Title: RICHARD OSBORN v. ELSIE F. WARNER AND JULIA A. KAZOR

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RICHARD OSBORN v. ELSIE F. WARNER AND JULIA A. KAZOR1985 WY 21694 P.2d 730Case Number: 84-113Decided: 02/01/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
RICHARD OSBORN, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT), 

v. 

ELSIE F. WARNER AND JULIA 
A. KAZOR, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

 
 
Richard Osborn, 
pro se.

H. Steven Brown, 
Casper, for appellees.

Before THOMAS,* C.J., and ROSE, ROONEY,** BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

* Became Chief Justice 
January 1, 1985.

** Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal is from a 
summary judgment partitioning real property held by appellant and his two 
sisters as tenants in common. The summary judgment does not dispose of all of 
the claims in the action, and for this reason is not a final order and not 
ordinarily appealable.1 However, since appellant might 
suffer irreparable damage by the partitioning before all claims could be 
disposed of, this court treated his appeal as a grant of a writ of certiorari. 
We affirm.

[¶2.]     Appellant raises the 
following issues:

"1. Whether a homestead, 
being this property in dispute, as provided by law, is protected from partition 
(alienation) by the Constitution of Wyoming, Article 19, Section 9, against the 
consent of the homesteader (owner), or is subject to partition (alienation) by 
co-owners under Wyoming Statute # 1-32-101.

"2. Whether a summary 
judgment granting partition is proper when it was opposed by Appellant's motion 
and affidavit in support of, citing facts that a material issue of dispute, the 
possession of the property, was in effect.

"3. Whether a United 
States Homestead Patent, this property Homestead Patent No. 748797 as recorded 
in the General Land Office Washington D.C., and records of Natrona County Book 5 
, is protected by United States Patent Laws, or is subject to partition under 
Wyoming Statute # 1-32-101.

"4. Whether the State 
District Court has original jurisdiction over a United States Homestead Patent, 
this land, when Title 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1338 states that Federal Courts shall 
have original jurisdiction over any civil case arising under any Act of Congress 
relating to patents."

[¶3.]     Appellant and Warner 
and Kazor, his two sisters, are tenants in common, each holding an undivided 
one-third interest in a section of land which was homesteaded by their father. 
Pursuant to § 1-32-101, et seq., W.S. 1977,2 Warner and Kazor brought an action 
seeking equitable partitioning of the property. Appellant answered pro se. 
Summary judgment was granted Warner and Kazor directing partition and execution 
upon the property.

[¶4.]     Appellant contends that 
the land in question is a homestead and, therefore, under the laws of our state, 
is not subject to being partitioned. Appellant misconstrues the meaning and 
application of the homestead. The public policy which is the basis for enactment 
of homestead laws is that the preservation of the home is of a greater social 
importance than payment of the debts of creditors. 40 C.J.S. Homesteads § 2. 
This case, however, does not involve creditors. A tenant in 
common

"* * * cannot obtain such 
homestead right or interest as will prejudice or interfere with the rights or 
interests of his cotenant or any person rightfully claiming under the latter, 
such as the right to partition or an accounting. Thus it is held that one joint 
owner of property cannot claim a homestead as against the other joint owners * * 
*." (Footnotes omitted.) 40 C.J.S. Homestead § 88, p. 527.

[¶5.]     Tenants in common have 
equal rights of possession and one cotenant cannot establish a homestead right 
as against the interests of other cotenants. Cooley v. Shepherd, 170 Kan. 232, 225 P.2d 75 (1950); Cole v. Coons, 162 Kan. 624, 178 P.2d 997 
(1947). The fact that this land was once the homestead of the father of these 
parties and that a patent was issued to him does not prevent partitioning among 
his heirs.

[¶6.]     Appellant next contends 
that a summary judgment was improper because

"* * * a material issue 
of dispute, the possession of the property, was in 
effect."

The fact that 
appellant has been in possession of the property is not in dispute. He claims 
that summary judgment was improper because his possession was adverse. Appellees 
contend that, since appellant did not set forth the defense as required by Rule 
8(c), W.R.C.P., the claim should not have been considered. The trial court, 
pursuant to Rule 15(b), W.R.C.P., considered the issue although not raised by 
the pleadings, and that was appropriate in this case.

[¶7.]     In his motion to 
dismiss the partition action, appellant stated that he was a tenant in common in 
possession for a period greater than ten years and that appellees were tenants 
in common out of possession. These allegations in the pleadings indicate that 
appellant bases his claim of adverse possession on his actual physical 
possession of the property as opposed to appellees' nonpossession. But there 
were no affidavits, facts, or evidence before the court supporting the claim 
that possession was adverse. We have said that a party faced with a motion for 
summary judgment may not rely upon the allegations of his pleadings. They are 
insufficient to create an issue of fact to prevent summary judgment. When the 
party moving for summary judgment has supported the motion with affidavits 
according to Rule 56(e), W.R.C.P.3, the party opposing the motion may 
not rest upon mere allegations or denials contained in his pleading. He must 
respond by affidavit or otherwise he must set forth specific facts indicating 
there is a genuine material factual issue for trial. Schepps v. Howe, Wyo., 
665 P.2d 504 (1983). The whole purpose of summary judgment would be defeated if 
trial could be forced by mere assertions or conclusions. Hyatt v. Big 
Horn School Dist. No. 4, Wyo., 636 P.2d 525 
(1981).

[¶8.]     The state of the record 
here indicates that appellees were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of 
law. Tenancy in common is characterized by possession or the right to possession 
of the common property. 20 Am.Jur.2d Cotenancy and Joint Ownership § 23. 
Appellant's actual possession, by itself, was not sufficient to show adverse 
possession against his sisters' right of possession. Before one cotenant can 
obtain title by adverse possession, he must assert an adverse right and a clear, 
positive and continuous disclaimer of title in his cotenants. Petrusic v. Carson, Wyo., 496 P.2d 70 (1972). Possession by one cotenant is 
not adverse in the absence of the elements of antagonism and notice. 4 Thompson 
on Real Property § 1811 (1979 Replacement), p. 228. It is difficult for one 
cotenant to successfully establish an adverse possession defense against other 
cotenants.

"[M]ere possession and 
use of the entire property by one cotenant is not an ouster, nor is his 
possession adverse, so long as the other cotenants remain voluntarily out of 
possession, and are not kept out of possession by the acts of the 
possessor-tenant." (Footnotes omitted.) II American Law of Property § 6.13 
(1952), pp. 52-54. See, Hackett v. Linch, 
57 Wyo. 
289, 116 P.2d 868 (1941).

[¶9.]     Appellant stated that 
he had been in continuous possession for a period greater than ten years. He 
does not assert sole ownership; he does not claim that his cotenants had notice 
of an adverse claim nor that their non-possession was anything but 
voluntary.

[¶10.]  The trial judge stated in his 
order:

"That the Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment does not set forth sufficient facts to cause the 
Court to conclude that the Defendant's defense of adverse possession 
exists."

We 
agree.

[¶11.]  Appellant finally contends that, since 
the property in question originated from a homestead patent deed, it should be 
protected by the United 
States patent laws and subject only to federal 
jurisdiction. Appellant confuses a land patent, defined 
as:

"A muniment of title 
issued by a government or state for the conveyance of some portion of the public 
domain." Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979),

with a 
patent-right, defined as:

"A right secured by 
patent; usually meaning a right to the exclusive manufacture and sale of an 
invention or patented article." Black's Law Dictionary, 
supra.

[¶12.]  The cases which appellant cites refer to 
a patent-right, e.g., inventions. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1338, cited by appellant for the 
proposition that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over this matter, 
refers to "[p]atents, plant variety protection, copyrights, trademarks, and 
unfair competition." It does not concern title to land granted by a homestead 
patent, has no application to this case, nor does it establish that the district 
court was without jurisdiction as appellant suggests.

[¶13.]  Appellant and his two sisters received an 
undivided interest in half of this property at the death of their father some 
thirty-five years ago. They acquired the remaining undivided one-half interest 
at the demise of their mother in 1976. It would be a strange state of the law 
indeed if co-owners lost their rightful share of property merely because one 
cotenant, with their permission, received the benefits of possession for many 
years.

[¶14.]  Appellant's arguments are specious and 
frivolous. Finding the appeal to be totally without merit or reasonable cause, 
the clerk of court is directed to tax, as part of the costs in this case, a fee 
of $250 to appellees' counsel and $250 as penalty and damages to appellees 
pursuant to Rule 10.05, W.R.A.P. Perry v. 
Vaught, Wyo., 624 P.2d 776 (1981). The order of summary judgment granting 
partition is affirmed.

1 Rule 2.01, W.R.A.P., 
provides:

"An appeal * * * from the 
district court to the Supreme Court, shall be taken * * * from entry of the 
judgment or final order appealed from * * *."

2 Section 1-32-101, W.S. 
1977, provides:

"Tenants in common and 
coparceners of any estate of lands, tenements or hereditaments within the state 
may be compelled to make a partition thereof as hereinafter 
prescribed."

3 Rule 56(e), W.R.C.P., 
provides:

"Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant 
is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies 
of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented 
or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this 
rule an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 
If he does not so respond summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against him."