Title: Nesbit v. GEICO

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

In the Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Case No. 03-C-03-008624
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 131
September Term, 2003
______________________________________
RICHARD NESBIT
v.
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE
COMPANY
____________________________________
Bell, C.J.
         Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Greene, J.
     ______________________________________
Filed:    July 23, 2004
On February 7, 2003, Richard Nesbit (“Nesbit”) was injured in an automobile
accident.  Nesbit attempted to recover personal injury protection ( “PIP”) benefits from his
insurer, Government Employees Insurance Company (“GEICO”).  GEICO rejected the PIP
claim because Nesbit had no PIP coverage, having signed a PIP waiver on June 15, 1998.
Nesbit sued GEICO in the District Court of Maryland sitting in Baltimore County.  The
parties tried the case on July 3, 2003, and the Court entered judgment on behalf of GEICO.
Nesbit noted a de novo appeal in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County on August 7, 2003.
The Court held the trial on December 1, 2003.  Nesbit did not appear for the trial, but his
attorney attended.  After taking testimony and hearing arguments, the Court entered judgment
in favor of GEICO.  Nesbit petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted
on March 11, 2004. 
The issue before this Court is whether Section 19-506 of the Insurance Article of the
Maryland Code voids a PIP waiver that (by its own terms) remains effective until withdrawn
by the insured in writing, if the insured’s policy has been renewed and changed since the
signing of the PIP waiver.  We hold that such a contract is permissible under Maryland law.
         Nesbit also questions whether the waiver form used by GEICO complied with the
statute and whether the Court erred by finding that he had received a three-page waiver form
from GEICO even though GEICO only produced the signed signature page of the form at
trial.  We hold that the form used complied with the statute and that the Circuit Court did not
1    Nesbit frames the questions before the Court as:
Is a purported waiver of PIP benefits, signed by an insured, for
an insurance policy five years earlier valid for an insurance
policy with new terms and conditions?
Is a purported waiver of PIP benefits, which consists of the third
page of an allegedly three page document that fails to comply
with the provisions of Md. Ins. Code Ann. §19-506, a valid
waiver?
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err in finding that Nesbit had received the whole form.1
FACTS
At the time of Nesbit’s accident (February 2003), he maintained an automobile
insurance policy with GEICO.  The renewal policy had issued on October 11, 2002, and
covered the period from November 27, 2002, through May 27, 2003.  Nesbit obtained his
original policy with GEICO in 1998.  On June 15, 1998, Nesbit signed a waiver of PIP
benefits, which included the following language:
I affirmatively waive the benefits required by section 539 of Article 48A of the
Maryland Insurance Code (PIP).  I understand and agree that this waiver of
coverage shall be applicable to the policy or binder of insurance described
below, on all future renewals of the policy and on all replacement policies
unless I notify the company in writing to the contrary, with the effective date
of such change being no earlier than the receipt date by the company of my
written notification.
Nesbit’s original policy with GEICO covered a 1992 Honda and a 1992 Pontiac.  At the time
of the accident, Nesbit’s policy covered the 1996 Dodge Caravan that was involved in the
accident and a 2000 Toyota.  
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As noted previously, Nesbit did not appear for the trial in Circuit Court.  He was,
however, represented by an attorney who agreed to stipulate to certain facts.  The attorneys
stipulated to the fact that Nesbit was insured by GEICO at the time of the accident, that
Nesbit was injured in the accident, that Nesbit signed the signature page of the PIP waiver
on June 15, 1998, and that Nesbit returned that signed page to GEICO.  Nesbit’s attorney
presented no witnesses.  He argued that the initial PIP waiver signed in 1998 was no longer
effective because Nesbit had renewed and changed his policy to include two different
vehicles than were originally covered and the waiver form itself did not comply with the
statutory requirements.  
GEICO called Alice Hinkle (“Hinkle”), the underwriting and sales manager for
GEICO, to testify.  Hinkle testified that GEICO routinely sends out a three-page PIP waiver
notice form to insureds, the third page being the signature page admitted to by Nesbit.  The
first two pages contain information about PIP including who it covers, how much the
premiums are with full PIP coverage, how much the premiums are if PIP is waived, the
minimum coverage benefits, what losses it covers, and for whom coverage can and cannot
be waived.  GEICO did not produce the original or a copy of the form actually sent to Nesbit.
Rather, GEICO offered a copy of a sample form into evidence, which was received.  Hinkle
testified that such a form would have been sent to Nesbit and that GEICO only retained the
signature page – the portion of the form that Nesbit returned to them.      
 Hinkle also testified that the PIP waiver form used by GEICO has been approved by
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the Maryland Insurance Administration.  In support of this testimony, GEICO introduced a
letter from GEICO to the Maryland Insurance Commissioner regarding the approval of
various GEICO forms, including the Waiver of Personal Injury Protection form, which was
attached to the letter.  The letter, which was received as an exhibit, included a June 7, 1994,
stamp from the Maryland Insurance Administration that says “APPROVED.” 
Hinkle testified that since the time that Nesbit signed the PIP waiver, his policy had
changed to include two different vehicles than were originally covered.  She also
acknowledged that the rate that would have been paid for PIP after the policy changed would
have been different than the PIP rate that would have been paid originally.  This change was
based on a number of factors, including the fact that the vehicles covered were different.
As previously noted, Nesbit did not testify.  There is no evidence that he ever notified
GEICO in writing or otherwise that he intended to revoke his PIP waiver.  Neither is there
any evidence that he sought to obtain PIP coverage at any time after the initial waiver or that
he ever paid for the PIP coverage he chose to waive in 1998.  Hinkley testified that the
declarations page received by Nesbit in October of 2002 showed that he had “option A” for
PIP coverage which, as explained by that document, meant that $2,500 of PIP benefits had
been waived by the signing of the PIP waiver.
At the conclusion of the trial, the judge found that Nesbit waived his PIP coverage and
that the form “clearly and concisely explains in the right type . . . the effect of the waiver, the
nature and extent and cost of coverage that would be provided.  It did all of that.  And as I
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said, he signed the form and sent it back and the evidence is that the form that was used has
been approved by the Maryland Insurance Commission.”  Regarding Nesbit’s legal
arguments, the trial judge stated:
I’ll incorporate what I said earlier which brings us up to this point and the
argument that the insurance companies must, in this case GEICO, tell the
insured each renewal period that they can waive or not waive PIP.  I don’t
believe the statute requires the companies to do that . . . .  Why MAIF is
singled out in these two statutes, I do not know the answer to that, but I do
know that the form that was sent that has been approved by the Commissioner
to, in this case Mr. Nesbit, told him that this waiver was applicable to all future
renewals and all replacement policies unless Mr. Nesbit notified the company
in writing to the contrary.  
The Circuit Court entered judgment in favor of GEICO.  This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Md. Rule 8-131(c) provides that when an action has been tried without a jury, “the
appellate court will review the case on both the law and the evidence.  It will not set aside
the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous, and will give due
regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.”  The
deference shown to the trial court’s factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard
does not, of course, apply to legal conclusions.  When the trial court’s order “involves an
interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law, our Court must determine
whether the lower court’s conclusions are legally correct under a de novo standard of
review.”  Walter v. Gunter, 367 Md. 386, 392, 788 A.2d 609, 612 (2002).
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When interpreting a statute, we must determine the intent of the legislature in enacting
it.  Baltimore v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 128, 756 A.2d 987, 991 (2000).  The rules governing
the search for legislative intent are settled.  Id.   In Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co.
of Maryland v. Director of Finance for Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 343 Md. 567,
683 A.2d 512 (1996), we stated:   
[W]e begin our analysis by reviewing the pertinent rules of
[statutory construction].  Of course, the cardinal rule is to
ascertain and effectuate legislative intent.  To this end, we begin
our inquiry with the words of the statute and, ordinarily, when
the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, according
to their commonly understood meaning, we end our inquiry
there also.
Chesapeake and Potomac, 343 Md. at 578, 683 A.2d at 517 (internal citations omitted).  We
assign words their ordinary and natural meaning when interpreting statutory language.  Lewis
v. State, 348 Md. 648, 653, 705 A.2d 1128, 1131 (1998), quoting Gardner v. State, 344 Md.
642, 647-48, 689 A.2d 610, 612-13 (1997). 
Section 19-505 (a) of the Insurance Article of the Md. Code requires “each insurer
that issues, sells, or delivers a motor vehicle liability insurance policy in this State” to provide
PIP coverage, unless that coverage is waived in accordance with § 19-506 of the Insurance
Article.  Md. Code (1997, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 19-505 (a) of the Insurance Article.  Section
19-506 (a) (1) states that “[i]f the first named insured does not wish to obtain the benefits
described in  § 19-505 of this subtitle, the first named insured shall make an affirmative
written waiver of those benefits.”  Md. Code (1997, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 19-506 (a) (1) of the
2  In particular, Nesbit notes that when his policy changed (to remove certain insured
vehicles from the policy and to add different vehicles to the policy) the premium costs for
PIP would have been different.  He argues that GEICO should have been required to notify
him of those possible premium changes in order for his waiver to remain effective.  
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Insurance Article.  Section 19-506 (c) notes that a waiver made under this section is not
effective “unless, prior to the waiver, the insurer gives the first named insured written notice
of the nature, extent, and cost of the coverage described in § 19-505 of this subtitle.”  Md.
Code (1997, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 19-506 (c) of the Insurance Article.  Finally, Section 19-506
(e) states that “[a] waiver made under this section by a person that is insured continuously
by the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund is effective until the waiver is withdrawn in
writing.”  Md. Code (1997, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 19-506 (e) of the Insurance Article.
Nesbit argues that because Section 19-506 (e) only mentions waivers made by people
who are insured continuously by the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund (MAIF), waivers
made by people insured continuously by other insurance companies do not remain effective
until withdrawn in writing.  Nesbit asserts that such waivers cease to be effective if the
insured’s policy changes in other respects.2  Nesbit is unable to provide any statutory support
for that argument because Section 19-506 is silent as to when a PIP waiver of someone
insured continuously by a company other than MAIF ceases to be effective.  To assist in
interpreting this silence, Nesbit suggests that we compare Section 19-506 (e) with Section
19-510 (e).  
3  As will be discussed later in this opinion, GEICO provided such notice to Nesbit.
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Section 19-510 covers waivers of uninsured motorist coverage and provides in
pertinent part, “[a] waiver made under this section by a person that is insured continuously
by an insurer or by the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund is effective until the waiver is
withdrawn in writing.”  Md. Code (1997, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 19-510 (e) of the Insurance
Article.  Nesbit argues that because the Legislature included all insurers in Section 19-510
(e), and only mentioned MAIF in Section 19-506 (e), they must have intended to exclude all
insurers but MAIF from the provisions of Section 19-506 (e).  In light of the plain language
and legislative history of Section 19-506, this argument fails and the comparison to Section
19-510 (e) becomes unnecessary.
Paragraph (c) of Section 19-506 is the only part of that section that discusses when
a waiver provided by any insurer is ineffective.  Md. Code (1997, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 19-506
(c) of the Insurance Article.  As already noted, that section provides that a waiver is
ineffective unless prior to the waiver, the insurer gives “written notice of the nature, extent,
and cost of the coverage described in §19-505 of this subtitle.”3 
By contrast, paragraph (e) of Section 19-506 plainly discusses MAIF only.  To
interpret the silence regarding other insurers in accordance with Nesbit’s suggestion is
illogical.  While it is true that the PIP statute “has a clear remedial purpose and therefore
must be afforded a liberal construction,” Sabatier v. State Farm, 327 Md. 296, 299, 609 A.2d
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307, 309 (1992) (citing Sabatier v. State Farm, 323 Md. 232, 249, 592 A.2d 1098), we have
held that the Court must take a “commonsensical” approach when construing a statute.
Board of Trustees of the Maryland State Retirement and Pension Systems v. Harry R.
Hughes, 340 Md. 1, 7, 664 A.2d 1250, 1253 (1995) (quoting Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125,
137-38, 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994).  We must seek to avoid constructions that are illogical,
unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense.  Id.  Even if one could interpret paragraph
(e) to mean that a waiver made by a person insured continuously by a company other than
MAIF becomes ineffective in some way other than when it is “withdrawn in writing,” the
language of the statute makes no suggestion about what that other way would be.  
Nesbit suggests that a waiver made by a person insured continuously by a company
other than MAIF becomes ineffective when the policy is renewed and vehicles are removed
and added to the policy, causing a difference in PIP premium costs.  There is absolutely
nothing in the language of the statute that requires or even suggests such an outcome.  We
will not “divine a legislative intention contrary to the plain language of a statute or judicially
insert language to impose exceptions, limitations or restrictions not set forth by the
legislature."  Langston v. Langston, 366 Md. 490, 515, 784 A.2d 1086, 1100 (2001).
Similarly, "[w]e neither add nor delete words to a clear and unambiguous statute to give it
a meaning not reflected by the words the Legislature used or engage in a forced or subtle
interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the statute's meaning."  Taylor v. NationsBank,
365 Md. 166, 181, 776 A.2d 645, 654 (2001).  Nothing in Section 19-506 prohibits an
4  Of course, any part of an insurance contract that is contrary to Maryland’s public
policy “as set forth in any statute, is invalid and unenforceable.”  Stearman v. State Farm,
381 Md. 436, 441, 849 A.2d 539, 542 (citing Jennings v. Government Employees Insurance
Company, 302 Md. 352, 356, 488 A.2d 166, 168 (1985)).  In the case at bar, the language of
the statute itself certainly does not indicate a public policy that would prohibit a contract
providing for an automatic renewal of a PIP waiver.  Moreover, as will be discussed further
in the opinion, there is nothing in the legislative history that indicates such a policy.
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insured and an insurance company from entering into a contract that includes a PIP waiver
containing an automatic renewal provision.  As a general rule, “‘parties are free to contract
as they wish.’”  Van Horn v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company, 334 Md. 669, 695, 641
A.2d 195, 207 (1994) (citing State Farm v. Nationwide, 307 Md. 631, 643, 516 A.2d 586,
592 (1986)).4  The waiver signed by Nesbit included this  statement: “I understand and agree
that this waiver of coverage shall be applicable to the policy or binder of insurance described
below, on all future renewals of the policy and on all replacement policies unless I notify the
company in writing to the contrary . . . .”  The fact that the policy renewals and changes
would have caused a difference in the cost of the PIP coverage does not change what Nesbit
agreed to when he signed the PIP waiver.  
While we believe the plain language (and lack of language) in Section 19-506 fairly
resolves the issue in this case, we do not read statutory language “in isolation or out of
context [but construe it] in light of the legislature’s general purpose and in the context of the
statute as a whole.”  Forbes v. Harleysville Mutual, 322 Md. 689, 696-97, 589 A.2d 944,
947-948 (1991); see also Ridge Heating, Air Conditioning & Plumbing v. Brennen, 366 Md.
336, 350-51, 783 A.2d 691, 699 (2001); State v. Thompson, 332 Md. 1, 7, 629 A.2d 731,
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734-735 (1993); Atkinson v. State, 331 Md. 199, 212, 627 A.2d 1019, 1027 (1993).  Context
may include legislative history and “‘other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue
of legislative purpose or goal.’”  GEICO v. Insurance Commissioner of the State of
Maryland, 332 Md. 124, 132, 630 A.2d 713, 717 (1993) (quoting Kaczorowski v. Mayor &
City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515, 525 A.2d 632-633 (1990)).  Moreover, when
a statute is silent as to a particular issue, it is appropriate for the Court to consider legislative
history.  See Jones v. Prince George’s County, 378 Md. 98, 111, 835 A.2d 632, 639-640
(2003) (regarding a wrongful death statute that was silent as to standing and turning to the
history of the statute and general Maryland choice of law principles for guidance);
Comptroller of Treasury v. Clyde’s of Chevy Chase, Inc., 377 Md. 471, 513, 833 A.2d 1014,
1039 (2003) (regarding tax statute language that was ambiguous and silent as to some matters
and relying on legislative history and case law to resolve the question at hand).  With these
principles in mind, we turn to a review of the legislative history of Section 19-506 (e).
Section 539 of Article 48A of the Insurance Code was the predecessor to the current
Section 19-506 of the Insurance Article.  The Bill Analysis for House Bill 616 (which
modified Section 539 (f) of Article 48A in 1992 to include the language regarding waiver
renewals of MAIF policies) sheds light on the question before us.  In particular, the Bill
Analysis states that the bill “clarifies that a waiver of PIP coverage under a policy issued by
5  In order to avoid any possible confusion on the matter, we note that the usage of the
word “vehicle” in this context was incorrect.  Instead, as is made clear by the language of the
statute itself, the word used should have been “persons.”  The statutory language of section
539 (f) (4) stated: “A waiver made under this subsection by persons continuously insured by
the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund shall be construed to be effective until withdrawn
in writing.”  Md. Code (1957, 1992 Cum. Supp.), Art. 48A §539 (f) (4) (emphasis added).
    
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[MAIF] shall continue in effect until withdrawn in writing provided that the vehicle[5] has
been continuously insured with MAIF by the person making the waiver.”  In addition, the
Bill Analysis described the issue to be dealt with by this change to the statute as follows:
Currently, the Insurance Division has interpreted a waiver of PIP coverage to
be effective if the policy holder renews the policy and does not affirmatively
withdraw the waiver.  However, because MAIF policies generally run for 1
year and technically cannot be renewed, the policy holder must waive PIP each
time a MAIF policy is rewritten as a new policy. 
It is clear that the Legislature passed this predecessor to Section 19-506 (e) for the purpose
of allowing MAIF to do what the other insurance companies had already been doing, that is,
operating as if waivers of PIP benefits remained effective until they have been affirmatively
withdrawn by the insured.  Because we know that the Legislature knew that the other
insurance companies were already engaging in this practice, it is nonsensical to argue that
the amendment giving MAIF the same ability was intended to prohibit other unnamed
insurance companies from continuing to engage in the practice.
Earlier and subsequent legislation can be consulted to determine legislative intent.
Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 385-387, 614 A.2d 590, 593-594 (1992).  Therefore, as
further evidence of the Legislature’s intent regarding Section 19-506 (e), we note that the
6We disagree with the factual premise that the policy itself changed.  In actuality, only
the coverage changed when vehicles were removed from the policy and other vehicles were
added.
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General Assembly passed a new amendment to the section in the 2004 session.  Senate Bill
236, passed unanimously by both the House and Senate and signed by the Governor, changed
paragraph (e) to read: “A waiver made under this section by a person that is insured
continuously by the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund or the insurer is effective until
the waiver is withdrawn in writing.” (Emphasis added.)  The Fiscal and Policy Note of
Senate Bill 236 provides that the bill has no effect except that it “codifies the Maryland
Insurance Administration’s current interpretation of the law.”  We agree with the Insurance
Administration’s current interpretation of the law – that a PIP waiver made by a person
insured continuously by the insurer remains effective until withdrawn in writing.  As
discussed in  Washington Sub. San. Comm’n. v. C.I. Mitchell and Best Co., 303 Md. 544, 495
A.2d 30 (1985), legislative acquiescence to the administrative construction of a statute
“gives rise to a strong presumption that the administrative interpretation is correct.”
Washington Sub. San. Comm’n., 303 Md. at 559, 495 A.2d at 37 (citing Valentine v. Bd. of
License Comm’rs of Anne Arundel Co., 291 Md. 523, 435 A.2d 459 (1981)).  
In addition to Nesbit’s contention that the waiver in this case is ineffective because
his policy has changed6 since the initial signing of the waiver, he argues that the waiver is
ineffective because the form used by GEICO does not comply with Section 19-506 (d) of the
Insurance Article.  We disagree.  Section 19-506 (d) provides:
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(1) A waiver made under this section shall be made on the form that the
Commissioner requires.
(2) The form may be part of the insurance contract.
(3) The form shall clearly and concisely explain in 10 point boldface type:
(i) the nature, extent, and cost of the coverage that would be
provided under the policy if not waived by the first named
insured;
(ii) each effect of a waiver as stated in subsection (b) of this
section;
(iii) that a failure of the first named insured to make a waiver
requires an insurer to provide the coverage described in § 19-
505 of this subtitle;
(iv) that an insurer may not refuse to underwrite a person
because the person refuses to waive the coverage described in
  § 19-505 of this subtitle; and 
(v) that a waiver made under this section must be an affirmative
written waiver.
Md. Code (1997, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 19-506 (d) of the Insurance Article.  As previously
noted, the form provided by GEICO contains information regarding who is covered by the
waiver,  how much the premiums are with full PIP coverage and how much the premiums
are if PIP is waived, what occurs if PIP is not waived, the minimum coverage benefits, what
losses it covers, for whom coverage can and cannot be waived, and a statement that if the
insured decides not to sign the waiver, the insurance company may not refuse to cover the
insured.  Furthermore, the Maryland Insurance Commissioner specifically approved the
waiver in question.  As we recently stated in O’Connor v. Maryland, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.2d
___ (2004),
7  As noted previously, we reject Nesbit’s argument that GEICO was required to notify
him of PIP premium changes that would occur when his policy was renewed and changed.
GEICO notified Nesbit in accordance with section 19-506 (d) originally and Nesbit agreed
that the waiver would remain effective “on all future renewals of the policy and on all
replacement policies” unless he notified GEICO in writing to the contrary.  Neither
paragraph (d) of Section 19-506 nor any other paragraph of Section 19-506 requires GEICO
to send out a new notice of PIP costs every time a policy is renewed or changed.  
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An administrative agency's interpretation and application of the statute which
the agency administers “should ordinarily be given considerable weight by
reviewing courts.”  Board of Physicians v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 69, 729 A.2d
376, 381 (1999).  “[T]he expertise of the agency in its own field should be
respected."  Id.  
O’Connor v. Maryland, ___Md. at___,__ A.2d at___ (2004) [slip op. at __].  Again, we
agree with the interpretation of the Insurance Commissioner on this matter.  It is clear that
the three-page waiver form provided by GEICO satisfies the requirements of Section 19-506
(d).7  
Nesbit also argues that the Circuit Court erred by finding that he had signed a proper
waiver in this case in view of the fact that GEICO only produced the last page of an
“allegedly” three page document into evidence.  As stated previously, we will not reverse the
trial court on questions of evidence unless the factual findings are clearly erroneous.  Md.
Rule 8-131 (c).  Furthermore, we will give due regard to the Court’s opportunity to judge the
credibility of the witnesses.  Id.  GEICO presented the testimony of its underwriting and sales
manager, Hinkle, who testified that it was GEICO’s policy to send the three-page PIP waiver
notice form to insureds, the third page constituting the signature page admitted to by Nesbit.
Hinkle also testified that she only had the signature page from Nesbit to offer because
8  Nesbit had objected to the entry of a sample form with the premium amount filled
in by GEICO, but did not object to the form that listed all the information described above,
without any actual cost numbers.
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GEICO does not keep copies of the actual waiver form sent to the insureds.  Rather, they
only keep the page that is returned by the insureds -- the signature page.  The Court accepted
a blank sample form into evidence, without objection from Nesbit.8  Based on the review of
the sample form, Hinkle’s testimony, and the signature page signed by Nesbit, it was not
clearly erroneous for the Court to determine that Nesbit had signed a valid PIP waiver.
In conclusion, we hold that Section 19-506 (e) of the Insurance Article does not
invalidate a PIP waiver like the one in this case, stating that it remains effective until
withdrawn in writing.  In addition, we hold that the waiver form used in this case complies
with Section 19-506 (d) of the Insurance Article and that the proof offered by GEICO at trial
regarding the waiver was sufficient evidence on which to decide that Nesbit had signed a
valid waiver of PIP benefits.  
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
B A L TI M OR E  
C O U N T Y  
A F F I R M E D .
APPELLANT TO PAY COSTS.