Title: Peper v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Peper v. State1989 WY 24768 P.2d 26Case Number: 88-177Decided: 01/26/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
TERRY 
PEPER, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE 
OF WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from 
the District Court, Big HornCounty, Gary P. Hartman, 
J.

 
 
ARE NOT AN 
OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] 

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, and Michael J. French, Public Defender Program, 
for appellant.

 
 
Joseph B. 
Meyer, Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Sr. 
Asst. Atty. Gen., and Paul S. Rehurek, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

 
 
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

 
 

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant, Terry Peper, 
pled guilty to the crime of escape from official detention. He appeals, 
challenging the district court's acceptance of the plea, denial of his motion to 
withdraw the plea, and the sentence imposed, claiming an abuse of 
discretion.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     On November 1, 1984, 
after pleading guilty to forgery, appellant was sentenced to a term of 20 to 40 
months in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. The court suspended all but 30 days of 
the sentence and placed him on probation for 40 months. Over the next two years, 
repeated violations of the conditions of appellant's probation resulted in three 
separate instances of revocation and subsequent reinstatement of that probation. 
Upon his fourth violation, the court, attempting to alter this pattern, ordered 
appellant to participate in the residential community corrections program 
offered by Community Alternatives of Greybull, Inc. in Greybull, Wyoming.

 
 

[¶4.]     On August 8, 1987, 
appellant left the center without the permission of authorities in charge, stole 
a car, and fled to California where he was 
apprehended and returned to Wyoming. At his arraignment, appellant entered 
a plea of not guilty to the charge of escape from official detention. The State 
later charged him with the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. Thereafter, 
pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, appellant changed his plea to guilty on 
the escape charge. The district court sentenced appellant to a term of two to 
four years, to be served concurrently with the time remaining on his forgery 
sentence.

 
 

[¶5.]     Appellant contends that 
his guilty plea must be vacated because the court failed to adequately inform 
him of the nature of the charged offense and to determine a factual basis for 
his plea, as required by Rule 15(c)(1) and (f), W.R.Cr.P.1 Appellant reasons that, since the 
sentencing court ordered him to submit to the supervision of the community 
correctional facility as a condition of his probation, he was not in official 
detention as that term is defined by statute. Therefore, he argues, his act of 
leaving the facility was not escape from detention. He contends that the 
district court failed to make him aware of a different interpretation before 
accepting his guilty plea, and that amounted to a failure to adequately inform 
him of the nature of the charge against him and find a factual basis for his 
plea. He concludes that without a factual basis for his plea, the district court 
erred when it denied his motion to withdraw that plea.

 
 

[¶6.]     Appellant's argument 
concerning the validity of his plea is based on an incorrect construction of the 
statute under which he was charged. That statute, W.S. 6-5-206, provides that 
"[a] person commits a crime if he escapes from official detention." W.S. 
6-5-201(a)(ii) defines "official detention" as

 
 
"arrest, 
detention in a facility for custody of persons under charge or conviction of 
crime or alleged or found to be delinquent, detention for extradition or 
deportation, or detention in any manner 
and in any place for law enforcement purposes. `Official detention' does not 
include supervision on probation or parole or constraint incidental to release 
on bail." (emphasis added)

 
 

[¶7.]     Appellant's argument 
ignores the provisions of Wyoming's Adult Community Corrections Act, 
W.S. 7-18-101, et seq., effective May 23, 1985. The legislature intended the act 
to encourage development of community correctional programs which could aid in 
reintegrating low-risk adult felons into society. 1985 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 219, 
§ 2. Accordingly, a comprehensive review of the language of the act demonstrates 
that the legislature intended these programs to provide a rehabilitative, 
supervisory control over the participants, different in kind from both the 
relative freedom of probation and the highly restrictive constraints associated 
with detention in the state penitentiary. We perceive a legislative intent to 
provide a "halfway house" between prison and probation. W.S. 7-18-108 provides 
that "the sentencing court may, as a condition of probation, order that the 
offender participate in a residential or nonresidential community correctional 
program during all or any part of his term of probation." (emphasis added) 
Although participation in these programs is imposed as a condition of probation, 
such placement falls within the definition of "official detention" provided in 
W.S. 6-5-201(a)(ii). W.S. 7-18-112 clearly expresses the legislature's intent 
that escape from a community corrections facility be governed by W.S. 6-5-206. 
W.S. 7-18-112 provides:

 
 
"(a) An offender or an inmate is deemed guilty of escape from official 
detention and shall be punished as provided by W.S. 6-5-206(a)(i) if, without proper authorization, 
he:

 
 
     "(i) Fails to remain within the extended 
limits of his confinement or to 
return within the time prescribed to 
a community correctional facility to which he was assigned or transferred; 
or

 
 
     "(ii) Being a 
participant in a program established under the provisions of this act he leaves 
his place of employment or fails or neglects to return to the community 
correctional facility within the time prescribed or when specifically ordered to 
do so." (emphasis added)

 
 
The 
statutory language conveys the notion that the limits on personal freedom, 
normally associated with penal confinement, are largely absent in these 
community facilities. While these "limits of * * * confinement" have been 
liberally "extended" in such facilities, the language of the statute also 
establishes that the few restrictions imposed upon residents of these correction 
centers are to be considered confinement. Therefore a breach of such 
restrictions must be considered a failure "to remain within the extended limits 
of his confinement." We hold, therefore, that participation in a community 
correctional program does not constitute the "supervision on probation or 
parole" that would preclude prosecution for the offense of escape from official 
detention.

 
 

[¶8.]     The trial court in this 
case rejected appellant's erroneous reading of the statutes. A correct reading 
of the applicable statutes demonstrates that appellant was informed of the 
nature of the offense to which he pled guilty. The district court must be 
satisfied that the appellant possessed an understanding of the law and its 
relation to the facts of his case. Sanchez v. State, 592 P.2d 1130, 1135 
(Wyo. 1979); York v. State, 619 P.2d 391, 397 (Wyo. 1980). The court 
complies with the intent of Rule 15, W.R.Cr.P. if a defendant is not misled into 
the waiver of substantial rights which attends a guilty plea. In some 
circumstances the court may discharge this obligation by simply reading the 
indictment or information to the defendant and permitting him the opportunity to 
ask questions. Bryan v. State, 745 P.2d 905, 
907-8 (Wyo. 1987); United States v. Dayton, 604 F.2d 931, 938 (5th Cir. 1979) 
(discussing Rule 11, F.R.Cr.P. from which our Rule 15 was derived). In other 
instances, however, it may be necessary to explain the elements of the crime and 
define complex legal terms. The actions required of the district court in any 
particular case depend largely on whether the elements of the offense are 
difficult to understand, considering both their complexity to the average person 
with no legal training and the sophistication of the individual defendant. 
Bryan, 745 P.2d at 907-8; Dayton, 604 F.2d  at 938. 
In addition to this explanation of the charges, the court must also determine 
that the facts a defendant admits constitute the offense with which he is 
charged. Such a requirement is designed to protect those defendants who, 
although pleading voluntarily and with an asserted understanding of the charge, 
fail to realize that their conduct does not fall within that charge. McCarthy v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466-67, 89 S. Ct. 1166, 
1170-71, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1969) (discussing Rule 11, 
F.R.Cr.P.).

 
 

[¶9.]     Prior to accepting 
appellant's guilty plea, the district court heard testimony in which appellant 
acknowledged:

 
 
            
1. He was charged with escape.

 
 
            
2. Pursuant to a motion for sentence reduction in a prior matter, the 
district court in CampbellCounty had ordered him to the correctional 
facility at Greybull, rather than to the state 
penitentiary.

 
 
            
3. On August 8, 1987, he left that facility and this state with the 
intention to never return to the facility.

 
 
            
4. He had no permission to depart from the community corrections center 
and the state.

 
 
Viewing the 
arraignment proceedings as a whole, we hold the district court sufficiently 
described the charge to appellant and sufficiently made him aware of the 
specific conduct which led to that charge. By eliciting that he had, without 
permission, terminated his court-ordered residency at the community correctional 
facility and failed to return to that facility, the district court assured that 
appellant was not misled as to the nature of the charges against him. The 
elements of the offense are quite simple, both conceptually and in the manner 
articulated by the legislature. The record shows appellant had some college 
level education, and he had something more than a passing exposure to the 
courtroom and the plea taking process. We are satisfied that appellant was 
sufficiently intelligent and sophisticated to understand the nature of the 
charge against him with only minimal help from the district 
court.

 
 

[¶10.]  Appellant also asserts that the district 
court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his plea. To prevail on this point 
he must establish that such a denial was an abuse of discretion, and he must 
provide a "plausible reason" for granting the motion. Chorniak v. State, 715 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Wyo. 1986). That is, he must show that 
fairness and justice require the withdrawal of his guilty plea, as would be the 
case where the record demonstrates that the plea was made in the face of a 
meritorious defense or continued assertions of innocence. Wright v. State, 703 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Wyo. 1985). Such is not the case here where 
appellant premises his alleged innocence, and/or his alleged defense, solely on 
an erroneous interpretation of the statute under which he was charged. 
Furthermore, this misinterpretation was conceived after the court had properly 
informed him of the charge and had determined that he pled voluntarily. Although 
the grant or denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is a reviewable 
exercise of the district court's discretion, there can be no abuse of that 
discretion, where the record shows that the plea was voluntary and made with a 
full understanding of the consequences, and where the trial court found a 
factual basis for that plea. Schmidt v. State, 668 P.2d 656, 660 (Wyo. 1983). We hold the 
district court properly denied appellant's motion to withdraw his 
plea.

 
 

[¶11.]  Finally, appellant contends that the 
district court abused its discretion in imposing a sentence of two to four 
years, to be served concurrently with a prior sentence for forgery. We will not 
disturb a sentence unless there has been an abuse of discretion or some 
procedural deficiency which prejudiced the appellant and which offends our sense 
of justice and fair play. Hicklin v. State, 535 P.2d 743, 751, 79 A.L.R.3d 1050 
(Wyo. 1975). 
Here, appellant asserts no procedural impropriety. Therefore, absent a clear 
abuse of discretion, we will not set aside appellant's sentence if it is within 
the limits set by statute for the particular offense. Wright, 703 P.2d  at 1105. 
Since the relevant statute sets a maximum term of ten years, appellant's 
sentence is within permissible limits.2 Furthermore, there has been no 
abuse of discretion unless the trial court's acts exceed the bounds of 
reasonableness. Duffy v. State, 730 P.2d 754, 757-58 (Wyo. 1986). Every 
sentencing decision involves two important considerations: the nature of the 
crime and the character of the criminal. Wright, 703 P.2d  at 1105. Escape is a 
serious offense which substantially undermines this state's efforts to protect 
its citizens by rehabilitating those who threaten their welfare and safety. 
Appellant left the state and presumably would not have returned had he not been 
captured in California. Additionally, though offered 
numerous opportunities for probation and this final opportunity to participate 
in a community correctional program, appellant's efforts to redeem and 
rehabilitate himself have been decidedly unsuccessful. In light of these 
factors, we cannot find an abuse of discretion in the sentence imposed upon 
him.

 
 

[¶12.]  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment and 
sentence of the district court.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Rule 15, W.R.Cr.P. 
provides in pertinent part:

 
 
"(c) Advice to defendant. - Before accepting 
a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address the defendant 
personally in open court and inform him of, and determine that he understands, 
the following:

 
 
"(1) The nature of the 
charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by 
law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law; * * 
*

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
     "(f) Determining accuracy of plea. - 
Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court should not enter a 
judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that 
there is a factual basis for the plea."

 
 

2 Section 6-5-206(a)(i) 
makes "escape from official detention" a felony with a maximum penalty of ten 
years if that detention resulted from a felony 
conviction.