Title: City of Cedarburg v. Hansen

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2020 WI 11 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP1129 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
City of Cedarburg, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Ries B. Hansen, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 11, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 9, 2019   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Ozaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Paul V. Malloy   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ROGGENSACK, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY and KELLY, JJ., joined.  
KELLY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, J., joined.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, 
in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and DALLET, JJ., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellants, there were briefs (in the court 
of appeals) filed by Johnathan G. Woodward and Houseman & Feind, 
LLP, Grafton. There was an oral argument by Johnathan G. Woodward. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief (in the court 
of appeals) filed by Andrew Mishlove and Mishlove & Stuckert, LLC, 
Glendale. There was an oral argument by Andrew Mishlove. 
 
 
 
 
2020 WI 11
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2018AP1129 
(L.C. No. 
2017CV411) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
City of Cedarburg, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Ries B. Hansen, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent.   
  
FILED 
 
FEB 11, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ROGGENSACK, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY and KELLY, JJ., joined.  
KELLY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, J., joined.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and DALLET, JJ., joined. 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court of Ozaukee County.  
Reversed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   This case comes before 
us on bypass, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.60 (2017–18),1 from the 
circuit court for Ozaukee County.2   
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 The Honorable Paul V. Malloy of Ozaukee County presided.  
No. 
2018AP1129   
 
2 
 
¶2 
In 2005, Ries B. Hansen was convicted by the Mid-Moraine 
Municipal Court of Operating While Intoxicated (OWI) in violation 
of a City of Cedarburg ordinance, based upon Hansen's guilty plea 
to the alleged violation.3  In 2016, when he was again charged with 
OWI, Hansen collaterally attacked his 2005 conviction by proving 
that he had a 2003 OWI conviction in Florida.  He contended that 
his 2005 OWI was factually a second offense and therefore, outside 
of the municipal court's limited subject matter jurisdiction.  The 
circuit court agreed and vacated Hansen's 2005 conviction.   
¶3 
We conclude that the 2005 municipal citations invoked 
the municipal court's subject matter jurisdiction, which was 
granted by Article VII, Section 14 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
Therefore, the municipal court had power to adjudicate the 
allegation that Hansen operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated 
in violation of a municipal ordinance.  And further, even if we 
were to agree with Hansen that Wisconsin's statutory progressive 
OWI penalties were not followed in 2005, the municipal court would 
have lacked competence not subject matter jurisdiction.  City of 
Eau Claire v. Booth, 2016 WI 65, ¶14, 370 Wis. 2d 595, 882 
N.W.2d 738.     
¶4 
And finally, an objection to a court's competence may be 
forfeited if it is not raised in a timely manner.  Id., ¶1.  Hansen 
was silent about his 2003 Florida OWI conviction until he was again 
arrested for OWI in 2016.  We conclude that, by his 11 years of 
                                                 
3 The 
Mid-Moraine 
Municipal 
Court 
serves 
multiple 
municipalities in Washington County and Ozaukee County. 
No. 
2018AP1129   
 
3 
 
silence, Hansen has forfeited any competence objection that could 
exist.  Accordingly, his 2005 and 2003 convictions were countable 
offenses in 2016 for purposes of Wisconsin's statutory progressive 
penalty requirements, and we reverse the order of the circuit 
court. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶5 
This case is grounded in three OWI convictions and their 
effects on each other due to Wisconsin's statutory progressive 
penalty requirements for OWI-related events.  In 2005, Hansen was 
arrested in Wisconsin for OWI.4  The arresting officer who issued 
the civil citations, the municipal court, and the municipal 
attorney who prosecuted the 2005 offense did not know that Hansen 
had a 2003 OWI conviction in Florida.   
¶6 
Therefore, Hansen was charged with violating a Cedarburg 
ordinance, and he was prosecuted as an OWI first-offender.  Hansen 
alleges, in a footnote in his brief, that the Ozaukee County 
District Attorney knew of the Florida OWI and "declined to 
prosecute that matter as a criminal offense due to a lack of 
clarity in the records."5  However, he admits he is "unable to 
confirm whether that occurred."6  Cedarburg asserts that the 
Florida OWI was unknown.  It points to Hansen's Wisconsin driving 
                                                 
4 He was arrested for operating a vehicle with both a 
prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC) and while intoxicated.  
Based on his plea, the municipal court convicted him of OWI and 
the PAC charge was dismissed. 
5 Resp't br. at 1 n.2.   
6 Id.   
No. 
2018AP1129   
 
4 
 
record dated May 22, 2005 that was submitted by affidavit and does 
not show a prior OWI offense.7   
¶7 
However, as Hansen's 2016 collateral attack shows, he 
knew of his Florida OWI conviction, but he did not disclose it in 
2005.  Instead, by written stipulation signed by his attorney, he 
pled guilty to a municipal OWI citation and the PAC citation was 
dismissed. 
¶8 
In 2016, when Hansen again was arrested for OWI, he was 
charged under state statute as OWI-third because the arresting 
officer had knowledge of the 2005 OWI conviction, as well as the 
Florida conviction.  Hansen collaterally attacked the validity of 
the 2005 municipal court conviction.  He asserted that the 
municipal court did not have jurisdiction to prosecute him in 2005 
because that OWI was factually a second offense, which is a 
criminal offense, for which municipal courts have no jurisdiction.  
He contended that his 2016 OWI violation could be counted only as 
a first-offense OWI because the 2005 conviction was void due to 
lack of municipal court jurisdiction and his 2003 Florida OWI 
occurred more than 10 years before his 2016 Wisconsin OWI.   
¶9 
In his collateral attack, Hansen moved the circuit court 
to vacate his 2005 conviction.  The circuit court granted the 
motion.  The court concluded that the municipal court did not have 
subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the 2005 OWI offense 
because factually it was a second offense, and therefore, a 
criminal offense outside of the municipal court's jurisdiction.   
                                                 
7 Exhibit E, R: 9-7. 
No. 
2018AP1129   
 
5 
 
¶10 Hansen also moved the municipal court to vacate its 
judgment of conviction for the 2005 OWI.8  The municipal court 
denied Hansen's motion.  It reasoned that an error in charging 
affected 
the 
municipal 
court's 
competence 
but 
not 
its 
jurisdiction.  Hansen sought review of the municipal court's 
decision in the Ozaukee County Circuit Court.  The circuit court 
reversed the municipal court, for a second time concluding that 
the 2005 judgment was void for lack of municipal court subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
¶11 We granted bypass to determine whether Hansen's 
undisclosed 2003 Florida OWI conviction negated the municipal 
court's jurisdiction or impacted only its competence in 2005.  We 
conclude that any error that occurred affected only the municipal 
court's competence.  Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶12 We independently interpret and apply Wisconsin statutes 
under known facts as questions of law.  Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 
2019 WI 47, ¶13, 386 Wis. 2d 449, 926 N.W.2d 710.   
¶13 Similarly, "We independently review questions of subject 
matter jurisdiction and competenc[e]."  Booth, 370 Wis. 2d 595, ¶6 
(citing Vill. of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, ¶7, 273 
Wis. 2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190).  Lastly, we independently review 
whether a party has forfeited his or her right to challenge a 
                                                 
8 The Honorable Steven M. Cain of Ozaukee County presided. 
No. 
2018AP1129   
 
6 
 
court's competence.  See Booth, 370 Wis. 2d 595, ¶6 (citing Mikrut, 
273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶7). 
B.  Statutory Progressive Penalties 
1.  Overview 
¶14 This case involves the legal issue of whether the 
municipal court's lack of knowledge of Hansen's 2003 Florida 
conviction affected its subject matter jurisdiction or only its 
competence in 2005.  Wisconsin's OWI penalties escalate with each 
countable offense both in regard to the nature of the conviction 
and in regard to the monetary and confinement consequences.  As a 
beginning, a first offense is a civil forfeiture.9  Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(am).  Second and third offenses are misdemeanors.  
§ 346.65(2)(am)2. & 3.  A fourth offense is a Class H Felony.  
§ 346.65(2)(am)4.  The penalty continues to escalate until a tenth 
offense, which is a Class E Felony.  § 346.65(2)(am)7. 
¶15 Under Wisconsin's progressive penalties for OWI-related 
offenses, a countable offense does not have to be an OWI 
conviction.  Wisconsin Stat. § 343.307(1) lists a variety of 
offenses, some of which do not arise from OWI convictions.  For 
example, revocation for improper refusal to take a chemical test 
that law enforcement has requested counts the same as an OWI 
                                                 
9 Wisconsin is the only state where the penalty for a first-
offense OWI is a civil forfeiture.  Todd Richmond, Criminalizing 
1st-time DUIs Is a Tough Sell in Wisconsin, Chi. Tribune (Jan. 13, 
2019), https://www.chicagotribune.com/nation-world/ct-wisconsin-
criminal-dui-20190113-story.html; 
Andrew 
Mishlove 
& 
Lauren 
Stuckert, Wisconsin's New OWI Law, Wis. Lawyer, June 2010, 
https://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/WisconsinLawyer/ 
Pages/Article.aspx?Volume=83&Issue=6&ArticleID=2045. 
No. 
2018AP1129   
 
7 
 
conviction for purposes of increasing statutory penalties.  Wis. 
Stat. § 343.307(1)(f); Wis. Stat. § 343.305(10).    
¶16 Furthermore, the prohibited conduct need not occur in 
Wisconsin. 
 
Out-of-state 
OWI-related 
events 
count 
as 
"[c]onvictions under the law of another jurisdiction that 
prohibits a person from refusing chemical testing."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.307(1)(d).  A court also counts administrative "[o]perating 
privilege suspensions or revocations under the law of another 
jurisdiction arising out of a refusal to submit to chemical 
testing."  § 343.307(1)(e).   
¶17 Prosecutors and courts cannot knowingly disregard 
countable offenses.  County of Walworth v. Rohner, 108 Wis. 2d 713, 
721, 324 N.W.2d 682 (1982).  For example, a prosecutor has no 
discretion to prosecute a second-offense OWI, which he knows is a 
second offense, as a first offense.  Id. at 718.  Wisconsin's 
progressive OWI penalties are mandatory directives from the 
legislature "to encourage the vigorous prosecution of offenses 
concerning the operation of motor vehicles by persons under the 
influence . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 967.055(1)(a). 
¶18 Initially, municipal courts were not involved in 
prosecuting OWI-related events.  However, in 1957, the Wisconsin 
legislature authorized municipalities to adopt such traffic 
regulations, as long as the regulations were in "strict conformity 
with the state statute."  Id. at 719.  The legislation required 
that the municipality's penalty was a civil forfeiture.  Id.  
Problematically, at the time, violation of a state OWI traffic 
regulation was a crime.  Id.  Giving local governments the power 
No. 
2018AP1129   
 
8 
 
to enact non-criminal versions of state traffic regulations led to 
inequality.  Id.  That is, under those provisions, a person whose 
OWI violation was adjudicated by a municipal court would face a 
civil penalty, whereas another person who engaged in the same 
conduct would face a criminal penalty in circuit court.  Id. 
¶19 In 
1971, 
the 
legislature 
tried 
to 
remedy 
that 
inequality.  Id. (citing § 66, ch. 278, Laws of 1971).  First, it 
decriminalized violations of several state traffic regulations, 
including first-offense OWI.  Id. at 720.  Second, the law 
"provided a uniform statewide procedure governing prosecutions 
under both state statutes and conforming local regulations."  Id. 
2.  Wisconsin Stat. § 343.307 
¶20 Progressive penalties for OWI violations are set out in 
Wis. Stat. § 346.6510 based on the application of Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.307 to OWI-related events.  Interpretation of § 343.307 
underlies the specific competence question presented in this case, 
but neither party directly engages in statutory interpretation 
because each simply assumes a somewhat different interpretation 
and then argues from that interpretation.   
¶21 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.307 provides in relevant part: 
                                                 
10 Relevant to our discussion here, the minimum punishment for 
a 
first 
offense 
OWI 
is 
a 
$150 
forfeiture, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(am)1., while the minimum punishment for a third 
offense OWI is a $600 fine and 45 days in county jail.  
§ 346.65(2)(am)3.  The maximum punishment for a first offense OWI 
is a $300 forfeiture, while the maximum punishment for a third 
offense is a $2,000 fine and one year in county jail.  
§ 346.65(2)(am)1. & 3.  
No. 
2018AP1129   
 
9 
 
(1) The court shall count the following to determine the 
length of a revocation under s. 343.30(1q)(b) and to 
determine the penalty under ss. 114.09(2) and 346.65(2): 
(a) Convictions for violations under s. 346.63(1), 
or a local ordinance in conformity with that section.  
. . . . 
(d) Convictions 
under 
the 
law 
of 
another 
jurisdiction that prohibits . . . using a motor vehicle 
while intoxicated . . . . 
¶22 Statutory interpretation begins with the language chosen 
by the legislature.  If the meaning is plain, we ordinarily stop 
the inquiry.  Sorenson v. Batchelder, 2016 WI 34, ¶11, 368 Wis. 2d 
140, 885 N.W.2d 362 (citing Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 119).  Plain meaning 
is assisted by the context in which the words are used.  
Batchelder, 368 Wis. 2d 140, ¶11.  We also interpret the statutory 
language reasonably "to avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  
Id.  
¶23 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.307 plainly requires a court to 
"count" prior convictions.  The statute employs mandatory terms, 
"shall count."  The court is to do so in order "to determine" the 
length of revocation and other penalties that arise from OWI 
convictions.  There is nothing in the plain wording of § 343.307 
that even implies that a court is precluded from counting an OWI 
conviction to determine the length of revocation or other penalty.   
¶24 However, Hansen contends that he has no OWI convictions 
that can be counted when his 2016 OWI violation is adjudicated.  
He argues that because the municipal court did not count his 2003 
Florida conviction in 2005, the court adjudicated a matter for 
No. 
2018AP1129   
 
10 
 
which it had no subject matter jurisdiction.  This lack of 
jurisdiction, he argues, voids his 2005 conviction and causes his 
2003 Florida conviction to occur more than 10 years before his 
2016 violation, thereby preventing his 2003 Florida conviction 
from having an effect on the penalty for his 2016 violation.    
¶25 Hansen's argument fails because the municipal court had 
subject matter jurisdiction in 2005, as we explain directly below.  
Therefore, his 2005 conviction stands and it, together with his 
2003 Florida conviction, must be counted in 2016 under the plain 
terms of Wis. Stat. § 343.307.  Furthermore, although Hansen's 
silence gave him a lesser penalty in 2005, the progressive 
penalties set out in Wis. Stat. § 346.65 were honored when Hansen 
was charged in 2016 with OWI-third pursuant to § 343.307.  Hansen's 
silence in 2005 had an effect only on the municipal court's 
competence in 2005.  As we said in Mikrut, and explain more fully 
below, a loss of competence "can be triggered by a variety of 
defects in statutory procedure."  Mikrut, 273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶12.   
C.  Invoking Municipal Court Jurisdiction 
¶26 Article VII, Section 14 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides, "All municipal courts shall have uniform jurisdiction 
limited to actions and proceedings arising under ordinances of the 
municipality."  Wis. Const. art. VII, § 14.  Accordingly, the 
constitution 
confers 
jurisdiction 
on 
municipal 
courts 
to 
adjudicate alleged ordinance violations.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 755.045(1) 
further 
provides 
that 
municipal 
courts 
have 
"exclusive jurisdiction" to enforce their ordinances.  Because it 
is foundational to jurisdiction of municipal courts, we interpret 
No. 
2018AP1129   
 
11 
 
the phrase "actions and proceedings arising under ordinances of 
the municipality" in Article VII, Section 14.   
¶27 It is undisputed that at the time the proceeding in 
municipal court commenced, it was based on an alleged ordinance 
violation.  Stated otherwise, in 2005, the proceeding was commenced 
by Hansen's civil traffic citations, which are the pleadings that 
alleged that the OWI and PAC violations arose under an ordinance.   
¶28 The means by which an action or proceeding arises is 
central to our discussion.  In another context, we have described 
the phrase, "arising under," as conferring jurisdiction at the 
time that "the plaintiff is able, from the nature of his case, to 
set up in his declaration or complaint, some right or equity 
against the defendant, arising under the constitution, laws or 
treaties of the United States."  Ableman v. Booth, 11 Wis. 517 
(*498), 531-32 (*512) (1859).  We further explained, "the facts 
conferring jurisdiction, would, by the plaintiff's showing, appear 
affirmatively upon the record, and the court might entertain the 
case."  Id. at 532.  As Ableman shows, we concluded that "arising 
under" was tied to the facts that the pleading alleged.11 
¶29 Confining ourselves to the four corners of the municipal 
citations that commenced the municipal court proceeding, Hansen 
was charged with two violations of a municipal ordinance that was 
                                                 
11 Ableman was a one justice opinion.  In 1859, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court had only three justices.  One justice recused and 
another dissented without filing an opinion.  We note that the 
disagreement between the two justices was not with the portion of 
Ableman on which we rely.   
No. 
2018AP1129   
 
12 
 
in conformity with statutory provisions.12  Hansen contends that 
subject matter jurisdiction in municipal court is defeated by his 
2003 Florida conviction.  Whether the alleged OWI violation was, 
or was not, preceded by a prior offense is not an element of an 
OWI ordinance violation, nor is it an element of an OWI criminal 
violation.  State v. McAllister, 107 Wis. 2d 532, 538, 319 
N.W.2d 865 (1982) ("[W]e hold that the fact of a prior violation, 
civil or criminal, is not an element of the crime of [OWI] either 
in the ordinary sense of the meaning of the word element, i.e., 
the incidents of conduct giving rise to the prosecution, or in the 
constitutional sense.").   
¶30 A defendant's prior convictions determine his status as 
a repeat offender, not his guilt.  State v. Saunders, 2002 WI 107, 
¶3, 255 Wis. 2d 589, 649 N.W.2d 263.  However, the State must prove 
a defendant's status as a prior offender at sentencing, where prior 
convictions must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.13  Id.  
                                                 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 349.06(1)(a) states, in relevant part, 
that "any local authority may enact and enforce any traffic 
regulation which is in strict conformity with one or more 
provisions of chs. 341 to 348 and 350 for which the penalty for 
violation thereof is a forfeiture."  Citations E626967-4 and -5 
allege that Hansen twice violated Cedarburg ordinance 10-1-1a (in 
strict conformity with Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a)) for operating 
while intoxicated and (in strict conformity with § 346.63(1)(b)) 
because of a "prohibited B.A.C. (breath)."   
13 In a criminal OWI prosecution, the jury never hears about 
the number of prior offenses.  Wis. JI——Criminal 2663 (2006).  This 
does not pose constitutional problems because prior convictions 
are not facts that must be submitted to the jury.  Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) ("Other than the fact of a prior 
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond 
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.").  Indeed, in practice, 
No. 
2018AP1129   
 
13 
 
Importantly, the city attorney is not required to allege or prove 
that the defendant had no prior offenses.   
¶31 We also have said that "arising under" jurisdiction is 
incredibly broad.  Beck v. State, 196 Wis. 242, 244, 219 N.W. 197, 
199 (1928) (explaining that a court has "jurisdiction to hear and 
determine all questions arising under the provisions of the 
inheritance tax laws").  We said, "[i]t is difficult to see how a 
broader jurisdiction could be conferred upon any court upon a given 
subject."  Id. at 247.  We then quoted the United States Supreme 
Court describing jurisdiction as the "power to entertain the suit, 
consider the merits and render a binding decision thereon; and by 
merits we mean the various elements which enter into or qualify 
the plaintiff's right to the relief sought."  Id. (quoting General 
Inv. Co. v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 271 U.S. 228 (1926)).   
¶32 We conclude that the municipal court did not entertain 
a suit for a second-offense OWI because there was no allegation of 
a prior offense in the charging documents.14  Therefore, he was 
                                                 
defendants are often the ones asking that prior convictions not be 
introduced into evidence.  The fear is that the jury will treat 
the prior convictions as establishing a propensity for the conduct 
in question.  "The policy of the law recognizes the difficulty of 
containing the effects of such information which, once dropped 
like poison in the juror's ear, 'swift as quicksilver it courses 
through the natural gates and alleys of the body.'" R. v. Handy, 
[2002] 2 S.C.R. 908, ¶40 (Can.) (quoting Hamlet, Act I, Scene v, 
11). 
14 We also note that according to Hansen's argument, neither 
a defendant nor defense counsel has any requirement to inform a 
court about prior offenses.  Indeed, a defense attorney may have 
an ethical obligation to safeguard information about prior 
convictions.  Revised Wis. Ethics Op. E-86-06 (Dec. 29, 2018) at 
4 n.9 ("Counsel's knowledge of the client's prior conviction is 
No. 
2018AP1129   
 
14 
 
prosecuted for ordinance violations shown on the civil citations 
he was issued.   
¶33 The history of the 1977 constitutional amendment that 
created Article VII, Section 14 of the Wisconsin Constitution is 
instructive.  The amendment process started with the passage of 
1975 Joint Resolution 13.  A summary and analysis of the resolution 
explained: 
The proposed amendment would limit the jurisdiction of 
municipal courts to actions and proceedings arising 
under the ordinances of the municipality in which 
established. 
 
Presently, 
municipal 
courts 
could 
constitutionally be given jurisdiction equal to that of 
circuit 
courts, 
although 
municipal 
courts 
are 
statutorily restricted to hearing cases involving 
ordinance violations. 
Jim Fullin, Summary and Analysis of 1975 Enrolled Joint Resolution 
13 Relating to the State Court System 4 (1976) (on file at the 
David T. Prosser, Jr. Wisconsin State Law Library).  The reference 
to "hearing cases involving ordinance violations" is telling.  A 
municipal court is hearing such a case when that is what has been 
alleged in a charging document, such as a civil citation for OWI.   
                                                 
information that relates to the representation and is protected by 
SCR 20:1.6(a).").  The Ethics Opinion does, however, explain that 
a defense lawyer "has a duty not to provide false information to 
the court" and discusses counsel's obligations under SCR 
20:3.3(a)(1) when the "court directly asks counsel or the defendant 
about the prior record."  In those situations, "counsel may not 
knowingly report an incorrect number of prior OWI convictions."  
Invoking subject matter jurisdiction should not depend on facts 
that no party has an obligation to bring to the court's attention. 
No. 
2018AP1129   
 
15 
 
¶34 In 1973, a similar attempt had been made at reforming 
municipal courts.  The proposal was summarized by a Report from 
the Wisconsin Legislative Council:  
In present section 2, the Legislature is authorized to 
create municipal courts with trial powers in their 
municipalities equal to that of the circuit courts.  
Assembly 
Joint 
Resolution 
5 
provides 
that 
the 
Legislature may provide for municipal courts, but under 
amended section 14, the trial jurisdiction of these 
courts as provided by law may not be greater than the 
trial of ordinance violations, state traffic offenses 
and forfeiture actions.   
Wis. Legislative Council, Report to the 1973 Legislature on Court 
Reorganization 10–11 (Mar. 1973) (on file at the David T. Prosser, 
Jr. Wisconsin State Law Library). 
¶35 Of particular importance is the report's reference to 
"trial of ordinance violations."  A trial, by definition, is a 
fact-finding mission to determine the truth of allegations in a 
pleading.  Trial, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining 
a trial as "[a] formal judicial examination of evidence and 
determination of legal claims in an adversary proceeding").  It 
should go without saying that a municipal court trial can occur 
only after jurisdiction arises under Article VII, Section 14.   
¶36 Federal case law has persuasive value in defining 
"arising under" because both the United States Constitution and 
federal statutes use the phrase, "arising under."15  At oral 
                                                 
15 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial power shall extend 
to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, 
the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall 
be made, under their Authority . . . ."); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("The 
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil 
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 
No. 
2018AP1129   
 
16 
 
argument, Hansen argued by analogizing to federal case law on 
jurisdictional facts.  Specifically, Hansen referred us to the 
United States Supreme Court's decision in Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 
546 U.S. 500 (2006), which we conclude supports our conclusion 
that municipal court subject matter jurisdiction is invoked by the 
pleadings. 
¶37 Arbaugh concluded that "[a] plaintiff properly invokes 
§ 1331 [federal question] jurisdiction . . . when she pleads a 
colorable claim 'arising under' the Constitution or laws of the 
United States."  Id. at 513 (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 
681–85 (1946)).  Arbaugh explained that there is a difference 
between invoking and establishing jurisdiction: the United States 
Constitution establishes jurisdiction when a plaintiff's case 
arises under a federal law and the plaintiff invokes that 
jurisdiction.  Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 513.  Congress can make certain 
facts a prerequisite to a claim arising under federal law, e.g., 
the amount-in-controversy threshold in diversity actions.16  Id. 
at 515–16 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332).  These facts are distinguished 
from facts going to the merits of the case.  Id. at 513–14. 
                                                 
United States."). 
16 The United States Supreme Court concluded that Congress 
must use clear language to create a prerequisite fact necessary to 
jurisdiction.  Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515 (2006) 
(internal citations removed) (modifications in the original) 
("Given the 'unfair[ness]' and 'waste of judicial resources' 
entailed in tying the employee-numerosity requirement to subject-
matter jurisdiction, we think it the sounder course to refrain 
from constricting [U.S.C.] § 1331 or Title VII's jurisdictional 
provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), and to leave the ball in 
Congress' court.").   
No. 
2018AP1129   
 
17 
 
¶38 However, even when Congress creates a prerequisite 
jurisdictional fact, it does not necessarily follow that the fact's 
non-existence when the merits of the action are tried negates 
subject matter jurisdiction that has been invoked by the 
allegations in the pleadings.  Diversity jurisdiction is an 
example.  Currently, the amount-in-controversy must be greater 
than $75,000.  28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).  If a plaintiff invokes 
diversity jurisdiction, the defendant can contest the amount-in-
controversy with the possibility of proving subject matter 
jurisdiction is not established.  However:  
[I]f the defendant does not lodge a challenge, the 
plaintiff's good-faith allegation controls, even if the 
amount in controversy does not, in fact, exceed the 
jurisdictional threshold.  The parties' pleading choices 
can thus establish jurisdiction even when the amount in 
controversy is, in fact, below the threshold.   
Scott Dodson, Jurisdiction and Its Effects, 105 Geo. L.J. 619, 631 
(2017).  It is not as if, should the jury return a verdict for 
less than $75,000, the lack of finding for the jurisdictional 
amount negates the federal court's jurisdiction.  Federal court 
jurisdiction does not turn on facts unknown at the start of the 
proceeding, but rather, jurisdiction is invoked by unchallenged 
pleadings.17 
                                                 
17 Federal courts allow subject matter jurisdiction to be 
raised for the first time on appeal.  Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514 
(quoting United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002)). 
However, as already explained, an unchallenged good-faith 
allegation can be sufficient to invoke jurisdiction.  And once 
jurisdiction is invoked and the time of direct appeal has passed, 
the defendant has no valid objection.  
No. 
2018AP1129   
 
18 
 
¶39 Other federal cases also have concluded that "arising 
under" jurisdiction is invoked by the pleadings.  In Louisville & 
Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908), the United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
explained, 
"It 
is 
the 
settled 
interpretation . . . that a suit arises under the Constitution and 
laws of the United States only when the plaintiff's statement of 
his own cause of action shows that it is based upon those laws or 
that Constitution."18  Id. at 152 (emphasis added); see also Johnson 
v. Apna Ghar, Inc., 330 F.3d 999, 1001 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting 
Sharpe v. Jefferson Distrib. Co., 148 F.3d 676, 677 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(modifications in original) ("If Johnson presents 'a non-frivolous 
claim under federal law; no more is necessary for subject-matter 
jurisdiction.  A plaintiff's inability to demonstrate that the 
defendant [is an "employer"] is just like any other failure to 
meet a statutory requirement.  There is a gulf between defeat on 
the merits and a lack of jurisdiction.'")); Kulick v. Pocono Downs 
Racing Ass'n, Inc., 816 F.2d 895, 897–98 (3d Cir. 1987) ("Under 
either section [of federal law], a court has jurisdiction over the 
dispute . . . .  Once the plaintiff has met [a] threshold pleading 
                                                 
18 We have discussed federal case law in this opinion for the 
sole purpose of interpreting the phrase, "arising under."  We note 
that federal law has permitted jurisdictional challenges on 
appeal; however, generally, it does not permit collateral attacks 
on subject matter jurisdiction.  See Chicot Cty. Drainage Dist. v. 
Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 375–78 (1940); see also Michael 
J. Edney, Comment, Preclusive Abstention: Issue Preclusion and 
Jurisdictional Dismissals after Ruhrgas, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 193, 
196–97 (2001) ("If the rendering court never addressed the question 
of subject matter jurisdiction, and vertical appeals have been 
exhausted, then any objection to subject matter jurisdiction has 
been waived."). 
No. 
2018AP1129   
 
19 
 
requirement, however, the truth of the facts alleged in the 
complaint is a question on the merits, as is the legal question 
whether the facts alleged establish a violation.").   
¶40 Legal 
scholars 
have 
described 
"arising 
under" 
jurisdiction similarly.  As one wrote: 
[T]he "arising under" (or "brought under" or "commenced 
to redress a deprivation of") jurisdictional grants do 
not ask historical factual questions.  They ask only for 
a prediction from the court:  Does it appear (based 
solely on the pleadings) that the plaintiff seeks relief 
created or made possible by a federal enactment? 
Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 Wash. L. Rev. 
643, 701 (2005).  The same scholar has also stated, "[a] court 
measuring its subject mat[t]er jurisdiction cannot look anywhere 
other than the affirmative claims properly stated in the 
complaint."  Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and 
Substantiality, 42 Tulsa L. Rev. 579, 590 (2007); see also Brianna 
J. Fuller, Developments in the Law, III. Federal Question 
Jurisdiction, 37 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1443, 1474 (2004) (citing The 
Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913)) 
(modifications in original) ("If done by the book, the court should 
look at the allegations in the complaint to see if they would raise 
a substantial federal question as alleged.  This should be made 
independently of 'whether the claim ultimately [would] be held 
good or bad.'"). 
¶41 We conclude that Cedarburg invoked municipal court 
subject matter jurisdiction conferred by Article VII, Section 14 
of the Wisconsin Constitution by the pleadings (civil traffic 
citations) that alleged violations that arose under municipal 
No. 
2018AP1129   
 
20 
 
ordinances.  Stated otherwise, the proceedings on the traffic 
citations were grounded in allegations that Hansen operated a 
vehicle while intoxicated in violation of municipal ordinance.  
¶42 We discussed the impact of municipal and state OWI 
charges on circuit court subject matter jurisdiction in Rohner.  
Rohner, 108 Wis. 2d 713.  Paul Rohner was first convicted for OWI 
in 1979.  Id. at 715.  In 1980, he was cited for OWI under a county 
ordinance.  Id.  The case proceeded in circuit court, but pursuant 
to an alleged violation of a county ordinance.  Id.  When it went 
to trial, Rohner moved to dismiss the proceedings on the ground 
that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate an 
ordinance violation.  Id.  The circuit court recognized that Rohner 
had a prior OWI conviction, but concluded that, nonetheless, it 
had jurisdiction to proceed on the 1980 OWI ordinance violation.  
Id.   
¶43 We disagreed.  Id. at 720–21.  We explained "that the 
[S]tate has the exclusive authority to prosecute second offenses 
for drunk driving" under State statutes, so Rohner could not be 
convicted of violation of a county ordinance.  Id. at 722.  "The 
legislative goal of providing uniform traffic enforcement would be 
subverted if local governments were allowed to punish second 
offenders with first offense penalties."  Id. at 720.  We held 
that a county ordinance "can have no application to a second or 
subsequent offense."  Id. at 722. 
¶44 Over time, our holding in Rohner was understood as 
imposing a duty on city attorneys and prosecutors who had knowledge 
of a prior OWI conviction to correctly charge subsequent OWIs.  In 
No. 
2018AP1129   
 
21 
 
one such case, Albert R. Jensen was undercharged with a first-
offense OWI in municipal court.  City of Kenosha v. Jensen, 184 
Wis. 2d 91, 93, 516 N.W.2d 4 (Ct. App. 1994).  Jensen pled no 
contest, and the municipality was unaware of Jensen's prior 
offense.  Id.  Subsequently, the City realized it had made a 
charging error, and it asked the municipal court to vacate the 
judgment and dismiss the municipal citation without prejudice.  
Id. at 93-94.  The municipal court did so, permitting the State to 
proceed criminally against Jensen for his second OWI.  Jensen 
objected, saying the municipal court lacked the ability to do so.  
Id. at 94.  The court of appeals agreed with the City of Kenosha 
and held that the municipal court had the inherent authority to 
vacate its judgment.  Id. at 98.  However, the court of appeals 
also opined: 
We are not holding that in every OWI-BAC case where the 
municipal attorney finds out that an offense is actually 
a second or subsequent offense within five years, the 
municipal attorney must seek vacation of the municipal 
judgment before criminal proceedings can ensue.  Quite 
the contrary, the State may proceed regardless of 
whether the municipal attorney or the municipal court 
first acts.  As the State points out in its amicus curiae 
brief, a municipal court does not have subject matter 
jurisdiction to try and convict a criminal operating 
while intoxicated.  Any such municipal action is null 
and void [under Rohner]. 
Id. at 98-99. 
¶45 Notably, "[a]t the time we decided Rohner, our case law 
did not clearly distinguish between the concepts of subject matter 
jurisdiction and competenc[e]."  Booth, 370 Wis. 2d 595, ¶14 
(citing Xcel Energy Servs., Inc. v. LIRC, 2013 WI 64, ¶27 n.8, 349 
No. 
2018AP1129   
 
22 
 
Wis. 2d 234, 833 N.W.2d 665).  Therefore, we labeled the concern 
one of subject matter jurisdiction in Rohner, as did the court of 
appeals in Jensen. 
¶46 In Booth, we took the opportunity to clarify the legal 
foundation of Rohner.  Booth, 370 Wis. 2d 595, ¶14.  The facts of 
Booth are highly similar to the facts of the matter now before us, 
except that the undercharged offense in Booth proceeded in circuit 
court.  Id., ¶¶2–5.  After a thorough discussion, we concluded 
that our subsequent case law on competence better explained the 
results in Rohner.  Id., ¶14.  We also withdrew language from all 
decisions that suggested otherwise.  Id.  This withdrawal included 
language in Jensen that stated, "a municipal court does not have 
subject matter jurisdiction to try and convict a criminal operating 
while intoxicated."  Jensen, 184 Wis. 2d at 99.  It was competence 
that the municipal court lacked in Jensen, not subject matter 
jurisdiction.   
¶47 The reasoning in our decision in Mikrut is important to 
review here because in Mikrut, we detailed the significant 
difference between subject matter jurisdiction and competence.  We 
said, "If a court has the power, i.e., subject matter jurisdiction, 
to entertain a particular type of action, its judgment is not void 
even though entertaining it was erroneous and contrary to the 
statute."  Mikrut, 273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶14.  We said that a loss of 
competence "can be triggered by a variety of defects in statutory 
procedure."  Id., ¶12.  Furthermore, "a lack of competency does 
not 
negate 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction 
or 
nullify 
the 
No. 
2018AP1129   
 
23 
 
judgment . . . .  Lack of competency is not 'jurisdictional' and 
does not result in a void judgment."  Id., ¶34 (citation omitted).  
¶48 Upon our review of Mikrut in Booth, we reasoned:  "the 
proper characterization of the circuit court's deficiency in 
Rohner was loss of circuit court competency to proceed to judgment 
rather than negation of subject matter jurisdiction."  Booth, 370 
Wis. 2d 595, ¶14.  We referred to Mikrut as teaching that 
"noncompliance with statutory mandates affects only a court's 
competency and will never affect its subject matter jurisdiction."  
Id. 
¶49 To explain further, subject matter jurisdiction and 
competence are related but distinct concepts.  "Subject matter 
jurisdiction . . . 'refers to the power of a . . . court to decide 
certain types of actions.'"  Id., ¶7 (quoting State v. Smith, 2005 
WI 104, ¶18, 283 Wis. 2d 57, 699 N.W.2d 508).  In other words, 
subject matter jurisdiction is about the type or category of case 
brought.  Competence presupposes a court has subject matter 
jurisdiction and is about a court's ability to exercise its 
jurisdiction in an individual case.  As we explained in Booth: 
A circuit court's ability to exercise its subject 
matter jurisdiction in individual cases . . . may be 
affected by noncompliance with statutory requirements 
pertaining to the invocation of that jurisdiction.  The 
failure to comply with these statutory conditions does 
not negate subject matter jurisdiction but may under 
certain 
circumstances 
affect 
the 
circuit 
court's 
competency to proceed to judgment in the particular case 
before the court.  A judgment rendered under these 
circumstances may be erroneous or invalid because of the 
circuit court's loss of competency but is not void for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
No. 
2018AP1129   
 
24 
 
Booth, 370 Wis. 2d 595, ¶12 (quoting Mikrut, 273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶2).  
An objection to subject matter jurisdiction cannot be forfeited.  
Booth, 370 Wis. 2d 595, ¶1.  However, an objection to a court's 
competence can be forfeited if it is not raised in a timely manner.  
Id.   
¶50 Hansen argues that our rationale in Booth rested on the 
circuit court's plenary subject matter jurisdiction.  Id., ¶¶8, 
12.  He argues that the circuit court could have heard the 
proceeding in Booth if the OWI had been correctly charged as a 
second-offense.  Id.  Hansen contends however, that municipal 
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and therefore, the 
reasoning in Booth does not apply.  He says that had his 2005 
violation been correctly charged, the municipal court could not 
have heard it.  However, it was charged based on the traffic 
citations which were the pleadings that commenced the action.  
Hansen knew that he had a prior OWI, but he chose to admit to OWI-
first and take advantage of the municipal court action.   
¶51 In summary, we are unpersuaded that the municipal court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  Hansen's contention goes only 
to an initial inability to follow Wisconsin statutes that require 
progressive penalties for OWI-related offenses.  Accordingly, 
under the facts of this case, only the municipal court's competence 
was affected by the pleading.   
No. 
2018AP1129   
 
25 
 
D.  Forfeiture of Competence Objections 
¶52 Having concluded that the municipal court's subject 
matter jurisdiction was properly invoked by the pleadings but that 
the municipal court may have lacked competence, we next address 
whether Hansen has forfeited his competence-based objection.  We 
conclude that he has. 
¶53 The facts of this case are similar to Booth.  The 
defendant in Booth waited 22 years to object.  Id., ¶25.  We 
suggested the delay and subsequent objection was "an attempt to 
play fast and loose with the court system, which is something this 
court frowns upon."  Id. (citing State v. Petty, 201 Wis. 2d 337, 
346–47, 548 N.W.2d 817 (1996)).  For that reason, we did not 
exercise our inherent authority to vacate the judgment.  Booth, 
370 Wis. 2d 595, ¶25.  Here, Hansen waited more than a decade to 
seek vacatur.  We see no legal or equitable distinction between 
the passage of time in this case and the passage of time in Booth.  
Furthermore, we need not decide precisely when Hansen forfeited an 
objection to competence, because he clearly did forfeit.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶54 We conclude that the 2005 pleadings filed invoked the 
municipal court's subject matter jurisdiction, which was granted 
by Article VII, Section 14 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
Therefore, the municipal court had power to adjudicate the 
allegation that Hansen operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated 
in violation of a municipal ordinance.  And further, even if we 
were to agree with Hansen that Wisconsin's statutory progressive 
OWI regulations were not followed in 2005, the municipal court 
No. 
2018AP1129   
 
26 
 
would 
have 
lacked 
only 
competence, 
not 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction.  Id., ¶14. 
¶55 And finally, an objection to a court's competence may be 
forfeited if it is not raised in a timely manner.  Id., ¶1.  Hansen 
was silent about his 2003 Florida OWI conviction until he was again 
arrested for OWI in 2016.  We conclude that, by his 11 years of 
silence, Hansen has forfeited any competence objection that could 
exist.  Accordingly, both his 2005 and 2003 convictions were 
countable offenses in 2016 for purposes of Wisconsin's statutory 
progressive penalty requirements, and we reverse the order of the 
circuit court. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the circuit court is reversed. 
 
No.  2018AP1129.dk 
 
1 
 
¶56 DANIEL KELLY, J.   (concurring).  I join the majority's 
opinion in its entirety.  The sole purpose of my concurrence is to 
address the dissent's deft, but pointless, reduction of a straw 
man to a fine powder. 
¶57 This case calls for us to determine whether the municipal 
court had subject matter jurisdiction over the case it heard, and 
if so, whether it was competent to hear it.  When we talk about 
subject matter jurisdiction, we are addressing a court's ability 
to hear a particular type of case. City of Eau Claire v. Booth, 
2016 WI 65, ¶7, 370 Wis. 2d 595, 882 N.W.2d 738 (Subject matter 
jurisdiction "refers to the power of a court to decide certain 
types of actions." (quoted source omitted)).  When we talk about 
competence, on the other hand, we are asking whether a court should 
have heard a specific case.  Id., ¶21 ("[A] failure to comply with 
a statutory mandate pertaining to the exercise of subject matter 
jurisdiction may result in a loss of the circuit court's competency 
to adjudicate the particular case before the court." (quoted source 
omitted)).  Here, we must determine whether the municipal court 
had subject matter jurisdiction over the type of case brought 
against Mr. Hansen, and whether it was competent to hear this 
specific case. 
¶58 The analytical engine powering the dissent is its 
failure to keep these concepts distinct.  But perhaps more 
surprising than that is the point at which the muddling of the two 
began.  The dissent insists that we may not analyze the municipal 
court's subject matter jurisdiction with respect to the case it 
actually heard.  Instead, it says, we are supposed to act as if 
No.  2018AP1129.dk 
 
2 
 
the municipal court heard something it refers to as a "second-
offense OWI" and then perform the jurisdictional analysis on that 
non-existent case.  Based on its analysis of this case that was 
not, the dissent concludes that the municipal court did not have 
subject matter jurisdiction to hear the actual case it did hear.  
So its premise is a straw man:  "[A] municipal court lacks the 
power to sentence someone convicted of a subsequent OWI offense 
precisely because that charge cannot be an ordinance violation, no 
matter how it is pled."  Dissent, ¶104 n.8. 
¶59 Why is this a straw man?  Because Mr. Hansen was not 
charged with, convicted of, or sentenced for, a "second-offense 
OWI."1  Instead, the City cited Mr. Hansen for violating the 
                                                 
1 The dissent embedded a pretty significant error of law in 
its straw man, to wit, its belief that there is something known as 
a "second-offense OWI."  There isn't.  Nor is there any such thing 
as a "first-offense OWI."  The substantive offense known as "OWI" 
exists without reference to the number of prior OWI convictions.  
Here's why. 
The definition of an OWI offense appears in Wis. Stat. 
§ 363.63, and contains no reference to prior OWI convictions; the 
penalties associated with that offense (which do depend on the 
number of prior OWI convictions) may be found in Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65.  The penalty, however, is not an element of the 
substantive offense.  State v. Wideman, 206 Wis. 2d 91, 104, 556 
N.W.2d 737 (1996) ("A prior offense is an element of Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(c), the OWI penalty enhancement statute, rather than 
of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1), the substantive crime charged.").  In 
fact, the penalties are entirely distinct from the substantive 
offense:  "[Wis. Stat. §] 346.63(1) . . . defines the offense of 
driving while intoxicated; it does not state the sentencing penalty 
and it does not state the term of revocation. The penalty 
provisions, "[Wis. Stat. §] 346.65 . . . are entirely independent 
of the provision that defines the offense." State v. Banks, 105 
Wis. 2d 32, 42, 313 N.W.2d 67 (1981) (quoting and agreeing with 
Criminal Law; Drunk Driving, 69 Wis. Att'y Gen. Op. 49 (1980)).  
So, as a matter of law, there is no such thing as a "second-offense 
OWI," as the dissent seems to think. 
No.  2018AP1129.dk 
 
3 
 
municipality's ordinance adopting the statutory prohibition 
against operating a motor vehicle while "[u]nder the influence of 
an intoxicant" ("OWI").  Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) (2005-06) (as 
adopted by the City; see Cedarburg, Wisconsin Municipal Code § 10-
1-1(a) (2005)).  The City prosecuted the ticket in municipal court 
by presenting evidence that Mr. Hanson committed an OWI ordinance 
violation.  Upon Mr. Hanson's plea to an OWI ordinance violation, 
the municipal court entered judgment against him for that ordinance 
violation.  The case ended with the municipal court imposing a 
forfeiture for an OWI ordinance violation. 
¶60 But for the dissent, none of this matters in determining 
what type of case the municipal court heard.  Apropos of quite 
literally nothing, the dissent believes the municipal court wasn't 
really hearing an OWI ordinance violation.  Instead, contra the 
entirety of the record, the dissent assumes the municipal court 
was hearing a "second-offense OWI."  Even if such a violation 
existed (it doesn't), the dissent says it wouldn't matter what 
offense the prosecuting agency actually presented to the municipal 
court, or what evidence the court heard, or what judgment it 
                                                 
Although the majority uses the term "first-offense OWI" and 
"second-offense OWI" as harmless shorthand references, when the 
dissent uses them it's clear they are driving its legal analysis.  
So, for example, it says that "[a] first-offense OWI citation for 
someone with a prior countable OWI offense is a violation that 
does not exist at law."  Dissent, ¶113 n.10 (emphasis in original).  
I suppose it's true that there is no such thing as a first-offense 
OWI, but only because there is no such thing as any OWI offense 
defined by the number of prior OWI convictions (or lack thereof).  
An OWI offense stands alone, without reference to or reliance on 
the defendant's prior OWI convictions.  This error suffuses the 
dissent's reasoning so thoroughly that it would be cumbersome to 
call it out each time it occurs.  So I won't. 
No.  2018AP1129.dk 
 
4 
 
entered, or which sanctions it imposed.2  Instead, it believes the 
case is properly defined and categorized solely by the defendant's 
actions, "no matter how it is pled."  Dissent, ¶104 n.8. 
¶61 "No matter how it is pled"?  It is hornbook law that the 
pleadings define, form, and create the claims the court 
adjudicates:  "The pleading is to define the pleader's position in 
the pending litigation."  Hansher v. Kaishian, 79 Wis. 2d 374, 
385, 255 N.W.2d 564 (1977) (emphasis added).  The pleadings "frame 
the issues to be resolved in the action . . . ."  Id. (emphasis 
added).  "The function of pleadings is . . . creation of the 
issue(s) to be tried."  Knapke v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 54 
Wis. 2d 525, 533, 196 N.W.2d 737 (1972) (emphasis added).   
¶62 Pleadings are not protean documents that naturally 
conform themselves to events as they actually occurred.  Which is 
why it is possible for a plaintiff to suffer judgment on the 
pleadings even though the case could have gone forward if the 
plaintiff had pled the case differently.  See, e.g., Tietsworth v. 
Harley-Davidson, Inc., 2007 WI 97, ¶61, 303 Wis. 2d 94, 735 
N.W.2d 418 (plaintiff could not proceed on viable contract claims 
because the pleading contained only tort claims); Piaskoski & 
Assocs. v. Ricciardi, 2004 WI App 152, ¶29, 275 Wis. 2d 650, 686 
N.W.2d 675 (plaintiff could not proceed on claims not contained in 
                                                 
2 "The question in this case is whether a municipal court had 
subject-matter jurisdiction over an OWI offense that was brought 
as an ordinance violation in municipal court when it should have 
been criminally charged as a second-offense OWI in circuit court.  
The majority says yes, and establishes a new rule:  As long as an 
ordinance violation was pled, a municipal court's subject-matter 
jurisdiction is established. Respectfully, this is wrong."  
Dissent, ¶85. 
No.  2018AP1129.dk 
 
5 
 
the pleadings).  For good or ill, a party is the master of its 
pleadings and courts don't have the authority to act as though 
they are not.  See, e.g., Poeske v. Estreen, 55 Wis. 2d 238, 243 
n.3, 198 N.W.2d 625 (1972) (In "challenges to pleadings the court 
shall not '. . . give consideration to extrinsic evidence or 
matters outside of the pleading or pleadings and not incorporated 
or made part thereof . . . .'" (quoted source omitted)).  So when 
the dissent casually backhands the pleadings in this case with its 
"no matter how it is pled" comment, it is ignoring the nature, 
function, and role of pleadings in our courts.  Under the dissent's 
formulation, we are free to reject a pleading's contents in favor 
of something we believe the proponent should have pled.  That 
proposition, if we were to accept it, would reduce pre-trial 
practice (and, perhaps, every other aspect of a case) to chaos.  
And the dissent offers neither reasoning nor authority to support 
such a revolutionary concept. 
¶63 Perhaps the dissent's insistence that we ignore the 
pleadings' content grew out of the close similarity between the 
actual case we are considering and the case that should have been 
brought against Mr. Hansen (an OWI violation seeking civil 
penalties versus an OWI violation seeking criminal penalties).  
The dissent's logical error will fluoresce if we observe how it 
would function when the charges are not so similar.  Suppose that, 
instead of driving drunk, someone (let's call him Mr. Smith) robbed 
an individual as he was walking through a Cedarburg park.  Suppose 
further that, instead of arresting Mr. Smith for robbery, the 
police cited him for disorderly conduct (a violation of Cedarburg's 
No.  2018AP1129.dk 
 
6 
 
ordinances).  And finally, suppose that the municipal court heard 
the disorderly conduct case, entered judgment against Mr. Smith 
for disorderly conduct, and assessed a fine allowed by the 
ordinances for such a violation.  Now, years later, Mr. Smith 
appears before us claiming——just like Mr. Hansen——that the 
judgment against him is null and void because the municipal court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his case. 
¶64 If we were to employ the dissent's reasoning, Mr. Smith 
would succeed.  He committed robbery, he would tell us, not 
disorderly conduct.  So when the municipal court heard the 
disorderly conduct case, it was actually purporting to exercise 
jurisdiction over a robbery case.  And because municipal courts 
have no subject matter jurisdiction over robbery cases, the 
judgment against him must be a nullity.  The dissent's analysis 
would require the conclusion that "a municipal court lacks the 
power to sentence someone convicted of a [robbery] precisely 
because [a robbery] cannot be an ordinance violation, no matter 
how it is pled."  Dissent, ¶104 n.8 (creative editing added).   
¶65 Now, it is certainly true that if the City (in my 
hypothetical) had pled a robbery instead of disorderly conduct, 
the municipal court would have rightly dismissed the complaint for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  But must it also dismiss the 
case when the City pleads disorderly conduct instead of robbery?  
Of course not.  There is no legal theory in our canon authorizing 
a court to pretend the plaintiff had pled something it had not, 
and plenty that forbids the court from doing so.  Poeske, 55 
Wis. 2d at 243 n.3; Tietsworth, 303 Wis. 2d 94, ¶61; Ricciardi, 
No.  2018AP1129.dk 
 
7 
 
275 Wis. 2d 650, ¶29.  Therefore, the disorderly conduct claim 
could still proceed because municipal courts have subject 
jurisdiction over such offenses even though what Mr. Smith had 
"actually" done was commit a robbery.  The dissent's reasoning 
would hold that the municipal court in my hypothetical was really 
hearing a robbery case because the reference point is not the 
pleadings or court proceedings, but what it knows about what Mr. 
Smith "actually" did.  For jurisdictional purposes, however, the 
only things that matter are what the complaint pleads, what the 
municipal court hears, what judgment it renders, and what 
consequences it imposes.3  If each of those elements fits within 
"actions and proceedings arising under ordinances of the 
municipality,"4 the municipal court is properly exercising subject 
matter jurisdiction——even when the defendant's conduct, taken as 
a whole, also qualifies as something over which the municipal court 
                                                 
3 The dissent says this is inconsistent with the court's 
opinion that the pleadings, alone, establish jurisdiction:  "I 
have no idea how both rules can be true.  Either subject-matter 
jurisdiction is established based on the pleading, and is not 
challengeable afterwards, or not."  Dissent, ¶113 n.10.  It does 
not appear the dissent has accounted for ¶38 n.17 and ¶39 n.18 of 
the majority opinion, both of which acknowledge that subject matter 
jurisdiction is subject to challenge after pleading.  I have also 
addressed the evidence, judgment, and penalty phases of the case 
in the interest of comprehensiveness.  The majority opinion 
contains no suggestion that it would disagree with the proposition 
that the municipal court must remain within its constitutionally-
conferred jurisdictional boundaries throughout the proceedings. 
4 Wis. Const. art. VII, § 14. 
No.  2018AP1129.dk 
 
8 
 
has no subject matter jurisdiction.  So the offense the charging 
agency pleads is not just important, it is nigh on dispositive.5 
¶66 The dissent says this illustration is a mere curiosity 
because "a person can validly be charged with a disorderly conduct 
ordinance violation regardless of whether a more serious charge is 
warranted, but cannot be given a citation for first-offense OWI 
unless it is in fact a first-offense OWI."6  Dissent, ¶113 n.10.  
I could not have crystallized the dissent's logical hitch better 
than that statement.  Yes, Mr. Smith could be cited for disorderly 
conduct even though all the facts add up to robbery (a crime over 
which the municipal court has no subject matter jurisdiction), but 
only 
because 
pleadings 
define 
the 
offense 
the 
court 
is 
adjudicating.  And in my illustration the pleadings described an 
offense over which a municipal court has subject matter 
jurisdiction.  It must also be true, therefore, that if the 
pleadings describe an OWI ordinance violation, then the municipal 
court has jurisdiction over the case even though the totality of 
the facts add up to an offense for which criminal sanctions are 
available.  That is to say, what is true for the first clause in 
the quote must also be true for the second clause.  So the quote 
evidences a logical glitch that is causing the dissent to reject 
the pleading's definitional power in the OWI context even as it 
accepts it in my illustration. 
                                                 
5 It is only "nigh on" dispositive because, as already noted, 
we must also account for the evidence produced and the court's 
disposition of the matter. 
6 Once again, the dissent's analysis depends on its belief in 
an offense known as "first-offense OWI." 
No.  2018AP1129.dk 
 
9 
 
¶67 Now we arrive at the only meaningful distinction between 
my illustration and Mr. Hansen's case——the question of a 
prosecutor's charging discretion.  In most circumstances, a 
prosecutor has the discretion to charge an offense less serious 
than the facts warrant.  Sears v. State, 94 Wis. 2d 128, 133, 287 
N.W.2d 785 (1980) ("In addition to his discretion in determining 
whether or not to prosecute, the prosecuting attorney is afforded 
great latitude in determining which of several related crimes he 
chooses to file against the defendant.").  But our OWI statutes 
make no such allowance.  If a defendant has committed a prior 
countable OWI offense, the prosecutor may not pursue an ordinance 
violation, but must instead charge the OWI offense in circuit court 
so criminal penalties can be imposed.  Booth, 370 Wis. 2d 595, ¶23 
("[C]riminal penalties are required of all OWI convictions 
following an OWI first-offense conviction.").  So let's account 
for that distinction and see if it makes a difference.  Let's say 
the Legislature enacts a statute providing that when the facts add 
up to a robbery the defendant may not be tried for a disorderly 
conduct ordinance violation, but must instead be criminally 
charged.  That puts my illustration on all fours with this case:  
The municipal court has subject matter jurisdiction over both 
disorderly conduct ordinance violations as well as OWI ordinance 
violations; the municipal court has no jurisdiction over either 
robbery or criminal sanctions for OWI offenses; and the prosecutor 
has no discretion to charge ordinance violations when the 
defendant's actions add up to either robbery or an OWI offense 
punishable by criminal sanctions.  The dissent says that under 
No.  2018AP1129.dk 
 
10 
 
these circumstances the municipal court has no subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear an OWI ordinance violation, and presumably 
would say the same about the disorderly conduct ordinance 
violation.  But the only difference between my illustration as 
originally constructed and as modified is a statute removing a 
prosecutor's charging discretion.  So the question is whether a 
statute 
can 
oust 
the 
municipal 
court's 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction. 
¶68 The answer, quite obviously, is that it cannot inasmuch 
as a statute cannot revoke what a constitution grants.  State ex 
rel. Ozanne v. Fitzgerald, 2011 WI 43, ¶71, 334 Wis. 2d 70, 798 
N.W.2d 436 (Prosser, J., concurring) ("Constitutional commands 
cannot be changed at the whim of the legislature; statutory 
provisions may.").  The source of subject matter jurisdiction for 
both municipal courts and circuit courts is the Wisconsin 
Constitution,7 a source impervious to statutory modifications.  We 
have already recognized this foundational principle in the OWI 
context, where we said that restricting a prosecutor's charging 
discretion does not, and cannot, affect a court's subject matter 
jurisdiction:  "[N]oncompliance with statutory mandates [that is, 
the charging decision] affects only a court's competency and will 
never affect its subject matter jurisdiction."  Booth, 370 
Wis. 2d 595, ¶14.  So a statute limiting a prosecutor's charging 
discretion can do nothing to a municipal court's subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
                                                 
7 See Wis. Const. art. VII, §§ 8, 14. 
No.  2018AP1129.dk 
 
11 
 
¶69 If that is so (and it is), then we return full circle to 
the dissent's problematic understanding of what a pleading is.  
The dissent's conclusion depends on the premise that pleadings do 
not define, form, or create the issues to be tried.  Instead, it 
must assume that a pleading's contents automatically conform to, 
or are supplemented by, someone's birds-eye view of all the facts.  
That is a concept entirely unknown to the law. See Hansher, 79 
Wis. 2d at 385; Knapke, 54 Wis. 2d at 533. 
¶70 With 
these 
principles 
in 
mind, 
the 
unavoidable 
conclusion is that the municipal court had subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear the case it heard.  We all agree that 
municipal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over OWI 
ordinance violations.  And as discussed above, the pleadings define 
the type of action the municipal court adjudicates.  The pleading 
in this case said Mr. Hansen had violated Cedarburg, Wisconsin 
Municipal Code § 10-1-1(a) (2005).  That ordinance adopted "the 
statutory provisions in Chapters 340 to 348 of the Wisconsin 
Statutes, describing and defining regulations with respect to 
vehicles and traffic," except for "any regulations for which the 
statutory penalty is a fine or term of imprisonment or exclusively 
state charges . . . ."  Because Cedarburg did not adopt any 
criminal penalties, the offense described in the pleading can be 
nothing but an OWI ordinance violation punishable by civil 
penalties.   
¶71 According to our law (but not according to the dissent, 
of course) the pleading defined the case as a type of action over 
which the municipal court had subject matter jurisdiction.  And 
No.  2018AP1129.dk 
 
12 
 
the proceedings never deviated from that foundational definition.  
It did not hear evidence that would require imposition of criminal 
sanctions, and it did not in fact impose a criminal sanction.  From 
start to finish, therefore, the "type of action[]" over which the 
municipal court presided remained an ordinance violation.  And 
because it was the type of matter the constitution entrusts to 
municipal courts, the municipal court had subject matter 
jurisdiction over Mr. Hansen's case. 
¶72 But just because the municipal court had subject matter 
jurisdiction does not mean the municipal court should have 
adjudicated Mr. Hansen's case.  Not because the case was of the 
wrong type, but because a piece of information (unknown to the 
City and the municipal court at the time) triggered a statutory 
command that Mr. Hansen be prosecuted as a criminal instead of an 
ordinance violator.  This is where the concept of "competency" 
plays its role.  Whereas subject matter jurisdiction addresses the 
"type" of case a court may hear, "competency refers to its 'ability 
to exercise the subject matter jurisdiction vested in it' . . . ."  
Vill. of Elm Grove v. Brefka, 2013 WI 54, ¶16, 348 Wis. 2d 282, 
832 N.W.2d 121, amended, 2013 WI 86, 350 Wis. 2d 724, 838 
N.W.2d 87 (quoted source omitted).  Consequently, a court may 
simultaneously have subject matter jurisdiction over a case, but 
have no ability to exercise it.   
¶73 Because Mr. Hansen had a prior OWI, his commission of an 
OWI violation was punishable by criminal sanctions.  See generally 
Wis. Stat. § 356.65(2) (describing how penalties escalate for 
successive OWI violations); see also Cty. of Walworth v. Rohner, 
No.  2018AP1129.dk 
 
13 
 
108 Wis. 2d 713, 716, 324 N.W.2d 682 (1982) ("Sec. 346.65(2) 
establishes an escalating penalty scheme for violation of the drunk 
driving statute.").  Therefore, the City erred when it cited Mr. 
Hansen for an OWI ordinance violation——not because he committed a 
"second-offense OWI," but because his OWI violation was subject to 
criminal sanctions, which only circuit courts may assess.  But 
this error is extrinsic to the court's proceedings, not intrinsic.  
That is to say, it affected what the case should have been, not 
what the case was.  Subject matter jurisdiction concerns itself 
with what the case was.  Competency concerns itself with what it 
should have been.  Mr. Hansen's case before the municipal court 
was an OWI ordinance violation.  It should have been an OWI 
violation pursued in a circuit court so that criminal sanctions 
could be assessed.  So the municipal court simultaneously had 
subject matter jurisdiction over the OWI ordinance violation, but 
did not have competency to hear the case because our statutes 
require that it be pursued in circuit court. 
¶74 The 
dissent's 
straw 
man 
indelibly 
colored 
its 
understanding and discussion of Booth, Rohner, and City of Kenosha 
v. Jensen, 184 Wis. 2d 91, 516 N.W.2d 4 (Ct. App. 1994).  But if 
it had reoriented its analysis to account for the fact that the 
municipal court adjudicated an OWI ordinance violation, it would 
have found that these cases are consistent with the court's 
conclusion today.  This trio (after Booth's adjustment to account 
for the difference between competency and subject matter 
jurisdiction) 
teaches 
that 
circuit 
courts 
have 
exclusive 
jurisdiction to prosecute OWI violations punishable by criminal 
No.  2018AP1129.dk 
 
14 
 
sanctions, and that they lack the competency to adjudicate such 
cases as ordinance violations.  To the extent the court of appeals 
suggested in Jensen that the municipal court had heard a criminal 
OWI case, it made the same mistake as the dissent.  Eliminating 
that mistaken assumption and applying the Booth adjustment brings 
Jensen into perfect alignment with both Booth and Rohner.   
¶75 The dissent derides Booth's correction of prior cases as 
a "chiropractic adjustment," whatever that means, but otherwise 
refuses to acknowledge its import with respect to Banks and Jensen.  
The Booth analysis applies to municipal courts as well as circuit 
courts.  The effects are not as broad because a municipal court's 
subject matter is not as broad as that of a circuit court.  But 
with respect to the matter at hand, there is no relevant 
distinction.  Both the circuit court in Booth and the municipal 
court here had subject matter jurisdiction to hear OWI ordinance 
cases.  In both Booth and this case, it turns out that the defendant 
should not have been charged with an OWI ordinance violation.  That 
error, however, affects competency, not jurisdiction.  As we said 
in Booth, "noncompliance with statutory mandates affects only a 
court's competency and will never affect its subject matter 
jurisdiction."  370 Wis. 2d 595, ¶14.  Therefore, we concluded, 
"the proper characterization of the circuit court's deficiency in 
Rohner was loss of circuit court competency to proceed to judgment 
rather than negation of subject matter jurisdiction."  Id.  There 
is no reason this principle does not apply to municipal courts 
just as it does to circuit courts.  Indeed, it must apply with 
equal force to municipal courts, and could hardly be otherwise.  
No.  2018AP1129.dk 
 
15 
 
The 
Wisconsin 
Constitution's 
conferral 
of 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction on municipal courts is no more susceptible to 
statutory modification than its conferral of subject matter 
jurisdiction on circuit courts.  Our OWI statutes can deprive the 
municipal court of competency to hear a specific case, but as we 
recognized in Booth, they can never affect the court's subject 
matter jurisdiction.  Consequently, because the municipal court 
had subject matter jurisdiction to hear an OWI ordinance violation, 
Booth says its jurisdiction cannot be dislodged simply because the 
case should have been charged as a criminal OWI violation.  It 
merely loses competence.   
¶76 The dissent's refusal to read Banks and Jensen in light 
of Booth apparently stems from its belief that we shared its straw 
man's assumption that we must perform the jurisdictional analysis 
on the case that should have been brought rather than the case the 
court actually adjudicated.  But we did not, and the entirety of 
Booth's analysis rejects that assumption.  The whole point of Booth 
was to determine whether the circuit court had competency to 
adjudicate the case presented to it——an OWI ordinance violation.  
Our conclusion that it lacked competence depended entirely on the 
fact that the case it adjudicated actually was an ordinance 
violation, not a criminal OWI in disguise.  Here, just as in Booth, 
the municipal court heard an ordinance violation.8 And just like 
in Booth, the municipal court had subject matter jurisdiction to 
                                                 
8 The record is uncompromisingly clear on this point——the 
pleadings, the evidence, the judgment, and the forfeiture all 
demonstrate beyond a cavil of a doubt that the municipal court 
adjudicated a first-offense OWI.   
No.  2018AP1129.dk 
 
16 
 
hear such a case.  And just like in Booth, the municipal court was 
not competent to adjudicate the ordinance violation because it 
should have been charged as a criminal matter.9 
¶77 The dissent contains one more significant error that 
bears some discussion.  It correctly observes that subject matter 
jurisdiction is always subject to challenge.  State v. Bush, 2005 
WI 103, ¶19, 283 Wis. 2d 90, 699 N.W.2d 80 holding modified by 
Booth, 
370 
Wis. 2d 595 
("[C]hallenges 
to 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction cannot be waived[.]").  But in making that 
observation, it simultaneously misconstrues the nature of such a 
challenge: 
If the pleading, trial, judgment, and consequences   
imposed 
effectually 
establish 
subject-matter 
jurisdiction, how can that oft-repeated precedent 
allowing subject-matter jurisdiction challenges after 
the fact still be true?  This is not the way subject-
matter jurisdiction works in federal court, and this is 
not the way we have ever described the subject-matter 
jurisdiction of municipal courts or other judicial 
bodies with limited subject-matter jurisdiction until 
today. 
Dissent, ¶113 n.10.   
¶78 The key to a successful jurisdictional challenge is 
understanding that it is a subtractive endeavor.  That is to say, 
a litigant setting out to demonstrate a court lacks jurisdiction 
must establish that one or more conditions or facts necessary to 
the invocation of jurisdiction does not exist.  State ex rel. R.G. 
v. W.M.B., 159 Wis. 2d 662, 668, 465 N.W.2d 221 (Ct. App. 1990) 
                                                 
9 There is no need to overrule Banks or Jensen in this case, 
in whole or in part.  But only because Booth already rejected the 
conflation of subject matter jurisdiction and competence on which 
the dissent's analysis depends. 
No.  2018AP1129.dk 
 
17 
 
("The party claiming that a judgment is void for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving subject matter 
jurisdiction did not exist.").  Thus, if the plaintiff in a federal 
case invokes diversity jurisdiction, the defense can defeat the 
court's jurisdiction by demonstrating one of two conditions is not 
true——either that the parties are not diverse, or the amount in 
controversy does not satisfy the threshold.  Hart v. FedEx Ground 
Package Sys. Inc., 457 F.3d 675, 676 (7th Cir. 2006) (affirming 
the district court's order remanding a case to state court for 
lack of complete diversity of the parties); and Gardynski-Leschuck 
v. Ford Motor Co., 142 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 1998) ("Unless the 
amount in controversy was present on the date the case began, the 
suit must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction."). 
¶79 The nature of the challenge is no different when 
considering the municipal court's subject matter jurisdiction.  If 
Mr. Hansen is to succeed, he must prove that a fact or condition 
necessary to the invocation of the municipal court's subject matter 
jurisdiction does not obtain.  We know that, pursuant to the 
Wisconsin Constitution, a municipal court has subject matter 
jurisdiction 
over 
"actions 
and 
proceedings 
arising 
under 
ordinances of the municipality."10  We also know that Cedarburg has 
an ordinance making it unlawful to operate a vehicle while 
intoxicated as described by Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a).  See 
Cedarburg, Wisconsin Municipal Code § 10-1-1(a) (2005).  And 
although we informally refer to the citation in this case as being 
                                                 
10 Wis. Const. art. VII, § 14. 
 
No.  2018AP1129.dk 
 
18 
 
a "first-offense OWI," there is no such thing——an OWI offense 
exists separate and apart from the number of the defendant's prior 
OWI convictions.  See supra ¶59 n.1.  And that necessarily means 
there is nothing in the ordinance or the Wisconsin Constitution 
that requires proof that the defendant had no prior OWI convictions 
as a predicate to invoking the municipal court's jurisdiction.  
Consequently, because the citation pled a violation of Cedarburg's 
ordinance, and invoking the municipal court's subject matter 
jurisdiction did not require establishing that Mr. Hansen's 
conduct did not require imposition of criminal penalties, the 
jurisdictional challenge must necessarily fail. 
¶80 The 
dissent's 
misunderstanding 
of 
jurisdictional 
challenges apparently flows from its assumption that they can be 
additive, as opposed to subtractive, in nature.  That is, it seems 
to believe that if a defendant's conduct adds up to an offense 
over which the municipal court does not have jurisdiction, then it 
necessarily follows that the defendant's conduct cannot comprise 
an offense over which it does have subject matter jurisdiction.  
But as demonstrated by my disorderly conduct/robbery illustration, 
that is most assuredly not true.  And the statutory elimination of 
the prosecutor's charging discretion cannot change this because we 
know that statutes cannot affect constitutional grants of subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
¶81 That is not to say that OWI ordinance violations are 
immune from jurisdictional challenges.  To the contrary, it is 
simply to say that, like all other such challenges, they are 
subtractive in nature.  An attempt to assess criminal sanctions 
No.  2018AP1129.dk 
 
19 
 
against Mr. Hansen in municipal court, for example, would be 
subject to a jurisdictional challenge.  Mr. Hansen would merely 
need to point out that criminal sanctions do not arise under a 
municipal ordinance.  Because the municipal court only has 
jurisdiction over ordinance violations, with their attendant civil 
penalties, Mr. Hansen's challenge would effectively demonstrate 
that one of the necessary conditions to invoking the municipal 
court's subject matter jurisdiction has not been satisfied.11 
¶82 There is no need to catalog the rest of the errors in 
the dissent's analysis——they are all premised on the initial 
assumption that we must act as though the municipal court heard a 
case that it did not.  Because of that mistaken assumption, the 
dissent was unable to keep the concept of subject matter 
jurisdiction distinct from a court's competence.  Without those 
foundational errors, the case resolves as a matter of course in a 
manner that I suspect even the dissent would accept.  As the 
majority explained, objections to a court's competency must be 
timely raised, whereas objections to a court's subject matter 
jurisdiction may be raised at any time.12  Majority op., ¶49. 
Because Mr. Hansen's challenge goes to the municipal court's 
competence to hear his case, his failure to raise it in a timely 
                                                 
11 This explanation, of course, is based on the fact that 
pleadings define, form, and create the issues to be adjudicated.  
I recognize that the dissent does not believe this. 
12 See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) 
("[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction, because it involves a court's 
power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived."). 
No.  2018AP1129.dk 
 
2 
 
manner means he may no longer challenge the judgment.  Booth, 370 
Wis. 2d 595, ¶25. 
¶83 Because I agree that the municipal court had subject 
matter-jurisdiction, but not competency, over Mr. Hansen's case, 
I join the majority opinion. 
¶84 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence. 
 
No.  2018AP1129.bh 
 
1 
 
¶85 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (dissenting).  The question in this 
case is whether a municipal court had subject-matter jurisdiction 
over an OWI offense that was brought as an ordinance violation 
when it should have been criminally charged as a second-offense 
OWI in circuit court.  The majority says yes, and establishes a 
new rule:  as long as an ordinance violation was pled, a municipal 
court's subject-matter jurisdiction is established.  Respectfully, 
this is wrong. 
¶86 A faithful application of our constitution, statutes, 
and cases yields a contrary result.  Our law makes clear that 
municipal courts are courts of limited subject-matter jurisdiction 
that may only hear ordinance violations.  A second-offense OWI is 
a criminal offense, not an ordinance violation, and must be brought 
as such.  Accordingly, the municipal court lacked subject-matter 
jurisdiction to entertain the improperly charged OWI offense, and 
the judgment is null and void. 
 
I 
¶87 The basic principles governing this case are not 
complicated.  In order to hear a particular case, a court must 
have power to entertain the kind of action brought.  This power is 
known as subject-matter jurisdiction.  Wis. Stat. § 801.04(1) 
(2017-18).1  Subject-matter jurisdiction "is conferred by the 
constitution and statutes of this state and by statutes of the 
United States."  Id.  But even assuming a court has subject-matter 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version. 
No.  2018AP1129.bh 
 
2 
 
jurisdiction, a court wishing to render a valid judgment must have 
the power to exercise that jurisdiction in the particular case 
before it.  This is called competence.  Village of Trempealeau v. 
Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, ¶9, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190. 
¶88 If a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, a judgment 
entered by the court is null and void because the court never had 
the power to hear the case in the first place.  Kohler Co. v. 
DILHR, 81 Wis. 2d 11, 25, 259 N.W.2d 695 (1977).  A court may also 
lose its competence——and thus be deprived of the power to enter a 
valid judgment——"when the parties seeking judicial review fail to 
meet certain statutory requirements."2  Xcel Energy Servs., Inc. 
v. LIRC, 2013 WI 64, ¶28, 349 Wis. 2d 234, 833 N.W.2d 665.  But 
unlike the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, a court's loss 
of competence generally does not void a prior judgment. 
¶89 The subject-matter jurisdiction of circuit courts is 
defined by the Wisconsin Constitution, which states:  "Except as 
otherwise provided by law, the circuit court shall have original 
jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal within this 
state . . . ."  Wis. Const. art. VII, § 8.  In recent years, we 
have made an effort to clarify subject-matter jurisdiction and 
competence.  And in Mikrut, we explained that pursuant to this 
constitutional language, circuit courts have plenary subject-
matter jurisdiction.  273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶¶8-9.  That is, circuit 
                                                 
2 A statutory mandate that is "central to the statutory 
scheme" deprives a court of its competence.  See Xcel Energy 
Servs., Inc. v. LIRC, 2013 WI 64, ¶28, 349 Wis. 2d 234, 833 
N.W.2d 665 (quoting Village of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, 
¶10, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190). 
No.  2018AP1129.bh 
 
3 
 
courts have the power to hear any type of case, and this power may 
not be curtailed by statute.  Id. 
¶90 How then do we categorize failures to comply with various 
statutory requirements in circuit court?  These failures are not 
matters of subject-matter jurisdiction——which, again, "is plenary 
and constitutionally-based."  
Id., ¶9.  Rather, statutory 
noncompliance implicates only a circuit court's competence.  Id. 
¶91 The subject-matter jurisdiction of municipal courts 
works quite differently.  We begin once more with the Wisconsin 
Constitution, which provides in relevant part:  "All municipal 
courts shall have uniform jurisdiction limited to actions and 
proceedings arising under ordinances of the municipality in which 
established."  Wis. Const. art. VII, § 14.  Thus, the Wisconsin 
Constitution does not grant municipal courts the same kind of 
plenary subject-matter jurisdiction granted to circuit courts.  
Rather, municipal court jurisdiction is "limited" only "to actions 
and proceedings arising under ordinances."  Id. 
¶92 This limited grant of subject-matter jurisdiction is 
further colored by statute.3  Wisconsin Stat. § 755.045(1) provides 
that "[a] municipal court has exclusive jurisdiction over an action 
in which a municipality seeks to impose forfeitures for violations 
of municipal ordinances of the municipality that operates the 
court . . . ."  And relevant here, Wis. Stat. § 349.06(1) permits 
                                                 
3 Because Article VII, Section 14 authorizes the legislature 
to establish a municipal court, we have recognized our municipal 
courts "are creatures of the legislature" that are bound by the 
legislature's constitutional policy choices.  See City of Sun 
Prairie v. Davis, 226 Wis. 2d 738, 755-56, 595 N.W.2d 635 (1999). 
No.  2018AP1129.bh 
 
4 
 
municipalities to adopt municipal traffic ordinances that strictly 
conform to the state's traffic laws and "for which the penalty 
thereof is a forfeiture." 
¶93 Understanding the issue in this case, as well as prior 
cases on these matters, requires one additional piece of 
background:  our statutory scheme for OWIs and its escalating 
penalty structure.  Wisconsin statutes define the violation of 
operating while intoxicated in Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1).  However, 
the penalty for the violation is separately laid out in Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(am).  That paragraph establishes an escalating penalty 
structure that turns on the number of prior countable offenses.  
The bottom line is that first-offense OWIs are civil in nature and 
punishable by forfeiture——a policy decision unique to this state—
—while all subsequent OWI offenses are criminal matters.  See 
§ 346.65(2)(am).4 
 
II 
¶94 With this background in mind, we turn to our cases 
applying these principles.  In 1981, this court first explained 
the mandatory OWI penalty structure described above.  State v. 
Banks, 105 Wis. 2d 32, 39-43, 313 N.W.2d 67 (1981).  Banks involved 
                                                 
4 The concurrence accuses this dissent of "a pretty 
significant error of law" for saying "something known as a 'second-
offense OWI'" exists.  Concurrence, ¶59 n.1.  Yet that same 
nomenclature for OWI offenses under our unique statutory scheme is 
used by the majority in this very case, and in innumerable other 
cases in the Wisconsin Reports.  Majority op., ¶¶14, 17, 19, 32; 
see also, e.g., City of Eau Claire v. Booth, 2016 WI 65, ¶16, 370 
Wis. 2d 595, 882 N.W.2d 738 ("Booth Britton's argument fails 
because first-offense and second-offense OWIs are both offenses 
known at law as set forth in our statutes."). 
No.  2018AP1129.bh 
 
5 
 
a civil forfeiture judgment entered on an OWI citation that should 
have been charged as a second-offense crime.  Id. at 43.  At the 
time the judgment was entered, the presiding court commissioner 
was "unaware" that only two weeks earlier the defendant had been 
convicted of a separate OWI offense.  Id. at 36.  When so advised, 
the court commissioner vacated the judgment as null and void and 
referred the matter for criminal prosecution, despite the fact 
that the citation was pled and tried as a first-offense civil 
forfeiture.  Id.  Banks was criminally charged with a second-
offense OWI, and eventually this court was called to address his 
claim that the criminal prosecution constituted double jeopardy.  
Id. at 38. 
¶95 We said no such violation had occurred.  Instead, we 
stated that, because the OWI offense should have been criminally 
charged as a second offense,5 the proceeding before the court 
commissioner was "in effect a nullity for lack of jurisdiction."  
Id. at 43-44.  This is so because the court commissioner had no 
statutory authority to preside over a case involving a criminal 
drunk driving offense, and therefore the civil forfeiture judgment 
on the incorrectly charged OWI offense had been properly vacated.  
Id. at 40-41. 
                                                 
5 Starting with Banks, our cases have consistently interpreted 
the OWI penalty structure to require mandatory escalating 
penalties with each subsequent offense.  See State v. Banks, 105 
Wis. 2d 32, 39-43, 313 N.W.2d 67 (1981); City of Lodi v. Hine, 107 
Wis. 2d 118, 122-23, 318 N.W.2d 383 (1982); County of Walworth v. 
Rohner, 108 Wis. 2d 713, 717-18, 324 N.W.2d 682 (1982); State v. 
Williams, 2014 WI 64, ¶¶21, 30, 32, 355 Wis. 2d 581, 852 
N.W.2d 467; Booth, 370 Wis. 2d 595, ¶¶22-24. 
No.  2018AP1129.bh 
 
6 
 
¶96 Then, in 1982, this court considered whether a 
prosecutor  had discretion to charge what was factually a second-
offense criminal OWI as a civil forfeiture ordinance violation.  
County of Walworth v. Rohner, 108 Wis. 2d 713, 715, 324 N.W.2d 682 
(1982).  The issue in Rohner arose at trial——on an ordinance 
violation pleading——when it was revealed that the defendant's OWI 
was a second offense.  Id. at 715.  After the prosecutor chose not 
to file a new criminal complaint, the circuit court heard the 
action as an ordinance violation.  Id.  We unanimously reversed.  
Id. at 722.  Relying on the mandatory escalating penalty structure 
established by the legislature, we held that a second-offense OWI 
must be brought as a criminal offense.  Id. at 717-18 (citing 
Banks, 105 Wis. 2d at 39).  Charging authorities have no discretion 
to charge what is in fact a second-offense OWI as a first-offense 
civil forfeiture.  Id. at 720-21.  And given this, it is the State 
that "has exclusive authority to prosecute second offenses for 
drunk driving."  Id. at 722. 
¶97 After Banks and Rohner, the court of appeals addressed 
the question of what becomes of a municipal court judgment on an 
OWI charge that should have been——indeed, per our earlier 
decisions, was required to be——brought as a criminal offense.  In 
City of Kenosha v. Jensen, the City had moved the municipal court 
to vacate an OWI civil forfeiture judgment on the grounds that the 
court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over an incorrectly 
charged OWI offense.  184 Wis. 2d 91, 92-93, 516 N.W.2d 4 (Ct. 
App. 1994).  In raising its motion for postjudgment relief, the 
City informed the municipal court that, unbeknownst at the time 
No.  2018AP1129.bh 
 
7 
 
the forfeiture judgment was entered, the defendant had been 
previously convicted of a separate OWI offense.  Id. at 92-94.  
The municipal court found it necessary to vacate the judgment, as 
did the circuit court.  Id.  Likewise, before the court of appeals, 
the State appeared as an amici and argued that the municipal court 
had no jurisdiction to hear a case involving an OWI that should 
have been criminally charged.  Id. at 98-99.  Relying on our 
precedent saying as much, the court of appeals agreed:   
[W]e want to make clear what we are not deciding.  We 
are not holding that in every [OWI] case where the 
municipal attorney finds out that an offense is actually 
a second or subsequent offense within five years, the 
municipal attorney must seek vacation of the municipal 
judgment before criminal proceedings can ensue.  Quite 
the contrary, the State may proceed regardless of 
whether the municipal attorney or the municipal court 
first acts.  As the State points out in its amicus curiae 
brief, a municipal court does not have subject matter 
jurisdiction to try and convict a criminal operating 
while intoxicated.  Any such municipal action is null 
and void.  See County of Walworth v. Rohner, 108 
Wis. 2d 713, 722, 324 N.W.2d 682, 686 (1982); State v. 
Banks, 105 Wis. 2d 32, 40-41, 313 N.W.2d 67, 71 (1981).  
As no jeopardy has attached as a result of municipal 
court action, the State may proceed regardless of what 
the municipal attorney or the municipal court does.  The 
municipal judgment having no force or effect, it is as 
if it never took place. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
¶98 The court of appeals then rejected Jensen's argument 
that the City "knew or should have known" of the earlier offense 
at the time it negotiated a plea agreement for the now-vacated 
judgment.  Id. at 100.  As the court explained, "the City had no 
authority to enter the plea agreement in the first place" because 
No.  2018AP1129.bh 
 
8 
 
as a factual matter the underlying OWI was a second-offense 
criminal charge.  Id. 
¶99 For several decades now, the courts of our state have 
understood and held that a municipal court has no subject-matter 
jurisdiction over a second or subsequent OWI offense, and hence, 
such judgments are null and void.  See, e.g., State v. Strohman, 
No. 2014AP1265-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶¶2-3, 17 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Feb. 3, 2015) (citing Jensen for the proposition that "because an 
offense that is actually a qualified second (or greater) OWI 
offense can only be criminally prosecuted, any municipal 
proceeding regarding such an offense is 'null and void[,]' with 
any such municipal judgment 'having no force or effect, [such that] 
it is as if it never took place'"). 
¶100 Three years ago, in City of Eau Claire v. Booth, we 
addressed 
whether 
a 
circuit 
court 
lacks 
subject-matter 
jurisdiction over an action based on a mischarged OWI offense.  
2016 WI 65, ¶1, 370 Wis. 2d 595, 882 N.W.2d 738.  Booth arose from 
a civil forfeiture judgment on a first-offense OWI that had been 
voided by a circuit court in reliance on Rohner.  Id., ¶4.  
Applying the same long-established principles, we explained that 
mischarging an OWI does not affect a circuit court's subject-
matter jurisdiction because circuit courts have plenary subject-
matter jurisdiction under our constitution.  Id., ¶¶1, 14.  That 
is, regardless of whether an OWI is incorrectly charged as a first-
offense ordinance violation or correctly charged as a second-
offense crime, our constitution grants circuit courts power to 
hear the action and enter a judgment on the matter.  Thus, even 
No.  2018AP1129.bh 
 
9 
 
though mischarging an OWI as a civil forfeiture in circuit court 
constitutes a failure to abide by the mandatory OWI penalty 
structure, statutory noncompliance of that kind results only in a 
loss of the circuit court's competence.  Id., ¶¶14, 19, 24.  
Playing this logic out, we determined that the defendant forfeited 
her competence challenge after waiting 22 years to bring a 
collateral attack.  Id., ¶25. 
¶101 Booth drew no blood on the core holdings of Banks, 
Rohner, and Jensen.  Because our cases since Rohner——Mikrut in 
particular——have more clearly distinguished circuit court subject-
matter jurisdiction and competence, we withdrew any language that 
suggested statutory deficiencies like the one in Booth were matters 
of circuit court subject-matter jurisdiction as opposed to 
competence.  Booth, 370 Wis. 2d. 595, ¶14.  In so doing, we 
emphasized that our decision "leaves intact Rohner's holding 'that 
the state has exclusive jurisdiction over a second offense for 
drunk driving.'"  Id., ¶15 (quoting Rohner, 108 Wis. 2d at 716).  
And in line with this exclusive prosecutorial authority, "criminal 
penalties are required of all OWI convictions following an OWI 
first-offense conviction," meaning our circuit courts have 
exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction to enter a judgment on a 
second-offense OWI.  Id., ¶23 (citing Rohner, 108 Wis. 2d at 717-
18, and Banks, 105 Wis. 2d at 39). 
 
III 
¶102 Applying the constitutional text and our precedent to 
the case before us today yields a clear outcome.  Unlike circuit 
No.  2018AP1129.bh 
 
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courts, municipal courts have limited subject-matter jurisdiction.  
They can only hear municipal ordinance violations.  Relying on the 
OWI statutory scheme, our cases make clear that an ordinance 
violation for a second-offense OWI does not exist at law; a second-
offense OWI is a criminal matter.  The State has exclusive 
authority to prosecute such charges, and circuit courts have 
exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction to hear such cases.  Thus, 
a municipal court has no constitutional grant of power——i.e., no 
subject-matter jurisdiction——to entertain an action based on an 
OWI offense that statutorily should have been and must be charged 
as a second-offense OWI.  Any judgment or order entered in such an 
action is null and void. 
¶103 The majority's contrary conclusion finds its footing in 
a single proposition that amounts to a false foundation.  It 
maintains that municipal court subject-matter jurisdiction is 
established based on the four corners of an ordinance citation 
alone.  Majority op., ¶¶3, 29, 54.  The majority's discussion in 
support of its pleading-establishes-jurisdiction rule covers three 
areas.  First, the majority relies on the "arising under" language 
in Article VII, Section 14 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Second, 
the majority endeavors to enlist the law of federal subject-matter 
jurisdiction in aid of its argument.  Finally, the majority implies 
that its holding is grounded in our prior cases, especially our 
recent decision in Booth.  In fact, nothing in the text of our 
constitution, nothing in the law of federal jurisdiction, and 
nothing in our prior cases suggest that invoking jurisdiction 
conclusively establishes jurisdiction.  In reaching its conclusion 
No.  2018AP1129.bh 
 
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today, the majority not only fails to apply our law, it blatantly 
defies it. 
¶104 Starting with the constitution, as already explained, 
municipal 
court 
jurisdiction 
is 
limited 
to 
"actions 
and 
proceedings arising under ordinances of the municipality in which 
established."  Wis. Const. art. VII, § 14.  The straightforward 
reading of the constitution is that we must actually be dealing 
with an ordinance violation in order for the municipal court to 
have the power to hear the case.  Nothing about the phrase "arising 
under" suggests mere invocation of an ordinance violation in the 
charging document is sufficient to actually confer jurisdiction on 
a municipal court.6  If there is a textual argument otherwise, the 
majority does not make it.  Nor does the majority cite a single 
Wisconsin case in support of its interpretation of this provision 
                                                 
6 The majority latches onto the fact that the phrase "arising 
under" is also found in federal law.  It is hornbook law that 
federal-question subject-matter jurisdiction is invoked when the 
pleading party presents a colorable claim "arising under" the 
Constitution or laws of the United States.  See Arbaugh v. Y&H 
Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 (2006) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331).  While 
the nature of this "well-pleaded complaint rule" is beyond dispute, 
the majority treats that rule as though this closes the case.  As 
shown below, this is wrong. 
No.  2018AP1129.bh 
 
12 
 
of the Wisconsin Constitution.7  That's because, so far as I can 
tell, none exist.8 
¶105 With no Wisconsin law to support its cause, the majority 
seeks refuge in the law of federal jurisdiction.  The majority 
suggests subject-matter jurisdiction in federal court works in a 
similar way to the rule it is announcing.  Not even close.  While 
federal jurisdiction must be invoked in a pleading, it is most 
                                                 
7 A reader might take away from the majority that Ableman v. 
Booth, a Wisconsin Supreme Court case from 1859, supports its view.  
11 Wis. 517 (*498), 531-532 (*512) (1859).  But the language quoted 
is actually one justice's discussion of the phrase "arising under" 
as it appears in the U.S. Constitution and as it relates to the 
subject-matter jurisdiction of federal courts.  Even then, nothing 
in the quoted language supports the proposition that invocation of 
federal jurisdiction is always sufficient to establish federal 
jurisdiction——the lesson the majority suggests is the pertinent 
takeaway.  As explained below, this is plainly not the law in 
federal courts. 
8 As part of its "arising under" discussion, the majority 
notes that "the city attorney is not required to allege or prove 
that the defendant had no prior offenses" in determining liability 
for a first-offense OWI in municipal court.  Majority op., ¶30.  
This is true, but irrelevant.  And I do not take this to be a 
separate argument relating to subject-matter jurisdiction.  After 
all, rendering judgment in a case necessarily includes prescribing 
the punishment for an offense.  Again, subject-matter jurisdiction 
is "the power of a court to decide certain types of actions."  
State v. Smith, 2005 WI 104, ¶18, 283 Wis. 2d 57, 699 N.W.2d 508 
(citing United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984)).  And 
it must be true that a court needs subject-matter jurisdiction 
through sentencing to decide an action.  But to the majority's 
broader point, even if a prior countable offense remains 
undisclosed throughout a municipal court proceeding, that silence 
does not in and of itself mean that jurisdiction was ever had.  As 
Banks, Rohner, and Jensen make clear, a subsequent OWI offense 
must be charged as such, and a municipal court lacks the power to 
sentence someone convicted of a subsequent OWI offense precisely 
because that charge cannot be an ordinance violation, no matter 
how it is pled. 
No.  2018AP1129.bh 
 
13 
 
certainly not established in all cases simply on the grounds that 
it was pled. 
¶106 Like municipal courts in Wisconsin, federal courts are 
courts of limited subject-matter jurisdiction, empowered only to 
hear cases as authorized by the U.S. Constitution and federal 
statutes.  Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 
377 (1994).  Thus, jurisdiction must be affirmatively alleged by 
citation to a statutory basis or by sufficient factual allegations.  
Id.  Mere pleading of federal jurisdiction doesn't settle the 
matter, however.  Rather, federal jurisdiction is subject to 
challenge throughout the proceeding.  See Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. 
v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) 
("[N]o 
action 
of 
the 
parties 
can 
confer 
subject-matter 
jurisdiction upon a federal court."); see also United States v. 
Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) ("[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction, 
because it involves a court's power to hear a case, can never be 
forfeited or waived.").  Importantly, federal courts themselves 
are obligated to independently ensure that jurisdiction is had at 
all stages of a proceeding.9  Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 
                                                 
9 Given this independent obligation, any merits decision 
entered by a federal court is deemed to include a factual 
determination that subject-matter jurisdiction was established.  
Chicot Cty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 
376-77 (1940).  This is so even if that determination is not 
explicitly recognized in the court's decision.  See 13D Charles A. 
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3536 
(3d ed. 2008) (discussing Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 557 
U.S. 137, 152-53 (2009)).  Because this finding is necessarily 
included within a federal court decision, it is generally 
recognized that any errors regarding the determination of 
jurisdiction must be made through direct appeal, not collateral 
attack.  Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de 
No.  2018AP1129.bh 
 
14 
 
U.S. 574, 583-84 (1999).  Thus, even on appeal, a federal court 
must dismiss any action upon discovery that jurisdiction is not 
had or was not had by a court below.  Id. 
¶107 It is hard to overstate the obvious:  the majority's 
rule, which it presents as somehow supported by the law of federal 
jurisdiction, stands instead in direct conflict.  If mere 
invocation is enough, how is it that a party can challenge 
jurisdiction after it has been pled?  What of the federal court's 
independent obligation to ensure jurisdiction is had——again, 
regardless of the invocation of subject-matter jurisdiction in a 
pleading?  How is it that a federal appeals court can dismiss the 
case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction years after the 
pleading was filed?  None of the cases the majority cites support 
the proposition that federal jurisdiction is conclusively 
established by virtue of its invocation in a pleading.  It is not.  
Federal jurisdiction is challengeable in federal court regardless 
of the sufficiency of the pleading.  The majority's rule granting 
subject-matter jurisdiction through a pleading finds no support in 
Wisconsin or federal law. 
¶108 This lack of support notwithstanding, the majority aims 
to align its conclusion here with several of the on-point Wisconsin 
cases explained above.  Across eight paragraphs, the majority 
describes those cases and closes by simply reasserting that 
subject-matter jurisdiction is had based on the allegations in the 
citation.  Majority op., ¶¶42-50.  No effort is made to engage the 
actual holdings or reasoning of the cases.  The majority fails to 
                                                 
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.9 (1982). 
No.  2018AP1129.bh 
 
15 
 
engage our cases because it cannot; its proposed rule runs right 
over what those cases actually say. 
¶109 For instance, the majority concludes the charging 
document alone establishes subject-matter jurisdiction.  But in 
Banks, the defendant pled to a first-offense civil forfeiture, and 
that fact made no difference when we determined that the entire 
proceeding was "in effect a nullity" because the court commissioner 
had no jurisdictional authority to hear what was in fact a second-
offense criminal OWI.  105 Wis. 2d at 36, 43.  Jensen reached the 
same conclusion:  a judgment was entered on a civil forfeiture, 
but later vacated because the incorrectly charged OWI meant the 
entire action was "null and void" because the municipal court had 
no subject-matter jurisdiction.  184 Wis. 2d at 93, 99.  Neither 
of these outcomes are consistent with, much less possible under, 
the majority's new rule. 
¶110 The majority also suggests, albeit indirectly, that the 
prosecuting authority's knowledge of a prior offense might affect 
a court's subject-matter jurisdiction.  See Majority op., ¶¶14, 
17, 44.  But in Banks, we noted that the court commissioner entered 
a civil forfeiture judgment "unaware" of the defendant's prior 
offense.  105 Wis. 2d at 36.  This lack of knowledge had no effect 
on our conclusion that that judgment was null and void because 
there was no subject-matter jurisdiction.  Id. at 41, 43.  
Similarly in Jensen, the municipal court was without subject-
matter 
jurisdiction 
even 
though 
the 
prior 
offense 
was 
"unbeknownst" to the court at the time it entered the civil 
forfeiture judgment.  184 Wis. 2d at 92-93, 98-99.  And in Rohner, 
No.  2018AP1129.bh 
 
16 
 
we held that the State has exclusive prosecutorial authority over 
all subsequent OWI offenses, never once nuancing the rule with a 
knowledge requirement.  108 Wis. 2d at 722; see also Booth, 370 
Wis. 2d 595, ¶15 (reaffirming that holding).  Once again, the 
majority's subtle importation of a knowledge requirement stands at 
direct odds with prior cases, and no effort is made to reconcile 
the inconsistencies. 
¶111 Along these lines, while the majority never quite says 
so, it implies that Booth stands for the proposition that statutory 
noncompliance equals a competence problem no matter what court 
you're dealing with.  As explained above, however, Booth was about 
statutory noncompliance and loss of competence in circuit courts, 
which 
have 
plenary 
subject-matter 
jurisdiction 
under 
our 
constitution.  Regardless of whether an OWI is incorrectly charged 
as a first-offense ordinance violation or correctly charged as a 
second-offense 
crime, 
a 
circuit 
court 
has 
subject-matter 
jurisdiction to hear the action and enter a judgment on the matter.  
A municipal court's subject-matter jurisdiction, on the other 
hand, hinges entirely on whether the offense is actually an 
ordinance violation.  No "Booth adjustment," in the concurrence's 
parlance, allows us to paper over the constitution's very different 
grants of subject-matter jurisdiction to circuit and municipal 
courts. 
¶112 Collecting all of the above, if the majority is correct, 
and pleading an OWI ordinance violation establishes subject-matter 
jurisdiction, Banks and Jensen must be overruled.  If an OWI 
offense is considered correctly charged solely because a municipal 
No.  2018AP1129.bh 
 
17 
 
prosecutor lacked knowledge of a prior offense, Rohner——and every 
other case that explains and relies on the mandatory nature of the 
OWI penalty structure, including Booth——needs to be modified.  See 
Banks, 105 Wis. 2d at 39-43; City of Lodi v. Hine, 107 Wis. 2d 118, 
122-23, 318 N.W.2d 383 (1982); Rohner, 108 Wis. 2d at 717-18; 
State v. Williams, 2014 WI 64, ¶¶21, 30, 32, 355 Wis. 2d 581, 852 
N.W.2d 467; Booth, 370 Wis. 2d 595, ¶¶22-24.  Rather than 
forthrightly acknowledge any of this, the majority simply 
sidesteps any substantive engagement with these decisions. 
¶113 It is difficult to figure out the consequences of a rule 
that 
pleading 
conclusively 
establishes 
subject-matter 
jurisdiction——a rule heretofore unknown in the law.10  What if the 
                                                 
10 The concurrence joins the majority's holding that pleading 
establishes jurisdiction.  Concurrence, ¶56.  At the same time, it 
proclaims that subject-matter jurisdiction depends not just on the 
pleading, but also on "the evidence produced and the court's 
disposition of the matter."  Concurrence, ¶65 n.5.  Subject-matter 
jurisdiction, according to the concurrence, is established if 
"what the complaint pleads, what the municipal court hears, what 
judgment it renders, and what consequences it imposes" all 
constitute an ordinance violation.  Concurrence, ¶65.  I have no 
idea how both rules can be true.  Either subject-matter 
jurisdiction is established based on the pleading, and is not 
challengeable afterwards, or not. 
No.  2018AP1129.bh 
 
18 
 
city attorney finds out midway through the proceeding (i.e., post-
pleading) that a prior OWI conviction exists, the very sequence of 
events in Banks (albeit before a court commissioner)?  Can the 
municipal court render judgment?  Could someone bring a post-trial 
appeal on similar grounds (again, post-pleading)? 
                                                 
Further, the concurrence's rule suffers from the same fatal 
disease as the majority's.  Our cases have repeatedly said subject-
matter jurisdiction can always be challenged, even after a case is 
completed, and that a defect in subject-matter jurisdiction 
renders a previously entered judgment null and void.  E.g., Kohler 
Co. v. DILHR, 81 Wis. 2d 11, 25, 259 N.W.2d 695 (1977) ("When a 
court or other judicial body acts in excess of its jurisdiction, 
its orders or judgments are void and may be challenged at any 
time.").  If the pleading, trial, judgment, and consequences 
imposed effectually establish subject-matter jurisdiction, how can 
that oft-repeated precedent allowing subject-matter jurisdiction 
challenges after the fact still be true?  This is not the way 
subject-matter jurisdiction works in federal court, and this is 
not the way we have ever described the subject-matter jurisdiction 
of municipal courts or other judicial bodies with limited subject-
matter jurisdiction until today. 
The concurrence also sets up a curious hypothetical regarding 
a municipal court's judgment for disorderly conduct.  The obvious 
problem with this is that a person can validly be charged with a 
disorderly conduct ordinance violation regardless of whether a 
more serious charge is warranted, but cannot be given a citation 
for first-offense OWI unless it is in fact a first-offense OWI.  A 
first-offense OWI citation for someone with a prior countable OWI 
offense is a violation that does not exist at law.  It is not and 
cannot be an ordinance violation.  This quirk of our OWI statutes 
is unlike other areas of law.  The concurrence finds this 
"revolutionary"; but as our cases make clear, it is actually the 
long-established way we have interpreted our OWI statutory scheme. 
Finally, the concurrence suggests a "Booth adjustment" to our 
prior cases is all the chiropractic correction needed to realign 
those decisions.  Concurrence, ¶74.  But it does not really conduct 
an accounting of those cases.  Instead, its effort to synthesize 
our body of cases rests wholly on its novel subject-matter 
jurisdiction analysis.  Booth was founded entirely on the plenary 
subject-matter jurisdiction of circuit courts.  Any effort to make 
it do more than that here begs the question. 
No.  2018AP1129.bh 
 
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¶114 No small part of the reason we are left guessing at 
potential unintended consequences is the fact that none of the 
briefing or arguments in this case went to the majority's holding 
that 
a 
municipal 
court's 
subject-matter 
jurisdiction 
is 
established by pleading an ordinance violation, or its suggestion 
that the prosecuting authority's knowledge of a prior OWI offense 
is relevant to that question.  All of this innovation originates 
solely from the majority's own inspiration. 
¶115 So far as I can tell, the upshot of the majority is if 
municipal courts accidentally or unintentionally violate the 
constitution by deciding a case the constitution says they have no 
power to decide, they haven't actually violated the constitution 
at all.  Good intentions notwithstanding, the constitution's 
limited grant of power to municipal courts should be read to mean 
what it says. 
¶116 Under our long-established law, the straightforward 
answer to the issue in this case is that a municipal court lacks 
subject-matter jurisdiction over an OWI offense that was brought 
as an ordinance violation when it should have been criminally 
charged as a second-offense OWI in circuit court.  The incorrectly 
charged OWI here is therefore null and void.  I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶117 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH BRADLEY 
and REBECCA FRANK DALLET join this dissent. 
 
No.  2018AP1129.bh 
 
 
 
1