Title: Angela Norris and George Norris v. Borough of Leonia

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). HANDLER, J., writing for a majority of the Court. The issue in this appeal is whether a municipality may be held liable for the negligent maintenance of a curb. In addressing the issue, the Court considers whether the common law immunity historically accorded municipalities for sidewalk wear and tear absolves a public entity form negligent curb maintenance, or whether negligent curb maintenance is subject to the standard of liability applicable to a dangerous condition of improved public property under the Tort Claims Act ( TCA ). On September 3, 1995, Angela Norris sustained personal injuries when the curb in front of her home in the Borough of Leonia collapsed as she stepped onto it, causing her to fall into the street. Thereafter, Norris and her husband filed suit against the Borough under the TCA. They alleged that Angela Norris sustained injuries due to the careless, reckless and negligent operation, supervision, management and/or maintenance of the curbing, which created a palpably unreasonable and dangerous condition. The Borough moved for summary judgment, asserting common law immunity for the natural deterioration and/or defective condition of the curb, and statutory immunity under the TCA. In addition, the Borough asserted that Norris had failed to establish prima facie proof of a dangerous condition and of actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Borough, concluding that a municipality is entitled both to a common law immunity for the natural deterioration of sidewalks and curbs and to an immunity defense under the TCA to a claim based on any alleged lack of inspection. The trial court further determined that Norris had failed to establish a basis for liability under the TCA. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the Borough, concluding that if the curb were part of the sidewalk and otherwise subject to municipal control, municipalities, like commercial landowners, no longer retained the common law immunity for the general wear and tear of sidewalks. The Appellate Division further rejected an immunity defense relating to inspections and determined that a curb, whether a part of a street or of the sidewalk, if under municipal control, would be subject to the liability standard applicable to public property under the TCA. Accordingly, the Appellate Division remanded the matter for trial. The Supreme Court granted the Borough's petition for certification. HELD: The traditional immunity for negligently maintained sidewalks accorded municipalities under the common law is abrogated, and liability resulting from the dangerous condition of such public property must be determined in accordance with the provisions of the Tort Claims Act governing liability on the part of a municipality for its public property. 1. A public entity's duty to maintain sidewalks at common law was nullified by the general shield of sovereign immunity, which absolutely absolved it from any liability for dangerous conditions on public property, except when its own actions created the hazard. (pp. 5-6) 2. Although common law sidewalk immunity as applied to private commercial landowners has been a frequent and recurring object of criticism, the Court has retained that immunity for residential landowners, while imposing a duty to maintain abutting sidewalks on commercial landowners. (pp. 6-10) 3. Because the TCA cloaks a municipality with the common law immunities available to public entities prior to the Act, as well as with any defenses applicable to private persons, a municipality under the TCA is conceivably immune from liability for negligently maintained sidewalks for which it is otherwise responsible. (pp. 11-14) 4. The issue of municipal liability for injuries caused by a defective sidewalk has not been expressly decided by the Court. (pp. 14-15) 6. In enacting the TCA, which expressly contemplates municipal liability for dangerous conditions of public property, the Legislature may be viewed as having interfered with the continuation of sovereign immunity for sidewalks. (pp. 19-20) 7. Although N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 does not refer expressly to any class of public property, such as sidewalks or streets, numerous cases have held that roadways, and their constituent elements, are governed by the TCA. Moreover, the Legislature made no effort to exempt sidewalks from the purview of that section of the Act, despite the prevailing understanding at common law that sidewalks were comparable to streets and thus considered public property. (pp. 20-22) 8. Given the Legislature's embrace in the TCA of a standard that allows for limited or qualified liability in respect of dangerous conditions of improved public property, there is no reason why the blanket immunity rule applicable to sidewalks should not be scaled back in respect of municipalities to conform to the standard expressed by the TCA. (pp.22-23) 9. A finding that a municipality had sufficient control over or responsibility for the maintenance and repair of a sidewalk and/or curb is crucial to any imposition of municipal liability because, in order to qualify as public property, a sidewalk and/or curb must be owned or controlled by the public entity. (pp. 23-24) 10. Whether a curb is deemed part of a sidewalk or a street might depend on the context and facts in a given case. However, given the Borough's expression of control in this case, the Court need not determine whether or not a curb should be considered a constituent part of the sidewalk as opposed to the street. That notwithstanding, there are strong policy reasons for considering a curb as part of a street. (pp. 24-28) 11. The traditional immunity for negligently maintained sidewalks accorded municipalities, as recognized at common law, is abrogated, and liability resulting from the dangerous condition of such public property must be determined in accordance with the provision of the TCA. (p. 28) 12. Although complaints of neighborhood residents about a dangerous condition may serve to establish actual or constructive notice to a municipality of that condition, such complaints cannot serve as notice of a defective curb at a different location. Because Norris has not established either actual or constructive notice on the part of the Borough of the alleged dangerous condition of the curb adjacent to her property, it is appropriate to award summary judgment in favor of the Borough. (pp.28 31) Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. JUSTICE O'HERN filed a separate concurring opinion, in which JUSTICE GARIBALDI joins. Although Justice O'Hern agreed with the majority's determination that the TCA should govern the liability of a municipality that owns a public sidewalk, he believed that the majority allowed the property in this case to be deemed public property on too slight a basis. JUSTICE STEIN filed a separate opinion, concurring in part in and dissenting in part from the majority's opinion. While joining the Court's opinion to the extent that it holds that the Borough was subject to liability if the curb in front of the Norris dwelling constituted a dangerous condition of public property within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 59:4-2, he believed that the Court's conclusion that the Borough had neither actual nor constructive notice of the dangerous condition was premature. Therefore, he would remand the matter to the Law Division for further proceedings and to permit that court to determine whether further discovery on the question of actual or constructive notice would be appropriate. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES POLLOCK and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE HANDLER's opinion. JUSTICE O'HERN filed a separate concurring opinion, in which JUSTICE GARIBALDI joins. JUSTICE STEIN filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part from the Court's opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 30 September Term 1998 ANGELA NORRIS and GEORGE NORRIS, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. BOROUGH OF LEONIA, Defendant-Appellant, and JOHN DOE (said name being fictitious and unknown), JOHN ROE (said name being fictitious and unknown), ROE DOE (said name being fictitious and unknown), Defendants. Argued March 15, 1999 -- Decided July 26, 1999 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. John J. Robertelli argued the cause for appellant (Hanrahan & Robertelli, attorneys; Mr. Robertelli and Christine M. Vanek, on the briefs). Lewis P. Sengstacke argued the cause for respondents (Davis, Saperstein & Salomon, attorneys). The opinion of the Court was delivered by HANDLER, J. Nearly twenty years later, Justice Proctor, joined by Justice Jacobs, vigorously attacked the continued viability of the common law rule as "manifestly unjust." Murray v. Michalak, 58 N.J. 220, 223 (Proctor, J., dissenting). Although indicating that he would place a duty to maintain abutting sidewalks on all property owners, Justice Proctor conceded that [t]he Court [] need go no further than to hold that such a duty of repair exists for the owner of commercial premises[,] id. at 225, writing: "For the protection of its patrons, every commercial establishment must maintain its premises, including means of ingress and egress, in reasonably safe condition (citing cases). And although the paved sidewalks fronting a commercial establishment are primarily for the use of the public generally, their condition is so beneficially related to the operation of the business that the unrestricted legal duty of maintaining them in good repair might, arguably, be placed on it. [Ibid. (quoting Krug v. Wanner, 28 N.J. 174, 179-80 (1958)).] In Yanhko v. Fane, 70 N.J. 528 (1976), Justice Pashman, joined by Justice Schreiber, dissented from the majority's decision to reaffirm the common law sidewalk immunity for private landowners. Id. at 537 (Pashman, J., dissenting). The majority reasoned that it would not be fair to hold an abutting landowner liable for sidewalk maintenance when such an owner "makes no use of the sidewalk other than pedestrian passage thereover in common with the public generally." Id. at 533. Justice Pashman disagreed, noting that commercial landowners enjoy numerous rights in respect of abutting public easements, and therefore there is an obvious distinction between those landowners and "pedestrians who may simply use the public easement." Id. at 541 (Pashman, J., dissenting). The dissent then analogized the imposition of liability on commercial landowners for the negligent maintenance of abutting sidewalks to the liability already imposed in respect of their business establishments: These criticisms of the common law rule were ultimately acknowledged and accepted in Stewart, supra, wherein the Court "overrule[d] Yanhko and [held] that a plaintiff has a cause of action against a commercial property owner for injuries sustained on a deteriorated sidewalk abutting that commercial property when that owner negligently fails to maintain the sidewalk in reasonably good condition." 87 N.J. at 149. Noting that responsibility for the provision and maintenance of sidewalks had evolved from origins that rested exclusively on municipalities, to a delegation of responsibility between municipalities and owners of abutting commercial lands, the Court concluded that the present 'no liability' rule is derived from conditions that no longer exist and is not responsive to current urban conditions. Id. at 155-56. Creating potential liability for commercial landowners, the Court wrote, will provide a remedy to many innocent plaintiffs for injuries caused by improper maintenance of sidewalks. As a corollary, it will give owners of abutting commercial property an incentive to keep their sidewalks in proper repair . . . [and] will eliminate the arbitrariness of the old rule. . . [since] injured persons will be able to recover for injuries sustained just outside a store as well as those sustained within it. The Court further explained that this exception was warranted because commercial landowners retained considerable interest in, and especially valuable rights to use, abutting sidewalks, including a cause of action to prevent obstruction of the public's view of [the commercial property] from the sidewalk . . . 'use of the adjacent sidewalk for stoops . . . and other domestic or trade conveniences' . . . [and] easy access to their premises and increase[d] [] value of their property. The Court therefore imposed a duty to maintain a sidewalk in a reasonably good condition on owners of commercial property, while retaining the common law sidewalk immunity for residential landowners. Id. at 159.See footnote 11 The issue of municipal liability for injuries caused by a defective sidewalk has not been expressly decided by this Court. In Yanhko, the matter of the city's liability was not raised by the parties on appeal and the accident occurred before the effective date of the TCA; consequently, the impact of the Act was not considered either in respect of the asserted liability of the commercial defendants, or of the city, which was joined as a defendant and later dismissed on motion. 70 N.J. at 534 n.1. Similarly, in Stewart, the Court did not have occasion to determine whether the common law sidewalk immunity applicable to private property owners was equally applicable to municipalities because [t]he question of the possible liability of a municipality for injuries sustained on deteriorated sidewalks [was] not before [it]." 87 N.J. at 155 n.3. Nevertheless, the Court observed that [n]umerous provisions of the Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 et seq., enacted in 1972, might be relevant to a determination of this issue in a given case. Ibid. In the wake of Stewart, New Jersey courts have wrestled with whether the duty to maintain sidewalks ought to be imposed on municipalities. Compare Christmas v. City of Newark, 216 N.J. Super. 393, 400 (App. Div.) ( [W]e do not interpret the court's holding in Stewart to mean that liability is shared by municipalities and commercial landowners but rather, the duty to maintain sidewalks is limited solely to owners of commercial property. ), certif. denied, 108 N.J. 193 (1987) with Levin v. Devoe, 221 N.J. Super. 61, 64 n.1 (App. Div. 1987) ("[w]e respectfully disagree with the holding in Christmas . . . that Stewart established an absolute municipal immunity for deteriorated sidewalks. ). Given the Legislature's embrace in the TCA of a standard that allows for limited or qualified liability measured only by palpably unreasonable conduct relating to the dangerous condition of improved public property, we accept that expression of legislative judgment as reflective of the principles of public policy that must be factored into the judicial understanding of the common law. Because the common law immunity relative to sidewalks and roadways was strongly influenced by the belief that tort responsibility thereover remained very much a legislative prerogative, the legislative signal to abandon that immunity should be heeded. Consequently, we see no reason why the blanket immunity rule applicable to sidewalks should not be scaled back in respect of municipalities to conform to the standard expressed by the TCA..See footnote 22 Our decision that the common law sidewalk immunity does not apply to municipalities is based on the allegations in this case, and the assumptions by the courts below, that the municipality had sufficient control over or responsibility for the maintenance and repair of the sidewalk and/or the curb to serve as a basis for liability. That finding is crucial to any imposition of municipal liability because, in order to qualify as public property, a sidewalk and/or a curb must be owned or controlled by the public entity. N.J.S.A. 49:4-1c (defining public property as real or personal property owned or controlled by the public entity, but does not include easements, encroachments and other property that are located on the property of the public entity but are not owned and controlled by the public entity ). In this regard, the Appellate Division, noting that defendant's control of the curb [is] a preliminary issue, observed: Here, defendant does not contest its control of the curb. Indeed, its subsequent act of placing a cone at the site of plaintiff's fall is indicative of its control. One of defendant's employees acknowledged defendant's responsibility to repair the curb. A remedial or precautionary measure taken after an event, while inadmissible to prove negligence, may be considered as evidence that a defendant had control over the property in question. Manieri v. Volkswagenwerk, 151 N.J. Super. 422, 432 (App. Div. 1977), certif. denied, 75 N.J. (1978); N.J.R.E. 407. To the extent that the curb is under municipal control, our decision rejecting the common law municipal immunity applicable to sidewalks and invoking the standards under the TCA for determining municipal liability renders unnecessary a definitive determination of whether or not a curb should be considered a constituent part of the sidewalk as opposed to the street. We note, however, that in other contexts, i.e., those involving private property owners, that consideration may be relevant. We recognize, as in so many of our "sidewalk cases," that whether a curb is deemed part of a sidewalk or a street might well depend on the context and facts in the given case. E.g., Yanhko, supra, 70 N.J. 528; Mitchell, supra, 163 N.J. Super. 287; Guerriero, supra, 175 N.J. Super. 1. We are constrained, however, to observe that there are strong reasons for considering a curb as part of a street. The Appellate Division, we note, determined that a curb is a constituent part of a roadway, thus qualifying as public property under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2.See footnote 33 In Levin, supra, the court determined that a curb is not an intrinsic part of a sidewalk, but rather, of a roadway: A curb separated from the sidewalk by a grass strip is a feature of the road, not the sidewalk. Its primary functions are to channel surface water from the road into storm drains and to serve as a barrier for cars to park against. Although such a curb is sometimes used by pedestrians to cross the street, like a road it is a significantly less immediate means of pedestrian ingress and egress to the abutting property than is a sidewalk. The characterization of a curb as part of the street and not the sidewalk in Levin was later favorably cited in MacGrath v. Levin Properties, 256 N.J. Super. 247, 252 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 19 (1992). Other courts considering the issue have reached a similar conclusion. See Humphries v. Trustees of the Methodist Episcopal Church of Cresco, 566 N.W.2d 869, 873 (Iowa 1997) (holding that statutory municipal immunity for negligence in failure to remove accumulations of snow and ice from street applied where pedestrian fell on curb because curb was part of street, noting that word street should be interpreted broadly so as to effectuate legislative intent); Gallegos v. Midvale City, 492 P.2d 1335, 1336 (Utah 1972) (construing statute requiring filing against city within thirty days for injury caused by defective, unsafe, dangerous condition of street to include curb as part of street). Additional support for classifying a curb as incident to a street is found in the recent Residential Site Improvement Standards, N.J.A.C. 5:21-1.1 to -7.5, promulgated by the Department of Community Affairs pursuant to the Residential Site Improvement Standards Act, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-40.1 to -40.7. See New Jersey State League of Municipalities v. Department of Community Affairs, __ N.J. __, __ (1999) (sustaining facial validity of act and regulations). The regulations define cartway as the actual road surface area from curbline to curbline and curb as a stone, concrete, or other improved boundary marking the edge of the roadway or paved area." N.J.A.C. 5:21-1.4. In contrast, sidewalk is defined as an improved path for pedestrian use outside the cartway. Ibid. (emphasis added). Moreover, the regulations suggest that a curb is an integral feature of a street by providing that [c]urbs or curbs and gutters shall be used for drainage purposes, safety, and delineation and protection of pavement edge and that [g]enerally, curbs shall be required on streets with on-street parking. N.J.A.C. 5:21:4-3. Curb requirements may be waived only in extremely narrow circumstances, and if waived, a comparable means of edge definition and stabilization is required. Ibid. In contrast, the dictates for sidewalk construction lack uniformity and vary according to the net density and location of the development. N.J.A.C. 5:21-4.5. In many cases, sidewalks are not required at all. See also N.J.S.A. 27:7-1 (governing acquisition, construction, and maintenance of state highways and defining "improvement" as "the original work on a road . . . consist[ing] of location, grading, surface and subsurface drainage provisions, including curbs, gutters, and catch basins . . . ."); McNally v. Township of Teaneck, 75 N.J. 33, 36 (1977) (describing township ordinance providing that new paving and new curbs would be installed on parts of eleven streets in three residential areas). Policy reasons also support the classification of a curb as part of a street for purposes of determining municipal liability for pedestrian injuries relating to the dangerous condition of curbs. If curbs are deemed to be part of the sidewalk, the duty of care owed by an abutting landowner to a pedestrian would depend on the status of the adjoining property owner, i.e., whether the property is public or private and, if private, whether the property is residential or commercial. If, however, the curb is considered part of the street, then the responsibility for that curb would be that of the municipality and would be subject to the uniform standards of the TCA. In order to establish that a public entity had actual notice of a dangerous condition for purposes of N.J.S.A. 59:4-2, the public entity must have had actual knowledge of the existence of the condition and knew or should have known of its dangerous character. N.J.S.A. 59:4 3a. Alternatively, a public entity may be charged with constructive notice if plaintiff establishes that the condition had existed for such a period of time and was of such an obvious nature that the public entity, in the exercise of due care, should have discovered the condition and its dangerous character. Contrary to the determination of the Appellate Division, plaintiff has not established either actual or constructive notice here. Plaintiff stated in deposition that she was aware of numerous cracks in the curbing in front of her house prior to her accident. Plaintiff admitted, however, that for at least the three or four years prior to that time, she had never complained about the condition of the curbing to Borough officials. Plaintiff instead relied on the affidavit of a neighbor, Axel Vikjaer, to establish notice. Vikjaer claimed that [o]n several occasions prior to September 3, 1995 I telephoned the Borough of Leonia and advised them that the curb in front of my house was in poor condition . . . Several years ago, I do not remember the exact date, I sent photographs of the curb to the Borough of Leonia. Even assuming the validity of Vikjaer's complaints, they cannot serve as notice to defendant in respect of plaintiff's defective curb. The complaints did not specify any dates and, further, revealed that Vikjaer's property was on a different side of the street. Moreover, plaintiff herself stated that the condition of curbing on the street varied from home to home, with most of it pretty bad, although [n]ot all." Complaints of neighborhood residents about a dangerous condition may serve to establish actual or constructive notice to a municipality of that condition. See Chatman v. Hall, 128 N.J. 394, 418 (1992); Saldana v. DiMedio, 275 N.J. Super. 488, 504 (App. Div. 1994). However, Vikjaer's complaints about his own curb cannot serve as notice of a defective curb at a different location. We agree with the trial court that Vikjaer's affidavit was inadequate to satisfy the notice requirement of N.J.S.A. 59:4-3. Because plaintiff cannot establish that the Borough had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition of her property, it is appropriate to award summary judgment in favor of defendant. See Grzanka v. Pfeifer, 301 N.J. Super. 563 (App. Div. 1997) (granting summary judgment to defendant city because of lack of notice of dangerous condition as required by N.J.S.A. 59:4-2), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 607 (1998); DeBonis v. Orange Quarry Co, 233 N.J. Super. 156 (App. Div. 1989) (same). Our conclusion that plaintiff has failed to present a claim under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 obviates the need to determine whether other provisions of the TCA, e.g., N.J.S.A. 59:2-6 or N.J.S.A. 59:2-3, otherwise immunize defendant from liability.See footnote 44 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 30 September Term 1998 ANGELA NORRIS AND GEORGE NORRIS, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. BOROUGH OF LEONIA, Defendant-Appellant, O'HERN, J., concurring. I agree that the Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 13-10, should govern the liability of a municipality that owns a public sidewalk. I disagree that the owner of a residential sidewalk, who is under governmental regulation to maintain the sidewalk, may sue a public body that neither owns nor maintains the sidewalk. Such a holding is as logical as it would be were plaintiff able to sue herself. Under our law, an abutting landowner's "'title [] goes to the middle of the street and [landowners] continue to retain considerable interest in and control over that portion of the sidewalk located on their land.'" Christmas v. City of Newark, 216 N.J. Super. 393, 400 (App. Div. 1987), certif. denied, 108 N.J. 193 (1987) (quoting Yankho v. Fane, 70 N.J. 528, 540 (1976)). The public is merely afforded an easement of passage over sidewalks. Ibid. Angela Norris was injured by a defect in the curb situated in front of her own home. Thus, the incident occurred on her own property. The majority's finding that the sidewalk in question is public property subject to municipal liability is based on a finding that the municipality placed a cone at the site after the accident. That should not be enough to establish municipal ownership or control. The basis for the commercial-landowner exception is "expressly tied to the use and benefit derived from the sidewalk by the owner of the abutting 'premises.'" Hollus v. Amtrack Northeast Corridor, 937 F. Supp. 1110, 1115 (D.N.J. 1996) aff'd, 118 F.3d 1575 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Stewart, supra, 87 N.J. at 158). Stewart emphasized that the commercial-landowner exception to non-liability for the maintenance of sidewalks was because commercial landowners retain[ed] considerable interest in and rights to the use of the abutting sidewalks, including the right to prevent obstruction of the public's view of the commercial property from the sidewalk, use of the sidewalk for "stoops . . . and other domestic or trade conveniences" and the benefit of the sidewalk providing commercial owners with "easy access to their premises. . . . . . . [And] sidewalks "increase the value of commercial property." [Chimiente v. Adam Corp., 221 N.J. Super. 580, 583 (App. Div. 1987) (quoting Stewart, supra, 87 N.J. at 151-52).] Angela Norris is suing the Borough for injuries that she sustained due to the deterioration of the curb situated in front of her own home. Unlike the commercial benefit that a sidewalk affords a proprietor, there is no benefit afforded to a municipality warranting a similar duty. Sims v. City of Newark, 244 N.J. Super. 32, 40 (Law Div. 1990); Christmas, supra, 216 N.J. Super. at 396. The majority of municipalities "have within their bounds miles of sidewalks," and it would be inconsistent with the Act to hold a municipality liable for injuries that result from the natural deterioration of those sidewalks. Christmas, supra, 216 N.J. Super. at 396; Sims, supra, 244 N.J. Super. at 40. In enacting the TCA in 1972, the Legislature recognized that while an entrepreneur may readily be held liable for negligence within the chosen ambit of his activity, the area in which government has the power to act for the public good is almost without limit and therefore the government should not have the duty to do everything that might need to be done. [Christmas, supra, 216 N.J. Super. at 396 (citing N.J.S.A. 59:1-2).] I might be willing to make the distinction that the majority makes between a sidewalk and a curb. Ante at __ (slip op. at 26-30); see Levin v. Devoe, 221 N.J. Super. 61, 65 (App. Div. 1987); MacGrath v. Levin Properties, 256 N.J. Super. 247, 252 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 19 (1992). On balance, I believe that the distinction would lead to too many disputes about where the sidewalk ends and the curb begins. What I cannot accept, however, is a holding that a municipality is generally liable for the condition of residential sidewalks. Although the Court has not held municipalities generally liable, it has allowed the property here to be "deemed public" on too slight a basis. Justice Garibaldi joins this opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 30 September Term 1998 ANGELA NORRIS and GEORGE NORRIS, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. BOROUGH OF LEONIA, Defendant-Appellant, and JOHN DOE (said name being fictitious and unknown), JOHN ROE (said name being fictitious and unknown), ROE DOE (said name being Defendants. STEIN, J., concurring. I join the Court's opinion to the extent that it holds that the Borough of Leonia was subject to liability if the curb in front of plaintiffs' dwelling constituted a dangerous condition of public property within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 59:4-2. I would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division, however, and remand the matter for trial because in my view the Court's conclusion that the municipality had neither actual nor constructive notice of the dangerous condition is premature. N.J.S.A. 59:4-3 defines actual and constructive notice for purposes of public entity liability, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:4-2: 59:4-3. Actual notice; constructive notice a. A public entity shall be deemed to have actual notice of a dangerous condition within the meaning of subsection b. of section 59:4-2 if it had actual knowledge of the existence of the condition and knew or should have known of its dangerous character. b. A public entity shall be deemed to have constructive notice of a dangerous condition within the meaning of subsection b. of section 59:4-2 only if the plaintiff establishes that the condition had existed for such a period of time and was of such an obvious nature that the public entity, in the exercise of due care, should have discovered the condition and its dangerous character. [Emphasis supplied.] The briefs in opposition to the Borough's motion for summary judgment included excerpts from the deposition of Angela Norris who testified that the curbing abutting her property was significantly deteriorated, and assert that the condition had persisted without remedy for a number of years. Moreover, in their brief opposing summary judgment, plaintiffs noted that defendants had failed to answer interrogatories propounded in April 1996, and also had indicated that the Borough of Leonia did not possess any documents responsive to plaintiffs demand for records of complaints about sidewalks, streets and curbing within 1000 feet of plaintiffs' residence for the preceding two years. Plaintiffs emphasized their desire to take the depositions of Borough officials in order to explore the question of actual or constructive notice, specifically making reference to the Borough's acknowledgment during the argument of the motion for summary judgment that the DPW was aware of a complaint made by a neighbor of plaintiff concerning defective curbing abutting his residence. This record demonstrates that the Law Division judge who granted defendants motion for summary judgment focused almost entirely on the immunity question and not on the issue of actual or constructive notice. Based on the incomplete state of the record before this Court, I am convinced that we are not sufficiently informed to resolve the notice issue as a matter of law, an issue that was not addressed specifically either by the Appellate Division or the Law Division. This Court should not rush to sustain the grant of summary judgment on a record that contains a strong suggestion of the need for further discovery and case management, especially where the legal issue deemed decisive by the Court is one that the lower courts never saw fit to address. Accordingly, I would remand the matter to the Law Division for further proceedings and permit that court to determine whether further discovery on the question of actual or constructive notice would be appropriate. NO. A-30 ANGELA NORRIS and GEORGE NORRIS, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. BOROUGH OF LEONIA, Defendant-Appellant, and JOHN DOE (said name being fictitious and unknown), JOHN ROE (said name being fictitious and unknown), ROE DOE (said name being fictitious and unknown), Defendants. DECIDED We do not reach the question of whether the same duty should be imposed on owners of residential property or whether the policy considerations underlying the impositions of a duty on commercial property owners apply to residential property owners. We note, however, that the law of sidewalk liability is an appropriate subject for reconsideration by the Legislature.