Title: DAVID GENTILINI V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DAVID GENTILINI V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 74Case Number: S-09-0078Decided: 06/03/2010NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.

APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
DAVID 
GENTILINI,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Washakie 
County

The 
Honorable Robert E. Skar, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; David E. 
Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Westling.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham Smith, Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Smith.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
Appellant, 
David Gentilini, challenges his conviction of attempted first degree murder in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-101(a) and 6-1-301 (LexisNexis 2007).  He contends the district court erred 
when it denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal.  He also asserts that the jury instruction 
specifying the elements of attempted first degree murder was erroneous.  We find no error and affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]        
Mr. 
Gentilini presents two issues:

 

1.    
Did 
the district court err in denying Mr. Gentilini's motion for judgment of 
acquittal on the charge of attempted first degree murder? 

 
 

2.    
Did 
the district court commit plain error in instructing the jury on the elements of 
attempted first degree murder?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
David 
Gentilini and his girlfriend had a loud argument at her Worland apartment 
building.  Mr. Ellsworth, a 
carpenter working in the building, intervened and asked them to stop.  Mr. Gentilini and Mr. Ellsworth had a 
brief but heated dispute.  The 
apartment manager persuaded Mr. Gentilini to leave without further 
incident.

 
 

[¶4]        
The 
next day, Mr. Ellsworth resumed his work at the apartment complex.  That afternoon, he went to his truck to 
retrieve some tools and saw Mr. Gentilini in the parking lot.  Mr. Gentilini began shouting and asked 
Mr. Ellsworth if he wanted to fight.  
Concerned for his safety, Mr. Ellsworth grabbed a hammer holder and put 
it in his back pocket.1  The two continued to exchange 
words.  Mr. Gentilini lunged at Mr. 
Ellsworth who responded by punching Mr. Gentilini several times and hitting him 
with the hammer holder.  Mr. 
Gentilini then got in his car and said "I'll just run you over."  He drove his car toward Mr. Ellsworth 
twice.  Both times Mr. Ellsworth was 
able to evade contact.  Mr. 
Gentilini then told Mr. Ellsworth he would go get his gun and drove away. 

 
 

[¶5]        
Mr. 
Ellsworth contacted law enforcement.  
After arriving on the scene, the police and Mr. Ellsworth discussed the 
incident in the apartment complex parking lot.  During this discussion, Mr. Ellsworth 
identified Mr. Gentilini's car driving on an adjacent street.  The vehicle stopped abruptly, turned 
around, and headed in the opposite direction.  The officers pursued and stopped the 
vehicle.  They discovered Mr. 
Gentilini in the car and a loaded semi-automatic .22 caliber rifle on the 
floorboard.  

 

[¶6]        
Mr. 
Gentilini was arrested.  During 
processing, he told the booking officer: "I lost it, I went home, got my gun, 
and came back to kill him."  He was 
charged with aggravated assault and battery in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-502(a)(ii) and attempted first degree murder in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 6-2-101(a) and 6-1-301.  A jury 
found Mr. Gentilini guilty of both crimes.  
He challenges only his conviction of attempted first degree 
murder.

 
 
Motion 
for Judgment of Acquittal

 
 

[¶7]        
In 
his first issue, Mr. Gentilini contends the district court erred in denying his 
motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of attempted first degree 
murder.  Motions for judgment of 
acquittal are governed by W.R.Cr.P. 29, which provides, in pertinent part: 

 
 
(a) 
At close of evidence.Motions for 
directed verdict are abolished and motions for judgment of acquittal shall be 
used in their place.  The court on 
motion of a defendant or of its own motion shall order the entry of judgment of 
acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment, information or 
citation after the evidence on either side is closed if the evidence is 
insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses.  If a defendant's motion for judgment of 
acquittal at the close of the evidence offered by the state is not granted, the 
defendant may offer evidence without having reserved the 
right.

 
 

When 
reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence in the context of a motion for 
judgment of acquittal, we examine and accept as true the State's evidence, 
together with all reasonable inferences.  Mattern 
v. State, 
2007 WY 24, ¶ 28, 151 P.3d 1116, 1128 (Wyo. 2007). 
 "A motion for judgment of acquittal 
is to be granted only when the evidence is such that a reasonable juror must 
have a reasonable doubt as to the existence of any of the essential elements of 
the crime."  Butcher 
v. State, 
2005 WY 146, ¶ 11, 123 P.3d 543, 548 (Wyo. 2005). 

 
 

[¶8]        
In 
his motion for judgment of acquittal, made at the close of the State's case in 
chief, Mr. Gentilini contended that the State had not presented sufficient 
evidence of a "substantial step" as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-301, which 
provides:

 
 

(a)   A 
person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if:

 
 

(i)    
With 
the intent to commit the crime, he does any act which is a substantial step 
towards commission of the crime. A "substantial step" is conduct which is 
strongly corroborative of the firmness of the person's intention to complete the 
commission of the crime[.]

 
 

Mr. 
Gentilini maintains that the evidence at that stage of the proceeding was 
insufficient to prove he engaged in conduct "strongly corroborative" of his 
intent to complete the crime of first degree murder.2  First degree murder is defined by Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101(a), which provides: "Whoever 
purposely and with premeditated malice . . . kills any human being is guilty of 
murder in the first degree." 

 
 

[¶9]        
Mr. 
Gentilini seeks support for his position from other cases where this Court has 
found sufficient evidence of a "substantial step."  He contends the evidence in this case is 
not as strong as in those cases.  To 
some extent he is correct.  In 
Reilly 
v. State, 
2002 WY 156, 55 P.3d 1259 (Wyo. 2002), the defendant shot at the victim several 
times.  In Guy v. State, 2008 WY 56, 184 P.3d 687 
(Wyo. 2008), the victim was stabbed.  
In Cohen v. State, 2008 WY 78, 
191 P.3d 956 (Wyo. 2008), the defendant, in the presence of an officer, pulled a 
gun from the waistband of his pants.

 
 

[¶10]     
These 
cases, however, are of limited value to the inquiry we must undertake here. The 
question of whether a defendant has engaged in a 
substantial step toward the commission of a crime is intensively fact specific. 
Cohen, ¶ 18, 191 P.3d  at 960.  "The authorities agree that it is 
impossible to formulate a general rule or definition of what constitutes an 
attempt (to murder), which may be applied as a test in all cases."  Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, What Constitutes Attempted Murder, 54 
A.L.R.3d 612, § 2(a) (1973).  We must determine the sufficiency of the evidence of a 
substantial step based on the individual facts and circumstances presented in 
this case.  

 
 

[¶11]     
We 
have described a substantial 
step as an act in furtherance of the intent to commit a crime "which, as it is 
most commonly put, goes beyond mere preparation." Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 940 
(Wyo. 1997).  

 
 

The 
"substantial step" necessary for a conviction of an attempt to commit a crime 
must be behavior of such a nature that a reasonable observer viewing it in 
context would conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that it was undertaken in 
accordance with a design to violate a criminal statute. 

 
 
The 
"substantial step" required to establish an attempt may be as much as, or less than, the actual commission of the 
attempted crime, but it must be of an unequivocal nature and strongly corroborative of the 
accused's alleged criminal purpose. 

 
 

22 
C.J.S. Criminal Law § 157 (2009) 
(footnotes omitted).  "The 
line between preparation and attempt . . . must at best depend largely upon the 
particular circumstances of each case  the seriousness of the crime attempted, 
and the danger to be apprehended from the defendant's conduct."  Francis B. Sayre, Criminal Attempts, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 821, 
845 (1928).  

 
 

[¶12]     
Mr. 
Gentilini attempts to limit the evidence of the substantial step to "the mere 
possession of the gun," and maintains that his "conduct was simply driving on a 
public street (not a crime) and possessing a .22 rifle (also not a crime) so 
there [was] no strong corroboration of a premeditated intent to kill Mr. 
Ellsworth."  He also asserts that 
his actions did not move beyond mere preparation because he "never pointed, 
brandished or even showed [the gun] to Mr. Ellsworth."  He maintains that his actions were too 
far removed from the requisite act of killing any human being, and that Mr. 
Ellsworth was unaware that Mr. Gentilini intended to kill him with the loaded 
rifle.  Essentially, 
Mr. Gentilini asks us to ignore other evidence that provides context to his 
possession of the weapon.  In 
determining whether denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal was 
erroneous, we must consider that evidence. 

 

[¶13]     
The 
facts reviewed in the light most favorable to the State establish that 
Mr. Gentilini and Mr. Ellsworth engaged in a verbal and physical 
altercation.  Mr. Gentilini 
unsuccessfully tried to hit Mr. Ellsworth with his car.  He then cursed and told Mr. Ellsworth 
that he was going to get his gun.  
He went to his house, retrieved the loaded weapon, and was returning to 
the scene of the altercation when he spotted law enforcement.  Most damning to Mr. Gentilini's position 
was his statement to the police that "I lost it, I went home, got my gun, and 
came back to kill him."  This 
unequivocal statement of intent to kill is relevant in evaluating whether the 
conduct at issue satisfies the substantial step requirement.  "[W]hen the intent to commit murder is clearly shown, slight 
acts in furtherance thereof will constitute an attempt to murder."  54 A.L.R.3d 
612.   See 
also 
People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 703 
(Cal. 1983) ("[T]he 
plainer the intent to commit the offense, the more likely that steps in the 
early stages of the commission of the crime will satisfy the overt act 
requirement."), abrogated on other 
grounds by People v. Chun, 203 P.3d 425 (Cal. 2009).  

 
 

[¶14]     
The 
nature and capability for injury of the weapon possessed by Mr. Gentilini is 
also relevant.  Collier v. State, 846 N.E.2d 340, 349 
(Ind. 2006) ("[A] defendant with a gun is objectively more dangerous from a few 
hundred feet away than a defendant with a knife or a vehicle.").  Given Mr. 
Gentilini's stated intention to kill Mr. Ellsworth, a 
reasonable juror could conclude that he retrieved the loaded gun as a necessary 
step toward completing his plan, and 
that the presence of law enforcement at the apartment complex prevented him from 
executing the final act.3  See 
United States v. Vaught, 133 Fed. 
Appx. 229, 233-34 (6th Cir. 2005) (defendant's actions of threatening to kill 
the victim and driving to her house with a loaded gun were sufficient to 
comprise a substantial step even though police stopped him before he got out of 
the car) and People v. Johnson, 750 P.2d 72, 73 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) (defendant's possession of a working rifle and 
live ammunition, near the victim's location, and his statements that he intended 
to shoot the victim comprised sufficient evidence to submit the case to the 
jury).

 
 

[¶15]     
A 
district court may only grant a motion for judgment of acquittal when the 
evidence is such that a reasonable juror must have a reasonable doubt as to the 
existence of any of the essential elements of the crime.  Wise v. State, 654 P.2d 116, 117 (Wyo. 
1982).  Taken as a whole, a jury 
could conclude that the acts that Mr. Gentilini completed before being 
apprehended by the police constituted a "substantial step" toward the commission 
of the crime of first degree murder.  
Retrieving a rifle and driving back to the site of a previous altercation 
may not, in every case, amount to a substantial step toward the commission of 
attempted first degree murder.  
However, Mr. Gentilini's actions, combined with his stated intent to 
commit the crime, convince us that the evidence in this case was sufficient to 
submit to the jury.  The district 
court did not err in denying Mr. Gentilini's motion for judgment of 
acquittal. 

 
 
Jury 
Instruction

 
 

[¶16]     
In 
his second issue, Mr. Gentilini contends the jury instruction pertaining to 
attempted first degree murder was erroneous.  Because there was no objection to the 
jury instruction at trial, we will review for plain error.  Granzer v. State, 2008 WY 118, ¶ 9, 193 P.3d 266, 269 (Wyo. 2008).  "Plain 
error exists when: 1) the record is clear about the incident alleged as error; 
2) there was a transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and 3) the 
party claiming the error was denied a substantial right which materially 
prejudiced him."  Guy, ¶ 9, 184 P.3d  at 692.  

 
 

[¶17]     
We 
also apply the following standard:

 
 
When 
reviewing questions involving jury instructions, we afford the trial court 
significant deference. Jury instructions must be considered as a whole, and 
individual instructions, or parts of them, should not be singled out and 
considered in isolation.  We confine 
our review to a search for prejudicial error.  As long as the instructions correctly 
state the law and the entire charge covers the relevant issue, reversible error 
will not be found.

 
 

Creecy 
v. State, 
2009 WY 89, ¶ 18, 210 P.3d 1089, 1093 (Wyo. 2009) (internal punctuation 
omitted).  "Jury 
instructions shall not be ruled defective absent a showing that the instructions 
confused or misled the jury as to the proper principles of law and prejudiced 
the defendant."  Baker v. State, 2010 WY 6, ¶ 31, 223 P.3d 542, 555 (Wyo. 2010).

 
 

[¶18]     
The 
relevant instructions state:

 
 
INSTRUCTION 
NO. 11

 
 
The 
necessary elements of the crime of Attempted Murder In the First Degree, in 
violation of Wyoming Statute § 6-2-101(a) and § 6-1-301 are as 
follows;

 
 

1.    
On 
or about the 23rd day of April, 2008;

2.    
while 
in Washakie County, Wyoming;

3.    
Defendant, 
David Gentilini;

4.    
Purposely;

5.    
With 
premeditated malice, attempted to kill a human being, the victim [Mr.] 
Ellsworth;

6.    
With 
the intent to commit the crime of first degree murder; 

7.    
Did 
an act which was a substantial step toward commission of the crime of first 
degree murder.

 
 
If 
you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these elements 
have not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the 
defendant not guilty.

 
 
If, 
on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that 
each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
should find the defendant guilty.  

 
 
INSTRUCTION 
NO. 12

 
 
"Premeditated 
malice" means that the defendant thought about and considered the idea of 
killing before or during taking a substantial act toward commission of the act 
of first degree murder. 

 
 
"Premeditated" 
implies an interval, however brief, between the formation of the intent or 
design to kill and the taking of the substantial act toward the commission of 
the act of first degree murder. 

 
 
INSTRUCTION 
NO. 13

 
 
The 
crime of murder in the first degree is one which requires specific 
intent.

 
 
In 
order to convict the Defendant of attempted murder in the first degree you must 
find that the Defendant specifically intended to commit the underlying offense, 
that being murder in the first degree.

 
 
If 
you have any doubt that the Defendant did not have the specific intent to kill 
the victim in this case then you must find him "not guilty" of the crime of 
attempted murder in the first degree.

 
 
INSTRUCTION 
NO. 14

 
 
A 
substantial step is "conduct which is strongly corroborative of the firmness of 
the person's intention to complete the commission of the 
crime."

 
 
INSTRUCTION 
NO. 15

 
 
If 
you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the defendant 
committed the crime of Attempt to Commit 1st Degree Murder as set 
forth in Instruction No. 11, then you must further consider whether the 
defendant renounced his criminal intention.

 
 
The 
defendant is not liable for an attempt to commit the crime of 1st 
Degree Murder if, under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete 
renunciation of his criminal intention, the defendant avoided the commission of 
the crime of 1st Degree Murder by abandoning his criminal 
effort.

 
 
Renunciation 
is no longer available to the defendant after the defendant has completed all of 
the acts necessary to constitute the criminal effort to commit the crime 
intended.

 
 
If 
you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the defendant 
voluntarily and completely renounced his criminal intention as explained in this 
Instruction, then you should find the defendant not guilty of the crime of 
Attempt to Commit 1st Degree 
Murder.

 
 

[¶19]     
Mr. 
Gentilini contends Instruction 11 did not properly instruct the jury on all of 
the required elements.  He asserts 
that the court should have given two separate instructionsone defining the 
elements of attempt, the other defining the elements of first degree murder. 
 He also contends the instruction 
was inadequate because "[i]t is difficult to state exactly what the intent 
requirements are and where they are to be applied."  

 
 

[¶20]     
A 
jury instruction is not given in error simply because it combines the elements 
of two crimes.  See Rigler v. State, 941 P.2d 734, 741-42 
(Wyo. 1997).  The test of an 
adequate jury instruction is "whether the instructions leave no doubt as to the 
circumstances under which the crime can be found to have been committed."  Mueller v. State, 2001 WY 134, ¶ 9, 36 P.3d 1151, 1155 (Wyo. 2001).  
Although Mr. Gentilini limits his challenge to Instruction 11, that 
instruction must be reviewed in context with the other instructions.  The jury was instructed on the essential 
elements of both attempt and the underlying crime of first degree murder.  The court defined "premeditated," 
"premeditated malice," and "substantial step."  The court also instructed the jury that 
Mr. Gentilini could not be convicted of attempted first degree murder if he 
renounced his intention and abandoned his effort.  Mr. Gentilini did not object to any of 
these instructions.  When these 
instructions are read together with Instruction 11, we are unable to find a 
violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law or that the instructions 
confused or misled the jury. 

 
 

[¶21]     
Mr. 
Gentilini also asserts that the instructions were insufficient because they did 
not identify which of his actions constituted the crime of attempted first 
degree murder.  He contends the jury 
could have used either the act of attempting to run over Mr. Ellsworth with 
the car, or the act of retrieving his gun, as a basis for finding him guilty of 
the attempted murder charge.  He 
cites to Heywood v. State, 2007 WY 
149, 170 P.3d 1227 (Wyo. 2007) for support.  

 
 

[¶22]     
In 
Heywood, the defendant was charged 
with three counts of second-degree sexual assault.  During deliberations, the jury sent a 
question to the district court asking which of the defendant's actions 
constituted each of the three counts.  
The district court did not answer the question and, instead, instructed 
the jury to rely on its recollection of the evidence and arguments.  Heywood, ¶ 19, 170 P.3d  at 1232.  We determined the district court's 
failure to answer the question was plain error.  We explained that the district court has 
a duty to provide additional instruction if the original instructions are 
incomplete or if the jury expresses confusion about a significant element of 
applicable law.  Id., ¶ 28, 170 P.3d  at 1235.  In this case, however, the district 
court received a question from the jury and answered it.    

 
 

[¶23]     
During 
deliberations, the jury sent a note to the district court.  The court then gathered counsel from 
both sides and engaged in the following exchange:

  

THE 
COURT:  Now, the . . . question is, 
"Specifically does the aggravated assault charge"they didn't say charge, but 
the aggravated assault charge, "refer solely to the automobile or does it refer 
to the rifle as well?"  And 
according to the Information that was filed by the County Attorney's Office it 
only relates to the vehicle.  Okay? 
Any questions about that?

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]: No.

 
 
THE 
COURT: Okay.

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]: 
State agrees.

 
 
THE 
COURT: And then the response, "The aggravated assault charge only relates to the 
automobile." Okay? All right.

 
 
The 
district court then provided its response to the jury.  The jury did not ask questions or 
otherwise indicate confusion regarding any other instruction.  

 
 

[¶24]     
During 
trial, the charge of attempted first degree murder was clearly connected to Mr. 
Gentilini's actions with the rifle.4  The State explained, during closing 
arguments, that attempted first degree murder requires an act which was a 
substantial step toward that crime.  
The Prosecutor then stated:

 
 
[Mr. 
Gentilini] goes and he says, "Okay, I'm going to go get a gun."  Okay.  He drives to his residence across town, 
as he said, "I'm going to get a gun."  
That's a step in that direction to commit first degree murder, whether 
it's substantial at this point or not, I think it is.  Going to get a gun, 
okay.

 
 
The 
State also clearly connected Mr. Gentilini's statement of his intent to kill, an 
essential element of attempted first degree murder, to his actions with the 
rifle: 

 
 
So 
let's go back  to the elements again.  
What was he thinking? Intent. Intent. What was he thinking? Normally, you 
know, how are you going to do that? How are you going to prove what somebody is 
thinking? 

 
 


 
 
[B]ut 
what did Mr. [Gentilini] say on April 23, 2008, right after the time this 
happened? "I lost it."  "I lost it, went home  got my gun,  and went back to 
kill him."

 
 
During 
his closing arguments, Defense Counsel also connected Mr. Gentilini's possession 
of the gun with the charge of attempted first degree murder and his actions with 
the car to the aggravated assault charge.  Our review of the jury instructions and 
the trial transcript convince us that the jury understood that the aggravated 
assault charge related to Mr. Gentilini's actions with the vehicle and the 
attempted first degree murder charge related to his actions with the rifle. 

 
 

[¶25]     
Mr. 
Gentilini suggests the jury instructions should have included a statement 
reciting which of his actions fulfilled the elements of each crime.5  We have never required such a statement 
in a jury instruction, and Mr. Gentilini did not request such an instruction at 
trial.  There is no violation of a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law.  
The district court adequately informed the jury of the elements of each 
crime and the circumstances that had to exist in order to find Mr. Gentilini 
guilty of those crimes.  
Mr. Gentilini has failed to establish plain error.  

 
 

[¶26]     
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The hammer holder was 
described as hard, made of leather, and about 16 inches long.  It was not holding a hammer at the time 
of the incident.

 

2In this appeal, Mr. 
Gentilini does not contend that there was insufficient evidence to support the 
jury's verdict.

 
 

3The jury was 
instructed that it must return a verdict of not guilty if it found that Mr. 
Gentilini voluntarily and completely renounced his criminal intention.  The guilty verdict indicates that the 
jury concluded that Mr. Gentilini did not abandon his plan to kill Mr. Ellsworth 
of his own accord but only because of the presence of police at the scene.  Mr. Gentilini does not challenge this 
result.

 
 

4We 
have said that this Court determines "the State's theories from its charging documents, its 
requested jury instructions, etceterafrom official record evidence, not from 
argument by counsel."  Tanner v. State, 2002 WY 170, ¶ 14, 57 P.3d 1242, 1246 (Wyo. 2002).  
However, when reviewing whether jury instructions misled or confused a 
jury, we consider all the jury heard and the instructions as a whole.  See United States v. Caro, 965 F.2d 1548, 1555 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1992).  See also Daley v. 
Wenzel, 2001 WY 80, ¶ 38, 30 P.3d 547, 556 (Wyo. 2001) (considering what the 
jury heard in closing arguments in a determination of sufficiency of jury 
instructions).

 
 

5We note that Mr. 
Gentilini never expressed any confusion about which of his actions comprised 
each crime.  Mr. Gentilini's 
proposed jury instructions also did not include a statement reciting which acts 
should be considered for each crime.  
His proposed instruction for Attempted First Degree Murder read: 

 
 

1.     
On or about the 
23rd day of April, 2008;

2.     
In Washakie County, 
Wyoming;

3.     
The Defendant, David 
A. Gentilini;

4.     
Purposely; 
and

5.     
With premeditated 
malice;

6.     
Intending to commit 
the crime of first degree murder;

7.     
Did attempt to kill 
[Mr.] Ellsworth. 

 
 
If you find from your 
consideration of all the evidence that each of these elements has been proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the Defendant 
guilty.

 
 
If, on the other 
hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these 
elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the 
Defendant not guilty.

 
 
His proposed jury 
instruction for Aggravated Assault and Battery read:

 
 

1.     
On or about the 23rd day of April 2008

2.     
 In the County of Washakie, and State of 
Wyoming

3.     
The Defendant, David 
A. Gentilini

4.     
Attempted to 
cause

5.     
Bodily injury to 
another person [Mr.] Ellsworth

6.     
With a deadly 
weapon.

 
 
If you find from your 
consideration of all the evidence that each of these elements has been proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the Defendant 
guilty.

 
 
If, on the other 
hand, you find from your consideration of all of the evidence that any of these 
elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the 
Defendant not guilty.