Title: Cincinnati v. Baskin

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Cincinnati v. Baskin, 112 Ohio St.3d 279, 2006-Ohio-6422.] 
 
 
CITY OF CINCINNATI, APPELLANT, v. BASKIN, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Cincinnati v. Baskin, 112 Ohio St.3d 279, 2006-Ohio-6422.] 
Cincinnati Municipal Code 708-37, which prohibits the possession of any 
semiautomatic rifle with a magazine capacity of more than ten rounds, is not 
in conflict with R.C. 2923.17(A) for purposes of Section 3, Article XVIII of the 
Ohio Constitution. 
(No. 2004-1829—Submitted October 26, 2005—Decided December 8, 2006.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County,  
No. C-030864, 158 Ohio App.3d 539, 2004-Ohio-5055. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Cincinnati Municipal Code 708-37, which prohibits the possession of any 
semiautomatic rifle with a magazine capacity of more than ten rounds, is 
not in conflict with R.C. 2923.17(A) for purposes of Section 3, Article 
XVIII of the Ohio Constitution. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J. 
{¶ 1} On May 31, 2003, defendant-appellee, Colt Lee Baskin, was 
charged with violating Cincinnati Municipal Code 708-37, which prohibits the 
possession of semiautomatic firearms, including any semiautomatic rifle with a 
capacity of more than ten rounds.1  The complaint alleged that Baskin was 
                                                 
1  {¶ a} Cincinnati Municipal Code 708-37 provides: 
   {¶ b} “(a) No person shall sell, deliver, rent, lease, offer, or display for sale, or transfer 
ownership of, acquire or possess a semiautomatic firearm. 
   {¶ c} “* * *  
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observed to be in possession of “a semi automatic firearm assault rifle SKS 
capabele [sic] of a capacity of more than ten rounds.  Magazine affixed not 
detachable.” 
{¶ 2} Baskin moved to dismiss the charge, claiming that the ordinance is 
in conflict with the state statutes governing the possession of firearms.  The trial 
court granted the motion on October 23, 2003, finding that Cincinnati Municipal 
Code 708-37 “mak[es] something illegal, which * * * under State law would be 
permitted.” 
{¶ 3} In a split decision, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of 
the trial court.  In so doing, the court of appeals identified R.C. 2923.11(E) as 
“[t]he Ohio statute upon which the disagreement turns in this case.”  Cincinnati v. 
Baskin, 158 Ohio App.3d 539, 2004-Ohio-5055, 817 N.E.2d 433, at ¶ 5.  R.C. 
2923.11(E) defines “automatic firearm,” the possession of which is prohibited 
under R.C. 2923.17(A), to include “any semi-automatic firearm designed or 
specifically adapted to fire more than thirty-one cartridges without reloading.”2  
The court of appeals determined that “R.C. 2923.11 is a general law” because it 
“addresses conduct of the citizenry, rather than actions of a municipal legislative 
                                                                                                                                     
   {¶ d} “(h) The term ‘semiautomatic’ means any firearm designed or specially adapted to fire a 
single cartridge and automatically chamber a succeeding cartridge and ready to fire, with a single 
function of the trigger. 
   {¶ e} “(i) For the purpose of this section, ‘semiautomatic firearm’ shall have the following 
meanings: 
   {¶ f} “(1) Any semiautomatic rifle or carbine that was originally designed with or has a fixed 
magazine or detachable magazine with a capacity of more than ten rounds.” 
 
2 {¶ a} R.C. 2923.17(A) provides, “No person shall knowingly acquire, have, carry, or use any 
dangerous ordnance.”  R.C. 2923.11(K) defines “dangerous ordnance” to mean, among other 
things, “(1) [a]ny automatic * * * firearm.”  R.C. 2923.11(E) provides: 
   {¶ b} “ ‘Automatic firearm’ means any firearm designed or specifically adapted to fire a 
succession of cartridges with a single function of the trigger.  ‘Automatic firearm’ also means any 
semi-automatic firearm designed or specially adapted to fire more than thirty-one cartridges 
without reloading, other than a firearm chambering only .22 caliber short, long, or long-rifle 
cartridges.” 
January Term, 2006 
3 
body.”  Id. at ¶ 10.  Agreeing with Baskin that “Ohio allows its citizens to have a 
[semiautomatic] firearm that can fire up to 31 rounds,” id. at ¶ 6, the court of 
appeals concluded that “the municipal ordinance and the state statute differ with 
regard to the lawful number of rounds permitted by one possessing a 
semiautomatic firearm:  the ordinance prohibits what the state permits.  Therefore, 
* * * the municipal ordinance must give way to the state statute.”  Id. at ¶ 13. 
{¶ 4} The dissenting judge stated, “I cannot agree that a definition is a 
general law.  The majority holds that R.C. 2923.11(E) is a general law because it 
addresses the conduct of the citizenry.  But when did defining a term become ‘the 
conduct of the citizenry’?  Definitions have nothing to do with conduct.”  Id. at ¶ 
14.  The dissenting judge opined, “[E]ven if a definition were a general law, the 
[municipal and state] provisions do not conflict.”  Id. at ¶ 20.  In the dissent’s 
view, prohibiting the possession of a semiautomatic firearm that holds more than 
31 cartridges is not tantamount to allowing the possession of a semiautomatic 
firearm that holds up to 31 cartridges.  Id. at ¶ 19.  Thus, according to the dissent, 
the ordinance does not prohibit what the statute permits.  Id. at ¶ 23. 
{¶ 5} The cause is now before this court upon the acceptance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
{¶ 6} The issue for our consideration is whether Cincinnati Municipal 
Code 708-37’s prohibition against the possession of a semiautomatic rifle with a 
magazine capacity of more than ten rounds is unenforceable as being in conflict 
with a general law of the state. 
{¶ 7} Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, which is known 
as the home-rule provision, provides: 
{¶ 8} “Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local 
self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, 
sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.” 
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{¶ 9} In Canton v. State, 95 Ohio St.3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 
N.E.2d 963, at ¶ 9, the court summarized the test for determining whether a 
municipal ordinance is displaced by a state measure: 
{¶ 10} “A state statute takes precedence over a local ordinance when (1) 
the ordinance is in conflict with the statute, (2) the ordinance is an exercise of the 
police power, rather than of local self-government, and (3) the statute is a general 
law.” 
{¶ 11} There is no dispute in this case that Cincinnati Municipal Code 
708-37 is an exercise of the police power, rather than of local self-government, 
and is therefore susceptible to displacement by conflicting general laws.  In 
addressing the other two prongs of the test, however, both the parties and the court 
of appeals have complicated matters by making R.C. 2923.11(E) the focal point of 
their inquiry.  As a result, they have embroiled themselves in a pointless 
theoretical debate as to whether a statutory definition constitutes a general law for 
purposes of home-rule analysis. 
{¶ 12} In determining whether the general-law requirement is met in this 
case, the court of appeals should have focused on R.C. 2923.17(A), which 
provides that “[n]o person shall knowingly acquire, have, carry, or use any 
dangerous ordnance.”  It is R.C. 2923.17(A), not R.C. 2923.11(E), that must 
qualify as a general law in this case.  One who has a semiautomatic firearm with 
the qualities described in R.C. 2923.11(E) is guilty of unlawful possession of 
dangerous ordnance in violation of R.C. 2923.17(A).  See R.C. 2923.17(D).  For 
present purposes, R.C. 2923.17(A) essentially provides, “No person shall 
knowingly acquire, have, carry, or use any [semi-automatic firearm designed or 
specially adapted to fire more than thirty-one cartridges without reloading].”  
Recognition of this fact would have obviated the amorphous controversy over the 
status of a definition. 
January Term, 2006 
5 
{¶ 13} There is no question that R.C. 2923.17(A) is a general law.  In 
Canton, supra, the court established a test to determine whether a provision of a 
state statute is a general law.  “To constitute a general law for purposes of home-
rule analysis, a statute must (1) be part of a statewide and comprehensive 
legislative enactment, (2) apply to all parts of the state alike and operate uniformly 
throughout the state, (3) set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, rather 
than purport only to grant or limit legislative power of a municipal corporation to 
set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, and (4) prescribe a rule of conduct 
upon citizens generally.”  Id., 95 Ohio St.3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 
963, at the syllabus. 
{¶ 14} Appellant, city of Cincinnati, concedes that “[l]aws regulating 
possession of firearms meet the first three requirements.”  And since we have 
already determined that only R.C. 2923.17(A) must qualify as a general law, we 
reject appellant’s contention that R.C. 2923.11(E) fails to satisfy the fourth 
requirement “because this statute merely establishes a definitional standard for 
semiautomatic firearms.”  Clearly, R.C. 2923.17(A) prescribes a rule of conduct 
upon citizens generally, i.e., that no person shall knowingly possess any dangerous 
ordnance, including any semiautomatic firearm that is designed or modified to 
accommodate more than 31 cartridges. 
{¶ 15} Appellant further argues, however, that even if R.C. 2923.11(E) 
and 2923.17(A) are construed together, the statute still fails as “a regulation on the 
conduct of ordinary citizenry.”  According to appellant, if the General Assembly 
intended to prevent municipalities from “regulating semiautomatic firearms 
capable of firing fewer than 31 cartridges, [it] would have overtly incorporated 
such preemption into the code’s language, as it did in enacting the concealed carry 
legislation.”  Instead, by virtue of its “silence on preempting the field of this 
restriction,” the General Assembly “implicitly recognizes that some firearms are 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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more dangerous in certain environments” and that municipalities will continue “to 
enact legislation [in this area] designed to meet the specific needs of their 
residents.”  Appellant concludes, therefore, that the statute “is not a general law 
that preempts the City of Cincinnati from enacting legislation regulating 
semiautomatic firearms capable of firing fewer than 31 cartridges.” 
{¶ 16} This argument basically summarizes appellant’s position on the 
issue of conflict, but has no real bearing on whether R.C. 2923.17(A) is a general 
law.  Essentially, appellant cites the absence of a preemption clause to support a 
construction of the statute that is compatible with the ordinance.  The construction 
urged by appellant is that the statute merely prohibits the possession of 
semiautomatic firearms with capacities exceeding 31 cartridges; it does not permit 
or declare a right to the possession of semiautomatic firearms that hold up to 31 
cartridges.  Under this construction, there is no conflict between the local and 
state provisions because the statute commits the regulation of lower-capacity 
firearms to municipal control. 
{¶ 17} In its attempt to apply a general-law analysis, however, appellant 
erroneously assumes that a statute must declare something to be a right in order to 
meet the rule-of-conduct requirement.  But forbidding an act is just as much 
prescribing a rule of conduct as is permitting an act.  Thus, even if appellant is 
correct that the statute has no preclusive effect on a municipality’s ability to 
regulate semiautomatic firearms capable of firing 31 or fewer cartridges, R.C. 
2923.17(A) is still a general law for purposes of Section 3, Article XVIII of the 
Ohio Constitution. 
{¶ 18} This brings us to the crucial issue, which is whether Cincinnati 
Municipal Code 708-37, to the extent that it prohibits the possession of any 
semiautomatic rifle with a magazine capacity of more than ten rounds, is in 
conflict with R.C. 2923.17(A). 
January Term, 2006 
7 
{¶ 19} It has long been established that “[i]n determining whether an 
ordinance is in ‘conflict’ with general laws, the test is whether the ordinance 
permits or licenses that which the statute forbids and prohibits, and vice versa.”  
Struthers v. Sokol (1923), 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519, at paragraph two of the 
syllabus.  See, also, State v. Burnett (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 419, 431, 755 N.E.2d 
857; Middleburg Hts. v. Ohio Bd. of Bldg. Standards (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 510, 
512, 605 N.E.2d 66.  In other words, “[n]o real conflict can exist unless the 
ordinance declares something to be right which the state law declares to be wrong, 
or vice versa.”  Sokol at 268, 140 N.E. 519. 
{¶ 20} It is also well established that “in order for such a conflict to arise, 
the state statute must positively permit what the ordinance prohibits, or vice versa, 
regardless of the extent of state regulation concerning the same object.”  
Cincinnati v. Hoffman (1972), 31 Ohio St.2d 163, 169, 60 O.O.2d 117, 285 
N.E.2d 714.  See, also, State ex rel. King v. Summit Cty. Council, 99 Ohio St.3d 
172, 2003-Ohio-3050, 789 N.E.2d 1108, at ¶ 39; Cleveland v. Raffa (1968), 13 
Ohio St.2d 112, 114, 42 O.O.2d 329, 235 N.E.2d 138. 
{¶ 21} In applying this test to the present dispute, the court of appeals 
necessarily had to interpret the statute to not only prohibit the possession of any 
semiautomatic firearm that can fire more than 31 rounds without reloading, but to 
also imply a right to the possession of any semiautomatic firearm that can fire up 
to 31 rounds without reloading.  Otherwise, it could not have found that the 
ordinance prohibits what the statute permits. 
{¶ 22} We acknowledge that in Am. Fin. Servs. Assn. v. Cleveland, 112 
Ohio St.3d 170, 2006-Ohio-6043, 858 N.E.2d 776, this court recently held that the 
Cleveland ordinances were in conflict with the state measures because Cleveland 
had “undertaken to regulate the making of a loan authorized by the General 
Assembly.”  Id. at ¶ 48. 
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{¶ 23} The instant case is distinguishable, however, because Cincinnati 
has not undertaken to regulate or prohibit any conduct that the state has 
authorized.  The relevant state statutes, i.e., R.C. 2923.11 and 2923.17, prohibit 
the possession of semiautomatic firearms that are designed or adapted to fire more 
than 31 cartridges without reloading.  They do not, however, permit or authorize 
the possession of semiautomatic firearms that are capable of firing 31 or fewer 
cartridges without reloading.  There is nothing in the weapons-control measures in 
the criminal code that manifests an intent to prevent municipalities from 
regulating the possession of semiautomatic firearms that hold fewer than 32 
rounds.  There is no provision in the statute declaring or otherwise suggesting that 
the limitation upon firing capacity fixed therein is the only limitation controlling 
the possession of a semiautomatic firearm, that the limitation shall not be 
diminished or altered by municipal regulation, or that municipalities may not 
prohibit the possession of lower-capacity firearms than are prohibited by the 
statute.  Nor is it entirely clear that the statute is even concerned with the 
regulation of semiautomatic firearms as a separate class of dangerous ordnance, 
other than to ensure that higher-capacity semiautomatic firearms are prohibited 
along with automatic firearms. 
{¶ 24} In the absence of any limiting provision or declaration to the 
contrary, we conclude that the General Assembly intended to allow municipalities 
to regulate the possession of lower-capacity semiautomatic firearms in accordance 
with local conditions, requiring only that under no condition shall municipalities 
allow the possession of any semiautomatic firearm that is capable of firing more 
than 31 cartridges without reloading.  Thus, the ordinance does not prohibit what 
the statute permits. 
{¶ 25} Accordingly, we hold that Cincinnati Municipal Code 708-37, 
which prohibits the possession of any semiautomatic rifle with a magazine 
January Term, 2006 
9 
capacity of more than ten rounds, is not in conflict with R.C. 2923.17(A) for 
purposes of Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶ 26} Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the syllabus and the judgment. 
O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
__________________ 
O’CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶27} Appellant, the city of Cincinnati, has asked this court to determine 
whether Cincinnati Municipal Code 708-37, which prohibits possession of any 
semiautomatic rifle with a magazine capacity of more than ten rounds, conflicts 
with R.C. 2923.17(A) for purposes of Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio 
Constitution, otherwise known as the Home Rule Amendment.  I conclude that 
the ordinance and the statute do not conflict, and therefore I concur in the 
judgment of the majority. 
GENERAL-LAW ANALYSIS 
{¶28} I agree with the majority that we should focus on R.C. 2923.17(A) 
when determining whether the ordinance conflicts with state law.  I further 
believe, however, that the reason we must focus on that section is because neither 
the definitional section, R.C. 2923.11(E), nor the prohibitory section, R.C. 
2923.17(A), could stand alone.  R.C. 2923.11 defines various terms, including 
“automatic firearm” and “dangerous ordnance.”  The statute reads:  “ ‘Automatic 
firearm’ * * * means any semi-automatic firearm designed or specially adapted to 
fire more than thirty-one cartridges without reloading * * *.”  R.C. 2923.11(E).  It 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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further defines “dangerous ordnance” as “[a]ny automatic or sawed-off firearm * * 
*.”  R.C. 2923.11(K)(1).  These definitions by themselves are meaningless in the 
context of a general-law analysis.  Similarly, the prohibition in R.C. 2923.17(A), 
which states that “[n]o person shall knowingly acquire, have, carry, or use any 
dangerous ordnance” would be void for vagueness on its own.  The statute bars 
knowingly possessing dangerous ordnance, but the statute by itself fails to define 
what “dangerous ordnance” includes.  Only when read in conjunction with R.C. 
2923.11 does this statute create an interpretable prohibition.  Accordingly, in 
deciding whether the general-law requirement is met in this case, the court of 
appeals should have focused on R.C. 2923.11(E) and (K) in conjunction with R.C. 
2923.17(A), rather than focusing only on R.C. 2923.11(E). 
{¶29} As there is no question that R.C. 2923.17(A), in conjunction with 
the definitions provided in R.C. 2923.11(E) and (K), qualifies as a general law 
under the test we set forth in Canton v. State, 95 Ohio St.3d 149, 2002-Ohio-
2005, 766 N.E.2d 963, I agree that the statutes, read together, qualify as general 
law. 
Home Rule: Does the Ordinance Conflict with the Statute? 
{¶30} This brings me to the crucial issue, which is whether Cincinnati 
Municipal Code 708-37, to the extent that it prohibits the possession of any 
semiautomatic rifle with a magazine capacity of more than ten rounds, conflicts 
with R.C. 2923.17(A). 
{¶31} The immense body of case law regarding conflict analysis 
dispensed by this court over the past 90 years has proven increasingly complex, 
yet the basic rule of conflict has not changed: “In determining whether an 
ordinance is in ‘conflict’ with general laws, the test is whether the ordinance 
permits or licenses that which the statute forbids and prohibits, and vice versa.”  
Struthers v. Sokol (1923), 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519, paragraph two of the 
January Term, 2006 
11 
syllabus.  See, also, State v. Burnett (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 419, 431, 755 N.E.2d 
857.  In other words, “[n]o real conflict can exist unless the ordinance declares 
something to be right which the state law declares to be wrong, or vice versa.”  
Sokol at 268, 140 N.E. 519. 
1.  Conflict by Implication 
{¶32} Although neither party used the term “conflict by implication” in 
its brief, both parties discussed whether the ordinance prohibits that which the 
statute implicitly permits.  If this court were to adopt the concept of conflict 
purely by implication, we would essentially be holding that a statute’s prohibiting 
one thing is the same as permitting everything else.  For example, if the state were 
to pass legislation stating that fireworks could not be used between 2:00 a.m. and 
6:00 a.m., that statute would also implicitly grant citizens the right to use 
fireworks between 6:00 a.m. and 2:00 a.m.  Accordingly, any ordinance that 
purported to prohibit the use of fireworks during different hours would conflict 
with the statute.  Likewise, in this case, Baskin argues that because the state 
statute prohibits possession only of semiautomatic firearms with a capacity of 
more than 31 rounds, the legislature also granted the citizens of this state a right to 
possess any semiautomatic firearm with a capacity of 31 or fewer rounds.  Thus, 
Baskin argues, the Cincinnati ordinance conflicts with the state statute by 
prohibiting that which the statute implicitly permits. 
{¶33} Although this court recently discussed the concept of conflict by 
implication in Am. Fin. Servs. Assn. v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio St.3d 170, 2006-
Ohio-6043, 858 N.E.2d 776, this case requires a more expansive analysis of the 
concept.  In Am. Fin., the legislature clearly indicated that it intended to occupy 
the field of loan regulation, so that any ordinance on that topic would conflict with 
the legislature’s intent to provide uniform loan regulation.  We did not need to 
consider whether a conflict could be purely by implication, because statutory 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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language distinctly showed that a conflict existed.  No such statutory language 
showing a conflict exists in this case, and we must therefore determine whether to 
recognize conflicts that arise purely by implication. 
{¶34} The Ohio constitutional provision rendering void any municipal 
ordinance in conflict with state statutes first appeared during the Constitutional 
Convention of 1912.  Vaubel, Municipal Home Rule in Ohio (1978) 679.  The 
original draft stated that the powers of local government were to be “subject to 
general laws,” but that section was altered to prohibit only municipal ordinances 
that conflicted with state statutes.  Id.  The original proposal further provided that 
“ ‘no such regulations shall * * * be deemed in conflict therewith unless the 
general assembly, by general law, affecting the welfare of the state as a whole, 
shall specifically deny all municipalities the right to act thereon.’ ”3  Id., quoting 2 
Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Ohio 
(1913) 1313.  The provision that voided only ordinances in actual conflict with 
state statutes was apparently “intended to overturn previous law, which directed 
that even in the absence of an express state denial, a stricter municipal regulation 
was in conflict.”  (Footnote deleted.)  Id.  The change in the section’s language 
during the Constitutional Convention shows that the delegates rejected the 
concept of conflict purely by implication.  The delegates believed that as long as 
the state legislature did not indicate an intent to occupy the field or to prevent a 
stricter standard, a municipality could freely pass any ordinance stricter than state 
legislation, as long as the ordinance could coexist with state legislation. 
{¶35} Other states similarly interpret “conflict” when applying their 
home-rule laws:   
                                                 
3 This is essentially what occurred in Am. Fin., 112 Ohio St.3d 170, 2006-Ohio-6043, 858 N.E.2d 
776. 
January Term, 2006 
13 
{¶36} “A municipality may * * * enact ordinances related to subjects in 
which the state does not have an overriding interest which requires it to retain 
exclusive control.  For instance, a state does not have an overriding state interest 
in gun control which requires it to retain exclusive control in order to prevent a 
home-rule unit from adopting an [sic] conflicting enactment; therefore, a 
municipality can exercise its police power to prohibit handguns.  However, if a 
local ordinance permits what a statute forbids or prohibits what a statute 
authorizes, there is a conflict between the statute and ordinance and the ordinance 
is preempted; if both are prohibitory and the ordinance merely goes further in its 
prohibition, though not counter to the prohibition in the statute, there is no 
conflict. 
{¶37} “Absent a clear manifestation of legislative intent to preempt a 
field of regulation, a municipality may enact an ordinance which neither conflicts 
with the state legislation nor is itself unreasonable.”  56 American Jurisprudence 
2d (2000) 433-434, Municipal Corporations, Section 393.   
{¶38} Accordingly, “ [t]he mere fact that the state, in the exercise of the 
police power, has made certain regulations does not prohibit a municipality from 
exacting additional requirements.  * * *  [A]n ordinance [that] enlarges upon the 
provisions of a statute by requiring more than the statute requires creates no 
conflict therewith unless the statute limits the requirement for all cases to its own 
prescription.”  56 American Jurisprudence 2d (1971) 408-409, Municipal 
Corporations, Section 374.  Instead, such an ordinance may stand when “ ‘there is 
nothing contradictory between the provisions of the statute and the ordinance 
because of which they cannot coexist and be effective.’ ” Detroit v. Qualls (1990), 
434 Mich. 340, 362-363, 454 N.W.2d 374, quoting 56 American Jurisprudence 2d 
409, Municipal Corporations, Section 374.  See, also, Savage v. Prator (La.2006), 
921 So.2d 51, 58; Wichita v. Hackett (2003), 275 Kan. 848, 851-852, 69 P.3d 621; 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
Modern Cigarette, Inc. v. Orange (2001), 256 Conn. 105, 120,  774 A.2d 969; 
Brown v. Yakima (1991), 116 Wash.2d 556, 559, 807 P.2d 353; City & Cty. of 
Denver v. Howard (Colo.1981), 622 P.2d 568, 570; Illinois Liquor Control 
Comm. v. Joliet (1975), 26 Ill.App.3d 27, 33, 324 N.E.2d 453; Charleston v. 
Jenkins (1963), 243 S.C. 205, 211-212, 133 S.E.2d 242; Taggart v. Latah Cty. 
(1956), 78 Idaho 99, 104, 298 P.2d 979. 
{¶39} This interpretation of “conflict” is also exemplified in other case 
law and secondary sources:  “In matters of mixed local and state concern, a home 
rule municipal ordinance may coexist with a state statute as long as there is no 
conflict between the ordinance and the statute* * *.”  62 Corpus Juris Secundum 
(1999) 260, Municipal Corporations, Section 143.  See Leavenworth Club Owners 
Assn. v. Atchison (1971), 208 Kan. 318, 320-321, 492 P.2d 183; Des Moines v. 
Reiter (1960) 251 Iowa 1206, 1209, 102 N.W.2d 363; Lake Charles v. Theall 
(1954), 227 La. 461, 469, 79 So.2d 739; Kansas City v. Troutner (Mo.App.1976), 
544 S.W.2d 295, 298.  An ordinance creating a stricter prohibition, therefore, 
would appear to be valid using this interpretation of “conflict,” as long as the state 
legislature has not expressly or implicitly prohibited alteration of the proscription 
by a valid preemption. 
{¶40} Some states interpret “conflict” more broadly by recognizing what 
they often call “implied preemption” of a field.  For example, California has 
determined that preemption by implication arises in three situations.  First, 
preemption may be implied when the particular area involved has been fully and 
completely covered by general law, indicating the intent that the area is one of 
exclusive state concern.  Morehart v. Cty. of Santa Barbara (Cal. 1994), 7 Cal.4th 
725, 751, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 804, 872 P.2d 143.  Second, preemption is implied when 
the area of law involved is partially covered by general law with terms indicating 
that “ ‘ “a paramount state concern will not tolerate further or additional local 
January Term, 2006 
15 
action.” ’ ”  Id., quoting State ex rel. Deukmejian v. Mendocino Cty. (1986), 36 
Cal.3d 476, 485, 204 Cal.Rptr. 897, 683 P.2d 1150, quoting In re Hubbard (1964) 
62 Cal.2d 119, 128, 41 Cal.Rptr. 393, 396 P.2d 809.  Finally, preemption may be 
implied when the area of law is partially covered by general law and “ ‘“the 
subject is of such a nature that the adverse effect of a local ordinance on the 
transient citizens of the state outweighs the possible benefit to the municipality.” ’ 
”  Id. 
{¶41} Courts in Michigan consider whether a state statute preempts an 
ordinance by considering four factors: (1) whether state law expressly preempts 
the area of law, (2) whether preemption should be implied based upon legislative 
history, (3) whether preemption may be implied based on the pervasiveness of a 
state regulatory scheme, and (4) whether the nature of the regulated subject matter 
demands exclusive state regulation to achieve the uniformity necessary to serve 
the state’s purpose or interest.  State v. Llewellyn (1977), 401 Mich. 314, 323-324, 
257 N.W.2d 902. 
{¶42} Washington courts recognize preemption by implication and 
consider on a case-by-case basis whether the state intended preemption or 
concurrent jurisdiction over a field.  Lenci v. Seattle (1964), 63 Wash.2d 664, 
669-670, 388 P.2d 926. 
{¶43} It is true that one might argue that our prior cases, including 
Schneiderman v. Sesanstein (1929), 121 Ohio St. 80, 167 N.E. 158; Neil House 
Hotel Co. v. Columbus (1944), 144 Ohio St. 248, 29 O.O. 403, 58 N.E.2d 665; 
and Lorain v. Tomasic (1979), 59 Ohio St.2d 1, 13 O.O.3d 1, 391 N.E.2d 726, 
recognized conflict purely by implication.  Closer inspection of those cases, 
however, reveals that they involved statutory language requiring application of the 
implied conflict and preemption test laid out above.  In Schneiderman, state law 
forbade municipalities to alter state speed-limit legislation, rendering any 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
municipal ordinance purporting to do so in conflict with the intent of the 
legislature.  Id. at 86-87, 167 N.E. 158.  The court in Neil House relied on 
statutory language allowing a liquor-premises licensee to sell alcohol until 2:30 
a.m., which left no question that a municipality could not ban such sales by a 
licensee prior to that hour.  Id. at 251-252, 29 O.O. 403, 58 N.E.2d 665.  Finally, 
in Tomasic, the Ohio Constitution granted the state, and not municipalities, the 
power to regulate lotteries.  Id. at 3, 13 O.O.3d 1, 391 N.E.2d 726.  Further, we 
have applied this general rule in additional cases both in cases where conflict by 
implication applied4 and at least one in which it did not.5 
{¶44} After considering the law from various states, as well as our own 
precedent, I would adopt the following test in regard to an alleged conflict 
between two prohibitory enactments.  A court should first consider the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the legislation to determine whether the legislature 
intended to preempt the field.  If preemption is either express or implied, the court 
should next determine whether the legislature validly exercised its legislative 
authority by preempting the field.6  If the area is validly preempted, any alteration 
                                                 
4 Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Painesville (1968), 15 Ohio St.2d 125, 44 O.O.2d 121, 239 N.E.2d 
75 (statute exempted certain intercity high-voltage power lines from municipal control); In re 
Decertification of Eastlake (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 363, 20 O.O.3d 327, 422 N.E.2d 598 (statute 
allowed use of Romex wiring in industrialized units and authorized placement of such units 
anywhere in state); Clermont Environmental Reclamation Co. v. Wiederhold (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 
44, 2 OBR 587, 442 N.E.2d 1278 (statute prohibited municipality from regulating hazardous-
waste-disposal facilities); Rispo Realty & Dev. Co. v. Parma (1990), 55 Ohio St.3d 101, 564 
N.E.2d 425 (statute set certain procedural requirements for zoning changes); Ohio Assn. of Private 
Detective Agencies, Inc. v. N. Olmsted (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 242, 602 N.E.2d 1147 (statute 
prohibited municipality from charging fees for registration or licensure of private investigators and 
security personnel).     
 
5 Middleburg Hts. v. Ohio Bd. of Bldg. Stds. (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 510, 605 N.E.2d 66 (allowing 
more stringent local building requirements, based upon language indicating that state rules were 
merely minimum requirements). 
 
6 For an example of possibly invalid preemption language by a state, see Denver v. Colorado 
(Nov. 5, 2004), 2d Dist. No. 03 CV 3809, www.courts.state.co.us/exec/media/cases/ 
January Term, 2006 
17 
by a municipality conflicts with the state statute.  If, on the other hand, the 
legislature has not validly preempted an area, a municipal ordinance does not 
conflict with a state statute if it merely enlarges upon the state statute, i.e., creates 
a stricter prohibition than the state statute.7  
{¶45} Despite the fact that this court has never specifically adopted a 
preemption test in the area of conflict, I find the construct emphatically helpful in 
determining whether an ordinance conflicts with a state statute.  The factors 
                                                                                                                                     
03cv3809order.pdf, affirmed by operation of law in Colorado v. Denver (Colo.2006), 139 P.3d 
635. 
 
7 {¶ a} This test clearly encompasses a further relevant doctrine, which states that “[s]tatutes which 
define crimes confer no privileges either expressly or by implication.” Vaubel, Municipal Home 
Rule in Ohio (1978) 719.  “[I]t does not follow from the General Assembly’s mere failure to define 
an act as a crime that it thereby expressly authorizes a person to commit the act.”  Wishing Well 
Club, Inc. v. Akron (C.P.1951), 66 Ohio Law Abs. 406, 412, 112 N.E.2d 41.  See, also, Benjamin 
v. Columbus (1958), 167 Ohio St. 103, 146 N.E.2d 854 (finding that an ordinance that goes further 
than a statute by imposing penalties for a related act not penalized by the statute does not conflict 
with that statute).  “A statute defining a crime is only a prohibition; it permits nothing.  
Consequently, a broader definition of a crime as provided by an ordinance does not forbid what a 
statute permits, and therefore no conflict exists. If the courts had reached any other conclusion, the 
effect would have been highly destructive of municipal independence in the exercise of local 
police power over the definition of crimes.  At the same time, the courts would have been thrust 
into an interpretative entanglement requiring them to resolve questions concerning how wide a 
range of acts could be said to be impliedly permitted by statutory prohibitions.”  Vaubel at 720. 
    {¶ b} For example, adoption of the concept of conflict purely by implication would deprive 
municipalities of the ability to ban conduct identical to that in a state statute because the ordinance 
could not legitimately include a sentence.  The state specifically accords each crime a specific 
range of punishment, and, purely by implication, the municipality could not, therefore, impose 
anything beyond the state-allotted punishment.  Our case law contradicts that idea.  See Struthers 
v. Sokol (1923), 108 Ohio St. 263, 269, 140 N.E. 519 (“the punishment of an act defined as a 
crime under a state law does not preclude further punishment as a misdemeanor under a municipal 
ordinance”).  This court has struck down additional municipal punishment only when the 
municipality attempts to add a punishment to a state crime.  State v. Burnett (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 
419, 431-432, 755 N.E.2d 857.  Even in that case, this court reiterated that “a municipal ordinance 
may proscribe the same conduct as a state criminal statute and impose a penalty greater than the 
state criminal code imposes.”  Id. at 431, 755 N.E.2d 857. 
   {¶ c} Another example of the problems with application of conflict by implication can be found 
in Pentco, Inc. v. Moody (S.D.Ohio 1978), 474 F.Supp. 1001, 1007-1008.  In that case, private 
massage parlor owners argued that a state law banning public nudity implicitly allowed private 
nudity and that a local ordinance banning nudity in the private massage parlors conflicted with 
state law.  The federal court rejected that analysis. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
enumerated by California and Michigan, although not exclusive, are extremely 
helpful in this area.  For example, preemption by implication may exist based 
upon language employed by the legislature, the extent of regulation in a field, or 
the need for uniformity within the field in order to protect the rights of the state’s 
citizens. 
2.  Application to Baskin 
{¶46} In this case, the prohibition enacted by the city merely enlarges 
upon the prohibition created by the legislature.  The two enactments can easily 
coexist, because if a person is in compliance with the city’s ordinance, he is also 
in compliance with the statute (i.e., if a person does not possess a semiautomatic 
firearm with a magazine capacity more than ten rounds, then he does not possess a 
semiautomatic firearm with the capacity of more than 31 rounds).  The two 
prohibitory enactments do not on their face conflict, and to infer that the 
legislature intended to grant citizens the right to possess a semiautomatic firearm 
capable of firing up to 31 rounds without reloading based merely on the language 
of the statute itself misreads the statute. 
{¶47} In an otherwise nonconflicting circumstance, a municipal 
ordinance may still conflict with state statutes, however, if the state has expressly 
indicated its intent to preempt, such as occurred in Am. Fin., or has by implication 
preempted the field.  Unlike the majority of states, 8 Ohio has not adopted 
                                                                                                                                     
 
8  Thirty-eight states currently have statutes that expressly preempt the field of firearms, although 
most statutes allow political subdivisions to regulate such matters as place of discharge and 
possession inside public buildings.  See Alaska Stat. 29.35.145; Ariz.Rev.Stat. 13-3108; Ark.Code 
Ann. 14-16-504; 9 Del.Code 330(c); Fla.Stat. 790.33; Ga.Code Ann. 16-11-173(b)(1); Ind.Code 
Ann. 35-47-11-2; Iowa Code 724.28; Kan.Stat.Ann. 12-16,124; Ky.Rev.Stat. 65.870; 
La.Rev.Stat.Ann. 40:1796; 25 Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. 2011; Md.Code Ann.Crim.Law 4-209; 
Mich.Comp.Laws 123.1102; Minn.Stat. 471.633; Miss.Code Ann. 45-9-51; Mo.Rev.Stat. 21.750; 
Mont.Code Ann. 45-8-351; Nev.Rev.Stat.Ann. 268.418;  N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. 159:26; Section 6, 
Article II, N.M. Constitution; N.C.Gen.Stat. 14-409.40; N.D.Cent.Code 62.1-01-03; Okla.Stat. 
1289.24; Or.Rev.Stat. 166.170; 18 Pa.Cons.Stat. 6120; R.I.Gen.Laws 11-47-58; S.C.Code Ann. 
January Term, 2006 
19 
statutory language indicating total preemption in regard to firearms, and no 
language within any of the state statutes regulating firearms indicates that the state 
intended to preempt the entire field of firearms regulation.  The only preemption 
language relevant to the field of firearms regulation was passed by the legislature 
in conjunction with the concealed-firearm laws, but that language plainly 
preempts only an “ordinance or resolution that attempts to restrict the places 
where a person possessing a valid license to carry a concealed handgun may carry 
a handgun concealed.”  Section 9, H.B. No. 12, Baldwin’s Ohio Legislative 
Service Annotated (Vol.1, 2004), L-60-61.  But that law relates to where one may 
carry a concealed handgun, which in no way relates to whether one may possess a 
semiautomatic rifle, so it does not preempt the law in question here. 
{¶48} The legislative history behind the state firearms regulations 
likewise does not indicate any intent to preempt either the field of firearms 
regulation or the more limited area of possession of semiautomatic firearms.  A 
brief look at the history of Ohio firearms regulations, and in particular 
semiautomatic firearms regulations, might be helpful here. Brigadier General John 
T. Thompson developed the first handheld, military automatic machine gun, 
called the submachine gun or “Tommy gun,” around 1920.  Cramer, For the 
                                                                                                                                     
23-31-510; S.D. Codified Laws 7-18A-36, 8-5-13, and 9-19-20; Tenn.Code Ann. 39-17-1314; 
Tex.Local Govt.Code Ann. 229.001; Utah Code Ann. 76-10-500; 24 Vt.Stat.Ann. 2295; Va.Code 
Ann. 15.2-915; Wash.Rev.Code Ann. 9.41.290; W.Va.Code 8-12-5a; Wis.Stat. 66.0409(2); and 
Wyo.Stat.Ann. 6-8-401.  Three states, Alabama, Colorado, and Idaho, have partial-preemption 
statutes.  See Ala.Code 11-45-1.1 (preempting the field of possession and ownership of handguns 
only); Colo.Rev.Stat. 18-12-105.6(b) (preempting the field of transport of weapons in a private 
vehicle for a lawful purpose); Idaho Code 31-872 (preempting fields of ownership, possession, and 
transport of firearms).  Illinois and New Jersey expressly permit local legislation on firearms, see 
430 Ill.Comp.Stat. 65/13.1 and N.J.Stat. 40:48-1, while Nebraska preempts the field of handgun 
transfer but grandfathers in any existing municipal regulation.  See Neb.Rev.Stat. 69-2401 and 69-
2425.  Of the remaining six states, Ohio has the least restrictive regulation over firearm possession, 
transfer, and use.  See Cal.Penal Code 12000 et seq.; Conn.Gen.Stat. 29-27 et seq. and 53a-216 et 
seq.; Haw.Rev.Stat. 134-1 et seq.; 140 Mass.Gen.Laws 121 et seq. and 269 Mass.Gen.Laws 10 et 
seq.; N.Y.Penal Law 265.00 et seq. and 400.00 et seq.  For Ohio statutes, see fns. 11 through 18.  
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
Defense of Themselves and the State: The Original Intent and Judicial 
Interpretation of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms (1994) 184.  It was initially 
intended for military use in World War I, but it was not ready for production until 
the war had ended.  To appeal to the nonmilitary customer, Auto-Ordnance, a 
company that sold the weapon, was forced to alter its marketing strategy for the 
submachine gun and enthusiastically pronounced “ ‘that the submachine gun was, 
in fact, good for anything.  Especially anything hard to hit, or that needed to be 
killed in quantity, or thoroughly intimidated.’ ”  Id. at 184, quoting Helmer, The 
Gun That Made the Twenties Roar (1969) 75.  Auto-Ordnance’s claims “ ‘could 
have been boiled down to a single slogan:  Anything a gun can do, the Thompson 
can do better.’ ”  Id. 
{¶49} Although Auto-Ordnance originally marketed the Tommy gun to 
police departments, the gun soon became a “glamorous weapon for gang warfare” 
in major cities.9  Id. at 184-185.  The submachine gun garnered much attention for 
its role in the 1929 St. Valentine’s Day Massacre, in which gangsters posing as 
policemen riddled the bodies of seven rival gangsters with fire from submachine 
guns.  Henderson, Gun Control (2000) 15.  Congress seized upon gun control as a 
national issue following an assassination attempt on newly elected President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933.  Id.  And likewise, in 1933, Ohio passed its first 
statute prohibiting a person from possessing, transporting, or using a machine gun, 
light machine gun, or submachine gun, unless the person first obtained a permit 
and paid a $5,000 bond.  G.C. 12819-3 and 12819-4, H.B. No. 166, 115 Ohio 
Laws 189-190. 
                                                 
9 Infamous outlaws, such as Pretty Boy Floyd and Ma Barker, helped to create notoriety for the 
Tommy gun. Utter, Encyclopedia of Gun Control and Gun Rights (2000) 300.  Also known as the 
“Chicago Piano,” the submachine gun was “an uncomplicated weapon, weighed just eight and one-
half pounds, * * * could fire a withering hail of bullets, approaching 1,000 rounds per minute, 
[and] was conveniently available by mail order.”  Id. 
 
January Term, 2006 
21 
{¶50} In 1961, the legislature broadened its definition of “machine gun” 
to include semiautomatic firearms capable of firing more than 18 rounds without 
reloading.  The law exempted .22- or smaller-caliber weapons from the definition.  
Former R.C. 2923.03, Am.S.B. No. 351, 129 Ohio Laws 420.  In 1972, the 
legislature completely overhauled the criminal code in Ohio in an effort to 
“provide a compact yet complete substantive criminal code, easier to understand 
and apply, meeting modern needs, and providing the necessary foundation for 
effective crime prevention, law enforcement, and treatment of offenders.”  
Legislative Service Commission Bill Analysis of 1972 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511 (law 
was effective in 1974).  Although the legislature modified the previous statutes in 
order to ban possession, use, or transport of certain semiautomatic firearms it 
classified as “dangerous ordnance,” with only limited exceptions, the new code 
merely consolidated the firearms regulations without alteration.  By 1986, the 
legislature had twice altered the definition of “dangerous ordnance” to prohibit the 
possession of a growing class of semiautomatic firearms, including those with a 
capacity of 32 rounds or more. 
{¶51} In the 70 plus years since Ohio enacted its first limit on possession 
of automatic weapons, the state has made only slight changes to the definition that 
determines what type of weapons are included in this regulation.  The only change 
relevant to this case is the round capacity of the semiautomatic firearm.10  
Throughout Ohio’s history of semiautomatic-firearms regulation, the legislature 
                                                 
10 In 1978, the state increased the limit from 18 to 21 rounds.  Former R.C. 2923.11, 137 Ohio 
Laws, Part II, 3307. The increase was added to legislation prohibiting possession of silencers and 
mufflers by motion during committee.  Materials in the bill file on record with the Ohio Historical 
Society indicate that the change was entered to accommodate National Trophy Match standards, 
which required use of a 20-round magazine.  See 1978 Am.H.B. No. 728, bill file, State Archives, 
Ohio Historical Society.  The legislature again increased the limit to 31 rounds in 1986 by adding 
the change to legislation prohibiting possession of a firearm on or in any premises with a liquor 
license.  141 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1204.  No explanation exists in the legislative history for this 
alteration.   
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
has never indicated that its prohibition on certain semiautomatic firearms could 
not be made more stringent by municipalities.  On the contrary, a memorandum by 
the Legislative Service Commission in regard to the specific question of whether 
the 1972 revamp of the criminal code would preempt local firearm legislation 
specifically states that the legislature intended no such preemption:  “The gun 
control legislation portion of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511 of the 109th General 
Assembly, sections 2923.11 to 2923.24, does not pre-empt this field from 
municipal authorities.”  Memorandum from Hubert C. Dutro to Senator Gillmor 
(Mar. 21, 1973).  This court, therefore, should not infer preemption of either the 
field of firearms regulation or the limited area of semiautomatic-firearms 
regulation based upon the legislative history of semiautomatic firearms regulation 
in the state of Ohio. 
{¶52} Further, this court cannot infer preemption based upon some 
comprehensive regulatory enactment in the field.  Ohio legislation currently 
touches on only a handful of areas in regard to firearms: Prohibition on ownership 
of certain items,11 prohibition on possession of firearms by certain classes of 
persons,12 limitations on discharge and transport of firearms,13 limits on places 
                                                                                                                                     
 
11 R.C. 2923.17 prohibits knowingly acquiring, having, carrying, or using any dangerous ordinance 
except under specified conditions.  “Dangerous ordnance” is defined to include automatic firearms, 
sawed-off firearms, zip guns, and semiautomatic firearms “designed or specially adapted to fire 
more than thirty-one cartridges without reloading, other than a firearm chambering only .22 caliber 
short, long, or long-rifle cartridges.”  R.C. 2923.11(K) and (E). 
 
12 R.C. 2923.13 prohibits those under disability, for example, felons and fugitives from justice, 
from possessing any firearm.  R.C. 2923.131 extends that prohibition to those under detention at a 
detention facility, and R.C. 2923.21 generally forbids sales of firearms to those under 18 and sales 
of handguns to those under 21.  Persons under the influence of alcohol or drugs are also prohibited 
from carrying or using any firearm.  R.C. 2923.15.  
 
13 R.C. 1547.69 imposes limits on the possession, discharge, and transportation of firearms on 
boats, while R.C. 2923.16 imposes similar limits for motor vehicles.  R.C. 4519.40 limits 
transportation of firearms on snowmobiles, off-highway motorcycles, and all-purpose vehicles. 
 
January Term, 2006 
23 
where a firearm may be discharged or possessed,14 sentencing rules and 
specifications applied when a firearm is used or possessed during commission of a 
crime,15 limitations on interstate sales,16 concealed-firearm provisions,17 and 
various laws related to things such as immunity for firearm manufacturers.18   
                                                 
14 Ohio law places limits on possession of firearms in detention and mental-health facilities (R.C. 
2921.36), liquor-permit premises (R.C. 2923.121), school safety zones (R.C. 2923.122), and 
courthouses (R.C. 2923.123) and on the discharge of firearms at permanent habitations (R.C. 
2923.161), in state parks (R.C. 1541.19), on airport operation grounds or at airplanes (R.C. 
2909.08), on cemeteries, public roads, or highways, and “on a lawn, park, pleasure ground, 
orchard, or other ground appurtenant to a schoolhouse, church, or inhabited dwelling, the property 
of another, or a charitable institution” (R.C. 2923.162).  The law also prohibits election observers 
from carrying a firearm.  R.C. 3505.21. 
 
15 See R.C. 2941.141 (firearm specification), 2941.144 (specification of use of automatic firearm 
or firearm with silencer or muffler), 2941.145 (specification that offender displayed, brandished, or 
indicated possession of a firearm), 2941.146 (specification that offender discharged a firearm from 
a motor vehicle), 2941.1412 (specification that offender discharged a firearm at a police officer or 
corrections officer), and 2929.14 (general sentencing statute). 
 
16 R.C. 2923.22 permits any Ohio resident not otherwise prohibited by law from possessing a 
firearm to purchase a rifle or shotgun or ammunition in Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, 
Pennsylvania, or West Virginia, and allows residents of those states to purchase a rifle or shotgun 
in Ohio if they may, under Ohio law, federal law, and the law of their domicile, possess that 
firearm.  Beyond those allowances, Ohio law prohibits the reckless transfer of a firearm to one who 
may not possess it under Ohio law (R.C. 2923.20) and renders all sales and purchases subject to 
the federal Gun Control Act of 1968 (R.C. 2923.22(C)).  The only specific requirement placed 
upon federally licensed firearm dealers by Ohio law is that they must offer a locking device to any 
purchaser of a firearm at the time of sale.  R.C. 2923.25. 
 
17 R.C. 2923.12 generally prohibits a person from carrying or having a concealed handgun unless 
the person has obtained the proper permit.  The license to carry a concealed handgun is governed 
by R.C. 109.69, 109.731, 311.41, 2923.124 through 2923.1213, and 5122.311, and various other 
statutes concern allowances for law enforcement and certain other professions to carry concealed 
weapons.  See, e.g., R.C. 4749.10 (certain employees of licensed private investigators and security 
services), R.C. 5502.14(C) (Department of Public Safety food-stamp undercover enforcement 
agents), and R.C. 5743.45 (investigative employees of the Department of Taxation). 
 
18 Ohio has a handful of other statutes concerning firearms.  For example, under certain 
circumstances, R.C. 2305.401 grants immunity to members of the firearm industry from civil 
liability and injunctive relief; R.C. 2923.201 prohibits defacing of identification marks on firearms; 
R.C. 2923.23 grants immunity from prosecution to certain persons who voluntarily relinquish 
illegally possessed firearms or dangerous ordnance to law enforcement; and R.C. 5502.63 requires 
the Division of Criminal Justice in the Department of Public Safety to prepare a poster and 
brochure on safe firearms practices. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
{¶53} Although this may appear to be a broad array of firearms 
regulation, in comparison to other states, Ohio has barely touched upon the 
subject of firearm possession, use, transfer, and ownership.19  For example, 
although some municipalities have ordinances requiring that firearms dealers 
obtain and pay a fee for a local license,20 no state statute requires a firearms dealer 
to be registered or licensed with the state.  Instead, federal law governing firearms 
dealers and transactions ensures that dealers are properly investigated and licensed 
in municipalities that opt not to pass a law requiring local licensure.  See Section 
922(a), Title 18, U.S.Code.  Ohio also does not have a statute that requires a 
person to obtain a permit or license before obtaining a gun, and has no statute 
requiring a background check prior to the purchase or transfer of a firearm.  
Again, local law enforcement conducts background checks on firearm purchasers 
only because federal law mandates such a check, Section 922(t), Title 18, 
U.S.Code, and some municipalities have passed ordinances requiring a license or 
permit to transfer or own a firearm.21  Municipalities have been left to fill in the 
                                                                                                                                     
 
19 In comparison to the other four states which have no express firearm preemption statute, Ohio 
law is rather meager on firearms regulation.  The California Penal Code, for example, contains six 
separate chapters on firearm and firearm-related regulation, including a chapter with four articles 
dedicated entirely to machine guns, an article with 21 statutes on licenses to sell firearms, and a 
chapter devoted solely to ammunition.  See Cal.Penal Code 12000 et seq.  Connecticut has over 30 
statutes dedicated to regulations concerning the transfer of firearms, Conn.Gen.Stat. 29-28 et. seq., 
as well as the general criminal regulations concerning possession and discharge of firearms. 
Conn.Gen.Stat. 53a-216 et seq.  Hawaii and New York law require a permit to acquire a firearm, 
registration of a firearm, and a license to sell firearms.  Haw.Rev.Stat. 134-2, 134-3, and 134-31 et 
seq.; N.Y.Penal Law 265.00 et seq. and 400.00 et seq.  In Massachusetts, one must have a license 
to possess a firearm, 140 Mass.Gen.Laws 129(c), and the state carefully regulates firearms 
transfers and possession, 140 Mass.Gen.Laws 121 et seq. 
 
20 Of the six largest Ohio municipalities, Akron (Akron Municipal Code 137.23 and 137.24), 
Cincinnati (Cincinnati Municipal Code 708-9), Columbus (Columbus City Code 545.02), and 
Toledo (Toledo Municipal Code 549.12) require a firearms dealer to obtain a local license. 
 
21 Akron requires that a dealer maintain certain records of sale filled out by a purchaser and given 
to the local police.  Akron Municipal Code 137.25.  Cincinnati requires an individual to file an 
January Term, 2006 
25 
gaps left by Ohio law regarding possession, transfer, and use of firearms to such a 
degree that I cannot say that the legislature intended to occupy the field of 
firearms regulation. 
{¶54} The strongest argument that Baskin makes to support his assertion 
that the state statute implicitly preempts the municipal ordinance is that allowing 
municipalities to bar specific weapons within the municipalities could create a 
patchwork of regulations that would leave the average citizen wondering whether 
he could legally possess his weapon when he travels around the state.  As noted in 
oral argument before this court, a person could legally possess a weapon in 
Municipality A and be permitted to have that weapon in Municipality B, but could 
not travel directly between the two points with the firearm because Municipality C 
banned possession. 
{¶55} This issue, however, is in part addressed by federal law: 
“Notwithstanding any other provision of any law or any rule or regulation of a 
State or any political subdivision thereof, any person who is not otherwise 
prohibited by [federal law] from transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm 
shall be entitled to transport a firearm for any lawful purpose from any place 
where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm to any other place where he 
may lawfully possess and carry such firearm * * *.”  Section 926A, Title 18, 
U.S.Code.  The statute further requires that the firearm be transported unloaded 
                                                                                                                                     
application for any firearms transfer, including a statement as to the intended use of the firearm, 
requires verification of the applicant’s identity by any individual personally known by the 
transferor, and imposes a 15-day waiting period from the time the application for transfer is 
received by the police before the applicant may receive the firearm.  Cincinnati Municipal Code 
708-13, 708-15, and 708-33.  Columbus requires each individual to obtain a license for a valid 
weapon transaction and imposes a seven-day waiting period between application for that license 
and grant of the license.  Columbus City Code 545.06.  Dayton requires anyone who possesses a 
firearm to have a valid owner’s identification card in most circumstances.  Dayton Code of 
Ordinances 138.12.  Toledo requires a valid identification card for anyone who wishes to obtain a 
handgun.  Toledo Municipal Code 549.11.  
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
and that neither the firearm nor its ammunition be readily accessible from the 
passenger compartment.  If the vehicle does not have a compartment separate 
from the passenger’s compartment, the firearm or ammunition must be contained 
in a locked container other than the glove compartment or console.  Id.  As this 
statute makes it legal to transport a firearm through a place where possession 
alone would otherwise be illegal, and that federal statute expressly preempts 
anything in direct conflict with it,  Section 927, Title 18 U.S.Code, Baskin’s 
argument is moot. 
{¶56} A person should be familiar with the firearms laws governing the 
locality in which he principally keeps his firearms.  He should also be familiar 
with the local and state firearms regulations for any area in which he intends to 
use that weapon.  In addition, he has the right under federal law to transport that 
firearm in a certain manner between those two places.  Thus, allowing 
municipalities to pass more restrictive firearms regulations than the state does not, 
as some may fear, require Ohio residents to research a patchwork of regulations to 
avoid violating the law.22  Instead, it only requires that a person know the laws of 
the jurisdiction where he keeps his gun and the laws where he would like to use 
his gun. 
{¶57} The only remaining issue is whether some statewide interest or 
concern should compel uniformity in the type of weapons that may lawfully be 
possessed throughout the state.  The Ohio Constitution grants Ohio citizens the 
“right to bear arms for their defense and security.”  Section 4, Article I, Ohio 
Constitution.  The right, however, is not absolute and is subject to reasonable 
regulation.  Arnold v. Cleveland (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 616 N.E.2d 163, 
                                                 
22 A review of many of the largest cities in Ohio reveals that five of them prohibit possession of 
firearms that are not prohibited by state law: Columbus, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Toledo, and 
Dayton.  
 
January Term, 2006 
27 
paragraph two of the syllabus.  In fact, this court has previously upheld a city’s 
firearms regulation that prohibited possession of firearms that were not prohibited 
by state law.  Id.  Arnold clearly explains the rationale behind allowing more 
stringent local firearms regulation as long as the regulation is not “ ‘arbitrary , 
discriminatory, capricious or unreasonable and [bears] a real and substantial 
relation to the object sought to be obtained, namely the health, safety, morals or 
general welfare of the public.’ ”  Id. at 46, 616 N.E.2d 163, quoting Cincinnati v. 
Correll (1943), 141 Ohio St. 535, 539, 26 O.O. 116, 49 N.E.2d 412.  I see no need 
to reiterate here the rationale expressed in Arnold for upholding Cleveland’s 
regulation banning possession of any semiautomatic rifle that accepts a magazine 
with a capacity of 20 or more rounds, but it is equally applicable in this case. 
{¶58} As noted above, Ohio is one of six states that lack a statute 
preempting regulation in the area of firearms regulations.  The legislature has 
never made clear that it intends to preempt local ordinances concerning firearms, 
and as long as the local regulations are reasonable and are not in direct conflict 
with existing Ohio law, this court should not infer preemption.  If the legislature 
intends to preempt any other area of firearms regulation beyond the concealed-
firearm provision, it needs to do so explicitly.  As the legislature has neither 
expressly nor implicitly preempted the area of firearms regulation and the local 
ordinance and state statute may coexist, I find that there is no conflict between 
Cincinnati Municipal Code 708-37 and Ohio state law.23 
CONCLUSION 
{¶59} I find that the General Assembly has never explicitly or implicitly 
preempted the field of gun regulation or the limited area of the class of firearms 
that may be possessed in Ohio.  As the legislature and the nature of the legislation 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
in no way indicate an intent to limit the power of municipalities to pass more 
restrictive firearms ordinances, I find that Cincinnati Municipal Code 708-37 does 
not conflict either expressly or by implication with Ohio law, as both prohibitory 
enactments can coexist and the ordinance in no way prohibits what Ohio law 
specifically permits.  Accordingly, I concur in the reversal of the judgment of the 
court of appeals. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶60} In my view of the home-rule issue presented to the court in this 
case, the beginning point in the analysis is to consider Section 3, Article XVIII of 
the Ohio Constitution, which authorizes municipalities to “exercise all powers of 
local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local 
police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general 
laws.” 
{¶61} Because the Constitution is immutable, pronouncements by the 
General Assembly regarding preemption or statewide concern, while instructive in 
considering legislative intent, are powerless to affect the language of the 
Constitution that empowers municipalities to enact legislation, provided such 
legislation is not in conflict with a general law. 
{¶62} The initial step in a home-rule analysis is to determine whether the 
matter involves local self-government or local police, sanitary, or other similar 
regulation.  Canton v. State, 95 Ohio St.3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 
963, syllabus.  The consensus in the record before us is that the state legislation 
and local ordinance are police regulations that differ as to the definition of the 
                                                                                                                                     
23 This court is aware of the current proposed legislation that would purport to preempt all local 
firearms ordinances.  Any action by the General Assembly would be prospective, and that 
January Term, 2006 
29 
term “semiautomatic” weapon.  The ordinance, therefore, does involve a police 
regulation. 
{¶63} Both the state of Ohio and the city of Cincinnati are authorized to 
legislate against possession of semiautomatic weapons.  The majority here holds 
that R.C. 2923.17(A) is a general law pursuant to the test we announced in 
Canton, 95 Ohio St.3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 963, syllabus.  There, 
we established a four-part test for determining whether an enactment of the 
General Assembly is a general law for home-rule analysis:  “a statute must (1) be 
part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment, (2) apply to all parts 
of the state alike and operate uniformly throughout the state, (3) set forth police, 
sanitary, or similar regulations, rather than purport only to grant or limit 
legislative power of a municipal corporation to set forth police, sanitary, or similar 
regulations, and (4) prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens generally.”  Id. 
{¶64} I agree with the majority that R.C. 2923.17(A), which provides, 
“No person shall knowingly acquire, have, carry, or use any dangerous ordnance,” 
is a general law pursuant to Canton.  That statute is a statewide police enactment, 
applies to all parts of the state, and prescribes a rule of conduct upon the citizens 
of Ohio.  Canton, 95 Ohio St.3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 963, syllabus.  
And in my view, Cincinnati Municipal Code 708-37(a) is very similar.  That 
ordinance provides, “No person shall sell, deliver, rent, lease, offer, or display for 
sale, or transfer ownership of, acquire or possess a semiautomatic firearm.”  
Therefore, the statute and the ordinance regulate the same conduct:  the 
acquisition and possession of a semiautomatic firearm. 
{¶65} The difference between these regulations results from the 
definition contained in R.C. 2923.11(K)(1), defining “dangerous ordnance” as 
“[a]ny automatic * * * firearm,” which includes “any semi-automatic firearm 
                                                                                                                                     
proposed legislation, therefore, has no influence on this case. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
designed or specially adapted to fire more than thirty-one cartridges without 
reloading.”  (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2923.11(E).  Cincinnati Municipal Code 708-
37(h)(1) defines “semiautomatic firearm” as “[a]ny semiautomatic rifle or carbine 
that was originally designed with or has a fixed magazine or detachable magazine 
with capacity of more than ten rounds.” (Emphasis added.)  The conflict, 
therefore, exists in the differing definitions of “semiautomatic” promulgated by 
the General Assembly and the city of Cincinnati; and with regard to the Canton 
test, the statutory definition of a semiautomatic weapon does not constitute a 
general law.   
{¶66} First, a definition is not “part of a statewide and comprehensive 
legislative enactment.”  Canton, 95 Ohio St.3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 
963, syllabus.  Second, while intended to “apply to all parts of the state alike” as a 
“police, sanitary, or similar regulation[],” the definition of “semiautomatic” does 
not “prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens generally.”  Id.  Thus, a definition is 
not a general law, and no further conflict analysis is necessary. 
{¶67} Accordingly, as Cincinnati Municipal Code 708-37 is not in 
conflict with any general law, I concur in reversing the judgment of the court of 
appeals and remanding the matter for further consideration. 
__________________ 
Julia L. McNeil, City of Cincinnati Solicitor, Ernest F. McAdams, City of 
Cincinnati Prosecutor, and Charles A. Rubenstein, Chief Deputy Prosecutor, for 
appellant. 
Robert H. Lyons, for appellee. 
______________________