Title: State v. Corvelo

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

91 Ariz. 52 (1962) 369 P.2d 903 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Egidio CORVELO, Appellant. No. 1191. Supreme Court of Arizona, En Banc. March 14, 1962. *53 Murray Miller, Phoenix, for appellant. Robert W. Pickrell, Atty. Gen., John J. Casey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. BERNSTEIN, Chief Justice. On March 24, 1960, the defendant was charged, by information, with the crime of "receiving stolen property, a felony." *54 To this charge the defendant entered a plea of not guilty. Five months thereafter the State amended the information, omitting the designation of the crime as a felony and charging that the defendant On the same day the defendant entered a plea of guilty to this amended information. However, prior to judgment and sentencing, he moved to withdraw this plea of guilty and to be permitted to enter a plea of not guilty. The grounds for this motion were that, although at all times the defendant had professed his innocence to his attorney, the County Attorney, and the Adult Probation Officer, he had been induced to plead guilty to the amended information which he understood would charge him with a lessor offense, because any conviction of a felony would be grounds to deport him as an undesirable alien. The court denied this motion to withdraw the plea of guilty and entered judgment as follows: A sentence of from two to five years in the State Prison was imposed. A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, 17 A.R.S.R.Crim.P. 188, and in the absence of a clear abuse of that discretion its ruling will not be disturbed on appeal, State v. Raponi, 32 Idaho 368, 182 P. 855 (1919), annot. 20 A.L.R. 1445 (1922); annot. 66 A.L.R. 628 (1929). However, the discretion of the trial court should be liberally exercised in favor of permitting the withdrawal, State v. Lawrence, 70 Idaho 422, 220 P.2d 380 (1950). Where there is any showing that justice will be served thereby, any doubt should be resolved in favor of withdrawing the plea. Krolage v. People, 224 Ill. 456, 79 N.E. 570 (1906). If it fairly appears that a plea of guilty was made under some mistake or misapprehension, the defendant should be *55 permitted to withdraw it. United States v. Davis, 212 F.2d 264 (7th Cir.1954); Bergen v. United States, 145 F.2d 181 (8th Cir.1944). We believe that this rule should apply in the instant case. It appears that all parties were somewhat confused as to the legal effect of the amended information and the plea of guilty thereto. The state had already filed an information charging a felony. Unless it was intended that the charge be changed to a misdemeanor there was no need for the amended information. If the defendant had intended to plead guilty to a felony, he could have done so to the first information. At the time of sentencing the court had before it the file of the Adult Probation Officer which included the following statement of the defendant: While this same report contained other material reflecting adversely on the defendant's veracity, the guilt or innocence of the defendant is not an issue where adequate grounds to support a change of plea are *56 shown. Such grounds exist here in the defendant's consistent statements that he was innocent, and in a rational explanation, supported by the circumstance of the amended information, which indicates that the guilty plea was entered under a mistake or misapprehension as to its legal effect. See also Gearhart v. United States, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 270, 272 F.2d 499 (1959). For these reasons the denial of the motion to change the plea was error. A review of the record indicates a more fundamental ground which requires that the judgment be set aside. It is an abuse of discretion to deny withdrawal of a plea of guilty where the information upon which it is based does not state an offense, Rose v. State, 234 Miss. 731, 107 So. 2d 730 (1958); People v. Englese, 7 N.Y.2d 83, 195 N.Y.S.2d 641, 163 N.E.2d 869 (1959). The amended information is fatally defective for the reason that it does not set forth a description of the property alleged to have been received, State v. Kuhnley, 74 Ariz. 10, 242 P.2d 843 (1952). It is necessary that the property be described with sufficient particularity to enable the accused to plead the judgment in bar of a subsequent prosecution for unlawfully receiving the same articles or goods. Certainly the expression "personal property belonging to one Lavonne Gillespie," without even indicating any value does not satisfy this requirement. The conviction is set aside and the case remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. UDALL, V.C.J., and STRUCKMEYER, JENNINGS and LOCKWOOD, JJ., concurring.