Title: Rebecca R. Price, Individually and as the Administratrix of the Estate of Jessica R. Price, Deceased et al. v. Thomas Built Buses, Inc. and Merls Bus Sales

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS,

 

REBECCA R. PRICE, INDIVIDUALLY
AND AS THE ADMINISTRATRIX OF
THE ESTATE OF JESSICA R. PRICE,
DECEASED, et al,

APPELLANTS,
vs.
‘THOMAS BUILT BUSES, INC. and
MERLS BUS SALES,

APPELLEES,

06-1074

opinion Davered June 28, 2007

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT
COURT OF BENTON COUNTY,
NO. 06-1074,
HON. JAY
JUDGE,

 

FINCH, CIRCUIT

 

ANNABELLE CLINTON IMBER, Associate Justice

‘On May 19, 2003, a school bus carrying 43 students from the Siloam Springs School

District ran off the road, flipped onto its side, and slid down an embankment. One student,

Jessica Price, was killed, and ten other students sustained serious injuries. At the time of the

accident, the bus was not outfitted with seat belts forall ofits passengers. ‘The specifications

governing school bus design promulgated by the Arkansas Department of Education do not

include passenger seat belts. Ina suit filed against the school bus manufacturer and distributor,

the circuit court entered 4

 

mmary judgment, dismissing all tort claims based upon the

manufacturers filure to provide passenger seatbelts. In so ruling, the court concluded that

the General Assembly's decision not to require seat belts in school buses precluded 3 jury from

deciding the issue again. Pursuant to the separation-of-powers doctrine, we agree and affirm

the circuit court's sumnmary-judgment order.
Appellants Rebecca Price, as administratrix of the Estate of Jessica Price, and the
parents, as next of friends, of the ten injured students, filed suit against Appellees Thomas
Built Buses, Inc, the bus manufacturer, and Mer!'s Bus Sales, the bus retailer." Appellants
specifically pleaded that Appellees were negligent (a) in filing to warn the purchasers, users,
and riders ofthe bus about the dangers of riding in the bus unrestrained by seatbelts, (b) in
failing to test the safety of the bus in side rollover accidents, (€) in failing to create a safer
altemative product, and (4) in failing to recall the bus for retrofitting with seat bels.
Appellants also asserted claims based on strict lability and breach of express and implied
warranties. In a motion for summary judgment, Appellees aserted they could not be held
liable for any alleged defect from a lack of seat belts due to their compliance with the Arkansas

Department of Education’s specifications for school bus design and safety. Furthermore,

 

according to Appellees, because the General Assembly has declined to require seat belt in
school buses, the issue oftheir negligence for filing to outfit the Siloam Springs bus with seat
belts was not an issue a jury should decide. After hearing, the circuit court granted summary
judgment, concluding that the legislature has spoken to the issue of requiring seat bets on
school buses, and it was not appropriate fora jury to be allowed to decide the issue again.
(On appeal, Appellants allege three points of error: (I) the circuit court erred in
concluding that Appellants were precluded from bringing a tort action against Appellees when

Appellees had complied with the federal and state minimum safety standards, (2) the circuit

"Appellants did not file any claim against the Siloam Springs School District or the school
district's insurance company; nor did they file claims with the Arkansas State Claims Commission.

de
‘court erred in concluding that the doctrine of acquired immunity applied to Appellees, and
(@) the circuit court erred in deciding that there was no genuine ise of material fet as t0
whether the bus was defective or unreasonably dangerous for purposes of strict liability,
‘whether the lack of seat belts on the bus was the proximate cause of Appellants’ injuries, and
‘whether there was evidence that Appellees breached the express and implied warranties. We
have jurisdiction over the instant case because it involves an isue of fint impression and an
issue of statutory interpretation, Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2 (b)(1) & (6) (2007).

‘A party is entitled to summary judgment if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the afidavits, if any, shows that there is
rho genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving patty is entitled to judgment as
‘a matter oflaw” on the isue set forth in the party’s motion. Ark. R. Civ. P. 56 (€)(2) (2007).
‘The burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact is upon the moving.
party. Windsong Enteprises, In. v. Upton, 366 Ark. 23, _S.W.3d___ (2006). On appellate
review, we must determine whether summary judgment was proper based on whether the
evidence presented by the moving party let a material question of fact unanswered. Id, This
court views the proofin the light most favorable to the party resisting the motion, resolving
any doubts and inferences against the moving party, to determine whether the evidence left
a material question of fact unanswered. Id

‘The issues in the instant case necessitate our interpretation of the statutes and
regulations governing the design of school buses in Arkansas, ‘This court reviews a circuit

‘court's interpretation ofa statute de nove because itis for this court to determine what a statute

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‘means. Morgan v. Chandler, 367 Ark. 430, __S.W.3d (2006). In the absence of a
showing that the circuit court erred, however, this court will accept the circuit court's
interpretation as correct on appeal. Id. The basic rule of statutory construction is to give
effect to the intent ofthe legislature. Ward v. Doss, 361 Ark. 153, 205 $.W.3d 767 (2005).
‘Where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, we determine the intent from
the ordinary meaning ofthe language wed. Id, We construe the statute just as it reads, giving
the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Id. When a
statute is ambiguous, we must interpret it according to legislative intent. Id. ‘Then, our
review becomes an examination of the whole act, reconciling the provisions to make them,
consistent, harmonious, and sensible in an effort to give effect to every part. Id. We must
ako look atthe legislative history, the language and the subject matter involved, Id. Similar
rules of construction apply to the interpretation of rules and regulations. See, e.., Srcelinv
Hays, 332 Ark. 270, 965 S.W.24 103 (1998).

Under the Arkansas Constitution Article 14 § 4, the General Assembly is vested with
the “supervision of public schools, and the execution of laws governing the same.” Ark,
Const. art. 14 § 14. The General Assembly has given the State Board of Education the
authority to “adopt and enforce regulations . . . to govern the design and operation of all
school buses used for the transportation of school children . ... and] such regulations shall
by reference be made a part of any contract with a school district.” Ark. Code Ann. § 6-19-
111 (a)-(o) (Repl. 1999). Individual school districts are authorized to use district funds to

purchase buses or transporting students to school asthe districts deem best, “affording safe and.

+
 

convenient transportation to the pupils.” Ark, Code Ann, § 6-19-102 (a)-(b) (Repl. 1999).
More specifically, the buses “shall be of such specifiations as may be prescribed by uniform
rules and regulations of the State Board of Education.” Ark. Code Ann. § 6-9-102 (e) (Repl.
1999) (emphasis added).

‘When purchasing a school bus, a school district must solicit bids from sellers, and the
local school board has the exchisive jurisdiction to make bus purchases. Ark. Code Ann. §
6-21-304 (a) & (b)(1) (Supp. 2005). However, under section § 6-21-304 (b) (2) & (3), the

Department of Education, in consultation with a committee of school administrators, “shall

 

be responsible for drawing up the minimum specifications for all school buses,” and under
section § 6-19-102 , any bus purchased by a school board “shall be ofsuch specifications.”
‘See Atk. Code Ann. §§ 6-21-304 (b)(2) & (3) and 619-102 (¢) (Repl. 1999 & Supp. 2008).

‘The Arkansas Department of Education's specification for passenger seating design
states that “fall seats... must comply with all requirements of FMVSS 222.” THE
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION RULES FOR THE SPECIFICATIONS GOVERNING.
SCHOOL BUS DESIGN, § 63.00 (Mar. 2004), FMVSS 222 is a federal safety standard
promulgated pursuant to the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Act (FMVSA), see 49 US.C §
3010, et seq (2000), that provides occupant protection requirements for school bus seating and
restraining bartiers, See 49 C.E.R. § 571.222, S1 (2006). Although FMVSS 222 sets out
restraining-barrier and impact-zone requirements, it does not address seat bet for school bus
pasiengers. See 49 CLR. § 571.222 (2006).

Appellants nonetheless suggest that the Department of Education only promulgates

Se
“minimum specifications” for school bus design, and that, although a bus manufacturer must
‘comply with the minimum specifications, nothing precludes manuficturers fom exceeding
those specifications. Appellants point out that, because the General Assembly has not spoken
to the issue of seat belts on school buses, the legislature did not prevent bus manufacturers
from exceeding the minimum specifications by installing seat belts. They also point out that
the federal courts have not interpreted the Federal Motor Safety Vehicle Act as preempting
common-law tort claims against manufacturers. Instead, the federal courts have held that
compliance with minimum standards only constitutes evidence of ordinary cate. See Geer.
American Honda Motor Co., Inc, 529 US. 861 (2000); Hanis v. Great Dane Trailers, In, 234
F.3d 398 (8th Cir, 2000). Accordingly, Appellants assert that a plaintiff should be able to
bring a common-law action against a manufieturer when safety measures beyond the
‘minimum would have better protected passengers from injury.

Appellees, onthe other hand, insist that the General Assembly has repeatedly addressed
the issue of mandatory seat bets in school buses, deciding each time not to require seat beks.
[Appellees alo point out that the term “specification” isnot equivalent tothe term “standard”
— that is, standards are aspirational in nature, whereas specifications are detailed technical
descriptions of design requirements. According to Appellees, the Department of Education,
{snot common consumer thats ignorant concerning bus safety features, and, therefore, bus
‘manufacturers may not deviate from the exact specifications set out by the department absent
‘consumer’ contrary request. Because Appellees assert that the legislature has spoken to the

issue of mandatory seat belts in school buses, they claim that the judicial branch would violate

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the separation-of-powers doctrine by deciding the question again.

Although the statutes and regulations conceming school-bus designs are silent with
regard to seat belts in school buses, the language of the act read as a whole indicates that a
‘manufacturer must comply with the specifications set out by the Department of Education.
Specifications are defined as “a technical description or other description of the physical or
fanctional characteristics of a commodity.” Ark, Code Ann. § 6-21-304 (a)(B)() (Supp.
2005). Any contract for the purchase of a school bus in Arkansas must contain the
specifications promulgated by the Department of Education— that is, the bus must contain
features that comply with the Department's technical descriptions. ‘The term standards, on
the other hand, means an “object or quality or measure serving a a bass or example or degree
of excellence.” OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS, 2d Ed. 814 (2001),
‘Thus, contrary tothe federal governments decision to adopt “standards” through the FMVSS,
‘which serve asa bass and example for school bus design, the Arkansas legislature has chosen,
to adopt particular specifications that will dictate the exact physical characteristics ofall school
buses in Arkansas.

Appellants assert that, because Arkansas has adopted the standards under FMVSS 222
by reference, the General Assembly intended to adopt the federal courts’ approach that
compliance with minimum standards does not preclude common-law actions. Appellants,
however, fail to recognize that the Department of Education has adopted the safety
requirements under FMVSS 2s a mandatory specification for Arkansas school buses:

‘These rules are enacted pursuant to the authority under Ark.
Code Ann. § 6-21-304 .... It is the purpose of these rules to

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‘establish specifications governing school bus design forthe State
‘of Arkansas... . All seats shall have a minimum cushion depth
‘of 15 inches and must comply with all requirements of FMVSS,
222. School bus design capacities shall be in accordance with
FMVSS 222 ..... All school buses (Including Type ‘A’) shal be
‘equipped with restraining baniers which conform to FMVSS 222.
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION RULES FOR THE SPECIFICATIONS GOVERNING
SCHOOL BUS DESIGN, §§ 1.02, 2.01, 63.01 & 63.06 (Mar. 2004) (emphasis added).
Appellants farther confuse the federal statutory scheme with our own when they assert
that our legislature, like Congress, did not intend to preclude common-law actions against
‘manufacturers that have complied with the minimum specifications. The federal courts have
held that Congress did not intend for common-law actions to be precluded in such cases
because Congress included a savings clause in the MVSA that expressly states “[cJompliance
with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempta person
from lability at common law.” 49 U.S.C. § 30103 (¢) 2000). In contrast, no such savings
clauses included in Arkansas's statutory scheme. Also, while Appellants cite to an Oklahoma
«ease as support for their proposition, the decision by the Oklahoma Court of Appeals centered
con the issue of preemption under the federal at, an issue not argued by either party in this
case, See Attocknie v. Carpenter Manufacturing, In, 901 P.2d 221 (Okla, Civ. App. 1995)
‘To the extent that any ambiguity may exist in the meaning of our state's school-bus
safety statutes, it is laid to rest by the legislative history surrounding the issue of seat bets in
school buses. In 1931, school districts were granted the authority to purchase school buses
for the safe and convenient transportation of students to school, and, in 1937, the legislature

gave the Department of Education the authority to promulgate regulations governing the

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design of school buses. See Popes Digest § 675%(a) (1937); see also 1937 Ark. Acts 300 § 102
and 1931 Ark, Acts 169 § 102, From that point on, the Department of Education has never
required passenger seat belts on school buses.

In 1984, following a school-bus accident near Newport, the General Assembly's
Legislative Council issued a report entitled “Feasibility of Requiring School Districts to Install
Seat Belts on School Buses.” After discussing several national studies on the issue of
‘mandatory passenger seat belts on school buses, the Council made a detailed lst of the pros
and cons for requiring seatbelts in Arkansas school buses. STATE OF ARKANSAS LEGISLATIVE
COUNCIL, FEASIBILITY OF REQUIRING SCHOOL DISTRICTS TO INSTALL SEAT BELTS ON
ScHOOL BUSES (Sept. 20, 1984). On the pro side, the Council found only two factors
supporting the use of seat belts in buses, (1) riders would be better off restrained than
‘unrestrained in accidents where the bus rolls over, crashes into another object, or stops
suddenly and (2) because seatbelts are required in cars, seatbelts on buses would encourage
the habit of buckling-up in school children. Id. at7. On the con side, however, the Council
found several reasons that militate against requiring seat belts on buses, including: (1) the
increased danger that a small child would be trapped by his oF her seat belt in a erash; (2)
students could use seat belts as weapons, increasing the risk of accidental injury; (3) seat belts
‘would require an asistant to the driver, thus increasing costs; (4) monitors would be required
to ensure that the students wore their belts property; (5) seat belts would be vandalized,
increasing replacement expenses; (6) seat belts would result in a 60% los of passenger seating

‘capacity, necesitating the purchase of more buses; (7) seat belts do not protect a student's

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hiead, neck, ices, and upper torso from injury; (8) some seat belt designs could cause injuries
to young students immature anatomies ina erash; and (9) lability insurance forthe use of seat
belts could be excessive. Id, t 7-8. The Legislative Council concluded thatthe installation
‘of seat belts in school buses should not be mandated by the legislature. Id. at 8-9.

‘Then, in 1985, the legislature enacted legislation requiring school bus drivers to wear
seat belts; but, in accordance with the Legislative Council’s recommendation, the legislature
<i not mandate the same for school bus pasengers. See Ark. Code Ann. § 6-19-109 (Repl
1999); 1985 Ark. Acts 757 § 5. ‘The General Assembly considered the issue of passenger seat
belts on school buses again in 2001, but the proposed bill, which would have mandated seat
belt in all school buses purchased after January 1, 2003, died in committee. 2001 Ark. HLB,
1134.

Based upon the legislature's extensive involvement in the regulation of school-bus
‘design and the legislature's repeated consideration of mandatory seat belts in school buses, we
‘conclude that the legislature has indeed spoken on the issue of whether manufacturers should
include seat bels in theie bus designs. ‘The Supreme Court of Alabama considered a case
involving similar issues in Denton v, Eidins & Lee Bus Sales, In, 491 So.24 942 (1986). In
that ease, the plaintiff alleged that, although the Alabama legislature had not mandated seat
belts on school buses, the legisature had not conclusively determined that a manufacturer or
seller that distributed buses without seat belts could not be held liable under products-lability
law. Id, Despite the absence of legislative history for the Alibama court to consider, the

‘court conchided that when the legislature decided to require seat belts for schoo! bus drivers,

“10.
the legislature ako considered the isue of passenger scat belts. Id. Thus, the Alabama court
held that the legislature had impliedly decided that seat belts were not required in school
buses, and a manufacturer could not be held liable under products-liability law for filing to
install seat belts in school buses. Id

Here, as in Dentson, the General Assembly has decided to require seat belts for school
bus drivers but not for passengers. See Ark, Code Ann. § 6-19-109 (Repl. 1999). In
‘Dentson, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that the legislature's decision to require
driver seatbelts reflected an implied intent to relieve manufacturers of lability for buses not
‘outfitted with passenger seat belts In this case, we have clear evidence, in the form of the
1984 report by the Legislative Council and the legislation following that report, that the
legislature has caefilly considered the sue of mandating passenger seat belt in school buses
but repeatedly declined to do so

Based upon the statutory and regulatory framework governing the specifications for
school bus design in Arkansas, we conclude that the Arkansas General Assembly has
afirmatively decided not to require passenger seat belts in school buses, In fact, the General
‘Assembly has expressly stated that the specifications adopted by the Department of Education
‘must be a part of every school bus contract in Arkansas. See Ark. Code Ann. § 6-19-102 (@)
(Repl. 1999), ‘Thus, a manufacturer must comply with those specifications. We hold that the
General Assembly has thereby preempted any common-law tort claims against school bus
‘manufacturers that have complied with the Department of Education's design specifications.

Ifwe were to hold otherwise, we would risk violating the separation-of-powers doctrine by

ole
deciding a public policy question over which the General Assembly has already affirmatively
exercised its authority, For these reasons, we affirm the circuit court’ summary-judgment
order?

Affirmed.

2 tm view of our holding tht an action cannot be maintained against the school bus
smanuficturer and dsuibutor, we need not addes the osher points on zppeal

2