Title: DENNIS HAYES V. THE CITY OF SHERIDAN

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DENNIS HAYES V. THE CITY OF SHERIDAN2005 WY 10105 P.3d 459Case Number: 04-70Decided: 02/02/2005
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 
 
                                                                                                            

DENNIS 
HAYES,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
CITY OF SHERIDAN,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 
 
 
Certified 
Question from the DistrictCourtofSheridanCounty

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Clay 
Jenkins, Sheridan, 
Wyoming

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

            
City of Sheridan waived briefing on April 29, 2004 

 
 
Representing 
IntervenorState of Wyoming:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Michael R. O'Donnell, Chief Deputy Attorney 
General; Barbara L. Boyer, Special Assistant Attorney 
General

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ., and WALDRIP, 
D.J.

 
 
 
 
GOLDEN, J., 
delivers the opinion of the Court; WALDRIP, D.J., files a dissenting 
opinion

 
 
 
 
 
 
GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]          
Dennis 
Hayes was an employee of the city of Sheridan who wanted to run for a municipal 
office before resigning his city employment.  He stated he would resign his city 
employment if he were elected to the office for which he wanted to run.  The city of Sheridan alleged that Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 22-23-301 prevented Hayes from running for city office while still 
a city employee.  In other words, 
the city alleged that, by Wyoming statute, Hayes was required to resign 
his city employment before he could run for municipal office.  Hayes filed a complaint for declaratory 
judgment in the Fourth Judicial District Court, seeking to have § 22-23-301 
declared unconstitutional.  The 
district court certified the following question to this Court:  

 
 
Does 
Wyoming Statute § 22-23-301 violate Article 1, Section 3 of the Wyoming 
Constitution by creating a class of persons who must resign their employment 
before seeking election to municipal office?  

 
 
For the 
reasons that follow, we answer the certified question in the 
negative.

 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶2]          
The 
pertinent part of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-23-301 (LexisNexis 2003) 
reads:

 
 
All 
candidates for municipal office shall be nominated at the municipal primary 
election.  In order to be eligible, 
a candidate must be a registered voter and a resident of the municipality and 
ward which he seeks to represent on the day the petition is filed, and shall not 
be an employee of the municipality.   

 
 
The 
parties take for granted that this statute requires that a person not be a 
municipal employee in order to be a candidate for municipal office.  As this Court reads the statute, it 
finds no such requirement.  The 
initial question is whether the requirement that a person not be a municipal 
employee applies to eligibility to be a candidate for a municipal office, or 
more simply to eligibility to ultimately hold a municipal office.  The plain language of the statute 
answers this question.  

 
 

[¶3]          
There 
are two separate clauses containing eligibility qualifications in the 
statute.  The first requires a 
candidate to be "a registered voter and a resident of the municipality and ward 
which he seeks to represent on the day the petition is filed."  The second clause states that a 
candidate "shall not be an employee of the municipality."  The second clause is very clearly 
separated from the first clause.  
The critical distinction between the clauses for the present purposes is 
that the first clause specifically refers to a time by which the clause's 
qualifications must be met, while the second clause does not.  

 
 

[¶4]          
"A 
statute is construed as a whole with the ordinary and obvious meaning applied to 
the words as they are arranged in paragraphs, sentences, clauses and phrases to 
express intent."  Wyoming Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Woods, 888 P.2d 192, 197 (Wyo. 
1994).  If the word "eligible" as 
used in the statute were meant to refer to eligibility for candidacy, there 
would be no need for the time qualification in the first clause.  As a simple matter of statutory 
construction, the statute must be referring to general eligibility to hold 
office.  To be eligible to hold 
municipal office, a candidate must meet residency and related requirements at 
the time of filing the candidacy petition.  
To be eligible to hold municipal office, a candidate must not be a 
municipal employee.  Construing the 
plain language of the statute, this Court determines that this statute does not 
require a person to resign municipal employment in order to run for municipal 
office.  It only requires that a 
person resign municipal employment prior to holding municipal 
office.

 
 

[¶5]          
Any 
possible question regarding the construction of § 22-23-301 is immutably 
clarified by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-23-302 (LexisNexis 2003).  Section 22-23-302 contains the language 
of an oath that candidates swear to in their petition for candidacy.  The language of the oath follows the 
qualification requirements of § 22-23-301.  
The oath reads: 

 
 
I, 
.........., the undersigned, swear or affirm that I was born on .........., 
(year), and that I have been a resident of the State of Wyoming since .........., 
residing at .........., and that I am a registered voter of Election District 
No. .........., Precinct No. .........., in Ward No. .........., in the City of 
.........., and the State of Wyoming as of the closing of the municipal 
clerk's office on the day this petition is filed, do hereby petition and request 
that my name be printed upon the Official Municipal Primary Ballot at the next 
primary election as a candidate for the office of .......... I hereby declare 
that if nominated and elected I will qualify for the 
office.

 
 
§ 
22-23-302. The first part of the oath reflects the first clause of § 
22-23-301.  The last part of the 
oath presumably reflects the second clause of § 22-23-301, but in any event 
makes it clear that there are no other restrictions to filing the candidacy 
petition.  Any other potential 
qualifications must be met only upon election to office.  A person need not resign from municipal 
employment to run for municipal office, but only must be willing to resign from 
municipal employment if elected to municipal office.

 
 

[¶6]          
The 
legislative history of § 301 and § 302 further confirms this reading.  In 1996, § 301 simply read: "All 
candidates for municipal office shall be nominated at the municipal primary 
election."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
22-23-301 (Michie 1992). Section 302 read, in pertinent 
part:

 
 
I, 
.........., the undersigned, certify that I was born on .........., 19.., and 
that I have been a resident of the State of Wyoming since .........., and that I am a 
registered voter of Election District No. .........., Precinct No. .........., 
in Ward No. .........., in the City of .........., and the State of Wyoming, do hereby 
petition and request that my name be printed upon the Official Municipal Primary 
Ballot at the next primary election as a candidate for the office of .......... 
I hereby declare that if nominated and elected I will qualify for the 
office.

 
 

Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 22-23-302 (Michie Cum. Supp. 1996).  
Based upon this language, this Court decided Rue v. Carter, 919 P.2d 633 (Wyo. 
1996).  Rue involved an 
election contest based upon the fact that the successful candidate for municipal 
office, Margaret Carter, had stated on her petition for candidacy that she was a 
registered voter.  Carter later 
discovered that she was not a registered voter, her name having been purged from 
the voter list because she failed to vote in the 1992 general election.  Carter reregistered and her name was 
placed on the ballot.  This Court 
upheld her election to municipal office, holding that Carter's misrepresentation 
regarding her voter registration status at the time her petition for candidacy 
was filed was an inconsequential irregularity, which had been cured, and did not 
constitute the basis for annulment of the election.  Id. at 635. Essentially, this Court 
held that the purpose of the statute was not violated.

 
 

[¶7]          
The 
Wyoming 
legislature amended both §§ 301 and 302 in 1997.  1997 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 173, § 1. Given the 
Rue decision in 1996, it is rational to infer that the legislature was 
aware of the distinction between qualifications that it required candidates to 
meet at the date of filing the petition and qualifications that simply must be 
met prior to taking office.  The 
legislature also understood that § 301 and § 302 were interrelated and were read 
together.  

 
 

[¶8]          
The 
legislative amendments in 1997 included adding the second sentence of § 
301.  At the same time, the 
legislature amended the oath in § 302 to add the phrase "as of the closing of 
the city or town clerk's office on the day this petition is filed."  This phrase was added to the first part 
of the oath.  The last part of the 
oath remained the same.  No other 
change was made to the oath.  
Specifically, the legislature did not add a requirement to the oath that 
the potential candidate swear he or she was not a municipal employee at the time 
of filing the petition.  The 
legislature certainly knew how to clarify time frames, yet it specifically 
excluded the requirement that a candidate not be a municipal employee from being 
a qualification for filing a petition for candidacy. 

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶9]          
No 
matter how one looks at it, it is clear that the legislature did not intend § 
22-23-301 to include a resign-to-run qualification.  Since § 22-23-301 does not create a 
class of persons who must resign their employment before seeking election to 
municipal office, the statute is not unconstitutional on that ground.  The certified question is answered in 
the negative based upon the statutory language, without any invocation of the 
Wyoming Constitution.

 
 
WALDRIP, D.J., 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶10]      
I 
respectfully dissent.  The majority 
reads the 
pertinent part of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-23-301 (LexisNexis 2003) to exclude any 
requirement that a candidate for municipal office not be a municipal 
employee.  In so concluding, the 
majority relies upon the plain language of the statute.  However, § 22-23-301 specifically 
states: "In order to be eligible, a candidate must be a registered voter and a 
resident of the municipality and ward which he seeks to represent on the day the 
petition is filed, and shall not be an employee of the municipality."  Id. 
(emphasis added).  "Candidate" is 
commonly defined as "one that aspires to or is nominated or qualified for an 
office."  Merriam-Webster Collegiate 
Dictionary, at 165 (10th ed. 2000) (emphasis added).  Synonyms for "candidate" are 
"applicant," "aspirant," "hopeful," "seeker."  Burton's Legal Thesaurus, at 70 (3d ed. 
1998).  The plain language of the 
statute clearly sets forth an employment (or lack thereof) 
requirement at the time of candidacy, 
not at the time of oath of office.  
The plain language of the statute does not require further inquiry into 
legislative history.

 
 

[¶11]      
I 
believe the parties "take for 
granted that this statute requires that a person not be a municipal 
employee in order to be a candidate for municipal office" because the parties 
read the statute exactly as the legislature intended it to be read.  I think the law in this state is clear: 
"It is our well-established rule that every law is presumed constitutional, 
and all doubts are resolved in favor of constitutionality."  Worcester v. State, 2001 WY 82, ¶22, 30 P.3d 47, ¶22 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting Smith v. State, 964 P.2d 421, 422-23 
(Wyo. 
1998)).  In this case, it seems to 
me that the majority works too hard to avoid this simple 
rule.

 
 

[¶12]      
Further, 
I am concerned that the evils the 
Wyoming Legislature meant to address via § 22-23-301 will now go 
unrestrained.  "Resign 
to run" laws, like § 22-23-301, prevent any potential abuse of office before or 
after an election; minimize the possibility of disruptions and conflict in 
public office; and require individuals to concentrate on the duties of their 
current jobs.  See Blair 
v. Harris, 45 P.3d 798, 803 (Haw. 2002) (quoting Fasi v. Cayetano, 
752 F. Supp. 942, 951 (Dist. Haw. 1990)); In the Matter of Buckson, 610 A.2d 203, 222-24 (Del. 1992); Acevedo v. City of North Pole, 672 P.2d 130, 133-34 (Alaska 1983); Bolin v. State, Dep't of Public Safety, 313 N.W.2d 381, 383 (Minn. 1981); Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n of La., 565 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978).  These prohibitions are designed to 
protect those in public service from unjust campaign solicitations; to free them 
from political pressure; and to promote efficiency and integrity in the 
discharge of public employment.  
Oklahoma 
State Election Bd. v. Coats, 610 P.2d 776, 778 (Okla. 1980).1

 

[¶13]      
At a 
minimum, § 22-23-301 serves to: 1) keep politics out of the government 
workplace; 2) guarantee job security free from political restraint; 3) avoid the 
appearance of impropriety; and 4) require individuals to concentrate on the 
duties of their current jobs.  These 
can be and are very real problems in our small cities and towns throughout 
Wyoming, where 
employees should feel secure in their jobs, free from political 
constraints.  In the event that a 
candidate for office exercises any sort of supervisory responsibilities, the 
employer must be allowed to protect its other employees from any bias or 
favoritism.  Above all, 
municipalities must be able to maintain public confidence in the integrity of 
their governments and avoid the appearance of impropriety.

 
 

[¶14]      
For 
these reasons, I believe the Court should conclude that § 22-23-301 requires a 
candidate to resign from office and should proceed to address the constitutional 
ramifications, if any, of the statute.

 
 
 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1I also 
find persuasive the reasoning of the Michigan Supreme Court in Martin v. 
Itasca County, 448 N.W.2d 368 (Minn. 1989):

 
 
[T]he 
United States Supreme Court recognized that our history as a democratic nation 
demonstrates that broadly prohibiting political activity by government employees 
is necessary to ensure that civil servants serve the public and not a political 
party.  A legislative body may 
prohibit a government employee from becoming a candidate for elective office not 
only to prevent potential conflict in the workplace between the employee and the 
supervisor-incumbent during the campaign, but also to prevent any tacit coercion 
of fellow employees and subordinates to assist in a political campaign.  This policy promotes efficiency and 
integrity in government ranks and also prevents both "danger to the service in 
that political rather than official effort may earn advancement and to the 
public in that governmental favor may be channeled through political 
connections."  

 
 

Martin, 448 N.W.2d  at 371 (upholding the dismissal of a county employee who had announced 
his candidacy for county commissioner).