Justice that the  
majority’s opinion functionally requires at the end of every  
judgment of sentence the disclaimer she articulates.  
Third, I continue to believe that a “substantial and  
compelling reason” does not limit the trial court to  
considering only factors that are “objective and verifiable.”  
Rather, I continue to subscribe to the position articulated in  
my dissent in People v Daniel, 462 Mich 1, 22-23; 609 NW2d 557  
3  
 
 
 
(2000), that all relevant factors, not only those that are  
objective 
and 
verifiable, 
should 
be 
considered 
when  
determining whether there is a substantial and compelling  
reason to depart from the sentencing guidelines.  
Fourth, I concur with the majority’s refinement of the  
abuse of discretion standard.  Ante at 19-24. The abuse of  
discretion standard, as previously articulated in Spalding v  
Spalding, 355 Mich 382, 384-385; 94 NW2d 810 (1959), was so  
exaggerated that it unreasonably limited appellate court  
review.  
Sentencing a defendant for the crime committed is a  
discretionary act.  As recognized by the majority, “the trial  
court is optimally situated to understand a criminal case and  
to craft an appropriate sentence for one convicted in such a  
case.” Ante at 21. 
Consequently, a considerable degree of  
deference should be afforded the trial court.  Today, the  
majority provides a reasonable definition of that deferential  
standard:  
At its core, an abuse of discretion standard 
acknowledges that there will be circumstances in 
which there will be no single correct outcome; 
rather, there will be more than one reasonable and 
principled outcome.  When the trial court selects  
one of these principled outcomes, the trial court 
has not abused its discretion and, thus, it is 
proper for the reviewing court to defer to the 
trial court’s judgment.  An abuse of discretion  
occurs, however, when the trial court chooses an 
outcome falling outside this principled range of  
4  
 
outcomes. [Ante at 22-23 (citations omitted).]  
I emphasize that according to this standard, the trial court  
does not abuse its discretion if it selects a different  
principled outcome than the reviewing court would have chosen  
from the range of principled outcomes.  
Applying the principles discussed herein to the facts of  
this case and considering all relevant factors, I would  
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in  
departing downward from the sentencing guidelines.  The trial  
court offered the following reasons for its departure: (1) the  
probation 
agent 
recommended probation, (2) abuse of the victim  
by her uncle and separation from her grandmother caused a  
great part of the harm suffered by the victim, (3) defendant’s  
original attorney recommended probation, (4) correspondence  
from defendant’s brother’s special-education teacher and from  
defendant’s brother’s attorney indicated that defendant was  
the caregiver for his brother, who suffers severe disability  
because of cerebral palsy and mental retardation, and (5) a  
letter 
from 
defendant’s 
physician 
indicated 
that 
defendant 
has  
a herniated disc in his back.  The articulation of these  
factors satisfies the requirement that the trial court  
articulate a substantial and compelling reason on the record  
for its downward departure.  Moreover, the trial court’s  
decision did not venture beyond the range of principled  
5  
outcomes under the circumstances. Therefore, the trial court  
did not abuse its discretion, and the judgment of the Court of  
Appeals should be affirmed.  
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
6