Title: DAVID DALE BAKER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DAVID DALE BAKER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 6223 P.3d 542Case Number: S-08-0094Decided: 01/20/2010
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
DAVID 
DALE BAKER,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable David B. Park, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender, Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel, Eric M. 
Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Alden.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General, Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General, D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Jenny Lynn Craig, Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. 
Craig.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      A jury 
convicted David Dale Baker of one count of possessing controlled substance 
precursors with intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation 
associated with that crime, three counts of conspiracy, and two counts of child 
endangerment.  He was sentenced to 
concurrent terms of six to eight years on the first four counts, and concurrent 
terms of eighteen to twenty-four months on the child endangerment charges.  The two terms, however, were to be 
served consecutively.  On appeal, 
Baker advances arguments regarding whether the search of his home was proper, 
whether the trial court erred in denying his Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, 
whether the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury, whether he was 
denied effective assistance of counsel, and whether merger of offenses, both 
with respect to charging and sentencing, applies in his case.  We affirm in part, and, for sentencing 
purposes, remand in part.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Baker states the 
issues as follows:

 
 

1.      
Evidence 
seized during the warrantless search of Mr. Baker's home and garage should have 
been suppressed.

2.      
The 
Trial Court should have granted Mr. Baker's Motion for Acquittal on Counts V and 
VI.

3.      
The 
trial court's instruction to the jury on the elements of W.S. § 6-4-405(a)(ii) 
failed to clarify that the presence of the child must be contemporaneous with 
the manufacturing activity.

4.      
The 
trial court applied the wrong conspiracy statute and failed to instruct the jury 
on the proper elements of conspiracy.

5.      
Mr. 
Baker was not provided effective assistance of counsel.

6.      
Counts 
II, III, and IV should merge for both charging and 
sentencing.

 
 
The 
State rephrases the issues this way:

 
 

1.    
The 
district court did not err when it denied [Baker's] motion to suppress 
evidence.

2.    
The 
district court did not err when it denied [Baker's] Motion for Judgment of 
Acquittal.

3.    
The 
district court did not fail to adequately instruct the jury regarding the 
elements of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-405(a)(ii).

4.    
[Baker] 
was not prejudiced by a jury instruction that required the jury to deliberate 
regarding the conspiracy counts III and IV pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-7-1042.

5.    
[Baker] 
did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel at 
trial.

6.    
Counts 
II, III, and IV of the information should not have merged for the purposes of 
charging but should have, and ultimately did merge for the purposes of 
sentencing.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On December 20, 
2006, Crystal Merck reported to the Casper Police Department that she had been 
assaulted by her live-in boyfriend, David Baker.  According to Merck, she and Baker argued 
and he repeatedly hit her in the head and caused a cut to her right upper 
lip.  Merck agreed to accompany 
Officers Douglas and Dabney to her home so they could investigate the incident 
and interview Baker  Merck accompanied the officers to the residence because 
she assumed that Baker would not open the door for the officers, and she was 
going to attempt to convince Baker to speak with them and allow them inside the 
home.

 
 
[¶4]      Upon arriving at 
the residence, Officer Douglas noted that Baker's pickup was running.  Inside the pickup, the officer noticed a 
large dog, several firearms, and a knife on the front seat of the vehicle.  Additional officers were requested, and 
after they arrived, Merck unlocked the back door of the house with her own 
key.  However, the door being 
chained from the inside, it only opened a few inches.  Merck yelled into the house, asking that 
Baker come outside.  When he did 
not, Merck gave the officers permission to break the door in, which they 
did.  The officers conducted a 
protective sweep of the residence and began looking for Baker.  In doing so, they noticed drug 
paraphernalia  specifically, methamphetamine 
paraphernalia.

 
 
[¶5]      The Wyoming 
Department of Criminal Investigation (DCI) was contacted and arrived at the 
residence within the hour.  After 
speaking with Merck and learning that she and her two children lived at the 
residence with Baker, Agent Wetzel of the DCI explained to her that he had 
reason to believe that methamphetamine was being manufactured in the home, and 
requested her permission to enter the house, garage, and trailer.  Merck agreed and, in addition, provided 
the agent with a key to the trailer.

 
 
[¶6]      After an 
extensive search of the premises, DCI agents found several items consistent with 
the manufacture of methamphetamine including, but not limited to: a propane 
bottle with a torch; hoses that had been sliced and connected to valves; acetone 
containers; hydrogen peroxide; laboratory glassware containing a white powdery 
residue (that eventually tested positive for methamphetamine); a filter for an 
air purifying respirator; a turkey baster (that eventually tested positive for 
methamphetamine); and an electric hot plate burner (that eventually tested 
positive for methamphetamine, pseudoephedrine, and 
amphetamine).

 
 
[¶7]      In January of 
2007, Baker was charged with six counts:  
one count of possessing a controlled substance precursor with intent to 
engage in a clandestine laboratory operation, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 35-7-1059(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2009), one count of conspiracy to engage in a 
clandestine laboratory operation, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 35-7-1059(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2009), one count of conspiracy to possess a 
controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage in a clandestine 
laboratory operation, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-7-1059(a)(i) 
and 35-7-1042 (LexisNexis 2009), one count of conspiracy to possess laboratory 
equipment or supplies with the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-7-1059(a)(ii) and 
35-7-1042 (LexisNexis 2009), and two counts of child endangerment, in violation 
of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-405(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2009).  A jury trial was held on August 20, 
2007, and on August 28, 2007, the jury found Baker guilty of all six 
counts.  The court denied Baker's 
motions for judgment of acquittal and for new trial after jury verdict.  He was sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment of not less than six years nor more than eight years on each of the 
possession and conspiracy counts, with each term to be served concurrently.  On each count of child endangerment, 
Baker was sentenced to a term of not less than eighteen months nor more than 
twenty-four months, those counts to be served concurrently with each other, but 
consecutive to the possession and conspiracy sentences.  Baker filed a timely notice of 
appeal.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Denial 
of Motion to Suppress  Consent

 
 
[¶8]      Baker's first 
issue on appeal is that the warrantless entry into his home was in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and art. 1, § 4 of the 
Wyoming Constitution, because he did not consent to the search.  The State disagrees and argues that this 
instance qualifies as an exception to the warrant 
requirement.

 
 
[¶9]      In reviewing a 
trial court's ruling on a motion to 
suppress evidence, we do not interfere with the trial court's 
findings of fact unless the findings are clearly 
erroneous.  
We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's 
determination because the trial court has an opportunity at the evidentiary 
hearing to assess the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make 
the necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions.  The constitutionality of a particular 
search is a question of law that we review de novo.  Shaw v. State, 2009 WY 18, ¶ 19, 
201 P.3d 1108, 1112 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
[¶10]   Indeed, under both the United 
States and Wyoming constitutions, searches and seizures conducted without a 
warrant 
are per se unreasonable unless they are justified by probable cause or 
recognized exceptions.  Pena v. 
State, 2004 WY 115, ¶ 29, 98 P.3d 857, 870 (Wyo. 2004).  Exceptions to the warrant requirement 
include:

 
 
1) 
search of an arrested suspect and the area within his control; 2) a search 
conducted while in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect; 3) a search and/or seizure 
to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence; 4) a search and/or seizure of 
an automobile upon probable cause; 5) a search which results when an object is 
inadvertently in the plain view of police officers while they are where they 
have a right to be; 6) a search and/or seizure conducted pursuant to consent; 
and 7) a search which results from an entry into a dwelling in order to prevent 
loss of life or property.

 
 

Andrews 
v. State, 2002 
WY 28, ¶ 18, 40 P.3d 708, 712 (Wyo. 2002) (internal citations 
omitted).  In this case, the 
exception to the warrant requirement that ostensibly applies is consent.  The officers had the consent of a 
resident of the home, Baker's live-in girlfriend Crystal 
Merck.

 
 
[¶11]   Baker advances a lengthy and 
citation-filled argument as to why Merck did not have the authority to consent 
in this instance.  Relying upon 
cases from a variety of jurisdictions, Baker argues, generally, that because 
Merck was locked out of her house from the inside, she lost all authority to 
enter the house.  Moreover, Baker 
insists that neither actual nor apparent authority existed.  Instead, he states that Merck "had no 
access at all" to the premises in question, and even though she possessed a key 
to open the door from the outside, Baker argues that because someone else had 
chained the door shut from the inside, "further inquiry" was needed as to 
whether or not Merck had the authority to consent to a 
search.

 
 
[¶12]   However, as the State points out, 
it is well settled that consent to a warrantless search is not confined to 
consent by a defendant.  
It may also be given by a "third party who possessed common authority 
over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be 
inspected."  United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 
171, 94 S. Ct. 988 (1974).

 
 
The 
authority which justifies the third-party consent rests on mutual use of the 
property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, 
so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the 
right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed 
the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be 
searched.

 
 

Matlock, 
415 U.S. 164, 171 at n.7.  In fact, consent is valid so long as 
the officer obtaining the consent reasonably believed that the third party had 
the authority to consent (even if the belief is in error).  Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186, 110 S.Ct 2793, 2800 
(1990).

 
 
As 
with other factual determinations bearing upon search and seizure, determination 
of consent to enter must "be judged against an objective standard: would the 
facts available to the officer at the moment  warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief' " that the consenting party had authority over the 
premises? If not, then warrantless entry without further inquiry is unlawful 
unless authority actually exists.  
But if so, the search is valid.

 
 

Andrews, ¶ 25, 40 P.3d  at 714 (internal 
citations omitted).

 
 
[¶13]   Here, the facts known to the 
officers at the time of the search support the conclusion that Merck had the 
authority to consent to a search of the residence.  Merck reported a domestic disturbance 
from her home at the hands of her 
live-in boyfriend.  She expected her 
boyfriend (Baker) to not answer the door, and told the officers that they could 
go inside the home, and she unlocked the back door with her own key from her 
personal keychain.  And although a 
"no trespassing" sign was posted on the property, Merck's consent stands.1

 
 
Denial 
of Motion for Judgment of Acquittal  Child 
Endangerment

 
 
[¶14]   Baker's next claim is that the 
district court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal with 
respect to the two counts of child endangerment, in violation of 
§ 6-4-405(a)(ii), because the State failed to prove the children were 
present at the time of the manufacturing activities.

 
 
[¶15]   When reviewing a district court's 
denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, this Court "accept[s] as true the 
State's evidence, together with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, 
leaving out entirely any conflicting evidence."  Mattern v. State, 2007 WY 24, ¶ 28, 
151 P.3d 1116, 1128-29 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
[¶16]   At the end of the State's 
case-in-chief, Baker moved for a judgment of acquittal, claiming that the State 
failed to prove that any manufacturing was taking place in the home or that the 
children were ever in the home at the time methamphetamine was being 
manufactured.  The district court, 
however, found that a prima facie case had been established as to this issue 
and, according to the State, there was ample evidence at trial to allow the 
district court to reach its judgment on Baker's motion.  Through various witnesses the State 
established that for several months during 2006, Baker conspired with various 
individuals to operate a clandestine methamphetamine lab.

 
 
[¶17]   First, Zachary Wolf testified that 
Baker was seeking a recipe to manufacture methamphetamine, and shortly 
thereafter, Wolf saw "several bottles" of anhydrous ammonia in Baker's 
garage.  Wolf also testified that he 
saw Baker trying to obtain methamphetamine from a "white sludge" with 
hydrochloric acid.  Wolf also 
testified that he and Baker tried to make methamphetamine two or three times and 
that Merck bought cold medicine and would break down those pills inside the 
house.  And, most importantly to 
this issue, Wolf testified that he was aware that Merck's two young children 
were living in the home during this activity.

 
 
[¶18]   
Merck's testimony also supported that Baker conspired to operate a 
clandestine methamphetamine lab.  
Merck testified that when she moved in with Baker, so did her two 
children.  What is more, she also 
testified that she would "cleanse" the methamphetamine in her home by pouring 
acetone over it and then letting it dry inside the home.  Also, Merck explained that she would put 
the drugs in her freezer to accelerate the evaporation process and would often 
use a propane torch or burner to continue the cleansing process.  Merck unequivocally admitted to the 
criminal activity taking place in her home over the course of basically a 
year:

 
 
[Mr. 
Marken]: Ms. Merck, would you agree that between February 1, 2006, and December 
20, 2006, that you knowingly and intentionally conspired with or aided David 
Baker to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation?

 
 
[Ms. 
Merck]: Yes, sir.

 
 
Q. 
And you would agree that the site of that clandestine laboratory operation was 
[your home] in Casper, Wyoming?

 
 
A: 
Yes, sir.

 
 
[¶19]   It is altogether reasonable to 
assume that from this evidence, the jury was able to infer that while this 
manufacturing of methamphetamine was taking place, the children were present.2  Certainly, operating under the 
applicable standard of review, there was ample evidence presented that allowed 
the jury to convict Baker of two counts of endangering children.  The district court did not err in 
denying Baker's motion for judgment of acquittal.

 
 
Jury 
Instructions Child Endangerment 

 
 
[¶20]   Baker's third argument on appeal is 
that the district court failed to adequately instruct the jury regarding the 
elements of child endangerment.  
However, Baker did not object to this at trial and, accordingly, on 
review when an appellant does not object to a jury instruction, this Court 
reviews the issue under the plain error standard, which states as 
follows:

 
 
First, 
the record must clearly present the incident alleged to be error.  Second, appellant must demonstrate that 
a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated in a clear and obvious, not 
merely arguable, way.  Last, 
appellant must prove that he was denied a substantial right resulting in 
material prejudice against him.

 
 

Six 
v. State, 
2008 WY 42, ¶ 12, 180 P.3d 912, 917 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
[¶21]   At trial the district court gave 
the jury two instructions regarding the two counts of child endangerment and the 
elements of the crime (one instruction for each count, i.e., for each of the two 
child victims):

 
 
Instruction 
No. 31

The 
elements of the crime of Child Endangering with methamphetamine, as alleged in 
Count Five of the Information, are:

1.   From 
on or about the 1st day of February, 2006 through on or about the 
20th day of December, 2006;

2.   In 
Natrona County, Wyoming,

3.   the 
Defendant, David Dale Baker;

4.   Did 
knowingly and willfully cause or permit a child, to wit: [Victim I], born 
October 1, 1998;

5.   To 
remain in a room or dwelling where the Defendant knew that methamphetamine was being 
manufactured.

If 
you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these elements 
has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant 
guilty.

If, 
on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any 
of these elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should 
find the defendant not guilty.3 [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 
[¶22]   Baker insists that the instructions 
were flawed because a change in tense expands the scope of the statute and thus 
did not require the jury to find that the children were present at the time the 
methamphetamine was being actively manufactured.  The statute reads that children must be 
present where "methamphetamine is being manufactured."  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-405 
(LexisNexis 2009) (emphasis added).  
Baker argues that the change in tense expands the scope of the statute 
and did not require the jury to find that the children were present at the time 
the methamphetamine was being actively manufactured.

 
 
[¶23]   Under the plain error standard of 
review, Baker meets the first prong by showing that the alleged error is clearly 
on the record.  However, the second 
prong is where Baker fails to meet the standard.  He cannot show that a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law was violated in a clear and obvious, not merely 
arguable, way.  The test and rule of 
law to be used when determining whether or not a jury instruction was proper 
regarding the necessary elements of a crime is "whether the instructions leave 
no doubt as to the circumstances under which the crime can be found to have been 
committed."  Butz v. State, 2007 WY 152, ¶ 18, 167 P.3d 650, 
655 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
[¶24]   The Wyoming Criminal Pattern Jury 
Instructions track almost exactly to the instruction used at trial in the 
instant case.  The applicable jury 
instruction reads in pertinent part: " Caused or permitted the child to remain 
in a room, dwelling or vehicle where the defendant knew that methamphetamine was 
being manufactured or sold."  
W.Cr.P.J.I. 44.05A (2004).  
The State argues, and we agree, that this is a compelling showing of the 
appropriateness of the jury instructions used at trial.

 
 
[¶25]   Moreover, the jury instruction 
mirrored the language of the statute.  
That the word "is" was changed to "was" makes sense  the jury was being 
asked to deliberate as to whether methamphetamine was being manufactured in the home 
between February 1, 2006, and December 20, 2006, which, at the time of trial, 
had already happened.  Thus, the 
time in question was effectively past tense.  "Reasonable jurors, being familiar with 
the English language, would understand the instruction in accordance with the 
ordinary meanings and uses of the words."  
Butz, ¶ 22, 167 P.3d  at 656.  Because Baker failed to meet the second 
prong of plain error, we affirm this issue and conclude that the jury 
instructions used at trial were proper.

 
 
Jury 
Instructions  Conspiracy

 
 
[¶26]   We next turn to Baker's fourth 
argument on appeal, which is that the district court instructed the jury under 
the wrong conspiracy statute, and thus, his convictions should be reversed.  Specifically, Baker claims that these 
instructions were given in error, because the "proper" conspiracy statute is 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-303, which requires proof of an overt act.  The State does not altogether disagree 
but argues mainly that the error, if any, was invited and altogether 
harmless.

 
 
[¶27]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-303 
(LexisNexis 2009) provides:

 
 
§ 
6-1-303. Conspiracy; renunciation of criminal intention; 
venue.

 
 
            
(a)  A person is guilty of conspiracy to commit a crime if he 
agrees with one (1) or more persons that they or one (1) or more of them will 
commit a crime and one (1) or more of them does an overt act to effect the 
objective of the agreement.

            
(b)  A person is not liable under this section if after 
conspiring he withdraws from the conspiracy and thwarts its success under 
circumstances manifesting voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal 
intention.

            
(c)  A conspiracy may be prosecuted in the county where the 
agreement was entered into, or in any county where any act evidencing the 
conspiracy or furthering the purpose took place.

 
 
[¶28]   In Miller v. State, 955 P.2d 892, 896-98 
(Wyo. 1998) we held:

 
 
            
While Miller primarily relies upon his claim of entitlement to relief 
under the law of the case doctrine, the instruction on the unilateral theory of 
conspiracy poses a novel question for Wyoming.  For that reason we consider whether that 
instruction was a correct instruction on the law.  The Supreme Court of North Dakota has 
distinguished the bilateral theory of conspiracy from the unilateral theory in 
this way:

 
 
"Under 
a unilateral formulation, the crime is committed when a person agrees to proceed 
in a prohibited manner; under a bilateral formulation, the crime of conspiracy 
is committed when two or more persons agree to proceed in such manner.  See Note [Conspiracy; Statutory Reform 
Since the Model Penal Code, 75 Colum.L.Rev. 1122, 1136 (1975)].  Under either approach, the agreement is 
all-important to conspiracy.  Under 
the unilateral approach, as distinguished from the bilateral approach, the 
trier-of-fact assesses the subjective individual behavior of a defendant * * 
*.  Under the traditional bilateral 
approach, there must be at least two guilty' persons, two persons who have 
agreed."

 
 

State 
v. Rambousek, 
479 N.W.2d 832, 833-34 (N.D.1992), citing State v. Kihnel, 488 So. 2d 1238, 1240 
(La.App.1986).

 
 
            
Prior to its revision in 1982, as amended in 1983, the statute making 
conspiracy a crime in Wyoming read:

 
 
      If two (2) or 
more persons conspire to (a) commit a felony in the state of Wyoming or to 
commit an act beyond the state of Wyoming which if done in this state would be a 
felony, and (b) one (1) or more of such persons do any act, within or without 
the state of Wyoming, to effect the object of the conspiracy, each, upon 
conviction, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or 
imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than ten (10) years or both.  A conspiracy may be prosecuted in the 
county where the conspiratorial agreement or combination was entered into, or in 
any county where any act or acts evidencing the conspiracy or in any county 
wherein the furtherance of its purpose took place.

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. § 6-1-117 (1977).  As revised 
in 1982, and then amended in 1983, this statute now reads:

 
 
      (a)  A 
person is guilty of conspiracy to commit a crime if he agrees with one (1) or 
more persons that they or one (1) or more of them will commit a crime and one 
(1) or more of them does an overt act to effect the objective of the 
agreement.  

      (b)  A 
person is not liable under this section if after conspiring he withdraws from 
the conspiracy and thwarts its success under circumstances manifesting voluntary 
and complete renunciation of his criminal intention.  

      (c)  A 
conspiracy may be prosecuted in the county where the agreement was entered into, 
or in any county where any act evidencing the conspiracy or furthering the 
purpose took place.  

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. § 6-1-303 (1988).

 
 
            
The new version was adopted from both the Model Penal Code and the laws 
of neighboring states.  See Theodore 
E. Lauer, Goodbye 3-Card Monte:  The 
Wyoming Criminal Act of 1982, 19 Land & Water L.Rev. 107, 119 (1984).  The Model Penal Code, like the new 
version of the Wyoming statute, defines conspiracy in the context of a single 
actor agreeing with another, and this language is said to adopt the unilateral 
approach.  Model Penal Code & 
Commentaries §  5.03(b) at 382-398 
(Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985).  While federal courts have continued to 
follow the bilateral theory of conspiracy, the modern trend in state courts is 
to rule that a conspiracy count is viable even when one of the participants is a 
government agent or is feigning agreement.  
See generally, Model Penal Code & Commentaries § 5.03(b) at 382-398 
(Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985); 2 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. 
Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 6.4(d).  Compare U.S. v. Barboa, 777 F.2d 1420, 
1422 (10th Cir. (N.M.) 1985) with State 
v. Null, 247 Neb. 192, 526 N.W.2d 220, 229 (1995); Com. v. Sego, 872 S.W.2d 441, 443 
(Ky.1994); State v. Conway, 193 
N.J.Super. 133, 472 A.2d 588 (1984); State v. Hohensee, 650 S.W.2d 268, 275 
(Mo.App.1982) (rev'd in part on other 
grounds).  The focus under the 
unilateral theory is on the culpability of the defendant, without any necessity 
to establish the guilty mind of one or more 
co-conspirators.

 
 
            
When we compare the first sentences of the earlier and current statutes 
in Wyoming, we find that the old statute began "[i]f two (2) or more persons conspire to (a) 
commit a felony in the state of Wyoming * * *," while the new statute reads, "[a] person is guilty of conspiracy to 
commit a crime if he agrees with one 
(1) or more persons that they or one (1) or more of them will commit a crime * * 
*."  (Emphasis added.)  Our research discloses that most states 
that have adopted this second definition of the crime of conspiracy have 
embraced a unilateral approach to conspiracy, and we hold that is appropriate in 
Wyoming.

 
 
            
Other states have justified the unilateral theory of conspiracy as sound 
public policy.  A person who 
believes he is conspiring with another to commit a crime is a danger to the 
public regardless of whether the other person in fact has agreed to commit the 
crime.  As one text writer has 
expressed the proposition, "such an approach is justified in that a man who 
believes that he is conspiring to commit a crime and wishes to conspire to 
commit a crime has a guilty mind and has done all in his power to plot the 
commission of an unlawful purpose."   
Friedman, Mens Rea in 
Conspiracy, 19 Modern L.Rev. 276, 283 (1956), adopted in, 2 Wayne R. LaFave & 
Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive 
Criminal Law § 6.4(d) n. 109 at 73.  
Miller's case furnishes a textbook example of the justification for a 
unilateral approach.  Miller's 
guilty mind was not diminished by the fact that Powell had made an agreement to 
serve as a law enforcement informant.  
It is true that Miller's chance of succeeding in kidnapping his family 
under the circumstances was minimal, but Miller has "nonetheless engaged in 
conduct which provides unequivocal evidence of his firm purpose to commit a 
crime."  2 Wayne R. LaFave & 
Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive 
Criminal Law § 6.4(d) at 73 (footnote omitted).  It is our conclusion that we should 
follow the majority rule of our sister states, and we hold that valid public 
policy as well as the language and the legislative history of our conspiracy 
statute make the unilateral approach to conspiracy the law of 
Wyoming.

 
 
[¶29]   Wyo. Stat. Ann § 35-7-1042 
(LexisNexis 2009) provides:

 
 
§ 
35-7-1042. Attempts and conspiracies.

 
 
            
Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense under this article within the 
state of Wyoming or who conspires to commit an act beyond the state of Wyoming 
which if done in this state would be an offense punishable under this article, 
shall be punished by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed the 
maximum punishment prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the 
object of the attempt or conspiracy.  
[Emphasis added.]

 
 
[¶30]   In Palato v. State, 988 P.2d 512, 513-16 
(Wyo. 1999) (emphasis in original) we held:

 
 
The 
question we must resolve is whether Wyoming's controlled substances conspiracy 
statute, § 35-7-1042, embraces the unilateral or bilateral theory of 
conspiracy.  "Under a unilateral 
formulation, the crime is committed when a person agrees to proceed in a 
prohibited manner; under a bilateral formulation, the crime of conspiracy is 
committed when two or more persons agree to 
proceed in such manner."  Miller v. State, 955 P.2d 892, 896 
(Wyo.1998) (quoting State v. 
Rambousek, 479 N.W.2d 832, 833-34 (N.D.1992)).  Therefore, under a unilateral theory, a 
conspiracy count is viable even when one of the participants is a government 
agent or is feigning agreement.  Miller, at 897; Wayne R. LaFave & 
Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive 
Criminal Law § 6.4(d) (1986).

 
 
            
This court recently considered the unilateral-bilateral question as it 
pertains to our general conspiracy statute, Wyo. Stat.  Ann. § 6-1-303 (Lexis 1999).  Miller.  Based on the language and legislative 
history of the statute, as well as public policy considerations, we held that § 
6-1-303 adopts the unilateral approach to conspiracy.  Id.  Our evaluation of those same 
considerations, and others, leads us to conclude that the legislature had a 
different intent when it enacted § 35-7-1042.

 
 
            
This court's primary focus when interpreting a statute is to determine 
the legislature's intent upon enactment.  
Tietema v. State, 926 P.2d 952, 953 (Wyo.1996).  "The initial 
step in arriving at a correct interpretation * * * is an inquiry respecting the 
ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed, according to their 
arrangement and connection."  Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. Game & 
Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo.1993) (quoting Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)).  If the 
language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, we apply its plain meaning and 
need not consult rules of statutory construction.  "[W]hile a determination that the 
meaning is not subject to varying interpretations will usually end our inquiry, 
we may resort to extrinsic aids of interpretation, such as legislative history 
and rules of construction, to confirm our determination."  Houghton v. Franscell, 870 P.2d 1050, 
1054 (Wyo.1994) (citing Parker, 845 
P.2d at 1045).

 
 
[I]n 
ascertaining the legislative intent in enacting a statute * * * the court * * * 
must look to the mischief the act was intended to cure, the historical setting 
surrounding its enactment, the public policy of the state, the conditions of the 
law and all other prior and contemporaneous facts and circumstances that would 
enable the court intelligently to determine the intention of the lawmaking 
body.

 
 

Carter 
v. Thompson Realty Co., 
58 Wyo. 279, 291, 131 P.2d 297, 299 (1942); see also Parker, 845 P.2d  at 1044.  We presume that the legislature enacts 
statutes with full knowledge of the existing condition of the law and with 
reference to it.  Parker, at 1044.

 
 
            
Wyoming's controlled substances conspiracy statute 
provides:

 
 

Any 
person who 
attempts or conspires to commit any offense 
under this article [the Wyoming Controlled Substances Act] within the state of 
Wyoming or who conspires to commit an act beyond the state of Wyoming which if 
done in this state would be an offense punishable under this article, shall be 
punished by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed the maximum 
punishment prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the object of 
the attempt or conspiracy.

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat.  Ann. § 35-7-1042 (Lexis 1999) 
(emphasis added).  We find that § 
35-7-1042 is ambiguous with respect to whether it adopts a bilateral or 
unilateral theory of conspiracy.  
The ambiguity in the statute arises from the use of the singular "[a]ny 
person" language, which since the adoption of the Model Penal Code has been said 
to be indicative of the unilateral approach to conspiracy, and the traditional, 
common law view that it takes at least two guilty parties to "conspire."  See, e.g., Jasch v. State, 563 P.2d 1327, 1332 (Wyo.1977) (quoting Goldsmith 
v. Cheney, 447 F.2d 624 (10th Cir.1971)) ("A conspiracy is an agreement 
between two or more persons to do an unlawful act.").

 
 
            
The history of Wyoming's drug conspiracy statute provides some insight 
into the legislature's intent at the time of its enactment.  Section 35-7-1042 was derived, not from 
the general conspiracy statute or the Model Penal Code, but from the Federal 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, codified at 21 
U.S.C. § 846.  When the Wyoming 
legislature adopts a statute from another jurisdiction, that jurisdiction's case 
law construing the statute is considered persuasive authority and an aid to 
determine legislative intent.  Apodaca v. State, 627 P.2d 1023, 1027 
(Wyo.1981);  Woodward v. Haney, 564 P.2d 844, 845-46 
(Wyo.1977).  As such, we have looked 
to the case law interpreting the federal conspiracy provision as persuasive 
authority when interpreting § 35-7-1042.  
Apodaca, 627 P.2d  at 1027; 
Dorador v. State, 768 P.2d 1049, 
1053-54 (Wyo.1989).

 
 
            
The federal courts have consistently adhered to the Sears rule, a Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals holding that there can be no conspiratorial liability imposed when the 
only other person involved is a government agent.  Sears v. United States, 343 F.2d 139, 
142 (5th Cir.1965); see also United 
States v. Rosenblatt, 554 F.2d 36, 38 n. 2 (2d Cir.1977); United States v. Escobar de Bright, 742 F.2d 1196, 1198-99 (9th Cir.1984).  
The federal rule, which takes a bilateral approach, is grounded in the 
traditional definition of conspiracy as "an agreement between two or more people 
to commit an unlawful act."  Escobar de Bright, 742 F.2d  at 
1199.  The reasoning behind the 
federal approach is that the act of agreeing is a group act requiring at least 
two people, and when one of two persons merely pretends to agree, there is 
neither a true agreement nor a meeting of the minds.  Id.  This was the conventional view of 
conspiracy law, and the view espoused by a majority of states, including Wyoming 
when § 35-7-1042 was enacted in 1971.  
In Miller, we determined the 
modification of the language in Wyoming's general conspiracy statute from the 
traditional "[i]f two (2) or more persons conspire" to the Model Penal Code 
formulation of "[a] person is guilty of conspiracy to commit a crime if" 
evidenced the legislature's intent to move to the unilateral approach.  In contrast, § 35-7-1042 has not been 
amended since its enactment, and we find no similar evidence of legislative 
intent to depart from the federal bilateral position.

 
 
            
We acknowledge that this construction results in divergent treatment of 
conspiracies in Wyoming, depending on whether controlled substances are 
involved.  However, the adoption of 
the Wyoming Controlled Substances Act, §§ 35-7-1001 et seq., suggests the 
legislature intended to treat drug crimes differently.  The preamble of the Act describes it as 
"providing a comprehensive codification and revision of the laws of the State of 
Wyoming relating to controlled substances and the use and abuse of drugs," 
providing for, among other things, "crimes and offenses."  1971 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 246.  At the time it was enacted, the 
legislature removed from the criminal code those provisions governing crimes and 
enforcement relating to controlled substances and placed them in the Act.  Id.

 
 
            
In addition, we note that § 35-7-1042 has already been determined to 
alter the general law of conspiracy in an important respect.  Apodaca, 627 P.2d  at 1026-27.  Specifically, the drug conspiracy 
statute includes no overt act requirement.  
When a defendant is charged under § 35-7-1042, the government is not 
required to allege and prove an overt act to sustain a conviction.  Apodaca, 627 P.2d  at 1027.  An overt act requirement affords at 
least a minimal added assurance, beyond the bare agreement, that a socially 
dangerous combination exists and that a person is not punished for a mere evil 
state of mind.  Deirdre A. Burgman, 
Unilateral Conspiracy:  Three Critical Perspectives, 29 
DePaul L. Rev. 75, 102 (1979).  With 
respect to unilateral conspiracies, the overt act requirement is conceivably a 
protection to insure that police activity is not abused.  See id. at 101.  The Model Penal Code does not require an 
overt act for conspiracies to commit first and second degree crimes.  Model Penal Code, supra, § 5.03(5).  Although the legislature generally 
followed the Model Penal Code approach when it modified the general conspiracy 
statute in 1982, the legislature saw fit to retain the overt act requirement for 
all conspiratorial objectives.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-1-303(b).  That being 
the case, and given the omission of an overt act protection in the drug 
conspiracy statute, we cannot ascribe to the legislature the intent to adopt the 
unilateral conspiracy theory absent a clear expression of that 
intent.

 
 
            
For the reasons stated above, we hold that the controlled substances 
conspiracy statute embraces the bilateral theory of conspiracy, in accordance 
with federal case law.  The 
certified question, whether a defendant can be found guilty, under Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 35-7-1042, of conspiring to deliver a controlled substance when the 
only other member of the alleged conspiracy is a government agent, is answered 
"no."

 
 
Also 
see Holzheuser v. State, 2007 WY 160, 
¶ 18, 169 P.3d 68, 78 (Wyo. 2007) (intimating that unilateral conspiracy 
theory might apply, but only concluding that there was no evidence in the record 
to support any kind of conspiracy theory).

 
 
[¶31]   We review issues regarding jury 
instructions under the following standard:

 
 
Jury 
instructions shall not be ruled defective absent a showing that the instructions 
confused or misled the jury as to the proper principles of law and prejudiced 
the defendant.  Prejudicial error 
must be demonstrated, and prejudice will not be demonstrated unless the 
instruction confused or misled the jury with respect to the proper principles of 
law.

 
 

Janpol 
v. State, 2008 WY 21, ¶ 7, 178 P.3d 396, 399 
(Wyo. 2008) (internal citations omitted).  
Also, 

 
 
A 
trial court is given wide latitude in instructing a jury and, as long as the 
instructions correctly state the law and the entire charge covers the relevant 
issue, reversible error will not be found.  
Instructions must be considered as a whole, and individual instructions, 
or parts of them, should not be singled out and considered in isolation.  Prejudice will be determined to exist 
only where an appellant demonstrates that the instruction given confused or 
misled the jury with respect to the proper principles of 
law.

 
 

Bromley 
v. State, 2007 WY 20, ¶ 31, 150 P.3d 1202, 
1212 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
[¶32]   At trial the jury was instructed 
regarding the crime of conspiracy in accordance with 
§ 35-7-1042:

 
 

Instruction 
No. 23

YOU 
ARE INSTRUCTED  that the elements of 
the crime of Conspiring to Commit the crime of "Knowingly or Intentionally 
Possessing a List I and/or a List II controlled Substance Precursor," as charged 
in Count Three of the Information, are:

1.            
From 
on or about the 1st day of February, 2006 through on or about the 
20th day of December, 2006:

2.            
In 
Natrona County, Wyoming;

3.            
The 
defendant, David Dale Baker;

4.            
Agreed 
with one or more other persons;

5.            
That 
they, or one of them, would commit the crime of Knowingly or Intentionally 
Possessing a List I and/or a List II controlled Substance Precursor, to 
wit:

(A)       List I  
Ephedrine or Pseudo-Ephedrine; and/or

(B)       List II  
Acetone and/or Iodine;

6.            
With 
the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation.

 
 
In 
arriving at your decision on Count Three, you must also consider the specific 
elements of the crime of "Knowingly or Intentionally Possessing a List I and/or 
List II Controlled Substance Precursor," which are set forth in Instruction No. 
24.

                        

If 
you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these elements 
has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant 
guilty of Count Three.

 
 
 
 
Instruction 
No. 28

YOU 
ARE INSTRUCTED  that the elements of 
the crime of Conspiring to Commit the crime of "Knowingly or Intentionally 
Possessing Laboratory Equipment or Supplies With Intent to Engage in a 
Clandestine Laboratory Operation," as alleged in Count Four of the Information, 
are:

1.    
From 
on or about the 1st day of February, 2006 through on or about the 
20th day of December, 
2006:

2.    
In 
Natrona County, Wyoming;

3.    
The 
defendant, David Dale Baker;

4.    
Agreed 
with one or more other persons;

5.    
That 
they, or one of them, would commit the crime of "Knowingly or Intentionally 
Possessing Laboratory Equipment or Supplies With Intent to Engage in a 
Clandestine Laboratory Operation."

 
 
In 
arriving at your decision on Count Four, you must also consider the specific 
elements of the crime of "Knowingly or Intentionally Possessing Laboratory 
Equipment or Supplies," which are set forth in Instruction No. 
29.

                        

If 
you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these elements 
has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant 
guilty under Count Four.

 
 
[¶33]   Some factual background may be 
helpful to the reader on this issue.  
Baker was originally charged with two counts of conspiracy pursuant to 
§ 35-7-1042.  About one week 
prior to trial, the State moved to amend the Information to charge Baker with 
two counts of conspiracy pursuant to § 6-1-303, in place of the former 
statute.  The State discussed, on 
the record, its confusion surrounding the issue of when each statute should be 
properly used and concluded that the general conspiracy statute would be the 
more appropriate statute upon which to proceed.  A hearing was held on the matter at 
which the State demonstrated its indifference as to which statute was used.  Defense counsel, however, was adamant 
that § 35-7-1042 was the appropriate charge.  Both the district court and the State 
were willing to accept defense counsel's position on the 
matter:

 
 
The 
Court:  Okay.  So that 
part of the amendment, everybody is clear, we're operating under the conspiracy 
as charged and governed by the Controlled Substances Act, which means an overt 
act does not have to be established, but it has to be a bilateral 
operation.

.

Mr. 
Marken:  And the State is comfortable with that.

The 
Court:  Okay.

Mr. 
Marken:  Just so the record is clear  and I think it is at this point 
 the defense has had an opportunity to call whichever direction we want; and as 
I understand it, he has been saying the law of this case should be governed by 
1042 and not 6-1-303.

The 
Court:  That's what I understand.

Mr. 
Tolin:  And, Your Honor, I think it would be improper for me to sit 
here and disingenuous to say that because it benefits the defendant, we want you 
to use this law even though it is clearly not the appropriate law.  I think that is inappropriate for me as 
a defense counsel.  And so I think 
I'm  I'm stuck with that position of what the Supreme Court said.  And I  you know, even though  

The 
Court:  Okay.  I 
understand, Mr. Tolin.

 
 
[¶34]   With respect to a conspiracy, the 
jury heard testimony of Zachary Wolf and Crystal Merck, who both admitted to 
conspiring with Baker to obtain items for a methamphetamine lab.  Also, the jury heard both of those 
witnesses testify regarding the overt acts that were taken in furtherance of the 
conspiracy (i.e., searching for a 
methamphetamine recipe; holding bottles of anhydrous ammonia at home to 
manufacture methamphetamine; driving to purchase as much cold medicine as was 
possible; Baker supplying money for the purchase of such cold medicines; Merck 
crushing the cold medicine to place in alcohol as part of the 
methamphetamine-making process).  
Furthermore, the jury heard DCI Agent Wetzel testify about the presence 
of equipment used to manufacture methamphetamine in Baker's home, some of which 
actually tested positive for methamphetamine.

 
 
[¶35]   In light of the discussion above, 
we conclude that § 6-1-303 does not apply to this case, in light of the 
discussion in Palato (the general 
conspiracy statute and the general drug conspiracy statute are distinct).  However, we also agree with Baker that 
§ 35-7-1042 does not apply.  We 
arrive at this conclusion after considering the structure and language of the 
challenged statutes.  First, we 
consider the structure of the Act.  
Statutes as a whole are divided into titles, chapters, and articles.  The Act is contained in Title 35, 
Chapter 7, Article 10.  Statutory 
Article 10 is not confined simply to the Act.  It contains two further provisions 
dealing with controlled substances:  
§ 35-7-1061 ("Pilot program for real-time database data access") and 
§ 35-7-1062 ("Pilot program for implementation assistance").4

 
 
[¶36]   Turning to the confines and actual 
language of the Act, it is divided into ten articles.5  Section 35-7-1042 is found in article 
V.  By its language, 
§ 35-7-1042 is limited in scope to offenses "under this article."  Considering the structure of the Act, 
the term "this article" as used in § 35-7-1042 looks to mean article V of 
the Act.  Beyond the plain language, 
we find it is unlikely, too, that the Wyoming Legislature intended for 
§ 35-7-1042 to apply to all provisions in statutory Article 10 in light of 
the fact that Article 10 contains provisions outside the confines of the 
Act.

 
 
[¶37]   Even if § 35-7-1042 applied to 
all provisions contained in statutory Article 10, it still would not apply given 
the facts of this case.  The 
substantive offenses Baker was charged with violating are contained in 
§ 35-7-1059.  This section is 
found in article IX of the Act and contains its very own conspiracy provision, 
which states: "It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally:   Conspire with or aid another to engage 
in a clandestine laboratory operation."  
§ 35-7-1059(a)(iv).  By 
well-settled rules of statutory construction, the specific statutory provision 
always prevails over a more general statutory provision.  See e.g. Schafer v. State, 2008 WY 149, 
¶¶ 13-15, 197 P.3d 1247, 1250-51 (Wyo. 2008).  Thus, we conclude that § 35-7-1042 
is inapplicable in this instance.

 
 
[¶38]   The fundamental problem of this 
case is this:  Counts III and IV 
charged Baker with conspiracy to possess precursors and laboratory equipment or 
supplies with the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation.  The conspiracies charged, however, are 
not crimes unless prohibited by the conspiracy provision of 
§ 35-7-1059(a)(iv).  Under the 
language of § 35-7-1059(a)(iv), this is not the case.  As defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 35-7-1058(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2009), "clandestine laboratory operation" 
means:

 
 
§ 
35-7-1058.  
Definitions.

 
 

(a)  
As 
used in this article:

.

(ii)  "Clandestine 
laboratory operation" means:

(A)         
Purchasing 
or procuring chemicals, supplies, equipment or a laboratory location for the 
illegal manufacture of controlled substances;

(B)         
Transporting 
or arranging for the transportation of chemicals, supplies or equipment for the 
illegal manufacture of controlled substances;

(C)         
Setting 
up supplies or equipment for the illegal manufacture of controlled substances; 
or 

(D)         
Distributing 
or disposing of chemicals, equipment, supplies, or products used in or produced 
by the illegal manufacture of controlled substances

 
 
The 
crime of conspiracy under § 35-7-1059, as defined by the legislature, is 
comprised of conspiring to engage in the purchase, procurement, transportation, 
or distribution of chemicals, supplies, or laboratory equipment associated with 
the manufacture of controlled substances, or conspiring to set up equipment or 
supplies in preparation for the manufacture of controlled 
substances.

 
 
[¶39]   From this language, it is apparent 
that Baker's charged conduct of conspiring to possess precursors and laboratory 
equipment or supplies is not delineated as a crime under the conspiracy 
provision of § 35-7-1059(a)(iv).  
The end result is that Baker was charged with and subsequently convicted 
of crimes that do not legally exist.  
Lacking a legal basis, those convictions must be reversed, and Baker 
should be sentenced accordingly.

 
 
Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel

 
 
[¶40]   Next, Baker argues that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because his trial attorney insisted 
that § 35-7-1042 was the correct conspiracy statute.  When an appellant brings a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel for the first time on appeal, this Court 
conducts a de novo review of the 
facts pertinent to the claim of ineffective assistance.  Eaton v. State, 2008 WY 97, ¶ 36, 
192 P.3d 36, 61 (Wyo. 2008).  
Furthermore, we have adopted the two-part test advanced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed. 2d. 674 (1984).  
Strickland requires that to 
prove ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must prove first that 
counsel's performance was deficient.  
This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel 
was not functioning as the counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.  Second, an appellant must prove that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defense in such a manner as to deprive the 
appellant of a fair trial.  Pendleton v. State, 2008 WY 36, 
¶ 20, 180 P.3d 212, 218-219.

 
 
            
We examine the conduct of defense counsel in light of all the 
circumstances in determining whether the identified acts or omissions fall 
outside the ambit of professionally competent assistance, bearing in mind the 
function of counsel is to make the adversarial testing process work in every 
case.  We do not evaluate the 
efforts of counsel from a perspective of hindsight but, rather, we endeavor to 
reconstruct the circumstances surrounding counsel's challenged conduct and 
evaluate the professional efforts from the perspective of counsel at the 
time.  "We invoke a strong 
presumption that counsel rendered adequate and reasonable assistance making all 
decisions within the bounds of reasonable professional judgment."  Gist [v. State], 737 P.2d [336,] 
342 [(Wyo. 1987)].

 
 

Bloomquist 
v. State, 914 P.2d 812, 820 (Wyo. 1996) (internal citations omitted).

 
 
[¶41] 
The burden of proving that counsel was ineffective rests entirely on the 
appellant. Martinez v. State, 2006 WY 20, ¶ 23, 128 P.3d 652, 663 
(Wyo. 2006).  The appellant must 
also demonstrate the existence of a reasonable probability that, absent the 
deficiency in counsel's performance, the result of the proceedings would have 
been different.  A failure to make 
the required showing of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice 
defeats an ineffectiveness claim.  An ineffectiveness claim may be disposed 
of solely on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice.  Id.

 
 
[¶42]   Considering that we have determined 
that § 35-7-1042 was the incorrect conspiracy statute to be applied to 
Baker's case, and considering that Baker's attorney insisted that 
§ 35-7-1042 was the correct conspiracy to be applied, we conclude that 
Baker's trial counsel's performance was deficient.  However, it tempers our analysis of this 
issue when also taking into consideration that we have determined that the 
alternative statute offered (§ 6-1-303) was also inapplicable.  Further tempering our analysis is the 
fact that Baker was properly convicted of one count of possession and two counts 
of child endangerment resultant from the confiscation of the items consistent 
with the manufacture of methamphetamine.  
Thus, although counsel's performance may have been deficient in insisting 
on the wrong statute, we cannot conclude that absent that deficiency, the result 
of the proceedings would have been altogether different  i.e., resulted in 
acquittal, or that Baker was ultimately prejudiced.  See Bromley v. State, 2007 WY 20, 
¶ 35, n.1, 150 P.3d 1202, 1213, n.1 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
Merger

 
 
[¶43]   
In his final argument, Baker contends that Counts II, III, and IV 
of the criminal information  
essentially, the conspiracy counts - should merge for the purposes of charging 
and sentencing.  Considering our 
analysis of the applicable statutes, Baker's charged conduct of conspiring to 
possess precursors and laboratory equipment or supplies is not, as we stated 
above, "delineated as a crime under the conspiracy provision of 
§ 35-7-1059(a)(iv)"  Thus, the 
charges and convictions under that statute are reversed, and Baker should be 
sentenced accordingly.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶44]   The evidence seized during the 
warrantless search of Baker's home should not have been suppressed, as his 
live-in girlfriend's consent was valid.  
Furthermore, Baker's two convictions for child endangerment stand, and 
the court's instructions on those charges were appropriate.  We reverse Baker's convictions on Counts 
III and IV because the incorrect conspiracy statute was applied.  Because of this, Baker's trial counsel 
was deficient, though he did not suffer any prejudice.  We remand to the district court to 
sentence Baker in accordance with this opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Despite Baker's argument that the "no trespassing" sign and the door 
being chained from the inside both should be viewed as implicit indicia of his 
refusal to consent, these factors are not sufficient to place this situation 
within the scope of the Randolph 
rule.  See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. 1515 
(2006).  In that case, the situation 
involved two co-tenants who were both present at the time of the search.  One of the co-tenants explicitly refused 
to consent to search, while the other tenant readily consented.  The key factor recognized in Randolph, and by this Court in McClelland v. State, 2007 WY 57, 155 P.3d 1013 (Wyo. 2007), is that there was a present, expressly 
non-consenting co-tenant.  Here, Baker was not present to refuse 
consent.

 
 

2Indeed, "Even if the children are not present for the actual cook,' they 
are still in danger.  Meth houses 
remain heavily contaminated for at least six months after the actual cook takes 
place."  Anne E. Hardwick, Comment, 
Meth Manufacturing: Arizona Increases Protection for Children, 39 Ariz. 
St. L.J. 297, 303-04 (2007) (internal quotations omitted).  "Meth manufacturing produces a toxic 
cloud.'  The methamphetamine is deposited everywhere, from walls and carpets 
to microwaves, tabletops and clothing.  
Children living in those labs might as well be taking the drug 
directly.'"  Id. at 303.

 
 

3The second instruction Baker complains of, Instruction Number 32, reads 
substantially the same, except that the victim's name and date of birth are 
changed.

 
 

4The Act is defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 35-7-1002(a)(xxviii)(LexisNexis2009) to mean §§ 35-7-1001 through 
35-7-1060.

 
 

5These articles are easily distinguishable from the overriding statutory 
articles by the fact that the word "article" is written in italics demarcated by 
a roman numeral, as opposed to the overriding statutory articles, which are 
printed in regular script and demarcated by numbers.  Also, the Act articles begin with I and 
end with X, while the overriding statutory articles continue numerically from 10 
to 11.