Title: B & W Glass, Inc. v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

B & W Glass, Inc. v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc.1992 WY 38829 P.2d 809Case Number: 91-123Decided: 04/10/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
B & W GLASS, 
INC.,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

WEATHER SHIELD MFG., 
INC., 

Defendant-Appellant.

 

Mark R. Smith, 
Clary, Nantz, Wood, Hoffius, Rankin & Cooper, Grand Rapids, Mich., and 
Thomas G. Gorman, Hirst & Applegate, P.C., Cheyenne, for 
defendant-appellant.

Douglas G. 
Madison, Dray, Madison & Thomson, P.C., Cheyenne, for 
plaintiff-appellee.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY, and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The only question 
involved in this case is the one certified to this court by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. In the Certification of Question of 
State Law, that court states the certified question to be:

Under the law of the 
State of Wyoming, may an oral promise otherwise within the statute of frauds as 
pronounced in Wyo. Stat. § 34.1-2-201 [1991] and the Uniform Commercial Code, 
nevertheless be enforceable on the basis of promissory estoppel? See Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 90 (1981).

We hold that the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel can be applied under these circumstances to 
enforce an oral promise, and the certified question is answered in the 
affirmative.

[¶2]      An understanding 
of the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel by the federal 
district court in this case requires a careful review of the business 
transaction which preceded this litigation. B & W Glass, Inc. (B & W) is 
a Wyoming corporation that sells and installs windows in both commercial and 
residential buildings. The principals in B & W are three brothers, Larry, 
Tom, and Doug Ludtke. Sometime during the first three months of 1987, Larry 
Ludtke learned of a General Services Administration (GSA) project that called 
for replacement of all the windows in the federal courthouse in Casper, Wyoming. 
After reviewing the GSA plans, Larry Ludtke prepared a list of specifications 
for the windows to be replaced, including dimensions, depth and types of glazing 
required.

[¶3]      Doug Ludtke then 
contacted Weather Shield Mfg. Inc. (Weather Shield) which is a Wisconsin 
corporation engaged in the manufacture of both standard size and custom windows. 
The purpose of Doug Ludtke's contact was to obtain a price quotation. Robert 
Schwalbe (Schwalbe), an experienced salesman familiar with bidding practices and 
price quotation procedures, acted on behalf of Weather Shield. Using the list of 
specifications that Larry Ludtke had prepared, Doug Ludtke discussed the GSA 
project with Schwalbe in Denver, Colorado. In the course of the first meeting, 
Schwalbe indicated he thought Weather Shield could produce the windows required 
for the project, but he explained he needed to check with company officials in 
Wisconsin.

[¶4]      At a brief second 
meeting between Schwalbe and Doug Ludtke, Schwalbe presented an itemized, 
written quotation, dated March 24, 1987, for windows to be used on the project. 
There is a dispute between the parties with respect to the specific type of 
windows quoted. Weather Shield's claim is that the quotation was for windows 
that are mass produced and normally stocked or carried in the company's catalog. 
B & W's contention is that the quotation included custom windows as well as 
stock windows. Subsequently, Larry Ludtke reviewed the written quotation, and he 
telephoned Schwalbe advising him there were too many size discrepancies in the 
quotation and custom windows, designed to meet GSA specifications, would be 
required.

[¶5]      A third meeting 
was scheduled between Schwalbe and Doug Ludtke, in Denver, for the purpose of 
reviewing the complete GSA project plans and specifications. At trial, Doug 
Ludtke testified that, at this third meeting, he and Schwalbe went through the 
plans and specifications together. He said Schwalbe indicated using custom 
windows would increase the cost, but Weather Shield had no problem in making the 
custom windows. Doug Ludtke stated that, at the conclusion of this meeting, he 
gave Schwalbe a copy of the plans and specifications to use preparing a bid. 
Schwalbe testified, to the contrary, that he could not have been provided with 
plans and specifications since he spent only forty-five minutes preparing the 
new quotation.

[¶6]      It is 
uncontroverted that, following the third meeting with Doug Ludtke, and on or 
before April 14, 1987, Schwalbe telephoned Larry Ludtke to quote a price of 
$101,725 for the Weather Shield windows to be used on the project. B & W 
never received written confirmation of this oral price 
quotation.

[¶7]      On April 14, 
1987, B & W, relying upon the Weather Shield price quotation, submitted its 
bid to the project's general contractor. The B & W bid was oral and was 
delivered by telephone around noon on the day that the general contractor's bid 
for the project was submitted. Two days later, Larry Ludtke was advised that B 
& W was the low bidder for supplying and installing the windows on the 
project. B & W also received a letter of intent, dated April 20, 1987, from 
the general contractor. Larry Ludtke then telephoned Schwalbe to advise him that 
B & W had received the letter of intent and that B & W would purchase 
Weather Shield windows for the project. 

[¶8]      In either May or 
June, 1987, Larry Ludtke and Schwalbe met in Cheyenne to review the plans and 
specifications in detail. Schwalbe received another set of the plans and 
specifications to send to the Weather Shield plant so that "shop drawings" could 
be prepared for the construction of the windows. Schwalbe and Larry Ludtke 
exchanged numerous telephone calls during the balance of the summer in the 
course of which they discussed the progress of the shop drawings and delivery 
and production schedules.

[¶9]      After B & W 
signed a contract with the general contractor in August of 1987, Larry Ludtke 
arranged for "field measurements" on the existing windows at the Casper federal 
courthouse. Larry Ludtke, accompanied by an architect from the Cheyenne area, 
met with Schwalbe in Denver in September to discuss these measurements. During 
that meeting, Larry Ludtke delivered a letter to Schwalbe, dated September 21, 
1987, requesting the shop drawings and providing another set of plans which 
contained the "field measurements" of the window sizes.

[¶10]   Following that meeting, from late 
September to December 3, 1987, Larry Ludtke telephoned Schwalbe on numerous 
occasions, each time requesting the shop drawings and other information. 
Finally, during the December 3 telephone call, Schwalbe committed to the 
completion of the shop drawings by December 14, 1987. This commitment was 
ineffectual, however, because Schwalbe's employment with Weather Shield was 
terminated in December, 1987. When Larry Ludtke failed to receive the shop 
drawings and was not able to contact Schwalbe, other Weather Shield employees 
were contacted. Ultimately, on December 30, 1987, Tom Ludtke spoke to a Weather 
Shield supervisor, Dan Emerich, who said that Weather Shield could not produce 
the windows.

[¶11]   After Weather Shield declined to 
produce the windows, B & W obtained custom windows from another manufacturer 
at a total cost of $226,579. Upon demand, Weather Shield refused to pay B & 
W the difference between Weather Shield's quoted price and the actual cost of 
the windows purchased from the other manufacturer.

[¶12]   B & W then filed suit in the 
District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Wyoming in and for 
Laramie County. Weather Shield answered and successfully petitioned for removal 
of the case to the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1986). Extensive discovery followed, after which 
Weather Shield moved for summary judgment on the ground that no written contract 
existed between the parties and the purported oral contract was unenforceable 
under the Wyoming enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) statute of 
frauds. At the same time, B & W moved to amend its complaint to add a claim 
of promissory estoppel. Weather Shield's motion for summary judgment was denied, 
and the B & W motion to amend was granted. The United States District Court 
ruled that Wyoming would allow the doctrine of promissory estoppel to remove an 
oral contract from the statute of frauds provision found in the 
UCC.

[¶13]   The case went to trial on three 
theories: breach of contract; breach of good faith and fair dealing; and 
promissory estoppel. The United States District Court granted a directed verdict 
in favor of Weather Shield on the breach of contract and good faith and fair 
dealing claims. The promissory estoppel theory was submitted to the jury. The 
jury found in favor of B & W, but it was deadlocked with respect to damages, 
and the United States District Court declared a mistrial. Weather Shield then 
moved for a directed verdict and to strike the jury and enter judgment in its 
favor. The United States District Court granted Weather Shield's motion to 
strike the jury, but it entered judgment in favor of B & 
W.

[¶14]   In an opinion order, the United 
States District Court found that Schwalbe was an authorized agent of Weather 
Shield and was aware of the plans and specifications for the courthouse project 
prior to making the oral bid. The court ruled that the bid quotation was made 
"without any exceptions," which, under usage of the trade, meant the quote was 
for products meeting the plans and specifications that had been provided. The 
United States District Court concluded that promissory estoppel had been 
established and the oral contract between the parties existed and was 
enforceable despite the statute of frauds provision in Wyoming's version of the 
UCC. Judgment was entered against Weather Shield for breach of contract in the 
amount of $100,214.48, with interest. Weather Shield took an appeal to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which certified the 
promissory estoppel question to this court.

[¶15]   The facts stated above essentially 
are contained in the Findings of Fact entered in the United States District 
Court and the Certification of Question of State Law from the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, both of which were made a part of the 
record before this court. Other than certain preliminary matters, the parties 
sharply contest the facts of this case. In its appeal to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Weather Shield has assigned error with respect 
to some of the district court findings. That dispute is not a part of the case 
before this court, however. The role of this court in answering certified 
questions does not include fact finding. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc., 713 P.2d 766 (Wyo. 1986). Wyo.R.App.P. 11.01 provides as 
follows:

The Supreme Court may 
answer questions of law certified to it by a federal court when requested by the 
certifying court, if there is involved in any proceeding before it a question of 
law of this state which may be determinative of the cause then pending in the 
certifying court and as to which it appears to the certifying court there is no 
controlling precedent in the decisions of the Supreme 
Court.

See Wyo. Stat. 
§§ 1-13-104 to -107 (1988). Because this court's jurisdiction pursuant to the 
rule and statute is limited, we do not consider the extra-record argument of 
counsel involving post-deliberation jury interviews and certain trial exhibits 
that are not included in the record on appeal. See Wyo.R.App.P. 4.01 and 
5.01.

[¶16]   The answer to a pure question of 
law presented for our determination does not require certainty with respect to 
the facts. Lige Dickson Co. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 96 Wn.2d 291, 635 P.2d 103 (1981). The legal question to be answered, posed by the certification 
order from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, is clear 
and undisputed. Once this court determines the applicable rule of law, the 
controversy between the parties must center on which findings of fact are 
material. Jurisdiction is retained by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit to apply the Wyoming law articulated in this opinion to those 
facts and decide the matters in controversy between the parties. K-W Industries, 
a Div. of Associated Technologies, Ltd. v. National Sur. Corp., 231 Mont. 461, 
754 P.2d 502 (1988).

[¶17]   The certified question presented by 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit asks whether an 
equitable principle, promissory estoppel, will be applied to defeat the 
operation of a statute of frauds. The philosophical conflict embodied in this 
question implicates principles of statutory construction, fundamental fairness, 
and certainty in the law which have been the subject of legal debate in the 
English common law system since the Middle Ages. See Henry L. McClintock, 
Handbook of the Principles of Equity § 22 (2nd ed. 1948). The policy choice 
required by this certified question is one that demands a detailed review. The 
analysis pursued considers the specific section or sections of the UCC that are 
applicable in this controversy; the effect of that application; the 
authorization under the UCC to invoke equitable principles generally; whether 
the UCC displaced equitable principles with its statute of frauds; the role of 
promissory estoppel in Wyoming's jurisprudence apart from statutes; and, 
finally, the application of promissory estoppel in the context of the UCC 
statute of frauds. See Robert S. Summers, General Equitable Principles Under 
Section 1-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 72 Nw.U.L.Rev. 906 (1978) 
[hereinafter General Equitable Principles].

[¶18]   Promissory estoppel is a doctrine 
incorporated in the law of contracts. Restatement (Second) Contracts § 90 
(1981). Judge Posner has provided a considered and succinct description of the 
doctrine: "If an unambiguous promise is made in circumstances calculated to 
induce reliance, and it does so, the promisee if hurt as a result can recover 
damages." Goldstick v. ICM Realty, 788 F.2d 456, 462 (7th Cir. 1986). Promissory 
estoppel is recognized as both a sword and a shield - a cause of action and a 
defense. Equitable estoppel is a close relative, but it is a tort doctrine that 
requires proof of misrepresentation. Goldstick.

[¶19]   Neither party disputes the 
applicability of the UCC, as adopted in Wyoming, to the transaction that 
resulted in this litigation. At its most basic level, that transaction involved 
a sale of goods, windows, by a seller, Weather Shield, to a buyer, B & W. B 
& W contends an oral contract was formed between the parties upon which it 
relied, to its detriment. Weather Shield challenges the reliance upon an oral 
contract contending that, even if one existed, it was for goods priced at $500 
or more and cannot be enforced under the UCC statute of frauds which 
provides:

(a) Except as otherwise 
provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods for the price of five 
hundred dollars ($500.00) or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense 
unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has 
been made between the parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement 
is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient 
because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the contract is 
not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in such 
writing.

(b) Between merchants if 
within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the contract and 
sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiving it has reason 
to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of subsection (a) against 
such party unless written notice of objection to its contents is given within 
ten (10) days after it is received. (c) A contract which does not satisfy the 
requirements of subsection (a) but which is valid in other respects is 
enforceable:

(i) If the goods are to 
be specially manufactured for the buyer and are not suitable for sale to others 
in the ordinary course of the seller's business and the seller, before notice of 
repudiation is received and under circumstances which reasonably indicate that 
the goods are for the buyer, has made either a substantial beginning of their 
manufacture or commitments for their procurement; or

(ii) If the party against 
whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in 
court that a contract for sale was made, but the contract is not enforceable 
under this provision beyond the quantity of goods admitted; 
or

(iii) With respect to 
goods for which payment has been made and accepted or which have been received 
and accepted (Section 34.1-2-606).

Wyo. Stat. § 
34.1-2-201 (1991), previously codified as Wyo. Stat. § 34-21-208 (1977) 
(hereinafter § 2-201 or statute of frauds).

In this case, 
there is no writing that satisfies the requirements of § 2-201(a) or (b). None 
of the three exceptions to the writing requirement, set forth in subsection (c) 
of the statute, apply to the facts as stated. Weather Shield contends that the 
exceptions found in subsections (b) and (c) are the exclusive exceptions to the 
statute of frauds recognized under the UCC. Weather Shield supports this 
argument by reference to the language: "Except as otherwise provided in this 
section. . . ." Wyo. Stat. § 34.1-2-201(a) (1991). Weather Shield asserts that 
this language demonstrates the legislative intent to limit the exceptions. 
Acceptance of this restrictive view espoused by Weather Shield would result in a 
conclusion that the effect of § 2-201 is to prevent enforcement of the oral 
agreement between the parties.

[¶20]   B & W argues that the UCC, read 
as a whole, incorporates a provision that supplements the language of § 2-201 
with the principles of equity, including promissory estoppel. It points to the 
provisions of Wyo. Stat. § 34.1-1-103 (1991), previously codified as Wyo. Stat. 
§ 34-21-103 (1977) (hereinafter § 1-103), which provides:

     Unless displaced by 
the particular provisions of this act [§§ 34.1-1-101 through 34.1-10-104], the 
principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to 
capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, 
duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause 
shall supplement its provisions.

B & W's 
argument is that the language of § 2-201 does not specifically displace 
promissory estoppel as that doctrine supplements the provisions of the code 
pursuant to § 1-103. Acceptance of the liberal view espoused by B & W 
results in a conclusion that the effect of § 1-103 is to allow promissory 
estoppel to defeat the operation of the statutes of 
frauds.

[¶21]   Decisions of other courts offer 
persuasive support when questions of the interpretation of uniform laws arise. 
See Apodaca v. State, 627 P.2d 1023 (Wyo. 1981). The decisions on whether 
promissory estoppel will serve to avoid the UCC statute of frauds track a 
storm-battered course. See Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Promissory Estoppel as 
Basis for Avoidance of UCC Statute of Frauds (UCC § 2-201), 29 A.L.R.4th 1006 
(1984 & Supp. 1991). The majority position espouses the rule that principles 
of promissory estoppel under § 1-103 operate as an exception to the statute of 
frauds. The minority position is that estoppel does not constitute an exception 
to the requirements of § 2-201. Note, Promissory Estoppel: Subcontractors' 
Liability in Construction Bidding Cases, 63 N.C.L.Rev. 387 (1985). B & W and 
Weather Shield vigorously urge the positions found in the authorities that 
support their respective views. We have identified appropriate points of 
departure for consideration in our review of this issue.

[¶22]   Two general themes can be 
identified in the authorities of those jurisdictions that approve a promissory 
estoppel exception to the UCC statute of frauds. If an estoppel exception has 
been generally recognized in that jurisdiction under other statutes of frauds, 
then the exception usually has been found in § 2-201. See, e.g., R.S. Bennett 
& Co., Inc. v. Economy Mechanical Industries, Inc., 606 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 
1979) (applying Illinois law); Ralston Purina Co. v. McCollum, 271 Ark. 840, 611 S.W.2d 201 (Ct.App. 1981); Warder & Lee Elevator, Inc. v. Britten, 274 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1979); Decatur Co-op Ass'n v. Urban, 219 Kan. 171, 547 P.2d 323 
(1976); Potter v. Hatter Farms, Inc., 56 Or. App. 254, 641 P.2d 628 (1982). 
These courts in approving of the exception have held that § 1-103 allows the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel to supplement § 2-201. Allen M. Campbell Co., 
General Contractors, Inc. v. Virginia Metal Industries, Inc., 708 F.2d 930 (4th 
Cir. 1983) (applying North Carolina law); Ralston Purina; 
Potter.

[¶23]   The Allen M. Campbell case, arising 
under factually similar surroundings to this case, provides a useful example of 
the analysis and rationale used by those courts approving the use of promissory 
estoppel. Allen M. Campbell Co. had prepared a bid on a Department of the Navy 
contract to construct housing. Only one-half hour before the bids were due, 
Virginia Metal Industries telephoned Allen M. Campbell Co. and quoted a price 
for hollow metal doors and frames that would meet the plans and specifications. 
Allen M. Campbell Co. based its bid on the quoted price and was awarded the 
contract. Virginia Metal Industries then backed out of the contract and Allen M. 
Campbell Co. covered by purchasing doors from another supplier at a higher cost. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that North 
Carolina recognized and applied the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Allen M. 
Campbell. The court stated that, pursuant to § 1-103, equitable principles were 
available to supplement § 2-201 and, after surveying relevant case law, the 
court concluded that North Carolina's approval of promissory estoppel provisions 
in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 90, 139 (1981) signaled its 
acceptance of the view that promissory estoppel avoids the statute of 
frauds.

[¶24]   In those jurisdictions that have 
espoused the rule that promissory estoppel is not available to avoid the statute 
of frauds under the UCC, consistent themes also are discernable. The fundamental 
distinction begins with the refusal to consider § 1-103 as supplementing the UCC 
with principles of equity, including estoppel. See, e.g., C.R. Fedrick, Inc. v. 
Borg-Warner Corp., 552 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1977) (applying California law); 
McDabco, Inc. v. Chet Adams Co., 548 F. Supp. 456 (D.S.C. 1982) (applying South 
Carolina Law); Cox v. Cox, 292 Ala. 106, 289 So. 2d 609 (1974); C.G. Campbell 
& Son, Inc. v. Comdeq Corp., 586 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Anderson 
Const. Co., Inc. v. Lyon Metal Products, Inc., 370 So. 2d 935 (Miss. 1979). 
Another reason those courts have chosen to deny the use of promissory estoppel 
as available to avoid § 2-201 is the refusal in those jurisdictions to permit 
the doctrines of estoppel to defeat general statutes of frauds. Cox; Anderson 
Const. Co.

[¶25]   A leading decision that rejects the 
application of promissory estoppel to avoid the statute of frauds found in § 
2-201 is Lige Dickson, 635 P.2d 103. The question presented in that case to the 
Supreme Court of Washington was whether an oral price protection agreement with 
a liquid asphalt supplier would be upheld. The buyer relied on the consistent 
selling price in submitting bids for construction contracts. The Washington 
court reviewed its previous position denying the invocation of promissory 
estoppel to overcome the general statute of frauds and noting the limiting 
language at the beginning of § 2-201, that court ruled promissory estoppel is 
not available to overcome the UCC's statute of frauds. The need for uniformity 
among different jurisdictions and decisions affecting commercial transactions 
was offered as another reason not to permit promissory estoppel to circumvent 
the statute of frauds in the UCC.

[¶26]   Conflicting decisions of state and 
federal courts in the same jurisdiction further magnify the divergence in 
precedent. Compare, e.g., McDabco, (holding estoppel not available in South 
Carolina to defeat § 2-201) with Atlantic Wholesale Co., Inc. v. Solondz, 283 
S.C. 36, 320 S.E.2d 720 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding a silver dealer would be 
allowed to recover for the buyer's breach of an oral contract because, in South 
Carolina, estoppel prevented the buyer from asserting a defense of failure to 
comply with § 2-201); see also Goldstick (declining to rule on present status of 
Illinois law). Another example is found in California where the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals applied state law and ruled the doctrine of estoppel could not 
be used to defeat the need for a writing under § 2-201. C.R. Fedrick. The 
California Court of Appeal, however, ruled in Allied Grape Growers v. Bronco 
Wine Co., 203 Cal. App. 3d 432, 249 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1988), that promissory estoppel 
constituted an exception to § 2-201. The Allied Grape court critically said the 
Ninth Circuit used inconsistent analysis, failed to consider the effect of § 
1-103 and, in conclusional fashion, found the statute of frauds would be 
eviscerated if estoppel applied.

[¶27]   In our view, the better-reasoned 
approach is articulated by those courts that have approved the majority view 
that promissory estoppel avoids § 2-201. We do not accept, however, the argument 
that this question can be resolved by simply adopting the logic of one line of 
decisions. The divergent authorities offer an opportunity for choice without 
specific policy concerns. That approach leads away from a primary duty of this 
court which is the charge that we implement legislative policy found in the 
enactment of the UCC. We conclude that the analysis of the certified question 
becomes primarily a matter of statutory interpretation for which Wyoming has 
established standards.

[¶28]   Questions that reach to statutory 
interpretation require the court to endeavor to perceive the legislative intent. 
Phillips v. Duro-Last Roofing, Inc., 806 P.2d 834 (Wyo. 1991). Legislative 
intent is to be ascertained, insofar as possible, from the language incorporated 
in the statute, which is viewed in light of its object and purpose. Belle 
Fourche Pipeline Co. v. State, 766 P.2d 537 (Wyo. 1988). Statutes that relate to 
the same subject matter should be harmonized whenever that is possible. Stauffer 
Chemical Co. v. Curry, 778 P.2d 1083 (Wyo. 1989). In pursuing this endeavor 
every subsection of a statute must be read in the context of all others to 
ascertain the meaning of the whole statute. Gookin v. State Farm Fire and 
Casualty Ins., 826 P.2d 229 (Wyo. 1992); Story v. State, 755 P.2d 228 (Wyo. 
1988).

[¶29]   In addition to these general rules 
of statutory construction, the UCC also has incorporated within it useful rules 
of construction and a statement of its purpose. The act is to be liberally 
construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies. Wyo. 
Stat. § 34.1-1-102(a) (1991); Century Ready-Mix Co. v. Lower & Co., 770 P.2d 692 (1989), appeal after remand sub nom. Century Ready-Mix Co. v. Campbell 
County School Dist., 816 P.2d 795 (Wyo. 1991). According to the legislative 
pronouncement, the purposes of the UCC are to simplify, clarify, and modernize 
the law governing commercial transactions; to permit continued expansion of 
commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties; and to 
make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions. Wyo. Stat. § 34.1-1-102(b) 
(1991). Professors White and Summers suggest a further purpose of the UCC is 
"that the law of commercial transactions be, so far as reasonable, liberal and 
nontechnical." 1 James J. White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code 
§ 4 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter White & Summers]. The authors apparently 
disagree, however, on the application of the doctrine of estoppel to avoid the 
statute of frauds. White & Summers §§ 2-6, 2-8. The official comments 
attached to the UCC, while not controlling an interpretation of the scope and 
intent of the Code, are persuasive. ABM Escrow Closing and Consulting, Inc. v. 
Matanuska Maid, Inc., 659 P.2d 1170 (Alaska 1983).

[¶30]   In Wyoming, rigid adherence to the 
UCC statute of frauds is contrary to the liberal construction philosophy 
surrounding the code. Century Ready-Mix. Professor Corbin, in urging the 
adoption of the UCC by the several states, noted: "The purpose of the statute of 
frauds is to prevent the enforcement of alleged promises that never were made; 
it is not, and never has been, to justify contractors in repudiating promises 
that were in fact made." Arthur L. Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code - Sales; 
Should It Be Enacted?, 59 Yale L.J. 821, 829 (1950). Another commentator asserts 
that the statute of frauds is the weapon of the written law to prevent fraud; 
estoppel is the equitable means invoked to achieve this end. 3 Walter H.E. 
Jaeger, Williston on Contracts § 533A (3rd ed. 1960).

[¶31]   In light of our approach to 
statutory construction, we are satisfied that, if promissory estoppel is to 
become an exception to § 2-201, it must be because of the provisions of § 1-103. 
Estoppel is specifically included in the listing of principles supplementing the 
UCC. Wyo. Stat. § 34.1-1-103 (1991). We previously have recognized the entry to 
general principles of law and equity found in § 1-103 to supplement the UCC. 
Western Nat. Bank of Casper v. Harrison, 577 P.2d 635 (Wyo. 1978) (allowing the 
law of waiver to supplement UCC provisions). Unless it is displaced, § 1-103 
imposes a duty to interpret and construe the UCC by taking into account the 
equities of a particular case. General Equitable Principles, 72 Nw.U.L.Rev. 
906.

[¶32]   We adopt the suggestions of 
Professor Summers as a framework for our analysis of whether the equitable 
principle of promissory estoppel can apply despite the statute of frauds in the 
UCC. His proposition is that the supplementary principles of law and equity 
incorporated into the operation of the UCC by virtue of § 1-103 survive unless 
it can be established that: (1) the principle is explicitly displaced by name in 
the plain language of the statute; (2) the specific objectives of the section 
would be served only by displacement of the principles of law and equity; (3) 
the general objectives of the UCC are best furthered by displacement of those 
principles; and (4) the legislative history plainly indicates displacement. 
General Equitable Principles, 72 Nw.U.L.Rev. 906. We will apply these criteria 
in our consideration of the question of whether § 2-201 displaces promissory 
estoppel.

[¶33]   Certainly, the UCC does require 
that supplemental bodies of law be "explicitly displaced" to void the effect of 
§ 1-103. Wyo. Stat. § 34.1-1-103 (1991) (Official Comment 1). Neither the text 
of § 2-201 nor the comments following it specifically refer to estoppel. White 
& Summers § 2-7. This silence on the part of the legislature in the language 
of the statute can not be construed to constitute a displacement of estoppel 
principles. Potter, 641 P.2d 628. For this reason, we disagree with the 
conclusions of the court in Futch v. James River-Norwalk, Inc. 722 F. Supp. 1395 
(S.D.Miss.), aff'd, 887 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1989), and McDabco, 548 F. Supp. 456, that the opening language of § 2-201 represents a displacement of the 
principles of promissory estoppel. As found in § 2-201, the phrase "[e]xcept as 
otherwise provided in this section" is simply a clause modifying the first 
subsection. Wyo. Stat. § 34.1-2-201(a) (1991). The intention of the Wyoming 
legislature in beginning Subsection (a) with that clause, is apparent from a 
reading of the entire section. Subsection (a) is the general statement of the 
statute of frauds applicable to the sale of goods. White & Summers § 2-3. 
The effect of the initial limiting language in subsection (a) is to alert the 
reader that the remaining subsections are disjunctive, and it serves to advise 
the reader of the proposition that the statutory exceptions to the statute of 
frauds are contained in subsections (b) and (c). Furthermore, the statutory 
exceptions listed in § 2-201(c) are not exhaustive. Warder & Lee Elevator, 
274 N.W.2d 339; White & Summers § 2-7. Neither the language of the statute 
of frauds nor any legislative history indicates that § 2-201 displaces 
promissory estoppel.

[¶34]   Secondly, we conclude the specific 
objectives of § 2-201 would not be served by displacing promissory estoppel. The 
longstated purpose of the statute of frauds is to prevent fraud from perjured 
testimony about nonexistent oral agreements. However, the concepts of equity and 
the passage of years resulted in the creation of exceptions to the writing 
requirement as a necessity to prevent substantive fraud. The part performance 
doctrine is one such exception that is specifically stated in the UCC. Wyo. 
Stat. § 34.1-2-201(c)(iii) (1991). Still, the UCC was not drafted to anticipate 
the equities of every possible transaction. The specific inclusion of § 1-103 
permits the invocation of principles of both law and equity as necessary to the 
resolution of commercial disputes. An adherence to a strict policy of demanding 
a writing in all cases that are not specifically exempted by § 2-201(b) or (c) 
would allow unscrupulous contractors to perpetrate fraud after creating 
reliance. The courts should be vigilant to inhibit the defense of the statute of 
frauds when that defense becomes an instrument for perpetrating fraud. Vogel v. 
Shaw, 42 Wyo. 333, 294 P. 687 (1930).

[¶35]   The third factor to be considered 
is whether the general objectives of the UCC would be served by displacement of 
promissory estoppel. We conclude they would not. The Lige Dickson court argued 
that uniformity among the several jurisdictions was the reason not to allow 
promissory estoppel to avoid the statute of frauds. Lige Dickson, 635 P.2d 103. 
That logic is not persuasive in view of the fact that the majority of 
jurisdictions allow promissory estoppel to avoid the provisions of § 2-201. 
Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958), is a leading 
case allowing promissory estoppel to defeat a general statute of frauds. Writing 
for the Supreme Court of California, Justice Traynor clearly set forth the 
principle of fairness implicit in recognizing the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel:

     When [the general 
contractor] used [the subcontractor's] offer in computing his own bid, he bound 
himself to perform in reliance on [the subcontractor's] terms. Though [the 
subcontractor] did not bargain for this use of its bid neither did [the 
subcontractor] make it idly, indifferent to whether it would be used or not. On 
the contrary it is reasonable to suppose that [the subcontractor] submitted its 
bid to obtain the subcontract. It was bound to realize the substantial 
possibility that its bid would be the lowest, and that it would be included by 
[the general contractor] in his bid. It was to its own interest that the 
contractor be awarded the general contract; the lower the subcontract bid, the 
lower the general contractor's bid was likely to be and the greater its chance 
of acceptance and hence the greater [the subcontractor's] chance of getting the 
paving subcontract. [The subcontractor] had reason not only to expect [the 
general contractor] to rely on its bid but to want him to. Clearly [the 
subcontractor] had a stake in [the general contractor's] reliance on its bid. 
Given this interest and the fact that [the general contractor] is bound by his 
own bid, it is only fair that [the general contractor] should have at least an 
opportunity to accept [the subcontractor's bid] after the general contract has 
been awarded to him.

Drennan, 333 P.2d  at 760.

[¶36]   The invocation of the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel to avoid § 2-201 is consistent with authority that permits 
promissory estoppel to avoid a general statute of frauds. See Robert A. 
Brazener, Annotation, Comment Note-Promissory Estoppel As Basis For Avoidance Of 
Statute Of Frauds, 56 A.L.R.3rd 1037 (1974 & Supp. 1991). The argument that 
application of promissory estoppel should change depending upon whether goods 
(UCC) or services (general statute) are involved simply begs the fundamental 
question of fairness. If the application of promissory estoppel is fair in one 
context, it must also be in the other. Reliance created by a subcontractor, who 
quotes a price for services, is the same as that which is created by another 
subcontractor, who quotes a price for goods. Therefore, in addition to the 
statutory exceptions found in § 2-201, the nonstatutory exception to the writing 
requirement, promissory estoppel, is also present through § 1-103. Northwest 
Potato Sales, Inc. v. Beck, 208 Mont. 310, 678 P.2d 1138 (1984); White & 
Summers § 2-6.

[¶37]   A recognition that promissory 
estoppel avoids the UCC statute of frauds is consistent with our prior Wyoming 
cases. See Inter-Mountain Threading, Inc. v. Baker Hughes Tubular Services, 
Inc., 812 P.2d 555 (Wyo. 1991), and the cases cited in that opinion. While some 
courts have expressed a reservation to the effect that recognizing nonstatutory 
exceptions to the statute of frauds may render it a nullity, McDabco, 548 F. Supp. 456, Wyoming has accepted a role of leadership in invoking equitable 
principles to avoid injustice. The need to enforce an implied promise to 
mortgage some cattle resulted in the first approval in Wyoming of the doctrine 
of promissory estoppel as stated in the Restatement of Contracts, § 90 (1932). 
Hanna State & Savings Bank v. Matson, 53 Wyo. 1, 77 P.2d 621 (1938). In 
Tremblay v. Reid, 700 P.2d 391 (Wyo. 1985), Wyoming adopted the principles of 
promissory estoppel as they are stated in the Restatement (Second) Contracts § 
90(1) (1981).

[¶38]   The drafters of the Restatement 
(Second) have taken an even more definite position on the availability of 
promissory estoppel to avoid the statute of frauds:

(1) A promise which the 
promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of 
the promisee or a third person and which does induce the action or forbearance 
is enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided 
only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach is be limited 
as justice requires.

Restatement 
(Second) Contracts § 139 (1981).

The drafters of 
the Restatement (Second) use Vogel, 294 P. 687, as an illustration of the 
section's application to avoid injustice. Restatement (Second) Contracts § 139 
(Reporter's Note 1981). In Remilong v. Crolla, 576 P.2d 461 (Wyo. 1978), this 
court approved the use of promissory estoppel, as phrased in the Restatement 
(Second), to avoid the general statute of frauds in Wyoming. In that case, we 
ruled that buyers of land could enforce an oral promise from the seller that all 
trailers would be removed from adjacent lands.

[¶39]   Our most recent cases are 
demonstrative of the safeguards that are present in the application of the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel. The elements of promissory estoppel demand 
evidence that establishes: "(1) a clear and definite agreement; (2) proof that 
the party urging the doctrine acted to its detriment in reasonable reliance on 
the agreement; and (3) a finding that the equities support enforcement of the 
agreement." Inter-Mountain Threading, 812 P.2d  at 559; Provence v. Hilltop Nat. 
Bank, 780 P.2d 990, 993 (Wyo. 1989). The party who is asserting promissory 
estoppel is assigned the burden of establishing all of the elements of the 
doctrine with a standard of strict proof. Provence. In both Inter-Mountain 
Threading and Provence, the party seeking relief by invoking promissory estoppel 
failed to establish the requisite elements. Inter-Mountain Threading; Provence. 
See also, Four Nines Gold, Inc. v. 71 Const., Inc., 809 P.2d 236 (Wyo. 
1991).

[¶40]   We do not share the concern that 
was present in the English courts of the 17th Century to the effect that a 
writing is the sole method to avoid undetected perjured testimony. Our judicial 
system is capable of discerning perjury and reaching a determination in an 
instance in which a litigant establishes promissory estoppel by appropriately 
assuming his burden.

[¶41]   Consistently with the majority rule 
and the law in Wyoming relating to general statutes of frauds, we conclude that 
promissory estoppel can and does justify the enforcement of an oral promise 
otherwise within the statute of frauds in the UCC, as articulated in Wyo. Stat. 
§ 34.1-2-201 (1991). Under the foregoing analysis, our answer to the certified 
question is "yes".