Title: Matter of Adoption of RDS

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matter of Adoption of RDS1990 WY 21787 P.2d 968Case Number: C-89-5Decided: 02/23/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
In 
the Matter of the ADOPTION OF RDS. JS,

 Appellant 
(Petitioner),

 

v.

 

FV 
and CV, 

Appellees 
(Respondents)

   Appeal from the 
District Court of Albany County, The Honorable Arthur T. Hanscum, 
Judge. Tony S. 
Lopez of Zimmers and Lopez, Laramie, for Appellant.Yvonne Wade 
Nagel of Pence and MacMillan, Laramie, for Appellees.Cardine, 
C.J., and Thomas, Urbigkit, Macy, and Golden, 
JJ.MACY[¶1]  
Appellant, the maternal grandmother of RDS, appeals from an order of the 
district court, dismissing her petition for visitation rights with RDS. 
Appellees are the adoptive parents of RDS. The district court dismissed 
Appellant's petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted.[¶2]  We 
affirm.[¶3]  Appellant 
raises the following issues:1 1. Did the district court 
abuse its discretion by granting Appellees' motion to dismiss without hearing 
the matter on its merits?2. Did the district court err in deciding that 
the oral agreement between Appellant and Appellees was void?3. Did the 
district court err in its interpretation of the grandparents' visitation statute 
by its refusal to consider what was in the best interest of the 
child?[¶4]  The record and 
materials filed in support of the petition reveal the following facts.2  RDS was born to Appellant's daughter on 
March 9, 1983. According to RDS's mother, RDS's father is unknown. RDS's mother 
relinquished her parental rights, and, by an order entered on September 13, 
1985, RDS became Appellees' adopted child. On June 2, 1989, Appellant petitioned 
the district court for visitation rights with RDS. In affidavits, Appellant made 
the following factual assertions: (1) Appellant was RDS's maternal grandmother 
and had been a primary caretaker of RDS; (2) RDS had resided with Appellant and 
her husband for substantial periods of time before the adoption occurred; (3) 
when Appellant's daughter decided to relinquish her parental rights, Appellant 
actively assisted in choosing the adoptive family; (4) Appellant advised her 
daughter to allow Appellees' adoption of RDS; (5) Appellees promised Appellant 
that she would always be able to see RDS; (6) Appellant spent time with RDS 
during Easter holidays from 1983 through 1987, Thanksgiving holidays from 1983 
through 1986, and Christmas holidays from 1983 through 1986; (7) Appellant 
visited RDS at least once every month from April 1985 until August 1987; and (8) 
Appellant did not contact Appellees again until September 1988, at which time 
Appellees informed her that she would not be permitted to visit 
RDS.[¶5]  On June 7, 1989, 
Appellees filed a motion to dismiss the petition for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted. The district court determined that Wyoming 
law does not provide for visitation rights under the circumstances of this case 
and that the alleged oral agreement between Appellant and Appellees was void 
under the statute of frauds.3  The court granted Appellees' motion on 
August 7, 1989, and Appellant filed this appeal.[¶6]  We begin our analysis with a recognition 
that, under the common law,4 n4 grandparents do not have a right 
to visit their grandchildren if forbidden by the parents. Morris v. 
Pressley, 494 So. 2d 87 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986); Annotation, Grandparents' 
Visitation Rights, 90 A.L.R.3d 222, 225 (1979). The Wyoming legislature 
enacted Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-113(c) (1977) to provide an exception to this 
common-law rule. See Note, The Constitutional Constraints on 
Grandparents' Visitation Statutes, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 118 (1986). Section 
20-2-113(c) provides: 

Subsequent 
to the death or remarriage of one (1) or both parents or after a divorce or 
judicial separation, the court may, upon petition of a grandparent, grant 
reasonable visitation rights to the grandparent of the children, if the court 
finds, after a hearing, that the visitation would be in the best interest of the 
child.

 The 
reach of § 20-2-113(c) is limited by its unambiguous terms.5  [¶7]  Appellant takes issue with the district 
court's failure to conduct a hearing to determine if visitation was in the best 
interest of RDS. Under § 20-2-113(c), Appellant has no standing to petition for 
visitation rights because her request for visitation rights is not premised upon 
"the death or remarriage of one (1) or both parents or after a divorce or 
judicial separation." If grandparents are to have visitation rights in Wyoming, 
it is only after the occurrence of one of these precipitating events. Section 
20-2-113(c).[¶8]  We also 
conclude that Appellant's petition for visitation rights is further undermined 
by the fact that RDS was adopted. Upon adoption, 

the 
former parent, guardian or putative father of the child shall have no right to 
the control or custody of the child. The adopting persons shall have all of the 
rights and obligations respecting the child as if they were natural 
parents.

 Wyo. 
Stat. § 1-22-114(a) (1977). Because a decree of adoption severs the parent-child 
relationship, Voss v. Ralston, 550 P.2d 481 (Wyo. 1976), RDS's adoption 
cut off the mother's and Appellant's visitation rights. See Heard v. 
Coleman, 181 Ga. App. 899, 354 S.E.2d 164 (1987); In re W.E.G., 710 P.2d 410 (Alaska 1985); and Bikos v. Nobliski, 88 Mich. App. 157, 276 N.W.2d 541 (1979). The petition was properly dismissed for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted.[¶9]  Finally, we address Appellant's claim 
that the district court erred in determining that the alleged oral agreement 
between her and Appellees was void because of the statute of frauds. Although we 
do not adopt the district court's decision that the statute of frauds is the 
proper basis for dismissing this petition, we do hold that public policy 
considerations require dismissal. Where an erroneous standard is applied by the 
district court, we may still affirm if the decision can be sustained on any 
legal ground appearing in the record. Price v. Sorrell, 784 P.2d 614 
(Wyo. 1989).[¶10]  Appellant 
asserts that she and Appellees entered into an oral contract which permitted her 
to have visitation rights with RDS in consideration for her encouraging the 
approval of the adoption. Adoption terminates visitation rights of natural 
parents and of those claiming rights of visitation through them. See Crawley 
v. Gardiner, 287 N.W.2d 555 (Iowa 1980). Courts have also held that consent 
for an adoption may not be conditioned upon the grant of visitation rights. 
In re W.E.G., 710 P.2d  at 415-16 n.10. In the case of Whetmore v. 
Fratello, 197 Or. 396, 252 P.2d 1083 (1953), the Supreme Court of Oregon 
held that a contract between divorced parents was void as being against public 
policy where the natural father of a child agreed to the adoption of his child 
by his former wife and her new husband if he would be permitted " at all times, 
[to] have rights of reasonable and seasonal visitation with said minor child at 
the home of the [natural father] or wherever else said minor child may be. " 
Id. at 1083. See also Stickles v. Reichardt, 203 Wis. 579, 234 N.W. 728 (1931). In an Iowa case, a decree of adoption contained a provision 
granting specific visitation rights to the grandparents. The court held in 
Crawley that the "purported legally enforceable right of 
visitation by grandparents," 287 N.W.2d  at 556 (emphasis in original), was void 
for public policy reasons; that inclusion of the provision in the adoption 
decree was done without jurisdiction; and that the portion of the decree 
granting visitation rights to the grandparents had no legal effect. 
Crawley, 287 N.W.2d 555. Under similar circumstances as those outlined in 
the Crawley case, the Supreme Court of Arkansas held: 

A 
decree attempting to grant visitation rights to a natural grandparent as an 
incident to an adoption or to enforce a grandparent's visitation rights granted 
before the adoption, without specific statutory authority, is surplusage, void 
and separable from the remainder of the decree.

 Poe 
v. Case, 263 Ark. 488, 565 S.W.2d 612, 614 (1978).[¶11]  We hold as a matter of public policy that 
any agreement, whether it was oral or in writing or whether it was included 
within the terms of an adoption decree, would not give Appellant a right to 
visitation with RDS. To the extent the existence of any such agreement 
permitting her to visit with RDS could be proved, it would be void and 
unenforceable as violative of public policy. [¶12]  Affirmed. 

FOOTNOTES

 

1 Appellant's brief was deficient for several reasons: It did not contain 
a statement of the issues presented for review; it did not contain a proper 
statement of the case or the facts; and it did not include the mandatory 
appendices. Because of the brevity of the record and the relative simplicity of 
the issues presented, we have opted not to dismiss the appeal.

2 We note that Appellant failed to file her petition in accordance with 
the directives established by this Court in Nation v. Nation, 715 P.2d 198 (Wyo. 1986). Rather, Appellant filed her petition as a continuation of the 
adoption proceeding which was initiated on May 8, 1985. Nonetheless, we will 
examine the merits of Appellant's issues.

3 
Wyo. Stat. § 1-23-105(a)(i) (1977) provides:

(a) In the following cases every agreement shall be void unless such 
agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof be in writing, and subscribed by 
the party to be charged therewith:(i) Every agreement that by its terms 
is not to be performed within one (1) year from the making 
thereof[.]

 

4 
Wyo. Stat. § 8-1-101 (1977) provides: 

The common law of England as modified by judicial decisions, so far as 
the same is of a general nature and not inapplicable, and all declaratory or 
remedial acts or statutes made in aid of, or to supply the defects of the common 
law prior to the fourth year of James the First (excepting the second section of 
the sixth chapter of forty-third Elizabeth, the eighth chapter of thirteenth 
Elizabeth and ninth chapter of thirty-seventh Henry Eighth) and which are of a 
general nature and not local to England, are the rule of decision in this state 
when not inconsistent with the laws thereof, and are considered as of full force 
until repealed by legislative authority.

 

5 If the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a 
clear and definite meaning, we will not resort to rules of construction. 
Halliburton Company v. McAdams, Roux and Associates, Inc., 773 P.2d 153 
(Wyo. 1989); Wyoming Insurance Department v. Avemco Insurance Company, 
726 P.2d 507 (Wyo. 1986).