Title: FONTAINE v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMM'RS OF PARK COUNTY

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

FONTAINE v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMM'RS OF PARK COUNTY2000 WY 884 P.3d 890Case Number: 99-68Decided: 04/11/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
MARIE FONTAINE, in her 
official capacity as the COUNTY CLERK for PARK COUNTY, STATE OF WYOMING, 
Appellant (Petitioner), v.BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF 
PARK COUNTY, STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee (Respondent).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Park County, The Honorable John C. Brackley, 
Judge.

Joseph E. Darrah 
and S. Joseph Darrah of Darrah & Darrah, Powell, Wyoming, Representing 
Appellant.Bradley D. Bonner, Park County Civil Attorney, Powell, 
Wyoming, Representing Appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1] The primary 
issue in this case is found in the claim by Marie Fontaine (Fontaine), the 
County Clerk for Park County, that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-402(a)(i)(A) - (D) 
(Lexis 1999) requires her to attend executive sessions of the Board of County 
Commissioners (the Board) to make minutes and preserve a record of such 
meetings. A collateral issue is raised concerning the adequacy of public notice 
by the Board of administrative meetings of the Board with the county staff. The 
district court ruled that the statute did not require the attendance of Fontaine 
at executive sessions of the Board, and it also ruled that no detailed agenda 
need be published of the administrative meetings with the county staff. Although 
we agree with the decision of the district court that no detailed agenda is 
required for administrative meetings of the Board with its staff, we are 
satisfied that the statute, properly construed, requires the attendance of 
Fontaine at the executive sessions to make minutes and preserve a record of 
those meetings. The Declaratory Judgment entered in the district court is 
affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case is remanded to the district 
court for further proceedings in accordance with this 
opinion.

[¶2] This 
statement of the issues is found in the Brief of Appellant, which was filed on 
behalf of Fontaine:

a. Whether the county 
clerk is required to attend all meetings of the county commissioners pursuant to 
W.S. § 18-3-402(a)(i)(A) - (D) which states that the county clerk shall attend 
all sessions of the board of county commissioners, record all proceedings of the 
board, and make regular entries of all the board's resolutions, orders and 
decisions when the board refuses the county clerk's attendance at executive 
sessions.

b. Whether the Park 
County Commissioners violate W.S. § 16-4-401 et seq. when the board has failed 
to provide adequate notice of meetings pertaining to scheduled discussions, 
deliberations and consultations related to matters of public 
business.

[¶3] This 
Statement of the Issues is found in the Brief of Appellee, filed for the 
Board:

1. Whether the District 
Court properly granted summary judgment, ruling that the Park County Board of 
County Commissioners may exclude any person, including the County Clerk, from 
its executive sessions.

2. Whether the District 
Court properly granted summary judgment, ruling that the Park County Board of 
County Commissioners is not required to publish detailed notice of meeting 
agendas where only "day to day" administrative activity is being 
conducted.

[¶4] The Board 
is the governing body of Park County, and is an agency within the definition set 
forth in the Wyoming Public Meetings Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 16-4-401 through 
16-4-407 (Lexis 1999).1 The Board holds three types of 
meetings: regular meetings, staff meetings, and executive sessions. Regular 
meetings take place each Tuesday, and are open to the public. A Commissioners' 
Agenda is available to the public and the media in advance of each regular 
meeting. Staff meetings are generally held on Tuesdays before the regular 
meetings; they are open to the public, but the matters to be addressed are not 
included on the Commissioners' Agenda or any other document provided to the 
public. Executive sessions are open only to Board members and their 
invitees.

[¶5] Fontaine 
began serving as the elected County Clerk of Park County in 1979, and was the 
County Clerk at the time she commenced this action. Earlier in her tenure as 
County Clerk, Fontaine had attended all types of meetings the Board held for the 
purpose of taking the minutes. At some point, however, the Board decided that 
minutes of its executive sessions were not required, and Fontaine was informed 
that she no longer would be required or even permitted to attend executive 
sessions. Following that advice, no minutes of either staff meetings or 
executive sessions are taken or kept by the Board.

[¶6] Fontaine 
requested access to the executive sessions, but her request was denied. She 
filed this complaint on February 24, 1998, seeking a declaratory judgment that, 
by statute, she is required to, and therefore must be allowed to, attend and 
record all meetings and proceedings of the Board. She further sought a 
declaration that all meetings involving public matters must be open to the 
public and must be publicized in advance, including sufficiently descriptive 
agendas of staff meetings and executive sessions. The Board moved for, and 
received, a summary judgment in its favor. Fontaine filed a timely appeal to 
this Court.

[¶7] When this 
Court reviews a summary judgment denying a petition for a declaratory judgment, 
we invoke our usual standard for review of summary judgments. Board of County 
Com'rs v. Geringer, 941 P.2d 742, 745 (Wyo. 1997); Kunard v. Enron Oil & Gas 
Co., 869 P.2d 132, 134 (Wyo. 1994). The summary judgment can be sustained only 
when no genuine issues of material fact are present and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. W.R.C.P. 56; Kirby v. NMC/Continue 
Care, 993 P.2d 951, 952 (Wyo. 1999); Selby v. Conquistador Apartments, Ltd., 990 P.2d 491, 494 (Wyo. 1999); Roberts v. Klinkosh, 986 P.2d 153, 155 (Wyo. 1999); 
Century Ready-Mix Co. v. Campbell County School Dist., 816 P.2d 795, 798 (Wyo. 
1991). The court must consider the record in the light most favorable to the 
party opposing the motion, and give to that party the benefit of all favorable 
inferences that fairly may be drawn from the record. Snyder v. Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079, 1083 (Wyo. 1999) (quoting 40 North Corp. v. Morrell, 964 P.2d 423, 
426 (Wyo. 1998)); Selby, 990 P.2d  at 494; Bluejacket v. Carney, 550 P.2d 494, 
497 (Wyo. 1976). In this instance, there is no contention that any genuine issue 
of material fact exists, and our concern is strictly with the application of the 
law. Questions of application of the law, including identification of the 
correct rule, are considered de novo. Kirby, 993 P.2d  at 952. If the summary 
judgment can be affirmed under any proper legal theory presented in the record, 
we will do so. In re HC, 983 P.2d 1205, 1209 (Wyo. 1999); Century Ready-Mix Co., 
816 P.2d  at 799 (citing Reeves v. Boatman, 769 P.2d 917, 918 (Wyo. 
1989)).

[¶8] On the 
first issue, Fontaine argues that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-402(a)(i) establishes 
her position that the county clerk must attend and record all meetings of the 
Board, including executive sessions. The statute provides, in the part pertinent 
to this case:

(a) The county clerk 
shall:

(i) Act as clerk to the 
board of county commissioners and as such shall:

(A) Attend all sessions 
of the board of county commissioners either in person or by 
deputy;

(B) Keep the seal, 
records and papers of the board of county commissioners;

(C) Record in a book 
provided for that purpose all proceedings of the board;

(D) Make regular entries 
of all the board's resolutions, orders and decisions in all questions coming 
before it;

(E) Sign all orders 
issued by the board for the payment of money and preserve and file all accounts 
acted upon by the board with a memorandum of its action 
thereon;

(F) Perform other duties 
as required by the board of county commissioners.

[¶9] The plain 
language of that statute, with nothing else, would clearly require the clerk's 
attendance at all Board proceedings. Fontaine further supports her position with 
the following language from one of the provisions in the Wyoming Public Meetings 
Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-403(c), providing for minutes:

(c) Minutes of a 
meeting:

(i) Are required to be 
recorded but not published from meetings when no action is taken by the 
governing body;

(ii) Are not required to 
be recorded or published for day-to-day administrative activities of an 
agency.

[¶10] The Board 
relies on the "[e]xecutive session" portion of the Wyoming Public Meetings Act, 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-405, which authorizes agencies to hold executive sessions 
not open to the public, when specific confidential or sensitive matters are to 
be considered. That statute provides:

(a) A governing body of 
an agency may hold executive sessions not open to the 
public:

(i) With the attorney 
general, county attorney, district attorney, city attorney, sheriff, chief of 
police or their respective deputies, or other officers of the law, on matters 
posing a threat to the security of public or private property, or a threat to 
the public's right of access;

(ii) To consider the 
appointment, employment, right to practice or dismissal of a public officer, 
professional person or employee, or to hear complaints or charges brought 
against an employee professional person or officer, unless the employee, 
professional person or officer requests a public hearing. The governing body may 
exclude from any public or private hearing during the examination of a witness, 
any or all other witnesses in the matter being investigated. Following the 
hearing or executive session, the governing body may deliberate on its decision 
in executive sessions;

(iii) On matters 
concerning litigation to which the governing body is a party or proposed 
litigation to which the governing body may be a party;

(iv) On matters of 
national security;

(v) When the agency is a 
licensing agency while preparing, administering or grading 
examinations;

(vi) When considering and 
acting upon the determination of the term, parole or release of an individual 
from a correctional or penal institution;

(vii) To consider the 
selection of a site or the purchase of real estate when the publicity regarding 
the consideration would cause a likelihood of an increase in 
price;

(viii) To consider 
acceptance of gifts, donations and bequests which the donor has requested in 
writing be kept confidential;

(ix) To consider or 
receive any information classified as confidential by law;

(x) To consider accepting 
or tendering offers concerning wages, salaries, benefits and terms of employment 
during all negotiations;

(xi) To consider 
suspensions, expulsions or other disciplinary action in connection with any 
student as provided by law.

[¶11] Wyo. Stat. 
Ann § 16-4-405. The Board contends that its authority to meet in executive 
session, not open to the public, must be construed to justify its exclusion of 
the county clerk as the recorder. The policy argument asserted is that the 
essential purpose of executive sessions, the candid discussion of confidential 
matters, would be thwarted if the county clerk, a non-Board member, were allowed 
to attend and record the proceedings.

[¶12] The core 
of the issue is the tension between the executive session provision and the 
enumerated statutory duties of the county clerk, along with the statutory 
requirement for recorded minutes. The final section of the Wyoming Public 
Meetings Act succinctly resolves any conflict that might exist between the 
Board's executive session privilege and the clerk's statutory duty to attend and 
record. The last provision of the Wyoming Public Meetings Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-4-407, directs: "If the provisions of this act conflict with any other 
statute, the provisions of this act shall control." Therefore, if we determine 
the executive session provision authorizes the Board to exclude the clerk from 
executive sessions, her reliance on a conflicting provision that requires her to 
attend is not persuasive. The threshold issue is whether the Board's statutory 
right to hold executive sessions in private supports and justifies its disregard 
of the statutory requirement that minutes be taken at every 
meeting

[¶13] Since the 
parties disagree on the meaning and application of the controlling statutes, a 
review of our rules of statutory construction is apropos:

An issue of statutory 
interpretation presents a question of law. Butts v. Wyoming State Bd. of 
Architects, 911 P.2d 1062, 1065 (Wyo. 1996); Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. 
Wyo. Game and Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993). In interpreting 
statutes, we primarily determine the legislature's intent. State ex rel. Motor 
Vehicle Div. v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732, 736 (Wyo. 1983). If the language is 
sufficiently clear, we do not resort to rules of construction. Id. We apply our 
general rule that we look to the ordinary and obvious meaning of a statute when 
the language is unambiguous. Parker Land, 845 P.2d  at 
1042.

Kirbens v. 
Wyoming State Bd. of Medicine, 992 P.2d 1056, 1060 (Wyo. 
1999).

[¶14] We 
endeavor to interpret statutes in accordance with the Legislature's intent. We 
begin by making an "`inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the 
words employed according to their arrangement and 
connection.'"

[¶15] "When the 
Court determines, as a matter of law, that a statute is clear and unambiguous, 
it must give effect to the plain language of the statute and should not resort 
to the rules of statutory construction." . . . If, on the other hand, the Court 
determines that a statute is ambiguous, it may use extrinsic aids of statutory 
interpretation to help it determine the legislature's 
intent.

[¶16] State ex 
rel., Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division v. Bruhn, 951 P.2d 373, 
376 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting State Department of Revenue and Taxation v. Pacificorp, 
872 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wyo. 1994), and quoting Lancto v. City of Rawlins, 892 P.2d 800, 802-03 (Wyo. 1995), respectively) (citations 
omitted).

Felix v. State 
ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 986 P.2d 161, 163 (Wyo. 
1999).

[¶17] In 
interpreting statutes, our primary consideration is to determine the 
legislature's intent. State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Div. v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732, 
736 (Wyo. 1983). All statutes must be construed in pari materia; and in 
ascertaining the meaning of a given law, all statutes relating to the same 
subject or hav[ing] the same general purpose must be considered and construed in 
harmony. Id. at 735. Holtz explained our statutory construction 
rules:

"If the language is 
sufficiently clear, there is no need to resort to rules of construction. When 
the language is not clear or is ambiguous, the court must look to the mischief 
the statute was intended to cure, the historical setting surrounding its 
enactment, the public policy of the state, the conclusions of law, and other 
prior and contemporaneous facts and circumstances, making use of the accepted 
rules of construction to ascertain a legislative intent that is reasonable and 
consistent."

Holtz, 674 P.2d  
at 736.

Peterson v. 
Wyoming Game and Fish Com'n, 989 P.2d 113, 118 (Wyo. 
1999).

[¶18] Recently, 
in Flores v. Flores, 979 P.2d 944, 946 (Wyo. 1999), we discussed the standard of 
review for questions of statutory interpretation:

"Statutory interpretation 
is a question of law, so our standard of review is de novo . . . . If the 
conclusion of law is in accordance with the law, we affirm it; if it is not, we 
correct it." May v. May, 945 P.2d 1189, 1191 (Wyo. 1997) (citing Parker Land and 
Cattle Co. v. Wyoming Game and Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 
1993)).

[¶19] "We 
endeavor to interpret statutes in accordance with the Legislature's intent. We 
begin by making an `inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the 
words employed according to their arrangement and connection.' Parker Land and 
Cattle Company v. Wyoming Game and Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993) 
(quoting Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)). We 
construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and 
sentence, and we construe together all parts of the statute in pari 
materia."

[¶20] Cargill v. 
State, Dept. of Health, Div. of Health Care Financing, 967 P.2d 999, 1001 (Wyo. 
1998) (quoting Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div. v. Bruhn, 951 P.2d 373, 376 (Wyo. 1997)).

[¶21] The 
legislature enacted the provisions of the Wyoming Public Meetings Act during the 
same legislative session, and thus they are considered to be in pari materia. 
Murray v. State, 855 P.2d 350, 358 (Wyo. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1045 
(1994). Our mandate is to harmonize them and, to the extent possible, give 
effect to each one. Id. at 358. The Wyoming Public Meetings Act provides for 
open meetings and minutes of meetings in this language:

(a) All meetings of the 
governing body of an agency are public meetings, open to the public at all 
times, except as otherwise provided. No action of a governing body of an agency 
shall be taken except during a public meeting following notice of the meeting in 
accordance with this act. Action taken at a meeting not in conformity with this 
act is null and void and not merely voidable.

* * 
*

(c) Minutes of a 
meeting:

(i) Are required to be 
recorded but not published from meetings when no action is taken by the 
governing body;

(ii) Are not required to 
be recorded or published for day-to-day administrative activities of an 
agency.

[¶22] Wyo. Stat. 
Ann § 16-4-403. The only specified exception from the requirement that minutes 
be recorded at meetings is for day-to-day administrative matters. "Meeting" is 
defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-402(a)(iii):

[¶23] "Meeting" 
means an assembly of at least a quorum of the governing body of an agency which 
has been called by proper authority of the agency for the purpose of discussion, 
deliberation, presentation of information or taking action regarding public 
business[.]

[¶24] The scope 
of this definition captures executive sessions as they are provided for in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-4-405. Although no action can be taken by an agency in an 
executive session (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-403(a)), the provision relating to 
minutes, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-403(c), unambiguously requires that minutes of 
executive sessions be taken but not published.

[¶25] The Board 
contends that it must be allowed to exclude the clerk and dispense with minutes 
in order to ensure that candid discussion in executive sessions is not chilled 
by the prospect of discovery. The Board supports that contention only with 
citations to authorities on parliamentary procedure. If that is the concept the 
legislature intended to capture, the legislature must be asked to reconsider the 
Wyoming Public Meetings Act. Our function is not to rewrite the statute, but to 
determine what the statute, as worded, actually means. We discern a clear 
statutory mandate for minutes to be taken at all meetings, and we will not 
resort to extrinsic aids of construction or public policy arguments to create an 
exception to that requirement for executive sessions. The district court's 
declaratory judgment on this issue is reversed.

[¶26] In arguing 
her second claim of error, Fontaine contends the district court erred when it 
declared the Board was not required to publish detailed agendas of its staff 
meetings because only day-to-day administrative matters are addressed. In its 
order, the district court noted, "[a]ccording to the Board `staff meetings' are 
used to discuss `day-to-day administrative' matters." Although it did not 
specifically say so, the district court apparently accepted that statement as 
true. The district court declared, "[t]he Board is not required to publish 
detailed notice of meeting agendas where only `day-to-day' administrative 
activity is being conducted." The taking of minutes for such meetings 
specifically is excepted from Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-4-403(c)(ii).

[¶27] In her 
appellate brief, Fontaine boldly asserts:

When the Court examines 
the supporting exhibits, it is apparent that the discussions at staff meetings 
and work sessions go well beyond "discussing the day to day administrative 
activities of the agency" as mentioned in W.S. § 16-4-404(e). * * * The fact 
remains, however, that the scheduled discussions at staff meetings go well 
beyond day-to-day administrative activities. They often include deliberations 
and discussions pertaining to important public matters.

[¶28] She goes 
on to state:

Contrary to the 
Commissioners' position, the staff meetings and work sessions have a primary 
purpose of discussing public business such as public access, landfill issues, 
policy on recordation of deeds, vacating of real property, subdivisions and 
budget hearing formats, among many other topics.

[¶29] These 
assertions, however, are not accompanied by citations to any part of the record, 
or any explanation of how the topics listed are anything but day-to-day 
administrative activities. Unsupported assertions do not suffice to sustain the 
burden of a non-moving party to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact, 
and they will not suffice to persuade this Court to reverse a summary judgment 
entered in the district court. This is particularly true when statutory language 
is as clear as it is in this instance.

[¶30] Affirmed 
in part, reversed in part, and remanded for entry of a judgment consistent with 
this opinion.

Footnotes

1 Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 16-4-402(a)(ii) reads:

"Agency" 
means any authority, bureau, board, commission, committee, or subagency of the 
state, a county, a municipality or other political subdivision which is created 
by or pursuant to the Wyoming constitution, statute or ordinance, other than the 
state legislature and the judiciary[.]