Title: Barker v. Frank

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Roger BARKER, Patty MacDonald and Malcolm
MacDonald, On Behalf of Themselves and All of
the Citizens, Residents, Taxpayers,
Inhabitants, and Owners of Real Property in
Fountain Lake School District # 18 in Saline
County, Arkansas v. Henry FRANK, In His
Official Capacity as President and Member of
the Board of Education of Fountain Lake
School District No. 18; Ron Koller, In His
Official Capacity as a Member of the Board of
Education of Fountain Lake School District
No. 18; Eddie Culpepper, In His Official
Capacity as a Member of the Board of
Education of Fountain Lake School District
No. 18; Tim Culbreth, In His Official
Capacity as a Member of the Board of
Education of Fountain Lake School District
No. 18; Phil Mariage, In His Official
Capacity as a Member of the Board of
Education of Fountain Lake School District
No. 18; Charles Clark, In His Official
Capacity as Superintendant of Fountain Lake
School District No. 18; Freddie Barton, In
His Official Capacity as Saline County Clerk;
and Nancy Elrod, In Her Official Capacity as
Saline County Collector

96-305                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered March 17, 1997


1.   Taxation -- county taxes -- county courts have exclusive jurisdiction. --
     Under Ark. Const. art. 7,  28, county courts have exclusive
     jurisdiction in all matters relating to county taxes.

2.   Taxation -- school purposes -- power to levy such taxes solely that of
     school districts -- not within county court's jurisdiction. -- Under the
     Arkansas Constitution, school taxes and county taxes are
     treated differently; under Ark. Const. art. 14,  3, the power
     to levy taxes for school purposes was solely that of the
     school districts; such a levy was not within the jurisdiction
     of the county court; although this section of the constitution
     has since been amended by Ark. Const. amends. 11 and 40, the
     language that school districts shall levy taxes remains
     intact.

3.   Taxation -- General Assembly has consistently treated school districts,
     counties, and municipalities as separate taxing units. -- The General
     Assembly, the body to whom the Arkansas Constitution delegates
     the power to tax, has consistently treated school districts,
     counties, and municipalities as separate taxing units; in
     addition, numerous statutes contain language differentiating
     between school district and county taxes, the most relevant
     being Ark. Code Ann.  26-80-104(b) (1987), which provides
     that school taxes are to be collected in the same manner as
     county taxes.

4.   Schools & school districts -- matters concerning public schools rest within
     province of state rather than county government. -- Article 14 of the
     State Constitution makes it the duty of the legislature to
     provide for the establishment, maintenance and support of a
     system of common schools; the legislature must employ agencies
     to accomplish that object, and a school district is a proper
     agency therefor; matters concerning public schools rest within
     the province of the state, not the county government.

5.   Taxation -- funds generated from school taxes must be credited to school
     fund and may not be converted into county's general fund. -- Although
     the General Assembly has given counties the responsibility of
     collecting school district taxes, Ark. Const. art. 16,  11,
     states that "no moneys arising from a tax levied for one
     purpose shall be used for any other purpose"; this provision
     has been interpreted to require that funds generated from
     school taxes must be credited to the school fund and may not
     be converted into the county's general fund for county
     purposes.

6.   Taxation -- school district taxes -- role of county is strictly clerical -
     - school taxes are not county taxes -- exclusive jurisdicition does not
     lie in county court. -- Counties may levy taxes for county
     purposes only; this power in the counties does not include the
     power to levy school taxes; the role of the county is strictly
     clerical with respect to school district taxes in that it
     collects and disburses the tax money; school taxes are not
     county taxes, and, thus, exclusive jurisdiction does not lie
     in county court.
7.   Jurisdiction -- circuit courts vested with concurrent jurisdiction to hear
     illegal exaction cases. -- Under Ark. Const. art. 7,  11, a
     circuit court has jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases
     for which exclusive jurisdiction may not be vested in some
     other court provided for by the constitution; under this
     provision, unless the constitution confers jurisdiction
     exclusively in another court, a circuit court has either
     exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction; the circuit courts are
     vested with concurrent jurisdiction to hear illegal exaction
     cases.

8.   Taxation -- illegal exaction -- two types distinguished. -- There are
     only two types of illegal exactions: (1) "public funds" cases;
     and (2) "illegal tax" cases; the former contemplates either
     the misapplication of public funds or the recovery of funds
     wrongly paid to a public official; the latter requires that
     the tax itself be illegal, and if the taxes complained of are
     not themselves illegal, a suit for illegal exaction will not
     lie.

9.   Taxation -- illegal exaction -- valid claim raised -- matter reversed and
     remanded. -- Where appellant taxpayers did not contest the
     county's real property reappraisal and reassessment but
     instead contested the failure of the school district to roll
     back taxes in violation of Ark. Const. amend. 59, and where
     the issue was the tax itself, which allegedly exceeded
     constitutional limits because a rollback had not been
     accomplished by the school district, the supreme court
     concluded that a valid claim for an illegal exaction had been
     raised and reversed and remanded the matter.


     Appeal from Saline Circuit Court; Harold S. Erwin, Judge;
reversed and remanded.
     Gill Law Firm, P.A., by: Glenn E. Kelley and C. Tad Bohannon,
for appellants.
     Laser, Wilson, Bufford & Watts, P.A., by: Dan F. Bufford; and
Nichols, Wolff, Ledbetter & Campbell, P.A., by: Mark W. Nichols,
for appellees Frank, Koller, Culpepper, Culbreth, Mariage, and
Clark.

     Robert L. Brown, Justice.
     Appellants Roger Barker, Patty MacDonald, and Malcolm
MacDonald (hereinafter referred to as "taxpayers") own real
property in Saline County and reside within Fountain Lake School
District #18, which includes part of Saline County and part of
Garland County.  The appellees are members of the Board of Fountain
Lake School District #18, the County Clerk of Saline County, and
the County Collector of Saline County.
     The complaint filed by the taxpayers against the appellees
alleged that in July 1993 the State Assessment Coordination
Division advised the Saline County Judge that the preliminary ratio
of the assessed value of real property to actual value of the real
property had fallen below 18 percent and that the state turnback
funds to the county were in jeopardy.  To cure this problem,
reappraisal of land located in Saline County was suggested, and a
reappraisal was done.  In August 1994, the Saline County
Equalization Board received the results of the reappraisal, which
showed that the aggregate value of taxable real property in the
school district for 1994 had increased 28.8% over that in 1993.
     At the core of the taxpayers' complaint is their assertion
that the collection of the 1994 school district tax constitutes an
illegal exaction because of the reappraisal and the failure of the
school district to roll back taxes.  This is so, they allege,
because the school district stands to receive revenues exceeding by
more than 10% those received in 1993, which violates the specific
requirements of Amendment 59 of the Arkansas Constitution.  The
taxpayers assert that because the aggregate value of taxable real
and personal property itself eclipsed 1993 by more than 10%, the
school district must roll back its rate of taxation under Amendment
59.  Otherwise, the tax is illegal.
     The taxpayers further complain that a number of statutory
tasks related to the reassessment of property have not been
performed by the school district and by Saline County public
officials.  For example, they point out that the Saline County
Clerk must certify the 1994 assessed value of land located in the
school district under Ark. Code Ann.  26-26-403 (Repl. 1992),
which was not done.  Also, the Saline County Clerk must report to
the school district's governing body and provide certification of
the assessment data on land in Saline County under the same code
section, which allegedly was a duty not performed.  Finally, the
taxpayers allege that the school district's governing body must
complete certain forms and return them to the Saline County Clerk,
using the data previously provided by the clerk, as required by
Ark. Code Ann.  26-26-404 (Repl. 1992).  This, too, was not
accomplished, according to the complaint.
     The complaint sought a writ of mandamus (1) to the Saline
County Clerk, requiring him to perform his duties, and (2) to the
school district to complete the rollback form and roll back its tax
rate pursuant to the State Constitution.  The taxpayers further
sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the collection of 1994 real
property taxes in violation of Amendment 59.  Next, the taxpayers
prayed for judgment declaring the collection of 1994 real property
taxes in the school district to constitute an illegal exaction
under Amendment 59 as revenue collected which is more than 10%
above revenues collected in 1993.  Finally, they sought to enjoin
the appellees from further violations of Amendment 59.
     The school district moved to dismiss the taxpayers' complaint
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The Saline County Clerk
and Collector moved similarly and asserted that the taxpayers'
claims were required to be brought in county court because they
involved county taxes.  The taxpayers replied that the taxes at
issue were school district taxes as opposed to county taxes, and,
thus, circuit court was the appropriate jurisdiction.  They further
referred to their prayers for mandamus and prohibition, remedies
which typically lie in circuit court.
     The taxpayers subsequently supplemented their response to the
motions to dismiss.  They contended that even assuming that the
school district tax was a county tax, jurisdiction in circuit court
was still proper because the case involved an illegal exaction. 
Citing Foster v. Jefferson County Quorum Court, 321 Ark. 105,