Title: Nancy Megal v. Green Bay Area Visitor & Convention Bureau, Inc.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2004 WI 98 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-2932 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Nancy Megal,  
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Green Bay Area Visitor & Convention  
Bureau, Inc., Valley Forge Insurance Company, 
and Tommy G. Thompson, Secretary of the United 
States Department of Health and Human Services,  
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2003 WI App 230 
Reported at:  267 Wis. 2d 800, 672 N.W.2d 105 
(Ct. App. 2003-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 2, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 1, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Brown   
 
JUDGE: 
William M. Atkinson   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: SYKES, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Jolene D. Schneider, John C. Peterson and Peterson, Berk & 
Cross, S.C., Appleton, and oral argument by Jolene D. Schneider. 
 
For the defendant-respondent Green Bay Area Visitor & 
Convention Bureau, Inc., there was a brief by William J. Ewald 
and Denissen, Kranzush, Mahoney & Ewald, S.C., Green Bay, and 
oral argument by William J. Ewald. 
 
2004 WI 98 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-2932  
(L.C. No. 
01 CV 185) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Nancy Megal,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Green Bay Area Visitor & Convention  
Bureau, Inc., Valley Forge Insurance  
Company, and Tommy G. Thompson, Secretary  
of the United States Department of Health  
and Human Services,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 2, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part; reversed in part and cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE D. ROGGENSACK, J.   Nancy Megal requests that 
we review a published court of appeals decision that affirmed 
the order of the circuit court for Brown County, William M. 
Atkinson, presiding, granting the defendant's motion for summary 
judgment, thereby dismissing Megal's safe-place violation and 
negligence claims.   
¶2 
Because we conclude that Megal's safe-place claim was 
properly dismissed, we affirm that part of the court of appeals 
No. 
02-2932   
 
2 
 
decision.  However, because we also conclude that the court of 
appeals erred when it affirmed the dismissal of Megal's 
negligence claim, we reverse that part of the court of appeals 
decision and remand for further proceedings. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
The background facts are undisputed.  On February 6, 
1998, Nancy Megal accompanied her seven-year-old granddaughter, 
her granddaughter's friend and the two girls' mothers to an ice 
show at the Brown County Veterans Memorial Arena (Arena).  The 
Arena has three floors totaling nearly 61,000 square feet and, 
for an ice show, seats a maximum of 5,248 patrons.  The night 
Megal was there for the "Pocahontas on Ice" show, the Arena had 
sold 4,220 seats, and many of the patrons were children.  Megal 
and her group were seated on the upper level of the Arena.  At 
the end of the show, Megal, along with the rest of the audience 
seated near her, descended a stairway to exit.  The stairway was 
crowded, and Megal said she held onto the stairway handrail; 
however, she could not see the stair in front of her.  As she 
neared the bottom step, Megal slipped and fell when she stepped 
on a ketchup-covered french fry.  Megal did not see the french 
fry before she slipped on it; she did not know how it got there 
or how long it had been there.  As a result of the fall, Megal 
fractured her left ankle and suffered permanent injury.  Aside 
from the french fry on the stair, there were no other spilled 
food items on the stairs, nor any other noticeable litter, trash 
or other debris cluttering the Arena.  
No. 
02-2932   
 
3 
 
¶4 
Patrons attending events at the Arena are not allowed 
to bring in food or drink from the outside; however, concessions 
are available for purchase inside the Arena, but only on the 
lower east concourse beginning an hour before a show and ending 
approximately fifteen to thirty minutes before the conclusion of 
a show.  Patrons may carry these concessions to all areas of the 
Arena without restriction. 
¶5 
At 
evening 
ice 
shows, 
including 
the 
one 
Megal 
attended, two workers are responsible for performing janitorial 
services.  They are not required to abide by formal written 
procedures.  Instead, one of the janitors generally would clean 
the lower east concourse food area after intermissions, and 
either janitor would clean up a spill or mess if he or she saw 
one or was told about one.  Usually, the janitors relied on 
others to tell them of spills.  
¶6 
The Arena is owned by Brown County and leased to the 
Green Bay Area Visitors & Convention Bureau, Inc. (Bureau).  The 
Bureau had an agreement with Promotion Management, Inc. (PMI) 
whereby PMI would provide concessions in the Arena, and the 
personnel necessary for the day-to-day operation of the Arena. 
¶7 
Megal filed a complaint on February 5, 2001, and, once 
the identity of all parties became known, she filed an amended 
complaint on April 26, 2001, naming, among others, the Bureau 
and its insurer, Valley Forge Insurance Company; PMI and its 
insurer, Valley Forge Insurance Company; and Brown County and 
its insurer, Wisconsin Municipal Mutual Insurance Company, 
alleging negligence and a violation of Wisconsin's safe-place 
No. 
02-2932   
 
4 
 
statute.  See Wis. Stat. § 101.11 (2001-02).1  The circuit court 
granted partial summary judgment for the Bureau, releasing it 
from liability for the statutory safe-place claim, but not from 
the negligence claim.  Both the Bureau and Megal moved for 
reconsideration and the circuit court granted the Bureau's 
motion, thereby dismissing the negligence claim as well.  Megal 
appealed.  The court of appeals affirmed and we accepted Megal's 
petition for review. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶8 
We review summary judgments de novo, using the same 
method as the circuit court.  Alvarado v. Sersch, 2003 WI 55, 
¶10, 262 Wis. 2d 74, 662 N.W.2d 350.  Summary judgment can be 
granted only if there are no disputes of material fact and one 
party's claim is entitled to judgment, as a matter of law.  Id.   
B. 
Safe-Place Violation Claim 
1. 
Safe-Place law 
¶9 
According to Wis. Stat. § 101.11, every employer and 
owner of a public building is to provide a place that is safe 
for employees and for frequenters of that place, and "[e]very 
employer and every owner of a place of employment or a public 
building . . . shall so construct, repair or maintain such place 
of employment or public building as to render the same safe."  
Section 101.11(1).  This duty has a higher standard of care than 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-02 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
02-2932   
 
5 
 
that imposed by common-law negligence.  Dykstra v. Arthur G. 
McKee & Co., 92 Wis. 2d 17, 26, 284 N.W.2d 692 (Ct. App. 1979), 
aff'd, 100 Wis. 2d 120, 301 N.W.2d 201 (1981).  However, the 
safe-place statute addresses unsafe conditions, not negligent 
acts.  Gross v. Denow, 61 Wis. 2d 40, 47, 212 N.W.2d 2 (1973).  
In addition, the law does not require an employer or an owner of 
a public building to be insurers of frequenters of the premises.  
Strack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 35 Wis. 2d 51, 54, 150 
N.W.2d 361 (1967).  
¶10 Moreover, "safe" is a relative term.  Gross, 61 
Wis. 2d at 46.  "Safe" does not mean completely free of any 
hazards.  See id.  What constitutes a safe place "depends on the 
facts and conditions present, and the use to which the place 
'was likely to be put.'"  Id. at 47 (quoting Gould v. Allstar 
Ins. Co., 59 Wis. 2d 355, 362, 208 N.W.2d 388 (1973)).  Just 
because a place could be made more safe, it does not necessarily 
follow that an employer or owner has breached the duty of care 
established by Wis. Stat. § 101.11(1).  See Fitzgerald v. Badger 
State Mut. Cas. Co., 67 Wis. 2d 321, 327, 227 N.W.2d 444 (1975).  
Rather, the duty set forth by the statute requires an employer 
or owner to make the place "as safe as the nature of the 
premises reasonably permits."  Strack, 35 Wis. 2d at 54.  The 
"nature of the business" and the "manner in which [business] is 
conducted" are factors to be considered in assessing whether the 
premises are safe, within the meaning of § 101.11(1).  See 
Gerdmann v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 119 Wis. 2d 367, 372, 
350 N.W.2d 730 (Ct. App. 1984).  
No. 
02-2932   
 
6 
 
¶11 In order for an employer or owner to be subject to the 
standard of care established by Wis. Stat. § 101.11(1) for any 
unsafe condition of the premises, the employer or owner must 
have notice that an unsafe condition exists.  This notice can be 
actual notice or constructive notice.  Strack, 35 Wis. 2d at 54-
55; Kaufman v. State Street Ltd. P'ship, 187 Wis. 2d 54, 59, 522 
N.W.2d 249 (Ct. App. 1994).  Constructive notice has been 
explained as: 
neither 
notice 
nor 
knowledge 
but 
a 
shorthand 
expression, 'the mere trademark of a fiction.'  In 
order 
to 
promote 
sound 
policy, 
we 
attribute 
constructive notice of a fact to a person and treat 
his legal rights and interests as if he had actual 
notice or knowledge although in fact he did not.   
Strack, 35 Wis. 2d at 54-55 (citations omitted).  See May v. 
Skelley Oil Co., 83 Wis. 2d 30, 36, 264 N.W.2d 574 (1978).   
¶12 In the context of an alleged safe-place violation, the 
general rule is that an employer or owner is deemed to have 
constructive notice of a defect or unsafe condition when that 
defect or condition has existed a long enough time for a 
reasonably vigilant owner to discover and repair it.  May, 83 
Wis. 2d at 36; Strack, 35 Wis. 2d at 55; Kaufman, 187 Wis. 2d at 
59.  Ordinarily, constructive notice requires evidence as to the 
length of time that the condition existed.  Kaufman, 187 Wis. 2d 
at 59.     
¶13 The length of time required for the existence of a 
defect or unsafe condition that is sufficient to constitute 
constructive notice depends on the surrounding facts and 
circumstances, including the nature of the business and the 
No. 
02-2932   
 
7 
 
nature of the defect.  May, 83 Wis. 2d at 37; Gerdmann, 119 
Wis. 2d at 371; Dykstra, 92 Wis. 2d at 26.  We have carved out a 
limited exception to the general rule that temporal evidence is 
required before constructive notice can arise.  We have 
explained: 
[W]hen an unsafe condition, although temporary or 
transitory, arises out of the course of conduct of the 
owner or operator of a premises or may reasonably be 
expected from his method of operation, a much shorter 
period of time, and possibly no appreciable period of 
time 
under 
some 
circumstances, 
need 
exist 
to 
constitute constructive notice. 
Strack, 35 Wis. 2d at 55.  See Steinhorst v. H.C. Prange Co., 48 
Wis. 2d 679, 683-84, 180 N.W.2d 525 (1970).   
¶14 In Strack, the plaintiff was shopping in defendant's 
grocery store in the produce area where there were tables 
displaying fruit for sale in the center of a wide aisle.  The 
plaintiff slipped on a small Italian prune that was on the floor 
and injured her back and leg.  Strack, 35 Wis. 2d at 53-54.  The 
plaintiff sued the store alleging a violation of the safe-place 
statute.  Though the plaintiff had no evidence that the prune 
had been on the floor for any appreciable amount of time, as 
would be required under the general rule for constructive 
notice, we determined that the grocery store had constructive 
notice because of its method of merchandizing articles for sale 
to the public in the area of store where the injury occurred.  
Id. at 55-56.  We said:   
[W]e think supermarkets which display their produce 
and fruit in such a way that they may be handled by 
customers 
and 
dropped 
or 
knocked 
to 
the 
floor 
No. 
02-2932   
 
8 
 
unintentionally is a way of doing business which 
requires the storekeeper to use reasonable measures to 
discover and remove such debris from the floor.  . . .  
While the use of self-service produce displays is not 
negligence as a matter of law, [such displays] do 
create marketing problems of safety and place upon the 
store operator the need for greater vigilance if he is 
to meet the higher than common-law standard of care 
required by the safe-place statute.  
Id. at 56-57.   
¶15 Similarly, 
in Steinhorst, 
the 
store's 
method of 
merchandizing articles for sale to the public in the area of the 
store where the injury occurred gave rise to constructive notice 
without evidence that the unsafe condition had existed for any 
amount of time.  Steinhorst, 48 Wis. 2d at 684.  There, the 
plaintiff was shopping in defendant's store and was walking next 
to the men's cosmetic counter when she slipped on spilled 
shaving foam and injured her wrist and her leg.  The cosmetic 
counter displayed a number of aerosol shaving foams, including 
"tester" bottles that customers were encouraged to sample.  Id. 
at 681.  The plaintiff presented no evidence as to how long the 
shaving foam was on the floor before she slipped on it.  We 
determined that the exception announced in Strack applied in 
Steinhorst as well.  That is, "[t]he unsafe condition here was 
substantially caused by the method used to display merchandise 
for sale.  . . .  [W]hether the shaving soap got on the floor 
accidentally 
or 
through 
negligence 
of 
a 
shopper, 
or 
intentionally by 'boys playing around,' such conduct should have 
been 
foreseen" 
by 
the 
defendant 
store. 
 
Id. 
at 
684.  
Accordingly, while constructive notice of an unsafe condition 
No. 
02-2932   
 
9 
 
usually requires temporal evidence relating to the condition, 
temporal evidence may be unnecessary when the method of 
merchandizing articles for sale to the public in the area in 
which the injury occurred makes the harm that occurred at that 
location reasonably foreseeable.   
2. 
Safe-Place law and Megal's claim 
¶16 It has not been disputed that the Arena is a public 
building and that the Bureau is an owner or employer within the 
meaning of Wis. Stat. § 101.11(1).  However, the Bureau urges us 
to affirm the court of appeals because Megal has not presented 
any evidence that the french fry upon which she slipped was on 
the step for any appreciable time.  Therefore, the Bureau 
contends that it cannot be deemed to have constructive notice 
unless the narrow Strack exception applies, and the Bureau 
asserts that nothing in the record supports it.   
¶17 On the other hand, Megal argues that the Strack 
exception applies to her because the Bureau could reasonably 
expect unsafe conditions to arise due to the Bureau's method of 
selling the Arena's concessions to the public.  She claims that 
two janitors working in a 61,000 square-foot facility throughout 
which patrons can carry food and drink without restriction, 
having no specific procedures for patrolling the Arena looking 
for spills, is similar to the self-serve produce section in 
Strack or the cosmetic counter in Steinhorst.  However, she also 
acknowledged that it was just as possible that someone ahead of 
her in the departing crowd dropped the french fry moments before 
she stepped on it, as it was that someone dropped the french fry 
No. 
02-2932   
 
10 
 
after intermission.  Additionally, Megal provided no affidavit 
from an expert witness or other materials from which we could 
conclude that a question of fact had arisen about whether the 
Arena was not as safe as the nature of a 61,000 square-foot 
entertainment enterprise reasonably permits.  
¶18 As we explained supra, if constructive notice is 
relied on, generally, evidence of the length of time that the 
unsafe condition existed is required to establish it.  May, 83 
Wis. 2d at 36.   We have imputed constructive notice, without a 
showing of temporal evidence of the unsafe condition, in a 
narrow class of cases where the method of merchandizing articles 
for sale to the public in the area where the harm occurred 
should have made that harm reasonably foreseeable at that 
location.  See, e.g., Steinhorst, 48 Wis. 2d at 683-84; Strack, 
35 Wis. 2d at 55.  It is important that the harm that occurred 
be foreseeable in the area where it occurred because Wis. Stat. 
§ 101.11(1) creates a standard of care that requires the 
employer or owner to make the premises "as safe as its nature 
would reasonably permit," by correcting the unsafe condition.  
Kaufman, 187 Wis. 2d at 64 (citing Strack, 35 Wis. 2d at 55-56).  
If this obligation is to arise without actual notice or evidence 
that the unsafe condition was permitted to exist for an 
unreasonable period of time, the harm that occurred must be 
reasonably foreseeable in the area where it occurred.  See 
Kaufman, 187 Wis. 2d at 65.  Otherwise, it would not be 
reasonable to require the employer or owner to incur liability 
for not correcting it.  See id.  We have refused to impute 
No. 
02-2932   
 
11 
 
constructive notice where the area where the harm occurred is 
not an area where the owner was merchandizing articles for sale 
to the public in a way that made the harm that occurred 
reasonably foreseeable.  See Kaufman, 187 Wis. 2d at 65 
(concluding that the Strack exception was not available to a 
plaintiff who slipped on a banana peel in a store's parking 
lot).   
¶19 Furthermore, 
in 
some 
business 
operations, 
what 
constitutes "as safe as the nature of the premises reasonably 
permits" is outside the realm of typical experience, and 
requires expert testimony to describe the practices that are 
reasonably required of the business enterprise at issue.  See 
Kujawski v. Arbor View Health Care Ctr., 139 Wis. 2d 455, 463, 
407 N.W.2d 249 (1987) (explaining that expert testimony is 
necessary when the trier of fact is to determine matters 
requiring knowledge or experience on subjects that are not 
within the common knowledge of mankind). 
¶20 Megal provided neither evidence of the length of time 
the french fry was on the stair, nor any expert testimony about 
the usual management and maintenance of a 61,000 square-foot 
public building where events are held and food is sold for the 
benefit of the patrons who attend an event.  What is reasonable 
to expect for the management of such a facility in regard to 
preventing the kind of accident that occurred here is not within 
the common knowledge of mankind or of this court.  Because we 
have been presented with no testimony that the Arena is not as 
safe as the nature of the enterprise permits, and because Wis. 
No. 
02-2932   
 
12 
 
Stat. § 101.11(1) does not make the Bureau the insurer of all 
who attend events at the Arena, we have no basis on which to 
analyze the Strack exception for Megal's injury.  We cannot 
speculate about what is reasonable for such an enterprise.  See 
also Moulas v. PBC Prods., Inc., 213 Wis. 2d 406, 417, 570 
N.W.2d 739 (Ct. App. 1997) (noting in a safe-place claim that 
"[p]ersonal opinions of an affiant in the absence of a 
validating 
basis 
do 
not 
constitute 
evidentiary 
facts").  
Accordingly, because the facts of record are insufficient to 
create a question of fact in regard to constructive notice, we 
affirm the court of appeals decision dismissing Megal's safe-
place claim.2   
C. 
Negligence Claim 
¶21 Aside from the safe-place violation, Megal's complaint 
also alleged common-law negligence.  The court of appeals 
affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of that cause of action, 
stating that a common-law negligence claim could not be 
maintained if a safe-place violation is alleged and cannot be 
established.  See Balas v. St. Sebastian's Congregation, 66 
                                                 
2  Whether an employer or owner has notice of an unsafe 
condition generally is a question of fact left to the jury.  
Gerdmann v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 119 Wis. 2d 367, 370, 
350 N.W.2d 730 (Ct. App. 1984).  Here, however, the facts are 
not in dispute, and the question is simply whether those facts 
have any legal significance (i.e., whether the facts Megal 
provided can be used to impute constructive notice to the Bureau 
under Strack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 35 Wis. 2d 51, 54, 
150 N.W.2d 361 (1967)).  This is a question of law.  See 
Vocational, Technical & Adult Educ., Dist. 13 v. DILHR, 76 
Wis. 2d 230, 240, 251 N.W.2d 41 (1977).  
No. 
02-2932   
 
13 
 
Wis. 2d 421, 426-27, 225 N.W.2d 428 (1975).  We disagree, and 
reverse that part of the court of appeals decision. 
¶22 Our discussion of the availability of a common-law 
negligence claim in this kind of situation requires some 
reference back to the safe-place statute.  However, to begin, in 
Wisconsin, everyone has a duty to everyone else to act with 
reasonable care.  Alvarado, 262 Wis. 2d 74, ¶16 n.2; Gritzner v. 
Michael R., 2000 WI 68, ¶20, 235 Wis. 2d 781, 611 N.W.2d 906.  
What constitutes "reasonable care" in a given situation may be 
defined by case law or by statute.  See Rosholt v. Worden-Allen 
Co., 155 Wis. 168, 172-73, 144 N.W. 650 (1913).  We long have 
held that the safe-place statute establishes a standard of care:  
to make the place as safe as the nature of the premises 
reasonably permits.  Strack, 35 Wis. 2d at 54; Krause v. 
Veterans of Foreign Wars Post No. 6498, 9 Wis. 2d 547, 552, 101 
N.W.2d 645 (1960); Paluch v. Baldwin Plywood & Veneer Co., 1 
Wis. 2d 427, 432, 85 N.W.2d 373 (1957); Stellmacher v. Wisco 
Hardware Co., 259 Wis. 310, 314, 48 N.W.2d 492 (1951); Morrison 
v. Steinfort, 254 Wis. 89, 91, 35 N.W.2d 335 (1948); Holzworth 
v. State, 238 Wis. 63, 68, 298 N.W. 163 (1941).  The standard of 
care that the safe-place statute establishes is a higher 
standard of care than that which the law imposes through common-
law negligence.  Dykstra, 92 Wis. 2d at 26.  
¶23 In our early discussions where we compared the safe-
place statute and common-law negligence, we concluded that those 
who violated the standard of care under the safe-place statute 
also violated the standard of care for common-law negligence.  
No. 
02-2932   
 
14 
 
Krause, 9 Wis. 2d at 552; Paluch, 1 Wis. 2d at 432-33; 
Stellmacher, 259 Wis. at 314; Morrison, 254 Wis. at 91; 
Holzworth, 238 Wis. at 68.  This is a valid conclusion.  More 
recently, we appear to have concluded that when the reverse 
occurs, i.e., when a plaintiff does not prove a violation of the 
safe-place standard of care, a plaintiff could not prove a 
violation of the common-law negligence standard of care.  Balas, 
66 Wis. 2d at 426-27; Merkley v. Schramm, 31 Wis. 2d 134, 142, 
142 N.W.2d 173 (1966); Lealiou v. Quatsoe, 15 Wis. 2d 128, 136, 
112 N.W.2d 193 (1961).  Our discussion in Lealiou appears to be 
the first time we made such a connection, which we set out 
without citing any authority:  
[I]f the defendant is found to have breached his duty 
under the safe-place statute, recovery is had for the 
breach of the higher degree of care, and if it is 
found the defendant has not breached the higher degree 
of care, he cannot be held to have breached the 
standard of care under common law. 
Lealiou, 15 Wis. 2d at 136.  In a later case, Balas, we 
attempted to explain ourselves as follows: 
At common law, the highest duty owed by an owner 
of land toward someone on the premises was that of 
ordinary care, owed to an invitee.  This duty could be 
satisfied by alternative means.  The landowner might 
either 
have 
his 
premises 
in 
a 
reasonably 
safe 
condition or give the invitee adequate and timely 
warning of latent and concealed perils which are known 
to the invitor but not to the invitee.  Another way of 
stating this same proposition is that there is no duty 
to inspect and warn unless it is shown that the 
premises were not in a reasonably safe condition.  The 
statutory safe-place duty to construct and maintain a 
public building as safe as its nature will reasonably 
permit is not a lesser standard than that imposed by 
the common law.  A fortiori no violation of a common-
No. 
02-2932   
 
15 
 
law duty is shown if violation of the safe-place 
statute cannot be established. 
Balas, 66 Wis. 2d at 426-27 (internal citations omitted).  These 
analyses are unsubstantiated and incorrect insofar as they 
preclude a common-law negligence claim if no violation of the 
safe-place standard of care is established, and we withdraw 
them.  In our view, there is no reason why, if an employee or 
frequenter has not proved that the employer or owner violated 
the higher standard of care in Wis. Stat. § 101.11(1) that it 
necessarily follows that the employee or frequenter cannot prove 
that the employer or owner violated the lower standard of 
common-law negligence by committing a negligent act.  As we have 
said, the safe-place statute addresses unsafe conditions, not 
simply negligent acts.  Gross, 61 Wis. 2d at 47.   
¶24 The enactment of the safe-place statute in 1911 
substantially changed the landscape of an employer's duty to his 
employees to provide a safe work environment.  Rosholt, 155 Wis. 
at 173 (noting that common law required only that the workplace 
be "reasonably safe," whereas the safe-place statute required 
the workplace to be as free from "danger to the life, health or 
safety of employees . . . as the nature of the employment will 
reasonably permit").  The statute also required employers to 
provide a safe environment for those who frequent their 
businesses.  Carr v. Amusement, Inc., 47 Wis. 2d 368, 374, 177 
N.W.2d 388 (1970).  However, the law did not——and does not——
release employers from their duty to act with reasonable care, 
as every other person in this state is required to do.  See 
No. 
02-2932   
 
16 
 
Alvarado, 262 Wis. 2d 74, ¶16 n.2; Gritzner, 235 Wis. 2d 781, 
¶20.   
¶25 Megal demonstrated no facts that could be used to show 
that the Bureau had constructive notice of the unsafe condition 
that caused her injury, as is necessary to establish a violation 
of the safe-place standard of care, but she may be able to show 
that the Bureau failed to exercise ordinary care.  A person is 
negligent if the person, without intending to cause harm, either 
acts affirmatively or fails to act in a way that a reasonable 
person would recognize as creating an unreasonable risk of 
injury.  Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 424, 541 N.W.2d 
742 (1995) (citation omitted).  See Wis. JI-Civil 1005.  
Accordingly, Megal is entitled to proceed with her common law 
claim. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶26 Because we conclude that Megal's safe-place claim was 
properly dismissed, we affirm that part of the court of appeals 
decision.  However, because we also conclude that the court of 
appeals erred when it affirmed the dismissal of Megal's 
negligence claim, we reverse that part of the court of appeals 
decision and remand for further proceedings. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part; reversed in part, and the cause is remanded to 
the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
¶27 DIANE S. SYKES, J., did not participate. 
 
No. 
02-2932   
 
 
 
1