Title: Dieudonne v. State

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

oe

 

127 Nev., Advance Opinion |
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

ABELL DIEUDONNE, No. 54491

Appellant, FILE D

‘THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent.

 

Dera
Appeal from a judgment of convietion, pursbant to a guilty

plea, of conspiracy to commit robbery, robbery with the use of a deadly
weapon, and second-degree murder. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark
Smith, Judge.

Affirmed,

County; Dough

 

David M. Schieck, Special Public Defender, and JoNell Thomas, Deputy
Special Public Defender, Clark County,
for Appellant.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; David J. Roger,
District Attorney, Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and
Susan M. Pate, Deputy District Attorney, Clark County,

for Respondent.

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.
OPINION

By the Court, CHERRY, J.:

In this appeal, we consider whether a criminal defendant
holds an absolute right to be sentenced by the judge who accepted his or
her plea. We conclude that there is no such right absent an express
agreement or indication by the defendant that the plea was entered with

MU 02036

 
 
 

that expectation. In this case, there was no such express agreement, and
we decline to imply one based on the judge's use of a personal pronoun
during the plea canvass, particularly given the defendant's failure to
object to proceeding with sentencing before a different judge. We also take
this opportunity to reaffirm our holding in Buschauer v. State, 106 Nev.
890, 893, 804 P.2d 1046, 1048 (1990), that witnesses offering oral victim
impact statements must be sworn. While the victim impact witnesses in
this case were not sworn, we cannot say that this error rises to the level of
plain error warranting a new sentencing hearing. Accordingly, we affirm
the judgment of conviction,
FACTS

Appellant Abell Dicudonne was charged in connection with
the robbery and murder of Giovanna Simmons. The State alleged that
Dieudonne and Semairo McNair conspired to rob Simmons and burglarize
her house. Specifically, the State alleged that McNair unlawfully entered
Simmons's residence with the intent to commit robbery, brandished a
loaded weapon to forcefully take Simmons’s money and marijuana, and
subsequently shot and killed her while Dieudonne acted as the lookout
and getaway driver during the commission of the crimes, The State
charged Dieudonne with conspiracy to commit burglary, burglary while in
possession of a firearm, conspiracy to commit robbery, attempted robbery
with the use of a deadly weapon, conspiracy to commit murder, and
murder with the use ofa deadly weapon.

Dieudonne entered a plea before Judge Elizabeth Gonzalez,
with the terms of the plea agreement providing that Dieudonne would
plead guilty to conspiracy to commit robbery, robbery with the use of a
deadly weapon, and second-degree murder, and the State would not
oppose the sentence for the conspiracy charge running concurrently to the

2

 
sentences for the other charges. Dietdonne indicated that he understood
the extent of the district court's discretion as to the range of sentences and
also acknowledged that he had not received any promises with regard to
sentencing that were not contained in his plea agreement. During the
plea canvass, Judge Gonzalez repeatedly used the personal pronoun “I”
when explaining the court's sentencing discretion but never directly
referenced that she would impose the sentence.

Before the sentencing hearing, the case was transferred from
Judge Gonzalez to Judge Douglas Smith.! At the sentencing hearing,
Judge Smith inquired of defense counsel as to whether there was any legal

reason why the court should not go forward with sentencing that day, and

 

counsel responded in the negative. Defense counsel did not object to Judge
‘Smith presiding over the hearing.

During the sentencing hearing, the victim’s sisters and friends

 

gave victim impact statements, These statements contained profanity,
threats, and the use of a racially based disparaging term directed at
Dieudonne.

Judge Smith sentenced Dieudonne to serve a term of 12 to 72

months on the conspiracy-to-commit-robbery charge, two consecutive

 

terms of 60 to 180 months on the robbery-with-use-of-a-deadly-weapon
charge, and a term of 120 months to life on the second-degree murder
charge. The sentences for each of the counts were ordered to run
consecutively. Dieudonne’s counsel expressed surprise that the district

court ordered the sentence on conspiracy to commit robbery to be served

*The record is silent as to the reason for the transfer of the case.

 

 
consecutively and noted that Judge Smith was not the judge who took the
plea. Thereafter, Judge Smith decided to make the conspiracy sentence
concurrent to the robbery and murder sentences and entered an amended
judgment of conviction. At the time, Judge Smith acknowledged that
Dieudonne had probably anticipated that Judge Gonzalez would sentence
him.

On appeal, Dieudonne contends that: (1) under the
circumstances, he was entitled to be sentenced by the judge who took his
guilty plea; and (2) he was entitled to a sentencing hearing in which those
testifying were sworn in, and in which testimony was not plagued by
racial epithets and profanity. We affirm the district court on all issues
because we conclude that there was no error with regard to the first issue
raised on appeal, and because the error associated with the second issue
did not amount to plain error.

DISCUSSION

Failure to object

Because Dieudonne failed to object to either being sentenced
by Judge Smith or to any of the victim impact statements, we review
Dieudonne’s arguments on appeal for plain error only. Vega v, State, 126
Nev. __, __, 236 P.3d 632, 636 (2010). While failure to object generally
precludes appellate review, we have discretion to address any errors that
were plain and that affected the defendant's substantial rights. Gallego v,

"The State argues that Dieudonne cannot appeal from the amended
judgment of conviction, as he is not an aggrieved party pursuant to NRS
177.015. We need not resolve this jurisdictional issue because Dieudonne
timely appealed from the judgment of conviction and there are no separate
issues related to the amended judgment.

 

 
 

State, 117 Nev. 348, 365, 23 P.3d 227, 239 (2001). “In conducting plain
error review, we must examine whether there was ‘error, whether the
error was ‘plain’ or clear, and whether the error affected the defendant's
substantial rights.” Green v. State, 119 Nev. 542, 545, 80 P.3d 93, 95
(2003). To amount to plain error, an error must be so unmistakable that it
is apparent from a casual inspection of the record. Vega, 126 Nev. at __,
632 P.3d at 637 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Dieudonne
‘must demonstrate that an error was prejudicial in order to establish that
it affected his substantial rights. Gallego, 117 Nev. at 365, 23 P.Sd at 239.
Sentencing requirements

Dieudonne contends that, as a matter of due process, he was
entitled to be sentenced by Judge Gonzalez because she took his guilty

plea, remains available as a sitting judge, and has retained discretion over

 

the sentence to be imposed. Furthermore, Dieudonne argues that he
entered his guilty plea with an expectation that he would be sentenced by
Judge Gonzalez. Dieudonne relies on People v. Arbuckle, 587 P.2d 220,
224-25 (Cal. 1978), for support of this contention. The State asserts that

Dieudonne was well aware that he was not guaranteed to be sentenced by

 

any particular judge because the plea agreement does not contain any
such promise, While this is an issue of first impression for this court,
several other jurisdictions have addressed the issue.

In the case on which Dieudonne relies, Arbuckle, the
California Supreme Court confronted this very situation. There, the
defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of assault with a deadly weapon with
intent to commit murder in exchange for a dismissal of assault-with-a-
deadly-weapon and possession-of-marijuana charges, Id, at 221. The

judge who accepted the plea was then transferred to another department

 

 
before sentencing. Id. at 222. During sentencing, the defendant objected
to the imposition of the sentence by another judge and requested a
transfer. 1d, His request was denied, and he was sentenced by the second
judge. Id.

On appeal, the defendant asserted that it was an implicit term
in the plea bargain that the judge that took the plea would be the judge
that conducted the sentencing. Id. at 224. The court agreed, concluding
that the judge's repeated use of the personal pronoun “I” supported the
conclusion that the plea bargain “was entered in expectation of and in
reliance upon sentence being imposed by the same judge.” Id, The
Arbuckle court determined that:

As a general principle, moreover, whenever
‘a judge accepts a plea bargain and retains
sentencing discretion under the agreement, an
implied term of the bargain is that sentence will
be imposed by that judge. Because of the range of
dispositions available to a sentencing judge, the
propensity in sentencing demonstrated by a
particular judge is an inherently significant factor
in the defendant's decision to enter a guilty plea.

Td, at 224-25,
‘The Arbuckle court concluded that the sentence imposed by
another judge could not be allowed to stand because the defendant had
been denied that aspect of the plea bargain. Id, at 225. Finally, the court
stated that if internal court administrative practices render it impossible
for the defendant to be sentenced by the judge that took the plea, then the
defendant should be permitted to choose between either withdrawing the
plea or proceeding before a different available judge. Id, at 225 & n.5.
Since Arbuckle has been decided, it has been interpreted by a

multitude of California Court of Appeal cases, with varying results.

 

 
Some courts of appeal in California have applied Arbuckle to
the outmost extent of the holding, concluding that there is an implied term
in plea bargains that the sentence will be imposed by the judge that
accepted the plea. See People v, Letter, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 723, 732-34
(Ct. App. 2002) (determining that “sentencing by a different judge
constitutes a significant deviation from the terms of the plea bargain’),
disapproved of on other grounds by Peracchi v, Superior Court, 70 P.3d
1054, 1062 n.6 (Cal. 2003); People v, Rosaia, 203 Cal. Rptr, 856, 861 (Ct.
App. 1984) (rejecting the argument that the right to be sentenced by the
same judge who took the plea, as provided in Arbuckle, is not applicable
when the defendant has failed to object to sentencing before a different
judge, and concluding that the record must indicate that the defendant
knew he had the right to be sentenced by the same judge who took his plea
but waived that right by his conduct), disapproved of on other grounds by
People v, Horn, 261 Cal. Rptr. 814, 819-20 (Ct. App. 1989). However,
other California Courts of Appeal have refused to imply in all plea
agreements the term that the judge who accepts the plea must also impose
the sentence.

“As many courts have recognized, Arbuckle does not stand for
the blanket proposition that under all circumstances, a defendant is
entitled to assert his or her right to have the same judge who presided
over the plea hearing also preside over the sentencing hearing.” People v.
Hau, 85 Cal. Rptr. 34 566, 574 (Ct. App. 2008). “Tt is not always an
implied term of a plea bargain that the judge who accepts the plea will

impose the sentence; rather, the record must affirmatively demonstrate

some basis upon which a defendant may reasonably expect that the judge
who accepts the plea will retain sentencing discretion.” People v. Serrato,

 

 
 

ne

 

247 Cal. Rptr. 322, 323-24 (Ct. App. 1988) (quoting People v. Ruhl, 214
Cal. Rptr. 98, 96 (Ct. App. 1985)); see also People v. McIntosh, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 901, 902 (Ct. App. 2009) (concluding that when, for reasons
beyond the court's or the prosecutor's control, the judge who accepted the
plea becomes unavailable, there is no automatic right for the defendant to
withdraw his or her plea unless the evidence demonstrates that the
identity of the sentencing judge was a material element in the defendant's
decision to plead guilty).

Additionally, courts in other jurisdictions have also declined to
conclude that a defendant has an absolute right to be sentenced by the
judge who accepted the plea, As stated by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, “there is no independent federal right to be
sentenced by the same judge that took a guilty plea and [we] find no
constitutional provision that guarantees such a right.” Taylor_v.
Bowersox, 329 F.8d 963, 969 (8th Cir. 2003); see also United States v,
Russell, 776 F.2d 956, 959 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that the defendant is
not entitled to be sentenced by the judge who took his plea when the judge
made no promise to sentence him); United States v, Pizzo, 453 F.2d 1063,
1065 (3d Cir, 1972) (holding that when the defendant admitted that he
pleaded guilty for reasons other than to have the judge who took his plea
sentence him, the defendant could properly be sentenced by a different
judge); State v. Carson, 597 P.2d 862, 865 (Utah 1979) (stating that
“{w]hile it is preferable that the judge who takes a defendant's plea be the
same as the judge who sentences that defendant, it is not essential that
they be the same” (footnote omitted)),

We determine this line of cases that rein in Arbuckle to be
more persuasive, We conclude that the decision in Arbuckle goes too far to

 
 

om

 

the extent that it recognizes an absolute right to be sentenced by the judge
who accepted the plea. We cannot agree that it is always an implied term
of a plea bargain that the judge who accepts the plea will impose the
sentence. If we accepted Dieudonne’s argument, a defendant could claim,
based only on an unexpressed unilateral expectation, that he or she has
the right to be sentenced by the judge who accepted the plea. This would
allow one party to profoundly affect the proceedings with nothing more
than a bare assertion,

Allowing a defendant to assert such a right prior to any
sentencing would interfere with the district courts’ broad authority to
, see Halverson v, Hardcastle, 123 Nev.
245, 261, 163 P.3d 428, 439-40 (2007) (the judiciary has broad inherent

administer their own caseloa:

 

powers to carry out its basic functions, to administer its own affairs, and
to perform its duties), and this would exacerbate preexisting difficulties in
the district court that often arise from the scheduling as

 

‘ignments of

 

istrict court judges.
Allowing a defendant to assert such a right after a sentence
has been imposed would essentially permit a defendant to try his or her
luck by asking to be resentenced by the judge who accepted the plea, Just
as a defendant is not guaranteed any particular sentence, he or she is not
automatically entitled to a second sentencing hearing before a particular
judge. See Randell v, State, 109 Nev. 5, 8, 846 P.2d 278, 280 (1993) (the
district court has wide discretion in its sentencing decision). We thus
conclude that without some explicit agreement, the district court need not
honor a defendant's unexpressed expectation.
We are well aware that in some circumstances, a defendant
considers the judge when deciding whether to enter a guilty plea. We

 
acknowledge that the identity of the sentencing judge may be of such
significance that the defendant would not enter the plea without a
guarantee of being sentenced by the judge who accepted the plea.
Although it is preferable that the judge who takes a defendant's plea be
the same judge who sentences that defendant, this court will not mandate
such a requirement. Certainly, where the judge who accepts a plea is
available, there may be a reasonable expectation that he or she will
impose the sentence, but it is not enough for a defendant to imply an
absolute right to be sentenced by the same judge who took the plea. At the
time of sentencing, there must be an acknowledgement that a promise
made by the court or by the prosecutor led to an express agreement that
the defendant would be sontenced by that particular jurist. A clear
statement must be made that the plea was entered in expectation of, and
in reliance upon, the sentence being imposed by the same judge who took
the plea in order to assert such a right.

While the circumstances of this case—the judge's repeated use
of the personal pronoun throughout the plea canvass—are similar to those
in Arbuckle, Dieudonne failed to demonstrate any expectation of, or
reliance on, being sentenced by the same judge who took his plea, and we
decline to imply such an expectation based solely on the judge's use of a
personal pronoun during the plea canvass. Upon complete review of the
record in this case, we fail to see any evidence that a promise or an
agreement arose that Dieudonne would be sentenced by Judge Gonzalez.
Dieudonne’s failure to object further supports the conclusion that the plea

‘was, in fact, not entered into in reliance on the sentencing judge being the

same as the judge who accepted the plea.

 

 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that it was not error for
Dieudonne to be sentenced by a judge other than the judge who accepted
his guilty plea.
Victim impact statements

Dieudonne contends that the district court improperly failed to
swear in the victim impact witnesses and violated his due process rights
by allowing the victim impact witnesses to testify in a certain manner.
With respect to the failure to swear in the witnesses, we agree, and we
reaffirm our holding in Buschauer v, State, 106 Nev. 890, 893, 804 P.2d
1046, 1048 (1990), that when a witness gives an oral victim impact
statement at sentencing, the witness must be sworn before testifying. The
district court erred in failing to swear in the witnesses, We further
conclude that this error was plain, as the law is clear that witnesses giving
an oral victim impact statement must first be sworn, However, we cannot
conclude that this error was prejudicial and, therefore, that it affected
Dieudonne’s substantial rights. There is no indication in the record that
the district court based its sentencing decision on the unsworn victim
impact statements. In sentencing Dieudonne, Judge Smith expressed that
Dicudonne’s criminal history was the primary reason for his decision and

made no reference to the victim impact statements. Further, “[t]he

*When properly preserved for appellate review, we analyze the
erroneous admission of victim impact statements for harmless error.
Sherman v. State, 114 Nev. 998, 1014, 965 P.2d 903, 914 (1998), However,
because Dieudonne did not object at trial, thus failing to preserve the error
for review, we review the district court's failure to swear in the victim
impact witnesses for plain error. Vega v. State, 126 Nev.__, _, 236
P.3d 632, 638 (2010).

 

 
district court is capable of listening to the victim’s feelings without being
subjected to an overwhelming influence by the victim in making its
sentencing decision.” Randell, 109 Nev. at 8, 846 P.2d at 280.

Dieudonne further contends that the district court violated his
due process rights by allowing victim impact speakers to use racial
epithets, curse words, and threats directed at him, and in allowing the
speakers to abuse the judicial system by acting without decorum. NRS
176.015(3) grants certain victims of crime an opportunity to “[xJeasonably
express any views concerning the crime, the person responsible, the
impact of the crime on the vietim and the need for restitution.” NRS
176.016(3)(b). “NRS 176.015(8) is similar in scope to statutes enacted in
Arizona and California. Courts in both states take expansive views of
their vietim impact statutes, concluding that they are designed to grant
victims expanded rights, rather than to limit the rights of victims.”
Randell, 109 Nev. at 7, 846 P.2d at 280 (citations omitted). However,
while the statute is broad in terms of what a victim can express, it is not
without limitation

 

racially charged comments, threats, and cursing are
not appropriate. See, e.g., People v. Polite, 45 Cal. Rptr. 845, 850 (Ct. App.
1965) (stating that “the trial judge owes a duty to see that proper
demeanor is maintained”); State v, Pelletier, 786 A.2d 609, 611-13 (Me.
2001) (affirming a contempt finding for a serious breach of decorum when
the defendant wore a vulgar T-shirt to his arraignment in front of a
heavily populated courtroom). Pursuant to the Nevada Code of Judicial

Conduct, judges are required to manage the courtroom to limit, as much

as possible, behavior such as racially charged comments, threats, and
curses, See NCJC Canon 2, Rule 2.8 (stating that “[a] judge shall require
order and decorum in proceedings before the court” and that a judge shall

 

 
om

 

require “dignified” and “courteous” behavior from those “subject to the
judge's direction and control"). ‘This decorum is to be maintained at all
times, including during victim impact statements. See id.

Because Diewdonne’s counsel failed to object to the victim
impact testimony, we review the issue under a plain error analysis as
‘opposed to an abuse of discretion standard. See Vega v. State, 126 Nev.
_s —. 286 P.3d 632, 638 (2010). Dieudonne contends that prejudice
affecting his substantial rights resulted from the improper victim impact
statements, While we agree that the victim impact statements contained
instances of harsh and inappropriate language, we conclude that this
language does not render the proceeding fundamentally unfair. The
record reflects that Judge Smith's sentencing decision was not affected by
the inappropriate statements. See Randell, 109 Nev. at 7-8, 846 P.2d at
280 (“[JJudges spend much of their professional lives

 

eparating the

 

wheat from the chaff and have extensive experience in sentencing, along
with the legal training necessary to determine an appropriate sentence.”
(quoting People v, Mockel, 276 Cal. Rptr. 559, 563 (Ct. App. 1990). While
Dieudonne contends that the prejudice from these statements is reflected
in the fact that he, as the less culpable defendant, received a much
harsher sentence than his codefendant for the same offenses, the
differences in the sentences do not demonstrate prejudice. See Nobles v.
Warden, 106 Nev. 67, 68, 787 P.2d 390, 391 (1990) (stating that
sentencing is individualized, and there is no legal requirement that the

13

 
district court sentence codefendants identically). Accordingly, we conclude
that the admission of the victim impact statements did not affect
Dieudonne’s substantial rights.

For the foregoing reason:

 

we affirm the judgment of

Che,

Cherry

conviction.