Title: MARRIAGE OF HUNTER

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

N o . 81-104 I N T H E S U P R E M E COURT O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1981 I N RE THE M A R R I A G E O F MARGARET K. HUNTER, P e t i t i o n e r and Respondent, and L E O N A R D R. HUNTER, Respondent and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of S i l v e r Bow Honorable Arnold Olsen, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Knight, Dahood, McLean and E v e r e t t , Anaconda, Montana For Respondent: Corette, Smith, Pohlman and Allen, Butte, Montana Submitted on b r i e f s : October 2 2 , 1981 Decided: January 1 4 , 1982 M r . J u s t i c e Fred J. Weber d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court . Leonard R. Hunter appeals from t h e p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t p r o v i s i o n s of a d i v o r c e d e c r e e e n t e r e d i n t h e Second J u d i c i a l District, S i l v e r Bow County. The following i s s u e s a r e presented t o t h i s Court f o r review: 1) Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n c o n s i d e r i n g a s p a r t of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e t h e sum of $51,000 which was d e p o s i t e d by t h e husband i n a checking account i n h i s name during t h e 18 months preceding t r i a l , and expended by him p r i o r t o t r i a l . 2 ) Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n awarding and d i s t r i b u t i n g t h e m a r i t a l property w i t h o u t f i r s t determining t h e n e t worth o f t h e p a r t i e s a t t h e t i m e of t h e divorce. The husband, i n h i s b r i e f , r a i s e s a s c a t t e r i n g of o t h e r c h a l l e n g e s t o t h e e q u i t a b i l i t y of t h e v a l u a t i o n and d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e p r o p e r t y , which w e w i l l c o n s i d e r i n t h e i r t u r n . W e a f f i r m i n p a r t and r e v e r s e i n p a r t . Margaret and Leonard Hunter w e r e married i n 1954. They have t h r e e s o n s , a l l of whom have reached t h e i r m a j o r i t y . I n t h e twenty-six y e a r s of t h e i r marriage, t h e p a r t i e s have amassed a c o n s i d e r a b l e e s t a t e , p r i m a r i l y comprising r e a l e s t a t e i n and around t h e C i t y of Butte. The p r o p e r t y v a r i e s widely i n perceived v a l u e according t o i t s development p o t e n t i a l , and o t h e r f a c t o r s considered by t h e a p p r a i s i n g p a r t y . I n t h e e a r l y y e a r s of t h e i r marriage, t h e husband worked a t mining and l a y i n g linoleum. Since 1978, he has been l i m i t e d by h i s h e a l t h t o land c o n t r a c t i n g and developing.  is wife a g r e e s t h a t he w a s "an aggressive worker and a good provider." H i s wife l e f t her work a s a telephone o p e r a t o r upon t h e i r marriage and devoted h e r s e l f t o r a i s i n g t h e i r t h r e e sons. She was r e h i r e d by Mountain B e l l i n 1968, and worked j u s t over e i g h t y e a r s , when a r e o r g a n i z a t i o n r e s u l t e d i n h e r being l a i d o f f r a t h e r than r e t r a i n e d . She c o l l e c t e d unemployment f o r a t i m e , b u t has n o t r e t u r n e d t o work because of her h e a l t h and her l i m i t e d q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . I n September of 1978, t h e wife p e t i t i o n e d f o r d i s s o l u t i o n of her marriage. The s e p a r a t i o n was acrimonious, and t h e p a r t i e s w e r e unable t o reach a mutually acceptable property s e t t l e m e n t . On September 2 6 , 1978, t h e day t h e p e t i t i o n f o r d i s s o l u t i o n was f i l e d , and again on J u l y 31, 1979, t h e D i s t r i c t Court ordered t h e husband t o r e f r a i n from " t r a n s f e r r i n g , encumbering, concealing o r otherwise disposing of any property except i n t h e usual course of business o r i n t h e n e c e s s i t i e s of l i f e . " The husband's own testimony revealed t h a t he t h e r e a f t e r s o l d 100 shares of Pabst Blue Ribbon stock and s p e n t t h e proceeds. The wife produced bank records t o show t h a t he deposited over $51,000 i n t o a checking account w i t h t h e F i r s t Metals Bank & T r u s t Co. of Butte, i n t h e name of Leonard Hunter, and withdrew a l l b u t a few d o l l a r s , i n t h e t i m e between t h e p e t i t i o n and t h e d i s s o l u t i o n . A hearing was held on March 20, 1980, a t which t i m e t h e w i f e ' s p e t i t i o n f o r d i s s o l u t i o n was granted. A t t h a t t i m e and a t a subsequent hearing held June 1 9 , 1980, t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court heard e x t e n s i v e testimony regarding t h e amount and v a l u e of t h e property owned by t h e p a r t i e s . The f i n d i n g s of f a c t , conclusions of law and judgment w e r e entered, w i t h regard t o t h e d i s s o l u t i o n , on J u l y 10, 1980, and, with regard t o t h e property d i s t r i b u t i o n , on J u l y 17, 1980. he ~ i s t r i c t Court i n i t s amended decree of d i s t r i b u t i o n , f i l e d October 6, 1980, awarded t h e husband r e a l property and o t h e r m a r i t a l a s s e t s amounting t o $203,236.00. The award t o t h e wife amounted t o only $178,200.00, b u t t h e award t o her i s f r e e and c l e a r of a l l l i e n s and encumbrances. I n a d d i t i o n , i n order " t o e s t a b l i s h a more e q u i t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n , " t h e husband i s obligated t o pay t h e wife $9,000, a t $900 annually, over a t e n year period, and a l l of h i s r e a l property i s mortgaged t o secure t h i s o b l i g a t i o n . N o maintenance award was made t o t h e wife, d e s p i t e t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g t h a t she i s n o t q u a l i f i e d f o r employment. The husband's motion t o amend the judgment with regard t o t h e property d i s t r i b u t i o n was granted only i n i t s s m a l l e s t p a r t i c u l a r s and t h e husband appeals t o t h i s Court. I. The husband argues t h a t Montana case law mandates r e v e r s a l because t h e D i s t r i c t Court included i n t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e t h e $51,000 t h e husband had deposited i n t h e Butte bank over an eighteen month period subsequent t o t h e w i f e ' s p e t i t i o n f o r d i s s o l u t i o n . What i s more, t h e D i s t r i c t Court "awarded" t h e e n t i r e amount t o t h e husband, although a t t h e t i m e of t h e d i s s o l u t i o n , t h e money was no longer p a r t of t h e e s t a t e , and t h e husband claimed t o have spent it on business matters and f o r h i s own maintenance. The husband r e l i e s upon I n re Marriage of Lippert (1981), - Mont. , 627 P.2d 1206, 38 St.Rep. 625, wherein t h i s Court overturned t h e D i s t r i c t Court' s d i s p o s i t i o n of m a r i t a l e s t a t e because t h a t c o u r t included i n t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e $96,000 which t h e husband had a l l e g e d l y squandered on an unwise business investment. Appellant now argues t h a t we a r e bound by Lippert, wherein w e s t a t e d t h a t (1) t h e worth of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e must be determined a t o r near t h e time of d i s s o l u t i o n , and ( 2 ) t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court may never award more than 100% of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e , and ( 3 ) t h e power of a spouse t o f r e e l y c o n t r a c t w i t h o t h e r s regarding m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y endures u n t i l l a w f u l l y moderated o r terminated. W e would remind a p p e l l a n t t h a t , i n t h e c a s e a t b a r , t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court - d i d moderate t h a t above-mentioned spousal power, on September 26, 1978, t h e day t h e p e t i t i o n f o r d i s s o l u t i o n was f i l e d , by e n j o i n i n g t h e husband from " t r a n s f e r r i n g , encumbering, concealing o r otherwise d i s p o s i n g of any p r o p e r t y , e x c e p t i n t h e u s u a l c o u r s e of b u s i n e s s o r i n t h e n e c e s s i t i e s of l i f e . " The obvious purpose of t h e o r d e r was t o p r e v e n t t h e husband, who c o n t r o l l e d t h e r e i n s and r e c o r d s of t h e family b u s i n e s s , from d i s s i p a t i n g o r s e c r e t i n g m a r i t a l a s s e t s i n what promised t o be a prolonged and b i t t e r d i s p u t e over d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h o s e a s s e t s . Therefore, i n t h i s c a s e , a s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from L i p p e r t , t h e husband's r i g h t t o d i s p o s e of j o i n t l y owned p r o p e r t y had been s h a r p l y circumscribed. W e would a l s o p o i n t o u t t o a p p e l l a n t t h a t nowhere i n L i p p e r t d i d t h i s Court d e c l a r e t h a t t h e t i m e of determining m a r i t a l e s t a t e must be t h e d a t e of d i s s o l u t i o n . I n f a c t , w e s t a t e d t h a t no s i n g l e e v e n t i n t h e d i s s o l u t i o n p r o c e s s n e c e s s a r i l y e s t a b l i s h e s t h e t i m e f o r proper v a l u a t i o n , whether it b e t h e d a t e of f i l i n g , t h e d a t e of t r i a l o r t h e d a t e of t h e d i s s o l u - t i o n i t s e l f . I n re Marriage of L i p p e r t , Mont. a t , 627 P.2d a t 1208, 38 St.Rep. a t 628. C l e a r l y , although t h e d a t e of f i l i n g i s n o t d e t e r m i n a t i v e of t h e t i m e of v a l u a t i o n , n e i t h e r i s it a u t o m a t i c a l l y beyond c o n s i d e r a t i o n a s t o o remote. W e have s t a t e d many t i m e s t h a t , i n c o n s i d e r i n g a p p e a l s a r i s i n g from d i s p o s i t i o n of m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y upon d i s s o l u t i o n , w e w i l l consider each c a s e i n l i g h t of t h e f a c t s unique t o it. I n r e Marriage of Aanenson (1979), Mont. 598 P.2d 1120, 36 St.Rep. 1525. Here, before t h e t r a n s f e r of $51,000 i n and o u t of t h e husband's account, t h e D i s t r i c t Court, i n i t s September 26, 1978, i n j u n c t i o n served t h e husband with f a i r warning t h a t he must be responsible f o r t h e disputed property i n h i s c o n t r o l . N o such warning was given i n Lippert; indeed, i n t h a t c a s e , a l l t r a n s f e r s t o t h e husband's accounts from shared property were completed before t h e p e t i t i o n f o r d i s s o l u t i o n was f i l e d . I n Lippert, t h i s Court found t h e r e was no evidence t h a t t h e funds had disappeared i n any way b u t through bad investments, and t h e r e was s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t h a t they were thus d i s s i p a t e d . H e r e , t h e wife submitted abundant evidence i n t h e form of bank statements showing t h e d e p o s i t and withdrawal of s u b s t a n t i a l sums of money, although t h e husband admittedly was doing no work o t h e r than c o l l e c t i n g r e n t and swapping r e a l e s t a t e during t h e period i n question. That r e a l e s t a t e , according t o t h e husband's own testimony, was i n t h e name of both p a r t i e s . The evidence i n d i c a t e s t h a t he would o b t a i n h i s w i f e ' s s i g n a t u r e , sell t h e property, and bank t h e money i n h i s personal account, a l l during t h e t i m e t h a t t h e i n j u n c t i o n was i n force. Furthermore, although t h e husband t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e money was spent primarily on business, and l i v i n g expenses, he produced no cancelled checks, no r e c e i p t s , no evidence whatsoever t o support h i s claim, except a l i s t of expenses he himself had drawn up. H e admitted t o paying h i s wife no maintenance, although he d i d pay some u t i l i t y b i l l s , and occasionally signed some small checks over t o her during t h e separation period p r i o r t o t h e d i s s o l u t i o n . When questioned by t h e w i f e ' s counsel a s t o t h e o r i g i n and d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e $51,000, h i s responses were evasive i n t h e extreme. A n example follows: "A. . . . '78 was t h e l a s t t i m e I was doing any work . . . September of '78. . . I made some work here and t h e r e . But it was t h e l a s t t i m e I d i d any physical, manual labor. . . "Q. H o w much money have you deposited i n t h a t account [with t h e F i r s t Metals Bank] s i n c e September of 1978, t h e l a s t t i m e you had any work? "A. I d o n ' t know. "Q. H o w about $51,175? "A. That I deposited i n t h e r e ? "Q. Y e s . "A. I f I deposited i n t h e r e -- a l o t of s t u f f I would buy f o r people. Some of it i s mine. "Q. W e l l , i f t h e bank statements show t h a t , i n September of '78 t o February of '80, you've run through t h a t account, made d e p o s i t s i n it of $51,175 -- "A. A l o t of it I took o u t of t h e bank, p u t i n my account t o pay b i l l s with. "Q. B i l l s t o h e l p your wife? "A. To pay f o r m y property; pay m y t a x e s , t h i n g s l i k e t h a t . "Q. Where d i d you g e t t h e $51,000 t o d e p o s i t i n t h e account i f you d i d n ' t have a job? "A. It a l l shows i n t h e r e . I had d i f f e r e n t things. "Q. H o w much money do you have? "A. You know what, I d o n ' t know. "Q. You've g o t a l o t of money, d o n ' t you? "A. No. J u s t what is t h e r e , what i s i n t h e escrow. Everything i s i n mine and Margaret's name. "Q. M r . Hunter, t h i s account t h a t I ' v e r e f e r r e d t o i s an account i n your own name? "A. C a l l t h e bank and Margaret Hunter can s i g n checks on it. "Q. Did you ever t e l l your w i f e t o w r i t e checks on t h i s account? "A. No. I had a checking account f o r her a t t h e S e c u r i t y s o w e d i d n ' t g e t it mixed up. "Q. Have you made any money on investments where it d i d n ' t r e q u i r e you t o work? "THE COURT: During what period of time? "Q. From September of '78 u n t i l now. "A. No. I l o s t money, I had money come t o m e before t h a t I made. I drew it o u t of t h e bank. I paid b i l l s with i t . " The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g of f a c t No. I V s t a t e s : "The Court f i n d s t h a t during t h e pendency of t h e above-entitled a c t i o n , Leonard Hunter deposi- t e d i n accounts a t t h e F i r s t Metals Bank & Trust Company approximately f i f t y - o n e thousand ($51,000), which w a s received from various s a l e s of property and from o t h e r u n i d e n t i f i e d sources. Respondent's Exhibit 'F' shows t h a t many of t h e i t e m s of money received and spent were from t h e sale of p r o p e r t i e s owned by t h e p a r t i e s and n o t accounted f o r t o Margaret Hunter. " t h e b a s i s of t h a t f i n d i n g , t h e t r i a l c o u r t found t h e $51,000 t o be a m a r i t a l a s s e t and awarded t h e a s s e t t o t h e husband. The husband now contends t h a t such an award i s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . W e disagree. The purpose of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n i s s u i n g i t s i n j u n c t i o n dated September 26, 1978, was obviously t o p r o t e c t t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e . Its conclusion t h a t t h e husband deposited i n a personal account a l a r g e sum of money obtained by h i s making incursions i n t o t h a t e s t a t e is supported by s u b s t a n t i a l evidence, much of it supplied by t h e husband's testimony and i n h i s Exhibit "F." The husband was given every opportunity t o p r e s e n t evidence i n support of h i s bald statements t h a t t h e money w a s spent on business or i n maintaining himself and h i s wife. N o such evidence w a s presented. C l e a r l y , t h e D i s t r i c t Court was unpersuaded by t h e husband's claim t h a t h i s personal accumulation and d i s p o s i t i o n of $51,000 was a blameless series of business t r a n s a c t i o n s . That c o u r t ' s skepticism appears well-founded i n l i g h t of t h e husband's own testimony t h a t b e f o r e t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n he s o l d $1,000 worth of Pabst s t o c k i n d e f i a n c e of t h e c o u r t ' s i n j u n c t i o n , and proof t h a t subsequent t o t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n he appropriated t h e $5,000 r e a l estate c o n t r a c t with t h e Dennises, which had been awarded t o h i s wife. W e a f f i r m our statement i n L i p p e r t , t h a t f i n d i n g s and conclusions may n o t r e l y s o l e l y on a perceived l a c k of c r e d i b i l i t y , b u t must be supported by evidence. H e r e , w e f i n d ample evidence t o support t h e t r i a l c o u r t . The standard of review of property d i s t r i b u t i o n on d i s s o l u t i o n i s w e l l s e t t l e d i n Montana: "A d i s t r i c t c o u r t has far-reaching d i s c r e t i o n i n r e s o l v i n g property d i v i s i o n s and its judg- ment w i l l n o t be a l t e r e d u n l e s s a c l e a r abuse of t h a t d i s c r e t i o n is shown. The c r i t e r i a f o r reviewing t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n is: Did t h e c o u r t i n t h e e x e r c i s e of i t s d i s c r e t i o n a c t a r b i t r a r i l y without employment of con- s c i e n t i o u s judgment, o r exceed t h e bounds of reason i n view of a l l t h e circumstances." S t r a t f o r d v. S t r a t f o r d (1981), Mont. I 631 P.2d 296, 298, 38 St.Rep. 1093, 1095; I n re Marriage of Aanenson (1979), Mont. I 598 P.2d 1120, 36 St.Rep. 1525; I n re Marriage of Kramer (1978), 177 Mont. 61, 580 P.2d 439; Z e l l v. Z e l l (1977), 174 Mont. 216, 570 P.2d 33. A review of t h e record i n d i c a t e s t h a t , f a r from a c t i n g a r b i t r a r i l y o r unreasonably, t h e D i s t r i c t Court a c t e d c a r e f u l l y and c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y t o p r o t e c t t h e m a r i t a l estate i n i t i a l l y , and t o e q u i t a b l y apportion it subsequent t o d i s s o l u t i o n . That t h e c o u r t considered t h e v a l u e of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e p r i o r t o d i s s o l u t i o n i s n o t e r r o r i n l i g h t of t h e circumstances of t h i s case. W e f i n d no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s i n c l u s i o n of t h e $51,000 i n t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e ; nor do w e f i n d an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e c o u r t ' s award of t h a t s u m t o t h e husband. The husband argues t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f a i l u r e t o determine t h e n e t worth of t h e e s t a t e c o n s t i t u t e s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r , r e q u i r i n g remand f o r r e t r i a l . He bases h i s argument upon t h e D i s t r i c t Court's f a i l u r e t o make an e x p l i c i t f i n d i n g t o t a l l i n g a l l of t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s and expressly a l l o c a t i n g t h e l i a b i l i t i e s . The w e l l - s e t t l e d p r i n c i p l e is set f o r t h c l e a r l y i n Schultz v. Schultz (1980), Mont. , 613 P.2d 1022, "This Court has, s i n c e 1975 when t h e Marriage and Divorce Act was passed, considered many cases with regard t o proper property d i v i s i o n i n d i s s o l u t i o n of marriage cases. W e have adopted c e r t a i n guidelines f o r t h e e q u i t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n a s mandated under s e c t i o n 40-4- 202, MCA. "Several c r i t e r i a stand o u t a s mandates, f i r s t of which i s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court make find- ings of f a c t from which t h e r e can be e s t a b l i s h - ed a n e t worth of t h e p a r t i e s . ( C i t a t i o n s omitted). "The above cases g e n e r a l l y hold t h a t t h e r e must be complete findings as t o t h e a s s e t s and l i a b i l i t i e s of t h e p a r t i e s and t h e i r values f o r establishment of a n e t worth. This Court has allowed a f a i l u r e t o f i n d a n e t worth t o stand only where t h e r e has been a 50/50 s p l i t of t h e property. ( C i t a t i o n s omitted).'' I n t h e case a t b a r , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f a i l u r e t o s t a t e t h e d o l l a r value of t h e t o t a l e s t a t e is purely a t e c h n i c a l omission. Exhibits "A" and "B" a r e incorporated i n t o finding of f a c t number I, which s t a t e s : "The Court f i n d s t h a t a l l of t h e property described i n Exhibits ' A ' and ' B ' attached hereto and by reference made a p a r t hereof, w e r e acquired by t h e p a r t i e s during t h e i r marriage and a r e p a r t and p a r c e l of t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s of t h e p a r t i e s . " Those e x h i b i t s c o n s t i t u t e a painstakingly complete and c a r e f u l l i s t of t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s , a determination of t h e i r value, and a t o t a l of t h e amount awarded t o each of t h e p a r t i e s . It i s evident t h a t t h e purpose of t h e c o u r t was t o d i v i d e t h e a s s e t s a s equally a s possible. The values assigned t h e various i t e m s of r e a l e s t a t e and personal property a r e supported by evaluations of t h e i r worth o f f e r e d by q u a l i f i e d a p p r a i s e r s o r by t h e p a r t i e s themselves. The t r a n s c r i p t r e v e a l s t h a t , contrary t o t h e husband's claim, t h e value of a g r e a t many of t h e items was determined by h i s own testimony. I t i s t r u e t h a t t h e views of husband and wife diverged sharply a s t o t h e value of c e r t a i n r e a l property, l a r g e l y because one viewed t h e property a s raw land and t h e o t h e r weighed i t s development p o t e n t i a l . Developers and a p p r a i s e r s themselves disagreed i n t h e i r valuations. "The D i s t r i c t Court, a s t h e trier of f a c t , i n t h i s t r i a l without a jury, has t h e d i s c r e t i o n t o g i v e whatever weight it sees f i t t o t h e testimony of land appaiser witnesses. Dicker- son v. Dickerson (1980), Mont., 614 P.2d 521, 37 St.Rep. 1286. Unless t h e v a l u a t i o n i s c l e a r l y erroneous, it s h a l l n o t be reversed on appeal. Rule 52 ( a ) M.R.Civ.P." I n re Marriage of Jensen (1981), Mont. , 631 P.2d 700, 702, 38 St.Rep. 1 1 0 9 , 1111. Viewing t h e evidence i n t h e l i g h t most favorable t o t h e p r e v a i l - ing p a r t y , w e f i n d t h a t t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t evidence before t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o support t h e value it found a p p l i c a b l e t o those disputed l o t s and a c r e s , Its v a l u a t i o n was n o t c l e a r l y erroneous: it was based upon s u b s t a n t i a l evidence and w i l l not be overturned. See Cameron v. Cameron (1978), 179 Mont. 219, 227-228, 587 P.2d 939, 945. Likewise, t h e r e i s ample evidence t h a t the D i s t r i c t Court c a r e f u l l y considered the l i a b i l i t i e s of t h e e s t a t e , and, while n o t giving them an e x p l i c i t d o l l a r value, equitably determined t h a t they should be borne by t h e husband. On d i r e c t examination, t h e husband w a s asked whether t h e d e b t s l i s t e d on h i s E x h i b i t "H" were h i s obligation: "A. Well, I plan on paying them. "Q. A l l r i g h t . Are they your r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ? "A. Y e s . " The D i s t r i c t Court subtracted t h e debts from t h e property t o which they attached, when possible. For example, t h e 1979 C a d i l l a c valued by t h e husband a t $12,000 (with $6,000 owing) and awarded t o him w a s valued a t only $6,000 by t h e court. The c o u r t c l e a r l y intended t h a t t h e husband pay t h e debts. H i s property award was g r e a t e r than t h e w i f e ' s and t h e c o u r t d i d n o t award her maintenance. Furthermore, i n its f i n d i n g s and conclusions t h e decree c l e a r l y s t a t e d t h a t t h e property i n Exhibit "A" was t o go t o Margaret Hunter f r e e and c l e a r of a l l l i e n s and encumbrances. The property i n Exhibit "B" was t o go t o Leonard Hunter; t h e r e is no c l a u s e i n d i c a t i n g t h a t h i s award i s n o t s u b j e c t t o c r e d i t o r s ' claims. I n I n re Marriage of Xetcalf (1979), Mont . , 598 P.2d 1 1 4 0 , 36 St.Rep. 1559, t h i s Court found t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court's f a i l u r e t o consider t h e unsecured debts of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e was an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . I n t h a t case, however, t h e r e was no evidence t h a t t h e c o u r t considered t h e d e b t s a t a l l , and i f t h e husband had received t h e burden of t h e i r payment, t o t a l l i a b i l i t i e s from t h e e s t a t e would have exceeded h i s s h a r e of t h e a s s e t s . Here, t h e r e is convincing evidence t h a t t h e c o u r t c a r e f u l l y considered t h e d e b t s , incorporated them i n t o i t s v a l u a t i o n of m a r i t a l property when possible, and decided t h a t t h e i r payment should be t h e husband's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . There i s no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n by t h e District Court and no unreasonable burden placed on t h e husband, whose s h a r e of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e amounts t o over $200,000. This Court has held t h a t t h e cumulative e f f e c t of t h e f i n d i n g s can be equivalent t o a finding of n e t worth when r e l e v a n t f a c t o r s a r e considered and adequately set f o r t h by t h e t r i a l court. I n r e Marriage of Bosacker (1980), Mont. , 609 P.2d 253, 256, 37 St.Rep. 469, 471. The record c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t assessed t h e value of t h e t o t a l m a r i t a l e s t a t e , including t h e debts t h e r e o f , and d i d i t s b e s t t o equitably apportion t h e a s s e t s between t h e p a r t i e s . W e f i n d no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n by t h e D i s t r i c t Court, under t h e circumstances set f o r t h above, i n i t s f a i l u r e t o s t a t e n e t worth and d e b t s a t e x a c t d o l l a r value. 111. W e t u r n now t o t h e s e v e r a l o t h e r a l l e g a t i o n s of e r r o r r a i s e d by t h e husband on appeal. The husband claims t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court u n f a i r l y awarded t h e wife both t h e family residence and " t h e Duffy place" where he had stayed s i n c e t h e separation. W e p o i n t o u t t h a t i n i t s amended decree dated October 6, 1980, t h e D i s t r i c t Court awarded " t h e Duffy place" residence t o t h e husband. The husband a l s o claims t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court r e l i e d upon t h e proposed f i n d i n g s submitted by t h e wife and c i t e s Tomaskie v. Tomaskie (1981), Mont. , 625 P.2d 536, 539, 38 St.Rep. 416, 419, a s d e c l a r i n g c a t e g o r i c a l l y , "That i s wrong!" What i s wrong, and it i s considered an e t h i c a l more than a l e g a l breach i n Tomaskie, i s not f o r a t r i a l judge t o r e l y upon proposed f i n d i n g s , b u t f o r him t o r e l y t o o heavily on them, t o t h e exclusion of a consideration of t h e f a c t s and t h e e x e r c i s e of h i s own judgment. There is no m e r i t i n t h e husband's a l l e g a t i o n . I n Tomaskie, t h e r e v e r s a l turned upon t h e g r o s s l y inadequate findings of t h e t r i a l c o u r t , Here, t h e f i n d i n g s a r e extensive, d e t a i l e d and comprehensive. Many of them r e f l e c t t h e husband's testimony a s t o t h e value of s p e c i f i c property and f a c t s surrounding t h e marriage and t h e d i s s o l u t i o n . Every page of t h e f i n d i n g s r e f l e c t s consideration of t h e f a c t s presented and t h e a r e a s of dispute. There i s no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n here. The husband argues t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n finding t h a t t h e wife was not q u a l i f i e d f o r employment because she was working as l a t e a s 1978, and presented no medical evidence of incapacity. W e p o i n t o u t t h a t t h e wife t e s t i f i e d t h a t she suffered from high blood p r e s s u r e and a bad back and l e g , and f e l t t h a t her h e a l t h prevented her from r e t u r n i n g t o work. It was w e l l within t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o f i n d t h e w i f e ' s testimony had s u f f i c i e n t weight t o support i t s f i n d i n g t h a t she was n o t q u a l i f i e d t o work. The husband d i d n o t argue on appeal, as he d i d subsequent t o t h e decree, t h a t t h e attachment of a mortgage t o a l l of h i s property, f o r t h e purpose of securing h i s $9,000 obliga- t i o n t o h i s wife, was inequitable. He d i d , however, remark t h a t t h e husband should leave t h e marriage "with a f a i r degree of d i g n i t y . " A s a c o u r t of e q u i t y , we must consider t h e e f f e c t upon t h e husband of mortgaging a s s e t s worth many times t h e amount of h i s o b l i g a t i o n . The husband is i n t h e business of t r a d i n g r e a l e s t a t e . To f r e e z e h i s a s s e t s f o r t e n years would deprive him of h i s occupation and h i s income. That i s unreasonable and inequitable. It would be f a r more reasonable t o mortgage only one o r two i t e m s of property having s u f f i c i e n t value t o secure t h e o b l i g a t i o n ; f o r example No. 7 of Exhibit "B" of t h e amended decree, h a l f - i n t e r e s t i n a duplex, valued a t $22,500.00, could be mortgaged. The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court is affirmed i n a l l r e s p e c t s except t h a t l a s t mentioned. W e remand t h i s case t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court with orders t o amend t h e decree so a s t o r e t a i n a mortgage on only so much of t h e husband's property a s i s necessary t o secure t h e payment of $9,000 t o t h e wife. W e Concur: r" 4 . 7 Ud-.zz. 4