Title: Avalonbay Communities, Inc. v. Orange

State: connecticut

Issuer: Connecticut Supreme Court

Document:

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AVALONBAY COMMUNITIES, INC., ET AL. v.
TOWN OF ORANGE ET AL.
(SC 16352)
Borden, Katz, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.
Argued February 16—officially released July 10, 2001
Counsel
Timothy P. Pothin and Thomas R. Gerarde, with
whom were Brian M. Stone and, on the brief, Hugh F.
Keefe and I. Milton Widem, for the appellants-appel-
lees (defendants).
Joseph P. Williams, with whom were Timothy S.
Hollister and, on the brief, Christopher B. Carveth and
Leo P. Carroll, for the appellees and the cross appel-
lant (plaintiffs).
Wesley W. Horton filed a brief for the Connecticut
Civil Liberties Union Foundation et al. as amici curiae.
Opinion
BORDEN, J. The defendants1 appeal2 and the named
plaintiff, AvalonBay Communities, Inc. (AvalonBay),
cross appeals3 from the judgment of the trial court,
Curran, J., rendered after a court trial, granting a per-
manent injunction in favor of the plaintiffs, Ernest Cuz-
zocreo, Jr., Cuzz-Acres Orange Limited Partnership
(Cuzz-Acres) and AvalonBay. In their appeal, the defen-
dants claim that the trial court improperly enjoined the
town from: (1) implementing its plans for an industrial
park (project plan) in the town, to be located on a
parcel that included a parcel of real property owned
by AvalonBay (AvalonBay parcel); and (2) proceeding
with any plans for the taking by eminent domain of the
AvalonBay parcel. In its cross appeal, AvalonBay claims
that the trial court improperly concluded that the plain-
tiffs were not entitled to damages for any allegedly
improper conduct by the town under federal and state
fair housing laws. We conclude that: (1) the trial court
properly enjoined the town from proceeding with the
project plan; (2) the issue of the taking of the AvalonBay
parcel has been rendered moot; and (3) the trial court
properly found in favor of the defendants with respect
to AvalonBay’s fair housing claims. Accordingly, we
affirm the judgment in part.
The trial court found the following facts. In May,
1997, the plaintiffs entered into a contract whereby
AvalonBay was to purchase a parcel of real property
located in the town owned by Cuzzocreo and Cuzz-
Acres, comprised of approximately 9.6 acres of land.
At the time of the purchase agreement, the parcel was
located in a district zoned light industrial, which specifi-
cally allowed planned residential developments, includ-
ing affordable housing projects in accordance with
General Statutes § 8-30g.4 Subsequently, in August,
1997, AvalonBay filed applications for a wetlands per-
mit and a special use permit, accompanied by a site
plan, seeking approval to build on the parcel a luxury
apartment complex, a percentage of which would qual-
ify as affordable housing rental units. The town inland
wetlands and watercourses commission denied Ava-
lonBay’s original and revised wetlands permit applica-
tions. The town plan and zoning commission denied
AvalonBay’s site plan and special use permit applica-
tion, as well as its subsequent, modified application.5
Approximately three weeks after AvalonBay’s applica-
tion was filed, the plan and zoning commission issued
a moratorium on all planned residential developments
in the town, effective September 26, 1997. In April, 1998,
while AvalonBay’s appeal from that decision of the plan
and zoning commission was pending,6 the town eco-
nomic development commission hired the planning firm
of DeCarlo & Doll, Inc., to draft a project plan for a
high-tech industrial park that would occupy eighteen
separate parcels of real property on a 172 acre plot in
the town, which would include the AvalonBay parcel.
In September, 1998, Orange Economic Development
Corporation, Inc., a private corporate entity, was
formed to oversee the proposed industrial park.
Before the project plan was completed, plans were
formed to take the parcel by eminent domain. In Novem-
ber, 1998, however, the voters of the town rejected the
proposed issuance of bonds for the acquisition of the
parcel. Plans for the industrial park, however, contin-
ued. In December, 1998, the board of selectmen passed
a resolution for the issuance of bonds for the condemna-
tion of the parcel. The project plan was approved by
the economic development commission in January,
1999,7 and by the board of selectmen in February, 1999.
On March 9, 1999, the plan to take the parcel by eminent
domain was revived and approved by the economic
development commission. The following day, the board
of selectmen voted to condemn the parcel. At a town
meeting on March 29, 1999, the taking of the AvalonBay
parcel by eminent domain for its inclusion in the indus-
trial park was approved. Additional facts will be pro-
vided as necessary.
The plaintiffs brought this action against the defen-
dants, seeking a permanent injunction against the proj-
ect plan and the taking of the AvalonBay parcel by
eminent domain, and also seeking to recover damages
from the town and various individual defendants.8 In
the first count of a second amended five count com-
plaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ pro-
posed implementation of the project plan ‘‘violates §§ 7-
136 and 7-148 and Chapters 132 or 588l of the General
Statutes, does not constitute a bona fide plan for a
municipal development project, constitutes a bad faith
exercise of the authority granted to municipalities by
these statutes, and constitutes ultra vires action by the
Town and its agencies . . . .’’ In the second count of
the amended complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the
intended condemnation of the parcel violated article
first, § 11, of the Connecticut constitution,9 in that it
was not being carried out to serve a public use. The
plaintiffs also alleged that the intended condemnation
constituted a bad faith exercise of the eminent domain
power. The plaintiffs further alleged that the intended
condemnation was unlawful because it was violative
of several federal and state fair housing statutes. In the
third count of the amended complaint, the plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants violated certain federal and
state fair housing laws. In the fourth count of the
amended complaint, the plaintiffs sought to recover
compensatory and punitive damages from Robert C.
Sousa, the first selectman of the town, in his individual
capacity, for tortious interference with business expec-
tancies. The plaintiffs alleged that Sousa had been
aware of the contract between AvalonBay as the pur-
chaser and Cuzzocreo and Cuzz-Acres as the sellers of
the parcel, and that he had acted outside the scope
of his duties and employment as first selectman by
improperly blocking the plaintiffs’ residential develop-
ment efforts. Finally, the fifth count of the amended
complaint constituted a claim for indemnification of
the plaintiffs by the town with respect to the third and
fourth counts. The defendants asserted eight special
defenses, which are not involved in this appeal.
On March 26, 1999, the defendants removed the
action to the United States District Court for the District
of Connecticut. That court concluded that the com-
plaint failed to allege a substantial federal question,
thereby depriving the court of subject matter jurisdic-
tion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Accordingly, the fed-
eral court remanded the action to the Superior Court
pursuant to its authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (c). The
trial court issued a stay of the condemnation pending
the resolution of the plaintiffs’ application for an
injunction.
After a court trial, the defendants moved to dismiss
count two of the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground of
mootness. The defendants argued that count two, which
sought an injunction against the taking of the parcel,
was rendered moot because: (1) the town’s authoriza-
tion for the condemnation had expired in September,
1999; (2) the board of selectmen had determined that
it was no longer in the town’s best interest to acquire
the parcel following a then recent reappraisal, and had
resolved that it would not vote to acquire the parcel
by eminent domain so long as AvalonBay owned the
property; and (3) the economic development commis-
sion had resolved not to seek the acquisition of the
parcel and to amend the project plan so as to delete
the acquisition therefrom. In February, 2000, the trial
court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, reason-
ing that the resolution lacked the permanent force of a
judgment and applied specifically to AvalonBay without
taking into consideration future transfers of ownership.
At the same time, the trial court ruled on the merits
of the case, concluding that, as a general matter, an
industrial park, such as the one proposed by the town,
may serve a public purpose for which the power of
eminent domain could be exercised. Although the court
found that there was no evidence that the property
to be taken for the industrial park would be used for
anything other than the stated purpose, the court also
found that the town had proceeded in bad faith and
that the project plan was a pretext in an effort to thwart
affordable housing on the AvalonBay parcel. In making
these findings, the court principally relied on the timing
of and the sparsity of detail in the project plan, as
well as the actions and statements of Sousa and other
town officials.
On the basis of these findings, the trial court con-
cluded, with respect to the first and second counts, that
the plaintiffs were entitled to a permanent injunction
prohibiting the town from proceeding with the imple-
mentation of the project plan and from proceeding with
any plans for the condemnation of the subject property.
With respect to the third count, the trial court concluded
that the plaintiffs were not entitled to damages for any
allegedly improper conduct by the town under either
the federal or state fair housing laws. Accordingly, the
trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
on the first and second counts of the amended com-
plaint, and in favor of the defendants on the third
count.10 This appeal and this cross appeal followed.
Before reaching the defendants’ claims on appeal
and AvalonBay’s claim on the cross appeal, we briefly
address the applicable standard of review. ‘‘The scope
of our appellate review depends upon the proper char-
acterization of the rulings made by the trial court. To
the extent that the trial court has made findings of fact,
our review is limited to deciding whether such findings
were clearly erroneous. When, however, the trial court
draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and
we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and
logically correct and find support in the facts that
appear in the record. . . . Torres v. Waterbury, 249
Conn. 110, 118–19, 733 A.2d 817 (1999).’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Olson v. Accessory Controls &
Equipment Corp., 254 Conn. 145, 156, 757 A.2d 14
(2000).
We also set forth ‘‘the governing principles for our
standard of review as it pertains to a trial court’s discre-
tion to grant or deny a request for an injunction: A party
seeking injunctive relief has the burden of alleging and
proving irreparable harm and lack of an adequate rem-
edy at law.
. . .
A prayer for injunctive relief is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court and the
court’s ruling can be reviewed only for the purpose
of determining whether the decision was based on an
erroneous statement of law or an abuse of discretion.
. . . Walton v. New Hartford, 223 Conn. 155, 165, 612
A.2d 1153 (1992). Therefore, unless the trial court has
abused its discretion, or failed to exercise its discretion;
Wehrhane v. Peyton, 134 Conn. 486, 498, 58 A.2d 698
(1948); the trial court’s decision must stand.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Advest, Inc. v. Wachtel, 235
Conn. 559, 562–63, 668 A.2d 367 (1995). ‘‘The extraordi-
nary nature of injunctive relief requires that the harm
complained of is occurring or will occur if the injunction
is not granted. Although an absolute certainty is not
required, it must appear that there is a substantial prob-
ability that but for the issuance of the injunction, the
party seeking it will suffer irreparable harm.’’ Karls v.
Alexandra Realty Corp., 179 Conn. 390, 402, 426 A.2d
784 (1980).
I
We first consider the defendants’ claim that the trial
court improperly enjoined the town from implementing
the project plan. Specifically, the defendants argue that:
(1) the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the adop-
tion or implementation of the project plan; and (2) the
plaintiffs are not entitled to an injunction with respect
to the project plan. We address, and reject, these argu-
ments in turn.
A
We first address the defendants’ claim that the plain-
tiffs lacked standing to challenge the adoption or imple-
mentation of the project plan.11 Specifically, the
defendants argue that: (1) the plaintiffs failed to allege
and prove that the adoption of the project plan threatens
or inflicts a direct injury upon them; (2) nothing in
chapters 132 and 588l of the General Statutes, which
pertain to the adoption and implementation of munici-
pal development project plans, expressly creates a pri-
vate right of action to challenge the terms, the
substantive adequacy or the procedures employed in
adopting such plans; and (3) the plaintiffs are not
afforded a private right of action by implication. The
plaintiffs argue, to the contrary, that they have standing
to challenge the project plan because they are aggrieved
by its adoption and intended implementation. We agree
with the plaintiffs. We base our conclusion on (1) the
statutory framework governing municipal development
project plans, coupled with (2) the trial court’s factual
findings that the defendants acted in bad faith in their
effort to prevent the development of affordable housing
on the AvalonBay parcel.
‘‘The issue of standing implicates this court’s subject
matter jurisdiction.’’ Fish Unlimited v. Northeast Utili-
ties Service Co., 254 Conn. 21, 31, 755 A.2d 860 (2000);
Steeneck v. University of Bridgeport, 235 Conn. 572,
580, 668 A.2d 688 (1995) (‘‘[w]here a plaintiff lacks
standing to sue, the court is without subject matter
jurisdiction’’). ‘‘Standing is the legal right to set judicial
machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the
jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] has, in an
individual or representative capacity, some real interest
in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title
or interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
. . . Gay & Lesbian Law Students Assn. v. Board of
Trustees, 236 Conn. 453, 466, 673 A.2d 484 (1996). When
standing is put in issue, the question is whether the
person whose standing is challenged is a proper party
to request an adjudication of the issue . . . . Malerba
v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 210 Conn. 189, 192, 554 A.2d
287 (1989). Standing requires no more than a colorable
claim of injury; a [party] ordinarily establishes . . .
standing by allegations of injury. Similarly, standing
exists to attempt to vindicate arguably protected inter-
ests. . . . Gay & Lesbian Law Students Assn. v. Board
of Trustees, supra, 466.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. DeCaro, 252 Conn.
229, 253–54, 745 A.2d 800 (2000).
‘‘Standing is established by showing that the party
claiming it is authorized by statute to bring suit or is
classically aggrieved. . . . The fundamental test for
determining aggrievement encompasses a well-settled
twofold
determination:
first,
the
party
claiming
aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific,
personal and legal interest in [the subject matter of
the challenged action], as distinguished from a general
interest, such as is the concern of all members of the
community as a whole. Second, the party claiming
aggrievement must successfully establish that this spe-
cific personal and legal interest has been specially and
injuriously affected by the [challenged action].’’ (Cita-
tion
omitted;
internal
quotation
marks
omitted.)
Steeneck v. University of Bridgeport, supra, 235 Conn.
579. ‘‘Aggrievement is established if there is a possibil-
ity, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally
protected interest . . . has been adversely affected.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pomazi v. Conser-
vation Commission, 220 Conn. 476, 483, 600 A.2d 320
(1991). We conclude that the statutory framework gov-
erning municipal development projects under chapter
132 of the General Statutes and the trial court’s factual
findings of bad faith on the part of the defendants in
their adoption and intended implementation of the proj-
ect plan, in an attempt to prevent the development of
affordable housing on the AvalonBay parcel, are suffi-
cient to have conferred standing on the plaintiffs to
challenge the project plan.
First, chapter 132 of the General Statutes; General
Statutes §§ 8-186 through 8-200b; entitled ‘‘Municipal
Development Projects,’’ pursuant to which the project
plan was adopted, provides the statutory framework
for the municipal acquisition and improvement of real
property for business and industrial purposes. As a gen-
eral matter, the purpose of this statutory framework is
to foster ‘‘the continued growth of industry and business
within the state,’’ by ‘‘permitting and assisting munici-
palities to acquire and improve’’ certain property in
accordance with the requirements and purposes of
chapter 132. General Statutes § 8-186.12 To that end,
General Statutes § 8-18813 authorizes municipalities ‘‘to
designate the economic development commission or
the redevelopment agency of such municipality or a
nonprofit development corporation as its development
agency and exercise through such agency the powers
granted under this chapter,’’ which include the power
of eminent domain granted pursuant to General Statutes
§ 8-193,14 entitled ‘‘Acquisition and transfer of real prop-
erty. General powers of agency.’’ General Statutes § 8-
18915 permits a development agency to ‘‘initiate a devel-
opment project by preparing a project plan . . . in
accordance with regulations of the commissioner [of
economic and community development].’’ General Stat-
utes § 8-19116 then provides that, once a project plan is
approved by the development agency, in accordance
with certain criteria, it must be submitted to the appro-
priate legislative body,17 which ‘‘shall vote to approve
or disapprove the plan.’’ Once the plan is approved, the
development agency may proceed with the acquisition
of the real property by purchase, lease, exchange, gift
or eminent domain. See General Statutes § 8-193 (a).
This statutory framework contemplates and serves
to effectuate the acquisition of real property, by eminent
domain if necessary, in order to foster industrial and
business development. In essence, under this frame-
work, without the acquisition of the subject property
the project plan would not accomplish its intended legal
purpose. Indeed, it is only ‘‘[a]fter approval of the [proj-
ect] plan as provided in [chapter 132],’’ that the develop-
ment agency may proceed with the acquisition of real
property within the project area. General Statutes
§ 8-193.
It bears emphasis that a project plan developed under
chapter 132 is significantly different from a town plan
of development, sometimes referred to as a master plan,
adopted pursuant to General Statutes § 8-23.18 This
court repeatedly has recognized that ‘‘a town plan is
merely advisory. Lathrop v. Planning & Zoning Com-
mission, 164 Conn. 215, 223, 319 A.2d 376 (1973); Spada
v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 159 Conn. 192,
200, 268 A.2d 376 (1970); Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning
Commission, 154 Conn. 470, 473, 226 A.2d 509 (1967).
The purpose of the [town] plan is to set forth the most
desirable use of land and an overall plan for the town.
. . . [S]ee Mott’s Realty Corporation v. Town Plan &
Zoning Commission, 152 Conn. 535, 538, 209 A.2d 179
(1965). Purtill v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission,
146 Conn. 570, 572, 153 A.2d 441 (1959).’’ (Citation omit-
ted.) Smith v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 227 Conn. 71,
87–88, 629 A.2d 1089 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1164,
114 S. Ct. 1190, 127 L. Ed. 2d 540 (1994). ‘‘The develop-
ment plan is the planning commission’s recommenda-
tion on the most desirable uses of all land within the
community, including all public and private uses from
street layouts to industrial sites.’’ T. Tondro, Connecti-
cut Land Use Regulation (2d Ed. 1992) pp. 203–204.
‘‘Because the overall objectives contained in the town
plan must be implemented by the enactment of specific
regulations, the plan itself can operate only as an inter-
pretive tool. See, e.g., Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v.
Planning & Zoning Commission, 186 Conn. 466, 475,
442 A.2d 65 (1982).’’ Smith v. Zoning Board of Appeals,
supra, 88.
Those characteristics of a town plan, however, do
not accompany a project plan adopted under chapter
132. The distinction between the two types of develop-
ment plans illuminates one of the significant, if not the
primary, legal functions that a project plan is designed
to serve, namely, to effectuate the municipal acquisition
of real property.
Second, the trial court found that the project plan
was ‘‘but a pretext in trying to thwart affordable housing
on the [AvalonBay parcel].’’ The court found that, in
light of the plaintiffs’ sustained appeals from the denials
by the town plan and zoning commission and the inland
wetlands and watercourses commission, it was likely
that the plaintiffs’ affordable housing application, which
met the town’s zoning standards, would proceed unless
the town condemned the parcel. The court also found
that, although the town ‘‘claim[ed] that the vacant land
surrounding the site has always been designated for
industrial use, the present condition of the land sought
for the industrial park is a mixture of parcels and uses.’’
The court also found that the zone that includes the
proposed
industrial
park,
until
recently
allowed
planned residential developments. Because of that zon-
ing scheme, one parcel adjoining the site is currently
used as a seniors apartment complex and another parcel
nearby was approved as a housing development.
The court reasoned that ‘‘the timing of the project
plan, as well as the sparsity of detail in the plan itself,’’
supported a finding of pretext. Specifically, the trial
court found that ‘‘the ideas for an industrial park first
[began] to take shape only after the affordable housing
application was submitted some weeks prior to the
issuance of a moratorium on planned residential devel-
opments. The moratorium would have precluded Ava-
lonBay’s application had it been filed subsequently.
Furthermore, the actual project plan was being devel-
oped
only
after
AvalonBay’s
proposal
to
build
affordable housing. Interestingly, the project plan was
not yet complete at the time that [the town] initiated
eminent domain proceedings, for the second time,
against the site.’’
The court further found that ‘‘the overwhelming evi-
dence suggests that the project plan exhibited but the
bare minimum amount of information and planning as
to any future industrial park.’’ The project plan was
‘‘deficient in numerous areas ranging throughout the
plan,’’ ‘‘ ‘evasive and vague,’ ’’ and was, at best, ‘‘incom-
plete.’’ Moreover, ‘‘[w]hile the plan discusses the site,
it is virtually silent as to the rest of the acreage that is
to comprise the industrial park. Thus, while the project
plan discusses the bare minimum as to the proposed
site for affordable housing, it does not even do so for
the rest of the project.’’
Although the haste and sparsity of the plan weighed
heavily in the court’s finding of pretext, the court also
relied on the actions and statements of the board of
selectmen and other town officials, as ‘‘more indicative
of the general attitude and motives . . . in regards to
AvalonBay’s affordable housing application.’’ In this
connection, the court specifically relied on statements
made by Sousa in which he described the town’s emi-
nent domain power with respect to the accompanying
industrial park as a way to regain control of property
that some statutes, such as the affordable housing stat-
ute, allegedly take away from municipalities. The trial
court found that town officials ‘‘strategized against Ava-
lonBay by attempting to downplay affordable housing
by focusing on the high costs with which the town
would be burdened if the application proceeded. . . .
[M]any of the representations made by [the town] were
gross exaggerations and misleading.’’ These misrepre-
sentations concerned the number of schoolchildren
who would live in the housing, the possibility that a
new school would have to be built at a substantial cost
to taxpayers, higher crime risks, increased municipal
costs and the alleged inability of the fire department
to combat fires at the site.
In sum, the statutory framework undergirding the
project plan, which anticipates and is a necessary com-
ponent in effectuating a taking by eminent domain, cou-
pled with the trial court’s factual findings of bad faith,
are sufficient to have established the plaintiffs’ stand-
ing. The plaintiffs’ ownership of the AvalonBay parcel,
and AvalonBay’s plan to develop affordable housing on
it, and the court’s findings of bad faith by the defendants
aimed at the plaintiffs’ development, gave the plaintiffs
a specific, personal and legal interest in the project
plan, which would have thwarted that development,
and are sufficient to establish that the plaintiffs’ legal
interest was specially and injuriously affected by the
project plan.
The defendants argue that the project plan is a mere
planning document, and that the plaintiffs have neither
alleged nor proven that its adoption threatens or inflicts
a direct injury upon them. As we stated previously,
however, without the intended acquisition of the parcel
the project plan would not serve its intended legal func-
tion. Approval of the project plan is the necessary predi-
cate to the acquisition of property for chapter 132
purposes. That statutory scheme, coupled with findings
of bad faith, satisfy classic aggrievement principles.
The defendants also argue that ‘‘it is inconsistent with
the statutory schemes involved to permit a private right
of action with respect to the adoption of municipal
development plans.
. . .
Nothing in the statutory
framework suggests that private parties should be given
a right of action to challenge the adoption or contents
of the plan per se . . . .’’ We agree that a private right
of action does not exist per se to challenge the adoption
of a project plan. We think, however, that in this case
the specific findings of bad faith, aimed at the plaintiffs,
in the formulation of a project plan under chapter 132,
were sufficient to afford the plaintiffs standing to chal-
lenge the project plan.
The defendants further contend that the record does
not support the trial court’s finding that the industrial
park was merely a pretext in an effort to thwart
affordable housing. We disagree.
First, the record fully supports the trial court’s finding
that the project plan was hastily assembled, poorly envi-
sioned and incomplete. There was ample evidence that
the defendants developed the idea for an industrial park
and began the process to create the project plan only
after AvalonBay had filed its application for affordable
housing, and only weeks before the issuance of a mora-
torium on planned residential developments. Indeed,
even when the town initiated eminent domain proceed-
ings against the parcel, the project plan was not
complete.
The plaintiffs offered the testimony of five expert
witnesses, each of whom criticized the project plan.
Those expert witnesses testified that the project plan
was missing information, contained inaccurate informa-
tion and did not meet the minimum standards of their
professions. For example, David Schiff, a planning and
development consultant, testified that the project plan’s
program overview was ‘‘unclear,’’ ‘‘contradictory in cer-
tain places’’ and ‘‘internally inconsistent.’’ The project
plan referred to the pressures of a changing economy,
but did not support that statement with any discussion
or description thereof. The project plan claimed that
there was an increased demand for industrial research
lands, but nowhere in the project plan was there any
evidence of an increased demand for high-tech indus-
trial development, and ‘‘certainly not in Orange.’’ Refer-
ence was made to the need to increase the grand list,
yet Schiff’s analysis demonstrated that the proposed
AvalonBay housing development would generate sub-
stantially more taxes to the town than would an indus-
trial development on the AvalonBay parcel. The project
plan’s program overview claimed that there was an
underutilization of existing industrial facilities and
space, as well as a demand for such facilities, yet, in
Schiff’s opinion, vacancies and deterioration of existing
industrial facilities do not reflect an increased demand
for such use.
Schiff also testified that the project plan, contrary to
its claims, neither provided a guide for planning and
development decisions, nor included objectives for
physical, social, economic and aesthetic development.
Furthermore, according to Schiff, the description of the
project boundaries was confusing. Schiff testified that
he could not perceive a rationale for starting the devel-
opment of an industrial park at the location of the
AvalonBay parcel. Schiff also identified other unsub-
stantiated, unexplained claims made in the project plan,
including that: (1) eminent domain was necessary; (2)
various, but as yet unidentified, parcels needed upgrad-
ing; and (3) it was necessary to divide parcels in order
to accommodate private development requests, despite
no indication that private development was seeking
smaller parcels. Moreover, Schiff pointed out the fol-
lowing omissions from the project plan: (1) there was
no discussion of proposed uses or actions necessary
concerning any parcels in the project area other than
the AvalonBay parcel; (2) there was no provision for
funding any improvements; (3) there was no analysis
as to why 10,000 to 40,000 square foot users constituted
the highest and best use; and (4) there was no discussion
of the creation of nonconforming uses for existing prop-
erty owners.
Furthermore, although the state department of eco-
nomic and
community development
(department)
found that the project plan did not conflict with its
objectives, it criticized the project plan as being inter-
nally inconsistent and weak in several areas. A letter
to the economic development commission from Chet
Camarata, the executive director of the department,
incorporated the detailed comments by Michael San-
toro, a community development specialist. Santoro’s
March 2, 1999 memorandum stated that the plan was
‘‘inconsistent in a number of sections as well as vague
and evasive in others.’’ Santoro found that the scope
of the project, relocation plan and financing plan were
unclear. For example, Santoro recognized that the proj-
ect plan identified eighteen parcels to be included in
the project area, but only provided details with respect
to two parcels, namely, those parcels involving the
plaintiffs. Santoro also recognized that twelve of the
parcels in the project area were currently occupied by
business or individuals, yet the project plan did not
indicate that any relocation was necessary.
B
The defendants next contend that the plaintiffs are
not entitled to injunctive relief with respect to the proj-
ect plan. The substance of this claim can be distilled
into three distinct subparts: (1) the plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate the imminent threat of irreparable harm
arising from the adoption or the implementation of the
industrial park plan; (2) ‘‘[t]here was no evidence from
which the trial court could properly have concluded
that the town’s actions were motivated by a desire to
exclude affordable housing’’; and (3) the trial court had
no factual or legal basis for enjoining the project plan.
We disagree.
We conclude that when a trial court makes findings
of bad faith on the part of a municipality in the context
of a project plan developed and adopted pursuant to
chapter 132, aimed at a proposed development of prop-
erty that would be thwarted by the project plan, such
findings provide a sufficient legal basis for granting an
injunction against the implementation of the project
plan. As discussed more thoroughly in part I A of this
opinion, chapter 132 of the General Statutes provides
for the municipal acquisition of property in order to
foster the continued growth of industry and business.
Because there is no statutory right to appeal from the
adoption of a project plan under chapter 132 of the
General Statutes, there is no adequate remedy at law.
See Stocker v. Waterbury, 154 Conn. 446, 449, 226 A.2d
514 (1967). In such a statutory context, where the trial
court has made factual findings of bad faith on the part
of the defendants, the granting of an injunction may
be proper.
In the present case, the trial court found that, in
connection
with
the
development,
adoption
and
intended implementation of the project plan, the town
had acted in bad faith in an attempt to prevent
affordable housing. Because we have set forth the
extensive factual findings of the trial court and the
ample evidence in the record to support those findings;
see part I A of this opinion; it is unnecessary to recount
that discussion here. We conclude, therefore, that the
trial court was well within its discretion in enjoining
the town from implementing the project plan.
The defendants argue that ‘‘it is essentially undis-
puted that the park plan was properly devised and
adopted in strict conformity with the governing state
statutes,’’ and, as such, the trial court did not have
any legal basis for enjoining the project plan. We are
not persuaded.
First, it can hardly be said that there was general
agreement that the project plan was developed and
adopted in accordance with the relevant statutory provi-
sions. The issue of the adequacy of the project plan was
disputed throughout the litigation and was thoroughly
contested at trial. The trial court expressly found:
‘‘While the evidence offered by the defendants’ expert
planner shows that the project plan met the essential
attributes of a basic development plan, the overwhelm-
ing evidence suggests that the project plan exhibited
but the bare minimum amount of information and plan-
ning as to any future industrial park.’’ As discussed
previously, there was ample evidence to support such
a finding.
Second, even if we were to assume that the project
plan and its adoption conformed to the substantive and
procedural requirements of chapter 132 of the General
Statutes, our conclusion in part I A and B of this opinion
would remain unchanged. Stated briefly, a project
plan—even one that conforms to the requirements of
chapter 132—may be enjoined if it was adopted, not
for the purposes contemplated by chapter 132, but in
bad faith and in furtherance of a plainly improper
motive, namely, as a pretext to thwart what would oth-
erwise be a legitimate use of the property.
The defendants argue that the trial court improperly
imposed its alleged policy preference, namely, its pref-
erence for affordable housing, upon the town. The
defendants rely on the following excerpt from the trial
court’s memorandum of decision: ‘‘The town . . . has
a void to fill when it comes to meeting the public need
for affordable housing. To uphold [the town’s] condem-
nation of land specifically devoted to that purpose
would, in light of the evidence discussed above, be
improper.’’ (Emphasis added.) We do not, however,
read the trial court’s statements, which the defendants
challenge herein, as a refusal, apart from its findings
of pretext, to permit the taking of the AvalonBay parcel
by eminent domain merely because it was to be devoted
to the use of affordable housing.
II
The defendants next claim that the trial court improp-
erly granted an injunction that enjoined them from tak-
ing the AvalonBay parcel by eminent domain. The
defendants argue that there was no colorable threat of
imminent or irreparable injury to the plaintiffs to sup-
port such an injunction. The defendants also argue that,
by the time that the court issued the injunction, the
second count of the plaintiffs’ amended complaint had
been rendered moot as a result of the resolutions
adopted by the board of selectmen and the economic
development commission to abandon the effort to take
the parcel by eminent domain. The defendants further
argue, among other arguments addressed more appro-
priately in part I of this opinion, that even if it were
proper for the trial court to rule on count two, the relief
it granted was overbroad. We agree with the defendants
in part, and conclude that the issue of the taking had
been rendered moot. We base our conclusion on two
independent factors: (1) the fact that the challenged,
intended condemnation of the AvalonBay parcel was
wholly dependent on the project plan, the injunction
against which we have affirmed in part I of this opinion;
and (2) the fact that the vote approving the condemna-
tion of the parcel, which was taken at a town meeting
on March 29, 1999, expired by operation of law on
September 29, 1999, before the trial court issued the
injunction.
‘‘[M]ootness implicates the jurisdiction of the court.
Goodson v. State, 228 Conn. 106, 114, 635 A.2d 285
(1993). It is a well-settled general rule that the existence
of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to
appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate
courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the
granting of actual relief or from the determination of
which no practical relief can follow.
. . .
In the
absence of an actual and existing controversy for us to
adjudicate . . . the courts of this state may not be used
as a vehicle to obtain judicial opinions upon points of
law . . . and where the question presented is purely
academic, we must refuse to entertain the appeal. . . .
Delevieleuse v. Manson, 184 Conn. 434, 436, 439 A.2d
1055 (1981). When, during the pendency of an appeal,
events have occurred that preclude an appellate court
from granting any practical relief through its disposition
of the merits, a case has become moot. . . . Loisel v.
Rowe, 233 Conn. 370, 378, 660 A.2d 323 (1995).’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Green Rock Ridge, Inc. v.
Kobernat, 250 Conn. 488, 497, 736 A.2d 851 (1999).
First, the controversy in the present case arises out
of the intended implementation of the project plan. The
intended condemnation of the AvalonBay parcel—the
subject of the second count of the amended com-
plaint—is wholly dependent on the project plan. Under
the statutory framework of chapter 132 described pre-
viously, the challenged, intended condemnation loses
its viability in the absence of a valid project plan. We
therefore conclude that the injunction of the project
plan, which we affirmed in part I of this opinion, renders
the intended condemnation of the parcel moot.
Second, approval of the condemnation of the parcel,
which was granted pursuant to General Statutes § 48-
619 at a town meeting on March 29, 1999, by the voters
of the town, expired on September 29, 1999, by opera-
tion of law, namely, § 48-6 (a). Section 48-6 (a) provides:
‘‘Any municipal corporation having the right to pur-
chase real property for its municipal purposes which
has, in accordance with its charter or the general stat-
utes, voted to purchase the same shall have power to
take or acquire such real property, within the corporate
limits of such municipal corporation, and if such munic-
ipal corporation cannot agree with any owner upon the
amount to be paid for any real property thus taken, it
shall proceed in the manner provided by section 48-
12 within six months after such vote or such vote
shall be void.’’ (Emphasis added.) We therefore turn to
General Statutes § 48-12,20 which provides in relevant
part: ‘‘The procedure for condemning land . . . for any
of the purposes specified in [section] . . . 48-6 . . . if
those desiring to take such property cannot agree with
the owner upon the amount to be paid him for any
property thus taken, shall be as follows . . . any town
. . . shall proceed in the same manner specified for
redevelopment agencies in accordance with sections 8-
128, 8-129, 8-129a, 8-130, 8-131, 8-132, 8-132a and 8-133.’’
The procedures required by those enumerated sections
include: determining the compensation to be paid to
the condemnee and filing a statement of compensation
with the clerk of the Superior Court; General Statutes
§ 8-129; filing a deposit as provided in General Statutes
§ 8-130 with the clerk of the Superior Court; General
Statutes § 8-129; giving notice to all persons appearing
of record as a property owner affected by the condem-
nation or as a holder of any encumbrance on such
property or interest therein; General Statutes § 8-129;
and causing a certificate of taking to be recorded in
the office of the town clerk. General Statutes § 8-129.
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the town
proceeded in any manner in accordance with the requi-
site procedures set forth in § 48-12, and, derivatively,
General Statutes §§ 8-128, 8-129, 8-129a, 8-130, 8-131, 8-
132, 8-132a and 8-133. Consequently, the requisite vote
authorizing the condemnation of the AvalonBay parcel
expired by operation of law, namely, § 48-6 (a), six
months after the vote was taken, or on September 29,
1999, approximately five months before the trial court
enjoined the eminent domain in February, 2000.
The plaintiffs argue that the issue of eminent domain
is not moot because the history of events and the politi-
cal environment in the town create a reasonable expec-
tation that the condemnation will be reinstated. In light
of the fact that we have affirmed the findings of the
trial court with respect to the defendants’ bad faith in
proceeding with its plans to take the AvalonBay parcel
and develop an industrial park; see part I of this opinion;
we believe that it is unlikely that the defendants would
attempt to reinstitute their efforts to condemn the par-
cel. Furthermore, the injunction against the project plan
would still be in effect, rendering any such attempt
legally futile.
The plaintiffs further argue that the defendants’
authorization to acquire the AvalonBay parcel had not
expired by operation of the six month period pursuant
to § 48-6 (a). The plaintiffs contend that ‘‘for projects
such as this one,’’ § 8-128 provides that the implement-
ing agency is to proceed ‘‘[w]ithin a reasonable time
after its approval of the redevelopment plan’’; General
Statutes § 8-128; and that, therefore, ‘‘[t]he defendants
were not required to complete acquisition within six
months.’’ This argument is unavailing.
First, the plaintiffs’ construction of those provisions
would render the six month period imposed by § 48-6
(a) meaningless, because the more general time limita-
tion contained in § 8-128—one of the referents in § 48-
12, which itself is a referent in § 48-6 (a)—would sub-
sume the more specific time period set forth in § 48-6
(a). Second, although § 8-193 provides that the develop-
ment agency may acquire real property by eminent
domain ‘‘in the same manner that a redevelopment
agency may acquire real property under sections 8-128
to 8-133, inclusive, as if said sections specifically applied
to development agencies,’’ we do not read the reason-
ableness time standard in the first clause of § 8-128,
which is expressly applicable to redevelopment plans,
to trump the specific time period set forth in § 48-6 (a).
See Willoughby v. New Haven, 254 Conn. 404, 422, 757
A.2d 1083 (2000) (refusing to construe general statutory
phrase in manner that would subsume and render mean-
ingless more specific phrase). Moreover, our treatment
of the six month time requirement in § 48-6 (a) does
not result in redundant language and gives meaning to
every clause of the applicable statutes. ‘‘It is a basic
tenet of statutory construction that the legislature did
not intend to enact meaningless provisions. Turner v.
Turner, 219 Conn. 703, 713, 595 A.2d 297 (1991). Accord-
ingly, care must be taken to effectuate all provisions
of the statute. See Pintavalle v. Valkanos, 216 Conn.
412, 418, 581 A.2d 1050 (1990) ([a] statute should be
read as a whole and interpreted so as to give effect to
all of its provisions); Hopkins v. Pac, 180 Conn. 474,
476, 429 A.2d 952 (1980) (it is a well established princi-
ple that statutes must be construed, if possible, such
that no clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous,
void or insignificant).’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Willoughby v. New Haven, supra, 422.
III
We next consider the claim raised in AvalonBay’s
cross appeal. AvalonBay claims that the trial court
improperly found on count three that the defendants
had not violated federal and state fair housing laws
that prohibit making a dwelling unavailable because
of familial status.21 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (a);22 General
Statutes § 46a-64c (a) (1).23 The trial court found that
the defendants opposed affordable housing in general
terms, but did not discriminate on the basis of families
with children. Thus, the trial court found that, although
the defendants sought to thwart the development of
affordable housing on the AvalonBay parcel, AvalonBay
failed to establish the basis of a fair housing violation,
namely, that the presence of families with children was
a motivating factor underlying the defendants’ actions.
Specifically, AvalonBay and the amici curiae, which
are the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union Foundation,
the Connecticut Housing Coalition and the Connecticut
Fair Housing Center, argue that, in applying the dispa-
rate treatment theory, specifically, the McDonnell
Douglas model,24 on which the plaintiffs relied, the trial
court improperly concluded that AvalonBay had failed
to establish a fair housing violation because it did not
offer the evidence of open hostility, specifically, that
which was offered in LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67
F.3d 412 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom. Airmont
v. LeBlanc-Sternberg, 518 U.S. 1017, 116 S. Ct. 2546,
135 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1996).25 AvalonBay also argues that
the defendants did not identify any legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for their actions that was not pre-
textual. The defendants’ arguments, to the contrary,
can be distilled as follows: (1) the trial court properly
applied the ‘‘pretext’’/McDonnell Douglas framework
and properly concluded that AvalonBay had not proven
a violation of the fair housing laws; (2) AvalonBay had
not proven an intent to discriminate by the municipal
decision-makers, which is necessary to establish munic-
ipal liability; and (3) in the alternative, even if the case
were subjected to a ‘‘mixed-motive’’/Price Waterhouse
analysis,26 the defendants would still prevail. AvalonBay
counters that the defendants’ second argument is not
entitled to appellate review. We agree with the defen-
dants’ first argument and, therefore, we need not
address the reviewability or the merits of their second
and third arguments.
In order to address this claim, we first note that, in
addressing claims brought under both federal and state
housing laws, ‘‘we are guided by the cases interpreting
federal fair housing laws; 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 through
3631; despite differences between the state and federal
statutes. Zlokower v. Commission on Human Rights &
Opportunities, 200 Conn. 261, 264, 510 A.2d 985 (1986).
In construing federal fair housing laws, the federal
courts have adopted the evidentiary requirements set
forth by the United States Supreme Court in federal
employment discrimination cases. Id., 265. Therefore,
we may look to these employment discrimination cases
for the appropriate standard applicable to [Ava-
lonBay’s] claim.’’ Miko v. Commission on Human
Rights & Opportunities, 220 Conn. 192, 202, 596 A.2d
396 (1991); see also Chestnut Realty, Inc. v. Commis-
sion on Human Rights & Opportunities, 201 Conn.
350, 358, 514 A.2d 749 (1986).
The Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful ‘‘[t]o refuse
to sell or rent . . . or otherwise make unavailable or
deny, a dwelling to any person because of . . . familial
status . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (a).
‘‘The phrase ‘otherwise make unavailable’ has been
interpreted to reach a wide variety of discriminatory
housing practices, including discriminatory zoning
restrictions. See, e.g. Huntington Branch, National
Association For the Advancement of Colored People v.
Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 938 (2d Cir.), aff’d,
488 U.S. 15, 109 S. Ct. 276, 102 L. Ed. 2d 180 (1988) (per
curiam); Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court of Puerto
Rico, 988 F.2d 252, 257 n.6 (1st Cir. 1993).
‘‘The [Fair Housing Act] confers standing to challenge
such discriminatory practices on any ‘aggrieved per-
son,’ 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (a) (1) (A). That term is defined
to include ‘any person who—(1) claims to have been
injured by a discriminatory housing practice; or (2)
believes that such person will be injured by a discrimi-
natory housing practice that is about to occur.’ 42 U.S.C.
§ 3602 (i). This definition requires only that a private
plaintiff allege ‘injury in fact’ within the meaning of
Article III of the Constitution, that is, that he allege
‘distinct and palpable injuries that are ‘‘fairly traceable’’
to [defendants’] actions.’ Havens Realty Corp. v. Cole-
man, 455 U.S. 363, 375–76, 102 S. Ct. 1114, 1122–23, 71
L. Ed. 2d 214 (1982). An injury need not be economic
or tangible in order to confer standing. See, e.g., id. [376]
(deprivation of social benefits of living in an integrated
neighborhood constitutes cognizable injury); Glad-
stone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 111–
12, 99 S. Ct. 1601, 1613–14, 60 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1979) (same).
See also H.R. Rep. No. 711, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. 23,
reprinted in 1988 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2173,
2184 (current statutory definition of ‘aggrieved person’
was meant ‘to reaffirm the broad holdings’ of Havens
Realty Corp. v. Coleman, [supra, 375–76] and Glad-
stone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, [supra, 111–12]).
‘‘Further, the explicit grant of standing to anyone
who believes he ‘will be injured by a discriminatory
housing practice that is about to occur,’ 42 U.S.C. § 3602
(i) . . .
means that a person who is likely to suffer
such an injury need not wait until a discriminatory effect
has been felt before bringing suit. Thus, where it has
been established that a zoning ordinance will likely be
applied in a discriminatory manner, it is unnecessary
that the municipality actually so apply it before the
ordinance may properly be challenged. . . .
‘‘[A Fair Housing Act] violation may be established
on a theory of disparate impact or one of disparate
treatment. See Huntington Branch, National Associa-
tion For the Advancement of Colored People v. Town
of Huntington, [supra, 844 F.2d 934–35].’’ (Citations
omitted; emphasis in original.) LeBlanc-Sternberg v.
Fletcher, supra, 67 F.3d 424–25. ‘‘Under the analysis of
the disparate treatment theory of liability, there are two
general methods to allocate the burdens of proof: (1)
the
mixed-motive/Price
Waterhouse
model;
Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 246, 109 S. Ct.
1775, 104 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1989); and (2) the pretext/
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine model. Texas Dept. of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–56,
101 S. Ct. 1089, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct.
1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973).’’ Levy v. Commission on
Human Rights & Opportunities, 236 Conn. 96, 104–105,
671 A.2d 349 (1996).
Under the McDonnell Douglas model, in a classic
refusal to rent case,27 ‘‘the plaintiff claiming discrimina-
tion . . . must prove that: (1) she is a member of the
statutorily protected class; (2) she has applied for and
was qualified to rent the unit involved; (3) she was
rejected by the defendant landlord; and (4) the unit
remained available thereafter. Zlokower v. Commission
on Human Rights & Opportunities, supra, [200 Conn.]
266. The plaintiff has the initial burden of offering evi-
dence on the above elements adequate to create an
inference that the refusal to rent was based on a discrim-
inatory criterion. Chestnut Realty, Inc. v. Commission
on Human Rights & Opportunities, supra, [201 Conn.]
361.’’ Miko v. Commission on Human Rights & Oppor-
tunities, supra, 220 Conn. 203–204. ‘‘By making out this
minimal prima facie case, even without evidence of
discrimination, the plaintiff creates a presumption that
the employer unlawfully discriminated, Fisher [v. Vas-
sar College, 114 F.3d 1332, 1335 (2d Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 1075, 118 S. Ct. 851, 139 L. Ed. 2d 752
(1998)] . . . and thus places the burden of production
on the employer to proffer a nondiscriminatory reason
for its action. If the defendant fails to discharge the
burden by presenting a nondiscriminatory reason, the
plaintiff will prevail (assuming the other aspects of the
prima facie case are not contested). Thus, aided by the
McDonnell Douglas presumption, which is designed to
force employers to come forward with reasons, a plain-
tiff who proves the minimal prima facie case is entitled
to prevail as a matter of law even without evidence that
would support a reasonable finding of discriminatory
motivation, if the employer does not come forward with
a reason. See St. Mary’s [Honor Center v. Hicks, 509
U.S. 502, 506–10, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 125 L. Ed. 2d 407
(1993)]; [Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v.] Bur-
dine, [supra, 450 U.S. 254]; Fisher [v. Vassar College,
supra, 1335].
‘‘On the other hand, once the employer articulates a
non-discriminatory reason for its actions . . . the pre-
sumption completely drops out of the picture.’’ (Cita-
tion omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) James
v. New York Racing Assn., 233 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir.
2000); Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hospital, 4
F.3d 134, 142 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1164,
114 S. Ct. 1189, 127 L. Ed. 2d 539 (1994). ‘‘If the defen-
dant articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for its action, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff
to prove that the given reason was pretextual. [Chestnut
Realty, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights & Oppor-
tunities, supra, 201 Conn.] 364. The disparate treatment
standard thus leaves the burden of persuasion at all
times with the plaintiff. Id., 363.
‘‘The United States Supreme Court recognized that
the prima facie case set forth in McDonnell Douglas
Corporation was not intended to be an ‘inflexible for-
mulation.’ See Chestnut Realty, Inc. v. Commission on
Human Rights & Opportunities, supra, [201 Conn.]
361, quoting International Brotherhood of Teamsters
v. United States, [431 U.S. 324, 358, 97 S. Ct. 1843, 52
L. Ed. 2d 396 (1977)]. Rather, the requirements of proof
must be tailored to the particular facts of each case.
McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, supra, [411
U.S. 802 n.13].’’ Miko v. Commission on Human
Rights & Opportunities, supra, 220 Conn. 204.
Thus, in LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, supra, 67 F.3d
425–26, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit stated that, under the disparate treatment
theory, ‘‘a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case by
showing that animus against the protected group was a
significant factor in the position taken by the municipal
decision-makers themselves or by those to whom the
decision-makers were knowingly responsive. United
States v. Yonkers Board of Education, 837 F.2d 1181,
1217, 1223, 1226 (2d Cir. 1987) . . . cert. denied, 486
U.S. 1055, 108 S. Ct. 2821, 100 L. Ed. 2d 922 (1988). If
the motive is discriminatory, it is of no moment that
the complained-of conduct would be permissible if
taken for nondiscriminatory reasons. See, e.g., id. at
1218–19 . . . United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d
562, 574–75 (6th Cir. 1981) . . . cert. denied, 456 U.S.
926, 102 S. Ct. 1972, 72 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1982).
‘‘Discriminatory intent may be inferred from the total-
ity of the circumstances, including the fact, if it is true,
that the law bears more heavily on one [group] than
another, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242, 96 S.
Ct. 2040, 48 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1976), as well as the historical
background
of
the
decision
. . .
[t]he
specific
sequence of events leading up to the challenged deci-
sion . . . contemporary statements by members of the
decisionmaking body . . . and [s]ubstantive depar-
tures . . . particularly if the factors usually considered
important by the decisionmaker strongly favor a deci-
sion contrary to the one reached, [United States v.
Yonkers Board of Education, supra, 837 F.2d] 1221
(quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267–68, 97
S. Ct. 555, 564–65, 50 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1977)); see also
United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185
n.3 (8th Cir. 1974) (racist statements by leaders of the
incorporation movement and fact that [r]acial criticism
. . . was made and cheered at public meetings could
be considered evidence of improper purpose), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1042, 95 S. Ct. 2656, 45 L. Ed. 2d 694
(1975).’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
In LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, supra, 67 F.3d 417–
20, the village of Airmont, New York, had adopted a
zoning code that arguably prohibited the use of home
synagogues, which were necessary for the strict obser-
vance of Orthodox Judaism. The Court of Appeals con-
cluded that ‘‘there was ample support for the jury’s
implicit finding that Airmont’s zoning code would be
interpreted to restrict the use of home synagogues,
[and] that the motivation behind the enactment was
discriminatory animus toward Orthodox and Hasidic
Jews . . . .’’ Id., 431. The evidence of the village’s ani-
mosity toward the Hasidic population included selec-
tive zoning that would curtail home synagogues, refusal
to grant a variance to a Hasidic party where a similar
variance was granted to a party who was not Hasidic,
and open hostility to the Hasidic Jewish population. Id.
In the present case, the trial court analyzed the case
under the framework established in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, supra, 411 U.S. 792.28 We need not con-
sider whether the trial court applied the proper legal
standard in determining whether AvalonBay made out
a prima facie case. Even if we were to agree with Ava-
lonBay that it sufficiently established a prima facie case
of discrimination, we would then analyze the second
step in the McDonnell Douglas model, namely, whether
the defendants articulated a legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason for its action. AvalonBay concedes in its
brief that ‘‘[t]he defendants’ assertion of a technology
park as their reason for condemnation on its face is
ostensibly legitimate.’’ As stated previously, once a
defendant has articulated, not proven, a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, the presump-
tion of discrimination invoked by the prima facie case
drops out of the case entirely. The burden of production
then shifts back to the plaintiff, who at all times has
the burden of persuasion, to prove that the stated rea-
son was pretextual.
In this regard, the trial court found that, although
the plaintiffs presented evidence that included various
statements made by town officials concerning the
impact that a large affordable housing project might
have on the town’s school system and the considerable
costs that would result from the additional influx of
students, those statements were not evidence of animus
toward familial status. Furthermore, the trial court
found that the only evidence offered by the plaintiffs
that suggested any disparate treatment of families with
children at the proposed affordable housing site was
an alleged statement made by Sousa to the effect that
the town would welcome senior housing rather than
affordable housing without age restrictions. The trial
court stated: ‘‘In the context of such a broad opposition
as to any housing, the statements regarding additional
costs to the town as a result of the influx of children
are viewed by this court as opposing housing in general
and not families specifically. Though such an analysis
might beg the question as to whether a desire to pre-
clude families with children begets a desire to prohibit
housing or vice versa, the defendants’ statements as to
the increase of criminal activity and the supposed
impact to the volunteer fire department support a gen-
eral view
that [the
town] opposed
the idea
of
(affordable) housing and not the presence of families
with children.’’ The trial court further stated that,
although the intended condemnation of the parcel was
improper in the context of affordable housing, namely,
the first and second counts of the amended complaint,
there was no evidence to suggest that such a condemna-
tion was also improper in the context of federal and
state fair housing laws under a disparate treatment the-
ory. Simply put, the trial court found that familial status
was not a motivating factor, and concluded accordingly
that AvalonBay had failed to prove a violation of the
fair housing laws. Our review of the record indicates
that the trial court’s factual findings in support of its
conclusion were not clearly erroneous.
AvalonBay and the amici argue that the trial court
did not apply the proper legal standard to its fair housing
claims. Specifically, AvalonBay and the amici contend
that the trial court improperly required it to offer the
type of evidence of animosity and open hostility that
was provided in LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, supra,
67 F.3d 412. We do not, however, read the trial court’s
memorandum of decision as requiring evidence of open
hostility to support AvalonBay’s fair housing claims.
The trial court’s reference to evidence of open hostility
was made in its discussion of the ‘‘cumulative evidence’’
provided in LeBlanc-Sternberg, which led the Court of
Appeals to conclude that the plaintiffs in that case had
established a violation of the fair housing laws. In
LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, supra, 431, the cumula-
tive evidence offered by the plaintiffs included evidence
of open hostility to the Hasidic Jewish population, as
well as evidence of various zoning restrictions and dif-
ferential treatment in the granting of variances. Indeed,
in that case, the court expressly stated that discrimina-
tory intent could be inferred from the totality of the
circumstances, including: ‘‘[T]he fact, if it is true, that
the law bears more heavily on one [group] than another
. . . as well as the historical background of the decision
. . . [t]he specific sequence of events leading up to the
challenged decision . . . contemporary statements by
members of the decisionmaking body . . . and [s]ub-
stantive departures . . . particularly if the factors usu-
ally
considered
important
by
the
decisionmaker
strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached
. . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 425. In reliance on LeBlanc-Sternberg, the
trial court in the present case stated that ‘‘that case
illustrates the type of cumulative evidence needed to
establish a fair housing action against a municipality
under a disparate treatment theory.’’ Nowhere in the
trial court’s decision is there any suggestion that the
trial court required AvalonBay to present specific, open
hostility evidence and that it based its decision on the
lack thereof.
AvalonBay also argues that the trial court found that
familial status was one of the factors motivating the
defendants, but nonetheless found for the defendants
on its fair housing claims. AvalonBay points specifically
to the trial court’s statement: ‘‘The cumulative evidence
suggests that the town, in an effort to stop any housing
from proceeding on the site, and in an effort to preserve
its industrial zone, would most likely have had con-
demned the site in the same fashion even if the town
did not buttress its position with political rhetoric as
to the costs associated with an influx of families with
children.’’ We do not read the trial court’s statement as
a finding that familial status was a motivating factor
underlying the defendants’ actions. Instead, the trial
court viewed the defendants’ statements concerning
families with children, not as evidence of a discrimina-
tory purpose, but as ‘‘grossly exaggerated’’ statements
made in an effort to boost support for the project plan.
The trial court’s citation to Smith & Lee Associates, Inc.
v. Taylor, 102 F.3d 781, 790 (6th Cir. 1996), immediately
following the court’s statement that AvalonBay chal-
lenges herein, buttresses our conclusion that it was not
based on an improper understanding of the applicable
legal principles, because that case reiterates the rule
that ‘‘[p]laintiffs must show that discriminatory purpose
was a motivating factor in the [defendants’] decision
. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) See also id.,
791, quoting United States v. Parma, supra, 661 F.2d
575 (‘‘ ‘[t]here is no requirement that . . . intent be the
sole basis of official action, if it is a motivating factor’ ’’).
AvalonBay further argues that the trial court’s conclu-
sion in favor of the defendants on its fair housing claims
is inconsistent with its factual findings related to counts
one and two, and ‘‘implie[s] that the standard for [a
Federal Housing Act] violation is even higher than the
bad faith/pretext standard it applied in enjoining con-
demnation of the AvalonBay property.’’ AvalonBay
refers specifically to the trial court’s statement: ‘‘While,
as discussed . . . above in regards to AvalonBay’s first
and second counts, the condemnation of the site might
be improper in the context of affordable housing, there
is no evidence to suggest that such a condemnation is
also improper in the context of fair housing under the
disparate treatment theory.’’ Contrary to the suggestion
of AvalonBay, the trial court’s statement merely
acknowledged that the standard that was applied to
enjoin the project plan on the basis of bad faith was
different from, but not necessarily lower than, the stan-
dard applied to AvalonBay’s fair housing claims. Stated
another way, a finding that a project plan was adopted
in bad faith in an effort to prevent affordable housing
does not necessarily require a finding that familial status
was also a motivating factor in the adoption of the
project plan.
In sum, the evidence does not warrant a conclusion
that the trial court’s factual findings were clearly errone-
ous or based on an improper understanding of the appli-
cable legal principles. AvalonBay simply failed to carry
its burden of proving that the defendants’ articulated
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions was
a pretext for discriminating against families with
children.
The judgment is affirmed with respect to the first
and third counts of the plaintiffs’ amended complaint,
namely, the injunction against the implementation of
the project plan and AvalonBay’s fair housing claims;
the judgment is vacated with respect to the second
count of the plaintiffs’ amended complaint, namely, the
injunction against the taking of the AvalonBay parcel.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
1 The plaintiffs brought the first count of their amended complaint against
all of the following defendants: the town of Orange (town); the town board
of selectmen (board of selectmen); Joseph F. Blake, Albert M. Clark III,
Mitchell R. Goldblatt, Patricia M. Pearson and Laura J. Reid, members of the
board of selectmen; the town economic development commission (economic
development commission); Gregory J. Mulherin, Roger Boyd, William R.
Fuhlbruck, Frank W. Rogers and Judy Zimmerman, members of the eco-
nomic development commission; the town board of finance (board of
finance); J. Phillip Smith, John M. Cifarelli, Patrick Fremont, Deborah C.
Hoffman, Brendan E. Williams and AnneMarie Paone-Mullin, members of
the board of finance; Orange Economic Development Corporation, Inc.;
Robert C. Sousa, the first selectman of the town and a member of the board
of selectmen; and Patrick O’Sullivan, the town clerk. Count two of the
amended complaint was brought against the town, the board of selectmen,
the economic development commission, the board of finance, the Orange
Economic Development Corporation, Inc., O’Sullivan and all members of
the defendant agencies in their official capacities. The third count of the
amended complaint was brought against the town, the board of selectmen,
the economic development commission, Sousa in his official and individual
capacities, and all members of the board of selectmen and of the economic
development commission in their official capacities. For clarity, our refer-
ence to ‘‘the defendants’’ throughout this opinion is only to those defendants
involved in the specific count that we address in the context of the reference.
For example, in part I of this opinion, we address count one of the amended
complaint and, therefore, ‘‘the defendants’’ refers only to the defendants in
count one.
2 The defendants appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the
Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to
Practice Book § 65-1 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c).
3 AvalonBay cross appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the
Appellate Court, and we transferred the cross appeal to this court pursuant
to Practice Book § 65-1 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c).
4 We assume that the trial court’s reference in its memorandum of decision
to General Statutes § 8-30 is simply a typographical error.
5 AvalonBay appealed from the decision of the plan and zoning commission
to the Superior Court. The trial court, Munro, J., sustained AvalonBay’s
appeal under § 8-30g and ordered that the plan and zoning commission
approve the modified application for a special permit and site plan pending
any reasonable and necessary conditions imposed by that commission. See
AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Plan & Zoning Commission, Superior
Court, judicial district of New Britain at New Britain, Docket No. CV 98-
0492246 (August 12, 1999). AvalonBay also appealed from the decision of
the inland wetlands and watercourses commission to the Superior Court.
The trial court, Munro, J., sustained AvalonBay’s appeal and ordered that
the inland wetlands and watercourses commission approve the wetlands
permit application subject to appropriate and reasonable conditions imposed
by that commission. See AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Inland Wet-
lands & Watercourses Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of New
Britain at New Britain, Docket No. CV 98-0492660 (August 12, 1999).
6 AvalonBay appealed to the Superior Court from the decision of the plan
and zoning commission amending the town’s zoning regulations to prohibit
planned residential developments in areas zoned as light industrial districts.
The trial court, Munro, J., dismissed AvalonBay’s appeal, concluding that
there existed a rational relationship between the amendments and the town’s
legitimate zoning goals. See AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Plan & Zoning
Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain at New Britain,
Docket No. CV 98-0492239 (August 13, 1999).
7 The economic development commission serves as the development
agency for the town.
8 We note that at the time of trial, the AvalonBay parcel comprised two
separate parcels, owned jointly by Cuzzocreo and Cuzz-Acres. Prior to the
trial court’s judgment, title to both of those parcels had passed to AvalonBay.
9 Article first, § 11, of the Connecticut constitution provides: ‘‘The property
of no person shall be taken for public use, without just compensation
therefor.’’
10 The trial court also rendered judgment in favor of the defendants on
the fourth and fifth counts of the amended complaint. The judgment on
those counts is not involved in this appeal.
11 Although the defendants challenge the plaintiffs’ standing with respect
to this claim for the first time on appeal, we nonetheless address it because
it involves subject matter jurisdiction. Fink v. Golenbock, 238 Conn. 183,
199, 680 A.2d 1243 (1996).
12 General Statutes § 8-186 provides: ‘‘Declaration of policy. It is found
and declared that the economic welfare of the state depends upon the
continued growth of industry and business within the state; that the acquisi-
tion and improvement of unified land and water areas and vacated commer-
cial plants to meet the needs of industry and business should be in
accordance with local, regional and state planning objectives; that such
acquisition and improvement often cannot be accomplished through the
ordinary operations of private enterprise at competitive rates of progress
and economies of cost; that permitting and assisting municipalities to acquire
and improve unified land and water areas and to acquire and improve or
demolish vacated commercial plants for industrial and business purposes
and, in distressed municipalities, to lend funds to businesses and industries
within a project area in accordance with such planning objectives are public
uses and purposes for which public moneys may be expended; and that the
necessity in the public interest for the provisions of this chapter is hereby
declared as a matter of legislative determination.’’
13 General Statutes § 8-188 provides: ‘‘Designation of development agency.
Any municipality which has a planning commission is authorized, by vote
of its legislative body, to designate the economic development commission or
the redevelopment agency of such municipality or a nonprofit development
corporation as its development agency and exercise through such agency
the powers granted under this chapter, except that the Quinnipiac Valley
Development Corporation, organized and existing by virtue of the provisions
of number 625 of the special acts of 1957, may be designated as a develop-
ment agency, for the purposes of this chapter, to act as such within the
geographical area specified in section 2 of said special act. Any municipality
may, with the approval of the commissioner, designate a separate economic
development commission, redevelopment agency or nonprofit development
corporation as its development agency for each development project under-
taken by the municipality pursuant to this chapter.’’
14 General Statutes § 8-193 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Acquisition and
transfer of real property. General powers of agency. (a) After approval of
the development plan as provided in this chapter, the development agency
may proceed by purchase, lease, exchange or gift with the acquisition or
rental of real property within the project area and real property and interests
therein for rights-of-way and other easements to and from the project area.
The development agency may, with the approval of the legislative body, and
in the name of the municipality, acquire by eminent domain real property
located within the project area and real property and interests therein for
rights-of-way and other easements to and from the project area, in the
same manner that a redevelopment agency may acquire real property under
sections 8-128 to 8-133, inclusive, as if said sections specifically applied to
development agencies. The development agency may, with the approval of
the legislative body and, of the commissioner if any grants were made by
the state under section 8-190 or 8-195 for such development project, and in
the name of such municipality, transfer by sale or lease at fair market value
or fair rental value, as the case may be, the whole or any part of the real
property in the project area to any person, in accordance with the project
plan and such disposition plans as may have been determined by the commis-
sioner. . . .’’
15 General Statutes § 8-189 provides: ‘‘The development agency may initiate
a development project by preparing a project plan therefor in accordance
with regulations of the commissioner. The project plan shall include: (a) A
legal description of the land within the project area; (b) a description of
the present condition and uses of such land or building; (c) a description
of the types and locations of land uses or building uses proposed for the
project area; (d) a description of the types and locations of present and
proposed streets, sidewalks and sanitary, utility and other facilities and the
types and locations of other proposed site improvements; (e) statements
of the present and proposed zoning classification and subdivision status of
the project area and the areas adjacent to the project area; (f) a plan for
relocating project-area occupants; (g) a financing plan; (h) an administrative
plan; (i) a marketability and proposed land-use study or building use study
if required by the commissioner; (j) appraisal reports and title searches; (k)
a statement of the number of jobs which the development agency anticipates
would be created by the project and the number and types of existing
housing units in the municipality in which the project would be located,
and in contiguous municipalities, which would be available to employees
filling such jobs and (l) findings that the land and buildings within the project
area will be used principally for industrial or business purposes; that the
plan is in accordance with the plan of development for the municipality
adopted by its planning commission and the plan of development of the
regional planning agency, if any, for the region within which the municipality
is located; that the plan is not inimical to any state-wide planning program
objectives of the state or state agencies as coordinated by the Secretary of
the Office of Policy and Management; that the project will contribute to the
economic welfare of the municipality and the state; and that to carry out
and administer the project, public action under this chapter is required. Any
plan which has been prepared by a redevelopment agency under chapter
130 may be submitted by the development agency to the legislative body
and to the commissioner in lieu of a plan initiated and prepared in accordance
with this section, provided all other requirements of this chapter for
obtaining the approval of the commissioner of the project plan are satisfied.’’
16 General Statutes § 8-191 provides: ‘‘Adoption of plan. (a) Before the
development agency adopts a plan for a development project, (1) the plan-
ning commission of the municipality shall find that the plan is in accord
with the plan of development for the municipality; and (2) the regional
planning agency, if any, for the region within which such municipality is
located shall find that such plan is in accord with the plan of development
for such region, or if such agency fails to make a finding concerning said
plan within thirty-five days of receipt thereof by such agency, it shall be
presumed that such agency does not disapprove of such plan; and (3) the
development agency shall hold at least one public hearing thereon. Upon
approval by the development agency, the agency shall submit such plan to
the legislative body which shall vote to approve or disapprove the plan.
After approval of the plan by the legislative body, the development agency
shall submit the plan for approval to the commissioner. Notice of the time,
place and subject of any public hearing held under this section shall be
published once in a newspaper of general circulation in such town, such
publication to be made not less than one week nor more than three weeks
prior to the date set for the hearing. In the event the commissioner requires
a substantial modification of the project plan before giving approval, then
upon the completion of such modification such plan shall first have a public
hearing and then be approved by the development agency and the legislative
body. Any legislative body, agency or commission in approving a plan for
a development project shall specifically approve the findings made therein.
‘‘(b) The provisions of subsection (a) with respect to submission of a
development project to and approval by the commissioner shall not apply
to a project for which no grant has been made under section 8-190 and no
application for a grant is to be made under section 8-195.’’
17 General Statutes § 8-187 (2) provides: ‘‘ ‘[L]egislative body’ means (A)
the board of selectmen in a town that does not have a charter, special act
or home rule ordinance relating to its government or (B) the council, board
of aldermen, representative town meeting, board of selectmen or other
elected legislative body described in a charter, special act or home rule
ordinance relating to government in a city, consolidated town and city,
consolidated town and borough or a town having a charter, special act,
consolidation ordinance or home rule ordinance relating to its govern-
ment . . . .’’
18 General Statutes § 8-23 provides: ‘‘(a) The commission shall prepare,
adopt and amend a plan of conservation and development for the municipal-
ity. Such plan shall show the commission’s recommendation for the most
desirable use of land within the municipality for residential, recreational,
commercial, industrial, conservation and other purposes and for the most
desirable density of population in the several parts of the municipality. Such
plan shall take into account the state plan of conservation and development
adopted pursuant to chapter 297 and shall note any inconsistencies it may
have with said state plan. Such plan shall make provision for the development
of housing opportunities, including opportunities for multifamily dwellings,
consistent with soil types, terrain and infrastructure capacity, for all resi-
dents of the municipality and the planning region in which the municipality
is located, as designated by the Secretary of the Office of Policy and Manage-
ment under section 16a-4a. Such plan shall also promote housing choice
and economic diversity in housing, including housing for both low and
moderate income households, and encourage the development of housing
which will meet the housing needs identified in the housing plan prepared
pursuant to section 8-37t and in the housing component and the other
components of the state plan of conservation and development prepared
pursuant to section 16a-26. Such plan may also show the commission’s
recommendation for a system of principal thoroughfares, parkways, bridges,
streets and other public ways; for airports, parks, playgrounds and other
public grounds; for general location, relocation and improvement of public
buildings; for the general location and extent of public utilities and terminals,
whether publicly or privately owned, for water, sewerage, light, power,
transit and other purposes; and for the extent and location of public housing
projects. Such other recommendations may be made by the commission
and included in the plan as will, in its judgment, be beneficial to the munici-
pality. The plan of conservation and development shall be a statement of
policies, goals and standards for the physical and economic development
of the municipality, and may include all necessary and related maps, explana-
tory material, photographs, charts or other pertinent data and information
relative to the past, present and future trends of the municipality, and
may include recommended programs for the implementation of the plan,
including a schedule and budget for public capital projects, and a program
for enactment and enforcement of zoning and subdivision controls, building
and housing codes and safety regulations, plans for implementation of
affordable housing and plans for open space acquisition and greenways
protection and development. In preparing such plan the commission shall
consider the community development action plan of the municipality, if any,
the need for affordable housing and the protection of existing and potential
public surface and ground drinking water supplies, and may consider physi-
cal, social, economic and governmental conditions and trends, including,
but not limited to, local, regional and state studies of the human resource,
education, health, housing, recreation, social services, public utilities, public
protection, transportation and circulation, cultural and interpersonal com-
munications needs of the municipality and the objectives of energy-efficient
patterns of development, the use of solar and other renewable forms of
energy, and energy conservation. The plan shall be designed to promote
with the greatest efficiency and economy the coordinated development of
the municipality and the general welfare and prosperity of its people. The
commission may prepare and adopt plans for the redevelopment and
improvement of districts or neighborhoods which, in its judgment, contain
special problems or show a trend toward lower land values. The plan adopted
under this section for any municipality that is contiguous to Long Island
Sound shall be made with reasonable consideration for restoration and
protection of the ecosystem and habitat of Long Island Sound and shall be
designed to reduce hypoxia, pathogens, toxic contaminants and floatable
debris in Long Island Sound. The plan of any municipality in which a traprock
ridge, as defined in section 8-1aa, is located may make recommendations
for conservation and preservation of traprock ridgelines, as defined in said
section. The commission may adopt the plan of conservation and develop-
ment by a single resolution or may, by successive resolutions, adopt parts
of the plan, whether geographical or functional, and amendments thereto.
Prior to adopting the conservation and development plan or any part thereof
or amendment thereto, the commission shall file in the office of the town
clerk a copy of such plan or part thereof or amendment thereto but, in the
case of a district commission, such commission shall file such information
in the offices of both the district clerk and the town clerk, and shall hold
at least one public hearing thereon, notice of the time and place of which shall
be published in a newspaper having general circulation in the municipality at
least twice at intervals of not less than two days, the first not more than
fifteen days, nor less than ten days, and the last not less than two days
prior to the date of each such hearing, which notice shall make reference
to the filing of such records in the office of the town clerk, or both the
district clerk and the town clerk, as the case may be. Any plan or part
thereof or amendment thereto shall, upon adoption by the commission, be
filed in the office of the town clerk, but, if it is a district plan or amendment,
it shall be filed in the offices of both the district and town clerk, and shall
become effective at a time established by the commission, provided notice
thereof shall be published in a newspaper having general circulation in the
municipality prior to such effective date.
‘‘(b) The commission shall review the plan of conservation and develop-
ment at least once every ten years and shall adopt such amendments to the
plan or parts of the plan, in accordance with the provisions of this section,
as the commission deems necessary to update the plan. On and after July
1, 2000, if a commission does not review the plan within said ten years, the
chief elected official of the municipality shall submit a letter to the Secretary
of the Office of Policy and Management and the Commissioners of Transpor-
tation and Economic and Community Development that explains why such
review was not conducted. A copy of the letter shall be included in each
application by the head of a municipal agency for funding for development
of real property submitted to said secretary or commissioners until the plan
is reviewed in accordance with this subsection.
‘‘(c) The commission of any municipality more than twenty per cent of
which is existing preservation area, conservation area or rural land, as
defined in the state plan of conservation and development adopted pursuant
to chapter 297, shall consider as part of its plan of conservation and develop-
ment the use of cluster development to the extent consistent with soil types,
terrain and infrastructure capacity within the municipality.’’
19 General Statutes § 48-6 provides: ‘‘When municipal corporations may
take land. (a) Any municipal corporation having the right to purchase real
property for its municipal purposes which has, in accordance with its charter
or the general statutes, voted to purchase the same shall have power to
take or acquire such real property, within the corporate limits of such
municipal corporation, and if such municipal corporation cannot agree with
any owner upon the amount to be paid for any real property thus taken, it
shall proceed in the manner provided by section 48-12 within six months
after such vote or such vote shall be void.
‘‘(b) In the case of acquisition by a redevelopment agency of real property
located in a redevelopment area, the time for acquisition may be extended
by the legislative body upon request of the redevelopment agency, provided
the owner of the real property consents to such request.
‘‘(c) In accordance with the policy established in section 7-603, any munici-
pal corporation may take property which is located within the boundaries
of a neighborhood revitalization zone identified in a strategic plan adopted
pursuant to sections 7-601 and 7-602. The acquisition of such property shall
proceed in the manner provided in sections 8-128 to 8-133, inclusive, and
section 48-12.’’
20 General Statutes § 48-12 provides: ‘‘Procedure for condemning land. The
procedure for condemning land or other property for any of the purposes
specified in sections 48-3, 48-6, 48-8 and 48-9, if those desiring to take such
property cannot agree with the owner upon the amount to be paid him for
any property thus taken, shall be as follows: The Comptroller in the name
of the state, any town, municipal corporation or school district, or the
trustees or directors of any state institution in the name of the state, shall
proceed in the same manner specified for redevelopment agencies in accor-
dance with sections 8-128, 8-129, 8-129a, 8-130, 8-131, 8-132, 8-132a and 8-133.’’
21 Title 42 of the United States Code, § 3602 (k), provides: ‘‘ ‘Familial status’
means one or more individuals (who have not attained the age of 18 years)
being domiciled with—
‘‘(1) a parent or another person having legal custody of such individual
or individuals; or
‘‘(2) the designee of such parent or other person having such custody,
with the written permission of such parent or other person.
‘‘The protections afforded against discrimination on the basis of familial
status shall apply to any person who is pregnant or is in the process of
securing legal custody of any individual who has not attained the age of
18 years.’’
General Statutes § 46a-64b (5) defines ‘‘ ‘[f]amilial status’ ’’ as ‘‘one or
more individuals who have not attained the age of eighteen years being
domiciled with a parent or another person having legal custody of such
individual or individuals; or the designee of such parent or other person
having such custody with the written permission of such parent or other
person; or any person who is pregnant or is in the process of securing legal
custody of any individual who has not attained the age of eighteen years.’’
22 Title 42 of the United States Code, § 3604, provides in relevant part: ‘‘As
made applicable by section 3603 of this title and except as exempted by
sections 3603 (b) and 3607 of this title, it shall be unlawful—
‘‘(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to
refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable
or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex,
familial status, or national origin. . . .’’
23 General Statutes § 46a-64c provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) It shall be a
discriminatory practice in violation of this section:
‘‘(1) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to
refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable
or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, creed, color, national
origin, ancestry, sex, marital status, age, lawful source of income or famil-
ial status. . . .’’
24 The McDonnell Douglas test for reviewing housing discrimination claims
brought under a disparate treatment theory was set forth in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d
668 (1973).
25 We note that AvalonBay does not claim that the trial court improperly
found that there was no disparate impact on families with children as a
result of the defendants’ actions.
26 The Price Waterhouse analysis of a claim involving housing discrimina-
tion was first applied by the United States Supreme Court in Price Water-
house v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 246, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 104 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1989).
27 Federal courts have applied the McDonnell Douglas model to federal
housing discrimination claims. See, e.g., Orange Lake Associates, Inc. v.
Kirkpatrick, 21 F.3d 1214, 1277 (2d Cir. 1994); Soules v. United States
Dept. of Housing & Urban Development, 967 F.2d 817, 821 (2d Cir. 1992);
Huntington Branch, National Assn. for the Advancement of Colored People
v. Huntington, supra, 844 F.2d 934. Similarly, this court has applied the
prima facie case established in McDonnell Douglas to housing discrimination
claims brought under General Statutes § 46a-64a. See Miko v. Commission
on Human Rights & Opportunities, supra, 220 Conn. 192; Chestnut Realty,
Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, supra, 201 Conn.
350; Zlokower v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, supra,
200 Conn. 261.
28 The defendants and AvalonBay agree that the McDonnell Douglas model
was the appropriate model to apply in the present case.