Title: State v. Felicia Stovall

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). ZAZZALI, J., writing for a majority of the Court. This appeal requires the Court to determine whether a law enforcement officer's investigatory stop at Newark International Airport was justified by a reasonable suspicion that the suspect was transporting narcotics. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey is charged with the operation of Newark International Airport. The Port Authority employs numerous law enforcement officers including Detective Charles Benoit, a narcotics interdiction officer who works primarily at Newark Airport. At the time of the incident, Benoit was on loan to the Port Authority from the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). On May 31, 1998, Benoit received an electronic page from DEA Agent Scott Cahill in Los Angeles, informing Benoit that an American Airlines ticket agent at Los Angeles International Airport had informed him that two potential drug couriers were aboard American Airlines Flight 114 from Los Angeles to Newark. According to the ticket agent, two female suspects had checked in using fraudulent or questionable identification. Agent Cahill also informed Benoit that one of the suspects was traveling under the name Roberta Chambers. He further stated that although the suspects' airline tickets had been purchased at the same time from the same agency, the women were traveling separately and did not appear to know each other. Agent Cahill described the suspects as possibly Hispanic, in their mid-twenties, and wearing business-type suits and carrying black tote bags with wheels. Agent Cahill further told Benoit that the tickets were purchased through International Mirmar Travel. Detective Benoit testified that he previously had arrested drug traffickers with tickets purchased from that agency. He also testified that he had received information of this nature from the DEA numerous times. Detective Benoit notified his partner, and met him at their office in Newark Airport. They confirmed the flight's arrival time, obtained the services of a Spanish-speaking officer, and notified a K-9 Port Authority police officer to stand by. The detectives then proceeded to the American Airlines terminal and waited for Flight 114 to arrive. As passengers disembarked, Detective Benoit noticed two women emerge separately from the jetway who matched the general descriptions provided by Agent Cahill. They were pulling small, black tote bags on wheels. Detective Benoit testified that drug couriers prefer carry-on luggage because check-in luggage might be subject to handling by others and because K-9 units are regularly posted in the baggage handling area. Although matching Agent Cahill's general descriptions, the women were African-American, not Hispanic. As the women were leaving the terminal, Detective Benoit followed Felicia Stovall and his partner pursued the other suspect. Detective Benoit approached Stovall, identified himself as a police officer, and asked for permission to speak with her. Stovall asked where he would like to speak with her and Benoit replied where they were was fine. Detective Benoit asked where Stovall's flight had originated from, and Stovall responded Los Angeles. At Benoit's request, Stovall produced her airline ticket bearing the name Roberta Chambers, which Benoit recognized as one of the names provided by Agent Cahill. Detective Benoit also noticed that Stovall had a bulk ticket. According to Benoit, narcotics suppliers often purchase such tickets, which are available at discounted rates because purchased in bulk. The tickets are then distributed to individual couriers. Detective Benoit then asked Stovall for identification. Stovall presented him with a California state identification card bearing the name Roberta Chambers with an address on Main Street in Los Angeles, California. Detective Benoit testified that he found this identification unusual, because most people carry more substantial identification, specifically a driver's license. Benoit also found the identification suspicious because the card had expired. The officers took Stovall into custody and advised her of their intention to seek a warrant to search the bag. Stovall then revealed her real name and consented to a search of the bag. The search yielded three bundles of marijuana totaling approximately forty-seven pounds. Stovall was indicted for various drug offenses, including possession of twenty-five pounds or more of controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute. The trial court granted Stovall's motion to suppress, and the Appellate Division affirmed in an unpublished, per curiam opinion. The Supreme Court granted the State's motion for leave to appeal. HELD: Based on the totality of the circumstances, the detective had a reasonable suspicion that Stovall was engaged in criminal activity to justify the investigatory stop. 1. A person has a constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. A seizure occurs when a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to leave. However, police may conduct an investigatory stop if the officer has a reasonable and particularized suspicion to believe that an individual is engaged in, or is about to engage in, criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop is a lower standard than the probable cause necessary to sustain an arrest. In this case, a seizure occurred. Stovall expressed her desire to leave, but Detective Benoit responded to stand by one minute and this will just take a few moments. An objectively reasonable person in Stovall's position would not have felt free to leave. (Pp. 8-12) 2. The trial court and the Appellate Division held that Detective Benoit's detention of Stovall was unconstitutional, concluding that he impermissibly relied on a drug courier profile. A drug courier profile is merely a shorthand way of referring to a group of characteristics that may indicate that a person is a drug courier. The mere fact that a suspect displays profile characteristics does not justify a stop. A court must examine the totality of the circumstances, including the facts that may match profile characteristics, to determine whether reasonable suspicion exists. (Pp. 13-17) 3. The information provided by Agent Cahill to Detective Benoit, standing alone, does not support a finding of reasonable suspicion. However, the tip must be included in the totality of the circumstances analysis. The Court also gives due weight to Detective Benoit's twenty-seven years of experience in the field of law enforcement and, most important, to his four years of experience in the field of narcotics interdiction. Among Detective Benoit's observations were that Stovall's flight originated in Los Angeles, a known source for drug trafficking; Stovall and the other suspect had bulk tickets that were purchased at the same time from the same agency, but were traveling separately; both suspects traveled using the same, black, carry-on luggage, common to drug couriers; Stovall's identification card had expired, and was not the type of substantial identification one would expect of someone traveling across country for an extended stay; and Stovall was nervous and her hand shook during the questioning. Although some of this evidence suggests benign behavior, the totality of all of the circumstances is more than sufficient to justify a finding of reasonable suspicion. (Pp. 17-33) Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED. JUSTICE COLEMAN has filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part. He agrees that the detention of Stovall constituted a seizure, but disagrees that the record establishes the constitutionally required reasonable and particularized suspicion that defendant possessed illegal drugs. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICE LaVECCHIA join in JUSTICE ZAZZALI's opinion. JUSTICE COLEMAN has filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which JUSTICE STEIN joins. JUSTICES LONG and VERNIERO did not participate. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FELICIA STOVALL, Defendant-Respondent. Argued September 10, 2001 -- Decided January 28, 2002 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Casey J. Woodruff, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Thomas V. Manahan, Union County Prosecutor, attorney; Mr. Woodruff and Steven J. Kaflowitz, Assistant Prosecutor, on the briefs). Joseph Charles argued the cause for respondent (Ashley and Charles, attorneys). Robert E. Bonpietro, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General, attorney). Linda Mehling, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for amicus curiae Office of the Public Defender (Peter A. Garcia, Acting Public Defender, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by ZAZZALI, J. controlled dangerous substance, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35- 10a(3), and possession of twenty-five pounds or more of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(10)(a). Defendant moved to suppress the seized evidence. Defendant neither testified nor presented witnesses at the suppression hearing, and did not file an affidavit in support of the motion. The trial court nevertheless granted defendant's motion and the State appealed. In an unpublished per curiam opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed. We granted leave to appeal, State v. Stovall, 165 N.J. 596 (2000), and now reverse. Detective Benoit followed defendant after she disembarked from the plane and approached her. We note that his initial stop and questioning of defendant was permissible. State v. Green, __ N.J. Super. __, __ (App. Div. 2001). However, he then examined defendant's plane ticket and identification, informed her that he was a narcotics interdiction officer and that he suspected her of drug trafficking, and requested defendant's consent to search her luggage. Defendant refused and told him that she wanted to leave. Detective Benoit then asked her could she please stand by one minute. Defendant repeated that she wanted to leave, and he told her this will just take a few moments. In light of these circumstances, an objectively reasonable person would not have felt free to leave. See W.R. LaFave, 4 Search and Seizure 9.3(a), at 102-03 (3d ed. 1996) ( [A]n encounter becomes a seizure if the officer engages in conduct which a reasonable [person] would view as threatening or offensive even if performed by another private citizen. This would include such tactics as pursuing a person who has attempted to terminate the contact by departing, [or by] continuing to interrogate a person who has clearly expressed a desire not to cooperate . . . . ) (footnotes omitted). Although Detective Benoit framed his first statement as a request rather than a command, the fact that defendant expressed her desire to leave and he did not allow her to do so demonstrates that defendant was not free to leave. Moreover, Detective Benoit's statement that this will just take a few moments, implied that he would not have permitted defendant to leave. Accordingly, we find that Detective Benoit's detention of defendant, however brief, constituted a seizure. It is fundamental to a totality of the circumstances analysis of whether reasonable suspicion exists that courts may consider the experience and knowledge of law enforcement officers. Maryland, supra, 167 N.J. at 487; Citarella, supra, 154 N.J. at 279; Arthur, supra, 149 N.J. at 9-10; Davis, supra, 104 N.J. at 504. Detective Benoit had been a Port Authority police officer for some twenty-seven years. At the time of the suppression hearing, he had been on loan to the DEA for at least four years. During his DEA training, he learned common narcotics source cities, methods of shipping and transporting narcotics, identifying characteristics of narcotics, and airlines frequently used by narcotics suppliers. His training also included working with different shippers and various police agencies throughout the country regarding narcotics shipments into Newark Airport. Over the past four years, Benoit has made over one hundred drug-related arrests. When asked whether he had ever acquired the type of information that he had received from Agent Cahill, he replied, [n]umerous times, dozens of times. He also testified that he requests permission to search suspects' suitcases in the airport every day. Hundreds of times. Accordingly, we give due weight to Detective Benoit's twenty- seven years of experience in the field of law enforcement and, most important, to his four years of experience in the field of narcotics interdiction. Detective Benoit summoned up that knowledge and experience in formulating his suspicions about defendant. For example, Benoit noted that defendant was traveling on a flight that departed from Los Angeles and arrived in Newark. In Sokolow, a DEA agent testified that, in his experience, the defendant's original destination, Miami, was a frequent destination for narcotics traffickers. Supra, 490 U.S. at 3, 109 S. Ct. at 1583, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 8; see also United States v. McCarthur, 6 F.3d 1270, 1278 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding defendant's train from major source city to be factor in reasonable suspicion analysis); Martinson, supra, 581 N.W.2d at 851 n.3 (same). In Sokolow, the Supreme Court held that, although a trip from Honolulu to Miami, standing alone, is not a cause for any sort of suspicion, when considered in light of other circumstances, a suspect's itinerary may be factored into the reasonable suspicion equation. Supra, 490 U.S. at 9, 109 S. Ct. at 1586, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 11. In the present case, Detective Benoit testified that [a] flight comes from Los Angeles, that particular flight we've arrested many people on. Drugs come up through Mexico, that stay in San Diego and Los Angeles, and [are] flown into Newark Airport through that route. That flight we had numerous arrests on. Importantly, Detective Benoit also observed that both defendant and the other suspect had tickets that were purchased at the same time from the same agency, but they chose to travel separately and appeared not to know each other. In United States v. Ushery, 968 F.2d 575, 579 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 946, 113 S. Ct. 392, 121 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1992), the court concluded that similar facts amply supported a finding of reasonable suspicion. In reviewing the totality of the circumstances, the court noted that the three suspects who were traveling together attempted to maintain the appearance of traveling separately. Ibid. Similarly, in United States v. Forero-Rincon, 626 F.2d 218, 222-23 (2d Cir. 1980), the court held that two travelers from a source city who had identical shoulder bags, conversed and disembarked from the plane together, but separated when one whispered to the other, and then were rejoined, was a factor to be considered in the reasonable suspicion analysis. Additionally, Detective Benoit confirmed Agent Cahill's description of defendant's ticket. The ticket was characterized as a bulk ticket purchased from a specific travel agency in California. According to Benoit, bulk tickets raise suspicion because just based on experience . . .[,] based on watching people traffic narcotics, they're purchased like that a lot of times. He testified that narcotics suppliers prefer to buy a large number of tickets at once to save money and to avoid detection. The tickets are then distributed to individual couriers. Also, defendant's ticket was purchased from an agency known to Benoit as one frequently used by narcotics traffickers. We recognize, as Benoit testified, that law abiding citizens purchase such tickets as well. However, the record reflects that the use of such tickets may on occasion be indicative of participation in the drug trafficking business. Detective Benoit examined defendant's ticket and, in combination with all of the other factors, concluded that the circumstances were suspicious. Although we do not give blind deference to that conclusion, we accord it appropriate weight, particularly in light of Detective Benoit's extensive experience. Additionally, just as Agent Cahill had described, both suspects were traveling with the same type of luggage _ a small, black, crew-type bag with wheels and a handle. Both suspects carried their luggage onto the plane. Detective Benoit observed defendant disembark with such a bag. Benoit admitted that it is not unusual for travelers to use carry-on luggage, but based on a totality of everything it raises your suspicions . . . it makes me suspicious. In his experience, drug couriers often carry the same type of luggage that defendant carried, and often carry their bags onto the plane to limit outside access to the bag. Specifically, he testified that carry-on bags are especially prevalent among drug traffickers because they don't want it in the belly of the aircraft, they don't want anybody on the ramp to have access to it. They are afraid of dogs at the tarmac checking bags. Detective Benoit also confirmed that defendant's identification was an expired state identification card bearing the name Roberta Chambers. Agent Cahill had informed Detective Benoit that the ticket agent alerted him that defendant checked in using fraudulent identification. Benoit's notes recounting his conversation with Agent Cahill indicate that Cahill described two women traveling with false ID. Benoit's police report describes the identification as questionable. Detective Benoit later confirmed that the card bearing the name Roberta Chambers was indeed fraudulent when defendant identified herself as Felicia Stovall. Because Benoit's corroboration of the fraud occurred after the detention commenced, however, we do not consider that fact in determining whether reasonable suspicion existed prior to the detention. The issue of the identification card is nonetheless relevant to our inquiry for two reasons. First, both the ticket agent and Agent Cahill found defendant's identification to be suspicious. Whether they characterized it as fraudulent, as Benoit testified, false, as Benoit wrote in his notes, or questionable, as indicated in Benoit's police report, is of little consequence. That the ticket agent and Agent Cahill did not explain the bases for their suspicions is true. However, a ticket agent who examines identification on a regular basis found defendant's identification suspicious. DEA Agent Cahill conveyed the agent's concern, which he shared, that the identification was questionable _ in effect, suspicious. Thus, Benoit had some suspicion based on that communication regarding defendant's identification even before he detained her. Quite apart from that consideration, we now turn to Benoit's independent evaluation. In addition to Agent Cahill's characterizations of the identification card, Benoit found two facts unusual. Although most people carry more substantial identification, specifically a driver's license, particularly those people traveling across country for an extended stay, defendant presented an identification card as her only form of identification. More important, the card had expired and listed an address on Main Street in Los Angeles. Accordingly, Detective Benoit found defendant's identification card suspicious based on the information he received from Agent Cahill and his own examination of the card. During his encounter with defendant, Detective Benoit noticed that defendant appeared nervous and that her hand shook. Concededly, some individuals become nervous when questioned by a police officer. Nonetheless, the fact that such reactions may be commonplace does not detract from the well-established rule that a suspect's nervousness plays a role in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists. See, e.g., Citarella, supra, 154 N.J. at 280 (holding that defendant's actions, including acting nervously, amounted to reasonable suspicion); Green, supra, __ N.J. Super. at __ (listing excessive nervousness as factor in determining whether reasonable suspicion existed to justify stop in airport); State v. Hickman, 335 N.J. Super. 623, 637 (App. Div. 2000) (finding defendant's unusual nervousness reasonable basis for officer's suspicion); State v. Matthews, 330 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (App. Div. 2000) (finding defendant's nervousness among factors constituting reasonable suspicion); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S. Ct. 673, 676, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570, 576 (2000) ( nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion ); United States v. Cotton, 261 F.3d 397, 409 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding defendant's visible nervousness when approached by police and questioned factor providing reasonable suspicion); United States v. Smith, 201 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding defendant's nervous appearance while waiting in bus terminal factor providing reasonable suspicion); United States v. Maher, 145 F.3d 907, 909 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding defendant's overt nervousness as he approached patrol car factor providing police with reasonable suspicion); United States v. Porter, 107 F.3d 582, 584 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding defendant's nervousness when questioned about his bags factor providing DEA agent with reasonable suspicion). Here, Benoit testified that all the while [he] was talking to [defendant] and while [he] asked her for identification her hand shook, and she appeared very nervous. In fact, Detective Benoit credibly testified that, as a result, his suspicions were heightened after [he] spoke to [defendant]. It may be, as the dissent points out, that no one of those factors alone constitutes reasonable suspicion. It also may be that some of those factors, such as the bulk ticket and the carry-on luggage, can be interpreted as being consistent with both innocence and guilt, and that some are simply neutral, occurring every day at airports. Even if all of the factors were susceptible of purely innocent explanations, a group of innocent circumstances in the aggregate can support a finding of reasonable suspicion. This Court has stated that [i]n evaluating the facts giving rise to the officer's suspicion of criminal activity, courts are to give weight to 'the officer's knowledge and experience' as well as 'rational inferences that could be drawn from the facts objectively and reasonably viewed in light of the officer's expertise.' The fact that purely innocent connotations can be ascribed to a person's actions does not mean that an officer cannot base a finding of reasonable suspicion on those actions as long as 'a reasonable person would find the actions are consistent with guilt.' [Citarella, supra, 154 N.J. at 279-80 (quoting Arthur, supra, 149 N.J. at 10-11) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).] Similarly, in Arthur, we noted that '[i]t must be rare indeed that an officer observed behavior consistent only with guilt and incapable of innocent interpretation.' Arthur, supra, 149 N.J. at 11 (quoting United States v. Viegas, 639 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970, 101 S. Ct. 2046, 68 L. Ed. 2d 348 (1981)). Citarella and Arthur make clear that the police may rely on characteristics consistent with both innocence and guilt in formulating reasonable suspicion. Importantly, neither decision requires that the State present corroborating facts consistent only with guilt. As noted, such behavior is rare indeed. Ibid. Both decisions focused on whether the totality of the circumstances, including factors consistent with both innocence and guilt, demonstrated reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. Citarella, supra, 154 N.J. at 281; Arthur, supra, 149 N.J. at 11- 12. Under our precedents, in determining whether reasonable suspicion is present in this case, we consider factors consistent with both innocence and guilt. The dissent concludes that Detective Benoit did not have reasonable suspicion to stop defendant because the factors relied on by Benoit, when viewed independently, are more consistent with innocence than guilt. Post at __ (slip op. at 18). That analysis, however, ignores the mandate of the totality of the circumstances test, which requires us to view in the aggregate the facts known to Detective Benoit at the time of the stop. In that regard, the case to be made for reasonable suspicion here is even more compelling because, unlike cases in which all of the factors are neutral yet amount to reasonable suspicion when aggregated, there are corroborating facts present here that are more consonant with guilt than with innocence. We thus hold that although some of the evidence in this record suggests benign behavior, the totality of all of the circumstances is more than sufficient to justify a finding of reasonable suspicion. As Benoit stated, even though no one factor would have set off alarms in his head, when coupled together [the] totality of it certainly makes you suspicious. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FELICIA STOVALL, Defendant-Respondent. COLEMAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree with the majority that Detective Benoit's detention of defendant constituted a seizure. Ante at (slip op. at 12). That seizure was part of an investigatory stop that permits law enforcement officers to detain an individual temporarily for questioning. State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 471, 486 (2001). [A]n investigatory stop directly implicates the Fourth Amendment because it involves a seizure in the constitutional sense. Ibid. Although the Fourth Amendment warrant and probable cause requirements are relaxed for an investigatory stop, such a seizure is constitutional only if, under the totality of circumstances, there is a reasonable and particularized suspicion to believe that an individual has just engaged in, or is about to engage in, criminal activity. Id. at 487; State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 504 (1986). I disagree with the Court's holding that the record in this case, inclusive of the alleged drug courier profile information, establishes the constitutionally required reasonable and particularized suspicion that defendant possessed illegal drugs. Hence, I dissent. [United States v. Sokolow, supra, 490 U.S. at 13-14, 109 S. Ct. at 1588-89, 104 L. Ed 2d at (Marshall, J., dissenting).] I am also skeptical of law enforcement officials' reliance upon a suspected drug courier's city of origin or destination in establishing reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop because that factor also has yielded inconsistent results. If and when used, it should be given very little weight, if any, in evaluating whether reasonable suspicion exists. Travelers have raised suspicions based on such a wide host of source cities that this factor could implicate virtually any individual traveling to or from any American city. E.g., Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441, 100 S. Ct. 2752, 2754, 65 L. Ed. 2d 890, (1980) (referring to appellate court's observation that Fort Lauderdale is a principal place of origin for cocaine); United States v. $22,474.00 in U.S. Currency, 246 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2001) (recognizing Phoenix as drug source city); United States v. O'Neal, 17 F.3d 239, 240 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 960, 115 S. Ct. 418, 130 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1994) (recognizing Chicago as drug source city); United States v. Ushery, 968 F.2d 575, 579 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 946, 113 S. Ct. 392, 121 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1992) (recognizing San Francisco as drug source city); United States v. Forero-Rincon, 626 F.2d 218, 220 (2d Cir. 1980) (recognizing Miami as drug source city); Johnson v. State, 765 A.2d 926, 929 (Del. 2000) (recognizing New York as drug source city). State v. Green, N.J. Super. , (App. Div. 2001) (recognizing Jamaica as drug source country). [T]housands of innocent persons travel from 'source cities' every day and . . . nearly every major city in the country may be characterized as a source or distribution city. United States v. Sokolow, supra, 490 U.S. at 16, 109 S. Ct. at 1590, 104 L. Ed 2d at ___ (Marshall, J., dissenting). Given the inauspicious inconsistencies in the drug courier profile and its chameleon-like characteristics, United States v. Sokolow, supra, 490 U.S. at 13, 109 S. Ct. at 1588, 104 L. Ed 2d at (Marshall, J., dissenting), I believe courts engaged in an investigatory stop analysis should assign little weight to the shifting drug courier profile characteristics. Where a majority or any substantial number of people share a specific characteristic, that characteristic is of little or no probative value in such a particularized and context-specific analysis. United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Sanchez-Guillen v. United States, 531 U.S. 889, 121 S. Ct. 211, 148 L. Ed. 2d 148 (2000). Such traits are frequently as consistent with innocence as they are with guilt. This is not a case like State v. Citarella, supra, 154 N.J. at 280, in which Detective Benoit recognized defendant from prior encounters or relied on specific facts from earlier encounters with defendant. Unlike the facts in Reid, supra, 448 U.S. at 439, 441, 100 S. Ct. at 2753-54, 65 L. Ed 2d at , and State v. Citarella, supra, 154 N.J. at 276, defendant did not attempt to flee once Detective Benoit identified himself as a police officer. Also, unlike State v. Arthur, supra, 149 N.J. at 10, Detective Benoit did not observe a drug transaction or furtive movements. Rather, this is a case in which unverified, non- specific, unreasonable, and generalized characteristics were given significant weight and used as the basis to stop defendant. Cf. State v. Kuhn, 213 N.J. Super. 275, 280-81 (App. Div. 1986) (noting some circumstances in which courts have found a sufficiently articulable basis to conduct a brief stop, including traffic violations, observations of narcotics or weapons, packages, objects or money changing hands between suspects, recent reports of a nearby crime, physical appearance or clothing suggestive of crime, the nearby presence of potential or likely crime victims, and tips that a crime or drug transaction is about to occur). NO. A-15 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FELICIA STOVALL, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED January 28, 2000 Chief Justice Poritz