Title: State ex rel. Painter v. Brunner

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Painter v. Brunner, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-35.] 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-35 
THE STATE EX REL. PAINTER ET AL. v. BRUNNER, SECY. OF STATE, ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Painter v. Brunner,  
Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-35.] 
Writ of mandamus issued compelling the secretary of state to rescind directives 
2010-80 and 2010-87 and directing the board of elections to review the 
disputed provisional ballots with the same procedures that it applied to 
provisional ballots in its review of them leading up to its decision on 
November 16. 
(No. 2010-2205 — Submitted January 6, 2011 — Decided January 7, 2011.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an original action for a writ of mandamus to compel 
respondents Secretary of State Jennifer L. Brunner and the Hamilton County 
Board of Elections to rescind certain directives and decisions relating to the 
procedure for an investigation ordered by a federal court.  The investigation is to 
determine whether certain disputed provisional ballots that were not counted in 
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the November 2, 2010 election for judge of the Hamilton County Court of 
Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, because they had been cast in the wrong 
precinct had been miscast due to poll-worker error.  Because relators have 
established their entitlement to the requested extraordinary relief, we grant the 
writ. 
Facts 
Election and Initial Count 
{¶ 2} On November 2, 2010, an election was held for judge of the 
Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, between relator 
John Williams and intervening respondent Tracie Hunter.  The term for the office 
began on January 1, 2011.  On election night, unofficial results indicated that 
Williams led Hunter by 2,847 votes.  There remained 10,500 provisional ballots 
as well as a few other ballots that had not been counted. 
{¶ 3} At a November 16 meeting, the board unanimously determined 
that 8491 of the provisional ballots were invalid and should not be counted 
because they had been cast in the wrong precinct.  At the same meeting, the board 
decided that 27 provisional ballots cast at the board of elections during the 28-day 
period before the November 2 election should be counted because although they 
were voted in the wrong precinct, that mistake was caused by poll-worker error.  
Board employees stated that for provisional ballots cast at the board, the voter 
would ask a board employee to vote, and the employee would give the voter a 
ballot, so if the voter received the wrong ballot, poll-worker error would have 
been the cause.  The board’s investigation into the validity of these ballots at the 
meeting was generally limited to an examination of election records, poll books, 
help-line records, and provisional-ballot envelopes.  The board voted to remake 
                                                 
1  Because one voter cast two provisional ballots in the wrong precinct, any references by the 
board of elections, courts, or secretary of state to 849 disputed provisional ballots are mistaken.  
Therefore, this opinion will refer to the number of disputed provisional ballots as 850 rather than 
849. 
January Term, 2011 
3 
 
these ballots so that they would be cast in the proper precincts.  After the meeting, 
the envelopes containing provisional ballots that the board had determined to be 
valid were opened, and the ballots were counted.  The board’s final count 
indicated that Williams had won the election by 23 votes. 
Federal District Court Action 
{¶ 4} On November 21, Hunter filed a complaint under Section 1983, 
Title 42, U.S.Code, for a temporary restraining order and declaratory and 
injunctive relief against the board of elections and its members in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division.  Hunter 
v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, S.D.Ohio (W.D.) No. 1:10-CV-820.  Hunter 
claimed that the board and its members had violated her rights to due process and 
equal protection by refusing to investigate whether poll-worker error caused some 
voters to vote at the right polling place but in the wrong precinct, even while 
correcting other poll-worker error that caused a voter to vote in the wrong 
precinct. 2  She also sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary 
injunction ordering the board and its members to contact provisional voters whose 
ballots had been rejected, to investigate whether poll-worker error contributed to 
the rejection of provisional ballots, and to count all provisional ballots where poll-
worker error caused the voter to vote in the wrong precinct. 
{¶ 5} On November 22, Judge Susan J. Dlott of the federal district court 
granted Hunter’s motion for a preliminary injunction “insofar as it seeks an order 
commanding [the board and its members] to investigate whether provisional 
ballots cast in the correct polling location but wrong precinct were improperly 
cast because of poll worker error.”  Judge Dlott reasoned that because the board 
of elections had, at its November 16 meeting, decided to count 27 provisional 
                                                 
2  At its November 16 meeting, the board of elections decided that 27 provisional ballots that had 
been voted at the board of elections in the wrong precinct should be considered to be valid because 
any mistake was caused by poll-worker error.   
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ballots cast at the board but in the wrong precinct due to “clear poll worker error,” 
its failure to apply similar scrutiny to other provisional ballots cast at the correct 
polling place but in the wrong precinct “raises equal protection concerns.”  To 
prevent irreparable harm to Hunter, Judge Dlott ordered that the board of 
elections “examine all 849 rejected provisional ballots * * * for reasons 
attributable to poll worker error.”  Judge Dlott further ordered that the board 
“immediately begin an investigation into whether poll worker error contributed to 
the rejection of the [850] provisional ballots now in issue and include in the 
recount of the race for Hamilton County Juvenile Court judge any provisional 
ballots improperly cast for reasons attributable to poll worker error.”  On 
November 23, the board certified the results of the election, with Williams 
certified the winner over Hunter by a margin of 23 votes—114,989 to 114,966. 
Appeal in Federal Case 
{¶ 6} Williams appealed the federal district court’s November 22 
preliminary injunction, and after initially granting him a stay of the order, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dissolved its prior stay and 
denied Williams’s motion for stay on December 1.  Hunter v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. 
of Elections, Sixth Circuit case No. 10-4481.  The court of appeals expressly 
stated that “[t]his disparate treatment–counting the 26 [27] wrong-precinct ballots 
based on poll-worker error during early voting without similarly investigating 
whether poll-worker error led to any of the 849 [850] ballots being cast in the 
wrong precinct on election day–forms the basis for the injunctive order in this 
case.”  On December 16, a divided panel of the court of appeals denied 
Williams’s petition for reconsideration of the denial of his motion for stay.  The 
appeal remains pending before the court of appeals, which has scheduled oral 
argument for March 1. 
Secretary of State Instructions 
on Poll-Worker Error Regarding Provisional Ballots 
January Term, 2011 
5 
 
{¶ 7} In Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless v. Brunner, 
S.D.Ohio (E.D.) No. C2-06-896, the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Ohio, Eastern Division, entered a consent decree in April 2010 in a 
case challenging Ohio’s identification and provisional-ballot laws.  The plaintiffs 
in that case, including the intervening respondents in this case, Northeast Ohio 
Coalition for the Homeless and the Ohio Democratic Party, claimed that some of 
the plaintiffs’ members lacked the identification required by Ohio law to cast a 
regular ballot on election day and that the provisional-ballot laws have been and 
will be applied differently and unequally by the state’s 88 boards of elections.  
The decree specified that boards of elections may not reject a provisional ballot 
cast by a voter who uses only the last four digits of his or her Social Security 
number as identification if the voter cast a provisional ballot in the correct polling 
place, but—for reasons attributable to poll-worker error—in the wrong precinct. 
{¶ 8} On November 1, 2010, the secretary of state issued Directives 
2010-73 and 2010-74 to boards of elections, which incorporated the provisions of 
the consent decree.  In Directive 2010-73, the secretary of state stated that the 
“consent decree provides that an individual voting a provisional ballot using the 
last four digits of his/her social security number may not be deprived of the 
fundamental right to vote because of a failure of a poll worker to follow Ohio 
law,” but that “poll worker error will not be presumed and must be demonstrated 
through evidence.” 
{¶ 9} In Directive 2010-74, which provides guidelines to boards of 
elections for determining the validity of provisional ballots, the secretary of state 
reiterated that the boards may not reject a provisional ballot cast by a voter who 
uses only the last four digits of his or her Social Security number as identification 
because the voter cast the provisional ballot in the wrong precinct but the correct 
polling place for reasons attributable to poll-worker error.  The secretary of state 
noted an example of this type of poll-worker error and suggested an investigative 
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procedure for the board’s determination of poll-worker error in multiple-precinct 
polling places: 
{¶ 10} “Another example of poll worker error is where the provisional 
ballot affirmation envelope (SOS Form 12-B) contains notations indicating that a 
poll worker directed the voter to the wrong precinct at a polling location 
containing multiple precincts.  Because it is a poll worker’s duty to ensure that the 
voter is directed to the correct precinct, these notations provide objective evidence 
that the poll worker did not properly or to the fullest extent required carry out his 
or her Election Day duties.  Similarly, if a board of elections finds multiple 
provisional ballots voted in the correct polling location but wrong precinct, it 
should, either in writing, with written responses from the poll workers, or at a 
public meeting of the board, question the poll workers in that polling location to 
determine whether they followed the board’s instructions for ensuring that voters 
were directed to the correct precinct.” 
{¶ 11} On November 30, eight days after Judge Dlott issued her 
injunctive order in the federal district court case, the secretary of state issued 
Directive 2010-79 to the Hamilton County Board of Elections for instructions on 
supplemental procedures regarding the provisional ballots.  According to the 
secretary of state, the directive was prompted by the board’s rejection of over 
1,000 provisional ballots cast in the November 2, 2010 general election and the 
board’s lack of any “conclusive review or inquiry to demonstrate the existence or 
lack thereof of poll worker error in specific provisional ballot situations” in 
accordance with the consent decree and Directives 2010-73 and 2010-74.  The 
secretary of state reiterated her admonition in Directive 2010-73 that “poll worker 
error will not be presumed and must be demonstrated through evidence” and her 
instructions in Directive 2010-74 for the questioning of poll workers when 
multiple provisional ballots are voted in the correct polling place but the wrong 
precinct.  The directive was limited to the provisional voters specified in the 
January Term, 2011 
7 
 
Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless consent decree – those voters using 
only the last four digits of their Social Security numbers as identification to obtain 
a provisional ballot. 
{¶ 12} Directive 2010-79 further defined poll-worker error as “when a 
poll worker acts contrary to or fails to comply with federal or Ohio law or 
directive issued by the Secretary of State” and set forth “objective criteria” for 
determining poll-worker error. 
{¶ 13} On December 8, pursuant to Directive 2010-79, board of elections 
staff determined that 12 of the 849 provisional ballots that it had previously 
invalidated for being cast in the wrong precinct fell within the category of ballots 
in the directive that required the questioning of poll workers. 
{¶ 14} The next day, after becoming aware of the federal court of appeals’ 
dissolution of its earlier stay of Judge Dlott’s preliminary injunction, the secretary 
of state issued Directive 2010-80.  In her directive, the secretary of state observed 
that although “Judge Dlott’s order only applies to the [850] provisional ballots 
cast in the wrong precinct that were not previously counted by the board of 
elections,” “the investigation of poll worker error required by Judge Dlott’s order 
is broader in scope than Directives 2010-73, 2010-74, and 2010-79 in that, for the 
[850] provisional ballots at issue, the determination of poll worker error is not 
limited to persons who voted using only the last four digits of their Social 
Security number.”  The secretary of state held that in conducting the investigation 
ordered by the federal district court, the board must identify the precincts and poll 
workers for the precincts in which the 850 provisional ballots were cast, contact 
each poll worker to determine whether he or she followed the board’s instructions 
for ensuring that voters were directed to the correct precinct, question each poll 
worker to determine whether he or she followed the applicable law, directives, 
and procedures for casting and processing provisional ballots, and examine the 
poll books for each precinct and the envelopes for the 850 provisional ballots for 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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indications of poll-worker error in directing voters to the wrong precinct.  The 
secretary of state concluded that if the board determined through its investigation 
that any of the provisional ballots were cast in the wrong precinct because of poll-
worker error, then those ballots should be counted, as required by Judge Dlott’s 
order. 
{¶ 15} On December 11, the board of elections voted unanimously to 
follow Directive 2010-80 by issuing subpoenas to 2,200 poll workers who had 
worked at the November 2 election in the precincts and polling places in which 
the 850 provisional ballots that were the subject of the federal district court’s 
order were cast.  The board had previously deadlocked two-to-two on whether to 
send questionnaires to poll workers in lieu of requiring their statements under 
oath.  The board also resolved to notify the Supreme Court of Ohio of the 
“potential for a vacancy on the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, 
Juvenile Division on January 1, 2011 if the board has not concluded its 
investigation and contact with each poll worker.”  The board began issuing 
subpoenas to poll workers on December 13. 
{¶ 16} On December 14, the secretary of state issued Advisory 2010-08, 
which—in addition to the procedures previously set forth in Directives 2010-79 
and 2010-80—authorized the board to subpoena poll workers to testify “under 
oath and recorded by a court reporter, about instructions the poll workers gave to 
voters who cast provisional ballots in the precincts being investigated and other 
relevant matters to determine whether poll worker error occurred regarding the 
provisional ballots in question” or issue questionnaires to poll workers, who could 
complete the questionnaire and return it within seven days in lieu of testifying 
pursuant to a subpoena. 
{¶ 17} The board’s investigation of poll workers began on December 16 
and continued the following day, with a total of 75 poll workers being examined 
during those days.  On the afternoon of the second day of testimony, the secretary 
January Term, 2011 
9 
 
of state issued Directive 2010-87, which ordered the board to accelerate its 
investigation and determination.  According to the secretary, she was concerned 
that at the board’s December 9 and 11 meetings, it had deadlocked on six 
different matters concerning the steps to be taken to complete the investigation 
ordered by Judge Dlott, which jeopardized compliance with the judge’s order to 
conduct the investigation “immediately.”  The secretary was also concerned that 
there would not be a judge on the Hamilton County Juvenile Court for the open 
seat when the term commenced on January 1, 2011. 
{¶ 18} Therefore, the secretary of state ordered that the board take the 
following steps to complete the investigation ordered by Judge Dlott:  (1) identify 
and subpoena all poll workers in those precincts where the 850 provisional ballots 
had been cast that had been invalidated for being voted in the wrong precinct, 
with the subpoenas to be issued no later than December 20 and interviews of poll 
workers subpoenaed to be completed no later than December 23, (2) issue 
questionnaires no later than December 20 to all of those poll workers who had not 
yet testified and give them two calendar days to complete and send their 
responses to avoid having to testify, (3) review all documents from the pertinent 
precincts in which the provisional ballots were cast to determine any indications 
of poll-worker error, with the review to be completed no later than December 27, 
(4) conduct a board meeting no later than December 28 to review the results of 
interviews, questionnaires, and documents to determine whether there was 
evidence that poll-worker error caused any of the 850 provisional ballots to be 
cast in the wrong precinct, (5) count any of the 850 provisional ballots for which 
there was evidence that poll-worker error caused the voter to cast the ballot in the 
wrong precinct, (6) submit any tie votes that arose in the investigation to the 
secretary of state with supporting arguments and statements within 48 hours of the 
vote to permit the matter to be resolved so that the judge who was elected could 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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timely take office, and (7) submit any currently unresolved tie votes to the 
secretary of state by December 21 or meet on that date to revote these matters. 
Writ Case 
{¶ 19} Three days after the secretary of state issued Directive 2010-87, on 
December 20, relators, Williams and John W. Painter, a Hamilton County elector, 
filed this action for a writ of mandamus to compel the secretary of state to rescind 
Directives 2010-80 and 2010-87 as erroneous interpretations of Ohio law and to 
compel the board of elections to rescind its decision to subpoena poll workers to 
testify before the board and instead to review the 850 provisional ballots that are 
the subject of Judge Dlott’s order with exactly the same procedures and scrutiny 
applied to any provisional ballots during the board’s review of them leading up to 
its decision on November 16, without assuming that poll-worker error occurred in 
the absence of specific evidence to the contrary.  Relators also requested a writ of 
prohibition requiring the board of elections to refrain from further contact with 
and questioning of poll workers. 
{¶ 20} Relators additionally filed a motion for temporary injunctive relief 
pending the court’s consideration of their request for mandamus relief, a motion 
for expedited consideration, and a motion for expedited issuance of an alternative 
writ.  We ordered that respondents file expedited responses to relators’ motions.  
State ex rel. Painter v. Brunner, 2010-Ohio-6284.  After the respondents filed 
their responses, we granted the motions of Hunter, the Northeast Ohio Coalition 
for the Homeless, and the Ohio Democratic Party to intervene as additional 
respondents, granted relators’ motion for temporary injunctive relief, granted an 
alternative writ on relators’ mandamus claim, and issued an expedited briefing 
and evidence schedule.  State ex rel. Painter v. Brunner, 2010-Ohio-6468.  We 
also dismissed relators’ prohibition claim.  Id. 
{¶ 21} On December 20, because it was impossible for the board to finish 
questioning the poll workers in the brief time ordered by the secretary of state in 
January Term, 2011 
11 
 
Directive 2010-87, the board requested, and the secretary granted, a waiver of the 
requirement of subpoenaing further poll workers, and questionnaires were sent to 
the remaining poll workers.  On December 27, Judge Dlott denied a motion of the 
intervening respondents to enjoin this writ case. 
{¶ 22} On December 28, the board met and concluded its investigation, 
which generated a record of the testimony of 77 witnesses and over 800 
completed questionnaires.  The board unanimously approved the counting of 16 
of the disputed 850 provisional ballots and unanimously rejected 565 of them.  
That left 269 provisional ballots that had been cast in the right polling location but 
in the wrong precinct.  The board split two-to-two on whether to count these 269 
provisional ballots.  On December 30, the two sides of board members submitted 
letters to the secretary of state to break the tie vote. 
{¶ 23} The parties submitted their evidence and briefs in this case, and the 
Ohio Republican Party filed an amicus curiae brief in support of relators.  This 
cause is now before this court for our consideration of relators’ mandamus claim. 
Legal Analysis 
Jurisdiction 
{¶ 24} We reject the argument of the secretary of state and the intervening 
respondents Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless and Ohio Democratic 
Party that we lack subject-matter jurisdiction over relators’ mandamus claim 
because it is a disguised action for a declaratory judgment and a prohibitory 
injunction.  When the issue is whether the secretary of state has misdirected 
boards of elections regarding their duties—which is relators’ claim here—we 
have consistently rejected this jurisdictional contention.  See, generally, State ex 
rel. Myles v. Brunner, 120 Ohio St.3d 328, 2008-Ohio-5097, 899 N.E.2d 120, ¶ 9, 
and cases cited therein. 
Laches 
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{¶ 25} Hunter and the secretary of state argue that relators’ mandamus 
claim is barred by laches.  “Laches may bar an action for relief in an election-
related matter if the persons seeking this relief fail to act with the requisite 
diligence.”  Smith v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Elections, 123 Ohio St.3d 467, 2009-Ohio-
5866, 918 N.E.2d 131, ¶ 11.  “The elements of laches are (1) unreasonable delay 
or lapse of time in asserting a right, (2) absence of an excuse for the delay, (3) 
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the injury or wrong, and (4) prejudice to the 
other party.”  State ex rel. Polo v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1995), 74 Ohio 
St.3d 143, 145, 656 N.E.2d 1277. 
{¶ 26} Hunter claims that because relators are indirectly challenging the 
suggestion in Secretary of State Directive 2010-74 that boards of elections 
investigate poll-worker error by questioning poll workers if the board finds 
multiple provisional ballots voted in the correct polling location but wrong 
precinct, which is repeated in Directive 2010-79, and because the first directive 
was issued on November 1, relators’ 49-day delay in filing this mandamus action 
on December 20 constituted an unreasonable delay.  Similarly, the secretary of 
state claims that any challenge to Directive 2010-79, which was issued on 
November 30, was unreasonably delayed. 
{¶ 27} Respondents are wrong.  Relators are challenging Directives 2010-
80 and 2010-87, which were issued on December 9 and 17.  Directives 2010-74 
and 2010-79 were restricted to those situations covered by the federal consent 
decree in Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless and are not challenged by 
relators in this action.  Relators’ 11-day and three-day delays to contest Directives 
2010-80 and 2010-87 were not unreasonably long, and because of the abbreviated 
statutory time period to generally resolve these disputes, an expedited schedule 
for briefing and evidence would have been warranted even if relators had filed 
this action on December 17.  Although the secretary of state also argues that the 
R.C. 3505.32(A) deadline for finishing the board’s canvass would probably expire 
January Term, 2011 
13 
 
before a recount after resolution of the pending litigation, given the delays 
attributable to the litigation by both Hunter and Williams, we are persuaded that 
this is a deadline that might pass even under the best of circumstances.  See State 
ex rel. Squire v. Taft (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 365, 369, 632 N.E.2d 883.  No 
prejudice to respondents thus occurred. 
{¶ 28} Therefore, because under the circumstances, relators acted with the 
requisite diligence in instituting this action for extraordinary relief, we reject 
Hunter’s claim that this case is barred by laches. 
Mandamus 
{¶ 29} Relators request a writ of mandamus to compel the secretary of 
state to rescind Directives 2010-80 and 2010-87 because they are an erroneous 
interpretation of law and to compel the board of elections to refrain from taking 
action to comply with the secretary of state’s instructions.  In addition, relators 
request a writ of mandamus directing the board of elections to review the disputed 
provisional ballots with exactly the same procedures and scrutiny applied to the 
board’s review of provisional ballots leading to its November 16 decisions, 
without assuming that poll-worker error occurred in the absence of specific 
evidence to the contrary. 
{¶ 30} “To be entitled to the requested writ, relators must establish a clear 
legal right to the requested relief, a corresponding clear legal duty on the part of 
the secretary of state [and the board of elections] to provide it, and the lack of an 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.”  State ex rel. Heffelfinger v. 
Brunner, 116 Ohio St.3d 172, 2007-Ohio-5838, 876 N.E.2d 1231, ¶ 13; see also 
State ex rel. Husted v. Brunner, 123 Ohio St.3d 288, 2009-Ohio-5327, 915 N.E.2d 
1215, ¶ 8.  “[I]f the secretary of state ‘has, under the law, misdirected the 
members of the boards of elections as to their duties, the matter may be corrected 
through the remedy of mandamus.’ ”  State ex rel. Colvin v. Brunner, 120 Ohio 
St.3d 110, 2008-Ohio-5041, 896 N.E.2d 979, ¶ 20, quoting State ex rel. Melvin v. 
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Sweeney (1950), 154 Ohio St. 223, 226, 43 O.O. 36, 94 N.E.2d 785.  
Notwithstanding the secretary’s argument to the contrary, because of our 
recognition of mandamus as the appropriate remedy and the need to resolve this 
election dispute in a timely fashion, relators lack an adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of the law.  Id. at ¶ 31. 
{¶ 31} For the reasons that follow, the secretary of state erred in issuing 
the postelection directives and instructions concerning the investigation of 
provisional ballots that had previously been invalidated by the board of elections 
because they had been cast in the wrong precinct. 
Ohio Statutory Law for Provisional Ballots Cast 
in the Incorrect Precinct 
{¶ 32} Initially, the United States Constitution “ ‘leaves the conduct of 
state elections to the states.’ ”  Warf v. Bd. of Elections of Green Cty., Ky. (C.A.6, 
2010), 619 F.3d 553, 559, quoting Gamza v. Aguirre (C.A.5, 1980), 619 F.2d 449, 
453.  For example, the Help America Vote Act, Section 15301 et seq., Title 42, 
U.S.Code, “ ‘conspicuously leaves * * * to the States’ the determination of 
‘whether a provisional ballot will be counted as a valid ballot.’ ”  State ex rel. 
Skaggs v. Brunner (C.A.6, 2008), 549 F.3d 468, 477, quoting Sandusky Cty. 
Democratic Party v. Blackwell (C.A.6, 2004), 387 F.3d 565, 577. 
{¶ 33} “One aspect common to elections in almost every state is that 
voters are required to vote in a particular precinct.  Indeed, in at least 27 of the 
states using a precinct voting system, including Ohio, a voter’s ballot will only be 
counted as a valid ballot if it is cast in the correct precinct.”  Sandusky Cty. 
Democratic Party, 387 F.3d at 568.  “The advantages of the precinct system are 
significant and numerous:  it caps the number of voters attempting to vote in the 
same place on election day; it allows each precinct ballot to list all of the votes a 
citizen may cast for all pertinent federal, state, and local elections, referenda, 
initiatives, and levies; it allows each precinct ballot to list only those votes a 
January Term, 2011 
15 
 
citizen may cast, making ballots less confusing; it makes it easier for election 
officials to monitor votes and prevent election fraud; and it generally puts polling 
places in closer proximity to voter residences.”  Id. at 569. 
{¶ 34} “Under Ohio law, then, only ballots cast in the correct precinct 
may be counted as valid.”  Id. at 578.  The plain language of several statutes so 
provides.  See R.C. 3503.01(A) (every qualified elector “may vote at all elections 
in the precinct in which the citizen resides”); R.C. 3505.181(C)(2)(a) (providing 
that “if an individual refuses to travel to the polling place for the correct 
jurisdiction * * * [a] provisional ballot cast by that individual shall not be opened 
or counted” if the “individual is not properly registered in that jurisdiction”) and 
(E)(1) (defining “jurisdiction” for purposes of provisional-ballot provisions as 
“the precinct in which a person is a legally qualified elector”); R.C. 3505.182 
(requiring that each individual casting a provisional ballot execute a written 
affirmation stating that he or she “understand[s] that * * * if the board of elections 
determines that” the individual is not a resident of the precinct in which the ballot 
was cast, the provisional ballot will not be counted); R.C. 3505.183(B)(4)(a)(ii) 
(if board determines that the “individual named on the affirmation is not eligible 
to cast a ballot in the precinct or for the election in which the individual cast the 
provisional ballot,” “the provisional ballot envelope shall not be opened, and the 
ballot shall not be counted”); and R.C. 3599.12(A)(1) (prohibiting any person 
from voting or attempting to vote in any election “in a precinct in which that 
person is not a legally qualified elector”) and (B) (making a violation of that 
section a felony of the fourth degree).  In fact, as recently as November 2009, the 
secretary of state’s office acknowledged that Ohio law “does not provide any 
exception when the ballot is cast in the wrong precinct due to poll worker error.” 
{¶ 35} These statutes do not authorize an exception based on poll-worker 
error to the requirement that ballots be cast in the proper precinct in order to be 
counted.  “ ‘[T]he general rule is that unless there is language allowing substantial 
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compliance, election statutes are mandatory and must be strictly complied with.’ ”  
State ex rel. Stewart v. Clinton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 124 Ohio St.3d 584, 2010-
Ohio-1176, 925 N.E.2d 601, ¶ 27, quoting Husted, 123 Ohio St.3d 288, 2009-
Ohio-5327, 915 N.E.2d 1215, ¶ 15.  We are not authorized to add an exception 
that is not contained in the express language of these statutory provisions.  State 
ex rel. Stoll v. Logan Cty. Bd. of Elections, 117 Ohio St.3d 76, 2008-Ohio-333, 
881 N.E.2d 1214, ¶ 39 (“the statute contains no exception, and we cannot add one 
to its express language”); cf. State ex rel. Reese v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of 
Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 126, 2007-Ohio-4588, 873 N.E.2d 1251, ¶ 31, and 
cases cited therein (mistaken or erroneous statement or advice by board of 
elections did not estop board from acting contrary to statement by invalidating 
petition). 
{¶ 36} Therefore, under Ohio statutory law, the secretary of state’s 
instructions to the board of elections, which required an investigation into whether 
poll-worker error caused any of the 850 provisional ballots to be cast in the wrong 
precinct, were erroneous because there is no exception to the statutory 
requirement that provisional ballots be cast in the voter’s correct precinct. 
Federal Consent Decree and Injunction 
{¶ 37} Nevertheless, the secretary of state and the intervening respondents 
assert that the secretary’s postelection instructions were warranted because of the 
federal consent decree in Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless (Apr. 19, 
2010), S.D. Ohio (E.D.) No. C2-06-896, as well as Judge Dlott’s November 22 
injunctive order in Hunter (Nov. 22, 2010), S.D. Ohio (W.D.) No. 1:10CV820.  
As the state’s chief election officer pursuant to R.C. 3501.04, the secretary of 
state has many election-related duties, including the duties to “[i]ssue instructions 
by directives and advisories * * * to members of the boards as to the proper 
methods of conducting elections,” “[p]repare rules and instructions for the 
conduct of elections,” and “[c]ompel the observance by election officers in the 
January Term, 2011 
17 
 
several counties of the requirements of the election laws.”  R.C. 3501.05(B), (C), 
and (M).  There is nothing in these statutes that restricts the secretary of state’s 
instructions to boards of elections to state election law.  Therefore, the secretary 
of state also has a duty to instruct election officials on the applicable requirements 
of federal election law as well as federal court orders that are applicable to them. 
{¶ 38} The federal district court’s consent decree in Northeast Ohio 
Coalition for the Homeless (Apr. 19, 2010), S.D. Ohio (E.D.) No. C2-06-896, 
however, does not justify the secretary of state’s issuance of Directives 2010-80 
and 2010-87 and Advisory 2010-08 to require the board of elections to contact 
poll workers for each of the disputed provisional ballots that were cast in the 
wrong precinct and to question them to determine whether poll-worker error 
caused the ballots to be cast in the improper precinct.  The decree specifies only 
that boards of elections may not reject a provisional ballot “cast by a voter, who 
uses only the last four digits of his or her social security number as identification” 
for any of several reasons, including that the “voter cast his or her provisional 
ballot in the wrong precinct, but in the correct polling place, for reasons 
attributable to poll worker error.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 4.  The secretary of 
state’s postelection directives and advisory applied more expansively to the 850 
provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct. 
{¶ 39} Notably, the secretary of state’s preelection Directive 2010-74, 
which was issued on November 1, 2010, and postelection Directive 2010-79, 
issued on November 30, 2010, both of which suggested that the board question 
poll workers to determine if poll-worker error caused provisional ballots in 
multiple-precinct polling locations to be cast in the wrong precinct, were 
accordingly limited to provisional ballots cast by voters who used only the last 
four digits of his or her Social Security number as identification. 
{¶ 40} Nor did the federal district court’s November 22, 2010 injunctive 
order in Hunter, S.D. Ohio No. 1:10CV820, justify the secretary of state’s 
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18 
 
postelection instructions directing the board of elections to question poll workers 
concerning the 850 provisional ballots cast in the wrong precincts.  The court’s 
order was premised on the fact that the board of elections had carved out an 
exception from the general Ohio rule that provisional ballots not be counted if 
they were cast in the wrong precinct, apart from the exception provided by the 
federal consent decree in Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless (Apr. 19, 
2010), S.D. Ohio (E.D.) No. C2-06-896, for voters using only the last four digits 
of their Social Security number as identification who cast provisional ballots in 
the wrong precinct due to poll-worker error.  Hunter, at 6-7.  The district court–as 
well as the court of appeals in its decision denying Williams’s motion for stay–
relied on the board’s determination that 27 provisional ballots cast in the wrong 
precinct at the board of elections should be counted because the evidence 
established that the improper casting of these votes must have been attributable to 
poll-worker error.  Id.  But there is no indication that any poll workers had been 
contacted and questioned by the board when it made its November 16 decision to 
count these provisional ballots, so any equal-protection claim did not require an 
investigation–it merely required the same inquiry that the board had engaged in 
for its initial determination of the validity of the provisional ballots. 
{¶ 41} In fact, insofar as the secretary of state’s postelection instructions 
conflict with her preelection instructions regarding the validity of provisional 
ballots cast at improper precincts, they are erroneous.  Cf. State ex rel. Skaggs v. 
Brunner, 120 Ohio St.3d 506, 2008-Ohio-6333, 900 N.E.2d 982, ¶ 58 (“By 
changing her instructions for one county but not for others after the election at the 
request of a candidate, the secretary of state failed to ensure that the same rules 
would be applied to each provisional voter of every county in the state”).  That is, 
in attempting to resolve equal-protection concerns implicated by the board’s 
counting 27 provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct at the board, the 
secretary of state may have caused much greater equal-protection concerns.  See 
January Term, 2011 
19 
 
Bush v. Gore (2000), 531 U.S. 98, 104, 121 S.Ct. 525, 148 L.Ed.2d 388 (“the 
right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental; and one source of its 
fundamental nature lies in the equal weight accorded to each vote and the equal 
dignity owed to each voter”); League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner 
(C.A.6, 2008), 548 F.3d 463, 476 (“[t]he right to vote includes the right to have 
one’s vote counted on equal terms with others”). 
{¶ 42} And if the secretary’s directives requiring the questioning of poll 
workers for provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct were extended to the 
entire state, it is doubtful that the time limits for resolving elections would ever be 
met.  See R.C. 3505.183(E)(2) (board of elections shall examine eligibility of 
persons who cast provisional ballots by, at the latest, the 11th day after election); 
R.C. 3505.32(A) (board of elections shall complete canvass of election returns not 
later than the 21st day after the election and canvass shall be deemed final 81 days 
after the election). 
{¶ 43} The secretary of state and boards of elections have general 
investigative authority over election irregularities, but this power is generally 
limited to reporting possible violations to the attorney general or prosecuting 
attorney for prosecution.  See R.C. 3501.05(N)(1) and 3501.11(J).  In this case, 
where the federal court orders did not require the specific type of investigation 
directed by the secretary of state and conducted by the board of elections and the 
investigation was plainly otherwise violative of Ohio law, we hold that the 
secretary and the board erred in so acting.3   
                                                 
3 The secretary of state, however, by issuing Directive 2010-87, did not act in clear disregard of 
R.C. 3501.11(X) by truncating the 14-day period to a two-day period for a board of elections to 
submit a tie vote to the secretary for resolution.  See R.C. 3501.11(X) (“In all cases of a tie vote or 
a disagreement in the board, if no decision can be arrived at, the director or chairperson shall 
submit the matter in controversy, not later than fourteen days after the tie vote or the disagreement, 
to the secretary of state, who shall summarily decide the question, and the secretary of state’s 
decision shall be final”).  As the secretary of state observes, there may be circumstances that 
warrant the secretary’s instructing board members that any statutory limits be shortened to further 
expedite matters in election situations. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
{¶ 44} Therefore, the secretary of state’s postelection instructions to the 
board of elections are not justified by either of the federal court decisions. 
Federalism and Collateral Attack 
{¶ 45} Respondents argue that the requested writ of mandamus should be 
denied because of the Supremacy Clause and the collateral-attack doctrine. 
{¶ 46} Clause 2, Article VI of the United States Constitution provides that 
the “Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof * * * shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in 
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any 
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”  “It has long been settled that the 
Supremacy Clause binds state courts to decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court on questions of federal statutory and constitutional law.”  State v. Burnett 
(2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 419, 422, 755 N.E.2d 857.  But as for decisions of lower 
federal courts, this court has observed that “we are reluctant to abandon our role 
in the system of federalism created by the United States Constitution until the 
United States Supreme Court directs us otherwise.”  Id. at 424.  Thus, “we are not 
bound by rulings on federal statutory or constitutional law made by a federal court 
other than the United States Supreme Court.  We will, however, accord those 
decisions some persuasive weight.”  Id; cf. Skaggs, 549 F.3d at 477, quoting 
Planned Parenthood of Cincinnati Region v. Strickland (C.A.6, 2008), 531 F.3d 
406, 410 (“To allow federal courts free rein in determining whether and under 
what circumstances a partially deficient provisional ballot will count–under state 
law–would deprive state courts of their long-established role as the ‘final arbiter 
on matters of state law’ ”). 
{¶ 47} Moreover, collateral or indirect attacks on judgments are 
disfavored.  Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, Div. of State Fire 
Marshal, 115 Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-5024, 875 N.E.2d 550, ¶ 22.  A 
collateral attack is “ ‘an attempt to defeat the operation of a judgment, in a 
January Term, 2011 
21 
 
proceeding where some new right derived from or through the judgment is 
involved.’ ”  Fawn Lake Apts. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (1999), 85 Ohio 
St.3d 609, 611, 710 N.E.2d 681, quoting Kingsborough v. Tousley (1897), 56 
Ohio St. 450, 458, 47 N.E. 541. 
{¶ 48} Neither the Supremacy Clause nor the collateral-attack doctrine 
prevents the requested extraordinary relief here.  As noted previously, the two 
federal court orders do not resolve the issues raised here.  The Northeast Ohio 
Coalition for the Homeless consent decree did not require the investigative 
procedures specified by the secretary of state for ballots cast in the wrong precinct 
that were not covered by the decree, and, while the Hunter injunction ordered an 
investigation and an examination of the disputed provisional ballots, it did not 
require the specific investigation ordered by the secretary of state and conducted 
by the board of elections.  As Judge Dlott herself recognized in her order in 
Hunter denying the motion of the intervening respondents in this case to enjoin 
this state-court action, “[i]t is within the province of the Ohio Supreme Court to 
determine whether Secretary of State Jennifer L. Brunner’s directives comply 
with state law governing election procedures, and this Court will not enjoin the 
Ohio Supreme Court from doing so.” 
Presumption against Poll-Worker Error 
{¶ 49} Relators also request a writ of mandamus to compel the board of 
elections to review the disputed provisional ballots with the same procedures it 
used in its review of the provisional ballots in its initial November 16 
determination, without assuming that poll-worker error occurred in the absence of 
specific evidence to the contrary.  This request has merit.  As noted previously, 
under Ohio law, these ballots should not be counted, so no investigation would 
normally be warranted.  And Judge Dlott’s injunctive order did not require the 
investigation ordered by the secretary of state and conducted by the board of 
elections here.  At best, any equal-protection claim would have merely required 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
 
the same examination that the board conducted in—concluding incorrectly under 
Ohio law—that 27 provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct at the board of 
elections during the early-voting period should be counted even though they were 
cast in the wrong precinct due to poll-worker error.  That review was limited to an 
examination of the poll books, help-line records, and provisional-ballot envelopes 
and emanated from the uncontroverted evidence that these ballots were cast in the 
wrong precinct due to poll-worker error. 
{¶ 50} Moreover, as we explicitly held in another case challenging the 
secretary of state’s instructions concerning the validity of disputed provisional 
ballots, see Skaggs, 120 Ohio St.3d 506, 2008-Ohio-6333, 900 N.E.2d 982, at ¶ 
51, quoting State ex rel. Speeth v. Carney (1955), 163 Ohio St. 159, 186, 56 O.O. 
194, 126 N.E.2d 449, election officials err in presuming poll-worker error because 
“ ‘[i]n the absence of evidence to the contrary, public officers, administrative 
officers and public authorities, within the limits of the jurisdiction conferred upon 
them by law, will be presumed to have properly performed their duties in a 
regular and lawful manner and not to have acted illegally or unlawfully.’ ” 
{¶ 51} Insofar as two of the board members appear to presume poll-
worker error in connection with the 269 provisional ballots cast in the wrong 
precinct but correct location in a multiple-precinct polling place, this is incorrect.  
Neither they nor respondents could rely on evidence obtained from the improper 
investigation ordered by the secretary of state and conducted by the board.  
Finally, the board members erred in relying on a statistical analysis comparable to 
the one we rejected in State ex rel. Yiamouyiannis v. Taft (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 
205, 208-209, 602 N.E.2d 644, to support their claim that poll-worker error 
occurred. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 52} Based on the foregoing, relators have established their entitlement 
to the requested extraordinary relief in mandamus.  The secretary of state’s 
January Term, 2011 
23 
 
postelection instructions to the board of elections were not justified by Ohio law 
or the pertinent federal court orders.  Therefore, we grant relators a writ of 
mandamus to compel the secretary of state to rescind Directives 2010-80 and 
2010-87 and to compel the board of elections to rescind its decisions made 
pursuant to those directives and to instead review the 850 provisional ballots that 
are the subject of Judge Dlott’s order and are not subject to the consent decree in 
Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless, with exactly the same procedures and 
scrutiny applied to any provisional ballots during the board’s review of them 
leading up to its decision on November 16, without assuming that poll-worker 
error occurred in the absence of specific evidence to the contrary. 
Writ granted. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, 
and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 53} I dissent from today’s decision but not on the merits.  Instead, my 
concern is the unnecessary expediting of this case.  The rush to judgment was 
started by the secretary of state in a fairly transparent attempt to play a role in the 
resolution of the election before her successor takes office on January 10.  Now, 
this court is along for the ride. 
{¶ 54} The two-judge juvenile court remains in good hands in Cincinnati: 
Judge Karla Grady remains on the bench and former Chief Justice Eric Brown 
assigned retired juvenile judge Thomas Louden to preside as the second juvenile 
judge through February while this election remains unresolved.  Thus, we have 
time to make a decision.  This court would benefit from ordering relators to file a 
reply brief in this case because some of the defenses, e.g., laches, lack of 
jurisdiction, the Supremacy Clause, and the collateral-attack doctrine, raised by 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
 
respondents in their briefs have arguably not been sufficiently addressed by 
relators in their merit brief.  I would order relators to file a reply brief by January 
13, 2011, so that all the pertinent issues have been addressed.  And in a case that 
may involve the profound unfairness of votes not being counted because 
registered voters were directed by poll workers to the wrong table in a multiple-
precinct polling place, we should make the most informed decision possible. 
{¶ 55} Moreover, although the secretary of state is in her final days of 
office, she does have a successor.  And it is possible that this writ case will be 
rendered moot if her successor, who takes office on Monday, January 10, rescinds 
the challenged directives.  There is thus no need to resolve this case before the 
secretary of state elect has had the opportunity to give his opinion on this matter.  
By acting more quickly than is necessary under these circumstances, we are 
acting contrary to “our general rules precluding advisory opinions and extolling 
judicial restraint.”  See State ex rel. LetOhioVote.org v. Brunner, 125 Ohio St.3d 
420, 2010-Ohio-1895, 928 N.E.2d 1066, ¶ 22.  Therefore, I dissent. 
__________________ 
 
Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P., R. Joseph Parker, W. Stuart Dornette, 
and John B. Nalbandian, for relators. 
 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, and Richard N. Coglianese, Erick D. 
Gale, and Michael J. Schuler, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondent 
Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner. 
 
Gerhardstein & Branch Co., L.P.A., Jennifer L. Branch, and Alphonse A. 
Gerhardstein, for intervening respondent Tracie Hunter. 
 
Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, L.L.P., Caroline H. Gentry, Sheena L. 
Little, and Brad Hughes; The Chandra Law Firm, L.L.C., and Subodh Chandra; 
and McTigue Law Group, Donald J. McTigue, and Mark A. McGinnis, for 
intervening respondents Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless and Ohio 
Democratic Party. 
January Term, 2011 
25 
 
 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Anne Marie Sferra, James P. Schuck, and 
Christopher N. Slagle, urging granting of the writ for amicus curiae, Ohio 
Republican Party. 
______________________