Title: People v. Harvey

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 89522-Agenda 9-March 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								PHILLIP HARVEY, Appellant.
Opinion filed June 21, 2001.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the
court:
	Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Champaign
County in 1985, defendant was found guilty of armed robbery (Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 18-2(a)) and sentenced to an extended
term of 45 years' imprisonment based on a previous conviction for
attempted murder. The circuit court's judgment was affirmed on
direct review. People v. Harvey, 140 Ill. App. 3d 1151 (1986)
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). A post-conviction petition challenging the judgment was subsequently
rejected. People v. Harvey, 190 Ill. App. 3d 1112 (1989)
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
	Defendant has now filed a petition under section 2-1401 of
the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 1998)),
challenging his extended-term sentence on the grounds that it is
void. The circuit court rejected defendant's challenge, and the
appellate court affirmed. No. 4-99-0073 (unpublished order under
Supreme Court Rule 23). For the reasons that follow, we now
affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
	In undertaking our review, we begin by noting that there is no
issue as to defendant's right to seek redress by means of a section
2-1401 petition. Section 2-1401 provides a comprehensive
statutory procedure by which final orders, judgments, and decrees
may be vacated after 30 days from their entry. Although a section
2-1401 petition is usually characterized as a civil remedy, its
remedial powers extend to criminal cases. People v. Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d 437, 460-61 (2000).
	As a general rule, a petition for relief from judgment under
section 2-1401 must be filed within two years after entry of the
judgment being challenged. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(c) (West 1998).
A section 2-1401 petition filed beyond the two-year period will
not normally be considered. People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205,
210 (1997). An exception to the two-year period has been
recognized where a clear showing has been made the person
seeking relief is under legal disability or duress or the grounds for
relief are fraudulently concealed. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d  at 210-11.
A person may also seek relief beyond section 2-1401's two-year
limitations period where the judgment being challenged is void.
R.W. Sawant & Co. v. Allied Programs Corp., 111 Ill. 2d 304,
309-10 (1986); see In re Marriage of Steinberg, 302 Ill. App. 3d
845, 856 (1998). In addition, section 2-1401's limitations period
may be waived by the opposing party. People v. Ross, 191 Ill.
App. 3d 1046, 1053 (1989).
	Because the defendant in this case is challenging his
extended-term sentence on the grounds that it is void, the State has
conceded that section 2-1401's two-year limitations period is
inapplicable. Here, as in the appellate court, it has not attempted
to invoke that deadline as a barrier to defendant's petition. We
shall therefore proceed to address defendant's claims on the
merits.
	In imposing sentences, trial courts must adhere to statutory
requirements. If a trial court imposes a sentence greater than that
permitted by statute, the excess portion of the sentence is void. See
People v. Rankin, 297 Ill. App. 3d 818, 822 (1998). Accordingly,
the extended-term portion of a criminal sentence is subject to
challenge and cannot stand where the requirements of the
extended-term sentencing statute have not been met. See People
v. Pittman, 316 Ill. App. 3d 245, 253 (2000). Defendant contends
that this is such a case.
	The extended-term sentence challenged here was imposed by
the circuit court pursuant to section 5-8-2 of the Unified Code of
Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-2) based on
its findings that the factors in aggravation set forth in section
5-5-3.2(b)(1) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat.,
1984 Supp., ch. 38, par. 1005-5-3.2(b)(1)) were present. The
aggravating factors set forth in section 5-5-3.2(b)(1) exist when
a defendant has been "convicted of any felony, after having been
previously convicted in Illinois of the same or greater class felony,
within 10 years, excluding time spent in custody, and such charges
are separately brought and tried and arise out of different series of
acts." Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 38, par. 1005-5-3.2(b)(1).
	The felony for which defendant was convicted and for which
he was sentenced to the extended term was armed robbery. At the
time he received the extended-term sentence, defendant had
previously been convicted of attempted murder. That conviction,
dating to 1974, was also a felony. There is no dispute that both
convictions took place in Illinois and occurred within 10 years of
each other, excluding time defendant spent in custody. There is
likewise no dispute that the charges underlying the convictions
were separately brought and tried and arose out of different series
of acts. Defendant's challenge to his extended-term sentence turns
solely on the question of whether attempted murder can be
regarded as "the same or greater class felony" as armed robbery. 	At the time defendant committed attempted murder, the
offense was classified as a Class 1 felony for sentencing purposes.
See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 8-4(c)(1). So was armed
robbery. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 18-2(b). By the time
defendant had committed the armed robbery for which he received
the extended term, the Criminal Code of 1961 had been amended.
For purposes of sentencing, attempted murder was no longer
considered a Class 1 felony. It was now a Class X felony. Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 8-4(c)(1); People v. Zuniga, 99 Ill. App. 3d
396, 401-02 (1981). The same was true, however, of armed
robbery. It was also reclassified as a Class X felony. Ill. Rev. Stat.
1983, ch. 38, par. 18-2(b). The relative severity of the offenses
thus remained unchanged. For purposes of sentencing, both
offenses were still of the same class. That being so, the
requirements of the extended-term sentencing provisions were
satisfied.
	Defendant challenges this conclusion by arguing that the
classification of his attempted murder conviction should be
determined in accordance with the law as it existed at the time he
committed that offense. In his view, the reclassification should be
disregarded. Similar claims were advanced by other defendants in
the wake of the legislature's reclassification of offenses in 1978.
They were properly rejected by the appellate court then (see
People v. Tipton, 207 Ill. App. 3d 688, 703-04 (1990); People v.
Butler, 78 Ill. App. 3d 809, 814-18 (1979)), and they were
properly rejected by the appellate court here. The change in the
law did not affect the elements of the crime, and the relative
severity of attempted murder was correctly assessed by the circuit
court in accordance with the law as it existed after that offense was
reclassified.
	How defendant's attempted murder conviction should be
classified for purposes of the extended-term sentencing rules is not
affected by this court's recent decision in People v. Olivo, 183 Ill. 2d 339 (1998). In contrast to the present case, Olivo had nothing
to do with the effect of statutory reclassification on offenses which
were and remained of the same relative severity. The prior
convictions in Olivo were less severe than the conviction for
which the extended term was imposed. They had merely drawn
enhanced sentences. Because enhancement of a sentence does not
operate to elevate the class of the crime for which the sentence is
imposed, the defendant in Olivo could not be said to have been
previously convicted "of the same or greater class felony" within
the meaning of section 5-5-3.2(b)(1). That case is therefore
inapposite.
	As an alternative basis for attacking the lower courts'
judgments, defendant argues that using his 1974 attempted murder
conviction as an aggravating factor to support imposition of an
extended term for his subsequent armed robbery conviction
contravenes the federal and state constitutional prohibitions
against ex post facto laws (U.S. Const., art. I, §10; Ill. Const. 1970,
art. I, §16). The prohibition against ex post facto laws bars a state
from enacting legislation that " 'changes the punishment, and
inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime,
when committed.' " (Emphasis omitted.) Collins v. Youngblood,
497 U.S. 37, 42, 111 L. Ed. 2d 30, 38, 110 S. Ct. 2715, 2719
(1990), quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390, 1 L. Ed. 648, 650 (1798). Defendant contends that the statutory
reclassification of his attempted murder conviction from a Class
1 to a Class X felony offends that prohibition because, in light of
the extended-term sentencing provisions, it had the effect of
subjecting him to a more serious punishment for attempted murder
than would have been possible when he committed the crime.
	There are two flaws in this argument. First, it fails to
appreciate that the particular classification a felony carries has no
importance, in and of itself, for purposes of applying the extended-term sentencing provisions. As our discussion has suggested, the
critical inquiry in determining whether those sentencing provisions
are applicable is the relative severity of the offenses. The offenses
at issue here retained their same relative severity. Before
reclassification they were both regarded as Class 1 felonies. After
reclassification they were both regarded as Class X felonies. There
was no change in the elements of the offenses, and there was never
a time when attempted murder was considered to be less serious
than armed robbery. Reclassification thus had no effect on
defendant's eligibility for an extended term.
	The second, and equally fundamental, flaw in defendant's
argument is that it assumes that the enhanced punishment
defendant received is attributable to his attempted murder
conviction. It is not. Defendant's subsequent conviction for armed
robbery is what drew the enhanced sentence. His punishment for
the attempted murder conviction remained the same. Defendant's
prior conviction for attempted murder merely served as a factor in
aggravation at the sentencing hearing for defendant's subsequent
armed robbery conviction. Under such circumstances, our court
has specifically held that no ex post facto concerns are present.
People v. Dunigan, 165 Ill. 2d 235, 242-43 (1995).
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court
is affirmed.
Affirmed. 
	JUSTICE McMORROW, specially concurring:
	I write separately to respond briefly to the concerns raised in
the concurring opinions of Justice Fitzgerald and Justice Garman.
Both concurring opinions conclude that a motion attacking a void
judgment is not properly brought under section 2-1401 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 1998).
	 Paragraph (f) of section 2-1401 states: "Nothing contained
in this Section affects any existing right to relief from a void order
or judgment, or to employ any existing method to procure that
relief." 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(f) (West 1998). The concurring
opinions read paragraph (f) as excluding motions to vacate void
judgments from the purview of section 2-1401. Both opinions
stress that void judgments may be attacked at any time and in any
court but then conclude that such a motion may be brought as
some type of "freestanding" action. Neither opinion indicates
under what statutory provision, rule of court, or common law
procedure such a motion may be brought.
	In my view, paragraph (f) of section 2-1401 does nothing
more than state that a motion attacking a void judgment need not
meet the requirements applied to other post-judgment motions
brought under section 2-1401. In other words, a post-judgment
motion seeking relief on the basis that the judgment is void is not
bound by the two-year limitation but, rather, may be brought at
any time and does not require allegations of a meritorious defense
or a showing of due diligence. Contrary to the views of the
concurring justices, I do not interpret paragraph (f) as affirmatively
excluding motions to vacate void judgments from being brought
under section 2-1401.
	Moreover, I note that section 2-1401(a) expressly abolishes
the old common law writs and equitable remedies that would have
provided the procedural vehicle for attacking a void judgment at
common law. As section 2-1401(a) states:
		"Writs of error coram nobis and coram vobis, bills of
review and bills in the nature of bills of review are
abolished. All relief heretofore obtainable and the grounds
for such relief heretofore available, whether by any of the
foregoing remedies or otherwise, shall be available in
every case, by proceedings hereunder, regardless of the
nature of the order or judgment from which relief is
sought or of the proceedings in which it was entered."
(Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 1998).
See also Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110, par. 2-1401, Joint Committee
Comments [1955] and Historical & Practice Notes, at 602-10
(Smith-Hurd 1983).
	I read section 2-1401, similar to Rule 60 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (Fed. R. Civ. P. 60), as replacing traditional
collateral proceedings as the proper vehicle for attacking void
judgments. See Malone v. Cosentino, 99 Ill. 2d 29, 33 (1983)
(final judgments can only be attacked on direct appeal, or in one
of the traditional collateral proceedings now defined by statute).
	Further, although the concurring justices agree on the merits
of the case at bar, the justices do not identify the means by which
this court exercises appellate jurisdiction. In this case, defendant
challenged the extended-term portion of his criminal sentence,
claiming the requirements of the extended-term sentencing statute
had not been met. The trial court's ruling, upholding defendant's
sentence against the challenge for voidness, might be viewed as a
final and appealable order. In other cases, however, depending
upon the underlying basis for the claim of voidness, the judgment
entered may, or may not, be a final and appealable order. In this
second class of cases, if the motion to vacate a void judgment is
not viewed or utilized as a section 2-1401 motion, there is no
vehicle for finding appellate jurisdiction. While this court might
exercise its supervisory authority to gain jurisdiction, the appellate
court cannot. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §16.
	In light of these concerns, I believe the better course of action
is simply to recognize that a motion for relief from a void
judgment may be brought under section 2-1401 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. This clarifies the basis of jurisdiction and
provides the procedural mechanism for exercising the principle of
law with which every member of this court agrees, i.e., that a
motion attacking a void judgment may be brought at any time.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN joins in this special concurrence.
	I agree with the majority that the judgment of the appellate
court, rejecting defendant's challenge to his extended-term
sentence, should be affirmed. To the extent this opinion holds,
however, that section 2-1401 is a proper vehicle to attack a void
judgment even after the two-year limitation period has expired, I
disagree.
	As noted by the majority, section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil
Procedure provides a method to attack final judgments or orders
after 30 days of the entry of judgment. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West
1998). The language contained in section 2-1401 is clear: a
petition for relief must be filed not later than two years after the
entry of the order or judgment. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(c) (West
1998). Section 2-1401 by its express language relaxes this
limitation period only if the person seeking relief is under legal
disability or duress or the grounds for relief are fraudulently
concealed. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(c) (West 1998). Contrary to the
view expressed by the majority, section 2-1401 does not also relax
this limitation period if the petitioner attacks the judgment on the
basis that it is void.(1) This exception is absent from the language of
the statute. When statutory language is clear it must be given
effect-it is not proper to depart from the plain language by reading
into the statute exceptions not expressed by the legislature. People
v. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d 1, 29 (2000). Moreover, this exception is
unnecessary. Section 2-1401 does not provide an obstacle for
parties who seek redress from void judgments beyond the two-year
limitation. Rather, "[n]othing contained in [section 2-1401] affects
any existing right to relief from a void order or judgment, or to
employ any existing method to procure that relief." 735 ILCS
5/2-1401(f) (West 1998).
	Citing to this court's opinion in R.W. Sawant & Co. v. Allied
Programs Corp., 111 Ill. 2d 304, 309-10 (1986), the majority
states that, "there is no issue as to defendant's right to seek redress
by means of a section 2-1401 petition." Slip op. at 1-2. In R.W.
Sawant, an order of default was entered against the defendant on
the underlying and third-party complaints. Within four months of
the order, the defendant entered a special and limited appearance
and a motion to quash the service of summons of both complaints.
This court considered whether the defendant used the "proper
vehicle" to contest jurisdiction. R.W. Sawant, 111 Ill. 2d  at 309.
The plaintiff and third-party plaintiff characterized the defendant's
jurisdictional attack as a collateral attack on the circuit court's
judgment under section 2-1401. Plaintiffs argued that the
defendant, however, had failed to satisfy the due diligence
requirement contained in section 2-1401. We concluded that
section 2-1401 did not govern the defendant's jurisdictional
attack:
			"We note initially that '[a] judgment, order or decree
entered by a court which lacks jurisdiction of the parties
or of the subject matter, or which lacks the inherent power
to make or enter the particular order involved, is void, and
may be attacked at any time or in any court, either
directly or collaterally.' (Emphasis added.) [Citations.] A
defendant, therefore, can properly challenge a court's
jurisdiction after a default judgment or order is entered.
			*** A defendant who is contesting personal jurisdiction
is not 'strictured by either the time limitations or the
requirement of due diligence to which petitions relying
on' section 2-1401 must conform. Home State Savings
Association v. Powell (1979), 73 Ill. App. 3d 915, 917.
(Home State Savings cited section 72 of the Civil Practice
Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, cfh. 110, par. 72); this section
became section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2-1401).)
			As the appellate court correctly pointed out in this case,
'section 2-1401, which provides relief from default
judgments, *** does not affect a party's right to seek
relief from a void order or judgment by any other method.
See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2-1401(f).'
[Citation.]
			[The defendant] chose one method of attacking the
personal jurisdiction of the Illinois courts. Although the
method [the defendant] chose may not be the most used
or the one most favored, it was nonetheless permissible
and proper." R.W. Sawant, 111 Ill. 2d  at 309-10.
Thus, R.W. Sawant did not create an exception to the two-year
limitation period.
	As in R.W. Sawant, the defendant's right to seek relief does
not depend on whether he satisfies the requirements contained in
section 2-1401. A party may attack a void judgment at any time in
a motion separate and apart from a section 2-1401 petition. R.W.
Sawant, 111 Ill. 2d  at 310; City of Chicago v. Fair Employment
Practices Comm'n, 65 Ill. 2d 108, 112 (1976); Barnard v.
Michael, 392 Ill. 130, 135 (1945); see State Bank v. Thill, 113 Ill. 2d 294, 308-09 (1986); Cavanaugh v. Lansing Municipal Airport,
288 Ill. App. 3d 239, 246 (1997); In re Marriage of Parks, 122 Ill.
App. 3d 905, 909 (1984); First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v.
Brown, 74 Ill. App. 3d 901, 905 (1979). Moreover, it is irrelevant
that defendant brought his petition pursuant to section 2-1401.
The character of a motion is determined by its content and not the
title or label asserted by the petitioner. Savage v. Mui Pho, 312 Ill.
App. 3d 553, 559 (2000); see also First Federal Savings & Loan
Ass'n, 74 Ill. App. 3d at 905.
	In the instant case, defendant brought his petition well beyond
the two-year limitation period. He does not allege legal disability,
duress, or fraudulent concealment in order to invoke the express
exceptions contained in section 2-1401 (735 ILCS 5/2-1401(c)
(West 1998)). Therefore, he may not proceed under section
2-1401. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(c) (West 1998). Nonetheless,
because defendant challenges his extended-term sentence on the
basis that the judgment is void, his challenge is proper and not
restricted by the two-year limitation period in section 2-1401.
	JUSTICES THOMAS and GARMAN join in this special
concurrence.
	I agree with the affirmance of the appellate court's judgment
in this case. I write separately because I believe that defendant's
petition was not properly brought under section 2-1401 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West
1998)).
	 Section 2-1401 provides relief by petition from final orders
and judgments after 30 days have elapsed from the entry thereof.
735 ILCS 5/2-1401(a) (West 1998). The petition must be filed not
later than two years after entry of the order or judgment. 735 ILCS
5/2-1401(c) (West 1998). Section 2-1401(f) of the Code makes
clear that "[n]othing contained in this Section affects any existing
right to relief from a void order or judgment, or to employ any
existing method to procure that relief." 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(f)
(West 1998). A void judgment is one that was entered without
jurisdiction of the parties or the subject matter and such a
judgment may be attacked at any time, either directly or
collaterally. People v. Wade, 116 Ill. 2d 1, 5 (1987). Neither the
two-year time limitation nor the due diligence requirement of
section 2-1401 apply to a petition challenging a judgment as void.
R.W. Sawant & Co. v. Allied Programs Corp., 111 Ill. 2d 304, 309
(1986).
	In Sawant, the circuit court entered a default judgment against
defendant Allied. Allied filed a special and limited appearance and
a motion to quash service of summons, alleging lack of personal
jurisdiction. Sawant, 111 Ill. 2d  at 306. The circuit court struck the
special and limited appearance and denied the motion to quash,
holding that Allied used improper procedure, had not diligently
presented its defense, and that Allied was subject to Illinois
jurisdiction. Sawant, 111 Ill. 2d  at 308-09. The appellate court
disagreed with each of these findings and reversed. Sawant, 111 Ill. 2d  at 309. On further appeal, plaintiffs argued that Allied's
filing of its special and limited appearance constituted a collateral
attack on the judgment under section 2-1401 of the Code and that
Allied had not established the requisite due diligence. This court
rejected that argument, noting that a void judgment may be
attacked at any time and that due diligence need not be shown.
Section 2-1401 of the Code did not preempt other means of
attacking a void judgment or order. We noted that, although
Allied's choice of a special and limited appearance as a method to
challenge the jurisdiction of the circuit court may be unusual, it
was nonetheless proper. Sawant, 111 Ill. 2d  at 309-10.
	 The majority in the instant case cites Sawant as authority for
the proposition that a party may seek relief under section 2-1401
beyond the two-year time limitation where the judgment is alleged
to be void. Slip op. at 2. However, Sawant does not support this
assertion. In addressing the plaintiffs' argument there that section
2-1401 did not provide relief to Allied in challenging the circuit
court's jurisdiction, this court observed that:
		"A defendant who is contesting personal jurisdiction is
not 'strictured by either the time limitations [citation] or
the requirement of due diligence to which petitions
relying on' section 2-1401 must conform." Sawant, 111 Ill. 2d  at 309-10, quoting Home State Savings Ass'n v.
Powell, 73 Ill. App. 3d 915, 917 (1979).
The method used by Allied in that case to attack the judgment as
void was a special and limited appearance. The quoted statement
merely noted that this method was not subject to the restrictions of
section 2-1401.
	A motion filed more than two years after entry of the
judgment challenged does not meet the time limitation for motions
under section 2-1401. The statute contains no exception to that
time limitation for a motion attacking a judgment as void. Instead,
it expressly permits a party to attack a judgment as void outside
the scope of the statute. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(f) (West 1998). Prior
appellate decisions establish that a party may challenge a void
judgment at any time by motion directed to the court. See, e.g., In
re Marriage of Parks, 122 Ill. App. 3d 905, 909 (1984); Augsburg
v. Frank's Car Wash, Inc., 103 Ill. App. 3d 329, 332-33 (1982)
(construing section 72 of the former Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 72), the predecessor to section 2-1401);
Home State Savings Ass'n v. Powell, 73 Ill. App. 3d 915, 917
(1979) (noting that section 72(6) of the former Civil Practice Act
(now section 2-1401(f) of the Code) explicitly provides that relief
from a void judgment is not limited by section 72).
	Thus, where a party files a motion challenging a judgment as
void more than two years after the judgment was entered, the
motion is not properly brought under section 2-1401. The party
may simply challenge the judgment by motion directed to the
circuit court.
	Here, although defendant mislabeled his petition as one under
section 2-1401 of the Code, courts should be liberal in
recognizing such a petition as a collateral attack on a void
judgment. See People v. Reymar Clinic Pharmacy, Inc., 246 Ill.
App. 3d 835, 841 (1993). Accordingly, defendant's petition may
be considered outside the scope of section 2-1401 as a collateral
attack upon a void judgment.
 



 



1.      1The majority also states that the "limitations period may be waived
by the opposing party." Slip op. at 2, citing Ross, 191 Ill. App. 3d 1046,
1053 (1989). In Ross, the appellate court held that section 2-1401
codifies a common law remedy and, therefore, "the statute is procedural
and may be waived." Ross, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 1053. This court has
never directly addressed whether section 2-1401 codifies a common law
remedy or creates a new cause of action rendering the limitations period
jurisdictional and not subject to waiver. I do not express an opinion on
the issue of whether the two-year limitation period in section 2-1401 is
procedural or jurisdictional.