Title: Commonwealth v. Gandia

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-13341 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JONATHAN GANDIA. 
 
 
May 19, 2023. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Discovery, Disclosure of identity of 
informer.  Privileged Communication.  Evidence, Informer, 
Privileged communication, Relevancy and materiality. 
 
 
 
This case is one of two that we decide today in which the 
Commonwealth seeks relief from a trial court order requiring it 
to disclose information regarding a confidential informant.  See 
Commonwealth v. Whitfield, 492 Mass.     (2023).1  For the 
reasons discussed infra, we conclude that the motion judge 
abused her discretion by failing to conduct the two-stage 
inquiry applicable to such motions.  See id. at    ; 
Commonwealth v. Bonnett, 472 Mass. 827, 846 (2015), S.C., 482 
Mass. 838 (2019).  We further conclude that, based on the 
 
 
1 This case comes before us on a reservation and report by a 
single justice of the Commonwealth's petition pursuant to G. L. 
c. 211, § 3. 
 
2 
 
undisputed documentary record in this case, disclosure of the 
identity2 of the confidential informant is unwarranted.3 
 
 
1.  Facts.  We summarize the facts as found by the motion 
judge, supplemented by undisputed facts from the record.4  See 
Whitfield, 492 Mass. at    .  On November 10, 2021, the 
confidential informant in this case, who was a registered 
informant with the Springfield police department's firearms 
investigation unit (FIU), contacted police to report 
observations of drug transactions occurring in that city.  The 
informant's identity was known to a captain in the Springfield 
police department and other supervisory officers in the FIU, as 
the informant previously had provided information resulting in 
the issuance of numerous search warrants resulting in seizures 
of firearms, "crack" cocaine, heroin, and large sums of cash. 
 
 
On this occasion, the informant notified Springfield police 
Officer Felix Aguirre that a man named "John" was dealing crack 
cocaine at a certain building on School Street (building).  The 
informant described John as having a large beard and wearing a 
black hooded sweatshirt, black pants, and a matching black hat 
backward.  The informant explained that John was carrying crack 
cocaine and money in a black "fanny pack" and that he was 
driving a white Dodge Durango sport utility vehicle (SUV) with 
black accents and distinctive black rims.  The informant stated 
that the SUV was parked at the corner of School and Temple 
 
 
2 In the defendant's motion for disclosure, he requested the 
informant's name and address, as well as additional information 
relating to the informant's interactions with law enforcement.  
The motion judge allowed the motion "for disclosure of the 
identity of the Commonwealth's [i]nformant," and on appeal, both 
parties treat the order as one ordering disclosure of the 
informant's identity only.  Should the defendant renew his 
request for information short of name and address, the motion 
judge should assess the request in accordance with the 
principles we reaffirm today in Commonwealth v. Whitfield, 492 
Mass.    ,     (2023). 
 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief of the Massachusetts 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
 
4 The Commonwealth's unopposed motion to supplement the 
record pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 8 (e), as appearing in 481 
Mass. 1611 (2019), to include the transcript dated May 10, 2022, 
from the hearing in the District Court on the defendant's motion 
for disclosure, is allowed. 
3 
 
Streets, which Aguirre knew from his prior experience to be a 
high crime area where police have received numerous complaints 
for "open air drug dealing." 
 
 
Aguirre went to the intersection of School and Temple 
Streets, where he observed the SUV parked at the corner, as the 
informant described.  Based on the SUV's registration 
information, Aguirre determined that the SUV was registered to 
the defendant,5 Jonathan Gandia, whose driver's license had been 
suspended.  Aguirre and Springfield police Detective Robert 
Patruno, who had arrived at the scene and observed the 
defendant, compared the defendant's photograph on file in the 
registry of motor vehicles with the appearance of the individual 
they believed to be John, and determined that John was the 
individual in the photograph. 
 
 
Other FIU officers arrived in the area of School and High 
Streets and began conducting surveillance.  They witnessed the 
defendant come and go from the doorway of the building, converse 
with people in the entryway, and admit them to the building or 
follow them in and then follow behind them when they left a few 
minutes after entering.  Through their observations, the 
officers determined that the defendant's actions were consistent 
with "open air drug dealing." 
 
 
While officers were conducting surveillance, Aguirre 
remained in constant communication with the informant.  At one 
point, the informant told Aguirre that the defendant was 
preparing to leave the building.  The informant then mentioned 
that he had observed the defendant make a drug transaction, 
during which time the defendant had "shown a large amount of 
crack cocaine in a clear plastic bag and had placed it into his 
fanny pack."  When the defendant got into and started his SUV, 
officers surrounded him, ordered him out of the vehicle, pat 
frisked and arrested the defendant, and recovered crack cocaine 
and cash. 
 
 
2.  Prior proceedings.  On November 12, 2021, a District 
Court judge issued a criminal complaint against the defendant, 
charging him with trafficking in cocaine, a class B drug, of 
eighteen grams or more, but less than thirty-six grams, in 
violation of G. L. c. 94C, 32E (b) (1), and unlicensed operation 
of a motor vehicle in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 10.  On 
 
5 Although the Commonwealth commenced this action by filing 
a petition in the county court, for convenience we refer to the 
respondent as the "defendant." 
4 
 
February 23, 2022, the Commonwealth moved to amend the 
trafficking charge to possession with intent to distribute a 
class B controlled substance in violation of G. L. c. 94C, 
§ 32A (a), which motion was allowed. 
 
 
On May 6, 2022, the defendant, through counsel, moved for 
disclosure of the informant's name and address, as well as 
details relating to the informant's credibility, such as how 
long police and other law enforcement agencies had employed the 
informant, the number of investigations in which the informant 
participated, and any compensation the informant received, 
including charge reductions, changes in custodial status, and 
immunity offered in exchange for testimony.  A hearing was held 
on the motion for disclosure; no witnesses testified at the 
hearing.  The judge subsequently issued an order allowing the 
defendant's motion to disclose the identity of the 
Commonwealth's informant.  The Commonwealth filed a motion to 
stay in the District Court, so that it could pursue a G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, petition, which motion was allowed; and on July 18, 
2022, the Commonwealth filed its petition for relief from the 
order of disclosure in the county court.  The defendant opposed 
the motion.  A single justice of this court stayed the trial 
proceedings and subsequently reserved and reported the matter to 
the full court. 
 
 
3.  Discussion.  We review a motion judge's order requiring 
disclosure of the identity of a confidential informant for an 
abuse of discretion.  Whitfield, 492 Mass. at    .  Where the 
motion judge's factual findings are based solely on documentary 
evidence, we afford them no deference.  Id. at    . 
 
 
As a matter of substantive law, this case is governed by 
the legal framework that we clarify and reaffirm today in 
Whitfield, 492 Mass. at    .  See Bonnett, 472 Mass. at 846.  
Under that framework, a motion judge must apply a two-stage 
inquiry to a motion for disclosure of the identity of a 
confidential informant: 
 
"In the first stage of the analysis, a court makes a 
preliminary determination whether the Commonwealth properly 
asserted the informant privilege, see Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 509(a)(1), and if so, whether the defendant has met his 
or her burden to challenge the Commonwealth's invocation of 
the privilege by establishing 'an impermissible 
interference with [the defendant's] right to present a 
defense.'  Bonnett, supra.  The informant privilege may be 
asserted by the Commonwealth where the Commonwealth 
5 
 
otherwise would be required to provide an informant's 
identity to a defendant as part of its discovery 
obligations under Mass. R. Crim. P. 14[, as appearing in 
442 Mass. 1518 (2004)].  See id., quoting [Roviaro v. 
United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957)].  Should a defendant 
wish to overcome the informant privilege, the defendant 
bears the burden of challenging the Commonwealth's 
assertion.  [Commonwealth v. Dias, 451 Mass. 463, 464 
(2008)].  'We have characterized a defendant's obligation 
at this juncture as "relatively undemanding," but it does 
require the defendant to articulate a basis sufficient for 
the judge to "assess the materiality and relevancy of the 
disclosure to the defense, if that relevancy is not 
apparent from the nature of the case."'  [Commonwealth v. 
D.M., 480 Mass. 1004, 1006 (2018)], quoting Bonnett, supra 
at 847. 
 
"Only if both the Commonwealth and the defendant have met 
their burdens in the initial stage should a judge then 
proceed to the second stage of the analysis, where the 
judge must 'decide whether the informant's identity and 
concomitant information are sufficiently "relevant and 
helpful to the defense of an accused" that it must be 
disclosed.'  Bonnett, 472 Mass. at 847, quoting Dias, 451 
Mass. at 468.  This determination necessitates a balancing 
of 'the public interest in protecting the flow of 
information against [the defendant's] right to prepare his 
[or her] defense.'  Bonnett, supra at 847-848, quoting 
Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 62.  The inquiry at the balancing 
stage must be case-specific:  '[w]hether a proper balance 
renders nondisclosure erroneous must . . . tak[e] into 
consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the 
possible significance of the informer's testimony, and 
other relevant factors.'  Roviaro, supra.  Where disclosure 
(1) is sufficiently 'relevant and helpful to the defense of 
an accused' or (2) 'is essential to a fair determination of 
a cause, the privilege must give way.'  Dias, supra, 
quoting Roviaro, supra at 60–61." 
 
Whitfield, supra at    . 
 
 
Here, it is undisputed that the motion judge failed to 
conduct this two-stage inquiry.  This was an abuse of 
discretion.  See Bonnett, 472 Mass. at 850 (remanding for 
further proceedings "to conduct the requisite 'orderly 
appraisal'" of factors relevant to motion for disclosure of 
informant's identity).  Moreover, for the reasons discussed 
6 
 
infra, we conclude that it is apparent on the undisputed record 
before us that disclosure is unwarranted under the applicable 
legal framework. 
 
 
First, the Commonwealth properly asserted the informant 
privilege, where it raised sufficient concern for the safety of 
the informant should his or her identity be disclosed and it 
asserted that revealing the identity of the informant would have 
a "chilling effect" on such informants in other cases making it 
"unlikely that they would continue to participate in 
investigations."  The defendant argues that the Commonwealth's 
invocation of the privilege is insufficient because it fails to 
offer "specific" and "tangible" safety concerns in the 
circumstances of this case.  We disagree.  Here, the 
Commonwealth argued that disclosure would place the informant in 
danger where the informant had provided numerous tips to the 
Springfield police department in the past, leading to the 
seizure, pursuant to warrants, of various forms of contraband, 
including firearms.  This was sufficient to invoke the 
privilege.  See D.M., 480 Mass. at 1005 (privilege properly 
asserted where informant's prior involvement in firearms cases 
would result in danger to informant if identity revealed). 
 
 
Next, we conclude that, in the circumstances of this case, 
the defendant has met his "relatively undemanding" burden at the 
initial stage of the inquiry to show that the informant's 
identity is material and relevant to his defense at trial, see 
Bonnett, 472 Mass. at 847; Commonwealth v. Kelsey, 464 Mass. 
315, 323 (2013), where the informant was present during the 
events leading up to the defendant's arrest, and the defendant 
asserts that the informant is the only nongovernment witness 
with the potential to rebut the police officers' anticipated 
testimony -- arguably relevant to the element of intent to 
distribute -- that people were entering and leaving the 
surveilled premises in a manner consistent with drug dealing.6  
 
 
6 To the extent the defendant relies on it, we reject the 
motion judge's reasoning that disclosure is warranted because 
the informant in this case is "essential" to a determination of 
probable cause in connection with a potential motion to 
suppress.  Probable cause for the defendant's arrest and the 
search of his vehicle arose when, on learning that the defendant 
did not have a valid driver's license, officers observed him get 
into the vehicle and engage the ignition.  See Commonwealth v. 
Uski, 263 Mass. 22, 24 (1928) (any intentional act setting in 
motion power of vehicle constitutes operation of vehicle within 
 
7 
 
However, for the reasons discussed infra, we conclude that the 
requisite balancing of the interests leads to the conclusion 
that disclosure of the informant's identity is unwarranted. 
 
 
At the second stage of the inquiry, a judge must assess 
whether the informant's identity sufficiently is "relevant and 
helpful to the defense of an accused" to require disclosure.  
D.M., 480 Mass. at 1006, quoting Bonnett, 472 Mass. at 847.  As 
stated supra, in making this determination, a judge must 
"balance[] . . . the public interest in protecting the flow of 
information against the individual's right to prepare his [or 
her] defense" and consider "the crime charged, the possible 
defenses, the possible significance of the [privileged] 
testimony, and other relevant factors" (citation omitted).  
Bonnett, supra at 848.  Accordingly, the inquiry at this stage 
boils down to "whether disclosure would have provided material 
evidence needed by the defendant for a fair presentation of his 
case to the jury."  Commonwealth v. Madigan, 449 Mass. 702, 706 
(2007), quoting Commonwealth v. Lugo, 406 Mass. 565, 574 (1990). 
 
 
Here, as the motion judge recognized, "[t]he informant in 
this case did not participate in the crime charged."  That is, 
proof of the crime charged does not require proof of any of the 
drug transactions that the informant is alleged to have 
witnessed.  Rather, the Commonwealth proposes to prove the crime 
charged -- possession with intent to distribute -- primarily by 
presenting evidence that twenty-two grams of crack cocaine and 
$2,500 of cash were seized in connection with the search 
following the defendant's arrest.  See Commonwealth v. Sepheus, 
468 Mass. 160, 164-166 (2014) (large amount of narcotics and 
cash can support inference of intent to distribute). 
 
 
This case therefore is governed by our well-settled 
precedents holding that the identity of a mere "tipster" need 
not be disclosed.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barry, 481 Mass. 
 
statute governing offense of operation of vehicle while under 
influence of intoxicating liquor).  Moreover, as we have 
observed, there is a significant distinction between "a demand 
for disclosure at a pretrial hearing, where the issue is 
probable cause for arrest or search, and a demand for disclosure 
at trial, where the issue is the defendant's ultimate guilt or 
innocence."  D.M., 480 Mass. at 1006, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Madigan, 449 Mass. 702, 706 n.8 (2007).  See Commonwealth v. 
Lugo, 406 Mass. 565, 571 (1990) ("nondisclosure is rather 
readily countenanced at pre-trial hearings, but not so at the 
trial itself" [citation omitted]). 
8 
 
388, 409-411, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 51 (2019) (disclosure not 
warranted where informant was not percipient witness to crime 
and was "merely relaying inadmissible, immaterial 'word on the 
street' information about the [crime]"); Commonwealth v. 
Maldonado, 456 Mass. 1012, 1012-1013 (2010) (potential testimony 
of tipsters as to information provided hours before, and 
ultimately leading to, defendant's stop was insufficient to 
warrant disclosure of tipsters' identity); Commonwealth v. 
Brzezinski, 405 Mass. 401, 408 (1989) (disclosure of tipster's 
identity not required where informant neither participated in 
crime charged nor was present during execution of search warrant 
or seizure of contraband found in search).  The defendant argues 
that this case is distinguishable from those cases because the 
Commonwealth also intends to offer the testimony of the 
surveilling officers regarding the actions they observed to be 
consistent with drug dealing, as additional evidence 
demonstrating intent to distribute.  Admittedly, the informant 
witnessed at least some of the activity that will be the subject 
of the officers' testimony.  However, where the benefit of 
impeaching the officers' testimony on this point would be 
marginal at best, and where there is nothing to suggest that the 
informant in fact would testify in a manner helpful to the 
defendant, the defendant's interest in exploring this line of 
questioning is insufficient to outweigh the government's 
interests in protecting the informant's identity from 
disclosure.  In other words, we conclude, after balancing the 
interests involved, that the information sought is not 
sufficiently material or relevant to the defense to warrant 
disclosure of the informant's identity in the face of the 
Commonwealth's assertion of the privilege.  See Bonnett, 472 
Mass. at 847, citing Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60–61. 
 
 
4.  Conclusion.  For the reasons discussed supra, we 
conclude that the motion judge abused her discretion by failing 
to conduct the two-stage inquiry applicable to motions for 
disclosure of information subject to the Commonwealth's 
assertion of the informant privilege.  Moreover, based on the 
undisputed record before us, disclosure of the informant's 
identity is unwarranted under the applicable legal standard.  
Accordingly, we remand the case to the county court for entry of 
a judgment reversing the motion judge's disclosure order and 
remanding the matter to the trial court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
9 
 
Michael W. Locke, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
Joseph N. Schneiderman for the respondent. 
Luke Ryan, Molly Ryan Strehorn, & Joshua M. Daniels, for 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief.