Title: Rue v. Carter

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Rue v. Carter1996 WY 100919 P.2d 633Case Number: 95-212Decided: 07/15/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
Mary 
Ellen RUE and Edward N. Strader,

 Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

Margaret 
CARTER,

 Appellee 
(Defendant).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Laramie County, Kenneth E.

Ronald E. 
Triggs, Cheyenne, for appellants.

Steven F. 
Freudenthal of Herschler, Freudenthal, Salzburg, Bonds & Rideout, Cheyenne, 
for appellee.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Mary Ellen Rue 
and Edward N. Strader filed a petition for election contest against Margaret A. 
Carter. The district court found no genuine issue as to any material fact in 
this case and granted Carter's motion for summary judgment. Rue and Strader 
appeal.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Rue and Strader 
present the following issues for our review:

1.         Did 
the court err in failing to order a new election in the above-referenced 
action?

2.         Was 
defendant, Margaret Carter, qualified as a candidate for office at the time of 
the filing of her application for nomination on 31 May 1994? 

3.         If 
unqualified, did her subsequent registration on 7 June 1994 cure that 
defect?

4.         If 
the defect was not cured, did she properly or improperly appear on the 
ballot?

5.         Was 
the certificate of election properly or improperly conferred upon her by the 
county clerk?

6.         If 
the defect in her registration could not be cured and her election was improper, 
should she be removed from office?

Carter presents 
a single issue:

In an election contest 
commenced after the general election, is a person's eligibility to hold office 
to be determined as of the date of: (1) the filing of the nominating petition, 
(2) the primary election, (3) the general election, or (4) taking 
office?

FACTS

[¶4]      On May 31, 1994, 
Carter filed her Application for Nomination by Primary for Cheyenne City 
Councilperson in Ward II. On her application, Carter certified she was a 
registered voter. On or about June 6, 1994, Carter received notice that she had 
been purged from the voter registration list between January and March 1993 for 
failure to vote in the 1992 general election. Carter reregistered as a voter on 
June 7, 1994. Subsequently, Carter's name was placed on the ballot. Carter's 
appearance on the ballot was affirmed by the Wyoming Secretary of State prior to 
the 1994 primary election.

[¶5]      Strader was one 
of the three candidates for councilperson in opposition to Carter. Prior to the 
primary election, Strader discovered that Carter had been purged from the voter 
list and had reregistered after the filing deadline. Strader spoke with voters 
concerning this issue prior to the primary election. He also shared this 
information with Rue, who was an election judge for the 1994 general 
election.

[¶6]      As a result of 
the primary election, both Carter and Strader were nominated to appear on the 
general election ballot. Carter won the general election held on November 8, 
1994, and was sworn into office on January 3, 1995. On November 16, 1994, Rue 
and Strader filed a Verified Petition for Election Contest and Permanent 
Injunction asking the court to annul the election because of Carter's failure to 
be registered on the date of filing her application. The district court granted 
Carter's motion for summary judgment, and Rue and Strader now 
appeal.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶7]      Summary judgment 
is granted to a party if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. W.R.C.P. 56; State ex rel. 
Bayou Liquors, Inc. v. City of Casper, 906 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Wyo. 1995). A 
material fact is one which, if proved, would have the effect of establishing or 
refuting one of the essential elements of the cause of action or defense 
asserted by the parties. O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278, 1285 (Wyo. 
1985). We conduct our review in the light most favorable to the party opposing 
the motion, and we accord no deference to the district court's decisions on 
issues of law. Duncan v. Town of Jackson, 903 P.2d 548, 551 (Wyo. 1995). In our 
review we use the same factual materials and the same standards as the district 
court, and we may affirm the summary judgment on any legal grounds appearing in 
the record. City of Casper, 906 P.2d  at 1048.

DISCUSSION

[¶8]      The 
qualifications required of a municipal officer are set out in W.S. 22-23-102 
(1992):

All municipal offices are 
nonpartisan, and municipal officers shall be qualified electors resident in 
the municipality and any ward established * * *.

(Emphasis 
added.) The definition of a qualified elector is found in W.S. 22-1-102(a)(x) 
(1992):

The term "qualified 
elector" includes every citizen of the United States who is a bona fide resident 
of Wyoming, has registered to vote and will be at least eighteen (18) years of 
age on the day of the election at which he may offer to vote * * 
*.

[¶9]      The Application 
for Nomination by Primary completed by Carter conformed with the requirement of 
W.S. 22-23-302 (Cum. Supp. 1995) and read as follows:

I, Margaret A. Carter, 
the undersigned, certify that I was born on 7/29/47, and that I have been a 
resident of the State of Wyoming since 1974, and that I am a registered voter of 
Election District No. 2, in Precinct No. 4, in Ward No. (if any) II, in the City 
of Cheyenne, and the State of Wyoming, do hereby petition and request that my 
name be printed upon the Official Municipal Primary Ballot at the next primary 
election as a candidate for the office of Cheyenne City Council. I hereby 
declare that if nominated and elected, I will qualify for the 
office.

(Emphasis and 
underscoring added.) To accept appellants' position that one must be a 
registered voter at the time the application is completed would be to ignore and 
render as meaningless the final sentence in the application. That argument is 
contrary to the judicial rules of statutory interpretation that a statute should 
not be interpreted to render any portion of it meaningless. See e.g., Matter of 
ALJ, 836 P.2d 307, 310 (Wyo. 1992) and Reliance Ins. Co. v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 
713 P.2d 766, 770 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶10]   The language of W.S. 
22-17-101(a)(ii) (1992) indicates that only when a person whose election is 
contested is not eligible to hold the office should the election be annulled. 
This language is unambiguous and, therefore, the court must apply the plain 
meaning of the statute. See Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. Game and Fish 
Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Wyo. 1993). Furthermore, this court has held that 
"[e]very reasonable presumption will be indulged in favor of the validity of an 
election which has been held, and the one asserting that the election is 
irregular must bear the burden of showing that it is otherwise." Reitveld v. 
Northern Wyoming Community College Dist., 344 P.2d 986, 988 (Wyo. 1959) (citing 
Anselmi v. City of Rock Springs, 53 Wyo. 223, 80 P.2d 419 
(1938)).

"[I]t is a canon of 
election law that an election is not to be set aside for a mere informality or 
irregularity which cannot be said in any manner to have affected the result of 
the election. Courts are anxious rather to sustain than to defeat the popular 
will." * * *

*           
*           
*           
*           
*           
*

The mere allegation that 
an irregularity occurred is not sufficient to authorize a court to declare the 
election illegal. If the matter complained of were one which in a sense were 
jurisdictional - that is, which went to the right of holding the election, or to 
its legality - the case might be different.

Anselmi, 53 Wyo. 
at 236, 238, 80 P.2d  at 423, 424 (quoting State ex rel. Utah Sav. & Trust 
Co. v. Salt Lake City, 35 Utah 25, 99 P. 255, 261 (1908)).

[¶11]   In the case at hand, appellants 
merely alleged that Carter was not registered at the time she filed the 
application and that she unjustly certified that she was registered at the time 
of filing. However, appellants have not alleged that this defect in any way 
affected or influenced the elections. Strader talked with voters concerning this 
issue, and the Secretary of State ruled that Carter's name could appear on the 
ballot as a candidate. Moreover, from the facts it clearly seems an 
inconsequential error as to its effects on the elections or Carter's ability to 
function in the office she holds. As soon as she found she was purged from the 
voter list, Carter reregistered and cured the defect.

[¶12]   We conclude that Carter's failure 
to be registered at the time of filing her application was inconsequential and a 
mere irregularity since shortly thereafter she reregistered and met all the 
statutory criteria during the primary election, the general election, and at the 
time she assumed the municipal office. In the particular circumstances of this 
case, Rue and Strader's action under the Election Contest Statute does not 
lie.

CONCLUSION

[¶13]   Rue and Strader failed to identify 
facts demonstrating that a genuine issue of material fact existed concerning 
annulment of the 1994 general municipal election. They therefore have not 
satisfied their burden for opposing a summary judgment motion. See Downen v. 
Sinclair Oil Corp., 887 P.2d 515, 519 (Wyo. 1994). The grant of summary judgment 
to Carter is

[¶14]   Affirmed.