Title: P. v. Gutierrez

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

SEE CONCURRING OPINION 
Filed 6/1/17 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
 
) 
S224724 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 5 F065984 
 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
 
) 
 
RENE GUTIERREZ, JR., 
) 
Kern County 
 
) 
Super. Ct. No. BF137853C 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
____________________________________) 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
 
) 
S224724 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 5 F065481 
 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
 
) 
 
GABRIEL RAMOS, 
) 
Kern County 
 
) 
Super. Ct. No. BF137853A 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
____________________________________) 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
 
) 
S240419 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 5 F065288 
 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
 
) 
 
RAMIRO ENRIQUEZ, 
) 
Kern County 
 
) 
Super. Ct. No. BF137853B 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
____________________________________) 
 
2 
 
 
Civil litigants and criminal defendants are guaranteed the right to trial by 
jury under the state and federal Constitutions.  Because of this, California‘s system 
of justice depends on jurors.  The mix of Californians who report for jury service 
across the state changes nearly every day, but the responsibility of courts to assure 
integrity in the selection of jurors does not.  We have long held that discrimination 
in jury selection based on race, ethnicity, or similar grounds offends constitutional 
guarantees –– and so has the United States Supreme Court.  (People v. Wheeler 
(1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler); Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 
(Batson).)  It is not only litigants who are harmed when the right to trial by 
impartial jury is abridged.  Taints of discriminatory bias in jury selection — actual 
or perceived –– erode confidence in the adjudicative process, undermining the 
public‘s trust in courts.  (Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231, 238; Powers v. 
Ohio (1991) 499 U.S. 400, 412.)   
 
During jury selection proceedings at trial, defendants Rene Gutierrez, Jr., 
Gabriel Ramos, and Ramiro Enriquez (collectively, defendants) joined in a 
Batson/Wheeler motion, contending that the prosecutor had improperly excluded 
prospective jurors on account of Hispanic ethnicity, after the prosecutor exercised 
10 of 16 peremptory challenges to remove Hispanic individuals from the jury 
panel.  The trial court found that defendants had established a prima facie case, but 
denied defendants‘ motion after finding the prosecutor‘s reasons to be neutral and 
nonpretextual.  The Court of Appeal affirmed defendants‘ convictions in all 
respects.   
 
This case offers us an opportunity to clarify the constitutionally required 
duties of California lawyers, trial judges, and appellate judges when a party has 
raised a claim of discriminatory bias in jury selection.  What we conclude is that 
the record here does not sufficiently support the trial court‘s denial of the 
Batson/Wheeler motion with respect to one prospective juror.  The error is 
3 
 
structural, damaging the integrity of the tribunal itself.  In addition, the Court of 
Appeal erred in refusing to conduct comparative juror analysis.  Defendants‘ 
resulting convictions must be reversed.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
A.  Overview 
 
 
 
Around midnight on July 30, 2011, defendant Ramos became involved in 
an altercation with Clarence Langston in the parking lot of the Western Nights 
Motel in Bakersfield.  Ramos asked defendants Gutierrez and Enriquez, who had 
been observing from a balcony, to come down.  Ramos said he was going to 
retrieve a gun to defend himself, and he left the motel on foot.  Langston rode 
away on his bicycle. 
 
Gabriel Trevino testified that after Ramos and Langston left the motel 
premises, he, along with Enriquez and Gutierrez, got into an SUV driven by Kyle 
Fuller.  At a stop sign, Enriquez said, ―Look, there he is, there he is,‖ identifying 
Langston.  Gutierrez exited the vehicle, brandished his firearm, and fired three 
rounds.  Langston was hit with multiple shotgun pellets and suffered nonfatal 
wounds to his upper body.  
 
The prosecution‘s gang expert testified that defendants were Sureño gang 
members, and that the shooting was gang-related.  According to the expert, Ramos 
was a member of the Varrio Bakers, a Sureño gang subset based in Bakersfield.  
Gutierrez and Enriquez, according to the expert, were members of Varrio West 
Side Shafter, a different Sureño gang subset based in Shafter.  And Trevino 
testified that he himself was member of Varrio Wasco Rifas, a Sureño gang subset 
based in Wasco. 
4 
 
 
On June 6, 2012, a jury convicted Gutierrez and Enriquez of attempted 
premeditated murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664 & 187, subd. (a));1 assault with a firearm 
(§ 245, subd. (a)(2)); and active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, 
subd. (a)).  As to those two defendants, the jury found applicable a firearm 
enhancement (§ 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)(1)) as to attempted premeditated 
murder, and a gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) as to attempted 
premeditated murder and assault with a firearm.  The jury deadlocked in deciding 
whether Ramos committed attempted premeditated murder and assault with a 
firearm, so the court declared a mistrial as to those counts.  Ramos was found 
guilty of active participation in a criminal street gang, and he thereafter pleaded no 
contest to making criminal threats and admitted prior convictions.  Following a 
bifurcated court trial, the court found true the prior strike conviction allegations as 
to Enriquez and Gutierrez. 
 
Gutierrez was sentenced to prison for 30 years to life, plus 27 years.  
Enriquez was sentenced to prison for 14 years to life, plus 25 years.  Ramos was 
sentenced to prison for 5 years.  The Court of Appeal consolidated the appeals for 
Gutierrez, Ramos, and Enriquez.  It unanimously affirmed the judgments in all 
respects. 
 
B.  Batson/Wheeler Motion 
 
All three defendants are Hispanic, and they joined in a Batson/Wheeler 
motion toward the end of voir dire proceedings.  The motion was brought on the 
basis of asserted discriminatory exclusion of Hispanic individuals.  Although 
counsel for Gutierrez also commented that a disproportionate number of strikes 
had been against females, he did not do so until after the prosecutor tendered his 
                                              
1 
All further unmarked statutory references are to the Penal Code.  
5 
 
neutral explanations for panelists identified as Hispanic.  Even assuming that 
defendants properly made a motion challenging the prosecutor‘s exclusion of 
females, the issue is not preserved for appeal because counsel did not obtain a 
ruling from the trial court.  The court did not determine whether defendants 
established a prima facie case based on gender discrimination.  (See People v. 
Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 481–482 [it was ―incumbent on counsel‖ to secure a 
trial court ruling on additional Batson/Wheeler grounds].)  
 
By the time the motion was made, the People had exercised 16 peremptory 
strikes –– 10 of them against individuals identified as Hispanic, either based on 
appearance or surname.2  The court observed that four of the prosecutor‘s 
challenges against Hispanics were consecutive.  There were two Hispanic 
prospective jurors seated on the panel at the time of the motion.  
                                              
2 
The People remarked that one of the prospective jurors at issue, Prospective 
Juror No. 2647624, had white skin and red hair, and did not ―appear to be 
Hispanic.‖  The court noted that she had a Hispanic surname, and that ―we‘re not 
in a position to determine whether she might be Hispanic.‖  In response to the 
court‘s invitation, the prosecutor put on the record his neutral reasons for 
removing this prospective juror.  In addition, the court commented that 
Prospective Juror No. 2732073 did not have a Hispanic surname, but discerned 
that she appeared to be Hispanic; the prosecutor tendered a neutral reason for 
striking this panelist. 
 
We have held that Spanish surnames may identify Hispanic individuals, 
who are members of a cognizable class for purposes of Batson/Wheeler motions.  
(People v. Trevino (1985) 39 Cal.3d 667, 686, disapproved on other grounds by 
People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194.)  ―Where . . . no one knows at the time 
of challenge whether a particular individual who has a Spanish surname is 
Hispanic, a showing that jurors are being excluded on the basis of surname alone‖ 
may nonetheless constitute a prima facie case of impermissible strikes based on 
association with a cognizable group.  (Ibid.)  ―Although the correlation between 
surname and group membership is not exact, such precision is unnecessary.‖  
(Ibid.)      
6 
 
 
The People do not dispute that the prosecutor‘s pattern of challenges 
showed ―a disproportionate number of . . . peremptory challenges against 
Hispanics.‖  After finding that defendants had established a prima facie case under 
the Batson/Wheeler framework, the court asked the prosecutor to explain the 
reasons for his challenges.  The prosecutor did so for each removed Hispanic 
panelist.  The court individually reviewed eight out of 10 proffered justifications.  
The court did not individually review the strikes of Prospective Jurors Nos. 
2468219 and 2547226.3  Thereafter, the court made a global finding that the 
prosecutor‘s strikes were neutral and nonpretextual.  It also found that the 
prosecutor ―paid the same attention to all the jurors in terms of questioning‖ and 
―asked appropriate questions‖ of all prospective jurors.  The court denied 
defendants‘ motion.  
 
Thereafter, the People struck three more panelists.  Defendants individually 
exercised further peremptory challenges, with counsel for Gutierrez removing one 
prospective juror previously identified as Hispanic.  The final jury included one 
Hispanic individual.  After additional voir dire, two alternate jurors were selected.  
Defendants did not renew their Batson/Wheeler motion.  We granted review on the 
limited issue of whether the Court of Appeal erred in upholding the trial court‘s 
denial of defendants‘ joint Batson/Wheeler motion.4    
                                              
3  
In the record, the names of all panel members were redacted and replaced 
with seven-digit identifying numbers. 
4  
Defendants‘ cases came before this court as a single cause denominated 
People v. Enriquez, et al., S224724.  Defendants submitted separate briefing and 
each joined in the others‘ arguments.  Prior to oral argument, the court ordered 
People v. Enriquez (F065288) severed and redocketed as S240419, due to 
circumstances reflected in the docket.  The other two matters — People v. 
Gutierrez (F065984) and People v. Ramos (F065481) — were captioned People v. 
Gutierrez, et al. and proceeded as a single cause, S224724, to oral argument.  
Counsel for Enriquez subsequently requested that People v. Enriquez be 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
7 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Legal Standard   
Peremptory challenges are a longstanding feature of civil and criminal 
adjudication.  But the exercise of even a single peremptory challenge solely on the 
basis of race or ethnicity offends the guarantee of equal protection of the laws 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution.  (Batson, supra, 476 
U.S. 79; United States v. Martinez-Salazar (2000) 528 U.S. 304, 315.)  Such 
conduct also violates a defendant‘s right to trial by a jury drawn from a 
representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16 of the 
state Constitution.  (Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, 276–277.) 
At issue in a Batson/Wheeler motion is whether any specific prospective 
juror is challenged on account of bias against an identifiable group distinguished 
on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds.  (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 
491, 549 (Avila).)  Exclusion of even one prospective juror for reasons 
impermissible under Batson and Wheeler constitutes structural error, requiring 
reversal.  (People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 386 (Silva).)     
When a party raises a claim that an opponent has improperly discriminated 
in the exercise of peremptory challenges, the court and counsel must follow a 
three-step process.  First, the Batson/Wheeler movant must demonstrate a prima 
facie case by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an 
inference of discriminatory purpose.  The moving party satisfies this first step by 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
consolidated with People v. Gutierrez, et al. for purpose of opinion.  Both counsel 
in People v. Enriquez waived oral argument and agreed to submit on the briefs.  
The court granted the unopposed request to consolidate.  Accordingly, in this 
opinion, we resolve the matters of all three defendants. 
8 
 
producing ― ‗evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that 
discrimination has occurred.‘ ‖  (Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 553, quoting 
Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 170.) 
Second, if the court finds the movant meets the threshold for demonstrating 
a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the opponent of the motion to give an 
adequate nondiscriminatory explanation for the challenges.  To meet the second 
step‘s requirement, the opponent of the motion must provide ―a ‗clear and 
reasonably specific‘ explanation of his ‗legitimate reasons‘ for exercising the 
challenges.‖  (Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 98, fn. 20.)  In evaluating a trial 
court‘s finding that a party has offered a neutral basis — one not based on race, 
ethnicity, or similar grounds — for subjecting particular prospective jurors to 
peremptory challenge, we are mindful that ― ‗[u]nless a discriminatory intent is 
inherent in the prosecutor‘s explanation,‘ ‖ the reason will be deemed neutral.  
(Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514 U.S. 765, 768 (per curiam) (Purkett).)   
Third, if the opponent indeed tenders a neutral explanation, the trial court 
must decide whether the movant has proven purposeful discrimination.  (See 
Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168.)  In order to prevail, the movant 
must show it was ― ‗more likely than not that the challenge was improperly 
motivated.‘ ‖  (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1059.)  This portion of the 
Batson/Wheeler inquiry focuses on the subjective genuineness of the reason, not 
the objective reasonableness.  (People v. Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 924.)  At 
this third step, the credibility of the explanation becomes pertinent.  To assess 
credibility, the court may consider, ― ‗among other factors, the prosecutor‘s 
demeanor; . . . how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and . . . 
whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.‘ ‖  
(People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 613 (Lenix), quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell 
(2003) 537 U.S. 322, 339 (Miller-El I).)  To satisfy herself that an explanation is 
9 
 
genuine, the presiding judge must make ―a sincere and reasoned attempt‖ to 
evaluate the prosecutor‘s justification, with consideration of the circumstances of 
the case known at that time, her knowledge of trial techniques, and her 
observations of the prosecutor‘s examination of panelists and exercise of for-cause 
and peremptory challenges.  (People v. Hall (1983) 35 Cal.3d 161, 167–168 
(Hall).)  Justifications that are ―implausible or fantastic . . . may (and probably 
will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.‖  (Purkett, supra, 514 
U.S. at p. 768.)  We recognize that the trial court enjoys a relative advantage vis-à-
vis reviewing courts, for it draws on its contemporaneous observations when 
assessing a prosecutor‘s credibility.  (See Lenix, at p. 613.) 
 
We review a trial court‘s determination regarding the sufficiency of 
tendered justifications with ― ‗great restraint.‘ ‖  (See People v. Ervin (2000) 22 
Cal.4th 48.)  We presume an advocate‘s use of peremptory challenges occurs in a 
constitutional manner.  (See People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707, 721 (conc. 
opn. of Mosk, J.).)  When a reviewing court addresses the trial court‘s ruling on a 
Batson/Wheeler motion, it ordinarily reviews the issue for substantial evidence.  
(People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 970.)  A trial court‘s conclusions are 
entitled to deference only when the court made a ―sincere and reasoned effort to 
evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered.‖  (People v. Burgener (2003) 
29 Cal.4th 833, 864.)  What courts should not do is substitute their own reasoning 
for the rationale given by the prosecutor, even if they can imagine a valid reason 
that would not be shown to be pretextual.  ―[A] prosecutor simply has got to state 
his reasons as best he can and stand or fall on the plausibility of the reasons he 
gives. . . . If the stated reason does not hold up, its pretextual significance does not 
fade because a trial judge, or an appeals court, can imagine a reason that might not 
have been shown up as false.‖  (See Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231, 252 
(Miller-El II).)      
10 
 
B.  Overview of Strikes 
The prosecutor provided justifications for strikes of 10 Hispanic 
individuals.  As to four of these prospective jurors — Prospective Jurors Nos. 
2647624, 2408196, 2732073, and 2632053 — the prosecutor cited as at least one 
reason the fact that they were each either previously affiliated with gangs or had 
family members who were at some point involved in gang activity.  The 
prosecutor struck Prospective Jurors Nos. 2852410 and 2291529 because they 
recounted negative experiences with law enforcement.  Prospective Juror No. 
2468219 (Juror 2468219) was removed because she testified about ―living in an 
area with a lot of gang activity, but that she had not specifically seen,‖ her brother 
had been accused of a crime, and she previously served as a juror in a criminal 
case that resulted in a hung jury.  Below we describe in more depth the 
circumstances surrounding the strikes of the remaining three Hispanic panelists 
who were the subject of defendants‘ Batson/Wheeler motion.   
 
 
1.  Prospective Juror No. 2723471 
 
 
A teacher from the City of Wasco, Prospective Juror No. 2723471 (Juror 
2723471) was divorced and without children.  Her former husband was a 
correctional officer.  She had other relatives in law enforcement positions, 
including an uncle who worked for California Highway Patrol.  Neither she nor 
anyone close to her had any connections to gangs. 
 
The prosecutor‘s colloquy with Juror 2723471, in its entirety, was as 
follows:  
 
―[The prosecutor]:  And starting with Ms. 2723471, are you gangs [sic] that 
are active in the Wasco area?  
 
―[Juror 2723471]:  No. 
―[The prosecutor]:  Do you live in the Wasco area?  
―[Juror 2723471]:  Yes. 
11 
 
―[The prosecutor]:  In Wasco itself?  
―[Juror 2723471]:  Yes, I live in Wasco.‖  
 
The prosecutor indicated that his decision to challenge Juror 2723471 was 
―a tough one.‖  The reason for the strike, he said, was that ―[s]he‘s from Wasco 
and she said that she‘s not aware of any gang activity going on in Wasco, and I 
was unsatisfied by some of her other answers as to how she would respond when 
she hears that Gabriel Trevino is from a criminal street gang, a subset of the 
Surenos out of Wasco.‖  The prosecutor did not specify which of her ―other 
answers‖ caused him dissatisfaction, nor do the People identify any such responses 
bearing on her possible reaction to Trevino‘s testimony.  We have found no other 
answers in the record to support the People‘s position on this point.   
 
The prosecutor had broached the Wasco-related justification a few minutes 
earlier, during his explanation of his strike of a different Hispanic female, 
Prospective Juror No. 2408196 (Juror 2408196).  He said that that panelist‘s 
unawareness of Wasco gang activity ―causes a moment of pause when she‘s going 
to hear . . . Mr. Trevino freely admits that he‘s a member of the Varrio Wasco.‖  
But the prosecutor struck Juror 2408196 because she also had an uncle who was in 
a gang and had a cousin who had been murdered.5       
                                              
5 
The prosecutor articulated multiple reasons for striking Juror 2408196:  
―Ms. 2408196 has also an uncle who is in a gang, and she lives in Wasco.  This is 
important, Your Honor, Gabriel Trevino is going to testify under the immunity 
agreement in this case.  And, although, he is a Sureno like the three defendants or 
at least the People‘s evidence wouldn‘t [sic] show that.  [¶]  He is specifically a 
member of the Varrio Wasco Rifas.  And I think that Ms. 2408196 in addition to 
saying that her uncle was in a gang, she also indicated that she was unaware of any 
gang activity in Wasco which is -- causes a moment of pause when she‘s going to 
hear -- if she left [sic] on this jury, Mr. Trevino freely admits that he‘s a member 
of the Varrio Wasco.  And she also had a cousin murder [sic] in 2004.  And for 
those reasons, the People issued the peremptory challenge.‖ 
12 
 
 
Regarding Juror 2723471, the court stated: ―I checked again, and [the 
prosecutor] did pass several times with Ms. 2723471 still on the panel.‖  The court 
noted that ―Ms. 2723471 was excused as a result of the Wasco issue and also lack 
of life experience.‖  Defendants argue, and the People concede, that the court was 
partially mistaken:  the prosecutor had not enumerated lack of life experience as a 
reason for striking Juror 2723471.  Accordingly, the sole basis relied upon by the 
prosecutor for striking this particular panelist was the ―Wasco issue.‖ 
 
 
2.  Prospective Juror No. 2547226 
Prospective Juror No. 2547226 (Juror 2547226) lived in southwest 
Bakersfield and worked as a service coordinator for mentally disabled individuals.  
She had two children, and her significant other was a self-employed truck driver.  
She had been selected to serve on a jury a couple years earlier, but parties reached 
a plea agreement.  She had no gang experience, nor any close relations with gang 
members.  
The prosecutor asked this prospective juror several questions about the jury 
deliberation process and her understanding of a juror‘s role.  Their exchange 
included the following excerpt:  
―[The prosecutor]:  And that‘s sort of the functions of these deliberations.  
You talk to each other, and you hear what people hear about the evidence, and you 
see where everyone is, and then ultimately you try to reach a verdict as best you 
can, do you understand that?  
―[Juror 2547226]:  Yes. 
―[The prosecutor]:  As one of 12 jurors, you would have a vote, do you 
understand that?   
―[Juror 2547226]:  Yes.  
―[The prosecutor]:  Okay.  You also understand that your vote is yours, you 
have a duty to listen to and talk to other jurors, but how you vote if you‘re 
13 
 
impaneled on this jury is yours, it‘s your responsibility, and it‘s what you believe 
the law that the judge gives you and the facts and the evidence that you heard in 
court indicated as the truth, do you understand that?  
―[Juror 2547226]:  Yes. 
―[The prosecutor]:  Would you be able to do that?  Would you be able to 
participate in deliberations and listen to everyone else in speaking your mind? 
―[Juror 2547226]:  Yes.  
―[The prosecutor]:  You don‘t think that there‘s anything about you that‘s 
differential [sic] or, you know, want to sit in the background or listen to other 
people?  
―[Juror 2547226]:  No, I don‘t think so.  
―[The prosecutor]:  Okay.  You have no problem with speaking your mind 
and listening to other people at the same time?  
―[Juror 2547226]:  I think I do better at listening than speaking my mind 
out.   
―[The prosecutor]:  What happens if you don‘t agree?    
―[Juror 2547226]:  Then the vote is mine.  So I just -- what I‘m not in 
agreement with and decide what I want to say.  
―[The prosecutor]:  Would you have any problem letting other people on 
the panel know that you don‘t agree and here‘s why?  
―[Juror 2547226]:  I don‘t think so.‖    
At first, the prosecutor could not recall why he struck this panelist.  Later, 
consulting a single note, he stated, ―I believe I asked her about 12 votes, each 
independent of the others and her being able to, you know, take on the task which 
is obviously the difficult task of any juror of both standing their own ground where 
they believe they are right, and also listening to other people.  And I was 
concerned about her articulation about that role.  I was concerned about her 
14 
 
understanding of that and her ability to -- quite frankly if she felt strongly to be 
heard in the course of jury deliberations.‖  
The trial court did not make any individualized finding with respect to the 
removal of this prospective juror.  In upholding this strike on direct appeal, the 
Court of Appeal explained, ―When questioned during voir dire, Juror 2547226 
indicated she was better at ‗listening than speaking my mind‘ and expressed that 
she did not know how many jurors had to agree to a verdict in a criminal case.  [¶] 
. . . Juror 2547226 gave equivocal answers to some questions and expressed a lack 
of understanding of the jury process in a criminal case.  The prosecutor‘s stated 
reasons reflect that, based upon Juror 2547226‘s equivocal answers to voir dire 
questions, he had doubts about her being able to engage fully in the deliberative 
process and fulfill her role as a juror.‖  We note that the prosecutor did not cite as 
a reason for striking Juror 2547226 her unawareness of the necessary unanimity of 
a verdict.   
When the prosecutor asked Juror 2547226, ―Would you be able to 
participate in deliberations and listen to everyone else in speaking your mind?‖ she 
answered, unequivocally, ―Yes.‖  Yet the prosecutor continued to probe her on 
this point, asking whether she considered herself deferential or prone to ―sit in the 
background.‖    
The prosecutor did not cite Juror 2547226‘s demeanor as a reason for 
exercising a strike against her.  The People argue that the precise phrasing of ―I 
don‘t think so‖ in response to a question asking whether this panelist may wish to 
sit in the background and listen to other people ―reasonably could make the 
prosecutor question her ability to deliberate and state her opinion to others when 
necessary.‖  During the same panel round in which the prosecutor individually 
questioned Juror 2547226, the prosecutor engaged Prospective Juror No. 2570137 
15 
 
(Juror 2570137), a non-Hispanic female.  The following colloquy transpired 
between the prosecutor and Juror 2570137:      
―[The prosecutor]:  And, Ms. 2570137, I asked the other potential jurors if 
you are impaneled on this jury you‘re going to be in deliberation with 11 other 
people, they are going to want and need your input, and you are very soft spoken, 
would you be able to speak your mind?  
―[Juror 2570137]:  I hope so.   
―[The prosecutor]:  Would you be able to listen to other people as well? 
―[Juror 2570137]:  Yes, definitely that if I can hear them. 
―[The prosecutor]:  Thank you, Ms. 2570137.‖ 
As the record demonstrates, the prosecutor perceived Juror 2570137 to be 
soft-spoken.  Despite her arguably noncommittal answer of ―I hope so‖ in 
response to the prosecutor‘s inquiry as to whether she could speak her mind during 
jury deliberations, the prosecutor did not further press this panelist on her ability to 
voice her opinions, as he had done with Juror 2547226.  Instead, he shortly 
thereafter thanked Juror 2570137 and moved on to question another prospective 
juror.  
 
 
3.  Prospective Juror No. 2510083 
An elementary school instructional aide, Prospective Juror No. 2510083 
(Juror 2510083) lived in southwest Bakersfield.  She was unmarried and had no 
children.  She had no prior jury experience.  One of her cousins was in the 
California Highway Patrol and another cousin worked for the highway patrol in 
Arizona.  A third cousin was a workers‘ compensation paralegal at a local law 
office. 
During the first week of voir dire proceedings, Juror 2510083 informed the 
court of a potential hardship due to a job interview scheduled the morning of the 
upcoming Friday.  The court advised her to request that the interview be 
16 
 
rescheduled to another time.  The next day, Juror 2510083 reported that her 
interview had been rescheduled for 4:00 p.m. on Friday.  In the presence of 
counsel, the court agreed to make arrangements so that she could attend her 
interview.  She returned the following week for the continuation of voir dire.     
When questioned by defense counsel, Juror 2510083 agreed that although 
people can be trained to make fewer mistakes, nobody is perfect and everyone is 
capable of making mistakes, even police officers.  The prosecutor‘s individual voir 
dire of this panelist proceeded as follows: 
―[The prosecutor]:  You‘re an instructional aide at an elementary school; is 
that correct?  
―[Juror 2510083]:  Hmm-hmm.  
―[The prosecutor]:  Where generally is the elementary school? 
―[Juror 2510083]:  It‘s over close to where I live on the Southwest part of 
town.  
―[The prosecutor]:  Okay. And what age students do you usually deal with? 
―[Juror 2510083]:  They are fourth graders. 
―[The prosecutor]:  About 10 years old?  
―[Juror 2510083]:  Yeah, about nine, 10.  
―[The prosecutor]:  Have you held any work prior to that or is this full-time 
work?  
―[Juror 2510083]:  Before I started working there?   
―[The prosecutor]:  Yes. 
―[Juror 2510083]:  Yeah, I worked somewhere else full-time. 
―[The prosecutor]:  What was the name of that place?    
―[Juror 2510083]:  It was customer service.   
―[The prosecutor]:  Any type of business in particular or just --   
―[Juror 2510083]:  For that job? 
17 
 
―[The prosecutor]:  Yes. 
―[Juror 2510083]:  It was a phone company.  
―[The prosecutor]:  Okay.‖  
In explaining why he struck Juror 2510083, the prosecutor stated, ―Ms. 
2510083, like I was asking to Mr. 2868617 and Ms. 2478882, I was concerned 
about her life experience.  She‘s an instructional aid[e] at an elementary school 
and she has no jury experience and she came across of being quite young.  And, 
although, her youth is not a reason for exclusion, I thought there was a lack of 
sophistication in some of her answers.  And, I believe, she had also asked for 
release due to a hardship because of her situation.  [¶]  . . . [I]t just didn‘t seem to 
me that she had -- again, she had the life experience necessary to consider some of 
the charges.‖  The prosecutor acknowledged that this strike was a ―tough call‖ 
because this panelist had relatives in law enforcement.  In addition, the prosecutor 
regarded with favor the fact that she had a cousin working as a paralegal ―so she 
had some idea of the nature and the purpose of these proceedings.‖  
The prosecutor incorrectly stated that this panelist ―had also asked for 
release due to a hardship because of her situation.‖  Juror 2510083‘s potential job 
interview conflict was resolved, in the prosecutor‘s presence, during the first week 
of voir dire proceedings:  she successfully rescheduled her interview and the court 
agreed to make accommodations so that she could attend.  At no time did Juror 
2510083 ask to be excused.  In this respect, the Court of Appeal erroneously 
affirmed the trial court‘s ruling as to Juror 2510083 on the hardship ground alone.  
On review, the People contend — for the first time — that the prosecutor‘s 
proffered hardship reason was based on a mistake of fact.  Voir dire lasted from 
Monday, May 7 through part of Wednesday, May 16.  Along with the court, four 
attorneys — the prosecutor and the three defense attorneys — engaged in separate 
lines of questioning during the jury selection process.  Several days, including an 
18 
 
intervening weekend, elapsed between the resolution of the panelist‘s potential 
interview conflict (on Thursday, May 10, the day before her interview) and the 
defendants‘ Batson/Wheeler motion (on Tuesday, May 15).  The People argue that 
the prosecutor made a genuine mistake regarding this point of hardship.   
In individually reviewing the tendered rationale for striking Juror 2510083, 
the court remarked, ―Another juror indicated he excused for the purposes of -- or 
excused as a result of primarily life experience, and I think it was Ms. 2510083, 
and both of those jurors are young.  The only juror similarly situated that -- 
obviously we still have -- we haven‘t finished the challenges, but Mr. 2861675 is 
young.  He‘s the only one that I find similarly situated perhaps to Ms. 2723471 
and Ms. 2510083 in terms of perhaps having a lack of life experience, but there 
were other reasons as he gave to those jurors as well, not just the lack of life 
experience.‖   
The prosecutor commented that this panelist‘s ―youth [was] not a reason for 
exclusion.‖  It appears that the trial court found Juror 2510083 and Prospective 
Juror No. 2861675 (Juror 2861675) to be comparable in terms of relative youth 
and lack of life experience, such that the decision to strike one but not the other 
might require further examination — if those had been the only reasons proffered.  
But the court apparently found credible the prosecutor‘s ―other reasons‖ for 
striking Juror 2510083, i.e., a request for release due to hardship and a lack of 
sophistication.  The court did not correct the prosecutor‘s erroneous assertion that 
this panelist asked to be excused due to a hardship. 
C.  Analysis 
 
1.  Claim of Error Regarding Prospective Juror No. 2723471  
 
 a.  Neutrality of Explanation   
 
When they assess the viability of neutral reasons advanced to justify a 
peremptory challenge by a prosecutor, both a trial court and reviewing court must 
19 
 
examine only those reasons actually expressed.  (People v. Jones (2011) 51 
Cal.4th 346, 365 (Jones).)  Defendants argue that the prosecutor‘s explanation 
regarding his removal of Juror 2723471 was inadequate because it did not explain 
why her unawareness of gang activity where she lived made her a bad or 
undesirable juror.  But Batson and Wheeler do not prescribe such an exacting 
standard at the second step.  We find the reason here to be ―clear and reasonably 
specific,‖ particularly considering that the prosecutor had previously, with respect 
to another prospective juror, introduced the notion of this Wasco-related rationale 
and provided somewhat more insight into the logic underlying it.  (See Jones, at 
pp. 358, 367 [prosecutor‘s explanation that he was ― ‗troubled‘ ‖ by potential 
juror‘s ― ‗body language and his response‘ ‖ to questioning about being falsely 
accused held to be ―clear and reasonably specific‖ even though prosecutor did not 
describe exactly what the body language was].)    
 
Defendants also contend that the prosecutor‘s reasoning was not neutral, 
because he was effectively using an individual‘s residence in Wasco as a proxy for 
Hispanic ethnicity.  According to 2010 census data, Wasco is a city of 
approximately 25,000 residents, 76.7% of whom identify as Hispanic or Latino.  
(See U.S. Census Bureau, Data for 2010 Census 
 [as of June 1, 
2017].)  Defendants cite United States v. Bishop (9th Cir. 1992) 959 F.2d 820 
(Bishop) for the proposition that equal protection principles prohibit the utilization 
of residence as a surrogate for racial stereotypes during jury selection.  In Bishop, 
the prosecutor explained that he felt an eligibility worker who lived in Compton 
was likely to be hostile to law enforcement and desensitized to violence.  (See id. 
at p. 822.)  The court found discriminatory intent to be inherent in these generic 
―group-based presuppositions‖ that ―one who lives in an area heavily populated by 
poor black people could not fairly try a black defendant.‖  (Id. at p. 825.)     
20 
 
 
The prosecutor‘s justification here is distinguishable from the justification 
at issue in Bishop.  True:  in some ways, the purported basis of unawareness of 
gang activity in one‘s neighborhood was particular to Wasco, a city whose 
population is mostly Hispanic or Latino.  After all, the prosecutor did not exercise 
a strike, for example, against non-Hispanic Prospective Juror No. 2581907, a 
longtime resident of Tehachapi who was unaware of gang problems in his 
neighborhood.6  But such a discrepancy is not altogether inconsistent, given the 
prosecutor‘s articulated basis referencing Trevino‘s Wasco gang affiliation.  The 
reason was thus not inherently based on stereotypical views of Wasco residents.   
 
We find the Wasco reason to be facially neutral.  Our conclusion is 
compelled by the high court‘s decision in Purkett, which held that the second stage 
of the Batson/Wheeler framework ―does not demand an explanation that is 
persuasive, or even plausible.  ‗ . . . [T]he issue is the facial validity of the 
prosecutor‘s explanation.‘ ‖ (Purkett, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 768.)  Accordingly, we 
proceed to the third step of the Batson/Wheeler inquiry, in order to assess the 
credibility of the explanations provided.  (Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613.) 
 
 b.  Credibility of Explanation 
 
At the third step of the Batson/Wheeler analysis, the trial court evaluates 
the credibility of the prosecutor‘s neutral explanation.  Credibility may be gauged 
by examining factors including but not limited to ― ‗the prosecutor's demeanor; by 
how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the 
proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.‘ ‖  (Jones, supra, 51 
Cal.4th at p. 360.)   
 
In evaluating the prosecutor‘s reasons, the court expressly acknowledged 
                                              
6  
This individual was ultimately seated on the jury.  
21 
 
the justification for striking Juror 2723471, noting that she ―was excused as a 
result of the Wasco issue.‖  It also observed that the prosecutor ―did pass several 
times with Ms. 2723471 still on the panel.‖  Moments later, in denying 
defendants‘ Batson/Wheeler motion as to all Hispanic panelists, the court made a 
global finding that ―in looking at the totality of the circumstances and judging the 
reasons given by [the prosecutor], I don‘t find his reasons to be a pretext in this 
particular case, and he does appear consistent.‖  The prosecutor cited the ―Wasco 
reason‖ for challenging both Jurors 2723471 and 2408196, the only two panelists 
who were Wasco residents.  This rationale nonetheless applied only to Hispanic 
panelists –– so the notion that the prosecutor ―consistently‖ cited this reason 
appears minimally probative on the issue of whether the reason offered by the 
prosecutor was credible.  The court also made a general finding that the prosecutor 
had ―paid the same attention to all the jurors in terms of questioning whether they 
are Hispanic or not Hispanic, and he‘s asked appropriate questions to all the jurors 
. . . .‖  Yet the prosecutor questioned only Hispanic panelists about gang activity in 
Wasco, because only Hispanic panelists stated that they lived in Wasco.  No 
adequate comparison exists between Hispanic and non-Hispanic panelists 
regarding the prosecutor‘s questioning specifically about Wasco.   
 
The prosecutor‘s articulated basis for striking Juror 2723471 was derived 
solely from three responses to yes/no questions, which established that this 
panelist lived in Wasco and was not aware of gangs active in the Wasco area.  The 
prosecutor may have conveyed the gist of his concern — that he was uncertain 
how a prospective juror‘s unawareness of Wasco gang activity might bear on her 
response to Trevino — but his explanation left some lucidity to be desired.  What 
the People argue on review is that Trevino was an ―important witness‖ for the 
prosecution, and ―[t]he prosecutor could have reasonably anticipated that Trevino 
would testify as to his own gang affiliation and criminal activity in Wasco.‖  They 
22 
 
assert, ―The fact that a potential juror is unaware of the activity of gangs in Wasco 
could cause that juror to be biased against Trevino who would testify to the 
contrary.‖  In consideration of the record of voir dire, such a deduction is tenuous.  
It is not evident why a panelist‘s unawareness of gang activity in Wasco would 
indicate a bias against a member of a gang based in Wasco.  Although it is 
possible that a juror unaware of gang activity in Wasco would be discomfited by, 
and skeptical of, a witness who claimed to be member of a gang based in her 
neighborhood, such a conclusion does not strike us as an obvious or natural 
inference drawn from this panelist‘s responses. 
 
It is conceivable — even though the People do not present this argument — 
that the prosecutor genuinely believed gang activity to be so rampant in Wasco 
that this panelist must have been either untruthful or uninformed in denying her 
awareness of Wasco gang activity.  If this had been the case, such reasoning 
should have been articulated by the prosecutor.  ―[A] prosecutor simply has got to 
state his reasons as best he can and stand or fall on the plausibility of the reasons 
he gives.  A Batson challenge does not call for a mere exercise in thinking up any 
rational basis.‖  (See Miller-El II, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 252.)7   
 
The questioning of Juror 2723471 provides little aid in elucidating the 
reasoning for this strike.  The prosecutor asked no follow-up questions to this 
                                              
7  
Even if a prosecutor had justified this strike with the belief that a panelist‘s 
professed unawareness of gang activity indicated her dishonesty or ignorance, the 
basis for such a belief would compel further scrutiny.  Insofar as a prosecutor‘s 
challenges might be guided by an ungrounded assumption that Hispanic or Latino 
residents of Wasco (a community that is predominantly Hispanic or Latino) should 
be aware of gang activity in their neighborhood, a court might query whether this 
reasoning is inherently neutral as to race or ethnicity.  (See Bishop, supra, 959 
F.2d at p. 827 [justification is not race-neutral when ―tainted by impermissible 
generalizations regarding racial groups and their environment‖].)   
23 
 
prospective juror, certainly none about how she would react if she heard that a 
member of a Wasco gang would testify in this case.  No further support for the 
People‘s argument is found in this panelist‘s dialogue with either the court or any 
of the defense attorneys.  The prosecutor‘s swift termination of individual voir dire 
of this panelist — even though her responses did not evince a manifest 
predisposition to disbelieve or dislike Trevino — at least raises a question as to 
how interested he was in meaningfully examining whether her unawareness of 
gang activity in Wasco might cause her to be biased against the witness for the 
People‘s case.  (Cf. Miller-El II, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 246 [―[T]he prosecution 
asked nothing further about the influence his brother‘s history might have had on 
[the prospective juror], as it probably would have done if the family history had 
actually mattered.  [Citation.]  There is no good reason to doubt that the State‘s 
afterthought about [the prospective juror]‘s brother was anything but 
makeweight.‖].) 
In the course of responding to voir dire questioning by the court, Juror 
2723471 disclosed that she had relatives in corrections and law enforcement 
positions.  Her former husband was a correctional officer, and she had other 
relatives in law enforcement positions, including an uncle who worked for the 
California Highway Patrol.  The record demonstrates that this prosecutor viewed 
familial relationships with law enforcement members as a generally desirable 
characteristic.  The prosecutor explained that he considered his strikes of Jurors 
2510083 and 2468219 to be a ―tough call‖ because of their relatives in law 
enforcement.  The prosecutor‘s statements, considered in context, reveal that he 
viewed familial ties to law enforcement as an offsetting force against 
characteristics he perceived as negative.  The fact that the prosecutor struck Juror 
2723471 despite her law enforcement ties — though he expressed his tendency to 
favor this characteristic with regard to other panelists — is a relevant circumstance 
24 
 
in assessing the credibility of the prosecutor‘s reasoning.  (See Miller-El II, supra, 
545 U.S. at p. 247 [considering fact that challenged black panelist ―should have 
been an ideal juror in the eyes of a prosecutor‖ when assessing credibility of 
prosecutor‘s reasons].)     
 
Weighing against a finding of discriminatory intent, however, is the fact 
that the prosecutor passed on challenges five times while Juror 2723471 remained 
on the panel.  She lasted through one full panel round and was the first person 
struck during the next panel round.  These passes may tend to indicate the 
prosecutor‘s good faith.  (See People v. Snow (1987) 44 Cal.3d 216, 225.)  Indeed, 
we have found that passes while a specific panelist remains on the panel ― 
‗strongly suggest[] that race was not a motive‘ ‖ in challenged strikes.  (People v. 
Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 576; see Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 629.)  We 
bear in mind this circumstance, which the trial court recognized.  But neither that 
acknowledgement nor the prosecutor‘s passes themselves wholly preclude a 
finding that a panelist is struck on account of bias against an identifiable group, 
when such a strike occurs eventually instead of immediately.  (See Avila, 
supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 549 [as to a Wheeler motion, ―the issue is whether a 
particular prospective juror has been challenged because of group bias‖].) 
 
Some neutral reasons for a challenge are sufficiently self-evident, if 
honestly held, such that they require little additional explication.  One example: 
excusing a panelist because she has previously been victim to the same crime at 
issue in the case to be tried.  Moreover, a peremptory challenge may be based on a 
broad range of factors indicative of juror partiality, even those which are 
―apparently trivial‖ or ―highly speculative.‖  (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 
153, 191, citing Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 275.)  Yet when it is not self-
evident why an advocate would harbor a concern, the question of whether a 
neutral explanation is genuine and made in good faith becomes more pressing.  
25 
 
That is particularly so when, as here, an advocate uses a considerable number of 
challenges to exclude a large proportion of members of a cognizable group.  (See 
Jones, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 362 [statistics of strikes constitute ―probative 
circumstances‖ in evaluating whether trial court erred in denying Batson/Wheeler 
motion].)  Out of 16 strikes exercised by the prosecution up to that point, 10 were 
used to remove jurors who shared the same ethnicity as defendants.  Four of these 
challenges against Hispanics were consecutive.  And when the motion was made, 
10 out of 12 Hispanic panelists (83 percent) who had entered the jury box were 
peremptorily struck by the prosecution.      
 
Advocates and courts both have a role to play in building a record worthy 
of deference.  Advocates should bear in mind the record created by their own 
questioning — where the court and opposing counsel have failed to elicit panelist 
responses in a certain area of interest — as well as their explanations for 
peremptory challenges.  In this instance, it is difficult to lend credence to the 
prosecutor‘s concern about ―how [Juror 2723471] would respond when she hears 
that Gabriel Trevino is from a criminal street gang‖ when his brief questioning of 
this panelist failed to shed light on the nature of his apprehension or otherwise 
indicate his interest in meaningfully examining the topic, and the matter was far 
from self-evident.   
 
The court, too, has its own obligations under the progeny of Batson and 
Wheeler.  ―[W]hen the prosecutor‘s stated reasons are either unsupported by the 
record, inherently implausible, or both, more is required of the trial court than a 
global finding that the reasons appear sufficient.‖  (Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 
386.)  The court here acknowledged the ―Wasco issue‖ justification and deemed it 
neutral and nonpretextual by blanket statements.  It never clarified why it accepted 
the Wasco reason as an honest one.  Another tendered basis for this strike, the 
reference to the prospective juror‘s ―other answers‖ as they related to an 
26 
 
expectation of her reaction to Trevino, was not borne out by the record — but the 
court did not reject this reason or ask the prosecutor to explain further.  In 
addition, the court improperly cited a justification not offered by the prosecutor:  a 
lack of life experience.  On this record, we are unable to conclude that the trial 
court made ―a sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate the prosecutor‘s 
explanation‖ regarding the strike of Juror 2723471.  (Hall, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 
167.)  The court may have made a sincere attempt to assess the Wasco rationale, 
but it never explained why it decided this justification was not a pretext for a 
discriminatory purpose.  Because the prosecutor‘s reason for this strike was not 
self-evident and the record is void of any explication from the court, we cannot 
find under these circumstances that the court made a reasoned attempt to 
determine whether the justification was a credible one.   
 
Though we exercise great restraint in reviewing a prosecutor‘s explanations 
and typically afford deference to a trial court‘s Batson/Wheeler rulings, we can 
only perform a meaningful review when the record contains evidence of solid 
value.  Providing an adequate record may prove onerous, particularly when jury 
selection extends over several days and involves a significant number of potential 
jurors.  It can be difficult to keep all the panelists and their responses straight.  
Nevertheless, the obligation to avoid discrimination in jury selection is a pivotal 
one.  It is the duty of courts and counsel to ensure the record is both accurate and 
adequately developed.  
 
Excluding by peremptory challenge even ―a single juror on the basis of race 
or ethnicity is an error of constitutional magnitude.‖  (Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 
386.)  The trial court‘s ruling — its finding that defendants had not met their 
burden of proving intentional discrimination with respect to the prosecutor‘s 
exclusion of Juror 2723471 — was unreasonable in light of the record of voir dire 
proceedings.  Our conclusion renders it unnecessary to determine whether the trial 
27 
 
court erred in denying the Batson/Wheeler motion as to other Hispanic panelists.  
Because the court‘s denial of defendants‘ motion is unsupported, at least regarding 
Juror 2723471, we conclude that defendants were denied their right to a fair trial 
in violation of the equal protection clause of the federal Constitution and their 
right to a trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the 
community under the state Constitution.  (Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 84–89; 
Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 276–277.)  Such error is structural and requires 
reversal of defendants‘ resulting convictions.  We can ― ‗neither indulge a 
presumption of regularity nor evaluate the resulting harm,‘ ‖ for racial 
discrimination in jury selection ― ‗undermines the structural integrity of the 
criminal tribunal.‘ ‖  (People v. Turner (1986) 42 Cal.3d 711, 728.)   
 
2.  Comparative Analysis 
 
When a court undertakes comparative juror analysis, it engages in a 
comparison between, on the one hand, a challenged panelist, and on the other 
hand, similarly situated but unchallenged panelists who are not members of the 
challenged panelist‘s protected group.  (See Miller-El II, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 
241.)  In this case, a comparative analysis would ask whether the prosecutor‘s 
justification for striking one Hispanic individual applies just as well to an 
otherwise similarly situated non-Hispanic individual who is permitted to serve on 
the jury.  The high court has held that comparative analysis may be probative of 
purposeful discrimination at Batson‘s third stage.  (See Miller-El II, at p. 241.)  
The individuals compared need not be identical in every respect aside from 
ethnicity:  ―A per se rule that a defendant cannot win a Batson claim unless there 
is an exactly identical white juror would leave Batson inoperable; potential jurors 
are not products of a set of cookie cutters.‖  (Miller-El II, at p. 247, fn. 6.)  
28 
 
 
 a.  Trial Court’s Comparisons 
 
In its review of the prosecutor‘s justifications, the trial court engaged in 
some comparative juror analysis.  Regarding removed Hispanic female Juror 
2510083, the court pointed out a similarly situated non-Hispanic male who was 
still on the panel (and who would sit on the jury), Juror 2861675.  The court 
commented, ―Mr. 2861675 is young.  He‘s the only one that I find similarly 
situated perhaps to . . . Ms. 2510083 in terms of perhaps having a lack of life 
experience, but there were other reasons as he gave to those jurors as well, not just 
the lack of life experience.‖ 
 
The court endeavored to identify nonchallenged jurors who were similarly 
situated to challenged jurors in other respects.  For the most part, it found no 
adequate comparisons.  The court noted that the prosecutor had been consistent in 
excusing jurors who had ―grown up in gang areas‖ or whose relatives ―have been 
involved in criminal gang activities.‖  The court also found that the prosecutor had 
been consistent in excusing prospective jurors who mentioned being upset about 
negative experiences with law enforcement.  In other words, the court did not 
identify any panelists similarly situated as to those gang-related life experiences or 
as to negative encounters with law enforcement who had avoided a peremptory 
challenge by the prosecutor.  
 
 b. Court of Appeal’s Reasoning 
 
On direct appeal, defendants urged the Court of Appeal to engage in 
comparative juror analysis.  The court declined, stating that ―[w]e do not engage in 
a comparative analysis of various juror responses to evaluate the good faith of the 
prosecutor‘s stated reasons for excusing a particular juror ‗because comparative 
analysis of jurors unrealistically ignores ―the variety of factors and considerations 
that go into a lawyer‘s decision to select certain jurors while challenging others 
that appear to be similar.‖ ‘ ‖   
29 
 
 
Defendants argue that the Court of Appeal erred in refusing to undertake 
comparative juror analysis.  We agree.  By avoiding comparative juror analysis in 
this context, the Court of Appeal went against the grain of established holdings 
from both our court and the high court, which recognize comparisons between 
panelists who are challenged and those who are not to be valuable tools in 
determining the credibility of explanations.  (See, e.g., Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at 
p. 622 [comparative juror analysis relevant to issue of intentional discrimination]; 
Foster v. Chatman (2016) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [136 S.Ct. 1737, 1750] [explanations 
―difficult to credit because the State willingly accepted white jurors with the same 
traits that supposedly rendered Garrett an unattractive juror‖]; Snyder v. Louisiana 
(2008) 552 U.S. 472, 483 [implausibility of explanation for removing African 
American prospective juror ―reinforced by the prosecutor's acceptance of white 
jurors who disclosed conflicting obligations that appear to have been at least as 
serious‖]; Miller-El II, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 241 [―More powerful than these bare 
statistics, however, are side-by-side comparisons of some black venire panelists 
who were struck and white panelists allowed to serve‖].)   
 
The appellate court reached its erroneous conclusion by relying on an 
excerpt from People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1220, which suggested 
that comparative analysis performed by a reviewing court is disfavored as 
impractical and insufficiently deferential to the trial court.  But our subsequent 
decisions have superseded Johnson in this respect.  What we held in Lenix is that 
―evidence of comparative juror analysis must be considered in the trial court and 
even for the first time on appeal if relied upon by defendant and the record is 
adequate to permit the urged comparisons.‖  (Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 622, 
italics added.)  We are mindful that comparative analysis is subject to inherent 
limitations, especially when performed for the first time on appeal.  (Ibid.)  But it 
was error for the Court of Appeal to categorically conclude that a court should not 
30 
 
undertake a comparative analysis for the first time on appeal — regardless of the 
adequacy of the record.  The Court of Appeal also erred in declining to review the 
panelist comparison that had been made by the trial court, the comparison between 
Jurors 2510083 and 2861675.  We overrule People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 
1194 to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion.   
31 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
Counsel have a role to play in ensuring that the record of proceedings 
sufficiently supports neutral, credible justifications for strikes of prospective 
jurors.  But the ultimate responsibility of safeguarding the integrity of jury 
selection and our justice system rests with courts.  (Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 
272.)  For at least one excluded panelist in this case, the record does not permit us 
to find that the trial court met its obligations to make ― ‗a sincere and reasoned 
attempt to evaluate the prosecutor‘s explanation‘ ‖ and ―clearly express its 
findings.‖  (Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th 345 at p. 385.)  In light of the voir dire record, 
we conclude that the trial court erred in denying defendants‘ Batson/Wheeler 
motion.  In addition, the Court of Appeal erred in refusing to conduct comparative 
juror analysis.  We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY LIU, J. 
 
I agree that the trial court erred in rejecting defendants‘ claim of racial 
discrimination in jury selection under Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 
(Batson) and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler).  Today‘s 
decision is the first time in 16 years, and the second time in over 25 years, that this 
court has found a Batson/Wheeler violation.  (People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 
345, 385 (Silva); People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707, 720 (Fuentes); see 
People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 885, 892–898 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.).)  
The occasion provides an opportunity to review key principles of Batson/Wheeler 
analysis and to make a few observations about the nature of the legal inquiry. 
I. 
In applying the three-stage Batson/Wheeler inquiry, our court and the 
United States Supreme Court have set forth several important precepts.  First, 
―[a]lthough we generally ‗accord great deference to the trial court‘s ruling that a 
particular reason is genuine,‘ we do so only when the trial court has made a 
sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate each stated reason as applied to each 
challenged juror.‖  (Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 385–386, italics added; see 
Fuentes, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 720 [―[A] truly ‗reasoned attempt‘ to evaluate the 
prosecutor‘s explanations [citation] requires the court to address the challenged 
 
2 
jurors individually to determine whether any one of them has been improperly 
excluded.‖].) 
Second, ―when illegitimate grounds like race are in issue,‖ a prosecutor‘s 
decision to strike a juror must ―stand or fall on the plausibility of the reasons he 
gives.‖  (Miller-El v. Dretke (2006) 545 U.S. 231, 252 (Miller-El).)  It does not 
matter if ―a trial judge, or an appeals court, can imagine a reason that might not 
have been shown up as false‖; a court‘s ―substitution of a reason‖ not given by the 
prosecutor ―does nothing to satisfy the prosecutor[‘s] burden of stating a racially 
neutral explanation for [his] own actions.‖  (Ibid.) 
Third, at the final stage of Batson/Wheeler analysis, courts must consider 
― ‗ ―all relevant circumstances‖ ‘ ‖ in determining whether a strike was improperly 
motivated, and this requires a careful ―review of the entire record.‖  (People v. 
Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 616 (Lenix); see Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Development Corp (1988) 429 U.S. 252, 266 [―Determining whether 
invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive 
inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be 
available.‖], quoted in Foster v. Chatman (2016) 578 U.S. __, __ [136 S.Ct. 1737, 
1748] (Foster).) 
Fourth, comparative juror analysis is an important tool in ferreting out 
improper discrimination (see Foster, supra, 578 U.S. at p. __ [136 S.Ct. at 
p. 1750]; Snyder v. Louisiana (2008) 552 U.S. 472, 483 (Snyder); Miller-El, 
supra, 545 U.S. at p. 241), and the mandate to consider all relevant circumstances 
means a court must undertake comparative juror analysis even if it is raised for the 
first time on appeal (Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 622).  
Today‘s opinion explains how the trial court and the Court of Appeal ran 
afoul of these principles in evaluating the prosecutor‘s strike of Prospective Juror 
No. 2723471 (Juror 2723471).  The trial court did not discharge its duty to make a 
 
3 
sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate the prosecutor‘s reason for striking this 
juror.  In upholding the strike, the trial court relied on a reason (―lack of life 
experience‖) that the prosecutor did not give.  The Court of Appeal accorded 
deference to the trial court‘s ruling even though no deference was warranted.  
Neither the trial court‘s ruling nor the Court of Appeal‘s opinion provided the 
careful and thorough examination of the record that today‘s opinion does in 
determining whether the prosecutor‘s stated reason was credible.  And the Court 
of Appeal improperly refused to conduct the comparative juror analysis urged by 
defendants. 
The trial court and the Court of Appeal committed similar errors in 
evaluating the prosecutor‘s strikes of Prospective Juror No. 2547226 (Juror 
2547226) and Prospective Juror No. 2510083 (Juror 2510083).  Today‘s opinion 
identifies these errors but does not decide whether the trial court should have 
granted defendants‘ Batson/Wheeler motion with respect to these strikes.  I would 
hold that these two strikes were improper as well. 
As the court recounts (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 12–15), the prosecutor initially 
could not recall why he had struck Juror 2547226.  After consulting his notes, he 
said:  ―I believe I asked her about 12 votes, each independent of the others and her 
being able to, you know, take on the task which is obviously the difficult task of 
any juror of both standing their own ground where they believe they are right, and 
also listening to other people.  And I was concerned about her articulation about 
that role.  I was concerned about her understanding of that and her ability to — 
quite frankly if she felt strongly to be heard in the course of jury deliberations.‖  
The trial court gave no indication that it examined this strike at all; its global 
ruling on the Batson/Wheeler motion did not mention this juror.  In according 
deference to the trial court‘s ruling on this strike, the Court of Appeal erred. 
 
4 
The Court of Appeal relied on two reasons in upholding the strike of Juror 
2547226.  The first was that she ―expressed that she did not know how many 
jurors had to agree to a verdict in a criminal case.‖  But the prosecutor did not rely 
on this reason, so it cannot be a valid basis for upholding the strike.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 14.)  Second, the Court of Appeal said, ―The prosecutor‘s stated reasons 
reflect that, based upon Juror 2547226‘s equivocal answers to voir dire questions, 
he had doubts about her being able to engage fully in the deliberative process and 
fulfill her role as a juror.‖  But the juror‘s responses to whether she would have 
problems voicing disagreement with others (―I think I do better at listening than 
speaking my mind out‖ and ―I don‘t think so‖) were not understood by the 
prosecutor at that time to signal equivocation.  As today‘s opinion notes, the 
prosecutor inferred no equivocation from similar answers given by Prospective 
Juror No. 2570137 (Juror 2570137), a non-Hispanic female juror whom the 
prosecutor described as ―very soft spoken.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 14–15.)  In 
addition, immediately after questioning Juror 2547226, the prosecutor sought to 
confirm the independent-mindedness of Prospective Juror No. 2758066 (Juror 
2758066) by reference to the answers given by Juror 2547226: 
―Q.  You‘ve heard what some of the things that Ms. 2547226 and I have 
been talking about.  And is there anything that you disagree with as far as what 
she’s been saying?   
―A.  No.   
―Q.  As far as yourself being a member, a possible member on this jury, or 
on any jury, would you have any difficulty speaking your mind?   
―A.  No, none whatsoever.  
―Q.  Would you have any difficulty listening to other people hearing what 
they have to say and taking that into serious consideration?    
 
5 
―A.  I can listen to other people and make up my own mind.‖  (Italics 
added.)     
If the prosecutor had thought Juror 2547226‘s answers expressed 
equivocation, why would the prosecutor have used that juror‘s answers as a 
reference point for assessing the next juror‘s ability to speak and make up his own 
mind?  It was only after the prosecutor reviewed his notes, after initially saying he 
did not know why he struck Juror 2547226, that the prosecutor mentioned 
concerns about her independence.  In light of the consistent answers Juror 
2547226 gave and the prosecutor‘s voir dire of Jurors 2758066 and 2570137, the 
credibility of the stated reason for this strike does not find support in the record. 
A careful review of the record also casts doubt on the credibility of the 
prosecutor‘s reasons for striking Juror 2510083.  The prosecutor said he was 
concerned about this juror‘s lack of life experience and the lack of sophistication 
in her answers, and because she had asked for a hardship release.  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 17.)  The trial court noted that one of the non-Hispanic jurors still on the jury 
at the time of the Batson motion was ―similarly situated‖ to Juror 2510083 with 
respect to life experience.  It therefore declined to credit that reason.  But the trial 
court found ―other reasons‖ given by the prosecutor — presumably Juror 
2510083‘s hardship request and lack of sophistication — to be credible.  The 
Court of Appeal affirmed on the hardship ground alone. 
But the Court of Appeal erred in relying on that ground because any 
hardship had been resolved, in the prosecutor‘s presence, by the time he stated this 
reason for striking Juror 2510083.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 17.)  The Attorney 
General argues, for the first time before this court, that the prosecutor made a 
mistake of fact regarding Juror 2510083‘s hardship.  Although ―an isolated 
mistake or misstatement that the trial court recognizes as such is generally 
insufficient to demonstrate discriminatory intent,‖ we have said ―it is another 
 
6 
matter altogether when . . . the record of voir dire provides no support for the 
prosecutor‘s stated reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge and the trial 
court has failed to probe the issue.‖  (Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 385, italics 
added.)  Here, the trial court did not recognize the discrepancy and did not probe 
the issue.  Because we have no basis for concluding that the prosecutor made a 
mistake, the hardship ground cannot serve as a valid basis for upholding the strike. 
The only other reason given by the prosecutor was that he ―thought there 
was a lack of sophistication in some of her answers.‖  But it is not evident from 
the record what answers the prosecutor was referring to.  The prosecutor‘s voir 
dire of Juror 2510083, which is reprinted in today‘s opinion (maj. opn., ante, at 
pp. 16–17), did not include any questions that could reasonably be understood to 
probe the juror‘s sophistication.  The trial court also questioned this juror: 
―Q.  Ms. 2510083, how are you this morning? 
―A.  Good. 
―Q.  If we can get your information please. 
―A.  I‘m an instructional aide at an elementary school and I‘m not married 
and I don‘t have any children.  I live in the southwest part of town and I have no 
jury experience. 
―Q.  All right.  The questions we asked the other jurors, any of those 
questions relate to you, ma‘am? 
―A.  Just a couple.  I have a cousin that‘s CHP here in Bakersfield.  I have 
another cousin in Yuma, Arizona and he‘s highway patrol.  And then my cousin 
— they are all older, older cousins.  She‘s a paralegal for an attorney here. 
―Q.  Here in town? 
―A.  Yeah. 
―Q.  Do you know what kind of law that attorney practices? 
―A.  Worker‘s comp. 
 
7 
―Q.  Go ahead. 
―A.  That‘s it. 
―Q.  That was it? 
―A.  Yeah. 
―Q.  All right.  Anything else . . . that leads you to believe that you would 
not be able to be a fair juror in this case? 
―A.  No.‖ 
In addition, the defense questioned Juror 2510083 as follows: 
―Q.  Ms. 2510083, do you think that people can be trained not to make any 
mistakes? 
―A.  No. 
―Q.  They can be trained to do some mistakes or less mistakes? 
―A.  Yeah.  If they — yeah.  
―Q.  But there‘s no perfection? 
―A.  No. 
―Q.  So you think that perhaps sometimes even police officers can make 
mistakes? 
―A.  Yeah, everybody makes mistakes.‖ 
From this record, I am unable to discern which of Juror 2510083‘s answers 
signaled a lack of sophistication.  The prosecutor did not point to any specific 
answer, and the trial court did not inquire.  It is possible that the juror‘s demeanor 
or intonation affected the prosecutor‘s perception of her answers; the prosecutor 
said, ―she came across of [sic] being quite young.‖  But because the trial court 
made no findings in that regard, our reliance on the juror‘s demeanor would be 
speculative.  (Cf. Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. at p. 479.)  In any event, it is not clear 
how any of the prosecutor‘s questions or other questions directed at Juror 2510083 
 
8 
served to gauge her level of sophistication.  In sum, none of the prosecutor‘s 
reasons for striking Juror 2510083 withstands scrutiny. 
II. 
As noted, the last time this court found a Batson/Wheeler violation was in 
Silva in 2001 and, before that, in Fuentes in 1991.  In those cases, as in this one, 
the trial court did not meet its obligation to carefully examine each reason given 
for each strike and to make an adequate record that clearly explained the basis of 
its rulings.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 25–26, 31; see Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 
p. 385 [trial court did not ―make ‗a sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate the 
prosecutor‘s explanation‘ ‖ or ―clearly express its findings‖]; Fuentes, supra, 54 
Cal.3d at p. 716, fn. 5 [same].)  No deference may be accorded to such 
unexplained rulings when the reason for a strike is not ―self-evident‖ (maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 24); a reviewing court must undertake its own thorough inquiry, with no 
presumption in favor of the trial court‘s ruling.  Today‘s opinion reinforces the 
teaching of Silva and Fuentes that reviewing courts may find it ―difficult to lend 
credence to the prosecutor‘s concern‖ when neither the prosecutor nor the trial 
court has made an adequate record.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 25.) 
I offer a few additional observations to put today‘s decision in context.  As 
the high court has explained, ―the adjudication of a Batson claim is, at bottom, a 
credibility determination.‖  (Foster, supra, 578 U.S. at p. __ [136 S.Ct. at 
p. 1765].)  In some cases, the inquiry turns up information that directly reveals the 
improper use of race.  In Foster, the high court noted that ―[t]he sheer number of 
references to race in [the prosecution‘s] file is arresting‖ and that ―[a]n ‗N‘ [for 
‗No‘] appeared next to each of the black prospective jurors‘ names on the jury 
venire list‖ and ―next to the name of each black prospective juror on the list of the 
42 qualified prospective jurors.‖  (Id. at p. __ [136 S.Ct. at p. 1755].)  In Miller-El, 
the high court observed that ―for decades leading up to the time this case was tried 
 
9 
prosecutors in the Dallas County office had followed a specific policy of 
systematically excluding blacks from juries . . . .‖  (Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. at 
p. 263.)  A manual ― ‗outlining the reasoning for excluding minorities from jury 
service‘ ‖ had been distributed to prosecutors (id. at p. 264), and the prosecutors in 
Miller-El ―took their cues‖ from this manual ―as shown by their notes of the race 
of each potential juror‖ (id. at p. 266). 
But Foster and Miller-El involved trials that took place over 30 years ago.  
(See Foster, supra, 578 U.S. at p. __ [136 S.Ct. at p. 1755] [trial occurred just 
months after Batson was decided in 1986]; Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. at pp. 235–
236 [trial occurred just months before Batson].)  I would surmise and hope, though 
I do not know for sure, that such brazenly unlawful practices are rare today. 
More typical are the circumstances in Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. 472, which 
involved a 1996 capital trial.  The prosecutor gave two reasons for striking a black 
juror, Jeffrey Brooks.  As to the prosecutor‘s first reason — ― ‗he looked very 
nervous to me throughout the questioning‘ ‖ — the high court said ―we cannot 
presume that the trial judge credited the prosecutor‘s assertion that Mr. Brooks 
was nervous‖ because the trial court made no ―specific finding on the record 
concerning Mr. Brooks‘ demeanor.‖  (Id. at pp. 478, 479.)  The prosecutor‘s 
second concern was that Mr. Brooks had a teaching obligation that might cause 
him to try ― ‗to go home quickly‘ ‖ by returning ― ‗a lesser verdict so there 
wouldn‘t be a penalty phase.‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 478.)  The high court found this reason 
―suspicious‖ and ―highly speculative‖ because (among other reasons) Mr. Brooks‘ 
―dean stated that he did not think that [Mr. Brooks‘ jury service] would be a 
problem‖ and ―the record contains no suggestion that Mr. Brooks remained 
troubled after hearing the report of the dean‘s remarks.‖  (Id. at pp. 482, 483.)  
Further, the high court said ―[t]he implausibility of this explanation is reinforced 
by the prosecutor‘s acceptance of white jurors who disclosed conflicting 
 
10 
obligations that appear to have been at least as serious as Mr. Brooks‘.‖  (Id. at 
p. 483.) 
The nature of the case before us is closer to Snyder than to Foster or Miller-
El.  Our finding of improper discrimination as to Juror 2723471 is not based on 
any conduct that is particularly egregious or any evidence that approximates a 
smoking gun.  Instead, the analysis in today‘s opinion involves a careful and 
comprehensive review of the record, highlighting the lack of comparable 
questioning of non-Hispanic jurors (maj. opn., ante, at p. 21), the lack of any 
indication that the prosecutor thought the juror was untruthful or uninformed (id. 
at p. 22), the prosecutor‘s lack of interest in ―meaningfully examining‖ the Wasco 
issue with the juror (id. at p. 23), and the fact that the prosecutor struck Juror 
2723471 despite her law enforcement ties ―though he expressed his tendency to 
favor this characteristic with regard to other panelists‖ (id. at pp. 23–24). 
Today‘s decision is an apt illustration of the ― ‗sensitive inquiry‘ ‖ (Foster, 
supra, 578 U.S. at p. __ [136 S.Ct. at p. 1748]) and ―review of the entire record‖ 
(Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 616) that Batson/Wheeler analysis demands.  Rarely 
does a record contain direct evidence of purposeful discrimination.  More often, as 
in this case and in Snyder, the inquiry calls on courts to assess the credibility of 
reasons given for a strike by drawing inferences from ― ‗such circumstantial . . . 
evidence of intent as may be available,‘ ‖ including comparative juror analysis.  
(Foster, at p. __ [136 S.Ct. at p. 1748].)  As today‘s opinion demonstrates, this 
requires a searching review of the record as well as sensitivity to the 
disproportionate effect that certain reasons — such as the gang-related reasons in 
this case — may have in excluding members of cognizable groups. 
In most cases, courts cannot discern a prosecutor‘s subjective intent with 
anything approaching certainty.  But the issue is not whether the evidence of 
improper discrimination approaches certainty or even amounts to clear and 
 
11 
convincing proof.  The ultimate issue is ―whether it was more likely than not that 
the challenge was improperly motivated.‖  (Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 
162, 170, italics added.)  This probabilistic standard is not designed to elicit a 
definitive finding of deceit or racism.  Instead, it defines a level of risk that courts 
cannot tolerate in light of the serious harms that racial discrimination in jury 
selection causes to the defendant, to the excluded juror, and to ―public confidence 
in the fairness of our system of justice.‖  (Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 87; see 
Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 238; Powers v. Ohio (1991) 499 U.S. 400, 412–
414.)  In the case before us, as in Snyder, the inferential analysis supports the 
conclusion that it is more likely than not that one or more strikes were improperly 
motivated.  But I do not think the finding of a violation should brand the 
prosecutor a liar or a bigot.  Such loaded terms obscure the systemic values that 
the constitutional prohibition on racial discrimination in jury selection is designed 
to serve. 
With these observations, I join the opinion of the court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Gutierrez, People v. Ramos & People v. Enriquez 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 1/30/15 – 5th Dist. 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S224724 & S240419 
Date Filed: June 1, 2017 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Kern 
Judge: Michael E. Dellostritto 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Scott Concklin, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant Rene Gutierrez, Jr. 
 
Donn Ginoza, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant Gabriel Ramos. 
 
Janet J. Gray, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant Ramiro Enriquez. 
 
Mary McComb, State Public Defender, Elias Batchelder and AJ Kutchins, Deputy State Public Defenders, 
as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler and Dane R. Gillette, Chief 
Assistant Attorneys General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel B. Bernstein, Eric L. 
Christoffersen, Rachelle A. Newcomb and Jennifer M. Poe, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Janet J. Gray 
P.O. Box 51962 
Pacific Grove, CA  93950 
(831) 375-6263 
 
Jennifer M. Poe 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 324-5474