Title: In the Matter of Maude Laroche-St. Fleur

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13262 
 
IN THE MATTER OF MAUDE LAROCHE-ST. FLEUR. 
 
 
October 27, 2022. 
 
 
Attorney at Law, Disciplinary proceeding, Suspension.  Board of 
Bar Overseers. 
 
 
The respondent attorney, Maude Laroche-St. Fleur, appeals 
from the order of a single justice of this court suspending her 
from the practice of law for eighteen months.  We affirm.1 
 
1.  Procedural background.  On June 25, 2020, bar counsel 
filed a three-count petition for discipline against the 
respondent, alleging that during the course of divorce 
proceedings in which she was self-represented, the respondent 
(1) filed multiple knowingly false financial statements under 
the pains and penalties of perjury;2 (2) disobeyed various orders 
of the probate court resulting in multiple contempt judgments 
 
 
1 We have reviewed the respondent's preliminary memorandum 
and appendix, as well as the record that was before the single 
justice.  Pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:23, 471 Mass. 1303 (2015), 
we dispense with further briefing and oral argument. 
 
 
2 In violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 (a) (1), (3), as 
appearing in 471 Mass. 1416 (2015) (candor toward tribunal), and 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1483 (2015) 
(conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation). 
2 
 
against her;3 and (3) pursued a frivolous motion for relief from 
judgment and frivolous appeals from the denial of that motion.4 
 
The respondent, acting pro se, filed an answer in August 
2020.5  In November 2020, prior to a hearing in the matter, bar 
counsel moved to preclude the respondent from relitigating 
certain facts alleged in the second count of the petition that 
bar counsel claimed were established in the respondent's divorce 
proceeding and related contempt proceedings.  The motion was 
allowed, and the order also identified certain facts admitted in 
the respondent's answer that were not to be contested during the 
proceedings.  The hearing committee chair also allowed a 
subsequent motion by bar counsel to deem certain matters 
admitted that were not specifically denied in the respondent's 
answer.  See Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers § 3.15. 
 
An evidentiary hearing was held on March 23 and 24, 2021.  
The hearing committee issued an amended report on October 21, 
2021, recommending that the respondent be suspended from the 
practice of law for eighteen months.  The respondent failed to 
object to or appeal from the hearing committee's report.  After 
considering the record, a majority of the board voted to adopt 
the hearing committee's report and recommendation. 
 
The board thereafter filed an information in the county 
court pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 8 (6), as appearing in 453 
Mass. 1310 (2009), recommending that the respondent be suspended 
from the practice of law for a term of eighteen months.  After a 
hearing, a single justice of this court concluded that the 
findings of misconduct were supported by substantial evidence -- 
in addition to having been established as a result of the 
respondent's waiver of any objection to the hearing committee's 
report -- and imposed the board-recommended sanction of an 
eighteen-month suspension.  This appeal followed.  Among other 
 
 
3 In violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4 (c), as appearing in 
471 Mass. 1425 (2015) (knowingly disobeying obligation under 
rules of tribunal), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (d) (conduct 
prejudicial to administration of justice). 
 
 
4 In violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.1, as appearing in 471 
Mass. 1414 (2015) (meritorious claims and contentions), and 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (professional misconduct). 
 
 
5 A later attempt to amend the answer failed procedurally 
when the respondent failed to file an amended answer in response 
to an order allowing in part the respondent's motion to amend. 
3 
 
filings in this court, the respondent filed an emergency motion 
seeking a stay of the imposition of the sanction in this case 
pending appeal.  This court denied the stay.6 
 
2.  Factual background.  We summarize the relevant facts as 
found by the hearing committee and adopted by the board.7  We 
agree with the single justice that these facts are supported by 
substantial evidence.  See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 8 (6). 
 
a.  The respondent's filing of false financial statements.  
The respondent was admitted to the Massachusetts bar in 2012.  
In May 2014, acting pro se, the respondent filed a complaint for 
divorce against her husband.  The primary issue in the divorce 
was the division of assets, including the marital home. 
 
At various times during the divorce proceedings, the 
respondent filed personal financial statements with the court, 
which were signed under the pains and penalties of perjury.  
These financial statements contained material false statements; 
chief among them, the respondent claimed that the marital home 
was encumbered by a "mortgage" when, in fact, the mortgage on 
the property had been paid off.  In another of her financial 
statements, the respondent claimed that she had an outstanding 
"loan" from a third party.  This purported "loan" was the same 
money that the respondent had elsewhere claimed as a "mortgage" 
on the marital home.  As the board noted, characterizing the 
purported debt as a "mortgage" stood to benefit the respondent, 
as each spouse's share of the property division would be reduced 
equally by the amount of a mortgage on the marital home, whereas 
the probate court was not bound to treat the respondent's 
 
 
6 In subsequent filings with this court, the respondent has 
brought to our attention the fact that bar counsel has since 
filed a petition for contempt against the petitioner in the 
underlying disciplinary matter in the county court.  As of the 
writing of this opinion, the single justice has held a hearing 
on the matter and issued an order holding the respondent in 
contempt of court for failure to comply with the order of term 
suspension at issue in this appeal.  Our decision in this appeal 
does not rely in any way on the single justice's recent contempt 
order, and we express no view on the findings and conclusions 
contained therein. 
 
 
7 We therefore refer to the hearing committee's factual 
findings as those of the board.  See Matter of Eisenhauer, 426 
Mass. 448, 449 n.1, cert. denied sub nom. Eisenhauer v. 
Massachusetts Bar Counsel, 524 U.S. 919 (1998). 
4 
 
nonmortgage liability as debt to be borne equally by the two 
parties.  The respondent also failed to disclose certain bank 
accounts on her financial statements, including accounts that 
she owned separately from her husband. 
 
The respondent eventually revealed to the court and to her 
husband's counsel that she had falsely listed the third party's 
purported loan as mortgage debt.  However, by the time of this 
disclosure, the respondent had on five prior occasions submitted 
financial statements to the court with the false claim of a 
mortgage on the marital home.8 
 
b.  Contempt judgments against the respondent.  The 
respondent acknowledged to the hearing committee that there were 
up to six contempt judgments against her in her divorce and 
related matters.  The second count of the petition for 
discipline was premised on three of these, dated April 17, 2015; 
December 23, 2015; and February 22, 2018, respectively. 
 
The April 2015 contempt judgment was based on the 
respondent's repeated refusal to cooperate with a special 
discovery master appointed by the probate court in the 
respondent's divorce proceeding.  As part of that judgment, the 
probate court ordered the respondent to pay the discovery 
master's fees and to pay her husband's reasonable attorney's 
fees in litigating the underlying discovery disputes.  In 
December 2015, after the respondent failed to pay any fees to 
the discovery master, the probate court again found the 
respondent in contempt. 
 
 
 
8 The respondent claimed that her motive for doing so was to 
protect the third party from a risk of kidnapping in Haiti.  
When considering this as a potential mitigating factor, the 
hearing committee credited that the respondent had this 
"generalized concern," but it did not credit that "this was the 
primary motivating factor" for the respondent's 
mischaracterization of the purported loan as a mortgage.  As 
discussed infra, we do not revisit the hearing committee's 
credibility determinations, see Matter of Diviacchi, 475 Mass. 
1013, 1018-1019 (2016), S.C., 480 Mass. 1016 (2018), and we find 
adequate support in the record for the hearing committee's 
ultimate conclusion that the respondent "knowingly and 
intentionally misrepresented her financial condition on her 
financial statements in an effort to obtain a more favorable 
outcome in the divorce case." 
5 
 
On December 30, 2015, after a two-day trial, the probate 
court issued a judgment of divorce nisi requiring, among other 
things, that the respondent sell the marital home so that the 
proceeds could be divided between the parties.  The respondent 
moved for, and was denied, relief from the divorce judgment.  
The Appeals Court affirmed the denial of the respondent's 
motion, and this court denied further appellate review.  After 
the respondent failed to sell the marital home, her former 
husband filed a further complaint for contempt against her.  The 
February 2018 contempt judgment entered as a result of the 
respondent's failure to sell the marital home.  As part of the 
February 2018 contempt judgment, the court appointed a master to 
sell the marital home; the respondent has since continually 
refused to cooperate with the master's efforts to sell the home. 
 
c.  The respondent's frivolous Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 60(b) 
motion and appeal.  On February 12, 2018, the respondent filed a 
motion pursuant to Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 60(b) in the probate 
court, in which she once again sought relief from the divorce 
judgment.  This motion did not raise any issue that was not or 
could not have been raised in the respondent's 2016 motion for 
relief from the judgment.  The motion was also filed over a year 
late.  See Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 60(b) (requiring that such 
motions be brought within one year of entry of judgment).  The 
probate court denied the respondent's motion and awarded 
attorney's fees to her husband.  The respondent appealed, and 
the Appeals Court affirmed the denial.  The respondent sought 
reconsideration from the Appeals Court, which was denied, and 
then she sought further appellate review from this court, which 
was also denied.  During this time, the marital home remained 
unsold.  Based on the foregoing, the board concluded that the 
respondent's February 2018 rule 60(b) motion was frivolous and 
that the respondent's appeals from its denial were intended 
merely to "hamper and delay her husband from receiving the 
benefit of the judgment of divorce." 
 
 
3.  Discussion.  The case is before us on the respondent's 
preliminary memorandum, pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:23 (b), 471 
Mass. 1303 (2015) (appeals in bar discipline cases).  Under that 
rule, the appellant bears of the burden of demonstrating 
 
"that there has been an error of law or abuse of discretion 
by the single justice; that the decision is not supported 
by substantial evidence; that the sanction is markedly 
disparate from the sanctions imposed in other cases 
involving similar circumstances; or that for other reasons 
the decision will result in a substantial injustice." 
6 
 
 
Moreover, "[t]he hearing committee . . . is the sole judge of 
credibility, and arguments hinging on such determinations 
generally fall outside our proper scope of review."  Matter of 
Diviacchi, 475 Mass. 1013, 1018-1019 (2016), S.C., 480 Mass. 
1016 (2018), quoting Matter of McBride, 449 Mass. 154, 161-162 
(2007).  "The subsidiary findings of the hearing committee, as 
adopted by the board, 'shall be upheld if supported by 
substantial evidence,' see S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (5), as 
appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009), and the hearing committee's 
ultimate findings and recommendations, as adopted by the board, 
are entitled to deference, although they are not binding by this 
court" (quotation and citation omitted).  Matter of Diviacchi, 
supra at 1019. 
 
For the reasons discussed infra, the respondent has failed 
to meet her burden under rule 2:23. 
 
a.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  On appeal before this 
court -- as well as before the single justice, as observed in 
his decision -- "the respondent makes some objections to the 
board's factual findings, but ultimately does not contest the 
relevant facts underlying the violations."  Rather, "[i]n her 
defense, she chiefly offers various reasons explaining why she 
committed her misconduct, or impermissibly seeks to relitigate 
issues already decided in her divorce proceedings."  We agree 
with the single justice that there is substantial evidence in 
the record to support the board's findings that the respondent 
committed the charged misconduct.9 
 
b.  Sanction.  Whether the sanction imposed in this case is 
"markedly disparate from the sanctions imposed in other cases 
involving similar circumstances," see S.J.C. Rule 2:23 (b), 
presents a closer question.  "Our primary concern in bar 
discipline cases is the effect upon, and perception of, the 
public and the bar, . . . and we must therefore consider, in 
reviewing the board's recommended sanction, what measure of 
discipline is necessary to protect the public and deter other 
attorneys from the same behavior" (quotations and citation 
omitted).  Matter of Lupo, 447 Mass. 345, 356 (2006). 
 
As the hearing committee noted in its report, "[t]he 
sanctions imposed for misconduct during a lawyer's own divorce 
 
 
9 The respondent's failure to object to the hearing 
committee's report provides an additional, independent basis for 
concluding that the alleged misconduct has been established. 
7 
 
have fallen short of those imposed when an attorney engages in 
misconduct while representing others."  Thus, while a two-year 
suspension is considered a "usual and presumptive" sanction for 
making false statements under oath, see Matter of Diviacchi, 475 
Mass. at 1020, quoting Matter of Finneran, 455 Mass. 722, 731 
n.13 (2010), similar forms of misconduct committed during the 
course of an attorney's own divorce typically have garnered 
suspensions ranging from several months to one year, see, e.g., 
Matter of Ring, 427 Mass. 186, 192-193 (1998) (three months); 
Matter of Finnerty, 418 Mass. 821, 828-830 (1994) (six months); 
Matter of Leahy, 28 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 529, 539 (2012) 
(two months); Matter of Kilkenny, 26 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 
288, 290 (2010) (three months); Matter of Okai, 11 Mass. Att'y 
Discipline Rep. 187, 188-190 (1995) (one year). 
 
This disparity may reflect a confluence of mitigating 
circumstances in such cases, or a commonsense understanding that 
infractions motivated by "deep disagreements" with an estranged 
spouse can be "a poor predictor of future professional 
misconduct, especially as regards client matters."  Matter of 
Leahy, 28 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. at 535.  Nonetheless, it 
is well established that an attorney is not "entitled to a free 
pass simply because 'the matter about which [he or] she 
testified falsely was a private one that arose in the context of 
a purely personal relationship.'"  Id. at 537, quoting Matter of 
Balliro, 453 Mass. 75, 88 (2009).  See Matter of Otis, 438 Mass. 
1016, 1017 n.3 (2003) (declining to apply any so-called "private 
citizen" exception to conduct involving fraud in connection with 
judicial proceedings).  Rather, we "must ultimately decide every 
case 'on its own merits [such that] every offending attorney 
. . . receive[s] the disposition most appropriate in the 
circumstances.'"  Matter of Lupo, 447 Mass. at 356, quoting 
Matter of the Discipline of an Attorney, 392 Mass. 827, 837 
(1984). 
 
We therefore examine the particular facts of this case, 
along with any attendant aggravating and mitigating factors, to 
assess the appropriateness of the sanction imposed.  Here, the 
board found a lack of mitigating factors and the existence of 
multiple aggravating factors, including the respondent's failure 
to accept the nature and seriousness of her misconduct; the 
respondent's attempts to blame others for her misconduct, 
including opposing counsel, the probate court, the Appeals 
Court, and this court; the financial and other harm caused by 
the respondent's misconduct, which was motivated by her 
pecuniary interests; the respondent's commission of multiple 
violations of the rules of professional conduct; and the 
8 
 
respondent's demonstrated lack of candor in her testimony before 
the hearing committee. 
 
The facts of Matter of Okai, although not identical, are 
closely analogous.  See Matter of Okai, 11 Mass. Att'y 
Discipline Rep. at 188-190 (imposing one-year suspension for 
"contumacious behavior" in attorney's own divorce, including 
four contempt judgments, disposal of assets in violation of 
court order, and prosecution of frivolous appeal, combined with 
other various misconduct in representing clients, with 
aggravating factors).  Here, as in Matter of Okai, the 
respondent committed multiple forms of misconduct in her own 
divorce, including (1) filing false financial statements with 
the court, (2) noncompliance with court orders resulting in 
contempt judgments, and (3) the pursuit of a frivolous motion 
and appeal.  In addition, as discussed supra, the board found a 
lack of mitigating factors and the existence of multiple 
aggravating factors. 
 
In contrast, cases in which a lesser sanction has been 
imposed for similar misconduct have generally involved the 
presence of significant mitigating factors.  See, e.g., Matter 
of Ring, 427 Mass. at 186, 188, 192-193 (imposing board-
recommended three-month suspension for multiple forms of 
misconduct in attorney's own divorce, despite some misgivings 
that sanction was too lenient, where evidence was presented that 
respondent was clinically depressed after breakup of thirty-five 
year marriage); Matter of Leahy, 28 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 
at 530-532, 538-539 (imposing two-month suspension for 
misconduct during attorney's own divorce, including contempt 
judgment for noncompliance with court orders and 
misrepresentations to court regarding wife's mental health, 
where misconduct was not motivated by pecuniary gain; aside from 
custody violations infractions were minor, and respondent timely 
paid most financial commitments); Matter of Patch, 20 Mass. 
Att'y Discipline Rep. 445, 445-446 (2004) (imposing three-month 
suspension, as stipulated by parties, for misconduct during 
attorney's own divorce, including seven contempt judgments, 
filing incomplete and inaccurate financial statement, and 
failing to timely comply with order to pay fees, where all 
arrearages were paid, all contempt was cleared, and respondent 
presented evidence of clinical depression). 
 
Here, the hearing committee did not credit the respondent's 
proffered mitigating factors, and this case arguably merits a 
sanction even more severe than that imposed in Matter of Okai, 
where multiple aggravating factors are present, and, as the 
9 
 
hearing committee observed, "[e]ach type [of misconduct] played 
a different role in service of the respondent's aggressive and 
persistent refusal to acknowledge the authority of the probate 
court to resolve her divorce and the authority of the Appeals 
Court and [this court] to review the probate court and to put 
the divorce litigation to an end." 
 
After careful review of the record, and giving due 
deference to the board's recommendation in light of the 
substantial aggravating factors and lack of mitigating factors, 
we conclude that the sanction imposed by the single justice in 
this case is not markedly disparate from sanctions imposed in 
similar cases. 
 
 
4.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 
order of the single justice suspending the respondent from the 
practice of law for a term of eighteen months. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on the record, accompanied by a 
memorandum of law. 
 
Maude Laroche-St. Fleur, pro se.