Title: Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Center Authority v. Hoadley

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

414 So. 2d 895 (1982)
BIRMINGHAM-JEFFERSON CIVIC CENTER AUTHORITY
v.
J. N. HOADLEY, as Director of Department of Revenue of Jefferson County, Alabama, et al.
80-697.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
March 19, 1982.
Rehearing Denied May 21, 1982.
*896 John S. Foster of Foster & Conwell and Lawrence Dumas, Jr., William A. Robinson, and Lee E. Bains, Jr. of Cabaniss, Johnston, Gardner, Dumas & O'Neal, Birmingham, for appellant.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Ronald C. Forehand, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees.
Edwin A. Strickland, Birmingham, for amici curiae Tom Gloor, Chriss Doss, and Ben Erdreich, as Commissioners of Jefferson County, Alabama.
James K. Baker, City Atty., Birmingham, for amicus curiae City of Birmingham.
BEATTY, Justice.
This is an appeal from an order issued in a declaratory judgment action which challenged the constitutionality of Act 80-383, 1980 Ala. Acts, Regular Session, at 519-42.[1] That local Act established the Birmingham-Jefferson County Civic Center Authority and purported to bring together in one act all prior laws relating to that particular civic center.
A number of constitutional challenges were made below, including the charge that Section 106 of the Constitution of 1901 was offended because of a variance between Section 4 of the published local law and Section 4 of the enacted local law. The action was submitted to the trial court on the pleadings, a stipulation of the parties, and an affidavit of the custodian of minutes of the Authority's board of directors. That court entered an order declaring, inter alia, that the Act was not unconstitutional on any of the several grounds asserted by the plaintiff. Following the denial of post-judgment motions, this appeal ensued.
We have concluded that the court below was in error in its application of Section 106 to these facts, and upon that basis alone the judgment must be reversed.
Alabama Constitution of 1901, Section 106, as amended by Amendment No. 341, provides:
Whether the "substance" of the proposed law was published, or whether there was a material variance in the terms of the advertised version and the enacted version, is the question before us. That question centers upon the method of selection of the non-ex officio members of the Authority's Board of Directors.[2]
The parties have stipulated to the version of Section 4 which was advertised, and we have examined the relevant portions of Section 4 which were enacted. Each version is reproduced in columnar form for comparison:
A comparison of these two versions reveals that both provide that the "Legislative Electoral College" consists of:
In the advertised version, the entire "Legislative Electoral College" was to vote "jointly." That requirement was not contained *899 in the enacted version; instead, the Senate and House delegations were separated: each separate delegation was to vote "jointly," but the Senate delegation was to appoint five of the Board members while the House delegation was to appoint only four of the Board members. In other words, although the published bill required that Board members would be elected by the entire Legislative Electoral College, the enacted bill provided that each legislative delegation would act separately, and that the Senate delegation elected one more member than the House delegation. Majority support from both delegations together for each director was changed to majority support from each delegation separately, with one delegation appointing fewer members than the other.
As the trial court aptly noted, the entire Act contains twelve sections, consists of over twenty pages of the volume of 1980 Legislative Acts, and pertains to a variety of subjects. We respectfully disagree with the conclusions of that court, however, that such changes as these, in the total context of the Act, do not constitute material changes.
The Constitutional framers adopted the notice requirements of Section 106 intending that "the essential or material part, the essence, the meaning or an abstract or compendium of the law, was to be given, and not its mere purpose or subject." Wallace v. Board of Revenue, 140 Ala. 491, 37 So. 321 (1904). Out of the many decisions which have considered that section, four well-defined canons of construction have evolved: (1) the "substance" means an intelligible abstract or synopsis of its material and substantial elements; (2) the substance may be sufficiently stated without stating the details subsidiary to the stated elements; (3) the Legislature may shape the details of proposed local legislation by amending bills when presented for consideration and passage; and (4) the substance of the proposed act as advertised cannot be materially changed or contradicted. State ex rel. Wilkinson v. Allen, 219 Ala. 590, 123 So. 36 (1929). It appears to us that the third and fourth of these canons are in issue here.
We do not doubt that the manner of selection of the governing body of the Authority was a material element of its composition. Was the change in their method of selection a "detail" which the Legislature could alter before ultimate passage? Wilkinson, 219 Ala. at 592, 123 So. 36, answers that question in the negative:
The earlier quoted portions of Section 4 as advertised disclose the details of the selection process of the Authority's directors. Those details included selection by the entire Legislative Electoral College which would choose all nine non-ex officio directors. It follows that the Legislature was not thereafter free to change those details in any material way. But a change in the very authority by whom those directorships are to be filled, and a change in the number which are to be filled by an altered selection authority, are not immaterial changes, for they go to the very essence of the selection process itself.
In similar cases the method of selection has been held to be a matter of substance. See, for example, Opinion of the Justices No. 67, 246 Ala. 518, 21 So. 2d 238 (1945); Parrish v. Faulk, 293 Ala. 401, 304 So. 2d 194 *900 (1974). The latter case contains an extensive discussion of the principles discussed herein and their application. We paraphrase from that case: The filling of directorships in the Authority is important, and the authority designated to fill those offices is a matter of substance and not merely a detail which can be changed from the authority designated in the published notice to a different authority not designated in the published notice. Accordingly, our duty compels us to hold that Act No. 80-383 was not enacted in compliance with Section 106 of the Constitution as amended. And because of this holding, it is unnecessary to address the appellant's other allegations of constitutional infirmity.
The judgment must be, and is, reversed and remanded.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
TORBERT, C. J., and FAULKNER, JONES, ALMON, SHORES, EMBRY and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
MADDOX, J., dissents.
MADDOX, Justice (dissenting).
The local circuit judge, after reviewing the evidence submitted on this action for declaratory judgment, found that "[i]n the total context of the act, the change of provisions relating to the persons designated by the law to appoint the Civic Center Board of Directors is not in the judgment of the Court a material change." I agree with that judgment of the trial court, and I think respectfully that this Court has failed to distinguish between the "substance" of Act 383 and what is a "material" change of a "detail."
I also think that this Court's decision will necessarily be construed to hold that if local legislation is advertised at length, it cannot be amended, and if it is amended, even as to "details," then it will be subject to constitutional attack.
The majority relies very heavily upon this Court's case of State ex rel. Wilkinson v. Allen, 219 Ala. 590, 593, 123 So. 36 (1929), where the Court did opine:
The Allen court cited no prior decision of this Court for the proposition that a "detail," as opposed to the "substance" of local legislation, could not be "materially changed," but even assuming the correctness of the statement of the principle set out in State v. Allen, supra, the inquiry nevertheless is whether there was a "material" change in a "detail."
Because of my concern about the impact of the quoted statement in State v. Allen, supra, and in view of the fact that the validity of local legislation and "home rule" is of such concern to the people of this state, I examined, in some detail, the proceedings of the 1901 Constitutional Convention and the early decisions of this Court which construe Section 106, and I am convinced that the Court, in State v. Allen, supra, by judicial decree gratuitously added the word "detail" to Section 106 of the Constitution. I do not have to overrule State v. Allen, however, in order to affirm the trial judge in this case; I only have to distinguish it. In State v. Allen, supra, the change of several "details" was held to be a material change. The one change of "detail" here was unimportant, and not misleading.
Since I have questioned the principle of law the majority relies upon so heavily, I first will state the reason for my disagreement with the principle, and then I will state why I think the facts of State v. Allen, supra, are so dissimilar that it is not controlling in this case.
Section 106 requires that the persons affected be notified of the "substance" of local legislation; it does not require that local legislation which is amended in the legislative process, especially with regard to matters of "detail," should be declared unconstitutional.
This Court has correctly stated on more than one occasion that Section 106 requires publication of a local act prior to its consideration by the legislature in order to give persons affected notice "of the substance of the proposed law, of its characteristics and essential provisions, and of its most important features." Wilkins v. Woolf, 281 Ala. 693, 208 So. 2d 74 (1968). (Emphasis supplied.)
Shortly after the Constitution of 1901 was ratified, this Court had an opportunity to discuss the purpose of Section 106 in Wallace v. Board of Revenue of Jefferson County, 140 Ala. 491, 500, 501, 502, 37 So. 321 (1903). The Court, after declaring the act in question to be a local act, stated:
The Court then established two principles, (1) publication of the title to a proposed act may not suffice to give persons affected notice of the "substance of the proposed law," and (2) the courts were empowered to decide the adequacy of the notice.
In Byrd v. State ex rel. Colquett, 212 Ala. 266, 268, 102 So. 223 (1924), this Court again discussed the purpose of Section 106. The Court stated:
In Byrd, this Court enjoined reviewing courts to apply the principle of seeking to "sustain" rather than "strike down" enactments.
Five years after this Court decided Byrd v. State, it released the opinion in State v. Allen, which the majority considers controlling. In State v. Allen, the Court correctly stated the general principles of law, and cited prior precedents to support those principles, as follows:
*903 "Section 106 of the Constitution has been considered many times by our courts, and four well-defined canons of construction have been firmly settled. They are as follows: `(1) That the "substance" of the proposed law means, not merely the subject of it, but an intelligible abstract or synopsis of its material and substantial elements (Wallace v. Board of Revenue, supra [140 Ala. 491, 37 So. 321]; Law v. State, supra [142 Ala. 62, 38 So. 798]); (2) the substance of the act may be sufficiently stated without stating the details which are subsidiary to the stated elements (City of Uniontown v. State ex rel. Glass, 145 Ala. 471, 39 So. 814, 8 Ann. Cas. 320; Law v. State, supra; Mayor, etc., of Ensley v. Cohn, supra [149 Ala. 316, 42 So. 827]); and (3) the Legislature is not inhibited from shaping up and working out the details of local legislation by amending bills when presented for consideration and passage.' (4) `The substance' of the proposed act, `as advertised cannot * * * be materially changed or contradicted.' First National Bank v. Smith, 217 Ala. 482, 117 So. 38; State ex rel. Hanna v. Tunstall, 145 Ala. 477, 482, 40 So. 135.
"We are concerned here with the third and fourth canons of construction stated above, and their application to the facts of this case. We are confronted with the following questions, therefore: What features of the act constitute its substance within the meaning of section 106, and whether there has been a material change in any portion thereof from the publication.
"The `substance' is said to be the essential and material parts and essence of said proposed law, or an abstract or compendium thereof, such as would give the people affected fair information of what the law is. Christian v. State, 171 Ala. 52, 54 So. 1001; Wallace v. Jefferson County Board of Revenue, 140 Ala. 491, 37 So. 321. It is only such departure from the `substance' as published which is material that will nullify the act."
219 Ala. at 591-592, 123 So. 36.
In State v. Allen, the Court even follows the principle that while the requirements of Sections 45 and 106 are not the same, the objects are. The Court opined:
State ex rel. Wilkinson v. Allen, 219 Ala. 590, 592, 123 So. 36 (1929).
After making this statement, the Court then states the principle that the majority relies on so strongly:
The Court cites no precedent for the proposition that "details of substantive features" cannot be "materially changed," but, of course, the Court did not have to cite any authority. I would point out, however, that the Court in the next paragraph of the opinion makes reference to "substantive features," not to "details of substantive features." *904 I shall discuss this in more detail later in this dissenting opinion.
It is quite apparent that I question the correctness of the Allen rule regarding the requirements of Section 106. The reason I do so is simple. After reading the Constitutional debates and the early cases, I think the Allen Court correctly stated the rule in the first part of its opinion when it stated the "substance" of the bill could not be changed, but stated a different rule in the latter portion of the opinion when it stated that the "details" could not be changed. Nevertheless, even assuming Allen correctly states the rule, I am of the opinion that Allen is distinguishable. The Court there said:
219 Ala. at 593, 123 So. 36.
The Court, in this case, in applying the Allen rule that the "details may not be materially changed," reverts to what I consider to be the correct rulethat the "substantive features" cannot be materially changed. In doing this, it seems clear to me that the Allen Court, either wittingly or unwittingly, used "substantive features" and "details of substantive features" interchangeably.
To apply the rule of Allen literally, as has the majority, I believe puts a legislator in a "Catch 22" situation. If he or she does not publish enough of the act to constitute its "substance," it is insufficient. If he or she publishes the proposed bill at length, then any detail of substantive features cannot be deleted or changed, even if those deletions or changes in details are the result of public opposition to some of the "details of substantive features." I just cannot believe that the deliberative process of the legislature can be that restrictive, although I recognize that the Constitution does definitely seek to restrict local legislation. On the contrary, however, I am not unmindful that the concept of "home rule" is much more prevalent today in Alabama, and after this Court's decision in Peddycoart v. City of Birmingham, 354 So. 2d 808 (Ala.1978), the people have specifically, by Constitutional Amendment, empowered the legislature to adopt local legislation in specified areas, has ratified local legislation previously passed, and has provided a vehicle for amendment of prior acts which were designated General Bills of Local Application. See, Amendment 389, Amendment 375, for example.
While the "notice" requirement of Section 106, as amended, has been retained in these amendments relating to local legislation (See Amendment 375), I believe that this Court should not apply literally the Allen rule in view of these latest developments of constitutional law by the people.
The Allen case, even if authority for the holding here, is distinguishable on its facts. The Allen Court looked at all the provisions of the proposed act it was considering and concluded that the act was invalid. The Court noted the changes made in the act, as follows:
The trial judge in this instance stated in his opinion that he considered the proposed bill as a whole, and after applying all the law, which I assume included the rule of the Allen case, concluded that the changes were not material. After a similar review of the act as published and as enacted, I come to the same conclusion. Former Governor O'Neal and the Justices of this Court, even in Allen, were concerned whether the public might be misled. I cannot believe that the published bill, which provided for the election of members of the board of the Civic Center Authority by the Jefferson County legislative delegation as a whole "voting jointly," was misleading because the enacted version provides that the senate delegation would appoint five and the house delegation would appoint four. In fact, a liberal construction of "voting jointly" would uphold the act, because the same delegation does "vote jointly" in the enacted version.[1] If we construed the words "voting jointly" liberally, we would hold that the change did not change the fact that the legislative delegation still was "voting jointly." The manner of the "voting jointly" was changed, but the number of Board members to be elected and the persons voting remained the same. That was not true in Allen. In Allen, not only was the appointing authority changed, but several other changes were made. I read Allen, at most, to speak to the cumulative effect of so many changes in so many different areas of the proposed bill. Amicus curiae argues:
This argument ignores the statement made by this Court in Calhoun County v. Morgan, 258 Ala. 352, 62 So. 2d 457 (1952):
It must be remembered that the Jefferson County delegation, because of its size, necessarily may not be able to shape up and work out details of local legislation as is true of counties with a single representative and a shared senator. The citizens of Jefferson County must know that compromises sometimes must be made to accommodate the varying interests in "local legislation" affecting Jefferson County. Does this decision mean that the Jefferson County delegation, and other large local delegations, must work out their differences before they advertise their bills? Apparently so. Then what need is there of legislative debate, and what about the concerns of the whole legislature of Alabama, which must vote on local legislation? Is the legislature so strapped that it cannot amend a detail of legislation which a majority of the public it represents might desire? Apparently so. I recognize the concept of "local courtesy." It was mentioned in the constitutional debates, but since the whole legislature voted on the amendments which are now declared illegal, I must assume that the legislature knew what was published and knew that a change had been made. In any event, I cannot presume that the legislature was consciously trying to mislead the people of Jefferson County by making the changes it did. The evils of local legislation which concerned the Constitutional Convention are not even hinted at in this record.
The Attorney General, in brief, asked some of the same questions I asked:
In summary, my study of the debates on Section 106 in the Constitutional Convention convinces me that the majority, ostensibly following precedent, has failed to carry out the intent of the framers of the Constitution. The majority takes one detail from one paragraph in a bill which covers 20 pages of the volume of 1980 legislative acts and applies a "narrow and literal construction" to Section 106. In McGehee v. *907 State, ex rel. Tate, 199 Ala. 287, 290, 74 So. 374 (1916), the Court opined:
The effect of the decision insofar as this case is concerned can be easily remedied during the current session by advertising the act just like it passed originally, but it will take a long time to undo the legal principle that publication of a "detail" automatically makes that "detail" a matter of "substance."
The press of time does not permit me to set out in minute detail all the illustrations from our cases which support my view that the change here was not one of "substance," but I refer the reader to Skinner's Alabama Constitution Annotated, pp. 518-534, where these cases are annotated.
I am painfully aware that I stand alone in this matter, but I believe the effect of this opinion will unduly affect the public's right, after having been notified of pending local legislation, to seek amendments to that legislation. I was always under the impression that the whole purpose of a "notice" requirement was to give the public an opportunity to lobby for or against the proposed legislation. Since I think the Court frustrates this principle, I must respectfully dissent.
[1]  The action also sought to have the trial court construe the plaintiff's entitlement to the proceeds of certain sales and use taxes levied and allocated by the provisions of Act No. 405 of the 1967 Regular Session. As will be shown, it is unnecessary to address that aspect of the decision below.
[2]  Both the advertised version and the enacted version constitute as members of the Board of Directors the mayor of Birmingham and the Chairman of the governing body of the county.
[1]  The actual language of the enacted version is "jointly appoint."