Title: Reynolds v. Goll

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

Reynolds et al., Appellees, v. Goll, Appellant. 
[Cite as Reynolds v. Goll (1996), ____ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Juvenile court -- Custody proceeding under R.C. 2151.23 -- Custody 
awarded to nonparent -- Court’s finding of abandonment and 
unsuitability supported by competent evident -- Best interests of 
child -- R.C. 3109.04. 
 
(No. 94-1464 -- Submitted December 5, 1995 -- Decided March 4, 
1996.) 
 
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Lorain County, No. 91CA005140. 
 
This case involves the custody dispute of Diana Katherine Goll, now age 
eleven, between her biological father, Robert Goll, defendant-appellant, and 
plaintiffs-appellees, Paul A. and Virginia L. Reynolds, who have cared for 
Diana almost since her birth.  The circumstances leading to this dispute are as 
follows.  Shortly after Diana was born, on September 5, 1984, her mother 
became ill and was diagnosed with cancer.  Her father had difficulty coping 
with his wife’s illness as well as caring for Diana and her three siblings, then 
ages fourteen, twelve and seven.  At the time, Mr. Goll worked at St. Joseph’s 
Hospital as a security officer and as a part-time police officer for the Vermilion 
Police Department. Virginia Reynolds, an RN who worked with Goll at the 
hospital, offered to help care for Diana.  Mr. Goll accepted this offer and Diana 
 
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was placed with Mr. and Mrs. Reynolds when she was just one week old.  
Diana was initially cared for by the Reynoldses on weekends and by another 
couple during the week.  However, due to the other couple’s marital problems, 
the Reynoldses took full-time responsibility of Diana in December 1984. 
 
Diana’s mother died on March 17, 1986.  Prior to her mother’s death, 
Diana visited her biological family just three times:  during the Christmas 
holidays in 1984, in February 1985, and in March 1985.  Just prior to her death, 
on February 1, 1986, Diana’s mother asked Mrs. Reynolds whether she and her 
husband would raise Diana.  Mrs. Reynolds told Mr. Goll she was willing to do 
this.  Mr. Goll agreed to have the Reynolds care for Diana.  However, 
according to Mr. Goll, he viewed this as a temporary arrangement. 
 
Nevertheless, from the time of Diana’s mother’s death in March 1986 
until at least the commencement of this custody proceeding in July 1989,  Mr. 
Goll visited with Diana only five times.  For the first eight months following 
the death of his wife, Mr. Goll had virtually no contact with Diana.  The first 
contact he had with Diana was in November 1986, when he remarried and 
requested that Diana attend the wedding.  Mr. Goll, who states that he 
 
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attempted to visit Diana more often but was told by the Reynoldses that Diana 
was unavailable, concedes that he only tried to visit her three additional times 
but was turned down.  He also concedes that he never phoned Diana.  Although 
Mr. Goll provided medical insurance for Diana, he never offered the 
Reynoldses any other financial support for Diana.  He also allowed the 
Reynoldses to claim Diana as an exemption for income-tax purposes. 
 
At one point, Mrs. Reynolds told Mr. Goll that she and her husband 
wanted to adopt Diana.  However, she did not further pursue it because Mr. 
Goll indicated that he might want Diana back and she feared losing Diana.  
Instead, the Reynoldses brought this custody action, pursuant to R.C. 2151.23, 
in July 1989.  The trial court set up a temporary visitation schedule, which it 
appears Mr. Goll adhered to.  The court also appointed a guardian ad litem who 
issued a report indicating that Mr. Goll had forfeited his rights to Diana 
through abandonment.  The guardian ad litem concluded that it is in the best 
interests of the child that she remain with the Reynoldses subject to liberal 
visitation by Mr. Goll. 
 
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Following a two-day trial, the court issued findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and awarded custody of Diana to the Reynoldses.  The court 
of appeals reversed and remanded on the ground that the trial court incorrectly 
applied the “best interest” test without also considering the suitability of the 
natural parent.  On remand, the court, by agreement of the parties, reconsidered 
the evidence already presented and issued new findings of fact and conclusions 
of law.  The court found that Mr. Goll is unsuitable on the ground that he 
abandoned his child by his lack of interest in her.  Furthermore, the court found 
that based upon the testimony of the psychologist, an award of Diana’s custody 
to the natural father would be detrimental to her best interests.  The court of 
appeals affirmed. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon allowance of a discretionary 
appeal. 
__________ 
 
Thomas H. Sanborn, for appellant. 
 
Douglas M. Brill, for appellees. 
__________ 
 
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Francis E. Sweeney, Sr., J.   Appellant, the biological father of Diana 
Goll, challenges the trial court’s award of custody of his daughter to Paul and 
Virginia Reynolds.  For the reasons that follow, we find that the trial court was 
warranted in its grant of custody of the minor to the Reynoldses.  
Consequently, we affirm the court of appeals. 
 
At the outset, we note that this case is limited to a child custody dispute 
initiated in juvenile court pursuant to R.C. 2151.23 between biological parents 
and non-biological “parents.”  In such a proceeding, we have long recognized 
that “the welfare of the minor is first to be considered.”  Clark v. Bayer (1877), 
32 Ohio St. 299, 310.  We have further stated that  parents who are deemed 
suitable are considered to have the “paramount” right to custody of their minor 
children.  In re Perales (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 89, 97, 6 O.O.3d 293, 297, 369 
N.E.2d 1047, 1051-1052.  However, in balancing the interests of both the 
parent and child, the right of custody by the biological parents is not absolute 
and can be forfeited.  Thus, “parents may be denied custody only if the 
preponderance 
of 
the 
evidence 
indicates 
abandonment, 
contractual 
relinquishment of custody, total inability to provide care or support, or that the 
 
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parent is otherwise unsuitable--that is, an award of custody would be 
detrimental to the child.”  Id. at 98, 6 O.O.3d at 297, 369 N.E.2d at 1052.  The 
trial court here determined that appellant, through lack of interest, abandoned 
his daughter and was unsuitable.  It then held that it is in the minor’s best 
interests that she remain with appellees rather than be turned over to her father.  
The court of appeals upheld the trial court’s decision. 
 
Appellant argues that the placement of his daughter with appellees 
during a time of need does not constitute abandonment and should not render 
him an unsuitable parent.  Whether a parent relinquishes rights to custody is a 
factual determination to be made by the trier of fact and should not be disturbed 
if supported by some reliable, credible evidence.  Masitto v. Masitto (1986), 22 
Ohio St.3d 63, 66, 22 OBR 81, 83, 488 N.E.2d 857, 860. 
 
 In this case, the trial court’s finding of abandonment and unsuitability 
was supported by competent evidence.  The trial court heard extensive 
testimony over the course of a two-day trial.  Both sides presented several 
witnesses on their behalf.  While we recognize that appellant was initially 
placed in a very difficult position of trying to cope with the illness and ultimate 
 
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death of his wife, we nonetheless believe that there was evidence to support the 
trial court’s determination that appellant, through his course of conduct, 
abandoned his daughter.  In reaching this decision, we are mindful of the fact 
that the trial court, after carefully listening to the testimony of the parties and 
witnesses, is in the best position to judge their credibility and to determine 
whether a parent has abandoned his or her child.  Thus, we adhere to the 
established rule that “[i]n proceedings involving the custody and welfare of 
children the power of the trial court to exercise discretion is peculiarly 
important.”  Trickey v. Trickey (1952), 158 Ohio St. 9, 13, 47 O.O. 481, 483, 
106 N.E.2d 772, 774.  As we stated in Miller v. Miller (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 
71, 74, 523 N.E.2d 846, 849: 
 
“The discretion which a trial court enjoys in custody matters should be 
accorded the utmost respect, given the nature of the proceeding and the impact 
the court’s determination will have on the lives of the parties concerned.  The 
knowledge a trial court gains through observing the witnesses and the parties in 
a custody proceeding cannot be conveyed to a reviewing court by a printed 
record.  Trickey v. Trickey (1952), 158 Ohio St. 9, 13, 47 O.O. 481, 483, 106 
 
8 
N.E.2d 772, 774.  In this regard, the reviewing court in such proceedings 
should be guided by the presumption that the trial court’s findings were indeed 
correct.  See Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 10 
OBR 408, 410, 461 N.E.2d 1273, 1276.” 
 
Not only was there evidence to support the finding of abandonment and 
unsuitability of appellant, but there was also evidence to support the trial 
court’s decision that it is in the best interests of Diana, age eleven, to remain 
with appellees.  The guardian ad litem, court investigator and the psychologist, 
all of whom testified in this case, agreed that appellees, who have cared for 
Diana since she was one week old, should be granted custody.  They also 
acknowledged that appellant should be granted liberal visitation.  In 
determining the best interests of the minor, under R.C. 3109.04(C) as it was in 
effect at the time, the trial court acted within its discretion by awarding custody 
to appellees. 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed and the 
cause remanded to the trial court for further proceedings to determine a 
visitation schedule. 
 
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                                                                                                 Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., WRIGHT, RESNICK, PFEIFER and CHRISTLEY, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., not participating. 
 
JUDITH A. CHRISTLEY, J., of the Eleventh Appellate District, sitting for 
COOK, J.