Title: State v. Hill

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 
 
No. 15–0030 
 
Filed April 22, 2016 
 
 
STATE OF IOWA, 
 
 
Appellee, 
 
vs. 
 
DONALD JAMES HILL, 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.   
 
 
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Cheryl E. 
Traum, District Associate Judge.   
 
 
A defendant appeals the district court’s sentencing order.  
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT 
SENTENCE VACATED AND CASE REMANDED.   
 
 
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer, 
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.   
 
 
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Tyler J. Buller, Assistant 
Attorney General, Michael Walton, County Attorney, and Steven A. 
Berger, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.   
 
 
 
2 
 
WATERMAN, Justice. 
In this appeal, we must decide whether the presumption for 
consecutive sentences in Iowa Code section 908.10A (2013) excuses the 
district court from the general requirement to state why it imposed a 
consecutive sentence and, if not, whether the district court’s stated 
reason for this consecutive sentence was adequate.  The defendant pled 
guilty to failure to comply with sex-offender registry requirements, an 
offense he committed while on parole for the underlying sex crime.  The 
district court imposed a two-year prison sentence consecutive to his 
parole revocation and stated, “The reason for the sentence is protection 
of the community, seriousness of the crime, and the nature and 
circumstances of the offense.”  The defendant appealed on grounds that 
the sentencing court failed to give reasons for imposing a consecutive 
sentence.  The court of appeals affirmed, concluding the statutory 
presumption for consecutive sentences obviated any need to give reasons 
for imposing the consecutive sentence.  The dissenting judge disagreed, 
noting section 908.10A allows discretion to impose concurrent or 
consecutive sentences, requiring the sentencing court to give reasons for 
its choice.  On further review, we hold the district court must give 
reasons for imposing a consecutive sentence under section 908.10A and 
that the reasons given in this case were insufficient.  Accordingly, we 
vacate the decision of the court of appeals, vacate the sentencing order, 
and remand the case for resentencing. 
 
I.  Background.   
In 2010, Donald James Hill was convicted of burglary in the third 
degree and assault with intent to commit sexual abuse and sentenced to 
prison.  He was required to register as a sex offender.  Hill was paroled 
on June 6, 2013.  As a condition of his parole, he was required to wear 
 
3 
 
an ankle bracelet with a GPS monitor.  On August 4, 2014, Hill reported 
to the Iowa Sex Offender Registry that he was residing at Bridge Avenue 
in Davenport, Iowa.  He was provided with the rules of the registry that 
day informing him that he must report any change in address within five 
days.  Hill moved to the City of Clinton, Iowa, four days later without 
reporting his change in address.  Shortly thereafter, Hill violated his 
parole by cutting off his ankle bracelet and traveling to Kentucky to 
attempt to meet with his ex-wife.  A warrant for his arrest for the parole 
violation was issued in Clinton County on August 26.  The next day, a 
Davenport police officer, Thomas Leonard, learned Hill was incarcerated 
in Kentucky.  Hill told the Kentucky officials that he resided in Clinton.  
On October 27, the State charged Hill with failure to comply with sex-
offender registry requirements in violation of Iowa Code section 
692A.111(1).1  Hill filed a written plea of guilty to that charge on 
December 3, which the Scott County District Court accepted on 
December 10.   
 
Hill appeared with counsel at his sentencing hearing in Davenport 
on January 2, 2015.  The State asked for a two-year prison term for the 
sex-offender registry conviction to be served consecutive to Hill’s parole 
revocation.  Hill requested a suspended sentence.  The district court 
orally imposed the following sentence:  
I am going to sentence you to the two years in prison, and it 
is consecutive to the parole [revocation] in FECR062306, 
which I understand is out of Clinton County.  I will give you 
credit for the time served.  The reason for the sentence is 
protection of the community, seriousness of the crime, and 
the nature and circumstances of the offense.   
1Hill’s parole revocation was prosecuted separately in Clinton County.   
                                      
 
 
4 
 
The district court issued this written sentencing order:  
Pursuant to Defendant’s plea of guilty to Count 1, Failure to 
Register as a Sex Offender, First Offense, in violation of 
Section 692A.104, Defendant is sentenced to the custody of 
the Director of the Iowa Department of Adult Corrections for 
a period not to exceed two years, to run consecutive to the 
parole 
revocation 
in 
Clinton 
County 
in 
Case 
No. FECR062306.  Credit is given for time served.  The Iowa 
Medical and Classification Center, Oakdale, Iowa, is 
designated as the reception center.  In addition, defendant is 
ordered to pay court appointed attorney fees not to exceed 
$1,000.  Court costs and fines are waived.  Defendant was 
advised of his right to appeal.  Appeal bond is set at $2,000.   
The district court did not refer to the statutory presumption for 
consecutive sentences. 
Hill appealed his sentence, contending the district court failed to 
provide adequate reasons for the consecutive sentence.  We transferred 
the case to the court of appeals.  A divided court of appeals affirmed 
Hill’s sentence because, “under section 908.10A, the default or 
presumptive sentence is a consecutive sentence.  The statute itself is 
sufficient reason for imposing consecutive sentences.”  The dissent 
concluded “[s]ection 908.10A empowers the district court to impose the 
sentences consecutively or concurrently,” which “implicates the court’s 
discretion and . . . requires a court to state reasons for imposing 
consecutive sentences.”  The dissent found the district court failed to 
exercise its discretion.   
We granted Hill’s application for further review.   
 
II.  Standard of Review.   
 
“We review the district court’s sentence for an abuse of discretion.”  
State v. Barnes, 791 N.W.2d 817, 827 (Iowa 2010).  A district court 
abuses its discretion when it exercises its discretion on grounds clearly 
untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.  Id.  A district court’s 
 
5 
 
“ground or reason is untenable when it is not supported by substantial 
evidence or when it is based on an erroneous application of the law.”  
State v. Putman, 848 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 2014) (quoting In re Det. of 
Stenzel, 827 N.W.2d 690, 697 (Iowa 2013)).  “When a sentence is not 
mandatory, the district court must exercise its discretion . . . .”  State v. 
Millsap, 704 N.W.2d 426, 433 (Iowa 2005) (quoting State v. Thomas, 547 
N.W.2d 223, 225 (Iowa 1996)).   
 
III.  Analysis.   
We must decide whether the presumption for consecutive 
sentences in Iowa Code section 908.10A, the parole-revocation 
sentencing statute, permits the district court to impose a consecutive 
sentence without stating a reason for doing so.  Hill argues, and the 
court of appeals dissent concluded, the district court abused its 
discretion by failing to explain why it imposed a consecutive sentence.  
The State contends, and the court of appeals majority held, the district 
court need not state any reasons for imposing a consecutive sentence 
because of the presumption for consecutive sentences in section 
908.10A.  The State alternatively argues the district court exercised its 
discretion and adequately explained the reasons for the consecutive 
sentence.  We interpret the statute to require an explanation for a 
consecutive sentence and conclude the district court’s explanation fell 
short.   
 
We begin with the text of Iowa Code section 908.10A, which 
provides,  
 
When a person is convicted and sentenced to 
incarceration in a state correctional institution in this state 
for an aggravated misdemeanor committed while on parole, 
. . . the person’s parole shall be deemed revoked as of the 
date of the commission of the new aggravated misdemeanor 
offense.   
 
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. . . The term for which the defendant shall be 
imprisoned as a parole violator shall be the same as that 
provided in cases of revocation of parole for violation of the 
conditions of parole. The new sentence of imprisonment for 
conviction of an aggravated misdemeanor shall be served 
consecutively with the term imposed for the parole violation, 
unless a concurrent term of imprisonment is ordered by the 
court.   
(Emphasis added.)  The plain language of section 908.10A makes clear 
that consecutive sentences are presumed, albeit not required, and are 
the default option unless the district court orders a concurrent term.  See 
id.  Yet, section 908.10A expressly allows the district court to impose a 
concurrent sentence, which necessarily gives the district court discretion 
to impose the sentence concurrently or consecutively.  Id.; see also id. 
§ 901.8 (“If a person is sentenced for two or more separate offenses, the 
sentencing judge may order the second or further sentence to begin at 
the expiration of the first . . . .”).  Thus, the district court had discretion 
when sentencing Hill for the sex-offender-registry charge to impose the 
prison sentence to run concurrent or consecutive to the prison sentence 
for his parole revocation.  The district court imposed a consecutive 
sentence.  Was the sentencing court required to give reasons for 
imposing the consecutive sentence?  The court of appeals majority 
concluded the statutory presumption for a consecutive sentence obviated 
the need to give reasons.  We disagree.   
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(3)(d) requires the district 
court to “state on the record its reason for selecting the particular 
sentence.”  Rule 2.23(3)(d) applies to the district court’s decision to 
impose consecutive sentences.  State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679, 690 
(Iowa 2000).  In State v. Thompson, we reiterated the purposes served by 
requiring the sentencing court to explain its reasons for imposing a 
particular sentence.  856 N.W.2d 915, 919 (Iowa 2014).  First, “[t]his 
 
7 
 
requirement ensures defendants are well aware of the consequences of 
their criminal actions.”  Id.  Second, and “[m]ost importantly,” this 
requirement “affords our appellate courts the opportunity to review the 
discretion of the sentencing court.”  Id.  Both purposes are served when 
offenders are sentenced under section 908.10A.  We hold that rule 
2.23(3)(d) applies to require the district court to state the reasons for its 
sentence, notwithstanding the statutory presumption for consecutive 
sentences in section 908.10A.  The court of appeals erred by holding 
otherwise.   
We next address whether the reasons given by the district court 
adequately explained Hill’s consecutive sentence.  In the sentencing 
colloquy, the district court, immediately after announcing its decision to 
impose a two-year prison term to run consecutive to the parole 
revocation, stated, “The reason for the sentence is protection of the 
community, seriousness of the crime, and the nature and circumstances 
of the offense.”  Those three reasons arguably applied to both the length 
of Hill’s sentence and the court’s decision to make it consecutive.  In 
Thompson, we concluded that similar reasons can be sufficient to show 
the exercise of discretion to impose a particular sentence.  856 N.W.2d at 
918, 921 (noting that the judge “can use forms, such as the one available 
in this case, to check the boxes indicating the reasons why a judge is 
imposing a certain sentence”).  The reasons given for Hill’s sentence 
mirror the reasons considered sufficient in Thompson.  See id. at 918 
(setting forth checklist that included as grounds for Thompson’s 
sentence, “[t]he nature and circumstances of the crime” and “[p]rotection 
of the public from further offenses”).  Thompson, however, did not involve 
consecutive sentences, and the district court, when giving reasons for 
 
8 
 
Hill’s sentence, did not explicitly state the same reasons supported 
making the sentence consecutive.   
Hill concedes that the district court’s statement was adequate to 
explain why it imposed a two-year prison term instead of a suspended 
sentence but argues the district court failed to further explain why it 
made its sentence consecutive to the prison term for the parole 
revocation.  We agree.  In State v. Hennings, we concluded that the 
district court’s stated reasons for sentences also applied to its decision to 
run them consecutively as part of an “overall sentencing plan.”  791 
N.W.2d 828, 838–39 (Iowa 2010) (quoting State v. Johnson, 445 N.W.2d 
337, 343–44 (Iowa 1989)).   
In our view, the stated reasons in this case were insufficient “to 
allow appellate review of the trial court’s discretionary action” to impose 
a consecutive sentence.  Barnes, 791 N.W.2d at 827 (quoting Jacobs, 607 
N.W.2d at 690); see State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 408 (Iowa 2015) 
(“While [rule 2.23(3)(d)] requires a statement of reasons on the record, a 
‘terse and succinct’ statement may be sufficient, ‘so long as the brevity of 
the court’s statement does not prevent review of the exercise of the trial 
court’s sentencing discretion.’ ” (quoting Johnson, 445 N.W.2d at 343)); 
Thomas, 547 N.W.2d at 225 (“The sentencing court . . . is generally not 
required to give its reasons for rejecting particular sentencing options”).  
The district court made no mention of the statutory presumption for a 
consecutive sentence in Iowa Code section 908.10A.  We cannot tell from 
this record whether the district court understood it had discretion under 
that statute to choose concurrent or consecutive sentences.  We are also 
unsure whether the stated reasons for the sentence applied to both the 
decision to reject Hill’s request for a suspended sentence and the 
decision to make his sentence consecutive.  Finally, the district court 
 
9 
 
missed the opportunity to elaborate about the separate crimes committed 
by Hill at different times—the underlying sex-crime conviction for which 
his parole was to be revoked and his new sentence for violating the sex-
offender registry statute while on parole.   
We encourage sentencing courts to give more detailed reasons for a 
sentence specific to the individual defendant and crimes and to expressly 
refer to any applicable statutory presumption or mandate.  Sentencing 
courts should also explicitly state the reasons for imposing a consecutive 
sentence, although in doing so the court may rely on the same reasons 
for imposing a sentence of incarceration.  To the extent our precedent 
such as Hennings and Johnson allowed us to infer the same reasons 
applied as part of an overall sentencing plan, we overrule them.   
The rule of law announced in this case overruling Hennings and 
Johnson shall be applicable to the present case, those cases not finally 
resolved on direct appeal in which the defendant has raised the issue, 
and all future cases.   
 
IV.  Conclusion.   
 
For these reasons, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals, 
reverse the sentencing order of the district court, and remand the case 
for resentencing.   
 
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT 
COURT SENTENCE VACATED AND CASE REMANDED.   
 
All justices concur except Appel and Wiggins, JJ., who concur 
specially.   
 
 
 
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#15–0030, State v. Hill 
APPEL, Justice (concurring specially). 
 
In this era of plea bargains, sentencing is often the most critical 
phase of a criminal proceeding.  As noted by one leading treatise, 
For defense counsel to focus efforts exclusively on trials is to 
ignore a crucial reality of criminal law: sentencing has as 
much—and often more—ultimate impact on clients and 
society than verdicts of guilt. 
Arthur W. Campbell, Law of Sentencing § 13:1, at 506–07 (2004).  And as 
one of the leading authorities on sentencing has observed, 
[B]ecause a sentencing outcome is the ultimate conclusion to 
the vast majority of criminal cases, the quality of most 
defendants’ representation will likely be reflected—and have 
its greatest bottom-line impact—at sentencing. 
Douglas A. Berman, From Lawlessness to Too Much Law? Exploring the 
Risk of Disparity from Differences in Defense Counsel Under Guidelines 
Sentencing, 87 Iowa L. Rev. 435, 437 (2002). 
 
But too often in our courtrooms, sentencing is given short shrift by 
the participants.  See Cait Clarke & James Neuhard, “From Day One”: 
Who’s in Control as Problem Solving and Client-Centered Sentencing Take 
Center Stage?, 29 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 11, 12 (2004) [hereinafter 
Clarke & Neuhard] (“Sentencing is too often considered an afterthought 
rather than seen as a critical stage in a criminal case.”).  There often 
seems to be an assumption that the process that led to the determination 
of guilt is generally sufficient to inform the court of the necessary 
information for sentencing. 
 
But this assumption is questionable.  As has been observed, 
Trial determines a defendant’s guilt; sentencing prescribes 
an offender’s fate.   
Trials 
are 
backward-looking, 
offense-oriented 
events. . . .   
 
11 
 
. . . Sentencing 
necessarily 
incorporates 
offender-
oriented considerations, many of which are forward-looking.  
Though sentencing judgments often consider how and why 
the crime was committed, the focus is different and 
broader. . . .  [W]hereas a defendant’s background and the 
criminal justice system’s purposes would be distracting or 
prejudicial 
at 
trial, 
they 
are 
key 
considerations 
at 
sentencing. 
Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 
4 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 37, 54–55 (2006). 
 
The importance of sentencing and its difference from the guilt 
phase of trial is recognized in professional standards that have been 
developed by leading legal organizations.  The ABA Standards for the 
Defense Function require a defense lawyer to conduct a prompt 
investigation that “should explore appropriate avenues that reasonably 
might lead to information relevant to . . . potential dispositions and 
penalties.”  ABA Criminal Justice Standard for the Defense Function  
4-4.1(c), 
www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/ 
DefenseFunctionFourthEdition.html.  In addition, a defense lawyer 
“should present all arguments or evidence which will assist the court or 
its agents in reaching a sentencing disposition favorable to the accused” 
and should verify, supplement, or challenge information in any 
presentence report made available to the defense.  Id. standard 4-8.3(c), 
(e); see generally Miriam S. Gohara, Grace Notes: A Case for Making 
Mitigation the Heart of Noncapital Sentencing, 41 Am. J. Crim. L. 41, 
(2013) [hereinafter Gohara] (recommending that defense counsel present 
a vigorous mitigation defense in noncapital cases). 
 
The National Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA) has 
developed more detailed guidelines for defense sentencing representation.  
The NLADA Guidelines for Defense in Sentencing require counsel to 
develop a plan for achieving the least restrictive sentencing outcome 
 
12 
 
based on the client’s social history and require where necessary, the 
opportunity to present evidence at a sentencing hearing.  NLADA 
Performance Guideline for Criminal Defense Representation 8.1 (1995).  
Counsel must ensure that “all reasonably available mitigating and 
favorable information, which is likely to benefit the client, is presented to 
the court.”  Id.; see Gohara, 41 Am. J. Crim. L. at 62.  According to 
observers, 
Sentencing preparation requires aggressively seeking out 
information about the client’s past, current life situation, the 
criminal conduct and underlying problems of the accused, 
and 
then 
presenting 
that 
information 
clearly 
and 
persuasively to decision-makers.  It cannot be done at the 
last moment or on short notice.  It must begin as early as 
possible in a case. 
Clarke & Neuhard, 29 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 53. 
 
Once a lawyer has fulfilled the distinct professional responsibilities 
related to sentencing, the district court must exercise its discretion in 
setting the sentence.  Even in a case that seems less consequential than 
other matters on a court’s crowded docket, the impact on the parties 
with a stake in the sentencing decision is substantial and requires a 
careful, thoughtful discretionary decision by the district court.  
Sentencing is not a time to cut corners. 
 
Last term we decided the case of State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402 
(Iowa 2015).  In Thacker, we reviewed the importance of a statement of 
reasons for a sentence.  Id. at 405–07.  We cited a seminal article by 
Marvin Frankel, who emphasized that “the giving of reasons helps the 
decision-maker . . . in the effort to be fair and rational, and it makes it 
possible for others to judge whether he has succeeded.”  Marvin E. 
Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1972).  And 
as Justice McCormick noted in his concurring opinion in State v. Horton, 
 
13 
 
reasons for articulating sentences include increasing the rationality of 
sentencing, the therapeutic value of sentencing on the defendant, 
ensuring meaningful appellate review, and informing correctional 
authorities of the reasoning behind the sentence.  231 N.W.2d 36, 41 
(Iowa 1975) (McCormick, J., concurring specially). 
 
The court in dicta indicates that the reasons for imposing 
consecutive rather than concurrent may be the same as the reasons for 
the sentence in the underlying crimes.  In the abstract, I agree.  The 
decision regarding whether sentences are served concurrently or 
consecutively, however, is often of great moment and, as the court 
recognizes, must be made separately from the underlying sentence on 
each count.  A decision to impose a lengthy prison term for the 
underlying crimes is not the same as the geometric increase in 
incarceration that may result from a decision to run sentences 
consecutively.  In considering the distinct question of whether to run 
sentences consecutively or concurrently, the district court must be 
careful to avoid mere boilerplate recitation and demonstrate an exercise 
of reasoned judgment. 
 
The court today, consistent with Thacker, takes another step in the 
direction of encouraging the kind of deliberation and expression that is 
required given the importance of the sentencing decision on the parties 
involved and the criminal justice system. 
 
Wiggins, J., joins this special concurrence.