Title: CHRISTOPHER RADER V. SUGARLAND ENTERPRISES, INC., a Wyoming corporation, d/b/a Holiday Inn

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CHRISTOPHER RADER V. SUGARLAND ENTERPRISES, INC., a Wyoming corporation, d/b/a Holiday Inn2006 WY 160149 P.3d 702Case Number: 06-20Decided: 12/28/2006
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
CHRISTOPHER RADER,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
SUGARLAND 
ENTERPRISES, INC., aWyoming corporation, d/b/a Holiday 
Inn,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofSheridanCounty

 
 
Representing Appellant:
J. Douglas McCalla and Tyson E. Logan of The Spence Law Firm, LLC, 
Jackson, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Logan.
 
 
Representing Appellee:
Timothy W. Miller of Casper, Wyoming.
 
 
Before VOIGT, C.J., and 
GOLDEN, HILL, and BURKE, JJ., and Brooks, 
DJ.

 
 
BROOKS, District 
Judge.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, 
Christopher Rader (Rader), a bar patron, filed a complaint for negligence 
against Appellee, Sugarland Enterprises, Inc. (Sugarland), a bar owner, to 
recover for damages sustained in a fight with other bar patrons.  Rader appeals the district court's entry 
of summary judgment against him, which found that under the undisputed facts of 
the case, Sugarland owed no duty of care to Rader.

 
 
[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶3]      The parties agree 
that the controlling issue on appeal is whether Sugarland owed a legal duty to 
Rader under the specific factual circumstances of this 
case.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      On the evening of 
March 17, 2001, Rader, his wife Rebecca, their friends, Steve and Shannon Kuzara 
and Tanya Stringer, entered Scooters Bar & Grill at the Holiday Inn in 
Sheridan, Wyoming.  
The Holiday Inn is owned and operated by Sugarland.  Rader recognized a friend in the bar and 
began talking to him.  Rebecca 
Rader, the Kuzaras, and Stringer went to the dance floor to dance.  

 
 
[¶5]      An argument 
occurred on the dance floor between Ms. Stringer and another lady, Mindy 
Lyle.  Jessica Taylor then came down 
on the dance floor and approached Ms. Rader in an aggressive manner and Ms. 
Rader held her hands out to defend herself.  Mr. Kuzara stepped between Ms. Taylor 
and Ms. Rader.  The bar disc jockey 
observed the commotion and called for security on the public address 
system.  Mr. Rader heard his wife 
calling his name and turned toward the dance floor.  He saw a man grab his wife and Rader 
went to the dance floor and pushed that man away from his wife.  The bartender then came down to the 
dance floor and told those involved to leave.

 
 
[¶6]      Two people who 
were not involved inside the bar were Jerome Taylor, Ms. Taylor's husband, and 
Danny Sutherland.  Rader had no 
contact with either Mr. Sutherland or Mr. Taylor inside the bar.  Neither Mr. Taylor nor Mr. Sutherland 
did anything in the bar to warrant their removal, and the record does not appear 
to indicate they were asked to leave.  
The bartender did, however, note that Sutherland was intoxicated when he 
entered the bar, that he had a belligerent look on his face, and the bartender 
refused to serve Sutherland any alcohol. 

 
 
[¶7]      The Raders, the 
Kuzaras, and Ms. Stringer also left at the request of the bartender.  Before he left, Rader found the man he 
had pushed on the dance floor and apologized.  That person had apparently just been 
trying to stop the argument.  It is 
clear that when Ms. Taylor and Ms. Lyle were asked to leave the bar, Mr. Taylor 
and Mr. Sutherland also left the premises.  
The Raders walked out of the bar through a patio and into the parking 
lot.  Mr. Rader was not expecting 
any trouble as he left the bar.  Mr. 
Taylor and Mr. Sutherland walked past the Raders.  Rader had not seen either man inside the 
bar and had never seen Sutherland in his life.  

 
 
[¶8]      Ms. Taylor and 
Ms. Stringer again started arguing outside.  Mr. Taylor, after he had walked past the 
Raders, called out to Rader, "That's my wife."  Rader then pointed to Ms. Rader, who was 
standing next to him, and said, "So, that's my wife," indicating that the person 
arguing with Ms. Taylor had no relation to Mr. Rader.  Rader turned away from Mr. Taylor.  Mr. Taylor and Mr. Sutherland then 
immediately attacked Rader and beat him severely causing a significant head 
injury.  A bar employee came outside 
and stated that the police were coming and Taylor and Sutherland fled the 
scene.  Rader testified in his 
deposition that the assault on him was a complete surprise.  Rader also stated that prior to the 
assault, there was no hostility between he and Taylor or 
Sutherland.

 
 
[¶9]      Rader filed suit 
against Sugarland alleging, in essence, that Sugarland failed to exercise 
reasonable care to protect him in light of a known and pending danger that arose 
on the bar premises.  Sugarland, 
after some discovery, filed a motion for summary judgment.  Rader responded and the district court 
granted the motion, finding that under the undisputed facts of the case, 
Sugarland owed no duty of care to Rader to prevent the 
assault.

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 
[¶10]   Summary judgment is appropriate 
only when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.  Easum v. Miller, 2004 WY 73, ¶15, 92 P.3d 794, 798-99 (Wyo. 2004).  In 
reviewing a summary judgment, we do not accord any deference to the district 
court's decisions on issues of law, and examine de novo the entire record--the parties' 
submissions of evidence--in a light most favorable to the party who opposes the 
motion.  Id. at 
799.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶11]   All negligence actions consist of 
the breach of a duty owed by the defendant which proximately causes injury to 
the plaintiff.   White v. HA, Inc., 782 P.2d 1125, 1128 
(Wyo. 
1989).  Our focus is whether 
Sugarland owed or breached any duty to Rader in this case.  This Court has considered on four 
previous occasions the question whether a bar owner owes a duty to a patron as a 
result of an altercation on or near the bar 
premises.

 
 
[¶12]   In Fisher v. Robbins, 78 Wyo. 50, 319 P.2d 116, 
117 (1957), an argument developed between two bar patrons.  A police officer entered the bar and 
began talking to the two patrons.  A 
third person approached them and broke a beer bottle over the head of one of the 
patrons who was talking to the policeman.  
A piece of glass from the bottle flew into the eye of yet another bar 
patron resulting in the loss of the eye.

 
 
[¶13]   This Court reversed a jury verdict 
in favor of the plaintiff.  The 
Court set forth a six-part burden of proof requirement that the plaintiff had to 
meet in order to prevail against the bar owner.  That burden of proof requirement 
consisted of:

 
 
(1)   a disturbance occurred which either 
did or should have attracted the defendant's 
attention;

 
 
(2)   defendant had opportunity to 
act;

 
 
(3)   defendant permitted the disturbance 
to continue without reasonable effort to quell the 
same;

 
 
(4)   defendant failed to give plaintiff 
reasonable protection;

 
 
(5)   there was some relationship between 
the disturbance and the subsequent violence; and

 
 
(6)   plaintiff was injured as a result 
of the violence. 

 
 
Fisher, 319 P.2d  at 118.

 
 
[¶14]   In Fisher, this Court found that the 
plaintiff's evidence did not prove that the original argument caused or inspired 
the violence which injured the plaintiff or that the bar owner had any 
opportunity to protect the plaintiff.  
Fisher, 319 P.2d  at 126. We 
went on to hold that a mere battle of words, no matter how violent, 
unaccompanied by action that gives warning that violence is impending, is not 
enough to create a duty on the part of the bar owner.  Id. 
at 120.

 
 
[¶15]   We next considered a bar owner's 
responsibility to patrons in Mayflower 
Restaurant Co. v. Griego, 741 P.2d 1106 (Wyo. 1987).  There, we affirmed a jury verdict in 
favor of the plaintiff.  In Mayflower, the plaintiff was threatened 
several times by another bar patron, who at one point grabbed the plaintiff's 
shirt.  Later, the plaintiff was 
involved in another altercation in the bar with the same bar patron, resulting 
in injury to the plaintiff.  We 
reiterated in Mayflower that a battle 
of words does not predict that a participant will resort to an unlawful assault 
and battery.  However, the evidence 
indicated that the plaintiff had been grabbed by the bar patron during the 
initial confrontation and that the altercation was such that it attracted the 
attention of bar employees.  The 
evidence also indicated that the initial disturbance was connected to the 
subsequent assault.  Therefore, this 
Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to affirm the jury 
verdict.  Id. at 
1113-14.  

 
 
[¶16]   This Court again addressed the 
issue in White v. HA, Inc., 782 P.2d 1125 (Wyo. 
1989).  White has some similarity to the case 
now before this Court.  In White, the plaintiff was a patron in the 
defendant's bar.  One of the 
plaintiff's friends and another bar patron got into a fight in the bar.  The plaintiff and his friend left the bar 
after the fight.  Shortly afterward, 
the fight resumed outside the bar premises between the plaintiff's friend and 
the other party to the bar fight.  
The plaintiff became involved and ultimately sustained a gunshot 
wound.  This Court affirmed a 
summary judgment in favor of the bar.  
We noted that the original altercation in the bar was brief and that the 
bar patron who shot the plaintiff voluntarily left the bar.  The plaintiff and that patron did not 
talk to each other in the bar or demonstrate any aggressive behavior towards 
each other in the bar.  We held that 
"[w]ithout sufficient notice of impending danger, no duty arose" to protect the 
plaintiff.  Id. at 1131.

 
 
[¶17]   Our most recent discussion of this 
issue occurred in Hanna v. Cloud 9, 
889 P.2d 529 (Wyo. 1995).  In Hanna, we again affirmed a summary 
judgment in favor of the bar owner.  
The plaintiff was an employee of the defendant bar, which adjoined a 
restaurant and coffee shop.  The 
plaintiff had several physical confrontations with two other people in the 
kitchen of the restaurant.  After 
going home, the plaintiff later returned and was injured in yet another 
confrontation in the bar.  This 
Court concluded that under the facts of that case, the bar owner had no 
opportunity to intervene and therefore summary judgment was proper.  Id. at 530.  In reaching that conclusion, we 
synthesized our previous rulings by setting forth a three-pronged burden of 
proof in order for a plaintiff to establish liability against a bar 
owner:

 
 
a disturbance which did 
attract or should have attracted the tavern keeper's 
attention;

 
 
the lapse of a reasonable 
amount of time between the attracting disturbance and the subsequent tortious 
act on the injured invitee by the other invitee, within which time period the 
tavern keeper had the opportunity to avert the impending danger or subsequent 
tortious act; and

 
 
a relationship between the 
attracting disturbance and the subsequent tortious 
act.

 
 
Id. at 532.

 
 
[¶18]   Our analysis of the present case 
begins with what we said in Fisher.  The disturbance, in order to attract 
the attention of the bar owner, must be more than a battle of words.  It must be action, threats of action, or 
some type of demonstration.  Fisher, 319 P.2d  at 120; and White, 782 P.2d  at 1129.  At the heart of the cause of action is 
notice and foreseeability of some impending danger to a business invitee and the 
ability to avert the danger.  Bars 
and taverns, by their very nature, involve alcohol, loud animated conversations, 
and spontaneous actions and reactions to normally innocuous words and 
events.  Given those realities, we 
have been reluctant to and decline now to broaden tavern owner liability beyond 
what we have said in Hanna or White.  White, 782 P.2d  at 1128.  "[T]he duty to protect a third party 
from danger, above and beyond the general landowner duty to provide reasonably 
safe premises to all invitees, arises when the disturbance in the bar is 
sufficient to alert the tavern keeper that there is imminent danger of injury to 
a third party."  Id. at 
1129.  "Proof of defendant's actual 
or implied knowledge of impending danger to his invitees and that he had 
reasonable opportunity to avert [that danger] is indispensable to entitle 
plaintiff to recovery."  Id. at 
1131.

 
 
[¶19]   Turning to the three-part burden of 
proof test set forth in Hanna, we 
conclude that the plaintiff's evidence fails on each part of that test.  Here, the disturbance at issue was the 
dance floor argument that involved some minimal amount of touching between Ms. 
Stringer, Ms. Lyle, Ms. Taylor, and Ms. Rader.  Mr. Taylor and Mr. Sutherland played no 
part in that disturbance.  Mr. Rader 
had some limited involvement, but it is clear that the real disturbance involved 
the four ladies.  Mr. Taylor and Mr. 
Sutherland did nothing to warrant their removal from the bar, and it is not 
clear from the record that they were asked to leave. The record is absolutely 
clear that Rader, on the one hand, and Taylor and Sutherland on the other, had 
no contact in the bar and certainly there was no confrontation between them in 
the bar.

 
 
[¶20]   Part one of the Hanna test requires a disturbance that 
attracted the attention of the tavern keeper.  There was a disturbance that did attract 
the disc jockey's attention, but it did not involve Taylor or Sutherland, nor 
did the disturbance involve threats against Rader.  There is simply nothing to indicate that 
the disturbance would pose a threat to Rader from Taylor and 
Sutherland.

 
 
[¶21]   Part two of the Hanna test requires that the tavern 
owner have a reasonable amount of time to avert the impending danger.  Here, there is no proof of impending 
danger from Taylor and Sutherland.  
There was nothing from which Sugarland could foresee that the argument 
among the ladies on the dance floor would lead to the Taylor and Sutherland 
attack on Rader.

 
 
[¶22]   Finally, Hanna requires a relationship between 
the disturbance and the subsequent tortious act.  Sutherland and Taylor had no part in the 
disturbance and had no acontact whatsoever with Rader 
in the bar.  The nexus between the 
disturbance and the subsequent attack is missing.

 
 
[¶23]   Rader points to a brief excerpt of 
this Court's opinion in Fisher, where 
we said, "[E]ven conceding that under some circumstances it might be of little 
importance whether those engaged in an argument were the same persons who became 
involved in later violence . . . ."  
Fisher, 319 P.2d  at 123.  Rader argues, therefore, that Sutherland 
and Taylor did not have to be part of the original disturbance to alert the bar 
owner.  

 
 
[¶24]   Certainly one could hypothesize a 
scenario where the subsequent combatants were not direct participants in the 
earlier disturbance and yet the bar owner would be liable; however, we also said 
in Fisher 
that

 
 
if it were not shown that 
the later violence was connected with, precipitated by or resulted in some 
manner from an earlier manifestation of danger, it cannot be said the injury 
occurred because of defendant's negligence in failing to suppress the trouble or 
avert the danger indicated by that manifestation.  The hazard which required defendant's 
action must be shown to be the same danger which resulted in plaintiff's 
injury.  No matter how ominous a 
condition or a situation becomes, if it is not the forerunner of acts which 
cause plaintiff injury, it cannot be made the basis for his recovery . . . 
.

 
 
Fisher, 319 P.2d  at 
123-24.

 
 
[¶25]   In this case, the connection 
between the argument involving the four ladies and the subsequent attack by 
Sutherland and Taylor is too tenuous to impose a duty upon Sugarland to 
anticipate that such an attack would occur.  The sophistry of Rader's argument is 
best illustrated by Rader himself.  
In his deposition testimony, he states that the attack by Taylor and 
Sutherland came as a complete surprise.   He further testified that there 
was no prior hostility between he and Taylor and Sutherland.  Nevertheless, Rader asserts that despite 
his own inability to predict the assault, Sugarland should have anticipated this 
surprise attack by two men who were not involved in the dance-floor 
incident.  This Court cannot find a 
breach of a duty where, as here, there was an unprovoked assault by two men who 
played no part in the initial disturbance and exhibited no hostility toward 
Rader prior to the attack.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶26]   Under the facts and circumstances 
of this case, Sugarland breached no duty owing to Rader and summary judgment of 
the district court is affirmed.