Title: Commonwealth v. K.W.

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC–13153 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  K.W. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 7, 2022. - September 8, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Expungement.  Criminal Records.  Marijuana.  Statute, 
Construction.  Words, "Best interests of justice." 
 
 
 
 
Complaints received and sworn to in the Dorchester Division 
of the Boston Municipal Court Department on June 30, 2003, and 
May 22, 2006. 
 
 
A petition for expungement, filed on June 26, 2019, was 
heard by Jonathan R. Tynes, J., and a motion for reconsideration 
was considered by him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Pauline Quirion for the petitioner. 
 
Andrew S. Doherty, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Ruth A. Bourquin, Katharine Naples-Mitchell, & Joshua M. 
Daniels, for American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts 
Foundation, Inc., & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
GEORGES, J.  K.W. filed a petition pursuant to G. L. 
c. 276, § 100K, in the Boston Municipal Court, seeking to have 
expunged two sets of criminal records stemming from separate 
arrests that had both occurred more than fifteen years earlier.  
Each set of records involved charges or convictions of 
possession of an amount of marijuana that since has been 
decriminalized.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 94C, § 32L.  A Boston 
Municipal Court judge denied both petitions on the ground that 
it was not "in the best interests of justice" to expunge the 
records.  See G. L. c. 276, § 100K (b).  The judge subsequently 
denied K.W.'s motion for reconsideration.  Because we conclude 
that the judge abused his discretion in concluding that, here, 
expungement was not "in the best interests of justice," the 
order denying K.W.'s petition for expungement must be reversed.  
More generally, we conclude that petitions for expungement that 
satisfy G. L. c. 276, § 100K (a), are entitled to a strong 
presumption in favor of expungement, and petitions for 
expungement in such cases may be denied only if a significant 
countervailing concern is raised in opposition to the petition.1 
 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the American 
Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts Foundation, Inc., the 
Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice, and the 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in support 
of the petitioner. 
3 
 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  K.W. seeks to have expunged 
records related to two incidents, in 2003 and 2006, in which he 
was arrested for possession of marijuana.  In each instance, the 
facts are undisputed. 
 
In 2003, K.W. was a rear-seat passenger in a vehicle that 
was stopped for asserted traffic violations.  During the stop, 
an officer pat frisked K.W. and found what the officer later 
described as "a small plastic bag of green vegetable-like 
substance believed to be marijuana."  K.W. subsequently was 
charged with possession of a class D controlled substance, G. L. 
c. 94C, § 34.  He filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized 
during the stop, and when no police officer appeared at the 
hearing on that motion, the case was dismissed. 
 
In 2006, K.W. was stopped by a police officer for driving 
at approximately forty miles per hour in a residential area.  
During the stop, K.W. presented the officer with another 
person's driver's license, and was found with what the officer 
later described as "two plastic bags containing an undetermined 
amount of a vegetable matter believed to be a Class D substance, 
to wit, marijuana."  K.W. later provided his actual name to the 
officer, and from this, police learned that he had been driving 
with a suspended driver's license. 
 
K.W. was arraigned on six charges.  To three of these 
charges -- one count of possession of a class D substance, G. L. 
4 
 
c. 94C, § 34; refusal to identify himself, G. L. c. 90, § 25; 
and operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license, G. L. 
c. 90, § 23 -- K.W. pleaded guilty.  The other three charges -– 
concealing identification, G. L. c. 90, § 23; use of a motor 
vehicle without authority, G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a); and the 
other count of possession of a class D substance, G. L. c. 94C, 
§ 34 -- were dismissed at the Commonwealth's request.  K.W. was 
sentenced to one year of probation, and later petitioned 
successfully for the sealing of all records pertaining to both 
the 2003 and 2006 incidents.2 
 
b.  The expungement statute.  In 2018, Massachusetts 
enacted an omnibus package of criminal justice reforms entitled 
"An Act relative to criminal justice reform" (2018 criminal 
justice reform act or act).  See St. 2018, c. 69.  Among other 
changes, the act created two distinct pathways by which to seek 
expungement of two different types of criminal records.  See 
Matter of Expungement, 489 Mass. 67, 69 (2022).  One pathway, 
typically referred to as "time-based" expungement, is available 
 
 
2 When a record is sealed, it becomes inaccessible to all 
except "[c]riminal justice agencies" performing "their criminal 
justice duties," see G. L. c. 6, § 172 (a) (1); firearms 
licensing authorities, see id.; and numerous entities whose work 
involves, among others, mental health care and the care and 
protection of children or the elderly, see, e.g., G. L. c. 6, 
§ 172.  Those whose criminal records are sealed may answer "no 
record" to inquiries about their criminal records on 
applications for housing or employment.  See G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100A. 
5 
 
to those who committed certain low-level offenses before the age 
of twenty-one.  See id.  The pathway at issue here, generally 
known as "reason-based" expungement, id. at 71, is set forth in 
G. L. c. 276, § 100K.  That statute provides: 
"(a) Notwithstanding the requirements of [G. L. c. 276, 
§§] 100I and 100J, a court may order the expungement of a 
record created as a result of criminal court appearance, 
juvenile court appearance or dispositions if the court 
determines based on clear and convincing evidence that the 
record was created as a result of: 
 
"(1) false identification of the petitioner or the 
unauthorized use or theft of the petitioner's identity; 
 
"(2) an offense at the time of the creation of the record 
which at the time of expungement is no longer a crime, 
except in cases where the elements of the original criminal 
offense continue to be a crime under a different 
designation; 
 
"(3) demonstrable errors by law enforcement; 
 
"(4) demonstrable errors by civilian or expert witnesses; 
 
"(5) demonstrable errors by court employees; or 
 
"(6) demonstrable fraud perpetrated upon the court. 
 
"(b) The court shall have the discretion to order an 
expungement pursuant to this section based on what is in 
the best interests of justice.  Prior to entering an order 
of expungement pursuant to this section, the court shall 
hold a hearing if requested by the petitioner or the 
district attorney.  Upon an order of expungement, the court 
shall enter written findings of fact. 
 
"(c) The court shall forward an order for expungement 
pursuant to this section forthwith to the clerk of the 
court where the record was created, to the commissioner [of 
probation] and to the commissioner of criminal justice 
information services appointed pursuant to [G. L. c. 6, 
§ 167A]."  (Emphasis added.) 
 
6 
 
 
c.  Procedural history.  In 2019, K.W. filed a petition in 
the Boston Municipal Court seeking expungement of the marijuana-
related records created in 2003 and 2006.  Attached to the 
petition was an affidavit in which K.W. averred that the amount 
of marijuana at issue in both incidents was under one ounce.  In 
the petition, K.W. described the "cloud of prosecution" that 
would continue to linger over him if those marijuana-related 
records were not expunged.  The affidavit explained the steps 
K.W. was taking to secure new employment, and his involvement 
with his religious community.  The affidavit also indicated that 
K.W. was then living with a friend and providing child care for 
his friend's children, and that he hoped to secure a home of his 
own to better facilitate spending time with his own children.  
Representatives from an organization with which K.W. had 
completed a job training program and the community with which 
K.W. worshiped both submitted letters commending K.W. for his 
efforts at self-improvement, attesting to his character, and 
supporting his attempt to expunge the marijuana-related criminal 
records. 
 
A hearing on the petition took place in August of 2019.  
Present were K.W.'s attorney and an assistant district attorney.  
The assistant district attorney told the judge that the 
Commonwealth did not object to the petition for expungement.  At 
7 
 
the conclusion of the hearing, the following exchange took 
place: 
The prosecutor:  "There would be no objection from the 
Commonwealth [to the petition], Your Honor." 
 
The judge:  "All right.  And do you know the effects of 
expungement?" 
 
The prosecutor:  "So I believe it limits anybody's access 
to the record where if it were to be viewed, the [criminal 
offense record information] would come up empty, including 
to police, [State] agencies, employers, anybody who would 
have access to a previously sealed record." 
 
The judge:  "What do you say about the effects of 
expungement?" 
 
K.W.'s counsel:  "Well, Your Honor, these would destroy the 
police records." 
 
The judge:  "Destroy all records?" 
 
K.W.'s counsel:  "Yes, and as well as the Court records and 
so the only record that would still exist, Your Honor, 
would be left to the [Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI)], and with this new expungement act, there is 
actually a system being set up so that the expungement 
notices go to the FBI so that they can decide whether or 
not to also take it off of the FBI record." 
 
The judge:  "Okay.  All right.  All right.  Thank you.  
I'll take it under advisement." 
 
 
In October of 2019, the judge denied the petition for 
expungement on the grounds that K.W. had not filed his petition 
correctly with the Commissioner of Probation (commissioner), and 
that "the Court does not find that it is in the interest of 
justice to destroy all records relating to the charges."  In 
December of 2019, K.W. filed a motion for reconsideration.  A 
8 
 
few days later, the commissioner's deputy legal counsel 
submitted to the court a letter asserting that K.W.'s initial 
petition had been filed properly; because it sought a reason-
based expungement, there was no need to submit it to the 
commissioner.  In April of 2020, the same judge denied the 
motion for reconsideration.  The judge's order stated, in full, 
"As previously noted the Court does not find that it is in the 
interest of justice to destroy all records relating to the 
charges."  K.W. appealed, and we granted his application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standards of review.  In reviewing a 
decision on a motion to expunge, we consider whether the judge 
abused his or her discretion.  See Commonwealth v. Pon, 469 
Mass. 296, 299 (2014).  That determination is based in part on 
whether the judge made an error of law in interpreting the 
relevant statutes; we review the interpretation of a statute de 
novo.  See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. 
Department of Agric. Resources, 477 Mass. 280, 285 (2017).  
"Where the words [of a statute] are 'plain and unambiguous' in 
their meaning, we view them as 'conclusive as to legislative 
intent'" (citation omitted).  Dorrian v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 479 
Mass. 265, 271 (2018).  But where "the meaning of a statute is 
not plain from its language, familiar principles of statutory 
construction guide our interpretation.  We look to the intent of 
9 
 
the Legislature 'ascertained from all its words . . . considered 
in connection with the cause of [the statute's] enactment, the 
mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to 
be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may 
be effectuated'" (citation omitted).  Id. 
 
b.  The "best interests of justice" standard.  The judge 
concluded that granting K.W.'s petition for expungement would 
not be "in the best interests of justice." See G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100K (b).  This phrase is both undefined in the statute and 
open to a nearly endless number of plausible interpretations; 
the plain statutory text therefore is ambiguous.  See, e.g., 
Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 447 Mass. 814, 818 (2006) ("When 
a statute is 'capable of being understood by reasonably well-
informed persons in two or more different senses,' it is 
ambiguous" [citation omitted]).  Much can be gleaned, however, 
from examining both the structure of the statute as a whole and 
the other provisions of G. L. c. 276, § 100K.  See Casseus v. 
Eastern Bus Co., Inc., 478 Mass. 786, 795 (2018) ("When the 
meaning of any particular section or clause of a statute is 
questioned, it is proper, no doubt, to look into the other parts 
of the statute . . ." [citation omitted]).  A judge ordering 
expungement under G. L. c. 276, § 100K (a), must employ a two-
part analysis.  "First, the judge must make findings based on 
clear and convincing evidence that the relevant criminal record 
10 
 
was created because of one or more of the reasons listed in 
G. L. c. 276, § 100K (a)."  Matter of Expungement, 489 Mass. at 
68.  Only after making such findings may a judge consider 
"whether expungement would be 'in the best interests of 
justice.'"  Id, quoting G. L. c. 276, § 100K (b). 
 
Because a petition only receives consideration under G. L. 
c. 276, § 100K (b), if it first satisfies G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100K (a),3 we may look to the development of the factors 
enumerated in G. L. c. 276, § 100K (a), to inform our 
interpretation of the phrase "the best interests of justice" in 
G. L. c. 276, § 100K (b).  See, e.g., Worcester v. College Hill 
Props., LLC, 465 Mass. 134, 139 (2013) ("if reasonably possible, 
all parts [of a statute] shall be construed as consistent with 
each other so as to form a harmonious enactment effectual to 
accomplish its manifest purpose").  The factors enumerated in 
 
 
3 As the judge found, K.W.'s petition falls squarely within 
the set of enumerated factors in G. L. c. 276, § 100K (a) (2), 
as his marijuana-related charges and conviction were for 
possession of marijuana in an amount that since has been 
decriminalized.  In his affidavit, K.W. averred that the amount 
of marijuana at issue in both the 2003 and 2006 incidents was 
less than one ounce.  Nothing in the record suggests otherwise, 
and the Commonwealth does not dispute this averment.  In 2008, 
the Legislature decriminalized the possession of up to one ounce 
of marijuana, see G. L. c. 94C, § 32L, inserted by St. 2008, 
c. 387, § 2; in 2017, the Legislature modified the statute to 
decriminalize possession of up to two ounces of marijuana, see 
St. 2017, c. 55, §§ 15-18.  See also G. L. c. 94G, § 13 (e), 
added by St. 2016, c. 334, § 5.  K.W.'s petition therefore 
clearly satisfies G. L. c. 276, § 100K (a). 
11 
 
G. L. c. 276, § 100K (a), set a very high bar:  the record at 
issue must pertain to a now-decriminalized offense or have been 
the product of "fraud" or "demonstrable error."  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. A.G., 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1126 (2020) (affirming 
denial of petition for reason-based expungement because arrest 
that created record, according to motion judge, was "judgment 
call" by police, which is not "the kind of demonstrable error 
contemplated by the statute"). 
 
These factors, furthermore, appear to be a direct response 
to decisions issued by this court in the years leading up to the 
enactment of the 2018 criminal justice reform act.  Two cases, 
Commonwealth v. Boe, 456 Mass. 337 (2010), and Commonwealth v. 
Moe, 463 Mass. 370 (2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1231 (2013), 
are particularly salient in this regard.  In both, we concluded 
that even though the petitioners' records had been created as a 
result of profound errors or fraud, those records could not be 
expunged because the Legislature had decided that sealing was 
the sole remedy available for records generated as a result of 
such situations. 
 
In Boe, 456 Mass. at 338-340, for instance, the petitioner 
sought the expungement of a record that had been created because 
of a litany of errors by a number of government officials.  The 
fiasco began when a man driving Boe's vehicle got into a two-car 
accident.  When the other driver requested the license and 
12 
 
registration of the male driver, "he told her that the car was 
not his, he threatened to return to the scene with a gun, and 
then he drove away without providing" any information.  Id. at 
338.  "The police traced the registration plate information 
through the registry of motor vehicles and learned that" the 
vehicle was registered to Boe.  Id. 
 
Notwithstanding that the offending driver had been 
identified as a man, while Boe was a woman, police applied for a 
criminal complaint charging Boe with leaving the scene of an 
accident after causing personal injury, see G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (2) (a 1/2) (1), and a hearing was scheduled "to determine 
whether probable cause existed to support the charge."  Boe, 456 
Mass. at 338.  Boe "arrived on time for the hearing," but she 
mistakenly was directed by a court employee to an arraignment 
session.  Id.  After waiting for "a long period of time," she 
inquired about the status of her hearing and was informed, by a 
different employee, that she was in the wrong place.  Id. 
at 338-339.  In the interim, Boe learned, her absence from the 
hearing had resulted in the issuance of a criminal complaint 
against her, and she was told to expect a summons with 
information about her next court date.  Id. at 339.  Eventually, 
these errors were revealed, and Boe and the Commonwealth filed a 
joint motion to dismiss the complaint and to expunge Boe's 
record, asserting that, as this court summarized it, 
13 
 
"expungement was appropriate because the complaint should not 
have issued in the first instance."  Id..  The motion judge 
agreed, dismissed the complaint, and ordered the record 
expunged.  The commissioner, however, filed a motion for 
reconsideration of the order of expungement on the ground that 
the judge lacked the statutory authority to order expungement of 
a record of this type, and that sealing thus was Boe's only 
available remedy.  Id. 
 
The Appeals Court upheld the order, Commonwealth v. Boe, 73 
Mass. App. Ct. 647 (2009), but this court reversed.  In holding 
that Boe's record could not be expunged, we acknowledged that 
the record was created by compounding errors in which Boe played 
no part, from the "error by the police in misidentifying Boe as 
the operator of the vehicle" to "the court's error in 
misdirecting Boe" when she arrived for her show cause hearing.  
Boe, 456 Mass. at 347.  Nonetheless, we concluded that "where 
the Legislature has clearly prescribed [sealing as] the remedy 
for limiting access to probation records when a criminal case 
has been dismissed, it is not the province of this court to 
decide that a different remedy would be more appropriate."  Id. 
 
Two years later, in Moe, we applied the holding of Boe to a 
similarly unfortunate set of circumstances.  Moe was the victim 
of blatant extortion.  See Moe, 463 Mass. at 370-371.  A man 
named Ramon Benzan told police that Moe had "pulled a gun" on 
14 
 
him in an attempt to avoid paying Benzan a debt he owed.  Id. 
at 371.  The incident was entirely fabricated, but police 
nonetheless arrested Moe at his home and charged him with 
assault by means of a dangerous weapon, in violation of G. L. 
c. 265, § 15B (b).  Id.  While Moe prepared his defense, Benzan 
told Moe's attorney that he would go on "national television" 
and describe the assault if Moe did not pay him $5,000.  Id. 
 
Eventually, Benzan's story fell apart; after a detective 
expressed doubts about the allegations, "the prosecutor filed a 
nolle prosequi," which attested that "based on the evidence it 
would not be in the interest of justice to further prosecute 
this case."  Id. at 372.  As in Boe, Moe filed a motion to 
expunge the record, and the commissioner opposed the motion.  
Id.  A Boston Municipal Court judge denied the motion for 
expungement on the ground that the judge "had no legal authority 
to expunge the criminal records," and that the only available 
remedy was sealing.  Id.  After concluding that "this case 
presents a set of facts very similar to those in Boe, and that 
case governs," we affirmed the denial.  Id. at 375. 
 
"By the enactment of G. L. c. 276, § 100K (a)," however, 
"the Legislature provided courts precisely the expungement 
authority that they lacked when Boe and Moe were decided."  
Matter of Expungement, 489 Mass. at 78.  Indeed, many of the 
factors enumerated in G. L. c. 276, § 100K (a), describe the 
15 
 
precise errors that led to the creation of the records in those 
cases; such factors include "false identification of the 
petitioner," G. L. c. 276, § 100K (a) (1); "demonstrable errors 
by law enforcement," G. L. c. 276, § 100K (a) (3); and 
"demonstrable errors by court employees," G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100K (a) (5).  Other factors concern closely related errors.  
See, e.g., G. L. c. 276, § 100K (a) (4) ("demonstrable errors by 
civilian or expert witnesses"), and G. L. c. 276, § 100K (a) (6) 
("demonstrable fraud perpetrated upon the court").  In light of 
this legislative directive, it would be a mistake to interpret 
"the best interests of justice" provision as allowing judges 
wide latitude to deny otherwise-eligible reason-based petitions 
for expungement.  See, e.g., Rosnov v. Molloy, 460 Mass. 474, 
482 (2011) (noting that "this court has interpreted 'swift 
legislative action in the wake' of a contrary judicial ruling to 
evince legislative intent to clarify its position on the issue" 
[citation omitted]). 
 
The reason-based expungement provisions, moreover, differ 
in crucial and illuminating ways from the time-based expungement 
provisions, which the Legislature also enacted as part of the 
2018 criminal justice reform act.  See G. L. c. 276, § 100I.  
Broadly speaking, time-based expungement is available to 
petitioners who were under the age of twenty-one at the time the 
record was created, whose offenses or alleged offenses were 
16 
 
"lower level," and for whom at least three and as many as seven 
years have passed since the successful completion of any 
sentence imposed as a result of the offense.  See Matter of 
Expungement, 489 Mass. at 69, citing G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100I (a) (1)-(3).  Petitioners also are excluded from time-
based expungement if their record pertains to any of the twenty 
categories of offenses enumerated in G. L. c. 276, § 100J.  See 
G. L. c. 276, § 100I (a) (1). 
 
Reason-based expungement, by contrast, requires none of 
these hurdles; reason-based petitioners may have been any age at 
the time of the creation of the record, and the records they 
seek to expunge may be from any time and may pertain to any kind 
of criminal offense, no matter how serious.  The relative lack 
of constraint on those seeking reason-based expungement evinces 
that the Legislature conceived of expungement as likely 
appropriate in those rare cases in which the record exists 
because of "fraud," "false identification," or "demonstrable 
error," or pertains to behavior that no longer constitutes a 
criminal act.  Reason-based expungement, therefore, is a pathway 
for which few will meet the threshold qualifications, but those 
petitioners who do must be entitled to a strong presumption that 
their records should be expunged. 
 
We previously have observed that "there are situations 
where the maintenance of criminal records of a particular 
17 
 
individual cannot be said to serve any valid law enforcement 
purpose because the events whose happening they reflect are of 
little or no relevance to the individual's likelihood of 
participation in future criminal activities or necessary to the 
achievement of other ancillary goals of the criminal justice 
system."  Police Comm'r of Boston v. Municipal Court of the 
Dorchester Dist., 374 Mass. 640, 658 (1978).  Indeed, the record 
of a decriminalized offense is the paradigmatic example of such 
a record; even if a petitioner were again to engage in the same 
conduct as that which created the record, the petitioner would 
not have committed a criminal act.  And this principle applies 
with equal force to records whose origins in "demonstrable 
error," "false identification," or "fraud," see G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100K (a), suggest that the records should not have been 
created in the first instance. 
 
The context for the development of the other reason-based 
factors, moreover, as typified by the Legislature's response to 
Boe and Moe, shares a common purpose with the development of 
G. L. c. 276, § 100K (a) (2).  The fact that the Legislature 
chose to include expungement of decriminalized records in the 
reason-based factors indicates that it viewed all six types of 
records as equally worthy of expungement and intended that they 
be subject to the same level of judicial discretion.  
Fundamentally, both types of factors represent an effort to make 
18 
 
expungement more available where the Legislature has determined 
that the continued existence of those types of records would be 
unjust.  For instance, the cochair of the committee that led the 
Legislature's criminal justice reform efforts noted, before the 
final vote on the legislation, that adoption of the act would 
mean that "the hope for a fairer and more equitable criminal 
justice system is being realized," highlighting in particular 
that the legislation would "allow adult expungement including an 
offense that is no longer a crime" as part of the Legislature's 
efforts to "let people reenter society."  Report on Senate Bill 
No. 2371 -- An Act relative to criminal justice reform, at 9 
(statement of Rep. Claire Cronin, Apr. 2, 2018). 
 
Nonetheless, we recognize that the factors enumerated in 
G. L. c. 276, § 100K (a), are not self-executing.  The 
Legislature could have made the kinds of records described 
therein automatically eligible for expungement, as it has done 
for the sealing of records of decriminalized offenses, see G. L. 
c. 276, § 100A, yet it did not.  The choice to reserve some 
judicial discretion for reason-based expungement, however, 
should not be understood as a grant of broad authority.  Rather, 
G. L. c. 276, § 100K (b), provides a mechanism by which judges 
considering whether to eliminate a criminal record permanently 
can account for the kind of rare countervailing factors that the 
Legislature could not anticipate with precision, but that would 
19 
 
warrant retaining a record that either should never have been 
created or no longer represents criminal behavior.  To conclude 
otherwise would risk resetting the expungement landscape to 
something similar to that of the era of Boe, 456 Mass. at 348, 
and Moe, 463 Mass. at 375, a landscape the Legislature clearly 
has rejected. 
 
K.W. argues that this case presents a situation similar to 
that in Pon, 469 Mass. at 312.  We disagree.  The context there 
differs meaningfully from the inquiry here.  In Pon, we 
established a new standard for judges to apply in determining 
whether "substantial justice would best be served" by the 
sealing of a criminal record pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 100C, 
and interpreted that phrase "to mean that the defendant must 
establish that good cause exists for sealing."  Pon, supra.4  In 
so doing, we noted that the relevant amendments to the sealing 
statute derived from the Legislature's attempt to balance the 
public's right of access to information contained in criminal 
records with the Commonwealth's interest in helping those who 
have served their criminal sentences to be reintegrated as 
productive members of society, and the defendant's interest in 
receiving a fresh start.  Id. at 315.  As we explained, 
 
 
4 See G. L. c. 276, § 100C, second par. ("In any criminal 
case wherein . . . it appears to the court that substantial 
justice would best be served, the court shall direct the clerk 
to seal the records of the proceedings in his [or her] files"). 
20 
 
"judges evaluating a petition for sealing must recognize 
the interests of the defendant and of the Commonwealth in 
keeping the information private.  These interests include 
the compelling governmental interests in reducing 
recidivism, facilitating reintegration, and ensuring self-
sufficiency by promoting employment and housing 
opportunities for former criminal defendants. . . .  Where 
there is persuasive evidence that employers and housing 
authorities consider criminal history in making decisions, 
there is now a fully articulated governmental interest in 
shielding criminal history information from these decision 
makers where so doing would not cause adverse consequences 
to the community at large." 
 
Id.  The good cause standard announced in Pon, id. at 312, as 
well as our detailed explanation of the factors that judges 
should consider in applying that standard, see id. at 316-319, 
explicitly reflected that particular legislative "balancing."  
See id. at 315. 
 
This case, however, deals with markedly different types of 
criminal records.  By creating the list of factors in G. L. 
c. 276, 100K (a), involving fraud, falsity, "demonstrable" 
errors, and conduct that is no longer criminal, the Legislature 
itself has identified factors that establish good cause for 
expungement.  Records created as a result of one of these 
factors have virtually no bearing on whether the petitioner 
might commit a criminal act in the future, and their value to 
society therefore is vanishingly small.  See Police Comm'r of 
Boston, 374 Mass. at 658.  By contrast, the sealing statute at 
issue in Pon pertained to any record of a case resulting "in the 
entry of a nolle prosequi or a dismissal," including records 
21 
 
involving offenses to which the petitioner, like Pon himself, 
had admitted to having committed.  See id. at 297-298.  The 
significant differences between such records and the records 
described in the reason-based factors therefore demand different 
considerations, and countenance different degrees of judicial 
discretion, when judges weigh the merits of a petition filed 
under G. L. c. 276, § 100K.5 
 
This strong presumption in favor of expungement for 
petitioners who meet the reason-based requirements of G. L. 
c. 276, § 100K (a), is supported by the legislative history of 
the 2018 criminal justice reform act.  Statements made by 
legislators around the time the act was adopted indicate that 
the Legislature conceived of its changes to the expungement 
scheme as transformational.  One legislator described the act as 
evidence of a "shift in philosophy," reflecting an understanding 
that "sometimes something someone has done will plague them for 
the rest of their life," and that this "doesn't help us []or 
them."  Report on Senate Bill No. 2371 -- An Act relative to 
criminal justice reform, at 3 (statement of Rep. Sheila C. 
Harrington, Apr. 4, 2018).  Another legislator, describing the 
 
 
5 Moreover, where a petitioner seeks reason-based 
expungement of a record that already has been sealed, that 
record, unlike the records at issue in Pon, is not "subject to a 
common-law presumption of public access."  See Pon, 469 Mass. 
at 311. 
22 
 
act as "momentous" and as providing "hope for a fairer and more 
equitable criminal justice system," noted that the act "allow[s] 
adult expungement[,] including [of] an offense that is no longer 
a crime."  Id. at 9 (statement of Rep. Claire Cronin, Apr. 2, 
2018).  On the floor of the House later that year, a different 
legislator observed that adoption of the act meant "that we can 
finally start living up to our end of the bargain and give every 
ex-offender a real ability to become a rehabilitated and 
productive member of society."  State House News Service (House 
Sess.), Dec. 4, 2018 (statement of Rep. Juana Matias).  Adhering 
to the legislative intent to allow this rehabilitation, 
therefore, requires affording petitioners whose records fall 
within the enumerated list of reasons in G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100K (a), a strong presumption in favor of expungement. 
 
Given these considerations, we conclude that judges 
considering whether reason-based expungement is in "the best 
interests of justice," see G. L. c. 276, § 100K (b), must 
balance the petitioner's strong presumption in favor of 
expungement against any significant countervailing concern.  
Unlike petitioners seeking to seal their records, whose criminal 
records may still be of some value to society, petitioners who 
clear the high bar of G. L. c. 276, § 100K (a), need not 
articulate the particular disadvantages they might confront as a 
23 
 
result of their records remaining accessible to those who have 
access to sealed records. 
 
If no substantial countervailing concern is raised, judges 
must grant the petition for expungement; if a concern is raised, 
judges who chose to deny motions for expungement in response to 
those concerns must make written findings as to the basis of 
their decisions.  There "must be some mechanism by which an 
appellate court can meaningfully assess whether a judge acted 
appropriately in granting or denying . . . relief," because such 
a mechanism "allows the appellate court to test the judge's 
reasoning for abuse of discretion."  Commonwealth v. Grassie, 
476 Mass. 202, 214–215 (2017), S.C., 482 Mass. 1017 (2019).  
Nothing in the language of G. L. c. 276, § 100K (b) -- which 
provides simply that "[u]pon an order of expungement, the court 
shall enter written findings of fact" -- prevents judges from 
also entering written findings on a denial, as we now conclude 
they must. 
 
Although we decline to speculate as to what might 
constitute a substantial countervailing factor, we note that the 
existence of any other criminal record belonging to a 
petitioner, regardless of whether that record is sealed, may not 
factor into judges' analyses regarding whether reason-based 
expungement is "in the best interests of justice" under G. L. 
c. 276, § 100K (b).  General Laws c. 276, § 100E, defines a 
24 
 
"record" as "public records and court records . . . which 
concern a person and relate to the nature or disposition of an 
offense, including, without limitation, an arrest, a criminal 
court appearance, a [J]uvenile [C]ourt appearance, a pre-trial 
proceeding, [or] other judicial proceedings" (emphasis added).  
Thus, under this scheme, expungement is decided on an offense-
by-offense basis, and not incident-by-incident.  Put another 
way, a judge may not deny expungement on the ground that, in the 
judge's view, expunging the requested record would make no 
practical difference to the defendant, given the existence of 
other criminal records for that defendant. 
 
Judges, therefore, may not deny an otherwise-eligible 
reason-based petition on the theory that a petitioner's other 
records make negligible the benefits of expunging the reason-
based record or records in question.  What is required for the 
denial of a petition for reason-based expungement on the grounds 
of "the best interests of justice" is a countervailing 
consideration regarding the expungement of that particular 
record that is sufficient to weigh against the petitioner's 
strong interests in having that record expunged. 
 
c.  Application to K.W.'s petition.  Turning to K.W.'s 
petition, the record suggests no countervailing factors that 
might weigh against allowing K.W.'s efforts to expunge his 
marijuana-related records.  The Commonwealth has offered none; 
25 
 
to the contrary, it consistently has supported K.W.'s petition 
for expungement.6  Nor did the motion judge identify any such 
factor.  These records, one of which pertains to a conviction of 
a now-decriminalized amount of marijuana, and the other of which 
pertains to a charge that was dismissed without any conviction 
or pretrial diversion program, are canonic candidates for 
expungement. 
 
We note, however, that the motion judge ultimately denied 
K.W.'s petition on the grounds that, in the judge's words, it 
was not in the "interest of justice to destroy all records 
relating to the charges" (emphasis added).  We have scant 
insight into the motion judge's thinking beyond these findings.  
Nonetheless, we recognize that the motion judge's denial could 
be read to imply that he interpreted the statute to mean that 
expungement of K.W.'s marijuana-related records required the 
destruction of both the 2003 and 2006 records (including the 
2006 records pertaining to traffic offenses that are ineligible 
for expungement) in their entirety.  We therefore take this 
opportunity to clarify this aspect of the expungement scheme. 
 
 
6 In a letter to the Boston Municipal Court concerning 
whether K.W. properly had filed his initial petition for 
expungement, the commissioner's deputy legal counsel wrote that 
the commissioner did "not take a position as to whether the 
court should allow the petition to expunge in the interest of 
justice." 
26 
 
 
As discussed supra, under this statutory scheme expungement 
is done record-by-record, not event-by-event.  Moreover, the 
expungement scheme explicitly permits expungement via redaction.  
General Laws c. 276, § 100E, which contains definitions for key 
terms used in G. L. c. 276, §§ 100E through 100U, defines 
"expungement" as "the permanent erasure or destruction of a 
record so that the record is no longer accessible to, or 
maintained by, the court, any criminal justice agencies or any 
other state agency, municipal agency or county agency."  That 
definition also states that "[i]f the record contains 
information on a person other than the petitioner, it may be 
maintained with all identifying information of the petitioner 
permanently obliterated or erased."  Id. 
 
Judges considering expungement of a record containing 
information on multiple individuals, therefore, need not be 
concerned about the effect of allowing expungement on 
information pertaining to anyone besides the petitioner.  
Furthermore, the allowance of a petition for expungement also 
need not mean that law enforcement officers are unable to access 
other information in the record, beyond the petitioner's 
identifying information, that officers may need for an ongoing 
or future investigation.  The expungement of records featuring 
multiple defendants differs, of course, from the expungement of 
records that may continue to have investigative value.  
27 
 
Nonetheless, G. L. c. 276, § 100E, makes clear that the 
Legislature anticipated that effectuating the expungement scheme 
sometimes would require redacting parts of some records rather 
than destroying those records entirely.  Thus, expungement by 
redaction, done for the purposes of preserving the future 
investigative value of other parts of a record, is permissible 
under the statute. 
 
If, therefore, the Commonwealth were concerned that the 
destruction of a record would hinder an ongoing law enforcement 
investigation, it could ask that the judge, in granting a 
petition for reason-based expungement, do so on the condition 
that all identifying information related to the petitioner be 
fully and permanently redacted, while the rest of the record 
would be left unchanged and would remain accessible to law 
enforcement.  This approach might be necessary, for example, in 
situations in which a petitioner's record was created by an act 
of fraud, and law enforcement officials wanted to preserve the 
record for purposes of investigating or prosecuting the person 
who perpetrated the fraud on the petitioner.  Thus, the 
expungement of one record has no effect on other records a 
petitioner may have, and judges may, in appropriate situations, 
expunge a record by permanently redacting a petitioner's 
identifying information, so as to preserve the investigative 
value of another part of a record. 
28 
 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The order denying K.W.'s petition for 
expungement is vacated and set aside, and the matter is 
remanded to the Boston Municipal Court, where an order shall 
enter allowing the petition for expungement and for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.