Title: In re Sawyer

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: OCTOBER 26, 2000
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In re Complaint as to the Conduct of
SANDRA M. SAWYER,
	Accused.
(OSB 96-127; SC S46356)

	En Banc
	On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
	Argued and submitted September 7, 2000.
	Jacob Tanzer, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
briefs for the accused.
	Jane E. Angus, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake Oswego,
argued the cause for the Oregon State Bar.  With her on the brief
was Jeffrey M. Kilmer, Portland.
	PER CURIAM
	The accused is suspended from the practice of law for a
period of nine months, commencing 60 days from the date of filing
of this decision.
PER CURIAM
		The Oregon State Bar (Bar) charged the accused by
formal complaint with violating Code of Professional
Responsibility Disciplinary Rule (DR) 1-102(A)(3) (prohibiting
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation); DR 7-104(A)(2) (prohibiting giving legal
advice to unrepresented person whose interest was, or had a
reasonable possibility of being, in conflict with lawyer's
client); DR 5-105(C) (former-client conflict of interest); DR 5-105(E) (current-client conflict of interest); ORS 9.460(2)
(lawyer shall "[e]mploy, for the purpose of maintaining the
causes confided to the [lawyer], such means only as are
consistent with truth"); and ORS 9.527(4) (court may disbar,
suspend, or reprimand lawyer guilty of "willful deceit or
misconduct in the legal profession").
		A trial panel of the Disciplinary Board held that the
accused's conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 7-104(A)(2), DR 5-105(E), ORS 9.460(2), and ORS 9.527(4), but not DR 5-105(C).  The
trial panel recommended that the accused be suspended from the
practice of law for nine months.  Review by this court is
automatic.  ORS 9.536(2); Bar Rule of Procedure (BR) 10.1.  We
review de novo.  ORS 9.536(3); BR 10.6. 
		We conclude that an exhaustive discussion of the facts
relevant to the accused's suspension in this proceeding would not
advance the interests of the bench or bar.  The record
establishes clearly and convincingly that the accused committed
the misconduct alleged.  As such, on de novo review, we adopt the
trial panel's findings, with one exception discussed below.  See
BR 10.6 (on de novo review, court may adopt or modify decision of
trial panel in whole or in part). 
		The trial panel found, and we agree, that the accused
violated DR 5-105(E) when she represented multiple clients --
Lewis Aytes (Aytes) and Janice and William Watson (collectively
"the Watsons") -- whose interests were in actual conflict.  See
DR 5-105(A)(1) ("'actual conflict of interest' exists when the
lawyer has a duty to contend for something on behalf of one
client that the lawyer has a duty to oppose on behalf of another
client").  Contrary to the trial panel, however, we also find
that, when the accused ceased to represent the Watsons but
continued to represent Aytes in the same matter, she violated DR
5-105(C).  That rule prohibits a lawyer who has represented a
client in a matter from subsequently representing another client
in the same matter when the interests of the current and former
clients are in actual conflict.  DR 5-105(D) provides an
exception to DR 5-105(C), viz., obtaining former and current
client consent after full disclosure, but the accused did not
seek the Watsons' consent to her continued representation of
Aytes.  Because the interests of her current (Aytes) and former
(the Watsons) clients were in actual conflict, under DR 5-105(C),
the accused was required either to obtain the Watsons' consent to
her continued representation of Aytes or to withdraw from further
representation of Aytes.  By continuing the representation
without the Watsons' consent, the accused violated DR 5-105(C).
		Notwithstanding that additional violation, we agree
with the trial panel's proposed sanction, and suspend the accused
for nine months. 
		The accused is suspended from the practice of law for a
period of nine months, commencing 60 days from the date of filing
of this decision.