Title: CAIN v HARRINGTON

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12337 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1973 H, H . CAIN and ISLA CAIN, Plaintiffs and Respondents, -VS - ANDY H A R R I N G T O N , Defendant and Appellant . Appeal from: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, Honorable W. W. Lessley, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : Bennett and Bennett, Bozeman, Montana Lyman Bennett Jr. argued, Bozeman, Montana For Respondents: Holter and Heath, Bozeman, Montana Robert M. Holter argued, Bozeman, Montana Submitted: January 23, 1973 Decided "'EE 2 1 37.3 Mr. Chief Justice James T. Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from the district court of Gallatin County. Plaintiffs brought this action to recover possession of Lot 123, Rainbow Subdivision, Gallatin County, Montana, and rental. Defendant counterclaimed, claiming a contract to purchase the land in question and asked for specific perform- ance of the contract and a money judgment. The jury verdict was for defendant and the judgment ordered conveyance and money judgment. Plaintiffs moved for a new trial or judgment notwith- standing the verdict. The district court ordered a new trial and from that order defendant appeals. Two issues are presented by appealing defendant. First, can the district court grant plaintiffs' motion for a new trial or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict after the expiration of the time specified by Rule 59(d), M.R.Civ.P.? Second, did the district court commit error in granting the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial after the money judgment had been satis- f ied? In regard to the first issue, the motion made by plaintiffs' counsel in this matter was in the alternative in that the motion asked for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. These two motions are provided for by Rule 50(b) and Rule 59(d), M.R.Civ.P. These rules clearly indicate that the Qourt shall rule and decide a motion for new trial or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict within fifteen days after the motion is submitted. The record discloses that the judgment was entered on the jury verdict on May 4, 1972. The motions were filed on May 10, 1972, noticed for hearing on May 15, 1972. On May 10 the hear- ing was continued and set for May 30. On that day the hearing was had, t h e motions were argued and t h e court granted t o June 1 9 , 1972, t o submit b r i e f s . P l a i n t i f f s 1 b r i e f was not f i l e d u n t i l July 1 0 , 1972, and on t h a t same day t h e court granted a new t r i a l . P l a i n t i f f s contend t h a t due t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e judge of t h e d i s t r i c t court from whose order granting a new t r i a l t h i s appeal was taken, made a c e r t i f i c a t e on October 1 2 , 1972, f i l e d i n t h i s Court on October 20, 1972, t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t some t i m e subsequent t o May 30, 1972, and before June 19, 1972, on telephonic request of Robert M. Holter, attorney f o r p l a i n t i f f s , who s t a t e d t h a t he wished t o append t o h i s b r i e f a portion of the t r a n s c r i p t of Harringtonls testimony and who c e r t i f i e d f u r t h e r t h e t r a n s c r i p t was not a v a i l a b l e because t h e c o u r t report- er was hospitalized and would not r e t u r n t o work u n t i l J u l y 5, 1972. Accordingly, t h e c o u r t o r a l l y extended t i m e f o r f i l i n g of such b r i e f and t i m e f o r submission u n t i l t e n days a f t e r r e - t u r n of t h e c o u r t r e p o r t e r . N o n o t i c e of t h i s telephonic exten- s i o n was given t o defendant u n t i l s e r v i c e of copy of t h e c o u r t ' s c e r t i f i c a t e on October 19, 1972, being t h e day before it was f i l e d i n t h i s Court with t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' b r i e f . Rule 5 9 ( d ) , M.R.Civ.P., provides t h a t t h e hearing s h a l l be had within t e n days a f t e r t h e motion has been served, except t h a t t h e c o u r t may continue t h e hearing f o r not t o exceed t h i r t y days. I n case it is continued it s h a l l be t h e duty of t h e c o u r t t o hear t h e same a t t h e e a r l i e s t p r a c t i c a b l e d a t e t h e r e a f t e r , and t h e court s h a l l r u l e upon and decide t h e motion within £ i f - teen days a f t e r it is submitted. I f t h e c o u r t f a i l s t o r u l e upon t h e motion within t h a t t i m e t h e motion s h a l l be deemed denied. The Advisory Committee's note t o t h i s s e c t i o n r e f e r s t o t h e confusion by reason of ambiguous language i n t h e previous s t a t u t e , t h e necessity of researching t h e case decisions under the statute spelling out the jurisdictional time limits, the effect thereof, and that it was felt that by incorporating the practice under this rule that it would be easier for the practitioner to comply. We believe the purpose of the rule should be adhered to and while we do not wish to be technical, at the same time we cannot permit deviations. In this case the court did, by the order of May 10, 1972, continue the hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for new trial which had been noticed by counsel for plaintiffs to be heard on May 15, 1972, to the date of May 30, 1972, at 10:OO a.m., as appears from the minutes of the court. As shown by the court minutes of May 30, 1972, the motion for new trial came on regularly to be heard that day, the motion was made, resisted by counsel for defendant and fully argued. This hearing was had some twenty days after the motion for new trial was filed on May 10, 1972. Further, on May 30, 1972, the trial court made an order that briefs were to be submitted Monday, June 19, 1972, at which time the minutes show as follows: "The matter will then be deemed submitted to the Court and by the Court taken under ad- visement." The time to which the court continued the matter for sub- mission of briefs was beyond the time permitted by Rule 59(d), M.R.Civ.P. The court had already continued the matter for fif- teen days by the time the hearing was had on May 30, 1972, that fifteen days being the time beyond the date specified in the notice of motion, and twenty days further until June 19, 1972, would constitute continuance of thirty-five days. The language of the last paragraph of Rule 59(d), M.R.Civ.P. is interesting in this connection and is as follows: "If the motion is not noticed up for hearing and no hearing is held thereon, it shall be deemed denied as of the expiration of the period of time within which hearing is required to be held under this Rule 59." The record of the district court contains no indication anywhere as to when the telephone conversation mentioned in the certificate of the judge occurred. No notice was given to counsel for defendant of any such extension of time. No show- ing of any filing of any portion of the transcript mentioned in the certificate of the judge has been made and the brief as filed by plaintiffs was completely outside the time permitted for the determination of the motion and contains no reference to any transcript of any evidence that was introduced in the trial of this action. The certificate of the district judge filed with the plaintiffs' brief indicates the judge extended the time for sub- mission of the cause to an indefinite time, i.e., ten days after return of the court reporter. According to the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure, no judge may disregard the requirements as set forth in Rule 59. In view of our holding on the first issue there is no necessity to discuss the second issue presented. The district court being in error in granting plaintiffs1 judgment enter Chief Justice We concur: As ociate ~ ~ ~ t i c & / !