Title: Martinez v. City of Cheyenne

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Martinez v. City of Cheyenne1990 WY 47791 P.2d 949Case Number: 89-139, 89-140Decided: 05/04/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming


Alejandro 
C. MARTINEZ 
and Dorthy A. Martinez, d/b/a Fleetwood Motel, 

Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

 v. 

CITY 
OF CHEYENNE, 
State of Wyoming and Wyoming State Highway Department,

 Appellees (Defendants). 

 

STATE 
of Wyoming and Wyoming State Highway Department, 

Appellants 
(Defendants), 

v.

 Alejandro C. MARTINEZ and Dorthy A. Martinez, d/b/a 
Fleetwood Motel, 

Appellees 
(Plaintiffs)

Glenn 
A. Hottenstein, Guy, Williams, White & Argeris, Cheyenne, for Alejandro 
C. Martinez and Dorthy A. Martinez, d/b/a 
Fleetwood Motel.Kenneth G. Vines, Vines, Gusea & White, P.C., 
Cheyenne, for State of Wyoming and Wyoming State Highway 
Department.Cardine, C.J., and Thomas, Urbigkit, Macy, and Golden, 
JJ. Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court; Urbigkit, J., filed a 
concurring opinion.THOMAS[¶1]  The issues in this case relate to 
jurisdiction, both in this court and in the trial court; procedure, which 
involves essentially the related questions of jurisdiction; and substantive law 
relating to damages in a negligence case. The jurisdictional issue with respect 
to this court is whether the notice of appeal was timely filed. It is not 
without difficulty that we conclude that the notice of appeal was timely filed. 
The dual questions of jurisdiction in the trial court concern the scope of the 
statutory waiver of governmental immunity and the authority of the trial court 
to enter an order of additur more than 90 days after the entry of judgment. We 
are satisfied that there was an appropriate waiver of governmental immunity 
in this instance, and the trial court did have jurisdiction to address the 
liability of the State of Wyoming. We are equally satisfied that the trial court 
had no jurisdiction to enter an order of additur more than ninety days after the 
entry of judgment, and that ruling must be reversed. Perhaps the most 
interesting of the issues involves the question of liability of a tortfeasor for 
damages arising out of a flooding of the plaintiffs' property in the course of 
an unprecedented rainstorm. We conclude that the jury verdict that awarded $ 
36,000 in damages was contrary to the evidence and the instructions given to the 
jury in view of the evidence of the actual loss the plaintiffs sustained in the 
amount of $ 120,000. We reverse the judgment entered by the trial court and 
remand the case for a new trial on the issue of damages only.[¶2]  The initial appeal was taken by 
Alejandro C. Martinez and Dorthy A. Martinez, dba 
Fleetwood Motel (Fleetwood). In their Brief of Appellants, the issues in the 
case are described as follows: 

"QUESTION 
1. Was the trial Court's action vacating the hearing on the motion for additur 
or new trial  set for March 9, 1989, and directing the motion be submitted 
on briefs with additional argument effective under Rule 59(f), Wyoming Rules of 
Civil Procedure, as an   extension of time for consideration of the motion 
for additur or new trial to 90 days or April 11, 1989? "QUESTION 2. 
Before appeal by either party, did the District Court have jurisdiction to enter 
an order granting additur within the appeal period of Rule 2.01, W.R.A.P., but 
after expiration of the ninety-day period set forth in Rule 59(f) of the Wyoming 
Rules of Civil Procedure by reason of inherent jurisdiction based on 
waiver? "QUESTION 3. Was the jury's verdict allocating to Appellee 
only $ 36,000 of Appellants' uncontradicted damages of $ 120,000 contrary to the 
evidence and to the Court's instructions? "QUESTION 4. Did the 
Court commit error in failing to instruct the jury that there can be no 
allocation of damages between a rare and unusual storm constituting an act of 
God and a negligent defendant?"

The 
State of Wyoming and the Wyoming State Highway Department (State), in their 
brief as appellee, rephrase the issues asserted by Fleetwood in this way: 

"1. 
Should Appellants' appeal be dismissed because it was not timely filed pursuant 
to Rule 2.01, Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure? "2. Did the 
District Court have jurisdiction to enter an Order Granting Additur or New Trial 
on Damages once the motion for additur or new trial on which the order was based 
was deemed denied pursuant to Rule 59(f), Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure? "3. Did the District Court have authority or 
jurisdiction to enter on May 9, 1989, an Order Nunc Pro Tunc Continuing Time to 
Determine the Plaintiffs' Motion for Additur or New Trial after the time period 
contained in Rule 59(f), Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, had run and the 
motion for additur or new trial had been deemed denied? "4. Was the 
jury verdict dated December 5, 1988, proper and regular on its face so that the 
judgment entered thereon on January 11, 1989 should stand as valid and 
enforceable thereby making the District Court's granting of a new trial an abuse 
of discretion? "5. Did The District Court commit error in failing 
to instruct the jury that there can be no allocation of damages between a rare 
and unusual storm constituting an act of God and a negligent 
defendant? "6. Did the failure of the trial court to include the 
plaintiffs on the jury verdict form for comparative negligence purposes 
constitute reversible error? "7. Did the failure of the District 
Court to give a proposed jury instruction offered by the state relating to 
comparative negligence constitute reversible error? "8. Is this 
lawsuit barred by the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, W.S. § 1-39-101, et 
seq. (1977)? "9. Did the lower court lack jurisdiction to hear 
this case pursuant to Article 16, Section 7, Wyoming Constitution, which 
requires that the claim against the state be certified to under penalty of 
perjury?"

[¶3]  The State perfected a cross-appeal in 
which it asserts the following issues: 

"1. 
Did the district court have jurisdiction to enter an Order Granting Additur or 
New Trial on Damages once the motion for additur or new trial on which the order 
was based was deemed denied pursuant to Rule 59(f), Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure? "2. Did the district court have the authority and 
jurisdiction to enter on May 9, 1989, an Order Nunc Pro Tunc Continuing Time to 
Determine the Plaintiffs' Motion for Additur or New Trial after the time period 
contained in Rule 59(f), Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, had run and the 
motion for additur or new trial had been deemed denied? "3. Was the 
jury verdict dated December 5, 1988, proper and regular on its face so that the 
judgment entered thereon on January 11, 1989 should stand as valid and 
enforceable thereby making the district court's granting of a new trial an abuse 
of discretion?  "4. Did the failure of the trial court to 
include the plaintiffs on the jury verdict form for comparative negligence 
purposes constitute reversible error? "5. Did the failure of the 
District Court to give a proposed jury instruction offered by the state relating 
to comparative negligence constitute reversible error? "6. Is this 
lawsuit barred by the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, W.S. § 1-39-101 et 
seq. (1977)? "7. Did the lower court lack jurisdiction to hear 
this case pursuant to Article 16, Section 7 of the Wyoming Constitution, which 
requires that a claim against the state be certified to under penalty of 
perjury?"

Fleetwood, 
as cross-appellee, responds to the same issues asserted by the State. No 
separate statement of the issues is presented by Fleetwood.[¶4]  The material facts in this case are 
straightforward and uncomplicated, although they were the subject of lengthy 
interpretation by a number of expert witnesses. Alejandro and Dorthy Martinez own the 
Fleetwood Motel in Cheyenne and, on August 1, 1985, it was severely flooded when 
a rainstorm of unprecedented intensity occurred in its vicinity. The Fleetwood 
Motel fronts East Lincolnway on the eastern edge of the city. East Lincolnway is 
a part of U.S. Highway 30 as it passes through Cheyenne. Not far from the 
Fleetwood Motel, a drainage system for diverting water beneath the highway is 
provided, starting with two lateral culverts that run parallel to the road. 
Those two lateral culverts empty into one main culvert that crosses the 
right-of-way underneath the highway. At the time the storm occurred, the primary 
culvert was partially obstructed by a concrete bulkhead, which had the effect of 
reducing the capacity of the culvert to carry runoff water by a substantial 
amount. This particular drainage system services a basin that is approximately 
four and one-half square miles.[¶5]  There is no controversy about the fact 
that, on the day in question, these culverts were inadequate to carry off the 
water generated by the downpour. Puddles as much as two feet deep formed on the 
Fleetwood side of the road.  The Fleetwood property was inundated by the 
water and extensively damaged. In an effort to obtain compensation for the 
damage, Fleetwood sued the State of Wyoming, the Wyoming State Highway 
Department, and the City of 
Cheyenne (City) alleging negligence in the design, construction, 
maintenance, and operation of the highway and its drainage system. The complaint 
also included claims of inverse condemnation.[¶6]  The State and the City denied 
Fleetwood's claims and asserted, instead, that the damage to the motel was an 
unforeseen catastrophe attributable entirely to natural causes. The defendants 
contended that the August 1, 1985 storm was unique, extremely rare, and of 
unprecedented severity. The State further defended by asserting that Fleetwood 
had failed to mitigate damages; that Fleetwood was contributorily negligent; and 
that, in any event, the claims were barred by the Wyoming Governmental Claims 
Act, §§ 1-39-101 to -120, W.S. 1977.[¶7]  Late in November of 1988, the case came 
to trial, and a verdict was reached promptly. The jury relieved both the State 
and the City from liability under any theory of inverse condemnation. It also 
found that the City was not negligent. In its special verdict form, however, the 
jury did find that the State was negligent in its operation of Highway 30 by 
reason of its design of the drainage system in and around the Fleetwood Motel; 
that the State was 100 percent negligent (in response to a question requiring an 
allocation of negligence that named only the State and the City as actors); and 
that the damages to the Fleetwood Motel were $ 36,000. By handwritten insertions 
in the verdict form, the jury evidenced that it was awarding thirty percent of 
the total estimate of repairs, which it determined to be $ 120,000. Nothing was 
awarded for loss of use or decrease in value of the Fleetwood Motel. The 
"Judgment on Jury Verdict" was entered on January 11, 1989.[¶8]  While litigation, like a carousel, goes 
around and around, we must find a place to get on and a place to get off. We 
will get on this carousel of litigation by first turning our attention to the 
jurisdiction of this court since, if the court lacks jurisdiction, any 
discussion of the other issues would be nothing more than dicta. We have noted 
the entry of judgment on January 11, 1989. A notice of appeal must be filed 
within fifteen days from entry of the judgment or final order.  Rule 2.01, 
W.R.A.P.; State v. Berger, 600 P.2d 708 (Wyo. 1979). This requirement of 
a timely notice of appeal is both mandatory and jurisdictional. Berger. 
Pursuant to this rule, the notice of appeal had to be filed before January 26, 
1989. It was not.[¶9]  The 
time for filing a notice of appeal is tolled, however, if a motion for a new 
trial or a motion to amend or alter a judgment is timely filed. In that event, 
the time for filing the notice of appeal does not begin to run until an order is 
entered denying the motion, or the motion is deemed denied pursuant to the 
provisions of Rule 59(f), W.R.C.P. Rule 2.01, W.R.A.P. Within the fifteen day 
period permitted by the rule, Fleetwood filed a motion asserting that the 
judgment should be increased from $ 36,000 to $ 120,000 in the form of a 
"PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR ADDITUR OR NEW TRIAL ON THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES AGAINST 
STATE OF WYOMING." A similar motion filed against the City was later withdrawn. 
The State responded by asserting that the judgment should stand because it 
represented a decision within the discretion of the jury. From that point on, 
the case became a quagmire of judicial procedure generated by a flood of 
pleadings by the parties.  Our task is to traverse the 
swamp.[¶10]  The first solid 
ground may be found in the proposition that the motion by Fleetwood, pursuant to 
Rule 59(f), W.R.C.P., effectively extended the time for filing the notice of 
appeal until March 27, 1989, unless the district court ruled upon the motion 
prior to March 12, 1989. The district court did not do that. On February 6, 
1989, a "NOTICE OF HEARING" was entered, setting Fleetwood's motion for hearing 
on March 9, 1989. That setting later was vacated by means of telephonic advice 
to counsel from the trial judge's secretary. The hearing never was reset, and no 
written order was entered at the time that it was continued.[¶11]  On March 28, 1989, Fleetwood filed 
additional argument in the matter to which the State responded by filing its 
"MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' ADDITIONAL ARGUMENT." Fleetwood filed a "MOTION TO 
EXTEND TIME FOR APPEAL" on April 27, 1989, apparently still anticipating a 
ruling on its motion even though, in the absence of an extension, the time for 
such a ruling had expired on March 12, 1989 pursuant to Rule 59(f), W.R.C.P. The 
same day, the district court issued a decision letter advising the parties that 
the motion for additur or new trial would be granted as necessary to make the 
verdict equal to $ 120,000. The State responded to this decision letter of the 
court by a letter in which it asserted that the time had expired for the entry 
of such an order and, consequently, the district court no longer had 
jurisdiction to rule on the matter. It also asserted that, in any event, the 
district court must offer the party against whom the additur is to be applied an 
opportunity to elect a new trial as an alternative to accepting the additur. On 
April 28, 1989, the district court entered its "ORDER EXTENDING TIME," in which 
it extended the time for appeal to May 22, 1989, while it further considered the 
motion for new trial. Fleetwood did not rely upon the April 28, 1989 order but, 
on May 1, 1989, it filed a "MOTION TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE NOTICE OF APPEAL UNTIL 
HEARING ON MOTION TO ENTER ORDER," in which it stated that it would soon file a 
motion to enter an order and requested that the time to file the notice of 
appeal be extended to May 11, 1989. This motion was granted by the district 
court. Then, on May 3, 1989, Fleetwood filed a "PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR ORDER 
NUNC PRO TUNC CONTINUING TIME TO DETERMINE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL" together with a 
"PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ENTER ORDER ON COURT'S DECISION REGARDING ADDITUR OR IN 
THE ALTERNATIVE, A NEW TRIAL ON DAMAGES." The State promptly opposed these new 
motions.[¶12]  The final 
shower occurred on May 9, 1989 when the district court entered its "ORDER NUNC 
PRO TUNC CONTINUING TIME TO DETERMINE THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR ADDITUR OR NEW 
TRIAL," in which it confirmed and memorialized both its earlier vacation of the 
hearing date and its order that the "time for the Court to determine the 
Plaintiffs' Motion be, and hereby is, extended until a decision of the Court." 
On the same day, ignoring the jurisdictional concerns expressed by the State, 
the court also entered its "ORDER GRANTING ADDITUR OR NEW TRIAL ON DAMAGES" and 
its "AMENDED ORDER EXTENDING TIME TO FILE NOTICE OF APPEAL." This latter order 
explicitly recognized excusable neglect on the part of 
Fleetwood.[¶13]  The next 
day, the State notified the district court of its rejection of any additur, 
renewed its claim that the court was without jurisdiction to award additur, and 
requested a stay of proceedings pending a petition for writ of certiorari or its 
appeal. The same day, Fleetwood filed a notice of appeal, and the State filed 
its notice of appeal promptly thereafter.[¶14]  The initial jurisdictional question is 
the product of this convoluted process in the trial court. If the notice of 
appeal filed by Fleetwood was not timely, the consequence is that this court is 
without jurisdiction to pursue the appeal, and it must be dismissed. The 
keystone for that determination is a resolution of the question of whether the 
oral advice by the district judge's secretary, pursuant to which the setting of 
the hearing for March 9, 1989 was vacated, constituted a continuance of the time 
for deciding the motion. The quest for a solution begins with Rule 59(f), 
W.R.C.P., which provides: 

"Motions 
for new trial or to alter or amend a judgment; time limit. 
-- Motions for new trial and motions to alter or amend a judgment shall be 
determined within sixty (60) days after the entry of the judgment, and if not so 
determined shall be deemed denied, unless within such sixty (60) days the 
determination is continued by order of the court but a continuance shall not 
extend the time to a day more than 90 days from the date of entry of 
judgment."

Fleetwood's 
motion for a new trial or to alter or amend the judgment thus had the effect of 
terminating the running of the time for appeal until March 12, 1989. Rule 2.01, 
W.R.A.P. If the determination of that motion was continued by order of the 
court, the tolling period could extend until April 11, 1989.[¶15]  The record contains no written order 
entered prior to March 12, 1989 by which the district court continued the time 
for determination of the Fleetwood motion presented under Rule 59, W.R.C.P. The 
State earnestly contends that the omission is fatal. Both parties concede that 
the telephone call by the judge's secretary did vacate the hearing previously 
set for March 9, 1989 to address Fleetwood's motion, and this action was 
accomplished within the sixty day period. Fleetwood's position is that the 
vacation constituted a continuance of the determination. The State argues that 
the failure of the district court to reset the hearing date manifests an 
intention not to continue the matter and that the failure to enter an order 
continuing the determination forecloses the application of Rule 59(f), 
W.R.C.P.[¶16]  This was the 
problem addressed in Blake v. Rupe, 651 P.2d 1096 (Wyo. 1982), cert. 
denied 459 U.S. 1208, 103 S. Ct. 1199, 75 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1983). There, 
construing both Rule 50(b) and 59(f), W.R.C.P., this court said that "nowhere in 
any of these rules appears any requirement that the order of continuance 
referred to must be in writing, labeled 'continuance' and signed by the district 
judge * * * *." Blake, 651 P.2d  at 1111. The rules have not been changed 
in the intervening eight years. If the effect of the oral notice of vacation of 
the hearing by the district court was broad enough to encompass a continuance of 
the determination of Fleetwood's motion, it is sufficient for that purpose under 
Rule 59(f), W.R.C.P. Blake. We conclude that the nunc pro tunc order of 
the district court in which it memorialized the continuance of the 
determination, as well as its later action in ruling that the Fleetwood motion 
should be granted, is sufficient to demonstrate the intent of the court to 
continue the determination of the Fleetwood motion until a date not later than 
April 11, 1989. We recognize the order to vacate as being also an order to 
continue the determination of the Fleetwood motion, and we hold that the net 
effect was to continue the time for determining the motion until April 11, 
1989.[¶17]  While no nunc 
pro tunc written order was necessary to effectuate the extension of the time for 
determination, the order was a proper method to establish an orderly record, and 
the effort is useful in the context of this appeal. A nunc pro tunc order serves 
to rectify omissions from the record so as to make it speak the truth. See 
Caillier v. City of Newcastle, 423 P.2d 653 (Wyo. 1967); Barrett v. 
Whitmore, 31 Wyo. 301, 226 P. 452 (1924). The nunc pro tunc order itself did 
not, and it could not, effect the continuance. This conclusion makes it 
unnecessary to address further the issue presented by the State with respect to 
whether the district court had jurisdiction to enter its May 9, 1989 "ORDER NUNC 
PRO TUNC CONTINUING TIME TO DETERMINE THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR ADDITUR OR NEW 
TRIAL." That was not an order that is of consequence in determining the 
appeal.[¶18]  We also note 
that the State, after the oral advice of the vacation of the hearing furnished 
by the district judge's secretary, appeared and contested matters without 
asserting any objections on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. Both parties 
considered the Fleetwood motion as undisposed of, and both parties treated the 
situation as one in which the determination by the district court had been 
continued. The effect of this conduct of the parties, while not amounting to a 
consent to jurisdiction, does serve as a waiver of any right to protest the 
thirty-day extension permitted by Rule 59(f), W.R.C.P. Blake; Board of 
Commissioners of Natrona County v. Casper National Bank, 55 Wyo. 144, 96 P.2d 564 (1939).[¶19]  Thus 
far, we have only justified an extension of the time to file the Fleetwood 
notice of appeal until April 26, 1989. The filing of the notice of appeal on May 
10, 1989 can only be sustained if, within thirty days after April 11, 1989, the 
district court found excusable neglect on the part of Fleetwood in not filing 
its notice of appeal by April 26, 1989. In its "AMENDED ORDER EXTENDING TIME TO 
FILE NOTICE OF APPEAL," the district court found excusable neglect on the part 
of Fleetwood and continued the time to file the notice of appeal to May 11, 
1989. We agree that Fleetwood's delay was that of a reasonably prudent person 
confronted with the particular circumstances of this case, and we affirm the 
ruling of the district court that excusable neglect did exist for failure to 
file the notice of appeal within fifteen days after the "PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
ADDITUR OR NEW TRIAL ON THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES AGAINST STATE OF WYOMING" was 
deemed denied on April 11, 1989. See Crossan v. Irrigation Development 
Corporation, 598 P.2d 812 (Wyo. 1979).[¶20]  Having resolved the question of this 
court's jurisdiction, we turn to the questions of jurisdiction that were posed 
with respect to the district court. The first of those is found in the State's 
argument that the action on the part of Fleetwood is barred by the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act, §§ 1-39-101 to -120, W.S.1977. The State first reminds 
us that statutes that waive governmental immunity must be strictly construed. 
Harrison v. Wyoming Liquor Commission, 63 Wyo. 13, 177 P.2d 397 (1947). 
From this premise, the State argues that any suit filed against it must be 
specifically authorized by statute and that authority for a suit of this nature 
has not been so authorized. It argues that only two provisions of the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act, §§ 1-39-108(a) and 1-39-111, W.S.1977, could possibly 
justify the action by Fleetwood in this instance. The State contends that 
neither statute is applicable to these circumstances.[¶21]  We recognize that any action against the 
State must be authorized by the legislature and that courts are without 
jurisdiction to proceed in any case that has not been so authorized. Wyo. Const. 
art. 1, § 8; § 1-39-104, W.S.1977; Worthington v. State, 598 P.2d 796 
(Wyo. 1979); Retail Clerks Local 187 AFL-CIO v. University of Wyoming, 
531 P.2d 884 (Wyo. 1975); Hamblin v. Arzy, 472 P.2d 933 (Wyo. 1970); 
Price v. State Highway Commission, 62 Wyo. 385, 167 P.2d 309 (1946); 
Utah Construction Company v. State Highway Commission, 45 Wyo. 403, 19 P.2d 951 (1933). We do not accept, however, the State's contention that neither 
of the cited provisions has any efficacy in this instance. Instead, we conclude 
that § 1-39-111, W.S.1977 (Cum.Supp. 1985), one of the sections cited by the 
State, does provide the requisite authority for this suit. That statutory 
provision was repealed in 1986, but it was in effect at the time of this 
occurrence, and it provided: 

"A 
governmental entity is liable for damages resulting from bodily injury, wrongful 
death or property damage caused by the negligence of public employees while 
acting within the scope of their duties in the operation or maintenance of 
public facilities within the jurisdiction of the employing governmental 
entity."

[¶22]  The State concedes that this provision 
includes highways within the scope of the term "public facilities." State v. 
Stovall, 648 P.2d 543 (Wyo. 1982). It argues, however, that it is not 
applicable in this case because it only justifies actions that seek recovery of 
damages arising from an automobile or motorcycle accident. We have discovered no 
language, nor any precedent, that would justify limiting the statutory provision 
in this manner, and we are not prepared to construe it so narrowly. The phrase 
"operation or maintenance of public facilities" is broad enough to encompass all 
situations relating to the facility in question, and it does not serve to limit 
liability to negligence occurring in the use of a highway by a motorist. In 
addition, we are satisfied that "public facility" is broad enough to encompass 
all components incorporated in the highway, including a drainage system to 
permit water to flow underneath it.[¶23]  The State presents a further argument to 
the end that § 1-39-111, W.S.1977 (Cum.Supp. 1985), does not authorize the cause 
of action presented in the trial court because it does not explicitly refer to 
the design or construction of a public facility, the conduct for which the jury 
found the State negligent. The State argues that the statute refers only to the 
"operation or maintenance" of the public facility. We are not constrained to 
read the statute as narrowly as the State does. In our view, the "operation and 
maintenance" of a public facility is broad enough to include the design and 
construction of the facility, especially when the function of the component that 
allegedly failed, the main culvert in this instance, is to provide for the 
operation and maintenance of the primary component.[¶24]  In support of its position, the State 
also argues that the subsequent enactment of § 1-39-120, W.S.1977 (Cum.Supp. 
1986), which specifically provided that liability under the Act does not include 
liability for damages caused by a "defect in the plan or design of any bridge, 
culvert, highway, roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or parking area," manifests a 
legislative intent not to include liability for such a defect under the original 
statute, and that this legislative intent is entitled to retroactive effect. 
See § 1-39-120(a)(i), W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1986). The State argues that 
an action like the one brought on behalf of Fleetwood could not be brought under 
similar circumstances today. We do not rule upon this contention because the 
repeal of the earlier version of the statute is of no moment to this case. The 
statute that we have noted previously was in effect at the time of the rainstorm 
in 1985. Our general rule is that retroactive legislation is not favored, and 
the statute will be construed prospectively unless there is clear evidence of a 
contrary legislative intent. Wyoming Refining Company v. Bottjen, 695 P.2d 647 (Wyo. 1985); Johnson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 568 P.2d 908 (Wyo. 
1977); Bemis v. Texaco, Inc., 400 P.2d 529, reh. denied 401 P.2d 708 (Wyo. 1965); State, ex rel. Lynch v. Board of County Commissioners, 
75 Wyo. 435, 296 P.2d 986 (1956); Mustanen v. Diamond Coal & Coke 
Company, 50 Wyo. 462, 62 P.2d 287 (1936). No such evidence has been brought 
to our attention, and we reject the argument of the State that the Fleetwood 
claim was not permitted under the provision of § 1-39-111, W.S.1977 (Cum.Supp. 
1985), in effect at the time of this occurrence, and that the statute is to be 
interpreted in light of a subsequent amendment. We hold that the Fleetwood claim 
was authorized by § 1-39-111, W.S.1977 (Cum.Supp. 1985), and that the court was 
not without jurisdiction to entertain the claim.[¶25]  In the last issue asserted in its 
appeal, the State contends that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to 
proceed because Fleetwood failed to comply with Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7. This 
constitutional provision requires, inter alia, that any claim against the 
State be "certified to under penalty of perjury." Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7. 
Specifically, the State asserts that Mr. and Mrs. Martinez, acting on behalf of 
Fleetwood, failed to make the certification under penalty of perjury when they 
first presented their claim and that, since proper filing of a claim is a 
condition precedent to suit, their claim cannot be brought because it was not 
properly filed. Wyoming State Highway Department v. Napolitano, 578 P.2d 1342 (1978); Awe v. University of Wyoming, 534 P.2d 97 (1975); Utah 
Construction Company v. State Highway Commission, 45 Wyo. 403, 19 P.2d 951 
(1933).[¶26]  This 
particular contention by the State is raised for the first time in this appeal. 
The point was never argued to the district court. The State agrees that this is 
true, but it contends that an omission of the correct certification results in a 
failure of subject matter jurisdiction, and the issue can be raised at any time 
in the proceeding. We do not agree with this contention. The failure to verify 
or certify as the constitution now reads is nothing more than a defect or an 
irregularity that is not jurisdictional. In re Bear River Irrigation 
District, 51 Wyo. 343, 65 P.2d 686 (1937). The effect of that decision is 
that this alleged defect is not jurisdictional and, for that reason, the defense 
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Matter of Estate of McCue, 
776 P.2d 742 (Wyo. 1989); Ricci v. New Hampshire Insurance Company, 721 P.2d 1081 (Wyo. 1986); Dennis v. Dennis, 675 P.2d 265 (Wyo. 1984); 
Nickelson v. People, 607 P.2d 904 (Wyo. 1980); Scherling v. 
Kilgore, 599 P.2d 1352 (Wyo. 1979). We apply our well-established rule 
concerning those issues raised for the first time on appeal, and we reject this 
contention by the State.[¶27]  
Continuing with jurisdictional claims, we next address the argument by 
the State that the district court no longer had authority to enter its order 
granting additur or a new trial on May 9, 1989. We hold that, at this juncture, 
the State has found some solid ground in the swamp. Rule 59(f), W.R.C.P., 
provides, in pertinent part, without equivocation, that: 

"* 
* * * [A] continuance shall not extend the time to a day more than 90 days 
from the date of entry of judgment." (Emphasis added.)

The 
clear language of the rule leaves little room for interpretation. See 
Halliburton Company v. McAdams, Roux & Associates, Inc., 773 P.2d 153 
(Wyo. 1989); In re Adoption of MM, 652 P.2d 974 (Wyo. 1982); Board of 
County Commissioners of Campbell County v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d 1174, reh. 
denied 627 P.2d 163 (Wyo. 1981); Oroz v. Hayes, 598 P.2d 432 (Wyo. 
1979). The Fleetwood motion was deemed denied on April 12, 1989. Johnson v. 
Hauffe, 567 P.2d 735 (Wyo. 1977). In justifying the timely filing of the 
notice of appeal, we concluded that the court had continued its determination 
beyond the sixty days provided in the rule. Still, the determination cannot be 
continued to a date more than 90 days from the date of the judgment. At this 
final deadline, the motion again is deemed denied, and the judgment becomes 
final in the form in which it was entered originally. Sun Land & 
Cattle Company v. Brown, 387 P.2d 1004 (Wyo. 1964). We do not permit 
exceptions to this rule.[¶28]  
In this instance, the ninetieth day following the entry of judgment was 
April 11, 1989. After that date, the district court had no alternative other 
than to recognize that the motion had been denied. From then on, it was without 
power or jurisdiction to enter any subsequent order granting the motion. 
Blake, 651 P.2d 1096. Once the ninety-day period after the entry of the 
judgment or final order has elapsed, the only further relief available to a 
party challenging the judgment or final order through a motion to alter or amend 
the judgment or, in the alternative, for a new trial must be by appeal to this 
court. See Matter of Estate of Campbell, 673 P.2d 645 (Wyo. 1983); 
Berger, 600 P.2d 708; Hauffe; McMullen v. McMullen, 559 P.2d 37 
(Wyo. 1977); Sun. The district court no longer had jurisdiction to enter 
the order granting the additur or, in the alternative, the new trial as of May 
9, 1989, and its order has no efficacy. Matter of Contempt Order Issued 
Against Anderson, 765 P.2d 933 (Wyo. 1988). Fleetwood relies upon Blake; 
Matter of Estate of Potter, 396 P.2d 438 (Wyo. 1964); Brasel & Sims 
Construction Company v. Neuman Transit Company, 378 P.2d 501 (Wyo. 1963); 
and Board of Commissioners of Natrona County v. Casper National Bank, 55 
Wyo. 144, 96 P.2d 564 (1939), in asserting that any jurisdictional defect was 
waived by the conduct of the parties. These cases are distinguishable from the 
instant case and, therefore, do not establish the proposition asserted. They are 
concerned only with a continuance of the determination within the sixty-day 
period and have no application to a case in which an order is entered after the 
ninety-day period has run. The jurisdiction to enter an order has been lost, and 
that lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived. Anderson; Blake. The only 
avenue of relief then available to Fleetwood is to attack the judgment on 
appeal.[¶29]  Confident in 
our belief that we have drained the jurisdictional and procedural swamp, we turn 
to the merits. The merits are addressed by the third and fourth questions 
articulated by Fleetwood in its brief, and they are responded to in the fourth 
and fifth issues in the brief of the State as appellee. The essence of the 
question posed is whether the verdict awarding $ 36,000 in damages to Fleetwood 
was contrary to the evidence and to the instructions of the court. We recall 
that the jury found the State to be 100 percent negligent; that Fleetwood had 
established repair costs totaling $ 120,000; and that the damage award was 
stated to be thirty percent of that, or $ 36,000. We must decide whether the 
jury arrived at a proper award in light of the evidence and the law. Fleetwood 
contends that the verdict is improper and urges this court to either grant 
judgment awarding it compensation equivalent to the sum of its losses, pursuant 
to Rules 1.04 and 7.03, W.R.A.P., or to remand the case for a new trial on 
damages. In our judgment, this is not an appropriate case to grant the request 
for a modification of the judgment. There are potentially dispositive questions 
of fact that should be resolved by a jury. We agree, however, that the jury 
verdict was improper and, for that reason, we remand the case for a new trial on 
the issue of compensatory damages.[¶30]  The objective of a damage award in a 
tort case is to compensate the plaintiff for a proven loss or injury caused by 
the negligent or intentional conduct of another. Douglas Reservoirs Water 
Users Association v. Cross, 569 P.2d 1280 (Wyo. 1977); Walton v. Atlantic 
Richfield Company, 501 P.2d 802 (Wyo. 1972). When the action sounds in 
negligence, as in this case, the award should be designed to compensate the 
injured party in full measure for the total harm proximately caused by the 
breach of the defendant's duty. First Wyoming Bank, Casper v. Mudge, 748 P.2d 713 (Wyo. 1988); Atlas Construction Company v. Slater, 746 P.2d 352 
(Wyo. 1987); Hagar v. Mobley, 638 P.2d 127 (Wyo. 1981). Cf. Texas West 
Oil & Gas Corporation v. Fitzgerald, 726 P.2d 1056 (Wyo. 1986) (injured 
party entitled to compensation for all the detriment proximately caused by a 
breach of duty in the context of intentional interference with 
contract).[¶31]  On the 
other hand, a negligent defendant is not liable for loss or injury, or any part 
of an injury, not proximately caused by his breach of duty. This policy now is 
reflected in § 1-1-109, W.S.1977 (June 1988 Repl.). Compare Ridenour, 623 P.2d 1174 (an analysis of comparative negligence in Wyoming as of the time of 
that decision.) In a situation in which a plaintiff suffers either several 
distinct and separate injuries or a single injury from distinct and separate 
causes, damages are apportioned in a ratio determined by the ratio of cause to 
harm. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433 A (1965). This apportionment is 
appropriate and is made even in an instance in which some part of the harm can 
be attributed to an entirely innocent cause such as an unprecedented and 
unforeseen rainfall. In such an event, the liability of the tortfeasor hinges on 
the extent that the naturally occurring and noncompensable harm has been 
aggravated or enhanced by his conduct. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 
433 A, Comment e.[¶32]  It 
is the function of the jury to apply the law as it has been explained by the 
court. See cases cited in 88 C.J.S. Trial § 297 (1955). The jury is not 
justified in furnishing its own interpretation of the law nor in arriving at its 
verdict in the light of its view as to the way things ought to be. Permitting 
the jury to determine the rules of law without guidance from the court, among 
other things, creates a substantial risk of inconsistent verdicts in very 
similar cases. The duty of the court, on the other hand, is to provide 
sufficient instruction to allow the jury to apply the appropriate law correctly. 
Shortfall in performing the responsibility of either the court or the jury 
results in an injustice to the parties, and a new trial is mandated. We add that 
neither the court nor the jury is permitted to speculate or engage in conjecture 
in awarding damages. Reposa v. Buhler, 770 P.2d 235 (Wyo. 1989); 
Reiman Construction Company v. Jerry Hiller Company, 709 P.2d 1271 (Wyo. 
1985); Krist v. Aetna Casualty & Surety, 667 P.2d 665 (Wyo. 
1983).[¶33]  In this 
instance, the jury determined that the State had breached its duty to Fleetwood 
in its design of the highway. It also found that the State was 100 percent 
negligent in the comparative negligence formula which involved only the State 
and the City. Finally, it determined that the cost of repairs to the Fleetwood 
Motel equalled $ 120,000. By handwritten amendment of the verdict form, the jury 
then determined the damages to be thirty percent of $ 120,000, or $ 36,000. 
Fleetwood argues, in a straightforward manner, that the only way to interpret 
this verdict is that the State is responsible for 100 percent of the damages and 
that the only damages that can be discerned from the verdict are the repair 
costs of $ 120,000. If we were to accept Fleetwood's contention and apply Rule 
1.04, W.R.A.P., we would simply modify the judgment entered by the district 
court to reflect an error found in the record. The cases that we follow for 
guidance in ascertaining damages in tort, however, also inject proximate cause 
of the injury into the equation. Mudge; Atlas; Hagar; Fitzgerald; 
Douglas.[¶34]  We then 
must determine whether, given the assignment of 100 percent of the negligence to 
the State by the jury in its verdict, there can be an apportionment of damages. 
The State earnestly contends that, given the severity of this torrential 
downpour, there would have been some flooding of the Fleetwood Motel in the 
absence of any negligence on its part. The verdict returned by the jury would 
seem to indicate that, in some way, the jury had developed an apportionment 
formula. If that speculation is not valid, then further conjecture raises the 
possibility of a depreciation factor, or a factor of enhanced value following 
the repairs. Certainly, the record does not explain how the jury arrived at the 
thirty percent factor in awarding damages.[¶35]  The resolution by the jury could very 
well be what is fair and just under the circumstances. We have already noted 
that the State is responsible only for the damage that is the proximate result 
of its negligence. Mudge; Atlas; Hagar; Fitzgerald; Douglas. Conceding 
that possibility, however, the record does not justify a conclusion that the 
verdict that was returned was proper in accordance with the evidence and the 
instructions.[¶36]  Question 
Four in the special jury verdict alludes to the negligence of the State of 
Wyoming as being one of the proximate causes of flooding in and around the 
Fleetwood Motel. There is a clear implication that there could be more than one 
proximate cause and, quite likely, that language encompassed the participation 
of the City whose liability had not been determined at that stage. That question 
would not lead to an apportionment of damages, however. The only instruction 
that would seem to fit into the apportionment context is Instruction No. 13, 
which reads as follows: 

"INSTRUCTION 
NO. 13 "A proximate cause of an injury is a cause which in direct, 
unbroken sequence produces injury. It is one without which the injury would not 
have occurred."

[¶37]  We are satisfied that there was no 
instruction given the jury that would permit an apportionment of the damages. 
Nevertheless, the jury arrived at a damage award of thirty percent of the repair 
cost. We assume that juries understand and follow the instructions given to 
them. Goggins v. Harwood, 704 P.2d 1282 (Wyo. 1985). The concomitant of 
that proposition is that when a verdict is returned that is inconsistent with 
the instructions, like the one reached in this case, the verdict must be one as 
to which the jury has applied its own interpretation of the law, or it is a 
product of conjecture and speculation. In either event, the verdict cannot 
stand. See Reposa; Reiman; Krist. Mere uncertainty with respect to the 
amount of damage does not foreclose recovery. Opheim v. United Mobile Homes, 
Inc., 511 P.2d 1289 (Wyo. 1973). The remedy in such a situation is to modify 
the judgment pursuant to Rules 1.04 and 7.03, W.R.A.P., or to remand for a new 
trial. Because we earlier have noted that it would not be appropriate to modify 
the judgment in this case, we conclude that it should be remanded for a new 
trial on a question of damages.[¶38]  This brings us to the question of 
whether the district court appropriately should have instructed the jury that 
there can be no apportionment of damages between a so called "act of God" and a 
negligent defendant. Fleetwood, invoking Ely v. Kirk, 707 P.2d 706 (Wyo. 
1985), and Sky Aviation Corporation v. Colt, 475 P.2d 301 (Wyo. 1970), 
argues that the theory behind the State's defense was the defense of an "act of 
God." They argue that the assertion of that theory must be confined by 
clarifying instructions and urge that, in the absence of such instructions, a 
jury is likely to apportion damages between the act of God and the negligent 
party. Fleetwood contends that this is an impermissible response under the law, 
but is probably the explanation for the reduction in damages in this case. The 
State contends, and Fleetwood does concede, that it did not assert the defense 
of an act of God at the trial. The record does demonstrate, however, that the 
State argued to the jury that the 1985 flood was a unique and unusual event 
beyond its control and that the damage to the Fleetwood Motel was inevitable 
because of the natural events.[¶39]  At the trial, Fleetwood requested the 
following instruction: 

"The 
defendants have the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the alleged damages were caused solely by an act of God. An act of God is 
any accident due directly and exclusively to natural causes without human 
intervention which by no means of foresight, anticipation or care, reasonably to 
have been expected could have been prevented. "In order for an act 
of God to be a defense to the Plaintiffs' claims in this matter the act of God 
must be the only cause of injury. There can be no combination of an act of God 
and fault of man as a presence of the fault of man eliminates the act of God as 
a defense."

The 
district court refused to give the instruction and, after analyzing the 
arguments and authorities presented by the parties, we agree that the 
instruction was improper although perhaps for different reasons than those 
espoused by the State and the trial court. In Cox v. Vernieuw, 604 P.2d 1353 (Wyo. 1980), we held that an "act of God" defense is superfluous in a 
negligence case and should not be considered. The rationale was that "an act of 
God is no more than another way of saying that the defendants were not 
negligent." Cox, 604 P.2d  at 1358. If the theory is espoused by the jury, 
it is simply finding that there was no negligence on the part of a defendant. 
See Ely. It follows in this case that, because the defense of an act of 
God is superfluous and inappropriate, the instruction pertaining to the defense 
is equally superfluous and inappropriate. Cox; Ely. If clarifying 
instructions are to be given, they are better served by incorporating them in a 
well-drafted instruction on proximate cause rather than by instructing 
separately on the defense of an act of God.[¶40]  We perceive another danger in such an 
instruction. The duty of establishing negligence is that of the plaintiff. The 
effect of the instruction offered would be to require the defendant to establish 
non-negligence, i.e., that the damage was attributable to a so-called "act of 
God." We think it is antithetical to the rule that imposes the burden of proof 
on the plaintiff to show by a preponderance of the evidence the duty of the 
defendant, the breach of that duty, and the injury to the plaintiff proximately 
caused by that breach. Ely; Pine Creek Canal No. 1 v. Stadler, 685 P.2d 13 (Wyo. 1984); Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975). While 
assignment of the burden of proof to the defendant would be appropriate if an 
act of God were truly an affirmative defense, see Anderson v. Schulz, 527 P.2d 151 (Wyo. 1974); Tavares, in light of our holdings that this is not 
an affirmative defense but, simply, addresses the essential elements of the 
cause of action in tort, such an instruction should not be given. It would seem 
to accomplish nothing more than a shifting of the burden of proof to a 
defendant. This determination that no error occurred when the court refused the 
instruction is particularly appropriate in this instance because the defendant, 
the State, never did request such an instruction. Furthermore, we agree with the 
State's argument that it was not relying on an act of God defense merely because 
it argued that the damage to the motel was the product of natural events. See 
Cox; Ely.[¶41]  This 
brings us to the two remaining questions with respect to whether reversible 
error was committed by the failure of the district court to include the 
Martinezes on the jury verdict form as actors for purposes of comparative 
negligence and by failing to give the proposed instruction of the State on 
comparative negligence. These two questions relate to the same topic and are 
resolved by the same rationale. The State's first contention is that § 1-1-109, 
W.S.1977, requires that Mr. and Mrs. Martinez be included on the jury form 
to provide a three-way consideration of comparable negligence among the State, 
the City, and Fleetwood. In pertinent part, § 1-1-109, W.S.1977, provides: 

"(b) 
The court may, and when requested by any party, shall: "(i) If a 
jury trial: "(A) Direct the jury to find separate special verdicts 
determining the total amount of damages and the percentage of fault attributable 
to each actor whether or not a party; and * * * *."

The 
State's proposed jury instruction, which was refused, addresses this subject of 
comparative fault on the part of Fleetwood and then encompasses an additional 
instruction mandating no recovery if there is fifty percent or more negligence 
attributable to Fleetwood. This statute is limited to its invocation "in those 
cases only where the plaintiff is contributorily negligent." Palmeno v. 
Cashen, 627 P.2d 163, 166 (Wyo. 1981). If the evidence does not disclose 
negligence on the part of the plaintiff, the statute does not apply. 
Palmeno. The district court ruled that there was no evidence of 
negligence on the part of Fleetwood that would justify its inclusion on the 
verdict form as an actor as to whom negligence could be attributed. Our 
examination of the record results in our reaching a similar conclusion and 
demonstrates that there was no error in the failure to give this instruction. 
Because Mr. and Mrs. Martinez were not negligent, the 
statute does not mandate their inclusion on the verdict form. It would have been 
inappropriate for the district court to give an instruction that was not 
sustained by the evidence. See Hernandez v. Gilveli, 626 P.2d 74 (Wyo. 
1981); Beard v. Brown, 616 P.2d 726 (Wyo. 1980); Edwards v. 
Harris, 397 P.2d 87 (Wyo. 1964). The State's attempt to distinguish 
Palmeno by pointing out that it was tried to a judge rather than to a 
jury is not effective. That distinction serves only to trigger separate sections 
of the statute, see § 1-1-109, W.S.1977, but it does not make any 
difference in the result. The entire statute has no application if the evidence 
fails to disclose any negligence attributable to an actor, whether a party or 
not, that would justify the jury considering attributing negligence to that 
actor.[¶42]  We dismount the 
carousel by summarizing. We hold that the notice of appeal in this case was 
timely filed and that we have jurisdiction to consider the other issues. 
 The action is not barred by the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, §§ 
1-39-101 to -120, W.S.1977 (1985 Repl.), and the alleged failure of Fleetwood to 
comply with Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7, did not deprive the district court of 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, the question of whether the district court had 
jurisdiction to enter its Order Nunc Pro Tunc Continuing Time to Determine the 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Additur or New Trial is of no consequence to the outcome 
of this appeal and need not be decided. The district court did not err in 
refusing to instruct the jury that there can be no allocation of fault between a 
natural event and an act of negligence of a defendant. The district court did 
not commit any error by refusing to include the Martinezes on the jury verdict 
form as actors for purposes of comparative negligence nor by refusing to give 
the State's proposed jury instruction on comparative negligence. We agree that 
the district court did not have jurisdiction to enter its order granting additur 
or new trial at the time it did so and its order so entered is void and of no 
effect. The jury verdict was not proper under the facts and the law, however, 
and we remand the case for a new trial on the issue of compensatory 
damages.[¶43]  Reversed and 
remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this 
opinion.Urbigkit, J., filed a concurring 
opinion.URBIGKIT, Justice, concurring.[¶44]  I concur in the decision and generally 
in the basic logic developed for resolution. However, I write further to reject 
any supposition contained in the statements of the majority opinion that the 
legislature can, by limiting legislation, control rights of access for citizens 
to enforce guarantees of the Wyoming Constitution.1  Constitutional rights are not subject to 
validation at the whim of the state legislative authorization. Discussion to the 
contrary in the majority opinion is clearly unprepossessing dictum for the 
decision rendered here where the appeal is not constitutional in concept. 
Compare Cooney v. Park County, Wyoming, 792 P.2d 1287 (Wyo. 1990), 
Urbigkit, J., dissenting, with White v. State, 784 P.2d 1313 (Wyo. 1989), 
Urbigkit J., dissenting.[¶45]  
The modern persuasion of state jurists generally recognizes that the 
foundational support for maintenance of state constitutional guarantees has 
become their primary, and not a secondary, responsibility as now effectively 
recognized after prodding from the federal judiciary. As Justice William J. 
Brennan, Jr. stated in the foreword in J. Grodin, In Pursuit of Justice, 
xiv-xv (1989): 

The 
very premise of the cases that foreclose federal remedies constitutes a clear 
call to state courts to step into the breach. With the federal locus of our 
double protection weakened, our liberties may suffer irretrievably if the state 
courts are not quick to take on the challenge the United States Supreme Court 
has laid down. * * * *Thus, the significance of the role of state courts 
in dispensing justice becomes greater each day. Without detracting in the 
slightest from the work of the federal courts, it is fair to say that the 
decisions that affect people's day-to-day lives most fundamentally are 
increasingly made by state courts.

[¶46]  It is for us to recognize that 
responsibility for the Wyoming Constitution is the absolute obligation of this 
state judiciary within the oath of office which each person honored by 
appointment provides to protect and defend. This subject is pervasively and 
appropriately addressed by the Michigan Supreme Court in Smith v. Department 
of Public Health, 428 Mich. 540, 410 N.W.2d 749 (1987), cert. granted sub 
nom. Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 485 U.S. 1005, 108 S. Ct. 1466, 99 L. Ed. 2d 696 (1988), judgment aff'd sub nom. Will v. Michigan 
Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45 
(1989). See Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hosp. Center, 300 Md. 520, 479 A.2d 921 (1984). See also Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 5 U.S. 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803) and the foundational construction of the controlling philosophy 
developed by Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619 
(1971).[¶47]  Any suggestion 
that the legislature can legislatively amend the Wyoming Constitution by either 
negative enactment or denial of affirmative access legislation is not only 
unacceptable in concept, but contrary to the state jurist's judicial 
responsibility. I am absolutely committed to a basic philosophy that 
constitutional wrongs are always subject to correction by the judiciary 
as the independent third branch of government in our democratic constitutional 
society. If not, we have no real present constitutional government or realistic 
promise of a continued democratic society. 

 

 

FOOTNOTES

1 "Any action against the State must be authorized by the legislature and 
that courts are without jurisdiction to proceed in any case that has not been so 
authorized."