Title: In re G.C.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

In re G.C. (99-416); 170 Vt. 329; 749 A.2d 28

[Filed 28-Jan-2000]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as  formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the  Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 99-416

In re G.C.	                                    Supreme Court

                                                    On Appeal from
                                                    Washington Family Court

                                                    January Term, 2000

M. Kathleen Manley, J.

Michael Rose, St. Albans, for Appellant.

William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, Montpelier, and Barbara L.
  Crippen and James C. Shea,   Assistant Attorneys General, Waterbury, for
  Appellee.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       JOHNSON, J.   Mother appeals the family court's determination that her
  infant son, G.C.,  is a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS).  We
  affirm.

       Mother suffers from chronic mental illness, described by her doctors
  as including borderline  personality disorder, disassociative
  identification disorder, and major recurrent depression.   Psychiatrists
  agree that mother's illness is the result of extreme physical, sexual, and
  emotional  abuse that she endured as a small child and throughout her
  developmental years at the hands of her  father and other close relatives. 
  Treatment for mother's illness includes psychotherapy and various 
  medications aimed at combating her anxiety, depression, and delusional
  thinking.

 

       In 1988, mother and her daughters, then aged one and four, were living
  with mother's  parents, including her abusive father.  During that period,
  the younger daughter was hospitalized on  a number of occasions because of
  excessive vomiting.  The Department of Social and  Rehabilitation Services
  (SRS) filed a CHINS petition, alleging that mother had induced the 
  vomiting by giving the child a drug called Ipecac, and further had
  disconnected and put pin holes in  the child's feeding tube at the
  hospital.  Mother stipulated to a CHINS adjudication with respect to  G.C.
  and  to a finding that she suffered from Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy
  (MSP), a mental  illness characterized by creating illnesses in one's
  children to gain attention for oneself.  In 1989,  the family court
  terminated mother's parental rights with respect to her daughters.

       Over the ensuing ten years, mother took advantage of significant
  mental health services and  made progress in recognizing and dealing with
  her mental and emotional problems.  Nevertheless,  she continued to suffer
  relapses and was hospitalized periodically throughout that period.  Between 
  1992 and 1999, mother had at least seventy contacts with police, many of
  them concerning threats  or attempts to commit suicide.  Mother's longest
  period of stability without intervention lasted only  a matter of days.  A
  long-term client of Washington County Mental Health (WCMH), mother relied 
  on the center's support in making her living arrangements over the years.

       Sometime in 1998, after discovering that she was pregnant with G.C.,
  mother began  lobbying the staff at WCMH to help her find a foster home
  that would provide twenty-four-hour-a-day support for her and her new
  baby.  After advertising through the newspaper and interviewing  potential
  candidates, mother and WCMH's support team set up a foster-care arrangement
  with a  couple who had been licensed foster parents for the previous five
  years.  The couple had five  children of their own ranging in age from five
  to twenty-five.  Under the arrangement set up by  WCMH, mother 

 

  would move in with the couple a month or so before the baby was born, and
  the couple would  provide support for her and the baby after the birth. 
  Mother began spending nights with her new  foster family in late January
  1999 and moved in with them on February 1 of that year.

       Early on in her pregnancy, mother insisted, and the doctors agreed,
  that she be taken off her  antipsychotic medication so as not to harm the
  unborn child.  As a result, mother's delusional  behavior worsened, and she
  was hospitalized for periods of time.  At times, she informed support 
  staff of her delusion that she was carrying a rat rather than a baby, and
  late in her pregnancy she  threatened to abort the fetus.  Shortly before
  she gave birth, she was hospitalized because of her  deteriorating mental
  condition.

       G.C. was born on February 17, 1999 and, as planned, lived with mother
  at the home of the  foster family.  At first, things appeared to be going
  fine for mother and baby, but mother became  depressed, and on March 7,
  1999 she attempted suicide and was hospitalized.  Mother indicated to  an
  SRS employee who visited her at the hospital that she was depressed in part
  because she felt that  no one trusted her to care for her baby.

       On March 9, 1999, SRS filed a CHINS petition, and the family court
  entered an emergency  order removing G.C. from the foster family's home. 
  Following the merits hearing, which was held  over three days in April and
  May of 1999, the family court granted SRS's petition to adjudicate the 
  child CHINS.  Citing mother's history of profound mental illness, including
  the abuse of her  daughter eleven years earlier, the court concluded that
  G.C. was in need of care or supervision  because mother remained the
  child's legal guardian, and the foster family had not been made aware  of
  the nature and significance of mother's mental disorders.  On appeal,
  mother argues that (1)  G.C.'s best interest required the family court to
  allow her to relitigate the issue of whether she  continued to suffer from, 

 

  or ever suffered from, MSP, and (2) the family court erred in adjudicating
  the child CHINS because  he had proper "parental care" under the
  arrangement set up by her and the staff at WCMH.

       Apparently, at some point during the merits hearing, mother requested
  that the family court  allow her to relitigate the 1988 stipulated finding
  that she suffers from MSP.  Each of the mental  health professionals who
  testified at the hearing, including psychiatrists and other staff from 
  WCMH, a psychologist from the Vermont State Hospital, and another
  psychologist with expertise  in diagnosing MSP, indicated that mother most
  probably did not suffer from MSP, and that, in any  case, the diagnosis had
  been based on insufficient information.  The experts agreed that mother's 
  explanation for why she harmed her daughter eleven years earlier -- to
  force the State to remove her  children from her father's abusive household
  -- was more probable than the MSP diagnosis.  Mother  claims that she was
  misdiagnosed, asserting that she agreed to the MSP diagnosis without 
  comprehending the future implications of doing so.  She believes that
  because MSP poses a  significant risk to the children of those who suffer
  from the illness, and is widely recognized as  difficult to cure, the
  faulty diagnosis has colored both the State's and the family court's view
  of her  ability to provide a safe environment for her son.  In her view,
  any interest in protecting the finality  of the 1988 finding by estopping
  her from challenging the earlier diagnosis must yield to the  overriding
  importance of determining G.C.'s best interest.

       The problem with mother's argument is that the family court did not
  rely on the MSP  diagnosis in making its CHINS determination.  While
  expressly acknowledging that the validity of  the diagnosis might become
  relevant at later disposition hearings, the court declined to set aside the 
  challenged finding "[a]t this juncture."  The court concluded that,
  regardless of whether the MSP  diagnosis was correct, G.C. was in need of
  care or supervision because of mother's unstable 

 

  psychiatric history and her inability to maintain herself in the community
  without significant  support, coupled with the fact that she, rather than
  the foster family, retained legal guardianship  over the child.  Because
  the family court did not rely on the MSP diagnosis in making its CHINS 
  determination, and the record supports that determination, we need not
  address mother's argument  that she should be allowed to challenge the 1988
  finding that she suffers from MSP.(FN1)  In fact,  the family court
  allowed mother to present evidence challenging the finding, but concluded
  that,  given the other evidence demonstrating that G.C. was in need of care
  or supervision, it need not  determine at that point whether the finding
  should be stricken from the record.

       Irrespective of the earlier MSP diagnosis, mother contends that the
  family court erred in  finding that G.C. was "without proper parental care
  . . . necessary for his well-being."  See 33  V.S.A. § 5502(12)(B). 
  According to mother, she and the staff at WCMH had made arrangements  to
  assure that G.C. would be provided with proper parental care during the
  anticipated periods when  she lapsed into depression or was otherwise
  unable to cope with caring for the child.  She asserts  that the
  arrangements worked just as planned, and that G.C. has never been without
  proper parental  care because her foster family took over care of the child
  following her suicide attempt and  hospitalization.

       We agree with mother that the use of the term "parental care" in §
  5502(12)(B) does not  compel a CHINS adjudication whenever incapacitated
  parents leave their children with relatives or 

 

  others to provide "parental" care during the period of incapacitation.  See
  In re Ayres,