Title: Lake City Corporation v. City of Mequon

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
94-3240 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Lake City Corporation, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
City of Mequon, 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
__________________________________________ 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  199 Wis.2d 353, 544 N.W.2d 600 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1996) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
January 30, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument:  
December 5, 1996 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Ozaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
 
JOSEPH D. MC CORMACK 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were 
briefs by John L. DeStefanis, Donald L. Mabry and Prieve & Meyer, 
S.C., Milwaukee and oral argument by John L. DeStefanis. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there was a brief by Alan 
Marcuvitz, Andrea Roschke and Weiss, Berzowski, Brady & Donahue, 
Milwaukee and oral argument by Andrea Roschke. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Richard A. Lehmann and 
Boardman, Suhr, Curry & Field, Madison for the Wisconsin Chapter 
of the American Planning Assocation. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Curtis A. Witynski and 
League of Wisconsin Municipalities and Eunice Gibson, James M. 
Voss and City of Madison, all of Madison, for the League of 
Wisconsin  
Municipalities and City of Madison. 
No. 94-3240 
 
1
  
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 94-3240 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Lake City Corporation, 
 
  
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v. 
 
City of Mequon, 
 
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 30, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  
Reversed and remanded. 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.  The City of Mequon (“Mequon”) 
seeks review of a published decision of the court of appeals,1 
which reversed and remanded a judgment of the Circuit Court for 
Ozaukee County, Joseph D. McCormack, Judge.  The court of 
appeals held that, under Wis. Stat. § 236.13(1)(c) (1991-92)2, a 
local master plan is consistent with an official map only to the 
extent the master plan reflects issues encompassed in the 
official map.  Accordingly, the court of appeals held that 
Mequon's Plan Commission (“Plan Commission”) improperly denied 
preliminary plat approval to Lake City Corporation (“Lake City”) 
                     
1  Lake City Corp. v. City of Mequon, 199 Wis. 2d 353, 544 N.W.2d 
600 (Ct. App. 1996). 
2 Section 236.13(1)(c) provides: “Approval of the preliminary or 
final plat shall be conditioned upon compliance with . . . [a]ny 
local master plan which is consistent with any  . . . official 
map adopted under s. 62.23.” 
All future references are to the 1991-92 Statutes unless 
otherwise indicated. 
No. 94-3240 
 
2
on the grounds that the plat conflicted with an element 
contained only in the master plan.  We conclude that, under 
§ 236.13(1)(c), a master plan is consistent with an official map 
if any common elements contained in both the master plan and 
official map are not contradictory.  We further conclude that a 
master plan is consistent with an official map even if the 
master plan contains additional elements that the official map 
does not.  We therefore hold that a city plan commission may 
rely on an element contained solely in a master plan to reject 
plat approval.3  Thus, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I. 
¶2 
In 1977, Lake City purchased 59 acres of land located 
in Mequon, Wisconsin.4  In March 1984, Lake City petitioned 
Mequon to rezone its property from RS-2 and RS-2(OH) zoning 
classifications 
to 
RS-3(OGP), 
RS-4(OGP), 
and 
C-3 
zoning 
classifications.  This proposed rezoning would allow Lake City 
to construct duplex structures on approximately 16 acres, and 
single family units on approximately 30 acres.  Lake City could 
use the remaining 10 acres for commercial development.  Mequon, 
by action of its common council, voted to rezone the property in 
substantially this manner.5  
                     
3  In this case, Mequon delegated its authority to review plats 
for subdivisions to the Plan Commission under Wis. Stat. 
§ 236.10(3).  Accordingly, this case deals with the authority of 
a city plan commission to deny plat approval.  However, our 
holding similarly applies to a municipality that has retained 
plat approval authority because it has not delegated such 
authority or has not created a plan commission.  This is because 
§ 236.13(1)(c) applies generally to plat approval, regardless of 
the entity authorized to review plats.   
4  The property is on the north side of West Mequon Road, and 
east of 76th Street (Wauwatosa Road). 
5  The city council rezoned the property as RS-3(OGP), 
RS-4 (OGP), and C-2 classifications.  
No. 94-3240 
 
3
¶3 
In the summer of 1992, Mequon began the process of 
comprehensively revising its master plan and zoning ordinances, 
due to growth in the city.  According to Mequon, it had informed 
the community of its new planning goals by 1993; therefore, 
developers began submitting plans for dormant projects to the 
Plan Commission in an attempt to gain approval before Mequon 
completed the revision of its master plan and zoning ordinances. 
¶4 
It appears that Lake City was one such developer.  
Lake City had taken no affirmative steps to develop its property 
since 1984, when Mequon had rezoned the property as requested.  
However, on February 1, 1993, Lake City applied for preliminary 
plat approval.  The plat provided for 33 single family 
residential lots of no less than 30,000 square feet in the RS-3 
area, and 18 lots consisting of 56 units in the multi-family RS-
4 area.6 The plat conformed with existing zoning ordinances.    
¶5 
The 
Plan 
Commission 
was 
originally 
scheduled to 
consider Lake City's proposed plat for approval on March 15, 
1993, but it tabled this matter until March 29, 1993.  On March 
29, the Plan Commission was also scheduled to consider a 
resolution proposing to amend Mequon's land use map, or 
comprehensive zoning plan, contained in Mequon's master plan.  
If adopted, the resolution would amend an area of the land use 
map which included Lake City's property, by limiting such area 
to residential uses of 1.5 acre minimum lot size per dwelling 
unit.  
¶6 
On March 29, 1993, the Plan Commission voted to adopt 
this amendment.  The Plan Commission then voted to deny Lake 
                     
6  Lake City did not propose to develop the C-2 area of the 
property. 
No. 94-3240 
 
4
City's request for preliminary plat approval, because the 
proposed plat conflicted with the newly adopted amendment to the 
master plan.  In particular, Lake City's plat proposed a total 
of 56 residential units, whereas the revised master plan allowed 
for a maximum capacity of 37 residential units.7  
¶7 
Lake City commenced this action on April 27, 1993, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 236.13(5).  The circuit court held that 
under Wis. Stat. §§ 62.23(2), 62.23(3)(b), and 236.13(1)(c), the 
Plan Commission had authority to deny Lake City's application 
for plat approval based upon the newly enacted amendment to the 
master 
plan. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
concluded 
that 
its 
interpretation of these statutes was supported by the following 
dicta in Reynolds v. Waukesha County Park & Planning Comm'n, 109 
Wis. 2d 56, 324 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1982):  “A 'local master 
plan' denotes a plan adopted by a municipal plan commission or 
the governing body of a municipality.  [Citation omitted.]  No 
such plan existed in the instant case.  Had there been one, only 
[the village of] Butler would have had authority to use it as a 
basis for disapproval of the plat.”  Id. at 63. 
¶8 
The court of appeals reversed.  Relying primarily on 
Gordie Boucher Lincoln-Mercury Madison, Inc. v. City of Madison 
Plan Comm'n, 178 Wis. 2d 74, 503 N.W.2d 265 (Ct. App.), review 
denied, 508 N.W.2d 421 (1993) (hereinafter “Gordie Boucher”), 
the court concluded that Wis. Stat. § 236.13(1)(c) authorizes a 
city plan commission “to look towards master plans only to the 
limited extent that the master plan reflects issues encompassed 
                     
7  On June 8, the city council passed a moratorium on new 
development.  In addition, the city council subsequently rezoned 
the RS-3 and RS-4 areas of Lake City's property, consistent with 
the amendment to the master plan. 
No. 94-3240 
 
5
in the locality's official map.”  Lake City Corp., 199 Wis. 2d 
at 360.  The court further determined that the legislative 
history of § 236.13(1)(c) supported its decision, because it 
concluded that the legislature modified this statute in 1979 to 
“eliminate any chance that a plan commission could use its 
master plan in this manner.”  Id. at 363.  
II. 
¶9 
The sole issue presented for review is whether Wis. 
Stat. § 236.13(1)(c) authorizes a city plan commission to deny 
plat approval based solely upon an element contained in a master 
plan.  Statutory interpretation is a question of law.  E.g., 
Stockbridge School Dist. v. Department of Pub. Instruction Sch. 
Dist. Boundary Appeal Bd., 202 Wis. 2d 214, 219, 550 N.W.2d 96 
(1996); Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc., 201 Wis. 2d 320, 327, 548 
N.W.2d 519 (1996).  This court reviews questions of law de novo, 
without giving deference to the decisions of the lower courts.  
E.g., Jungbluth, 201 Wis. 2d at 327; Hughes v. Chrysler Motors 
Corp., 197 Wis. 2d 973, 978, 542 N.W.2d 148 (1996).   
¶10 The goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain 
and give effect to the intent of the legislature.  E.g., 
Stockbridge School Dist., 202 Wis. 2d at 219; Hughes, 197 Wis. 
2d at 978.  To achieve this goal, we first resort to the plain 
language of the statute itself.  E.g., Jungbluth, 201 Wis. 2d at 
327; In re Kyle S.-G., 194 Wis. 2d 365, 371, 533 N.W.2d 794 
(1995).  In the absence of statutory definitions, this court 
construes all words according to their common and approved 
usage, which may be established by dictionary definitions.  
Swatek v. County of Dane, 192 Wis. 2d 47, 61, 531 N.W.2d 45 
(1995) (quoting State v. Gilbert, 115 Wis. 2d 371, 377-78, 340 
No. 94-3240 
 
6
N.W.2d 511, 514 (1983)).8  In addition, it is a basic rule of 
statutory construction that effect is to be given to every word 
of a statute if possible, so that no portion of the statute is 
rendered superfluous.  County of Columbia v. Bylewski, 94 Wis. 
2d 153, 164, 288 N.W.2d 129 (1980); State v. Wachsmuth, 73 Wis. 
2d 318, 324, 243 N.W.2d 410 (1976).  It is also a fundamental 
rule of statutory construction that any result that is absurd or 
unreasonable must be avoided.  E.g., Jungbluth, 201 Wis. 2d at 
327 (citing Green Bay Redev. Auth. v. Bee Frank Inc., 120 Wis. 
2d 402, 409, 355 N.W.2d 240 (1984)).  
¶11  If the meaning of a statute is clear from its 
language, we are prohibited from looking beyond such language to 
ascertain its meaning.  Stockbridge School Dist., 202 Wis. 2d at 
220 (quoting Jungbluth, 201 Wis. 2d at 327).  However, if a 
statute does not clearly set forth the legislative intent, we 
must look at the history, scope, context, subject matter, and 
object of the statute.  Id.; In re Kyle S.-G., 194 Wis. 2d at 
371. 
¶12 We therefore turn to the language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 236.13(1)(c), to determine whether it clearly sets forth the 
intent of the legislature.  Section 236.13(1)(c) provides in 
pertinent part:  “Approval of the preliminary or final plat 
shall be conditioned upon compliance with . . . [a]ny local 
master plan which is consistent with any . . . official map 
adopted under s. 62.23.”  The parties dispute the meaning of 
“consistent” in § 236.13(1)(c).  Lake City contends that any 
                     
8  However, this general rule of statutory construction does not 
apply to technical words and phrases that have a peculiar 
meaning.  See State v. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 904, 470 N.W.2d 
900 (1991). 
No. 94-3240 
 
7
portion of a master plan that deals with issues not covered by 
an official map is inconsistent with the official map.  Under 
this interpretation, a city plan commission may deny plat 
approval based upon an element contained in a master plan only 
if such element is similarly contained in an official map.   
¶13 Mequon claims that Lake City's proposed interpretation 
of Wis. Stat. § 236.13(1)(c) renders the words “master plan” 
superfluous.  Mequon further contends that “[i]f the legislature 
had intended that only issues addressed in an official map could 
form the basis of a denial of a plat, then it need have only 
referenced the 'official map' in Section 236.13(1)(c), Stats.”  
(Petitioner's brief at 9.)  Accordingly, Mequon asserts that 
this court must interpret “consistent” in § 236.13(1)(c) as 
requiring that any issues addressed in both a master plan and an 
official map are not "otherwise inconsistent." (Petitioner's 
brief at 10.)  If this requirement is met, Mequon claims that a 
master plan is consistent with an official map even if the 
master plan addresses issues not contained in the official map. 
¶14 We agree with Mequon's interpretation of the plain 
language of Wis. Stat. § 236.13(1)(c).  The word “consistent,” 
according to common and approved usage, means “[i]n agreement; 
compatible.”  The American Heritage Dictionary 402 (3d ed. 
1992).9   In other words, “consistent” means “not contradictory." 
 Under a common sense application of this definition to the 
present case, a master plan is consistent with an official map 
if they share common elements, meaning that any elements 
                     
9  The legislature did not define the word "consistent" in Wis. 
Stat. § 236.13. 
No. 94-3240 
 
8
addressed by both the master plan and official map are in 
agreement.   
¶15 However, it does not necessarily follow that a master 
plan is inconsistent with an official map if the master plan 
contains elements that the official map does not.  A master 
plan, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 62.23(2), is likely to contain 
additional elements.10  Yet, a master plan is not incompatible 
with an official map simply because the master plan contains 
additional elements.  So long as any issues addressed in both a 
master plan and an official map are not contradictory, the 
master plan is consistent with the official map. 
¶16 We additionally accept Mequon's interpretation because 
it gives effect to the words “master plan” in Wis. Stat. 
§ 236.13(1)(c), whereas Lake City's interpretation does not. 
Under Lake City's interpretation, a plan commission can rely on 
                     
10  An official map may show only streets, highways, historic 
districts, parkways, parks, playgrounds, the location of 
railroad rights-of-way, waterways and public transit facilities. 
Wis. Stat. § 62.23(6)(b).  
However, under § 62.23(2), a master plan: 
[M]ay include, among other things without limitation 
because 
of 
enumeration, 
the 
general 
location, 
character and extent of streets, highways, freeways, 
street grades, roadways, walks, bridges, viaducts, 
parking areas, tunnels, public places and areas, 
parks, 
parkways, 
playgrounds, 
sites 
for 
public 
buildings 
and 
structures, 
airports, 
pierhead 
and 
bulkhead lines, waterways, routes for railroads and 
buses, historic districts, and the general location 
and extent of sewers, water conduits and other public 
utilities whether privately or publicly owned, the 
acceptance, 
widening, 
narrowing, 
extension, 
relocation, removal, vacation, abandonment or change 
of use of any of the foregoing public ways, grounds, 
places, 
spaces, 
buildings, 
properties, 
utilities, 
routes or terminals, the general location, character 
and extent of community centers and neighborhood 
units, the general character, extent and layout of the 
replanning of blighted districts and slum areas, and a 
comprehensive zoning plan.  
 
Wis. Stat. § 62.23 (emphasis added). 
No. 94-3240 
 
9
a master plan only to the limited extent that it reflects issues 
contained in an official map.  Accordingly, the words "master 
plan" are rendered superfluous, because the master plan serves 
as nothing more than a conduit to the official map.  If the 
legislature had intended such a result, it need not have 
included the words "master plan" in the statute; it could have 
simply included the words "official map."  
¶17 We further reject Lake City's proffered interpretation 
because it leads to an illogical result.  Under Wis. Stat. 
§ 236.11, a final plat is entitled to approval only if it 
"conforms substantially . . . to local plans . . . adopted as 
authorized by law . . . ."11  The reference in § 236.11 to local 
(master) plans is not qualified by reference to an official map. 
 Accordingly, if we were to accept Lake City's interpretation, 
this would result in the following: under § 236.11 a plan 
commission would have authority to deny final plat approval 
based on any element contained in a master plan, whereas under 
§ 236.13(1)(c) it would have authority to deny preliminary plat 
approval based on an element contained in a master plan only if 
the element was similarly contained in an official map.  Not 
only is this result absurd, but it also directly contradicts 
§ 236.13(1)(c).  Section 236.13(1)(c) explicitly applies to 
preliminary and final plats, and therefore indicates that a plan 
                     
11  "When multiple statutes are contained in the same chapter and 
assist in implementing the chapter's goals and policy, the 
statutes should be read in pari materia and harmonized if 
possible."  In re Angel Lace M., 184 Wis. 2d 492, 512, 516 
N.W.2d 678 (quoting In re R.W.S., 162 Wis. 2d 862, 871, 471 
N.W.2d 16 (1991)).  "In pari materia" refers to statutes that 
deal with the same subject matter or have the same common 
purpose.  Id. at 512 n.13.  Sections 236.11 and 236.13(1)(c) 
both deal with plat approval, and therefore should be construed 
together.   
No. 94-3240 
 
10
commission's authority to review both preliminary and final 
plats under ch. 236 should be substantially similar.    
¶18 Application of Lake City's interpretation would lead 
to an additional illogical result.  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§§  62.23(2), (3), and (6)(b), a city is not required to have an 
official map, nor is a municipality prohibited from having a 
master plan in the absence of an official map.  Under Lake 
City's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 236.13(1)(c), if a 
municipality has only a master plan, then the master plan could 
never serve as the basis for the denial of preliminary plat 
approval, since none of the issues addressed in the master plan 
would be similarly addressed in the (non-existent) official map. 
 Therefore, in these circumstances, § 236.13(1)(c) would be 
rendered a nullity.  Again, this result defies common sense, 
because the plan commission could then deny final plat approval 
based upon any element contained in the master plan under Wis. 
Stat. § 236.11.   
¶19 We also conclude that language in Reynolds supports 
Mequon's 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 236.13(1)(c).  
Specifically, the court stated: "No such [master] plan existed 
in the instant case.  Had there been one, only [the village of] 
Butler would have had authority to use it as a basis for 
disapproval of the plat."  Reynolds, 109 Wis. 2d at 63.  The 
Reynolds court therefore indicated that where a local master 
plan exists, a municipality has the authority to rely on it to 
deny plat approval.12 
                     
12  We agree with Lake City and the court of appeals that the 
issue the Reynolds court addressed was what entity had the 
authority to rely on the master plan  the village or the county 
park commission.  Nonetheless, the Reynolds court's statement 
supports the assertion that where a local master plan exists, a 
No. 94-3240 
 
11
¶20 Finally, 
we conclude 
that 
the 1957 
interpretive 
commentary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 236.13 
supports 
Mequon's 
interpretation of this statute.  The interpretive commentary 
states: "The master plan standing alone has no legal teeth.  But 
for plat approval purposes 236.13(1) puts legal teeth into the 
relatively few master plans that do exist in this state.”  Jacob 
H. Beuschler, Interpretive Commentary [1957], Wis. Stat. Ann. 
§ 236.13 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996).13 Mequon's interpretation is 
consistent with the legislature's intent to put "legal teeth" 
into master plans, because it allows city plan commissions to 
continue to rely on master plans to deny plat approval.   
¶21 The court of appeals concluded that this interpretive 
commentary is no longer persuasive in light of the 1979-80 
amendment to Wis. Stat. § 236.13(1)(c).  In particular, the 
court of appeals determined that, by recreating § 236.13(1)(c) 
in 1955, the legislature intended to provide plan commissions 
with the power to give master plans equal weight with ordinances 
or official maps when reviewing a plat.  Lake City Corp., 199 
Wis. 2d at 362.  However, the court of appeals further 
determined that: 
 
[T]wenty years later, as master plans became more 
common, the dynamics of the equation changed and the 
legislature apparently reasoned that the total risk to 
landowners and developers no longer outweighed the 
benefits.  Whatever, the statute was modified to 
eliminate any chance that a plan commission could use 
its master plan in this manner. 
Id. at 362-63.  We have reviewed the legislative history of the 
1979-80 amendment, and conclude that although the text of the 
                                                                  
municipality may use it as a basis to deny plat approval. 
13 The interpretive commentary to Wis. Stat. § 236.13 was cited 
with approval by this court in State ex rel. Columbia Corp. v. 
Town Board of the Town of Pacific, 92 Wis. 2d 767, 286 N.W.2d 
130 (Ct. App. 1979). 
No. 94-3240 
 
12
amendment standing alone arguably supports the court of appeals' 
determination, the bill drafting file indicates that the 
legislature did not intend to drastically revise § 236.13(1)(c). 
¶22 Chapter 236 was repealed and recreated by section 4, 
chapter 570, Laws of 1955.  Wis. Stat. § 236.13(1)(c), as 
recreated in 1955, provided:  "Approval of the preliminary or 
final plat shall be conditioned upon compliance with . . . any 
local master plan or official map."  In 1979, Representative 
Jonathan Barry introduced 1979 Assembly Bill 885, which proposed 
to revise § 236.13(1)(c) in the following manner:  "Approval of 
the preliminary or final plat shall be conditioned upon 
compliance with . . . [a]ny local master plan which is 
consistent with any plan adopted under s. 236.46 or official map 
adopted under s. 62.23."  In his drafting request, Rep. Barry 
indicated: "In s. 236.13(1)(c) include reference to s. 236.46 
and 62.23."  In addition, an analysis by the Legislative 
Reference Bureau ("LRB") stated: "The bill makes clear that a 
plat is subject to approval by a municipality which has adopted 
an official map only if the official map is adopted according to 
the statutory procedure."  Neither Rep. Barry nor the LRB 
explained the meaning of the "consistent with" language that is 
the crux of this case.  Instead, these comments indicate that 
Rep. Barry intended only to make it clear that in order for a 
plan commission to deny approval based on a master plan or 
official map, the plan or map must be properly adopted under the 
appropriate state law. 
¶23 Although Rep. Barry may have intended the changes to 
be minor, it appears that the proposed amendment became more 
complicated and confused throughout the drafting process in the 
No. 94-3240 
 
13
legislature.  In another document contained in the drafting 
file, someone wrote "what does this mean?" above Rep. Barry's 
proposed revision to Wis. Stat. § 236.13(1)(c).  Most likely in 
response to such confusion, Rep. Barry offered a clarifying 
amendment to his original bill, which proposed to change the 
language as follows: "Approval of the preliminary or final plat 
shall be conditioned upon compliance with  . . . local plans and 
ordinances adopted as authorized by law." See Assembly Amendment 
3 to 1979 Assembly Bill 885. 
¶24 However, this portion of Assembly Amendment 3 was 
superseded by Senate Amendment 2, in which the legislature 
adopted the consistency language of Wis. Stat. § 236.13(1)(c) as 
it appears today.  Accordingly, it appears that the legislature 
considered several versions of the amendment, including this 
separate version that required the master plan to be "consistent 
with" an official map.  Nothing in the drafting file indicates 
the legislature's reasoning for adopting the "consistent with" 
language of Senate Amendment 2.  Nonetheless, we consider it 
relevant that the drafting file does not indicate that the 
legislature intended, by adopting Senate Amendment 2, to reduce 
drastically the power of plan commissions to rely on master 
plans when denying plat approval.  Thus, in the absence of 
anything to the contrary, we conclude that the legislature did 
not intend to pull the legal teeth out of master plans.  We 
therefore consider the 1957 interpretive commentary to be 
persuasive, and in support of our interpretation of the 
"consistent with" language of Wis. Stat. § 236.13(1)(c).   
No. 94-3240 
 
14
III. 
¶25 Lake City argues that Mequon's interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 236.13(1)(c) ignores the basic legal distinction between 
enacted legislation and an administrative recommendation.  Lake 
City contends that “the zoning ordinance, the legislation 
enacted after recommendations, notice and public hearings, must 
control over the master plan, an administrative planning tool.” 
(Respondent's brief at 14.)  We have carefully considered this 
argument and conclude that it is not persuasive here. 
¶26 Lake City correctly points out that the adoption of a 
master plan is an administrative function of a city plan 
commission, Heider v. Common Council of Wauwatosa, 37 Wis. 2d 
466, 476, 155 N.W.2d 17 (1967), whereas adoption of zoning 
ordinances is a legislative function. Buhler v. Racine County, 
33 Wis. 2d 137, 146, 146 N.W.2d 403 (1966).  However, this does 
not necessarily mean that zoning ordinances must always prevail 
over master plans when the two are inconsistent.  
¶27 In Chapter 236, the legislature has delegated the 
power to approve subdivision plats to municipalities.  Town of 
Sun Prairie v. Storms, 110 Wis. 2d 58, 61, 327 N.W.2d 642 (1983) 
(citing Mequon v. Lake Estates Co., 52 Wis. 2d 765, 773, 190 
N.W.2d 912 (1971)) (hereinafter "Storms").  The legislature has 
specified the extent of such authority in ch. 236.  In 
particular, 
the 
legislature 
has 
given 
municipalities 
the 
discretion to delegate their plat approval power to city plan 
commissions.  Wis. Stat. § 236.10(3).  Where a municipality has 
delegated such power, as is the case here, the city plan 
commission has the power to deny plat approval based on an 
No. 94-3240 
 
15
element 
contained 
in 
a 
master 
plan 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 236.13(1)(c).   
¶28 However, in Wis. Stat. § 236.13(1)(c), the legislature 
did not indicate that a plan commission's ability to rely on a 
master plan is limited by zoning ordinances.  If the legislature 
had intended this, it could have easily qualified the language 
in § 236.13(1)(c) by requiring that a master plan be consistent 
with zoning ordinances in order to serve as a basis for denial 
of plat approval.  It is clear that the legislature knew how to 
accomplish this goal, since it included similar qualifying 
language in this very same statute.  See § 236.13(1)(c).14  
Furthermore, the legislature also has specified that its grant 
of zoning power to city councils "may not be deemed a limitation 
on any power granted elsewhere." Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(a).  
Thus, because the statutes do not indicate that the legislature 
intended zoning ordinances to limit a city plan commission's 
authority to deny plat approval based on a master plan, we are 
not persuaded by Lake City's argument.  
¶29 This, however, does not mean that a plan commission 
has extra-legislative power to override the common council.  
Minimum lot size, which is at issue here, is an area of shared 
power that may be regulated by a municipality through its 
authority under ch. 236, or through the enactment of zoning 
ordinances by the applicable zoning authority.  Specifically, in 
Storms, this court rejected the argument that a municipality may 
not regulate minimum lot size under Wis. Stat. § 236.45 because 
                     
14  In Wis. Stat. § 236.13(1)(c), the legislature clearly 
provided that, in order to serve as a basis for denial of plat 
approval, a master plan must be "consistent with any plan 
adopted under s. 236.46 or official map adopted under s. 62.23." 
No. 94-3240 
 
16
only zoning authorities may regulate this area.15 110 Wis. 2d at 
67.  Instead, the court found that zoning and subdividing are 
complementary land planning devices.  Id. at 68.  As the Storms 
court stated: "The fact that minimum lot size may also be 
regulated by zoning ordinances does not detract from the power 
of local governments to exercise such power pursuant to ch. 
236., Stats."  Id. at 69.  The court further specified: 
 
Zoning regulations and subdivision controls are not 
only adopted and administered by separate agencies, 
but are authorized by separate enabling acts which may 
be unlike in their requirements for enactment of 
regulations and their procedure for enforcement or 
relief.  Thus, the authority of the agency assigned to 
plat 
review 
may 
not 
be 
limited 
by 
the 
zoning 
regulations. 
Id. (quoting 4 Anderson, American Law of Zoning, § 23.21 at 90 
(2d ed. 1977)) (emphasis added).  Accordingly, the court held 
that "[a]s long as the regulation is authorized by and within 
the purposes of ch. 236, the fact that it may also fall under 
the zoning power does not preclude a local government from 
enacting 
the 
regulation 
pursuant 
to 
the 
conditions 
and 
procedures of ch. 236."  Id. at 70-71.  Thus, as the Storms 
court decided, in the area of minimum lot size regulation, the 
power of a plan commission which is authorized to review plats 
is not limited or detracted by zoning regulations.  
¶30 Lastly, 
we 
conclude 
that 
Gordie 
Boucher 
is 
distinguishable, and therefore does not support the proposition 
that zoning ordinances must prevail in this case.  In Gordie 
                     
15  Although the Storms court considered whether a municipality 
has the authority to adopt an ordinance regulating minimum lot 
size under Wis. Stat. § 236.45, the court's discussion of the 
authority of planning agencies to regulate minimum lot size 
under ch. 236 is nonetheless persuasive here.  This case deals 
with the similar issue of whether a planning agency has the 
power to regulate minimum lot size under Wis. Stat. 
§ 236.13(1)(c) through reliance on a master plan. 
No. 94-3240 
 
17
Boucher, the court of appeals held that the plan commission of 
Madison exceeded its jurisdiction when it conditioned approval 
of plaintiff's certified survey map ("CSM") on compliance with 
an element contained in Madison's master plan.  178 Wis. 2d at 
80.  However, the property at issue in Gordie Boucher was 
located outside of city limits, in Madison's extraterritorial 
plat approval jurisdiction.  Id. at 80-82.   Therefore, 
regulation of such land involved not only the planning and 
zoning authority of the city of Madison, but also the planning 
and zoning authority of the cities and towns within Madison's 
extraterritorial planning jurisdiction and the Dane County Board 
of Supervisors.  Id. at 87.  In addition, regulation of this 
property involved Wis. Stat. § 59.97, the county planning and 
zoning 
enabling 
statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§  62.23(7a), 
the 
Extraterritorial Zoning Enabling Act, and Wis. Stat. §  236.13.16 
 Id.  This is distinguishable from the present case, which 
involves land located within Mequon's city limits, and therefore 
implicates only Mequon's zoning ordinances and Mequon's master 
plan.  Accordingly, this case does not require us to balance the 
authority of a county and several municipalities, nor does it 
require us to harmonize ch. 236 with other planning and zoning 
enabling acts, as was the situation in Gordie Boucher.  We 
therefore conclude that Gordie Boucher is not persuasive here. 
                     
16  Under §§  62.23(7a) and (c), a city's common council may 
enact an extraterritorial zoning ordinance, provided that it is 
approved by a majority of the extraterritorial zoning committee, 
which is comprised of representatives of the city plan 
commission and the affected cities and towns.  Gordie Boucher 
Lincoln-Mercury Madison, Inc. v. City of Madison Plan Comm'n, 
178 Wis. 2d 74, 88, 503 N.W.2d 265 (Ct. App.), review denied, 
508 N.W.2d 421 (1993).  Madison had not enacted such an 
ordinance.  Id. at 88. Accordingly, the land was covered by a 
Dane County ordinance which permitted plaintiff's proposed use. 
No. 94-3240 
 
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¶31 In summary, we hold that Wis. Stat. §  236.13(1)(c) 
authorizes a city plan commission to deny approval of a plat 
that conflicts with a local master plan, so long as any common 
elements contained in both the master plan and official map are 
not contradictory.  We further conclude that a master plan is 
consistent with an official map even if the master plan contains 
additional elements that the official map does not.  We 
therefore hold that a city plan commission may rely on an 
element contained solely in a master plan to reject plat 
approval.  Applying this holding to the present case, we 
conclude that the Plan Commission had the authority to deny 
approval of Lake City's proposed preliminary plat, because this 
plat conflicted with Mequon's newly revised master plan. The 
cause is remanded to the circuit court for the purpose of 
reinstatement of its judgment 
By the Court.The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and cause remanded.