Title: Commonwealth v. Windsor Plaza Condo. Ass'n, Inc.

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, EX REL. 
FAIR HOUSING BOARD 
 
v.     Record No. 131806 
 
WINDSOR PLAZA CONDOMINIUM 
ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL.  
 
 
   OPINION BY 
 
 
               
 
JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
MICHAEL FISHEL, ET AL.   
 
     December 31, 2014 
 
v.     Record No. 131817 
 
WINDSOR PLAZA CONDOMINIUM 
ASSOCIATION, INC. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 
Joanne F. Alper, Judge 
 
In these consolidated appeals, we consider various issues 
arising under the Virginia Fair Housing Law, Code § 36-96.1 et 
seq. (VFHL), and the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 
1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (FHAA). 
Background 
 
On March 4, 2009, Michael Fishel (Fishel) filed 
complaints with the Virginia Fair Housing Board (FHB) and the 
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD), alleging that Windsor Plaza Condominium Association 
(Windsor Plaza) had discriminated against him in violation of 
the VFHL and the FHAA.  HUD transferred Fishel’s complaint to 
the FHB. 
On May 28, 2010, the FHB, after an investigation, 
determined that reasonable cause existed to believe that 
 
2 
Windsor Plaza had engaged in a “discriminatory housing 
practice . . . in violation of . . . Code § 36-96.3(B)(ii).”  
Pursuant to Code § 36-96.14, the FHB referred the charge to 
the Attorney General on June 1, 2010. 
 
On June 30, 2010, the Office of the Attorney General, on 
behalf of the Commonwealth, filed a complaint against Windsor 
Plaza in the Circuit Court of Arlington County.  The complaint 
alleged that Windsor Plaza had violated Code § 36-96.3(B)(ii) 
by failing “to make reasonable accommodations in rules, 
practices, policies, or services [that were] necessary to 
afford [Fishel] equal opportunity to use and enjoy [his] 
dwelling.” 
 
On November 23, 2010, Fishel and his wife Eleanor 
(collectively “Fishels”) moved to intervene in the 
Commonwealth’s lawsuit pursuant to Code § 36-96.16(B).  They 
also lodged a “Complaint in Intervention” with the court on 
the same date.  In their Complaint in Intervention, the 
Fishels alleged, as had the Commonwealth, that Windsor Plaza 
had violated the VFHL by refusing their request for a 
reasonable accommodation. 
The Fishels also alleged additional causes of action.  
They alleged that Windsor Plaza had discriminated against them 
in violation of Code §§ 36-96.3(A)(8) and (9), and 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 3604(f)(1), (2) and (3)(B).  The circuit court granted the 
 
3 
Fishels’ motion to intervene and deemed their Complaint in 
Intervention filed on January 28, 2011. 
 
Windsor Plaza filed a plea in bar to the Fishels’ 
intervening complaint, arguing that the Fishels’ new state and 
federal fair housing claims were barred by the applicable 
statutes of limitations. 
On April 5, 2012, pursuant to a court order granting the 
Commonwealth leave to join “as additional defendants to this 
action the . . . persons vested with the right to use the four 
limited common element parking spaces in the Windsor Plaza 
Condominium residential parking garages that are labeled ‘HC’ 
[i.e., handicapped] on the Windsor Plaza site plan and any 
person that has a security interest in those four ‘HC’ parking 
spaces,” the Commonwealth filed a second amended complaint.  
It added eight individuals who owned interests in the four 
parking spaces as defendants (collectively “individual parking 
space owners”).1  Not only did the Commonwealth add these 
individuals as owners of the controverted parking spaces, it 
also alleged that the individual parking space owners had 
violated the VFHL by parking in the disabled parking spaces 
                     
1 The Commonwealth named Lois Ann Rossi, Edward and 
Virginia Scruggs, Winston and Maureen Moore, Alan and Kathleen 
Hickling, and Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. as additional 
defendants.  Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. holds an interest in 
Alan and Kathleen Hickling’s handicapped parking space by 
virtue of a deed of trust. 
 
4 
that had been deeded to them with the purchase of their 
condominiums in a manner inconsistent with the parking spaces’ 
designations on the site plan.  The complaint stated, “This 
non-conforming use contributes to the Defendant Association’s 
refusal to make a reasonable accommodation as requested by the 
Fishels.” 
Lois Ann Rossi (Rossi), one of the individual parking 
space owners, filed a plea in bar to the Commonwealth’s second 
amended complaint, asserting that the statute of limitations 
in Code § 36-96.16(A) barred the Commonwealth’s claim against 
her and the other individual parking space owners. 
The circuit court scheduled a hearing to address Windsor 
Plaza’s special plea concerning the Fishels’ complaint and 
Rossi’s special plea concerning the Commonwealth’s second 
amended complaint.  After a hearing on the pleas in bar, the 
circuit court sustained Windsor Plaza’s plea in bar to the 
Fishels’ complaint.  It also sustained Rossi’s plea in bar and 
dismissed the Commonwealth’s claims against all of the 
individual parking space owners as being barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations. 
On March 4, 2013, the parties proceeded to trial on the 
claim that Windsor Plaza violated Code § 36-96.3(B)(ii) by 
failing to make reasonable accommodations in rules, practices, 
policies or services that were necessary to afford Fishel 
 
5 
equal opportunity to enjoy his dwelling.  At the close of the 
Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, Windsor Plaza moved to strike 
the Commonwealth’s evidence and for summary judgment.  The 
circuit court granted the motion. 
At a later hearing to consider Windsor Plaza’s requests 
for attorney’s fees, the circuit court determined that 
sovereign immunity did not bar Windsor Plaza’s request for 
attorney’s fees and costs against the Commonwealth pursuant to 
Code § 36-96.16(D).  Nevertheless, the court exercised its 
discretion and declined to award Windsor Plaza attorney’s fees 
against the Commonwealth.  The court also declined to award 
Windsor Plaza attorney’s fees against the Fishels. 
 
The Commonwealth and the Fishels filed separate appeals, 
which are both addressed in this opinion.  Windsor Plaza 
assigns cross errors to the circuit court’s denial of its 
request for the award of attorney’s fees against the 
Commonwealth and the Fishels. 
Facts 
 
Windsor Plaza Condominium is located in Arlington County 
and is comprised of two condominium buildings, each with 
underground parking garages.  When the condominium was first 
built, parking spaces in these garages were general common 
 
6 
elements.2  The site plan for the buildings notes four parking 
spaces for use by disabled persons.  Those parking spaces were 
designated as “HC” on the site plan. 
In 1995, the developer of Windsor Plaza Condominium 
executed an “Amendment to Condominium Instruments” document.  
The amendment allowed the developer to assign the previously 
general common element parking spaces as limited common 
element3 parking spaces.  Pursuant to the amendment, the 
developer deeded every parking space in the condominium’s 
underground garages, including the four parking spaces 
designated for use by disabled persons (hereinafter “disabled 
parking spaces”), to individual unit owners “as a limited 
common element for the exclusive use of the unit owner of such 
condominium unit.” 
Fishel suffers from “severe osteoarthritis” and must use 
a wheelchair.  In July 2007, the Fishels purchased a 
condominium unit in the Taylor Street Building of Windsor 
Plaza Condominium.  The Fishels received a “resale package,” 
which they reviewed carefully for two days before purchasing 
their unit.  In the resale package, a diagram of the parking 
                     
2 “Common elements” are “all portions of the condominium 
other than the units.”  Code § 55-79.41. 
3 A “limited common element” is “a portion of the common 
elements reserved for the exclusive use of those entitled to 
the use of one or more, but less than all, of the units.”  
Code § 55-79.41. 
 
7 
garages showed four disabled parking spaces.  The documents in 
the resale package also indicated that garage parking spaces 
at the condominium were limited common elements and that the 
developer had already assigned all of the parking spaces to 
individual unit owners. 
Before buying their condominium unit, the Fishels visited 
the site and looked at the unit and underground parking 
garage.  The Fishels saw the parking space that would be 
purchased with their condominium.  They testified at trial 
that they knew the space was not a disabled parking space and 
that “[it] wasn’t going to meet [their] needs.”  The Fishels 
did not inquire about the availability of disabled parking 
spaces in the garage before purchasing their condominium unit. 
 
Soon after purchasing their condominium unit, the Fishels 
contacted Joseph Tilton (Tilton), Windsor Plaza’s building 
manager, and informed him that Fishel was unable to park his 
van in their parking space.  Tilton advised the Fishels to 
park in one of the disabled parking spaces, which they did “a 
couple times,” but the Fishels were soon informed that they 
could not park in that space because it belonged to another 
condominium unit owner. 
On July 30, 2007, the Fishels emailed Tilton, asking for 
“a larger parking space” in a better location.  Windsor 
Plaza’s Board of Directors (the Board) considered their 
 
8 
request at a board meeting, and Tilton relayed the Board’s 
response to the Fishels by email on August 23, 2007: 
The Board of Directors reviewed your request for a 
larger parking space at last night’s meeting.  As 
all existing garage spaces are individually owned by 
unit owners, assigning a different parking space to 
your residence is beyond the authority of the Board.  
This does not preclude you from advertising your 
interest in trading parking spaces with another 
owner.  If you would like to draft a flyer 
announcing your need for a larger space, we would be 
happy to post copies on both bulletin boards.  Such 
a notice may facilitate an exchange of spaces, 
either as a casual agreement or as a permanent 
reassignment, based on the preferences of all 
parties involved. 
Please contact us should you have any further 
concerns. 
 
The Fishels responded to Tilton’s August 23, 2007 email 
and asserted Fishel’s “right . . . to park in a handicapped-
designated space,” but they indicated that they were reluctant 
to “go this route.”  The Fishels’ email concluded, “Please ask 
the Board to review this issue again in an expedited manner.  
We need a parking space that we can actually use.” 
 
The next email from Tilton, dated September 12, 2007, 
related that the Board had met again and that “[a] copy of 
your request is being sent to the Condominium’s counsel so he 
may instruct us in how to best accommodate your needs.” 
 
During the following months, the Fishels inquired 
periodically about the status of their request.  On May 7, 
2008, Windsor Plaza’s attorney, Raymond Diaz (Diaz), informed 
 
9 
the Fishels by letter that Windsor Plaza could not force any 
of the individual parking space owners to trade with them.  
Diaz asserted that “it has proven impossible for the 
Association to persuade the owner of the larger space to 
conclude an arrangement permitting you the use of the larger 
garage parking space.” 
 
In the same letter, Diaz offered to help the Fishels 
secure approval from the county to reserve a parking space on 
the street outside their condominium building.  The Fishels 
rejected this proposal because in order to park on the street, 
Fishel would have to exit his car into traffic.  Moreover, the 
curb was too steep, and the nearest entrance door was not 
handicap-accessible. 
Diaz wrote another letter dated August 10, 2009, 
informing the Fishels that the owners of one of the disabled 
parking spaces were willing to enter into a licensing 
agreement that would allow the Fishels to use the disabled 
parking space.  The Fishels did not accept this offer because, 
in the proposed agreement, the parking space owners reserved a 
right to reclaim the disabled parking space if they sold their 
condominium or if at some point they had a tenant who needed 
the disabled parking space. 
 
On March 4, 2009, the Fishels filed complaints with the 
FHB and HUD.  Thereafter, an investigator from the FHB visited 
 
10 
the condominium building.  Fishel testified that while he was 
in the garage with the investigator, Tilton walked by, and 
Fishel raised with Tilton the idea of converting a bicycle 
storage space, located in the garage, into an accessible 
parking space.  Tilton expressed concern that doing so would 
be too expensive.  Fishel testified that he offered to pay for 
the “disabled logo and everything.”  The circuit court found 
that Fishel did not present any evidence that this option was 
ever presented to the Board or its counsel. 
Analysis 
A. 
The Commonwealth’s Appeal (Record No. 131806) 
 
The Commonwealth assigns error to the rulings of the 
circuit court in (1) holding that the statute of limitations 
barred the Commonwealth’s action against the individual 
parking space owners; (2) ruling that the Commonwealth’s 
evidence supported a claim for a reasonable modification 
instead of a reasonable accommodation; (3) granting Windsor 
Plaza’s motion to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence of 
reasonable accommodation; and (4) ruling that Windsor Plaza’s 
request for attorney’s fees under Code § 36-96.16(D) was not 
barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  Windsor Plaza 
assigns cross error to the circuit court’s refusal to exercise 
its discretion to award Windsor Plaza attorney’s fees and 
costs against the Commonwealth. 
 
11 
1. 
Necessary Parties 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the circuit court erred in 
ruling that the statute of limitations barred its action 
against the individual parking space owners.  It claims that 
the use of disabled parking spaces by unit owners who are not 
disabled is a “continuing violation” and that Windsor Plaza 
created restrictive covenants running with the land, which 
resulted in negative easements on the disabled parking spaces.  
The Commonwealth notes that the Condominium’s Policy 
Resolution No. 74 prohibits parking in disabled spaces without 
a disabled license plate or placard and concludes that to the 
extent that non-disabled unit owners park in the disabled 
parking spaces they own, there is a continuing violation that 
extends the statute of limitations in Code § 36-96.16(A). 
 
 In its prayer for relief, the Commonwealth seeks both a 
declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction requiring 
those with exclusive rights to use the four parking spaces 
identified as “HC” parking spaces to make those spaces 
                     
4 Windsor Plaza’s parking policy (Policy Resolution No. 
7) includes a provision stating, “No vehicles shall be parked 
in any General Common Element spaces that are reserved for 
handicap parking except vehicles displaying current handicap 
placards or license plates.”  Policy Resolution No. 7 also 
authorizes the Board “from time to time and as available, [to] 
designate General Common Element parking spaces for special 
usage purposes (such as handicap parking spaces to accommodate 
disabled residents).” 
 
 
12 
available for use by all disabled residents.  The circuit 
court ruled that the individual parking space owners were 
necessary parties to the Commonwealth’s action against Windsor 
Plaza.  In response thereto, the Commonwealth was allowed to 
file the second amended complaint naming the individual 
parking space owners as defendants.  Rossi then filed a 
special plea of the statute of limitations, and the circuit 
court sustained that special plea and entered an order 
determining that the Commonwealth’s actions against all of the 
individual parking space owners were barred by the applicable 
statute of limitations. 
Rossi asks this Court to dismiss the Commonwealth’s 
assignment of error concerning the circuit court’s ruling on 
her special plea because the Commonwealth has not joined all 
of the individual parking space owners in this appeal.  Of the 
eight individual parking space owners it named as defendants 
in its second amended complaint, the Commonwealth has only 
named Rossi in its appeal. 
The Commonwealth does not assign error to the circuit 
court’s determination that each of the individual parking 
space owners was a necessary party; therefore, this ruling has 
become “the law of the case and is binding on appeal.”  See 
Maine v. Adams, 277 Va. 230, 242, 672 S.E.2d 862, 869 (2009).  
Because the Commonwealth alleges that the individual parking 
 
13 
space owners all violated the VFHL and the relief sought by 
the Commonwealth involves the property interests of all of the 
individual parking space owners, they each have an interest in 
resisting the Commonwealth’s claim against them.  An 
appellant’s failure to join a necessary party in the appeal 
compels dismissal of the appeal.  Asch v. Friends of the Cmty. 
of Mount Vernon Yacht Club, 251 Va. 89, 91, 465 S.E.2d 817, 
818-19 (1996).  Because the Commonwealth has failed to join 
all the individual parking space owners as parties in its 
appeal, we will dismiss the Commonwealth’s appeal concerning 
the circuit court’s ruling on the plea in bar filed by Rossi 
without further consideration. 
2. 
Modifications and Accommodations under  
     Code §§ 36-96.3(B)(i) and (ii) 
 
 
In support of its claim that Windsor Plaza discriminated 
against Fishel by failing to make reasonable accommodations in 
rules, practices, policies or services that were necessary to 
afford him equal opportunity to use and enjoy his dwelling, 
the Commonwealth presented evidence that the Fishels mentioned 
to Tilton that there was a common element bicycle storage area 
in the parking garage that was large enough to be converted 
into a parking space for Fishel.  The circuit court ruled that 
such request constituted a reasonable modification request 
rather than a request for a reasonable accommodation. 
 
14 
The Commonwealth asserts that the circuit court erred in 
ruling that the request for the creation of the disabled 
parking space was not a request for an accommodation under 
Code § 36-96.3(B)(ii).  According to the Commonwealth, parking 
is a service, and Fishel sought an accommodation in the 
“rules, practices, and policies involving the provision of 
that service.”  The Commonwealth claims that modifications 
involve “structural changes” while accommodations involve 
“cosmetic changes” and that converting the bicycle space into 
a disabled parking space for Fishel would require only 
cosmetic changes.  The Commonwealth further argues that 
Windsor Plaza’s Policy Resolution No. 7 explicitly authorizes 
the Board to convert a common elements area, such as the 
bicycle space, into a limited common element parking space to 
accommodate the needs of a disabled person.  Hence, because 
the Fishels’ request to convert the bicycle space into an 
accessible parking space required cosmetic changes and an 
alteration in Windsor Plaza’s parking policy, the Commonwealth 
concludes that its evidence supported a reasonable 
accommodation claim under Code § 36-96.3(B)(ii). 
 
According to Windsor Plaza, parking is not a service at 
the condominium because all parking spaces are limited common 
elements and are assigned to individual unit owners.  Windsor 
Plaza argues that the circuit court correctly determined that 
 
15 
the Commonwealth’s evidence concerning the possible conversion 
of the bicycle space supported a cause of action for a 
reasonable modification because a “modification” is made to 
“premises,” while an “accommodation” is made to “rules, 
policies, practices, or services.” 
Whether the Commonwealth’s evidence supported a cause of 
action for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation under 
Code § 36-96.3(B)(ii) requires statutory interpretation of the 
VFHL.  This Court reviews a trial court’s statutory 
interpretation de novo, as a question of law.  Collelo v. 
Geographic Servs., Inc., 283 Va. 56, 66, 727 S.E.2d 55, 59 
(2012).  The primary goal of the Court in interpreting 
statutes is to determine the General Assembly’s intent.  
Sheppard v. Junes, 287 Va. 397, 403, 756 S.E.2d 409, 411 
(2014).  To do this, we examine the language contained in the 
statute itself, if unambiguous, and apply its plain meaning.  
See Rutter v. Oakwood Living Ctrs. of Va., Inc., 282 Va. 4, 
10, 710 S.E.2d 460, 463 (2011). 
 
The VFHL protects disabled persons from “unlawful 
discriminatory housing practices.”  See Code § 36-96.3(A) 
(describing actions that qualify as “discriminatory housing 
practices”).  Code § 36-96.3(A)(9) provides, 
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory housing 
practice for any person . . . [t]o discriminate 
against any person in the terms, conditions, or 
 
16 
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in 
the provision of services or facilities in 
connection therewith because of a handicap of . . . 
that person. 
“Discrimination” is defined several ways in the VFHL.  
Relevant to this appeal, Code § 36-96.3(B)(i) states that 
“discrimination includes . . . a refusal to permit, at the 
expense of the handicapped person, reasonable modifications of 
existing premises occupied or to be occupied by any person if 
such modifications may be necessary to afford such person full 
enjoyment of the premises.”  Code § 36-96.3(B)(ii) provides 
that discrimination also includes “a refusal to make 
reasonable accommodations in rules, practices, policies, or 
services when such accommodations may be necessary to afford 
such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 
 
The Commonwealth only asserts a violation of Code § 36-
96.3(B)(ii). It insists that parking is a service and that 
the Fishels requested a reasonable accommodation in that 
service when they requested that Windsor Plaza convert the 
bicycle space into an accessible parking space for them.  
However, the plain meaning of the word “service” does not 
encompass the underground garage parking scheme at Windsor 
Plaza Condominium. 
“Service” is “[l]abor performed in the interest or under 
the direction of others; specif[ically], the performance of 
 
17 
some useful act or series of acts for the benefit of another, 
usu[ally] for a fee.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1576 (10th ed. 
2014).  At the condominium, parking spaces have been assigned 
to individual unit owners as property rights appurtenant to 
their condominium units.  These assigned parking spaces are 
limited common elements, which are “reserved for the exclusive 
use” of individual unit owners.  Code § 55-79.41.  Because 
parking spaces are forms of real property at the condominium, 
they are not acts or labor performed to benefit the unit 
owners, and thus parking is not a service under Code § 36-
96.3(B)(ii). 
To aid us in discerning the General Assembly’s intent, 
we also look at surrounding words in the statute that can 
indicate a term’s meaning.  Newberry Station Homeowners Ass’n 
v. Board of Supervisors, 285 Va. 604, 619-20 & n.9, 740 
S.E.2d 548, 556-57 & n.9 (2013).  In Code § 36-96.3(B)(ii), 
“accommodations” is followed by “in rules, practices [and] 
policies,” which indicates that accommodations involve 
exceptions to intangible standards, procedures and customs.  
On the other hand, the term “modifications” in Code § 36-
96.3(B)(i) is followed by the phrase “of existing premises” 
and includes a requirement that the person requesting a 
modification pay for the modification.  The context of Code § 
 
18 
36-96.3(B)(i) indicates that physical alterations of premises 
involve a modification rather than an accommodation. 
We conclude the ruling of the circuit court is faithful 
to the plain language of Code §§ 36-96.3(B)(i) and (ii).  
There was no evidence at trial concerning what would be 
involved in changing the bicycle storage space into a parking 
space.  However, the Commonwealth acknowledges that 
converting the bicycle space into an accessible parking space 
for Fishel would require physical alterations, although 
slight, to the premises.  Consequently, the circuit court did 
not err in determining that the Commonwealth’s evidence 
concerning the conversion of the bicycle space into an 
accessible parking space supported a cause of action under 
Code § 36-96.3(B)(i) for a reasonable modification rather 
than a cause of action under Code § 36-96.3(B)(ii) for a 
reasonable accommodation. 
3. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence: Reasonable 
Accommodation Claim 
 
The Commonwealth contends that it presented sufficient 
evidence of a violation of Code § 36-96.3(B)(ii) to survive 
Windsor Plaza’s motion to strike the evidence.  The 
Commonwealth asserts that the parties stipulated at trial 
that Fishel is disabled and that it is necessary for him to 
have an accessible parking space.  According to the 
 
19 
Commonwealth, the evidence showed that Fishel asked for a 
larger parking space in a different location.  The 
Commonwealth claims that in response Windsor Plaza proposed 
“two flawed solutions” and “ignored” Fishel’s reasonable 
request to convert the bicycle storage space into an 
accessible parking space.  It adds that even if all four 
disabled spaces were being used by disabled people,5 Windsor 
Plaza would nevertheless be required under the VFHL to 
consider converting the bicycle space into an accessible 
parking space for the Fishels.  The Commonwealth argues that 
the Fishels’ request for an accessible parking space is 
reasonable because Windsor Plaza is required by law to 
provide disabled parking spaces. 
 
By contrast, Windsor Plaza maintains that the evidence 
showed that it offered the Fishels a reasonable accommodation 
but that they rejected the offer.  According to evidence at 
trial, Windsor Plaza negotiated a licensing agreement in 
which the owners of a disabled parking space would allow the 
Fishels to use their space.  Windsor Plaza insists that it is 
not obligated to provide a permanent accommodation. 
To assert a reasonable accommodation claim under the 
VFHL, the plaintiff bears the burden to prove by a 
                     
5 There was no evidence presented at trial concerning 
whether the four designated “HC” spaces were being used by 
disabled individuals. 
 
20 
preponderance of the evidence that the requested 
accommodation is reasonable and necessary to give a disabled 
person the equal opportunity to use and enjoy housing.  See 
Scoggins v. Lee’s Crossing Homeowners Ass’n, 718 F.3d 262, 
272 (4th Cir. 2013) (stating the elements of a reasonable 
accommodation claim under the FHAA).  In the proceedings 
below, the parties agreed that Fishel is disabled and needs 
an accessible parking space in order to have an equal 
opportunity to enjoy his condominium unit, but they disagreed 
as to whether the Fishels requested a reasonable 
accommodation. 
 
The Fourth Circuit has recognized several factors a 
court can use to determine whether an accommodation is 
reasonable: 
In determining whether the reasonableness 
requirement has been met, a court may consider as 
factors the extent to which the accommodation would 
undermine the legitimate purposes and effects of 
existing zoning regulations and the benefits that 
the accommodation would provide to the handicapped.  
It may also consider whether alternatives exist to 
accomplish the benefits more efficiently.  And in 
measuring the effects of an accommodation, the 
court may look not only to its functional and 
administrative aspects, but also to its costs. 
Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard Cnty., 124 F.3d 597, 604 
(4th Cir. 1997) (analyzing whether a request for an exception 
to zoning regulations was reasonable).  An accommodation is 
not reasonable if it poses “undue financial and 
 
21 
administrative burdens or changes, adjustments, or 
modifications to existing programs that would be substantial, 
or that would constitute fundamental alterations in the 
nature of the program.”  See id. (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  This is a “fact-specific inquiry.”  
Scoggins, 718 F.3d at 272. 
 
The Fishels asked for a larger parking space in a 
different location.  However, Virginia’s Condominium Act 
permits the reassignment of limited common elements, such as 
the parking spaces at issue, only with the consent of all 
property owners affected by the reassignment.  See Code § 55-
79.57(A).  We hold that requesting, as an accommodation, the 
reassignment of limited common element parking spaces 
belonging to private individuals is unreasonable because 
Windsor Plaza has no authority to confiscate property 
belonging to one unit owner and to reassign that property to 
another.  See Groner v. Golden Gate Gardens Apartments, 250 
F.3d 1039, 1046 (6th Cir. 2001) (“As a matter of law, the 
[neighbor’s] rights did not have to be sacrificed on the 
altar of reasonable accommodation.”) (alteration in original) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
The Commonwealth also argues that its evidence showed 
that Windsor Plaza failed to provide the Fishels with a 
reasonable accommodation by refusing to convert the bicycle 
 
22 
storage space into an accessible parking space.  However, as 
stated previously, converting the bicycle space is a 
modification “of existing premises,” not an accommodation “in 
rules, practices, policies, or services.”  Therefore, the 
Commonwealth’s evidence concerning the bicycle space did not 
prove a request for a reasonable accommodation. 
 
The Commonwealth’s only evidence of an accommodation 
request refused by Windsor Plaza was that of reassigning one 
of the limited common element parking spaces to the Fishels.  
Because Windsor Plaza does not have the authority to reassign 
disabled parking spaces that are limited common elements 
without the consent of the owner of the parking space, this 
accommodation request was not reasonable, and we hold that 
the Commonwealth failed to satisfy its burden of proving that 
Windsor Plaza failed to provide a reasonable accommodation.  
Consequently, the circuit court did not err in granting 
Windsor Plaza’s motion to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence. 
4. 
Sovereign Immunity 
 
 The Commonwealth argues that the circuit court erred in 
ruling that Windsor Plaza’s claim for attorney’s fees and 
costs against the Commonwealth pursuant to Code § 36-96.16(D) 
was not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  
Whether the Commonwealth is protected by sovereign immunity 
is a question of law that we review de novo.  See City of 
 
23 
Chesapeake v. Cunningham, 268 Va. 624, 633, 604 S.E.2d 420, 
426 (2004).  Furthermore, whether the Commonwealth has waived 
sovereign immunity depends upon the proper interpretation of 
Code § 36-96.16(D), which is also a question of law reviewed 
de novo by this Court.  See Collelo, 283 Va. at 66, 727 
S.E.2d at 59. 
“[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity . . . is alive and 
well in Virginia.”  Jean Moreau & Assocs. v. Health Ctr. 
Comm’n, 283 Va. 128, 137, 720 S.E.2d 105, 110 (2012) 
(alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  “Sovereign immunity is a rule of social 
policy, which protects the state from burdensome interference 
with the performance of its governmental functions and 
preserves its control over state funds, property, and 
instrumentalities.”  Id. (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Only the General Assembly can abrogate 
sovereign immunity on behalf of the Commonwealth.  Afzall v. 
Commonwealth, 273 Va. 226, 230, 639 S.E.2d 279, 281 (2007).  
When it chooses to do so, the “waiver . . . cannot be implied 
from general statutory language but must be explicitly and 
expressly announced in the statute.”  Id. (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
Code §§ 36-96.16 and -96.17 create causes of action in 
which the Commonwealth is the plaintiff in actions alleging 
 
24 
discriminatory housing practices.  In this case, the 
Commonwealth filed its civil action against Windsor Plaza 
pursuant to Code § 36-96.16(A), which mandates, 
Not later than thirty days after a charge is 
referred by the [FHB] to the Attorney General under 
§ 36-96.14, the Attorney General shall commence and 
maintain a civil action seeking relief on behalf of 
the complainant in the circuit court for the city, 
county, or town in which the unlawful discriminatory 
housing practice has occurred or is about to occur. 
(Emphasis added.)  Thus, after receiving a referral from the 
FHB, the Commonwealth must “commence and maintain a civil 
action.”  Id. 
On the other hand, under Code § 36-96.17, the 
Commonwealth is given discretion in filing certain types of 
fair housing claims.  See Code §§ 36-96.17(B) (“Whenever the 
Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any 
person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or 
practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the 
rights granted by this chapter, or that any group of persons 
has been denied any of the rights granted by this chapter and 
such denial raises an issue of general public importance, the 
Attorney General may commence a civil action in the 
appropriate circuit court for appropriate relief.”) (emphasis 
added); -96.17(C) (“In the event of a breach of a 
conciliation agreement by a respondent, the [FHB] may 
authorize a civil action by the Attorney General.  The 
 
25 
Attorney General may commence a civil action in any 
appropriate circuit court . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
Both Code §§ 36-96.16 and -96.17 enable a “prevailing 
party” to seek an award of attorney’s fees.  Code § 36-
96.16(D), upon which Windsor Plaza relies in requesting 
attorney’s fees and costs from the Commonwealth, states, “In 
any court proceeding arising under this section, the court, 
in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party reasonable 
attorney’s fees and costs.”  Code § 36-96.17(E)(3) states in 
relevant part that a court may “[a]ward the prevailing party 
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.  The Commonwealth shall 
be liable for such fees and costs to the extent provided by 
the Code of Virginia.”  Thus, Code § 36-96.17(E)(3) 
specifically states that “[t]he Commonwealth shall be liable 
for such fees and costs,” while Code § 36-96.16(D) does not. 
 
“[W]hen the General Assembly has used specific language 
in one instance, but omits that language or uses different 
language when addressing a similar subject elsewhere in the 
Code, we must presume that the difference in the choice of 
language was intentional.”  Newberry Station Homeowners 
Ass’n, 285 Va. at 616, 740 S.E.2d at 554 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  Code § 36-96.16(A) 
imposes a mandatory governmental duty on the Attorney General 
to file a civil action on behalf of a complainant when the 
 
26 
FHB makes a reasonable cause determination and refers the 
matter to the Attorney General.  In such an instance, the 
Attorney General is required by statute to file the civil 
action under the VFHL; the Commonwealth is without discretion 
under Code § 36-96.16 in filing the action.  In interpreting 
the General Assembly’s decision to omit the explicit waiver 
of sovereign immunity contained in Code § 36-96.17(E)(3) from 
Code § 36-96.16(D), we conclude that the General Assembly 
decided not to waive sovereign immunity in actions in which 
the Attorney General is performing a mandatory governmental 
function by filing an action pursuant to Code § 36-96.16. 
Without an express waiver of sovereign immunity, Windsor 
Plaza cannot recover attorney’s fees from the Commonwealth.  
Therefore, the circuit court erred in ruling that Windsor 
Plaza’s claim for attorney’s fees was not barred by the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity.  However, because the circuit 
court decided not to impose attorney’s fees or costs against 
the Commonwealth, such error was harmless.  See Code § 8.01-
678. 
B. 
The Fishels’ Appeal (Record No. 131817) 
 
The Fishels assign error to the rulings of the circuit 
court in (1) establishing the accrual date for their state 
and federal reasonable accommodation claims; (2) applying the 
statute of limitations period in Code § 36-96.18(B) to their 
 
27 
additional claims brought when they intervened; and (3) 
determining that the alleged violations of Code §§ 36-
96.3(A)(8) and (9) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(f)(1) and (2) were 
not continuing violations.  Windsor Plaza assigns cross error 
to the circuit court’s ruling denying its request for 
attorney’s fees against the Fishels. 
1. 
Accrual of State and Federal Reasonable 
Accommodation Claims 
 
The Fishels argue that the circuit court erred in 
finding that their state and federal reasonable accommodation 
claims accrued on August 23, 2007.  “A plea in bar presents a 
distinct issue of fact which, if proven, creates a bar to the 
plaintiff’s right of recovery.”  Hilton v. Martin, 275 Va. 
176, 179, 654 S.E.2d 572, 574 (2008).  Whether the circuit 
court erred in finding that August 23, 2007, was the date of 
accrual of the Fishels’ causes of action is a mixed question 
of law and fact that this Court reviews de novo.  See 
Chalifoux v. Radiology Assocs. of Richmond, Inc., 281 Va. 
690, 696, 708 S.E.2d 834, 837 (2011).  This Court defers to 
the circuit court’s findings of fact and “view[s] the facts 
in the light most favorable to” Windsor Plaza as the 
prevailing party.  See id.  However, we review the trial 
court’s application of the law to facts de novo.  See 
 
28 
Westgate at Williamsburg Condo. Ass’n v. Philip Richardson 
Co., 270 Va. 566, 574, 621 S.E.2d 114, 118 (2005). 
 
Under both the VFHL and FHAA, a reasonable accommodation 
claim accrues upon “the occurrence or the termination of an 
alleged discriminatory housing practice.”  Code § 36-
96.18(A); 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A).  “[D]iscrimination 
includes . . . a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in 
rules, practices, policies, or services when such 
accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal 
opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling . . . .”  Code § 36-
96.3(B)(ii); 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).  Thus, the Fishels’ 
reasonable accommodation claims accrued when Windsor Plaza 
denied their request for a reasonable accommodation. 
The parties dispute when Windsor Plaza denied the 
Fishels’ request.  The circuit court found that Windsor Plaza 
denied their request on August 23, 2007.  However, the 
Fishels claim that after August 23, 2007, they engaged in an 
interactive process with Windsor Plaza and that their 
reasonable accommodation claims did not accrue until this 
interactive process concluded. 
 
When a disabled person makes a request for a reasonable 
accommodation, the parties may engage in an interactive 
process.  The purpose of this interaction between one who has 
requested a reasonable accommodation and the recipient of the 
 
29 
request is to arrive at a solution that is agreeable to both 
parties.  See Joint Statement of Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. 
& Dep’t of Justice, Reasonable Accommodations Under the Fair 
Housing Act 7 (May 17, 2004).6  However, the interactive 
process does not change the date of accrual because such a 
process is not required and a reasonable accommodation claim 
accrues when the request is denied.7  Thus, the relevant 
question is when Windsor Plaza denied the Fishels’ request, 
thereby triggering the statute of limitations for their 
reasonable accommodation claims. 
 
On July 30, 2007, the Fishels asked for “a larger 
parking space” in a different location because of Fishel’s 
disability.  After Windsor Plaza’s Board considered the 
Fishels’ request, it informed them by email on August 23, 
                     
6 The Joint Statement is available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/joint_statement_ra.pdf  
(last visited December 29, 2014). 
 
7 Our conclusion is reinforced by the recognition that 
parties may choose to forego the interactive process.  We note 
that federal courts disagree as to whether the interactive 
process is mandatory under the FHAA.  Compare Jankowski Lee & 
Assocs. v. Cisneros, 91 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 1996) (“If a 
landlord is skeptical of a tenant's alleged disability or the 
landlord's ability to provide an accommodation, it is 
incumbent upon the landlord to request documentation or open a 
dialogue.”) with Lapid-Laurel, L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of 
Adjustment, 284 F.3d 442, 455-56 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Therefore, 
we hold that notwithstanding the ‘interactive process’ 
requirement that exists in the law of this court in the 
employment context under the Rehabilitation Act, . . . the 
FHAA imposes no such requirement on local land use 
authorities.”) (citation omitted). 
 
30 
2007, that it was powerless to accommodate their request 
because all the parking spaces were limited common elements 
and deeded to other condominium owners.  It stated that it 
could not reassign the disabled parking spaces.  Thus, there 
is evidence to support the circuit court’s finding that this 
email constituted Windsor Plaza’s denial of the Fishels’ 
request and that the Fishels’ reasonable accommodation claims 
accrued on that date. 
The Fishels argue alternatively that they renewed their 
request after receiving the August 23, 2007 email.  They cite 
Tobin v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 553 F.3d 121, 131 (1st 
Cir. 2009), a case concerning the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA), in support of their position.  In Tobin, the First 
Circuit considered an employee’s reasonable accommodation 
claim against his employer.  Id. at 124-25.  The court 
acknowledged that the denial of a subsequent request for an 
accommodation could constitute a new discriminatory act for 
purposes of the statute of limitations if an employer commits 
a “new ‘discrete act’ of discrimination.”  Id. at 131.  
However, the First Circuit observed that when an employer 
denies a subsequent request simply seeking reversal or 
“modification” of a prior denial, the subsequent denial is 
not a new discrete act sufficient to extend the statute of 
limitations.  See id. (“[A]n employee may not extend or 
 
31 
circumvent the limitations period by requesting modification 
or reversal of an employer’s prior action.”). 
Even if law governing renewed requests for reasonable 
accommodations under the ADA applies to reasonable 
accommodations claims under the VFHL and FHAA, there is 
evidence to support the circuit court’s finding that the 
Fishels did not renew their request.  After the Board denied 
their request on August 23, 2007, the Fishels asked “the 
Board to review th[e] issue again in an expedited manner.”  
This is a request for reconsideration of the Board’s prior 
denial, not a renewed request that results in a new denial.  
Consequently, the Board did not commit a new discriminatory 
act after its initial denial on August 23, 2007. 
The Fishels had to file their state reasonable 
accommodation claim within the longer of two years from the 
date of accrual or “180 days after the conclusion of the 
administrative process.”  See Code § 36-96.18(B).  Two 
calendar years from the date of accrual fell on August 23, 
2009, and 180 days from the conclusion of the FHB proceeding 
fell in late November 2010.  See Ward v. Insurance Co. of N. 
Am., 253 Va. 232, 235, 482 S.E.2d 795, 797 (1997) (holding 
that Virginia statutes of limitations are calculated using 
“calendar years and not ‘365-day periods’”).  The Fishels’ 
 
32 
intervening complaint was not filed until January 28, 2011, 
after both statutory time periods had passed. 
Likewise, the Fishels’ federal reasonable accommodation 
claim was also barred.  Even with the benefit of tolling 
while the administrative process was pending from May 4, 2009 
until June 1, 2010, the federal two-year statute of 
limitations expired in September 2010.  See 42 U.S.C. § 
3613(a)(1)(B).  Therefore, we hold that the circuit court did 
not err in finding that the Fishels’ reasonable accommodation 
claims filed on January 28, 2011 were barred by the statute 
of limitations. 
2. 
Intervention Pursuant to Code § 36-96.16 
The Fishels contend that the circuit court also erred in 
applying the statute of limitations in Code § 36-96.18 to 
their claims because they intervened in the Commonwealth’s 
action pursuant to Code § 36-96.16.  They point out that 
under Code § 36-96.16(B) intervention is “as of right.”  The 
Fishels maintain that there is no statute of limitations for 
intervention under Rule 3:14 or Code § 36-96.16 and that 
circuit courts instead exercise their sound discretion in 
permitting intervention. 
 
On the other hand, Windsor Plaza asks this Court to 
construe Code §§ 36-96.16 and -96.18 together.  Windsor Plaza 
maintains that although Code § 36-96.16 allows the Fishels to 
 
33 
intervene, the statute of limitations period in Code § 36-
96.18 applies to the Fishels’ new claims because they are 
private parties and because no exception is carved out for 
intervenors. 
 
The Fishels not only intervened in the action brought by 
the Commonwealth, they also filed an intervening complaint 
which raised additional causes of action that had not been 
raised by the Commonwealth in its complaint.  Whether the 
statute of limitations in Code § 36-96.18 applies to the 
Fishels’ civil action filed pursuant to Code § 36-96.16 
requires statutory interpretation, which is a question of law 
that we review de novo.  See Collelo, 283 Va. at 66, 727 
S.E.2d at 59.  “Statutes dealing with the same subject matter 
must be read together so as to adhere to the legislative 
intent underlying them and to permit them to operate together 
without conflict.”  McKinney v. Virginia Surgical Assocs., 
P.C., 284 Va. 455, 460, 732 S.E.2d 27, 29 (2012). 
Code § 36-96.16(B) enables an “aggrieved person” to 
intervene in the Commonwealth’s civil action: “Any aggrieved 
person with respect to the issues to be determined in a civil 
action [filed by the Attorney General after referral from the 
FHB] may intervene as of right.”  This subsection does not 
set forth a specific limitations provision for claims made 
 
34 
through intervention by aggrieved persons.  See Code § 36-
96.16(B). 
However, Code § 36-96.18(A), which permits “aggrieved 
person[s]” to file original civil actions alleging 
“discriminatory housing practice[s],” does contain a 
limitations period.  Subsection (B) provides, 
An aggrieved person may commence a civil action 
under § 36-96.18 A no later than 180 days after the 
conclusion of the administrative process with 
respect to a complaint or charge, or not later than 
two years after the occurrence or the termination 
of an alleged discriminatory housing practice, 
whichever is later. 
Code § 36-96.18(B).  The statutory language gives no 
indication that an intervenor’s civil action should be immune 
from the statute of limitations normally applicable to claims 
brought by aggrieved persons.  In fact, Code § 36-96.16(B) 
uses the same term, “aggrieved person,” to describe the 
intervenor as is used in Code § 36-96.18(B) to describe the 
private party plaintiff. 
 
We note that this Court has applied a statute of 
limitations in one statute to an action allowed to be filed 
in intervention pursuant to a different statute.  In 
Commonwealth Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Standard Federal 
Savings & Loan, 222 Va. 330, 332, 281 S.E.2d 811, 812 (1981), 
we held that the limitations period in Code § 43-17 applied 
to “a lienor’s intervening petition in a suit to enforce a 
 
35 
mechanics’ lien” filed pursuant to Code § 43-22.  The 
limitations period in Code § 43-17 applied to suits to 
enforce liens, but it did not expressly refer to Code § 43-
22.  Id.  As noted by this Court, the “common history” of 
Code §§ 43-17 and -22 dictated they should “be interpreted in 
light of [each] other.”  Id.  We observed that intervening in 
an existing action as a means of asserting new claims was 
“the equivalent of instituting a suit under Code § 43-17.”  
Id. 
 
Like the statutes at issue in Commonwealth Mechanical 
Contractors, Code §§ 36-96.16 and -96.18 are interrelated.  
Pursuant to these statutes, an aggrieved person may choose to 
intervene in a civil action filed by the Attorney General 
alleging a discriminatory housing practice on behalf of the 
aggrieved person or file an original claim alleging a 
discriminatory housing practice on his or her own behalf.  
See Code §§ 36-96.16 (A) and (B); -96.18(A).  When an 
aggrieved person not only intervenes in a civil action, but 
also files a new claim not previously asserted, the 
applicable statute of limitations applies to that new claim.  
Therefore, we hold that the circuit court did not err in 
applying the statute of limitations in Code § 36-96.18 to the 
Fishels’ additional claims brought in a new complaint filed 
upon intervention. 
 
36 
3. 
Continuing Violations 
 
Finally, the Fishels claim that the circuit court erred 
in determining that Windsor Plaza’s alleged violations of 
Code §§ 36-96.3(A)(8) and (9) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(f)(1) and 
(2) were not continuing violations.  They maintain that 
Windsor Plaza continues to discriminate against them in the 
sale of their condominium unit as well as continues to make 
housing unavailable by “operat[ing] a condominium premises 
that does not provide the accessible garage parking spaces 
required by [law].”  Because Windsor Plaza continues to 
operate a condominium that lacks handicap-accessible parking 
while benefitting from the payment of the Fishels’ 
condominium fees, the Fishels argue that “the statute of 
limitations does not bar [their] claims” because Windsor 
Plaza’s latest discriminatory act falls within the statute of 
limitations period. 
Windsor Plaza responds that the violations alleged by 
the Fishels are continuing effects, not continuing 
violations.  Windsor Plaza contends that its alleged 
violations are the continuing effects of the developer’s 
assignment of disabled parking spaces to individual unit 
owners and cannot extend the statute of limitations. 
 
The circuit court’s determination that the Fishels did 
not allege continuing violations presents a mixed question of 
 
37 
law and fact that this Court reviews de novo.  See Chalifoux, 
281 Va. at 696, 708 S.E.2d at 837.  “In our review of the 
circuit court's application of the law to the facts, we give 
deference to the circuit court's factual findings and view 
the facts in the light most favorable to . . . the prevailing 
party below.”  Id. 
In addition to their reasonable accommodation claims, 
the Fishels’ complaint alleged that Windsor Plaza 
discriminated against them in violation of Code §§ 36-
96.3(A)(8) and (9) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(f)(1) and (2).  Code 
§§ 36-96.3(A)(8) and (9) make unlawful the following 
discriminatory housing practices: 
8.  To refuse to sell or rent, or refuse to 
negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise 
discriminate or make unavailable or deny a dwelling 
because of a handicap of (i) the buyer or renter, 
(ii) a person residing in or intending to reside in 
that dwelling after it is so sold, rented or made 
available, or (iii) any person associated with the 
buyer or renter; 
9.  To discriminate against any person in the 
terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental 
of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or 
facilities in connection therewith because of a 
handicap of (i) that person, (ii) a person residing 
in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it 
was so sold, rented or made available, or (iii) any 
person associated with that buyer or renter. 
See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(f)(1) and (2) (containing 
substantially similar provisions). 
 
38 
 
The continuing violation doctrine is one in “which acts 
occurring outside the statute of limitations may be 
considered when there is a ‘fixed and continuing practice’ of 
unlawful acts both before and during the limitations period.”  
Scoggins, 718 F.3d at 271 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  One federal district court has explained the 
difference in continuing violations and continuing effects of 
past violations: “[A] continuing violation is occasioned by 
continual unlawful acts, not continual ill effects from an 
original violation.”  Moseke v. Miller & Smith, Inc., 202 F. 
Supp. 2d 492, 495 (E.D. Va. 2002) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
In Moseke, the court concluded that the inaccessible 
features of three condominium complexes were “more akin to a 
continuing effect rather than a continuing violation under 
the FHA[A].”  Id. at 507.  Because the plaintiffs alleged 
design and construction claims under the FHAA and VFHL, the 
court reasoned that the last discriminatory act occurred when 
the defendants completed construction of the complexes.  Id.  
The court was not swayed by the plaintiff’s argument that the 
violation was ongoing because the condominiums continued to 
operate without disabled parking spaces.  Id. at 510. 
In this case, the circuit court correctly determined 
that the Fishels did not allege continuing violations of Code 
 
39 
§§ 36-96.3(A)(8) and (9) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(f)(1) and (2).  
The violations alleged by the Fishels — allowing disabled 
parking spaces to be assigned to residents as limited common 
elements without reserving a handicap-accessible parking 
space for the Fishels — occurred at one point in time.  The 
Fishels’ not being able to use a disabled parking space is a 
continuing effect of having assigned all the handicap-
accessible parking spaces to other owners before the Fishels 
bought their condominium.  Thus, the circuit court did not 
err in determining that the alleged discriminatory acts by 
Windsor Plaza are not continuing in nature but continuing in 
effect.  Therefore, the circuit court did not err in 
sustaining Windsor Plaza’s plea in bar to the Fishels’ claims 
under Code §§ 36-96.3(A)(8) and 9 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(f)(1) 
and (2). 
4. 
Windsor Plaza’s Cross Error:   
Attorney’s Fees 
 
 
Windsor Plaza argues that the circuit court abused its 
discretion by refusing to award it attorney’s fees against 
the Fishels.  Windsor Plaza contends that the Fishels’ claims 
were meritless.  It maintains that the Fishels filed six 
untimely claims, greatly expanding the scope of their lawsuit 
compared to the Commonwealth’s single claim.  Windsor Plaza 
further asserts that the Fishels did not assert their claims 
 
40 
in good faith because they were aware that their assigned 
parking space was inadequate when they purchased it and 
because they “knew or should have known” that the remainder 
of the parking spaces in the underground garages were 
assigned to other unit owners. 
The Fishels disagree that the VFHL authorizes an award 
of attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant.  Furthermore, 
they insist that they asserted their claims in good faith and 
that the circuit court “properly weighed” each point raised 
by Windsor Plaza.  The Fishels claim that they helped Windsor 
Plaza avoid extra expense by intervening in the 
Commonwealth’s lawsuit instead of filing their claims 
separately.  According to the Fishels, the circuit court 
“specifically found” that Fishel was entitled to an 
accommodation and that their claims were not meritless merely 
because the statute of limitations barred the claims. 
This Court reviews a trial court’s refusal to award 
attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion.  Lynchburg Div. of 
Soc. Servs. v. Cook, 276 Va. 465, 484, 666 S.E.2d 361, 370 
(2008).  A trial court may abuse its discretion by failing to 
consider a “relevant factor that should have been given 
significant weight”; by considering “an irrelevant or 
improper factor [and giving it] significant weight”; or by 
“commit[ting] a clear error of judgment.”  Robinson-Huntley 
 
41 
v. George Washington Carver Mut. Homes Ass’n, 287 Va. 425, 
432, 756 S.E.2d 415, 420 (2014) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  A trial court may also abuse its 
discretion by basing its decision on an erroneous legal 
conclusion.  Cook, 276 Va. at 484, 666 S.E.2d at 371. 
Code § 36-96.16(D) states, “In any court proceeding 
arising under this section, the court, in its discretion, may 
allow the prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees and 
costs.”  A “prevailing party” is “[a] party in whose favor a 
judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount of damages 
awarded.”  Sheets v. Castle, 263 Va. 407, 413, 559 S.E.2d 
616, 620 (2002) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Because the circuit court granted Windsor Plaza’s 
plea in bar and entered judgment in its favor, it is a 
“prevailing party” for purposes of Code § 36-96.16(D). 
In denying Windsor Plaza’s claim for attorney’s fees, 
the circuit court found that the Fishels asserted their 
claims in good faith.  The circuit court noted that the FHB 
found reasonable cause to believe Windsor Plaza had committed 
a discriminatory housing practice and the Attorney General 
filed a civil action based on the FHB’s determination.  
Furthermore, it found the Fishels reasonably chose to 
intervene in the Commonwealth’s suit rather than file a 
separate lawsuit and asserted their federal and state claims 
 
42 
in the same action.  The circuit court opined that their 
claims were not meritless simply because they were barred by 
the statute of limitations.  Although the court acknowledged 
the expense Windsor Plaza had incurred in defending itself 
during the litigation, it pointed out that the policy behind 
fair housing laws seeks to encourage private enforcement. 
The circuit court considered relevant factors and duly 
weighed them.  Windsor Plaza fails to identify any improper 
factor or erroneous legal conclusion that the circuit court 
used in reaching its decision.  Therefore, we cannot say that 
the circuit court abused its discretion in refusing to award 
attorney’s fees to Windsor Plaza. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons stated, we dismiss the Commonwealth’s 
assignment of error claiming that the circuit court erred in 
dismissing “the four individual defendants” because the 
Commonwealth failed to join all of these defendant parties in 
its appeal.  We affirm the circuit court’s rulings that the 
evidence relating to conversion of the bicycle storage space 
into an accessible parking space supported a claim for 
reasonable modification under Code § 36-96.3(B)(i), rather 
than a claim for reasonable accommodation under Code § 36-
96.3(B)(ii).  We also affirm the circuit court’s ruling 
granting Windsor Plaza’s motion to strike.  However, we hold 
 
43 
that although the error was harmless, the circuit court erred 
in ruling that Windsor Plaza’s request for attorney’s fees 
against the Commonwealth under Code § 36-96.16(D) was not 
barred by sovereign immunity. 
As for the Fishels’ appeal, we affirm the circuit 
court’s sustaining of Windsor Plaza’s plea in bar to the 
Fishels’ additional claims because the statutes of 
limitations had expired when the Fishels filed their 
intervening complaint.  The Fishels’ claims do not concern 
continuing violations, and the claims accrued on August 23, 
2007.  Thus the statutes of limitations in Code § 36-96.18 
and 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) bar the Fishels’ claims brought 
pursuant to Code §§ 36-96.3(A)(8) and (9) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 
3604(f)(1), (2) and (3)(B).  Finally, the circuit court did 
not abuse its discretion in refusing to award Windsor Plaza 
attorney’s fees against the Fishels. 
Record No. 131806 – Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
and final judgment. 
 
Record No. 131817 – Affirmed.