Title: Lakyra Elliott v. Navistar, Inc., and IC Bus, LLC

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 12/03/2010
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
____________________
1090152
____________________
Lakyra Elliott
v.
Navistar, Inc., and IC Bus, LLC
____________________
1090153
____________________
Nequaisha Bland
v.
Navistar, Inc., and IC Bus, LLC
_________________
1090154
____________________
Seville Briggs
v.
Navistar, Inc., and IC Bus, LLC
____________________
1090155
____________________
Ishakey Bennett
v.
Navistar, Inc., and IC Bus, LLC
____________________
1090156
____________________
Freddie Washington
v.
Navistar, Inc., and IC Bus, LLC
____________________
1090159
____________________
Phillip Hinton
v.
Navistar, Inc., and IC Bus, LLC
____________________
1090160
____________________
Yolanda Moore
v.
Navistar, Inc., and IC Bus, LLC
____________________
1090161
____________________
Kyle Rose
v.
Navistar, Inc., and IC Bus, LLC
____________________
1090162
____________________
Anthoni T. Moore
v.
Navistar, Inc., and IC Bus, LLC
____________________
1090163
____________________
Lawanda Jefferson
v.
Navistar, Inc., and IC Bus, LLC
____________________
1090164
____________________
Tassarian Fletcher
v.
Navistar, Inc., and IC Bus, LLC
____________________
1090165
____________________
Charles Ford
v.
Navistar, Inc., and IC Bus, LLC
____________________
1090166
____________________
Shirley Ann Davidson, as mother and next friend of 
Joe Davidson, a minor
v.
Navistar, Inc., and IC Bus, LLC
____________________
1090167
____________________
James O. Garth
v.
Navistar, Inc., and IC Bus, LLC
5
____________________
1090168
____________________
Dawon Massey
v.
Navistar, Inc., and IC Bus, LLC
Appeals from Madison Circuit Court
(CV-07-265; CV-07-268; CV-07-269; CV-07-270;
CV-07-321; CV-07-322; CV-07-323; CV-07-324;
CV-07-326; CV-07-327; CV-07-329; CV-07-330;
CV-07-900263; CV-08-900126; and CV-08-1526)
STUART, Justice.
Lakyra Elliott, Nequaisha Bland, Seville Briggs, Ishakey
Bennett, Freddie Washington, Phillip Hinton, Yolanda Moore,
Kyle Rose, Anthoni T. Moore, Lawanda Jefferson, Tassarian
Fletcher, Charles Ford, James O. Garth, Dawon Massey, and
Shirley Ann Davidson, as mother and next friend of Joe
Davidson, a minor ("the plaintiffs"), asserted products-
liability, 
breach-of-warranty, 
and 
negligence 
and/or
wantonness claims against Navistar, Inc., formerly known as
International Truck & Engine Corporation, Inc., and its wholly
owned subsidiary IC Bus, LLC, formerly known as IC Corporation
1090152, 1090153, 1090154, 1090155, 1090156, 1090159,
1090160, 1090161, 1090162, 1090163, 1090164, 1090165,
1090166, 1090167, and 1090168
6
(collectively referred to as "the bus companies"), in the
Madison Circuit Court, seeking damages for injuries sustained
in an accident involving a school bus designed, manufactured,
and sold by the bus companies.  The trial court entered a
summary judgment in favor of the bus companies, and the
plaintiffs appeal.  We reverse and remand.
I.
On 
November 
20, 
2006, 
a 
school 
bus 
transporting
approximately 40 students from Lee High School in Huntsville
to the Huntsville Center for Technology was struck by another
vehicle while traveling on an elevated portion of U.S.
Interstate 565 in Huntsville.  As a result of the collision,
the bus ran over a 32-inch high concrete barrier on the left
side of the roadway and fell approximately 30 feet to the
ground below, killing four students and injuring the other
students to varying degrees.
On February 9, 2007, 14 of the plaintiffs filed separate
complaints in the Madison Circuit Court asserting claims
against Laidlaw Transit, Inc., which owned and operated the
bus involved in the accident; Anthony Scott, an employee of
1090152, 1090153, 1090154, 1090155, 1090156, 1090159,
1090160, 1090161, 1090162, 1090163, 1090164, 1090165,
1090166, 1090167, and 1090168
The 15th plaintiff, Garth, filed a similar complaint on
1
February 7, 2008.
7
Laidlaw Transit who was driving the bus at the time of the
accident; and Tony Williams, the driver of the other car
involved in the accident.  Those plaintiffs also identified as
fictitiously named defendants "those persons, corporations,
associations, firms, or other entities, who or which designed,
manufactured, marketed, advertised, sold, or otherwise placed
into the stream of commerce, the school bus, or any component
thereof"; however, they did not assert any claims against
those fictitiously named defendants at that time.   
1
Multiple other complaints were filed around this same
time by other students who were injured in the bus accident,
and, on October 29, 2007, the 26 cases stemming from the bus
accident that were then pending in the Madison Circuit Court
were assigned to the same judge.  Some of those cases named
the bus companies as defendants and included claims asserted
against them; however, at that time the plaintiffs' cases did
not.  
The trial court thereafter officially consolidated the
cases for pretrial purposes, and the parties engaged in
1090152, 1090153, 1090154, 1090155, 1090156, 1090159,
1090160, 1090161, 1090162, 1090163, 1090164, 1090165,
1090166, 1090167, and 1090168
The new attorney retained by the plaintiffs was already
2
involved in this litigation representing other students who
had been injured in the bus accident and who had previously
asserted claims against the bus companies.
8
discovery.  Eventually, the plaintiffs entered into settlement
agreements 
with 
Laidlaw Transit, Scott, and Williams.
However, after settling their claims against those defendants,
the plaintiffs retained a new attorney, and, in April, May,
and June 2009, they filed amended complaints asserting
products-liability, breach-of-warranty, and negligence and/or
wantonness 
claims 
against 
the 
bus 
companies.  
 
On
2
approximately June 29, 2009, the bus companies moved for a
summary judgment on all the claims asserted against them,
arguing that the claims were barred by the applicable statute
of limitations because they were not asserted until, at the
earliest, April 2009 –– more than two years after the November
20, 2006, bus accident.  The bus companies also argued that
the claims were barred by the doctrine of waiver and the
doctrine of laches.  
The plaintiffs opposed the bus companies' summary-
judgment motion, arguing that the injured parties were all
minors at the time of the accident and that, under Alabama
1090152, 1090153, 1090154, 1090155, 1090156, 1090159,
1090160, 1090161, 1090162, 1090163, 1090164, 1090165,
1090166, 1090167, and 1090168
Apparently, although the plaintiffs' claims against
3
Williams, Scott, and Laidlaw Transit had been settled, the
trial court had not yet dismissed the claims against those
defendants.
9
law, the statute of limitations for their claims was therefore
tolled until their 19th birthdays and that the doctrines of
waiver and laches did not apply.  On September 16, 2009, the
trial court granted the bus companies' motion for a summary
judgment, noting that "[t]he Plaintiffs' claims against [the
bus companies] are barred by the doctrine of laches, the
doctrine of waiver and ... the applicable statute of
limitations."  On October 26, 2009, the plaintiffs filed
timely notices of appeal to this Court.  On August 4, 2010,
the clerk of this Court entered an identical order in each of
these 15 appeals remanding this case to the trial court.  That
order stated:
"It appearing to the Court that claims stated
against Tony Lamar Williams, Anthony Tyrone Scott,
and 
Laidlaw 
Transit, 
Inc., 
have 
not 
been
adjudicated,
 these causes are remanded to you for
[3]
a determination as to whether to (1) make the
interlocutory order of September 16, 2009, in favor
of [the bus companies] and against the plaintiffs,
a final judgment, pursuant to the provisions of Rule
54(b), Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure; or (2)
adjudicate the remaining claims, thus making the
interlocutory orders of September 16, 2009, final
1090152, 1090153, 1090154, 1090155, 1090156, 1090159,
1090160, 1090161, 1090162, 1090163, 1090164, 1090165,
1090166, 1090167, and 1090168
These cases were assigned to Justice Stuart on September
4
27, 2010.
10
and appealable; or (3) do nothing, in which event
the appeals will be dismissed as from a non-final
order."
Following an extension of time for responding to the remand
order, the trial court filed a supplemental record on appeal
on September 24, 2010, certifying the interlocutory order of
September 16, 2009, in favor of the bus companies as final
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.4
II.
The plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by
entering a summary judgment in favor of the bus companies
because none of the grounds cited by the trial court ––
statute of limitations, waiver, and/or laches –– apply to the
claims they have asserted against the bus companies.  We
consider each of those grounds in turn.
The plaintiffs first argue that the trial court erred in
holding that their claims against the bus companies were
barred by the statute of limitations because, they argue, the
trial court failed to give effect to § 6-2-8(a), Ala. Code
1975.  The bus companies, however, argue that the summary
1090152, 1090153, 1090154, 1090155, 1090156, 1090159,
1090160, 1090161, 1090162, 1090163, 1090164, 1090165,
1090166, 1090167, and 1090168
11
judgment was correctly entered because, they argue, § 6-2-8(a)
does not apply.  "Because the resolution of this issue is a
matter of mere statutory construction, the standard of review
is de novo."  Arthur v. Bolen, 41 So. 3d 745, 748 (Ala. 2010)
(citing Ex parte Birmingham Bd. of Educ., [Ms. 1071539,
November 6, 2009] __ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2009)).  Our
inquiry is governed by the following well settled principles
of statutory construction:
"'The fundamental rule of statutory
construction is that this Court is to
ascertain and effectuate the legislative
intent as expressed in the statute.  League
of Women Voters v. Renfro, 292 Ala. 128,
290 
So. 
2d 
167 
(1974). 
 
In 
this
ascertainment, we must look to the entire
Act instead of isolated phrases or clauses;
Opinion of the Justices, 264 Ala. 176, 85
So. 2d 391 (1956).'
"Darks Dairy, Inc. v. Alabama Dairy Comm'n, 367 So.
2d 1378, 1380 (Ala. 1979) (emphasis added).  To
discern the legislative intent, the Court must first
look to the language of the statute.  If, giving the
statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning,
we conclude that the language is unambiguous, there
is no room for judicial construction.  Ex parte
Waddail, 827 So. 2d 789, 794 (Ala. 2001).  If a
literal construction would produce an absurd and
unjust result that is clearly inconsistent with the
purpose 
and 
policy 
of 
the 
statute, 
such 
a
construction is to be avoided.  Ex parte Meeks, 682
So. 2d 423 (Ala. 1996)."
1090152, 1090153, 1090154, 1090155, 1090156, 1090159,
1090160, 1090161, 1090162, 1090163, 1090164, 1090165,
1090166, 1090167, and 1090168
12
City of Bessemer v. McClain, 957 So. 2d 1061, 1074-75 (Ala.
2006).  
Section 6-2-8(a) provides:
"If anyone entitled to commence any of the actions
enumerated in this chapter, to make an entry on land
or enter a defense founded on the title to real
property is, at the time the right accrues, below
the age of 19 years, or insane, he or she shall have
three years, or the period allowed by law for the
commencement of an action if it be less than three
years, after the termination of the disability to
commence an action, make entry, or defend.  No
disability shall extend the period of limitations so
as to allow an action to be commenced, entry made,
or defense made after the lapse of 20 years from the
time the claim or right accrued.  Nothing in this
section 
shall 
be 
interpreted 
as 
denying 
any
imprisoned person the right to commence an action
enumerated in this chapter and to make any proper
appearances on his or her behalf in such actions."
The plaintiffs have submitted evidence establishing that the
injured students were all under the age of 19 at the time of
the bus accident and that the plaintiffs amended their
individual complaints to assert claims against the bus
companies within the two-year period after the injured
students turned 19; accordingly, they argue, their claims are
timely because the plain language of § 6-2-8 indicates that
1090152, 1090153, 1090154, 1090155, 1090156, 1090159,
1090160, 1090161, 1090162, 1090163, 1090164, 1090165,
1090166, 1090167, and 1090168
The plaintiffs further note that their wantonness claims
5
are actually subject to a six-year statute of limitations and
that the trial court erred by failing to recognize that fact;
however, the bus companies argue that the plaintiffs failed to
raise this issue in the trial court and argue that the
plaintiffs cannot now raise it.  Our resolution of this appeal
ultimately makes it unnecessary to consider these issues.   
The original complaints in the underlying cases were
6
styled to reflect that the injured minors were suing by and
through a parent.  The notices of appeal in 14 of the appeals
name only the injured parties.
13
the two-year statute of limitations applicable to their claims
was tolled during the pendency of their minority.5
The bus companies, however, argue that § 6-2-8 does not
apply in cases, such as these, where injured minors are
represented by guardians or next friends who, in fact,
initiated actions on their behalf while the injured parties
were still minors.   In support of that argument, the bus
6
companies cite Lee v. Wood, 85 Ala. 169, 170, 4 So. 693, 693
(1888), in which this Court held that the general rule that
"statutes of limitation do not run against those laboring
under a personal disability, such as infancy ... does not
apply to infants, or other persons disabled, who have a
trustee capable of suing"; and Spann v. First National Bank of
1090152, 1090153, 1090154, 1090155, 1090156, 1090159,
1090160, 1090161, 1090162, 1090163, 1090164, 1090165,
1090166, 1090167, and 1090168
14
Montgomery, 240 Ala. 539, 545, 200 So. 554, 559 (1941), in
which this Court stated:
"It is clear enough there is here shown no such
exception.  The guardian all along not only had the
power but was also under the duty to rescind the
transactions and bring the suit.  Not having done
so, the bar of the statute of limitation of six
years presents a bar to the suit by the guardian and
likewise is applicable to the ward."
The plaintiffs counter by arguing that Lee and Spann are
distinguishable inasmuch as they involved appointed guardians
or trustees who had a duty to bring an action on behalf of the
minor parties they represented –– not next friends who had no
duty to assert claims such as those asserted here –– a
distinction the plaintiffs argue was recognized by this Court
in Emerson v. Southern Ry., 404 So. 2d 576, 579 (Ala. 1981)
("It is clear to us, however, that failure on the part of the
representative to file or pursue this claim within the
limitation period does not bar recovery where § 6-2-8 is
applicable.").  
We agree with the plaintiffs that § 6-2-8 applies to the
claims they asserted against the bus companies and that those
claims accordingly are not barred by the statute of
1090152, 1090153, 1090154, 1090155, 1090156, 1090159,
1090160, 1090161, 1090162, 1090163, 1090164, 1090165,
1090166, 1090167, and 1090168
15
limitations.  Section 6-2-8(a) clearly provides that a minor
entitled to commence "any of the actions enumerated in this
chapter ... shall have three years, or the period allowed by
law for the commencement of an action if it be less than three
years, after the termination of the disability to commence an
action ...."  This language is unambiguous; there is,
accordingly, no room for judicial construction.  Ex parte
Waddail, 827 So. 2d 789, 794 (Ala. 2001).  The claims asserted
by the plaintiffs against the bus companies were subject to a
two-year statute of limitations (see supra note 5), and they
were accordingly entitled to assert those claims at any time
before the injured parties turned 21.  Section 6-2-8 contains
no exception indicating that the statute ceases to have
application merely because a minor's representative pursued
some claims belonging to the minor while failing to bring
other claims, and "courts have no authority to engraft
exceptions, which are not found in the statutes."  Barclay v.
Smith, 66 Ala. 230, 232 (1880).  This Court has also indicated
on previous occasions that the statute of limitations does not
run on a minor's claims regardless of whether the minor's
1090152, 1090153, 1090154, 1090155, 1090156, 1090159,
1090160, 1090161, 1090162, 1090163, 1090164, 1090165,
1090166, 1090167, and 1090168
16
representative failed to or elected not to pursue claims on
the minor's behalf, negligently pursued claims on the minor's
behalf, or even if the minor's representative pursued some
claims while failing to pursue others.  See Emerson, 404 So.
2d at 579 (stating that, although a representative may file a
claim on behalf of an injured minor, the failure to do so does
not bar the minor from later doing so if § 6-2-8 is
applicable); Spurling v. Fillingim, 244 Ala. 172, 176, 12 So.
2d 740, 743 (1943) (holding that a minor, who initiated an
action through her next friend within the applicable one-year
limitations period, seeking damages for injuries sustained in
an automobile accident was permitted to amend her action to
add another defendant even after that one-year period expired
because her right to maintain an action would continue for one
year after she reached the age of majority);  Hood v.
Johnston, 210 Ala. 617, 619, 99 So. 75, 77 (1924) (stating
that plaintiff was entitled to sue in his own name upon
reaching the age of majority regardless of "whatever may or
may not have been done by his guardian"); and McLaughlin v.
Beyer, 181 Ala. 427, 437, 61 So. 62, 65 (1913) ("The neglect
1090152, 1090153, 1090154, 1090155, 1090156, 1090159,
1090160, 1090161, 1090162, 1090163, 1090164, 1090165,
1090166, 1090167, and 1090168
17
or dereliction of a next friend, in the prosecution of a suit
or in allowing a dismissal thereof, ought not to be allowed to
prejudice the rights or remedies of the infant, and such seems
to be the weight of the authority on the subject.").  To the
extent Lee and Spann are in conflict with these cases and with
the plain language of § 6-2-8, we hereby overrule them.
It is undisputed that the plaintiffs asserted their
claims against the bus companies before the injured parties
reached the age of 21.  The trial court therefore erred by
relying on the statute of limitations as a basis for entering
a summary judgment in favor of the bus companies.
III.
The plaintiffs next argue that the trial court erred by
holding that they had waived their rights to assert claims
against the bus companies.  Before the trial court, the bus
companies argued that the plaintiffs had waived their rights
to pursue claims against them because, the bus companies
argued, the bus companies' role in designing and manufacturing
the bus was always known –– as evidenced by the fact that
other students injured in the bus accident had named the bus
1090152, 1090153, 1090154, 1090155, 1090156, 1090159,
1090160, 1090161, 1090162, 1090163, 1090164, 1090165,
1090166, 1090167, and 1090168
18
companies as defendants in actions filed the same month as the
plaintiffs' actions –- yet the plaintiffs nevertheless took no
action to name the bus companies as defendants for over two
years while they actively pursued claims against Laidlaw
Transit, Scott, and Williams.  The plaintiffs deny that their
conduct in this litigation demonstrated an intent to waive
their rights to pursue claims against the bus companies, and
they argue that, if they had intended to waive such claims
they would not have identified as fictitiously named
defendants in their complaints "those persons, corporations,
associations, firms, or other entities, who or which designed,
manufactured, marketed, advertised, sold, or otherwise placed
into the stream of commerce, the school bus, or any component
thereof."
This Court has stated that
"'[a] 
waiver 
consists 
of 
a 
"voluntary 
and
intentional surrender or relinquishment of a known
right," Dominex, Inc. v. Key, 456 So. 2d 1047, 1058
(Ala. 1984), and the burden of proof in establishing
a waiver rests upon the party asserting the claim.'
Bentley Sys., Inc. v. Intergraph Corp., 922 So. 2d
61, 93 (Ala. 2005).  Moreover, whether a party has
voluntarily or intentionally waived a known right is
normally a jury question.  See Edwards v. Allied
1090152, 1090153, 1090154, 1090155, 1090156, 1090159,
1090160, 1090161, 1090162, 1090163, 1090164, 1090165,
1090166, 1090167, and 1090168
The plaintiffs have responded to the argument that they
7
waived their claims against the bus companies only by arguing
that there is insufficient evidence indicating such a waiver;
they have not addressed the issue whether a party can waive a
claim by a delay in its assertion that does not extend beyond
the applicable limitations period.
19
Home Mortgage Capital Corp., 962 So. 2d 194, 209
(Ala. 2007)."
Horne v. TGM Assocs., L.P., [Ms. 1070766, August 20, 2010] ___
So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2010).  A summary judgment should be
entered only if there is no genuine issue of material fact
when the record is viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant.  Payton v. Monsanto Co., 801 So. 2d 829, 832-33
(Ala. 2001).  Assuming, without deciding, that a delay in
asserting a claim not subject to a statute-of-limitations
defense can work a waiver of that claim, we first note that
"[w]hether there has been a waiver is a question of fact,"
Bentley Sys., Inc. v. Intergraph Corp., 922 So. 2d 61, 93
(Ala. 2005), and, in light of the record in this case, we
cannot agree with the trial court that there is no question
that the plaintiffs intended to voluntarily relinquish their
right to assert their claims against the bus companies.   The
7
1090152, 1090153, 1090154, 1090155, 1090156, 1090159,
1090160, 1090161, 1090162, 1090163, 1090164, 1090165,
1090166, 1090167, and 1090168
20
summary judgment entered by the trial court cannot stand on
the basis of the doctrine of waiver.
IV.
The plaintiffs' final argument is that the trial court
erred in concluding that their claims against the bus
companies should be barred by the doctrine of laches.
"'Laches' is defined as neglect to assert a right or a claim
that, taken together with a lapse of time and other
circumstances causing disadvantage or prejudice to the adverse
party, operates as a bar."  Ex parte Grubbs, 542 So. 2d 927,
928 (Ala. 1989) (citing Black's Law Dictionary 787 (5th ed.
1979)).  It is an equitable doctrine applied by the courts to
prevent a party that has delayed asserting a claim to assert
that claim after some change in conditions has occurred that
would make belated enforcement of the claim unjust.  Ex parte
Grubbs, 542 So. 2d at 929.  A party asserting laches as a
defense is generally required to show that the plaintiff has
delayed in asserting a claim, that that delay is inexcusable,
and that the delay has caused the party asserting the defense
undue prejudice.  Id.  The plaintiffs argue that laches cannot
1090152, 1090153, 1090154, 1090155, 1090156, 1090159,
1090160, 1090161, 1090162, 1090163, 1090164, 1090165,
1090166, 1090167, and 1090168
21
bar a claim if the statute of limitations has not yet run on
that claim; they also argue that, regardless, they did not
delay in asserting their claims against the bus companies and
that, even if this Court were to find that they had delayed,
there is no evidence indicating that the bus companies were
unduly prejudiced by any such delay.  The bus companies argue
that the doctrine of laches may bar a claim even if the
statute of limitations has not expired and that the plaintiffs
did in fact delay in asserting their claims and that that
delay has caused the bus companies undue prejudice.
The bus companies have cited numerous cases in support of
their argument that the doctrine of laches should be applied
in this case, regardless of whether the statute of limitations
has run, see Multer v. Multer, 280 Ala. 458, 463, 195 So. 2d
105, 109 (1966), Alabama Cablevision Co. v. League, 416 So. 2d
433, 435 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992), and United States of America
v. Olin Corp., 606 F.Supp. 1301, 1309 (N.D. Ala. 1995);
however, none of those cases involved a claim for money
damages subject to a statute of limitations.  In Ballenger v.
Liberty National Life Insurance Co., 266 Ala. 407, 410, 96 So.
1090152, 1090153, 1090154, 1090155, 1090156, 1090159,
1090160, 1090161, 1090162, 1090163, 1090164, 1090165,
1090166, 1090167, and 1090168
22
2d 728, 731 (1957), this Court addressed this specific issue
and stated:
"There is competent 
authority 
elsewhere 
based 
on
unassailable rationale holding that where the issue
involved is a legal one and does not lie within the
breast or conscience of the chancellor the statute
of limitation is the applicable rule and the defense
of laches may not properly be interposed."
After reviewing the caselaw from Kentucky to which it
referred, see Gover's Administrator v. Dunagan, 299 Ky. 38,
184 S.W.2d 225 (1944), and Crawford's Administrator v. Ross,
299 Ky. 664, 186 S.W.2d 797 (1945), the Ballenger Court
concluded:
"The principle enunciated by the Kentucky Court
impresses us as being thoroughly sound. Therefore,
the issue now under consideration is, we think,
ruled by the stated principle.  A claim for
conversion is a legal one cognizable at law, with
the result that the defense of laches may not be
applied, even though the claim 'got into equity'
under the removal statute.  If the contrary view
should be upheld, untoward illogical consequences
would obtain.  It would be purposeless to multiply
the many ridiculous illustrations, but it is
conceivable that under such a view most all actions
at law could be moved into equity so the defendant
could plead laches and thereby subvert the right of
trial by jury and operation of the applicable
statute of limitation."
1090152, 1090153, 1090154, 1090155, 1090156, 1090159,
1090160, 1090161, 1090162, 1090163, 1090164, 1090165,
1090166, 1090167, and 1090168
23
266 Ala. at 411, 96 So. 2d at 733.  Applying the holding of
Ballenger to the present case –– which involves a claim for
money damages –– we agree with the plaintiffs that the
doctrine of laches should not be applied to bar their claims
because, as discussed supra, the statute of limitations has
not yet run on their claims.  Accordingly, the trial court
erred to the extent the summary judgment in favor of the bus
companies was based on the doctrine of laches.
V.
The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of
the bus companies, stating in its order that "[t]he
[p]laintiffs' claims against [the bus companies] are barred by
the doctrine of laches, the doctrine of waiver and ... by the
applicable statute of limitations."  However, the plaintiffs
have established that none of those grounds, in fact, apply to
their claims against the bus companies.  The judgment entered
in favor of the bus companies is accordingly reversed, and the
cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
1090152--REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1090153--REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1090152, 1090153, 1090154, 1090155, 1090156, 1090159,
1090160, 1090161, 1090162, 1090163, 1090164, 1090165,
1090166, 1090167, and 1090168
24
1090154--REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1090155--REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1090156--REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1090159--REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1090160--REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1090161--REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1090162--REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1090163--REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1090164--REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1090165--REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1090166--REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1090167--REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1090168--REVERSED AND REMANDED.
 
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Smith, Bolin, Parker, and Murdock,
JJ., concur.
Woodall, J., concurs in the result.