Title: State v. Hemp

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2014 WI 129 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP1163-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Kearney W. Hemp, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 353 Wis. 2d 146, 844 N.W.2d 421) 
(Ct. App. 2014 – Published) 
PDC No.: 2014 WI App 34 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 18, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 7, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Jean A. DiMotto 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by James B. Duquette and Seymour Kremer Koch Lochowicz & 
Duquette LLP, Elkhorn, and oral argument by James B. Duquette. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Christine A. Remington, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was Jill Kastner, Shelia Sullivan, 
Erica Seitzer-Beckman, and Elyce Wos on behalf of Legal Action 
of Wisconsin. 
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Kelli S. Thompson and 
Colleen D. Ball on behalf of the Office of the State Public 
Defender. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014 WI 129
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2013AP1163-CR  
(L.C.  
2009CF4636) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Kearney W. Hemp, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 18, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.    We review a published 
decision of the court of appeals1 affirming the Milwaukee County 
circuit court's order denying Kearney Hemp's ("Hemp") petition 
for expungement.2  At Hemp's sentencing, the circuit court found 
Hemp eligible for expungement conditioned upon his successful 
                                                 
1 State v. Hemp, 2014 WI App 34, 353 Wis. 2d 146, 844 N.W.2d 
421. 
2 The Honorable Jean A. DiMotto, presiding.  
No. 
2013AP1163-CR   
 
2 
 
completion of probation.  Hemp petitioned for expungement a year 
after successfully completing probation but the circuit court 
denied his petition, concluding that not only did Hemp have the 
responsibility to petition for expungement, but that he also had 
the responsibility to do so in a timely fashion.  The circuit 
court explained that Hemp's "desire for expungement did not 
ripen until he was charged with new offenses in Walworth 
County."  "The implied time element . . . coupled with the 
defendant's tardy action in seeking expungement" led the circuit 
court to deny his petition.   
¶2 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
affirmed, 
concluding 
the 
expungement statute, Wis. Stat. § 973.015 (2009-10)3, required 
Hemp to forward his "certificate of discharge" to the circuit 
court.  State v. Hemp, 2014 WI App 34, ¶10, 353 Wis. 2d 146, 844 
N.W.2d 421.  The court explained that Hemp's failure to forward 
his certificate for over a year after the Department of 
Corrections (DOC) discharged him from probation rendered his 
petition for expungement tardy.  Id. 
¶3 
Three issues are presented for our consideration: 
1) whether 
Hemp's 
successful 
completion 
of 
probation 
automatically entitled him to expungement; 2) whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.015 places any burden on Hemp to petition the circuit 
court within a certain period of time in order to effectuate 
expungement; and 3) whether the circuit court could reverse the 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2013AP1163-CR   
 
3 
 
decision it made at sentencing to find Hemp eligible for 
expungement conditioned upon the successful completion of his 
sentence. 
¶4 
First, we hold that the successful completion of 
probation automatically entitled Hemp to expungement.  Second, 
we hold Wis. Stat. § 973.015 is unambiguous and places no burden 
on Hemp to petition for expungement within a certain period of 
time because the duty to forward the certificate of discharge 
rests solely with the "detaining or probationary authority."  
Finally, we hold the circuit court improperly exercised its 
discretion when it reversed the decision it made at sentencing 
to find Hemp eligible for expungement.  Accordingly, the 
decision of the court of appeals is reversed, and we remand to 
the circuit court with the instructions that the clerk of courts 
expunge Hemp's record. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶5 On October 13, 2009, the Milwaukee County District 
Attorney's Office charged Hemp with one count of possession with 
intent to deliver THC (tetrahydrocannabinols), 200 grams or 
less, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1m)(h)1, a Class I felony.  
A conviction for a Class I felony subjects a defendant to a 
maximum term of imprisonment of three years and six months.4  
Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(i).  Hemp subsequently pleaded guilty.  
                                                 
4 For the purposes of our discussion, we need recite only 
the maximum term of imprisonment.  A recitation of the potential 
fines is unnecessary.  
No. 
2013AP1163-CR   
 
4 
 
In exchange for Hemp's guilty plea, the State agreed to 
recommend probation with 90 days conditional jail time, various 
treatment 
based 
conditions, 
and 
to 
take 
no 
position 
on 
expungement.  The circuit court sentenced5 Hemp to one year in 
the House of Corrections, consecutive to any other sentence, 
stayed for 18 months of probation with 30 days of conditional 
jail time.  As conditions of probation, the court ordered that 
Hemp continue psychological treatment with his counselor, 
maintain 
absolute 
sobriety, 
and 
complete 
fifty 
hours 
of 
community service.  Further, the circuit court found Hemp 
eligible 
for 
expungement 
conditioned 
upon 
the 
successful 
completion of probation.6  
¶6 
On December 9, 2011, the DOC notified Hemp he 
successfully completed and was discharged from probation.  The 
DOC issued Hemp a certificate of discharge, dated December 15, 
2011, which it also forwarded to the "court of record."  The 
                                                 
5 "Probation itself is generally not a sentence."  State v. 
Horn, 226 Wis. 2d 637, 647, 594 N.W.2d 772 (1999).  "[I]f a 
person is convicted of a crime, the court, by order, may 
withhold 
sentence 
or 
impose 
sentence . . . and 
stay 
its 
execution, and in either case place the person on probation to 
the department for a stated period, stating in the order the 
reasons 
therefor." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.09(1)(a) 
(2013-14).  
However, 
in 
Matasek 
we 
concluded 
that 
"§ 973.015 
[the 
expungement statute] itself views probation as a sentence."  
State v. Matasek, 2014 WI 27, ¶36, 353 Wis. 2d 601, 846 N.W.2d 
811. 
6 There is no dispute that at the time of sentencing in 
Milwaukee County Hemp was eligible for expungement under Wis. 
Stat. § 973.015(1)(a). 
No. 
2013AP1163-CR   
 
5 
 
circuit court's "Criminal Court Record" entry for January 24, 
2012, states: "Notice of case status change" "Probation/Extended 
Supervision status: Discharged."  The certificate of discharge 
informed the parties "You [Hemp] were placed on probation.  The 
department having determined that you have satisfied said 
probation, it is ordered that effective December 9, 2011, you 
are discharged absolutely." 
¶7 
On October 8, 2012, the Walworth County District 
Attorney's Office charged Hemp with possession of THC, second or 
subsequent offense, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(e) 
(2011-12), and possession of drug paraphernalia, contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 961.573(1) (2011-12).  Realizing the Milwaukee 
County Class I felony conviction (possession with intent to 
deliver THC, 200 grams or less) had not been expunged, as the 
conviction was the basis for the second or subsequent enhancer 
in Walworth County, Hemp filed Form CR-266,7 "Petition to Expunge 
Court Record of Conviction" with the Milwaukee County circuit 
court on October 30, 2012.  Hemp did not attach the discharge 
certificate issued by the DOC.  In response, the circuit court 
requested proof that Hemp successfully completed probation and 
                                                 
7 This form is the product of the Wisconsin Records 
Management Committee, a committee of the Director of State 
Court's 
Office 
and 
a 
mandate 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Judicial 
Conference.  Wisconsin Stat. § 758.18(1) (2013-14) requires the 
Judicial Conference to "adopt standard court forms for use by 
parties and court officials in all civil and criminal actions 
and proceedings in the circuit court." 
No. 
2013AP1163-CR   
 
6 
 
paid his financial obligations; however, Hemp's counsel did not 
respond. 
¶8 
On December 12, 2012, Hemp again petitioned for 
expungement and attached the requested proof.  In an order dated 
January 3, 2013, the circuit court ordered Hemp to submit a 
"personal statement" indicating why he thought expungement 
should be granted despite the pending charges in Walworth 
County.  Hemp subsequently filed such a statement and the State 
filed a response, arguing Hemp had the responsibility to forward 
the certificate of discharge to the circuit court in a timely 
manner.  On March 4, 2013, the circuit court issued a decision 
and order denying expungement.  The circuit court explained 
Hemp's "desire for expungement did not ripen until he was 
charged with new offenses in Walworth County" and "[t]he implied 
time element in the expungement statute as argued by the State 
coupled with the defendant's tardy action in seeking expungement 
[led] the court to deny his petition."  
¶9 
On July 22, 2013, Hemp appealed this order.  On 
February 4, 2014, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit 
court's order denying expungement.  Hemp, 353 Wis. 2d 146, ¶1.  
The court of appeals concluded that, per Wis. Stat. § 973.015, 
upon the successful completion of probation Hemp had the 
responsibility to petition the circuit court for expungement, 
using Form CR-266, and to forward his certificate of discharge 
to the circuit court.  Id., ¶¶13, 15.  The court of appeals 
further concluded that Wis. Stat. § 973.015 implicitly requires 
a defendant seeking expungement to petition the circuit court in 
No. 
2013AP1163-CR   
 
7 
 
a timely fashion based on the ordinary definition of "upon," 
meaning "immediately following; very soon after."  Id., ¶15  
(citing 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.015(2) 
which 
states 
"[u]pon 
successful 
completion 
of 
the 
sentence 
the 
detaining 
or 
probationary authority shall issue a certificate of discharge 
which shall be forwarded to the court of record and which shall 
have the effect of expunging the record").  The court of appeals 
further concluded the petition must be approved by the circuit 
court before expungement is effectuated.  Id.  Because Hemp did 
not petition the circuit court until a year after his discharge, 
the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's order denying 
Hemp expungement.  Id., ¶16. 
¶10 The dissent disagreed with the propositions that the 
defendant is responsible for forwarding the certificate of 
discharge to the circuit court and that the circuit court 
retains discretion to deny expungement.  Id., ¶¶19, 26 (Curley, 
J., dissenting).  The dissent noted: "[t]he statute says 
absolutely nothing about the person who has successfully 
completed his sentence taking any affirmative action to obtain 
the expungement."  Id., ¶20 (Curley, J., dissenting).  Rather, 
the dissent argued the detaining or probationary authority bears 
the burden of both issuing the certificate and forwarding the 
certificate to the circuit court.  Id., ¶21 (Curley, J., 
dissenting).  The dissent explained it would be unfair to punish 
Hemp for not forwarding the discharge certificate because the 
statute provides no notice that he is required to do so.  Id., 
¶26 (Curley, J., dissenting).  According to the dissent, "the 
No. 
2013AP1163-CR   
 
8 
 
statute's clear and unambiguous wording" states that the 
issuance of the certificate by the detaining or probationary 
authority "ha[s] the effect of expunging the record."  Id. 
(Curley, J., dissenting). 
¶11 Hemp petitioned this Court for review, which we 
granted on June 12, 2014.   
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶12 This 
case 
requires 
us 
to 
construe 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.015.  This presents a question of law, which we review de 
novo.  Vill. of Shorewood v. Steinberg, 174 Wis. 2d 191, 201, 
496 N.W.2d 57 (1993).   
¶13 Statutory interpretation begins with the language of 
the statute, and, if the language is unambiguous, we apply the 
statute's plain language to the facts at hand.  Id.  Statutory 
language is examined within the context in which it is used.  
Alberte v. Anew Health Care Servs., Inc., 2000 WI 7, ¶10, 232 
Wis. 2d 587, 605 N.W.2d 515.  "Words are ordinarily interpreted 
according to their common and approved usage; technical words 
and phrases and others that have a particular meaning in the law 
are 
ordinarily 
interpreted 
according 
to 
their 
technical 
meaning."  State v. Matasek, 2014 WI 27, ¶12, 353 Wis. 2d 601, 
846 N.W.2d 811.  Further, statutes are interpreted to avoid 
surplusage, giving effect to each word.  Id.  "Moreover, words 
are given meaning to avoid absurd, unreasonable, or implausible 
results and results that are clearly at odds with the 
legislature's 
purpose." 
 
Id., 
¶13; 
see 
also 
State 
v. 
Hanson, 2012 
WI 
4, 
¶17, 
338 
Wis. 
2d 
243, 
808 
N.W.2d 
No. 
2013AP1163-CR   
 
9 
 
390 ("'Context 
and 
[statutory] 
purpose 
are 
important 
in 
discerning the plain meaning of a statute.' . . . We favor an 
interpretation that fulfills the statute's purpose.") (citation 
omitted). 
¶14 However, if the statute is ambiguous, we examine 
extrinsic sources, such as legislative history, to ascertain the 
legislature's intent; a statute is ambiguous if the language 
reasonably gives rise to two or more different meanings.  State 
ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶¶47, 
50-51, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶15 We first consider whether Hemp's successful completion 
of probation automatically entitled him to expungement, and 
conclude that it did.  We then address whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.015 places any burden on Hemp to petition the circuit 
court within a certain time frame in order to effectuate 
expungement, and conclude the statutory duty unambiguously rests 
with the detaining or probationary authority, not with Hemp.  
Finally, we consider whether the circuit court could reverse the 
decision it made at sentencing to find Hemp eligible for 
expungement conditioned upon the successful completion of his 
sentence, and conclude it could not.  We therefore reverse the 
court of appeals and remand for further proceedings. 
A. Hemp's Successful Completion of Probation Automatically 
Entitled Him to Expungement. 
¶16 We first consider whether Hemp's successful completion 
of probation automatically entitled him to expungement.  We 
No. 
2013AP1163-CR   
 
10 
 
conclude that it did.  Upon successfully completing probation, 
Hemp's expungement could not be revoked and, as we will explain 
below, Hemp's "probationary authority" had the duty to take the 
necessary steps to effectuate Hemp's expungement.   
¶17 The expungement statute, Wis. Stat. § 973.015, is 
clear: 
(1)(a) . . . when a person is under the age of 25 at 
the time of the commission of an offense for which the 
person has been found guilty in a court for violation 
of a law for which the maximum period of imprisonment 
is 6 years or less, the court may order at the time of 
sentencing that the record be expunged upon successful 
completion of the sentence if the court determines the 
person will benefit and society will not be harmed by 
this disposition. 
 . . .  
(2) A person has successfully completed the sentence if 
the person has not been convicted of a subsequent 
offense and, if on probation, the probation has not 
been revoked and the probationer has satisfied the 
conditions of probation. Upon successful completion of 
the sentence the detaining or probationary authority 
shall issue a certificate of discharge which shall be 
forwarded to the court of record and which shall have 
the effect of expunging the record. If the person has 
been imprisoned, the detaining authority shall also 
forward a copy of the certificate of discharge to the 
department. 
We have construed this statute to mean "if a circuit court is 
going to exercise its discretion to expunge a record, the 
discretion must be exercised at the sentencing proceeding."  
Matasek, 353 Wis. 2d 601, ¶45.   
¶18 Before beginning our analysis we wish to briefly 
explain expungement.  "It is the intent of [expungement] to 
provide an alternative to [the] procedures in the criminal code 
No. 
2013AP1163-CR   
 
11 
 
relating to conviction and sentencing."  Wis. Stat. § 54.01(2) 
(1975-76).8  At the heart of the expungement statute lies an 
intention "to provide a break to young offenders who demonstrate 
the ability to comply with the law" by successfully completing 
and 
being 
discharged 
from 
their 
sentences. 
 
State 
v. 
Leitner, 2002 WI 77, ¶38, 253 Wis. 2d 449, 646 N.W.2d 341.   
¶19 Expungement offers young offenders a fresh start 
without the burden of a criminal record and a second chance at 
becoming law-abiding and productive members of the community.  
Expungement allows individual defendants a chance to move past 
the barriers that can be created by a criminal record by giving 
them "an incentive to rehabilitate," which, in turn, "promotes 
the public's safety."  Jon Geffen & Stefanie Letze, Chained to 
the Past: An Overview of Criminal Expungement Law in Minnesota-
State v. Schultz, 31 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1331, 1335 (2005) 
(internal citations omitted).  
Indeed, expungement allows 
"offenders to . . . present themselves to the world—including 
                                                 
8 Wis. Stat. § 973.015 was included as Assembly Substitute 
Amendment 1 to 1975 Assembly Bill 222, §711m.  The drafting file 
for the substitute amendment, which is included in the drafting 
file for Laws of 1975, ch. 39, does not contain any statements 
concerning why the language was included or even who requested 
its inclusion.  However, the criteria for a youthful offender 
disposition under Ch. 54 and expungement under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.015 were the same——a person under the age of 21, and a 
finding that the person will benefit and society will not be 
harmed.  
Compare Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 54.03(1)(a) 
and 
(b) 
(1975-
76) with Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1).  This history, along with 
their simultaneous enactment, reflects that the two statutes 
were aimed at achieving the same goals for the same type of 
offenders. 
No. 
2013AP1163-CR   
 
12 
 
future employers—unmarked by past wrongdoing."  Hemp, 353 
Wis. 2d 146, ¶17.   
¶20 The legislature, by enacting Wis. Stat. § 973.015, not 
only "provide[d] a break to young offenders who demonstrate the 
ability to comply with the law" but also "provide[d] a means by 
which trial courts may, in appropriate cases, shield youthful 
offenders from some of the harsh consequences of criminal 
convictions."  Leitner, 253 Wis. 2d 449, ¶38 (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted).  The subsequent amendments to 
§ 973.015 show a consistent legislative effort to expand the 
availability of expungement to include a broader category of 
youthful offenders.  This legislative effort is reflected in the 
language of the relevant statute, in that, originally, only 
those 21 years or younger who were found guilty of an offense 
for which the maximum penalty was one year or less in the county 
jail were eligible for expungement.  Laws of 1975 ch. 39, 
§ 711m.  However, Wis. Stat. § 973.015 has since been amended to 
apply to those 25 years or younger who are found guilty of an 
offense for which the maximum period of imprisonment is six 
years or less.  Wis. Stat. § 973.015 (1)(a). 
 
¶21 Thus, Wisconsin's expungement statute indicates our 
legislature's willingness (as expressed by the plain language of 
the statute) to help young people who are convicted of crimes 
get back on their feet and contribute to society by providing 
them a fresh start, free from the burden of a criminal 
conviction.  Through expungement, circuit court judges can, in 
No. 
2013AP1163-CR   
 
13 
 
appropriate 
circumstances, 
help 
not 
only 
the 
individual 
defendant, but also society at large.     
¶22 With these broad foundational principles in mind, we 
now return to the text of the expungement statute.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 973.015(2) explains how an individual successfully 
completes a sentence.  "A person has successfully completed [a] 
sentence if the person has not been convicted of a subsequent 
offense and, if on probation, the probation has not been revoked 
and the probationer has satisfied the conditions of probation."  
Wis. Stat. § 973.015(2).  Thus, an individual defendant like 
Hemp who is on probation successfully completes probation if (1) 
he has not been convicted of a subsequent offense; (2) his 
probation has not been revoked; and (3) he has satisfied all the 
conditions of probation.  These (and these alone) are the only 
requirements Wis. Stat. § 973.015(2) places on an individual 
defendant like Hemp to successfully complete probation.   
¶23 If a probationer satisfies these three criteria, he 
has earned expungement, and is automatically entitled to 
expungement of the underlying charge.  See Matasek, 353 Wis. 2d 
601, ¶45.  Thus, the court of appeals was incorrect when it 
concluded 
a 
defendant 
is 
not 
automatically 
entitled 
to 
expungement upon the successful completion of his sentence 
because he must first petition for expungement, which the 
circuit court must approve.  The court of appeals' construction 
reads requirements into the statute that simply are not present.  
See Brauneis v. State, Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2000 WI 69, 
¶27, 236 Wis. 2d 27, 612 N.W.2d 635 ("We should not read into 
No. 
2013AP1163-CR   
 
14 
 
the statute language that the legislature did not put in.").  If 
a circuit court finds an individual defendant eligible for 
expungement and conditions expungement upon the successful 
completion of the sentence, then the plain language of the 
statute indicates that once the defendant successfully completes 
his sentence, he has earned, and is automatically entitled to, 
expungement. 
¶24 The 
record 
clearly 
indicates 
Hemp 
successfully 
completed probation.  First, Hemp was not convicted of any 
subsequent offense while on probation.  Second, Hemp's probation 
was not revoked.  As the relevant certificate indicates, the DOC 
discharged Hemp from probation effective December 9, 2011, 
having "satisfied said probation."  Finally, Hemp satisfied all 
the conditions of probation and paid all his supervision fees.  
Nothing in Wis. Stat. § 973.015 authorizes the circuit court to 
revisit, impose new requirements, or otherwise reverse its 
decision 
to 
find 
an 
individual 
eligible 
for 
expungement 
conditioned upon the successful completion of the sentence.  
Matasek, 353 Wis. 2d 601, ¶45.  In accordance with the plain 
language of Wis. Stat. § 973.015, Hemp's successful completion 
of probation automatically entitled him to expungement of his 
conviction.   
B. The Duty to Forward the Certificate of Discharge Rests with 
the Detaining or Probationary Authority. 
¶25 Next, we consider whether Wis. Stat. § 973.015 places 
any burden upon Hemp to petition the circuit court within a 
certain period of time in order to effectuate the expungement.  
No. 
2013AP1163-CR   
 
15 
 
We conclude it does not.  Further, we conclude the detaining or 
probationary authority must forward the certificate of discharge 
to 
the 
court 
of 
record 
upon 
the 
individual 
defendant's 
successful completion of his sentence and at that point the 
process of expungement is self-executing.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 973.015(2) places no burden on the individual defendant to 
forward his certificate of discharge to the court of record and 
petition for expungement within a certain period of time.    
¶26 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.015(2) requires:  
Upon 
successful 
completion 
of 
the 
sentence 
the 
detaining or probationary authority shall issue a 
certificate of discharge which shall be forwarded to 
the court of record and which shall have the effect of 
expunging the record.  If the person has been 
imprisoned, the detaining authority shall also forward 
a copy of the certificate of discharge to the 
department.   
¶27 Once an individual defendant successfully completes 
his sentence, the plain language of the expungement statute 
mandates a self-executing process.  The legislature's use of the 
word "shall" indicates that the legislature required the 
detaining or probationary authority to both issue a certificate 
of discharge and forward the certificate to the court of record.  
See Rotfeld v. Wis. Dep't of Natural Res., 147 Wis. 2d 720, 726, 
434 N.W.2d 617 (Ct. App. 1988) (explaining the word "may" is 
permissive, while "shall" is presumed to indicate mandatory 
action).  As we will explain below, in this context we interpret 
"shall" to be mandatory.  Thus, if the circuit court finds a 
defendant eligible for expungement at sentencing, once an 
No. 
2013AP1163-CR   
 
16 
 
individual successfully completes his sentence, the "detaining 
or 
probationary 
authority 
shall 
issue 
a 
certificate 
of 
discharge, which shall be forwarded to the court of record and 
which shall have the effect of expunging the record."  Wis. 
Stat. § 973.015(2) (emphasis added).  In other words, upon the 
successful completion of the defendant's sentence, the detaining 
or probationary authority must issue a certificate of discharge, 
and must forward that certificate to the court of record as a 
matter of course.  When this process is completed, expungement 
is effectuated.  Wis. Stat. § 973.015(2) ("Upon successful 
completion of the sentence the detaining or probationary 
authority shall issue a certificate of discharge which shall be 
forwarded to the court of record and which shall have the effect 
of expunging the record.").  
¶28 We read statutes to avoid surplusage and the use of 
the word "also" in the statute indicates that the detaining or 
probationary authority is to forward the certificate to both the 
court of record and the DOC.  Wis. Stat. § 973.015(2) ("If the 
person has been imprisoned, the detaining authority shall also 
forward a copy of the certificate of discharge to the 
department.") (emphasis added).  Here, if we were to accept the 
State's interpretation, we would read "also" out of the 
sentence.  "Also" means "in addition."  The American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language 53 (5th ed. 2011).  The use 
of the phrase "shall also forward" in describing the "detaining 
authority's" responsibility to forward the certificate to the 
DOC indicates that, if the "person has been imprisoned," the 
No. 
2013AP1163-CR   
 
17 
 
detaining authority has the responsibility to forward the 
certificate of discharge to the DOC, in addition to forwarding 
it to the court of record.  See Matasek, 353 Wis. 2d 601, ¶18. 
("'[E]very word appearing in a statute should contribute to the 
construction of the statute.'") (internal citation omitted). 
¶29 Further support for our conclusion is found in Wis. 
Stat. § 973.09(5)(a) and § 973.09(5)(c).  When a probationer is 
discharged from probation, the DOC is to complete and send one 
of two forms.  Wisconsin Stat. § 973.09(5)(a)(1) requires the 
issuance of a "certificate of discharge from probation for the 
felony for which he or she was placed on probation if, at the 
time of discharge, the probationer is on probation or parole for 
another felony."  Wisconsin Stat. § 973.09(5)(a)(2) requires the 
issuance of a certificate of final discharge to a probationer if 
the underlying conviction was for a felony and the probationer 
is not on probation or parole for another felony.  A certificate 
of final discharge was issued in the instant case as Hemp was 
not on probation or parole for another felony.  Further, Wis. 
Stat. § 973.09(5)(c) requires the DOC, when the probationer is 
discharged from probation, to "[i]n all cases, notify the court 
that placed the probationer on probation that the period of 
probation has expired."  "When two or more statutes are 
involved, we seek to construe them so that they are harmonious."  
State ex rel. Rupinski v. Smith, 2007 WI App 4, ¶19, 297 Wis. 2d 
749, 728 N.W.2d 1 (internal citations omitted).  Reading these 
statutes together with Wis. Stat. § 973.015(2), we conclude that 
once the detaining or probationary authority forwards the 
No. 
2013AP1163-CR   
 
18 
 
certificate of discharge to the court of record, expungement has 
been effectuated.  Having already assigned the detaining or 
probationary authority the duty to forward the certificate to 
the court of record, it would be absurd to construe the statute, 
absent any plain language to the contrary, to also require the 
defendant to forward to the court of record the very same 
certificate.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 (explaining that 
we interpret statutory language "in relation to the language of 
surrounding or closely-related statutes"). 
¶30 The State argues Wis. Stat. § 973.015 uses the passive 
voice, leaving the identity of the actors indeterminate.  While 
the statute does indeed use the passive voice, we cannot agree 
that the identity of the actors is indeterminate.  As we have 
already concluded, the statute places the duty to forward the 
certificate with the detaining or probationary authority.9      
¶31 If the legislature wished to place the burden on an 
individual defendant to petition for expungement and forward his 
                                                 
9 The Division of Community Corrections' Operations Manual 
belies the State's argument, that it is the defendant's duty to 
forward the certificate, as it directs its agents to forward to 
the court of record the certificate of discharge, which has the 
effect of expunging the record.  DCC Operations Manual, Division 
of Community Corrections 01.01.02, 06.26.01-06.26.05 (Oct. 21, 
2013), 
http://doc.wi.gov/community-resources/probation-
parole/dcc-operations-manual ("Within ten days following the 
discharge date, the agent shall forward information to the court 
indicating 
whether 
or 
not 
the 
offender 
has 
successfully 
completed probation. . . . Upon notification of discharge, the 
court will expunge the record.").  The Division of Community 
Corrections supervises individuals on probation, parole, or 
extended supervision. 
No. 
2013AP1163-CR   
 
19 
 
certificate of discharge it could have easily done so.  In two 
other expungement statutes, the legislature clearly required an 
individual defendant to petition for expungement.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 165.77(4) (requiring a defendant to petition for the 
expungement of DNA records); Wis. Stat. § 938.355(4m)(a) ("A 
juvenile who has been adjudged delinquent under s. 48.12, 1993 
stats., or s. 938.12 may, on attaining 17 years of age, petition 
the court to expunge the court's record of the juvenile's 
adjudication.").  If we were to follow the State's and court of 
appeals' construction we would read language into the statute 
which the legislature did not include.  "We should not read into 
the statute language that the legislature did not put in."  
Brauneis, 236 Wis. 2d 27, ¶27.  "The more reasonable presumption 
is that the legislature chose its terms carefully and precisely 
to express its meaning."  Ball v. Dist. No. 4, Area Bd. of 
Vocational, Technical & Adult Educ., 117 Wis. 2d 529, 539, 345 
N.W.2d 389 (1984).  If the legislature wished to assign similar 
duties to similarly situated defendants, it has already shown it 
is capable of doing so.  Matasek, 353 Wis. 2d 601, ¶21.   
¶32 The statute neither requires, nor suggests, that the 
defendant has the duty to petition for expungement.  The phrase 
"shall have the effect" plainly indicates that once the 
certificate of discharge has been forwarded by the detaining or 
probationary authority, expungement has been effectuated.  Wis. 
Stat. § 973.015(2).  Thus, the forwarding of the certificate of 
discharge to the circuit court is what triggers expungement, not 
the filing and approval of a petition.  The expungement statute 
No. 
2013AP1163-CR   
 
20 
 
simply does not require a person who successfully completes his 
sentence to take any affirmative action to obtain expungement.  
See 67 Wis. Op. Atty. Gen. 301 (1978) ("Subsec. (2) [of Wis. 
Stat. § 973.015] must be construed to mean that [once the 
detaining 
or 
probationary 
authority 
has 
forwarded 
the 
certificate of discharge, its] filing [with the court of record] 
will give notice to the clerk of courts to physically strike 
from the record all references to the name and identity of the 
defendant.").10  After the detaining or probationary authority 
forwards the certificate of discharge, expungement has been 
effectuated, and the defendant need not take any action. 
¶33 Here, 
no 
doubt 
exists 
that 
Hemp's 
probationary 
authority forwarded his certificate of discharge to the circuit 
court.  The circuit court's Criminal Court Record reflects that 
it received the certificate of discharge.  Hemp's case entry for 
January 
24, 
2012, 
shows 
"Notice 
of 
case 
status 
change: Discharge."  Once the probationary authority forwarded 
the certificate, expungement was effectuated, and neither Hemp 
                                                 
10 "[A] statutory interpretation by the attorney general 'is 
accorded even greater weight, and is regarded as presumptively 
correct, when the legislature later amends the statute but makes 
no changes in response to the attorney general's opinion.'"  
Schill v. Wis. Rapids Sch. Dist., 2010 WI 86, ¶126, 327 Wis. 2d 
572, 
786 
N.W.2d 
177 
(internal 
citation 
omitted). 
 
The 
expungement 
statute 
has 
been 
amended 
eight 
times 
since 
67 Wis. Op. Atty. Gen. 301 (1978), yet the applicable language 
has remained the same.  Section 973.015(2) has never been 
amended to require any action by an individual defendant.    
No. 
2013AP1163-CR   
 
21 
 
nor his probationary authority had to take additional action.11  
Thus, whether or not Hemp had a "change in circumstances" (as 
the State argues) is irrelevant. 
¶34 The State, however, suggests that we must look to Form 
CR-266, which, in its view, places the responsibility on the 
defendant to forward his certificate of discharge to the court 
of record and petition for expungement.  Form CR-266 is titled 
"Petition to Expunge Court Record of Conviction," which the 
State argues the defendant must file with the court of record.  
However, the State is mistaken as Hemp had no duty to use Form 
CR-266, as he was not required to do so by the plain language of 
§ 973.015.  Form CR-266 is a mechanism that a defendant could 
use to petition for expungement should the detaining or 
                                                 
11 Obviously the clerk of the court had to go through and 
strike Hemp's name from the records, but this is a mere 
formality, as the forwarding of the certificate of discharge by 
Hemp's probationary authority had the effect of expunging the 
record.  Wisconsin Stat. § SCR 72.06 (2013-14) provides the 
process for expungement: 
SCR 72.06. Expunction. When required by statute or 
court order to expunge a court record, the clerk of 
the court shall do all of the following: 
(1) Remove any paper index and nonfinancial court 
record and place them in the case file. 
(2) Electronically remove any automated nonfinancial 
record, except the case number. 
(3) Seal the entire case file. 
(4) Destroy expunged court records in accordance with 
the provisions of this chapter. 
No. 
2013AP1163-CR   
 
22 
 
probationary authority fail in its statutory duty to forward the 
certificate of discharge, but its use is not mandatory as it is 
not required by Wis. Stat. § 973.015.  Further, this form 
contradicts the statute's plain language, as it attempts to 
shift the burden of forwarding the defendant's certificate of 
discharge from the detaining or probationary authority, to the 
individual defendant.  Form CR-266 requires the defendant to 
state, under oath, that "[t]he detaining or probationary 
authority has issued a certificate of discharge.  A copy is 
attached."  The expungement statute imposes no such duty.   
¶35 Accordingly, we direct that form CR-266 be revised 
consistent with this opinion.  A defendant is not required to 
use form CR-266 in order to effectuate expungement.  Rather, the 
detaining or probationary authority must forward the certificate 
of discharge to the clerk of court of the court of record.  It 
is this forwarding which has the effect of expunging the record.  
It would be inconsistent with both the plain language of the 
statute 
and 
with 
common 
sense 
to 
expect 
a 
(usually) 
unrepresented individual seeking expungement, who is (usually) 
neither educated in the law nor in legal procedure, to perform 
the 
inspection 
necessary 
to 
ensure 
that 
expungement 
was 
effectuated.  To be clear, one who has successfully completed 
probation need not forward a copy of his certificate of 
discharge, as that duty does not rest with him, but with the 
detaining or probationary authority. 
¶36 The court of appeals also erroneously concluded that 
the certificate of discharge must be approved by the circuit 
No. 
2013AP1163-CR   
 
23 
 
court.  Hemp, 353 Wis. 2d 146, ¶13.  Once the detaining or 
probationary authority forwards a certificate of discharge to 
the court of record, expungement is effectuated.  By inferring 
the 
necessity 
of 
court 
approval, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
construction of the statute imposes additional requirements that 
are contrary to the statute's plain language.  See Brauneis, 236 
Wis. 2d 27, ¶27 ("We should not read into the statute language 
that the legislature did not put in.").  
¶37 Finally, we wish to briefly explain that the circuit 
court and court of appeals incorrectly determined that Wis. 
Stat. § 973.015 contains an implicit time limit.  There is no 
basis in Wis. Stat. § 973.015 on which the court of appeals or 
the circuit court could find such a time limit within which a 
defendant must petition for expungement.  As we have explained, 
a court should not read language into a statute.  Matasek, 353 
Wis. 2d 601, ¶20. 
¶38 Here, the probationary authority did forward the 
certificate of discharge, which completed the expungement 
process and should have expunged the record.  However, for 
reasons unknown to us, Hemp's record was not expunged.  This 
failure led Hemp to bring his petition for expungement, which 
the circuit court denied as untimely.  The legislature, via Wis. 
Stat. § 973.015, placed no burden on Hemp to petition at all, 
let alone within a certain period of time, and the circuit court 
did not have the authority to add such a condition.  Hemp's 
expungement 
was 
effectuated 
upon 
the 
forwarding 
of 
his 
certificate of discharge by his probationary authority to the 
No. 
2013AP1163-CR   
 
24 
 
court of record.  Wis. Stat. § 973.015(2) ("Upon successful 
completion of the sentence the detaining or probationary 
authority shall issue a certificate of discharge which shall be 
forwarded to the court of record and which shall have the effect 
of expunging the record."). 
C. The Circuit Court Improperly Exercised its Discretion in 
Denying Hemp Expungement. 
¶39 Finally, we examine whether the circuit court could 
reverse the decision it made at sentencing to find Hemp eligible 
for expungement conditioned upon the successful completion of 
his sentence.  We conclude, in accord with Matasek, that the 
circuit court improperly exercised its discretion when it denied 
Hemp expungement.  Once Hemp successfully completed probation 
the circuit court did not have the discretion to refuse to 
expunge Hemp's record. 
¶40 Nothing in the expungement statute grants the circuit 
court the authority to revisit an expungement decision.  The 
fact that the circuit court cannot re-examine the decision is 
emphasized by our decision in Matasek.  The only point in time 
at which a circuit court may make an expungement decision is at 
the sentencing hearing.  Matasek, 353 Wis. 2d 601, ¶45.  If the 
circuit court exercises its discretion in ordering expungement 
upon the successful completion of the sentence, and the 
defendant 
successfully 
completes 
that 
sentence, 
then 
the 
defendant 
has 
earned, 
and 
is 
automatically 
entitled 
to, 
expungement.  A circuit court cannot amend its expungement 
No. 
2013AP1163-CR   
 
25 
 
order, and once the detaining or probationary authority forwards 
the certificate of discharge, expungement is effectuated.   
¶41 Here the circuit court found Hemp eligible for 
expungement 
at 
sentencing 
stating 
"I'm 
going 
to 
grant 
expungement upon successful completion of probation."  The 
court's Criminal Court Record also states: "Upon successful 
completion of probation, the court GRANTS expungement."  After 
Hemp successfully completed probation and his probationary 
authority forwarded his certificate to the court of record, the 
circuit 
court 
exceeded 
its 
authority 
in 
denying 
Hemp 
expungement.   
¶42 In ordering Hemp to produce a "personal statement" the 
court opined:  
had the defendant applied for an expungement a year 
ago, his petition probably would have been granted. 
But now the circumstances are such that he is asking 
the court to ignore his recent behavior and to assist 
him in the defense of his new charges by ordering 
expungement in this case.  
Matasek prohibits a circuit court from re-exercising its 
discretion under the circumstances of the instant case.  Id., 
¶43 ("By deciding expunction at the time of sentencing, a 
circuit court creates a meaningful incentive for the offender to 
avoid reoffending.") (emphasis added).  The circuit court here 
disregarded 
the 
statute's 
plain 
language 
and 
improperly 
exercised its discretion by asking for a "personal statement," 
giving the State a chance to respond, and ultimately denying 
expungement.  Once the circuit court realized that expungement 
had not been effectuated, it had the plain duty to see to the 
No. 
2013AP1163-CR   
 
26 
 
completion of the expungement process.  Instead, the circuit 
court asked for a "personal statement" from Hemp and gave the 
State a chance to respond, neither of which it had the authority 
to do.  Thus, the circuit court incorrectly concluded Hemp's 
desire for expungement did not "ripen" until he was charged with 
a subsequent offense.  Hemp always had the desire for 
expungement because its benefits reach much further than 
mitigating future offenses.  See Leitner, 253 Wis. 2d 449, ¶38.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 973.015 does not allow for the kind of "wait 
and see" approach taken by the circuit court here.12  
V. CONCLUSION 
¶43 Therefore, 
we 
first 
hold 
that 
the 
successful 
completion 
of 
probation 
automatically 
entitled 
Hemp 
to 
expungement. 
 
Second, 
we 
hold 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.015 
is 
unambiguous and places no burden on Hemp to petition for 
expungement within a certain period of time because the duty to 
forward the certificate of discharge rests solely with the 
detaining or probationary authority.  Finally, we hold the 
circuit court improperly exercised its discretion when it 
reversed its decision to find Hemp eligible for expungement.  
                                                 
12 "If the legislature allows the circuit court to take 
the . . . 'wait-and-see' approach, offenders will be uncertain 
whether the circuit court will expunge the record and this 
uncertainty might provide a weaker incentive to an offender to 
complete his or her sentence successfully."  Matasek, 353 
Wis. 2d 601, ¶43. 
 
No. 
2013AP1163-CR   
 
27 
 
Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeals is reversed, 
and we remand to the circuit court with the instructions that 
the clerk of courts expunge Hemp's record. 
 
By the Court.-The decision of the court of appeals is reversed, 
and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
No. 
2013AP1163   
 
 
 
1