Title: Weidman v. Hildebrandt

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Weidman v. Hildebrant, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-2931.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-2931 
WEIDMAN, APPELLEE, v. HILDEBRANT, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Weidman v. Hildebrant, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-2931.] 
Statute of limitations—R.C. 2305.11—Libel—Discovery rule—Discovery rule 
applies to claims of libel when the publication of the libelous statements 
was secretive, concealed, or otherwise inherently unknowable to plaintiff 
due to nature of the publication—Discovery rule applies to derivative 
claims that are premised on the same allegations as the claim of libel—
Court of appeals’ judgment affirmed and cause remanded. 
(Nos. 2022-0837 and 2022-1042—Submitted May 16, 2023—Decided August 8, 
2024.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Warren County,  
No. CA2021-09-084, 2022-Ohio-1708. 
__________________ 
DONNELLY, J., authored the opinion of the court, which STEWART, 
BRUNNER, and MAYLE, JJ., joined.  MAYLE, J., authored a concurring opinion.  
FISCHER, J., concurred in judgment only.  KENNEDY, C.J., and WILKIN, J., 
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dissented, with opinions.  KRISTY S. WILKIN, J., of the Fourth District Court of 
Appeals, sat for DEWINE, J.  CHRISTINE MAYLE, J., of the Sixth District Court of 
Appeals, sat for DETERS, J. 
 
DONNELLY, J. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we are asked to determine when a cause of action for 
libel accrues when the reputational injury caused to the defamed person is 
inherently unknowable because the publication of the libelous statements was 
secretive or concealed.  We hold that the discovery rule applies to claims of libel 
when the publication of the libelous statements was secretive, concealed, or 
otherwise inherently unknowable to the plaintiff due to the nature of the 
publication.  We also hold that the discovery rule applies to derivative claims that 
are premised on the same allegations as the claim of libel.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the judgment of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals. 
II.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
{¶ 2} Appellant, Christopher Hildebrant, is a Cincinnati-based real-estate 
developer.  In 2011, Hildebrant facilitated the sale of property owned by SDI Foods, 
Inc. (“SDI Foods”), to Sycamore Township for development.  If SDI Foods 
successfully sold the property to Sycamore Township, Hildebrant expected to 
receive a consulting fee from both Sycamore Township and SDI Foods.  During the 
facilitation of the transaction, Hildebrant worked with SDI Foods representative 
Stanford Roberts and the Sycamore Township Board of Trustees, a board on which 
appellee, Thomas Weidman, served.  Hildebrant has alleged that Roberts and 
Weidman each sought a kickback from Hildebrant, whose consulting fees for the 
transaction would have been substantial.  Hildebrant has further alleged that 
Weidman threatened to block the transaction unless he received his payment.  
Hildebrant has claimed that in order to appease them and “save the deal,” he told 
January Term, 2024 
3 
 
both Roberts and Weidman that he would pay each of them, although Hildebrant 
has also asserted that he never intended to make either payment. 
{¶ 3} Hildebrant has claimed that he never paid any money to either 
Weidman or Roberts but that Roberts aggressively pursued the illicit payment.  To 
alleviate the pressure, Hildebrant created a fictitious email account with the address 
tweidman12@gmail.com and sent an email (the “2011 email”) from that account 
to himself on December 20, 2011.  The email portrayed Weidman as having 
accepted an illicit payment from Hildebrant and demanding more payments in 
exchange for his support in another real-estate transaction.  Hildebrant forwarded 
the 2011 email to Roberts to show that he did not have enough money to pay 
Roberts, because Weidman had already demanded significant payments.  The 2011 
email remained private between Hildebrant and Roberts for the next several years. 
{¶ 4} In 2019, Hildebrant sought to purchase a parcel of land owned by 
Sycamore Township on behalf of his development group.  The parcel purchase 
required unanimous consent by the Sycamore Township Board of Trustees, on 
which Weidman still served.  Weidman opposed the sale of the parcel of land. 
{¶ 5} On January 25, 2020, Hildebrant met with Sycamore Township 
Trustee James LaBarbara and Sycamore Township Administrator Raymond 
Warrick to discuss the parcel purchase.  During the meeting, Hildebrant asserted 
that Weidman’s opposition to the sale was in retaliation for Hildebrant’s failure to 
pay Weidman a kickback from the SDI Foods transaction in 2011 and Hildebrant 
showed the 2011 email to LaBarbara and Warrick. 
{¶ 6} Because the 2011 email revealed potential illegal conduct, the auditor 
of Ohio was notified and an investigation was initiated.  The auditor’s special-
investigations unit (“SIU”) subpoenaed the 2011 email.  On November 18, 2020, 
Weidman first learned of the 2011 email during an interview with investigators 
from the SIU.  Weidman denied the 2011 email’s authenticity, telling the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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investigators he owned no such email address and did not write the email.  
Weidman did not receive a copy of the 2011 email until January 2021. 
{¶ 7} Weidman filed suit against Hildebrant on February 17, 2021, claiming 
defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), and false-light 
invasion of privacy.  In his answer, Hildebrant admitted that he had created the 
2011 email and had shared it with LaBarbara and Warrick but raised the affirmative 
defense that Weidman’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations. 
{¶ 8} Hildebrant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that 
because the 2011 email, which forms the basis of Weidman’s claims, was 
forwarded to Roberts in December 2011, Weidman’s defamation claim was time-
barred.  Likewise, Hildebrant argued that the IIED and false-light-invasion-of-
privacy claims were also time-barred because those claims are derivative of the 
alleged defamation.  Alternatively, Hildebrant argued that even if the court found 
that the date of publication was January 25, 2020—when the 2011 email was first 
shown to LaBarbara and Warrick—the claims were still time-barred because the 
complaint was filed in February 2021, more than a year after the publication to 
LaBarbara and Warrick. 
{¶ 9} Weidman opposed the motion for summary judgment, arguing that 
the “discovery rule” applied because the publication of the 2011 email had been 
done in secret.  Weidman argued that the running of the statute-of-limitations period 
had been tolled until November 2020 when he learned about the 2011 email during 
the SIU interview. 
{¶ 10} The trial court granted Hildebrant’s motion for summary judgement, 
relying on Rowan v. Schaffer, 2019-Ohio-3038, ¶ 3 (8th Dist.), which held that a 
defamation claim accrues at the time that the allegedly defamatory statement is first 
published to a third party.  The court of appeals in Rowan rejected the discovery 
rule’s application to defamation claims, noting that it is of no legal consequence 
January Term, 2024 
5 
 
that the “subject of the alleged defamation does not discover the statements until 
after the running of the statute of limitations.”  Id. 
{¶ 11} Weidman appealed, and the Twelfth District Court of Appeals 
reversed, holding that the discovery rule applied to defamation claims when the 
publication of the defamatory statements was secretive, concealed, or otherwise 
inherently unknowable.  2022-Ohio-1708, ¶ 29 (12th Dist.).  The court of appeals 
relied on O’Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp., 4 Ohio St.3d 84 (1983), and subsequent 
cases in which we applied the discovery rule.  2022-Ohio-1708 at ¶ 23 (12th Dist.).  
On Hildebrant’s motion, the Twelfth District certified that its decision was in 
conflict with decisions from other appellate districts.  We subsequently determined 
that a conflict exists and ordered briefing on the following issues: 
 
Does the discovery rule apply to libel actions where the publication 
of the defamatory statements was secretive, concealed, or otherwise 
unknowable such that the cause of action does not accrue until the 
plaintiff discovers, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should 
have discovered, that he or she was injured by the wrongful conduct 
of the defendant?  Where a derivative claim is premised upon the 
same allegations, does the discovery rule apply to that claim as well? 
 
2022-Ohio-3636.   
We also accepted jurisdiction over the sole proposition of 
law in Hildebrant’s discretionary appeal: “The discovery rule does not apply to 
defamation claims, even where the publication of the defamatory statements was 
secretive, concealed, or otherwise inherently unknowable.”  See id.  We sua sponte 
consolidated the two cases for briefing.  Id. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
{¶ 12} We review matters requiring statutory interpretation de novo.  
Stewart v. Vivian, 2017-Ohio-7526, ¶ 23. 
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{¶ 13} R.C. 2305.11(A) provides that “[a]n action for libel . . . shall be 
commenced within one year after the cause of action accrued.”  Because the statute 
does not define the term “accrued,” we apply the plain and ordinary meaning of 
that term.  See State v. Chappell, 2010-Ohio-5991, ¶ 3, 16-17; see also O’Stricker 
at paragraph one of the syllabus (“Absent legislative definition, it is left to the 
judiciary to determine when a cause ‘arose’ for purposes of statutes of 
limitations.”). 
A.  Discovery Rule 
{¶ 14} In Norgard v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 2002-Ohio-2007, ¶ 8, we stated 
the general rule that “a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins 
to run at the time the wrongful act was committed.”  We have, however, recognized 
the discovery rule as an exception to this general rule.  Id.  Under the discovery 
rule, “a cause of action does not arise until the plaintiff discovers, or by the exercise 
of reasonable diligence should have discovered, that he or she was injured by the 
wrongful conduct of the defendant.”  Id., citing Collins v. Sotka, 81 Ohio St.3d 506, 
507 (1998), citing O’Stricker, 4 Ohio St.3d 84.  We reached that conclusion because 
“the application of the general rule ‘would lead to the unconscionable result that 
the injured party’s right to recovery can be barred by the statute of limitations 
before he is even aware of its existence.’”  O’Stricker at 87, quoting Wyler v. Tripi, 
25 Ohio St.2d 164, 168 (1971).  The discovery rule allows those who are injured 
adequate time to seek relief on the merits without undue prejudice to defendants.  
See Oliver v. Kaiser Community Health Found., 5 Ohio St.3d 111, 114 (1983).  But 
we have also stated that the discovery rule must be tailored to the particular context 
in which it is being applied.  Browning v. Burt, 66 Ohio St.3d 544, 559 (1993). 
{¶ 15} This court has applied the discovery rule to toll statutes of limitations 
in several different contexts.  In O’Stricker, we applied the discovery rule to claims 
of bodily injury related to asbestos exposure.  There, the plaintiff had been regularly 
exposed to asbestos at his job.  O’Stricker at 84.  Asbestos is a known carcinogenic 
January Term, 2024 
7 
 
agent, exposure to which may cause a latent disease with a gestation period of up 
to 30 years.  Id. at 84, 86, 89.  Based on the circumstances of that case, we concluded 
that the discovery rule applied to bodily-injury actions under R.C. 2305.10.  Id. at 
paragraph two of the syllabus (“When an injury does not manifest itself 
immediately, the cause of action does not arise until the plaintiff knows or, by the 
exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that he had been injured by 
the conduct of defendant . . . .”).  Put plainly, we found that application of the 
discovery rule was necessary to avoid the unconscionable result of barring the 
plaintiff from recovery before he even knew that he had been injured.  See id. at 89. 
{¶ 16} In Oliver, we applied the discovery rule to medical-malpractice 
claims, Oliver at syllabus, which at the time, were subject to a one-year time bar 
under the same statute at issue here, R.C. 2305.11(A), Oliver at 112.1  In Skidmore 
& Hall v. Rottman, 5 Ohio St.3d 210, 211 (1983), we applied the discovery rule to 
legal-malpractice claims that were otherwise subject to a one-year time bar under 
R.C. 2305.11(A).  We have also applied the discovery rule in cases involving 
wrongful-death claims, Collins at 511; hospital negligence in credentialing a 
physician, Browning at 558-559; certain sexual-abuse claims, Ault v. Jasko, 70 
Ohio St.3d 114, 117-118 (1994), superseded by statute as stated in Pratte v. 
Stewart, 2010-Ohio-1860; and employer intentional torts, Norgard at ¶ 18.  See 
Harris v. Liston, 86 Ohio St.3d 203, 206 (1999) (listing other situations in which 
we have applied the discovery rule).2 
 
1. Since Oliver was decided, the General Assembly adopted a four-year statute of repose for 
medical-malpractice claims.  R.C. 2305.113(C). 
 
2. The first dissenting opinion correctly notes that this court has not uniformly applied the discovery 
rule, dissenting opinion of Kennedy, C.J., ¶ 52; this is because the rule has been applied in narrow 
circumstances, as here, to prevent an unconscionable result.  In this case, the first dissenting opinion 
expresses empathy for Weidman, the person who was allegedly defamed.  See id. at ¶ 60.  The tenor 
of the first dissent, however, ultimately sympathizes with the alleged wrongdoer, Hildebrant, who 
is alleged to have intentionally created a fictitious email account, written the 2011 email and sent 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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{¶ 17} The discovery rule has not been applied to defamation claims.3  This 
dates to Pearl v. Koch, 5 Ohio Dec. 5, 6-8 (Super.Ct. 1894), when the Superior 
Court of Cincinnati ruled that the statute of limitations for slander must be strictly 
construed and that the discovery rule did not apply.  Even though the Superior Court 
of Cincinnati was a court of law, not a court of equity, id. at 8, and therefore lacked 
the authority to apply equitable principles like the discovery rule, various courts of 
appeals have adhered to the rule announced in Pearl and have strictly construed the 
statute of limitations for defamation, see, e.g., Kienow v. Cincinnati Children’s 
Hosp. Med. Ctr., 2015-Ohio-4396, ¶ 8 (1st Dist.); Harvey v. Sys. Effect, L.L.C., 
2020-Ohio-1642, ¶ 35 (2d Dist.); Spitzer v. Knapp, 2019-Ohio-2770, ¶ 27 (5th 
Dist.); Reed v. Jagnow, 2013-Ohio-2546, ¶ 25 (7th Dist.); Sabouri v. Ohio Dept. of 
Job & Family Servs., 145 Ohio App.3d 651, 654-655 (10th Dist. 2001); Altier v. 
Valentic, 2004-Ohio-5641, ¶ 38 (11th Dist.); Daubenmire v. Sommers, 2004-Ohio-
914, ¶ 82 (12th Dist.).  At least one appellate court has held to the contrary.  See 
Dipillo v. Cashen, 1983 Ohio App. LEXIS 11595, *3-4 (6th Dist. Aug. 12, 1983) 
(holding that under R.C. 2305.11(A), the statute of limitations for libel or slander 
commences “when the plaintiff discovers, or, in the exercise of reasonable care and 
diligence, should have discovered the resulting injury”).  Today, we conclude that 
the discovery rule applies to claims of libel based on reputational injuries when the 
 
that email to himself as if it was sent from the fictitious email account, published the 2011 email by 
forwarding it to Roberts, and republished the 2011 email several years later by showing it to 
LaBarbara and Warrick in order to impugn Weidman.  If, as the first dissenting opinion states, the 
discovery rule does not apply in the narrow circumstances here, this illicit practice may become a 
regular occurrence. 
 
3. Many statements in the record of this case refer to “defamation,” which comprises slander and 
libel.  Sweitzer v. Outlet Communications, Inc., 133 Ohio App.3d 102, 108 (10th Dist. 1999).  This 
opinion focuses on libel, which is a defamatory statement that is “written or printed and published,” 
Watson v. Trask, 6 Ohio 531, 532-533 (1834), because this case involves a published email, though, 
at times, we use the more general word “defamation.” 
January Term, 2024 
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publication of the libelous statements was secretive, concealed, or otherwise 
inherently unknowable to the plaintiff due to the nature of the publication.4 
B.  Weidman’s Defamation Claim 
{¶ 18} According to Weidman, the 2011 email containing allegedly 
defamatory statements that Hildebrant forwarded to Roberts was not otherwise 
shared or communicated to anyone else prior to 2020.  Based on the private nature 
of the 2011 email, Weidman alleges that he could not have known that he had 
suffered reputational harm until 2020 when, after a second publication of the email 
but in this instance to LaBarbara and Warrick, the defamatory statements were 
disclosed to Weidman.  We conclude that Weidman could not have known of the 
potential injury to his reputation until he became aware of the allegedly defamatory 
statements; we make no determination about when he became aware of the 
defamatory statements. 
{¶ 19} In O’Stricker, 4 Ohio St.3d at 89, we applied the discovery rule 
because asbestos exposure may cause a latent disease with a gestation period that 
is longer than the statutory period for bringing a claim.  Here, the delay in 
reputational harm was not due to an inherent latency but, rather, to intentional 
conduct by Hildebrant to use secret communications to allegedly defame Weidman.  
If the cause of action for a defamation claim accrued upon the publication of the 
defamatory statements, a tortfeasor could conceal that publication until the statute-
of-limitations period had expired.  This would mean that a tortfeasor could secretly 
publish defamatory statements without concern that the defamed person would be 
able to seek recourse.  “How can anyone charged with the responsibility of 
 
4. The first dissenting opinion accuses the majority of this court of rewriting laws and circumventing 
the General Assembly in this case.  Dissenting opinion of Kennedy, C.J., at ¶ 39-40.  We do no such 
thing.  Instead, as we have done in other contexts such as those discussed above, we are merely 
determining when a cause of action for a tort accrues under certain circumstances.  Specifically, we 
determine when a cause of action for libel accrues when the publication of the libelous statements 
was secretive, concealed, or otherwise inherently unknowable to the plaintiff due to the nature of 
the publication. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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administering justice allow such an absurdity?”  Amer v. Akron City Hosp., 47 Ohio 
St.2d 85, 93 (1976) (Celebrezze, J., dissenting) (urging application of the discovery 
rule to a husband’s claims of loss of consortium, loss of services, and medical 
expenses arising from an alleged medical malpractice on his wife). 
{¶ 20} Statutes of limitations are a shield, not a sword.  Here, according to 
Weidman, the delay in him discovering the alleged injury to his reputation was 
deliberately manufactured by Hildebrant.  Private email communications used to 
defame someone are inherently not discoverable by the defamed person until the 
communication is disclosed publicly.  Statutes of limitations are enacted to ensure 
fairness to defendants, encourage prompt prosecution of causes of action, suppress 
stale claims, and avoid difficulties of proof because of lost or eroded evidence.  
Browne v. Artex Oil Co., 2019-Ohio-4809, ¶ 32.  Applying the discovery rule to 
cases such as the one before us offends none of these goals.  Rather, it reflects the 
understanding that a tortfeasor should not be permitted to secretively injure a person 
and avoid liability for that injury by hiding behind a statute of limitations. 
{¶ 21} Today, we hold that the discovery rule applies to claims of libel 
when the publication of the libelous statements was secretive, concealed, or 
otherwise inherently unknowable to the plaintiff due to the nature of the 
publication.5  This accords with the rationale explained by Justice Cook in NCR 
 
5. The first dissenting opinion reads too much into nothing when it states that “the use of the 
discovery rule also directly contradicts the General Assembly’s clear intent to not extend the 
discovery rule to defamation cases.”  Dissenting opinion of Kennedy, C.J., at ¶ 54.  That the General 
Assembly is aware of the discovery rule and has not applied it to defamation claims is not proof of 
anything except that the General Assembly has not applied the discovery rule to defamation claims.  
One example should clarify this issue.  In Klein v. Leis, 2003-Ohio-4779, ¶ 9, this court addressed 
a statutory scheme that prohibited the carrying of concealed weapons.  We concluded that the 
statutory scheme “that has been part of our legal heritage since 1859, that has been amended by our 
General Assembly time and again without fundamental modification, that did not arouse the concern 
of two different constitutional conventions, and that has been held by this court to be constitutional” 
was constitutional.  Id. at ¶ 11.  According to the logic of the first dissent in this case, the fact that 
the General Assembly had not changed the statutory scheme that prohibited the carrying of 
concealed weapons would have been proof that it did not want to change the scheme.  But, of course, 
 
January Term, 2024 
11 
 
Corp. v. U.S. Mineral Prods. Co., 72 Ohio St.3d 269, 271 (1995), in which, citing 
O’Stricker, she stated that the “discovery rule is invoked in situations where the 
injury complained of may not manifest itself immediately and, therefore, fairness 
necessitates allowing the assertion of a claim when discovery of the injury occurs 
beyond the statute of limitations.”  See Collins, 81 Ohio St.3d at 510 (“the discovery 
rule was adopted to prevent inequities that occur when a statute of limitations is 
rigidly followed”). 
{¶ 22} When defamatory statements are published in the media or otherwise 
offered in the marketplace of ideas or when the defamed person gains knowledge 
of the defamatory statements within the statute-of-limitations period, the discovery 
rule is not applicable.  As the Latin maxim aptly states, vigilantibus non 
dormientibus aequitas subvenit—equity aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on 
their rights.  New York City v. Pine, 185 U.S. 93, 98 (1902); Ivani Contracting Corp. 
v. New York City, 103 F.3d 257, 259 (2d Cir. 1997).  We do little more today than 
recognize, again, though in a new context, that a plaintiff cannot be said to have 
slept on his rights when he was unaware that he was injured.  Oliver, 5 Ohio St.3d 
at 114 (“Use of the discovery rule eases the unconscionable result to innocent 
victims who by exercising even the highest degree of care could not have 
discovered the cited wrong.”). 
{¶ 23} Weidman alleges that he did not know and could not have discovered 
even with the exercise of due diligence the allegedly defamatory statements made 
by Hildebrant and that he was not injured until they were disclosed to him during 
 
that the General Assembly has not done something is proof of nothing; within a year of our decision 
in Klein, the General Assembly amended the statutory scheme to allow sheriffs to issue licenses to 
carry concealed handguns to certain persons.  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 12, 150 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3297.  
The general point is that we know what the General Assembly wants by its action, not by its inaction.  
Similarly, it would be folly for litigants to rely on the fact that we did not accept jurisdiction over 
an issue as proof that we will not accept jurisdiction over a similar, or even the same, issue in the 
future. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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the interview with SIU investigators.  Accordingly, he argues that he could not have 
brought an action against Hildebrant until November 2020.  He filed suit within 
one month of receiving a copy of the 2011 email. 
{¶ 24} Hildebrant argues that applying the discovery rule to defamation 
claims will unduly prejudice defendants by subjecting them to endless liability.  
This argument is unavailing because any unfairness to defendants is far outweighed 
by the undue prejudice faced by plaintiffs who are barred from recovery before they 
even know that they have been libeled.  A tortfeasor ought not be allowed to 
privately libel another person and benefit from the ability to keep that libelous 
statement a secret. 
{¶ 25} Moreover, evidence in a libel claim such as this one tends not to be 
stale, because modern technology and media allow evidence to be well preserved.  
The 2011 email provides the exact date and time that it was sent as well as the 
sender and all recipients.  “[A]s problems of proof and defense dwindle, so does 
the persuasiveness of the ‘stale claims’ reasoning.”  Melnyk v. Cleveland Clinic, 32 
Ohio St.2d 198, 200 (1972). 
C.  Weidman’s Derivative Claims 
{¶ 26} In addition to his defamation claim, Weidman also asserted claims 
of IIED and false-light invasion of privacy against Hildebrant.  To determine which 
statute of limitations applies to these claims, we must look to the substance of the 
claims. Hambleton v. R.G. Barry Corp., 12 Ohio St.3d 179, 183 (1984). 
{¶ 27} Both parties agree that because the substance of the IIED claim and 
the false-light-invasion-of-privacy claim are virtually identical to the defamation 
claim, the statute of limitations associated with the defamation claim controls.  The 
court of appeals agreed.  2022-Ohio-1708 at ¶ 37 (12th Dist.).  We also agree and 
hold that because the alleged conduct underlying the IIED claim and the false-light-
invasion-of-privacy claim is virtually identical to the alleged conduct underlying 
the defamation claim, the applicable statute of limitations for Weidman’s IIED 
January Term, 2024 
13 
 
claim and false-light-invasion-of-privacy claim is R.C. 2305.11(A).  See 
Stainbrook v. Ohio Secy. of State, 2017-Ohio-1526, ¶ 27 (10th Dist.) (holding that 
“a false light invasion of privacy claim[] involving allegations that would also 
support a defamation claim has the same statute of limitations applied to it as the 
defamation claim”); Boyd v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 2015-Ohio-1394, ¶ 51 (2d 
Dist.) (holding that “where defamation is the basis for an intentional infliction of 
emotional distress claim, the applicable one-year statute of limitations for 
defamation also applies to the emotional distress claim”).  To hold otherwise would 
allow a plaintiff to repackage a defamation claim as a separate cause of action to 
avail a longer statute of limitations.  For the reasons discussed above, the discovery 
rule applies to these derivative claims. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 28} We hold that the discovery rule applies to claims of libel based on 
reputational injuries when the publication of the libelous statements was secretive, 
concealed, or otherwise inherently unknowable to the plaintiff due to the nature of 
the publication.  Because Hildebrant’s publication of allegedly libelous statements 
in the 2011 email was allegedly secretive, concealed, or otherwise inherently 
unknowable to Weidman, the cause of action for defamation may not have accrued 
until Weidman discovered the 2011 email on November 18, 2020.  Additionally, 
because Weidman’s claims of IIED and false-light invasion of privacy are virtually 
identical to the defamation claim, the statute of limitations for those derivative 
claims is subject to the same discovery rule.  We affirm the judgment of the Twelfth 
District Court of Appeals and remand the cause to the Warren County Court of 
Common Pleas for further proceedings. 
Judgment affirmed 
and cause remanded. 
MAYLE, J., concurring. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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{¶ 29} I agree with the overall analysis and ultimate decision set forth in the 
majority opinion, but I wish to clarify some of my reasoning. 
{¶ 30} The majority states that “we know what the General Assembly wants 
by its action, not by its inaction.”  Majority opinion, ¶ 21, fn. 5.  This is not always 
true.  In fact, the General Assembly’s failure to specify when a libel claim 
“accrue[s]” under R.C. 2305.11(A)—i.e., its inaction—while simultaneously 
specifying an accrual date for the tort of unlawful abortion under division (B) of 
that same statute is relevant to my analysis here. 
{¶ 31} R.C. 2305.11(B) shows that the legislature knows how to specify 
when a claim “accrues.”  Under R.C. 2305.11(B), a civil action for unlawful 
abortion accrues on the date of the performance or inducement of the abortion or 
the attempt to perform or induce the abortion.  Other examples of statutes that 
specify when a cause of action accrues include R.C. 2305.07(C) (cause of action 
for a claim arising out of a consumer transaction “accrues thirty calendar days after 
the date of the last charge or payment by, or on behalf of, the consumer, whichever 
is later”); R.C. 2305.091(B) (cause of action by a board of education for asbestos 
abatement in a board-owned building accrues “upon the date that the board of 
education is informed” by a certain specified entity that there is asbestos that should 
be removed because it poses a health hazard to users of the building); R.C. 
2305.10(A) (cause of action “based on a product liability claim” and “for bodily 
injury or injuring personal property” accrues, subject to certain exceptions, “when 
the injury or loss to person or property occurs”); R.C. 2305.111(B)(1) and (2) 
(cause of action for a claim of assault or battery accrues on the date the alleged 
assault or battery occurs, unless the plaintiff did not know the identity of the 
tortfeasor); R.C. 2305.114 (civil action for partial-birth feticide or dismemberment 
feticide accrues on the date of “the commission of the offense”); and R.C. 2305.13 
(cause of action for a claim in respect to a shipment of property accrues “upon the 
delivery, or tender of delivery thereof, by the carrier”). 
January Term, 2024 
15 
 
{¶ 32} When the legislature has not made clear when a cause of action 
accrues, “the matter has been relegated to determination by the Ohio judiciary.”  
Investors REIT One v. Jacobs, 46 Ohio St.3d 176, 180 (1989).  This court has 
applied the discovery rule to determine the “accrual” of a claim when, like here, the 
legislature has left the matter open to the judiciary.  See majority opinion at ¶ 15-
16. 
{¶ 33} When doing so, this court has described the discovery rule in two 
ways—sometimes within the same opinion.  It has said that the discovery rule 
relates to when a cause of action “accrues.”  See, e.g., Flagstar Bank, F.S.B. v. 
Airline Union’s Mtge. Co., 2011-Ohio-1961, ¶ 13 (discussing discovery rule in 
terms of accrual); Oliver v. Kaiser Community Health Found., 5 Ohio St.3d 111 
(1983), syllabus (same); see also Collins v. Sotka, 81 Ohio St.3d 506, 507 (1998) 
(explaining that under the discovery rule, “a cause of action accrues when the 
plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered, 
that he or she was injured by the wrongful conduct of the defendant”); Investors 
REIT One at 180 (recognizing that in some circumstances, the “discovery rule is 
appropriate for calculating when a cause of action accrues for purposes of defining 
a limitations period”).  This court has also described the discovery rule as “tolling” 
the statute of limitations.  See, e.g., Melnyk v. Cleveland Clinic, 32 Ohio St.2d 198, 
201 (1972); Collins at paragraph one of the syllabus (holding that the discovery rule 
applies to toll the two-year statute of limitations for a wrongful-death claim); 
Investors REIT One at 180 (explaining that “[d]epending on the claim and the 
applicable statute, the date of discovery may toll the running of the governing 
statute of limitations”); see also Oliver at 118-119 (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(characterizing the discovery rule as a tolling event).  The two concepts, however, 
are distinct.  “Toll” means “to stop the running of; to abate,” Black’s Law 
Dictionary (11th Ed. 2019), while “accrue” means “[t]o come into existence as an 
enforceable claim or right,” id. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
16 
{¶ 34} In my view, the discovery rule is most accurately described as “a 
rule of accrual.”  Liddell v. SCA Servs. of Ohio, Inc., 70 Ohio St.3d 6, 13 (1994) 
(referring to the discovery rule as the “O’Stricker rule of accrual”), citing 
O’Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp., 4 Ohio St.3d 84 (1983).  That is, “a cause of action 
does not arise until the plaintiff discovers, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence 
should have discovered, that he or she was injured by the wrongful conduct of the 
defendant.”  (Emphasis added.)  Norgard v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 2002-Ohio-2007, 
¶ 8.  When the discovery rule applies, there is nothing to “toll” because the action 
has not yet “accrued.” 
{¶ 35} When the discovery rule is viewed through an “accrual” lens, those 
instances in which the legislature has codified the discovery rule, see dissenting 
opinion of Kennedy, C.J., ¶ 54, are additional examples of the General Assembly’s 
exercising its prerogative to specify an accrual date.  If the legislature does not want 
the discovery rule to apply to a claim, it specifies an accrual date in a manner that 
precludes the discovery rule’s application as discussed above or it otherwise signals 
its intent with respect to a particular statute.  For example, R.C. 1302.98(B) 
provides that a cause of action for the breach of a contract for sale “accrues when 
the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party’s lack of knowledge of the 
breach,” which clearly indicates the legislature’s intent that the discovery rule not 
be applied to that type of claim. 
{¶ 36} There are other instances when the legislature’s intent to not extend 
the discovery rule is not express but may be inferred.  For example, in Investors 
REIT One, this court declined to extend the discovery rule to claims of accountant 
negligence, which are governed by the four-year statute of limitations for general 
negligence under R.C. 2305.09(D), because R.C. 2305.09 contains an express 
discovery rule for other actions—i.e., actions for trespassing underground or injury 
to mines, for the wrongful taking of personal property, and for fraud—but not for 
“injury to the rights of the plaintiff not arising on contract” under division (D) of 
January Term, 2024 
17 
 
R.C. 2305.09, which was the division at issue in that case.  This court reasoned that 
“[t]he legislature’s express inclusion of a discovery rule for certain torts arising 
under R.C. 2305.09, including fraud and conversion, implies the exclusion of other 
torts arising under [that same] statute, including negligence.”  Investors REIT One, 
46 Ohio St.3d at 181. 
{¶ 37} Here, R.C. 2305.11 is silent on the discovery rule.  In addition, it 
contains a specific date of accrual for some claims—e.g., unlawful abortion under 
R.C. 2305.11(B)—but not for the claims specified under R.C. 2305.11(A), which 
includes libel.  For these reasons, I agree with the majority opinion that the General 
Assembly has left it to the judiciary to determine whether the discovery rule should 
apply to the accrual of libel claims. 
__________________ 
KENNEDY, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 38} For more than 170 years, the statute of limitations for a defamation 
claim in Ohio—slander or libel—has been one year from the date that the cause of 
action accrued and the cause of action accrued on the date of publication. 
{¶ 39} Today, the majority engages in judicial activism and rewrites Ohio 
law.  The majority “ignore[s] governing texts and precedents” and allows its 
“personal views about public policy . . . to guide [its] decisions.”  Black’s Law 
Dictionary (12th Ed. 2024) (defining “judicial activism”).  The majority takes the 
judicially created “discovery rule,” which has been narrowly applied in bodily-
injury, medical-malpractice, and actual-economic-loss cases, and expands its 
application to defamation cases.  By holding that the date of publication does not 
control when a defamation cause of action accrues, the majority’s decision 
“thrust[s] the judiciary into the role of law maker,” Stefanie A. Lindquist, Judicial 
Activism in State Supreme Courts: Institutional Design and Judicial Behavior, 28 
Stan.L. & Pol’y Rev. 61, 67 (2017). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
18 
{¶ 40} Today’s decision circumvents the public policy established by the 
General Assembly and is contrary to precedent from Ohio’s appellate districts.  
Because this court “is not supposed to invent law but to apply it,” Robert H. Bork, 
The Judge’s Role in Law and Culture, 1 Ave Maria L.Rev. 19, 20 (2003), I dissent 
from the majority’s judgment.  The statute of limitations for a defamation claim 
begins to run when the allegedly defamatory words are first spoken or published, 
regardless of the aggrieved party’s knowledge.  Therefore, I would reverse the 
judgment of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals. 
I.  Defamation 
{¶ 41} “Defamation is defined as a false publication which injures a 
person’s reputation.”  Dale v. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Assn., 57 Ohio St.3d 112, 117 
(1991).  Likewise, a defamatory matter is that which is “injurious to the reputation 
of a private individual.”  Gert v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974).  “To 
establish a claim for defamation, [a] plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that a false publication caused injury to his reputation, or exposed him to 
public hatred, contempt, ridicule, shame, or disgrace, or affected him adversely in 
his trade or business.”  Miller v. Ohio Rehab. Serv. Comm., 86 Ohio Misc.2d 97, 
101 (Ct. of Cl. 1997), citing Ashcroft v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 68 Ohio App.3d 359, 
365 (8th Dist. 1990). 
{¶ 42} There are two types of defamation—slander and libel.  35 Ohio 
Jur.3d, Defamation and Privacy, § 1, at 443 (2019).  Slander is the spoken form of 
defamation.  Id.  Libel is the written form of defamation.  Id.  The allegedly 
defamatory statements in this case were written.  A plaintiff must prove five 
elements to succeed on a libel claim: “‘(1) a false and defamatory statement, (2) 
about plaintiff, (3) published without privilege to a third party, (4) with fault of at 
least negligence on the part of the defendant, and (5) that was either defamatory per 
se or caused special harm to the plaintiff.’”  Lewis v. Delaware Cty. JVSD, 2005-
January Term, 2024 
19 
 
Ohio-2550, ¶ 33 (5th Dist.), quoting Gosden v. Louis, 116 Ohio App.3d 195, 206 
(9th Dist. 1996). 
II.  Statute of Limitations 
{¶ 43} A statute of limitations is a “law that bars claims after a specified 
period.”  Black’s.  The statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action 
accrues.  See Norgard v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 2002-Ohio-2007, ¶ 8.  “Generally, a 
cause of action accrues . . . at the time the wrongful act was committed.”  Id.  
Exceptions to a statute of limitation must be set forth by the General Assembly.  
See 51 Am.Jur.2d, Limitation of Actions, § 151, at 600 (2021).  “Courts will not, 
as a general rule, read into statutes of limitations exceptions that are not written into 
the statute, however reasonable such exceptions may seem and even though such 
exceptions would be equitable.”  Id., citing Foxworth ex rel. Estate of Durden v. 
Kia Motors Corp., 377 F.Supp.2d 1196 (N.D.Fla. 2005), aff’d, 148 Fed.Appx. 920 
(11th Cir. 2005); Muskingum Watershed Conservancy Dist. v. Steinmetz, 57 Ohio 
App. 502 (5th Dist. 1937); Bain v. Smith, 97 S.W.2d 353 (Tex.Civ.App. 1936). 
{¶ 44} “Statutes of limitation are designed to assure an end to litigation and 
to establish a state of stability and repose.”  Wyler v. Tripi, 25 Ohio St.2d 164, 171 
(1971), overruled on other grounds by Oliver v. Kaiser Community Health Found., 
5 Ohio St.3d 111 (1983).  “It must be assumed that when the General Assembly 
enacts a statute of limitations it is aware that, although a stale claim may be 
meritorious, the statute will operate without reference to merit and will cut off the 
claim.”  Id.  “The rationale underlying statutes of limitations is fourfold: to ensure 
fairness to defendant; to encourage prompt prosecution of causes of action; to 
suppress stale and fraudulent claims; and to avoid the inconvenience engendered 
by delay, specifically the difficulties of proof present in older cases.”  O’Stricker v. 
Jim Walter Corp., 4 Ohio St.3d 84, 88 (1983), citing Harig v. Johns-Manville 
Prods. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 75 (1978). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
20 
A.  Statute of Limitations on Defamation Claims 
{¶ 45} On March 11, 1853, the General Assembly passed an act “[t]o 
establish a Code of Civil Procedure” to be known as the “Code of Civil Procedure 
of the State of Ohio.”  51 Ohio Laws 57.  That code provided that civil actions for 
libel and slander must be brought within one year after the cause of action accrued.  
Id. At 59. 
{¶ 46} A cause of action for defamation accrues at the time the defamatory 
words are communicated because the damage to reputation occurs immediately 
upon communication.  See Kienow v. Cincinnati Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., 2015-
Ohio-4396, ¶ 12 (1st Dist.).  “For defamation as a result of slander, the statute of 
limitations begins to run from the time the words were spoken, whether the plaintiff 
had knowledge of the fact or not.”  Miller, 86 Ohio Misc.2d at 100; see also Cramer 
v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 2009-Ohio-3338, ¶ 69 (5th Dist.).  “For defamation as a 
result of libel, a cause of action accrues upon the first publication of the defamatory 
matter.”  Miller at 100. 
{¶ 47} The second dissenting opinion rejects the first-publication rule in 
favor of the single-publication rule.  Specifically, the second dissent supports the 
principle set forth in the Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, that “‘each of several 
communications to a third person by the same defamer is a separate publication’” 
and gives rise to a new cause of action.  Dissenting opinion of Wilkin, J., ¶ 99, 
fn. 11, quoting 3 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, § 577A(1), at 208 (1977).  
“Although the Restatements are frequently cited in cases and commentary, a 
Restatement provision is not binding on a court unless it has been officially adopted 
as the law by that jurisdiction’s highest court.”  Black’s (defining “Restatement”). 
{¶ 48} In Ohio, the single-publication rule has never been formally adopted 
by this court.  And several of Ohio’s appellate districts have wholly rejected the 
rule.  See, e.g., Snell v. Drew, 1985 WL 8216, *2 (6th Dist. Nov. 1, 1985) (“This 
court . . . expressly rejects the single publication rule, for the simple reason that it 
January Term, 2024 
21 
 
does not state Ohio law.”); Fleming v. Ohio Atty. Gen., 2002-Ohio-7352, ¶ 14 (10th 
Dist.), quoting Anthony v. Wonnell, 1992 WL 230583 (10th Dist. Apr. 7, 1992) 
(“We cannot embrace plaintiff’s continuing defamation theory . . . as this court has 
previously expressly rejected the single publication rule” as being “‘in derogation 
of the prevailing first publication rule.’”); T.S. v. Plain Dealer, 2011-Ohio-2935, 
¶ 7, quoting Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, 64 Ohio Misc. 59, 60 (C.P. 1978) (“It 
is well settled that ‘[i]n terms of publications . . . the right to file suit on a cause of 
action for libel accrues upon the first publication of the matter complained of.’”  
[Bracketed text and ellipsis in original.]).  Therefore, adoption of the single-
publication rule here would change established Ohio law.  Not only does the single-
publication rule conflict with Ohio law, but it also runs contrary to the purpose of 
the statute of limitations.  Specifically, the single-publication rule does not 
“establish a state of stability and repose,” Wyler, 25 Ohio St.2d at 171, because the 
cause of action for libel could potentially never end and the statute of limitations 
for libel would run every time the defamatory matter was republished. 
B.  Judicially Created Discovery Rule Circumvents the Statute of Limitations 
{¶ 49} The discovery rule is a judicially created doctrine that circumvents 
legislatively enacted statutes of limitations.  Under the discovery rule, a cause of 
action does not accrue until the injured party learns or should have learned, through 
the exercise of reasonable diligence, that he or she has been injured by the conduct 
of the defendant.  See Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 2006-Ohio-2625, ¶ 21; see 
also O’Stricker, 4 Ohio St.3d at 90; Flagstar Bank, F.S.B. v. Airline Union’s Mtge. 
Co., 2011-Ohio-1961, ¶ 14.  The discovery rule is an example of judicial activism 
because it “enhance[s] the power of the judiciary . . . [and] engage[s] the judiciary 
in certain lawmaking activities more properly exercised by the legislature and 
executive.”  Lindquist, 28 Stan.L. & Pol’y Rev. at 67. 
{¶ 50} The discovery rule was first applied in Ohio in Melnyk v. Cleveland 
Clinic, 32 Ohio St.2d 198 (1972).  Melnyk involved a medical-malpractice claim 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
22 
that was based on metallic forceps and a nonabsorbent sponge being left inside a 
patient’s body during surgery.  Id. at 201.  This court acknowledged that there is “a 
firm Ohio legislative history of opposition to the adoption of a ‘discovery rule.’”  
Id. at 199.  Nonetheless, this court determined that implementation of the discovery 
rule did not “interfere in the affairs” of the General Assembly.  Id. at 201. 
{¶ 51} Since Melnyk, this court has consistently applied the discovery rule 
to medical-malpractice and bodily-injury cases.  See, e.g., Oliver, 5 Ohio St.3d at 
112 (medical malpractice); O’Stricker at 90 (bodily injury caused by exposure to 
asbestos); Burgess v. Eli Lilly & Co., 66 Ohio St.3d 59, 64 (1993) (bodily injury 
caused by exposure to diethylstilbestrol).  This court has also extended application 
of the discovery rule to legal-malpractice cases, Skidmore & Hall v. Rottman, 5 
Ohio St.3d 210, 211 (1983), and to bodily-injury actions resulting from a hospital’s 
negligence in credentialing a physician, Browning v. Burt, 66 Ohio St.3d 544, 559 
(1993). 
{¶ 52} As demonstrated in the caselaw, “[t]he discovery rule was developed 
in certain bodily-injury, medical-malpractice, and actual economic loss cases to 
ease ‘the unconscionable result to innocent victims who by exercising even the 
highest degree of care could not have discovered the cited wrong.’”  (Emphasis in 
original.)  Cramer, 2009-Ohio-3338, at ¶ 70, fn. 2 (5th Dist.), quoting Oliver at 114.  
Consequently, this court has extended the discovery rule only in narrow 
circumstances when application of the general statute-of-limitations rule—that a 
cause of action accrues at the time the wrongful act was committed—would create 
an unconscionable result to the injured party’s recovery.  See O’Stricker, 4 Ohio 
St.3d at 87; see also Wyler, 25 Ohio St.2d at 168; LGR Realty, Inc. v. Frank & 
London Ins. Agency, 2018-Ohio-334, ¶ 26.  Conversely, in Flagstar, this court held 
that the discovery rule did not apply to any professional-negligence claims.  
Flagstar, 2011-Ohio-1961, at ¶ 27 (discovery rule not applicable to any claims of 
professional negligence, including alleged negligence by an appraiser); see 
January Term, 2024 
23 
 
Investors REIT One v. Jacobs, 46 Ohio St.3d 176, 182 (1989) (discovery rule not 
applicable to claims of professional negligence by accountants); see also LGR 
Realty, Inc. at ¶ 36-39 (DeWine, J., concurring) (discussing Investors REIT One 
and Flagstar and professional-negligence claims accruing at the time of the 
wrongful act). 
III.  Discovery Rule Does Not Circumvent the Statute of Limitations for 
Defamation 
{¶ 53} Extending the discovery rule to defamation claims contravenes the 
rule’s intended narrow application and applies it to cases when the only injury is 
reputational harm.  Unlike injuries in medical-malpractice cases, which may not 
present themselves until years after the negligent act, injuries in defamation cases 
occur as soon as the defamatory words are spoken or published.  Ohio’s appellate 
districts have universally held that a defamation cause of action accrues at 
publication.  See, e.g., Kienow, 2015-Ohio-4396, at ¶ 7-8 (1st Dist.) (holding that 
defamation claim began to accrue when the statements were made); Harvey v. Sys. 
Effect, L.L.C., 2020-Ohio-1642, ¶ 35 (2d Dist.) (defamation cause of action accrues 
on date of publication of the defamatory matter); Talwar v. Kattan, 1998 WL 
151072, *4 (3d Dist. Mar. 31, 1998) (libel cause of action accrues at publication); 
Glass v. Glass, 2003-Ohio-4477, ¶ 18 (4th Dist.) (defamation cause of action 
accrues when words are written or spoken, not when plaintiff discovers the words); 
Lewis, 2005-Ohio-2550, at ¶ 36 (5th Dist.) (holding that defamation cause of action 
accrues upon publication of the defamatory matter); Tajblik v. Dennis, 2012-Ohio-
6251, ¶ 9 (6th Dist.) (libel cause of action began to accrue when the document was 
published “in the holding cell [in prison]”); Reed v. Jagnow, 2013-Ohio-2546, ¶ 25 
(7th Dist.) (discovery rule does not apply to defamation claims and the cause of 
action accrues when defamatory words are published); Rowan v. Schaffer, 2019-
Ohio-3038, ¶ 3 (8th Dist.) (defamation cause of action accrues at the time of 
publication); Smith Elec. v. Rehs, 1998 WL 103334, *2 (9th Dist. Feb. 18, 1998) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
24 
(“the actual tort occurs when the party falsely and maliciously defames the property 
of another”); Sabouri v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 145 Ohio App.3d 651, 
654-655 (10th Dist. 2001) (defamation cause of action began to accrue when the 
defamatory words were published, not when injured party learned of the words); 
Altier v. Valentic, 2004-Ohio-5641, ¶ 38 (11th Dist.) (cause of action for 
defamation accrues when the words are published or spoken); Daubenmire v. 
Sommers, 2004-Ohio-914, ¶ 82 (12th Dist.) (libel cause of action accrues “when 
the written words are first published”).  By changing when a defamation cause of 
action accrues, the majority opinion disrupts established law in every appellate 
district. 
{¶ 54} The majority’s decision to broaden the use of the discovery rule also 
directly contradicts the General Assembly’s clear intent to not extend the discovery 
rule to defamation cases. The General Assembly is aware of the discovery rule and 
has extended its application, but only to cases that involve bodily injury, the 
potential for bodily injury, medical malpractice, or actual economic loss.  For 
example, in 1992, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 2305.091, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 
334, 144 Ohio Laws, Part III, 4847, 4847-4848, which includes a discovery-rule 
provision that tolls the statute of limitations for asbestos-abatement actions brought 
by school boards, R.C. 2305.091(B).  Similarly, the General Assembly amended 
R.C. 2305.10 in 2005, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 80, 150 Ohio Laws, Part V, 7915, 7931-
7933, and extended the discovery rule to actions claiming toxic-chemical bodily 
injury, R.C. 2305.10(B)(1) through (5).  As recently as 2022, the General Assembly 
enacted R.C. 2305.118, 2022 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 288, which includes a discovery-
rule provision for deoxyribonucleic bodily-injury actions, R.C. 2305.118(C)(1). 
{¶ 55} “[W]e presume that the General Assembly knows of the state of the 
common law when it enacts legislation.”  Ames v. Rootstown Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 
2022-Ohio-4605, ¶ 20.  When the General Assembly has amended R.C. 2305.11, it 
has not applied the discovery rule to R.C. 2305.11(A)—the statute of limitations 
January Term, 2024 
25 
 
for defamation.  Rather, when the General Assembly has wanted to extend the 
discovery rule to claims under R.C. 2305.11, it has made statutory revisions to 
effect that extension. 
{¶ 56} For example, in 2002, the General Assembly amended R.C. 2305.11 
and removed the statute-of-limitations provision for medical, dental, optometric, 
and chiropractic claims.  Am.Sub.S.B. No. 281, 149 Ohio Laws 3791, 3796-3797.  
Under the same legislative act, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 2305.113, 
which outlined the statute of limitations for bringing medical, dental, optometric, 
or chiropractic claims.  Id. at 3799-3804.  The newly created R.C. 2305.113 
included a discovery-rule provision for those claims involving a foreign object 
being left in the claimant’s body.  Id. at 3800-3801.  When the General Assembly 
passed Am.Sub.S.B. No. 281, its decision to not include a discovery-rule provision 
for claims of libel or slander was deliberate, not inadvertent.  The legislature’s 
decision to not extend the discovery rule to defamation claims was reaffirmed as 
recently as 2021, when the General Assembly last amended R.C. 2305.11 without 
adding any discovery-rule provision.  See 2021 S.B. No. 13. 
{¶ 57} The General Assembly’s decision to not adopt a discovery rule for 
defamation claims is strong support for the assertion that “it was not the 
legislature’s intent to apply the discovery rule to such claims.”  Investors REIT One, 
46 Ohio St.3d at 181; see id. (holding that “failure to include general negligence 
claims under the discovery rule set out in R.C. 2305.09” showed the General 
Assembly’s intent to not extend the rule to those claims); Pratte v. Stewart, 2010-
Ohio-1860, ¶ 23 (discussing the concurring opinion in Ault and noting that 
concurring justice’s view that “the General Assembly is the most appropriate body 
to establish a discovery rule for cases of childhood sexual abuse” [emphasis in 
original]), citing Ault v. Jasko, 70 Ohio St.3d 114, 119 (1994) (Resnick, J., 
concurring). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
26 
{¶ 58} If the discovery rule is to apply to defamation claims, “‘it is the 
General Assembly that should [make that declaration] rather than this court.’”  
Pratte at ¶ 20, quoting Ault at 120 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).  I disagree with the 
majority’s decision to extend application of the discovery rule to defamation claims 
because to “do so would place us in the obvious and untenable position of having 
not only legislated, but of having done so directly in the face of a clear and opposite 
legislative intent,” Wyler, 25 Ohio St.2d at 171.  “‘[T]he only sure safeguard against 
crossing the line between adjudication and legislation is an alert recognition of the 
necessity not to cross it and instinctive, as well as trained, reluctance to do so.’”  
(Bracket texted in original.)  State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Pike Cty. 
Coroner’s Office, 2017-Ohio-8988, ¶ 117 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), quoting 
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum.L.Rev. 527, 
535 (1947). 
{¶ 59} In the case between appellee, Thomas Weidman, and appellant, 
Christopher Hildebrant, an action for libel accrued when Hildebrant sent the fake, 
allegedly defamatory email about Weidman’s alleged bribery demands to Stanford 
Roberts on December 20, 2011.  The discovery rule does not apply here, because 
the libel injury manifested itself immediately when the email was delivered to 
Roberts.  Although Weidman was unaware of the email until several years later, his 
reputation was injured the moment Roberts read the email. 
{¶ 60} While I empathize with Weidman, the General Assembly has 
spoken.  Because a cause of action for defamation accrues on the date of publication 
of the defamatory matter, the discovery rule does not apply to defamation claims, 
and Weidman was required to bring his defamation claim within one year after 
Hildebrant sent the fake email to Roberts.  See R.C. 2305.11(A).  Because Weidman 
did not bring his defamation claim within one year of publication of the fake email, 
his suit is barred by the statute of limitations set forth in R.C. 2305.11(A). 
IV.  Conclusion 
January Term, 2024 
27 
 
{¶ 61} The General Assembly is the final arbiter of public policy in Ohio.  
See Sutton v. Tomco Machining, Inc., 2011-Ohio-2723, ¶ 20; State v. Smorgala, 50 
Ohio St.3d 222, 223 (1990), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in 
State v. Mayl, 2005-Ohio-4629, ¶ 54.  The legislature decided in 1853 that 
defamation claims must be brought within one year from the date that the action 
accrued, and that action accrues on the date of publication, even when the injured 
party is unaware of the claim.  The legislature knows how to include a discovery 
rule in statutes and has decided against its application in defamation claims. 
{¶ 62} Ohio’s appellate districts have consistently held that a defamation 
cause of action accrues at the time the defamatory words are spoken or published.  
The majority’s decision today effectively overrules that precedent by changing 
when a defamation cause of action accrues.  Relying on the judicially created 
discovery rule, the majority circumvents the statute of limitations for defamation 
and establishes its own accrual date for seeking relief for reputational injuries 
caused by the publication of defamatory words.  Because the discovery rule is 
intended for narrow application in bodily-injury, medical malpractice, or actual-
economic-loss cases, and because the General Assembly has not applied the 
discovery rule to defamation claims, I dissent from the majority’s judgment and 
would reverse the judgment of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals. 
__________________ 
WILKIN, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 63} I respectfully dissent from the majority’s judgment affirming the 
Twelfth District Court of Appeals’ judgment, which held that the discovery rule 
applies to libel actions when the publication of the defamatory statements was 
secretive, concealed, or otherwise inherently unknowable.  However, for reasons 
that differ from the majority, I agree that this case should be remanded to the trial 
court. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
28 
{¶ 64} I dissent for the following reasons.  First, the plain text of R.C. 
2305.11(A) does not include a discovery rule for libel actions when the publication 
of the defamatory statements was secretive, concealed, or otherwise inherently 
unknowable.  Therefore, this court should not read the discovery rule into the 
statute. 
{¶ 65} Moreover, the majority’s concern that “a tortfeasor could secretly 
publish defamatory statements,” hide behind the one-year statute of limitations, go 
“public” with the defamatory statement after that one-year period has expired, and 
be shielded from liability, majority opinion, ¶ 19, is unfounded.  If a tortfeasor kept 
a defamatory email a “secret” for more than one year and then released it 
“publicly,” releasing that statement “publicly” (i.e., publishing it) creates a new 
cause of action with a new limitations period.  Thus, the statute of limitations would 
not shield the tortfeasor from liability. 
{¶ 66} The majority opinion also is contrary to well-established law that 
statutes of limitations are the legislature’s prerogative and represent policy 
decisions that are not within the judiciary’s authority.  The majority supplants the 
legislature’s intent and overrides the legislature’s policy-making authority. 
{¶ 67} Furthermore, even if this court were authorized to supplant the 
legislature’s intent, I agree with the first dissenting opinion that our precedent 
establishes that the discovery rule does not apply to defamation actions involving 
secretive, concealed, or otherwise inherently unknowable publications.  However, 
as discussed below, I do not agree with the first dissent’s statement that libel causes 
of action accrue upon “‘first publication.’”  Dissenting opinion of Kennedy, C.J., 
¶ 46, quoting Miller v. Ohio Rehab. Serv. Comm., 86 Ohio Misc.2d 97, 100 (Ct. of 
Cl. 1997).   
I.  The Plain Text of R.C. 2305.11(A) Does Not Include a Discovery Rule 
{¶ 68} A thorough, objective, and plain-text review of R.C. 2305.11(A) 
reveals that the word “accrued” does not support the majority’s holding that a libel 
January Term, 2024 
29 
 
action involving a secretive, concealed, or otherwise inherently unknowable 
publication accrues when the defamed person discovers, or by the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have discovered, the existence of the publication.6  
Instead, in accordance with this court’s well-established caselaw that requires us to 
read statutes according to their plain meaning, the word “accrued,” read in context, 
means that a libel action involving a secretive, concealed, or otherwise inherently 
unknowable publication accrues (i.e., comes into existence) upon publication of the 
defamatory statement; it does not accrue upon the plaintiff’s discovery of the 
publication or upon the plaintiff’s discovery that the defendant’s publication caused 
an injury. 
{¶ 69} R.C. 2305.11(A) states that “[a]n action for libel, slander, malicious 
prosecution, or false imprisonment . . . shall be commenced within one year after 
the cause of action accrued.” 
{¶ 70} The statute does not define the meaning of the word “accrued.”  
“Absent legislative definition, it is left to the judiciary to determine when a cause” 
of action accrues.  O’Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp., 4 Ohio St.3d 84 (1983), 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  However, this statement from O’Stricker does not 
mean that courts may select an accrual date that is divorced from the language used 
in the applicable statute of limitations and decide when a cause of action accrues in 
a vacuum.  See Everhart v. Coshocton Cty. Mem. Hosp., 2023-Ohio-4670, ¶ 19 
(“we do not read statutes in a vacuum”); State ex rel. Figueroa v. Ohio Dept. of 
Commerce, Div. of Real Estate & Professional Licensing, 2020-Ohio-4275, ¶ 8, 
 
6. Although the majority holds that the discovery rule applies to libel actions when the publication 
of the libelous statements was secretive, concealed, or otherwise inherently unknowable, its holding 
does not clearly define the event that triggers the running of the statute of limitations.  At one point, 
the majority states, “We conclude that [appellee, Thomas Weidman,] could not have known of the 
potential injury to his reputation until he became aware of the allegedly defamatory statements.”  
Majority opinion at ¶ 18.  At another point, the majority refers to the triggering event as the point 
when Weidman discovered “the alleged injury to his reputation.”  Id. at ¶ 20.  To avoid these 
problems (and more), this court should follow the common-law accrual rule, as explained below. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
30 
quoting D.A.B.E., Inc. v. Toledo-Lucas Cty. Bd. of Health, 2002-Ohio-4172, ¶ 19 
(“a court must look ‘beyond single phrases’ and ‘consider, in proper context, all 
words used by the General Assembly in drafting [the relevant statute] with a view 
to its place in the overall statutory scheme’” [bracketed text in original]); see also 
Reading Co. v. Koons, 271 U.S. 58, 61-62 (1926) (recognizing that the word 
“accrued” must be read “in the light of the general purposes of the statute and of its 
other provisions, and with due regard to those practical ends which are to be served 
by any limitation of the time within which an action must be brought”).  Instead, as 
with all cases involving the meaning of statutory language, we begin by examining 
the statutory text.  E.g., State ex rel. DeMora v. LaRose, 2022-Ohio-2173, ¶ 32. 
{¶ 71} “When the statutory language is unambiguous, we apply it as written 
without resorting to rules of statutory interpretation or considerations of public 
policy.”  Gabbard v. Madison Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2021-Ohio-2067, 
¶ 13.  “In other words, our review ‘starts and stops’ with the unambiguous statutory 
language.”  Id., quoting Johnson v. Montgomery, 2017-Ohio-7445, ¶ 15.  Statutory 
language is unambiguous when it “‘express[es] plainly, clearly and distinctly, the 
sense of the law-making body.’”  State ex rel. Cordray v. Midway Motor Sales, 
Inc., 2009-Ohio-2610, ¶ 15, quoting Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621 (1902), 
paragraph two of the syllabus.  This court “may look beyond the plain statutory 
language only when a definitive meaning remains elusive despite a thorough, 
objective examination of the language.”  (Emphasis added.)  New Riegel Local 
School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Buehrer Group Architecture & Eng., Inc., 2019-Ohio-
2851, ¶ 24, citing Ohio Neighborhood Fin., Inc. v. Scott, 2014-Ohio-2440, ¶ 23, 
citing State v. Porterfield, 2005-Ohio-3095, ¶ 11; accord Everhart at ¶ 16, quoting 
Sears v. Weimer, 143 Ohio St. 312, 316 (1944), quoting 37 Ohio Jur., Statutes, 
§ 278, at 514-517 (1934) (“‘“Where the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for 
resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation.  To interpret what is already plain 
January Term, 2024 
31 
 
is not interpretation, but legislation, which is not the function of the courts, but of 
the general assembly.  . . .  An unambiguous statute is to be applied, not 
interpreted.”’  [Ellipsis added in Sears.]”). 
{¶ 72} Thus, to determine whether the discovery rule applies to a libel 
action involving a secretive, concealed, or otherwise inherently unknowable 
publication, we first consider the “‘plain and ordinary meaning’” of the word 
“accrued.”7  Rancho Cincinnati Rivers, L.L.C. v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2021-
Ohio-2798, ¶ 21, quoting Lingle v. State, 2020-Ohio-6788, ¶ 15; DeLong v. 
Campbell, 157 Ohio St. 22, 23 (1952) (when a statute of limitations “begins to run 
depends upon the meaning of the word, ‘accrued’”), overruled on other grounds by 
Oliver v. Kaiser Community Health Found., 5 Ohio St.3d 111 (1983); see Stewart 
v. Vivian, 2017-Ohio-7526, ¶ 25 (“Terms that are undefined in a statute are 
accorded their common, everyday meaning.”), citing R.C. 1.42.  “To discern the 
plain meaning of statutory text, we consult not only lexical sources such as 
dictionaries, but also the meaning that the words have acquired when they are used 
in case law.”  Rancho Cincinnati Rivers at ¶ 21; see State v. Wells, 91 Ohio St.3d 
32, 34 (2001) (“To determine the common, everyday meaning of a word, we have 
consistently used dictionary definitions.”). 
{¶ 73} Furthermore, when a legislative body “‘“‘uses terms that have 
accumulated settled meaning under . . . the common law, a court must infer, unless 
the statute otherwise dictates, that [the legislative body] means to incorporate the 
established meaning of these terms.’”’”  (Ellipsis added in Community for Creative 
Non-Violence.)  Rancho Cincinnati Rivers at ¶ 21, quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. 
 
7. The majority states that it is applying “the plain and ordinary meaning of” the word “accrued,” 
majority opinion at ¶ 13, but it completely omits any plain-and-ordinary-meaning analysis of the 
word.  Instead, it skips directly to the discovery rule without explaining how the word “accrued” 
plainly leads to the discovery rule.  The majority thus “sidesteps the logically antecedent question 
whether the [statute] has room for such a rule,” Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v. Nealy, 601 U.S. __, 
__, 144 S.Ct. 1135, 1140 (2024) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  To avoid confusion, this court should be 
consistent and follow the standard statutory analysis that it has used in previous cases. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
32 
Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992), quoting Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989), quoting NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 
U.S. 322, 329 (1981); accord Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 362 (2012), quoting 
Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 529 (1984) (“‘The starting point in our own analysis 
is the common law.’”); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 330 (1983), quoting 
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 258 (1981) (courts presume that the 
legislative body was “‘familiar with common-law principles . . . and that [it] likely 
intended these common-law principles to obtain, absent specific provisions to the 
contrary’”); Willoughby Hills Dev. & Distrib., Inc. v. Testa, 2018-Ohio-4488, ¶ 25, 
quoting Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 320 
(2012) (“‘A statute that uses a common-law term, without defining it, adopts its 
common-law meaning.’”  [Boldface omitted by Willoughby Hills.]); see 
Willoughby Hills at ¶ 27 (“The relevant statutes did not provide an answer to the 
question, so we looked to common-law understandings embodied in the case law 
and the Restatement.”).  Indeed, courts generally presume that the legislature enacts 
laws “against the backdrop of the common law.”  Comcast Corp. v. Natl. Assn. of 
African Am.-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327, 335 (2020), citing Univ. of Texas 
Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 347 (2013). 
{¶ 74} Moreover, “[a] basic principle of statutory construction is that words 
in a statute should be interpreted based on their meaning at the time of enactment—
to do otherwise would amount to judicial amendment outside of the legislative 
process.”  Vossman v. AirNet Sys., Inc., 2020-Ohio-872, ¶ 17, citing New Prime 
Inc. v. Oliveira, 586 U.S. 105, 113 (2019).  Likewise, this court presumes that 
“statutes . . . embrace the common law extant at their enactment.”  Mann v. 
Northgate Investors, L.L.C., 2014-Ohio-455, ¶ 17.  This rule means that we should 
read statutes “‘“in the light of and with reference to the rules and principles of the 
common law in force at the time of their enactment,”’” and we should not read the 
statute in a way that is contrary to “‘“the settled rules of the common law,”’” unless 
January Term, 2024 
33 
 
the legislature has used language that “‘“clearly expresses or imports such 
intention.”’”  (Emphasis deleted.)  Id., quoting Shump v. First Continental-
Robinwood Assocs., 71 Ohio St.3d 414, 420 (1994), quoting State ex rel. Morris v. 
Sullivan, 81 Ohio St. 79 (1909), paragraph three of the syllabus; accord Williams 
v. Spitzer Autoworld Canton, L.L.C., 2009-Ohio-3554, ¶ 17, quoting Mandelbaum 
v. Mandelbaum, 2009-Ohio-1222, ¶ 29, quoting State ex rel. Hunt v. Fronizer, 77 
Ohio St. 7, 16 (1907) (courts will not presume that the legislature “‘“intended to 
abrogate a settled rule of the common law unless the language used in a statute 
clearly supports such intention”’”). 
{¶ 75} Applying these well-established principles leads to one conclusion: 
A defamation action involving a secretive, concealed, or otherwise inherently 
unknowable publication accrues (i.e., comes into existence) upon publication of the 
defamatory statement, not upon the plaintiff’s discovery of the publication or upon 
the plaintiff’s discovery that the publication caused an injury. 
A.  The Plain Meaning of “Accrued” 
{¶ 76} Dictionary and caselaw definitions, along with the common law, 
demonstrate that when the General Assembly enacted the Code of Civil Procedure 
of the State of Ohio in 1853, which provided a statute of limitations for civil actions 
for libel and slander, 51 Ohio Laws 57, 59, a defamation cause of action accrued 
upon publication, not upon the plaintiff’s discovery of the publication or upon the 
plaintiff’s discovery that the publication caused an injury, even if the publication 
occurred in a secretive, concealed, or otherwise inherently unknowable manner. 
{¶ 77} Since the 19th century, both dictionaries and caselaw have defined 
the word “accrued” to mark the point in time when a cause of action “‘comes into 
existence.’”  Gabelli v. Secs. & Exchange Comm., 568 U.S. 442, 448 (2013), 
quoting United States v. Lindsay, 346 U.S. 568, 569 (1954) (tracing the history of 
the dictionary and caselaw definitions of the word “accrued” and stating that the 
word has retained the same meaning since the 19th century: “‘In common parlance 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
34 
a right accrues when it comes into existence’”); Reading Co., 271 U.S. at 61 (noting 
that “accrued” relates to “what point of time the cause of action has come into 
existence, and consequently at what point of time the statute of limitations begins 
to run”); State ex rel. Estate of McKenney v. Indus. Comm., 2006-Ohio-3562, ¶ 8, 
quoting State ex rel. Bowman v. Columbiana Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 77 Ohio St.3d 
398, 400 (1997), and Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1986) (the 
“‘usual, normal, or customary meaning’” of “accrued” is “‘to come into existence 
as an enforceable claim: vest as a right’”); DeLong, 157 Ohio St. at 24, quoting 
Black’s Law Dictionary (2d Ed. 1910) (“accrue” “‘means to arise, to happen, to 
come into force or existence’”); Fee’s Admr. v. Fee, 10 Ohio 469, 471 (1841) (“The 
plea of the statute goes to the existence of the cause of action, and not to the 
knowledge of it.”). 
{¶ 78} And since 1831, this court has held that a general tort cause of action 
accrues (i.e., comes into existence) “from the time of the injury, that being the cause 
of action, and not from the time of damage or discovery of the injury.”  Kerns v. 
Schoonmaker, 4 Ohio 331, 334 (1831); see Rancho Cincinnati Rivers, 2021-Ohio-
2798, at ¶ 21 (“To discern the plain meaning of statutory text, we consult . . . the 
meaning that the words have acquired when they are used in case law.”); DeLong 
at 27 (“The cause accrues when the negligently-caused injury is inflicted.”).  Later 
cases refined this rule to mean “that a cause of action exists from the time the 
wrongful act is committed.”  Flagstar Bank, F.S.B. v. Airline Union’s Mtge. Co., 
2011-Ohio-1961, ¶ 13, citing O’Stricker, 4 Ohio St.3d at 87; see id., quoting Kerns 
at syllabus (“‘Statute of limitations commences to run so soon as the injurious act 
complained of is perpetrated, although the actual injury is subsequent, and could 
not immediately operate.’”); accord LGR Realty, Inc. v. Frank & London Ins. 
Agency, 2018-Ohio-334, ¶ 14 (also quoting Kerns); see also Wyler v. Tripi, 25 Ohio 
St.2d 164, 166 (1971) (“It is generally stated that a cause of action accrues when 
the wrongful act complained of is committed, and not as of the date the damage is 
January Term, 2024 
35 
 
discovered or reasonably should have been discovered.”), citing 34 Ohio Jur.2d, 
Limitation of Actions, § 58, at 536 (1958), and 34 Am.Jur., Limitation of Actions, 
§ 115, at 94 (1941), overruled on other grounds by Oliver, 5 Ohio St.3d 111. 
{¶ 79} Furthermore, absent fraud or mistake, this court did not apply the 
discovery rule to a cause of action until 1972.  See Melnyk v. Cleveland Clinic, 32 
Ohio St.2d 198 (1972), syllabus (“Where a metallic forceps and a nonabsorbent 
sponge are negligently left inside a patient’s body during surgery, the running of 
the statute of limitation governing a claim therefor is tolled until the patient 
discovers, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the 
negligent act.”); see generally Ormsby v. Longworth, 11 Ohio St. 653, 667-668 
(1860) (applying the discovery rule to a deed-reformation case based upon mistake 
and likening mistake to fraud).  As noted above, the General Assembly enacted the 
statute of limitations for defamation actions in 1853, more than 100 years before 
Melnyk was decided.  Thus, it would be legislating from the bench to state that at 
the time of the enactment of the defamation statute of limitations, the word 
“accrued” meant that a defamation cause of action accrued at the time a person 
discovered, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the 
wrongful act.  Rather, as explained above, this court’s caselaw plainly indicates that 
at the time of the statute’s 1853 enactment, the word “accrued” meant the time 
when a cause of action came into existence and not the time when a person 
discovered the existence of a cause of action.  Fee’s Admr. at 471 (“The plea of the 
statute goes to the existence of the cause of action, and not to the knowledge of 
it.”).  And this court held that general tort causes of action accrued at “the time of 
the injury” (i.e., at the time of the wrongful act), not at “the time of damage or 
discovery of the injury.”  Kerns at 334. 
{¶ 80} However, some tort actions are subject to “distinctive” accrual rules.  
For example, in Wallace v. Kato, the United States Supreme Court stated the 
traditional tort-accrual rule, but it did not apply that rule to the cause of action at 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
36 
issue in that case, i.e., false imprisonment.  549 U.S. 384, 391 (2007), quoting 1 
Corman, Limitation of Actions, § 7.4.1, at 526-527 (1991) (“‘Under the traditional 
rule of accrual . . . the tort cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations 
commences to run’” at the time of the wrongful act and “‘[t]he cause of action 
accrues even though the full extent of the injury is not then known or predictable.’”  
[Ellipsis in original.]).  Instead, it noted that false imprisonment “is subject to a 
distinctive rule” in determining when the cause of action accrues.  Id. at 389.  The 
Court looked to the common law and the Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, to locate 
that “distinctive rule” and to define when the false-imprisonment cause of action 
accrues.  Wallace at 389, quoting 2 Wood, Limitation of Actions, § 187d(4), at 878 
(4th Rev.Ed. 1916) (“‘Limitations begin to run against an action for false 
imprisonment when the alleged false imprisonment ends.’”); id., citing 4 
Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, § 899, Comment c (1977), and Underhill, 
Principles of Law of Torts 202 (1881). 
{¶ 81} Moreover, this court previously consulted the Restatement of the 
Law 2d, Torts, for guidance in deciding when a malicious-prosecution cause of 
action accrues (and determined that it accrues when “criminal proceedings are 
terminated in favor of the accused”), Froehlich v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Health, 
2007-Ohio-4161, ¶ 13-19, citing 3 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, § 659 (1977), 
and in resolving whether a “grievance complaint filed with the local bar association 
constituted a publication,” Hecht v. Levin, 66 Ohio St.3d 458, 460 (1993), citing 3 
Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, § 577 (1965). 
{¶ 82} Notably, R.C. 2305.11(A) lists false imprisonment and malicious 
prosecution—two causes of action that have distinctive accrual rules—in the same 
clause as libel and slander.  By listing libel and slander in the same clause as false 
imprisonment and malicious prosecution, the context of the statute indicates that 
libel and slander likewise have distinctive accrual rules.  See Figueroa, 2020-Ohio-
4275, at ¶ 8, quoting D.A.B.E., 2002-Ohio-4172, at ¶ 19 (“a court must look 
January Term, 2024 
37 
 
‘beyond single phrases’ and ‘consider, in proper context, all words used by the 
General Assembly in drafting [the relevant statute] with a view to its place in the 
overall statutory scheme’” [bracketed text in original]).  Consequently, the statute 
indicates that those four causes of action (i.e., libel, slander, malicious prosecution, 
and false imprisonment) are subject to distinctive accrual rules, not the wrongful-
act accrual rule that this court has applied to general tort causes of action. 
{¶ 83} The broader context of R.C. 2305.11(A) further shows that the 
causes of action listed in that provision are subject to distinctive rules, not the 
general tort-accrual rule.  R.C. 2305.11(A) reads in its entirety as follows: 
 
An action for libel, slander, malicious prosecution, or false 
imprisonment, an action for malpractice other than an action upon a 
medical, dental, optometric, or chiropractic claim, an action for legal 
malpractice against an attorney or a law firm or legal professional 
association, or an action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture 
shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action 
accrued, provided that an action by an employee for the payment of 
unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, or 
liquidated damages by reason of the nonpayment of minimum 
wages or overtime compensation shall be commenced within two 
years after the cause of action accrued. 
 
{¶ 84} Under the common law, each cause of action set forth in R.C. 
2305.11(A) had a distinctive accrual rule, not the wrongful-act accrual rule.  As 
indicated above, malicious-prosecution causes of action accrued when “criminal 
proceedings [were] terminated in favor of the accused.”  Froehlich, 2007-Ohio-
4161, at ¶ 13-19, citing 3 Restatement, § 659.  False-imprisonment causes of action 
accrued “‘when the alleged false imprisonment end[ed].’”  Wallace, 549 U.S. at 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
38 
389, quoting 2 Wood at 878.  Legal-malpractice causes of action accrued “when 
the attorney-client relationship finally terminate[d].”  Keaton Co. v. Kolby, 27 Ohio 
St.2d 234 (1971), syllabus, overruled by Skidmore & Hall v. Rottman, 5 Ohio St.3d 
210 (1983).  Causes of action based on a penalty or a forfeiture statute accrued 
“when the violation of the statute occur[red].”  Squire v. Grdn. Trust Co., 79 Ohio 
App. 371, 383 (8th Dist. 1947). 
{¶ 85} Medical-malpractice actions formerly were listed in R.C. 2305.11 as 
well.  See Wyler, 25 Ohio St.2d at 165 (citing former R.C. 2305.11 as stating the 
statute of limitations that applied to medical-malpractice actions).  Under the 
common law, medical-malpractice causes of action accrued “when the physician-
patient relationship finally terminate[d].”  Id. at syllabus. 
{¶ 86} Thus, under the common law, the causes of action discussed above 
did not accrue at the time of the wrongful act.  The context of the entire statute 
therefore indicates that at common law, each cause of action had a distinctive 
accrual rule, not the wrongful-act or traditional tort-accrual rule. 
{¶ 87} For all these reasons, this court should conclude that the causes of 
action listed in R.C. 2305.11(A)—including libel and slander—are subject to 
distinctive accrual rules.  Additionally, in Investors REIT One v. Jacobs, 46 Ohio 
St.3d 176, 179 (1989), this court stated that “[g]eneral tort claims, including those 
for negligence, are governed by R.C. 2305.09(D),” which suggests that this court 
should not use the rules for “general tort claims” in determining when a defamation 
cause of action accrues.  See generally Dobbs, The Law of Torts, 1115 (2000) 
(defamation is a “dignitary” tort); Allen, Twibel Retweeted: Twitter Libel and the 
Single Publication Rule, 15 J.High Tech.L. 63, 67 (2014) (“Defamation is a 
dignitary tort with ancient roots . . . .”).  I therefore question whether in a defamation 
action involving a secretive, concealed, or otherwise inherently unknowable 
publication, the court should be setting a precedent that implies that the wrongful-
January Term, 2024 
39 
 
act accrual rule applies to defamation causes of action.  See majority opinion at 
¶ 14, citing Norgard v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 2002-Ohio-2007, ¶ 8.8    
{¶ 88} Moreover, as stated above, this court previously consulted the 
Restatement to determine the accrual rule for one of the causes of action listed in 
the same clause as libel and slander—malicious prosecution—Froehlich, 2007-
Ohio-4161, at ¶ 13-19, and to decide a publication issue in a defamation cause of 
action, Hecht, 66 Ohio St.3d at 460; see also Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389 (consulting 
the Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, to define when a false-imprisonment cause 
of action accrues).  To be consistent, the court likewise should consult the 
Restatement in this case. 
{¶ 89} The Restatement and “textbook tort law,” Nassar, 570 U.S. at 347, 
citing Keeton, Dobbs, Keeton & Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 
41, at 265 (5th Ed. 1984), indicate that defamation causes of action accrue upon 
publication of a defamatory statement.  Dobbs, § 421, at 1187 (“Publication is not 
only an element of the cause of action; it is also the trigger for the statute of 
limitations.”); 4 Lindahl, Modern Tort Law: Liability and Litigation, § 35:69, at 
578 (2023) (“A defamation action ordinarily accrues when the defamatory matter 
is published.”); 3 Restatement, § 577A, Comment a (“It is the general rule that each 
communication of the same defamatory matter by the same defamer, whether to a 
 
8. Coincidentally, the wrongful act in a defamation action is “‘the publication of a false and 
defamatory statement concerning another person without lawful justification.’”  Black’s Law 
Dictionary (11th Ed. 2019), quoting R.F.V. Heuston, Salmond on the Law of Torts 138 (17th Ed. 
1977).  However, to be consistent with the statutory context, the common law, and the weight of 
scholarly authority, this court should use the distinctive, common-law accrual rule for defamation 
actions as discussed in this opinion, i.e., a defamation cause of action accrues upon publication, with 
publication being a term of art that does not mean first publication.  Moreover, adopting the 
Restatement’s common-law rule would give guidance to courts and attorneys who may have to 
grapple with complicated issues surrounding internet, social-media, and other publications.  If it 
consulted the Restatement in this case, the court would be indicating to Ohio courts and attorneys 
that they likewise should consult the Restatement to help resolve issues that may arise in defamation 
actions.  Using the wrongful-act accrual rule or the discovery accrual rule does not provide courts 
and attorneys with this same level of guidance.   
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
40 
new person or to the same person, is a separate and distinct publication, for which 
a separate cause of action arises.”); see also TransUnion, L.L.C. v. Ramirez, 594 
U.S. 413, 432 (2021), quoting Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 13 
(1990) (“a person is injured when a defamatory statement ‘that would subject him 
to hatred, contempt, or ridicule’ is published to a third party”); Keeton v. Hustler 
Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 777 (1984) (“The tort of libel is generally held to 
occur wherever the offending material is circulated.”), citing 3 Restatement, 
§ 577A, Comment a; Jackson v. Columbus, 2008-Ohio-1041, ¶ 9, quoting A & B–
Abell Elevator Co., Inc. v. Columbus/Cent. Ohio Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 
73 Ohio St.3d 1, 7 (1995) (“defamation occurs when a publication contains a false 
statement ‘made with some degree of fault, reflecting injuriously on a person’s 
reputation, or exposing a person to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, shame or 
disgrace, or affecting a person adversely in his or her trade, business or profession’” 
[emphasis added]); 54 C.J.S., Limitations of Actions, § 228, at 279-280 (2020) (“As 
a general rule, a cause of action for libel or slander accrues, so as to start the running 
of limitations, at the time of publication and not on the date of discovery of the 
wrong, or when the alleged injury occurred.  Thus, the statute of limitations on 
defamation actions generally begins to run when the defamatory statement is 
published.”  [Footnotes omitted.]). 
{¶ 90} Moreover, the common law does not distinguish between secretive, 
concealed, or otherwise inherently unknowable publications and nonsecretive, 
unconcealed, or otherwise inherently knowable publications.  In Hecht, we stated: 
 
“Publication of defamatory matter is its communication 
intentionally or by a negligent act to one other than the person 
defamed.”  3 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965), Section 
577(1).  Any act by which the defamatory matter is communicated 
to a third party constitutes publication.  Id. at Comment a.  Also, it 
January Term, 2024 
41 
 
is sufficient that the defamatory matter is communicated to one 
person only, even though that person is enjoined to secrecy.  See id. 
at Comment b.  Ohio law recognizes that publication of defamation 
consists in communicating it to a person or persons other than the 
person libeled.  Hahn v. Kotten[, 43 Ohio St.2d 237, 243 (1975)]. 
 
(Emphasis in original.)  Hecht at 460. 
{¶ 91} Thus, “[a]ny act by which the defamatory matter is communicated 
to a third party constitutes publication.”  (Emphasis in original.)  Id.  The word 
“‘any’ has an expansive meaning.”  United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997).  
It means “‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’”  State ex rel. Purdy v. 
Clermont Cty. Bd. of Elections, 77 Ohio St.3d 338, 340 (1997), quoting Webster’s 
Third New International Dictionary (1971).  “‘Any’ is often used as meaning ‘all.’”  
(Citation omitted.)  Wachendorf v. Shaver, 149 Ohio St. 231, 240 (1948); accord 
State v. Wells, 146 Ohio St. 131, 137 (1945) (“‘Any person’ means every person 
. . . .”  [Emphasis in original.]). 
{¶ 92} Consequently, this court’s precedent recognizes that publication 
means any, all, and every act by which the defamatory matter is communicated to 
a third party, even if that act occurs in a secretive, concealed, or otherwise 
inherently unknowable manner, such as a “grievance complaint filed with the local 
bar association,” Hecht, 66 Ohio St.3d at 460, or a private email shared with at least 
one other person. 
{¶ 93} Accordingly, under well-settled common law, a cause of action for 
defamation accrues (i.e., comes into existence) upon any publication (i.e., “[a]ny 
act by which the defamatory matter is communicated to a third party” [emphasis in 
original], id.) of a defamatory statement, including one that is communicated in a 
secretive, concealed, or otherwise inherently unknowable manner.  The common 
law does not support the conclusion that a defamation cause of action involving a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
42 
secretive, concealed, or otherwise inherently unknowable publication accrues when 
the defamed person discovers, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should 
have discovered, that a secretive, concealed, or otherwise inherently unknowable 
defamatory statement about that person has been published. 
{¶ 94} Additionally, any common-law discovery rule that may have existed 
at the time of the 1853 enactment of the statute of limitations for civil actions for 
libel and slander was limited to fraud cases.  See Gabelli, 568 U.S. at 449, quoting 
Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S 633, 644 (2010) (explaining that the 
discovery rule “arose” in “fraud cases as an ‘exception’ to the standard rule, based 
on the recognition that ‘something different was needed in the case of fraud, where 
a defendant’s deceptive conduct may prevent a plaintiff from even knowing that he 
or she has been defrauded’” [emphasis added in Merck & Co.]); Holmberg v. 
Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946), quoting Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342, 348 
(1874) (“where a plaintiff has been injured by fraud and ‘remains in ignorance of it 
without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute does 
not begin to run until the fraud is discovered’”); Bailey at 347 (“when the object of 
the suit is to obtain relief against a fraud, the bar of the statute does not commence 
to run until the fraud is discovered or becomes known to the party injured by it”).9  
Thus, at the time of the statute’s enactment, the common law did not recognize a 
discovery rule for any defamation actions, even one that involved a secretive, 
concealed, or otherwise inherently unknowable publication. 
 
9. Although Weidman argued in his memorandum in opposition to appellant Christopher 
Hildebrant’s summary-judgment motion that Hildebrant engaged in “fraud” and sought to toll the 
statute of limitations based on “the doctrine of fraudulent concealment,” Weidman’s complaint does 
not allege fraud. 
 
January Term, 2024 
43 
 
{¶ 95} Therefore, under the common law, a defamation cause of action 
came into existence upon publication of the defamatory statement.10  Nothing in 
our caselaw or the common law suggests that at the time of the statute’s enactment, 
a defamation cause of action—even one involving a secretive, concealed, or 
otherwise inherently unknowable publication—accrued (i.e., came into existence) 
when the defamed person discovered, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence 
should have discovered, the secretive, concealed, or otherwise inherently 
unknowable publication.  Importantly, R.C. 2305.11(A) does not distinguish 
between defamation causes of action involving a secretive, concealed, or otherwise 
inherently unknowable publication and all other defamation causes of action.  
Instead, the statute refers to libel or slander without modification.  For this reason, 
the plain text of R.C. 2305.11(A) does not indicate that the discovery rule applies 
to a defamation cause of action involving a secretive, concealed, or otherwise 
inherently unknowable publication.  Because R.C. 2305.11(A)’s text is plain, this 
court must apply it as written. 
B.  R.C. 2305.11(A)’s Language Does Not Express a Clear Intent to Depart 
from the Settled Common-Law Rule 
{¶ 96} Courts should not read statutes in a way that is contrary to “‘“the 
settled rules of the common law,”’” unless the legislature has used language that 
“‘“clearly expresses or imports such intention.”’”  (Emphasis deleted.)  Mann, 
2014-Ohio-455, at ¶ 17, quoting, Shump, 71 Ohio St.3d at 420, quoting Morris, 81 
Ohio St. 79, at paragraph three of the syllabus.  In other words, courts will not 
presume that the legislature “‘“intended to abrogate a settled rule of the common 
law unless the language used in a statute clearly supports such intention.”’”  
 
10. I do not agree with the majority opinion’s assertion that we must distinguish between libel and 
slander to decide this case.  Section 577A of the Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, does not 
distinguish between the two, and the majority’s distinction between the two causes of action serves 
only to cause confusion. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
44 
Williams, 2009-Ohio-3554, at ¶ 17, quoting Mandelbaum, 2009-Ohio-1222, at 
¶ 29, quoting Hunt, 77 Ohio St. at 16. 
{¶ 97} Nothing in the text of R.C. 2305.11(A) indicates that the legislature 
clearly intended to abrogate a settled rule of the common law and that it instead 
intended to apply the discovery rule to a defamation cause of action involving a 
secretive, concealed, or otherwise inherently unknowable publication.  The 
majority’s holding that a defamation cause of action involving a secretive, 
concealed, or otherwise inherently unknowable publication accrues when the 
defamed person discovers, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered, the existence of the publication, reads into the statute not only the 
discovery rule but also the words “secretive, concealed, or otherwise inherently 
unknowable,” despite this court’s “clear duty not to alter the language of a statute 
by adding or removing words,” State v. Jeffries, 2020-Ohio-1539, ¶ 18.  The 
language in R.C. 2305.11(A) does not distinguish between secretive, concealed, or 
otherwise inherently unknowable libel or slander and nonsecretive, unconcealed, 
or otherwise inherently knowable libel or slander. 
{¶ 98} Therefore, this court should not alter the plain language of R.C. 
2305.11(A) by adding a discovery rule for a defamation cause of action involving 
a secretive, concealed, or otherwise inherently unknowable publication.  See Pratte 
v. Stewart, 2010-Ohio-1860, ¶ 45, quoting Cleveland Mobile Radio Sales, Inc. v. 
Verizon Wireless, 2007-Ohio-2203, ¶ 12 (“‘A court is neither to insert words that 
were not used by the legislature nor to delete words that were used.’”); id. at ¶ 58 
(“The General Assembly did not include a tolling provision for persons with 
repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse, and it is not our province to add 
such a provision where one plainly does not exist.”); Rotkiske v. Klemm, 589 U.S. 
8, 14 (2019), quoting TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 37 (2001) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (an “expansive approach to the discovery rule is a ‘bad 
wine of recent vintage’”); Rotkiske at 14, quoting Scalia & Garner at 94 (“It is a 
January Term, 2024 
45 
 
fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that ‘absent provision[s] cannot be 
supplied by the courts.’”  [Bracketed text in original.]); Fronce v. Nichols, 12 Ohio 
C.D. 472, 476 (Cir.Ct. 1901) (“Judicial construction that reads anything into, or out 
of, [the] statute, is judicial legislation.”). 
II.  R.C. 2305.11(A) Does Not Indicate that Defamation Causes of Action 
Accrue upon First Publication 
{¶ 99} The majority reasons that “[p]rivate email communications used to 
defame someone are inherently not discoverable by the defamed person until the 
communication is disclosed publicly.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 20.  The majority and 
the first dissent appear to presume that even when a defendant publishes a 
defamatory statement to different groups of people at different times, a plaintiff has 
one cause of action and it accrues at the time of the first publication, which is the 
rule that the trial court and the Twelfth District applied.11  However, this court has 
 
11. Although neither party explicitly argued that this “first-publication rule” is incorrect, this court 
is “certainly not limited to the analyses presented by the parties or the analysis of the lower court in 
resolving an issue before the court, as this court must apply correct legal principles to resolve legal 
issues,” State v. Gwynne, 2023-Ohio-3851, ¶ 33 (Fischer, J., concurring in judgment only); see also 
Warner Chappell Music, 601 U.S. at __, 144 S.Ct. at 1141 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Nothing 
requires us to play along with these particular parties and expound on the details of a rule of law 
that they may assume but very likely does not exist.”).   
I further note that this first-publication rule appears to be a misinterpretation of the “single-
publication rule” contained in the Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts.  The single-publication rule 
states as follows: 
 
(1) Except as stated in Subsections (2) and (3), each of several 
communications to a third person by the same defamer is a separate publication. 
(2) A single communication heard at the same time by two or more third 
persons is a single publication. 
(3) Any one edition of a book or newspaper, or any one radio or 
television broadcast, exhibition of a motion picture or similar aggregate 
communication is a single publication. 
(4) As to any single publication, 
(a) only one action for damages can be maintained; 
(b) all damages suffered in all jurisdictions can be recovered in the one 
action; and 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
46 
never held that defamation causes of action accrue upon the first publication of the 
defamatory statement.  See Haines v. Welling, 7 Ohio 253, 256 (1835) (noting that 
a defendant could be liable for slander for repeating a defamatory statement that 
originated from another person, i.e., “whether the defendant be the author, or 
whether he be merely the propagator of a slander originating with another”); see 
also Anderson v. WBNS-TV, Inc., 2019-Ohio-5196, ¶ 11-12 (referring to 
defamatory “publications”); Wartenbe v. Sternberger, 1890 WL 1967, *2 (Ohio 
Jan. 21, 1890) (“The responsibility for written, or printed, defamation does not stop 
with its first publication.”), citing 2 Addison, A Treatise on the Law of Torts, § 
1140, at 364 (Wood Ed. 1881). 
{¶ 100} Additionally, to state that a defamation cause of action accrues 
upon the first publication of the defamatory statement would be to read the word 
“first” into R.C. 2305.11(A), as in “first accrued.”  Compare Gabelli, 568 U.S. at 
447-448, quoting 28 U.S.C. 2462 (“‘an action . . . for the enforcement of any civil 
fine, penalty, or forfeiture . . . shall not be entertained unless commenced within 
five years from the date when the claim first accrued’” [ellipses in original; 
emphasis added]). 
 
 
(c) a judgment for or against the plaintiff upon the merits of any action 
for damages bars any other action for damages between the same parties in all 
jurisdictions.   
 
3 Restatement, § 577A, at 208.  The single-publication rule  
 
is applied in cases where the same communication is heard at the same time by 
two or more persons.  In order to avoid multiplicity of actions and undue 
harassment of the defendant by repeated suits by new individuals, as well as 
excessive damages that might have been recovered in numerous separate suits, 
the communication to the entire group is treated as one publication, giving rise to 
only one cause of action.   
 
Id. at Comment b. 
Thus, the plain text of the Restatement shows that the “single” publication rule clashes with 
the “first” publication rule that the trial court and the court of appeals applied. 
January Term, 2024 
47 
 
{¶ 101} Furthermore, 
other 
authorities 
recognize 
that 
“[e]ach 
communication of a defamatory statement to a third person constitutes a new 
publication and gives rise to a separate cause of action,” 4 Lindahl, § 35:12, at 480, 
and that “each communication of the same defamatory matter by the same defamer, 
whether to a new person or to the same person, is a separate and distinct publication, 
for which a separate cause of action arises,” 3 Restatement, § 577A, Comment a.  
Thus, the majority’s concern that “a tortfeasor could conceal that publication until 
the statute-of-limitations period had expired,” majority opinion at ¶ 19, is 
unfounded.  If a tortfeasor keeps a defamatory statement secret, concealed, or 
otherwise inherently unknowable to the plaintiff for more than one year and then 
publishes it again after one year, that publication gives rise to a new limitations 
period (i.e., each publication gives rise to a new cause of action).  Similar 
statements that appear throughout the majority opinion likewise are unsupported.  
See id. at ¶ 20 (“Private email communications used to defame someone are 
inherently not discoverable by the defamed person until the communication is 
disclosed publicly.”); id. at ¶ 24 (“A tortfeasor ought not be allowed to privately 
libel another person and benefit from the ability to keep that libelous statement a 
secret.”).  Additionally, if a tortfeasor “privately libel[s] another person” and keeps 
the defamatory statement “a secret,” id., then unless that private libel is published 
to a third party, the action would not be justiciable,12 TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 434 
(discussing the requirement of concrete harm to have standing to sue and stating 
that “if someone wrote a defamatory letter and then stored it in her desk drawer,” 
the stored letter “does not harm anyone, no matter how insulting the letter is”). 
 
12. The majority opinion also raises questions regarding the meaning of private libel and secret.  Is 
a secret, private libel a written, defamatory statement that a person publishes to only one other 
person, or is it a written, defamatory statement that the defamer locks in a drawer?  Presumably, the 
majority means the former, but the opinion is not clear. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
48 
{¶ 102} If the majority evaluates this case without presuming that 
defamation causes of action accrue upon first publication, then it will recognize that 
each new publication gives rise to a new cause of action, which starts a new 
limitations period.  The reason for this rule makes eminent sense.  For practical 
purposes, a person who is defamed “in secret”13 and who learns about it ten years 
later may not suffer the type of harm that would warrant court intervention.  For 
example, in this case, if Hildebrant had sent only the one email to Stanford Roberts 
in 2011, and then, in 2020, Roberts told Weidman about that email, would this case 
exist?  Although the answer to that question is unknowable, logic would seem to 
indicate that a person is not going to take the time or spend the money to litigate a 
defamation action that involves a solitary and secretive, concealed, or otherwise 
inherently unknowable publication (e.g., one email sent to one other person and to 
no one else).  However, applying the discovery rule to “secretive, concealed, or 
otherwise inherently unknowable” defamation causes of action would allow that 
person to seek redress if that person chose to do so.  The Restatement’s general rule 
that each publication of a defamatory statement (even those publications that are 
secretive, concealed, or otherwise inherently unknowable) gives rise to a new cause 
of action thus may serve to prevent courts from becoming arbiters of trifling 
disputes.14  See Ruther v. Kaiser, 2012-Ohio-5686, ¶ 13 (“the legislature determines 
what injuries are recognized and what remedies are available”); id. at ¶ 14 (“the 
General Assembly has the right to determine what causes of action the law will 
recognize and to alter the common law by abolishing the action, by defining the 
 
13. A secret is defined as “[s]omething that is kept from the knowledge of others or shared only with 
those concerned; something that is studiously concealed.”  Black’s (11th Ed.).   
14. I do not mean to suggest that Weidman’s case involves a trifling dispute.  Instead, this statement 
above indicates only that the majority’s discovery rule also will apply outside the specific facts of 
Weidman’s case.  Additionally, in today’s modern society, how much “secretive, concealed, or 
otherwise inherently unknowable” defamation might be occurring in emails, text messages, and 
social media?  Applying the discovery rule to these types of defamation actions could create an 
avalanche of “secretive, concealed, or otherwise inherently unknowable” defamation actions.  
January Term, 2024 
49 
 
action, or by placing a time limit after which an injury is no longer a legal injury”); 
see also Black’s (11th Ed.) (stating that the maxim de minimis non curat lex means 
“[t]he law does not concern itself with trifles”); Lathan v. Ohio State Corr. 
Reception Ctr., 2016-Ohio-3348, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.) (stating that the maxim de 
minimis non curat lex places “outside the scope of legal relief the sorts of ‘injuries’ 
that are so small that they must be accepted as the price of living in society” 
[cleaned up]). 
{¶ 103} The more times that a secretive, concealed, or otherwise inherently 
unknowable defamatory statement is published, the more harmful it becomes—and 
the more likely that a defamed person will discover the publication within the one-
year statute of limitations.  Hence, the Restatement’s rule that each publication 
gives rise to a new cause of action, 3 Restatement, § 577A, Comment a, essentially 
operates as a built-in discovery rule—the more times that a secretive, concealed, or 
otherwise inherently unknowable statement is published, the more likely the 
defamed person will discover the existence of the defamatory statement within the 
limitations period. 
{¶ 104} Additionally, the majority opinion draws a distinction between a 
secretive, concealed, or otherwise inherently unknowable publication of a 
defamatory statement and all other publications, which is contrary to this court’s 
precedent and the Restatement.  As noted above, in Hecht, this court held that a 
“grievance complaint filed with the local bar association constituted a publication.”  
Hecht, 66 Ohio St.3d at 460.  And the court rejected the notion that “[f]or the 
purposes of defamation, ‘publication’” requires “widespread dissemination.”15  Id.  
This court stated: “We discern no reason to disturb the settled law of defamation 
 
15. For this reason, I do not agree that the court should distinguish between secretive, concealed, or 
otherwise inherently unknowable publications of defamatory statements and defamatory statements 
that “are published in the media or otherwise offered in the marketplace of ideas,” majority opinion 
at ¶ 22.  The majority’s statement is contrary to Hecht, and the majority’s statement will cause 
confusion—e.g., when is a defamatory statement “offered in the marketplace of ideas”? 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
50 
and create an exception to the definition of ‘publication’ for confidential 
communications to a bar association.”  Id.  Yet in this case, the majority decides to 
disturb well-established law regarding the accrual date for defamation causes of 
action and fails to consult the common-law principles contained in the Restatement, 
as this court has done in other cases.  E.g., Carter v. Reese, 2016-Ohio-5569, ¶ 18 
(consulting the Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, for the common-law principles 
of a bystander’s duty to aid or protect another); Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield 
Family Counseling Ctr., 77 Ohio St.3d 284, 293 (1997) (referring to the 
Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, as stating “the common-law rule” regarding the 
duty element of a cause of action for negligence); Shump, 71 Ohio St.3d at 419-420 
(looking to the Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, in part, to determine common-
law principles in a landlord-tenant case); Embers Supper Club, Inc. v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co., 9 Ohio St.3d 22, 25 (1984) (examining the Restatement 
of the Law 2d, Torts, to determine whether a publication was subject to “common-
law privilege”), modified on other grounds, Lansdowne v. Beacon Journal 
Publishing Co., 32 Ohio St.3d 176 (1987) (plurality opinion); see also Masson v. 
New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 516 (1991) (citing 3 Restatement, § 563, 
Comment c, and Keeton, Dobbs, Keeton & Owen at 776, to support a statement of 
“[t]he common law of libel”); Diller v. Diller, 2023-Ohio-1508, ¶ 4 (Stewart, J., 
dissenting) (referring to 1 Restatement of the Law 3d, Property: Wills & Other 
Donative Transfers, § 1.2, Comment a (1999), as stating the “common-law rule”). 
{¶ 105} More than 70 years ago, this court recognized the danger of 
applying the discovery rule to defamation causes of action, stating: “[I]f the statute 
of limitations as to libel or slander did not begin to run until knowledge was had by 
the one injured by the libel or slander it might result that an action therefor could 
be brought an indefinite number of years after the libel or slander occurred.”  
DeLong, 157 Ohio St. at 28; see generally Gabelli, 568 U.S. at 449, quoting Wood 
v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879) (stating that statutes of limitations are 
January Term, 2024 
51 
 
“‘vital to the welfare of society’”); Gabelli at 449, quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 
U.S. 261, 271 (1985) (recognizing that “‘even wrongdoers are entitled to assume 
that their sins may be forgotten’”).  Holding that the discovery rule applies to 
defamation causes of action involving a secretive, concealed, or otherwise 
inherently unknowable publication is legislating from the bench and will create 
infinite liability.  Under the majority’s decision, a person who discovers that 
another person defamed that person in an email published to one other person years 
earlier could bring a lawsuit years later.16  I do not believe that the legislature 
intended to allow our courts to be used to litigate these types of disputes.  See 
Ruther, 2012-Ohio-5686, at ¶ 13-14 (stating that the legislature has the right to 
determine what causes of action the law will recognize). 
{¶ 106} I readily agree that the facts alleged in Weidman’s case are 
egregious.  However, if this court applies the discovery rule to Weidman’s case, it 
also will apply to all defamation causes of action involving a secretive, concealed, 
or otherwise inherently unknowable publication and not simply to cases with an 
allegedly outrageous set of facts.  This court should not allow a purportedly 
egregious set of facts to upset well-settled law.  See Brandt v. Pompa, 2022-Ohio-
4525, ¶ 73 (Kennedy, Fischer, and DeWine, JJ., dissenting) (“Bad facts make bad 
law . . . .”); State v. Bortree, 2022-Ohio-3890, ¶ 20 (even when a case involves a 
“particularly heinous set of facts,” this court will not “rewrite the statute”); Bank of 
Hartford Cty. v. Waterman, 26 Conn. 324, 331 (1857), quoting E. India Co. v. Paul, 
1 Eng.L. & Eq.R. 44, 48 (1849) (“‘hard cases must not make bad law’”). 
{¶ 107} The majority’s assertion that applying the discovery rule in cases 
like Weidman’s is necessary to achieve justice, majority opinion at ¶ 19, is not 
wholly unfounded.  However, the legislature, not this court, carries the 
 
16. As Hildebrant notes in his reply brief, applying the discovery rule to secretive, concealed, or 
otherwise inherently unknowable defamation will cause Ohioans to “live in perpetual fear that an 
ill-chosen comment about a neighbor, made decades ago, will give rise to a lawsuit.”  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
52 
responsibility “to decide how ‘humane’ legislation should be—or (to put the point 
less tendentiously) to strike the balance between remediation of all injuries and a 
policy of repose,” TRW, 534 U.S. at 38 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id., 
quoting Amy v. Watertown, 130 U.S. 320, 323-324 (1889) (“‘[T]he cases in which 
[the statute of limitations may be suspended by causes not mentioned in the statute 
itself] are very limited in character, and are to be admitted with great caution; 
otherwise the court would make the law instead of administering it.’”  [Bracketed 
text in original.]). 
III.  The Majority Opinion Supplants Legislative Intent 
{¶ 108} The majority opinion also violates the principle that statutes of 
limitations are the legislature’s prerogative.  Courts have long recognized that 
“[t]he existence and duration of a statute of limitations for a cause of action 
constitutes an issue of public policy for resolution by the legislative branch of 
government as a matter of substantive law.”  Erwin v. Bryan, 2010-Ohio-2202, ¶ 
29; accord Rotkiske, 589 U.S. at 14-15, quoting Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 
Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 463-464 (1975) (“The length of a limitations period ‘reflects a 
value judgment concerning the point at which the interests in favor of protecting 
valid claims are outweighed by the interests in prohibiting the prosecution of stale 
ones.’  . . .  It is Congress, not this court, that balances those interests.  We simply 
enforce the value judgments made by Congress.”); United States v. Kubrick, 444 
U.S. 111, 117 (1979), quoting RR. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 
342, 349 (1944) (stating that statutes of limitations “represent a pervasive 
legislative judgment that it is unjust to fail to put the adversary on notice to defend 
within a specified period of time and that ‘the right to be free of stale claims in time 
comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them’”).  Provisions that delay the 
running of a statute of limitations, such as the discovery rule, are a “legislative 
prerogative,” Pratte, 2010-Ohio-1860, at ¶ 49.  Thus, “it is not our job as members 
January Term, 2024 
53 
 
of the judicial branch to overreach and invade the province of the General 
Assembly.”  Brandt at ¶ 73 (Kennedy, Fischer, DeWine, JJ., dissenting). 
{¶ 109} This court should not disregard the plain statutory text that the 
legislature has chosen simply because it believes that the legislature may have 
intended to add a discovery rule for defamation causes of action involving secretive, 
concealed, or otherwise inherently unknowable publications or because it believes 
that applying the discovery rule will be more “consonant with the demands of 
justice and the dictates of ethics,” Oliver, 5 Ohio St.3d at 112.  Instead, as this court 
repeatedly has recognized, statutes of limitations represent the legislature’s role as 
“‘the final arbiter of public policy’” and “‘judicial policy preferences may not be 
used to override valid legislative enactments.’”  Bortree, 2022-Ohio-3890, at ¶ 20, 
quoting State ex rel. Tritt v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 2002-Ohio-6437, ¶ 17; see 
In re Estate of Centorbi, 2011-Ohio-2267, ¶ 13, quoting Weaver v. Edwin Shaw 
Hosp., 2004-Ohio-6549, ¶ 13, quoting Wachendorf v. Shaver, 149 Ohio St. 231 
(1948), paragraph five of the syllabus (“A statute’s wording ‘“may not be restricted, 
constricted, qualified, narrowed, enlarged or abridged . . . .”’”). 
{¶ 110} R.C. Ch. 2305 illustrates that the legislature knows how to write a 
discovery rule into a statute.  See, e.g., R.C. 2305.09(E) (“If the action is for 
trespassing under ground or injury to mines, or for the wrongful taking of personal 
property, the causes thereof shall not accrue until the wrongdoer is discovered; nor, 
if it is for fraud, until the fraud is discovered.”); R.C. 2305.112 (a civil action for 
identity fraud “shall be commenced within five years from the date on which the 
identity of the offender was discovered or reasonably should have been 
discovered”); R.C. 2305.113(D)(1) and (2) (incorporating discovery rules for 
medical, dental, optometric, and chiropractic claims); R.C. 2305.111(C)(1) (“If the 
defendant in an action brought by a victim of childhood sexual abuse asserting a 
claim resulting from childhood sexual abuse that occurs on or after August 3, 2006, 
has fraudulently concealed from the plaintiff facts that form the basis of the claim, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
54 
the running of the limitations period with regard to that claim is tolled until the time 
when the plaintiff discovers or in the exercise of due diligence should have 
discovered those facts.”). 
{¶ 111} Had the legislature thought that applying the discovery rule to 
defamation causes of action involving a secretive, concealed, or otherwise 
inherently unknowable publication would produce results that are “more nearly 
consonant with the demands of justice and the dictates of ethics,” Oliver at 112, 
then it would have included language within R.C. Ch. 2305 to that effect, see 
Rotkiske, 589 U.S. at 14 (“Atextual judicial supplementation is particularly 
inappropriate when . . . Congress has shown that it knows how to adopt the omitted 
language or provision.”); TRW, 534 U.S. at 27-28 (declining to insert a discovery 
rule when a statute is silent on the issue and rejecting the “view that Congress can 
convey its refusal to adopt a discovery rule only by explicit command, rather than 
by implication from the structure or text of the particular statute”).17  The absence 
of discovery-rule language for defamation causes of action involving a secretive, 
concealed, or otherwise inherently unknowable publication, in the face of clear 
discovery-rule language elsewhere within the same chapter of the Revised Code, 
speaks volumes and evinces the legislature’s intent that the discovery rule not apply 
to defamation causes of action that involve a secretive, concealed, or otherwise 
inherently unknowable publication. 
 
 
 
17. Moreover, even if this court were to determine that R.C. 2305.11(A) is ambiguous, the 
legislature has instructed courts to consider, in part, “[t]he common law” when determining the 
meaning of ambiguous statutes, R.C. 1.49(D).  As stated above, the common law indicates that 
defamation claims accrue upon publication, not upon the plaintiff’s discovery of the publication or 
the plaintiff’s discovery of an injury, even if the publication occurred in a secretive, concealed, or 
otherwise inherently unknowable manner. 
January Term, 2024 
55 
 
IV.  Applying the Discovery Rule to “Secret” Defamation Is Contrary to 
Discovery-Rule Precedent 
{¶ 112} To the extent that this court has any authority to read the discovery 
rule into R.C. 2305.11(A),18 I agree with the first dissent’s reasoning that the 
discovery rule does not apply to defamation causes of action when the publication 
of the defamatory statements was secretive, concealed, or otherwise inherently 
unknowable to the plaintiff.  However, for the reasons stated earlier, I disagree with 
the first dissent’s statement that defamation causes of action accrue upon “‘first 
publication.’”  Dissenting opinion of Kennedy, C.J., at ¶ 46, quoting Miller, 86 
Ohio Misc.2d at 100.19   
{¶ 113} Nevertheless, as explained above, one problem with applying the 
discovery rule to a defamation cause of action involving a secretive, concealed, or 
otherwise inherently unknowable publication is that this rule will apply to all 
defamation actions involving a secretive, concealed, or otherwise inherently 
 
18. I am not suggesting that this court should overrule previous cases in which it stated that it could 
determine when a cause of action accrues when a statute does not explicitly mark the accrual date.  
See, e.g., O’Stricker, 4 Ohio St.3d 84; Oliver, 5 Ohio St.3d 111; Melnyk, 32 Ohio St.2d 198.  Instead, 
this court should recognize that those cases date to a time when the legislature had not enacted 
statutes that explicitly incorporated discovery rules for causes of action, unless the cause of action 
involved fraud, see Peterson v. Teodosio, 34 Ohio St.2d 161, 164, fn. * (1973), citing former R.C. 
2305.09(C), Am.S.B. No. 5, 129 Ohio Laws 13, 177.  Since that time, the legislature has enacted 
discovery rules for other causes of action.  Thus, the legal landscape has changed.  Consequently, 
this court should no longer presume that it has authority to supply a discovery rule if the legislature 
has not.  Instead, as explained above, this court should examine the statutory text to determine 
whether the plain language includes a discovery rule. 
 
19. This first-publication rule appears to have originated in a 1978 trial-court decision that cited no 
authority for the statement that libel causes of action accrue “upon the first publication.”  Guccione 
v. Hustler Magazine, 64 Ohio Misc. 59, 60, (C.P. 1978) (determining that in a libel action against a 
magazine publisher, “the right to file suit on a cause of action for libel accrues upon the first 
publication of the matter complained of”).  Various Ohio courts have since repeated that rule.  See, 
e.g., Miller at 100; Reimund v. Brown, 1995 WL 643939, *3 (10th Dist. Nov. 2, 1995) (“A cause of 
action for libel accrues upon the first publication of the defamatory matter.”); Snell v. Drew, 1985 
WL 8216, *2 (6th Dist. Nov. 1, 1985) (“This court, however, expressly rejects the single publication 
rule, for the simple reason that it does not state Ohio law.  The controlling rule in Ohio has been set 
forth in the case of Guccione . . . .”). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
56 
unknowable publication.  Thus, although I do not agree with the majority that the 
discovery rule applies to these types of defamation cases, I believe that the majority 
should limit the discovery rule that it is adopting to indicate that it applies only 
when the facts are like the facts alleged in Weidman’s case.  Those facts allege 
multiple publications, repetition, and nefarious conduct. 
V.  Conclusion 
{¶ 114} In sum, I would reverse the Twelfth District Court of Appeals’ 
judgment that held that “the discovery rule applies to those libel actions where the 
publication of the defamatory statements was secretive, concealed, or otherwise 
inherently unknowable due to the nature of the publication.”  2022-Ohio-1708, ¶ 
29 (12th Dist.).  However, given that this case resulted from the courts below 
misconstruing the law to mean that a libel cause of action “accrues when the written 
words are first published,” id. at ¶ 20, and that we accepted jurisdiction over 
Hildebrant’s discretionary appeal, 2022-Ohio-3636, I would remand this matter to 
the trial court with instructions to reconsider whether genuine issues of material 
fact remain using the Restatement’s publication rule, with the word “publication” 
being a term of art, Welling v. Weinfeld, 2007-Ohio-2451, ¶ 53, quoting 3 
Restatement, § 652D, Comment a (stating that “‘“[p]ublication” . . . is a word of 
art’”), that does not mean first publication.  As the Restatement recognizes, “[i]t is 
the general rule that each communication of the same defamatory matter by the 
same defamer, whether to a new person or to the same person, is a separate and 
distinct publication, for which a separate cause of action arises,” 3 Restatement, § 
577A, Comment a, even if the publication is secretive, concealed, or otherwise 
inherently unknowable to the plaintiff,20 see Hecht, 66 Ohio St.3d at 460, citing 3 
 
20. I understand that remanding a case to a trial court based on a rule that the parties have not 
specifically asserted is incorrect may seem unusual, but it would give the majority the result that it 
wishes to reach but does so for the right reasons.  Plus, this type of decision is not unprecedented.  
See Bennett v. Stanley, 92 Ohio St.3d 35, 42 (2001) (adopting the attractive-nuisance doctrine); id. 
 
January Term, 2024 
57 
 
Restatement, § 577(1), Comment a.  Any additional contours of the publication rule 
are far outside the scope of this appeal, so I do not believe that saying more is 
necessary or prudent. 
{¶ 115} Moreover, I do not believe that remanding this matter to the trial 
court to reconsider Hildebrant’s summary-judgment motion using the correct 
accrual rule would be a futile exercise.  Although the parties have suggested that 
the record contains two potential publication dates (i.e., December 20, 2011, and 
January 25, 2020), Hildebrant’s burden was to prove the absence of a genuine issue 
of material fact regarding the accrual date for Weidman’s defamation claim.  
Hildebrant presented evidence indicating that he last published the allegedly 
defamatory statements on January 25, 2020.  However, the record further 
establishes that at some point between January 25 and February 27, 2020, someone 
told Sycamore Township Trustee Tom James about the statements. 
{¶ 116} According to the “case-closing memo” of the auditor’s special-
investigations unit, on February 27, 2020, James contacted the auditor’s office to 
report the allegations involving Weidman.  Although the trial court stated in its 
order granting summary judgment that Hildebrant showed the 2011 email to James 
on January 25, 2020, the evidence that Hildebrant submitted in support of his 
 
at 44-45 (Cook, J., dissenting) (concluding that the plaintiffs had “waived any right to pursue the 
attractive nuisance doctrine as a theory of recovery” when they specifically “disclaimed that theory 
of recovery” and asserted in their appellate briefing “that they ‘[did] not have to rely upon the 
doctrine of attractive nuisance to prevail’”); see also Hudson v. Petrosurance, Inc., 2010-Ohio-4505, 
¶ 29 (in discretionary appeal involving summary judgment, “[t]his court has complete and 
independent power of review as to all questions of law”); Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, 
¶ 39 (“courts lack the discretion to make errors of law, particularly when the trial court’s decision 
goes against the plain language of a statute or rule”); Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm., 58 
Ohio St.2d 108, 110 (1979) (“As to questions of law, . . . this court has complete, independent power 
of review.  Legal issues are accordingly subject to more intensive examination than are factual 
questions.”); see generally Onderko v. Richmond Mfg. Co., 31 Ohio St.3d 296, 299 (1987), quoting 
Bosjnak v. Superior Sheet Steel Co., 145 Ohio St. 538 (1945), paragraph five of the syllabus 
(“‘where, in instructing the jury, the court states a correct rule or principle of law and also states an 
incorrect rule or principle of law with reference to the same subject matter, no presumption arises 
that the correct rule was applied by the jury in the consideration of the issue presented, and the error 
in giving the incorrect rule will be deemed prejudicial’”). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
58 
summary-judgment motion does not establish that James was present at the January 
25, 2020 meeting, when Hildebrant showed the email to Sycamore Township 
Trustee James LaBarbara and Sycamore Township Administrator Raymond 
Warrick.  In support of his summary-judgment motion, Hildebrant submitted 
affidavits from LaBarbara and Warrick, in which they stated that Hildebrant 
showed them the email on January 25, 2020.  However, Hildebrant did not present 
any evidence indicating when James learned about the email. 
{¶ 117} The record demonstrates that before James contacted the auditor, 
only four people knew about the 2011 email—Hildebrant, LaBarbara, Warrick, and 
Roberts.  Furthermore, the auditor’s memo indicates that James called the auditor’s 
office on February 27, 2020, and James reported that he “recently” learned about 
the allegations.  “Recently” could mean sometime between February 17 and 
February 27, 2020.21  Because the evidence shows that Hildebrant, LaBarbara, 
Warrick, and Roberts were the only people who knew about the email before 
February 27, 2020, one of them must have informed James.  For these reasons, the 
court should remand this matter to the trial court so that it can reevaluate this case 
using the correct accrual rule, not the first-publication rule. 
{¶ 118} Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s judgment 
affirming the Twelfth District’s judgment that held that the discovery rule applies 
to libel causes of action when the publication of the defamatory statements was 
secretive, concealed, or otherwise inherently unknowable to the plaintiff.  I would 
reverse the Twelfth District’s judgment and remand this matter to the trial court. 
__________________ 
 
Hemmer DeFrank Wessels, P.L.L.C., Todd V. McMurtry, and J. Will 
Huber, for appellee.  
 
21. Events taking place on or after February 17, 2020, would be relevant to the statute of limitations 
for Weidman’s claims because he filed his complaint against Hildebrant on February 17, 2021.  
January Term, 2024 
59 
 
Taft Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P., Russell S. Sayre, Chad R. Ziepfel, and 
Medora M. Akers, for appellant. 
 
The Gittes Law Group, Frederick M. Gittes, and Jeffrey P. Vardaro, urging 
affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Employment Lawyers Association. 
_______________________