Title: Thompson v. Oklahoma Public Employees Retirement System

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

THOMPSON v. STATE ex rel. BD. OF TRUSTEES OF OKLA. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM2011 OK 89Case Number: 107661; Consol. w/107662Decided: 10/25/2011THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN 
THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR 
WITHDRAWAL. 

DONALD D. THOMPSON, and PAULA R. THOMPSON, 
Petitioners/Appellants,v.STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ex rel., BOARD OF TRUSTEES 
OF THE OKLAHOMA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM and THE OKLAHOMA EMPLOYEES 
RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Respondents/Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTYTHE 
HONORABLE PATRICIA G. PARRISH, DISTRICT JUDGE
¶0 The petitioners/appellants, Donald D. Thompson and Paula R. Thompson, 
appeal the decision of the District Court of Oklahoma County, which affirmed an 
administrative decision from the Board of Trustees of the Oklahoma Public 
Employees Retirement System, respondents/appellees. After a hearing, the 
district court determined that Mr. Thompson's state retirement benefits must be 
forfeited after he was convicted of felonies that violated his oath of office as 
a district court judge. The district court determined that Mrs. Thompson, Mr. 
Thompson's wife, did not have standing in the individual administrative 
proceedings and was not a proper party therein.
AFFIRMED.
Clark O. Brewster, Robert Nigh, Jr., Marvin G. Lizama, BREWSTER & De 
ANGELIS, P.L.L.C., Tulsa, Oklahoma; Joe E. White, Jr., Charles Weddle, WHITE 
& WEDDLE, P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for appellants.Marc Edwards, 
Catherine L. Campbell, PHILLIPS MURRAH P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Joseph A. 
Fox, General Counsel Oklahoma Public Employees Retirement System, Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma, for appellees.
WINCHESTER, J.
¶1 Donald D. Thompson, petitioner/appellant, appeals the forfeiture of his 
judicial retirement benefits ordered by the Oklahoma Public Employees Retirement 
System Board of Trustees1 and affirmed by the District Court of Oklahoma County. 
This Court retained the matter for review.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE
¶2 On August 18, 2004, Mr. Thompson submitted his Declaration of Intent to 
Retire, which was approved August 31, 2004. He began receiving his pension 
benefits. On January 20, 2005, the State of Oklahoma filed charges against him 
for Indecent Exposure. The trial ended on June 29, 2006, with a guilty verdict 
returned by the jury on all four counts.2 The charges on which he was convicted occurred while 
Mr. Thompson was on the bench presiding over contested hearings and jury trials. 
Court personnel present during those trials testified they saw Mr. Thompson 
expose himself. 
¶3 The prosecuting attorney in the criminal case that resulted in Mr. 
Thompson's felony convictions notified the Oklahoma Public Employees Retirement 
System (OPERS) by letter of the felonies. On September 12, 2006, OPERS notified 
Mr. Thompson in writing that as a result of his conviction his judicial 
retirement pension benefits must be forfeited. Mr. Thompson requested an 
administrative hearing to contest the forfeiture. Ultimately, the OPERS Board of 
Trustees adopted the recommendation of a hearing examiner and on February 19, 
2009, entered a final agency order sustaining the forfeiture of Mr. Thompson's 
retirement benefits.
¶4 In the Board's Findings of Fact, it determined that Mr. Thompson had 
served as a State Representative from November 20, 1974, through November 19, 
1980, with six years of participating service in OPERS. These benefits are not 
in dispute.3 Mr. Thompson was appointed as District Judge in and for 
Creek County, Oklahoma, in February of 1982. In 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998 and 2002 
he remained in office by election. He had 23 years of participating service in 
the Uniform Retirement System for Justices and Judges, February 12, 1982, 
through August 18, 2004. He retired before the expiration of his last term and 
began to receive his benefits in September of 2004. His gross monthly benefit at 
the time of his retirement was $7,489.91, and with a cost of living adjustment, 
his income increased to $7,789.51, effective July 1, 2006. Mr. Thompson's own 
contributions to URSJJ were not subject to forfeiture.
II. BURDEN OF PROOF
¶5 Mr. Thompson asserts that OPERS violated the Oklahoma Administrative 
Procedures Act when it forced him to forfeit his retirement benefits without 
proper notice as required by 75 O.S.2001, § 309, nor did he receive an 
individual proceeding providing him an opportunity to proffer evidence and 
present witnesses on his behalf as required by 75 O.S.2001, § 310. He further states OPERS' 
decision on September 12, 2006, to refuse further payment of his retirement 
benefits was premature, without any supporting evidence, and solely the result 
of hearsay, conjecture and innuendo.
¶6 The facts reveal that Tom Spencer, the Executive Director of OPERS made 
the decision to require forfeiture of Mr. Thompson's retirement benefits, and 
informed him by letter of that action. Mr. Spencer included that if Mr. Thompson 
was aggrieved by the decision, he had the right to an administrative hearing 
before the Board of Trustees pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, and 
that the hearing was his exclusive remedy and must be requested in writing 
within thirty days of the receipt of the letter. This letter was not a final 
determination of the forfeiture, but served in a similar manner as a notice to 
show cause.
¶7 A show-cause order is not a binding opinion on the merits in an issue 
before a court, it is merely the means prescribed by law, in the nature of 
process, for bringing the party into court to answer certain demands.4 It does not shift the 
burden of proof, but is merely a method of summary procedure, like a summons.5 A party to a lawsuit may 
shift the burden of going forward by producing some evidence and the opposing 
party may introduce evidence to explain the contested matters.6
¶8 The transcript of Mr. Spencer's testimony reveals he decided to notify Mr. 
Thompson of the forfeiture after examining the judgment and sentence sent by the 
district attorney. The district attorney's accompanying letter to Mr. Spencer 
concluded that the crimes for which Mr. Thompson was convicted occurred while he 
was presiding as judge over a trial. Mr. Thompson requested a hearing. At that 
hearing the hearing examiner placed the burden of going forward with the 
evidence on Mr. Thompson, so he presented his evidence after the hearing 
examiner already had before him the full record of Mr. Thompson's final felony 
convictions. 
¶9 When Mr. Thompson challenged this procedure of providing notice of 
forfeiture on appeal, OPERS answered that it must act within the parameters of 
51 O.S.2001, § 24.1(A),7 which provides in 
pertinent part that the attorney responsible for prosecuting the elected state 
officer shall notify the retirement system in which such officer is enrolled of 
the forfeiture of such officer's retirement benefits. The wording of the statute 
appears to place the responsibility on the prosecuting attorney to determine 
whether there is cause to believe the felony offense violated the officer's oath 
of office and to notify the retirement system that the officer must forfeit 
retirement benefits. Pursuant to this statute, the action of informing the state 
officer that the benefits must be forfeited is merely a perfunctory act of OPERS 
following its notification by the prosecuting attorney. The prosecuting attorney 
has identified the offense and made the preliminary conclusion that the officer 
violated the oath of office. 
¶10 After the prosecutor's initial conclusion that forfeiture is indicated 
and OPERS relays that conclusion to the state officer who is accused of 
violating the oath of office, that officer is entitled to an individual 
proceeding, but may still choose not to contest the accusation. If the officer 
chooses to contest the accusation, an individual proceeding must be held 
providing an opportunity for the officer to proffer evidence and present 
witnesses, all pursuant to 75 O.S.2001, § 309. At such hearing the 
burden is on the accusing party to show the officer has violated his oath of 
office. 
¶11 The hearing examiner expressed his view that the hearing Mr. Thompson 
requested placed the burden of proof on him concerning whether his conviction 
violated his oath of office. Determining that a state official has violated his 
oath of office is an evidentiary matter. Stipe v. State ex rel. Bd. of 
Trustees of Oklahoma Public Employees Retirement System, 2008 OK 52, ¶ 16, 188 P.3d 120, 124. The burden of proof remains with 
OPERS to establish facts tending to show that the state officer violated his 
oath of office during the commission of a felony. In this case, the judgment and 
sentence in the criminal matter established a prima facie case against Mr. 
Thompson. A prima facie case is made out of such evidence as in the judgment of 
the law is sufficient to establish a given fact, and if unrebutted, remains 
sufficient to uphold a judgment in favor of the issue that it supports. Sides 
v. John Cordes, Inc., 1999 OK 36, ¶ 14, 981 P.2d 301, 306; Glenn Smith Oil v. Sheets, 
1985 OK 56, ¶ 9, 704 P.2d 474, 478. A felony conviction for indecent 
exposure on each of four counts, which acts occurred during four trials in which 
Mr. Thompson presided as judge, is sufficient to establish OPERS burden of proof 
that Mr. Thompson's retirement benefits are subject to forfeiture pursuant to 
the statute. 
¶12 With a prima facie case established, the hearing examiner properly placed 
the responsibility on Mr. Thompson to proceed with the evidence to explain or 
contradict that his felony convictions did not violate his oath of office. The 
examiner mistakenly called this the "burden of proof," but it was actually the 
burden of proceeding with the evidence. Mr. Thompson presented as his defense 
that the felonies he committed did not disrupt the trials. While that is an 
attempt to rebut the prima facie case, it is not a successful defense. 
¶13 Mr. Thompson received his requested hearing before a hearing examiner, 
and cannot claim that he failed to receive advance notice and an opportunity to 
fully present his case. The hearing examiner informed both parties near the 
conclusion of the hearing that:
"[O]ne of my main purposes is to make sure you get all your arguments, all 
your evidence, everything you want me to consider, everything you want the board 
to consider, everything you want an appellate court to consider because all that 
is based on this record, so I'm going to do my best to make sure that you get 
everything before anybody that's going to see it that you can."8
¶14 The uncontested facts revealed multiple felonies committed while Mr. 
Thompson presided over jury trials, and the offended parties included court 
personnel. Court reporters observed the felonious exposure of Mr. Thompson's 
private parts, and testified to the fact during the criminal trial. That trial 
resulted in conviction of felonies. Those felonies violated Mr. Thompson's oath 
of office. This uncontested evidence presented by OPERS is sufficient to support 
forfeiture. 
III. RIGHTS OF BENEFICIARY
¶15 Mr. Thompson's wife, Paula R. Thompson, repeatedly sought participation 
in the administrative proceedings regarding forfeiture of Mr. Thompson's 
retirement benefits, and at each step was denied participation. She claims her 
due process rights were denied. She further claims that she has a vested 
property right because the pension benefits are an asset of her marriage to Mr. 
Thompson, and she asserts that all of the vested pension benefits were accrued 
during their marriage. Mrs. Thompson supports her argument by citing divorce 
cases. Those holdings are not applicable to the essential issue now before us, 
and that is whether a wife, such as Mrs. Thompson who was married to Mr. 
Thompson at the time of the forfeiture hearing, has a vested right to her 
spouse's retirement benefits when those benefits have been forfeited by 
operation of law. 
¶16 OPERS argues that she is a surviving spouse beneficiary to one who has no 
current rights to his pension benefits. Determining whether an individual has 
been denied procedural due process is a two-step inquiry. First, we determine 
whether the individual possesses a protected interest to which due process 
protection applies, and if so, whether the individual was afforded an 
appropriate level of process. In re A.M., 2000 OK 82, ¶ 7, 13 P.3d 484, 487. 
¶17 The statutes governing the Uniform Retirement System for Justices and 
Judges are found within title 20, Chapter 16. Section 1102C provides options for 
payment of benefits to a spouse. Subsection A reveals those benefits are 
available to a spouse or surviving spouse. In Woods v. City of Lawton, 
1992 OK 167, 845 P.2d 880, the Court held that membership in any 
pension or retirement system of the state, any unit of local government or 
school district, or any agency or instrumentality thereof, shall be an 
enforceable contractual relationship, with the rights being defined by the 
limits of the contract, which may provide that vesting is subject to 
contingencies that can cause a forfeiture. Woods, 1992 OK 167, ¶ 12, 845 P.2d  at 883. Accordingly, 
contingencies provided by statute, more specifically, § 24.1 of Title 51, can 
provide that a violation of a state officer's oath of office results in a 
forfeiture of retirement benefits, in which case the officer would no longer 
have a vested interest in those benefits. If the officer has no vested interest 
in the benefits, neither does the spouse. Because this spouse has no protected 
interest, due process protection does not apply. The agency and the district 
court did not err in denying Mrs. Thompson's participation as a party in the 
forfeiture proceedings against Mr. Thompson.
IV. FORFEITURE OF BENEFITS OF OFFICE 
¶18 Mr. Thompson asserts that strict construction of the forfeiture statute 
requires that it must apply only to his oath of office filed January 15, 2003, 
the last oath of office he took, so that he would forfeit only the retirement 
benefits from his last term in his judicial office. OPERS answers that the 
statute, 51 O.S.2001, § 
24.1, does not support this position.
¶19 This state has a strong policy against forfeitures, and will neither 
search for a construction that will bring about a forfeiture, nor adopt a 
meaning that would produce such an effect unless the language of the statute 
under consideration clearly demonstrates the legislature intended that a 
forfeiture take place. Hendrick v. Walters, 1993 OK 162, ¶ 7, 865 P.2d 1238-1239. The 1998 version 
of § 24.19 provided in pertinent part that if an elected official 
during the term he is elected is found guilty of a felony, he shall be 
automatically suspended from office, and upon final conviction shall vacate the 
office. If the felony violates his oath of office he shall forfeit "all the 
benefits of said office" including retirement benefits provided by law. The 
forfeiture is limited to the benefits accruing to the officer after 1981.10 Mr. Thompson argues that the wording of the statute 
restricts the forfeiture to his last term in office. We cannot agree with this 
construction of the statute. The purpose of §24.1(A) is to ensure that public 
officials who commit serious criminal offenses, particularly those which violate 
their oath of office, lose their rights to serve further and to the benefits of 
office. Nida v. OPERS, 204 OK CIV APP 85, ¶ 15, 99 P.3d 1224, 1227.
¶20 The statute covers elected state and county officials and state 
employees. If this Court accepted Mr. Thompson's construction of the statute, 
officials who were elected to multiple terms in office would be in a superior 
position to state employees who are hired and worked for exactly the same number 
of years. Under his suggested construction, Mr. Thompson would lose less than 
four years of benefits after serving twenty-two years as a district judge, while 
an employee of the state who was employed twenty-two years and commits a felony 
that violates the oath of office taken when the employment commenced, would lose 
a total of twenty-two years of benefits. We see no reason to believe the 
legislature intended such a disproportionate penalty between state employees and 
state officers for violation of their oaths of office.
V. ORAL ARGUMENT, ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
¶21 In the last two paragraphs of his reply brief, Mr. Thompson requests oral 
argument, attorney fees and costs. Based on the uncontested facts included in 
the original record, we see no reason to grant oral argument. Mr. Thompson also 
requested attorney fees. No argument is made, nor is any statute or case cited 
to support an award of attorney fees and costs, and this request is denied.
AFFIRMED.
ALL JUSTICES CONCUR.
FOOTNOTES
1 The Board of Trustees of 
the Oklahoma Public Employees Retirement System manages the Uniform Retirement 
System for Justices and Judges and the State Judicial Retirement Fund. 
20 O.S.Supp.2010, § 
1108(A). 
2 On or between these dates, the individual felonies of 
indecent exposure were committed: Count 1, May 5, 2003 and June 10, 2003; Count 
2, August 21, 2003 and August 26, 2003; Count 3, September 8, 2003 and September 
18, 2003, and Count 4, October 14, 2002 and October 25, 2002. 
3 The forfeiture clause in title 51, § 24.1 was added by 
the 1st Extr. Sess., ch. 1, § 3, emerg. eff. September 8, 1981. Although this 
section has been amended by 1987 Okla.Sess.Laws, ch. 30, § 1, 1998 
Okla.Sess.Laws, ch. 419, § 8, and 2009 Okla.Sess.Laws, ch. 77, § 1, this Court 
in Stipe v. State ex rel. Bd. Of Trustees of OPERS, 2008 OK 52, ¶ 8, 188 P.3d 120, 122-123, and the Court of Civil 
Appeals, Nida v. OPERS Bd. Of Trustees, 2004 OK CIV APP 85, ¶ 17, 99 P.3d 1224, 1228, has treated the effective date of 
the forfeiture statute as September 1, 1981, even though each revision includes 
a similar phrase seeming to except retirement funds vested on the "effective 
date of this act." The Legislature has made no changes in the wording since 
Nida, so we may conclude the Legislature has agreed to the 1981 date as 
the effective date of the act. "[L]egislative silence, when it has authority to 
speak, may be considered as giving rise to an implication of legislative 
intent." City of Duncan v. Bingham, 1964 OK 165, ¶ 12, 394 P.2d 456, 460. 
4 See Goldstein v. United States, 11 F.2d 593, 594 
(5th Cir. 1926) (cert. den. 271 U.S. 668, 46 S. Ct. 483, 70 L.Ed. 
1141), Morehouse v. Pacific Hardware & Steel Co., 177 F. 337, 339 
(9th Cir. 1910). 
5 Chambers v. Blickleford Sales, Inc., 313 F.2d 262, 257 (2nd Cir. 1963). 
6 See Chambers. 313 F.2d  at 256. 
7 The statute has subsequently been amended by 2009 Okla. 
Sess. Laws, ch. 77, § 1. The above language cited is now found in title 
51 O.S.Supp.2010, § 
24.1(J). 
8 Original Record at 260. 
9 A. Any elected or appointed state or county officer or 
employee who, during the term for which he or she was elected or appointed, is, 
or has been, found guilty by a trial court of a felony in a state or federal 
court of competent jurisdiction shall be automatically suspended from said 
office or employment. The Governor shall appoint an interim successor to serve 
during the period of suspension of any county commissioner or any state officer 
other than a member of the State Legislature. A vacancy created by the 
suspension of a member of the State Legislature shall be filled as provided in 
Section 20 of Article V of the Oklahoma Constitution. A vacancy created by the 
suspension of a county officer other than a county commissioner shall be filled 
as provided by Section 10 of this title. In the event any elected or appointed 
state or county officer or employee who, during the term for which he or she was 
elected or appointed, pleads guilty or nolo contendere to a felony or any 
offense involving a violation of his or her official oath in a state or federal 
court of competent jurisdiction, he or she shall, immediately upon the entry of 
said plea, forfeit said office or employment. Any such officer or employee upon 
final conviction of, or pleading guilty or nolo contendere to, a felony in a 
state or federal court of competent jurisdiction shall vacate such office or 
employment and if such felony or other offense violates his oath of office shall 
forfeit all benefits of said office or employment, including, but not limited 
to, retirement benefits provided by law, however, the forfeiture of retirement 
benefits shall not occur if any such officer or employee received a deferred 
sentence, but retirement benefits shall not commence prior to completion of the 
deferred sentence; provided however, that such forfeiture of retirement benefits 
shall not include such officer's or employee's contributions to the retirement 
system or retirement benefits that are vested on the effective date of this act. 
Any claims for payment of salary or wages, or any claims for payment of any 
other benefits, to any such officer or employee suspended from or forfeiting his 
or her office or employment shall be rejected by the proper authority. Such 
suspension or forfeiture shall continue until such time as said conviction or 
guilty plea is reversed by the highest appellate court to which said officer or 
employee may appeal. The attorney responsible for prosecuting such elected or 
appointed state or county officers or employees shall notify the retirement 
system in which such officer or employee is enrolled of the forfeiture of such 
officer's or employee's retirement benefits. 
10 See Stipe v. State ex rel. Bd. Of Trustees of 
OPERS, 2008 OK 
52, ¶ 8, 188 P.3d 120, 122-123; and Nida v. OPERS Bd. Of Trustees, 2004 OK CIV APP 85, ¶ 17, 99 P.3d 1224, 1228.