Title: GLENN EDDIE GARCIA v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

GLENN EDDIE GARCIA v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1989 WY 155777 P.2d 1091Case Number: 88-205Decided: 07/13/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
GLENN EDDIE GARCIA, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Edward L. Grant, 
J.

ARE NOT AN 
OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] 

Leonard Munker, 
State Public Defender, Gerald M. Gallivan, Director, Defender Aid Program, and 
Brian J. Godard, Student Intern, for 
appellant. Argument presented by Brian J. Godard.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Paul S. Rehurek, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. Argument presented by 
Paul S. Rehurek.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Glenn Eddie Garcia was 
convicted of one count of concealing stolen property in violation of W.S. 
6-3-403(a)(i), one count of aggravated assault in violation of W.S. 
6-2-502(a)(ii), and two counts of interference with a police officer in 
violation of W.S. 6-5-204(a). On appeal, he contends that he was improperly 
charged with concealing stolen property, that the trial court erroneously 
admitted evidence of his prior bad acts, and that the trial court erroneously 
denied his motion for acquittal.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Shortly before 2:30 
p.m. on November 1, 1987, a dark blue 1984 Toyota Celica was stolen in 
Laramie, Wyoming. At approximately 10:20 p.m. that 
evening, Officer Bomar of the Cheyenne Police Department saw a vehicle matching 
the description of the stolen vehicle and, with Officer Nicholl providing backup 
in a separate patrol car, stopped the suspect vehicle. As the officers 
approached the Toyota, the driver, later 
identified as appellant Garcia, sped off into south Cheyenne, beginning a high speed chase that was to end 
nearly forty minutes later near Wellington, Colorado.

[¶4.]     Early in the chase 
Officer Nicholl temporarily fell prey to appellant's evasive actions and, 
attempting to rejoin the pursuit, turned north onto Van Lennen Avenue with 
lights and sirens blaring. He quickly realized that appellant had turned off the 
Toyota's 
headlights and was headed down the wrong side of the street on a high speed 
collision course with his patrol vehicle. When appellant failed to move into the 
proper lane, Nicholl was forced to swerve off the left edge of the street to 
avoid the imminent collision. Shortly after this incident, Officer Bomar and the 
Toyota collided 
as the officer attempted to block appellant's escape.

[¶5.]     As more officers became 
involved in the effort to contain Garcia, it became increasingly evident that he 
would not voluntarily abandon his flight. When Sergeant Renner attempted to 
intercept appellant on House 
Avenue, appellant entered Renner's lane and forced 
him into the curb. Shortly thereafter appellant proceeded into a nonincorporated 
portion of LaramieCounty and headed for I-25. 
As speeds increased, Officer Stone attempted to pass appellant and block his 
progress. Appellant looked at the officer, swerved the Toyota towards the patrol 
vehicle and forced Stone into a ditch. Pursuit continued through the county and 
south along I-25, until a member of the Colorado State Patrol finally succeeded 
in forcing appellant off the highway.

[¶6.]     Appellant was arrested 
and brought to trial on the following charges:

COUNT 1, aggravated 
assault against Officer Nicholl;

COUNT 2, aggravated 
assault against Officer Stone;

COUNT 3, aggravated 
assault against Sergeant Renner;

COUNT 4, concealing 
stolen property of a value greater than $500.

The jury found 
him guilty of Counts 1 and 4 but, as to Counts 2 and 3, found him guilty only of 
the lesser included offense of interfering with a police officer. The trial 
court imposed and suspended two one-year sentences relating to Counts 2 and 3 
and on the remaining charges sentenced him to concurrent terms of four and 
one-half to six years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary.

CONCEALING STOLEN 
PROPERTY

[¶7.]     Prior to trial, 
appellant submitted a "Motion to Dismiss or for Judgment of Acquittal on Count 
IV." In support of that motion, he admitted that he stole the Toyota and argued that a 
thief could not be prosecuted for the possessory offenses of receiving or 
concealing stolen goods. He reiterated this position as part of a motion to 
acquit following the State's presentation of evidence and raises it once again 
on appeal. We find no merit in his argument.

[¶8.]     Appellant cites much 
authority for the proposition that a defendant cannot be prosecuted, convicted, 
and sentenced both for the larceny of property and the receipt or concealment of 
that same property. He correctly notes that such a situation potentially offends 
both state and federal constitutional proscriptions against double jeopardy, in 
that the possessory offenses are necessarily committed when one steals property. 
A defendant cannot receive multiple punishments for a single offense. See 
generally Howard v. State, 762 P.2d 28 (Wyo. 
1988); Schultz v. State, 751 P.2d 367 (Wyo. 
1988); Birr v. State, 744 P.2d 1117 (Wyo. 
1987); Tuggle v. State, 733 P.2d 610 (Wyo. 1987). However, appellant's argument, and 
the authorities cited, are inapposite here. Appellant was merely charged with 
concealing stolen property. No attempt was made to try or punish him for the 
theft of the Toyota.

[¶9.]     He attempts to shore up 
this obvious weakness in his argument by contending that the possessory offenses 
of receiving and concealing were intended by the legislature to reach only a 
thief's accessories after the fact. He cites no cogent authority in support of 
this position, however, and ignores past decisions of this court suggesting a 
contrary conclusion. Where evidence strongly indicated the defendant's 
involvement in the underlying theft, we upheld his conviction for receiving and 
concealing stolen oil field drill bits based on his unexplained possession of 
those bits. Tageant v. State, 673 P.2d 651 (Wyo. 1983); see also Capshaw v. State, 737 P.2d 740 
(Wyo. 1987). 
Furthermore, we expressly rejected the argument that an admitted thief could not 
be charged and convicted of concealing the stolen property in Pote v. State, 695 P.2d 617, 622 (Wyo. 1985). If we were to adopt appellant's 
argument, the State would be required to offer evidence that someone other than 
the possessor of stolen goods committed the actual theft. This court has 
repeatedly rejected such a requirement. See generally State v. Callaway, 72 
Wyo. 509, 267 P.2d 970 (1954); Curran v. State, 
12 Wyo. 553, 
76 P. 577 (1904). Appellant fails to consider that the evil which the 
legislature intended to address in this instance may just as well have been the 
mere wrongful possession and use of stolen property. The evil character of such 
possessory acts does not disappear when an unproved thief engages in such acts 
only to magically reappear when a fence or some other third party engages in 
similar conduct. Where the thief can be proven to have committed the lesser 
offense, we will not permit him to obstruct prosecution by giving partial proof 
of greater guilt. Appellant was properly charged and prosecuted for concealing 
stolen property.

[¶10.]  Appellant's reassertion of this issue 
after the State's presentation of its case, however, raises the additional 
question of whether sufficient evidence was produced on this offense to overcome 
his motion for acquittal. We have frequently articulated our standard of review 
with respect to that question. A motion for acquittal should be denied where, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a reasonable 
inference can be drawn from that evidence that the defendant is guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The motion should be granted, however, where there is such a 
lack of substantial evidence such that a reasonable juror must harbor a 
reasonable doubt as to the existence of an essential element of the crime. 
Washington v. State, 751 P.2d 384, 386-87 
(Wyo. 1988); Abeyta v. State, 705 P.2d 330, 332 
(Wyo. 1985); Russell v. State, 583 P.2d 690,693-94 (Wyo. 1978).

[¶11.]  The elements of the offense with which 
appellant was charged are set forth in W.S. 6-3-403, which provides in pertinent 
part:

"(a) A person who * * * 
conceals * * * property which he knows, believes or has reasonable cause to 
believe was obtained in violation of law is guilty of:

"(i) A felony punishable 
by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more than ten 
thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both, if the value of the property is five 
hundred dollars ($500.00) or more."

Thus, to 
overcome appellant's motion, the State was required to produce evidence that, at 
the time and place alleged in the charging documents, appellant: (1) concealed 
property; (2) of a value of at least five hundred dollars; (3) with the 
knowledge, belief, or reasonable cause to believe that the property had been 
illegally obtained.

[¶12.]  Appellant concealed the Toyota, for purposes of 
the statute, if he placed it out of the owner's sight or prevented the owner 
from recognizing it. However, concealment does not require an effort to disguise 
or hide the vehicle; it merely requires that appellant drove the vehicle away 
from where the owner was likely to discover it. Hunter v. State, 704 P.2d 713, 
717-18 (Wyo. 
1985). Appellant's possession of the Toyota in 
Cheyenne, some eight hours after its theft in 
Laramie, is 
circumstantial evidence sufficient to make a prima facie showing that he 
concealed the car. By demonstrating that it was three years old and cost over 
two thousand dollars to repair, the State also provided sufficient evidence of 
the car's value. Finally, the State introduced considerable evidence to indicate 
appellant's awareness that the vehicle had been illegally obtained. Officer 
Zukauckas testified to appellant's admission that he took the Toyota in Laramie. The strongest possible proof that a 
car had been stolen and that a defendant knew that to be the case is provided by 
evidence of his participation in the theft. Pote, 695 P.2d  at 622. Additionally, 
appellant's evasive actions provide strong circumstantial evidence of his guilty 
state of mind. The district court correctly denied appellant's motion to acquit 
with respect to the charge of concealing stolen property.

AGGRAVATED 
ASSAULT

[¶13.]  We reach a similar conclusion with 
respect to the motion insofar as it relates to appellant's alleged assault 
against Officer Nicholl. The statute under which he was charged, W.S. 
6-2-502(a)(ii), provides:

"(a) A person is guilty 
of aggravated assault and battery if he:

* * * * * 
*

"(ii) Attempts to cause, 
or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly 
weapon."

Appellant 
contends only that the State's evidence was insufficient regarding his specific 
intent to cause bodily injury to Officer Nicholl. His argument relies heavily 
upon a superficial reading of our decision in Fuller v. State, 568 P.2d 900 
(Wyo. 1977). 
That argument is ill-conceived.

[¶14.]  In Fuller we explained that, although the 
law presumes an individual to generally intend the natural consequences of his 
actions, it will not presume that he specifically intended any particular 
consequence. That is, a mere showing that certain conduct occurred which 
produced a particular result is legally sufficient to establish the actor's 
general intent. Thus, we explained that the bare fact of assaultive behavior 
will not give rise to a presumption that an assailant had the specific intent to 
cause any particular harm. Id. at 903-04. We also noted, however, that 
such specific intent may be properly proven by reasonable inferences from the character of such 
acts and their surrounding circumstances. In particular, the specifics of a 
defendant's conduct and other circumstantial evidence may permit the jury to 
infer that he acted with the specific intent to cause bodily injury. Id. at 904. See also 
Johnston v. State, 747 P.2d 1132, 1135-36 
(Wyo. 1987); Simmons v. State, 674 P.2d 1294, 
1297 (Wyo. 1984); Brightwell v. State, 631 P.2d 1048, 1050 (Wyo. 1981). In the present case, the trial 
court's "Jury Instruction No. 8" properly informed the jury that such inferences 
were permissible by stating, "[Specific intent] may be determined from all the 
facts and circumstances surrounding the case." Appellant correctly notes that 
specific intent cannot be proved by presumption but conveniently ignores the 
State's proof of that intent by the permissible means of inference from 
circumstantial evidence.

[¶15.]  The transcript of appellant's trial is 
replete with testimony that, although apparently in full control of the 
Toyota, 
appellant repeatedly directed that potentially dangerous weapon towards a number 
of police officers. In each of those instances, either a collision occurred or 
the particular officer was forced to swerve off the roadway to avoid a 
collision. Additionally, Officer Zukauckas testified to a post-arrest interview, 
during which appellant stated that the officers were lucky he did not kill them. 
Viewing only the State's evidence, and in the light most favorable to the State, 
we find that this evidence would not necessarily cause a reasonable jury to 
harbor a reasonable doubt as to appellant's specific intent to cause bodily 
injury to Officer Nicholl. To the contrary, such a jury could reasonably infer 
from this evidence the existence of such intent beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
question is not whether other inferences would be possible. Rather, the question 
is whether a rational jury could possibly make this particular inference without 
entertaining a reasonable doubt as to the truth of the inferred fact. 
Washington, 751 P.2d at 386-87; Abeyta, 705 P.2d  at 332-33. The district court 
properly denied appellant's motion for acquittal.

PRIOR BAD 
ACTS

[¶16.]  During the presentation of its case, the 
State attempted to introduce the testimony of Officer Swezey concerning an 
altercation with appellant which occurred some two years prior to the date of 
the charged offenses. Appellant, then fifteen or sixteen years old, allegedly 
struck the officer when he tried to quell a disturbance at the home of 
appellant's father. Appellant objected that the State was making an improper use 
of his prior bad acts, contrary to the dictates of W.R.E. 404(b). The trial 
court, however, agreed with the prosecutor that such evidence was relevant to 
the issue of whether appellant mistakenly, accidentally or intentionally 
performed the acts that formed the basis of the three counts of aggravated 
assault. The court, therefore, overruled appellant's objection and admitted the 
testimony.

[¶17.]  Our recent decision in Coleman v. State, 
741 P.2d 99 (Wyo. 1987), provides a comprehensive outline 
of our position with respect to the admission of prior bad acts evidence. We 
noted in that decision that, while such evidence is not admissible solely to 
prove that a defendant possessed a particular character trait and that his 
present acts were a further reflection of that character, prior bad acts are 
admissible for certain purposes delineated by W.R.E. 404(b). We also explained 
that the trial court, in admitting such evidence, must perform the balancing 
test of W.R.E. 403, weighing the probative value of that evidence against the 
probability that it will unfairly prejudice or mislead the jury. Id. at 
102.

[¶18.]  As a means of aiding the district courts 
in their analysis of the Rule 404(b) problem, we set forth a number of factors 
to be considered in determining the admissibility of prior bad acts. Many of 
those factors were initially adopted from United States v. 
Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 42 A.L.R. Fed. 855 (5th Cir. 1977), in Bishop v. State, 
687 P.2d 242, 246 (Wyo. 1984). They are:

1. The extent to which 
the prosecution plainly, clearly, and convincingly can prove the other similar 
crimes.

2. The remoteness in time 
of those crimes from the charged offense.

3. The extent to which 
the evidence of other crimes is introduced for a purpose sanctioned by W.R.E. 
404(b).

4. The extent to which 
the element of the charged offense, that the evidence is introduced to prove, is 
actually at issue.

5. The extent to which 
the prosecution has a substantial need for the probative value of the evidence 
of other crimes. 

Additionally, we 
adopted the following approach as set out in C. McCormick, McCormick on Evidence 
§ 190 at 565 (3d ed. 1984):

"In deciding whether the 
danger of unfair prejudice and the like substantially outweighs the incremental 
probative value, a variety of matters must be considered, including the strength 
of the evidence as to the commission of the other crime, the similarities 
between the crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, 
the need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to 
which the evidence probably will rouse a jury to overmastering hostility." 
Coleman, 741 P.2d  at 104.

[¶19.]  On review, this court gives considerable 
deference to the trial court's discretionary balancing of these factors and its 
determination that the probative value of the prior bad acts outweighs its 
potential to unfairly prejudice the jury. Id. at 103-06. Thus, we will not reverse the 
trial court's decision if its alleged error was harmless. We must be convinced a 
reasonable possibility exists that, had the evidence been excluded, the jury's 
verdict would have been more favorable to the appellant. Bishop, 687 P.2d at 
246-47; Stambaugh v. State, 613 P.2d 1237, 1240 (Wyo. 1980). Such is not the case 
here.

[¶20.]  The State introduced a substantial amount 
of circumstantial evidence probative of appellant's intent to cause bodily 
injury to three officers. Those officers testified that on each occasion 
appellant sped toward them, making a dangerous collision inevitable had the 
officers not taken sudden evasive actions. In each instance, they testified to 
their belief that both appellant's actions and their own responses necessitated 
by those actions created a serious risk that they would suffer bodily injury. 
Additionally, evidence was introduced of appellant's post-arrest statements in 
which he expressed extreme hostility towards the officers who pursued 
him.

[¶21.]  While this evidence does not 
overwhelmingly establish appellant's intent to cause bodily harm, it is 
sufficient to convince us that appellant was not convicted because of his prior 
bad acts. An examination of the probative and prejudicial strength of the prior 
bad acts evidence, when considered against the jury's actual decision concerning 
the three related assault charges, adds even further certainty to that 
conclusion. Though appellant's assault on Officer Swezey was indeed relevant to 
his intent in the present case, the logical tendency of the former act to 
establish present intent is at best highly attenuated. The same can be said of 
its tendency to cause unfair prejudice. The actions of a fifteen year old boy 
defending his father, even from the legitimate exercise of police authority, 
cannot be said to be so inflammatory as to override the obvious perception that 
the events have little in common. Were we to assert that the jury had become so 
inflamed, we would be at a loss to explain why it was moved to find that 
appellant intended to injure only Officer Nicholl. That a similar intent was not 
found with respect to Officers Stone and Renner convinces us that something 
other than prejudice motivated the jury's verdict.

[¶22.]  The record reveals that the jury could 
easily have distinguished the incidents involving Stone and Renner from the near 
collision with Nicholl. When appellant, with his lights off but under full 
control of the vehicle, bore down on Officer Nicholl, the officer was not 
immediately aware of his presence and was seeking only to avoid appellant. Both 
Stone and Nicholl, however, were affirmatively attempting to block appellant's 
progress at a time when appellant was allegedly trying to negotiate or recover 
from a high speed turn. The jury could rationally conclude that, in these latter 
instances, the actions of the police officers contributed every bit as much to 
the creation of a hazard as did appellant's actions.

[¶23.]  We cannot, and need not, determine 
whether the jury analyzed the facts of this case in such a manner. We only note 
that properly admitted evidence supports and harmonizes a verdict which would 
appear inconsistent if motivated solely by prejudice. We are therefore convinced 
that the jury was not unduly or unfairly influenced by the introduction of 
appellant's prior bad acts, and that it properly decided this case on the 
evidence which was properly before it. If there was error in this regard (we do 
not say there was), it was undoubtedly harmless.

[¶24.]  Affirmed.

URBIGKIT, J., filed an opinion 
concurring in part and dissenting in part.

URBIGKIT, Justice, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part.

[¶25.]  I concur in affirming the conviction of 
Glenn Eddie Garcia (Garcia), age eighteen, for aggravated assault as well as 
interference with a police officer. These charges resulted from his conduct with 
a motor vehicle which endangered the police officer, the general public, his 
automobile passengers and, of course, himself. Differing, however, as to the 
concealing stolen property charge, I dissent in that conviction and would 
reverse that count.

[¶26.]  According to the appellate record, Garcia 
stole a 1984 dark-blue Toyota Celica in Laramie, 
Wyoming mid-afternoon on November 1, 1987, 
after which he purchased gasoline in Laramie, 
drove to Fort Collins, Colorado, purchased more gasoline and then came to 
Cheyenne, Wyoming. Local police, following an alert by 
an all points bulletin, observed the vehicle on the city streets and took up the 
chase. Nothing about Garcia's activities showed an effort to conceal. Garcia had 
picked up his fiancée and two other passengers in Cheyenne and then engaged in a course of 
in-town driving. The vehicle, for ease of identification, had a Wyoming license plate, 
was dark-blue in color and easily distinctive in model. I fail to find in these 
events and appellate record any sufficient evidence of concealing stolen 
property. We are presented with a course of behavior revealing Garcia's macho 
character by his driving around Cheyenne in the illegally taken, very 
identifiable automobile.1 Hunter v. State, 704 P.2d 713 
(Wyo. 1985), 
to the contrary, Garcia simply did not conceal the stolen property. This count 
within the total charges and concurrent sentences given will hopefully, at least 
for now, not make any difference for Garcia as he is called to task for his 
other very serious criminal misconduct. Cf. W.S. 6-10-201 (habitual criminal 
statute exposure if any further offenses should be a crime of violence). It is 
to be noted, however, that if the Laramie offense was joyriding, W.S. 31-11-102, 
and not larceny, W.S. 6-3-402, it would be only a misdemeanor while the 
concealment charge, W.S. 6-3-403, is a maximum ten year felony. See Engle v. 
State, 774 P.2d 1303 (Wyo. 1989).

[¶27.]  I would have preferred to have avoided 
these inquiries in dissent by application of the concurrent sentence doctrine. 
Driskill v. State, 761 P.2d 980 (Wyo. 1988). See Emanuel, The Concurrent 
Sentence Doctrine Dies a Quiet Death - Or Are the Reports Greatly Exaggerated?, 
16 Fla.St. U.L.Rev. 269 (1988). Nevertheless, since neither Garcia nor the State 
wish to discuss a question of why this concurrent sentence really matters, 
substantive consideration remains necessary for this issue of law of major 
significance in Wyoming criminal justice 
precedent.

[¶28.]  For Garcia, the act conceptualized into a 
concealing stolen property offense for trial in Laramie 
County, Wyoming is substituted for 
the actual offense of felony larceny or misdemeanor joyriding committed in 
AlbanyCounty. In that process, we 
create what is not so as to be something by a mirage of language. Garcia did 
everything but conceal that dark-blue, 1984 Wyoming licensed Toyota Celica and, in 
concurring with the appropriate conviction of the offenses for what he did do, I 
would not convict him of what he obviously did not do. My concern is not the 
double jeopardy question of two convictions for the same offense, it is in the 
creation of an independently conceived and necessarily corollary duplicate 
offense for every occurrence of larceny. Jackson 
v. Com., 670 S.W.2d 828 (Ky. 1984), cert. 
denied 469 U.S. 1111, 105 S. Ct. 791, 83 L. Ed. 2d 784 (1985).

[¶29.]  In historical perspective, it is apparent 
that the ancestors of the receiving, concealing and disposing statute, now W.S. 
6-3-403,2 was initially adopted as a 
third-party crime to augment the first-party offense of larceny currently 
provided in W.S. 6-3-402.3 See in historical perspective the 
original Wyoming statute, 1890 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 
73.4

[¶30.]  From there, statutory construction has 
clouded original intent despite the continued recognition that the thief could 
also not be guilty of receiving. This result has occurred by further implication 
that an offense could exist of concealment or disposition as a first-party 
crime. The adaptation was not without resistance, but this court took the 
concept to ultimate application in Hunter, 704 P.2d 713 by conclusion that in 
driving out of Michigan in a stolen car, a concealing offense occurred in 
stopping to ask directions from police in Laramie, 
Wyoming.

[¶31.]  This historical process of judicial 
legislating to cover expanded areas of conviction has viable precedent, but the 
majority now accommodates an extension that is not justified in history, 
language or existent case law. Where concealment has been expanded to the thief 
as a first-person, not third-person offense, the case law has required a 
discrete offense as subsequent in time to the initial larceny for separation 
from the initial principal offense. That consonant is missing in the present 
expansion of a criminal offense to cover a joyriding offense as a concealment 
crime. Here, undoubtedly, if Garcia had been somewhat more careful in publicly 
driving the stolen vehicle around Cheyenne, he 
would either have had the opportunity to return to Laramie or abandon the vehicle in Cheyenne.

[¶32.]  Within the extensive national case law, 
Hunter reaches the outer limits of criminal conviction justification; 
permitting, however, an accommodation to be made for this case which still 
denies present affirmation. Missing for any comparable acceptability, even where 
the conjunctive offenses can be impressed upon the original thief, are facts 
sufficiently removed to create a separate or discrete criminal offense arising 
from doing something more than committing the original larceny. Initial 
instruction is provided by the early Wyoming 
case of Curran v. State, 12 Wyo. 553, 76 P. 577 
(1904) and the superintending constitutional analysis of Milanovich v. 
United States, 365 U.S. 551, 81 S. Ct. 728, 5 L. Ed. 2d 773 
(1961). The perceptive interpretation of Justice Frankfurter, although in 
dissent in Milanovich, has irreversibly set the standard for application of a 
second offense chargeable to the thief after completion of the 
larceny:

It is hornbook law that a 
thief cannot be charged with committing two offenses - that is, stealing and 
receiving the goods he has stolen. E.g., Cartwright v. United States, 
146 F.2d 133; State v. Tindall, 213 S.C. 484, 50 S.E.2d 188; see 2 Wharton, 
Criminal Law and Procedure, § 576; 136 A.L.R. 1087. And this is so for the 
commonsensical, if not obvious, reason that a man who takes property does not at 
the same time give himself the property he has taken. In short, taking and 
receiving, as a contemporaneous - indeed a coincidental - phenomenon, constitute 
one transaction in life and, therefore, not two transactions in law. It also may 
well be that a person who does not himself take but is a contemporaneous 
participant as an aider and abettor in the taking is also a participant in a 
single transaction and therefore has committed but a single offense. Regina v. Coggins, 12 Cox C.C. 517; Regina v. Perkins, 2 Den. 
C.C. 458, 169 Eng.Rep. 582; Rex v. Owen, 1 Moody C.C. 96, 168 Eng.Rep. 1200. In 
such a case, the jury must be told that the taking and receiving, being but a 
single transaction, constitute, of course, only one crime. SeeCommonwealth v. Haskins, 128 Mass. 60. (This, of 
course, does not bar Congress from outlawing and punishing as separate offenses 
the severable ingredients of one compound transaction. See Gore v. 
United States, 357 U.S. 386 [78 S. Ct. 1280, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1405].)

The case before us 
presents a totally different situation - not a coincidental or even a 
contemporaneous transaction, in the loosest conception of contemporaneity. Here 
we have two clearly severed transactions. The case against the defendant - and 
the only case - presented two behaviors or transactions by defendant clearly and 
decisively separated in time and in will. The intervening seventeen days between 
defendant's accessorial share in the theft and her conduct as a recipient left 
the amplest opportunities for events outside her control to frustrate her hope 
of sharing in the booty, or ample time for her to change her criminal purpose 
and avail herself of a locus poenitentiae. Two larcenies, separated in time, 
would not be merged * * *.

Milanovich, 365 U.S.  at 558-59, 81 S. Ct.  at 731-32 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

[¶33.]  It is in the absence of a lapse of time 
during one joyriding episode during an afternoon and evening activity by 
continuing to use the stolen Toyota Celica that this decision of the majority is 
faulty in persuasion and legal perspective in extracting a concealment offense. 
In order to recognize the attributes of this judicially created offense, it is 
necessary to observe that the character of conduct within the single statute has 
come to be differentiated where commonly including a choice of receipt, 
concealment or disposition. It was first factually obvious that the receiving 
could not create a second offense if the thief was the only actor. As a singular 
number of cases recite, a person cannot receive from himself where the larcenous 
conduct affixed the original possession for him. However, the ingenuity of 
effort of the courts to affirm convictions and ease venue choice problems in 
conviction came to recognize that there could be a theory of a separate event as 
a second crime by either concealment or property disposition. This application 
abandons the historical concept that the original statutes (often more severe in 
punishment than larceny) were directed at the fence or marketer in 
crime.

[¶34.]  Curran fits within this perspective. In 
that case, there was no certain proof that the defendant participated in the 
original theft, although thereafter contributing in crime by receipt of the 
merchandise from an unproved source who was, in fact, apparently a coworker who 
had pleaded guilty. The second offense status of receipt and concealment was 
established and proof of the original theft was not required. Curran was 
convicted of being a guilty receiver so that in a prosecution against a receiver 
the name of the thief is immaterial. Curran, 12 Wyo. at 572, 76 P. 577. The material facts for 
that case were (1) receipt (2) of goods that had been stolen and (3) knowing 
them to have been stolen. This resolution is not in conflict with Milanovich, 
but specifically falls within the Frankfurter second-offense criteria. The 
obvious differentiation here between Garcia's conviction and Hunter's offense is 
time and geography sufficient to extrapolate out another or second crime instead 
of one joyriding sequence.

[¶35.]  To apprehend any logic in this 
progression, we should first understand the initial third-party conduct 
determinant of these receiving, concealing and disposing statutes and then apply 
the majority and dissent in Milanovich to define the redirection achieved. The 
basic point of non-application of a crime to the thief "receiving from himself," 
Milanovich, 365 U.S.  at 552, 81 S. Ct.  at 729, was conclusively stated and 
comprehensively supported in Annotation, May Participant in Larceny or Theft Be 
Convicted of Offenses of Receiving or Concealing the Stolen Property?, 136 
A.L.R. 1087, 1088 (1942), which states that "[i]t is an elementary principle of 
law that the principal in a theft, or the person who actually steals the 
property, cannot be convicted of the crime of receiving, concealing, or aiding 
in the concealment of the property stolen." Included within the more than 100 
cases cited in that annotation and its succeeding update services, are 
Milanovich, 365 U.S. 551, 81 S. Ct. 728; United States v. Casey, 540 F.2d 811 
(5th Cir. 1976); Leon v. State, 21 Ariz. 418, 189 P. 433 (1920); People v. 
Jackson, 78 Cal. App. 3d 533, 144 Cal. Rptr. 199 (1978); People v. Jaramillo, 16 Cal. 3d 752, 129 Cal. Rptr. 306, 548 P.2d 706 (1976); People v. Tatum, 209 Cal. App. 2d 179, 25 Cal. Rptr. 832 (1962); Duncan v. State, 503 So. 2d 443 
(Fla.App. 1987); People v. Feinberg, 237 Ill. 348, 86 N.E. 584 (1908); State v. 
Alvarez, 9 Kan. App. 2d 371, 678 P.2d 1132 (1984); Com. v. McCann, 16 Mass. App. 
990, 454 N.E.2d 497 (1983); State v. Hines, 354 N.W.2d 91 (Minn.App. 1984); and 
State v. Hancock, 44 Wn. App. 297, 721 P.2d 1006 (1986). This rule is 
comprehensively and decisively settled that where a larceny has been committed, 
the principal thief, that is the one who is guilty of the actual taking, cannot 
be adjudged guilty of criminally receiving the stolen goods for the reason that 
the thief cannot receive from himself. See Leon, 189 P.  at 434. See also W. 
LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law § 93 at 681 (1972).

[¶36.]  Further analysis is then required to 
follow what is best described as the discrete - differentiated offense flowing 
from the concealment or disposition function of the post-larceny possession 
statutes such as W.S. 6-3-403(a). Within this concept as was advanced by Justice 
Frankfurter in Milanovich, it is apparent that transitionally severed 
occurrences as separated in time and in will are required to create a basis for 
conviction of the thief for a second offense. Milanovich, 365 U.S.  at 559, 81 S. Ct.  at 732. 
Initially related to the offense or a third-party, see discussion in Jackson, 144 Cal. Rptr. 199 
and Jaramillo, 548 P.2d 706.

[¶37.]  This adaptation developed to ensnare the 
initial thief for commission of a second offense against the property invokes 
establishment of that follow-on or separable offense. It is in accord with the 
conduct of Hunter in driving from Michigan away 
from the owner and police of that state to Wyoming, that justification in policy and 
precedent exists. Hunter only goes as far as it goes, and Pote v. State, 695 P.2d 617 (Wyo. 
1985) extends no further in support of what this majority now attempts to do to 
affirm. In Pote, the concealed car and guns had been acquired by larcenous 
conduct of persons not clearly determined sometime earlier in Washington and Oregon. Whatever those discrete offenses may 
have first been, they ended with completion of the thievery at that 
geographically far removed location and the new offense occurred in Park County, 
Wyoming by the secretion of the stolen property at the cabin when occupied by 
the criminals in attempted escape from the bar room shoot out in Cody, 
Wyoming.

[¶38.]  In Hunter, the Laramie, Wyoming offense was different from the 
original taking. In Pote, there was certainly a different course of criminal 
conduct. Curran also adds no support since the essence of that case clearly 
demonstrated that Curran was not the initial thief from the Union Pacific 
Railroad Company but rather a guilty receiver. Proof of identity of the original 
thief was not required for conviction of the crime of receipt. The 
differentiation between an accessory offense and the substantive felony is 
clearly identified. SeeState v. Tageant, 673 P.2d 651 (Wyo. 1983), where the 
only appellate issue was knowledge of the stolen character of the merchandise. 
That issue does not offend the discrete offense requirement for second 
conviction which is this appellate issue.

[¶39.]  In broad perspective, the only issue at 
task in development of a definable and consistent legal theory which retains 
logic and rejects fantasy of a philosophic bent to confirm conviction is what 
conduct is intrinsic to the original offense in its continuing nature and what 
conduct is separate and discrete as an additional offense. Conduct of selling 
stolen property is easy to identify; but retaining for a period of time embraces 
questions of further defined conduct or intent to produce the second crime after 
the original theft. Tageant was of the first class involving admitted resale. 
Hunter was the second conception. We now face Garcia which embraces only one 
continuous joyriding episode.

[¶40.]  In addition to the dual event thesis to 
be derived from the somewhat recent Milanovich case, a course of development 
accommodating the discrete offense differentiation as a definable progression of 
the law can be ascertained from a course of other cases. The basic original 
cases include Byrd v. State, 117 Tex.Cr. 489, 38 S.W.2d 332 (1931). See also 
Jaramillo, 548 P.2d 706; State v. Weiner, 84 Conn. 411, 80 A. 198 (1911); State v. Ward, 40 Conn. 429 
(1881); Wertheimer & Goldberg v. State, 201 Ind. 572, 169 N.E. 40 (1929); 
Com. v. Matheson, 328 Mass. 371, 103 N.E.2d 714 
(1952); People v. Harris, 53 N.W. 780 (Mich. 1892); and Recent Case, Criminal Law - 
Receiving Stolen Property. - [Texas], 27 Ill.L.Rev. 207 (1932). Jaramillo 
involved driving a stolen vehicle, where the car was stolen in San Diego in August 1972 and about twelve days later, the 
defendant was found driving the car in Van Nuys, California. Jaramillo was charged with both 
theft and receiving and was convicted of both. The Supreme Court of California 
reversed by leaving an option for retrial or reinstatement of the conviction 
only on receiving.

[¶41.]  The Michigan court in Harris, 53 N.W. 780 dealt 
with charges of both stealing and concealing the horse. The court affirmed the 
count of conviction for concealment on trial proof that Harris was not in the 
vicinity when the horse was abducted. The separate offense existed for which 
Harris was properly convicted. In Byrd, 38 S.W.2d 332, the issue was whether the 
evidence had proven a case of theft and not one of receiving stolen property for 
which defendant was convicted. The contemporaneous nature of the facts defined 
Byrd as a principal in theft and "being a principal to the theft, he cannot be 
guilty of the crime of knowingly receiving said stolen cattle, and can only be 
convicted of the offense of which the evidence shows him guilty, and for this 
reason the judgment of the trial court cannot be sustained." Id. at 
334.

[¶42.]  In Com. v. Kuperstein, 207 Mass. 25, 92 N.E. 1008, 1009 (1910), it was questioned whether defendant aided in getting the 
cloth disposed so that it might find its way into the ordinary channels of 
trade, and by being commingled with the general merchandise of the country, lose 
the marks of identity as stolen property. This might be effective aid in its 
concealment. See similarly in question Harris, 53 N.W. 780. In Matheson, 103 N.E.2d  at 714, defendant aided in the concealment of the stolen goods knowing 
them to have been stolen. In State v. Moynahan, 164 Conn. 560, 325 A.2d 199, 
cert. denied 414 U.S. 976, 94 S. Ct. 291, 38 L. Ed. 2d 219 (1973), the deputy 
superintendent of police acquired and disposed of a stolen television set. That 
case recognizes that a third party, upon acquisition of known stolen property, 
conceals it criminally if he does not return it and conversely converts it to 
his own use involving affirmative prescribed conduct not related to initial 
theft. See likewise State v. Pambianchi, 139 Conn. 543, 95 A.2d 695 (1953). The word 
"conceals" ordinarily implies design or purpose. Norton v. State, 119 Neb. 588, 230 N.W. 438 
(1930). The conduct becomes a substantive crime separate from just theft. See 
also United States v. 
Pichany, 490 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1973) and State v. Conklin, 153 Iowa 216, 133 N.W. 119 
(1911). In Lindsey v. Com., 383 S.W.2d 333 (Ky. 1964), after admission of initial theft, 
the receiving charge was dismissed and defendant was promptly recharged and 
convicted on the theft as a differentiated transaction from the original 
receiving charge. See also Tramnell v. State, 511 S.W.2d 951 (Tex.Cr.App. 
1974).

[¶43.]  Analysis of the case law provides 
relevant tests for facts adjudicatively sufficient to show the differentiated or 
discrete offense of concealing or disposing which will escape the confinement of 
the one offense crime for a single theft. The near unanimous case law, except in 
two cases of the recent innovation of an alternative venue statute,5 delineates required proof of a 
successive separate offense.

[¶44.]  What conduct of the thief is sufficient 
to create the second offense responsibility for what he does with the property 
after the initial act of borrowing or stealing, e.g., taking and removal 
(driving away)? In Jackson, 144 Cal. Rptr. 199, acquisition and 
retention for resale as one transaction did not invoke application of receiving, 
concealing and withholding as an additional or different crime. Tatum, 25 Cal. Rptr. 832 presented a house trailer stolen in Lancaster, California on 
November 7 and located three days later parked in Moorpark, California. Defendant was tried and acquitted 
of theft for the original taking and then charged in VenturaCounty with concealing. That court 
said:

We conclude that, in the 
absence of facts indicating a complete divorcement of the concealing activities 
from the course of conduct of the thief in the initial concealing of the 
property stolen by him, a thief may not be found guilty of concealment in 
violation of section 496(1). (Accord: People v. Daghita, 301 N.Y. 223, 93 N.E.2d 649.) In the instant case a review of the testimony reveals there was no 
evidence of concealment independent of that involved in the theft. In the 
absence of such evidence it was error to instruct the jury that they could find 
defendant guilty of concealment even though they believed he had stolen the 
trailer.

Had there been evidence 
of acts of concealment entirely separate and apart from the theft and 
sufficiently removed therefrom to constitute an independent course of conduct, 
then an instruction which clearly spelled out such distinction could properly 
have been given.

Id. 25 Cal. Rptr.  at 835. 
Similarly postured in California law are People v. Marquez, 237 Cal. App. 2d 627, 47 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1965), disapproved on other bases sub nom. 
People v. Ramirez, 668 P.2d 761, 767 (Cal. 
1983) and Williams v. SuperiorCourtofLos AngelesCounty, 81 Cal. App. 3d 330, 146 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1978). In the latter case, in comprehensive review, the defendant attorneys 
lost the challenge to charges against them for receiving and concealing when 
they surreptitiously obtained an insurance company's investigative file which 
was then used to solicit clients and achieve a large personal injury settlement. 
They were not innocent acquirers. In State v. Para, 120 Ariz. 26, 583 P.2d 1346, 
1349-50 (1978), the court faced a course of action not proved to have been 
originally a theft but a later retention of whether the

"acts of concealment 
entirely separate and apart from the theft and sufficiently removed therefrom to 
constitute an independent course of conduct." People v. Tatum, 209 Cal. App. 2d 179, 185, 25 Cal. Rptr. 832, 835 (1962). We believe the rule stated by the 
California 
courts is applicable to our statute. Thus, in order to return a verdict of 
guilty, the jury had to find (1) that appellant stole the horses by possessing 
or concealing them when he knew they were not his, and (2) that appellant 
committed further acts of possession or concealment. The evidence was sufficient 
to present a jury question on this issue.

Based on 
inadequate instructions, the conviction was reversed.

[¶45.]  The Oregon court adduced the same rule for 
application of initial theft and subsequent removal to a disassociated rural 
location "to a deserted area and concealed the [stolen] meters under some trees 
and stumps." State v. Carlton, 233 Or. 296, 378 P.2d 557, 557 (1963). 
That court said in analysis:

The keystone of the 
defense's contention is the proposition that a thief cannot be convicted of receiving stolen property when the 
property received is the selfsame 
property which he stole. The state concedes this proposition. It is without 
contradiction. 2 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure (Anderson), § 576. This 
proposition is based upon the logical reason that one cannot receive something 
from one's self. Here, however, the court convicted Carlton of concealing stolen property. The court 
stated it was not necessary to decide whether or not the defendant was also 
guilty of receiving stolen 
property.

Once this distinction is 
comprehended, that defendant was convicted of concealing, not receiving, stolen 
property, it is apparent that the logical barrier, one cannot receive from one's 
self, has no materiality. This then becomes a commonplace situation. The 
defendant engaged in a criminal transaction, or course of conduct. He stole 
meters; he carried them off; and he concealed them. The state selected one part 
of this transaction which constituted the crime of concealing stolen property 
and the defendant was convicted of such crime. The defendant is contending that 
he cannot be convicted of concealing the stolen property because the state could 
have convicted him of a different crime involving the first part of the 
transaction, i.e., stealing or larceny. The fact that one transaction embodies 
facts constituting two crimes and the state chooses to prosecute for one rather 
than the other cannot avail defendant, unless the existence of one crime 
precludes the other. Proving larceny precludes establishment of receiving, but 
not concealing.

Id. 378 P.2d  at 
557 (emphasis in original).

[¶46.]  The Washington case, Hancock, 721 P.2d 1006, is 
distinguishable in application of similar facts from the Oregon case but follows 
the same perception in denial of the second offense of possession where the 
miscreant held the stolen cheese until a sale could be obtained. The Washington court reversed 
the second conviction on the basis that only one offense had occurred. Taking 
the cheese to a barn for three weeks was not sufficient to create a second 
criminal offense of concealment following the original theft. See also Alvarez, 
678 P.2d 1132, where the differentiated offense charge created a venue question 
for a doubled crime claim. The truck was stolen in McPherson 
County, Kansas and found with 
defendant in Segwick County, 
Kansas. The court determined that 
McPhersonCounty venue did not permit 
complaint amendment to charge a crime committed in another county involving 
receipt of stolen property.

[¶47.]  Attuned to this two-offense criteria is 
State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Utah App. 1987), cert. granted 765 P.2d 1277 
(Utah 1988), 
where the theft of the automobile occurred in 1981 and both concealment with 
possession and use continued for the next four years. The Utah court affirmed theft 
for the original crime and possession by conclusion that "[t]he crime of theft 
by no means includes retention and possession of the stolen goods for a period 
in excess of four years." Id. at 97. That case provided justification in 
broader perspective than did our decision in Hunter. In State v. Ellerbe, 217 
La. 639, 47 So. 2d 30 (1950), the court opined that pigs which were obtained 
illegally in Franklin Parish, Louisiana and then taken to Caldwell Parish, 
Louisiana where the defendant resided did not create an offense of receiving 
stolen property separately in his home parish where the receiving offense had 
been committed elsewhere. That case is to be compared with the later case of 
State v. Crum, 255 La. 60, 229 So. 2d 700 (1969), where the motor vehicle was 
stolen in Mississippi and then taken to New Orleans and used in a robbery. 
Concealment was found for a criminal offense. Attendant circumstances were 
considered and found as

[t]he commingling of a 
stolen automobile with other vehicles on the public thoroughfares of a city 
foreign to and removed from the owner is an effective hinderance to the owner's 
discovery of it.

We conclude that the 
removal of the automobile by Crum and Smith from Mississippi to Louisiana, 
and more particularly into the populous City of New Orleans, and their use of it for their own 
purposes and benefit were calculated to hinder or prevent the owner's discovery 
and recovery of it, and constitute "concealing" within the 
statute.

Id. 229 So. 2d  at 
701.

[¶48.]  It is apparent that a singular difference 
exists between taking a car from Mississippi to 
the large metropolitan of New Orleans when 
compared with joyriding around the Laramie, 
Fort Collins, and Cheyenne areas at a distance from original 
taking of approximately forty-five miles. Factually similar to this case and 
precedentially influential in reasoning is the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
opinion in Casey, 540 F.2d 811, where the automobile was stolen in Alabama and shortly thereafter found as occupied by 
defendant in Georgia. At issue was a concealment 
charge. That court observed:

Although the term 
"conceal" as used in [federal law] is not limited to physically secreting the 
vehicle, all of the cases which have found sufficient evidence to sustain a 
conviction for concealment have involved some overt physical act on the part of 
the Defendant. For example, this Circuit, as others, has held that acts such as 
altering title papers, changing vehicle identification numbers, changing license 
plates, or making false statements on title applications, fall within the broad 
definition of the term.

The difference between 
oral deception and physical deception is a distinction with a difference under 
[federal law]. All of the overt physical acts in other cases affirming [federal 
law] convictions operated in some sense to conceal the stolen vehicle as well as 
to conceal the crime. Changing a car's license plates, like painting it a 
different color, is a deliberate and premeditated physical attempt to disguise 
the vehicle - to make it seem to be one other than the one which was stolen. A 
spontaneous verbal denial that one has stolen the car one is driving simply does 
not rise to this level of "concealment." The stolen vehicle is there, in its 
original form, for all the world to see - through verbalization, the miscreant 
can only hope to conceal the fact that a crime has 
occurred.

Id. at 815 (footnotes 
omitted).

[¶49.]  It is my reasoned conclusion by following 
the general concept of the law, that Garcia's activities did not provide 
sufficient evidence to justify his conviction for a post-theft offense of the 
felony of concealment under W.S. 6-3-403. He did not conceal and should not be 
convicted of what he did not do. These facts do not justify that judicial 
expansion by slight of phrase to result in making any taking into a two-crime 
offense. The logical result is to create a conclusive presumption that if you 
steal, you conceal, and effectively repeals the joyriding misdemeanor statute. 
Cf. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S. Ct. 2450, 61 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1979).

[¶50.]  I respectfully concur in affirming the 
conviction of Glenn Eddie Garcia for aggravated assault as well as interference 
with a police officer, but dissent as to the concealing stolen property charge 
and would reverse conviction on that count.

FOOTNOTES

1 The record also reveals 
different explanations of different passengers as to how he got the car, but to 
none that it was stolen until he tried to escape when spotted by the police. 
This case does tell "the rest of the story" which is unfortunately missing from 
television and movie exploitation of hot rod driving and police chase escapes as 
a world of fantasy and non-described risk. See also Coryell v. Town of Pinedale, 745 P.2d 883 (Wyo. 1987) (Urbigkit, J., specially 
concurring). Joyriding can end up to be attempted or committed 
homicide.

2 W.S. 6-3-403 
states:

(a) A person who buys, 
receives, conceals or disposes of property which he knows, believes or has 
reasonable cause to believe was obtained in violation of law is guilty 
of:

(i) A felony punishable 
by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more than ten 
thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both, if the value of the property is five 
hundred dollars ($500.00) or more; or

* * * * * 
*

(b) A person may be 
indicted under this section in the county where he received or possessed the 
property, notwithstanding the wrongful taking occurred in another 
county.

3 W.S. 6-3-402 states in 
part:

(a) A person who steals, 
takes and carries, leads or drives away property of another with intent to 
deprive the owner or lawful possessor is guilty of 
larceny.

(b) A bailee, a public 
servant as defined by W.S. 6-5-101(a)(vi) or any person entrusted with the 
control, care or custody of any money or other property who, with intent to 
steal or to deprive the owner of the property, converts the property to his own 
or another's use is guilty of larceny.

* * * * * 
*

(d) Conduct denoted 
larceny in this section constitutes a single offense embracing the separate 
crimes formerly known as larceny, larceny by bailee or 
embezzlement.

4 Section 39 of 1890 
Wyo. Sess. 
Laws ch. 73 states:

Whoever feloniously 
steals, takes and carries, leads or drives away the personal goods of another of 
the value of twenty-five dollars or upwards, is guilty of grand larceny, and 
shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than ten 
years.

Section 41 of 
1890 Wyo. 
Sess. Laws ch. 73 states:

Whoever buys, receives, 
conceals or aids in the concealment of anything of value, which has been stolen, 
taken by robbers, embezzled or obtained by false pretense, knowing the same to 
have been stolen, taken by robbers, embezzled or obtained by false pretense, 
shall, if the goods are of the value of twenty-five dollars or upwards, suffer 
the punishment prescribed for grand larceny, and if the goods are worth less 
than twenty-five dollars, shall suffer the punishment prescribed for petit 
larceny.

5 There are two cases 
based on recent state statutes which affirmatively find a separate offense of 
possession of stolen property at time of arrest no matter how related in time or 
activity to the earlier theft. See Sutton v. Com., 623 S.W.2d 879 (Ky. 1981) and People v. Hastings, 422 Mich. 267, 373 N.W.2d 533 
(1985). These statutes actually create an alternative but not a double offense 
exposure by creation of a possession offense. See Jackson, 670 S.W.2d 828 and Phillips v. Com., 679 S.W.2d 235 (Ky. 
1984), holding that dual prosecution is inappropriate since the offenses 
merged.