Title: Vincent v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
HOWARD LEWIS VINCENT  
v. 
RECORD NO. 072539 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY  
JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA  
 
 
  October 31, 2008 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGNIA  
 
Howard Lewis Vincent was convicted in a bench trial in the 
Circuit Court of the City of Alexandria of breaking and 
entering with the intent to commit larceny in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-91.  The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the 
evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Vincent had the intent to commit larceny when he broke into and 
entered a retail department store.  Because we conclude that 
the evidence was insufficient to prove that specific intent, we 
will reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Virginia 
upholding Vincent’s conviction. 
At approximately 6:33 a.m. on June 9, 2005, a male 
intruder broke into and entered a then closed retail department 
store located in the City of Alexandria.  The store was 
equipped with a video camera surveillance system that recorded 
the intruder’s entrance into the store.1  The intruder used a 
                     
1 The Commonwealth introduced into evidence as one of its 
exhibits a compact disc containing video-recorded footage from 
the surveillance cameras.  
metal pole to shatter the glass in one of the store’s entrance 
doors.  The metal pole was subsequently found inside the store. 
When the manager arrived at the store approximately 
30 minutes after the unlawful entry, he discovered the broken 
glass.  No audible alarm was sounding at that time, but a 
police officer arrived soon thereafter in response to a call.  
The officer reviewed the surveillance cameras’ video recording 
and searched the immediate vicinity for the person observed on 
the recording.  The search was not productive.  Later that day, 
however, Vincent was arrested for being intoxicated in public.  
The police subsequently recognized Vincent as the intruder seen 
on the store’s video recording.  The police searched him, but 
the search did not reveal any merchandise owned by the retail 
department store. 
The positioning of the various surveillance cameras in the 
store did not allow the cameras to record all of Vincent’s 
movements during the approximate four minutes that he remained 
in the store.  The video-recorded footage did, however, show 
Vincent walking past cash registers without stopping and 
exiting the premises through the door with the broken glass.  
When he left the store, he was not carrying any of the store’s 
merchandise, and there were no discernable bulges in his 
clothing to suggest that he was concealing merchandise.  
Finally, the footage revealed Vincent shoving a shopping cart. 
2 
The store manager testified that the store sells watches, 
jewelry, clothes, shoes, household goods, and other “small 
items which are very easy to conceal.”  Because of the large 
inventory, and because the last in-store inventory had been 
conducted approximately a year before the incident, the manager 
could not state whether Vincent had taken any items.  The 
manager did affirmatively testify that no cash was missing from 
the store.  He additionally testified that the shopping cart 
Vincent shoved went “almost through” a clothes rack and that 
the “merchandise was dispersed.” 
At trial, the Commonwealth argued, pursuant to this 
Court’s decision in Ridley v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 834, 
252 S.E.2d 313 (1979), that, in the absence of evidence showing 
a contrary intent, an inference arises that an unlawful entry 
is made with the intent to commit larceny.  The trial court 
“adopt[ed]” the inference and found Vincent guilty of breaking 
and entering with the intent to commit larceny. 
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Vincent argued that the 
trial court erred in utilizing that inference because there was 
evidence showing a contrary intent at the time of the unlawful 
entry, i.e, that Vincent intended only to damage the store’s 
merchandise, not to steal it.  The Court of Appeals initially 
reversed the conviction in an unpublished opinion, with one 
judge dissenting.  Vincent v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2701-05-
3 
4 (Jan. 23, 2007) (Haley, J., dissenting).  Upon a rehearing en 
banc, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment 
and concluded that Vincent’s hypothesis of innocence – 
specifically, that “his intent at the time he entered was to 
damage property, not to steal property” – was not reasonable 
because there was no evidence that any property in the store 
had been damaged.  Vincent v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2701-05-
4, slip op. at 5-6 (Nov. 20, 2007).  Vincent now appeals to 
this Court. 
On appeal, Vincent’s sole assignment of error challenges 
the sufficiency of the evidence to prove that he had the intent 
to commit larceny when he broke into and entered the store.2  
Vincent argues, as he did in the trial court and in the Court 
of Appeals, that the circumstantial evidence proved only that 
he had the intent to vandalize or damage the store and its 
merchandise.  Thus, according to Vincent, the permissible 
inference adopted by the trial court was inapplicable because 
there was evidence showing a contrary intent.  Furthermore, 
Vincent argues that the inference cannot be used to relieve the 
Commonwealth of its duty to prove each element of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
                     
2 Vincent does not contest that he was the intruder seen on 
the video-recorded footage from the store’s surveillance 
cameras. 
4 
Citing this Court’s decision in Ridley, the Commonwealth 
contends that the trial court properly relied upon the 
permissible inference that Vincent’s breaking into and entering 
the retail department store was with the intent to commit 
larceny because there was no evidence of a contrary intent.  On 
oral argument, the Commonwealth, however, agreed that, without 
the benefit of the inference, the evidence was insufficient to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Vincent had the intent to 
commit larceny. 
In deciding the question before us, we review the evidence 
and all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the Commonwealth as the prevailing party in 
the trial court.  Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 514, 
578 S.E.2d 781, 786 (2003).  When a defendant on appeal 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a 
conviction, we must examine the evidence that supports the 
conviction and allow the conviction to stand unless it is 
plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.  Code § 8.01-
680; Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 255 Va. 516, 520, 499 S.E.2d 263, 
265 (1998). 
The relevant provisions of Code § 18.2-91 state that a 
person is guilty of statutory burglary if that person breaks 
into and enters any building permanently affixed to realty with 
the intent to commit larceny.  When a statute, such as Code 
5 
§ 18.2-91, “makes an offense consist of an act combined with a 
particular intent, such intent is as necessary to be proved as 
the act itself, and it is necessary for the intent to be 
established as a matter of fact before a conviction can be 
had.”  Dixon v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 380, 382, 89 S.E.2d 344, 
345 (1955); accord Patterson v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 698, 699, 
213 S.E.2d 752, 753 (1975).  “Intent in fact is the purpose 
formed in a person’s mind and may be, and frequently is, shown 
by circumstances.  It is a state of mind which may be shown by 
a person’s conduct or by his statements.”  Hargrave v. 
Commonwealth, 214 Va. 436, 437, 201 S.E.2d 597, 598 (1974); 
accord Johnson v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 291, 295, 163 S.E.2d 
570, 574 (1968). 
The trial court relied on the decision in Ridley and the 
permissible inference at issue when it found Vincent guilty.  
The defendant in Ridley, like Vincent, asserted that the 
evidence was insufficient to prove the specific intent to 
commit larceny when breaking into and entering a furniture 
store.  219 Va. at 835, 252 S.E.2d at 314.  The defendant broke 
into the building by shattering a window with a large piece of 
cinder block and then entered through a large hole in the 
window.  Id. at 835-36, 252 S.E.2d at 314.  The police found 
the defendant in a corner of the building.  Id. at 836, 
252 S.E.2d at 314.  The defendant, however, did not have any of 
6 
the store’s merchandise in his possession when the police 
apprehended him, and there was no evidence that the defendant 
had tampered with or moved any merchandise.  Id. 
In addressing the defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency 
of the evidence to prove his intent to commit larceny, we cited 
the principle that “when an unlawful entry is made into a 
dwelling of another, the presumption is that the entry was made 
for an unlawful purpose, and the specific intent with which 
such entry was made may be inferred from the surrounding facts 
and circumstances.”  Id.  (citing Tompkins v. Commonwealth, 
212 Va. 460, 461, 184 S.E.2d 767, 768 (1971)).  Although the 
principle was originally utilized in conjunction with the 
burglary of a dwelling, we concluded that it was equally 
applicable to the breaking and entering of the storehouse at 
issue in Ridley.  Id. 
Consequently, we held that the evidence was sufficient to 
support the inference that the defendant’s unauthorized 
presence in the furniture store was with the intent to commit 
larceny.  Id. at 837, 252 S.E.2d at 315.  The “surrounding 
facts and circumstances” supporting that inference included 
evidence that the defendant had broken into and entered a 
closed store containing items of personal property.  The 
evidence also proved that, although the defendant did not have 
any of the store’s merchandise in his possession when the 
7 
police apprehended him, he was still inside the furniture store 
at that point.  Furthermore, there was no evidence either as to 
the length of time the defendant had been in the store or as to 
his movements or actions while he was in the building before 
the police found him. 
That is the factual context in which we then stated: “In 
the absence of evidence showing a contrary intent, the trier of 
fact may infer that a defendant’s unauthorized presence in a 
house or building of another in the nighttime was with the 
intent to commit larceny.”  Id. at 837, 252 S.E.2d at 314.  
However, in Velasquez v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 326, 661 S.E.2d 
454 (2008), this Court rejected the use of a jury instruction 
containing such an inference.  There, the trial court granted a 
jury instruction with regard to a charge of breaking and 
entering with the intent to commit rape that read: “In the 
absence of evidence showing a contrary intent, you may infer 
that a defendant’s unauthorized presence in a building of 
another was with the intent to commit rape.”  Id. at 328 n.1, 
661 S.E.2d at 455 n.1.  The Court held the instruction was an 
improper comment on the evidence and explained that, while 
specific intent may be inferred from the surrounding facts and 
circumstances of a burglary, the nature of that specific intent 
“is a matter for determination by the fact-finder alone, based 
upon the evidence.  It is not the function of the court to 
8 
suggest to the jury what conclusion it should draw from the 
facts in evidence.”  Id. at 330, 661 S.E.2d at 456. 
Thus, under a correct reading of Ridley, Tompkins, and 
Velasquez, a trier of fact may not reasonably infer the 
specific intent to commit larceny merely from the absence of 
evidence showing a different intent.  Instead, as we stated in 
both Ridley and Tompkins, the specific intent with which an 
unlawful entry is made “may be inferred from the surrounding 
facts and circumstances.”  Ridley, 219 Va. at 836, 252 S.E.2d 
at 314; Tompkins, 212 Va. at 461, 184 S.E.2d at 768. 
In the case before us, the evidence and the reasonable 
inferences flowing therefrom, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, proved only that Vincent 
forcibly broke into and entered the retail department store by 
breaking the glass in an entrance door, that he walked around 
in the store for approximately four minutes, that he shoved a 
shopping cart into a rack of clothing, and that he exited the 
store without touching or tampering with cash registers and 
without removing any merchandise.  In contrast to the defendant 
in Ridley, Vincent was not apprehended while he was in the 
store but, instead, several hours later after he had exited the 
store.  At that time, the police did not find any of the 
store’s merchandise on Vincent’s person, and the store manager 
could not state whether any merchandise was even missing.  
9 
10 
These facts and circumstances do not support the inference that 
Vincent had the specific intent to commit larceny.  As we have 
explained, such an intent may not reasonably be inferred merely 
from the absence of evidence of a different intent.  We agree 
with Vincent that, to hold otherwise, would relieve the 
Commonwealth of its burden to prove each element of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
For these reasons, we conclude that the evidence was not 
sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Vincent had 
the specific intent to commit larceny when he unlawfully broke 
into and entered the retail department store.  The Court of 
Appeals thus erred by affirming the judgment of the trial court 
finding Vincent guilty of breaking and entering with the intent 
to commit larceny.  We will reverse the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals of Virginia and dismiss the indictment. 
Reversed and dismissed.