Title: PEOPLE OF MI V WALTER JACKSON JR

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

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Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED SEPTEMBER 17, 2002  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v  
No. 120300  
WALTER JACKSON, JR.,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
PER CURIAM  
This case presents the question whether the trial court  
properly denied the prosecutor’s request for a continuance  
where a subpoenaed witness failed to appear on the date set  
for trial.  We hold that the trial court abused its discretion  
in denying a continuance in the circumstances presented in  
this case.  We thus reverse the judgments of the Court of  
Appeals and the trial court and remand the case to the trial  
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
 
 
I. Factual background and procedural posture  
Defendant was charged with two counts of armed robbery,  
MCL 750.529, and one count of possession of a firearm during  
the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b.1  A key prosecution  
witness, Myron Dawson, failed to appear on the date set for  
trial.2  When the police telephoned Dawson’s home, his mother  
stated that Dawson had gone to Ohio two weeks earlier and that  
she had not heard from him since then.  The prosecution  
thereafter moved to admit Dawson’s preliminary examination  
testimony under MRE 804(a)(5), (b)(1).3  Defendant opposed the  
1  The prosecution also notified defendant that he was 
subject to an enhanced sentence as an habitual offender.  MCL  
769.11.  
2  At the preliminary examination, Dawson testified that 
he was present when the robbery occurred and had clearly seen 
the defendant.  
3 
s
MRE 804(a) provides in relevant part: 
“Unavailability 
as 
a 
witness” 
ituations in which the declarant— 
includes 
* * * 
(5) is absent from the hearing and the 
proponent of a statement has been unable to procure 
the declarant’s attendance . . . by process or 
other reasonable means, and in a criminal case, due 
diligence is shown.  
MRE 804(b) provides in relevant part:  
The following are not excluded by the hearsay 
rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:  
2  
 
 
motion.  
In connection with this motion, the court conducted a  
hearing on whether the prosecution had exercised “due  
diligence” in attempting to produce Dawson for trial.  
Undisputed testimony reflected that Dawson had previously  
cooperated with the prosecution by voluntarily furnishing a  
statement to the police and testifying at defendant’s  
preliminary examination.  The police had served a subpoena on  
Dawson one month before trial, and Dawson had given no  
indication that he would not appear. The officer who served  
the subpoena testified that Dawson was “somewhat scared,” but  
that he accepted and signed for the subpoena and understood  
his duty to appear.  
The trial court found that Dawson’s failure to appear on  
the date set for trial had caught the prosecution by surprise  
and that, although Dawson had been somewhat scared when the  
subpoena was served, he was no more nervous than other  
witnesses. Despite these findings, the court found that the  
prosecution had not exercised due diligence because it had  
(1) Former Testimony.  Testimony given as a 
witness at another hearing of the same or a 
different proceeding, if the party against whom the 
testimony is now offered . . . had an opportunity 
and similar motive to develop the testimony by 
direct, cross, or redirect examination.  
3  
made no efforts to produce Dawson apart from serving the  
subpoena.  The court stated that in lieu of admitting the  
preliminary 
examination 
testimony, 
it 
would 
give the  
prosecution an opportunity to search for Dawson and would  
issue a bench warrant for Dawson’s arrest.  
In response to this prompting, the prosecution moved for  
a continuance. Defendant opposed a continuance and moved to  
dismiss.  The court then asked the prosecution to state the  
length of the continuance requested. An exchange followed:  
Mr. McCreedy [Assistant Prosecutor]: I would 
request a continuance of two weeks.  
Of course, if the case is dismissed without 
prejudice then that introduces an even longer 
delays [sic] than would be to continued [sic], 
because then we would have to start out, go back 
and re-arrest him and have a new opportunity for 
preliminary exam and bind over, arraignment, pre­
trail [sic] etcetera so.  
The Court: But presumably, if you find a new 
witness, and you schedule a preliminary exam, then 
to 
[sic] 
afford 
the 
defense 
attorney 
the  
opportunity to question him.  Now, that issue 
should be dissolved [sic] should it have to come up 
again. So then if you lose the witness the second 
time around, you would have an opportunity to 
develop more fully a record; am I correct?  
Mr. McCreedy: Well, your Honor, I mean our  
position would be that once this witness is  
located, I mean, we are going to be asking for a 
bench warrant today, we ask that he be held on that 
warrant.  I don’t think that losing him would be an 
issue after he has been served and failed to appear 
knowing that the trial would absolutely be held.  
4  
 
Following a side-bar discussion with the attorneys, the  
court stated:  
Even 
if 
the 
court 
were 
to 
afford 
a  
continuance, we don’t know exactly how long we  
would need in order to bring this matter back 
before the Court.  I don’t know of any reason based 
in law or in fact, why this matter should be 
continued when the witness has failed to appear.  I  
am going to dismiss the matter without prejudice as 
to [defendant].  
The prosecution filed a claim of appeal.  The Court of  
Appeals affirmed,4 opining that the prosecutor had not made a  
diligent effort to produce Dawson.  The Court of Appeals  
further stated that the trial “court apparently did not  
envision [the search for Dawson] taking two weeks and the  
prosecutor did not request a shorter adjournment in the  
alternative.
 Therefore, under the facts of this case, we  
cannot find that the court abused its discretion.”  
The prosecution has filed an application for leave to  
appeal to this Court.  
II. Standard of review  
A trial court’s decision whether to grant a continuance  
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  MCR 2.503(D)(1) (“In  
its discretion the court may grant an adjournment to promote  
4 Unpublished memorandum opinion, issued October 9, 2001 
(Docket No. 230421).  
5  
 
the 
cause 
of 
justice”) (emphasis supplied); People v Williams,  
386 Mich 565; 194 NW2d 337 (1972); People v Hoaglin, 262 Mich  
162; 247 NW 141 (1933).  
III. Analysis  
A motion or stipulation for a continuance must be based  
on good cause.  MCR 2.503(B)(1). 
MCR 2.503(C) governs the  
granting of adjournments5 on the basis of the unavailability  
of a witness or evidence:  
(C) Absence of Witness or Evidence.  
(1) A motion to adjourn a proceeding because 
of the unavailability of a witness or evidence must 
be made as soon as possible after ascertaining the 
facts.  
(2) An adjournment may be granted on the 
ground of unavailability of a witness or evidence 
only if the court finds that the evidence is 
material and that diligent efforts have been made  
to produce the witness or evidence.  
(3) If the testimony or the evidence would be 
admissible in the proceeding, and the adverse party 
stipulates in writing or on the record that it is 
to be considered as actually given in the  
proceeding, there may be no adjournment unless the 
court deems an adjournment necessary. [Emphasis 
supplied.]  
The trial court did not articulate clearly the basis for  
5  Although our court rule uses the term “adjournment,”  
the case law on this subject generally uses the word 
“continuance.”
 We use the terms interchangeably in this 
opinion.  
6  
its decision to deny a continuance.  It did not discuss the  
requirements of the court rule or explain precisely how the  
prosecution 
had 
failed to satisfy those requirements.  Despite  
these failings, the court did make statements during the  
proceedings that we presume formed the basis for its decision.  
The court’s apparent reasoning, however, was “so palpably and  
grossly violative of fact and logic,” Spalding v Spalding, 355  
Mich 382, 384; 94 NW2d 810 (1959), that we conclude it abused  
its discretion.  
The court suggested that a dismissal without prejudice  
would allow another preliminary examination to be held and  
thus permit the defense to cross-examine Dawson in the event  
that he failed again to appear for trial. This reasoning is  
illogical. A preliminary examination had already been held,  
and the defense had already cross-examined Dawson at that  
proceeding.  
Under 
the prosecution’s approach, once Dawson was  
apprehended, his testimony could have been obtained at trial  
without a need to ensure his presence at further proceedings.  
Under the trial court’s approach, however, two additional  
proceedings requiring Dawson’s testimony would be needed,  
i.e., another preliminary examination and then a trial.  
The Court of Appeals articulated another possible basis  
for the trial court’s decision.  It stated that the trial  
7  
 
 
court “did not envision [the effort to produce Dawson] taking  
two weeks and the prosecutor did not request a shorter  
adjournment 
in 
the 
alternative.”  The prosecution’s failure to  
request a shorter adjournment, however, was not a valid reason  
to deny a continuance altogether in this case.  The trial  
court denied the motion for a continuance without explaining  
how or why the prosecution’s estimate of the time needed was  
unacceptable. The prosecution had no opportunity to suggest  
a different length of time.  
The trial court also suggested that the prosecution  
failed to make “diligent efforts” to produce Dawson, as  
required by MCR 2.503(C)(2).6  Denial of a continuance is  
appropriate where a party fails to demonstrate diligent  
efforts to serve a subpoena. See McMillan v Larned, 41 Mich  
521, 522; 2 NW 662 (1879) (“There must also be search or an  
effort made to find the witness and serve the subpoena”);  
People v Burby, 218 Mich 46; 187 NW 359 (1922); Hoaglin, supra  
6  The court discussed “due diligence” primarily in the 
context of the prosecution’s request to introduce Dawson’s 
preliminary 
examination testimony.  The court suggested at one 
point, however, that the request for a continuance would 
reopen the due diligence inquiry.  Given the muddled state of  
the record and the court’s failure to clearly articulate its 
reasoning in ruling on the various motions, we conclude that 
the court impliedly found a lack of “diligent efforts” when it 
denied the request for a continuance.  
8  
 
at 168 (“The affidavit annexed to the motion [for a  
continuance] did not show what efforts had been made to locate  
the witness . . .”).  
The 
police 
here 
successfully served the subpoena.  Dawson  
had 
previously 
cooperated with the police and prosecution, and  
they had no reason to expect that his cooperation would not  
continue.  We do not know what further efforts the court could  
have expected of the prosecution or police in these  
circumstances.  We do not require the prosecutor to assume  
that every witness is a flight risk who must be monitored to  
ensure his attendance at trial.  
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court abused its  
discretion in denying the request for a continuance.7  We  
reverse the judgments of the trial court and the Court of  
Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further  
7  The prosecutor represents that certain judges of the 
Wayne Circuit Court Criminal Division regularly dismiss cases 
on the date of trial because of the failure of subpoenaed 
witnesses to appear, rather than granting a continuance and 
issuing a bench warrant or permitting introduction of the 
witness’ preliminary examination testimony.  We do not know  
whether docket-management considerations motivated the denial 
of a continuance in this case.  We take this opportunity to 
remind the bench, however, that MCR 2.503 governs the decision 
whether to grant a continuance, and that “the desire of the 
trial courts to expedite court dockets is not a sufficient 
reason to deny an otherwise proper request for a continuance.” 
Williams, supra at 577.  
9  
 
  
 
 
 
 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.8  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred.  
CAVANAGH and KELLY, JJ., would not dispose of this case by  
an opinion per curiam, but would deny leave to appeal.  
8  The trial court did not expressly rule on the 
prosecutor’s motion to admit Dawson’s preliminary examination 
testimony. The prosecution is free, if necessary, to renew 
that motion on remand.  The record does not reflect whether  
Dawson has been located.  
10