Title: S.M. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC15-2127 
____________ 
 
S.M., etc.,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, et al.,  
Respondents. 
 
[September 1, 2016] 
 
PARIENTE, J. 
This case involves what is constitutionally required before terminating the 
parental rights to children.  Recognizing that parents have a fundamental liberty 
interest in being a parent to their children, this Court has required that, as part of a 
parent’s constitutional rights, the termination of parental rights be the “least 
restrictive means” of protecting the child from harm.  Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & 
Rehab. Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla. 1980).  The mother of three minor 
children, while conceding that the grounds for termination of parental rights had 
been met and that reunification would be harmful to the children, asserts that the 
 
 
- 2 - 
trial court should have considered permanent guardianship or some other 
arrangement rather than termination of her parental rights.1    
The specific issue we address, based on a certified conflict between the 
Fourth District’s opinion in S.M. v. Florida Department of Children & Families, 
190 So. 3d 125 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015), and the First District’s opinion in C.D. v. 
Florida Department of Children & Families, 164 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), is 
whether, under the least restrictive means prong enunciated in Padgett, the trial 
court is required to consider a permanent guardianship rather than adoption in 
order to preserve the parent-child bond and allow the parent to have continued 
contact with the child, after the grounds for termination of parental rights have 
been established and the court has determined that reunification with the parent 
would be harmful to the child.2  As the Fourth District Court explained, the focus 
of the “least restrictive means” prong is whether the parent has the ability to be a 
parent to the child with all of the responsibilities that it entails and “not merely to 
be an occasional presence in the life of the child.”  S.M., 190 So. 3d at 128. 
                                          
 
 
1.  As set forth in the trial court’s order, the rights of the biological fathers 
are not at issue because their rights were terminated.  
 
2.  The mother and identified fathers were appointed attorneys to represent 
them throughout the proceedings.  The children were appointed a guardian ad 
litem, although they were not represented by an attorney. 
 
 
- 3 - 
 
We agree with the conclusion of the Fourth District, which is also advanced 
by the Department of Children and Families (DCF) and the Guardian Ad Litem 
program (GAL).  The least restrictive means prong does not require the trial court 
to consider a permanent guardianship, instead of adoption, after the grounds for 
termination have been established by clear and convincing evidence and 
reunification would not be in the manifest best interests of the child.  Not only 
would this option be contrary to legal precedent, but it would also be contrary to 
the legislative scheme.  Section 39.621, Florida Statutes (2016), specifies that 
permanent guardianship shall be considered only after reunification and adoption 
are not available options.  
Accordingly, we approve the decision of the Fourth District in S.M. and 
disapprove the decision of the First District in C.D, to the extent that it could be 
read as prohibiting termination of parental rights if there is any emotional bond 
between the parent and child and there is another permanency option, such as 
guardianship, that would protect the child from harm.3 
                                          
 
 
3.  S.M. also briefed two additional issues: (1) whether the trial court erred 
in allowing the testimony of mental health expert, Dr. Garma, under the Gen. Elec. 
Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), standard, and (2) whether the trial court erred 
in adopting the proposed judgment of the Department of Children and Families as 
its final judgment.  We decline to address these issues as they are outside the scope 
of the certified conflict jurisdiction.  See Campbell v. State, 125 So. 3d 733, 734 
n.1 (Fla. 2013) (declining to address issue beyond the basis of the Court’s conflict 
 
 
- 4 - 
FACTS 
The Fourth District set forth the material facts in the underlying termination 
of parental rights trial that demonstrate the extensive efforts made by DCF to 
reunify the mother with her children before it filed a petition to terminate parental 
rights:  
The mother had three children, born in 2007, 2008, and 2010.  
Her last child tested positive for drugs when born, and a case manager 
for a volunteer agency came to work with the mother and provide a 
voluntary services plan for the mother.  The plan included random 
drug tests and counselling, and the recommendation that she obtain 
employment, housing, and child care.  The mother did not comply 
with any of the recommendations.  The case manager also observed 
that one of the children had decayed teeth and needed dental work, but 
the mother did not follow through on making any appointment to have 
the necessary work done.  Despite repeated visits from the case 
manager, the mother never complied with any of the tasks in the 
voluntary case plan, other than going once for a drug test which 
proved positive for marijuana.  The mother moved several times 
without telling the case manager where she was moving.  When the 
case manager finally found her in a home under construction and 
containing hazards to the children, the case manager filed an abuse 
report with DCF. 
DCF first filed a shelter petition for the children and later filed a 
dependency petition.  Ultimately, it placed the two older children in 
the care of the mother’s great-aunt and the youngest child with the 
mother’s cousin.  After the children were adjudicated dependent in 
February 2012, a case plan was developed for the mother which 
required her to have drug treatment and to obtain stable housing and a 
job.  The mother made no effort to complete any of her case tasks.  In 
fact, she explicitly refused to comply with drug screening and 
counselling.  She admitted to using marijuana on a regular basis and 
                                          
 
jurisdiction); Paulucci v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 842 So. 2d 797, 803 n.6 (Fla. 
2003) (declining to address issues outside of the scope of the certified jurisdiction). 
 
 
- 5 - 
essentially saw nothing wrong with it.  She did not visit with the 
children on a regular basis.  The mother also routinely missed court 
hearings. 
When her great-aunt became ill, the mother moved back to the 
area and assisted with the children for a while.  Nevertheless, she 
continued to be non-compliant with drug testing as well as with 
finding stable housing and a job.  Finally, in June 2013, the mother 
agreed to seek drug treatment.  However, she was not compliant with 
court-ordered drug screening.  When she was screened, she 
continually tested positive for marijuana.  She did not successfully 
complete the drug treatment. 
Unfortunately, the great-aunt suffered a stroke and died in 
March 2014.  The cousin then took custody of the two children who 
had previously been in the great-aunt’s care.  The case manager noted 
that the children reacted positively with the mother and clearly loved 
her, but they were very attached to the cousin as their caregiver.  After 
the death of the great-aunt, DCF filed a petition to terminate the rights 
of the mother. 
In July 2014, the case manager tried again to get the mother in 
for drug screening and treatment.  Finally, a bed opened up in a 
treatment facility.  But when the mother was told that the treatment 
could take up to six months, she refused to participate and told the 
case manager that DCF “could make other arrangements for her 
children to be adopted.” 
At the final hearing on termination, in addition to the testimony 
of case managers as to the mother’s complete failure to comply with 
any case plan tasks despite years of assistance, a psychologist testified 
that the mother had a narcissistic personality disorder, which meant 
that she put her own needs and desires above those of the children.  
This was evidenced in her refusal to obtain drug treatment as well as 
in failing to find a job or do any work.  The psychologist did not 
recommend that the children be placed with the mother. 
The cousin, who had custody of all three children, 
acknowledged that the mother helped out on occasion with the 
children and was the “primary babysitter” for the youngest child when 
the cousin would work.  However, the mother had also moved away 
recently and saw the children infrequently.  The cousin loves the 
children and wants to adopt them.  She would allow the mother 
continued contact because the children know her.  She reported that 
the children love their mother, and “if [the mother’s] situation was 
 
 
- 6 - 
different and she could, you know, have her own place and was stable, 
it would be a good thing [for the children] to be with her, but that’s 
not the case.” 
At the close of the hearing, the mother’s counsel argued against 
termination of parental rights and maintained that the evidence 
showed that the mother had a good relationship with her children and 
could rehabilitate herself if given more time and that termination was 
not the least restrictive means of preventing harm to the children.  The 
court requested proposed judgments from each party, which were 
circulated to the parties. 
The court adopted DCF’s proposed final judgment and 
terminated the mother’s parental rights.  In the final judgment, the 
court found that the mother had made essentially no effort to comply 
with the case plan.  When the children were removed from her 
because of her transient, unstable lifestyle, she made no effort to 
improve and remained unstable.  Her drug use continued unabated, 
and she spent whatever money she had on drugs and not on her 
children.  The court found no reasonable basis to think that the mother 
would improve if given more time, as she had failed to show any 
progress in over three years.  The court concluded that DCF had 
proven grounds for termination as well as that termination was in the 
manifest best interest of the children. 
 
S.M., 190 So. 3d at 126-28.   
S.M. challenged whether termination of parental rights was the least 
restrictive means even while conceding that grounds for termination of parental 
rights had been met.  S.M. relied primarily on the evidence of her loving bond with 
her children.  She further cited the placement of her children with her cousin, who 
would allow S.M. to visit and babysit the children.  Id. at 127.  S.M. argued that, 
under the circumstances of her case, termination was not warranted and relied on 
the First District’s opinion in C.D.  Id. at 129. 
 
 
- 7 - 
In C.D., the First District held that because the children in that case had a 
positive bond with their parents and their placement with a relative allowed the 
children continued contact with the parents, termination of the parents’ rights was 
not the least restrictive means.  164 So. 3d at 44.  The Fourth District disagreed 
with the First District’s interpretation of the least restrictive means prong, holding 
that the prong was not about “whether, under controlled circumstances, a parent 
can have contact with the child and develop an emotional bond, but whether a 
mother . . . can be a parent to the child, with all of the responsibility and care that 
entails.”  S.M., 190 So. 3d at 129.  Rather, once the “constitutional test for 
termination of parental rights was met . . . the court was not required to consider a 
permanent guardianship.”  Id. at 126.  The Fourth District certified conflict with 
C.D. 
In accordance with Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.146(h), this case 
has been expedited by the Court because it involves termination of parental rights. 
ANALYSIS 
  In this case, we clarify the meaning of the “least restrictive means” prong 
that the State must satisfy before a parent’s rights are terminated.  S.M. concedes 
that DCF has proven one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights 
to all of her children under section 39.806 by clear and convincing evidence.  She 
also does not contest that termination of her parental rights would be in the 
 
 
- 8 - 
manifest best interests of the children, under the considerations required by section 
39.810.  She argues only that termination of her liberty interest in being a parent to 
her children is not the least restrictive means to protect her children from harm.  
The mother misunderstands the purpose of the least restrictive means prong.  
Focusing on the third prong of the termination of parental rights test, our 
analysis will first examine the process for the termination of parental rights 
provided for in an extensive statutory scheme, then turn to an explanation of the 
least restrictive means prong of the termination of parental rights test, followed by 
a discussion of the conflict case.  Finally, we will address the legislative intent and 
policy in this area, concluding that the Fourth District’s interpretation in S.M. is 
more consistent with the nature of the fundamental liberty interest in being a parent 
to one’s child as well as the Legislature’s permanency goals in dependency and 
termination of parental rights proceedings.   
Dependency and Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings in Florida 
 
There is a multi-step process set forth in the statutory scheme and case law 
of this State before parental rights can be terminated in deference to the important 
constitutional rights of the parents at stake.  The process begins with a shelter 
petition and then, if the child is sheltered, a petition for dependency and a 
determination by the trial court of dependency if warranted under the facts of the 
case.  Specifically, the Florida Statutes lay out the process in great detail, from the 
 
 
- 9 - 
initial child protective services investigation (section 39.301), the shelter hearing 
(section 39.401), the adjudication of dependency (section 39.501), the case plan 
(section 39.6011), and finally the permanency determination (section 39.621) and 
the termination of parental rights (section 39.801).   
The Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure governing Dependency and 
Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings also specify in detail the procedures 
for effectuating the legislative scheme beginning with the Shelter Petition (Rule 
8.305), the Dependency Petition (Rule 8.310), the Case Plan (Rules 8.400, 8.401 
and 8.410), and finally the Termination of Parental Rights Petition (Rule 8.500).  
Judicial reviews are provided for by statute, section 39.701, and embedded 
throughout the process (Rule 8.415).      
For termination to occur, section 39.806, Florida Statutes, requires that the 
trial court find by clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the grounds 
for termination under the section has been established.  § 39.802(4)(a), Fla. Stat. 
(2016).  In pertinent part, the relevant grounds are:   
When the parent or parents engaged in conduct toward the child 
or toward other children that demonstrates that the continuing 
involvement of the parent or parents in the parent-child relationship 
threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional 
health of the child irrespective of the provision of services.  Provision 
of services may be evidenced by proof that services were provided 
through a previous plan or offered as a case plan from a child welfare 
agency. 
 
§ 39.806(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2016). 
 
 
- 10 - 
In most cases, before termination of parental rights is considered, the first 
step in the proceedings is an adjudication of dependency, and once the children are 
adjudicated dependent, the parent is ordinarily given the opportunity to comply 
with a case plan.  See § 39.6011, Fla. Stat. (2016) (requiring DCF to prepare a draft 
of the case plan for each child receiving services under this chapter).  However, if 
the parent cannot succeed in complying with the case plan, the statute provides, in 
pertinent part: 
(e)  When a child has been adjudicated dependent, a case plan has 
been filed with the court, and: 
1.  The child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned 
by the parent or parents.  The failure of the parent or parents to 
substantially comply with the case plan for a period of 12 
months after an adjudication of the child as a dependent child or 
the child’s placement into shelter care, whichever occurs first, 
constitutes evidence of continuing abuse, neglect, or 
abandonment unless the failure to substantially comply with the 
case plan was due to the parent’s lack of financial resources or 
to the failure of the department to make reasonable efforts to 
reunify the parent and child.  
 
§ 39.806(e), Fla. Stat. (2016). 
 
Second, Florida Statutes also require that the trial court shall consider “the 
manifest best interests of the child” by evaluating the relevant factors listed under 
section 39.810, Florida Statutes.  § 39.802(4)(c), Fla. Stat. (2016).  Pursuant to 
section 39.810, these factors include: 
(1)  Any suitable permanent custody arrangement with a 
relative of the child.  However, the availability of a nonadoptive 
placement with a relative may not receive greater consideration than 
 
 
- 11 - 
any other factor weighing on the manifest best interest of the child and 
may not be considered as a factor weighing against termination of 
parental rights.  If a child has been in a stable or preadoptive 
placement for not less than 6 months, the availability of a different 
placement, including a placement with a relative, may not be 
considered as a ground to deny the termination of parental rights. 
(2)  The ability and disposition of the parent or parents to 
provide the child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial 
care recognized and permitted under state law instead of medical care, 
and other material needs of the child. 
(3)  The capacity of the parent or parents to care for the child to 
the extent that the child’s safety, well-being, and physical, mental, and 
emotional health will not be endangered upon the child’s return home. 
(4)  The present mental and physical health needs of the child 
and such future needs of the child to the extent that such future needs 
can be ascertained based on the present condition of the child. 
(5)  The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing 
between the child and the child’s parent or parents, siblings, and other 
relatives, and the degree of harm to the child that would arise from the 
termination of parental rights and duties. 
(6)  The likelihood of an older child remaining in long-term 
foster care upon termination of parental rights, due to emotional or 
behavioral problems or any special needs of the child. 
(7)  The child’s ability to form a significant relationship with a 
parental substitute and the likelihood that the child will enter into a 
more stable and permanent family relationship as a result of 
permanent termination of parental rights and duties. 
(8)  The length of time that the child has lived in a stable, 
satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining 
continuity. 
(9)  The depth of the relationship existing between the child and 
the present custodian. 
(10)  The reasonable preferences and wishes of the child, if the 
court deems the child to be of sufficient intelligence, understanding, 
and experience to express a preference. 
(11)  The recommendations for the child provided by the 
child’s guardian ad litem or legal representative. 
 
§ 39.810, Fla. Stat. (2016). 
 
 
- 12 - 
Finally, because parents have a fundamental liberty interest in being a parent 
to their children, constitutional principles and case law require that DCF 
demonstrate that some action short of termination of parental rights could have 
been undertaken by the State before filing a petition to terminate the parent’s right, 
indicating that termination is the least restrictive means of protecting the child 
from harm.  Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 570.  It is the interpretation of the “least 
restrictive means” prong that is our focus. 
Least Restrictive Means Prong 
 
Termination of parental rights cases are necessarily centered on the 
fundamental liberty interest in being a parent to a child.  See Santosky v. Krammer, 
455 U.S. 745, 753, 787 (1982); Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 570.  In discussing this 
fundamental right, the United States Supreme Court has stated: 
The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, 
custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply 
because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary 
custody of their child to the State.  Even when blood relationships are 
strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable 
destruction of their family life.  If anything, persons faced with forced 
dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need for 
procedural protections than do those resisting state intervention into 
ongoing family affairs.   
   
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.  Likewise, this fundamental right is equally as strong, if 
not stronger, under the Florida Constitution.  This Court, in Padgett, explained: 
“Florida courts have long recognized this fundamental parental right . . . ‘to enjoy 
 
 
- 13 - 
the custody, fellowship and companionship of [their] offspring.  This rule is older 
than the common law itself.’ ”  577 So. 2d at 570 (quoting State ex rel. Sparks v. 
Reeves, 97 So. 2d 18, 20 (Fla. 1957)).   
 
 Yet the constitutional right to be a parent without state interference is not 
unlimited.  The right to be a parent carries with it important responsibilities to be 
able to care for one’s children without causing them serious harm.  Specifically, 
“the only limitation on this rule of parental privilege is that as between the parent 
and the child the ultimate welfare of the child must be controlling.”  Id. (quoting 
Sparks, 97 So. 2d at 20).  The parent’s rights are subject to the overriding principle 
that it is the ultimate welfare and the best interests of the children that must prevail.  
Id.     
 
The least restrictive means prong of the termination of parental rights test is 
tied directly to the due process rights that must be afforded to a parent before his or 
her parental rights are terminated and is intended to protect the rights of both the 
parent and the child.  This prong focuses specifically on what actions were taken 
by the State before filing a petition to terminate the parent’s rights.  “When the 
State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with 
fundamentally fair procedures.”  Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.  As this Court has 
stated: 
To protect the rights of the parent and child, we conclude that 
before parental rights in a child can be permanently and involuntarily 
 
 
- 14 - 
severed, the state must show by clear and convincing evidence that 
reunification with the parent poses a substantial risk of significant 
harm to the child.  Implicit in this standard is the basic requirement 
that, under ordinary circumstances, the state must show that the parent 
abused, neglected or abandoned a child.   
 
Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 571 (footnote omitted).   
The determination of the least restrictive means must be evaluated in light of 
the right being terminated: to be a parent to one’s child.  Consideration of this 
prong is all the more critical in the extraordinary case, where DCF does not offer 
the parent the chance to comply with the requirements of a case plan and be 
reunited with his or her child and, instead, moves to terminate the parent’s rights to 
the child based on the parent’s abuse or neglect of a different child.  Id. at 571.  
This Court has made clear that the least restrictive means prong is implicit in 
Florida’s statutory scheme based on the Court’s obligation to construe statutes in a 
constitutional manner.  Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So. 2d 602, 
609 (Fla. 2004).  To satisfy the least restrictive means prong, DCF must 
“ordinarily” prove that before it files a petition to terminate the parent’s rights, 
DCF made a “good faith effort to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.”  
Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 571.  In most cases, where DCF is not moving directly from 
sheltering the child to seeking termination of the parent’s rights, as occurred in 
Padgett, this prong is generally satisfied by DCF offering the parent a case plan 
and providing the parent with the help and services necessary to complete the case 
 
 
- 15 - 
plan.  Id.  The least restrictive means prong, which is derived from Padgett, “is not 
intended to preserve a parental bond at the cost of a child’s future.  Rather . . . it 
simply requires that measures short of termination should be utilized if such 
measures can permit the safe re-establishment of the parent-child bond.”  Fla. 
Dep’t of Children & Families v. B.B., 824 So. 2d 1000, 1009 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).  
Conflict Case 
 
In the conflict case, C.D., the children were removed from their mother and 
placed in foster care with their mother’s sister.  164 So. 3d at 41.  A psychologist 
testified that although the children were not harmed by weekly visits with the 
mother, reunification would pose a significant risk of harm to the children’s 
wellbeing.  Id.  There was also testimony that even though the parents had a bond 
with the children, terminating parental rights would not harm the children because 
the maternal aunt wished to adopt the children and would allow continued contact 
with the mother.  Id.  The First District found that the State failed to prove that 
termination was the least restrictive means to protect the children from harm 
because of inconsistencies in the evidence presented.  Id. at 44.  The First District, 
held that “DCF failed to establish that TPR [termination of parental rights], as 
opposed to some other arrangement, is the least restrictive means of protecting the 
children from harm.  This conclusion is based on the testimony that it was safe for 
the children to have supervised contact with Appellant, as well as the GAL’s own 
 
 
- 16 - 
assessment that TPR would not harm the children despite their bond with 
Appellant, because the prospective adoptive aunt would allow such contact.”  Id. at 
43 n.1.    
Proper Interpretation of the Least Restrictive Means Prong 
 
S.M. argues that C.D. stands for the proposition that where a stable, long-
term placement with a family relative is available that poses no risk of harm by the 
parent to her children and there is a strong parent-child bond, termination of 
parental rights should be rejected in favor of this other alternative placement.  She 
contends that C.D. requires the consideration of the nurturing bond between parent 
and child in any least restrictive means analysis.  The trial court must decide 
whether some avenue short of the evisceration of the parent-child bond could 
foster the reestablishment of the parent-child bond.  S.M. contends that when there 
is no risk to the child’s safety, an alternative, long-term placement with a relative is 
more appropriate than termination of parental rights.  We reject this argument.  
 
First and importantly, the First District clarified its holding in C.D. in Fla. 
Department of Children & Families v. B.C., 185 So. 3d 716 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016), 
stating:  
The Court in C.D. specifically disclaimed that its decision could 
be interpreted to mean that termination of parental rights is precluded 
because there is some connection or bond between the children and 
their mother and there may be some future supervised contact between 
the mother and the children.  Instead, on the specific facts in the case, 
this Court found that the Department failed to establish that 
 
 
- 17 - 
[termination], as opposed to some other arrangement, is the least 
restrictive means of protecting the children from harm.   
 
Id. at 719-20 (citing Statewide Guardian Ad Litem Program v. A.A., 171 So. 3d 
174 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)) (internal quotations omitted).  Indeed, the First District 
in B.C. noted the uniformity of judicial precedent rejecting the notion that 
termination is impermissible under the least restrictive means prong “simply 
because some limited and highly restricted contact with a parent may pose no 
harm.”  Id. at 720.  In light of this clarification, it is clear that not even the First 
District would embrace as expansive of a reading of C.D. as S.M. asserts in this 
case.  The First District made clear in B.C. that C.D. was based on the specific 
facts in that case and on the inconsistencies of the testimony presented, not on 
consideration of the bond between the parent and children. 
 
Next, even if S.M.’s characterization of C.D.’s holding were accurate, the 
Fourth District’s interpretation of the least restrictive means prong more faithfully 
articulates the appropriate considerations to be taken into account when analyzing 
the least restrictive means prong of the termination of parental rights test.  The 
Fourth District described the conflict between the two opinions as follows: 
We think C.D.’s interpretation of the least restrictive means test is 
contrary to Padgett.  The test is not whether, under controlled 
circumstances, a parent can have contact with the child and develop 
an emotional bond, but whether a mother or father can be a parent to 
the child, with all of the responsibility and care that entails.  If 
reunification is not possible because the father or mother cannot or 
will not assume responsibility as a parent to the child, as 
 
 
- 18 - 
demonstrated, for example, by the repeated failure to comply with a 
case plan, then termination is the least restrictive means of preventing 
harm.  
 
S.M., 190 So. 3d at 129.   
As DCF and GAL note, this interpretation of the least restrictive means 
prong properly puts the focus on the State’s actions prior to filing the termination 
of parental rights petition, rather than on the consideration of what remains of the 
bond between parent and child.  In adhering to the reason behind the least 
restrictive means analysis and to ensure that parents are afforded due process 
before their fundamental right is terminated, the Fourth District correctly analyzed 
whether some action, apart from termination, could have been undertaken by the 
State prior to filing the petition to terminate the parent’s rights that would have 
preserved the parent-child bond and still protected the child from harm.  This 
interpretation, as opposed to the interpretation of the First District in C.D. that 
S.M. alleges, appropriately considers the process due and the parental right being 
terminated—the right to be a parent to one’s child—rather than focusing on the 
bond between the parent and child.  This interpretation is also consistent with the 
views of the other appellate courts:  
Although the children were placed with a relative, the 
availability of relative placement does not mean that termination of 
the mother’s parental rights is not the least restrictive means of 
preventing harm.  Courts have frequently determined that the 
availability of a relative placement is not the dispositive consideration 
under the least restrictive means test.  See In re Z.C., 88 So. 3d 977 
 
 
- 19 - 
(Fla. 2d DCA 2012); S.S. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 891 
So. 2d 1068, 1070 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); R.L. v. Dep’t of Children & 
Families, 955 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); see also N.S. v. 
Dep’t of Children & Families, 36 So. 3d 776, 779 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) 
(holding that “[t]he existence of possible placement with a relative is 
irrelevant to the least [restrictive] means test, where DCF made 
reasonable [but unsuccessful] efforts to rehabilitate the Mother and 
provide services to her and her children with the goal of reuniting 
them as a functional family”). 
S.M., 190 So. 3d at 129. 
 
 
In termination of parental rights cases, consideration of the bond between 
the parent and child and the best permanency decision for the child is appropriate 
and relevant in an analysis of the second prong of the termination of parental rights 
test, which requires the trial court to consider the manifest best interests of the 
child by evaluation of the relevant factors listed under section 39.810, Florida 
Statutes.  Some of those factors listed include: 
(1)  Any suitable permanent custody arrangement with a 
relative of the child.  However, the availability of a nonadoptive 
placement with a relative may not receive greater consideration than 
any other factor weighing on the manifest best interest of the child and 
may not be considered as a factor weighing against termination of 
parental rights.  If a child has been in a stable or preadoptive 
placement for not less than 6 months, the availability of a different 
placement, including a placement with a relative, may not be 
considered as a ground to deny the termination of parental rights. 
 
 
 
. . .  
(5)  The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing 
between the child and the child’s parent or parents, siblings, and other 
relatives, and the degree of harm to the child that would arise from the 
termination of parental rights and duties. 
 
 
 
- 20 - 
 
. . .  
 
(9)  The depth of the relationship existing between the child and 
the present custodian. 
 
§ 39.810, Fla. Stat. (2016).  Therefore, to require consideration of the bond 
between the parent and child in the third prong of the test, the least restrictive 
means prong, would be unnecessarily duplicative and confuse the purpose of that 
prong: to ensure that the parent is afforded due process by the State before his or 
her fundamental right to be a parent to his or her children is terminated. 
The Fourth District’s interpretation is also more consistent with the 
Legislature’s permanency goals in dependency cases.  The Legislature has clearly 
stated its preference of permanency options for children in the dependency system 
in section 39.621, Florida Statutes: 
(2)  The permanency goals available under this chapter, listed in 
order of preference, are: 
 
(a)  Reunification;  
(b)  Adoption, if a petition for termination of parental rights has 
been or will be filed;  
(c)  Permanent guardianship of a dependent child under s. 39.6221;  
(d)  Permanent placement with a fit and willing relative under 
s. 39.6231; or 
(e)  Placement in another planned permanent living arrangement 
under s. 39.6241   
 
Id. §§ 39.621(2)(a)-(e) (emphasis added).   
Only after the trial court determines that adoption or reunification would not 
be in the best interests of the child may DCF consider “some other arrangement.”  
 
 
- 21 - 
Section 39.6221, specifically states: “[i]f a court determines that reunification or 
adoption is not in the best interest of the child, the court may place the child in a 
permanent guardianship with a relative or other adult approved by the court.”  Id. 
§ 39.6221(1). 
The Legislature has also made clear that “[t]ime is of the essence” in 
providing permanency for children requiring that, if possible, children should be 
placed in a permanent living situation within one year of coming into care.  
§ 39.621(1), Fla. Stat.  Timeliness is also mandated by the federal government.  
See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(C) (2015) (requiring that reasonable efforts shall be 
made to place the child in a timely manner in accordance with the permanency 
plan); see also 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (2015) (requiring a permanency hearing to be 
held, no later than twelve months after the date the child is considered to have 
entered foster care). 
The position advocated by S.M. runs contrary to these goals.  First, S.M. 
states that if the children have a bond with the parents, then children should 
continue to remain involved in the state dependency system through a permanent 
guardianship, so long as they are in a long-term placement and are not being 
harmed.  When a person is appointed the permanent guardian of the child, the court 
retains jurisdiction over the case, and the permanency determination can be 
modified at any time upon court approval.  See § 39.6221(5), Fla. Stat. (2016).  A 
 
 
- 22 - 
permanent guardianship does not terminate the parent-child relationship. 
§ 39.6221(6), Fla. Stat.  Second, S.M. also advocates that “some other 
arrangement,” as opposed to termination of rights and adoption, should be the 
preferred permanency goal.  Both of these arguments shift the focus of the 
termination of rights hearing away from the best interests of the child to the 
parent’s interests in preserving the parent-child bond.   
While the Court and the Legislature understand the importance of the parent-
child bond, that is the very reason that all efforts are made before termination of 
parental rights occurs to assist the parent in being able to parent his or her child 
and protect his or her child from harm.  The “right” of a parent to a bond with the 
child is important, but ultimately the health, welfare, and safety of the child must 
be paramount.  Being a parent requires parental obligations to care for the child, 
specifically to ensure the child’s life, safety, well-being, and physical, mental, and 
emotional health.  See § 39.806(c), Fla. Stat. (2016).  
 
Contrary to S.M.’s assertion, termination of parental rights does not always 
end in eviscerating the bond between the parent and child forever.  In looking at 
the best interests of the child, the Legislature has left open the possibility of 
allowing continued visitation between a biological parent and child after the 
parent’s rights have been terminated.  See § 39.811(7)(b), Fla. Stat. (2016); Fla. 
Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. v. A.D., 904 So. 2d 480, 482 (Fla. 1st DCA 
 
 
- 23 - 
2005) (holding “the termination of parental rights does not necessarily mean that 
all bonds are broken between parent and child.  A court may allow some continued 
communication between the parent and children pending adoption, and even after 
adoption, if it determines that such contact is in the children’s best interest.”)   
These options could alleviate any concern of harm caused to the child from the 
termination of the parent-child bond and still allow the child to achieve 
permanency in a timely fashion.   
 
Finally, there is a strong policy incentive in achieving permanency for 
children in care as quickly as possible.  This is clear in the Legislature’s statutory 
requirement that “[t]ime is of the essence” in dependency cases.  § 39.621(1), Fla. 
Stat. (2016) (stating that “[t]ime is of the essence for permanency of children in the 
dependency system”).  Indeed, the United States Supreme Court and this Court 
have recognized this as well.  This Court has explained, “[t]imely disposition of 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims is essential in light of the harm to the child 
that results when permanency is unduly delayed.”  J.B. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & 
Families, 170 So. 3d 780 (Fla. 2015).  The United States Supreme Court has also 
stated: 
The State’s interest in finality is unusually strong in child-
custody disputes.  The grant of federal habeas would prolong 
uncertainty for children . . . , possibly lessening their chances of 
adoption.  It is undisputed that children require secure, stable, long-
term, continuous relationships with their parents or foster parents.  
There is little that can be as detrimental to a child’s sound 
 
 
- 24 - 
development as uncertainty over whether he is to remain in his current 
“home,” under the care of his parents or foster parents, especially 
when such uncertainty is prolonged.  
 
Lehman v. Lycoming Cty. Children’s Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 513-14 (1982).  
The least restrictive means analysis advocated by S.M. would allow children to 
stay in care indefinitely, so long as they maintained a bond with their parents and 
were not being harmed, which is in direct opposition to the children’s need for 
permanency.  
This Case 
 
Clearly, this case is not about whether S.M. is or should be a “model 
parent[].”  Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 570.  Both the Fourth District’s opinion and the 
trial court’s 43-page order detail the efforts that were made to assist the mother 
with her obligations to be a parent to her children and protect their welfare.  
The three children were born in 2007, 2008, and 2010, and the last child 
tested positive for drugs at birth. The State did not intervene initially, but a case 
manager for a volunteer agency came to work with the mother and provide a 
voluntary services plan for the mother.  That plan included random drug tests and 
counselling and the recommendation that she obtain employment, housing and 
child care.   
As the Fourth District’s opinion details, despite repeated visits from her case 
manager, the mother never complied with the tasks and changed residences several 
 
 
- 25 - 
times without notifying the case manager.  Only after the case manager determined 
there were hazards in the mother’s choice of housing, a home under construction, 
did the case manager file an abuse report with DCF.  From the time the children 
were sheltered in March of 2011 and the dependency petition filed in April of 2011 
until the petition for termination of parental rights was filed, two and a half years 
elapsed.  The trial on the termination of parental rights did not occur until April of 
2015.  
The efforts made by DCF are detailed in the trial court’s order: 
The children were taken into protective custody on March 18, 
2011, due to the mother’s severe neglect of R.H., her substance abuse, 
and her transient lifestyle which lead to instability for the children.  At 
the time, the mother was leaving her two young boys alone when she 
went out at night.  These behaviors threatened the children’s life, 
safety, and health.  The Department made efforts to prevent removal 
by establishing safe living arrangements for the mother and her 
children and offering services to address the mother’s substance abuse 
and lack of supervision of her children.  The mother did not avail 
herself of these services; rather, she made excuses and claimed to be 
too busy to take advantage of the services.  After the children were 
removed, the mother’s behavior did not change.  She continued to live 
a transient lifestyle; she continued to use marijuana and failed to 
submit to random drug screens; she failed to follow through with 
substance abuse treatment.  Substance abuse treatment has 
consistently been made available to this mother over the past four 
years.  During this time the mother has attended only three months of 
treatment before being discharged.  She never completed treatment.  
The mother was placed on the drug hotline and failed to submit to 
random drug screens.  Every drug screen this mother has completed, 
over the past four years, had been positive for THC, the active 
ingredient in cannabis i.e. marijuana.  At this point there is no 
reasonable basis to believe the mother will improve.  
 
 
 
- 26 - 
The trial court found that DCF had established three grounds for termination 
of S.M.’s right to all three children pursuant to section 39.806, Florida Statutes, by 
clear and convincing evidence: (1) section 36.806(1)(c), continuing involvement of 
the parent in the parent-child relationship threatens the life, safety, well-being, or 
physical, mental, or emotional health of the child irrespective of the provision of 
services; (2) section 39.806(1)(e), parent’s failure to complete or substantially 
comply with the case plan for a period of 12 months, parent’s material breach of 
the case plan, and child has been in care for any 12 of the last 22 months and the 
parents have not substantially complied with the case plan; and (3) section 
39.806(1)(j), parent has a history of extensive, abusive, and chronic use of a 
controlled substance which renders her incapable of caring for the children, and 
has refused or failed to complete available treatment for such use during the three-
year period immediately preceding the filing of the petition for termination of 
parental rights.  S.M., 190 So. 3d at 129.  It also found that termination was in the 
manifest best interests of the children under section 39.810, Florida Statutes, and 
that reunification with S.M. would pose a substantial risk of harm to all three of her 
children.  Id.   
As the uncontroverted facts in the record show, DCF made good faith efforts 
over a four-year period to work toward reunification by offering the mother three 
case plans.  Despite DCF’s efforts, the mother has “no commitment to treatment” 
 
 
- 27 - 
for her drug problem and has shown a “pervasive pattern of putting herself first.”  
In the two years following her children’s removal, S.M. never passed a drug 
screening, nor did she successfully complete any drug treatment program.  DCF 
has more than satisfied its burden under the least restrictive means test in this case.  
The children are entitled to permanency.  
CONCLUSION 
“While we are loath to sanction government interference in the sacrosanct 
parent-child relationship, we are more reluctant still to forsake the welfare of our 
youth.  Florida’s children are simply too important.”  Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 571.  
We conclude that the Fourth District’s interpretation is more consistent with the 
nature of the fundamental right to be a parent to one’s child as well as the 
Legislature’s permanency goals in dependency and termination of rights 
proceedings.  Accordingly, based on the analysis above, we approve the decision 
of the Fourth District in S.M. and disapprove the decision of the First District in 
C.D. to the extent that it could be read as prohibiting termination of parental rights 
if there is any emotional bond between the parent and child and there is another 
permanency option, such as guardianship, that would protect the child from harm. 
This case is remanded to the Fourth District on an expedited basis to ensure that 
the final judgment of adoption is finalized by the trial court.   
It is so ordered. 
 
 
- 28 - 
LABARGA, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., 
concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D15-2186 
 
 
(St. Lucie County) 
 
Antony Parker Ryan, Regional Counsel, and Richard Gordon Bartmon, Assistant 
Regional Counsel, Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel, Fourth 
District, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Stephanie Christina Zimmerman, Deputy Director and Statewide Director of 
Appeals, Children’s Legal Services, Bradenton, Florida; and Karla F. Perkins, 
Appellate Counsel, Children’s Legal Services, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent Florida Department of Children and Families 
 
Dennis Wayne Moore, Thomasina Moore, and Wendie Michelle Cooper, Sanford, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent Guardian ad Litem Program