Title: Diamond State Towing Co., Inc. v. Cash

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

DIAMOND STATE TOWING COMPANY, Inc., and James
Ingram v. Lindel Kay CASH

95-1282                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered April 22, 1996


1.   New trial -- when new trial may be granted -- trial court's
     discretion limited. -- Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure
     59(a)(6) provides that a new trial may be granted to all or
     any of the parties on all or part of the issues on the
     application of the party aggrieved when the verdict or
     decision is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence
     or is contrary to the law; although the trial court is granted
     some discretion in the matter, that discretion is limited, and
     the trial court may not substitute its view of the evidence
     for the jury's except when the verdict is clearly against the
     preponderance of the evidence.

2.   New trial -- test on review. -- The test applied in reviewing
     the trial court's granting of the motion is whether the trial
     court abused its discretion; a showing of abuse of discretion
     is more difficult when a new trial has been granted because
     the party opposing the motion will have another opportunity to
     prevail.

3.   New trial -- trial court did not abuse its discretion in
     granting of. -- Where appellant driver admitted that he saw
     the headlights from the first accident but took no action and
     further admitted that he saw appellee's taillights but did not
     realize they were not moving, the supreme court, under the
     circumstances, could not say that the trial court abused its
     discretion in granting a new trial on the basis that appellant
     driver failed to keep a proper lookout and that appellee's
     negligence, if any, did not equal or exceed that of appellant.


     Appeal from Ouachita Circuit Court; David F. Guthrie, Judge;
affirmed.
     Wood, Smith, Schnipper & Clay, by: Lynn Williams, for
appellants.
     Harrell & Lindsey, P.A., by: Searcy W. Harrell, Jr., and
Phillip J. Foster, for appellee.

     Andree Layton Roaf, Justice.*ADVREP5*
April 22, 1996.







DIAMOND STATE TOWING COMPANY,
INC., AND JAMES INGRAM
                    APPELLANTS,

V.

LINDEL KAY CASH,
                    APPELLEE.



95-1282


APPEAL FROM THE OUACHITA COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT,
NO. CIV-92-128-2,
HON. DAVID F. GUTHRIE, JUDGE,



AFFIRMED.


                       Andree Layton Roaf

     This case arises from an automobile collision.  Appellee
Lindel Kay Cash filed an action for personal injury against the
appellants, Diamond State Towing Company, Inc. (Diamond State
Towing), and James Ingram.  A jury returned a verdict in favor of
Diamond State Towing and Ingram.  Subsequently, Cash filed a motion
for new trial pursuant to ARCP Rule 59(a)(6), asserting that the
verdict was clearly contrary to the preponderance of the evidence;
the trial court granted the motion.  The sole issue on appeal is
whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting a new
trial.  We affirm.
     At approximately 4:30 a.m. on June 24, 1989, Lindel Cash was
traveling east on Interstate 30 east of Texarkana.  Ms. Cash
testified that she could see something in the road as she
approached an overpass; she was in the left lane.  Subsequently,
she recognized that there was an accident and stopped her car.  Ms.
Cash testified that she was sitting with her foot on the brake when
one of her passengers, Floyd Waites, yelled, "[H]e's going to hit
us."  Ms. Cash looked in the rear-view mirror and saw lights. 
James Ingram, a shareholder in Diamond State Towing, was driving a
1966 Hendrixson heavy-duty wrecker.  Mr. Ingram's vehicle struck
the rear of Ms. Cash's vehicle.
     Ingram testified that he was returning to Hope, Arkansas, from
Nash, Texas, where he had spent four or five hours pulling a truck
and trailer out of a ditch.  He testified that he was not sleepy,
had not been drinking any alcohol, and had taken no drugs other
than his blood pressure medication.  Ingram stated that he saw the
headlights flash from the first accident, thought it might have
been a lightning flash, and did not "hit the brakes or let off the
accelerator"; he kept going, then he saw taillights.  Ingram
testified that he "did not think much, then I got closer and
noticed the taillights were not moving."  When he realized that
Cash's car was stopped, Ingram slammed on his brakes.  Ingram also
testified that he was traveling fifty miles per hour, which he
thought was a reasonable speed.
     Ingram stated that there was a barricade on the left and a van
stopped on the right.  He testified that he was not tailgating the
Cash vehicle and the first time he saw her was when he "came on
her."  In addition, Ingram stated that he saw Cash's taillights,
but he did not see any hazard lights, signal lights, or brake
lights.  Ingram further testified that no one else hit anyone, but
the driver of the eighteen wheel truck behind Ingram stated "it was
a miracle he got it stopped" without hitting Ingram.
     Corporal Robert Lavender of the Arkansas State Police
testified that a one car accident occurred at the apex of the
overpass.  He stated that the vehicle swerved and hit the concrete
wall; the left lane of the interstate was completely blocked and
part of the outside lane was blocked.  Corporal Lavender testified
that the accident involving Ms. Cash occurred within 100 yards of
the single vehicle accident.  Lavender stated that there was
aluminum railing on the shoulder of the highway and there was not
enough room for Ingram to pass on the right of Ms. Cash's vehicle. 
Lavender testified that "failed to yield" was marked on the
accident report, but he meant following to closely.  In addition,
Lavender testified that there was a 282-foot skid mark from the
left front of the wrecker; he did not find any skid marks which led
from Ms. Cash's vehicle.  Finally, Lavender stated that it was not
normal for a car to come to a complete stop on the interstate.
     Floyd Waites, Ms. Cash's son-in-law, testified that Ms. Cash
took a quarter- to a half-mile to brake easily, and she stopped
without skidding or losing control.  He testified that Ingram's
wrecker struck the Cash vehicle approximately 15 to 20 seconds
later.
     The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants;
however, the trial court concluded the verdict was against the
clear preponderance of the evidence and granted a new trial.  In
making its ruling, the trial court observed that the key testimony
was that of Mr. Ingram.  Ingram stated the first thing that he saw
was "white lights" flashing; he thought it was when the first car
hit the bridge.  Ingram testified that "I got a glimpse of
something up there, you know, a flash and I figured that's what it
was."  Ingram stated that he did not slow down; he testified that
he "kept going and then I seen some taillights and I didn't think
nothing much of it right then and then as I got closer I noticed
the taillights wasn't moving."
     The trial court found that Ingram could not take evasive
action to the right because of another vehicle nor could he take
evasive action to the left because of the barricade.  However, the
trial judge also recognized that Ms. Cash was confined to the lane
in which she had stopped.  The trial court concluded the issue was
whether Ingram was negligent in not recognizing the danger earlier. 
The trial court stated that Ingram was put on notice by the flash
of lights, which he thought were from an accident, but he did not
slow down.  Further, the trial court concluded Ingram's inability
to keep a proper lookout may have been affected by his long workday
without any sleep.  The trial judge also found Ms. Cash was not
negligent.  He stated that Ms. Cash's failure to activate her
hazard lights was of little consequence; Ms. Cash's brake lights
would have been clearly visible to following traffic.
     Appellants, Diamond State Towing and James Ingram, bring this
appeal from the trial court's order granting Cash's motion for a
new trial.  Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6) provides that
a new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties on all or
part of the issues on the application of the party aggrieved when
the verdict or decision is clearly against the preponderance of the
evidence or is contrary to the law.  Bristow v. Flurry, 320 Ark.
51, 894 S.W.2d 894 (1995).  Although the trial court is granted
some discretion in the matter, that discretion is limited, and the
trial court may not substitute its view of the evidence for the
jury's except when the verdict is clearly against the preponderance
of the evidence.  Id.;  Richardson v. Flanery, 316 Ark. 310, 871 S.W.2d 589 (1994).  The test we apply in reviewing the trial
court's granting of the motion is whether the trial court abused
its discretion.  Bristow, supra.  A showing of abuse of discretion
is more difficult when a new trial has been granted because the
party opposing the motion will have another opportunity to prevail. 
Id.
     On appeal, the appellants cite three cases in which this Court
has found an abuse of discretion where a trial court granted a new
trial, Razorback Cab of Ft. Smith, Inc. v. Martin, 313 Ark. 445,