Title: State ex rel. Teamsters Local Union v. Bd. of Comm'rs

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Teamsters Local Union No. 436 v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., Slip Opinion 
No. 2012-Ohio-1861.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-1861 
THE STATE EX REL. TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 436 ET AL., APPELLEES, v. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State ex rel. Teamsters Local Union No. 436 v. Cuyahoga 
Cty. Bd. of Commrs., Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-1861.] 
Appeals from decisions of political subdivisions—R.C. Chapter 2506—Exclusion 
of one department from public employer’s early-retirement plan—
Taxpayer’s action—Standing—Declaratory judgment—Exhaustion of 
administrative remedies. 
(No. 2011-0569—Submitted December 6, 2011—Decided May 1, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 94703, 
194 Ohio App.3d 258, 2011-Ohio-820. 
__________________ 
MCGEE BROWN, J. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, the Board of County Commissioners of Cuyahoga 
County, appeals from a declaratory judgment in favor of appellees, Teamsters 
Local Union No. 436 and union member Kevin Lesh (collectively, “the union”), 
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holding that the commissioners’ Employee Retirement Incentive Plan (“ERIP”) 
was in violation of R.C. 145.297.1 
{¶ 2} For the reasons set forth, we reverse the court of appeals. 
Background 
{¶ 3} On November 6, 2008, the commissioners passed a resolution 
establishing an early-retirement incentive program, enrollment for which would 
be open from January 15, 2009, to January 14, 2010.  The resolution made the 
plan available to all employees of the commissioners, except for the Sanitary 
Engineering Division. 
{¶ 4} The union represents a bargaining unit of employees who work for 
the Sanitary Engineering Division of the commissioners.  Pursuant to R.C. 
6117.01(C), the commissioners supervise the Sanitary Engineering Division, set 
the compensation of its employees, and approve collective-bargaining agreements 
with the union.  A few days before passage of the resolution, some employees of 
the Sanitary Engineering Division, none of whom were union members, and none 
                                                 
1   
 R.C. 145.297(B) provides:  
An employing unit may establish a retirement incentive plan for its eligible 
employees. In the case of a county or county agency, decisions on whether to establish a 
retirement incentive plan for any employees other than employees of a board of alcohol, 
drug addiction, and mental health services or county board of developmental disabilities 
and on the terms of the plan shall be made by the board of county commissioners. 
      
R.C. 145.297(A) provides:  
As used in this section, “employing unit” means: 
(1) A municipal corporation, agency of a municipal corporation designated by the 
legislative authority, park district, conservancy district, sanitary district, health district, 
township, department of a township designated by the board of township trustees, 
metropolitan housing authority, public library, county law library, union cemetery, joint 
hospital, or other political subdivision or unit of local government. 
* * * 
(3)(a) With respect to employees of a board of alcohol, drug addiction, and mental 
health services, that board. 
(b) With respect to employees of a county board of developmental disabilities, that 
board. 
(c) With respect to other county employees, the county or any county agency 
designated by the board of county commissioners. 
(4) In the case of an employee whose employing unit is in question, the employing 
unit is the unit through whose payroll the employee is paid. 
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3 
 
of whom are parties to this appeal, had filed a grievance on behalf of all Sanitary 
Engineering Division employees regarding eligibility for the retirement plan.  The 
county administrator, James McCafferty, held a hearing on the grievance on 
January 9, 2009.  Approximately 15 Sanitary Engineering Division employees, at 
least four of whom were union members, attended the hearing and were given an 
opportunity to be heard.  On January 20, 2009, the administrator issued a 
decision, determining that the Sanitary Engineering Division employees were not 
permitted to participate in the retirement plan.  The administrator mailed the 
decision to each employee who had attended the hearing, including the four 
identified union members, Kevin Lesh, Jerry Tharp, Richard Dryer, and Thomas 
Spracale.  None of the employees attempted to appeal the administrator’s 
decision. 
{¶ 5} Almost one year later, on December 22, 2009, the union sent a 
taxpayer demand letter to the Cuyahoga County prosecutor.  The union urged the 
prosecutor to file an action to compel the commissioners to extend the retirement 
plan to the Sanitary Engineering Division employees, or to recover the funds used 
for the retirement plan due to its allegedly unlawful exclusion of the Sanitary 
Engineering Division.  The prosecutor declined to initiate the requested action. 
{¶ 6} On December 30, 2009, the union filed a taxpayer action against 
the commissioners, on behalf of all union-member Sanitary Engineering Division 
employees, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief.  Specifically, the union 
sought a declaration that the commissioners violated R.C. 145.297 when they 
authorized the ERIP for all board employees excluding the Sanitary Engineering 
Division and sought an order compelling the commissioners to include the 
Sanitary Engineering Division in the ERIP.  The union sought similar relief in a 
separate cause of action for declaratory judgment and in a request for a writ of 
mandamus in its January 7, 2010 amended complaint.  In addition to denying the 
merits of the union’s claims, the commissioners asserted that the union did not 
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have standing to bring its taxpayer action and that it was otherwise barred from 
requesting equitable remedies because the Sanitary Engineering Division 
employees had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. 
{¶ 7} Noting that the union had brought the present action mere days 
before the ERIP was due to terminate, the trial court denied the union’s request 
for injunctive relief and its action in mandamus, in an entry issued on January 22, 
2010.  However, the trial court did grant the union’s prayer for declaratory relief, 
and held that the commissioners’ failure to include the Sanitary Engineering 
Division as part of the “employing unit” that was eligible for the ERIP did not 
comply with the definition of “employing unit” in R.C. 145.297 and that the 
commissioners were therefore in violation of the statute. 
{¶ 8} The commissioners appealed to the Eighth District Court of 
Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s judgment.  State ex rel. Teamsters Local 
Union No. 436 v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 194 Ohio App.3d 258, 2011-
Ohio-820, 955 N.E.2d 1020.  We accepted discretionary jurisdiction to hear the 
commissioners’ appeal.  128 Ohio St.3d 1556, 2011-Ohio-2905, 949 N.E.2d 43. 
Analysis 
{¶ 9} The commissioners raise three propositions of law: first, that the 
commissioners had the budgetary discretion to exclude one or more of its 
subordinate divisions from participating in the ERIP; second, that the union-
represented Sanitary Engineering Division employees did not have standing to 
initiate a taxpayer suit, because they did not seek to vindicate a public right; and 
third, that the Sanitary Engineering Division employees were required to exhaust 
the available administrative remedies prior to filing the action.  Because our 
resolution of the issues of taxpayer standing and exhaustion of administrative 
remedies is dispositive, we will address them first. 
 
 
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5 
 
Taxpayer Standing 
{¶ 10} Before a court may consider the merits of a party’s legal claim, the 
party seeking relief must establish that he or she has standing to bring the claim.  
State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 469, 
715 N.E.2d 1062 (1999).  The issue of standing determines “whether a litigant is 
entitled to have a court determine the merits of the issues presented.”  Ohio 
Contrs. Assn. v. Bicking, 71 Ohio St.3d 318, 320, 643 N.E.2d 1088 (1994).  
Whether a party has established standing to bring an action before the court is a 
question of law, which we review de novo.  Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. 
State, 112 Ohio St.3d 59, 2006-Ohio-6499, 858 N.E.2d 330, ¶ 23. 
{¶ 11} An analysis of standing in a statutory taxpayer action against a 
county entity must begin with R.C. 309.12, which allows a county prosecutor to 
initiate legal action to restrain the contemplated misapplication of county funds or 
completion of illegal contracts or to recover funds or damages from illegal 
contracts that have been executed or funds that have been misapplied.  If a 
taxpayer presents a written request to the county prosecutor to take action 
pursuant to R.C. 309.12 and is denied assistance from the county prosecutor, the 
taxpayer may initiate his own action on behalf of the county.  R.C. 309.13.  In 
addition to the satisfaction of the foregoing formal requirement, the taxpayer must 
also demonstrate that the remedy sought will benefit the public in order to have 
standing.  State ex rel. White v. Cleveland, 34 Ohio St.2d 37, 295 N.E.2d 665 
(1973). 
{¶ 12} “ ‘ “There are serious objections against allowing mere interlopers 
to meddle with the affairs of the state, and it is not usually allowed unless under 
circumstances when the public injury by its refusal will be serious.” ’ (Emphasis 
added.)”  State ex rel. Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 86 Ohio St.3d at 
472, 715 N.E.2d 1062, quoting State ex rel. Trauger v. Nash, 66 Ohio St. 612, 
616, 64 N.E. 558 (1902), quoting People ex rel. Ayres v. Bd. of State Auds., 42 
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Mich. 422, 429, 4 N.W. 274 (1888).  Accordingly, only “when the issues sought 
to be litigated are of great importance and interest to the public [may they] be 
resolved in a form of action that involves no rights or obligations peculiar to 
named parties.”  Sheward at 471.  Conversely, when a remedy being pursued is 
one that is merely for the individual taxpayer’s benefit, the taxpayer cannot claim 
that he is vindicating a public right, and he will not have standing to pursue a 
taxpayer action.  State ex rel. Caspar v. Dayton, 53 Ohio St.3d 16, 20, 558 N.E.2d 
49 (1990). 
{¶ 13} In Caspar, police officers alleged that the city of Dayton was in 
violation of R.C. 9.44 by not recognizing the officers’ prior public service when 
computing the amount of each officer’s supplemental vacation leave.  Id. at 16.  
The police officers sought a writ of mandamus to compel the city to correct its 
computation process and provide additional leave benefits.  This court held that 
the goal of compelling fringe benefits for the police officers’ own benefit did not 
constitute the goal of enforcing a public right and that the police officers’ right to 
vacation pay did not constitute a public right for purposes of a statutory taxpayer 
action.  Id. at 20. 
{¶ 14} Since Caspar, our state’s appellate courts have generally 
concluded that taxpayers were not attempting to benefit the public in similar 
circumstances. E.g., Cleveland ex rel. O'Malley v. White, 148 Ohio App.3d 564, 
2002-Ohio-3633, 774 N.E.2d 337, ¶ 42-47 (8th Dist.) (holding that electricians’ 
union lacked taxpayer standing to enjoin the city from using nonelectricians to 
perform certain work, because public safety was not a true concern, and the union 
was merely protecting its members’ interests in keeping the work for themselves);  
Assn. of Cleveland Fire Fighters, Local 93 v. Cleveland, 156 Ohio App.3d 368, 
2004-Ohio-994, 806 N.E.2d 170, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.) (holding that firefighters’ union 
lacked taxpayer standing to compel back pay and wage differentiation between 
different ranks of officers because the allegation of a public benefit was a pretext 
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for seeking a private benefit); Cincinnati ex rel. Radford v. Cincinnati, 1st Dist. 
No. C-030749, 2004-Ohio-3501, 2004 WL 1486072, ¶ 12-13 (holding that 
retirement-system trustees lacked taxpayer standing because their goal was not to 
enforce a public right but was merely to benefit the retirement system and its 
members); Home Builders Assn. of Dayton & Miami Valley v. Lebanon, 167 Ohio 
App.3d 247, 2006-Ohio-595, 854 N.E.2d 1097, ¶ 54 (12th Dist.) (holding that 
homebuilders lacked standing in a taxpayer action seeking a declaration of 
unconstitutionality of a city ordinance requiring telecommunications connection 
fees, as the action was primarily to enforce the homebuilders’ private interests, 
not a public right). 
{¶ 15} This court distinguished Caspar in a subsequent decision, State ex 
rel. Fisher v. Cleveland, 109 Ohio St.3d 33, 2006-Ohio-1827, 845 N.E.2d 500.  
The relators in Fisher sought to enjoin the city from requiring municipal 
employees to submit copies of their tax returns in order to prove that they satisfied 
the city’s residency requirement.  Although the relators’ taxpayer action in Fisher 
was similar to Caspar in that the controversy arose from a public-employment 
relationship, we reached a different conclusion and held that the relators did have 
standing to pursue the action.  Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.  Specifically, 
the city’s actions constituted an unnecessary violation of privacy and therefore an 
abuse of its corporate powers, which is an appropriate target for a statutory 
municipal taxpayer action.  Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus.  This court 
made it clear that we were not suggesting that citizens always have taxpayer 
standing to challenge the terms of public employment, when we expressly 
distinguished Caspar.  Id. at ¶ 12-18.  Moreover, our decision in Fisher was 
supported by factors that are not present in the case at hand. 
{¶ 16} Unlike the relators in Fisher, the union here has failed to allege 
any concrete taxpayer interest that is threatened by the county’s ERIP resolution.  
Instead, the union merely alleges that the existence of a statutorily noncompliant 
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county resolution constitutes an injury in and of itself.  Although it is well 
established that taxpayers “may judicially contest the validity of any official act 
which directly affects prejudicially their rights as taxpayers by increasing the 
burden of taxes or otherwise,” taxpayers cannot contest official acts “merely upon 
the ground that they are unauthorized and invalid.”  Pierce v. Hagans, 79 Ohio St. 
9, 22, 86 N.E. 519 (1908).  Thus, without more than the bare claim that the county 
has failed to comply with R.C. 145.297, the union cannot establish taxpayer 
standing. 
{¶ 17} Although a county’s failure to comply with a statute would 
certainly not benefit the public, allowing constant judicial intervention into 
government affairs for matters that do not involve a clear public right would also 
not benefit the public.  As in Caspar, there is no vindication of public rights or 
conferral of public benefits to be found in the union’s attempt to obtain retirement 
benefits for a small number of employees.  Therefore, we hold that the union 
lacked taxpayer standing to challenge the board’s ERIP resolution, and the courts 
below erred in failing to dismiss the union’s taxpayer action for that reason. 
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 
{¶ 18} Because we hold that the union did not have standing to pursue its 
taxpayer action, the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies is moot as to 
the taxpayer action.  However, to the extent that the union’s complaint sought 
relief that was separate from the taxpayer cause of action, we examine whether 
the union and the Sanitary Engineering Division employees were required to 
exhaust administrative remedies prior to initiating a declaratory-judgment action. 
{¶ 19} It is a “long-settled rule of judicial administration that no one is 
entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed 
administrative remedy has been exhausted.”  Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding 
Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51, 58 S.Ct. 459, 82 L.Ed. 638 (1938).  Thus, a “party 
must exhaust the available avenues of administrative relief through administrative 
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appeal” before seeking separate judicial intervention.  Noernberg v. Brook Park, 
63 Ohio St.2d 26, 29, 406 N.E.2d 1095 (1980).  “Exhaustion is generally required 
as a matter of preventing premature interference with agency processes, so that 
the agency may function efficiently and so that it may have an opportunity to 
correct its own errors, to afford the parties and the courts the benefit of its 
experience and expertise, and to compile a record which is adequate for judicial 
review.” Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 
(1975).  Where a party fails to exhaust available administrative remedies, 
allowing declaratory relief would serve “only to circumvent an adverse decision 
of an administrative agency and to bypass the legislative scheme.”  Fairview Gen. 
Hosp. v. Fletcher, 63 Ohio St.3d 146, 152, 586 N.E.2d 80 (1992). 
{¶ 20} We first look to what administrative remedies were available to the 
union-represented Sanitary Engineering Division employees.  When a board of 
county commissioners adopts regulations that allow parties to request review from 
an administrative authority, the decision of that authority constitutes a final order 
that is appealable, under R.C. 2506.01, to an applicable court of common pleas.  
R.C. 307.56.  Pursuant to R.C. 145.297(B), “[e]very retirement incentive plan 
shall include provisions for the timely and impartial resolution of grievances and 
disputes arising under the plan.” 
{¶ 21} The ERIP in question complied with the above statutory 
requirements by providing:  “Any employee determined to be ineligible to 
participate in this early retirement incentive plan may file a grievance * * *.  Such 
grievances shall be heard and decided by the Cuyahoga County Administrator 
* * *.  The decision of the Cuyahoga County Administrator shall be final.”  
Although the ERIP was made available only to employees in an “Employing 
Unit” defined to exclude the Sanitary Engineering Division, the ERIP did not 
define “Employee” to exclude any division’s employees, and thus the grievance 
process was made available to all employees under the board’s supervision.  
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Accordingly, the Sanitary Engineering Division employees were required to file a 
grievance with the administrator, and to file an R.C. 2506.01 administrative 
appeal from the administrator’s decision, in order to exhaust their administrative 
remedies. 
{¶ 22} Although none of the union-represented employees was named in 
the grievance that was filed on behalf of all of the Sanitary Engineering Division 
employees, some of the union-represented employees availed themselves of the 
grievance process by participating in the hearing with the administrator.  After the 
administrator issued a final order denying the grievance, none of the Sanitary 
Engineering Division employees filed an administrative appeal.  Accordingly, the 
employees failed to exhaust all of their administrative remedies. 
{¶ 23} It is well settled that “[a] party entitled under R.C. Chapter 2506 to 
appeal [an administrative order] is not entitled to a declaratory judgment where 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies is asserted and maintained.” 
Schomaeker v. First Natl. Bank of Ottawa, 66 Ohio St.2d 304, 421 N.E.2d 530 
(1981), paragraph three of the syllabus.  Under this general rule, the union was 
not entitled to pursue its action for declaratory judgment, because it filed the 
action almost one year after the final order of the administrator without first 
attempting a timely R.C. 2605.01 appeal from the order.  However, in line with 
the Eighth District’s holding below, the union asserts that an exception to the 
general rule applies and that the Sanitary Engineering Division employees were 
not required to exhaust their administrative remedies, because continuing to 
participate in the grievance process would have been futile. 
{¶ 24} It is true that parties need not pursue their administrative remedies 
if doing so would be futile or a vain act.  Driscoll v. Austintown Assocs., 42 Ohio 
St.2d 263, 275, 328 N.E.2d 395 (1975).  However, “a ‘vain act’ occurs when an 
administrative body lacks the authority to grant the relief sought; a vain act does 
not entail the petitioner’s probability of receiving the remedy.  The focus is on the 
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power of the administrative body to afford the requested relief, and not on the 
happenstance of the relief being granted.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Nemazee v. Mt. Sinai 
Med. Ctr., 56 Ohio St.3d 109, 115, 564 N.E.2d 477 (1990).  Neither the decision 
below nor the appellees explain why it would have been impossible to obtain 
relief through an administrative appeal, apart from merely stating that the Sanitary 
Engineering Division employees were excluded from participating in the ERIP.  
As noted above, the board’s ERIP made the grievance process available to the 
employees, and union-represented employees were given an opportunity to be 
heard during the grievance hearing.  Nothing would have prevented the union 
from attacking the validity of the ERIP in an administrative appeal.  Therefore, 
we hold that the Sanitary Engineering Division employees’ continued 
participation in the grievance process would not have been a vain act, and we 
reverse the Eighth District’s decision allowing the union to pursue the declaratory 
judgment action without exhausting the available administrative remedies. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 25} We hold that the union lacked standing to bring a taxpayer action 
against the commissioners and that to the extent that the union had standing in its 
own right, the union failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. Therefore, the 
issue of whether the commissioners’ ERIP was in violation of R.C. 145.297 is 
moot.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Eighth District Court of 
Appeals. 
Judgment reversed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, 
and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
Mangano Law Offices Co., L.P.A., Basil W. Mangano, and Joseph J. 
Guarino III, for appellee. 
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William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Dale 
Pelsozy, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
______________________