Title: Crawford v. Crawford

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Crawford v. Crawford1988 WY 90757 P.2d 563Case Number: 88-9, 88-10Decided: 07/07/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
HARRY C. CRAWFORD, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

FAYE L. CRAWFORD, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

FAYE L. CRAWFORD, 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

v.

HARRY C. CRAWFORD, 
APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, 
J.

Roberta A. 
Coates and Richard Wolf, Cheyenne, for Faye L. 
Crawford.

Bernard E. Cole 
and Donald A. Cole, Cheyenne, for Harry C. 
Crawford.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY, 
JJ., and BROWN, J. (Retired).

BROWN, Justice.1

1 Chief Justice, Retired, 
June 30, 1988.

[¶1.]     In these consolidated 
appeals Harry C. Crawford (Harry) appeals from a portion of a judgment of the 
district court, dated November 23, 1987, ordering him to pay $12,000 to his 
ex-wife to satisfy his obligations under a property settlement agreement 
incorporated into a divorce decree filed on August 23, 1985. Faye L. Crawford 
(Faye) cross-appeals from the portion of the same judgment denying her motion 
for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3), Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure, concerning the setting aside of a transfer of a warehouse shelter 
stock based on alleged fraudulent misrepresentation as to its 
value.

[¶2.]     As to the $12,000 
order, Harry states the issue as:

"Did the District Court 
err in holding that the parties who executed a Property Settlement Agreement 
intended for [Faye] to receive a sum certain out of a fixed pool of assets 
despite [Faye's] reduction of the designated assets prior to execution of the 
agreement?"

[¶3.]     Concerning the denial 
of her motion, Faye inquires:

"Whether a Judgment and 
Decree of Divorce incorporating a Property Settlement Agreement, which Property 
Settlement Agreement was based upon misrepresentations of one party to another 
during the negotiation of that Property Settlement Agreement, should be 
modified."

[¶4.]     The portion of the 
judgment ordering Harry to pay $12,000 to Faye is reversed. The portion of the 
judgment denying Faye's motion is affirmed.

[¶5.]     On November 19, 1984, 
Faye filed a complaint for divorce in the First Judicial District. Harry filed 
an answer and counterclaim on November 30, 1984. Before a scheduled trial, the 
parties entered into a property settlement agreement (agreement), dated June 20, 
1985, which was approved by the court and incorporated into the judgment and 
decree of divorce filed August 23, 1985. The agreement, drafted by Faye and her 
attorney, essentially provided for an approximately equal distribution of the 
marital assets. Pertinent portions of the agreement provide as 
follows:

"1. Property 
Settlement

"a. The Wife shall 
receive as her sole and separate property, all the following 
assets:

"* * 
*

"8. Cash interest in the 
following totaling $41,000.00

"AG Edwards                                                
$25,000 

"Municipal Bonds                              
15,000 

"Bonds - safety deposit 
                               
10,000 

"Capitol savings                                
10,000 

"CD's (United)                                               
7,000 

"Cash - checking                               
8,000

"* * 
*

"b. The Husband shall 
receive as his sole and separate property, all of the following 
assets:

"* * 
*

"5. Balance of cash 
interest in the following after distribution pursuant to paragraph eight (8) 
above.

"AG Edwards                                                
$25,000 

"Municipal Bonds                              
15,000 

"Bonds - safety deposit 
                               
10,000 

"Capitol savings                                
10,000 

"CD's (United)                                               
7,000 

"Cash - checking                               
8,000"

The agreement 
also provided for the transfer to Faye of full right, title and interest in a 
warehouse shelter stock, estimated by Harry, in a proposed distribution of 
assets, to have the value of $26,000.

[¶6.]     A year later, on August 
21, 1986, Faye filed a motion for relief from judgment aimed at modifying or 
clarifying the divorce decree or alternatively, setting aside the decree 
altogether pursuant to Rule 60, W.R.C.P. In support of her motion, Faye alleged 
that Harry, in the proposed distribution of assets, had fraudulently 
misrepresented the value of the warehouse shelter stock transferred to her 
pursuant to the agreement, and that she, therefore, received less than she had 
negotiated for.

[¶7.]     A hearing was held on 
Faye's motion on October 22, 1987. Faye testified that she had received the 
$15,000 in municipal bonds and a $14,000 check from Harry, totaling $29,000 
towards her interest in the $41,000. She also testified that she had already 
spent the $10,000 listed under the notation "Capitol Savings" in paragraph a.8, 
and the $7,000 listed under "CD's (United)," before the execution of the 
agreement in order to support herself while the divorce was pending. While she 
agreed that her share of the $41,000 was to be distributed from the listed 
assets specified in paragraph a.8 of the agreement, she disagreed that the 
$17,000 she had already spent comprised part of that 
amount.

[¶8.]     Harry testified that at 
the time the parties executed the agreement, he understood that all the assets 
listed within the disputed paragraph were still in existence and were to make up 
the entire pool of assets from which Faye was to receive the $41,000. Harry 
never received notice from Faye or her attorney that $17,000 of the assets they 
had listed in paragraph a.8 no longer existed on the date the agreement was 
executed. Harry stated that he gave Faye $14,000 from "AG Edwards," and that 
Faye had $10,000 worth of bonds within a safety deposit box, $10,000 worth of 
savings, and the $7,000 listed as "CD's." Harry contended, therefore, that Faye 
had received her full $41,000 share of the $75,000 listed in paragraph 
a.8.

[¶9.]     The trial court 
disagreed with Harry's contention and found that Faye had received only $29,000 
of the $41,000 and was, consequently, entitled to an additional $12,000 under 
the agreement. The trial court concluded that the assets liquidated by Faye 
amounted to temporary support while the divorce was pending and that she was 
entitled to the $41,000 as of the date the agreement was executed.2 The court further found that no fraud had been 
perpetrated by Harry in the valuation of the warehouse shelter stock transferred 
to Faye pursuant to the agreement, and thereby denied Faye's motion to have the 
transfer set aside under Rule 60(b)(3), W.R.C.P.

[¶10.]  Harry's appeal from the portion of the 
judgment ordering him to pay Faye $12,000 was docketed as No. 88-9. Faye's 
appeal from the portion of the judgment denying her motion to have the transfer 
of the warehouse shelter stock set aside was docketed as No. 88-10. These cases 
are consolidated in this appeal.

I

[¶11.]  Faye argues that the $41,000 she is to 
receive pursuant to the agreement is merely a cash amount to be transferred to 
her upon divorce exclusive of the $17,000 she already spent. While she agrees 
that the $41,000 is to come from those assets listed in paragraph a.8, she 
contends that the $17,000 she spent before execution of the agreement amounted 
to temporary support while the divorce was pending. The trial court agreed with 
her. We disagree. To adopt Faye's interpretation would require locating another 
source within the entire marital estate from which the $12,000 allegedly owed to 
Faye would come, rather than limiting payment from the assets listed in 
paragraph a.8.

[¶12.]  Our main purpose in the construction or 
interpretation of contracts or agreements is to determine the intention and 
understanding of the parties. Wolff v. Belco Development Corporation, Wyo., 736 P.2d 730, 732 
(1987). The intent of the parties to a clear and unambiguous written agreement 
will be derived from the words of the entire agreement and determined by the 
court as a matter of law. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company v. Paulson, Wyo., 
756 P.2d 764, 766 (1988); Tibbets v. P & M Petroleum Co., Wyo., 744 P.2d 651, 652-653 (1987); Nelson v. Nelson, Wyo., 740 P.2d 939, 940 (1987); and 
Wangler v. Federer, Wyo., 714 P.2d 1209, 1217 (1986). We will not use extrinsic 
evidence to contradict the plain meaning of a clear and unambiguous written 
agreement, Nelson v. Nelson, supra, at 940; Rouse v. Munroe, Wyo., 658 P.2d 74, 
78 (1983), nor will we rewrite a clear and unambiguous agreement under the guise 
of interpretation. Arnold v. Mountain West Farm 
Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, Wyo., 707 P.2d 161, 166 
(1985).

[¶13.]  With these principles in mind we look to 
the language of the agreement, specifically, paragraphs a.8 and b.5, 
state:

"a. The Wife shall 
receive as her sole and separate property, all the following 
assets:

"* * 
*

"8. Cash interest in the following totaling 
$41,000.00

"AG Edwards                                                
$25,000 

"Municipal Bonds                              
15,000 

"Bonds - safety deposit 
                               
10,000 

"Capitol savings                                
10,000 

"CD's (United)                                               
7,000 

"Cash - checking                               
8,000

"* * 
*

"b. The Husband shall 
receive as his sole and separate property, all of the following 
assets:

"* * 
*

"5. Balance of cash interest in the 
following after distribution pursuant to paragraph eight (8) 
above.

"AG Edwards                                                
$25,000 

"Municipal Bonds                              
15,000 

"Bonds - safety deposit 
                               
10,000 

"Capitol savings                                
10,000 

"CD's (United)                                               
7,000

 "Cash - checking                              
8,000

This language is 
clear and unambiguous. Curiously, both Faye and Harry agree with this 
conclusion. Paragraph a.8 of the agreement lists $75,000 in assets. Each asset 
listed is individually named with a specified valuation attached thereto. The 
plain language of the agreement provides that Faye is to receive $41,000 cash 
interest in those assets listed in paragraph a.8, with Harry to receive the 
balance pursuant to paragraph b.5. The intent of the parties, based on that 
language, is that the $41,000 is to come from the pool of assets listed in 
paragraph a.8 only, and not from the entire marital estate. This is the only 
construction that the agreement could logically have and the only one the 
parties could have intended.

[¶14.]  It is further uncontroverted that Faye 
and her attorney drafted the agreement, and that they did not inform Harry that 
Faye had spent the $17,000 before the agreement was executed. A contract should 
be construed most strongly against the party who drafted it. Kelliher v. 
Herman, Wyo., 701 P.2d 1157, 1159, n. 1 
(1985).

[¶15.]  The list in paragraph a.8 constitutes the 
entire pool of assets from which Faye's $41,000 share is to be derived. There is 
no other pool of assets from which this money could be transferred. That Faye 
liquidated the assets listed under the notations "CD's" and "savings," and 
thereby reduced the total value of the list of assets in paragraph a.8 from 
$75,000 to a sum $17,000 short of that, is immaterial and extrinsic evidence 
contradictory to the clear meaning of the agreement; it does not mean that Faye 
should be able to receive the $12,000 from another source. The intention of the 
parties was clearly to give Faye $41,000 from the pool of assets listed in paragraph 
a.8.

[¶16.]  This is also true in light of the entire 
agreement. The agreement divided the entire marital estate. Thus, realistically, 
no other source within the marital estate exists from which the money could be 
derived without destroying that other source and thwarting the clear intent of 
that pertinent provision.

[¶17.]  We hold that the agreement executed by 
Faye and Harry, and incorporated into the judgment and decree of divorce, 
evidences a binding and valid written agreement concerning the valuation and 
transfer of the various assets in dispute. That agreement is clear and 
unambiguous as written, and evidences intent to take the $41,000 from the pool 
of assets specifically listed in paragraph a.8 only. The trial court's ruling 
that the $17,000 spent by Faye before execution of the agreement amounted to 
temporary support during the pendency of the divorce is unfounded. Faye filed a 
motion for temporary support on April 26, 1985, but because the parties entered 
into the agreement, the motion was never heard. It was improper for the district 
court to rule that the money spent by Faye amounted to temporary support when 
Harry was not afforded an opportunity to be heard and cross-examined on this 
issue. The effect of the court's ruling was to open up the agreement and 
circumvent the intent of the parties clearly expressed in its language. The 
trial court abused its discretion by ignoring the plain and unambiguous language 
of the property settlement agreement.

II

[¶18.]  In case No. 88-10, Faye contends that the 
judgment and decree of divorce should be modified pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3), 
W.R.C.P., in a manner that would set aside the transfer of the warehouse shelter 
stock to her under the agreement. Faye alleged that Harry fraudulently 
misrepresented the value of the stock in his proposed distribution of assets 
relied upon by her in negotiating and drafting the agreement ultimately 
incorporated into the judgment and decree of divorce. Harry had listed the value 
of the warehouse shelter stock at $26,000 in the proposed distribution. Upon 
sale, however, Faye only received $14,000 for the stock. The trial court 
disagreed with Faye's characterization of the transaction and denied her motion 
to have the transfer set aside under Rule 60(b)(3), 
W.R.C.P.

[¶19.]  Rule 60(b)(3), W.R.C.P. provides for 
relief from a final judgment or proceeding for "* * * fraud (whether heretofore 
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of 
an adverse party * * *." Our standard in reviewing an attack on a judgment 
pursuant to Rule 60(b) is well settled:

"* * * Since the granting 
of relief pursuant to that rule is a matter of the exercise of the discretion by 
the trial court, on review the appellate court is limited to the question of 
whether there has occurred an abuse of the trial court's discretion. It was the 
Appellant's burden before the trial court to bring her cause within the claimed 
grounds for relief and to substantiate by adequate proof the grounds that she 
claimed for relief. The rule applies to special situations justifying 
extraordinary relief, but a showing of such exceptional circumstances should be 
made. A reversal of an order denying relief under Rule 60(b) will be ordered 
only if the trial court was clearly wrong." McBride v. McBride, Wyo., 598 P.2d 814, 816 
(1979).

See also Kreuter 
v. Kreuter, Wyo., 728 P.2d 1129, 1132 
(1986).

Moreover,

"[w]here fraud and 
misrepresentation is relied upon as a ground for relief sought pursuant to a 
Rule 60(b) motion, it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Fraud is 
never presumed, and the burden of proof to clearly establish such fraud or 
misrepresentation is upon the party seeking relief. McBride v. McBride, supra, 
11 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2860, pp. 
188-189." Stevens v. Murphy, Wyo., 680 P.2d 78, 79 
(1984).

Faye's only 
evidence of the alleged fraud perpetrated upon her by Harry was that, upon sale, 
the stock yielded less than the amount listed in the agreement. The trial court 
found that this evidence failed to satisfy Faye's burden of proof in 
establishing a fraud in representing the value of the warehouse shelter stock. 
As such the court declined to grant the requested relief. We are not convinced 
that the trial court abused its discretion or that appellant carried her burden 
of proving fraud or misrepresentation by clear and convincing 
evidence.

[¶20.]  Evidence elicited at trial showed that 
Harry's proposed distribution of assets relied upon by Faye merely estimated the 
values of various assets listed in the agreement, including the warehouse 
shelter stock. The evidence further showed that the estimated value of other 
items included in Harry's proposed distribution also proved incorrect upon sale. 
For example, bank stock listed on Harry's side of the agreement, originally 
estimated by Harry to be worth $82,000, was worthless at hearing date. Like 
those other items, the warehouse shelter stock was only actually valued when 
Faye attempted to liquidate it. This did not constitute fraud or 
misrepresentation in the trial court's opinion, nor does it in ours. The trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Faye's motion for modification of 
the decree. There is no basis to reverse the court's 
holding.

[¶21.]  The portion of the judgment ordering 
Harry to pay $12,000 to Faye pursuant to the agreement is reversed; the portion 
of the judgment denying Faye's Rule 60(b)(3) motion is 
affirmed.

THOMAS, J., filed a concurring 
and dissenting opinion.

2 Faye filed a Motion for 
Temporary Support During Pendency for Action on April 26, 1985. However, because 
the parties entered into the property settlement agreement on June 20, 1985, 
this motion was never heard and a determination at that time as to a possible 
award of temporary support was never determined. Nonetheless, at the hearing on 
Faye's motion for relief from judgment on October 22, 1987, the district court 
ruled that the assets utilized by Faye during the pendency of the divorce 
constituted temporary support. See discussion of the effects of the court's 
ruling in the text under heading I.

THOMAS, Justice, concurring and 
dissenting.

[¶22.]  I agree with the majority of the court 
that the appeal by the wife in this instance, identified as case No. 88-10, 
should result in affirmance of the judgment of the district court. I cannot 
agree with reversing the judgment in favor of the wife, identified as case No. 
88-9, and I dissent from the disposition made by the 
majority.

[¶23.]  The rule in Wyoming is that, when 
parties have entered into a separation agreement, the trial court should confirm 
and uphold the agreement unless it is contrary to public policy. Lewis v. 
Lewis, Wyo., 716 P.2d 347 (1986); Mentock v. Mentock, Wyo., 638 P.2d 156 (1981); Pavlica v. Pavlica, Wyo., 587 P.2d 639 (1978); Beard v. Beard, Wyo., 368 P.2d 953 (1962). If, in the view of 
the district court, a property settlement agreement meets the statutory duty 
imposed upon a court of making a just and equitable division of the property, 
those qualities must be present as of the date the decree is entered. Beckle v. 
Beckle, Wyo., 452 P.2d 205 (1969). It is logical then 
to analyze the intent of the parties on the date of the decree because it is at 
that point in time that the property settlement agreement must satisfy the 
statutory duty imposed upon the court. The trial court did so in this instance 
and concluded that the parties intended the wife was to receive $41,000 out of 
particular listed assets. The trial court ruled that she had been paid only 
$29,000 of the $41,000 and that she was entitled to the balance of $12,000. 
Apparently, the trial court understood that she had received some $17,000 out of 
these assets prior to the incorporation of the property settlement agreement in 
the decree.

[¶24.]  The majority asserts that awarding her 
the $12,000 would require invasion of other funds in the marital estate. I do 
not understand that reasoning because, even after the $17,000 that she received 
was deducted, the listed assets still had a value of $58,000. Consequently, 
there was more than enough money in the value of those listed assets to pay her 
the $41,000, which the trial court held was consistent with the intent of the 
parties.

[¶25.]  I am satisfied that the majority has 
erred in refusing to affirm the judgment in favor of the wife. I believe the 
trial court was correct, and I would affirm that judgment.