Title: Commonwealth v. Loya

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
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SJC-12475 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ADRIAN T. LOYA. 
 
 
 
Barnstable.     November 8, 2019. - February 6, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Criminal Responsibility.  Insanity.  Practice, 
Criminal, Capital case, Instructions to jury, Request for 
jury instructions, Acquittal by reason of insanity. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on July 1, 2015. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Gary A. Nickerson, J. 
 
 
 
Theodore F. Riordan (Deborah Bates Riordan also present) 
for the defendant. 
 
Elizabeth A. Sweeney, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  On February 5, 2015, the defendant broke into 
Lisa Trubnikova's home.  He confronted her in the bedroom, where 
she lay beside her wife, Anna Trubnikova.1  The defendant shot 
                     
 
1 Because Lisa Trubnikova and Anna Trubnikova share a last 
name, we refer to them by their first names. 
2 
 
 
both women, killing Lisa and wounding Anna.  Before finally 
surrendering to police, the defendant also shot and wounded a 
responding police officer, Jared P. MacDonald. 
 
For more than one year, the defendant had been obsessed 
with killing Lisa, and in turn being killed by police.  The 
defendant eventually reduced this intended murder-suicide in a 
detailed, written plan labeled "Operation Purple Rebel" in his 
electronic files.  At trial, the defendant argued that this 
obsessive and self-destructive plot showed that the killing was 
not born out of malice; rather, he was mentally disturbed.  
Counsel unsuccessfully claimed that a mental disorder caused the 
defendant to suffer delusions that compelled him to plan and 
commit the crime.  On appeal, the defendant contends that our 
current law on criminal responsibility made this defense not 
viable, and therefore, because he was deprived of his only 
defense, a new trial is required.  Alternatively, the defendant 
asks us to reduce the verdict, pursuant to our authority under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
We discern no reason to order a new trial or to reduce the 
conviction.  Accordingly, we affirm the convictions. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  We recite the facts as the 
jury could have found them, in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, reserving certain details for later discussion. 
3 
 
 
 
The defendant first met Lisa in 2011, when they served 
together in the United States Coast Guard at a base in Kodiak, 
Alaska.  They worked together in an information technology 
office, and they developed a fast friendship. 
 
Their relationship took a dramatic turn in September of 
2012 following an incident at Lisa's home.  According to the 
defendant, Lisa invited him over to have drinks and watch some 
video recordings.  While he was there, however, Lisa became 
intoxicated and attempted to seduce him.  Although Lisa had no 
sexual contact with the defendant, this incident affected him so 
deeply that he would later refer to it as a "rape of the mind." 
 
The defendant eventually reported the encounter to his 
superiors.  In June of 2013, he was transferred from Kodiak to 
Chesapeake, Virginia.  On the day he arrived at his new base, 
the Coast Guard issued the defendant a "Page 7" reprimand for 
his role in the incident and ordered him to cut off all contact 
with Lisa and her wife Anna.  The defendant was shocked and 
refused to sign the letter acknowledging the outcome of the 
Coast Guard's investigation.  He felt wronged, and this feeling 
turned to anger. 
 
These events coincided with a deterioration of the 
defendant's mental health.  He became depressed, started taking 
Benadryl to help him sleep, and lost interest in the few 
activities that previously had interested him, such as playing 
4 
 
 
video games.  The defendant also began to harbor a hatred for 
the woman he blamed for his misfortune:  Lisa.  As his life 
seemed to unravel around him, the defendant ultimately decided 
that he no longer wanted to live.  He did not want to die, 
however, without seeking vengeance.  Therefore, he resolved to 
take Lisa's life. 
 
Over the following months, the defendant meticulously 
planned his killing.  Through the Internet, he learned that Lisa 
and Anna had relocated to the town of Bourne on Cape Cod.  In 
October of 2014, he traveled to Massachusetts and set up hunting 
cameras outside their new home to confirm that Lisa was living 
there.  When he returned home, he also began playing shooting 
games with plastic replica weapons, using plastic bullets,2 to 
gain more experience with wielding weapons in a combat 
situation.  In the midst of these preparations, the defendant 
documented his troubled history with Lisa, the downward spiral 
of his professional and personal life, and his plot to kill Lisa 
in a 250-page manifesto entitled "The Wrath of Loya."3  After 
                     
 
2 The defendant obtained these weapons, sold for use in 
casual and competitive games, from a commercial manufacturer. 
 
 
3 The electronic file containing the manifesto was titled 
"The Loya Wars."  The titles were references to the science 
fiction television and movie series Star Wars and Star Trek, 
respectively.  Both series featured prominently in other aspects 
of the crime, including insignia the defendant wore during the 
5 
 
 
months of planning, he ultimately decided to carry out the 
killing on February 5, 2015, his thirty-first birthday. 
 
On February 1, 2015, the defendant left his home in 
Chesapeake, Virginia, and began making his way to Massachusetts.  
He arrived on February 3, 2015, checked into a local hotel, and 
prepared for the fatal encounter.  His original plan was to 
attack Lisa at her house, force her to confront what he had 
become, and stab her in the heart.4  He did not intend to harm 
Anna.  The defendant originally planned to cover Anna's ears 
with "ear protection" so that she would not have to hear any 
sounds that Lisa might make as she was dying.  Once Lisa was 
dead, the defendant then would provoke a firefight with police 
so that they would shoot and kill him. 
 
The defendant arrived at Lisa's house shortly before 2 A.M. 
on February 5, 2015.5  He parked his vehicle across the road 
approaching her house, and set it on fire to obstruct police 
                     
shooting.  Dr. John Daignault identified these references as 
further evidence of the defendant's delusional disorder. 
 
 
4 Many details of the defendant's planning and the 
commission of the crime come from his statements to police.  As 
Dr. Martin Kelly, an expert called by the Commonwealth, noted, 
the defendant's recollection of these events was unusually 
precise.  Kelly identified this "Eidetic memory" as further 
evidence of the defendant's mental disorder. 
 
 
5 Most of the following encounter was captured on video 
recording by a body camera that the defendant strapped to his 
chest.  An edited version of this recording was played at trial, 
and the entire recording was entered as an exhibit. 
6 
 
 
access.  He also set up smoke grenades, noise makers, and fake 
explosive devices to further delay first responders.  Having 
staged the scene, the defendant breached the door to Lisa's 
house by shooting the lock off with a shotgun.  Once inside, he 
made his way up the stairs to her bedroom. 
 
The defendant found Lisa and Anna in their bed.  He ordered 
them to separate, threw handcuffs at them, and demanded that 
they put on the cuffs.  The women screamed and asked who he was 
and why he was in their house.  The defendant pulled off his 
mask, revealing his identity.  Lisa and Anna recognized him, and 
Lisa shouted his name.  The defendant responded, "See what you 
did to me" and "This is what I've become because of you." 
 
Lisa apologized to the defendant and said that she never 
meant to hurt him.  Both women pleaded with the defendant and 
promised that they would not tell anyone if he left them in 
peace.  Face-to-face with Lisa, the defendant froze, unsure of 
how to proceed. 
 
With the defendant momentarily distracted, Lisa and Anna 
attempted to shield themselves with their mattress.  The 
defendant exclaimed, "What do you think you're doing?"  Now 
refocused on completing his "mission," he drew his pistol and 
fired fifteen shots through the mattress in Lisa's direction.  
Eleven bullets struck Lisa, killing her in a matter of seconds.  
7 
 
 
Four bullets struck Anna.  The defendant heard gurgling sounds 
from Lisa's direction, and he concluded that she was dying. 
 
With his primary objective completed, the defendant 
intended to die at the hands of the police.  He went back 
outside, retrieved a rifle that he previously stashed in a snow 
bank, and prepared to engage with responding officers.  Soon 
thereafter, he saw the silhouette of an approaching police 
officer, Jared MacDonald.  The defendant fired four shots at 
MacDonald; one struck him in the spine. 
 
The defendant then retreated behind the victims' house to 
wait for more officers to come and end his life.  As the minutes 
slipped by, however, the defendant's resolve to kill himself 
weakened, and he decided to give himself up.  He discarded his 
weapons, approached the officers with hands raised, and was 
taken into custody. 
 
b.  Procedural history.  On July 1, 2015, the defendant was 
indicted on thirty counts, including murder in the first degree 
for the shooting death of Lisa.6  Trial commenced on August 28, 
                     
 
6 The other indictments against the defendant were three 
counts of assault with intent to murder; three counts of 
aggravated assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon; 
two counts of armed home invasion; two counts of armed assault 
in a dwelling; three counts of using a firearm in the commission 
of a felony; two counts of armed kidnapping with bodily injury; 
one count of burglary and assault on an occupant; one count of 
burning a motor vehicle; one count of possessing a hoax device; 
8 
 
 
2017.  From the beginning of the trial, defense counsel 
acknowledged that this case was not a "whodunit."7  Rather, the 
key issue at trial was whether the defendant was criminally 
responsible for his actions. 
 
Four medical professionals testified concerning the 
defendant's mental condition at the time of the shooting.  Each 
expert opined as to whether the defendant met the standard to 
establish a lack of criminal responsibility set out in 
Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544, 546–547 (1967):  "A 
person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of 
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks 
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality 
[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law" (citation omitted). 
 
Two witnesses testified that the defendant had been 
criminally responsible, and two testified that he had not.  Dr. 
David W. Holtzen, a forensic psychologist at Bridgewater State 
Hospital, was asked by the Commonwealth to perform competency 
                     
one count of assault and battery on a police officer; and ten 
counts of possessing a large capacity feeding device. 
 
7 Indeed, defense counsel stated the same in an extensive 
interview he gave to the Cape Cod Times on the day before trial 
began.  The judge took pains to comment on this interview during 
empanelment, and to make sure that the article was preserved in 
the record.  Exposure to media coverage was, appropriately, a 
subject of individual voir dire. 
9 
 
 
and criminal responsibility examinations of the defendant.  He 
testified that the defendant had not been suffering from any 
mental disorder or illness at the time of the killing.  Dr. 
Judith Edershein, a forensic psychiatrist based at a large 
teaching hospital,8 was engaged by the Commonwealth to reach a 
determination whether the defendant had been criminally 
responsible by reviewing the records and other experts' 
opinions, but she was precluded from speaking with the 
defendant.9  She testified that although the defendant had at 
least one personality disorder, it did not render him incapable 
of conforming his conduct to the law or appreciating the 
wrongfulness of his actions. 
 
Another of the Commonwealth's witnesses, Dr. Martin Kelly, 
a practicing psychiatrist also at a large teaching hospital, 
interviewed and examined the defendant three times, and reviewed 
records and the police reports.  Kelly testified that the 
defendant had high functioning Asperger's Syndrome, a disorder 
on the "autism spectrum," and that the condition was "hardwired" 
                     
 
8 Dr. Judith Edershein also testified that she had graduated 
from Harvard Law School and become an attorney prior to entering 
psychiatry and ultimately becoming an assistant professor of 
psychiatry. 
 
 
9 Edershein was retained in December of 2016, after the 
Commonwealth's first expert, Kelly, completed his report.  
Edershein did not formally request to interview the defendant 
until May of 2017, at which point her request was denied by 
defense counsel. 
10 
 
 
in the brain, not something that is acquired, readily amenable 
to treatment, or "episodic."  Kelly considered and rejected 
diagnoses of schizoid personality disorder, major depressive 
disorder, and delusional disorder.  Based on his evaluation of 
the defendant and having examined the records, including the 
police reports, Kelly concluded that the defendant "suffered 
from a mental disease; and that as a result of that mental 
disease, he lacked the substantial capacity to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law." 
 
The defendant called a single expert, Dr. John Daignault, a 
forensic psychologist, who previously had been the clinical 
director of Bridgewater State Hospital.  Daignault determined 
that the defendant had not been criminally responsible for his 
actions on the night of the shooting, but concluded as well that 
the defendant suffered from a delusional disorder and did not 
suffer from Asperger's Syndrome. 
 
After deliberating over the course of three days, the jury 
convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree on 
theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or 
cruelty.  The jury also found the defendant guilty of twenty-
eight of the twenty-nine other indictments.  He was found not 
guilty of armed assault with intent to murder.  The defendant 
filed a notice of appeal in September 2017. 
11 
 
 
 
2.  Discussion.  Before us, the defendant argues that a new 
trial is required because our current law regarding criminal 
responsibility deprived him of a meaningful defense.  The 
defendant contends that the trial judge committed reversible 
error by denying two motions the defendant filed to remedy these 
flaws.  One motion proposed a verdict slip that presented the 
jury's decision in a series of yes-or-no questions, in addition 
to a general verdict of "guilty," "not guilty," or "not guilty, 
lack of criminal responsibility."  The other motion asked the 
judge to instruct the jury to consider a verdict of "guilty but 
not criminally responsible" rather than "not guilty, lack of 
criminal responsibility."  As appellate counsel acknowledged at 
oral argument, both motions advocated for a departure from our 
current law regarding the defense of a lack of criminal 
responsibility.  We decline to adopt the defendant's recommended 
changes, and discern no error in the trial judge's decision to 
deny these motions. 
 
a.  Verdict slips.  At the beginning of trial, counsel 
filed a motion requesting that the verdict slips include several 
yes-or-no questions on whether the Commonwealth had met its 
burden.10  Ultimately, however, the defendant expressed 
                     
 
10 By way of illustration, the defendant suggested the 
following language: 
 
12 
 
 
satisfaction with the verdict slips, drafted by the judge, that 
omitted these questions.  Therefore, as the parties agree, any 
error in the judge's decision to deny the motion is unpreserved 
and would be reviewed for a substantial likelihood of a 
                     
"1.  Has the government proven that the Defendant committed 
the act of an unlawful killing of a human being without 
justification? 
 
"__________Yes  
 
 
 
 
 
__________No 
 
"If the answer to the above is yes, proceed to Question 2. 
 
"2.  Has the government proven beyond every reasonable 
doubt that the Defendant, at the time of such killing, was 
not suffering from a mental disease or defect? 
 
"__________Yes  
 
 
 
 
 
__________No 
 
"If the answer to this question is no, proceed to Question 
3. If the answer is yes, proceed to Question 4. 
 
"3.  Has the government proven beyond every reasonable 
doubt that such mental disease or defect did not affect the 
Defendant so that [he] was unable to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of [his] conduct or conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law? 
 
"__________Yes  
 
 
 
 
 
__________No 
 
" . . . 
 
"4.  Has the government proven beyond every reasonable 
doubt that at the time of the killing that the Defendant 
was not suffering from a mental disease or Defect that 
reduced his capacity to either appreciate the wrongfulness 
of his conduct or to conform [his] conduct to the 
requirements of the law? 
 
"__________Yes  
 
 
 
 
 
__________No" 
13 
 
 
miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Garcia, 470 Mass. 
24, 40 (2014). 
 
"[W]e review these claims to determine whether there was 
error and, if so, whether it created a substantial likelihood of 
a miscarriage of justice."  Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 
805, 814–815 (2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018).  "In 
analyzing a claim under the substantial likelihood standard, we 
review the evidence and case as a whole and consider whether any 
error made in the course of the trial was likely to have 
influenced the jury's conclusion."  Commonwealth v. Berry, 457 
Mass. 602, 618 (2010), S.C., 466 Mass. 763 (2014).  Where there 
is no error, this court need not reach the question of 
prejudice.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gomes, 459 Mass. 194, 207 
(2011) (analysis stops at determination there was no error).  
 
The defendant's motion most fairly is read as a motion for 
special questions pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 27 (c), 378 
Mass. 897 (1979).11  Special questions are "rarely resorted to in 
criminal trials."  Commonwealth v. Dane Entertainment Servs., 
                     
 
11 Alternatively, the defendant's motion could be 
interpreted as a motion for a "special verdict," i.e., one that 
"involves no determinative, ultimate verdict from a jury but 
only a statement of facts the jury have found from which the 
judge determines the appropriate judgment."  Commonwealth v. 
Licciardi, 387 Mass. 670, 675 (1982).  Only general verdicts are 
permitted in criminal trials.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 27 (a), 378 
Mass. 897 (1979); Licciardi, supra (recognizing that 
Massachusetts rules of criminal procedure eliminated special 
verdicts in criminal trials). 
14 
 
 
Inc. (No. 1), 389 Mass. 902, 916 (1983), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Lussier, 333 Mass. 83, 94 (1955).  Although they sometimes may 
"aid in the disposition of a case," Commonwealth v. Licciardi, 
387 Mass. 670, 676 (1982), the decision to issue them typically 
is "discretionary with the judge."  Dane Entertainment Servs., 
Inc. (No. 1), supra, quoting Lussier, supra.  We have required 
special questions only where they are necessary to ensure that, 
should a jury convict a defendant of an offense, they are 
unanimous as to the theory of that offense.  Compare 
Commonwealth v. Santos, 440 Mass. 281, 287–288 (2003) (where 
Commonwealth pursues multiple theories of murder in first 
degree, verdict slip must indicate unanimous theory of 
culpability), with Commonwealth v. Shea, 460 Mass. 163, 175 
(2011) (no special question necessary where Commonwealth pursued 
only one theory of murder in first degree), and Commonwealth v. 
Arias, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 429, 433 (2010) (no special question 
required on different methods of committing assault by means of 
dangerous weapon). 
 
We discern no compelling reason to require special 
questions when the jury consider criminal responsibility.12  
Although the criminal responsibility defense presents special 
                     
 
12 We do not decide whether, in other circumstances, special 
questions may be required for some purpose other than to ensure 
the unanimity of a verdict. 
15 
 
 
problems for a jury, see part 2.b, infra, it is unclear how yes-
or-no questions on the Commonwealth's burden would help the jury 
to deliberate fairly on this issue.  Indeed, such questions are 
at least as likely to steer the jury towards a verdict of 
guilty.  See Licciardi, 387 Mass. at 676, quoting Commonwealth 
v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249, 260-261 (1977), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 1039 (1978) (special questions "must avoid any 'tendency to 
lead the jurors step by step to a verdict of guilty'").  See 
United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 182 (1st Cir. 1969) 
("There is no easier way to reach, and perhaps force, a verdict 
of guilty than to approach it step by step").  To the extent 
that a jury may require additional guidance on how to consider 
whether a defendant lacked criminal responsibility, the proper 
source of that guidance is the jury charge.  See Commonwealth v. 
Wolfe, 478 Mass. 142, 152 (2017) (Lowy, J., dissenting) ("the 
long-standing principle that the jury are presumed to follow the 
judge's instructions . . . lies at the very heart of our justice 
system" [citation omitted]). 
 
Thus, the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the 
defendant's motion for special questions to which he was not 
entitled. 
 
b.  Jury instructions.  In addition to his motion for 
special questions, the defendant filed a "Motion to Permit the 
Jury to Consider Whether the Defendant is Guilty But Insane."  
16 
 
 
Through this motion, he requested that the jury consider a 
verdict of "guilty but not criminally responsible," rather than 
the verdict set forth in the then-existing model instruction, 
"not guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibility."  See 
Model Jury Instruction on Homicide 11 (2013). 
 
At the charge conference, however, defense counsel did not 
renew this request, and ultimately declared himself satisfied 
with the judge's instructions on criminal responsibility.  We 
therefore review the judge's decision to deny this motion for a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See Brown, 
477 Mass. at 814–815. 
 
The defendant argues that the option of finding him "guilty 
but not criminally responsible" was necessary in order for the 
jury fairly to consider the role that mental illness played in 
his crimes.  The defendant maintains that, to the average juror, 
a finding of "not guilty" is tantamount to a finding of factual 
innocence.  In addition to potentially confusing the jurors, the 
defendant argues, this formulation requires them to 
compartmentalize their knowledge of the defendant's actions and 
separately to consider if he nonetheless was not guilty.  The 
defendant contends that, given the particularly egregious acts 
17 
 
 
in this case, asking the jury to equate the defendant with the 
term "not guilty" was simply unrealistic.13 
 
Without discounting these concerns, we conclude that the 
instruction the defendant requested was not warranted.  
Instructing the jury to consider a verdict of "guilty but not 
criminally responsible" would be inconsistent with our long-
standing jurisprudence on criminal responsibility.  As the 
defendant acknowledged at trial, he can point to no 
Massachusetts authority that supports his requested language. 
 
Furthermore, the defendant's requested instruction would 
invite unnecessary confusion.  A verdict of "guilty but not 
criminally responsible" is an oxymoron:  if the Commonwealth is 
unable to prove a defendant is criminally responsible beyond a 
                     
 
13 "[E]xperience in this Commonwealth has shown that it is 
most difficult for a defendant to prevail on a claim of 
insanity."  Commonwealth v. Keita, 429 Mass. 843, 854 (1999), 
overruled on another ground by Commonwealth v. Lawson, 475 Mass. 
806 (2016).  Jurors' objections to the criminal responsibility 
defense, particularly in the homicide context, are well-
documented outside the Commonwealth as well.  See Brooks, Guilty 
by Reason of Insanity:  Why a Maligned Defense Demands a 
Constitutional Right of Inquiry on Voir Dire, 20 Geo. Mason L. 
Rev. 1183, 1202-1203 (2013); Grachek, The Insanity Defense in 
the Twenty-First Century:  How Recent United States Supreme 
Court  L.J. 1479, 1487-
1488 (2006).  This resistance may stem from suspicions that 
defendants malinger, and that the expert testimony on which a 
criminal responsibility defense depends is susceptible to bias.  
See Sanders, Expert Witness Ethics, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1539, 
1575-1577 (2007).  In any event, it is clear that jurors do not 
easily reach the "chilling determination that the defendant is 
an insane killer not legally responsible for his acts."  
Commonwealth v. Mutina, 366 Mass. 810, 822 (1975). 
18 
 
 
reasonable doubt, the defendant is not guilty.  See Commonwealth 
v. Bruneau, 472 Mass. 510, 517 (2015); Golden, petitioner, 341 
Mass. 672, 674 (1961) (affirming "the undoubted premise that one 
acquitted by reason of insanity has been found guilty of no 
crime").  To make sense of this instruction, the jury would have 
to parse the difference between factual "guilt" in the context 
of criminal responsibility and legal "guilt" as it applies to 
the charges as a whole.  Particularly in light of the other 
complications that the jury face when considering criminal 
responsibility, it would be unwise to add this complexity to the 
equation. 
 
The nomenclature the judge used, "not guilty by lack of 
criminal responsibility," was proper.  This language has deep 
roots in our common law.  See Commonwealth v. Green, 17 Mass. 
515, 515 (1822) (defendant "found not guilty, by reason of 
insanity").14  We recently affirmed this formulation in our Model 
Jury Instructions on Homicide.  See Model Jury Instructions on 
Homicide 10-11 (2018).  The Legislature similarly has employed, 
and thereby sanctioned, this language.  See G. L. c. 123, § 16 
(establishing commitment procedures for those found "not guilty by 
                     
 
14 We since have moved away from the formulation "by reason 
of insanity," see Commonwealth v. Goudreau, 422 Mass. 731, 738 
(1996) (Appendix), in favor of "by reason of a lack of criminal 
responsibility."  See Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 10-11 
(2018). 
19 
 
 
reason of mental illness or mental defect").  It was not error for 
the judge to rely upon this well-established formulation. 
 
Viewing the entire jury charge in light of the evidence at 
trial, it is clear that the issue of criminal responsibility was 
properly and fully before the jury.  The judge accurately 
explained the law on criminal responsibility before commencing 
to instruct on the numerous specific offenses with which the 
defendant had been charged.  When discussing each offense, the 
judge again reminded the jury that even should they find that 
the elements were met, they still had to consider whether the 
defendant was criminally responsible.15  These instructions 
informed the jury that they could recognize that the defendant 
had committed unlawful acts, but still find him not guilty by 
reason of lack of criminal responsibility.16 
                     
 
15 The judge also informed the jury that they could consider 
the role that mental illness might have played in the 
defendant's ability to form the requisite intent for certain 
offenses. 
 
 
16 To the extent that a defendant may seek further 
clarification in future cases, a better practice would be for 
the judge to provide an additional instruction on the 
relationship between criminal responsibility and factual guilt.  
An appropriate instruction would mirror the language we 
sanctioned in Commonwealth v. Odgren, 483 Mass. 41, 52 (2019):  
"If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that the 
defendant committed a crime, you must decide whether the 
Commonwealth . . . prove[d] that the defendant was criminally 
responsible beyond a reasonable doubt."  This language would 
clarify that a verdict of not guilty by reason of lack of 
criminal responsibility necessarily includes a conclusion that 
20 
 
 
 
With these instructions in hand, the jury were well 
equipped to consider the evidence from both sides that bore on 
the defendant's responsibility:  the opinions of four expert 
witnesses;17 the video recording of the defendant's planning and 
commission of the offense; the defendant's recorded statements 
to police; and the defendant's manifesto.  The jury deliberated 
over a period of three days before reaching their verdicts.  In 
sum, the defendant was not deprived of a meaningful defense; the 
jury rejected it. 
 
c.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Having reviewed the 
entirety of the record pursuant to our duty under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, we are left with no doubt that mental illness played a 
central role in this crime.  Nonetheless, although the defendant 
presented "substantial evidence supporting his insanity 
defense," Commonwealth v. Brown, 449 Mass. 747, 773 (2007), we 
discern no reason to exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E.  Mental illness does not equate with the absence of 
criminal responsibility.  The jury could properly credit the 
opinions of Edershein and Holtzen that, assuming the defendant 
                     
the defendant committed the act that constitutes the charged 
offense.  See id. at 52-53; Commonwealth v. Bruneau, 472 Mass. 
510, 517 (2015) (not guilty by reason of criminal responsibility 
verdict "is unlike an acquittal because it includes a finding 
that the defendant committed the criminal act"). 
 
17 In addition to the witnesses' testimony, by agreement of 
the parties, each expert's report was introduced as an exhibit. 
21 
 
 
suffered from a qualifying mental disorder, he nonetheless was 
able to conform his actions to the law and to understand the 
wrongfulness of his brutal actions.  Their testimony provided 
sufficient support for the jury's verdict.  On similar facts, we 
have concluded that, "[s]ince the issue of the defendant's 
criminal responsibility was fully and fairly before the jury[,] 
. . . justice does not require that their verdict be 
disturbed.'"  Brown, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Lunde, 390 
Mass. 42, 50 (1983).  We likewise conclude that this verdict was 
consonant with justice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.