Title: State v. Norstrom

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

613 So. 2d 437 (1993)
STATE of Florida, Petitioner,
v.
Eric C. NORSTROM, Respondent.
No. 78568.

Supreme Court of Florida.
January 14, 1993.
Rehearing Denied March 4, 1993.
*438 Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Joan Fowler, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for petitioner.
Michael Salnick of Salnick & Krischer, West Palm Beach, for respondent.
OVERTON, Justice.
We have for review Norstrom v. State, 587 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), in which the district court held that statements made by Norstrom, after he was informed of his Miranda[1] rights and signed a waiver form, were not admissible because the statements were made during the accident investigation phase of the incident and were, therefore, privileged under section 316.066, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988). The district court certified the following to be a question of great public importance:
Id. 587 So. 2d  at 1153. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We find that, since Norstrom voluntarily made the statements after Miranda warnings had been given, there is no evidence that Norstrom's Fifth Amendment rights were violated. Accordingly, we find that his statements were admissible and answer the question in the negative.
The relevant facts, as set forth in the district court's opinion, are as follows:
587 So. 2d  at 1149-50.
The statements made by Norstrom after he had been read his Miranda rights related to what occurred prior to, during, and after the accident. The statements included an admission that he had been traveling "about seventy" miles per hour and had consumed some alcohol during the evening. The taped statements were played to the jury and included his acknowledgment that he understood his Miranda rights.
The issue presented by the certified question is whether Norstrom's statements were privileged under section 316.066 in circumstances where: (1) the statements were made after Norstrom had been read his Miranda warnings and had signed a waiver form; (2) Norstrom had not been advised that, pursuant to section 316.066, he must answer questions pertaining to the accident; and (3) Norstrom's statements were made while the investigating officer was proceeding in the accident investigation phase of the incident, as distinguished from the criminal investigation of the incident.
The district court held that the Miranda warnings alone did not change the nature of the investigation from accident to criminal to allow for the admission of Norstrom's statements. Id., 587 So. 2d  at 1151. More importantly, the district court held that another warning, in addition to the standard Miranda warning, is required before a voluntary statement by a defendant can be admitted without violating section 316.066. The district court stated that, "`unless a defendant has been apprised by police that the questions being asked are part of a criminal investigation, the statements made in response to those questions will be deemed privileged pursuant to § 316.066(4).'" Id. 587 So. 2d  at 1152 (quoting West v. State, 553 So. 2d 254, 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)). The district court concluded that the "statements [Norstrom] made while at the police station prior to the point at which Officer Lavoie `changed hats,' even though informed of his Miranda rights, fell within the accident investigation privilege." Id. 587 So. 2d  at 1151.
The pertinent part of section 316.066, which sets forth the statutory privilege, reads as follows:
We interpreted the application and scope of that privilege in our decision in Brackin v. Boles, 452 So. 2d 540, 544 (Fla. 1984), in which we stated:
We emphasized in Brackin that "[t]he statute only prohibits the use of communications ... in order to avoid a fifth amendment violation." Id. The district court in this case recognized that our decision in Brackin is susceptible to an interpretation that a statement made after Miranda warnings had been given could be admissible under the statute, "particularly where [a defendant] has not been told that he is required to answer." Norstrom, 587 So. 2d  at 1151. We find that the district court erred in not focusing on whether Norstrom's Fifth Amendment rights were violated.
The purpose of the United States Supreme court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), was to establish an effective means to inform accused persons of their rights, including their right to remain silent. The purpose of section 316.066(1) was to obtain information on accidents. The legislature established a statutory privilege under section 316.066(4) to ensure that accident information could be compelled without Fifth Amendment violations.
As noted by the district court, the record reflects that Norstrom was never advised that he had to answer questions regarding the accident. Further, there is no evidence in this record that Norstrom believed he had to answer questions to provide accident information to the investigating officer. In fact, rather than being told that he must provide accident information to the investigating officer, Norstrom was informed of his Miranda rights, which included the right to remain silent. The record establishes that Norstrom expressly waived his right to remain silent.
Given the factual circumstances of this case, we find that the statements made by Norstrom were voluntary and that there was no Fifth Amendment violation. We hold that the privilege granted by section 316.066 is not applicable in this case where Norstrom was not told that he had to respond to the questions asked by the officers and where Norstrom was given his Miranda rights. Accordingly, we quash the decision of the district court on this issue. Furthermore, we also disapprove its prior decision in West v. State, 553 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). To clarify our decision, we emphasize that the privilege granted under section 316.066 is applicable if no Miranda warnings are given. Further, if a law enforcement officer gives any indication to a defendant that he or she must respond to questions concerning the investigation of an accident, there must be an express statement by the law enforcement official to the defendant that "this is *441 now a criminal investigation," followed immediately by Miranda warnings, before any statement by the defendant may be admitted.
On the second issue, we agree with the district court that the evidence that Norstrom had consumed alcoholic beverages on the night of the incident is relevant to the prosecution's charge of reckless driving in a case of manslaughter by culpable negligence, and, consequently, that this evidence was properly presented in the trial of this cause.
Finally, we note that the district court was concerned that Norstrom's right to a fair trial could have been prejudiced by the prosecution's introduction of certain evidence regarding the physical condition of the victims, the extensive details of surgical procedures, and the use of family member witnesses for identification purposes where other credible witnesses were available. Because the district court reversed the trial court on the admissions issue, it did not address the introduction of this evidence; nor was the issue presented in the briefs before this Court.
Accordingly, we answer the question in the negative, quash, in part, the decision of the district court, and remand this cause to the district court with directions to consider the other issues raised in the initial appeal.
It is so ordered.
BARKETT, C.J., and McDONALD, SHAW, GRIMES, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur.
[1]  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).