Title: State v. Were

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Were, 94 Ohio St.3d 173, 2002-Ohio-481.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. WERE, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Were (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 173.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder of a prison guard — Death penalty 
reversed and cause remanded for new trial, when — Under former R.C. 
2945.37(A), now subsection (B), trial court must hold a competency 
hearing, when — An evidentiary competency hearing is constitutionally 
required, when. 
(No. 98-2197 — Submitted September 18, 2001 — Decided February 6, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-950908. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  Under former R.C. 2945.37(A) (now subsection [B]), a trial court must hold a 
competency hearing if a request is made before trial. 
2.  An evidentiary competency hearing is constitutionally required whenever there 
are sufficient indicia of incompetency to call into doubt defendant’s 
competency to stand trial.  (State v. Berry [1995], 72 Ohio St.3d 354, 650 
N.E.2d 433, followed.) 
__________________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.  In April 1993, inmates rioted at the 
Southern Ohio Correctional Facility in Lucasville, Ohio.  During the upheaval, 
groups of inmates overpowered prison guards and held authorities at bay for 
several days.  Before control was regained at the maximum security facility, 
several inmates and one guard were murdered.  In this death-penalty case, 
defendant-appellant, James Were, was tried and found guilty of the murder of the 
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2 
prison guard, Robert Vallandingham.1  Upon appeal, the court of appeals 
affirmed.  This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right from the 
court of appeals. 
 
Appellant raises thirty-one propositions of law for our consideration.  
However, because we find merit in appellant’s claim in one of those propositions 
that the court committed reversible error, we do not reach the other issues.  In 
proposition VIII, appellant asserts that he was deprived of a fair trial because the 
trial court failed to conduct a competency hearing as repeatedly requested by trial 
counsel.  We find this argument meritorious.  Accordingly, we overturn his 
convictions and death sentence and reverse and remand for a new trial. 
 
Fundamental to our adversarial system of justice is the due process right of 
a criminal defendant who is legally incompetent not to be subjected to trial.  State 
v. Berry (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 354, 359, 650 N.E.2d 433, 438, citing Pate v. 
Robinson (1966), 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815, and Drope v. 
Missouri (1975), 420 U.S. 162, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103.  In Dusky v. United 
States (1960), 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 789, 4 L.Ed.2d 824, 825, the 
United States Supreme Court defined the test for competence to stand trial as 
whether the defendant “ ‘has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer 
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational 
as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him,’ ” quoting the 
brief of the United States Solicitor General. 
 
In R.C. 2945.37, the General Assembly codified the criminal defendant’s 
right to a competency hearing and set forth the test to determine competency.  At 
the time of Were’s trial, this statute provided: 
 
“(A) In a criminal action in a court of common pleas or municipal court, 
the court, prosecutor, or defense may raise the issue of the defendant’s 
                                                          
 
1. 
Although appellant was also tried for the murder of inmate Bruce Harris, the jury 
acquitted him of those charges. 
January Term, 2002 
3 
competence to stand trial.  If the issue is raised before trial, the court shall hold a 
hearing on the issue as provided in this section.  * * * 
 
“A defendant is presumed competent to stand trial, unless it is proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence in a hearing under this section that because of his 
present mental condition he is incapable of understanding the nature and 
objective of the proceedings against him or of presently assisting in his defense.”  
(Emphasis added.)  142 Ohio Laws, Part I, 755-756. 
 
Thus, under former R.C. 2945.37(A), a trial court must hold a competency 
hearing if a request is made before trial.  (Substantially the same requirement is 
now in subsection [B].)  Our cases have underscored that requirement.  See State 
v. Hessler (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 108, 124, 734 N.E.2d 1237, 1253; State v. Bock 
(1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 108, 109, 28 OBR 207, 209, 502 N.E.2d 1016, 1018. 
 
Defense counsel filed a pretrial motion requesting a competency hearing 
on March 27, 1995.  Although the trial court ordered a competency evaluation, the 
requested hearing was not held or waived.  Instead, on August 23, 1995, the trial 
court issued a journal entry that determined competency without a hearing: 
 
“The court finds that the Shawnee Forensic Center attempted to conduct a 
competency examination of the defendant as ordered by the court.  The court 
finds that the defendant refused to speak with the examiners in a face to face 
confrontation with the defendant ordered by the court.  A copy of this report is 
attached.  The examiners concluded based on their information that defendant was 
intentionally refusing to cooperate as part of a deliberate ploy on his part to 
disrupt these legal proceedings.  It was their further opinion that defendant is 
competent and is capable of understanding the nature and objective of the 
proceedings and assisting in his defense. 
 
“The court finds defendant is competent to stand trial and these 
proceedings should continue as scheduled.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
Thus, based on the examiners’ report, the trial court concluded that 
appellant was competent. Since appellant refused to meet with the examiners, this 
determination was made without the benefit of a psychiatric evaluation.  Also, the 
court’s decision was made without a defense stipulation to the report or a hearing 
on the matter.  We find this to be error. The issue was raised prior to trial; thus, in 
accordance with the express language of the statute, the trial court was required to 
hold a competency hearing.  Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not 
satisfy the requirement of a hearing in former R.C. 2945.37(A). 
 
Moreover, the record supports a further finding that the failure to hold a 
competency hearing was a constitutional violation.  In Berry, supra, we stated, 
“The right to a hearing on the issue of competency rises to the level of a 
constitutional guarantee where the record contains ‘sufficient indicia of 
incompetence,’ such that an inquiry into the defendant’s competency is necessary 
to ensure the defendant’s right to a fair trial.”  Berry, 72 Ohio St.3d at 359, 650 
N.E.2d at 438, quoting Drope v. Missouri (1975), 420 U.S. 162, 175, 95 S.Ct. 
896, 905, 43 L.Ed.2d 103, 115.  We hold that an evidentiary competency hearing 
is constitutionally required whenever there are sufficient indicia of incompetency 
to call into doubt defendant’s competency to stand trial.  (State v. Berry [1995], 
72 Ohio St.3d 354, 650 N.E.2d 433, followed.) 
 
Here, the record is replete with suggestions of appellant’s incompetency.  
Defense counsel directly raised the issue and asked for a competency hearing on 
several occasions: (1) in the previously mentioned pretrial motion, (2) after 
opening arguments, (3) during the trial, and (4) before the mitigation phase began.  
While defense counsel was afforded the opportunity to offer reasons in support of 
their request for a competency hearing at these various points, they were never 
afforded an evidentiary hearing. 
 
Also, on many occasions, defense counsel directly or indirectly 
represented to the court that they believed appellant to be incompetent. For 
January Term, 2002 
5 
instance, at a status conference held on July 18, 1995, defense counsel John 
Mackey stated that he had served for the past eight years as a part-time referee in 
probate court handling civil commitments.  Based on this experience, he believed 
that appellant exhibited signs of paranoia and harbored suspicion against the 
defense team that, in counsel’s view, could not be overcome. 
 
Additionally, defense counsel filed two separate motions to withdraw and 
a motion for a continuance.  As grounds for these motions, counsel cited 
appellant’s bizarre belief that counsel was taping confidential conversations and 
turning the tapes over to the state.  Counsel also cited appellant’s refusal to speak 
with them or any member of the defense team and his refusal to accept their 
correspondence.  Counsel consistently claimed that appellant’s failure to 
cooperate seriously hampered their ability to present a defense. 
 
Appellant’s own letters and statements to the court suggest that appellant’s 
paranoia centered on defense counsel.  In addition to other pro se filings, 
appellant filed six pro se motions to dismiss his attorneys.  He stated that his 
attorneys were racially biased, had threatened his life, were conspiring with the 
prosecution, and had failed to adequately prepare for the mitigation phase.  The 
last argument ignored his refusal to speak with the mitigation specialist. 
 
The state admits that an evidentiary hearing on competency was not held.  
However, the state relies on Bock, supra, 28 Ohio St.3d 108, 28 OBR 207, 502 
N.E.2d 1016, where this court found that the failure to hold a competency hearing 
was harmless error. We find that the state’s reliance on Bock is misplaced.  The 
facts in Bock are far different from those present in this case. 
 
In Bock, the court found harmless error in the trial court’s failure to 
conduct a competency hearing in part because the defendant testified in his own 
defense and was subject to cross-examination, and the record failed to reveal 
sufficient indicia of incompetency.  In addition, the court noted, “Defense 
counsel, after the original motion for a hearing, failed ever again to mention the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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defendant’s competency until the time for appeal.” Id., 28 Ohio St.3d at 111, 28 
OBR at 210, 502 N.E.2d at 1019. 
 
Here, defense counsel continually raised the issue of appellant’s 
competency.  Also, unlike the defendant in Bock, appellant never testified during 
the guilt phase, and his unsworn statement offered during mitigation was not 
subject to cross-examination.  Nor can it be said that the record here lacks 
sufficient indicia of appellant’s incompetency.  In addition to defense counsel’s 
repeated allegations, the many pro se motions filed by appellant clearly cast doubt 
on appellant’s competency. 
 
The court of appeals found that appellant’s “intransigence” was to blame 
for the trial court’s failure to hold the statutorily mandated hearing.  However, the 
appellate court does not explain how appellant’s refusal to speak with appointed 
mental health experts prevented the judge from conducting a hearing.  Even 
without an interview, experts could have reviewed counsel’s problems and the 
many letters and motions written by appellant.  In addition, appellant could have 
been moved to a mental facility in order to be observed as requested by defense 
counsel.  Moreover, the record does not support the lower court’s conclusion that 
appellant was engaged in a “calculated effort to avoid prosecution by delaying the 
progress of the trial.”  In fact, the contrary may be true in light of appellant’s 
stated desire to be brought to trial earlier. 
 
Understandably, appellant’s intransigence and lack of cooperation were 
frustrating to the trial court. However, “[c]ommon sense dictates that no 
defendant can make a record of lack of competency absent the findings and 
hearings contemplated by R.C. 2945.37 and 2945.371.”  Bock, 28 Ohio St.3d at 
113, 28 OBR at 212, 502 N.E.2d at 1021 (Wright, J., dissenting). 
 
Based on these facts, we conclude that the trial court violated appellant’s 
constitutional and statutory right to a competency hearing.  We find appellant’s 
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7 
proposition VIII to be well taken.  Accordingly, we vacate appellant’s convictions 
and sentence, reverse the judgment, and remand for a new trial. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
RESNICK, J., dissents. 
 
COOK, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., dissenting.  I believe that the arguments the 
majority relies on are unpersuasive and inapposite to the conclusion it has reached 
in vacating the appellant’s convictions and sentence and remanding the case for a 
new trial.  I, therefore, dissent from the judgment of the court. 
 
The trial court aptly described the situation: “[T]he Shawnee Forensic 
Center attempted to conduct a competency examination of the defendant as 
ordered by the court.  The court finds that the defendant refused to speak with the 
examiners in a face to face confrontation with the defendant ordered by the court.  
* * * The examiners concluded based on their information that defendant was 
intentionally refusing to cooperate as a part of a deliberate ploy on his part to 
disrupt these legal proceedings.  It was their further opinion that defendant is 
competent and is capable of understanding the nature and objective of the 
proceedings and assisting in his defense.”  (Emphasis added.)  How then can the 
trial court be found to have committed reversible error when the appellant himself 
refused to cooperate during the attempted evaluation?  The trial court made a 
good-faith effort to comply with defense counsel’s request, yet the only stumbling 
block to ensuring that a hearing would take place was the appellant’s 
unwillingness to speak with the examiners assigned to determine his competence 
to stand trial. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
Furthermore, the majority’s wide-ranging examples of appellant’s 
supposed incompetence are equally unpersuasive.  The appellant’s desire to 
dismiss his counsel does not, in and of itself, lead to the conclusion that appellant 
is incompetent.  Nor does the fact that defense counsel attempted to withdraw and 
to continue the case prove that appellant was incapable of understanding the 
charges against him.  As the appellate court thoughtfully stated, “In those 
meaningful respects where objective evidence of the state of his competency 
might have been provided, Were acted with varying degrees of intransigence that, 
at times, rose to the level of an outright refusal to cooperate.  In particular, he 
resisted any meaningful attempt to have his mental state evaluated by the court-
appointed experts.  In our view * * * Were’s lack of cooperation was a symptom 
not of mental illness, but of his calculated effort to avoid prosecution by delaying 
the progress of the trial.”  State v. Were (Sept. 30, 1998), Hamilton App. No. C-
950908, unreported, at 16, 1998 WL 682146.  The appellant wittingly created 
every obstacle that has ultimately led this court to find in his favor.  Moreover, 
due to the appellant’s deliberate acts, there was no way the trial court could 
conduct a hearing.  It is unfortunate that appellant’s seemingly purposeful delay 
tactics have now been misconstrued as a violation of his due process rights.  If 
any error occurred, it was invited error on the part of the appellant and certainly 
not reversible error as the majority has found.  Thus, I would affirm the judgment 
of the court of appeals and impose the sentence of death on the appellant. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  I fully agree with the legal principles set forth in 
the syllabus.  And I also agree with the majority that the trial court violated 
Were’s due process rights by failing to hold the pretrial competency hearing 
mandated by R.C. 2945.37.  But despite my agreement with these aspects of the 
majority’s decision, I cannot join the ultimate disposition of this case.  Today’s 
decision implies that a reversal and remand for a new trial are the only remedy 
January Term, 2002 
9 
available to rectify the trial court’s constitutional error.  I would follow the lead of 
numerous jurisdictions, however, and order a remand to the trial court for the 
limited purpose of conducting, if possible, a retrospective competency hearing. 
I 
 
The majority finds that the record contains “sufficient indicia of 
incompetence” that triggered Were’s due process right to a competency hearing.  
See State v. Berry (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 354, 359, 650 N.E.2d 433, 438.  I agree 
with the majority’s conclusion in that regard, but for somewhat different reasons. 
 
Defense counsel first raised the issue of Were’s competency to stand trial 
in a motion filed in March 1995.  Following a court order for a psychological 
examination, which was not completed because Were did not cooperate, the trial 
court journalized an entry denying defense counsel’s motion for a competency 
hearing.  The court, relying on a psychologist’s report and a letter from Were, 
found that “the defendant appears to be competent to stand trial” and noted that 
Were’s “lack of cooperation alone is not sufficient to render him incompetent.” 
 
In the months following the psychological examination, Were filed several 
pro se motions seeking removal of his counsel and appointment of new counsel.  
Were also requested new counsel at a pretrial hearing in July 1995, during which 
he told the court that his attorneys “show[ed] prejudice and racism towards me” 
and that he could not trust them because of their “trickery.”  Following this 
hearing, the trial court denied Were’s request to have counsel removed and 
ordered a second psychological evaluation, despite the fact that the defendant had 
refused to cooperate with the previous evaluation.  In a journal entry the court 
stated: 
 
“The Court finds that counsel for defendant are competent, highly skilled 
practitioners fully capable of representing this defendant in these matters.  The 
Court finds that counsel for defendant have filed numerous motions and received 
and reviewed voluminous discovery.  The defendant on the other hand has refused 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
in every way to cooperate or assist his counsel in his defense.  This failure to 
cooperate is either a deliberate tactic on the part of the defendant to inject error in 
these proceedings or the product of some mental incapacity.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
By expressly acknowledging the possibility that Were was incompetent to 
stand trial, the trial court implicitly acknowledged the existence of a genuine issue 
concerning Were’s competency.  See Thompson v. Commonwealth (Ky.2001), 56 
S.W.3d 406, 407-408.  This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that one of 
Were’s attorneys, who had conducted civil commitment proceedings as a probate 
court magistrate, advised the court that Were exhibited signs of a paranoid 
personality disorder that rendered him incapable of assisting in his defense.  See 
Drope v. Missouri (1975), 420 U.S. 162, 177, 95 S.Ct. 896, 906, 43 L.Ed.2d 103, 
116, fn. 13 (noting that a lawyer’s representation about the client’s competence 
“is unquestionably a factor which should be considered” in deciding whether to 
hold a competency hearing).  Moreover, by ordering a further psychological 
evaluation, the trial court sent the implicit message that it no longer trusted its 
previous competency determination after having observed Were firsthand at the 
pretrial hearing. 
 
It is true that the trial court later concluded that Were was merely 
uncooperative with counsel and that Were was, in fact, competent to stand trial.  
And the trial court found nothing about Were’s behavior during trial to change its 
opinion on that issue.  But because the court had already found that a genuine 
issue existed concerning Were’s competency, the due process requirement for a 
competency hearing was already triggered.  The trial court therefore committed 
constitutional error by failing to conduct the pretrial competency hearing required 
by former R.C. 2945.37(A) (see R.C. 2945.37[B]). 
II 
 
Having found a constitutional violation, the majority reverses Were’s 
conviction and remands for a new trial.  In doing so, however, the majority fails to 
January Term, 2002 
11 
consider a viable alternate remedy.  Specifically, today’s judgment overlooks the 
possibility of remanding this cause to the trial court for a retrospective 
competency evaluation.  That is, this court could remand this case to the trial 
court for a hearing in which the state may establish the defendant’s competency at 
the time of trial and, in effect, “demonstrate that the * * * trial court’s failure to 
hold a competency hearing constituted harmless error.”  James v. Singletary 
(C.A.11, 1992), 957 F.2d 1562, 1571. 
 
Admittedly, reversal and remand for a new trial because of a trial court’s 
failure to hold a constitutionally required competency hearing is consistent with 
United States Supreme Court precedent.  See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. at 183, 
95 S.Ct. at 909, 43 L.Ed.2d at 119-120; Pate v. Robinson (1966), 383 U.S. 375, 
386-387, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842-843, 15 L.Ed.2d 815, 822-823.  In Drope, the court 
reversed the petitioner’s conviction upon finding a due process violation and 
declined to remand for a determination of whether the petitioner was competent at 
the time of trial.  “Given the inherent difficulties of such a nunc pro tunc 
determination under the most favorable circumstances * * *, we cannot conclude 
that such a procedure would be adequate here.”  Drope, 420 U.S. at 183, 95 S.Ct. 
at 909, 43 L.Ed.2d at 119-120.  Similarly, the Pate court recognized “the 
difficulty of retrospectively determining an accused’s competence to stand trial” 
and simply ordered the district court to grant habeas corpus relief rather than 
attempt to do so.  Pate, 383 U.S. at 387, 86 S.Ct. at 843, 15 L.Ed.2d at 823, citing 
Dusky v. United States (1960), 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824.  In 
light of the admonitions in Drope and Pate, both state and federal courts have 
recognized that retrospective competency determinations are disfavored.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Renfroe (C.A.3, 1987), 825 F.2d 763, 767; State v. Sanders 
(2001), 209 W.Va. 367, 549 S.E.2d 40, 54. 
 
Though disfavored, however, retrospective competency determinations do 
not per se offend notions of due process.  Numerous federal circuits have held 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
that retrospective determinations of competency are constitutionally permitted so 
long as a meaningful hearing on the defendant’s competency at the prior 
proceedings is still possible.  See United States v. Auen (C.A.2, 1988), 846 F.2d 
872, 878; Renfroe, 825 F.2d at 767; United States v. Mason (C.A.4, 1995), 52 
F.3d 1286, 1293; Wheat v. Thigpen (C.A.5, 1986), 793 F.2d 621, 630; Cremeans 
v. Chapleau (C.A.6, 1995), 62 F.3d 167, 169; United States ex rel. Lewis  v. Lane 
(C.A.7, 1987), 822 F.2d 703, 706; Reynolds v. Norris (C.A.8, 1996), 86 F.3d 796, 
802-803; Moran v. Godinez (C.A.9, 1994), 57 F.3d 690, 696; James, 957 F.2d at 
1570, fn. 11.  “A ‘meaningful’ determination is possible where the state of the 
record, together with such additional evidence as may be relevant and available, 
permits an accurate assessment of the defendant’s condition at the time of the 
original * * * proceedings.”  Reynolds, 86 F.3d at 802.  A number of state courts 
have adopted this view and have remanded cases to trial courts for retrospective 
competency hearings rather than automatically reversing and remanding for a new 
trial.  See Sanders, 209 W.Va. at 380-383, 549 S.E.2d at 53-55; Thompson, 56 
S.W.3d at 409-410; State v. Bostwick (1999), 296 Mont. 149, 160-161, 988 P.2d 
765, 772; State v. Snyder (La.1999), 750 So.2d 832, 855; State v. McRae (2000), 
139 N.C.App. 387, 391-392; 533 S.E.2d 557, 560-561. 
 
Consistent with this weight of authority, I would remand this case to the 
trial court for the limited purpose of holding a retrospective competency hearing.  
On the record before this court, I see “no clear impediment” to the trial court’s 
ability to retroactively assess Were’s competency at the time of his trial.  Sanders, 
209 W.Va. at 381, 549 S.E.2d at 54.2  This is not to say that a remand would 
                                                          
 
2. 
When determining whether it is appropriate to remand a case for a retrospective 
competency hearing, a court should consider (1) the passage of time between the trial and the 
retrospective hearing; (2) whether contemporaneous medical evidence is available, including 
medical records and prior competency evaluations; (3) any statements by the defendant in the trial 
record; (4) the availability of witnesses (both expert and nonexpert) who interacted with the 
defendant during trial, including the trial judge, prosecutors, defense counsel, and jail officials.  
January Term, 2002 
13 
obligate the trial court to conduct a retrospective competency hearing if it found 
that it could not meaningfully determine whether Were was competent at the time 
of his trial.  After all, “[t]he trial court is in the best position to determine whether 
it can make a retrospective determination of defendant’s competency during his 
trial and sentencing.”  Snyder, 750 So.2d at 855, citing Renfroe, 825 F.2d at 767.  
If a trial court finds that it cannot conduct a meaningful retrospective inquiry or if 
the court holds a hearing and finds that a defendant was not competent to stand 
trial during the prior proceedings, a defendant would be entitled to a new trial (if 
and when he is competent). Snyder, 750 So.2d at 856; Thompson, 56 S.W.3d at 
410; McRae, 139 N.C.App. at 392, 533 S.E.2d at 561.  If a trial court holds a 
hearing and concludes that a defendant was competent, then no new trial would be 
required and this court could proceed to evaluate the merits of the remaining 
contentions on appeal.  See Snyder, 750 So.2d at 856, citing United States v. 
Haywood (C.A.3, 1998), 155 F.3d 674; see, also, Bostwick, 296 Mont. at 161, 988 
P.2d at 773.  Because the majority chooses to reverse and remand Were’s 
convictions without exploring the viable option of a retrospective competency 
determination, I respectfully dissent. 
__________________ 
 
Mark E. Piepmeier, Special Prosecutor, and William E. Breyer, Assistant 
Special Prosecutor, for appellee. 
 
Elizabeth E. Agar and Julia A. Sears, for appellant. 
__________________ 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
Sanders, 209 W.Va. at 381, 549 S.E.2d at 54, citing Clayton v. Gibson (C.A.10, 1999), 199 F.3d 
1162, 1169; see, also, Reynolds, 86 F.3d at 802-803; Thompson, 56 S.W.3d at 409.