Title: Johnston, Administratrix v. Ecord

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

196 Kan. 521 (1966)
412 P.2d 990
HELEN V. JOHNSTON, Administratrix of the Estate of Harold L. Johnston, Deceased, Appellee,
v.
ELWOOD M. ECORD, Appellant.
No. 44,395

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 9, 1966.
*522 Gerald Sawatzky, of Wichita, argued the cause, and George B. Powers, Carl T. Smith, John F. Eberhardt, Stuart R. Carter, Robert C. Foulston, Malcolm Miller, Robert N. Partridge, Robert M. Siefkin, Richard C. Harris, Donald L. Cordes, Robert L. Howard, Charles J. Woodin, Mikel L. Stout, Ronald K. Badger, Benjamin C. Langel, and Phillip S. Frick, all of Wichita, were with him on the brief for the appellant.
Gerald L. Michaud, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Russell Cranmer, Orval L. Fisher, and M. William Syrios, all of Wichita, were with him on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARMAN, C.:
This is a negligence action in two counts brought by an administratrix. The first cause of action is for personal injury to plaintiff's decedent prior to death and for automobile damage, and the second is for wrongful death, both allegedly caused by negligence of defendant in a rear-end auto collision. The jury assessed damages for plaintiff on both causes after a directed verdict on the liability phase of the case and defendant appeals.
Consideration of the liability feature requires a review of the evidence thereon. The decedent and defendant were the drivers of automobiles involved in a collision which occurred on a Saturday afternoon, August 19, 1961, on U.S. highway 54 in Wichita. Decedent died October 7, 1961. There were two witnesses on the issue of liability; an investigating police officer and defendant. West Kellogg avenue is a four lane divided highway with a medial strip of grass twenty-four feet wide between the eastbound and westbound lanes. The minimum speed limit is thirty-five and the maximum fifty miles per hour. Near the 1200 block on the north or westbound lanes on a downhill grade there is an exit for traffic for Seneca street, the exit being west of the crest of an overpass bridge for Seneca street. Further west there is an approach to Kellogg avenue from Seneca street, as reflected in photographs of the scene. Kellogg contains additional lanes for the use of exiting and entering traffic. According to the investigating officer the collision took place in the south or left westbound lane between the Seneca exit and the approach, the point of impact being fifty-four feet east of the east edge of the approach from Seneca street. Defendant's vehicle laid down sixty-one feet of skidmarks prior to impact and another twenty-three feet of skidmarks after impact. The officer testified there were no skidmarks he could relate to decedent's vehicle. He discussed the collision with both drivers, both signed written reports, and the officer further testified:
"A. The driver of the No. 1 vehicle 
"Q. That was who now?
"A. That was the  Mr. Johnston.
"Q. All right.
..............
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. It hadn't yet got out on the road, had it?
"A. That I couldn't say."
Under the heading "DESCRIBE ACCIDENT IN DETAIL" in the signed written accident report by defendant it was stated (as nearly as can be made out from a somewhat illegible copy):
In the space on the report headed "Distance Danger Noticed" a notation of fifty feet appears. Approximate speed of defendant's vehicle was indicated at forty to forty-five miles per hour.
On the report signed by decedent wherein the accident is described this appears:
The figures on decedent's report indicating approximate speed are marked over so that it is difficult to tell whether a figure of 10, 15, 20 or 25 was finally intended. This referred to speed at point of impact. Photographs of decedent's automobile showed the rear end thereof substantially damaged.
Defendant testified that he was driving west on Kellogg and further that:
..............
"Q. All right. Was there anybody in the car?
"Q. All right, sir. Then what did you do?
..............
"Q. What did you do, sir, please? What did you do?
"A. On the left-hand lane.
"Q. All right. Then what happened?
"Q. All right, sir. What did you do?
"A. Well, knowing that this car was 
"A. I decided that neither lane 
..............
"Q. All right.
..............
"Q. All right.
"MR. MICHAUD: Objection, Your Honor.
"THE COURT: Sustained as to that.
"Q. All right. Then what happened?
Defendant further testified that after one crested the overpass the vision was clear ahead and he was looking ahead, driving in the vicinity of forty-five miles per hour. He was traveling somewhere around two hundred feet from the woman's car. When he saw the brake lights of the woman's car he felt he couldn't stop and he decided to use the passing lane. He had no intentions of hitting the woman and two children in the automobile which had apparently stopped. Decedent was proceeding west on the inside traffic lane at a distance which he did not consider a hazard but which he would estimate as probably two hundred feet. He had checked that traffic lane, he looked in his rear view mirror and there was no car within a reasonable distance for pulling into the passing lane. Defendant applied his brakes twice. He was angling between the two traffic lanes when he saw the brake lights of decedent's car; as he crossed the center line he was braking his car. Decedent's car was then traveling noticeably slower but he could not say whether it was stopped or not. The woman and decedent did not slow simultaneously. Defendant then drove to the left to get over into the center grass strip but his wheels wouldn't go over the curb and he again applied his brakes and skidded into the rear of decedent's *526 car. Defendant did not see anything in front of decedent's car which would indicate why it was either slowed or stopped on the highway; he saw no dog and did not see the woman and the two children again. Defendant was questioned as to another written statement he had signed after the collision wherein he had stated decedent's car was about fifty feet west of where he was crossing the center of the lanes. He testified this was the first time he had noticed this car as a hazard, either stopped or slowed down. He further testified as follows:
"A. That's correct.
"A. Yes, to clear the passing lane.
"Q. And you saw there was nobody at all behind you?
"A. Yes.
"A. No.
"A. That's right.
"A. First time it was called to my attention.
"Q. And at that very time his brake lights were on?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And he was fifty feet away?
"A. This was a guess, as all distances.
"Q. That was your estimate at that time?
"A. That was my estimate."
The written statement referred to above contained this item:
There was other evidence pro and con as to decedent's injury and death, but on this state of the case each of the parties moved for a directed verdict upon the issue of liability. Defendant's motion was denied. Plaintiff's motion was sustained in part, the court's ruling thereon being most clearly embodied in its instruction No. 2 to the jury, as follows:
Thus the court ruled as a matter of law not only that defendant was guilty of negligence which was a proximate cause of the collision but also that plaintiff's decedent was not guilty of contributory negligence, which defense had been asserted by defendant. We will consider rulings on these issues first. Without attempting any extended analysis of the evidence, which we have noted in detail, we are of opinion it was such as to require submission of these issues to the jury. It is only when different minds can reasonably arrive at but one result that fact issues become questions of law justifying a court in substituting its judgment for the jury. As stated in Krentz v. Haney, 187 Kan. 428, 357 P.2d 793:
In Casement v. Gearhart, 189 Kan. 442, 370 P.2d 95, it was held:
On the question of contributory negligence, statutory duties aside, we think it was for the jury to determine whether under all the circumstances decedent was negligent and, if so, whether such negligence *528 contributed to the collision. Negligence is the lack of ordinary care. It is the failure of a person to do something that a reasonably careful person would do, or the act of a person in doing something that a reasonably careful person would not do, measured by all the circumstances then existing (see PIK, No. 3.01, p. 70). Thus we see the standard is the conduct of the reasonably careful person under the circumstances. The policy of the law has relegated the determination of this to the jury, to note the special circumstances of each particular case and then say whether the conduct is such as would be expected of a reasonably careful person under a similar state of affairs. Only when the facts are such that reasonable men must draw the same conclusion from them does the question of negligence become one of law for the court.
Evidence as to the actions of the decedent and the reasons therefor just prior to the collision is unfortunately meager. We know he stated he slowed or stopped because of a dog. We are inclined to the view that the mere presence of a dog upon a through highway is not sufficient as a matter of law to relieve a motorist of all liability for consequences of whatever evasive action he may take in behalf of the dog, but rather that this presents a question of fact for a jury to determine.
In Kuether v. Locke, 261 Minn. 41, 110 N.W.2d 539, the plaintiff made a sudden stop when a dog ran into the street in front of her, and her automobile was thereupon struck from behind by defendant's auto. Plaintiff asserted that the jury should have been instructed she was free from negligence as a matter of law and that defendant was negligent as a matter of law. The court had this to say:
..............
..............
See, also, Edwards v. Houston Transit Company, 342 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Civ. App.), wherein it was held that the evidence presented a jury question as to whether a motorist, who had made a sudden stop because of a dog running in the street, and was struck in the rear by defendant's following bus, was guilty of contributory negligence as to stopping suddenly.
Moreover, on this question of contributory negligence we think it was jury work to determine whether there was any violation by *530 decedent of the duty imposed by K.S.A. 8-547 (c) which provides:
K.S.A. 8-549 provides that stop or decrease of speed signals given by hand and arm shall be by hand and arm extended downward, and further that stop signal lamps on the rear may be used in lieu of hand and arm signals, and that either may be used to indicate a stop or turn. It is definitely established that decedent had brake lights working on his car indicating the application of brakes. Plaintiff argues as a matter of law this was sufficient compliance with the statute 8-547 (c). Defendant claims he did not have adequate warning of decedent's sudden decrease in speed in order to prevent what occurred. It must be noted 8-547 (c) requires the giving of an appropriate signal when there is opportunity to give such signal.
Several of the states have statutes identical or virtually so to ours which have been construed. Minnesota is one.
In Keuther v. Locke, supra, the court stated:
..............
In Ryan v. Griffin, 241 Minn. 91, 62 N.W.2d 504, the court said this with respect to rear-end collisions:
*531 In United States v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, 208 F. 424 (10th Cir., Utah), 42, A.L.R.2d 951, 959, the court, in construing identical Utah statutes respecting brake lights as a signal to stop, said:
In White v. Rohrer, (Sup. Ct., Mo.) 267 S.W.2d 31, the court noted that the electric signal functions only on application of the brakes and in construing a statute similar to our own stated:
And in Johnson v. Hill, 274 F.2d 110 (8th Cir., N.D.) the court construed a North Dakota statute identical to our own holding that where a leading driver suddenly applied his brakes and there was a collision with the car behind, the failure of the first driver to signal until he depressed the brake pedal furnished an adequate basis for a finding that the flashing of the brake light was not an appropriate signal under the circumstances. We hold then that it was a jury question to determine whether an appropriate signal was given under the circumstances. In so doing we have not overlooked certain language in Curtiss v. Fahle, 157 Kan. 226, 139 P.2d 827, indicating that the statute does not require two signals of intention to stop. The holding in that case was that one who has actual notice of decrease in speed as a specified distance has the same notice that a signal would have given him, and is not controlling here.
Turning to the question of whether the court erred in holding as a matter of law that the defendant was guilty of negligence which was the proximate cause of the collision, much of what has already been said is pertinent and will indicate our belief that the evidence was such that minds of reasonable men could reach different conclusions on these questions.
*532 The case of Hill v. Hill, 168 Kan. 639, 215 P.2d 159, involved a rear-end collision wherein it was claimed the driver of the following car was guilty of negligence as a matter of law. This court in rejecting that contention said:
In Lechleitner v. Cummings, 160 Kan. 453, 163 P.2d 423, in which defendant collided with the rear of plaintiff's car which had suddenly slowed to ten miles per hour, this court said: "Whether either was guilty of negligence was a fair question for the jury." (p. 456.)
In short, this case presents a rather unusual factual situation wherein there was evidence of two sudden stops upon a through highway, and we believe the jury should be permitted to analyze the evidence and determine the issues of negligence on the part of both decedent and defendant and the issue of proximate cause of the collision.
Defendant further contends his motion for directed verdict insofar as liability for wrongful death (plaintiff's second cause of action) should have been sustained. The trial court did submit the question of causal connection between the collision and the death to the jury for its determination. Defendant concedes a question of fact for the jury existed as to whether decedent suffered any injury in the collision, but he claims there was no evidence upon which a finding of death caused by the collision could have been made. Decedent died from cerebral hemorrhage seven weeks after the collision. For a number of years he had suffered from severe hypertension, obesity and early congestive heart failure and had been treated therefor. Immediately after the collision decedent indicated he was not hurt but he was sleepless that night with pain and nervousness. He consulted his family doctor the second day and was hospitalized and referred to an orthopedic surgeon. We shall not go into the medical evidence at length, although there was considerable. Suffice it to say there was positive medical opinion from his family doctor that there was a causal connection between the death and the collision in that the collision aggravated the hypertension which resulted in the cerebral hemorrhage. There *533 was also positive medical opinion from a specialist in internal medicine, testifying hypothetically, to the same effect. The latter further opined in a written statement:
The fact there was evidence as to other possibilities which might have caused death does not mitigate from the essential character of this evidence. We think the evidence presented a jury question and conclude the trial court committed no error in denying defendant's motion for directed verdict as to plaintiff's second cause of action.
Defendant raises other contentions of error. Some relate to requested instructions inherently foreclosed in the direction of verdict for plaintiff by the trial court and need not be further discussed. Some we need not reach as the court is of opinion a new trial should be granted as to all issues including damages. The others we have considered but find no error.
One further matter needs to be noticed. We are confronted with a record on appeal in this case of 383 pages. Virtually all of the testimony of witnesses is in verbatim question and answer form, accounting for most of the record, and is placed in the record by defendant. Rule No. 6 (c) of this court provides in part:
No motion for advancement of costs was presented to the trial court but plaintiff brings the matter to our attention. Obviously this was a lengthy trial, and the court appreciates the difficult task of counsel in deciding how the testimony of witnesses may be presented most effectively to an appellate court, and the natural apprehension lest too little be included. The court realizes that great latitude must necessarily be left with the advocate in determining when verbal accuracy is required, and that there are instances wherein it is essential that questions and answers be reproduced in order to understand and assess properly such testimony. However, everything considered in the instant case, the court feels there is a substantial breach of the aforesaid rule in the inclusion at great length of unnecessary verbatim testimony which could have been omitted or condensed in narrative form, such inclusion not being essential to the determination of any question in controversy. Accordingly, *534 pursuant to Rule Nos. 3 and 6 (e), the costs of the record on appeal will be assessed two-thirds to the defendant and one-third to the plaintiff, balance of costs of appeal to be assessed against plaintiff.
The judgment and the order denying motion for new trial are reversed with directions to grant a new trial generally on all issues in accordance with the views herein expressed.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.