Title: State Ex Rel. Eagerton v. Corwin

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

359 So. 2d 767 (1977)
STATE of Alabama on relation of John C. EAGERTON, III, et al.
v.
Paul C. CORWIN et al.
SC 2562.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
December 22, 1977.
James L. Shores, Jr., Birmingham, for appellants.
Thomas W. Thaggard and Charles S. Coody, Montgomery, for appellees.
EMBRY, Justice.
This is an appeal from a judgment in a quo warranto action that upheld the right of a member of the Alabama Real Estate Commission residing in the same Congressional District with another member to continue to hold office until his term expired later in the year of the judgment (1977). This event has occurred and a successor has been named who resides in a different Congressional District from any other member.
This action was brought in the name of the State of Alabama, on the relation of John C. Eagerton, III, and by John C. Eagerton, III, as plaintiffs against Paul C. Corwin and Stancil King, defendants, pursuant to Title 7, Chapter 33, Code (1940). The relief sought was a judgment holding Corwin and King to be guilty of usurping, or intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising the office of a member of the Alabama Real Estate Commission and excluding each of them from such office.
The parties entered into the following stipulation:
Other evidence was adduced which in view of the decision to follow, we do not deem necessary to comment upon. After submission to the trial court without a jury, judgment was entered which in pertinent part reads:
The statutory provision cited in the judgment reads:
The contentions of the parties on this appeal are found in their respective briefs and as argued orally. Appellants say:
Appellees say:
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Shortly before this appeal was argued and submitted in this court the term of Stancil King as a member of the Commission expired and a successor was appointed *769 by the Governor so that no longer do two members reside in the same Congressional District. As a consequence a motion to dismiss this appeal as being moot was filed. As we see no interests of the public, or the litigants, to be served by writing to the merits of this appeal as they were addressed by the parties. We will grant the motion and dismiss the appeal as calling for decision on a moot question.
As the case stands before us now, there is no justiciable controversy between Eagerton and Corwin and King, involving § 311(4), Tit. 46. The controversy ceased to exist when King's term as a member of the Commission expired, therefore there are no existing facts which frustrate the legislative intent as expressed in § 311(4). No longer is more than one member from any Congressional District serving at the same time on the Commission. This renders this case moot. A case is moot when there is no real controversy and it seeks to determine an abstract question which does not rest on existing facts or rights. Postal TelegraphCable Co. v. City of Montgomery, 193 Ala. 234, 69 So. 428 (1915); American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees v. Dawkins, 268 Ala. 13, 104 So. 2d 827 (1958).
We have held that where an event occurs which renders a case moot prior to this court considering the appeal it will be dismissed because a decision is not necessary. Chisolm v. Crook, 272 Ala. 192, 130 So. 2d 191 (1961); Weathington v. City of Birmingham, 293 Ala. 652, 309 So. 2d 430 (1975).
In Weathington, quoting from Dawkins, this court said:
"`* * * The function or duty of a judicial tribunal is to determine real controversies relative to the legal rights of persons or property, which are actually involved in the particular case * * *' * * *"
This case does not present a situation where there is likelihood of repetition of the situation giving rise to this litigation: appointment of two members of the Commission from the same Congressional District. Neither does it appear that the requirements of § 311(4) will not be strictly adhered to in the future. The judgment of the trial court is quite clear on this point. Thus we do not have the factors militating against mootness that were present in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147; and Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 94 S. Ct. 1684, 94 S. Ct. 1694, 40 L. Ed. 2d 1.
A decision by this court in this case would accomplish nothing.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
TORBERT, C. J., and FAULKNER, JONES and ALMON, JJ., concur.