Title: Howell v. State

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

300 So. 2d 774 (1974) Harvey R. HOWELL v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 47752. Supreme Court of Mississippi. March 25, 1974. Rehearing Denied September 30, 1974. *775 Alfred Lee Felder, Pascagoula, for appellant. A.F. Summer, Atty. Gen., by John C. Underwood, Jr., Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. ROBERTSON, Justice: Harvey Ray Howell was indicted, tried and convicted in the Circuit Court of Jackson County for the unlawful possession of amphetamines. He was sentenced to serve a term of two years in the Mississippi State Penitentiary. The only assignment of error was that the trial court erred in overruling defendant's motion to suppress the evidence. Deputy Sheriff Alexander was on patrol at 2:25 A.M. on August 7, 1972, when he noticed a white van parked in front of Sherman's Grocery in Escatawpa. Alexander noticed that the driver was slumped over the steering wheel. He investigated and roused the driver sufficiently to get him out of the van. Howell appeared to be drunk or under the influence of drugs, so Alexander assisted him to his patrol car and put him on the back seat. In getting Howell out of the van, Alexander noticed a pistol in a holster on the right front floorboard of the van. He went back to pick up the pistol and, when he opened the front door on the passenger's side, he noticed in a shallow offset in the dashboard two cellophane bags containing white tablets. Alexander turned these over to the narcotics officer, who, on analysis, found these small white pills to be amphetamines. Howell contends that inasmuch as deputy sheriff Alexander did not have an arrest warrant or a search warrant he had no right to retrieve the pistol and take the two cellophane bags into his possession, and have the contents analyzed. We are of the opinion that the trial court was correct in overruling appellant's motion to suppress, and that Alexander's action, under the circumstances of this case, did not amount to an unreasonable search and seizure. Finding Howell slumped over the steering wheel of the van at 2:25 A.M. was enough to require an investigation to determine the cause. Howell could have been sick or injured, could have suffered a heart attack; he could have been drunk or under the influence of drugs; or he could have been engaged in criminal activity. It was the sheriff's duty to keep an incapacitated person from driving a car on a public road and endangering the lives of others. So it was reasonable for Alexander to place him in the patrol car where he could not hurt himself or others. Having noticed the pistol on the right front floorboard, it was reasonable for Alexander to retrieve the pistol if for no other reason than to keep it from being stolen while the van was unattended. When Alexander noticed the two cellophane bags in the open recess next to the glove compartment, he acted reasonably in taking these bags together with their contents into his possession. This Court has consistently held that the "eye cannot trespass". Wilson v. State, 186 So. 2d 208 (1966); Powell v. State, 184 So. 2d 866 (Miss. 1966); Corn v. State, 250 Miss. 157, 164 So. 2d 777 (1964); Bone v. State, 207 Miss. 868, 43 So. 2d 571 (1949). The United States Supreme Court stated the "plain view" doctrine in Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 88 S. Ct. 992, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1968): Having reached the conclusion that deputy sheriff Alexander had "a right to be in the position to have that view" when he noticed the two cellophane bags, the two *776 bags with their contents were subject to seizure, and could be introduced into evidence when found to contain amphetamines. The conviction, therefore, is affirmed. We do think that the two-year sentence is excessive in view of Mississippi Code 1972 Annotated, Section 41-29-139(d)(3) (1973 Supp.), which provides: Even though the conviction is affirmed, we must set aside the sentence, and remand for resentencing in accord with the statute. Conviction affirmed, but sentence set aside, and case remanded for resentencing. GILLESPIE, C.J., and SUGG, WALKER and BROOM, JJ., concur. On a former day we affirmed Howell's conviction for possession of amphetamines, but remanded the case for resentencing because the two year sentence imposed was in excess of that permitted by statute. Both Howell and the State filed petitions for rehearing in this case. Howell contends that this Court erroneously applied the "plain-view" doctrine by holding that certain police action did not amount to an unreasonable search and seizure. The State's petition for rehearing alleges that the remand for resentencing was erroneous because the State Board of Health, pursuant to statutory authorization, transferred all amphetamines from Schedule III to Schedule II of the Uniform Controlled Substances Law[1] on October 13, 1971. The State argues that since the maximum penalty for Schedule II substances is confinement for not more than three years, the lower court's sentence was not excessive. After the petitions for rehearing were filed, we requested additional briefs on the following questions: Mississippi Code Annotated section 41-29-111 (1972) provides, in part, as follows: This section of the Mississippi Uniform Controlled Substances Law is similar to title 21 section 811, U.S.C. (1970), one of the differences being that the authority to reschedule substances in the federal statute is vested in the Attorney General of the United States, whereas the Mississippi act vests this authority in the State Board of Health. In United States v. Jones, 480 F.2d 954 (5th Cir.1973), the statute was attacked as being unconstitutionally vague. The Court stated: In United States v. Westlake, 480 F.2d 1225 (5th Cir.1973), the statute was attacked on the ground that it represented an impermissible delegation of legislative power. With reference to this contention, the Court stated: Unlike Jones and Westlake, the question is squarely before this Court because Howell's sentence was increased as a result of the action of the State Board of Health in transferring amphetamines from Schedule III to Schedule II. Since the validity of Section 41-29-111 has been questioned, we must determine if this act of the legislature is authorized by the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 because if it is not authorized by the Constitution, it will be void. Article 1, Section 1, divides the powers of the government of the State of Mississippi into three distinct departments, each of which is confided to a separate magistry. Section 2 of the Article prohibits any person or collection of persons of one of the departments from exercising any power belonging to the other departments. Section 5 of Article 3 declares that all government of right originates with the people, is founded upon their will only, is instituted for the good of the whole and all political power is vested in and derived from the people. By Section 6 the people of Mississippi reserved to themselves the exclusive right to regulate internal government and to alter and abolish the Constitution and form of government whenever they deem it necessary to their safety and happiness, provided such change is not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. Article 4, Section 33, vests all legislative power in the legislature, the elected representatives of the people. The question of the delegation of legislative authority was *778 considered in Alcorn v. Hamer, 38 Miss. 652 (1860) under similar provisions in the Constitution of 1832. The Court stated: It is quite obvious that in 1860 this Court did not contemplate that any delegation of legislative authority was permissible under the Constitution. However, as life and legislation became more complex there was engrafted onto the Alcorn doctrine certain exceptions designed to permit, within strict limits, the delegation of legislative authority to administrative agencies. We have consistently held, however, that an administrative agency cannot be vested with an arbitrary and uncontrolled discretion. State v. Allstate Insurance Co., 231 Miss. 869, 97 So. 2d 372 (1957). A recent statement of the rule concerning delegation of legislative authority is found in Columbia Gulf Transmission Co. v. Barr, 194 So. 2d 890 (Miss. 1967). In that case we stated: The State argues that the legislative grant of authority in Section 41-29-111 is proper since the State Board of Health is only given fact-finding authority to classify dangerous substances and is provided with guidelines for making its determinations. Section 41-29-111 provides specific guidelines to be used by the Board in determining whether or not a substance should be controlled and Sections 41-29-113 to XX-XX-XXX, inclusive, provide additional standards to be followed by the Board in assigning a substance to one of the five schedules. The question of whether or not the grant of authority to the State Board of Health is valid arises because, under the Uniform Controlled Substances Law, the penalties prescribed for violations thereof are inextricably tied to the various schedules. For example, the maximum penalty for the possession of a Schedule III substance is one year in prison or $1,000 fine, or both; the maximum penalty for possession of a Schedule II substance is three years in prison or $3,000 fine, or both. It is readily apparent that when the State Board of Health shifted amphetamines from Schedule III to Schedule II, the maximum penalty for possession thereof increased. The practical effect of moving a substance from one schedule and placing it in another is to increase or diminish the criminal penalty for violation of *780 the act. It is likewise true that, if substances are added to or deleted from any of the schedules such action makes acts pertaining to the substances so added a crime, and as to substances deleted, abolishes a crime. The result is that the State Board of Health is given the authority to define a crime, and ordain its punishment. The exclusive authority of the legislature to define crimes and fix the punishment therefor is without question. The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. (U.S.) 76, 5 L. Ed. 37 (1820) laid down the principle that the power to define a crime and the power of punishment was vested in the legislative and not in the judicial department. Speaking through Chief Justice Marshall, the Court stated: This Court held in Arnold v. State, 213 Miss. 667, 57 So. 2d 484 (1952) that the power of the legislature to fix punishment for crimes was an unquestioned constitutional power. In Broadhead v. Tax Commission, 238 Miss. 239, 117 So. 2d 881 (1960), this Court had under consideration the constitutionality of Section 9220-24, Mississippi Code Annotated (1942) Recompiled which authorized the Commissioner of the State Tax Commission to impose a penalty for a delinquent income tax return of not less than 10% nor more than 25% of the delinquent sum. The Court held that the power to prescribe penalties to be incurred for breaches of public duty belongs to the legislative department. It further held that determination of the amount of penalty to be imposed for noncompliance with a requirement of law is a legislative function which may not be delegated to an administrative officer with unrestricted power to impose such penalties, within broad limits, as he may see fit to impose. The Court held this statute unconstitutional on the ground that the legislature had no power to surrender its own discretion to an administrative officer in the matter of determining the amount of a penalty to be imposed for delinquencies under the revenue law. The Court recognized an exception in the case in the following language: *781 In Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269 (1944) the Texas Supreme Court held that the power to define crimes and the punishment therefor was vested by the constitution in the legislature. In Grimes v. Greer, 223 Ga. 628, 157 S.E.2d 260 (1967), the Supreme Court of Georgia held that the power to prescribe penalties to be imposed for the commission of crime rests with the legislature and is part of the sovereign power of the state to maintain social order. In State v. Sutton, 21 Ariz. App. 271, 518 P.2d 590 (1974) Division 1, Court of Appeals of Arizona stated: The rule is stated in 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 577 (1965) as follows: We hold that the authority to define crimes and fix the punishment therefor is vested exclusively in the legislature, and it may not delegate that power either expressly or by implication, but must exercise it under Article 4, Section 33 of the Constitution. We further hold that the attempted delegation of power to the State Board of Health is contrary to Article 1, Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution providing for separation of the powers of the government of the state into three departments. The State Board of Health is an administrative agency and as such is a part of the executive department of the state. When it rescheduled amphetamines from Schedule III to Schedule II, it increased the punishment of Howell in excess of that fixed by the legislature and thereby exercised legislative power. This infringes on the separation of the powers of government and is prohibited. We therefore hold that the portions of Mississippi Code Annotated section 41-29-111 (1972) quoted in this opinion are unconstitutional, but are separable from the remaining provisions of the Uniform Controlled Substances Law. The constitutionality of the remaining provisions thereof are not affected by this decision under the rule that a statute may be valid in part, and the invalid part may be disregarded, where the two parts are not so intimately connected as to raise the presumption that the legislature would not have enacted the one without the other. American Express Co. v. Beer, 107 Miss. *782 528, 65 So. 575 (1914); Campbell v. Mississippi Union Bank, 7 Miss. 625 (1842); The General Tompkins, 9 F. 620 (C.C.S.D.Miss. 1881). In view of the result here reached, it will be of no effect for the State Board of Health to revise and republish the schedules as provided in Mississippi Code Annotated section 41-29-123 (1972). We do not reach the question of whether the notice given by the State Board of Health constituted due process because the decision on the constitutional question involved renders it unnecessary. The State's petition for rehearing is denied and the maximum amount of time one may be confined for possession of amphetamines remains one year as prescribed by statute. We have carefully considered the defendant's petition for rehearing and find it is without merit; therefore, it is denied. Petitions for rehearing denied. All Justices concur. [1] Under the Uniform Controlled Substances Law, substances are classified in five schedules. Mississippi Code Annotated sections 41-29-113 to XX-XX-XXX (1972).