Title: State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer, Div. of Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Dupuis

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer, Div. of Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. 
Dupuis, 98 Ohio St.3d 126, 2002-Ohio-7041.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, DIVISION OF GANNETT SATELLITE 
INFORMATION NETWORK, INC., APPELLANT, v. DUPUIS, SOLICITOR, ET AL., 
APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer, Div. of Gannett Satellite Info. 
Network, Inc. v. Dupuis, 98 Ohio St.3d 126, 2002-Ohio-7041.] 
Public records — R.C. 149.43 — Mandamus sought to compel city of Cincinnati 
and its Solicitor to provide relator documents relating to the United States 
Department of Justice’s investigation of the city’s police department’s 
practices and policies and a proposed settlement agreement — Court of 
appeals’ denial of writ reversed and cause remanded for further 
proceedings — Trial preparation exemption inapplicable to settlement 
proposal — Relator entitled to attorney fees. 
(No. 2002-1038 — Submitted  November 13, 2002 — Decided December 23, 
2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-020179, 147 
Ohio App.3d 561, 2002-Ohio-2883, 771 N.E.2d 340. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
Appellant, The Cincinnati Enquirer, a division of Gannett Satellite 
Information Network, Inc. (“Enquirer”), operates as The Cincinnati Enquirer, a 
newspaper of general circulation in appellee city of Cincinnati, Ohio.  Appellee 
Fay Dupuis is the Cincinnati Solicitor and her official duties include 
responsibility for the custody of certain documents concerning legal matters 
involving Cincinnati. 
{¶2} 
In April 2001, the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) 
started an investigation into alleged patterns and practices of the Cincinnati Police 
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Department.  As that investigation proceeded, on March 7, 2002, the city received 
a proposed settlement agreement from the DOJ.  On that same date, Cincinnati 
Deputy Solicitor Pete Heile advised Greg Korte, a reporter for the Enquirer, that 
certain documents related to the investigation, including the proposed settlement 
agreement, were not disclosable. 
{¶3} 
By facsimile transmission dated March 8, 2002, Korte requested 
that Heile provide the Enquirer with the records they had talked about the 
previous day, including “a copy of the city’s settlement with the U.S. Justice 
Department over its recent patterns and practices investigation, and any drafts, 
memos, correspondence, reports, notes, 
analyses, e-mails, annotations, 
appendices, attachments, or other documents related thereto.” 
{¶4} 
On February 19, 2002, in Tyehimba v. Cincinnati, S.D. Ohio 
(W.D.) No. C-1-99-317, 2001 WL 1842470, United States District Court Judge 
Susan J. Dlott issued a protective order that governed “the parties during 
negotiations under the Order Establishing Collaborative Procedure.”  Judge Dlott 
ordered that “all drafts of any terms for settlement, including correspondence and 
other documents related to said drafts, whether offered by the Special Master or 
by the parties, shall be deemed confidential and may not be released by any 
person receiving said document except to counsel and the parties in this case.”  
The DOJ was not a party in the Tyehimba case.  By letter dated March 14, 2002, a 
confidentiality agreement among the Tyehimba parties was confirmed in which 
Cincinnati “agreed to release to the collaborative attorneys only, documents 
related to the proposed settlement between the city and the U.S. Department of 
Justice, including the draft settlement proposal itself.”  The agreement by the 
Tyehimba parties concerned the use of certain materials submitted in the 
mediation of that case. 
{¶5} 
Appellees, Dupuis and Cincinnati, did not provide access to the 
requested records, including the DOJ’s proposed settlement agreement.  On 
January Term, 2002 
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March 14, 2002, the Enquirer filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for 
Hamilton County for a writ of mandamus to compel Dupuis and the city to make 
the records available for inspection and copying in accordance with R.C. 
149.43(B) and for an award of attorney fees.  Dupuis and the city filed an answer, 
and the parties filed stipulated facts and memoranda.  In their answer, Dupuis and 
the city contended that they had no duty to provide access to the proposed 
settlement agreement received from the DOJ because  (1) the agreement was 
subject to Judge Dlott’s protective order in Tyehimba, (2) disclosure of the 
proposal would violate Dupuis’s professional duty not to disclose confidential 
attorney-client communications and attorney work product, (3) the proposal was a 
confidential law enforcement investigatory record, and (4) the federal Freedom of 
Information Act (“FOIA”) prevented the city from disclosing the proposal. 
{¶6} 
On June 14, 2002, the court of appeals, in a two-to-one decision, 
denied the writ.  The court of appeals concluded that the proposed settlement 
agreement sent by the DOJ to Cincinnati constituted an exempt “trial preparation 
record” under R.C. 149.43(A)(4).  147 Ohio App.3d 561, 2002-Ohio-2883, 771 
N.E.2d 340, at ¶ 4.  This cause is now before the court upon the Enquirer’s appeal 
as of right. 
Mootness 
{¶7} 
On appeal, Cincinnati and its Solicitor claim that the city 
voluntarily released the requested proposed settlement agreement after a final 
settlement agreement was approved by Cincinnati and the DOJ.  According to 
appellees, this occurred before oral argument and the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
{¶8} 
In general, the provision of requested records to a relator in a 
public-records mandamus case renders the mandamus claim moot.  State ex rel. 
Wadd v. Cleveland (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 50, 52, 689 N.E.2d 25; State ex rel. 
Taxpayers Coalition v. Lakewood (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 385, 392, 715 N.E.2d 
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179.  An event that causes a case to become moot may be proved by extrinsic 
evidence outside the record.  State ex rel. Nelson v. Russo (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 
227, 228, 729 N.E.2d 1181. 
{¶9} 
Appellees, however, offer no proof that they have provided this 
record aside from the bare unverified assertions in their appellate brief.  The 
Enquirer has not conceded that it has received the proposed settlement agreement, 
and the court of appeals never so found.  Furthermore, the Enquirer’s claim of 
attorney fees would not be rendered moot by the provision of the requested 
record.  State ex rel. Pennington v. Gundler (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 171, 661 
N.E.2d 1049, syllabus. 
{¶10} Based on the foregoing, we refuse to dismiss this appeal based on 
mootness. 
Mandamus:  General Provisions 
{¶11} The Enquirer seeks a writ of mandamus to compel Cincinnati and 
its Solicitor to provide it with access to the requested proposed settlement 
agreement.  Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel compliance with R.C. 
149.43, Ohio’s Public Records Act.  State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Krings 
(2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 654, 657, 758 N.E.2d 1135.  “R.C. 149.43 must be 
construed liberally in favor of broad access to records kept by public offices, and 
any doubt is to be resolved in favor of disclosure of the records.”  State ex rel. 
Wallace v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 431, 433, 732 N.E.2d 
960.  With these standards in mind, the Enquirer’s claims are now considered. 
R.C. 149.43 and 149.011(G):  Records 
{¶12} A “public record” includes “records kept by any public office.”  
R.C. 149.43(A)(1).  R.C. 149.011(G) defines “[r]ecords” broadly to include “any 
document * * * created or received by * * * any public office of the state or its 
political subdivisions, which serves to document the organization, functions, 
policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the office.”  The 
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proposed settlement agreement requested by the Enquirer constituted a record for 
purposes of R.C. 149.43.  See R.C. 149.011(G). 
{¶13} In its response to the Enquirer’s claim in the court of appeals, 
Cincinnati admitted that it “did not produce the proposed settlement agreement to 
the Cincinnati Enquirer while settlement negotiations were proceeding between 
the City and the Department of Justice.”  The city and its Solicitor note on appeal, 
and the court of appeals found, that the proposal was merely a step in the 
negotiation process between the city and the DOJ.  By so arguing, appellees in 
effect concede that they considered the proposal in the negotiation process 
concerning the investigation by the DOJ into the patterns and practices of the 
Cincinnati Police Department. 
{¶14} Consequently, the requested DOJ proposal kept by appellees and 
used by them in attempting to reach a settlement in the DOJ investigation of the 
city’s police department constituted a public record for purposes of R.C. 
149.43(A)(1) and 149.011(G). 
Trial-Preparation Record 
{¶15} The court of appeals recognized that an agreement settling a 
lawsuit in which a public office is a party is generally a public record subject to 
disclosure under R.C. 149.43.  State ex rel. Findlay Publishing Co. v. Hancock 
Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 134, 136, 684 N.E.2d 1222; State ex 
rel. Sun Newspapers v. Westlake Bd. of Edn. (1991), 76 Ohio App.3d 170, 601 
N.E.2d 173. 
{¶16} Nevertheless, the court of appeals determined that the proposed 
settlement agreement was exempt from disclosure as a trial-preparation record.  
R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(g).  “[E]xceptions to disclosure must be strictly construed 
against the public records custodian, and the custodian bears the burden to 
establish the applicability of an exception.”  State ex rel. Besser v. Ohio State 
Univ. (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 396, 398, 732 N.E.2d 373. 
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{¶17} The court of appeals erred in so concluding.  As the appellate court 
in State ex rel. Kinsley v. Berea Bd. of Edn. (1990), 64 Ohio App.3d 659, 663, 582 
N.E.2d 653, observed in rejecting a comparable argument concerning the 
applicability of the trial-preparation exemption to a settlement agreement: 
{¶18} “A settlement agreement is not a record compiled in anticipation of 
or in defense of a lawsuit.  It simply does not prepare one for trial.  A settlement 
agreement is a contract negotiated with the opposing party to prevent or conclude 
litigation.” 
{¶19} Similarly, a settlement proposal received by a public office is not a 
record compiled in anticipation of or in defense against a lawsuit.  It is simply an 
offer intended to prevent or conclude litigation. 
{¶20} Moreover, we have consistently held that “[e]ven if a record is not 
in final form, it may still constitute a ‘record’ for purposes of R.C. 149.43 if it 
documents the organization, policies, functions, decisions, procedures, operations, 
or other activities of a public office.”  See State ex rel. Calvary v. Upper 
Arlington (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 229, 232, 729 N.E.2d 1182, and cases cited 
therein.  The court of appeals found that the settlement proposal constituted a step 
in the negotiation process.  Consequently, the city and its Solicitor considered the 
proposal, and it documents their policies and decisions. 
{¶21} There is no specific exemption for documents provided to a public 
office to negotiate the settlement of a potential lawsuit or for settlement proposals 
before a final settlement agreement is reached.  If the General Assembly had so 
intended, it would have specifically provided such an exemption.  Cf., e.g., Mo. 
Stat. 610.021(1) (settlement agreement not subject to disclosure prior to final 
disposition).  Although there may be good policy reasons to exempt settlement 
proposals, these policy considerations cannot override R.C. 149.43, because the 
General Assembly is the ultimate arbiter of public policy.  State ex rel. E. 
Cleveland Fire Fighters’ Assn., Local 500, Internatl. Assn. of Fire Fighters v. 
January Term, 2002 
7 
Jenkins, 96 Ohio St.3d 68, 2002-Ohio-3527, 771 N.E.2d 251, at ¶ 12; State ex rel. 
Master v. Cleveland (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 23, 28-29, 661 N.E.2d 180.  Public 
offices “cannot withhold public records simply because they disagree with the 
policies behind the law permitting the release of these records.”  State ex rel. 
Consumer News Serv., Inc. v. Worthington City Bd. of Edn., 97 Ohio St.3d 58, 
2002-Ohio-5311, 776 N.E.2d 82, at ¶ 54. 
{¶22} In fact, as the Tyehimba parties’ confidentiality agreement 
establishes, appellees agreed to voluntarily disclose the DOJ’s settlement proposal 
to the opposing parties in Tyehimba.  Voluntarily disclosing the requested record 
can waive any right to claim an exemption to disclosure.  See State ex rel. Zuern 
v. Leis (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 20, 22, 564 N.E.2d 81; State ex rel. Gannett Satellite 
Info. Network, Inc. v. Petro (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 261, 265, 685 N.E.2d 1223. 
{¶23} Therefore, the trial-preparation exemption is inapplicable to the 
requested settlement proposal. 
Protective Order and Confidentiality Agreement 
{¶24} The city and its Solicitor assert that the DOJ’s settlement proposal 
is also exempt because of Judge Dlott’s protective order in Tyehimba and the 
parties’ confidentiality agreement in that case. 
{¶25} Under R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v), public records do not include 
“[r]ecords the release of which is prohibited by state or federal law.” 
{¶26} Here, however, the protective order does not apply to the DOJ’s 
settlement proposal.  The DOJ was not a party to the Tyehimba litigation. 
{¶27} Moreover, the confidentiality agreement was executed after the 
Enquirer’s request for access to the proposal.  And no contract or promises of 
confidentiality altered the public nature of the proposal.  See State ex rel. Gannett 
Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Shirey (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 400, 403, 678 N.E.2d 
557; State ex rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Columbus (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 39, 
42, 734 N.E.2d 797. 
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{¶28} Therefore, neither the protective order nor the confidentiality 
agreement precluded disclosure of the settlement proposal. 
Canons of Code of Professional Responsibility 
{¶29} Appellees also claim that various Canons of the Code of 
Professional Responsibility prevented the Solicitor from disclosing the settlement 
proposal.  But they did not meet their burden of establishing that any of the 
specified canons exempted the record from R.C. 149.43.  There is nothing in the 
record proving that disclosure of the requested record would expose the 
confidences and secrets of the city, would inhibit the Solicitor’s exercise of 
independent professional judgment on behalf of the city, or would affect the 
Solicitor’s zealous representation of the city within the bounds of the law.  See 
Canons 4, 5, and 7, Code of Professional Responsibility. 
Confidential Law Enforcement Investigatory Record 
{¶30} Appellees contend that the DOJ settlement proposal is exempt 
from disclosure because it is a confidential law enforcement investigatory record 
under R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(c).  This statute exempts the disclosure of certain 
records where their release would create a high probability of disclosure of 
specific confidential investigatory techniques or procedures or specific 
investigatory work product. 
{¶31} This exemption is inapplicable here.  As noted previously, 
appellees’ voluntary disclosure of the settlement proposal could waive any 
exemptions.  Zuern, 56 Ohio St.3d at 22, 564 N.E.2d 81.  In addition, the proposal 
was not exempt investigatory work product; it was not prepared in anticipation of 
litigation.  Cf. State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 420, 434, 
639 N.E.2d 83. 
FOIA 
{¶32} Appellees finally claim that FOIA precluded disclosure of the DOJ 
settlement agreement.  Like their other claimed exemptions, this claim is  
January Term, 2002 
9 
meritless.  FOIA does not apply to nonfederal agencies or officers.  Sections 
551(1) and 552(f), Title 5, U.S.Code; State ex rel. Findlay Publishing Co. v. 
Schroeder (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 580, 582, 669 N.E.2d 835; State ex rel. Warren 
v. Warner (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 432, 433, 704 N.E.2d 1228. 
Attorney Fees 
{¶33} The Enquirer is also entitled to attorney fees.  It has established a 
sufficient public benefit.  The proposed settlement of the DOJ’s investigation into 
the practices and policies of the Cincinnati Police Department was a matter of 
great public interest.  The Enquirer’s access to the requested record would enable 
it to provide complete and accurate news to the public.  See State ex rel. Beacon 
Journal Publishing Co. v. Maurer (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 54, 58, 741 N.E.2d 511.  
And the city’s and its Solicitor’s claimed exemptions lacked any reasonable basis, 
particularly when they agreed to voluntarily disclose the proposal to other parties 
in the Tyehimba litigation. 
Conclusion 
{¶34} Based on the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and remand the cause to that court for further proceedings consistent with 
our opinion.  The Enquirer has established entitlement to the writ of mandamus 
and an award of attorney fees. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissents. 
DOUGLAS, J., not participating. 
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LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting. 
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{¶35} I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision, particularly its 
finding that the proposed agreement, the object of the mandamus action, has not 
yet been provided. 
{¶36} Appellees state that the city has provided the requested proposed 
settlement agreement and did so before oral argument in the court of appeals and 
before the judgment of the court of appeals was issued.  However, the majority 
denies dismissal for mootness because the majority finds that the appellees 
offered no “proof” that the city provided the proposed settlement agreement and 
the Enquirer “has not conceded” that it received the proposed agreement. 
{¶37} The majority’s finding is completely contrary to the concessions in 
the merit briefs.  The city, in its merit brief, states, beginning on the first line of 
the very first paragraph of its statement of facts: 
{¶38} “Respondents/Appellees (‘the City of Cincinnati’ or ‘the City’) 
supplement the statement of facts.  In fact, and as admitted by the Enquirer at the 
oral argument before the Court of Appeals, the City provided the requested 
proposed settlement agreement to the Enquirer after the final settlement 
agreement had been executed by the City, the United States Department of 
Justice, and the parties to the federal court case Tyehimba v. City of Cincinnati, et 
al., Case No. C-1-99-317, 2001 WL 1842470 (Southern District of Ohio) 
(renamed In re Cincinnati Policing).  Insofar as the Enquirer filed suit to obtain 
that particular document, that claim is moot.” 
{¶39} The Enquirer in its reply brief, in the first line of the first paragraph 
of its statement of facts, concedes: 
{¶40} “Respondents Dupuis and the City of Cincinnati (the ‘City’) do not 
dispute the facts set out in the Enquirer’s brief.” 
{¶41} The Enquirer contends only that the document was not produced 
upon its initial request, a point no one disputes.  The court of appeals simply 
ignored these contentions, and it certainly made no opposite conclusion.  For this  
January Term, 2002 
11 
court to make a contrary finding flies in the face of both statements of facts, the 
admissions by the parties, and the general rule of law concerning admissions by 
parties.  We have never required a party to provide proof on an issue that is 
admitted.  Of course the city provided no additional proof.  It had no idea our 
court would require such an unprecedented step.  The current request for 
mandamus is moot because both parties admit that the document has been 
provided. 
{¶42} That said, I agree with the majority’s grant of attorney fees, but 
only for the fees accrued up to the date that the document was actually provided, 
because, for the reasons stated in the majority’s opinion, the document should 
have been released upon the Enquirer’s initial request. 
{¶43} Therefore, I would dismiss the request for mandamus as moot but 
would award attorney fees up to the date that the city released the requested 
document to the Enquirer. 
{¶44} Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
__________________ 
 
Graydon, Head & Ritchey, L.L.P., John C. Greiner and John A. Flanagan, 
for appellant. 
 
Julia L. McNeil, Cincinnati City Solicitor, and Richard Ganulin, Assistant 
City Solicitor, for appellees. 
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