Title: Commonwealth v. Perkins

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-12256 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MARK PERKINS. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     March 7, 2017. - October 10, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, & Lowy, JJ.1 
 
 
Controlled Substances.  Firearms.  Constitutional Law, Search 
and seizure, Probable cause.  Probable Cause.  Search and 
Seizure, Warrant, Affidavit, Probable cause.  Practice, 
Criminal, Motion to suppress. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 13, 2014. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Shannon 
Frison, J., and a motion to reconsider was also heard by her. 
 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Spina, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court 
for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by him to 
the Appeals Court.  The Supreme Judicial Court granted an 
application for direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Nicole M. Nixon, Assistant District Attorney (Graham G. Van 
Epps, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Robert F. Hennessy (John M. Thompson also present) for the 
defendant. 
                                                     
 
1 Justice Hines participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  A Suffolk County grand jury returned 
indictments charging the defendant with trafficking in cocaine 
over 200 grams, G. L. c. 94C, § 32E (b) (4); possession of 
ammunition after three or more criminal convictions, G. L. 
c. 269, §§ 10 (h), 10G (c); and possession of an electrical 
weapon, G. L. c. 140, § 131J.  The indictments stemmed from a 
wiretap investigation by State police and Framingham police of a 
drug distribution network operating in Framingham, Natick, 
Worcester, and Boston.2  Based on intercepted telephone 
conversations between the defendant's alleged middleman and a 
street-level distributor of cocaine, police surveillance of a 
suspected drug transaction, and other information, a judge in 
the Superior Court in Suffolk County issued a warrant 
authorizing a search of the defendant's apartment for evidence 
including a cellular telephone and drug-related records.  The 
warrant also authorized police to search for a distinctive 
article of clothing (an orange, hooded sweatshirt) allegedly 
worn by the defendant at the time of the suspected transaction.  
The warrant affidavit did not seek authorization to search for 
narcotics.  When the warrant was executed, officers seized a 
                                                     
 
2 As a result of the joint investigation of the alleged 
trafficking network, the defendant also was indicted by a 
Middlesex County grand jury on cocaine trafficking charges. 
3 
 
 
 
large quantity of cocaine, cellular telephones, drug 
paraphernalia, and ammunition. 
 
The defendant filed a motion to suppress in the Superior 
Court in Middlesex County.  Concluding that the affidavit failed 
to establish either probable cause to believe that the defendant 
sold cocaine or a sufficient nexus between the defendant's 
alleged criminal activity and his apartment, a judge allowed the 
defendant's motion to suppress the seized evidence.  A single 
justice of this court allowed the Commonwealth's application to 
pursue an interlocutory appeal in the Appeals Court, and we 
allowed the defendant's application for direct appellate review. 
 
We conclude that the warrant affidavit established probable 
cause to believe that the defendant, acting through a middleman, 
sold cocaine to a street-level dealer on the date alleged.  It 
also established a sufficient nexus between the defendant's 
participation in that transaction and his residence to permit a 
search for the cellular telephone used to arrange the sale and 
the sweatshirt he wore while conducting the transaction.  As the 
motion judge determined, however, the affidavit did not provide 
sufficient particularized information to allow a general search 
of the apartment for other "drug-related" evidence.  
Accordingly, we remand the matter to the Superior Court for a 
determination, after appropriate proceedings, whether the search 
exceeded the permissible scope of the warrant. 
4 
 
 
 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Investigation and warrant application.  
On April 30, 2014, State police Trooper Patrick M. Burke and 
Framingham police Detective Robert J. Lewis applied for warrants 
to search twelve residences in Middlesex, Suffolk, and Worcester 
counties.  The defendant's apartment, located in a building on 
Commonwealth Avenue in the Allston section of Boston, was one of 
the twelve.  In support of the warrant application, the officers 
submitted a 221-page affidavit that described a wiretap 
investigation into a drug distribution network headed by Robert 
Hairston, operating in Framingham, Worcester, Natick, Boston and 
surrounding areas.  The warrant affidavit provided as follows. 
 
Pursuant to several wiretap warrants issued in April, 2014, 
officers intercepted text messages and calls between telephones 
used by Hairston and other members of his organization.  Through 
intercepted telephone calls between Hairston and Nasean Johnson,3 
his alleged cocaine supplier, police learned the locations of 
the transactions, the amount of cocaine Hairston agreed to 
purchase from Johnson, and the purchase price. 
 
i.  Transaction on April 23, 2014.  The affidavit alleged 
that on April 23, 2014, the defendant, assisted by Johnson, who 
was acting as a middleman, sold Hairston 125 grams of cocaine 
for $5,200.  The affidavit relied upon a detailed description of 
                                                     
 
3 The wiretap warrants did not authorize interception of 
communications to and from Nasean Johnson's telephone. 
5 
 
 
 
cellular telephone calls intercepted on April 23, 2014, to 
establish probable cause that the defendant had conducted the 
transaction.  These calls were described as follows. 
 
At 11 A.M., Hairston telephoned Johnson to discuss a 
resupply of cocaine.  In response to the question, "What's the 
word?," Johnson said that he had called his own supplier, 
referred to as "Ol' boy," and informed Ol' boy that Hairston 
wanted "two."  Hairston asked if the supplier would "come this 
way" (toward Framingham).  Johnson replied that Ol' boy would be 
there "if you want him to." 
 
When Hairston complained that the $5,200 purchase price was 
excessive, Johnson responded that his supplier had determined 
the price:  "Nah, he said fifty-two, yo."  Hairston remarked 
that this was a "crazy" price.  Johnson reiterated that his 
supplier had set the price, and added, "I'm not getting nothing 
off it, he ain't looking out for me."  Johnson urged Hairston to 
let him know as soon as possible if he intended to complete the 
purchase, because he had to call his supplier "while it's still 
early." 
 
At 12:08 P.M., police intercepted a telephone call in which 
Hairston and Johnson agreed to meet at the Natick Mall at 2 P.M. 
to complete the transaction.  Johnson also mentioned that his 
supplier would be coming from Brighton.  Later, Hairston and 
6 
 
 
 
Johnson arranged to meet at a particular department store 
parking lot. 
 
At 2:35 P.M., Hairston informed Johnson that he was 
arriving at the parking lot.  A few minutes later, a police 
officer observed the defendant, wearing an orange, hooded 
sweatshirt (hoodie) and jeans, walking from a restaurant into 
the parking lot.  At 2:37 P.M., Johnson telephoned Hairston.  
While they were trying to locate each other in the parking lot, 
Hairston thought that he had spotted Johnson wearing a hoodie, 
but immediately corrected himself.  "Oh I see you, that's you in 
the hoodie?  Nah, that's not you in the hoodie.  Hell no."  
Johnson told Hairston that the person in the hoodie was his 
associate.  "Yeah, yeah, keep going that my peeps." 
 
At approximately 2:40 P.M., police observed Hairston enter 
a Nissan Altima automobile, driven by Johnson, parked in a 
parking space directly across from the entrance to the 
department store.  A few minutes later, Hairston got out of the 
Altima and entered his Audi vehicle.  Johnson then left the 
Altima and approached the Audi.  After a brief conversation with 
Hairston, Johnson re-entered the Altima and left the parking 
lot. 
 
Surveillance officers followed the Altima.  After 
approximately twenty minutes, at 3:02 P.M., uniformed officers 
stopped the vehicle on the purported ground of a traffic 
7 
 
 
 
violation.  They identified the defendant as the individual 
driving the vehicle and Johnson as the passenger.  When the 
defendant opened the glove compartment to retrieve his 
registration, they saw a bundle of cash, later determined to be 
$5,200. 
 
During the course of the stop, at 3:10 P.M., police 
intercepted a telephone call between Hairston and Johnson, in 
which Hairston complained that the cocaine he had just purchased 
was "wet."  Johnson told Hairston that he would have to call 
back "because I just got pulled over." 
 
At 3:24 P.M., Johnson telephoned Hairston.  Johnson said 
that his supplier had advised him that the cocaine would dry out 
in approximately one hour.  Johnson added that his supplier 
promised to make it up to Hairston on the next purchase.  "[B]ut 
on the next one he's got you." 
 
b.  Search of the defendant's apartment.  On April 30, 
2014, a judge of the Superior Court in Suffolk County issued a 
search warrant authorizing police to search the defendant's 
apartment for evidence of his participation in the cocaine 
distribution network.  The warrant authorized the seizure of 
records, in paper or electronic form, related to the defendant's 
alleged drug distribution business; records related to the 
financial proceeds stemming from that business; currency used to 
purchase or sell cocaine; paraphernalia used in the distribution 
8 
 
 
 
of cocaine; cellular telephones used to further the defendant's 
alleged drug distribution business, including cellular 
telephones showing evidence of contact with Johnson's telephone 
number; personal contact lists; any documentation identifying 
persons having custody or control over the premises or its 
contents; and the orange, hooded sweatshirt the police observed 
during the April 23, 2014, drug transaction. 
 
Police executed the warrant on May 1, 2014.  According to 
the search warrant return, they seized three bags of cocaine, a 
scale, two ice cube trays, a bottle of Inositol powder, paper 
containing white powdery residue, $1,000 in cash, nine cellular 
telephones, an Apple iPad brand tablet computer, one round of 
ammunition, a stun gun, a container for a "concealed carry deep 
cover holster," a checkbook in the names of the defendant and 
his girl friend, one white circular pill, and miscellaneous 
paperwork.4 
 
c.  Prior proceedings.  As stated, the defendant filed a 
motion in the Superior Court to suppress all evidence seized 
during the execution of the search warrant.  A judge of that 
court allowed the defendant's motion on the grounds that the 
search warrant affidavit failed to establish either the 
defendant's involvement in the drug transaction or a sufficient 
                                                     
 
4 Police did not find an orange hooded sweatshirt. 
9 
 
 
 
nexus between the alleged drug transaction and his apartment.  
The Commonwealth sought reconsideration of the suppression order 
and written findings and rulings.  After an evidentiary hearing, 
the judge issued the requested written findings and denied the 
motion for reconsideration. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  Under both the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, a search warrant may 
issue only upon a showing of probable cause.  Commonwealth v. 
Valerio, 449 Mass. 562, 566 (2007).  In reviewing a 
determination that there was probable cause to issue a search 
warrant, we consider the facts contained within the "four 
corners of the [search warrant] affidavit" (citation omitted), 
see Commonwealth v. O'Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003), and the 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from them.  See Commonwealth 
v. Martinez, 476 Mass. 410, 415 (2017).  To establish probable 
cause, the facts contained in the warrant affidavit, and the 
reasonable inferences drawn from them, must be sufficient for 
the issuing judge to conclude that the police seek items related 
to criminal activity and that the items described "reasonably 
may be expected to be located in the place to be searched at the 
time the warrant issues" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Walker, 438 Mass. 246, 249 (2002). 
10 
 
 
 
 
The question whether there was probable cause to issue the 
search warrant is a question of law that we review de novo, see 
Commonwealth v. Tapia, 463 Mass. 721, 725 (2012), in a 
commonsense and realistic manner.  See Commonwealth v. Molina, 
476 Mass. 388, 394 (2017); Commonwealth v. Cruz, 430 Mass. 838, 
840 (2000).  A reviewing court reads the warrant affidavit as a 
whole, without overly parsing or severing it, or subjecting it 
to "hypercritical analysis" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Donahue, 430 Mass. 710, 712 (2000).  See Commonwealth v. 
Anthony, 451 Mass. 59,68 (2008) ("In dealing with probable 
cause . . . we deal with probabilities.  These are not 
technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of 
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal 
technicians, act" [citation omitted]). 
 
b.  Whether the warrant affidavit established probable 
cause to believe that the defendant participated in the April 23 
drug transaction.  In allowing the defendant's motion to 
suppress, the motion judge determined that police had 
"absolutely no information that they provided the issuing 
Justice as to the role or duties of Mark Perkins in the alleged 
drug conspiracy."  Drawing all reasonable inferences from the 
information set forth in the affidavit, we conclude that the 
search warrant affidavit established probable cause to believe 
11 
 
 
 
that the defendant participated in the April 23, 2014, drug 
transaction. 
 
First, it is reasonable to infer from the affidavit that 
Johnson acted as a middleman for the April 23, 2014, sale of 125 
grams of cocaine to Hairston.  This inference is supported by 
several statements made during the 11 A.M. telephone 
conversations between Hairston and Johnson in which Hairston 
sought to purchase cocaine.  Johnson told Hairston that he had 
called another individual, nicknamed Ol’ boy, and informed him 
that Hairston "wanted two."  Johnson offered, and Hairston 
agreed, that "Ol' boy" should "come this way."  When Hairston 
commented that the price was excessive, Johnson informed 
Hairston that his supplier had set the purchase price, and that 
Johnson himself was not being compensated for arranging the 
transaction.  "That's what he said, fifty-two.  I'm not getting 
nothing off it, he ain't looking out for me."  At the end of the 
conversation, Johnson said, "So if you want to make that move I 
have to call him while it's still early.  You know?" 
 
Second, it was reasonable for the issuing judge to have 
inferred that the defendant was Johnson's source of supply.  In 
another telephone call with Hairston, Johnson indicated that his 
source would come from Brighton and would meet them at the 
Natick Mall at 2 P.M.; the defendant lived in Allston, a section 
of Boston adjacent to Brighton and arrived at the mall at 
12 
 
 
 
approximately 2:35 P.M.  While Hairston and Johnson were 
attempting to locate each other in the parking lot, Hairston 
asked, "Oh I see you, that's you in the hoodie?" and Johnson 
responded, "Yeah, yeah, keep going[;] that my peeps."  At the 
same time, police saw the defendant in the parking lot near an 
ice cream store where Hairston was standing; the defendant was 
wearing an orange, hooded sweatshirt and had a cellular 
telephone pressed to his ear. 
 
After Hairston had entered the Altima where Johnson was 
seated, then returned to his Audi, the defendant drove the 
Altima out of the parking lot, with Johnson as his passenger.  
When police stopped the Altima under the ruse of a traffic 
violation, they saw $5,200 in cash (the same amount as the 
purchase price that had been discussed) in the glove 
compartment.  While the Altima was stopped, Hairston telephoned 
Johnson to complain that the cocaine he had just purchased was 
"wet."  Johnson said he would have to call later because he had 
just been pulled over by police.  Johnson then telephoned 
Hairston a few minutes later and assured him that "he" had said 
to let the cocaine dry and that "he" had said he would make good 
on a future transaction.  Based on this series of telephone 
calls and events, a reasonable inference could be drawn that the 
source Johnson referenced was the defendant, who was present in 
the Altima with Johnson at that time. 
13 
 
 
 
 
c.  Whether the search warrant affidavit established a 
sufficient nexus to the defendant's apartment.  "Information 
establishing that a person is guilty of a crime does not 
necessarily constitute probable cause to search the person's 
residence."  Commonwealth v. Cinelli, 389 Mass. 197, 213, cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 860 (1983).  See Commonwealth v. Matias, 440 
Mass. 787, 794 (2004). 
To establish probable cause to search an individual's 
house, the search warrant affidavit must establish a 
"substantial basis for concluding that evidence connected to the 
crime will be found on the specified premises. "  Tapia, 463 
Mass. at 726, quoting Commonwealth v. Donahue, 430 Mass. 710, 
712 (2000).  The nexus between the crime alleged and the place 
to be searched "need not be based on direct observation."  
Matias, 440 Mass. at 794, quoting Cinelli, 389 Mass. at 213.  
"No bright-line rule can establish whether there is a nexus 
between suspected drug dealing and a defendant's home."  
Commonwealth v. Escalera, 462 Mass. 636, 643 (2012).  The nexus 
to search a residence for evidence of a crime "may be found in 
the type of crime, the nature of the . . . items [sought], the 
extent of the suspect's opportunity for concealment, and normal 
inferences as to where a criminal would be likely to hide [items 
of the sort sought]" (quotations and citation omitted).  
Cinelli, supra. 
14 
 
 
 
 
We consider in turn the individual items to be searched as 
listed in the warrant to determine whether there was a 
sufficient nexus between the item and the defendant's home. 
 
i.  Cellular telephones.  The defendant argues that the 
warrant affidavit did not set forth specific information 
connecting his alleged criminal activity to his apartment.  He 
asserts that in Commonwealth v. White, 475 Mass. 583 (2016), 
this court rejected "nearly identical efforts by the 
Commonwealth to rely on general considerations to establish 
probable cause to search a cellular telephone."  We conclude 
that the search warrant affidavit established probable cause to 
search the defendant's apartment for the cellular telephone he 
used to arrange the April 23, 2014, transaction. 
 
The search warrant authorized police to search the 
defendant's residence for "[c]ellular telephones used to 
facilitate narcotics transactions, including [a] telephone with 
unidentified call number, showing evidence of contact with [a 
specific telephone number] ('Nasean Johnson Phone')" and 
"[p]ersonal contact lists or telephone directories, in paper or 
electronic form, which reflect the names or nicknames of parties 
associated with telephone numbers, including the electronic 
contact lists of cellular telephones." 
In Commonwealth v. White, 475 Mass. at 590, we noted that 
the police "did not have any information that [a] cellular 
15 
 
 
 
telephone was used in the crime under investigation."  Rather, 
they believed that if the defendant had planned and committed 
multiple crimes with two accomplices, it was likely that he had 
communicated with the accomplices by using his cellular 
telephone, and, accordingly, likely that evidence of these 
communications would be found on the device.  Id.  We determined 
that "police may not seize or search . . . a cellular telephone 
to look for evidence unless they have information establishing 
the existence of particularized evidence likely to be found 
there."  Id.  See Commonwealth v. Broom, 474 Mass. 486, 496-497 
(2016) ("general" and "conclusory" opinion by affiant that 
individual is likely to store information in cellular telephone 
does not satisfy probable cause standard). 
In this case, however, quite unlike the situation in White, 
police had detailed and specific knowledge concerning the 
defendant's use of a cellular telephone to arrange drug 
transactions, and a particular telephone number with which that 
cellular telephone had been in contact at a specific time.  The 
affidavit established probable cause to believe that the 
defendant had used a cellular telephone to arrange cocaine sales 
through Johnson, his middleman.  During the intercepted 11 A.M. 
telephone conversation between Johnson and Hairston, Johnson 
twice mentioned calling his supplier.  When Hairston, who was 
seeking to purchase cocaine, asked, "Well, ah, what's the word?"  
16 
 
 
 
Johnson responded, "I called Ol' boy too, man."  At the end of 
the conversation, when the two discussed the price charged by 
"Ol' boy," Johnson told Hairston, "So, if you want to make that 
move I have to call him while it's still early.  You know?" 
[Emphases added.] 
Police also made direct observations corroborating a number 
of the statements made in the calls.  They observed the 
defendant arrive in the parking lot where the transaction had 
been arranged to take place at the scheduled time, talking on a 
cellular telephone while moving towards an ice cream store 
described in the intercepted conversations.  The defendant left 
the parking lot with Johnson immediately after the presumed drug 
transaction.  Thus, it was reasonable to infer that Johnson kept 
the defendant informed about the transaction as those plans 
evolved throughout the afternoon.  Because there was probable 
cause to believe that the defendant had used a cellular 
telephone to arrange the drug sale, through Johnson as 
intermediary, and that he had used cellular telephones to 
arrange drug transactions on other occasions, the warrant 
affidavit sought to seize all of the cellular telephones found 
in the defendant's apartment.  We conclude that the seizure of 
the nine telephones found in the apartment was supported by 
probable cause.  See Molina, 476 Mass. at 396-397 (probable 
cause existed for search warrant to seize all computers at 
17 
 
 
 
defendant's apartment where evidence showed a particular IP 
address had been used to acquire child pornography and all 
computers on router in defendant's house shared that IP 
address). 
The conclusion that the warrant affidavit established a 
sufficient nexus to search the defendant's apartment for the 
cellular telephone used to communicate with Johnson on April 23, 
2014, does not mean, however, that police had unlimited 
discretion to search every portion of the nine cellular 
telephones seized from the apartment.  The Fourth Amendment, 
art. 14, and G. L. c. 276, § 2, require that a search warrant 
describe with particularity the places to be searched and the 
items to be seized.  See Molina, 476 Mass. at 394.  "By defining 
and limiting the scope of the search, these constitutional and 
statutory particularity requirements prohibit general warrants 
amounting to 'exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings.'" 
Id., quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 
(1971).  See Commonwealth v. Dorelas, 473 Mass. 496, 499 n.3 
(2016) (examining whether warrant to search cellular telephone 
was overly broad). 
Here, the warrant established probable cause to search the 
call logs of the nine seized telephones to determine which, if 
any, had contacted the telephone number belonging to Johnson.  
In addition, the police were authorized to search the telephone 
18 
 
 
 
contact lists to determine whether there was evidence that the 
defendant was associated with Johnson.  See Dorelas, 473 Mass. 
at 502 (search of cellular telephone files "must be done with 
special care"); Commonwealth v. Berry, 463 Mass. 800, 807 (2012) 
(distinguishing between limited search of cellular telephone to 
view recent call activity and more intrusive search of device).  
The police were not authorized to rummage through the entirety 
of the defendant's cellular telephones, and were confined by the 
plain terms of the warrant affidavit to call activity and 
contact lists.  See Dorelas, supra, at 510 ("no impediment to 
limiting the search to certain types . . . of files stored in 
specific sections" of cellular telephone). 
ii.  The orange sweatshirt.  As an initial matter, the 
defendant argues that the Commonwealth's contention that there 
was probable cause to search for the orange sweatshirt was not 
raised before the motion judge, and therefore it may not be 
considered as a basis for reversing the order allowing his 
motion to suppress.  See Commonwealth v. Bettencourt, 447 Mass. 
631, 633-634 (2006) (arguments not raised below by Commonwealth 
in connection with motion to suppress are usually not considered 
on appeal as basis for reversal).  We do not agree. 
In its opposition to the defendant's motion to suppress, 
the Commonwealth stated that the issuing judge authorized the 
police to seize an "[o]range[,] hooded sweatshirt, as observed 
19 
 
 
 
April 23, 2014[,] in Natick."  The Commonwealth then argued that 
the defendant's appearance at the Natick mall during the April 
23, 2014, drug transaction was evidence of his participation in 
the drug trafficking conspiracy.  While focused on other items 
sought under the search warrant, the Commonwealth's argument in 
opposition to the motion to suppress ultimately addressed the 
sufficiency of the warrant affidavit to establish probable cause 
to search for all of the listed items.  Contrast Bettencourt, 
447 Mass. at 633-634 (court did not consider Commonwealth's 
argument that State trooper's actions were justified because 
actions were taken pursuant to trooper's community caretaking 
function, where argument was raised for first time on appeal). 
A warrant affidavit may, in particular circumstances, 
establish probable cause to search for articles of clothing, 
including at a suspect's residence, to identify a suspect in a 
criminal investigation.  "There is no prohibition against 
seizure of articles of clothing to be used for evidentiary 
purposes where, as here, there is a nexus between these articles 
and the crime."  Commonwealth v. Murray, 359 Mass. 541, 547 
(1971).  See Commonwealth v. Perez, 357 Mass. 290, 292-293, 298 
(1970) (probable cause for seizure of blood-stained articles of 
clothing at dry cleaner to aid in identification aspect of 
investigation).  In Commonwealth v. Cavitt, 460 Mass. 617, 627-
628 (2011), we held that police had probable cause to search an 
20 
 
 
 
apartment for clothing, including red and white sneakers, to 
identify a defendant as the suspected robber.  In Commonwealth 
v. James, 424 Mass. 770, 774 (1997), police sought to search 
suspects' homes for dark clothing, based on eyewitness account 
of the events surrounding a killing.  We held that the search 
was valid given that the evidence, which could help identify the 
suspects as the perpetrator, was "durable, of continuing utility 
to the defendants, and it was reasonable to expect that they 
would be kept at home, particularly as they are not inherently 
incriminating to possess."  Id. at 778. 
 
The defendant argues that, because the affiants already had 
positively identified the black male wearing an orange, hooded 
sweatshirt as the defendant during the motor vehicle stop on the 
day of the drug transaction, the affidavit did not provide 
probable cause to believe that recovery of the orange sweatshirt 
would meaningfully aid in a particular apprehension or 
conviction in this case. 
 
"The Fourth Amendment does not bar a search for evidence to 
prove the commission of a crime[,] provided there is probable 
cause for the belief that the evidence sought will aid in a 
particular apprehension or conviction."  Murray, 359 Mass. at 
547.  See Matter of Lavigne, 418 Mass. 831, 835 (1994), quoting 
Murray, supra ("a search for evidence to prove the commission of 
a crime [is not barred] provided there is probable cause for the 
21 
 
 
 
belief that the evidence sought will aid in a particular 
apprehension or conviction." 
 
The orange sweatshirt, if found in the defendant's 
apartment, would have been relevant to his identification as the 
seller in the transaction.  The Commonwealth could have used the 
sweatshirt to corroborate police observations of the defendant 
in the department store parking lot at the time of the 
intercepted exchange between Hairston and Johnson.  This could, 
in turn, have assisted the Commonwealth to prove that the 
defendant was the supplier who promised to be present at the 
exchange.  The fact that the officers who submitted the search 
warrant affidavit had identified the defendant during the motor 
vehicle stop, which occurred approximately twenty minutes after 
the drug transaction, did not negate the sweatshirt's 
evidentiary value.  See Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 
U.S. 294, 306-307 (1967) (government may seize evidence simply 
for purpose of proving crime). 
 
Our probable cause analysis requires that the affidavit 
"provide[] the magistrate with a substantial basis for 
concluding that any of such articles was probably present in the 
[residence]."  See Commonwealth v. Stewart, 358 Mass. 747, 749 
(1971).  Because the warrant application set forth facts derived 
from the registry of motor vehicles and direct police 
observation that the defendant lived at the apartment named in 
22 
 
 
 
the search warrant affidavit, it was reasonable to infer that 
the defendant likely kept his clothing, including the orange 
sweatshirt, in this apartment.  See James, 424 Mass. at 778 
(suspect's clothing reasonably expected to be kept at home, 
particularly given that it is not inherently incriminating to 
possess items of clothing). 
 
iii.  Drug records, proceeds, and paraphernalia.  The 
Commonwealth maintains that "circumstantial evidence coupled 
with the affiant's specialized knowledge concerning the 
logistics of narcotics distribution established probable cause" 
to search for drug-related evidence, including proceeds and 
records of drug distribution, in the defendant's apartment.  The 
Commonwealth points out that the nexus between the crime alleged 
and the place to be searched may be established through normal 
inferences as to where such items are typically kept, see 
Cinelli, 389 Mass. at 213, and that a reviewing court may 
consider the experience and expertise of a police officer in 
making this determination, see White, 475 Mass. at 589.  This 
does not establish the nexus the Commonwealth suggests. 
 
The affidavit here did not contain sufficient 
particularized information to justify a search of the defendants 
apartment for drug-related records, proceeds, and paraphernalia.  
The affidavit included a single, conclusory statement that 
probable cause existed based on the affiant's "training and 
23 
 
 
 
experience and the facts and circumstances learned during the 
course of this investigation."5  The affidavit contained no 
facts, or opinion based upon the affiant's considerable 
experience as a narcotics officer, that would have establish 
probable cause to believe that the defendant would be likely to 
store particular items of evidence in his home.  Contrast 
Commonwealth v. Lima, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 114, 118-119 (2011) 
(affidavit premised on police officer's specialized knowledge 
supported inference that drug organization utilized specific 
dwelling to store proceeds and records); Commonwealth v. 
Santiago, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 515, 521-522 (2006) (magistrate 
entitled to rely on specific facts drawn from police officer's 
experience to support affiant's conclusion that records, 
ledgers, or proceeds were contained in particular dwelling).  
Accordingly, we affirm the motion judge's determination that the 
affidavit failed to establish probable cause to conduct a 
general search for drug-related evidence. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The order allowing the defendant's motion 
to suppress is vacated and set aside.  The matter is remanded to 
the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
                                                     
 
5 The Commonwealth maintains that the affiants offered an 
opinion concerning records typically maintained by drug dealers.  
This opinion, found in an appended affidavit submitted in 
support of an application for a wiretap, concerned the general 
structure of a drug organization, and did not address the type 
of evidence that would be found in this defendant's residence. 
24 
 
 
 
opinion, to determine, consistent with this opinion, whether the 
search exceeded the permissible scope of the warrant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.