Title: In Re Maple Tree Place

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 90-354


In re Maple Tree Place                       Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
                                             Chittenden Superior Court

                                             September Term, 1990


Stephen B. Martin, J.

Spokes, Foley & Peterson, Burlington, for appellant

Fred I. Parker, Mark L. Sperry and Alison J. Bell of Langrock Sperry
  Parker & Wool, Burlington, for appellee

Harvey D. Carter, Jr., Burlington, for Williston Citizens for Responsible
  Growth


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ.


     DOOLEY, J.   This interlocutory appeal involves Maple Tree Place
Associates' (MTP) pursuit of a subdivision and site plan approval.  The Town
of Williston and Williston Citizens for Responsible Growth appeal a decision
by the Chittenden Superior Court remanding the case to the Williston
Planning Commission.  We affirm.
     In 1987 MTP filed an application with the Williston Planning
Commission for conceptual subdivision approval for a 477,159-square-foot
shopping mall under the Town of Williston Subdivision and Zoning
Regulations.  Conceptual approval was granted in March 1988, and in May of
1988 MTP applied to the commission for site plan approval and preliminary
subdivision approval.  After sixteen public hearings the commission on
December 5, 1989 concluded on a five-to-four vote that MTP did not meet five
of the twelve standards for review set forth in the subdivision and site
plan regulations, and denied MTP's application.
     MTP appealed to the Chittenden Superior Court under 24 V.S.A. {{ 4471
and 4475, referencing in addition V.R.C.P. 74.  Soon thereafter, MTP moved
for remand to the Williston Planning Commission for leave to present
additional evidence, namely a plan for phasing the project.  In support of
its motion, MTP pointed to numerous references in the commission's decision
to the ill effects of the immediate, unphased development of so large a
project on the Town's plan for orderly growth; on secondary commercial
growth in the Town; on land values; and on the impression of a rural
community, historic resources, and other values.  MTP focused particularly
on paragraph 39 of the decision, which stated:
            Phasing a development is often appropriate to
         mitigate unreasonable highway congestion or unsafe
         conditions.  The Applicant has indicated it would not
         accept a condition to phase its project.  Other
         developments in the Taft Corners area have been phased
         by conditions imposed in the Town permitting process or
         by the District Environmental Commission.  Phasing would
         allow the Town to control traffic by being assured that
         increased use of the highways does not outpace the
         necessary road improvements.  Alternative traffic
         routing patterns and roadway improvements could be
         explored if initial phases of the project result in
         unacceptable impacts.

MTP argued that it was misled into not presenting a phasing plan by the
commission's conceptual review and, thus, it was not at fault for this
omission.  It denied that it had expressed to the commission that it would
not accept a phased project.
     MTP relied in its remand motion on the language of 24 V.S.A. { 4471
providing that an "appeal [from a planning commission to a superior court]
shall be taken in such manner as the supreme court may by rule provide for
appeals from state agencies governed by sections 801 through 816 of Title 3
[the Administrative Procedure Act]."  MTP contended that 3 V.S.A. { 815(b)
allowed a reviewing court to remand a matter to the originating agency for
presentation of additional evidence upon a showing of "good reasons for
failure to present it in the proceeding before the agency . . . ."  The Town
opposed the motion on grounds that { 815(b) was limited to appeals from
state agencies and that the Administrative Procedure Act did not apply to
appeals under 24 V.S.A. { 4471.
     The trial court granted the motion to remand, adopting MTP's theory.
It noted that the permit denial included other reasons besides the lack of
phasing but concluded that it was unable to determine "which concerns caused
a majority of the commission to rule against the project or whether a
majority would have voted in favor of the project if MTP had presented a
'phase in' plan."  Initially, it specified that the review would be under
the "current town plan."  It amended the order, however, to specify that
review of the phased proposal should occur under the plan in effect when
MTP originally sought approval.  The court subsequently granted the Town's
motion for interlocutory review, pursuant to V.R.A.P. 5, of the decision to
remand, and Williston Citizens for Responsible Growth (CRG), an intervenor,
joined in the appeal.
     The court certified the following controlling question of law pursuant
to the Rule:
         Whether the superior court has authority under 3 V.S.A.
         section 815 to remand an amended application for
         subdivision and site plan approval to a town planning
         commission.

The Town repeats on appeal its central argument before the superior court
-- that 3 V.S.A. { 815 does not apply to appeals brought from municipal
zoning and planning bodies under 24 V.S.A. { 4471 and the language of the
latter section does not make it applicable by reference.  It is clearly
correct on the first part of its argument.  As set out in 3 V.S.A. {
801(b)(1), "agency" is defined in the APA with only state, rather than
municipal, entities in mind:
         "[A]gency" means a state board, commission, department,
         agency, or other entity or officer of state government,
         other than the legislature, the courts, the Commander in
         Chief and the Military Department, authorized by law to
         make rules or to determine contested cases.

The APA does not apply to local boards or commissions.  See Burroughs v.
West Windsor Bd. of School Directors, 141 Vt. 234, 236,