Title: Campbell v. Manchester Board of School Directors

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

CAMPBELL_V_MANCHESTER_BD_SCHL_DIRECTORS.92-194; 161 Vt. 441; 641 A.2d 352

[Opinion Filed 28-Jan-1994]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 17-Mar-1994]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 92-194


 Orland Campbell                              Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Washington Superior Court

 Manchester Board of                          February Term, 1993
 School Directors


 David A. Jenkins, J.

 Charles S. Martin and Edward Wayland, Law Clerk (On the Brief), of Martin
   & Paolini, P.C., Barre, for plaintiff-appellant

 Peter S. Cullen and John Davis Buckley of Theriault & Joslin, P.C.,
   Montpelier, for defendants-appellees



 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      DOOLEY, J.   Plaintiff Orland Campbell appeals the decision of the
 Washington Superior Court denying his claim to the right of reimbursement
 under 16 V.S.A. { 822 for tuition expenses incurred in educating his son at
 St. Andrews Academy in Delaware.  The superior court affirmed the decisions
 of the Vermont Board of Education (State Board) and the defendant, the
 Manchester Board of School Directors, that reimbursement is prohibited by
 the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States
 Constitution because of St. Andrews' sectarian character.  We reverse.
      This is the second time this case has been before this Court.
 Plaintiff originally attempted to appeal directly from the State Board to

 

 this Court.  Defendant moved to dismiss arguing that no review of the State
 Board decision was available.  We agreed that no review was available by way
 of appeal, but concluded that plaintiff could obtain judicial review by
 certiorari in the superior court.  Campbell v. Manchester Bd. of School
 Directors, 152 Vt. 643, 644, 565 A.2d 1318, 1318 (1989).  This appeal is
 from the adverse decision of the superior court.
      The Town of Manchester does not maintain a public high school.  As a
 result, it is required to pay the tuition costs of local students to attend
 "an approved public or independent high school, to be selected by the
 parents or guardians of the pupil, within or without the state."  16 V.S.A.
 { 822(a)(1).  The amount of tuition assistance is not to exceed "the average
 announced tuition of Vermont union high schools for the year of attendance
 . . . or any higher amount approved by the electorate."  Id. { 824(c).
      In 1985, apparently at the instigation of plaintiff, St. Andrews
 Academy contacted the Vermont Department of Education for approval to
 educate Vermont students under the compulsory education statute, 16 V.S.A. {
 1121, and for approval to receive tuition payments from towns without a
 public high school.  The Department approved the former request but denied
 the latter "[b]ecause of constitutional barriers."  Because of this
 decision, St. Andrews appears on a list of approved private schools,
 published in November 1987 by the Department of Education, with a notation
 that it is ineligible to receive school district tuition payments.
      Plaintiff enrolled his son at St. Andrews Academy and applied for
 tuition reimbursement from defendant.  Defendant sent a "Tuition Eligibility
 Questionnaire" to St. Andrews, and, on the basis of the response, denied
 reimbursement "based on its religious affiliation."  Pursuant to 16 V.S.A. {

 

 828, plaintiff appealed these decisions to the State Board which, after a
 hearing before a hearing officer, denied the appeal.
      Although there are no obvious factual disputes, there has been only
 limited fact-finding in this case.  Relying on the St. Andrews catalogue and
 questionnaire responses, the State Board found:
              In this case the materials presented suggest that the
           St. Andrews academic program is excellent.  While it
           requires bible study, one cannot judge from the
           catalogue alone the true nature and content of these
           courses.  However, the catalogue cover features a
           church.  The Episcopal insignia is incorporated in the
           school crest, and of greater relevance here, St. Andrews
           holds itself out as a sectarian institution.  It
           requires participation in Episcopalian services of its
           students (allowing only Catholic students to substitute
           attendance at mass for the on campus Episcopal service).
           The religious aspects of its program "give focus and
           meaning to our community and weave together the many
           unique strands within it."  St. Andrews Catalogue p. 21.
         The catalogue also states that the purpose of the school is to provide
    education "of a definitely Christian character."  The Headmaster's message
    at the front of the catalogue states "St. Andrew's is an Episcopal Church
    School" and amplifies that "[w]hat it does mean is that the School takes the
    Christian faith seriously."
         Based on the facts and the standards applied by the Department of
    Education (FN1) and defendant, the State Board found "St. Andrews to be a
    sectarian school" and affirmed on that basis.  On certiorari, the superior
    court affirmed, although it was concerned that defendant had failed to hold
    a hearing to make a factual record.  The court held that on the record
    presented tuition reimbursement would be unconstitutional.

 

         Before reaching the merits of this case, we must consider one
    procedural issue raised by defendant.  It argues that the relevant statute,
    16 V.S.A. { 828, vests the approval of private schools for tuition
    reimbursement in the State Board so that no relief from an adverse
    determination is possible against an individual school board directly.
    Defendant relies on { 828, which states:
                 A school district shall not pay the tuition of a
              pupil except to a public or independent school approved
              by the state board, nor shall payment of tuition on
              behalf of a person be denied on account of age.  A
              person who is aggrieved by a decision of a school board
              relating to eligibility for tuition payments, the amount
              of tuition payable, or the school he may attend, may
              appeal to the state board and its decision shall be
              final.

 16 V.S.A. { 828 (1989) (current, amended version at 16 V.S.A. { 828 (Supp.
 1993)).
      We note that this argument was never addressed by the superior court,
 and further is inconsistent with defendant's actions prior to the superior
 court proceeding.  See In re Twenty-Four Vermont Utilities, ___ Vt. ___,
 ___, 618 A.2d 1295, 1303 (1992) (failure to raise issue in administrative
 proceeding precludes judicial review).  Defendant made the decision to deny
 tuition payments based on its own analysis of St. Andrews Academy, and it
 defended that decision before the State Board.  There is nothing in the
 record that indicates that the State Board maintains a list of schools
 approved for tuition reimbursement; indeed, its decision-making process is
 inconsistent with the presence of such a list.(FN2) See id. at ___, 618 A.2d  at

 

 1308 (absent compelling indication of error, statutory constructions by
 agency responsible for its execution is followed).  The Department of
 Education maintains a list but it is specifically designated as "not binding
 on a local school board in the exercise of its authority to determine
 eligibility for tuition purposes."
      Irrespective of whether defendant is correct that the tuition approval
 decision is vested in the State Board, the second sentence clearly sets
 forth the appeal route, which plaintiff followed.  If tuition is to be paid,
 defendant will pay it.  Thus, the court had before it the parties with the
 direct stake in the outcome.  Defendant has suggested no alternative route
 by which plaintiff could have the serious constitutional issues in this case
 decided.  We conclude that { 828, and the certiorari jurisdiction of the
 superior court, provide jurisdiction for the superior court's review of the
 merits of the decision.
      Because it is related to the substance of this case, we also address
 the statutory construction issue raised by defendant.  Defendant reads { 828
 to vest in the State Board, through its power to approve a school, the
 entire responsibility to determine which schools can be reimbursed
 consistent with the Establishment Clause.  We do not believe that is a
 proper reading of the section.  An independent school is "a school other
 than a public school, which provides a program of elementary or secondary
 education, or both."  16 V.S.A. { 11(a)(8).  The term "approved independent
 school" is defined in 16 V.S.A. { 11(a)(20) as an independent school, which
 is approved under 16 V.S.A. { 166.  That section, in turn, makes clear that

 

 the approval contemplated relates to approval for attendance purposes (FN3) --
 that is, the school meets curricular and other regulatory standards such
 that children attending the school meet the statutory school attendance
 requirement.  See 16 V.S.A. {{ 166(b)(5) (loss of approval means students
 are truant unless they enroll in another qualifying school), 1121
 (attendance at school of children of school age required); see also State v.
 DeLaBruere, 154 Vt. 237, 241-42, 577 A.2d 254, 257 (1990) (discussing {
 1121).  Reading the sections together, as we must, we believe that a "public
 school approved by the state board," as the phrase appears in { 828, refers
 to approval under { 166(b).
      There is nothing in { 166(b) to suggest that the Legislature intended
 the State Board to review whether a particular school is sectarian.  No
 procedures are set forth in the statutes for such a determination.  Although
 the State Board is given rulemaking power with respect to the approval of
 independent schools, these rules are to relate to whether a school provides
 a "minimum course of study," "has the resources required to meet its stated
 objectives," has qualified faculty, and has physical facilities and special
 services that are in accord with state and federal law.  16 V.S.A. { 166(b).
 In fact, the State Board has issued no rules that condition approval on a

 

 school being non-sectarian.  See Vermont Bd. of Educ., Manual of Rules &
 Practices {{ 2220-2228 (1992) (independent school approval regulations),
 reprinted in 3 Code of Vt. Rules 22000004 (1992).  The State Board also has
 approved a number of sectarian independent schools pursuant to 16 V.S.A. {
 166(b).  See Vermont Dep't of Educ., Directory of Approved And Recognized
 Independent Schools in Vermont (1993).(FN4)  Moreover, the Legislature has
 specifically set out the powers of the State Board, but has not given it the
 power to determine whether payment of tuition would offend the Establishment
 Clause of the First Amendment.  See 16 V.S.A. { 164.
      In 1961, in Swart v. South Burlington Town School District, 122 Vt.
 177,