Title: THOMAS L. WILSON, and HELEN L. WILSON, Husband and Wife v. PATRICK T. TYRRELL, in His Calacity as State Engineer for the State of Wyoming and LUCERNE CANAL AND POWER COMPANY; THOMAS L. WILSON and HELEN L. WILSON v. LUCERNE CANAL AND POWER COMPANY

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

THOMAS L. WILSON, and HELEN L. WILSON, Husband and Wife v. PATRICK T. TYRRELL, in His Calacity as State Engineer for the State of Wyoming and LUCERNE CANAL AND POWER COMPANY; THOMAS L. WILSON and HELEN L. WILSON v. LUCERNE CANAL AND POWER COMPANY2011 WY 7Case Number: No. S-10-0054, S-10-0055, S-10Decided: 01/19/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 

THOMAS 
L. WILSON and HELEN L. WILSON, Husband and Wife,Appellants 
(Petitioners),v.PATRICK T. TYRRELL, in His Capacity as State 
Engineer for the State of Wyoming,Appellee 
(Respondent),andLUCERNE CANAL AND POWER COMPANY,Appellee 
(Intervenor).

AND

 
 

THOMAS 
L. WILSON and HELEN L. WILSON,Appellants  (Plaintiffs),v.LUCERNE 
CANAL AND POWER COMPANY,Appellee (Defendant).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Goshen County

The 
Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

Frank 
J. Jones of Wheatland, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee Patrick T. Tyrrell, in his capacity as Wyoming State Engineer, in Case 
No. S-10-0054:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Jay A. Jerde, Deputy Attorney General; 
Peter K. Michael, Senior Assistant Attorney General; S. Jane Caton, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Caton.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee Lucerne Canal and Power Company:

Harriet 
M. Hageman and Kara Brighton of Hageman & Brighton, P.C.  Argument by Ms. 
Hageman.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

  
VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The three appeals 
consolidated for decision in this opinion all arise out of a decades-old dispute 
between Thomas L. Wilson and Helen L. Wilson (the Wilsons) and Lucerne Canal and 
Power Company (Lucerne).  The casus belli is Lucerne's use of an old 
river channel to carry irrigation water across land owned by the Wilsons.  This is the third round of the dispute 
that has reached this Court.  We 
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the district court for entry of 
an order consistent herewith.

 
 
BACKGROUND

 
 
[¶2]      Before we set out 
the issues presently facing the Court, we will briefly present the factual 
context in which those issues have arisen.  
For more detailed recitations of the facts, see Wilson v. Lucerne Canal and Power 
Company, 2003 WY 126, 77 P.3d 412 (Wyo. 2003) (Wilson I) and Wilson v. Lucerne Canal and Power 
Company, 2007 WY 10, 150 P.3d 653 (Wyo. 2007) (Wilson II).  A sketch map attached as an exhibit to 
the opinion in Wilson II shows the 
area in controversy.

 
 
[¶3]      In 1893, Lucerne 
obtained and perfected a right to appropriate water from the North Platte River, 
with the point of diversion located on unpatented lands in Goshen County.  The river was divided into two channels 
in the area, with the headgate to Lucerne's canal located at its adjudicated 
point of diversion on the eastern channel.  
In 1913, because of insufficient flow down that channel, Lucerne 
constructed a diversion dam upstream on the main channel, to divert water into 
the eastern channel.  That diversion 
dam contains no headgate or other "check structure" that can measure or control 
the amount of water diverted into the eastern channel.  Edwin R. Hisey obtained the patent to the 
land in 1908.  The Wilsons purchased 
the property in 1964.  Wilson II, 2007 WY 10, ¶¶ 4-6, 150 P.3d  at 
656.

 
 
[¶4]      Squabbles arose 
over the years between the Wilsons and Lucerne, in which the Wilsons accused 
Lucerne of trespassing upon and damaging their property, and in which Lucerne 
accused the Wilsons of interfering with Lucerne's right to use its appropriated 
water.  In 1988, Lucerne filed suit 
against the Wilsons, seeking damages and injunctive relief due to the Wilsons' 
alleged blocking of access to Lucerne's irrigation facilities.  Wilson I, 2003 WY 126, ¶ 1, 77 P.3d  at 
413-14.  This lawsuit was resolved 
in 1990 via a Consent Decree and Judgment that recognized Lucerne's easement and 
right-of-way across the Wilsons' land for the purpose of access to, and 
maintenance of, its irrigation facilities.  
Id. at ¶ 4, at 414; Wilson II, 2007 WY 10, ¶ 13, 150 P.3d  at 
658.

 
 
[¶5]      Lucerne sought 
district court intervention again in 2002, this time alleging that the Wilsons 
had constructed an earthen berm or dike in the eastern channel that interfered 
with the flow of water downstream to Lucerne's headgate.  Wilson I, 2003 WY 126, ¶ 16, 77 P.3d  at 418; 
Wilson II, 2007 WY 10, ¶ 16, 150 P.3d  at 
659-60.  The district court entered 
a permanent injunction prohibiting the Wilsons from interfering with Lucerne's 
use of its access easement and its irrigation facilities.  We affirmed that decision in Wilson I, 2003 WY 126, ¶ 21, 77 P.3d  at 
419.

 
 
[¶6]      Taking their turn 
as plaintiffs, the Wilsons filed suit in 2004, seeking to quiet title against 
Lucerne to the land underlying the old eastern channel and the land between that 
channel and the main western channel.  
They also sought trespass damages, alleging that Lucerne was transporting 
excessive amounts of water down the eastern channel.  Wilson II, 2007 WY 10, ¶ 19, 150 P.3d  at 
660.  After a bench trial, the 
district court held that the eastern channel remained a river channel, that 
Lucerne's use of the channel and its irrigation facilities had not changed since 
the 1990 settlement, and that the Wilsons' claims were barred by the doctrines 
of judicial estoppel, collateral estoppel, and res judicata.  Id. at ¶¶ 20, 21, at 
661-62.

 
 
[¶7]      In Wilson II, 2007 WY 10, ¶¶ 24-28, 150 P.3d  at 
662-64, we affirmed the district court's application of estoppel and res judicata, insofar as those doctrines 
prohibited the Wilsons from contesting Lucerne's right to access and use its 
facilities, including the eastern channel.  
We disagreed with the district court, however, on the separate quiet 
title issue, which we did not find to be barred by the earlier lawsuits or 
settlement.  We concluded that 
reliction had occurred, that the Wilsons' property line was now the thread of 
the western river channel, and we remanded to the district court for entry of an 
order quieting title to the property in the Wilsons, subject to Lucerne's 
easements.  Id. at ¶ 35, at 667.  Of special significance in the current 
controversy is our specific holding that the district court had erred in 
concluding that the eastern channel remained part of the river.  Id. at ¶ 32, at 
666.

 
 
Docket 
No. S-10-0054

 
 
[¶8]      In the first of 
the three consolidated cases now under consideration, Docket No.S-10-0054, 
the Wilsons are the appellants, the State Engineer is an appellee, and Lucerne, 
who intervened below, is also an appellee.  
The case began on April 11, 2007, when the Wilsons' attorney sent a 
letter to the superintendent of Water Division No. 1, asking the superintendent 
to require Lucerne to construct a headgate at its diversion dam on the North 
Platte River.1  Relying upon this Court's holding in Wilson II that the eastern channel was 
no longer part of the river, the Wilsons cited Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-3-613 
(LexisNexis 2009) for the proposition that "Lucerne has no choice but to 
construct a substantial headgate" at the diversion dam.  Section 41-3-613 provides in pertinent 
part as follows:

 
 
            
The owner or owners of any ditch or canal shall maintain, to the 
satisfaction of the division superintendent of the division in which the 
irrigation works are located, a substantial headgate at the point where the 
water is diverted, which shall be of such construction that it can be locked and 
kept closed by the water commissioner; and such owners shall construct and 
maintain, when required by the division superintendent, flumes or other 
measuring devices at such points along such ditch as may be necessary for the 
purpose of assisting the water commissioner in determining the amount of water 
that is to be diverted into said ditch from the stream, or taken from it by the 
various users. . . .

 
 
[¶9]      In a letter dated 
April 20, 2007, the division superintendent denied the Wilsons' request.  His reasoning may be summarized as 
follows: (1) this Court's opinion in Wilson II did not change his belief that 
Lucerne's "appropriation is being diverted at a properly recorded point of 
diversion"; (2) the continued use of the upper diversion dam was supported by 
this Court's holding that title to the property at issue was quieted in the 
Wilsons, subject to Lucerne's continued right to transport water from the 
diversion dam to its headgate; and (3) the district court had determined that 
the eastern channel continues to be a river channel, and the "Supreme Court did 
not reverse this finding in its opinion[.]"

 
 
[¶10]   On May 9, 2007, the Wilsons 
appealed the decision of the division superintendent to the State Engineer. 
 In that appeal, the Wilsons 
presented three inter-related arguments:  
(1) Lucerne's adjudicated point of diversion no longer was on the river; 
(2) the point at which Lucerne diverts waterthe diversion damis not its 
adjudicated point of diversion; and (3) Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-3-613 requires 
Lucerne to maintain a headgate at the diversion dam.

 
 
[¶11]   The State Engineer confirmed the 
decision of the division superintendent in a letter to the Wilsons' attorney 
dated May 23, 2007.  Citing Wilson II, the State Engineer concluded 
that this Court had approved Lucerne's continued use of the diversion dam and 
the eastern channel to deliver water to its properly recorded point of 
diversion, where a lockable control structure was located.  Specifically relevant to the issues we 
now consider, the State Engineer "[did] not find in the Supreme Court decision 
any direction that the diversion (including the [eastern] channel) is to be used 
in any fashion different from its historic operation."

 
 
[¶12]   On June 22, 2007, the Wilsons filed 
in the district court a notice of appeal of the decision of the State Engineer. 
 After considerable procedural 
wrangling, the district court allowed the Wilsons to amend that pleading, and an 
Amended Petition for Review was filed on May 23, 2008.  Generally, the Wilsons alleged that the 
decisions of the division superintendent and the State Engineer were contrary to 
law, were unsupported by the evidence, and were arbitrary and 
capricious.

 
 
[¶13]   The district court issued its Order 
Affirming State Engineer's Action on November 24, 2009.  Preliminarily, the district court 
concluded that the Wilsons had failed to prove that Lucerne's historic two-part 
diversion was contrary to law, or that the division superintendent and State 
Engineer had acted arbitrarily or capriciously in refusing to order Lucerne to 
change that historic use.2  The district court also concluded that, 
by virtue of the 1990 stipulation, the Wilsons were judicially "estopped from 
now attempting to force a significant change in the diversion and headgate." 
 The Wilsons' appeal of this order 
is the case now before us in Docket No. S-10-0054.

 
 
Docket 
No. S-10-0055

 
 
[¶14]   This appeal is the successor in 
interest to Wilson II, wherein this 
Court remanded the case to the district court for entry of an order quieting 
title to the underlying property in the Wilsons, subject to Lucerne's right to 
an easement to transport water from its diversion dam to its headgate, which 
easement was to be identified and located.  
Wilson II, 2007 WY 10, ¶ 35, 150 P.3d  at 
667.  Subsequent to the remand, the 
parties were unable to agree upon the form of a quiet title order, and were 
unable to agree upon a description of Lucerne's easement.  Consequently, the district court set a 
hearing to determine the location of the easement.

 
 
[¶15]   The hearing was set for November 9 
and 10, 2009.  On September 14, 
2009, the Wilsons filed a pre-trial disclosure statement that listed Cotton 
Jones as a "may call" witness.  Lucerne responded with a motion in limine, seeking to prevent Jones from 
testifying because the Wilsons had not complied with the requirements of 
W.R.C.P. 26(a)(2) for the disclosure of expert testimony.  The district court heard arguments on the 
motion prior to the start of the hearing and took the matter under advisement. 
 During the trial, the issue was 
again discussed, this time at an unreported bench conference, after which the 
district court granted the motion.  At the end of the hearing, the Wilsons 
submitted an offer of proof, outlining Jones' proposed testimony.  The gist of that testimony was that 
Jones, a licensed surveyor, had surveyed the eastern channel and had prepared a 
report containing the survey.

 
 
[¶16]   Lucerne's two key witnesses at the 
hearing were Robert W. Taylor, the licensed surveyor who prepared the survey and 
easement submitted by Lucerne, and Gordon W. Fassett, a former Wyoming State 
Engineer.  Without delving into the 
details of their testimony, suffice it to say that they both agreed that a 
rather well-delineated bank on the eastern side of the eastern channel permitted 
a relatively definitive description, but the low flat lands on the western side 
of the channel were not conducive to such a description, with a good deal of 
fluctuation as to the water's edge on that "bank" at any given time.  A focal point of contention during the 
hearing was Taylor's inclusion in the easement of a three-foot vertical 
"freeboard" above the surveyed channel, the purpose of which was to provide for 
unexpected high water events.

 
 
[¶17]   The district court entered its 
Order on Location of Easement on November 24, 2009.  The essential findings and conclusions of 
that order, which is the subject of this appeal, may be re-stated as 
follows:

 
 
            
1.    The doctrines 
of res judicata and judicial estoppel 
bar the Wilsons from contesting Lucerne's right to continue its historic use of 
the eastern channel to carry water between its diversion dam and its headgate, 
and to operate its irrigation system as it historically has done, with the same 
flows.

 
 
            
2.    Lucerne has 
historically used the eastern channel as a naturally occurring river channel, 
irregular in size and shape, and with the amount of flow determined only by the 
amount of water coming down the river toward Lucerne's diversion 
dam.

 
 
            
3.    The eastern 
channel, as historically used, has no significant bank or boundary on its west 
side.

 
 
            
4.    Lucerne's 
water delivery system requires the diversion of more water down the eastern 
channel than Lucerne's appropriation, to account for loss and to assure a 
sufficient flow to operate the downstream headgate.

 
 
            
5.    The location 
of the eastern channel is readily recognized on the ground, but if a written 
easement is necessary to show the area of Lucerne's permitted use, the Taylor 
survey submitted into evidence adequately describes the 
area.

 
 
            
6.    The three-foot 
freeboard area included in the Taylor survey is a necessary "buffer area" for 
use during unforeseen high-water flows, although Lucerne may not intentionally 
use the freeboard area to convey water.

 
 
  
 
 
Docket 
No. S-10-0119

 
 
[¶18]   In this third appeal, the Wilsons 
challenge the district court's award of costs to Lucerne in the case now pending 
in Docket No. S-10-0055.  The 
Wilsons' contentions revolve around the sequence of filings that resulted in the 
award of costs, which they argue violated U.R.D.C. 501.  The Wilsons recite that sequence as 
follows:

 
 
            
1.    The Order on 
Location of Easement was filed on November 24, 2009.

 
 
            
2.    Lucerne filed 
its certificate of costs on January 5, 2010, forty-two days 
later.

 
 
            
3.    The district 
court signed the order approving Lucerne's certificate of costs on January 6, 
2010, one day after it was filed.

 
 
            
4.    The Wilsons 
filed a response to the certificate of costs, with detailed objections, on 
January 18, 2010.

 
 
            
5.    The order 
approving the certificate of costs was filed, without hearing, on April 27, 
2010.

 
 
[¶19]   The Wilsons complain that (1) the 
certificate of costs was not timely, inasmuch as U.R.D.C. 501(a)(1) requires 
that it be filed within twenty days after entry of the final judgment allowing 
costs; (2) costs were awarded without the court hearing the Wilsons' objections, 
in violation of U.R.D.C. 501(a)(2); and (3) some of the costs awarded are not 
allowable under the U.R.D.C. 501.

 
 
[¶20]   Lucerne responds to the Wilsons' 
contentions by noting first that the November 24, 2009, order was not seen at 
the time it was filed as the final judgment, and it did not address costs.  Both parties subsequently filed proposed 
judgments, and the district court set a hearing to consider the proposed 
judgments.  During that hearing, 
which took place on December 17, 2009, the district court ruled that the 
November 24, 2009, order would serve as the final judgment and then permitted 
Lucerne to submit a certificate of costs.  Lucerne filed its certificate of costs 
nineteen days later.  Beyond that, 
Lucerne contends that there was no abuse of discretion in the award of 
costs.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶21]   1.    Was the decision of the State 
Engineer that Lucerne's headgate at its adjudicated point of diversion satisfies 
the requirements of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-3-613 contrary to 
law?

 
 
            
2.    Was the 
decision of the State Engineer that Lucerne is not required to install a 
headgate at its diversion dam arbitrary and capricious?

 
 
            
3.    Did the 
district court fail to follow the mandate of the Supreme Court upon 
remand?

 
 
            
4.    Are the 
district court's findings of fact clearly erroneous?

 
 
            
5.    Did the 
district court abuse its discretion by excluding the testimony of the Wilsons' 
proposed expert witness?

 
 
            
6.    Was Lucerne's 
certificate of costs timely filed?

 
 
            
7.    Did the 
district court abuse its discretion in awarding costs to 
Lucerne?

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Was 
the decision of the State Engineer that Lucerne's headgate at its adjudicated 
point of diversion satisfies the requirements of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-3-613 
contrary to law?

 
 
[¶22]   In reviewing the actions of an 
administrative agency, "we give no special deference to the decision of the 
district court, but consider the case as if it came directly from the 
agency."  Northfork Citizens for Responsible Dev. v. 
Bd. of County Comm'rs of Park County, 2010 WY 41, ¶ 16, 228 P.3d 838, 844 
(Wyo. 2010).  Pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
12.09(a), our review of administrative agency action is "limited to a 
determination of the matters specified in Wyo. Stat. 16-3-114(c) [(LexisNexis 
2009)]."  We have set forth that 
statute in detail many times and it is not necessary to do so again here.  Suffice it to say that one of our review 
obligations under the statute, when the question is raised, is to determine 
whether the agency's decision was contrary to law.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-3-114(c)(ii)(A).  We review an 
agency's conclusions of law de novo, 
and we affirm those conclusions if they are in accordance with the law.  Dale v. S & S Builders, LLC, 2008 WY 84, ¶ 26, 188 P.3d 554, 561-62 (Wyo. 2008); 
Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. Dep't of 
Revenue, 970 P.2d 841, 850 
(Wyo. 1998).

 
 
[¶23]   At issue is the State Engineer's 
interpretation of the following language found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
41-3-613:

 
 
            
The owner or owners of any ditch or canal shall maintain, to the 
satisfaction of the division superintendent of the division in which the 
irrigation works are located, a substantial headgate at the point where water is 
diverted . . . .

 
 
[¶24]   In Wilson II, 2007 WY 10, ¶¶ 32, 34, 150 P.3d  at 
666, 667, this Court concluded that, because it was sustained only by Lucerne's 
upstream diversion dam, the eastern channel was no longer a river channel, and 
was "now operated in fact as an irrigation canal."3  The Wilsons seized upon this conclusion 
and, in light of the above statutory language, demanded of the division 
superintendent that he require Lucerne to construct a headgate at the diversion 
dam.  The superintendent declined, 
reasoning that the Supreme Court opinion had not changed his view that "there is 
an adequate and appropriate headgate to allow regulatory and priority 
administration."  In confirming the 
decision of the superintendent, the State Engineer noted that this Court had 
approved Lucerne's historical use of its irrigation facilities, that Lucerne had 
the right to transport water from the diversion dam to its headgate, and that 
its headgate is located at its permitted point of 
diversion.

 
 

[¶25]   The district court agreed with the 
State Engineer's interpretation and application of the statute in this instance, 
and we will do likewise.  While Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 41-3-613 might allow 
the division superintendent to require Lucerne to install a headgate at or near 
the diversion dam, the statute does not 
mandate that 
the division superintendent do so.  
Because of the undisputed facts of this case, in particular the 
historical use of the "dual diversion" and the location of a suitable headgate 
at the adjudicated point of diversion, the division superintendent and the State 
Engineer found the system to be maintained to their satisfaction, which is all 
that the statute requires.  The 
statute does not directly address the question of what is to happen if a river 
moves to a different channel and the old channel loses its flow of water.  The division superintendent and the 
State Engineer concluded in this case that Lucerne's right to convey water to 
its legally sufficient headgate was satisfactory under the statute, and we have 
been shown no law to the contrary.

 
 
Was 
the decision of the State Engineer that Lucerneis not required to install a 
headgate at its diversiondam arbitrary and 
capricious?

 
 
[¶26]   Before we begin discussion of this 
issue, we will briefly mention that the Wilsons raised in their brief, but did 
not separately argue the question of whether the State Engineer's decision was 
supported by substantial evidence.  
In their responsive briefs, both the State Engineer and Lucerne agreed 
with the district court's citation to Newman v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2002 WY 
91, ¶ 22, 49 P.3d 163, 171 
(Wyo. 2002), for the proposition that the substantial evidence test does not 
apply in the absence of a contested case proceeding.  We here simply note that the substantial 
evidence test is now the appropriate test to be applied "anytime we are 
reviewing an evidentiary issue."  Dale, 2008 WY 84, ¶ 25, 188 P.3d  at 
561.  So, although the evidentiary 
issue was mentioned, the matter has been treated as one of arbitrary and 
capricious conduct, and we will follow that lead.

 
 
[¶27]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-3-114(c)(ii)(A) directs the reviewing court to set aside agency action found 
to be arbitrary or capricious.  We 
have defined that test as follows:

 
 
The 
arbitrary and capricious test requires the reviewing court to review the entire 
record to determine whether the agency reasonably could have made its finding 
and order based upon all the evidence before it.  The arbitrary and capricious standard is 
more lenient and deferential to the agency than the substantial evidence 
standard because it requires only that there be a rational basis for the 
agency's decision.

 
 

Northfork, 
2010 WY 41, ¶ 17, 228 P.3d  at 
845 (quoting Dale, 2008 WY 84, ¶ 12, 188 P.3d at 559) 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

 
 
[¶28]   The Wilsons' contentions that the 
decision of the State Engineer was arbitrary and capriciousthat it was not 
reasonable given the facts and that it had no rational basiscan be condensed 
into the following points: (1) the statute requires a headgate where the water 
is being diverted; (2) the diversion dam sends five to six times Lucerne's 
adjudicated amount down the eastern channel; (3) no headgate at the diversion 
dam means no control over that flow; (4) the excess flow damages the Wilsons' 
property; and (5) during the 1990s, the division superintendent and the State 
Engineer required Lucerne to install a headgate or other check structure at the 
diversion dam, but then abandoned that demand.

 
 
[¶29]   The State Engineer responds to the 
Wilsons' allegations first by reminding the Court that the petitioner bears the 
burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that an agency action was 
arbitrary and capricious.  Newman, 2002 WY 91, ¶ 15, 49 P.3d  at 
169.  Next, the State Engineer 
identifies two fundamental facts supporting its decision: this Court held in Wilson II that Lucerne was entitled to 
continue its historic use of its irrigation facilities, and Lucerne operates an 
adequate headgate at its historically permitted location.

 
 
[¶30]   We have carefully reviewed the 
entire record in these related cases and we conclude that the State Engineer's 
decision was not arbitrary or capricious.  
In addition to the points just mentioned, the record reflects that 
additional flow down the eastern channel is necessary for the proper operation 
of Lucerne's downstream headgate, that the overflow is returned to the river 
without harm to other appropriators, and that, statewide, the State Engineer 
does not treat diversion dams as the point of diversion in situations such as 
this.

 
 
[¶31]   In Dale, 2008 WY 84, ¶ 24, 188 P.3d  at 561, 
we explained that "the words arbitrary' and capricious' must be understood in 
context as terms of art under the administrative review statute . . . ."  Under our precedent, that has come to 
mean that the agency acted reasonably based upon the evidence before it, and 
that there was a rational basis for the agency's decision.  The standard legal definition of 
"arbitrary and capricious" is "founded on prejudice or preference rather than on 
reason or fact."  Black's Law Dictionary 119 (9th ed. 
2009).  In the instant case, the 
State Engineer considered the facts "on the ground," considered this Court's 
binding determinations in regard to the controversy, considered Lucerne's 
legally permitted water right, and treated this diversion dam just as it would 
treat any other.  That is not 
arbitrary and capricious conduct.

 
 
Did 
the district court fail to follow the mandate of the Supreme Court upon 
remand?

 
 
[¶32]   In Wilson II, 2007 WY 10, ¶ 35, 150 P.3d  at 667, 
we reversed in part and remanded the case to the district court for the 
following stated purpose:

 
 
As 
to the issue of quiet title, however, we reverse and remand this matter to the 
district court for entry of an order quieting title to the property in the 
Wilsons, subject to the right of Lucerne to transport water from its diversion 
dam to its headgate, and beyond, as set forth above.  If the precise location of such easement 
cannot be stipulated, the district court shall take additional evidence to 
identify the precise location thereof, including the survey originally ordered 
by the district court in its January 10, 1989 order.

 
 
[¶33]   "We have held that substantial 
compliance is the standard for testing the disposition of a case made by the 
trial court after a remand order."  
Smith Keller & Assocs. v. 
Dorr, 4 P.3d 872, 875 (Wyo. 
2000).  Where, as here, the remand 
involves a bench trial, we apply our usual standard of review of the findings 
and conclusions of a judge, as opposed to a jury:

 
 
After 
a bench trial, we review the trial court's factual findings under a clearly 
erroneous standard and its legal conclusions de novo.  We do not substitute ourselves for the 
trial court as a finder of facts; instead, we defer to the trial court's 
findings unless they are unsupported by the record or erroneous as a matter of 
law.  Although the factual findings 
of a trial court are not entitled to the limited review afforded a jury verdict, 
the findings are presumptively correct.

 
 
This 
Court may examine all of the properly admissible evidence in the record, but we 
do not reweigh the evidence.  Due 
regard is given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the credibility 
of the witnesses.  We accept the 
prevailing party's evidence as true and give to that evidence every favorable 
inference which may fairly and reasonably be drawn from it.  Findings may not be set aside because we 
would have reached a different result.  
A finding will only be set aside if, although there is evidence to 
support it, this Court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed.

 
 

Ultra 
Res., Inc. v. Hartman, 
2010 WY 36, ¶ 97, 226 P.3d 889, 922-23 (Wyo. 2010) 
(citations omitted).

 
 
[¶34]   We will give short shrift to this 
argument.  We remanded to the 
district court in Wilson II for entry 
of a quiet title order in favor of the Wilsons, subject to Lucerne's water 
facilities easement.  Wilson II, 2007 WY 10, ¶ 35, 150 P.3d  at 
667.  If the parties could not agree 
upon the easement's location, the district court was to hold a hearing on the 
matter.  That hearing was held and 
the district court issued its Order on Location of Easement on November 24, 
2009.  The order was appealed before 
the dust had settled in the resultant battle over the form of the final 
judgmenta final judgment we presume would have included the order quieting 
title to the underlying land in the Wilsons.

 
 
[¶35]   The district court substantially 
complied with this Court's mandate upon remand in Wilson II.  Logically, the quiet title order could 
not be entered until the easement to which title was subject was 
identified.  That has now been done, 
so we will again remand the case to the district court for the purpose of entry 
of such order.  We presume, perhaps 
at our peril, that the legal description of the land to which title has been 
quieted was adequately described in the proceedings that led to Wilson II.  If not, that process should also be 
completed.

 
 
Are 
the district court's findings of fact clearly 
erroneous?

 
 
[¶36]   Earlier herein, we noted that the 
factual findings of a district court after a bench trial are presumptively 
correct and that we do not set them aside unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  Ultra Res., 2010 WY 36, ¶ 97, 226 P.3d  at 
922-23.  Before we can apply that 
review standard to the present issue, we must set out some factors that will 
limit our discussion.

 
 
[¶37]   First, as we recognized in Wilson II and the district court 
recognized upon remand, the Wilsons are precluded by the doctrines of res judicata and judicial estoppel from 
contesting Lucerne's historically defined use of the eastern channel as part of 
Lucerne's irrigation facilities.  Wilson II, 2007 WY 10, ¶¶ 24, 28, 150 P.3d  at 
662-63, 664.  In Wilson II, all that was remanded was the 
need for the district court to identify and locate that use as an easement.  Therefore, the only findings of fact the 
Wilsons can be challenging herein are the findings of fact related to that 
identification and location.4

 
 
[¶38]   The second limiting factor in this 
analysis is the structure of the Wilsons' appellate brief.  The brief sets out numerous separately 
listed issues, including the "clearly erroneous" issue, but the argument section 
of the brief is not arranged issue-by-issue, and nowhere does it list the 
specific findings of fact alleged to be clearly erroneous.  This leaves the Court with the task of 
speculating, based upon the arguments made, what findings of fact the Wilsons 
believe are clearly erroneous.5

 
 
[¶39]   With those caveats, our review of 
the Wilsons' appellate brief, the district court's order, and the entire record, 
leads us to conclude that the Wilsons find the following findings of fact to be 
clearly erroneous:

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 

            
9.      
Lucerne historically has used the eastern channel, wherever 
that channel is, 
to get water from its upper diversion to its final diversion. 

 
 
            
10.    [The] 
[e]astern channel has a definable bank on the east and north side, but generally 
does not have a definable bank on the south and west side.  In many places the slope from the 
eastern channel to the south and west is very gradual.

 
 
            
11.    The eastern 
channel is highly irregular in size and shape.  Although the Supreme Court stated that 
is has been used as [a] canal, its physical characteristics are nothing like a 
canal.  It is a naturally occurring 
river channel, without a significant bank or boundary in many place[s] on its 
south and west side.

 
 
            
12.    Some 
free-board is necessary and appropriate to accommodate Lucerne's historic use of 
the eastern channel.  In times of 
high river flows that free-board area has been used (i.e.: 1982-83 
flows).

 
 
            
13.    It is not 
reasonably possible to identify a line or high point on the south and west side 
of the eastern channel beyond which water has not flowed or would not be 
expected to flow as a result of Lucerne's full use of the eastern 
channel.

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 
            
18.    The location 
of any easement down the eastern channel is adequately described by referring to 
the eastern channel of the North Platte River.  All witnesses were able to determine and 
discuss where the eastern channel is.[]

marker1fn0         
19.          
If a surveyed description of the area utilized by Lucerne is required, 
the description provided by Lucerne in Exhibit 2(a) adequately describes the 
area utilized by Lucerne, including a 3 foot free-board.  That free-board may not be intentionally 
used by Lucerne to convey its water, but is a buffer for use during unforeseen 
high flows.  The area Lucerne may 
intentionally use is limited to the location of the eastern channel without the 
3 foot free-board.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
[¶40]   We will not analyze these findings 
individually because it is more instructive to view them collectively, in the 
context of the parties' positionspositions which the trial transcript reveals 
were the focus of the battle below.  
Lucerne contends that its historic use of the eastern channel, in 
whatever amount and wherever flowing at any given time, defines the extent of 
its easement.  The Wilsons contend, 
to the contrary, that the easement should be limited to the much smaller area 
where water usually flows in the channel.  
That is the substance of this conflictLucerne wants the area of its use 
to remain unlimited, while the Wilsons want to limit that 
area.

 
 
[¶41]   When seen in this light, it is 
clear that the Wilsons are trying to do what they are estopped from doing; that 
is, they are asking the court to change Lucerne's historic use of the eastern 
channel from the unfettered flow of a natural watercourse, to the controlled 
flow of a canal.  The district court 
recognized this fact and made findings of fact, based upon the record evidence, 
that supported the "law of the case."  
All of the contested findings of fact are supported by the testimony of 
the surveyor and the former State Engineer, including the meandering nature of 
the eastern channel and the poorly defined western "bank."  The easement survey introduced by 
Lucerne was the only easement survey admitted into evidence, and witness 
testimony established its accuracy in identifying historic 
use.

 
 
[¶42]   One issuethat of 
"freeboard"perhaps deserves special comment.  The surveyor added a three-foot vertical 
"air space" above the high water line of the easement because this Court had 
said in Wilson II that the channel 
was being used as a canal, and canal design parameters include a freeboard area 
above the expected high water flow to account for unforeseen high water events. 
 Further, the surveyor believed the 
freeboard area would protect Lucerne from liability in the event of such an 
unforeseen event.  The surveyor's 
testimony in regard to freeboard is instructive:

 
 
Q     And as you heard me say 
in my opening, it's basically air space, is it not?  Above the high waterline, 3 foot, there 
is nothing there, is there, sir?

 
 
A     It is an operating 
area.  It is a recommended operating 
area.  It is a safety valve in canal 
facilities.  All of them have it in 
the irrigation districts, Fort Laramie Canal.  You cannot build a canal to transport 
irrigation water and not have some sort of safety valve, some sort of area.  Yes, typically, that area would be air 
when everything is operating correctly, properly, normally, whatever you want to 
call it, yes; but when we have a maximum event of some sort where water may be 
introduced into the system or there is a failure in part of the system to 
disallow us from totally controlling the amount of water entering the channel, 
then you have a safety valve there to protect the adjoining 
area.

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
A     Freeboard is a design 
consideration in canals.  It 
provides a number of safety factors and protections for the irrigation district 
in their operation of their facilities.  
It allows them to not have a perfect system, not to have total control 
over that system, be able to make some mistakes in how much water they let into 
the channel, also provides for space for incoming storm flows or some other type 
of flow so that it will not overflow the channel and do damage to their system 
or adjoining system. 

 
 
[¶43]   What is most significant in respect 
to the freeboard area contained in the easement survey admitted into evidence, 
and included in the district court's order as an area that could not 
intentionally be used by Lucerne, but which existed only for unforeseen events, 
is that such comes as close as possible to duplicating the historic use of the 
eastern channel by Lucerne as a naturally flowing channel, as opposed to a 
designed canal.  Lucerne never has 
had, and never will have, control over upstream events on the North Platte 
River.  The freeboard concept 
adopted by the district court simply recognizes that fact and incorporates it 
into the resolution of this dispute.  
The district court's finding that the freeboard area was part of the 
historic use was not clearly erroneous.

 
 
Did 
the district court abuse its discretion by excluding the testimony of the 
Wilsons' proposed expert witness?

 
 
[¶44]   On June 19, 2009, the Wilsons 
responded to a discovery request from Lucerne by indicating that "[n]o experts 
have been hired."  On August 25, 
2009, the Wilsons supplemented their response with the following 
information:

 
 
            
Wilsons may utilize the testimony of the following expert 
witnesses:

 
 
            
. . . . 

 
 
            
B.    Mr. Cotton 
Jones

                    
Jones Land Surveying, Inc.

                    
6750 Say Kally Road

                    
Cheyenne, Wyoming  
82009

                    
(307) 637-7107

 
 
            
Mr. Jones may be employed to survey the channel now utilized as an 
irrigation canal.  If he makes a 
survey he will testify as to the location of the channel and the means he 
utilized to determine the location.  
If a survey is not made, Mr. Jones will give his opinion as to the ease 
with which the channel now utilized as an irrigation canal can be surveyed and 
the engineering techniques which can be utilized for making such a 
survey.

 
 
[¶45]   Lucerne's attorney immediately 
contacted the Wilsons' attorney to inquire about this proposed expert witness, 
and wrote the following in a letter to the Wilsons' attorney on August 26, 
2009:

 
 
I 
understand from speaking with you today that Mr. Jones has not been retained by 
you and that you have, in fact, never spoken with him.  You further confirmed that Mr. Jones has 
not completed any survey and, to your knowledge, has never visited the Wilsons' 
property in relation to the issues involved in the current dispute over the 
survey, location, boundaries or scope of Lucerne's easement.  I understand that Mr. Jones has not 
provided you with a cost estimate regarding completing a survey or any other 
work.  You indicated that there 
would be no reason for me to depose Mr. Jones as he would have no information 
about the survey or the easement in question.

 
 
[¶46]   Despite the above correspondence, 
the Wilsons' pre-trial disclosure listed Cotton Jones as a "may call" witness, 
and identified the following as a possible exhibit: "If prepared, a survey and 
description of the channel which Lucerne utilizes for transporting water from 
where it is diverted from the North Platte River to its headgate."  Lucerne responded with a motion in limine asking the district court to 
preclude Jones from acting as an expert witness and from providing any opinion 
testimony at trial.  In the 
memorandum of law filed in support of its motion, Lucerne noted the discovery 
matters set forth above, and then argued that the Wilsons had violated W.R.C.P. 
26(a)(2), which requires in pertinent part as follows:

 
 
(2)    Disclosure of expert 
testimony.

 
 
(A)    In addition to the 
disclosures required by paragraph (1) or (1.1), a party shall disclose to other 
parties the identity of any person who may be used at trial to present evidence 
under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Wyoming Rules of 
Evidence.

 
 

(B)    Except as otherwise 
stipulated or directed by the court, this disclosure shall, 
with respect to a witness who is retained or specially employed to provide 
expert testimony in the case 
or whose duties as an employee of the party regularly involve giving expert 
testimony, be 
accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the witness or disclosure 
signed by counsel for the party.  
The report or disclosure shall contain a complete statement of all 
opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefor; the data or other 
information considered by the witness in forming the opinions; and exhibits to 
be used as a summary of or support for the opinions; the qualifications of the 
witness, including a list of all publications authored by the witness within the 
preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony; 
and a listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert 
at trial or by deposition within the preceding four 
years.

 
 

(C)    These 
disclosures shall be made at the times and in the sequence directed by the 
court.  In the absence of other 
directions from the court or stipulation by the parties, the disclosures shall 
be made at least 90 days before the trial date or the date the case is to be 
ready for trial or, if the evidence is intended solely to contradict or rebut 
evidence on the same subject matter identified by another party under paragraph 
(2)(B), within 30 days after the disclosure made by the other party.  The parties shall supplement these 
disclosures when required under subdivision 
(e)(1).

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
[¶47]   As noted above, the district court 
granted Lucerne's motion in limine 
during an unreported bench conference. See supra ¶ 15.  The post-trial Order on Location of 
Easement contained the following explanation of that 
ruling:

 
 
            
Wilsons attempted to offer evidence of a survey they obtained in late 
October, 2009, less than two weeks before trial.  The Court excluded that evidence for 
failure to comply with WRCP 26.  
Wilsons submitted an offer of proof.

 
 
[¶48]   In the memorandum of law submitted 
to the district court in support of its motion in limine and in its appellate brief, 
Lucerne identifies the Wilsons' deficiencies in this regard as the failure to 
provide any of the following:

 
 
1.    a written report prepared and 
signed by Mr. Jones in which he provided a complete statement of all of the 
opinions that he would be expressing, and the basis and reasons for such 
opinions;

 
 
2.    the data or other information 
considered by him in forming his opinions;

 
 
3.    any exhibits to be used as a 
summary of or in support of his opinions;

 
 
4.    his 
qualifications;

 
 
5.    a list of the publications 
that he has authored within the preceding ten years;

 
 
6.    the compensation to be paid 
for his studies or testimony; or

 
 
7.    a listing of any other cases 
in which he has testified as an expert within the preceding four 
years.

 
 
[¶49]   The Wilsons counter these arguments 
with several contentions.  First, 
they argue that they appropriately disclosed Mr. Jones and his survey report in 
a supplemental discovery response on August 25, 2009, and again in their 
pre-trial disclosures on September 14, 2009.  Next, they contend that Mr. Jones was not 
able to complete the survey until late October 2009, and that the record of his 
survey was provided to counsel for Lucerne as soon as it was available in 
November 2009.  Finally, at the 
outset of the trial, the Wilsons' attorney informed the district court that Mr. 
Jones would be called as a rebuttal or impeachment witness, if at all.  Based upon this last assertion, the 
Wilsons contend that W.R.C.P. 26(a)(3) creates an exception to disclosure for 
impeachment witnesses.

 
 
[¶50]   The question of the admissibility 
of evidence is primarily a question for the trial court.  W.R.E. 104(a).  "We will reverse a trial court's 
decision on the admissibility of evidence only if the trial court abused its 
discretion."  Clark v. Gale, 966 P.2d 431, 435 (Wyo. 1998).  "In determining whether there has been 
an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could 
reasonably conclude as it did."  Dean v. State, 2008 WY 124, ¶ 14, 194 P.3d 299, 
303 (Wyo. 2008) (quoting Campbell v. 
Studer, 970 P.2d 389, 392 
(Wyo. 1998)).  These rules apply to 
a district court's decision whether to admit or reject expert testimony.  Id.

 
 
[¶51]   We will first discuss the Wilsons' 
final contentionthat is, that they were not required to disclose Cotton Jones 
as a witness because he was only a rebuttal or impeachment witness.  The Wilsons are wrong in this regard, 
for a couple of reasons.  First, the 
structure of W.R.C.P. 26(a) does not support their argument.  W.R.C.P. 26(a) is concerned with 
required disclosures during the discovery process.  Subsection (a)(1) governs initial 
disclosures, subsection (a)(2) governs disclosure of expert testimony, and 
subsection (a)(3) governs specific matters such as the disclosure of the names 
and addresses of all witnesses, the distinction between "will call" and "may 
call" witnesses, the designation of witnesses expected to testify by deposition, 
and identification of exhibits.  The 
exception in (a)(3) for witnesses being called "solely for impeachment" simply 
does not negate the requirement in (a)(2) for appropriate disclosure of expert 
witnesses.  Were this true, 
defendants could always avoid identification of their expert witnesses by 
claiming that the expert testimony was solely intended to impeach the 
plaintiff's expert.  Beyond that, 
and the second reason the Wilsons argument is not valid, is the fact that the 
proffered testimony of Cotton Jones went well beyond impeachment and was, for 
all intents and purposes, simply the testimony of an expert 
witness.

 
 
[¶52]   The disclosures required by 
W.R.C.P. 26(a)(2) are mandatory.  LM v. Laramie County Dep't of Family Servs. 
(In re MN), 2007 WY 189, ¶ 
5, 171 P.3d 1077, 1080 (Wyo. 
2007) (use of the word "shall" in a statute makes the provision mandatory).  Thus, if the district court reasonably 
found that the Wilsons did not comply with those mandates, it certainly cannot 
be said that the district court abused its discretion in not admitting the 
expert testimony.  Of particular 
importance in the instant case are the time limitations contained in W.R.C.P. 
26(a)(2)(C), which, absent other direction by the district court, require 
disclosure as to expert testimony to be made at least 90 days before trial, and 
disclosure of rebuttal expert testimony to be made within 30 days after that 
disclosure.

 
 
[¶53]   The sequence of significant 
post-remand pre-trial disclosure events was as follows in this case:  On May 19, 2008, the Wilsons filed a 
Request for Entry of Order Quieting Title and Order Establishing Date for 
Completion of Survey.  On July 7, 
2008, the district court entered its Order on Motion, which ordered Lucerne to 
file an easement survey by July 31, 2008, gave the Wilsons 30 days thereafter to 
file any objections, and reserved the setting of an evidentiary hearing.  Lucerne filed its easement survey on July 
30, 2008, and the Wilsons filed their objections thereto on September 2, 2008. 
 On May 5, 2009, the district court 
entered a Scheduling Order, requiring discovery to be completed by September 15, 
2009, and setting the evidentiary hearing for November 9, 
2009.

 
 
[¶54]   As mentioned above, the Wilsons 
disclosed Cotton Jones as a "may call" witness in a supplemental discovery 
response on August 25, 2009, and listed him again in the same capacity in their 
pre-trial disclosure of September 14, 2009.  These filings resulted in Lucerne's 
motion in limine, the granting of 
which led to the issue now before the Court.  It bears repeating at this point that, 
in its final order, the district court noted that Mr. Jones had not conducted 
his easement survey until October 2009, less than two weeks before the trial, 
and that the Wilsons had not complied with W.R.C.P. 26 in regard to his 
testimony.  The proffer of Mr. 
Jones' testimony made at the end of the evidentiary hearing specifies October 
28, 2009, as the date the survey occurred.  
There is no indication in the record that the survey report was provided 
to Lucerne prior to trial, or that the disclosures mandated by W.R.C.P. 26(a)(2) 
outlined above were ever made in the detail required by the 
rule.

 
 
[¶55]   Under these circumstances, we 
cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in disallowing the 
testimony of the Wilsons' belatedly identified expert, Cotton Jones.  The Wilsons have not presented 
compelling argument or citation to pertinent authority supporting their 
contention that Mr. Jones was merely an impeachment witness under W.R.C.P. 
26(a)(3), rather than an expert witness under W.R.C.P. 26(a)(2).   In addition, Lucerne filed its 
easement survey on July 30, 2008, the Wilsons filed their objection thereto on 
September 2, 2008, and the evidentiary hearing did not occur until November 9, 
2009.  The purpose of the remand was 
for the district court to determine the location of the eastern "channel" 
easement, and the record shows no justifiable excuse for the Wilsons' failure to 
file a survey report for more than a year after they clearly objected to the 
survey report presented to the district court by Lucerne.

 
 
Was 
Lucerne's certificate of costs timely filed?

 
 
[¶56]   U.R.D.C. 501(a)(1) provides in 
pertinent part that "[w]ithin 20 days after entry of the final judgment allowing 
costs to the prevailing party, a certificate of costs shall be filed and copy 
served upon opposing counsel."  In 
the present case, the Order on Location of Easement was filed on November 24, 
2009.  That order did not indicate 
that it was a final judgment, and no mention was made of costs.  On November 30, 2009, the Wilsons 
submitted a proposed judgment.  On 
December 2, 2009, Lucerne filed an objection to the form of that proposed 
judgment.  The matter was heard on 
December 17, 2009, at which time the district court indicated that the November 
24, 2009, order would stand as the final judgment and granted Lucerne's request 
to submit a certificate of costs.  
Lucerne's certificate of costs was filed on January 5, 
2010.

 
 
[¶57]   The Wilsons contend that Lucerne 
should have filed its certificate of costs within twenty days of entry of the 
November 24, 2009, order.  They cite 
Platt v. Creighton, 2007 WY 18, ¶ 9, 150 P.3d 1194, 1199 (Wyo. 2007) for 
the proposition that time limits established by court rule are mandatory.  While this legal proposition may be 
true, we find that the November 24, 2009, order, at the time it was entered, was 
not the "final judgment allowing costs to the prevailing party" contemplated by 
U.R.D.C. 501(a)(1).  It was not 
until December 17, 2009, after considering the parties' proposed judgments, that 
the district court announced the November 24, 2009, order as the final judgment 
and directed Lucerne to file its certificate of costs.  Such filing occurred within twenty days, 
making it timely.

 
 
Did 
the district court abuse its discretionin awarding costs to 
Lucerne?

 
 
[¶58]   W.R.C.P. 54(d)(1) provides that, in 
the absence of a statutory or rule-based exception, "costs other than attorney's 
fees shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court 
otherwise directs[.]"  In turn, 
U.R.D.C. 501(a)(3) defines allowable costs in civil case.  We review a district court's decision 
regarding the award of costs for abuse of discretion.  Meyer v. Hatto, 2008 WY 153, ¶ 25, 198 P.3d 552, 
557 (Wyo. 2008).  To prevail, the 
party contesting the district court's ruling must show that the court "act[ed] 
in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances."  Id.

 
 
[¶59]   The Wilsons' first disagreement 
with the district court's award of costs is the court's alleged failure to 
consider their objections thereto.  
Lucerne filed its certificate of costs on January 5, 2010.  The Wilsons filed a response on January 
18, 2010, objecting to the award of costs.  
U.R.D.C. 501(a)(2) requires the court to consider, with or without a 
hearing, any objections that have been filed.  The order approving Lucerne's 
certificate of costs was filed on April 27, 2010, but it was signed by the 
district judge on January 6, 2010, the day after the certificate of costs was 
filed.  The date of signing leads 
the Wilsons to conclude that the district court did not consider their 
objections, as mandated by U.R.D.C. 501(a)(2).

 
 
[¶60]   Without more shown in the record, 
we cannot conclude that the district court ignored its duty to consider the 
Wilsons' objections to an award of costs.  
To the contrary, the fact that the order was not filed until well after 
both the certificate and the objections were filed indicates that, if the 
district court inadvertently signed an order that was presented with the 
certificate, the order was withheld until the court had time to review both 
documents.  The fact that a hearing 
was not held is neutral because no hearing is required by the 
rule.

 
 
[¶61]   U.R.D.C. 501(a)(3)(B)(ii) allows 
the taxation of costs for expert witnesses "at the rate of $25.00 per day or 
such other amount as the court may allow according to the circumstances of the 
case."  In their response filed in 
the district court, the Wilsons objected to the award of expert witness costs to 
Lucerne's surveyor at the rate of $80.00 per hour, and to the former State 
Engineer at the rate of $195.00 per hour.  In their appellate brief, the Wilsons 
complain only about the latter.  The 
gist of the Wilsons' complaint is that the State Engineer was a "token expert 
witness" and that "[h]is testimony falls far short of being of the nature for 
which any expert witness fees should be awarded."  To be blunt, we find no substance to 
these complaints.  Rather than 
attack the hourly rates as being unreasonable, the Wilsons have chosen to attack 
the "value" of the testimony to the final outcome.  We have reviewed the trial transcript and 
it is clear that Lucerne's position was presented largely through the testimony 
of these two witnesses.  
Furthermore, their testimony, and their areas of expertise, focused 
directly on the points at issue during the trial.  The Wilsons have not shown that the 
district court abused its discretion in awarding these 
costs.

 
 
[¶62]   Next, the Wilsons challenge the 
award of $497.00 as costs for the taking of Mr. Wilson's deposition.  The governing rule as to deposition 
costs is U.R.D.C. 501(a)(3)(D), which reads as follows:

 
 
(D)       Costs of 
depositions.

 
 
(i)    Costs of depositions are 
taxable if reasonably necessary for the preparation of the case for trial.  A deposition is deemed reasonably 
necessary if:

 
 
I.       Read to the 
jury as provided in Rule 32(a)(3), W.R.C.P.;

 
 
II.      Used at trial for 
impeachment concerning a material line of testimony (impeachment on a collateral 
issue does not fall within the scope of this rule);

 
 
III.     Necessarily, and not 
merely conveniently, used to refresh the recollection of a witness while on the 
stand; or

 
 
IV.    Was taken at the request of a 
nonprevailing party.

 
 
The 
foregoing are meant to provide guidelines, and are not exhaustive.  The use of depositions for trial 
preparation alone does not justify the imposition of 
costs.

 
 
[¶63]   It is, perhaps, interesting that, 
under U.R.D.C. 501(a)(3)(D), the deposition of a party opponent is not 
automatically considered reasonably necessary for the preparation of the 
case.  Consequently, as with any 
deposition, "the burden must be upon the party seeking the award of costs to 
justify to the district court that those costs were reasonably necessary for the 
preparation of the case for trial."  
Cundy Asphalt Paving Constr. v. 
Angelo Materials Co., 915 P.2d 1181, 1183 (Wyo. 1996) (quoting Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361, 1373 (Wyo. 
1986)).  In the instant case, the 
record does not reflect any justification for an award of costs for this 
deposition beyond the bald assertion in the certificate of costs that the 
deposition was used at trial and the costs were actually and necessarily 
incurred.  Given this dearth of 
justification, we would be hard-pressed to find that the district court acted 
reasonably in awarding these costs.  
See Garrison v. CC Builders, 
Inc., 2008 WY 34, ¶ 49, 179 P.3d 867, 879-80 (Wyo. 
2008).

 
 
[¶64]   In its appellate brief, Lucerne 
attempts to justify the award of costs for Mr. Wilson's deposition because the 
deposition was used at trial to impeach Mr. Wilson on the following question and 
answer from the deposition:

 
 
Q.    Mr. Wilson, are you trying to 
require Lucerne to take legal and physical responsibility for the North Platte 
River as it flows through this area?

 
 
A.    Yes.

 
 
Lucerne 
finds significance in this exchange because the district court, in its Order on 
Location of Easement, made the following finding of fact:

 
 
14.    Thomas Wilson testified that 
his goal for a survey is to contain and restrict the area Lucerne can use to 
transport its water.  The evidence 
showed that such a restriction would be contrary to Lucerne's historic 
use.

 
 
[¶65]   We find none of this persuasive in 
regard to the award of costs for Mr. Wilson's deposition.  The question in the deposition is simply 
argumentative, and the district court's finding does little more than 
encapsulate the central trial issue.  
In short, there is nothing in the record supporting an award of costs to 
Lucerne for Mr. Wilson's deposition.  
That portion of the award will be reversed.

 
 
[¶66]   Finally, the Wilsons object to the 
award of costs to Lucerne in the amount of $67.43 for "duplication and 
preparation costs and expenses for documents and exhibits admitted into 
evidence."  The controlling law is 
found in U.R.D.C. 501 (a)(3)(E), which includes in allowable costs 
"[d]uplicating costs necessarily incurred for documents admitted into evidence . 
. . ."  While we are troubled 
somewhat by the lack of specificity as to this category of costs, by the fact 
that "duplication and preparation costs and expenses" may or may not equal 
"duplicating costs," and by the fact that Lucerne apparently provided no further 
information to the district court upon which it could exercise its discretion, 
the certificate of costs was verified, and we have held that a "verified bill of 
costs is prima facie evidence that 
the items listed were necessarily expended and are properly taxable as 
costs.  Garrison, 2008 WY 34, ¶ 45, 179 P.3d  at 879. 
 Lucerne asserts in its appellate 
brief that these costs "represent one copy of the exhibits introduced."  Even that information supplied to the 
district court would have been helpful.  
In the end, however, we conclude that the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in awarding duplication costs.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶67]   The 
decision of the State Engineer that Lucerne's headgate located at its 
adjudicated point of diversion satisfies the requirements of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
41-3-613 was not contrary to law, and the State Engineer's decision not to 
require Lucerne to install a headgate at its diversion dam was not arbitrary and 
capricious.  The process and 
decisions of the district court were consistent with this Court's mandate upon 
remand, and its findings of fact following the bench trial were not clearly 
erroneous.  The district court's 
exclusion of the testimony of Wilsons' belatedly identified expert witness did 
not evince an abuse of discretion, particularly because the required disclosures 
in regard to that witness were not made.  
Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in its award of 
costs to Lucerne, except for the award of $497.00 in deposition costs, which 
were not adequately substantiated under the applicable court 
rule.

 
 
[¶68]   Affirmed in part, and reversed and 
remanded to the district court for entry of an order consistent 
herewith.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
power and duties of division superintendents are set out in Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
41-3-502 through 41-3-504 (LexisNexis 2009).

 
 

2It 
must be pointed out that, in outlining the context of the case, the district 
court erroneously stated that the eastern channel remains part of the river and 
that this Court, in Wilson II, had 
only quieted title to the "island" lying between the channels.  That is contrary to the holding in Wilson II, which was that the eastern 
channel is no longer a river channel, and that reliction also gave the Wilsons 
title to the land underlying that channel.  
That fact, of course, is what led to the conclusion that Lucerne's right 
to use that channel as part of its stipulated "irrigation facilities" 
should be located as an easement.  
See Wilson II, ¶¶ 30-33, 150 P.3d  at 664-67.  While that 
erroneous statement by the district court led to the State Engineer and Lucerne 
presenting in the related cases considerable evidence and argument as if the 
eastern channel was still a river channel, our ultimate resolution of this case 
has not been affected thereby.

 
 

3Much 
deposition time, trial time, and appellate time would have been saved had we, 
perhaps, used the word "ditch" rather than the word "canal."  We did not mean to imply that the 
naturally occurring channel had somehow been transformed into a concrete-lined 
symmetrical irrigation canal.  The 
point of the observation was that Lucerne was operating the channel as part of 
its irrigation facilities.

 
 

4The 
parties have not raised the law of the case doctrine, which also may be 
applicable.  See Lieberman v. Mossbrook, 2009 WY 65, ¶ 28, 208 P.3d 1296, 1305 (Wyo. 2009) 
(court's decision on an issue of law at one stage of proceeding is binding in 
successive stages of that and related cases).

 
 

5This 
problem is exacerbated by the fact that the district court's findings of fact 
and conclusions of law are not separately stated.