Title: Hagen v. City of Sioux Falls

State: south-dakota

Issuer: South Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

464 N.W.2d 396 (1990) Roland L. HAGEN and Joanne C. Hagen, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF SIOUX FALLS, a municipal corporation, Defendant and Appellee. No. 17007. Supreme Court of South Dakota. Considered on Briefs October 22, 1990. Decided December 19, 1990. *397 Acie W. Matthews of Pruitt, Matthews & Muilenburg Sioux Falls, for plaintiffs and appellants. William Fuller of Woods, Fuller, Shultz & Smith, P.C., Sioux Falls, for defendant and appellee. WUEST, Justice. Roland L. Hagen and Joanne C. Hagen, (Hagens) husband and wife, appeal an order of summary judgment in favor of the City of Sioux Falls (City) in an action for negligent inspection and enforcement of the City Building Code. We affirm. In 1974, the Hagens purchased their present residence located in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. In 1978, the Hagens hired Daryl Monen to construct a garage for their home. A building permit was secured for the garage project on October 26, 1978. The garage was constructed and passed final inspection on November 14, 1978. At the time of final inspection, the garage was either completed or substantially completed. Following completion of the garage, the Hagens hired the same contractor, Daryl Monen, to construct an addition to their residence. A building permit was secured on April 16, 1979, and the addition passed final inspection on August 10, 1979. The addition was also completed or substantially completed at the time of its final inspection. Neither Hagen was present for the final inspection of either the garage or the addition. The Hagens claim the City, through the action or omission of its employees, was negligent in failing to properly inspect the garage and addition construction. The Hagens contend that the studs in the garage were not built sixteen inches on center and that both structures were not built at least six inches above grade as required by the City Building Code. As a result, water runs into the garage and the addition causing the wood foundation and supports of each structure to deteriorate and rot. The Hagens claim the failure of the contractor to construct both the garage and the addition six inches above grade could have been easily seen upon completion of the construction and at the time of the inspections. The Hagens first became aware of their water problems in approximately 1987 when they noticed rotting siding around the foundation of the addition and the garage. In early 1988, the Hagens spoke with officials of the City concerning the damages to their property and were advised to pursue a claim with the City's insurance division. On June 10, 1988, the Hagens filed such a claim. Almost one year later, on June 6, 1989, the Hagens gave formal written notice to the City and the Attorney General that the Hagens intended to seek recovery of damages for the property damage sustained by the garage and addition. This suit followed. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City and the Hagens appealed. We resolve this appeal on the issue of whether the City owes a duty to the Hagens upon which a cause of action for damages may be premised.[1] The City adopted the 1970 Edition of the Uniform Building Code, and it was in effect at the time the Hagens' construction work was being done. Section 102 of the Code provides: The Hagens contend section 102 establishes a duty of care to the Hagens, the breach of which supports a cause of action for resultant damages. The City asserts that section 102 does not create a duty owed to the Hagens as individuals, but rather creates a general duty to the entire public which cannot form the basis of an action in negligence against the City. The existence of a duty is a threshold issue in any case of tort liability. Whether a duty exists is a matter of law for the court to determine. Gilbert v. United National Bank, 436 N.W.2d 23, 27 (S.D.1989). The question whether to impose liability upon a municipality for the damages caused by its agent's negligent inspection or negligent failure to inspect has given rise to two distinct lines of decision. While reaching contrary conclusions, the jurisdictions which have addressed this issue focus upon the nature of the duty of the inspector. Exemplary of those jurisdictions which recognize an actionable legal duty, and thus impose liability, is Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis.2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976). There, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated: Coffey, 74 Wis.2d at 540, 247 N.W.2d at 139. See also Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976); Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1979). Hoffert v. Owatonna Inn Towne Motel, Inc., 293 Minn. 220, 199 N.W.2d 158 (1972) exemplifies the reasoning employed in jurisdictions finding no actionable duty. The Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned: Hoffert, 199 N.W.2d at 160. See also Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801 (Minn.1979); Lakeside Condominium "C" Association v. Frediani Developers, Inc., 135 Ill.App.3d 972, 90 Ill. *399 Dec. 686, 482 N.E.2d 665 (1st Dist.1985); Rich v. City of Mobile, 410 So. 2d 385 (Ala. 1982); Duran v. City of Tucson, 20 Ariz. App. 22, 509 P.2d 1059 (1973); Grogan v. Commonwealth, 577 S.W.2d 4 (Ky.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 835, 100 S. Ct. 69, 62 L. Ed. 2d 46 (1979); Dinsky v. Town of Framingham, 386 Mass. 801, 438 N.E.2d 51 (1982). The case of Halvorson v. Dahl, 89 Wash. 2d 673, 574 P.2d 1190 (1978), cited by the Hagens, is particularly noteworthy. Halvorson involved the alleged failure of city officials to enforce the municipal building, housing, and safety codes in connection with a hotel fire. The court acknowledged: Id. at 676, 574 P.2d at 1192. However, Id. The court found a provision in the municipal housing code to identify and protect a particular and circumscribed class of persons, i.e. occupants of buildings. Thus, the court held the housing code imposed upon the municipality a duty of care that would support a cause of action for damages resulting from negligent enforcement of the code. In contradistinction, the court cited the municipal building code as exemplary of those codes enacted merely for public safety or the general welfare. The building code provision at issue in Halvorson is identical to the building code provision at issue here. The Halvorson court held that under the traditional rule such codes impose upon the municipality a duty to the public, not an actionable duty to any individual member of the public. See generally Annotation, 38 A.L.R. 4th 1194 (1985) which notes that a majority of jurisdictions apply the public duty/special duty analysis. It is a basic principle of tort law that public duties created by statute cannot be the basis for a negligence action even as against private tortfeasors. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288 (1965) provides: does not create a standard of conduct to be used to impose tort liability. Comments on Clause (a) and (b) illustrate further: Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288, comment on clause (a), (b) (1965). The public duty/special duty distinction is therefore a well-established tort principle applicable to actions against individuals as well as governments. We agree with the analysis of the Halvorson court and find persuasive the rationale stated in Hoffert. The broad, general language of the City's Building Code section 102 evidences an intent on the part of the City to create only a general duty to the public as a community, rather than an obligation to a specific class of individual members of the public. Under general tort principles, then, section 102 does not create a duty of care which will support the Hagens' negligence claim and their action must fail. We affirm. All the Justices concur. [1] In view of our decision, we do not resolve a second issue raised on appeal; namely, whether the Hagens' cause of action is time barred by reason of SDCL 3-21-2 and 3-21-3.