Title: In re Mandate of Funds for Ctr. Twp. of Marion County Small Claims Court

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
CENTER TOWNSHIP TRUSTEE,  
 
 
 
JUDGE MICHELLE SMITH SCOTT 
EUGENE W. AKERS, AND THE  
 
 
 
Karl L. Mulvaney 
CENTER TOWNSHIP ADVISORY BOARD 
 
 
Philip L. Isenbarger 
Gregory F. Hahn  
 
 
 
 
 
Margaret M. Christensen 
Alan S. Townsend 
 
 
 
 
 
Bingham Greenebaum Doll LLP 
Bryan H. Babb 
 
 
` 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Jonathan W. Hughes 
Bose McKinney & Evans LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 49S00-1207-MF-420 
 
IN RE MANDATE OF FUNDS FOR 
CENTER TOWNSHIP OF MARION 
 
 
 
MARION CO. SMALL CLAIMS COURT 
COUNTY SMALL CLAIMS COURT 
 
 
CAUSE NO. 49D01-1111-SC-10887 
ORDER FOR MANDATE AND 
 
 
 
MANDATE OF FUNDS 
 
_________________________________ 
 
On Automatic Review Pursuant to Trial Rule 60.5(B) and Appellate Rule 61 
_________________________________ 
 
The Honorable Charles E. Berger, Special Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
 
June 28, 2013 
 
 
Rucker, Justice. 
Jun 28 2013, 11:34 am
2 
 
This is a mandate action involving a dispute between the Center Township of Marion 
County Small Claims Court and the Center Township Trustee and Advisory Board over court 
renovations, additional staff, increase in salaries, and the location of the court.  As explained 
below we approve the renovations, additional staff, and the mandate prohibiting the relocation of 
the court.  We disapprove the mandated salary increases.   
 
Background 
 
From time to time—as has happened in the case before us—disagreement over court 
resources between a judge and local government will prove to be so intractable as to require 
litigation.  In 1976, this Court adopted Trial Rule 60.5 establishing orderly procedures for the 
resolution of intracounty disagreements about court resources.  See St. Joseph Cnty. Comm’rs v. 
Nemeth (In re Mandate of Funds), 929 N.E.2d 703, 707 (Ind. 2010).  “We adopted the rule after 
studying the report of a legislative joint committee that held hearings attended by judges and by 
many representatives of county government.”  Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 
In 2008, an informal working group of county government representatives and trial court 
judges proposed several changes to Trial Rule 60.5.  For example, “they suggested that the rule 
explicitly provide for referring such disagreements to mediation;” that “when it became 
necessary to appoint a special judge to adjudicate such disagreements, that [the] special judge not 
be a sitting or [former] judge but instead a practicing lawyer;” and proposed that “the rule 
specify that any attorney fees awarded by a special judge in such cases be paid at a rate not 
greater than the reasonable and customary hourly rate for an attorney in the county.”  Id. at 708.  
This Court adopted the proposals of the working group in 2009.  This is the second case using 
the 2009 amended procedures of Trial Rule 60.5.  See id. 
 
Procedural History 
 
 
The procedures established by Trial Rule 60.5 “are infrequently invoked in Indiana.”  
Montgomery Cnty. Council v. Milligan (In re Mandate of Funds), 873 N.E.2d 1043, 1045 (Ind. 
2007).  And although the typical mandate proceeding involves a disagreement about court 
3 
 
funding, we have held that the procedures of Trial Rule 60.5 apply to mandates other than those 
involving court funding, including disputes over the location of court offices.  See In re 
Assignment of Courtrooms, Judge’s Offices, and Other Court Facilities of St. Joseph Super. Ct., 
715 N.E.2d 372, 373 n.1 (Ind. 1999).  In this case the procedures of Trial Rule 60.5 have been 
employed to settle a dispute not only about the funding for court operations, but also the 
relocation of the court itself.  
 
In most Indiana counties, small claims cases1 are heard as part of the “small claims 
docket” of the County Circuit or Superior Courts.  See Ind. Code § 33-29-2-4.  Marion County 
operates differently.  In Marion County there are nine township government entities.2  And by 
statute a small claims court has been established in each township.  See Ind. Code § 33-34-1-2. 
Together the nine township courts handle approximately 70,000 cases annually.  See Indiana 
Supreme Court Small Claims Task Force, Report on the Marion County Small Claims Courts 7 
(2012).3   
 
In essence, the Marion County small claims courts are township-level judicial entities; 
and for some time there has been tension between these courts and the township governing 
bodies with regard to control of court activities.  The busiest of the township courts is that in 
                                              
1 Small claims are defined as “[c]ivil actions in which the amount sought or value of the property sought 
to be recovered is not more than six thousand dollars ($6,000).”  Ind. Code § 33-28-3-4.  
2 The entities include: Center Township; Decatur Township; Franklin Township; Lawrence Township; 
Perry Township; Pike Township; Warren Township; Washington Township; and Wayne Township.  
 
3 In January 2012 this Court created the Marion County Small Claims Task Force to “investigate whether 
litigants in those courts are denied access to justice that is provided to small claims litigants in Indiana’s 
other 91 counties and whether the township trustees exert control over the courts’ financial and personnel 
matters in a manner that threatens judicial independence.”  Id. at 1.  After conducting three public 
hearings over a period of three weeks and gathering information and input from a variety of sources, 
including judges, attorneys, small claims plaintiffs and defendants, community leaders, local bar 
associations, and concerned citizens throughout Marion county, the task force – composed of Judge John 
G. Baker of the Indiana Court of Appeals and Senior Judge Betty Barteau of the Indiana Court of Appeals 
– submitted a detailed report that included findings of fact describing serious problems and procedures in 
the Marion County Small Claims Courts along with recommendations to remedy those problems.  Id. at 
1-2.  We express our appreciation to the task force for its excellent work.  Also, we cite that document 
throughout this opinion as “Task Force Report”; it is available online at www.in.gov/judiciary/3844.htm.  
Although the report was not made a part of the record by the parties, the special judge appointed to hear 
this case took judicial notice of the report, and in the absence of objection from either party we have done 
likewise. 
4 
 
Center Township, which receives approximately 14,000 case filings annually.  See Task Force 
Report, Appendix at 370.  Center Township encompasses central Marion County, including 
downtown Indianapolis and the nearest suburbs.   
 
In 2006, the then-Center Township Small Claims Court judge, the Honorable Paula 
Lopossa, filed a complaint for mandate enjoining the then-trustee, Carl Drummer, from “hiring, 
supervising, and disciplining” the court’s clerks and declaring that the court has the sole 
authority to hire, supervise, and discipline its employees, prepare and submit its annual budget, 
and to order its own equipment and supplies.  Joint Exhibits at 201-202.  The complaint also 
alleged that the 1,615 square feet of workspace then allocated for court operations in the City-
County Building in downtown Indianapolis was insufficient, though Judge Lopossa requested no 
relief in this regard.  See id. at 200.  
 
 
After her election to the Center Township Small Claims Court bench in 2007, Judge 
Michelle Smith Scott was substituted as the plaintiff in the court’s complaint against Trustee 
Drummer.  Judge Scott and Trustee Drummer subsequently negotiated a compromise and the 
complaint originated by Judge Lopossa was dismissed in 2009.  However, this did not end the 
tension about administrative authority over the court.  The record shows that after taking office 
in January 2011, the then newly-elected Center Township Trustee, Eugene Akers, continued the 
practice of exercising control over the court’s budgets, funds, and employees.  See, e.g., Tr. at 
110-14, 162-63 (Trustee Akers’ testimony that the Small Claims Court clerks and other staff 
members reported to the Trustee, not to Judge Scott); Tr. at 160 (Trustee Akers’ testimony that 
he required court employees to recite the Township Mission Statement upon his request); see 
also Appellant’s Verified Statement at 3 (acknowledging that the Trustee and/or Center 
Township “unintentional[ly]” failed to notify Judge Scott before extending offers to new court 
employees and failed to notify the Judge of their hire until the business day before they reported 
to work in Judge Scott’s court). 
 
 
Sometime in early spring of 2011, Trustee Akers advanced a plan to relocate the Center 
Township Small Claims Court from its small space in the basement of the City-County Building 
to a larger, more modern facility in the township-owned Carson Center on Fall Creek Parkway in 
5 
 
Indianapolis and to renovate the Carson Center space to accommodate the court.  The Trustee 
first advised Judge Scott of his plan on June 7, 2011.  At a public hearing the next day the 
Trustee presented the plan to the Center Township Advisory Board.  Judge Scott attended the 
June 8 meeting and asked the Trustee and the Board to take various concerns of hers into 
consideration before deciding to move the court.  See Joint Exhibits at 33-34.  On June 13 Judge 
Scott sent a letter to the Board president offering, in conjunction with the Office of State Court 
Administration, technical assistance for a feasibility study on moving the court, for the purpose 
of obtaining “an objective opinion by an individual experienced in Court Operations.”  Id. at 39.  
Judge Scott opined that the cost of such a study “may be underwritten and likely free.”  Id.  
Another Board meeting was held on July 18, at which Trustee Akers stated “A Feasibility Study . 
. . will cost more than I am going to spend.”  Id. at 42.  Instead the Trustee conducted what he 
characterized as a “commonsense study” to conclude that the court should be relocated.  Id. at 
40.  Also at the July 18 meeting, Judge Scott presented a report providing support for her 
conclusion that the court should remain in its present location in the City-County Building.  Id. at 
42; 47-57.  On August 31, Judge Scott wrote to Trustee Akers in preparation for the upcoming 
budget meeting, requesting funds for salary increases, additional staff, and replacement of office 
furniture in the City-County Building to facilitate better operation of the court.  Id. at 68-69.  
Ultimately, on September 21, 2011 the Board voted to approve the Trustee’s plan and issued an 
order relocating the court to the Carson Center over the objection of Judge Scott.   
 
 
Having been unsuccessful in resolving the relocation issue through other avenues and 
pursuant to her authority under Indiana Trial Rule 60.5, Judge Scott, on behalf of the Small 
Claims Court (collectively, the “Court”) issued an “Order For Mandate And Mandate Of Funds”  
directing the Trustee and the Advisory Board (collectively, the “Township”) to show cause why:  
 
[T]he Center Township of Marion County Small Claims Court 
should not at this time remain located in the City County Building . 
. . the Center Township of Marion County Small Claims Court 
clerks should not receive a 5% increase in salary . . . the Court 
should not be provided two additional full-time clerks; and . . . 
why funds should not be appropriated to allow for new space-
efficient furniture, and the reconfiguration of the Court’s existing 
space and for the configuration of new space offered to the Court 
by the City-County Building Authority.  
6 
 
Joint Exhibits at 1.  The Order specifically mandated: 
 
[T]hat the Center Township Small Claims Court shall not be 
moved, and that the Trustee and Township Board provide (1) funds 
for a 5% increase in salary for all court employees; (2) funds 
necessary to fund two new clerk positions; and (3) funds to 
purchase new furniture and to allow for reconfiguration of current 
and new space in the City-County Building. 
 
Id. at 1-2.     
 
 
The Township opposed the Mandate Order and filed with this Court a motion to dismiss.  
Noting that “an overriding issue presented in this matter is the fundamental question of access to 
justice,” this Court on December 9, 2011 denied the Township’s motion4 and pursuant to Trial 
Rule 60.5(B) appointed Mr. Charles L. Berger, an experienced Vanderburgh County attorney, as 
special judge to hear the matter and make findings regarding the mandate.5  In re Center Twp. of 
Marion Cnty. Small Claims Ct. Order for Mandate, No. 49S00-1111-SJ-667 at 1-2 (Ind. Dec. 9, 
2011).  The special judge held a trial on May 1, 2, and 3, 2012; and thereafter on June 11, 2012 
entered his findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree.  The decree affirmed the Mandate 
Order in certain respects including decreeing:  (1) the location of the Small Claims Court should 
remain in the City-County Building; (2) Center Township must provide reconfigured space and 
certain items of new furniture and equipment for the Small Claims Court; and (3) Center 
Township must allocate funds to provide two additional full-time staff members for the Small 
Claims Court.  Although not a part of the Mandate Order itself, but consistent with the evidence 
and with Judge Scott’s specific request at trial, the decree further directed “the Court shall 
maintain authority and control of its staff” in matters of supervising, hiring, and firing “without 
                                              
4 Three days after the Court denied the Township’s motion to dismiss, the Township contracted with a 
construction firm to proceed with the renovation of the Carson Center space for the Small Claims Court at 
a cost of $459,000.00. 
5 When a mandate order is issued, the matter “shall be set for trial on the merits of such order to show 
cause” unless the mandated party or parties waive the right to trial and agree to make such appropriation 
or payment. T.R. 60.5(B).  The purpose of this trial is to “provide a factual foundation, developed in a 
suitable adversary atmosphere, to permit a rational decision of the issues.”  State ex rel. Lake Cnty. 
Council v. Lake Cnty. Ct., 359 N.E.2d 918, 920 (Ind. 1977).  T.R. 60.5(B) further provides that to hear 
the mandate action the Supreme Court “shall . . . appoint as special judge an attorney who is not a current 
or former regular judge and who does not reside nor regularly practice law in the county issuing the Order 
of Mandate of Funds or in any county contiguous thereto.”   
7 
 
supervision or involvement of the Trustee,” and further ordered the Trustee “to relinquish 
control” over the Small Claims Court’s financial operations.  App. at 48.6  The decree also 
ordered the Township to pay the reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses incurred by each party.  
See id. at 47-48.  Further, the special judge reversed that portion of the mandate ordering an 
increase to court employees’ salaries.  We express our appreciation to special judge Berger for 
his service in this challenging case. 
 
Trial Rule 60.5 provides that the special judge’s decree be reviewed by this Court unless 
the responsible governmental entities expressly waive review.  Review was not waived here, so 
this Court issued an order governing briefing and the filing of the record on appeal.  The 
                                              
6  In pertinent part the Decree specifically provided: 
 
The Current Small Claims Court facility is in need of improvements.  It is ordered that 
the location of the Court shall remain at the current location in the City-County Building.  
It is further ordered that Center Township shall provide reconfigured court space and 
updated furniture and equipment to the Court to ensure the Court facility is adequate in 
accordance with Indiana Code § 33-34-6-1. 
 
Center Township is hereby ordered to allocate funds to provide two additional full time 
staff to the Center Township Small Claims Court.  In order to give practical, permanent, 
and lasting effect to the Mandate Order, the Trustee is ordered to relinquish control over 
the Small Claims Court’s operations to the Court.  Specifically, the Court shall maintain 
authority and financial control by: 
 
1) 
Preparing an annual Court budget for submission to the Center 
Township Board and Trustee; 
2) 
Managing the Court’s bank account and issuing checks without 
supervision of involvement of the Trustee; and 
3) 
Managing financial records and submitting mandatory financial 
reports to state entities. 
 
Specifically, the Court shall maintain authority and control of its staff by: 
 
1) 
Supervising the staff on a day-to-day basis and making decisions 
as to specific personnel policies applicable to Court staff without 
supervision or involvement of the Trustee; and 
2) 
Making decisions as to hiring and termination of staff members, 
in accordance with the Court’s personnel policies without 
supervision or involvement of the Trustee. 
 
App. at 47-48.  With respect to the authority of the Court maintaining control over its finances, we would 
add that of course any such authority must be exercised consistent with the requirements of the State 
Board of Accounts.  
8 
 
Township appeals aspects of the decree; however the Small Claims Court does not cross-appeal 
the issue of salary increases.  The parties concluded briefing on October 19, 2012, and we took 
the matter under advisement.  
Discussion 
 
 
It bears repeating that disputes between the judiciary and governmental legislative and 
executive authorities, if they cannot otherwise be resolved, are governed by Indiana Trial Rule 
60.5, which provides in relevant part: 
 
Whenever a court, except the Supreme Court or the Court of 
Appeals, desires to order either a municipality, a political 
subdivision of the state, or an officer of either to appropriate or to 
pay unappropriated funds for the operation of the court or court-
related functions, such court shall issue and cause to be served 
upon such municipality, political subdivision or officer an order to 
show cause why such appropriation or payment should not be 
made.  
 
T.R. 60.5(B).  Where there is a clear and present danger of impairment of a court’s operation, a 
mandate action is proper.  St. Joseph Cnty. Comm’rs v. Nemeth, 929 N.E.2d at 710 (citing 
Montgomery Cnty. Council, 873 N.E.2d at 1046).  The special judge’s role in a mandate 
proceeding is to determine whether the mandated funds or actions are reasonably necessary for 
the operation of the courts and court-related functions, and whether any other governmental 
interests are so severely and adversely affected by the order as to require it to be set aside.  See 
id.; In re Assignment of Courtrooms, 715 N.E.2d at 375; Morgan Cir. Ct. v. Morgan Cnty. 
Council, 550 N.E.2d 1303, 1304 (Ind. 1990).  When we review the special judge’s decree, “we 
do not ordinarily reevaluate the evidence and we will affirm the decree if there is substantial 
evidence of probative value to support the judgment.”  In re Assignment of Courtrooms, 715 
N.E.2d at 375 (citing In re Mandate of Funds for the Brown Cir. Ct., 507 N.E.2d 583, 584 (Ind. 
1987)).  But given the “profound public interest in open and functioning courts and our special 
knowledge of trial court operations,” we retain “a measure of authority to weigh and evaluate the 
evidence in reviewing the judgment of the special judge.”  Morgan Cir. Ct., 550 N.E.2d at 1304.  
 
9 
 
 
In this case the Township expressly does not contest that portion of the special judge’s 
decree directing that the Court – without the intervention of the Trustee – shall control the 
supervising, hiring, and firing of court staff; or ordering the Trustee to relinquish control over the 
Small Claims Court’s financial operations.  See Br. of Appellants at 40.  This is of course as it 
should be.  See Bd. of Comm’rs of Crawford Cnty. v.  Riddle, 493 N.E.2d 461, 463 (Ind. 1986) 
(declaring a court “cannot be controlled, directed, or impeded in its functions by any other 
department of government”).  Also, the Township does not object to allocating funds for two 
additional full-time staff members for the court.  Instead, the Township complains only about 
that portion of the decree concerning the court’s location and the award of attorney fees.  
 
I.  Location of the Court 
 
The Township urges that the decree ordering the Small Claims Court to remain in the 
City-County Building and directing the Township to provide reconfigured space and new 
furniture and equipment should be reversed.  In support of its position the Township calls our 
attention to numerous facts and arguments favoring relocation.  From these, we distill two 
relevant contentions: (1) the Mandate Order adversely affects governmental interests, namely: 
the interest of the Board in sharing joint authority with the local judge over the Court’s location, 
and (2) the Mandate Order is unsupportable because relocating the court to the Carson Center 
presents no clear and present danger of impairment to its operations.  
 
 
With respect to the first contention the Township’s argument can best be summarized as 
follows:  the exercise of joint authority over the decision concerning the Court’s location was 
rendered a nullity when Judge Scott mandated that the court remain in its present location.  
According to the Township there is no “‘joint’ exercise of any authority” where a court can 
resort to mandate “any time the Legislative and Executive branches refuse to adopt the 
Judiciary’s position on a dispute over court facilities . . . .”  Br. of Appellants at 43.  
 
 
We first observe that it is certainly correct to say that the Township’s statutory 
responsibility to “provide a courtroom and an office for each judge in a convenient location 
10 
 
within the township,” I.C. § 33-34-6-1,7 “carries with it a reasonable degree of discretion about 
the location of court offices.”  In re Assignment of Courtrooms, 715 N.E.2d at 375.  However, as 
the special judge correctly observed although “the Trustee . . . bear[s] the duty to provide for the 
small claims court, [the relevant statutes] do not grant the Trustee the unilateral power or 
authority to relocate the Court without consulting the presiding judge or involving the Board in 
the decision to relocate the Court.”  App. at 39 (emphasis in original).  As for resort to the 
extraordinary remedy of mandate, it is true that “there is no Indiana code provision granting the 
presiding judge the authority to veto or override any final decision to move a court.”  Id.  
Nonetheless, “[i]f the separation of powers is to be maintained, it is essential that the judicial 
branch [of] government not be throttled by either the legislative or administrative branches, and 
that the courts be empowered to mandate what is reasonably necessary to discharge their duties.”  
McAfee v. State ex rel. Stodola, 284 N.E.2d 778, 782 (Ind. 1972).  
 
In essence, although the Township and the Small Claims Court judge exercise joint 
authority with respect to the location of the court facility, the question presented is how to 
resolve a dispute over the exercise of that joint authority.  The special judge reached a common 
sense resolution: “unless and until Center Township engages in a collaborative decision-making 
process involving all three co-equal branches of government, Center Township should not be 
permitted to relocate the Court to the Carson Center.”  App. at 46.  The Township counters that 
its decision to move the court’s location was taken only after a public meeting in compliance 
with Indiana statutory authority, thus giving “a voice to all three co-equal branches of 
government.”  Br. of Appellants at 38 (internal quotation marks omitted).8  Indeed, the record 
                                              
7 More specifically the statute provides:  
The township trustee shall provide a courtroom and an office for each 
judge in a convenient location within the township that has: (1) adequate 
access; (2) sufficient parking facilities; (3) a separate and appropriate 
courtroom; (4) proper space and facilities for the bailiff, clerks, and other 
employees; and (5) enough room for files and supplies.   
 
I.C. § 33-34-6-1.  Further, the Township is required to furnish equipment, supplies, and staff to the small 
claims court.  See I.C. §§ 33-34-6-2 and -3.   
8 Indiana Code section 33-34-1-7 provides: 
A hearing must be conducted to obtain evidence, opinions, advice, and 
suggestions from public officials and the general public concerning: 
11 
 
reflects the Board conducted a public hearing concerning the location of the court and entered an 
order for the court’s relocation.  But, as the special judge found and as the evidence of record 
supports:    
 
The Trustee’s process that ultimately lead to a Board order to 
relocate the Small Claims Court failed to adequately involve the 
Court and failed to adequately study and analyze the impact of the 
move.  Indeed, Trustee Akers determined that he would move the 
Court out of the City-County Building before consulting with  the 
Court or the Board.  While the Trustee and Board permitted Judge 
Scott to present facts and concerns during various Board meetings, 
these concerns were dismissed without investigation by the Trustee 
or Board.  Moreover, neither the Trustee nor the Board engaged in 
a meaningful dialogue or exchange of ideas with the presiding 
judge regarding the relocation of the Court.  Ultimately the 
suggestions and efforts of the presiding judge were ignored. 
 
The Court made efforts to follow appropriate steps to analyze the 
appropriateness of the relocation of the Court and the concern for 
public access to justice. 
 
App. at 40.  In the end, absent the Township (i) “adequately involv[ing] the court,” (ii) 
“engag[ing] in meaningful dialogue or exchange of ideas with the presiding judge” and instead 
(iii) “ignor[ing]” the court’s “suggestions and efforts” the Judge of the Center Township Small 
                                                                                                                                                  
(1) whether a small claims court should be established or abolished in the 
township, if the township has a population of less than fifteen thousand 
(15,000) persons;  
(2) whether the small claims court should be full time or part time; 
(3) the location of the small claims court courtroom and offices; and 
(4) other relevant matters. 
 
 
Section 33-34-1-9 further requires: 
Not more than two (2) weeks after a hearing is conducted under section 7 
of this chapter, the township board shall, after considering the evidence, 
opinions, advice, and suggestions presented at the hearing, enter an order 
concerning: 
(1) whether a small claims court shall be established or abolished in the 
township if the township has a population of less than fifteen thousand 
(15,000) persons; 
(2) whether the small claims court if any, shall function full time or part 
time; 
(3) the location of the small claims court courtroom and offices under IC 
33-34-6-1; and 
(4) other relevant matters. 
12 
 
Claims Court was left only with the option of mandate where she was of the view that there was 
a clear and present danger of impairment of the court’s operation.9  This leads to our next 
discussion.  
 
 
The Township contends the Mandate Order should be set aside because relocating the 
court presents no clear and present danger of impairment of court operations.  The Township 
rests this conclusion on the present condition of the court facilities in the City-County Building, 
its supposition that such conditions will not be ameliorated by expanded and reconfigured space 
and furniture, the availability of the newly-renovated Carson Center space, and the fact that most 
court employees support the move.  See Br. of Appellants at 45-46, 49-51.  On review of this 
mandate order, our job is not to assess whether the Carson Center would be a “better” location 
for the court.  Rather, we must determine whether the record contains substantial evidence of 
probative value that there is a clear and present danger of impairment to the court or court 
functions if the court is not maintained and reconfigured in its present location.  We find that it 
does. 
 
 
As we previously observed, an overriding issue presented in this case is the fundamental 
question of access to justice.  Indeed, providing such access is a constitutionally-mandated 
function of Indiana courts.  See Ind. Const. art. 1, § 12 (“All courts shall be open; and every 
person, for injury done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due 
course of law.  Justice shall be administered freely, and without purchase; completely, and 
without denial; speedily, and without delay.”).  It is undisputed that the Small Claims Court is 
presently centrally located in Center Township and is in close proximity to all (and within easy 
walking distance to most) public bus routes in the township and Marion County.  Further, there is 
no dispute that the court is located in the same building as multiple other Marion County Courts 
and public services frequently used by litigants.  We also find it relevant that the court in this 
case, as with most small claims courts, hears a substantial volume of consumer collection cases 
and landlord-tenant disputes such as evictions.  See Tr. at 185, 310.  According to a 
                                              
9 Contrary to the Township’s apparent position we would encourage cooperation and dialogue between 
judges of the Small Claims Courts and their Township governing bodies.  Indeed this very process 
resulted in a compromise between Judge Scott and former Trustee Drummer thereby circumventing a 
prior action for mandate. 
13 
 
comprehensive study of legal needs of the poor in Indiana, it is precisely these types of cases that 
most frequently plague low-income Hoosiers.  See Indiana State Bar Association, et al., Unequal 
Access to Justice: A Comprehensive Study of the Civil Legal Needs of the Poor in Indiana 80-83 
(2008), available at www.indianalegalservices.org/files/ilsi-unequal-access-2008-full.pdf.  And it 
is also worth noting that the Center Township Small Claims Court is not only in the same 
building, but is on the same floor as courts handling paternity and child support, domestic 
violence, and protective orders – services also of particular relevance to this demographic.  See 
id. at 81-85. 
 
 
In sum, we conclude the record is replete with probative evidence that moving the Center 
Township Small Claims Court away from its present location poses a clear and present danger to 
access to justice for the litigants it serves, and that maintaining and upgrading the Court in its 
present location is reasonably necessary to preserve that access.  And although the Township 
does not object to other components of the special judge’s decree, see Br. of Appellants at 40, we 
think it bears emphasizing that we specifically affirm the special judge’s order that the Township 
shall allocate funds to hire two additional Court employees, that the Trustee shall relinquish 
control over Court functions, and that authority over its employees and its financial operations 
shall be vested solely in the Court. See supra n. 6; see also Task Force Report at 19, 24, 25 
(concluding that township courts must have sole authority over their employees and their 
financial operations).   
 
II.  Attorney Fees 
 
 
Finally, we address attorney fees.  Because the proper delivery of judicial services is 
often at stake in Trial Rule 60.5 proceedings, we have acknowledged the propriety of reasonable 
compensation for attorneys who represent courts in such matters.  See  St. Joseph Cnty. Cmm’rs, 
929 N.E.2d at 720 (citing Montgomery Cnty. Council, 873 N.E.2d at 1049; Kramer v. Hancock 
Cnty. Ct., 448 N.E.2d 1190, 1192 (Ind. 1983)).  The factors to be considered in determining the 
reasonableness of a fee include the following: “(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and 
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; 
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will 
14 
 
preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for 
similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations 
imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional 
relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers 
performing the services; and (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.”  Id. (quoting Ind. 
Professional Conduct Rule 1.5(a)).  In this case the special judge’s decree provided in relevant 
part:  “The Center Township, by and through its Trustee, is responsible for the reasonable 
attorney fees and expenses incurred by each side in this case.  The parties are directed to present 
their fee petitions within twenty (20) days of the issuance of this Order.”  App. at 48.  Thereafter 
the attorneys representing the Court presented their petition for fees and expenses to the special 
judge.  In response, the attorneys representing the Township objected to the petition as premature 
and requested a stay pending this Court’s review of the mandate order.  App. at 283-85.  The 
special judge granted the stay.  App. at 287-88.  
 
 
On review the Township makes no claim concerning the reasonableness of the fees and 
expenses requested, reserving any such issue for an evidentiary hearing before the special judge.  
Instead, in a one-paragraph argument, the Township contends “This Court should deny Judge 
Scott’s fee request.”  Br. of Appellants at 51.  The Township’s contention is premised on the fact 
that over and above her statutory salary, Judge Scott also received additional revenue for 
performing wedding ceremonies in her capacity as a judge.  According to the Township Judge 
Scott’s motivation in issuing the order of Mandate was to prevent the Court from relocating in an 
effort “to preserve and protect her own personal stream of income.”  Id.  We make the following 
observations.  First, although the special judge determined that “[o]ne consideration” for Judge 
Scott not wanting the Court to relocate to the Carson Center was the potential loss of wedding 
income, the special judge specifically found, “[t]he concern that Judge Scott’s Mandate Action 
was motivated by a perceived loss of wedding income results from speculation and is 
unsupported by credible evidence.”  App. at 26 (emphasis added).  Second, and more importantly 
the question here is not Judge Scott’s motivation, but rather whether mandate was necessitated 
by a clear and present danger of impairment of the court’s operation.  See St. Joseph Cnty. 
Cmm’rs  929 N.E.2d at 710.  As recounted above, there was sufficient evidence presented to the 
special judge that the mandated action was reasonably necessary for the operation of the court 
15 
 
and court-related functions, and that any other governmental interests were not so severely and 
adversely affected by the order as to require Order of Mandate be set aside.  See In re 
Assignment of Courtrooms, 715 N.E.2d at 375; Morgan Cir. Ct., 550 N.E.2d at 1304.10  We 
therefore affirm the special judge’s decree concerning attorney fees and expenses.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
We affirm the decree of the special judge. 
 
Dickson, C.J., and David, Massa and Rush, JJ., concur. 
                                              
10 We also observe that effective March 1, 2013 Rules governing the Marion County Small Claims Courts 
were adopted prohibiting judges from retaining fees for weddings as their own personal income.  See 
Addendum to Appellant’s Reply at 12 (reproducing Marion County Small Claims Court Rule LR49-
SC00-703).  Comments to the rules declare in pertinent part: “the Rule follows the Task Force 
recommendation and requires that wedding fees for weddings performed in the Court or on Court time be 
deposited in the Township General Fund.”  Id. at 13.