Title: Byrnes v. LCI Communications Holding Co.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

Byrnes et al., Appellees, v. LCI Communications Holdings Company et al., 
Appellants. 
[Cite as Byrnes v. LCI Communications Holding Co. (1996), ____Ohio 
St.3d_____.] 
Age discrimination -- Employment discharge action -- Inference that 
employer was motivated by discriminatory animus to act against 
employee not possible absent casual connection between 
employer’s 
discriminatory 
statements 
and 
employee 
-- 
Discrimination against other employees, standing alone, is 
insufficient to prove employer also discriminated against plaintiff-
employee on basis of age -- Establishing primia facie case of age 
discrimination under R.C. 4112.02 or 4112.14. 
 
(No. 95-1222 -- Submitted May 22, 1996 -- Decided December 11, 1996.) 
 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, Nos. 94APE09-
1372 and 94APE09-1396. 
 
In 1988, Lawrence McLernon, then chief executive officer of defendant-
appellant Litel Communications, Inc. (“LCI”; other defendants are affiliated 
corporations), recruited plaintiff-appellee Thomas J. Byrnes, age forty-eight, to 
become LCI’s president and chief operating officer. In his capacity as president, 
 
2
Byrnes was responsible for the inside operations of LCI and had direct 
supervision over sales, operations and computer projects. 
 
McLernon also recruited plaintiff-appellee Richard Otto, age fifty-six.  
Otto began as a consultant for the company in 1985.  In 1987, Otto became a 
full-time employee and was named vice president.  He worked on special 
projects and reported to McLernon.  He was placed in charge of an area 
designated as “standards and analysis,” and he began reporting directly to 
Byrnes. 
 
In 1990, LCI acquired Charter Network Company (“Charter”), and Otto 
was responsible for integrating the acquisition. There were problems with the 
acquisition, and Byrnes received complaints about Otto’s performance.  As a 
result, Byrnes gave Otto an unsatisfactory rating for the third quarter of 1990, 
and he was not given a performance bonus for that period.  After the Charter 
acquisition was completed, Otto was relieved of further responsibility for LCI’s 
acquisitions.  Eventually, Byrnes eliminated Otto’s position and distributed his 
duties among other vice presidents.  Byrnes told Otto that LCI no longer needed 
 
3
his services.  Byrnes testified that his decision to terminate Otto had nothing to 
do with Otto’s age and that he tried to find another position for Otto during the 
latter half of 1990 but was unable to locate an available position.  LCI 
announced Otto’s departure as retirement. 
 
Byrnes also received an unsatisfactory rating for the third quarter of 1990 
and did not receive a performance bonus.  He failed to meet all his performance 
objectives for 1990, and LCI failed to meet its budgeted revenues for the year.  
In early 1991, McLernon terminated Byrnes, age fifty-one.  McLernon, who is 
older than Byrnes, assumed Byrnes’s duties. 
 
Otto received severance pay of one year’s salary.  Byrnes was given a 
severance package in accordance with the terms of his employment agreement.  
He returned home to his family in Ireland, where he eventually accepted a 
position as a university professor at about ten percent of his total 1990 
compensation from LCI. 
 
In 1991, Byrnes and Otto filed this action against LCI alleging that they 
had been discharged on the basis of their age in violation of R.C. 4112.02.  At 
 
4
trial, several former LCI employees testified about McLernon’s attitude toward 
older employees.  Priscilla Frasher was hired in 1984 as executive secretary for 
McLernon.  Frasher, who was over age fifty when hired, was discharged shortly 
before her three-month probationary period ended.  She testified that she was 
told by LCI’s chief financial officer, Larry Wolfe, that she had been terminated 
so that the company could hire a younger person at a lower salary. 
 
Former employee Daniel Lopez testified that during his initial 
employment interviews in 1989, McLernon said he was displeased with LCI’s 
marketing organization and the only way to turn it around “was to bring in 
young, aggressive staff managers and change out the old folks.”  McLernon 
stated that he “was looking for young risk-takers,” and he commented on the 
youthful marketing departments of LCI’s competitors, AT&T and MCI.  On 
another occasion after Lopez had been hired, McLernon favorably commented 
on Lopez’s proposed reorganization of the marketing department because “some 
of the older folks there could no longer contribute” to the company.  Lopez 
testified that later McLernon  referred to an advertising manager as being 
 
5
“essentially over the hill” and “too old to grasp the concepts that he was looking 
for.”  McLernon also referred to another terminated employee as being “too old 
and tired” for this business. 
 
Ed Florek, another former LCI executive, testified about a conversation in 
1985 with McLernon about wanting to create a sales associate program to hire 
very young, inexperienced associates to be teamed with older, more experienced 
persons to mentor them.  McLernon’s reasoning was that “[t]hose old farts you 
hired aren’t going to be around forever.”  Another LCI executive, John Janis, 
reportedly  stated to Florek, “I don’t want old marathoners in my sales 
organization. I want young sprinters.” 
 
The only testimony to have possibly created an inference of age 
discrimination toward these plaintiffs came from Byrnes, who testified that, 
during the problematic period of the Charter acquisition, he met with McLernon, 
who questioned whether Otto might be suffering from Alzheimer’s disease.  
Thereafter, McLernon repeatedly asked Byrnes what he intended to do about 
Otto’s future with LCI and began nagging him to terminate Otto. 
 
6
 
At the close of the plaintiffs’ case, the trial judge denied LCI’s motions 
for directed verdicts despite his comment that “98 percent of the evidence in the 
record doesn’t have anything to do with age discrimination.”  A jury rendered 
verdicts in favor of Byrnes and Otto and awarded them damages in the form of 
back pay, front pay, and punitive damages, totaling approximately $7.1 million.  
LCI filed post-trial motions seeking judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and a 
new trial or remittitur on the basis that the plaintiffs had not produced sufficient 
evidence that age had been considered by LCI in terminating Otto or Byrnes.  
The court denied the motions and also awarded plaintiffs-appellees additional 
sums for stock rights each would have received but for their terminations, and 
for attorney fees. 
 
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court in all respects except for its 
denial of prejudgment interest.  The court concluded that the evidence 
demonstrated a pattern whereby LCI hired older, experienced management 
employees for their knowledge and experience, then discarded them once their 
knowledge and experience had been assimilated into the company, a theory 
 
7
which the court of appeals analogized to squeezing the contents from a tube of 
toothpaste, then throwing the tube away, i.e., the “toothpaste tube” theory of 
liability.  The appellate court then remanded the matter with instructions to grant 
prejudgment interest. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary 
appeal. 
 
Russell A. Kelm, for appellees. 
 
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Patrick F. McCartan, Glen D. Nager and 
Steven T. Catlett, for appellants. 
 
Stewar, Jaffy & Associates Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy and Marc J. Jaffy, 
urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio AFL-CIO. 
 
Murray & Murray Co., L.P.A., Dennis E. Murray, Jr. and Patrick G. 
Warner, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
Spater, Gittes, Schulte & Kolman, Frederick M. Gittes, Kathaleen B. 
Schulte and Louis A. Jacobs, urging affirmance for amici curiae, Ohio Chapter 
of the National Organization for Women, 9To5 National Association of Working 
 
8
Women, Police Officers for Equal Rights, Stonewall Union, Ohio Now 
Education and Legal Fund, National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People, Columbus Chapter, the Ohio Civil Rights Coalition, and the 
Ohio Employment Lawyers Association. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Jeffrey S. Sutton, State 
Solicitor, urging reversal on the issue of punitive damages for amicus curiae, 
Ohio Attorney General. 
 
Jonathan A. Allison, urging reversal for amicus curiae, the Ohio Chamber 
of Commerce. 
 
STRATTON, J.  The issues presented for review involve the sufficiency of 
evidence that LCI terminated plaintiffs-appellees on the basis of their age in 
violation of R.C. 4112.02(N), and the propriety of the damages awarded by the 
jury.  Plaintiffs-appellees contend that evidence of discriminatory remarks 
demonstrated that a pervasive, discriminatory animus existed at LCI, in 
particular with Lawrence McLernon, and was sufficient to support a finding of 
 
9
age discrimination.  Because we determine that the evidence was not sufficient 
to support the verdict, we reverse the court of appeals. 
 
R.C. 4112.02 makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge without just 
cause or otherwise discriminate against a person with respect to any matter 
related to employment on the basis of age.  R.C. 4112.14 (formerly R.C. 
4101.17) specifically prohibits an employer from discriminating against a job 
applicant or discharging without just cause any employee aged forty or older 
who is physically able to perform the duties and otherwise meets the established 
requirements of the job.   
 
In Mauzy v. Kelly Services, Inc. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 578, 664 N.E.2d 
1272,  this court clarified the methods for establishing a prima facie case of age 
discrimination under R.C. 4112.14.  The methods are the same for R.C. 4112.02, 
at issue here.  Discriminatory intent may be established indirectly by the four-
part analysis set forth in Barker v. Scovill, Inc. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 146, 6 OBR 
202, 451 N.E.2d 807, adopted from the standards established in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973), 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668. 
 
10
The Barker analysis requires that the plaintiff-employee demonstrate “(1) that he 
was a member of the statutorily-protected class, (2) that he was discharged, (3) 
that he was qualified for the position, and (4) that he was replaced by, or that his 
discharge permitted the retention of, a person not belonging to the protected 
class.”  Id., paragraph one of syllabus. 
 
Discriminatory intent may also be established by direct evidence of age 
discrimination, which is evidence other than the four-part demonstration of 
Barker.  Kohmescher v. Kroger Co. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 501, 575 N.E.2d 439. 
A plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by presenting evidence, of any 
nature, to show that an employer more likely than not was motivated by 
discriminatory intent.  Mauzy, 75 Ohio St.3d 578, 664 N.E.2d 1272, paragraph 
one of the syllabus. 
 
The evidence at trial consisted of remarks by McLernon and other LCI 
executives as proof of LCI’s discriminatory attitude and continuing animus 
toward older workers.  However, none of the remarks, except for the single 
reference to Alzheimer’s disease, had any connection to either of these plaintiffs.  
 
11
There was no link or nexus between the remarks and plaintiffs’ discharges that 
could logically support the inference that the discharges were the result of 
discriminatory intent.  The remarks were distant in time and in fact to plaintiffs’ 
terminations.  Lopez testified as to comments made in 1989, more than one year 
before these plaintiffs were terminated.  Frasher’s and Florek’s testimony related 
to comments even more remote, dating back to 1985, years before either Byrnes 
or Otto became employees of LCI.   
 
The remarks did not relate to Byrnes and Otto or the decisions to 
terminate their employment. They related to other persons and positions within 
the company, specifically an executive secretary and sales and marketing 
personnel.  Otto was a vice president who worked in operations, and Byrnes was 
a high level executive.  
 
The isolated statement attributed to McLernon about Alzheimer’s disease, 
a disease which generally afflicts the elderly, refers only to Otto and may best be 
characterized as inappropriate and insensitive. This single comment by 
McLernon is insufficient to form the basis of Otto’s claim for age 
 
12
discrimination, considering that Byrnes made the final decision to terminate 
Otto, that Byrnes testified that his decision was not related to Otto’s age, and 
that there is no evidence to the contrary. 
 
Although the record is replete with testimony of LCI’s business woes and 
tales from former LCI employees, glaringly absent from the record below is 
evidence which points to age discrimination against these plaintiffs, an 
observation made by the trial judge when he commented at the close of all 
evidence that “98 percent of the evidence in the record doesn’t have anything to 
do with age discrimination.”  In fact, there is ample testimony of the failure of 
performance by both Otto and Byrnes. 
 
Even plaintiffs-appellees concede that they do not meet the four-part 
Barker analysis.  Byrnes was the executive who terminated Otto, who was not 
replaced.  Byrnes himself was then terminated and replaced by McLernon, who 
was older.  Therefore, the fourth prong of the Barker analysis was not met, as 
neither Byrnes nor Otto was replaced by a person outside the statutorily 
protected class. 
 
13
 
Instead, plaintiffs-appellees rely upon evidence in the form of statements 
by McLernon and other LCI executives over a period of many years to prove 
discriminatory intent against older workers in general.  However, this theory, 
called the “toothpaste tube” theory by the court of appeals, has no basis in law.  
The ultimate inquiry in an age discrimination case is whether a plaintiff-
employee was discharged on account of age. Kohmescher v. Kroger Co. (1991), 
61 Ohio St.3d 501, 505, 575 N.E.2d 439, 442.  Age-related comments referring 
directly to the worker may support an  inference of age discrimination.  
However, comments which are isolated, ambiguous or abstract, or made in 
reference to totally unrelated employee categories cannot support a finding of 
age discrimination against employees in a wholly different classification.  See 
Phelps v. Yale Security, Inc. (C.A.6, 1993), 986 F.2d 1020, 1025.  There must be 
a link or nexus between the discriminatory statement or conduct and the 
prohibited act of discrimination to establish a violation of the statute. In 
Kohmescher, there was a memorandum which recommended that the plaintiff be 
selected for Kroger’s reduction in workforce because he was “eligible for [the] 
 
14
retirement window.”  Here, at best, plaintiffs have an isolated comment by 
McLernon suggesting one of the plaintiffs, Otto, might have Alzheimer’s 
disease.  Perhaps McLernon was truly concerned about Otto’s status;  more 
likely, he made a joke in poor taste.  However insensitive and intemperate these 
remarks were, they were not tied in time or fact to either Byrnes’s or Otto’s 
terminations.  Consequently, they are simply insufficient to support the jury’s 
findings that these plaintiffs were discharged on account of their age. 
 
Absent some causal connection or link between an employer’s 
discriminatory statements or conduct and a plaintiff-employee, there is no 
permissible inference that the employer was motivated by discriminatory animus 
to act against the plaintiff-employee.  The mere fact that an employer may have 
discriminated against other employees, standing alone, is insufficient.  The issue 
is whether this employee was discharged because of his age.  The evidence here 
clearly does not support such a causal link or nexus. 
 
Therefore, we hold that, in a cause of action for age discrimination under 
R.C. 4112.02 or 4112.14, when relying upon the direct evidence standard, which 
 
15
is evidence other than the four-part test of Barker v. Scovill, Inc. (1983), 6 Ohio 
St.3d 146, 6 OBR 202, 451 N.E.2d 807, an employee must prove a causal link or 
nexus between evidence of a discriminatory statement or conduct and the 
prohibited act of discrimination to establish a violation.  The judgment of the 
court of appeals is reversed.  Based upon our finding of insufficient evidence to 
sustain the verdicts for plaintiffs-appellees, we need not reach the issue of the 
propriety of damages.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and COOK, J., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur in the judgment. 
 
RESNICK and PFEIFER, JJ., dissent separately. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurring.     I concur in the judgment.  In doing so, I 
continue to subscribe to our holding in Mauzy v. Kelly Services, Inc. 
(1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 578, 664 N.E.2d 1272.   
 
My concurrence herein is based specifically on the fact that the 
fourth prong of the test established in Barker v. Scovill, Inc. (1983), 6 
 
16
Ohio St.3d 146, 6 OBR 202, 451 N.E.2d 807, is absent in this case, to 
wit, that plaintiffs-appellees were not replaced by a person or persons not 
belonging to the protected class.  Plaintiffs-appellees were, in fact, not 
replaced at all. 
 
In concurring, I am not unmindful of the “direct evidence” standard 
as so well set forth in the dissent of Justice Resnick.  I believe the 
standard, where it can be shown to exist, still lives. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, J., concurs in the foregoing concurring opinion. 
 
Alice Robie Resnick, J., dissenting.  There is a majority in this case, but 
no majority opinion.  The majority consists of five justices who conclude that 
the decision of the court of appeals should be reversed.  The majority, however, 
is fractionalized and represented by two separate opinions, neither of which has 
garnered the four votes necessary to establish binding legal precedent as to what 
the proof requirements are or should be in an action for age discrimination 
brought under R.C. 4112.02 or 4112.14.  Under normal circumstances, I would 
be apt to conclude that the substance content of such nonmajority opinions is 
innocuous and regard any direct response thereto as ostentatious.  However, I 
deem it necessary in this case to fully and directly respond to the lead and 
concurring opinions, despite the fact that neither enjoys majority support.  This 
is because both opinions are ultimately of the same mind regarding the 
 
17
restrictions and limitations to be placed upon the use of circumstantial evidence 
in an age discrimination case in direct contravention of Mauzy v. Kelly Services, 
Inc. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 578, 664 N.E.2d 1272.  Thus, the lead and concurring 
opinions, albeit separate and without the force of law at present, lie in wait for 
the next opportunity to join forces and ambush the holding of Mauzy. 
 
The lead opinion derogates Mauzy by framing the ultimate issue of age 
discrimination in terms of a prima facie case and employing causative 
phraseology to mask what is essentially a direct evidence requirement.  When 
the lead opinion is stripped of its veneer of causative language, all that remains 
is the singular holding that the plaintiff must either satisfy the four-element 
indirect test for establishing a prima facie case set forth in Barker v. Scovill, Inc. 
(1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 146, 6 OBR 202, 451 N.E.2d 807, at the syllabus, or 
produce direct evidence of discrimination in the hornbook sense, i.e, evidence 
that directly proves discrimination without an inference.  In the final analysis, 
these three justices favor a formula under which direct and circumstantial 
evidence is dichotomized, and which would provide that the only way a plaintiff 
could prove age discrimination by circumstantial evidence is to satisfy each of 
the four discrete elements specified in the Barker prima facie test. 
 
The concurring opinion “is based specifically on the fact that the fourth 
prong of the test established in Barker *** is absent in this case, to wit, that 
plaintiffs-appellees were not replaced by a person or persons not belonging to 
the protected class.”  Thus, the lead and concurring opinions would both hold 
that Barker’s nonstatutory elements must be proved in order to make out a case 
for age discrimination, despite the existence of other evidence from which a jury 
 
18
may infer age discrimination.  Since this is precisely and unequivocally what 
was rejected in Mauzy, and for all the foregoing reasons, I find it imperative to 
write in defense of Mauzy. 
 
The present action was fully tried on the merits in the trial court.  To now 
frame the issue in terms of whether plaintiffs-appellees, Thomas J. Byrnes and 
Richard Otto, made out a prima facie case “unnecessarily evade[s] the ultimate 
question of discrimination vel non.”  United States Postal Serv. Bd. of 
Governors v. Aikens (1983), 460 U.S. 711, 714, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1481, 75 
L.Ed.2d 403, 409.  The prima facie case is but the first of three stages dealing 
with the process of allocating the burdens and order of presentation of proof in 
an age discrimination case.  Barker, supra; Kohmescher v. Kroger Co. (1991), 
61 Ohio St.3d 501, 575 N.E.2d 439; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973), 
411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668, 677-678.  Once the 
paradigm runs its course, each burden thereunder “merges with the ultimate 
burden of persuading the [jury] that [plaintiffs have been] the victim[s] of 
intentional discrimination.”  Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine 
(1981), 450 U.S. 248, 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1095, 67 L.Ed.2d 207, 217.  At this 
 
19
point, it is no longer relevant how or even whether plaintiffs succeeded initially 
in establishing a prima facie case.  Aikens, supra, 460 U.S. at 715, 103 S.Ct. at 
1481-1482, 75 L.Ed.2d at 410. 
 
The only relevant question at this point is whether the defendant 
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiffs.  Since the jury in the case sub 
judice has answered this question in the affirmative, the issue presented to this 
court is whether plaintiffs produced sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s 
finding.  This issue should be decided no differently from “disputed questions of 
fact in other civil litigation.”  Aikens, supra, 460 U.S. at 715-716, 103 S.Ct. at 
1482, 75 L.Ed.2d at 410.  “[T]rial courts or reviewing courts should [not] treat 
discrimination differently from other ultimate questions of fact.  Nor should they 
make their inquiry even more difficult by applying legal rules which were 
devised to govern ‘the basic allocation of burdens and order of presentation of 
proof,’ in deciding this ultimate question.”  (Citation omitted.)  Id., 460 U.S. at 
716, 103 S.Ct. at 1482, 75 L.Ed.2d at 411.  Thus, it is clearly erroneous to now 
 
20
“focus[] on the question of prima facie case rather than directly on the question 
of discrimination.”  Id., 460 U.S. at 717, 103 S.Ct. at 1483, 75 L.Ed.2d at 411. 
 
On the state of the record, the court should have proceeded directly to the 
disputed question of whether the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to 
support the jury’s finding that Byrnes and Otto were the victims of age 
discrimination, just as we do when deciding other ultimate questions of fact.  
There is no reason to allow this case to become mired in a discussion of the 
elements or alternative methods of proving a prima facie case. 
 
Also, in evaluating the sufficiency of plaintiffs’ evidence, it is essential to 
understand that in proving discrimination the plaintiff is not required to produce 
any certain kind of evidence and, in particular, may prove discrimination by 
circumstantial evidence.  The plaintiff “is not limited to presenting evidence of a 
certain type.”  Patterson v. McLean Credit Union (1989), 491 U.S. 164, 187, 
109 S.Ct. 2363, 2378, 105 L.Ed.2d 132, 157.  The high court has clearly and 
specifically explained: 
 
21
 
“As in any lawsuit, the plaintiff may prove his case by direct or 
circumstantial evidence.  The trier of fact should consider all the evidence, 
giving it whatever weight and credence it deserves.  Thus, we agree with the 
Court of Appeals that the District Court should not have required Aikens to 
submit direct evidence of discriminatory intent.  See Teamsters v. United States, 
431 U.S. 324, 358, n. 44 [97 S.Ct. 1843, 1866, 52 L.Ed.2d 396, 429] (1977) 
(‘[T]he McDonnell Douglas formula does not require direct proof of 
discrimination.’).”  Aikens, supra, 460 U.S. at 714, 103 S.Ct. at 1481, 75 
L.Ed.2d at 409, fn. 3. 
 
Thus, it would also be erroneous to require plaintiffs “to submit direct 
evidence of discriminatory intent” in order to prevail.  Id., 460 U.S. at 717, 103 
S.Ct. at 1483, 75 L.Ed.2d at 411. 
 
A proper analysis, therefore, should reflect that the various ageist remarks 
by Lawrence McLernon constitute circumstantial evidence (in that they require 
an inference from the statements proved to the conclusion intended) that a 
discriminatory motive played a part in the challenged employment decisions.  
 
22
This kind of evidence may support a finding of discrimination irrespective of the 
McDonnell Douglas formula for establishing a prima facie case.  Id., 460 U.S. at 
713-714, 103 S.Ct. at 1481, 75 L.Ed.2d 409, fn. 2 and 3.  The only question, if 
indeed there is one, is whether McLernon’s statements were vague, ambiguous 
or isolated.  See Cooley v. Carmike Cinemas, Inc. (C.A.6, 1994), 25 F.3d 1325, 
1331; Phelps v. Yale Security, Inc. (C.A.6, 1993), 986 F.2d 1020, 1025.  
Certainly, they were not isolated.  They were repeated, ongoing for at least five 
years, and made by a decisionmaker who, the evidence shows, played a part in 
both of the terminations at issue.  Nor is there anything vague or ambiguous 
about statements indicative of a desire “to bring in young, aggressive staff 
managers and change out the old folks,” or of a belief that “some of the older 
folks there could no longer contribute” to the company, or that a particular 
employee was “too old to grasp the concepts that he was looking for” or “too old 
and tired” for the business, or the statement that “I don’t want old marathoners in 
my sales organization.  I want young sprinters,” to mention a few. 
 
23
 
As the court of appeals aptly observed, these comments reflect “inaccurate 
notions that middle age equated with lack of energy, loss of memory and deficits 
in aggressiveness.”  Such statements, therefore, are indicative of the very type of 
age-stereotyping that the General Assembly under R.C. 4112.02 and 4112.14 
prohibited employers from acting upon.  They also reflect an intent to bring such 
inaccurate notions to bear on employment decisions.  McLernon’s comments are 
not expressions of political belief; they are an indication to the world of how he 
intends to act.  In particular, they express a desire to clear out the older 
employees.  The jury should be permitted to draw an inference from this 
evidence that McLernon’s ongoing and deep-rooted bias against older workers 
had influenced the decisional process at issue, especially since there was 
additional evidence that LCI had discriminated against other employees because 
of age.  See Cooley, supra, 25 F.3d at 1331-1332; Estes v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc. 
(C.A.8, 1988), 856 F.2d 1097, 1102-1103; Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp. 
(C.A.7, 1986), 797 F.2d 1417, 1423. 
 
24
 
Thus, if we treat the issue of discrimination no differently from ultimate 
questions of fact in other civil litigation, or for that matter in criminal litigation, 
see State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St. 3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, McLernon’s 
comments constitute circumstantial evidence of age discrimination sufficient to 
support the jury’s verdict in this case.  This conclusion is inescapable unless 
some way can be found to artificially limit the plaintiffs to presenting evidence 
of a certain type and, in particular, to require the plaintiffs to produce direct 
evidence of discrimination in order to prevail.  This is precisely what the lead 
opinion seeks to accomplish today; and, in so doing, it runs headlong into 
Mauzy. 
 
The lead begins by revisiting the requirements for and methods of 
establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination.  It observes, on the one 
hand, that “[d]iscriminatory intent may be established indirect by the four-part 
analysis set forth in Barker [supra], adopted from the standards established in 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. [supra].”  On the other hand, it continues, 
“[d]iscriminatory intent may also be established by direct evidence of age 
 
25
discrimination which is evidence other than the four-part demonstration of 
Barker.”  Having thus dichotomized two opposing methods of establishing a 
prima facie case, the lead opinion concludes that “the fourth prong of the Barker 
analysis was not met, as neither Byrnes nor Otto was replaced by a person 
outside the statutorily protected class.”  Thus, plaintiffs must rely “upon the 
direct evidence standard” for establishing a prima facie case. 
 
In defining the “direct evidence standard,” the lead opinion correctly cites 
Mauzy for the proposition that “[a] plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by 
presenting evidence, of any nature, to show that an employer more likely than 
not was motivated by discriminatory intent.”  However, it then goes on to 
establish a legal standard of causation which is applicable only “when relying 
upon the direct evidence standard.”  Under this standard, a finding of 
discrimination will be permitted only when the employer’s actions or 
discriminatory statements are aimed at the plaintiff and directed to the very 
decisional process at issue.  The lead opinion will not permit the jury to infer 
that an illegitimate criterion entered into the decisional process where the 
 
26
plaintiff produces evidence that the very decisionmaker who actively or tacitly 
participated in the personnel decision at issue made repeated statements 
reflective of discriminatory animus toward a protected group of which plaintiff 
is a member.  Nor would it allow the jury to draw such an inference from 
discriminatory comments made about the desirability or work abilities of 
minority “workers in general,” even when those comments are linked to the 
actual termination of other minority workers, or even when they reflect an intent 
to act in accordance therewith. 
 
Thus, the lead opinion seeks to establish a formula under which the 
plaintiff must either satisfy the discrete elements specified in Barker or proceed 
under the “direct evidence standard.”  It then uses causative language to define 
the “direct evidence standard” in such a way as to preclude it from being 
satisfied by circumstantial evidence.  Indeed, it would take a tremendous amount 
of naiveté to accept that the requirement that a statement must directly link a 
decisionmaker’s discriminatory animus to the plaintiff and the decision to 
terminate the plaintiff’s employment is not a requirement of “direct evidence” in 
 
27
the hornbook sense, that is, in contrast to circumstantial evidence.  Simply, 
under this formula, the plaintiff must produce hornbook direct evidence of 
discrimination (as opposed to circumstantial evidence) in order to avoid 
application of Barker’s four-element prima facie test.  As a result, under the 
formula invoked by the lead opinion, the Barker prima facie test is the only way 
that a plaintiff can prove a case of age discrimination by circumstantial evidence. 
 
This formula, however, is precisely the one rejected in Mauzy dressed up 
in causative attire.  In Mauzy, the court of appeals created the exact same 
formula that the lead opinion creates today.  As we explained, the court of 
appeals “agreed with Mauzy that ‘the four elements [to establish a prima facie 
case of age discrimination]  set forth in the syllabus of Kohmescher *** need not 
be proven where direct evidence of age discrimination is presented.’   The court 
found, however, that Mauzy failed to present such direct evidence of age 
discrimination.  In so finding, the court relied on the definition of ‘direct 
evidence’ as set forth in Black’s Law Dictionary (5 Ed.1979) 414:  ‘Evidence 
that directly proves a fact, without an inference or presumption, and which in 
 
28
itself, if true, conclusively establishes that fact.’  The court of appeals then 
reasoned that ‘[a]s a result, appellants were required to present a prima facie 
case of discrimination by proving the four elements set forth in the syllabus of 
Kohmescher.’”  Mauzy, supra, 75 Ohio St.3d at 581, 664 N.E.2d at 1275. 
 
In this way, the court of appeals in Mauzy interpreted the words “direct 
evidence” as used in Kohmescher in the same way that today’s lead opinion has 
interpreted the “direct evidence standard” which it ascribes to Mauzy, i.e., as 
“amount[ing] to a rendition of a dichotomy between ‘direct’ and ‘circumstantial’ 
evidence.”  Mauzy, 75 Ohio St.3d at 583, 664 N.E.2d at 1277.  Additionally, the 
employer in Mauzy argued, as the lead opinion would hold today, that “a 
plaintiff attempting to produce direct evidence to avoid application of the 
McDonnell Douglas test cannot rely upon the presentation of merely 
circumstantial evidence.”  Id., 75 Ohio St.3d at 584, 664 N.E.2d at 1278.  
Similarly, the dissenting judge in the court of appeals in the case sub 
judice(whose opinion was rendered prior to our decision in Mauzy) argued as 
did the employer in Mauzy: 
 
29
 
“While here, there were many instances of insensitive comments with 
respect to other personnel, there was no direct evidence that age discrimination 
took place, particularly as it related to appellees.  In each of the comments cited 
by the majority, we can only infer that age was the cause for termination.  Unlike 
Kohmescher, there is no direct evidence in the instances cited here and, 
certainly, no direct evidence with respect to appellees. 
 
“*** Clearly, the statements are not direct evidence of age discrimination, 
as it relates to appellees herein.  Appellees should not be able to get around the 
evidentiary requirements of Barker based on inferences created from statements 
and any attitudes associated with them.”  (Close, J., dissenting.) 
 
Our primary and precise focus in Mauzy was to reject these notions.  We 
very carefully and clearly explained that “McDonnell Douglas is one method, an 
indirect method involving the process of elimination, whereby the plaintiff may 
create an inference that an employment decision was more likely than not based 
on illegal discriminatory criteria.  The process of elimination, however, is not the 
only method by which such an inference may be created.”  Id., 75 Ohio St.3d at 
 
30
584, 664 N.E.2d at 1277.  Instead, “the four-element McDonnell Douglas prima 
facie test comes into play ‘“absent direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence 
of discrimination.”’”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id., 75 Ohio St.3d at 584, 664 N.E.2d at 
1278.  Thus, “[t]he caliber of evidence as ‘direct’ *** is [not] the sole alternative 
method [to the Barker/McDonnell Douglas test] by which to create an inference 
of discrimination.”  Id., 75 Ohio St.3d at 586, 664 N.E.2d at 1279. 
 
Accordingly, we held that “[t]he phrase ‘Absent direct evidence of age 
discrimination,’ as used in Kohmescher ***, refers to a method of proof, not a 
type of evidence.  It means that a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of 
age discrimination directly by presenting evidence, of any nature, to show that 
an employer more likely than not was motivated by discriminatory intent.”   
Mauzy, supra, at paragraph one of the syllabus. 
 
Mauzy made clear that there was no limitation placed upon the type of 
evidence that a plaintiff may produce instead of the Barker four-element prima 
facie test.  Only when the plaintiff lacks direct, circumstantial or statistical 
evidence of discrimination is he or she required to prove the discrete elements  
 
31
specified in Barker.  Simply stated, the Barker test is not the only way for a 
plaintiff to raise an inference that an employment decision was based on illegal 
discriminatory criteria.  The plaintiff is entitled to prove his or her case by 
circumstantial evidence of age discrimination outside the confines of Barker’s 
four-element prima facie test. 
 
Similarly, the concurring opinion “is based specifically on the fact that the 
fourth prong of the test established in Barker *** is absent in this case, to wit, 
that plaintiffs-appellees were not replaced by a person or persons not beloning to 
the protected class.”  However, even if at this late stage of the proceedings we 
allow the inquiry to become entangled in a discussion of the prima facie case, we 
cannot require Byrnes and Otto to prove that they were replaced by a person not 
belonging to the protected class without directly contravening Mauzy.  The 
replacement requirement is not a statutory requirement.  Neither R.C. 4112.02 
nor 4112.14 imposes any such requirement.  Instead, it is imposed as part of a 
judicially created formulation which “allow[s] the plaintiff to raise an inference 
of discriminatory intent indirectly [by] serv[ing] to eliminate [one of] the most 
 
32
common nondiscriminatory reasons for the employer’s action.”  Mauzy, supra, 
75 Ohio St.3d at 583, 664 N.E.2d at 1277.  The indelible core principle of 
Mauzy is that where the plaintiff creates an inference “directly by presenting 
evidence, of any nature, to show that an employer more likely than not was 
motivated by discriminatory intent,” the McDonnell Douglas/Barker prima facie 
test simply does not come into play.  This means that where the plaintiff presents 
circumstantial evidence of age discrimination other than the Barker formulation, 
as Byrnes and Otto did in this case, none of Barker’s nonstatutory elements 
apply, particularly the requirement that plaintiff prove that he or she was 
replaced by, or that his or her discharge permitted the retention of, a person not 
belonging to the protected class.  “‘As in any lawsuit, the plaintiff may prove his 
case by direct or circumstantial evidence.’”  Mauzy, supra, 75 Ohio St.3d at 584, 
664 N.E.2d at 1278, quoting Aikens, supra, 460 U.S. at 714, 103 S.Ct. at 1481, 
75 L.Ed 2d at 409, fn. 3. 
 
The approach advanced in the lead and concurring opinions, therefore, 
stands in diametric contradiction to our holding in Mauzy, as well as to the 
 
33
holdings of the United States Supreme Court, regarding the plaintiff’s ultimate 
evidentiary burden in cases of disparate treatment of individuals.  In addition, 
the lead opinion incorporates a number of erroneous assumptions about what 
kinds of discriminatory comments made by an employer will suffice to support a 
finding of discrimination. 
 
First, it assumes that discriminatory comments about “older workers in 
general” are insufficient to support an inference of age discrimination.  The lead 
opinion states that “this theory, called the ‘toothpaste tube’ theory by the court 
of appeals, has no basis in law.”  Instead, it reasons, “[a]ge-related comments 
referring directly to the worker may support an inference of age discrimination.” 
 
Leaving aside for the moment the lead opinion’s characterization of the 
court of appeals’ reference to oral hygiene,1 comments about “older workers in 
general” may indeed support an inference of age discrimination.  Comments 
about entire groups or classes in society, particularly when directed at the 
desirability of employing them and their ability to work, are the very stuff of 
individual disparate-treatment cases.  In fact, even courts which require direct 
 
34
evidence of discrimination to shift the burden of persuasion in a Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins (1989), 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268, 
“mixed motives” type of case do not preclude expressions of discriminatory 
animus from serving this function merely because they are general in nature.  
Thus, even “[d]irect evidence of discrimination usually entails a general 
comment about a minority group in society.  The courts infer from such a remark 
that the defendant had discriminatory animus toward the particular plaintiff in 
the particular job.”  Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological Univ. 
(D.C.Mich.1991), 767 F.Supp. 1403, 1413, reversed on other grounds (1992), 
975 F.2d 302.  See, also, Talley v. Bravo Pitino Restaurant, Ltd. (C.A.6, 1995), 
61 F.3d 1241, 1249; Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., (C.A. 8, 
1993), 996 F.2d 200, at 202-203; Linn v. Andover Newton Theological School, 
Inc. (C.A.1, 1989), 874 F.2d 1, 3-4; Sennello v. Res. Life Ins. Co. (C.A.11, 
1989), 872 F.2d 393, 394-395; Miles v. M.N.C. Corp. (C.A.11, 1985), 750 F.2d 
867, 874, 876.  Even a cursory review of these cases reveals a myriad of 
 
35
comments which clearly support an inference of discrimination, despite the fact 
that they do not refer directly to the plaintiff-worker. 
 
Second, the lead opinion concludes that comments which are “made in 
reference to totally unrelated employee categories cannot support a finding of 
age discrimination against employees in a wholly different classification.”  In 
this regard, it explains that “[t]he remarks did not relate to Byrnes and Otto or 
the decisions to terminate their employment.  They related to other persons and 
positions within the company, specifically an executive secretary and sales and 
marketing personnel.” 
 
The underlying assumption here is that discriminatory statements must 
directly relate to the challenged employment decision in order to support a 
finding of discrimination.  Thus, in the absence of a direct relationship between 
the employer’s ageist remarks and the decisional process at issue, an inference of 
discrimination is impermissible.  In Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, Inc. (C.A.8, 
1993), 997 F.2d 444, 449, the court explained: 
 
36
 
“We do not believe corporate planning documents that set forth a 
company’s overall direction and that demonstrate that a decisionmaker considers 
youth a positive factor (and, by inference, age a negative factor) can fairly be 
characterized as ‘stray remarks,’ even if the documents do not directly relate to 
the challenged employment decision.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
In Cooley, supra, 25 F.3d at 1331, the court, in considering two ageist 
comments made by the employer outside the employment context about older 
people in general, stated that “[a]lthough those two quoted comments were not 
made in the context of [plaintiff’s] termination, *** they do help to reveal [the 
decisionmaker’s] state of mind and reflect a deep-rooted, ongoing pattern that is 
anything but isolated.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Similarly, in Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc. (C.A.8, 
1994), 27 F.3d 1316, 1324, the court explained that: 
 
“‘Not all comments that reflect a discriminatory attitude will support an 
inference that an illegitimate criterion was a motivating factor in an employment 
decision.’  Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, Inc., 997 F.2d 444, 449 (8th Cir.1993).  
 
37
Hudson’s comment that ‘women were the worst thing’ that had happened to the 
company, however, warrants such an inference, even though it was not made 
during the decisional process.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Thus, an inference of discrimination with regard to a particular 
employment decision is permissible from general discriminatory comments, 
despite the fact that the comments “do not directly relate to the challenged 
employment decision,” “were not made in the context of [plaintiff’s] 
termination,” or were “not made during the decisional process” at issue.  
Accordingly, the fact that McLernon’s “remarks did not relate to Byrnes and 
Otto or the decisions to terminate their employment” does not preclude an 
inference of age discrimination. 
 
Moreover, McLernon’s comments, while perhaps made in reference to 
employees other than a vice president and a high level executive, nevertheless 
reflect, as the court of appeals stated, “inaccurate notions that middle age 
equated with lack of energy, loss of memory and deficits in aggressiveness.”  
Also, as previously noted, McLernon’s comments reflect an intent to act against 
 
38
older employees.   I cannot agree that McLernon’s statements can only be 
construed as though he intended them to mean that he would discriminate on the 
basis of age only as to particular classifications of employees.  It was perfectly 
reasonable for the jury to infer from these statements that McLernon’s 
discriminatory motives carried over to other employment decisions and to other 
categories and classes of employees.  Thus, the issue of whether McLernon’s 
discriminatory state of mind was compartmentalized according to employee 
classifications was one of fact, which the jury resolved. 
 
Additionally, I have some very serious reservations about endorsing any 
general rule that allows an employer to compartmentalize its discriminatory 
remarks when they prove to be disadvantageous to the employer’s subsequent 
litigation posture.  See Lockhart v. Westinghouse Credit Corp. (C.A.3, 1989), 
879 F.2d 43, 54.  There is no more reason to think that an employer’s 
discriminatory attitudes necessarily differ from one group of employees to 
another than “[t]here is *** reason to think those attitudes differ from hiring to 
promotion.”  Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm. v. Alton Packaging Corp. (C.A.11, 
 
39
1990), 901 F.2d 920, 924, fn. 6.  If we allow the employer to pigeonhole its 
discriminatory statements in this manner, we in effect remove the ultimate 
question of discrimination from the province of the jury and hand it over to one 
of the parties. 
 
In its third error concerning what kinds of discriminatory comments are 
sufficient, the lead opinion implicitly concludes that the temporal remoteness of 
discriminatory comments should, of itself, bar any inference that the bias 
expressed thereby entered into the decisional process.  It explains as follows: 
 
“The remarks [attributable to McLernon and other LCI executives] were 
distant in time *** to plaintiffs’ terminations.  Lopez testified as to comments 
made in 1989, more than one year before these plaintiffs were terminated.  
Frasher’s and Florek’s testimony related to comments even more remote, dating 
back to 1985, years before either Byrnes or Otto became employees of LCI.” 
 
Discrimination law is “[l]ike the common law of torts,” in part because 
legal liability is conditioned “on a determination that the consideration of an 
illegitimate factor caused a tangible employment injury of some kind.”  
 
40
(Emphasis sic.)  Price Waterhouse, supra, 490 U.S. at 264-265, 109 S.Ct. at 
1798, 104 L.Ed.2d at 297 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Under common-law tort 
principles, temporal remoteness is not a bar to a finding of causal connection.  
See Prosser & Keeton on Torts (5 Ed.1984) 283, Section 43; 2 Restatement of 
the Law 2d, Torts (1965) 434, Section 433, Comment f. 
 
This principle has special force when applied in the context of evaluating 
expressions of discriminatory animus in an action for disparate treatment of an 
individual.  This is because discriminatory animus does not necessarily dissipate 
after the lapse of some arbitrarily imposed period of time.  As explained in 
Wilson v. Aliceville (C.A.11, 1986), 779 F.2d 631, 635, quoting the trial court: 
 
“‘Presumably, people don’t pick up a racially prejudiced attitude 
overnight.  The jury is entitled to consider that later than 1982, he [the 
decisionmaker] was referring to the plaintiff as a “goddam nigger.”  He felt that 
way about him when he wouldn’t hire him.  It’s a jury question.  And it’s not too 
remote.  In fact, I think I would have to oblige myself to human nature to agree 
with you. 
 
41
 
“‘If the man is prejudiced in late 1982, it’s almost certain he was in early 
1982.  Now, if he was unprejudiced in late 1982, he might have learned 
something in the meantime.  But people don’t usually pick up racial prejudice 
overnight. 
 
“‘And if they have got it in late 1982, it is almost certain they had it in 
early 1982.  At least the jury can so consider, and they have the right to consider 
it in the light of human experience.  And that has been my human experience.’” 
 
Thus, as the court in Riordan v. Kempiners (C.A.7, 1987), 831 F.2d 690, 
698-699, pointedly explained: 
 
“Proximity in time to the alleged discrimination is a proper consideration 
in assessing probative value; but given the importance of circumstantial 
evidence in proving (and, equally, disproving) employment discrimination, a 
blanket exclusion of evidence of events that occurred before or after the 
discrimination is arbitrary.” 
 
In the case sub judice, Priscilla Frasher, Daniel Lopez and Ed Florek 
testified as to numerous discriminatory age-related statements made by  
 
42
McLernon.  Construing the evidence most strongly in favor of plaintiffs-
appellees, Posin v. A.B.C. Motor Court Hotel, Inc. (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 271, 
275, 74 O.O.2d 427, 430, 344 N.E.2d 334, 338, the substance of the various 
statements reveals two things about McLernon:  (1) he harbored a bias toward 
older workers, and (2) his intent was to clear out older employees.  The 
statements were made in 1984, 1985 and 1989.  Otto was terminated at the end 
of 1990 and Byrnes in early 1991. 
 
The lead opinion would have us believe that although McLernon had 
discriminatory animus toward the aged worker from 1984 through 1989, and at 
times acted upon such an attitude, it is impermissible to infer that such deep-
rooted, ongoing bias against older workers persisted into early 1991.  Yet there 
is nothing to suggest that McLernon “might have learned something in the 
meantime” that served to eviscerate his animus.  Instead, the lead opinion 
appears to view verbal expressions of prejudicial intent as though they are 
events which take place at particular moments in time.  Thus, the it is able to 
confine what is essentially McLernon’s long-lasting and ongoing basic mental 
 
43
attitude or governing spirit to particularly circumscribed periods of time 
corresponding to the dates of his statements.  However, I would have hoped that 
this court was a bit more sophisticated than to conclude, as a matter of law, that 
repeated expressions of discriminatory animus spanning a five-year period are 
but separate acts or occurrences each with a clearly delineated beginning and 
end. 
 
Moreover, the only case cited by the lead opinion in support of any of its 
critical conclusions is Phelps, supra, 986 F.2d at 1025.2  Subsequent to Phelps, 
however, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Cooley, supra.  The court 
set forth the following pertinent facts: 
 
“The jury believed Cooley’s contention that *** he was really fired as part 
of a corporate effort to clear out older employees.  In the course of proving his 
contention, Cooley testified that Patrick [the president of Carmike Cinemas by 
whom Cooley was employed] despised older people.  For example, he related 
that Reddish, who had previously held the higher corporate position of vice 
president and general manager in Columbus, Georgia, had once told him of a 
 
44
strange conversation with Patrick that had taken place on a Thanksgiving Day.  
As Cooley remembered it, Reddish said to him: 
 
“‘[On] Thanksgiving [Patrick] made the statement, “I got to go over to my 
mom’s and dad’s and have lunch today with them. *** I don’t want to go.”’ 
 
“[Reddish] said, ‘Well, Mike, why?  This is Thanksgiving.’ 
 
“And [Patrick’s] words were, “‘Well, my grandmother is over there, and I 
just don’t want to be -- I don’t like to be around old people.”’ 
 
“Cooley further testified that, back in 1968, when Patrick was eighteen-
years-old, he had come out of the movie theater after seeing ‘Wild in the Streets’ 
and said to Cooley, ‘Yeah, I believe that.  Everybody over 30 years old needs to 
be put in a pen.  Yeah, if they don’t want to be put in a pen, they should be 
confined to a concentration camp.’”  (Footnote omitted.)  Id., 25 F.3d at 1329. 
 
In reviewing the district court’s decision to admit these statements, the 
court examined its previous decisions, including Phelps, dealing with the 
propriety of statements allegedly showing employer bias, and explained: 
 
45
 
“*** Patrick is the ultimate decision maker at Carmike, and Cooley had 
the burden to prove by the preponderance of the evidence that Patrick’s resentful 
comments against the aged were not vague, ambiguous, or isolated.  Although 
those two quoted comments were not made in the context of Cooley’s 
termination, and they had been made a long time before he was dismissed, they 
do help to reveal Patrick’s state of mind and reflect a deep-rooted, ongoing 
pattern that is anything but isolated.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id., 25 F.3d at 1331. 
 
Thus, even the single federal circuit cited throughout the entire lead 
opinion allows a finding of discrimination to be based on temporally remote 
general comments made outside the context of plaintiff’s termination.  In other 
words, the lead opinion relies exclusively on a case from a jurisdiction that has 
permitted the very so-called toothpaste tube theory which the lead opinion 
rejects. 
 
In addition, the lead opinion seems singularly impressed with the trial 
court’s determination that “98 percent of the evidence in the record doesn’t have 
anything to do with age discrimination.”  I do not claim to have tested the 
 
46
mathematical accuracy of this determination, but I am not aware of any age or 
other invidious discrimination claim that has been decided on the basis of such a 
percentage.  Moreover, under the direct evidence standard proposed in the lead 
opinion the statement “I fired plaintiff on account of his age” would (and in fact 
is just about the only statement that could) suffice to prove age discrimination.  
This single statement, had it been uttered by McLernon, would constitute 
considerably less than the two percent of evidence that so troubles the lead 
opinion.  Regardless, whether the evidence of McLernon’s ongoing, deep-
rooted, repeated expressions of bias and intent to discriminate against the aged 
worker constitute two percent, ten percent, or some other percentage of the 
evidence in the record, it certainly amounts to substantially more and better-
quality evidence than is generally considered sufficient to permit an inference of 
discrimination. 
 
Thus, not only does the lead opinion’s direct evidence standard, couched 
as it is in causative language, directly contravene Mauzy and the United States 
 
47
Supreme Court holdings, but its foundational assumptions are fallacious and 
actually contravene its own authority. 
 
None of the foregoing, however, should be construed as an outright 
rejection of the application of principles of causation to an age discrimination 
case.  Properly construed and applied, a legal standard of causation can be 
helpful in determining whether age was a motivating factor in an employment 
decision.  The ultimate question in these cases is whether the plaintiff was 
“discharged on account of age.”  Kohmescher, supra, 61 Ohio St.3d at 505, 575 
N.E.2d at 442.  As we explained in Mauzy, supra, 75 Ohio St.3d at 587, 664 
N.E.2d at 1280, “[f]ormer R.C. 4101.17 [now renumbered R.C. 4112.14], like 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, Section 
2000e et seq., Title 42, U.S. Code, is not a thought control law.”  Neither is R.C. 
4112.02.  “Thus, while proof of discriminatory thought is necessary to the 
establishment of a discrimination claim, it is not sufficient.  There must be a 
consequential prohibited act.”  Id., 75 Ohio St.3d at 588, 664 N.E.2d at 1280. 
 
48
 
Accordingly, R.C. 4112.02 and 4112.14 are not designed in furtherance of 
a state policy to prohibit mere prejudice.  Prejudice is simply an irrational 
opinion or attitude of hostility directed against a group or class of people or their 
supposed characteristics.  See Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 
(1988) 928. Regardless of how distasteful or unsupported, prejudice is mere 
thought which, even if expressed, is not illegal.  What these statutes prohibit is 
discrimination, i.e., prejudice in action.  An employer is free to believe whatever 
he or she wishes about protected groups or classes in society, so long as those 
beliefs do not influence his or her employment decisions. 
 
Accordingly, no derogation of the statutes results from the imposition of a 
standard that requires a connection (or link or nexus) between the employer’s 
negative beliefs about a particular group or class in society and the challenged 
employment action.  In fact, when the plaintiff’s evidence consists primarily of 
the employer’s expressions of discriminatory animus, it is helpful to restate the 
ultimate issue in these terms.  In this way, we can ensure that liability is not 
premised solely upon the employer’s political or social beliefs about a protected 
 
49
class, but is instead properly based on whether those beliefs were actually 
brought to bear on employment decisions.  This serves to facilitate the process of 
determining whether liability was based on prejudice or discrimination. 
 
However, there is a critical distinction between stating, in causative terms, 
the requirement that plaintiff demonstrate that he or she was discharged on 
account of age and requiring that to do so the plaintiff must produce the type of 
evidence that directly proves discrimination without the aid of an inference.  
Indeed, it is mere trickery to require the plaintiff to produce direct evidence of 
discrimination in order to satisfy a causative standard which restates a standard 
under which direct evidence is not required.  Evidence of clear discriminatory 
statements made by a decisionmaker or company policymaker, like any other 
evidence, need not prove discrimination directly, without the aid of an inference, 
in order to support a finding of discrimination.  Thus, evidence that a 
decisionmaker made discriminatory comments may support a finding of 
discrimination, even though an inference is required to connect the employer’s 
state of mind expressed thereby to the challenged employment decision.  In 
 
50
short, a discriminatory statement may constitute circumstantial evidence that a 
discriminatory motive was a factor in the decisional process at issue.   
 
These principles were aptly stated as follows in  Stacks v. Southwestern 
Bell Yellow Pages, Inc. (C.A.8, 1993), 996 F.2d 200, 201, fn. 1: 
 
“We use this term [‘demonstrate’] advisedly, in order to avoid the 
‘thicket’ created by some courts’ use of the term ‘direct evidence’ to describe the 
plaintiff’s initial burden of proof in a Price Waterhouse case.  See, e.g., Tyler v. 
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1183-85 (2d Cir.1992) (describing use of 
the term ‘direct evidence’ as ‘unfortunate’).  We conclude that there is no 
restriction on the type of evidence a plaintiff may produce to demonstrate that an 
illegitimate criterion was a motivating factor in the challenged employment 
decision.  The plaintiff need only present evidence, be it direct or circumstantial, 
sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate 
criterion actually motivated the challenged decision. 
 
“We do not believe that our decision in Beshears v. Asbill, 930 F.2d 1348 
(8th Cir.1991), mandates a different result.  Although the Beshears court used 
 
51
the terms ‘direct evidence’ and ‘indirect evidence,’ it is clear that those terms 
were not used in their hornbook sense.  In evaluating the evidence, the court 
stated that ‘we conclude that Asbill did present evidence that may properly be 
characterized as “direct.”’  Id. at 1354.  This evidence consisted of a statement 
by a decisionmaker ‘to the effect that older employees have problems adapting 
to new employment policies.’  Id.  In hornbook terms, this statement constitutes 
circumstantial evidence (in that it requires an inference from the statement 
proved to the conclusion intended) that a discriminatory motive played a 
motivating factor in the challenged employment decision.  We believe that the 
term ‘direct evidence,’ as used in Beshears, means only that the plaintiff must 
present evidence showing a specific link between discriminatory animus and the 
challenged decision.”  (Emphasis sic.) 
 
The lead and concurring opinions are potentially a disdainful epitaph to 
Mauzy.  Our brothers and sisters below will no doubt shake their heads in 
consternation at the precarious force of our mandates.  In evaluating 
circumstantial evidence in an age discrimination case, trial courts are now 
 
52
invited to flip the Mauzy/Byrnes coin.  They will query:  Do we phrase the 
question in causative terms and require direct evidence, or is circumstantial 
evidence sufficient?  Is Barker’s four-element test for establishing a prima facie 
case a straight-jacket on the presentation of circumstantial evidence or one 
method of proof?  The court today does not do justice to the law or to those 
below seeking a definitive answer on how to proceed in these types of 
discrimination cases. 
 
The decision of the court of appeals should be affirmed. 
 
 
FOOTNOTES: 
 
1 The  reference to the court of appeals’ adoption of a “‘toothpaste tube’ 
theory” is misleading and derogatory.  By making what is essentially an analogy 
appear as a colloquial term for a rule of law, the lead opinion is able to slight the 
court of appeals for establishing a legal rule that purportedly has no basis in law.  
But, see, Cooley, supra.  The truth is that the court of appeals used the term 
 
53
simply to illustrate the facts of the case as described by the plaintiffs-appellees.  
The court explained: 
 
“On this appeal, Mr. Otto and Mr. Byrnes assert that they should be 
permitted to recover if they demonstrate the existence of a pattern of hiring and 
firing by LCI in which LCI hired older, experienced management employees; 
acquired the benefit of their knowledge and experience; and then discarded the 
employees once their knowledge and experience had been assimilated into the 
company.  The analogy used is to buying a full tube of toothpaste, squeezing the 
contents from the tube, then throwing the tube away once the tube has served its 
purpose.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
2 The lead opinion cites Phelps in support of the proposition that 
“comments which are isolated, ambiguous or abstract, or made in reference to 
totally unrelated employee categories cannot support a finding of age 
discrimination against employees in a wholly different classification.”  By way 
of clarification, Phelps, supra, 986 F.2d at 1025, does indeed explain that 
“isolated and ambiguous comments ‘“are too abstract, in addition to being 
 
54
irrelevant and prejudicial, to support a finding of age discrimination.”’”  Also, in 
deference to the lead opinion, I would note that, even though not referred to in 
the lead opinion, the court in Phelps concluded that “[b]ecause McCulloch made 
the statements nearly a year before the layoff, the comments were made too long 
before the layoff to have influenced the termination decision.”  Id., 986 F.2d at 
1026.  However, Phelps made no mention of any rule proscribing the use of 
evidence of a decisionmaker’s discriminatory motive regarding one employment 
decision or category of employees to show that decisionmaker’s motives 
regarding another employment decision or class of employees. 
 
Pfeifer, J., dissenting.  I believe that Justice Resnick’s dissenting opinion 
correctly articulates both what the law now is and what the requirements for 
proof should continue to be in age discrimination cases in Ohio.  While I am 
sympathetic with the result achieved by the majority, I would have taken 
different steps to correct what appears to be an excessive jury award.  This case 
was well and truly tried, the parties skillfully represented, and the operative law 
correctly stated to the jury by the trial judge.  We should wring the passion out 
 
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of the jury’s verdict by ordering remittitur on the general verdict and eliminating 
the punitive damages award.  Instead, the majority has massaged and convoluted 
the law, rendering proof of an age discrimination case unrealistically difficult for 
persons who most need the law’s protection. 
 
I am concerned that this area of the law is being further “developed” in a 
case where the plaintiffs are high-salaried, executive-level employees.  That 
world, artificial to most working men and women who truly need the protection 
of antidiscriminatory legislation, now yields a standard of proof which does not 
fit the real workplace world. Because we are uncomfortable seeing a jury award 
$7.1 million to two highly compensated executives who gladly, and knowingly, 
swam with sharks, we raise the bar on proof for others.  This case makes age 
discrimination harder to prove and thus impractical for lower level, lower paid, 
less educated employees, who do not have the resources to pursue an 
increasingly complicated and complex claim.  Older employees at the bottom of 
the economic ladder, unlawfully demoted or discharged because of their age, and 
 
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without a golden parachute to cushion their fall (or to finance their litigation), 
are the Ohioans the majority decision hurts most.