Title: Commonwealth v. Valentin

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-11581 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  PEDRO VALENTIN. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 6, 2014. - December 8, 2014. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel.  Due Process of Law, 
Assistance of counsel.  Homicide.  Practice, Criminal, 
Assistance of counsel, Capital case, New trial.  Witness, 
Impeachment. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 23, 1991. 
 
 
Following review by this court, 420 Mass. 263 (1995), a 
motion for a new trial, filed on January 6, 2012, was considered 
by Patrick F. Brady, J. 
 
 
A request for leave to appeal was allowed by Gants, J., in 
the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk. 
 
 
 
Dennis Shedd for the defendant. 
 
Paul B. Linn, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CORDY, J.  The defendant's conviction of murder in the 
first degree was affirmed by this court in 1995.  See 
2 
 
Commonwealth v. Valentin, 420 Mass. 263 (1995).  In 2012, he 
filed a motion for a new trial which was denied.  The case is 
now before us pursuant to an order of a single justice of the 
county court allowing, in part, the defendant' s application for 
leave to appeal from that denial under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
We conclude that trial counsel did not render ineffective 
assistance in failing to impeach a witness as to one of his 
statements, where counsel's decision was not manifestly 
unreasonable and, in any event, did not so impact the outcome of 
the trial as to create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice.  We also conclude that the substitution of trial 
counsel's partner to stand in for her during jury deliberations 
was not one of structural error warranting a new trial absent a 
showing of prejudice.  Further, considering the claim as one of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, we conclude that the 
defendant did not receive constitutionally deficient assistance 
or suffer any appreciable prejudice as a result of the 
substitution.  Accordingly, the defendant's motion for new trial 
was properly denied. 
 
Background.  In October, 1991, the defendant was indicted 
on charges of murder in the first degree, G. L. c. 265, § 1, for 
the killing of Timothy Bond in July, 1991, and for assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b). 
3 
 
 
1.  Evidence at trial.  The facts of this case are set 
forth in our decision in Valentin, 420 Mass. at 265-266.  In 
summary, in July, 1991, Timothy Bond stole cocaine from Angel 
Ruidiaz, who was selling drugs on behalf of the defendant's 
brother, Simon.  Though Ruidiaz paid Simon for the stolen drugs, 
Simon stated that he was "still going to get" Bond. 
 
Later that month, Bond went to Metcalf Court in the Jamaica 
Plain section of Boston with his friend Kenneth Stokes and 
joined a group of others who were sitting on a wall, talking and 
drinking.  Shortly thereafter, Simon and the defendant 
approached Bond from behind and Simon shot Bond in the back of 
the head.  Bond then fell to the ground and Simon shot him once 
more in the head.  Stokes testified that the defendant 
subsequently stomped on the victim's head, saying, "Die, 
motherfucker," and then fled with Simon.  While running away, 
the defendant said to Simon, "Man, put the gun away, the police 
are coming." 
 
At trial, the defendant's primary defense was alibi.  He 
called three witnesses to testify that he was elsewhere playing 
dominoes at the time of the shooting.  The Commonwealth called 
four witnesses (including Stokes) who were present at the 
shooting.  Each of them testified that the defendant "kicked" or 
"stomped" on Bond's head after Simon fired the second shot.  
Only Stokes testified that the defendant said, "Die, 
4 
 
motherfucker," when he did so.  The defense cast doubt on the 
credibility of these witnesses, two of whom acknowledged that 
when they spoke to the police shortly after the incident, they 
did not say that the defendant had stomped on Bond.  Stokes was 
extensively cross-examined but was not questioned about his 
initial failure to tell the police about the defendant's "Die, 
motherfucker" statement. 
 
2.  Role of trial counsel's law partner.  On the second day 
of jury deliberations, trial counsel, Frances Robinson, asked 
permission from the judge to have her law partner stand in for 
her.  Her partner had not done any work on the case, but had 
discussed it with Robinson.  The judge granted this request.  
The judge did not seek the defendant's consent to the 
substitution on the record.1 
 
While substitute counsel was standing in, the jury asked to 
be reinstructed on both joint venture and premeditation.  With 
substitute counsel present, the judge provided supplemental 
instructions on both topics.  After the judge provided these 
reinstructions, substitute counsel asked to preserve any 
objections that Robinson had made previously to the joint 
venture and premeditation instructions in the main jury charge.  
The judge assured substitute counsel that he was not waiving any 
                                                          
 
 
1 In her affidavit filed in connection with the new trial 
motion, trial counsel stated that she discussed the substitution 
of counsel with the defendant. 
5 
 
of these objections.  Later that afternoon the jury found the 
defendant guilty as a joint venturer in premeditated murder, and 
not guilty of assault and battery by means of a dangerous 
weapon. 
 
In January, 2012, the defendant filed a motion for a new 
trial, which was denied without a hearing on February 6, 2013.  
Later that month, the defendant filed a petition for leave to 
appeal under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and on August 1, 2013, a 
single justice allowed the petition as to two of the presented 
issues:  first, whether the defendant's trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance by failing to impeach Stokes's testimony 
about the defendant's statement made at the scene of the murder; 
and second, whether the defendant was deprived of counsel when 
his trial counsel's law partner stood in during jury 
deliberations. 
 
Discussion.  As this case comes to us on appeal from the 
denial of a motion for a new trial and alleges errors that are 
grounded in the record that was before this court in its plenary 
review, we review it under the standard of "substantial risk of 
a miscarriage of justice."  Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 
290, 297 (2002).  A substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice 
exists when we have a "serious doubt whether the result of the 
trial might have been different had the error not been made."  
Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 687 (2002), S.C., 444 Mass. 
6 
 
72 (2005), quoting Commonwealth v. LeFave, 430 Mass. 169, 174 
(1999).  "Errors of this magnitude are extraordinary events and 
relief is seldom granted. . . . Such errors are particularly 
unlikely where, as here, the defendant's conviction . . . has 
undergone the exacting scrutiny of plenary review under § 33E" 
(citation omitted).  Randolph, supra at 297.  However, because 
the single justice permitted the defendant leave to appeal from 
the denial of his motion for a new trial, we review the issues 
raised. 
 
1. Impeachment of Stokes.  We turn first to whether the 
defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel as a result 
of trial counsel not impeaching Stokes's testimony attributing 
the statement, "Die, motherfucker," to the defendant.  This 
testimony had obvious relevance to the defendant's shared intent 
with his brother in the murder of Bond.  While at trial Stokes 
testified that the defendant had said this, he had not told this 
to the police who interviewed him immediately after the 
shooting, saying then only that the perpetrators "ran away." 
 
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984), 
quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970), the 
United States Supreme Court recognized that the right to counsel 
in a criminal case is the right to "effective assistance of 
counsel."  To establish a claim of constitutional 
ineffectiveness, the defendant must establish that his 
7 
 
attorney's performance fell "below an objective standard of 
reasonableness" such that there is a "probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome."  Id. at 688, 694.  The 
court emphasized that "[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's 
performance must be highly deferential" and that "the distorting 
effects of hindsight" must be avoided in evaluating a claim made 
after a trial in which attorney's defense strategy was proved 
unsuccessful.  Id. at 689. 
 
When evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel arising under both the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights of 
the Massachusetts Constitution, we ask whether there has been a 
"serious incompetency, inefficiency, or inattention of counsel -
- behavior of counsel falling measurably below that which might 
be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer -- and, if that is 
found, then, typically, whether it has likely deprived the 
defendant of an otherwise available, substantial ground of 
defence."  Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).  
See Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 466 Mass. 422, 437 (2013); 
Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 446 Mass. 435, 442 (2006).  
Essentially, "[t]he defendant must demonstrate that 'better work 
might have accomplished something material for the defense.'"  
Acevedo, 446 Mass. at 442, quoting Commonwealth v. Satterfield, 
373 Mass. 109, 115 (1977).  Moreover, this court has generally 
8 
 
shown deference to the strategic decisions made by attorneys, 
noting that "[a] strategic or tactical decision by counsel will 
not be considered ineffective assistance unless that decision 
was 'manifestly unreasonable' when made."  Acevedo, supra at 
442, quoting Commonwealth v. Adams, 374 Mass. 722, 728 (1978).  
See Commonwealth v. Fisher, 433 Mass. 340, 354 (2001); 
Commonwealth v. White, 409 Mass. 266, 272 (1991) ("In cases 
where tactical or strategic decisions of the defendant's counsel 
are at issue, we conduct our review with some deference to avoid 
characterizing as unreasonable a defense that was merely 
unsuccessful"). 
 
Although the failure to pursue an "obviously powerful form 
of impeachment" can theoretically rise to the level of 
unreasonableness that would constitute ineffective assistance, 
we have repeatedly stated that, generally, the failure to 
impeach a witness does not, on its own, constitute ineffective 
assistance.  Fisher, 433 Mass. at 357.  See Commonwealth v. 
Jenkins, 458 Mass. 791, 805-808 (2011), citing Commonwealth v. 
Bart B., 424 Mass. 911, 916 (1997).  Ultimately, this is because 
the "[i]mpeachment of a witness is, by its very nature, fraught 
with a host of strategic considerations to which we will, even 
on § 33E review, still show deference" and "it is speculative to 
conclude that a different approach to impeachment would likely 
have affected the jury's conclusion."  Fisher, supra.  Here, we 
9 
 
cannot say that trial counsel's decision not to impeach Stokes 
on the statement in question was "manifestly unreasonable" such 
that her assistance was ineffective (citation omitted).  
Acevedo, 446 Mass. at 442. 
 
In an affidavit submitted in connection with the 
defendant's motion for a new trial, trial counsel explains:  "I 
did cross examine . . . Stokes extensively on his not having 
made statements consistent with the testimony he gave at trial.  
In reviewing the transcript, I believe that I did not cross 
examine him specifically on not having said '[D]ie, 
motherfucker' because I had gotten the point across that his 
statement was not the same.  I do not believe that further cross 
examination on the statement . . . would have helped the defense 
because I believe it would have highlighted it."  Having focused 
considerable attention on proving that the defendant was not 
Simon's companion at the incident in pursuit of an alibi 
defense, and having impeached the credibility of Stokes based on 
various differences between his original statement to police and 
his testimony, trial counsel's decision not to impeach Stokes on 
whether he heard the defendant make this particular statement, 
in order to avoid highlighting it, was not manifestly 
unreasonable. 
 
However, the defendant notes that trial counsel did end up 
repeating the "Die, motherfucker" statement in her closing in an 
10 
 
attempt to discredit it, and did not discuss alibi until the end 
of her argument.  The manner in which the trial ultimately 
played out after Stokes's cross-examination is of little weight 
in our analysis of whether it was "manifestly unreasonable" for 
counsel to have cross-examined Stokes the way she did at the 
time of his testimony.  This is particularly so where she 
conducted a thorough impeachment of Stokes based on a series of 
inconsistent statements, thereby casting doubt on the veracity 
of his over-all testimony. 
 
Even if it was unreasonable for counsel not to impeach 
Stokes's specific statement, we cannot say that this error led 
to a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  There is no 
question that the "Die, motherfucker" statement was evidence 
that went directly to the question whether the defendant had the 
necessary mental state to support a finding of guilt as a joint 
venturer.  The defendant cites to Commonwealth v. Reaves, 434 
Mass. 383, 391-392 (2001), arguing that a conviction of murder 
in the first degree requires a finding that he had to share the 
mental state of "intent to kill and premeditation" with the 
principal.  He further contends that if Stokes's statement had 
been more thoroughly discredited through additional impeachment, 
the Commonwealth could not have convinced the jury that the 
defendant had the requisite mental state to support his 
conviction.  We disagree. 
11 
 
 
In Reaves, this court stated that the "jury may infer the 
requisite mental state [for a joint venturer] from the 
defendant's knowledge of the circumstances and subsequent 
participation in the offense."  Id. at 392, quoting Commonwealth 
v. Longo, 402 Mass. 482, 486 (1988).2  Accordingly, in the 
instant case, even though the specific statement was not 
impeached, there was substantial additional evidence from which 
the jury could have inferred that the defendant shared Simon's 
intent to kill the victim, including evidence that the defendant 
(1) knew that Simon was angry at the victim over a drug deal 
gone bad; (2) knew that Simon had a gun; (3) appeared to be 
acting as a lookout before the crime; (4) arrived with and stood 
with the shooter during the commission of the crime; and (5) 
fled with and urged the shooter to conceal the gun.3 
 
The defendant points to several cases in which this court 
did conclude that failure to pursue an avenue of witness 
impeachment could constitute ineffective assistance.  However, 
each of these cases is appreciably different from the instant 
case.  For example, in Commonwealth v. Ly, 454 Mass. 223, 229-
                                                          
 
 
2 We also noted this point in our 1995 decision upholding 
the defendant's conviction.  See Commonwealth v. Valentin, 420 
Mass. 263, 266-267 (1995). 
 
 
3 The jury also heard the testimony of three witnesses other 
than Stokes that the defendant kicked or stomped on the victim's 
head as he fled the scene with Simon, although in his testimony 
the medical examiner did not mention any injuries to the victim 
consistent with being kicked or stomped on the head. 
12 
 
231 (2009), the defendant's primary defense to a charge of 
indecent assault and battery was that the complainant had called 
him multiple times after having sexual relations with him, 
saying that she wanted to marry and move away with him, and that 
she did not bring a complaint until after he refused.  The 
attorney in Ly failed to summon these crucially relevant 
telephone records and therefore was unable to impeach the 
complainant when she denied ever calling the defendant after the 
incident.  Id. at 229.  Accordingly, this court found that the 
failure of counsel to impeach the complainant using telephone 
records was ineffective assistance, noting that the "centrality 
of the telephone calls to the only issue in the case is 
apparent, and should have been apparent to trial counsel before 
the case began."  Id. at 230.  See Commonwealth v. Nwachukwu, 65 
Mass. App. Ct. 112, 116-117 (2005) (ineffective assistance of 
counsel where attorney failed to obtain records that 
contradicted complainant's testimony and therefore failed to 
impeach her though her testimony and credibility went to heart 
of case). 
 
Unlike in Ly where there was only one disputed issue that 
depended completely on the complainant's credibility, there were 
several disputed issues here other than Stokes's credibility, 
and each could have been established in a variety of ways.  
Whether the defendant actually made the statement in question 
13 
 
was not the linchpin of the defense.  Defense counsel presented 
several alibi witnesses, who, if believed, would have rendered 
anything that Stokes said about the shooting incident 
irrelevant.  Moreover, defense counsel did attempt to impeach 
Stokes's credibility and the credibility of the other 
eyewitnesses with prior inconsistent statements about what 
occurred.  Even if the jury did not believe the alibi witnesses, 
they still had reason to doubt the testimony of the 
Commonwealth's witnesses as to what the defendant did and said.  
Where this was not a single issue case like Ly, the failure to 
impeach here is not so obviously unreasonable. 
 
The defendant also cites to Commonwealth v. Sena, 429 Mass. 
590 (1999), S.C., 441 Mass. 822 (2004).  In Sena, although other 
witnesses placed the defendant at the scene of the crime, only 
one saw the defendant shoot the victim.  Id. at 592.  Prior to 
trial, the witness had made a statement to a defense 
investigator that contradicted his trial testimony.  Id. at 591-
593.  After already having been admonished twice by the judge to 
comply with a pretrial discovery order, defense counsel gave 
prosecutors a report of the eyewitness's earlier statement on 
the final day of trial.  Id. at 592-593.  Given the judge's 
previous warnings to comply with the discovery order and defense 
counsel's extremely untimely provision of the report, the judge 
did not permit defense counsel to question the investigator 
14 
 
regarding the report and defense counsel was unable to use it to 
impeach the eyewitness himself.  Id. at 593-594.  Ultimately, 
this court ordered a new trial, as, given counsel's missteps, we 
could not be "substantially confident that, if the error had not 
been made, the jury verdict would have been the same," id. at 
595, quoting Commonwealth v. Ruddock, 428 Mass. 288, 292 n.3 
(1998), as the preclusion of the reports "had a tangible effect 
on [the defendant's] defense."  Id. 
 
Sena is readily distinguishable from the present case.  In 
that case, the attorney's error was not merely a strategic 
decision.  The ultimate prejudice to the defendant arose from 
his attorney's failure to comply with a discovery order.  As a 
consequence, defense counsel was unable to use the 
investigator's report to cross-examine the eyewitness or to 
examine the investigator.  Id. at 594-595.  Although the 
eyewitness had already been impeached and some of the facts from 
the report otherwise had been admitted in evidence, the addition 
of the investigator's report would have permitted the jury to 
completely reject the sole eyewitness's testimony rather than 
just call it into question.  See id. at 595. 
 
Finally, the defendant analogizes his case to a series of 
United States Supreme Court cases under the confrontation clause 
of the Sixth Amendment in which a judge's refusal to allow 
impeachment of a witness was sufficiently prejudicial to require 
15 
 
a new trial.  However, these cases are not analogous to the 
defendant's case for two reasons.  First, the standard of review 
of confrontation errors is considerably stricter than the 
ineffectiveness standard applicable to the instant case.  See, 
e.g., Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 232 (1988), quoting 
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986) ("whether, 
assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination 
were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say 
that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"); 
Commonwealth v. Vardinski, 438 Mass. 444, 450 (2003) ("whether 
reversal is warranted because the error was not harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt").  Second, those cases deal with a judicial 
decision to disallow impeachment evidence, rather than a defense 
counsel's strategic decision not to impeach a witness or to use 
a particular method of impeachment after tactical consideration. 
 
Given that this case involved multiple avenues of defense, 
more than one key witness, and general impeachment of all of the 
Commonwealth's witnesses based on inconsistent statements, 
defense counsel's strategic decision not to impeach Stokes's 
particular statement was not "manifestly unreasonable" such that 
her assistance was ineffective.  Moreover, even though defense 
counsel did not pursue an otherwise available avenue of 
impeachment, and although in hindsight that may not appear to 
have been wise, we cannot conclude that this decision so 
16 
 
impacted the outcome of the case that there was a "substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice." 
 
2.  Substitution of trial counsel.  The United States 
Supreme Court has found that a criminal trial is inherently 
unfair if the defendant is denied counsel at a "critical stage" 
of the proceedings, meaning that counsel is either totally 
absent or is prevented from assisting the accused at that time.  
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n.25 (1984).  Such 
denials of counsel constitute structural error and require no 
showing of prejudice to warrant reversal.  Id. at 658-660, 662. 
 
In Massachusetts, jury deliberations have been found to be 
a critical stage of the proceedings, at least when the jury 
communicates a request that is of legal significance.  
Commonwealth v. Bacigalupo, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 629, 632 (2000).  
See Commonwealth v. Floyd P., 415 Mass. 826, 833-834 (1993).  
The assistance of counsel in these circumstances requires the 
judge, before responding to the jury's communication, to consult 
with counsel as to an appropriate response. 
 
Here, the jury requested reinstruction on joint venture and 
premeditation, two legal issues of significance to the case, and 
the judge responded to the jury's questions in the absence of 
the defendant's original counsel.  Therefore, the issue before 
us clearly arose during a critical stage of the proceedings, 
such that if the defendant was actually or constructively denied 
17 
 
counsel, he would have a right to a new trial without a showing 
of prejudice.  See, e.g., Curtis v. Duval, 124 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st 
Cir. 1997) (automatic reversal required when judge gives jury 
instruction without consulting with and in absence of defendant 
and counsel). 
 
a.  Structural error.  The defendant argues that even 
though he had counsel during every stage of jury deliberations, 
he was constructively denied counsel because the judge did not 
obtain his informed consent to the substitution of counsel and 
substitute counsel was unfamiliar with the case.  Further, even 
if the Sixth Amendment does not require a finding of structural 
error here, the defendant argues that art. 12 is given a broader 
reading than the Sixth Amendment. 
 
The Commonwealth concedes that jury deliberations are a 
critical stage of the proceedings, such that denial of counsel 
would warrant automatic reversal.  However, the Commonwealth 
argues that because the defendant did not raise the issue of 
informed consent to the substitution of counsel in his motion 
for a new trial, the single justice was prevented from 
determining whether the issue was new and substantial as 
required by G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Accordingly, the Commonwealth 
argues that the issue is waived.4 
                                                          
 
 
4 No challenge to the substitution of counsel, or the lack 
of consent to the same, was raised in the direct appeal. 
18 
 
 
On the merits of the defendant's claim, the Commonwealth 
argues that he was not constructively denied counsel because 
substitute counsel, a licensed lawyer, was present and competent 
to represent him at that stage.  The Commonwealth additionally 
argues that even though art. 12 may afford greater protections 
than the Sixth Amendment, the defendant is still required to 
show that the substitution of counsel resulted in the forfeiture 
of a substantial defense, which the defendant has not shown. 
 
Trial counsel's affidavit indicates that the defendant 
least knew about the attorney substitution, but it is apparent 
that the judge did not obtain the defendant's consent on the 
record before permitting it.  The defendant has not cited to any 
case in which a court has held that the absence of informed 
consent to substitute counsel mandates reversal, and we decline 
to adopt such an absolute rule.  We are not persuaded that the 
substitution of counsel during jury deliberations without the 
defendant's consent constitutes a per se structural error.  
Structural errors are ones that render the "adversary process 
itself presumptively unreliable" or that constitute 
"constitutional error[s] of the first magnitude" that simply 
cannot be cured even if the error was ultimately harmless.  
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659, quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 
318 (1974).  This court also has held that structural errors are 
"fundamental defects" that "necessarily render[] a criminal 
19 
 
trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for 
determining guilt or innocence," and accordingly, "occur 
rarely."  Commonwealth v. Petetabella, 459 Mass. 177, 183 
(2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Hampton, 457 Mass. 152, 163 
(2010). 
 
We cannot say that the substitution of counsel in this case 
amounted to such a high order of unfairness that our confidence 
in the adversary process itself is in doubt or that there was a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  While the court 
in Cronic acknowledged that "[c]ircumstances of [this] magnitude 
may be present on some occasions when although counsel is 
available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood 
that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide 
effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice 
is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the 
trial," 466 U.S. at 659-660, constructive denials of counsel 
which meet that order of magnitude are rare.  In Cronic itself, 
the Court declined to find structural error, even where a 
defendant was facing a twenty-five year sentence for mail fraud 
and was appointed a young attorney with a real estate practice 
who had only twenty-five days to prepare, while the government 
had had four and one-half years to investigate the case and 
review thousands of documents.  466 U.S. at 649, 666.  Contrast 
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 58 (1932) (structural error 
20 
 
where defendants charged with atrocious crime and "put in peril 
of their lives within a few moments after counsel for the first 
time charged with any degree of responsibility began to 
represent them"). 
 
The defendant notes several cases in other jurisdictions in 
which convictions were overturned because an unprepared counsel 
was appointed at the last minute for the duration of an entire 
trial.  See Hunt v. Mitchell, 261 F.3d 575, 582-583, 585 (6th 
Cir. 2001); United States v. Koplin, 227 F.2d 80, 86 (7th Cir. 
1955); In re Shawn P., 172 Md. App. 569, 587-588 (2007).  Such 
cases present a far different circumstance from the one before 
us.  Each involves representation by an unprepared attorney for 
an entire trial, such that defense counsel could not 
meaningfully function as an effective adversary.  Ultimately, 
"the 'appropriate [Sixth Amendment] inquiry focuses on the 
adversary[y] process, not on the accused's relationship with his 
lawyer.'"  Commonwealth v. Britto, 433 Mass. 596, 607 (2001), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Tuitt, 393 Mass. 801, 806-807 (1985). 
 
The defendant's argument that art. 12 should provide relief 
in these circumstances is also meritless.  He cites no examples 
of how a broader reading of art. 12 would help him in this 
analysis, other than that this court has found denials of the 
right to counsel amounting to structural error specifically 
where a trial attorney has a conflict of interest or where the 
21 
 
trial judge has not followed strict protocols for forfeiting the 
right to counsel.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hodge, 386 Mass. 
165, 169-170 (1982) (where counsel has genuine conflict of 
interest, no prejudice required to warrant new trial); 
Commonwealth v. Means, 454 Mass. 81, 89-97 (2009) (strict 
protocols apply before defendant can be found to have waived or 
forfeited his right to counsel).  Both of these cases are 
consistent with an understanding that constructive denials of 
counsel rising to a level of structural error occur only where 
the defendant essentially is denied the assistance of any 
qualified attorney who could theoretically represent him in a 
way that does not undermine our trust in the adversary system. 
 
Here, substitute counsel was not fundamentally incapable of 
representing the defendant's interests for the brief period of 
his representation to warrant a finding of structural error.  
And, as found by the motion judge, substitute counsel did 
actively render some assistance to the defendant by ensuring 
that objections to the instructions made earlier by trial 
counsel were preserved.  Any error in permitting substitute 
counsel to stand in for trial counsel was not structural and 
therefore requires a showing of prejudice in order to justify a 
new trial.5  No such showing has been made. 
                                                          
 
 
5 In the future, it would be better practice for the judge 
to engage in a colloquy with the defendant to ensure that he has 
22 
 
 
b.  Effectiveness of counsel.  Even if the defendant was 
not constructively denied counsel outright, he still has a right 
to effective assistance of counsel.  Accordingly, we look to 
whether the conduct fell within a range of professionally 
reasonable judgments based on the professional norms as they 
existed at the time.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.  The measure 
we use in assessing attorney conduct is an objective one.  See 
Commonwealth v. Hardy, 464 Mass. 660, 665 (2013), cert. denied, 
134 S. Ct. 248 (2013); Saferian, 366 Mass.  at 96.  Unlike with a 
structural error, if substitute counsel's performance was 
substandard, the defendant must still show prejudice and that 
better work "might have accomplished something material for the 
defense."  Acevedo, 446 Mass. at 442, quoting Satterfield, 373 
Mass. at 115. 
 
Here, substitute counsel represented the defendant for only 
a portion of the jury's deliberations, during which time the 
judge provided reinstruction on two legal issues on which he had 
previously instructed the jury in the presence of trial counsel.  
The defendant claims error as to the "joint venture" 
reinstruction, noting that while trial counsel made sure the 
judge instructed that both "guilty" and "not guilty" verdicts 
were options when considering whether the defendant should be 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
been properly informed about and has no objection to the 
substitution before allowing it. 
23 
 
convicted of this charge, the judge did not include the option 
of "not guilty" when reinstructing on joint venture and 
substitute counsel did not object.  This omission on the part of 
substitute counsel arguably is not even error, because the jury 
were previously instructed both generally and in the context of 
joint venture that they could find the defendant not guilty and 
had to if the Commonwealth failed to prove any element of murder 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
Further, it is not clear that the judge would have repeated 
the full instruction he had given previously even if substitute 
counsel had objected.  The jury's question was specifically, 
"Your Honor, could you please refresh [us] on the laws on the 
elements of the joint venture in detail."  The judge could have 
interpreted this question to be fully answered by only walking 
through the various elements of joint venture.  Therefore, we 
cannot say that substitute counsel's failure to object likely 
influenced the jury's verdict in any significant way. 
 
The defendant also claims error as to the judge's 
supplemental premeditation instruction.  The judge intermingled 
a definition of malice generally within his explanation of 
premeditated malice and included a statement, only in the 
supplemental premeditation instruction, that malice generally 
could be "a specific intent to inflict grievous bodily harm."  
Thus, the jury could have possibly understood premeditated 
24 
 
malice to include intent to inflict grievous bodily harm, so 
long as the "deliberation and reflection" elements of 
premeditation were met.6 
 
In support of his argument, the defendant cites 
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 435 Mass. 113, 119, 121-122 (2001), in 
which this court held that a premeditation instruction that 
included all three prongs of malice created a substantial 
likelihood of miscarriage of justice.  However, Johnson was 
decided long after the defendant's trial and substitute counsel 
could not possibly have been aware of it at that time.  As noted 
by the Commonwealth, this court did not expressly state until 
1998 that jury instructions should make clear that "murder in 
the first degree by reason of deliberate premeditation relates 
only to the first prong of malice," a specific intent to kill.  
Commonwealth v. Diaz, 426 Mass. 548, 553 (1998).  Still, 
substitute counsel could have argued that the supplemental 
instruction was confusing.  Accordingly, we consider whether not 
pursuing this argument was "manifestly unreasonable" in a way 
that gives rise to a "substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice" (citation omitted).  Acevedo, 446 Mass. at 442. 
                                                          
 
 
6 The Commonwealth claims that the judge included a 
reference to malice as grievous bodily harm in the original jury 
instructions as well and trial counsel did not object.  Although 
this is accurate, the judge also clearly delineated malice 
generally, as it would apply to murder in the second degree, 
from premeditated murder. 
25 
 
 
Given that this court had yet to articulate expressly that 
jury instructions on deliberate premeditation clearly should 
relate only to the first prong of malice, it is an unreasonably 
high standard to expect "an ordinary fallible lawyer" to have 
anticipated this future holding and objected to the jury 
instructions.  See id., quoting Saferian, 366 Mass. at 96.  
Substitute counsel would not have had a clear statement of law 
on which to rely in arguing that the judge erred in mentioning 
grievous bodily harm in a way that could have been interpreted 
to apply to premeditated murder. 
 
Even if this was error on substitute counsel's part, we 
cannot say that there was a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice.  In a postappeal, collateral attack that raises an 
issue regarding jury instructions, we "consider whether 'a 
reasonable juror could have used the instruction incorrectly,'" 
in light of "the instruction as a whole and in the context of 
the trial."  Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 430 Mass. 348, 349-350 
(1999), quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 427 Mass. 245, 249 
(1998). 
 
Considering the instructions in this case in light of how 
the jury would have perceived them and in the context of the 
entire trial, there was no substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice here.  First, this was a supplemental instruction and 
the judge's original instructions on general malice and 
26 
 
premeditation clearly delineated the two concepts.  Second, 
although the judge did not distinguish the two concepts as 
clearly in the supplemental instruction, he did make a 
distinction between the two.  He described "malice aforethought, 
just plain malice aforethought," and then reiterated that this 
could be an intent to kill without justification or an intent to 
inflict grievous bodily harm.  Then, he noted that "deliberately 
premeditated malice aforethought is something more than that," 
and proceeded to discuss premeditation at greater length.  
Moreover, in his premeditation discussion, he repeatedly 
described premeditated malice as "something more than the 
instant formation of the purpose to take life," it requires a 
"plan or purpose to take life," or a settled "determination to 
kill." 
 
Thus, even though the judge's supplemental instructions 
could have more clearly distinguished between general malice and 
premeditation, the jury would have understood from the language 
of the judge's supplemental instruction that deliberate 
premeditation relates to an intent to kill and not an intent to 
inflict grievous bodily harm.  Although the defendant surmises 
that trial counsel might have objected to portions of the 
supplemental instructions given her detailed familiarity with 
the case, the fact that a certain attorney might have done a 
better job on the defendant's behalf is not the standard for 
27 
 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  Even though he could have 
made certain objections regarding the supplemental instructions, 
substitute counsel's actions did not fall below what we would 
expect from an ordinary fallible lawyer, and the defendant was 
not significantly prejudiced by substitute counsel's performance 
such that he is entitled to a new trial. 
 
Conclusion.  The order denying the defendant's motion for a 
new trial is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.