Title: Pette v. State ex rel. Dept. of Employment

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Pette v. State ex rel. Dept. of Employment1998 WY 156968 P.2d 952Case Number: 98-8Decided: 12/14/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

In 
the Matter of the Unemployment Compensation Claim of: Wendy Pfaffhausen PETTE, 
Appellant (Petitioner/Claimant),

v.

STATE of Wyoming ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT, 
Unemployment Insurance Commission and Tourism Promotion 
Joint

Powers Board, Appellees 
(Respondents/Agency/Employer.)

 

Appeal from the District Court, Laramie County, 
Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J.

 

Bill G. Hibbler, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming, for Appellant.

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General; and Joe Scott, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Representing 
Appellee State:

 

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and TAYLOR,* JJ.

 * Chief Justice at time of oral argument; retired 
November 2, 1998.

 

MACY, Justice.

 [¶1] Appellant Wendy Pette appealed to the district 
court from the denial of her claim for unemployment insurance benefits. The 
district court certified the case to the Wyoming Supreme Court pursuant to 
W.R.A.P. 12.09(b).

 

[¶2] We reverse and 
remand.

 

        
                                     ISSUES

 

[¶3] Pette presents two 
issues for our consideration:

 

          
I. Whether Decision of Commission[ ] No. C-6401-97, holding that Ms. 
Pette is disqualified from receiving

unemployment compensation benefits, because she 
voluntarily left her most recent work without good cause and not for a bona fide 
medical reason, is supported by substantial evidence?

 

II. Whether Ms. Pette is eligible for unemployment 
compensation benefits, because Decision of Commission No. C-6401-97[ ] is 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or contrary to law, based upon the 
commission's failure to apply its own precedent decisions, as required by 
Wyoming Statute § 27-3-406(b)?

 

        
                                      FACTS

 

[¶4] Pette was employed by 
Appellee Tourism Promotion Joint Powers Board (the tourism board) as a 
convention sales manager. Her job duties included marketing the City of Cheyenne 
to various groups to encourage them to schedule their conventions, meetings, and 
conferences in Cheyenne. Pette was required to make numerous sales calls to 
these groups to fulfill the duties of her position.

 

[¶5] In the summer of 1996, 
the tourism board hired a new executive director. In late December 1996 or early 
January 1997, the executive director reviewed Pette's work performance. The 
executive director criticized Pette's time management skills and her general 
attitude. Pette was directed to increase the number of sales calls she made per 
week from 50 to 150 and to reduce the time she spent on each call. As a result 
of the poor job performance review, Pette sensed that her job was in 
jeopardy.

 

[¶6] Pette complained to the 
tourism board and the executive director that the quota of 150 sales calls per 
week was unreasonable; consequently, they reduced the quota to 100 sales calls 
per week. In February 1997, the executive director reviewed Pette's job 
performance for a second time. Pette had not met the sales call quota, and the 
executive director told her that, if she did not meet the goal by the end of 
March 1997, termination of her employment was a 
possibility.

 

[¶7] On March 20, 1997, 
Pette submitted a resignation letter to the executive director and the tourism 
board. Her letter stated in relevant part:

 

After careful consideration, it is with regret that I 
submit my resignation as Convention Sales Manager. I have reached this decision 
primarily due to the recent mandate to increase sales call quotas. I have worked 
hard since January to meet the new requirements. The results have shown an 
increase in sales call productivity to an average [of] 79 calls weekly and a 
considerable rise in tentative group bookings. However, this growth apparently 
is not enough, for it falls short of the 100 calls which you have directed. It 
is my firm belief that quality of work is being jeopardized in favor of 
quantity. The demand to produce at such a rate has been so stressful that I can 
no longer continue to work under this pressure on a day to day 
basis.

 

Understanding fully the importance of a smooth 
transition and continued momentum in this position, I will stay until April 25, 
1997. After this date, I am offering my services on a weekly basis with the 
understanding that a one week notice of termination [will] be given by either 
party.

 

The tourism board's 
personnel committee met the next day. At four o'clock in the afternoon of March 
21, 1997, the executive director informed Pette that her resignation was 
accepted, effective that day, and that she had one hour in which to vacate the 
premises.

 

[¶8] Pette subsequently 
filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits. A claims deputy for the 
employment resources division determined that Pette was not qualified to receive 
unemployment insurance benefits because she voluntarily left her employment 
without having good cause which was directly attributable to her employment or a 
bona fide medical reason. Pette appealed from the deputy's decision. The chief 
appeals examiner for the unemployment insurance division held a contested case 
hearing on June 10, 1997. The examiner reversed the deputy's determination and 
awarded unemployment insurance benefits to Pette. The tourism board appealed 
from the examiner's decision to Appellee Department of Employment, Unemployment 
Insurance Commission (the commission). On August 12, 1997, the commission 
reversed the examiner's decision and denied Pette's request for 
benefits.

 

[¶9] Pette petitioned the 
district court for a review of the commission's decision. The district court 
certified the case to the Wyoming Supreme Court.

 

                                       
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

[¶10] When a case has been 
certified to the Wyoming Supreme Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b), we review 
the case by applying the appellate standards which are applicable to a reviewing 
court of the first instance. Weaver v. Cost Cutters, 953 P.2d 851, 854 (Wyo. 
1998). W.R.A.P. 12.09(a) limits judicial review of administrative decisions to a 
determination of the matters specified in WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-3-114(c) (Michie 
1997). Everheart v. S & L Industrial, 957 P.2d 847, 851 (Wyo. 1998). Under § 
16-3-114(c)(ii), the reviewing court may 
reverse an agency's action if that action was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Division v. Bruhn, 951 P.2d 373, 376 (Wyo. 
1997).

 

[¶11] We will not disturb an 
agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly contrary to the overwhelming 
weight of the evidence.  Weaver, 953 P.2d  at 855. We do not, however, grant the same deference to an agency's 
conclusions of law. Nelson v. Sheridan Manor, 939 P.2d 252, 255 (Wyo. 1997). We 
affirm an agency's conclusions of law when they are in accordance with the law. 
Corman v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 909 P.2d 966, 
970 (Wyo. 1996). When an agency has not invoked and properly applied the correct rule of law, we correct 
the agency's errors. Gneiting v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Division, 897 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Wyo. 1995).

 

                                           DISCUSSION

 

[¶12] We will initially 
consider Pette's second issue because our resolution of that issue is 
dispositive in this case. The commission determined that, although the tourism 
board unilaterally changed Pette's separation date from the April 25, 1997, date 
set out in her resignation letter to March 21, 1997, Pette voluntarily left her 
employment without having good cause and that she was not, therefore, entitled 
to receive unemployment insurance benefits. The commission relied upon WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 27-3-311(a)(i) (Michie 1997) in making its determination. That statutory section 
states:

 

(a) An individual shall be disqualified from benefit 
entitlement beginning with the effective date of an otherwise valid claim or on 
the date the failure occurred, until he has been employed in an 
employee-employer relationship for a period of at least twelve (12) weeks 
whether or not consecutive, and has earned at least twelve (12) times the weekly 
benefit amount of his current claim for services after that date, if the 
department finds that he:

 

(i) Left his most recent work voluntarily without 
good cause attributable directly to his employment, except for bona fide medical 
reasons involving his health or if returning to approved training which meets 
the requirements of W.S. 27-3-307[.]

 

Section 
27-3-311(a)(i).

 

[¶13] Pette maintains that 
the commission's denial of her claim for unemployment insurance benefits was 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise not in accordance 
with the law. She asserts that the commission improperly refused to apply its 
earlier legal rulings concerning situations where an employee quits, effective 
on a certain date, and the employer directs the employee to leave earlier. The 
commission's development of precedent on this issue has, to say the very least, 
been a tumultuous process. On June 29, 1993, the commission issued a decision in 
the case of Brigance v. Taco Bell Corporation, No. C-5025-93 (June 29, 1993). In 
that decision, the commission stated:

 

We 
recognize that the Division, by precedent, has treated situations, such as this, 
where the employee gives notice of intention to quit sometime in the future, for 
example two weeks or a month, and the employer moves up the separation as a 
quit. This precedent is hereby overruled for the following reasons. A sort of 
counterpart precedent to this involves the situation where the employer tells 
the employee his job will be over some time in the future, for example two 
weeks, a month, or when the project is completed and the employee chooses to 
leave earlier. This situation was also treated as a quit and we believe it still 
should be. However, in both situations, the claimant usually ended up being 
disqualified for quitting without good cause. Also, this is not fair. We 
believe, that as a matter of policy, we should encourage the employee and employer to maintain that 
relationship as long as possible. This will put off as long as possible the time 
the employee will become a claimant drawing unemployment benefits. This can be 
accomplished by treating it as a discharge when the employer moves up the 
separation date and treating it as a quit when the claimant moves up the 
separation date. Of course, the employer will still have the opportunity to 
prove that the discharge was for misconduct connected with work and the claimant 
may prove that the quit was for good cause connected with 
employment.

 

Brigance, No. C-5025-93 at 2 
(emphasis added). Less than a year later, the commission overruled the legal 
principle it had articulated in the Brigance case, 
stating:

 

Since we issued our Decision No. C-5025-93 [the 
Brigance decision], we have noted some problems that we did not anticipate when 
it was issued. While it is desirable to keep the claimant and employer together 
and delay the time when the claimant will go on unemployment as long as 
possible, there are other considerations. The unfortunate reality is that there 
are frequently hard feelings when an employee quits or when an employer fires 
him even when a few weeks notice is given. It is not desirable to force the 
parties to remain together in this situation. There are other practical reasons 
why the parties should be allowed to move up the final day of work. For example, 
sometimes an employee may have an opportunity for a new job, but only if he 
pursues that opportunity now, rather than waiting two weeks until the layoff 
becomes effective. For these reasons, we are overruling our precedent in 
Decision No. C-5025-93.

 

[¶14] The new precedent will 
be as follows:

 

If the employee gives notice to his employer that he 
intends to quit at a certain time in the future, and the employer moves up the 
actual termination date by a month or less, the situation will be treated as a 
quit. The decision will then have to 
be made on whether the claimant quit for good cause directly attributable to 
employment or for a bona fide medical reason. If an employer has given notice 
to his employee that the job will end a certain time in the future, and the 
employee moves up the actual termination date by a month or less, the situation 
will be treated as a discharge.  
The decision will then have to be made whether the discharge was for 
misconduct connected with work. By a certain time in the future, we mean to 
include when a particular event occurs, such as when school is out or when the 
project is completed, as well as a particular day.

 

We recognize that justice will 
require that future precedents will have to allow for some exceptions to 
this.

 

Capasso v. Nagel Motors, 
Inc., No. C-5396-94 at 2 (May 17, 1994) (emphasis added).

 

[¶15] Pette gave notice on 
March 20, 1997, that she was resigning effective April 25, 1997, and the tourism 
board directed her to leave her job on March 21, 1997. A true application of the 
Capasso decision would have resulted in Pette's employment termination being 
treated as a discharge because the tourism board moved up her separation date by 
a month and four days. The commission did not, however, follow the rule set out 
in Capasso. It quoted the "new precedent" from the Capasso decision but stated 
that it was only "a guideline and 
presumption." The commission concluded that Pette was not entitled to receive 
unemployment insurance benefits because she voluntarily resigned from her 
position without having good cause which was directly attributable to her 
employment.

 

[¶16] We must consider WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 27-3-406(b) (Michie 1997) in resolving this case. That statutory 
section provides:

 

(b) Unless expressly or impliedly overruled by the 
commission or a court of competent jurisdiction, principles of law adjudicated 
under a final decision of the commission or an appeal tribunal are binding on 
the commission, a special examiner and an appeal tribunal in proceedings 
involving similar questions of law.

 

Section 27-3-406(b). Pette 
claims that § 27-3-406(b) required the commission to follow the legal principles 
which it had articulated in the Capasso decision and to, therefore, treat her 
separation from employment as being a discharge. The commission argues that its 
rulings were correct because, under § 27-3-406(b), it may modify and clarify its 
precedent in the context of a particular case. The gist of the commission's 
argument is that § 27-3-406(b) allows it to change its precedent and apply the 
new rule in the same case.

 

[¶17] This Court gives 
effect to the plain language of an unambiguous statute. Lyles v. State ex rel. 
Division of Workers' Compensation, 957 P.2d 843, 846 (Wyo. 1998). The plain 
language of § 27-3-406(b) directs the commission to follow its earlier 
declarations of principles of law except when a precedent has been overruled. If 
the commission were allowed to deviate from its precedent on a case-by-case 
basis, it would not truly be bound by its precedent, and § 27-3-406(b) would, in 
effect, be a nullity. We do not believe the legislature intended that result. We 
conclude that, under § 27-3-406(b), the commission must give effect to its 
former adjudications of principles of 
law and may only change a precedent prospectively.

 

[¶18] The commission argues 
further that it was not bound by the Capasso decision because the decision was 
merely a presumption or a guideline. We recognize that the commission stated in 
Capasso, No. C-5396-94 at 2, that "justice will require that future precedents 
will have to allow for some exceptions" to the legal rule which was set out in 
that case. The commission did not define the factors it would take into account 
in a particular case in determining whether or not justice required it to make 
an exception to the rule. Further, the commission did not, in this case, 
articulate its reasons for refusing to follow the Capasso rule. If we were to 
allow the commission to choose when to 
apply the rule and when not to, § 27-3-406(b) would not have a true 
effect.

 

[¶19] The commission urges 
us to review its decision to determine whether substantial evidence supported 
its conclusion that Pette voluntarily left her employment without having good 
cause. The commission's argument completely disregards the legal precedent which 
it set out in Capasso. We cannot ratify the commission's failure to follow its 
precedent by simply reviewing whether or not sufficient evidence supported its 
factual determination. The commission's decision in this case was arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise not in accordance with the 
law.

 

[¶20] The commission's 
denial of Pette's claim for unemployment insurance benefits is reversed, and 
this case is remanded to the commission for entry of an order which is 
consistent with this opinion.