Title: Commonwealth v. Jones

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12027 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MAURICE JONES. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 10, 2017. - June 20, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, & Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Jury and Jurors.  Practice, Criminal, Jury and 
jurors, Empanelment of jury, Challenge to jurors, Hearsay, 
Instructions to jury.  Evidence, Identity, Consciousness of 
guilt, Hearsay.  Constitutional Law, Self-incrimination. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 26, 2013. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Linda E. Giles, J., and a 
motion to set aside the verdict was heard by her. 
 
 
 
James L. Sultan (Kerry A. Haberlin also present) for the 
defendant. 
 
Matthew T. Sears, Assistant District Attorney (Julie Sunkle 
Higgins, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  The defendant was convicted by a Superior Court 
jury of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate 
premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty in connection with 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
the shooting death of Dinoriss Alston on April, 17, 2012.1  The 
identity of the shooter was the central issue at trial.  On 
appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence, and also asserts a number of errors in the trial 
proceedings.  He maintains that the judge erred in failing to 
require the Commonwealth to explain its peremptory challenge of 
a prospective juror; improperly allowed the admission of 
evidence as to the defendant's refusal to go to the hospital to 
be shown to the surviving witness and as to a police radio 
broadcast describing the shooter; incorrectly instructed the 
jury that circumstantial evidence would suffice while failing to 
instruct that mere presence was not enough; and improperly 
limited the defendant's cross-examination of a Commonwealth 
witness.  The defendant asserts also that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel and requests relief under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
We conclude that, while the evidence at trial was not by 
any means overwhelming, it was sufficient to sustain the 
defendant's convictions.  The judge's failure to require an 
explanation of the prosecutor's peremptory challenge of a 
                     
 
1 This was the defendant's second trial on these charges;  
the first trial ended in a mistrial when the jury were unable to 
reach a verdict.  The defendant also was convicted of assault 
and battery by means of a dangerous weapon and unlawful 
possession of a firearm.  He was acquitted of armed assault with 
intent to murder on charges stemming from the nonfatal shooting 
of the victim's girl friend, Ashley Platt. 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
prospective juror who is African-American, however, requires the 
convictions be vacated.  We address other claimed errors only 
insofar as they may recur at any new trial. 
 
1.  Background.  Because the defendant challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence, we discuss in some detail the facts 
the jury could have found. 
 
a.  The shooting.  On the afternoon of April 17, 2012, 
Alston and his girl friend, Ashley Platt, were sitting in her 
vehicle near a park on Dunreath Street in the Roxbury section of 
Boston when they were struck by multiple gunshots.  Platt was in 
the driver's seat, and Alston was in the front passenger's seat.  
The primary issue at trial was the identity of the shooter. 
Platt testified that, on April 17, 2012, an unseasonably 
warm day, she and Alston went to the beach after she left work 
at around 11 A.M., and later decided to drive to a park in 
Roxbury where they frequently spent time, arriving at 
approximately 3:40 or 3:45 P.M.  Platt did not tell anyone about 
their plans for the day.  Alston spoke on his cellular telephone 
"a couple of times" during the afternoon, including making a 
call at about 3:07 P.M. to a person identified as "Suncuz."2  At 
some point on the drive from the beach to the park, the two 
stopped at a location in the Grove Hall neighborhood of Roxbury, 
where Alston spoke briefly to a man Platt did not know; when he 
                     
 
2 "Suncuz" was never identified. 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
returned to the vehicle, Alston's demeanor remained "normal."  
Platt then drove to a convenience store, where Alston made a 
purchase while she remained in the vehicle, and the two then 
made their way to Dunreath Street near the park.3  After they 
stopped, they remained in the vehicle smoking marijuana, while 
Platt used her cellular telephone to send messages. 
Twenty to thirty minutes later, at around 4:03 P.M., 
someone opened fire on the vehicle.  Bullets came through the 
windshield and struck Alston, who was in the front passenger's 
seat, multiple times in the right side of his neck, the right 
side of his chest, and through his right elbow.4  Alston reached 
down and put the vehicle in gear and told Platt, who was in the 
driver's seat, to "go."  Platt drove rapidly away from the scene 
and sought help at a nearby gasoline station on the corner of 
Moreland Street and Blue Hill Avenue.  Emergency responders 
pronounced Alston dead at the scene, and discovered that Platt 
also had been shot; she was transported to the hospital in the 
ambulance that had been summoned for Alston. 
 
b.  The investigation.  i.  Flight from the scene.  Platt 
did not see the shooting itself or anyone carrying a firearm; 
                     
3 The video surveillance system at the convenience store 
showed Alston entering the store, making a purchase, and leaving 
the store without speaking to anyone other than the cashier. 
 
 
4 The medical examiner who performed the autopsy testified 
that Alston died of gunshot wounds, and that three of the five 
wounds independently could have been fatal. 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
she saw the windshield cracking and glazing and an individual 
walking calmly away from the parked vehicle, along Dunreath 
Street, who ignored her screams for help.  She did not see 
anyone else nearby.  At trial, Platt described the individual, 
whom she saw only from behind, as a black male wearing a white 
and red shirt, khaki cargo shorts,5 a black and red hat, and 
Chuck Taylor sneakers, a distinctive brand of shoes that were 
primarily black but have a white "rubber front."  She lost track 
of him after driving past him on Dunreath Street. 
 
Because Platt did not see the shooter's face, and thus was 
unable to identify him, the Commonwealth relied on testimony 
from a number of other witnesses to establish the defendant's 
familiarity with the area near the shooting.  His former girl 
friend, who lived in that neighborhood, testified that the 
defendant had grown up in the neighborhood and continued to come 
by frequently to visit her.  She testified that she spent the 
evening of the shooting with the defendant "like a normal day," 
and that he had been "shocked" by the fact that a shooting had 
taken place nearby. 
                     
 
5 Cargo pants are "loose-fitting, casual pants having a 
number of cargo pockets, some typically on the side of the upper 
leg."  A cargo pocket, in turn, is "a capacious pocket sewn onto 
the outside of a garment or bag, often having a flap and side 
pleats."  Webster's New World College Dictionary 226 (5th ed. 
2016). 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
Another of the defendant's friends testified that, before 
the shooting, he had seen the defendant in the neighborhood 
several times a week, but, after the shooting, saw him in the 
area much less frequently.  When asked why he no longer spent 
time in the area, the defendant replied "the block is hot," 
which his friend understood to mean that "there [are] cops 
everywhere." 
 
In addition to Platt's description of the shooter, the 
Commonwealth introduced testimony from a number of witnesses 
along the purported path of flight away from the scene of the 
shooting.  Byrain Winbush was at home watching television, near 
the corner of Warren Street and Dunreath Street, when he heard a 
series of shots, which sounded as though they had been fired 
from a semiautomatic firearm.  He looked out his window and 
telephoned 911.  Both in his testimony and in the audio 
recording of the 911 call, which was played for the jury, he 
described seeing a black male, whom he could see only from 
behind, wearing "yellow shorts," a "white shirt," and socks and 
sneakers, without a hat, running up the street.  He could see 
the individual's hands and did not notice a weapon.  Although he 
heard screaming and the sounds of "scattering" feet, he did not 
see anyone else.  The individual with the white shirt and yellow 
shorts remained in view until he reached the corner of the 
nearby park. 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
Leonor Woodson was sitting near the window of her home on 
Dunreath Street, across the street from the park, when she heard 
multiple gunshots and looked out the window.  Her sister, Leila 
Jackson, also heard the shots and ran to the window.6  Both saw a 
black man wearing light pants with pockets on the side, a dark 
colored jacket,7 and a cap8 "gallop[]" or run quickly down 
Dunreath Street, turn into the park, then run through the park 
and turn left onto Copeland Street.  As the man ran, he held his 
right side, either near the hip or the mid-thigh, as if there 
were something in the pocket.  Jackson said that the item 
appeared to be "weighing him down."  The sisters lost sight of 
the man soon after he left the park and turned onto Copeland 
Street.  While the man was running past their house, Woodson saw 
a light-colored vehicle drive quickly down Dunreath Street. 
 
Nicolas Guerrero and Bryan Santiago were playing basketball 
with Santiago's young son in the park between Dunreath and 
Copeland Streets when they heard gunshots.  A few seconds after 
the shooting stopped, Santiago saw a white vehicle with a 
shattered passenger's side window go past.  Soon thereafter, 
                     
 
6 Leila Jackson died before the second trial.  Her testimony 
from the first trial was read in evidence. 
 
 
7 Jackson described the jacket as "black."  Woodson said it 
was dark, but that it "wasn't black." 
 
 
8 Jackson described the cap as black with a white brim, 
while Woodson suggested it was brown. 
 
 
 
8 
 
 
both Guerrero and Santiago saw a man run past and then leave the 
park.  Both described him as holding the right pocket of his 
shorts; Guerrero described the shorts as cargo shorts, and 
Santiago described them as being in between "light brown" and 
"dark brown."  Santiago believed the man was holding something 
relatively heavy in that pocket. 
 
Jerome Baker was sitting on the porch of his house on 
Copeland Street, across the park from Dunreath Street, when he 
heard gunshots, which sounded like they were coming from the 
other side of the park.  He looked up and saw a vehicle "speed 
away" down Dunreath Street.  He then saw a man he knew at that 
point only as "Mo," but whom he identified during his testimony 
as the defendant, run through the park.  He testified that he 
believed the defendant had been wearing jeans, but agreed that 
he had little recollection of the defendant's clothing and may 
have thought that simply because the defendant frequently wore 
jeans. 
 
Joan and Joy Andrews9 were standing near each other on the 
Copeland Street side of the park, watching a young girl who was 
Joan's grandniece and Joy's granddaughter ride her bicycle 
around the playground.  They heard multiple gunshots in rapid 
succession, coming from Dunreath Street.  Both were focused on 
                     
 
9 Because they share a last name, we refer to Joan and Joy 
Andrews by their first names. 
 
 
 
9 
 
 
protecting the child, but each saw at least one person running.  
Joan testified that, after she left the park and had crossed the 
street, she saw a man running out of the park, alone, wearing 
cargo shorts.  She said that the pocket on the right side of his 
shorts was swinging as though it contained a heavy object.  She 
only saw the man from the side so was unable to distinguish his 
face.  He continued running on Copeland Street until he reached 
Langford Park, a small, dead-end street, where he turned.  
Although Joan knew a man "by the name of Mo," she could not 
identify him as the person whom she saw running.  Joy testified 
that she saw "Mo" around the neighborhood "every day," and 
recognized him as the first man from the area to get a job; she 
identified him as the defendant in court.  She recalled that, 
immediately after hearing gunshots, she saw several people, 
including Mo, running out of the park and onto Copeland Street, 
but did not remember what Mo had been wearing. 
 
Brian McClain was on the porch of his house on Langford 
Park.  He saw "Mo," whom he had known much of his life, and whom 
he identified in court as the defendant, walking past and spoke 
briefly to him.  McClain was unable to remember anything about 
the clothes the defendant had been wearing, did not remember 
seeing the defendant running or clutching a leg or pocket, and 
did not remember the defendant sweating or breathing heavily as 
though he had been running.  McClain saw "Mo" walk down the 
 
 
 
10 
 
 
street toward a hole in the fence that separated the dead-end 
Langford Park from the properties on Perrin Street.  McClain did 
not see him go through the hole in the fence. 
 
ii.  Interviews of Platt.  Investigating officers 
interviewed Platt several times in order to obtain a description 
of the shooter.  At each interview, she gave generally 
consistent accounts that varied somewhat in their detail.  When 
police first spoke to Platt at the gasoline station, she was 
"very upset," crying, and unable to stand still.  She described 
the shooter as a younger black male, wearing a white T-shirt and 
khaki pants.10  The interview ended after only a few minutes, 
when the responding officer realized that Platt also had been 
shot, in the hip, and she was transported to the hospital.  At 
4:08 P.M., the officer broadcast Platt's initial description 
over the police radio.  An audio recording of this broadcast was 
played for the jury. 
 
Detective Donald Lee, who had gone directly to the 
hospital, spoke with Platt three times later that afternoon.  
During the first interview, conducted while Platt awaited 
                     
 
10 A police officer interviewed a man who was nearby and 
whose description matched that of the shooter.  He was an 
African-American male wearing a white T-shirt, khaki shorts, and 
a black and gray Boston Bruins cap.  During a brief 
conversation, the man asked calmly, "Is he dead?"  Police 
completed a field interrogation and observation report, but 
there is no indication that they pursued any further 
investigation of this man. 
 
 
 
11 
 
 
treatment, she described a young black male, wearing a white T-
shirt and khaki pants.  After another officer joined them, Lee 
and that officer conducted another, recorded, interview.  During 
that interview, Platt described the man as a black male wearing 
a white shirt, khaki shorts, a hat, and Chuck Taylor sneakers.  
Lee broadcast this description over the police radio at 
5:07 P.M.  This broadcast, too, was played for the jury. 
 
Lee returned to the hospital later that afternoon and 
obtained a second recorded statement, also played for the jury, 
in which Platt specified that the man had been wearing "solid 
black" Chuck Taylor sneakers, a black hat "with a red brim," 
and, after some prompting, agreed that the white shirt "might a 
had some red in it." 
 
At trial, Platt testified that she saw a black male wearing 
"khaki cargo shorts," a shirt with a "white and red 
combination," a black hat with a red brim, and Chuck Taylor 
sneakers. 
 
iii.  Cell site location information.  Cell site location 
information (CSLI) indicated that the defendant's cellular 
telephone had been near the scene of the shooting at the 
relevant time.11  State police Sergeant David Crouse testified 
                     
 
11 The jury learned that, to make or receive calls, a 
cellular telephone transmits messages through radio waves to a 
particular cellular service provider's network of cell site 
towers.  Each tower (base station) serves a particular "sector" 
 
 
 
12 
 
 
that, on the evening prior to the shooting, the CSLI showed a 
cellular telephone that the defendant used routinely12 located in 
a "wedge shaped" cell tower sector that included the area of the 
shooting.  Records indicated that, the following morning, the 
cellular telephone was in a sector that included the defendant's 
house on Cardington Street.  That afternoon, the CSLI showed the 
telephone at various locations in Roxbury other than the 
defendant's house. 
                                                                  
(geographic region) in the provider's network.  The cell towers 
send signals to each other, and, as an individual on an active 
call moves from an area served by one cell tower to another, the 
call will be handed off to a different cell tower.  By 
determining which cell site received the telephone's signals at 
any given time, it is possible to determine, within certain 
limitations, the approximate location of the telephone.  Because 
a cell tower's signal extends from two to ten miles, a given 
cellular telephone call may be within range of multiple cell 
sites at any given time. 
 
 
State police Sergeant David Crouse testified that, at the 
beginning of a call, a cellular telephone will connect to the 
cell site which provides the strongest signal, typically, albeit 
not always, the nearest one.  Because the telephone may, 
thereafter, be routed to a number of different cell sites within 
range, he prepared his testimony on the basis of the cell sites 
to which the telephone at issue initially connected.  Both the 
sergeant and the records custodian acknowledged that locations 
derived from CSLI are not exact. 
 
 
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 475 Mass. 396, 400 
n.12 (2016); Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 236-239 
(2014), S.C., 470 Mass. 837 and 472 Mass. 448 (2015). 
 
 
12 Although the defendant's mother was the listed subscriber 
in the telephone company's records, the defendant told 
detectives that the telephone number was his. 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
 
The shooting occurred at approximately 4:03 P.M. on 
April 17, 2012.  According to Crouse, the CSLI showed that, at 
3:58 P.M., a call was made from the defendant's cellular 
telephone while it was located in a sector that included the 
scene of the shooting, and at 3:59 P.M., a call was made while 
the telephone was located in an adjacent sector.  Those two 
sectors overlapped in a relatively small area covering the 
location of the shooting.  Crouse testified that, to have moved 
from one sector to the other within such a short period of time, 
the person using the cellular telephone was probably "really 
close to where those two sectors meet."  The telephone was not 
used again, for incoming or outgoing calls, until 4:09 P.M., at 
which point the CSLI showed it as being located in the vicinity 
of the shooting.  At 4:14 P.M., a call was made from a sector 
including the area near the defendant's house.  At 4:34 P.M., 
police spoke with the defendant near his house. 
 
iv.  The defendant's encounters with police.  Boston police 
Officer Brian Johnson, who knew the defendant from prior 
interactions, had spoken to him on the evening of April 
16, 2012, near the area where the shooting took place the 
following day.  That evening, the defendant was wearing a black 
hat with a red Ralph Lauren Polo brand emblem.  The following 
day, Johnson was called to respond to a shooting.  When he 
learned that it had taken place at the park on Dunreath Street, 
 
 
 
14 
 
 
he went to the defendant's house -- located roughly an eighteen-
minute walk, and less than a five-minute drive, away from the 
crime scene -- in order to speak to him, as he knew the 
defendant regularly frequented the area around that park. 
Johnson received an initial description of the suspect, i.e., a 
black male with a white T-shirt and khaki pants.  Around 4:34 
P.M., while en route to the defendant's house, Johnson saw the 
defendant walking on Cobden Street, approximately one block from 
his house.  He was wearing a white T-shirt with a large gray and 
red design on the front, the same black Polo cap with a red 
emblem that he had worn the previous night, khaki cargo shorts, 
black sneakers with a red stripe near the sole, and short white 
athletic socks.  Johnson performed a patfrisk of the defendant 
and found no weapons. 
 
The defendant told Johnson that he was on his way to a 
nearby pharmacy to meet his mother.  After the defendant left, 
police went to the defendant's mother's house and spoke briefly 
with her.  She said that, although she had spoken to the 
defendant earlier in the day, she had no plans to meet him. 
 
After police received Lee's broadcast from the hospital, 
containing Platt's somewhat more detailed description of the 
suspect, and noted that it remained generally consistent with 
that of the defendant, Johnson and his partner were asked to 
speak with the defendant again.  They again found him on Cobden 
 
 
 
15 
 
 
Street, near his house.  One of the officers asked the defendant 
if he would speak with them for a few minutes, and he agreed to 
do so.  At that point, the defendant's demeanor was "very 
casual."  Soon thereafter, two detectives who had been at the 
hospital joined them.  At some point, an officer took 
photographs of the defendant,13 and of a friend who was with him.  
When the detectives began the interview, the defendant was 
polite but was "showing some signs of anxiety."  He reiterated 
that he had been at his house all day, and that he had not been 
near the park on Dunreath Street. 
 
The detectives made a series of requests of the defendant.  
The defendant agreed to be photographed, and to give the 
detectives his and his mother's cellular telephone numbers.  He 
also agreed to have his hands tested for gunshot residue,14  but 
declined to go to the hospital to be viewed by Platt.15  The 
defendant told the officers that he was left-handed, but 
subsequently he was seen signing a document with his right hand.  
                     
 
13 Several of these photographs of the defendant were 
introduced at trial. 
 
 
14 One of the police officers testified that when a gun is 
fired, "gases, smoke and remnants of gunshot" are discharged.  
This can leave residue on the hands of the individual who fired 
it. 
 
 
15 The officers testified that they in fact had not intended 
to perform gunshot residue testing or to bring the defendant to 
the hospital, but made both requests to gauge the defendant's 
reaction. 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
After some discussion, the defendant asked if he was free to 
leave and, when told that he was, walked away. 
 
v.  Forensic evidence.  Sergeant Detective Paul McLaughlin 
and other members of the Boston police department's homicide 
unit arranged for Platt's vehicle to be towed to Boston police 
headquarters.  It had bullet holes through the hood and the 
windshield, a bullet lodged in the hood, and two bullets in the 
passenger seat.16  In addition, police recovered shell casings 
from Dunreath Street.  The shell casings, the bullets recovered 
from the vehicle, and the bullets removed from Alston's body all 
came from the same semiautomatic .45 caliber firearm. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  As 
stated, the primary issue at trial was the identity of the 
shooter.  The defendant contends that the evidence at trial was 
insufficient as a matter of law to support his conviction of 
murder in the first degree, and therefore that his motion for a 
required finding should have been allowed.17  We consider this 
claim to determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the Commonwealth, any rational finder of fact 
                     
 
16 The vehicle was tested for fingerprints.  Although some 
were recovered, there was "nothing that led . . . anywhere in 
the investigation." 
 
17 The defendant moved for a required finding of not guilty 
at the close of the Commonwealth's case and at the close of all 
the evidence.  The judge denied the motions.  She later denied 
the defendant's motion for postconviction relief, seeking to set 
aside the verdict. 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
could have found each of the elements of the offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 
676-677 (1979).  A conviction may rest exclusively on 
circumstantial evidence, and, in evaluating that evidence, we 
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Commonwealth. 
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lydon, 413 Mass. 309, 312 (1992).  A 
conviction may not, however, be based on conjecture or on 
inference piled upon inference.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Mazza, 399 Mass. 395, 399 (1987). 
 
The Commonwealth primarily relied on three types of 
evidence to establish that the defendant was the shooter.  
First, the Commonwealth introduced evidence of the flight path 
of the single person seen at the scene of the shooting who 
generally matched the description of the defendant.  In light of 
witness testimony that this man ran alone, from near the 
victim's vehicle down Dunreath Street and into the park, 
clutching something in his pocket consistent with a firearm, the 
jury reasonably could infer that he was the shooter.  Although 
witnesses gave somewhat varying descriptions, all (save two who 
could not identify his race) described him as black or dark-
skinned, and most agreed he was wearing cargo shorts.  Those who 
saw him from behind were confident that he was wearing a white 
or primarily white T-shirt, while those who saw him from the 
front provided a more varied description of his clothing.  
 
 
 
18 
 
 
Multiple witnesses described him as wearing a black cap and 
sneakers; Platt provided a more specific description of each, 
identifying a black cap with some red and the sneakers as black 
Chuck Taylor ones. 
 
The unidentified runner was linked with the defendant in 
several ways.  First, he was seen turning onto Langford Park as 
he fled; the defendant's friend McClain testified that he saw 
the defendant on Langford Park that afternoon.  Second, shortly 
after the shooting, police encountered and photographed the 
defendant wearing clothes consistent with the descriptions given 
by eyewitnesses:  a black and red hat, a white shirt with a dark 
design on the front, khaki cargo shorts, and black sneakers -- 
albeit not the distinctive Chuck Taylor brand.  Also, several 
witnesses, some of whom had known the defendant since childhood, 
testified to the defendant's knowledge of the scene.  The jury 
could have found that the defendant grew up in the area and 
spent time there multiple times per week.  More particularly, 
through the CSLI information concerning the location of the 
defendant's cellular telephone, and the identifications by 
several witnesses who had lengthy acquaintances with the 
defendant, the jury could have found that the defendant was 
present at or near the park on Dunreath Street at the time of 
the shooting. 
 
 
 
19 
 
 
 
In addition, the Commonwealth introduced evidence of the 
defendant's consciousness of guilt.  Such evidence is probative 
and can, in conjunction with other evidence, support a verdict 
of guilt.  See Commonwealth v. Doucette, 408 Mass. 454, 461 
(1990).  The Commonwealth presented evidence that the defendant 
lied to police, both about his whereabouts on the day of the 
shooting, claiming that he had been home all day despite 
evidence linking him to the neighborhood of the shooting, and 
also about his dominant hand.  The jury also heard evidence 
that, although the defendant previously regularly had spent time 
in the area of the shooting, after the shooting, he avoided the 
area; when asked why he had not been around, he explained that 
there was a heavy police presence. 
 
Although these discrete pieces of evidence, standing alone, 
might not be sufficient to sustain a conviction, together they 
formed a "mosaic" of evidence such that the jury could conclude, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was the shooter.  
Commonwealth v. Salim, 399 Mass. 227, 233 (1987).  Cf. Lydon, 
413 Mass. at 312-313 (upholding conviction based on defendant's 
regular presence at location of shooting, his capture in vehicle 
generally consistent with one identified at scene, his 
consciousness of guilt, his prior threats to victim, and 
recovery of weapon used in killing on road traveled by 
defendant).  While not overwhelming, the evidence would have 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
permitted the jury to infer guilt from the combination of the 
defendant's presence in the area of the shooting, his 
consciousness of guilt, and the similarity between his clothing 
and the clothing worn by the sole person seen fleeing the 
scene.18  There was no error, therefore, in the judge's denial of 
the defendant's motion for a required finding.19 
                     
 
18 The defendant's effort to analogize the circumstances 
here to cases such as Commonwealth v. Mazza, 399 Mass. 395, 399-
400 (1987), is unavailing.  In that case, we determined that the 
defendant's mere presence at the scene of the crime, at a time 
that could not be connected to the victim's death, coupled with 
evidence of consciousness of guilt, was insufficient to sustain 
a conviction.  See id.  Here, by contrast, there was evidence 
that the defendant was present at the scene at the time of the 
shooting and that his physical description matched, at least to 
some degree, a number of witnesses' descriptions of the sole 
person leaving the scene. 
 
 
19 Although the defendant does not contend that the evidence 
was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the 
remaining elements of murder in the first degree by deliberate 
premeditation or extreme atrocity or cruelty, we nevertheless 
have reviewed the record pursuant to our duty under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, and conclude that the evidence was sufficient to 
sustain a conviction on both theories. 
 
 
To prove murder in the first degree on a theory of 
deliberate premeditation, the Commonwealth must show beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally caused the 
victim's death and that he or she did so with deliberate 
premeditation.  That the shooter carried a loaded gun to the 
scene and shot an unarmed victim five times was sufficient to 
make this showing.  See Commonwealth v. Andrews, 427 Mass. 434, 
440-441 (1998). 
 
 
To prove murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty, the Commonwealth must show beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant caused the victim's death 
with the intent to kill, with the intent to cause grievous 
bodily harm, or with the intent to do an act that the defendant 
 
 
 
21 
 
 
 
b.  Peremptory challenge of a prospective juror.  The 
defendant contends that the judge abused her discretion by 
declining to require the prosecutor to provide an adequate and 
genuine race-neutral reason for her peremptory challenge to an 
African-American member of the venire.  See Commonwealth v. 
Oberle, 476 Mass 539, 545 (2017). 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights prohibit 
a party from exercising a peremptory challenge on the basis of 
race.20  See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95 (1986); 
Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 486, cert. denied, 444 
U.S. 881 (1979).  While the inquiries under the Federal and 
State Constitutions each have a different focus, they lead to 
the same conclusion.  See Commonwealth v. Benoit, 452 Mass. 212, 
                                                                  
should have known was likely to cause death.  It must further 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with 
extreme atrocity or cruelty.  The evidence was sufficient to 
show intent to kill and at least two of the seven Cunneen 
factors sufficient to establish extreme atrocity or cruelty.  
See Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 Mass. 216, 227 (1983).  That 
the victim remained conscious long enough to put the vehicle in 
gear showed his consciousness of suffering, see Commonwealth v. 
Brown, 474 Mass. 576, 579 (2016), and expert testimony that 
three of the five gunshots each independently might have been 
enough to kill the victim established a disproportion between 
the means necessary to cause death and those employed.  See 
Commonwealth v. James, 427 Mass. 312, 313-314 (1998). 
 
 
20 A peremptory challenge on the basis of membership in 
other constitutionally protected groups, such as sex, also is 
prohibited.  See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 
130 (1994); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 488-489, 
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979). 
 
 
 
22 
 
 
218 n.6 (2008).  The Federal inquiry turns on the right of the 
prospective juror to be free from discrimination in the exercise 
of his or her right "to participate in the administration of the 
law."  Id., quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 
(1880).  The question under our Declaration of Rights, on the 
other hand, focuses on the defendant's right to be tried by a 
fairly drawn jury of his or her peers.  See Benoit, supra; 
Soares, supra at 488.  "Regardless of the perspective from which 
the problem is viewed, [however,] the result appears to be the 
same."  Benoit, supra.  A party may no more seek to strike a 
single prospective juror on the basis of his or her race than 
attempt to strike all members of a particular race.  See Snyder 
v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008); Commonwealth v. Lacoy, 
90 Mass. App. Ct. 427, 431 (2016). 
 
A challenge to a peremptory strike, whether framed under 
State or Federal law, is evaluated using a burden-shifting 
analysis.  In the initial stage, the burden is on the party 
challenging the peremptory strike to make a prima facie showing 
that the strike is improper.  If the party does so, the burden 
shifts to the party attempting to strike the prospective juror 
to provide a group-neutral reason for doing so.  The judge then 
must determine whether the proffered reason is adequate and 
genuine.  See, e.g., Benoit, 452 Mass. at 218-220.  An appellate 
court reviews the trial judge's decision to allow the juror to 
 
 
 
23 
 
 
be struck for abuse of discretion.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Issa, 466 Mass. 1, 10 (2013).  The question in this case is 
whether, as to the first part of this three-part inquiry, the 
judge abused her discretion in declining to find that the 
defendant had made a prima facie showing of impropriety in the 
prosecutor's peremptory challenge of prospective juror no. 143. 
 
The defendant first lodged an objection to the prosecutor's 
use of the peremptory challenge after the Commonwealth had 
challenged juror no. 113B, an African-American.21  At that point, 
no African-Americans had been seated, and the prosecutor had 
used peremptory challenges to exclude four prospective jurors 
who were African-American, and seven prospective jurors of other 
races.  The judge determined that the defendant had made a prima 
facie showing of improper use of the peremptory challenge, and 
required the prosecutor to provide an adequate and genuine race-
neutral reason for her decision to strike.  The prosecutor 
provided such an explanation, pointing out that the prospective 
juror, whose native language was not English, seemed to have 
some difficulties with his comprehension of English.  The judge 
deemed the explanation satisfactory, and also noted additional 
concerns the juror had raised about his young child, who was 
                     
 
21 Two members of the venire were identified in the record 
as "Juror number 113."  Following the lead of the parties, we 
refer to the challenged juror, who was the second of the two to 
be called to voir dire, as "juror no. 113B." 
 
 
 
24 
 
 
facing surgery.  The defendant does not contest this 
determination on appeal. 
 
The defendant again challenged the prosecutor's use of 
peremptory strikes after she attempted to strike juror no. 143, 
also an African-American.  Between the dismissal of juror no. 
113B and the voir dire of juror no. 143, one African-American 
juror and one juror of another race had been seated without 
challenge by either party,22 and, in addition to juror no. 143, 
the prosecutor had struck one juror who was not African-
American.  Thus, at that point, the Commonwealth had used 
peremptory challenges against five prospective jurors who were 
African-American and eight other prospective jurors, while one 
African-American and six jurors of other races had been 
empanelled.  The defendant had exercised eight peremptory 
strikes that were not challenged; the record is silent as to the 
race of any of those jurors. 
 
In considering the defendant's challenge to the 
prosecutor's exercise of a peremptory challenge to strike 
juror no. 143, the judge, persuaded by the presence of a single 
African-American on the empanelled jury, determined that the 
defendant had not met his prima facie burden.  After some 
initial confusion regarding the racial composition of the seated 
                     
 
22 The African-American who had been empanelled was 
juror no. 117.  This juror was the next to be called to voir 
dire following the defendant's first Batson-Soares challenge. 
 
 
 
25 
 
 
jurors, the judge declined to require the prosecutor to offer an 
adequate and genuine race-neutral reason for the strike.  The 
judge commented: 
 
"I think we're still in the same position as we were 
the last time relative to the prima facie showing of 
irregularity.  There are no -- strike that.  I just noticed 
there is an African-American woman on the jury.  I forgot 
about her, the woman who works as a member of the Board of 
Bar Overseers.  That being the case, . . . I cannot find 
that you have made a prima facie showing, because I'm 
entitled to look at the composition of the jury.  And of 
the seven [empanelled] jurors there is an African-American 
woman on this jury." 
 
 
It is this decision which the defendant maintains was an 
abuse of discretion; we agree.  Peremptory challenges are 
presumed to be proper, but rebutting the presumption of 
propriety is not an onerous task.  By their nature, peremptory 
challenges "permit[] 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to 
discriminate'" (citation omitted).  Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.  In 
light of this, and in order "to ensure that the important 
protections set forth in [Batson and Soares] are fully adhered 
to, the burden of making [the prima facie] showing ought not be 
a terribly weighty one."  Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 
460, 463 n.4 (2003). 
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
has called the first stage burden "not substantial."  Sanchez v. 
Roden, 753 F.3d 279, 302 (1st Cir. 2014), quoting Aspen v. 
Bissonnette, 480 F.3d 571, 574 (1st. Cir.), cert. denied, 552 
 
 
 
26 
 
 
U.S. 934 (2007), appropriately characterizing it as being merely 
a burden of production, not persuasion.  See Sanchez, supra at 
306.  See also Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168 (2005) 
(rejecting requirement that discrimination be "more likely than 
not" in order to make prima facie showing); Aspen, supra at 575 
(rejecting requirement that discrimination be "likely").  Given 
the relative ease with which a party can make the necessary 
prima facie showing, we have urged "judges to think long and 
hard before they decide to require no explanation . . . for [a] 
challenge."  Issa, 466 Mass. at 11 n.14.23 
 
When evaluating whether the party challenging the strike 
has met the relatively low bar of a prima facie showing, a trial 
judge is to consider all of the relevant facts and 
circumstances.  See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96; Sanchez, 753 F.3d at 
299-300.  The inquiry ordinarily begins with the number and 
percentage of group members who have been excluded.  See Issa, 
466 Mass. at 9.  This factor can, in certain circumstances, 
itself suffice to make the requisite prima facie showing.  See 
                     
 
23 Some jurisdictions have eliminated the need to make a 
prima facie showing, and require a race-neutral reason whenever 
a Batson challenge is made.  See Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 439 
Mass. 460, 463 n.4 (2003), citing State v. Holloway, 209 Conn. 
636, 645-646, cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1071 (1989), State v. 
Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319, 1321 (Fla. 1993), State v. Parker, 
836 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Mo.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014 (1992), 
and State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302, 305-306 (1995), overruled on 
other grounds, State v. Adams, 322 S.C. 114 (1996). 
 
 
 
27 
 
 
id.  Other factors to consider may include:24  the possibility of 
an objective group-neutral explanation for the strike or 
strikes;25 any similarities between excluded jurors and those, 
not members of the allegedly targeted group, who have been 
struck; differences among the various members of the allegedly 
targeted group who were struck;26 whether those excluded are 
members of the same protected group as the defendant or the 
victim;27 and the composition of the jurors already seated.  See 
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005); Issa, 466 Mass. 
at 10-11; Sanchez, 753 F.3d at 302; State v. Rhone, 168 Wash. 2d 
645, 656, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1011 (2010). 
                     
 
24 This list of factors is neither mandatory nor exhaustive; 
a trial judge and a reviewing court must consider "all relevant 
circumstances" for each challenged strike.  See Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986).  See also People v. Rivera, 
221 Ill. 2d 481, 501 (2006) (citing seven such factors); State 
v. Rhone, 168 Wash. 2d 645, 656, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1011 
(2010) (listing eight factors and noting they are "not 
exclusive"). 
 
 
25 This factor overlaps with the analysis at the second and 
third stages, in which the proponent of the strike must provide 
an adequate and genuine group-neutral reason to justify it; such 
considerations may play a role in the first-step analysis as 
well. 
 
 
26 Because the record does not reveal which of the 
prospective jurors struck by the Commonwealth, other than 
jurors nos. 113B and 143, were African-American, we cannot 
evaluate this factor. 
 
 
27 This factor does little to tip the balance in either 
direction here.  The defendant and both of the alleged victims 
were members of the same protected group as the excluded juror.  
See Commonwealth v. Issa, 466 Mass. 1, 11 (2013). 
 
 
 
28 
 
 
 
In many respects, this case is similar to Sanchez, in which 
the First Circuit concluded that the judge abused his discretion 
in failing to find that the defendant had made a prima facie 
showing of impropriety in a peremptory strike.  See Sanchez, 753 
F.3d at 299.  We look to many of the same factors as the Sanchez 
court did, and turn first to the numerical considerations:  the 
raw number of African-American prospective jurors struck up to 
that point, and the percentage of such jurors struck. 
 
The raw number of African-American prospective jurors 
struck, standing by itself, is inconclusive here.  The 
prosecutor excluded five African-American members of the venire, 
a number comparable to the four persons of color whose exclusion 
was challenged in Sanchez, supra at 303.  Cf. Issa, 466 Mass. at 
10 (judge could have found, but was not required to find, prima 
facie showing where prosecutor excluded one African-American 
prospective juror, who was last such juror in venire). 
 
On the other hand, the percentage of African-American 
prospective jurors struck suggests that the defendant made the 
necessary prima facie showing.28  At the time when the defendant 
raised his second Batson-Soares objection, to the peremptory 
strike of juror no. 143, the prosecutor had struck five African-
American prospective jurors and one such juror had been 
                     
 
28 As was the case in Sanchez, 753 F.3d at 307, the record 
is not entirely clear. 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
empanelled.  For comparison, the prosecutor had struck eight 
prospective jurors of other races, but six jurors of other races 
had been empanelled.  Because the record does not disclose 
whether one or more African-Americans had not been challenged by 
the Commonwealth, but subsequently had been struck by the 
defendant, we cannot say with certainty, as the defendant would 
have us do, that the prosecutor struck five of six -- or more 
than eighty-three per cent -- of African-Americans whom the 
judge declared indifferent.  Nevertheless, it seems that the 
prosecutor exercised a disproportionate number of her peremptory 
challenges against African-Americans, challenging a much higher 
percentage of African-American members of the venire than of 
prospective jurors of other races.  See Commonwealth v. 
Hamilton, 411 Mass. 313, 316-317 (1991) (concluding prima facie 
showing had been made solely on basis that prosecutor challenged 
sixty-seven per cent of African-American members of venire 
compared to fourteen per cent of Caucasian members of venire).  
Contrast Issa, 466 Mass. at 10 (no indication of 
disproportionate use of peremptory strikes). 
 
Moving beyond purely numerical considerations, the 
possibility that juror no. 143 was struck because of her race is 
heightened by the fact that the record reveals no race-neutral 
reason that might have justified the strike.  See Sanchez, 753 
F.3d at 303 ("Juror . . . answered all . . . questions 
 
 
 
30 
 
 
appropriately, and nothing . . . casts doubts on his ability 
to . . . follow . . . instructions or evaluate the evidence 
fairly and impartially").  Like all of the jurors who had been 
seated, juror no. 143 gave brief, straightforward, and 
appropriate answers to the voir dire questions, and no issues of 
bias or competence were raised.  Contrast Issa, 466 Mass. at 11, 
where our determination that the judge did not abuse his 
discretion in failing to find a prima facie showing of 
discrimination took into account the prosecutor's possible 
recognition of the prospective juror whom she struck.  Here, on 
the other hand, we discern no objective reason that juror no. 
143 could not have served. 
 
The significant similarities between juror no. 143 and 
other prospective jurors to whom the prosecutor did not object 
further strengthen the possibility that juror no. 143 was struck 
because of her race.  See, e.g., Sanchez, 753 F.3d at 302 (focus 
on "whether similarly situated jurors [of other races] were 
permitted to serve" [citation omitted]).  The prosecutor only 
briefly questioned juror no. 143 before exercising the 
peremptory strike, and the questions she asked her had not been 
asked of most of the previous prospective jurors, so any 
detailed comparison is difficult.  Compare id. at 304 (record 
permitted detailed comparison with one particular juror who was 
not African-American).  It is, nonetheless, telling that the 
 
 
 
31 
 
 
prosecutor did not strike prospective jurors with 
characteristics similar to those of juror no. 143, who either 
were not African-American or whose race is not evident from the 
record. 
 
In response to questioning from the prosecutor, juror no. 
143 revealed that she worked by herself rather than with others, 
that that she or a member of her family previously had served on 
a jury, and that she had attended high school outside the United 
States.  With the exception of her education outside the United 
States, elicited in response to a question asked of too few 
jurors to allow for comparison, her responses did not 
differentiate her from other prospective jurors.  At least two 
other prospective jurors, including a non-African-American juror 
who was seated, had previous experience with jury service, while 
others, again including a non-African-American who was seated, 
did not work with others.29 
 
In concluding that the defendant had not met his minimal 
prima facie burden, the judge appears to have relied primarily, 
if not exclusively, on the presence of the single African-
American who at that point had been seated.  That juror, 
juror no. 117, was seated immediately following the defendant's 
first Batson-Soares challenge to juror no. 113B, where the judge 
                     
 
29 In addition, the prosecutor struck several jurors who 
reported that they did work with others. 
 
 
 
32 
 
 
without hesitation had determined that the defendant had made a 
prima facie showing of discrimination.30 
 
While it is permissible for a judge to consider the 
composition of the empanelled members of the jury, insofar as it 
may affect whether he or she infers discrimination in the strike 
under review, see Commonwealth v. Scott, 463 Mass. 561, 571 
(2012); Scott v. Gelb, 810 F.3d 94, 103 (1st Cir. 2016) (denying 
habeas corpus in same case), that is only one factor among many, 
and must be assessed in context.  The presence of one empanelled 
African-American juror, as appears to have been the case here, 
cannot be dispositive.  Indeed, in Sanchez, five African-
Americans already had been seated.  See Sanchez, 753 F.3d at 
303.  As the court explained in that case, to place undue weight 
on this factor not only would run counter to the mandate to 
consider all relevant circumstances, see Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-
97, but also would send the "unmistakable message that a 
prosecutor can get away with discriminating against some African 
Americans . . . so long as a prosecutor does not discriminate 
                     
 
30 While a judge must evaluate each such challenge on the 
facts known at the time, we note that little had changed since 
the judge had found a prima facie showing of discrimination.  
Between the two challenges, the prosecutor had exercised two 
peremptory strikes, one against juror no. 143, an African-
American, and one against a juror who was not African-American.  
The proportion of the Commonwealth's strikes exercised against 
African-Americans, therefore, actually had increased slightly, 
from four out of eleven to five out of thirteen. 
 
 
 
33 
 
 
against all such individuals" (emphasis in original).  See 
Sanchez, supra at 299. 
 
Consideration of all relevant circumstances compels the 
conclusion that the defendant made the limited showing necessary 
to make out a prima facie showing of discrimination, and that 
the judge abused her discretion by finding otherwise.  Had the 
judge allowed the inquiry to go forward, the prosecutor might 
well have proffered an adequate and genuine race-neutral reason 
for her strike of juror no. 143.  Because the judge did not do 
so, and because a Batson-Soares error constitutes structural 
error for which prejudice is presumed,31 we vacate the 
convictions and remand the case to the Superior Court for a new 
trial.32 
                     
 
31 In this case, we reach only the first step of the Batson-
Soares analysis, and acknowledge the constitutionally 
permissible option of remanding for an evidentiary hearing at 
which the Commonwealth would bear the burden of establishing a 
race-neutral justification for the challenge which would render 
the judge's error harmless.  See, e.g., Sanchez v. Roden, 753 
F.3d 279, 307 (1st Cir. 2014).  We have long disfavored this 
approach, however, on the ground that "the conditions of the 
empanelment . . . cannot be easily recreated."  Soares, 377 
Mass. at 492 n.37.  See Issa, 466 Mass. at 11 n.14 (error in 
failing to find prima facie showing of discrimination "unlikely 
to be harmless"). 
 
 
32 We discern no merit in the Commonwealth's argument that 
the defendant waived the Batson-Soares issue either by failing 
to object a second time following the judge's determination that 
he had not made the necessary prima facie showing, or by 
mentioning only Soares, 377 Mass. 461, rather than both Soares 
and Batson, 476 U.S. 79. 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
 
 
c.  Issues on retrial.  We discuss briefly those issues 
which may occur at a new trial.33 
 
i.  Refusal evidence.  On cross-examination of Johnson, one 
of the investigating officers who spoke with the defendant, 
defense counsel elicited testimony that the defendant willingly 
spoke to police, that he was polite, and that he consented to 
have his hands swabbed for gunshot residue.  On redirect 
examination of Johnson, and again on direct examination of 
Sergeant Thomas O'Leary, the Commonwealth then elicited 
testimony that the defendant refused to go to the hospital to be 
viewed by Platt, the surviving victim. 
 
To be sure, absent a defendant "opening the door" to such 
testimony, admission of "refusal" evidence violates a 
defendant's right against self-incrimination.  See art. 12 of 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; Commonwealth v. Conkey, 
430 Mass. 139, 141-142 (1999), S.C., 443 Mass. 60 (2004).34  To 
                     
 
33 We do not reach the defendant's claim that the judge 
improperly limited his cross-examination of Detective Donald 
Lee, noting only that the trial judge has discretion to 
determine the proper scope of cross-examination.  See 
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 431 Mass. 535, 540 (2000).  Nor do we 
address the defendant's claim that his trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance. 
 
 
34 For example, while a defendant's compelled production of 
a writing exemplar does not violate his or her privilege against 
self-incrimination, the Commonwealth ordinarily may not 
introduce evidence of a defendant's refusal to participate 
voluntarily in such a procedure; the latter, unlike the former, 
is testimonial evidence protected under art. 12 of the 
 
 
 
35 
 
 
the extent that the defendant leaves the jury with a false or 
misleading impression, however, he thereby opens the door to the 
Commonwealth's introduction of pertinent refusal evidence on 
that issue to correct the misimpression created.  See 
Commonwealth v. Beaulieu, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 100, 104 (2001) 
(where defense counsel elicited testimony that defendant was not 
subjected to field sobriety test, Commonwealth was entitled to 
elicit testimony that defendant refused); Commonwealth v. 
Johnson, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 398, 405-406 (1999) (where defendant 
testified that he "did not disguise his voice" during 
identification procedure, Commonwealth was entitled to elicit 
testimony that defendant twice failed to show up for voice 
identification).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Toolan, 460 Mass. 452, 471 
(2011) (where defendant puts voluntariness of statement at 
issue, prosecutor may introduce post-Miranda silence to show 
voluntariness).  To the extent that defense counsel elicited on 
cross-examination of Johnson that the defendant had been willing 
to be swabbed for gunshot residue, was willing to turn over his 
                                                                  
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  See Opinion of the 
Justices, 412 Mass. 1201, 1209 (1992) (discussing difference 
between testimonial and real evidence).  While this distinction 
is well established as a matter of Massachusetts law, the United 
States Supreme Court has reached the opposite conclusion under 
the cognate provision of the Federal Constitution, see South 
Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564 (1983) (refusal to take 
breathalyzer admissible under Fifth Amendment to United States 
Constitution), as have many other States under the cognate 
provisions of their State Constitutions. 
 
 
 
36 
 
 
and his mother's telephone numbers, and was otherwise generally 
cooperative, the door was surely open to refusal evidence as to 
the topics he raised.  The question here is how widely the door 
was opened.  Otherwise put, the question is whether the 
defendant, by eliciting evidence to show he cooperated in 
certain respects, thereby allowed the Commonwealth to elicit 
refusal evidence showing he did not cooperate in a different 
respect. 
 
In decisions to date, the admitted refusal evidence has 
been confined to the discrete issue with regard to which the 
defendant elicited evidence.  See Beaulieu, 79 Mass. App. Ct. at 
104; Johnson, 46 Mass. App. Ct. at 405-406.  In addition to 
assuring that the risk of undue prejudice from the proffered 
testimony does not outweigh its probative value, see 
Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249 & n.27 (2014), it is 
the better part of wisdom, in such circumstances, given the 
constitutional protection accorded to testimonial refusal 
evidence, to view the door as having been left ajar rather than 
wide open.  Had the defendant only elicited testimony that he 
had consented to gunshot residue testing, refusal evidence, if 
any, limited to that discrete issue, would be proper.  That 
being said, to the extent that the defendant here elicited 
considerable evidence creating the impression of full 
cooperation with the police, evidence as to his refusal to 
 
 
 
37 
 
 
cooperate by allowing Platt to see him at the hospital was 
probative of that issue.  Given this, it was not an abuse of 
discretion to allow the Commonwealth to inquire on redirect 
examination of Johnson as to the challenged refusal evidence.  
Because such evidence should be admitted charily, however, it 
should not have been allowed to come in a second time on the 
direct examination of O'Leary.35 
 
ii.  Police radio broadcast.  At trial, the Commonwealth 
played a police radio broadcast in which Lee, one of the 
detectives who interviewed Platt at the hospital, thereafter 
relayed the description of the suspect that Platt had given him:  
"a young male with khaki shorts, Chuck Taylor sneakers, a white 
and red shirt, and a black and red baseball cap."  The defendant 
maintains that this broadcast was hearsay and should not have 
been admitted.  The Commonwealth contends that it was admissible 
for two reasons:  to show the state of police knowledge, and as 
an earlier out-of-court identification of the defendant by a 
testifying witness.  Neither is persuasive. 
                     
 
35 The Commonwealth also contends that the admission of 
refusal evidence was proper to rebut a defense of insufficient 
police investigation.  See generally Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 
Mass. 472 (1980).  Insofar as police, by their own admission, 
did not intend to have the defendant viewed by the surviving 
victim even if he had consented, this argument fails.  Contrast 
Commonwealth v. Beaulieu, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 100, 103-105 (2001) 
(police intended to perform field sobriety testing if defendant 
consented). 
 
 
 
38 
 
 
 
As to the first reason, the Commonwealth argues that the 
radio broadcast showed the state of police knowledge and thereby 
provided the jury with context for the detectives' decision to 
speak repeatedly to the defendant after the shooting.  See 
Commonwealth v. Miller, 361 Mass. 644, 659 (1972).  Hearsay 
admitted for this purpose, however, rarely should give such a 
specific description; instead, "a statement that an officer 
acted 'upon information received,' . . . or words to that 
effect" is sufficient.  See Commonwealth v. Rosario, 430 Mass. 
505, 510 (1999), quoting McCormick, Evidence § 249 (E. Cleary 3d 
ed. 1984).  Even in that event, such evidence would require a 
limiting instruction, not given here, that it cannot be used for 
the truth of the description it contains. 
 
In reliance on Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(1)(C) (2017), and 
cases cited, the Commonwealth also maintains that the radio 
broadcast is admissible for its truth insofar as Platt testified 
at trial and the broadcast "identifies the person as someone the 
declarant [Platt] perceived earlier."  Quite apart from the 
failure to overcome the totem pole hearsay aspect of the 
challenged broadcast, Platt did not see the shooter, nor could 
she identify the defendant as the shooter.  While in certain 
instances a description of a person's characteristics, rather 
than an identification of a specific person, can constitute an 
identification for purposes of the aforesaid rule, see, e.g., 
 
 
 
39 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Weichell, 390 Mass. 62, 72 (1983), cert. denied, 
465 U.S. 1032 (1984) (approving admission of detailed facial 
description of perpetrator), the description here was simply too 
vague to qualify. 
 
iii.  Instruction on circumstantial evidence.  The judge 
informed the venire, before empanelment, that the case likely 
would turn on circumstantial evidence, and that such evidence, 
like direct evidence, was sufficient to prove guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  This was a correct statement of the law, and 
often is given during a judge's charge.  See Commonwealth v. 
Colon-Cruz, 408 Mass. 533, 556 (1990).  See also Massachusetts 
Superior Court Criminal Practice Jury Instructions § 1.3 (Mass. 
Cont. Legal Educ. 2d ed. 2013).  To the extent that the 
defendant contends that such an instruction, while appropriate 
after the close of all the evidence, is inappropriate to give to 
the venire before trial, we disagree.  In Commonwealth v. 
Andrade, 468 Mass. 543, 548-549 (2014), for example, we held 
that a judge does not abuse his or her discretion by taking the 
stronger step of asking prospective jurors individually whether 
they would be able to convict on the basis of circumstantial 
evidence, and striking for cause those who answer in the 
negative. 
 
iv.  Instruction on mere presence.  The defendant contends 
that he is entitled to an instruction that his mere presence at 
 
 
 
40 
 
 
the scene of the shooting is not sufficient to convict.  While 
such an instruction is permissible, we decline to require it, 
insofar as the standard instructions regarding the elements of 
the offenses adequately cover the issue.  See Commonwealth v. 
Hoose, 467 Mass. 395, 412 (2014) (no specific instruction 
necessary where Commonwealth's burden of proof adequately 
explained by standard instruction).  The judge correctly 
instructed the jury that, in order to convict the defendant of 
murder in the first degree, they must find that the defendant 
"caused the death" of the victim and that he "consciously and 
purposefully intended to cause" the victim's death.36  A 
reasonable jury could not find these elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt based on the defendant's mere presence in a 
public park. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The defendant's convictions are vacated 
and set aside.  The case is remanded to the Superior Court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
 
36 Similarly explicit instructions were given regarding the 
elements of the other crimes with which the defendant was 
charged.