Title: ESTATE OF KINYON

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 79-87 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1980 I N T H E M A T T E R OF T H E ESTATE O F JESSE KINYON, Deceased. Appeal from: The D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County o f Meagher, The Honorable LeRoy McKinnon, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: G a l t and Swanberg, Helena, Montana Robert F. Swanberg argued, Helena, Montana For Respondent: Gordon R. Hickman, Harlowton, Montana John V. P o t t e r , White Sulphur Springs, Montana Glen N e i e r argued, White Sulphur Springs, Montana F i l e d : Submitted: June 17, 1980 Decided : J u L . 22 1980 M r . J u s t i c e John C. Sheehy delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This is an appeal from an order entered i n D i s t r i c t Court, Fourteenth D i s t r i c t , Meagher County, declaring s e c t i o n 91-142, R.C.M. 1947 (now s e c t i o n 72-11-334, MCA) t h e Montana mortmain s t a t u t e , unconstitutional. Jesse Kinyon died t e s t a t e on January 26, 1971, leaving no surviving spouse, i s s u e , parents, o r o t h e r r e l a t i v e s of a c l o s e r degree of kinship than nieces and nephews. A f t e r c o n t e s t (see Wallin v. Kinyon E s t a t e (1974), 1 6 4 Mont. 160, 519 P.2d 1236) h i s W i l l , dated January 18, 1971 was admitted t o probate. The W i l l named Jennie L. Minder a s executrix. Kinyon bequeathed t h e sum of $1,000 each t o t h r e e of h i s surviving e i g h t nieces and nephews, and $2,000 t o a surviving cousin. The balance of Kinyon's $29,568.73 e s t a t e was d i s - posed of by paragraph f i v e of t h e W i l l which provides: "All of t h e rest, residue and remainder of m y estate, I give and bequeath t o t h e Trustees of t h e Mayn Cemetery D i s t r i c t of Meagher County, Montana, f o r t h e following uses and purposes: F i r s t , I d i r e c t t h a t t h e s a i d Trustees s h a l l expend such funds a s may be reasonably required t o fence, r e s t o r e and maintain t h e b u r i a l grounds near F o r t Logan i n Meagher County, Montana, t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t it is p o s s i b l e and p r a c t i c a l ; Second, t h e balance of s a i d bequest, i f any funds remain s h a l l be used by t h e Trustees of s a i d Cemetery D i s t r i c t t o improve, c a r e f o r , maintain and enlarge t h e Mayn Cemetery near White Sulphur Springs, Meagher County, Montana o r f o r such o t h e r purposes as may be permitted by law." Mayn Cemetery District i s a public cemetery. The b u r i a l grounds a t F o r t Logan c o n s i s t s of an a r e a wherein a r e now buried former r e s i d e n t s of Meagher County including t h e parents of t h e decedent. It is n o t p r e s e n t l y maintained o r supported by t a x funds but is a h i s t o r i c site v i s i t e d by t h e general public. A f t e r admission t o probate t h e e x e c u t r i x on A p r i l 8, 1974 p e t i t i o n e d t h e c o u r t f o r an order construing t h e W i l l . The petition challenged the constitutionality of the Montana mortmain statute. Legal notice was given to all interested parties including the state attorney general. On March 17, 1976, the District Court issued an order requiring application of the law existing prior to enactment of the Uniform Probate Code pursuant to authority granted to the Court under section LT 91A-6-103b). R.C.M. 1947 (now section 72-1-107, MCA). Advance distribution to beneficiaries whose bequests were not in question was authorized by the court on January 10, 1977. After an August 27, 1979 hearing, the court concluded the mortmain statute lacked a fair and substantial relation to the legislative objective of the section. In addition, the court concluded the statute made no distinctions based upon sanity, undue influence or existence of dependents or close relatives. It is from this order that the heirs appeal. A stipulated statement of facts has been filed in lieu of a transcript with the approval of the District Court pursuant to Rule 9(d), M.R.App.Civ.P. The question for our review is whether the District Court erred by declaring the Montana mortmain statute unconstitutional. We hold that the District Court did not err. This Court recently ruled in Matter of Estate of Holmes (1979) , Mont. - , 599 P.2d 344, 36 St.Rep. 1569, that section 91-142, R.C.M. 1947 (now section 72-11-334, MCA) the Montana mortmain statute had been repealed by implication due to the adoption of the Uniform Probate Code. However, at the time of the decedent's death the statute read as follows: "Restriction to devise for charitable purposes. No estate, r e 5 or personal shall be bequeathed or devised to any charitable or benevolent society or corporation, or to any person or persons in trust for charitable uses, except the same be done by w i l l duly executed a t least t h i r t y (30) days before t h e decease of t h e t e s t a t o r , and i f s o made a t least t h i r t y (30) days p r i o r t o such death, such devise o r legacy, and each of them, s h a l l be v a l i d ; provided t h a t t h e p r o h i b i t i o n contained i n t h i s s e c t i o n s h a l l n o t apply t o cases where not more than one-third (1/3) of t h e e s t a t e of t h e t e s t a t o r s h a l l be bequeathed o r devised f o r c h a r i t a b l e o r benevolent purposes, and provided f u r t h e r , t h a t i f any such devise o r bequest be made i n a w i l l executed within t h i r t y (30) days p r i o r t o such death and be f o r more than one-third (1/3) of t h e e s t a t e of t h e decedent, t h e same s h a l l be void a s t o t h e excess over one-third (1/3), b u t as t o t h a t only." The purpose of t h e s t a t u t e w a s " t o prevent improvident a l i e n a t i o n s o r d i s p o s i t i o n s by languishing o r dying persons t o t h e disherison of t h e lawful h e i r s . " I n R e Beck's E s t a t e (1912), 44 Mont. 561, 577, 121 P. 784, 789. In o t h e r words t h e purpose was two-fold, namely t o prevent overreaching by c h a r i t i e s and t o p r o t e c t t h e i n t e r e s t s of r e l a t i v e s . W e note i n passing t h a t our decision here i n no way abandons t h e s e safeguards s i n c e e x i s t i n g law is s u f f i c i e n t t o prevent t h e abuses a t which t h e mortmain s t a t u t e w a s d i r e c t e d . See s e c t i o n 72-3-310, MCA. The D i s t r i c t Court made t h e following s p e c i f i c finding: "That t h e provisions of Section 91-142, R.C.M. 1947, a r e a r b i t r a r y , unreasonable, and lack a f a i r and s u b s t a n t i a l r e l a t i o n t o t h e l e g i s l a t i v e o b j e c t of s a i d s e c t i o n ; t h a t no d i s t i n c t i o n is made between persons of sound mind o r those of unsound mind; o r between those having e i t h e r dependents o r c l o s e r e l a t i v e s , and those having n e i t h e r dependents o r c l o s e r e l a t i v e s ; o r between those being unduly influenced during terminal i l l n e s s , and those who are f r e e of o u t s i d e influence, and have a clear and r a t i o n a l i n t e n t i o n a s t o t h e o b j e c t s of t h e i r bounty." W e agree with t h i s conclusion. Even granting a p p e l l a n t s ' argument t h a t t h e p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n does not r e q u i r e t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e " s t r i c t s c r u t i n y " test, b u t instead r e q u i r e s a p p l i c a t i o n of a reasonableness standard, w e s t i l l f i n d t h e Montana s t a t u t e wholly a r b i t r a r y i n t h a t t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s c r e a t e d by t h e s t a t u t e are n o t reasonably r e l a t e d t o i t s purported s t a t u t o r y o b j e c t i v e . "A classification 'must be reasonable', not arbitrary and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." Reed v . Reed (1971), 404 U . S . 71, 76, 92 S.Ct. 251, 254, 30 L.Ed.2d 225, 229. The Montana statute goes beyond the legislative objective in that it applies to situations where there is no basis to assume the existence of an improper influence on a testamentary disposition. The statute applies to -- all situations in which a testator makes a testamentary disposition to charity and happens to die within 30 days of such a disposition. However, we agree with the reasoning of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in In Re Estate of Cavill (Pa. 1974), 329 A.2d 503. In holding the Pennsylvania mortmain statute violative of equal protection guarantees, that court stated: "Clearly, the statutory classification bears only the most tenuous relation to the legislative purpose. The state strikes down the charitable gifts of one in the best of health at the time of the execution of his will and regardless of age if he chances to die in an accident 29 days later. On the other hand, it leaves untouched the charitable bequests of another, aged and suffering from a terminal disease, who survives the execution of his will by 31 days. Such a combination of results can only be characterized as arbitrary. "Because the statute sweeps within its prohibition many testamentary gifts which present no threat of the evils which the statute purports to minimize, it is substantially over-inclusive. Since the statute also leaves unaffected many gifts which do present such a threat, it is also substantially under-inclusive. We are thus compelled to conclude that it lacks 'a fair and substantial relation' to the legislative object. Therefore, the Equal Protection Clause forbids us to give it any effect. (Citing cases.)" Cavill, 329 A.2d at 505-06. Although it is true that the Pennsylvania Court found the statute denied charitable beneficiaries equal protection guarantees whereas the present case concerns testators, we find no substance to such a distinction since such guarantees pertain to all persons and not just to beneficiaries. We are aware of the cases that hold the right to devise property by will is a matter of legislative grant, In Re Noyes Estate (1909), 40 Mont. 178, 105 P. 1013, and therefore the legislature has the exclusive power to designate those whom the testator may make the object of his bounty. In Re Beck's Estate, supra, 44 Mont. at 571. However, the legislature in so designating is bound by the constitutional restrictions of nondiscrimination and equal protection. 1972 Mont. Const., Art. 11, Section 4. The decision of the District Court is affirmed. Justice We Concur: \ Chief Justice Justices d/