Title: Marker v. City of Colorado Springs

State: colorado

Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court

Document:

336 P.2d 305 (1959) William MARKER, Agnes Hutchinson, Henry I. Szymanski, and North End Home Owners Association, Inc., a Colorado Corporation, Plaintiffs in Error, v. CITY OF COLORADO SPRINGS, a municipal corporation, and Fred Simpson, Jr., Harry Blunt, Harold Hawks, Carl Decker, Harold Heyse, Robert W. Johnson, Melvin Olson, Eugene Martin, William C. Henderson, as President and Members Respectively of the City Council of City of Colorado Springs, W. C. Service, Richard Vanderhoof, Harold Dyer, James R. Kennedy, Louis J. Kennedy, Herbert Thomson, A. L. Ingerick and Peter J. Labowskie, Defendants in Error. No. 18643. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. February 2, 1959. Rehearing Denied March 23, 1959. *306 Donald E. La Mora, Colorado Springs, for plaintiffs in error. John A. Love, Frederick T. Henry, Haney & Howbert, Colorado Springs, for defendants in error. KNAUSS, Chief Justice. We shall refer to the parties to this writ of error as they appeared in the trial court, where plaintiffs in error were plaintiffs and defendants in error were defendants. Pursuant to Rule 106 R.C.P.Colo. plaintiffs sought review of the action of the defendant City of Colorado Springs, Colorado in granting a use variance permit to defendants in error Service and Vanderhoof to erect a medical office building on certain unimproved lots owned by them with office space for eight doctors. The property involved was zoned R-3, under which the lots were limited by the zoning ordinance to one and two family dwellings and other non-commercial and non-business uses. Pursuant to the ordinances of the City of Colorado Springs the defendants Service and Vanderhoof applied to the Planning Commission of said city for a variance in the use of said property, and after notice and hearing, at which testimony was taken and recorded, the Planning Commission granted said variance and a permit to erect the contemplated structure. The plaintiffs then appealed the action of the Planning Commission, pursuant to the zoning ordinance, to the City Council of Colorado Springs. The Council set the matter for hearing where the record and transcript of the proceedings before the Planning Commission were submitted including the testimony of the witnesses both for and against the application for the variance. After a full hearing the Council sustained the action of the Planning Commission and adopted an appropriate resolution which among other things recited: *307 "(b) That such variance is necessary for the preservation and enjoyment of the property right of the petitioners; and Plaintiffs then commenced the instant action in the District Court asking that the Use Variance Permit be set aside and that the City of Colorado Springs be enjoined from issuing a building permit thereon to applicants. Defendants in error submitted a complete transcript of the proceedings before the Planning Commission and the City Council, together with the findings and conclusions of the Planning Commission and the City Council. Among the findings of the trial is the following: From this judgment plaintiffs bring the cause here on writ of error. Plaintiffs alleged "with the exception of Glockner-Penrose hospital the above described lots are situated among residential properties or unimproved land." They further alleged that the use variance ordinance of Colorado Springs under which the Planning Commission acted violates the Colorado constitution in that it "deprives plaintiffs herein of their right of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness in their property." They further asserted in their petition for relief that said ordinance "deprives plaintiffs of their property without due process of law" and "deprives plaintiffs of equal protection of the laws." In any zoning case the factual situation, the ordinance involved and the law as announced by this court, control the ultimate decision as to whether an inferior tribunal has abused its discretion or acted arbitrarily or capriciously. The question here presented is fully answered in State Civil Service Commission v. Hazlett, 119 Colo. 173, 201 P.2d 616, 619, where it is stated: We find ample evidence in this record to sustain the findings of the bodies vested under the ordinance with authority to a determination of the issues presented. We find nothing arbitrary or capricious in the proceedings had or conclusions reached. The very purpose of such an ordinance is to vest the fact finding body with authority to relieve a property owner of hardship which might ensue in the event the zoning ordinance was strictly enforced. *308 It appears from the record that the property in question has never been improved. It is on a corner, adjacent to a large and favorably known hospital. At the hearing before the City Council, one of the witnesses for applicants testified that he originally had been opposed to the erection of the medical building, but added: A councilman who voted against the variance stated at the hearing before the City Council that as a boy he played ball on these lots and concluded his remarks thus: "I do believe that if the doctors' building were the only thing that were there, perhaps it would not be objectionable, but I am fearful of what might happen to that neighborhood and I know that neighborhood." Under our decisions we cannot interfere with the lawful determination of the properly constituted authority when, as here, the record discloses competent evidence on which it is based, and the action of the inferior tribunal appears to be neither arbitrary nor capricious. The judgment is affirmed. SUTTON, J., not participating.