Title: Eden Retirement Center, Inc. v. Department of Revenue

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 97703-Agenda 31-September 2004.
EDEN RETIREMENT CENTER, INC., Appellee, v. THEDEPARTMENT OF REVENUE et al., Appellants.
Opinion filed December 2, 2004. 
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Plaintiff, Eden Retirement Center, Inc., filed a complaint in the
circuit court of Madison County seeking administrative review of a
decision by the Illinois Department of Revenue (Department). The
Department denied plaintiff's application for a charitable-use property
tax exemption for the 1996 tax year. The circuit court set aside the
Department's decision and granted the exemption, based solely on the
court's interpretation of section 15-65 of the Property Tax Code (35
ILCS 200/15-65 (West 2000)). The appellate court affirmed. 346 Ill.
App. 3d 252.
	Defendants, the Department, Edwardsville Community Unit
School District No. 7, and the Village of Glen Carbon filed a joint
petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), which we allowed.
We now reverse the judgments of the appellate and circuit courts, and
confirm the decision of the Department.

BACKGROUND
	The facts, as found by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), are
not in dispute.

Plaintiff's Business
	In 1976, plaintiff was organized as a not-for-profit corporation.
Plaintiff's articles of incorporation included the following corporate
purpose: "This corporation shall be organized and operated
exclusively for charitable purposes in providing housing, nursing and
other related care for the aged, and in connection therewith, to buy,
sell, lease, mortgage and in all manner deal with real or personal
property." Section 6 of plaintiff's bylaws provides:
			"It is the express purpose of this corporation to be
organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes in
providing housing, nursing care, financial security and other
related care for the elderly. Recognizing that charitable
purpose, it is the intent of the corporation to provide housing,
nursing care and other related care by limiting the charges for
such services. To that extent, charges shall be set at an
amount sufficient to amortize indebtedness, maintain reserves
adequate to provide life care for the residents, and to set
aside amounts sufficient for expansion to meet the
community's need. All reserves provided for herein shall be
reasonable. It is expressly provided that it is the intention of
the corporation to continue to provide for the maintenance of
those residents who are financially unable to continue making
payments due the corporation for care. In order to continue
to provide such services to residents, the corporation shall be
authorized, in maintaining reserves for the care of the
residents, to provide a reserve especially for the care of those
who may be unable to further care for themselves and to
make the payments due the corporation. It is the established
policy of the corporation to continue to maintain such
persons as residents. To the extent that charges previously
determined exceed amounts determined above, then charges
shall be reduced so as to maintain charges equal to the
aforesaid requirements.
Further, section 7 of the bylaws provides: "All entrance fees, monthly
maintenance charges, routine service charges, nursing care charges,
and non-rated charges may be waived in full, reduced in part, or
liability for payment postponed based upon the individual's inability
to pay and the Association's financial circumstances." Also, plaintiff
is exempt from federal income tax pursuant to section 501(c)(3) of the
United States Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. §501(c)(3) (1994)).
	During 1996, plaintiff owned and operated a 122-bed, skilled-care nursing facility, and an apartment building containing 78
apartments for independent living. Plaintiff also owned 11 single-story, duplex buildings containing 22 independent living units, with
each unit containing one or two bedrooms. For example, building 407
contains units 407A and 407B. Plaintiff sought a charitable-use
property tax exemption for 1996 on a parcel of property with five of
the duplex buildings.
	The residents of the duplexes at issue here lived in their units
since at least 1996. The residents of most of the units signed a
"Resident Agreement" with plaintiff, while the residents of one unit
signed what is alternatively designated a "Rental Agreement" or
"Rental Lease." The resident agreement required up-front entrance
fees ranging from $65,000 to $76,900. The lease required a security
deposit of $5,000. Both the resident agreement and the lease require
the prospective resident to provide plaintiff with a detailed financial
report as part of the resident's application.
	Paragraph 10 of the resident agreement provides as follows. If a
resident fails to make any of the required payments for a period of 90
days, the board of directors may, in its discretion, cancel the
agreement. The paragraph declares the intent of the board of directors
that once a resident has been accepted, the resident may not be
terminated solely for inability to pay. The board of directors may
either allow the delinquent charges to accrue as credits to the
remaining returnable balance of the entrance fee, or even waive the
payments "if such can be done without endangering the sound
financial structure of the organization."
	The lease includes the following provisions. Paragraph Five
provides for a security deposit. Paragraph Three provides that if rent
is not paid within 10 days after the due date, the resident shall pay an
additional 10% of the overdue rent as a late payment penalty. Also,
overdue rent shall accrue interest at the rate of 1½% per month.
Pursuant to paragraph 16, failure to pay rent constitutes a default,
upon which plaintiff's remedies include the right to terminate the
lease, take possession of the unit, and distrain for rent due. Paragraph
25 is a confession of judgment, pursuant to which plaintiff may seek
possession of the unit and a judgment for rent due from the resident
at the resident's expense.
	The ALJ noted from the administrative record an example of a
maintenance fee reduction. During 1996, a husband and wife
occupied, pursuant to a residential agreement, one of plaintiff's duplex
units not at issue in this case. Because of high medical expenses, they
were having trouble paying the monthly maintenance fee. The husband
asked plaintiff to reduce their payment. It was agreed for that year
their maintenance fee would be reduced $80 per month. In 1997, due
to hardship, their maintenance fee was reduced an additional $50 per
month. In 1998, they were able to pay the full monthly maintenance
fee. In 1999, upon their request, they were granted a reduction of $70
per month. Initially, plaintiff reimbursed itself for this maintenance fee
reduction out of the refundable portion of their entrance fee.
Eventually the fund was exhausted and plaintiff carried the cost of the
maintenance fee reduction. This was the only occurrence of a
maintenance fee reduction in the last 15 years among plaintiff's 78
independent living apartments and 22 independent living duplex units.
	While plaintiff has allowed prospective residents to delay
payment of the entrance fee, plaintiff has never waived or reduced the
entrance fee. Also, no resident has ever been evicted from the
apartments or the duplexes because of inability to pay.
	During the 1996 calendar year, plaintiff's nursing facility income
was $3,464,277. Approximately 35% of plaintiff's nursing facility
residents received Illinois public aid. For that year, plaintiff's average
cost of providing care to a nursing facility resident was $82.63 per
day. The public aid reimbursement per recipient was $68.06 per day.
Thus, during 1996, plaintiff was spending an average of $14.57 more
per day on a public aid recipient in its nursing facility than it was
receiving.
	Also during 1996, plaintiff's independent living income was
$989,610. That same year, plaintiff received charitable contributions
of $12,552.

Proceedings

	In December 1996, plaintiff applied to the Madison County board
of review (board) for the property tax exemption. Having been
notified of plaintiff's application, Edwardsville Community School
District No. 7 and the Village of Glen Carbon petitioned to intervene
as taxing districts with tax revenue interests in the subject property. In
March 1997, the board determined that the 1996 tax assessment of the
subject property was $151,460 and recommended to the Department
that the exemption be denied. In February 1999, the Department
initially rejected the board's recommendation and granted the
exemption, except for one building. See generally 35 ILCS 200/16-70
(West 2000).
	In November 2000, upon the request of the school district and
the village, the Department held an administrative hearing on
plaintiff's application for property tax exemption. See generally 35
ILCS 200/8-35 (West 2000). In his recommended findings, the ALJ
took administrative notice that on December 22, 1989, the
Department exempted the skilled-care nursing facility, the independent
living apartments, and a different parcel of property with six duplexes
containing 12 independent living units.
	At the close of the hearing, the ALJ recommended that the
Department deny plaintiff's application. The ALJ found that plaintiff
did not meet the requirements for the exemption as established by
article IX, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const.
1970, art. IX, §6) and section 15-65 of the Property Tax Code (35
ILCS 200/15-65 (West 2000)). The ALJ reasoned: "From the plain
language of the Constitution and [section 15-65] it is clear that to
qualify for a charitable exemption, property must first be actually used
for charitable purposes." The ALJ recognized that in Methodist Old
Peoples Home v. Korzen, 39 Ill. 2d 149, 156-57 (1968), this court
articulated six guidelines for determining whether property is in fact
used for charitable purposes as required by the constitution and the
Code. The ALJ concluded that the subject property "met only one of
the six guidelines set forth in the Methodist Old Peoples Home case.
Consequently these duplex units were not primarily used for charitable
purposes." On March 28, 2001, the Department adopted the ALJ's
recommended findings and conclusions as the final administrative
decision. The Department served a copy of the decision on plaintiff via
United States mail on April 5, 2001.
	Plaintiff timely filed a complaint in the circuit court seeking
administrative review of the Department's denial of plaintiff's
application for property tax exemption. The circuit court set aside the
Department's decision based solely on the court's interpretation of
section 15-65 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/15-65 (West
2000)). According to the circuit court, the current version of section
15-65(c) of the Property Tax Code removes the guidelines articulated
by this court in Methodist Old Peoples Home for determining whether
organizations such as plaintiff qualify for a charitable-use property tax
exemption. The circuit court ruled that plaintiff qualified for the
charitable-use property tax exemption based on: (1) plaintiff's federal
income-tax-exempt status; and (2) plaintiff's bylaw provision allowing
for the reduction or waiver of charges based on residents' inability to
pay "whether or not any such fee reduction or waivers [sic] had
actually been granted." The circuit court denied defendants' motion
for reconsideration.
	The appellate court affirmed. After discussing the statutory
history of section 15-65(c), the court concluded:
		"Accordingly, we believe that the plain language of the
present statute dictates that when a facility fitting within the
parameters of section 15-65(c)-e.g., an old people's
home-meets the requirements that it (1) be an exempt
organization under paragraph (3) of section 501(c) of the
Internal Revenue Code and (2) either have bylaws that
provide for a waiver or reduction, based on an individual's
ability to pay, of entrance fees, assignment of assets, or fee
for services or have been qualified, built, or financed under
section 202 of the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C. §1701
et seq. (1994)), then that facility is entitled to a charitable-use
property tax exemption as a matter of law, without having to
clear the additional nonstatutory hurdles imposed by the
[Methodist Old Peoples Home] decision and intended to
apply only to the pre-1984 version of the Property Tax Code.
Because in the case at bar the plaintiff, an exempt
organization under paragraph (3) of section 501(c) of the
Internal Revenue Code with bylaws providing for a waiver or
reduction, based on an individual's ability to pay, of the
applicable entrance fee, clearly met the statutory
requirements of section 15-65(c) for tax year 1996, the
plaintiff is entitled as a matter of law to the requested
exemption." 346 Ill. App. 3d at 256-57.
We allowed defendants' joint petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d
R. 315(a). We subsequently granted Life Services Network of Illinois
leave to submit an amicus curiae brief in support of plaintiff. See 155
Ill. 2d R. 345. Additional pertinent background will be discussed in
the context of our analysis of the issues.

ANALYSIS
	We note at the outset our standard of review. The Property Tax
Code provides that judicial review of the Department's decisions be
in accordance with the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS
5/3-101 et seq. (West 2000)). 35 ILCS 200/8-40 (West 2000). The
Administrative Review Law provides that judicial review extends to
all questions of law and fact presented by the entire record. The
statute limits judicial review to the administrative record; the court
may not hear new or additional evidence. The statute additionally
mandates that the "findings and conclusions of the administrative
agency on questions of fact shall be held to be prima facie true and
correct." 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2000). Accordingly, an
administrative agency's findings of fact should not be disturbed on
review unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence.
City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 204 (1998); Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional
Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 88 (1992).
	In this case, however, the facts are not in dispute. Thus, the issue
before us is not whether the Department's findings of fact were
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Rather, the Department's
decision as to whether plaintiff's property is exempt from taxation
depends solely on the application of the appropriate legal standard to
the undisputed facts, which is a question of law. See Chicago
Patrolmen's Ass'n v. Department of Revenue, 171 Ill. 2d 263, 271
(1996); City of Chicago v. Illinois Department of Revenue, 147 Ill. 2d 484, 491 (1992) (and cases cited therein); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v.
Department of Revenue, 29 Ill. 2d 564, 565-66 (1963). We review
questions of law de novo. City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d  at 205 (and
cases cited therein).

The Illinois Constitution and the Property Tax Code
	The controlling principles, which flow from article IX of the 1970
Illinois Constitution, are quite established. Had the lower courts
merely recited this fundamental authority, which they did not, the
error in their judgments would have been apparent.
	In Illinois, generally: "Every subject within the scope of civil
government which is not within some constitutional inhibition may be
acted upon by the General Assembly." Locust Grove Cemetery Ass'n
v. Rose, 16 Ill. 2d 132, 138 (1959). The Illinois Constitution does not
grant power to the legislature, but rather restricts the legislature's
power to act. MacMurray College v. Wright, 38 Ill. 2d 272, 276
(1967); Locust Grove, 16 Ill. 2d  at 138. Specifically, the state's
inherent power to tax is vested in the General Assembly. The
legislature's power to tax is plenary; it is restricted only by the federal
and state constitutions. Diana Shoe Stores Co. v. Department of
Revenue, 5 Ill. 2d 112, 114 (1955) (collecting cases). The power to
exempt from taxation is concomitant with the power to tax. The
legislature, having the inherent power to tax, also has the inherent
power to grant exemptions from those taxes. Carmichael v. Southern
Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 509, 81 L. Ed. 1245, 1253, 57 S. Ct. 868, 872 (1937); see E. Arkiss, A Perspective on the Real Estate Tax
Exemption, 54 Chi. B. Rec. 273, 274 (1973). This basic understanding
of Illinois constitutional government shows the crucial role of the
Illinois Constitution in establishing limits on the power of the
legislature in the area of property tax exemption. The lower courts
failed to even mention the pertinent constitutional provision.
	Article IX of the 1970 Illinois Constitution generally subjects all
real property to taxation. Small v. Pangle, 60 Ill. 2d 510, 514 (1975);
North Shore Post No. 21 of the American Legion v. Korzen, 38 Ill. 2d 231, 233 (1967). Thus: " 'It is the well settled rule of law in the State
of Illinois that all property is subject to taxation, unless exempt by
statute, in conformity with the constitutional provisions relating
thereto. Taxation is the rule-tax exemption is the exception.' " City
of Chicago v. Department of Revenue, 147 Ill. 2d 484, 491 (1992),
quoting Rogers Park Post No. 108, American Legion v. Brenza, 8 Ill. 2d 286, 289-90 (1956).
	Section 6 of article IX of the 1970 Illinois Constitution permits
the legislature to exempt certain property from taxation:
			"The General Assembly by law may exempt from taxation
only the property of the State, units of local government and
school districts and property used exclusively for agricultural
and horticultural societies, and for school, religious, cemetery
and charitable purposes. The General Assembly by law may
grant homestead exemptions or rent credits." Ill. Const.
1970, art. IX, §6.
This section is clearly nothing more than a rephrasing of a similar
provision in the 1870 Illinois Constitution. Accordingly, "cases
interpreting the permissive legislative exemptions under the
Constitution of 1870 are equally relevant to the limits of exemption
now constitutionally permitted." Pangle, 60 Ill. 2d  at 514; accord
ILCS Ann., Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, §6, Constitutional Commentary,
at 741 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (observing that the framers of the 1970
Illinois Constitution intended "to maintain existing Constitutional
limitations on the General Assembly's power to grant property tax
exemptions based upon use and ownership of the property").
	Section 6 of article IX divides property that the legislature may
exempt from taxation into two classes: (1) property owned by "the
State, units of local government and school districts" (Ill. Const.
1970, art. IX, §6); and (2) property used exclusively for the purposes
defined in the second clause of the section. City of Chicago, 147 Ill. 2d  at 493, citing People ex rel. Gill v. Trustees of Schools, 364 Ill. 131, 136 (1936). By enumerating the classes of property that the
legislature may exempt from taxation, section 6 of article IX limits the
legislature's authority to exempt; such enumeration excludes all other
subjects of property tax exemption. The legislature cannot add to or
broaden the exemptions that section 6 of article IX specifies. Chicago
Bar Ass'n v. Department of Revenue, 163 Ill. 2d 290, 297 (1994) (and
cases cited therein); Locust Grove, 16 Ill. 2d  at 139. "Equally familiar
is the rule that courts have no power to create exemption from
taxation by judicial construction." Spring Hill Cemetery v. Ryan, 20 Ill. 2d 608, 616 (1960).
	One class of property that the legislature may exempt from
taxation is property used for charitable purposes. Charitable use is a
constitutional requirement. An applicant for a charitable-use property
tax exemption must "comply unequivocally with the constitutional
requirement of exclusive charitable use." Small, 60 Ill. 2d  at 516,
citing People ex rel. Nordlund v. Association of the Winnebago Home
for the Aged, 40 Ill. 2d 91, 100 (1968). In Methodist Old Peoples
Home v. Korzen, 39 Ill. 2d 149 (1968), this court articulated
guidelines or criteria for resolving the constitutional question of
charitable use: (1) the benefits derived are for an indefinite number of
persons for their general welfare or in some way reducing the burdens
on government; (2) the organization has no capital, capital stock, or
shareholders, and does not profit from the enterprise; (3) funds are
derived mainly from private and public charity, and the funds are held
in trust for the objects and purposes expressed in the organization's
charter; (4) charity is dispensed to all who need and apply for it; (5)
no obstacles are placed in the way of those seeking the benefits; and
(6) and the exclusive, i.e. primary, use of the property is for charitable
purposes. Methodist Old Peoples Home, 39 Ill. 2d  at 156-57. This
court held in Methodist Old Peoples Home, after applying the six
criteria to the facts of the case, "that the plaintiff's property is not held
exclusively for charitable purposes within the meaning of our
constitution and is not entitled to exemption from tax." (Emphasis
added.) Methodist Old Peoples Home, 39 Ill. 2d at 159-60; accord
Winnebago Home for the Aged, 40 Ill. 2d  at 102.
	In conformity with section 6 of article IX, the legislature enacted
a statute that creates a charitable-use property tax exemption. Section
15-65 of the Property Tax Code provides in pertinent part:
			"Charitable purposes. All property of the following is
exempt when actually and exclusively used for charitable or
beneficent purposes, and not leased or otherwise used with
a view to profit:
* * *
				(c) Old people's homes, facilities for persons with a
developmental disability, and not-for-profit organizations
providing services or facilities related to the goals of
educational, social and physical development, if, upon
making application for the exemption, the applicant
provides affirmative evidence that the home or facility or
organization is an exempt organization under paragraph
(3) of Section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code or its
successor, and either: (i) the bylaws of the home or facility
or not-for-profit organization provide for a waiver or
reduction, based on an individual's ability to pay, of any
entrance fee, assignment of assets, or fee for services, or
(ii) the home or facility is qualified, built or financed under
Section 202 of the National Housing Act of 1959, as
amended.
				An applicant that has been granted an exemption under
this subsection on the basis that its bylaws provide for a
waiver or reduction, based on an individual's ability to
pay, of any entrance fee, assignment of assets, or fee for
services may be periodically reviewed by the Department
to determine if the waiver or reduction was a past policy
or is a current policy. The Department may revoke the
exemption if it finds that the policy for waiver or reduction
is no longer current." 35 ILCS 200/15-65 (West 2000).
Section 15-65 also exempts the property of institutions of public
charity, resale shops, not-for-profit health maintenance organizations,
free public libraries, and historical societies, "when actually and
exclusively used for charitable or beneficent purposes." 35 ILCS
200/15-65(a), (b), (d), (e), (f) (West 2000).
	Of course, property tax exemption statutes, such as section
15-65, "are to be strictly construed and are not to be extended by
judicial interpretation beyond the authority given in the constitution."
Northshore Post No. 21, 38 Ill. 2d  at 234-35. This court has held:
			"Since the terms of article IX of the constitution subject all
property generally to taxation, the courts have strictly
construed statutes granting tax exemptions and have insisted
that they keep clearly within the boundaries set forth in the
constitution. [Citations.] The burden of proving the right to
exemption is upon the party seeking it, and in determining
whether property is included within the scope of an
exemption, all facts are to be construed and all debatable
questions resolved in favor of taxation. [Citations.] Plaintiffs
must show that its organization and the use of its property
came within the provisions of the statute and the
constitution." (Emphasis added.) Methodist Old Peoples
Home, 39 Ill. 2d  at 155.
Accord Association of the Winnebago Home for the Aged, 40 Ill. 2d
at 99-100; North Shore Post No. 21, 38 Ill. 2d  at 235; Coyne
Electrical School v. Paschen, 12 Ill. 2d 387, 389-90 (1957) (repeating
rule that "the burden is on the person asserting the claim of exemption
to prove clearly and conclusively that the use of the property in
question is within both the constitutional authorization and the terms
of the statute under which the claim of exemption is made" (emphasis
added)).
	In this case, the lower courts concluded that plaintiff qualified for
the charitable-use property tax exemption based solely on plaintiff's
(1) exemption from federal income taxes, and (2) bylaw provision
allowing for the reduction or waiver of charges based on residents'
inability to pay. 346 Ill. App. 3d at 257. The appellate court viewed
the Methodist Old Peoples Home decision as interpreting only the
charitable-use property tax exemption statute as it existed in 1968.
346 Ill. App. 3d at 256. Further, and without explanation, the
appellate court examined the history of the charitable-use property tax
exemption statute, from its 1968 language to its current version in
section 15-65. The court noted that in 1984 the legislature amended
the statute by adding the requirements of federal income-tax-exempt
status and bylaw provision for fee waiver or reduction. The appellate
court reasoned: "We believe that this amendment evinces the intent of
the General Assembly to clearly and unambiguously state that with
regard to old people's homes, an actual and exclusive charitable use
arises as a matter of law when [those] statutory requirements *** are
met." 346 Ill. App. 3d at 256. Thus, the appellate court concluded that
when a facility has met those two requirements, "then that facility is
entitled to a charitable-use property tax exemption as a matter of law,
without having to clear the additional nonstatutory hurdles imposed
by the [Methodist Old Peoples Home] decision and intended to apply
only to the pre-1984 version of the Property Tax Code." 346 Ill. App.
3d at 257.
	The appellate court's analysis is erroneous. The Methodist Old
Peoples Home criteria are not mere nonstatutory "hurdles" intended
to apply only to the pre-1984 version of the charitable-use property
tax exemption statute. Rather, this court articulated the criteria in
Methodist Old Peoples Home to resolve the constitutional issue of
charitable use. Methodist Old Peoples Home, 39 Ill. 2d  at 156; see
also Association of the Winnebago Home for the Aged, 40 Ill. 2d  at
100. The legislature could not declare that property, which satisfied
a statutory requirement, was ipso facto property used exclusively for
a tax-exempt purpose specified in section 6 of article IX of the Illinois
Constitution. It is for the courts, and not for the legislature, to
determine whether property in a particular case is used for a
constitutionally specified purpose. See, e.g., Methodist Old Peoples
Home, 39 Ill. 2d at 155-56; MacMurray College, 38 Ill. 2d  at 276.
	Indeed, it is well settled that the requirement of federal tax-exempt status cannot be deemed dispositive. Section 6 of article IX is
not self-executing; it is permissive rather than mandatory. The Illinois
Constitution does not require the legislature to exempt any property
from taxation. A property tax exemption exists only when the
legislature chooses to create one by enacting a law. North Shore Post
No. 21, 38 Ill. 2d  at 233; Rogers Park Post No. 108, 8 Ill. 2d  at 290.
"It follows, therefore, that in exempting property the legislature may
place restrictions, limitations, and conditions on such exemptions as
may be proper by general law." North Shore Post No. 21, 38 Ill. 2d  at
233. Again, however, " 'the statute cannot be made broader than the
provisions of the constitution.' " Methodist Old Peoples Home, 39 Ill. 2d  at 155, quoting Locust Grove, 16 Ill. 2d  at 137. Thus, the
legislature was free to include in section 15-65(c) of the Property Tax
Code a requirement that the facility be exempt from federal income
tax. However, a federal income tax exemption does not provide
material facts about exclusive charitable use of property required by
section 6 of article IX of the Illinois Constitution, and does not
determine the constitutional issue. See People ex rel. County
Collector v. Hopedale Medical Foundation, 46 Ill. 2d 450, 464
(1970) (and cases cited therein).
	Further, the plain language of section 15-65 reveals that the
legislature did not intend to remove the constitutional requirement of
charitable use in the context of facilities such as plaintiff operates. The
controlling principles are familiar.
			"The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain
and give effect to the true intent of the legislature. [Citation.]
The best evidence of legislative intent is the language used in
the statute itself, which must be given its plain and ordinary
meaning. [Citations.] The statute should be evaluated as a
whole, with each provision construed in connection with
every other section. [Citation.] If legislative intent can be
ascertained from the statute's plain language, that intent must
prevail without resort to other interpretive aids." Paris v.
Feder, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177 (1997).
It is equally familiar that "a court presumes that the legislature
intended to enact a constitutional statute. Accordingly, a court will
construe a statute as constitutional, if it is reasonable to do so.
[Citation.] If a statute's construction is doubtful, a court will resolve
the doubt in favor of the statute's validity." Bonaguro v. County
Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 397 (1994); see, e.g.,
Methodist Old Peoples Home, 39 Ill. 2d  at 156; MacMurray College,
38 Ill. 2d  at 277.
	In this case, section 15-65, as earlier quoted, begins by reciting
the constitutional requirement: "All property of the following is
exempt when actually and exclusively used for charitable or
beneficent purposes, and not leased or otherwise used with a view to
profit." (Emphasis added.) 35 ILCS 200/15-65 (West 2000). The
statute then identifies the types of properties that are eligible for the
charitable exemption allowed by the Illinois Constitution. When read
as a whole, section 15-65 obviously applies the charitable use
requirement to each of the types of properties identified therein. "We
repeat that a court should first look to the statutory language as the
best indication of legislative intent without resorting to other aids for
construction. [Citation.] Where the language of a statute is plain and
unambiguous, a court need not consider its legislative history."
Envirite Corp. v. Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, 158 Ill. 2d 210, 216-17 (1994) (and cases cited therein). In determining
whether the charitable use requirement applied to plaintiff, the lower
courts should have relied on the plain language of section 15-65 of
the Property Tax Code, which conforms to section 6 of article IX of
the 1970 Illinois Constitution.
	We note that amicus cites decisions from other jurisdictions in
support of plaintiff. However: " 'The numerous decisions of this court
cited by both plaintiff and defendants in their briefs referred to in this
opinion provide us with ample background for deciding the issue
presented and we see no reason for relying on decisions from other
jurisdictions ***.' " Association of the Winnebago Home for the
Aged, 40 Ill. 2d  at 102, quoting Methodist Old Peoples Home, 39 Ill. 2d  at 159.
	Of course, "charging fees and dispensing benefits to other than
those who are poverty stricken does not cause an institution to lose its
charitable character." Association of the Winnebago Home for the
Aged, 40 Ill. 2d  at 101 (collecting cases). In this case, however, the
lower courts' interpretation of section 15-65 of the Property Tax
Code violated article IX of the 1970 Illinois Constitution. Therefore,
the judgments of the lower courts must be reversed. We do not
address defendants' additional arguments.

The Department's Decision
	As noted earlier, the issue before us is not whether the
Department's findings of fact were against the manifest weight of the
evidence but, rather, whether the ALJ applied the appropriate legal
standard to the undisputed facts. We conclude that he did.
	The ALJ acknowledged the constitutional principles discussed
above, including the Methodist Old Peoples Home criteria. The ALJ
applied the legal principles to the facts as follows:
			"Eden is an Illinois not-for-profit corporation,
consequently it has no capital, capital stock, or shareholders.
			During 1996 Eden's funds were derived primarily from
nursing home fees, independent living apartment and duplex
rent, and not charitable contributions.
			Concerning the criteria of whether the benefits derived are
for an indefinite number of persons, charity is dispensed to all
who need and apply for it, and no obstacles are place[d] in
the way of those seeking the benefits in regard to these units,
there is the matter of the substantial entrance fees. Most
certainly the benefits derived are only for persons who can
pay the substantial entrance fees. While Eden's bylaws
provide that the entrance fees may be waived or reduced, in
the last 15 years this simply has not happened. The best a
prospective resident in the duplexes can hope for is a short
delay before being required to pay the entrance fee.
Regarding the monthly maintenance fee, the testimony
indicates that in the last 15 years out of a total of 100
independent living units, there has been one case where there
was a reduction of the maintenance fee. During the first
couple of years of that reduction, Eden was able to pay itself
out of the reimbursable portion of the Residents' entrance
fee. Clearly the entrance fee is an obstacle placed in the way
of those seeking the benefits of Eden's independent living
units. In addition the entrance fee provides Eden with a
method of reimbursing itself if it is required to reduce the
maintenance fee.
			The witnesses for Eden testified that the prospective
residents of the duplexes had the option of either executing
the Resident Agreement, which required an entrance fee, or
a Rental Contract. The Rental Contract requires a security
deposit, which is set in the amount of several months rent.
The Rental Contract also includes a late payment penalty,
provides for interest on late payments, and also provides for
eviction on failure to pay rent. The Rental Contract cannot
under any circumstances be considered as promoting the
charitable use of the independent living units subject to that
agreement.
			In 1996, all prospective residents of the duplexes were
required to complete a very detailed financial statement,
which along with either the entrance fee or the form of the
Rental Contract constituted obstacles placed in the way of
those seeking the benefits.
			I therefore conclude that the five duplex units of Eden here
in issue met only one of the six guidelines set forth in the
Methodist Old Peoples Home case. Consequently these
duplex units were not used primarily for charitable purposes."
The ALJ's decision applied the appropriate legal standard to the
undisputed facts. We confirm the Department's decision denying
plaintiff's application for a charitable-use property tax exemption for
the 1996 tax year.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the appellate court
and the circuit court of Madison County are reversed, and the decision
of the Department denying the exemption is confirmed.
Appellate court reversed;circuit court reversed;Department confirmed.