Title: The People v. Jonathan Mattocks

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 59  
The People &c., 
            Respondent, 
        v. 
Jonathan Mattocks, 
            Appellant.
Brian P. McCloskey, for appellant.
Gina Mignola, for respondent.
GRAFFEO, J.:
In this case, we are asked whether the forgery
provisions of Penal Law article 170 apply to Metropolitan Transit
Authority "MetroCards" that were purposefully bent in order to
obtain free fares.  We hold that this type of alteration can be
prosecuted as a forgery.
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I
The Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) is responsible
for operating the mass transit system in the New York City area. 
In years past, a person gained access to the subways by
purchasing a token and depositing it into a turnstile.  This
mechanical means of entry was eventually replaced with a
computerized system that uses a "MetroCard" -- a plastic swipe
card that is "read" by a scanner, embedded within a turnstile,
that deducts the cost of the fare from the MetroCard.
There are two types of MetroCards:  value-based
MetroCards (referred to as "pay-per-ride" cards) and time-based
MetroCards (referred to as "unlimited" cards).  A purchaser of a
time-based card is provided unlimited transportation access for a
specified period of time (one day, one week or one month
depending on the purchase price).  The purchaser of a value card
electronically stores a certain amount of money on the MetroCard
that will be debited each time the user enters the MTA system. 
Only value cards are at issue in this appeal.
A MetroCard has two distinct magnetic fields that
contain information, referred to as the primary and secondary
fields.  The MTA opted to use two fields so that the information
encoded onto the card has "backup" storage in the event that a
magnetic field is damaged.  Based on the testimony of an MTA
expert in this case, when a value-based MetroCard is swiped
through the electronic eye of a turnstile, a computer reads both
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magnetic fields.  If the MetroCard has monetary value remaining,
the turnstile grants access and deducts the cost of the ride from
the value of the card, amending the information stored on the
magnetic strip to reflect the reduction in value.  Thus, the
expert explained, if a MetroCard is bought for $4 in value, that
amount is initially encoded onto both the primary and secondary
fields.  When the card is first used for a $2 fare, the computer
will deduct $2 from one of the fields, leaving the other field at
$4.  The next time the MetroCard is swiped for entry, the
computer does not change the $2 field but instead reduces the $4
field to zero.  Once one of the fields reads zero, the turnstile
is not supposed to open.  By utilizing this design methodology,
which electronically leaves $2 of value on one of the magnetic
fields even though the purchased value has been depleted to zero,
the MTA intended to give riders "the benefit of the doubt" in the
event that the magnetic strip was damaged.  Thus, if the computer
eye in the turnstile cannot determine the true remaining purchase
value but can read the $2 backup field, one ride can be obtained.
Individuals seeking free rides on the subway soon
learned how to take advantage of the system's design.  By
creating a small bend or crease on the section of the magnetic
strip where the zero-value field is contained, a person can
obliterate that information so that, when swiped, the computer is
unable to detect that the MetroCard is worthless, meaning no
purchase value remains.  When there is a strategically-placed
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crease or bend on the card, the turnstile computer will read the
other field containing the $2 "backup" information, which gives
the user of the card a free entry to the subway.  Hence, a person
can bend a valueless MetroCard and swipe it once, then use or
sell the free ride at a discounted price by swiping it a second
time (this is referred to as "selling swipes").  The ease of this
type of alteration and its popularity among individuals who are
willing to defraud the MTA contributed to considerable losses of
revenue for the MTA -- it was estimated that as of 2005,
fraudulent MetroCard use was costing the MTA approximately $16
million per year, the equivalent of about 8 million ride fares.
II
One night in October 2005, an MTA employee working at
the 125th Street station of the Lexington Avenue subway line
reported that several individuals were selling MetroCard swipes. 
Two police officers responded and observed defendant bend
MetroCards and swipe them through turnstiles, after which he
solicited riders and gave them access to the subway using the
bent MetroCards in exchange for money.  When an officer
approached defendant, he attempted to flee but was quickly
apprehended with 14 MetroCards in his possession, all of which
had the tell-tale crease; 11 of the cards had zero value and
three of them had been successfully altered and would have each
yielded a free ride.  After he was in custody, defendant remarked
to the police that "you better watch your back.  I'm gonna serve
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three months.  When I come out, you better just shoot me in the
head, because I'm going to kill you."  The reference to three
months of incarceration appears to have stemmed from defendant's
numerous prior convictions for MTA-related offenses and his
apparent assumption that he would be facing charges under Penal
Law § 165.16 -- a class B misdemeanor -- for the unauthorized
sale of certain transportation services.
Instead of pursuing misdemeanor charges, the People
secured an indictment charging defendant with 14 counts of
criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree,
class D felony offenses.  Defendant moved to suppress the
MetroCards and cash that he had possessed at the time of the
arrest, along with his statement to the police.  Supreme Court
denied the motion.  During the ensuing jury trial, defendant
moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the evidence was
insufficient to prove that he committed possession of a forged
instrument, and Supreme Court reserved decision.
At the close of proof, the court submitted only one
count of second-degree possession of a forged instrument to the
jury.  The jury convicted defendant of that crime and Supreme
Court subsequently denied defendant's motion to dismiss. 
Defendant was adjudicated a second felony offender and sentenced
to 2 to 4 years of imprisonment.  The Appellate Division affirmed
(51 AD3d 301 [1st Dept 2008, Nardelli, J.]), a Judge of this
Court granted leave (11 NY3d 738 [2008]) and we now agree with
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the well-reasoned opinion of the Appellate Division.
III
Article 170 of the Penal Law defines the crime of
forgery and related offenses.  A person commits criminal
possession of a forged instrument in the second degree "when,
with knowledge that it is forged and with intent to defraud,
deceive or injure another, he utters or possesses any forged
instrument of a kind specified in section 170.10" (Penal Law    
§ 170.25).  Section 170.10 applies to a "written instrument" that
a person "falsely makes, completes or alters" and "which is or
purports to be, or which is calculated to become or to represent
if completed . . . [p]art of an issue of tokens, public
transportation transfers, certificates or other articles
manufactured and designed for use as symbols of value usable in
place of money for the purchase of . . . services" (Penal Law   
§ 170.10 [4]).  A "written instrument" under section 170.10
includes "any instrument or article, including computer data or a
computer program, containing written or printed matter or the
equivalent thereof, used for the purpose of reciting, embodying,
conveying or recording information, or constituting a symbol or
evidence of value, right, privilege or identification, which is
capable of being used to the advantage or disadvantage of some
person" (Penal Law § 170.00 [1]).  In this case, defendant
concedes, and we agree, that a MetroCard satisfies the statutory
definition of a "written instrument."
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Defendant maintains, however, that a bent MetroCard
does not qualify as a "forged" instrument because it is not
"falsely altered" (see Penal Law § 170.00 [7]).  An instrument is
falsely altered
"when, without the authority of anyone
entitled to grant it, he changes a written
instrument, whether it be in complete or
incomplete form, by means of erasure,
obliteration, deletion, insertion of new
matter, transposition of matter, or in any
other manner, so that such instrument in its
thus altered form appears or purports to be
in all respects an authentic creation of or
fully authorized by its ostensible maker or
drawer" (Penal Law § 170.00 [6]).
According to defendant, since the MTA does not sell MetroCards
with creases, no person who examines a bent MetroCard would
conclude that it was authentic, and it is therefore void on its
face and not subject to the forgery statutes.  Defendant also
argues that a bent MetroCard is not a forged instrument because
the damage does not create value on a worthless card, it merely
prevents the turnstile computer from determining that the card
has no value.
We reject these assertions.  While it is true, as
defendant submits, that the creasing of the MetroCards did not
add monetary value where none existed, the damage to the
MetroCards thwarted the usual computer processing of the
information contained on the magnetic strips.  By bending the
MetroCards, defendant successfully destroyed the zero-value
information encoded on one of the fields in the magnetic strips
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(see Penal Law § 170.00 [6]) and was able to acquire free rides
on what were worthless MetroCards.  Thus, defendant misused the
"benefit of the doubt" system by intentionally making the
valueless MetroCards purport to be authentic instruments.  Nor
did the small creases on the MetroCards make them appear to be
inauthentic -- in other words, not genuine MTA-issued MetroCards
-- to the human eye, they merely rendered the cards slightly
bent.  Notwithstanding this minimal physical blemish on the
cards, they "appear[ed] or purport[ed] to be in all respects an
authentic creation of or fully authorized by" the MTA as $2
MetroCards (Penal Law § 170.00 [6]) and were not void on their
face.  We therefore hold that the MetroCards defendant possessed
were forged instruments under article 170 of the Penal Law.
Defendant additionally claims that the Legislature, in
enacting Penal Law § 165.16 (a class B misdemeanor) to deal
specifically with illegal MetroCard activity, determined that
this type of conduct was not to be prosecuted under article 170. 
The statute was adopted in 2005 to address MetroCard abuses and
applies to the sale of certain transportation services provided
by the MTA through the use of an "unlimited farecard or doctored
farecard" (Penal Law § 165.16 [1]), which can include a bent
MetroCard similar to the ones defendant possessed (see Penal Law
§ 165.16 [3] [c]).  The Executive Memorandum described the
statute's purpose:
"Under current law, these illegal MetroCard
swipers can often only be charged with a non-
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No. 59
1 The executive proposal called for the creation of a class A
misdemeanor offense.  The Legislature amended that request by
making the new crime punishable as a class B misdemeanor.
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criminal violation, the penalty for which has
proved unsuccessful in deterring this type of
illegal activity.  Also, since current
violations do not appear on the perpetrators'
records, there is no easy way to keep track
of repeat offenders.  This bill would help
correct this situation by subjecting the
swipers to misdemeanor penalties of up to one
year in jail" (2005-2006 Exec Budget,
Transportation Art VII Legislation, Mem in
Support, A 1924 at 10-11).1
Although this statement indicates that a relevant provision
addressing this type of conduct appears in 21 NYCRR 1050.4 (a
noncriminal violation for the unlawful receipt of fare for
providing access to transit authority facilities), there was no
legislative direction to eliminate the applicability of forgery
statutes.  The primary governmental concern was that a violation
as the penalty was ineffective as a deterrent and hampered the
detection of repeat offenders.
Furthermore, we have recognized that the existence of
"a statutory prohibition against a particular type of conduct" --
such as Penal Law § 165.16 -- "will not be deemed to constitute
the exclusive vehicle for prosecuting that conduct unless the
Legislature clearly intended such a result" (People v Duffy, 79
NY2d 611, 614 [1992]; see People v Walsh, 67 NY2d 747, 749
[1986]; People v Bergerson, 17 NY2d 398, 401 [1966]).  This
intent cannot be imputed to the Legislature solely by virtue of
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2 Similar charging discretion is available in connection with
turnstile jumping, which can be prosecuted under various
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the enactment of section 165.16 because the Legislature is
presumed to be aware of existing law when it creates a new crime
(see e.g. People v Robinson, 95 NY2d 179, 184 [2000]).  Prior to
the codification of section 165.16, it had been acknowledged that
the forgery statutes had been intentionally written in a broad
fashion to encompass a wide range of conduct (see People v
Gottlieb, 36 NY2d 629, 632 [1975]; People v Abeel, 182 NY 415,
421 [1905]).  Notably, the use of "slugs" in place of tokens at
subway turnstiles had been upheld as a forgery (see e.g. People v
Gibbs, 210 AD2d 4 [1st Dept 1994]; People v Roberts, 208 AD2d 410
[1st Dept 1994]).  As the modern-day equivalent of "slugs," the
illegal use of altered MetroCards remains eligible for
prosecution as a forgery despite the enactment of Penal Law      
§ 165.16.
This type of conduct is subject to varying degrees of
prosecution, including the noncriminal violation under 21 NYCRR
1050.4 (c) and the A misdemeanor pursuant to Penal Law § 170.20
(criminal possession of a forged instrument in the third degree),
in addition to the class D felony and class B misdemeanor
offenses.  Thus, prosecutors have considerable discretion in
choosing among these classifications, having due regard for the
accused's prior history of defrauding or attempting to defraud
the MTA, and other relevant considerations.2  We trust that
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statutes, such as failure to pay a fare (21 NYCRR 1050.4 [a], a
noncriminal violation), criminal trespass (Penal Law § 140.05, a
violation), criminal trespass in the third degree (Penal Law    
§ 140.10, a B misdemeanor) or theft of services (Penal Law      
§ 165.15 [3], an A misdemeanor).  
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felony forgery prosecutions involving bent or altered MetroCards
will be reserved for individuals, like defendant, who have been
repeatedly prosecuted and convicted for abusing the MetroCard
system.
Consequently, we conclude that defendant is not
entitled to vacatur of his conviction of criminal possession of a
forged instrument in the second degree.
IV
Defendant alternatively argues that his motion to
suppress the MetroCards, cash and his statement should not have
been denied without a hearing.  Although Supreme Court
incorrectly believed that defendant lacked standing to pursue
suppression (see People v Burton, 6 NY3d 584, 588-589 [2006]),
the motion was properly denied without a hearing.  A police
officer averred that he had observed defendant swipe three people
into the subway in exchange for money from the riders.  Although
defendant maintained that he was merely "speaking with various
neighborhood acquaintances," he never challenged the assertion
that he had been selling swipes.  Hence, the police officer's
unchallenged statement was sufficient to provide probable cause
for the arrest and there was no factual dispute on a material
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issue that needed to be resolved before a decision could be
rendered on the suppression motion.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   * 
Order affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Graffeo.  Chief Judge Lippman
and Judges Ciparick, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur.
Decided April 30, 2009