Title: Teleguz v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
IVAN TELEGUZ 
 
v.  Record No. 062085     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
April 20, 2007 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKINGHAM COUNTY 
John J. McGrath, Jr., Judge 
 
Ivan Teleguz was convicted by a jury of the capital 
murder for hire of Stephanie Yvonne Sipe in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-31(2) and sentenced to death.  We consolidated the 
automatic review of Teleguz's death sentence with the appeal 
of his capital murder conviction pursuant to Code § 17.1-
313(F).  For the reasons stated below, after consideration of 
the issues raised by Teleguz and our mandated review of the 
imposition of the death penalty, we will affirm the judgment 
of the trial court. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
We recite the facts in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the prevailing party below.1  Remington v. 
Commonwealth, 262 Va. 333, 338, 551 S.E.2d 620, 624 (2001), 
cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1062 (2002).  During the summer of 
2001, Teleguz hired Edwin Lee Gilkes, Jr., and Michael Anthony 
Hetrick to kill Sipe, who was Teleguz's ex-girlfriend and the 
                                                          
 
1 Facts relevant only to specific issues raised by Teleguz 
will be recited in conjunction with the discussion of those 
issues. 
 2
mother of his young child.  On July 21, 2001, Teleguz, driving 
his car, took Gilkes and Hetrick from their apartment in 
Lancaster, Pennsylvania, to Harrisonburg, Virginia, where Sipe 
lived.  Teleguz told Hetrick he wanted Sipe's "throat cut" and 
"to make sure she was dead."  Once in Virginia, Teleguz waited 
in the car while Gilkes and Hetrick went into a Wal-Mart.  
Hetrick purchased a fillet knife, which Teleguz approved as a 
suitable murder weapon.  Teleguz took the men to Sipe's 
apartment complex and pointed out her apartment.  They then 
drove the car to a parking lot near Sipe's residence, where 
Gilkes and Hetrick got out of the car.  Teleguz told the men 
to "wait until he had time to get back to Pennsylvania." 
After waiting several hours, Gilkes and Hetrick walked 
back to Sipe's apartment complex.  Hetrick approached Sipe's 
apartment alone and gained entry by asking to use the 
telephone.  Once in the apartment, Hetrick killed Sipe by 
cutting her throat.  In the course of the attack, Hetrick 
injured his hand.  Hetrick went to the bathroom to clean his 
hand and was surprised to find Sipe's infant son "in the 
bathtub with the water running."  Hetrick turned off the water 
and left the apartment.  Gilkes and Hetrick returned to 
Pennsylvania by bus. 
On the evening of July 23, 2001, Sipe's mother, Pamela Y. 
Woods, went to her daughter's apartment because she had not 
 3
heard from Sipe during the previous two days and was unable to 
reach her by telephone.  When Woods entered the apartment, she 
found Sipe's body in the front room and began screaming for 
help.  Woods then found Sipe's twenty-three month-old son in 
the bathroom of the apartment, with the bathtub full of water.  
The child was unharmed.  In response to Woods' screams, Mark 
Edwin Moore, a neighbor, went to Sipe's apartment and, after 
placing a blanket over Sipe's body, took Woods and her 
grandson out of the apartment. 
The medical examiner testified that Sipe suffered a 
number of cuts described as defensive wounds, as well as three 
other wounds.  The first, according to the medical examiner, 
was a superficial wound.  The second wound was a "stabbing 
wound," which affected the area "all the way from the left 
side of the neck . . . to the right side of the neck" and 
consisted of a cut to Sipe's windpipe and esophagus.  The 
medical examiner also testified that the third wound, the 
fatal wound, was a "cutting wound" which consisted of a cut 
approximately two and one-half inches deep into Sipe's 
trachea, larynx, and a major artery on the right side of 
Sipe's neck, which was completely severed. 
At the crime scene, the Harrisonburg police discovered 
blood that did not belong to Sipe.  Investigator Kevin A. 
Whitfield learned from Sipe's family members that Teleguz was 
 4
the father of Sipe's son and that he was currently living in 
Pennsylvania.  Investigator Whitfield also learned that 
relations between Sipe and Teleguz had been strained, and that 
Teleguz was upset about a court order requiring him to pay 
child support.  On July 24, 2001, Investigator Whitfield 
interviewed Teleguz at Teleguz's residence in Pennsylvania.  
Teleguz denied any involvement in the murder, and stated he 
had been in Pennsylvania since July 20, 2001. 
 
On December 14, 2001, Investigator Whitfield, assisted by 
Pennsylvania State Police, executed a search warrant on 
Teleguz.  Police collected samples of Teleguz's blood, hair, 
and saliva.  Testing revealed that Teleguz was not the source 
of the blood found at Sipe's apartment. 
 
Also in 2001, Investigator Whitfield interviewed Mark 
Moore who told Whitfield that he had seen an unknown person 
around Sipe's apartment prior to her murder.  When shown a 
photograph array that included a photograph of Teleguz, Moore 
told Investigator Whitfield he was about 70 percent certain 
Teleguz was the person he had seen at Sipe's apartment.  
Investigator Whitfield also interviewed Ryan Ferguson, who was 
with Moore the night he saw the individual leave Sipe's 
apartment.  Ferguson was also shown a photograph array.  
Although Ferguson initially failed to identify Teleguz, he 
subsequently identified the photograph of Teleguz as the one 
 5
which "most" resembled the person he had seen leaving Sipe's 
apartment.  No arrests were made on the basis of these 
interviews. 
 
The investigation stalled until February 2003, when 
Michael Nelson, a deputy marshal with the United States 
Marshal Service, contacted Investigator Whitfield with 
information about the Sipe murder.  Aleksey Safanov, who was 
facing federal criminal charges, told Deputy Marshal Nelson 
that Teleguz had hired a black male from Lancaster, 
Pennsylvania, to kill Sipe because Teleguz was angry about 
having to pay child support.  According to Safanov, Teleguz 
said that Sipe had been murdered, and that Teleguz was upset 
because "[w]hoever killed her left blood evidence."  Safanov 
also told investigators that after Sipe's murder, Teleguz 
wanted to rob Sipe's parents, and that he and Teleguz had 
driven to Harrisonburg but ultimately did not commit the 
robbery. 
Safanov's information led the police to Edwin Gilkes who 
told the police that he refused Teleguz's offer to murder Sipe 
for pay but that Michael Hetrick accepted the offer.  The 
police then contacted Hetrick who ultimately confessed to 
murdering Sipe.  Hetrick said Teleguz had hired him to kill 
Sipe for $2,000, with half to be paid before the murder.  When 
Teleguz received confirmation of Sipe's death, he paid Gilkes 
 6
and Hetrick the remaining $1,000 plus an additional $500 for 
expenses.  Subsequent testing revealed that Hetrick was the 
source of the unidentified blood found at Sipe's apartment. 
As a result of Hetrick's confession, Teleguz was arrested 
in Pennsylvania on July 1, 2004 and subsequently extradited to 
Virginia.  He was indicted by a Rockingham County grand jury 
for the willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of a 
person by another for hire as an accessory before the fact in 
violation of Code § 18.2-31(2). 
Following a four day trial, the jury found Teleguz guilty 
as charged.  The jury proceeded to hear further evidence 
regarding sentencing.  The Commonwealth presented evidence at 
sentencing in support of the statutory aggravators of vileness 
and future dangerousness.  In addition to the evidence 
presented during the guilt portion of the trial, the 
Commonwealth's evidence included Teleguz's prior criminal 
convictions, testimony from Sipe's relatives, the nature of 
the injuries Sipe sustained, and the pain she would have 
experienced prior to her death.  Teleguz presented mitigation 
evidence including testimony about his background and 
childhood in the Ukraine.  He presented testimony about his 
lack of disciplinary infractions while incarcerated.  The jury 
found both statutory aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt and 
recommended a sentence of death. 
 7
Teleguz filed a number of post-trial motions, including a 
motion to compel disclosure of information he asserted was 
improperly suppressed.  He then moved to set aside the 
verdict, arguing that the Commonwealth's suppression of 
exculpatory evidence violated his due process rights under 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  The trial court denied 
the motion, finding that the evidence allegedly suppressed was 
not material to the issue of Teleguz's guilt and therefore no 
Brady violation occurred.  The trial court also rejected the 
other grounds on which Teleguz sought to have the verdict set 
aside and declined to set aside the sentence of death and 
impose a life sentence pursuant to Code § 19.2-264.5.  Teleguz 
appealed, asserting 35 assignments of error. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
A.  ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR WAIVED OR ABANDONED 
 
1.  Juror 50 
 
Teleguz argues that the trial court's failure to strike 
Juror 50 for cause was error because she stated she could not 
consider information about Teleguz's background as mitigating 
evidence.  This argument is a new argument not presented to 
the trial court.  At trial, Teleguz argued that Juror 50 
should have been removed from the venire due to a potential 
scheduling conflict involving the juror's child.  Accordingly, 
we will not consider this argument raised for the first time 
 8
on appeal.  Rule 5:25; Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 
463, 470 S.E.2d 114, 128, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 887 (1996). 
2.  Comments Made in Opening Statement 
 
 
Teleguz asserts that the trial court erred in denying his 
"mistrial motions" based upon comments made by the 
Commonwealth during opening statements.  The first comment was 
that Teleguz gave "no reaction" when told by the police about 
Sipe's murder, and that he did not ask about his son.  The 
second comment referred to expected testimony of Teleguz's 
brother, Pavel Teleguz. 
A review of the record demonstrates that the trial court 
never denied a motion for mistrial with regard to either 
statement because no such motions were made.  Although the 
trial court sustained Teleguz's motion in limine to exclude 
any evidence regarding his precustodial silence, Teleguz did 
not object, ask for a cautionary instruction, or move for a 
mistrial in conjunction with the Commonwealth's reference to 
precustodial silence in its opening statement.  While Teleguz 
did object to the Commonwealth's comments regarding Pavel 
Teleguz's testimony, he did not request a mistrial.  Teleguz 
only commented, "I don't think we should risk a mistrial based 
on that" before the trial court overruled the objection.  
Accordingly, these assignments of error do not address a 
 9
ruling made by the trial court and we do not consider them.2  
Rule 5:17(c); Rawls v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 334, 344, 634 
S.E.2d 697, 701 (2006). 
3.  Motion for Continuance 
 
Teleguz argues that the trial court should have granted a 
motion for continuance raised when Investigator Whitfield 
testified regarding Moore's identification of Teleguz.  The 
record shows that during this testimony, Teleguz asked for a 
"mistrial or at least a continuance" to allow him to find and 
question Moore.  The trial court denied the motion for a 
mistrial but never ruled on the continuance request, and 
Teleguz did not seek a ruling on his motion for a continuance. 
Because this assignment of error does not address any 
ruling made by the trial court, we do not consider it.  Rule 
5:17(c); Riner v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 296, 325, 601 S.E.2d 
555, 571-72 (2004); Lenz v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 451, 462-63, 
544 S.E.2d 299, 305-06, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1003 (2001). 
4.  Pavel Teleguz Testimony 
 
Teleguz claims that the trial court's decision to permit 
Pavel Teleguz to testify as a hostile witness was error 
because it allowed the Commonwealth to use an investigator's 
                                                          
 
2 On brief Teleguz also complains of a comment made by the 
Commonwealth during the penalty phase.  Teleguz has not 
assigned error to this comment and accordingly we do not 
consider it here.  Rule 5:17(c). 
 
10
notes for impeachment in violation of the Confrontation Clause 
of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
The only argument submitted by Teleguz in this Court in 
support of this claim was a single sentence that the use of 
the investigator's notes in questioning Pavel Teleguz was 
"wholly improper."  Because Teleguz has failed to brief this 
assignment of error, it is abandoned.  Rule 5:17(c); Muhammad 
v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 478-79, 619 S.E.2d 16, 31 
(2005), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2035 (2006); 
Elliott v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 396, 422, 593 S.E.2d 270, 286 
(2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1081 (2005). 
5.  Driving Time Testimony 
 
Teleguz claims that the trial court erred in allowing 
testimony from Investigator Whitfield regarding the driving 
time between Teleguz's residence in Pennsylvania and the crime 
scene in Harrisonburg because such testimony was irrelevant 
and prejudicial.  Teleguz did not raise these arguments at 
trial.  Instead, Teleguz argued that the testimony should not 
be admitted because it described "an experiment." 
We will not consider this new argument because it was not 
presented to the trial court.  Rule 5:25; Goins, 251 Va. at 
463, 470 S.E.2d at 128. 
6.  Pamela Woods Testimony 
 
 
11
At trial, Pamela Woods testified, over Teleguz's 
objection, that Teleguz had asked Sipe to "go with him" but to 
leave their son behind.  Teleguz argues that this testimony 
was "irrelevant and prejudic[ial]" and its admission was 
reversible error.  At trial, Teleguz objected to this 
testimony on relevancy and hearsay grounds.  The trial court 
sustained the hearsay objection but never ruled on the 
relevancy objection.  Because the trial court did not issue a 
ruling on Teleguz's relevancy objection, there is no basis 
upon which this Court may consider the issue.  Rule 5:17(c); 
Riner, 268 Va. at 325, 601 S.E.2d at 571-72; Lenz, 261 Va. at 
462-63, 544 S.E.2d at 305-06.  Finally, we do not consider 
Teleguz's argument that this testimony was prejudicial, 
because that argument was not presented to the trial court.  
Rule 5:25; Goins, 251 Va. at 463, 470 S.E.2d at 128. 
7.  Evidence of a Knife and Gloves 
 
 
When the Commonwealth sought to elicit testimony about a 
knife and a pair of gloves found in Teleguz's car shortly 
after the murder, Teleguz objected, arguing that the knife and 
gloves had not been connected to the murder and such evidence 
was therefore irrelevant.  The trial court sustained Teleguz's 
objection finding the evidence "too attenuated and 
prejudicial."  Teleguz subsequently moved for a mistrial and 
if the mistrial was not granted "to certainly instruct the 
 
12
jury" with regard to the excluded evidence.  The trial court 
responded by instructing the jury that the knife and gloves 
were not to be considered as evidence.  Teleguz assigns error 
to the trial court's failure to grant his motion for a 
mistrial, arguing the Commonwealth's comments on the knife and 
gloves tainted the jury.  
 
Based on the record, we conclude that Teleguz has waived 
this assignment of error.  When the trial court granted the 
request for the jury instruction, Teleguz raised no objection 
to the failure to grant the mistrial.  Accordingly, this 
assignment of error is waived.  Rule 5:25. 
8.  Photograph Array 
Teleguz assigns error to the admission of the photograph 
array because it was unduly suggestive.  Teleguz's primary 
argument on this issue is that Moore's identification was 
unreliable due to the time of the day when Moore stated he saw 
Teleguz, and the fact that Moore was "using drugs and drinking 
heavily" when he saw the person leave Sipe's apartment.  
Teleguz's argument does not address the grounds on which the 
error was assigned and only refers to the array as containing 
"four minorities as 'fillers'" and Teleguz's brother without 
more.  In the absence of any substantive argument on why the 
display was unduly suggestive, this assignment of error has 
been abandoned.  Rule 5:17(c). 
 
13
9.  Testimony of Kimberly Woods 
Teleguz assigns error to the trial court's refusal to 
accept a stipulation regarding the testimony of Kimberly 
Woods.  On brief, Teleguz argues only that the trial court 
erred in refusing to grant a continuance to allow Teleguz to 
secure Woods' attendance at trial.  This argument does not 
relate to the assignment of error and accordingly we do not 
consider it here.  Rule 5:17(c).  In the absence of any 
argument in support of the assignment of error, the assignment 
of error is abandoned.  Rule 5:17(c); see Juniper v. 
Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362, 414, 626 S.E.2d 383, 416, cert. 
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 397 (2006). 
Teleguz also claims that the trial court erred by 
refusing to allow Investigator Whitfield to testify regarding 
Woods' out of court statements.  The only argument in support 
of this assignment of error is a single sentence that 
reiterates the assignment of error.  Such a statement does not 
constitute an argument in support of the error assigned.  
Accordingly, this assignment of error is abandoned.  Rule 
5:17(c); Muhammad, 269 Va. at 478-79, 619 S.E.2d at 31; 
Elliott, 267 Va. at 422, 593 S.E.2d at 286. 
B.  ISSUES PREVIOUSLY DECIDED 
 
 
14
In three assignments of error, Teleguz raises arguments 
which have been previously considered and rejected by this 
Court. 
1.  Conditions of Confinement 
Teleguz argues that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion to present expert testimony and evidence regarding the 
conditions of incarceration to rebut allegations of future 
dangerousness.3  Teleguz's motion was a general motion seeking 
to present evidence on prison conditions and security and did 
not address evidence specific to him.  Therefore, the trial 
court did not err in rejecting his motion.  Bell v. 
Commonwealth, 264 Va. 172, 201, 563 S.E.2d 695, 714, cert. 
denied, 537 U.S. 1123 (2002); and Burns v. Commonwealth, 261 
Va. 307, 340, 541 S.E.2d 872, 893, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1043 
(2001). 
2.  Constitutionality of Death Penalty 
Teleguz argues that imposition of the sentence of death 
constitutes reversible error due to the following purported 
                                                          
 
3 We assume Teleguz is referring to his pretrial motion 
for the appointment of an expert on prison conditions to rebut 
allegations of future dangerousness or in the alternative to 
proffer evidence on such conditions.  The record shows that 
the only other instance in which he sought to introduce such 
evidence was for the trial court's consideration of prison 
conditions when determining whether, for good cause shown, the 
sentence of death recommended by the jury should be commuted 
to a sentence of life without parole pursuant to Code § 19.2-
 
15
constitutional deficiencies of the death penalty statutes and 
procedures in Virginia.  We find nothing additional in the 
arguments raised by Teleguz in this case and adhere to our 
previous holdings. 
(1) Code §§ 19.2-264.2 through -264.5 fail to 
adequately direct the jury as to how to evaluate 
the aggravating factors so as to avoid the 
arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.  
Rejected in Wolfe v. Commonwealth, 265 Va. 193, 
208, 576 S.E.2d 471, 480, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 
1019 (2003), and Mickens v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 
395, 403, 442 S.E.2d 678, 684, vacated and remanded 
on other grounds, 513 U.S. 922 (1994).  
 
(2) Unadjudicated criminal acts should not be 
considered to prove future dangerousness.  Rejected 
in Stockton v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 192, 209-10, 
402 S.E.2d 196, 206, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 902 
(1991). 
 
(3) Hearsay should not be considered in the post-
sentence report.  Rejected in O'Dell v. 
Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 701-02, 364 S.E.2d 491, 
507-08, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988). 
 
(4) The death sentence may not be set aside upon a 
showing of good cause.  Rejected in Breard v. 
Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 76, 445 S.E.2d 670, 675-
76, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 971 (1994). 
 
(5) Appellate review procedures are not consistent 
with the Eighth Amendment and other constitutional 
provisions.  Rejected in Satcher v. Commonwealth, 
244 Va. 220, 228, 421 S.E.2d 821, 826 (1992), cert. 
denied, 507 U.S. 993 (1993) and Smith v. 
Commonwealth, 239 Va. 243, 253, 389 S.E.2d 871, 
876, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881 (1990). 
 
C.  PRETRIAL ISSUES 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
264.5.  The trial court granted Teleguz's motion to consider 
this evidence. 
 
16
1.  Juror 66 
 
 
Teleguz argues that the trial court committed reversible 
error by failing to remove Juror 66 after the juror indicated 
he "could not consider Mr. Teleguz's background as mitigating 
evidence." 
 
During the individual voir dire of a four-juror panel, 
Teleguz sought to determine whether the jurors would have 
trouble considering as mitigating evidence in the penalty 
phase someone's personal experiences if that person came from 
a very different background, specifically the Soviet Union.  
However, Teleguz's questions initially were not clearly 
directed to the penalty phase and referred to Teleguz's 
country of origin, rather than personal experiences.  Juror 66 
and another juror clearly were confused by Teleguz's 
questions.  Juror 66, for example, responded that he could not 
say someone was "guilty because he's from Russia."  Although 
Teleguz attempted to clarify his question, the jurors' 
confusion about the use of such evidence remained.  Juror 66 
said that he would not decide a penalty "[b]ased on where 
[Teleguz] was from."  The trial court attempted to clarify the 
question it believed Teleguz wanted to ask, but the jurors 
continued to interpret the question as whether they would 
determine Teleguz's penalty based on his country of origin.  
The trial court stated that it would take the jurors' 
 
17
confusion into account when evaluating their answers.  Teleguz 
moved to strike Juror 66 for cause, because of his inability 
to "consider things in mitigation."  The trial court denied 
Teleguz's motion. 
We apply an abuse of discretion standard when we review a 
trial court's refusal to strike a juror for cause.  Spencer v. 
Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 94, 393 S.E.2d 609, 619, cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 908 (1990).  As we have previously 
recognized, a trial judge who personally observes a juror, 
including the juror's tenor, tone, and general demeanor, is in 
a better position than an appellate court to determine whether 
a particular juror should be stricken.  Id. (citing LeVasseur 
v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 584, 304 S.E.2d 644, 655 (1983), 
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984)). 
In this case, the trial court was well aware of the 
confusion arising from Teleguz's questions, took that 
confusion into consideration when evaluating the jurors' 
answers, and concluded that Juror 66 should not be stricken 
for cause because of an inability to consider mitigating 
evidence.  Based on our review of the record, we conclude the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
2.  Motion for Change of Venue 
 
Teleguz argues that the trial court should have granted 
his motion for change of venue because of the media coverage 
 
18
of the trial and because many of the jurors were aware of 
Sipe's murder through this media coverage. 
 
Teleguz filed a change of venue motion on January 27, 
2006.  His motion was accompanied by a single article 
published the day before in a Harrisonburg newspaper, 
recounting the plea agreement of Gilkes, his willingness to 
assist in the prosecution, and statements by the prosecutor 
that Teleguz "wanted [Sipe] dead because he did not want to 
pay child support."  The trial court denied Teleguz's motion, 
holding that Teleguz failed to meet his burden of overcoming 
the presumption that he would receive a fair trial in 
Harrisonburg.  
Prior to voir dire, which began on February 6, 2006, 
Teleguz reasserted his motion for change of venue based on a 
newspaper article published that morning.  Teleguz asked the 
trial court, if his motion was denied, to question the 
potential jurors in voir dire regarding their knowledge of the 
case acquired through the media.  The trial court denied the 
motion for change of venue but stated that it intended to 
"take up specific issues of publicity" with the jury. 
The record reflects that although a number of prospective 
jurors had learned something about the case from newspapers, 
radio, or television, only two indicated that they could not 
put that information "out of their mind[s]" in deciding the 
 
19
merits of the case.  Selection of the jury was completed in 
one day.  The following morning, prior to empanelling the 
jury, at Teleguz's request, the trial court asked whether any 
one had read an article about the trial that appeared in the 
morning paper.  The panel members responded in the negative.  
Teleguz, in response to a question from the trial court, 
stated that he was satisfied that the jury panel chosen was 
"free from exception." 
In considering a motion for change of venue, we begin 
with the presumption that a defendant can receive a fair trial 
in the jurisdiction in which the offense occurred.  Stockton 
v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 137, 314 S.E.2d 371, 379-80, 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873 (1984).  The defendant must 
overcome this presumption by showing that it is reasonably 
certain a fair trial will be prevented because of the 
prejudice against the defendant that exists in the community.  
Id.  Whether a change of venue should be granted lies within 
the sound discretion of the trial court.  George v. 
Commonwealth, 242 Va. 264, 274, 411 S.E.2d 12, 18 (1991), 
cert. denied, 503 U.S. 973 (1992) (citing LeVasseur v. 
Commonwealth, 225 Va. at 577, 304 S.E.2d at 651). 
The existence of media reports about the accused and the 
crime does not necessarily require a change of venue.  
Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 407, 384 S.E.2d 757, 
 
20
767-68 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1063 (1990).  "A 
potential juror who has knowledge of the case, even if such 
person has formed an opinion about the case, is entitled to 
sit on the jury if that opinion can be set aside."  Thomas v. 
Commonwealth, 263 Va. 216, 231, 559 S.E.2d 652, 660 (2002) 
(citing Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1961)).  In this 
case, only two examples of media coverage of the trial were 
offered and no juror was empanelled who voiced any difficulty 
with ignoring what he or she had learned from the media 
reports.  Furthermore, by conceding that the jury panel was 
"without exception," Teleguz cannot assert here that he was 
denied a fair trial because of media coverage.  Code § 8.01-
352.  
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying Teleguz's motion for a change of venue. 
3.  Vienna Convention 
 
Teleguz claims that the trial court committed reversible 
error by denying his motion to strike the death penalty due to 
a violation of the Vienna Convention.  Prior to trial, Teleguz 
argued that the violation of Article 36 of the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on 
Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 
occurred because the police failed to notify him of his rights 
under the Vienna Convention, including his right to have the 
 
21
Ukrainian consulate notified of his arrest, until eleven 
months after his arrest.  
The United States Supreme Court has stated that it is 
"extremely doubtful" that a violation of the Vienna Convention 
would require a conviction to be overturned absent a showing 
that the trial was affected by the violation.  Breard v. 
Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 377 (1998).  Even if we assumed that a 
violation occurred in this case, which the trial court did not 
find, there is no evidence in the record that Teleguz's trial 
was affected.  The trial court granted Teleguz's request for a 
continuance in order to contact the Ukrainian consulate and 
rescheduled the trial for approximately six months later in 
February 2006.  The trial court noted that it would entertain 
any motions from the Ukrainian consulate to replace Teleguz's 
counsel or for an extension of time should the consulate show 
that it was willing to assist Teleguz in obtaining evidence 
from the Ukraine.  No such motions were ever filed.  Teleguz 
did not request new counsel from the consulate even though the 
trial court provided him with two weeks in which to do so.  
Teleguz did not show that there was any impact on his trial as 
a result of the delay in being informed of his rights under 
the Vienna Convention.  Accordingly, we reject this assignment 
of error. 
 
22
D.  GUILT PHASE ISSUES 
 
1.  Testimony of Pavel Teleguz 
 
During the investigation of Sipe's murder, Teleguz's 
brother, Pavel Teleguz (Pavel), talked with Sergeant Chris 
Rush of the Harrisonburg Police Department.  Sergeant Rush 
made notes of this interview.  At trial, the Commonwealth told 
the trial court it expected Pavel to be an adverse witness and 
wanted to question him about statements made in the interview 
with Sergeant Rush.  The Commonwealth told the trial court 
that if Pavel did not respond as he did in his interview with 
Sergeant Rush, it intended to question him regarding his 
inconsistent statements.  Pavel testified that he did not 
recall the substance of his conversation with Sergeant Rush.  
When he was shown Sergeant Rush's notes, Pavel stated he did 
not make the statements recorded in the notes.  At the 
Commonwealth's request, the trial court declared Pavel a 
hostile witness.  Teleguz objected, stating, "The fact that 
the witness doesn't remember does not in fact make him 
hostile."  The trial court overruled Teleguz's objection. 
The Commonwealth proceeded to ask Pavel if he heard his 
brother, the defendant, make certain statements, including a 
statement about child support.  Pavel denied hearing his 
brother make the statements.  Teleguz declined to cross-
examine Pavel.  The Commonwealth then sought to elicit 
 
23
testimony from Sergeant Rush about the statements which Pavel 
denied making.  The trial court ruled, however, that this 
would deny Teleguz the right to confront and cross-examine 
regarding out of court statements.  The Commonwealth did not 
call Sergeant Rush as a witness. 
Before Pavel left the courtroom, the Commonwealth stated:  
"Judge, I would ask that Sgt. Rush come back in and take Mr. 
Paul Teleguz into custody for perjury."  Teleguz moved for a 
mistrial.  The trial court denied Teleguz's motion, stating 
that the Commonwealth's comment was made out of the hearing of 
the jury.  When Teleguz again raised the issue and asked that 
the jury be polled to determine if they heard the comment, the 
trial court denied Teleguz's request and renewed motion for a 
mistrial, but specifically cautioned the jury that if they had 
heard any comment following Pavel's release from the witness 
stand, it was to be disregarded.  
a.  Hostile Witness 
Teleguz argues that the trial court erred when it allowed 
the Commonwealth to treat Pavel as a hostile witness.  
According to Teleguz, Pavel was not a party to the proceeding 
and no evidence was presented showing that he had any personal 
or adverse interest in the proceeding. 
With respect to the right to attack the testimony of an 
adverse witness, Code § 8.01-401(A) states, "[a] party called 
 
24
to testify for another, having an adverse interest, may be 
examined by such other party according to the rules applicable 
to cross-examination."  This rule applies to any person who 
has an adverse interest, even if that person is not a party to 
the litigation.  Hegwood v. Virginia Natural Gas, Inc., 256 
Va. 362, 368, 505 S.E.2d 372, 376 (1998) (citing Butler, 186 
Va. at 431-32, 43 S.E.2d at 4).  In addition, a person may be 
considered a hostile witness if his testimony surprises the 
party who called the person to testify at trial.  See Butler, 
186 Va. at 434, 43 S.E.2d at 5.  The rules of cross-
examination apply to the examination of a witness who has been 
deemed hostile or who has an adverse interest.  Code § 8.01-
401(A); Butler, 186 Va. at 435, 43 S.E.2d at 6. 
We review a trial court's ruling that a witness is a 
hostile witness under an abuse of discretion standard.  Id.  
The trial court determines whether a witness is hostile or 
adverse because "the trial court sees and hears the witness on 
the stand, observes his demeanor, and hence is in a much 
better position to determine whether he is in fact adverse or 
hostile than is an appellate court which must rely on the 
printed record."  Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Hall, 184 
Va. 102, 105, 34 S.E.2d 382, 383 (1945). 
We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in 
declaring Pavel a hostile witness because Pavel, as Teleguz's 
 
25
brother, was a person with an interest adverse to the 
prosecution.  Butler, 186 Va. at 434, 43 S.E.2d at 5 (witness 
closely connected by blood to accused can have adverse 
interest).  
b.  Comments on Perjury 
Teleguz argues that the trial court erred when it denied 
his motion for a mistrial based on the Commonwealth's request 
that Pavel be taken into custody for perjury.  Teleguz claims 
that the statement was heard by the jury and that the trial 
court's instruction to the jury to disregard what it may have 
heard was insufficient to overcome the prejudice created by 
the comment. 
We find no error by the trial court in its denial of 
Teleguz's mistrial motion.  Regardless of whether the jurors 
heard the Commonwealth's Attorney's comment, jurors are 
presumed to follow the instructions provided by the trial 
court.  Muhammad, 269 Va. at 524, 619 S.E.2d at 58 (citing 
Green v. Young, 264 Va. 604, 611, 571 S.E.2d 135, 139 (2002)).  
Nothing in the record suggests that the jurors acted 
otherwise.  Accordingly, we reject this assignment of error. 
2.  Reference to "Russian Mafia" 
 
Teleguz filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude the 
Commonwealth from commenting about or introducing evidence on 
Teleguz's alleged connection to the "Russian Mafia."  The 
 
26
trial court took the motion under advisement, commenting that 
testimony showing the witnesses' fear of Teleguz because of a 
relationship with the "Russian Mafia" was appropriate, not for 
the truth of the matter, but to show the witnesses' state of 
mind. 
At trial, Gilkes and Hetrick each stated that they were 
afraid of Teleguz because they had heard that he was 
associated with the "Russian Mafia."  Teleguz objected to the 
statements, relying on his prior motion and also on the 
grounds that the statements were inadmissible hearsay.  The 
trial court overruled the objections and instructed the jury 
that the statements were only to be considered to show Gilkes' 
and Hetrick's states of mind and not for the truth of the 
matter being asserted. 
Teleguz argues that the trial court erred when it allowed 
Gilkes and Hetrick to testify regarding Teleguz's alleged 
connections to the "Russian Mafia" because such statements 
were highly prejudicial.  We disagree.  The trial court gave a 
proper limiting instruction and a jury is presumed to follow 
the instructions given by the trial court.  Muhammad, 269 Va. 
at 524, 619 S.E.2d at 58 (citing Green, 264 Va. at 611, 571 
S.E.2d at 139).  The instructions provided by the trial court 
were designed to focus the jury's attention on the specific 
purpose for which the jurors needed to consider Gilkes' and 
 
27
Hetrick's statements, namely to show their states of mind in 
order to explain their actions.  For this reason, the trial 
court's instructions were adequate to address any prejudice 
caused by the statements, and eliminated the likelihood that 
the jury would consider the statements as proof that Teleguz 
was a member of the "Russian Mafia."  Accord Upchurch v. 
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 408, 410-11, 258 S.E.2d 506, 508 (1979) 
(approving decision to admit testimony concerning burglary 
where jury was properly instructed that testimony was not to 
be considered for the truth of the matter, but rather to 
establish foundation on another point). 
3.  Testimony of Pete Sipe, Jr. 
Over Teleguz's objection, the Commonwealth asked the 
victim's father, Pete J. Sipe, Jr., (Pete Sipe) whether his 
daughter ever spoke to him "about Ivan paying child support."  
Pete Sipe testified that his daughter told him Teleguz wanted 
her to terminate her demand for child support and he was going 
to try to take their child. 
Teleguz argues on appeal that this testimony was hearsay 
and that the trial court erred in admitting it.  We agree.  
The witness' testimony consisted of "a narration by one person 
of matters told him by another."  Techdyn Sys. Corp. v. 
Whittaker Corp., 245 Va. 291, 300, 427 S.E.2d 334, 340 (1993) 
(quoting Williams v. Morris, 200 Va. 413, 416-17, 105 S.E.2d 
 
28
829, 832 (1958)).  In the absence of any applicable exception 
to the hearsay rule which would have rendered the testimony 
admissible, we hold that the trial court erred in admitting 
the testimony.  See Scruggs v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 736, 745-
46, 99 S.E.2d 518, 521 (1919)(holding that testimony regarding 
"an alleged conversation of the deceased with a witness (but 
not in the presence of the accused)" was hearsay). 
We nonetheless conclude, based on our review of the 
record, that the error was harmless.  To the extent the 
testimony established that Teleguz was upset that he had been 
ordered to pay child support to Sipe, it was cumulative, as 
this fact was also established through the testimony of other 
witnesses.  For this reason, the trial court's admission of 
the testimony was harmless error.  Code § 8.01-678. 
4.  Crime Scene Photographs 
Teleguz asserts that the trial court erred by admitting 
into evidence graphic photographs of the crime scene and 
autopsy because the photographs were prejudicial and inflamed 
the passion of the jury. 
Accurate photographs of a crime scene are not rendered 
inadmissible solely because they are gruesome, and autopsy 
photographs of the victim are admissible to show the 
atrociousness or vileness of a crime.  Juniper, 271 Va. at 
413, 626 S.E.2d at 415-16, Walton v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 85, 
 
29
92, 501 S.E.2d 134, 138, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1046 (1998).  
Such photographs must nevertheless be excluded if their 
prejudicial effect substantially outweighs their probative 
value.  Walker v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 54, 69, 515 S.E.2d 
565, 574 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1125 (2000).  Such 
weighing is left to the discretion of the trial court and will 
not be disturbed on appeal, absent an abuse of discretion.  
Id. 
After reviewing the photographs admitted into evidence, 
we conclude they were accurate depictions of the crime scene 
and autopsy and that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by admitting them. 
E.  PENALTY PHASE ISSUES  
1.  Vileness Statutory Aggravator 
 
 
As a prerequisite to recommending a sentence of death, a 
jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
would commit criminal acts of violence that would 
constitute a continuing serious threat to society 
or that his conduct in committing the offense for 
which he stands charged was outrageously or 
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it 
involved torture, depravity of mind or an 
aggravated battery to the victim. 
 
Code § 19.2-264.2.  In this case, the Commonwealth presented 
evidence on both the vileness and future dangerousness 
aggravators.  The jury found both aggravators were proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
30
Teleguz claims that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion to strike the vileness aggravator.  He argues that the 
evidence of vileness is insufficient because he did not commit 
the murder and the only evidence that can attribute vileness 
to him is the evidence that he instructed the perpetrators to 
cut Sipe's throat.  According to Teleguz, this direction alone 
does not support a finding that the actual acts performed to 
accomplish the murder are attributable to him.  Further, while 
recognizing that the issue whether the acts committed by the  
actual murderer can be imputed to him is "an open question," 
Teleguz argues that such imputation should not be allowed. 
In Lewis v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 302, 593 S.E.2d 220, 
cert. denied, 543 U.S. 904 (2004), the defendant was convicted 
of capital murder for hire of her husband.  We approved the 
jury's finding of vileness because Lewis' actions, as the 
mastermind of the murder plot, constituted depravity of mind, 
an element satisfying the statutory definition of vileness.  
Id. at 316, 593 S.E.2d at 228.  In Lewis, the defendant's 
actions included planning the murder to acquire her husband's 
money and life insurance proceeds, and, although he was still 
alive after the attack, taking his wallet from his person and 
waiting 45 minutes to call the police.  Id. at 305-11, 316, 
593 S.E.2d at 221-25, 227. 
 
31
Like Lewis, Teleguz was the mastermind of the murder for 
hire plot.  He planned the murder to avoid his responsibility 
of supporting his child; directed and approved the purchase of 
the murder weapon; took the perpetrators to the victim's home; 
directed the murder be committed in the apartment without 
regard to the well-being of his child who would likely be 
present; and directed the actual manner of the murder – 
cutting the victim's throat.  Teleguz's specific directions 
for the manner in which Sipe was to be murdered are evidence 
of his depravity of mind.  Furthermore, directing the manner 
of a murder necessarily includes knowledge of the expected 
physical attributes of the murder.  In this case, the fatal 
wound was a deep stab wound to Sipe's neck which resulted in 
massive external and internal bleeding, causing Sipe to drown 
in her own blood. 
Depravity of mind, as used in Code § 19.2-264.2, is "a 
degree of moral turpitude and psychical debasement surpassing 
that inherent in the definition of ordinary legal malice and 
premeditation."  Stewart v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 222, 245, 
427 S.E.2d 394, 409, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 848 (1993) 
(quoting Thomas v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 1, 25, 419 S.E.2d 
606, 619-20, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 958 (1992)).  The facts in 
this case support a finding of such depravity of mind and thus 
satisfy the statutory predicate of vileness.  The trial court 
 
32
therefore did not err in denying Teleguz's motion to strike 
the vileness statutory aggravator. 
In light of this holding, we need not address Teleguz's 
arguments regarding whether the actions of the perpetrator can 
be imputed to Teleguz. 
2.  Response to Jury Question 
 
During jury deliberations in the sentencing phase of the 
trial, the trial court was informed that a juror had asked the 
bailiff if Teleguz would have access to her identity and 
contact information.  The trial court sent the following 
statement to the jury room:  
As required by law, defense counsel and the 
Commonwealth's attorney are provided with the 
name, address and occupation of each person in 
the venire (in this case, approximately 125 
individuals). . . .  As a matter of course, 
attorneys do not provide copies of this master 
list to their clients. 
 
Teleguz claims that the trial court committed reversible error 
when it failed to tell the jury "that Mr. Teleguz would not 
have access to their personal information." 
 
In support of this claim, Teleguz refers to the trial 
court's response as "improper" and "prejudicial."  Teleguz 
also argues that the response was "factually" erroneous 
because the trial court "had the authority to sua sponte place 
all the information identifying the jurors under seal."  At 
oral argument before this Court, counsel for Teleguz agreed 
 
33
that the trial court's response was correct, and conceded that 
no objection had been raised at trial as to the accuracy of 
the statement, although an objection had been made as to the 
sufficiency of the response.  According to Teleguz, the 
question posed indicated that the jury was not limiting its 
consideration to the evidence and the trial court's response 
was insufficient because it should have included an admonition 
to the jury to restrict their deliberations to the evidence. 
Teleguz's arguments on this point have shifted throughout 
the course of this litigation.  We do not consider the 
argument made in this Court that the trial court should have 
sua sponte placed the juror's identifying information under 
seal because that argument was not made in the trial court.  
Rule 5:25.  The argument regarding the sufficiency of the 
trial court's response made before the trial court and in oral 
argument here, is not encompassed within the assignment of 
error and thus we do not consider it, Rule 5:17(c).  Moreover, 
Teleguz's counsel agreed that the trial court's response was 
correct.  Accordingly, we reject this assignment of error. 
F.  POST-TRIAL ISSUES 
1.  Brady Claim 
 
A number of Teleguz's assignments of error are directed 
to his claim that the Commonwealth violated his due process 
rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and its 
 
34
progeny by suppressing material evidence that was exculpatory 
or could lead to exculpatory evidence.4  The following facts 
are relevant to Teleguz's Brady violation claim.  According to 
his written notes, Investigator Whitfield interviewed Moore on 
December 18, 2001, at the office of Walter Green, Moore's 
attorney.  The handwritten notes state that the Commonwealth's 
Attorney, Moore, and Green signed a "proffer letter," and that 
Moore then stated that on the "day before" Sipe's murder he, 
along with Ryan Ferguson and Will Davis, were outside Moore's 
apartment smoking marijuana when he saw a white male with 
"mustache," but who was otherwise "clean shaven" leave Sipe's 
apartment.  Moore was shown a photograph array at the 
interview which included Teleguz's photograph and, according 
to the notes, Moore identified Teleguz with 70 percent 
certainty "especially if he had a mustache." 
Investigator Whitfield also made handwritten notes of two 
November 2001 interviews with Ryan Ferguson.  The notes state 
that Ferguson saw a male who looked to be Hispanic with a 
goatee enter and leave Sipe's apartment on July 21, 2001.  
According to the notes, Ferguson was shown a photograph array 
which included Teleguz's photograph.  At first Ferguson said 
                                                          
 
4 Included in this argument on brief was an assignment of 
error regarding the trial court's refusal to grant a 
continuance following Moore's identification of Teleguz from a 
 
35
none of the photographs looked like the person he saw, but 
then said that Teleguz's photograph looked the "most" like the 
person he saw, but that he was not certain.  None of the 
handwritten notes were provided to Teleguz prior to trial.5 
At trial, the Commonwealth showed Moore the photograph 
array containing Teleguz's picture.  Moore testified that 
Investigator Whitfield had showed him this array sometime 
after Sipe's death and that he had identified Teleguz as the 
person he had seen leaving Sipe's apartment. 
Following a lunch break when Teleguz had the opportunity 
to check his files, Teleguz objected to the admission of the 
photograph array and moved for a mistrial, asserting he was 
"surprised" by Moore's testimony and had not been provided 
with the photograph array.  Before the trial court ruled on 
Teleguz's motion, Investigator Whitfield was questioned 
outside of the presence of the jury regarding Moore's 
identification from the photograph array.  Investigator 
Whitfield testified that he had interviewed Moore "probably 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
photographic array.  As discussed above, this assignment of 
error was not preserved.  
5 Prior to trial, Teleguz did receive a computer disc that 
contained a typed portion of Investigator Whitfield's notes 
from his December 18, 2001 interview with Moore.  The typed 
document referenced a proffer letter signed by the 
Commonwealth's Attorney, Moore, and Green, and recited Moore's 
observation of an unknown male leaving Sipe's apartment on 
Saturday evening.  This document did not refer to an 
identification of Teleguz from a photograph array. 
 
36
two weeks" after the murder, although he could not recall the 
precise date without his notes.  He believed the interview 
took place at Moore's residence and that when Moore was shown 
the photograph array, Moore identified Teleguz but was not 100 
percent certain of the identification.  Investigator Whitfield 
testified that he had given his notes to the Commonwealth's 
Attorney.  
Teleguz then objected to the photograph array as "unduly 
suggestive," and reiterated that he had received nothing in 
discovery regarding Moore's identification of Teleguz, 
including Investigator Whitfield's notes.  The trial court 
denied Teleguz's motion for a mistrial and admitted the 
photograph array into evidence.  Investigator Whitfield then 
essentially repeated his testimony in the presence of the 
jury, except for certain statements regarding who was present 
during the interview and the photograph array. 
Following completion of the guilt and penalty portions of 
the capital murder proceeding, Teleguz filed a motion to 
compel disclosure of, inter alia, any material relating to 
Investigator Whitfield's interviews with Moore, Ferguson, and 
Davis, and any proffer agreement between the Commonwealth and 
Moore.  The trial court granted Teleguz's motion and the 
Commonwealth provided Teleguz with Investigator Whitfield's 
handwritten notes from the interviews with Moore and Ferguson.  
 
37
The Commonwealth maintained that there were no notes from any 
interview with Davis and that it did not have in its 
possession any signed proffer agreement relating to Moore.  
The Commonwealth did provide Teleguz with a copy of its 
standard proffer agreement. 
Teleguz then filed a motion asking the trial court to set 
aside the verdict or in the alternative to set aside the 
jury's recommendation of the death penalty and impose a 
sentence of life imprisonment pursuant to Code § 19.2-264.5, 
relying in part on arguments that the evidence suppressed by 
the Commonwealth was material and the Commonwealth's 
suppression denied Teleguz a fair trial.  The Commonwealth, in 
response, asserted inter alia that Teleguz had access prior to 
trial to a computer disc which contained a portion of the 
interview with Moore including a reference to a proffer 
agreement but not to the photograph array identification.  The 
Commonwealth also argued that prior to trial Teleguz had a 
copy of the application for a Pennsylvania search warrant 
dated December 14, 2001, which referred to the interview with 
Ferguson and Ferguson's identification of Teleguz from the 
photograph array.  Finally, the Commonwealth argued that even 
if the evidence not provided was favorable to Teleguz, there 
was no support for the proposition that the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
 
38
Following a hearing, the trial court denied Teleguz's 
motion, concluding that, even if material information had been 
suppressed there was no violation under Brady because there 
was no likelihood that the verdict would have been different.  
On appeal, Teleguz asserts that the trial court committed 
reversible error in refusing to grant a mistrial, refusing to 
set aside the death sentence and impose a sentence of life for 
good cause shown pursuant to Code § 19.2-264.5, and refusing 
to set aside the guilty verdict. 
In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that "the 
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence 
is material to either guilt or to punishment."  373 U.S. at 
87.  We have recently reviewed the principles to be applied in 
considering whether there has been a violation of the Brady 
disclosure rule and its progeny: 
There are three components of a violation of the 
rule of disclosure first enunciated in Brady:  a) 
The evidence not disclosed to the accused 'must 
be favorable to the accused, either because it is 
exculpatory,' or because it may be used for 
impeachment; b) the evidence not disclosed must 
have been withheld by the Commonwealth either 
willfully or inadvertently; and c) the accused 
must have been prejudiced.  [Strickler v. Greene, 
527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999).]  Stated 
differently, "[t]he question is not whether the 
defendant would more likely than not have 
received a different verdict with the evidence, 
but whether in its absence he received a fair 
trial, understood as a trial resulting in a 
 
39
verdict worthy of confidence."  Kyles v. Whitley, 
514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).  
 
Workman v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 633, 644-45, 636 S.E.2d 368, 
374 (2006). 
In determining the question of materiality, we consider 
the suppressed evidence as a whole, not item by item and if a 
Brady violation is established, we do not engage in a harmless 
error review.  Id.; Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435–36 
(1995).  Instead, a "constitutional error occurs, and the 
conviction must be reversed, only if the evidence is material 
in the sense that its suppression undermines confidence in the 
outcome of the trial."  United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 
678 (1985); Workman, 272 Va. at 645, 363 S.E.2d at 374. 
 
The suppressed evidence Teleguz relies on to establish a 
Brady violation consists of Investigator Whitfield's 
handwritten notes relating to his interviews with Moore and 
Ferguson, the photograph array used by Moore and Ferguson in 
the identification of Teleguz, and Moore's proffer agreement.6  
If this evidence had not been suppressed, Teleguz contends, he 
would not have been "surprised" when Moore testified regarding 
his identification of Teleguz from the photograph array; he 
could have used the evidence to impeach the testimony of Moore 
                                                          
 
6 Teleguz identified a number of other documents which he 
also alleged were suppressed.  Because he does not rely on 
 
40
and Investigator Whitfield with regard to Moore's 
identification of Teleguz as the person seen leaving Sipe's 
apartment prior to her murder; and the uncertainty in the 
identification of Teleguz by Moore and Ferguson shown in the 
suppressed evidence could have supported a third party 
perpetrator defense.  Teleguz argues that this suppressed 
evidence was material under the standard in Kyles, because the 
evidence "significantly undermined the credibility of both Mr. 
Moore and Inv[estigator] Whitfield, as well as the overall 
reliability of the police investigation."  Without the 
testimony of Moore and Investigator Whitfield, Teleguz 
contends "the Commonwealth's case rested entirely on 
unreliable and biased witnesses, such as Mr. Hetrick, a 
confessed murderer, Mr. Gilkes, a confessed co-conspirator, 
and Mr. Safanov, a career criminal, each of whom had received 
favorable deals in exchange for their testimony."  In summary, 
Teleguz argues that the inability to impeach the testimony of 
Moore and Investigator Whitfield, the "only two supposedly 
unbiased witnesses," undermines the confidence in the outcome 
of the trial because evidence of Teleguz's guilt would then 
rest solely on the testimony of Gilkes, Hetrick, and Safanov. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
these documents to establish his Brady violation claim, we do 
not consider or address these documents in our analysis.  
 
41
 
While it is clear that Teleguz did not have the evidence 
at issue prior to trial, the Commonwealth argues, and the 
record reflects, that Teleguz did have access before the trial 
to the information that Investigator Whitfield had interviewed 
Moore in December 2001, that a proffer agreement was signed, 
and that Moore, along with Davis and Ferguson, had seen an 
unknown person coming from Sipe's apartment prior to her 
murder.  Teleguz also had information indicating that Ferguson 
had been interviewed by the police and that he was shown a 
photograph array from which he identified Teleguz as the 
person he saw leaving Sipe's apartment.  The Commonwealth also 
argues that it did not suppress any exculpatory evidence 
relating to Ferguson or Davis, that Teleguz had access to the 
photograph array at trial before Moore testified and had the 
opportunity to fully cross-examine Investigator Whitfield 
regarding Moore's identification of Teleguz from the 
photograph array, and finally that it did not suppress Moore's 
proffer agreement because it did not have such agreement in 
its possession.  
In resolving Teleguz's Brady claim, we will assume 
without deciding that the evidence at issue was favorable to 
Teleguz and was suppressed.  We nevertheless conclude that 
this evidence does not meet the test of materiality because 
its suppression does not undermine confidence in the outcome 
 
42
of the trial.  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434-38.  Teleguz was not 
charged with being the actual perpetrator of the wounds 
inflicted on Sipe.  Therefore, impeaching Moore's testimony 
regarding whether Teleguz was present at Sipe's apartment 
prior to her murder would not undermine the testimony 
regarding whether Teleguz hired others to commit the murder.7 
Teleguz's second theory, that impeaching Investigator 
Whitfield's testimony would have called into question the 
reliability of the police investigation and in turn undermine 
confidence in the verdict, is equally unavailing.  The 
investigation that led to identifying the perpetrators and 
Teleguz's role in the murder was initiated by United States 
Deputy Marshal Nelson, not Investigator Whitfield.  In his 
interviews with Safanov, Deputy Marshal Nelson learned that 
Teleguz told Safanov he had hired someone to kill Sipe and 
that Teleguz was "responsible" for her death because he was 
angry about making child support payments.  Based on this 
information, Deputy Marshal Nelson located and identified 
Gilkes.  There is no basis to conclude that any question about 
the reliability of Investigator Whitfield's investigation 
                                                          
 
7 Teleguz argues that Moore's testimony on this issue had 
to be relevant to his guilt or it would not have been 
admissible.  However, such testimony could be relevant to 
establish knowledge and familiarity with Sipe and her 
apartment.  Although such testimony could have been cumulative 
 
43
would have impugned Deputy Marshal Nelson's investigation, 
which initially identified Teleguz's role in Sipe's murder and 
ultimately led to the confessions by Gilkes and Hetrick.  
Finally, we find no merit in Teleguz's argument that the 
reliability of the proceeding is suspect because the only 
independent, and by implication credible, witnesses were Moore 
and Investigator Whitfield.  Neither Moore nor Investigator 
Whitfield testified about any independent knowledge regarding 
the transaction between Teleguz, Gilkes, and Hetrick.  
Regardless of Moore's and Investigator Whitfield's testimony 
and credibility, in order to return a guilty verdict, the jury 
had to believe the testimony of Safanov, Gilkes, and Hetrick, 
irrespective of their character and any "deals" they received 
from the government.  Accordingly, the suppression of the 
evidence at issue did not undermine confidence in the 
reliability of the outcome of the proceeding and the trial 
court did not err in admitting the photograph array, or in 
denying Teleguz's motion for a mistrial, motion to set aside 
the sentence of death and impose a life sentence, and motion 
to set aside the verdict based on an alleged Brady violation. 
2.  Disqualification of Commonwealth's Attorney 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
as Teleguz argues, no such objection to its admission was made 
on that basis. 
 
44
 
Teleguz assigns error to the ruling of the trial court in 
post-trial proceedings denying his motion to disqualify the 
Commonwealth's Attorney.  The Commonwealth's Attorney was 
present at meetings between Investigator Whitfield, Ferguson, 
and Moore.  Teleguz argues that the Commonwealth's Attorney's 
testimony on what transpired at these meetings was "critical" 
in light of the inconsistencies in the testimony of the other 
attendees and the questionable credibility of those witnesses.  
Based on his argument that the Commonwealth's Attorney was a 
material witness, Teleguz asserts that the trial court erred 
in denying his motion to disqualify the Commonwealth's 
Attorney and to issue a subpoena for her testimony. 
 
Teleguz's position is based on the principle that a 
lawyer should not act as an advocate in an adversarial 
proceeding in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary 
witness.  Rule 3.7 of the Virginia Rules of Professional 
Conduct.  Critical to the application of this principle is the 
requirement that the lawyer be a necessary witness.  
Sutherland v. Jagdmann, No. 3:05CV042-JRS, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 25878, at *5 (E.D. Va. Oct. 31, 2005) ("[A] party 
seeking to invoke the witness-advocate rule for 
disqualification purposes must prove that the proposed 
witness-advocate's testimony is strictly necessary.")  
(internal citations omitted).  The facts of this case do not 
 
45
provide that predicate.  As noted above, the testimony of 
Ferguson and Moore regarding the identification of Teleguz is 
not material to the elements of the crime charged.  
Furthermore, Teleguz does not rely on the substance of any 
testimony he suggested the Commonwealth's Attorney would 
provide, only that it would clear up "inconsistencies" in the 
testimony of the others at the meeting.  Adding the testimony 
of a fourth person may reinforce one version of the facts or 
add another, but would not "clear up" inconsistent testimony.  
Finally, any testimony by the Commonwealth's Attorney 
regarding the exchanges between Investigator Whitfield and 
Moore or Investigator Whitfield and Ferguson, would be 
inadmissible hearsay.  Therefore, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying Teleguz's motion. 
3.  Subpoena for Walter Green 
 
Teleguz assigns error to the trial court's refusal to 
issue a subpoena to Walter Green, Moore's attorney.  Teleguz 
argues here, as he did in the trial court, that Green 
represented Moore and Ferguson in this case, and Teleguz and 
Sipe's mother in other matters.  This concurrent 
representation, Teleguz argued, produced a conflict of 
interest, and Teleguz should have been entitled to examine 
Green about the conflicted representation, his role in 
inducing Moore and Ferguson to identify Teleguz and any 
 
46
agreements reached with them, and the nature of any 
discussions with the Commonwealth. 
As the trial court stated in denying Teleguz's motion, 
allegations of conflicting representation are based on the 
Rules of Professional Responsibility and are matters for the 
Virginia State Bar disciplinary process.  The remainder of the 
testimony sought by Teleguz's motion would either be 
inadmissible hearsay, restricted by the attorney-client 
privilege, or cumulative of other testimony regarding the 
interviews.  Accordingly, we find no error in the ruling of 
the trial court denying Teleguz's subpoena request. 
4.  Use of False Evidence 
Teleguz argues the Commonwealth violated his Due Process 
rights, pursuant to Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), by 
knowingly permitting Investigator Whitfield to give false 
testimony.  A conviction obtained based on false testimony 
"must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that 
the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the 
jury."  United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).  This 
requirement applies even where the testimony affects the 
witness' credibility, rather than the issue of guilt.  Napue, 
360 U.S. at 269-70.  In order to find that a violation of 
Napue occurred in this case, we must determine first that the 
testimony identified by Teleguz was false, second that the 
 
47
prosecution knew of the falsity, and finally that the falsity 
affected the jury's judgment.  Id. at 269-71. 
Teleguz identifies five statements by Investigator 
Whitfield which he claims meet these criteria.  As an initial 
matter, two of these statements, Investigator Whitfield's 
testimony regarding who was present at the interview and the 
races of the other individuals whose photographs were included 
on the photograph array, were made during a voir dire that 
took place outside the presence of the jury and, therefore, 
could not have "affected the judgment of the jury," Napue, 360 
U.S. at 271, in violation of the Due Process Clause. 
We conclude that the other portions of Investigator 
Whitfield's testimony cited by Teleguz likewise fail to give 
rise to a violation of Napue.  Contrary to Teleguz's argument, 
Investigator Whitfield did not falsely testify about the 
timing and location of his interview with Moore.  Although a 
review of the record reveals some inconsistencies in 
Investigator Whitfield's testimony, much of his testimony, 
including the inconsistencies, was given in conjunction with 
his own qualification that he was unable to remember or that 
he would need to consult his notes to refresh his 
recollection.  These statements were not false, but rather 
were simply statements of what he believed to be true, 
accompanied by a qualification that he was not certain. 
 
48
The final two statements identified as false by Teleguz 
relate to Investigator Whitfield's testimony regarding the 
impetus for his interview with Moore.  At trial, Investigator 
Whitfield testified that he approached Moore because he 
believed that Moore, as Sipe's neighbor, might have 
information regarding her murder, and because the police were 
already familiar with Moore based on previous interactions 
with him.  Although Whitfield's testimony in a post-trial 
hearing was inconsistent with these statements, nothing in the 
record establishes that the prosecutor knew that Investigator 
Whitfield's trial testimony was inaccurate.8 
As we explained above, Teleguz's guilt depended on the 
testimony of the Commonwealth's witnesses which established 
that Teleguz hired Gilkes and Hetrick to kill Sipe.  Even 
assuming that the prosecutor knew of the alleged false 
testimony, there is no "reasonable likelihood" that 
Investigator Whitfield's testimony on the reason for 
interviewing Moore "could have affected the judgment of the 
jury."  Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103. 
G.  STATUTORY REVIEW 
1.  Passion and Prejudice 
 
                                                          
 
8 While Investigator Whitfield's notes indicate the 
prosecutor was present at the meeting with Moore, they do not 
state whether the meeting took place as a result of Moore 
having approached the police. 
 
49
Teleguz argues that the jury's recommendation to impose a 
sentence of death was made under the influence of passion and 
prejudice because of a statement made by the prosecutor in 
closing argument.  Specifically, the prosecutor told the jury 
that it should find Teleguz posed a future danger and should 
receive the death penalty because "[a]t any time he can pick 
up a phone . . . and dial up a murder."  According to Teleguz, 
this statement "pointedly instilled fear in the members of the 
jury for their very lives."  The prejudicial effect of the 
statement was "greatly amplified," Teleguz asserts, by the 
trial court's subsequent explanation to the jury regarding 
Teleguz's access to the jurors' names and contact information.  
Finally, Teleguz argues that the Commonwealth made improper 
arguments designed to establish that Teleguz was a member of 
the "Russian Mafia" even though there was no evidence to 
support any such connection.  These arguments, according to 
Teleguz, "raise the strong inference" that the jury's finding 
of future dangerousness and the recommendation of the death 
penalty were based on "passion and prejudice, not facts." 
Code § 17.1-313(C)(1) requires that we consider and 
determine "[w]hether the sentence of death was imposed under 
the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary 
factor."  In conducting this review, we make an independent 
review of the entire record.  Based on this review we 
 
50
determine whether the record shows the existence of passion, 
prejudice or any other arbitrary factor and, if so, whether 
such elements influenced the penalty recommended by the jury. 
During closing argument in the penalty phase, the 
Commonwealth's Attorney made the following statement: 
How would he be dangerous in prison?  At any 
time he can pick up a phone when he has access 
to a phone and dial up a murder because he can 
call another Aleksey Safanov or another Edwin 
Gilkes or another Michael Hetrick.  When a man 
can hire out a murder he can hire out a murder 
with a mere telephone when you have the 
abilities that Ivan Teleguz has shown. 
 
Teleguz claims that this argument appealed to the jurors' 
passions by exciting their personal interests in protecting 
their safety.  The statement, however, did not directly 
suggest any connection between the jurors and Teleguz's future 
criminal action.  Compare, e.g., Hutchins v. Commonwealth, 220 
Va. 17, 19, 255 S.E.2d 459, 460-61 (1979) (argument 
questioning whether the jury would suggest a sentence that 
would "send [a message] out to the people of Franklin County 
[that says] 'Come on down.  It's down here.  It's yours for 
the picking.  We don't care.' ").  Considering the nature of 
the crime of murder for hire, the Commonwealth's statement in 
this case is analogous to an argument in a capital murder case 
that a defendant should receive the death penalty because he 
 
51
could be a future danger by replicating his crime of murder 
while in the prison.  
Teleguz argues however, that the effect of this statement 
was enhanced by the prior references to a connection between 
Teleguz and the "Russian Mafia" and the explanation made to 
the jury by the trial court regarding Teleguz's access to 
jurors' names and contact information. 
As discussed above, the record shows that at some point 
during jury deliberations, one of the female jurors, not 
necessarily the jury foreperson, asked the bailiff if Teleguz 
"know[s] her identity and location."  Teleguz argues that the 
trial court's answer "endorsed the Commonwealth's inflammatory 
argument, thereby underscoring the jurors' explicit fear that 
Mr. Teleguz represented a threat to their physical safety."  
The jury's subsequent recommendation of the death penalty was, 
according to Teleguz, based on their "personal interest in 
their own safety and security" and thus made under the 
influence of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factor.9 
We first note that, unlike other questions submitted to 
the trial court during jury deliberations in this case, the 
question regarding Teleguz's knowledge of jurors' names and 
                                                          
 
9 Teleguz asserted in oral argument that the jury 
delivered its sentencing verdict "within minutes" after it 
received the trial court's response.  However, nothing in the 
 
52
contact information was not submitted to the court in writing 
and was made orally by a single juror to the bailiff regarding 
information about her.  Therefore, the record is far from 
clear that the jury as a whole was concerned about whether 
Teleguz had access to the jurors' identity or location 
information.  Furthermore, the trial court's response to the 
inquiry was correct and indicated that defendants are 
generally not provided such information. 
Finally, the fact that Teleguz could hire someone to kill 
another person was established by the evidence in this case; 
that is precisely the crime for which Teleguz was convicted.  
Any purported connection to the "Russian Mafia" does not 
change that fact.  Basing a sentencing determination on an 
undisputed fact is not an act of passion and prejudice.  The 
jurors, furthermore, were clearly instructed during the trial 
that the testimony regarding the "Russian Mafia" was solely 
for the purpose of showing the witnesses' state of mind, not 
for the truth of the matter. 
Teleguz's argument rests on the premise that the 
prosecutor's statements injected passion and prejudice into 
the jury's decision making by conveying a threat to the 
jurors' personal safety and security.  For the reasons stated 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
record indicates the time interval suggested by Teleguz, or 
any other time interval. 
 
53
above, we conclude that the prosecutor's statements were not 
addressed to the jurors' safety and security, and even if that 
was a fair inference, the record does not support a conclusion 
that the jury was concerned about the issue.  Even assuming 
that the jurors harbored sufficient concern about their safety 
the record does not reveal that such concern influenced their 
decision to recommend the death penalty. 
Accordingly, after a complete review of the record, we 
conclude that the sentence of death was not the product of 
passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factor. 
2.  Proportionality 
 
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-313(C)(2), this Court is required 
to review a sentence of death in order to determine "[w]hether 
the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the 
penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime 
and the defendant."  We do not conduct a proportionality 
review to "insure complete symmetry among all death penalty 
cases."  Muhammad, 269 Va. at 532, 619 S.E.2d at 63 (quoting 
Orbe v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 390, 405, 519 S.E.2d 808, 817 
(1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1113 (2000)).  In conducting 
the proportionality review, this Court must determine whether 
"other sentencing bodies in this jurisdiction generally impose 
the supreme penalty for comparable or similar crimes, 
considering both the crime and the defendant."  Lovitt v. 
 
54
Commonwealth, 260 Va. 497, 518, 537 S.E.2d 866, 880 (2000), 
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 815 (2001).  The review is done to 
"identify and invalidate the aberrant death sentence."  
Muhammad, 269 Va. at 532, 619 S.E.2d at 63. 
In conducting this review, we have examined all capital 
murder cases reviewed by this Court in which murder for hire 
was the predicate offense, where the Commonwealth sought the 
death penalty, and where both aggravating factors were found.  
Because only a single case, Wolfe v. Commonwealth, 265 Va. 
193, 576 S.E.2d 471, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1019 (2003), 
involved both aggravating factors, we have also examined those 
cases where a sentence of death was imposed, murder for hire 
was the predicate offense, and only one aggravating factor was 
found, Fisher v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 403, 374 S.E.2d 46 
(1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1028 (1989) (finding by jury of 
future dangerousness); Lewis v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 302, 593 
S.E.2d 220, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 904 (2004) (finding by 
court of vileness).  Finally, our review included those cases 
in which the defendant was convicted of murder for hire in 
violation of Code § 18.2-31(2) and received a sentence of 
life.  Based on this review, we find that Teleguz's sentence 
was neither excessive nor disproportionate to sentences 
imposed in capital murder cases similar to the instant case. 
 
55
Teleguz argues that his sentence is disproportionate 
given that Hetrick, the actual killer, only received a 
sentence of life in prison.  This Court has stated that it 
will not compare the sentences received by confederates in 
order to determine if a sentence is excessive or 
disproportionate because "[t]he test is not whether a jury may 
have declined to recommend the death penalty in a particular 
case but whether generally juries in this jurisdiction impose 
the death sentence for conduct similar to that of the 
defendant."  Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 283-84, 257 
S.E.2d 808, 824 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980).  
See also Lewis, 267 Va. at 313, 593 S.E.2d at 227; Murphy v. 
Commonwealth, 246 Va. 136, 145, 431 S.E.2d 48, 53, cert. 
denied, 510 U.S. 928 (1993); Thomas, 244 Va. at 26, 419 S.E.2d 
at 620; King, 243 Va. at 371, 416 S.E.2d at 679.  Accordingly, 
we reject Teleguz's argument here. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
Upon review of the record and arguments presented, we 
find no reversible error in the judgment of the trial court.  
Additionally, we find no reason to commute or set aside the 
sentence of death.  The judgment of the trial court is 
accordingly affirmed. 
Affirmed.