Title: Wiles v. Medina Auto Parts

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Wiles v. Medina Auto Parts, 96 Ohio St.3d 241, 2002-Ohio-3994.] 
 
 
WILES, APPELLANT, v. MEDINA AUTO PARTS, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Wiles v. Medina Auto Parts, 96 Ohio St.3d 240, 2002-Ohio-3994.] 
Employer and employee — Ohio does not recognize a cause of action for 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy when the cause of action 
is based solely on a discharge in violation of the federal Family and 
Medical Leave Act, Section 2601 et seq., Title 29, U.S.Code. 
(No. 2001-1303 — Submitted March 27, 2002 — Decided August 28, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Medina County, No. 3131-M. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J. 
{¶1} 
The federal Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA” or “Act”), 
Section 2601 et seq., Title 29, U.S.Code, guarantees up to twelve weeks of unpaid 
leave during a one-year period for a qualifying employee needing time off to care 
for a relative.1  In addition to providing substantive rights, the FMLA provides 
specific remedies for employees who have been aggrieved by their employer’s 
violation of the Act.  This case asks us to recognize, as a matter of Ohio common 
law, a cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy based 
solely on an employer’s violation of the FMLA.  Because allowing such a claim is 
unnecessary to vindicate the policy goals of the FMLA, we decline to do so. 
I 
{¶2} 
According to his complaint, the appellant, Herb Wiles, began 
working for Medina Auto Parts in 1993.  In April 1999, Wiles requested and 
received permission to take a two-week leave of absence to care for his father, 
who had been injured in an automobile accident.  At the time he requested the 
leave of absence, Wiles earned $21.20 per hour as a store manager.  When Wiles 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
returned to work after the leave of absence, however, Medina Auto Parts lowered 
his pay rate to $11 per hour and demoted him from manager to counter person.  
Medina Auto Parts also transferred Wiles to a different store. 
{¶3} 
In January 2000, Wiles filed a complaint in the Medina County 
Court of Common Pleas alleging that Medina Auto Parts had constructively 
discharged him in retaliation for exercising his rights under the FMLA.  Despite 
citing the FMLA in his complaint, Wiles did not seek recovery under the Act’s 
remedial provisions.  Rather, Wiles asserted a state common-law cause of action, 
alleging that the actions of Medina Auto Parts constituted a wrongful discharge in 
violation of public policy.  See, generally, Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance 
Contrs., Inc. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 228, 551 N.E.2d 981. 
{¶4} 
Medina Auto Parts moved for summary judgment on the basis that 
Ohio does not recognize a cause of action for wrongful discharge that is based 
solely on the public policy expressed in the FMLA.  The trial court granted the 
motion and the court of appeals affirmed.  The cause is now before this court on 
the allowance of a discretionary appeal. 
II 
{¶5} 
The common-law doctrine of employment at will generally governs 
employment relationships in Ohio.  Under this doctrine, a general or indefinite 
hiring is terminable at the will of either the employee or the employer; thus, a 
discharge without cause does not give rise to an action for damages.  Collins v. 
Rizkana (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 65, 67, 652 N.E.2d 653; see, also, Mers v. 
Dispatch Printing Co. (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 100, 19 OBR 261, 483 N.E.2d 150, 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  In response to perceived abuses of the at-will 
principle, a number of states created an exception that permitted a discharged 
employee to assert a tort cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of a 
fundamental public policy.  See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980), 27 
January Term, 2002 
3 
Cal.3d 167, 172, 164 Cal.Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330; Phung v. Waste Mgt., Inc. 
(1986), 23 Ohio St.3d 100, 104, 23 OBR 260, 491 N.E.2d 1114 (Clifford F. 
Brown, J., dissenting) (collecting cases).  After first declining to do so in Phung, 
this court followed the national trend in Greeley, supra, and recognized a cause of 
action in tort for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.  Specifically, 
we held that “[p]ublic policy warrants an exception to the employment-at-will 
doctrine when an employee is discharged or disciplined for a reason which is 
prohibited by statute.”  Greeley at paragraph one of the syllabus.  Thus, after 
Greeley, an employee terminated in violation of a statute could maintain a 
common-law action for damages. 
{¶6} 
In the years following Greeley, this court expanded and otherwise 
refined the scope of the wrongful-discharge tort.  We have held that a valid 
Greeley claim is not limited to situations where the discharge violates a statute.  
Instead, the “clear public policy” sufficient to justify a wrongful-discharge claim 
“may also be discerned as a matter of law based on other sources, such as the 
Constitutions of Ohio and the United States, administrative rules and regulations, 
and the common law.”  Painter v. Graley (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 377, 639 N.E.2d 
51, paragraph three of the syllabus (overruling Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic Corp. 
[1992], 62 Ohio St.3d 541, 584 N.E.2d 729).  In addition to expanding the 
potential sources of the “clear public policy” for purposes of a Greeley claim, 
Painter also suggested defining the tort by using the four elements described by 
then Villanova Law School professor (now Dean and Professor of Law at 
Chicago-Kent College of Law) Henry H. Perritt, Jr.:   
{¶7} 
“ ‘1. 
That clear public policy existed and was manifested in a 
state or federal constitution, statute or administrative regulation, or in the common 
law (the clarity element). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶8} 
“ ‘2. 
That dismissing employees under circumstances like those 
involved in the plaintiff’s dismissal would jeopardize the public policy (the 
jeopardy element). 
{¶9} 
“ ‘3. 
The plaintiff’s dismissal was motivated by conduct related 
to the public policy (the causation element). 
{¶10} “ ‘4. 
The employer lacked overriding legitimate business 
justification for the dismissal (the overriding justification element).’  (Emphasis 
sic.)”  Painter, 70 Ohio St.3d at 384, 639 N.E.2d 51, fn. 8, quoting H. Perritt, The 
Future of Wrongful Dismissal Claims: Where Does Employer Self Interest Lie? 
(1989), 58 U.Cin.L.Rev. 397, 398-399.  See, also, 2 Perritt, Employee Dismissal 
Law and Practice (4th Ed.1998) 3-4, Section 7.1. 
{¶11} Less than one year after deciding Painter, this court formally 
adopted Professor Perritt’s framework as the four elements of an Ohio common-
law claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.  Collins, 73 Ohio 
St.3d at 69-70, 652 N.E.2d 653.  We further established that the clarity and 
jeopardy elements were questions of law to be decided by the court while factual 
issues relating to the causation and overriding justification elements were 
generally for the trier of fact to resolve.  Id. at 70, 652 N.E.2d 653; 2 Perritt at 18, 
Section 7.9. 
{¶12} In this case, Wiles bases his Greeley claim solely on the public 
policy expressed in the FMLA.  The court of appeals upheld the trial court’s grant 
of summary judgment for Medina Auto Parts on the basis that Ohio recognizes no 
such claim.  Although it found the clarity element of a wrongful-discharge tort 
satisfied based on the FMLA’s substantive provisions, the court of appeals found 
that the jeopardy element was lacking.  We review the court of appeals’ resolution 
of these purely legal issues using a de novo standard of review.  See Cleveland 
Elec. Illum. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 521, 523, 668 N.E.2d 
January Term, 2002 
5 
889; see, also, Doe v. Shaffer (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 388, 390, 738 N.E.2d 1243 
(“We review the grant of summary judgment de novo”). 
{¶13} Based on the analytic framework adopted in Collins, our first task 
is to ascertain whether the conduct Wiles alleges to have occurred violated a 
“clear public policy” of this state.  Collins, 73 Ohio St.3d at 70, 652 N.E.2d 653.  
We agree with the court of appeals that the FMLA manifests a sufficiently clear 
public policy to satisfy the clarity element of a wrongful-discharge tort claim.  
Indeed, Congress expressly stated an intent “to balance the demands of the 
workplace with the needs of families, to promote the stability and economic 
security of families, and to promote national interests in preserving family 
integrity” and “to entitle employees to take reasonable leave * * * for the care of a 
child, spouse, or parent who has a serious health condition.”  Section 2601(b).  
See, also, Stekloff v. St. John’s Mercy Health Sys. (C.A.8, 2000), 218 F.3d 858, 
861 (observing that “a desire to promote job security and stability in workplace 
relationships was central to Congress’s decision to pass the FMLA”).  In 
furtherance of these legislative objectives, “[t]he FMLA’s central provision 
guarantees eligible employees 12 weeks of leave in a 1-year period following 
certain events: a disabling health problem; a family member’s serious illness; or 
the arrival of a new son or daughter.”  (Emphasis added.)  Ragsdale v. Wolverine 
World Wide, Inc. (2002), 535 U.S. 81, ___, 122 S.Ct. 1155, 1160, 152 L.Ed.2d 
167, 175, citing Section 2612(a)(1).  The Act reinforces this “central provision” 
by requiring a covered employer to maintain the employee’s group health 
coverage during the leave, Section 2614(c)(1), and to reinstate the employee to his 
or her former position or an equivalent when the employee returns from leave, 
Section 2614(a)(1).  Moreover, the Act specifically prohibits a covered employer 
from interfering with, restraining, or denying the exercise of FMLA rights by an 
employee.  Section 2615(a)(1).  Thus, the FMLA prohibits what Wiles alleges 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
Medina Auto Parts to have done here—discharging him for exercising his right to 
FMLA leave.  See Chaffin v. John H. Carter Co., Inc. (C.A.5, 1999), 179 F.3d 
316, 319; see, also, Section 825.220(c), Title 29, C.F.R. (explaining that the 
FMLA prohibits an employer from discriminating against employees who have 
used FMLA leave).  In light of the Act’s statutory and administrative provisions, 
we conclude that the FMLA expresses a clear public policy in favor of a qualified 
employee being allowed to take medical leave to care for a parent with a serious 
health problem. 
{¶14} Having found the clarity element satisfied, we next turn to the 
jeopardy element to determine whether an employer’s dismissal of an employee 
under the circumstances alleged by Wiles would jeopardize the public policy set 
forth in the FMLA.  In other words, we must assess whether the absence of a 
cognizable Greeley claim based solely on a violation of the FMLA would 
seriously compromise the Act’s statutory objectives by deterring eligible 
employees from exercising their substantive leave rights.  See Kulch v. Structural 
Fibers, Inc. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 134, 154, 677 N.E.2d 308; see, also, 2 Perritt at 
42-43, Section 7.17.  It is here that Wiles’s claim fails. 
{¶15} An analysis of the jeopardy element necessarily involves inquiring 
into the existence of any alternative means of promoting the particular public 
policy to be vindicated by a common-law wrongful-discharge claim.  Id. at 44, 
Section 7.17.  Where, as here, the sole source of the public policy opposing the 
discharge is a statute that provides the substantive right and remedies for its 
breach, “the issue of adequacy of remedies” becomes a particularly important 
component of the jeopardy analysis.  See Collins, 73 Ohio St.3d at 73, 652 N.E.2d 
653.  “If the statute that establishes the public policy contains its own remedies, it 
is less likely that tort liability is necessary to prevent dismissals from interfering 
with realizing the statutory policy.”  2 Perritt at 71, Section 7.26.  Simply put, 
January Term, 2002 
7 
there is no need to recognize a common-law action for wrongful discharge if there 
already exists a statutory remedy that adequately protects society’s interests.  See 
Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co. (Hawaii) Ltd., Inc. (1994), 76 Haw. 454, 464, 879 P.2d 
1037; Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., Inc. (1990), 117 N.J. 539, 562, 569 
A.2d 793; Kofoid v. Woodard Hotels, Inc. (1986), 78 Ore.App. 283, 286-287, 716 
P.2d 771, citing Walsh v. Consol. Freightways (1977), 278 Ore. 347, 563 P.2d 
1205.  In that situation, the public policy expressed in the statute would not be 
jeopardized by the absence of a common-law wrongful-discharge action in tort 
because an aggrieved employee has an alternate means of vindicating his or her 
statutory rights and thereby discouraging an employer from engaging in the 
unlawful conduct.   
{¶16} In addition to providing substantive rights for employees and 
prohibitions applicable to employers, the FMLA also contains a comprehensive 
remedial scheme designed to compensate an employee for his or her employer’s 
violation of the Act.  Significantly, the Act entitles an aggrieved employee to 
compensatory damages equal to the amount of “any wages, salary, employment 
benefits, or other compensation denied or lost to such employee by reason of the 
violation,” plus interest calculated at the prevailing rate.  Section 2617(a)(1)(A)(i) 
and (ii).  This provision describes an award of back pay, which is designed to “ 
‘make the claimant whole [and] place him in the same position he would have 
been in’ ” but for the FMLA violation.  Rogers v. AC Humko Corp. 
(W.D.Tenn.1999), 56 F.Supp.2d 972, 976, quoting Rasimas v. Michigan Dept. of 
Mental Health (C.A.6, 1983), 714 F.2d 614, 626.  In a case in which an 
employer’s violation of the FMLA has not resulted in a denial of wages, salary, or 
benefits to the employee (i.e., an adverse employment action other than a 
discharge), the employee may recover “any actual monetary losses sustained by 
the employee as a direct result of the violation, such as the cost of providing care, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
up to a sum equal to 12 weeks of wages or salary for the employee.”  Section 
2617(a)(1)(A)(i)(II).  The employee may additionally recover a like amount “as 
liquidated damages,” unless the employer proves that it acted “in good faith” and 
“had reasonable grounds for believing that the act or omission was not a violation 
of” the FMLA.  Section 2617(a)(1)(A)(iii); see, also, Nero v. Indus. Molding 
Corp. (C.A.5, 1999), 167 F.3d 921, 928 (holding that a district court may not 
reduce or eliminate a liquidated-damages award “unless the employer first 
sustains its burden of showing that its failure to obey the statute was in good 
faith”).  Further, the FMLA authorizes “such equitable relief as may be 
appropriate, including employment, reinstatement, and promotion.”  Section 
2617(a)(1)(B).  Proper equitable relief may also include an award of front pay 
either in lieu of reinstatement or, in some cases, in conjunction with it (i.e., for the 
period between judgment and reinstatement).  See Cline v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
(C.A.4, 1998), 144 F.3d 294, 307; see, generally, Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co. (2001), 532 U.S. 843, 846, 121 S.Ct. 1946, 150 L.Ed.2d 62.  
Finally, the FMLA allows a prevailing employee to recover reasonable attorney 
fees as an item of the “costs of the action.”  Section 2617(a)(3). 
{¶17} When viewed as a whole, the FMLA’s remedial scheme provides 
an employee with a meaningful opportunity to place himself or herself in the same 
position the employee would have been absent the employer’s violation of the 
FMLA.  For example, if Wiles had pursued a cause of action based on the FMLA 
and prevailed, he could have obtained (1) compensatory damages for the salary he 
lost following his demotion, (2) liquidated damages in a like amount if Medina 
Auto Parts could not prove that it acted in good faith, (3) prejudgment interest, (4) 
reasonable attorney fees, and (5) appropriate equitable relief, including front pay 
and/or reinstatement to the managerial position he held prior to taking his FMLA 
leave.  This combination of compensatory damages and equitable remedies is 
January Term, 2002 
9 
sufficiently comprehensive to ensure that the public policy embodied in the 
FMLA will not be jeopardized by the absence of a tort claim for wrongful 
discharge in violation of public policy.2  Indeed, a number of federal courts have 
cited the adequacy of the statutory remedies as a reason not to extend state law 
and recognize a claim for wrongful discharge based on the public policy of the 
FMLA.  See Cavin v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc. (S.D.Ohio 2001), 138 F.Supp.2d 
987, 997-998, and Dorricott v. Fairhill Ctr. for Aging (N.D.Ohio 1998), 2 
F.Supp.2d 982, 992, affirmed without published opinion (C.A.6, 1999), 187 F.3d 
635 (applying Ohio law)3; Lange v. Showbiz Pizza Time, Inc. (D.Kan.1998), 12 
F.Supp.2d 1150, 1155 (applying Kansas law); McClain v. Southwest Steel Co. 
(N.D.Okla.1996), 940 F.Supp. 295, 298 (applying Oklahoma law); Hamros v. 
Bethany Homes & Methodist Hosp. (N.D.Ill.1995), 894 F.Supp. 1176, 1179 
(applying Illinois law).  We therefore conclude that Ohio does not recognize a 
cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy when the 
cause of action is based solely on a discharge in violation of the FMLA.  An 
aggrieved employee’s proper recourse for an employer’s FMLA violation is to 
bring the cause of action authorized by Congress under Section 2617. 
{¶18} In arguing that the jeopardy element is satisfied, Wiles relies 
heavily on this court’s decision in Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc., 78 Ohio St.3d 
134, 677 N.E.2d 308.  In that case, a discharged employee brought a Greeley 
claim alleging that his employer fired him for reporting safety violations.  This 
court allowed the plaintiff to maintain a Greeley claim based on the public policy 
embodied in the Whistleblower Statute, R.C. 4113.52, despite the existence of 
specific statutory civil remedies.  While acknowledging that the jeopardy analysis 
relating to a Greeley claim based on R.C. 4113.52 was “a bit more difficult” 
because of the remedies already provided in the Whistleblower Statute, the Kulch 
opinion found that these remedies did not foreclose recovery of cumulative 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
remedies by way of a common-law cause of action.  Id. at 155, 677 N.E.2d 308.  
Because Kulch deemed the remedies in R.C. 4113.52 “not adequate to fully 
compensate an aggrieved employee who is discharged, disciplined, or otherwise 
retaliated against in violation of the statute,” recognition of a Greeley claim 
“would serve to encourage the legislative objectives of R.C. 4113.52 and 
complement the limited remedies available under the Whistleblower Statute.”  Id. 
{¶19} Despite the existence of comprehensive remedies in the FMLA, 
Wiles contends that Kulch directs us to recognize a tort claim for wrongful 
discharge based on an FMLA violation.  He argues that the important policy 
objectives of the FMLA will be jeopardized absent our recognition of a Greeley 
claim because the Act’s statutory remedies do not provide “make whole tort 
relief.”  Specifically, Wiles notes that the FMLA does not allow recovery of 
punitive damages and compensatory damages for “anxiety and emotional 
distress.”  See Cavin, supra; Keene v. Rinaldi (M.D.N.C.2000), 127 F.Supp.2d 
770, 772-773; Settle v. S.W. Rodgers Co., Inc. (E.D.Va.1998), 998 F.Supp. 657, 
665-666, affirmed without published opinion (C.A.4, 1999), 182 F.3d 909, 1999 
WL 486643.  Because of these perceived shortcomings in the FMLA remedial 
scheme, Wiles argues that additional tort remedies are necessary to effectuate 
fully the intent of Congress.  We do not agree. 
{¶20} Wiles reads Kulch more broadly than is warranted.  Kulch does 
not, as Wiles argues, stand for the proposition that statutory remedies are 
inadequate—therefore warranting a Greeley claim—when those remedies provide 
something less than the full panoply of relief that would be available in a tort 
cause of action for wrongful discharge.  Importantly, the analysis upon which 
Wiles relies garnered the votes of only three justices.  See Kulch, 78 Ohio St.3d at 
163-164, 677 N.E.2d 308 (Pfeifer, J., concurring in syllabus and judgment only); 
see, also, Pytlinski v. Brocar Prod., Inc. (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 77, 82, 760 N.E.2d 
January Term, 2002 
11 
385 (Cook, J., concurring in judgment only).  Thus, Kulch is not controlling 
authority on the question of whether the remedies provided in a statute are 
sufficiently comprehensive to render unnecessary the recognition of a separate 
common-law Greeley claim based solely on the same statute—much less a 
Greeley claim based on a federal statute that was the product of a Congressional 
balancing of right and remedy that we ought not disturb.  See Chappell v. S. 
Maryland Hosp., Inc. (1990), 320 Md. 483, 498, 578 A.2d 766; cf. Bush v. Lucas 
(1983), 462 U.S. 367, 388, 390, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (declining to 
recognize constitutional tort action on behalf of federal civil servant demoted in 
violation of his First Amendment rights when Congress had already in place an 
“elaborate remedial system” that was produced “with careful attention to 
conflicting policy considerations”). 
{¶21} While the FMLA may not (as the law stands today) allow punitive 
damages or damages for emotional distress, the absence of those items of recovery 
does not render the statutory remedies inadequate.  For one thing, the question 
whether punitive damages are recoverable is irrelevant to any discussion of 
whether the statutory remedies provide something close to make-whole tort relief.  
Punitive damages are designed not to compensate the plaintiff but, rather, to 
punish the defendant and deter future wrongdoing.  Preston v. Murty (1987), 32 
Ohio St.3d 334, 335, 512 N.E.2d 1174.  For another thing, the mere absence of 
recovery for emotional distress is not enough to convince us that the remedies 
authorized by the FMLA are somehow insufficient to vindicate the policy 
Congress created in the very same statutory scheme.  The remedies that the FMLA 
provides—most notably the compensatory damages allowed by Section 
2617(a)(1)(A)(i) and the liquidated damages to which a prevailing plaintiff is 
presumptively entitled under Section 2617(a)(1)(A)(iii)—are broad enough in 
their own right to compensate an aggrieved employee for an employer’s violation 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
of the Act.  There is accordingly no need to create by judicial fiat further remedies 
by way of a Greeley claim when the FMLA provides reasonably satisfactory ones.  
Cf. Provens v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities 
(1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 252, 594 N.E.2d 959 (refusing to recognize private cause of 
action for public employee discharged in violation of constitutional rights when 
there exist “other reasonably satisfactory remedies provided by statutory 
enactment and administrative process”).4 
{¶22} By our holding today, we intend neither to diminish nor to 
disparage the laudable objectives of the FMLA.  Nor should our holding be 
confused with a statement that the FMLA somehow preempts state law in the area 
of family and medical leave as a matter of Congressional occupation of the field.  
Indeed, the FMLA states that “[n]othing in this Act or any amendment made by 
this Act shall be construed to supersede any provision of any State or local law 
that provides greater family or medical leave rights than the rights established 
under this Act or any amendment made by this Act.”  Section 2651(b).5  By not 
recognizing a Greeley claim based solely on an FMLA violation, we are merely 
deciding that the statutory remedies in the FMLA adequately protect the public 
policy embedded in the Act, leaving no reason for us to expand the scope of 
remedies that Congress has provided.  See Collins, 73 Ohio St.3d at 73, 652 
N.E.2d 653 (noting that courts sometimes confuse the adequacy-of-remedies 
analysis with preemption).  Rather than preempting a common-law claim for 
wrongful discharge as a matter of legislative occupation of the field, statutory 
remedies provide an effective vehicle for vindicating the statute’s policy, 
obviating recognition of a wrongful discharge claim based on the same statute.  
See Masters v. Daniel Internatl. Corp. (C.A.10, 1990), 917 F.2d 455, 456-457 
(finding that federal statute did not preempt retaliatory discharge claim under 
Kansas law but declining to recognize cause of action because federal Act had 
January Term, 2002 
13 
adequate remedies); see, also, Kofoid, supra, 78 Ore.App. at 286-287, 716 P.2d 
771. 
{¶23} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concur. 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
DOUGLAS, J., dissenting. 
{¶24} The majority holds that there is no independent cause of action for 
wrongful discharge in Ohio based solely on the public policy embodied in the 
federal Family and Medical Leave Act.  I respectfully dissent from the majority’s 
decision. 
{¶25} I would instead hold that an at-will employee who is discharged or 
disciplined in violation of the public policy embodied in the federal Family and 
Medical Leave Act may maintain a common-law tort cause of action against the 
employer pursuant to Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contrs., Inc. (1990), 
49 Ohio St.3d 228, 551 N.E.2d 981, and its progeny. 
 
RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting 
opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Michael Terrence Conway, for appellant. 
 
Andrew S. McIlvaine and Thomas E. Palecek, for appellee. 
 
Gittes & Schulte and Frederick M. Gittes; Louis A. Jacobs; Law Offices of 
John S. Marshall and Joshua J. Morrow, urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio 
Employment Lawyers Association, Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers, Ohio NOW 
Education & Legal Fund, and 9 to 5, National Association of Working Women. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
__________________ 
                                          
 
1. 
All statutory references will be to Title 29, U.S.Code unless otherwise specified. 
2. 
Both Wiles and amici curiae state that the FMLA does not allow recovery of 
compensatory damages.  This contention is simply wrong.  Although Section 2617(a) does not by 
its terms allow recovery for all categories of compensatory damages (viz., emotional distress 
damages), we cannot characterize the damages it does authorize (i.e., lost salary, benefits, other 
income, actual monetary losses) as anything other than compensatory damages.  See, e.g., 
Chandler v. Specialty Tires of Am. (Tennessee), Inc. (C.A.6, 2002), 283 F.3d 818, 827 (noting that 
Section 2617[a][1][A][i] and [ii] specify recoverable “compensatory damages”); Hukill v. Auto 
Care, Inc. (C.A.4, 1999), 192 F.3d 437, 441 (describing relief under Section 2617[a][1] as 
“compensatory damages”).  Moreover, the cases cited by the amici as support for the blanket 
statement that “[t]he FMLA does not provide compensatory damages”—Montgomery v. Maryland 
(C.A.4, 2001), 266 F.3d 334, vacated on other grounds (2002), __ U.S. __, 122 S.Ct. 1958, 152 
L.Ed.2d 1019,  and Walker v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. (C.A.10, 2001), 240 F.3d 1268—do not 
say that.  Montgomery held that the FMLA does not allow recovery of emotional distress damages, 
266 F.3d at 341; Walker held that the FMLA does not allow recovery of nominal damages, 240 
F.3d at 1277. 
3. 
Before today, the federal courts in Ohio had reached differing conclusions as to whether 
Ohio law recognizes a Greeley claim based solely on a violation of the FMLA.  Compare Cavin, 
supra, 138 F.Supp.2d 987, Dorricott, supra, 2 F.Supp.2d 982, Vargo-Adams v. United States 
Postal Serv. (N.D.Ohio 1998), 992 F.Supp. 939, and Gall v. Quaker City Castings, Inc. (N.D.Ohio 
1995), 874 F.Supp. 161 (not allowing wrongful-discharge claim under Ohio law based on violation 
of FMLA), with Arthur v. Armco, Inc. (S.D.Ohio 2000), 122 F.Supp.2d 876, and Maxwell v. GTE 
Wireless Serv. Corp. (N.D.Ohio 2000), 121 F.Supp.2d 649 (allowing wrongful-discharge claim). 
4. 
Even if the Kulch plurality’s analysis were controlling, Wiles still may not prevail.  The 
Kulch  plurality found a cognizable Greeley claim only after it concluded that (1) the remedies 
provided in the Ohio Whistleblower Act were not sufficient to provide complete relief and (2) the 
legislature did not intend the statutory remedies to be the exclusive means of vindicating the 
statute’s policy.  Kulch, 78 Ohio St.3d at 157-160, 677 N.E.2d 308.  Thus, even if we agreed with 
Wiles that the FMLA’s remedies were insufficient, we would still need to decide whether they 
were intended to be exclusive; if so, a Greeley claim would not lie solely for violation of the 
statute.  See Cavin, 138 F.Supp.2d at 991.  The federal courts are currently split on the question of 
whether the FMLA remedies are exclusive and therefore preclude other causes of action predicated 
upon a violation of the Act.  Compare, e.g., O’Hara v. Mt. Vernon Bd. of Edn. (S.D.Ohio 1998), 
16 F.Supp.2d 868, 893-895 (finding FMLA’s remedies exclusive, thereby foreclosing a claim 
under Section 1983, Title 42, U.S.Code based on FMLA violation), with Knussman v. Maryland 
(D.Md.1998), 16 F.Supp.2d 601, 609-610 (holding that FMLA’s remedial scheme does not 
preclude a claim under Section 1983, Title 42, U.S.Code); see, also, Cavin, 138 F.Supp.2d at 997, 
and Desrochers v. Hilton Hotels Corp. (D.Mass.1998), 28 F.Supp.2d 693, 695 (finding that 
FMLA’s exclusive remedies preclude state-law claims based on FMLA).  
5. 
But, see, Desrochers, 28 F.Supp.2d at 694, fn.1 (concluding that Section 2651[b] “merely 
allows states to provide additional substantive leave rights” and “does not suggest Congress 
January Term, 2002 
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intended that states should provide additional remedies for FMLA violations”); accord Cavin, 138 
F.Supp.2d at 993-994.