Title: Robbins v. South Cheyenne Water and Sewage Dist.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Robbins v. South Cheyenne Water and Sewage Dist.1990 WY 61792 P.2d 1380Case Number: 89-272, 89-273Decided: 06/04/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
ALFRED V. 
ROBBINS,

 APPELLANT, 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

SOUTH CHEYENNE WATER AND 
SEWAGE DISTRICT, 

APPELLEE, 
(PLAINTIFF).

 ALFRED V. ROBBINS, 

APPELLANT, 
(PLAINTIFF),

 v.

 SOUTH CHEYENNE WATER AND SEWAGE DISTRICT, 

APPELLEE, 
(DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Laramie County, Harold Joffe, J.

Douglas J. 
Mickey, Park Ridge, Ill., for appellant.

Edwin H. 
Whitehead, Whitehead, Gage & Davidson, P.C., Cheyenne, for 
appellee.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., and PATRICK, District 
Judge.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]      How does one 
assert and foreclose a lien on the property of another when no services, work, 
or materials have been furnished to the owner? The answer is that one cannot, 
and that answer is dispositive of the first case in these consolidated appeals 
although the decision is premised on an issue that is somewhat different from 
the questions posed to the district court. In that case, No. 89-272, we resolve 
a question of jurisdiction that we are entitled to consider even though it was 
not raised in the district court. In the second case, No. 89-273, we treat with 
the question of whether A.V. Robbins (Robbins) was entitled to a contested case 
hearing with respect to his claim that his two mobile homes had been joined in 
such a way that they constituted a single structure so that only one water and 
one sewer connection was required instead of two. We conclude that this record 
reveals that the jurisdictional facts that must be demonstrated in order for the 
South Cheyenne Water and Sewer District (District) to foreclose its lien are not 
present. Consequently, the case docketed here as No. 89-272 must be reversed and 
remanded with directions to dismiss the District's complaint. We affirm the 
determination by the district court that Robbins was not entitled to the 
contested case hearing that he sought by a declaratory judgment action in the 
second case. The judgment of the trial court in that case is 
affirmed.

[¶2]      Robbins appealed 
from the decisions of the district court in two different cases. These appeals 
were consolidated, and in his brief in the consolidated appeals, Robbins asserts 
the issues to be:

"1. Whether the District 
Court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the Wyoming Legislature did 
not contemplate a trial-type hearing prior to lien foreclosure under the 
provisions of W.S. § 41-10-113(a)(xxi).

"2. Whether the District 
Court erred as a matter of law in failing to find that Robbins has been deprived 
of due process because of South Cheyenne Water and Sewer District's (hereinafter 
District) failure to provide Robbins with a trial-type hearing in accord with 
the provisions of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.

"3. Whether the District 
Court erred as a matter of law in failing to find that the District's Resolution 
of July 7, 1987 is an ex post facto law as applied to Robbins, in violation of 
Article One, Section Thirty-Five of the Wyoming Constitution.

"4. Whether the District 
Court erred as a matter of law in failing to conclude that the District lacked 
proper statutory authority to impose its lien against Robbins' property, because 
the District had provided no services to Robbins in exchange for the sum of 
money demanded by it.

"5. Whether the District 
Court erred as a matter of law in failing to conclude that the District lacks 
proper statutory authority to compel property owners within the District to 
connect with the District's water system.

"6. Whether the District 
Court erred as a matter of law in failing to conclude that the District's 
Resolution of July 17, 1987 violates Article One, Section Thirty-Four of the 
Wyoming Constitution because the same is not uniformly applied to property 
owners within the District's boundaries.

"7. Whether there was 
substantial evidence of record to support the District Court's conclusion that 
Robbins' two mobile homes were not incorporated into a single structure and that 
therefore, each mobile home requires its own separate water and sewer 
taps."

[¶3]      In its brief as 
appellee, the District asserts the issues to be:

"I. The hearing provided 
Robbins pursuant to the provisions of W.S. § 41-10-113(a)(xxi) was not equired 
to be a trial type hearing in accord with the provisions of the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act, nor was Robbins deprived of due process as a 
result of the hearing.

"II. The District Court 
did not err in failing to find that the District's resolution of July, 7, 1987 
is an ex post facto law as applied to Robbins, in violation of Article One, 
Section Thirty-Five of the Wyoming Constitution.

"III. The District Court 
did not err as a matter of law in failing to conclude that the District lacked 
proper authority under the statutes to impose a lien against Robbins' property, 
because the District had provided no services to Robbins in exchange for the sum 
of money demanded by it and it had authority to compel property owners to 
connect to its system.

"IV. The District Court 
did not err as a matter of law in failing to conclude that the District's 
resolution of July, 7, 1987 violates Article One, Section Thirty-Four of the 
Wyoming Constitution because the same is not uniformly applied to property 
owners within the District's boundaries.

"V. There was substantial 
evidence presented at trial to support the District Court's conclusion that 
Robbins' two trailers were not incorporated into a single structure and that 
therefore, each trailer requires its own separate water and sewer line and 
tap."

[¶4]      These appeals are 
the products of separate actions initiated in the district court. In the case 
that is identified as No. 89-272, the District filed its complaint on February 
17, 1989 seeking a judgment and decree of foreclosure against Robbins on the 
premise of a valid perpetual lien on Robbins's property in favor of the District 
according to statute. The District's complaint alleged that the District had 
published a notice of hearing prior to judicial foreclosure of a perpetual lien 
directed to the Robbins's property pursuant to § 41-10-113(a), W.S. 1977. In the 
complaint, the District asserted that Robbins owed it $2,860 for a water tap, a 
water utility fee, a sewer permit, a sewer facility fee, and the cost of 
advertising the hearing on the lien. On the record before us, none of these 
items were actually furnished to Robbins prior to the initiation of the action, 
nor have they been furnished to Robbins since. The District simply made a 
determination that Robbins was indebted to it according to the tenor of its 
complaint. That decision was made after a hearing before the Board of Directors 
of the District (Board) at which there was testimony by the District's foreman 
that on Robbins's property there were situated two separate mobile homes that 
had no common walls, doors, or roof and had not otherwise been incorporated into 
a single dwelling. The Board determined that this arrangement of dwellings 
required two connections rather than one.

[¶5]      Robbins's 
position in the proceedings before the Board was that these mobile homes 
constituted only one dwelling. Robbins had connected the second mobile home into 
the sewer system for the first mobile home, and he also had made a water 
connection between the two mobile homes.1 The record establishes that Robbins 
did receive notice of the first Board meeting at which his protest was 
considered. He was not, however, given notice of the two subsequent meetings 
where that issue was discussed further and at which the decision was made to 
proceed with the perfecting of a lien against his property.

[¶6]      The decision of 
the district court, in the case identified as No. 89-272, incorporated specific 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Those findings included the facts that 
the District reached a preliminary conclusion, after inspecting Robbins's 
property, that he had a second mobile home on his property that did not have a 
separate water and sewer tap as required by the District; a hearing was held on 
November 1, 1988 at which Robbins was afforded the opportunity to demonstrate to 
the District why he should not be required to pay the required fees for a second 
connection to the District's systems; following that hearing, a decision was 
deferred until the foreman for the District had inspected Robbins's property; 
after the inspection and after the receipt of the report from the foreman, the 
District decided to file the lien against Robbins's property and gave him notice 
of the lien on December 15, 1988; and when Robbins did not satisfy the demands 
by the District for payment of the amount secured by the lien, the suit was 
filed to foreclose it. In the course of those proceedings, the parties agreed 
that there would be no need to obtain a foreclosure decree because Robbins had 
posted cash with the court so that, if the District prevailed, the District 
would be paid what it claimed to be owed out of the cash posted.

[¶7]      The parties agree 
that Robbins owned a mobile home that was properly connected to the District's 
systems prior to the spring of 1987. They also agreed that, prior to July of 
1987, Robbins had moved a second mobile home onto the property and had connected 
it into the sewer line that serviced the first mobile home. The District then 
passed, in July of 1987, its resolution that required each individual structure 
to have its own separate water and sewer connections. One of Robbins's primary 
contentions before the District Court was that no services ever were rendered 
with respect to the second mobile home by the District, so that there was no 
subject matter to justify foreclosure of a lien. Ultimately, the district court 
determined that the District was in full compliance with all the governing 
statutes, rules, and regulations, and the District was granted a judgment on its 
lien. Robbins paid the amount due the District, and then prosecuted his appeal 
from the judgment of the district court in favor of the District.

[¶8]      In the other case 
that was consolidated on appeal, identified as No. 89-273, Robbins filed a 
petition for declaratory judgment in the district court. By his pleading, he 
sought a determination that he was entitled to a contested case hearing before 
the Board prior to its determination that his mobile homes constituted two 
separate structures rather than one integrated structure. In that case, the 
district court determined that Robbins was not entitled to the contested case 
hearing under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, §§ 16-3-101 to -115, 
W.S. 1977, and it dismissed his complaint. Robbins also prosecuted an appeal 
from that order.

[¶9]      It is evident 
from the record in this case that Robbins never actually received anything in 
the way of permits, fees, connections, or service for which he did not pay. In 
essence, the District attempted to be paid in advance for the permits, fees, 
connections, and services that Robbins, according to its view, was obligated to 
obtain for the second mobile home. The pertinent language of the statute 
reads:

"(a) For and on behalf of 
the district the board of any district shall have the following 
powers:

* * * * * *

"(xxi) * * * To fix and 
from time to time to increase or decrease water and sewer rates, tolls or 
charges, including but not necessarily limited to use charges, connection fees 
and standby charges, for services or facilities furnished by the district, and 
to pledge such revenue for the payment of any indebtedness of the district. 
Until paid, all rates, tolls or charges shall constitute a perpetual lien on and 
against the property served, and any such lien may be foreclosed in the same 
manner as provided by the laws of the state of Wyoming for the foreclosure of 
mechanics' liens. Before any such lien is foreclosed the district shall hold a 
hearing thereon after notice thereof by publication and by registered first 
class mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the last known owner at his last known 
address according to the records of the district and the real property 
assessment roll in the county in which the property is located. The board 
shall shut off or discontinue service for delinquencies in the payment of such 
rates, tolls or charges, or in the payment of taxes or assessments levied 
pursuant to this act, and prescribe and enforce rules and regulations for the 
connection with and the disconnection from properties of the facilities of the 
district. For health and sanitary purposes the board shall have the power to 
compel the owners of inhabited property within a sewer district to connect their 
property with the sewer system of such district and upon the failure to so 
connect within sixty (60) days after such written, mailed notice by the board so 
to do the board may cause such connection to be made and a lien to be filed 
against the property for the expense incurred in making such connection. No 
owner shall be compelled to connect his property with such system unless a 
service line is brought, by the district, to a point within four hundred (400) 
feet of his dwelling place; * * *." Section 41-10-113(a)(xxi), W.S. 1977 
(emphasis added).

[¶10]   This statute refers the district to 
the mechanics' lien statutes and the requirements of those statutes. One of 
those statutes provides, in pertinent part:

"(a) In order to have a 
perfected lien pursuant to this title, a lien claimant shall file with the 
county clerk a lien statement sworn to before a notary public. The county clerk 
shall file the statement and index by date, the name of claimant and property 
owner, and legal description.

"(b) The lien statement 
and the abstracts shall contain as appropriate the following 
information:

"(i) The name and address 
of the person seeking to enforce the lien;

"(ii) The amount claimed 
to be due and owing;

"(iii) The name of the 
person against whose property the lien is filed;

"(iv) An itemized list 
setting forth and describing materials delivered or work 
performed;

"(v) The name of the 
person against whom the lien claim is made;

"(vi) The date when 
labor was last performed or services were last rendered or the date when the 
project was substantially completed;

"(vii) The legal 
description of the premises where the materials were furnished or upon which the 
work was performed; and

"(viii) A copy of the 
contract, if available." Section 29-1-301, W.S. 1977 (emphasis 
added).

It is apparent 
from this record that, at this point in time, the District could not satisfy 
those statutory requirements.

[¶11]   A number of remedies might well be 
invoked by the District in order to require Robbins to bring his property into 
compliance with the statutes, rules, and regulations that govern the operations 
of the District, e.g., injunction, discontinuance of service, or an action for 
damages. Under the circumstances evidenced by this record, however, the 
mechanics' lien is a remedy that the District did not have available. Simply 
put, the District did not provide anything to Robbins in the form of permits, 
services, or connections, and that is a condition precedent to the vesting of 
jurisdiction in the district court in a mechanics' lien case to ascertain the 
existence of a valid lien. See Section 29-1-301, W.S. 1977. A mechanics' lien is 
a creature of statute and, however equitable a lien claim may be, it does not 
exist unless the one claiming the land has substantially complied with all 
requirements of the statute. Hamel v. American Continental Corporation, 713 P.2d 1152 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶12]   It is a fundamental proposition 
that, if a claim does not exist because the party attempting to invoke the lien 
statutes has not complied with the statutory requirements, there is no matter 
over which the district court may exercise jurisdiction. This court has the 
inherent power, and the duty, to address jurisdictional defects on appeal even 
though they have not been called to our attention by a litigant. Parker v. 
Haller, 751 P.2d 372 (Wyo. 1988). In this instance, Robbins, at least by 
implication, called that matter to our attention. We are compelled to reverse 
the judgment of the district court in case No. 89-272. That case is remanded to 
the district court with directions to dismiss the complaint for failure to 
assert the statutory mechanics' lien requirements necessary to vest jurisdiction 
in the court.

[¶13]   Turning to Robbins's second appeal 
in which he claims that he was entitled to a contested case hearing before the 
Board and that, absent such a full due process hearing, the Board could not make 
a determination that he was required to pay for a second water and sewer 
connection for his property, we are in accord with the district court. It ruled 
that no such contested case style hearing was required. We are satisfied that 
the hearing provided for under § 41-10-113(a)(xxi), W.S. 1977, satisfies the 
basic requirements for due process of law that are implicated by the statutory 
scheme governing the operation of water and sewer districts. Our cases hold that 
procedural due process is satisfied if a person is afforded adequate notice and 
an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. 
Higgins v. State ex rel. Workers' Compensation Division, 739 P.2d 129 (Wyo. 
1987), cert. denied 484 U.S. 988, 108 S. Ct. 508, 98 L. Ed. 2d 507 (1987). In White 
v. Board of Trustees of Western Wyoming Community College, 648 P.2d 528 (Wyo. 
1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1107, 103 S. Ct. 732, 74 L. Ed. 2d 956 (1983), we 
summarize the constitutional principles that are demanded by the Constitution of 
the United States and prescribe that, where a state seeks to terminate a life, 
liberty, or property interest, the state must afford notice and an opportunity 
for hearing, appropriate to the case, before termination. See Lentsch v. 
Marshall, 741 F.2d 301 (10th Cir. 1984).

[¶14]   We have no doubt that this is an 
instance in which the state is seeking to terminate a property interest. Given 
the circumstances, we conclude that the water and sewer district statutes 
provide for the hearing that Robbins actually was afforded. He did have notice 
of the claims of the District and he did have an opportunity to present any and 
all evidence that he chose to present. He also had that opportunity in the 
context of questioning the conclusions of the employees of the District who had 
made the determination that he had two mobile homes on his property. To the 
extent that any further due process could be appropriate, it is clearly 
available both in terms of the need of the District to foreclose on its lien and 
the availability of a declaratory or injunctive relief such as that which 
Robbins sought. See Gerstell v. Department of Revenue and Taxation, 769 P.2d 389 
(Wyo. 1989).

[¶15]   To summarize, we affirm the 
decision of the district court dismissing Robbins's complaint for a declaratory 
judgment to the effect that he was entitled to a contested case style hearing 
under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. We do reverse and remand the 
judgment of the district court that granted foreclosure to the District on its 
complaint seeking foreclosure of its lien on Robbins's property. Because of this 
disposition which encompasses a direction to dismiss the complaint, it is not 
necessary to address the other issues raised by Robbins.

[¶16]   The decision of the district court 
in case No. 89-273 is affirmed. The decision of the district court in case No. 
89-272 is reversed, and that case is remanded to the district court with 
direction that the District's complaint be dismissed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Nothing in the record 
serves to establish that any of the other issues that Robbins pursues in this 
appeal were raised before the District at the hearing conducted by the 
Board.