Title: People v. Zaragoza

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 7/11/16 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S097886 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
   
LOUIS RANGEL ZARAGOZA, 
) 
 
) 
San Joaquin County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. SP076824A 
 
____________________________________) 
 
In February 2001, a San Joaquin County jury found defendant Louis Rangel 
Zaragoza guilty of the 1999 first degree murder of David Gaines and the robbery 
of William Gaines.  (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189.)1  The jury found true the robbery-
murder and lying-in-wait special circumstances — making defendant eligible for 
the death penalty (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15), (17)(A)) — and also concluded that 
defendant personally used a handgun and caused a death in the commission of the 
murder and robbery.  (Former §§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (d).)  
Following the penalty phase trial, the jury returned a verdict of death.  This appeal 
is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)  We reverse the death judgment because of error 
in the death-qualification of the jury, but otherwise affirm.   
                                              
1 
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
2 
I.  FACTS 
The judgment of death under review rests on the jury‘s finding that 
defendant murdered David Gaines in the commission of a robbery and while lying 
in wait.  The prosecution‘s theory was that defendant and his brother, David 
Zaragoza, together committed the robbery murder and that defendant was the 
shooter.  The brothers were originally charged in a single information.  After 
David Zaragoza was found incompetent to stand trial, defendant was tried alone. 
A.  Guilt Phase 
1.  The Prosecution’s Case 
The murder victim was 36-year-old David Gaines.  He worked with his 
father, William Gaines, 87, at Gaines Liquors in Stockton.  On Friday, June 11, 
1999, David Gaines arrived for work in the afternoon, as usual.  William Gaines 
returned to the store around 7:00 p.m., bringing food his wife Mary had prepared.  
Mary usually packed a meal and salad for her son on Friday nights because there 
was no time for him to go out for a sandwich.  The salad was in a fluted Pyrex 
glass bowl with a blue lid.  
After closing the store at 11:00 p.m., David and William Gaines drove in 
separate cars back to their home, located at 1122 Cameron Way, in an 
unincorporated area of Stockton.  David Gaines parked his car in the garage; 
William parked his in front of the house.  When William Gaines got out of the car, 
he was holding a brown paper bag in one hand and his keys in the other.  On rare 
occasions, William Gaines would bring home the day‘s receipts, but the paper bag 
on this day contained only the Pyrex bowl.  As soon as William Gaines shut the 
car door, a man punched him in the chin and shoulder.  With his other hand, the 
man grabbed the bag containing the Pyrex bowl.  William Gaines briefly fell to 
one knee.  When he got back up, he called out ―David‖ to his son.  The assailant, 
3 
later identified by William Gaines as David Zaragoza, took off running in an 
eastbound direction.  
David Gaines rushed outside with a canister of Mace and said, ―Hey.‖   
David Zaragoza was already 10 to 30 feet down the street, with his back to 
William Gaines.  Suddenly, William Gaines heard gunshots, so he ducked behind 
his vehicle.  He did not see any muzzle flash coming from the fleeing David 
Zaragoza before he lost sight of his assailant.  Seconds later, when the gunfire had 
ceased, William found his son on the driveway in a pool of blood.  David 
Zaragoza and another man were running down the street.  The men were 50 to 100 
feet away, one trailing about 10 feet behind the other.  William Gaines entered the 
house to tell his wife what had happened and to call 911.  The 911 call came in at 
11:16 p.m.     
Carol Maurer, who lived across the street and a little to the east of the 
Gaines residence, testified that she looked outside her bedroom, the room closest 
to the Gaines residence, after hearing gunfire.  She saw two young men, medium 
build and ―not too tall,‖ heading east.  The men were running fast and only a few 
feet apart.  The one in back was wearing white.  Maurer had told neighbor David 
French at the scene that she saw two young people running down the street after 
the shots were fired, and French in turn relayed that information to 911.  Cindy 
Grafius, who lived east of the Gaines family home on Cameron Way, heard four 
loud ―pops‖ and then saw a person run by her driveway.  She did not recall seeing 
anything in this person‘s hands.  By the time she walked outside her home, she 
looked west and then east but did not see anyone.  
David Gaines was not breathing and had no pulse when the paramedics 
arrived.  He suffered four gunshot wounds:  one each to his head and wrist, and 
two to his chest.  The presence of soot indicated that these must have been contact 
wounds, except for the wound to the head, where the muzzle would have been no 
4 
more than 18 inches away.  The three bullets that could be recovered were so 
damaged as to preclude the conclusion that they were fired by any particular gun, 
but the criminalist was able to determine that they all could have been fired by the 
same gun.  
The prosecution theorized that the first shot, a defensive wound, hit David 
Gaines‘s wrist and caused his watch to shatter and spread pieces over a large area.  
The remaining shots, which were fatal, spun David Gaines around.  Based on the 
trajectory of the bullets, the northwesterly direction of the blood spatter, and the 
recovery of a spent bullet in the next-door neighbor‘s yard to the east, the 
prosecution argued that David Gaines must have been facing south, away from the 
fleeing David Zaragoza but toward his killer, at the time he was shot.  According 
to the prosecution, this was the only explanation for the downward trajectory of 
the bullets that entered David Gaines, who was taller than defendant or his brother 
and was on a driveway that sloped up from the street toward the house.   
Later that night, William Gaines scooped up some papers from the ground 
near his car door.  He assumed they must have fallen out of his shirt pocket when 
he was accosted.  The next morning, after looking at the papers, he realized they 
were not his and called the San Joaquin County Sheriff‘s Department.  The papers 
included a number of items that bore David Zaragoza‘s name or fingerprints, 
including a Medi-Cal identification card, a transit card, and a San Joaquin County 
Medical Facility interoffice memo.   
Meanwhile, at the crime scene, the sheriff‘s department had already 
recovered a torn book-and-release form and another piece of paper with the words 
―Mr. Zar‖ on it.  Further research revealed that the form belonged to David 
Zaragoza.  The next morning, June 12, 1999, Detective Jerry Alejandre went to the 
board and care home where David Zaragoza resided; David was not home.  
Alejandre interviewed the caretakers and was shown photographs of David 
5 
Zaragoza and his family, including a single photo of defendant.  When Detective 
Alejandre returned to the board and care home in the afternoon, the photo of 
defendant was missing from the display.   
In his statement to police on June 12, 1999, David Zaragoza denied being 
with defendant on the previous evening.  A clinical psychologist who examined 
David in January 2000 diagnosed him as suffering from chronic paranoid 
schizophrenia, polysubstance abuse (in remission because of his incarceration), 
and severe personality disorder with paranoid, antisocial, and schizotypal features.  
David had borderline intellectual functioning, a verbal IQ of 61, a second grade 
reading level, and a global assessment of functioning score indicating severe 
impairment and psychosis.         
On June 13, 1999, Detective Bruce Wuest went to 429 South Airport Way, 
where defendant lived with his sister, Nina Koker, and her disabled husband, John 
Koker, to search for evidence.  In the garbage bin outside the Koker residence, 
Wuest found a fluted Pyrex glass bowl, which had been wrapped in a plastic bag 
from Grocery Outlet and placed in a white kitchen-size garbage bag.  There was 
oil inside the bowl, which was consistent with its having contained a salad.  Mary 
Gaines identified the bowl as the one she had used to pack dinner for her son on 
the day he died.  Wuest also found a small white bag containing a receipt from a 
Jack in the Box on Pacific Avenue, which was less than a mile from the Gaines 
residence, and an empty pack of Marlboro 100 Lights.  The Jack in the Box receipt 
was dated June 12, 1999, at 12:03 a.m.  The garbage bin was otherwise empty, as 
the garbage had been picked up on Friday, June 11.      
Two days later, Wuest returned to the Koker residence and looked in the 
garbage bin again.  This time, he found the blue lid to the fluted Pyrex bowl.  The 
lid had been placed in a coffee can that was used for cigarette butts.  Wuest 
6 
recalled seeing the coffee can inside the house during his earlier visit.  Mary 
Gaines identified the lid as hers.    
No Pyrex products were found inside the Koker residence.  Yolanda Tahod, 
defendant‘s mother, confirmed that neither she nor her daughter owned any Pyrex 
bowls of the type found in the garbage at the Koker residence.  Koker claimed that 
she sometimes would put plastic containers of dog food in the refrigerator, forget 
about them, and then throw them away when she was cleaning up.  She did not 
know whether she had thrown any bowls away between that Friday, when the 
garbage was picked up, and that Sunday, when the police found the Pyrex bowl in 
the garbage can.  Nor did she know how the blue lid to the Pyrex bowl came to be 
in the coffee can.                   
On Sunday, June 13, 1999, defendant voluntarily went to the sheriff‘s 
department for a videotaped interview.  The jury viewed excerpts from that 
interview, as well as excerpts from defendant‘s interview the next day following 
his arrest.  During the first interview, defendant admitted that he had been with his 
brother on Friday night, but denied any involvement in the robbery or murder.  
According to defendant, David Zaragoza had called on Friday to ask whether he 
could spend the night at the Koker residence.  Defendant secured permission from 
his sister and called his brother back to tell him that he would be picked up after 
their mother dropped off the car.  (Koker, however, testified that she had not given 
permission for David to sleep over that night.)  Defendant picked up David around 
9:30 p.m. in front of the board and care home.  David, who (according to 
defendant) often dresses ―weird,‖ was wearing a white tuxedo vest and gray or 
7 
blue pajama-style pants from the Stockton State Hospital.2  Defendant complained 
that his hands were numb and tingling from his work as a welder, and asked David 
to rub some ointment on his hands and feet.  After David did so, defendant fell 
asleep.  When defendant woke up between 11:00 p.m. and 11:30 p.m., David was 
gone.  Defendant estimated that he must have fallen asleep between 10:00 p.m. 
and 10:30 p.m.  David called the next morning to explain that he had decided to 
leave the previous night because he was hearing voices.  Defendant said he left for 
work on Saturday morning around 4:45 a.m., but was told when he arrived that 
there was no work for him. 
After defendant was arrested and reinterviewed on June 14, 1999, he told 
police that David Zaragoza wanted to spend Friday night at the Koker residence, 
that defendant picked David up and brought him to the house between 9:45 p.m. 
and 10:00 p.m., that David was wearing a white vest and tennis shoes, that 
defendant asked David to massage a sports cream into his aching feet, that 
defendant fell asleep around 10:30 p.m., and that defendant woke up around 11:30 
p.m. or 11:45 p.m. to find that David was gone.  The following afternoon, David 
called defendant to explain that he had left because he was hearing voices and 
could not get any medication until Monday.  When defendant asked David about 
his two visits with the police, David said, ―I got nothing to worry about, because I 
ain‘t did nothing.‖  Defendant admitted that he was the person who empties the 
trash at the Koker residence, but said he had no knowledge about the bowl that 
was found in the garbage can outside the house.  He did point out, though, that his 
                                              
2  
David Zaragoza was wearing those pants when he was interviewed on June 
12, 1999, and likewise told police he had been wearing those same pants, which 
had no pockets, the night before.  
8 
sister ―throws a lot of bowls away.‖  He also denied going to Jack in the Box that 
night.  He added that his sister eats a ―lot‖ of fast food.   
Defendant and his mother, Yolanda Tahod, told police that David Zaragoza 
did not drive and that they had never known him to drive.  Stella Lee Tahod, 
defendant‘s sister-in-law, believed that she had seen David drive in 1985 or 1986; 
David, however, had been in prison for all but four months in 1985 and all but two 
months in 1986.  Eddie Tahod, defendant‘s half brother, recalled that David had 
driven as a teenager, 20 to 25 years earlier.  Yolanda Tahod testified at trial that 
David had driven a car before, but not since 1975.  Yolanda Tahod also testified 
that she regularly let defendant use her car, a beige Honda, to drive back and forth 
to work and that she returned the car to defendant around 7:00 p.m. on the night of 
the murder.  
Billy Gaines, grandson of William Gaines and nephew of David Gaines, 
testified that defendant came into the liquor store in the early afternoon on the day 
before the murders to buy a beer.  Defendant pointed to a ―funny‖ ball behind the 
counter and asked what it was.  Billy Gaines told defendant it was a camera.  
Defendant asked whether it worked and, before leaving, said ―Cool, pretty neat.‖  
Defendant‘s timesheet, however, showed that he was at work in Tracy until 4:32 
p.m. that day.         
Paul Banning, who worked evening shifts at the liquor store, testified that 
he had seen defendant there on occasion.  He, like Billy Gaines, did not remember 
ever seeing David Zaragoza.   
Howard Stokes, who lived down the street from the Gaines family, testified 
that William Gaines came home from closing the store each night at the same 
time.  On Monday, June 7, 1999, four days before the murder, Stokes was walking 
his dog when he saw a male, possibly Latino, with a stocky build, between five 
feet six inches and five feet eight inches tall, get out of a green minivan and walk 
9 
towards the Gaines residence.  When William Gaines drove up to the house, 
however, the man hid behind a tree.  As Stokes and the man walked on opposite 
sides of Cameron Way in the same direction, Stokes saw what appeared to be 
some sort of coating on the man‘s face, which gave the man a ―scary‖ look.  
Stokes was not sure whether the man had facial hair.  (Defendant had a very full 
mustache at the time.) 
Stanley Monckton, who lived on Cameron Way near the Gaines family, 
testified that he was watering his lawn around noon on Saturday, June 12, 1999, 
the day after the murder, and saw defendant driving a car — an older white or 
cream Honda, like the car defendant typically drove — that seemed to be out of 
place in the neighborhood.  Defendant drove by slowly.         
In an effort to challenge defendant‘s claim that his sister, Nina Koker, must 
have visited Jack in the Box just after midnight on Saturday, June 12, 1999, the 
prosecution offered evidence that Koker and the man who became her fiancé, 
Raymond Padilla, visited Padilla‘s cousin, Marcus Anthony Ellsworth II, on June 
11 for dinner at his home.  Ellsworth testified that Koker realized at the end of the 
night that she had locked her keys in her car and had to call a locksmith, who took 
30 to 45 minutes to arrive.  Ellsworth estimated that Koker left between 1:00 a.m. 
and 2:00 a.m.   
Koker, on the other hand, denied having anything to eat that night until she 
stopped at the Jack in the Box on her way home.  Koker agreed that she and 
Padilla had gone to Ellsworth‘s house that evening for a barbecue, but claimed that 
there was no food because Ellsworth‘s parents had gone to Reno for their 
daughter‘s graduation.  Koker said the three of them watched television all 
evening instead.  She did not realize she had locked her keys in the car until it was 
time to leave.  She was able to retrieve her keys 10 or 15 minutes before midnight, 
10 
went to Jack in the Box, and got home around 12:25 a.m.  Koker said she got up 
for work less than three hours later.  
Padilla could not recall whether they ate anything at Ellsworth‘s home.  He 
said Koker left around midnight, between five and 20 minutes after the locksmith 
retrieved her keys from the locked car.   
The bookkeeper at Cecil‘s Security Systems testified that Koker‘s request 
for assistance with a locked car was received at 11:51 p.m., that a locksmith 
arrived at 11:59 p.m., and that the work was completed at 12:08 a.m. — five 
minutes after the time stamped on the Jack in the Box receipt.   The Jack in the 
Box on Pacific Avenue was about a quarter-mile from Ellsworth‘s house.   
2.  The Defense Case 
Detective Alejandre testified that William Gaines did not claim when 
interviewed at the scene to have observed two people running away after shots 
were fired.  In fact, Gaines told Alejandre that he did not see anyone other than the 
man who assaulted him.  
When Deputy Sheriff Daniel Anema spoke to Carol Maurer around 12:30 
a.m. on June 12, 1999, Maurer was very shaken up and did not give her name.  
Anema found it difficult to get information out of her.  Maurer said she heard four 
shots and then saw two White males running down the street.  A defense 
investigator, Wilson Stewart, talked with Maurer in May 2000.  Maurer told 
Stewart that she heard the shots and then saw two ―Mexican boys‖ fleeing.  
Stewart also talked with Howard Stokes, who said that David Zaragoza‘s 
11 
photograph was ―consistent‖ with the person he had seen on June 7, 1999, who did 
not have a mustache like the one depicted in defendant‘s newspaper photograph.3             
Antoinette Duque, defendant‘s former girlfriend, testified that defendant 
called her three times between 6:24 a.m. and 10:42 a.m. on Saturday, June 12, 
1999.  In the early morning of June 14, 1999, defendant called to say that he 
believed he was going to be arrested.  
James Allen, a caretaker at the group home where David Zaragoza lived, 
testified that David was absent from the home during the evening of the murder 
but returned sometime during the 10 o‘clock news.  Allen stated that the weekend 
curfew at the group home was between 10:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m.  Ernie 
Williams, who was David‘s roommate at the group home, told Detective Wuest 
that David came home near the end of the Late Night with David Letterman show, 
which began at 11:00 p.m.  
Kimberly Kjonaas, a senior psychiatric technician for the San Joaquin 
County Mental Health Department, testified that David Zaragoza came to the 
clinic in the morning of June 13, 1999.  He claimed that he was sick and needed to 
be admitted for treatment.  Although David strained to defecate in his pants and 
then smeared feces on his shirt, Kjonaas did not have a basis to commit him at that 
time.   
                                              
3  
By the end of the case, the prosecution no longer insisted on the theory that 
Stokes had seen defendant — rather than his brother David, who was of similar 
height and build — on that Monday night.  The prosecution focused instead on 
evidence establishing that defendant and his brother were together that evening:  
defendant had picked up David from Eddie Tahod‘s house before 9:00 p.m. on 
Monday; defendant stopped next at Gaines Liquor Store, which was two or three 
blocks away, to pick up cigarettes for his brother; and the two of them then went 
to the Back Door bar for about an hour.   
12 
David Zaragoza‘s mother testified that David had a temper and that what he 
said sometimes did not make any sense.     
The defense commissioned an animated recreation depicting its version of 
the events surrounding the murder and showed it to the jury.  The depiction 
assumed that David Zaragoza knew how to drive, that David Zaragoza took the car 
from the Koker residence without permission, that he returned to the group home 
between 10:00 p.m. and 10:30 p.m., that he drove from there to the Gaines 
residence, that a number of identifying papers spilled out of his pocket when he 
pulled out a gun and shot David Gaines, that he placed the bag containing the 
Pyrex bowl into the garbage can at the Koker residence around 11:30 p.m., and 
that he left the car there and walked back to the group home, which was over two 
miles away.  The animation did not explain how the bag containing the bowl was 
placed in a Grocery Outlet bag or how the lid got into the Koker residence.  The 
information underlying the animation came from defense counsel, not from 
transcripts of the trial or statements made by defendant.  
Nina Koker told police that she smoked Marlboro Lights, which was the 
brand of the empty pack that police found in the Jack in the Box bag.  When 
defendant was interviewed by police on June 14, 1999, he was smoking Camel 
cigarettes.   
3.  Rebuttal 
Psychiatrist Kent Edward Rogerson, who evaluated David Zaragoza in 
2000 and found him incompetent to stand trial, testified that David was 
intellectually disabled, had reduced activity in the parts of the brain associated 
with executive functioning, and was very easily led.  Rogerson opined that 
David‘s illness was ―variable‖ and that he was capable of goal-directed behavior 
as well as great violence.    
13 
B.  Penalty Phase                 
1.  Prosecution Evidence 
The prosecution presented evidence of defendant‘s prior crimes as well as 
testimony from David Gaines‘s family about David‘s life and the effect of his 
murder.   
On September 21, 1975, defendant, then 15, and Daryl Thomas, 19, 
planned to rob a liquor store in Stockton.  Upon arriving at the store, defendant 
recognized the clerk and decided not to commit the robbery.  After a bite to eat, 
defendant and Thomas robbed a cab driver, Benny Wooliver.  Thomas shot the 
driver behind the right ear and killed him.  They took $50 and fled from the cab, 
which had jumped the curb and hit a tree and a house.   
Defendant and Thomas were picked up in a van driven by their friend 
Gilbert Renteria, who was with three male occupants.  This larger group decided 
to rob a 7-Eleven store in north Stockton.  One of the van occupants, Marcus 
Duron, took the money from the cash register.  Before leaving the store, defendant 
fired twice, hitting the store clerk, Dale Sym, once in the small of his back.  The 
other bullet passed through Sym‘s shirt and hit a slushie machine.  Renteria and 
Duron got back to the van first and drove off at high speed.  Police stopped the van 
shortly thereafter and arrested the occupants.  Defendant, who had been left 
behind, stole a bicycle and rode home.  The van‘s occupants implicated him in the 
robbery, and he surrendered to police three days later.    
Defendant admitted to first degree murder as an aider and abettor, was 
committed to the California Youth Authority, and was released five years later.  
During Thomas‘s trial for Wooliver‘s murder, defendant testified that he had shot 
the victim and that Thomas was not even in the cab at the time.  Thomas was 
nonetheless convicted of first degree murder.      
14 
On December 24, 1980, defendant was stopped while driving and was 
found in possession of stolen property.  In addition, a .22-caliber pistol was found 
underneath the car‘s right rear seat, and a shortened rifle with a ―banana clip‖ was 
found in the trunk.  He was sentenced to prison.   
On July 6, 1982, the FBI and the Stockton Police Department, based on a 
tip, were able to thwart the robbery of a Bank of America branch in Stockton.  One 
of defendant‘s accomplices, who discharged his weapon immediately upon 
entering the bank, was shot by an FBI agent.  This accomplice managed to shoot 
and wound another FBI agent before dying.  Another accomplice was shot and 
wounded trying to run from the scene.  Defendant initially pointed his sawed-off 
shotgun at an FBI agent when ordered to drop his weapon, but complied with the 
order when an agent on top of the building fired a warning shot.  Subsequent 
inspection of defendant‘s shotgun revealed that it had malfunctioned.  Defendant 
was sentenced to federal prison for his part in the attempted bank robbery and was 
released in October 1998.   
David Gaines was described as an innocent and gentle son, brother, and 
uncle, who enjoyed gadgetry, flying airplanes, history, and his family.  David 
lived with his parents, who were both over 80 years old, and was the son who 
helped out the most at the liquor store.  David‘s parents were convinced they 
would not have another good day for the rest of their lives.     
2.  Defense Evidence 
Defendant testified at his penalty trial.  He started skipping school in junior 
high, ―took off‖ from juvenile hall but turned himself in, and then was sent to the 
California Youth Authority when he was 12 or 13.  After he was released from the 
Youth Authority in 1975, he lived on the streets and met Daryl Thomas.  He and 
Thomas committed four or five strong-arm robberies of people on the street.  He 
15 
admitted his involvement in planning to rob a liquor store, robbing a cab driver, 
robbing a 7-Eleven, and shooting the 7-Eleven clerk.  Defendant said he agreed to 
testify at Thomas‘s trial because Thomas was facing a sentence of life in prison 
and defendant felt sorry for Thomas, who was the father of a newborn baby.  
Defendant also admitted burglarizing some homes just before he was pulled over 
and arrested for receiving stolen property in 1980.     
When defendant was released from state prison, he joined a crew of friends 
and committed five bank robberies in a 30-day period.  Defendant said that he was 
armed with a sawed-off shotgun during the attempted robbery at the Bank of 
America, but that he had broken the firing pin to render it inoperable prior to the 
robbery.  Over the course of his 16 years in federal prison, defendant came to 
realize that he wanted the family life that his brothers and sisters had.  
When defendant was released from federal prison in October 1998, he 
completed Delta College courses in machinery and welding and got a job as a 
welder in April 1999, after passing a welding test, a physical exam, and a drug 
test.  This was his first regular job, and it made him feel proud.  He worked six 
days a week, spent Sundays with Duque, who was at first his girlfriend and then 
just a friend when his desire to start a family could not be reconciled with her lack 
of interest in having more children.  He also went to church regularly. 
Defendant admitted driving David Zaragoza home from Eddie Tahod‘s 
house on the Monday prior to the murder and testified that they stopped at Gaines 
Liquors before dropping David at the board and care home.  But he denied going 
to the Back Door bar that evening, although he conceded that he and David had 
gone there some other evening.  Defendant‘s description of his actions on the night 
of the murder and his conversation with his brother David the next day largely 
tracked the version he had given in his police statements.   
16 
Defendant‘s mother, Yolanda Tahod, testified that defendant‘s father, Louis 
Zaragoza, Sr., often beat her and that the family was on welfare much of the time 
because her husband could not keep a job.  Louis, Sr., often drank and physically 
and verbally abused the children, particularly David and defendant.  In 1967, 
Yolanda Tahod separated from Louis, Sr., after he was hospitalized for digging a 
grave big enough for the whole family in their backyard, and left Los Angeles.  
Defendant was seven years old.  She moved the children to Stockton and married 
Albert Tahod a year later.  Shortly thereafter, Louis, Sr., kidnapped the children, 
but was arrested on the freeway.  Yolanda and Albert drank a lot, and Yolanda 
started to neglect her children.   
Defendant‘s troubles with the law coincided with the family‘s move to 
Stockton.  He began shoplifting at seven, was arrested for shoplifting and 
malicious mischief at 11, and was arrested for shoplifting, vehicular burglary, and 
glue-sniffing at 12.  He was made a ward of the juvenile court.  The family 
believed that Ruben Arellano, Sr., a counselor at the Youth Authority and old 
enough to be defendant‘s father, had a negative influence on defendant.  
Defendant was driving Arellano‘s car at the time he was arrested for receiving 
stolen property, and it was Arellano who connected defendant, once he was 
released from prison, with a woman who organized bank robberies.   
Yolanda and other family members testified that defendant decided to 
change his life upon his release from prison in 1998:  he reestablished his 
relationship with her, his siblings, and their children with the help of religion; 
attended college welding classes and got a job he enjoyed; had a girlfriend and 
wanted to start a family; and made arrangements to borrow money from his half 
brother Eddie to purchase a car.  David, on the other hand, was known for his 
bursts of anger and his delusions of persecution.   
17 
When David Zaragoza called his mother on the night of the murder, he told 
her that defendant had fallen asleep while he was massaging defendant‘s feet and 
that he was going to walk home.  A week after David was arrested, he admitted 
taking her car to commit the robbery and killing David Gaines.  He said he needed 
money to buy rock cocaine.     
On June 21, 1999, David Zaragoza told his brother Reynaldo that he left the 
house after defendant fell asleep and met up with an unknown White man who 
offered him a ride.  While in the vehicle, he saw a revolver.  The White man, who 
had long blond hair, a thin build, and raggedy clothing, drove to somewhere in 
north Stockton and shot someone at a residence before taking David home.  
During defendant‘s trial, David told family members visiting him at Napa 
State Hospital that he had committed the shooting himself.  David recounted to 
them that he had needed drugs, and a White male he did not know had handed him 
a gun.  David then drove off in his mother‘s car.  After the shooting, he sold the 
gun for drugs, drove back to Nina‘s house, left the car there, and walked home.  
David also stated four times during a pretrial hearing that he had shot and killed 
David Gaines and added that he wanted to be sentenced that day.  Later in the 
hearing, David pulled down his pants and defecated in the courtroom.     
A crisis clinician at the San Joaquin County Mental Health Services 
considered David a danger to others, based on an assessment he had conducted in 
February 1999, and testified that David had stopped taking his medications at that 
time, was abusing drugs, and indicated he might kill himself or others.     
Defendant attended Bible study and religious services in jail while awaiting 
trial in this case.  Defendant recruited other inmates to participate and hold Bible 
study on days when the prison ministry was not present.  A number of fellow 
inmates testified that they gained salvation and the determination to improve their 
lives as a result of defendant‘s ministry.   
18 
3.  Rebuttal  
Yolanda Tahod spoke with a district attorney investigator on August 3, 
1999.  According to Yolanda, David Zaragoza told her he had been walking to a 
donut shop on Charter Way to buy a soda when he approached a White man in a 
car. The White man offered to give him some change if David went with him.  The 
White man then drove to a residence in north Stockton and shot somebody.  Later 
in the conversation, David told his mother that he killed a man.  As he was on 
medication, he did not remember everything about it, but did know that he didn‘t 
mean to do it.   
Stella Tahod, defendant‘s sister-in-law, told an investigator working for 
David Zaragoza that David had called her from the county jail on August 12, 
1999, to say, ―I‘m getting 250 milligrams of Haldol.  Then they wonder why we 
shot that man.‖  Stella, however, denied telling the investigator that David had said 
―we.‖  During a jail visit that same day, David told Eddie Tahod, Stella‘s husband 
and defendant‘s half brother, that he left the house after defendant had fallen 
asleep, that he was picked up by a White man in a car, that the White man flashed 
a gun, and that he then dozed off.  David did not mention anything about a 
shooting.   
During a police interview on June 12, 1999, David said he had not been 
with defendant at all the night before.  David said instead that he had walked to a 
Taco Bell from the board and care home, did not mention meeting any White man, 
and denied any involvement in the murder.  Yolanda initially denied to police that 
David had contacted her on the night of the murder, but admitted on June 21, 
1999, that such a call occurred.  She could not remember what David had said.  
19 
II.  JURY SELECTION ISSUES 
A.  Asserted Error in Excusing Jurors for Cause  
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by dismissing two prospective 
jurors based solely on responses in their written questionnaires concerning the 
death penalty.  We conclude that the dismissal of one juror was error, requiring 
reversal of the penalty judgment.   
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
guarantee a criminal defendant the right to an impartial jury that has not been tilted 
in favor of capital punishment by prosecutorial challenges for cause.  (Uttecht v. 
Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 9.)  To protect that right, a challenge for cause because 
of a prospective juror‘s views on the death penalty may properly be sustained only 
when ―the juror‘s views would ‗prevent or substantially impair the performance of 
his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.‘ ‖  
(Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424.)  Thus, a death sentence cannot 
stand if the jury that imposed or recommended the penalty was selected by 
excluding prospective jurors for cause ―simply because they voiced general 
objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples 
against its infliction.‖  (Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 522.)  Even 
those who ―firmly believe that the death penalty is unjust may nevertheless serve 
as jurors in capital cases so long as they state clearly that they are willing to 
temporarily set aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule of law.‖  (Lockhart 
v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162, 176.) 
When the trial court‘s assessment of a prospective juror‘s capacity to serve 
is based at least in part on the juror‘s tone, demeanor, or other elements that 
cannot be reflected in the written record, its ruling is owed deference by reviewing 
courts.  (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 529.)  But no such deference is 
20 
warranted when a trial court‘s ruling on a for-cause challenge is based solely on 
the prospective jurors‘ answers to a written questionnaire.  (Ibid.)  In those 
circumstances, we review de novo the trial court‘s dismissal of the prospective 
juror for cause.  (People v. Riccardi (2012) 54 Cal.4th 758, 779.)   
1.  Prospective Juror No. 129        
Prospective Juror No. 129‘s questionnaire responses reflected the extent of 
her personal opposition to the death penalty.  When asked whether she had any 
religious convictions that would in any way interfere with her ability to sit as a 
juror in a capital case, Juror No. 129 answered ―Yes‖ and wrote ―Don‘t feel I have 
the right to decide if a person is to die.‖  A similar question 11 pages later asked 
whether she had any religious, moral, or personal beliefs that would make it 
difficult to impose the death penalty.  She responded ―Yes‖ and wrote ―Don‘t 
believe I have the right to make judgement [sic] for another human being to die.‖  
The juror provided a very similar answer when asked for her ―general feelings 
about the death penalty.‖  When asked if there were ―particular reasons‖ for her 
feelings on the issue, the juror responded ―No[,] other than moral,‖ and referred to 
her earlier responses.  Near the end of the questionnaire, the juror answered ―No‖ 
when asked whether her ―answers given above‖ were ―based on a religious 
consideration‖ but then said ―Somewhat‖ when asked in question No. 19 whether 
she believed ―that any religious beliefs [she] may have would have a substantial 
impact on [her] decision in this case.‖           
What her responses to the same questionnaire also suggested, though, is 
that Juror No. 129 could nonetheless put aside her views about capital punishment 
in determining the appropriate penalty in this case.  In the section entitled 
―Attitudes Regarding The Death Penalty,‖ she stated without qualification that she 
would not refuse to find the defendant guilty of first degree murder just to prevent 
21 
the penalty phase from taking place, nor would she refuse to find a special 
circumstance allegation true just to prevent a penalty phase from taking place.  She 
also conveyed that she would not automatically vote for life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole ―because of any views [she] may have concerning the 
death penalty,‖ that she would not substitute a different standard of proof in a 
capital case, and that she would be able to follow the court‘s instructions not to 
consider the issue of penalty during the guilt phase and not to consider the relative 
costs of execution and life imprisonment in deciding the penalty.  Moreover, when 
asked in question No. 9d, assuming she was in the penalty phase of the trial, 
―Could you set aside your own personal feelings regarding what the law in this 
case ought to be and follow the law as the court explains it to you?,‖ the juror 
answered, ―Yes.‖     
When the prosecutor then challenged Juror No. 129 for cause based on her 
religious beliefs, defense counsel objected:  ―I don‘t believe she‘s presented an 
unwillingness to follow the law.‖  The trial court initially expressed some 
uncertainty about the juror‘s responses, and the adequacy of some of the questions.  
With respect to question No. 19 in particular, which asked whether the juror 
believed her religious beliefs would have a substantial impact on her decision, the 
court admitted, ―I don‘t think it was a very good question.  We probably should 
have elaborated a little bit on this.‖  Nonetheless — and based solely on the 
written responses in the questionnaire — the trial court excused the juror, citing 
only in a conclusory fashion ―a substantial impairment to prevent her ability to be 
neutral‖ and to ―follow the Court‘s instructions.‖    
Reviewing that ruling independently, we conclude the trial court erred.  The 
prosecution, as the party making the challenge, had the burden to establish the 
juror‘s impairment.  (People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 445 (Stewart).)  In 
assessing whether the prosecution carried its burden, the question is not whether 
22 
the record might reasonably have supported a finding that the juror was unwilling 
to follow instructions pertaining to the death penalty.  Rather, a prospective juror 
may be discharged for cause solely on the basis of written questionnaire responses 
only if it is ―clear‖ from those responses that the juror is unable or unwilling to 
temporarily set aside the juror‘s beliefs and follow the law.  (People v. Riccardi, 
supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 781, fn. 11; People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 531; see 
also People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 647-648.)  Where a prospective 
juror‘s written responses are ambiguous with respect to the individual‘s 
willingness or ability to follow the court‘s instructions in a potential penalty phase, 
the record does not support a challenge for cause.  (Stewart, at pp. 448-449.)   
The for-cause challenge should not have been sustained on this record.  A 
prospective juror‘s conscientious objection to capital punishment is not by itself a 
sufficient basis for excluding that person from jury service.  (Stewart, supra, 33 
Cal.4th at p. 446.)  Although the juror here also stated that her beliefs would make 
it ―difficult‖ to vote for execution, we have explained that ―[b]ecause the 
California death penalty sentencing process contemplates that jurors will take into 
account their own values in determining whether aggravating factors outweigh 
mitigating factors such that the death penalty is warranted, the circumstance that a 
juror‘s conscientious opinions or beliefs concerning the death penalty would make 
it very difficult for the juror ever to impose the death penalty is not equivalent to a 
determination that such beliefs will ‗substantially impair the performance of his 
[or her] duties as a juror‘ . . . .‖  (Id. at p. 447.)  That is especially true here, where 
the juror affirmed that her personal views would not control her approach to 
various aspects of the case and that she could set aside her personal feelings and 
follow the law as instructed by the court.   
As the People point out, the prospective juror‘s responses also raised the 
possibility that her religious views could have interfered with her ability to sit as a 
23 
juror.  Indeed, she believed ―[s]omewhat‖ that these views could have a substantial 
impact on her decision in the case.  We need not decide whether these responses 
alone would have sufficiently buttressed a challenge for cause, though, because we 
conclude that even if these responses could have been disqualifying in the absence 
of any contrary responses, the prospective juror‘s other responses in this case also 
mattered.  At most, the prospective juror‘s concerns about the death penalty 
created an ambiguity when considered together with the juror‘s other responses.  
(See People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 533 [analyzing the prospective juror‘s 
written responses ―taken together‖].)  Not only did the juror‘s responses indicate 
that she would not always or automatically reject the death penalty, but she also 
answered ―Yes‖ to the question that ― ‗directly address[ed] the pertinent 
constitutional issue‘ in Witt — i.e., whether the prospective juror could 
temporarily set aside his or her personal beliefs and follow the court‘s instructions 
in determining penalty.‖  (People v. McKinnon, supra,  52 Cal.4th at p. 645.)   
On voir dire, the juror might have demonstrated that her personal beliefs 
were of such overwhelming weight that they would substantially burden her 
ability to fulfill her oath at a potential penalty phase.  (See People v. Nunez and 
Satele (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1, 23-24 [deferring to the trial court‘s resolution of the 
prospective juror‘s equivocal and conflicting responses on the questionnaire and in 
voir dire]; People v. Whalen (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1, 48 [―Although her written 
questionnaire responses were somewhat ambiguous, her answers on oral voir dire 
made it quite clear that because of her beliefs, she was unwilling to vote to impose 
the death penalty under any circumstances, even if this were the most ‗horrible 
crime in history.‘ ‖].)  Alternatively, the juror might have reaffirmed in open court 
her written response to question No. 9d that she would set aside those views and 
follow the court‘s instructions.  But such further probing never took place, and 
nothing in the record suggests that the trial court had a clear basis on which to 
24 
resolve the ambiguity.  (People v. Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 782.).  
Accordingly, the juror‘s written responses do not clearly establish that she should 
have been disqualified.  (See Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 448-449.)     
People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527 underscores this very point.  There, a 
prospective juror‘s questionnaire revealed ―someone profoundly conflicted as to 
whether she could ever personally vote to impose the death penalty.‖  (Id. at p. 
541.)  After identifying herself as Catholic, the juror stated that she did not believe 
she could send someone to his or her death, that she believed only God had the 
right to take away life, that the conflict between her beliefs and the efficacy of 
deterrence was one that she has ― ‗not yet been able to resolve,‘ ‖ but that she 
would ― ‗err on the side of God.‘ ‖  (Id. at pp. 541-542.)  On the other hand, the 
juror also responded that she could give honest consideration to both penalties, 
that her views would not cause her automatically to vote against the death penalty, 
and that she ― ‗would follow the law‘ ‖ — even though she was ― ‗not sure [she] 
could live with it‘ ‖ and recognized that God would hold her ― ‗accountable‘ ‖ for 
her acts.  (Id. at p. 542.)  Because the questionnaire left it ―unclear‖ whether the 
prospective juror was could or would follow the law, we found that the trial court 
and counsel then ―appropriately‖ used voir dire to resolve the ambiguity.  (Ibid.)  
The People seek to rely on People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th 491.  But that 
reliance is misplaced.  Although the questionnaire responses of Prospective Juror 
O.D. in that case included an acknowledgement at the outset concerning a juror‘s 
duty to follow the law and an indication that the juror could set aside his feelings 
and follow the law, O.D. nonetheless went on to respond that he would, in every 
case and regardless of the evidence presented, ―automatically vote for something 
other than first degree murder so as not to reach the penalty phase, automatically 
vote for a verdict of not true as to the special circumstances alleged so as not to 
reach the penalty phase, and, automatically vote for life imprisonment without the 
25 
possibility of parole if there were a penalty phase.‖  (Id. at p. 532.)  O.D. also 
wrote, ― ‗I was taught that there should be no reason to kill and I will continue to 
think this way.‘ ‖  (Ibid.) 
In contrast to the situation we encountered in Avila, Prospective Juror No. 
129‘s written responses did not clearly reveal personal views that would interfere 
with her ability to judge the penalty based on the evidence presented.  Rather –– as 
in Duff –– her written responses, at worst, left it uncertain whether she had the 
ability to perform as a juror.  Because those responses did not ―clearly reveal‖ an 
inability to perform her duties, the trial court erred in granting the prosecution‘s 
challenge for cause without examining the juror in court to ascertain her true state 
of mind.  (People v. Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 782.)  When a trial court errs 
in excusing a prospective juror for cause because of that person‘s views 
concerning the death penalty, we must reverse the penalty.  We do so in this case.  
(Id. at p. 783; accord, Gray v. Mississippi (1987) 481 U.S. 648, 659-667.)   
2.  Prospective Juror No. 16 
Prospective Juror No. 16, was examined in court after completing the 
questionnaire.  Her written and oral responses conveyed inconsistent views about 
the death penalty.  At first, her questionnaire responses indicated that she had no 
religious, moral, or personal beliefs that would interfere with her ability to impose 
the death penalty.  Yet when asked for her general feelings about the death 
penalty, she wrote, ―I don‘t feel that I would be able to take a life‖ and added that 
the death penalty served no purpose.  Although she stated that she would 
automatically refuse to vote for the death penalty without regard to any 
aggravating or mitigating factors regarding the crime and the defendant‘s 
background and character, she said she would change her answer and set aside her 
views and follow the law if so instructed by the court.  On the other hand, when 
26 
asked if she would be able to follow an instruction not to consider the monetary 
cost of keeping the defendant in prison for life or executing him, she marked 
―No.‖  
During voir dire, the juror disavowed her questionnaire response and said 
she would be able to disregard the monetary cost of keeping defendant in prison or 
executing him.  When asked why she had said otherwise on the questionnaire, she 
replied, ―Well, I really don‘t feel that I should be — should take — or be a part of 
taking another person‘s life.  [¶]  But if the law says you — I have never broken 
the law in my life, and I don‘t intend to do one now.‖  She also said she would be 
able to follow the law as well as weigh and consider the aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances.  The prosecutor challenged the prospective juror on the 
basis of her ―contradictory‖ and ―conflicted‖ answers.  He also noted that she was 
not being forthcoming, that she rolled her eyes upon being called into the jury box, 
that she seemed ―pretty entrenched in her views‖ — and therefore suspected that 
she had ―an agenda.‖  Defense counsel admitted that ―there‘s some ambivalence‖ 
in the juror‘s responses, but argued that she did not exhibit ―the inability to follow 
the law that I think is required.‖  The trial court agreed with counsel that the 
juror‘s responses could be viewed as ―equivocal.‖  Based on its finding that the 
juror‘s true views would ―substantially impair‖ her ability to impose the death 
penalty, the trial court sustained the challenge.     
The trial court was able to observe and speak with the prospective juror, so 
we review its ruling for abuse of discretion.  (People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 
363, 378-379 (Scott).)  The juror here stated on her questionnaire that she would 
not be able to follow the court‘s instruction to disregard the monetary cost of 
imprisonment or execution in selecting the appropriate penalty.  In voir dire, she 
changed course and said she would be able to follow the court‘s instructions on 
this topic, connecting her prior answer to her reluctance to be involved with the 
27 
death penalty.  We defer to the trial court‘s resolution of these conflicting 
responses, because that court had the opportunity to assess the juror‘s tone, 
apparent level of confidence, and demeanor.  (People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 
Cal.4th 830, 862.)          
B.  Asserted Error in Denying Defendant‘s Batson/Wheeler Motion                    
Defendant, who is Latino, contends that the prosecutor violated his state 
and federal constitutional rights to equal protection and a jury drawn from a fair 
cross-section of the community by peremptorily excusing two Latino prospective 
jurors, L.R. and R.C.  (See Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79; People v. 
Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258.)  The claim lacks merit.  
The familiar Batson/Wheeler inquiry consists of three distinct steps.  The 
opponent of the peremptory strike must first make out a prima facie case by 
showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of 
discriminatory purpose.  If a prima facie case of discrimination has been 
established, the burden shifts to the proponent of the strike to justify it by offering 
nondiscriminatory reasons.  If a valid nondiscriminatory reason has been offered, 
the trial court must then decide whether the opponent of the strike has proved the 
ultimate question of purposeful discrimination.  (Johnson v. California (2005) 545 
U.S. 162, 168; Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 383.)  Because the trial court ruled 
that defendant had failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination, but did 
so in reliance on ―the since disapproved ‗strong likelihood‘ standard,‖ we 
independently review the record then before the trial court to determine whether it 
supports an inference that the prosecutor excused either of these jurors on the basis 
of race.  (People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 698.)   
Defendant‘s claim of discrimination rested solely on the fact that the 
prosecutor exercised his first two peremptory challenges against Latino 
28 
prospective jurors and that defendant was Latino.  We have previously recognized 
that removing members of an identifiable group, where the defendant is a member 
of that group, is a fact that ―may prove particularly relevant‖ to the first-stage 
inquiry.  (Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 384.)  But a prima facie case of 
discrimination can be established only if the totality of the relevant facts gives rise 
to an inference of discriminatory purpose.  A court, in particular, may also 
consider nondiscriminatory reasons ―that are apparent from and ‗clearly 
established‘ in the record [citations] and that necessarily dispel any inference of 
bias.‖  (Ibid.) 
The record in this case clearly establishes nondiscriminatory reasons for 
excusing Prospective Jurors L.R. and R.C.  L.R.‘s questionnaire responses 
revealed that she had been convicted of shoplifting; that her sister had been 
convicted of a drug charge and had been incarcerated; and that she strongly 
disagreed with the proposition that the rights of persons charged with crimes are 
better protected than the rights of crime victims and that harsh punishment is the 
best solution to the crime problem.  She also stated that she would impose a higher 
burden than proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a capital case and would require 
proof ―without doubt‖ that ―the defendant was 100% guilty.‖  The record thus 
contained a compelling nondiscriminatory justification for excusing L.R.  (See 
Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 385.)   
R.C.‘s questionnaire responses revealed that she did not ―believe‖ in the 
death penalty, that she doubted it served any purpose, and that her religious 
convictions on the topic would interfere with her ability to sit as a juror in a 
murder case or in a case involving the death penalty.  Although she marked ―yes‖ 
when asked whether she could set aside her personal feelings and follow the 
court‘s instructions, she also wrote, ―I don‘t believe that another life should be 
taken and although I don‘t believe in it that I could not rule for it.‖  Despite the 
29 
responses above, she marked ―no‖ when asked at the end of the questionnaire 
whether her religious beliefs would have a substantial impact on her decision.   
In voir dire, R.C. said that she ―probably‖ could get to the point of 
believing that she ―could‖ impose the death penalty.  Nonetheless, she reaffirmed 
in open court her previous responses that her religious beliefs would interfere with 
her ability to be a juror in a murder or death penalty prosecution and added that 
her beliefs were ―firmly held.‖  R.C. recalled that when a co-worker was 
murdered, she had thought that the murderer ―probably‖ deserved to die.  On the 
other hand, she said, ―I don‘t know that I could get to that point if I was actually 
involved . . . in the decision.‖     
R.C. may have offered inconsistent responses as to her ability to consider 
the death penalty, but a prosecutor could readily have concluded that her true 
views were consistent with her confession in voir dire that she had ―never been 
able to say, ‗Well, he should be dead.‘ ‖  This prospect was sufficient to dispel any 
inference of discrimination.  (Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 385.)  The trial court 
therefore did not err in denying the Batson/Wheeler motion.   
III.  GUILT PHASE ISSUES 
A.  Asserted Insufficiency of the Evidence that Defendant Was Involved in 
the Murder  
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of 
murder or robbery.  In his view, the evidence showed that his brother David 
Zaragoza committed the crimes by himself and there was insufficient evidence 
that defendant was even present.  We disagree.  
When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is challenged 
on appeal, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment 
to determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid 
value from which a trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a 
30 
reasonable doubt.  (People v. Elliott (2013) 53 Cal.4th 535, 585.)  Our review 
must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could 
reasonably have deduced from the evidence.  (People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 
Cal.4th 40, 87.)  Even where, as here, the evidence of guilt is largely 
circumstantial, our task is not to resolve credibility issues or evidentiary conflicts, 
nor is it to inquire whether the evidence might reasonably be reconciled with the 
defendant‘s innocence.  (Id. at p. 92; People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403.)  
It is the duty of the jury to acquit the defendant if it finds the circumstantial 
evidence is susceptible to two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the 
other innocence.  (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 66.)  But the relevant 
inquiry on appeal is whether, in light of all the evidence, ―any reasonable trier of 
fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.‖  (People v. 
Towler (1982) 31 Cal.3d 105, 118.)   
The sole issue in dispute in this case was the identity of the shooter.  The 
evidence that defendant was the shooter was entirely circumstantial — but it was 
sufficiently substantial to uphold his convictions.   
First, there was substantial evidence that David Zaragoza did not commit 
the robbery by himself.  Carol Maurer told another neighbor at the crime scene 
that she had seen two men running down Cameron Way after hearing gunfire; she 
reiterated that fact to a deputy sheriff that night and to a defense investigator in 
May 2000; and she testified at trial that she had seen two men fleeing.  Although 
Cynthia Grafius, who lived east of Maurer, saw only one person running down the 
street, it was entirely possible that the other suspect had been ahead of or behind 
the man she saw from her kitchen window, given that William Gaines testified that 
the men in flight were separated by about 10 feet.  Indeed, the trial court observed 
that Grafius‘s vantage point blocked her from a view of the entire street.     
31 
The circumstances of the robbery and the murder also supported the 
conclusion that two people were involved.  William Gaines, who watched David 
Zaragoza flee eastbound down Cameron Way, testified that David was between 10 
and 30 feet away when the shots rang out and Gaines ducked behind his station 
wagon.  At the time that Gaines heard the shots, David Zaragoza‘s back was to 
Gaines, and Gaines did not see any muzzle flash coming from David‘s direction.  
Nor did he ever see David turn around and head up the driveway.  Yet according 
to the pathologist, the gun used in the murder left three contact wounds and a set 
of stipple marks, which indicated that the muzzle could have been no more than 18 
inches away from the victim.   
Additional forensic evidence supported the theory of a second assailant.  
Both David Zaragoza and defendant were shorter than David Gaines, and the 
Gaines‘s driveway sloped upward from the street to the house.  But the pathologist 
testified that two of the bullets entered David Gaines on a downward trajectory.  A 
downward trajectory suggested that the shorter gunman must have been on higher 
ground — that is, between David Gaines and the house, not approaching David 
Gaines from the street.  
David Zaragoza was also unlikely to have committed these crimes alone.  
He had substantial intellectual deficits.  The Gaines‘s house was 6.1 miles from 
defendant‘s residence, yet David had no driver‘s license, was driven everywhere 
by family members, and had not driven a car in over a dozen years — if ever.  
David also was wearing pants that had no pockets that night.  If David had a gun 
that night, it was odd, under the circumstances, that he did not use it during the 
robbery of William Gaines and that William Gaines did not see it.  All this 
suggested that the gunman was someone other than David Zaragoza.    
Second, there was substantial evidence to connect defendant to the crime.  
Defendant admitted he was with his brother David that evening — although David 
32 
initially attempted to cover that up and even removed defendant‘s photograph 
from the board and care home.  The fruits of the robbery — i.e., the Pyrex salad 
bowl and lid — were found in the garbage bin outside defendant‘s residence.  
Both items had previously been inside defendant‘s house:  the bowl was in a 
kitchen garbage bag that defendant had taken out of his mother‘s hands to place in 
the bin outside, and the bowl‘s blue lid was in a coffee can that the police saw on a 
coffee table during their first visit.   
A receipt from a Jack in the Box located less than a mile from the Gaines 
residence was also found in the garbage bin outside defendant‘s house.  The 
receipt was time-stamped at 12:03 a.m., approximately 45 minutes after the 
murder.  The defense argued vigorously that the receipt reflected a purchase by 
defendant‘s sister, Nina Koker.  But the evidence showed that Nina was at the 
home of Raymond Padilla‘s cousin, dealing with the locksmith who had helped 
recover her keys from her locked car, until at least 12:08 a.m., and may not have 
left there until after 1:00 a.m.     
The record also shows that it was defendant, not David, who was familiar 
with Gaines Liquors.  Paul Banning, a clerk, testified that he recognized defendant 
as a customer who came to the store in the afternoons and evenings.  Stella Lee 
Tahod, defendant‘s sister-in-law, testified that defendant sometimes walked her 
two daughters the block or two to get candy at the store.  Billy Gaines, who was 
the murder victim‘s nephew, testified that defendant had come to the store and had 
asked about the surveillance camera.  Billy testified in January 2001 that this 
conversation had occurred in the early afternoon on the day before the murder, 
although there was evidence that Billy may have mistaken as to the date or time.  
And defendant himself admitted that he had been to Gaines Liquors on many 
occasions, including on the Monday or Tuesday prior to the murder.  
33 
The evidence also connected defendant to the area around the Gaines 
residence before and after the murder.   
Howard Stokes testified that on the Monday prior to the murder, he saw a 
man resembling David Zaragoza walking towards the Gaines residence late at 
night.  When William Gaines arrived home from work, the man hid behind a tree.  
Defendant admitted that he and David were together that night after having dinner 
at the Tahod home.   
Around noon on the day after the murder, Stanley Monckton saw defendant 
driving a car slowly through the neighborhood.  Defendant was in an older, white 
or cream Honda, like defendant‘s mother‘s car.  Interestingly, defendant told 
police that he drove straight back from Tracy early on that Saturday morning to his 
mother‘s house to return the car, and that she then drove him home.  His mother 
told police, however, that defendant did not return the car until 2:00 or 3:00 p.m.  
 Finally, the timeline tended to rebut the theory that David Zaragoza had 
borrowed his mother‘s car, committed the robbery and murder, returned the car to 
defendant‘s house, and walked home before midnight.  The murder victim‘s watch 
stopped at 11:16 p.m.  According to the defense theory, David had to run to the car 
after the shooting, drive the 6.1 miles back to defendant‘s house, wrap the salad 
bowl in a Grocery Outlet bag and place it in the kitchen garbage, slip the salad 
bowl lid into the coffee can in the room where his brother was still sleeping, and 
leave on foot no later than 11:30 p.m. — given that defendant told police that he 
woke up between 11:00 p.m. and 11:30 p.m. to discover that David was gone.  
David then had to dispose of the murder weapon and walk the 2.3 miles to the 
board and care home, where his roommate, Ernie Williams, told police that he 
arrived near the end of the David Letterman show, which began at 11:00 p.m.  
Even defendant concedes it was ―improbable‖ that David could have 
accomplished all this in the allotted time.  
34 
The record, in sum, contained substantial evidence that David did not 
commit these crimes by himself, that defendant was present at the scene with his 
brother, and that defendant was the shooter.   
B.  Denial of Defendant‘s Request to Subpoena David Zaragoza 
Defendant and his brother, David Zaragoza, were originally charged 
together.  During a pretrial hearing shortly after arraignment, David blurted out in 
court that he shot and killed the victim, that his brother was ―not involved in none 
of this,‖ and that he wanted to be sentenced that day.  As the parties discussed 
future court dates, David pulled down his pants and defecated.  Bailiffs then 
removed him from the courtroom.  David was subsequently found incompetent to 
stand trial.  
When the defense subpoenaed David to testify, David‘s attorney filed a 
motion to quash, invoking the privilege against self-incrimination on his client‘s 
behalf.  (Evid. Code, § 940.)  Because the district attorney would not stipulate to 
David‘s unavailability, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion.  At the 
hearing, David‘s attorney asserted that he had the authority and responsibility to 
invoke the privilege on his client‘s behalf, given the finding that his client was 
incompetent to stand trial.  David‘s attorney also expressed his understanding that 
the question presented was ―about [David‘s] availability and that [defense counsel] 
really is seeking my client to be found unavailable‖ so that David‘s confession at 
the pretrial hearing could be introduced.  (See Evid. Code, § 1230.)  The trial court 
agreed that defendant had issued the subpoena ―to show that [David] is 
unavailable to testify,‖ since ―[t]here is no other way he can do that.‖ 
Defense counsel offered no objection to the assertion of the privilege by 
David‘s attorney, on behalf of his client (David).  Indeed, defense counsel had 
nothing to say at all in response to the argument presented by David‘s attorney, 
35 
other than to clarify that (once David‘s unavailability had been established) he 
intended to introduce not only the postarraignment confession, but also statements 
David had made admitting his involvement in the murder to his mother, his 
brother Reynaldo, and a fellow inmate.     
Over the district attorney‘s objection, the trial court ruled that David‘s 
attorney was entitled to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination on his 
client‘s behalf.  Based on its conclusion that David was unavailable, the trial court 
quashed the subpoena.   
On appeal, defendant for the first time complains that David‘s attorney 
lacked the authority to invoke the privilege on David‘s behalf and claims that the 
trial court‘s finding of unavailability deprived him of his state and federal 
constitutional rights to compulsory process, to present a defense, and to a reliable 
verdict in a capital trial.  But defendant plainly forfeited this claim by failing to 
object at the time David‘s attorney asserted the privilege and by failing to identify 
the substance, purpose, and relevance of David‘s live testimony.  (Evid. Code, 
§ 354, subd. (a); People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 691; People v. Blacksher 
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 821; accord, State v. Diaz (Conn.App.Ct. 2006) 893 A.2d 
495, 498.)   
Indeed, the record tends to show that defendant had no interest in actually 
having his brother David testify at trial.  Rather, the apparent purpose of the 
subpoena was to have David declared unavailable so that his statements against 
penal interest, in and out of court, could be introduced.  Defendant‘s reluctance to 
offer David as a live witness was understandable, as David had given a number of 
different statements about his involvement (or noninvolvement) in the incident.  
David had twice denied to law enforcement any involvement in the murder.  He 
told his mother, on the other hand, that he left the Koker residence after defendant 
fell asleep, was given a ride by a White male, and had no other recollection of 
36 
what occurred that night.  He told his half brother, Eddie Tahod, that the White 
male had flashed a gun before David ―lost track of things.‖  And he told his 
brother Reynaldo Zaragoza that the White male had shot someone at a residence in 
north Stockton and later dropped him off — but subsequently confessed to 
Reynaldo that he had committed the murder by himself.  Counsel thus could 
reasonably have decided, given the additional uncertainty posed by David‘s 
incompetency to stand trial, that the safest course was to rely on David‘s prior 
statements, rather than to risk having David testify.   
Having gambled and lost with that strategy, defendant cannot belatedly 
argue here that he is entitled to a reversal in order to pursue some other strategy.    
― ‗ ― ‗If any other rule were to obtain, the party would in most cases be careful to 
be silent as to his objections until it would be too late to obviate them, and the 
result would be that few judgments would stand the test of an appeal.‘ ‖ ‘ ‖  
(People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 590.)  We therefore need not consider 
the novel question whether an attorney may validly invoke the privilege against 
self-incrimination on behalf of a codefendant, where the codefendant has been 
declared unfit to stand trial, in the face of a criminal defendant‘s constitutional 
right to compulsory process and to present a defense.   
C.  Exclusion of a Segment from David Zaragoza‘s Videotaped Interview            
The key evidence connecting David Zaragoza to the robbery of William 
Gaines included the numerous bits of paper containing David‘s name that were 
recovered next to and around the driver‘s side door of Gaines‘s car.  The 
prosecution theorized that the papers fell out of David‘s shirt pocket at some point 
when he assaulted Gaines, struggled with Gaines over the brown paper bag 
containing the Pyrex bowl, and reached down with both hands to pick up the bag 
after the bag fell to the ground.  The defense, on the other hand, contended that the 
37 
papers must have fallen out when David pulled a gun out of his pants pocket.  
When the prosecution introduced David‘s admission during his videotaped 
interview that the pants he was wearing that night did not have pockets, the 
defense requested permission to show the jury a different segment of the 
videotaped interview.  In the segment identified by the defense, the interviewing 
officers asked David, who had a tobacco pouch and a lighter in his shirt pocket, to 
stand and then bend over to pick up something from the ground.  Neither the 
tobacco nor the lighter fell out of David‘s pocket.     
The People objected that the interviewing officers‘ experiment was 
irrelevant, and more prejudicial than probative.  The trial court agreed that 
―[t]here‘s a lot of things that aren‘t the same‖ in the experiment as compared to the 
circumstances at the crime scene, and sustained the objection.  Defendant claims 
on appeal that the evidence was relevant and, for the first time, that its exclusion 
deprived him of his due process right to present a complete defense and his Eighth 
Amendment right to a reliable guilt determination.  We deem his federal claims 
preserved only to the extent that they represent merely a gloss on the arguments he 
presented in the trial court.  (People v. Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 236-237.) 
A ruling admitting or excluding the results of an experiment or 
demonstration as evidence for the existence or nonexistence of a material fact in 
controversy ―is a determination largely within the discretion of the trial court and 
its ruling will not be disturbed except upon a clear showing of an abuse thereof.‖  
(Grupe v. Glick (1945) 26 Cal.2d 680, 685.)  Experimental evidence is admissible 
only when the results are relevant, the experiment was conducted under conditions 
substantially similar to those of the actual occurrence, and the presentation will not 
unduly delay the trial or confuse the jury.  (People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 
228.)   
38 
This is not a case where the trial court abused its discretion.  Given the 
dissimilarities between the experiment conducted at the interview and the 
circumstances at the crime scene, it was within the bounds of the trial court‘s 
discretion to exclude the experiment.  The experiment showed that a pouch of 
tobacco and a lighter did not fall out of David Zaragoza‘s shirt pocket when he 
bent over.  But the question in this case was whether small pieces of paper — 
more than a dozen in all — could fall out of his shirt pocket.  Moreover, in the 
experiment, David Zaragoza simply walked to a certain spot and bent over to pick 
up an item.  At the crime scene, however, the papers allegedly fell out after David 
punched William Gaines twice and struggled with him to take the bag, which fell 
to the ground.  David then quickly reached down with both hands to scoop up the 
bag and ran away.   
Given the different size, weight, and number of items in David‘s pocket 
during the experiment as well as the lack of speed and suddenness when David 
bent over to pick up an item from the floor during the interview, it was not 
unreasonable for the trial court to conclude that the experiment lacked the 
necessary foundation to be relevant.  (People v. Lucas, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 
227.)  Nor did defendant suffer any deprivation of his federal rights, given the 
experiment‘s limitations.  (Ibid.; see People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 442.)                              
D.  Failure to Provide the Defense with a Copy of the Jack in the Box 
Videotape  
Defendant claims that the prosecution violated its discovery obligations 
under section 1054.1, as well as its constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory 
evidence, by failing to provide the defense with a usable copy of the videotape 
from the night of the murder obtained from the Jack in the Box near the Gaines 
residence.   
39 
The Jack in the Box receipt that was recovered from the garbage bin outside 
defendant‘s home recorded a transaction less than an hour after the murder.  The 
parties vigorously disputed at trial the identity of the person who had gone to this 
Jack in the Box that night.  In an effort to bolster the evidence of identity, police 
investigators visited the Jack in the Box and recovered the surveillance videotape 
of the drive-through for the relevant period.  Detectives Alejandre and Wuest 
viewed the videotape at the Jack in the Box.   
According to the prosecution, these police officers stated that the grainy, 
monochrome videotape offered only a very limited view of the vehicles as they 
approached the drive-through.  The corner of the vehicle that was visible could 
have belonged to a Toyota, a Honda — or, indeed, ―any car from 1979 to 1999‖ 
that was beige, brown, white, or a faded color.  The videotape could not exclude 
defendant‘s mother‘s car, which was in his possession that night, or his sister‘s 
vehicle.  The videotape did not show the driver, either.     
Because the videotape had ―no probative value whatsoever,‖ the 
prosecution decided not to use it.  A copy of the tape was not provided to the 
defense, however, because the recording system used by Jack in the Box was not 
compatible with VHS machines and the tape could not be converted to play on a 
VHS player.   The videotape‘s existence was nonetheless known to counsel, and 
the prosecution made the videotape available to the defense to be viewed, as police 
investigators already had, at Jack in the Box.  
We perceive no violation of the prosecution‘s statutory or constitutional 
discovery obligations.  By alerting the defense to the existence of the videotape 
and making it available for viewing offsite, the prosecution complied with its 
obligations under section 1054.1, subdivision (e) to disclose exculpatory evidence 
in its possession.  (See Schaffer v. Superior Court (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1235, 
1242 [the current discovery statutes, like the earlier ones, provide that the 
40 
prosecution‘s obligations can be satisfied ―by making the information available 
‗for inspection and copying‘ ‖].)  Even if the prosecution had a duty to supply a 
―usable copy,‖ as defendant contends, its obligation would have been excused on 
the ground of impossibility.  The prosecutor stated that ―we had someone come in 
with a particular machine that . . . supposedly converts these kind of videotapes 
from their particular format to normal VHS tape,‖ but the conversion could not be 
completed.  Indeed, defense counsel admitted that a copy ―turned out not be 
available, as I understand it, through whatever technical reasons.‖  The trial court 
therefore did not abuse its discretion in concluding that ―so long as [the defense] 
had access to the actual physical evidence, it was not necessary for the prosecutor 
to search the world to see whether there‘s proper technology to do the transfer.‖  
(See Hill v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 812, 816-817.)        
Defendant contends that the prosecution further violated its duties by 
failing to provide ―clear directions as to how [the defense] could view the tape.‖  
But defendant does not explain why the prosecution would have been obligated to 
facilitate a screening of the tape, given defense counsel‘s statement that he ―didn‘t 
need a copy‖ of the Jack in the Box tape if the prosecution was not going to 
introduce it.  Nor does defendant cite any authority, or otherwise offer a 
persuasive argument, for requiring the prosecution to volunteer directions for 
viewing the tape.  In any event, defense counsel appeared to have been well aware 
of all he needed to know about how to view the tape, since he admitted to the trial 
court that ―the viewing machine I was told existed only at the Jack in the Box.‖   
For similar reasons, we conclude that the prosecution did not deny 
defendant his rights under Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83.  To challenge a 
conviction on Brady grounds, defendant must show that the prosecution 
suppressed evidence, that the suppressed evidence was favorable to the defense, 
and that it was material.  (Barnett v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 890, 900-
41 
901; People v. Salazar (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1031, 1043.)  Defendant has failed to 
establish that the prosecution, by alerting him to the existence of the videotape and 
by making it available for him to view at the Jack in the Box, suppressed any 
information.  (Salazar, at p. 1049 [evidence is not suppressed when it ―is available 
to a defendant through the exercise of due diligence‖]; accord, Amado v. Gonzalez 
(9th Cir. 2014) 758 F.3d 1119, 1137 [―defense counsel cannot ignore that which is 
given to him or of which he otherwise is aware‖].)  Nor has defendant discharged 
his burden to show that the evidence allegedly withheld was favorable and 
material.  (Barnett, at pp. 900-901.)  Defendant does not deny that the prosecutor‘s 
secondhand description of the videotape did not reveal any evidence favorable to 
the defense.  He instead hypothesizes that favorable inferences might have been 
discovered if the defense had viewed the tape.  But speculation that favorable and 
material evidence might be found does not establish a violation of Brady.  (People 
v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 259.)   
E.  Refusal of Pinpoint Instruction on Circumstantial Evidence 
 The jury was instructed how to evaluate circumstantial evidence with 
CALJIC No. 2.01, as modified at defendant‘s request:  ―[A] finding of guilt as to 
any crime may not be based on circumstantial evidence unless the proved 
circumstances are not only, one, consistent with the theory that the defendant is 
guilty of the crime, but, two, cannot be reconciled with any other rational 
conclusion.  [¶]  Further, each fact which is essential to complete a set of 
circumstances necessary to establish the defendant‘s guilt must be proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  [¶]  In other words, before an inference essential to establish 
guilt may be found to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, each fact or 
circumstance on which the inference necessarily rests must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  [¶]  Also, if the circumstantial evidence as to any particular 
42 
count permits two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to a finding of 
guilt and the other to a finding that guilt has not been proven, you must adopt that 
interpretation which points to a finding that guilt has not been proven and reject 
that interpretation which points to a finding of guilt. [¶]  If, on the other hand, one 
interpretation of this evidence appears to you to be reasonable, and the other 
interpretation to be unreasonable, you must accept the reasonable interpretation 
and reject the unreasonable.‖   
The trial court rejected defendant‘s pinpoint instruction attempting to link 
the principle above to its theory of the case.  The rejected instruction provided:  ―If 
the evidence permits two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to the 
guilt of the defendant and the other to the guilt of [David Zaragoza], you must 
reject the interpretation that points to the defendant‘s guilt and return a verdict of 
not guilty.‖  The court expressed concern that the jury could ―easily‖ interpret the 
instruction to mean that ―the evidence can only point to the guilt of one or [the] 
other,‖ even though the jury in this case could conclude ―that the evidence points 
to the guilt of both.‖  The court also noted that there were ―sufficient other 
instructions‖ to make the point ―I think that you‘re trying to make, which is if they 
think it was David alone, they have to acquit the defendant.‖  What we find is that 
the refusal to give the requested instruction was not error. 
A trial court may properly reject an instruction proposed by the defendant if 
the instruction incorrectly states the law; is argumentative, duplicative, or 
potentially confusing; or is not supported by substantial evidence.  (People v. 
Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 30.)  The instruction proposed by defendant, as the trial 
court pointed out, was an incorrect statement of the law.  The proposed instruction 
posited that only one person (defendant or his brother David) could be ―guilty.‖  
Yet, as defendant himself concedes, the jury could have believed that defendant 
shot David Gaines ―as part of the robbery‖ committed by defendant and his 
43 
brother.  Under that version of the events, defendant could be guilty of murder.  
But so could David, as an accomplice under the instructions given to the jury, if 
the jury found that the murder was a natural and probable consequence of the 
robbery.  (See People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 262-263.)  Because it 
was possible to interpret the evidence as pointing towards David‘s guilt of the 
murder as an accomplice — and yet also find that defendant was guilty of murder 
as the shooter — the instruction was erroneous and thus properly rejected.   
To the extent defendant merely sought to advise the jury that only one man 
could have been the shooter, the trial court correctly concluded that the matter was 
covered adequately by the other instructions.  (People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 
1, 81-82; People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 975.)  Under CALJIC No. 2.01, 
the jury was instructed that if the circumstantial evidence was reasonably 
susceptible to two interpretations, only one of which pointed to guilt, it was 
obligated to reject that interpretation and adopt the interpretation pointing to a 
finding that guilt was not proven.  Moreover, the jury was instructed that the 
burden was on the People to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was 
the person who committed the charged crimes and that defendant was present at 
the time the crime was committed.  (CALJIC Nos. 2.91, 4.50.)  These instructions 
correctly advised the jury what to do if it harbored a reasonable doubt that David 
was the shooter.   
The cases on which defendant relies are plainly distinguishable.  In People 
v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, the trial court failed to instruct the jury how to 
evaluate the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, except as to evidence of 
mental state, thus depriving the jury of guidance as to how circumstantial evidence 
of identity should be evaluated.  (Id. at p. 885; see also People v. Fuentes (1986) 
183 Cal.App.3d 444, 455 [―None of the required instruction, which is set forth in 
CALJIC No. 2.01, was given.‖].)  Here, by contrast, the jury not only received the 
44 
general instruction as to circumstantial evidence, but was also told that the 
standard of reasonable doubt applied specifically to the issue of identity. 
F. Refusal of Request to Modify the Instruction on Motive           
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his request to 
modify the pattern instruction concerning motive.  The trial court did not 
prejudicially err.   
The jury was instructed about motive in accordance with CALJIC No. 2.51, 
as follows:  ―Motive is not an element of the crime charged and need not be 
shown.  However, you may consider motive or lack of motive as a circumstance in 
this case.  [¶]  Presence of motive may tend to establish the defendant is guilty.  
Absence of motive may tend to show the defendant is not guilty.‖  The defendant 
proposed, but the trial court rejected, a modification of the final paragraph of the 
instruction so that it would read:  ―Presence of motive IN THE DEFENDANT OR 
[DAVID ZARAGOZA] may tend to establish THAT PERSON‘S GUILT.  
Absence of motive IN THE DEFENDANT OR [DAVID ZARAGOZA] may tend 
to establish THAT PERSON‘S innocence.  You will therefore give its presence or 
absence, as the case may be, the weight to which you find it to be entitled.‖  The 
trial court rested its rejection of the instruction on the ground that the jury was not 
deciding David Zaragoza‘s guilt in this proceeding, and that defendant remained 
free to argue that David ―had motives.‖  
The trial court properly refused the modified instruction.  What that 
instruction directed the jury to consider is a third party‘s guilt, which in this case 
would have been a distraction from the jury‘s duty to decide whether the 
prosecution had proven defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  (People v. 
Lucas, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 286 [rejecting defense modification to CALJIC No. 
2.03 that would have instructed the jury to consider a third party‘s false and 
45 
misleading statements as evidence of his consciousness of guilt].)  As stated in the 
preceding section, this was not a situation in which only one of the two men could 
be guilty.  Moreover, the pattern instruction, which correctly stated the law 
(People v. Daya (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 697, 714), did not preclude the jury from 
considering David Zaragoza‘s motives in analyzing whether there was a 
reasonable doubt about defendant‘s guilt.  Indeed, defense counsel discussed 
David‘s possible motives in argument.  
Even if the jury had been instructed with the modified instruction, it is not 
reasonably probable that defendant would have achieved a more favorable result.  
(People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 887.)  The issue of David Zaragoza‘s 
motivation for the robbery was essentially moot, given the undisputed evidence 
that he committed the robbery.  The question for this jury, as far as motive was 
concerned, was whether defendant may have wanted to support or protect his 
brother while his brother was committing the robbery.  Evidence of David’s 
motivation sheds little light on that question.  Accordingly, any error would have 
been harmless.  (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 720-721.)  
G.  Denial of Motion to Suppress Defendant‘s Statements 
  Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to suppress his 
statements to police on June 13 and 14, 1999, as the product of an illegal detention 
and an illegal arrest, respectively.  The claim lacks merit.       
1.  Statements Made on June 13, 1999 
For his initial interview, defendant accompanied two detectives from his 
home to the sheriff‘s department. There, he was interviewed for two hours, and 
then driven to his mother‘s home.  Defendant claims that his consent to 
accompany the detectives was not voluntary and was instead the product of an 
implied assertion of authority.  The trial court ruled that defendant‘s consent was 
46 
―clearly voluntary.‖  We review the trial court‘s characterization of defendant‘s 
contact with the detectives as a consensual encounter independently, but we 
review its factual findings under the deferential substantial evidence standard.  
(People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 342.) 
On June 13, 1999, Detectives Alejandre and Wuest drove up to the Koker 
residence and found defendant sitting on the front porch.  The detectives were in 
plainclothes (jeans) and were driving an unmarked vehicle.  No other police units 
or personnel were present.  After introducing themselves, they informed defendant 
that they were investigating a homicide that had occurred two days earlier and 
mentioned that they had already talked to his brother.  When they asked whether 
defendant would be willing to come down to the sheriff‘s department for an 
interview, defendant said he would.  Defendant remained on the porch, 
unsupervised, while the detectives went into the house to talk to defendant‘s sister.  
When the detectives exited the house, they asked defendant whether he was ready 
to accompany them to the sheriff‘s department.  Defendant said he was.  After a 
―real quick patdown‖ for weapons, defendant got in the front passenger seat.  He 
was not handcuffed or otherwise involuntarily restrained.   
About 15 minutes later, defendant and the detectives arrived at the station 
and went to an interview room, which remained unlocked throughout.  Defendant 
was told that he was not under arrest, that the interview was voluntary and could 
be stopped at any time, and that they would drive him home at the end of the 
interview.  Defendant appeared to understand.  During the course of the interview, 
defendant agreed to a participate in a computer voice stress analysis and to allow 
photographs of his injuries.  At the end of the interview, he rode with the 
detectives in the unmarked vehicle to his mother‘s house.   
A detention occurs when the officer, by means of force or show of 
authority, has restrained a person‘s liberty.  (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 19, 
47 
fn. 16.)  Unlike a consensual encounter, a detention must be supported by 
reasonable suspicion the person is involved in criminal activity.  (People v. Souza 
(1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231.)  The facts here demonstrate that defendant was not 
detained by the officers.  Defendant was told that he was not under arrest and that 
the interview was ―voluntary.‖  He was reminded that he could stop the 
questioning at any time, and that he would then be driven back home.  The 
detectives conducting the interview were dressed casually, they displayed no 
weapons and uttered no commands.  They asked defendant for his permission 
before each of the investigative steps they undertook, and they at no point placed 
defendant under any restraints.  Indeed, defendant was left alone on the porch after 
the detectives secured his consent to accompany them to the station.  Given these 
facts, a reasonable person in defendant‘s situation would not have believed he or 
she lacked the freedom to leave, decline the detectives‘ requests, or otherwise 
terminate the encounter.  (People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 344-345; 
People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 328-329 [―the record amply supports the 
trial court‘s factual finding that defendant freely consented to remain for the 
purposes of speaking with [the] [d]etective [] . . . and being transported in 
handcuffs to the police station for further questioning,‖ where the defendant was 
handcuffed for safety reasons and expressed no reluctance about being 
handcuffed]; accord, People v. Anderson (Ill.App.Ct. 2009) 917 N.E.2d 18, 26.)   
2.  Statements Made on June 14, 1999 
The next day, Detective Wuest arrested defendant and his brother outside 
the county mental health facility.  Defendant contends that his postarrest 
statements should have been excluded as the fruits of an illegal arrest without 
probable cause.  The trial court denied his suppression motion, ruling that there 
was ―a strong suspicion of probable cause‖ at the time defendant was arrested.  
48 
Where, as here, the underlying facts are undisputed, we independently review 
whether those facts constitute probable cause for an arrest.  (People v. Glaser 
(1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.)  Probable cause is shown ―when the facts known to 
the arresting officer would persuade someone of ‗reasonable caution‘ that the 
person to be arrested has committed a crime.‖  (People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 
667, 673.)        
The police had probable cause here.  The investigating officers quickly 
identified David Zaragoza as a suspect based on the personal papers he left at the 
scene, including his book-and-release form and Medi-Cal identification card.  
Further investigation revealed that a second person must have been involved in the 
robbery homicide, and created a strong suspicion that the second person was 
defendant.  William Gaines told investigators that he saw his assailant running 
eastbound down the street at the same time he heard the gunshots.  In light of the 
contact wounds on David Gaines‘s body, Detective Wuest did not believe that one 
person could have been close enough to David Gaines to cause the contact wounds 
while also running down the street.  Indeed, one of the neighbors confirmed to a 
deputy sheriff that she saw two people running down the street after shots were 
fired.   
Suspicion focused on defendant as the detectives investigated David 
Zaragoza‘s claim not to have been with defendant on the night of the murder.  Not 
only had David announced that he was meeting his brother when he left the board 
and care home between 8:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. that night, but defendant himself 
admitted that he had been with his brother at that time.  Moreover, the fruits of the 
robbery — i.e., the Pyrex salad bowl and lid — were found in the garbage bin 
outside defendant‘s home a short time after the murder.  A receipt from a Jack in 
the Box located less than half a mile from the Gaines residence, reflecting a 
transaction that occurred not long after the murder, was also found in the garbage 
49 
bin outside defendant‘s home.  Taken together, these facts supplied a strong 
suspicion that defendant was a participant, along with his brother, in the robbery 
homicide.  (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1037.)     
H.  Failure to Excuse Juror No. 8  
Defendant claims the trial court violated his constitutional rights to due 
process and to an impartial jury by failing to conduct a full inquiry into a seated 
juror‘s potential bias and by failing to discharge that juror at the guilt phase.  We 
reject the claim. 
During the presentation of the defense case, Juror No. 8 sent a note to the 
trial judge.  The note recited that the juror and Steve Gaines, the victim‘s brother, 
both worked at Save Mart, that the two had talked on the phone, and added:  ―I 
think this should be no problem, but you should know.‖  Under examination by the 
court, the juror explained that he had only just realized the connection to David 
and William Gaines.  The juror had never met Steve Gaines in person, but had 
talked with him on the phone at least three times in the preceding three or four 
months, and expected to have contact with him again in the future.  Their phone 
conversations, which all predated the trial, involved work-related matters, such as 
installation of a punch clock in the store.  The juror pledged to avoid contact with 
Steve Gaines during the trial.  When defense counsel asked whether returning a 
verdict ―that‘s not proper with Mr. Gaines‖ would cause the juror any problems, 
the juror responded, ―I have no idea.  That‘s something you would have to, you 
know, it‘s something that could be a possibility.‖  The juror then reaffirmed that 
he would not feel an obligation to explain his verdict, regardless of what it was, to 
anyone, including Steve Gaines.  When defense counsel asked the juror whether 
―[y]ou feel comfortable with where you‘re at right now then,‖ the juror replied, 
50 
―I‘m fine.  I just wanted to make you aware of this.‖  Defense counsel then 
announced, ―I have no more questions.‖   
Defendant forfeited his challenge to the adequacy of the court‘s inquiry into 
the juror‘s potential bias.  He did so by announcing that he had no more questions 
and by failing to seek a broader or more extensive inquiry.  (People v. Holloway 
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 126 (Holloway).)  Defendant also forfeited his claim of error 
arising from the trial court‘s failure to discharge the juror.  Defendant neither 
sought the juror‘s excusal nor objected to the trial court‘s handling of the issue.  
(Id. at p. 124.)  But even if these claims had been preserved, we would find that 
they were meritless. 
The decision whether to investigate the possibility of juror bias or to 
discharge a juror rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.  (People v. 
Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 343.)  We find no abuse of discretion in the trial 
court‘s failure to inquire further into Juror No. 8‘s possible bias or to discharge 
him.  (Holloway, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 127.)  The record shows that the juror‘s 
infrequent contacts with Steve Gaines were limited to work matters and predated 
his jury service.  The juror also pledged to avoid contact with Gaines during the 
trial.  Although the juror expressed uncertainty when asked to predict whether a 
verdict that displeased Gaines might be a problem for the juror in the future, the 
juror was emphatic that he would not feel any obligation to justify his verdict, 
whatever it might be, to Gaines and that he was ―fine‖ sitting as a juror in the case.  
The trial court, which was able to observe the juror‘s tone and demeanor, 
conducted an inquiry adequate to determine that Juror No. 8 could be impartial 
and would be unaffected by the coincidence that the victim‘s brother, who was not 
a witness in the case, worked at the juror‘s place of employment.  (Cf. Ray, at p. 
344 [no abuse of discretion in failing to investigate where a juror disclosed that he 
worked at the high school attended by the murder victim‘s daughter but had never 
51 
discussed the case with her].)  Indeed, defendant fails to identify what part of the 
record could have supported the juror‘s inability to perform ― ‗as a demonstrable 
reality.‘ ‖  (People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 21.)  
We also find that defendant forfeited his claim that Juror No. 8 actively 
concealed his work relationship with Gaines, as well as his claim that this 
misconduct heightened the likelihood the juror was actually biased.  Defendant 
failed to object at trial that the juror had engaged in misconduct or to seek the 
juror‘s discharge.  (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 808, fn. 22.)  These 
claims are, in any event, meritless.  The juror stated that he had only recently 
realized that the Steve Gaines on the witness list was the Steve Gaines who 
worked at Save Mart, and the juror‘s claim of inadvertence was bolstered by the 
fact that he volunteered the possible connection rather than remain silent.  (People 
v. Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 344.)  An honest mistake on voir dire cannot upset a 
judgment in the absence of proof that the juror‘s wrong or incomplete answer hid 
actual bias, and the trial court‘s finding that Juror No. 8 was ―especially fair,‖ 
based on his sensitivity to defendant‘s viewpoint in answering the court‘s 
inquiries, is supported by the record here.  (See In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 
273, 300.)   
Finally, defendant‘s speculation that Gaines had supervisorial authority 
over the juror fails to acknowledge the juror‘s statement that Gaines was ―not 
anywhere within my path to have any effect on my career at all.‖  
I.  Cumulative Error 
Defendant contends that the cumulative effect of the asserted errors 
requires reversal of his murder and robbery convictions, even if none of the errors 
is prejudicial individually.  The only error we have found involved the death-
qualification of his jury, and the only error we have assumed, for purposes of 
52 
argument, was the failure to modify the instruction on motive.  Neither error 
increased the impact of the other, and their cumulative impact did not deprive 
defendant of a fair trial or his right to due process of law.    
IV.  PENALTY PHASE ISSUES 
Because we have determined that the penalty judgment must be reversed on 
account of the trial court‘s error in the death-qualification of the jury, we need not 
consider defendant‘s other claims of penalty phase error. 
53 
 
V.  DISPOSITION  
The judgment of death is reversed.  In all other respects, the judgment is 
affirmed.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Zaragoza 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S097886 
Date Filed: July 11, 2016 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Joaquin 
Judge: Thomas Teaford 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael R. Snedeker, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette and Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorneys 
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Stephanie Mitchell, Sean M. McCoy and Peter H. 
Smith, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Michael R. Snedeker 
Snedeker, Smith & Short 
4110 SE Hawthorne Boulevard 
Portland, OR  972414-5246 
(503) 234-3584 
 
Peter H. Smith 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 324-5114