Title: William Melvin White v. State Of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
_____________ 
 
No. SC05-1613 
_____________ 
 
 
WILLIAM MELVIN WHITE, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[July 12, 2007] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
William Melvin White appeals an order of the circuit court denying his 
motion to vacate a judgment of conviction of first-degree murder and a sentence of 
death under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  Because the order concerns 
postconviction relief from a capital conviction for which a sentence of death was 
imposed, this Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under article V, section 3(b)(1), 
Florida Constitution.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the circuit court’s 
denial of the motion for postconviction relief. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
White was convicted of first-degree murder for the 1978 death of Gracie 
Mae Crawford.  The facts of the crime, as set out in this Court’s opinion on 
White’s initial direct appeal, are as follows: 
White was a member of a Kentucky chapter of the Outlaws, a 
motorcycle gang, but was visiting the Orlando chapter.  A group of 
the Outlaws, accompanied by some girl friends, visited an Orlando 
nightclub where they met Gracie Mae Crawford.  Gracie Mae 
accompanied some of the Outlaws back to their Orlando clubhouse.  
Soon after returning to the clubhouse, White retired to a bedroom with 
his girl friend.  Sometime thereafter White was called by Richard 
DiMarino who stated that Crawford liked blacks and that they had to 
teach her a lesson.  White dressed and went into the kitchen area 
where he joined DiMarino and Guy Ennis Smith in severely beating 
Crawford.  Whether DiMarino or White led the assault is unclear, but 
one witness testified of White’s hitting Crawford with his fist and 
knocking her to the floor.  After the beating, DiMarino and White 
placed Crawford in the middle of the front seat of White’s girl friend’s 
car.  White started driving but along the way stopped the car and 
DiMarino drove the car to the end of a deserted road.  (The victim, 
White and DiMarino had done a lot of drinking that evening, but 
White’s girl friend testified that he knew what he was doing.)  After 
they stopped the car, DiMarino and White pulled Crawford from the 
car, passed her over a barbed wire fence, and laid her on the ground.  
White then straddled her, took out his knife, stabbed her fourteen 
times and slit her throat.  He handed the knife to DiMarino who also 
cut her throat.  Crawford died as a result of the wounds inflicted upon 
her. 
While leaving the area White and DiMarino ran out of gas at 
the SeaWorld parking lot and were later identified by SeaWorld 
security guards who had given them gas.  White and DiMarino went 
back and picked up the body of the deceased and thereafter discarded 
it at a different place.  The body was discovered that afternoon. 
White v. State, 415 So. 2d 719, 719-20 (Fla. 1982).  At the penalty phase, the 
defense presented no mitigating evidence.  The jury unanimously recommended 
 
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death, and the trial judge imposed a death sentence.  We affirmed the conviction 
and sentence on appeal.  Id. at 720.  The United States Supreme Court denied 
certiorari review on November 29, 1982.  White v. Florida, 459 U.S. 1055 (1982). 
In 1983, White filed a motion for postconviction relief.  While that motion 
was pending in the circuit court, White filed a habeas petition with this Court, 
contending that he was entitled to relief as a result of Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 
U.S. 393 (1987), because the standard jury instructions given at his trial restricted 
mitigating circumstances to those set forth in the sentencing statute.  White v. 
Dugger, 523 So. 2d 140, 140 (Fla. 1988).  We denied White’s petition, stating: 
On the totality of the circumstances of this case we can, and do, 
unhesitatingly find that the instant evidence of nonstatutory mitigating 
circumstances, if in fact not considered by the jury and/or the judge, 
would conclusively have had no effect upon the recommendation of 
the death sentence imposed in this case.  The charge which may have 
limited the jury to a consideration of statutory mitigating circumstance 
was clearly harmless. 
Id. at 141. 
The circuit court then held a hearing on White’s still-pending postconviction 
motion and denied relief on all of his claims on April 16, 1996.  On appeal, we 
affirmed the denial of White’s postconviction motion on his claims of error in the 
guilt phase of his trial, including that he received ineffective assistance of counsel 
from his guilt-phase counsel, and his claims that evidence was improperly withheld 
in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and that false testimony 
 
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was given in violation of Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).  White v. 
State, 729 So. 2d 909, 911-13 (Fla. 1999). 
However, we reversed White’s death sentence upon reevaluating his 
Hitchcock claim.  We explained that because White had presented additional 
mitigating evidence at the evidentiary hearing that was different from what he 
alleged in his habeas petition, he was not procedurally barred from raising this 
claim again on postconviction.  Id. at 914 (citing Hall v. State, 541 So. 2d 1125 
(Fla. 1989)).  We explained: 
At trial, defense counsel proffered no witnesses during the penalty 
phase but only a brief argument.  In his 1988 habeas petition to this 
Court, appellant argued that [the] trial judge and the advisory jury 
failed to consider the following record nonstatutory evidence: (1) 
residual doubt as to appellant’s guilt; (2) the complicity of a 
codefendant; and (3) appellant’s use and consumption of alcohol on 
the day of the murder. We held the failure of the court and jury to 
consider this evidence was harmless.  White, 523 So. 2d at 141. 
The relevant assertions in the present 3.850 motion and the 
evidence presented at the 3.850 hearing focused on three general 
areas: (1) an abusive childhood; (2) alcohol and drug dependency 
resulting in mental impairment; and (3) a subservient personality 
susceptible to the domination of others.  Appellant produced his 
mother, sister, and stepsister.  All three testified without contradiction 
that appellant’s father was an alcoholic who frequently abused 
appellant both physically and emotionally.  Several other witnesses 
testified without contradiction that appellant himself is an alcoholic.  
Appellant began drinking heavily at around eleven years of age when 
his father would take him to bars.  Dr. Caddy, a forensic psychologist, 
testified based on the additional evidence that appellant’s capacity to 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to 
the requirements of the law was substantially impaired.  Dr. Caddy 
also opined that appellant’s alcoholism led to significant impairment 
in organic mental functioning and an inability to process information 
 
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in a normal manner.  Finally, Dr. Caddy stated that appellant’s 
personality was subservient in nature based on a lack of self-worth 
and that it was possible he committed the murder at the direction of 
others. 
This was all relevant evidence which the sentencing court and 
advisory jury should have at least considered, but it was precluded 
from doing so. 
Id. at 914.  We considered the merits of White’s claims and concluded that error 
did occur in White’s penalty phase because the jury instructions were parallel to 
those given in Hitchcock.  We found that the failure to present this evidence from 
the postconviction hearing was not harmless because the error had a substantial 
and injurious effect or influence on the sentencing jury.  We remanded the case to 
the trial court for a new penalty phase.  Id. at 915-16. 
On resentencing, the jury recommended a death sentence by a ten-to-two 
vote.  The trial judge sentenced White to death, finding four aggravators,1 one 
statutory mitigator,2 and nine nonstatutory mitigators.3  State v. White, No. CR78-
1840 (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. order dated April 20, 2000) (hereinafter Sentencing Order).4   
                                          
 
1.  The aggravating factors were: (1) White had been convicted of a prior 
violent felony; (2) the murder was committed while White was engaged in a 
kidnapping; (3) the murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and (4) the 
murder was committed to disrupt or hinder the enforcement of laws. 
 
2.  The statutory mitigating factor was that the murder was committed while 
White was under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and 
the sentencing judge accorded this factor little weight. 
 
3.  The nonstatutory mitigating factors were that White: (1) had a poor 
family background and an abusive childhood, lived in squalor, and suffered from 
parental neglect (accorded some weight); (2) had an extensive history of alcohol 
 
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White appealed to this Court, raising five issues.5  White v. State, 817 So. 2d 
799, 803 (Fla. 2002).  We rejected each of White’s claims on appeal and affirmed 
his sentence of death.  The United States Supreme Court thereafter denied White’s 
petition for a writ of certiorari.  White v. Florida, 537 U.S. 1091 (2002). 
White filed a rule 3.851 motion for postconviction relief on December 16, 
2003, raising twelve claims.6  The circuit court granted an evidentiary hearing on 
                                                                                                                                        
and substance abuse from an early age (accorded some weight); (3) suffered from 
organic brain damage and neurological deficiencies (accorded some weight); (4) 
had marginal intelligence and a low IQ (accorded little weight); (5) was intoxicated 
and had diminished capacity when he committed the crime (accorded very little 
weight); (6) was a willing worker and good employee (accorded some weight); (7) 
lacked future dangerousness, had the potential to be rehabilitated, and had a good 
prison record (accorded some weight); (8) contributed to the community (accorded 
very little weight); and (9) was a loving person and was generous to others 
(accorded very little weight). 
 
4.  Following White’s original conviction and sentence in the instant case, he 
pled guilty in 1980 to a second-degree murder charge in Tennessee.  White was 
sentenced to thirty years and that Tennessee plea was used at White’s Florida 
resentencing to establish the prior violent felony aggravator. 
 
5.  On direct appeal of his resentencing, White argued that: (1) the trial court 
erred in not permitting the cross-examination of a key State witness concerning the 
underlying facts of the witness’s subsequent murder conviction; (2) the trial court 
erred in finding that the murder was committed to disrupt or hinder the 
enforcement of laws; (3) the trial court erred in rejecting the statutory mitigating 
factor that the murder was committed while White was under extreme duress or 
under the substantial domination of another; (4) the imposition of the death penalty 
is disproportionate; and (5) White’s execution, after serving more than twenty-two 
years on death row, will constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 
 
6.  The claims raised by White in his initial motion were: (1) newly 
discovered evidence exculpated White and made him ineligible for the death 
penalty; (2) guilt-phase counsel was ineffective for failing to call Joseph Watts as a 
 
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the second part of claim five in the motion, and the hearing was held on June 23, 
2005.  At the hearing, White presented the testimony of his resentencing attorneys, 
Chandler Muller and Bryan Park.  Following the hearing, the circuit court denied 
all of White’s postconviction motion claims.  State v. White, No. 48-1978-CF-
001840-O (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. order filed Aug. 5, 2005) (Postconviction Order).  
White appeals that denial to this Court, raising nine issues.7 
                                                                                                                                        
witness; (3) resentencing counsel was ineffective for failing to call Watts as a 
witness; (4) resentencing counsel was ineffective for failing to call John DiMarino 
as a witness; (5) White’s rights were violated, and resentencing counsel was 
ineffective for failing to properly challenge or mitigate the admission of White’s 
prior Tennessee conviction; (6) the State offered false testimony at the guilt phase; 
(7) resentencing counsel was ineffective for agreeing to strike a prospective juror 
for cause simply because English was not her primary language; (8) White was 
denied equal protection when a prospective juror was struck for cause simply 
because English was not her primary language; (9) resentencing counsel was 
ineffective for failing to preserve and file a motion for rehearing on the trial court’s 
clear error as to one of White’s proposed mitigators; (10) resentencing counsel was 
ineffective for failing to more thoroughly question or raise a for-cause challenge to 
a juror; (11) jury instructions were in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 
320 (1985); and (12) Florida’s sentencing scheme violates Ring v. Arizona, 530 
U.S. 584 (2002). 
 
7.  In his appeal to this Court, White argues that: (1) the newly discovered 
evidence of Frank Marasa’s statement regarding the murder exculpates White of 
first-degree murder; (2) guilt-phase counsel was ineffective for failing to call 
Joseph Watts to testify; (3) resentencing counsel was ineffective for failing to call 
Joseph Watts to testify; (4) resentencing counsel was ineffective for failing to call 
John DiMarino to testify; (5) evidence of White’s guilty plea to a Tennessee 
murder was improperly admitted, and resentencing counsel was ineffective for 
failing to properly challenge the admission of this plea or present testimony that 
would have mitigated against this testimony; (6) the State submitted false 
testimony at White’s guilt phase; (7) resentencing counsel was ineffective for 
agreeing to excuse for cause a prospective juror solely because English was not her 
 
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II.  ANALYSIS OF POSTCONVICTION ISSUES 
White argues that the circuit court erred in denying his postconviction 
motion.  Finding no error in the circuit court’s conclusion that White’s guilt-phase 
claims are procedurally barred, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of those 
claims.8  White compares his case to Hitchcock v. State, No. SC03-2203 (Fla. 
order filed May 3, 2005), in which the circuit court found Hitchcock’s 
postconviction guilt-phase claims were procedurally barred.  On appeal, this Court 
remanded the case with instructions for the circuit court to consider the merits of 
all guilt-phase claims raised in Hitchcock’s rule 3.850 motion for postconviction 
relief.  However, unlike the situation in Hitchcock, this Court considered and 
denied White’s guilt-phase claims in his previous motion for postconviction relief.  
White, 729 So. 2d at 916.  In Hitchcock, the defendant had not had the opportunity 
to ever fully pursue his guilt-phase postconviction claims.  Therefore, we find that 
the circuit court properly held that the guilt-phase claims in the instant case were 
                                                                                                                                        
primary language; (8) White was denied equal protection because a prospective 
juror was excused for cause solely because English was not her primary language; 
and (9) resentencing counsel was ineffective for not fully exploring the racial 
issues in the case with a juror during voir dire. 
 
8.  We conclude that the following claims are procedurally barred and we 
reject White’s arguments that they were improperly summarily denied by the 
circuit court: (1) White’s guilt-phase counsel was ineffective for failing to call 
Joseph Watts to testify; and (2) the State submitted false testimony at the guilt 
phase in violation of Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
 
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procedurally barred.  We deny the remainder of White’s claims on their merits, as 
discussed below. 
A.  Newly Discovered Evidence 
White asserts that newly discovered evidence would have resulted in his 
acquittal had it been presented at trial.  This evidence, as alleged in White’s 
postconviction motion, is the statement of Frank Marasa, a member of the Outlaws 
motorcycle gang at the time of the victim’s murder, that he was told by Richard 
DiMarino on the day after the murder that DiMarino “had to get rid of a girl last 
night.” 
The circuit court summarily denied this claim, finding it to be procedurally 
barred.  Postconviction Order at 4.  The circuit court noted that White had “failed 
to specifically explain why his proposed witness, Frank Marasa, could not have 
been discovered by diligent efforts either prior to trial, in preparation of his 1983 
postconviction motion, or through an amendment to his 1983 postconviction 
motion.”  Postconviction Order at 5.  The circuit court also denied the claim 
because it found that White could not prevail on either prong of the newly 
discovered evidence test. 
While White’s guilt-phase claims are procedurally barred, newly discovered 
evidence claims may be raised in successive postconviction motions.  Fla. R. Crim. 
P. 3.851(d)(2)(A).  Claims in successive motions may be denied without an 
 
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evidentiary hearing “[i]f the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively 
show that the movant is entitled to no relief.”  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B). 
In considering newly discovered evidence claims, we have set forth the 
following standard: 
To obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a 
defendant must meet two requirements: First, the evidence must not 
have been known by the trial court, the party, or counsel at the time of 
trial, and it must appear that the defendant or defense counsel could 
not have known of it by the use of diligence.  Second, the newly 
discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably 
produce an acquittal on retrial.  See Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 
521 (Fla. 1998).  Newly discovered evidence satisfies the second 
prong of the Jones test if it “weakens the case against [the defendant] 
so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his culpability.”  Id. at 
526 (quoting Jones v. State, 678 So. 2d 309, 315 (Fla. 1996)). 
Diaz v. State, 945 So. 2d 1136, 1145 (Fla. 2006). 
The circuit court found that White failed to set out sufficient allegations in 
his postconviction motion to meet either prong of this test.  We agree with the 
circuit court’s following conclusions: 
White, however, has failed to specifically explain why his proposed 
witness, Frank Marasa, could not have been discovered by diligent 
efforts either prior to trial, in preparation of his 1983 postconviction 
motion, or through an amendment to his 1983 postconviction motion. 
. . . 
. . . Additionally, White has failed to demonstrate that the 
evidence is of such a nature that it would probably produce an 
acquittal upon retrial.  At the 1978 trial, Richard DiMarino testified 
that he helped take the victim out to the deserted area where she was 
killed, that he helped put her over a fence, and that he cut her throat.  
Therefore it was clear to the guilt phase jury that Richard DiMarino 
murdered the victim.  Mr. DiMarino’s alleged statement to Frank 
 
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Marasa the day after the murder that “he had to get rid of a girl last 
night,” was not inconsistent with his testimony and does [not] 
exculpate White. 
Postconviction Order at 5 (citation and footnote omitted). 
We agree that this alleged evidence cannot meet either prong of the newly 
discovered evidence test.  We therefore affirm the circuit court’s summary denial 
of this newly discovered evidence claim. 
B.  Ineffective Assistance of Resentencing Counsel 
White argues that his resentencing counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to 
call Joseph Watts to testify; (2) failing to call John DiMarino to testify; (3) failing 
to properly challenge the admission of White’s plea to second-degree murder in 
Tennessee; (4) failing to present testimony that would have mitigated against the 
Tennessee charge; (5) agreeing to excuse for cause a prospective juror solely 
because English was not her primary language; and (6) not fully exploring the 
racial issues in the case with a prospective juror during voir dire. 
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 
first show that counsel’s performance was deficient.  Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  An attorney’s performance is deficient when it falls 
below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional 
norms.  Id. at 688.  Second, the defendant must show that counsel’s deficiency 
prejudiced the defendant, which occurs when “there is a reasonable probability 
 
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that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different.  A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Id. at 694.  Ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims are mixed questions of law and fact.  We review the legal issues 
under a de novo standard of review.  The circuit court’s factual determinations are 
given deference if they are supported by competent, substantial evidence. 
First, White alleges that resentencing counsel should have called Joseph 
Watts, a member of the Outlaws motorcycle gang, to testify before the 
resentencing jury.  Watts testified at the Spencer9 hearing, and there is no 
allegation that this testimony was not representative of the testimony Watts would 
have given had he been called to testify before the jury.  Watts’s testimony at the 
Spencer hearing was essentially that DiMarino confessed to Watts that he killed 
Crawford and did not indicate that White was involved in the murder. 
While the circuit court did not grant an evidentiary hearing on this specific 
claim, resentencing counsel Chandler Muller did make a reference to Watts during 
his evidentiary hearing testimony.  Muller stated that he did not want to call many 
members of the Outlaws motorcycle gang because he did not want the resentencing 
jury to associate the defendant with the gang members.  He mentioned that he did 
                                          
 
9.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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not want to call Watts in particular because he was “totally unpredictable and 
uncontrollable.” 
The circuit court summarily denied this claim, in part because Watts’s 
testimony “would have been consistent with Richard DiMarino’s testimony and 
cumulative to the other evidence.”  Postconviction Order at 7.  On initial 
postconviction motions, an evidentiary hearing should be granted on any claims 
listed by the defendant as requiring a factual determination.  Fla. R. Crim. P. 
3.851(f)(5)(A)(i).  However, we agree with the circuit court that Watts’s testimony 
is consistent with DiMarino’s testimony at the guilt and resentencing phases of 
White’s trial.  DiMarino testified that he took part in Crawford’s murder.  At no 
point did Watts testify that DiMarino stated that White did not participate in the 
murder or that White did not inflict the fatal wound and other wounds which led 
the trial court to find the HAC aggravator. 
Given this record evidence, we affirm the circuit court’s summary denial of 
this postconviction claim.  Our confidence in the resentencing outcome is not 
undermined by the absence of Watts’s testimony before the resentencing jury 
because the alleged testimony did not contradict DiMarino’s testimony and 
because Watts was described by defense counsel as unpredictable and 
uncontrollable.  Thus, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of this claim. 
 
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White next argues that resentencing counsel was ineffective for failing to 
call John DiMarino, Richard DiMarino’s brother, to testify at the resentencing.  
The circuit court summarily denied this claim, finding that John DiMarino’s 
testimony was presented to the resentencing jury when his testimony from White’s 
original guilt and penalty phases was read into the record.  Postconviction Order at 
9.  The circuit court noted that resentencing counsel was unable to locate John 
DiMarino at the time of the resentencing. 
At resentencing, the defense called Carrie Farney, a licensed private 
investigator.  Farney testified that after several attempts, he was unable to locate 
John DiMarino for the resentencing.  Based on this testimony, the resentencing 
court found John DiMarino to be unavailable and permitted his testimony from 
White’s 1978 trial to be read to the jury.  A defendant cannot establish ineffective 
assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to call a witness who is 
unavailable.  Melton v. State, 949 So. 2d 994, 1004 (Fla. 2006), petition for cert. 
filed, No. 06-11339 (U.S. May 15, 2007).  We therefore affirm the circuit court’s 
summary denial of this claim. 
The basis for White’s next claims involves his plea to second-degree murder 
in Tennessee following his 1978 conviction in the instant case.  At the 
resentencing, the State introduced the transcript of the March 4, 1980, Tennessee 
plea colloquy to support the aggravating factor that White was previously 
 
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convicted of another felony involving the use or threat of violence.  At that 
proceeding, White pled guilty to second-degree murder.  White argues that 
resentencing counsel was ineffective for failing to properly challenge the 
introduction of this prior conviction.  White also argues that resentencing counsel 
should have presented the testimony of White’s Tennessee codefendant, Michael 
Markham, because this testimony would have mitigated White’s involvement in 
the Tennessee offense.  To the extent that White raises a substantive claim that his 
rights were violated because of the introduction of this Tennessee conviction, that 
claim is procedurally barred and should have been raised on direct appeal of the 
resentencing.  Lamarca v. State, 931 So. 2d 838, 851 n.8 (Fla. 2006). 
White argues that the plea colloquy indicates that White did not knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to trial and that no factual basis 
supports White’s plea.  The circuit court summarily denied this claim, finding that 
based upon the record, there was no valid basis for counsel to attack the plea or 
conviction.  Postconviction Order at 9. 
At the plea hearing, the Tennessee court read the facts of the investigation 
into the record and asked questions of White in an attempt to determine whether 
the guilty plea was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.  We affirm the 
circuit court’s finding that resentencing counsel was not ineffective because 
resentencing counsel had no basis for objecting to the introduction of this evidence.  
 
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See Rogers v. State, 32 Fla. L. Weekly S263, S265 (Fla. Jan. 18, 2007) (“Because 
none of the closing arguments were improper, counsel cannot be deemed 
ineffective in failing to object to them.”). 
White also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present to 
the resentencing jury the testimony of White’s codefendant in the Tennessee 
homicide case, Michael Markham.  Markham did testify at the Spencer hearing.  
He stated that he committed the Tennessee homicide and that while White was 
present, White did not participate in the killing and only assisted Markham in 
getting rid of the body.  This subclaim was the one item on which the circuit court 
held an evidentiary hearing. 
At the evidentiary hearing, resentencing counsel Muller testified that he was 
aware of the Tennessee plea and that he investigated the circumstances of the plea 
as well as Markham’s testimony.  He stated that his focus at resentencing was to 
present the mitigating circumstances of White’s terrible childhood and that he 
“didn’t want to focus on” the Tennessee homicide.  He also stated that he met with 
Markham, who told him that he alone shot the Tennessee victim.  However, Muller 
pointed out that the autopsy report conflicted with Markham’s testimony because it 
did not reflect that the victim received any gunshot wounds, only stabbing wounds, 
and so Muller “did not want the jury to see [Markham].”  Muller admitted that 
 
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there were some questions as to the validity of the autopsy report.  Muller 
explained: 
I found [Markham] credible for purposes of, you know, doing what I 
felt was the best thing to do to try to save Mr. White’s life with the 
judge.  I don’t have an independent recollection.  I didn’t do a memo 
and I would have made this hearing earlier saying I’m deciding not to 
call Mr. Markham in front of the jury because of “X.” 
. . . . 
But I know there were––I was worried about him.  I have to say 
the reason I didn’t call Mr. Markham, something bothered me and I 
can’t, you know––my best recollection is that it was because he was 
going to get up there and say he shot this guy and that there was the 
plea colloquy.  And my focus in the case was all of the stuff that Mr. 
White went through in his life and, you know, the other evidence that 
we presented at the trial. 
So I would say that I wanted the Judge to hear what he had to 
say, but I didn’t want the jury to. 
Co-resentencing counsel Bryan Park further explained that Markham was 
concerned about having to answer questions that were unrelated to the Tennessee 
murder and that he was concerned about being badgered on cross-examination.  He 
also set forth: 
[The defense] need[s] to have as much jury appeal as possible.  
And the more Outlaws, we thought, would take the witness stand in 
front of a jury, the more of a danger of hurting the credibility of our 
case, because the Outlaws, they were not good people, and Mr. White 
was an Outlaw.  And we didn’t––if you put on too many Outlaw 
witnesses, there was the chance of him getting dirty just by 
association. 
The circuit court denied this claim, finding that “counsel’s decision not to 
present the testimony of Mr. Markham to the penalty-phase jury, but to instead 
 
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present his testimony at the Spencer hearing, was a reasonable trial strategy.”  
Postconviction Order at 12.  The circuit court also found that Markham’s testimony 
was not credible because it was contradicted by the autopsy report and by his plea.  
Id. 
We find that the circuit court’s determination that resentencing counsel 
made a reasonable, tactical decision not to call Markham before the jury is 
supported by competent, substantial evidence.  Muller testified that he did not 
think Markham would make a good witness because his testimony conflicted with 
the autopsy report and his plea.  In addition, Muller testified that he wanted to 
focus on other mitigating evidence about White and not on this crime.  The record 
reveals that Markham came to Florida to testify and so was available if Muller 
determined that Markham was needed.  After a full investigation, Muller ultimately 
decided not to present Markham’s testimony to the jury.  Thus, this case is 
distinguishable from Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005).  In Rompilla, trial 
counsel admitted that she did not investigate the defendant’s prior violent felony 
record, which would have revealed a great deal of mitigating evidence that she 
could have used on the defendant’s behalf at the penalty phase.  In the instant case, 
trial counsel ultimately made a strategic decision after a full investigation not to 
present Markham’s testimony at resentencing.  “Strategic decisions do not 
constitute ineffective assistance if alternative courses of action have been 
 
- 18 -
considered and rejected.”  Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 2d 216, 223 (Fla. 1998) 
(quoting State v. Bolender, 503 So. 2d 1247, 1250 (Fla. 1987)). 
Thus, we affirm the circuit court’s determination that counsel was not 
ineffective for failing to call Markham.  See Lamarca, 931 So. 2d at 849 
(reasonable trial strategy for counsel not to call persons who were not credible and 
would not have made good defense witnesses). 
Next, White asserts that resentencing counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object and agreeing to the excusal for cause of a prospective juror due to the juror’s 
difficulties understanding English.  During voir dire, the prospective juror 
indicated that she felt life in prison was a more severe punishment than a death 
sentence.  In answer to the prosecutor’s more specific questions, she stated that her 
feelings would interfere with her ability to participate in the recommendation and 
that she did not think she could recommend the death penalty.  Defense counsel 
and the trial court attempted to rehabilitate her, and the following exchange 
occurred: 
THE COURT: Could you stand by your convictions? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Yes, ma’am.  Maybe I can act 
according to the law. 
THE COURT: I’m sorry? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Is acting according to the law.  But 
I’m a Christian, Christian person.  What I read in the Bible, that’s 
what I’ve been, that’s what I’ve been thinking about it, you know.  
MR. MULLER: When you say what you read in the Bible–– 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: That’s what I’ve been thinking my 
beliefs would be because one of the commandments is thou should not 
 
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kill somebody.  This guy killed somebody.  The law here in this world 
is different.  Right, you kill, we have to kill you.  That’s it.  Do you 
understand what I mean? 
. . . . 
MR. MULLER: That’s not the law.  If a person kills another 
person the law doesn’t say we just kill the person that killed the other 
person.  That’s not what the law says.  The law says, the judge is 
going to read you the law if you’re on the jury, there are certain 
circumstances where you would recommend to the judge that the 
death penalty be imposed.  But the state would have to prove those 
circumstances beyond every reasonable doubt.  The defense gets to 
put things on about Mr. White that you would weigh against those 
other circumstances. 
Would it, does that make sense? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I don’t understand what you said. 
MR. MULLER: This is, we feel bad about––you understand 
we’re not trying to pick on you? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: No, I know. 
MR. MULLER: Let me ask you this, ma’am: would, do you 
feel the language barrier is such that, like you were talking about it 
there when people start talking and everything, and like we’re doing 
right now, it would make it hard for you to be on the jury? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Yes, it is hard for me. 
MR. MULLER: Do you think it would be so hard that–– 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I don’t feel comfortable. 
MR. MULLER: Does your level of not feeling comfortable, is 
it so bad you just don’t think you could be fair under any 
circumstance? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I don’t know.  I don’t feel 
comfortable because this gets me nervous. 
 
The prosecutor moved to have the prospective juror removed for cause because 
“she said her feelings about the death penalty would interfere with her ability to 
follow your instructions.  She also said that she wasn’t comfortable and had 
problems understanding.”  Defense counsel agreed, and the prospective juror was 
excused. 
 
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White argues that this prospective juror was improperly excused solely 
because of her problems understanding English and that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to her excusal for cause.  The circuit court 
summarily denied this claim, finding that, based on the record, the challenge was 
proper and that counsel’s performance was not deficient.  Postconviction Order at 
14. 
We agree with the circuit court that counsel was not ineffective because the 
prospective juror clearly stated on the record that she did not think that she could 
follow the law were she to serve on the jury.  Even counsel’s attempts to 
rehabilitate her were unsuccessful, because she never clearly stated that she could 
follow the law––at most she said “maybe” she could.  A juror is considered 
competent if the juror can “lay aside any bias or prejudice and render a verdict 
solely on the evidence presented and the instructions on the law given by the 
court.”  Ault v. State, 866 So. 2d 674, 683 (Fla. 2003).  We have held that a trial 
court has great discretion when deciding whether a challenge based on juror 
incompetency is improper, and this decision will not be overturned absent manifest 
error.  Id.  Indeed, in affirming the trial judge’s denial of the defense motion for 
excusal for cause of prospective jurors because they did not understand English, 
we stated: 
There is hardly any area of the law in which the trial judge is 
given more discretion than in ruling on challenges of jurors for cause.  
 
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Appellate courts consistently recognize that the trial judge who is 
present during voir dire is in a far superior position to properly 
evaluate the responses to the questions propounded to the jurors. 
Cook v. State, 542 So. 2d 964, 969 (Fla. 1989). 
The trial judge and the attorneys were in the best position to determine 
whether the prospective juror would be able to follow the law.  Therefore, we 
affirm the circuit court’s summary denial of this claim.  To the extent that White 
raises a substantive claim on this juror’s excusal, that claim is procedurally barred 
because it should have been raised on direct appeal.  Morris v. State, 931 So. 2d 
821, 832 n.12 (Fla. 2006). 
In his final claim, White asserts that his resentencing counsel was ineffective 
for failing during voir dire to fully question an African-American man who 
eventually served as a juror at White’s resentencing to ensure that the race issue in 
this case would not improperly bias him.  This race issue concerns Richard 
DiMarino’s testimony setting forth that Crawford was beaten and ultimately killed 
because she seemed attracted to an African-American man.  The circuit court 
summarily denied White’s claim, finding that “[t]he possibility of there being a 
racial aspect to some of the evidence was covered with [the juror] during voir 
dire.”  Postconviction Order at 16. 
The following exchange occurred during voir dire: 
MR. MULLER: Okay.  Let me ask you this question: There are 
certain things that are right at the core of our being.  And if there was 
 
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evidence that in the whole circumstance of this situation in 1978 that 
there were racial undertones in this homicide involving blacks and 
whites, would that factor cause you to think oh, my gosh, and it would 
substantially affect your ability to apply the law as the judge instructs? 
JUROR: Not a racial situation. 
MR. MULLER: Please understand, sir, I’m not trying to–– 
JUROR: Yes, sir. I mean–– 
MR. MULLER: Question number 27 under political 
identification, you put other.  Can you tell me about that? 
We affirm the summary denial of this claim.  The record shows that the juror 
was questioned and given an opportunity to respond as to whether the racial issue 
would affect his ability to apply the law.  He responded that it would not.  Thus, 
counsel’s performance was not deficient because the juror was asked whether this 
racial overtone to the case would affect his impartiality, and the juror responded 
that it would not. 
Moreover, White failed to sufficiently allege that the juror actually was 
biased and thus failed to sufficiently allege any prejudice in his postconviction 
motion.  See Davis v. State, 928 So. 2d 1089, 1117 (Fla. 2005) (“[E]ven if we were 
to conclude that this failure rendered trial counsel’s performance deficient, Davis 
has failed to demonstrate how this prejudiced these proceedings.  Davis has not 
provided evidence that any unqualified juror served in this case, that any juror was 
biased or had an animus toward the mentally ill or persons suffering from drug 
addiction.”), cert. dismissed, 126 S. Ct. 1649, and cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 206 
 
- 23 -
 
- 24 -
(2006).  We agree with the circuit court’s holding that the facts set out in the record 
show that no error occurred, and therefore, we affirm the denial of this claim. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we affirm the denial of the postconviction motion. 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Orange County,  
Margaret T. Waller, Judge - Case No. 48-1978-CF-1840-O 
 
Bill Jennings, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Peter J. Cannon and Robert T. 
Strain. Assistant CCR Counsel, Middle Region, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Stephen D. Ake, 
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee