Title: Harris v. Wilson

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

693 So. 2d 945 (1997)
Lizzie HARRIS, et al., Petitioners,
v.
Dale WILSON, et al., etc., Respondents.
No. 86210.

Supreme Court of Florida.
March 20, 1997.
Rehearing Denied April 25, 1997.
Gloria A. Einstein of Jacksonville Area Legal Aid, Inc., Orange Park, for Petitioners.
Robert L. Nabors, Gregory T. Stewart and Virginia Saunders Delegal of Nabors, Giblin & Nickerson, P.A., Tallahassee; and Mark H. Scruby, Clay County Attorney, Green Cove Springs, for Respondents.
Larry E. Levy of the Levy Law Firm, Tallahassee, for Quinton Dryden, Amicus Curiae.
April Carrie Charney, Chair, Consumer Law Work Group, Sarasota, for Florida Legal Services, Inc., Amicus Curiae.
*946 Harry Morrison, Jr., General Counsel and Kraig A. Conn, Assistant General Counsel, Tallahassee, on behalf of the Florida League of Cities, Inc.; William J. Roberts, General Counsel, Tallahassee, on behalf of the Florida Association of Counties; and Herbert W.A. Thiele, President, Tallahassee, on behalf of the Florida Association of County Attorneys, Amici Curiae.
OVERTON, Justice.
We have for review Harris v. Wilson, 656 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), in which the district court affirmed the trial court's validation of a special assessment for solid waste disposal. We accepted jurisdiction because of direct conflict with the Second District Court of Appeal's opinion in Sarasota County v. Sarasota Church of Christ, Inc., 641 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), which was quashed by this Court in Sarasota County v. Sarasota Church of Christ, Inc., 667 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1995) (Sarasota County). Consistent with our opinion in Sarasota County, we approve the district court's decision in the instant case.
In this case, homeowners of Clay County challenged a special assessment imposed to finance the maintenance of solid waste facilities. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the County. On appeal, the district court set forth the pertinent facts as follows:
Harris, 656 So. 2d  at 513-14 (footnote omitted).
The district court held that this special assessment could be levied throughout an entire taxing unit, that a special assessment was an appropriate mechanism for funding solid waste services, and that sufficient uncontroverted evidence was presented in this case to reflect that the assessment was properly apportioned.
Although the district court's opinion in this case was rendered before our opinion in Sarasota County, we note that the district court resolved the issues in this case consistent with our opinion. In Sarasota County, we determined that (1) a special assessment can be levied throughout a community as a whole so long as the assessment provides a special benefit to the properties assessed and the assessment is properly apportioned; (2) an assessment can be for services even if levied against homestead property; (3) a previous method of funding for the services (such as the tax in Sarasota County or the tipping fees previously collected in this case) does not preclude the imposition of an assessment; and (4) questions of special benefit and fair apportionment are questions for the legislative body imposing the assessment and will not be overturned absent a finding of arbitrariness. Having previously resolved these issues in Sarasota County, in this case we need only address the narrow question of whether the County was arbitrary in its findings regarding the questions of special benefit and fair apportionment. We agree with the district court's conclusion that the County's findings were not arbitrary.[1]
We note that Clay County stated in the ordinances and resolution adopting the assessment that the properties subject to the assessment would be specially benefitted by the assessment. Specifically, the County found that the
Clay County, Fla., Final Assessment Resolution 93-23 (Dec. 8, 1992). Moreover, in the background information provided in the assessment itself, the County stated:
Clay County, Fla., Partial Year Solid Waste Disposal Assessment (1993). These benefits provided to the assessed properties by solid waste disposal and recycling services are similar to the benefits provided by the polluted *948 stormwater runoff treatment services that we recently found specially benefitted the properties being assessed in Sarasota County. In Sarasota County, the County was legislatively required to treat stormwater for the protection of the environment which, in turn, benefitted the properties being assessed; the amended statute requiring such treatment specifically provided that the collection of the cost of the treatment could be by assessment; and only developed properties were to be assessed because those were the properties that contributed to the stormwater problem. In finding that the provision of stormwater services at issue in that case conferred special benefits to the properties assessed, we compared the benefits provided by those services to the special benefits received from the collection and disposal of solid waste referred to in Charlotte County v. Fiske, 350 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (special assessment approved for solid waste services implemented due to inundation of public dumping). Likewise, in the instant case, the County is legislatively required to properly dispose of solid waste;[2] the legislature has provided that the collection for the cost of the disposal can be by assessment;[3] the properties are benefitted by the services provided for disposal of solid waste; and only developed residential properties in the unincorporated areas of the county are to be assessed because those are the properties that contribute to the solid waste disposal problem for which the county is unable otherwise to adequately obtain payment to cover the cost of disposal. In view of these findings, we agree with the trial and district courts' determinations that Clay County did not act arbitrarily in finding that the properties in question were specially benefitted by the provision of disposal services. See Sarasota County; South Trail Fire Control Dist. v. State, 273 So. 2d 380 (Fla.1973) (question of what constitutes special benefit is a matter of judgment that courts should not overturn in the absence of a clear and full showing of arbitrary action or plain abuse).
In regard to the apportionment issue, the County made the following findings:
Clay County, Fla., Ordinance 92-26 (Nov. 10, 1992). Additionally, the affidavits submitted by the County reflected:
In adopting the assessment, the County also provided for an annual vacancy credit, which affords any owner of residential property who can demonstrate that a dwelling unit thereon was unoccupied and vacant during the entire assessment period the right to receive reimbursement for any assessment paid for the vacant property.
In sum, the County determined that the assessment would not be levied against residential property owners within the City or against commercial property owners because other efficient means of ensuring payment for the disposal of those property owners' solid waste existed. However, the assessment against residential property owners in the unincorporated areas of the County was necessary to ensure that "all county residents pay their share for services the County must provide" due to the illegal dumping engaged in by some residents. See Clay County, Fla., Partial Year Solid Waste Disposal Assessment (1993). Because the amount of the assessment reflects the actual cost of providing disposal services and facilities to the properties subject to the assessment, the cost is equally distributed among the assessed properties and bears a rational relationship to the benefits received by the properties assessed, and the determination as to which residents are to be assessed is reasonable, we agree with the trial and district courts' conclusion that the method of apportionment of the assessment is not arbitrary.
Accordingly, for the reasons expressed, we find that the County's findings regarding the questions of special benefit and method of apportionment were not arbitrary, and we approve the district court's decision affirming the validation of the special assessment in this case.
It is so ordered.
KOGAN, C.J., and SHAW, GRIMES and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which HARDING, J., concurs.
WELLS, Justice, dissenting.
I dissent. The majority opinion completely obliterates the distinction between ad valorem taxes and special assessments. The majority has effectively erased from "special assessment" the word "special." When there is nothing special about an "assessment," logic and common sense dictate that the assessment is a tax. See Fisher v. Board of County Comm'rs, 84 So. 2d 572 (Fla.1956).
The majority has eradicated "special" in that the majority's focus in justifying what the county imposed is not upon whether the assessed property receives any benefit that is special or peculiar in the enhancement of that property's value. Such an analysis has been a historical feature of Florida's special assessments. City of Boca Raton v. State, 595 So. 2d 25 (Fla.1992); Klemm v. Davenport, 100 Fla. 627, 129 So. 904 (1930). Rather, the majority's focus is upon the fact that this was the efficient means of ensuring that the owners of residential property in unincorporated areas of the county paid a part of the costs of the dump. The majority notes that "other efficient means of ensuring payment for the disposal" of solid waste existed for the owners of commercial property or those whose property was within a municipality. The majority also finds the assessment appropriate for residential properties in unincorporated areas because those are the properties "for which the county is unable otherwise to adequately obtain payment to cover the cost of disposal." This justification describes an administrative solution for the government, not a special benefit for the property in question. In sum, the majority approves what the county has enacted because it is an efficient collection device, not *950 because it meets the previously recognized criteria for a special assessment.
I believe the Fifth District made a cogent analysis of this issue in Water Oak Management Corp. v. Lake County, 673 So. 2d 135 (5th DCA), review granted, 683 So. 2d 483 (Fla.1996):
673 So. 2d  at 138 (footnote omitted).
My overarching concern is that the majority's decision fosters government that is not straightforward or honest about revenue raising. The citizens of this state have voted for millage caps on ad valorem taxes[4] and for homestead exemption from levy of ad valorem taxes.[5] However, the majority's decision now allows governments to give these voter mandates a wink and a nod and then circumvents them by semantics in labeling as a special assessment what actually is a tax. Voters are the victims of such deception, and I believe this Court should protect them from it.
HARDING, J., concurs.
[1]  We decline to discuss the issue of whether the trial court properly excluded the homeowner's documents, finding that this issue was properly disposed of by the district court.
[2]  Pursuant to section 403.706(1), Florida Statutes (1995), the County has the primary responsibility and authority to provide for the operation of solid waste disposal facilities to meet the needs of all incorporated and unincorporated areas within the County.
[3]  Section 125.01(1)(q), Florida Statutes (1995), provides that garbage disposal facilities may be funded through the imposition of special assessments.
[4]  Article VII, section 9(b), Florida Constitution, provides:

Ad valorem taxes ... shall not be levied in excess of the following millages upon the assessed value of real estate and tangible personal property: for all county purposes, ten mills; for all municipal purposes, ten mills; for all school purposes, ten mills; for water management purposes for the northwest portion of the state lying west of the line between ranges two and three east, 0.05 mill; for water management purposes for the remaining portions of the state, 1.0 mill; and for all other special districts a millage authorized by law approved by vote of the electors who are owners of freeholds therein not wholly exempt from taxation. A county furnishing municipal services may, to the extent authorized by law, levy additional taxes within the limits fixed for municipal purposes.
[5]  Article VII, section 6(a), Florida Constitution, provides in pertinent part:

Every person who has the legal or equitable title to real estate and maintains thereon the permanent residence of the owner, or another legally or naturally dependent upon the owner, shall be exempt from taxation thereon, except assessments for special benefits, up to the assessed valuation of five thousand dollars, upon establishment of right thereto in the manner prescribed by law.