Title: Marr. of Brown & Yana

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 2/2/06 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
In re Marriage of NICOLE F. BROWN 
) 
and ANTHONY YANA. 
) 
 
) 
NICOLE F. BROWN, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S131030 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/6 B170252 
ANTHONY YANA, 
) 
 
) 
San Luis Obispo County 
 
Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. DR 21998 
___________________________________ ) 
 
In this case, a parent who had been awarded sole legal and sole physical 
custody of a child after a contested custody dispute sought to relocate with her 
child to Nevada.  The noncustodial parent opposed the relocation and sought, 
among other things, to have the matter addressed in an evidentiary hearing, i.e., a 
contested hearing with live testimony.  The trial court denied the noncustodial 
parent’s applications to restrain the relocation and to modify custody without 
holding an evidentiary hearing.  The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that “in a 
‘move-away’ case, a parent without legal or physical custody is entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing.” 
We conclude the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying 
relief without holding an evidentiary hearing.  We therefore reverse the judgment 
of the Court of Appeal. 
 
2 
FACTS 
The relevant facts are undisputed. 
In 1994, Nicole F. Brown and Anthony Yana obtained a dissolution of their 
marriage.  In 1999, the court awarded Brown sole legal custody and sole physical 
custody of their son, Cameron, following a psychological evaluation of the parties 
and a contested evidentiary hearing on custody.  After these events, Brown and 
Yana each continued to reside in San Luis Obispo County.  Brown remarried and 
has two children with her second husband. 
On June 12, 2003, Yana filed an order to show cause to modify legal 
custody of Cameron from sole to joint, to expand his visitation, and to appoint 
counsel for Cameron, who was then 12 years old.1  Yana asserted in a supporting 
declaration that his relationship with Brown had improved significantly, that 
Cameron expressed an interest in spending more time with him, and that Cameron 
was doing well in his academic and social relationships.  Shortly thereafter, Brown 
informed Yana she was moving with Cameron to Las Vegas, Nevada, at the end of 
the summer.  On June 27, 2003, Yana filed an order to show cause to restrain any 
change of residence for Cameron and to request a psychological evaluation and a 
contested evidentiary hearing on the move-away issue. 
Also on June 27, 2003, Brown filed an order to show cause to adjust Yana’s 
visitation schedule upon her move to Nevada.  She stated in a supporting 
declaration that her husband had taken a job in Las Vegas and that the family 
would be residing in Green Valley, Nevada.  She also stated Cameron was 
extremely close to his two half siblings, and that they miss one another when 
                                              
1  
In family law proceedings, a party may seek relief from the trial court by an 
order to show cause or other application.  (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.118.) 
 
3 
apart.  Brown asserted there was no basis for Yana’s requested relief because, as 
Yana admitted, Cameron was doing well in her sole custody.  Moreover, she 
contended, she had a legitimate reason for the residential move, and the move 
would not constitute a change of circumstances.  Brown objected to a 
psychological evaluation on the ground that her family had already been through 
two of them, and claimed Yana told her he wanted more time with Cameron to 
stop her from moving.  Finally, with the planned relocation in mind, Brown 
offered an increase in Yana’s summer visitations with Cameron in the event Yana 
did not like her proposal to modify his weekend visitations. 
The trial court temporarily restrained Brown from moving away with 
Cameron, appointed an attorney for Cameron, and set the matters for a hearing. 
At the hearing, the trial court expressed its reluctance to grant Yana’s 
requests for relief.2  Although Yana acknowledged that Brown was not seeking to 
relocate in bad faith, he argued that Cameron’s removal could be restrained “if it 
would prejudice the rights or the welfare of the child.”  Yana, however, disclaimed 
any obligation to plead or otherwise show prejudice before the setting of an 
evidentiary hearing—i.e., a contested hearing where he would offer oral testimony 
on the matter.  When the court queried whether Yana “shouldn’t . . . tell us a little 
something before we launch into all of this,” Yana reiterated the need for an 
independent evaluation to explore Cameron’s feelings about moving to Las Vegas.  
He also repeated his request for an evidentiary hearing, stating he was prepared to 
offer “a lot of evidence about Las Vegas, Nevada, such as the high student-to-
                                              
2  
The record reflects the trial court understood Yana’s request regarding 
Brown’s proposed relocation with Cameron as an application for a change of 
custody based on the relocation.  We have the same understanding, based on 
Yana’s arguments in the trial court and on appeal. 
 
4 
teacher ratio; the fact that the state of Nevada has one of the highest dropout rates 
in junior high and high school of any state in the nation; the amount of crime over 
there; the volume of the people moving in and out of the community of Las Vegas, 
Nevada, and what the transient effect has upon people in that community.” 
Cameron’s court-appointed attorney reported at the hearing what Cameron 
had told him during interviews at each parent’s home.  The attorney offered his 
opinion, based on everything Cameron had said and done, that Cameron was “a 
conflicted young man,” who said “different things at different times, based upon 
who he happened to be with at the time.” 
At the hearing’s conclusion, the trial court denied Yana’s requests for relief.  
In doing so, the court commented that a full contested hearing following 
psychological examinations had occurred in 1999, resulting in an award of sole 
legal and physical custody of Cameron to Brown.3  Given that judicial custody 
order, the court determined that Yana was required to assert some detriment to 
warrant an evidentiary hearing.  The court expressed its awareness “that children 
are disoriented when they move [and] it’s not comfortable for them,” but 
concluded that “that level of discomfort for the child is not what detriment or 
substantial changed circumstances is about sufficient to change custody from mom 
here to dad.”  In light of the move, however, the court found Yana entitled to a 
hearing on visitation and later established a modified visitation schedule. 
                                              
3  
The 1999 order included findings that:  (1) Yana had not been honest or 
truthful with the court, his attorney, and others; (2) following a license suspension 
for driving under the influence, Yana drove without a license with Cameron in the 
car and put Cameron at risk of being taken into protective custody; and (3) Yana 
engaged in at least two other instances of unwise parenting. 
 
5 
Yana appealed.  The Court of Appeal reversed in a split decision, holding 
that, in a move-away case, a parent with no legal or physical custody rights is 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing. 
We granted Brown’s petition for review. 
DISCUSSION 
The question presented is this:  In a case where sole legal and sole physical 
custody of a child has been awarded to one parent after a contested custody 
dispute, and the custodial parent’s subsequent decision to relocate with the child is 
opposed by the noncustodial parent, is the noncustodial parent entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing on the matter? 
Brown contends the Court of Appeal’s affirmative answer to this question 
is wrong.  Starting from the premise that a parent who has been awarded sole legal 
and sole physical custody has the exclusive statutory right and responsibility to 
make all decisions regarding the minor child’s residence and schooling, Brown 
first argues the noncustodial parent may not obtain a change in custody, or any 
evidentiary hearing on the matter, based on the custodial parent’s decision to 
relocate.  Even assuming otherwise, she asserts, the trial court retains discretion to 
deny a custody modification request without a full evidentiary hearing where, as 
here, no prima facie showing of detriment to the child has been made. 
We begin by addressing Brown’s first contention, as it potentially is 
dispositive. 
A.  May a parent without legal and physical custody seek and obtain a 
custody change based on the custodial parent’s decision to relocate 
with their child? 
California’s statutory scheme governing child custody and visitation 
determinations is set forth in the Family Code (all further statutory references are 
to this code unless otherwise indicated).  Under this scheme, “the overarching 
 
6 
concern is the best interest of the child.”  (Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 
249, 255 (Montenegro).) 
For purposes of an initial custody determination, section 3040, subdivision 
(b), affords the trial court and the family “ ‘the widest discretion to choose a 
parenting plan that is in the best interest of the child.’ ”  (In re Marriage of 
Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 25, 31 (Burgess).)  When the parents are unable to 
agree on a custody arrangement, the court must determine the best interest of the 
child by setting the matter for an adversarial hearing and considering all relevant 
factors, including the child’s health, safety, and welfare, any history of abuse by 
one parent against any child or the other parent, and the nature and amount of the 
child’s contact with the parents.  (§§ 3011, 3185, subd. (a); see Montenegro, 
supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 255-256.) 
Once the trial court has entered a final or permanent custody order 
reflecting that a particular custodial arrangement is in the best interest of the child, 
“the paramount need for continuity and stability in custody arrangements—and the 
harm that may result from disruption of established patterns of care and emotional 
bonds with the primary caretaker—weigh heavily in favor of maintaining” that 
custody arrangement.  (Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 32-33.)  In recognition of 
this policy concern, we have articulated a variation on the best interest standard, 
known as the changed circumstance rule, that the trial court must apply when a 
parent seeks modification of a final judicial custody determination.  (Montenegro, 
supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 256, relying on Burchard v. Garay (1986) 42 Cal.3d 531, 
535.)  Under the changed circumstance rule, custody modification is appropriate 
only if the parent seeking modification demonstrates “a significant change of 
circumstances” indicating that a different custody arrangement would be in the 
child’s best interest.  (Ibid.)  Not only does this serve to protect the weighty 
 
7 
interest in stable custody arrangements, but it also fosters judicial economy.  
(Ibid.)4 
The Family Code contemplates that, in making a custody determination, 
consideration of the best interest of the child may lead the trial court to award 
custody either to both parents (joint or shared custody) or to only one parent (sole 
custody).  If a parent is awarded “sole legal custody,” that means the parent “shall 
have the right and the responsibility to make the decisions relating to the health, 
education, and welfare of a child.”  (§ 3006.)  If a parent is awarded “sole physical 
custody,” that means the child “shall reside with and be under the supervision” of 
the custodial parent, “subject to the power of the court to order visitation” for the 
noncustodial parent.  (§ 3007.) 
Brown argues, in effect, that sections 3006 and 3007 permit a parent with 
sole legal and sole physical custody to unilaterally supervise and make all 
decisions regarding a minor child’s residence and schooling, thereby conferring a 
right to relocate with the child without interference from the noncustodial parent.  
In her view, the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that a parent with no legal or 
physical custody is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to relitigate custody over a 
proposed move away cannot be squared with these statutory provisions.  We are 
not persuaded. 
Brown concedes, as she must, that another provision of the Family Code, 
section 7501, expressly addresses the right of a custodial parent to relocate with a 
child.  By its terms, section 7501 unambiguously provides the right is not absolute 
                                              
4  
A stipulated custody order qualifies as “a final judicial custody 
determination for purposes of the changed circumstance rule only if there is a 
clear, affirmative indication the parties intended such a result.”  (Montenegro, 
supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 258.) 
 
8 
and may be curtailed if the move would result in detriment to the child:  “A parent 
entitled to the custody of a child has a right to change the residence of the child, 
subject to the power of the court to restrain a removal that would prejudice the 
rights or welfare of the child.”  (§ 7501, subd. (a), italics added.)  Notably, the 
statute contains no qualifying language purporting to limit its application to 
parents with only certain custodial rights.  Thus, while sections 3006 and 3007 
recognize the general right of a parent with sole custody to supervise and make 
decisions regarding a child’s residence and education, section 7501, fairly read, 
contemplates that even a parent with sole legal and sole physical custody may be 
restrained from changing a child’s residence, if a court determines the change 
would be detrimental to the child’s rights or welfare. 
Not only does section 7501 undermine any notion of a custodial parent’s 
absolute right to relocate with a child, but so does the lack of any California 
decision supporting such a proposition.  The seminal decision of Burgess, supra, 
13 Cal.4th 25, referred to the right of a custodial parent to change the residence of 
a child as a presumptive right that might not prevail if the move would result in 
detriment to the child.5  (Burgess, at p. 35.)  Decisions subsequent to Burgess 
uniformly acknowledge that, even where a permanent custody order is in place, 
the custodial parent’s right to relocate with a child remains subject to the changed 
circumstance rule.  (E.g., In re Marriage of LaMusga (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1072, 
1088-1089 (LaMusga); Osgood v. Landon (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 425, 432-434; 
In re Marriage of Campos (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 839, 843 (Campos); In re 
                                              
5  
In 2003, the Legislature codified Burgess by amending section 7501 to 
read:  “It is the intent of the Legislature to affirm the decision in In re Marriage of 
Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 25, and to declare that ruling to be the public policy and 
law of this state.”  (§ 7501, subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 2003, ch. 674, § 1.) 
 
9 
Marriage of Edlund & Hales (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1468-1469; In re 
Marriage of Whealon (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 132, 140-141.) 
Brown attempts to distinguish Burgess and its progeny on the ground they 
did not involve a parent with sole legal and sole physical custody.  We are not 
convinced.  Like the situation here, some of the cases were decided in the context 
of a relocation sought by a parent with sole physical custody.  (E.g., Burgess, 
supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 29 [stipulated order provided for temporary joint legal 
custody and sole physical custody to mother]; Osgood v. Landon, supra, 127 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 431-432 [stipulated order provided for joint legal custody, but 
default judgment awarded sole physical custody to mother]; Campos, supra, 108 
Cal.App.4th at p. 841 [judicial custody order provided for joint legal custody and 
sole physical custody to mother].)  Those decisions hold or otherwise 
acknowledge that an order for sole physical custody may be modified, despite the 
general importance of maintaining ongoing physical custody arrangements, if 
relocation with the custodial parent will cause the child to suffer detriment, thus 
rendering it essential or expedient for the child’s welfare that there be a custody 
change (Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 38; see also LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th 
at pp. 1088-1089).  None of the decisions, moreover, attributes any significance to 
the presence of a joint legal custody arrangement or the absence of one for sole 
legal custody. 
Brown additionally contends that a parent with no custodial rights has no 
standing to challenge the custodial parent’s decision to relocate.  That contention 
lacks merit.  As indicated, section 7501, subdivision (a), provides that a custodial 
parent’s right to change the residence of the child is “subject to the power of the 
court to restrain a removal that would prejudice the rights or welfare of the child.”  
It is reasonable to infer from this language, as Burgess and its progeny have, that 
the noncustodial parent may request a court to exercise this power.  Conversely, 
 
10 
section 7501’s language is not reasonably susceptible of a construction that bars a 
noncustodial parent from doing so. 
Moreover, we recently recognized in a similar context that an award of sole 
legal and sole physical custody of a child to one parent does not serve to 
“terminate” the other’s parental rights or due process interest in parenting.  (In re 
Marriage of Harris (2004) 34 Cal.4th 210, 227 (Harris).)  In Harris, we addressed 
section 3104’s provisions for court-ordered grandparent visitation over the 
objection of the parent with sole custody.  As part of our analysis, we rejected the 
attempt of a mother who had been awarded sole legal and sole physical custody to 
liken the noncustodial father to a deceased parent and to equate herself to a sole 
surviving parent whose right to the custody and control over her child would be 
infringed by court-ordered grandparent visitation under section 3104.  (Harris, at 
p. 227.)  Consistent with Harris, we find the award of sole custody to Brown did 
not terminate any right of Yana to seek relief under section 7501.  Indeed, Harris 
stands as an example that a parent cannot rely on an award of sole custody to 
shield herself from a court order to which she objects, where such order is 
supported by the noncustodial parent and is in the best interest of the child.6 
In sum, we conclude that, where a final custody order had awarded sole 
legal and sole physical custody to the parent seeking to relocate with a child, the 
noncustodial parent opposing the relocation may seek and obtain a custody 
                                              
6  
The statute at issue in Harris, section 3104, permits a grandparent to 
petition for visitation, but provides a rebuttable presumption that grandparent 
visitation is not in the child’s best interest where a parent with sole custody of a 
child objects to such visitation.  (§ 3104, subd. (f).)  Although we did not uphold 
the trial court’s order allowing grandparent visitation over the mother’s objection, 
we remanded the matter to permit reconsideration of that order in light of the 
statutory presumption, which the trial court had failed to utilize.  (Harris, supra, 
34 Cal.4th at p. 214.) 
 
11 
modification based on a proper showing pursuant to the changed circumstance 
rule. 
B.  What right, if any, does a noncustodial parent have to an 
evidentiary hearing to relitigate custody over a proposed move 
away? 
Having concluded that a parent without legal and physical custody may 
seek a change in custody based on the custodial parent’s decision to relocate with 
their child, we now determine whether and to what extent a trial court must hold 
an evidentiary hearing on the matter.  Although we generally described the 
standard for custody modification in a move-away case in part A, ante, we 
elaborate on that standard as part of our analysis here. 
A custodial parent seeking to relocate after dissolution of marriage need not 
establish the move is “necessary” in order to be awarded physical custody of a 
minor child, or to retain physical custody under an existing custody order.  
(Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 37.)  Moreover, while a decision to change a 
child’s residence ordinarily does not reflect upon the parent’s suitability to retain 
custody, “[a]n obvious exception is a custodial parent’s decision to relocate simply 
to frustrate the noncustodial parent’s contact with the minor child[].”  (Id. at p. 36, 
fn. 6.)  In this regard, “[e]ven if the custodial parent is otherwise ‘fit,’ such bad 
faith conduct may be relevant to a determination of what permanent custody 
arrangement is in the minor child[]’s best interest.”  (Ibid.)7 
                                              
7  
Although a court need not evaluate the wisdom of the custodial parent’s 
decisionmaking, “[e]ven if the custodial parent has legitimate reasons for the 
proposed change in the child’s residence and is not acting simply to frustrate the 
noncustodial parent’s contact with the child, the court still may consider whether 
one reason for the move is to lessen the child’s contact with the noncustodial 
parent and whether that indicates, when considered in light of all the relevant 
factors, that a change in custody would be in the child’s best interests.”  
(LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1100, fn. omitted.) 
 
12 
When a final judicial custody determination is in place (see also ante, fn. 
4), and a noncustodial parent seeks to modify custody in response to a proposed 
relocation, the trial court must apply the changed circumstance rule.  Although the 
noncustodial parent is not required to show a custody modification is “essential” to 
prevent detriment to the child from the planned move, he or she bears the initial 
burden of showing that the proposed relocation of the child’s residence will cause 
detriment to the child, requiring a reevaluation of the existing custody order.  
(LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1078; see also id. at p. 1096; Ragghanti v. Reyes 
(2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 989, 996 [“[t]he changed circumstances test requires a 
threshold showing of detriment before a court may modify an existing final 
custody order that was previously based upon the child’s best interest”].)  
Imposing this burden on the noncustodial parent is consistent with the recognition 
that “ ‘the paramount need for continuity and stability in custody arrangements—
and the harm that may result from disruption of established patterns of care and 
emotional bonds with the primary caretaker—weigh heavily in favor of 
maintaining ongoing custody arrangements.’ ”  (LaMusga, at p. 1093, quoting 
Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 32-33.) 
The changed circumstance rule requires a substantial showing to modify a 
final judicial custody determination.  “In a ‘move-away’ case, a change of custody 
is not justified simply because the custodial parent has chosen, for any sound good 
faith reason, to reside in a different location, but only if, as a result of relocation 
with that parent, the child will suffer detriment rendering it ‘ “essential or 
expedient for the welfare of the child that there be a change.” ’ ”  (Burgess, supra, 
13 Cal.4th at p. 38.) 
In applying this rule, we affirmed a custody modification order where 
evidence established that the custodial parent tended to alienate the children from 
the noncustodial parent, the children’s relocation some 2,000 miles away would 
 
13 
not promote frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent, and the 
primary loss to the children pertained to the growing and improving relationship 
with the noncustodial parent.  (LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 1083-1085.)  In 
another case, a custody modification order was affirmed where evidence showed 
the child would not have adequate medical care in the new location and would not 
transition well to a new school or new surroundings.  (In re Marriage of Melville 
(2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 601, 612 [involving a child with Down’s Syndrome and a 
heart condition].)  Ultimately, “[t]he extent to which a proposed move will 
detrimentally impact a child varies greatly depending upon the circumstances.”  
(LaMusga, at p. 1097.) 
If the noncustodial parent makes the required initial showing of detriment, 
the court is then obligated to “perform the delicate and difficult task of 
determining whether a change in custody is in the best interests” of the child.  
(LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1078.)  Among the factors the court ordinarily 
should consider when deciding whether to modify custody in light of a proposed 
move are the following:  the child’s interest in stability and continuity in the 
custodial arrangement; the distance of the move; the child’s age; the child’s 
relationship with both parents; the relationship between the parents, including, but 
not limited to, their ability to communicate and cooperate effectively and their 
willingness to put the child’s interests above their individual interests; the child’s 
wishes if the child is mature enough for such an inquiry to be appropriate; the 
reasons for the proposed move; and the extent to which the parents currently share 
custody.  (LaMusga, at p. 1101.) 
The trial court enjoys “wide discretion” to order a custody change based 
upon a showing of detriment, including detriment caused to the relationship 
between the noncustodial parent and the child, if such a change is in the best 
interests of the child in light of all the relevant factors.  (LaMusga, supra, 32 
 
14 
Cal.4th at p. 1095.)  That is, a reviewing court generally will leave it to the trial 
court to assess the detrimental impact of a proposed move in light of other relevant 
factors in determining what is in the best interest of the child.  (Id. at p. 1097) 
Section 7501, we observe, does not speak to the matter of evidentiary 
hearings in the event a noncustodial parent seeks to restrain a removal allegedly 
prejudicing the rights or welfare of the child.  However, two other provisions—
section 3170 and section 3185—generally apply when a parent seeks to modify 
custody on any basis, including, accordingly, a proposed relocation. 
Section 3170 provides in relevant part:  “(a) If it appears on the face of a 
petition, application, or other pleading to obtain or modify a temporary or 
permanent custody or visitation order that custody, visitation, or both are 
contested, the court shall set the contested issues for mediation.”  In turn, section 
3185 provides:  “(a) If issues that may be resolved by agreement pursuant to 
Section 3178[8] are not resolved by an agreement of all the parties who participate 
in mediation, the mediator shall inform the court in writing and the court shall set 
the matter for hearing on the unresolved matters.”  (Italics added.) 
In re Marriage of Dunn (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 345 (Dunn), considered 
the type of hearing required when a parent seeks modification of a postdissolution 
child custody order.  There, the trial court had modified a preexisting custody 
order so as to effectively prohibit the father’s new wife from participating in 
certain school, church, and scouting activities during the times when the mother 
had custody of the children.  The matter was handled in two unreported informal 
                                              
8  
Section 3178 provides in pertinent part that where mediation is required to 
settle a contested issue of custody or visitation, an agreement between the parties 
resulting from mediation “shall be limited” to “the resolution of issues relating to 
parenting plans, custody, visitation, or a combination of these issues.” 
 
15 
chambers proceedings with only counsel present.  In reversing the modification 
order, Dunn relied on sections 3170 and 3185 for the proposition that, where 
mediation fails to resolve a custody dispute, “[t]he context of postjudgment 
modification orders appears to contemplate an oral hearing,” where the party 
opposing a requested modification is “apprised of the date, time and place of the 
hearing, sufficiently in advance to appear or otherwise protect his or her interests.”  
(Dunn, at p. 348.)  After noting the need for a party to introduce admissible 
evidence of changed circumstances at a formal hearing, Dunn indicated that an 
“evidentiary hearing” of contested factual issues should be conducted “if 
necessary.”  (Ibid.)  In reaching its conclusions, Dunn emphasized that “ ‘[i]n spite 
of the need for efficiency, courts should not lose sight of the need that parties be 
given their “day in court.” ’ ”  (Ibid.)  Dunn additionally observed that 
“[u]nreported informal chambers proceedings hamper the opportunity for 
meaningful appellate review.”  (Ibid.) 
Consistent with Dunn, we hold an evidentiary hearing in a move-away 
situation should be held only if necessary.  Where, as here, one parent has been 
awarded sole legal and sole physical custody of a child, and the noncustodial 
parent opposes the custodial parent’s decision to relocate with the child, a trial 
court may deny the noncustodial parent’s requests to modify custody based on the 
relocation without holding an evidentiary hearing to take oral evidence if the 
noncustodial parent’s allegation or showing of detriment to the child is 
insubstantial in light of all the circumstances presented in the case, or is otherwise 
legally insufficient to warrant relief. 
Needless to say, an evidentiary hearing serves no legitimate purpose or 
function where the noncustodial parent is unable to make a prima facie showing of 
detriment in the first instance, or has failed to identify a material but contested 
factual issue that should be resolved through the taking of oral testimony.  As in 
 
16 
other family law contexts, application of this procedure in move-away cases 
fosters the goal of judicial economy and reduces litigation costs and unnecessary 
distress for the parents and children involved.  It also serves to protect the policy 
considerations underlying the changed circumstance rule, particularly in the 
context of a case in which the trial court has already determined that the moving 
parent “shall have the right and the responsibility to make the decisions relating to 
the health, education, and welfare of a child.”  (§ 3006.) 
As sections 3170 and 3185 contemplate, the trial court here referred the 
underlying dispute to mediation9 and set the matter for a formal court hearing.  At 
the hearing, the court made every effort to provide Yana a reasonable opportunity 
to make his case for modifying custody based on Brown’s proposed relocation 
with Cameron.  It reviewed the parties’ applications and supporting declarations 
and papers, and diligently inquired into whether or not Yana would be able to 
prove detriment if he were granted the full evidentiary hearing he desired.  In this 
connection, the court permitted Yana to make an offer of proof, despite his failure 
to allege facts establishing detriment in the documents supporting his orders to 
show cause.  The court declined to order an evidentiary hearing only after 
determining that Yana’s offer of proof did not tend to demonstrate the planned 
move would be detrimental to Cameron. 
Review of the record compels us to uphold the trial court’s actions.  The 
record reflects that Yana’s orders to show cause and his supporting papers did not 
identify any detriment to Cameron that might result from the proposed move.  At 
the court hearing, Yana conceded that Brown was not seeking to relocate in bad 
faith.  Consistent with this concession, and with Brown’s proposal for a slight 
                                              
9  
Yana failed to attend the mediation. 
 
17 
modification in visitation, Yana made no claim that Brown sought to use the 
relocation to limit his contact with Cameron. 
The record additionally shows that when the court pressed Yana for a 
description of the detriment he claimed, Yana merely offered to produce “a lot of 
evidence about Las Vegas, Nevada, such as the high student-to-teacher ratio; the 
fact that the state of Nevada has one of the highest dropout rates in junior high and 
high school of any state in the nation; the amount of crime over there; the volume 
of people moving in and out of the community of Las Vegas, Nevada, and what 
the transient effect has upon people in that community.”  Like the trial court, we 
conclude this was insufficient to justify an evidentiary hearing given the record as 
a whole.  Even if Yana were to produce such evidence, and even assuming it were 
uncontroverted, such evidence would be relevant merely to establish only certain 
generalities concerning the standard of living and schooling in Las Vegas and 
more broadly in Nevada.  Standing alone, such evidence did not tend to show that 
a move to Las Vegas would, with specific reference to Cameron or Brown’s plans 
for Cameron, “prejudice [his] rights or welfare.”  (§ 7501, subd. (a).)  Likewise, 
such evidence did not suggest that Cameron could not or would not thrive in the 
new location with his mother, stepfather, and two half siblings.10 
At Yana’s request, the trial court also conducted an inquiry into Cameron’s 
preferences regarding custodial placement.  The court appointed counsel for 
Cameron and, at the hearing on the proposed move away, heard counsel’s report 
of his interviews with Cameron at each parent’s home.  Counsel noted that, during 
                                              
10  
Strictly speaking, Brown and her current husband purchased a home in 
Green Valley, which is approximately 20 minutes away from the husband’s job in 
Las Vegas.  Our reasoning, however, would remain the same if the move was in 
fact to Las Vegas proper. 
 
18 
these interviews, Cameron spoke favorably of his relationship with his two half 
siblings and his stepfather’s involvement in his life.  He also mentioned his ties 
and friends in San Luis Obispo County and was naturally reluctant to break those 
ties.  Later, however, Cameron telephoned counsel from his father’s house, 
claimed he did not feel comfortable saying what his real thoughts were while at his 
mother’s house, and said he would really like to stay with his father.  Cameron 
also mentioned the existence of “problems” in his mother’s home, but that seemed 
to counsel “to be a paraphrase . . . of what he might have heard from someone 
else.”  Counsel offered his opinion, based on everything Cameron said and did, 
that Cameron was “a conflicted young man” who said “different things at different 
times, based upon who he happened to be with at the time.”  After ascertaining 
that counsel had articulated “everything that Cameron wants me to know,” the 
court expressed its awareness that “children are disoriented when they move [and] 
it’s not comfortable for them.”  The court concluded, however, that “that level of 
discomfort for the child is not what detriment or substantial changed 
circumstances is about sufficient to change custody from mom here to dad.” 
We are not prepared to hold, as a matter of law, that a showing of a child’s 
discomfort at the prospect of moving can never suffice to establish or support a 
finding of detriment for purposes of the changed circumstance rule.  Nonetheless, 
the record here amply supports the trial court’s decision to forgo an evidentiary 
hearing.  There was no issue of any bad faith on Brown’s part, and no concern 
expressed that she might use the relocation to limit Yana’s contact with Cameron.  
The detriment Yana described regarding the standard of living and schooling in 
Las Vegas and Nevada, without more, would merely show detriment in the 
abstract.  The only other consideration before the court was counsel’s report of 
 
19 
Cameron’s conflicted feelings over moving,11 but there was nothing to indicate the 
move would subject Cameron to anything atypical or unusual for a move-away 
situation.  Notably, Yana made no effort to offer facts or evidence showing that 
the relocation would detrimentally affect Cameron’s rights or his well-being, or 
that it would alienate the father-son relationship.  Because these circumstances 
disclosed no need for further assessment, the court acted well within its discretion 
to deny Yana’s request for an evidentiary hearing. 
In the proceedings below, the Court of Appeal concluded that Yana, as a 
parent without legal or physical custody who objected to a move away, was 
entitled, essentially as a matter of law, to an evidentiary hearing.  In doing so, the 
appellate court relied primarily on Campos, supra, 108 Cal.App.4th 839, in which 
the father sought to modify a child custody and visitation order in response to the 
mother’s decision to move with their two sons to a town approximately two hours 
away by car.  In Campos, the trial court read Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th 25, as 
requiring denial of the father’s order to show cause for custody modification 
without an evidentiary hearing because there was no allegation of bad faith in the 
planned move.  (Campos, at p. 842.)  Accordingly, the trial court failed to consider 
the father’s evidence that the move would be detrimental to the children’s welfare.  
                                              
11  
Yana appears to complain the trial court should have allowed Cameron 
himself to testify.  Although a trial court is authorized to consider and give due 
weight to the wishes of a child who is of sufficient age and capacity so as to form 
an intelligent preference as to custody (§ 3042, subd. (a)), it need not call a child 
as a witness where the best interests of the child so dictate, and may instead 
provide alternative means of obtaining information regarding the child’s 
preferences (id., subd. (b)).  By appointing counsel to represent and interview 
Cameron and having counsel report the results of his interviews at the hearing, the 
court obtained the information sought regarding Cameron’s views.  Yana does not 
establish error or abuse of discretion under section 3042. 
 
20 
Campos held this was error.  Finding that evidence of bad faith and evidence of 
detriment to the child are both relevant issues in a move-away case, Campos 
remanded the matter to the trial court so it could consider the issue of detriment in 
an evidentiary hearing.  (Id. at p. 844.) 
Contrary to the Court of Appeal’s conclusion here, Campos does not stand 
for the proposition that a noncustodial parent who opposes a move away has an 
absolute right to an evidentiary hearing for purposes of establishing detriment to a 
child or determining the best interest of a child.  Reasonably viewed, Campos 
simply recognized the duty of the trial court to consider all relevant issues in a 
move-away case.  Where, as here, a trial court in a move-away case diligently 
inquires into the matter of detriment in a formal court hearing, and duly considers 
the noncustodial parent’s claims, evidence, and offers of proof but properly finds 
them insufficient to establish the detriment required for a custody modification 
under the changed circumstance rule, the court does not err or abuse its discretion 
in denying custody modification without taking the further step of holding an 
evidentiary hearing with live testimony.12  (Cf. In re Marriage of Stevenot (1984) 
154 Cal.App.3d 1051, 1059, fn. 3 [citing favorably to the trial court’s procedure of 
allowing counsel to make offers of proof of matters not in the declarations and 
making inquiries of the parties and counsel as necessary to gain information it 
needed to rule on a family law matter].) 
                                              
12  
We note Campos involved a situation where the parent seeking the custody 
change sought to offer “evidence that the move would cause detriment to the 
children because they were opposed to the move and because it would separate 
them from their extended family, friends and classmates.”  (Campos, supra, 108 
Cal.App.4th at p. 843.)  Although some of the evidence Yana offered seems 
similar to the father’s evidence in Campos, the trial court here cannot be faulted 
because it solicited and considered Yana’s offer of proof, as well as appointed 
counsel’s report of the child’s views, before making its rulings. 
 
21 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the matter is 
remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed 
herein. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
COOPER, J. * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________  
*  Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division 
Eight, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 
California Constitution. 
 
22 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Marriage of Brown & Yana 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 125 Cal.Appp.4th 54 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S131030 
Date Filed: February 2, 2006 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Luis Obispo 
Judge: Donald G. Umhofer 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
John F. Hodges, Daniel L. Helbert; Misho, Kirker & Associates and Vanessa Kirker for Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Law Offices of Jeffrey W. Doeringer and Jeffrey W. Doeringer for Respondent. 
 
Judy Wood for Minor. 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
John F. Hodges 
789 Valley Road 
Arroyo Grande, CA  93420 
(808) 481-4570 
 
Jeffrey W. Doeringer 
Law Offices of Jeffrey W. Doeringer 
16152 Beach Blvd., Suite 121 
Huntington Beach, CA  92647 
(714) 841-6116 
 
Judy Wood 
5975 Entrada Avenue 
Atascadero, CA  93422 
(805) 466-2600