Title: Ex parte Duck Boo International Company, Ltd. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Tonya Leann Leytham, administratrix and personal representative of the estate of Tiffany Stabler, deceased, and as mother and next friend of Tiffany Stabler, deceased v. Kia Motors America, Inc., et al.)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 11/16/2007
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1061114
_________________________
Ex parte Duck Boo International Company, Ltd.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Tonya Leann Leytham, administratrix and personal
representative of the estate of Tiffany Stabler, deceased,
and as mother and next friend of Tiffany Stabler, deceased
v.
Kia Motors America, Inc., et al.)
(Mobile Circuit Court, CV-06-2263)
LYONS, Justice.
1061114
2
The petitioner, Duck Boo International Company, Ltd., a
manufacturer of seat belts for motor vehicles, is a defendant
in an action pending in the Mobile Circuit Court.  Kia Motors
America, Inc., and  Kia Motors Corporation (collectively
referred to as "Kia Motors"), are also defendants in that
action.  Tiffany Stabler was killed in an automobile accident
while driving a vehicle manufactured by Kia Motors and
equipped with a seat belt manufactured by Duck Boo, which
Stabler was wearing at the time of the accident.  Tonya Leann
Leytham, in her capacity as administratrix and personal
representative of Stabler's estate, and as Stabler's mother
and next friend, sued Duck Boo, Kia Motors, and several other
defendants.  Duck Boo is located in South Korea and contends
it does no direct business with, or in, the United States.
Duck Boo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based upon a
lack of personal jurisdiction.  The trial court denied the
motion and Duck Boo has filed a petition for the writ of
mandamus asking us to direct the trial court to dismiss the
claims against it on the basis that the trial court lacks
personal jurisdiction over Duck Boo.  We deny the petition. 
I. Proceedings in the Trial Court
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A. Procedural Matters
The accident that is the basis of Leytham's complaint
occurred on or about July 4, 2004, when Stabler was involved
in a fatal automobile accident while she was driving a 1999
Kia Sephia automobile.  Leytham alleged that Stabler was
wearing her seat belt at the time of the accident and that the
seat belt, which was manufactured by Duck boo, failed,
allowing Stabler to be ejected from the vehicle and to suffer
fatal injuries.  Specific to Duck Boo, Leytham alleged that
Duck Boo is a foreign corporation with its principal place of
business in a place other than Alabama.  
Duck Boo filed a motion to dismiss based upon lack of
personal jurisdiction to which it attached the affidavit of
Jung-Ho Choi, the director in charge of the technical
department 
at 
Duck 
Boo. 
 
Leytham 
thereafter 
served
interrogatories and requests for production on Duck Boo.
Reasserting the jurisdictional arguments contained in its
motion to dismiss and also arguing that Leytham had not
alleged a colorable claim of jurisdiction, Duck Boo asserted
that a response to the discovery was not required.  Leytham
filed a motion to compel, contending that Duck Boo, by placing
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the seat belts into the stream of commerce in the United
States without any limitations, should reasonably expect to be
haled into court in one of the states in which the product is
used, and for that reason, she says, Duck Boo was required to
respond to discovery directed to the issue of personal
jurisdiction.  
Leytham 
amended 
her 
complaint 
to 
add 
additional
jurisdictional allegations.  The trial court thereafter
granted the motion to compel before Duck Boo had filed a
response.  Duck Boo moved to reconsider, contending that
simply allowing a product to be placed into the stream of
commerce was insufficient to subject an entity to jurisdiction
in Alabama, and that evidence that the defendant had
purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business
in Alabama and that it had purposefully directed activities
toward the State was required.  The trial court denied the
motion to reconsider.  Duck Boo filed a subsequent motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.  The trial court
denied the motion to dismiss eight days after denying the
motion to reconsider.  
B.  Matters Relevant to Duck Boo's Contacts
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Leytham's complaint alleges that the following establish
that the trial court has personal jurisdiction over Duck Boo:
Duck Boo "purchased and carries liability insurance that
provides insurance coverage in every one of the United States,
including Alabama"; Duck Boo "has engaged in designing,
manufacturing and marketing its seatbelts and other products
to conform with United States governmental and industry wide
safety and design standards and criteria, including safety
standards by United States regulatory agencies and state
common law court decisions, including the Courts of Alabama";
Duck Boo "and/or its representatives have attended American
automobile manufacturing trade shows and/or have participated
in trade groups to ensure that [its] products comply with
governmental and industry wide safety and design standards and
criteria, 
including 
government 
standards 
imposed 
by
legislative bodies, regulatory agencies and/or state common
law court decisions, including the Courts of Alabama"; Duck
Boo "has advertised through the World Wide Web and print and
other media with a goal towards expanding the markets for its
seatbelts and other products to all of the United States,
including Alabama"; Duck Boo "has employed personnel and
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6
consultants ... to provide guidance and advice about how to
successfully market its seatbelts and other products to
automobile and other manufacturers who, in turn, sell their
products in all of the United States, including Alabama"; Duck
Boo "has retained American legal counsel ... to defend and
protect [its] interests when foreseeable product liability
suits would be filed against it in the United States,
including Alabama"; Duck Boo attached to the seat belt in the
automobile driven by Stabler "a label written in the English
language and stating, among other things, that it was
manufactured by [Duck Boo] International Co., Ltd., and that
it complies with the United States Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety 
Standards 
applicable 
to 
seatbelts"; 
Duck 
Boo
"contracted with one or more companies in the United States to
conduct seatbelt testing, it being the purpose of [Duck Boo]
to avail itself of markets throughout the United States
including Alabama"; Duck Boo "has had many different models of
its seatbelts shipped to the United States to be tested for
compliance with the United States of American Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard 209 by a U.S. based company--i.e., SGS
U.S. Testing Company, Inc."; Duck Boo "attaches identification
1061114
7
tags to the seatbelts that it manufacturers, just like the
seatbelt with the label in English referenced hereinabove";
and Duck Boo "previously included on its website a time line
stating that in 1987 it began to export vehicle seatbelts to
the United States."  In support of her right to compel
discovery, Leytham submitted to the trial court pleadings in
actions against Duck Boo in other states, documents produced
by Kia Motors reflecting testing by SGS U.S. Testing Company,
Inc., and an affidavit of one of Leytham's attorneys attaching
a photograph of the Duck Boo seat belt on the vehicle involved
in the accident made the basis of this claim, which reflects
that Duck Boo manufactured the seat belt in accordance with
United States Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards.  
Duck Boo's motion to dismiss relied upon the affidavit of
Choi, who testified that Duck Boo conducts business entirely
within the Republic of Korea and maintains no agents, physical
presence, or property within the State of Alabama or the
United States; that it manufactures vehicle-restraint systems
that it sells exclusively to Korean final-stage motor-vehicle
manufacturers, who are solely responsible for integrating Duck
Boo's restraint system into their final product; and that it
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8
has no control over where the final product is marketed, sold,
or 
distributed, 
because 
the 
marketing, 
selling, 
and
distributing is left to the final-stage manufacturer.  Choi
also testified that Duck Boo is not qualified, authorized, or
registered to do business in Alabama; that it does not sell
any products in Alabama and has never entered into any
contract in Alabama; that it has never entered into a contract
with an Alabama resident and has never entered into a contract
to be performed in Alabama; that it has never transacted
business in Alabama and is not currently doing business in
Alabama; that it has never provided any services in Alabama;
that it does not now pay, and has never paid, taxes in
Alabama; that it does not now own, rent, purchase, or lease,
and has not ever owned, rented, purchased, or leased, any real
or personal property in Alabama; that it does not maintain any
office or place of business in Alabama; that it does not have
any assets in Alabama; that it does not have any distributors
in Alabama; that it has never had an agent for service of
process in Alabama; that it has never maintained a telephone,
telex, or telefax number or address in Alabama; that it does
not have, and never has had, any employees (including
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salespersons, representatives, agents, or servants) who
conducted business in Alabama or who were residents of
Alabama; that it does not do, and has never done, any
advertising in Alabama; that it does not solicit, and has not
ever solicited, business directly or through agents in
Alabama; that it does not provide regular advice to customers
in Alabama; that it has never marketed any product in Alabama;
that it has no officers, employees, or directors living in
Alabama; that it has never applied for a loan or acted as a
guarantor or cosigner on a bank loan in Alabama; that it has
never maintained any records, bank accounts, payroll records,
books of account, and/or any other business record in Alabama;
that it has never initiated litigation in Alabama; that it has
never consented to personal jurisdiction of a court in
Alabama; that it never anticipated or intended that it would
be subject to personal jurisdiction in Alabama; that it does
not derive any revenue from Alabama; that all transactions
relating to Duck Boo's sale of restraint systems to vehicle
manufacturers (including Kia Motors) occurred in the Republic
of Korea; that no aspect of the relationship between Duck Boo
and Kia Motors takes place in the United States; that Duck Boo
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10
did not install the restraint systems into the automobile made
the basis of this action; that Duck Boo did not manufacture,
sell, or distribute the automobile made the basis of this
action; that Duck Boo did not service, maintain, or repair the
automobile made the basis of this action or any of its
components; that Duck Boo had no knowledge of what happened to
its vehicle-restraint systems after it sold them to Kia Motors
(a Korean corporation) in the Republic of Korea, beyond the
general knowledge that its restraint systems would be
installed in vehicles in the Republic of Korea; and that Duck
Boo was not involved in bringing the subject automobile,
restraint systems, or any components into the United States or
Alabama.  
II. Standard of Review
We recently addressed the standard of review in a
proceeding challenging the trial court's ruling on a motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in Ex parte Bufkin,
936 So. 2d 1042, 1044-45 (Ala. 2006):
"'"The writ of mandamus is a drastic
and extraordinary writ, to be 'issued only
when there is: 1) a clear legal right in
the petitioner to the order sought; 2) an
imperative duty upon the respondent to
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so;
1061114
11
3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and
4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the
court.'  Ex parte United Serv. Stations,
Inc., 628 So. 2d 501, 503 (Ala. 1993); see
also Ex parte Ziglar, 669 So. 2d 133, 134
(Ala. 1995)."  Ex parte Carter, [807 So. 2d
534,] 536 [(Ala. 2001)].'
"Ex parte McWilliams, 812 So. 2d 318, 321 (Ala. 2001).
'An appellate court considers de novo a trial court's
judgment on a party's motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction.'  Elliott v. Van Kleef, 830 So. 2d
726, 729 (Ala. 2002).
"'"'In considering a Rule
12(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion
to dismiss for want of personal
jurisdiction, 
a 
court 
must
consider as true the allegations
of the plaintiff's complaint not
controverted by the defendant's
affidavits, Robinson v. Giarmarco
& Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253 (11th
Cir. 
1996), 
and 
Cable/Home
Communication Corp. v. Network
Productions, Inc., 902 F.2d 829
(11th Cir. 1990), and "where the
plaintiff's complaint and the
defendant's affidavits conflict,
the ... court must construe all
reasonable inferences in favor of
the plaintiff."  Robinson, 74
F.3d at 255 (quoting Madara v.
Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th
Cir. 1990)).'"
"'Wenger Tree Serv. v. Royal Truck &
Equip., Inc., 853 So. 2d 888, 894 (Ala.
2002) (quoting Ex parte McInnis, 820 So. 2d
795, 798 (Ala. 2001)).  However, if the
defendant makes a prima facie evidentiary
showing that the Court has no personal
1061114
12
jurisdiction, 
"the 
plaintiff 
is 
then
required 
to 
substantiate 
the 
jurisdictional
allegations in the complaint by affidavits
or other competent proof, and he may not
merely reiterate the factual allegations in
the complaint."  Mercantile Capital, LP v.
Federal Transtel, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 2d
1243, 1247 (N.D. Ala. 2002) (citing Future
Tech. Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys.,
218 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 2000)).  See
also Hansen v. Neumueller GmbH, 163 F.R.D.
471, 
474-75 
(D.Del. 
1995) 
("When 
a
defendant 
files 
a 
motion 
to 
dismiss
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), and
supports that motion with affidavits,
plaintiff is required to controvert those
affidavits with his own affidavits or other
competent evidence in order to survive the
motion.") (citing Time Share Vacation Club
v. Atlantic Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 63
(3d Cir. 1984)).'
"Ex parte Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904 So. 2d 226,
229-30 (Ala. 2004)."  
III.  Analysis
A. Leytham's Contention that Duck Boo's Petition
Is Premature
Leytham opposes Duck Boo's petition for the writ of
mandamus on the basis that the trial court did not err in
denying the motion to dismiss "at least until jurisdictional
discovery is complete."  Duck Boo responds to Leytham's
contention that its petition is premature by noting that it
does not take issue with the propriety of the trial court's
1061114
13
order granting the motion to compel discovery.  Instead, Duck
Boo contends that prematurity does not justify denial of the
petition because Leytham did not ask the trial court to delay
its ruling on the motion to dismiss until Duck Boo responded
to discovery; because the trial court did not condition its
denial of Duck Boo's motion to dismiss on whether Duck Boo had
responded to discovery; and because counsel for Leytham
advised counsel for Duck Boo that she no longer needed or
wanted the discovery after the trial court denied the motion
to dismiss.  
We cannot reject Leytham's defense of prematurity on the
basis of alleged communications between counsel because the
grounds 
for 
such 
rejection 
rely 
upon 
allegations 
of
communications between counsel that are not supported by the
materials before us on this petition for the writ of mandamus.
See Ex parte Jett, [Ms. 1060281, July 20, 2007] ___ So. 2d ___
(Ala. 2007) (See, J., concurring specially).  Nor are we
impressed by the absence from the materials submitted to this
Court of any objection by Leytham to the trial court's
consideration of the motion to dismiss before it received
responses to the outstanding discovery requests and the
1061114
14
unconditional denial of the motion by the trial court.  As we
recently noted in Ex parte Reindel, 963 So. 2d 614, 624 (Ala.
2007): 
"[I]t must be remembered that '[a] denial of a ...
motion to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction
is interlocutory and preliminary only.'  Ex parte
McInnis, 820 So. 2d [795,] 798 [(Ala. 2001)].
'After such a denial, the continuation of personal
jurisdiction over a defendant who appropriately
persists in challenging it in [an] answer to the
complaint and by motion for summary judgment or at
trial depends on the introduction of substantial
evidence to prove the ... jurisdictional allegations
in the ... complaint.'  Id."  
Moreover, a petitioner seeking a writ of mandamus to direct
the trial court to dismiss an action against the petitioner
for want of personal jurisdiction has the burden of
establishing a clear legal right to the relief.  See Ex parte
Barton, [Ms. 1050303, June 15, 2007] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala.
2007); Ex parte McInnis, 820 So. 2d 795, 798 (Ala. 2001).  We
have no record of the argument presented at the hearing on the
motion to compel discovery.  Nor is there any indication that
a second hearing took place before the trial court entered the
order denying the motion to dismiss eight days later.  Rather
than disclaiming in this Court any challenge as to the
propriety of the trial court's order compelling further
1061114
15
discovery, it was incumbent upon Duck Boo, in order to show a
clear legal right to relief by mandamus, to obtain a
determination in the trial court as to the mootness of the
order compelling discovery as a prerequisite to resisting
Leytham's contention of prematurity. 
Leytham, however, must overcome another obstacle in order
to sustain her defense to the petition based upon prematurity.
Leytham must show that the outstanding discovery is material
to the disposition of the issue of personal jurisdiction.
Duck Boo contends that Ex parte Alloy Wheels International,
Ltd., 882 So. 2d 819, 827 (Ala. 2003), holds that merely
placing a product in the stream of commerce does not
constitute evidence of purposeful direction of the product to
the forum state.  Duck Boo then contends that, under Alloy
Wheels, evidence of purposeful direction of its activities
toward the State of Alabama, as opposed to general direction
of activities toward the United States, is required.  Duck Boo
further states that  Leytham's outstanding discovery requests
are not aimed at determining whether Duck Boo purposefully
directed its activities toward the State of Alabama, as
opposed 
to 
any 
other 
state 
in 
the 
United 
States.
1061114
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Consequently, according to Duck Boo, Leytham's contention of
prematurity does not prevent this Court from reaching the
merits.
We 
found 
no 
impediment 
to 
resolution 
of 
the
jurisdictional issue by reason of the pendency of outstanding
discovery requests in Ex parte Gregory, 947 So. 2d 385 (Ala.
2006), where analysis of the interrogatories and requests for
production yielded the conclusion that the outstanding
discovery requests related to the merits rather than the
jurisdictional issue.  Here, the complaint alleges no facts
that would base jurisdiction on conduct specifically directed
toward Alabama, as opposed to conduct directed toward every
state.  To be sure, there are outstanding interrogatories
seeking information without specification as to contacts
specifically with Alabama that theoretically could produce
answers revealing contacts with Alabama. Nevertheless, the
lack of answers to these interrogatories does not deprive
Leytham of the information sought by the interrogatories,
because Choi's affidavit furnishes information particularly
negating any specific contact with Alabama.  Likewise, to the
extent that the outstanding request for production seeks
1061114
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documents that could be useful in determining activity
specific to Alabama, the absence of a response does not
deprive Leytham of information that might be developed on the
issue of activity within Alabama because of the availability
to Leytham of the Choi affidavit.  Leytham's outstanding
discovery responses do not seek information specific to
activities in Alabama, nor does Leytham contend that the
outstanding discovery responses are needed in order to attempt
to impeach the matters set forth in the Choi affidavit.  In
fact, Leytham contends, as discussed below, that the
information sought in the interrogatories and request for
production is germane to evidence that becomes useful in the
event we overrule Alloy Wheels, as Leytham has asked us to do.
Therefore, in order to sustain Leytham's contention of
prematurity, we must consider whether we should revisit our
holding in Alloy Wheels.  
B. Generally Applicable Principles of Law
In Ex parte Bufkin, 936 So. 2d at 1045, this Court stated
the 
principles 
generally 
applicable 
to 
challenges 
to
jurisdiction: 
"'A state has jurisdiction over a person or
corporation so long as its "long-arm statute"
1061114
18
reaches the person or corporation and the state's
jurisdiction comports with the requirements of due
process.'  Leithead v. Banyan Corp., 926 So. 2d
1025, 1029-30 (Ala. 2005).  Rule 4.2, Ala. R. Civ.
P., Alabama's long-arm rule, provides:
"'An appropriate basis exists for service
of process outside of this state upon a
person or entity in any action in this
state when the person or entity has such
contacts 
with 
this 
state 
that 
the
prosecution of the action against the
person or entity in this state is not
inconsistent with the constitution of this
state or the Constitution of the United
States....'
"Therefore, Alabama's long-arm rule extends the
personal jurisdiction of Alabama courts to the
limits 
of 
due 
process 
permissible 
under 
the
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States
Constitution and Art. I, § 13, Constitution of
Alabama of 1901.  See Ex parte Alloy Wheels Int'l,
882 So. 2d 819, 822 (Ala. 2003).
"'The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment permits a forum state to subject a
nonresident defendant to jurisdiction in its courts
only when that defendant has had "minimum contacts"
with the forum state.'  Ex parte Full Circle
Distrib., L.L.C., 883 So. 2d 638, 644 (Ala. 2003)
(citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945))."
We must apply these principles in light of the facts of
this case and our precedent.  Choi's affidavit does not
contradict the allegations of the complaint relating to
jurisdiction, which, as previously noted, is silent on
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specific activities in Alabama.  Nor does Choi's affidavit
contradict the evidence in Leytham's submission except where
it states that Duck Boo "had no knowledge of what would become
of its restraint systems after it sold them to Kia Motors
Corporation (a Korean corporation) in the Republic of Korea,
beyond the general knowledge that [Duck Boo] restraint systems
would be installed in vehicles in the Republic of Korea."  The
affidavit of Leytham's counsel describing the photograph of
the label on the seat belt in the Kia Sephia automobile
involved in the accident here reflects conduct of Duck Boo
consistent with its foreknowledge that the product would be
exported to the United States for sale in the United States.
Nevertheless, there is no evidence indicating that Duck Boo
acted in any way specifically directed to the Alabama market
other than to the extent that the evidence establishes an
intent to serve the United States market. 
C. Effect of Alloy Wheels
In Alloy Wheels, this Court, in an opinion authored by
Justice Johnstone, unanimously held:
"The plaintiff now before us argues that the
evidence establishes an intent or purpose in Alloy
Wheels to serve, in the words of its brief, 'the
American market.'  Evidence of an intent or purpose
1061114
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to serve 'the American market,' however, absent
evidence of 'an intent or purpose to serve the
market in the forum State,' does not establish the
'action of the defendant purposefully directed
toward the forum State' that would constitute
contact sufficient to warrant the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over the defendant by the
forum state.  [Ex parte] McInnis, [820 So. 2d 795,]
804 [(Ala. 2001)] (quoting Asahi Metal Industry Co.,
Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, Solano County,
480 U.S. 102, 112, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92
(1987)).  On the contrary, the plaintiff now before
us has not submitted substantial evidence that Alloy
Wheels 'purposefully directed' any action 'at the
forum State [other] than the mere act of placing a
product in the stream of commerce.'  World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.
Ct. 559, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1980), Asahi, and
McInnis, supra.  No evidence establishes sufficient
minimum contacts between Alloy Wheels and the State
of Alabama."
882 So. 2d at 827 (emphasis added).  
Leytham 
first 
contends 
that 
Alloy 
Wheels 
is
distinguishable from this case.  We do not consider Alloy
Wheels to be distinguishable.  The defendant in Alloy Wheels
manufactured the component in the United Kingdom for
installation on a car manufactured in the United Kingdom and
shipped to the United States.  The component included markings
applied by the manufacturer in conformity with Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standards.  Recognizing that Alloy Wheels
1061114
21
serves as a formidable obstacle, Leytham, alternatively, asks
us to overrule Alloy Wheels.
The United States Supreme Court has not given clear
guidance on this issue.  In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980), the Court stated:
"When a corporation 'purposefully avails itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State,' Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. [235, 253
(1958)], it has clear notice that it is subject to
suit there, and can act to alleviate the risk of
burdensome 
litigation 
by 
procuring 
insurance,
passing the expected costs on to customers, or, if
the risks are too great, severing its connection
with the State."
The Court there held that the unilateral, isolated act of a
purchaser of a vehicle in driving through Oklahoma did not
subject the New York seller to jurisdiction in Oklahoma.  444
U.S. at 298.  In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of
California, Solano County, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), the Court
considered whether the defendant's act of placing the product
into the stream of commerce subjected it to jurisdiction in a
forum that the product foreseeably reached.  The Court split
three ways, with four Justices in one camp, four in another,
and Justice Stevens in the middle.  Four Justices emphasized
that the defendant must insert the product into the stream of
1061114
22
interstate commerce with a reasonably specific "intent or
purpose to serve the market in the forum State," 480 U.S. at
112 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.); while four dissenting
Justices emphasized that placement into the stream of commerce
with reasonable foreseeability of the arrival of the product
into the forum state was sufficient.  480 U.S. at 117
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).  Justice Stevens provided the fifth vote to hold
that a finding of personal jurisdiction in that case did not
comport with due process.  In his special writing, after
concluding that the fundamental unfairness was sufficiently
clear as to obviate the necessity for articulation of a
standard, Justice Stevens stated:
"Second, even assuming that the test ought to be
formulated here, Part II-A misapplies it to the
facts of this case.  The plurality seems to assume
that an unwavering line can be drawn between 'mere
awareness' that a component will find its way into
the forum State and 'purposeful availment' of the
forum's market.  [480 U.S. at 110-13.]  Over the
course of its dealings with Cheng Shin, Asahi has
arguably engaged in a higher quantum of conduct than
'[t]he placement of a product into the stream of
commerce, without more ....'  Ibid.  [480 U.S. at
112.]  Whether or not this conduct rises to the
level 
of 
purposeful 
availment 
requires 
a
constitutional determination that is affected by the
volume, the value, and the hazardous character of
the components.  In most circumstances I would be
1061114
23
inclined to conclude that a regular course of
dealing that results in deliveries of over 100,000
units annually over a period of several years would
constitute 'purposeful availment' even though the
item delivered to the forum State was a standard
product marketed throughout the world."
480 U.S. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).
Leytham points to several jurisdictions, some of which
involve claims against Duck Boo, that have taken a broader
approach to personal jurisdiction than did this Court in Alloy
Wheels.  According to Alison G. Myrha, Fifth Circuit Survey
June 2005-May 2006, Civil Procedure, 39 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 689,
718 n. 120 (2007), 19 jurisdictions adhere to a test
comparable to the test used in Alloy Wheels, while 8
jurisdictions reject the requirement of additional conduct
beyond the placement of the product into the stream of
commerce.  According to the article, in the United States
Courts of Appeals, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have embraced
the more relaxed standard set forth by Justice Brennan while
the First, Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted
the more restrictive standard set forth by Justice O'Connor.
Recently, in Luv n' care, Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, Inc., 438 F.3d
465, 475 (5th Cir. 2006), Judge DeMoss, concurring specially
1061114
24
in a holding that the defendant was subject to suit in
Louisiana, noted that while he was bound by Fifth Circuit
precedent to apply the less restrictive view urged by Justice
Brennan in Asahi, he preferred the "stream-of-commerce-plus"
approach advocated by Justice O'Connor.  Judge DeMoss stated:
"Asahi is the last in a long line of Supreme Court
cases to define the contours of [the 'minimum
contacts'] test, and it left the test in a state of
complete disarray.  ...  It is the stream of
commerce approach that the Fifth Circuit follows and
that I criticize here (although I recognize its
binding effect). The stream of commerce, or 'mere
foreseeability,' approach requires only that a
nonresident defendant place its product in the
stream of commerce with the expectation that the
product will reach the forum state.  Nuovo Pignone,
SpA v. STORMAN ASIA M/V, 310 F.3d 374, 380 & n.7
(5th Cir. 2002).  As Judge Niemeyer of the Fourth
Circuit 
eloquently 
stated 
in 
Lesnick 
v.
Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939, 945 (4th Cir.
1994), 'To permit a state to assert jurisdiction
over any person in the country whose product is sold
in the state simply because a person must expect
that to happen destroys the notion of individual
sovereignties inherent in our system of federalism.'
Justice O'Connor's stream-of-commerce-plus approach
states that mere foreseeability is not enough and
requires '[a]dditional conduct of the defendant ...
indicat[ing] an intent or purpose to serve the
market in the forum State,' and thereby better
comports 
with 
our 
country's 
principles 
of
federalism.  See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112, 107 S. Ct.
1026. 
"....   
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25
"For the above reasons, I hope Insta-Mix will
apply for a writ of certiorari and I urge the
Supreme Court to take up the minimum contacts issue
and resolve it and the increasing circuit divide
with clarity."
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.  Insta-Mix,
Inc. v. Luv n' care, Ltd., ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 2968
(2006).  We, of course, can only speculate as to the basis for
the denial.  It is noteworthy that in 2002 and 2003 the
defendant in Luv n' care, Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, Inc. filled 65
purchase orders for bottles to be sent to Louisiana and sent
invoices to Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., confirming the orders bound
for Louisiana.  Also, Judge DeMoss's plea for greater respect
for federalism runs counter to Insurance Corp. of Ireland,
Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703
n.10 (1982) ("The restriction on state sovereign power
described in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. [v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
280 (1980)], however, must be seen as ultimately a function of
the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process
Clause.  That Clause is the only source of the personal
jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes no
mention of federalism concerns.").  
1061114
26
In support of her contention that Alloy Wheels should be
overruled, Leytham urges us, in her response to Duck Boo's
petition, to embrace Justice Stevens's standard in this
proceeding based on "the volume, the value, and the hazardous
character" of the seat belt.  As for the hazardous character
of the product, Leytham states:  "Moreover, the seat belts are
at least theoretically designed to protect citizens of Alabama
and other states, so the 'hazardous character' of [Duck Boo's]
defective seat belts further supports jurisdiction, at least
under [Justice] Stevens's reasoning."  Leytham's brief at 16-
17.  With regard to volume and value, Leytham concedes that
that determination cannot be made based on the materials
before us.  She states:  "Ms. Leytham is entitled to develop
similar evidence as to how many seat belts [Duck Boo] sold to
Kia [Motors] and other automobile manufacturers that sold
vehicles across the United States."  Leytham's brief at 15-16.
IV. Conclusion
We note that the doctrine of stare decisis has diminished
impact in a setting where we are dealing with a constitutional
issue.  See Ex parte State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 764 So. 2d
543, 547 n.8 (Ala. 2000) ("The doctrine of stare decisis has
1061114
27
a diminished efficacy in instances where the former decision
is grounded in an erroneous application of the Constitution
and corrective action is limited to constitutional amendment
or overruling the earlier decision.").  In World-Wide
Volkswagen, the Supreme Court embraced the stream-of-commerce
test, stating:  "The forum State does not exceed its powers
under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal
jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products
into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they
will be purchased by consumers in the forum State."  444 U.S.
at 297-98.  Because Alloy Wheels embraced a plurality opinion
in Asahi and adopted a "stream-of-commerce-plus" theory, it is
at least arguable that we departed from binding precedent in
World-Wide Volkswagen, where the stream-of-commerce test
commanded a majority.  Moreover, in the last analysis, the
issue turns on what is fair and reasonable in order to satisfy
due process.  Leytham contends that we should take into
account the factors urged by Justice Stevens in Asahi, that
is, the volume, the value, and the hazardous character of the
component, consistent with his view that no "unwavering line
can be drawn between 'mere awareness' that a component will
1061114
28
find its way into the forum State and 'purposeful availment'
of the forum's market."
Whether we should depart from the standard announced in
Alloy Wheels and embrace the view advocated by Leytham
consistent with Justice Stevens's special writing in Asahi
under the facts of this case cannot be satisfactorily
addressed without the further discovery that is outstanding in
the trial court, the subject of a motion to compel which has
been granted, and a matter to which Duck Boo has disavowed any
objection.  In short, we are persuaded that this petition is
premature; therefore, under these circumstances, we cannot say
that Duck Boo has made a showing that it has a clear right to
relief at this stage of the proceedings.
PETITION DENIED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, and
Parker, JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., concurs in the result.
1061114
29
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in the result).
I agree with the majority's conclusion that this Court
should reexamine the issue of in personam jurisdiction.  In so
doing, I note that thoughtful and scholarly opinions by
federal and state courts alike have staked out positions on
both sides of the minimum-contacts issue raised in Asahi Metal
Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102
(1987).
Numerous jurisdictions have chosen to follow the "stream-
of-commerce" approach urged by Justice Brennan and three other
Justices in Asahi, see 480 U.S. at 116-21.  Federal appellate
jurisdictions that have done so, or that at least have
refrained from endorsing the alternative "stream-of-commerce-
plus" approach urged by Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion,
see Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112, include the Fifth, Seventh, and
Eighth Circuits.  See Clune v. Alimak AB, 233 F.3d 538, 542
(8th Cir. 2000) ("[P]ersonal jurisdiction may be exercised
consonant with due process 'over a corporation that delivers
its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation
that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.'
[World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286] at 297-98
1061114
30
[(1980)], 100 S.Ct. 559."); Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. v.
Donaldson Co., 9 F.3d 415, 420 (5th Cir. 1993) ("Asahi does
not provide clear guidance on the 'minimum contacts' prong,
and therefore we will continue to follow the stream of
commerce 
analysis 
in 
World-Wide 
Volkswagen." 
(emphasis
added)); Dehmlow v. Austin Fireworks, 963 F.2d 941, 947 (7th
Cir. 1992) ("Because the Supreme Court established the stream
of commerce theory, and a majority of the Court has not yet
rejected it, we consider that theory to be determinative.  We
may not depart from Court precedent on the basis of a belief
that present Supreme Court Justices would not readily agree
with past Court decisions.").  See also Oswalt v. Scripto,
Inc., 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1980).
According to Professor Myrha's survey, cited in the
majority opinion, ___ So. 2d at ___ (citing Alison G. Myrha,
Fifth Circuit Survey, June 2005-May 2006, Civil Procedure, 39
Tex. Tech L. Rev. 689, 718 n. 120 (2007)), a larger number of
jurisdictions 
have 
expressed a preference 
for Justice
O'Connor's stream-of-commerce-plus approach.  Even those
jurisdictions, however, or at least many of them, have not
deemed the "plus" to require as much as this Court's opinion
1061114
I therefore question the majority's reference to the 19
1
jurisdictions 
identified 
as 
"stream-of-commerce-plus"
jurisdictions in Professor Myrha's survey as also being
jurisdictions that "adhere to a test comparable to the test
used in Alloy Wheels."  See ___ So. 2d at ___.  
31
in Alloy Wheels appears to require when it states that
"[e]vidence of an intent or purpose to serve 'the American
market,'" may not be sufficient to establish that a defendant
has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of selling
its product in any one state for purposes of minimum-contacts
analysis.  See  Ex parte Alloy Wheels Int'l, Ltd., 882 So. 2d
819, 
827 
(Ala. 
2003).  
 
See, 
e.g., 
Tobin 
v. 
Astra
1
Pharmaceutical Prods., Inc., 993 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied sub nom., Duphar, B.V. v. Tobin, 510 U.S. 914
(1993); A. Uberti & C. v. Leonardo, 181 Ariz. 565, 892 P.2d
1354 (1995); compare Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985
F.2d 1534, 1548 (11th Cir. 1993) (referencing the varying
views expressed in Asahi and concluding that "we need not
determine which standard actually controls this case") with
Pitts ex rel. Pitts v. Seneca Sports, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d
1353, 1357 (S.D. Ga. 2004) ("'the sale of goods in another
state, knowing that they will be resold in Georgia, is a
purposeful activity sufficient to establish a "contact" with
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32
Georgia'" (quoting  Continental Research Corp. v. Reeves, 204
Ga. App. 120, 124, 419 S.E.2d 48, 52 (1992))).  See also
Kernan v. Kurz-Hastings, Inc., 175 F.3d 236 (2d Cir. 1999)
(not included in Myrha's survey, but echoing the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals' explanation in Tobin that "purposeful
availment" does not require the singling out of the forum
state in some way different than any other state in a national
marketing effort); Fogle v. Ramsey Winch Co., 774 F. Supp. 19,
22 (D.D.C. 1991); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961) (cited
with approval by the United States Supreme in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980)).
I also note that the denial of the petition in this case
will allow the parties and the trial court to conduct
discovery and to examine what is considered a second prong in
the due-process analysis.  As the Supreme Court explained in
Burger King Corp v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985), general
considerations 
of 
fundamental 
fairness 
can 
affect the
sufficiency of a defendant's contacts with a forum state.
Such considerations can include:
"'the burden on the defendant,''the forum State's
interest 
in 
adjudicating 
the 
dispute,' 
'the
1061114
33
plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and
effective relief,' 'the interstate judicial system's
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution
of controversies,' and the 'shared interest of the
several States in furthering fundamental substantive
social 
policies.' 
 
World-Wide 
Volkswagen 
[v.
Woodson], 444 U.S. [286], at 292 [(1980)].  These
considerations sometimes serve to establish the
reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing
of 
minimum 
contacts 
than 
would 
otherwise 
be
required.  ..."
471 U.S. at 477-78.  On the other hand, the Burger King Court
reasoned, such considerations "may defeat the reasonableness
of jurisdiction even if the defendant has purposefully engaged
in forum activities."  471 U.S. at 478 (citing Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 36-37 (1971)).  These general
considerations of fundamental fairness, rather than a minimum-
contacts analysis per se, provided the alternative ground for
decision in the view of the O'Connor plurality, as explained
in Part II.B of its Asahi opinion, Asahi, 480 U.S. 113-16, and
that provided the basis for the special concurrences of the
other five Justices in that case.  See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116-
21 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment, and citing Part II.B. of the O'Connor plurality
opinion), and Asahi, 480 U.S. 121-22 (Stevens, J., concurring
1061114
34
in part and concurring in the judgment, and also citing Part
II.B. of the O'Connor plurality opinion).