Title: State v. Miguel E. Marinez, Jr.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2011 WI 12 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP567-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Miguel E. Marinez, Jr., 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 23, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 2, 2010 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Jefferson 
 
JUDGE: 
Randy R. Koschnick 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. and BRADLEY, J. dissent 
(Opinion filed).    
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Rebecca Rapp St. John, assistant attorney general with whom 
on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  The cause 
was argued by Rebecca Rapp St. John. 
 
For the defendant-appellant was a brief and oral argument 
by Ralph J. Sczygelski and Sczygelski & Pangburn Law Firm, LLC, 
Manitowoc. 
 
 
 
2011 WI 12
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2009AP567-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2007CF491) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Miguel E. Marinez, Jr., 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 23, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 regarding the 
admissibility of other-acts evidence referenced in an otherwise-
admissible videotaped statement of a child victim.  In the 
videotaped forensic interview, the then four-year-old alleged 
victim, M.M.L., disclosed that she was sexually assaulted by the 
defendant, Miguel E. Marinez, Jr. (Marinez).  During this 
interview, M.M.L. also referred to a separate incident in which 
                                                 
1 State v. Marinez, No. 2009AP567-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2010). 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
2 
 
Marinez burned her hands with hot water.  Marinez had already 
been convicted of child abuse for that assault before this 
interview took place.  After M.M.L. brought up the hand-burning 
incident, the interviewer referred to that incident in an 
attempt to ascertain when the sexual assault occurred in 
relation to that event.  M.M.L.'s statements about the hand-
burning incident also served to demonstrate that "Mikey," 
M.M.L.'s name for Marinez, perpetrated both acts.  M.M.L. also 
referred to the hand-burning incident at other points during the 
videotaped interview.   
¶2 
In preparation for Marinez's trial for the sexual 
assault of M.M.L., the State moved to admit this video interview 
under Wis. Stat. § 908.08 (2007-08)2 and the references to the 
hand-burning 
incident 
within 
the 
video 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 904.04(2)(a).  The Jefferson County Circuit Court, the 
Honorable Randy R. Koschnick presiding, admitted the video in 
its entirety, concluding that the other-acts evidence it 
contained was admissible under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a)3 for the 
purposes of identity and context, and including within context, 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 The relevant portion of this statute provides that 
"evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to 
prove the character of a person in order to show that the person 
acted in conformity therewith.  This subsection does not exclude 
the evidence when offered for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, 
opportunity, 
intent, 
preparation, 
plan 
knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.04(2)(a). 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
3 
 
the time and location of the assault, and in order to assist the 
jury in assessing M.M.L.'s credibility.  To prevent unfair 
prejudice to Marinez, the circuit court limited the details of 
the hand-burning incident that the State could present and also 
gave a cautionary instruction to the jury.  Marinez was 
convicted, and he appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred 
in admitting the other-acts evidence relating to the hand-
burning incident.  The court of appeals reversed the circuit 
court's judgment of conviction after concluding that the other-
acts evidence was erroneously admitted and the error was not 
harmless.  The State petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted.  In its petition, the State presented the following 
issue 
for 
review: 
whether 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion in admitting M.M.L.'s videotaped 
statements without excising the references to the separate hand-
burning incident perpetrated by Marinez. 
¶3 
We hold that the circuit court did not err in 
admitting 
the 
video 
in 
its 
entirety 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 904.04(2)(a) and 908.08.  We affirm the circuit court's 
evidentiary ruling on the admissibility of the other-acts 
evidence because the circuit court "examined the relevant facts, 
applied a proper standard of law, used a demonstrated rational 
process, and reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could 
reach."  State v. Hunt, 2003 WI 81, ¶34, 263 Wis. 2d 1, 666 
N.W.2d 771.   
¶4 
We conclude that in light of the greater latitude rule 
and the fact that the other-acts evidence was so intertwined 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
4 
 
with the otherwise admissible videotaped statement of the child 
victim, the circuit court properly determined that each of the 
three prongs of the Sullivan analysis supported admission.  See 
State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 772-73, 576 N.W.2d 30 
(1998).  Under the first prong, we conclude that the circuit 
court 
reasonably 
concluded 
that, 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 904.04(2)(a), the hand-burning references were admissible for 
the proper purposes of establishing M.M.L.'s identification of 
Marinez as her abuser and providing context, including assisting 
the jury in assessing M.M.L.'s credibility, establishing the 
time and location of the sexual abuse, and providing a complete 
story to the jury.  Regarding the second prong, we conclude that 
the 
circuit 
court's 
determination--that 
the 
hand-burning 
evidence was relevant to establish M.M.L.'s identification of 
Marinez, and the time and location of the sexual abuse, to 
provide context, including regarding M.M.L.'s credibility, and 
to provide a more complete story to the jury--was reasonable, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 904.01.  Under the third prong, we 
conclude that the circuit court reasonably determined that, in 
accord with Wis. Stat. § 904.03, the probative value of the 
entire video, including M.M.L.'s references to the hand-burning 
incident, was not substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice to Marinez. 
¶5 
We are also satisfied that any misuse of the hand-
burning evidence by the prosecutor did not "so infect[] the 
trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a 
denial of due process."  See State v. Mayo, 2007 WI 78, ¶43, 301 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
5 
 
Wis. 2d 642, 734 N.W.2d 115.  Thus, we reverse the court of 
appeals and affirm the circuit court's judgment of conviction. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶6 
In 2005, Marinez married M.M.L.'s mother, Rachel 
Marinez (Rachel) and became M.M.L.'s stepfather.  The Marinez 
family, including M.M.L. and two of her brothers, Evan and 
Aiden, lived in Watertown, Wisconsin, from October through 
December of 2006.  In this home, Evan and Aiden shared a 
bedroom, and M.M.L. slept in a separate bed in her parents' 
room.  During this period, M.M.L. was subjected to physical 
abuse and also alleged sexual abuse at the hands of Marinez.  
Because of the severity of the physical abuse, which required 
extended hospitalization for severe burns to her hands, M.M.L.'s 
family and law enforcement were aware of that abuse immediately 
after it happened.4  The alleged sexual abuse came to light some 
time after the hand-burning incident occurred. 
¶7 
On December 27, 2006, when M.M.L. was four years old, 
Marinez severely burned her hands by holding them under 
extremely hot water, injuring her so severely that M.M.L. was 
hospitalized for some time.  As a result, Marinez was arrested 
on December 28, 2006, and later convicted of intentional child 
abuse which creates a high probability of great bodily harm, 
                                                 
4 M.M.L.'s mother, Rachel, testified that M.M.L. was taken 
to the hospital on December 27, 2006, after the hand-burning 
incident took place and remained hospitalized for some time.  
Detective Brower testified that he went to the hospital on 
December 27, 2006, to investigate the physical abuse of M.M.L. 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
6 
 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.03(2)(c).5  After this incident, 
M.M.L. lived with her father in Madison, Wisconsin, and Marinez 
apparently no longer had contact with her.  
¶8 
Approximately six months later, on June 25, 2007, 
during a forensic interview by Kari Orn (Orn) at Safe Harbor 
Child Advocacy Office (Safe Harbor) in Madison, Wisconsin, 
M.M.L. disclosed that Marinez had also sexually abused her when 
they lived together in Watertown, Wisconsin.6  Orn videotaped 
this interview, which took place when M.M.L. was four years old.  
M.M.L. revealed that, on at least one occasion, "Mikey," which 
is what she called Marinez, instructed her to take off her 
clothes and lie on her parents' bed, after which he touched what 
she called her "private area" with his hand.   
¶9 
M.M.L. provided only limited details about the sexual 
abuse.  She described one particular incident,7 which happened 
while her mother was at work and Evan and Aiden were playing 
                                                 
5 The relevant portion of this statute provides: 
(2) Intentional causation of bodily harm. 
(c) Whoever intentionally causes bodily harm to a 
child by conduct which creates a high probability of 
great bodily harm is guilty of a Class F felony.  
Wis. Stat. § 948.03(2)(c). 
6 The record does not indicate why M.M.L. was brought to 
Safe Harbor for the interview. 
7 In the interview, M.M.L. disclosed that "Mikey" touched 
her private area "[m]ore than one time," though she provided the 
details of only one particular incident, which is the incident 
underlying the charge in this case. 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
7 
 
together in their room.  M.M.L. stated that after she had taken 
a bath and gotten dressed, "Mikey" told her to take off her 
clothes and lie on the bed that Marinez and Rachel shared.  She 
stated that he kept his clothes on and touched her private area 
with his hand.  M.M.L. also stated that neither she nor Marinez 
said anything while he was touching her.  At Orn's request, 
M.M.L. drew a picture of where she and Marinez were when this 
took place.  In response to one of Orn's questions, M.M.L. also 
spontaneously brought up the hand-burning incident, indicating 
that "Mikey" was the person who burned her hands.  Orn used this 
hand-burning incident to try to establish when the sexual abuse 
occurred, but M.M.L. was unable to recall which happened first, 
the physical or sexual abuse.    
¶10 Additional details about the assault could be inferred 
from M.M.L.'s statements when considered along with other known 
facts.  Her description of the living arrangements at the time 
this took place, when M.M.L., Marinez, Rachel, Evan, and Aiden 
lived together and Evan and Aiden shared a room, indicated that 
the sexual abuse occurred when they lived in Watertown, 
Wisconsin.  M.M.L. was unable to remember when this happened, 
but given her description of the living arrangements, it was 
limited to the period during which the Marinez family lived in 
Watertown, Wisconsin, from October through December of 2006.  
M.M.L. identified Marinez as the person who sexually assaulted 
her because, while she simply called him "Mikey," she stated 
elsewhere in the video that "Mikey" was also the person who 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
8 
 
burned her hands and was married to her mother, thus identifying 
"Mikey" as Marinez.   
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶11 As a result of M.M.L.'s allegations, Marinez was 
charged on November 21, 2007, with sexual contact with a child 
under the age of thirteen contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1).8  
Given M.M.L.'s age--she was five years old at the time of the 
hearing--the State sought to admit the video of her interview 
with Orn under Wis. Stat. § 908.089 in lieu of having her testify 
in court about the details of this incident.  The State moved to 
admit the other-acts evidence referenced in the video regarding 
the hand-burning incident under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a).  
During the motion hearing, the State argued that such evidence 
                                                 
8 The relevant portion of this statute provides: 
(1) First degree sexual assault. 
(e) Whoever has sexual contact with a person who has 
not attained the age of 13 years is guilty of a Class 
B felony. 
Wis. Stat. 948.02(1)(e). 
9 In relevant part, this statute provides an exception to 
the hearsay rule: 
(1) In any criminal trial or hearing, juvenile fact-
finding hearing under s. 48.31 or 938.31 or revocation 
hearing 
under 
s. 
302.113(9)(am), 
302.114(9)(am), 
304.06(3), or 973.10(2), the court or hearing examiner 
may admit into evidence the audiovisual recording of 
an oral statement of a child who is available to 
testify, as provided in this section. 
Wis. Stat. § 908.08(1). 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
9 
 
was admissible for the purposes of establishing the time and 
location 
of 
the 
alleged 
assault, 
explaining 
M.M.L.'s 
identification of Marinez, providing context, and allowing the 
jury to better assess M.M.L.'s credibility.   
¶12 Marinez objected to the admission of the sections of 
the videotape that refer to the hand-burning incident.  Marinez 
addressed each of the purposes for which the State sought to 
admit the hand-burning references.  Marinez argued that M.M.L.'s 
identification of who assaulted her could be established by her 
other statements in the interview and Detective David Brower's10 
verification of who lived with M.M.L.'s mother during this 
period.  He also argued that this separate hand-burning incident 
was not related enough to the sexual assault to provide any 
context or to assist the jury in assessing M.M.L.'s credibility.  
Marinez further argued that, instead, the State was actually 
seeking to admit the hand-burning evidence to establish a 
"pattern of complete truth telling" by M.M.L. to boost her 
credibility, which, he argued, is prohibited by Whitty v. State, 
34 Wis. 2d 278, 149 N.W.2d 557 (1967).  Regarding context, 
Marinez asserted that other-acts evidence is admissible to 
provide context only to show the "context of the crime itself, 
not 
supporting 
a 
victim's 
statement 
about 
the 
crimes 
themselves."  He argued that the hand-burning references could 
not provide context because that incident was entirely unrelated 
                                                 
10 Detective Brower investigated both the physical and 
sexual assault of M.M.L.  He also testified at the preliminary 
hearing and at trial in this case. 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
10 
 
to the sexual assault and the two events did not occur 
contemporaneously.  Finally, Marinez asserted that the time 
frame of the sexual assault would be adequately established by 
Detective Brower's investigation and testimony and M.M.L.'s 
other statements in the video.11  Turning to the danger of unfair 
prejudice to Marinez, he asserted that the probative value of 
this evidence was low and that there was a very high risk of 
unfair prejudice to him.  Marinez argued that the State lacked 
any physical evidence or a confession, and thus the inflammatory 
nature of M.M.L.'s references to the hand-burning would unduly 
prejudice Marinez.   
¶13 The circuit court admitted the hand-burning references 
in the video because it concluded that the State offered that 
evidence for proper purposes under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a), 
for which this evidence was relevant and not unduly prejudicial.  
Noting that M.M.L. was a very young child, five years old at the 
                                                 
11 Initially, Marinez sought to enter into a stipulation 
regarding the time frame of the alleged assault to avoid the 
admission of the hand-burning references to establish when the 
assault could have occurred.  The State noted that there were 
other purposes for which the hand-burning references were 
admissible and thus declined to enter into a stipulation for 
that purpose.  The circuit court did accept a stipulation that 
Marinez did not have any contact with M.M.L. after the hand-
burning incident for the purposes of excluding any evidence that 
Marinez had been in continuous custody since then for the charge 
and conviction related to that incident.  After accepting the 
stipulation, the circuit court directed Marinez's counsel to 
address each of the state's grounds for admitting the other-acts 
evidence including "identity, the time frame to establish the 
date of the alleged violation and venue, as well as context as 
it relates to credibility." 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
11 
 
time of the motion hearing and the trial, the circuit court 
stated 
that 
the 
greater 
latitude 
rule 
strengthened 
its 
conclusion that this evidence was admissible for these purposes.  
The circuit court also minimized the risk of unfair prejudice to 
Marinez by giving a cautionary instruction to the jury, limiting 
the admission of details about the hand-burning incident, and 
prohibiting the State's witnesses from dwelling on the hand-
burning incident.12   
¶14 The jury found Marinez guilty of sexual contact with a 
child under the age of thirteen contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02(1).  Marinez appealed, arguing that the circuit court's 
admission of the hand-burning evidence was an erroneous exercise 
of discretion.  Marinez also argued that the State exceeded the 
limits placed on the admission of the hand-burning evidence 
while questioning witnesses and during closing arguments.  The 
State responded that the circuit court properly admitted the 
other-acts evidence.  Further, the State argued that it stayed 
within the circuit court's limitations for the use of the hand-
burning evidence and that, in any event, Marinez forfeited any 
argument to the contrary by failing to object.   
                                                 
12 Marinez's 
counsel 
also 
asked 
whether 
the 
State's 
witnesses would be permitted to testify about the hand-burning 
incident under the circuit court's ruling.  The circuit court 
clarified that other witnesses would be permitted to mention the 
hand-burning incident only within the limits of its ruling and 
would not be allowed to bring up extraneous details or dwell on 
the incident. 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
12 
 
¶15 The court of appeals held that the circuit court 
erroneously admitted the hand-burning evidence because it was 
not 
admitted 
for 
a 
proper 
purpose 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 904.04(2)(a) and that such error was not harmless.  Marinez, 
No. 2009AP567-CR, ¶¶17, 25.  While the court of appeals stated 
that context and credibility were proper purposes for which to 
admit other-acts evidence in certain circumstances, it concluded 
that the hand-burning evidence was not properly admitted for 
those purposes in this case, distinguishing Hunt, 263 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶¶58-59, a case in which a defendant's prior drug use was 
properly admitted for the purposes of context and credibility.  
Marinez, No. 2009AP567-CR, ¶¶10-15.  The court of appeals noted 
that even the application of the greater latitude rule could not 
overcome the lack of a proper purpose.  Id., ¶17.  Further, the 
court of appeals concluded that the circuit court's error in 
admitting the other-acts evidence was not harmless because of 
how the State used that evidence, the fact that there was little 
actual evidence of the sexual abuse, and the likelihood that the 
hand-burning evidence influenced the jury improperly.  Id., 
¶¶23-25.  Since the court of appeals reversed the circuit 
court's judgment of conviction on this basis, it did not reach 
the question of whether the State exceeded the circuit court's 
limitations on the admission of the hand-burning evidence.  Id., 
¶8.  Therefore, the court of appeals reversed the circuit 
court's judgment of conviction. 
III. ANALYSIS 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
13 
 
¶16 The State petitioned this court for review of the 
following issue, namely, whether the circuit court properly 
admitted M.M.L.'s videotaped interview without excision of the 
hand-burning references under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a).  Since 
M.M.L. was five years old at the time of the motion hearing and 
the trial, the greater latitude rule, which provides for the 
more liberal admission of other-acts evidence in child sexual 
assault cases, applies in this case.  State v. Hammer, 2000 WI 
92, ¶23, 236 Wis. 2d 686, 613 N.W.2d 629.  The three-prong 
analysis from Sullivan governs the propriety of admitting other-
acts evidence under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a) and the greater 
latitude rule applies to our review of each prong.  Sullivan, 
216 
Wis. 2d 768, 
¶¶5-8; 
Hammer, 
236 
Wis. 2d 686, 
¶23.  
Additionally, while Marinez did not directly petition this court 
for review of his claim that the State exceeded the order 
admitting the hand-burning evidence, we will address his 
arguments in this regard as an allegation of prosecutorial 
misconduct.  See Mayo, 301 Wis. 2d 642, ¶43. 
¶17 We review a circuit court's admission of other-acts 
evidence for an erroneous exercise of discretion.  Hunt, 263 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶34.  We will uphold a circuit court's evidentiary 
ruling if it "examined the relevant facts, applied a proper 
standard of law, used a demonstrated rational process and 
reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach."  Id.  
Even if a circuit court fails to set forth the basis for its 
ruling, we will nonetheless independently "review the record to 
determine whether it provides an appropriate basis for the 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
14 
 
circuit court's decision."  Id.  Here, the circuit court 
thoroughly articulated its reasons for admitting the hand-
burning evidence. 
A. 
General Principles Regarding the Admissibility of Other-
Acts Evidence 
¶18 Several overlapping rules and principles govern the 
admissibility M.M.L.'s videotaped interview generally and the 
hand-burning evidence more specifically.  When child witnesses 
are available for cross examination, Wis. Stat. § 908.08 allows 
for the admission of videotaped child witness interviews that 
meet certain requirements.  See Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin 
Practice Series: Wisconsin Evidence § 808.1 (3d ed. 2008).  
Marinez did not and does not challenge the admissibility of the 
video itself, but rather the references to the hand-burning 
incident within the video and other witnesses' testimony 
regarding 
the 
hand-burning 
incident. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 904.04(2)(a) 
prohibits 
the 
admission 
of 
evidence 
of 
a 
defendant's other bad acts to show that the defendant has a 
propensity to commit crimes.  However, other-acts evidence that 
is offered for a purpose other than the prohibited propensity 
purpose is admissible if it is relevant to a permissible purpose 
and is not unfairly prejudicial.  Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a); 
Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 783.  Wisconsin Stat. § 904.04(2)(a) 
contains an illustrative, and not exhaustive, list of some of 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
15 
 
the permissible purposes for which other-acts evidence is 
admissible, none of which applies here.13   
¶19 To guide courts in determining whether other-acts 
evidence is admissible for a proper purpose under Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.04(2)(a), we developed a three-prong test.  Sullivan, 216 
Wis. 2d at 772-73.  Other-acts evidence is properly admissible 
(1) if it is offered for a permissible purpose, other than the 
prohibited 
propensity 
purpose, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 904.04(2)(a), (2) if it is relevant under the two relevancy 
requirements in Wis. Stat. § 904.01,14 and (3) if its probative 
value is not substantially outweighed by the risk or danger of 
                                                 
13 The circuit court stated that one of the purposes for 
which it admitted the other-acts evidence was identity; however, 
it was not actually offered for identity as that term is used in 
Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a).  As explained in more detail below, 
see infra, ¶25 n.17, identity, within the meaning of Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.04(2)(a), relates to a defendant's signature or imprint 
that would allow the perpetrator of a crime in a particular case 
to be identified through his modus operandi in connection to a 
separate crime he was known to have committed.  Blinka, supra 
§ 404.7 at 212-13.  In this case, the State sought to admit 
M.M.L.'s references to the hand-burning incident to provide a 
full explanation of her identification of Marinez via her 
reference to "Mikey" as the perpetrator of both assaults when it 
had been established that Marinez burned M.M.L.'s hands. 
14 Wisconsin Stat. § 904.01 defines relevant evidence as 
"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence."  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 904.01, evidence is 
relevant if it (1) "relates to a fact or proposition that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action" and (2) "has a 
tendency to make a consequential fact more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence."  Sullivan, 216 
Wis. 2d at 785-86. 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
16 
 
unfair prejudice under Wis. Stat. § 904.03.  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 
2d at 772-73.  The party seeking to admit the other-acts 
evidence bears the burden of establishing that the first two 
prongs are met by a preponderance of the evidence.  State v. 
Payano, 2009 WI 86, ¶¶63, 68 n.14, 320 Wis. 2d 348, 768 
N.W.2d 832; Hunt, 263 Wis. 2d 1, ¶53.  Once the proponent of the 
other-acts evidence establishes the first two prongs of the 
test, the burden shifts to the party opposing the admission of 
the other-acts evidence to show that the probative value of the 
evidence is substantially outweighed by the risk or danger of 
unfair prejudice.  Hunt, 263 Wis. 2d 1, ¶53; Payano, 320 
Wis. 2d 348, ¶80. 
¶20 Because this is a child sexual assault case with a 
young victim, the greater latitude rule "permit[s] 'a more 
liberal admission of other crimes evidence.'"  State v. 
Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶44, 236 Wis. 2d 537, 613 N.W.2d 606; 
Hammer, 236 Wis. 2d 686, ¶23.  This more liberal evidentiary 
standard applies to each prong of the Sullivan analysis.15  
Hammer, 236 Wis. 2d 686, ¶23.  The greater latitude rule "does 
not relieve the court of the duty to ensure that the other-acts 
evidence is offered for a proper purpose," Hunt, 263 Wis. 2d 1, 
                                                 
15 A more liberal standard applies in child sexual assault 
cases because of "the difficulty sexually abused children 
experience in testifying, and the difficulty prosecutors have in 
obtaining admissible evidence in such cases."  Davidson, 236 
Wis. 2d 537, ¶42.  Another reason for this rule, which is 
particularly relevant in this case, "is the need to corroborate 
the victim's testimony against credibility challenges."  Id., 
¶40. 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
17 
 
¶87, but it does support the admission of such evidence if it 
can be used for a purpose not prohibited under Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.40(2)(a), see Hammer, 236 Wis. 2d 686, ¶23.     
B. The Sullivan Analysis 
¶21 Under these guidelines we now turn to whether the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in admitting 
the hand-burning references within the videotaped interview. 
1. Was the evidence offered for a permissible purpose? 
¶22 The circuit court admitted the other-acts evidence for 
two main purposes: identity and context.  Regarding identity, 
the circuit court explained that M.M.L.'s statements in the 
video 
regarding the hand-burning incident established her 
identification of Marinez as the person who sexually abused her.  
M.M.L.'s videotaped statements identified "Mikey" as the person 
who both sexually assaulted her and burned her hands.  These 
statements, together with evidence that she called Marinez 
"Mikey" and evidence that Marinez burned M.M.L.'s hands, 
established M.M.L.'s identification of Marinez as the person who 
sexually assaulted her.  The circuit court explained:  
The alleged victim refers to the defendant as "Mikey" 
or "Mikey-Miguel," and when she is talking to the 
child interviewer in the videotape interview, she is 
describing Mikey as being the person who burned her 
hands, and she clearly describes the person who burned 
her hands as the same person who touched her private 
spot, all within the context of a family residential 
setting.  And so it is probative of identity.  It 
identifies the defendant as the same perpetrator of 
both abusive acts. 
A jury otherwise might have difficulty determining, 
even if they believe the girl was sexually assaulted, 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
18 
 
whether this defendant is the one who assaulted her.  
And so the linkage between the hand burning and the 
sexual assault claim is that [M.M.L.] clearly is 
attempting to tell us that the defendant is the same 
person who committed both of those acts.  And so it's 
admissible for the identity purpose, as well. 
Within context, the circuit court included the purposes of 
establishing the time and location of the assault, providing a 
complete explanation of the case, and enhancing M.M.L.'s 
credibility.  The circuit court stated: 
I think context in this case includes the date.  And 
we have a young child.  She is five years old.  I 
believe.  Sometimes it's difficult for young children 
to pin down a date that an event occurred, especially 
a difficult event like this.  The location, as far as 
which house they lived in, and whether it was in 
Jefferson 
County 
when 
the 
crime 
was 
allegedly 
committed as part of the context. 
The hand burning incident also enhances [M.M.L.'s] 
credibility, because the hand burning incident has now 
been established, I think beyond dispute, that the 
defendant has been convicted of perpetrating that act 
of abuse against [M.M.L.].  She complained of it and 
was examined at a hospital, and that hand burning 
incident happened within a period of 90 days or less, 
going back possibly as early as the beginning of 
October, according to the charged time frame in the 
Information in this case.  And that does provide 
additional credibility for [M.M.L.'s] story, if the 
jury believes her testimony overall.  It doesn't 
necessarily establish, to a certainty, that she is 
telling the truth, but it is certainly relevant to her 
credibility, and that's something that the jury, 
obviously, has to deal with. 
¶23 The State focuses on three main purposes for which the 
other-acts evidence was admissible: credibility, completeness, 
and context.  Credibility, the State argues, has already been 
recognized as an acceptable purpose for which to admit other-
acts evidence in Hunt, 263 Wis. 2d 1.  The State argues that 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
19 
 
playing the video as a whole, including the hand-burning 
references, helped the jury assess M.M.L.'s credibility.  This 
additional information was critical from the State's standpoint 
because of the difficulties children have in remembering and 
relaying the details required to garner a conviction, and other 
difficult proof issues that exist in child sexual assault cases.  
The State notes that the purpose of the greater latitude rule is 
to address these proof problems in child sexual assault cases 
and to help the jury evaluate the child's credibility.  Given 
these 
unique 
challenges, 
the 
State 
argues 
that 
removing 
references to other-acts evidence that a child wove into her 
videotaped statement would have seriously affected the jury's 
ability to assess the child's credibility and would have 
hampered the State's ability to prove the elements of the 
assault. 
 
The 
State 
also 
asserts 
that 
the 
hand-burning 
references "helped pinpoint the timing and perpetrator of the 
sexual assault."16 
¶24 In response, Marinez argues that the circuit court 
failed to fully explain its reasoning and admitted the hand-
                                                 
16 At oral argument, the State clarified that it was not 
conceding that the circuit court erred by admitting the hand-
burning evidence for the identity purpose.  The State clarified 
that the evidence was not offered for identity as that term is 
commonly used with regard to a common imprint or modus operandi 
between the other act and the crime at issue since that is 
obviously not present in this case.  Rather, the State asserted 
that the hand-burning evidence provided the complete picture of 
M.M.L.'s identification of Marinez, whom she referred to as 
"Mikey," as the perpetrator of both acts, which established 
M.M.L.'s actual identification of Marinez as her abuser. 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
20 
 
burning evidence for improper purposes.  Distinguishing Hunt, 
Marinez asserts that this evidence is not properly admitted for 
context because the hand-burning incident was not so intertwined 
with the sexual assault as the other-acts evidence in Hunt was, 
and that the references in the video were easily excised.  
Further, Marinez argues that the State's argument amounts to an 
assertion that "a child's credible report of prior bad behavior 
makes the child's report of unrelated sexual assault behavior 
more credible."  Marinez asserts that this is not how the other-
acts evidence in Hunt was used to establish the victim's 
credibility and is not a permissible way to use such evidence.  
Marinez insists that other-acts evidence cannot be used to 
establish M.M.L.'s credibility because such use makes it 
character evidence, prohibited by Wis. Stat. § 904.04(1) when it 
is used to establish that M.M.L. has a truthful character. 
¶25 This first step in the Sullivan analysis is not 
demanding.  Payano, 320 Wis. 2d 348, ¶63.  Identifying proper 
purposes for the admission of other-acts evidence is largely 
meant to develop the framework for the relevancy determination.  
See Payano, 320 Wis. 2d 348, ¶63; Blinka, supra, § 404.6 at 180.  
The purposes for which other-acts evidence may be admitted are 
"almost infinite" with the prohibition against drawing the 
propensity inference being the main limiting factor.  Blinka, 
supra, § 404.6 at 173 n.10; see also Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 
783 ("Although Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2) precludes the 
admission of character or propensity evidence, it permits the 
admission of other acts evidence if its relevance does not hinge 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
21 
 
on an accused's propensity to commit the act charged.").  "The 
proponent need only identify a relevant proposition that does 
not depend upon the forbidden inference of character as 
circumstantial evidence of conduct."  Blinka, supra, § 404.6 at 
180.  As long as the State and circuit court have articulated at 
least one permissible purpose for which the other-acts evidence 
was offered and accepted, the first prong of the Sullivan 
analysis is met.  See Hammer, 236 Wis. 2d 686, ¶29 n.4. 
¶26 Applying these principles to our review of the circuit 
court's decision, we conclude that the circuit court reasonably 
concluded that the hand-burning evidence was admissible for the 
purposes of establishing M.M.L.'s identification of Marinez17 and 
                                                 
17 Although we discussed previously the State's position on 
identity, we now note our agreement with the State's assertion 
at oral argument that the hand-burning evidence was not offered 
for the traditional identity purpose, that is, to identify the 
defendant as the perpetrator of the other act and the act for 
which he is on trial by providing evidence of his signature at 
each crime.  See Blinka, supra, § 404.7 at 212-13.  Thus, the 
stricter requirements specifically applicable to that purpose 
are not relevant here.  See Blinka, supra, § 404.7 at 212-15; 
State v. Scheidell, 227 Wis. 2d 285, 301, 595 N.W.2d 661 (1999).  
To clarify, the hand-burning references are admissible to fully 
explain how M.M.L. identified Marinez as the person who sexually 
abused her by accusing "Mikey" of both the physical and sexual 
assaults. 
 
While 
the 
circuit 
court's 
decision 
did 
not 
distinguish between the traditional identity purpose and the 
purpose for which the hand-burning references were used, any 
error was harmless because the circuit court's decision was not 
made in the jury's presence.  See Hunt, 263 Wis. 2d 1, ¶57.   
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
22 
 
to provide context for M.M.L.'s statements.  Within context, the 
circuit court properly admitted this evidence to provide a more 
complete story of the sexual assault, including the time and 
location of the assault, as well as to provide greater 
information 
from 
which 
the 
jury 
could 
assess 
M.M.L.'s 
                                                                                                                                                             
Additionally, the circuit court gave the following modified 
version of the pattern jury instruction for the typical 
"identity" purpose:  "That is whether the person [M.M.L.] 
described as burning her hands, is one in the same person who 
sexually assaulted her, such that it tends to identify the 
defendant as the one who committed the offense charged."  See 
Wis——JI Criminal 275 (providing the following pattern jury 
instruction for identity, "that is, whether the prior conduct of 
the defendant is so similar to the offense charged that it tends 
to identify the defendant as the one who committed the offense 
charged") (emphasis added).  This allowed the jury to use the 
other-acts evidence for the permissible purpose of establishing 
M.M.L.'s 
identification 
of 
Marinez 
and 
did 
not 
rely 
on 
similarities between the two bad acts such that the additional 
requirements of the "identity" purpose would apply.  See State 
v. Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d 247, 264 n.7, 378 N.W.2d 272 (1985) 
("In order for other-acts evidence to be admitted for purposes 
of identity, there should be such a concurrence of common 
features and so many points of similarity between the other acts 
and the crime charged that it can reasonably be said that the 
other acts and the present act constitute the imprint of the 
defendant."). 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
23 
 
credibility.18  None of these purposes relies on the prohibited 
propensity inference of the defendant's character to commit 
crimes, and thus they are legally permissible purposes under the 
first 
prong 
of 
the 
Sullivan 
analysis 
and 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 904.04(2)(a). 
¶27 We 
have 
previously 
recognized 
that 
context, 
credibility, and providing a more complete background are 
permissible purposes under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a).  Hunt, 263 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶58.  In Hunt, the victims and witnesses, Hunt's 
family members, made statements to police detailing Hunt's 
physical and sexual assaults, which were related to his drug 
use.  Id., ¶¶12, 15.  As a result, Hunt was charged with 
                                                 
18 Marinez mischaracterizes the credibility purpose for 
which the hand-burning evidence was admitted when he asserts 
that M.M.L.'s references to the hand-burning incident become 
character evidence inadmissible under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(1) 
when used for this purpose.  Character evidence is defined as 
"evidence regarding someone's personality traits; evidence of a 
person's moral standing in a community, based on reputation or 
opinion."  Black's Law Dictionary 576 (7th ed. 1999).  The 
circuit court did not admit M.M.L.'s truthful account of the 
hand-burning incident to show that M.M.L. had an honest 
character, which would not be a permissible use of this evidence 
here.  It is true that some of the circuit court's exchanges 
with counsel at the motion hearing could be construed as a 
mistaken belief that the hand-burning evidence was admissible to 
corroborate M.M.L.'s allegations by establishing a pattern of 
truth-telling.  However, its ruling admitting this evidence 
clarifies that it was not admitted for an improper character 
purpose.  The circuit court admitted the hand-burning evidence 
as relevant to M.M.L.'s credibility under the umbrella of 
context, which explains the purpose for which it was admitted: 
to provide greater context to M.M.L.'s sexual assault allegation 
in order to allow the jury to better assess M.M.L.'s credibility 
and to provide a more complete story for the jury. 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
24 
 
multiple counts of sexual assault of his wife and step-daughter.  
Id., ¶13.  Later, the victims and witnesses recanted, and the 
State sought to admit their statements, which included other-
acts evidence regarding Hunt's drug use and other instances of 
physical and sexual abuse of his family.  Id., ¶15.  The State 
offered this other-acts evidence to provide greater context and 
background, to explain the victims' state of mind regarding why 
they recanted, to provide more information about the credibility 
of their statements, and as part of the corpus of Hunt's crimes.  
Id., ¶¶15-17.  The circuit court admitted the other-acts 
evidence for these purposes.  We affirmed, concluding that 
"[o]ther-acts evidence is permissible to show the context of the 
crime, [] to provide a complete explanation of the case[,] . . . 
and to establish the credibility of victims and witnesses."  
Id., ¶58.   
¶28 The fact that the hand-burning evidence establishes 
context and credibility and provides a more complete story for 
the jury in a different way than the other-acts evidence in Hunt 
is inapposite, because it does not transform these purposes into 
prohibited propensity purposes.  What matters is that Hunt 
established context and credibility as permissible purposes for 
which to admit other-acts evidence in certain circumstances.  
Id.  Like in Hunt, the admission of other-acts evidence was 
appropriate because of the unique nature of this case.  In a 
videotaped interview, M.M.L., a very young child, wove this 
hand-burning incident into her account of the sexual abuse she 
suffered.  The State's case rested entirely on M.M.L.'s 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
25 
 
videotaped allegations.  The lack of physical evidence and the 
difficulty children have in testifying in court are common 
predicaments in child sexual assault cases, which is why the 
greater latitude rule is necessary.  Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, 
¶42.  Providing a complete story for the jury, additional 
context to M.M.L.'s allegations of sexual abuse, and more 
information 
with 
which 
the 
jury 
could 
assess 
M.M.L.'s 
credibility was critical in this case and justified the 
admission of the hand-burning evidence.19      
¶29 We also note that other-acts evidence may have been 
admitted for a proper purpose even if we have not recognized 
that specific purpose as such in a previous case.  This is true 
because other-acts evidence is admissible for any purpose except 
those purposes that draw the prohibited propensity inference 
                                                 
19 While its use was appropriate here, we recognize that 
context is a nebulous term that can be misused by prosecutors 
who seek refuge under this potentially broad umbrella because 
they cannot articulate a specific permissible purpose.  For this 
reason, the United States Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has 
sometimes criticized its corollary "inextricably intertwined" 
doctrine.  United States v. Taylor, 522 F.3d 731, 734-35 (7th 
Cir. 2008) (criticizing the vagueness of the "inextricably 
intertwined" doctrine as inviting "prosecutors to expand the 
exceptions to the rule beyond the proper boundaries of the 
exceptions"); United States v. Klebig, 600 F.3d 700, 712-13 (7th 
Cir. 2009) (same).  As explained above, given that M.M.L. tied 
this other-acts evidence into her videotaped allegations of 
sexual assault, which were presented to the jury instead of in-
court testimony because of her young age, admitting the hand-
burning references was necessary to provide context to M.M.L.'s 
videotaped 
allegations 
and 
to 
help 
the 
jury 
assess 
her 
credibility.  Thus, while the concerns raised by the Seventh 
Circuit are legitimate, those concerns are not implicated in 
this case. 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
26 
 
regarding 
a 
defendant's 
character. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 904.04(2)(a).20  We now turn to whether the hand-burning 
references in the video and in other witnesses' testimony are 
relevant to these purposes.     
2. Was the hand-burning evidence relevant to those purposes? 
¶30 The circuit court's analysis of the relevance of the 
hand-burning evidence to each of the above purposes was somewhat 
integrated into its analysis of whether that evidence was 
admissible for a proper purpose.  To further explain its 
decision, the circuit court stated: 
Specifically, as to identity, it makes the likelihood 
greater that the defendant is the one who perpetrated 
the sexual assault, because the hand burning evidence 
                                                 
20 In this regard the court of appeals erred by drawing 
distinctions between previous other-acts cases, including Hunt, 
and 
this 
case, 
and 
by 
concluding 
that 
the 
hand-burning 
references were easily excisable from the video.  Marinez, No. 
2009AP567-CR, ¶¶11-17.  We emphasize that, as long as the 
circuit court fully articulated its reasoning, as the circuit 
court did in this case, we review only whether the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion in admitting other-acts 
evidence for a proper purpose.  Hunt, 263 Wis. 2d 1, ¶34.  As 
noted above, a circuit court has properly exercised its 
discretion if it "examined the relevant facts, applied a proper 
standard of law, used a demonstrated rational process, and 
reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach."  Id.  
A circuit court properly applies Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a) and 
the first prong of the Sullivan analysis if it articulates a 
purpose, which is not the prohibited propensity inference, for 
which to admit the other-acts evidence.  The circuit court has 
done so here.  The circuit court considered Marinez's argument 
that the hand-burning references were excisable from the video 
but reasonably concluded that the State was permitted to admit 
the entire video as it articulated a proper purpose for which it 
sought to use the hand-burning evidence.  As long as circuit 
courts reach a reasonable conclusion, we will not supplant their 
judgment with ours.  Id., ¶42. 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
27 
 
corroborates the victim's claim of these two different 
instances of abuse.  The prior bad act evidence 
concerning hand burning is relevant to prove that the 
sexual assault, in fact, happened because it helps the 
jury to understand the time frame when this incident 
may have occurred —— the sexual assault, that is —— it 
helps them to understand where it occurred; and the 
State is required to prove it happened in Jefferson 
County as part of this prosecution.  It helps the jury 
to understand the case as a whole.   
In fact, the child may be somewhat fearful when she 
testifies at the trial.  I assume she will be 
testifying in person, and this history of the hand 
burning by the defendant might also help the jury to 
understand 
the 
alleged 
victim's 
demeanor 
and 
appearance as she testifies in court. 
As we saw from the videotape interview as well, the 
hand burning is really an integral part of the history 
that the alleged victim provides, because she talks 
about the defendant being the same person as the one 
who burned her hands; she talks about whether the 
sexual assault happened the same day that the hand 
burning occurred, whether it was in the same room or 
house.  She talks about the fact that her mother was 
gone when both incidents occurred.  And so she is, in 
her own statement as we see on the videotape, 
describing one event in connection with the other, as 
far as time, location and perpetrator. 
So, the hand burning incident does provide a necessary 
background.  It provides the necessary background for 
understanding the defendant's behavior.  It also 
provides the complete explanation of the case and the 
history and the relationship of the parties.  
¶31 The State's central argument is that because the 
jury's credibility determination was the crux of the case, the 
hand-burning evidence was relevant because it allowed the jury 
to better assess M.M.L.'s credibility.  The State asserts that 
the hand-burning evidence was relevant considering "how the 
hand-burning evidence fit in with the [S]tate's case and 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
28 
 
Marinez's defense, how the hand-burning evidence came up in 
M.M.L.'s videotaped statement, and what the credibility analysis 
entails."  The State argues that because of M.M.L.'s age, the 
limited details of the assault she could provide, and the lack 
of any physical evidence, this case depended entirely on the 
jury's assessment of M.M.L.'s credibility, which was also the 
basis of Marinez's defense.  The State asserts that the jury 
needed to see the entire video in order to assess M.M.L.'s 
credibility, which the State provides is a "holistic" assessment 
that "depends on more than isolated parts of a witness's 
answers," including the "variety of factors" listed in the 
credibility jury instruction.  Wis——JI Criminal 300.  Since 
Marinez's defense at trial was that M.M.L.'s allegations in the 
video were too vague, the State argues that the hand-burning 
references were necessary to provide the complete context of 
M.M.L.'s 
allegations 
regarding 
the 
timing, 
location, 
and 
perpetrator of the assault.  Further, the State emphasizes that 
the circuit court reasonably concluded that M.M.L.'s description 
of the hand-burning incident in the video was so "integral" to 
her allegations of sexual assault that admitting the video as a 
whole was necessary to provide the jury with sufficient 
background 
information 
with 
which 
to 
assess 
M.M.L.'s 
credibility.  Finally, the State argues that to present the who, 
when and where of the sexual assault, it was critical to show 
the entire video to the jury, including M.M.L.'s references to 
the hand burning. 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
29 
 
¶32 Marinez 
primarily 
asserts 
that 
the 
hand-burning 
evidence was not relevant because it simply was not necessary to 
establish any element of the State's case.  He argues that 
M.M.L.'s other statements, not referring to the hand burning 
incident, and other witnesses' testimony were sufficient to 
establish context, identity, and the time frame.  Additionally, 
Marinez argues that M.M.L.'s hand-burning references do not 
provide any context because there is no link between the hand-
burning incident and the sexual assault like there was in Hunt 
between the sexual assault and the defendant's illegal drug use.  
Finally, Marinez asserts that the hand-burning references are 
not relevant to M.M.L.'s credibility because such determinations 
are left to the trier of fact, and bolstering M.M.L.'s 
credibility in this way is improper.      
¶33 This second prong is significantly more demanding than 
the first prong but still does not present a high hurdle for the 
proponent of the other-acts evidence.  "The expansive definition 
of relevancy in Wis. Stat. § 904.01 is the true cornerstone of 
the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence."  Blinka, supra, § 401.1 at 97.  
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the 
existence 
of 
any 
fact 
that 
is 
of 
consequence 
to 
the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence."  Wis. Stat. § 904.01.  Even 
dissimilar events or events that do not occur near in time may 
still be relevant to one another.  Payano, 320 Wis. 2d 348, ¶70.  
There are two parts to a relevancy analysis: first, "whether the 
evidence relates to a fact or proposition that is of consequence 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
30 
 
to the determination of the action," and second, "whether the 
evidence has a tendency to make a consequential fact more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence."  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 785-86; Payano, 320 
Wis. 2d 348, ¶68.  The second part of the relevancy analysis 
illustrates the evidence's probative value, which is also part 
of the third prong of the Sullivan test.  See Sullivan, 216 
Wis. 2d at 786.      
¶34 Each of the purposes for which the hand-burning 
evidence was admitted relates to a proposition that is of 
consequence to the determination, namely, whether the jury 
believed M.M.L.'s account of sexual abuse at the hands of 
Marinez.  "A witness's credibility is always 'consequential' 
within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 904.01."  Blinka, supra, 
§ 401.101 at 98.  Like so many child sexual assault cases, this 
case boiled down to whom the jury believed; the child alleging 
she was sexually assaulted or the defendant who denies it 
occurred.  See Blinka, supra, § 404.7 at 217-18 (noting that 
"[c]hild sexual abuse prosecutions often proceed under three 
major disabilities: they rely on a single witness who is very 
young and whose allegations are frequently unsupported by 
physical evidence").  The difficult proof issues provide the 
rationale behind the greater latitude rule.  Davidson, 236 
Wis. 2d 537, ¶40.  Thus, it follows that the greater latitude 
rule allows for the more liberal admission of other-acts 
evidence that has a tendency to assist the jury in assessing a 
child's allegations of sexual assault.  It was reasonable for 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
31 
 
the circuit court to conclude that the hand-burning references 
were admissible to add additional context to the limited details 
of the sexual assault that M.M.L. was able to provide, and to 
allow the jury to better assess M.M.L.'s credibility, which was 
the central determination here.   
¶35 Additionally, it was reasonable for the circuit court 
to conclude that M.M.L.'s hand-burning references provided 
additional context about the time and location of the alleged 
sexual assault.  Professor Daniel Blinka states in his treatise 
on Wisconsin Evidence that "background information is often 
necessary to provide the jury with the proper context in which 
to place other critical testimony."  Blinka, supra, § 401.101, 
at 101.  While Orn referred to the hand-burning incident to try 
to pin down when the sexual abuse occurred, M.M.L. stated that 
she did not know "which one was first or last."  This was the 
only time in the interview that Orn asked M.M.L. when this 
happened.  Thus, these facts are an important part of M.M.L.'s 
disclosure because, without this, the jury may have wondered why 
no one even asked M.M.L. when this happened, and could have 
questioned M.M.L.'s credibility based on the lack of information 
in an excised video interview.  
¶36 Given the fact that the State sought to admit the 
hand-burning evidence because M.M.L. referred to that incident 
in the videotaped interview and wove it into her account of the 
sexual abuse, the relevance of the hand-burning evidence is tied 
to the relevance of the video itself.  M.M.L.'s videotaped 
statements alleging that Marinez sexually abused her were 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
32 
 
properly admissible under Wis. Stat. § 908.08 and of significant 
relevance because they were the State's sole evidence of the 
sexual assault.  Certainly, given the importance of the video 
evidence to the State's case, it was not unreasonable for the 
circuit court to conclude that such evidence was relevant to the 
jury's credibility determination, which was the central focus of 
the case, and thus properly admissible.  The hand-burning 
evidence was relevant in this case. 
3. 
Was the probative value of the hand-burning evidence 
substantially outweighed by the risk or danger of unfair 
prejudice? 
¶37 After explaining the relevance of the hand-burning 
evidence, which also pertains to the probative value of that 
evidence, the circuit court added: 
As to the probativeness versus unfair prejudice 
analysis, there's also a concern, of course, which is 
legitimate, that other acts evidence under 904.04, 
especially involving criminal acts, has the possible 
effect of being unfairly prejudicial to the defendant 
or the party against whom it is offered.  That is a 
concern here.  The hand burning is an act of violence 
perpetrated against a child. 
I do believe, however, that, first of all, we can 
significantly minimize the possibility that the jury 
will use the hand burning evidence for an improper 
purpose by giving a cautionary instruction.  There's a 
pattern instruction which the State has referred to.  
I would be willing to modify that as needed in this 
case, but that would be the general instruction that I 
would give.  It would be the pattern instruction. 
That instruction clearly tells the jury they are to 
use the evidence only for a certain purpose, context 
and identification.  And they are not to use it for 
any other purpose.  
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
33 
 
I believe the instruction also tells the jury that 
they are not to conclude that, because the defendant 
had committed some other crime that he is, therefore, 
more likely to have committed the crime in this case.  
I also will limit what level of detail and what type 
of evidence the State can introduce concerning the 
hand burning.  I have already indicated I won't allow 
photographs of the child's hands. 
 . . .  
So we're going to limit the details concerning the 
hand burning.  And I will direct Mr. Wambach to go 
over that with his witnesses; that that's to be 
covered in a very general nature so it's just used for 
the purpose that I have indicated. 
¶38 The circuit court also noted that its consideration of 
the greater latitude rule helped tip the balance in favor of 
admitting 
the 
hand-burning 
evidence 
when 
it 
weighed 
its 
probative value against the risk of unfair prejudice. 
I do think that the greater latitude of proof standard 
has its primary application in this case on this last 
factor; and that given that greater latitude of proof, 
that this evidence is highly probative and that it is 
properly admissible.  The danger of unfair prejudice 
is relatively low, given the effect of the Court's 
limiting ruling and the effect of the cautionary 
instruction which I will give. 
¶39 The focus of Marinez's argument is on this third 
prong. He argues that the hand-burning evidence was extremely 
prejudicial and that the prosecutor exceeded the limited 
purposes for which this evidence was admitted.  Marinez asserts 
that the circuit court did not adequately consider just how 
prejudicial this evidence was, especially given the cumulative 
effect of M.M.L.'s allegations of both sexual and physical 
assault at the hands of Marinez.  Marinez argues that jurors 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
34 
 
already see a man charged with sexually assaulting a child as a 
"monster," and "coupled with further testimony that this monster 
burned the hands of a five year old girl, it would be difficult, 
if not impossible to divorce the emotion of such a heinous act 
from the sexual assault charge for which he is on trial."  
Additionally, 
Marinez 
argues 
that 
the 
generic 
cautionary 
instruction was insufficient to undo the prejudice to Marinez.  
Marinez asserts that the purposes for which the hand-burning 
references were admitted, specifically identity, time, location 
and context, could have been established through other avenues.  
Finally, Marinez argues that the circuit court should have 
waited to decide whether to admit the hand-burning evidence 
until after the defense presented its case and it knew what 
Marinez challenged.      
¶40 The State asserts that Marinez has not met his burden 
of showing that the probative value of the hand-burning evidence 
is substantially outweighed by the risk or danger of unfair 
prejudice, particularly considering the deference given to 
circuit courts' evidentiary rulings.  The State argues that the 
hand-burning 
references 
were 
probative 
because 
of 
their 
importance to M.M.L.'s disclosure of the sexual assault in the 
video, which was the only evidence that the jury had to assess 
her credibility.  The State noted that it was not possible or 
necessary for the circuit court to wait to rule on the other-
acts motion until after the defense rested because the video was 
so critical to the State's case.  Further, the State noted that 
the hand-burning evidence was "certainly prejudicial," but that 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
35 
 
the circuit court adequately addressed that prejudice by (1) 
limiting the introduction of details about the hand-burning 
incident, (2) giving a limiting instruction during voir dire, 
(3) controlling the testimony on the hand-burning incident, and 
(4) giving a tailored cautionary instruction to the jury after 
closing arguments.     
¶41 We continue to the third prong of the Sullivan 
analysis, recognizing that the burden now shifts to Marinez to 
establish that the evidence's probative value was substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  Hunt, 263 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶69; Payano, 320 Wis. 2d 348, ¶80.  Evidence that is 
relevant 
"may 
be 
excluded 
if 
its 
probative 
value 
is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."  
Wis. Stat. § 904.03.21  The probative value of evidence "is a 
function of its relevance under Wis. Stat. § 904.01."  Blinka, 
supra, § 403.1 at 135.  The circuit court should also consider 
the proponent's need to present this evidence given the context 
of the entire trial.  Blinka, supra, § 403.1 at 136.  Prejudice 
is not based on simple harm to the opposing party's case, but 
rather "whether the evidence tends to influence the outcome of 
                                                 
21 Wisconsin Stat. § 904.03 provides in full: 
Exclusion 
of 
relevant 
evidence 
on 
grounds 
of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.  Although 
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair 
prejudice, 
confusion 
of 
the 
issues, 
or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
36 
 
the case by 'improper means.'"  Payano, 320 Wis. 2d 348, ¶87 
(quoting State v. Johnson, 184 Wis. 2d 324, 516 N.W.2d 463 
(1994)).  To limit the possibility that the jury will convict 
based on "improper means," circuit courts may provide limiting 
instructions, give a cautionary instruction, edit the evidence, 
or restrict a party's arguments.  Id., ¶99; Hunt, 263 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶¶72-73; Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 791.  We presume that juries 
comply with properly given limiting and cautionary instructions, 
and thus consider this an effective means to reduce the risk of 
unfair prejudice to the party opposing admission of other acts 
evidence.  See State v. Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d 628, 644 n.8, 369 
N.W.2d 711 (1985); Hunt, 263 Wis. 2d 1, ¶72.  Because the 
statute provides for exclusion only if the evidence's probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, "[t]he bias, then, is squarely on the side of 
admissibility.  Close cases should be resolved in favor of 
admission."  Blinka, supra, § 403.1 at 139.        
¶42 For the reasons discussed above in the relevancy 
analysis, we agree with the State that the hand-burning evidence 
is highly probative because it was "an integral part of the 
history that the alleged victim provide[d]" and was intertwined 
with M.M.L.'s sexual assault allegations in the video.  This 
video testimony was the only opportunity M.M.L. had to tell the 
jury about the sexual assault because she did not otherwise 
testify, due to her young age.  The State notes that "[i]t is 
unclear if M.M.L. could have provided coherent live testimony."  
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
37 
 
Thus, the entire video, including the hand-burning references, 
was critical to the State's case. 
¶43 As noted above, the probative value of the hand-
burning references is tied to the fact that the video was 
central to the State's case and properly admissible under Wis. 
Stat. § 908.08.  The impetus for the legislature's creation of 
this means to admit video testimony of child victims is also 
relevant to the circuit court's analysis of whether the 
probative value of M.M.L.'s references to the hand-burning 
incident within the videotape was substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice.  The legislature created Wis. 
Stat. § 908.08 in recognition of the fact "that special 
evidentiary rules were necessary to accommodate the increasing 
numbers of children called as witnesses and the difficult proof 
problems raised by those cases."  Blinka, supra, § 808.1 at 884.  
These difficult proof problems also support the greater latitude 
rule and therefore provide additional weight to the probative 
value of evidence within a videotaped interview used in a child 
sexual assault case. 
¶44 The hand-burning references were certainly prejudicial 
to Marinez, as the circuit court noted.  As we have noted, to 
limit prejudice, the circuit court took several measures to 
ensure that Marinez was not unfairly prejudiced.  First, the 
circuit court gave limiting and cautionary instructions to the 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
38 
 
jury during voir dire and after closing arguments.22  Second, the 
circuit court limited the admission of the hand-burning evidence 
                                                 
22 The circuit court gave the following modified version of 
the standard cautionary instruction for other acts evidence 
after closing arguments: 
Evidence has been presented regarding other conduct of 
the defendant for which the defendant is not on trial.  
Specifically, evidence has been presented that the 
defendant burned the hands of [M.M.L.].  If you find 
that this conduct did occur, you should consider it 
only on the issues of identity and to provide context 
for the child's statements.  You may not consider this 
evidence to conclude that the defendant has a certain 
character or a certain character trait and that the 
defendant acted in conformity with that trait or 
character with respect to the offense charged in this 
case. 
This evidence was received on the issues of, number 
one, identity.  That is whether the person [M.M.L.] 
described as burning her hands, is one in the same 
person who sexually assaulted her, such that it tends 
to identify the defendant as the one who committed the 
offense charged. 
Number two, context or background, that is to provide 
a more complete presentation of the evidence relating 
to the offense charged.  You may consider this 
evidence only for the purposes I have described, 
giving it the weight you determine it deserves. 
It is not to be used to conclude that the defendant is 
a bad person and for that reason is guilty of the 
offense charged.  In weighing the evidence you may 
take into account matters of your common knowledge and 
your observations and experience in the affairs of 
life. 
See Wis——JI Criminal 275.   
During voir dire, the circuit court gave a limiting 
instruction to the jury that was almost identical to the first 
paragraph of the cautionary instruction quoted above. 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
39 
 
by restricting what details the prosecutor could bring in, 
excluding any photos of M.M.L.'s burned hands, and warning the 
prosecutor not to allow witnesses to dwell on the hand-burning 
incident.   
¶45 Marinez asserts that the limiting and cautionary 
instructions were inadequate to address the unfair prejudice 
from this hand-burning evidence, which he argues was especially 
prejudicial given M.M.L.'s additional comments about Marinez in 
the video when referencing the hand-burning incident.23  Marinez 
further argues that this prejudice was exacerbated by the 
prosecutor's misuse of such evidence.  This argument does not 
pertain to the three-prong Sullivan analysis, however.  When we 
review a circuit court's admission of other-acts evidence under 
the Sullivan analysis, only the facts that were before the 
circuit court when it ruled on the motion to admit other-acts 
evidence are relevant.  While circuit courts should consider the 
likely impact of this evidence at trial when providing limiting 
instructions, we will not conclude that a circuit court erred by 
failing to divine exactly how the evidence would be used at 
trial.  If the circuit court properly examined the facts before 
it and balanced the probative value versus the potential danger 
of unfair prejudice of the other-acts evidence, according to the 
                                                 
23 Specifically, Marinez argues that M.M.L.'s statements 
that (1) she thought her mother allowed Marinez to burn her 
hands, (2) she hoped Marinez was "in jail right now for doing 
what he did to" her hands, and (3) she hoped her mother would 
marry a different person, were unfairly prejudicial. 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
40 
 
appropriate legal standard, we will affirm its decision.24    
Allegations that a prosecutor used evidence in a way that 
exceeded the purposes for which that evidence was admitted or 
failed to comply with a circuit court's limiting instruction are 
more appropriately considered as allegations of prosecutorial 
misconduct.  See Mayo, 301 Wis. 2d 642, ¶43.  Thus, we address 
Marinez's argument in this regard below under the standard for 
prosecutorial misconduct. 
¶46 The circuit court reasonably concluded that Marinez 
did not meet his burden of establishing that the probative value 
of the hand-burning evidence was substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice.  Therefore, the circuit court did 
not err in admitting the hand-burning evidence under Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.04(2)(a) according to the Sullivan analysis.  Marinez has 
failed to establish that the probative value of such evidence 
                                                 
24 In previous cases in which we reviewed a circuit court's 
admission of other-acts evidence, we discussed how the evidence 
was actually used at trial within our three-prong Sullivan 
analysis.  See Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 790-92; Davidson, 236 
Wis. 2d 537, ¶78; Hammer, 236 Wis. 2d 686, ¶36 n.8; Payano, 320 
Wis. 2d 348, ¶101.  We note that a discussion of how the other-
acts evidence was used at trial may supplement our conclusion 
that 
a 
circuit 
court 
properly 
admitted 
such 
evidence, 
particularly under this third prong.  Additionally, if we 
conclude that a circuit court erred in admitting other-acts 
evidence, how that evidence was used at trial becomes relevant 
to our subsequent analysis of whether that error was harmless.  
See Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 792-94.   
Because we conclude that the circuit court properly 
exercised its discretion in admitting the other-acts evidence, 
we do not reach the harmless error analysis in this case.  Thus, 
we consider Marinez's argument in this regard as an allegation 
of prosecutorial misconduct. 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
41 
 
was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  
We 
now 
turn 
to 
Marinez's 
allegations 
of 
prosecutorial 
misconduct.  
C. 
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
¶47 Marinez argues that the circuit court's "allowance of 
the other acts evidence for the purposes stated [was] an 
erroneous exercise of judicial discretion because the evidence 
was not used for the purposes proposed by the [S]tate."  Marinez 
alleges that there are several instances in which the prosecutor 
exceeded the circuit court's limitations on the use of this 
evidence, which we address below.   
¶48 The State responds that this issue, whether the 
prosecutor exceeded the circuit court's limits on the admission 
of other-acts evidence, is not properly before this court 
because it was not raised in the State's petition for review, or 
in a cross-petition by Marinez, nor was it objected to at trial.  
The State also asserts that Marinez's arguments about how the 
prosecutor used the hand-burning evidence at trial are not 
pertinent to the Sullivan analysis, which reviews the circuit 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
42 
 
court's admission of this evidence before trial.25  As discussed 
in more detail above, we agree with the State that allegations 
of misuse of other-acts evidence by a prosecutor are not 
properly part of the Sullivan analysis. 
¶49 Such allegations should be considered an argument for 
a new trial due to prosecutorial misconduct.  See Mayo, 301 
Wis. 2d 642, 
¶43. 
 
Initially, 
a 
defendant 
ought 
to 
contemporaneously object to any misuse of other acts evidence by 
a prosecutor to allow a circuit court the opportunity to correct 
any alleged errors during trial.  See State v. Doss, 2008 WI 93, 
¶83, 312 Wis. 2d 570, 754 N.W.2d 150.  A defendant who fails to 
object at the time of alleged errors by the prosecutor risks 
forfeiting review of such errors on appeal.  Id.  That being 
said, "some errors are so plain or fundamental that they cannot 
be waived" and will be considered on appeal despite the absence 
of an objection.  Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶88.  Because of 
the limited evidence presented at trial, and the potentially 
                                                 
25 See e.g., State v. Warren J.A., No. 1997AP2455-CR, 
unpublished slip op., (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 1998) (separately 
addressing the issues of the admissibility of other-acts 
evidence and the prosecutor's alleged misuse of that evidence); 
United States v. Hale, 448 F.3d 971, 986 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(characterizing 
the 
defendant's claim that the prosecutor 
misused other-acts evidence during rebuttal "as a claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct separate from the district court's 
evidentiary ruling"); United States v. Simpson, 479 F.3d 492 
(7th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the defendant's claim that the 
prosecutor misused the other-acts evidence was an allegation of 
prosecutorial misconduct and addressing it in the harmless error 
analysis after holding that such evidence was improperly 
admitted). 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
43 
 
prejudicial nature of this other-acts evidence, we will address 
Marinez's claim of prosecutorial misconduct. 
¶50 As we discussed previously, the circuit court placed 
limitations on the hand-burning evidence.  First, the prosecutor 
was not permitted to introduce photographs of M.M.L.'s burned 
hands.  Second, the State's witnesses were not permitted to 
dwell on the hand burning incident.  Third, the prosecutor was 
not allowed to introduce medical evidence or a detailed 
explanation of M.M.L.'s injuries.  Fourth, the prosecutor was 
instructed to explain to his witnesses the limitations on the 
hand-burning evidence so that it would be used only "in a very 
general nature" for the prescribed purposes.   
¶51 Marinez asserts that the following details of the 
hand-burning incident should not have been admitted because they 
were 
unnecessary 
and 
emotional, 
and 
that 
the 
prosecutor 
improperly focused on these details during trial.  Marinez 
challenges the focus on the following details: (1) M.M.L. 
thought her mother allowed Marinez to burn her hands, (2) M.M.L. 
wanted her mother to marry someone else, (3) M.M.L. hoped that 
Marinez was in jail for burning her hands, (4) M.M.L. had to go 
to two hospitals after her hands were burned, and (5) M.M.L. had 
to stay at the hospital "for some period of time" because her 
burns were serious.  M.M.L. referred to the first three details 
during the videotaped interview while referring to the hand-
burning incident.  These statements were part of the hand-
burning references that the circuit court admitted, and thus 
these references did not violate the circuit court's limitations 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
44 
 
on such evidence.  The fourth and fifth details, listed above, 
came out in Rachel Marinez's testimony after the prosecutor was 
directed to lead her in order to stay within the circuit court's 
order.26  At the time, Marinez did not object to the prosecutor's 
questions that elicited these facts.  The State concedes that 
these questions were outside of the circuit court's limiting 
order because these facts were not mentioned in the videotape.  
While these facts arguably may have been outside of the circuit 
court's limitations, they do not add significantly inflammatory 
details to those that were already admitted regarding the hand-
burning incident.  Any prejudice to Marinez from the references 
to the hand-burning incident, or to the details surrounding that 
incident, 
was 
addressed 
in 
the 
limiting 
and 
cautionary 
instructions.  These additional details did not negate the 
                                                 
26 These facts came forth in the following exchange: 
Prosecutor Wambach: [M.M.L.] was transported from Watertown 
ER to the University of Wisconsin Hospitals in Madison? 
Rachel Marinez: 
Yes. 
Q: 
And the defendant did come to visit her that same 
night, December the 27th; correct? 
A: 
 
 
 
Yes. 
Q: 
[M.M.L.] stayed at the hospital for some period of 
time; right? 
A: 
 
 
 
Yes. 
Q: 
 
 
 
Because her burns were serious? 
A: 
 
 
 
Yes. 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
45 
 
effect of those instructions or "so infect[] the trial with 
unfairness" as to deny Marinez due process. 
¶52  Marinez also asserts that the prosecutor misused the 
hand-burning evidence throughout his closing argument, and he 
highlights four specific instances of alleged misuse.  These 
statements were not objected to at trial.  First, Marinez 
alleges 
that, 
during 
closing 
argument, 
the 
prosecutor 
"essentially lump[ed] the burning hands in with the sexual 
assault allegation" when the prosecutor argued as follows:     
Do you remember how [M.M.L.] described the fact that 
the defendant had burned her hands?  She first said: 
My mommy letted, my mommy letted Mikey burn my hands.  
That's how she felt.  As long as we are talking about 
that, let's fast forward to when Kari asked her asked 
[M.M.L.] if – I want to get this right. 
If something happens, is there a safe grown up you can 
talk about stuff with?  [M.M.L.] said: James is a safe 
person.  You know James, from her mother's testimony 
and from [M.M.L.'s], was the driver who would take 
[M.M.L.] to go visit her mother after [M.M.L.'s] hands 
had got burned.  James is a safe person.  You're a 
safe person.  Cathy is a safe person. 
No Mikey.  Is he not a safe person.  Isn't that 
consistent with someone who touches your private area 
when they shouldn't when your mom is off at work?  Not 
there protecting you in your four year old mind.  
Mikey is not a safe person.  And you notice mommy 
didn't make that list of safe people either; did she. 
The aim of the prosecutor's line of argument here became clear 
when he explained the conclusion that he wanted the jury to draw 
from these facts, which is that M.M.L. was consistent in her 
statements within the video. 
And isn't that consistent corroboration of a child who 
says: Mommy letted him burn my hands.  Isn't that 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
46 
 
consistent in the way [M.M.L.] has put together the 
fact that her mother isn't protecting her. 
The prosecutor properly used this evidence for the purposes of 
context and credibility for which this evidence was admitted.   
¶53 Second, Marinez asserts that the following excerpt of 
the prosecutor's closing argument goes beyond the circuit 
court's order:    
We also learned from Kari Orn that when there have 
been multiple incidents of abuse, that her experience 
is that there are times when, in fact, children will 
relate because disclosure is a process.  It's not an 
event.  That there will be times when the child will 
relate, for instance, like in this case, that her 
hands had been burned by Mikey.  And at some later 
point, she will, based on all of the factors going on, 
fear could be one of them. 
Certainly after someone has burned your hands serious 
enough for you to have to get transferred from the ER 
to the UW Hospital and to stay there, that you might 
not feel safe at that point and that you might not be 
able to differentiate all the things going on in the 
moment with past abuse. 
This is not a misuse of the hand-burning evidence.  The 
prosecutor used the fact that the jury knew that there was a 
serious incident of physical abuse to explain why M.M.L. may 
have initially disclosed the physical, but not the sexual, 
abuse.  This is permissible to provide context to M.M.L.'s 
disclosure 
to 
assist 
the 
jury 
in 
assessing 
whether 
her 
statements are credible. 
¶54 Third, Marinez argues that, during his rebuttal, the 
prosecutor tried to present Marinez as someone with a "criminal 
character" by mentioning that M.M.L.'s burns were so serious 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
47 
 
that she was treated in two different hospitals.  The prosecutor 
stated: 
Let's turn to what the defense argues:  Look at how 
different [M.M.L.] acted between talking about the 
burning of her hands and her private area being 
violated.  Well, what would you expect?  I mean she 
was - - she had serious burns and she was in two 
different hospitals.  That, of course, is going to 
have a much greater impact on you when you are four 
and you don't even necessarily have an appreciation 
for just how private that private area is.  Right. 
In the context of the prosecutor's argument, it is clear that 
these details were used for a permissible purpose within the 
circuit court's order: that is, to provide context for the jury 
to assess M.M.L.'s credibility regarding the sexual assault.   
Additionally, we note that Marinez opened the door to this 
response by the prosecution when he argued in closing that the 
jury should not believe M.M.L. because of the differences in her 
demeanor when she talked about the two incidents in the video.  
See United States v. Reagan, 694 F.2d 1075, 1080 (7th Cir. 1982 
(noting that "where defense counsel makes remarks in closing 
that invite the [State] to respond, the prosecutor may, in 
rebuttal, enter into areas which would otherwise constitute 
improper argument.").   
¶55 Finally, 
Marinez 
argues 
that 
the 
prosecutor's 
following argument during rebuttal closing invited the jury to 
convict based on Marinez's "overall evil character."  Marinez 
refers to the following portion of the prosecutor's rebuttal 
argument: 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
48 
 
We know from the evidence that the defendant is 
responsible for burning [M.M.L.'s] hands.  And that 
wasn't to distract you, but when the child is 
believable and credible in letting you know what he 
did, when he perpetrated that kind of abuse on her, 
the facts and circumstances tell you that she has the 
same credibility in describing the other abuse he did. 
And that's what this trial is about and that's what 
you should find the defendant guilty of.  Thank you.  
The State concedes that this line of argument was improper, 
perhaps presuming that this was an improper comment on M.M.L.'s 
credibility or Marinez's character.  We disagree with both 
Marinez's assertion and the State's concession.  The prosecutor 
asked the jury to conclude that M.M.L.'s allegations of sexual 
assault were credible because they were in the context of a 
videotaped interview in which she also accurately recounted 
physical abuse by Marinez.  Context and credibility are both 
proper 
purposes 
for 
which 
the 
hand-burning 
evidence 
was 
admitted.  Therefore, none of the prosecutor's statements 
discussed above "so infected the trial with unfairness as to 
make the resulting conviction a denial of due process."  See 
Mayo, 310 Wis. 2d 642, ¶43.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶56 We hold that the circuit court did not err in 
admitting 
the 
video 
in 
its 
entirety 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 904.04(2)(a) and 908.08.  We affirm the circuit court's 
evidentiary ruling on the admissibility of the other-acts 
evidence because the circuit court "examined the relevant facts, 
applied a proper standard of law, used a demonstrated rational 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
49 
 
process, and reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could 
reach."  Hunt, 263 Wis. 2d 1, ¶34.   
¶57 We conclude that, in light of the greater latitude 
rule, and the fact that the other-acts evidence was so 
intertwined with the otherwise admissible videotaped statement 
of the child victim, the circuit court properly determined that 
each of the three prongs of the Sullivan analysis supported 
admission.  See Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772-73.  Under the 
first prong, we conclude that the circuit court reasonably 
concluded that, under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a), the hand-
burning references were admissible for the proper purposes of 
establishing M.M.L.'s identification of Marinez as her abuser 
and providing context, including assisting the jury in assessing 
M.M.L.'s credibility, establishing the time and location of the 
sexual abuse, and providing a complete story to the jury.  
Regarding the second prong, we conclude that the circuit court's 
determination that the hand-burning evidence was relevant to the 
above purposes was reasonable, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 904.01.  
Under the third prong, we conclude that the circuit court 
reasonably determined that, in accord with Wis. Stat. § 904.03, 
the probative value of the entire video, including M.M.L.'s 
references to the hand-burning incident, was not substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Marinez. 
¶58 We are also satisfied that any misuse of the hand-
burning evidence by the prosecutor did not "so infect[] the 
trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a 
denial of due process."  See Mayo, 301 Wis. 2d 642, ¶43.  Thus, 
No. 
2009AP567-CR   
 
50 
 
we reverse the court of appeals and affirm the circuit court's 
judgment of conviction. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is reversed 
and the judgment of conviction is affirmed. 
 
No.  2009AP567-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶59 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I agree 
with the unanimous decision of the court of appeals reversing 
the conviction for the sexual offense and allowing Marinez to 
get a new trial.  I agree with the court of appeals that the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in admitting 
the four-year-old child's videotaped statements describing a 
separate incident in which Marinez burned her hands.  I also 
agree with the court of appeals that the district attorney's 
office improperly introduced testimony and arguments about the 
burning beyond what the circuit court allowed.1    
¶60 The issue in the present case is whether Marinez got a 
fair trial when the circuit court admitted the full videotape in 
which the four-year-old accused Marinez of burning her hands so 
severely that she was hospitalized.    
¶61 The majority concludes the hand-burning evidence is 
"highly probative," yet cannot articulate an answer to the 
question, probative of what?   
¶62 The majority confuses the issue by stating the obvious 
and uncontested proposition that the videotape interview of the 
child 
is 
highly 
probative 
regarding 
the 
charged 
crime.  
Certainly those parts of the videotape in which the child 
accuses Marinez of the sexual offense charged are highly 
probative of the charged crime.  The question presented, 
however, is how are the child's six distinct references in the 
                                                 
1 State v. Marinez, No. 2009AP567-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2010). 
No.  2009AP567-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
videotape to a seperate hand-burning incident relevant to the 
sexual assault, beyond showing that Marinez is a bad man and has 
a propensity for hurting children?  The answer is that the six 
references are not relevant to the sexual assault and should 
have been excised from the videotape.2   
¶63 The conclusion I draw from the evidence of Marinez's 
reprehensible act in severely burning a four-year-old's hands 
(and I think it is the conclusion that all reasonable people 
would draw) is that Marinez is a bad person who is likely to 
harm this child again (and perhaps harm any child with whom he 
has contact).  As I see it, evidence of the burning incident 
obscured the focus of the trial, which was supposed to be on the 
sexual assault.3  Because of the burning evidence, there was the 
likelihood that the jury would convict Marinez for the sex 
offense "merely because he is a person likely to do such acts."4   
¶64 The 
burning 
evidence 
was 
character 
evidence, 
inadmissible for the purpose of proving Marinez acted in 
conformity with his character or propensities.  The aim of Wis. 
Stat. § 904.04(2) is to keep evidence from the jury that the 
defendant is a bad person and so is prone to commit the crime 
                                                 
2 No one suggests that the videotape of the child's 
statements 
could 
not 
have 
been 
edited 
to 
eliminate 
the 
references to the burning.  Yet the circuit court did not have 
the videotape edited.    
3 State v. Sonnenberg, 117 Wis. 2d 159, 178, 344 N.W.2d 95 
(1984). 
4 State v. Whitty, 34 Wis. 2d 278, 292, 149 N.W.2d 557 
(1967). 
No.  2009AP567-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
alleged.5  The purpose of § 904.04(2) is to prevent the State 
from relying on character and propensity evidence, "implying 
that the jury needn't worry overmuch about the strength of the 
government's evidence."6  The law is designed to ensure that 
Marinez (and every other person charged with a crime) gets a 
fair trial in which the State must prove the charged crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  The law does not allow Marinez to be 
convicted of a sexual offense because he is a bad person who has 
a propensity to hurt this child.7 
¶65 Wisconsin Stat. § 904.04(2) does, however, allow the 
State to introduce evidence of other bad acts for certain 
limited purposes.  The majority opinion struggles mightily and 
at great length to fit the burning evidence into one of the 
legitimate purposes for introducing other crimes evidence.     
¶66 The majority opinion offers a litany of legitimate 
purposes for the burning evidence.  See majority op., ¶4.  But 
the 
majority 
fails 
in 
its 
attempts 
to 
legitimize 
the 
introduction of the burning evidence. 
¶67 The majority seems to say that the burning incident is 
permissible to establish the identity of Marinez as the person 
who committed the sexual offense.  The State abandoned the 
                                                 
5 State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 782-83, 576 N.W.2d 30 
(1998).   
6 United States v. Taylor, 522 F.3d 731, 735 (7th Cir. 
2008). 
7 See Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d  at 783.  
No.  2009AP567-CR.ssa 
 
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identity argument before the court of appeals,8 but the State 
resurrected it on questioning by this court at oral argument.  
See majority op., ¶23 n.16.   
¶68 The majority opinion resurrects identity as a proper 
purpose for the burning evidence by adopting a new approach to 
identity evidence.  The majority also seemingly joins identity 
with "context" and "credibility."  The majority's discussions of 
identity evidence are conflicting and, in my opinion, leave the 
law surrounding the purpose of identity evidence uncertain and 
confused.  Compare majority op., ¶12 n.11, ¶18 n.13, ¶22, ¶23 
n.16, ¶26 n.17.    
¶69 The majority opinion also allows introduction of the 
burning evidence as "providing context, including assisting the 
jury in assessing [the child's] credibility . . . and providing 
a complete story to the jury."  See majority op., ¶4.    
¶70 I agree that "context" and "providing a complete 
story" are permissible purposes for introducing other crimes 
evidence.  Case law and treatises explain that "context" and 
"completing the story" evidence are a part of the res gestae of 
the crime.9  The other crime must be integral to the crime 
charged such that evidence of the other crime is not only 
helpful in "completing the story" but is necessary to fill in 
                                                 
8 State v. Marinez, No. 2009AP257-CR, unpublished slip op., 
¶10 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2010). 
9 See, e.g., State v. Hereford, 195 Wis. 2d 1054, 1069, 537 
N.W.2d 62 (Ct. App. 1995); 7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin 
Practice: Evidence 198-99 (3d ed. 2008). 
No.  2009AP567-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
otherwise misleading or confusing gaps related to the charged 
crime.10  
¶71 The burning incident in the present case does not fall 
within these accepted concepts of "context" or "completing the 
story."  The references to the hand-burning incident are not 
integral to the sexual assault crime.  The burning is a separate 
crime, distinct in time and type; it doesn't fill in misleading 
or confusing gaps related to the sexual assault crime. 
¶72 The majority, however, has offered a new explanation 
of "context" and "completing the story."  As used by the 
majority these concepts are unlimited, vague, and render the 
law's prohibition of character evidence meaningless.  "The fact 
that omitting some evidence would render a story slightly less 
complete cannot justify circumventing" altogether the rule 
prohibiting character and propensity evidence.11  "Context" and 
"completing the story" cannot be interpreted so broadly that 
these concepts allow the introduction of all propensity and 
character evidence.   
                                                 
10 State v. Muckerheide, 2007 WI 5, ¶53, 298 Wis. 2d 553, 
725 N.W.2d 930 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting):  
Case law and treatises explain that 'context' evidence 
show the res gestae of the crime.  The other act is 
ordinarily close in time to the crime and is integral 
to the crime such that is not only helpful in 
understanding 
what happened but is necessary to 
complete the story by filling in otherwise misleading 
or confusing gaps.  In other words, the fact-finder 
must hear the entire story in order not to be misled. 
(Citations omitted.) 
11 United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 929 (D.C. Cir. 
2000). 
No.  2009AP567-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶73 The majority opinion allows prosecutors to expand the 
boundaries of "context" and "complete the story" beyond the 
proper 
boundaries 
of 
the 
rule 
prohibiting 
character 
and 
propensity evidence.12  Similar expansions have been criticized 
by federal courts as threatening to override the evidentiary 
rule making other acts evidence inadmissible.13 
¶74 The majority opinion goes even one step further in 
expanding 
these 
boundaries 
by 
presenting 
"context" 
and 
"completing the story" as being intertwined with and offered to 
prove credibility.  In doing so the majority opinion expands and 
changes the concept of credibility evidence.  See majority op., 
¶¶27, 28.  Indeed, it is difficult to discern whether "context" 
and "credibility" are one or two concepts in the majority 
opinion.14     
                                                 
12 United States v. Klebig, 600 F.3d 700, 713 (7th Cir. 
2009). 
13 See Klebig, 600 F.3d at 713; Taylor, 522 F.3d at 734; 
United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
14 See majority op., ¶4 ("providing context, including 
assisting the jury in assessing . . . credibility"); ¶12 n.11 
("context as it relates to credibility"); ¶22 ("providing a 
complete 
explanation 
of 
the 
case, 
and 
enhancing 
M.M.L's 
credibility"); 
¶26 
("[w]ithin 
context, 
the 
circuit 
court 
properly admitted this evidence to provide a more complete story 
of the sexual assault . . . [and] to provide greater information 
from which the jury could assess M.M.L.'s credibility"); ¶26 
n.18 ("[t]he circuit court admitted the hand-burning evidence as 
relevant 
to 
M.M.L.'s 
credibility 
under 
the 
umbrella 
of 
context"); ¶27 ("context, credibility, and providing a more 
complete background are permissible purposes"); ¶28 ("the hand-
burning 
evidence 
establishes 
context 
and 
credibility 
and 
provides a more complete story"); ¶28 n.19 ("admitting the hand-
burning references was necessary to provide context . . . and to 
help the jury assess her credibility"); ¶34 (hand-burning 
evidence relates to the victim's credibility). 
No.  2009AP567-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶75 Ultimately, the majority opinion concludes that the 
hand-burning incident makes the child's testimony about the 
sexual offense more credible.      
¶76 The majority struggles to articulate how it is that 
the references to the hand-burning in the child's video 
statement make her statements regarding the sexual assault more 
credible.  While not explicitly articulating its conclusion, the 
majority opinion winds up relying upon the inference that 
because the child told the truth about a separate and distinct 
crime of hand-burning it is more probable that she is telling 
the truth about the sexual assault.15  This kind of evidence and 
inference is not admissible to prove credibility.16    
¶77 In any event, even assuming that the burning evidence 
is relevant for a proper (non-character or propensity) purpose,  
the probative value, if any, of the burning incident evidence is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.17  
The numerous cautionary jury instructions the circuit court gave 
do not sway this balance; on the contrary, they only served to 
highlight the hand-burning incident.  Majority op., ¶¶41, 44.   
¶78 The error in admitting the burning evidence was not 
harmless in and of itself under the circumstances of the case.  
                                                 
15 Thus the majority opinion concludes at ¶34:  "Each of the 
purposes for which the hand-burning evidence was admitted 
relates to a proposition that is of consequence to the 
determination, namely, whether the jury believed [the child's] 
account of sexual abuse at the hands of Marinez."  
16 Credibility is attacked or supported by evidence in the 
form of reputation or opinion.  See Wis. Stat. § 906.08. 
17 Wis. Stat. § 904.03. 
No.  2009AP567-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
In this case the error was further exacerbated by the State's 
comments in closing arguments about the burning evidence 
contrary to the circuit court's instructions.  See majority op., 
¶52. 
* * * * 
¶79 The majority opinion has taken another step toward a 
judicially created exception to Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2), allowing 
virtually unrestricted use of propensity evidence in child 
sexual assault cases.18  The greater latitude rule for admission 
of other crime evidence in child sexual offense cases cannot 
overcome the total lack of a proper purpose for the burning 
incident evidence in the present case.  The child's videotaped 
testimony that "Mikey" burned her hands leads to the inference 
that Marinez has hurt this child and has acted in conformity 
with his character by sexually assaulting the child as charged.  
This propensity evidence "is not legally or logically relevant 
to the crime charged."19     
¶80 Justice Bradley said it all a decade ago: 
Unfortunately 
our 
post-Whitty 
jurisprudence 
consistently reveals that courts may freely permit 
prior acts evidence in child sexual assault cases to 
show the defendant's propensity to abuse children.  
Despite 
Sullivan's 
valiant 
attempt 
to 
revitalize 
Whitty and its call to exercise restraint in prior 
acts 
determinations, 
this 
court 
has 
once 
again 
contorted the definitions of the acceptable statutory 
purposes to meet the facts. 
                                                 
18 State v. Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶93, 236 Wis. 2d 537, 613 
N.W.2d 606 (Bradley, J., dissenting).  
19 Whitty, 34 Wis. 2d at 292. 
No.  2009AP567-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
Rather than endeavoring to stretch beyond repair the 
definitions of the acceptable purposes under Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2), the majority should simply 
lay all its cards on the table and acknowledge that it 
is sanctioning the blanket use of propensity evidence 
in child sexual assault cases.  However, the majority 
maintains its refuge under the cloak of the very 
statute it simultaneously erodes. . . .  
An honest and forthright approach by the majority 
would serve us all better than perpetrating the 
artifice 
of 
adherence 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 
904.04(2).  Because the majority engages in legal 
gymnastics to justify the admission of propensity 
evidence in contravention of the statute, I dissent. 
State v. Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶¶108-110, 236 Wis. 2d 537, 613 
N.W.2d 606 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
¶81 For the reasons set forth, I would affirm the decision 
of the court of appeals.  Accordingly, I dissent. 
¶82 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
No.  2009AP567-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
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