Title: In re Commercial Airfield

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

In re Commercial Airfield (99-079); 170 Vt. 595; 752 A.2d 13

[Filed 27-Jan-2000]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 99-079

                             DECEMBER TERM, 1999

In re Commercial Airfield	       }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
     	                               }	Environmental Board
                                       }	
                                       }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. Dec. Ruling #368

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Appellant Edward V. Peet owns an airport in Cornwall, Vermont.  Due to
  certain  improvements to his airport and associated flight activities, the
  District Environmental  Commission informed him that he needed to apply for
  a permit pursuant to 10 V.S.A. §§ 6001-6092 ("Act 250").  Appellant
  objected to this requirement on the basis that Act 250 was  preempted by
  federal law and petitioned the Environmental Board for a declaratory
  ruling.  The  Environmental Board held an evidentiary hearing and affirmed
  the District Commission's  jurisdictional opinion requiring appellant to
  obtain an Act 250 permit.  On appeal, appellant again  argues that Act 250
  jurisdiction is preempted by federal aviation law.  We disagree and affirm.

       Appellant's airport is located within the 600-acre Peet farm.  It is
  comprised of a runway  and a maintenance shop.  Aircraft maintenance
  services are performed within the shop.  A crop-dusting company servicing
  local farms operates out of the airport.  The Environmental Board 
  determined that appellant was required to apply for a permit under Act 250
  for this airport and  its aviation-related activities. See 10 V.S.A.§
  6001(3).

       While the Environmental Board made numerous findings of fact and
  conclusions of law, the  only issue on appeal is whether the Environmental
  Board's application of Act 250 to appellant's  property is preempted by
  federal law.  We generally defer to the Environmental Board's 
  interpretation of Act 250.  See In re Killington, Ltd., 159 Vt. 206, 210,
  616 A.2d 241, 244  (1992) (citations omitted).  We also defer to the
  Environmental Board's conclusions of law if they  are rationally derived
  from the correct interpretation of law and findings of fact based on 
  substantial evidence. See id. We "have often recognized the Board's special
  expertise in  determining . . . . the scope of its authority."  In re
  Stokes Communications Corp., 164 Vt. 30,  35,