Title: ROBERT L. SCHERER, II V. LARAMIE REGIONAL AIRPORT BOARD

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ROBERT L. SCHERER, II V. LARAMIE REGIONAL AIRPORT BOARD2010 WY 105Case Number: S-09-0196Decided: 07/30/2010NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
ROBERT 
L. SCHERER, II,Appellant(Defendant),v.LARAMIE 
REGIONAL AIRPORT 
BOARD,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Albany County

The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Theodore 
C. Preston of Prehoda, Leonard & Edwards, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming 

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Matthew 
F.G. Castano of Brown & Hiser LLC, Laramie, Wyoming 

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT,* BURKE, JJ.

 
 
* 
Chief Justice at time of expedited conference

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Robert L. 
Scherer, II, (Scherer) appeals the judgment of the district court, entered after 
an unreported bench trial, that awarded Laramie Regional Airport Board (Board) 
$88,112.97 on its complaint that Scherer had breached paragraph 19 of the 
parties' lease agreement which required Scherer to "keep the leased premises and 
adjacent area clean, orderly, and free of accumulated trash at his own 
expense."  We 
affirm.

 
 

STATEMENT 
OF THE ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      In Scherer's 
principal brief, he presents these issues:

 
 
1.         
Did the District Court err by shifting the cost of removing the Quonset 
hut to Mr. Scherer despite passage of the deadline set forth in paragraph 
10?

 
 
2.         
Did the District Court err as a matter of law in finding that Mr. Scherer 
was responsible to return the leased premises to its pre-lease 
condition?

 
 
3.         
Did the District Court err in identifying the pre-lease condition of the 
leased premises?

 
 
In 
reply, the Board states the issue is whether the district court erred in finding 
that Scherer breached the terms of the lease and in awarding damages to the 
Board.

 
 
[¶3]      Scherer filed a 
reply brief which failed to comply with the requirements of W.R.A.P. 7.03, 
namely, "the reply brief shall precisely and concisely set forth on the first 
page those new issues and arguments raised by the brief of the appellee which 
are addressed in the reply brief.  A 
reply brief is limited to such new issues and arguments . . . ."  We refuse to consider Scherer's reply 
brief.  W.R.A.P. 
1.03.

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      In the mid-1980s, 
Scherer purchased a Quonset hut1 from the Board.  On January 1, 1986, the parties executed 
a 20-year lease of the land underlying the hut which is located on Brees Field 
Airport near Laramie, Wyoming.  The 
provisions of the lease which are pertinent to this appeal are the 
following:

 
 

LEASE 
EXPIRATION

 
 
9.         
Within one (1) year before the expiration of the term of this agreement, 
the parties may negotiate in good faith a new agreement.

 
 
10.       In the 
event a new lease is not entered into, the structure located upon the lands 
leased herein by Lessee shall:

 
 
            
(a) Be removed by Lessee at his own expense within sixty (60) days of the 
expiration of the term of this agreement, with the understanding that weather 
may require an extension of time.  
In the event of any removal of improvements, the premises must be left 
clean, orderly and as close to the original condition as reasonably 
possible.  Provided, however, that 
Lessee shall not remove any permanent improvement such as a floor upon which the 
building sits, plumbing, electrical lines or other utility without Lessor's 
approval.

 
 
(b)  If any building improvements are not 
disposed of as provided above, to the extent permitted by applicable law, they 
shall revert to and absolute title shall vest in Lessor.  After the title vests in Lessor, Lessor 
in its sole discretion, may remove the structure within sixty (60) days, 
understanding that weather may require an extension of time, at the expense of 
Lessee.

 
 
* 
* * *

 
 
19.       Lessee 
shall keep the leased premises and adjacent area clean, orderly, and free of 
accumulated trash at his own expense.

 
 
[¶5]      During the first 
two years of the lease term, Scherer operated an air freight business on the 
property; during the remaining years of the lease term, he used the hut as 
storage space.  The parties did not 
renew the lease, and it expired on December 31, 2005.  Although paragraph 10(a) of the lease 
stated that if the parties did not enter into a new lease Scherer shall remove 
the hut at his own expense within sixty days of the expiration date, Scherer did 
not remove the hut and continued to use it as a storage facility.  Although paragraph 10(b) of the lease 
stated that if Scherer did not remove the hut at his own expense within sixty 
days of the expiration date then the hut shall revert to and title shall vest in 
the Board and then the Board may remove the hut at Scherer's expense within 
sixty days, the Board did not remove the hut.

 
 
[¶6]      In September 
2006, the Board served Scherer with a Notice to Quit the premises, but Scherer 
did not quit the premises.  The 
parties' attempts to resolve the situation bore no fruit.  In a letter dated December 28, 2006, the 
Board informed Scherer that it possessed title to the hut, that it was entitled 
to remove it at his expense, that it intended to remove it, and that he should 
contact the Board if he wanted to remove it himself.  In January and February 2007, the 
parties continued to try to resolve the situation, but to no avail.  Between early 2007 and July 2007, 
Scherer began cleaning his property out of the hut, but had made only limited 
progress.

 
 
[¶7]      In early July 
2007, the Board contacted an engineering and surveying company to assist in 
removing the hut from the airport property.  That company enlisted the help of an 
industrial hygienist to ensure that the removal was done in a safe manner.  Upon inspection of the hut, the 
industrial hygienist found that the hut had fallen into considerable disrepair 
during the lease term.  During 
Scherer's occupancy, the hut's windows and skylights had been broken and not 
repaired.  This condition allowed 
the hut to be occupied by a number of animals, including pigeons.  The Board, the engineering firm, and the 
industrial hygienist developed a plan for removing the hut in light of the hut's 
poor condition and the danger posed by pigeon feces.  The Board advertised for bids and 
accepted the lowest one; demolition began in October 2007 and was completed by 
early November 2007.

 
 
[¶8]      On August 1, 
2008, the Board filed its complaint against Scherer for breach of the covenants 
in the lease and damages of $90,504.89 for the cost of restoring the leased 
property.  The allegations of the 
complaint pertinent to this appeal include paragraphs 10, 11, and 12.  Paragraph 10 alleged that Scherer had 
failed to restore the property within sixty days after surrender of the leased 
premises in accordance with paragraph 10 of the lease.  Paragraph 11 alleged that when Scherer 
surrendered the lease the property was in a poor and dangerous condition because 
of Scherer's acts of omissions during the period of his tenancy.  Paragraph 12 alleged that Scherer 
breached the covenants of the lease by surrendering the leased property in the 
poor and dangerous condition as described.

 
 
[¶9]      The parties tried 
the case before the district court on August 4, 2009.  The trial was not reported; therefore, 
no transcript of the trial exists; and the parties have not submitted a 
statement of the evidence or proceedings.  
W.R.A.P. 3.03.  The district 
court issued its decision letter on August 10, 2009, and its judgment which 
incorporated that letter on August 21, 2009.  The following excerpt from the district 
court's decision letter explains that court's ruling in favor of the 
Board:

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
LRAB 
seeks recovery under three legal theories: breach of contract, promissory 
estoppel, and equitable estoppel.

 
 
I.          
Breach of Contract

 
 
LRAB 
first seeks recovery under a breach of contract theory under the terms of the 
parties' lease agreement. "The elements for a breach of contract claim consist 
of a lawfully enforceable contract, an unjustified failure to timely perform all 
or any part of what is promised therein, and entitlement of injured party to 
damages." Reynolds v. Tice, 595 P.2d 1318, 1323 (Wyo. 
1979).

 
 
A. 
Lawfully Enforceable Contract

 
 
In 
the instant case, the parties agreed that a lawfully enforceable contract 
existed in the form of their lease agreement. Stipulation as to Facts Not 
Disputed at Trial, at 
1 (filed Aug. 3, 2009).

 
 
B. 
Breach

 
 
The 
parties focused the evidence and their arguments on the provisions set forth 
above concerning the parties' remedies available upon the expiration of the 
lease. Those provisions, paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Lease, are unambiguous and 
the Court finds that Mr. Scherer did not breach his duties under those 
provisions. In fact, Mr. Scherer had no duties under those provisions. Paragraph 
10(a) allowed him 60 days after the lease expired to remove the Quonset hut from 
the airport land at his expense. Failing that, paragraph 10(b) transferred 
ownership of the building to LRAB and allowed it 60 days to remove the building 
at Mr. Scherer's expense. These lease provisions do not require either party to 
take affirmative action, though. Thus, when Mr. Scherer failed to remove the 
Quonset hut within 60 days of the lease's expiration, title vested in LRAB. LRAB 
could then do whatever it desired with the building, but could only remove it at 
Mr. Scherer's expense if it did so within 60 days of receiving title. The 
parties agreed that neither took any action regarding the building within its 
respective 60-day period. Therefore, at the end of 120 days after the lease's 
expiration, LRAB owned the Quonset hut, but could no longer force Mr. Scherer to 
pay for its removal under the lease provision primarily at issue 
here.

 
 
The 
Court, however, does find that Mr. Scherer breached the Lease. LRAB contended in 
its Complaint:

 
 
11. 
When [Mr. Scherer] surrendered the leased premises said premise (sic) was in a 
poor and dangerous condition due to the acts of omission of [Mr. Scherer] during 
the period of the tenancy. The property at the time of surrender contained a 
wide variety of items that were not placed or located in any organized or 
apparently usable fashion. Furthermore, the floor and other surfaces of the open 
shop portion of the building and the upper level of the building, which 
comprised most of the building floor area, were covered with significant 
quantities of pigeon feces such that walking through these portions of the 
building without walking on pigeon feces was not possible. Several openings in 
the structure through which pigeons and other birds could enter and exit the 
building at will were noted.

 
 
12. 
The surrender of the leased premises in the condition described above was a 
breach by [Mr. Scherer] of the covenants in the lease.

 
 

Complaint, 
at 
2-3 (filed Aug. 1, 2008). Specifically, Mr. Scherer breached paragraph 19 of the 
Lease, which provides:

 
 
[Mr. 
Scherer] shall keep the leased premises and adjacent area clean, orderly, and 
free of accumulated trash at his own expense.

 
 
Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1, "Lease," at 5.

 
 
The 
evidence presented at trial clearly shows that Mr. Scherer failed to keep the 
property clean, orderly, and free of accumulated trash. At trial, Mr. Scherer 
testified that several skylights and windows were broken and that the front door 
had patched holes where the airport's snow remover inadvertently "punched" holes 
through the door several years earlier. See Defendant's Exhibit D. At 
closing, Mr. Scherer admitted to his "lack of diligence" in taking any 
affirmative action regarding the building throughout his 
leasehold.

 
 
Of 
course, LRAB's primary concern was the large quantity of pigeon excrement 
contaminating the interior of the Quonset hut. See Plaintiff's Exhibits 
9-11. The dangers posed by pigeon feces and the care which had to be exercised 
at its cleanup are obvious in Dr. James Dennison's "work 
plan":

 
 
A 
substantial amount of pigeon excrement exists in the Quonset hut, and needs to 
be cleaned up prior to demolition of the building. Pigeon excrement often 
contains biological agents which can cause serious health effects, including the 
bacteria Histoplasma capsulatum and the fungus Cryptococccus 
neoformans. When pigeon excrement is observed, standard practice is to 
assume it is contaminated with these agents and to follow established 
precautions handling it, as sampling the waste for the biological agents is 
impractical.

 
 
Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 8, "Pigeon Waste Cleanup," at 1. Numerous pigeons gained entrance to the 
interior of the building through the broken skylights and the large quantity of 
feces followed thereafter.1 

 
 
FN 
1:  Mr. Scherer testified that when 
he began organizing the building's contents in February 2007 in preparation of 
cleaning it up, he did not "notice" a large amount of pigeon excrement.  However, the Court finds the pictures 
entered into evidence along with Dr. James Dennison's "work plan" to be more 
credible indicators of the serious quantity of bird feces inside the Quonset 
hut.

 
 
Thus, 
LRAB has established that Mr. Scherer breached the lease agreement by failing to 
keep the premises clean, orderly, and free of accumulated trash as shown by the 
building's general disrepair and the pigeon excrement coating its 
interior.

 
 
Though 
Mr. Scherer owned the Quonset hut during the lease term, and he could 
theoretically do with it as he pleased (including allowing it to fall into 
disrepair), the Lease contemplated potential transfer of the building to LRAB 
following expiration of the Lease. Therefore, the provision requiring Mr. 
Scherer to keep the building clean, orderly, and free of accumulated trash was 
reasonable and prudent because LRAB may have taken over as owner of the 
building. That particular scenario played out here. The parties agreed to the 
Lease terms knowing that the Quonset hut may eventually transfer to LRAB at the 
end of the lease period. The Lease provided LRAB protection against Mr. Scherer 
essentially trashing the building and then handing ownership of it over to LRAB 
by failing to remove it within the 60-day time period provided. Mr. Scherer, 
however, breached his covenant to maintain the building and now seeks to impose 
the cost of that breach on LRAB. The parties' Lease simply does not allow Mr. 
Scherer's gambit to succeed.

 
 

C. 
Damages

 
 
The 
Court finds that LRAB is entitled to damages.

 
 
The 
measure of damages for breach of contract is that which would place plaintiff in 
the same position as he would have been had the contract been performed, less 
proper deductions. In other words, it is that which will compensate him for the 
loss which full performance would have prevented or breach of it 
entailed.

 
 

Reynolds, 
595 P.2d  at 1323. "In Wyoming, damages must be proven with a reasonable degree of 
certainty, but proof of exact damages is not required." WSP, Inc. v. Steel Fabricators & Erectors, 
2007 WY 80, ¶ 18, 158 P.3d 651, 655 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
Had 
Mr. Scherer not breached the lease provision requiring him to keep the premises 
clean and in orderly condition, LRAB would have taken ownership over the Quonset 
hut once Mr. Scherer's 60-day time period for him to remove the building 
expired. At that point, LRAB would have been free to use the building itself or 
lease it to a new tenant. However, due to Mr. Scherer's breach, the evidence and 
testimony presented at trial established that LRAB had no real option but to 
demolish the Quonset hut.

 
 
Mr. 
Scherer testified that several years into the leasehold, the airport cut off 
electricity to the building and re-routed it to the fuel farm. Mr. Scherer then 
testified that the electric company later refused to re-establish electricity to 
the building unless it was re-wired to conform to current building codes. Thus, 
in addition to the general disrepair of the building and the bird feces, the 
Quonset hut did not have power and could not gain it without serious renovation. 
In sum, the Court finds that the building's demolition was reasonably necessary 
under the circumstances in light of its dilapidated and dangerous condition. The 
Quonset hut could not be simply cleaned up for the airport's use or 
rental.

 
 
The 
Court also notes that the detailed "work plan" provided by Dr. James Dennison 
contemplates cleanup of the pigeon feces as part of the building's demolition, 
not with an eye toward future rental of the building. Dr. James Dennison's and 
Mr. Skinner's primary objective was to prevent any possible contaminants in the 
excrement from becoming airborne and traveling toward the airport's parking lot 
and terminal during the building's demolition. The parking lot is immediately 
adjacent to the Quonset hut. Both the parking lot and the terminal are east of 
the Quonset hut, significant because Laramie's prevailing wind blows to the east 
and northeast. Additional cleanup and disinfection beyond that set forth by Dr. 
James Dennison would likely have been required before the airport could use the 
building or lease it to a new tenant. In sum, the Court finds that cleanup and 
demolition of the building was required to return the premises to its pre-lease 
condition and salvage some utility from the site.

 
 
Additionally, 
Mr. Scherer asserted the affirmative defense that LRAB failed to mitigate its 
damages in answering the Complaint. 
 Answer, at 2 (filed Aug. 25, 2008). Mr. 
Scherer did not present any cogent argument or evidence supporting this 
contention at trial. The uncontested evidence was that LRAB received two bids 
for the cleanup and demolition of the Quonset hut and awarded the contract to 
the lowest bidder. In fact, LRAB contracted with Summit Trucking to have the job 
done for $80,300.00 while the other bid was for $142,960.00. Thus, the Court 
finds that LRAB has proven its damages with the required reasonable degree of 
certainty and Mr. Scherer has not proven that LRAB failed to mitigate its 
damages in any way.

 
 
LRAB 
is awarded the damages it incurred in removing the Quonset hut from its 
property. Those costs include the amount paid to Summit Trucking for the cleanup 
and demolition of the Quonset hut plus the amount paid to Coffey Engineering for 
planning the project. LRAB paid Summit Trucking $80,300.00 to clean and demolish 
the building pursuant to their contract. Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, "Form of 
Agreement Between Owner and Contractor," at 3. John Galbreath, Coffey 
Engineering, testified that LRAB paid Coffey Engineering a total of $7,812.97 
for planning the project and soliciting contractor bids through newspapers in 
the surrounding area. Thus, the Court awards damages to LRAB in the amount of 
$88,112.97.

 
 
Scherer 
timely filed his notice of appeal.

 
 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶10]   Scherer contends that the district 
court's judgment is based on two erroneous conclusions of law in its 
interpretation of the lease and one erroneous finding of fact, as we will 
discuss below.  We review the 
district court's conclusions of law de 
novo.  Shepard v. Beck, 2007 WY 53, ¶ 9, 154 P.3d 982, 986 (Wyo. 2007).  To the 
extent we must review the district court's findings of fact in a bench trial, 
our standard is as follows:

 
 
The 
factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a 
jury verdict.  While the findings 
are presumptively correct, the appellate court may examine all of the properly 
admissible evidence in the record.  
Due regard is given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the 
credibility of the witnesses, and our review does not entail weighing disputed 
evidence.  Findings of fact will not 
be set aside unless the findings are clearly erroneous.  A finding is clearly erroneous when, 
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.  

 
 

Forshee 
v. Delaney, 
2005 WY 103, ¶ 6, 118 P.3d 445, 448 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting Springer v. Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield, 944 P.2d 1173, 1175-76 (Wyo. 1997)).   

 
 

Shepard, 
¶ 9, 
154 P.3d  at 986.  Because the record contains neither 
a transcript of evidence nor a statement of the evidence or proceedings, we are, 
of course, restricted in our review to those allegations of error not requiring 
an inspection of the transcript.  Arnold v. Day, 2007 WY 86, ¶¶ 9, 10, 158 P.3d 694, 697 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶11]   Our resolution of Scherer's 
argument that the district court's judgment rests on two erroneous conclusions 
of law and an erroneous finding of fact requires that we interpret the parties' 
lease.  We have 
said:

 
 
Contract 
law governs the construction and interpretation of a lease.  Pavuk v. Rogers, 2001 WY 75, 30 P.3d 19 
(Wyo. 2001).  A lease is to be 
construed as a whole, with the objective to find reasonable construction which, 
if possible, does not render any provision meaningless.  Brazelton v. Jackson Drug Co., Inc., 796 P.2d 808, 810 (Wyo. 1990).  We 
resolve any doubts as to the meaning of a lease against the drafting party, . . 
. .  Id.  If the lease terms are ambiguous, we may 
consider extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties. Wadi Petroleum, Inc. v. Ultra Resources, 
Inc., 2003 WY 41, 65 P.3d 703 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
* 
* * *

 
 
            
We interpret express covenants according to the obvious intention of the 
parties, in consonance with the reasonable sense of the words employed, and we 
will not extend express covenants by interpretation unless their implication is 
clear and undoubted.   Fuchs v. Goe, 62 Wyo. 134, 163 P.2d 783, 
793 (1945).  Additionally, in 
determining the parties' intention as gleaned from the language, we look to the 
lease as a whole, keeping in mind the situation of the parties when the lease 
was made, its subject matter, and purpose of its execution.   Bornel, Inc. v. City Products Corp., 432 P.2d 489, 492 (Wyo. 1967).   

 
 

Brown 
v. Johnston, 
2004 WY 17, ¶¶ 23, 25, 85 P.3d 422, 429-30 (Wyo. 2004).  We follow the well-known rule that 
general provisions in a contract yield to specific provisions, unless the 
general and specific provisions are reconcilable.  Landen v. Production Credit Ass'n of 
Midlands, 737 P.2d 1325, 1328 (Wyo. 1987).  We also strive to avoid construing a 
contract so as to render one of its provisions meaningless, because each 
provision is presumed to have a purpose.  
Wyoming Game & Fish Comm'n v. 
Mills Co., 701 P.2d 819, 822 (Wyo. 1985).  We should, if possible, avoid a 
construction leading to a conclusion that inconsistent provisions exist in the 
contract.  Shepard v. Top Hat Land & Cattle 
Co., 560 P.2d 730, 732 (Wyo. 1977).  

 
 
[¶12]   Scherer identifies the district 
court's first erroneous conclusion of law to be the interpretation of an alleged 
general lease provision  paragraph 19 requiring Scherer during the lease term 
to "keep the leased premises and adjacent area clean, orderly, and free of 
accumulated trash at his own expense"  to create a remedy "explicitly available 
under" an alleged specific lease provision  paragraph 10 containing a 120-day 
deadline after expiration of the lease for removal of the hut at Scherer's 
expense.  He contends that the 
district court's interpretation creates a conflict between paragraph 19, an 
alleged general provision, and paragraph 10, an alleged specific provision.  To resolve that alleged conflict, he 
would apply the rule of construction that a general provision in a lease yields 
to a specific provision in a lease, unless those provisions are 
reconcilable.  He asserts these 
particular provisions are irreconcilable and, therefore, paragraph 10, the 
alleged specific provision, controls.  
Under that provision, Scherer notes, he bears the expense of the hut's 
removal under only two scenarios:  
1)  If he removed the hut 
within sixty days after the lease expired (paragraph 10(a)); or 2) if the Board 
removed the hut within sixty days after he failed to remove the hut (paragraph 
10(b)).  Because neither he nor the 
Board removed the hut within those specific timeframes, he argues, he must not 
bear the expense of the hut's removal which occurred nearly two years 
later.

 
 
[¶13]   Scherer identifies the district 
court's second erroneous legal conclusion to be that cleanup and demolition of 
the hut was required to return the leased premises to its pre-lease condition, 
contrary to paragraph 10(a) of the lease which required him to leave the 
premises "clean, orderly and as close to the original condition as reasonably 
possible" only if he removed improvements within sixty days after the lease 
expired.  Somewhat related to this 
contention, Scherer maintains the district court's judgment is based on a 
factual error that restoration of the leased premises to its pre-lease condition 
required demolition of the hut; in this regard, he notes that it is undisputed 
that the hut was present on the leased premises before the lease was 
executed.  He argues that logically 
the hut's demolition would not restore the leased premises to its pre-lease 
condition.

 
 
[¶14]   In response to Scherer's argument, 
the Board asserts that paragraphs 10 and 19 of the lease are not in conflict 
because they "encompass completely different contractual premises."  The Board argues that paragraph 10 
enumerates the parties' rights following expiration of the lease term 
contemplating that lessee Scherer during the lease term performed his duty under 
paragraph 19 to "keep the leased premises and adjacent area clean, orderly, and 
free of accumulated trash at his own expense."  On the other hand, the Board states, 
paragraph 19 pertains specifically to lessee Scherer's duty during the 
lease term.  Had Scherer performed 
his paragraph 19 duty during the lease term as contemplated, on lease expiration 
the parties had the option to remove or not a hut in undamaged condition.  This important point is clearly 
recognized by the district court in this excerpt from its decision 
letter:

 
 
Though 
Mr. Scherer owned the Quonset hut during the lease term, and he could 
theoretically do with it as he pleased (including allowing it to fall into 
disrepair), the Lease contemplated potential transfer of the building to LRAB 
following expiration of the Lease. Therefore, the provision requiring Mr. 
Scherer to keep the building clean, orderly, and free of accumulated trash was 
reasonable and prudent because LRAB may have taken over as owner of the 
building. That particular scenario played out here. The parties agreed to the 
Lease terms knowing that the Quonset hut may eventually transfer to LRAB at the 
end of the lease period. The Lease provided LRAB protection against Mr. Scherer 
essentially trashing the building and then handing ownership of it over to LRAB 
by failing to remove it within the 60-day time period provided. Mr. Scherer, 
however, breached his covenant to maintain the building and now seeks to impose 
the cost of that breach on LRAB. The parties' Lease simply does not allow Mr. 
Scherer's gambit to succeed. 

 
 
[¶15]   In connection with Scherer's duty 
under paragraph 19 of the lease, the Board correctly observes that Scherer has 
not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence of the district court's factual 
findings that the Board was forced to demolish the hut because of its 
dilapidated and dangerous condition and that the costs of $88,112.97 incurred to 
clean the leased premises were reasonable.

 
 
[¶16]   Responding to Scherer's claim that 
the district court erroneously concluded that the cleanup and hut demolition was 
required to return the leased premises to its pre-lease condition, contrary to 
paragraph 10(a) which required him to leave the premises as close as reasonably 
possible to its pre-lease condition only if he removed the improvements, the 
Board states that the district court simply concluded that Scherer was 
responsible for the damages incurred as a result of his breach of his duty under 
paragraph 19.

 
 
[¶17]   We have carefully considered the 
parties' arguments and the district court's decision, and conclude that 
Scherer's position has no merit.  As 
we construe the lease, paragraphs 10 and 19 are unambiguous and are clearly not 
in conflict.  Paragraph 10 concerns 
the removal of a hut in reasonably good condition within 120 days after 
expiration of the lease.  Paragraph 
19 concerns lessee Scherer's duty during the lease term to keep the leased 
premises clean, orderly, and free of accumulated trash at his own expense.  Without question, as the district court 
correctly found and concluded, Scherer breached that paragraph during the lease 
term and must bear the expense of cleaning the leased premises which includes 
the demolition and removal of the accumulated trash in the form of the 
dilapidated and dangerous hut.

 
 
[¶18]   Our construction of the lease 
between the Board and Scherer achieves, as did the district court's 
construction, the objective of finding a reasonable construction which does not 
render meaningless any provision of the lease.  The lease terms are unambiguous, and 
paragraphs 10 and 19 are easily reconcilable as each provision serves a distinct 
purpose.  Clearly, they are not in 
conflict.  Our construction has 
considered the lease as a whole, keeping in mind, as did the district court, the 
parties' situation when the lease was executed, its subject matter, and the 
purposes of its execution.

 
 
[¶19]   We affirm the judgment of the 
district court in all respects. 

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Trademark.  A 
semi-cylindrical  metal shelter 
having end walls.  Random House Webster's College 
Dictionary 1108 (1992).