Title: John Carter v. Township of Bordentown

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

CHIEF JUSTICE ZAZZALI and JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, WALLACE and RIVERA-SOTO join in JUSTICE HOEN S opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 16 September Term 2006 IN THE MATTER OF JOHN CARTER JOHN CARTER, Petitioner-Respondent, v. TOWNSHIP OF BORDENTOWN, Respondent-Appellant. Argued January 17, 2007 Decided June 20, 2007 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Gregory J. Sullivan argued the cause for appellant (Hartsough Kenny Chase & Sullivan, attorneys). Mark W. Catanzaro argued the cause for respondent (Mr. Catanzaro, attorney; Mr. Catanzaro and Ashley H. Auerbach, on the briefs). Todd A. Wigder, Deputy Attorney General, submitted a letter in lieu of brief on behalf of respondent Merit System Board (Stuart Rabner, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). JUSTICE HOENS delivered the opinion of the Court. Bordentown Police Officer John Carter was served with a series of disciplinary notices charging him with, among other things, sleeping on duty. Although the Merit System Board upheld the penalty of termination for that offense, the Appellate Division reversed, concluding that imposition of that sanction violated the principle of progressive discipline. We granted the Township of Bordentown's petition for certification, 188 N.J. 217 (2006), and we now reverse and reinstate the penalty imposed by the Board. [Mazza v. Bd. of Trustees, 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995) (citing Campbell, supra, 39 N.J. at 562).] Moreover, in reviewing agency actions, [a]ppellate courts must defer to an agency s expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field. Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992). Although an appellate court is in no way bound by the agency s interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue, Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973), if substantial evidence supports the agency s decision, a court may not substitute its own judgment for the agency s even though the court might have reached a different result, Greenwood, supra, 127 N.J. at 513. [Twp. of Moorestown v. Armstrong, 89 N.J. Super. 560, 566 (App. Div. 1965), certif. denied, 47 N.J. 80 (1966).] Moreover, as we have recently cautioned, courts should take care not to substitute their own views of whether a particular penalty is correct for those of the body charged with making that decision. See In re License Issued to Zahl, 186 N.J. 341, 353-54 (2006). Here, the appellate panel did precisely that, rejecting the well-reasoned analysis of the Board, considering the principle of progressive discipline to be an absolute mandate of law and regarding Carter s prior disciplinary history as insufficient. In doing so, however, the panel misperceived the Board s analysis. Neither the ALJ nor the Board simply relied on Carter s prior history, including the numerous charges adjudicated along with the sleeping on duty charge, and applied the theory of progressive discipline to support the dismissal sanction. Instead, the ALJ also considered whether the offending behavior alone would support the penalty. The ALJ recognized that some offenses are sufficiently severe that dismissal is appropriate regardless of the extent of one s prior history of discipline. Noting that Carter did not have an unblemished prior record, the ALJ concluded that dismissal was appropriate for a police officer who pulls his patrol car to the side of the road to sleep on three successive nights, for periods as long as two hours at a time, who fails as a result to attend to his police duties, and who fails to promptly respond to another officer s call for assistance. Under these circumstances, we find nothing arbitrary or capricious about the imposition of the sanction of removal. We do not suggest that removal is always the appropriate sanction to be imposed on a police officer who is found sleeping while on duty. Circumstances relating to other officers or staffing patterns and practices in other municipalities might well dictate the imposition of a different penalty on another police officer. Nonetheless, in mandating that only a lesser penalty could be imposed, our appellate panel exceeded its proper role and inappropriately substituted its view for that of the appointing authority and the Board. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY NO. A-16 SEPTEMBER TERM 2006 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court IN THE MATTER OF JOHN CARTER ____________________________________ JOHN CARTER, Petitioner-Respondent, v. TOWNSHIP OF BORDENTOWN, Respondent-Appellant. DECIDED June 20, 2007 Chief Justice Zazzali PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Hoens CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY