Title: In the Matter of Michael Christian Steele

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 19S-DI-427 
In the Matter of 
Michael C. Steele, 
 Respondent. 
Decided: August 6, 2021 
Attorney Discipline Action 
Hearing Officer Lloyd H. Milliken, Jr. 
Per Curiam Opinion 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices David, Massa, Slaughter, and Goff concur. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Aug 06 2021, 11:17 am
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-DI-427 | August 6, 2021 
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Per curiam. 
We find that Respondent, Michael C. Steele, committed attorney 
misconduct by making an improper demand that disciplinary grievances 
filed against him be withdrawn as a condition for settlement in a civil 
matter. For this misconduct, we conclude that Respondent should be 
suspended for 30 days with automatic reinstatement. 
The matter is now before us on the report of the hearing officer 
appointed by this Court to hear evidence on the Indiana Supreme Court 
Disciplinary Commission’s verified disciplinary complaint. Respondent’s 
2005 admission to this state’s bar subjects him to this Court’s disciplinary 
jurisdiction. See IND. CONST. art. 7, § 4. 
Procedural Background and Facts 
The genesis of this case was Respondent’s breakup with his girlfriend 
in July 2018. In the immediate aftermath of that breakup, criminal and 
protective order proceedings were brought against Respondent in 
Hamilton County, and Respondent filed suit against his now ex-girlfriend 
alleging defamation and other counts. A few months later, Respondent’s 
ex-girlfriend and her sister filed disciplinary grievances against 
Respondent with the Commission. 
In December 2018, Respondent sent an email to opposing counsel in the 
defamation case. Respondent’s email demanded, among other things, that 
the disciplinary grievances filed against him be withdrawn as a condition 
precedent to settlement discussions.  
The criminal and protective order proceedings against Respondent in 
Hamilton County eventually were dismissed. The Commission also 
eventually dismissed the grievances filed by the two sisters against 
Respondent. During its investigation, though, the Commission learned of 
the email Respondent had sent to opposing counsel in the defamation 
case, and in July 2019 the Commission filed a disciplinary complaint 
alleging that Respondent’s demand in that email violated Professional 
Conduct Rule 8.4(d).    
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After many twists and turns, this matter proceeded to final hearing in 
December 2020, and the hearing officer issued his report in February 2021. 
Respondent has petitioned for review of that report, the Commission has 
filed a brief on sanction, and responsive briefs have been filed.1 The matter 
is now ripe for our consideration. 
Discussion and Discipline 
Respondent does not dispute having sent the email in question to 
opposing counsel in the defamation case, nor does he dispute the contents 
of that email. And due to several procedural irregularities in this case we 
need not elaborate upon, we are constrained to accept as true for purposes 
of this proceeding that the grievances Respondent sought to have 
withdrawn were meritless (that is to say, they did not involve any 
underlying attorney misconduct committed by Respondent). 
That leaves us with the essential legal question framed by the parties 
and in the hearing officer’s report—can an attorney’s demand that 
disciplinary grievances filed by an opposing party in a civil matter be 
withdrawn as a condition of settlement be “prejudicial to the 
administration of justice” within the meaning of Rule 8.4(d) when those 
grievances were meritless? 
Our disciplinary precedent firmly establishes that a coercive threat to 
file a grievance with the Commission, or (as here) a quid pro quo demand 
that a grievance be withdrawn, violates Rule 8.4(d).2 See, e.g., Matter of 
 
1 After the briefing contemplated by Admission and Discipline Rule 23(15) had concluded, 
Respondent filed two additional motions—a motion to compel production of evidence and a 
request for investigation into the conduct of Disciplinary Commission staff. We hereby deny 
both motions. 
2 Our precedent is consistent with other jurisdictions’ interpretation and application of 
professional conduct rules analogous to our Rule 8.4(d). See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Chambers, 125 Ohio St.3d 414, 417, 928 N.E.2d 1061, 1064-65 (2010); Matter of Tartaglia, 20 
A.D.3d 81, 84, 798 N.Y.S.2d 458, 460-61 (2005); Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Artimez, 208 W.Va. 
288, 295-97, 540 S.E.2d 156, 164-65 (2000); Florida Bar v. Frederick, 756 So.2d 79, 86-87 (Fla. 2000); 
In re Conduct of Boothe, 303 Or. 643, 653-55, 740 P.2d 785, 790-91 (1987). 
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Ramirez, 853 N.E.2d 121, 121 (Ind. 2006) (holding that even suggesting that 
a client withdraw a grievance violates Rule 8.4(d)). Such a demand has the 
potential to prejudice the disciplinary investigation, notwithstanding the 
fact that a grievance cannot be withdrawn once it has been filed, because it 
can frustrate the Commission’s ability to secure the grievant’s cooperation 
and obtain evidence. Cf. Matter of Moore, 665 N.E.2d 40, 42-43 (Ind. 1996) 
(explaining that unreasonable disruptions to the “resolution of a case by 
an orderly procedure”—even absent prejudice to parties—violates Rule 
8.4(d)).  
For example, in Ramirez, the respondent attorney sent his dissatisfied 
clients (a husband and wife) a letter forgiving their outstanding legal bill 
and agreeing to withdraw from representing them. 853 N.E.2d at 121. The 
attorney then asked his clients “in return” to discuss with one another 
“the possibility” of withdrawing a disciplinary grievance they had filed 
against him. Id. at 121, 122. The clients did not attempt to withdraw the 
grievance. Id. at 121. A majority of this Court accepted the parties’ 
conditional agreement for discipline, explaining that while the attorney’s 
conduct was not egregious, “we wish to make clear that even such 
relatively mild action designed to stop a disciplinary proceeding is 
prohibited by Rule 8.4(d).” Id. Dissenting, Justice Dickson would have 
rejected the conditional agreement, opining that Respondent had made a 
request and not a demand, the request was not a precondition, the 
grievance could not have been withdrawn, and Respondent had 
unconditionally made his clients whole. Id. at 122. In Justice Dickson’s 
view, the attorney’s actions in response to his clients’ dissatisfaction with 
his representation were “very commendable and should not be 
discouraged,” and his request was not prejudicial to the administration of 
justice. Id.  
As in Ramirez, here Respondent’s demand was not actually prejudicial 
to the outcome of the underlying litigation; his ex-girlfriend did not act 
upon the demand, and she ultimately obtained a dismissal of some counts 
and summary judgment on the remaining counts. Respondent’s demand 
also did not change the trajectory of the Commission’s investigation 
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insofar as the initial grievances were concerned;3 those grievances were 
not withdrawn by the grievants (nor could they have been), and hindsight 
informs us those grievances’ lack of merit destined them for eventual 
dismissal by the Commission.4 
But prejudice under Rule 8.4(d) is measured in relation to the 
“administration of justice” and not any particular outcome for the parties. 
There can be little question that disciplinary investigations are 
encompassed within the administration of justice, both in terms of 
protecting the public from attorneys who commit misconduct and 
protecting attorneys from unwarranted claims of misconduct made 
against them. See Admis. Disc. R. 23(1)(c). Accepting as true that the 
grievances against Respondent were meritless simply begs the question 
the Commission was charged with answering. See Admis. Disc. Rs. 23(10), 
(11). At the time Respondent made his demand, the Commission had 
objectively good cause for its investigation, as Respondent was facing 
criminal charges and was the subject of a temporary protective order in 
connection with his alleged conduct toward his ex-girlfriend. That much 
of this eventually was resolved in Respondent’s favor does nothing to 
alter the need for the Commission to investigate the allegations made in 
the grievances, and for that process to occur free from any attempts to 
undermine it. 
Respondent’s frustration at having to deal with meritless disciplinary 
grievances certainly is understandable. He is not alone in that regard. The 
vast majority of grievances filed against attorneys are dismissed by the 
Commission for want of reasonable cause to believe misconduct has 
occurred. See id.; see also Indiana Supreme Court Annual Report 2018-2019 at 
47 (showing 1,414 grievances were filed in the fiscal year, and during the 
 
3 Of course, Respondent’s demand prompted a new line of investigation that gave rise to the 
instant proceedings. 
4 The Commission claimed in a pretrial pleading that the grievances were not “dismissed,” 
but rather, “the internal case management system number the Commission assigned to the 
grievances was ‘closed[.]’” (Comm’n Mot. to Correct “Entry Regarding Final Hearing” at 4). 
The Commission wisely has not reprised this semantic distinction in its briefs to this Court. 
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same period 1,149 grievances were dismissed either summarily or 
following investigation). For this reason, the investigatory process is 
largely confidential. See Admis. Disc. R. 23(22)(a). It also is understandable 
under the circumstances that Respondent might wish to have other 
pending matters against him be resolved before entering into any 
settlement in his defamation case. But there is a right way and a wrong 
way to go about addressing these matters, and our precedents make clear 
that any attempt—however mild or unsuccessful—to interfere with the 
investigatory process required by Rule 23 or use the disciplinary process 
to leverage more favorable settlement terms is forbidden.5   
For these reasons, we find and conclude that Respondent violated Rule 
8.4(d) as charged.6 We turn now to the question of sanction. 
The Commission properly acknowledges that under the particular 
circumstances of this case “[t]he nature of [R]espondent’s misconduct was 
not serious” and “[t]he potential for harm . . . was minimal.” (Br. on 
Sanction at 2, 4). Similar violations of Rule 8.4(d) have resulted in public 
reprimands. Matter of Love, 19 N.E.3d 251, 252 (Ind. 2014); Matter of Dimick, 
969 N.E.2d 17, 18 (Ind. 2012); Ramirez, 853 N.E.2d at 121; Matter of 
Blackwelder, 615 N.E.2d 106, 108 (Ind. 1993). One can also imagine, 
provided certain conditions were met, that the Commission in such a case 
might even exercise its discretion to forgo prosecution of a disciplinary 
 
5 Nothing in our opinion today should be construed as prohibiting notice to the Commission 
that an underlying dispute has been resolved. Mere notice of settlement, as opposed to a 
demand or request that a grievance be withdrawn, does not risk compromising a disciplinary 
investigation and does not create any expectancy of doing so.  
6 Apart from the meritlessness of the grievances, Respondent additionally argues that his 
conduct was not prejudicial to the administration of justice because the grievants were not 
former clients but an opposing party and her sister. However, we share the view of the Ohio 
Supreme Court that this is a distinction without a difference for purposes of a Rule 8.4(d) 
analysis. Chambers, 125 Ohio St.3d at 417; Disciplinary Counsel v. Bruce, 158 Ohio St.3d 382, 385, 
143 N.E.3d 501, 504 (2020). Respondent similarly contends that there was insufficient nexus 
between the grievances he demanded be withdrawn as a condition of settlement and his 
professional obligations as an attorney, but he is mistaken. See Matter of Usher, 987 N.E.2d 
1080, 1087 (Ind. 2013) (“[T]he Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct apply to an attorney who 
is a party to litigation”); see also Matter of Keaton, 29 N.E.3d 103 (Ind. 2015) (disciplining an 
attorney for a pattern of stalking and harassment committed against an ex-girlfriend). 
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complaint. See, e.g., Admis. Disc. Rs. 23(10)(a)(2) (permitting the 
Commission’s Executive Director to issue a caution letter to an attorney 
and, if the attorney complies with the terms of the letter, take no further 
action on the grievance); 23(12.1)(a) (allowing the Commission and the 
respondent attorney to resolve a disciplinary matter by private 
administrative admonition if, among other things, the misconduct is not 
likely to result in “material prejudice” and “would not likely result in 
discipline greater than a public reprimand if successfully prosecuted”). 
Were this the end of the story, we likely would issue a public 
reprimand here as well. Respondent has no prior discipline, his improper 
demand to opposing counsel was a minor violation, and no other acts of 
misconduct have been charged in this matter.7 But in assigning a sanction, 
we consider aggravating and mitigating factors as well. See, e.g., Matter of 
Bernacchi, 83 N.E.3d 700, 703 (Ind. 2017). Here, we simply cannot turn a 
blind eye to Respondent’s abusive conduct during these proceedings 
against the Commission’s staff, the hearing officer, the judge in his 
defamation case, and even members of this Court. Accord id. at 703-04 
(considering the respondent’s conduct during the disciplinary 
proceedings when deciding on sanction). While we will not repeat here 
the full range of epithets and ad hominem attacks Respondent has directed 
toward others, he repeatedly attacked the Commission for incompetence 
and corruption, including calling the Commission’s Executive Director a 
“buffoon” and “playground weakling” and the Commission’s staff 
attorney an “errand boy.” (Comm’n Exs. 9, 10, 11, 13, 20, 27, 33, 35, 36, 41). 
Respondent has also accused the judge in his defamation case of having 
“betrayed and shamed his oath and his office,” he has accused the hearing 
officer of being a “puppet,” and he has repeatedly accused members of 
this Court of having improperly attempted to influence the hearing officer 
in this matter. (Comm’n Exs. 30, 33, 36, 38, 41; Pet. for Rev. at 10, 17).  
Let us be clear: attorneys have every right to defend themselves in 
disciplinary investigations and proceedings using every bit of persuasive 
 
7 Respondent does have an unrelated disciplinary case pending against him, but we give that 
no consideration here. 
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power that facts, law, reason, and rhetoric can offer. But they do not have 
a right to merely hurl senseless invective and baseless allegations toward 
opposing counsel, judicial officers, and everyone else with a connection to 
the matter. Such vituperative and unfounded conduct unnecessarily 
undermines the legitimacy of proceedings and “has no place within the 
contemporary practice of law.” Matter of Crumpacker, 269 Ind. 630, 663, 383 
N.E.2d 36, 52 (1978). It also is not effective advocacy, whether on behalf of 
a client or oneself. Respondent has advanced colorable arguments on 
occasion during these proceedings, but it has not helped his cause that we 
have had to wade through reams of vitriol to find them.   
In sum, Respondent’s violation, coupled with his conduct during these 
proceedings, persuades us that a short suspension is warranted in this 
case. Although we do not adopt the Commission’s request that 
Respondent be required to undergo the reinstatement process at the 
conclusion of his suspension, the Commission’s observations about 
Respondent’s intemperate behavior are well-taken, and we strongly 
caution Respondent to conduct himself more appropriately going 
forward. A failure to do so likely will cause any future findings of 
misconduct to be met with stiffer sanction. See Matter of Wray, 91 N.E.3d 
578, 584-85 (Ind. 2018); Matter of Powell, 76 N.E.3d 130, 135 (Ind. 2017).   
Conclusion 
The Court concludes that Respondent violated Professional Conduct 
Rule 8.4(d) as charged. For Respondent’s professional misconduct, the 
Court suspends Respondent from the practice of law in this state for a 
period of 30 days, beginning September 17, 2021. Respondent shall not 
undertake any new legal matters between service of this opinion and the 
effective date of the suspension, and Respondent shall fulfill all the duties 
of a suspended attorney under Admission and Discipline Rule 23(26). At 
the conclusion of the period of suspension, provided there are no other 
suspensions then in effect, Respondent shall be automatically reinstated to 
the practice of law, subject to the conditions of Admission and Discipline 
Rule 23(18)(a). The costs of this proceeding are assessed against 
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Respondent, and the hearing officer appointed in this case is discharged 
with the Court’s appreciation. 
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur. 
R E S P ON D E NT  P R O  S E  
Michael C. Steele 
South Lake Tahoe, California 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  I ND I A NA SU P RE ME CO U R T  
D I SC I PL I NA R Y C OMM ISS I O N  
Hon. Robert B. Mrzlack, Interim Executive Director 
David E. Griffith, Staff Attorney 
Indianapolis, Indiana