Title: People v. Williams

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 82807-Agenda 2-September 1998.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
								BOBBY O. WILLIAMS, Appellant.


Opinion filed July 6, 2000.
	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the judgment of the court:
	Following a jury trial in the circuit court of St. Clair County,
the defendant, Bobby O. Williams, was convicted of the first
degree murder of Sharon Bushong. The same jury found defendant
eligible for the death penalty. Following a hearing in aggravation
and mitigation, the jury found that there were no factors sufficient
to preclude imposition of the death penalty and sentenced
defendant to death. Defendant's conviction and sentence have been
stayed pending direct review by this court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI,
§4(b); 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 603, 609(a).
BACKGROUND
	Shortly before 1 a.m. on November 3, 1994, Sharon Bushong
was shot to death during a robbery of the Convenient Food Mart
at 9618 West Main Street in Belleville, Illinois. At the time of her
death, Bushong was working in the convenience store as the sole
clerk. The principal pieces of physical evidence recovered from the
crime scene were a surveillance videotape that had been recorded
by the store's security cameras, and a spent cartridge case that had
been fired from a .380-caliber pistol. Several fingerprints were
collected from the convenience store, but none matched
defendant's. In addition, a .380-caliber bullet was recovered from
Bushong's body during her autopsy.
	The surveillance videotape was played for the jury at trial and
is part of the record on appeal. The videotape shows,
simultaneously, the views from four cameras placed in different
locations in the store. Two of the cameras are positioned behind
the store's counter, providing views of the cash register. The
videotape is recorded in black and white and has no sound. A date
and time display is included on the tape.
	The surveillance videotape shows two African-American males
entering the convenience store at 12:49 a.m.(1) on November 3,
1994. One of the men is wearing shorts and a short-sleeve, dark-colored shirt with piping or thin stripes around the collar,
shoulders, sleeves and bottom. He is wearing only one, ankle-high
sock. He is also wearing some type of light-colored garment,
possibly boxer shorts, over his head. The second man is wearing a
baseball cap, and is covering his face with his hands and shirt.
Neither man's face is visible at any time.
	The individual with the garment over his head can be seen on
the videotape taking Bushong behind the store counter and then
standing to Bushong's right as she opens the cash register drawer.
After Bushong opens the drawer, the man raises his left hand and
shoots Bushong in the head. Bushong immediately falls to the
ground. The man then shifts the gun to his right hand and removes
the money from the cash register drawer with his left hand. During
this time, the second man, who is on the public side of the store
counter, can be seen leaning over and reaching into a display rack
filled with potato chips. After the shooter removes the money from
the cash register, the two men leave the store.
	Richard Vorder Bruegge, a forensic photographic examiner
with the FBI, provided expert testimony regarding the surveillance
videotape. Bruegge explained that, by using various analytical
techniques, it is possible to determine the height of an individual in
a photograph. Bruegge stated that he examined the surveillance
videotape, and photographs made from the videotape, to determine
the height of the shooter seen on the videotape. After describing
his analysis to the jury, Bruegge stated that the results of his
examination were consistent with a person whose height was six
feet, one inch to six feet, two inches. Additional evidence presented
at trial established that defendant's height is six feet, one inch.
Testimony was also introduced which showed that defendant was
left-handed.
	On February 15, 1995, defendant was arrested in Washington
Park, a town located north of Belleville in St. Clair County. Two
other individuals, Fred Jones and Andrew Towns, were arrested at
the same time. At the time of his arrest, defendant was carrying a
.380-caliber pistol in his jacket. James Hall, a forensic firearms
examiner for the Illinois State Police, testified that both the
cartridge case discovered in the convenience store and the bullet
recovered from Bushong's body were fired from the .380-caliber
pistol taken from defendant.
	Rico Edwards, defendant's neighbor in Washington Park,
testified that he had known defendant for approximately 18 years.
Edwards stated that, in the middle of November 1994, he saw a
.380-caliber pistol on the floor of defendant's car. In court,
Edwards was shown the gun that was taken from defendant at the
time of his arrest in February 1995. Edwards stated that it looked
like the one he had seen in defendant's car, but he was not certain
that it was the same one. Edwards also indicated that the people he
associated with regularly exchanged guns.
	Michael Cook testified that he had known defendant for
approximately a year and that he knew defendant through Tony
Turner, defendant's uncle. Cook stated that he had seen defendant
with a .380-caliber pistol on four or five occasions during the
summer of 1994. Cook also stated that the weapon taken from
defendant at the time of his arrest, which was shown to Cook in
court, looked like the one defendant had been carrying in the
summer of 1994. Cook explained that the weapon looked like the
one defendant had in 1994 because it was scraped and scratched
around the front of the barrel, and because it had lost some of its
black coloring at the tip of the barrel. Cook also positively
identified the shirt which the shooter was wearing in the
surveillance videotape as one that defendant had worn while
playing basketball in the summer of 1994. In addition, Cook stated
that he had seen defendant wearing just one sock while playing
basketball.
	On cross-examination, Cook said that he could not remember
when he told police that he recognized the shirt worn by the
shooter in the videotape, though he was certain that he had told
them. Cook also acknowledged that he had not told the police that
he had seen defendant wearing only one sock. Cook further stated
that the people he associated with regularly traded guns.
	Lavarro Jenkins testified that he saw defendant with a .380-
caliber handgun in January 1995. According to Jenkins, defendant
showed him the gun while the two of them were driving in a car in
Belleville. In court, Jenkins identified the gun taken from defendant
at the time of his arrest as the gun which defendant had shown him
in January 1995. Jenkins stated that he knew it was the same gun
because he had offered to buy it from defendant. Jenkins also
testified that, while he and defendant were discussing the gun,
defendant said "there's a hot one on it." Jenkins explained that this
was a slang term meaning that the gun had been used in a murder.
Jenkins further stated that, while driving down "the 90's part" of
West Main Street in Belleville, he and defendant passed a
convenience store. At that point, according to Jenkins, defendant
reached over, pointed to the convenience store and said "that's one
of them."
	On cross-examination, Jenkins admitted that he had been
convicted of theft over $10,000 for stealing a car. He also
acknowledged that there were two felony forgery counts pending
against him, though he stated that the State had not offered him
anything in exchange for his testimony at defendant's trial. Jenkins
also stated that defendant never said that he, himself, had
"committed a hot one" with the .380-caliber pistol. Like the prior
witnesses, Jenkins indicated that it was common for the people he
associated with to exchange guns back and forth.
	Fred Jones, a friend of defendant, testified for the State
pursuant to a plea agreement. Jones explained that, in exchange for
his testimony, the State had agreed to dismiss a murder charge
pending against him in St. Clair County and to recommend a 6- to
15-year sentence for armed robbery.
	Jones testified that he saw defendant sometime after midnight
on November 3 or November 4, 1994. At that time, defendant told
him that he "and a couple more boys went up in Belleville to rob
the convenience store and they shot the lady." Sometime after
defendant told him about the murder, Jones saw that defendant was
carrying a black, .380-caliber pistol. Jones identified the gun taken
from defendant at the time of his arrest as the gun that defendant
had with him in November 1994. Jones explained that he knew it
was the same gun because he had seen defendant with it on several
different occasions. Jones further stated that defendant called the
gun his "Baby." Jones also identified the shirt worn by the shooter
in the surveillance videotape as the one defendant was wearing
when Jones saw him on November 3 or 4. In addition, Jones stated
that, having played football with defendant, he knew that defendant
was left-handed.
	Jones was extensively cross-examined regarding six separate,
conflicting statements which he had given to the police. In the first
statement, given to police in early November 1994, Jones denied
having any knowledge about the robbery of the Belleville
convenience store or the murder of Bushong. The second
statement was given to police on February 15, 1995, shortly after
Jones was arrested, along with defendant, in Washington Park. In
this statement, Jones again denied having any knowledge about the
convenience store robbery or Bushong's murder. In the third
statement, given on February 17, 1995, Jones said that he saw
defendant "sometime after 11:00 p.m." on November 2, 1994,
when defendant and two other individuals, Carvon Jones and
Ricardo Spratt, picked Jones up in defendant's car. Jones said in
this statement that both defendant and Spratt had guns, though
Jones did not identify the types of weapons they had. Jones again
said nothing in the third statement about the convenience store
robbery or Bushong's murder.
	The fourth statement was given to police on March 29, 1995,
after Jones had been charged in the St. Clair County murder that
later formed the basis of Jones' plea agreement with the state. In
this fourth statement, Jones said that defendant picked him up at
about 9 or 9:30 p.m., and that defendant told him that he intended
to go to Belleville to rob someone. Jones also indicated that, while
defendant was driving him to work a couple of days after
November 3, 1994, defendant said that he "shot the lady in
Belleville." In the fifth statement, given to police on May 15, 1995,
Jones stated that defendant picked him up around 11:30. Jones
again stated that defendant told him about Bushong's murder while
driving to work. The sixth statement was given to police on May
31, 1996, after Jones reached the plea agreement with the State. In
this statement, which was similar to his direct testimony at trial,
Jones made clear that Spratt and Carvon Jones were in the car with
defendant when defendant said he robbed the convenience store in
Belleville. Explaining the inconsistencies in the statements that he
had given to the police, Jones stated that he had lied in his initial
statements because he "was scared and didn't want to get [him]self
no further involved in it." Jones also stated that the people he
associated with exchanged guns back and forth.
	Andrew Towns, defendant's cousin, testified that he
remembered seeing defendant with a .380-caliber pistol in the early
part of November 1994. Towns identified the gun taken from
defendant at the time of his arrest as the one which defendant had
in November based on a worn area on the tip of the gun's barrel.
Towns acknowledged that when he was arrested along with
defendant in February 1995, he was carrying his father's .38-caliber
gun. Towns stated that he was a juvenile at the time of his arrest
and that no charges had been filed in relation to the .38- caliber
weapon. Towns also stated that sometime around November 1994,
he overheard defendant and Ricardo Spratt laughing when
defendant said, "Don't forget the chips." Towns asked defendant
what the phrase meant. Defendant told Towns that he "and some
more people robbed a liquor store or convenience store. And while
they were running out the store, [defendant] yelled, 'Don't forget
the chips,' to another person." According to Towns, defendant also
told him that "he shot the bitch" who worked at the convenience
store. Towns also testified that he had seen defendant wearing a
shirt like the one worn by the shooter in the surveillance videotape.
	On cross-examination, Towns admitted that when he was first
questioned by the police on February 15, 1995, he denied having
any knowledge about the convenience store murder. Towns also
acknowledged that he was questioned again by the police on March
8, 1995. On this occasion, Towns told the police that he had stolen
from his father the .38-caliber weapon that he was carrying at the
time of his arrest. The police, in turn, pointed out to Towns that the
theft of the weapon was a crime. Subsequently, Towns told the
police about defendant's statements regarding Bushong's murder.
Towns acknowledged that he had been given immunity with respect
to charges relating to the .38-caliber weapon, but he stated that the
immunity was not given in exchange for his testimony. Towns also
stated that he had seen defendant lend or trade his .380-caliber gun
to defendant's uncle, Tony Turner.
	The final witness for the State was Officer Calvin Dye of the
Illinois State Police. Dye testified to the events surrounding
defendant's arrest on February 15, 1999. On cross-examination,
Dye was shown two photographs of Fred Hoffman, an early suspect
in Bushong's murder. The pictures were taken on November 4,
1994, the day that Hoffman was arrested, and showed Hoffman
wearing only one sock. Dye stated that this was significant because
the shooter in the surveillance videotape was wearing only one
sock.
	Lucille Williams, defendant's grandmother and Andrew
Towns' aunt, testified first for the defense. Williams stated that
Towns did not have a good reputation for truthfulness in the
community. Williams called Towns "a liar" and said that "other
people say he be telling it the way the[y] want to hear it."
	Carvon Jones testified that sometime early in November 1994,
around midnight, he rode in defendant's car with defendant,
Ricardo Spratt and Fred Jones. Carvon stated that, while in the car,
he never heard defendant say anything about robbing a convenience
store or shooting anyone. Carvon also stated that he saw Spratt and
Fred Jones, but not defendant, carrying guns. Carvon indicated that
the gun taken from defendant at the time of his arrest looked like
the one that Spratt had been carrying, though he could not say that
it was, in fact, the same gun.
	On cross-examination, Carvon admitted that he had seen
defendant with a .380-caliber gun in the past. He also
acknowledged that in a statement given to the police in February
1995 he said that, while in the car in November 1994, Fred Jones
had made a reference to "the white lady in Belleville."
	The remainder of the defense's case consisted of brief
testimony from various law enforcement officers. Thomas Gamboe,
a forensic scientist with the Illinois State Police, stated that
defendant's shoes did not match any of the footwear impressions
found at the convenience store. Michael Harper, a Belleville police
detective, testified that he recovered a spent, .380-caliber shell
casing from Dewayne Willis' front porch. Orville Lester, a Belleville
police officer, stated that he recovered a vehicle that police initially
thought might have been used as the getaway vehicle in Bushong's
murder. Finally, David Ellis, a Belleville police officer, testified that
he transported defendant to the Belleville police station after his
arrest in February 1995, and that defendant's street clothes,
including his shoes, were taken from him.
	After closing arguments, the jury was instructed on the
alternative types of first degree murder. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)
(West 1994). The jury then returned a general verdict finding
defendant guilty of the first degree murder of Sharon Bushong.
	No testimony was presented at the eligibility phase of
defendant's capital sentencing hearing. After arguments, the jury
found the defendant eligible for the death penalty based upon two
statutory aggravating factors: (1) murder in the course of another
felony (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1994)); and (2) murder
committed in a cold, calculated manner pursuant to a preconceived
plan, scheme or design to take a human life (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(11)
(West 1994)).
	At the aggravation-mitigation phase of the sentencing hearing,
the State introduced evidence that defendant had murdered a
second individual, Carlos Robertson, shortly after murdering
Bushong. Robertson's body was discovered by police in his
Washington Park home in the afternoon of November 3, 1994.
Robertson had been shot twice in the head with different guns.
Ballistics evidence established that one of the guns used to kill
Robertson was the same .380-caliber weapon that had been used to
murder Bushong and that had been taken from defendant at the
time of his arrest in February 1995.
	Fred Jones testified again for the State at the aggravation-mitigation stage of sentencing. Jones stated that he had been
charged in the murder of Carlos Robertson and that it was this
offense which formed the basis of his plea agreement with the State.
Jones also stated that he had known Robertson and had been
preparing to move in with him before his murder. As he did at the
guilt-innocence phase of trial, Jones explained that sometime after
midnight, on November 3, 1994, defendant, Carvon Jones, and
Ricardo Spratt picked Jones up in defendant's car. Jones stated that
defendant picked him up because he wanted Jones to help "get
[defendant] inside Carlos Robertson's house." According to Jones,
defendant said that Robertson and two others, Ricardo Spratt and
Gerald Simpson, had been with him when he robbed the
convenience store in Belleville and "shot the lady." Defendant also
said that Robertson and Simpson had driven off without him after
the robbery and murder. After listening to defendant, Jones agreed
to go with him to Robertson's house. At the house, Jones asked
Robertson to open the door, while defendant and Spratt hid to the
side. When Robertson opened the door, defendant and Spratt
rushed in. Defendant and Spratt then shot and killed Robertson for
having abandoned defendant at the Belleville convenience store.
	Jones was cross-examined, as he was at the guilt-innocence
phase of trial, regarding contradictory statements he had given to
the police. Jones also admitted that it was only after reaching the
plea agreement with the State that he fully explained the events
surrounding Robertson's murder.
	Howard Morgan, Bushong's father, read a victim impact
statement to the jury. This concluded the evidence presented by the
State in aggravation.
	Carvon Jones testified for the defense in mitigation. As before,
Carvon stated that, when he was in defendant's car with defendant,
Ricardo Spratt, and Fred Jones on November 3, 1994, he saw only
Spratt and Fred Jones carrying guns. Carvon also stated that after
the group drove to Carlos Robertson's house, only Spratt and Fred
Jones got out of the car. According to Carvon, defendant never left
the car.
	Shermane Turner, defendant's mother, also testified in
mitigation. Turner stated that defendant had been an average
student who graduated from high school on time. Defendant
entered the Marines right after high school with Turner's
encouragement because she "didn't want [him] on the streets."
About a year after entering the Marines, defendant was honorably
discharged after he was diagnosed with asthma. According to
Turner, defendant had no prior criminal record. Turner stated that
the murder of Bushong was "out of character" for defendant and
"just not like him."
	In rebuttal, Sergeant Gregory Fernandez, of the Illinois State
Police, stated that Carvon Jones had given an oral statement
indicating that defendant had gotten out of his car at Carlos
Robertson's house. However, when Carvon gave his written
statement to police, he stated that defendant remained in the car.
	Following arguments, the jury returned a verdict finding that
there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the
imposition of the death penalty. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
I. Pretrial and Trial Issues
A. Speedy Trial
	Defendant was arrested in connection with the murder of
Carlos Robertson on February 15, 1995. He was charged with that
offense on February 17, 1995, and indicted on March 17, 1995.
Defendant was tried before a jury for Robertson's murder, but the
jury was unable to reach a verdict, and a mistrial was declared on
July 18, 1996. On January 26, 1996, the St. Clair County grand jury
returned an indictment charging defendant with the first degree
murder of Sharon Bushong. Defendant was in continuous custody
from the time he was arrested in February 1995 until the time he
was charged with Bushong's murder.
	Defendant alleges that his statutory right to a speedy trial was
violated when the State delayed charging him with the murder of
Bushong until January 1996. In support of this argument, defendant
cites to the rule announced in People v. Williams, 94 Ill. App. 3d
241, 248-29 (1981):
			"Where new and additional charges arise from the same
facts as did the original charges and the State had
knowledge of these facts at the commencement of the
prosecution, the time within which trial is to begin on the
new and additional charges is subject to the same statutory
limitation that is applied to the original charges.
Continuances obtained in connection with the trial of the
original charges cannot be attributed to defendants with
respect to the new and additional charges because these
new and additional charges were not before the court when
those continuances were obtained."
	Defendant asserts that Bushong's murder arose from the "same
facts" as the murder of Carlos Robertson because both murders
stemmed from the robbery of the Convenient Food Mart. In
addition, defendant maintains that the State knew, based on
evidence available in February 1995, that the two offenses were
related. According to defendant, continuances which he obtained in
connection with the Robertson trial cannot be attributed to his trial
for Bushong's murder. Therefore, according to defendant, the 120-day, statutory speedy-trial period (see 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West
1996)) started, and expired, in the Bushong case months before
these charges were filed.
	This court has explained that, under the Williams rule, the
speedy-trial period will begin running on the later charge at the
same time it begins running on the earlier charge only if the two
charges are subject to compulsory joinder under section 3-3(b) of
the compulsory joinder provisions of the Criminal Code of 1961
(720 ILCS 5/3-3(b) (West 1994)). People v. Gooden, 189 Ill. 2d 209 (2000). Because the Williams rule applies only when the new
and original charges are subject to compulsory joinder, we must
determine whether, in the case at bar, the charge of murdering
Sharon Bushong was subject to compulsory joinder with the charge
of murdering Carlos Robertson.
	Section 3-3(b) of the Criminal Code of 1961 provides:
			"(b) If the several offenses are known to the proper
prosecuting officer at the time of commencing the
prosecution and are within the jurisdiction of a single
court, they must be prosecuted in a single prosecution, ***
if they are based on the same act." (Emphasis added.) 720
ILCS 5/3-3 (West 1992).	
In this case, it is clear that the murder of Sharon Bushong and the
murder of Carlos Robertson did not arise from the same act. The
two crimes occurred at different times, in different places, involved
different victims, and were driven by different motivations. That the
shootings were related, under the State's theory of the case, does
not alter this result. People v. Mueller, 109 Ill. 2d 378, 385 (1985)
("There is no requirement of joinder where multiple offenses arise
from a series of related acts"). Consequently, because the charge of
murdering Sharon Bushong was not subject to compulsory joinder
with the charge of murdering Carlos Robertson, defendant's
statutory right to a speedy trial was not violated.
B. Gerald Simpson's Statement
	Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion seeking permission to
introduce into evidence a statement given to police by Gerald
Simpson, a cousin and roommate of Carlos Robertson. Shortly after
police discovered Robertson's body on November 3, 1994, they
questioned Simpson about his knowledge of the crime. Simpson
initially denied knowing anything about the murder of Robertson or
Bushong. However, on November 4, 1994, Simpson gave police a
lengthy, written statement in which he admitted to being the second
individual (the nonshooter) in the Convenient Food Mart the night
that Bushong was murdered.
	In his statement, Simpson explained that he, Carlos Robertson,
and a man named "Fred" drove from Washington Park to Belleville
around midnight on November 2, 1994. According to Simpson,
Fred told him that they were going to Belleville to meet some
women. When the group reached Belleville, Fred, who was driving,
pulled into a convenience store. He then told the others that he was
going to rob the store. Simpson asked him whether he was "for
real." Fred started laughing and told Simpson to "come on." Fred
and Simpson got out of the car while Robertson stayed behind.
Fred put something that looked liked boxer shorts over his head,
and told Simpson to "look out for him" as he and Simpson entered
the store. Once they were inside the store, according to Simpson,
"Fred started behind the counter and told the white girl to open up
the cash register. The white girl opened up the cash register, Fred
shot the white girl once, *** in the head. She fell to the floor and
Fred took the money out of [the] cash register. Fred stuffed all of
the money into his pants pocket." While Fred was robbing the store,
Simpson tried to cover his face with his hands because he had seen
a security camera when he entered the store. After robbing the
store, Fred, Simpson and Robertson returned to Washington Park.
Later, Fred murdered Robertson after the two had an argument.
	Although Simpson did not say in his statement to the police
what "Fred's" last name was, the record indicates that he
subsequently identified Fred Hoffman as the individual who shot
Bushong. Fred Hoffman was arrested by police for Bushong's
murder but was not indicted, because, among other reasons, he was
too short to match the height of the shooter in the surveillance
videotape as determined by the FBI.
	On November 7, 1994, Simpson gave another statement to the
police. In this statement, Simpson again admitted to being at the
Convenient Food Mart on the night that Sharon Bushong was
murdered. However, on this occasion, Simpson explained that it
was not "Fred" who shot Bushong, but rather Dewayne Willis.
Willis is identified in the record as another roommate of Carlos
Robertson. Willis was never charged in Bushong's murder because
police believed he had a firm alibi.
	Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion seeking permission to
introduce into evidence the statement in which Simpson identifies
"Fred" as the murderer of Bushong. According to defendant, the
statement was admissible under the statement-against-penal-interest
exception to the hearsay rule. Following argument, the trial court
denied defendant's motion. Defendant now contends that the trial
court erred in excluding Simpson's statement.
	 The general rule is that a third party's out-of-court statement
that he committed a crime is hearsay and is inadmissible, even
though the statement is against the declarant's penal interest.
People v. Tate, 87 Ill. 2d 134, 143 (1981). However, where justice
requires, and where there are sufficient indicia of reliability, such
statements may be admitted under the statements-against-penal-interest exception to the hearsay rule. People v. Bowel, 111 Ill. 2d 58, 66 (1986), citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302,
35 L. Ed. 2d 297, 313, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 1049 (1973). To determine
whether a statement contains sufficient indicia of reliability, we look
foremost to whether the statement is self-incriminating and against
the declarant's interest. People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 29 (1995).
We also look to whether the statement was made spontaneously to
a close acquaintance shortly after the crime occurred; whether the
statement was corroborated by other evidence; and whether there
was adequate opportunity for cross-examination of the declarant.
These latter factors "are indicia, not hard and fast requirements,"
and they need not all be present for a statement to be admitted.
People v. House, 141 Ill. 2d 323, 390 (1990), citing Bowel, 111 Ill. 2d  at 67; Keene, 169 Ill. 2d  at 29. Ultimately, the question to be
considered in deciding the admissibility of the statement is whether
it was "made under circumstances that provide 'considerable
assurance' of its reliability by objective indicia of trustworthiness."
Bowel, 111 Ill. 2d  at 67, quoting Chambers, 410 U.S.  at 300-01, 35 L. Ed. 2d  at 311-12, 93 S. Ct.  at 1048-49. Whether a statement is
admissible under the statement-against-penal-interest exception to
the hearsay rule is within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Bowel, 111 Ill. 2d  at 68.
	The circumstances surrounding a statement may play an
important role in determining whether the statement was actually
against the declarant's penal interest when made. See generally 2 J.
Strong, McCormick on Evidence §319(c), at 345 (4th ed. 1992).
The record in the present case, however, gives us little indication of
the circumstances under which Simpson's statement was made.
Accordingly, our analysis is limited primarily to an examination of
the statement itself.
	In the statement which Simpson gave to police on November
4, 1994, he admitted driving to the Belleville convenience store
with Bushong's murderer. He also admitted that "Fred" told him he
was going to rob the store, and that "Fred" told Simpson to "look
out for him" when they entered the store. Simpson also admitted to
being in the Convenient Food Mart when the robbery and murder
took place and to witnessing both events. Thus, in his November 4
statement, Simpson clearly implicated himself in the armed robbery
of the convenience store and Bushong's murder. Indeed, as
defendant points out, Simpson was charged and tried for Bushong's
murder. And, at that trial, the prosecutor introduced Simpson's
statement into evidence in an attempt to secure a conviction.(2) In
light of the foregoing, we conclude that portions of Simpson's
statement, on their face, were self-incriminating and against the
declarant's penal interest.
	Our conclusion that portions of Simpson's statement were
against his penal interest does not complete our analysis. At trial,
defendant did not seek to admit only those portions of Simpson's
statement in which Simpson admitted to being present at the
Convenient Food Mart. Rather, what defendant sought to have
admitted were Simpson's statements identifying "Fred" as
Bushong's murderer. These statements, however, were not directly
against Simpson's penal interest. Thus, we must determine whether
the fact that Simpson's statements naming "Fred" as Bushong's
murderer are collateral to Simpson's other, self-inculpatory
statements affects their admissibility under the exception for
statements against penal interest.
	Commentators and authorities have taken differing views as to
whether statements that are collateral to self-inculpatory
declarations should be admissible under the statement-against-penal-interest exception to the hearsay rule. Compare, e.g., 5 J.
Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence §1465, at 339 (Chadbourn rev.
ed.1974) ("[s]ince the principle is that the statement [against
interest] is made under circumstances fairly indicating the
declarant's sincerity and accuracy ***, it is obvious that the
situation indicates the correctness of whatever he may say while
under that influence"), and 2 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence
§319(b), at 344 (4th ed. 1992) ("When a statement both
incriminates the declarant and exculpates the accused, complete
rejection of related or contextual statements is not required"), with
Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 129 L. Ed. 2d 476, 114 S. Ct. 2431 (1994) (Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) allows trial
courts to admit, as a hearsay exception, only those statements
which are themselves self-inculpatory). In the present case, we need
not decide which view to adopt because even if we accept that there
may be instances in which collateral statements should be admitted,
this is not such a case.
	Those commentators and authorities which have endorsed the
admission of collateral statements under the statements-against-penal-interest exception to the hearsay rule have recognized that
not all collateral statements should be admitted. See, e.g., 2 J.
Strong, McCormick on Evidence §319(b), at 344 (4th ed.1992) ("a
rather tight integration" between a statement incriminating the
declarant and exculpating the accused may be required for
admissibility of the latter); 5 J. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence
§1465, at 339 (Chadbourn rev. ed.1974) (the limits to the rule that
collateral statements may be admitted "must be largely a matter of
judgment in each case"); Buckley v. Cronkhite, 74 Ill. App. 3d 487,
492 (1979) (collateral statement must be "substantially connected"
with declaration against interest). One of the recognized limitations
imposed upon the admission of collateral statements is that the
collateral statements must be neutral in character, rather than self-serving. See C. McCormick, McCormick on Evidence §256, at 552
(1954) ("[a] certain latitude as to contextual statements, neutral as
to interest, giving meaning to the declaration against interest seems
defensible, but bringing in self-serving statements contextually
seems questionable"). In the instant case, each of Simpson's
pertinent references to "Fred" was self-exculpatory. Paraphrasing,
Simpson stated that "Fred, not I, decided to rob the convenience
store"; that "Fred, not I, took the money"; and that "Fred, not I,
shot the clerk." Thus, because these statements were self-exculpatory, they were properly found inadmissible, despite their
connection to Simpson's other, self-inculpatory statements.
	We note, in addition, that there is absolutely nothing in the
record to corroborate Simpson's statements that "Fred" murdered
Bushong. Fred Hoffman was rejected as a viable suspect because he
was too short. On November 7, Simpson himself stated that
Bushong was murdered not by "Fred" but by a man named
Dewayne Willis. Given these facts, it cannot be said that Simpson's
assertions that "Fred" was the murderer were "made under
circumstances that provide 'considerable assurance' of [their]
reliability by objective indicia of trustworthiness." Bowel, 111 Ill. 2d 
at 67, quoting Chambers, 410 U.S.  at 300-01, 35 L. Ed. 2d  at 311-12, 93 S. Ct.  at 1048-49.
	Defendant notes that Simpson's statement of November 4 was
read, in its entirety, to the jury at Simpson's own trial for
Bushong's murder. He argues that if the statement was admissible
in its entirety in that case, then it should be admissible in its entirety
here. The State, however, was not using Simpson's statement to
establish the identity of the shooter at Simpson's trial. Rather, the
State was attempting to prove Simpson's accountability for the
murder. The reliability of Simpson's identification of "Fred" as the
shooter was simply not at issue. See also People v. Ward, 154 Ill. 2d 272, 312-13 (1992) (whether a statement is admissible under the
statement-against-penal-interest exception is an analytically distinct
question from whether the statement is admissible as a party
admission); M. Graham, Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois
Evidence §802 (7th ed. 1999) (same). Accordingly, in the case at
bar, we find no error in the trial court's decision to exclude
Simpson's statements that "Fred" shot Bushong.
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence
	Defendant argues that the evidence produced at trial was
insufficient to prove him guilty of first degree murder beyond a
reasonable doubt. Defendant maintains that the State proved only
that, at the time of his arrest, defendant possessed the weapon that
shot Bushong. No credible evidence, defendant argues, placed him
in the store at the time of the murder and robbery, and no credible
evidence proved defendant actually murdered Bushong.
	A criminal conviction will be set aside, based upon an
insufficiency of the evidence, only when the evidence that was
presented at trial is so unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory
that there remains a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.
People v. Smith, 141 Ill. 2d 40, 55 (1990). Upon review, the
question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. People v.
Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985).
	Defendant's challenge regarding the sufficiency of the evidence
is directed primarily at the testimony of three State's witnesses:
Lavarro Jenkins, Fred Jones and Andrew Towns. Defendant
contends that the testimony of each of these witnesses was
impeached and that each witness had a motive to provide the police
with evidence implicating defendant in Bushong's murder.
	Defendant asserts, for example, that Jenkins' testimony lacks
credibility because he stole a car in February 1995, and because, at
the time of trial, there were two felony charges pending against him.
With respect to Fred Jones, defendant points out that at the time
Jones testified, he was incarcerated on a charge of first degree
murder. Jones admitted that, in exchange for his testimony in this
case, the State would dismiss the murder charge and Jones would
plead guilty to the lesser offense of armed robbery. Defendant
further notes that Jones' statements to police changed frequently
and that Jones implicated defendant in the robbery and in
Bushong's murder only after Jones was charged with murder and
had retained a lawyer. Lastly, defendant points out that Andrew
Towns also told the police conflicting stories. Towns did not reveal
that defendant had implicated himself in the murder until after the
police had informed Towns that he could be charged with a
weapons violation for having stolen his father's .38-caliber
handgun.
	It is the function of the jury, as the trier of fact, to determine
the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their
testimony. People v. Tye, 141 Ill. 2d 1, 13 (1990). Here, the jury
was given this opportunity, as the biases and inconsistent statements
of Jones, Towns and Jenkins were fully aired. Moreover, we have
carefully reviewed the testimony of each witness and we cannot say
that it is so unreasonable or unsatisfactory as to be unworthy of
belief.
	Having found no reason to disturb the jury's implicit findings
of credibility regarding the State's principal witnesses, we conclude
that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. Jones
and Towns both testified that defendant admitted to Bushong's
murder. Jones testified that, shortly after the murder, defendant told
him that he "and a couple of boys went up in Belleville to rob the
convenience store and they shot the lady." Towns testified that
defendant told him he had robbed the store and that "he shot the
bitch" who worked at the store.
	In addition, as defendant concedes, the weapon found in
defendant's possession at the time of his arrest was the weapon
used to murder Bushong, and several witnesses testified that
defendant was in possession of that gun both before and after
Bushong's murder. The evidence also showed that defendant is the
same height as the murderer and that both defendant and the
murderer are left-handed.
	Viewing the evidence described above in a light most favorable
to the State, we conclude that the State met its burden. The
evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict finding
defendant guilty of first degree murder.
D. Impeachment of Andrew Towns
	At the close of the State's case, defense counsel informed the
trial court that she planned to impeach the testimony of Andrew
Towns through the testimony of defendant's grandmother, Lucille
Williams. According to counsel, Williams would have testified that
she heard Towns state, while he was in her front yard talking to
some friends, that he was receiving $200 "to testify." The trial court
refused to allow Williams' testimony. The court ruled that defense
counsel had failed to lay the proper foundation necessary to
introduce the allegedly impeaching statements.
	Defendant contends that the court's ruling constitutes both a
denial of defendant's due process rights and an abuse of the trial
court's discretion. The State, in response, maintains that
defendant's argument is procedurally barred because defendant
neglected to include the court's ruling in defendant's post-trial
motion.
	We agree with the State. To preserve an error for review, a
defendant must raise a timely objection at trial and identify the
alleged error in a written post-trial motion. People v. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167, 191 (1996). Failure to meet these requirements
constitutes a procedural default of the purported error. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d  at 191. Nevertheless, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
615(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)), this court may review an argument
not properly preserved if we conclude that plain error affecting a
substantial right has occurred. People v. Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d 301, 326-27 (1998). Before invoking the plain error exception, however, "it
is appropriate to determine whether error occurred at all." People
v. Wade, 131 Ill. 2d 370, 376 (1989).
	As the State points out, no error of any kind occurred because
the supposedly impeaching testimony of Lucille Williams did not
exist. At trial, defense counsel conceded that when he spoke to
Williams outside the courtroom prior to the introduction of her
testimony "she indicated that she [did] not know what the topic of
[Towns'] conversation was." While Williams was still certain that
Towns had said something about receiving $200, she was no longer
certain that Towns had said he was receiving $200 "to testify."
	There was no error in the trial court's refusal to admit
Williams' testimony. Consequently, we also find no plain error and
no basis to excuse defendant's procedural default.
II. Sentencing Issues
A. Cold, Calculated and Premeditated Aggravating Factor
	Defendant was found eligible for the death penalty pursuant to
section 9-1(b)(11) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS
5/9-1(b)(11) (West 1994)). Section 9-1(b)(11) provides for death
eligibility where the defendant was 18 years or older at the time of
the murder and where:
			"[T]he murder was committed in a cold, calculated and
premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan,
scheme or design to take a human life by unlawful means,
and the conduct of the defendant created a reasonable
expectation that the death of a human being would result
therefrom." 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(11) (West 1994).
	Defendant challenges the constitutionality of section
9-1(b)(11). Defendant also maintains that the evidence produced
at trial was insufficient to support a finding of death eligibility under
section 9-1(b)(11).
1. Constitutionality of Section 9-1(b)(11)
	In Illinois, the statutory aggravating factors perform the
constitutionally required task of "channeling and limiting" the
sentencer's discretion to impose the death penalty. Maynard v.
Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362, 100 L. Ed. 2d 372, 380, 108 S. Ct. 1853, 1858 (1988). The aggravating factors work to remove the
risk of arbitrary and capricious sentencing by providing an
objective, " 'meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in
which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which
it is not.' " Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859,
883, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2932 (1976), quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346, 392, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 2764 (1972)
(White J., concurring). Under the eighth amendment, a statutory
aggravating factor must "genuinely narrow the class of persons
eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the
imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to
others found guilty of murder." Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862,
877, 77 L. Ed. 2d 235, 249-50, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2742 (1983).
Defendant maintains that section 9-1(b)(11) fails this test.
	Defendant contends that the language of section 9-1(b)(11),
which is focused on the concept of premeditation, does little more
than describe the mens rea of an intentional murder. In support of
this contention, defendant notes that, in People v. Stewart, 105 Ill. 2d 22 (1984), this court found no error in a trial court's definition
of the term "premeditation" as " '[a] prior determination to do an
act, but such determination need not exist for any particular period
before it is carried into effect.' " Stewart, 105 Ill. 2d  at 73.
Defendant asserts that this definition of premeditation, because it
requires no period of deliberation or reflection, is no different from
the statutory definition of the term "intent"set forth in the Criminal
Code: "A person intends, or acts intentionally or with intent, to
accomplish a result or engage in conduct described by the statute
defining the offense, when his conscious objective or purpose is to
accomplish that result or engage in that conduct." 720 ILCS 5/4-4
(West 1996). Thus, according to defendant, the language of section
9-1(b)(11), on its face, effectively permits a finding of death
eligibility in all cases of first degree, intentional murder. Therefore,
in defendant's view, section 9-1(b)(11) fails to genuinely narrow
the class of individuals eligible for the death penalty and is
unconstitutional.
	The definition of premeditation approved of in Stewart was
taken from a Pennsylvania decision, Commonwealth v. Dreher, 274
Pa. 325, 326, 118 A. 215, 216 (1922). Pennsylvania is one of
several states which, early in their history, adopted a statutory
definition of murder that divides murder into first and second
degrees and that defines first degree murder as "willful, deliberate
and premeditated." 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §2502 (1999); see generally
Annotation, Modern Status of the Rules Requiring Malice
"Aforethought," "Deliberation," or "Premeditation," as Elements
of Murder in the First Degree, 18 A.L.R.4th 961 (1982); 2 W.
LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law §7.7(a), at 237-41
(1986). In most states which distinguish degrees of murder as
Pennsylvania does, the term "premeditation" has evolved, through
a process of judicial interpretation, into a legal term of art meaning
nothing more than " 'having made the choice to kill.' " Smith v.
State, 41 Md. App. 277, 321, 398 A.2d 426, 450 (1979).(3)
Defendant is therefore correct, in a technical sense, when he argues
that every intentional murder is premeditated: "When there is the
formation of a specific intent to kill or 'a definite purpose to kill,'
there has been, of necessity, time for the formation of such specific
intent or such 'definite purpose to kill' to wit, 'premeditation.' One
cannot form a purpose without having had time to form that
purpose." Smith, 41 Md. App. at 308, 398 A.2d  at 444.
	However, this court has repeatedly rejected the argument that
section 9-1(b)(11) requires proof of nothing more than the
technical premeditation which accompanies every first degree,
intentional murder. People v. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d 158, 191 (1996),
People v. Macri, 185 Ill. 2d 1, 52-53 (1998); People v. Haynes,
174 Ill. 2d 204, 254-55 (1996); People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48,
89-90 (1996). In so holding, this court has stressed that section
9-1(b)(11) requires proof not only of cold, calculated
premeditation, but also proof that the murder was committed
"pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme or design" (720 ILCS
5/9-1(b)(11) (West 1994)). In Munson, the court explained that
section 9-1(b)(11) performs the constitutionally required task of
narrowing the class of murder defendants to those who justifiably
deserve a more severe sentence, because it "pertains to the intent to
murder pursuant to a particular plan, scheme or design. It is not
simply the intent to commit murder. As such, this factor is not
present in every murder case. Thus, *** [section 9-1(b)(11)] does
place the necessary restraint on the sentencer's discretion to impose
death." Munson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 191.
	Although this court has been consistent in holding that section
9-(b)(11) requires proof of a preconceived plan, scheme or design
to warrant a finding of death eligibility, and consistent in holding
that the "preconceived plan, scheme and design" language is critical
to the constitutionality of the statute, the court has never explicitly
stated what is meant by that phrase. Clearly, as Munson held, to
murder pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme or design means
something more than merely forming the intent to murder.
Otherwise, section 9-1(b)(11) would apply to all first degree,
intentional murders. What then must the State show to establish
that a murder has been committed pursuant to a preconceived plan,
scheme or design?
	When used in their plain and ordinary sense, words such as
"premeditate and design *** import forethought, careful reflection,
deliberately arranged purpose-ideas all involving, in their
structures, the essential element of time." Park. Cr. Rep. 347, 358
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1852) (Roosevelt, J., concurring). In common
usage, a phrase such as "wilful, deliberate and premeditated malice
aforethought" clearly "impl[ies] the mental process involved where
a matter has been pondered over for a substantial period of time"
R. Perkins, A Re-examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 Yale L.J.
537, 538 (1934). The plain language of section 9-1(b)(11), which
posits not merely a cold, calculated and premeditated murder, but
also one committed pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme or
design, strongly indicates that time is an essential element of the
aggravating factor and that proof of a substantial period of
reflection or deliberation is required to render a defendant death
eligible.
	Consistent with this language, prior decisions from this court
have adhered to the principle that a murder which is committed
pursuant to "a preconceived plan, scheme or design" is one which
is thought out well in advance of the crime. For example, in People
v. Macri, 185 Ill. 2d 1 (1998), this court upheld a finding of death
eligibility under section 9-1(b)(11) where the defendant murdered
the victim with a crowbar. Ten months prior to the murder, the
defendant told a friend that he "intended to hit [the victim] over the
head with a crowbar, rape her, steal her car, and escape to New
York City, all of which eventually transpired." Macri, 185 Ill. 2d  at
54.
	Similarly, in People v. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d 204 (1996), this
court upheld a finding of death eligibility under section 9-1(b)(11)
where the defendant "coldly and meticulously planned the murder"
of a plastic surgeon over a period of days. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d  at
255. Evidence showed that the defendant had decided to murder a
plastic surgeon in order to " 'strike out' against the perpetrators of
'fake Aryan cosmetics.' " Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d  at 255. The defendant
had selected a surgeon from the yellow pages of the telephone book
and, "a few days prior" to the crime, had made an appointment
under a false name. The defendant had gone to the surgeon's office
with the purpose of carrying out his plan and then had waited to
commit the murder until he was in the office with the surgeon to
ensure that he was murdering the right man. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d  at
255-56.
	The time of deliberation was critical to this court's decision in
People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48 (1996). In that case, the evidence
established that the defendant threatened to kill his former
girlfriend, Michelle, and her companion, Anthony. The next day, the
defendant saw Michelle and Anthony together and became upset.
Later that day, the defendant took a loaded gun and drove to
Michelle's house. He then hid behind a tree, waited for Michelle to
emerge, and then shot and murdered her. This court upheld the
finding of death eligibility under section 9-1(b)(11), stating:
			"These facts demonstrate that defendant's actions were
not spontaneous. The sentencer could find that defendant
murdered Michelle after much thought and reflection.
Defendant had ample time for reflection the previous day
after he threatened Michelle and Anthony and attacked
them with a knife. Defendant had more time for reflection
after he again saw Michelle and Anthony together at the
mall the next afternoon. Defendant's actions in driving
home and then proceeding to Michelle's house later that
evening with a loaded gun show that defendant
contemplated this murder well in advance. We find that
this evidence supports the trial court's determination that
defendant murdered Michelle in a cold, calculated and
premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan,
scheme or design ***." (Emphasis added.) Williams, 173 Ill. 2d  at 91.
	In People v. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d 132, 166 (1996), the court
upheld a finding of death eligibility under section 9-1(b)(11) where
the defendant, a gang member, formed "a plan to go to a particular
location for the purpose of killing members of a rival gang." Almost
three hours after first devising the plan, and after steps were taken
in furtherance of the plan, including obtaining a rental car, the
murder was carried out. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d  at 166-67.
	As these decisions illustrate, this court has required a
substantial period of reflection or deliberation to establish death
eligibility under section 9-1(b)(11). This interpretation of the
statute is supported by the legislative history of section 9-1(b)(11).
The cold, calculated and premeditated aggravating factor was not
part of the original Illinois death penalty statute enacted in 1977.
See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b). The factor was
originally adopted by the General Assembly in 1987 (see 85th Ill.
Gen. Assem., House Bill 1567, 1987 Sess.). However, that action
was vetoed by Governor James Thompson, who concluded that the
cold, calculated and premeditated aggravating factor was
unconstitutionally vague. See 85th Ill. Gen. Assem., House
Proceedings, October 22, 1987, at 132-33 (statements of
Representative Countryman). The General Assembly successfully
enacted the aggravating factor in 1989. Pub. Act 86-834, eff.
September 7, 1989 (adding 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(11)).
	Throughout the legislative debates on the cold, calculated and
premeditated aggravating factor, concerns were raised about its
constitutionality. Much like defendant in the case at bar, those
legislators who spoke in opposition to the aggravating factor
maintained that the language of the factor was vague and undefined,
and that it could potentially apply to every defendant convicted of
first degree murder. See 86th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings,
June 16, 1989, at 69-71 (statements of Representative
Countryman); 85th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 29,
1987, at 57-59 (statements of Representative Johnson). In
response, the supporters of the aggravating factor defended its
constitutionality by arguing that, because of the "preconceived plan,
scheme or design" language, it would apply only to murders in
which "there is a substantial qualitative difference" from other
murders. 85th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 29, 1987
at 59 (statements of Representative McCracken). Representative
Petka explained:
		"This provision is intended to apply to those situations in
which a defendant basically takes the life of another
person after deliberating upon it for extended periods of
time. It is not widely known, but many of the crimes in
which the death penalty is now eligible, basically are crimes
which are committed as an after-thought on a murder [sic]
that is committed in after-thought to a forceable felony.
For example, back in the County of Will, in a case that I
personally tried myself, a defendant jumped on a drunk
who was staggering out of a bar at two o'clock in the
morning and beat him up and knocked him unconscious
and as a result, he died. Because there was a robbery
connected with this, he was eligible for the death penalty
and received it [See People v. Owens, 102 Ill. 2d 88
(1984)]. However, in another instance in which a defendant
found out that his wife was cheating on him, he laid in
ambush for approximately one week waiting for the ideal
time, shot the victim a couple of times and then doused him
entirely with gasoline and after he was doused in gasoline,
the defendant [sic]... the victim expired. That type of case
was not eligible for the death penalty and it seems that's an
anomaly in the law that needs to be corrected. This is
exactly what this Section is intended to remedy and I move
for concurrence." (Emphasis added.) 85th Ill. Gen. Assem.,
House Proceedings, June 29, 1987, at 55-56 (statements of
Representative Petka).
	Senator Barkhausen also explained:
		"As I mentioned in my opening remarks, Florida has, as
part of its death penalty, the aggravating factor that a
murder was committed in a cold, calculated and
premeditated manner, and that has been upheld. But in
addition, what we would be adding here, not only requires
that factor, but in addition, the qualifying language
pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme or design to take
a human life. So what we are talking about here is not only
cold, calculated and premeditated, but a-a preconceived
plan whereby an individual say, decides to commit a
murder by torture, and thinks it out well in advance."
(Emphasis added.) See 86th Ill. Gen. Assem., Sen.
Proceedings, June 26, 1989, at 62 (statements of Senator
Barkhausen).
See also 85th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 29, 1987,
at 59 (statements of Representative McCracken) (the aggravating
factor requires the "penultimate intentional act" of forming a plan,
scheme or design).
	As Senator Barkhausen's remarks indicate, the Illinois
legislators intended to distinguish the language of the cold,
calculated and premeditated aggravating factor from the language
of a similar factor enacted by the State of Florida. The Florida
aggravating factor, which was frequently mentioned by the Illinois
legislators, allowed a finding of death eligibility if the murder was
committed in a "cold, calculated and premeditated manner without
any pretense of moral or legal justification" (Fla. Stat.
§921.141(5)(i) (1981)). As early as 1984, the Florida Supreme
Court had clarified the Florida aggravating factor, holding that the
statute incorporated a "heightened premeditation" standard.
Preston v. State, 444 So. 2d 939, 946-47 (Fla. 1984). As the
Florida Supreme Court explained, "[t]he level of premeditation
needed to convict in the guilt phase of a first-degree murder trial
does not necessarily rise to the level of premeditation required in
section 921.141(5)(i). This aggravating circumstance has been
found when the facts show a particularly lengthy, methodic, or
involved series of atrocious events or a substantial period of
reflection and thought by the perpetrator." Preston, 444 So. 2d  at
946. The legislators in the General Assembly who spoke in support
of Illinois' cold, calculated and premeditated aggravating factor
were consistent in pointing out that, by including the phrase
"preconceived plan, scheme or design," they were intending to
make the language of Illinois' factor clearer than Florida's. Indeed,
by using the "preconceived plan, scheme or design" language, the
Illinois legislators were essentially adopting, by statute, Florida's
judicially created, heightened premeditation standard. See Macri,
185 Ill. 2d  at 56-57 (holding it unnecessary to follow Florida's
heightened premeditation standard because of the "preconceived
plan, scheme or design" language contained in section 9-1(b)(11)).
	The General Assembly carefully sought to eliminate the
possibility of arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death
penalty under section 9-1(b)(11) by qualifying the term
"premeditated"-which could potentially apply to all first degree,
intentional murders-with the "preconceived plan, scheme or design"
language. The legislature's unequivocal intent was to limit the
application of section 9-1(b)(11) to those defendants who commit
a murder after an extended period of deliberation. In the
legislature's considered opinion, a defendant who contemplates a
murder for a substantial period of time, yet still commits it, is set
apart from other murder defendants in a meaningful way and is a
defendant "with a malignant heart who must be permanently
eliminated from society." People v. Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d 564, 590
(1980).
	Thus, to establish that a murder defendant is death eligible
under section 9-1(b)(11), the State must prove more than that the
murder was technically premeditated. Section 9-1(b)(11) requires
that the murder be "cold," i.e., not motivated by mercy or the
emotion of the moment, and that it be "calculated and premeditated,
pursuant to a preconceived, plan, scheme or design," i.e.,
deliberated or reflected upon for an extended period of time. When
section 9-1(b)(11) is read and applied in this plain and ordinary
sense, as our prior decisions have done, the factor properly narrows
the class of death eligible defendants and provides a " 'meaningful
basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty]
is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.' " Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859, 883, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2932 (1976), quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
313, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346, 392, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 2764 (1972) (White,
J., concurring). Accordingly, defendant's argument that section
9-1(b)(11) is unconstitutional must fail.
2. Sufficiency of the Evidence
	Defendant argues that the evidence produced at trial was
insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt (720 ILCS
5/9-1(f) (West 1994)), that he was eligible for the death penalty
under section 9-1(b)(11). The State, in turn, contends that this
issue has not been properly preserved because it was not set forth
with specificity in defendant's post-trial motion. As the State points
out, the pertinent portion of defendant's post-trial motion states
only that the trial court and jury "erred in sentencing the defendant
to death." However, we believe that it is appropriate to reach the
merits of this issue, regardless of the specificity of defendant's post-trial motion, because defendant's argument relates to the sufficiency
of the evidence, one of the three types of error that need not be
raised in a post-trial motion. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d  at 10.
	The State contends that two facts support the finding of death
eligibility under section 9-1(b)(11). First, the time display on the
surveillance videotape shows that just under one minute elapsed
from the time the two assailants entered the store until the time they
left. According to the State, the fact that the murder occurred
quickly indicates that it was planned in advance. Second, Bushong
did not physically resist defendant during the robbery. This fact is
significant, in the State's view, because unless defendant had
intended to kill Bushong "all along, [there was no point in]
deliberately shooting her after she had complied with his demands
and stood to the side unthreateningly." Thus, according to the
State, the speed of the murder, and Bushong's cooperation in
opening the cash register, are sufficient to support the jury's finding
that the murder was committed "in a cold, calculated and
premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme or
design." We disagree.
	There is no evidence that defendant deliberated over the
murder of Bushong for an extended period of time, as is required
under section 9-1(b)(11). Although two witnesses, Fred Jones and
Andrew Towns, both testified that, after the fact, defendant
admitted murdering Bushong, neither witness' testimony established
or suggested that defendant considered killing Bushong "well in
advance" (Williams, 173 Ill. 2d at 91) of the crime. Moreover, the
circumstantial evidence upon which the State relies, i.e., the fact
that the murder occurred quickly once the assailants entered the
store, and that Bushong did not physically resist defendant, does
not show that defendant engaged in a substantial period of
reflection. At most, the evidence to which the State points suggests
that defendant had formed an intent to murder Bushong at the time
he entered the store or, in other words, approximately one minute
before the murder occurred. This is not a case where the manner in
which the murder was committed was so particular or exacting that,
by its very nature, the murder must have been deliberated upon for
an extended period of time. Cf. People v. Lenius, 293 Ill. App. 3d
519 (1997) (defendant found death eligible under section
9-1(b)(11) after murdering the victim with a complex, homemade
bomb). To suggest that a plan to kill Bushong had been formed
some time well in advance of defendant's arrival at the store is
merely to speculate.
	The case at bar is similar to Thompson v. State, 456 So. 2d 444
(Fla.1984). In Thompson, the defendant was convicted of the
murder of a gas station attendant. The evidence at trial established
that the defendant had "demanded money from the victim,
whereupon the victim stated that he had no money, laughed, and
raised a chair in front of himself. At that point, [the defendant] fired
[a] shotgun, killing the victim, and [the defendant and a companion]
fled the scene without consummating the robbery." Thompson, 456 So. 2d  at 445. At trial, three witnesses testified that they discussed
robbing the gas station with the defendant hours before the murder
took place.
	The trial court concluded that the defendant's decision to
murder the unarmed gas station attendant instead of leaving the
scene after being told there was no money rendered the defendant
death eligible under Florida's cold, calculating and premeditated
aggravating factor. The Florida Supreme Court disagreed, stating:
		"No evidence was produced to set the murder apart from
the usual hold-up murder in which the assailant becomes
frightened or for reasons unknown shoots the victim either
before or during an attempt to make good his escape.
None of the numerous witnesses testified or even
suggested that the discussions they held with the appellant
concerning the robbery contemplated the murder of the
station attendant. *** For the purpose of sentencing, the
evidence does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
heightened degree of premeditation, calculation, or
planning which we have consistently held is required to in
order to find this aggravating circumstance." (Emphasis
added.) Thompson, 456 So. 2d  at 446-47.
See also People v. Andrews, 132 Ill. 2d 451, 465-66 (1989) (error
to impose an extended-term sentence for murder where, during an
armed robbery, the victim was defenseless and did not resist, but
the defendant nevertheless shot the victim in the head).
	The murder of Sharon Bushong was unquestionably senseless
and horrific. However, the record is devoid of the kind of
deliberation the legislature intended, and that this court has
previously required, to uphold a finding of death eligibility under
section 9-1(b)(11). On the record before us we must conclude that
no reasonable trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the murder was committed "in a cold, calculated and
premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme or
design." Accordingly, we vacate the jury's finding of death
eligibility under section 9-1(b)(11).
B. Felony Murder Aggravating Factor
	Defendant challenges the jury's death penalty eligibility verdict
based upon the commission of a felony murder. Defendant contends
that the verdict returned by the jury was legally insufficient because
it omitted the mental state necessary to support a finding of death
eligibility.
	The felony-murder aggravating factor is set forth in section
9-1(b)(6) of the Criminal Code of 1961. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6)
(West 1994). That section provides for death eligibility where, inter
alia, the victim was killed in the course of another felony, and
where the defendant "acted with the intent to kill the murdered
individual or with the knowledge that his acts created a strong
probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered individual
or another." 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6)(b) (West 1994).
	In the instant case, the verdict form returned by the jury
omitted the required mental state. The verdict form reads: "We the
jury unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
Bobby Williams is eligible for a death sentence under the law. We
unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that: the defendant
was 18 years old or older at the time of the murder for which he
was convicted in this case; and the following statutory aggravating
factor exists: the murder was committed during the course of an
armed robbery." Defendant claims that because the requisite mental
state was omitted, the jury's verdict is legally insufficient.
Therefore, according to defendant, he was not found eligible for the
death penalty under section 9-1(b)(6) and his death sentence must
be vacated.
	Whether the felony-murder eligibility verdict returned by the
jury in the case at bar is legally insufficient is governed by this
court's decision in People v. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d 525 (1995). In
Mack, this court held that a defendant was entitled to a new
sentencing hearing because the felony-murder eligibility verdict
omitted the mental state needed to support a finding of death
eligibility. The verdict form in that case provided: " 'We, the jury,
unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the following
aggravating factor exists in relation to this Murder: Larry Mack
killed Joseph Kolar in the course of an Armed Robbery.' " Mack,
167 Ill. 2d  at 529-30. In analyzing the sufficiency of this verdict,
this court explained:
			"It is well established that a general verdict of 'guilty in
manner and form as charged in the indictment' or simply
'guilty' is sufficient to sustain a conviction [citation], as is
a verdict identifying the offense by name [citation].
However, where the verdict purports to set out the
elements of the offense as specific findings, it must do so
completely or be held insufficient. [Citation.}
			 *** [T]he verdict [in this case] attempted to set forth a
statutory aggravating factor, but failed to do so completely
and omitted an essential element." Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at
538.
Because the eligibility verdict omitted an essential element, this
court concluded that it was legally insufficient-it did not constitute
an "actual verdict"-and the defendant's death sentence could not be
sustained. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 539. See also People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 223-25 (1999) (felony-murder eligibility verdict legally
insufficient because it omitted the required mens rea); People v.
Macri,185 Ill. 2d 1, 58 (1998) (same); People v. Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d 30, 68 (1998) (same).
	In the instant case, the State does not dispute the fact that
defendant's felony-murder eligibility verdict is legally insufficient.
The State argues, instead, that defendant is procedurally barred
from challenging the sufficiency of the verdict because the issue was
not properly preserved at trial. We disagree.
	The court in Mack stressed that the issue there, like the issue
in this case, involved the sufficiency of the jury's findings rather
than an error in how the jury was instructed. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at
536; cf. People v. Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d 130, 149 (1998). This
distinction was significant because, as the Mack opinion noted, an
insufficient verdict cannot be deemed harmless error based upon the
strength of the evidence. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 539, citing Sullivan
v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 124 L. Ed. 2d 182, 113 S. Ct. 2078
(1993).
	In Sullivan, the United States Supreme Court held that
harmless error analysis could not be used to cure a legally deficient
verdict. In so holding, the Court explained:
			"Once the proper role of an appellate court engaged in
the Chapman [harmless error] inquiry is understood, the
illogic of harmless-error review in the present case
becomes evident. Since, for the reasons described above,
there has been no jury verdict within the meaning of the
Sixth Amendment, the entire premise of Chapman review
is simply absent. There being no jury verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt, the question whether the same
verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt would have
been rendered absent the constitutional error is utterly
meaningless. There is no object, so to speak, upon which
harmless-error scrutiny can operate. The most an appellate
court can conclude is that a jury would surely have found
petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt-not that the
jury's actual finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
would surely not have been different absent the
constitutional error. That is not enough." (Emphasis in
original.) Sullivan, 508 U.S.  at 280, 124 L. Ed. 2d at189-90, 113 S. Ct.  at 2082.
	In the case at bar, the jury returned only a general verdict at the
guilt phase of trial, and the defective death-eligibility verdict form
resulted in no finding of the mental state necessary to sustain a
verdict of death eligibility under section 9-1(b)(6). Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 538-39. Because the jury failed to return an actual verdict of
death eligibility, there is "no object *** upon which harmless-error
scrutiny can operate." (Emphasis omitted.) Sullivan, 508 U.S.  at
280, 124 L. Ed. 2d  at 189-90, 113 S. Ct.  at 2082. Accordingly,
harmless error analysis may not be used to cure the defective death-eligibility verdict. Cf. People v. Childress, 158 Ill. 2d 275 (1994)
(omission of mental state from felony-murder eligibility verdict not
reversible error where same jury returned finding at guilt phase that
defendant was guilty of knowing or intentional murder).
	Mack also raised, though it did not decide, the issue of whether
this court could, under Illinois law, cure a jury's invalid death-eligibility verdict by making an independent finding as to the
existence of a statutory aggravating factor. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at
534-35, citing Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 108 L. Ed. 2d 725, 110 S. Ct. 1441 (1990). This court has recently answered this
question in the negative:
			"[T]he Illinois capital sentencing statute does not permit
a court of review to usurp the jury's role as sentencer
without damaging defendant's due process rights.
[Citations.] The statute plainly states that, if a defendant
elects to have a jury perform the sentencing function, the
jury and the jury alone will determine defendant's eligibility
for death and whether any mitigating factor or factors
should preclude capital punishment. [Citation.] By its
terms, the Illinois capital sentencing statute does not permit
this court to assume these responsibilities. Defendant has
a liberty interest in having a jury 'make particular findings
relative to sentencing.' [Citation.]" People v. Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d 301, 344 (1998).
See also People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 445-46 (1999) (same).
Thus, in the case at bar, this court may not independently make a
finding that defendant is death eligible under section 9-1(b)(6)
without violating the defendant's constitutionally protected liberty
interest in having the jury determine death eligibility. See Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 539.
	We think it clear that sentencing a defendant to death when
there has been no finding of death eligibility is such a fundamental
defect that it amounts to plain error. This is particularly true, given
that the deficiency in the eligibility finding is not amenable to
resentencing or harmless error analysis by this court. We note,
moreover, that Mack implicitly holds that the omission of the
requisite mental state from the eligibility verdict under the present
circumstances is plain error. Mack held that the insufficiency of the
eligibility verdict could be raised for the first time in a post-conviction petition, under a claim of ineffective assistance of direct
appellate counsel. Mack further held that appellate counsel in that
case was constitutionally ineffective for having failed to raise the
verdict issue on direct review. It would be illogical to hold that
appellate counsel in the case at bar may not raise the very claim
which, in Mack, this court held appellate counsel should have raised
on direct appeal. Accordingly, notwithstanding defendant's
procedural default, we believe that we are compelled to recognize
the error in the felony-murder eligibility verdict.
C. Disposition of This Appeal
	Before a defendant may be sentenced to death in Illinois, the
existence of one valid, statutory aggravating factor must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b), (f) (West
1994); People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 445 (1999). That has not
occurred in this case. A majority of this court has determined that
the jury's finding of death eligibility pursuant to the cold, calculated
and premeditated aggravating factor (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(11) (West
1994)) cannot be affirmed, either because the evidence is
insufficient to sustain the finding of death eligibility under that
factor (slip op. at 31 (opinion of McMorrow, J., joined by Miller
and Freeman, JJ.)), or because the factor itself is unconstitutional
(slip op. at 49 (Heiple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)), or because the Illinois death penalty statute is
unconstitutional (slip op. at 47 (Harrison, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)). A majority of this court has also concluded
that defendant is not death eligible under the felony-murder
aggravating factor (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1994)) either
because the legally insufficient verdict form returned on that factor
amounts to plain error (slip op. at 35 (opinion of McMorrow, J.,
joined by Freeman and Rathje, JJ.)) or because the Illinois death
penalty statute is unconstitutional (slip op. at 47 (Harrison, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Accordingly, because
this court is unable to affirm either of the factors upon which
defendant was found death eligible, defendant's death sentence
must be vacated and the cause remanded for a new sentencing
hearing.
	At the remand sentencing hearing, the State may not pursue
death eligibility under the cold, calculated and premeditated
aggravating factor (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(11) (West 1994)) because,
again, a majority of this court has held either that the evidence is
insufficient to sustain the jury's finding of death eligibility or that
the factor is unconstitutional. The former determination bars the
State from pursuing death eligibility under principles of double
jeopardy. See West, 187 Ill. 2d  at 447 ("once either the trial court
or court of review has determined that the evidence was insufficient
to prove the existence of a statutory aggravating factor, the State
is precluded by double jeopardy principles from seeking the death
penalty again"). However, the State is not barred by double
jeopardy principles from pursuing death eligibility under the felony-murder aggravating factor (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1994)).
See People v. Mack, 182 Ill. 2d 377 (1998) (double jeopardy not a
bar to second capital sentencing hearing where reversal of death
sentence is based upon flawed verdict form).
D. Other Errors at Sentencing
	Defendant alleges other errors relating to the admission of
evidence at his sentencing hearing. In light of our disposition of this
appeal, we need not address these contentions at this time.
E. Constitutionality of Death Penalty Statute
	Defendant challenges the constitutionality of Illinois' death
penalty on three grounds. Defendant asserts that the statute is
unconstitutional because it is inevitable that an innocent person will
be executed; that the statute is unconstitutional because it places a
burden of proof on the defendant which precludes meaningful
consideration of mitigation; and that the statute is unconstitutional
because it fails to sufficiently minimize the risk that death sentences
will be arbitrarily and capriciously imposed. Each of these
contentions has been rejected by this court, and we decline to revisit
our holdings on these issues. See People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179,
211-20 (1998); People v. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d 158, 203-05 (1996);
People v. Taylor, 166 Ill. 2d 414, 440 (1995).
CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction is affirmed.
Defendant's death sentence is vacated and the cause is remanded to
the circuit court of St. Clair County for a new sentencing hearing
to be conducted in accordance with the dictates of this opinion.
Conviction affirmed;
death sentence vacated;
cause remanded.
	JUSTICE MILLER, specially concurring:
	I agree with the majority that the defendant's conviction for
first degree murder must be affirmed. I also agree that the defendant
was not properly found eligible for the death penalty under the
"cold, calculated and premeditated" aggravating circumstance
found in section 9-1(b)(11) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720
ILCS 5/9-1(b)(11) (West 1994)).
	Unlike the majority, however, I do not believe that the second
eligibility finding made by the sentencing jury, that involving section
9-1(b)(6) (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1994)), the commission of
murder in the course of another felony, was invalid under People v.
Mack, 167 Ill. 2d 525 (1995). Like Justices Bilandic and Heiple, I
believe that the jury's determination concerning section 9-1(b)(6)
may stand, even though the verdict form used in this case omitted
any reference to the mental state necessary to sustain a finding
under that provision, which was the defect found in Mack.
	In the present case, the same jury had previously found the
defendant guilty of first degree murder. At the guilt phase of the
proceedings, the jury was instructed on all three forms of murder:
intentional murder, knowing murder, and felony murder. After
deliberating, the jury returned a general verdict of guilty on the
charge of first degree murder. Addressing similar issues in the
capital sentencing context, our cases have consistently held that the
return by a jury of a general verdict of guilty of murder, after being
instructed on the multiple forms of the offense, gives rise to the
presumption that the jury found the defendant guilty of intentional
murder. Under that principle, a jury's implicit finding of intent or
knowledge at the guilt stage of the proceedings may satisfy the
subsequent requirement of a finding of intent or knowledge for
purposes of establishing a defendant's eligibility for the death
penalty, whether under section 9-1(b)(6), murder in the course of
another felony, as in this case, or under section 9-1(b)(3), multiple
murders (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3), (b)(6) (West 1998)). See People
v. Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d 130, 149-52 (1998) (jury trial, jury
sentencing; section 9-1(b)(6)); People v. Smith, 176 Ill. 2d 217,
228-30 (1997) (jury trial, bench sentencing; section 9-1(b)(6));
People v. Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d 133, 149-51 (1996) (jury trial, bench
sentencing; section 9-1(b)(6)); People v. Johnson, 149 Ill. 2d 118,
156-57 (1992) (jury trial, bench sentencing; section 9-1(b)(6));
People v. Thompkins, 121 Ill. 2d 401, 455-56 (1988) (jury trial,
bench sentencing; section 9-1(b)(3)). Thus, while I continue to
believe that Mack was wrongly decided, I would find it
distinguishable here. Unlike the present case, Mack involved a
bench trial and a jury sentencing hearing, and the eligibility stage
marked the first opportunity for the jury to make any findings of
intent.
	Applying the preceding rules to the present case, we may
conclude that the jury found the defendant guilty of intentional
murder, and we may use the determination of intent implicit in that
verdict to supply the finding needed to establish the defendant's
eligibility for the death penalty under section 9-1(b)(6). The
mittimus entered by the trial judge properly cites section 9-1(a)(1)
of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 1994)),
intentional murder, as the statutory basis for the defendant's
conviction. We should do likewise and recognize the finding of
intent implicit in the jury's verdict. That much should be sufficient
to satisfy the requirements of Mack, and, like Justices Bilandic and
Heiple, I would therefore uphold the jury's determination of
eligibility under the murder-in-course-of-felony aggravating
circumstance.
	Because a majority of this court has not affirmed either of the
two statutory aggravating circumstances on which the defendant's
eligibility for the death penalty was premised, I agree that the
defendant's death sentence must be vacated and that the cause must
be remanded for a new sentencing hearing.
	JUSTICE BILANDIC, also specially concurring:
	I join in part I of the opinion, which correctly affirms
defendant's convictions. I also join in part II(C), which recognizes
that defendant's death sentence must be vacated because a majority
of this court has not affirmed either one of the two eligibility factors
upon which it was based. I also join in parts II(D) and II(E). I,
however, do not join in parts II(A) and II(B) of the opinion, for the
reasons explained below.
Cold, Calculated and Premeditated Aggravating Factor
	The jury found defendant eligible for the death penalty under
section 9-1(b)(11) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS
5/9-1(b)(11) (West 1994)). According to part II(A) of the opinion,
the evidence on this factor was insufficient to support the jury's
finding. I disagree. I would affirm the jury's finding of death
eligibility on this factor for the reasons stated in the separate
opinion of Justice Rathje.
Felony Murder Aggravating Factor
	The jury also found defendant eligible for the death penalty
under section 9-1(b)(6) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS
5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1994)). According to part II(B) of the opinion,
this finding must be vacated pursuant to People v. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d 525 (1995). I disagree. I would affirm the jury's finding of death
eligibility on this factor. Mack is distinguishable from this case and,
thus, it provides no basis for vacating defendant's death sentence.
	The defendant in Mack was found guilty of murder and armed
robbery at a bench trial. A jury was empaneled for the death penalty
hearing. The jury was properly instructed to determine whether the
defendant was eligible for the death penalty solely on the basis of
the statutory aggravating factor of murder in the course of another
felony (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6)). The jury
returned a verdict finding the defendant eligible for the death
penalty. The eligibility verdict form read: " 'We, the jury,
unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the following
aggravating factor exists in relation to this Murder: Larry Mack
killed Joseph Kolar in the course of an Armed Robbery.' " Mack,
167 Ill. 2d  at 529-30. The defendant alleged in his post-conviction
petition that appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising on
direct appeal that the death-eligibility verdict was legally
insufficient. The defendant argued that the jury failed to find that
the statutory aggravating factor was proven given that the eligibility
verdict form omitted the culpable mental state required to establish
murder in the course of a felony. The trial court found appellate
counsel ineffective and vacated the defendant's death sentence.
	A majority of this court affirmed and held that appellate
counsel was ineffective for failure to seek reversal of the
defendant's death sentence on the basis of the defective eligibility
verdict. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 533-38. In so holding, we found
appellate counsel's performance to be deficient for failing to
recognize the fundamental importance of a legally sufficient
eligibility verdict, which must include a finding on all essential
elements of the statutory aggravating factor at issue. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 533. In support, we pointed out that a culpable mental state
of intent to kill or knowledge of a strong probability of death or
great bodily harm is an essential element of the particular statutory
aggravating factor upon which the defendant's eligibility for the
death penalty was based, namely, murder in the course of a felony.
Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 533. Next, we found that, had appellate
counsel raised the issue of the defective eligibility verdict, there is
a reasonable probability that the defendant's death sentence would
have been reversed. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 533-38. We based this
finding on a determination that the meaning of the jury's eligibility
verdict could not be determined clearly and without speculation
from the record, which included a discrepancy between the jury
instructions and the verdict form at the eligibility phase. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 535-37. This court therefore concluded that appellate
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on direct appeal the issue
that the death eligibility verdict was legally insufficient because the
jury had not found the mental state necessary for finding the
defendant eligible for the death penalty. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 538.
	Here, at first glance, the circumstances surrounding
defendant's death-eligibility verdict appear to mirror those found
problematic in Mack. As in Mack, the State here relied on the
section 9-1(b)(6) statutory aggravating factor of murder in the
course of a felony to establish defendant's eligibility for the death
penalty. To be eligible for the death penalty under section
9-1(b)(6), a defendant must have "acted with the intent to kill the
murdered individual or with the knowledge that his acts created a
strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered
individual or another." 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1994).
Likewise, the jury in this case was also properly instructed as to the
grounds for finding defendant eligible for the death penalty under
section 9-1(b)(6), including the aforementioned mental states. The
verdict returned by the jury as to defendant's eligibility for the death
penalty stated:
			"We, the jury, unanimously find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant, Bobby Williams, is eligible for a
death sentence under the law. We unanimously find beyond
a reasonable doubt that:
			the defendant was 18 years old or older at the time of the
murder for which he was convicted in this case; and
			the following statutory aggravating factor exists: the
murder was committed during the course of an armed
robbery."
	Although this death-eligibility verdict form is similar to the
death-eligibility verdict form found deficient in Mack, there are
significant differences in the circumstances surrounding the
respective jury verdict forms. As noted, in Mack, the defendant was
found guilty at a bench trial but was found eligible for the death
penalty by a jury. Consequently, the sentencing jury in Mack had
not made a determination at the guilt phase of the trial regarding the
defendant's mental state while committing the murder. Thus, the
jury's decision as to whether the State proved the defendant's
mental state for purposes of finding the defendant eligible for the
death penalty under the murder in the course of a felony
aggravating factor could not be ascertained from the record. See
Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 537 (explaining that all parts of the record will
be searched and interpreted together in determining the meaning of
a verdict).
	In the case at bar, however, the same jury that found defendant
eligible for the death penalty had previously found defendant guilty
of the murder of Sharon Bushong. The record reveals that, at the
guilt phase of defendant's trial, the jury was presented with
evidence that defendant was caught on videotape deliberately
shooting the compliant store clerk in the head after she opened the
cash register drawer for him. The jury was also instructed properly
on intentional, knowing and felony murder, and returned a general
verdict finding defendant guilty of the offense of first degree
murder. Under these circumstances, we have held that such a
general verdict raises the presumption that the jury found that
defendant committed the most serious crime alleged, here that being
intentional murder. For example, in People v. Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d 130, 151-52 (1998), we held that there was no plain error where
the sentencing jury returned a general verdict of death eligibility but
had not been instructed at the eligibility stage of the sentencing
hearing as to the culpable mental state requirement under the
felony-murder provision in section 9-1(b)(6). We reasoned in
Armstrong that the same jury at the guilt phase of the trial, after
being properly instructed on the issue of the defendant's intent, had
returned a general verdict finding defendant guilty of murder, which
raised the presumption that the jury had found the defendant
committed the most serious crime alleged, namely, intentional
murder. See also People v. Cardona, 158 Ill. 2d 403, 411 (1994)
(holding that where an indictment contains several counts arising
out of a single transaction and a general verdict is returned, the
effect is that the defendant is guilty as charged in each count to
which the proof is applicable); People v. Johnson, 149 Ill. 2d 118,
157 (1992) (holding that where the jury was charged with
instructions including intentional murder and a general verdict was
returned, these circumstances raise the presumption that the jury
found the defendant guilty of intentional murder).
	Accordingly, in this case, the jury did make a mental state
finding at the guilt phase of the trial and determined that the State
had proved defendant intended to kill Bushong. Moreover, at the
eligibility phase, the same jury considered its prior guilty verdict and
the evidence from the guilt phase of the trial, and the trial judge
properly instructed the jury as to the culpable mental state required
under section 9-1(b)(6). These factors support the conclusion that
the jury found that defendant acted with the culpable mental state
necessary to establish defendant's death-penalty eligibility. See
People v. Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d 133, 150-51 (1996) (upholding trial
judge's death-eligibility finding based on the aggravating factor of
murder in the course of a felony because the trial judge took judicial
notice of the jury's general verdict at the guilt phase of the trial
which encompassed the finding of intent necessary for determining
eligibility).
	Unlike in Mack, the meaning of the eligibility verdict and the
intention of the jury is clear, and requires no speculation on the part
of this court. Therefore, there has been a valid death-eligibility
finding by the sentencing jury, and the circuit court's reliance on
Mack is misplaced. Cf. People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 222-27
(1999) (holding that one of the jury's eligibility verdicts properly
established the defendant's eligibility for the death penalty
notwithstanding that the jury's other eligibility verdict, which was
based on murder in the course of a felony, was legally insufficient
under Mack because the verdict form omitted the necessary mental
state; but where this court did not consider that the same jury found
the requisite mental state at the guilt phase of the trial after finding
the defendant guilty of six counts of first degree murder, including
intentional murder); People v. Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d 30, 66-69 (1998)
(same).
	In conclusion, I would hold that the jury's eligibility verdict
was sufficient to affirm defendant's eligibility for the death penalty
under section 9-1(b)(6).
Disposition of This Appeal
	As stated above, I would affirm the jury's finding that
defendant is eligible for the death penalty under both sections
9-1(b)(11) and 9-1(b)(6). Nonetheless, I agree that, because a
majority of this court has not affirmed either one of the two
eligibility factors upon which defendant's death sentence was based,
that sentence must be vacated. I therefore join in part II(C) of the
opinion, which explains the disposition of this appeal.
	JUSTICE RATHJE, also specially concurring:
	Unlike Justices McMorrow, Miller and Freeman, I would hold
that the evidence was sufficient to find defendant eligible for the
death penalty under section 9-1(b)(11) of the Criminal Code of
1961 (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(11) (West 1994)). Accordingly, I
respectfully dissent. 
	Section 9-1(b)(11) provides for death penalty eligibility where
the defendant was 18 years or older at the time of the offense and
where:
			"[T]he murder was committed in a cold, calculated and
premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan,
scheme or design to take a human life by unlawful means,
and the conduct of the defendant created a reasonable
expectation that the death of a human being would result
therefrom." 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(11) (West 1994).
Defendant argues that the evidence produced at trial was
insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he was
eligible for the death penalty under section 9-1(b)(11). Specifically,
defendant argues that the State failed to prove that defendant
murdered Bushong according to a "preconceived plan, scheme or
design" (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(11) (West 1994)).
	In response, the State argues that two facts establish that the
murder was committed pursuant to a preconceived plan. First, the
time display on the surveillance videotape shows that just under one
minute elapsed from the time the two assailants entered the store
until the time they left. According to the State, the fact that the
murder occurred quickly indicates that it was planned in advance.
Second, Bushong did not physically resist defendant during the
robbery. This fact is significant, in the State's view, because "unless
defendant had planned to kill [Bushong] all along, [there was no
point in] deliberately shooting her after she had complied with his
demands and stood to the side unthreateningly." Thus, according to
the State, both the speed of the murder and Bushong's cooperation
in opening the cash register are sufficient to support the jury's
finding that the murder was committed pursuant to a preconceived
plan, scheme or design. 
	I agree with the State.  The standard of review is whether, after
viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the elements
necessary to establish defendant's eligibility for the death penalty
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d 133, 213-14 (1992). Here, the speed of the murder and the victim's
cooperation undeniably permit a reasonable trier of fact to
conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the murder was
committed pursuant to a preconceived plan. The surveillance
videotape reveals that defendant shot Bushong in the head at the
very instant that the cash register drawer opened. In addition,
although the State does not mention it, the reaction of defendant's
accomplice is significant. Defendant's accomplice, who was
standing only feet away from a brutal murder, merely glanced in
defendant's direction when the gun was fired and immediately
returned to stealing potato chips. Nothing in the accomplice's
reaction shows any sign of surprise, fear, or panic; he neither ran
from the store nor even looked over the counter to find out what
defendant had done. The accomplice simply continued stealing
potato chips as if nothing unexpected had happened.
	To be sure, other circumstances surrounding the murder, such
as the fact that it occurred in the front of the store in full view of
the security cameras, might allow a reasonable fact finder to
conclude that Bushong's murder was unplanned. Cf. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 192 (finding of preconceived plan upheld, in part, because
the defendant drove the murder victim to an isolated area so that
the killing would not be observed). Nevertheless, the surveillance
videotape provides more than sufficient evidence for a reasonable
trier of fact to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
murder was committed pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme or
design.
* * *
	Notwithstanding the foregoing analysis, I agree with Justices
McMorrow, Miller, Bilandic and Freeman that, under the particular
circumstances presented by this case, defendant's death sentence
must be vacated. Although a majority of this court believes that
defendant's death sentence should be affirmed, that majority does
not agree on a single basis for doing so. I, along with Justice
Bilandic, would hold that defendant was properly found eligible for
the death penalty under section 9-1(b)(11). In addition, Justices
Miller, Bilandic, and Heiple would hold that defendant was properly
found eligible for the death penalty under the felony-murder
aggravating factor (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1994)). Whether
this court is permitted to affirm the death sentence in this case is
uncertain. However, even if permitted, affirming a death sentence
where a majority of this court cannot agree on the reason for doing
so is not required and certainly imprudent. Accordingly, I agree
that defendant's death sentence must be vacated.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, concurring in part and
dissenting in part:
	I agree that Williams' murder conviction should not be
disturbed, but that his sentence of death should be set aside. In my
view, however, the State should not be permitted to seek the death
penalty under any theory at the new sentencing hearing. For the
reasons set forth in my dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179
(1998), this state's present death penalty law does not meet the
requirements of the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV) or
article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art.
I, §2). It is therefore void and unenforceable. Accordingly, on
resentencing, the circuit court should impose a term of 
imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(j) (West 1998).
	JUSTICE HEIPLE, also concurring in part and dissenting in
part:
	I concur in the majority's affirmance of defendant's conviction
for first degree murder. However, because I would also affirm
defendant's sentence of death, I dissent in part.
	On November 3, 1994, Sharon Bushong was murdered during
the course of a robbery at the convenience store where she worked.
Following investigation by police, defendant was arrested and
charged with the crime. After hearing the evidence and arguments,
the jury returned a general verdict finding defendant guilty of first
degree murder.
	During the sentencing phase of defendant's trial, the same jury
found the defendant eligible for the death penalty based upon two
statutory aggravating factors: (1) murder committed in a cold,
calculated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme or
design to take a human life (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(11) (West 1994));
and (2) murder committed in the course of another felony (720
ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1994)). With respect to the first factor,
defendant argues, inter alia, that his sentence of death must be
vacated because the statute in question is unconstitutionally vague.
With respect to the second factor, defendant argues that the verdict
form signed by the jury was defective in that it failed to list the
mental state required by the statute, namely, that defendant
intended to kill the victim. Although I agree with defendant that the
"preconceived plan" aggravating factor is insufficiently precise to
genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty,
I would hold that defendant was properly sentenced to death under
the "felony-murder" factor.
	Defendant argues that section 9-1(b)(11), which makes a
defendant eligible for the death penalty upon a finding that "the
murder was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated
manner pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme or design to take
a human life," does little more than describe the mens rea of any
intentional murder. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(11) (West 1994). In support
of this contention, defendant cites this court's opinion in People v.
Stewart, 105 Ill. 2d 22 (1984). In Stewart, this court approved a
definition of premeditation as " '[a] prior determination to do an
act,' " but noted that " 'such determination need not exist for any
particular period before it is carried into effect.' " Stewart, 105 Ill. 2d  at 73. According to defendant, therefore, the statutory term
"premeditated" as used in section 9-1(b)(11) is triggered in any
case in which a defendant is convicted of first degree intentional
murder. Likewise, the terms "cold" and "calculated" fail to
meaningfully differentiate among first degree intentional murders.
Accordingly, defendant argues that section 9-1(b)(11) fails to
satisfy the constitutional requirement that a death-eligibility factor
must "genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death
penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe
sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of
murder." Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877, 77 L. Ed. 2d 235,
249-50, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2742 (1983). I agree.
	In the past, this court has rejected constitutional challenges to
section 9-1(b)(11), holding that the statutory language "pursuant
to a preconceived plan, scheme or design to take a human life"
provided sufficient guidelines for the sentencer in determining
eligibility. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 356, 372-73
(1993); People v. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d 158, 191 (1996); People v.
Macri, 185 Ill. 2d 1, 52-53 (1998); People v. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d 204, 254-55 (1996); People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48, 89-90
(1996). In those cases, this court held that the requirement that the
sentencer find that defendant acted pursuant to a preconceived plan
required a finding of more than the simple intent to commit a
murder. As such, we held that this factor was not present in every
murder, and that section 9-1(b)(11) placed the necessary restraint
on the sentencer's discretion to impose death. Nevertheless, despite
this court's holdings in those cases, I do not believe that section
9-1(b)(11) provides a constitutionally adequate means of
identifying those individuals deserving of the death penalty.
	The instant case aptly illustrates the degree of imprecision
inherent in section 9-1(b)(11). Today, three justices of this court,
including myself, find the evidence in this case sufficient to permit
a jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant killed the
victim pursuant to a preconceived plan to take a human life. In so
finding, we base our conclusion upon the fact that defendant killed
the victim almost immediately after she had cooperated by opening
the cash register. However, while I believe that this evidence was
indeed sufficient for a jury to find the existence of a preconceived
plan to take a human life, it is difficult to imagine a case of
intentional murder in which the evidence would not be sufficient for
such a finding. As this court held in Stewart, premeditation does not
require that a defendant's intent exist for any particular period of
time before he acts. Stewart, 105 Ill. 2d  at 73. Accordingly, there
is nothing in section 9-1(b)(11) which would prevent a sentencer
from finding that premeditation existed in the instant before
defendant pulled the trigger. Indeed, if premeditation did not in fact
exist to some extent, it might be argued that the killing was
accidental or inadvertent. I fail to see how the phrase "preconceived
plan, scheme or design" provides any greater limitation upon a
sentencer's discretion. As Justice McMorrow points out in her
plurality opinion, this court has never explicitly stated what is meant
by that phrase. Slip op. at 23. That we have failed to do so should
not be surprising, however, as the phrase defies explicit definition.
It is unclear from the language of the statute whether a defendant
must have harbored the plan to kill for a second, a minute, an hour,
or some other undefined period. Where the language of the statute
is so vague that this court is incapable of formulating a standard for
its application, such a statute necessarily provides insufficient
guidance to a sentencer charged with determining whether a
defendant is eligible to be put to death. Accordingly, I would hold
that section 9-1(b)(11) is unconstitutional.
	Despite my belief that defendant was improperly sentenced to
death under section 9-1(b)(11), I nevertheless believe that
defendant's sentence should be affirmed based upon the jury's
finding that defendant was eligible for the death penalty by virtue of
having committed the murder during the course of another felony.
Section 9-1(b)(6) of the Criminal Code makes a defendant eligible
for the death penalty where:
			"[T]he murdered individual was killed in the course of
another felony if:
				(a) the murdered individual:
					(i) was actually killed by the defendant ***
					***
				[and]
				(b) in performing the acts which caused the death of
the murdered individual *** the defendant acted with the
intent to kill the murdered individual or with the
knowledge that his acts created a strong probability of
death or great bodily harm to the murdered individual or
another[.]" 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1994).
When returning its verdict, however, the jury signed a verdict form
which stated:
			"We, the jury, unanimously find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant, Bobby Williams, is eligible for a
death sentence under the law. We unanimously find beyond
a reasonable doubt that:
			the defendant was 18 years old or older at the time of the
murder for which he was convicted in this case; and
			the following statutory aggravating factor exists: the
murder was committed during the course of an armed
robbery."
Defendant points out that, although the verdict signed by the jury
listed some of the elements which the jury was required to find in
order to find the defendant eligible for death under section
9-1(b)(6), the form failed to list the requirement that the jury find
that the defendant acted with an intent to kill or with knowledge
that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily
harm. Citing this court's opinion in People v. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d 525
(1995), defendant argues that the verdict form's omission of the
requisite mental state rendered the jury's verdict legally insufficient
to find him eligible for the death penalty.
	For the reasons which led me to dissent in Mack, I disagree
with defendant in this case. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 539-41 (Bilandic,
J., dissenting, joined by Miller and Heiple, JJ.). When the complete
record of the defendant's sentencing hearing is reviewed, it is clear
that the jury's eligibility verdict was proper. The record clearly
demonstrates that the jury was instructed that eligibility premised
upon murder in the course of a felony required a finding that "[t]he
murdered person was actually killed by the defendant and in
performing the acts which caused the death of the murdered person,
the defendant acted with the intent to kill the murdered person or
with knowledge that his acts created a strong probability of death
or great bodily harm to the murdered person." This instruction was
clear and precise. Moreover, the evidence that defendant intended
to kill the victim when he raised his gun to the victim's head and
shot her is overwhelming. Under the facts of this case, I would hold
that the error, if any, stemming from the verdict form's failure to list
the requisite mental state with which defendant acted was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, I would affirm the jury's
verdict sentencing defendant to death based upon his commission
of a murder in the course of another felony.
	I therefore concur in part and dissent in part.
1.      1The time display on the videotape actually reads 1:49 a.m. The
display was incorrect by one hour because it was still showing daylight
savings time.

2.      2The jury in that trial was unable to reach a verdict and a mistrial was
declared. The record does not indicate whether Simpson was tried again.

3.      3The process by which the statutory term "premeditation" came to be
equated with actual intent occurred in much the same way that the
common law term "malice aforethought" was reduced to actual intent.
See, e.g., Smith, 41 Md. App. at 308-22, 398 A.2d at 444-50; J.
Knudson, Murder by the Clock, 24 Wash. U.L.Q. 305 (1939); R.
Perkins, A Re-examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 Yale L.J. 537
(1934); see also 720 ILCS Ann. 5/9-1, Committee Comments-1961, at
9-13 (Smith-Hurd 1993).