Title: Ex parte Sacha Baron Cohen et al. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Kathie Martin v. Sacha Baron Cohen et al.)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL:01/18/08 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
____________________
1061288
____________________
Ex parte Sacha Baron Cohen et al.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Kathie Martin
v.
Sacha Baron Cohen et al.) 
(Jefferson Circuit Court, CV-06-7333) 
BOLIN, Justice.
Sacha 
Baron 
Cohen; 
Twentieth 
Century 
Fox 
Film
Corporation; One America Productions, Inc., d/b/a Springland
Films; Everyman Pictures; Dune Entertainment, L.L.C.; MTV
1061288
2
Networks; Comedy Central; Dakota North Entertainment, Inc.;
and Four by Two Production Company (hereinafter collectively
referred to as "the petitioners"), the defendants in an action
filed in the Jefferson Circuit Court by Kathie Martin, moved
the trial court to dismiss Martin's claims against them on the
basis of a forum-selection clause in the contract between
Martin and Springland Films that provides that New York
County, New York, is the exclusive venue for Martin's claims.
The trial court denied the petitioners' motion.  The
petitioners now seek mandamus relief from this Court.  We
grant their petition and issue the writ.
I.
Kathie Martin owns and operates the Etiquette School of
Birmingham, which provides etiquette training to individuals
and corporate groups.  Sometime in October 2005, Todd
Schulman, an employee of One America Productions, contacted
Martin via telephone to inquire about her business and to
assess her interest in participating in what he described as
a documentary being filmed for Belarusian television about the
experiences of a foreign reporter traveling in the United
1061288
In all his dealings with Martin, Schulman identified
1
himself as "Todd Lewis" and the company he was working for as
Springland Films.
3
States.   Martin agreed to give the reporter a lesson on
1
dining etiquette, and, on October 24, 2005, she traveled to
the Tutwiler Hotel in Birmingham for the filming of the
lesson.  Upon arriving at the Tutwiler Hotel, Martin was
presented 
with 
a 
document 
entitled 
"Standard 
Consent
Agreement," which she signed.  That document (hereinafter
referred to as "the consent agreement") provided, in pertinent
part:
"This is an agreement between Springland Films
(the 'Producer') and the undersigned participant
(the 'Participant').  In exchange for the Producer's
obligation to pay a participation fee in the amount
of $350 (receipt of which is acknowledged by the
Participant) and the opportunity for the Participant
to appear in a motion picture, the Participant
agrees as follows:
"1.  The Participant agrees to be
filmed and audiotaped by the Producer for
a documentary-style film (the 'Film').  It
is understood that the Producer hopes to
reach a young adult audience by using
entertaining content and formats.
"2.  The Participant agrees that any
rights that the Participant may have in the
Film or the Participant's contribution to
the Film are hereby assigned to the
Producer, and that the Producer shall be
exclusively entitled to use, or to assign
1061288
4
or license to others the right to use, the
Film 
and 
any 
recorded 
material 
that
includes 
the 
Participant 
without
restriction in any media throughout the
universe 
in 
perpetuity 
and 
without
liability to the Participant, and the
Participant hereby grants any consents
required 
for 
those 
purposes. 
 
The
Participant also agrees to allow the
Producer, and any of its assignees or
licensees, 
to 
use 
the 
Participant's
contribution, 
photograph, 
film 
footage, 
and
biographical material in connection not
only with the Film, but also in any
advertising, marketing or publicity for the
Film and in connection with any ancillary
products associated with the Film.
"....
"4.  The Participant specifically, but
without limitation, waives, and agrees not
to bring at any time in the future, any
claims against the Producer, or against any
of its assignees or licensees or anyone
associated with the Film, that include
assertions of (a) infringement of rights of
publicity or misappropriation (such as any
allegedly improper or unauthorized use of
the Participant's name or likeness or
image), (b) damages caused by 'acts of God'
(such as, but not limited to, injuries from
natural disasters), (c) damages caused by
acts of terrorism or war, (d) intrusion
(such as any allegedly offensive behavior
or questioning or any invasion of privacy),
(e) false light (such as any allegedly
false or misleading portrayal of the
Participant), (f) infliction of emotional
distress (whether allegedly intentional or
negligent), (g) trespass (to property or
person), (h) breach of any alleged contract
1061288
5
(whether the alleged contract is verbal or
in 
writing), 
(i) 
allegedly 
deceptive
business or trade practices, (j) copyright
or trademark infringement, (k) defamation
(such as any allegedly false statements
made on the Film), (l) violations of
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act (such as
allegedly false or misleading statements or
suggestions 
about 
the 
Participant 
in
relation to the Film or the Film in
relation to the Participant), (m) prima
facie tort (such as alleged intentional
harm to the Participant), (n) fraud (such
as any alleged deception or surprise about
the Film or this consent agreement), (o)
breach of alleged moral rights, or (p)
tortious or wrongful interference with any
contracts or business of the Participant,
or 
any 
claim 
arising 
out 
of 
the
Participant's viewing of any sexually-
oriented materials or activities.
"....
"6.  Although the Participant agrees
not to bring any claim in connection with
the Film or its production, if any claim
nevertheless is made, the Participant
agrees that any such claim must be brought
before, 
and 
adjudicated 
by, 
only 
a
competent court located in the State of New
York and County of New York, under the laws
of the State of New York."
After signing the consent agreement, Martin was introduced to
the alleged foreign reporter who was the subject of the film,
and they proceeded to begin filming the dining-etiquette
lesson.  It is sufficient to say that an eventful meal ensued
1061288
6
during which the alleged reporter engaged in behavior that
would generally be considered boorish and offensive.  
After the lesson concluded, Martin telephoned her husband
and related what had occurred.  After hearing Martin's
description of what had happened and being suspicious of the
alleged reporter, Martin's husband sent to Martin's office
pictures of two characters played by comedian and actor Sacha
Baron Cohen on his HBO television series "Da Ali G Show," Ali
G and Borat, which he had gotten off the Internet. Martin then
learned for the first time that the alleged foreign reporter
was in fact Cohen in character as Borat, a fictitious
journalist from Kazakhstan.  
Unbeknownst to Martin, her lesson with Borat had in fact
been 
filmed 
not 
for 
use 
in 
a 
Belarusian 
television
documentary, but for inclusion in a major Hollywood motion
picture, Borat: Cultural Learnings of America for Make Benefit
Glorious Nation of Kazakhstan (hereinafter referred to as "the
Borat movie"), distributed by Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corporation.  The Borat movie, which was assigned an R-rating
by the ratings board based on strong crude and sexual content
and graphic nudity and language, was released in the United
1061288
Cohen was not initially included in the motion to dismiss
2
because he had not yet been served when it was filed.
However, after being served, Cohen filed a motion adopting and
joining in the previously filed motion to dismiss.
7
States on approximately November 3, 2006, and went on to gross
more than $200 million worldwide.  Martin was identified by
name in the film, which included portions of her etiquette
lesson with Borat.  Segments of Martin's initial meeting with
Borat were also used in the film's advertising and promotion.
On December 22, 2006, Martin, claiming that she had been
embarrassed and humiliated by her encounter with Borat and her
inclusion in and association with the Borat movie, sued Cohen,
the production companies associated with the Borat movie, and
other parties related to the film, in the Jefferson Circuit
Court, stating claims alleging fraud and deceit, quasi-
contract and unjust enrichment, commercial appropriation and
invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress.  The petitioners responded by filing, pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., a motion to dismiss for
improper venue, based on the forum-selection clause in the
consent agreement naming New York as the proper venue for any
claims arising out of that agreement.   In her response to the
2
motion to dismiss, Martin argued, among other things, that the
1061288
Section 10-2B-15.02(a) provides, in pertinent part:
3
"All contracts or agreements made or entered into in
this 
state 
by 
foreign 
corporations 
prior 
to
obtaining a certificate of authority to transact
business in this state shall be held void at the
action of the foreign corporation or by any person
claiming through or under the foreign corporation by
virtue of the contract or agreement ...."
8
consent agreement that included the forum-selection clause was
void because the only defendant that was a signatory to that
agreement –– Springland Films –– was not qualified to do
business in Alabama and that, pursuant to Alabama's door-
closing statute, § 10-2B-15.02(a), Ala. Code 1975, the consent
agreement was therefore void.   The petitioners filed a reply,
3
arguing that they were engaged in interstate commerce in
making the film and that the Commerce Clause in the United
States Constitution accordingly shielded them from § 10-2B-
15.02(a).  See North Alabama Marine, Inc. v. Sea Ray Boats,
Inc., 533 So. 2d 598, 601 (Ala. 1988) (stating that the United
States Constitution bars Alabama from preventing a foreign
corporation that has not qualified to do business in Alabama
"from enforcing its contracts in Alabama when its activities
within this state are incidental to the transaction of
interstate business").
1061288
9
On April 26, 2007, after receiving further briefing on
the issue and holding a hearing, the trial court denied the
petitioners' motion to dismiss on the basis that the consent
agreement was void and unenforceable under § 10-2B-15.02(a)
because Springland Films was not qualified to do business in
Alabama.  On June 7, 2007, the petitioners timely petitioned
this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to
vacate its April 26, 2007, order and to grant their motion to
dismiss.  
II.
"'[A] petition for a writ of mandamus is the
proper vehicle for obtaining review of an order
denying enforcement of an "outbound" forum-selection
clause when it is presented in a motion to dismiss.'
Ex parte D.M. White Constr. Co., 806 So. 2d 370, 372
(Ala. 2001); see Ex parte CTB, Inc., 782 So. 2d 188,
190 (Ala. 2000).  '[A] writ of mandamus is an
extraordinary remedy, which requires the petitioner
to demonstrate a clear, legal right to the relief
sought, or an abuse of discretion.'  Ex parte Palm
Harbor Homes, Inc., 798 So. 2d 656, 660 (Ala. 2001).
'[T]he review of a trial court's ruling on the
question of enforcing a forum-selection clause is
for an abuse of discretion.'  Ex parte D.M. White
Constr. Co., 806 So. 2d at 372."
Ex parte Leasecomm Corp., 886 So. 2d 58, 62 (Ala. 2003).
Thus, we review the trial court's April 26, 2007, order to
determine whether the trial court exceeded its discretion in
1061288
10
concluding that the consent agreement was void because
Springland Films failed to register to do business in Alabama.
III.
We first note that at the trial court level there was
some question as to whether the relevant test for determining
whether the Commerce Clause barred the application of § 10-2B-
15.02(a) in this case was: 1) whether the primary purpose of
the transaction between Martin and Springland Films was
interstate commerce, or 2) whether the transaction between
Martin and Springland Films merely affected interstate
commerce.  Our opinion in Briarcliff Nursing Home, Inc. v.
Turcotte, 894 So. 2d 661, 667 (Ala. 2004), issued after the
Supreme Court of the United States decided Citizens Bank v.
Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52 (2003), makes clear that the test
in cases involving § 10-2B-15.02(a) remains whether the
primary purpose of the transaction constitutes an interstate
activity:
"[I]n Community Care [of America of Alabama, Inc. v.
Davis, 850 So. 2d 283 (Ala. 2002)], this Court also
stated:
 
"'The test of the enforceability of
the arbitration clause in the Admission
Contract in this case is not, as Community
Care contends, whether the transaction
1061288
11
substantially affects interstate commerce
–– which is the proper analysis in cases
not involving § 10-2B-15.02, see Sisters of
the Visitation v. Cochran Plastering Co.,
775 So. 2d 759 (Ala. 2000) –– but "whether
the 
main 
or 
primary 
purpose 
of 
the
[transaction] constitutes an interstate or
intrastate activity."  Competitive Edge,
Inc. v. Tony Moore Buick-GMC, Inc., 490 So.
2d 1242, 1244-45 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986).'
 
"Community Care, 850 So. 2d at 287.  In Community
Care, Community Care was attempting to enforce a
contract (specifically an arbitration provision in
the admission contract); however, it was not
qualified to do business in Alabama at the time it
entered into the admission contract.  This Court
held that the penalty of § 10-2B-15.02(a), Ala. Code
1975, extends to the enforcement of arbitration
provisions.  Id. at 286.  Section 10-2B-15.02(a) is
a 'door closing' statute that '"bars a foreign
corporation not qualified to do business in Alabama
from enforcing in an Alabama court a contract it
made in Alabama."'  Community Care, 850 So. 2d at
286 (quoting Hays Corp. v. Bunge Corp., 777 So. 2d
62, 64 (Ala. 2000)).  Therefore, this Court held
that § 10-2B-15.02(a) voided the admission contract
and changed the test of the enforceability of the
arbitration provision from whether it substantially
affects interstate commerce to '"whether the main or
primary purpose of the [transaction] constitutes an
interstate or intrastate activity."'  850 So. 2d at
287 (quoting Competitive Edge, Inc. v. Tony Moore
Buick-GMC, Inc., 490 So. 2d 1242, 1244-45 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1986)).  The present case does not involve §
10-2B-15.02(a); 
therefore, the proper test is
whether 
the 
activity 
substantially 
affects
interstate commerce."
894 
So. 
2d 
at 
667. 
Because 
this 
case 
does 
involve
10-2B-15.02(a), the proper test is accordingly whether the
1061288
12
main or primary purpose of the transaction between Martin and
Springland Films constitutes an interstate, or an intrastate,
activity.  That, in turn, depends on how the purpose of the
transaction is defined.
The petitioners argue that "[t]he purpose of the
[consent] agreement between [Martin] and One America [d/b/a
Springland Films] was to provide for [Martin]'s appearance in
an internationally distributed motion picture."  (Petition at
p. 2.)  Martin, however, argues that the purpose of the
consent agreement "was for Mrs. Martin to provide dining
etiquette services for filming in the State of Alabama" and
that 
"[n]o 
mention 
was 
ever 
made 
about 
Mrs. 
Martin
participating in any production or distribution of a 'motion
picture' or, for that matter, any activities outside of
Alabama."  (Response to petition at p. 6.)  For the reasons
that follow, we agree with the petitioners.
When attempting to discern the purpose of a contract,
"this Court must first look to the plain language of the
contract."  Turner v. West Ridge Apartments, Inc., 893 So. 2d
332, 335 (Ala. 2004).  The plain language of the consent
agreement makes clear that the transaction between Martin and
1061288
13
Springland Films was not, as Martin attempts to portray it, a
simple exchange pursuant to which Martin was to provide one
filmed etiquette lesson in return for $350. Indeed, the
consent agreement makes no mention of Martin's providing any
services in exchange for the $350 payment.  Rather, pursuant
to the terms of the consent agreement, Martin was given the
$350 payment "and the opportunity for [Martin] to appear in a
motion picture" in exchange for her agreement, among other
things, "to be filmed and audiotaped by [Springland Films] for
a documentary-style film" and to assign to Springland Films
any rights she may have in the recorded material so as to
allow 
Springland 
Films 
to 
use 
the 
material 
"without
restriction 
in 
any 
media 
throughout 
the 
universe 
in
perpetuity."
Thus, although Martin has characterized the primary
purpose of the transaction as "the provision of local labor by
Mrs. Martin" (response to petition at p. 24), which, under
Alabama caselaw, would clearly be an intrastate activity, see
Building 
Maintenance 
Personnel, 
Inc. 
v. 
International
Shipbuilding, Inc., 621 So. 2d 1303, 1305 (Ala. 1993) (noting
that labor is not an article of commerce and "'is quite
1061288
Although this Court is not bound by the label parties may
4
attach to a document, the fact that the contract at the center
of this dispute was prominently labeled "Standard Consent
Agreement" further supports our conclusion that obtaining
Martin's consent was an integral part of the transaction,
which was not a transaction characterized by the simple
exchange of money for Martin's services.
14
clearly defined as intrastate, rather than interstate,
activity'" (quoting Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v. Blalock,
525 So. 2d 1366, 1370 (Ala. 1988))), the transaction here
clearly encompassed more than Martin's providing labor. The
plain language of the consent agreement indicates that any
provision of services by Martin was incidental to the actual
purpose of the transaction –– to provide for Martin's
appearance in recorded footage that might be used "without
restriction 
in 
any 
media 
throughout 
the 
universe."4
Accordingly, we hold that the primary purpose of the
transaction between Martin and Springland Films constituted an
interstate activity.  This is true notwithstanding the fact
that the filming, the execution of the consent agreement
(along with the assignment of rights therein), and Springland
Films' payment to Martin all took place in Alabama.
We 
further 
note 
that 
Martin's 
argument 
that 
the
petitioners failed to make their current argument to the trial
1061288
15
court and that their petition should now be denied on that
basis is without merit.  Citing Kingvision Pay-Per-View, Ltd.
v. Ayers, 886 So. 2d 45 (Ala. 2003), Martin argues that the
petitioners argued below only that the transaction with Martin
affected interstate commerce –– not that its primary purpose
was interstate commerce –– and that because the petitioners
did not make the latter argument in the trial court the
argument was waived and cannot now be made. See Smith v.
Equifax Servs., Inc., 537 So. 2d 463, 465 (Ala. 1988) (stating
that "this Court will not reverse the trial court's judgment
on a ground raised for the first time on appeal"). The
appellant in Kingvision sought to have a default judgment
against it vacated.  In the trial court, the appellant had
argued that it had a meritorious defense to the plaintiff's
claims; however, the appellant apparently did not at that time
address the other two elements of the three-factor test this
Court first enunciated in Kirtland v. Fort Morgan Authority
Sewer Service, Inc., 520 So. 2d 600 (Ala. 1988), for
challenging a default judgment –– whether the plaintiff would
be prejudiced if the judgment was set aside and whether the
default judgment was the result of the appellant's own
1061288
16
culpable conduct.  Thus, because the appellant did not argue
to the trial court that its case met the three-part test, this
Court did not allow it to make that argument on appeal.
In the present case, the petitioners did first argue to
the trial court that the Commerce Clause barred the
application of § 10-2B-15.02(a) because their transaction with
Martin merely affected interstate commerce.  However, after
Martin argued that the proper test was whether the primary
purpose of the transaction was interstate, the petitioners
responded by arguing that they were entitled to relief under
the test advocated by Martin as well.  At the April 26, 2007,
hearing on this matter, the petitioners' counsel argued:
"What [an affidavit filed by a Springland Films
official] establishes more clearly I think is the
interstate nature of the transaction at issue, that
is, the making of this and distribution of this
film.  Which I think even without the affidavit,
Judge, the result from our perspective should be the
same, that is, that this is plainly an interstate
commerce transaction no matter how one articulates
the test.  Whether it be an [Citizens Bank v.]
Alafabco[, 539 U.S. 52 (2003),] type test of
substantially affect[ing] interstate commerce or
whether it be a test of plaintiff –– excuse me ––
plaintiff now argues that you have to look to see
whether 
the 
main 
or 
primary 
purpose 
of 
the
transaction was intrastate or interstate."
1061288
17
Thus, unlike the appellant in Kingvision, the petitioners did
argue to the trial court that their case met the entirety of
the relevant test, and they accordingly preserved their
argument for appeal.
IV.
The petitioners have established that the primary purpose
of the transaction between Springland Films and Martin was
interstate commerce, specifically, to provide for Martin's
appearance in a film that might be used "without restriction
in any media throughout the universe."  Because the purpose of
that transaction was interstate commerce, the Commerce Clause
of the United States Constitution precludes the courts of this
State 
from 
applying 
§ 
10-2B-15.02(a) 
to 
prevent 
the
petitioners from enforcing the consent agreement. Because the
petitioners have a clear, legal right to the relief they seek
–– an order directing the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate
its order holding the consent agreement void and unenforceable
–– their petition for the writ of mandamus is granted. The
trial court is directed to vacate its April 26, 2007, order
and to conduct further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
1061288
18
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons and Stuart, JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., concurs specially.
1061288
19
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially).
The main opinion concludes that the subject of the
contract at issue is sufficiently interstate in nature that
§ 10-2B-15.02, Ala. Code 1975, may not be used against the
petitioners by Martin.  I concur in this rationale.  In so
doing, I note that this is the only ground argued by the
petitioners as to why § 10-2B-15.02, which is commonly
referred to as Alabama's door-closing statute because it bars
nonqualified foreign corporations from accessing Alabama
courts to enforce their contracts, does not prevent the
petitioners from using provisions of their contract with
Martin to defend against the lawsuit she initiated.