Title: Jones v. Artery

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

FRANK J. JONES v. DAN ARTERY2012 WY 63Case Number: S-11-0173Decided: 05/01/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012
 
FRANK 
J. JONES,Appellant(Defendant),v.DAN 
ARTERY,Appellee(Plaintiff).
 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Platte County
The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge
 
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Frank 
J. Jones, pro 
se
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Richard 
A. Mincer and Melissa R. Skorcz of Hirst Applegate, LLP, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
GOLDEN, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      In June 2009, Dan 
Artery (Artery) was attacked by three Boston terriers that were under the care 
and responsibility of Frank Jones (Jones) and Amy Bates (Bates).  Artery brought an action against Jones 
and Bates for injuries Artery sustained during the attack.  On the morning of trial, Jones admitted 
one hundred percent liability for the injuries, and the district court dismissed 
Bates as a defendant.  The remaining 
question of damages was then tried to a jury, and the jury awarded Artery 
damages in the amount of $13,059.83.  
Thereafter, the district court, over the objections of Jones, ordered 
Jones to pay Artery’s costs in the amount of $1,005.20.  Jones appeals a portion of the awarded 
costs.  We affirm in part and 
reverse in part.
 
ISSUE
 
[¶2]      Jones presents 
the following issue on appeal:  Did 
the district court abuse its discretion in awarding certain costs to 
Appellee?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      On June 11, 2009, 
Artery was visiting his brother-in-law, Jerry Gebhart, who lived across the 
street from Jones and Bates.  On 
that June date, three Boston terriers either owned by or under the care and 
responsibility of Jones and Bates were running at large.  The three dogs attacked and injured 
Artery.  
 
[¶4]      On December 18, 
2009, Artery filed a Complaint against Jones and Bates asserting strict 
liability and negligence claims and seeking damages for the injuries he 
sustained.  On January 26, 2010, 
Jones and Bates filed an Answer admitting that Bates was the owner of the three 
dogs, and otherwise denying all allegations.  
 
[¶5]      The matter was 
set for a jury trial, and on April 13, 2011, the first morning of the trial, 
Jones, during a conference in chambers, stipulated to one hundred percent 
liability for Artery’s injuries.  
The district court then dismissed the Complaint against Bates and ordered 
her to pay her own fees and costs.  
The remaining issue of damages was tried to the jury, and the jury 
returned a verdict for Artery in the amount of $13,059.83.  
 
[¶6]      Artery thereafter 
submitted a certified bill of costs seeking $1,005.20 in costs.  Artery’s bill of costs contained a more 
detailed itemization of the costs, but summarized generally, Artery sought the 
following costs:
 
            
            
a.         
Filing fee for Complaint: $60.00
            
            
b.         
Service fees (10):  
$350.00
            
            
c.         
Witness fees for Gerald Gebhart:  
$266.40
            
            
d.         
Reporter fees:  $180.00 
(pretrial conference and trial)
            
            
e.         
Deposition costs:  $148.80 
(transcripts)
 
Jones 
objected to all of the costs except $185.00, which accounted for:  $60.00 for the filing fee; $35.00 for 
service of the summons and complaint on Jones; and $90.00 for two days of court 
reporter fees at $45.00 per day.  

 
[¶7]      On June 1, 2011, 
the district court entered an order awarding Artery’s costs in their 
entirety.  On June 30, 2011, Jones 
filed a notice of appeal from the district court’s order awarding costs.  
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶8]      We review a 
district court’s award of costs for an abuse of discretion.  Elk Ridge Lodge, Inc. v. Sonnett, 2011 
WY 106, ¶ 17, 254 P.3d 957, 962 (Wyo. 2011); Garrison v. CC Builders, Inc., 2008 WY 
34, ¶ 42, 179 P.3d 867, 878 (Wyo. 2008); Mueller 
v. Zimmer, 
2007 WY 195, ¶ 11, 173 P.3d 361, 364 (Wyo. 2007).  A court abuses its discretion when it 
acts in a manner that exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances.  Lykins v. Habitat for Humanity, 2010 WY 
118, ¶ 9, 237 P.3d 405, 408 (Wyo. 2010); Snyder v. Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079, 
1084 (Wyo. 1999).  “The burden is 
placed upon the party who is attacking the trial court’s ruling to establish an 
abuse of discretion, and the ultimate issue is whether the court could 
reasonably conclude as it did.”  Nish v. Schaefer, 2006 WY 85, ¶ 6, 138 P.3d 1134, 1137 (Wyo. 2006); Snyder, 
992 P.2d  at 1084.
 
[¶9]      Our review of the 
district court’s award of costs in this case is hampered by the failure of Jones 
to designate the trial transcript as part of the record on appeal.  See Nish, ¶ 21, 138 P.3d  at 1142 (it is the 
appellant’s responsibility to provide a record adequate to enable this Court’s 
review).  In these circumstances, we 
have explained:
 
When 
this Court does not have a properly authenticated transcript before it, it must 
accept the trial court’s findings of fact upon which it bases any decisions 
regarding evidentiary issues. Capshaw 
v. Schieck, 
2002 WY 54, ¶ 21, 44 P.3d 47, 54 (Wyo. 2002). 
The failure to provide a transcript does not necessarily require dismissal of an 
appeal, but our review is restricted to those allegations of error not requiring 
inspection of the transcript. Lacking a transcript, or a substitute for the 
transcript, the regularity of the trial court’s judgment and the competency of 
the evidence upon which that judgment is based must be presumed. Stadtfeld 
v. Stadtfeld, 
920 P.2d 662, 664 (Wyo. 1996); 
Combs 
v. Sherry-Combs, 
865 P.2d 50, 55 (Wyo. 1993).
 
 
Lykins, 
¶ 11, 237 P.3d  at 408 (quoting Burt 
v. Burt, 
2002 WY 127, ¶ 7, 53 P.3d 101, 103 (Wyo. 2002)); 
see also Arnold v. Day, 2007 WY 86, ¶ 9, 158 P.3d 694, 697 (Wyo. 2007) (“In the absence of anything to 
refute them, we will sustain the trial court’s findings, and we assume that the 
evidence presented was sufficient to support those 
findings.”).
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶10]   The district court awarded costs to 
Artery pursuant to Rule 54(d)(1) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure and 
Rule 501(a) of the Uniform Rules for District Courts.  Rule 54(d)(1) provides, in relevant 
part, that “[e]xcept when express provision therefor is made either in a statute 
or in these rules, costs other than attorney’s fees shall be allowed as of 
course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs.”  W.R.C.P. 54(d)(1). Rule 501(a) details 
the taxable costs and the requirements for a certified bill of costs.  We have recognized that Rule 501(a)(3) 
sets forth guidelines for awarding costs, but that those guidelines are not 
mandatory.  Garrison, ¶ 42, 179 P.3d  at 878 (citing 
Wyo. U.R.D.C. 501(a)(4)).  As 
indicated by our standard of review, the question whether and what costs to 
award is discretionary.  Id.  
 
[¶11]   In keeping with Rule 501’s 
guidelines and this Court’s standard of review, we consider each objection of 
Jones to the costs awarded by the district court.
 
A.        
$35.00 Summons and Complaint Service Fee on Amy 
Bates
 
[¶12]   Jones contends that he should not 
be taxed for this cost because Bates was voluntarily dismissed as a defendant in 
this action and because the district court ordered Bates to pay her own 
costs.  We disagree. 

 
[¶13]   This Court has held that “costs 
should not be awarded for service fees upon parties with whom the successful 
party has settled.”  State v. Dieringer, 708 P.2d 1, 11 (Wyo. 
1985).  We find the present case 
distinguishable, however, in that there was no settlement between Artery and 
Bates.  Rather, on the morning of 
the first day of trial, Jones, who lives with and was counsel for Bates, 
stipulated to one hundred percent liability and the dismissal of Bates as a 
co-defendant.  Under these 
circumstances, Jones has not shown an abuse of discretion by the district 
court.
 
[¶14]   We also find no inconsistency 
between the district court’s order requiring Bates to pay her own costs and the 
order requiring Jones to pay this service fee.  The fee for service of the summons and 
complaint on Bates was not one of Bates’ costs, it was one of Artery’s 
costs.  The two orders are not in 
conflict, and the district court thus did not abuse its discretion in requiring 
Jones to pay the fee for service on Bates.
 
[¶15]   Finally, we are not persuaded by 
Jones’ hypothetical scenario of being required to pay the service costs for 
twenty additional defendants voluntarily dismissed from an action.  The facts and circumstances in each case 
will inform the district court’s exercise of discretion, and if there were a 
case in which there were twenty such additional defendants voluntarily 
dismissed, the quantity and voluntarily dismissal of those defendants would be 
factors to be considered and weighed by the district court.  That is precisely the nature of Rule 
501.  The guidelines as to allowable 
costs are discretionary, not mandatory.
 
B.        
$105.00 Subpoena Service Fees on Veterinary Clinics and Wheatland 
Police             
Officer
 
[¶16]   Jones contends that subpoenas 
served on two separate veterinary clinics and a Wheatland police officer were 
mere “fishing expeditions” that could not and did not lead to any discoverable 
information pertaining to damages, the issue that ultimately was the only issue 
before the jury.  We reject Jones’ 
argument.  
 
[¶17]   First, Jones provides no cites to 
the record in support of his argument.  
Second, the issue to be presented to the jury was not narrowed to the 
question of damages until the morning of trial.  Under these circumstances, Jones has not 
met his burden of proving an abuse of discretion.
 
C.        
$70.00 Subpoena Service Fees for Vacated November 2010 
Trial
 
[¶18]   Jones contends he should not be 
responsible for the costs of serving subpoenas on two witnesses subpoenaed for 
the vacated November 2010 trial because the original trial date was vacated by 
the district court on its own motion.  
We agree that the record contains no evidence or reasoning to support 
this assessment of costs against Jones and find that the district court abused 
its discretion in this portion of the cost award.
 
D.        
Gebhart Witness Fees
 
[¶19]   The district court assessed against 
Jones a witness fee of $266.40 for the attendance of Jerry Gebhart at the 
trial.  The majority of that cost 
was for Mr. Gebhart’s travel from Phoenix, Arizona.  Jones contends the witness fee should be 
limited to the $15.00 allowed a witness for half a day’s travel and testimony 
because Gebhart’s permanent residence is in Wheatland, approximately one mile 
from the courthouse, and his testimony lasted only fifteen minutes.  We disagree.
 
[¶20]   Rule 501(a) provides as follows 
regarding witness fees:
 
Witness 
fees are allowed at the rate of $30.00 per day and $15.00 per half day 
necessarily spent traveling to and from the proceeding and in attendance at the 
proceeding. Mileage is allowed at the rate of $.23 per mile, not to exceed the 
costs of common carrier transportation rates.
 
Wyo. 
U.R.D.C. 501(a)(3)(B)(i).  Nothing 
in the rule restricts the compensation to travel from the witness’s residence to 
the courthouse.  In fact, the rule 
contemplates travel from other locations in its cost certification 
requirements.  Rule 501requires that 
the certificate of costs identify the witness’s place of residence or “the place 
where subpoenaed.”  Wyo. U.R.D.C. 
501(a)(1)(B).   

 
[¶21]   The record contained verified 
documentation of Mr. Gebhart’s travel costs from Phoenix and evidence that his 
travel and testimony together consumed an entire day.  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion in its award of Mr. Gebhart’s witness fees.
 
E.        
Reporter Fees
 
[¶22]   The district court awarded $180.00 
in court reporter fees, consisting of a $45.00 court reporter fee for appearance 
at a pretrial conference and a $135.00 fee for appearance at a three-day jury 
trial.  Jones contends no fee should 
be permitted for the pretrial conference and that the fee for the jury trial 
should be limited to two days’ worth, for a total of $90.00, because the trial 
only lasted two days.  Jones cites 
to Rule 905 of the Uniform Rules for District Courts, which establishes the 
court reporter fee, to support his argument.
 
[¶23]   Rule 501 provides as follows 
concerning the allowance of court reporter fees as costs:
 
The 
$45.00 fee is a taxable cost. Transcripts of proceedings, such as motion 
hearings, pretrial conferences, etc., prepared at the request of a party in 
anticipation of trial are not taxable as costs unless such matters become part 
of the record on appeal.
 
Wyo. 
U.R.D.C. 501(a)(3)(C).  The district 
court explained it basis for awarding the court reporter fees for the pretrial 
conference and three days of trial as follows:
 
g.         
The pretrial conference reporter fees are appropriate, as there is no 
requirement that a party forego a court reporter in reliance on a court’s 
order;
 
h.         
The reporter fees for a three-day trial [are appropriate] on the grounds 
that trial was scheduled to last three days and a reporter must be reserved in 
advance of trial[.]
 
 [¶24]  We find no abuse of discretion in the 
district court’s findings and reasoning.  
The issues to be tried had not been limited to damages until the morning 
of trial, and nothing in the rule precludes a reporter fee for pretrial 
proceedings.  The rule’s only 
limitation is on the taxing of transcript costs.  Rule 905 does not change this result as 
it does not define costs that are taxable but instead establishes the court 
reporter fees and what is covered by that fee.  See Wyo. U.R.D.C. 
905.
 
F.         
Deposition Transcript Costs
 
[¶25]   The district court assessed costs 
for the transcripts for the depositions of Artery and Jones.  Jones objected to both on the ground 
that they were not reasonably necessary as defined by Rule 501.  
 
[¶26]   Rule 501 makes the costs of 
depositions taxable if the deposition is reasonably necessary for trial 
preparation.  It 
provides:
 
A 
deposition is deemed reasonably necessary if:
 
I.          
Read to the jury as provided in Rule 
32(a)(3), W.R.C.P.;
 
II. 
        
Used at trial for impeachment concerning a material line of testimony 
(impeachment on a collateral issue does not fall within the scope of this 
rule);
 
III. 
       
Necessarily, and not merely conveniently, used to refresh the 
recollection of a witness while on the stand; or
 
IV. 
      Was taken 
at the request of a non-prevailing party. 
 
The 
foregoing are meant to provide guidelines, and are not exhaustive. The use of 
depositions for trial preparation alone does not justify the imposition of 
costs.
 
Wyo. 
U.R.D.C. 501(a)(3)(D)(i).
 
[¶27]   We address first the cost for the 
Jones deposition transcript.  Jones 
contends he had no knowledge concerning the extent of Artery’s damages, the only 
issue submitted to the jury, and thus his trial testimony and deposition 
transcript were not reasonably necessary.  
As we noted above, the trial transcript was not designated as part of the 
record, and we thus have no way to review Jones’ testimony or the extent to 
which the deposition was necessary for trial.  Under these circumstances, we must defer 
to the district court’s understanding of the dynamics of the trial and presume 
the competency of the evidence upon which the district court based its 
judgment.  See Lykins, ¶ 11, 237 P.3d  at 408; Dieringer, 708 P.2d  at 
12.  Moreover, as we have also noted 
throughout our discussion, Jones’ stipulation to one hundred percent liability 
did not come until the morning of trial.  
We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s award of the Jones 
deposition transcript costs.
 
[¶28]   With respect to the Artery 
deposition transcript, the rule is clear.  
The cost is recoverable if the deposition was taken at the request of the 
non-prevailing party.  Jones took 
Artery’s deposition, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
awarding the cost of the deposition transcript.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶29]   The district court abused its 
discretion in awarding $70.00 for witness subpoena service fees for the vacated 
November 2010 trial.  We find no 
other abuse of discretion in the district court’s award, and we remand for entry 
of an order awarding costs consistent with this opinion.