Title: Taylor v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC17-1458 
____________ 
 
WILLIAM KENNETH TAYLOR, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[April 5, 2018] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before the Court on appeal by William Taylor from an order 
denying a motion to vacate a sentence of death under Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.851.  Because the order concerns postconviction relief from a sentence 
of death, this Court has jurisdiction over the appeal under article V, section 3(b)(1) 
of the Florida Constitution.  For the reasons explained below, we affirm the 
postconviction court’s denial of relief. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Taylor was found guilty of first-degree murder of Sandra Kushmer, 
attempted first-degree murder of William Maddox, robbery with a deadly weapon, 
 
 
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robbery with a firearm, and armed burglary of a dwelling.  See Taylor v. State 
(Taylor I), 937 So. 2d 590, 596 (Fla. 2006).  After the penalty phase, the jury 
returned a recommendation of death by a vote of twelve to zero.  Id. at 597.  The 
trial court found the following aggravating circumstances: “(1) the murder was 
committed while Taylor was on felony probation; (2) Taylor had previously been 
convicted of a felony involving a threat of violence to the person; and (3) the 
murder was committed for pecuniary gain.”  Id. (citations omitted).  Each 
aggravating circumstance was afforded great weight.  Id.  The trial court did not 
find that any statutory mitigators existed, but found thirteen nonstatutory 
mitigating circumstances.  Id.  The trial court concluded that the aggravating 
circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances and Taylor was sentenced 
to death.  Id. 
 
On direct appeal, Taylor raised one guilt phase claim and three penalty phase 
claims.  Id. at 597-601.  We denied Taylor’s claims and upheld his convictions and 
sentence of death.  Id. at 604.  Taylor did not seek certiorari review, and his 
sentence became final upon expiration of the time to file a petition for writ of 
certiorari.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1)(A).  
On October 9, 2006, Taylor filed a postconviction motion under Florida 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  Taylor v. State (Taylor II), 87 So. 3d 749, 756-
57 (Fla. 2012).  The postconviction court denied all of Taylor’s postconviction 
 
 
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claims.  Id. at 757.  Taylor also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus.  Id. at 
753.  We affirmed the postconviction court’s denial of Taylor’s rule 3.851 motion 
and denied Taylor’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Id. at 765.   
 
On January 9, 2017, Taylor filed a successive motion for postconviction 
relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  The postconviction court 
denied Taylor’s motion.   
This appeal follows.   
ANALYSIS 
In this successive postconviction motion, Taylor raises two claims: (1) his 
death sentence violates the Sixth Amendment in light of Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 
So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2161 (2017), and Hurst v. Florida, 
136 S. Ct. 616 (2016); and (2) his death sentence violates the Eighth Amendment 
under Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985).  These issues present purely 
legal questions, which we review de novo.  E.g., Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248, 
1262 (Fla. 2016). 
In Davis v. State, 207 So. 3d 142 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2218 
(2017), we held that a jury’s unanimous recommendation of death is “precisely 
what we determined in Hurst to be constitutionally necessary to impose a sentence 
of death” because a “jury unanimously f[inds] all of the necessary facts for the 
imposition of [a] death sentence[] by virtue of its unanimous recommendation[].”  
 
 
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207 So. 3d at 175.  This Court has consistently relied on Davis to deny Hurst relief 
to defendants who have received unanimous jury recommendations of death.  See, 
e.g., Smithers v. State, No. SC17-1283 (Fla. Mar. 29, 2018); Grim v. State, No. 
SC17-1071 (Fla. Mar. 29, 2018); Bevel v. State, 221 So. 3d 1168, 1178 (Fla. 2017); 
Guardado v. Jones, 226 So. 3d 213, 215 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, No. 17-7171 
(U.S. Apr. 2, 2018); Cozzie v. State, 225 So. 3d 717, 733 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, 
No. 17-7545 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2018); Morris v. State, 219 So. 3d 33, 46 (Fla.), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 452 (2017); Tundidor v. State, 221 So. 3d 587, 607-08 (Fla. 
2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 829 (2018); Oliver v. State, 214 So. 3d 606, 617 
(Fla.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 3 (2017); Truehill v. State, 211 So. 3d 930, 956-57 
(Fla.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 3 (2017).  Taylor is among those defendants who 
received a unanimous jury recommendation of death, and his arguments do not 
compel departing from our precedent. 
Accordingly, because we find that any Hurst error in this case was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirm the circuit court’s order summarily denying 
Taylor’s successive motion for postconviction relief. 
Taylor also contends that a unanimous jury recommendation violates the 
Eighth Amendment pursuant to Caldwell, when a jury is repeatedly told that its 
role is advisory.  Taylor’s Caldwell claim is procedurally barred because it was 
raised and rejected on direct appeal.  Taylor I, 937 So. 2d at 599; e.g., Dennis v. 
 
 
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State, 109 So. 3d 680, 692 (Fla. 2012) (“Dennis’ claim . . . is procedurally barred 
because it was raised and rejected on direct appeal.”). 
CONCLUSION  
  
Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of Taylor’s motion 
for postconviction relief.  
 
It is so ordered.  
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, and 
LAWSON, JJ., concur.  
CANADY, J., concurs in result. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Hillsborough County,  
Michelle Sisco, Judge - Case No. 292001CF008692000AHC  
 
Kevin T. Beck of Law Office of Kevin T. Beck, P.A., St. Petersburg, Florida,  
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Christina Z. 
Pacheco, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,  
 
 
for Appellee