Title: Commonwealth v. Niemic

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11535 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JONATHAN NIEMIC. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     April 9, 2015. - September 17, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Assistance of 
counsel, Argument by prosecutor, Cross-examination by 
prosecutor, Instructions to jury.  Evidence, Argument by 
prosecutor, Self-defense, Cross-examination, Impeachment of 
credibility, Prior inconsistent statement.  Self-Defense.  
Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 9, 2010. 
 
 
The case was tried before Thomas F. McGuire, Jr., J. 
 
 
 
Theodore F. Riordan (Deborah Bates Riordan with him) for 
the defendant. 
 
Tara L. Blackman, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
SPINA, J.  On October 20, 2010, the defendant stabbed the 
victim six times with a small folding pocket knife, killing him.  
The Commonwealth's theory of motive was that both men had been 
2 
 
vying for the affection of the same woman.  The primary dispute 
at trial was whether the victim was the first aggressor, whether 
the defendant acted in self-defense, and who first had 
possession of the knife.  The jury convicted the defendant of 
murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty.  On appeal the defendant asserts error by trial 
counsel, by the prosecutor, and by the judge.  He claims that 
trial counsel was ineffective (1) for making an incorrect 
argument about voluntary manslaughter (which he asked the jury 
to find), and (2) for failing to request an instruction on 
involuntary manslaughter.  The defendant argues that the 
prosecutor improperly cross-examined him on his right to remain 
silent, including (1) questions about why he had not gone to 
police with his version of events, (2) questions about his 
failure to tell his grandmother and friends that he was 
defending himself, and (3) questions that emphasized his failure 
to tell anyone his version of events until trial.  The defendant 
also contends that the prosecutor (4) improperly appealed to the 
sympathy of the jury in his closing argument, and (5) made 
improper argument about the defendant's failure to call 
witnesses to corroborate his testimony.  The defendant asserts 
that the judge erred (1) by failing to instruct the jury that 
the Commonwealth must disprove the absence of excessive force in 
self-defense, and (2) by giving an incorrect instruction on 
3 
 
self-defense.  We conclude that the combined effect of the 
prosecutor's closing argument and trial counsel's failure to 
request a voluntary manslaughter instruction based on reasonable 
provocation requires that the defendant be given a new trial.  
However, we give the Commonwealth the option of either accepting 
a reduction of the verdict to manslaughter, or having the 
conviction vacated and proceeding with a new trial. 
 
1.  Background.  The jury could have found the following 
facts.  We reserve other details for discussion of specific 
issues.  The defendant was incarcerated on an unrelated matter 
from about the middle of August, 2010, until October 15, 2010.  
While he was incarcerated, the defendant wrote a letter to a 
woman named Lisa whom he had started dating in June.  In the 
letter he confessed that he thought she was "perfect."  During 
the defendant's incarceration the victim took notice of Lisa and 
began flirting with her.  After the defendant was released from 
his incarceration he learned of the developing relationship 
between the victim and Lisa.  This angered the defendant, who 
told a friend that the next time he saw the victim he was going 
to punch him in the head.  On October 19, 2010, the defendant 
and Lisa socialized with another couple until about 11 P.M.  At 
one point the defendant and Lisa became involved in a mild 
argument over the victim.  The two couples agreed to get 
together the next day. 
4 
 
 
The two couples met at about 2 P.M. on October 20, as 
planned.  At about 7:30 P.M. they went to a soup kitchen in New 
Bedford because Lisa had forgotten her key to the addiction 
recovery house for women where she was staying, and other 
residents of the recovery house were at the soup kitchen 
attending an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting.  She planned to 
borrow a key from one of the residents who was at the meeting.  
The victim was at the meeting.  The defendant and Lisa appeared 
to be having a serious conversation. 
 
During a break in the meeting the defendant walked over to 
the victim and said he had been hearing things that the victim 
was saying about him, and he felt "disrespected."  The defendant 
then started punching the victim in the head.  The victim tried 
to deflect the blows and backed away.  The defendant started 
chasing and lunging at the victim.  He stabbed the victim six 
times with a small folding pocket knife, a type of knife the 
defendant owned.  The incident lasted no more than thirty 
seconds.  The defendant left the scene with the people who had 
arrived with him.  As they were driving, the defendant said that 
he had stabbed the victim, adding, "I hope I didn't kill him."  
The victim died later that night from his wounds, which included 
two puncture wounds to the heart and one that completely passed 
through the liver. 
5 
 
 
The defendant threw the knife into a wooded area.  It was 
later recovered by police.  The defendant's friends left him at 
a supermarket where he telephoned his grandmother.  He asked her 
to give him a ride.  The defendant's grandmother drove him to 
the home of one of his close friends.  He told one of the people 
living there that he had gotten into a fight over a girl with 
someone at the soup kitchen.  He said that he and the other man 
got into a fist fight, and that the other man got the better of 
him.  The defendant said that he went to the vehicle in which he 
had arrived, retrieved a knife, and then "slashed" the other man 
in the chest two or three times.  He said that he did not know 
if the other man was still alive.  This person heard him make 
several telephone calls trying to find out if the other man was 
alive.  The defendant seemed very worried. 
 
Police went to the friend's house looking for the defendant 
at approximately 2 A.M. on October 21, 2010.  They found him 
hiding in a cubby hole in a rear hallway.  He was placed under 
arrest.  Police observed a fresh cut on the defendant's right 
hand between the webbing of his right index finger and his 
thumb.  They also observed three fresh cuts on his left hand, 
two of which were between the webbing of his index finger and 
his thumb, and the third was on the pad of this thumb. 
 
A friend with whom the defendant had socialized on October 
19 and 20, 2010, testified for the defense.  He said that the 
6 
 
victim threw the first punch.  He also testified that about two 
months before the killing, the victim had threatened to stab the 
defendant.  The defendant testified in his defense.  He said 
that he was fearful of the victim, who was known as a "tough 
guy," and referred to as "Big Mike."  The victim was "a lot 
bigger" and ten years older than the defendant.  He said that he 
wanted to resolve their issues by talking when other people were 
nearby.  He testified that the victim started punching him and 
then pulled out a knife.  The defendant grabbed the blade of the 
knife and pulled it out of the victim's hand.1  The victim came 
after him and tried to grab him.  The defendant swung the knife 
"wildly" in order to defend himself.  He said that he did not 
realize that he was stabbing the victim, or that the victim 
might be seriously hurt, and that he broke down in tears over 
the incident.  He said that he never intended to kill the 
victim. 
 
The defendant testified that he once owned a similar knife, 
but not at that time.  He said that the knife that was involved 
in the stabbing was not his, and that he did not recall telling 
anyone that the fight was over a girl.  He denied going back to 
the car in which he arrived at the soup kitchen to get the 
                     
 
1 There is no dispute that deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 
testing on the knife handle and blade revealed blood from at 
least two individuals, that the defendant's DNA matched the 
major profile, and that the victim was a potential contributor 
of the minor profile. 
7 
 
knife, and he said that he had no recollection of telling anyone 
that he did so.  He testified that the victim had threatened to 
stab him about two months before the stabbing. 
 
2.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  The defendant first 
contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
request a jury instruction on involuntary manslaughter, based on 
his testimony that he did not intend to kill the victim.  See 
Commonwealth v. Whitman, 430 Mass. 746, 753 n.13 (2000) 
(involuntary manslaughter involves unintentional unlawful 
killing).  We need not dwell on this issue.  The defendant cites 
no authority in support of this argument.  The blade of the 
knife used to kill the victim penetrated the victim's body to a 
depth greater than the length of the blade.  The Commonwealth's 
pathologist testified that this can occur when the force with 
which the knife is thrust into the body compresses the rib cage.  
The force was so great that the knife blade went completely 
through the victim's liver.  The victim had been stabbed six 
times, including in the chest, back, and side.  In comparable 
circumstances, this court has said that an onslaught of this 
degree does not support a finding that the killing was 
unintentional, notwithstanding a defendant's statement that he 
did not intend to kill the victim.  A request for an involuntary 
manslaughter instruction properly would have been denied.  See 
Commonwealth v. Tague, 434 Mass. 510, 518-519 (2001), cert. 
8 
 
denied, 534 U.S. 1146 (2002); Commonwealth v. Dunton, 397 Mass. 
101, 103 (1986); Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249, 260 
(1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978).  Counsel was not 
ineffective for failing to request an instruction that was not 
warranted by the evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Leng, 463 Mass. 
779, 788 (2012). 
The defendant next argues that counsel was ineffective for 
making a legally incorrect and confusing argument on self-
defense and voluntary manslaughter.2  He contends that trial 
counsel urged the jury to find the defendant guilty of 
manslaughter because he had acted in self-defense.  The correct 
statement of law, he maintains, would have been that the 
defendant should be convicted of manslaughter because he had 
used excessive force in self-defense.  However, he continues, 
trial counsel argued self-defense, which should have culminated 
in a request for a verdict of not guilty.  Counsel was 
ineffective, the defendant concludes, because he failed to 
explain why the verdict should be manslaughter. 
The defendant misstates trial counsel's argument.  Trial 
counsel never used the term "self-defense" in his argument, and 
                     
 
2 A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel made on the 
trial record alone, as here, "is the weakest form of such a 
challenge because it is bereft of any explanation by trial 
counsel for his actions and suggestive of strategy contrived by 
a defendant viewing the case with hindsight."  Commonwealth v. 
Peloquin, 437 Mass. 204, 210 n.5 (2002). 
9 
 
he expressly said that he was not asking the jury to find the 
defendant not guilty.  The argument was purely factual.  Counsel 
argued that the significant variations in the eyewitness 
testimony were understandable because there were many people 
milling about and conversing in small groups during a break in 
the Alcoholics Anonymous meeting.  The various witnesses caught 
different and only partial glimpses of this very brief incident.  
In most instances, the glimpse that a witness caught was in his 
or her peripheral vision.  As a result, no one witness saw the 
entire incident, and there were obvious flaws in some 
perceptions of what occurred.  The culmination and thrust of the 
argument was that there was one fact that was not in dispute, 
and that was that the defendant sustained cuts on his hands, and 
his blood was found on the knife.  This could only be explained, 
he reasoned, by the defendant's testimony that the victim was 
the one who introduced the knife to the fray, and the 
defendant's hands were cut as he wrested it away from him.  
Counsel also argued, based on the testimony of the defendant's 
friend, that the victim had been the first aggressor.  Although 
counsel never used the words "self-defense" or "excessive use of 
force in self-defense," it is readily apparent that counsel was 
urging the jury to find that the defendant, armed with the knife 
he had taken from the victim, used excessive force in self-
defense while the victim continued to pursue him. 
10 
 
This was not a model closing argument, but it was adequate.  
Counsel's decision to focus on the single fact that was 
essential to the jury's acceptance of his manslaughter theory, 
namely, the victim's introduction of lethal force, without 
discussing the applicable law, was not a manifestly unreasonable 
strategy.  See Commonwealth v. Adams, 374 Mass. 722, 728 (1978) 
(tactical decision of counsel will not constitute ineffective 
assistance unless it was manifestly unreasonable when made).  
Counsel reasonably could have thought that a brief closing that 
concentrated on the most critical fact for the defense would 
emblazon the importance of that fact on the minds of the jurors 
and become the centerpiece of their deliberations.  He 
reasonably could have anticipated that in short order his 
closing would play directly into what the judge would instruct 
the jury on self-defense and use of excessive force in self-
defense, and that it would be more beneficial to concentrate on 
the facts without a discussion of the law. 
Typically (and properly), lawyers are permitted some leeway 
during closing argument to discuss the law as it pertains to 
their case, to give context to the facts they argue, but they 
are not required to do so.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Jones, 432 Mass. 
623, 628 (2000) ("Prosecutors and defense counsel must restrict 
their closing arguments to the evidence and [permissible] 
inferences that can be drawn from the evidence").  However, 
11 
 
lawyers may not misstate principles of law in closing argument.  
See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 401 Mass. 109, 113 (1987).  The 
prosecutor barely discussed the law in his closing argument.  
Counsel's decision to leave the jury with the factual crux of 
the defense, without comment on the law, did not amount to 
ineffective assistance. 
 
3.  Cross-examination of the defendant.  The prosecutor 
cross-examined the defendant about his failure to tell civilian 
witnesses that he was defending himself, his failure to contact 
police prior to his arrest and tell them that he was acting in 
self-defense, and whether the first time that he told anyone 
that he was defending himself was at trial.  The defendant 
argues that these questions constituted improper comment on his 
right to remain silent, and that a new trial is required.  See 
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976); Commonwealth v. Person, 
400 Mass. 136, 140 (1987).  There was no objection, so we review 
under the standard of a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage 
of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 681 
(1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014). 
 
During his direct examination the defendant testified that 
he had approached the victim.  The victim "snapped" at him, and 
then threw a punch at him.  The victim then produced the knife, 
but the defendant grabbed it from him.  The victim came at the 
defendant, who swung "wildly" at the victim to try to keep him 
12 
 
at bay.  The defendant testified that he did not realize that he 
was stabbing the victim, and that he did not intend to kill him.  
Later, he called for his grandmother to pick him up.  He was in 
shock and was crying over what had happened.  On cross-
examination the defendant said that he learned that the victim 
had been hurt badly and that he was concerned for the victim, as 
well as for himself.  He telephoned a number of people trying to 
find out how the victim was doing, and what kind of trouble he 
might be facing. 
 
Earlier in the trial a Commonwealth witness had testified 
that the defendant came to the house of a friend, where the 
witness had been staying.  The defendant appeared worried, and 
the witness asked him what had happened.  The defendant 
described the encounter with the victim, as previously 
discussed, including an admission that he, the defendant, went 
to the vehicle in which he arrived and obtained a knife.  The 
defendant also made statements about the stabbing as he and 
others drove from the scene. 
 
This was not a case in which the defendant was confronted 
with his prearrest silence.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Nickerson, 386 Mass. 54 (1982).  This was a case where the 
prosecutor was confronting the defendant with his prearrest 
statements, and impeaching him with inconsistencies between 
those statements and his trial testimony.  The defendant never 
13 
 
mentioned in his prearrest statements that he had acted in self-
defense or that the victim was the first aggressor.  The 
prosecutor was entitled to cross-examine the defendant about 
those inconsistencies, including any omissions in those 
statements that were different from his trial testimony.  See 
Commonwealth v. Hesketh, 386 Mass. 153, 161 (1982).  An omission 
in a prior statement may render that statement inconsistent 
"when it would have been natural to include the fact in the 
initial statement."  Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 
70, 72 (1995).  See Commonwealth v. Perez, 460 Mass. 683, 699 
(2011); Mass. G. Evid. § 613(a)(2) & notes (2015).  Where the 
defendant had been worried about the fate of the victim, as well 
as his own legal fate, it would have been natural to explain 
that he was acting in self-defense when describing the incident 
in his prearrest statement to civilian witnesses.  The 
prosecutor acted appropriately when cross-examining the 
defendant about what he told and what he did not tell civilian 
witnesses. 
 
The prosecutor's cross-examination of the defendant about 
his failure to seek out police to report that the victim might 
be in need of medical attention, and to tell them he acted in 
self-defense, was not proper.  Although the prosecutor might 
properly have cross-examined the defendant about his "concern" 
for the victim by asking if he called for an ambulance, it would 
14 
 
not have been natural for him to seek out police to tell his 
exculpatory story.  Compare Commonwealth v. Barnoski, 418 Mass. 
523, 536 (1994).  This was error, but we conclude that it did 
not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
The defendant had made several prearrest statements to friends 
in which he made no reference to self-defense.  We are satisfied 
that questions about his failure to seek out police to say he 
acted in self-defense added little, if anything, to the impact 
on the jury of the several statements he made to his friends in 
which he made no mention of self-defense.  Moreover, the 
prosecutor did not mention the matter in his closing argument, 
thus keeping any prejudice at a minimum.  See id. at 537 n.7. 
 
4.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant contends 
that the prosecutor made improper closing argument by appealing 
to the sympathy of jurors, and by arguing that the defendant 
failed to call witnesses to testify about the victim's 
reputation for violence.  Because the defendant did not object 
to the prosecutor's argument, our review is under the standard 
of a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Wright, 411 Mass. at 681.  In making that determination, the 
cumulative effect of all the errors must be "considered in the 
context of the arguments and the case as a whole."  Commonwealth 
v. Maynard, 436 Mass. 558, 570 (2002).   If a defendant 
establishes that the prosecutor's closing argument was improper, 
15 
 
we are guided by the following factors when deciding whether a 
new trial is required:  "whether 'defense counsel seasonably 
objected to the arguments at trial . . . whether the judge's 
instructions mitigated the error . . . whether the errors in the 
arguments went to the heart of the issues at trial or concerned 
collateral matters . . . whether the jury would be able to sort 
out the excessive claims made by the prosecutor . . . and 
whether the Commonwealth's case was so overwhelming that the 
errors did not prejudice the defendant.'"  Id., quoting 
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 425 Mass. 491, 500 (1997), S.C., 427 
Mass. 298, and 428 Mass. 39, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1003 (1998).  
See Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 516-518 (1987). 
 
The prosecutor's argument covered thirty pages of the trial 
transcript.  For the most part, it was highly structured and 
grounded in the trial record.  About one-third of the way 
through his closing, when discussing the defendant’s testimony 
that he was "scared" of the victim, that the victim was bigger 
and ten years older, and that the victim had a reputation as a 
"tough guy," the prosecutor argued as follows: 
"Bad guy, tough guy, bad reputation.  Where's the evidence 
of that?  Only out of his mouth.  And when you consider the 
credibility of witnesses in this case, you have to consider 
bias, motive to lie.  Who has the biggest interest in the 
outcome of this case?  This guy.  He's the one on trial.  
He's the one who wants to make you think poorly of [the 
victim].  Because that helps him.  Because then that starts 
to make you think maybe the guy wasn't such a good guy.  
16 
 
Maybe this isn't such a big deal.  There's no evidence of 
that."  (Emphases added.) 
 
The defendant contends that the argument constituted an improper 
missing witness argument.  There is some force to the claim.  
The argument implies, among other things we will discuss 
shortly, a failure to call witnesses on the question of the 
identity of the first aggressor.  As such, it was improper 
because the prosecutor did not first obtain judicial approval to 
make a missing witness argument, see Commonwealth v. Pena, 455 
Mass. 1, 16-17 (2009), and Mass. G. Evid. § 1111(a) (2015), and 
because testimony from third-party witnesses regarding the 
victim’s reputation would not be admissible.  See Commonwealth 
v. Adjutant, 443 Mass. 649, 664-665 (2005) (testimony by third-
party witnesses as to victim’s reputation for violent behavior 
to establish that victim was first aggressor is inadmissible). 
 
We discern another flaw in this argument.  A prosecutor may 
argue that a testifying defendant has an interest in the outcome 
of a case and his credibility may be scrutinized on that basis, 
see Commonwealth v. Ortega, 441 Mass. 170, 181-182 & n.19 
(2004), but the argument must be understated and approached 
cautiously.  Here, it was not.  The clear premise of the 
prosecutor's argument is that the defendant's testimony, because 
he was the defendant and on trial, did not even qualify as 
evidence because it was inherently incredible.  The argument was 
17 
 
patently improper.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Scesny, 472 Mass. 185, 
201-202 (2015) (prosecutor improperly described evidence 
introduced by defendant as not material or relevant and 
therefore not to be considered as evidence). 
Toward the end of his argument the prosecutor focused on 
the Cunneen factors that must be considered on the question of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty.  They are: indifference to the 
victim's suffering, the consciousness and degree of suffering of 
the victim, the number of stab wounds and physical punches 
thrown, the manner and force with which the stab wounds were 
inflicted, and the disproportion between the means needed to 
cause death and those employed.  See Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 
389 Mass. 216, 227 (1983).  This part of the prosecutor's 
closing was very powerful, and proper.  The prosecutor should 
have stopped there.  He ended his closing argument with a highly 
improper, emotionally charged discussion covering three pages of 
transcript. 
 
The prosecutor built upon the Cunneen factors.  He 
commented that the civilian witnesses, who were "at the wrong 
time at the wrong place," tried to save the victim, only to 
"[see] the color run right out of him, right down to gray.  And 
they saw him struggling and bleeding in front of his own 
father."  The emotional impact on witnesses of the victim's 
death was not a proper matter for consideration by the jury.  In 
18 
 
contrast to the defendant's indifference, the prosecutor 
developed a mantra of how "[the victim's] life mattered" to his 
family, to the civilians who tried to save him, to the 
paramedics who summoned heroic effort to try to save this "total 
stranger," to the police who investigated the case, and "to all 
of us."  He ended with a statement that the victim "has as much 
right . . . [to live as] this defendant . . . has an absolute 
right to a fair trial. . . .  [The victim] had a 
[c]onstitutional right to live, to pursue whatever means of 
happiness he chose to pursue.[3] . . .  [H]e was a human being 
just like any of us, and . . . there was an inherent value to 
his life just like any of our lives."  He asked the jury, on 
behalf of the Commonwealth, to return "a fair and just verdict," 
adding that the victim "asks for no more, but he deserves 
nothing less," because the defendant "chose . . . to end the 
life of [the victim]" out of "anger." 
 
It is improper for a prosecutor to characterize a criminal 
trial as a dispute between a deceased victim on the one hand, 
and the defendant on the other, and to exhort the jury to 
dispense justice evenly between them.  The deceased is not a 
party to the case.  A criminal trial places the interests of the 
Commonwealth and the defendant against one another.  An argument 
                     
 
3 The prosecutor had argued earlier that the victim "had 
every right to have an acquaintance with Lisa Weaver, as well as 
she did" with the victim. 
19 
 
that asks the jury to give justice to the victim is an improper 
appeal to sympathy for the victim.  See Commonwealth v. 
Drumgold, 423 Mass. 230, 253 (1996).  The prosecutor's improper 
call to justice for the victim was aggravated by his inclusion 
of the paramedics and the civilian witnesses to the victim's 
last moments in his appeal to sympathy.  Similarly, the 
prosecutor's argument that the victim's life mattered, and that 
the victim had a constitutional right to live, were improper 
appeals to sympathy.  See Commonwealth v. Torres, 437 Mass. 460, 
464-465 (2002). 
 
These improprieties were not just fleeting comments or 
minor aspects of his closing argument, nor were they the type of 
afterthought that we have said does not require reversal.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Judge, 420 Mass. 433, 451-452 (1995) 
(single improper sentence appealing to sympathy does not require 
new trial).  The improper comments at the end of the closing 
comprised a structural segment, indeed, the denouement of the 
prosecutor's closing.  This section of his argument was 
integrated into his argument of the Cunneen factors, 
particularly the defendant's indifference to the victim's 
suffering.  The juxtaposition of the defendant's indifference 
with the effect of the killing on the paramedics, the civilian 
witnesses, the police, and "all of us," for whom the victim's 
life "mattered," was demonstrably improper.  It suggested that 
20 
 
everyone's collective concern for the victim's life was a 
legally relevant consideration of and, by way of contrast, an 
illumination of the defendant's indifference to the victim's 
suffering.  Although jurors may be credited as having a "certain 
measure of . . . sophistication in sorting out excessive 
claims," Kozec, 399 Mass. at 517, the suggestion here was that 
they properly and logically could consider the evidence of 
heroic and humanitarian efforts to save the victim, and the 
rhetoric of how his life "mattered" to everyone except the 
defendant, on the question of the defendant's indifference to 
the victim's suffering.  The judge's general instructions on 
evidence, sympathy, and arguments of counsel did not dispel that 
notion.  See Santiago, 425 Mass. at 501.  He did not 
specifically address the prosecutor's improprieties, which were 
hard driving and sustained, and which went to a critical aspect 
of the case.  The prosecutor's argument far overshadowed the 
defendant's assertion at trial that he was concerned for the 
victim and did not realize that he was stabbing him. 
 
The portion of the argument that presumed that the 
defendant was not credible because he was on trial challenged 
the heart of the defense, namely, the defendant's credibility as 
to who was the initial aggressor, who produced the knife, and 
whether the defendant had acted in self-defense.  Again, the 
21 
 
judge's general instructions did not adequately address the 
error. 
 
Although there was no objection, which is some indication 
of the level of prejudice, that is not dispositive.  
Commonwealth v. Toro, 395 Mass. 354, 360 (1985).  The 
Commonwealth's case was strong, but it was not overwhelming.  We 
have serious concerns about the effect of the improprieties in 
the prosecutor's closing argument on the jury's deliberations.  
We need not decide if they created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice because we have identified another error 
in the course of our plenary review that, in combination with 
the errors in the prosecutor's closing argument, require a new 
trial.  That error is discussed in the final section of this 
opinion. 
 
5.  Jury instructions.  The defendant asserts error in the 
jury instructions.  We address them because they may arise on 
remand.  First, he argues that the judge failed to instruct the 
jury that in order to return a verdict of guilty of murder, the 
jury must find that the Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt the absence of mitigating circumstances, specifically, the 
absence of excessive force in self-defense.  Second, the 
defendant contends that the instruction on manslaughter was 
flawed because it used permissive language that failed to 
require the jury to find manslaughter if the defendant used 
22 
 
excessive force in self-defense, and because it inconsistently 
stated that the jury should consider manslaughter only if the 
defendant lawfully was acting in self-defense.  There were no 
objections to the judge's instructions. 
 
The Model Jury Instructions on Homicide (1999) in effect at 
the time of the trial of this case, at page 27, contain the 
instruction that "[i]n order to obtain a conviction of murder, 
the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the 
absence of . . . mitigating circumstances," including "excessive 
use of force in self-defense."  The judge did not include this 
instruction, and he should have included it.  However, the judge 
twice instructed the jury that to obtain a conviction of murder 
the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant did not act in self-defense, and if it failed to do 
so, then they must find the defendant not guilty.  The judge 
also instructed that if the Commonwealth proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant used excessive force in 
defending himself (the judge defined excessive force in self-
defense), then the jury should return a verdict of guilty of 
voluntary manslaughter.  This was a correct statement of law.  
See Commonwealth v. Glacken, 451 Mass. 163, 167 (2008); 
Commonwealth v. Williams, 450 Mass. 879, 885 n.4 (2008); 
Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 433 Mass. 558, 563 (2001); 
Commonwealth v. Little, 431 Mass. 782, 787 (2000); Commonwealth 
23 
 
v. Boucher, 403 Mass. 659, 663 (1989).  It also conformed with 
the Model Jury Instructions on Homicide (1999), at page 30.  
There was no error, but we urge judges to adhere to the model 
instructions on homicide.  On remand, the 2013 version of the 
Model Jury Instructions on Homicide should be followed. 
 
The defendant's final argument fails.  The judge erred by 
his use of the permissive words "may" and "should"4 when 
discussing use of excessive force in self-defense, rather than 
the clearly directive "must."  See Commonwealth v. Santos, 454 
Mass. 770, 776-777 (2009).  See also Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 
433 Mass. 558, 563 (2001) (where mandatory language is required, 
permissive language should not be used).  In Santos, a new trial 
was required because the judge used permissive language and 
"failed to make clear to the jury . . . that murder was 
unavailable," and not an option, where the killing occurred as a 
result of the use of excessive force in self-defense.  Id. at 
776.  Here, the judge instructed the jury that "[i]f the 
defendant used excessive force in defending himself in light of 
all the circumstances, the defendant may be found guilty of no 
more than manslaughter."  Unlike the judge at the underlying 
trial in Santos, the judge here made it abundantly clear that 
murder was not an option if the Commonwealth proved that the 
                     
 
4 See Commonwealth v. Caramanica, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 376, 378 
(2000) ("should" is permissive). 
24 
 
defendant used excessive force in lawfully defending himself.  
Although the judge did not use the precise language used in the 
Model Homicide Instructions (2013), at page 71, he anticipated 
the basic instruction that has been approved for current use. 
 
There is no merit to the defendant's claim that the judge 
incorrectly instructed the jury that voluntary manslaughter is 
the use of excessive force when lawfully defending oneself.  
This was a correct formulation.  As we said in Santos, "the use 
of excessive force deprives the defendant of his right to be 
acquitted altogether, entitling him instead to a verdict of 
manslaughter."  Santos, 454 Mass. at 775.  There was no error. 
 
6.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  There was evidence 
that the victim was the first aggressor, that the victim 
introduced a knife during the fray, that the defendant was 
fearful of the victim, and that the defendant swung the knife 
wildly.  This evidence, particularly the evidence of the 
defendant's mental state, warranted an instruction on reasonable 
provocation.  The defendant was entitled to such an instruction, 
and it would have been compatible with excessive force in self-
defense.  Indeed, it probably would have been more favorable to 
the defendant.  Such an instruction, had it been given, would 
have allowed the jury to find the defendant guilty of voluntary 
manslaughter if they had a reasonable doubt as to whether the 
victim initiated the fight by throwing the first punch.  Counsel 
25 
 
should have requested such an instruction, and such an 
instruction should have been given.  See Commonwealth v. 
Acevedo, 446 Mass. 435, 446-450 (2006).  The cumulative effect 
of the absence of this instruction and the errors in the 
prosecutor's closing argument create a substantial likelihood of 
a miscarriage of justice.  The judgment is vacated. 
The Commonwealth shall have the option of either retrying 
the defendant on the murder indictment or accepting a reduction 
of the verdict to manslaughter, which was the verdict urged by 
the defendant at his first trial, and which is the verdict he 
could best hope to obtain after a request for an instruction on 
reasonable provocation.  See Commonwealth v. Howard, 469 Mass. 
721, 750 (2014).  The Commonwealth shall inform this court 
within fourteen days of the date this opinion issues whether it 
will retry the defendant for murder in the first degree or move 
to have the defendant sentenced for manslaughter.  After the 
Commonwealth so informs us, we will issue an appropriate 
rescript to the Superior Court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.