Title: ARLYCE L. BROWN v. STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ARLYCE L. BROWN v. STATE OF WYOMING1985 WY 100703 P.2d 1097Case Number: 84-297Decided: 07/31/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
ARLYCE L. BROWN, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, ParkCounty, John T. Dixon, 
J.

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Martin J. McClain, Appellate Counsel, Wyoming 
Public Defender Program, Cheyenne, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., Criminal Div., John W. 
Renneisen, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Michael A. Blonigen, Asst. Atty. Gen., 
Cheyenne, for 
appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROONEY, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant was convicted 
of writing three fraudulent checks within a sixty-day period which exceeded $500 
in the aggregate. She was sentenced as a felon to not less than one year, nor 
more than three years at the Wyoming Women's Correctional 
Institute.

[¶2.]     The single issue raised 
by appellant is: "Whether there was insufficient evidence to convict Appellant 
of check fraud in an amount exceeding five-hundred dollars and thus, justify a 
felony sentence."

[¶3.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶4.]     The information in this 
case dated June 24, 1983, charged that appellant "* * * on the 23rd day of 
December, A.D. 1982 * * * did unlawfully write two or more checks within a sixty 
(60) day period in the State of Wyoming, said checks totaling in excess of $200, 
with intent to defraud, in violation of § 6-3-124(b)(ii), W.S." The state filed 
a bill of particulars dated June 11, 1984:

"2. The State will 
produce evidence showing that during the month of December, 1982, the Defendant 
wrote eight (8) checks on her account with the First Wyoming Bank of Cody, 
Wyoming, all of said checks having been written while the defendant did not have 
sufficient funds with her account at the First Wyoming Bank to `cover' the 
amounts of the checks. The State will show that the total amount of those checks 
came to $788.11. Those checks were written between December 9, 1982, and 
December 23, 1982."

[¶5.]     Section 6-3-124, W.S. 
1977, 1982 Cum. Supp., the statute in effect at the time of the alleged offense, 
provided in part:

"(a) Any person who 
deceitfully issues a check which is not paid because the drawer has insufficient 
funds with the drawee, has issued a fraudulent check and commits fraud by check 
unless the check is paid by the maker within ten (10) days of receiving notice, 
sent to the address shown on the instrument of dishonor or 
nonpayment.

"(b) Fraud by check 
is:

* * * * * 
*

"(ii) A felony if the 
fraudulent check was for the sum of two hundred dollars ($200.00) or more, or if 
the offender is convicted of fraud by check involving two (2) or more checks 
within any sixty (60) day period in the state of Wyoming totaling two hundred 
dollars ($200.00) or more in the aggregate. * * *"

[¶6.]     At the time of 
appellant's trial, August 2, 1984, and sentencing, October 22, 1984, the 
fraudulent check statute had been reenacted and renumbered § 6-3-702, W.S. 1977, 
1984 Cum.Supp., providing in part:

"(a) Any person who 
knowingly issues a check which is not paid because the drawer has insufficient 
funds or credit with the drawee has issued a fraudulent check and commits fraud 
by check.

"(b) Fraud by check 
is:

* * * * * 
*

"(iii) A felony 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more 
than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both, if the fraudulent check was for 
the sum of five hundred dollars ($500.00) or more, or if the offender is 
convicted of fraud by check involving two (2) or more checks issued within any 
sixty (60) day period in the state of Wyoming totaling five hundred dollars 
($500.00) or more in the aggregate."

[¶7.]     The only difference in 
the later statute that is significant here is that the dollar amount in the 
aggregate was raised from $200 to $500 for the offense to result in a felony.1 Section 6-1-101(c), W.S. 1977 (June 
1983 Replacement), provides:

"In a case pending on or 
after the effective date of this act, involving a crime committed prior to the 
effective date, if the penalty under this act for the crime is different from 
the penalty under prior law, the court shall impose the lesser 
sentence."

[¶8.]     Because § 6-3-702(b) 
raises the aggregate dollar amount and § 6-1-101(c) indicates which penalty 
applies, it is clear that unless an aggregate of $500 in fraudulent checks were 
proved within a sixty-day period, appellant could not be properly sentenced as a 
felon. Attletweedt v. State, Wyo., 684 P.2d 812 
(1984).

Appellant has 
broken down her sufficiency of the evidence issue into two 
parts:

I

Notice as an element of 
the offense, and

II

Variance between criminal 
complaint and charge upon which conviction was based.

I

[¶9.]     At a trial before the 
court, the state introduced into evidence numerous checks issued by appellant 
showing insufficient funds or account closed. Appellant was found guilty of 
fraud by check, a felony, and sentenced accordingly. The court relied on a check 
issued December 11, 1982, in the sum of $247.76; a check issued December 16, 
1982, in the sum of $58.52; and a check issued December 23, 1982, in the sum of 
$235.87, a total of $542.15 in checks written within a 60-day 
period.

[¶10.]  Appellant suggests that the notice 
portion of § 6-3-124(a), W.S. 1977, 1982 Cum.Supp., is an element of the crime 
of fraud by check. We disagree.

"It is well settled in 
the decisions in this state that the statutory notice itself is not an element 
of the offense, and failure to pay after receipt thereof is merely one way by 
which the State may attempt to show fraudulent intent and knowledge of the 
worthlessness of the check. [Citations.]" State v. Merriweather, Tenn., 625 S.W.2d 256, 258 (1981). See also State 
v. Haremza, 213 Kan. 201, 515 P.2d 1217 
(1973).

The elements of 
this offense, other than date and venue, are set out in the first portion of § 
6-3-124(a), as follows:

"Any person who 
deceitfully issues a check which is not paid because the drawer has insufficient 
funds with the drawee, has issued a fraudulent check and commits fraud by check 
unless the check is paid by the maker within ten (10) days of receiving notice, 
sent to the address shown on the instrument of dishonor or 
nonpayment."

The notice 
portion of § 6-3-124(a) is an anomaly in the law. This portion of the statute 
provides, "an opportunity for an otherwise guilty individual to have a change of 
heart and redeem his `bad check.'" State 
v. Laude, Wyo., 
654 P.2d 1223, 1229 (1982).

[¶11.]  After criminal intent has been formed, 
the notice portion of the statute provides for abandonment of such intent. This 
notice portion has also been characterized as a "repentence" concept, 
"nullification of a criminal act," or an "absolution clause." State v. Laude, supra, at 1230-1231 
(Brown, J., dissenting). While abandonment of criminal intent is rare, it is not 
unheard of. For example, § 6-1-301(b), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement), 
provides no liability for criminal attempt by one who avoids "* * * the 
commission of the crime attempted by abandoning his criminal effort." In like 
manner, § 6-1-302(b) provides no liability for solicitation if one renounces his 
criminal intent; and § 6-1-303(b) allows one to withdraw from a conspiracy, 
thereby exonerating himself from the crime.

[¶12.]  In Laude this court also said: "The crime 
is obviously not ripe for prosecution until ten days after notice of dishonor or 
nonpayment and the maker has failed to pay the check." Id., at 1229. This 
statement does not say that the notice provision is an element of the crime, but 
rather suggests a procedural requirement. If the notice portion of the statute 
is somewhat confusing, appellant cannot complain because the notice provision of 
§ 6-3-124(a) is a humane provision in the law that provides for abandonment of 
criminal intent or a change in heart and allows an otherwise guilty person to 
avoid conviction. This court's holding in Laude, supra, suggests, but does not 
hold, that the ten-day notice must be given before a prosecution can be 
commenced. Section 6-3-125(a)(i), W.S. 1977, 1982 Cum. Supp., seems to hold 
otherwise:

"(a) Any of the following 
is prima facie evidence that the person at the time he issued the check or other 
order for the payment of money intended that it should not be 
paid:

"(i) Proof that at the 
time of issuance he did not have an account with the 
drawee."

[¶13.]  Here, notice was given, so there is no 
need to explain what was meant by "not ripe for prosecution" in Laude, nor 
determine if the ten-day notice is a prerequisite to 
prosecution.

[¶14.]  On January 10, 1983, and again on January 
17, 1983, a local credit service in Cody sent letters to appellant at her Cody 
address, and advised her that checks in the sum of $247.76, dated December 11, 
1982 and $58.52, dated December 16, 1982, had been returned because of 
insufficient funds, and demanded payment. On December 29, 1982, the First 
Wyoming Bank - Cody, notified appellant by letter that her account had been 
closed because of "excessive overdraft activity" and that any other checks 
presented would be returned unpaid with a notation "account closed." The notice 
recited a substantial overdraft balance and demanded payment within ten days. 
This notice from the bank did not specifically identify the check for $235.87, 
dated December 23, 1982; however, the overdraft balance shown on the notice was 
greater than the amount of the check. From this notice given by the bank, 
appellant could reasonably determine that the December 23, 1982, check in the 
sum of $235.87 had been dishonored or would be dishonored upon 
presentation.

[¶15.]  The ten-day notice provided for in § 
6-3-124(a), W.S. 1977, 1982 Cum.Supp., does not specify the words that must be 
contained in the notice, nor does it indicate who must give the notice. The 
intent appears to be that the maker of an insufficient funds check be advised of 
"dishonor" or "nonpayment."

[¶16.]  Under the circumstances of this case we 
hold that the notice provisions of § 6-3-124(a) have been minimally complied 
with.

II

[¶17.]  Appellant contends that "the criminal 
complaint charged one crime and appellant was tried and convicted of a different 
crime." It appears that appellant is contending that this is a fatal variance 
between the complaint and information and the proofs which resulted in her 
conviction.

[¶18.]  The critical language in the complaint 
and information are identical, that is, appellant did "unlawfully write two or 
more checks within a sixty-day period in the State of Wyoming, said checks 
totaling in excess of $200.00, with intent to defraud, in violation of § 
6-3-124(b), W.S." In the probable cause portion of the criminal complaint five 
checks are listed, beginning with a December 23, 1982 check and ending with a 
February 23, 1983 check. Both the information and the complaint indicate 
December 23, 1982, as the date of the crime, but neither indicate the specific 
sixty-day period relied on. However, the bill of particulars identified the 
checks relied on for conviction as those written between December 9, 1982, and 
December 23, 1982.

[¶19.]  Ordinarily, in charging a crime, only a 
single date is significant. Because of the peculiar nature of the check fraud 
statute, a sixty-day period may be significant under § 6-3-124(b)(ii). In the 
complaint and information the date of December 23, 1982, was specified. This 
date could be the beginning of a sixty-day period, the ending of a sixty-day 
period, or it could be some place between the beginning and ending of a 
sixty-day period. The critical consideration is that two or more "insufficient 
funds" checks be issued within a sixty-day period. The statute allows for 
aggregation of any sixty-day period.

[¶20.]  The complaint, including the probable 
cause portion, indicated that the checks relied on were issued on and after 
December 23, 1982. The information, together with the bill of particulars, 
indicated that the checks relied on were issued on and before December 23, 1982. 
Appellant claims that there was a fatal variance between the complaint and 
information and that appellant was charged with one crime and convicted of a 
different crime.

[¶21.]  The problem of variance was discussed in 
Bartlett v. State, Wyo., 569 P.2d 1235 
(1977). In that case the court set out the applicable facts and then discussed 
variances generally, saying:

"* * * [D]efendant claims 
he was denied a substantial legal right to a preliminary hearing on the 
underlying act of speeding - since the original complaint referred only to 
driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The information filed 
against defendant, after his preliminary hearing, included the speeding 
allegation. This is not a situation where there is an amended information. See 
Rule 9(c), W.R.Cr.P. Rather, it is a situation where there is a variance between 
the original complaint and a subsequent information. See 41 Am.Jur.2d Indictment 
and Information § 20; and 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations § 73(j). 
Wyoming has no 
specific provision governing such variances. Generally, where an information can 
be filed only after a preliminary hearing, as is true in Wyoming under Rule 9(a), 
W.R. Cr.P., the information must charge substantially the same offense alleged 
in the complaint under which a preliminary hearing was held. State v. Perry, 27 Utah 2d 48, 492 P.2d 1349. This is substantially the theory on which Rule 9(c), supra, is based. * * 
*" Id., at 
1242-1243.

The court then 
held:

"* * * In the present 
case, the defendant was charged with involuntary manslaughter in both the 
complaint and the information - only an underlying act was added. In light of 
the fact that the State need only have charged the offense of manslaughter in 
the words of the statute, we cannot see how the offense charged was changed, or 
how the defendant was prejudiced. [Citation.]" Id., at 1243.

[¶22.]  In the case here both the complaint and 
information charged fraud by check as described in § 6-3-124, W.S. 1977, 1982 
Cum. Supp. As in Bartlett, the only difference is a variance 
between some underlying facts alleged in the complaint and information. The 
state did not alter the crime charged, but only relied on some different 
underlying facts. The different underlying facts, i.e., checks dated December 11 
and December 16, 1982, are within the sixty-day period. The checks relied on for 
a conviction at trial were specified in a bill of particulars given to appellant 
well in advance of trial.

[¶23.]  Appellant makes a technical argument and 
attempts to take advantage of some quirks in an imperfectly drafted statute. 
Appellant cannot, in good faith, contend that she did not know that the three 
checks relied on for her conviction had been dishonored and payment demanded, 
nor can she claim that she did not know what checks the state relied on to prove 
her guilty of fraud by check.

[¶24.]  Affirmed.

1 The legislature cannot 
resist the temptation to "tinker" with the check fraud statute almost every time 
they are in session. See Ch. 
128, § 1, S.L. of Wyoming, 1985; 
Ch. 44, §§ 2 and 3; S.L. of 
Wyoming 1984; Ch. 96, § 2, and Ch. 171, § 1, S.L. of Wyoming, 1983; Ch. 75, § 3, S.L. of Wyoming, 1982; Ch. 18, §§ 1, 2 & 3, S.L. of Wyoming, 
1980.

CARDINE, Justice, dissenting, 
with whom ROSE, Justice, 
joins.

[¶25.]  I dissent.

[¶26.]  Appellant was convicted of fraud by 
check, a felony, and sentenced to one to three years in prison. Appellant's 
conviction was based upon issuance, within a sixty-day period, of three 
insufficient funds checks totalling more than $500. These three checks were 
issued on December 11, December 16, and December 23, 1982.

[¶27.]  The fraudulent check statute in effect on 
the date these checks were issued, § 6-3-124, W.S. 1977, provided in part as 
follows:

"(a) Any person who 
deceitfully issues a check which is not paid because the drawer has insufficient 
funds with the drawee, has issued a fraudulent check and commits fraud by check 
unless the check is paid by the maker 
within ten (10) days of receiving notice, sent to the address shown on the 
instrument of dishonor or nonpayment." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶28.]  A letter was mailed to appellant giving 
her notice of dishonor or nonpayment of the checks issued December 11 and 
December 16. She never received notice that the check issued December 23 had 
been dishonored or not paid. The majority of this court in its opinion suggests 
that a letter from the bank, dated December 29, advising appellant that her 
account had been closed was notice to appellant that her check of December 23 
had been dishonored or not paid. The suggestion is fatally flawed. The check of 
December 23 could have been paid before the account was closed. But that is not 
the point. The statute under which appellant was charged and prosecuted requires 
"notice * * * of dishonor or nonpayment," not a subsequent notice of "account 
closed."

[¶29.]  We have said 

"that where there is 
plain, unabiguous language used in a statute there is no room for construction, 
and a court may not properly look for and impose another meaning. * * * 
[G]enerally speaking penal statutes are to be strictly construed * * *." State v. Stern, Wyo., 526 P.2d 344, 
346-347 (1974).

[¶30.]  Appellant was never given notice of 
dishonor or nonpayment; and this court, apparently feeling uncomfortable with 
the suggestion that a later notice of "account closed" is compliance with this 
requirement of § 6-3-124, supra, states in the majority opinion that the "notice 
of dishonor" is just a "procedural requirement." Does the court mean to say that 
compliance with a procedural requirement is not required? Surely not, for 
adoption of such a rule would have the effect of repealing the notice 
requirement of § 6-3-124(a), supra; that would be legislating, something this 
court cannot and should not do.

[¶31.]  Even more astonishing than the court's 
suggestion that the notice of dishonor is procedural and may be ignored, is the 
following statement by the court:

"If the notice portion of 
the statute is somewhat confusing, appellant cannot complain because the notice 
provision of § 6-3-124(a) is a humane provision in the law that provides for 
abandonment of criminal intent or a change in heart and allows an otherwise 
guilty person to avoid conviction."

I cannot fathom 
why appellant cannot complain about not receiving the statutory notice and 
having an opportunity to avoid conviction.

[¶32.]  In State v. Laude, Wyo., 
654 P.2d 1223, 1229 (1982), we stated:

"The plain language of § 
6-3-124, supra, makes it quite clear that for the crime to have been committed a 
check must have been deceitfully issued and the maker must have failed to redeem 
within ten days of notice of dishonor or nonpayment by the bank. * * * The crime is obviously not ripe for 
prosecution until ten days after notice of dishonor or nonpayment and the 
maker has failed to pay the check." (Emphasis added.)

Mailing a letter 
to the issuer of a check that the check was dishonored or not paid is neither 
difficult nor onerous. Such notice is required by § 6-3-124, supra. Every 
prosecutor knows of that requirement and should comply. We also said in State v. Laude, supra at 
1227:

"The statute * * * 
confers a benefit on everyone * * * who has written an insufficient funds check 
* * * a grace period in which to redeem the check before being subjected to 
prosecution. An additional defense is specifically provided for those charged * 
* *."

[¶33.]  Appellant in this case was not given 
notice of dishonor and, therefore, was deprived of the statutory grace period 
for redemption and the additional defense available according to State v. Laude, supra. For the reasons 
stated, I would reverse and remand this case for resentencing upon the charges 
with respect to the two insufficient funds checks not in dispute or such other 
disposition as is appropriate.