Title: State v. Michael R. Hess

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2010 WI 82 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP2231-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Michael R. Hess, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2009 WI App 105 
Reported at 320 Wis. 2d 600, 770 N.W.2d 769 
(Ct. App. 2009-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 15, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 2, 2010   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth   
 
JUDGE: 
James L. Carlson   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ZIEGLER, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
GABLEMAN, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ROGGENSACK, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: CROOKS, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Aaron R. O’Neil, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by George M. 
Tauscheck, Milwaukee, and oral argument by George M. Tauscheck. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 82
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP2231-CR   
(L.C. No. 
2007CF000110) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael R. Hess, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 15, 2010 
 
A. John. Voelker 
Acting Clerk of 
Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   The issue presented in this 
case is whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule permits the use of evidence obtained by a law enforcement 
officer in his execution of an arrest warrant that was void from 
the beginning because the warrant had no basis in fact or law.  
The State contends that suppression of evidence from a warrant 
issued solely as a result of judicial error would not further 
the purposes of the exclusionary rule. 
¶2 
We conclude that the good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule does not apply to a situation in which: (1) no 
No.  2008AP2231-CR 
2 
 
facts existed that would justify an arrest without a warrant; 
(2) the civil arrest warrant issued by a circuit judge was void 
ab initio1 because (a) it did not comply with any statute 
authorizing the court to issue a warrant; and (b) it was not 
supported by an oath or affirmation; and (3) the court issued 
the warrant without the benefit of verification of the facts or 
scrutiny of the procedure to ensure that the judge acted as a 
detached and neutral magistrate.   
¶3 
The 
warrant 
here 
was 
defective 
on 
its 
face.  
Nonetheless, we cannot reasonably attribute fault to the law 
enforcement officer who executed the warrant.  Thus, suppressing 
evidence obtained as a result of the unauthorized, defective 
warrant is necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial 
process.  Consequently, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals, State v. Hess, 2009 WI App 105, 320 Wis. 2d 600, 770 
N.W.2d 769. 
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶4 
In mid-2005 the defendant, Michael R. Hess, was 
arrested in Walworth County for operating a motor vehicle under 
the influence of an intoxicant, in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.63(1)(a) (2007-08).2  Hess was released on a $1,000 cash 
bond, which included various conditions including requirements 
                                                 
1 Ab initio is defined as "[f]rom the beginning."  Black’s 
Law Dictionary 5 (8th ed. 2004).   
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2008AP2231-CR 
3 
 
that he "appear on all court dates" and "not possess or consume 
alcohol." 
¶5 
Hess 
subsequently pled guilty to the offense——a 
felony——and on January 12, 2007, the court ordered a presentence 
investigation (PSI).  The order stated: "The Department of 
Corrections 
(Department) 
shall 
conduct 
a 
presentence 
investigation and prepare a report based on this investigation."  
It also set March 28, 2007, as the sentencing date.  The court 
adjusted Hess's bond to a $10,000 signature bond with conditions 
of release similar to those in the original bond. 
¶6 
On February 8, 2007, the PSI author, a Department of 
Corrections agent, sent a letter to the circuit court.  The 
letter explained that the agent had contacted Hess to schedule a 
meeting for February 1.  Hess appeared at the meeting.  The 
agent then reviewed a questionnaire that she had sent to Hess, 
noticing that portions of it were incomplete.  When asked why he 
had not completed the questionnaire, Hess responded that it 
incorrectly listed the offense as his fifth OWI.  The agent then 
asked Hess to return to the lobby to complete the questionnaire, 
after which the interview would begin.  Hess then left, which 
the agent presumed was because Hess was feeling ill. 
¶7 
The agent was unable to contact Hess after this 
meeting.  She left a message with Hess's mother asking Hess to 
contact the agent by 4 p.m. that day.  Hess did not respond, 
although 
he 
left 
a 
message 
with 
the 
agent's 
supervisor 
complaining about the agent.  The agent's supervisor contacted 
Hess and directed him to return to complete the interview on 
No.  2008AP2231-CR 
4 
 
February 6.  He did not comply.  The agent also was unable to 
contact Hess's attorney.  Thus, the agent concluded her letter 
to the court with the following paragraph: 
It should be noted that to date, Mr. Hess has not 
attempted to contact this agent or [the agent's 
supervisor].  Therefore, due to the current situation 
and Mr. Hess' failure to cooperate, as outlined above, 
this agent does not foresee, at this time, that the 
Pre-Sentence Investigation ordered by the Court will 
be 
completed 
as 
requested. 
 
However, 
it 
is 
respectfully requested that Mr. Hess be placed in 
custody, 
which 
would 
allow 
the 
Pre-Sentence 
Investigation to be completed.  Should the Court 
concur with this request, please notify our office of 
such. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶8 
On February 14, 2007, Circuit Judge John Race issued a 
"Bench 
Warrant 
Civil." 
 
This 
warrant 
directed 
"any 
law 
enforcement officer" to "[a]rrest and deliver to the sheriff the 
above named person because this person: . . . failed to: Meet 
with 
the 
Agent 
assigned 
to 
complete 
his 
Pre-Sentence 
Investigation."  The warrant specified that Hess could be 
released upon "Completion of the Presentence Investigation 
Interview with the Agent assigned." 
¶9 
On March 7, 2007, Deputy Gilbert Maas of the Walworth 
County 
Sheriff's 
Department 
went 
to 
Hess's 
address, 
understanding that he "had a criminal felony arrest warrant for 
Michael Hess."  When he arrived, Deputy Maas encountered Hess's 
father at the front door.  After a brief conversation with 
Hess's father, Deputy Maas spoke with Hess himself and advised 
him that he had an arrest warrant for failure to appear in 
No.  2008AP2231-CR 
5 
 
court.  As the two men were walking to the squad car, Deputy 
Maas smelled the odor of intoxicants coming from Hess.  He 
placed Hess under arrest, handcuffed him, did a pat-down search, 
and placed Hess in the back of the squad car. 
¶10 Following normal procedure, Deputy Maas requested the 
dispatch center to check if Hess was on any conditions of bond.  
He was advised by the dispatch center that Hess was on bond for 
a sixth offense drunk driving with a minor in the vehicle and 
that one of the conditions of his bond was that he not possess 
or consume alcohol.  Deputy Maas then transported Hess to 
Lakeland Medical Center to obtain a blood draw. 
¶11 Hess was thereafter charged with felony bail jumping, 
in violation of Wis. Stat. § 946.49, for violating the bond 
requirement that he not possess or consume alcohol.  He in turn 
filed a motion to suppress any evidence obtained as a result of 
the civil warrant.  This included Deputy Maas's observations 
regarding Hess's sobriety on March 7.  Hess argued that the 
civil bench warrant was invalid because it failed to conform to 
the requirements for a civil bench warrant in Wis. Stat. 
ch. 818.  Specifically, he argued that (1) none of the 
enumerated situations in which an arrest may be made was 
present; and (2) the court was not furnished with an affidavit 
prior to issuing the warrant.  He argued that all evidence 
obtained on March 7 must be suppressed as the fruit of an 
illegal arrest. 
¶12 The circuit court, Judge James Carlson presiding, held 
a hearing on the motion to suppress.  The court declined to take 
No.  2008AP2231-CR 
6 
 
testimony at the hearing because it deemed the legality of the 
warrant an issue of law.  It then denied the motion, reasoning 
that the warrant was valid under either (1) the court's inherent 
power to issue warrants; or (2) the court's general statutory 
powers under Wis. Stat. § 757.01.  The circuit court also stated 
that even if the warrant were not valid, the evidence was 
admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule. 
¶13 The case proceeded to a jury trial, at which Deputy 
Mass testified regarding his observations on March 7.  The jury 
found Hess guilty.  The court withheld sentence and placed Hess 
on three years probation.  Hess appealed. 
¶14 The court of appeals reversed and remanded after 
suppressing the evidence.  Hess, 320 Wis. 2d 600, ¶3.  The court 
analyzed the validity of the warrant, observing that the circuit 
court lacked the authority to issue a civil bench warrant 
because this was a criminal case.  Id., ¶11 (citing Wis. Stat. 
ch. 818).  The court then noted that the court lacked the 
authority to issue a criminal bench warrant under Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.09(1) because Hess did not fail to appear in court and was 
under no express or implied requirement to meet with the PSI 
writer.  Id., ¶12.  Finally, the court said that the court had 
no authority to issue a warrant for contempt because the court 
did not order Hess to cooperate with the PSI writer.  Id., ¶13.  
The court concluded that, because warrants may be issued only 
pursuant to statute, the arrest warrant was invalid.  Id., ¶14 
(citing Wagner v. Lathers, 26 Wis. 436, 438 (1870)). 
No.  2008AP2231-CR 
7 
 
¶15 The court next examined the applicability of the 
exclusionary rule.  The court noted that the primary purpose of 
the rule was to deter unlawful police conduct while also 
preserving judicial integrity.  Hess, 320 Wis. 2d 600, ¶16 
(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968)).  It cited 
State v. Kriegbaum, 194 Wis. 229, 232, 215 N.W. 896 (1927), for 
the proposition that the exclusionary rule prohibits evidence 
obtained pursuant to a warrant issued by a judge with no legal 
authority to issue such a warrant.  Hess, 320 Wis. 2d 600, ¶¶17-
18. 
¶16 The court of appeals next turned to the good-faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule.  It reasoned that the good-
faith exception, as set out in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897 (1984), and State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 
N.W.2d 625, "allow[s] the admission of evidence when law 
enforcement officers did what they were supposed to . . . but 
someone made an accidental clerical or technical error or the 
judge erred in concluding that the law enforcement's application 
fulfilled 
the 
requirements 
for 
a 
warrant." 
 
Hess, 
320 
Wis. 2d 600, ¶21.  The court rejected the State's argument that 
the good-faith exception applies where the error is judicial, 
reasoning that the court in this case did not merely make an 
error, but acted outside the law.  Id., ¶22. 
¶17 The court declared that the purpose of the good-faith 
exception is not simply to deter police misconduct,  id., ¶23, 
but also to preserve judicial integrity, meaning that courts 
must ensure "that our judicial process does not sanction, 
No.  2008AP2231-CR 
8 
 
approve and be party to constitutional violations," id., ¶25.  
Finally, 
the 
court 
examined 
cases 
in 
several 
different 
jurisdictions to conclude that "the good faith exception does 
not apply when a judge acts outside the law by issuing a warrant 
he or she had no authority whatsoever to issue."  Id., ¶26; 
United States v. Scott, 260 F.3d 512, 515 (6th Cir. 2001); 
Bosteder v. City of Renton, 117 P.3d 316, 323 (Wash. 2005); 
State v. Wilson, 618 N.W.2d 513, 520 (S.D. 2000). 
¶18 The State petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted.   
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶19 We review a motion to suppress in two steps.  State v. 
Matejka, 2001 WI 5, ¶16, 241 Wis. 2d 52, 621 N.W.2d 891.  First, 
we uphold the circuit court's findings of historical fact unless 
they are clearly erroneous.  Id.  Second, we independently apply 
constitutional 
principles 
to 
those 
facts. 
 
Id. 
 
The 
constitutional sufficiency of a warrant and the application of 
the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule are issues of 
law, which we review de novo.  See State v. Meyer, 216 
Wis. 2d 729, 744, 576 N.W.2d 260 (1998); Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 
¶9. 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶20 The State concedes that the arrest warrant was 
invalid. 
 
As 
a 
result, the State's evidence of Hess's 
consumption and possession of alcohol——the evidence used to 
convict Hess of felony bail jumping——was obtained in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
No.  2008AP2231-CR 
9 
 
Article I, § 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Thus, the issue 
in 
this 
case 
is 
whether exclusion of that evidence is 
appropriate, or whether the court should permit use of the 
evidence on grounds that law enforcement obtained the evidence 
while acting in good-faith reliance on an arrest warrant that 
was void. 
¶21 In resolving this issue, we begin by examining the 
statutory 
and 
constitutional warrant requirements and the 
deficiencies of the warrant at issue in this case.  We then 
consider the historical development of the exclusionary rule and 
its good-faith exception in the federal courts as well as the 
parallel developments in Wisconsin.  Finally, we apply these 
principles to determine whether exclusion is an appropriate 
remedy under the unusual facts of this case. 
A. 
Warrant Requirements in Wisconsin 
¶22 The warrant in this case suffered from two primary 
defects: (1) the circuit court did not have statutory authority 
to issue a warrant for failure to meet with a PSI investigator; 
and (2) the warrant was not supported by an oath or affirmation.   
1. 
Lack of Statutory Authority 
¶23 The defendant contends and the State concedes that the 
arrest warrant was issued without authority. 
¶24 Under appropriate circumstances, a circuit court has 
statutory authority to issue a (1) civil bench warrant, (2) a 
criminal bench warrant, or (3) a contempt warrant.  To 
illustrate, had the circuit court ordered Hess to comply with 
the requests of the PSI writer or made his cooperation a 
No.  2008AP2231-CR 
10 
 
condition of bond, the court might have ordered the defendant 
arrested for contempt (Wis. Stat. §§ 785.03(1)(b), 785.04(1)) or 
issued a criminal bench warrant (Wis. Stat. § 968.09(1)) after 
Hess failed to follow up with the PSI writer.  Had Hess failed 
to appear before the court on a civil matter, a civil bench 
warrant would have been appropriate (Chapter 818).  Under the 
facts of this case, however, the warrant cannot be supported by 
any of these various statutes.  The court issued what purported 
to be a civil bench warrant in a criminal case on the basis of 
Hess's failure to comply with an order the court never gave. 
¶25 Civil arrests are governed by Wis. Stat. ch. 818.  In 
a civil action, arrests are to be made only "as prescribed by 
this chapter."  Wis. Stat. § 818.01(1).  The statute then lists 
eight circumstances under which a defendant may be arrested 
pursuant to a civil bench warrant.  Wis. Stat. § 818.02.  The 
procedures under the chapter, in turn, require that an "order 
for the arrest of the defendant must be obtained from the 
court."  Wis. Stat. § 818.03.  The court may issue such an order 
"where it shall appear by affidavit that a cause of action 
exists, and that it is one of those mentioned in s. 818.02." 
Wis. Stat. § 818.04 (emphasis added).  To execute the warrant, 
"[t]he affidavit, bond and order of arrest shall be delivered to 
the sheriff."  Wis. Stat. § 818.07 (emphasis added).   
¶26 Nothing in the record suggests that any of the 
circumstances authorizing a civil bench warrant under § 818.02 
existed.  No affidavit was provided to the circuit court 
demonstrating the existence of any of those circumstances, and 
No.  2008AP2231-CR 
11 
 
consequently no affidavit accompanied the order for arrest 
delivered to the sheriff.  Equally important, the matter pending 
before the court was criminal, not civil.  Therefore, the court 
was without authority to issue a civil bench warrant. 
¶27 The court may issue a warrant for the arrest of a 
defendant when a judge determines that there is probable cause 
to believe that a criminal offense has been committed and that 
the accused has committed it.  Wis. Stat. § 968.04.  Hess's 
failure to cooperate with the agent in preparing a PSI was not a 
crime.  In addition, under Wis. Stat. § 968.09(1), a court may 
issue a criminal arrest warrant when a witness fails to appear 
before the court as required "or violates a term of the 
defendant's . . . bond."  Here, Hess had not failed to appear 
for a court date.  Nor had he violated a term of his bond, 
because meeting with the PSI agent was not a condition of his 
bond.  Therefore, the circuit court was without authority to 
issue an arrest warrant under § 968.09(1). 
¶28 Finally, Wis. Stat. ch. 785 permits a circuit court to 
order imprisonment as a remedial sanction for contempt of court.  
Such contempt is defined in relevant part as intentional 
"[m]isconduct in the presence of the court" or "[d]isobedience, 
resistance or obstruction of the authority, process or order of 
a court."  Wis. Stat. § 785.01(1)(a)-(b).  There is nothing in 
the record to suggest that Hess satisfied either definition of 
contempt of court.  In particular, he did not fail to comply 
with an explicit order of the court.  Therefore, the arrest 
warrant was not authorized under ch. 785. 
No.  2008AP2231-CR 
12 
 
¶29 Because the circuit court had no authority to issue 
the warrant it did, exclusion is an appropriate remedy for 
evidence obtained as a result of that warrant.  This court held 
in Kriegbaum that where a magistrate lacked authority to issue a 
warrant, the search conducted and evidence seized resulted in a 
constitutional violation.  Kriegbaum, 194 Wis. at 232.  In 
Kriegbaum, a justice of the peace issued a warrant authorizing a 
search of the person of the defendant, but the statutes 
authorized justices of the peace to issue warrants only to 
search a "particular house or place."  Id.  From these facts, 
the court held: "A search made pursuant to warrant issued by a 
justice of the peace to whom the legislature had not granted the 
power to issue such a warrant is an unreasonable search and in 
violation of the defendant's constitutional rights."  Id. 
¶30 The court of appeals has applied the principle 
articulated in Kriegbaum in several cases.  In these cases, the 
court held that evidence must be suppressed when it was obtained 
pursuant to a warrant issued by a court commissioner not 
authorized to issue search warrants.  State v. Loney, 110 
Wis. 2d 256, 258-60, 328 N.W.2d 872 (Ct. App. 1982); State v. 
Grawien, 123 Wis. 2d 428, 431, 367 N.W.2d 816 (Ct. App. 1985).3  
                                                 
3 State v. Grawien was decided after the United States 
Supreme Court had adopted a good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule.  State v. Grawien, 123 Wis. 2d 428, 367 
N.W.2d 816 (Ct. App. 1985).  The Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
refused to apply the good-faith exception, which had not yet 
been adopted in Wisconsin, reasoning that doing so would 
overrule existing Wisconsin precedent.  Id. at 432. 
No.  2008AP2231-CR 
13 
 
These cases, together with Kriegbaum, support the conclusion 
that exclusion is an appropriate remedy where evidence was 
obtained by a warrant issued by a magistrate who lacked the 
authority to issue the warrant. 
¶31 This basic principle is reinforced by State v. 
Popenhagen, 2008 WI 55, 309 Wis. 2d 601, 749 N.W.2d 611.  In 
Popenhagen, the state obtained evidence pursuant to subpoenas 
that did not satisfy the statutory requirement of a showing of 
probable cause.  Id., ¶¶7, 13.  We held that suppression was 
necessary because the means by which the state procured evidence 
was in violation of the procedures set out by statute.  Id., 
¶97.  Allowing documents obtained by a subpoena not complying 
with the statutory probable cause requirement would make the 
statutory safeguards meaningless.  Id., ¶61.  By the same token, 
we held that suppression of an incriminating statement procured 
by use of those same documents was necessary to fully protect 
persons from the state's failure to comply with the statute.  
                                                                                                                                                             
In State v. Collins, the court of appeals applied the good-
faith exception to the exclusionary rule before this court 
adopted it.  State v. Collins, 122 Wis. 2d 320, 329-30, 363 
N.W.2d 229 (Ct. App. 1984).  Collins does not contradict the 
basic principle from State v. Kriegbaum, 194 Wis. 229, 215 
N.W. 896 (1927), because the court noted specifically that "the 
defect in the warrant did not stem from its being issued by a 
person other than a properly empowered neutral magistrate."  Id. 
at 327. 
No.  2008AP2231-CR 
14 
 
Id., ¶85.  Like the subpoenas in Popenhagen, the warrant in this 
case did not conform to the basic statutory requirements.4 
¶32 These cases lead us to conclude that because the 
statutes did not authorize a warrant under these circumstances, 
the warrant was void ab initio.  In such a situation, exclusion 
is an appropriate remedy.  The State is no more entitled to the 
use of the evidence here than it would be had law enforcement 
placed Hess in custody without a warrant in circumstances where 
a warrant was required.  The warrant had no basis in fact or law 
and was void from the moment it was issued; therefore, the 
evidence seized pursuant to Hess's arrest is subject to the 
exclusionary rule. 
2. 
Lack of Oath or Affirmation 
¶33 Both the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions 
provide that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation . . . ."  U.S. Const. amend. 
IV; Wis. Const. art. 1, § 11.  We have declined to consider this 
requirement a mere technicality, but have upheld its basic 
substantive importance, stating: 
An oath is a matter of substance, not form, and it is 
an essential component of the Fourth Amendment and 
legal proceedings.  The purpose of an oath or 
affirmation is to impress upon the swearing individual 
an appropriate sense of obligation to tell the truth.  
                                                 
4 A 
concurring 
opinion 
employed 
a 
somewhat 
different 
analysis and concluded: "A circuit court cannot be denied the 
power to remedy an obvious and undisputed misuse of its judicial 
authority by the district attorney."  State v. Popenhagen, 2008 
WI 55, ¶109, 309 Wis. 2d 601, 749 N.W.2d 611 (Prosser, J., 
concurring). 
No.  2008AP2231-CR 
15 
 
An oath or affirmation to support a search warrant 
reminds both the investigator seeking the search 
warrant 
and 
the 
magistrate 
issuing 
it 
of 
the 
importance and solemnity of the process involved.  An 
oath or affirmation protects the target of the search 
from impermissible state action by creating liability 
for perjury or false swearing for those who abuse the 
warrant 
process 
by 
giving 
false 
or 
fraudulent 
information.  An oath preserves the integrity of the 
search 
warrant 
process 
and 
thus 
protects 
the 
constitutionally 
guaranteed 
fundamental 
right 
of 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable 
searches 
and 
seizures.  
State v. Tye, 2001 WI 124, ¶19, 248 Wis. 2d 530, 636 N.W.2d 473 
(footnotes omitted). 
¶34 When a warrant fails to comply with the constitutional 
oath or affirmation requirement, we have considered it to be 
"invalid when issued."  Id., ¶23.  In Tye the warrant was 
"facially defective because no sworn affidavit was attached," 
although the court held and the parties stipulated that the 
affidavit, if true and sworn, would have provided probable cause 
for the search.  Id., ¶¶5, 7.  We contrasted the warrant's 
deficiency with a case where the error was in the street number 
of the premises to be searched.  State v. Nicholson, 174 
Wis. 2d 542, 544, 497 N.W.2d 791 (Ct. App. 1993).  In Nicholson, 
however, this error was only a "technical irregularity not 
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant," allowing the 
warrant itself to be valid when issued.  Tye, 248 Wis. 2d 530, 
¶23.   
¶35 Here, the arrest warrant was not accompanied by an 
affidavit, sworn or unsworn.  The absence of an affidavit 
violated Wis. Stat. §§ 818.04 and 818.07.  The absence of a 
No.  2008AP2231-CR 
16 
 
sworn affidavit violated the state and federal constitutions and 
rendered 
evidence 
obtained 
as 
a 
result 
of 
the 
warrant 
inadmissible.  Tye, 248 Wis. 2d 530, ¶3.   An oath or 
affirmation is necessary "to induce an honest belief in the mind 
of the magistrate" that probable cause exists.  Kraus v. State, 
226 Wis. 383, 386 (1937) (citing State v. Baltes, 183 Wis. 545, 
552, 198 N.W. 282 (1924) (suppressing evidence because no sworn 
testimony existed to support the warrant)).   
¶36 The 
oath 
or 
affirmation 
and 
probable 
cause 
requirements apply equally to arrest warrants as well as search 
warrants.  Giordenello v. U.S., 357 U.S. 480, 485-86 (1958).  
The sworn complaint or affidavit is necessary to allow the judge 
or magistrate to make an informed determination regarding the 
existence of probable cause.  Id. at 486.  The test for the 
sufficiency of a sworn complaint or affidavit is whether it can 
"support 
the 
independent 
judgment 
of 
a 
disinterested 
magistrate."  Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo. State Pen., 401 U.S. 560, 
565 (1971). 
¶37 Without 
an 
affidavit 
accompanied 
by 
oath 
or 
affirmation, the warrant failed to meet a basic constitutional 
requirement and was void ab initio.  See Tye, 248 Wis. 2d 530, 
¶13.  The absence of any affidavit should have put both the 
court and the sheriff's department on notice of a problem. 
B. 
The Exclusionary Rule and Good-Faith Exception 
¶38 Although we hold that the exclusionary rule applies 
because the warrant was void when issued, the State asks us to 
extend the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in 
No.  2008AP2231-CR 
17 
 
Wisconsin to render evidence admissible when it is seized 
pursuant to a warrant issued without statutory authority.  To 
determine whether such an extension of the good-faith exception 
is appropriate, we begin by examining the historical background 
of the exclusionary rule in the federal courts and in Wisconsin.  
We then apply these principles to the situation in which a 
circuit court issues a warrant without statutory authority and 
unsupported by an oath or affirmation.   
1. 
The Federal Exclusionary Rule 
¶39 The origin of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule 
can be traced to the Supreme Court's decision in Weeks v. United 
States, in which the Court considered a defendant's timely 
objection to the warrantless seizure of evidence from his 
residence.  Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 387-88 (1914).  
The import of the Fourth Amendment, it explained, was "to put 
the courts . . . under limitations and restraints as to the 
exercise of [their] power and authority."  Id. at 391-92.  It 
concluded that unlawful seizures "should find no sanction in the 
judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the 
support of the Constitution."  Id. at 392.  Accordingly, the 
Court held that the trial court erred by refusing the return of 
the papers and by allowing them to be used at trial.  Id. at 
398. 
¶40 Initially, the exclusionary rule created in Weeks 
applied only to federal officers and federal courts.  In Wolf v. 
Colorado, the Court acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment 
protections are applied to the states through the Due Process 
No.  2008AP2231-CR 
18 
 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but it declined to extend 
the exclusionary rule to the states on grounds that the rule was 
not required by the text of the Constitution or by virtue of 
legislation.    Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949). 
Rather, exclusion was "a matter of judicial implication."  Id. 
at 28.  Instead of imposing the exclusionary rule on the states' 
administration of justice, the Court chose to allow the states 
to pursue other methods that might be equally effective 
solutions to the constitutional problem.  Id. at 31.  
¶41 Twelve years later, however, the Court reconsidered 
this view and overruled Wolf, holding that "all evidence 
obtained 
by 
searches 
and 
seizures 
in 
violation 
of 
the 
Constitution is . . . inadmissible in a state court."  Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).  To hold, as Wolf did, that the 
Fourth Amendment as applied to the states does not impose 
consequences for violations would be "to grant the right but in 
reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment."  Id. at 656.  
In response to criticism that the exclusionary rule results in 
letting the guilty go free, the Court reaffirmed an earlier 
holding from Elkins v. United States: 
"[T]here is another consideration——the imperative of 
judicial integrity."  The criminal goes free, if he 
must, but it is the law that sets him free.  Nothing 
can destroy a government more quickly than its failure 
to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of 
the charter of its own existence.    
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 
206, 222 (1960)) (internal citations omitted).  The Court went 
on to emphasize that applying the exclusionary rule to the 
No.  2008AP2231-CR 
19 
 
states "is not only the logical dictate of prior cases, but it 
also makes very good sense.  There is no war between the 
Constitution and common sense."  Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657. 
¶42 The Court elaborated on the purposes and functions of 
the exclusionary rule in the context of police officer "stop and 
frisk" seizures in Terry v. Ohio.  In Terry the Court held that 
excluding evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
seeks to deter unlawful police conduct while serving another 
"vital 
function——'the 
imperative 
of 
judicial 
integrity.'"  
Terry, 392 U.S. at 12-13 (citing Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222).  The 
Court ultimately concluded that the police officer's actions in 
Terry were proper under the Fourth Amendment, but emphasized 
that "[c]ourts which sit under our Constitution cannot and will 
not be made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional 
rights of citizens."  Terry, 392 U.S. at 13. 
¶43 Sixteen years later, the Supreme Court modified the 
exclusionary rule to provide a good-faith exception when a 
police officer relies in good faith on a facially valid warrant 
that was issued by a neutral and detached magistrate.  Leon, 468 
U.S. at 905.  Crucial to the Court's analysis was balancing the 
interests of preserving probative evidence in criminal trials 
and 
removing 
any 
incentive 
for 
official 
misconduct 
or 
constitutional violations.  Id. at 900-01.  
¶44 The 
Court 
tempered 
the 
good-faith 
exception 
by 
identifying four circumstances in which the good faith reliance 
of 
an 
officer 
will 
not 
save 
unconstitutionally 
obtained 
evidence: (1) where the facially valid affidavit is based upon 
No.  2008AP2231-CR 
20 
 
knowingly or recklessly made false statements; (2) where the 
issuing judge or magistrate "wholly abandoned his judicial 
role;" (3) where the affidavit was insufficient to allow the 
magistrate to make a determination of probable cause; and (4) 
where the officer cannot demonstrate objective good faith 
because the affidavit supporting the warrant is "so lacking in 
indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its 
existence entirely unreasonable."  Id. at 923.   
¶45 Since Leon, the Court has continued to reexamine the 
boundaries of the good-faith exception.  In Illinois v. Krull 
the Court extended the good-faith exception to allow evidence 
seized 
pursuant 
to 
a 
state 
statute 
later 
deemed 
unconstitutional.  Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349 (1987) 
(relying on Leon, 468 U.S. at 920-21, for the proposition that 
the deterrence function of the rule would not be furthered where 
the police officer's reliance was objectively reasonable).  The 
Court later declined to apply the exclusionary rule to clerical 
errors by court employees where law enforcement’s behavior was 
reasonable.  Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1995).  Most 
recently, the Court considered whether a clerical error by 
police personnel should likewise be exempted from the scope of 
the exclusionary rule.  Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. ___, 
129 S. Ct. 695, 703 (2009).  Although the Court rejected a 
categorical exception similar to the one in Evans, it held that 
the police conduct in Herring did not warrant exclusion because 
it "was the result of isolated negligence attenuated from the 
arrest."  Id. at 698. 
No.  2008AP2231-CR 
21 
 
2. 
The Exclusionary Rule in Wisconsin 
¶46 In Wisconsin, the exclusionary rule dates back to 
1923, when this court held that, for "the Bill of Rights as 
embodied in constitutions to be of substance rather than mere 
tinsel," a conviction may not rest on unlawfully seized 
evidence.  Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 415, 193 N.W. 89 
(1923).  Although the court acknowledged that other states had 
reached contrary conclusions, it found "no reason in logic, 
justice, or in . . . fair play" why a court of justice should 
allow the use of evidence obtained through a plain violation of 
the constitution.  Id. at 417.  The court instead elected to 
follow federal precedent, which at that time considered the 
unlawful seizure of evidence analogous to compelled self-
incrimination under the Fifth Amendment.  Id. at 415-16.  The 
constitutional guarantee of security against unreasonable search 
and seizure cannot be discarded in favor of a conviction 
obtained by the violation of that same guarantee.  Id. at 417.  
"Such a cynical indifference to the state's obligations should 
not be judicial policy."  Id.   
¶47 In subsequent cases, the court continued to follow the 
United States Supreme Court in the development and application 
of the exclusionary rule.  Echoing the Supreme Court's language 
in Elkins, the court identified two rationales underlying the 
rule: deterrence of unlawful police conduct and assurance of 
judicial integrity.  Conrad v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 616, 635, 218 
N.W.2d 252 (1974).  In Conrad we recognized that both purposes 
have their limits in reality: deterrence cannot be achieved 
No.  2008AP2231-CR 
22 
 
where persons are never charged or tried, and the integrity of 
judicial process may be compromised when relevant evidence is 
excluded from the truth-finding process.  Id.  Imperfect though 
the remedy might be, the court recognized the important 
principles underlying the rule's development and concluded that 
"[c]ourts and judges should not sanction violations of the 
constitution."  Id.5 
¶48 In State v. Brady the court was asked to reconsider 
Hoyer in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Leon.  State 
v. Brady, 130 Wis. 2d 443, 453, 388 N.W.2d 151 (1986).  Brady 
challenged the validity of a material witness arrest warrant 
issued by a judge in a John Doe proceeding, arguably without 
statutory authority.  Id. at 449-50.  The court did not address 
whether the judge had authority to issue the warrant, concluding 
that even if the judge had authority, the warrant was void 
because it was lacking in probable cause.  Id. at 453.  The 
court declined to adopt the good-faith exception because the 
circumstances of the case fell within one of the four limiting 
situations identified in Leon: the warrant was so lacking in 
indicia of probable cause that the question of "good faith" was 
not implicated.  Id. at 454.  Justice Abrahamson noted in a 
concurrence:  
                                                 
5 "Courts and judges should not sanction violations of the 
constitution. The integrity of the judicial process must be 
inviolate and free from reliance upon transgressions against the 
constitution which every judge has taken the oath to uphold."  
Conrad v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 616, 635-36, 218 N.W.2d 252 (1974). 
No.  2008AP2231-CR 
23 
 
It is not clear whether Leon . . . appl[ies] only to 
cases in which the magistrate has authority to issue a 
warrant but there was lack of probable cause or a 
technical error . . . or to cases such as this one in 
which the magistrate has no authority whatsoever to 
issue the warrant. 
Id. at 455 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).  Accordingly, the court 
left the good-faith exception for another day. 
¶49 The first decision of this court to recognize a good-
faith exception did so in the limited context in which law 
enforcement relied on controlling law at the time of the search, 
although that law was subsequently overruled.  State v. Ward, 
2000 WI 3, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 604 N.W.2d 517.  In Ward, law 
enforcement had properly relied on a warrant containing no-knock 
entry authorization, pursuant to the rule articulated by this 
court in State v. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410, 424-25, 511 
N.W.2d 591 (1994), and State v. Richards, 201 Wis. 2d 845, 549 
N.W.2d 218 (1996).  Ward, 231 Wis. 2d at 743.  The United States 
Supreme Court issued an opinion rejecting our exception to the 
rule of announcement three months after the search of Ward's 
home occurred.  Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 388 (1997).  
Because the police officers involved reasonably and in good 
faith relied upon the rule as it existed when the warrant was 
issued and executed, the court adopted the United States Supreme 
Court's reasoning in Illinois v. Krull and recognized a limited 
exception to the exclusionary rule.  Ward, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 
¶¶51-52. 
¶50 The following year, in Eason, the court adopted the 
good-faith exception articulated in Leon.  The search warrant in 
No.  2008AP2231-CR 
24 
 
Eason provided authorization for a no-knock entry, authorization 
that this court determined to be unjustified by the attached 
affidavit.  Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206, ¶1.  The court carefully 
reviewed the Court's rationale in Leon, and ultimately concluded 
"the good faith exception applies where the State has shown, 
objectively, that the police officers reasonably relied upon a 
warrant issued by an independent magistrate."  Id., ¶3.   
¶51 The court made clear that Eason did not mark the end 
of the exclusionary rule in Wisconsin, noting: "We would no more 
overrule Hoyer than we could overrule Mapp v. Ohio."  Id., ¶57. 
The court also held that, for the good-faith exception to apply, 
the state must show that the process of obtaining the search 
warrant included: (1) a significant investigation; and (2) 
review by a government attorney or police officer trained in and 
knowledgeable of probable cause requirements.  Id., ¶74.  Noting 
that the probable cause determination was "a close case," id., 
¶1, and that the officers relied upon a search warrant "issued 
by a detached and neutral magistrate," the court concluded that 
the good-faith exception applied to permit the use of the 
evidence, id., ¶74. 
¶52 Not long after Eason was decided, the state asked this 
court to extend the good-faith exception in the context of 
affidavits lacking a sworn affidavit.  Tye, 248 Wis. 2d 530, 
¶24.  The court declined to extend the good-faith exception this 
far, holding: "The exclusionary rule applies when no oath or 
affirmation supports a search warrant; 'it is plainly evident 
that a magistrate or judge had no business issuing a warrant.'"  
No.  2008AP2231-CR 
25 
 
Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 264 (1983) (White, 
J., concurring)).  Despite the conclusion that the warrant would 
have satisfied probable cause requirements had the affidavit 
been properly sworn, the court held that the evidence was 
inadmissible.  Id., ¶¶5, 7. 
3. 
Application 
of 
the 
Exclusionary 
Rule 
and 
Good-Faith 
Exception 
¶53 Our historical overview of the exclusionary rule and 
good faith exception demonstrates how this court has followed 
the development and application of the exclusionary rule and 
good-faith exception articulated by the United States Supreme 
Court.6  Unfortunately, the facts of this case are not a neat fit 
                                                 
6 See State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 
N.W.2d 625 (following United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 
(1984), 
in 
recognizing 
a 
good-faith 
exception 
to 
the 
exclusionary rule); State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, ¶50, 231 
Wis. 2d 723, 604 N.W.2d 517 (applying the good-faith exception 
from Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349 (1987) to law 
enforcement reliance on laws in existence at the time the 
warrant was issued); State v. Brady, 130 Wis. 2d 443, 454, 388 
N.W.2d 151 (1986) (relying on the categories identified in Leon, 
468 U.S. at 923, as being outside the scope of the good-faith 
exception); Conrad, 63 Wis. 2d at 635 (citing Elkins v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960), for the importance of judicial 
integrity); Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 415-16, 193 N.W.2d 89 
(1923) (following Bram v. U.S., 168 U.S. 532 (1897) and Weeks v. 
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 387-88 (1914)).  Eason represents 
the only case in which this court deviated from the United 
States Supreme Court's jurisprudence by imposing two additional 
requirements 
upon 
the 
state 
in 
order 
to 
admit 
evidence 
unlawfully 
obtained. 
 
Popenhagen, 
309 
Wis. 2d 601, 
¶215 
(Roggensack, J., dissenting).  We have never expanded the good-
faith exception nor limited the exclusionary rule in the absence 
of United States Supreme Court precedent, and we decline to do 
so here. 
No.  2008AP2231-CR 
26 
 
with the traditional framework under the Fourth Amendment, the 
exclusionary rule, or the good-faith exception.  The Supreme 
Court has never addressed whether the good-faith exception can 
save evidence seized pursuant to a warrant that the judge had no 
authority to issue.  Applying the traditional principles of the 
exclusionary rule and the good-faith exception, we decline to 
extend the good-faith exception to the facts of this case.  
¶54 Both federal and Wisconsin case law concerning the 
exclusionary rule and the good-faith exception start from the 
presumption of a warrant issued by "a detached and neutral 
magistrate."  Leon, 468 U.S. at 900; Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206, ¶2; 
see also Gates, 462 U.S. at 240; Evans, 514 U.S. at 11; Krull, 
480 U.S. 340, 348 (1987).  Most of the case law in this area 
addresses 
search 
warrants 
issued 
upon 
affidavit 
by 
law 
enforcement, 
focusing 
the 
discussion 
of 
the 
judge 
or 
magistrate’s role in this process on whether she abdicated her 
role in the process by serving as a rubber stamp for law 
enforcement.  See Gates, 462 U.S. at 239 (discussing a 
magistrate’s role in issuing a warrant).   
¶55 We 
have 
held 
that 
the 
"detached 
and 
neutral 
magistrate" requirement is necessary to "interpose the impartial 
judgment of a judicial officer between the citizen and the 
police and also between the citizen and the prosecutor, so that 
an individual may be secure from an improper search or an 
improper arrest."  Walberg v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 448, 455, 243 
N.W.2d 190 (1976).  In this instance, the court did not have the 
opportunity to act as a detached and neutral magistrate, because 
No.  2008AP2231-CR 
27 
 
there was no prosecutor or police action to evaluate.  In most 
situations, a sworn affidavit is necessary for a court to act as 
a detached and neutral magistrate when issuing an arrest 
warrant.  See Giordenello, 357 U.S. at 485 (probable cause and 
oath or affirmation requirements apply to arrest warrants); Tye, 
248 Wis. 2d 530, ¶21 (noting the "historical importance of the 
oath or affirmation as the basis upon which a neutral magistrate 
issues a warrant").  This is true even for warrants issued in 
civil cases.  See Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 67 (1992) 
(Fourth Amendment protections apply in the civil context). 
¶56 In Eason the court required additional evidence of a 
serious and careful process for obtaining a search warrant 
before permitting the good-faith exception to be invoked.  The 
State does not argue that the Eason requirements have been met; 
instead it asks us to find them inapplicable under the 
circumstances.  
¶57 The dissent points out that the additional Eason 
requirements do not apply to bench warrants issued without 
police involvement.  Dissent, ¶94.  We acknowledge that the 
Eason requirements for the good-faith exception were crafted for 
search warrants and may not be applicable to all warrants for 
arrest, especially in situations where a law enforcement agency 
is not in the picture. 
¶58 It is true that bench warrants do not require police 
involvement.  However, civil bench warrants, like the one issued 
in this case, require an affidavit demonstrating the existence 
of the requisite cause of action, and a person may not be 
No.  2008AP2231-CR 
28 
 
arrested as a remedial sanction for contempt without notice and 
hearing.  Wis. Stat. §§ 818.03, 785.03(1)(a), 785.04(1)(b).  
These statutory requirements are intended to put the judge in a 
position to act as a detached and neutral magistrate with the 
proper facts placed before him in a manner sufficiently reliable 
to satisfy the constitutional requirements. 
¶59 A judge may issue an arrest warrant for failure to 
appear or may summarily imprison a defendant as a punitive 
sanction for contempt in the "actual presence of the court" 
without a sworn affidavit.  Wis. Stat. §§ 968.09, 785.03.  A 
judge may do this constitutionally because the judge has 
personal knowledge of the facts justifying the arrest.  See 
United States v. Evans, 574 F.2d 352, 355 (6th Cir. 1978) 
(discussing a personal knowledge exception to the oath or 
affirmation requirement). 
¶60 Thus, 
the 
Eason requirements do not necessarily 
control 
when 
applying 
the 
good-faith 
exception 
to 
bench 
warrants, but they implicate relevant considerations.  A judge 
cannot act as a detached and neutral magistrate without being 
presented with sufficient, reliable facts.  This basic principle 
is why we take the oath or affirmation requirement so seriously.  
See Tye, 248 Wis. 2d 530, ¶20 (describing the "historical 
importance of the oath or affirmation as the basis upon which a 
neutral magistrate issues a warrant").  Here, there was no 
significant investigation or review by a government attorney.  
The judge acted without verified input or objective feedback.  
He apparently acted on impulse without the facts being properly 
No.  2008AP2231-CR 
29 
 
presented to him.  Under these circumstances, the resulting 
warrant, which was void ab initio, cannot be saved by law 
enforcement good-faith.   
¶61 Case 
law 
on 
the 
good-faith 
exception 
generally 
proceeds from a warrant that was valid when issued, but later 
determined to be lacking in probable cause.  See, e.g., Leon, 
468 U.S. at 903; Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206, ¶55.  As we have 
already noted, in this case the warrant was void ab initio.  It 
had no basis in fact or law.  Other courts have reached the 
conclusion that good faith on the part of law enforcement has no 
bearing where a warrant is void ab initio.  See United States v. 
Neering, 194 F. Supp. 2d 620, 626-28 (E.D. Mich. 2002) 
(suppression of evidence pursuant to a warrant that was void ab 
initio because the magistrate’s appointment had not been 
properly completed); Wilson, 618 N.W.2d at 515 (good-faith 
exception does not apply where warrant was issued by judge who 
had no jurisdiction in that judicial circuit); United States v. 
Scott, 260 F.3d 512, 513 (6th Cir. 2001) (good-faith exception 
cannot cure a constitutional violation because the warrant 
issued by a retired judge was void ab initio). 
¶62 Our holdings in Brady and Tye further underscore the 
importance, 
as 
a 
preliminary 
matter, 
of 
meeting 
the 
constitutional requirements of oath or affirmation and probable 
cause.  Brady, 130 Wis. 2d at 454; Tye, 248 Wis. 2d 530, ¶24.  
When a court issues a warrant in complete absence of one of 
these basic constitutional requirements, the state cannot rely 
on the good faith of the executing officer to overcome a 
No.  2008AP2231-CR 
30 
 
judicial mistake.  We have no reason to question the intentions 
of the circuit judge, but like the judge in Tye, he "had no 
business issuing a warrant" under these circumstances.  Id.   
¶63 The 
goal 
of 
judicial 
integrity 
warrants 
some 
clarification.  The court of appeals concluded that "[t]he act 
of issuing a warrant without any authority whatsoever to do 
so . . . is not a 'judicial' act and the attempt to clothe it as 
such is contrary to judicial integrity."  Hess, 320 Wis. 2d 600, 
¶30.  The purpose of preserving judicial integrity is often tied 
directly to the purpose of deterring unlawful police conduct.  
Leon, 468 U.S. at 921 n.22 (citing United States v. Janis, 428 
U.S. 433, 458 n.35 (1976)).  But judicial integrity is 
implicated when a judge issues a warrant that does not comply 
with statutory requirements and is not supported by the 
constitutionally required oath or affirmation.  In this case, 
there was no affidavit at all.  In Leon, the Supreme Court held 
that "[a]bsent unusual circumstances, when a Fourth Amendment 
violation has occurred because the police have reasonably relied 
on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but 
ultimately found to be defective, 'the integrity of the courts 
is not implicated.'"  Leon, 468 U.S. at 921 n.22 (quoting Gates, 
462 U.S. at 259 n.14 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added).  
Even were we to hold that the circuit court fulfilled Leon's 
"detached 
and 
neutral 
magistrate" 
requirement, 
this 
case 
presents those "unusual circumstances."  The constitutional 
violation was initiated when the court issued a warrant without 
No.  2008AP2231-CR 
31 
 
authority to do so, and the officer's good-faith reliance on 
that warrant cannot save the resulting evidence.7 
¶64 The 
dissent 
postulates 
that 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
abandoned judicial integrity in Janis, 428 U.S. 433.  Yet, even 
the dissent's quote from Janis refers to the "[p]rimary meaning 
of 'judicial integrity.'"  Id. at 458 n. 35 (emphasis added).  
The dissent overlooks the language leading up to the Janis 
quote: "To the extent that recent cases state that deterrence is 
the prime purpose of the exclusionary rule, and that 'judicial 
integrity' is a relevant, albeit subordinate factor, we hold 
that in this case considerations of judicial integrity do not 
require exclusion of the evidence."  Id. (emphasis added).  This 
language cannot reasonably be read to abandon judicial integrity 
and restrict the exclusionary rule solely to deterrence of law 
enforcement officers.  The Court's statement in Leon that 
judicial integrity is not implicated when police rely in good 
faith on a warrant, "absent unusual circumstances," preserves 
judicial integrity as a secondary consideration when applying 
the exclusionary rule.  Leon, 468 U.S. at 921 n.22 (quoting 
Gates, 462 U.S. at 259 n.14 (White, J., concurring). 
¶65 We do not read recent cases such as Herring and Evans 
as withdrawing the language from Janis and Leon suggesting that 
judicial integrity is a secondary consideration that may come to 
                                                 
7 Other courts have articulated this same concern in terms 
of the court's jurisdiction, noting that "[a]ctions by a police 
officer cannot be used to create jurisdiction, even when done in 
good faith."  State v. Wilson, 618 N.W.2d 513, 520 (S.D. 2000). 
No.  2008AP2231-CR 
32 
 
the fore in unusual cases.  These cases simply refused to 
exclude evidence based on judicial integrity in the specific 
facts of those cases.  None of the recent cases cited by the 
dissent involved a warrant that was per se void ab initio 
because the judge lacked statutory authority to issue it.  Nor 
do they involve a fundamental defect like the complete absence 
of a constitutionally required sworn affidavit, which renders 
the warrant "invalid when issued."  Tye, 248 Wis. 2d 530, ¶23.  
¶66 The consideration of judicial integrity must take into 
account the nature of the defects in the warrant.  The defects 
in the warrant here were not technical irregularities or errors 
of judgment: The defendant's failure to cooperate with the agent 
in preparing a PSI was not a crime.  It did not violate a court 
order, and it did not violate a condition of his bond.  He could 
not have been arrested without a warrant because the defendant 
did not commit a crime.  See Wis. Stat. § 968.07(1)(d); State v. 
Lange, 2009 WI 49, ¶19, 317 Wis. 2d 383, 766 N.W.2d 551 ("A 
warrantless arrest is not lawful except when supported by 
probable cause.").  The bench warrant civil that the court 
issued was void ab initio because it did not comply with any 
statute authorizing the court to issue a warrant.  It was 
defective on its face because it was a civil warrant in a 
criminal case.  It was not supported by a constitutionally 
required oath or affirmation.  This should have been obvious 
because there was no affidavit at all.  No law enforcement 
officer or agency made a significant investigation to support an 
affidavit; 
no 
government 
attorney 
or 
informed 
officer 
No.  2008AP2231-CR 
33 
 
scrutinized the warrant for probable cause.  In short, the 
warrant was void ab initio because it was unauthorized and 
defective in nearly every respect.  
¶67 While it is easy to understand why a clerk’s failure 
to remove a warrant from the computer system does not threaten 
the integrity of our judicial system, see Arizona v. Evans, 514 
U.S. at 4-5, a warrant issued without statutory authority in the 
complete absence of the basic constitutional requirement of oath 
or affirmation raises more serious questions.  As stated by the 
Sixth Circuit, "Leon presupposed that the warrant was issued by 
a 
magistrate 
or 
judge 
clothed 
in 
the 
proper 
legal 
authority . . .  
Indeed, 
Leon 
noted 
that 
it 
left 
'untouched . . . the various requirements for a valid warrant.'"  
Scott, 260 F.3d at 515 (internal quotes and citations omitted).  
When fundamental constitutional and statutory requirements for 
issuing 
a 
warrant 
are 
completely 
absent, 
the 
good-faith 
exception cannot save the resulting unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶68 We conclude that the good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule does not apply to a situation in which: (1) no 
facts existed that would justify an arrest without a warrant; 
(2) the civil arrest warrant issued by a circuit judge was void 
ab initio because (a) it did not comply with any statute 
authorizing the court to issue a warrant; and (b) it was not 
supported by an oath or affirmation; and (3) the court issued 
the warrant without the benefit of verification of the facts or 
No.  2008AP2231-CR 
34 
 
scrutiny of the procedure to ensure that the judge acted as a 
detached and neutral magistrate. 
¶69 The 
warrant 
here 
was 
defective 
on 
its 
face.  
Nonetheless, we cannot reasonably attribute fault to the law 
enforcement officer who executed the warrant.  Thus, suppressing 
evidence obtained as a result of the unauthorized, defective 
warrant is necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial 
process.   Consequently, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶70 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J., did not participate. 
 
 
No.  2008AP2231-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
¶71 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I join 
the majority opinion's conclusion that the evidence here must be 
suppressed, see majority op., ¶32, but my conclusion is based on 
the fact that this warrant was per se void ab initio.  This 
warrant was per se void ab initio because the circuit court 
absolutely 
lacked 
the 
authority 
to 
issue 
this 
warrant, 
regardless of the presentence investigation (PSI) author's 
request.  See id., ¶7.  That is, the circuit court issued what 
purported to be a civil bench warrant in a criminal case on the 
basis that the PSI author informed the court that Hess failed to 
stay and complete a PSI interview.  However, the circuit court 
had never previously ordered Hess to participate in that 
interview, and no statute or other authority requires a 
defendant to participate in such an interview.  I write 
separately to emphasize that in this case, the circuit court's 
complete lack of authority to issue this warrant under these 
circumstances is most akin to the magistrate's lack of authority 
to issue the search warrant in State v. Kriegbaum, 194 Wis. 229, 
232, 215 N.W. 896 (1927), and the court commissioners' lack of 
authority to issue the search warrants in State v. Loney, 110 
Wis. 2d 256, 260, 328 N.W.2d 872 (Ct. App. 1982), and State v. 
Grawien, 123 Wis. 2d 428, 430-31, 367 N.W.2d 816 (Ct. App. 
1985).  In those cases, the remedy was to exclude the evidence 
obtained based on the warrants that were per se void ab initio.  
See Kriegbaum, 194 Wis. at 232; Loney, 110 Wis. 2d at 260; 
Grawien, 123 Wis. 2d at 433.   
No.  2008AP2231-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
¶72 I continue to agree with the application of the good 
faith exception to the exclusionary rule regarding the defective 
warrants in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (search 
warrant unsupported by probable cause), and State v. Eason, 2001 
WI 98, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625 (affidavit submitted in 
support of search warrant did not justify authorizing a no-knock 
entry).   
¶73 While a per se void ab initio warrant is always 
defective, a defective warrant is not always per se void 
ab initio.  The line must be drawn somewhere.  I draw it in a 
case such as this one, in which the warrant is not just 
defective, but rather, it is per se void ab initio.  "Leon could 
not have been intended to save a warrant that was per se 
invalid."  United States v. Neering, 194 F. Supp. 2d 620, 627 
(E.D. Mich. 2002) (citing United States v. Scott, 260 F.3d 512, 
515 (6th Cir. 2001)). 
¶74 For the foregoing reason, I respectfully concur. 
 
 
No.  2008AP2231-CR.mjg 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶75 MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   (dissenting).  I part with 
the majority because it departs from the United States Supreme 
Court's 
well-articulated 
principles 
governing 
exclusion 
of 
evidence resulting from unlawful searches and seizures.  First, 
the majority begins with a presumption of exclusion and looks 
for an exception to that presumption in contravention of the 
pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court.  Second, it 
justifies its application of the exclusionary rule on the 
grounds of judicial integrity——a purpose long since discarded by 
the United States Supreme Court——while ignoring the singular 
animating purpose of exclusion: deterrence of police misconduct.  
Finally, the majority leaves confusion as to whether and when 
the Eason requirements are applicable to the issuance of bench 
warrants. 
¶76 I follow the dictates of the United States Supreme 
Court: I begin with a presumption of admissibility and then 
address whether the remedy of exclusion is appropriate.  Herring 
v. United States, 555 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700-01 (2009).  
I conclude that exclusion is unwarranted in this case because it 
will not serve to deter police misconduct and its application 
here cannot justify the "substantial social costs" exclusion 
imposes.  Id. 
I. THE EXCLUSION EXCEPTION 
¶77 One year ago, the United States Supreme Court issued a 
landmark opinion summarizing and clarifying its prior case law 
regarding exclusion of evidence resulting from unlawful searches 
No.  2008AP2231-CR.mjg 
 
2 
 
and seizures.  Exclusion, the Court explained, is an "extreme 
sanction" that should only be applied as a "last resort."  Id. 
at 700. 
¶78 "[I]mportant principles [] constrain application of 
the exclusionary rule," the Court explained.  Id.  Exclusion is 
not a right, nor is it a necessary consequence of a Fourth 
Amendment violation.  Id.  The remedy of exclusion should apply 
only where it accomplishes the goal of deterrence, and only if 
the benefits of deterrence outweigh the substantial social costs 
of exclusion——most significantly, the toll upon the truth-
seeking and law enforcement objectives underlying the criminal 
justice system.  Id. at 700-01. 
¶79 The United States Supreme Court has made clear that 
exclusion is aimed at deterrence of police misconduct, not 
judicial misconduct.1  Id. at 701.  The Court explained that 
judicial employees "were unlikely to try to subvert the Fourth 
Amendment," and that application of the exclusionary rule in 
cases involving judicial misconduct made no sense because it 
would have no significant effect in deterring the errors.  Id. 
¶80 The 
court 
went 
further, 
and 
stated 
that 
the 
exclusionary rule is appropriate only in cases involving 
                                                 
1 Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Souter, dissented on the 
grounds that the unlawful search at issue in Herring involved 
police error, and exclusion is appropriate when the error 
resulting in a Fourth Amendment violation is the police's.  
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 695, 710-11 
(2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  He explained that United 
States Supreme Court precedent on the exclusionary rule "was 
premised on a distinction between judicial errors and police 
errors," and the exclusionary rule was designed to deter the 
latter, not the former.  Id. at 710. 
No.  2008AP2231-CR.mjg 
 
3 
 
"intentional conduct that was patently unconstitutional."  Id. 
at 702.  Errors arising from "nonrecurring and attenuated 
negligence" are "far removed from the core concerns that led 
[the Court] to adopt the rule in the first place."  Id. 
¶81 The United States Supreme Court then summarized the 
operative rule for application of the exclusionary rule: 
To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must 
be 
sufficiently 
deliberate 
that 
exclusion 
can 
meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that 
such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice 
system.  As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary 
rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly 
negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring 
or systemic negligence. 
Id. 
¶82 The United States Supreme Court's decision in Herring 
has been widely seen as establishing broad principles that 
dramatically narrow application of the exclusionary rule.  See, 
e.g., Russell L. Weaver, The Irrelevancy of the Fourth Amendment 
in the Roberts Court, 85 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 191, 203-04 (2010) 
(recognizing that the broad language in Herring "signals a 
dramatic restriction in the application of the exclusionary 
rule," and "represents a significant recasting of modern 
exclusionary rule theory"). 
¶83 What says the majority about these developments?  Not 
much.  Not much at all.  Instead, the majority states: "We have 
never 
expanded 
the 
good-faith 
exception 
nor 
limited 
the 
exclusionary rule in the absence of United States Supreme Court 
precedent, and we decline to do so here."  Majority op., ¶53 
n.6.  If the majority is looking for United States Supreme Court 
No.  2008AP2231-CR.mjg 
 
4 
 
precedent regarding exclusion and the good-faith exception, I 
respectfully suggest that it take a closer look at the most 
recent Supreme Court pronouncements. 
¶84 The most troubling thing about the majority opinion is 
that it completely ignores the development of the law in this 
area.2  For example, the majority spends two paragraphs 
discussing this court's decision 83 years ago in State v. 
Kriegbaum, 194 Wis. 229, 215 N.W. 896 (1927) (see majority op., 
¶¶29-30), and a mere two sentences referencing Herring, where it 
states a cabined and fact-specific summary of its holding (see 
majority op., ¶45).  Commentators agree that the logic and 
sweeping language in Herring is hard to ignore.  See Michael 
Vitiello, 
Herring 
v. 
United 
States: 
Mapp's 
"Artless" 
Overruling?, 10 Nev. L.J. 164, 164 (2010) ("While arguably a 
narrow decision, few readers can miss its sweeping logic, 
effectively eroding the general application of the Fourth 
Amendment's exclusionary rule.").3  Somehow, the majority does 
just that. 
¶85 The majority begins from the wrong starting point.  
While the nomenclature suggests an "exclusionary rule" and a 
"good-faith exception" to the rule, the law as it stands today 
                                                 
2 See generally Robert W. Smith, Herring v. United States: 
The Continued Erosion of the Exclusionary Rule, 61 Mercer 
L. Rev. 663 (2010) (discussing the evolution of the exclusionary 
rule from a straightforward pseudo-right to a much more narrow 
rule applying in certain factual situations). 
3 See also Matthew Allan Josephson, To Exclude or Not to 
Exclude: The Future of the Exclusionary Rule After Herring v. 
United States, 43 Creighton L. Rev. 175, 176 (2009) (discussing 
the fact that Herring's logic is hard to ignore). 
No.  2008AP2231-CR.mjg 
 
5 
 
is exactly the opposite.  It would not be a stretch to say that 
the recent jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court 
makes admission of unlawfully obtained evidence the rule, and 
authorizes an exclusionary exception in limited circumstances.  
See id.  
II. THE PURPOSE OF EXCLUSION 
¶86 The 
majority 
justifies 
applying 
the 
remedy 
of 
exclusion here on the grounds of "judicial integrity."  Majority 
op., ¶¶63-67.  But time and time again, the United States 
Supreme Court has reiterated that exclusion is not only 
unnecessary but inappropriate unless it will serve to deter 
knowing constitutional violations by police: 
• "[T]he exclusionary rule is designed to deter police 
misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and 
magistrates."  United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 
(1984). 
• "[E]vidence obtained from a search should be suppressed 
only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had 
knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that 
the 
search 
was 
unconstitutional 
under 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment."  Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 (quoting United States 
v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975)) (emphasis added). 
• "[W]here the officer's conduct is objectively reasonable, 
'excluding the evidence will not further the ends of the 
exclusionary rule in any appreciable way.'"  Id. at 919-20 
(quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 539-40 (1976) 
(White, J., dissenting)) (emphasis added). 
No.  2008AP2231-CR.mjg 
 
6 
 
• "[A]pplication of the exclusionary rule properly has been 
restricted to those situations in which its remedial 
purpose is effectively advanced."  Illinois v. Krull, 480 
U.S. 340, 347 (1987) (emphasis added). 
• "Where 
'the 
exclusionary 
rule 
does 
not 
result 
in 
appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use . . . is 
unwarranted.'"  Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 11 (1995) 
(quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976)) 
(emphasis added). 
• "'[M]arginal 
or 
nonexistent 
benefits 
produced 
by 
suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable 
reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant 
cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.'"  Id. 
at 12 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922) (emphasis added). 
• "[The exclusionary rule is] applicable only where its 
deterrence 
benefits 
outweigh 
its 
'substantial 
social 
costs.'"  Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 
363 (1998) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 907) (emphasis 
added).4 
                                                 
4 This court has recognized the same principles: 
The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy, 
not a right, and its application is restricted to 
cases where its remedial objectives will best be 
served.  That means that just because a Fourth 
Amendment violation has occurred does not mean the 
exclusionary rule applies.  Rather, exclusion is the 
last resort.  The application of the exclusionary rule 
should focus on its efficacy in deterring future 
Fourth 
Amendment 
violations. 
 
Moreover, 
marginal 
deterrence is not enough to justify exclusion; the 
benefits of deterrence must outweigh the costs. 
No.  2008AP2231-CR.mjg 
 
7 
 
¶87 Accordingly, 
evidence 
seized 
in 
violation 
of 
a 
defendant's right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures should not be excluded if the police were acting in the 
objectively reasonable belief that their conduct did not violate 
the constitution.5  See Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (no exclusion when 
police act in objectively reasonable reliance on a search 
warrant later deemed invalid); Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (no exclusion 
when police act in objectively reasonable reliance on binding 
law later deemed unconstitutional). 
¶88 The exclusionary rule applies, then, only when there 
is: (1) police conduct that the police knew or should have known 
was in violation of the Fourth Amendment (for simplicity's sake, 
"police misconduct"); and (2) sufficient capability of deterring 
that conduct6 worth the substantial societal cost of exclusion.  
                                                                                                                                                             
State v. Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, ¶35, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___ (internal citations removed); see also State v. Ward, 
2000 WI 3, ¶46, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 604 N.W.2d 517 ("Application of 
the [exclusionary] rule 'has been restricted to those areas 
where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously 
served.'") (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 
(1974)). 
5 This is termed the "good faith exception" to the 
exclusionary rule.  See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14 (1995).  
As noted above, a more appropriate phraseology under current 
doctrine might be the "exclusionary exception" to the good faith 
rule. 
6 The United States Supreme Court has categorically rejected 
the notion that the exclusionary rule was meant to (or even can) 
deter judges: 
To the extent that proponents of exclusion rely on its 
behavioral effects on judges and magistrates in these 
areas, their reliance is misplaced.  First, the 
exclusionary 
rule 
is 
designed 
to 
deter 
police 
misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges 
No.  2008AP2231-CR.mjg 
 
8 
 
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702.  Furthermore, the police conduct 
cannot be merely negligent, but must be "deliberate, reckless, 
or grossly negligent" or part of a pattern of "recurring or 
systemic negligence."  Id. 
¶89 The majority rejects these rules from the United 
States Supreme Court and embraces the "judicial integrity" 
purpose for exclusion——a purpose long-since abandoned by our 
highest Court.  See majority op., ¶3.  The United States Supreme 
Court has explained "judicial integrity" as follows: 
The primary meaning of "judicial integrity" in the 
context of evidentiary rules is that the courts must 
not 
commit 
or 
encourage 
violations 
of 
the 
Constitution.  In the Fourth Amendment area, however, 
the evidence is unquestionably accurate, and the 
violation is complete by the time the evidence is 
presented to the court.  The focus therefore must be 
on the question whether the admission of the evidence 
encourages violations of Fourth Amendment rights.  As 
the Court has noted in recent cases, this inquiry is 
essentially the same as the inquiry into whether 
exclusion would serve a deterrent purpose.  The 
analysis showing that exclusion in this case has no 
demonstrated deterrent effect and is unlikely to have 
any significant such effect shows, by the same 
reasoning, that the admission of the evidence is 
                                                                                                                                                             
and magistrates.  Second, there exists no evidence 
suggesting that judges and magistrates are inclined to 
ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment or that 
lawlessness among these actors requires application of 
the extreme sanction of exclusion.  Third, and most 
important, we discern no basis, and are offered none, 
for 
believing 
that exclusion of evidence seized 
pursuant 
to 
a 
warrant 
will 
have 
a 
significant 
deterrent effect on the issuing judge or magistrate. 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984) (citation 
omitted). 
 
No.  2008AP2231-CR.mjg 
 
9 
 
unlikely 
to 
encourage 
violations 
of 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment. 
Janis, 428 U.S. at 458 n.35 (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). 
¶90 Thus, 
while 
early 
exclusion 
cases 
did 
discuss 
"judicial integrity" as a secondary purpose of the exclusionary 
rule, judicial integrity for Fourth Amendment violations has 
effectively been subsumed under the main goal of deterring 
police misconduct.7  See id. at 456 n.34.  This explains why 
judicial integrity has received little treatment in the case 
law.  Notably, in the five United States Supreme Court cases 
addressing the good-faith exception since Leon (Massachusetts v. 
Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984); Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987); 
Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004); 
Herring, 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009)), not one of them even mentions 
judicial integrity;8 each focuses solely on whether exclusion 
would deter the police conduct giving rise to the constitutional 
                                                 
7 Until now, this court had agreed.  See State v. Knapp, 
2005 WI 127, ¶¶79-81, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899 (noting 
that preserving judicial integrity refers to preventing the 
judicial process from being subverted by law enforcement 
officers' unconstitutional actions); State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, 
¶44, 
245 
Wis. 2d 206, 
629 
N.W.2d 625 
(noting 
that 
the 
exclusionary rule protects judicial integrity by ensuring that 
"the judiciary would refuse to give its imprimatur to police 
misconduct by relying upon evidence obtained through that 
misconduct"). 
8 The majority concludes that "these cases simply refused to 
exclude evidence based on judicial integrity on the specific 
facts of those cases."  Majority op., ¶65.  Not so.  They never 
even applied a judicial integrity test.  The majority can point 
to no United States Supreme Court case involving the good faith 
exception that even mentions judicial integrity since Leon, 26 
years ago. 
No.  2008AP2231-CR.mjg 
 
10 
 
violation.  The majority now breathes new life into a legal 
theory put to rest long ago.9 
III. THE EASON REQUIREMENTS 
¶91 I write further to address the appropriateness of 
applying the additional requirements of Eason to bench warrants.  
This 
court, 
in 
State 
v. 
Eason, 
adopted 
two 
additional 
requirements during the search warrant application process, 
making them necessary in order to shield any seized evidence 
from suppression if the search warrant is later deemed invalid.  
2001 WI 98, ¶74, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625.  The State 
must "show that the process used in obtaining the search warrant 
included a significant investigation and a review by either a 
police officer trained and knowledgeable in the requirements of 
probable cause and reasonable suspicion, or a knowledgeable 
government attorney."  Id. (emphasis added).  Such safeguards, 
we held, were required by Article 1, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  Id.10  
                                                 
9 Despite resting its holding on "judicial integrity," the 
majority does not tell us what this means.  It states only that 
"judicial integrity is implicated when a judge issues a warrant 
that does not comply with statutory requirements and without the 
constitutionally required oath or affirmation."  Majority op., 
¶63. 
10 The 
Eason 
court's 
reasoning 
for 
requiring 
these 
additional measures can charitably be described as meager.  
Seeming to forget that exclusion is not a constitutional right, 
but a judicial remedy, the Eason court nonetheless asserted that 
these additional procedural safeguards were required by the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206, ¶63.  For 
support, the court appears to have rested almost entirely on a 
law review article it found persuasive.  See id.  Because these 
requirements suggested by a law professor were "not [] onerous 
or unreasonable," they became constitutional mandates.  Id. 
No.  2008AP2231-CR.mjg 
 
11 
 
¶92 These requirements are wholly inappropriate in the 
context of bench warrants, which normally need not involve any 
police investigation. 
¶93 Bench warrants are available in criminal, civil, and 
contempt proceedings.  See Wis. Stat. § 968.09 (2007-08)11 (bench 
warrants in criminal cases for defendants or witnesses who fail 
to appear or violate bond); Wis. Stat. ch. 818 (bench warrants 
in civil cases for defendants who fail to pay judgments or fines 
and other defendants from whom something is required); Wis. 
Stat. § 818.01(2) (bench warrants for parties subject to 
contempt 
proceedings 
under 
chapter 
785). 
 
None 
of 
the 
proceedings requires police to apply for the warrant.  See 
§ 968.09 (court may issue warrant on its own); ch. 818 (court 
may issue warrant upon request of plaintiffs); Wis. Stat. 
§ 785.03 (court may issue warrant upon request of aggrieved 
parties or on its own). 
¶94 Because of this, applying the Eason requirements to 
bench warrants makes no sense.  How are officers to ensure a 
"significant investigation" has taken place preceding the 
issuance of a bench warrant that the police had no role in?  And 
what sort of review should the arresting officer in this case 
have undertaken before acting on what he understood was a valid 
arrest warrant?  The majority first suggests that the Eason 
requirements are not necessary in situations where police are 
not involved in seeking a bench warrant, see majority op., ¶57, 
                                                 
11 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2008AP2231-CR.mjg 
 
12 
 
but later implies that some investigation or review could have 
saved the evidence in this case from exclusion, see majority 
op., ¶60. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶95 Applying 
the 
proper 
legal 
principles 
here 
is 
straightforward.  Instead of starting with exclusion and 
attempting to fit this case into a recognized exception, I 
follow the dictates of the United States Supreme Court and begin 
with the presumption of admissibility and then address whether 
the remedy of exclusion is appropriate. 
¶96 The threshold question is whether the police engaged 
in deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or 
whether these facts evince a recurring or systemic negligence.  
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702.  As the majority implicitly 
recognizes, this case reflects no police misconduct at all; the 
officer acted in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant he 
had no reason to know was invalid.  Therefore, exclusion is 
unwarranted because it will not serve its intended purpose of 
deterring police misconduct, and its application here cannot 
justify the "substantial social costs" exclusion imposes.  Id. 
at 700-01. 
¶97 The majority, on the other hand, is enmeshed in an 
outdated analytical framework.  The United States Supreme Court 
has recognized that its early approach to exclusion was too 
broad.  It has since recast the exclusionary rule as a drastic 
remedy that is justified in only limited circumstances where 
exclusion will deter flagrant police misconduct.  See id. at 
No.  2008AP2231-CR.mjg 
 
13 
 
700-02.  Because the majority fails to appreciate and apply the 
clear instructions of the United States Supreme Court, I 
respectfully dissent. 
¶98 I am authorized to state that Justice PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2008AP2231-CR.mjg 
 
1