Title: State v. Morton

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: March 5, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,

		Respondent on Review,

	v.

DEANN LORRAINE MORTON,

	Petitioner on Review.

(CC 10-93-01567B; CA A80443; SC S42838)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*

	Argued and submitted September 4, 1996,; reassigned 

February 3, 1998.

	Steve V. Humber, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review.  With him on
the briefs was Sally L. Avera, Public Defender.

	Rives Kistler, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the
cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With him on
the brief was Theodore R. Kulongoski, Attorney General, and
Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Graber, and Durham, Justices.**

	GILLETTE, J.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The order
of the circuit court suppressing evidence is affirmed.

	*Appeal from Lane County Circuit Court, 

	 Ann Aiken, Judge.

 	 137 Or App 228, 904 P2d 631 (1995)

    **Fadeley, J., retired January 31, 1998, and did not
participate in this decision.

		GILLETTE, J.

		This is a criminal case in which defendant was charged
with unlawful possession of a controlled substance, ORS
475.992(4)(b), and with unlawful delivery of a controlled
substance, ORS 475.992(1)(b).  The central issue is whether the
police lawfully seized a small container that defendant dropped
during an arrest.  That issue is clouded by two other issues: (1)
because defendant denied, at the time of the seizure, that the
container belonged to her, the state argues that defendant does
not have standing to contest the seizure; and (2) defendant
argued at trial, and the trial court found, that the warrant
under which she was arrested was not valid and defendant's arrest
therefore was illegal.

		Based on its conclusions that the warrant was invalid
and that defendant could challenge the seizure of the container,
the trial court suppressed evidence of the container and the
controlled substance that it contained.  A divided in banc Court
of Appeals reversed, holding that defendant did not have standing
to contest the seizure, because she had disclaimed any interest
in the container.  State v. Morton/Evans, 137 Or App 228, 237,
904 P2d 631 (1995).  We allowed defendant's petition for review
and now reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

		We take the facts from the Court of Appeals' opinion:

		"In December 1991, defendant * * * was convicted
for driving while suspended.  ORS 811.175.  That
offense is a traffic infraction.  ORS 153.505; ORS
811.175.  [Defendant] was ordered to pay a fine or
appear in court on January 10, 1992.  After she failed
to do either, a Lane County municipal court issued a
warrant for her arrest.

		"On February 2, 1993, a detective saw [defendant]
associating with people whom he knew were under
investigation for drug involvement * * *.  The
detective arrested [defendant] pursuant to the 1992
warrant. * * * While [defendant] was being placed under
arrest, a plastic container fell from her jacket.
[Defendant] denied knowing what was in the container,
denied having ever seen it[,] and denied ownership of
the container.  The detective opened the container and
found methamphetamine and related paraphernalia."

Morton/Evans, 137 Or App at 230.  

		It is clear from its order suppressing evidence in this
case that the trial court did so exclusively on the theory that
the arrest of defendant was unlawful.  Because the evidence at
issue was discovered as the direct result of the arrest, the
trial court ruled that the evidence should be suppressed.  The
trial court did not base its decision on any factual issue
relating to the dropping of the container or its seizure.

		On the state's appeal, however, the Court of Appeals
leaped past the issue of defendant's arrest and concentrated on
the events surrounding the discovery of the container.  The
court's entire analysis was as follows:

		"To challenge the lawfulness of a search, a
defendant must establish that she had an interest in
the particular item that was seized. [Citations
omitted.] In this case, the uncontradicted evidence was
that Morton said that she had never seen the container
that contained the drugs and related paraphernalia, did
not own it and knew nothing of its contents.  In the
light of that testimony, there is no basis on which to
find that Morton had an interest in the container and,
consequently, she cannot challenge its seizure.  The
trial court erred in suppressing that evidence."

Morton/Evans, 137 Or App at 231-32.

		It was logical for the Court of Appeals to address
first the issue whether any constitutionally protected interest
of defendant had been invaded by the seizure of the container
because, if none were invaded, defendant was not entitled to have
the evidence suppressed.  See State v. Kosta, 304 Or 549, 553-54,
748 P2d 72 (1987) (where defendant was not a sender, an
addressee, or an intended recipient of a package, he had no
protectable interest under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon
Constitution, in the package sufficient to permit him to succeed
in a motion to suppress evidence of the contents of the package,
based on police activity that occurred before the defendant ever
came into contact with the package).  However, the uncontradicted
evidence in this case showed that this defendant had, in fact,
been in personal possession of the container in question only
moments before it came into the possession of the police. 
Although defendant denied vehemently any ownership interest in or
knowledge of the contents of the container, there was no debating
the fact that she had possessed it.  It follows that she was
entitled to challenge, under Article I, section 9, the police
seizure of the container.  See State v. Tanner, 304 Or 312, 315-16, 745 P2d 757 (1987) ("[A] search or seizure must violate the
defendant's section 9 rights before evidence obtained thereby
will be suppressed; * * * [t]he question whether a defendant's
personal rights were violated by an unlawful search or seizure is
often mislabeled a question of 'standing,' but the question goes
to the merits of a motion to suppress").  The Court of Appeals'
contrary rationale was error.

		Our disagreement with the rationale of the Court of
Appeals does not end the case, however.  Even if the defendant
would have the right, under the rationale of Kosta and Tanner, to
move to suppress the evidence of the container and its contents,
that right would be lost if, for example, the facts showed that
the defendant had abandoned the container before the police
seized it.  See State v. McDonald, 105 Or App 102, 803 P2d 1211
(1990) (so holding).  The prosecutor argued to the trial judge
that defendant had, in fact, abandoned the container, but -- as
our recitation of the pertinent facts makes clear -- defendant
dropped the container only after the police had begun the process
of taking defendant into custody pursuant to the arrest warrant. 
Thus, in this instance, the state cannot separate the act of
arrest from the dropping of the container; the seizure can be
proper only if the arrest itself was authorized by a valid
warrant.  We turn to that issue.

		The trial court ruled that the defendant's arrest was
not lawful, because that arrest was pursuant to a warrant issued
by a municipal judge for failure to appear in court in connection
with a charge of driving while suspended.  ORS 811.175(1)(a). 
That offense is a traffic infraction.  ORS 153.505(1); 811.175. 
The Court of Appeals held that, because the underlying offense
was a traffic infraction, the municipal court did not have
authority to issue a warrant for defendant's arrest. 
Morton/Evans, 137 Or App at 236.

		The state disagrees with the foregoing analysis.  It
argues that the municipal court did have authority, under ORS
153.560(1), to issue the arrest warrant.(1)  That statute provides:

		"If a person cited for a traffic crime fails to
comply with the provisions of ORS 153.540, or if the
person fails to appear at any time fixed by the court,
a warrant for the person's arrest may be issued."

		That argument need not detain us long.  The authority
granted by that statute is to issue a warrant for the arrest of
someone referred to by the statute as "the person."  The
antecedent for that referent is in the same statute, viz., "a
person cited for a traffic crime."  (Emphasis added.)  As noted,
the offense with which the defendant was charged was a traffic
infraction, not a traffic crime.  That statute therefore provides
no support for the state's theory that the issuance of the
warrant for defendant's arrest was valid, and we know of no other
statute that would provide such authority.  The trial court
correctly ruled that the defendant's arrest was invalid.  It
follows that the seizure and search of the container were not
valid and the judgment of the trial court to that effect should
be sustained.  

		The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
order of the circuit court suppressing evidence is affirmed.

1. 	The state also argues that the municipal court had
authority to issue an arrest warrant under ORS 153.200(1), but
that statute does not deal with the authority of a municipal
court to issue warrants in connection with traffic offenses.