Title: Village of Cross Plains v. Kristin J. Haanstad

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2006 WI 16 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP2232 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Village of Cross Plains, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Kristin J. Haanstad, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 284 Wis. 2d 570, 699 N.W.2d 253 
(Ct. App. 2005-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 14, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 11, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Diane M. Nicks 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: WILCOX, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
by John M. Gerlach and Larowe, Gerlach & Roy, LLP, Madison, and 
oral argument by John M Gerlach. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief by Kenneth 
B. Axe, Paul A. Johnson, Frank C. Sutherland, and Lathrop & 
Clark, LLP, Village of Cross Plains, and oral argument by 
Kenneth B. Axe. 
 
 
2006 WI 16
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP2232  
(L.C. No. 
2003CV3590) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Village of Cross Plains, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Kristin J. Haanstad, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 14, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   Kristin J. Haanstad seeks 
review of a decision by the court of appeals reversing the 
decision of the Dane County Circuit Court, the Honorable Diane 
M. Nicks, that concluded that Haanstad was not operating a motor 
vehicle while either under the influence of an intoxicant under 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) 
or 
with 
a 
prohibited 
alcohol 
concentration under Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b)(2003-04).1  The 
circuit court, following a court trial, concluded that sitting 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2004AP2232   
 
2 
 
in the driver's seat of a running, parked motor vehicle, without 
more, was not operating a motor vehicle under § 346.63, and 
found Haanstad not guilty.  The court of appeals reversed, 
concluding that Haanstad was operating a motor vehicle pursuant 
to § 346.63 when she was found sitting behind the wheel of a 
running vehicle.  Village of Cross Plains v. Haanstad, No. 
2004AP2232, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 12, 2005). 
¶2 
Haanstad asks this court to reverse the court of 
appeals decision because no evidence was presented that she 
physically activated or manipulated the controls of the car, as 
required by Wis. Stat. § 346.63(3)(b).2  We agree and conclude 
that Haanstad was not operating a motor vehicle as defined under 
that section.  We therefore reverse the court of appeals. 
I 
¶3 
The following facts are undisputed.  On May 25, 2003, 
Kristin Haanstad met Timothy Satterthwaite at a bar around 7 
p.m.  While at the bar, Haanstad consumed alcoholic beverages.  
Sometime between 11:30 p.m. and 12:00 a.m., Haanstad gave 
Satterthwaite the keys to her Cavalier and Satterthwaite drove 
her and Justin Cushman to Baer Park in the Village of Cross 
Plains where Satterthwaite had left his Blazer.  Haanstad sat in 
the passenger seat and Cushman sat in the back seat.   
¶4 
Satterthwaite parked the Cavalier on the left side of 
the Blazer.  Leaving the vehicle running and the headlights on, 
                                                 
2 Haanstad 
was 
not 
charged 
with 
driving, 
so 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(3)(a) is not implicated in this case. 
No. 
2004AP2232   
 
3 
 
Satterthwaite left the Cavalier and helped Cushman into his 
Blazer.  While Satterthwaite was between the two vehicles, 
Haanstad slid over from the passenger's seat into the driver's 
seat, with her body and her feet facing the passenger seat, 
allowing Satterthwaite to enter her car at the front passenger 
door so they could discuss their relationship.  Satterthwaite 
entered the car through the passenger-side door and sat in the 
passenger seat with Haanstad's feet and body pointing towards 
him.   
¶5 
At approximately 12:30 a.m. on May 26, 2003, Village 
of Cross Plains Police Officer Gregory Kosharek, while on duty, 
approached the two vehicles parked in the parking lot of Baer 
Park.  Officer Kosharek approached the Cavalier on the driver's 
side, and observed Haanstad sitting in the driver's seat of the 
Cavalier. Satterthwaite was observed sitting in the passenger's 
seat.  Satterthwaite and Haanstad had been talking for less than 
ten minutes before Officer Kosharek approached the Cavalier.   
¶6 
Satterthwaite exited the vehicle and met Officer 
Kosharek at the rear end of the Cavalier.  When Kosharek 
returned to the driver's side to speak with Haanstad, he 
observed that her eyes were bloodshot and watery, her face was 
flushed, and a distinct odor of intoxicants emanated when she 
spoke.  Haanstad admitted she had been drinking at a bar and 
that her last drink was about 30 minutes earlier. 
¶7 
Kosharek returned to the rear of the Cavalier to speak 
further with Satterthwaite, who stated that he and Haanstad had 
been discussing their relationship in the car.  Satterthwaite 
No. 
2004AP2232   
 
4 
 
then told Kosharek that a male passenger, Cushman, was in the 
Blazer parked next to the Cavalier.   
¶8 
Officer Kosharek walked over to the Blazer to speak 
with Cushman.  Cushman told Kosharek that Satterthwaite was 
going to drive him home after speaking with Haanstad.  Kosharek 
then returned to Haanstad and asked her to perform field 
sobriety tests.  Although Haanstad informed Officer Kosharek 
that she had not been driving the vehicle, Kosharek placed 
Haanstad under arrest for operating while under the influence of 
an 
intoxicant 
and 
operating 
with 
a 
prohibited 
alcohol 
concentration.   
II 
¶9 
Whether Haanstad was operating a motor vehicle while 
under 
the 
influence 
of 
an 
intoxicant 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a), 
or 
with 
a 
prohibited 
alcohol 
concentration 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b), 
involves 
an 
application of these statutes to undisputed facts.  Statutory 
interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo.  State v. 
Stenklyft, 2005 WI 71, ¶7, 281 Wis. 2d 484, 697 N.W.2d 769.  The 
purpose of statutory interpretation is to give the statute its 
"full, proper, and intended effect."  State ex. rel Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110.  We begin with the statute's language because it 
is assumed that the legislature's intent is expressed in the 
words it used.  Id., ¶45.  When statutory language includes 
"technical or specially-defined words or phrases [they] are 
given their technical or special definitional meaning."  Id.  
No. 
2004AP2232   
 
5 
 
(citation omitted).  If the meaning of the statute is plain, the 
court ordinarily stops its inquiry. Id. (citation omitted).  
"The presence of different 'plain meaning' interpretations by 
lawyers or judges does not authorize the court to skip this 
process, assume ambiguity, and begin searching for extrinsic 
sources of legislative intent."  Bruno v. Milwaukee County, 2003 
WI 28, ¶21, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656.  Instead, the court 
examines the language of the statute or ordinance "to determine 
whether 'well-informed persons' should have become confused."  
Id. (emphasis in original, citation and quotations omitted).     
III 
¶10 Haanstad was charged with operating a motor vehicle 
while 
under 
the 
influence 
of 
an 
intoxicant 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) and with a prohibited blood alcohol 
concentration 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b). 
 
At 
trial, 
Haanstad testified that she did nothing more than sit in the 
driver's seat with her feet and body facing the passenger seat, 
never touching or manipulating the gas pedal, steering wheel, or 
the keys which were in the ignition, or any of the other 
controls of the car.  The Village of Cross Plains ("Village") 
presented no testimony to the contrary.  That evidence was 
uncontroverted.   
¶11 Nonetheless, the Village asserted that the mere fact 
that Haanstad positioned her body in the driver's seat behind 
the wheel meant that she was restraining the vehicle which, the 
Village contends, falls within the definition of "operate" under 
No. 
2004AP2232   
 
6 
 
County of Milwaukee v. Proegler, 95 Wis. 2d 614, 291 N.W.2d 608 
(Ct. App. 1980). 
¶12 The circuit court disagreed with the Village.  The 
court 
reasoned 
that 
"operate" 
as 
defined 
requires 
some 
affirmative act of control on the part of the defendant.  The 
court concluded that the words "the physical manipulation or 
activation 
of 
the 
controls" 
could 
not 
be 
read 
out 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(3)(b).  The court therefore found Haanstad 
not guilty of the violations.        
¶13 The court of appeals reversed.  The court concluded 
that although Haanstad "did not physically manipulate or 
activate any of the controls necessary to put the vehicle in 
motion," she was operating the motor vehicle within the meaning 
of the statute as interpreted by Proegler.  Haanstad, No. 
2004AP2232, unpublished slip op., ¶20. 
A 
¶14 We begin by examining the plain meaning of the 
statute.  Haanstad was charged with operating a motor vehicle 
while intoxicated and operating with a prohibited alcohol 
concentration.  The statutes state, in relevant part: 
(1) No person may drive or operate a motor vehicle 
while:  
(a) Under the influence of an intoxicant, a controlled 
substance, 
a 
controlled 
substance 
analog 
or any 
combination of an intoxicant, a controlled substance 
and a controlled substance analog, under the influence 
of any other drug to a degree which renders him or her 
incapable of safely driving, or under the combined 
influence of an intoxicant and any other drug to a 
No. 
2004AP2232   
 
7 
 
degree which renders him or her incapable of safely 
driving; or 
. . . .  
(b) The person has a prohibited alcohol concentration. 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) & (b).   
¶15 The term "operate" is defined in § 346.63(3)(b), which 
reads: "'Operate'" means the physical manipulation or activation 
of any of the controls of a motor vehicle necessary to put it in 
motion." 
¶16 The court of appeals' conclusion directly contradicts 
the plain meaning of the statute.  According to the explicit 
words of the statute, in order to "operate" a motor vehicle, the 
statute requires that the person physically manipulate or 
activate any of the controls of the motor vehicle necessary to 
put it in motion.  The Village does not dispute, and the court 
of appeals concluded, that Haanstad never physically manipulated 
or activated any of the vehicle's controls.  She did not turn on 
or turn off the ignition of the car.  She did not touch the 
ignition key, the gas pedal, the brake, or any other controls of 
the vehicle.  Haanstad simply sat in the driver's seat with her 
feet and body pointed towards the passenger seat.  Haanstad did 
not "operate" a motor vehicle under the statute's plain meaning. 
B 
¶17 In addition to drawing a conclusion that directly 
contradicts the plain meaning of the statute, the court of 
appeals' reliance on Proegler is misplaced.  In Proegler, 
officers found the defendant sleeping alone behind the wheel of 
No. 
2004AP2232   
 
8 
 
his pickup truck, which was parked partially on the right 
emergency ramp of I-43.  Proegler, 95 Wis. 2d at 618.  "The keys 
were in the ignition; the motor was running; the lights and 
heater were on."  Id.  The transmission gear was in the "park" 
position.  Id.  "The defendant testified that he had driven to 
the spot where the officers found his truck, stopped there 
without completely pulling off the highway, left the motor 
running and the lights on, and then fell asleep."  Id. at 628. 
¶18 The Village relies on language in Proegler that the 
prohibition against "activation" "applies either to turning on 
the ignition or leaving the motor running while the vehicle is 
in 'park.'"  Id. at 626.  That language is taken out of context, 
however, and must be viewed in light of the sentences that 
immediately follow: 
The prohibition against the "activation of any of the 
controls of a motor vehicle necessary to put it in 
motion" applies either to turning on the ignition or 
leaving the motor running while the vehicle is in 
"park."  One who enters a vehicle while intoxicated, 
and does nothing more than start the engine is as much 
of a threat to himself and the public as one who 
actually drives while intoxicated.  The hazard always 
exists 
that 
the 
car 
may 
be 
caused 
to 
move 
accidentally, or that the one who starts the car may 
decide to drive it. . . .  
Id.   
¶19 In other words, the Proegler court dealt with facts 
where there was no question that the defendant had started the 
engine, thereby "activating" the controls necessary to put the 
vehicle in motion.  The real issue in Proegler was whether the 
statute should be interpreted to penalize one who, having 
No. 
2004AP2232   
 
9 
 
already started the engine, has the "brains to get off the 
road."  Id. at 626-27.       
¶20 The court of appeals in Proegler also relied on the 
fact that there existed circumstantial evidence sufficient to 
substantiate that the defendant "operated" his truck within the 
meaning of the statute:  the defendant was alone in his vehicle 
and he admitted to driving the vehicle to its parking spot and 
leaving 
it 
running. 
Id. 
Relying 
on 
cases 
from 
other 
jurisdictions, the court of appeals stated that, although at the 
time of apprehension the defendant exercised "no conscious 
volition with regard to the vehicle, still there is a legitimate 
inference to be drawn that the defendant had of his choice 
placed himself behind the wheel thereof, and had either started 
the motor or permitted it to run."  Id. at 627 (quoting State v. 
Webb, 274 P.2d 338, 340 (Ariz. 1954) (which involved a statute 
that prohibited the actual physical control of a car while under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor)).  The court of appeals 
upheld the trial court's determination that the defendant had 
"operated" the vehicle within the meaning of the statute,3 
finding that the defendant had "actual physical control" of the 
vehicle, even though the vehicle remained motionless.  Id. at 
628.  The court ultimately concluded that "'[o]peration' of a 
vehicle occurs either when a defendant starts the motor and/or 
leaves it running."  Id. at 628-29.   
                                                 
3  The relevant statutory language remains unchanged from 
the 1980 version of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(3). 
No. 
2004AP2232   
 
10 
 
¶21 In contrast, the evidence here is undisputed that 
Haanstad did not drive the car to the point where the officer 
found her behind the wheel.  Further, there is no evidence that 
the defendant "activated" or "manipulated" any control in the 
vehicle that is necessary to put the vehicle in motion.  The 
Village offered no circumstantial evidence to prove that 
Haanstad had operated the vehicle.  The Village does not contest 
that Satterthwaite was the individual who "operated" the vehicle 
by driving it, placing it in park, and leaving the motor 
running.  The Village does not claim that Haanstad drove or even 
touched the controls of the vehicle at any time while she was 
intoxicated.  There is no dispute:  Haanstad never touched the 
controls of the vehicle.  As the circuit court judge so aptly 
stated, "if she is guilty, she is guilty of sitting while 
intoxicated." 
¶22 In Burg v. Cincinnati Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 76, 254 
Wis. 2d 36, 645 N.W.2d 880, this court examined the meaning of 
the term "operate" in Wis. Stat. § 350.09(9r) for purposes of 
the head and tail lamp illumination requirement of § 350.09(1).  
Section 350.01(9r), 
like 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(3)(b), 
defines 
"operate" in part as "physical manipulation or activation of any 
of the controls of a snowmobile necessary to put it in motion."  
No. 
2004AP2232   
 
11 
 
§ 350.01(9r) (emphasis added).4  Compare Wis. Stat. § 346.63 
(3)(b).  This court concluded that at the time of the accident, 
the defendant in Burg was not "operating" his snowmobile.  Burg, 
254 Wis. 2d 36, ¶¶22, 29.  The court reasoned that operating 
under § 350.09 does not include the act of sitting on a parked 
snowmobile with the engine off. Id. While physical manipulation 
or activation of the controls necessary to put a snowmobile in 
motion does not necessarily require the snowmobile to actually 
be in motion,5 it does plainly require some affirmative physical 
act of manipulation or activation of the controls necessary to 
put it in motion.  Id., ¶22.  "Sitting on a parked snowmobile 
with its engine off is not, without more, the 'manipulation or 
activation' [] necessary to put it in motion."  Id.     
¶23 In the present case, Haanstad was merely sitting in 
the driver's seat of a parked vehicle.  Although the engine was 
running, the uncontested evidence shows that Haanstad was not 
the person who left the engine running.  She never physically 
                                                 
4 "Operate" is also defined in Wis. Stat. § 350.01(9r) as 
the exercise of physical control over the speed or direction of 
a snowmobile.  That portion of the definition is not contained 
in the OWI and refusal statutes, which define drive or operate 
separately, and is therefore not pertinent to this case.  See 
Burg v. Cincinnati Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 76, ¶20 n.6, 254 
Wis. 2d 36, 645 N.W.2d 880.     
5 See also State v. Modory, 204 Wis. 2d 538, 544, 555 
N.W.2d 399 
(Ct. 
App. 
1996) 
(where 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
interpreting Wis. Stat. § 346.63(3) held that the immobility of 
the vehicle was immaterial, because the physical manipulation or 
activation of the controls for purposes of the definition of 
"operate" did not necessarily require that the vehicle be 
moving).  
No. 
2004AP2232   
 
12 
 
manipulated or activated the controls necessary to put the 
vehicle 
in 
motion. 
 
In 
addition, 
the 
present 
case 
is 
distinguishable from Proegler, as there is no circumstantial 
evidence that Haanstad "recently" operated the vehicle.  In 
contrast, there is uncontested evidence demonstrating that 
Haanstad never touched the driving controls while sitting in the 
driver's seat, and that Satterthwaite was the individual who 
recently operated the vehicle.  
¶24 We therefore conclude that because there exists no 
evidence, direct or circumstantial, that Haanstad touched any 
controls of the vehicle necessary to put it in motion while she 
was intoxicated, neither Proegler nor Burg supports a conclusion 
that Haanstad was "operating" the motor vehicle as defined in 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(3)(b).   
IV 
¶25 We conclude that Haanstad did not "operate" the motor 
vehicle as defined in Wis. Stat. § 346.63(3)(b).  We also find 
that this conclusion is consistent with prior Wisconsin cases.  
We therefore reverse the court of appeals and reinstate the 
circuit court's finding of not guilty. 
By the Court.— The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
¶26 JON P. WILCOX, J., did not participate. 
 
 
No. 
2004AP2232   
 
 
 
1