Title: Leshore v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 23S-CR-51 
Charlie D. Leshore, Jr., 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
–v– 
State of Indiana, 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
Decided: February 28, 2023 
Corrected 
Appeal from the Allen Superior Court 
02D04-9804-CF-207 
The Honorable David M. Zent, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals 
No. 22A-CR-193 
Opinion by Justice Massa 
Chief Justice Rush and Justice Molter concur. 
Justice Goff dissents with separate opinion in which Justice Slaughter joins. 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Feb 28 2023, 10:08 am
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Massa, Justice.  
Chaucer said in The Canterbury Tales, “For better than never is late; 
never to succeed would be too long a period.”1 Centuries later, we simply 
say, “Better late than never,”2 and say it here to afford Appellant a chance 
at relief. 
This ancient principle buttresses Post-Conviction Rule 2(1)(a), which 
permits convicted defendants to seek permission to file a belated notice of 
appeal under certain circumstances. Yet Charlie Leshore, who pleaded 
guilty to felonies in 1999, was denied that chance upon discovering new 
information in 2021. He claims that at his guilty plea hearing he was never 
advised of his right to appeal his sentence, and only recently learned that 
he could. Still, his post-conviction petition for permission to file a belated 
notice of appeal was denied in the trial court and the Court of Appeals 
affirmed over a dissent. We now grant Leshore’s petition to transfer, 
reverse and remand with instructions to let his appeal proceed.  
 
Facts and Procedural History 
In 1999, Charlie Leshore pleaded guilty to these crimes: burglary, a 
Class B felony; two counts of robbery as Class B felonies; rape, a Class A 
felony; and two counts of criminal confinement as Class B felonies. App. 
Vol. II, p. 24. Under the plea agreement, the trial court was entrusted the 
“final and full authority to impose the sentence it deem[ed] proper.” Id. In 
its colloquy with Leshore, the court advised him that he was relinquishing 
certain rights by pleading guilty to these felonies, which included the 
right to appeal his conviction. It stated: 
 
1 Geoffrey Chaucer, The Canterbury Tales: The Canon’s Yeoman’s Tale 8 (Gerard NeCastro ed. 
2007), https://users.pfw.edu/flemingd/23cyt.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/R8KX-J22P. 
2 Geoffrey Chaucer, THE CANTERBURY TALES: THE CANON’S YEOMAN’S TALE 473 (Nevill Coghill 
revised ed. 2003). 
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Court: If you were to have a trial and were found guilty you’d have 
the right to appeal your conviction. Do you understand this? 
Mr. Leshore: Yes. 
Court: Do you understand that by pleading guilty you would give 
up all of these rights? 
Mr. Leshore: Yes. 
Id. at 31.  
The trial court accepted Leshore’s guilty plea and sentenced him to 
seventy years in the Indiana Department of Correction. Neither the trial 
court nor his public defender advised him that he could appeal his 
sentence.  
In 2001, Leshore petitioned for post-conviction relief under Rule 1, 
arguing his sentence was inappropriate due to the nature of the offense 
and the character of the offender.3 The State Public Defender’s Office 
reviewed Leshore’s petition and analyzed its merits, and concluded the 
“trial court advised Leshore of all necessary rights.” Id. at 82. In light of 
these findings, the Public Defender’s Office withdrew its representation, 
and Leshore abandoned his efforts in 2005.  
On December 20, 2021, Leshore petitioned for post-conviction relief to 
file a belated notice of appeal under Rule 2, claiming he “signed his guilty 
plea,” and “there was no [a]dvisement that he had the right to [a]ppeal his 
sentence.” Id. at 17. According to Leshore, he did not learn he could 
appeal his sentence until that information was supplied by another inmate 
on December 1, 2021. The trial court, however, denied Leshore’s petition 
without a hearing, which Leshore appealed pro se.  
In a divided memorandum decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed. 
Leshore v. State, 194 N.E.3d 608, 2022 WL 3036401, at *1 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 
 
3 On appeal, Leshore did not attach his petition for post-conviction relief in his appendix. So, 
similar to the Court of Appeals’ treatment of his petition, we rely on the State Public 
Defender’s review of his petition to discern which claims he attempted to raise.  
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2, 2022). The panel held Leshore was “unable to show that he was diligent 
in his pursuit of permission to file a belated notice of appeal,” id. at *2, and 
thus the trial court did not err in denying his petition. Id. at *3. In reaching 
its decision, the panel employed several factors under precedent to 
evaluate his petition, including the “overall passage of time,” a fact which 
cut against Leshore given the time gap between 2005 and 2021. Id. at *2–3. 
Dissenting from the panel’s affirmance, Judge Weissmann concluded 
Leshore satisfied the three conditions under Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 
2(1)(a) and therefore should be allowed to pursue his belated appeal. Id. at 
*4–5. The dissent contended it was error to overlook the second prong 
under Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 2(1)(a)(2)—“the failure to file a timely 
notice of appeal was not due to the fault of the defendant.” Id. at *4 
(emphasis added). Judge Weissmann suggested that condition is 
indivisibly “intertwined” with Rule 2(1)(a)(3), which requires a defendant 
to be “diligent in requesting permission to file a belated notice of appeal.” 
Id. (emphasis added). Because Leshore received mistaken advice from the 
trial court and counsel, “[t]hese errors fused to justify his inaction.” Id. at 
*5. And because he acted nineteen days after receiving the new and 
correct information, he acted diligently under these circumstances. Id.  
Leshore now petitions for transfer, which we grant, thus vacating the 
appellate opinion, see Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A), and remanding to the 
trial court.  
 
Standard of Review 
The decision whether to grant permission to file a belated notice of 
appeal is left to “the sound discretion of the trial court,” and therefore 
faces abuse of discretion review. Moshenek v. State, 868 N.E.2d 419, 422 
(Ind. 2007). But when, as here, the trial court did not hold a hearing on the 
motion to file a belated notice of appeal, “we are reviewing the same 
information available to the trial court,” so we review these unique 
petitions de novo. St. Clair v. State, 901 N.E.2d 490, 492 (Ind. 2009). We 
therefore afford no deference to the trial court’s determination. Id.  
 
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Discussion and Decision 
Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 2(1)(a) establishes the requisites for filing 
a belated notice of appeal:  
“An eligible defendant convicted . . . may petition the trial court for 
permission to file a belated notice of appeal of the conviction or 
sentence if; 
(1) the defendant failed to file a timely notice of appeal;  
(2) the failure to file a timely notice of appeal was not due to the 
fault of the defendant; and  
(3) the defendant has been diligent in requesting permission to file 
a belated notice of appeal under this rule.” 
P-C.R. 2(1)(a). Under this Rule, “[t]he defendant bears the burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he was without fault in 
the delay of filing” and was “diligent in pursuing permission to file a 
belated motion to appeal.” Moshenek, 868 N.E.2d at 422–23. These inquiries 
are fact-sensitive because “[t]here is substantial room for debate as to what 
constitutes diligence and lack of fault on the part of the defendant.” Id. at 
424. And since each case is shaped by its own circumstances, there are no 
assigned “standards of fault or diligence.” Id. at 423. Instead, courts 
examine a range of factors, including “the defendant’s level of awareness 
of his procedural remedy, age, education, familiarity with the legal 
system, whether the defendant was informed of his appellate rights, and 
whether he committed an act or omission which contributed to the delay.” 
Id. (quoting Land v. State, 649 N.E.2d 106, 108 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)).  
On transfer, we evaluate one issue: whether the trial court erred by 
denying Leshore’s petition for permission to file a belated notice of 
appeal.4 For the reasons below, we hold that it did.  
 
4 The trial court simply denied the petition without explanation. The appellate panel affirmed 
for lack of diligence. Leshore v. State, 194 N.E.3d 608, 2022 WL 3036401 at *1 (Ind. Ct. App. 
Aug. 2, 2022).  
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I. 
The Rule’s requirements are intertwined on 
these facts. 
     When confronted with a tardy petition seeking dispensation from 
otherwise firm deadlines and their decisive consequences, judges must 
ask, “was it your fault?” And if not, “did you act quickly enough 
thereafter?” Courts should take these questions up in sequence, though a 
negative answer to either one can be enough to bar relief. For instance, if 
the delay were caused through no fault of petitioner, but he still waited 
years to seek relief after discovery of the error, he could be denied on a 
lack of diligence alone. 
     Here the very same facts influence both answers. It was not Leshore’s 
fault because he received inaccurate advisements from both his lawyers 
and the trial court, and his reliance on that advice led to his long delay in 
seeking relief until he learned otherwise from another source. 
The panel below relied on two cases to affirm the denial of Leshore’s 
petition to file a belated notice of appeal based on a lack of diligence 
alone: Moshenek v. State, 868 N.E.2d 419 (Ind. 2007), and Cole v. State, 989 
N.E.2d 828 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. We, however, read those 
cases slightly differently. First, while Moshenek held the defendant had not 
been diligent in requesting permission to file a belated notice of appeal, 
this Court still evaluated the issue of fault under subsection (a)(2): “The 
fact that a trial court did not advise a defendant about this right can 
establish that the defendant was without fault in the delay of filing a 
timely appeal.” 868 N.E.2d at 424. On this point, Moshenek suggests that a 
trial court’s failure to advise a defendant of his right to appeal can satisfy 
the no-fault requirement. See also Jackson v. State, 853 N.E.2d 138, 141 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2006) (misadvisement); Baysinger v. State, 835 N.E.2d 223, 226 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (same), trans. denied. Second, while Cole indeed 
authorizes courts to resolve Rule 2(1)(a) petitions on “the diligence 
component alone,” 989 N.E.2d at 831, that principle does not bar Leshore 
from pursuing his appeal under these circumstances, as he was actually 
diligent once accurately informed of his rights. Leshore could have lost on 
the “diligence component alone,” id., had he waited too long upon 
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learning of the trial court’s and public defender’s errors, but we conclude 
that he acted with sufficient alacrity. 
A. Leshore was not at fault in failing to file a timely notice 
of appeal.  
The source of the delay was the mistaken advice shared with Leshore. 
That said, the panel confirmed in a footnote the right to appeal is not 
among the necessary rights for which a trial court advisement is required 
when the defendant pleads guilty. Leshore, 2022 WL 3036401, at *3 n.2. In 
its view, the public defender’s assessment was proper because it was 
limited to Leshore’s pro se attack on his guilty plea, and not his sentence. 
See id. Even so, Leshore’s public defender also informed Leshore that he 
“did not discover any other post-conviction issues.” App. Vol. II, p. 82 
(emphasis added).  
A public defender has distinct obligations under Indiana Post-
Conviction Rule 1(9)(c). That Rule requires the public defender to consult 
with Leshore and “ascertain all grounds for relief under this rule, 
amending the petition if necessary to include any grounds not included by 
petitioner in the original petition.” P-C.R. 1(9)(c) (emphasis added). 
Further, “[i]n the event that counsel determines the proceeding is not 
meritorious or in the interests of justice, . . . counsel shall [certify] that . . . 
the petitioner has been consulted regarding grounds for relief in his pro se 
petition and any other possible grounds . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). 
Leshore’s public defender also needed to “expla[in] . . . the reasons for 
withdrawal” to him. Id. He did not.   
Here, the public defender shared mistaken advice with Leshore about 
his available post-conviction relief. Leshore had a chance to appeal his 
sentence, but that choice was never presented to him. As for the 
sentencing court’s error, while the lack of appellate advisement is not 
grounds for overturning a guilty plea, see Ind. Code § 35-35-1-2 and Garcia 
v. State, 466 N.E.2d 33, 34 (Ind. 1984), its absence can constitute grounds 
for satisfying the no-fault requirement under Rule 2(1)(a)(2). See Moshenek, 
868 N.E.2d at 424. For example, in Baysinger v. State, 835 N.E.2d at 226, the 
trial court failed to inform the defendant of his right to appeal his sentence 
and “instead informed him that by pleading guilty he was giving up 
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‘most’ of his grounds for appeal.” Id. The court decided this advice was 
“insufficient guidance to a defendant who is pleading guilty as to what 
claims may or may not be available for appeal.” Id. In that case, the 
defendant asserted his counsel did not inform him of his right to appeal, 
and so the panel aptly concluded the defendant was not at fault for his 
failure to file a timely notice of appeal. See id.  
The mistaken advice here establishes Leshore was not at fault for his 
delay. In short, he had no reason to appeal his sentence when he was 
never aware of his right to do so. The record also contains equitable 
factors weighing in his favor: he was nineteen years-old when sentenced, 
he had limited education and contact with the legal system, and no 
experience with appellate law and its many rules. These facts, reviewed as 
a whole, “fused to justify Leshore’s inaction.” Leshore, 2022 WL 3036401, at 
*5 (Weissmann, J., dissenting). To hold otherwise would be “unfair” 
because Leshore made a sensible and rational decision based on mistaken 
advice from “the very people responsible for advising him correctly.” Id.  
B. Leshore was diligent in pursuing his belated notice of 
appeal.  
Leshore argues that he did not learn he could appeal his sentence until 
he was informed by an inmate in 2021, after which “he was diligent and 
immediately began pursuing his [a]ppellate [r]ights.” Appellant’s Br. at 7. 
We agree. 
In 2004, this Court in Collins v. State, 817 N.E.2d 230 (Ind. 2004), 
prescribed the proper procedure for challenging a sentence imposed 
under an “open plea” agreement: file a direct appeal; or, if the time for 
filing a direct appeal has run, seek permission to file a belated direct 
appeal under Post-Conviction Rule 2. Id. at 233. Since Collins, we have 
examined a defined universe of petitioners who had petitions for post-
conviction relief containing challenges to their sentence at the time of 
Collins. For example, in Johnson v. State, 898 N.E.2d 290 (Ind. 2008), this 
Court found “[p]rompt efforts to pursue those challenges through P-C.R. 2 
were allowed to proceed.” Id. at 292. Johnson involved a defendant who 
amended his petition for post-conviction relief to include a sentencing 
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claim in 2001, then withdrew his post-conviction petition in 2005, before 
filing for permission to file a belated notice of appeal in 2006. See id. at 291.  
Here, Leshore falls within the Johnson category of petitioners having 
petitioned for post-conviction relief, which contained a challenge to his 
sentence in 2001 and remained pending until after Collins was decided. 
Critically, Johnson states the Post-Conviction Rule 2 challenge must be 
“prompt.” 898 N.E.2d at 292. But prompt according to what rightful 
starting place? Diligence under these facts is best measured from the time 
when Leshore learned of his rights to the filing of his permission to file a 
belated notice of appeal. 
Thus, the more appropriate starting place for evaluating Leshore’s 
diligence begins on December 1, 2021. Nineteen days later, Leshore filed 
his petition. Similar to Baysinger, when the defendant confirmed he only 
learned of his right to challenge his sentence after he read Collins, Leshore 
acted promptly after discovering his rights from an inmate, who 
confirmed his discussion with Leshore. See Baysinger, 835 N.E.2d at 226. 
And while we decline to draw a line for when diligence must always 
begin, we can say Leshore was prompt enough. 
 
Conclusion 
The Court of Appeals thus erred in affirming the trial court’s decision 
to deny Leshore’s petition for permission to file a belated appeal, so we 
grant transfer, vacate the opinion, and remand to the trial court with 
instructions to grant the petition to allow Leshore’s appeal to proceed.  
Rush, C.J., and Molter, J., concur. 
Goff, J. dissents with separate opinion in which Slaughter, J., joins. 
 
 
 
 
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A P PE LL AN T  P R O  SE  
Charlie D. Leshore, Jr.  
New Castle, Indiana  
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E  
Theodore E. Rokita 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Samuel J. Dayton 
Deputy Attorney General  
Indianapolis, Indiana 
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Goff, J., dissenting. 
To obtain permission to file a belated notice of appeal, Charlie Leshore 
had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was “diligent in 
requesting” such permission. See Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 2(1)(a)(3); 
Moshenek v. State, 868 N.E.2d 419, 422‒23 (Ind. 2007). The record here does 
not affirmatively show such diligence. 
As the Court relates, Leshore pled guilty to six felony counts in 1999. 
Ante, at 2. His plea agreement left his sentence open. The trial court 
sentenced him to seventy years. He was not advised by the trial court or, 
he says, by counsel of his right to appeal his sentence. In 2001, Leshore 
filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief under Indiana Post-
Conviction Rule 1. The record does not contain a copy of this petition.1 It 
is uncertain, therefore, whether Leshore’s first petition actually raised a 
challenge to his sentence, as the Court states. Id. at 8. 
The State Public Defender reviewed Leshore’s case. In a memo 
approved on April 27, 2004, the State PD determined that Leshore had no 
meritorious claims that would justify representing him in post-conviction 
proceedings. See P-C.R. 1(9)(c). The memo analyzed several potential 
sentencing issues but found none that had merit. The State PD was 
required to “ascertain all grounds for relief under this rule,” so the fact 
that the memo discusses sentencing issues is not evidence that Leshore 
raised these issues in his pro se petition. See id. 
The State PD was obligated to consult with Leshore “regarding 
grounds for relief in his pro se petition and any other possible grounds” 
and to explain to him “the reasons for withdrawal.” See id. The Court 
states that the public defender “did not” do the latter. Ante, at 7. But I find 
no evidence in the record to support this inference. The State PD 
withdrew from Leshore’s case in September 2004. 
The Court also claims that the State PD “shared mistaken advice with 
Leshore about his available post-conviction relief.” Id. The State PD’s 
 
1 Nor is it available to view in the Odyssey case management system. 
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memo concluded that the trial court “advised Leshore of all necessary 
rights” and there were no post-conviction issues beyond those discussed, 
omitting any right to a belated appeal under Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 
2. App. Vol. II, p. 82. However, when the State PD withdrew from 
Leshore’s case, the post-conviction landscape was less clear than today. 
See Johnson v. State, 898 N.E.2d 290, 291 (Ind. 2008) (acknowledging there 
was formerly “a split in authority” about how to challenge a sentence 
following an open plea). In 2003, the Court of Appeals decided Gutermuth 
v. State, holding that, because the trial court had not informed the 
defendant of his right to appeal his sentence, he could instead challenge it 
via a Post-Conviction Rule 1 petition. 800 N.E.2d 592, 596‒97 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2003), vacated 817 N.E.2d 233 (Ind. 2004); see also Collins v. State, 800 
N.E.2d 609, 613–14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), vacated 817 N.E.2d 230 (Ind. 2004). 
Leshore’s case was on all-fours with Gutermuth. There was, therefore, no 
need for the State PD to advise Leshore in September 2004 that he could 
file for a belated notice of appeal. Only in November 2004 did our Court 
hand down its decision in Collins v. State, explaining that misadvised 
defendants must proceed via Post-Conviction Rule 2. 817 N.E.2d at 233; 
see also Gutermuth, 817 N.E.2d at 234–35. 
In January 2005, following the State PD’s withdrawal from his case, 
Leshore decided to withdraw his Post-Conviction Rule 1 petition without 
prejudice, rather than continuing pro se. See P-C.R. 1(9)(c). At that point, 
Leshore had received the State PD’s advice that his case involved no 
potentially meritorious sentencing claims. The very fact that the State PD 
had analyzed his sentencing in depth must have indicated to Leshore that 
there was an opportunity to challenge his sentence in post-conviction 
proceedings. Instead, he abandoned any sentencing claim he may have 
considered bringing. And, from that time until 2021, Leshore did not 
attempt to pursue post-conviction relief. 
In 2021, Leshore filed a Post-Conviction Rule 2 petition addressing his 
sentence, claiming that he had only recently learned he could file for a 
belated appeal. App. Vol. II, p. 87. This may be true in the technical sense 
that he only found out lately about his right to pursue Post-Conviction 
Rule 2, as opposed to Post-Conviction Rule 1, relief. But, practically 
speaking, Leshore had already received and abandoned the opportunity 
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to challenge his sentence in post-conviction proceedings. He enjoyed State 
PD review at a time when it appeared he could raise a sentencing 
challenge via the Post-Conviction Rule 1 petition that he filed. His failure 
to pursue relief upon receipt of the State PD’s advice demonstrates a lack 
of diligence in pursuing his claims. His subsequent discovery that he 
should, after all, have filed for a Post-Conviction Rule 2 belated appeal 
does not meaningfully change things. Leshore’s position is not like that in 
Johnson, where the defendant filed a prompt sentencing challenge under 
Post-Conviction Rule 1 and dismissed it after Collins only so he could 
refile under Post-Conviction Rule 2. 898 N.E.2d at 291. Leshore gave up 
any pursuit of post-conviction relief for a period of sixteen years. Had he 
proceeded with sentencing claims via Post-Conviction Rule 1 in 2005, he 
would probably have discovered much sooner that he needed to seek a 
belated appeal. 
Because I find that Leshore has not demonstrated diligence in pursuing 
an appeal, I respectfully dissent. 
 
Slaughter, J., joins.