Title: Walsh v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
JAMES B. WALSH, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 337, 2012 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for Sussex County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. ID No. 1006004227 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  November 14, 2012 
Decided:  December 3, 2012 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 3rd day of November 2012, it appears to the Court that:  
1.  Defendant–Appellant James Walsh appeals the Superior Court judge’s 
order sentencing him for a violation of probation (VOP).   
2.  Walsh pleaded guilty on October 20, 2010 to a sixth offense of driving 
under the influence and resisting arrest, and in exchange the State entered a nolle 
prosequi on the eight remaining charges.  On the DUI charge, Walsh received a 
sentence of eight years at Level V incarceration, with credit for two days served, to 
be suspended after one year and the successful completion of the TEMPO 
program, followed by successful completion of one year at a Level IV residential 
substance abuse treatment program, followed by two years of Level III aftercare.  
2 
 
On the resisting arrest charge, Walsh received a sentence of two years at Level V, 
suspended for two years at Level III.     
3.  On March 9, 2012, the Department of Corrections filed an administrative 
warrant alleging that Walsh violated his probation when he registered a 0.040 BAC 
on an Alco-Sensor test upon returning from approved employment.  A Violation of 
Probation Report filed on March 19, 2012 included three additional alleged 
violations that Walsh’s counsel did not contest because Walsh had previously 
admitted to them and thought they had been resolved through administrative 
discipline.    
4.  On April 26, 2012, the Superior Court judge found Walsh guilty of a 
VOP and ordered TASC to evaluate Walsh for substance abuse and mental health 
needs, with a report due to the court at sentencing.  On May 25, 2012, the Superior 
Court judge gave Walsh credit for time served and resentenced him to six years at 
Level V incarceration, to be suspended after successful completion of the Key 
program, followed by one year at a Level IV residential substance abuse treatment 
program, followed by one year of Level III aftercare on the DUI charge and two 
years at Level V, suspended for one year at Level III, on the resisting arrest charge.   
5.  In his Opening Brief, Walsh contends that (1) he was denied due process 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because the trial court 
sentenced him without considering the court-ordered substance abuse and mental 
3 
 
health evaluation and (2) the Superior Court judge abused his discretion by 
allegedly improperly relying on evidence of previous probation violations resolved 
administratively and exhibited a closed mind by sentencing Walsh without the 
benefit of the substance abuse and mental health evaluation.   
6.  With respect to Walsh’s first argument, we find no merit to his claim.  
While the report does not appear in the record,1 the transcript from the sentencing 
hearing clearly indicates that Walsh admitted the evaluation was done and that 
Walsh’s counsel read the report.2  Walsh’s counsel informed the trial judge that the 
report recommended Level V incarceration through the Key program combined 
with a Level IV substance abuse program (Crest).3  The trial judge did not express 
confusion over the report to which Walsh’s counsel referred, from which we infer 
that he was satisfied with the oral report by counsel.  Accordingly, we find the 
Superior Court judge considered the mental health and substance abuse evaluation 
when resentencing Walsh and Walsh’s due process claim is meritless.   
                                          
 
1 We take judicial notice that the report is not ordinarily docketed because it is confidential and 
reviewed by the judge prior to sentencing.   
2 State v. Walsh, Crim. ID No. 1006004227, at 1–2, 6 (Del. Super. May 25, 2012) 
(TRANSCRIPT).  We take judicial notice that the report, submitted by the State as an exhibit to 
its Answering Brief, indicates that it was copied to the Superior Court Case Manager and is 
consistent with Walsh’s counsel’s admissions at the hearing.  App. to Answering Br. B–8 to B–
10.  Accordingly, if there was any error, it was harmless.   
3 Walsh, Crim. ID No. 1006004227, at 1. 
4 
 
7.  With respect to the first prong of Walsh’s second claim, we find the 
Superior Court judge did not abuse his discretion by relying on improper evidence 
when he resentenced Walsh.  Our review of sentences generally ends if the 
sentence is within the statutory limits imposed by the General Assembly.4  Where 
the State can establish a VOP, the trial court may “impose any period of 
incarceration up to and including the balance of the Level V time remaining to be 
served on the original sentence.”5  Furthermore, the trial judge is “entitled to rely 
upon information regarding other, unproven crimes” when making a sentencing 
determination.6  The record supports the trial judge’s conclusion that the State 
established Walsh’s VOP by a preponderance of the evidence based on the Alco-
Sensor test.  The trial judge was permitted to consider evidence of other violations, 
whether administratively resolved or not, when making his sentencing 
determination.7  Because the judge considered at least one violation for which 
Walsh had never been disciplined, we need not reach the issue of whether a trial 
judge could resentence a defendant for VOPs that have already been resolved 
                                          
 
4 Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 842 (Del. 1992). 
5 Collins v. State, 29 A.3d 245, 2011 WL 4838255, at *2 (Del. Oct. 12, 2011) (ORDER) (citing 
11 Del. C. § 4334(c)). 
6 Mayes, 604 A.2d at 842–43 (collecting cases).   
7 See Kurzmann v. State, 903 A.2d 702, 717 (Del. 2006) (“Because probation is an ‘act of grace,’ 
the State need only present ‘some competent evidence’ to prove the violation asserted and to 
reasonably satisfy the VOP judge that the probationer’s conduct has not been as good as required 
under the conditions of probation.”).    
5 
 
administratively.  The sentence the trial judge imposed did not exceed the time 
remaining to be served on Walsh’s original sentence, and, accordingly, we find that 
the sentence was authorized by law and was neither arbitrary nor excessive.   
8.  With respect to the second prong of Walsh’s second claim, we find the 
Superior Court judge did not abuse his discretion by exhibiting a closed mind when 
he resentenced Walsh.  A judge exhibits a closed mind when he bases a sentence 
on a preconceived bias and fails to consider the nature of the offense or the 
defendant’s character.8  A judge is also required to maintain an open mind toward 
all possible mitigating information.9  Walsh bases his claim on his argument that 
the trial judge failed to consider the results of the substance abuse and mental 
health evaluation.  Because we find that the trial judge considered the evaluation, 10 
Walsh’s claim is meritless. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
 
                                          
 
8 Id. at 714 (quoting Weston v. State, 832 A.2d 742, 746 (Del. 2003)). 
9 Id. (quoting Weston v. State, 832 A.2d 742, 746 (Del. 2003)).  
10 See supra ¶ 6.