Title: State v. James

State: tennessee

Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court

Document:

902 S.W.2d 911 (1995) STATE of Tennessee, Appellee, v. Shawnda Lee JAMES, Appellee, v. THE TENNESSEAN, Intervenor-Appellant. No. 01S01-9505-JV-00069. Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Nashville. June 26, 1995. Charles W. Burson, Atty. Gen. and Reporter, Michael E. Moore, Sol. Gen., Gordon W. Smith, Associate Sol. Gen., Nashville, for the State. Alfred H. Knight and Alan D. Johnson, Willis & Knight, Nashville, for intervenor, The Tennessean. Elizabeth B. Marney, Nashville, for amicus curiae, The Nashville Banner. Robert D. Massey, Pulaski, for defendant Shawnda Lee James. Gregory D. Smith and Rebecca Freeman, Nashville, for amicus curiae, the Tennessee Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers. DROWOTA, Justice. The issue presented in this extraordinary appeal is whether the Juvenile Court for Giles County erred in ruling that all further proceedings before the juvenile court should be closed to the public and press. For reasons hereinafter stated, we vacate the judgment of the juvenile court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On March 6, 1995, separate petitions were filed in the Juvenile Court for Giles County charging fourteen-year-old Shawnda Lee James with first degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping. Both of these acts were allegedly committed on March 5, 1995. On March 10, 1995, the juvenile court ordered that Shawnda Lee James be temporarily placed in the Rutherford County juvenile detention center. The same order stated that a hearing would be conducted on March *912 15, 1995, to determine the further placement of the juvenile. The Tennessean, a division of Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc., filed a motion with the juvenile court on March 14, 1995. The Tennessean's motion included the following: On March 22, 1995, the juvenile court entered an order stating that a hearing on The Tennessean's motion had been conducted on March 15, 1995, and granting The Tennessean's unopposed motion to intervene. This order also included the following: There is no transcript of the March 15, 1995, hearing conducted by the juvenile court. The Tennessean filed an application under Rule 10, Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, for an extraordinary appeal of the trial court's order denying The Tennessean's motion to open further proceedings. The Rule 10 application was denied by the Court of Appeals on April 13, 1995. The Tennessean applied to this Court on May 9, 1995, for review of the Court of Appeals' order denying its Rule 10 application. By an order entered on May 23, 1995, this Court granted The Tennessean's Rule 10 application and set oral argument for June 6, 1995. We also ordered that all proceedings in the Juvenile Court for Giles County be stayed pending further orders of this Court. In State v. Drake, 701 S.W.2d 604 (Tenn. 1985), an issue similar to the one in this case was presented to the Supreme Court. The Court summarized the matters before it as follows: Id. at 606. In addition to describing procedures for hearing closure motions in criminal proceedings and for appellate review under Rule 10 of orders involving closure of criminal proceedings, the Court announced the principles that must be applied when a party seeks to close such proceedings. Relying on the United States Supreme Court decisions in Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S. Ct. 2210, 81 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1984), and Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 104 S. Ct. 819, 78 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1984), both of which were criminal cases involving competing interests under the First and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution, we adopted the following rule when a closure or other restriction order is sought: Drake, 701 S.W.2d at 608. The United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed how the principles stated by it with respect to closing criminal proceedings would apply in the context of juvenile proceedings. However, the federal courts have recognized that additional interests are involved in juvenile proceedings. For example, in In re J.D.C., 594 A.2d 70 (D.C.App. 1991), a juvenile delinquency proceeding, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals stated: Id. at 75. In another juvenile delinquency proceeding, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. A.D., 28 F.3d 1353 (3rd Cir.1994), observed as follows: Id. at 1357. State courts have also addressed such issues. These cases have involved varying procedural postures, varying statutes and rules governing juvenile matters in respective jurisdictions, and varying constitutional issues. The cases have in common an approach that involves balancing the interest of public access to the operations of the judiciary and the interest of confidentiality in juvenile proceedings. See, e.g., Wideman v. Garbarino, 160 Ariz. 16, 770 P.2d 320 (1989); Ex parte The Island Packet, 308 S.C. 198, 417 S.E.2d 575 (1992); Associated Press v. Bradshaw, 410 N.W.2d 577 (S.D. 1987); Matter of N.H.B., 769 P.2d 844 (Utah App. 1989). In Tennessee, these concerns about juvenile proceedings are reflected in Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-124(d), which provides: In addition, Rule 27(a), Tennessee Rules of Juvenile Procedure provides: In addition to the principles discussed in the cases from other jurisdictions, we must be guided by the policies reflected in our own statute and rule. The nature and purpose of juvenile proceedings are different from those involved in criminal proceedings. Despite such differences, we believe that an approach that balances *914 the public's interest in open judicial proceedings and the litigants' right to a fair trial should be applied in deciding whether to close juvenile proceedings. Based on the desirability of expediting further proceedings in the Juvenile Court for Giles County and on the relatively meager nature of the record before us, we have not undertaken in this opinion to analyze the ramifications of any particular provisions of the Constitution of Tennessee on the issues that may be presented in this case. From the record before us, we do not know what factors the juvenile court considered or how it analyzed them in determining to close all further proceedings. Therefore, we vacate that portion of the order of the Juvenile Court for Giles County involving closure of further proceedings and remand the case for a reconsideration of the closure motion. Upon remand, the juvenile court shall balance the parties' respective interests, as described above, and shall apply the following rules: 1. The party seeking to close the hearing shall have the burden of proof; 2. The juvenile court shall not close proceedings to any extent unless it determines that failure to do so would result in particularized prejudice to the party seeking closure that would override the public's compelling interest in open proceedings; 3. Any order of closure must be no broader than necessary to protect the determined interests of the party seeking closure; 4. The juvenile court must consider reasonable alternatives to closure of proceedings; and 5. The juvenile court must make adequate written findings to support any order of closure. ANDERSON, C.J., and REID, BIRCH, WHITE, JJ., concur.