Title: State v. Dillard

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2014 WI 123 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP2044-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Myron C. Dillard, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
Reported at 350 Wis. 2d 331, 838 N.W.2d 112 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Published) 
PDC No.: 2013 WI 108 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 26, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 4, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago 
 
JUDGE: 
Scott C. Woldt 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, PROSSER, ZIEGLER, JJJ., dissent. 
(Opinion filed.) 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, the cause was 
argued by Katherine D. Lloyd, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief and oral 
argument by Donna L. Hintze, assistant state public defender.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014 WI 123
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012AP2044-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2011CF157) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Myron C. Dillard, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
NOV 26, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   Myron C. Dillard, the 
defendant, was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to 25 
years of confinement and 15 years of extended supervision after 
a negotiated plea agreement.  The circuit court for Winnebago 
County, 
Scott 
C. 
Woldt, 
Judge, 
denied 
the 
defendant's 
postconviction motion to withdraw his no-contest plea.  The 
court of appeals reversed the judgment of conviction and the 
No. 
2012AP2044-CR   
 
2 
 
circuit court's order denying the defendant's postconviction 
motion.  We now review the decision of the court of appeals.1 
¶2 
Two issues of law are presented: 
¶3 
The first issue is whether, under the totality of the 
circumstances, the defendant has the right as a matter of law to 
withdraw his no-contest plea on the ground that it was not 
entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  The basis 
for the defendant's challenge to his plea is that when he was 
deciding whether to accept the State's plea offer or go to 
trial, the State, the court, and the defendant's trial counsel 
mistakenly advised the defendant that he was facing a mandatory 
sentence of life in prison without the possibility of extended 
supervision. 
¶4 
The second issue is whether, under the totality of the 
circumstances, the defendant has the right as a matter of law to 
withdraw his no-contest plea on the ground that he has 
demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel.  The alleged 
ineffective assistance of counsel is that defendant's trial 
counsel mistakenly advised the defendant that he was facing a 
mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of 
extended supervision if he did not accept the State's plea 
offer. 
¶5 
The error of law in the instant case, which permeated 
the entire proceeding and which is the basis of the defendant's 
                                                 
1 State v. Dillard, 2013 WI App 108, 350 Wis. 2d 331, 838 
N.W.2d 112. 
No. 
2012AP2044-CR   
 
3 
 
claims, was the State's erroneous attachment of a persistent 
repeater enhancer to the armed robbery charge.   
¶6 
If the defendant had been convicted of armed robbery 
under the persistent repeater statute, he would have faced a 
mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of 
extended supervision.  It is undisputed that the defendant did 
not meet the criteria for being a persistent repeater.  The 
error did not come to light until after sentencing.  Thus, the 
State, the court, the defendant's trial counsel, and the 
defendant 
proceeded 
under 
the 
mistaken 
belief 
that 
the 
persistent repeater enhancer applied to the defendant and that 
he therefore could have faced a mandatory life sentence if he 
did not accept the State's offer and enter a plea. 
¶7 
The 
circuit 
court 
denied 
the 
defendant's 
postconviction motion to withdraw his no-contest plea, holding 
that the plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and that 
the defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. 
¶8 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
reversed 
the 
judgment 
of 
conviction and the circuit court's order denying the defendant's 
postconviction motion to withdraw his no-contest plea.  It 
remanded the matter to the circuit court to allow the defendant 
to withdraw his plea.  The court of appeals concluded that the 
defendant's plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and 
that the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. 
¶9 
With regard to the first issue, we conclude that the 
defendant has proved that the no-contest plea was not knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary and thus that the matter should be 
No. 
2012AP2044-CR   
 
4 
 
remanded to the circuit court to allow the defendant to withdraw 
his no-contest plea. 
¶10 Although the matter is resolved on the first issue, we 
also address the second issue.  We conclude that the defendant 
has proved that he received ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel and thus that the matter should be remanded to the 
circuit court to allow the defendant to withdraw his no-contest 
plea.  
¶11 Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
I 
¶12 For purposes of this review, the following facts and 
procedural history are not in dispute. 
¶13 This case arises out of an armed robbery that took 
place in December 2009 in Menasha, Wisconsin.  The victim was 
sitting in her car in a shopping center parking lot when a man 
opened the passenger-side door and entered her vehicle.  He put 
a gun up to the victim's arm and told her to begin driving.  He 
also told the victim to hand over her cash, which she did.  The 
man directed the victim to pull the car over near some 
apartments.  He then informed her he would exit the vehicle.  He 
instructed her to count to 30 after he exited and then to drive 
away.   
¶14 The victim cooperated with law enforcement to identify 
the man who robbed her.  First, she helped investigators develop 
a composite sketch of the man.  The defendant was on probation 
at the time of the robbery.  His probation agent thought the 
No. 
2012AP2044-CR   
 
5 
 
composite sketch resembled the defendant.  However, when the 
victim was provided with a photo array that included a photo of 
the defendant, she did not recognize him as the robber. 
¶15 Several months later, the victim saw a photograph of 
the defendant while looking through an online sex offender 
database.  This photograph was the same one the victim had 
viewed in the photo array.  The victim contacted the police and 
said she believed the defendant was the man who robbed her. 
¶16 The defendant was arrested and charged with two 
counts: armed robbery in violation of Wis. Stat. § 943.32(2) 
(2011-12),2 with a persistent repeater enhancer pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 939.62, and false imprisonment in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 940.30, with a repeater enhancer pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.62. 
¶17 Had the defendant been convicted of armed robbery as a 
persistent repeater, he would have faced a mandatory sentence of 
life in prison without the possibility of extended supervision. 
¶18 Had the defendant been convicted of armed robbery and 
of false imprisonment as a repeater, without the persistent 
repeater enhancer erroneously attached to the armed robbery 
charge, he would have faced a maximum sentence of 32 years of 
confinement and 18 years of extended supervision. 
¶19 The State offered a plea agreement in which the 
persistent repeater enhancer was dropped, as was the false 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2011-
12 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2012AP2044-CR   
 
6 
 
imprisonment charge.  The defendant agreed to plead to the 
charge of armed robbery without any penalty enhancer. 
¶20 The plea colloquy in the present case correctly 
informed the defendant of the penalty for armed robbery without 
a penalty enhancer.   
¶21 Adhering 
to 
the 
plea 
agreement, 
the 
prosecutor 
recommended a sentence of eight years' initial confinement with 
an 
open 
term 
of 
extended 
supervision. 
 
A 
presentence 
investigation report (PSI) recommended a sentence of 10 to 11 
years of confinement and five to six years of extended 
supervision. 
¶22 The plea agreement permitted the defendant to argue 
for a more lenient sentence.  The defendant's trial counsel 
urged the circuit court to impose a sentence of five years' 
initial confinement to run consecutive to a sentence the 
defendant was then serving.  Trial counsel further requested "a 
lengthy term of extended supervision."  
¶23 The circuit court sentenced the defendant to a 
bifurcated sentence of 25 years of initial confinement and 15 
years of extended supervision. 
¶24 Again, the error of law pervading these proceedings 
was the attachment of the persistent repeater enhancer to the 
armed robbery charge against the defendant.     
¶25 From 
the 
defendant's 
initial 
appearance 
through 
sentencing, the court, the prosecuting attorney, and the 
defendant's trial counsel all advised the defendant that he was 
subject to the persistent repeater enhancer.   
No. 
2012AP2044-CR   
 
7 
 
¶26 At the defendant's initial appearance, prior to the 
appointment of defense counsel, the court commissioner twice 
informed the defendant that the criminal complaint alleged that 
he is a persistent repeater subject to life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole.3  The court commissioner stated and 
then restated: 
The Court:  It is alleged in Count 1 of the criminal 
Complaint that you've committed the offense of armed 
robbery.  It is alleged that you would be a persistent 
repeater as that term is defined under the Wisconsin 
State Statutes, that would therefore subject you, if 
convicted 
on 
the 
persistent 
repeater, 
of 
life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.   
¶27 At the preliminary hearing, the court commissioner 
again referenced the persistent repeater enhancer, telling the 
defendant that "there is the persistent repeater enhancer on 
Count 1 so there is significant incarceration and penalties 
involved in regards to this case."  Neither the prosecuting 
attorney nor the defendant's trial counsel corrected this 
mistake of law.   
¶28 At sentencing, after the persistent repeater enhancer 
had been dismissed by the State and only the armed robbery 
charge remained, the circuit court referenced the mandatory life 
sentence the defendant would have faced if convicted of armed 
robbery as a persistent repeater.   
                                                 
3 See Wis. Stat. § 757.69 (stating the powers of court 
commissioners). 
No. 
2012AP2044-CR   
 
8 
 
¶29 The prosecutor misinformed the court and the defendant 
that the defendant was subject to the persistent repeater 
enhancer.   
¶30 At the initial appearance, in requesting a $100,000 
cash bond, the prosecutor noted that the defendant "qualifies as 
a persistent repeater.  If he gets convicted of Count 1 that's 
life without parole." 
¶31 On March 21, 2011, after the preliminary examination, 
the State filed an information that included the persistent 
repeater enhancer.  
¶32 As we explain more fully later, the defendant's trial 
counsel advised the defendant that he was subject to the 
persistent repeater enhancer and therefore faced mandatory life 
imprisonment without extended supervision.  Trial counsel based 
her advice to the defendant about accepting the plea agreement 
on this mistaken view of the law.   
¶33 That the persistent repeater enhancer was an error of 
law, that is, a legal impossibility, did not come to light until 
after sentencing. 
II 
¶34 We first address whether, under the totality of the 
circumstances, the defendant has the right as a matter of law to 
withdraw his no-contest plea on the ground that it was not 
entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  The basis 
for the defendant's challenge to his plea is that when he was 
deciding whether to accept the State's plea offer or go to 
trial, the State, the court, and the defendant's trial counsel 
No. 
2012AP2044-CR   
 
9 
 
mistakenly advised the defendant that he was facing a mandatory 
sentence of life in prison without the possibility of extended 
supervision.  
¶35 We 
agree 
with 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
that 
"the 
fundamental error of law [about the applicability of the 
persistent repeater enhancer to the defendant] that pervaded the 
plea negotiations and sentencing" rendered the defendant's plea 
unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary.4 
¶36 The applicable standard of review is as follows: To 
withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing, a defendant must show 
by clear and convincing evidence that a refusal to allow 
withdrawal of the plea would result in manifest injustice, that 
is, that there are "serious questions affecting the fundamental 
integrity of the plea."5  The defendant has the burden to 
establish manifest injustice.6 
                                                 
4 Dillard, 350 Wis. 2d 331, ¶21. 
5 State v. Denk, 2008 WI 130, ¶71, 315 Wis. 2d 5, 758 
N.W.2d 775. 
6 State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 311, 548 N.W.2d 50 
(1996). 
In past cases, the court has recited that the clear and 
convincing evidence standard applies to the defendant's burden 
of proving manifest injustice, without distinguishing between 
the various ways that manifest injustice can be proven.  We 
apply the clear and convincing evidence standard in the present 
case. 
No. 
2012AP2044-CR   
 
10 
 
¶37 There are several ways a defendant may demonstrate 
manifest injustice.7  One way is to show that the defendant did 
not enter the plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.8  A 
plea 
that 
was 
"not 
entered 
knowingly, 
voluntarily, 
and 
intelligently violates fundamental due process, and a defendant 
therefore may withdraw the plea as a matter of right."9 
¶38 Whether a defendant's plea was entered knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily is a question of constitutional 
fact.10  An appellate court upholds the circuit court's findings 
of historical facts unless they are clearly erroneous.11  An 
appellate court independently determines whether those facts 
demonstrate that the defendant's plea was knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary, benefiting from the analyses of the circuit court 
and court of appeals.12   
¶39 In numerous cases, the court has held that affirmative 
misinformation about the law provided by the prosecutor and 
                                                 
7 State v. Cain, 2012 WI 68, ¶26, 342 Wis. 2d 1, 816 
N.W.2d 177. 
8 State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶18, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 
N.W.2d 906. 
9 State v. Cross, 2010 WI 70, ¶14, 326 Wis. 2d 492, 786 
N.W.2d 64. 
10 Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶14; Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 311. 
11 State v. Dawson, 2004 WI App 173, ¶7, 276 Wis. 2d 418, 
688 N.W.2d 12. 
12 State v. Hoppe, 2009 WI 14, ¶61, 317 Wis. 2d 161, 765 
N.W.2d 794. 
No. 
2012AP2044-CR   
 
11 
 
defense counsel can support a holding that withdrawal of a plea 
of guilty or no contest must be permitted because the plea is 
uninformed and its voluntariness is compromised.13  Appellate 
                                                 
13 See, e.g., State v. Riekkoff, 112 Wis. 2d 119, 332 
N.W.2d 744 (1983) (holding that when the defendant pled guilty 
incorrectly believing he could seek appellate review of an 
evidentiary order, he misunderstood the effects of his plea and 
the plea was therefore involuntary); State v. Brown, 2004 WI App 
179, 276 Wis. 2d 559, 687 N.W.2d 543 (holding that when the 
State promised to drop, but did not drop, all charges requiring 
the defendant to register as a sex offender or subjecting the 
defendant to Chapter 980 civil confinement, the defendant's plea 
was involuntary); Dawson, 276 Wis. 2d 418 (holding that the 
legally 
unenforceable 
reopen-and-amend 
provision 
of 
the 
defendant's plea deal rendered the plea involuntary); State v. 
Woods, 173 Wis. 2d 129, 496 Wis. 2d 144 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding 
that a guilty plea entered at least in part based on inaccurate 
legal information about sentencing was neither knowing nor 
voluntary). 
No. 
2012AP2044-CR   
 
12 
 
courts at the state14 and federal15 levels have similarly 
concluded that misinformation given to a defendant about the 
consequences of conviction may warrant withdrawal of a guilty 
plea.   
¶40 In 
determining 
whether 
a 
similar 
holding 
is 
appropriate here, we review the totality of the circumstances, 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., Reeves v. State, 564 N.E.2d 550, 553 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1991) (trial counsel's recommendation that Reeves "accept 
the plea agreement to avoid being charged as an habitual 
offender——when Reeves was not habitual eligible" rendered the 
plea involuntary); Nash v. State, 429 N.E.2d 666, 672 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1981) ("In the instant case, Nash was a 30 year old man 
facing a possibility of a substantial amount of time being 
tacked on to his sentence by virtue of the improper habitual 
offender counts.  Even if we accept the proposition that this 
was not the 'main' motivation for his guilty plea, the 
uncontradicted testimony leads unerringly to the conclusion that 
it played a significant part in the plea negotiations and 
therefore rendered the bargain illusory."); People v. Graves, 
523 N.W.2d 876, 878 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) ("Because there is a 
legal bar to conviction on the charge that was dismissed 
pursuant to the plea bargain, and defendant's plea was induced 
by a promise to forgo that charge, defendant was misinformed 
concerning the benefit of his plea.  Thus, defendant is entitled 
to withdraw his guilty plea as not having been understandingly 
and voluntarily made."); People v. Lawson, 255 N.W.2d 748, 750 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1977) ("Since defendant surrendered his right to 
trial in apparent misapprehension of the value of commitments 
made to him, he should be allowed to withdraw his plea."). 
15 See, e.g., Hammond v. United States, 528 F.2d 15, 19 (4th 
Cir. 
1975) 
("Where, 
as 
here, 
counsel's 
alleged 
advice, 
corroborated by the information supplied by the court, grossly 
exaggerated the benefit to be derived from the pleas of guilty, 
it would follow that the pleas were not voluntary."). 
No. 
2012AP2044-CR   
 
13 
 
including the record of the postconviction hearing at which only 
the defendant and his trial counsel testified.16 
¶41 The defendant testified at the postconviction hearing 
that, early on, he intended to go to trial because he believed 
the State's case was weak.  The main weakness of the State's 
case, in the defendant's opinion, was the victim's failure to 
identify him when provided with a photo array that included his 
photo.  The State acknowledged this weakness of its case. 
¶42 The prosecuting attorney explained at the sentencing 
hearing that the State had agreed to recommend the sentence it 
did in exchange for the defendant's plea "because there were 
some underlying factual burdens that were going to be difficult 
for the State. . . . [I]dentity may have been a problem . . . ."  
¶43 In addition, the State's reply brief in this court 
acknowledges that "it can be problematic to show an eye witness 
a photo of a suspect during a subsequent photo array when the 
witness has previously seen, and failed to identify, that photo 
at a previous array."17   
                                                 
16 The hearing on the defendant's postconviction motion was 
a Machner hearing.  See State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 804, 
285 N.W.2d 905 (1979).  Several cases discuss the allegations 
required in a postconviction motion seeking plea withdrawal to 
entitle a defendant to a Machner hearing on the ground that the 
plea resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel.  See, 
e.g., Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 316; State v. Saunders, 196 
Wis. 2d 45, 48, 538 N.W.2d 546 (Ct. App. 1995).  The defendant's 
motion in the present case was obviously sufficient under these 
cases.  A Machner hearing took place. 
17 Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner at 11. 
No. 
2012AP2044-CR   
 
14 
 
¶44 The defendant testified that, in spite of his initial 
intention to go to trial, when he considered the possibility of 
receiving a sentence of life in prison without extended 
supervision he decided he "couldn't take that chance."  The 
defendant thus entered a no-contest plea because, in his words, 
"even though there's not a lot of proof, I can't take the chance 
of not coming out . . . . I mean life without parole is life 
without parole . . . it's just too much." 
¶45 The defendant further testified that the greatest 
benefit of the plea deal was "getting rid of the persistent 
repeater."  He stated that he entered the plea to "make the life 
without parole go away so that I could get myself a chance to 
get out." 
¶46 The defendant acknowledged that he might not have 
filed a postconviction motion for plea withdrawal if he had 
received the sentence the State recommended.  He nonetheless 
insisted that the dropped persistent repeater enhancer was his 
main reason for accepting the plea offer and 
that the 
inapplicability of that enhancer rendered his plea involuntary. 
¶47 The 
defendant's 
trial 
counsel 
confirmed 
the 
defendant's declarations to a large extent.  Trial counsel 
testified that the defendant had expressed a strong desire for 
the "opportunity for a life on the outside with his wife"; that 
prior to receiving the State's plea offer, the defendant never 
said he did not want to go to trial; and that trial counsel knew 
the defendant was greatly concerned about the persistent 
repeater enhancer. 
No. 
2012AP2044-CR   
 
15 
 
¶48 Trial counsel further testified that the State's offer 
to 
drop 
the 
persistent 
repeater 
enhancer 
was 
the 
most 
significant factor motivating her recommendation that the 
defendant accept the plea deal.  A letter trial counsel sent the 
defendant after the State made its plea offer corroborates this 
testimony.  The letter was entered into evidence at the 
postconviction hearing.  It states: 
If convicted on count one as alleged, you would face 
life in prison with NO POSSIBILITY of parole or 
extended supervision. . . . The State is recommending 
that you plead to count one, without the persistent 
repeater. . . .  
In light of the State's willingness to dismiss 
the persistent repeater in count one and to dismiss 
outright the charge of false imprisonment in count 
two, I believe that it is in your best interest to 
give serious consideration to the State's offer.  You 
are still able to argue for a lower sentence through 
me, however you would not face life in prison if 
convicted. 
(Emphasis in original.) 
¶49 Trial counsel also testified that she would have 
advised the defendant to enter the plea agreement regardless of 
the persistent repeater enhancer.  Trial counsel considered the 
State's offer to recommend just eight years' initial confinement 
a good deal for the defendant. 
¶50 In the letter quoted above, trial counsel explained 
that if the defendant chose to go to trial, the State intended 
to introduce other acts evidence of the defendant's past 
convictions, which involved multiple counts of armed robbery and 
sexual assault.  Trial counsel advised the defendant that this 
No. 
2012AP2044-CR   
 
16 
 
evidence, along with evidence that the victim identified him as 
a result of looking at a sex offender database, would be "very 
devastating" to his case.  Trial counsel informed the defendant 
that the victim made a very credible witness. 
¶51 Finally, trial counsel testified that, in her view, 
the defendant agreed to plead no contest based on the totality 
of the circumstances, not just the dropped penalty enhancer. 
¶52 The 
defendant 
presented 
a 
persuasive 
account 
(including his testimony, that of defense counsel, and trial 
counsel's 
letter 
to 
the 
defendant) 
of 
why, 
absent 
the 
misinformation 
he 
received 
about 
the 
persistent 
repeater 
enhancer, he would not have entered a no-contest plea, why he 
would have gone to trial, and why the no-contest plea was not 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 
¶53 The State points to several parts of the record to 
support its contention that, regardless of the mistake of law 
regarding the applicability of the persistent repeater enhancer 
to the defendant, he would have accepted the State's plea offer.  
The State argues there were multiple factors at play, including 
the potential admission of other acts evidence and the apparent 
credibility of the State's main witness (the victim). 
¶54 The State emphasizes trial counsel's statement that 
she believed the defendant accepted the plea offer based on "the 
totality of the circumstances," which included the potential 
admission of other acts evidence and the apparent credibility of 
the State's main witness (the victim).  But the State 
acknowledges that trial counsel also identified the dropped 
No. 
2012AP2044-CR   
 
17 
 
persistent repeater enhancer as "the most significant factor" 
contributing to the defendant's decision to enter a plea of no 
contest. 
¶55 The State also points to trial counsel's statement 
that she would have advised the defendant to enter a plea 
regardless 
of 
the 
dropped 
enhancer. 
 
In 
contrast, 
the 
defendant's testimony supports the conclusion that the defendant 
would not have heeded his counsel's advice to accept the plea 
agreement if he had known the persistent repeater enhancer was 
inapplicable.  
¶56 Finally, the State argues the defendant's motivation 
for moving to withdraw his plea is evidence the plea was 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  The defendant conceded at 
the postconviction hearing that had he received the sentence the 
State recommended, he would not now be challenging his plea.  
¶57 The circuit court raised this point at the conclusion 
of the postconviction hearing, announcing as follows: "[T]he 
only reason we're here on appeal is because I did not go along 
with 
those 
recommendations 
and 
I 
gave 
him 
the 
maximum 
sentence. . . . [N]ow that he's got the sentence he doesn't like 
it and now he wants to appeal it and find a way to do so."   
¶58 The State asserts that because the defendant admitted 
that his dissatisfaction with his sentence drove his decision to 
challenge the plea, his challenge must fail.   
¶59 The court of appeals was not persuaded by the State's 
arguments.  Neither are we.   
No. 
2012AP2044-CR   
 
18 
 
¶60 First, for a defendant to show that a plea was not 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, the case law does not 
require that the decision to plead no contest be based 
exclusively on the misinformation the defendant received.18  
Rather, a guilty or no-contest plea is not voluntary unless the 
defendant is "fully aware of the direct consequences [of his 
plea], including the actual value of any commitments made to him 
by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel . . . ."19   
¶61 In the instant case, the defendant's no-contest plea 
was not made with full knowledge of the factors pertinent to a 
decision regarding whether to plead or proceed to trial.  The 
defendant did not know the actual value of the commitments made 
to him by the prosecutor in the plea offer.   
                                                 
18 See, e.g., Woods, 173 Wis. 2d 129 (a guilty plea entered 
at least in part based on inaccurate legal information about 
sentencing was neither knowing nor voluntary). 
19 The United States Supreme Court stated the standard for 
voluntariness in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 
(1970), as follows: 
The standard as to the voluntariness of guilty pleas 
must be essentially that defined by Judge Tuttle of 
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit: 
"(A) plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the 
direct consequences, including the actual value of any 
commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or 
his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats 
(or promises to discontinue improper harassment), 
misrepresentation 
(including 
unfulfilled 
or 
unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that 
are by their nature improper as having no proper 
relationship 
to 
the 
prosecutor's 
business 
(e.g. 
bribes).'  242 F.2d at page 115." 
No. 
2012AP2044-CR   
 
19 
 
¶62 Second, 
the 
defendant 
repeatedly 
asserted 
that 
eliminating the possibility of receiving a mandatory life 
sentence was his primary motivation for entering the plea 
agreement.  Trial counsel's testimony supports the defendant's 
testimony. 
¶63 Third, 
the 
disparity 
between 
the 
sentence 
the 
defendant thought he would face if convicted of armed robbery 
with a persistent repeater enhancer and the maximum sentence he 
would have faced without the persistent repeater enhancer 
attached to the armed robbery charge was significant.  According 
to the court of appeals, "[t]he hope that one will live long 
enough to have a life outside the prison walls is, as the 
advertisement goes, priceless."  Because the defendant "thought 
he had to bargain for that hope," he pled no contest. 
¶64 At oral argument, Justice Prosser and the State 
posited that the State could have amended its complaint to 
attach a repeater enhancer (as opposed to a persistent repeater 
enhancer) to the armed robbery charge.  Had the State done so, 
the defendant would have faced an additional six years of 
confinement, for a total of 38 years of confinement.   
¶65 The implication of this reasoning is that, for this 
51-year-old defendant, there is no significant difference 
between a maximum sentence of 32 or 38 years in prison and a 
mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of 
extended supervision.   
¶66 This reasoning overlooks the crucial fact that the 
statutory penalty of 32 or 38 years in prison represents the 
No. 
2012AP2044-CR   
 
20 
 
maximum penalty a circuit court may impose.  A circuit court 
may, in its discretion, impose a lesser term of confinement.  In 
contrast, the persistent repeater enhancer imposes life in 
prison as a mandatory sentence.  The circuit court has no choice 
but to impose that sentence.  The possibility that a circuit 
court may impose a sentence less than the statutory maximum is 
important to the defendant in deciding whether to enter a plea. 
¶67 Fourth, while the sentence imposed by the circuit 
court may be driving the defendant's pursuit of plea withdrawal, 
the appropriate inquiry is not into the defendant's motivation 
for filing the postconviction motion.  Rather, the appropriate 
inquiry is into the defendant's motivation for entering the no-
contest plea in the first place.  The defendant's subsequent 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with his sentence has no bearing 
on whether his initial decision to enter a plea was knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary.   
¶68 Fifth, 
if 
the 
defendant's 
trial 
counsel 
were 
ineffective (and we conclude in Part III that she was 
ineffective), it follows that the defendant's plea was not 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  "[T]he sine qua non to a 
voluntary plea of guilty is the assistance of counsel 'within 
the range of competence required of attorneys representing 
defendants in criminal cases.'"20 
                                                 
20 Hammond, 528 F.2d at 18 (citing Parker v. North Carolina, 
397 U.S. 790, 797-98 (1970)). 
No. 
2012AP2044-CR   
 
21 
 
¶69 Considering the totality of the circumstances, we 
conclude that the defendant entered into the plea agreement 
without knowing the actual value of the State's plea offer and 
relying on misinformation from the court, the State, and trial 
counsel about the applicability of the persistent repeater 
enhancer.  As a result, the defendant was prevented from making 
a reasoned decision whether to proceed to trial or plead.  The 
misinformation undermined the defendant's capacity to knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily choose between accepting the 
State's plea offer and proceeding to trial.  Thus, we conclude 
that the defendant established that he did not knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily enter the plea of no contest.   
¶70 A plea that was "not entered knowingly, voluntarily, 
and intelligently violates fundamental due process, and a 
defendant therefore may withdraw the plea as a matter of 
right."21  The defendant must be permitted to withdraw his no-
contest plea. 
¶71 Before 
we 
turn 
to 
the 
second 
issue 
regarding 
ineffective assistance of counsel, we examine the State's 
argument that the instant case is governed by State v. Denk, 
2008 WI 130, 315 Wis. 2d 5, 758 N.W.2d 775, and that the court 
of appeals incorrectly applied Denk to the instant case.22   
                                                 
21 Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶14. 
22 The State asserts that the court of appeals incorrectly 
applied the Cross case to the instant case.  Both the State and 
the defendant agree that Cross is inapplicable to the instant 
case.  We agree.   
(continued) 
No. 
2012AP2044-CR   
 
22 
 
¶72 We briefly state the facts in the Denk case to compare 
it to the present case.  
¶73 Denk was charged with Class I felony possession of 
methamphetamine, 
Class 
H 
felony 
possession 
of 
drug 
paraphernalia, 
misdemeanor 
possession 
of 
marijuana, 
and 
misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia.  Pursuant to a 
plea agreement, Denk pled no contest to felony possession of 
methamphetamine.  The State dismissed the remaining charges.   
¶74 Denk subsequently filed a postconviction motion to 
withdraw his plea, arguing that "there was no factual basis for 
charging 
him 
with 
one 
felony 
count 
of 
possession 
of 
methamphetamine paraphernalia [the dismissed charge]. . . and 
thus, the district attorney's offer to drop the charge provided 
an illusory benefit."23  Denk's appellate counsel argued that the 
methamphetamine paraphernalia in Denk's possession "was intended 
for personal use," while the statute relating to paraphernalia 
                                                                                                                                                             
The 
defect 
alleged 
in 
Cross 
was 
"insubstantial" 
misinformation about the penalty given to the defendant during 
the plea colloquy.  In contrast, the plea colloquy in the 
present case correctly informed the defendant of the penalty for 
armed robbery without a penalty enhancer.   
In the present case, unlike in Cross, the defendant's 
acceptance of the State's proposed plea agreement and the 
defendant's entry of the plea of no-contest to armed robbery 
were induced by "significant" misinformation the defendant 
received prior to the plea colloquy regarding the penalty he 
would face if he did not accept the State's proposed plea 
agreement and enter a plea of no contest.   
23 Denk, 315 Wis. 2d 5, ¶23. 
No. 
2012AP2044-CR   
 
23 
 
under which he was charged "related to the manufacture of 
methamphetamine."  Thus, Denk argued that the State's dropping 
the charge provided an illusory benefit.  This court did not 
allow Denk to withdraw his plea.24 
¶75 There is a superficial similarity between Denk and the 
instant case.  The two cases are, however, significantly 
different.  The instant case is not a Denk case.  It is a case 
of first impression. 
¶76 In short, in Denk the charge that was dismissed  
pursuant to Denk's plea agreement did not pose a legal or 
factual impossibility.  The Denk court did not decide (and the 
record did not demonstrate) that there was no factual or legal 
basis for that charge. 
¶77 In Denk, there was a factual and legal dispute about 
what Denk was doing with the methamphetamine paraphernalia, 
about whether the State could have proved the dismissed charge 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and about the proper scope of the 
                                                 
24 Denk distinguished a line of cases in which (1) "the 
dispute involved the charge to which the defendant actually 
pled"; (2) "the consequence for which the defendant had 
bargained when he entered the plea to the charge was a legal 
impossibility"; and (3) "the defendant failed to understand the 
inevitable consequences of his plea to that charge, thus 
rendering his plea . . . involuntary."  Denk, 315 Wis. 2d 5, 
¶75.  These three factors were not set out as the sole 
prerequisites in all cases to proving a plea was entered 
unknowingly, unintelligently and involuntarily.  Rather, Denk 
outlined these factors to summarize our prior plea cases 
involving mistakes of law and legally unenforceable promises by 
the State. 
No. 
2012AP2044-CR   
 
24 
 
statute applicable to the dismissed felony.  The Denk court 
recognized that it was uncertain whether the State would have 
prevailed on the dismissed charge.  At that stage in the 
proceeding, 
however, 
Denk 
had 
not 
demonstrated 
that 
the 
dismissed charge was a factual or legal impossibility.  Denk 
thus benefitted when the felony drug paraphernalia charge was 
dropped pursuant to the plea agreement. 
¶78 In contrast, it is undisputed in the present case that 
the persistent repeater enhancer attached to the armed robbery 
charge could not, as a matter of law, have been applied to the 
defendant.  The law required the State to drop the persistent 
repeater enhancer.  The State's offer to drop the persistent 
repeater enhancer as part of the plea agreement provided no 
benefit to the defendant.  
¶79 In the present case, the plea offer was significantly 
less valuable than the defendant believed because the persistent 
repeater enhancer was a legal impossibility.  Dropping the 
enhancer provided an illusory benefit to the defendant.  When 
entering his plea of no contest, the defendant failed to 
understand "the actual value" of the plea offer he accepted.   
¶80 No prior case has addressed the validity of a guilty 
or no-contest plea entered to avoid a penalty enhancer attached 
to a felony charge when that penalty enhancer was indisputably a 
legal impossibility.  The instant case presents a question of 
first impression.  We have addressed that question here.     
III 
No. 
2012AP2044-CR   
 
25 
 
¶81 Although the matter is resolved on the first issue, we 
turn now to the second issue:  Under the totality of the 
circumstances, did the defendant have the right as a matter of 
law to withdraw his no-contest plea on the ground that he 
demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel?  The basis for 
the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is that 
the defendant's trial counsel mistakenly advised the defendant 
he would face a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the 
possibility of extended supervision if he did not accept the 
plea agreement. 
¶82 We 
agree 
with 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
that 
the 
defendant's trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. 
¶83 The applicable standard of review for this issue is 
the same as for the first issue:  To withdraw a guilty plea 
after sentencing, a defendant must show by clear and convincing 
evidence that a refusal to allow withdrawal of the plea would 
result in manifest injustice, that is, that there are "serious 
questions 
affecting 
the 
fundamental 
integrity 
of 
the 
No. 
2012AP2044-CR   
 
26 
 
plea . . . ."25  There are several ways the defendant can meet 
this burden of proof.26 
¶84 One way to demonstrate manifest injustice is to 
establish that the defendant received ineffective assistance of 
counsel.27  Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are rooted 
in the United States and Wisconsin constitutions.  Article I, 
Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution and the Sixth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution (applied to the states by the 
Fourteenth Amendment) guarantee criminal defendants the right to 
effective assistance of counsel.   
¶85 To show he has been deprived of that right, the 
defendant must prove (1) that trial counsel's performance was 
deficient; 
and 
(2) 
that 
this 
deficiency 
prejudiced 
the 
defendant.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
¶86 Whether the defendant received ineffective assistance 
of counsel is a question of constitutional fact.28  An appellate 
                                                 
25 Denk, 
315 
Wis. 2d 5, 
¶71. 
 
See 
also 
Brown, 
293 
Wis. 2d 594, ¶18; Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 311. 
In past cases, the court has recited that the clear and 
convincing evidence standard applies to the defendant's burden 
of proving manifest injustice, without distinguishing between 
the various ways that manifest injustice can be proven.  We 
apply the clear and convincing evidence standard in the present 
case. 
26 Cain, 342 Wis. 2d 1, ¶26. 
27 Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 311. 
28 State v. Jenkins, 2014 WI 59, ¶38, 355 Wis. 2d 180, 848 
N.W.2d 786. 
No. 
2012AP2044-CR   
 
27 
 
court upholds the circuit court's findings of fact unless they 
are 
clearly 
erroneous. 
 
"Findings 
of 
fact 
include 
'the 
circumstances of the case and the counsel's conduct and 
strategy.'"29  An appellate court independently determines 
whether 
those 
historical 
facts 
demonstrate 
that 
defense 
counsel's performance met the constitutional standard for 
ineffective assistance of counsel, benefiting from the analyses 
of the circuit court and court of appeals.30   
¶87 We first explore whether trial counsel's performance 
was deficient. 
¶88 The test for deficiency of performance is objective: 
Under the totality of the circumstances, did trial counsel's 
performance fall "outside the wide range of professionally 
competent assistance"?31  "Normally, judicial scrutiny of an 
attorney's performance will be highly deferential."32  
¶89 The 
State 
has 
not 
challenged 
the 
defendant's 
contention that trial counsel's performance fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness. 
¶90 A defendant's decision whether to go to trial or plead 
no contest (or guilty) is generally the most important decision 
                                                 
29 State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶21, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 
N.W.2d 305 
30 Jenkins, 355 Wis. 2d 180, ¶38. 
31 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984); State 
v. Smith, 207 Wis. 2d 258, 274, 558 N.W.2d 379 (1997). 
32 Smith, 207 Wis. 2d at 274.   
No. 
2012AP2044-CR   
 
28 
 
to be made in a criminal case.  A defendant should have the 
benefit of an attorney's advice on this crucial decision.33   
¶91 We agree with the court of appeals that the defendant 
has shown that trial counsel performed deficiently when she 
failed to ascertain that the persistent repeater enhancer was, 
as a matter of law, inapplicable to the defendant and when she 
advised the defendant to enter the plea agreement based in large 
part on the State's offer to drop that enhancer. 
¶92 Our decisions in State v. Carter, 2010 WI 40, 324 
Wis. 2d 640, 782 N.W.2d 695, and State v. Domke, 2011 WI 95, 337 
Wis. 2d 268, 805 N.W.2d 364, are instructive regarding the 
extent to which counsel is required to know or investigate the 
relevant law.  These cases teach that to meet the constitutional 
standard for effective assistance, "[c]ounsel must either 
reasonably investigate the law and facts or make a reasonable 
                                                 
33 United States v. Gordon, 156 F.3d 376, 380 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(quoting Boria v. Keane, 99 F.3d 492, 496–97 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(quoting Anthony G. Amsterdam, Trial Manual 5 for the Defense of 
Criminal Cases § 201, at 339)).  See also Patterson v. LeMaster, 
21 P.3d 1032, 1036 (N.M. 2001) (citing Gordon). 
See also ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 14-3.2 (3d 
ed. 1999)("To aid the defendant in reaching a decision defense 
counsel, after appropriate investigation, should advise the 
defendant of the alternatives available . . . . Defense counsel 
should not recommend acceptance of a plea unless appropriate 
investigation and study of the case has been completed."). 
No. 
2012AP2044-CR   
 
29 
 
strategic 
decision 
that 
makes 
any 
further 
investigation 
unnecessary."34 
¶93 Trial counsel in the present case offered no reason——
strategic or otherwise——for failing to know or investigate the 
persistent repeater enhancer statute or for failing to challenge 
the persistent repeater enhancer attached to the armed robbery 
charge.  The persistent repeater enhancer statute is not obscure 
or unsettled law as applied to the facts of the present case.  
Thus, trial counsel performed deficiently because she did not 
know or reasonably investigate a clear statute erroneously 
applied to the defendant and because she offered no explanation 
for 
her 
failure 
to 
know 
or 
investigate 
the 
statute.  
Furthermore, defense counsel's advice to the defendant about his 
plea was based on the erroneously applied statute.       
¶94 We turn to the prejudice prong of the Strickland test 
for ineffective assistance of counsel. 
¶95 To prove prejudice, a defendant "must show that there 
is 
a 
reasonable 
probability 
that, 
but 
for 
counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.  A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."35 
                                                 
34 State v. Domke, 2011 WI 95, ¶41, 337 Wis. 2d 268, 805 
N.W.2d 364 
(citing 
Carter, 
324 
Wis. 2d 640, 
¶23 
(quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691:  "[C]ounsel has a duty to make 
reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that 
makes particular investigations unnecessary.")). 
35 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
No. 
2012AP2044-CR   
 
30 
 
¶96 Thus, 
the 
defendant 
in 
the 
present 
case 
must 
demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability he would not 
have pled no contest and that he would have gone to trial had he 
known 
the 
persistent 
repeater 
enhancer 
was 
a 
legal 
impossibility.36  
¶97 The State argues that the defendant did not prove that 
trial counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial.  The 
State characterizes the circuit court's declaration that the 
defendant would have pled no contest even absent the error of 
including the penalty enhancer as a finding of fact and a 
finding about the defendant's credibility.   
¶98 The circuit court never explicitly or implicitly made 
a finding that the defendant's testimony was incredible.  
Rather, the circuit court concluded, as a matter of law, that 
under the totality of circumstances the defendant failed to show 
that there was a reasonable probability he would have gone to 
trial absent counsel's error.   
¶99 This court determines independently, as a matter of 
law, whether the facts demonstrate prejudice, that is, whether 
under the totality of the circumstances there is a reasonable 
probability the defendant would not have pled no contest and 
would have gone to trial had he known the persistent repeater 
                                                 
36 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) ("[I]n order to 
satisfy the 'prejudice' requirement, the defendant must show 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted 
on going to trial."); Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 312. 
No. 
2012AP2044-CR   
 
31 
 
enhancer was a legal impossibility.  "[I]t is by no means 
obvious how a court is to determine the probability that a 
defendant would have gone to trial.  It is clear enough that a 
defendant must make more than a bare allegation that he 'would 
have pleaded differently and gone to trial' . . . ."37  The 
defendant in the present case made more than a bare allegation 
that he would have pleaded differently and gone to trial.    
¶100 The defendant does not rely on a conclusory assertion 
of prejudice.  Rather, he presented a persuasive factual account 
of the special circumstances that support his contention that he 
would have gone to trial absent the misinformation he received 
about the persistent repeater enhancer.38  The defendant detailed 
why his plea of no contest was a direct consequence of the 
misinformation he received about the penalty he faced.  The 
defendant's testimony is supported by trial counsel's testimony 
and the record.  The record allows the court to meaningfully 
address the defendant's claim of prejudice.   
¶101 The defendant explained that he perceived the State's 
case as having a weak spot (which the State acknowledged at 
sentencing and in this court) and that he would have gone to 
                                                 
37 United States v. Horne, 987 F.2d 833, 835-36 (D.C. Cir. 
1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 852 (1993). 
38 Hill, 474 U.S. at 50 (the defendant should allege that 
had counsel correctly informed him about the penalty, he would 
have insisted on going to trial and should further allege 
special circumstances that might support the conclusion that he 
placed particular emphasis on the misinformation in deciding 
whether to plead no contest). 
No. 
2012AP2044-CR   
 
32 
 
trial absent his overwhelming desire to avoid a mandatory 
sentence of life in prison.  The disparity in penalty between 
the sentence for armed robbery with the persistent repeater 
enhancer (mandatory life in prison) and the sentence for armed 
robbery without such an enhancer (a circuit court discretionary 
determination of prison for a term of years) was significant to 
the defendant.  He did not want to forever foreclose the 
opportunity 
to 
be 
released 
from 
prison. 
 
Under 
these 
circumstances the State's dropping the (legally impermissible) 
persistent repeater enhancer was a substantial inducement to the 
defendant to accept the plea agreement.   
¶102 Trial counsel's testimony and written communications 
with the defendant were consistent with the defendant's account 
of the defendant's state of mind and the events leading up to 
the plea agreement.  
¶103 The record support a determination of prejudice under 
Strickland.  Strickland "does not require certainty or even a 
preponderance of the evidence that the outcome would have been 
different with effective assistance of counsel"; it requires 
only "reasonable probability."39  
                                                 
39 Magana v. Hofbauer, 263 F.3d 542, 547  (6th Cir. 2001). 
See William v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000), in 
which the Court explained Strickland as follows: 
Take, for example, our decision in Strickland v. 
Washington, 
466 
U.S. 668, 
104 
S. Ct. 2052, 
80 
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). If a state court were to reject a 
prisoner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
on the grounds that the prisoner had not established 
(continued) 
No. 
2012AP2044-CR   
 
33 
 
¶104 Under the totality of the circumstances set forth in 
the record (and we have detailed the testimony at ¶¶41-51), we 
conclude that the defendant has satisfied the prejudice prong of 
the Strickland standard.  He has established that there was a 
reasonable probability that he would not have pled no-contest 
and would instead have gone to trial had he known he did not 
face a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the 
possibility of extended supervision.  
¶105 The recent federal district court decision in Pidgeon 
v. Smith, No. 13-cv-57-bbc, 2014 WL 4294965 (W.D. Wis. 2014), is 
instructive on the question of prejudice.  The issue in Pidgeon, 
a federal habeas corpus proceeding, was whether Pidgeon was 
denied effective assistance of counsel and was entitled to a 
trial.  
¶106 In Pidgeon, the prosecutor proposed a plea agreement 
promising the defendant that he would not be prosecuted for a 
sexual offense in a separate case and that the prosecutor would 
recommend a sentence of 10 years in prison followed by 10 years 
of supervision.  Pidgeon agreed to plead no contest after being 
misinformed by his trial counsel of the possibility that, should 
                                                                                                                                                             
by a preponderance of the evidence that the result of 
his criminal proceeding would have been different, 
that decision would be "diametrically different," 
"opposite in character or nature," and "mutually 
opposed" to our clearly established precedent because 
we held in Strickland that the prisoner need only 
demonstrate a "reasonable probability that . . . the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. 
No. 
2012AP2044-CR   
 
34 
 
he decline the plea offer, he might be subject to Wisconsin's 
persistent repeater enhancer statute mandating life in prison 
without extended supervision. 
¶107 After sentencing, Pidgeon learned (as a result of his 
own research) that his prior conviction and the offense in the 
separate case did not render him subject to the statutory 
persistent repeater enhancer.  He sought to withdraw his no-
contest plea.  A hearing was held, and Pidgeon and his trial 
counsel were the only witnesses.  Pidgeon testified that he 
entered the plea agreement because he believed he was facing a 
mandatory sentence of life in prison. 
¶108 The federal district court concluded that Pidgeon's 
trial counsel's failure to investigate the prior conviction and 
the applicable law was objectively unreasonable: "[A] reasonably 
capable lawyer . . . would not tell a client that he faced a 
mandatory life sentence without undertaking an investigation to 
determine that the advice was accurate."40 
¶109 The federal district court further concluded that 
Pidgeon's trial counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial, 
noting that "[t]he only evidence on point is petitioner's 
unrebutted testimony:  he would have taken his chances at trial" 
had trial counsel not misinformed him that "he ran a strong risk 
of getting a life sentence . . . ."41  The federal court stated 
                                                 
40 Pidgeon v. Smith, No. 13-cv-57-bbc, 2014 WL 4294965, at 
*5 (W.D. Wis. 2014). 
41 Id. 
No. 
2012AP2044-CR   
 
35 
 
that trial counsel "neither adduced any evidence that would tend 
to call petitioner's testimony into question nor suggested that 
even if counsel misrepresented the potential sentence petitioner 
could receive, it was not significantly different from what he 
could actually have received."42  Thus, Pidgeon showed a 
reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty absent 
trial counsel's error. 
¶110 In sum, with regard to the first issue, we conclude 
that 
the 
defendant's 
no-contest 
plea 
was 
not 
knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary and that the matter should be 
remanded to the circuit court to allow the defendant to withdraw 
his no-contest plea. 
¶111 We 
also 
conclude 
that 
the 
defendant 
received 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that the matter 
should be remanded to the circuit court to allow the defendant 
to withdraw his no-contest plea. 
¶112 Accordingly, the court of appeals' decision remanding 
the matter to the circuit court to allow the defendant to 
withdraw his no-contest plea is affirmed. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
                                                 
42 Id. 
No.  2012AP2044-CR.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶113 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (dissenting).   Myron C. 
Dillard was convicted of armed robbery based on his plea of no 
contest.  He received the maximum permissible sentence for armed 
robbery.  He moved to withdraw his plea, asserting that manifest 
injustice will result if his plea is not vacated.  Dillard 
asserts his plea was not entered knowingly and intelligently 
because his counsel did not tell him that the State could not 
prosecute him as a persistent repeater for armed robbery.  He 
claims ineffective assistance of counsel based on the same 
assertion.   
¶114 In 
order 
to 
withdraw 
his 
plea 
subsequent 
to 
sentencing, Dillard bears the burden to prove manifest injustice 
by clear and convincing evidence.  State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 
303, 311, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996).  Dillard failed to shoulder that 
burden 
because 
he 
submitted 
insufficient 
factual-objective 
information at the plea withdrawal hearing.  Furthermore, the 
circuit court found that Dillard's testimony was not credible.  
Accordingly, I would reverse the court of appeals; affirm the 
circuit court; and I respectfully dissent from the majority 
opinion.   
I.  BACKGOUND 
¶115 The 
State's 
charges 
against 
Dillard 
arose 
from 
Dillard's victimization of a young woman, T.L., on December 4, 
2009.  T.L. was seated in her car in a parking lot when Dillard 
opened the front passenger-side door and entered her car.  He 
forcefully placed a gun against her right shoulder and told her 
to drive.  T.L. complied, fearing Dillard would shoot her if she 
No.  2012AP2044-CR.pdr 
 
2 
 
did not.  Dillard asked for money, and T.L. gave him all she 
had.  He ordered her to drive to various locations, then to 
stop, and he exited the car.  As he was leaving, he told her not 
to call the police or he would come after her and her family and 
that he knew where to find her.  
¶116 Dillard was convicted of armed robbery, contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 943.32(2) (2011-12).1  His conviction was based on a 
plea agreement wherein the State dismissed a count of false 
imprisonment, charged as a repeater; dismissed a persistent 
repeater charge, in regard to the armed robbery; and the 
district attorney recommended eight years of incarceration 
consecutive to the time that Dillard was serving.  Dillard was 
then serving a sentence of four years, seven months and nine 
days based on revocation of his parole for two past armed 
robberies and two sexual assaults, and revocation of his 
extended supervision for convictions of theft and identity 
theft.   
¶117 At the plea hearing, the court explained to Dillard 
that a conviction of armed robbery had a maximum imprisonment of 
40 years, with 25 years incarceration and 15 years extended 
supervision.  The court asked Dillard if he understood that the 
court was not bound by any plea agreements and that the court 
could sentence him to the maximum for the crime of conviction.  
Dillard said that he understood.  The court thoroughly reviewed 
the constitutional rights that Dillard was giving up through his 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated.   
No.  2012AP2044-CR.pdr 
 
3 
 
plea and informed him of the consequences of his plea if he were 
not a United States citizen and asked Dillard if he understood.  
Dillard said, "Yes, Your Honor."  The court asked whether 
Dillard was satisfied with the representation that his attorney 
had provided to him, and Dillard said that he was.  The court 
also asked Dillard whether he wanted to ask the court any 
questions, and Dillard said, "No, sir, none."  The circuit court 
then concluded:   
The court will find that the defendant understands 
these proceedings and is entering his plea to Count 1 
without 
the 
repeater 
freely, 
voluntarily, 
and 
intelligently, and I find that there's a factual basis 
for the plea and, therefore, accept the same and will 
adjudicate him guilty.  Count 2 will be dismissed.   
¶118 At the time the plea was accepted, the assistant 
district attorney, trial counsel and the judge all mistakenly 
believed that the armed robbery charge was subject to a 
persistent repeater charge.2  If that belief had been correct, 
Dillard would have been subject to a mandatory sentence of life 
in prison pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2m)(c).   
¶119 In addressing the victim, her family and the court at 
sentencing, Dillard admitted he committed armed robbery, saying, 
"Good morning, everybody.  Well, I'm the person who robbed Miss 
[T.L.] in December. . . .  Not only did I rob Miss [L.] of 
money, I frightened her half to death as well. . . .  So I'm 
                                                 
2 Dillard was not subject to a persistent repeater charge 
because both of his prior armed robbery convictions occurred on 
the same day.  Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2m)(b)1.; State v. Long, 2009 
WI 36, ¶¶35-36, 317 Wis. 2d 92, 765 N.W.2d 557.   
No.  2012AP2044-CR.pdr 
 
4 
 
sorry, Miss [L.] for what I've done in harming you."  The 
defendant was then 50 years of age.   
¶120 T.L.'s father spoke at sentencing, and in a prior 
letter to the court, T.L.'s father said:  
Among other consequences of the assault, [T.] has 
been unable to sleep, has had nightmares in which she 
relived the assault and has had to relive the 
experience over and over each time she has come to 
court either testifying or expecting to testify.  She 
has been unable to concentrate, and has experienced 
fear, anxiety, and apprehension.  In addition, she has 
suffered financially——she is unable to go to work at 
times, has been unable to get back into the car in 
which the robbery took place, has been in counseling 
and 
has 
required 
medication 
to 
deal 
with 
the 
consequences. 
¶121 Testimony given at sentencing explained that during 
the robbery Dillard had "made threats that he would come back to 
her family after this occurred if she told the police and he 
knew where to find her."   
¶122 In deciding what sentence it would impose, the court 
knew of the ongoing problems of the victim who suffered from 
post-traumatic stress disorder because of Dillard's crimes and 
who had had an acute reaction to the stress of testifying that 
required hospitalization after the final hearing.   
¶123 The court was very concerned about the repetitive 
nature of Dillard's conduct as this was the third robbery of a 
young woman under very similar circumstances, the other two 
involving sexual assaults as well as robbery.  The court said: 
What goes towards character is the fact that you 
had two other very similar incidents in 1989 with 
robberies and sexual assaults.  You sat——served a 
prison sentence on those, you were paroled and were 
revoked.  You were on supervision at the time of this 
No.  2012AP2044-CR.pdr 
 
5 
 
incident.  You had Sexual Offender Treatment, and you 
had all of the treatment in the prison system, and you 
still got out and you still did this, and you did it 
again.  That goes towards character.  That also goes 
towards the need to protect the public. 
In this case, when you have treatment, you go through 
everything, your rehabilitative needs are addressed in 
prison, and you get out and you still do the same 
thing. . . .  What I'm going to do on this case is a 
40-year 
prison 
sentence, 
25 
years[] 
initial 
confinement, 15 years[] extended supervision.  I just 
think he needs a long supervision if he gets out.  I 
figure if he's 75, at least maybe he's not going to be 
doing this anymore when he gets out.  I'm going to run 
it concurrent to his other sentences, so I don't know 
where——where he's at with credit.  The reason I'm 
doing it concurrent is because the reason he's sitting 
now is because of these facts.  That's the reason he 
got revoked. 
¶124 Dillard, by counsel, moved to withdraw his plea.  He 
contended that the benefit of dismissing the persistent repeater 
charge was "illusory," and caused his plea to be unknowing and 
unintelligent. 
 
He 
also 
claimed 
his 
trial 
counsel 
was 
ineffective in failing to alert him to the legal conclusion that 
he was not subject to a persistent repeater charge.  He 
contended that refusing to permit him to withdraw his plea to 
armed robbery would result in manifest injustice.   
¶125 The circuit court held a Machner3 hearing, wherein it 
considered the testimony of Dillard and of trial counsel, as 
well as the submissions of Dillard and the State.  Dillard 
testified that he was concerned about the potential for life in 
prison 
without 
the 
possibility 
of 
parole 
or 
extended 
                                                 
3 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 
1979). 
No.  2012AP2044-CR.pdr 
 
6 
 
supervision.  He said that he discussed this with his attorney, 
as well as the district attorney's offer to recommend eight 
years confinement and his attorney's recommending five years 
confinement and 15 years extended supervision.  He said that 
they also discussed the district attorney's agreement to dismiss 
the charge of false imprisonment and its repeater charge. 
Dillard asserted that he would not have pled, but would have 
gone to trial, if he had known that the State could not 
prosecute him on the persistent repeater charge.   
¶126 The court questioned Dillard further to assess his 
credibility regarding his assertion that he would not have pled, 
but would have gone to trial if he had known that he could not 
be prosecuted on the persistent repeater charge.  The court did 
so by asking whether his motion to withdraw his plea was 
grounded in the sentence imposed.  Dillard was asked: 
Q. 
If I would have gave you the five years' initial 
confinement, would you have been satisfied with 
that sentence? 
A. 
Of course. 
Q. 
If I would have went along with what the State 
said, the eight years' initial confinement, would 
you have been satisfied with that? 
A. 
Of course.  That's better than a life without 
parole. 
Q. 
Your dissatisfaction with my sentence was the 
fact that I gave you the——the maximum, correct? 
A. 
Um——I guess.  Yes, I guess so.    
¶127 Subsequent to the above colloquy with the court, in 
response to questions from postconviction counsel, Dillard said 
No.  2012AP2044-CR.pdr 
 
7 
 
that he understood that the judge could sentence him to 40 years 
imprisonment for the armed robbery charge when he made his plea. 
¶128 Trial counsel was next to testify.  She explained the 
preparation for trial and her representation of Dillard in the 
revocation proceeding where she had seen [T.L] testify as a very 
credible witness.  She spoke of the State's offer and said: 
I also advised him that, even if he felt there were 
some problems with the State's case——and he and I had 
acknowledged there may be——that he had to take into 
consideration that if he went to trial the jury would 
likely hear things that would be very devastating 
towards his case, like the fact that the victim had 
identified him on a sex offender database.  I also 
reminded him that the victim had testified at a 
revocation hearing and that she testified in the 
proceedings rather credibly and that an administrative 
law judge had made a similar comment, and in light of 
all those circumstances, as well as his ability to 
argue for a lesser sentence, I thought he should give 
serious consideration to accepting the State's offer.   
Testimony at the plea withdrawal hearing showed that before 
Dillard pled, his trial attorney explained weaknesses in his 
case to him.  Trial counsel said that T.L. identified Dillard as 
the perpetrator of the armed robbery at the revocation hearing 
and that she had testified very credibly.  Therefore, earlier 
concerns about the strength of her identification were not 
significant.  Dillard's attorney also told him that at trial the 
jury would hear that T.L. had identified him from his picture on 
the sex offender registry, and that would be "devastating" to 
his case. 
¶129 When trial counsel was asked whether Dillard ever 
indicated to her why he agreed to the State's offer, she said: 
No.  2012AP2044-CR.pdr 
 
8 
 
I 
believe 
it 
was 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances, the dismissal of Count 2, the dismissal 
of any repeater enhancer at all on Count 1, even just 
a simple repeater for having been convicted of prior 
felonies, the fact that the State had a motion filed 
that would introduce to the jury other acts that had 
very similar type of conduct that I believe would come 
in, which I told Mr. Dillard about, the fact again 
that we had seen the victim testify at a prelim[inary] 
and at a revocation hearing and she did not waiver in 
her identification of the defendant in the testimony.  
All of those things[.] 
Counsel explained that she told Dillard that other acts evidence 
would be admitted at trial because of the similar types of 
victimization 
that 
led 
to 
his 
two 
prior 
armed 
robbery 
convictions.  She again explained that they had seen T.L. 
testify at two prior hearings and that T.L. was firm and 
convincing in her identification of Dillard as the perpetrator 
of the armed robbery. 
¶130 When trial counsel was asked if she had known before 
his plea that Dillard was not subject to a persistent repeater 
charge in regard to armed robbery would she nevertheless have 
recommended that he accept the plea bargain, she said that she 
would have.  She explained that he was facing 40 years on Count 
1 and ten years on Count 2 and there were "overwhelming negative 
facts" that she believed would come in at the trial.  When the 
court asked, "Did Mr. Dillard ever say to you, 'I will take any 
deal 
whatsoever 
if 
you 
can 
get 
the 
persistent 
repeater 
dismissed?'"  Trial counsel said, "No."  
¶131 Based on the information provided, including Dillard's 
testimony, the circuit court denied Dillard's motion, finding 
that he got the benefit of his plea bargain and concluding that 
Dillard suffered no prejudice.  The court of appeals reversed.  
No.  2012AP2044-CR.pdr 
 
9 
 
Relying on cases where a circuit court had erred4 in regard to 
the charge to which the defendant pled, the court of appeals 
extended the holdings of those cases to a charge that was 
dismissed.  The court of appeals concluded that State v. Cross, 
2010 WI 70, 326 Wis. 2d 492, 786 N.W.2d 64, controlled because 
the charging error "marred the plea negotiations" and was more 
substantial than the mistake in Cross.  State v. Dillard, 2013 
WI App 108, ¶¶18-19, 350 Wis. 2d 331, 838 N.W.2d 112.  The court 
of appeals also concluded that Dillard was provided ineffective 
assistance of counsel based on the same charging error.  Id., 
¶20. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶132 Dillard claims that manifest injustice will result if 
his plea is not vacated because it was not entered knowingly and 
intelligently and because trial counsel was ineffective in not 
telling him that the State erroneously charged him as a 
persistent repeater with regard to armed robbery.  Whether a 
plea has been entered knowingly and intelligently presents a 
question of constitutional fact that we review independently.  
                                                 
4 The court of appeals relied on State v. Cross, 2010 WI 70, 
326 Wis. 2d 492, 786 N.W.2d 64 (wherein the circuit court gave 
Cross mistaken information about the crime to which he pled); 
State v. Woods, 173 Wis. 2d 129, 496 N.W.2d 144 (Ct. App. 1992) 
(wherein the court erred by imposing a sentence to run 
consecutive to a juvenile disposition that Woods was then 
serving); State v. Brown, 2004 WI App 179, 276 Wis. 2d 559, 687 
N.W.2d 543 (wherein the court erred by stating that Brown's plea 
did not trigger sex offender registration or Wis. Stat. ch. 980 
commitment potential).  
No.  2012AP2044-CR.pdr 
 
10 
 
Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶14.  Whether counsel was ineffective 
presents a mixed question of fact and law.  State v. Johnson, 
153 Wis. 2d 121, 127, 449 N.W.2d 845 (1990).  We will not 
reverse a circuit court's factual findings unless they are 
clearly erroneous.  Id.  However, we independently review 
whether counsel's performance was deficient and prejudicial.  
Id. at 128.  
B.  Plea Withdrawal 
¶133 Dillard claims that if he had known that the State 
could not prosecute him as a persistent repeater in regard to 
the armed robbery, he would not have pled, but would have gone 
to trial on the charges of armed robbery and false imprisonment 
as a repeater.5   
1.  General principles 
¶134 There is the potential that a plea may not have been 
entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily if the colloquy 
conducted 
by 
the 
circuit 
court 
was 
constitutionally 
insufficient.  State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 255, 389 
N.W.2d 12 (1986).  A plea may be involuntary either because the 
defendant does not understand the charge to which he pleads or 
because he does not understand the constitutional rights 
accorded to him that he is waiving by pleading.  Id. at 265-66. 
¶135 Furthermore, a plea may be withdrawn if the circuit 
court does not comply with Wis. Stat. § 971.08.  Id. at 274.  
                                                 
5 Dillard argues for plea withdrawal because resentencing 
would have put him in the same position he was with his plea, 
facing a 40-year maximum imprisonment for armed robbery.    
No.  2012AP2044-CR.pdr 
 
11 
 
"The initial burden rests with the defendant to make a prima 
facie showing that his plea was accepted without the trial 
court's conformance with sec. 971.08."  Id.  If the defendant 
makes such a showing and alleges that he did not know or 
understand the information that § 971.08 requires be provided to 
him at the plea hearing, "the burden will then shift to the 
state to show by clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant's plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 
entered, despite the inadequacy of the record at the time of the 
plea's acceptance."  Id.   
¶136 The specific obligations that Wis. Stat. § 971.08 
places on the circuit court when a plea is forthcoming relevant 
to our inquiry herein are as follows:   
(1) Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or 
no contest, it shall do all of the following: 
(a) Address 
the 
defendant 
personally 
and 
determine that the plea is made voluntarily with 
understanding of the nature of the charge and the 
potential punishment if convicted.  
(b) Make such inquiry as satisfies it that the 
defendant in fact committed the crime charged. 
¶137 Plea withdrawal based on a constitutionally inadequate 
colloquy or based on a statutorily insufficient colloquy 
requires error by the circuit court.  Id. at 274-76.  Circuit 
court error in informing the defendant is required in order for 
the burden to shift to the State once the defendant makes a 
prima facie showing of error and alleges that he did not know or 
understand the information the circuit court was required to 
provide.   
No.  2012AP2044-CR.pdr 
 
12 
 
¶138 However, there are times when plea withdrawal after 
sentencing is permitted and the error does not lie with the 
circuit court, but rather is found elsewhere.  In such cases, a 
defendant is entitled to withdraw a guilty or no contest plea 
upon his proving by clear and convincing evidence that a 
manifest injustice will result unless the plea is vacated.  
Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 311.  Ineffective assistance of counsel 
is such an error.  Id.   
¶139 In order to be entitled to withdraw a plea after 
sentencing based on ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
defendant bears the burden to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence "that counsel's performance was both deficient and 
prejudicial."  Id. at 312 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).  In order to satisfy the prejudice prong 
of the Strickland test, a defendant seeking to withdraw his or 
her plea must prove that but for counsel's errors, he would not 
have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.  
See id. at 312.  In order to meet his proof obligation, "[a] 
defendant must do more than merely allege that he would have 
pled differently; such an allegation must be supported by 
objective factual assertions."  See id. at 313 (citing State v. 
Saunders, 196 Wis. 2d 45, 51, 538 N.W.2d 546 (Ct. App. 1995) 
(explaining that a defendant must provide evidence that is 
"factual-objective" rather than information that is "opinion-
subjective," and a defendant's saying that he would have gone to 
trial if counsel had properly advised him is an opinion, not a 
fact)).    
No.  2012AP2044-CR.pdr 
 
13 
 
¶140 Bentley contended that he would not have pled if 
"counsel correctly informed him about his minimum parole 
eligibility date."  Id. at 316.  In evaluating Bentley's 
assertion, we explained that Bentley's allegation, without more, 
was not sufficient to grant his motion to withdraw his plea.  
Id.   
¶141 We cited Santos v. Kolb, 880 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1989), 
abrogated on other grounds by Padilla v. Kentucky, 599 U.S. 356 
(2010), with approval.  Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 314.  Santos 
held that a "specific explanation of why the defendant alleges 
he would have gone to trial is required."  Id. (quoting Santos, 
493 U.S. at 943).  The First Circuit, the Tenth Circuit and the 
D.C. Circuit are in accord with the Seventh Circuit in this 
regard.  United States v. LaBonte, 70 F.3d 1396, 1413 (1st Cir. 
1995), rev'd on other grounds, 520 U.S. 751 (1997) (concluding 
that a defendant's self-serving statement that if his counsel 
had given him complete advice, he would not have pled guilty is 
not sufficient to prove prejudice); United States v. Gordon, 4 
F.3d 1567, 1571 (10th Cir. 1993) (mere allegation that but for 
counsel's inaccurate information regarding sentencing, he would 
have gone to trial held to be insufficient to establish 
prejudice); United States v. Horne, 987 F.2d 833, 836 (D.C. Cir. 
1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 852 (1993) (explaining that a bare 
allegation that he would have gone to trial is insufficient to 
withdraw plea).   
¶142 In 
addition, 
federal 
courts 
look 
to 
whether 
a 
defendant has made a viable claim of innocence of the crime of 
No.  2012AP2044-CR.pdr 
 
14 
 
conviction.  United States v. West, 392 F.3d 450, 456 (D.C. Cir. 
2004).  This amounts to affirmatively advancing an objectively 
reasonable argument that the defendant is innocent of the crime 
to which he pled.  United States v. Cray, 47 F.3d 1203, 1209 
(D.C. Cir. 1995).6   
2.  Dillard's plea withdrawal motion 
¶143 Dillard does not identify a circuit court error that 
would result in a Bangert-type analysis.  That is, he does not 
contend 
that 
the 
circuit 
court's 
colloquy 
was 
either 
constitutionally 
insufficient 
or 
failed 
to 
satisfy 
the 
requirements established in Wis. Stat. § 971.08.7  Rather, he 
objects to a charging error that the district attorney made and 
that his attorney did not recognize and explain to him before he 
pled no contest.  Accordingly, Bentley, not Bangert, provides 
the analytic framework by which we evaluate Dillard's motion for 
plea withdrawal.  In a Bentley proceeding, the defendant has the 
burden of proof throughout the proceedings; it never shifts to 
the State, as it may in a Bangert proceeding.  State v. Burton, 
2013 WI 61, ¶7, 349 Wis. 2d 1, 832 N.W.2d 611.    
¶144 State v. Denk, 2008 WI 130, 315 Wis. 2d 5, 758 N.W.2d 
775, is important when analyzing a claim that a defendant's plea 
                                                 
6 Dillard could not meet this federal requirement because he 
admitted he committed the armed robbery of which he was 
convicted. 
7 The majority opinion erroneously states, "the [circuit] 
court . . . advised the defendant that he was facing a mandatory 
sentence of life in prison without the possibility of extended 
supervision."  Majority op., ¶34.  The circuit court never 
advised the defendant what would occur if he did not plead. 
No.  2012AP2044-CR.pdr 
 
15 
 
was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary because there was a 
charging error of which defendant was unaware.  Denk was charged 
with felony possession of methamphetamine; felony possession of 
THC with intent to deliver; misdemeanor possession of marijuana; 
misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia; and felony intent 
to convert methamphetamine, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 961.575(3).  
Id., ¶¶17, 19.  Denk focuses on the last felony charge. 
¶145 In that case, the district attorney and Denk entered 
into a plea agreement wherein Denk agreed to plead to felony 
possession of methamphetamine.  In exchange, the district 
attorney agreed to dismiss all other charges, including felony 
intent to convert methamphetamine, and to recommend that Denk 
serve six months in the county jail as a condition of probation.  
Id., ¶21.  The district attorney and Denk did as they agreed.  
After determining that Denk was satisfied with his attorney's 
services and that Denk's plea was knowing and voluntary, the 
court accepted Denk's no contest plea and placed Denk on 
probation, with five months in the county jail as a condition of 
probation.  Id., ¶22.   
¶146 Several months later, Denk moved to withdraw his plea, 
asserting that there was no factual basis for charging him with 
felony possession of methamphetamine paraphernalia under Wis. 
Stat. § 961.573(3).  Id., ¶23.  He contended that because he 
could not have been convicted of the charge, the district 
attorney's offer to drop the charge was "an illusory benefit" 
that rendered his plea unknowing and involuntary.  Id.  
No.  2012AP2044-CR.pdr 
 
16 
 
¶147 We affirmed the denial of Denk's motion to withdraw 
his plea.  Id., ¶78.  We explained that State v. Brown, 2004 WI 
App 179, 276 Wis. 2d 559, 687 N.W.2d 543 and State v. Riekkoff, 
112 Wis. 2d 119, 332 N.W.2d 744 (1983), the cases on which Denk 
relied, involved problems with the charge to which the defendant 
actually pled, while Denk's allegations involved a charge to 
which he did not plead.  Denk, 315 Wis. 2d 5, ¶75.  We also 
explained that "[u]nlike the cases upon which Denk relies, this 
was not a plea based on an illusory promise, but rather it was a 
plea where the promise was realized."  Id., ¶78.  Stated 
otherwise, Denk received the benefits of his bargain with the 
district attorney because the district attorney honored the plea 
bargain.  Id.    
¶148 Mistakes in charging may be caused by insufficient 
facts known at the time the complaint or information is filed or 
the need to do further legal research.  They probably occur with 
some frequency, as the records presented to us often show 
charges that have been dismissed on cases that have gone to 
trial.  Denk establishes that a mistakenly charged crime that is 
dismissed does not form part of the conviction and is not 
subject to the same scrutiny as the crime of conviction.  For 
example, although the circuit court must establish the factual 
basis for the crimes to which a defendant pleads, the court has 
no such obligation in regard to crimes charged but later 
dismissed.   
¶149 Surely the majority opinion can't be suggesting that 
the circuit court is obligated to inform a defendant about facts 
No.  2012AP2044-CR.pdr 
 
17 
 
that the State would have had to prove for dismissed charges, as 
well as facts the State would be required to prove for charges 
to which a defendant pleads.  This would be an extraordinary 
burden to place on circuit courts.  However, Dillard, who is 
dissatisfied with the results of his plea bargain, is attempting 
to make the circuit court somehow responsible for the bargain he 
made, but now seeks to avoid.    
¶150 Cross also is helpful when considering mistaken 
information, although it is not as "on point" as is Denk because 
Cross involved a claimed circuit court error in giving Cross 
mistaken 
information 
about 
the 
crime 
to 
which 
he 
pled.  
Therefore, Cross applied a Bangert analysis, not the Bentley 
analysis that is applicable here.  Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶4.   
¶151 Subject to a plea bargain, Cross pled guilty to 
second-degree sexual assault, which has a maximum imprisonment 
of 30 years, with 20 years incarceration and 10 years extended 
supervision.  However, at the plea hearing, "counsel for Cross 
informed the circuit court that second degree sexual assault was 
a Class C felony and that the maximum total sentence was 40 
years," with the potential of 25 years incarceration and 15 
years extended supervision.  Id., ¶8.  The district attorney 
recommended only 24 months of initial confinement.  Id., ¶7.  At 
the plea hearing, the circuit court repeated the potential for 
the same maximum punishments defense counsel had incorrectly set 
out.  Id., ¶8.    
¶152 At sentencing, the court reviewed numerous victim 
impact statements that explained that Cross had molested or 
No.  2012AP2044-CR.pdr 
 
18 
 
sexually assaulted many family members.  Id., ¶9.  The victim in 
the case then before the court was Cross' ten-year-old great-
granddaughter.  Id., ¶6.  After explaining that the court did 
not want to give Cross another opportunity to molest other 
family members, the court sentenced Cross to the maximum that it 
believed was available, i.e., 25 years incarceration and 15 
years of extended supervision.  Id., ¶10.   
¶153 Cross moved for postconviction relief, requesting plea 
withdrawal and resentencing.  Id., ¶11.  Cross argued that 
because he was incorrectly advised of the penalties prior to his 
plea, his plea was not knowing and intelligent.  Id.  The 
circuit court denied Cross' motion to withdraw his plea, but did 
vacate the sentence and ordered resentencing.  Id., ¶12.  Cross 
was again sentenced to the maximum for the crime of conviction, 
20 years confinement and ten years extended supervision.  Id.  
¶154 We affirmed the denial of Cross' motion to withdraw 
his plea after concluding that the circuit court's statements on 
the range of punishments to which Cross was subjected by 
pleading was not "substantially higher[] than that authorized by 
law."  Id., ¶30.  We concluded that Cross had not made a prima 
facie case entitling him to shift the burden to the State to 
prove that his plea was knowing and intelligent.  Id.   
¶155 Dillard artfully attempts to place the burden on the 
State to show that his plea was knowing and intelligent.  
However, under a Bentley analysis, which is the analysis that is 
applicable here, the burden of proof never shifts to the State.  
Burton, 349 Wis. 2d 1, ¶7.  Therefore, it is Dillard who must 
No.  2012AP2044-CR.pdr 
 
19 
 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that manifest injustice 
will result unless his plea is vacated because he did not plead 
knowingly and intelligently.  Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 311.  
Requiring the defendant to shoulder the burden of proof on 
whether his plea was knowing and intelligent is consistent with 
Bentley's and Strickland's directive that with regard to an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant bears the 
burden to prove both deficient performance and prejudice.  Id. 
at 312; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.   
¶156 I conclude that our opinion in Denk controls Dillard's 
plea withdrawal motion because Denk is grounded in a charging 
error where there is no subsequent circuit court error.  As in 
Denk, 
the 
circuit 
court 
here 
fully 
complied 
with 
its 
constitutional 
and 
statutory 
obligations 
during 
its 
plea 
colloquy with Dillard.  That conclusion is affirmed by Dillard, 
who before us has never contended that the circuit court did not 
fully inform him of the potential punishments for armed robbery, 
the crime to which he pled; the constitutional rights he was 
relinquishing by his plea; or pointed to any error of any type 
in the plea colloquy.    
¶157 After 
its 
thorough 
colloquy, 
the 
circuit 
court 
concluded 
that 
Dillard 
pled 
to 
armed 
robbery 
"freely, 
voluntarily, and intelligently."  In order to overturn this 
conclusion, Dillard must prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that he did not "freely, voluntarily, and intelligently" plead.  
To do so he must provide factual-objective, not opinion-
subjective, information that will prove by clear and convincing 
No.  2012AP2044-CR.pdr 
 
20 
 
evidence that he did not knowingly and intelligently plead to 
armed robbery.  Saunders, 196 Wis. 2d at 51.  
¶158 At the hearing on Dillard's motion to withdraw his 
plea, Dillard said that he would have gone to trial on the 
charges of armed robbery and false imprisonment as a repeater if 
he had known that the State could not prosecute him as a 
persistent repeater on the armed robbery charge.8  That is an 
"opinion-subjective" 
statement, 
not 
a 
"factual-objective" 
statement.9  Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 313 (concluding that a 
"defendant must do more than merely allege that he would have 
pled differently; such an allegation must be supported by 
objective factual assertions."); accord Sanders, 196 Wis. 2d at 
51. 
¶159 Dillard also said that he believed that the State had 
some problems with his identification and that bore on why he 
would 
have 
gone 
to 
trial. 
 
This 
is 
factual-objective 
information.  However, his trial attorney testified that she 
advised him that their earlier concerns about the victim's 
identification of him were no longer strong after seeing the 
victim testify at two hearings.  She said: 
                                                 
8 Dillard said this same thing in a number of different 
ways, but each amounts to the same opinion-subjective narration 
about what he would have done if he had known the State could 
not prosecute him as a persistent repeater.  
9 The majority opinion repeatedly uses Dillard's assertion 
as though repeating it will change it from an insufficient 
opinion-subjective statement into requisite factual-objective 
proof, e.g., majority op., ¶¶44-47.   
No.  2012AP2044-CR.pdr 
 
21 
 
[H]e had to take into consideration that if he went to 
trial the jury would likely hear things that would be 
very devastating towards his case, like the fact that 
the victim had identified him on a sex offender 
database.  I also reminded him that the victim had 
testified at a revocation hearing and that she 
testified in the proceedings rather credibly and that 
an administrative law judge had made a similar 
comment. 
¶160 Therefore, before he pled, counsel explained to 
Dillard 
that 
T.L. 
had 
testified 
very 
credibly 
when 
she 
identified him as the perpetrator of the armed robbery at the 
revocation hearing.  Accordingly, earlier concerns about the 
strength of her identification of him were not significant.  
Counsel also told Dillard that at trial the jury would hear that 
T.L. had identified him from his picture on the sex offender 
registry, a "devastating" fact to place before the jury. 
¶161 Trial counsel was asked whether Dillard indicated to 
her why he agreed to the district attorney's offer, she said: 
I believe it was the totality of the circumstances, 
the dismissal of Count 2, the dismissal of any 
repeater enhancer at all on Count 1, even just a 
simple repeater for having been convicted of prior 
felonies, the fact that the State had a motion filed 
that would introduce to the jury other acts that had 
very similar type of conduct that I believe would come 
in, which I told Mr. Dillard about, the fact again 
that we had seen the victim testify at a prelim[inary] 
and at a revocation hearing and she did not waiver in 
her identification of the defendant in the testimony.  
All of those things[.] 
Before he pled, Dillard knew that other acts evidence would be 
admitted at trial because of the similar types of victimization 
that led to his two prior armed robbery convictions.  Dillard's 
trial attorney again explained that they had seen T.L. testify 
at two prior hearings and that T.L. was firm and convincing in 
No.  2012AP2044-CR.pdr 
 
22 
 
her identification of Dillard as the perpetrator of the armed 
robbery. 
¶162 The 
only 
factual-objective 
information 
Dillard 
provided in support of his motion to withdraw his plea was a 
concern about the strength of the victim's identification.  At 
the hearing on Dillard's motion to withdraw his plea, trial 
counsel said that prior to his plea, she told Dillard that 
earlier concerns about the victim's identification of him were 
not significant after seeing T.L. testify at the preliminary 
hearing and the revocation hearing.  There, T.L. was a credible 
witness who "did not waiver in her identification of [him]."   
¶163 Trial counsel's testimony was sufficient to offset any 
benefit Dillard could receive from his sole, factual-objective 
statement that focused on the strength of T.L.'s identification 
of him as the perpetrator.  The circuit court concluded that he 
did not meet his burden of proof by clear and convincing 
evidence.  I agree with the circuit court and conclude that 
Dillard did not provide sufficient factual-objective information 
to meet his burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that his plea to armed robbery was not knowing, intelligent and 
voluntary. 
¶164 In addition, at the hearing on plea withdrawal, the 
circuit court assessed the credibility of Dillard's statement 
that if he had known that the State could not prosecute him as a 
persistent repeater, he would have gone to trial on the charges 
No.  2012AP2044-CR.pdr 
 
23 
 
of armed robbery and false imprisonment as a repeater.10  In 
making its assessment, the court asked: 
Q. 
If I would have gave you the five years' initial 
confinement, would you have been satisfied with 
that sentence? 
A. 
Of course. 
Q. 
If I would have went along with what the State 
said, the eight years' initial confinement, would 
you have been satisfied with that? 
A. 
Of course.  That's better than a life without 
parole. 
Q. 
Your dissatisfaction with my sentence was the 
fact that I gave you the——the maximum, correct? 
A. 
Um——I guess.  Yes, I guess so.    
¶165 Although not explicitly stated, the circuit court 
found that Dillard's assertion that he would have gone to trial 
but for the charging error was not credible.  As the court 
explained:  
[T]he only reason we're here on appeal is because I 
did not go along with [counsel or the district 
attorney's] recommendations and I gave him the maximum 
sentence which he knew he could have received from me.  
This is all a matter, in my opinion, from listening to 
him, now that he's got the sentence he doesn't like it 
and now he wants to appeal it and find a way to do so.  
                                                 
10 The majority opinion attempts to characterize the circuit 
court's questioning of Dillard as irrelevant to the validity of 
Dillard's plea.  "The defendant's subsequent satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction with his sentence has no bearing on whether his 
initial decision to enter a plea was knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary."  Majority op., ¶67.  The majority opinion should 
consider why the circuit court would have asked such questions.  
Clearly, the circuit court was trying to assess the credibility 
of Dillard's representations to the court.   
No.  2012AP2044-CR.pdr 
 
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Credibility determinations are for the circuit court.  We will 
not set them aside unless they are clearly erroneous.  See State 
v. Carter, 2010 WI 40, ¶19, 324 Wis. 2d 640, 782 N.W.2d 695.  
The circuit court described why it did not believe Dillard; its 
credibility determination is not clearly erroneous.  
¶166 The circuit court also concluded that Dillard did not 
prove that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because 
the mistaken belief of counsel was not prejudicial to Dillard.  
The court explained: 
I believe that the other acts' evidence of the almost 
identical type crime taking place with a sexual 
assault and that evidence coming in on this case would 
have been devastating to any type of defense in this 
case, and that's, in my opinion, the reason why he 
reached this agreement because, as counsel indicates 
in her letter and here in testimony, there are a lot 
of negatives and she still would have recommended, 
even if the persistent repeater would automatically be 
dismissed, that she would have recommended [the plea 
that was offered] to him.  
¶167 A defendant is prejudiced by ineffective assistance of 
counsel when factual-objective information submitted to the 
circuit court proves that "there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for the counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded 
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."  Bentley, 201 
Wis. 2d at 312-13 (citation omitted).   
¶168 I agree with the circuit court:  Dillard received the 
benefit of his bargain and suffered no prejudice.11  Dillard's 
                                                 
11 The State conceded that trial counsel's performance was 
deficient, so I do not address whether Dillard met his burden of 
proof on that component of his ineffective assistance claim.   
No.  2012AP2044-CR.pdr 
 
25 
 
plea bargain was with the district attorney, not with the 
circuit court, who told Dillard that the court was not bound by 
any plea agreement.  The district attorney fully performed, 
giving Dillard the benefit of his plea bargain.  Furthermore, 
Dillard failed to prove that his plea was not knowing and 
intelligent because he did not provide sufficient factual-
objective evidence to overcome other evidence presented at the 
plea withdrawal hearing.  Stated otherwise, he did not prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that but for trial counsel's 
error, he would not have pled to armed robbery.   
¶169 The 
prejudice 
analysis 
for 
Dillard's 
ineffective 
assistance claim is based on the same contention, i.e., that his 
plea was not knowing and intelligent.  Therefore, the same 
analysis as I applied above, in which I concluded that Dillard 
failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that his plea 
was not knowing and intelligent, controls the prejudice prong of 
his ineffective assistance claim.  This is so because Dillard's 
ineffective assistance claim and his claim that his plea was not 
knowing and intelligent are based on the same lack of knowledge 
that the State could not prosecute him as a persistent repeater.   
¶170 Therefore, Dillard failed to prove manifest injustice 
by clear and convincing evidence based on prejudice that arises 
from deficient performance, just as he failed to prove that his 
plea was not knowing and intelligent.  The arguments are, in 
this case, two sides of the same coin.  Accordingly, I would 
reverse the court of appeals and affirm the decision of the 
circuit court.   
No.  2012AP2044-CR.pdr 
 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
¶171 Dillard was convicted of armed robbery based on his 
plea of no contest.  He received the maximum permissible 
sentence for armed robbery.  He moved to withdraw his plea, 
asserting that manifest injustice will result if his plea is not 
vacated.  Dillard asserts his plea was not entered knowingly and 
intelligently because his counsel did not tell him that the 
State could not prosecute him as a persistent repeater for armed 
robbery.  He claims ineffective assistance of counsel based on 
the same assertion.   
¶172 In 
order 
to 
withdraw 
his 
plea 
subsequent 
to 
sentencing, Dillard bears the burden to prove manifest injustice 
by clear and convincing evidence.  Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 311.  
Dillard failed to shoulder that burden because he submitted 
insufficient 
factual-objective 
information 
at 
the 
plea 
withdrawal hearing.  Furthermore, the circuit court found that 
Dillard's testimony was not credible.  Accordingly, I would 
reverse the court of appeals; affirm the circuit court; and I 
respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.   
¶173 I am authorized to state that Justices DAVID T. 
PROSSER and ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER join in this dissent. 
 
No.  2012AP2044-CR.pdr 
 
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