Title: WALLOP v. WALLOP

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

WALLOP v. WALLOP2004 WY 4688 P.3d 1022Case Number: 02-248, 02-249Decided: 04/27/2004
April Term, A.D. 2004

FRENCH CARTER WALLOP,

Appellant(Defendant),

v.

MALCOLM WALLOP,

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

MALCOLM WALLOP,

Appellant(Plaintiff),

v.

                                                                        

FRENCH CARTER WALLOP,

Appellee(Defendant).

 

The Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge

 

Representing Appellant French Carter Wallop:

Karen Budd-Falen of Budd-Falen Law Offices, P.C., Cheyenne, 
WY; and Clark W. Sessions and T. Mickell Jimnez-Rowe of Clyde, Snow, Sessions 
& Swenson, P.C., Salt Lake City, UT.  Argument by Mr. Sessions.

 

Representing Appellee Malcolm Wallop:

Ann M. Rochelle of Shively, Taheri & Rochelle, P.C., 
Casper, WY; and Rex Arney of Brown, Drew & Massey, LLP, Sheridan, WY.  Argument by Ms. 
Rochelle.

 

Before LEHMAN and VOIGT, JJ., and DONNELL, BROOKS, and 
JAMES, DJJ.

  

LEHMAN, Justice.

 

[¶1]      Appellant/Cross-Appellee French Carter-Wallop (Wife) appeals 
the district court's property division upon divorce, while 
Appellee/Cross-Appellant Malcolm Wallop (Husband) appeals the district court's 
ruling regarding his government retirement account.  We affirm in part, 
modify in part, and reverse and remand in part.

 

[¶2]      Husband and Wife were 
married May 26, 1984.  
After nearly sixteen years of marriage, the parties separated on April 
24, 2000.  Two 
years later their divorce case was tried before the district court.  Substantial 
testimony was given and numerous exhibits submitted.  The parties each 
filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The district court 
issued its decision letter on June 20, 2002, and entered the final Judgment and 
Decree of Divorce on August 13, 2002.  These appeals followed.  

 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

[¶3]      We recently recognized 
our long-standing standard of review in Hall v. Hall, 
2002 WY 30, ¶¶11-12, 40 P.3d 1228, ¶¶11-12 
(Wyo. 2002):

 

            
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114 (Lexis 1999) governs the division of marital 
property:

            
In granting a divorce, the court shall make such disposition of the 
property of the parties as appears just and equitable, having regard for the 
respective merits of the parties and the condition in which they will be left by 
the divorce, the party through whom the property was acquired and the burdens 
imposed upon the property for the benefit of either party and children.  

            
Decisions regarding the division of marital property are within the trial 
court's sound discretion, and we will not disturb them on appeal unless there 
was an abuse of discretion.  Davis v. Davis, 980 P.2d 322, 323 (Wyo. 
1999).  An abuse 
of discretion occurs when the property disposition shocks the conscience of this 
court and appears to be so unfair and inequitable that reasonable people cannot 
abide it.  Id.

 

Ranch Valuation

 

[¶4]      At trial, the primary 
asset in contention was the Canyon Ranch.  Three separate valuations were prepared for the ranch ranging 
from $4.6 to $15 million.  The first appraisal, performed in 1997 by Mark 
Sonderby, valued the ranch together with other related property at $5.635 
million. This appraisal was performed on behalf of both Husband and Wife for tax 
and loan purposes.  
The second appraisal occurred in 2000. Theo Hirschfeld, a licensed 
certified appraiser acting as an expert witness for Husband, valued the ranch at 
that time at $4.6 million.  Finally, Richard Wayne Lewis, a licensed real 
estate broker with Sotheby's International Realty, valued the ranch at $11 to 
$15 million and testified at trial as an expert witness for Wife.  In its Judgment and 
Decree of Divorce, the district court accepted the $4.6 million appraisal.  Wife contends the 
district court abused its discretion in doing so because the court failed to 
discuss or fully explain its determination.

 

[¶5]      As stated previously, 
the trial court has broad discretion in making a distribution of marital 
property upon divorce.  
Hall, at ¶¶11-12.  
Further, with respect to the valuation of marital assets, trial courts 
must exercise discretion and adjudicate marital property dispositions on a 
case-by-case basis using the best possible valuation method appropriate for that 
particular case.  
Neuman v. Neuman, 842 P.2d 575, 582 (Wyo. 
1992).

 

[¶6]      The district court 
addressed the Canyon Ranch in its Judgment and Decree of Divorce, in applicable 
part, as follows:

 

1.  The Canyon Ranch consists of about 3,090 
deeded acres.  
The Ranch raises livestock and operates as a bird-hunting resort.

2.  Approximately 2,000 acres of the Canyon Ranch 
are restricted by a conservation easement.

3.  Richard Lewis, an agent of the Sotheby 
International Realty Office in Jackson, Wyoming (not a certified appraiser), 
offered an opinion that the value of the Canyon Ranch is $11 to $15 million. 
This estimate relies in part on information taken from the Internet and does not 
properly consider parcels within the ranch borders owned by others.

4.  In December of 1997, a certified appraiser, 
Mark Sonderby, appraised the Canyon Ranch at $5.635 million. (Ex. CCCC)

5.  Effective April 24, 2000, certified appraiser, 
Theo Hirschfeld, appraised the Canyon Ranch at $4.6 million (Ex. 545). The Court 
accepts this value.

 

[¶7]      While the district 
court did not set forth an extended discussion of its reasons for accepting Mr. 
Hirschfeld's appraisal rather than Mr. Lewis', the court did appropriately 
distinguish the two valuations.  First, the district court recognized a 
distinction between the qualifications of the experts involved, noting that Mr. 
Hirschfeld was a licensed certified appraiser while Mr. Lewis was not.1  In addition, the district court noted that Mr. 
Lewis' estimate relied upon information from the internet which did not take 
into account parcels within the ranch borders owned by others.  

 

[¶8]      The transcript of the 
trial also discloses that Mr. Lewis' valuation relied on second-hand, somewhat 
dated information from previous appraisals, including measurements of the 
buildings located on the ranch.  Mr. Lewis failed to provide the district court 
with his calculations and many of the documents upon which he relied.  When calculating his 
appraisal, Mr. Lewis used comparable but distant properties located in Colorado 
and Montana.  He 
additionally relied on other properties with building improvements that were 
dramatically different than those located on the Canyon Ranch.  Many of the comparables he used were of listing prices, as 
opposed to actual sales prices.  Finally, Mr. Lewis failed to adequately take 
into account the substantial conservation easement that exists on the ranch and 
made a market evaluation as opposed to an actual appraisal of the property.  

 

[¶9]      On the other hand, Mr. 
Hirschfeld's appraisal was conducted using the Uniform Standards of Professional 
Appraisal Practice.  
Specifically, Mr. Hirschfeld's valuation was based on an actual sales 
approach supported by a cost analysis.  The substantial and complete bases for Mr. 
Hirschfeld's valuation of the Canyon Ranch were included within his admitted 
appraisal report.  
The appraisal performed by Mr. Hirschfeld was based upon his own personal 
involvement with the subject property and the comparable properties.  

[¶10]   We cannot conclude, therefore, that the 
district court abused its discretion when it chose to rely upon Mr. 
Hirschfield's valuation.  Adequate reasons exist to support the district 
court's determination.  
Moreover, issues of credibility and the weight to be given to testimony 
are matters to be resolved by the trier of fact, not an appellate court.  Thus, we may not 
substitute our judgment for that of a trial court with respect to issues 
concerning credibility.  Carlton v. Carlton, 
997 P.2d 1028, 1035 (Wyo. 
2000) (citing Semler v. Semler, 924 P.2d 422, 424 (Wyo. 
1996) and Deen v. Deen, 774 P.2d 621, 622 (Wyo. 
1989)).

 

Timing of Property Valuation/Applicable Date of 
Division

 

[¶11]   Wife asserts the district court erred 
when it chose to value the Canyon Ranch and other marital property at the 
approximate date of the parties' separation.  
This court has not identified with particularity the time at which 
marital property must be valued when dividing property in a divorce.  Rather, this court 
has taken the general approach that the appropriate time of valuation is a 
matter within the broad and sound discretion of the trial court.  Similarly, this 
court has always allowed the trial court open discretion in determining the 
effective date of the division.  See generally Breitenstine v. Breitenstine, 2003 WY 16, 62 P.3d 587 (Wyo. 2003); 
McCulloh v. Drake, 2001 WY 56, 24 P.3d 1162 (Wyo. 2001); 
Bailey v. Bailey, 954 P.2d 962 (Wyo. 1998); 
Neuman, at 582; Overcast v. 
Overcast, 780 P.2d 1371 (Wyo. 1989); 
Sellers v. Sellers, 775 P.2d 1029 (Wyo. 1989); 
Igo v. Igo, 759 P.2d 1253 (Wyo. 1988); 
David v. David, 724 P.2d 1141 (Wyo. 1986); 
Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814 (Wyo. 1984); 
Paul v. Paul, 616 P.2d 707 (Wyo. 1980); 
and Parsons v. Parsons, 189 P.2d 159 (Wyo. 
1948).  Further, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114 (Lexis 1999) demands such an 
approach.

 

[¶12]   Although states vary in their approaches 
regarding when marital property should be valued or effectively split, many 
states, like Wyoming, have adopted a discretionary analysis. See 24 Am.Jur.2d Divorce and 
Separation § 575 (1998) and Lee R. Russ, Annotation, Proper date for valuation of property being distributed 
pursuant to divorce, 34 A.L.R.4th 63 (1984).  Further, we agree with the Kansas Supreme 
Court's reasoning when it addressed the appropriateness of a discretionary 
analysis in considering the timing of the valuation of marital 
property:

 

[¶13]   In this instance, the evidence presented 
at trial established that Husband and Wife separated on April 24, 2000, and thereafter, in essence, lived their own 
distinct lives.  
As such, we hold that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in selecting that year as the date of valuation and division of the 
marital property.  

Property Division

A.  The Canyon Ranch

 

[¶14]   Wife's primary contention is that the 
trial court inequitably divided the marital assets.  She asserts that 
Husband was awarded the Canyon Ranch, which caused a substantial imbalance in 
the value of the property awarded each party.  Husband counters that the trial court properly 
considered the merits of the parties and through whom the Canyon Ranch and other 
property were acquired in fashioning a just and equitable division.  

 

[¶15]   This court in Hall v. Hall, at ¶¶ 13-14, addressed a similar 
argument.  In 
that case this court recognized:

 

            
The trial court possesses a great amount of discretion in dividing 
marital property.  
A just and equitable division of property is just as likely not to be 
equal.  Carlton v. Carlton, 997 P.2d 1028, 1032 (Wyo. 
2000).  Although 
the trial court cannot divide the property in such a way that it would punish 
one of the parties, it may consider fault of the respective parties, together 
with all other facts and circumstances surrounding the dissolution of the 
marriage in dividing a couple's marital assets.  997 P.2d  at 1034.  We are required to 
limit our review of the record to an evaluation of whether the trial court's 
decision was supported by sufficient evidence, and we afford to the prevailing 
party every favorable inference while omitting any consideration of evidence 
presented by the unsuccessful party.  Id.  Findings of fact not 
supported by the evidence, contrary to the evidence, or against the great weight 
of the evidence cannot be sustained.  Id.

 

Id., at ¶14.  In France v. 
France, 902 P.2d 701, 704 (Wyo. 
1995) (emphasis added), we stated:

 

            
The property which is subject to division under our statute consists of 
property which is the product of 
the marital union and was acquired during the course of the marriage by the 
joint efforts of the parties. . . . Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-114 includes as a factor, "the party 
through whom the property was acquired . . . ."  In Warren v. Warren, 361 P.2d 525 (Wyo. 1961), 
we held property, which was inherited by or given to that party, can properly be 
awarded to the party by whom it was inherited or given. In Paul v. Paul, 616 P.2d 707 (Wyo. 1980), 
we held it is not an abuse of discretion to award to a party the property he 
brought to the marriage.

 

[¶16]   In France, we 
affirmed a property division in which the wife received an overwhelming majority 
of the property.  
We agreed with the trial court that, because most of the couple's 
property was brought into the marriage by the wife or inherited by her, she was 
the appropriate party to receive it upon their divorce.  France, at 706.  In accord see Pittman v. Pittman, 999 P.2d 638, 640 (Wyo. 
2000), where we held that when most of the property was brought into the 
marriage by one party or acquired during the marriage through that party, it is 
not unreasonable that the party through whom the property was acquired receive a 
larger share.2  

 

[¶17]   In the case at hand, it is undisputed 
that the Canyon Ranch has been in Husband's family since 1889.  In 1980, Husband and 
his two sisters inherited the ranch, whereupon Husband bought his sisters' 
interests resulting in his incurring a $2.4 million debt.  Prior to the 
marriage, Husband sold and exchanged portions of the ranch to reduce some of his 
ranch indebtedness.  
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Husband continued to make contributions 
to the ranch.  
In 1986, Husband sold his McLean, Virginia home for $912,000 and applied 
$650,000 toward the Canyon Ranch loan.  In 1987, Husband pledged $500,000 of personal 
stock to continue the Canyon Ranch loan and ultimately surrendered this stock in 
1991 to make loan payments on the ranch.  In 1990 and 1992, Husband sold additional 
ranch property to make payments on the Canyon Ranch.  In addition, Husband 
personally took out a $120,000 loan in 1996 to pay $75,000 on the Canyon Ranch 
mortgage.  

 

[¶18]   During the trial, Ed Hoffman, a 
certified public accountant, testified regarding the contributions to the ranch 
made by Husband and Wife.  Mr. Hoffman's analysis showed that from 1993 
to 2000, Husband made $4,428,231.21 in net contributions, while Wife had made 
only $6,054.62 in net contributions.  

 

[¶19]   In 1992, Husband and Wife formed the 
Wallop Family Limited Partnership (Partnership) for estate planning purposes in 
an effort to pass the Canyon Ranch to Husband's four children and Wife's son.3  The initial members of the Partnership were 
Husband with forty-nine percent ownership, Wife with forty-nine percent 
ownership, and Canyon Ranch, LLC with two percent ownership.  Husband and Wife 
each owned one-half of Canyon Ranch, LLC.  Wife argues the district court failed to 
recognize her interests in the Partnership and Canyon Ranch, LLC when awarding 
the ranch to Husband.  

 

[¶20]   In making this award, the district court 
provided the following:

 

            
Property inherited by one party in a divorce can properly be awarded to 
that party. Warren v. Warren, 361 P.2d 525 (Wyo. 1961) 
and France v. France, 902 P.2d 701 (Wyo. 
1995).  Neither 
the acquisition of [the Partnership] real estate nor any significant increase in 
its current value can be attributed solely to [Wife]. [Husband] made [Wife] a 
record owner of the [Partnership]. As in France, the 
transfer was to effectuate an estate plan that assumed a continuing 
marriage.  It 
would be a "windfall" to a transferee, within any marriage, for the Court to 
consider all estate plan transfers as gifts that always survive 
divorce.

 

[¶21]   On June 2, 1993, Husband signed a 
Quitclaim Deed transferring approximately 3,089 acres of the Canyon Ranch to the 
Partnership and in addition quitclaimed another 44.34 acres of the ranch, known 
as the Homesite, to himself and Wife.  On October 15 of that same year, Husband and 
Wife quitclaimed 3.06 acres of the Homesite to the Partnership on which to build 
a lodge.  In 
1995, 1996, and 1997, Husband and Wife gifted a small percent interest in the 
Partnership to each of the five adult children. 

[¶22]   The Certificate and Agreement of the 
Partnership provides that contributions and distributions by each partner must 
be reflected in the partners' respective capital accounts and that the balances 
of these accounts would provide a basis for determining percentages of 
ownership.  The 
Partnership tax returns attributed ownership in the Partnership to Wife, the 
Canyon Ranch, LLC, and the children.  

 

[¶23]   Given the established facts noted above 
and in line with our holding in France, it was proper 
for the district court to recognize and consider Husband's inheritance of the 
Canyon Ranch coupled with his actual contributions to the ranch over the 
years.  
Furthermore, there was sufficient evidence to support the district 
court's determination that the actual intent of the Canyon Ranch transfers was 
to enable Husband and Wife to transfer ownership of the ranch to their adult 
children with minimal tax consequences.  Such determination is also supported by our 
holding in France.

 

[¶24]   In France, 
husband and wife initiated an estate plan in an effort to minimize tax 
consequences and provide the maximum estate for their disabled daughter.  Accordingly, wife 
gifted stock in her family's closely held ranching corporation, which she had 
received from her parents, to her husband making him a forty-five percent 
shareholder in the corporation.  Upon dissolution of the marriage, the trial 
court awarded all of the stock in the corporation to the wife.  In affirming the 
award, this court said:

 

            
It is apparent that the purpose of the gift of the stock to the husband 
was to effectuate the estate plan on the assumption they still would be married 
when the first one died. . . . We are satisfied, given the record 
demonstrating the stock . . . came to the parties by virtue of wife's 
inheritance from her parents and the purpose for which the gift of stock was 
made to the husband, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.  The distribution of 
the property made by the court was fair, just, and manifested an exercise of 
discretion that is unassailable.   

 

France, at 706.   Therefore, this court made it clear that 
the parties' underlying motivation and intent behind their actions may be 
dispositive.

 

[¶25]   Wife asserts the France case is not applicable in this instance.  She argues that France stands for the proposition that it is just and 
equitable to set property over to one party without any corresponding offset to 
the non-donee spouse of the value of their interest therein only when 1) the non-donee 
spouse has made absolutely no contribution to the donee spouse's property, 2) 
neither party is at fault when the parties' merits are considered, and 3) the 
source and time of acquisition and maintenance of the identified separate 
property are readily traceable.  We disagree with Wife's limited interpretation 
of France.  

 

[¶26]   We have emphasized time and time again 
that when making marital property distributions upon divorce, a trial court must 
consider a number of factors.  Specifically, in rendering such a decision the 
trial court must have regard for 1) the respective merits of the parties, 
2) the condition in which the parties will be left by the divorce, 
3) the party through whom the property was acquired, and 4) the 
burdens imposed upon the property for the benefit of either party and 
children.  Hall, at ¶¶11-12.  The trial court has the discretion to 
determine what weight should be given each of these individual factors.   

 

[¶27]   Wife further cites the cases of Barton v. Barton, 996 P.2d 1, 4 (Wyo. 2000) 
and Tyler v. Tyler, 624 P.2d 784, 785-86 (Wyo. 
1981) for the proposition that when property is taken into a marriage and placed 
into the names of both spouses, even when consideration is furnished by only one 
party, there is a rebuttable presumption that a gift of one-half interest was 
intended for the other spouse.  The evidence in this case sufficiently 
rebutted this presumption. Again, the evidence supports the finding that the 
actual intent of the parties was to place the Canyon Ranch in a position to pass 
to the parties' adult children with minimal tax consequences if the marriage 
continued.4

 

[¶28]   Our holding is also consistent with our 
recent opinion in Breitenstine, 2003 WY 16, although Wife 
asserts otherwise.  
In that case, the wife was awarded a portion of husband's inherited 
property upon divorce.  
Much of husband's inheritance was placed into a joint account that both 
parties had access to and utilized of their own free will.  These funds were 
commingled with other marital property, and thereafter the couple lived off 
these funds or the income from investments purchased with these funds in both 
their names, husband's name, wife's name, and the childrens' names.  The couple also 
built a home in Wyoming using a substantial amount from their joint account to 
pay for the home.  
Later, the couple formed various trusts and transferred a substantial 
portion of their marital assets to the trust.  Trusts were also created for their children 
funded with marital assets.  However, husband converted funds from the 
trusts for his own personal use until he was removed as trustee.  Breitenstine, at ¶¶11-12.  Given these facts this court, 
stated:

 

A reading of the statute [Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114 
(LexisNexis 2001)] indicates that the party through whom the property was 
acquired is one of the 
multiple factors the trial court considers in determining the appropriate 
division of property.  
In McCulloh, we made it clear that property 
inherited by one party can 
be awarded to the party by whom it was inherited or given.  McCulloh, at ¶15.  But we did not hold that property inherited by 
one spouse must always be awarded to the spouse that received it.  Before the McCulloh decision, we said no hard and fast rules govern 
property divisions.  
We continue to adhere to that principle.  We have never established bright line rules 
for the disposition of a gift or inheritance, and we do not do so now.  Instead, we review 
whether the trial court considered the appropriate factors in making the 
disposition.

 

Breitenstine, at ¶9 (emphasis in original; some citations omitted).  This court 
thereafter recognized that the trial court properly considered the respective 
merits of the parties in making its property division award, including husband's 
inability to provide a proper accounting of his assets, wife's substantial 
contributions towards the increased value of the marital assets, the conditions 
of the parties after the divorce and the intent of the parties with respect to the inherited 
property.  Id., at 
¶¶11-13.   

 

[¶29]   Wife also argues that the district court 
failed to recognize her financial contributions to the Canyon Ranch and her 
numerous non-economic contributions to the marriage.  In tandem with this 
argument, she proffers that the separately owned property became so commingled 
with the marital estate that it lost its premarital identity and that her 
contributions must be considered to have increased the value of the Canyon 
Ranch.  As 
indicated previously, evidence presented by Mr. Hoffman indicated that Wife had 
made only $6,054.62 in net contributions toward the Canyon Ranch.  Further, the record 
establishes an ability to trace the origin of a large majority of contributions 
made toward the Canyon Ranch to Husband.  

 

[¶30]   Wife claims that Husband's employment 
salary with the United States Senate prior to 1994, ranging from $89,500 to 
$133,000, was insufficient to meet their expenses, requiring her to make 
financial contributions approximating $1,260,881.84.  She therefore claims 
that she shouldered all of the responsibility for the parties' household 
expenses, day-to-day living expenses, and debt during the entire marriage.  

 

[¶31]   Initially, it should be noted that, 
through her statement, Wife admits she was not solely responsible for marital 
expenses and debts of the marriage from 1994 forward.  In fact, Wife 
received no salary from either of her businesses, Corporate Travel Services, 
Inc. and Corporate Consulting International, Inc. from 1984 to 1986 and after 
1995, and neither of these companies made a profit after 1993.5  Furthermore, 
evidence was presented that prior to 1994 Husband made substantial additional 
monies above and beyond his employment salary.  Such income included dividends, interest, 
honoraria, and other sources.  Husband's yearly incomes were as 
follow:

 

1988   $215,859 (including a Canyon Ranch 
loss of $43,983)

1989   $134,566 (including a Canyon Ranch 
loss of $87,807)

1990   $102,180 (including a Canyon Ranch 
loss of $101,268)

1991   $1,007,093 (including a Canyon Ranch 
loss of $5,953)

1992   $137,283 (including a Canyon Ranch 
loss of $40,388)

1993   $84,211 (including a Canyon Ranch loss 
of $83,859)

1994   $92,207 (including a Canyon Ranch loss 
of $80,253)

 

After 1994, Husband's income increased dramatically.  These monies were 
used, in part, to make significant payments to Wife's business indebtedness and 
contribute to household expenses.  Husband's annuity was utilized to pay off a 
$215,000 debt owed by Wife's company.  Additionally, Husband made tax payments for 
Wife during the marriage and incurred detrimental tax consequences as a result 
of Wife.  
Although Wife made some tax payment contributions, these were 
offset.  
Finally, a large portion of the amounts claimed by Wife as marital 
contributions were shown to be in actuality unrelated to the marriage.  Therefore, Wife's 
economic contribution and commingling argument is not supported by the 
record.  

 

[¶32]   Wife generally argues that her 
non-economic contributions must be considered by the district court to have 
increased the value of the Canyon Ranch.  However, Wife fails to particularly enumerate 
any of her non-economic contributions or how they actually increased the value 
of the ranch.  
Rather, Wife identifies these contributions in very broad terms.  Viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to Husband and giving him the benefit of all 
reasonable inferences, as we are required to do under the applicable standard of 
review, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it 
awarded the Canyon Ranch to Husband.   

 

B.  Chevy Chase Visa Credit Card 
Debt

 

[¶33]   Wife disputes the district court's 
allocation of the Chevy Chase Visa Credit Card debt to her, claiming the 
district court provided only summarily in its findings of fact that "[W]ife 
has/had a Chevy Chase Bank Visa Credit Card Account."  Wife also asserts 
that the district court relied solely on Exhibit 932 in justifying this award, 
however that exhibit was never admitted into evidence.  Though Wife is 
correct that Exhibit 932 was never admitted into evidence, Wife submitted 
Exhibit DD, which admitted that she had paid this credit card previously using a 
personal line of credit.  Husband furthermore testified that this 
account was Wife's personal account.  We cannot say the district court acted 
unreasonably when it recognized Wife's payment of this account with personal 
funds.  We, 
therefore, do not detect an abuse of the district court's discretion in awarding 
this debt to Wife.

 

C.  General Overall Property 
Award

 

[¶34]   Wife argues the district court abused 
its discretion when it failed to consider her contributions to the marriage, the 
commingling of property, the merits of the parties, and the condition in which 
the parties would be left after the divorce.  Wife asserts that in the overall marital 
property division, the district court awarded Husband $6,093,566.74 of the 
marital estate and Wife $556,748.58 of debt, yet Wife does not provide any 
substantiated basis for these figures.

 

[¶35]   Wife, in making her calculations, counts 
the award of the Canyon Ranch to Husband.  As indicated above, under the circumstances, 
we cannot conclude that the district court erred when it awarded the Canyon 
Ranch to Husband.  
Wife also incorrectly utilizes the award to Husband of the Partnership 
and the Canyon Ranch, LLC to reach her figures, thereby counting the Canyon 
Ranch twice.  
Removing these items from Wife's arithmetic substantially narrows the 
margin.  Wife 
further complains that she remains responsible for the Hong Kong and Shanghai 
Banking Corporation line of credit.  However, the record disclosed that this line 
of credit was taken out by Wife as a personal debt without Husband's knowledge 
and that Wife utilized this line of credit for largely non-marital matters.  

 

[¶36]   The justness and fairness of a marital 
property division cannot be gauged with a simple comparison of the amount of 
property awarded to each party.  Rather, the disposition should be performed 
with regard to the respective merits of the parties, the condition in which they 
will be left by the divorce, the party through whom the property was acquired, 
and the burdens imposed upon the property for the benefit of either party and 
children.

 

[¶37]   The record discloses that the district 
court took painstaking efforts to explain and justify its property 
division.  This 
analysis included the Canyon Ranch, the Partnership, Canyon Ranch, LLC, the 
Virginia home, Hubbell, Inc. deferred compensation, El Paso Energy deferred 
compensation and stock options, Husband's government retirement account, 
Husband's and Wife's businesses and business-related debt, various other stocks 
and interest holdings, trusts, insurance policies, vehicles, personal 
properties, judgments, credit card indebtedness, as well as other issues.  The reasoning 
utilized included the party through whom the property or indebtedness was 
acquired and when it was acquired.  Contrary to Wife's assertions, the district 
court also made specific findings, all supported by the record, concerning the 
parties' contributions to the Canyon Ranch, the Partnership, and the marital 
estate.  For 
those reasons, we are not persuaded by Wife's arguments. 

 

[¶38]   Wife additionally maintains that the 
district court failed to consider the respective merits of the parties.  She asserts 
primarily that the district court did not consider that Husband had 
extra-marital relations during the marriage.  However, the district court allowed evidence 
to be presented on these issues, while at the same time noting that such 
evidence may not be used to penalize any party.  See Hall v. Hall, at ¶¶13-14 (citing Carlton v. Carlton, at 1034). 

 

[¶39]   In a similar argument, Wife argues that 
the district court erred when it did not consider the condition in which the 
parties would be left by the divorce.  The district court, however, recognized the 
respective ages of the parties and that they were in equally good health and 
both able bodied enabling them to provide for themselves.  The district court 
further found that Husband would soon face mandatory retirement from certain 
boards of directors with little probability for extension.  The district court 
further extensively reviewed the parties' financial situations both during the 
marriage and after their separation.  

 

[¶40]   Again, decisions regarding the division 
of marital property are within the trial court's sound discretion, and we will 
not disturb them on appeal unless there is a clear showing of an abuse of 
discretion.  In 
this instance, we conclude that the district court properly assessed the facts 
and considered each of the required factors in making its determination.  Therefore, we hold 
there is no clear showing of an abuse of discretion.

 

Attorney Fees

 

[¶41]   Wife 
argues the district court abused its discretion when it awarded her only $10,000 
in attorney fees.  
In particular, Wife asserts the district court erred when it made no 
findings of fact concerning attorney fees and merely awarded her that sum.  An award of attorney 
fees in a divorce case is part of the property division and thus subject to the 
same clear abuse of discretion standard of review.  McCulloh v. Drake, at ¶18 (citing Carlson v. Carlson, 888 P.2d 210, 216 (Wyo. 
1995)); Scherer v. Scherer, 931 P.2d 251, 254 (Wyo. 
1997).  Where 
the totality of the property distribution is equitable, no abuse of discretion 
occurs.  Id. 

 

[¶42]   Upon review of the record, we again do 
not recognize that the district court acted in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner in making its overall property distribution, including its award of 
attorney fees.  
In McCulloh v. Drake, at ¶19, we stated:

            
It is rare when a marriage dissolves for either party to be satisfied 
with the trial court's final decision.  It is for this reason that trial courts 
impress upon the parties the benefits to coming to a mutual decision between 
themselves rather than leaving the property division decisions to the trial 
court. The parties in this case did not follow this advice, and neither is 
completely happy with the disposition. The wife, however, has failed to 
demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion. Consequently, we decline 
to alter the final property distribution with regard to the property division 
order or with regard to the assessment of fees and costs.

 

Adequacy of Findings

 

[¶43]   Wife again in a very summary fashion 
claims that the district court acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner when 
it failed to make adequate findings with respect to marital assets.  In particular, Wife 
contends that the district court failed to make findings concerning Husband's 
Arlington, Virginia apartment and his various holdings in oil and gas leases and 
Community Media stock.  
She also asserts that the district court did not properly address the 
United Bancorp "phantom" stock, Eaglestone Capital interest, Clean Fuels 
Technology securities, and Western Strategy Group joint venture interest.  Hence, Wife 
concludes that this court should vacate the district court's property 
distribution in its entirety, although she provides no authority to support this 
conclusion. 
  

[¶44]   The record, however, reflects that the 
district court did address many of the above issues.  The district court 
awarded Husband all of the "phantom" stock of United Bancorp, the Eaglestone 
Capital interests, the Clean Fuels Technology securities, and Western Strategy 
Group joint venture interest.  The record discloses that Husband had no 
common stock but only 1,000 units of non-transferable "phantom" stock in United 
Bancorp potentially valued at $1,000 and that Husband had a minority interest in 
Eaglestone Capital, a business that is not actively doing business and has no 
assets.  Husband 
was granted options in Clean Fuels Technology, a non-publicly traded entity on 
August 10, 2000, after the couple's separation.  These options vest in one-third increments 
each year beginning on August 10, 2001.  Western Strategy Group was established as a 
joint venture that Husband has with two other persons.  This venture 
provides consulting services under contract, but had no contracts, only minimal 
cash in the bank, has limited resale value, and posted a loss for the year 
2000.  Based on 
these established facts, we do not discern the district court abused its 
discretion in awarding these interests to Husband.

 

[¶45]   Furthermore, the parties were allowed to 
present proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court 
for consideration.  
A letter from Wife's counsel, dated June 24, 2002, was sent to the 
district court acknowledging receipt of the district court's decision letter and 
advising the district court that Wife would be supplementing the decision letter 
as requested with respect to the matters not addressed by the court.  However, Wife never 
provided any supplementation concerning the remaining subjects of which she now 
complains.  

 

[¶46]   Wife, however, did file a variety of 
other objections and motions concerning the proposed order submitted to the 
district court by Husband after the district court issued its decision 
letter.  Wife 
also submitted her own proposed Judgment and Decree of Divorce.  Upon review of 
Wife's pleadings, it is once again apparent that she failed to address those 
areas about which she now complains.  Wife also failed in any other manner to bring 
these matters to the district court for consideration. 

 

[¶47]   This court has long held that issues not 
brought before the district court may not be reviewed on appeal.  "We strongly adhere 
to the rule forbidding us to "consider for the first time on appeal issues that 
were neither raised in, nor argued to, the trial court," except for those issues 
which are jurisdictional or are fundamental in nature.'"  Donaghy v. Board of Adjustment, 2002 WY 150, ¶11, 55 P.3d 707, ¶11 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Bredthauer v. TSP, 864 P.2d 442, 446 (Wyo. 
1993) and Oatts v. Jorgenson, 821 P.2d 108, 111 (Wyo. 
1991)).  We will 
not abrogate this rule now.  Additionally, Wife sets forth no authority to 
support those arguments and her broad conclusion that this court must vacate the 
district court's property distribution.   

 

Lifetime Annuity/Survivor Benefit

 

[¶48]   Husband on cross-appeal contends that 
the district court made a mathematical error when it awarded Wife twentynine 
percent of his lifetime annuity and survivorship benefit.  Paragraph AA(1)(d) 
of the Judgment and Decree of Divorce dealing with Husband's United States 
government annuity provides:

            
d.  French Wallop should be awarded, and her counsel should 
prepare a QDRO, reflecting her share of this retirement account to be 29%. 
(Calculated: ½ of the months during the time frame 6/1/84 to 12/31/94 [139/2] 
over total months = 69.5/240).  The QDRO must conform with the U.S. Office of 
Personnel Management's regulations under Section 838.

 

[¶49]   Husband's argument is relatively simple 
concerning the district court's calculations, contending that the district court 
improperly calculated the number of months from June 1, 1984, to December 31, 
1994, to be 139 months, when in fact it is 127 months.  Hence, Husband 
asserts that by utilizing the months in the calculation of Wife's interest, the 
district court arrived at a twenty-nine percent interest when it should have 
been twenty-six and a half percent interest.  We agree.  Indeed, Wife concedes that these calculations 
were in error.  
Nonetheless, we need not reverse the district court in order to correct 
these errors.

 

[¶50]   As stated in Hurlbut v. 
Scarbrough, 957 P.2d 839, 843 (Wyo. 
1998):

 

            
In O's Gold Seed Company v. United Agri-Products 
Financial Services, Inc., 761 P.2d 673, 677 (Wyo. 1988), we quoted from our earlier decision in Robert W. Anderson Housewrecking and Excavating, Inc. v. 
Board of Trustees, School District No. 25, Fremont County, 681 P.2d 1326, 1333 (Wyo. 
1984):  
"[W]here the judgment does not result from passion or prejudice and any 
error may be ascertained by mathematical calculations, the supreme court may 
modify without reversing.'" Accordingly, we remand, without reversing, the 
district court's judgment in this case, directing the district court to modify 
its award so that it reflects the ten percent per year interest rate and to 
calculate the interest on each obligation from the time that the obligation 
became a judgment by operation of law.

 

See also Adel v. Parkhurst, 681 P.2d 886, 890 (Wyo. 
1984).  
Accordingly, we order that Paragraph AA.1.d. of the Judgment and Decree 
of Divorce entered by the district court dealing with Husband's United States 
government annuity be modified to reflect the proper percentage as set forth 
above.

 

[¶51]   In a second argument, Husband asserts 
that the district court failed to comply with the management rules and 
regulations of the United States Office of Personnel by not clearly delineating 
what portions of the lifetime annuity and the survivor benefit were to be set 
over to Wife.  
Husband asserts that Wife, by submitting a proposed Qualified Domestic 
Retirement Order (QDRO), has overreached the district court's order by 
attempting to obtain additional survivor benefits.  Husband also 
contends that the district court improperly ordered that a QDRO be drafted when 
a QDRO is not applicable in instances involving retirement funds held within the 
Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS), which is the case here.

 

[¶52]   In addressing the latter contention, it 
is clear that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) does not 
govern retirement benefits held within the CSRS.  As explained within "A 
Handbook for Attorneys On Court-ordered Retirement" published by the United 
States Office of Personnel Management (OPM) at RI 83-116, Rev. July 1997 
(Handbook):

 

            
A substantial number of State court orders are drafted under the mistaken 
belief that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) (29 U.S.C. 1001 
et seq.) applies to CSRS or FERS [Federal Employees Retirement System] 
benefits.  
Sections 1003 (b)(1) and 1051 of title 29, United States Code, exempt 
CSRS and FERS from ERISA. 

 

Handbook, at p. 5.  CSRS and FERS are "governmental plans" as 
defined in section 1001(23) of title 29, United States Code.  Therefore, because 
the term QDRO is an ERISA-created term used to summarize the division of 
retirement benefits under ERISA plans, QDROs are not acceptable to affect CSRS 
benefits unless the correct terminology is used.  As set forth in the Handbook, at p. 
5:

 

Since CSRS and FERS are exempt from ERISA, some provisions 
that ERISA plans must honor do not apply to CSRS and FERS. For OPM to be able to 
process court orders in the way intended by the parties, OPM and the court must 
be speaking the same language. To assure that the court has used our 
terminology, rather than ERISA's terminology, an order labeled as a QDRO is not 
acceptable. However, this 
prohibition against labeling the order as a QDRO does not apply if court orders 
expressly state that they are written in conformity with OPM's regulations. This 
exception will guarantee that the purpose of the ban  that the court 
understands that we are exempt from ERISA and that the court is using the 
terminology as provided in the regulations  is satisfied by requiring that any 
QDRO mention the regulations. 

 

(Emphasis added.)  In the same vein, both 5 C.F.R. § 838.302 
(dealing with annuity benefits) and 5 C.F.R. § 838.803 (dealing with 
survivor benefits) also provide that a QDRO may be utilized when retirement 
benefits held within a CSRS are at issue, as long as the court order refers to 
part 838 of Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations, and specifies that the 
provisions of the QDRO must be drafted in accordance with the terminology 
required by that part.

 

[¶53]   In the portion of the district court's 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce dealing with Husband's United States government 
annuity, the district court found that Wife should be awarded a percentage of 
that annuity and then specified that "[t]he provisions of this order concerning 
[Husband's] CSRS or FERS benefits are governed by § 838.302 of the Retirement 
Regulations."  
The district court later ordered that Wife's counsel prepare a QDRO, 
reflecting her share of Husband's retirement account and that:  "The QDRO must 
conform with the U.S. [OPM]'s regulations under Section 838."  Accordingly, we hold 
that while the district court did order that Wife's counsel prepare a QDRO, it 
appropriately specified that any such QDRO be drafted within OPM's rules and 
regulations as required.    

 

[¶54]   Lastly, 
Husband asserts that the district court was not specific enough when it made its 
order concerning his annuity because the district court did not specify the 
exact percentages to be awarded to Wife with respect to the employee annuity and 
the survivorship benefits as required by the OPM.  In a related argument, Husband asserts that 
because survivor benefits are always a percentage of the lifetime annuity, Wife 
is guilty of overreaching when her attorneys prepared a proposed order 
specifying that she also receive twenty-nine percent of the survivor benefit of 
Husband. 

 

[¶55]   As stated previously, the district court 
ordered that Wife should be awarded twenty-nine percent of Husband's retirement 
account.  
However, due to a mathematical error, this percentage should have been 
correctly stated at twenty-six and a half percent.  Subsequently, Wife's 
counsel prepared a proposed order that provided that the amount of Wife's 
survivor benefit would be equal to twenty-nine percent (corrected to twenty-six 
and a half percent) of Husband's employee annuity, to which Husband 
objected.  In 
response to such objections, the district court handwrote a note to counsel 
specifying that Wife "is entitled to "29% [corrected to 26.5%] of the account  
period.  The 
Court was not aware that survivor annuities are akin to a separate 
account."  

 

[¶56]   5 C.F.R. § 838.301 et seq., as well as 
the Handbook, at pp. 5-6, require that the court order specify which retirement 
benefit is being awarded and in what amount.  Clearly, such a mandate is necessary so that 
the OPM can be assured that it is making the correct distribution as awarded by 
a court.  
Unfortunately, upon our review of the record, we cannot discern the exact 
intent of the district court concerning the retirement account, and an ambiguity 
with respect to this issue remains.  Therefore, we can only speculate that the OPM 
may face similar difficulties in carrying out the district court's 
directives.  We, 
therefore, remand this issue to the district court for clarification so that the 
district court can specify, with particularity, the percentages to be awarded to 
Wife out of Husband's retirement account, whether it be through his employee 
annuity or survivorship benefits.   

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶57]   Given the reasons set forth above, the 
judgment of the district court is affirmed in part, modified in part, and 
reversed and remanded for clarification in part, consistent with this opinion. 

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1The district court also specifically recognized that Mr. 
Sonderby was a certified appraiser. 

2It should be recognized that in both France and Pittman, the trial 
court applied the parameters set forth in Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-114 in accordance 
with our established case law. 

3Husband has four adult children who are not a product of the 
marriage between Husband and Wife, while Wife has an adult son through a 
different marriage.  
Husband and Wife have no children together.  

4It is apparent the district court understood this principle 
and recognized Husband's intent to gift one-half of the Homesite property to 
Wife by directly transferring this property to Wife and himself, as tenants in 
the entirety. Thus, while the district court awarded Husband the remaining 
Homesite property (the Homesite property less the 3.06 acres of the Homesite 
gifted by the couple to the Partnership on which to build a lodge), the district 
court ordered Husband to pay Wife $157,000, one-half of the remaining Homesite's 
recognized appraised value, for her one-half interest in that property.  

5Wife did not file a personal tax return in 1999, 2000 or 
2001.  The last 
year she filed a tax return for CTS was 1997 and for CCI 1993.