Title: State v. Gonzalez

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2011 WI 63 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP1249-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Esteban M. Gonzalez, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2010 WI App 104 
Reported at: 328 Wis. 2d 182, 789 N.W.2d 365 
(Ct. App. 2010-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 8, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 8, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
CIRCUIT COURT 
 
COUNTY: 
MILWAUKEE 
 
JUDGE: 
PATRICIA D. McMahon 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J. concurs (Opinion filed). 
GABLEMAN, J. joins concurrence. 
ZIEGLER, J. concurs (Opinion filed). 
ROGGENSACK, J. joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Frank J. Schiro, Kristin Anne Hodorowski, 
and Law Office of Frank Joseph Schiro, LTD.  
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Maura 
Whelan, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
2011 WI 63
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2009AP1249-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2006CF2405) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Esteban M. Gonzalez, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 8, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals1 affirming the 
judgment of conviction and order denying post-conviction relief 
of the circuit court for Milwaukee County, Patricia D. McMahon, 
Judge.  The defendant, Esteban M. Gonzalez, was convicted of 
Count 1, exposing a child to harmful material, contrary to Wis. 
                                                 
1 State v. Gonzalez, 2010 WI App 104, 328 Wis. 2d 182, 789 
N.W.2d 365. 
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
2 
 
Stat. § 948.11(2)(a) (2005-06).2  He was acquitted of Count 2, 
intentionally causing a child to view sexually explicit conduct, 
which in the present case was masturbation.  
¶2 
The question presented on review of the conviction of 
Count 1 is whether the defendant should be granted a new trial 
because there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury was 
misled 
by 
the 
jury 
instruction 
and 
applied 
it 
in 
an 
unconstitutional manner.  More specifically, the question 
presented is whether the defendant has shown there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the instruction, viewed in the light 
of the proceedings as a whole, misled the jury into believing 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.11(2)(a) (2005-06) defines the crime 
as follows: 
(2)(a) Whoever, with knowledge of the character and 
content of the material, sells, rents, exhibits, 
plays, distributes, or loans to a child any harmful 
material, with or without monetary consideration, is 
guilty of a Class I felony if any of the following 
applies: 
1. The person knows or reasonably should know that the 
child has not attained the age of 18 years. 
2. The person has face-to-face contact with the child 
before or during the sale, rental, exhibit, playing, 
distribution, or loan. 
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-06 
version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
3 
 
that the State need not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant knowingly exhibited the harmful material to the child.3 
¶3 
We 
conclude 
that 
the 
jury 
was 
not 
instructed 
explicitly or implicitly that it had to determine whether the 
defendant had knowingly exhibited the harmful material to the 
child, 
as 
distinguished 
from 
accidentally 
or 
unknowingly 
exhibiting harmful material to the child.  The jury instruction 
did not sufficiently define the first element of the crime, 
                                                 
3 The defendant argues that the circuit court made several 
erroneous evidentiary rulings.  "[E]rroneous evidentiary rulings 
can, in combination, rise to the level of a due process 
violation."  Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 53 (1996) 
(plurality opinion) (quoted with approval in Michigan v. Bryant, 
___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1162 n.13 (2011).  
Because we determine that the misleading jury instruction 
necessitates a new trial, we do not fully address those 
arguments.   
Nevertheless, we note two erroneous circuit court rulings.  
First, the circuit court erroneously failed to allow the 
defendant to present testimony bolstering his character.  As the 
State's brief concedes:  
The circuit court misapplied § 906.08(1)(b).  The rule 
provides that the "truthful character" of a testifying 
defendant "may be  . . . supported by evidence in the 
form 
of 
reputation 
or 
opinion." . . . Thus, 
[Gonzalez's family members'] opinions about Gonzalez's 
"truthful character" were admissible. 
Second, the circuit court erroneously refused to allow the 
defendant to make an offer of proof that the defendant offered 
to take a polygraph examination prior to being represented, 
believing that the polygraph results would be admissible.  The 
State's brief (citing State v. Pfaff, 2004 WI App 31, ¶26, 269 
Wis. 2d 786, 676 N.W.2d 562) acknowledges the appropriate law:  
"Although polygraph test results are always inadmissible, an 
offer to take a polygraph test may be admissible." 
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
4 
 
namely, that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant knowingly exhibited the harmful material to the 
child.  Accordingly, we are satisfied that the jury instruction  
misled the jury into believing that the State did not have the 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
knowingly exhibited the harmful material to the child.  Viewing 
the jury instruction in light of the proceedings as a whole, we 
further conclude that the defendant has established a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury applied the instruction in a way that 
relieved the State of its burden of proving every element of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore applied the 
potentially confusing instruction in an unconstitutional manner.  
We therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals and 
remand the cause for a new trial.   
I 
¶4 
The defendant was charged with two counts.  Count 1 
was for exposing a child to harmful material.4  Count 2 was for 
intentionally causing a child to view sexually explicit conduct, 
specifically in the present case, masturbation.5   
                                                 
4 Wis. Stat. § 948.11. 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.055 states in full: 
(1) Whoever intentionally causes a child who has not 
attained 18 years of age to view or listen to sexually 
explicit conduct may be penalized as provided in sub. 
(2) if the viewing or listening is for the purpose of 
sexually 
arousing 
or 
gratifying 
the 
actor 
or 
humiliating or degrading the child. 
(2) Whoever violates sub. (1) is guilty of: 
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
5 
 
¶5 
The two counts stem from an incident that occurred on 
April 24, 2006.  The defendant was taking care of his three-and-
one-half-year-old daughter in a two-bedroom apartment.  It is 
undisputed that on that evening the defendant masturbated to a 
pornographic film in the living room of his apartment.     
¶6 
Three 
police officers, two detectives and their 
lieutenant, 
and 
the 
defendant 
were 
the 
principal 
trial 
witnesses.   
¶7 
The officers testified about statements made by the 
defendant in two interviews on May 1 and 2, 2006.  
¶8 
The State's position at trial was that the defendant 
admitted to the officers that he was aware that his daughter had 
entered the living room, and that the defendant, "caught up in 
the moment," failed to stop his activities, thereby exposing his 
daughter 
to 
the 
pornographic 
film 
and 
sexually 
explicit 
behavior. 
¶9 
The officers testified that the defendant's initial 
statements to police on May 1, 2006, were exculpatory.  The 
defendant's statements were to the effect that the child was in 
bed and that, although she may have been out of bed, she did not 
see him masturbate and did not see the video. 
¶10 The State presented testimony that at the May 2, 2006, 
interview the defendant made oral and written statements that 
                                                                                                                                                             
(a) A Class F felony if the child has not attained the 
age of 13 years. 
(b) A Class H felony if the child has attained the age 
of 13 years but has not attained the age of 18 years. 
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
6 
 
were 
inculpatory. 
 
Lieutenant 
Edwards 
testified: 
"[The 
defendant] had told me that he heard [his daughter] come into 
the [living] room.  He didn't directly look at her, but he knew 
she was in the room from what he heard."  Lieutenant Edwards 
further testified that "the video was on the television 
approximately three minutes," "that [the defendant] masturbated 
during the entire time," and that "the child was in the room 
during the entire time."   
¶11 Detective Antreassian testified: "[The defendant] told 
me that in the evening hours he had been in a recliner in his 
living room masturbating and he looked out the corner of his eye 
and he did see his daughter in the room and at the time there 
was a video playing and he was caught up in the moment and he 
continued until he did ejaculate and she was in the room."  
¶12 The persistent theme of the defendant's testimony was 
that during the initial interviews the detectives repeatedly 
urged him to admit that he accidentally exposed the child to 
harmful material, implying that he would be in less trouble if 
he admitted to an accidental exposure. 
¶13 At 
trial, 
the 
defendant 
denied 
the 
inculpatory 
statements and testified that the pretrial statements were given 
under duress and were coerced.  The defendant did not deny that 
he was watching the video.  He did not deny that the video was 
"harmful material" for the child. 
¶14 At trial, the defendant denied any knowledge that the 
child was present in the living room while the video was 
playing.  He claimed that the child was never within his 
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
7 
 
"eyeshot."  His testimony suggested that if the child saw the 
video, the viewing was accidental and without his knowledge. 
¶15 The defendant testified that on the evening of April 
24, 2006, he was taking care of his daughter in his apartment.  
At approximately 7:00 P.M. he put his daughter to bed.  Soon 
afterward, she got out of bed and came out of her bedroom.  The 
defendant put her back to bed.  She then called out to the 
defendant.  He went into her room and tucked her back into bed.  
A little while later, the defendant heard her bedroom door open, 
saw the bathroom light go on, and heard his daughter put herself 
back to bed.  At approximately 8:00 to 8:30 P.M., according to 
the defendant, she came out of the bedroom a fourth time.  He 
yelled at her and told her she needed to go back to bed, and he 
placed her back in her bed.   
¶16 Following this, the defendant testified that he was 
watching television, sitting in his recliner in the living room, 
and talking to a friend on the computer.  The defendant 
estimated the conversation with the friend lasted an hour.  He 
testified that he then began to play a pornographic video with 
the sound muted and masturbate.   
¶17 The defendant testified that approximately 30 seconds 
after initiating those activities he heard a noise, sat up, and 
looked around.  Seeing nothing and believing the noise to have 
come from the upstairs neighbor's apartment, the defendant 
testified he finished masturbating, turned off the video, 
cleaned himself up, pulled up his pants, and watched a short 
portion of a recorded television program. 
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
8 
 
¶18 The defendant further testified that he then got up to 
use the bathroom.  He walked around the corner of the living 
room into the hallway and saw his daughter lying on the floor, 
hands under her chin, in the doorway of her bedroom.  He again 
scolded her and directed her to go back to bed. 
¶19 Further facts will be presented in the discussion of 
the jury instruction. 
II 
¶20 We turn now to the standard of review an appellate 
court applies when a challenge is made to a jury instruction.  
¶21 There 
are 
two 
types 
of 
challenges 
to 
a 
jury 
instruction. 
 
One 
challenges 
the 
legal 
accuracy 
of 
the 
instruction.  The other asserts that a legally accurate 
instruction unconstitutionally misleads the jury.6    
¶22 When 
a 
jury 
instruction 
is 
challenged 
as 
not 
completely 
and 
correctly 
informing 
the 
jury 
of 
the 
law 
applicable to the charge, the challenger has presented a 
question of law that an appellate court determines independently 
of the circuit court and court of appeals but benefiting from 
their analyses.7   
                                                 
6 State v. Burris, 2011 WI 32, ¶44, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 797 
N.W.2d 430. 
7 Ferguson, 317 Wis. 2d 586, ¶9. 
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
9 
 
¶23 When a jury instruction is challenged as confusing or 
misleading, such that it is subject to misinterpretation by the 
jury, a conviction should not be reversed "simply because the 
jury possibly could have been misled."8  Rather, an appellate 
court should order a new trial only if upon review of the 
instruction the court determines that the defendant has shown 
that "there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury was misled 
and therefore applied potentially confusing instructions in an 
unconstitutional manner."9   
¶24 The United States Supreme Court has stated that a new 
trial is warranted when the defendant carries the burden of 
establishing that "the instruction was ambiguous and that there 
was 
a 
reasonable 
likelihood 
that 
the 
jury 
applied 
the 
instruction in a way that relieved the State of its burden of 
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."10  
                                                                                                                                                             
An erroneous instruction is not necessarily prejudicial 
error.  State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶35, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 
N.W.2d 189 ("[A]n instruction that omits an element of the 
offense 
does 
not 
necessarily 
render 
a 
criminal 
trial 
fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining 
guilt 
or 
innocence" 
(quoted 
source 
omitted; 
emphasis 
in 
original).). 
8 State v. Lohmeier, 205 Wis. 2d 183, 193, 556 N.W.2d 90 
(1996).  
9 State v. Lohmeier, 205 Wis. 2d 183, 194, 556 N.W.2d 90 
(1996).  See also Burris, 2011 WI 32, ¶49. 
10 Burris, 2011 WI 32, ¶48 (quoting Waddington v. Sarausad, 
555 U.S. 179, 129 S. Ct. 823, 831 (2009)). 
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
10 
 
A new trial is also warranted when the defendant carries the 
burden of establishing that there was a reasonable likelihood 
that the jury applied the instruction in a way that denied the 
defendant "a meaningful opportunity for consideration by the 
jury of his defense . . . to the detriment of the defendant's 
due process rights."11      
¶25 In 
determining 
whether 
there 
is 
a 
reasonable 
likelihood that the jury was misled and applied the potentially 
confusing 
instructions 
in 
an 
unconstitutional 
manner, 
an 
appellate court "should view the jury instructions in light of 
the proceedings as a whole, instead of viewing a single 
instruction in artificial isolation."12  
¶26 Because the jury instruction given by the circuit 
court in the present case relating to Count 1, exposing a child 
to harmful material, essentially tracked the language of the 
statute and is arguably a correct statement of the law (even if 
                                                                                                                                                             
"States may not 'deprive the accused of liberty unless the 
prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt every element of 
the charged offense.'"  State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶19, 254 
Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189 (quoting Carella v. California, 491 
U.S. 263, 265 (1989)). 
11 Burris, 2011 WI 32, ¶50 (quoting State v. Lohmeier, 205 
Wis. 2d 183, 192, 556 N.W.2d 90 (1996)). 
"[A] jury applies an instruction in an unconstitutional 
manner 
if 
it 
believes 
that 
such 
instruction 
'precludes 
consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.'"  State v. 
Burris, 2011 WI 32, ¶50 (quoting Boyde v. California, 494 
U.S. 370, 380 (1990). 
12 State v. Lohmeier, 205 Wis. 2d 183, 194, 556 N.W.2d 90 
(1996).  
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
11 
 
the text regarding the fourth element is not applicable to the 
present case),13 we shall consider the defendant's challenge to 
the 
jury 
instruction 
as 
challenging 
the 
instruction 
as 
unconstitutionally 
confusing 
or 
misleading 
the 
jury 
into 
believing that the State did not have to prove an element of the 
crime, namely that the defendant knowingly exhibited harmful 
material to the child.14   
III 
¶27 At trial, the circuit court gave the following jury 
instruction, substantially tracking the language of the statute 
in regard to the substantive law of exposing a child to harmful 
material, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2)(a):   
Exposing a child to harmful material as defined in 
948.11(2)(a) of the criminal code of Wisconsin is 
committed by one who, with knowledge of the character 
and content of the material, sells, rents, exhibits, 
plays, distributes, or loans to a child any harmful 
material, with or without monetary consideration, and 
has face-to-face contact with the child before or 
during 
this 
sale, 
rental, 
exhibit, 
playing, 
distribution, or loan. 
Before you may find the defendant guilty of this 
offense, the State must prove by evidence which 
satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt the following 
                                                 
13 See ¶¶45-61, below. 
14 State v. Lohmeier, 205 Wis. 2d 183, 194, 556 N.W.2d 90 
(1996). 
Were we to consider the defendant's challenge as asserting 
that the jury instruction was legally incorrect, our analysis 
would be substantially the same.  For the reasons set forth, we 
would conclude that the instruction was not a correct statement 
of the law and was prejudicial error.  State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 
93, ¶44, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189. 
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
12 
 
four elements: first, that the defendant exhibited or 
played harmful material to [the child] . . . . 
. . . . 
The defendant had knowledge of the character and 
content of the material is the second element.  And 
this requires the defendant knew that the material 
contained 
a 
description, 
narrative 
account, 
or 
representation of nudity, sexually explicit conduct, 
sexual excitement, sadomasochistic abuse, physical 
torture, or brutality. 
Third element, [the child] was under the age of 18 
years.  Fourth element, that the defendant had face-
to-face contact with the child before or during the 
exhibition or the playing of the material. 
If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that 
all four elements of this offense have been proved, 
you should find the defendant guilty of exposing a 
child to harmful material as charged in Count 1 of the 
information (emphasis added). 
¶28 As we shall explain more fully later, the instruction 
at issue follows both the text of the statute15 and the text of 
pattern criminal Jury Instruction 214216 to a substantial extent 
                                                 
15 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.11(2)(a) defines the crime as 
follows: 
(2)(a) Whoever, with knowledge of the character and 
content of the material, sells, rents, exhibits, 
plays, distributes, or loans to a child any harmful 
material, with or without monetary consideration, is 
guilty of a Class I felony if any of the following 
applies: 
1. The person knows or reasonably should know that the 
child has not attained the age of 18 years. 
2. The person has face-to-face contact with the child 
before or during the sale, rental, exhibit, playing, 
distribution, or loan. 
16 Pattern criminal jury instruction 2142 reads as follows: 
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
13 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Statutory Definition of the Crime 
 
Exposing a child to harmful material, as defined 
in § 948.11(2)(a) of the Criminal Code of Wisconsin, 
is committed by one who, with knowledge of the 
character and content of material, sells, rents, 
exhibits, plays, distributes, or loans to a child any 
harmful 
material, 
with 
or 
without 
monetary 
consideration and [knows or reasonably should know 
that the child has not attained the age of 18 
years][has face-to-face contact with the child before 
or 
during 
the 
sale, 
rental, 
exhibit, 
playing, 
distribution, or loan.] 
State's Burden of Proof 
 
Before you may find the defendant guilty of this 
offense, the State must prove by evidence which 
satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
following four elements were present. 
Elements of the Crime That the State Must Prove 
1. 
The 
defendant 
(sold) 
(rented) 
(exhibited) 
(played) (distributed) (loaned) harmful material to 
(name of child). 
 
This does not require that the defendant received 
any monetary consideration.  "Harmful material" means 
(identify the type of material) of a person or portion 
of the human body that depicts nudity, sexually 
explicit 
conduct, 
sadomasochistic 
abuse, 
physical 
torture, 
or 
brutality, 
and 
that 
is 
harmful 
to 
children.   
 
"Harmful to children" means that quality of any 
description, narrative account, or representation of 
nudity, sexually explicit conduct, sexual excitement, 
sadomasochistic abuse, physical torture, or brutality 
when it 
 
(1) 
predominantly 
appeals 
to 
the 
prurient, 
shameful or morbid interest of children; and 
 
(2) is patently offensive to prevailing standards 
in the adult community of Wisconsin as a whole with 
respect to what is suitable material for children, and 
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
14 
 
but deviates from both in an important respect.  The instruction 
at issue, unlike the statute or the pattern jury instruction, 
requires a jury to make a finding regarding the fourth element 
as described in the jury instruction given.  Under the facts of 
the 
present 
case, 
the 
circuit 
court 
used 
the 
incorrect 
instruction for the fourth element of the crime.   
¶29 The defendant requested the circuit court to modify 
the jury instructions regarding the first element.17  He argued 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
(3) lacks serious literary, artistic, political, 
scientific, or educational value for children of the 
age of (name of child), when taken as a whole. 
2. 
The defendant had knowledge of the character and 
content of the material. 
 
This requires that the defendant knew that the 
material contained a description, narrative account, 
or 
representation 
of 
nudity, 
sexually 
explicit 
conduct, sexual excitement, sadomasochistic abuse, 
physical torture, or brutality. 
3. 
(Name of child) was under the age of 18 years. 
4. 
The defendant [knew or reasonably should have 
known that the child was under the age of 18 
years][had face-to-face contact with the child before 
or during the (sale) (rental) (exhibit) (playing) 
(distribution) (loan)].  
Wis JI——Criminal 2142 (footnotes omitted). 
17 The defendant also suggested language relating to the 
instruction on the fourth element, face-to-face contact.  The 
defendant requested the jury instruction regarding the fourth 
element 
of 
the 
crime 
be 
modified 
to 
read 
as 
follows 
(modifications in italics): 
4. 
The defendant had face-to-face contact with the 
child before or during the exhibition or playing of 
the material. 
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
15 
 
that the jury instruction did not adequately explain the 
requirement that the exhibition of the harmful material to the 
child was done knowingly, and not accidentally.  He suggested 
that the italicized language shown below be added to the pattern 
instruction, advising the jury that the defendant had to have 
knowingly exhibited the harmful material to the child: 
ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME THAT THE STATE MUST PROVE 
1. 
The 
defendant 
knowingly 
exhibited 
or 
played 
harmful material to [the child]. 
This does not require that the defendant received 
any monetary consideration. 
 
"Exhibited" means that the defendant knowingly 
offered or presented for inspection to a specific 
minor or minors material defined as harmful to 
children. 
 
"Exhibited" 
requires 
a 
"knowing 
and 
affirmative act" by the defendant; which is only 
satisfied by "affirmative conduct" of the defendant 
"toward a specific minor."  To find that the defendant 
"exhibited" harmful material, you must be satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant targeted 
harmful material at a specific minor child.  If you 
find that the defendant intended to present the adult 
video to any audience other than the specific minor 
child [] in this case then you must find that he did 
not "exhibit" it to her, for purposes of Count 1. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
"Face-to-face contact" with the child means that 
the defendant had "personal contact" or a "personal 
meeting" with the child sufficient to allow him to 
determine that his audience is underage, before or 
during the exhibition or playing of the harmful 
material.  "Face-to-face contact" therefore requires 
"some interaction between the accused and the child-
victim." 
For a discussion of the "face-to-face contact" part of the 
instruction, see ¶¶45-61, below.   
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
16 
 
¶30 The defendant also asked for a jury instruction based 
on his theory of defense that any exhibition of the harmful 
material to the child was accidental.18   
¶31 A circuit court has broad discretion in determining 
whether to give a particular jury instruction.19  The circuit 
court denied the defendant's request for the modified jury 
instructions, stating that the concept of knowing is evident in 
the context of the total pattern instruction and that the word 
"exhibit" is not an exotic or difficult word that needs to be 
described further.  The circuit court declared:  
[T]he patterned instruction accurately states what the 
law is.  And we've got four elements, and the concept 
of knowing is in the context of the four elements.  
And I think exhibited is not such an exotic term that 
it needs to be described further.  And, in fact, I 
find that the proposed description is confusing and 
misleading and not helpful . . . . 
¶32 As is evident from the circuit court's ruling, the 
circuit court agreed with the defendant on the basic premise of 
law that the defendant was advancing:  The State has the burden 
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
knowingly exhibited the harmful material to the child.  Indeed, 
the circuit court, the court of appeals,20 and the State21 agree 
                                                 
18 The court of appeals ruled that because the defendant's 
defense of accidental exhibiting "was adequately covered by the 
other instructions given to the jury, he was not entitled to an 
accident instruction."  Gonzalez, 328 Wis. 2d 182, ¶17. 
19 State v. Ferguson, 2009 WI 50, ¶9, 317 Wis. 2d 586, 767 
N.W.2d 187. 
20 State v. Gonzalez, 2010 WI App 104, ¶11, 328 Wis. 2d 182, 
789 N.W.2d 365. 
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
17 
 
with the defendant that the State has the burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly exhibited 
the harmful material to the child.  This court also agrees with 
the defendant on this legal point.  
¶33 As the defendant, the circuit court, the court of 
appeals, the State, and this court know, the supreme court in 
State v. Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d 505, 535, 515 N.W.2d 847 (1994), 
interpreted Wis. Stat. § 948.11 to mean that "an individual 
violates [the statute] if he or she, aware of the nature of the 
material, knowingly offers or presents for inspection to a 
specific minor or minors material defined as harmful to 
children . . ." (emphasis added).22 
                                                                                                                                                             
21 Brief of the Plaintiff-Respondent at 20-22. 
22 In State v. Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d 505, 515 N.W.2d 847 
(1994), 
to 
avoid 
an 
unconstitutional, 
overly 
broad 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 948.11, the court interpreted the 
statute to include the concept of "knowingly."  When a statute 
is challenged as unconstitutionally over-broad, the statute can 
be 
"saved" 
by 
a 
narrowing 
and 
validating 
judicial 
interpretation.  In Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d at 533, the court applied 
such a narrowing and validating interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.11(2), holding that each of the verbs in Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.11(2)(a) 
and 
(b)——"'sell,' 
'loan,' 
'exhibit,' 
and 
'transfer'——represents 
a 
knowing 
and 
affirmative 
act. . . . [T]he 
language 
of 
sec. 
948.11 
focuses 
on 
the 
affirmative conduct of an individual toward a specific minor or 
minors.  Therefore, an individual violates the statute if he or 
she, aware of the nature of the material, knowingly offers or 
presents for inspection to a specific minor or minors material 
defined as harmful to children in sec. 948.11(1)(b)."  Thiel, 
183 Wis. 2d at 535 (emphasis added).   
This court reiterated this holding from Thiel in applying 
Wis. Stat. § 948.11 in State v. Booker, 2006 WI 79, ¶17, 292 
Wis. 2d 43, 717 N.W.2d 676.   
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
18 
 
¶34 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.11, construed narrowly as Thiel 
instructs, is the law.  The circuit court must instruct the jury 
according to that law.       
¶35 We conclude, for the following reasons, that the 
defendant has shown that there is a reasonable likelihood that 
the jury instruction misled the jury on whether the State had to 
prove the defendant acted "knowingly," and therefore the jury 
applied the instruction in an unconstitutional manner.  
¶36 First, 
the 
jury 
instruction 
did 
not 
explicitly 
instruct the jury that the State must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant knowingly, as opposed to accidentally, 
exhibited the harmful material to the child.  The word 
"knowingly" does not appear anywhere in the instruction.  
¶37 Thus, the likelihood of the jury being misled about 
the State's obligation to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant "knowingly" exhibited the video to the child is 
                                                                                                                                                             
In considering the concurrence, we reiterate that the court 
did not rewrite Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2)(a) in Thiel and we do not 
rewrite the statute in the present case.  Instead, Thiel 
interpreted § 948.11(2)(a), and we apply Thiel's interpretation 
of the statute.  Thiel's interpretation of the statute is the 
law, at least until modified either by the legislature through 
amending the language of the statute or by this court overruling 
its prior interpretation. 
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
19 
 
inherent in the jury instruction given.23  To avoid misleading 
the jury, the proceedings as a whole (including the instruction) 
must clearly show that the jury was aware of the State's burden 
of proving that the defendant's conduct was knowing, not 
accidental, with regard to exhibiting the material to the child.  
¶38 Did the proceeding and the jury instruction viewed as 
a whole so advise the jury?  The circuit court and court of 
appeals answered "Yes."  The court of appeals concluded that 
"[t]he 'exhibited or played harmful material to' language of the 
instruction required a finding by the jury that [the defendant] 
                                                 
23 That the instructions were misleading in the present case 
without use of the word "knowing" does not mean that the 
instructions given in the present case would necessarily be 
misleading in another case.  Jury instructions must fit the 
facts of the particular case.  See Burris, 2011 WI 32, ¶64 
(recognizing that language approved by the court may raise 
questions if incorporated in a jury instruction in a case with 
different facts).  The error in the present case is that the 
statutory language and pattern instructions were not modified to 
fit the facts of the present case.    
The pattern jury instructions promulgated by the Wisconsin 
Criminal Jury Instructions Committee and the University of 
Wisconsin 
Law 
School 
explain 
the 
function 
of 
pattern 
instructions.  The Jury Instruction Committee advises that the 
pattern instructions may frequently be used without change but 
"may often have to be modified to fit the needs of the 
particular case. . . . It is suggested that the comment and the 
footnotes to the instructions be read fully and carefully before 
the instruction is used, in order that the user be informed of 
any conditions prerequisite to its use, alternative materials 
for particular cases, and of other cautionary information."  I 
Wis JI——Criminal xi (preface to 1962 edition reprinted in 
current edition).           
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
20 
 
acted 
affirmatively 
[i.e., 
knowingly]——as 
opposed 
to 
accidentally."24   
¶39 We disagree with the circuit court and court of 
appeals.  We do not perceive the words cited by the court of 
appeals as instructing the jury that the State had to prove the 
defendant acted knowingly.  As we shall explain further, the 
words "exhibited or played harmful material to," which the court 
of appeals relied upon for the clarity of the instruction, are 
the very words the jury questioned and about which the jurors 
sought clarification.      
¶40 Second, the jury instruction did not define the word 
"exhibit," 
which 
the 
Thiel 
court 
and 
the 
pattern 
jury 
instructions define.  The Thiel court defined the statutory verb 
"exhibit" in a way that did not constitutionally imperil Wis. 
Stat. § 948.11.  The Thiel court presented a legal definition of 
"exhibit," construing "'exhibit' to mean 'to offer or present 
for inspection,'" citing Black's Law Dictionary.25     
¶41 The pattern jury instruction includes a footnote at 
the verb "exhibit."  The footnote states: "In State v. 
Thiel . . . the court construed 'exhibit' to mean 'to offer or 
present for inspection,' emphasizing that, like the other terms 
in the statute, it 'represents a knowing and affirmative act.'"26   
                                                 
24 State v. Gonzalez, 2010 WI App 104, ¶11, 328 Wis. 2d 182, 
789 N.W.2d 365. 
25 Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d at 535. 
26 Wis JI——Criminal 2142. 
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
21 
 
¶42 The Thiel court and the Jury Instruction Committee 
thought it important and necessary to define the verb "exhibit" 
to explicitly explain that that word represents a knowing, 
affirmative act.   
¶43 In contrast, the jury was given no definition of the 
word "exhibit."  The circuit court determined "exhibit" is not 
an exotic term and need not be described further.  The words 
"exhibited . . . to" may have been clear to the circuit court 
and the court of appeals, both of whom had the benefit of the 
Thiel case and the pattern instruction, but they were not clear 
to the jurors, who did not have the benefit of these legal 
materials. 
 
Even 
after 
the 
jury 
specifically 
asked 
for 
clarification 
of 
the 
phrase 
"exhibit 
to" 
in 
the 
jury 
instruction,27 the circuit court did not clarify for the jury 
that the burden was on the State to prove that the defendant 
knowingly exhibited the harmful material to the child.  
¶44 The 
jury 
instruction 
at 
issue 
did 
not 
define 
"exhibit," making the instruction susceptible to ambiguity.  
When we look beyond the instruction to the entire proceedings, 
we cannot point to anything in the record that assures us that 
the jury understood that it was required to find that the 
defendant acted knowingly, as opposed to accidentally. 
¶45 Third, 
the 
jury 
instruction 
was 
confusing 
and 
misleading when the circuit court erroneously instructed the 
                                                 
27 The jury questions are analyzed in further detail below 
at ¶¶ 62-79. 
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
22 
 
jury on the fourth element of the crime.  The court instructed 
the jury that the fourth element of the crime required that the 
defendant "had face-to-face contact with the child before or 
during the exhibition or the playing of the material" (emphasis 
added).  This "face-to-face contact" instruction was not the 
appropriate alternative instruction based on the evidence 
presented in the instant case.  
¶46 The fourth element of the crime is that the defendant 
knows the age of the child.  The State's burden of proving this 
element can be satisfied in one of two alternative ways.  The 
statute and the pattern instructions clearly set forth the 
alternatives and clearly set forth that the circuit court should 
instruct on the alternative appropriate to the facts of the 
case.     
¶47 The statute makes it a felony to expose a child to 
harmful material "if any of the following applies:  1. The 
person knows or reasonably should know that the child has not 
attained the age of 18 years.  2. The person has face-to-face 
contact with the child before or during the sale, rental, 
exhibit, playing, distribution, or loan."  
¶48 Adhering to the text of the statute, the pattern jury 
instruction 
reads 
as 
follows: 
 
"The 
defendant 
[knew 
or 
reasonably should have known that the child was under 18 years] 
[had face-to-face contact with the child before or during the 
(sale) (rental) (exhibit) (playing) (distribution) (loan)]."  
The footnote to this part of the pattern jury instruction 
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
23 
 
directs the circuit court that "[t]he alternative supported by 
the evidence should be selected."   
¶49 The first alternative, that the defendant knew that 
the child was under 18 years of age, is supported by the 
evidence in the present case.  The child was the defendant's 
daughter and she was three-and-one-half years old.  The circuit 
court erred by not giving the jury this alternative instruction.   
¶50 The State acknowledges that the circuit court should 
have given only this first alternative under the statute and 
pattern instruction.  The circuit court should have instructed 
the jury that the State had the burden to prove that the 
defendant knew or should have known that the child was under 18 
years old.28  No such instruction was given. 
                                                 
28 The 
State's 
brief 
asserts 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
instructed the jury on both alternatives and that the face-to-
face contact instruction merely imposed an additional burden on 
the State.  According to the State, the error is therefore 
harmless to the defendant.  Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent at 21-
22.  The State is mistaken that the circuit court gave both 
alternatives in its instruction on the elements of the crime.  
It did not.   
The circuit court read the information to the jury prior to 
instructing the jury on the four elements of the crime.  The 
information read to the jury charged both that the defendant 
knew the child was under 18 years of age and that the defendant 
had face-to-face contact with the child.  The circuit court read 
the 
following 
to 
the jury from the information:  "the 
information in this case charges the defendant with the crime[] 
of exposing a child to harmful material"; "the defendant did 
exhibit to a child with whom the defendant had face-to-face 
contact"; "the defendant knew or reasonably should have known 
[that the child] had not attained the age of 18 years."   
The circuit court explained the significance of the 
information to the jury as follows:  
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
24 
 
¶51 The 
second 
alternative 
relating 
to 
"face-to-face 
contact" is not appropriate in the present case and is confusing 
in the context of the present case.  The State agrees in its 
brief to this court that the circuit court erred in giving the 
"face-to-face contact" instruction in the present case.29   
¶52 This second alternative commonly applies to internet 
transactions and does not apply to the present case.30  Generally 
                                                                                                                                                             
The 
information 
in 
this 
case 
charges 
the 
defendant with the crimes of exposing a child to 
harmful material and causing a child under 13 to view 
sexual activity. . . .   
The information is nothing more than a written, 
formal accusation against a defendant charging the 
commission of one or more criminal acts.  You are not 
to consider it as evidence against the defendant in 
any way . . . . 
After reading the information to the jury, the circuit 
court then went on to instruct the jury about the four elements 
of the crime.  The instruction did not state that one element 
was that the defendant knew or should have reasonably known the 
child was under 18 years of age.  The fourth element in the 
instruction stated that the defendant had face-to-face contact 
with the child before or during the exhibition or the playing of 
the material.  The instruction is printed at ¶27, above.  
29 Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent at 21-22. 
30 The alternative in the statute and the instruction 
relating to "face-to-face contact" was added to the instruction 
in response to changes made to the statute by 2001 Wis. Act 16.  
The statutory change was made in response to State v. Weidner, 
2000 WI 52, 235 Wis. 2d 306, 611 N.W.2d 684. 
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
25 
 
the alternative "face-to-face contact" instruction should be 
used when evidence supports the affirmative defense in Wis. 
Stat. § 948.11(2)(c) that the defendant had reasonable cause to 
believe the child had attained the age of 18 years.  In the 
present case, the defendant did not claim the affirmative 
defense, and no evidence supports an affirmative defense that he 
had reasonable cause to believe that the child had attained the 
age of 18 years.  The circuit court thus chose the incorrect 
alternative "face-to-face contact" instruction in the present 
case. 
¶53 The State argues that the erroneous "face-to-face 
contact" instruction just placed an additional burden on the 
State and did not harm the defendant.  The State is wrong.       
                                                                                                                                                             
In 
Weidner, 
the 
court 
determined 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.11(2) was "unconstitutional in the context of the internet 
and other situations that do not involve face-to-face contact 
between a minor and the accused" because the statute shifted the 
burden of proving knowledge of the victim's age to the defendant 
and 
infringed 
upon 
protected 
First 
Amendment 
expression.  
Weidner, 235 Wis. 2d 306, ¶1.  
In Weidner, the accused was charged under Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.11(2)(a) with sending harmful material to a minor over the 
internet.  The court declared that in situations devoid of face-
to-face contact, such as in the context of the internet, the 
State did not bear the burden to prove scienter; the legislature 
had shifted the scienter element of Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2)(a) to 
an affirmative defense, thereby eliminating an element of the 
crime.  Weidner, 235 Wis. 2d 306, ¶13.  In response to Weidner, 
the legislature amended Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2)(a) to ensure the 
State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant reasonably knew that the child was under the age of 18 
or that the defendant had face-to-face contact with the child 
before 
or 
during 
the 
sale, 
rental, 
exhibit, 
playing, 
distribution, or loan of the harmful material.     
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
26 
 
¶54 In the present case, the "face-to-face contact" 
instruction was misleading when viewed in light of the entire 
jury instruction and the entire proceedings.  Specifically, the 
"face-to-face contact" instruction was misleading with regard to 
the crucial element of the defendant's "knowingly" exhibiting 
harmful material to the child.  The jury appears to have 
interpreted 
the 
"face-to-face 
contact" 
instruction 
as 
interacting with the first element of the crime and requiring 
the defendant to have face-to-face contact with the child.   
¶55 Without clarification from the circuit court, the jury 
was left to its own devices to figure out how the face-to-face 
contact instruction related to the State's burden of proving the 
defendant "exhibited material to" the child.   
¶56 The instruction provides that the State must prove 
that the defendant "had face-to-face contact with the child 
before 
or 
during 
this 
sale, 
rental, 
exhibit, 
playing, 
distribution, or loan."  The defendant's "face-to-face contact" 
with the child thus could have occurred before the playing of 
the video.   
¶57 It is reasonably likely that this erroneous "face-to-
face contact" instruction misled the jury into thinking that the 
State did not have to prove that the defendant affirmatively, 
that is, knowingly, exhibited the harmful material to the child, 
and instead that the State had to prove only that the defendant 
had face-to-face contact with the child before exhibiting the 
video to the child.  Clearly the defendant in the present case 
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
27 
 
had face-to-face contact with the child before exhibiting or 
playing the video.    
¶58 The court of appeals determined that the jury could 
not reasonably have concluded that face-to-face contact before 
exhibiting the harmful material was sufficient for purposes of 
finding the defendant guilty in this case.31  But, the jury 
instruction explicitly stated that face-to-face contact with the 
child before the playing of the video satisfied an element of 
the crime.               
¶59 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
explicitly 
relied 
on 
the 
erroneous 
"requisite 
face-to-face 
contact" 
instruction 
to 
support 
its 
conclusion 
that 
the 
"face-to-face 
contact" 
instruction was such that "the jury would have had to find that 
[the defendant] was aware of (i.e., had knowledge of) [the 
child's] presence in the room."32  The court of appeals could 
reach this conclusion only by misreading the "face-to-face 
contact" instruction to ignore the word "before" and to read the 
instruction as containing only the phrase "face-to-face contact 
during the playing."33  
¶60 In contrast to the court of appeals, we conclude that 
there is a reasonable likelihood that the "face-to-face contact" 
instruction, which should not have been given in the present 
case, misled the jury.  The jury was left on its own to figure 
                                                 
31 State v. Gonzalez, 328 Wis. 2d 182, ¶13. 
32 Id., ¶11.   
33 See id., ¶18. 
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
28 
 
out 
the 
meaning 
of 
the 
erroneous 
"face-to-face 
contact" 
instruction, which under the law related to the fourth element, 
the defendant's knowledge of the age of the child.  Yet, the 
defendant's knowledge of the child's age was not at question in 
the proceedings.  Under these circumstances, the jury was left 
to ponder the significance of the State's burden to prove "face-
to-face contact."  
¶61 As the jury questions discussed below suggest, the 
jury viewed the "face-to-face contact" instruction as relating 
to the first element of Count 1.  The jury's questions suggest 
that the jurors were mistakenly using the "face-to-face contact" 
instruction to determine the physical whereabouts of the child 
in relation to the defendant for purposes of determining whether 
the defendant "exhibited" the video "to" the child.   
¶62 Fourth, the jury asked the circuit court questions 
that demonstrate its confusion about the jury instruction and 
what was necessary to find the defendant guilty of exposing a 
child to harmful material.  The questions posed show the jury's 
confusion about key language in the instruction and whether the 
State had to prove that the defendant "knowingly" played or 
exhibited harmful material to the child. 
¶63 Within an hour of the start of deliberations, the jury 
sent two sets of questions to the circuit court.  The first set 
asked for some exhibits to be sent to the jury room.  The second 
set submitted two questions on the substantive law: 
Q4: Clarify word of exposure for us. 
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
29 
 
Q5: Clarify statement 'the defendant exhibited or 
played harmful material To [A.G.][the child]'  
    – what does to say? (Emphasis in original.)34 
¶64 The circuit court sent the exhibits to the jury room, 
as the parties had previously agreed should be done upon the 
jury's request.  The jurors subsequently asked for all of the 
exhibits and were told by the circuit court that they had all of 
the exhibits.   
¶65 The circuit court did not immediately respond in any 
way to the questions on the substantive law.  The circuit court 
did not immediately communicate with counsel regarding the 
questions. 
 
Approximately 
an 
hour 
after 
the 
substantive 
questions were sent to the circuit court, the clerk of circuit 
court suggested to counsel they take a lunch break and check in 
about an hour and a half later. 
¶66 Defense counsel checked in later with the circuit 
court as instructed, and the circuit court informed defense 
counsel that the jury had submitted some questions.  
¶67 With counsel for both parties present, the circuit 
court read the jury's questions to counsel and stated that it 
had "waited to see what they were going to do, and apparently 
they've asked a couple of times to the bailiffs, 'When will we 
get an answer to our questions,' so they want an answer . . . ."  
                                                 
34 In addition the jurors asked: "Q3: What do we do about 
hostility between jurors  aggressive behavior, while we 
deliberate?"  In response to this "hostility" question, the 
circuit court had lunch delivered and had the bailiffs take the 
jury for a walk. 
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
30 
 
¶68 After receiving no response to the initial substantive 
questions for over three hours, the jury further asked the 
circuit court the following questions:  
Q7: Please define face-to-face contact with the child  
– proximity??-eye to eye? - in room?  
Q8: Same question: on meaning of count 1, part 1, 
'exhibited or played harmful material to [the child]'  
– need more definition behind exhibited –  
– need more definition behind played   
– need more definition for the entire statement. 
(Emphasis in original.) 
¶69 The 
parties 
presented 
their 
respective 
arguments 
regarding how the circuit court should respond to the original 
and subsequent substantive questions.   
¶70 The State asserted that no response was necessary and 
that at this point the jurors should use their common-sense 
application of the words in the original instruction.   
¶71 The defendant contended that his rejected modified 
jury instructions had been proffered in anticipation of the very 
confusion that the jury's questions presented.  The defendant 
asked the circuit court to answer the jury's question by re-
instructing 
with 
the 
modified 
jury 
instructions 
he 
had 
originally offered. 
¶72 While the parties were presenting their arguments to 
the circuit court, the jury advised the circuit court that it 
had reached a verdict.  The circuit court did not answer the 
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
31 
 
questions, determining that the questions and answers were now 
moot.  
¶73 The jury found the defendant guilty of the first 
count, exposing a child to harmful material, contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 943.11(2)(a),35 and not guilty of the second count,  
intentionally exposing a child to sexually explicit activity, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.055(1)(2)(a).36    
¶74 The jury questions were directed specifically at the 
language of the first element of Count 1, exposing a child to 
harmful material.  The questions suggest that the jury was 
struggling 
with 
interpreting 
the 
scope 
of 
the 
language 
"exposure," "exhibited to," "played to," and "face-to-face 
contact."  Specifically, the questions raise the issue of 
whether the defendant had to know that the child was present. 
The question went to whether the defendant's exhibiting or 
playing the video to the child had to be done "knowingly."  The 
jury should not have been left to struggle with interpreting the 
instruction without judicial assistance.   
¶75 The Thiel court interpreted the statutory language to 
ensure that the statute was not unconstitutionally overbroad.  
That interpretation requires that an accused "knowingly" exhibit 
the harmful material to the child.  The jury should not have 
                                                 
35 The jury verdict as to Count 1 reads: "We, the jury, find 
the defendant, ESTEBAN GONZALEZ, guilty of EXPOSING A CHILD TO 
HARMFUL MATERIAL, as charged in Count One of the Information." 
36 The jury verdict as to Count 2 reads: "We, the jury, find 
the defendant, ESTEBAN GONZALEZ, not guilty as to Count Two." 
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
32 
 
been left to struggle with interpreting the statute when the 
supreme court had already done so. 
¶76 Without any modification of the instruction, the jury 
was left on its own to sort out how to interpret the "exposure," 
"exhibit to" and "play to" language of the first element of the 
crime.  The very language that the Thiel court had to narrowly 
interpret to ensure the constitutionality of the statute was not 
explained to the jury, even after it was evident from the jury's 
questions that the jurors did not clearly understand the 
instruction.     
¶77 The jury's questions demonstrate that the instructions 
initially given by the circuit court were confusing and 
ambiguous.  The court erred in failing to provide the jury with 
at least some part of the defendant's proffered modified jury 
instruction37 so that the jury could understand that accidently 
exhibiting harmful material to a child is not sufficient to 
satisfy the first element of the crime charged.   
                                                 
37 The 
defendant's proposed modified jury instructions 
expressly set forth the "knowing" and "affirmative" aspect of 
the first element of the crime in several different ways.   
Not all of the defendant's modifications to the pattern 
jury instruction were necessarily correct or were needed to 
properly instruct the jury.  But without any modification of the 
instruction to explicitly require the State to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly exhibited the 
harmful material to the child, or to provide an instruction 
relating to an accident theory of defense, there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the instruction was misleading in the present 
case.   
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
33 
 
¶78 The jury instruction at issue in the present case 
failed to sufficiently instruct the jury on the meaning of the 
statutory language under the circumstances of the present case.  
Reviewing the jury instruction and proceedings as a whole, it is 
reasonably likely that the jury was misled.  
¶79 Nothing in the record or the instruction assures us 
that the jury found the defendant guilty of count 1 after 
interpreting the instruction to require that the State prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly exhibited 
the harmful material to the child.  On the basis of the 
proceedings, the jury could have concluded either that the 
defendant knowingly exhibited the harmful material to the child 
or that the defendant accidentally exhibited the harmful 
material to the child.  We do not know the tack the jury took.  
We do not know how the jury interpreted the misleading jury 
instructions.  Accordingly, we are not confident that the jury 
necessarily found that the State proved that the defendant 
"knowingly" exhibited the harmful material to the child.  
¶80 Fifth, the possibility that the jury was confused or 
misled about the element of "knowing" in Count 1 is further 
demonstrated when we examine the jury instruction given for 
Count 2.    
¶81 In the substantive instruction on Count 2, the jury 
was instructed that to find the defendant guilty, the jury must 
find that the defendant intentionally caused the child who had 
not attained the age of 13 years to view sexually explicit 
conduct for the purpose of sexual gratification, contrary to 
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
34 
 
Wis. Stat. § 948.055(1),(2)(a).  The circuit court instructed 
the jury as follows: 
This section of the criminal code is violated by a 
person who intentionally causes the child to view or 
listen to sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of 
sexually 
arousing 
or 
gratifying 
the 
person 
or 
humiliating or degrading the child. 
Before you may find the defendant guilty of this 
offense, the State must prove by evidence which 
satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt the following 
four elements were present: first, the defendant 
caused [the child] to view or listen to sexually 
explicit conduct. . . .  
Second 
element, 
that 
the 
defendant 
intentionally 
caused [the child] to view or listen to sexually 
explicit conduct.  "Intentionally" requires that the 
defendant acted with a purpose to cause her to view or 
listen to sexually explicit conduct.  Third, that [the 
child] 
had 
not 
attained 
the 
age 
of 
13 
years. . . . Fourth, that the defendant acted with the 
purpose 
of 
sexually 
arousing 
or 
gratifying 
the 
defendant or humiliating or degrading [the child] 
(emphasis added). 
¶82 Both 
criminal 
counts 
arose 
out 
of 
allegedly 
simultaneous events:  The defendant was accused of intentionally 
causing the child to view him masturbating as he simultaneously 
watched and exhibited or played the video.  The instruction for 
Count 2 expressly includes an element of intent.  For Count 2, 
the jury was instructed that an element of the crime was "that 
the defendant intentionally caused [the child] to view or listen 
to sexually explicit conduct.  'Intentionally' requires that the 
defendant acted with a purpose to cause her to view or listen to 
sexually explicit conduct" (emphasis added).  
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
35 
 
¶83 With regard to Count 1, the jury was instructed that 
the State had to prove only that the defendant exhibited harmful 
material to the child; the instruction for Count 1 did not 
include the word "knowing" or "intentional."38 
¶84 The jurors had the instructions for both Counts 1 and 
2 before them.  Had the jurors compared the instruction for 
Count 1 with the instruction for Count 2, they would have found 
a significant difference between the two.  The instruction for 
Count 2 explicitly requires the State to prove that the 
defendant intentionally caused the child to view or listen to 
sexually explicit conduct.  Intentionally causing a child to 
view 
sexual 
activity 
necessarily 
encompasses 
knowingly 
presenting sexual activity to a child.39  The instruction for 
                                                 
38 In the criminal statutes, as well as in ordinary 
parlance, the words "intentional" and "knowing" denote a state 
of mind.   
Wisconsin Stat. § 939.23(1) provides that "[w]hen criminal 
intent is an element of a crime in chs. 939 to 951, such intent 
is indicated by the term 'intentionally', the phrase 'with 
intent to', the phrase 'with intent that', or some form of the 
verbs 'know' or 'believe'."   
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 939.23(2) 
provides 
that 
"'[k]now' 
requires only that the actor believes that the specified fact 
exists."   
Wisconsin Stat. § 939.23(3) defines "intentionally" to 
include knowledge:  "'Intentionally' means that the actor either 
has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified, or 
is aware that his or her conduct is practically certain to cause 
that result.  In addition, except as provided in [§ 939.23] sub. 
(6), the actor must have knowledge of those facts which are 
necessary to make his or her conduct criminal and which are set 
forth after the word 'intentionally'." 
39 Wis. Stat. § 939.23(3), quoted above. 
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
36 
 
Count 1 has no similarly explicit "intention" or "knowing" 
language.   
¶85 This difference between the two instructions increases 
the likelihood that the jury may have interpreted the jury 
instruction for Count 1 as not requiring the defendant to have 
knowingly exhibited harmful material to a child. 
¶86 Viewing the jury instruction for Count 1 in light of 
the instruction for Count 2 and reviewing the proceedings as a 
whole, we conclude that there is a reasonable likelihood that 
the jury was confused and misled about the need for the State to 
prove an element of the crime. 
¶87 The jury expressed its confusion regarding the jury 
instruction related to Count 1, exposing a child to harmful 
material.  The circuit court had an opportunity to rectify the 
jury instruction.  Yet, the circuit court did not respond to the 
jury's queries.     
¶88 We do not know whether the jury interpreted the 
instruction to require the jury to find that the defendant 
knowingly exhibited the harmful material to the child or whether 
the jury interpreted the instruction to allow the jury to find 
that the defendant's accidental exhibition of the harmful 
material to the child was sufficient to find guilt.  The 
evidence supports either of these findings.  If the jury 
interpreted the instruction in the latter way, the challenged 
jury instruction relieved the State of the burden of proving an 
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, violating the 
defendant's fundamental constitutional rights.  
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
37 
 
¶89 Accordingly, we reverse the conviction and remand the 
cause for a new trial.    
IV 
¶90 Finally, we address the circuit court's failure to 
notify counsel about the questions the jury posed until a 
substantial amount of time had elapsed.   
¶91 The defendant complains that the circuit court's "wait 
and 
see" 
approach 
to 
the 
jury's 
questions 
violated 
his 
constitutional rights to trial by an impartial jury and to be 
present with counsel at all critical stages of the trial. 
¶92 The defendant does not contest that the circuit court 
has discretion to determine what, if any, re-instruction is 
given.  The circuit court is vested with discretion in 
determining the necessity for, the extent of, and the form of 
any jury re-instruction.  State v. Hubbard, 2008 WI 92, ¶57, 313 
Wis. 2d 1, 752 N.W.2d 839.  Wisconsin Stat. § 805.13(5) provides 
that "[a]fter the jury retires, the court may reinstruct the 
jury as to all or any part of the instructions previously given, 
or may give supplementary instructions as it deems appropriate." 
¶93 The defendant contends, however, that a defendant has 
a right to be present and represented by counsel, so that he may 
represent his interests in a circuit court's communications with 
a 
deliberating 
jury. 
 
The 
defendant 
argues 
that 
his 
constitutional right to be present at a critical stage of trial 
was violated by the circuit court's failure to promptly notify 
him of the jury's questions.  Prompt notice would ensure that 
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
38 
 
the defendant has an opportunity to discuss with the circuit 
court a possible response to any jury question.   
¶94 The 
circuit 
court's 
communication 
with 
the 
deliberating jury is a critical stage of the trial.40  We have 
not determined whether a circuit court's decision not to respond 
to a jury question is equivalent to communicating with the 
deliberating 
jury 
such 
that 
a 
decision 
not 
to 
respond 
constitutes a critical stage of the trial.  Because we reverse 
the decision of the court of appeals and remand for a new trial 
on the basis of the jury instruction, we need not, and do not, 
decide whether a circuit court's decision not to respond to a 
jury question constitutes a critical stage of the trial, or 
whether the circuit court's delay of two to three hours in 
advising 
counsel 
of 
the 
jury's 
questions 
violated 
the 
defendant's constitutional rights in the present case. 
¶95 We do, however, recommend that circuit courts apply 
Principle 15D of the American Bar Association Principles for 
Juries & Jury Trial as a best practice standard.41  Principle 15D 
states as follows: 
                                                 
40 State v. Anderson, 2006 WI 77, ¶¶67-69, 291 Wis. 2d 673, 
717 N.W.2d 74. 
41 In 2006, the Conference of Chief Justices adopted a 
resolution encouraging the use of the ABA Principles for Juries 
and Jury Trials as a best practice standard.  The resolution 
states: 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Conference of 
Chief Justices:  
1. Encourages state courts to use the ABA Principles 
for Juries and Jury Trials as the standard against 
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
39 
 
When jurors submit a question during deliberations, 
the court, in consultation with the parties, should 
supply a prompt, complete and responsive answer or 
should explain to the jurors why it cannot do so.42   
¶96 Had this principle been applied in the present case, 
the jury instruction may have been clarified and the appeal and 
retrial may not have been needed.  
* * * * 
¶97 We 
conclude 
that 
the 
jury 
was 
not 
instructed 
explicitly or implicitly that it had to determine whether the 
defendant had knowingly exhibited the harmful material to the 
child, 
as 
distinguished 
from 
accidentally 
or 
unknowingly 
exhibiting harmful material to the child.  The jury instruction 
did not sufficiently define the first element of the crime, 
                                                                                                                                                             
which to evaluate and improve their own jury system 
policies and procedures; 
2. Encourages all state courts to implement procedures 
and practices consistent with the ABA Principles for 
Juries and Jury Trials;  
3. Encourages state courts to continue to broaden 
efforts to educate and inform the public about jury 
service, 
and 
to 
enhance 
positive 
attitudes 
and 
opinions about jury service; and 
4. Supports the continued efforts of the American Bar 
Association through the Commission on the American 
Jury Project. 
Conference of Chief Justices, Resolution 14: In Support of the 
American Bar Association Principles for Juries and Jury Trials 
(2006), available at http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/JuryResols.html. 
42 ABA Principles for Juries and Jury Trials Principle 15 is 
entitled "COURTS AND PARTIES HAVE A DUTY TO FACILITATE EFFECTIVE 
AND IMPARTIAL DELIBERATIONS."   
No. 
2009AP1249-CR   
 
40 
 
namely, that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant knowingly exhibited the harmful material to the 
child.  Accordingly, we are satisfied that the jury instruction  
misled the jury into believing that the State did not have the 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
"knowingly" exhibited the harmful material to the child.  
Viewing the jury instruction in light of the proceedings as a 
whole, we further conclude that the defendant has established a 
reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instruction in a 
way that relieved the State of its burden of proving every 
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore 
applied 
the 
potentially 
confusing 
instruction 
in 
an 
unconstitutional manner.  We therefore reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals and remand the cause for a new trial. 
¶98 By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded. 
No.  2009AP1249-CR.dtp 
1 
 
¶99 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 948.11 is entitled, in part, "Exposing a child to harmful 
material."  It reads in part: 
 
(2) Criminal 
Penalties. 
(a) 
Whoever, 
with 
knowledge 
of 
the 
character 
and 
content 
of 
the 
material, sells, rents, exhibits, plays, distributes, 
or loans to a child any harmful material, with or 
without monetary consideration, is guilty of a Class I 
felony if any of the following applies: 
 
1. 
The person knows or reasonably should know 
that the child has not attained the age of 18 years. 
 
2. 
The person has face-to-face contact with the 
child before or during the sale, rental, exhibit, 
playing, distribution, or loan. 
Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2)(a). 
¶100 A person looking at this statute might wonder why the 
statute does not read as follows: "Whoever, with knowledge of 
the character and content of the material, sells, rents, 
exhibits, plays, distributes, or loans to a child any harmful 
material, with or without monetary consideration, is guilty of a 
Class I felony." 
¶101 When ch. 948 of the statutes was created in 1988,1 Wis. 
Stat. § 948.11(2)(a) did read more simply: "Whoever, with 
knowledge of the nature of the material, sells, exhibits, 
transfers or loans to a child any material which is harmful to 
children, with or without monetary consideration, is guilty of a 
Class E felony." 
¶102 The legislature revised the statute and approved the 
present language in § 948.11(2)(a) and (c) in 2001 in an effort 
to deal with continuing issues surrounding a defendant's 
                                                 
1 See 1987 Wis. Act 332, § 55. 
No.  2009AP1249-CR.dtp 
2 
 
knowledge about a child's age.2  This knowledge factor has always 
been troubling.  Defendants have had some form of an affirmative 
                                                 
2 See 2001 Executive Budget Act, 2001 Wis. Act 16, §§ 3976-
3977.  The budget provision was derived from 2001 Senate Bill 
26, introduced by a bipartisan group of legislators at the 
request of Attorney General James Doyle.  The bill analysis for 
Senate Bill 26 reads, in part, as follows: 
Current law does not require that the state prove that 
the defendant knew or should have known that the 
recipient of the material was a child.  The law does, 
however, establish an affirmative defense under which 
the defendant may avoid criminal liability by proving 
that he or she reasonably believed that the recipient 
was 18 years of age or older.  In order to prove that 
he or she reasonably believed the recipient was 18 
years of age or older, the defendant must show that 
the recipient provided the defendant an official 
document purporting to establish that the recipient 
was at least 18 years of age. 
 
The Wisconsin supreme court recently ruled that 
the statute that prohibits exposure of a child to 
harmful materials is unconstitutional as applied to a 
defendant who sent harmful material over the Internet 
to a 17-year-old, and to other instances in which the 
defendant does not have face-to-face contact with the 
recipient.  State v. Weidner, 235 Wis. 2d 306 (2000).  
The supreme court found the statute unconstitutional 
because the statute does not make knowledge of the 
recipient's age an element of the crime, which the 
state must prove to obtain a conviction.  The supreme 
court distinguished Weidner (in which the defendant 
transmitted harmful material over the Internet) from 
instances in which the defendant meets the recipient 
face-to-face.  The supreme court did not disturb a 
lower 
court 
ruling 
that 
found 
the 
statute 
constitutional as applied to instances in which the 
defendant meets the recipient face-to-face, because 
the 
face-to-face 
meeting 
provides 
the 
defendant 
opportunity to assess the recipient's age. 
 
This bill makes knowledge of the recipient's 
status as a child an element of the crime only if the 
defendant does not have face-to-face contact with the 
child.  Under the bill, if the defendant does not have 
face-to-face contact with the recipient, the state 
No.  2009AP1249-CR.dtp 
3 
 
defense involving reasonable mistake of age——a provision now 
embodied in § 948.11(2)(c)——for at least four decades.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 944.25(11)(a) (1971).   
¶103 Several years ago, the court observed that "[s]ection 
948.11 has been somewhat of a 'work in progress' since 1957."  
State v. Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d 505, 534 n.22, 515 N.W.2d 847 
(1994).  Historically, the major points of contention have been 
(1) the character of the "harmful material" covered by the 
statute, and (2) the defendant's knowledge about the child's 
age.  To some extent, both of these issues implicate the 
defendant's knowledge or state of mind. 
¶104 The present case presents a new issue of mens rea 
because of a somewhat unusual application of the statute.  
¶105 The defendant played a pornographic video at night in 
his apartment at a time when his three-year-old daughter was 
supposed to be in bed.  Apparently, the daughter left her 
bedroom and entered the room where the video was being shown.  
Apparently, she saw the video. 
¶106 The State contends that the defendant admitted to 
police officers that he was aware that his daughter had entered 
                                                                                                                                                             
need not prove that the defendant knew or should have 
known that the recipient was a child.  A defendant who 
has face-to-face contact with the recipient may avoid 
criminal liability by proving the affirmative defense 
as modified by the bill.  The modified affirmative 
defense requires that the defendant prove that he or 
she had reasonable cause to believe that the recipient 
was at least 18 years of age, but does not require the 
defendant to prove that the recipient displayed an 
official document purporting to establish that the 
recipient was 18 years of age or older. 
No.  2009AP1249-CR.dtp 
4 
 
the living room but he was so preoccupied that he failed to turn 
off the video.  The defendant contests this version of events. 
¶107 There is no dispute that Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2) 
requires more than that the defendant purposely played a 
pornographic video.  That is not unlawful.  The new issue is 
what state of mind the defendant had to have with respect to his 
daughter's seeing the video——the harmful material——to be guilty 
of the offense. 
¶108 The defendant argues that the instructions given to 
the jury were misleading because they could have led the jury to 
believe that if the child observed the defendant's video being 
played and the defendant either saw the child before the child 
watched the video, or if the defendant saw the child during the 
time the child was watching the video, he would be guilty even 
though the child's viewing of the video was inadvertent or 
accidental.  The defendant contends that permitting a jury to 
convict him because of an accidental viewing by the child would 
unconstitutionally relieve the State of the burden of proving an 
affirmative act on his part vis-à-vis the child. 
¶109 If we ask what state of mind the statute requires for 
conviction, the question has nothing to do with the age of the 
child.  The question has everything to do with volition or 
knowledge.  Did the defendant have to make a conscious choice to 
"play" or "exhibit" the video to his daughter?  Could the 
defendant be convicted if he knew that his daughter had begun to 
watch the video but he did not act immediately to stop the 
viewing?  Is an accidental viewing subject to prosecution? 
No.  2009AP1249-CR.dtp 
5 
 
¶110 Chief Justice Abrahamson appears to address these 
questions by requiring the insertion of the word "knowingly" 
before all six verbs in the statute, namely, "sells, rents, 
exhibits, 
plays, 
distributes 
or 
loans," 
in 
future 
jury 
instructions.  The word "knowingly" is derived from Thiel, 183 
Wis. 2d at 535, where the court said, in a particular fact 
situation, that "an individual violates the statute if he or 
she, aware of the nature of the material, knowingly offers or 
presents for inspection to a specific minor or minors material 
defined as harmful to children."  (Emphasis added.) 
¶111 There is resistance to this remedy.  The word 
"knowingly" is not contained in the statute.  The word has not 
been picked up and highlighted in the headnotes to the Thiel 
case.  It has not been put into the jury instructions over the 
past 16 years.  And the statute has been substantially amended 
since 1994.   
¶112 Justice Ziegler contends that a state of mind is 
implicit in the six verbs——that each verb "represents a knowing 
and affirmative act."  Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d at 535.  She believes 
that adding the word "knowingly" to the jury instructions would 
create mischief.  She wants to leave well enough alone. 
¶113 On the other hand, the record in this case is clear 
that the jury was confused and wanted guidance.  The circuit 
court did not provide guidance, and the jury was left with an 
erroneous instruction.  The circuit court would have benefited 
from discussion and advice from the Wisconsin Criminal Jury 
Instructions Committee in the jury instructions. 
No.  2009AP1249-CR.dtp 
6 
 
¶114 Rather than try to resolve here the issue of mens rea 
embedded in the first element of the statute involving the words 
"play" and "exhibit," I would ground a new trial solely on the 
misleading fourth element employed by the circuit court. 
¶115 I am authorized to state that Justice MICHAEL J. 
GABLEMAN joins this concurrence. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2009AP1249-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
¶116 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I write 
in concurrence because I, like the lead opinion, conclude that 
in light of these proceedings as a whole, Gonzalez has met his 
burden of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that the jury 
applied the instruction on Count 1 in a manner that violates the 
constitution.  In particular, Gonzalez has met his burden of 
demonstrating that the instruction was ambiguous and that there 
is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instruction 
in a way that relieved the State of having to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Gonzalez exhibited or played harmful 
material to three-year-old A.G.  I wish to clarify, however, 
that the jury instruction on Count 1 was a legally correct 
statement of the law.  I concur to highlight that the lead 
opinion should not be read as now requiring that the word 
"knowingly" be 
added to the first element of the jury 
instruction on Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2)(a).  Indeed, both the 
pattern jury instruction and the instruction given in this case 
track the exact language of § 948.11(2)(a).  In a different 
case, under a different set of facts, this identical jury 
instruction might not pose any constitutional concerns.   
I. ANALYSIS 
A. The jury instruction was a legally 
correct statement of the law. 
¶117 The jury instruction on Count 1 tracked the exact 
language of Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2)(a).  Section 948.11(2)(a) 
provides that a person is guilty of a Class I felony if he or 
she "with knowledge of the character and content of the 
material, sells, rents, exhibits, plays, distributes, or loans 
No.  2009AP1249-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
to a child any harmful material, with or without monetary 
consideration" and either (1) "knows or reasonably should know 
that the child has not attained the age of 18 years" or, 
alternatively, (2) "has face-to-face contact with the child 
before 
or 
during 
the 
sale, 
rental, 
exhibit, 
playing, 
distribution, or loan."   
¶118 Likewise, in this case, the circuit court instructed 
the jury as follows: 
Exposing a child to harmful material, as defined 
in § 948.11(2)(a) of the Criminal Code of Wisconsin, 
is committed by one who, with knowledge of the 
character and content of the material, sells, rents, 
exhibits, plays, distributes, or loans to a child any 
harmful 
material, 
with 
or 
without 
monetary 
consideration and has face-to-face contact with the 
child before or during the sale, rental, exhibit, 
playing, distribution, or loan. 
The circuit court then broke down the statutory definition into 
four elements, instructing the jury that the State must prove 
each element beyond a reasonable doubt:  
Before you may find the defendant guilty of this 
offense, the State must prove by evidence which 
satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
following four elements were present. 
 . . . . 
1. The defendant exhibited or played harmful 
material to [A.G.].   
 . . . . 
2. The defendant had knowledge of the character 
and content of the material.   
This requires that the defendant knew that the 
material contained a description, narrative account, 
or 
representation 
of 
nudity, 
sexually 
explicit 
No.  2009AP1249-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
conduct, sexual excitement, sadomasochistic abuse, 
physical torture, or brutality.   
3. [A.G.] was under the age of 18 years.   
4. The defendant had face-to-face contact with 
the child before or during the exhibition or playing 
of the material. 
¶119 As the lead opinion explains, and I do not dispute, 
the circuit court erred when it instructed the jury on the 
fourth element and applied the incorrect alternative under the 
statute.  See lead op., ¶¶46-52.  As I more fully explain in 
Part B, on the basis of the fourth element, I conclude that 
Gonzalez has met his burden of demonstrating a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury applied the legally correct jury 
instruction in a manner that violates the constitution.  See 
infra ¶¶130-36. 
¶120 The fourth element is a means of determining that the 
defendant knew the child was under the age of 18.  See lead op., 
¶46.  Under the statute, the State can prove the fourth element 
in one of two ways: either by proving that the defendant (1) 
"kn[ew] or reasonably should [have] know[n] that the child ha[d] 
not attained the age of 18 years" or, alternatively, (2) "ha[d] 
face-to-face contact with the child before or during the sale, 
rental, exhibit, playing, distribution, or loan."  See Wis. 
Stat. § 948.11(2)(a).  In this case, given the fact that A.G. is 
Gonzalez's daughter, the circuit court should have instructed 
the jury that the fourth element is satisfied if the defendant 
"kn[ew] or reasonably should [have] know[n] that [A.G.] ha[d] 
not attained the age of 18 years."  See § 948.11(2)(a).  The 
No.  2009AP1249-CR.akz 
 
4 
 
alternative "face-to-face" instruction is inapplicable under the 
facts of this case.  See lead op., ¶¶51-52; infra ¶¶130-31. 
¶121 In spite of the fact that the instruction on the 
fourth element did not fit the facts of this case, the jury 
instruction otherwise tracked the exact language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.11(2)(a).  The lead opinion claims to conclude that the 
instruction was a legally correct statement of the law.  See 
lead op., ¶¶26-28.  Still, at times, the lead opinion implies 
that the jury instruction was legally inaccurate because the 
word "knowingly" was absent from the instruction's first 
element.1  That is, the lead opinion implies that the circuit 
court was required to explicitly instruct the jury that the jury 
must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
"knowingly exhibited or played harmful material to A.G."  In 
support, the lead opinion relies upon this court's decision in 
State v. Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d 505, 515 N.W.2d 847 (1994).  The 
lead opinion reasons:  
                                                 
1 See, e.g., lead op., ¶3 ("The jury instruction did not 
sufficiently define the first element of the crime, namely, that 
the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant knowingly exhibited the harmful material to the 
child."); id., ¶26 n.14 ("For the reasons set forth, we would 
conclude that the instruction was not a correct statement of the 
law and was prejudicial error."); id., ¶36 (concluding that 
Gonzalez has met his burden of demonstrating that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the jury instruction misled the jury 
because "the jury instruction did not explicitly instruct the 
jury that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant knowingly, as opposed to accidentally, exhibited 
the 
harmful 
material 
to 
the 
child"); 
id., 
¶83 
("[T]he 
instruction for Count 1 did not include the word 'knowing' or 
'intentional.'").  
No.  2009AP1249-CR.akz 
 
5 
 
As the defendant, the circuit court, the court of 
appeals, the State, and this court know, the supreme 
court in State v. Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d 505, 535, 515 
N.W.2d 847 (1994), interpreted Wis. Stat. § 948.11 to 
mean that "an individual violates [the statute] if he 
or she, aware of the nature of the material, knowingly 
offers or presents for inspection to a specific minor 
or minors material defined as harmful to children."   
Wisconsin Stat. § 948.11, construed narrowly as 
Thiel instructs, is the law.  The circuit court must 
instruct the jury according to that law. 
Lead op., ¶¶33-34 (alteration in original); see also lead op., 
¶75 ("The Thiel court interpreted the statutory language to 
ensure that the statute was not unconstitutionally overbroad.  
That interpretation requires that an accused 'knowingly' exhibit 
the harmful material to the child.").  The lead opinion misreads 
Thiel when it suggests that the circuit court was required to 
add the word "knowingly" to the first element of the jury 
instruction.  In so doing, the lead opinion rewrites the statute 
in a manner that Thiel expressly advocated against.  I, unlike 
the lead opinion, am not so willing to usurp the role of the 
legislature or disregard the precedent that Thiel commands. 
¶122 Our decision in Thiel must be understood in context.  
In that case, the defendant raised a facial constitutional 
challenge to Wis. Stat. § 948.11, arguing that the statute, as 
written, is substantially overbroad.  183 Wis. 2d at 518-20.  
Specifically, the defendant maintained that the language of 
§ 948.11(2)(a), which provides that a person may not "exhibit" 
material that is harmful to children, effectively chills 
legitimate 
activities 
protected 
by 
the 
First 
Amendment——
including an adult's right to sell, view, or examine sexually 
explicit materials deemed harmful to minors.  Id. at 521.  We 
No.  2009AP1249-CR.akz 
 
6 
 
disagreed, concluding that "[t]he statute properly regulates the 
dissemination of materials considered to be harmful to minors 
without unduly burdening the rights of adults to have access to 
these same materials."  Id. at 523. 
¶123 As the Thiel court recognized, pursuant to Ginsberg v. 
New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), a state may enact a "variable 
obscenity" statute that prohibits the distribution of sexually 
explicit materials to children, even though the same materials 
would not be considered obscene if distributed to an adult.  
Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d at 524-27.  At the same time, such statutes 
must strike a proper balance between a state's compelling 
interest in protecting children and an adult's First Amendment 
right to have access to materials not considered obscene for 
adults.  See id. at 531 (citing Am. Booksellers v. Webb, 919 
F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1990)).  Accordingly, variable obscenity 
statutes must be narrowly construed and, importantly, cannot be 
rewritten in order to conform to constitutional requirements.  
See id. at 533. 
¶124 The Thiel court concluded that Wis. Stat. § 948.11, as 
written, can be narrowly construed to strike "a proper balance 
between this state's compelling interest to protect the physical 
and psychological well-being of our youth while not precluding 
adult access to materials deemed to be harmful to minors though 
not obscene for adults."  Id. at 533-34.  We reasoned that the 
language 
of 
§ 948.11 
has 
been 
narrowly 
drafted 
to 
only 
incidentally affect an adult's First Amendment right to view 
materials not considered obscene for adults.  Id. at 534.  In 
No.  2009AP1249-CR.akz 
 
7 
 
particular, the language of § 948.11(2)(a), providing that a 
person may not sell, loan, exhibit, or transfer harmful 
materials to a child, "focuses upon the affirmative conduct of 
an individual toward a specific minor or minors."  Id. at 535.  
With that being the focus, the statute is "[d]istinct from those 
cases involving the commercial display of materials to a 
general, consumer audience."  Id.  A person violates § 948.11 
only "if he or she, aware of the nature of the material, 
knowingly offers or presents for inspection to a specific minor 
or minors material defined as harmful to children in sec. 
948.11(1)(b)."  Id. 
¶125 Thiel does not stand for the proposition that the word 
"knowingly" is a requisite of the first element of the jury 
instruction on Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2)(a).  To the contrary, the 
Thiel court concluded that the statute, as written, "focuses 
upon the affirmative conduct of an individual toward a specific 
minor or minors."  Id. at 535.  Hence, just as the circuit court 
and court of appeals concluded in the instant case, see lead 
op., ¶38, the statute's requirement that a person "sell[], 
rent[], exhibit[], play[], distribute[], or loan[]" harmful 
material 
"to 
a 
child" 
already 
contemplates 
knowing 
and 
affirmative conduct.  The lead opinion rejects this analysis, 
see id., ¶39, and instead, appears to rely on Thiel for the 
proposition that the circuit court was required to explicitly 
instruct the jury that the jury must be satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant "knowingly exhibited or 
played harmful material to A.G."  However, such rewriting of 
No.  2009AP1249-CR.akz 
 
8 
 
§ 948.11(2)(a) amounts to judicial legislating and is exactly 
what the Thiel court made clear it could not do.  See 183 
Wis. 2d at 532-33; see also Heimerl v. Ozaukee Cnty., 256 
Wis. 151, 155, 40 N.W.2d 564 (1949) ("[W]hile a statute should 
be held valid whenever by any fair interpretation it may be 
construed to serve a constitutional purpose, courts cannot go 
beyond the province of legitimate construction to save it, and 
where the meaning is plain, words cannot be read into it or out 
of it for the purpose of saving one or other possible 
alternative.").   
¶126 In sum, in Thiel, this court did not rewrite Wis. 
Stat. § 948.11(2)(a) and insert the word "knowingly" before the 
phrase "sells, rents, exhibits, plays, distributes, or loans to 
a child any harmful material . . . ."  Instead, as we parsed the 
statute, we narrowly construed that existing phrase as one 
which, as written, already encompasses affirmative conduct 
towards a specific minor or minors——as opposed to the act of 
selling, renting, exhibiting, playing, distributing, or loaning 
the objected to material to an adult or group of adults when it 
is not known that a minor is part of the group.2   
¶127 Accordingly, 
both 
the 
language 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.11(2)(a) and this court's decision in Thiel lead me to 
conclude that the jury instruction on Count 1 was a legally 
                                                 
2 See State v. Weidner, 2000 WI 52, ¶20, 235 Wis. 2d 306, 
611 N.W.2d 684 (explaining that the Thiel court "not[ed] that 
the term 'exhibit' contemplates affirmative conduct to target 
specific minors rather than a commercial display to a general 
audience" (emphasis added)). 
No.  2009AP1249-CR.akz 
 
9 
 
correct statement of the law and that the absence of the word 
"knowingly" 
from 
the 
first 
element 
did 
not 
render 
the 
instruction deficient.  In a different case, under a different 
set of facts, this identical jury instruction might not pose any 
constitutional concerns. 
¶128 However, I agree with the lead opinion that in light 
of these proceedings as a whole, and particularly in light of 
the jury instruction's misapplication of the fourth element, 
Gonzalez has met his burden of demonstrating a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury applied the legally correct jury 
instruction in a manner that violates the constitution.   
B. In light of these proceedings as a whole, 
Gonzalez has met his burden of demonstrating a 
reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the 
jury instruction in a manner that violates the 
constitution. 
¶129 A defendant is entitled to a new trial if he or she 
establishes that "'there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
jury applied the challenged [jury] instruction[] in a manner 
that violates the constitution.'"  State v. Burris, 2011 WI 32, 
¶45, __ Wis. 2d __, 797 N.W.2d 430 (quoting State v. Lohmeier, 
205 Wis. 2d 183, 193, 556 N.W.2d 90 (1996)).  "[A]n 'especially 
heavy burden'" is placed upon a defendant "who . . . seeks to 
show constitutional error from a jury instruction that quotes a 
state statute."  Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 129 S. 
Ct. 823, 831 (2009) (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 
155 (1977)).  A defendant meets that burden if he or she 
"'show[s] both that the instruction was ambiguous and that there 
was 
a 
reasonable 
likelihood 
that 
the 
jury 
applied 
the 
instruction in a way that relieved the State of its burden of 
No.  2009AP1249-CR.akz 
 
10 
 
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'"  
Burris, 2011 WI 32, ¶48 (quoting Waddington, 129 S. Ct. at 831).  
Upon review, we consider the challenged jury instruction "in 
light of the proceedings as a whole, instead of viewing a single 
instruction in artificial isolation."  Lohmeier, 205 Wis. 2d at 
194.  
¶130 In this case, in light of the proceedings as a whole, 
I agree with the lead opinion that Gonzalez has met his burden 
of demonstrating that the jury instruction on Count 1 was 
ambiguous and that there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
jury applied the instruction in a way that relieved the State of 
having to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Gonzalez 
exhibited or played harmful material to A.G.  See lead op., ¶78 
("The jury instruction at issue in the present case failed to 
sufficiently instruct the jury of the meaning of the statutory 
language under the circumstances of the present case.  Reviewing 
the jury instruction and proceedings as a whole, it is 
reasonably likely that the jury was misled." (Emphasis added.)).  
Unlike the lead opinion, I do not arrive at that conclusion on 
the grounds that the jury instruction did not explicitly 
instruct the jury that it must be satisfied beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant "knowingly" exhibited or played harmful 
No.  2009AP1249-CR.akz 
 
11 
 
material to A.G.3  See id., ¶¶36-37.  As discussed above, the 
jury instruction correctly stated the law.  Instead, I conclude 
                                                 
3 The lead opinion supports its conclusion, in part, by 
comparing the jury instruction on Count 1 with the jury 
instruction on Count 2.  See lead op., ¶¶80-86.  On Count 2, 
consistent with the express language of Wis. Stat. § 948.055(1), 
the circuit court instructed the jury that "[s]ection 948.055 of 
the Criminal Code of Wisconsin is violated by a person who 
intentionally causes a child to view or listen to sexually 
explicit conduct for the purpose of sexually arousing or 
gratifying the person or humiliating or degrading the child."  
(Emphasis added.)  The lead opinion compares that instruction's 
explicit reference to "intentionally" with the instruction on 
Count 1, noting that "[t]he instruction for Count 1 has no 
similarly explicit 'intention' or 'knowing' language."  Lead 
op., ¶84.  In making such a comparison, the lead opinion makes 
several false insinuations, including suggesting that the terms 
"knowingly" and "intentionally" are one and the same.  They are 
not.  In the criminal statutes, the terms "knowingly" and 
"intentionally" 
have 
distinct 
and 
particularized 
meanings.  
Compare Wis. Stat. § 939.23(2) with § 939.23(3). 
The lead opinion also falsely insinuates that Count 1 and 
Count 2 are somehow interrelated.  A violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.11(2)(a), Count 1, is separate and distinct from a 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.055(1), Count 2.  As the jury 
instructions make explicit, the crimes are comprised of entirely 
different elements.  Compare Wis JI——Criminal 2142 with Wis JI——
Criminal 2125.  Notably, a person is guilty of violating Wis. 
Stat. § 948.055(1) if he or she "intentionally causes a child 
who has not attained 18 years of age to view or listen to 
sexually explicit conduct" and does so "for the purpose of 
sexually arousing or gratifying the actor or humiliating or 
degrading the child."  If the child is under the age of 13, then 
the actor is guilty of a Class F felony.  § 948.055(2)(a).  In 
comparison, neither criminal "intention" nor sexual arousal is 
an element of Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2)(a).  A violation of 
§ 948.11(2)(a) is a Class I felony.  
No.  2009AP1249-CR.akz 
 
12 
 
that the jury instruction was ambiguous and that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the jury was misled because the 
instruction misapplied the fourth element of the offense, given 
the facts of this case. 
¶131 As mentioned earlier, the circuit court misapplied 
Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2)(a) when it instructed the jury that it 
must be satisfied beyond a reasonable a doubt that Gonzalez "had 
face-to-face contact with [A.G.] before or during the exhibition 
or playing of the [harmful] material."  As the lead opinion 
explains, the instruction on "face-to-face contact" is generally 
applicable to Internet transactions, in which the defendant may 
assert the affirmative defense under § 948.11(2)(c) that he or 
she "had reasonable cause to believe the child had attained the 
age of 18 years."  See lead op., ¶52; Wis JI——Criminal 2142A.  
In such cases, the State bears the burden of proving that the 
defendant had "face-to-face contact with the child before or 
during the sale, rental, exhibit, playing, distribution, or 
loan" of the harmful material and therefore had knowledge of the 
child's age.  § 948.11(2)(a)2.; see also State v. Weidner, 2000 
WI 52, 235 Wis. 2d 306, 611 N.W.2d 684. 
¶132 In this case, however, the instruction on "face-to-
face contact" was unnecessary because Gonzalez's knowledge of 
                                                                                                                                                             
Despite the fact that these two counts "arose out of 
allegedly simultaneous events," lead op., ¶82, it is entirely 
legitimate for the jury to convict on one and not the other, and 
I reject the lead opinion's insinuation otherwise.  For example, 
it is possible that the jury could believe that the defendant 
exhibited or played the pornographic video to A.G. but did not 
intentionally cause her to view his masturbation for the purpose 
of sexually arousing him or humiliating her. 
No.  2009AP1249-CR.akz 
 
13 
 
A.G.'s age was not in doubt; A.G. is Gonzalez's daughter.  Thus, 
the circuit court should have instructed the jury that the 
fourth element is satisfied on the alternative grounds that 
Gonzalez "kn[ew] or reasonably should [have] know[n] that [A.G.] 
ha[d] not attained the age of 18 years."  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.11(2)(a). 
¶133 In a different case, a jury instruction's erroneous 
application of the instruction on "face-to-face contact" might 
not rise to the level of a due process violation.  However, in 
this case, in light of the proceedings as a whole, it is 
reasonably likely that the instruction on "face-to-face contact" 
misled the jury into believing that the State did not have to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Gonzalez exhibited or 
played harmful material to A.G. 
¶134 By instructing the jury that it must be satisfied 
beyond a reasonable a doubt that Gonzalez "had face-to-face 
contact with [A.G.] before or during the exhibition or playing 
of the [harmful] material," the jury instruction may have 
relieved the State of having to prove that Gonzalez exhibited or 
played harmful material to A.G.  (Emphasis added.)  That is, if 
the jury found that Gonzalez had face-to-face contact with A.G. 
before, but not during, the exhibition or playing of the harmful 
material, then it is reasonably likely that the jury did not 
believe that Gonzalez exhibited or played the harmful material 
to A.G.  That likelihood is compounded by defense counsel's 
closing arguments and the questions submitted by the jury.   
No.  2009AP1249-CR.akz 
 
14 
 
¶135 In 
his 
closing 
arguments, 
Gonzalez's 
counsel 
repeatedly spoke of "face-to-face" contact in relation to the 
State having to prove that Gonzalez exhibited or played the 
pornographic video to A.G.4   
¶136 In addition, the jury specifically asked the circuit 
court to "[c]larify statement 'the defendant exhibited or played 
harmful material To [A.G.] [the child],'" see lead op., ¶63, and 
to define "face-to-face contact with the child," see id., ¶68.  
¶137 I do not pretend to know the jury's thought process or 
the meaning behind its questions; the court's role is not to 
invite such speculation.  Nonetheless, the lead opinion does 
much of this.  See id., ¶74 (speculating that the jury questions 
"raise the issue of whether the defendant had to know that the 
child was present" and "went to whether the defendant's 
exhibiting or playing the video to the child had to be done 
'knowingly'").  Still, I am satisfied that, given the closing 
arguments and the jury questions as they related to the fourth 
element, it is at least reasonably likely that the jury 
instruction misled the jury into believing that the State did 
not have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Gonzalez 
exhibited or played harmful material to A.G.  
                                                 
4 For example, Gonzalez's counsel argued that "[t]here is 
absolutely no evidence that [Gonzalez] intentionally exposed 
[A.G.] to the video in a face-to-face confrontation or context, 
which is required by the statute for the first count."  
Similarly, he argued that Gonzalez's behavior was "consistent 
with a reasonable parent who would not and has testified [] 
would not intentionally knowingly exhibit a face-to-face, for 
their child, a porno movie . . . ." 
No.  2009AP1249-CR.akz 
 
15 
 
¶138 In conclusion, I want to make clear that the jury 
instruction was a legally correct statement of the law and that 
the absence of the word "knowingly" from the first element did 
not render the instruction deficient.  In a different case, 
under a different set of facts, this identical jury instruction 
might not pose any constitutional concerns.  However, I agree 
with the lead opinion that in light of these proceedings as a 
whole, Gonzalez has met his burden of demonstrating a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury applied the legally correct jury 
instruction in a manner that violates the constitution. 
¶139 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶140 I am authorized to state that Justice PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK joins this concurrence. 
 
No.  2009AP1249-CR.akz 
 
1