Title: Guardianship of Justan A. Smith

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
 
 
 
     
    Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2011 ME 51 
Docket: 
Yor-10-464 
Submitted 
  On Briefs: 
February 24, 2011 
Decided: 
April 26, 2011 
 
Panel: 
ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ. 
 
 
GUARDIANSHIP OF JUSTAN A. SMITH 
 
 
JABAR, J. 
 
[¶1]  Robert E. Smith appeals from a judgment of the York County Probate 
Court (Bailey, J.) appointing Candy M. Batson and Robert’s wife, Christine Smith, 
as co-guardians of Justan A. Smith.  Robert argues that the court erred by: 
(1) failing to make sufficient findings of fact; (2) admitting the testimony and 
reports of a guardian ad litem appointed for Justan in a separate District Court 
proceeding; and (3) ordering him to deposit a portion of Justan’s monthly Social 
Security Income (SSI) benefits into a separate bank account.  We vacate the 
portion of the judgment dealing with Justan’s SSI benefits, and otherwise affirm. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  Robert and Candy are the parents of Justan, who was born with a 
developmental disability on August 23, 1988.  For much of his life, Justan has been 
caught in the middle of an ongoing and bitter feud between his parents, which we 
do not recount in detail here.  It is sufficient for present purposes to observe that 
 
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the conflict between Robert and Candy has been marked by contentious and 
protracted litigation; mutual hostility and disrespect; and an exceedingly 
uncooperative co-parenting relationship.  Justan has been negatively affected by 
his parents’ conduct. 
 
[¶3]  In April 2009, Candy filed a petition for appointment of a guardian and 
conservator in the Probate Court,1 see 18-A M.R.S. § 5-303 (2010), after which the 
court entered an interim order appointing Robert and Candy as Justan’s temporary 
co-guardians.  To effectuate its award of shared custody, the court set forth a 
visitation schedule dividing Justan’s time between Robert and Candy. 
 
[¶4]  In June 2009, Robert intentionally prevented the occurrence of three of 
Candy’s scheduled visits with Justan.  Although Robert claimed to be concerned 
for Justan’s safety, he continued to withhold Justan from visits after the dismissal 
of a temporary protection from abuse order initially entered against Candy.  In 
response to Robert’s actions, Candy filed a motion for contempt. 
 
[¶5]  In December 2009 and April 2010, the court held hearings on the 
guardianship petition and Candy’s motion for contempt.  Over Robert’s objection, 
the court admitted the testimony and guardian ad litem reports of Lee Corbin, who 
had once served as a guardian ad litem (GAL) for Justan in a separate District 
                                         
1  Candy filed a similar petition in 2006 that was ultimately dismissed for failure to prosecute.  Robert 
filed his own guardianship petition in response to Candy’s April 2009 petition. 
 
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Court action.2  On June 1, 2010, the court entered a judgment appointing Candy 
and Christine as Justan’s co-guardians, and Christine as Justan’s sole conservator.  
The court found Robert in contempt for violating the court-ordered visitation 
schedule, and awarded Candy “make-up time” with Justan to account for the 
missed visits.  Finally, as part of the judgment, the court ordered that “[a]t least 
$200.00 per month from Justan’s [SSI benefits] shall be deposited into a bank 
account which shall require 3 signatures (Justan, Christine and Candy) to withdraw 
from.” 
 
[¶6]  Following entry of the judgment, Robert filed a motion for findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, see M.R. Prob. P. 52; M.R. Civ. P. 52, asking the 
court to make “findings on all significant contested issues,” and requesting specific 
findings on the issue of contempt.  The court granted the motion in part, issuing an 
amended judgment with only minor changes.  Robert filed this appeal. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶7]  Contrary to Robert’s contentions, the court’s findings are sufficient to 
support the judgment.  See Jarvis v. Jarvis, 2003 ME 53, ¶ 18, 832 A.2d 775, 779 
(“Where, as here, a request for findings is made pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(a) . . . 
we review the original findings and any additional findings made in response to the 
                                         
2  A different guardian ad litem was appointed specifically for this case pursuant to 18-A M.R.S. 
§§ 1-112, 5-303(c) (2010), and his reports were admitted without objection. 
 
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motion for findings to determine if they are sufficient, as a matter of law, to 
support the result and if they are supported by the evidence in the record.”).  
Although conflicting evidence was presented regarding the parenting deficiencies 
of both Robert and Candy, the court found that it was in Justan’s best interest to 
maintain a relationship with each parent.  See 18-A M.R.S. § 5-311(b) (2010).  
Because Robert and Candy could not function as co-guardians, the court 
appropriately chose to appoint Robert’s wife, Christine, with whom Candy had 
recently enjoyed “limited cooperation and communication,” to serve as a 
co-guardian with Candy.  See Estate of Bragdon, 2005 ME 85, ¶¶ 8-11, 875 A.2d 
697, 700.  Likewise, the court’s findings support the judgment of contempt.  See 
White v. Nason, 2005 ME 73, ¶ 7, 874 A.2d 891, 893-94.  Although Robert offered 
evidence in defense and mitigation, see M.R. Civ. P. 66(d)(2)(D), the court was not 
bound to accept it, see Dupuis v. Soucy, 2011 ME 2, ¶ 19, 11 A.3d 318, 323, and 
competent evidence supports the court’s finding that Robert’s actions were taken 
“in an attempt to control Justan’s life, even to his detriment.” 
 
[¶8]  Nor are we persuaded by Robert’s argument that the court committed 
reversible error when it admitted Lee Corbin’s testimony and guardian ad litem 
reports.  According to Robert, this evidence was not statutorily admissible pursuant 
to the Probate Code because the Probate Court had not appointed Corbin to serve 
 
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as a GAL pursuant to 18-A M.R.S. §§ 1-112, 5-303(c) (2010).3  However, even if 
we assume that some of this evidence was improperly admitted based on the Maine 
Rules of Evidence, the abundance of other evidence supporting the court’s 
guardianship appointment renders any such error harmless.  See M.R. Prob. P. 61; 
M.R. Civ. P. 61; see also In re Elijah R., 620 A.2d 282, 285 (Me. 1993) (holding 
that the admission of hearsay evidence was harmless error because it was “highly 
probable that admission of the evidence did not affect the judgment”). 
 
[¶9]  We must, however, vacate the portion of the judgment ordering Robert 
to deposit $200 of Justan’s monthly SSI benefits into a bank account subject to the 
joint control of Candy, Christine, and Justan.  Robert argues that the court’s order 
conflicts with federal law governing the obligations of “representative payees.”4  
See 42 U.S.C.S. § 405(j) (LexisNexis 2010); 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.601-416.665 
(2010).  We agree. 
                                         
3  Title 18-A M.R.S. § 5-303(c) (2010) states that the “guardian ad litem shall submit a report in 
writing to the court.”  Pursuant to 18-A M.R.S. § 1-112(e) (2010), that report “is admissible as evidence 
and subject to cross-examination and rebuttal, whether or not objected to by a party.” 
 
4  Robert also contends that the court’s order violates 42 U.S.C.S. § 407(a) (LexisNexis 2010), 
commonly referred to as the Social Security Act’s “antiattachment” provision, see Wash. State Dep’t of 
Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 379 (2003), which states:  
 
The right of any person to any future payment under this title shall not be transferable or 
assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid or payable or rights existing 
under this title shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal 
process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law. 
 
Because the court’s order conflicts with federal law concerning “representative payees,” we do not reach 
this issue. 
 
 
6 
 
[¶10]  “[I]t is through operation of the supremacy clause of the United States 
Constitution that federal law preempts conflicting state law.”  Robards v. Cotton 
Mill Assocs., 677 A.2d 540, 543 (Me. 1996) (quotation marks omitted).  In 
determining whether federal law preempts state law, we apply the following test: 
Preemption occurs when Congress, in enacting a federal statute, 
expresses a clear intent to preempt state law, when there is an outright 
or actual conflict between federal and state law, where compliance 
with both federal and state law is in effect physically impossible, 
where there is implicit in federal law a barrier to state regulation, 
where Congress has legislated comprehensively, thus occupying an 
entire field of regulation and leaving no room for the States to 
supplement federal law, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment and execution of the full objectives of Congress. 
 
Verizon New Eng., Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 2005 ME 64, ¶ 21, 875 A.2d 118, 
123 (quotation marks omitted); see also Me. Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. Me. Pub. 
Utils. Comm’n, 581 A.2d 799, 803 (Me. 1990) (“‘Federal regulations have no less 
pre-emptive effect than federal statutes.’” (quoting Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. 
de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982))).  Federal preemption, which involves 
issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation, is a question of law reviewed 
de novo.  See Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1153 (9th Cir. 
2009); McGee v. Sec’y of State, 2006 ME 50, ¶ 5, 896 A.2d 933, 936. 
 
[¶11]  The SSI program, which is administered by the Social Security 
Administration (SSA), provides federal assistance to low-income individuals who 
are elderly, blind, or disabled.  See 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 1381-1385 (LexisNexis 2010).  
 
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Although SSI benefits are, in some cases, paid directly to the beneficiary, 
payments can be made to a duly certified fiduciary—called a “representative 
payee”—for the beneficiary’s “use and benefit” if the Commissioner of the SSA 
“determines that the interest of [the beneficiary] . . . would be served thereby.”  
42 U.S.C.S. § 405(j), (j)(1)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.610 (“When payment will 
be made to a representative payee.”).  According to the record, Robert currently 
serves as Justan’s representative payee. 
 
[¶12]  Representative payees are subject to detailed regulations governing 
the use of SSI benefits.  See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.635 (“What are the 
responsibilities of your representative payee?”), 416.640 (“Use of benefit 
payments.”), 416.645 (“Conservation and investment of benefit payments.”).  
Payees must abide by “a system of accountability monitoring” under which they 
are forbidden from “misus[ing]” an individual’s benefit payments in any way.5  
42 U.S.C.S. § 405(j)(3)(A), (j)(7)(A).  Payees are also required to report to the 
SSA at least once per year “with respect to the use of such payments.”  42 U.S.C.S. 
§ 405(j)(3)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.625 (“What information must a 
representative payee report to us?”); 416.665 (“How does your representative 
payee account for the use of benefits?”). 
                                         
5  A representative payee who misuses Social Security payments may also be subject to criminal 
sanctions pursuant 42 U.S.C.S. § 408(a)(5) (LexisNexis 2010). 
 
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[¶13]  The court’s order here—requiring Robert to deposit a portion of 
Justan’s monthly SSI benefits into a bank account subject to the joint control of 
Candy, Christine, and Justan—conflicts with these federal statutes and regulations.  
Federal law specifically requires the representative payee to use the benefits of the 
beneficiary “in a manner and for the purposes he or she determines . . . to be in [the 
beneficiary’s] best interests.”  20 C.F.R. § 416.635(a) (emphasis added).  As 
Justan’s representative payee, it is Robert—not Candy, Christine, and Justan—who 
is vested with the discretionary authority to determine how the SSI benefits should 
be spent on Justan’s behalf.  Moreover, while representative payees are subject to 
multiple regulations created to prevent misuse or abuse of funds, and are 
“responsible for paying back misused benefits,” 20 C.F.R. § 416.641(a), the 
Probate Court’s order contains no direction regarding the manner in which Candy, 
Christine, and Justan may collectively use the deposited funds.6 
 
[¶14]  Given the nature of the court’s guardianship appointment, the parties 
may wish to seek SSA review of the situation and have a new representative payee 
                                         
6  We note that the court made no finding that Robert misused Justan’s SSI benefits.  Other 
jurisdictions have reached conflicting opinions regarding whether state courts have concurrent subject 
matter jurisdiction to consider whether a representative payee has misused an individual’s SSI benefits.  
Compare Grace Thru Faith v. Caldwell, 944 S.W.2d 607, 613 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (“[I]f a 
representative payee misuses or misappropriates SSI benefits . . . Tennessee courts have jurisdiction to 
examine the payee’s accounting, determine if any abuse has occurred, and order the appropriate 
remedy.”), with Brevard v. Brevard, 328 S.E.2d 789, 792 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (“The courts of North 
Carolina, however, do not possess the power . . . to determine that defendant is misusing Social Security 
benefits paid to him on behalf of the children and to direct that he account for them to some other 
person.”). 
 
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appointed.  See 42 U.S.C.S. § 405(j)(2); 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.620, 416.621, 416.624, 
416.650.  In these circumstances, however, the court erred in interfering with the 
current representative payee’s discretionary authority to use the SSI benefits in the 
beneficiary’s best interest. 
 
[¶15]  Although “[t]he exercise of federal supremacy should not be 
presumed lightly,” Robards, 677 A.2d at 543 (quotation marks omitted), when “no 
other conclusion is possible given the nature of the regulated subject matter, or 
Congress has clearly ordained this result, federal law must preempt conflicting 
state law,” Me. Yankee Atomic Power Co., 581 A.2d at 803.  Such is the case here.  
Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the judgment pertaining to Justan’s SSI 
benefits. 
The entry is: 
Judgment vacated in part.  Remanded to the 
District Court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.  In all other respects, the 
judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney for Robert Smith: 
 
J. Kimball Hobbs, Esq. 
Cooper & Bull, P.A. 
850 Main Street, Suite 3 
Westbrook, Maine  04092 
 
 
 
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Attorney for Candy Batson: 
 
Arthur H. Dumas, Esq. 
Arthur H. Dumas, P.A. 
51 Cottage Street 
Sanford, Maine  04073 
 
 
 
 
York County Probate Court docket number 2006-0669 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY