Title: State ex rel. Hipp v. N. Canton

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

The State ex rel. Hipp, Appellant, v. City of North Canton et al., Appellees. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Hipp v. N. Canton (1996),    Ohio St.3d      .] 
Mandamus to compel North Canton and civil service commission to 
promote patrolman to lieutenant with back pay -- Writ denied, when. 
 
(No. 95-934 -- Submitted February 6, 1996 -- Decided March 5, 1996.) 
 
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Stark County, No. CA 9374. 
 
Appellee city of North Canton has employed appellant, Mark Hipp, as a 
patrolman in its police department since 1984.  In 1990, appellee North Canton 
Civil 
Service 
Commission 
(“commission”) 
administered 
a 
promotional 
examination for the position of lieutenant in the North Canton Police Department.    
Hipp was certified third on a July 5, 1990 promotion eligibility list for lieutenant.    
On June 4, 1991, the person who had been ranked first on the eligibility list was 
promoted to lieutenant.  The commission passed a resolution shortly thereafter 
which extended the effectiveness of the 1990 promotion eligibility list to July 5, 
1992.   
 
On June 2, 1992, a lieutenant retired.  Eventually, Greg Bednar, who had 
been certified second on the July 5, 1990 eligibility list, was ordered to be 
 
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appointed to fill the June 2, 1992 vacancy.  State ex rel. Bednar v. N. Canton 
(1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 278, 631 N.E.2d 621. 
 
Prior to the expiration of the July 5, 1990 eligibility list, the commission 
scheduled a promotional examination for the position of lieutenant. The 
examination consisted of a written part administered on May 21, 1992, and an oral 
part administered on June 13, 1992.  Hipp received the fourth highest overall 
score, but would have placed first if the examination had not contained an oral 
portion.  Hipp objected to the commission’s use of an oral component in the 
promotional examination.     
 
On July 23, 1992, another vacancy was created by the promotion of a 
lieutenant to police chief.  Since Hipp did not have one of the top three scores on 
the 1992 promotional examination, his name was not among the three certified to 
appellee Mayor William Hines for appointment. A different patrolman was 
promoted to lieutenant.   
 
In June 1993, Hipp filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals 
for Stark County, alleging that appellees, North Canton, Mayor Hines, Director of 
Administration John Boyajian, and the commission and its members and secretary, 
failed to appoint him to either the June 2 or July 23, 1992 vacancies in the 
 
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lieutenant position in the North Canton Police Department. Hipp requested 
appointment to either of the lieutenant vacancies, back pay, attorney fees, and 
costs.  The court of appeals summarily dismissed the complaint on the basis that 
Hipp had an adequate remedy at law.  This court reversed and remanded the cause 
to the court of appeals.  State ex rel. Hipp v. N. Canton (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 102, 
637 N.E.2d 317. 
 
On remand, Hipp filed an amended complaint which requested the same 
relief, i.e., promotion to lieutenant and back pay, and further requested “such 
further relief as th[e] Court deems just and equitable.”  The parties filed motions 
for summary judgment and submitted evidence.  Hipp requested in his arguments 
in the court of appeals, as an alternative to appointment to one of the specified 
lieutenant vacancies, that the court order appellees “to re-test for the position of 
Lieutenant using only a written examination and appoint the person having the 
highest eligible score.”  The court of appeals granted appellees’ summary 
judgment motion, overruled Hipp’s motion, and denied the writ.   
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
____________________ 
 
Ronald G. Macala and Anthony M. DioGuardi, II, for appellant. 
 
4
 
Roy H. Batista, North Canton Director of law, for appellees. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Hipp asserts in his propositions of law that the court of 
appeals erred in granting appellees’ motion for summary judgment and denying 
the requested writ of mandamus. 
 
Mandamus is an appropriate remedy in wrongful-denial-of-promotion cases.  
Hipp, supra, 70 Ohio St.3d at 103, 637 N.E.2d at 319.  In order to be entitled to a 
writ of mandamus regarding his claim for appointment, Hipp had to establish a 
clear legal right to promotion to lieutenant and back pay, a clear legal duty on the 
part of appellees to provide the foregoing, and that he had no plain and adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Lightfield v. Indian Hill (1994), 
69 Ohio St.3d 441, 442, 633 N.E.2d 524, 525-526.  In addition, Civ.R. 56(C) 
provides that before summary judgment may be granted, it must be determined 
that (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the 
evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and viewing the 
evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse 
 
5
to the nonmoving party.  State ex rel. Howard v. Ferreri (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 
587, 589, 639 N.E.2d 1189, 1192. 
 
Hipp asserts that the oral component of the 1992 promotional examination 
was invalid under pertinent civil service statutes and that he therefore received the 
highest score and was entitled to promotion to lieutenant under R.C. 124.44.  Hipp 
claims that he should have been appointed to fill either the June 2 or July 23, 1992 
vacancies in the position of lieutenant in the North Canton Police Department. 
 
As to the June 2, 1992 vacancy, the evidence is uncontroverted that the July 
5, 1990 eligibility list was in effect until July 5, 1992.   Hipp does not contend that 
the 1990 promotional examination that produced the July 5, 1990 list contained an 
oral component or was otherwise invalid.  Bednar, who was ranked higher on that 
list than Hipp, was eventually ordered promoted to fill the June 2 vacancy.  
Bednar, supra.  Assuming, as Hipp contends, the applicability of R.C. 124.44, 
Bednar was entitled to the position.  Therefore, the court of appeals correctly 
determined that even after construing the evidence most strongly in Hipp’s favor, 
appellees were entitled to summary judgment because Hipp had no clear legal 
right to the June 2, 1992 vacancy. 
 
6
 
Unlike the June 2 vacancy, the July 23, 1992 vacancy occurred following 
the expiration of the July 5, 1990 eligibility list.  As noted previously, Hipp relies 
on R.C. 124.44, which provides: 
 
“*** Whenever a vacancy occurs in the position above the rank of 
patrolman in a police department, and there is no eligible list for such rank, the 
municipal *** civil service commission shall, within sixty days of such vacancy, 
hold a competitive promotional examination.  After such examination has been 
held and an eligible list established, the commission shall forthwith certify to the 
appointing officer the name of the person receiving the highest rating.  Upon such 
certification, the appointing officer shall appoint the person so certified within 
thirty days from the date of such certification.  ***” 
 
“All examinations for promotions shall be competitive and be in writing.”  
R.C. 124.31(B).  Construing R.C. 124.31(B) and 124.44 in pari materia, police 
promotional examinations must be in writing.  Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 
No. 67 v. Maple Heights (1991), 77 Ohio App.3d 674, 676, 603 N.E.2d 291, 292; 
see, also, State ex rel. Campbell v. Whitehall Mun. Civ. Serv. Comm. (1978), 53 
Ohio St.2d 114, 116, 7 O.O.3d 190, 191, 372 N.E.2d 606, 607 (promotional 
examination for police chief properly voided by civil service commission where it 
 
7
included an oral test); State ex rel. Ethell v. Hendricks (1956), 165 Ohio St. 217, 
223, 59 O.O. 298, 301-302, 135 N.E.2d 362, 366 (promotional examination for 
police chief which contains oral portion is unlawful). 
 
Hipp claims entitlement to a writ of mandamus compelling his appointment 
to the July 23, 1992 vacancy because he received the highest score on the written 
portion of the 1992 promotional examination.  However, assuming the invalidity 
of the oral component of that examination, he would still not be entitled to 
appointment and back pay.  As stated in Ethell, supra, 165 Ohio St. at 223, 59 
O.O. at 302, 135 N.E.2d at 366: 
 
“As there are many varying methods of setting up examinations and 
weighting the questions asked, the examination in question must be viewed from 
the standpoint of the civil service commission which gave it, and it is apparent that 
it was considered as a single examination having multiple parts, written, oral, and 
predetermined credit for seniority.  Viewed in such a manner, it follows 
necessarily that if one part of such an examination is unlawful then the whole 
examination must fail, and it is not possible to consider merely the written portion 
thereof and decide from that who is entitled to the promotion for which the 
 
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examination was given.”  See, also, Campbell and Fraternal Order of Police, 
supra.   
 
An additional reason for the denial of Hipp’s request for a writ of 
mandamus compelling his promotion to the July 23, 1992 vacancy and back pay is 
that raised by appellees and relied on by the court of appeals, i.e., that North 
Canton Ordinance No. 31-86 conflicts with and supersedes R.C. 124.44.   
 
The Home Rule Amendment to the Ohio Constitution authorizes 
municipalities to “exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and 
enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, 
as are not in conflict with general laws.”  Section 3, Article XVIII, Ohio 
Constitution.  The appointment of officers within a city’s police department 
constitutes an exercise of local self-government within the meaning of the Home 
Rule Amendment.  State ex rel. Regetz v. Cleveland Civ. Serv. Comm. (1995), 72 
Ohio St.3d 167, 169, 648 N.E.2d 495, 497. 
 
Section 1.02 of the North Canton City Charter provides: 
 
“The municipality shall have all powers of local self-government and home 
rule and all powers possible for a municipality to have under the Constitution of 
the State of Ohio.  The municipality shall have all powers that now or hereafter 
 
9
may be granted to municipalities by the laws of the State of Ohio.  All such 
powers shall be exercised in the manner prescribed in this charter, or if not 
prescribed therein, in such manner as shall be provided by ordinance of council.” 
 
 In Bednar, supra, 69 Ohio St.3d at 281, 631 N.E.2d at 624, we held Section 
1.02 of the North Canton Charter “sufficiently reserve[s] home rule authority to 
permit enactment of an ordinance at variance with R.C. 124.44 ***.”  Many 
matters of local self-government are matters of detail and procedure that are out of 
place in a charter, which is comparable to a local constitution.  Id., citing 
Perrysburg v. Ridgway (1923), 108 Ohio St. 245, 253, 140 N.E. 595, 597; see, 
also, State ex rel. E. Cleveland Assn. of Firefighters v. E. Cleveland (1988), 40 
Ohio St.3d 222, 533 N.E.2d 282; Ohio Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. v. West 
Carrollton (Feb. 2, 1994), Montgomery App. No. 14099, unreported (“Where the 
intent is generally to have the municipality acquire all of the powers 
constitutionally available to it, including the power to override State statutes not 
intended to have general application, we see no compelling reason to require that a 
laundry list be inserted into the charter reciting every matter in which the 
municipal legislative authority may override State statutes.  Such a charter would 
 
10
be unwieldy and would be likely to confuse the electorate called upon to approve 
it or, from time to time, to amend it.”).   
 
Hipp acknowledges that the charter permits the city council to enact 
ordinances which supersede state civil service statutes.  Hipp contends that 
Ordinance No. 31-86 does not contradict R.C. 124.44.  Ordinance No. 31-86 
amended and supplemented Ordinance No. 2195, which sets forth commission 
rules and regulations, as amended by Section 12 of Rule XII and Section 13 of 
Rule XIII of Ordinance No. 75-82.  Title to Ordinance No. 31-86.  More 
specifically, Ordinance No. 31-86 provides: 
 
“Section 2.  That Section 12.1 of Ordinance No.75-82 be, and is hereby 
amended to read as follows: 
 
“‘Section 12.1  Promotional Examination. 
 
“‘Upon request for certification, as provided for in Section 12.0, and in the 
event the eligible list for promotion is exhausted, the Civil Service Commission 
shall conduct a promotional examination for the purpose of establishing an 
eligible list for the applicable position, as provided for in Rules X and XI of the 
within Rules and Regulations.’ 
 
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“Section 3.  That Section 12.2 of Ordinance No. 75-82 be, and is hereby 
amended to read as follows: 
 
“‘12.2 Certification from Eligible List. 
 
“‘Upon receipt of a request for certification from the Appointing Authority 
or upon completion of the promotional examination procedure, the Commission 
shall certify to the Appointing Authority thereof, the names and addresses of the 
three (3) applicants standing highest on the eligible lists.’ 
 
“*** 
 
“Section 7.  That Section 13.0(B) of Ordinance No. 75-82, be, and is hereby 
amended to read as follows: 
 
“‘13.0(B)   Appointing Authority[.] 
 
“‘The Appointing Authority shall fill the vacancy by appointment of one of 
the applicants certified by the Civil Service Commission unless the applicant is 
not qualified for appointment or the applicant has requested removal from the 
eligible list, as set forth in Section 11.6 of the within Rules and regulations.’”   
 
R.C. 124.44 requires that the person at the top of the eligibility list be 
appointed.  Conversely, Ordinance No. 31-86 allows the appointing authority to 
appoint one of the top three candidates.  Hipp argues that there is no conflict 
 
12
because Ordinance No. 31-86 does not apply to promotions to police lieutenant.  
However, Section 2 of Ordinance No. 31-86 expressly states that the eligible list 
established by promotional examination shall be “as provided for in Rules X and 
XI” of Ordinance No. 75-82.  Section 10.0 of Rule X provides that the commission 
“shall conduct promotional examinations for the purpose of establishing an 
eligible list for positions above the entrance level,” and that the commission is 
notified of any “vacancy in the Classified Civil Service in a position above the 
rank of patrolman or radio dispatcher ***.”  Since the position of lieutenant is 
above the rank of patrolman, Ordinance 31-86 applies to the 1992 promotional 
examination administered by the commission.  Therefore, Ordinance No. 31-86 
supersedes R.C. 124.44. 
 
In that Ordinance No. 31-86 allowed the appointing authority to fill the July 
23, 1992 vacancy by appointment of one of the top three applicants on the 
eligibility list, the most that Hipp could establish was a right to have been 
considered for appointment rather than a right to appointment.  Therefore, the 
court of appeals properly granted appellees’ motion for summary judgment as to 
Hipp’s claim for a writ of mandamus compelling his appointment to the July 23, 
1992 vacancy. 
 
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Hipp also requested below that, alternatively, he was entitled to a writ of 
mandamus compelling appellees to retest for the position of lieutenant using only 
a written examination, and to appoint the person having the highest eligible score.   
Indeed, the main focus of Hipp’s alternative argument to the court below, which 
was not included as a specific request for relief in his amended complaint, was that 
if the 1992 promotional examination is invalid in its entirety because of its oral 
component, he would be entitled to promotion based on the July 5, 1990 eligibility 
list.  However, the 1990 list was inapplicable because it had expired at the time of 
the July 23, 1992 vacancy.  Further, assuming that the 1992 examination was 
invalid due to its inclusion of an oral portion, and a new promotional examination 
ordered, if Hipp received the top score, he would again only have been entitled to 
consideration for the appointment under Ordinance No. 31-86, which superseded 
R.C. 124.44. 
 
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, no genuine issue as to any material 
fact was raised, and appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  The 
judgment of the court of appeals denying the writ is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
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MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., 
concur. 
 
WRIGHT, J., not participating.