Title: Fleming v. Amateur Athletic Union of United States, Inc.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2023 WI 40 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2021AP1054 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Femala Fleming, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Amateur Athletic Union of the United States, 
Inc., 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 404 Wis. 2d 377, 979 N.W.2d 614 
PDC No: 2022 WI App 46 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 17, 2023   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 23, 2023    
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Rhonda L. Lanford   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and HAGEDORN, JJ., 
joined. KAROFSKY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN 
WALSH BRADLEY and DALLET, JJ., joined. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by John J. Reid and Cassiday Schade LLP, Milwaukee. There 
was an oral argument by John J. Reid. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
James P. Scoptur, Jeffrey M. Herman, Jason S. Sandler, and Aiken 
& Scoptur, Brookfield, and Herman Law, Boca Raton. There was an 
oral argument by Jeffrey M. Herman.  
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Timothy W. Burns, Jesse 
J. Bair, Nathan M. Kuenzi, and Burns Bair LLP, Madison, for 
CHILD USA.   
 
 
 
 
 
2023 WI 40 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2021AP1054 
(L.C. No. 
2020CV1789) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Femala Fleming, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Amateur Athletic Union of the United States, 
Inc., 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
MAY 17, 2023 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and HAGEDORN, JJ., 
joined. KAROFSKY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN 
WALSH BRADLEY and DALLET, JJ., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   This is a review of 
a published decision of the court of appeals, Fleming v. Amateur 
Athletic Union of the United States, Inc., 2022 WI App 46, 404 
Wis. 2d 377, 979 N.W.2d 614, reversing the Dane County circuit 
court's1 order dismissing Femala Fleming's action against Amateur 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Rhonda L. Lanford presided. 
No. 
2021AP1054   
 
2 
 
Athletic Union of the United States, Inc. ("AAU") as untimely 
under Wis. Stat. § 893.54 (2021-22).2  We reverse. 
¶2 
Fleming argues that she timely filed her negligence 
claim against AAU because the governing statute of limitations 
is Wis. Stat. § 893.587, which requires that "[a]n action to 
recover damages for injury caused by an act that would 
constitute a violation of" certain ch. 948 sexual assault 
offenses against children "shall be commenced before the injured 
party reaches the age of 35 years or be barred."  According to 
Fleming, § 893.587 governs her negligence claim because she 
alleged AAU negligently hired, retained, and supervised Shelton 
Kingcade, who sexually assaulted Fleming between 1997 and 2000, 
making her "injury caused by an act that would constitute a 
violation of" an enumerated ch. 948 offense.  She also argues 
that Wis. Stat. § 893.13 tolls this deadline for "30 days from 
the date of final disposition" of Fleming's "action to enforce 
[her] cause of action."  Because Fleming originally filed her 
action against AAU in federal court, turned 35 years old while 
that action was pending, and filed this action in the Dane 
County circuit court within 30 days after her federal action was 
dismissed, Fleming argues that her action was timely filed. 
¶3 
At issue is not whether Fleming could sue Kingcade.  
Our analysis concerns only the claim against AAU.  We conclude 
that Fleming's negligence claim against AAU was not timely 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-
22 version unless otherwise noted.  
No. 
2021AP1054   
 
3 
 
filed.  Wisconsin Stat. § 893.587 does not provide the governing 
statute of limitations for Fleming's negligence claim against 
AAU because her claim is not "[a]n action to recover damages for 
injury caused by an act that would constitute a violation of" an 
enumerated ch. 948 offense.  Instead, Fleming's "action to 
recover damages" is "for" "injury caused by an" entirely 
different act——AAU's act of negligently hiring, retaining, and 
supervising Kingcade.  Because Fleming does not allege that AAU 
committed an enumerated injury-causing act, her claim is not 
"[a]n action to recover damages" to which § 893.587 applies.  
The governing time limit is instead the three-year statute of 
limitations under Wis. Stat. § 893.54 as extended by Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.16, which the parties agree would bar Fleming's negligence 
claim against AAU if applicable.  Accordingly, Fleming's claim 
is time-barred, and the circuit court was correct to grant AAU's 
motion to dismiss.  We therefore do not reach the issue of 
whether the tolling period under Wis. Stat. § 893.13 applies to 
§ 893.587.  
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶4 
The following facts are taken from Fleming's complaint 
as well as federal and state court case records, including 
No. 
2021AP1054   
 
4 
 
documents AAU attached as exhibits to its motion to dismiss.3  We 
accept these facts as true for purposes of our review.  Data Key 
Partners v. Permira Advisers LLC, 2014 WI 86, ¶18, 356 
Wis. 2d 665, 849 N.W.2d 693.   
¶5 
Between 1997 and 2000, Fleming was a member of the 
Madison Spartans Youth Basketball Club, an AAU-affiliated youth 
basketball 
program. 
 
AAU 
is 
a 
non-profit 
"multi-sport 
organization dedicated to the promotion and development of 
amateur sports and physical fitness programs," and which 
"sponsors and sanctions athletic events, including basketball 
tournaments in Wisconsin and Minnesota."  Fleming's coach was 
Shelton Kingcade, an adult male who coached both the Madison 
Spartans and Fleming's school basketball team.  "Kingcade 
applied for and became a member and/or volunteer affiliated 
with" AAU, and he maintained this affiliation at all relevant 
times.  "In order for a coach to participate in AAU tournaments, 
he must be a member of the AAU.  Furthermore, athletes can only 
participate in AAU tournaments with coaches who are AAU 
members."    
                                                 
3 AAU argued to the circuit court that the court could 
accept the facts in these exhibits as "incorporated into the 
pleadings 
by 
reference." 
 
"The 
incorporation-by-reference 
doctrine 
'prevents 
a 
plaintiff 
from 
"evad[ing] 
dismissal . . . simply by failing to attach to his complaint a 
document that prove[s] his claim has no merit."'"  Soderlund v. 
Zibolski, 2016 WI App 6, ¶38, 366 Wis. 2d 579, 874 N.W.2d 561 
(quoting Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 
690 (7th Cir. 2012)) (alterations in original).  The circuit 
court and court of appeals considered the contents of these 
exhibits in ruling on AAU's motion, and Fleming does not object 
to our doing the same here.    
No. 
2021AP1054   
 
5 
 
¶6 
Kingcade 
sexually 
assaulted 
Fleming 
on 
multiple 
occasions during the relevant period, for which he was later 
convicted of repeated sexual assault of a child contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 948.025(1) and second-degree sexual assault of a child 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2).  State v. Kingcade, 
No. 2015CF1094 (Dane Cnty. Cir. Ct. June 27, 2016).  These 
assaults "occurred in Kingcade's home and in hotels rented by 
Kingcade," and while Fleming and Kingcade attended tournaments 
"sanctioned and organized" by AAU.  Fleming was a minor, between 
the ages of 13 and 16, during this entire period.  She alleges 
that Kingcade was previously arrested and convicted of second-
degree sexual assault of a minor in 1990, again arrested but not 
convicted 
of 
the 
same 
offense 
in 
1992, 
that 
Kingcade's 
supervisor was aware of the conviction, and that "AAU was aware 
or should have been aware that Kingcade was convicted of Second-
Degree Sexual Assault of a Minor in 1990."   
¶7 
On November 1, 2019, Fleming filed a complaint in the 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Wisconsin alleging various causes of action against AAU, Dane 
County, the Madison Metropolitan School District, and Kingcade's 
supervisor Stephen Blue.  Doe v. Amateur Athletic Union of the 
U.S., Inc., No. 19-cv-901-jdp (W.D. Wis.).  Fleming turned 35 
years old on November 4, 2019, while that action was still 
pending, and the district court dismissed that action on 
August 11, 2020, on jurisdictional grounds.  Id.  
¶8 
On August 31, 2020, Fleming filed this action against 
AAU in the Dane County circuit court alleging AAU was negligent 
No. 
2021AP1054   
 
6 
 
in hiring, retaining, and supervising Kingcade, and "[a]s a 
direct and proximate result of [AAU's] negligence" Fleming "was 
sexually abuse[d] by Kingcade" and suffered damages.  AAU filed 
a motion to dismiss based on the three-year statute of 
limitations under Wis. Stat. § 893.54(1m)(a) for negligence 
claims. 
 
Fleming 
argued 
this 
statute 
of 
limitations 
is 
inapplicable and that the appropriate statute of limitations is 
instead Wis. Stat. § 893.587, which states, "[a]n action to 
recover damages for injury caused by an act that would 
constitute a violation of [certain enumerated criminal sexual 
assault offenses against minors] . . . shall be commenced before 
the injured party reaches the age of 35 years or be barred."  
Fleming further argued that, though she already reached the age 
of 35, Wis. Stat. § 893.13 tolled the limitations period during 
the duration of her federal action, making this claim timely.  
AAU responded in supplemental briefing that § 893.13 did not 
toll the limitations period because "§ 893.587 functions as a 
statute of repose, not limitations and as such, it is explicitly 
not subject to tolling."   
¶9 
In a written decision dated April 30, 2021, the 
circuit court granted AAU's motion to dismiss.  The court 
concluded, 
Due to the nature of the statutes listed in [Wis. 
Stat.] § 893.587, and the legislature choosing to hold 
religious 
organizations 
accountable 
until 
an 
individual reaches the age of 35 and not extending 
that accountability to other similar groups this Court 
finds that [§ ]893.587 was not intended to provide an 
extended 
statute 
of 
limitations 
for 
the 
claims 
No. 
2021AP1054   
 
7 
 
Plaintiff sets forth in her Complaint.  The Court 
finds 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
[§ ]893.54 
applies 
and 
Plaintiff's lawsuit is time-barred. 
Because the circuit court concluded § 893.54(1m)(a) was the 
applicable statute of limitations, the court did not reach the 
issue of whether Wis. Stat. § 893.13 applied to toll the 
limitations period.  
¶10 Fleming appealed, and the court of appeals reversed.  
The court of appeals first concluded that Wis. Stat. § 893.587 
applies to Fleming's negligence claim because the statute's 
language "expressly expands the injury-causing act that may 
underlie the action for damages to any act that would violate 
any of the enumerated statutes" and "defines only the universe 
of injury-causing acts, not actors or theories of liability."  
Fleming, 404 Wis. 2d 377, ¶20.  The court also held that Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.13 
tolled 
that 
limitations 
period 
because, 
"regardless of whether Wis. Stat. § 893.587 is a statute of 
repose or a statute of limitation, the distinction asserted by 
AAU is irrelevant" as the tolling statute applies to both.  Id., 
¶¶44-48.  As a result, the court of appeals concluded that 
Fleming timely filed her action in state court.  Id., ¶49. 
¶11 AAU petitioned this court for review on the questions 
of whether Wis. Stat. § 893.587 provides the applicable time 
limitation for Fleming's negligence action and, if so, whether 
Wis. Stat. § 893.13 tolls that limit.  We granted review.  
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶12 "In this case, we review a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim.  'Whether a complaint states a claim 
No. 
2021AP1054   
 
8 
 
upon which relief can be granted is a question of law for our 
independent review; however, we benefit from discussions of the 
court of appeals and circuit court.'"  Saint John's Communities, 
Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2022 WI 69, ¶13, 404 Wis. 2d 605, 982 
N.W.2d 78 (quoting Data Key Partners, 356 Wis. 2d 665, ¶17). 
¶13 "The motion to dismiss here is based on whether the 
complaint was timely filed under the applicable statute of 
limitations . . . ."  Doe 56 v. Mayo Clinic Health Sys., 2016 WI 
48, ¶14, 369 Wis. 2d 351, 880 N.W.2d 681.  "This involves the 
interpretation and application of a statute to an undisputed set 
of facts, which also presents a question of law we review de 
novo.  If a complaint is not timely filed, the claim is time-
barred and dismissal will be upheld."  Id. (citation omitted). 
¶14 "Judicial deference to the policy choices enacted into 
law by the legislature requires that statutory interpretation 
focus primarily on the language of the statute.  We assume that 
the 
legislature's 
intent 
is 
expressed 
in 
the 
statutory 
language."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 
WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  "Thus, we have 
repeatedly held that statutory interpretation 'begins with the 
language of the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is 
plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry.'"  Id., ¶45 (quoting 
Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 
N.W.2d 659).  "[S]tatutory language is interpreted in the 
context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a 
whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-
related 
statutes; 
and 
reasonably, 
to 
avoid 
absurd 
or 
No. 
2021AP1054   
 
9 
 
unreasonable results."  Id., ¶46.  Additionally, "[s]tatutory 
language is read where possible to give reasonable effect to 
every word, in order to avoid surplusage."  Id.  "Where 
statutory language is unambiguous, there is no need to consult 
extrinsic 
sources 
of 
interpretation, 
such 
as 
legislative 
history."  Id.  "However, even where the statutory language 
bears a plain meaning, 'we nevertheless may consult extrinsic 
sources "to confirm or verify a plain-meaning interpretation."'"  
Westmas v. Creekside Tree Serv., Inc., 2018 WI 12, ¶20, 379 
Wis. 2d 471, 907 N.W.2d 68 (quoting State v. Grunke, 2008 WI 82, 
¶22, 311 Wis. 2d 439, 752 N.W.2d 769). 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶15 AAU 
raised 
three 
issues 
in 
its 
petition 
for 
review:  (1) whether an injured party bringing "claims for 
negligent hiring and negligent supervision of the sexual abuser 
of a child . . . may file such claims against a non-abuser at 
any time before reaching the age of 35 years under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.587"; (2) "[a]re claims for negligent hiring and negligent 
supervision of a sexual abuser subject to the three-year 
limitations period in Wis. Stat. § 893.54"; and (3) "[i]f Wis. 
Stat. § 893.587 applies to Fleming's claims against a non-
abuser, does § 893.587 operate as a statute of repose to which 
no 
tolling 
provision 
applies . . . or 
as 
a 
statute 
of 
limitations, such that the tolling provisions in Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.13 apply to extend the time within which Fleming may file 
her action under § 893.587."  
No. 
2021AP1054   
 
10 
 
¶16 We begin by reviewing Wis. Stat. §§ 893.54(1m)(a) and 
893.587, and we explain that Fleming's claim may proceed only if 
the governing statute of limitations is § 893.587.  We then 
interpret § 893.587, and we conclude it does not govern 
Fleming's negligence claim against AAU.  Instead, the applicable 
statute 
of 
limitations4 
is 
the 
three-year 
period 
under 
§ 893.54(1m)(a) as extended by Wis. Stat. § 893.16, which 
renders Fleming's claim time-barred.  We therefore do not reach 
the issue of whether the tolling period under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.13 applies to § 893.587. 
A.  The Competing Limitations Periods 
¶17 The primary dispute in this case is which of two 
statutes of limitations governs Fleming's negligence claim 
against AAU:  Wis. Stat. §§ 893.587 or 893.54(1m)(a).   
¶18 Fleming argues the governing statute of limitations is 
Wis. Stat. § 893.587.  Under this statute,  
An action to recover damages for injury caused by an 
act that would constitute a violation of s. 948.02, 
948.025, 948.06, 948.085, or 948.095 or would create a 
cause of action under s. 895.442 shall be commenced 
before the injured party reaches the age of 35 years 
or be barred. 
§ 893.587.  Fleming filed her action in federal court on 
November 1, 2019, and she turned 35 years old three days later 
on November 4, 2019.  The Western District of Wisconsin 
                                                 
4 One issue raised in the briefing is whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.587 is a statute of limitations or a statute of repose.  
We do not reach this issue.  However, for the sake of 
simplicity, we refer to § 893.587 as a statute of limitations. 
No. 
2021AP1054   
 
11 
 
dismissed her federal action on August 11, 2022.  Under Wis. 
Stat. § 893.13,  
(2)  A law limiting the time for commencement of 
an action is tolled by the commencement of the action 
to enforce the cause of action to which the period of 
limitation applies.  The law limiting the time for 
commencement of the action is tolled for the period 
from the commencement of the action until the final 
disposition of the action. 
(3)  If a period of limitation is tolled under 
sub. (2) by the commencement of an action and the time 
remaining after final disposition in which an action 
may be commenced is less than 30 days, the period 
within which the action may be commenced is extended 
to 30 days from the date of final disposition. 
According to Fleming, this statute tolls the limitations period 
by the length of her federal action plus an additional 30 days.5  
Because she filed this action in the circuit court on August 31, 
2020, only 20 days after her federal action was dismissed, 
Fleming concludes her action is timely.    
¶19 AAU argues the governing statute of limitations is not 
Wis. Stat. § 893.587 but is instead Wis. Stat. § 893.54(1m)(a).  
Under § 893.54(1m)(a), "[a]n action to recover damages for 
injuries to the person" "shall be commenced within 3 years or be 
barred."  "The three year period begins on the same date that 
the cause of action accrued against [AAU]."  Pritzlaff v. 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 194 Wis. 2d 302, 312, 533 N.W.2d 780 
(1995).  For "a person entitled to bring an action [who] is, at 
                                                 
5 Fleming argues in the alternative that 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) 
applies and accomplishes the same result.  We likewise do not 
reach this argument. 
No. 
2021AP1054   
 
12 
 
the time the cause of action accrues, . . . under the age of 18 
years," Wis. Stat. § 893.16 extends this limitations period to 
the age of 20.6   
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.16 provides in full: 
(1)  If a person entitled to bring an action is, 
at the time the cause of action accrues, either under 
the age of 18 years, except for actions against health 
care providers; or mentally ill, the action may be 
commenced within 2 years after the disability ceases, 
except that where the disability is due to mental 
illness, the period of limitation prescribed in this 
chapter may not be extended for more than 5 years. 
(2)  Subsection (1) does not shorten a period of 
limitation otherwise prescribed. 
(3)  A 
disability 
does 
not 
exist, 
for 
the 
purposes of this section, unless it existed when the 
cause of action accrues. 
(4)  When 2 or more disabilities coexist at the 
time the cause of action accrues, the 2-year period 
specified in sub. (1) does not begin until they all 
are removed. 
(5)  This section applies only to statutes in 
this chapter limiting the time for commencement of an 
action or assertion of a defense or counterclaim 
except it does not apply to: 
(a)  Actions for the recovery of a penalty or 
forfeiture or against a sheriff or other officer for 
escape; 
(b)  Extend the time limited by s. 893.33, 
893.41, 893.59, 893.62, 893.73 to 893.76, 893.77(3), 
893.86 or 893.91 or subch. VIII for commencement of an 
action or assertion of a defense or counterclaim; or 
(c)  A cause of action which accrues prior to 
July 1, 1980. 
No. 
2021AP1054   
 
13 
 
¶20 Both AAU and Fleming agree that if Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.587 does not provide the governing statute of limitations 
for Fleming's claim, then the governing statute of limitations 
is instead Wis. Stat. § 893.54(1m)(a) as extended by Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.16.  They also agree that, even with this extension, 
Fleming's claim would be time-barred if § 893.54(1m)(a) is the 
governing statute of limitations.  Accordingly, Fleming's claim 
may proceed only if § 893.587 governs her claim and Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.13 tolls the limitations period.  
B.  Wisconsin Stat. § 893.587 
¶21 As always, we begin with the text of the statute.  To 
repeat, Wis. Stat. § 893.587, titled "Sexual assault of a child; 
limitation," reads as follows: 
An action to recover damages for injury caused by an 
act that would constitute a violation of s. 948.02, 
948.025, 948.06, 948.085, or 948.095 or would create a 
cause of action under s. 895.442 shall be commenced 
before the injured party reaches the age of 35 years 
or be barred. 
The statute applies to two types of actions.  The first is "[a]n 
action to recover damages for injury caused by an act that would 
constitute a violation of" certain enumerated statutes.  Id.  
Each of these enumerated statutes is a criminal offense relating 
to sexual assault of children.7  The second type of action is 
                                                 
7 The enumerated offenses include sexual assault of a child 
(Wis. Stat. § 948.02), engaging in repeated acts of sexual 
assault of the same child (Wis. Stat. § 948.025), incest with a 
child (Wis. Stat. § 948.06), sexual assault of a child placed in 
substitute care (Wis. Stat. § 948.085), and sexual assault of a 
child by a school staff person or a person who works or 
volunteers with children (Wis. Stat. § 948.095). 
No. 
2021AP1054   
 
14 
 
"[a]n action to recover damages for injury caused by an act 
that . . . would create a cause of action under s. 895.442."  
Id.  Wisconsin Stat. § 895.442 provides a cause of action for 
"[a]ny person who suffers an injury as a result of sexual 
contact with a member of the clergy that occurs while the person 
is under the age of 18."  § 895.442(2)(a).  It also provides a 
cause of action against a religious organization:  
Any person who may bring an action under par. (a) may 
bring an action against the religious organization 
that employed the member of the clergy for all damages 
caused by that sexual contact if, at the time that the 
sexual contact occurred, another employee of that 
religious 
organization 
whose 
duties 
included 
supervising that member of the clergy knew or should 
have known that the member of the clergy previously 
had sexual contact with a person under the age of 18 
and failed to do all of the following: 
1. Report that sexual contact under s. 48.981(3). 
2. Exercise ordinary care to prevent similar 
incidents from occurring. 
§ 895.442(2)(b). 
¶22 Fleming argues that Wis. Stat. § 893.587 applies 
because her action against AAU for negligence is "[a]n action to 
recover damages for injury caused by an act that would 
constitute a violation of" an enumerated ch. 948 offense.  All 
agree the alleged negligent acts of AAU——negligently hiring, 
retaining, and supervising Kingcade——do not "constitute a 
violation of" an enumerated ch. 948 offense or "create a cause 
of action under s. 895.442."  However, according to Fleming, 
§ 893.587 nonetheless applies because her injury was ultimately 
caused by Kingcade sexually assaulting her, making her injury 
No. 
2021AP1054   
 
15 
 
"caused by an [enumerated] act."  In other words, Fleming 
furthers the court of appeals' argument that § 893.587's "first 
clause does not impose any restriction based on whom the action 
is against or the theory of liability."  
¶23 We disagree.  Wisconsin Stat. § 893.587 does not apply 
to Fleming's negligence claim against AAU because her claim is 
not "[a]n action to recover damages for injury caused by an act 
that would constitute a violation of" an enumerated ch. 948 
offense.  Rather, Fleming's claim is an entirely different kind 
of "action to recover damages" because it is "for" injury caused 
by AAU's negligence, not "injury caused by an [enumerated] act."   
¶24 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 893.587 
defines 
the 
particular 
"action to recover damages" to which the extended limitations 
period applies.  The statute defines the "action to recover 
damages" using two criteria:  the presence of an injury, and the 
type of injury-causing act.  First, there must be "an injury."  
Second, the injury-causing act must be one of the enumerated 
acts.  A qualifying "action to recover damages" must therefore 
allege both an injury and an enumerated injury-causing act.   
¶25 Additionally, and most important to this case, it is 
not enough that the "action to recover damages" is "for injury" 
and that this injury be "caused by an [enumerated] act."  This 
reading isolates portions of the statute, failing to give the 
whole statute its "common, ordinary, and accepted meaning."  
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  Rather, the "action to recover 
No. 
2021AP1054   
 
16 
 
damages" must be "for"8 the particular "injury caused by an 
[enumerated] act."  Section 893.587 defines a qualifying "action 
to recover damages."  If the alleged injury-causing "act" is not 
one of the enumerated acts, then this changes the nature of the 
"action to recover damages."  It is no longer "[a]n action to 
recover damages" "for" "injury caused by an [enumerated] act"; 
it is instead "[a]n action to recover damages" "for" "injury 
caused by" an entirely different act.  When the injury-causing 
"act" changes, so too does the nature of the "action to recover 
damages."  
¶26 In other words, the question is not whether the injury 
was "caused by an act that would constitute a violation of" an 
enumerated ch. 948 offense.  That interpretation reads out the 
first part of the clause and disregards the fact that Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.587 defines a qualifying "action to recover damages."  
Rather, the question is whether the plaintiff's action is "[a]n 
action to recover damages for" the injury as caused by an 
enumerated act.  If the alleged injury was caused by an 
enumerated act, but the "action to recover damages" is not "for" 
injury as caused by that same act, then it is a different kind 
of "action to recover damages," and § 893.587 does not apply.  
As a result, for § 893.587's extended limitations period to 
apply, at the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff must have 
                                                 
8 See For, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 709 (3d ed. 1992) ("[u]sed to indicated the object, 
aim, or purpose of an action or activity"; "[u]sed to indicate 
equivalence or equality"). 
No. 
2021AP1054   
 
17 
 
alleged 
in 
the 
complaint 
that 
the 
defendant 
caused 
the 
plaintiff's injury by committing an enumerated act.   
¶27 A review of Wis. Stat. § 893.587's statutory history 
supports this plain meaning.  "A review of statutory history is 
part of a plain meaning analysis.  Statutory history encompasses 
the previously enacted and repealed provisions of a statute."  
Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶22, 309 
Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581 (citation omitted). 
¶28 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.587's original form contained 
the same operative language we interpret here, but the only 
enumerated act was incest: 
An action to recover damages for injury caused by 
incest shall be commenced within 2 years after the 
plaintiff discovers the fact and the probable cause, 
or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should 
have discovered the fact and the probable cause, of 
the injury, whichever occurs first.   
Wis. Stat. § 893.587 (1987-88) (emphasis added).  The crime of 
incest could only be committed by "persons related by blood or 
adoption."  Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 211 Wis. 2d 312, 
351, 565 N.W.2d 94 (1997) (citing Wis. Stat. § 948.06 (1993-
94)).  In cases of incest, the perpetrator's access to the child 
is due to a familial relationship, not the perpetrator's 
affiliation with any third person or organization. 
¶29 The legislature amended this statute in 2001 to expand 
the list of enumerated acts.  Whereas the previous version 
applied to "[a]n action to recover damages for injury caused by 
incest," the amended version applied to "[a]n action to recover 
damages for injury caused by an act that would constitute a 
No. 
2021AP1054   
 
18 
 
violation of s. 948.02, 948.025, 948.06, or 948.095."  2001 Wis. 
Act 16, § 3862x.  Importantly, this amendment only expanded the 
list of enumerated acts beyond incest.  The legislature's intent 
as evident from the text was to eliminate the requirement that 
the perpetrator have a familial or adoptive relationship with 
the child.  It retained the same operative language——"[a]n 
action to recover damages for injury caused by"——and did not 
extend the limitations period in any way other than by expanding 
this list of enumerated acts.  
¶30 The legislature amended Wis. Stat. § 893.587 in 2003 
again to expand the list of enumerated acts.  It added to this 
list "an act that . . . would create a cause of action under 
s. 895.[442]."9  2003 Wis. Act 279, § 6.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 895.442 provides a cause of action for "[a]ny person who 
suffers an injury as a result of sexual contact with a member of 
the clergy that occurs while the person is under the age of 18" 
"against the member of the clergy" and "against the religious 
organization 
that 
employed 
the 
member 
of 
the 
clergy."  
§ 895.442(2)(a) 
and 
(b). 
 
This 
amendment 
continued 
the 
legislature's pattern of defining the specific conduct that 
exposed 
a 
person 
to 
claims 
under 
§ 893.587's 
extended 
limitations period. 
¶31 Under Fleming's interpretation, several parts of Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.587 
would 
be 
meaningless. 
 
"Where 
possible, 
                                                 
9 The amendment cited Wis. Stat. § 895.71, which has since 
been renumbered to Wis. Stat. § 895.442. 
No. 
2021AP1054   
 
19 
 
statutory provisions dealing with the same subject matter should 
be interpreted 'in a manner that harmonizes them in order to 
give each full force and effect.'  Further, '[a] construction of 
a statute rendering a portion of it meaningless must be 
avoided.'" 
 
Belding 
v. 
Demoulin, 
2014 
WI 
8, 
¶33, 
352 
Wis. 2d 359, 843 N.W.2d 373 (first quoting Madison Metro. Sch. 
Dist. v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2011 WI 72, ¶101, 336 
Wis. 2d 95, 800 N.W.2d 442; and then quoting State v. Kruse, 101 
Wis. 2d 387, 395, 305 N.W.2d 85 (1981)).  If § 893.587's first 
clause applied to claims against persons or organizations that 
did not themselves commit an enumerated "act," there would be no 
need for the statute to reference claims against religious 
organizations under § 895.442.10  The same is true for another 
                                                 
10 Fleming argues our interpretation cannot be correct 
because 
it 
"would 
create 
a 
constitutional 
problem 
by 
discriminating against religious organizations."  However, "the 
purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine what the 
statute means so that it may be given its full, proper, and 
intended effect."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane 
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  It is 
true that "[a] court should avoid interpreting a statute in such 
a way that would render it unconstitutional."  Am. Fam. Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. DOR, 222 Wis. 2d 650, 667, 586 N.W.2d 872 (1998).  
But the constitutional-doubt canon does not trump a plain 
meaning.  "[T]he canon rests instead upon a judicial policy of 
not 
interpreting 
ambiguous 
statutes 
to 
flirt 
with 
constitutionality, thereby minimizing judicial conflicts with 
the legislature."  Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading 
Law:  The Interpretation of Legal Texts 249 (2012).  The canon 
thus "has no application in the absence of statutory ambiguity." 
United 
States 
v. 
Palomar-Santiago, 
593 
U.S. 
___, 
141 
S. Ct. 1615, 1622 (2021) (quoting United States v. Oakland 
Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 494 (2001)).  Therefore, 
"[w]e will not rewrite a law to conform it to constitutional 
requirements."  United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 481 
(2010).  We likewise will not decide whether any portion of Wis. 
No. 
2021AP1054   
 
20 
 
statute enumerated as a qualifying "act"——Wis. Stat. § 948.06, 
the incest statute.  That statute defines the crime of incest, 
but it also imposes criminal liability on a person responsible 
for a child's welfare whose inaction exposes the child to the 
risk of incest: 
(2)  Is a person responsible for the child's 
welfare and: 
(a)  Has knowledge that another person who is 
related to the child by blood or adoption in a degree 
of kinship closer than 2nd cousin or who is a child's 
stepparent 
has 
had 
or 
intends 
to 
have 
sexual 
intercourse or sexual contact with the child; 
(b)  Is physically and emotionally capable of 
taking action that will prevent the intercourse or 
contact from occurring or being repeated; 
(c)  Fails to take that action; and 
(d)  The failure to act exposes the child to an 
unreasonable risk that intercourse or contact may 
occur between the child and the other person or 
facilitates the intercourse or contact that does occur 
between the child and the other person.  
§ 948.06(2).  The extended limitations period under § 893.587 
therefore applies to claims against persons who did not commit 
incest but did commit an offense in violation of § 948.06(2).  
If all that mattered was the injury-causing act, § 893.587 would 
not need to reference this offense.  These examples demonstrate 
that the statutes enumerated as qualifying acts under § 893.587 
specifically identify when the extended limitations period 
                                                                                                                                                             
Stat. § 893.587 is unconstitutional as a consequence of our 
interpretation, as that is a question for another day, and we 
must not prejudge the issue.  
No. 
2021AP1054   
 
21 
 
applies against persons or organizations that did not directly 
commit an act of sexual abuse.  Where the limitations period has 
broader application, the enumerated statutes say so.  Fleming's 
interpretation would render reference to these provisions 
meaningless.   
¶32 Indeed, our prior application of Wis. Stat. § 893.587 
is consistent with this plain meaning.  In Doe 1 v. Archdiocese 
of Milwaukee, 2007 WI 95, 303 Wis. 2d 34, 734 N.W.2d 827, we 
determined the proper limitations periods for claims brought by 
three plaintiffs who alleged, "when they were children, a now-
deceased Roman Catholic priest . . . abused them sexually after 
he had been criminally convicted of sexually molesting another 
child and the Archdiocese knew of his conviction."  Id., ¶3.  
The plaintiffs brought claims of negligent supervision and fraud 
against the Archdiocese.  Id., ¶5.  Though the plaintiffs' 
injuries were all ultimately caused by acts of sexual abuse, we 
concluded that the limitations period in Wis. Stat. § 893.587 
did not apply to their fraud claims against the Archdiocese11:  
The statutes listed in Wis. Stat. 893.587 refer 
to 
acts 
of 
sexual 
assault, 
incest, 
or 
sexual 
exploitation.  The act that the complaints allege 
caused 
injury 
is 
the 
Archdiocese's 
fraudulent 
misrepresentation, i.e., the representation that the 
                                                 
11 We did not address Wis. Stat. § 893.587 with regard to 
the negligent supervision claims because "those claims accrued 
at the time of abuse in the mid–1970s or 1982 and were barred by 
the statute of limitations then in effect.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 893.587 was not created until 2003 and did not take effect 
until May 2004."  Doe 1 v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 2007 WI 95, 
¶59 n.18, 303 Wis. 2d 34, 734 N.W.2d 827 (citing 2003 Wis. Act 
279, § 6). 
No. 
2021AP1054   
 
22 
 
Archdiocese did not know the priests had histories of 
sexually abusing children and did not know the priests 
were dangerous to children.  None of the statutes 
listed 
in 
§ 893.587 
refers 
to 
fraudulent 
misrepresentations.  Therefore, the statute does not 
apply to these claims of fraud. 
Id., ¶60.  It is therefore consistent for us to hold that 
§ 893.587 
only 
applies 
to 
claims 
against 
persons 
or 
organizations that directly committed an enumerated act.  
¶33 Consulting extrinsic sources further confirms this 
plain meaning.  Even though Wis. Stat. § 893.587 is unambiguous, 
we 
may 
nonetheless 
consult 
extrinsic 
sources, 
such 
as 
legislative history, but only "to confirm the plain meaning."  
Anderson v. Aul, 2015 WI 19, ¶112, 361 Wis. 2d 63, 862 
N.W.2d 304 (Ziegler, J., concurring). 
¶34 The 
legislature 
originally 
enacted 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.587 to provide an extended limitations period for actions 
against abusers, codifying the court of appeals' decision in 
Hammer v. Hammer, 142 Wis. 2d 257, 418 N.W.2d 23 (Ct. App. 
1987).  Hammer involved a suit against the plaintiff's "father 
for incestuous abuse, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress."  Id. 
at 259.  The issue was "whether the discovery rule . . . applies 
to cases of incestuous abuse."  Id.  We held, "as a matter of 
law, that a cause of action for incestuous abuse will not accrue 
until the victim discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence should have discovered, the fact and cause of the 
No. 
2021AP1054   
 
23 
 
injury."12  Id. at 264.  "The legislature later codified the 
Hammer decision by enacting Wis. Stat. § 893.587 as the statute 
of limitations for claims of incest."  Doe, 211 Wis. 2d at 336; 
accord 1987 Wis. Act 332, § 22m.  The fact that the legislature 
enacted § 893.587 in response to Hammer, where the only claim 
was against the individual who committed the incest, supports 
our interpretation of § 893.587.  
¶35 The legislature has also considered, but repeatedly 
rejected, an amendment that would achieve Fleming's proposed 
interpretation.  The first instance of this was in 2007, where 
the legislature rejected an amendment that would have extended 
Wis. Stat. § 893.587 to claims "against any person"13: 
An action to recover damages against any person for 
injury caused by an act that would constitute a 
violation of s. 948.02, 948.025, 948.06, 948.085, or 
948.095 an adult's sexual contact with anyone under 
the age of 18 or by an act committed by an adult that 
would create a cause of action under s. 895.442 shall 
may be commenced before the injured party reaches the 
age of 35 years or be barred at any time. 
2007 S.B. 356; 2007 A.B. 651.  In fact, the legislature 
considered the very same amendment numerous times in the 
following years.  See 2009 S.B. 319; 2009 A.B. 839; 2009 A.B. 
                                                 
12 The discovery rule no longer applies, as Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.587 was later amended to remove language that incorporated 
the rule:  "within 5 years after the plaintiff discovers the 
fact and the probable cause, or with the exercise of reasonable 
diligence should have discovered the fact and the probable 
cause, of the injury, whichever occurs first."  2003 Wis. Act 
279, § 6. 
13 Underlines 
indicate 
proposed 
additions, 
and 
strikethroughs indicate proposed deletions.  
No. 
2021AP1054   
 
24 
 
453; 2011 S.B. 345; 2011 A.B. 461; 2013 S.B. 225; 2013 A.B. 265; 
2015 S.B. 262; 2015 A.B. 348; 2019 S.B. 381; 2019 A.B. 424.  It 
rejected the amendment each time, indicating that § 893.587 does 
not apply to claims "against any person."  
¶36 We therefore conclude the limitations period in Wis. 
Stat. § 893.587 applies only to claims alleging that the 
defendant caused the plaintiff's injury by committing an 
enumerated act.  The question is not whether the injury was 
"caused by an act that would constitute a violation of" an 
enumerated ch. 948 offense.  Rather, the question is whether the 
plaintiff's action is "[a]n action to recover damages for" the 
injury as caused by an enumerated act.  If the alleged injury 
was caused by an enumerated act, but the "action to recover 
damages" is not "for" the injury as caused by that same act, 
then the "action to recover damages" is not "for" "injury caused 
by an [enumerated] act," and § 893.587 does not apply.   
C.  Fleming's Claim Against AAU 
¶37 We conclude that Fleming's claim against AAU does not 
qualify as "[a]n action to recover damages for injury caused by 
an [enumerated] act" under Wis. Stat. § 893.587.  The governing 
statute of limitations is instead the three-year period under 
Wis. Stat. § 893.54(1m)(a).  Accordingly, Fleming's claim is 
time-barred.  
¶38 Fleming's claim against AAU is "for negligence in its 
hiring, retention and supervision of Kingcade as a coach-
No. 
2021AP1054   
 
25 
 
member."14  In her complaint, Fleming alleged, "As a direct and 
proximate result of Defendant AAU's negligence, [Fleming] has 
suffered severe psychological, emotional and physical injuries, 
and emotional distress."  
¶39 We first recognized a cause of action for negligent 
supervision in Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 219 Wis. 2d 250, 
580 N.W.2d 233 (1998), which involved a claim by a shopper 
alleging 
"Wal-Mart 
employees 
unlawfully 
stopped, 
detained, 
searched, and interrogated him."  Id. at 258.  Relevant to this 
case, we explained the causation element for such claims as 
requiring two wrongful acts——one by the employer, and one by the 
employee: 
With respect to a cause of action for negligent 
hiring, training or supervision, we determine that the 
causal question is whether the failure of the employer 
to exercise due care was a cause-in-fact of the 
wrongful act of the employee that in turn caused the 
plaintiff's injury.  In other words, there must be a 
nexus between the negligent hiring, training, or 
supervision and the act of the employee.  This 
requires two questions with respect to causation.  The 
first is whether the wrongful act of the employee was 
a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injury.  The second 
question is whether the negligence of the employer was 
a 
cause-in-fact 
of 
the 
wrongful 
act 
of 
the 
employee. . . . The 
act 
of 
the 
employee, 
whether 
intentional or unintentional, must be causal to the 
injury 
sustained. 
 
But 
equally 
important, 
the 
negligence of the employer must be connected to the 
act of the employee.  
                                                 
14 We refer to such claims in shorthand as "negligent 
supervision" claims. 
No. 
2021AP1054   
 
26 
 
Id. at 262.  Fleming argues this is significant because it means 
a 
negligent 
supervision 
claim 
"inherently 
includ[es] 
the 
intentional tort committed by the perpetrator."  
¶40 We do not place the same significance on the fact that 
negligent supervision claims require two causal acts.  Fleming's 
claim is not "[a]n action to recover damages" to which Wis. 
Stat. § 893.587 applies.  "While negligent supervision does 
require an underlying wrong to be committed by the employee as 
an element, the tort actually focuses on the tortious, i.e. 
negligent, conduct of the employer."  Doyle v. Engelke, 219 
Wis. 2d 277, 291 n.6, 580 N.W.2d 245 (1998), overruled on other 
grounds by Talley v. Mustafa, 2018 WI 47, 381 Wis. 2d 393, 911 
N.W.2d 55.  To argue that an employer's act of negligent 
supervision "inherently includ[es]" an employee's intentional 
tort conflates the two separate acts, and it morphs liability 
for negligence into vicarious liability.15  See Lewis v. 
Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 2001 WI 60, ¶11, 243 Wis. 2d 648, 
627 
N.W.2d 484 
(quoting 
Vicarious 
Liability, 
Black's 
Law 
Dictionary 
927 
(7th 
ed. 
1999)) 
("[T]he 
law 
in 
certain 
circumstances will impose 'vicarious liability' on a non-
negligent party.  Vicarious liability is '[l]iability that a 
supervisory party (such as an employer) bears for the actionable 
conduct of a subordinate or associate (such as an employee) 
                                                 
15 We leave for another day, however, the issue of whether 
Wis. Stat. § 893.587 applies to claims that a defendant is 
vicariously liable for injury caused by the enumerated act of 
another.  
No. 
2021AP1054   
 
27 
 
because of the relationship between the two parties.'").  
Fleming's claim against AAU is "for injury caused by" AAU's 
negligence, not Kingcade's intentional tort.16  For this reason, 
§ 893.587 does not apply.   
¶41 Though Fleming did suffer an injury, and that injury 
was in part caused by an act enumerated under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.587, her claim against AAU is not based on that act.  For 
§ 893.587 to apply, Fleming's claim would have to be "for" 
injury as caused by an enumerated act——Kingcade's act of sexual 
assault.  However, her claim is for injury as caused by an 
entirely separate act——AAU's negligence, an act that all agree 
is not enumerated in § 893.587 and would not constitute an 
enumerated offense.  This changes the nature of Fleming's 
"action to recover damages" such that it is not "for" "injury 
caused by an [enumerated] act," and § 893.587 therefore does not 
apply.17   
¶42 Both AAU and Fleming agree that if Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.587 does not provide the governing statute of limitations 
                                                 
16 We emphasize that this distinction is based on the 
alleged act, not the theory of liability applied to that act. 
17 We have previously held that a negligent supervision 
claim is a "derivative cause[] of action" which "accrue[s] at 
the same time that the underlying intentional tort claims 
accrue[]."  Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 211 Wis. 2d 312, 
366, 565 N.W.2d 94 (1997).  However, this conclusion is based on 
application 
of 
the 
discovery 
rule 
to 
determine 
when 
a 
limitations period commences for a derivative claim.  See 
Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 194 Wis. 2d 302, 311-15, 
533 N.W.2d 780 (1995).  That rationale does not inform our 
decision here because the discovery rule does not apply under 
the current version of Wis. Stat. § 893.587. 
No. 
2021AP1054   
 
28 
 
for Fleming's claim, then the governing statute of limitations 
is instead Wis. Stat. § 893.54(1m)(a) as extended by Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.16.  They also agree that, even with this extension, 
Fleming's claim would be time-barred if § 893.54(1m)(a) is the 
governing statute of limitations.  Therefore, because § 893.587 
does not provide the governing statute of limitations, Fleming's 
claim against AAU is time-barred, and the circuit court was 
correct to grant AAU's motion to dismiss.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶43 Fleming argues that she timely filed her negligence 
claim against AAU because the governing statute of limitations 
is Wis. Stat. § 893.587, which requires that "[a]n action to 
recover damages for injury caused by an act that would 
constitute a violation of" certain ch. 948 sexual assault 
offenses against children "shall be commenced before the injured 
party reaches the age of 35 years or be barred."  According to 
Fleming, § 893.587 governs her negligence claim because she 
alleged 
AAU 
negligently 
hired, 
retained, 
and 
supervised 
Kingcade, who sexually assaulted Fleming between 1997 and 2000, 
making her "injury caused by an act that would constitute a 
violation of" an enumerated ch. 948 offense.  She also argues 
that Wis. Stat. § 893.13 tolls this deadline for "30 days from 
the date of final disposition" of Fleming's "action to enforce 
[her] cause of action."  Because Fleming originally filed her 
action against AAU in federal court, turned 35 years old while 
that action was pending, and filed this action in the Dane 
No. 
2021AP1054   
 
29 
 
County circuit court within 30 days after her federal action was 
dismissed, Fleming argues that her action was timely filed. 
¶44 At issue is not whether Fleming could sue Kingcade.  
Our analysis concerns only the claim against AAU.  We conclude 
that Fleming's negligence claim against AAU was not timely 
filed.  Wisconsin Stat. § 893.587 does not provide the governing 
statute of limitations for Fleming's negligence claim against 
AAU because her claim is not "[a]n action to recover damages for 
injury caused by an act that would constitute a violation of" an 
enumerated ch. 948 offense.  Instead, Fleming's "action to 
recover damages" is "for" "injury caused by an" entirely 
different act——AAU's act of negligently hiring, retaining, and 
supervising Kingcade.  Because Fleming does not allege that AAU 
committed an enumerated injury-causing act, her claim is not 
"[a]n action to recover damages" to which § 893.587 applies.  
The governing time limit is instead the three-year statute of 
limitations under Wis. Stat. § 893.54 as extended by Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.16, which the parties agree would bar Fleming's negligence 
claim against AAU if applicable.  Accordingly, Fleming's claim 
is time-barred, and the circuit court was correct to grant AAU's 
motion to dismiss.  We therefore do not reach the issue of 
whether the tolling period under Wis. Stat. § 893.13 applies to 
§ 893.587. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
No.  2021AP1054.jjk 
 
1 
 
¶45 JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.   (dissenting).  
This case 
demands that we answer a straightforward question: Under Wis. 
Stat. § 893.587, is Femala Fleming's1 action against the Amateur 
Athletic Union (AAU) an "action to recover damages for injury 
caused by an act that would constitute a violation of" an 
enumerated child sexual assault statute?  I would answer this 
question with a resounding "yes."  Fleming's action requires her 
to prove that the following two acts caused her injury: (1) the 
AAU negligently hired and supervised Kingcade; and (2) Kingcade 
sexually assaulted her when she was a child.  Therefore, 
Fleming's action is "an action to recover damages for injury 
caused by an act that" undisputedly constitutes a violation of 
§§ 948.025(1) & 948.02(2).2  The majority atextually reads Wis. 
Stat. § 893.587 to require that "the defendant cause[] the 
plaintiff's injury by committing an enumerated act"3 and thus 
improperly excludes actions to recover damages for injury caused 
by more than one act.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent.  
¶46 Having decided that Wis. Stat. § 893.587 operates to 
allow Fleming to file her action against the AAU until she turns 
35, I would also hold that such limitation is tolled under Wis. 
Stat. § 893.13.  This section applies in general terms to any 
                                                 
1 This court generally refers to victims using pseudonyms.  
However, on appeal Fleming referred to herself by name.  We 
therefore follow her lead and refer to her by name.  
2 Fleming's coach, Shelton Kingcade, has already been 
convicted of repeated sexual assault of the same child under 
Wis. Stat. § 948.025(1) and second degree sexual assault of a 
child under § 948.02(2) for the conduct alleged in this action. 
3 See Majority op., ¶26 (emphasis added). 
No.  2021AP1054.jjk 
 
2 
 
"law limiting the time for commencement of an action," and thus 
applies in this case whether § 893.587 is considered a statute 
of 
limitations 
or 
a 
statute 
of 
repose. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.13(2).  As such, Fleming's filing was timely and should 
not be dismissed on those grounds.  I would affirm the court of 
appeals decision and remand the cause for further proceedings. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶47 The majority provides an accurate description of the 
facts of this case which I briefly reiterate here.  Fleming 
brought an action against the AAU alleging that a supervising 
member of the AAU was aware that Kingcade had been convicted of 
second-degree sexual assault of a minor in 1990 and was 
arrested, but not convicted, for the same offense in 1992.  
Despite 
knowledge 
of 
the 
these 
convictions, 
the 
AAU——an 
organization that promotes and organizes youth and adult 
athletic events——granted Kingcade membership and allowed him to 
coach Fleming's youth basketball team between 1997 and 2000 
without adequate supervision.  During the time Kingcade was a 
member and coach with the AAU, he assaulted Fleming on multiple 
occasions.  Fleming was between 13 and 16 years old at the time 
of the assaults. 
¶48 Fleming filed a complaint in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin when she 
was 34 years old, and she turned 35 while the action was 
pending. 
 
That 
federal 
action 
was 
then 
dismissed 
on 
jurisdictional grounds, and Fleming filed this action in the 
No.  2021AP1054.jjk 
 
3 
 
Dane County Circuit Court within 30 days of the federal action's 
dismissal. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
¶49 We must determine whether Fleming's claim was timely 
filed.  The facts regarding when Fleming filed her claim are 
undisputed.  The parties dispute: (1) whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.587 extends the time period in which Fleming may bring her 
claims against the AAU until she is 35 years old; and if so, (2) 
whether Wis. Stat. §  893.13 tolls said limitation for 30 days 
from the time her federal action was dismissed.  Both are 
matters 
of 
statutory 
interpretation 
which 
we 
decide 
independently.  Duncan v. Asset Recovery Specialists, Inc., 2022 
WI 1, ¶9, 400 Wis. 2d 1, 968 N.W.2d 661.  I begin by addressing 
Wis. Stat. § 893.587 and then will turn to the tolling statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 893.13. 
A.  Wisconsin Stat. § 893.587 
¶50 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.587 reads in full:  
An action to recover damages for injury caused by an 
act that would constitute a violation of s. 948.02, 
948.025, 948.06, 948.085, or 948.095 or would create a 
cause of action under s. 895.442 shall be commenced 
before the injured party reaches the age of 35 years 
or be barred. 
The language of this statute is not, on its face, difficult to 
understand.  The phrase "caused by an act that would constitute 
a violation of [an enumerated statute]" modifies the word 
"injury."  The relevant action brought by the injured party must 
therefore be to recover damages for injury caused by such an 
act.   
No.  2021AP1054.jjk 
 
4 
 
¶51 In this case Fleming alleges that the AAU was 
negligent in hiring, retaining, and supervising Kingcade.4  The 
elements 
of 
a 
negligent 
supervision 
claim 
are: 
(1) 
the 
organization had a duty of care owed to the plaintiff; (2) the 
organization breached its duty; (3) a wrongful act or omission 
of an organization member was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's 
injury; and (4) an act or omission of the organization was a 
cause-in-fact of the wrongful act of the member.  See John Doe 1 
v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 2007 WI 95, ¶16, 303 Wis. 2d 34, 
734 N.W.2d 827.  Specifically, the cause of action in this case 
is to recover damages for injury caused by two acts: (1) 
Kingcade's assault of Fleming; and (2) the AAU's negligent act 
of allowing Kingcade to become a member of the AAU and coach 
youth basketball without adequate supervision despite his 
history of child sexual assault.  Fleming must prove that both 
acts caused her injury in order to establish causation and 
recover damages.  
¶52 If the AAU had allowed Kingcade to become an AAU 
member and coach despite his history of child sexual assault but 
Kingcade had not then assaulted Fleming, then Fleming would not 
be able to support this specific cause of action against the 
AAU.  Fleming's injury, as alleged in this particular cause of 
                                                 
4 The elements of these negligence claims are generally 
expressed 
in 
terms 
of 
an 
employer/employee 
relationship.  
Fleming's claim characterizes Kingcade as a "servant" of the 
AAU.  Neither the relationship between the AAU and Kingcade nor 
the applicability of such negligence claims to these facts are 
at issue in this appeal.  As such, I present the elements as an 
organization/member relationship, and, for simplicity, focus on 
the negligent supervision claim. 
No.  2021AP1054.jjk 
 
5 
 
action, would not have existed but for Kingcade's assaults.  
Those assaults are acts that would constitute (and in fact did 
constitute) a violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 948.02 & 948.025.  
Therefore, Flemings's specific cause of action is to recover 
damages for injury caused by acts that constitute a violation of 
an enumerated child sexual assault statute.  Section 893.587 
squarely governs and extends the time to file a claim until 
Fleming turns 35.   
¶53 The majority opinion confuses this plain reading in a 
number of ways.  First, it tortures the language of the statute 
to create an atextual requirement that the defendant in the 
action be the same person who committed the act of child sexual 
assault enumerated in the statute.  Second, the majority focuses 
on the statutory and legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 893.587 
but fails to acknowledge that the statutory language never 
excluded actions against third parties.  Third, the majority 
mistakenly asserts that Fleming's reading of the statute renders 
operative portions of the statutes meaningless.  Fourth, the 
majority's approach raises constitutional issues that are easily 
avoided by a straightforward reading of the statute.  I will 
address each of the majority's missteps in turn. 
1.  Textual Analysis 
¶54 The majority's first misstep is a tortured textual 
analysis that contradicts itself in its quest to add additional 
requirements not present in the statute.  The majority opinion 
begins by rightly acknowledging that "the statute defines the 
'action to recover damages' using two criteria: the presence of 
No.  2021AP1054.jjk 
 
6 
 
an injury, and the type of injury-causing act."  Majority op., 
¶24.  But the majority quickly contradicts itself, insisting 
that "it is not enough that the 'action to recover damages' is 
'for injury' and that this injury be 'caused by an [enumerated] 
act.'"  Id., ¶25.  If the statute provides only two criteria to 
define the "action to recover damages," then how could those 
criteria not be enough? 
¶55 The majority then asserts that "the question is not 
whether the injury was 'caused by an act that would constitute a 
violation of' an enumerated ch. 948 offense" because such a 
reading does not account for the part of the statute that 
requires "an action to recover damages."  Id., ¶26.  That is 
nonsense.  The words of the statute clearly indicate that this 
is precisely the question to answer, and the "action to recover 
damages" language remains fully operative.  There clearly must 
be an action to recover damages, and the statute sets out two 
criteria for what that action must be: it must be for injury and 
the injury must be caused by an act that would constitute a 
violation of an enumerated statute.  As set out above, Fleming's 
action against the AAU satisfies both criteria. 
¶56 All of the majority's attempts to reorder the words of 
the statute lead to the same result.  The reordering only serves 
to confuse the analysis and provide an opening to create 
atextual requirements.  For example, the majority opinion states 
that "if the alleged injury was caused by an enumerated act, but 
the 'action to recover damages' is not 'for' injury as caused by 
that same act, then it is a different kind of 'action to recover 
No.  2021AP1054.jjk 
 
7 
 
damages' and § 893.587 does not apply."  Id.  As already 
explained, Fleming's action against the AAU is an "action to 
recover damages" "for" injury caused by an enumerated act and an 
additional act of negligence by the AAU.  Fleming's cause of 
action requires her to establish that both acts caused her 
injury.  Thus, Fleming's cause of action satisfies this 
formulation of the majority's reading of the statute as well.   
¶57 The majority then maintains that "[a]s a result, for 
§ 893.587's 
extended 
limitations 
period 
to 
apply . . . a 
plaintiff must have alleged in the complaint that the defendant 
caused the plaintiff's injury by committing an enumerated act."  
Id. (emphasis added).  This requirement that the defendant 
themselves must have committed an enumerated act comes out of 
thin air and not from the words of the statute——no matter how 
the majority reorders or emphasizes certain words.   
¶58 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.587 does not specify who the 
action to recover damages must be against.  The statute does not 
qualify the nature of the action other than that it must be for 
a qualifying injury.  Fleming's injury qualifies under the 
criteria of the statute. 
¶59 The majority supports its reading, in part, by looking 
to Doe 1's analysis, which declined to apply Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.587 to a fraudulent representation claim.  Majority op., 
¶32; Doe 1 v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 2007 WI 95, 303 Wis. 2d 
34, 734 N.W.2d 827.  Doe 1 explicitly left open the question 
No.  2021AP1054.jjk 
 
8 
 
presented to us in this case.5  However, its holding that 
negligent supervision claims are derivative of the employee's 
wrongful acts while fraudulent representation claims are not 
weighs heavily in Fleming's favor, rather than the AAU's.  See 
Doe 1, 303 Wis. 2d 34, ¶50.  The Doe 1 court distinguished the 
two types of claims based on the cause of the plaintiffs' 
injuries, which goes to the very heart of the question presented 
to us today.  
¶60 Doe 1 concerned claims of both negligent supervision 
and fraudulent representation by multiple plaintiffs.  The 
negligent supervision claims were based on the Archdiocese's 
unsupervised placement of a priest who had previously molested 
children and the priest's subsequent molestation of more 
children.  Id., ¶5.  The fraudulent representation claims were 
based on the Archdiocese's affirmative representation that the 
priest did not have a history of molesting children.  Id. 
¶61 On the negligent supervision claim, Doe 1 held that 
"the claims of negligent supervision made here are derivative of 
the underlying sexual molestations."  Id., ¶36.  As the court 
explained, "a derivative claim is one 'that derives from, grows 
out of, or results from an earlier or fundamental state or 
condition.'" Id., ¶24 fn. 11 (citing Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary Unabridged 608 (1961 ed.)).  In the 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.587 did not apply to the negligent 
supervision claims in Doe 1 because the assaults occurred on or 
before 1982, prior to the relevant amendments to § 893.587.  Doe 
1 v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 2007 WI 95, ¶59 n. 18, 303 
Wis. 2d 34, 734 N.W.2d 827. 
No.  2021AP1054.jjk 
 
9 
 
case of negligent supervision, the claim derives, or results 
from, the employee's wrongful act.  Id.  In contrast, "claims 
for 
fraud 
based 
on 
intentional 
misrepresentations 
are 
distinguishable 
from 
negligent 
supervision 
claims" 
because 
"fraud claims are not derivative . . . ."  Id., ¶50.  A fraud 
claim is not derivative, the court reasoned, because it "does 
not require proof of a wrong by an employee that causes injury 
to another."  Id., ¶24 fn. 11.  Instead, "the wrongful act is 
the . . . fraudulent representation" and "[f]raud claims, if 
proven, provide a separate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries."  
Id., ¶50. 
¶62 The Doe 1 court's assertion that Wis. Stat. § 893.587 
did not apply to fraudulent representation claims is consistent 
with its holding regarding derivative claims.  It makes sense 
that if an action for fraudulent representation "does not 
require proof of a wrong by an employee that causes injury to 
another," then it is not an "action to recover damages for 
injury caused by an act that would constitute a violation" of 
the child sexual assault statutes.  See id., ¶24 fn. 11; 
§ 893.587.  The same logic does not apply to a negligent hiring 
action, which is "derivative of an employee's wrongful act that 
causes injury to another" and does require proof that an 
employee's wrongful acts caused the plaintiff's injury.  See Doe 
1 303 Wis. 2d 34, ¶16; ¶24 fn. 11. 
¶63 Even without the "derivative" versus "not derivative" 
labels, all we need to do is look to the elements of a negligent 
supervision claim and an intentional misrepresentation claim to 
No.  2021AP1054.jjk 
 
10 
 
distinguish them.  The elements of fraudulent misrepresentation, 
as discussed in Doe 1, are:  
(1) the defendant made a factual representation; (2) 
which was untrue; (3) the defendant either made the 
representation knowing it was untrue or made it 
recklessly without caring whether it was true or 
false; (4) the defendant made the representation with 
intent to defraud and to induce another to act upon 
it; and (5) the plaintiff believed the statement to be 
true and relied on it to his/her detriment. 
Id., ¶38 (quoting Kaloti Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 
2005 WI 111, ¶12, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 699 N.W.2d 205).  Each of 
these elements is focused exclusively on the acts of the person 
making the representation and the response of the plaintiff.  In 
contrast, the elements of a negligent supervision claim require 
both that "a wrongful act or omission of an employee was a 
cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injury" and that "an act or 
omission of the employer was a cause-in-fact of the wrongful act 
of the employee."  Id., ¶16.  The elements require two acts by 
different actors.  In Fleming's case, she must establish one act 
by Kingcade, and one act by the AAU.  Thus, based on these 
elements, 
§ 893.587 
should 
apply 
to 
Fleming's 
negligent 
supervision cause of action even though it was not applied to 
the fraudulent representation claims in Doe 1. 
 
¶64 In sum, neither the language of the statute nor Doe 1 
supports the majority's assertion that § 893.587 applies only to 
actions where the defendant is the same person who committed the 
act of child sexual assault.  Instead, both the language of the 
statute and Doe 1 indicate that Fleming's action is "[a]n action 
to recover damages for injury caused by an act that would 
No.  2021AP1054.jjk 
 
11 
 
constitute a violation of" an enumerated child sexual assault 
statute, and thus can be brought until Fleming turns 35. 
2.  Statutory and Legislative History 
¶65 The majority recounts the legislative history of Wis. 
Stat. § 893.587 without ever acknowledging that the statute was 
always written to apply to actions against third parties.6  The 
relevant portion of the statute originally read: "An action to 
recover damages for injury caused by incest shall be commenced 
within 2 years after the plaintiff discovers the fact and the 
probable cause . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 893.587 (1987-88).  The 
operative language has not changed.  It emphasizes that the 
action to recover damages be for injury, and that the injury be 
caused by incest.  This does not mean that the only action to 
recover damages could be against the person committing incest. 
¶66 The legislature's subsequent amendments did not change 
this operative language.  The legislature never introduced a 
requirement regarding the identity of the defendant in the 
action to recover damages.  See 2001 Wis. Act 16, 2003 Wis. Act 
279, 2005 Wis. Act 277. 
                                                 
6 The majority goes so far as to state that "the fact that 
the legislature enacted § 893.587 in response to Hammer, where 
the only claim was against the individual who committed the 
incest, supports our interpretation of § 893.587."  ¶34.  The 
language of a statute cannot be limited by the specific fact 
pattern presented in a case that inspired the drafting of that 
statute.  This court should not imply that statutes can be thus 
limited.     
No.  2021AP1054.jjk 
 
12 
 
¶67 The majority also finds it significant that the 
legislature has, on multiple occasions, rejected the following 
proposed amendment:7 
An action to recover damages against any person for 
injury caused by an act that would constitute a 
violation of s. 948.02, 948.025, 948.06, 948.085, or 
048.095 an adult's sexual contact with anyone under 
the age of 18 or by an act committed by an adult that 
would create a cause of action under s. 895.442 shall 
may be commenced before the injured party reaches the 
age of 45 or be barred at any time. 
This amendment includes the addition of the words "against any 
person" 
to 
qualify 
the 
action 
to 
recover 
damages.   
But that is not the only change it would make.  The proposed 
amendment would also remove any limitation on the time period in 
which a child victim must bring an action to recover damages.  
It would also add a requirement that the injury-causing act be 
committed by an adult and would remove the enumerated child 
sexual assault statutes in favor of more general language 
encompassing any sexual contact with a child.  The legislature 
may have rejected this amendment because it disagreed with any 
number of these significant proposed changes.  This rejection 
does not reliably indicate that the legislature was concerned 
about the addition of the phrase "against any person." 
¶68 But even if the only proposed change in this amendment 
were the addition of "against any person," we could just as 
easily assume the legislature rejected such a proposal because 
the change is unnecessary.  The statute currently contains no 
                                                 
7 Underlines indicate proposed additions, and strikethroughs 
indicate proposed deletions. 
No.  2021AP1054.jjk 
 
13 
 
parameters regarding the identity of the defendant.  Why would 
the legislature need to further specify that the action to 
recover damages could be against any person?  In short, the 
legislature wrote and amended the statute so that it has always 
applied to actions against third-parties.  
3.  Surplusage 
¶69 The majority mistakenly states that reading Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.587 as I do——providing no limitations regarding the 
identity of the defendant——would render several parts of Wis. 
Stat. § 893.587 meaningless.  See majority op., ¶31.  The parts 
the majority reference as meaningless actually functionally 
expand § 893.587 under any reading of the statute.  Furthermore, 
the majority appears to forget that the enumerated statutes 
serve a purpose beyond their connection to § 893.587, which 
renders the referenced language far from meaningless. 
¶70  In 2001, the legislature amended Wis. Stat. § 893.587 
to apply to acts other than incest and to include enumerated 
statutory references rather than referencing only the general 
act of incest.  2001 Wis. Act 16.  Now, instead of an undefined 
reference to an "act of incest," § 893.587 lists enumerated 
statutes that clearly define the possible injury-causing acts.  
This clarifying change could not be rendered "meaningless" by 
any reading of the statute.   
¶71 In 2003, the legislature again amended § 893.587 to 
extend the limitation period to when the victim turns 35 and to 
include an "act that would create a cause of action under s. 
895.71" to the enumerated injury-causing acts.  2003 Wis. Act 
No.  2021AP1054.jjk 
 
14 
 
279.  Section 895.71 was later renumbered to § 895.442.  Section 
895.442 creates a cause of action against clergy who have sexual 
contact with a minor as well as a cause of action against 
religious organizations who knowingly hire clergy who have 
previously had sexual contact with a minor.   
¶72 The majority asserts that Fleming's interpretation of 
§ 893.587 would render this amendment meaningless because if the 
statute already included claims against third parties, "there 
would be no need for the statute to reference claims against 
religious organizations."  Majority op., ¶31.  Not so——
referencing § 895.442 increased the scope of § 893.587 to 
include causes of action that were not covered by any of the 
other enumerated statutes.  First, adding § 895.442 expanded the 
limitation period for victims to bring an action against a 
clergy member if they were abused by the clergy member when they 
were 16 or 17 years old.  Likewise, adding § 895.442 expanded 
the limitation period for 16- or 17-year-old victims to bring a 
claim against a third party (in this case the religious 
organization).  This is true even though the statute already 
applied to actions against third parties for injuries caused by 
violations of the other enumerated statutes.8  The reference to 
                                                 
8 The references to Wis. Stat. § 948.02 and § 948.025 would 
not allow for such claims because they both require the victim 
to be under 16 years old, § 948.06 and § 948.085 may not apply 
because they require a familial or care-taking relationship 
between perpetrator and victim, and § 948.095 may not apply 
because it requires the perpetrator to be a school staff member 
or in a position that requires the perpetrator to work directly 
with children.  Each of these are additional requirements that 
§ 895.442 does not include. 
No.  2021AP1054.jjk 
 
15 
 
§ 895.442 
was 
therefore 
not 
meaningless, 
but 
instead 
functionally expanded the scope of the statute.  To the extent 
that causes of action brought under § 895.442 might overlap with 
those brought for violations of the other enumerated statutes, 
the same can be said for the other enumerated statutes under any 
reading of § 893.587.9 
¶73 Furthermore, the majority ignores the fact that the 
enumerated statutes serve an independent purpose outside of 
their use in § 893.587.  The majority claims that the enumerated 
statutes "specifically identify when the extended limitations 
period applies against persons or organizations that did not 
directly commit an act of sexual abuse."  Id.  But that is not 
true.  The enumerated statutes create some offenses or causes of 
action against persons or organizations that did not directly 
commit an act of sexual abuse, but the statutes do not do so for 
the purpose of identifying an extended limitation period.  The 
enumerated statutes' purpose is to create and define those 
offenses or causes of action.  In contrast, § 893.587 addresses 
                                                 
9 For instance, § 948.025 requires three or more violations 
of certain subsections of § 948.02.  The fact that § 893.587 
lists both statutes even though § 948.02 covers acts that 
violate § 948.025 suggests that the legislature may have 
prioritized 
covering 
its 
bases 
over 
maximum 
efficiency.  
Although we avoid reading a statute to create surplusage, the 
legislature is not restricted to writing statutes in the most 
efficient manner possible.  See Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. 
Milwaukee Cnty., 2019 WI 24, ¶24, 385 Wis. 2d 748, 924 N.W.2d 
153  (discussing the "reality that '[s]ometimes drafters do 
repeat themselves and do include words that add nothing of 
substance.'" 
(quoting 
Scalia 
& 
Garner, 
Reading 
Law: 
the 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 176 (2012)).   
No.  2021AP1054.jjk 
 
16 
 
only the timing limitation of actions and does not create any 
action in and of itself. 
¶74 The 
fact 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.587 
already 
contemplates the timing limitation of a common law cause of 
action 
for 
negligent 
supervision 
does 
not 
influence 
the 
legislature's decision to implement a statutory cause of action 
for 
negligent 
supervision 
by 
religious 
organizations 
in 
§ 895.442(2)(b).  Likewise, it is not meaningless to include a 
reference to that statutory cause of action in § 895.587.  As 
such, Fleming's reading of the statue, which I would adopt, does 
not render any portion of the statutes meaningless. 
4.  Constitutional Avoidance 
¶75 Finally, the majority's reading of the statute likely 
renders the statute unconstitutional.  This issue could be 
easily avoided by adopting Fleming's straightforward reading of 
the statute.  
¶76 I 
agree 
with 
the 
majority 
that 
a 
canon 
of 
interpretation cannot trump a plain meaning interpretation of an 
unambiguous statute.  See majority op., ¶31 n.10.  But as I 
explain above, the majority does not offer a convincing reading 
of the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 893.587, let alone an 
unambiguous reading.  Here, I maintain that the statute 
unambiguously applies to third-party claims.  However, if I were 
to accept the majority's alternative reading as reasonable, and 
thus agreed that the statue is ambiguous, the principle of 
constitutional avoidance supports Fleming's position.  When 
faced with an ambiguous statute where one reading of the statute 
No.  2021AP1054.jjk 
 
17 
 
raises serious constitutional questions, this court has long 
favored the reading of the statute that avoids constitutional 
issues.  See Baird v. La Follette, 72 Wis. 2d 1, 5, 239 N.W.2d 
536 (1976) ("Where there is serious doubt of constitutionality, 
we must look to see whether there is a construction of the 
statute which is reasonably possible which will avoid the 
constitutional question.").  
¶77 The majority's reading both twists the language of the 
statute 
and 
gives 
rise 
to 
a 
possible 
constitutional 
issue.  Under the majority's reading, §§ 893.587 and 895.442 
work together to allow an extended period of time for a victim 
to bring a negligent supervision cause of action, but only 
against a religious organization.  An action against any other 
secular organization for acts of its employees or members would 
have a much shorter statute of limitations.  This arbitrarily 
favors secular organizations and clearly runs the risk of 
violating both the Federal and Wisconsin Constitutions.10  Such a 
risk can be easily avoided by interpreting the statute as I 
have, which would provide a consistent limitations period in 
which to bring negligent supervision claims based on a violation 
of an enumerated statute. 
                                                 
10 U.S. Const. amend. I; Wis. Const. art. I, § 8. 
No.  2021AP1054.jjk 
 
18 
 
B.  Tolling 
¶78 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.1311 operates to toll a "law 
limiting the time for commencement of an action" while the 
action is pending and for up to "30 days from the date of final 
disposition" of that action.  Wis. Stat. § 893.13(2), (3).  The 
AAU argues that Wis. Stat. § 893.587 is a statute of repose 
rather than a statute of limitations.  As such, it argues that 
§ 893.13 does not operate to toll the limitation in § 893.587. 
¶79 There is no functional difference between a statute of 
limitations and a statute of repose in Wisconsin law, at least 
for the purposes of determining whether a tolling statute 
applies.  See Landis v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 2001 WI 86, 
¶¶51-61, 245 Wis. 2d 1, 628 N.W.2d 893 (holding that the 
statutory 
phrase 
"any 
applicable 
statute 
of 
limitations" 
includes statutes of repose, in part because "the phrase 
'statute of repose' is judicial terminology and is not featured 
in legislative lingo.").  Whether § 893.587 is a statute of 
limitations or a statute of repose, it is a "law limiting the 
time for commencement of an action."  Wis. Stat. § 893.13.  As 
such, § 893.13 tolls the time limit set in § 893.587. 
¶80 Fleming filed her action in federal court before she 
turned 35 years old——before the limitation period under Wis. 
Stat. § 893.587 ran.  She then filed her action in Wisconsin 
                                                 
11 The briefing in this case focuses on Wis. Stat. § 893.13 
as the operative statute to toll Fleming's statute of limitation 
while her federal case was pending.  It appears that both 
§ 893.13 and 893.15 are required to toll a limitation during the 
pendency of a federal case, but this does not change the 
relevant analysis, so I will also focus on § 893.13. 
No.  2021AP1054.jjk 
 
19 
 
court within 30 days of the final disposition of the federal 
case.  Her action was timely filed. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶81 Fleming's 
cause 
of 
action 
against 
the 
AAU 
for 
negligent supervision is "an action to recover damages for 
injury caused by an act that would constitute a violation 
of . . . s. 948.02 [and] 948.025" under Wis. Stat. § 893.587.  
As such, Fleming had until she was 35 years old to bring her 
action against the AAU, and the time limit was further tolled by 
§ 893.13.  Because the majority ignores the plain meaning of 
§ 893.587's text and holds that Fleming's action is untimely, I 
respectfully dissent. 
¶82 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and REBECCA FRANK DALLET join this dissent.

 
 
 
 
No.  2021AP1054.jjk 
 
1