Title: Lamb v. Geovjian

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Lamb v. Geovjian (95-510); 165 Vt 375; 683 A.2d 731

[Opinion Filed 02-Aug-1996]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 No. 95-510


Lawrence Lamb, D.V.M.             Supreme Court

                                  On Appeal from
     v.                           Washington Superior Court

Lisa Geovjian, D.V.M.             April Term, 1996


John P. Meaker, J.

       Robert E. Manchester of Manchester Law Offices, P.C., Burlington, for
  plaintiff-appellant

       Ritchie E. Berger and Sandra A. Strempel of Dinse, Erdmann, Knapp &
  McAndrew, P.C., Burlington, for defendant-appellee


       PRESENT:  Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ., and Peck, J. (Ret.),
  Specially Assigned


       GIBSON, J.   Plaintiff Lawrence Lamb, D.V.M., appeals an order of the
  Washington Superior Court granting a motion in limine filed by defendant
  Lisa Geovjian, D.V.M., in plaintiff's action for intentional interference
  with contractual relations and prospective advantage. Among other claims,
  plaintiff contends that the superior court erred in giving preclusive
  effect to a stipulated settlement in an earlier State Veterinary Board
  proceeding.  Because we hold that plaintiff is barred by res judicata from
  relitigating the merits of the charges in the earlier Board proceeding, we
  affirm without addressing plaintiff's other claims.

       Plaintiff and defendant are both licensed veterinarians in the State
  of Vermont.  In a complaint filed in superior court on November 14, 1988,
  and amended on August 27, 1991, plaintiff alleged that defendant, who was
  then a member of the State Veterinary Board, together with four other
  veterinarians (FN1) and the director of licensing and registration,
  negligently and

 

  intentionally defamed plaintiff and intentionally interfered with his
  contractual relations.

       The substance of plaintiff's claims concerned actions taken by
  defendant in the course of investigating and resolving complaints that
  plaintiff had engaged in unprofessional conduct. Defendant was the Board
  member designated to conduct the preliminary investigation of the
  complaints.  In that capacity, defendant recommended to the Board that
  several of the complaints be dismissed and that the remaining complaints be
  investigated further, and the Board so ordered.  As a committee of the
  whole, defendant and the other Board members then further investigated the
  remaining complaints and determined that charges of unprofessional conduct
  should be brought against plaintiff.  The Attorney General, on behalf of
  the Board, filed a Notice of Charges with the Appeals Panel of the Office
  of the Secretary of State.

       On October 28, 1988, prior to a contested hearing on the Board's
  complaint, plaintiff and the Board reached a stipulated settlement of the
  Board's charges.  The stipulation, after noting that plaintiff continued to
  deny the charges against him and that the matter continued to be a disputed
  case, stated:


      The parties are prepared to proceed to litigate all aspects of the case,
    but prefer to resolve their differences by way of this stipulation and in
    such a manner as to ensure a fair compromise between their respective
    contentions thus eliminating substantial expense, time and inconvenience
    which will necessarily result from the continuance of this litigation.

  The parties further stipulated that:

       2.  The agreement to this Stipulation by Lawrence Lamb, D.V.M.
    does not constitute or imply an admission to these charges.  However,
    Lawrence Lamb, D.V.M., strictly for and limited to the purposes of
    this proceeding, does not contest the allegations in the Notice of
    Charges in this matter and the State agrees to resolve this matter by
    way of this Stipulation.

  Under the terms of the settlement, plaintiff continued to practice
  veterinary medicine, subject to conditions that he complete certain
  training programs and that he comply with certain monitoring and reporting
  requirements.  Plaintiff's failure to comply with any provision of the
  stipulation would result in a finding of unprofessional conduct on the part
  of plaintiff.

       In his amended complaint in superior court, plaintiff alleged that
  defendant had defamed

 

  "plaintiff's personal and professional reputation by encouraging, assisting
  and implementing [sic] members of the public to obtain other members of the
  public to file complaints against the plaintiff with the State Veterinary
  Board."  Plaintiff further alleged that defendant, through her statements,
  had intentionally interfered with plaintiff's contractual relations and
  prospective advantage.

       According to plaintiff's deposition testimony, defendant's wrongful
  statements fall into two categories:  those made prior to the Board's
  decision to bring formal charges to the Appeals Panel, and those made after
  plaintiff filed his initial complaint in superior court.  The latter
  category consisted of statements defendant allegedly made to veterinarians
  who were considering purchasing plaintiff's X-ray equipment.  Defendant
  allegedly told the prospective purchasers that she did not think the X-ray
  equipment was worth buying, and that she believed plaintiff was "nuts" for
  bringing a lawsuit.

       Defendant and the director of licensing and registration moved
  separately for summary judgment.  In an order filed on June 11, 1992, the
  superior court granted summary judgment on all counts in favor of the
  director of licensing and registration.

       With respect to defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court
  held that defendant was entitled to immunity to the extent she was acting
  within the scope of her position as a member of the Board.  The court,
  however, denied the motion for summary judgment "to the extent that
  defamatory comments may have been made outside the scope of her state
  position, and on the issue of interference with contractual
  relations/prospective advantage."  Specifically, the court found that a
  question of fact remained concerning defendant's statement about "the
  quality of plaintiff's x-rays."  As for the statement that plaintiff was
  "nuts," the court held that "the remark could not reasonably have been
  taken in its literal sense," and thus could not support a defamation action
  as a matter of law.  With respect to the claim of intentional interference
  with contractual relations and prospective advantage, the court concluded
  that questions of fact remained concerning defendant's statement about
  plaintiff's X-ray equipment, "along with the allegation that defendant
  encouraged others to complain about plaintiff."

 

       Plaintiff took no appeal from the June 11, 1992 order.  Defendant,
  however, moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the superior court. 
  This Court dismissed defendant's collateral appeal.  Lamb v. Bloom, 159 Vt.
  633, 635, 622 A.2d 505, 507 (1993).

       On March 9, 1993, defendant moved in limine to prohibit plaintiff from
  introducing evidence pertaining to the merits of the charges of
  unprofessional conduct previously brought by the Attorney General against
  plaintiff.  In an order filed June 12, 1995, the superior court granted
  defendant's motion and barred plaintiff

    from introducing evidence (1) seeking to challenge the acts/omissions set
    out in the Attorney General's "Notice of Charges" and (2) to establish
    that defendant should not have recommended to the Attorney General
    that the "Notice of Charges" be brought, because such evidence is not
    relevant to the substantive remaining counts.


       In a motion to amend the June 12 order, plaintiff argued that the
  order in limine effectively terminated his intentional interference claim
  and thus constituted a final, appealable order.  Defendant opposed the
  motion.  In a stipulation filed on July 18, 1995, plaintiff agreed to
  withdraw his motion to amend, and to refrain from filing an appeal from the
  June 12 order until his defamation claims were resolved.  In a stipulation
  filed on September 12, 1995, plaintiff agreed to dismiss his defamation
  claims with prejudice, but without prejudice to his right to appeal the
  June 12 order, which the parties agreed was a final order with respect to
  the intentional interference claim.  The present appeal followed.

       Despite the protracted proceedings in the trial court, the parties
  present a narrow issue on appeal:  whether the superior court erred in
  giving preclusive effect, in plaintiff's intentional interference action,
  to plaintiff's stipulated settlement of the charges brought by the State
  Veterinary Board.  The parties agree that, if there was no error, the order
  granting defendant's motion in limine resolves plaintiff's intentional
  interference claim in favor of defendant.

       A trial court has broad discretion in its pretrial evidentiary
  rulings.  Ball v. Melsur Corp., 161 Vt. 35, 42,