Title: Jordan v. Western Farmers Electric Cooperative

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

JORDAN v. WESTERN FARMERS ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE2012 OK 94Case Number: 108550Decided: 11/13/2012THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN 
THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR 
WITHDRAWAL. 

DAVID JORDAN, Plaintiff/Appellant,v.WESTERN FARMERS 
ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, A Domestic Not For Profit Cooperative, 
Defendant/Appellee.
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION I,ON 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CHOCTAW COUNTY, STATE OF OKLAHOMA
HONORABLE JAMES R. WOLFE, TRIAL JUDGE
¶0 Employee, David Jordan, brought an intentional tort action against his 
employer, Western Farmers Electric Cooperative, for injury from on-the-job 
exposure to allegedly highly toxic fly ash. Jordan alleged Western's spread of 
this hazardous material on the premises was intentional and with knowledge to a 
substantial certainty that serious injury would occur to employees. Western 
moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the 
exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act for injuries arising out 
of and in the course of employment. The trial court found the petition failed to 
allege facts which plausibly demonstrated Western's conduct was intentional 
under the then-existent substantial certainty standard. The trial court 
dismissed the action with prejudice for failure to state claim upon which relief 
may be granted, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. We granted certiorari 
to determine whether the petition pled sufficient facts to remove the claim from 
the exclusive remedy of the Workers' Compensation Act. We hold that the petition 
sufficiently pled a claim under the intentional tort/substantial certainty 
exception to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation Court. The 
order of dismissal is reversed and this case is remanded for further 
proceedings.
CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; OPINION OF THE COURT OF CIVIL 
APPEALS VACATED; JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH 
INSTRUCTIONS.
Jerry L. McCombs, JERRY L.. MCCOMBS, P.C., Idabel, Oklahoma for 
Plaintiff/Appellant,Rachel R. Shephard, Douglas A. Rice, DERRYBERRY & 
NAIFEH, LLP, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellee.
REIF, J.:
¶1 The issue presented on certiorari review is whether an employee in 
district court pled sufficient facts to plausibly demonstrate that employer's 
conduct was intentional under the substantial certainty standard, removing the 
claim from the exclusive remedy of the Workers' Compensation Act. We hold that 
the employee's petition was sufficient to withstand the employer's dismissal 
motion. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's dismissal of the employee's 
action, and remand the case for further proceedings in the district court. 
¶2 David Jordan brought suit in district court against his employer, Western 
Farmers Electric Cooperative. Jordan claimed that Western disposed of highly 
toxic fly ash, a by-product of the company's operations, in ponds created for 
that purpose until 2002. Then, Western began spreading the ash on the plant's 
roads and parking lots. Jordan states that his on-the-job exposure to the highly 
toxic fly ash caused him injury, and that he suffered pain, impairment, and lost 
income as a result. Jordan asserted that Western's conduct amounted to an 
intentional tort. 
¶3 Western argued that Jordan's claim did not meet the standard an 
intentional tort under the substantial certainty test set out in Parret v. 
UNICCO Service Co., 2005 OK 54 ¶ 26, 127 P.3d 572, 579, and that as a result, the Worker's 
Compensation Court had exclusive jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed the 
case with prejudice under 12 O.S. § 2012(B)(1) for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted. Jordan appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals 
affirmed, holding Jordan failed to allege facts which plausibly demonstrated 
Western's conduct was intentional under the substantial certainty standard. 
¶4 Jordan filed a petition for certiorari. His chief complaint was that the 
trial court and Court of Civil Appeals erred in concluding "[the petition] 
failed to allege facts which plausibly demonstrate that Defendant's conduct was 
intentional under the substantial certainty standard."1 This Court previously 
granted certiorari to determine the sufficiency of the petition to state a claim 
for intentional tort under the former substantial certainty standard.
¶5 Review of the trial court's dismissal for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted presents a question of law as to whether the 
petition is legally sufficient. Hayes v. Eateries, Inc., 1995 OK 108, ¶ 2, 905 P.2d 778, 780. This Court reviews questions of law 
de novo. Id. When reviewing such a dismissal, "an appellate court must 
take as true all of the challenged pleading's allegations together with all 
reasonable inferences which may be drawn from them." Great Plains Federal 
Savings and Loan Association v. Dabney, 1993 OK 4, ¶ 2 n.3, 846 P.2d 1088, 1090. "A pleading must not be dismissed 
for failure to state a legally cognizable claim unless the allegations indicate 
beyond any doubt that the litigant can prove no set of facts which would entitle 
him to relief." Frazier v. Bryan Memorial Hospital Authority, 
1989 OK 
73, ¶ 13, 775 P.2d 281, 287. 
¶6 Upon review, this Court finds that the Court of Civil Appeals erred in 
affirming the trial court's dismissal, because Jordan alleged sufficient facts 
under the substantial certainty standard set forth in Parret, 
2005 OK 54 at ¶¶ 23-26, 127 P.3d  at 
578-79. Jordan's claim is controlled by 85 O.S. 2001 § 11 and 85 O.S. Supp. 2005 § 12, the liability provisions 
in effect at the time his claim accrued in August of 2009. OKLA. CONST. Art. V, 
§ 54. These provisions,2 that the Workers' Compensation Act provides exclusive 
liability in place of all other liability of the employer for accidental 
personal injury incurred by an employee during the scope of employment. 
¶7 In Parret, this Court recognized an exception to the exclusive 
remedy of Workers' Compensation in cases where the employee's injury is not 
accidental, but results from an intentional tort. Parret, 
2005 OK 54, ¶¶ 23-27, 127 P.3d  at 
578-79. According to Parret, "in order for an employer's conduct to 
amount to an intentional tort, the employer must have (1) desired to bring about 
the worker's injury or (2) acted with the knowledge that such injury was 
substantially certain to result from the employer's conduct." Id. ¶ 24, 
127 P.3d  at 579. Although the sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint was not 
at issue in Parret, this Court did address the necessary allegations to 
maintain a tort claim in district court. "The worker must allege facts which 
'plausibly demonstrate' that the employer's conduct was intentional under the 
'substantial certainty' standard." Id. ¶ 26, 127 P.3d  at 579. Jordan met 
this heightened pleading requirement in his complaint.
¶8 Jordan's pleading sufficiently alleged facts under the substantial 
certainty standard because a trier of facts could reasonably infer from the 
allegations that Western acted with substantial certainty. A pleading must not 
be dismissed "unless the allegations indicate beyond any doubt that the litigant 
can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief." Hayes, 
1995 OK 
108, ¶ 2, 905 P.2d  at 780 (quoting Frazier v. Bryan Memorial Hospital 
Authority, 1989 OK 
73, ¶ 13, 775 P.2d 281, 287). Moreover, "the court must take as true all of the challenged 
pleading's allegations together with all reasonable inferences which may be 
drawn from them." Hayes, 1995 OK 108, ¶ 2, 905 P.2d  at 780.
¶9 As noted, in Parret this Court specifically addressed the 
requirements of allegations in order to remove a claim from the exclusive remedy 
of Workers' Compensation. Parret, 2005 OK 54, ¶ 26, 127 P.3d  at 579. A worker "must 
allege facts which 'plausibly demonstrate' that the employer's conduct was 
intentional under the 'substantial certainty' standard." Id. Substantial 
certainty, as defined by Parret, is found when an employer intended the 
act that caused the injury with knowledge that the injury was substantially 
certain to follow. Id. ¶ 24, 127 P.3d  at 579. This Court further 
clarified substantial certainty by stating, "an employer's knowledge may be 
inferred from the employer's conduct and all the surrounding circumstances." 
Id. 
¶10 The substantial certainty requirement was further refined in Price v. 
Howard, where the court stated that, "nothing short of a demonstration of 
the employer's knowledge of the substantial certainty of injury will suffice" to 
remove a claim from the exclusive remedy of Workers' Compensation. 
2010 OK 26, ¶ 10, 236 P.3d 82, 88. In Price, a woman brought suit 
after her husband died while traveling in a corporate airplane during a business 
trip. Id. ¶ 3, 236 P.3d  at 86. However, the claim in Price was not 
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, but 
rather because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate employer's knowledge on a 
motion for summary judgment. Id. ¶¶ 5-6, 236 P.3d  at 86-87.
¶11 To determine whether Jordan's complaint sufficiently alleged facts, this 
Court must determine whether the allegations, when taken as true and all 
reasonable inferences drawn from them, "plausibly demonstrate" that Western 
acted with knowledge that Jordan's injury was substantially certain to follow.3 Jordan alleged that 
Western disposed of toxic fly ash in ponds created for that purpose until 2002, 
when Western began spreading the ash on the plant's roads and parking lots. 
Jordan alleged Western acted with knowledge that there was substantial certainty 
serious death or injury would occur to its employees as a result. Jordan further 
alleged that he was injured as a result of this exposure and that he complained 
to Western in 2009. If all of these allegations are taken as true, a trier of 
facts could reasonably infer that Western disposed of the fly ash in ponds due 
to its toxicity and was aware of the potential for injury. Without further 
discovery regarding the toxicity of the fly ash, Jordan's case cannot be 
dismissed for failure to meet the substantial certainty standard.
¶12 In analyzing Jordan's petition, we are cognizant that "the use of the 
word 'intent' in allegations 'is not a talisman that can change the allegations 
into colorable claims.'"4 However, this is not the sole basis of Jordan's claim. 
In addition to alleging Western's intent, Jordan also alleges facts and 
circumstances from which Western's knowledge may be inferred, including the 
allegation that Western altered its disposal methods of what it allegedly knew 
to be toxic ash. A reasonable inference may be drawn from the totality of 
Jordan's allegations to satisfy Jordan's burden to plausibly demonstrate that 
Western acted with knowledge of the substantial certainty of an injurious effect 
of the fly ash. Under these circumstances, the trial court erred in dismissing 
the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
¶13 In conclusion, we hold that if all allegations in Jordan's petition are 
taken as true, and all reasonable inferences drawn from them, the petition 
plausibly demonstrates that Western's actions constituted an intentional tort 
under the substantial certainty standard, which was the law in effect at the 
time of his injury in August of 2009. The trial court's dismissal of Jordan's 
claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is reversed 
and the matter is remanded to district court for further proceedings. 
CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; OPINION OF THE COURT OF CIVIL 
APPEALS VACATED; JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH 
INSTRUCTIONS.
¶14 COLBERT, V.C.J., WATT, EDMONDSON, REIF, and COMBS, JJ., 
concur.
¶15 KAUGER, J., concurs specially.
¶16 TAYLOR, C.J., WINCHESTER, and GURICH, JJ., dissent.
TAYLOR, C.J., dissenting. The trial judge and the unanimous Court of 
Civil Appeals were absolutely correct in their disposition of this meritless 
lawsuit. This Court spoke clearly in Parret and 
Price that the Workers' Compensation Court has exclusive 
jurisdiction except in the case of an intentional tort in which the 
employer had willful, deliberate and specific intent ("a desire") to cause 
injury to an employee or the employer acted with knowledge that injury to 
the employee was substantially certain. In Price, this 
Court referred to this standard as a "formidable barrier" and held that "nothing 
short" of that standard will suffice. The record in this case shows that the 
employer in this case did not intend, plan, desire or have a substantially 
certain knowledge and plan to injure this employee. The employer did not intend 
or plan to injure this employee. This is a frivolous claim in district court and 
the trial court's dismissal should be affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
1 Jordan's petition for 
certiorari also contended the dismissal with prejudice was error. Our decision 
on the substance of the claim makes it unnecessary to address this issue. 
See Brown v. Founders Bank and Trust Co., 1994 OK 130, ¶ 9, 890 P.2d 855, 861. 
2 Title 85 O.S. 2001 § 11 provides:
A. Every employer subject to the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act 
shall pay, or provide as required by the Workers' Compensation Act, compensation 
according to the schedules of the Workers' Compensation Act for the disability 
or death of an employee resulting from an accidental personal injury 
sustained by the employee arising out of and in the course of employment, 
without regard to fault as a cause of such injury, . . . (emphasis added)
with exceptions for certain conduct by employees. The exclusivity provision 
is set out in section 12, as follows:
The liability prescribed in Section 11 of this title shall be exclusive and 
in place of all other liability of the employer and of his employees, any 
architect, professional engineer, or land surveyor retained to perform 
professional services on a construction project, at common law or otherwise, for 
such injury, loss of services, or death, to the employee, . . . .
85 O.S 2001 § 11 and 85 O.S. Supp. 2005 § 12 were amended in 2010 and 
repealed in 2011. In their place, 85 O.S. 2011 § 302 was enacted, providing in 
part:
A. The liability prescribed in this act shall be exclusive and in place of 
all other liability of the employer and any of his or her employees, at common 
or otherwise, for such injury, loss of services, or death, to the employee, . . 
. except in the case of an intentional tort . . . .
B. An intentional tort shall exist only when the employee is injured as a 
result of willful, deliberate, specific intent of the employer to cause such 
injury. Allegations or proof that the employer had knowledge that such injury 
was substantially certain to result from the employer's conduct shall not 
constitute an intentional tort. The issue of whether an act is an intentional 
tort shall be a question of law for the Court.
Because liability for on the job injuries is governed by the law in effect at 
the time of the injury, Jordan's claim is governed by sections 11 and 12, 
including the exception from exclusivity for an employer's intentional torts, as 
set forth in Parret, 2005 OK 54, ¶¶ 23-27, 127 P.3d  at 578-79, and not 
section 302, enacted after Jordan's injury. 
3 Parret, 2005 OK 54 ¶ 24, 127 P.3d  at 579; see 
also Hayes, 1995 OK 108, ¶ 2, 905 P.2d  at 780. 
4 Parret, 2005 OK 54 ¶ 26, 127 P.3d  at 579 (quoting 
Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 491 A.2d 368, 375 (1985)). 

KAUGER, J., with whom Watt, Combs, JJ., join, concurring specially: 
¶1 I concur with remanding the case and that this proceeding is governed by 
the holding of Parret v. Unicco Services Co., 
2005 OK 54, ¶24, 127 P.3d 572. I write separately to explain why, when 
the Legislature makes a statutory change, immediate, instantaneous gratification 
of the change does not always occur. Sometimes patience is required.
¶2 Unless the Legislature clearly expresses a contrary intent, the general 
rule is that new statutes or statutory changes operate prospectively.1 In workers compensation 
proceedings, the right of an employee to compensation derives from the 
contractual relationship between the employee and employer at the time of the 
injury.2 The statutes which are in effect on the date of injury 
dictate the substantive rights and obligations of the employee and employer.3 This is so because the 
statutes then in force form a part of the contract and determine the substantive 
rights and obligations of the parties.4 Unlike purely procedural amendments, a subsequent 
amendment to those statutes which affects substantive rights cannot operate 
retroactively to change fixed rights and obligations.5
¶3 What does all of this mean? It means that when a case like Parret, 
supra, is decided, its holding will apply to those cases which occur after it. 
It was decided on June 28, 2005. Nearly two years later, a lawsuit was filed in 
the case of Price v. Howard, 2010 OK 26, ¶17, 236 P.3d 82. Because the death of the employee in 
Price occurred on October 15, 2006, and the lawsuit was filed on May 29, 
2007, the law expressed in Parret, supra, applied to the Price 
litigation. 
¶4 On August 27, 2010, the Legislative amendment to the Oklahoma Workers' 
Compensation Act explicitly overruled Parret, by repealing an employee's 
ability to bring an intentional tort claim under the substantial certainty 
standard.6 When this Legislative change occurred, there may have 
been employees who were injured and/or cases which were filed between the time 
Parret, supra, was decided and the time the Legislature changed the 
law.
¶5 Because the Okla. Const., art. 5 §54 expressly prohibits the Legislature 
from applying a change in the law after court proceedings have begun, those 
cases which were filed after Parret, but in which the injury had occurred 
before the Legislative change, were governed by Parret's holding, rather 
than the new Legislative amendment.7 Why? Because once a right has accrued and a court 
proceeding has started under particular statutes in effect at that time, that 
right is not removed if the Legislature repeals or changes the statutes. This is 
true as long as the right is a substantive right, protected by the Oklahoma 
Constitution and not merely a procedural change that has no real effect on an 
employee's protected rights.8 
¶6 Here, Jordan's claim arose when his injury was discovered in August of 
2009, and he brought suit on April 20, 2010. At that time, Parret had 
already been decided and was the current law. Consequently, even though the 
Legislature changed the law in August of 2010, and Jordan's appeal is not 
decided until today, Parret applies to his case and not the 2010 
statutory change. Otherwise, the Court would expressly violate the Oklahoma 
Constitution -- the same Constitution we have sworn to uphold.
¶7 Soon, the few cases in the pipeline, if any, will be decided and any 
backlog of lawsuits begun before the August 2010 Legislative change will be 
exhausted. At that point, Parret, supra, will be inapplicable and the 
2010 Legislative changes will control. 
FOOTNOTES
1 Forest Oil 
Corp. v. Corp. Comm'n of Oklahoma, 
1990 OK 58, ¶11, 807 P.2d 774. 
2 King Mfg. v. Meadows, 
2005 OK 78, ¶11, 127 P.3d 584. 
3 King Mfg. v. Meadows, see note 2, 
supra. See, Knott v. Halliburton Services, 
1998 
OK 29, 
¶4, 752 P.2d 812; Batt v. Special Indemnity Fund, 
1993 OK 163, ¶9, 865 P.2d 1244; Leeway Motor Freight, 
Inc. v. Wilson, 1980 OK 48, ¶7, 609 P.2d 777. 
4 King Mfg. v. Meadows, see note 3, 
supra; Knott v. Halliburton Services, see note 3, supra; 
Leeway Motor Freight, Inc., v. Wilson, see 
note 3, supra at ¶8; Magnolia Petroleum v. Watkins, 
1936 OK 372, ¶5, 57 P.2d 622. 
5 King Mfg. v. Meadows, see note 2, 
supra; Batt v. Special Indemnity Fund, see note 3, 
supra; Knott v. Halliburton Services, see note 3, supra; 
Leeway Motor Freight, Inc. v. Wilson, see 
note 3, supra. 
6 The language of 85 O.S. Supp. 2010 ¶12 was amended 
effective August 27, 2010, and later repealed, but recodified in 2011 as 
85 O.S. 2011 §302. It provides in pertinent 
part:
A. The liability prescribed in this act shall be exclusive and in place of 
all other liability of the employer and any of his or her employees, at common 
law or otherwise, for such injury, loss of services, or death, to the employee, 
or the spouse, personal representative, parents, or dependents of the employee, 
or any other person, except in the case of an intentional tort, or where the 
employer has failed to secure the payment of compensation for the injured 
employee.
B. An intentional tort shall exist only when the employee is injured as a 
result of willful, deliberate, specific intent of the employer to cause such 
injury. Allegations or proof that the employer had knowledge that such injury 
was substantially certain to result from the employer's conduct shall not 
constitute an intentional tort. The issue of whether an act is an intentional 
tort shall be a question of law for the Court. . . . 
7 The Okla. Const. Art. 5 §54 provides:
The repeal of a statute shall not revive a statute previously repealed by 
such statute, nor shall such repeal affect any accrued right, or penalty 
incurred, or proceedings begun by virtue of such repealed statute. 
8 We explained in King Mfg. v. 
Meadows, see note 2, supra at ¶19 that: 
The terms of the Okla. Const., art. 5, §54 protect matured rights from the 
effects of after-enacted legislative change. After-enacted legislation that 
increases or diminishes the amount of recoverable compensation or alters the 
elements of the claim or defense by imposition of new conditions affects the 
parties' substantive rights and liabilities. The statute in effect at the time 
of the initial injury governs a claimant's award of permanent disability for a 
change in condition. (Citations omitted.)