Title: Gray v. SK Constr. Co.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

GRAY, ADMR., ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. SK CONSTRUCTION COMPANY ET AL;  CITY 
OF DAYTON, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Gray v. SK Constr. Co. (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 262.] 
Discretionary appeal allowed – Court of appeals’ judgment reversed on authority 
of State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward. 
(No. 99-1327 – Submitted September 21, 1999 – Decided December 1, 1999.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 98AP-947. 
__________________ 
 
David M. Deutsch Co., L.P.A., and David M. Deutsch, for appellants. 
 
Freund, Freeze & Arnold, Neil F. Freund and Shawn M. Blatt, for appellee. 
__________________ 
 
The discretionary appeal is allowed. 
 
The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded 
on the authority of State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward (1999), 
86 Ohio St.3d 451, 715 N.E.2d 1062. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur separately. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
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DOUGLAS, J., concurring.  For the reasons stated in my concurrence in 
Burger v. Cleveland Hts. (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 188, 189, 718 N.E.2d 912, I 
respectfully concur. 
 
RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur in the foregoing concurring opinion. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting.  I disagree with the decision of the majority, 
which reverses the judgment of the court of appeals on the authority of State ex rel. 
Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 715 N.E.2d 
1062.  The parties in this case did not challenge the constitutionality of 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350, and, therefore, I believe that the case should have been 
decided on the issue raised.  While it is true that if Sheward is to be followed in the 
instant case, the question whether R.C. 2744.02(C) as amended by Am.Sub.H.B. 
No. 350 should be applied retroactively to the instant case would be rendered 
moot, I would not want a vote of concurrence in this case to in any way suggest 
that I believe Sheward should necessarily be followed by this court in the future.  
Therefore, I dissent. 
 
It is not unusual for this court to summarily decide pending cases that raise 
legal issues dependent on those recently decided by the court in another case.  It 
has been my past practice in such circumstances to follow the law announced in 
the earlier case, even where I dissented from the decision of the majority in that 
 
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earlier case.  My reason is based on my belief that once this court announces its 
opinion on an issue of law, that principle of law should be applied consistently to 
all persons similarly situated, whether or not I agree with that principle. 
 
Regrettably, I am compelled to make an exception to that practice in this 
case.  In view of irregularities in the assumption of jurisdiction and the inclusion of 
inappropriate references to the conduct of the General Assembly in State ex rel. 
Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, as is more fully described in my 
dissent therein, I cannot agree that Sheward should control the outcome of this 
case. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.