Title: IN THE MATTER OF BTW

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF BTW  IN THE MATTER OF BTW 2010 OK 69 Case Number: 106865 Decided: 10/05/2010 As Corrected: October 14, 2010 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA IN THE MATTER OF BTW, Deprived child under the age of eighteen (18) years APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF WOODWARD COUNTY ¶0 The mother appeals from a post-appeal permanency/review hearing order of the District Court, Woodward County, Rick Bozarth, Judge, that provides: (1) the child is to remain in the care of the foster parent (2) for supervised visitation by the mother with child and (3) a permanency plan of long-term out-of-home placement for the child. AFFIRMED Jami J. Fenner, Lester, Loving & Davies, P.C., Edmond, Oklahoma, for the mother, Susan K. Meinders, Office of the District Attorney of Woodward County, for the State of Oklahoma, Careylyn Stuckey Talley, Foard, Talley & Stake, P.L.L.C., Woodward, Oklahoma, for the child, D. Kent Meyers, Harvey D. Ellis, Mary H. Tolbert, Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for the foster parent. Opala, J. ¶1 This appeal presses three issues: (1) whether this court's mandate - that affirmed a 2008 trial court order - was ignored by the trial judge's 2009 decision in a post-appeal permanency/review hearing order, (2) did the trial judge abuse his discretion when he ordered (A) the child to remain in the care of the foster parent (B) supervised visitation for the mother and (C) a change of permanency plan to long-term out-of-home child placement and (3) were the mother's due process rights violated when the court ordered long-term foster care for the child. We answer all questions in the negative. I. ANATOMY OF THE LITIGATION ¶2 The appeal deals with the post-decisional consequence of an earlier pronouncement by this court, In the Matter of BTW. Facts and Procedure Leading to BTW I ¶3 The mother (appellant in today's cause) adopted BTW in 1999. ¶4 Two permanency/review hearings were held. In October 2007, following the first hearing, the trial judge ordered that a different placement be found for the child, all parties to work toward a permanency plan for the child's reunification with her mother and increased visitation with a view to allowing weekend visitations in the mother's home within thirty days. ¶5 Although visitation increased, DHS did not find alternative foster placement for BTW. At the second review hearing the foster parent intervened. Following the hearing the trial judge issued an order on 15 February 2008 that again directed a change of foster-home placement, reunification for the permanency plan, and visitation between the mother and her child to continue. ¶6 On 25 February the appellants filed in this court an application to assume original jurisdiction, a petition for writ of prohibition, and an application for an emergency stay. The court stayed solely the requested change in foster placement. ¶7 On 21 April the appellants sought a request to clarify whether the court's writ of prohibition prevents the enforcement of the trial court's order for visitation. Facts and Proceedings Following BTW I ¶8 Before mandate issued in BTW I, ¶9 The trial judge set 25 November for a regular review hearing and to entertain: (1) the state's emergency motion to discontinue visitation and (2) its earlier motion pursuant to 10 O.S. §7003-4.6(A). The trial judge denied the movants' latter motion sans hearing. II. THE FEBRUARY 2008 ORDER WAS SUBJECT TO REVIEW AND ¶10 Mother first urges the trial judge erred in his 9 February 2009 order when he failed to enforce this court's 27 October 2008 mandate that affirmed the 2008 trial court's ruling. According to mother, the latter order - that directed a change in foster placement, unsupervised visitation, and the goal of family reunification - was never implemented. ¶11 The appellees respond the February 2008 order was never more than an interlocutory order. It is hence subject to modification at any time in accordance with the terms of 10 O.S. § 7003-6.1. ¶12 The goal of inquiry into the meaning of a statutory enactment is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. ¶13 The district court's continuing authority over children whose status stands adjudicated as deprived is implicit in the scheme of the Oklahoma Children's Code. ¶14 The terms of § 7003-6.1 III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT ORDERED NO CHANGE IN THE CHILD'S FOSTER HOME PLACEMENT, A LONG-TERM OUT-OF-HOME PERMANENCY PLAN, AND SUPERVISED VISITATION WITH THE MOTHER A. Foster-Home Placement ¶15 The mother next urges the trial judge abused his discretion when he failed to order a change of foster placement, changed the permanency plan from reunification to long-term out-of-home placement, and ordered supervised visitation. According to the mother, the foster mother's failure to support reunification, the lack of assistance from DHS, and the unflagging litigation brought by the appellants is the primary cause of BTW's anger towards, fear of, and alienation from her. This has served to undermine her relationship with BTW and efforts toward successful visitation and reunification with the child. ¶16 Abuse of discretion is the standard of review for the conclusion we reach here. When reduced to articulate and meaningful simplicity, abuse of discretion - as a legal standard of appellate review - means exceeding the outer range of permissible judicial choice-making. ¶17 The record in this appeal is lengthy. Divergent views of the situation and its cause are again pressed by the parties. There is evidence to support the mother's contention. The child, when initially placed with the foster mother, loved and missed her mother. ¶18 Until the recent visits, upon which the April 2008 emergency motion to terminate visitation was based, the child has been unable to provide specific information about what is stressful about her visits with her mother. ¶19 The record further reveals the most recent reports and testimony of the two treating psychologists - one who works jointly with mother and child and one who works solely with BTW. The child's counselor, although originally concerned about the foster mother's negative impact on the child's relationship with her mother, has since the May/June 2008 hearing on visitation testified that he doesn't now believe the foster mother tries to harm the child's relationship with her mother. ¶20 According to both counselors, BTW has a genuine fear of her mother and of being returned to the latter's care. ¶21 A district court has the duty to remove a child from foster care when the circumstances do not promote an opportunity for reunification. B. Permanency Plan ¶22 The mother next urges the trial judge abused his discretion when he changed the permanency plan from reunification to long-term, out-of-home placement. According to the mother, the trial judge erred when he determined the state has made reasonable efforts to reunify this family. The mother's argument must fail in light of the record before us. The trial judge's February 2009 order does reflect some tension exists between the mother and DHS staff. "[I]t is the position of the court that the DHS should make every effort to facilitate visitation that is more successful than in the past and supervised by persons and in places that are more conducive to pleasant circumstances." (9 February 2009 order, p. 5) Although the mother asserts efforts by DHS dealing with reunification are meager, she does not identify any required services the state has failed to provide her. The evidence reveals the state is providing foster care, conducting monthly visits of the foster home, arranging and supervising visitation sessions, talking with providers, and facilitating some transportation for the child's visits with her mother. ¶23 The mother further urges that it was error for the trial judge to fail to order a modification in the treatment and service plan following the November/December 2008 review hearing, in conformity to the terms of 10 O.S. § 7003-5.6(F)(6). ¶24 The § 7003-5.3 terms deal with the initial service plan implemented by the district court. It is subject to modification by the § 7003-5.6 terms that deal with periodic review hearings. ¶25 Lastly, the mother contends the trial judge violated her due process rights when he changed the permanency plan from family reunification to long-term, out-of-home placement. ¶26 The mother's reliance on Matter of Baby Girl L is mistaken. That cause dealt with the return of a child to its biological parents after a failed adoption. The court there held that prospective adoptive parents should be allowed to make a showing of serious psychological harm to a child resulting from a change in custody from adoptive parents to the biological parent after a lengthy period of a failed adoption. If this showing has been made, a trial court may award custody to a party other than a biological parent. The court's decision there was bottomed on the state's adoption statutes. ¶27 In that cause the court reiterated that concern about actual or imminent harm to the child is the legislature's standard in terminating or restricting parental rights. C. Visitation ¶28 The mother's final claim to error is that no factual basis exists to deny her unsupervised visitation. Neither is there evidence that suggests BTW will be harmed by the mother or by unsupervised visitation. Further, she urges her fear that has already been instilled in BTW will only be reinforced by requiring supervised visitation. Although there is evidence to support each side's position on appeal, we cannot say the trial tribunal erred when it ordered supervised visitation of the mother with the child. The counselors have testified that the child's fear of her mother is genuine. One counselor has recommended that visitations cease and the other questions the advisability of unsupervised interactions between the mother and child. IV. SUMMARY ¶29 We review the trial court's resolution of fact issues under the centuries-old equitable standard. It is our duty to affirm the trial court's decree if it is not clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence. Our careful review of the massive record reveals that although there is conflicting evidence, we cannot say the trial judge abused his discretion (or that his findings are clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence) when he ordered the child to remain in her current foster-home environment as a long-term, out-of-home placement and permanency plan, and enjoy supervised visitation with her mother. The trial court's order must be and hence is affirmed. ¶30 EDMONDSON, C.J., TAYLOR, V.C.J., HARGRAVE, OPALA, KAUGER, WATT, WINCHESTER AND REIF, JJ., CONCUR; ¶31 COLBERT, J, CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART. FOOT