Title: Webster v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
 
 
DANIEL WEBSTER, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Defendant Below-  
§ 
No. 346, 2003 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior 
v. 
§ 
Court of the State of 
§ 
Delaware in and for 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
Sussex County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Cr. Id. No. 0205013274 
 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date Submitted: 
November 25, 2003 
 
 
 
 
Date Decided: 
December 23, 2003 
 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, and STEELE and JACOBS, Justices 
 
ORDER 
 
This 23rd day of December, 2003, upon review of the briefs submitted 
by the parties, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The appellant, Daniel Webster, was convicted by a Superior 
Court jury of stalking in violation of 11 Del. C. §1312(A), for which he was 
sentenced to three years’ incarceration at Level V with credit for 412 days 
previously served, followed by six months at Level IV Work Release. 
Webster appeals from his conviction and sentence on the ground that he was 
improperly deprived of a possible mental illness defense.  For the reasons set 
 
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forth below, Webster’s appeal lacks merit and his conviction and sentence 
should be affirmed. 
 
(2) 
Before the trial, Webster’s counsel moved the trial court to 
order a mental evaluation of his client.  That motion was granted, but 
Webster thereafter refused to be examined unless his attorney was present.  
That position resulted in the trial court modifying its order to clarify that the 
sole purpose of the examination was to determine Webster’s competency to 
stand trial, and to assure Webster that he would not be asked about his 
alleged participation in the stalking offense.  Despite that, Webster persisted 
in his refusal to be examined. 
 
(3) 
Although Webster’s counsel took the position that Webster’s 
irrational conduct did not preclude his being examined by other methods, the 
trial court determined that by not cooperating with the examiner, Webster 
had waived both the issue of his competency to stand trial and any mental 
illness defense.  Specifically, the trial court found that Webster was “as 
smart as a fox” and “unreasonably manipulative.”1  The trial court deemed 
Webster competent to stand trial, and the trial then proceed without Webster 
testifying or presenting any evidence regarding his mental state at the time 
of the incident or at the time of trial. 
                                                 
1 A-24 
 
3
 
(4) 
On appeal Webster does not attack the trial court’s factual 
findings but instead asserts, without evidentiary support, that it is common 
knowledge that persons with paranoia or schizophrenia may be hostile or 
delusional, or may act in a bizarre manner.  Even if that were the fact, there 
is no evidence of record that Webster was paranoid or schizophrenic. 
 
(5) 
Webster also asserts, again without evidentiary support, that the 
Delaware State Hospital was capable of performing a mental evaluation with 
an uncooperative subject.  Even if that were so, Webster not only refused to 
cooperate on both occasions where a mental evaluation was ordered, but also 
his defense counsel never requested the court to order a third evaluation at 
the State Hospital. 
 
(6) 
Although Delaware law affords a defendant an insanity defense 
in a criminal proceeding, the defendant must comply with the rules and 
procedures that provide for a court-ordered mental examination and that 
require timely notice of a defendant’s intention to rely upon that defense.  
Failure to comply with those rules, including that which governs a court-
ordered mental examination, can result in the exclusion of any opinion 
testimony on the defendant’s mental condition.2  Procedural requirements 
                                                 
2 See Del. Super Ct. Crim. R. 12.2; State v. Grossberg, 1998 WL 117976 (Del. Super). 
 
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that condition or limit a defendant’s right to raise an insanity defense do not 
unconstitutionally burden a defendant’s right to present that defense.3 
(7) 
Although Webster’s brief obliquely suggests that Webster’s 
non-cooperation may have been caused by mental illness, the record does 
not support that suggestion; nor does it come to grips with the trial court’s 
finding that Webster’s refusal to cooperate was voluntary and manipulative. 
The testimony of the forensic psychiatrist, that Webster understood the 
purpose and ramifications of the mental examination but nonetheless refused 
to cooperate and undergo the evaluation, supports the trial court’s 
determination.  
(8) 
For these reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is 
AFFIRMED. 
   
 
 
 
 
    BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
    Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
 
    Justice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., People v. Toma, 613 N.W. 2d 694, 699-700 (Mich. 2000); State v. Richards, 
495 N.W.2d 187, 197-99  (Minn. 1992) (sanctions that precluded defendant from 
asserting insanity defense after defendant failed to cooperate with court-appointed 
psychiatrist held not to violate due process).