Title: Lombard v. Rohrbaugh

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
RALPH D. LOMBARD 
 
v.  Record No. 002459 
 
DORSEY W. ROHRBAUGH 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
September 14, 2001 
 
VIRGINIA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
 
v.  Record No. 002675 
 
DORSEY W. ROHRBAUGH 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Dennis J. Smith, Judge 
 
 
In these two appeals, we consider whether the trial court 
erred in permitting Dorsey W. Rohrbaugh (“Rohrbaugh”) to 
mention liability insurance during cross-examination of a 
physician who testified on behalf of Ralph D. Lombard 
(“Lombard”) and Virginia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company 
(“Farm Bureau”).  Additionally, we consider the enforceability 
at trial of a stipulation reached during pretrial discovery 
proceedings and the trial court’s denial of Lombard’s 
proffered cautionary instruction. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
Rohrbaugh was injured in an automobile accident on August 
11, 1995, when his automobile was struck from behind by a 
vehicle operated by Lombard.  Lombard had a liability policy 
of insurance with Allstate Insurance Company (“Allstate”).  
Farm Bureau provided Rohrbaugh’s motor vehicle insurance.  
Rohrbaugh filed his motion for judgment against Lombard on 
June 25, 1999, in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County.  He 
served the motion for judgment on Lombard and upon his own 
carrier, Farm Bureau, as the underinsured motorist carrier 
pursuant to Code § 38.2-2206.  Allstate provided counsel for 
Lombard, who filed appropriate responsive pleadings.  Farm 
Bureau, pursuant to Code § 38.2-2206, filed a separate 
response to the motion for judgment in its own name. 
 
Rohrbaugh presented evidence at trial that two of his 
cervical discs were herniated and his back was injured as a 
result of the accident.  Lombard and Farm Bureau disputed the 
existence, as well as the causation, of any injuries and 
contended that Rohrbaugh’s continued pain and subsequent 
anterior cervical discetomy and fusion were due to a pre-
existing arthritic condition. 
 
Allstate and Farm Bureau engaged Bruce J. Ammerman, M.D. 
(“Dr. Ammerman”) to conduct a medical examination of Rohrbaugh 
pursuant to Rule 4:10 of the Rules of the Virginia Supreme 
Court.  Dr. Ammerman was regularly employed not only by 
Allstate, but by numerous other insurance companies to conduct 
Rule 4:10 examinations.  In discovery proceedings, Rohrbaugh 
 
2
attempted to determine precisely how much money Dr. Ammerman 
had been paid by Allstate for such forensic work. 
 
From a prior unrelated personal injury action, 
Rohrbaugh’s counsel had obtained from Allstate a computer 
printout indicating the amounts paid by Allstate to Dr. 
Ammerman in various years, including 1998 and 1999.  In 
pretrial depositions in the unrelated case, Dr. Ammerman had 
acknowledged that the reported figures were accurate; however, 
he testified that he could not state how much of his income 
from Allstate was for forensic work and how much was for 
patient care.  Aware of this absence of differentiation among 
the payments, Rohrbaugh’s counsel in the present case caused a 
subpoena to be issued for a deposition pursuant to Rule 
4:5(b)(6) of an Allstate corporate designee knowledgeable 
about payments to Dr. Ammerman.  Allstate engaged counsel 
independent from that which it provided for Lombard and filed 
a motion to quash the notice of deposition. 
 
The Honorable R. Terrence Ney denied the motion to quash 
and further ordered that the deposition of the Allstate 
designee would proceed with the understanding that Allstate 
would provide a witness who could differentiate between 
payments made to Dr. Ammerman for medical services and 
payments made for forensic services.  On the date of this 
ruling, Rohrbaugh’s counsel suggested to Allstate’s counsel 
 
3
that Allstate’s designee might need access to a computer 
terminal and offered to hold the deposition in an Allstate 
office.  Allstate’s counsel rejected this effort to 
accommodate the witness and insisted that the deposition be 
taken at the office of Rohrbaugh’s counsel, where it had been 
noticed. 
 
The deposition of Allstate’s designee occurred on June 6, 
2000 at Rohrbaugh’s counsel’s office and was attended by 
Lombard’s counsel, Allstate’s counsel, and Rohrbaugh’s 
counsel.1  Farm Bureau’s counsel, although given notice, 
elected not to attend.  Immediately prior to the beginning of 
the deposition, a telephone call was placed to Farm Bureau’s 
counsel, and Rohrbaugh’s counsel was advised that no one would 
be appearing on behalf of Farm Bureau.  As anticipated by 
Rohrbaugh’s counsel, the Allstate designee could not 
differentiate the reasons for the payments made by Allstate to 
Dr. Ammerman simply by looking at a computer printout and 
testified that if she had access to the Allstate computer 
system, she could identify the reason for particular payments.  
Rohrbaugh’s counsel sought to move the deposition to a 
                     
1 The deposition was originally noticed for May 8, 2000.  
The motion to quash was filed on May 5, 2000, but the notice 
of the motion to quash was not filed until May 22, 2000.  The 
hearing on the motion to quash occurred on June 2, 2000 and on 
that date, Judge Ney ordered the deposition to proceed on June 
6, 2000.   
 
4
location where the witness could obtain information from the 
Allstate computer system; however, counsel for Allstate 
refused.  At that time, Rohrbaugh’s counsel indicated that he 
would call Judge Ney for a ruling on the matter.  Lombard’s 
counsel left the deposition before Judge Ney was called, 
stating, “I’m going to let you guys do whatever you’re doing.  
I’m going to excuse myself, because I have a bunch of other 
things.”  The deposition was still in progress, but Judge Ney 
was presiding over other matters and was not available.  
Rohrbaugh’s counsel stated that the deposition would remain 
open until a ruling could be obtained from Judge Ney. 
 
Later that day Judge Ney became available by telephone 
and, in a conference call with Rohrbaugh’s counsel and 
Allstate’s counsel, Judge Ney indicated that he would order 
Allstate to make the designated witness available at a 
computer terminal where the information sought could be 
obtained.  Allstate’s counsel remained opposed to this 
solution and offered the alternative of stipulating to the 
accuracy of the amounts paid to Dr. Ammerman and “agreed not 
to attempt to differentiate between the services for which 
they were made.”  Instead of ordering the continuation of the 
deposition at a computer terminal, Judge Ney accepted 
Allstate’s alternative solution and, in an opinion letter 
 
5
rendered after the trial in this matter, Judge Ney summarized 
his ruling as follows: 
 
Finally, the Court’s ruling as to the 
computer terminal was not in any manner a 
sanction but rather an order compelling 
discovery.  While the details of the written 
Order of July 21st, 2000 reflect the agreement 
between counsel for plaintiff and Allstate as 
to the limitations placed on Dr. Ammerman’s 
testimony insofar as a differentiation of the 
payments made to him by Allstate, those terms 
were not ordered by the Court.  They resulted 
solely from the agreement between counsel when 
faced with the consequences of the Court’s 
order compelling discovery by the use of a 
computer terminal. 
 
Judge Ney did not address whether or how the relationship 
between Dr. Ammerman and Allstate could be explored at the 
trial.  Allstate stipulated that it had paid Dr. Ammerman 
$106,520 in 1998, and $104,971 in 1999.  The reasons for these 
payments were not differentiated. 
 
The trial of this matter was held before the Honorable 
Dennis J. Smith.  At trial, Rohrbaugh was permitted to 
deliberately inject the concept of insurance into the case by 
cross-examining Dr. Ammerman on potential bias concerning the 
total amount of money he received from Allstate.  Among other 
questions, Rohrbaugh asked Dr. Ammerman, “[i]n fact, Doctor, 
Allstate Insurance Company, who is the insurance company for 
the defendant in this case, has paid you in 1999, $104,971, 
right?”  Rohrbaugh’s counsel continued, “[i]n 1998, if I told 
 
6
you that Allstate Insurance Company had paid you $106,520, the 
same answer, I’m assuming.” 
In Dr. Ammerman’s responses, he confirmed the amounts 
paid, but, contrary to Judge Ney’s ruling, nonetheless 
testified that he did not know in what capacity he received 
the money.  He further stated that he could not speak to the 
“veracity [of Allstate’s document listing the payments] one 
way or the other, because [he] didn’t produce it” and 
suggested that the “document breaks out patients [he had] 
treated.” 
 
This cross-examination concerning bias was permitted over 
vigorous objection from Lombard and Farm Bureau.  The trial 
court rejected an alternative method of conducting cross-
examination that would have made reference to forensic 
examinations, but not the existence of insurance.  Prior to 
Dr. Ammerman’s testimony, the trial court gave a cautionary 
instruction to the jury that it was not to consider the 
existence of insurance for any purpose other than the possible 
bias of Dr. Ammerman.2  
                     
2 The trial court stated the following prior to the direct 
examination of Dr. Ammerman: 
 
Ladies and gentlemen, the cross 
examination of Dr. Ammerman will ask 
questions intended to elicit evidence 
regarding payments made to Dr. Ammerman by 
 
7
 
In closing argument, Rohrbaugh’s counsel was permitted to 
mention the relationship between Dr. Ammerman and Allstate for 
the purpose of arguing that Dr. Ammerman’s testimony was 
biased.  At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a 
verdict in favor of Rohrbaugh in the amount of $125,000.  In 
post-verdict motions, Lombard and Farm Bureau requested Judge 
Ney to reconsider his pretrial ruling concerning stipulations.  
The motion was denied.  Lombard and Farm Bureau also filed 
motions asking Judge Smith to declare a mistrial, set aside 
the jury’s verdict, and order a new trial.3  These motions 
were denied as well. 
 
On appeal, Lombard and Farm Bureau allege that the trial 
court erred in permitting Rohrbaugh to impeach Dr. Ammerman 
with the purposeful mentioning of liability insurance.  
Additionally, Lombard alleges that the trial court erred in 
                                                                
a liability insurance company which 
provides coverage to the defendant. 
You may only consider this as 
evidence of possible bias on the part of 
Dr. Ammerman.  The fact of the existence 
of any liability insurance in this case is 
not to be considered by you in any way in 
determining whether the defendant was 
negligent, whether any negligence of the 
defendant proximately caused any injury to 
the plaintiff, or the amount of any 
judgment you might ultimately award. 
3  Lombard filed a “Motion to Declare a Mistrial, Set 
Aside the Verdict and Grant a New Trial,” while Farm Bureau 
filed a “Motion to Set Aside Jury’s Verdict and Motion for New 
Trial.”  
 
8
“disallowing a jury instruction offered by the Defendant’s 
counsel that would properly have warned the jury against 
taking an assertion of fact contained in Rohrbaugh’s counsel’s 
cross-examination as evidence of that fact.”  Finally, Farm 
Bureau alleges that the trial court erred in enforcing, at 
trial, the pretrial stipulation between Allstate and Rohrbaugh 
concerning the amounts paid to Dr. Ammerman and the agreement 
not to differentiate between forensic payments and medical 
care payments at trial. 
II. Analysis 
A. Evidence of Insurance 
 
Initially we consider the trial court’s decision allowing 
presentation of evidence of insurance.  With regard to the 
admission of evidence, the responsibility for balancing the 
competing considerations of probative value and prejudice 
rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.  The 
exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal in 
the absence of a clear abuse.  Coe v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 
83, 87, 340 S.E.2d 820, 823 (1986). 
 
The trial court’s decision to permit Rohrbaugh to 
deliberately interject insurance into the trial involves the 
tension between two established rules concerning admission of 
evidence and cross-examination of witnesses.  We have 
previously stated that, “evidence as to whether defendant did 
 
9
or did not carry liability insurance was irrelevant and 
inadmissible.  This holding is based on the theory that such 
evidence tends to unduly influence the jury in behalf of the 
plaintiff.”  Highway Express Lines v. Fleming, 185 Va. 666, 
672, 40 S.E.2d 294, 297 (1946).  At one time, we adhered to 
the rule that “it is reversible error not to grant a mistrial 
where the reference to insurance is deliberate and for 
improper purposes.”  Davis v. Maynard, 215 Va. 407, 408, 211 
S.E.2d 32, 33 (1975).  However, we recognized in Medina v. 
Hegerberg, 245 Va. 210, 427 S.E.2d 343 (1993), that: 
Generally, any comment deliberately made 
to inform the jury that a defendant is insured 
against an accident constitutes reversible 
error.  The policy underlying this rule is to 
insure that a jury does not award damages 
unrelated to any finding of fault because it is 
aware that insurance coverage exists and that 
the insurer, rather than the named defendant, 
would pay the damages award.  The mention of 
insurance constitutes reversible error 
requiring a new trial when the comment probably 
has misled or prejudiced the jury. 
 
Nevertheless, this rule is not absolute.  
For example, when the insurer is the named 
defendant in a direct action authorized by the 
insurance policy, the insurer has waived any 
claim of prejudice.  Likewise, when sufficient 
cautionary instructions are made by the court 
following a mention of insurance, we generally 
will not hold comments regarding insurance 
coverage to be reversible error.  And, mention 
of insurance may not be reversible error where 
there is an otherwise fair trial and 
substantial justice is done. 
 
 
10
Id. at 213-14, 427 S.E.2d at 345-46 (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
The general rule prohibiting the mention of insurance in 
such cases may collide with another rule concerning a 
litigant’s right to cross-examine a witness concerning 
interest, bias, prejudice, credibility, or relationship to the 
parties.  Although the “trial court has discretion to limit 
the scope of cross-examination which is for the purpose of 
establishing bias,” such discretion must not be exercised to 
prohibit proper cross-examination.  Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. 
v. Sonney, 236 Va. 482, 488, 374 S.E.2d 71, 74 (1988). 
 
In Fleming, a paid employee of the defendant’s insurance 
carrier who had interviewed several of plaintiff’s witnesses 
immediately after the accident, testified at trial in 
contradiction of plaintiff’s witnesses.  The trial court 
permitted plaintiff, on cross-examination, to reveal to the 
jury the potential bias of defendant’s witness by establishing 
the employment relationship between the witness and the 
insurance carrier for the defendant.  Id. at 670, 40 S.E.2d at 
297.  In affirming the trial court’s judgment, we observed: 
This court has consistently held that the 
vital issue in this class of actions is whether 
defendant was guilty of negligence that was the 
proximate cause of the injury and that evidence 
as to whether defendant did or did not carry 
liability insurance was irrelevant and 
inadmissible.  This holding is based on the 
 
11
theory that such evidence tends to unduly 
influence the jury in behalf of the plaintiff. 
It did not appear in any of the Virginia 
cases cited that the fact that defendant 
carried liability insurance was admissible on 
any ground other than that such carrier was the 
party ultimately liable.  The evidence in the 
case at bar was clearly admissible under the 
well settled rule that a litigant has a right 
to establish facts and circumstances tending to 
show the interest, bias or prejudice of a 
hostile witness.  Both rules cannot be applied 
in this case.  The facts tending to show the 
interest or bias of the witness cannot be 
admitted without establishing the fact that the 
defendant carried liability insurance.  “In 
this Scylla-and-Charybdis dilemma most Courts 
have attempted to concede something to each of 
the opposing principles, i.e. by allowing the 
questions when properly asked” either of a 
juror on his voir dire or of a witness to 
establish his interest or bias.  2 Wigmore on 
Evidence, 3 Ed., sec. 282a. 
The activity of this witness in 
preparation for the trial and his testimony on 
direct examination made it imperative for the 
jury to know his full relation to the named 
defendant and the insurance carrier.  He, as a 
paid employee, visited the scene a few days 
after the accident.  He interviewed numerous 
witnesses and reduced their statements to 
writing.  In the trial he was introduced by the 
defendant in an attempt to discredit or impeach 
the testimony of numerous witnesses introduced 
by plaintiff.  The jurors, in deciding whether 
defendant was negligent, had to determine what 
weight, if any, they must give to the testimony 
of the agent for the insurance carrier.  If 
they accepted his testimony, they had to 
discard the testimony of many of plaintiff’s 
witnesses.  Under these circumstances, the 
jurors were entitled to know his interest or 
bias and his relation to the party ultimately 
liable.  As Judge Soper said, in Sprinkle v. 
Davis, 111 F.(2d) 925, 128 A.L.R. 1101 [(4th 
Cir. 1940)], such evidence should be admitted 
for the value the jury may accord to it.  The 
 
12
trial court, if requested by proper 
instruction, should inform the jury of the 
purpose for which such evidence was admitted. 
 
Id. at 672-73, 40 S.E.2d at 297-98 (internal case citations 
omitted). 
 
Although the mention of insurance was not an issue, we 
encountered a similar dilemma in Henning v. Thomas, 235 Va. 
181, 366 S.E.2d 109 (1988), where, in a medical negligence 
case, defendants’ counsel sought to cross-examine plaintiff’s 
expert witness concerning how he became involved in the case.  
The trial court would not permit cross-examination other than 
upon the narrow question of whether the witness was being paid 
to give his testimony.  Id. at 187, 366 S.E.2d at 112.  The 
defendants claimed that the trial court erred in prohibiting 
them from revealing to the jury that plaintiff’s expert 
witness was employed by a nationwide company engaged in the 
business of providing testimony in medical negligence cases.  
Agreeing with defendants, we reversed, noting that: 
The bias of a witness, like prejudice and 
relationship, is not a collateral matter.  The 
bias of a witness is always a relevant subject 
of inquiry when confined to ascertaining 
previous relationship, feeling and conduct of 
the witness. . . . [O]n cross-examination great 
latitude is allowed and . . . the general rule 
is that anything tending to show the bias on 
the part of a witness may be drawn out. 
. . . 
The defendant doctors were entitled to 
attempt to persuade the jury that [plaintiff’s 
witness] was a “doctor for hire,” who was part 
 
13
of a nationwide group that offered themselves 
as witnesses, on behalf of medical malpractice 
plaintiffs.  Once the jury was made aware of 
this information it was for the jury to decide 
what weight, if any, to give to [the witness’] 
testimony.  This was a classic case of an 
effort to establish bias, prejudice, or 
relationship. 
 
Id. at 188-89, 366 S.E.2d at 113 (internal citations 
omitted) (emphasis removed). 
 
In the case before us today, the trial court did not err 
in permitting Rohrbaugh to cross-examine Dr. Ammerman 
concerning his relationship with Allstate.  Dr. Ammerman had a 
substantial connection with Allstate, including receipt of 
over $100,000 per year in payments for the years 1998 and 
1999.4  Lombard and Farm Bureau argue that because Dr. Ammerman 
is not an employee of Allstate as the witness was in Fleming, 
Rohrbaugh should not have been permitted to mention insurance 
in cross-examination.  Additionally, Lombard and Farm Bureau 
argued at trial that Rohrbaugh should be limited in cross-
examination to questions relating to frequency of testimony 
and whether the witness testified more or less frequently for 
defendants rather than plaintiffs.  The trial court correctly 
                     
 
4 Although there was no differentiation between payments 
for medical services and payments for forensic services, 
Rohrbaugh was not responsible for the inability to distinguish 
between reasons for payment at trial.  Rohrbaugh sought 
through proper discovery to determine precisely how much Dr. 
Ammerman was paid by Allstate for forensic services.  Allstate 
 
14
refused each of these proposed limitations upon cross-
examination.   
 
A witness’ status as an employee of an insurance company 
providing coverage to a party is evidence of potential bias, 
but the absence of an employer-employee relationship does not 
define the limits of cross-examination.  At issue is the 
potential for bias because of the witness’ interests in the 
case, not artificial labels.  Similarly, the suggestion that 
Rohrbaugh be limited to questions about frequency of forensic 
testimony and identification of Dr. Ammerman’s preference for 
testifying on behalf of plaintiffs or defendants misses the 
crux of the issue, namely, whether there is a substantial 
connection between the witness and a particular insurance 
carrier that has a financial interest in the outcome of the 
case. 
 
A majority of jurisdictions addressing this issue apply a 
“substantial connection” analysis to determine whether the 
relationship between a party and a witness, particularly an 
expert witness, is such as to make proof of their financial 
dealings sufficiently probative to outweigh prejudice that 
arises from knowledge that the party carries liability 
                                                                
resisted such discovery and subsequently entered into a 
stipulation, accepted by the trial court.  
 
15
insurance.5  See Otwell v. Bryant, 497 So.2d 111 (Ala. 1986); 
Bonser v. Shainholtz, 3 P.3d 422 (Colo. 2000); Hawes v. Chua, 
769 A.2d 797, 810 (D.C.App. 2001); Mills v. Grotheer, 957 P.2d 
540 (Ok. 1998); Yoho v. Thompson, No. 25273, 2001 WL 289788 
(S.C. Mar. 26, 2001).  As the Colorado Supreme Court noted in 
Bonser, “[t]he substantial connection analysis looks to 
whether a witness has ‘a sufficient degree of “connection” 
with the liability insurance carrier to justify allowing proof 
of this relationship as a means of attacking the credibility 
of the witness.’ ”  Bonser, 3 P.3d at 425 (quoting Otwell, 497 
So.2d at 115). 
 
In a very recent case, remarkably similar to the one before 
us today, the Supreme Court of South Carolina considered the 
propriety of permitting cross-examination of a defendant’s 
expert witness concerning the witness’ relationship with the 
insurance carrier providing underinsured liability coverage.6  
                     
5 Some courts have applied a similar analysis without 
using the label “substantial connection.”  See Barsema v. 
Susong, 751 P.2d 969, 974 (Ariz. 1988); Kelley v. Wiggins, 724 
S.W.2d 443, 446-47 (Ark. 1987); Golden v. Kishwaukee Community 
Health Servs. Ctr., Inc., 645 N.E.2d 319, 325-26 (Ill.App.Ct. 
1994); Strain v. Heinssen, 434 N.W.2d 640, 643 (Iowa 1989); 
Wallace v. Leedhanachoke, 949 S.W.2d 624, 627-28 (Ky.Ct.App. 
1996); Davila v. Bodelson, 704 P.2d 1119, 1126 (N.M.Ct.App. 
1985); Cerasuoli v. Brevetti, 166 A.D.2d 403, 404 
(N.Y.App.Div. 1990). 
6 South Carolina rules of evidence 403 and 411 are 
patterned after the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Although we 
have not and do not adopt the Federal Rules, the operative 
 
16
The witness did “a fair amount of consulting work” with the 
carrier and “ten to twenty percent of [the witness’] practice 
consisted of reviewing records for insurance companies.”  
Yoho, 2001 WL 289788, at *1.  The witness gave lectures to the 
carrier’s agents and adjusters.  Id. at *3.  Additionally, 
“his yearly salary was based on the amount of money his 
practice earned, which included his consulting work.”  Id. at 
*1.  Holding that “the trial court erred in refusing to allow 
Yoho to cross-examine [the expert witness] about his 
relationship with [the carrier],” the South Carolina Supreme 
Court rejected the same alternative suggestion made by Lombard 
and Farm Bureau in the case before us.  Id. at *3.  Rejecting 
the argument that any error was harmless, the South Carolina 
Supreme Court stated: 
 
Although the court gave Yoho permission to 
discuss [the expert witness’] bias by using 
generic terms such as “defense,” “defendants,” 
and “defense lawyer,” Yoho sought to show 
specifically that [the witness] consulted for 
[the carrier] and lectured [the carrier’s] agents 
and adjusters.  This evidence is qualitatively 
different from showing [the expert witness] works 
for “the defense” generally, and is much more 
indicative of possible bias in favor of the 
defendant. 
 
Id.
                                                                
principles of law involved in Yoho have been well-established 
in Virginia case law. 
 
17
 
We reaffirm the general principle that evidence as to 
whether a defendant did or did not carry liability insurance 
is generally irrelevant and inadmissible in a trial to address 
issues of negligence, causation, and damages.  However, 
consistent with our prior cases and the majority view in the 
United States, we hold that testimony concerning liability 
insurance may be elicited for the purpose of showing bias or 
prejudice of a witness if there is a substantial connection 
between the witness and the liability carrier.  If a 
substantial connection is demonstrated, its probative value 
concerning potential bias or prejudice outweighs any prejudice 
to the defendant resulting from the jury’s knowledge that the 
defendant carries liability insurance.  Of course, as the 
trial court did in this case, a cautionary instruction to the 
jury concerning the limits of the jury’s consideration of the 
evidence must be given upon request of a defendant. 
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in permitting cross-examination of Dr. Ammerman 
concerning his relationship with Allstate, and properly 
refused to narrow the scope of questioning to exclude any 
mention of insurance. 
B. Denial of Lombard’s Proposed Cautionary Instruction 
 
Lombard assigns as error the trial court’s refusal to 
instruct the jury that questions by Rohrbaugh’s counsel during 
 
18
cross-examination of Dr. Ammerman did not provide evidence of 
the matters contained in those questions.  Upon review of jury 
instructions given or refused at trial, our responsibility is 
“to see that the law has been clearly stated and that the 
instructions cover all issues which the evidence fairly 
raises.”  Swisher v. Swisher, 223 Va. 499, 503, 290 S.E.2d 
856, 858 (1982) (citing E. I. DuPont v. Snead’s Amr., 124 Va. 
177, 97 S.E. 812 (1919)).  Moreover, the proffered instruction 
“must be supported by more than a mere scintilla of evidence.”  
Gibson v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 412, 417, 219 S.E.2d 845, 849 
(1975).  An instruction that is not supported by the evidence, 
however, is properly refused.  Frye v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 
370, 388, 345 S.E.2d 267, 280 (1986). 
 
At trial, counsel for Lombard requested a cautionary 
instruction prior to Dr. Ammerman’s testimony that was 
duplicative of the one given with the exception of the 
following additional language: “You may not consider the mere 
asking of such questions as evidence of the truth of such 
payments.”  The trial court refused to give Lombard’s 
proffered instruction.  
 
It is readily apparent that this assignment of error is 
premised upon Lombard’s misunderstanding of the content of 
Rohrbaugh’s questions to Dr. Ammerman upon cross-examination.  
Repeatedly, on brief and in oral argument, Lombard asserts 
 
19
that Rohrbaugh’s questions referred to payments for forensic 
work.  A review of the record reveals that Lombard is wrong in 
his assessment of what transpired at trial.  In accordance 
with the pretrial stipulation, Rohrbaugh asked about payments 
in general without specific reference to forensic work.  
Nonetheless, citing Rakes v. Fulcher, 210 Va. 542, 172 S.E.2d 
751 (1970), Lombard argues that the trial court erred in 
refusing his instruction concerning the content of counsel’s 
questions.  We disagree. 
 
In Rakes, the objectionable questions posed by counsel 
were prefaced with introductions such as, “[d]o you recall 
telling the ***?,” “[d]idn’t you also tell me ***?,” “[d]idn’t 
you tell me ***?,” and “[w]hy did you tell me ***?”  Id. at 
548, 172 S.E.2d at 756.  Rejecting this form of questioning as 
improper, we stated: 
 
To have permitted the questions in the 
proposed form, the court would have in effect 
been permitting counsel to testify against [the 
witness] without becoming a witness, and this 
could have resulted in giving the jury the 
impression that the facts assumed by the 
questions actually existed.  Such a procedure 
would have amounted to an unwarranted and 
improper attempt to discredit the witness.  
Thus we hold that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in holding that the proposed 
cross-examination was improper. 
 
Id. at 548-49, 172 S.E.2d at 757 (internal citation omitted). 
 
 
20
 
In stark contrast to Rakes, Rohrbaugh’s counsel asked 
questions in proper form for cross-examination.  As such, the 
questions were “leading” in that they often contained the 
answer sought, but permitted Dr. Ammerman to admit or deny the 
question.  Of great significance, Dr. Ammerman admitted 
receipt of the payments from Allstate.  The questions of 
Rohrbaugh’s counsel concerning payments did not, as suggested 
by Lombard, contain reference to forensic work.  Accordingly, 
the trial court properly refused Lombard’s proffered jury 
instruction. 
C. Binding Effect of Allstate’s Stipulation 
 
Finally, Farm Bureau maintains that the trial court erred 
in permitting Allstate, a non-party, to make a stipulation 
binding upon Lombard, Farm Bureau, and Dr. Ammerman when Farm 
Bureau did not consent to, nor have knowledge or notice of the 
hearing on the stipulation.  This assignment of error refers 
to the pretrial ruling of Judge Ney that was enforced at trial 
by Judge Smith. 
 
The deposition of the Allstate representative was taken 
on June 6, 2000, one day before trial.  Notice was given to 
counsel for Lombard and counsel for Farm Bureau.  Pursuant to 
Rule 4:5(b) of the Rules of the Virginia Supreme Court, the 
notice stated the time and place of the deposition.  In 
addition, the notice indicated that Rohrbaugh sought to 
 
21
question Allstate’s designee concerning an attached printout 
described as “Allstate Insurance Companies IRS Payments List 
and Payment Detail for TIN Number 521074671, Washington 
Neurosurgical Associates, P.C., and Bruce Ammerman, M.D., for 
the period beginning January 1, 1995 to December, 31, 1999.” 
 
The purpose of such a deposition was readily apparent to 
defense counsel.  Questions about payments made by Allstate to 
Dr. Ammerman for a period of five years could only relate to 
discovery of information sought for the purpose of impeachment 
at trial.  Allstate retained counsel separate from counsel 
retained for Lombard to defend its interests.  Farm Bureau’s 
counsel chose not to attend the deposition.  
 
The Allstate designee could not identify certain codes in 
the printout relating to the purpose of payments without 
access to an Allstate computer terminal.  Counsel for Allstate 
resisted moving the location of the deposition to a place 
where the obvious purpose of the deposition could be 
accomplished.  Not satisfied, Rohrbaugh’s counsel indicated 
that he would call Judge Ney for clarification of the trial 
court’s previous order compelling the deposition.  Without 
waiting for the telephone call to be made to Judge Ney, 
counsel for Lombard left the deposition.  The deposition, 
however, remained pending, and later that day Judge Ney 
conducted a conference call with counsel for Rohrbaugh and 
 
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Allstate.  Judge Ney indicated that he would order Allstate to 
make the witness available at a computer terminal where the 
information could be obtained.  After Judge Ney’s ruling and 
on his own initiative, counsel for Allstate offered the 
alternative of stipulating to the accuracy of the amounts paid 
by Allstate to Dr. Ammerman.  Counsel for Allstate also agreed 
that neither Dr. Ammerman nor counsel would attempt to 
differentiate between the types of services for which the 
payments were made.  Judge Ney accepted the stipulation in 
lieu of his order with the understanding that neither Dr. 
Ammerman nor counsel would discuss the allocation of the 
payments.   
 
Rohrbaugh’s counsel had sought to differentiate between 
medical payments and forensic payments from Allstate to Dr. 
Ammerman for the obvious purpose of impeachment at trial.  
Allstate and Farm Bureau had retained Dr. Ammerman for the 
purpose of examination of Rohrbaugh and testimony at trial.  
When Allstate offered a stipulation as a compromise solution 
in response to Rohrbaugh’s attempt to discover precise 
information for use at trial, Judge Ney accepted the 
stipulation as an alternative to his order.  Rule 4:7 of the 
Rules of the Virginia Supreme Court provides for use of 
depositions in court proceedings “against any party who was 
present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who 
 
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had reasonable notice thereof.”  Certainly, defense counsel 
could not be surprised by the possibility that deposition 
testimony could be offered in conformance with the Rules at 
trial.  Similarly, counsel could not be surprised by the 
possibility that pretrial orders could be made during a 
deposition and stipulations could be reached that affected 
parties with notice of the proceedings.  As Judge Ney noted in 
his opinion letter:  
[C]ounsel for the defendant and the 
uninsured motorist carrier were both 
properly noticed for the deposition of the 
Allstate designee.  One chose not to 
attend and another chose to leave the 
deposition before it concluded, but not 
before the dispute which led to the 
conference call had begun.  As a result, 
their complaints about the Court’s ruling 
ordering the use of the computer terminal 
come too late.  They were not present to 
object to the Court, and they were also 
not present to object to the agreement. 
 
Judge Smith did not err in enforcing at trial a stipulation 
reached in a pretrial discovery proceeding where parties had 
notice and opportunity to object but chose not to participate. 
III. Conclusion 
 
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of 
the trial court. 
Affirmed. 
 
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