Title: Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Lipella

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Motor Vehicle Administration v. Ronald William Lipella, No. 80, September Term, 2010.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW - MOTOR VEHICLE
ADMINISTRATION - ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSE SUSPENSION HEARING:
Suspension of a driver’s license is appropriate when the officer lists the reasons for
suspecting the driver of driving while intoxicated on the DR-15A.  The officer is not obliged
to enumerate on the DR-15A the reasons for making the initial traffic stop, unless they reveal
the basis for believing intoxication on the part of the operator.  The Administrative Law
Judge properly held that, the Washington County Sheriff’s Deputy had reasonable grounds,
as listed on the DR-15A, to pull over the Respondent for intoxicated driving and
subsequently confiscate and suspend his license for ninety days.
Circuit Court for Washington County
Case No. 21-C-09-36042AA
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No.  80
September Term, 2010
                                                                             
MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION
v.
RONALD WILLIAM LIPELLA
                                                                             
 
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
         *Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
JJ.
                                                                             
Per Curiam
                                                                             
Filed:   June 25, 2012
*Murphy, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an
active member of this Court, but did not
participate in the decision or adoption of this
opinion.
 
1 Unless otherwise provided, all statutory references are to Maryland Code (1977,
2009 Repl. Vol.) of the Transportation Article.  The subsections of the Implied Consent
Statute (§ 16-205.1) in this case have not been changed since the time of the events in
question.
2 The Motor Vehicle Administration (“MVA”) Form DR-15A (“Officer’s Certification
and Order of Suspension”) contains a section for the officer to indicate why he suspected the
driver was under the influence.  The MVA Form DR-15A will be discussed in detail, infra.
This case arises from an Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) suspension on
November 17, 2009 of Respondent’s, Ronald Lipella, driver’s license for ninety days,
pursuant to Maryland Code (1977, 2009 Repl. Vol.), Transportation Article, §16-205.1
(b)(i)(2)(A) (“Implied Consent Statute”).1  The operative facts underlying the ALJ’s decision
began on August 29, 2009 when Washington County Sheriff’s Deputy Jared Lee Barnhart
pulled Lipella over for swerving outside the proper travel lane on a highway in Washington
County.  Discovering after he approached Lipella that the driver smelled of alcohol and
slurred his speech, Barnhart administered to Lipella the three standard field sobriety tests
(“SFSTs”), all of which he failed.  His blood alcohol content (“BAC”) registered 0.16, based
on a preliminary breath test administered in the field.  Deputy Barnhart detained and
transported Lipella to the Washington County Sheriff’s Department where an official
breathalyzer test was administered, which also registered a BAC of 0.16.  His driver’s license
was confiscated for driving while intoxicated.
Upon judicial review of Lipella’s license suspension, the Circuit Court for
Washington County concluded that Deputy Barnhart failed to indicate adequately on the
Motor Vehicle Administration (“MVA”) Form DR-15A2 the reasonable grounds for the
3 The facts presented here were gathered from the Alcohol Influence Report, which
is the police officer’s narrative of the entire incident–the underlying traffic violation, the
officer’s suspicions of intoxication, the results of the standard field sobriety tests, and the
events at the police station.  This document was admitted into evidence at the MVA hearing,
although not relied upon explicitly by the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) in explaining
why he found that the MVA presented a prima facie case.  The admissibility of this document
will be discussed further, infra.
-2-
underlying traffic stop that led to the license suspension.  Therefore, the Circuit Court held
that the ALJ’s suspension of Lipella’s license was “unsupported by competent, material and
substantial evidence in light of the entire record submitted.”  As we shall explain, the Implied
Consent Statute does not require the officer to supply the grounds for the underlying traffic
stop.  Rather, the officer is required to provide on the DR-15A form the reasonable grounds
for the suspect’s intoxication.  Thus, the ALJ concluded properly that the MVA mounted
successfully a prima facie case, which was unrebutted, supporting the suspension of Lipella’s
license.  Accordingly, we shall reverse the Circuit Court’s judgment.
FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
On August 29, 2009, at approximately 12:49 a.m., Deputy Barnhart of the Washington
County Sheriff’s Department observed a person, later identified as Lipella, traveling
eastbound in a motor vehicle on Maryland Route 64 in Washington County.3  Deputy
Barnhart observed Lipella’s car swerve twice onto the right shoulder and then move back
onto the road, all the while traveling in excess of 65 mph.  The posted speed limit was 50
mph.  The Deputy signaled for Lipella to pull over.  Upon first contact with the driver,
Deputy Barnhart detected a strong odor of alcohol emanating from his person.  He asked
4 The three standard field sobriety tests (SFSTs) performed were: the horizontal gaze
nystagmus test, which evaluates a driver’s ability to follow a horizontally moving point of
reference (if intoxicated, the eyes present a jerky movement); the heel-to-toe walk test; and
the one leg stand test.
-3-
Lipella to step out of the vehicle and administered the SFSTs.4  Lipella exhibited signs of
intoxication during the first test, the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, and could not complete
the other two tests, due apparently to his inebriation.  
Deputy Barnhart requested of Lipella that he submit to a preliminary breathalyzer test
(“PBT”).  Lipella acquiesced.  The test yielded a BAC reading of 0.16.  Barnhart placed
Lipella under arrest for driving while intoxicated and transported him to the Washington
County Sheriff’s Office.  Before administering the second BAC test, the Deputy informed
Lipella of his right to refuse the breathalyzer test and the consequences of:  (1) a refusal to
take the test; (2) a result of BAC over 0.08; and, (3) a result of BAC over 0.15.  These rights
and consequences are detailed also on the DR-15 Advice of Rights form, which is a replica
of the language in § 16-205.1.  Lipella agreed to submit to the second, certified breathalyzer
test, which also resulted in 0.16 BAC reading.  A DR-15A Order of Suspension was issued,
Lipella’s license was confiscated, and he was issued a temporary driver’s license pending the
results of an administrative hearing before an ALJ of the Maryland Office of Administrative
Hearings.  Deputy Barnhart forwarded a copy of the completed DR-15A, as required by the
Implied Consent Statute, to the MVA.  The form explained, in part:
CERTIFICATION OF POLICE OFFICER
I, the undersigned officer, had reasonable grounds to believe that
5 Deputy Barnhart did not testify before the ALJ.  The case was submitted by the
MVA on its papers.  Lipella did not seek an administrative subpoena for Barnhart to testify.
6 Code of Maryland Regulations 11.11.02.10(H) provides:
Notwithstanding the fact that evidence may have been seized or
(continued...)
-4-
the driver described and named above had been driving or
attempting to drive a motor vehicle on a highway or on any
private property that is used by the public in general in this State
while under the influence of alcohol, while impaired by alcohol,
while so far impaired by any rug, any combination of drugs, or
a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol that the person
could not drive a vehicle safely while impaired by a controlled
dangerous substance, in violation of an alcohol restriction of
Section 16-813 of the Maryland Vehicle Law.
REASONABLE GROUNDS: VEH[CLE WAS] STOPPED ON
REASONABLE GROUNDS. UPON CONTACT WITH
DRIVER I DETECTED A STRONG ODOR OF AN
ALC[OHOLIC] BEV[ERAGE] AND HE HAD SLURRED
SPEECH.  DRIVER FAILED SFST.  PBT - .16[.]
Lipella requested timely an administrative hearing regarding the ninety-day
suspension of his license.  At the hearing,5 Lipella argued that, because Deputy Barnhart
wrote on the DR-15A only that the “veh[icle was] stopped on reasonable grounds[,]” the
MVA’s paperwork did not meet its prima facie burden to show that the officer had
reasonable grounds to stop initially Lipella’s vehicle.  Lipella maintained that the officer was
required to list on the DR-15A the specific reasons for making the underlying traffic stop.
Without such information regarding the initial stop, Lipella complained he was precluded
from presenting a bad faith challenge to the grounds for the stop, as permitted by
6(...continued)
obtained in violation of a licensee’s Fourth Amendment
constitutional rights, the evidence is admissible unless the:
(1) Police officer, in obtaining or seizing the evidence,
acted in bad faith and not as a reasonable officer should
act in similar circumstances . . . .
-5-
intoxication are separate from one another, based on Illiano.  390 Md. at 281, 888
A.2d at 340 (holding that the Legislature’s use of the phrase “stop or detain” in §16-
205.1(b)(2) serves to sever the stop from the detention, and permits reasonable grounds to
believe intoxication of the driver may arise post-stop to justify the detention and request for
administration of a breath test).  The MVA sought to bolster its argument by contending that
the Legislature intended to make it easier to remove intoxicated drivers from Maryland’s
roads by not requiring suspicion of intoxication necessarily to be developed prior to
approaching the driver.  To this end, the Implied Consent Statute was enacted to prevent
endless litigation and achieve swiftness in removing intoxicated drivers from endangering
the public; therefore, the underlying traffic stop’s constitutionality is not a permitted issue
 
7 Section 16-205.1(f)(7)(i) enumerates seven issues that may be considered by the
ALJ, whether:  (1) the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person was driving or
attempting to drive impaired by alcohol or drugs; (2) there was evidence of the person’s use
of alcohol or drugs; (3) the officer requested the test only after the person was fully advised
of the administrative sanctions as provided in (b)(2) of the Implied Consent Statute as listed
on the DR-15 Advice of Rights form; (4) the person refused the test; (5) the person had a test
result of 0.08 or more; (6) the person had a test result of 0.15 or more; and, (7) the person
held a commercial driver’s license (“CDL”) or was driving a commercial vehicle, if the
hearing involved disqualification of a CDL.  See § 16-205.1(f)(7)(i).
-6-
to be raised at a license suspension hearing.7
As the MVA’s argument continued, the ALJ should conclude that the MVA is
required only to show, in making a prima facie case, that the officer had reasonable grounds
to request the driver to take the official breathalyzer test.  To this effect, the MVA relied
upon Motor Vehicle Administration v. Shea, 415 Md. 1, 18, 997 A.2d 768, 778 (2010), where
we held that the ALJ’s duty is to determine whether the officer had reasonable grounds to
request the accused to take a test to determine the BAC.
The ALJ suspended Lipella’s license for ninety days because the DR-15A describing
Deputy Barnhart’s basis for suspecting intoxicated driving, and the official BAC test result
administered at the Washington County Sheriff’s Office, were sufficient to constitute a prima
facie case.  Although he admitted the Alcohol Influence Report into evidence, the ALJ felt
he did not need to rely on the report as corroborating evidence because the MVA presented
a prima facie case otherwise, using the DR-15A and the BAC results.
Additionally, although Lipella suggested tangentially a possible defense of bad faith
on the part of the police officer, he adduced no evidence to call the police officer’s statements
8  This is a reference to the Alcohol Influence Report, which read:
I [Deputy Barnhart] observed a grey passenger car traveling
eastbound in front of me that appeared to be speeding.  The
vehicle veered sharply across the white line and onto the
shoulder, and then returned back to the traffic lane.  I paced the
vehicle eastbound on Rt.64 from the intersection fo While Hall
road to the intersection of Twin Springs Drive in excess of 65
mph.  While I was pacing the vehicle again veered sharply over
the white line and then quickly returned to the lane of travel. 
-7-
into question.  This scenario is illustrated by the following exchange between the ALJ and
Lipella’s attorney:  
ALJ:
In the absence of bad faith, we don’t even get into the
stop.  So I get Counsel’s position, but I still think at this point,
it’s still a prima facie case, but it could be refuted by evidence.
(emphasis added)
ATTORNEY:
Well, that’s what the problem is.  We don’t know what
to refute, because he didn’t tell us.
ALJ:
Well, I can look at the corroboration to find out.[8]
ATTORNEY:
Well–
ALJ:
But it’s still a prima facie case and in the absence of bad
faith-and I can’t make a presumption of bad faith-I have to make
a presumption of good faith because the officer said he had
9 Here, the ALJ referred to the documents he intended to admit into evidence: a copy
of the hearing notice, transmittal form of delegation of authority to the ALJ from the MVA
and certification of the records submitted by the MVA, Officer’s Certification and Order of
Suspension (“DR-15A”), Alcohol Influence Report, Advice of Rights (“DR-15"), Alcohol
Test Result Certification (“MSP 33"), Intox ECIR (the breathalyzer equipment) print-out, and
Lipella’s prior driving record.
-8-
reasonable grounds.  So, I’ll just go ahead and admit them.[9]
ATTORNEY:
Ok.
In addition to not subpoenaing the Deputy to testify, Lipella did not testify on his own
behalf at the hearing.  Based on the admitted evidence, the ALJ held that the officer’s stop
was made in good faith and Lipella’s license should be suspended for ninety days.
Lipella filed a petition for judicial review with the Circuit Court for Washington
County, pursuant to Maryland Code (1984
), State Government Article, §
10-222.  He renewed his assertion that the DR-15A, as completed by Deputy Barnhart, was
overly vague and insufficient to constitute a prima facie case by the MVA.  Additionally, due
to the MVA’s lack of evidence as to the grounds for the traffic stop, he asserted that he was
deprived of the opportunity to raise and prove the defense that the stop was made in bad
faith.  Lipella also argued that the Alcohol Influence Report should not have been admitted
into evidence in the administrative hearing because it was not a sworn statement and, if
excluded, the MVA had no evidence to corroborate or supplement the insufficient DR-15A.
The MVA riposted that, under the Maryland Code (1984
), State
-9-
Government Article, § 10-213(b), the ALJ may consider any probative evidence, as long it
would be accepted commonly by reasonable and prudent individuals in the conduct of their
affairs.  See Md. Code Regs. 11.11.02.10(A) (2012).  Furthermore, the MVA argued that §
16-205.1 enumerates the only permissible issues that may be raised at license suspension
administrative hearings, and Lipella’s “insufficient grounds for a stop” argument was not one
of them.  Specifically, the MVA maintained that this Court held in Motor Vehicle
Administration v. Richards, 356 Md. 356, 368 n.7, 739 A.2d 58, 65 n.7 (1999), that the
constitutionality of the underlying traffic stop was prohibited from being an issue at the
administrative hearing, absent proof tendered by the driver that the officer acted in bad faith
in making this stop.  The MVA pointed out also that the DR-15A refers only to the
reasonable grounds the officer had to believe the person was driving or attempting to drive
under the influence, requiring no particular details be supplied in the first instance regarding
the underlying traffic stop.
The Circuit Court concluded that, in order to enable Lipella to elect whether to raise
a bad faith defense, the officer must list on the DR-15A specifically what he contended were
the reasonable grounds for the underlying traffic stop.  The judge held that, without adducing
the specific reasons for the stop, the MVA did not make a prima facie case on this record.
The Circuit Court explained why it was reversing the ALJ’s decision and remanding the
matter:  
[T]here should be the reasonable grounds for the stop
were that x, y and z and Mr. Lipella would then have the
opportunity to say, ‘No, that wasn’t true.’
10 Here the judge is referring to the DR-15A section labeled REASONABLE
GROUNDS, and that the Deputy failed to detail why he stopped Lipella’s vehicle and rather
only wrote “VEH[ICLE] [WAS] STOPPED ON REASONABLE GROUNDS[.]”
-10-
* * *
And therefore I do find that the findings of the
Administrative Law Judge is unsupported by competent,
material and substantial evidence in light of the entire record
submitted.  And also that it was arbitrary and capricious for this
sanction to be imposed based on the reasonable ground being
reasonable grounds.[10]
The MVA filed timely a petition for a writ of certiorari with this Court, under
Maryland Code (1973, 2006 Repl. Vol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, § 12-305,
which allows for a direct appeal from the Circuit Court judgment regarding administrative
hearings held under Title 16 of the Transportation Article.  We granted the petition, Motor
Vehicle Administration v. Lipella, 415 Md. 607, 4 A.3d 512 (2010), to consider the following
question:
In determining the sufficiency of an officer’s sworn
certification of grounds to request an alcohol concentration test
under § 16.205.1, as recorded on the DR-15A, did the ALJ err
in determining that the specific reasons for the underlying traffic
stop need not be recorded under the section labeled
“REASONABLE GROUNDS?”
We shall reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court and remand with directions to
affirm the decision of the ALJ.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In judicial review of a state administrative agency (such as the ALJ decision here,
-11-
where he acted on behalf of the MVA by express delegation), we review the action of the
agency directly, rather than the judgment of the intervening reviewing court.  See Consumer
Prot. Div. v. Morgan, 387 Md. 125, 160, 874 A.2d 919, 939 (2005).  Under the Maryland
Administrative Procedure Act, a reviewing court may:
(1) remand the case for further proceedings;
(2) affirm the final decision; or
(3) reverse or modify the decision if any substantial right
of the petitioner may have been prejudiced because a
finding, conclusion, or decision:
(i) is unconstitutional;
(ii) exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction
of the decision maker;
(iii) results from an unlawful procedure;
(vi) is affected by any other error of law;
(v) is unsupported by competent, material, and
substantial evidence in light of the entire record as
submitted; or
(vi) is arbitrary and capricious.  
Md. Code (1957, 2009, Repl. Vol), State Gov’t Art., § 10-222.  
In United Parcel Service, Inc. v. People’s Counsel for Baltimore County, 336 Md.
569, 577, 650 A.2d 226, 230 (1994), we held that a court’s role in reviewing an agency’s
adjudicatory decision is narrow and “limited to determining if there is substantial evidence
in the record as a whole to support the agency’s findings and conclusions, and to determine
if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.”  The
substantial evidence test evaluates “whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached
the factual conclusion the agency reached.”  Bulluck v. Pelham Wood Apts., 283 Md. 505,
512, 390 A.2d 1119, 1123 (1978).  Furthermore, significant weight is given to any reasonable
11 Code of Maryland Regulations 11.1102.10(A)-(C) (2012), reads, in pertinent part:
(continued...)
-12-
factual inferences that the ALJ draws in license suspension proceedings specifically, Shea,
415 Md. at 18, 997 A.2d at 778 (quoting Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Delawter, 403 Md. 243,
256-57, 941 A.2d 1067, 1076 (2008)), as well as the statutory interpretations of an
administrative agency in the field of its delegated authority from the Legislature.  See e.g.,
Md. Aviation Admin. v. Noland, 386 Md. 556, 571-72, 873 A.2d 1145, 1154-55 (2005);
Fogle v. H & G Rest., Inc., 337 Md. 441, 445, 654 A.2d 449, 456 (1995) (holding that an
agency’s expertise in its own field should be respected).  See also Md. Code 
State Gov’t Art., 
(stating that “[j]udicial
review of disputed issues of fact shall be confined to the record for judicial review,” and “[i]n
a proceeding under this section, the court may remand, reverse, or modify the decision of the
administrative agency” if, inter alia, the decision “is unsupported by competent, material, and
substantial evidence in light of the entire record as submitted”).
DISCUSSION
In reviewing the ALJ’s decision, we consider only the evidence that was before the
ALJ at the hearing.  We will review first the evidentiary standards for administrative
hearings; evaluate the plain language requirements of § 16-205.1 and how they relate to the
DR-15A; and, finally review the sufficiency of the evidence with regards to the ALJ’s ruling
on Lipella’s contemplated bad faith defense and the suspension of his license.
As detailed in Code of Maryland Regulations (COMAR) § 11.11.02.10 (2012),11 any
(...continued)
A. Evidence that possesses probative value commonly
accepted by reasonable and prudent persons in the
conduct of their affairs may be admitted at a hearing.
B. Incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial, and unduly
repetitious evidence may be excluded.
C. The ALJ or other trier of fact is not bound by the
technical rules of evidence.
-13-
proffered evidence that the ALJ determines to be probative and accepted commonly by
reasonable and prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs, may be considered.  In the
present case, the ALJ admitted the Alcohol Influence Report.  He mentioned that, although
the Alcohol Influence Report would not be considered by him in determining whether the
MVA had advanced a prima facie case, it could, if needed, be looked to for corroboration.
An ALJ, presiding over an administrative hearing of a driver’s license suspension
matter, may consider also evidence that might not be admissible in a court proceeding.
Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Weller, 390 Md. 115, 133-34, 887 A.2d 1042, 1053 (2005).  In
Weller, we approved the admission in evidence of a PBT in a license suspension hearing.
390 Md. at 138, 887 A.2d. at 1056.  Weller argued that § 16-205.1 prohibits specifically the
PBT from being used in any “court action.”  Weller, 390 Md. at 135, 887 A.2d. at 1054.  We
held that, because the administrative hearing is not a “court action,” the formal rules of
evidence were not operative strictly and, thus, the PBT was permissible.  Weller, 390 Md.
at 135, 887 A.2d at 1053-54.  
In Motor Vehicle Administration v. McDorman, 364 Md. 253, 262, 772 A.2d 309, 314
(2001), we reiterated that hearsay evidence may be admitted in administrative hearings and,
12 Thomas attempted to argue that because he was never offered a breathalyzer test he
could not be cited for refusing the test.  The crux of his argument was that the DR-15A
conflicted with the Alcohol Influence Report.  Thomas v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 418 Md.
280, 298-99, 13 A.3d 1256, 1267 (2011).  We determined that the DR-15A and Alcohol
Influence Report were complimentary, and established the MVA’s assertions that Thomas
refused a breathalyzer and, thus, was in violation of the Implied Consent Statute.  Thomas,
418 Md. at 299, 13 A.3d at 1267.  It should be noted that Thomas was decided after Lipella’s
MVA hearing and the Circuit Court’s review.  Thus, neither the Circuit Court nor the ALJ
had the benefit of that opinion in deciding Lipella’s claim that the Alcohol Influence Report
is inadmissable.
-14-
if credible, may be the sole basis of a successful prima facie case.  (Citing Eger v. Stone, 253
Md. 533, 542, 253 A.2d 372, 377 (1969)).  Furthermore, we approved the use of an Alcohol
Influence Report as evidence of a defendant’s refusal of a breathalyzer test, which was the
basis for the subsequent suspension of his driver’s license.  Thomas v. Motor Vehicle Admin.,
418 Md. 280, 298-300, 13 A.3d 1256, 1267 (2011).12  
In the present case, the sworn DR-15A and the formal toxicology report of a BAC
reading of 0.16 from the official breathalyzer test are prima facie case evidence, in and of
themselves, proving a violation of § 16-205.1.  Accord Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Lytle, 374
Md. 37, 51-52, 821 A.2d 62, 70 (2003) (holding that the Legislature intended for the
completed DR-15A to be prima facie evidence of a violation of § 16-205.1).  The Alcohol
Influence Report, as corroborative evidence, may be admitted in an administrative hearing
under COMAR 11.11.02.10(A) because it is a probative document that a reasonable police
officer uses in the conduct of his duties.  Just as the PBT in Weller was probative because it
made the fact that Weller was driving while intoxicated  more likely so than not, the Alcohol
Influence Report in the present case makes it more likely so than not that Deputy Barnhart
13 Section 16-205.1 states, in relevant part:  
(a)(2) Any person who drives or attempts to drive a motor
vehicle on a highway or on any private property that is used by
the public in general in this State is deemed to have consented,
subject to the provisions of §§ 10-302 through 10-309, inclusive,
of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, to take a test if
the person should be detained on suspicion of driving or
attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol, while
impaired by alcohol, while so far impaired by any drug, any
combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs
and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle safely,
while impaired by a controlled dangerous substance, in violation
of an alcohol restriction, or in violation of § 16-813 of this title.
* * *
(a)(2)(b)(1)(i)(2).  For a test result indicating an alcohol
concentration of 0.15 or more at the time of testing:
(A) For a first offense, suspend the driver’s license for 90
days; . . .
(a)(2)(b)(2) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this
section, if a police officer stops or detains any person
who the police officer has reasonable grounds to believe
is or has been driving or attempting to drive a motor
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, while
(continued...)
-15-
had a reasonable belief that Lipella was driving while intoxicated.  Therefore, the ALJ
admitted properly here the Alcohol Influence Report as corroborating evidence.
We examined, in detail, the plain meaning of § 16-205.1 in Illiano, 390 Md. at 278-79,
888 A.2d at 337-38, in order to determine if the Legislature intended to separate procedurally
the events leading to the traffic stop from the detention events that lead to the request to take
a breathalyzer test.  See also Richards, 356 Md. at 368 n.7, 739 A.2d at 65 n.7.  The DR-15A
was created, using the requirements set out in § 16-205.113 as a precise model, to record the
13(...continued)
impaired by alcohol . . . the police officer shall:
(i) Detain the person;
(ii) Request that the person permit a test to be
taken
(iii) Advise the person of the administrative
sanctions that shall be imposed for test results
indicating an alcohol concentration of at least
0.08 but less than 0.15 at the time of testing;
(iv) Advise the person of the administrative
sanctions, including ineligibility for modification
of a suspension or issuance or a restrictive license
unless the person participates in the Ignition
Interlock System Program under §4.1 of this title,
that shall be imposed . . . for test results indicating
an alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more at the
time of testing . . . .
-16-
information that led the police officer to suspect intoxication.  Neither the form, nor the
statute, require the officer to document the events leading to the underlying traffic stop,
unless those events formed a part of the officer’s suspicion of intoxication.  The only
requirement is that the officer provide the “reasonable grounds to believe that the person had
been driving or attempting to drive . . . while under the influence of alcohol . . . ,” and,
therefore, to request the driver submit to a chemical test.  § 16-205(2)(viii).
In Illiano, the officer did not stop Illiano while she was driving; on the contrary,
Illiano brought her vehicle to rest directly behind the officer’s patrol car on an active
Maryland highway.  390 Md. at 269, 888 A.2d at 331-32.  The officer developed no
suspicions of possible intoxicated driving until he backed his patrol car alongside Illiano’s
and smelled alcohol on her breath.  Illiano, 390 Md. at 269, 888 A.2d at 332.  Because, § 16-
-17-
205.1(b)(2) uses the disjunctive “stop or detain,” instead of “stop and detain,” this indicated
that suspicions of intoxicated driving may arise separately from a traffic stop.  Illiano, 390
Md. at 277, 888 A.2d at 336-37.
This Court approved various officer-driver encounters, ending in suspensions of
persons’ driver’s licenses for intoxicated driving, even though they did not begin because of
suspicion of intoxicated driving.  For example, we affirmed a suspension that began when
an officer approached a driver on the street, known as a “consensual encounter.” See Ferris
v. State, 355 Md. 356, 373 n.4, 735 A.2d 491, 500 n.4 (1999) (citing United States v.
Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1408 (10th Cir. 1990)).  Another possible valid officer-initiated stop
occurs when a non-moving violation of the Transportation Article attracts an officer’s
attention, such as being illegally parked on a highway, as demonstrated in McDorman, 364
Md. at 262, 772 A.2d at 315.  Also, a police officer’s reasonable belief of criminal activity
may lead to a lawful interaction with a driver not related to intoxication.  See Richards, 356
Md. at 357, 739 A.2d at 59-60; Illiano, 390 Md. at 279-80, 888 A.2d at 338.  
If we were to accept Lipella’s argument that the officer must document why the
circumstances leading to the underlying traffic stop lead the officer to believe the driver was
intoxicated, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to suspend a person’s license for driving
under the influence because there would be plausible, non-alcohol-related, explanations for
many moving-violations:  e.g., driving too fast; distracted driving; or reaching for something
on the floor.  Furthermore, any non-moving violations, such as an expired tag, a non-working
headlight, or an illegally parked vehicle, could not lead to the suspension of a driver’s license
14 Richards slowed his truck down in the middle of a road and then drove to the end
of a dead-end street.  Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Richards, 356 Md. 356, 358, 739 A.2d 58, 59-
60 (1999).  The trooper watched this and concluded that Richards either lived down the dead
end street or he had no business in this neighborhood.  Richards, 356 Md. at 358, 739 A.2d
60.  When Richards came out of the dead-end street without stopping, the trooper stopped
him in order to inquire into Richard’s reasons for driving around this neighborhood after
midnight, which neighborhood had experienced a rash of vehicle thefts and night-time
burglaries.  Richards, 356 Md. at 358, 739 A.2d at 59-60.
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because the police officer would have no reason necessarily to believe the person was
intoxicated before he approached the driver in the vehicle.
In Richards, a Maryland State Police Trooper stopped Richards in his vehicle on the
basis that, because there had been a rash of criminal activity in the area, the trooper
determined that Richards’s actions were suspicious,14 but he had no reason to suspect
intoxication before the stop.  356 Md. at 358-59, 739 A.2d at 59-60.  What gave rise to a
suspicion of intoxication was detection of a strong odor of alcohol emanating from Richards
after the stop of his vehicle.  Id.  At the license suspension hearing, Richards challenged the
constitutionality of the stop on the ground that the officer had no indications of Richards
being intoxicated when the stop was made and, therefore, did not list the proper reasons to
suspect intoxication on the DR-15A.  Richards, 356 Md. at 359-60, 739 A.2d at 60.  Richards
argued that none of the evidence revealed during or after the stop could be considered in the
ALJ hearing because it flowed from an unconstitutional traffic stop.  Richards, 356 Md. at
367-68, 739 A.2d at 64-65.  This Court rejected specifically the challenge to the
constitutionality of the underlying traffic stop as a reason to prohibit the refusal, or results,
of a breathalyzer in a license suspension hearing, unless the accused showed bad faith on the
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part of the officer in making the stop.  Richards, 356 Md. at 368 n.7, 739 A.2d at 65 n.7. 
Lipella attempts (unpersuasively) to distinguish Illiano and Richards from the present
case.  Illiano provides an example of scenarios when there need not be a traffic stop
preceding an officer developing reasonable suspicions of intoxication.  390 Md. at 269, 888
A.2d at 332.  Richards demonstrates how the underlying stop need not be initiated solely
because of suspicion of intoxicated driving.  356 Md. at 358, 739 A.2d at 59-60.  In both
cases, the suspicions of intoxication, SFSTs, and subsequent requests for a breathalyzer were
sufficient, standing alone, to support the suspensions of the driver’s licenses.
Applying in Richards the distinction between the basis for the underlying stop and the
development of suspicions of intoxication, we concluded that the reasons for the stop do not
bear necessarily on the suspicion of intoxication determination, as long as the stop was
executed in good faith by the officer.  356 Md. at 368 n.7, 739 A.2d at 65 n.7.  Deputy
Barnhart’s specific suspicions of intoxication on Lipella’s part developed after he approached
the car and smelled the alcohol odor on Lipella and heard Lipella slur his words.  The request
for a field breathalyzer was a result of these indications, not necessarily or solely because of
Lipella’s inability to keep the travel of his car within the lane markings, which may have
been explainable otherwise as the result of distracted or drowsy driving, instead of
intoxicated driving.
The DR-15A, which is based on § 16-205.1, compels enumeration by the officer only
of the indications of the believed intoxication of the driver and does not compel attention to
the reasons for the officer approaching the driver in the first instance if not believed to be
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indicative of the driver’s intoxication.  For example, under the section of the form labeled
“ORDER OF SUSPENSION - ISSUE DATE (MONTH / DATE / YEAR)” the only pre-
printed boxes able to be checked are those regarding driving while intoxicated; there is no
comparable section regarding the initial stop.  Additionally, in regard to the specific section
of the form most relevant to the present case, “CERTIFICATION OF POLICE OFFICER,”
the instructions do not direct the police officer to indicate why he or she stopped the driver
in the first place, only what the police officer’s reasonable grounds were to believe the driver
was under the influence: 
I, the undersigned officer, had reasonable grounds to believe
that the driver described and named above had been driving or
attempting to drive a motor vehicle on the highway or any
private property that is used by the public in general in this State
while under the influence of alcohol, while impaired by alcohol
. . . (emphasis added)
Based on the requirements of § 16-205.1, Barnhart’s insertion of a notation on the
form that “veh[icle] [was] stopped on reasonable grounds” is superfluous to his later reasons
to suspect intoxication, and if stricken from the DR-15A, the reasons for harboring suspicion
of intoxicated driving would stand still because the Deputy detailed the smell of alcohol,
slurred speech, and failed SFSTs on the DR-15A, which led to confirmatory 0.16 BAC
readings on the two mechanical tests.
An accused driver’s right to argue that the officer acted in bad faith in making the
initial stop or collecting the evidence of intoxication is acknowledged.  In Shea, 415 Md. at
17 n.10, 997 A.2d at 777 n.10, we ameliorated concerns about the lack of Fourth Amendment
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applicability to administrative hearings by explaining that COMAR 11.11.02.10(H)(1)
provides for the possible exclusion of tainted evidence in an administrative hearing if it is
shown the officer acted in bad faith.  The ALJ, however, assumes good faith on the part of
the officer unless the accused provides evidence of bad faith and asserts how it affects the
hearing.  Richards, 356 Md. at 378, 739 A.2d at 71.
 For example, Illiano attempted to mount a bad faith argument by accusing the officer
of fabricating the reasons for the initial traffic stop and the events that occurred after their
first contact.  Illiano, 390 Md. at 271, 888 A.2d 333.  The ALJ found incredulous Illiano’s
description of the events leading up to her being administered a PBT and, therefore, rejected
her argument.  Illiano, 390 Md. at 271-72, 888 A.2d at 333.  In Chase v. State, 309 Md. 224,
253, 552 A.2d 1348, 1362 (1987), we held that credible evidence showing the officer’s
improper motives may be adduced by the accused in such a way that would be sufficient to
require the State to rebut it and attempt to re-establish that the officer’s actions were in
accord with reasonable law enforcement activities.  Bad faith is an affirmative defense, and
it was incumbent upon Lipella to present evidence tending to show bad faith on the part of
Deputy Barnhart.  See also Sheetz v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 315 Md. 208, 213, 553
A.2d 1281, 1283 (1989).  
Lipella did not adduce at the administrative hearing evidence of bad faith on
Barnhart’s part; rather, he contended only that he could not begin to argue bad faith without
knowing, from Barnhart’s pen, why he was stopped initially.  Lipella did not attempt to cure
this deficiency, even after the ALJ made it clear that, absent proof of bad faith, he would not
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consider the underlying traffic stop in his analysis of whether the MVA made out a prima
facie case of Lipella’s operation of his vehicle while intoxicated.  Lipella could have sought
a subpoena for Deputy Barnhart to appear for questioning at the suspension hearing; he did
not.  Lipella had the opportunity to present other evidence in an effort to implicate bad faith
in the  Deputy’s initial stop; he did not.  Having failed to mount a timely bad faith defense,
Lipella waived effectively his right to raise such a claim on appeal.
We turn now to whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to
support the ALJ’s suspension of Lipella’s license.  Whether the ALJ had enough evidence
to suspend Lipella’s license is determined by examining first the evidence that led the officer
to request a breathalyzer test.  See Shea, 415 Md. at 18, 997 A.2d at 778; Motor Vehicle
Admin. v. Shepard, 399 Md. 241, 251, 923 A.2d 100, 106 (2007).  As established supra, the
analysis of the evidence begins when the Deputy made contact with the Lipella.
The ALJ credited that, after pulling over Lipella in his car, Deputy Barnhart detected
a strong odor of alcohol and slurred speech emanating from Lipella.  These indications were
recorded on the DR-15A, which was enough to support reasonable suspicion to require
Lipella to undertake the SFSTs.  Lipella’s failure in performing the SFSTs was recorded on
the DR-15A.  These factors led Deputy Barnhart to ask Lipella to submit to a field PBT, as
authorized by § 16-205.1, resulting in a BAC of 0.16 reading.  The 0.16 BAC result provided
Deputy Barnhart with reasonable suspicion to transport Lipella to the Washington County
Sheriff’s Office for an official breathalyzer test.  After reading the required DR-15, Advice
of Rights, to Lipella, a toxicologist administered the official breathalyzer test, which resulted
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in a 0.16 BAC reading.  The ALJ determined that the intoxication indications–slurred speech,
odor of alcohol, failed SFSTs, and a PBT result of 0.16, as articulated on the DR-15A, along
with the Result of Test for Alcohol Concentration Form, signed by the toxicologist–were
sufficient for the MVA to make its prima facie case.
We conclude that the ALJ’s findings and conclusions that Deputy Barnhart possessed
reasonable grounds to request Lipella to submit to a formal breathalyzer test at the
Washington County Sheriff’s Office were supported by evidence in the record as a whole,
and that that evidence demonstrated Lipella’s violation of § 16-205.1(b)(i)(2).  The ALJ’s
decision to affirm suspension of Lipella’s driver’s license for ninety days per § 16-
205.1(b)(i)(2)(A) was correct and supported by substantial evidence.  The Circuit Court erred
in reversing the ALJ’s suspension of Lipella’s license.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT 
FOR 
WASHINGTON
COUNTY REVERSED.  CASE
REMANDED TO THAT COURT
WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO AFFIRM
T H E  
D E C I S I O N  
O F  
T H E
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE.
C O S T S  
T O  
B E  
P A I D  
B Y
RESPONDENT.