Title: State ex rel. Gold v. Washington County Bd. of Elections

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Gold v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-1051.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-1051 
THE STATE EX REL. GOLD, F.K.A. LABES v. WASHINGTON COUNTY BOARD OF 
ELECTIONS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Gold v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip 
Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-1051.] 
Elections—Mandamus—R.C. 3513.06—Change of name of candidate—Writ of 
mandamus sought to compel board of elections to place relator’s name on 
May 2, 2023 primary-election ballot as mayoral candidate—Relator failed 
to show that the board abused its discretion or clearly disregarded 
applicable law by refusing to certify his name to the ballot because relator 
had failed to include his former name on his declaration of candidacy and 
petition—Writ denied. 
(No. 2023-0313—Submitted March 24, 2023—Decided March 30, 2023.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
2 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} In this expedited election matter, relator, Ari Gold, formerly known 
as “David Asaf Labes,” seeks a writ of mandamus ordering respondent, the 
Washington County Board of Elections, to place his name on the May 2, 2023 
primary-election ballot as a Democratic candidate for mayor of Marietta.  Gold has 
also filed a motion to strike the board’s merit brief as untimely. 
{¶ 2} We deny the motion to strike, because the board timely filed its brief 
under the expedited schedule set out in S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.08(A).  And because the 
board did not abuse its discretion or clearly disregard applicable law in declining to 
certify Gold’s name to the ballot, we deny the writ. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
{¶ 3} Upon obtaining United States citizenship in September 2020, relator 
legally changed his name from “David Asaf Labes” to “Ari Gold.”  “Ari” had been 
his father’s name, and “Gold” had been a surname in relator’s family a long time 
ago.  Since obtaining citizenship, Gold has exclusively used the name “Ari Gold” 
on legal documents, social media, and in court cases.  Gold is registered to vote 
under that name and is also well known by it as a restaurant owner in Marietta and 
through his activities in the community. 
{¶ 4} On January 17, 2023, Gold filed a nominating petition and declaration 
of candidacy with the board, seeking to be a candidate for the Democratic 
nomination for mayor of Marietta.  The declaration of candidacy and petition listed 
“Ari Gold” as the candidate’s name but did not state that Gold’s former name was 
“David Asaf Labes.”  At a meeting on February 7, the board voted not to certify 
Gold’s candidacy for the primary-election ballot.  The board determined that R.C. 
3513.06 required Gold to list his former name on his nominating petition, because 
the name change had occurred within the last five years.  R.C. 3513.06 states: 
 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
3 
If any person desiring to become a candidate for public 
office has had a change of name within five years immediately 
preceding the filing of the person’s declaration of candidacy, the 
person’s declaration of candidacy and petition shall both contain, 
immediately following the person’s present name, the person’s 
former names. 
 
{¶ 5} The board informed Gold of its decision in a letter dated February 8.  
Gold requested reconsideration, and the board held a hearing on February 24.  Gold 
appeared with counsel, who called three witnesses: David Grande, a candidate for 
president of the Marietta City Council; Mandy Amos, the director of the board; and 
Gold. 
{¶ 6} Grande testified that Gold was well known in the community as “Ari 
Gold.”  Grande also testified that when he filed his own candidacy petition with the 
board of elections, Amos informed him by telephone that he had placed an incorrect 
date on his petition and that Grande could either cure the defect by submitting new 
petitions or by coming to the board’s certification meeting on February 7.  Grande 
opted to appear at the certification meeting to explain the date on his petition, and 
the board ultimately certified him as a candidate.  Amos testified that the board 
does not engage in “precheck[ing]” a candidate’s petition to alert the candidate of 
possible defects but acknowledged that she had contacted Grande about his petition.  
Gold claimed at the hearing that he was treated differently, because he was not 
given the same opportunity to correct his petition or otherwise explain the defect to 
the board. 
{¶ 7} Gold testified that he changed his name to Ari Gold in September 
2020 and that he had used that name exclusively since then.  Gold added that he did 
not change his name to gain an advantage in his candidacy for mayor or to deceive 
voters.  He further testified that had the board alerted him about the requirement 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
4 
that he include his former name on his petition and declaration of candidacy, he 
would have either recirculated his petition with both names or appeared before the 
board at its February 7 certification meeting like Grande had done. 
{¶ 8} At the close of the hearing, the board voted unanimously to deny 
Gold’s request for reconsideration.  Gold commenced this action on March 3, 
seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the board to place his name on the May 2, 
2023 primary ballot as a candidate for the Democratic nomination for mayor of 
Marietta.  Gold also asks for awards of costs and attorney fees.  The board filed an 
answer, and the parties filed evidence and merit briefs under the expedited schedule 
set out in S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.08(A). 
II.  MOTION TO STRIKE 
{¶ 9} Under S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.08(A)(2)(b), a respondent shall file its 
evidence and merit brief in an expedited election case “within three days after the 
filing of relator’s merit brief.”  Gold moves to strike the board’s merit brief, which 
was filed on March 16, as untimely under this rule.  Gold contends that he 
electronically filed his brief and served it on the board on Sunday, March 12.  Thus, 
Gold argues that under S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.08(A)(2), the board’s brief was due on 
March 15. 
{¶ 10} Gold is wrong.  Our rules provide that a brief is filed when “the 
Clerk’s Office file-stamps a document and dockets it in a case.”  S.Ct.Prac.R. 
3.02(A)(1)(a).  Because Gold filed his merit brief on Sunday, March 12, the clerk 
did not docket and file-stamp it until the next business day: Monday, March 13.  
Accordingly, the board’s merit brief was timely filed on March 16.  We deny Gold’s 
motion to strike. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
{¶ 11} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Gold must establish by clear 
and convincing evidence that (1) he has a clear legal right to the requested relief, 
(2) the board is under a clear legal duty to perform the requested acts, and (3) he 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
5 
has no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  See State ex rel. 
Linnabary v. Husted, 138 Ohio St.3d 535, 2014-Ohio-1417, 8 N.E.3d 940, ¶ 13.  
Given the proximity of the May election, Gold lacks an adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of the law.  See State ex rel. O’Neill v. Athens Cty. Bd. of Elections, 
160 Ohio St.3d 128, 2020-Ohio-1476, 154 N.E.3d 44, ¶ 10.  The remaining 
elements of the analysis require us to determine whether the board of elections 
“engaged in fraud, corruption, or abuse of discretion, or acted in clear disregard of 
applicable legal provisions.”  Whitman v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 97 Ohio 
St.3d 216, 2002-Ohio-5923, 778 N.E.2d 32, ¶ 11; see also O’Neill at ¶ 11. 
{¶ 12} Gold complains of bad faith on the board’s part but does not argue 
that the board committed fraud or is guilty of corruption.  Rather, he contends that 
the board abused its discretion and clearly disregarded applicable law in deciding 
not to place his name on the ballot. 
A. Was There a Name Change? 
{¶ 13} With certain exceptions not applicable in this case, R.C. 3513.06 
requires “any person * * * [who] has had a change of name within five years 
immediately preceding the filing of the person’s declaration of candidacy” to 
include the person’s former names on his declaration of candidacy and petition.  By 
his own admission, Gold changed his name from “David Asaf Labes” to “Ari Gold” 
in September 2020, upon obtaining United States citizenship.  Thus, by not 
including his former name on his declaration of candidacy and petition, Gold did 
not comply with the statute, thereby subjecting his petition to rejection by the board.  
See R.C. 3501.39(A)(4). 
{¶ 14} Gold argues, however, that the board erred by ignoring evidence that 
he had used the name “Ari Gold” for longer than five years.  Thus, Gold contends 
that he effectuated a “common law name change” more than five years prior to his 
declaration of candidacy, making R.C. 3513.06 inapplicable to his case. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
6 
{¶ 15} The board did not abuse its discretion or clearly disregard applicable 
law in finding that Gold had changed his name within five years of submitting his 
declaration of candidacy.  As noted above, Gold testified at the reconsideration 
hearing that he changed his name from “David Asaf Labes” to “Ari Gold” in 
September 2020 when he became a United States citizen.  He further testified that 
he had used the name “Ari Gold” exclusively since September 2020.  Based on 
Gold’s own testimony suggesting that he was previously known as David Labes 
and began going exclusively by “Ari Gold” in September 2020, the board had 
ample evidence to conclude that Gold had changed his name within five years of 
the date of his declaration of candidacy.  The board therefore found properly that 
R.C. 3513.06 applied to Gold’s declaration of candidacy and petition. 
B.  Gold’s “Statutory Intent” Arguments 
{¶ 16} Gold also contends that the board abused its discretion and acted 
contrary to law in “applying an overly-strict interpretation” of the statute to his 
declaration of candidacy and petition.  He emphasizes this court’s observation that 
“[t]he clear purpose of the statute is to prevent a candidate from changing his name 
to another to avoid an unfavorable result in the use of the abandoned name or to 
secure advantage by the use of such other name,” Pierce v. Brushart, 153 Ohio St. 
372, 381, 92 N.E.2d 4 (1950).  That statutory purpose is not implicated here, says 
Gold, because there is no evidence that he changed his name for a fraudulent or 
otherwise improper purpose. 
{¶ 17} Gold’s argument is not persuasive.  Though Gold asks us to glean 
the legislative intent behind R.C. 3513.06, the first place to look for that intent is in 
the statutory language itself.  See State ex rel. Wolfe v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of 
Elections, 88 Ohio St.3d 182, 184, 724 N.E.2d 771 (2000).  When statutory 
language is “unambiguous and definite, it must be applied as written and no further 
interpretation is necessary.”  State ex rel. Savarese v. Buckeye Local School Dist. 
Bd. of Edn., 74 Ohio St.3d 543, 545, 660 N.E.2d 463 (1996).  And in this case, R.C. 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
7 
3513.06 is unambiguous: when a person has had a change of name within the 
preceding five years, the person’s former name or names must be placed on the 
declaration of candidacy and petition.  Under the statute’s plain language, the intent 
behind the candidate’s use of a different name is not relevant.  Pierce does not 
override the unambiguous statutory language. 
{¶ 18} Regardless, Pierce does not support Gold’s argument that the board 
abused its discretion and disregarded applicable law.  In Pierce, the question before 
this court was whether a person’s use of two names “for many years both before 
and after the enactment of Sections 4785-70a, 4785-90a and 4785-98a, General 
Code, and more than ten years before the filing of his declaration of candidacy and 
petition * * * constitute[d] a change of name within the purview and meaning of 
such statutes.”  Id. at 380.1  The court of appeals held that the candidate had been 
required to use both names in his declaration of candidacy and petition.  Id.  This 
court reversed, determining that R.C. 3513.06’s predecessor statute, G.C. 4785-
70a, did not apply because the candidate had used two surnames, those of his father 
and his stepfather, “continuously from childhood.”  Pierce at 381.  Thus, there was 
no change of name within the meaning of the statute.  In contrast, the record in this 
case supports the board’s conclusion that Gold, in fact, changed his name from 
“David Asaf Labes” to “Ari Gold” less than five years before submitting his 
declaration of candidacy. 
{¶ 19} Gold also relies on McLaughlin v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 
156 Ohio App.3d 98, 2004-Ohio-492, 804 N.E.2d 1004 (8th Dist.), and State ex rel. 
Krupa v. Green, 114 Ohio App. 497, 177 N.E.2d 616 (8th Dist.1961), for the 
 
1. G.C. 4785-70a was the precursor to R.C. 3513.06.  At the time Pierce was decided, it stated, “In 
the event that any person desiring to become a candidate for public office has changed his or her 
name within ten years next preceding the filing of his or her declaration of candidacy, his declaration 
of candidacy and petition must both contain, immediately following his present name, his former 
name or names.”  See H.B. No. 183, 118 Ohio Laws, 81.  G.C. 4785-90a applied the same rule to 
nominating petitions, and G.C. 4785-98a required any former names declared under G.C. 4785-70a 
or 4785-90a to be printed on the ballot along with the candidate’s current name. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
8 
proposition that R.C. 3513.06 will invalidate a candidacy only if a candidate 
intended to gain an advantage or deceive voters by using a particular name.  But 
neither case stands for that rule.  To the contrary, they speak to a candidate’s choice 
of name on election documents in situations in which R.C. 3513.06 does not apply. 
{¶ 20} In McLaughlin, the candidate used her maiden name, which she had 
not otherwise used since her marriage; in Krupa, the candidate used her maiden 
name, as she had done continuously since her marriage.  McLaughlin at ¶ 2, 7; 
Krupa at 499.  Under the facts in each of those cases, R.C. 3513.06 was not 
applicable, because the candidate had not changed her name within the meaning of 
the statute.  McLaughlin at ¶ 6-7; Krupa at 503.  When there has been no such name 
change, R.C. 3513.06 does not apply and the validity of the candidate’s declaration-
of-candidacy petition is “guided by the principle that candidates shall be prevented 
from changing their names ‘* * * to avoid an unfavorable result in the use of the 
abandoned name or to secure advantage by the use of the abandoned name.’ ”  
McLaughlin at ¶ 7, quoting Pierce, 153 Ohio St. at 381, 92 N.E.2d 4; see also Krupa 
at 501 (noting that a person may adopt “any name he wishes,” so long as such 
change is made in good faith and not for fraudulent purposes).  In other words, the 
candidate’s intent in using a particular name is relevant when R.C. 3513.06 does 
not otherwise apply.  In this case, however, R.C. 3513.06 applies to Gold’s name 
change, and therefore the board did not act improperly when it found his declaration 
of candidacy and petition to be invalid under the statute. 
{¶ 21} Finally, Gold contends that this court should treat name changes 
made as part of the citizenship process the same as name changes related to 
marriage.  R.C. 3513.06 specifies that it does not apply “to a change of name by 
reason of marriage,” which Gold argues is indicative of the legislative recognition 
that such name changes are not undertaken to deceive voters or to gain an unfair 
advantage in an election.  Likewise, Gold contends that his name change was part 
of the process of becoming a United States citizen and, thus, he should be exempted 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
9 
from R.C. 3513.06’s requirement that both his current and former name be placed 
on a declaration of candidacy and petition.  But this argument is also without merit 
because we cannot add an exception that does not appear in the statutory language.  
See State ex rel. Stoll v. Logan Cty. Bd. of Elections, 117 Ohio St.3d 76, 2008-Ohio-
333, 881 N.E.2d 1214, ¶ 39. 
C.  Absence of a Protest or Another Democratic Candidate Are Irrelevant 
{¶ 22} Gold also complains that the board invalidated his candidacy on its 
own initiative, without any protest having been filed.  Gold argues that without a 
protest, the board lacked authority to invalidate his petition based on 
noncompliance with R.C. 3513.06. 
{¶ 23} Gold is incorrect.  Under R.C. 3501.39(A)(4), a board of elections 
must accept a candidate’s petition unless “[t]he candidate’s candidacy or the 
petition violates the requirements of this chapter, Chapter 3513. of the Revised 
Code, or any other requirements established by law.”  Thus, a board may invalidate 
a declaration of candidacy and petition “where such declaration and petition does 
not conform to [the] requirements specified by law, even though no protests were 
filed.”  Pierce, 153 Ohio St. at 378, 92 N.E.2d 4.  The board therefore acted within 
its statutory authority when it refused to certify Gold’s petition. 
{¶ 24} Gold also argues that the board’s “strict reading” of R.C. 3513.06 
deprives Marietta voters of a Democratic candidate in the mayoral election, because 
Gold was the only Democrat to file a declaration of candidacy.  Relying on State 
ex rel. Morrison v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections, 63 Ohio St.2d 336, 410 N.E.2d 
764 (1980), Gold contends that we should order the board to place his name on the 
ballot in the interest of giving voters a meaningful choice between mayoral 
candidates. 
{¶ 25} The resulting absence of a Democratic mayoral candidate on the 
ballot does not excuse Gold’s noncompliance with R.C. 3513.06.  Notably, 
Morrison does not support the proposition that we should take that circumstance 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
10 
into account when deciding issues related to a candidate’s use of different names.  
In that case, Fred L. Morrison had changed the name on his voter registration to 
“Fred ‘Curly’ Morrison” and then filed a declaration of candidacy for state senator 
as “Fred ‘Curly’ Morrison.”  Id. at 336.  Morrison sought a writ of mandamus to 
direct the board to place his name on the ballot as “Fred Curly Morrison” instead 
of “Fred L. Morrison.”  Id. at 337.  We denied the writ without deciding whether 
Morrison’s candidacy was invalid under R.C. 3513.06.  Morrison at 338.  Because 
it was unclear from the record whether Morrison had used “Curly” simply as a 
nickname or if he actually intended to change his name to include “Curly” as part 
of his true name, this court found no abuse of discretion in the board’s decision to 
exclude “Curly” from Morrison’s name on the ballot.  Id. at 337-339.  But the fact 
that there would have been no Republican candidate had Morrison’s candidacy 
been deemed invalid was not a basis for this court’s decision. 
D.  Gold’s “Bad Faith” Arguments 
{¶ 26} Gold also argues that the board acted in bad faith in refusing to 
certify his candidacy.  He points to several circumstances that purportedly show 
that the board members were motivated by personal animus toward him or bias 
against him.  Gold also contends that he was subject to disparate treatment: though 
board director Amos alerted Grande to a possible defect in his candidate petition 
for a different office, giving Grande time to either cure the defect or explain it to 
the board, Gold says that he was not given the same opportunity. 
{¶ 27} Gold raises bad faith as a basis for an award of attorney fees in this 
case.  But Gold is not entitled to a writ of mandamus and is therefore not a 
prevailing party entitled to attorney fees.  See State ex rel. Maloney v. Sherlock, 100 
Ohio St.3d 77, 2003-Ohio-5058, 796 N.E.2d 897, ¶ 55 (absent a statute allowing 
attorney fees as costs, the prevailing party is not entitled to attorney fees unless the 
opposing party acted in bad faith).  Moreover, Gold is proceeding pro se in this case 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
11 
and is therefore not entitled to recover attorney fees.  See State ex rel. Ullmann v. 
Klein, 160 Ohio St.3d 457, 2020-Ohio-2974, 158 N.E.3d 580, ¶ 15. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 28} We deny Gold’s motion to strike the board’s merit brief, because the 
brief was timely filed under S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.08(A).  And because the board did not 
abuse its discretion or clearly disregard applicable law in declining to certify Gold’s 
name to the ballot, we deny the writ.  We also deny Gold’s request for an award of 
attorney fees. 
Writ denied. 
KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER, 
and DETERS, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Ari Gold, pro se. 
Nicole T. Coil, Washington County Prosecuting Attorney, and Alison 
Cauthorn-Kreiss, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent. 
_________________