Title: State v. Collington

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 290PA15-2  
Filed 25 September 2020 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
v. 
JEFFREY TRYON COLLINGTON 
 
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision 
of the Court of Appeals, 259 N.C. App. 127, 814 S.E.2d 874 (2018), affirming an order 
granting defendant’s motion for appropriate relief entered on 3 April 2017 by 
Judge Mark E. Powell in Superior Court, Transylvania County. Heard in the 
Supreme Court on 18 November 2019. 
 
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Teresa M. Postell, Assistant Attorney 
General, for the State-appellant. 
 
North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services, Inc., by Christopher J. Heaney, for 
defendant-appellee. 
 
 
BEASLEY, Chief Justice. 
 
In this case, we must determine whether appellate counsel’s failure to cite a 
particular case or line of cases amounted to constitutionally ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Because the facts present in the line of cases the Court of Appeals would 
have had appellate counsel cite are distinguishable from those of this case, that 
precedent does not govern the instant case and appellate counsel’s failure to rely 
thereon is objectively reasonable.  
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Facts and Procedural History 
The State’s primary witness, Christopher Hoskins, testified that he went to 
the recording studio of Dade Sapp to “hang out” on the evening of 1 October 2012. 
Shortly after his arrival, two men identified by Hoskins as defendant and Clarence 
Featherstone entered the studio and demanded to speak with someone named “Tony.” 
Defendant asked Hoskins if he was Tony and pointed a gun at Hoskins when Hoskins 
answered that he was not. Hoskins testified that defendant and Featherstone beat 
him up, went through his pockets and removed approximately $900 in cash, and left 
the studio. At trial, Hoskins identified the gun that was reportedly wielded by 
defendant as belonging to Sapp.  
Defendant’s testimony differed greatly from that of Hoskins. Defendant 
testified that he and Featherstone went to the studio that evening but that the 
purpose of the visit was for Featherstone to purchase oxycodone from Hoskins. An 
argument ensued over the amount paid for the oxycodone, which resulted in a 
fistfight between Hoskins, defendant, and Featherstone. Defendant testified the 
following:  
Sapp had set the whole deal up, and he had tried to cross 
us all up. He had taken warrants out on us for robbing his 
studio, when he had set up this whole ordeal. . . . He told 
the cops that we came in and robbed his studio. But that’s 
not what happened. He set up a drug deal and got half of 
the pills that were purchased, or at least somewhere near 
. . . I did admit that I got in a physical altercation after he 
tried to retaliate for the rest of his money.  
 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
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Defendant also testified that he never possessed a gun during the altercation. 
Rather, defendant testified that later in the evening, he and Featherstone met Sapp 
in a McDonald’s parking lot. There, Sapp gave the gun to Featherstone and asked 
him to hold onto it because according to defendant, Sapp “was scared due to the fact 
[that] he had gave the detectives and Mr. Hoskins a story about [how] he couldn’t 
locate his gun.” Defendant testified that he did not know what Featherstone did with 
the gun after the interaction.  
Defendant was indicted for robbery with a dangerous weapon, conspiracy to 
commit robbery with a dangerous weapon, possession of a firearm by a felon, and 
being a habitual felon. The indictment charging defendant with possession of a 
firearm by a felon stated that defendant “did have in [his] control a black handgun, 
which is a firearm” and that defendant had previously been convicted of a felony. 
Without objection by defendant, the trial court instructed the jury that  
[f]or a person to be guilty of a crime it is not necessary that 
he personally do all of the acts necessary to constitute the 
crime. If two or more persons join in a common purpose to 
commit the crime of robbery with a dangerous weapon 
and/or possession of a firearm by a felon, each of them, if 
actually or constructively present, is not only guilty of that 
crime if the other person commits the crime but [is] also 
guilty of any other crime committed by the other in 
pursuance of the common purpose to commit robbery with 
a dangerous weapon and/or possession of a firearm by a 
felon, or as a natural or probable consequence thereof. 
 
If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable 
doubt that on or about the alleged date the defendant 
acting either by himself or acting together [with] 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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. . . Featherstone with a common purpose to commit the 
crime of robbery with a dangerous weapon and/or 
possession of a firearm by a felon, each of them if actually 
or constructively present, is guilty of robbery with a 
dangerous weapon and/or possession of a firearm by [a] 
felon. 
 
With respect to the specific charge of possession of a firearm by a felon, the trial court 
instructed the jury on the following:  
The defendant has been charged with possessing a 
firearm after having been convicted of a felony. For you to 
find the defendant guilty of this offense, the State must 
prove two things beyond a reasonable doubt.  
 
First, that on April 20, 2006, in the Superior Court 
Criminal Session of Transylvania County the defendant 
was convicted by pleading guilty to the felony of possession 
with the intent to sell and deliver cocaine that was 
committed on October 26, 2005, in violation of the laws of 
the State of North Carolina.  
 
And second, that thereafter the defendant possessed 
a firearm.  
 
If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant was convicted of a felony in the 
Superior Court of Transylvania County, State of North 
Carolina, on April 10, 2006, and that the defendant 
thereafter possessed a firearm, it would be your duty to 
return a verdict of guilty.  
 
If you do not so find or have a reasonable doubt as to 
one or more of these things, it would be your duty to return 
a verdict of not guilty. 
 
The jury found defendant guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon and being 
a habitual felon. He was not found guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon and 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon. The verdict sheet did not 
indicate whether the jury convicted defendant of possession of a firearm by a felon 
under a theory of actual possession or under a theory of acting in concert. Defendant 
was sentenced to 86 to 115 months imprisonment.  
Defendant appealed the conviction, contending that the trial court committed 
plain error by instructing the jury on the acting in concert theory with respect to the 
charge of possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant specifically argued that the 
jury instruction impermissibly allowed the jury to convict him of possession of a 
firearm by a felon based on testimony that Featherstone received a gun from Sapp in 
the McDonald’s parking lot. In a unanimous, unpublished decision, the Court of 
Appeals held that defendant had not established that the trial court committed plain 
error in instructing the jury on the acting in concert theory for the charge of 
possession of a firearm by a felon. State v. Collington (Collington I), No. COA14-1244, 
2015 WL 4081786, at *4 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) (unpublished). The Court of Appeals 
opined that although the jury did not believe that defendant robbed Hoskins, both 
defendant and Hoskins testified that they engaged in a physical altercation; 
therefore, the jury reasonably could have believed that defendant was in possession 
of Sapp’s gun at the time. Id.  
Finally, the Court of Appeals observed that defendant had not presented an 
argument under State v. Pakulski, 319 N.C. 562, 356 S.E.2d 319 (1987), “which held 
that a trial court commits plain error when it instructs a jury on disjunctive theories 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-6- 
of a crime,” one of which was erroneous, and it cannot be discerned from the record 
the theory upon which the jury relied. Id. Noting that “[i]t is not the role of the 
appellate courts . . . to create an appeal for an appellant,” the Court of Appeals 
concluded that defendant had not sufficiently demonstrated plain error. Id. (first 
quoting Viar v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 359 N.C. 400, 402, 610 S.E.2d 360, 361 (2005); 
then citing State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 516, 723 S.E.2d 326, 333 (2012)). 
Defendant filed a petition for discretionary review, which this Court denied on 24 
September 2015. 
After the Court of Appeals’ decision in Collington I, defendant filed a motion 
for appropriate relief in the trial court alleging ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel. Specifically, defendant argued that had his appellate counsel made the 
proper argument under Pakulski, a reasonable probability exists that defendant 
would have received a new trial on appeal. The trial court denied defendant’s motion 
for appropriate relief on 13 October 2016, stating that “the Court of Appeals found 
that no plain error was established in the trial . . . even assuming . . . an acting in 
concert instruction was improper.” Defendant petitioned the Court of Appeals for writ 
of certiorari. The Court of Appeals entered an order allowing the petition for writ of 
certiorari, vacating the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion for appropriate 
relief, and remanding the case to the trial court to enter an appropriate order. The 
Court of Appeals reasoned that “the trial court utilized the incorrect legal standard 
in assessing defendant’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim.” On 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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remand, the trial court entered an order granting the motion for appropriate relief, 
vacating defendant’s conviction, and awarding defendant a new trial. The State 
proceeded to file a motion in the Court of Appeals to temporarily stay the trial court’s 
order, a petition for writ of supersedeas, and a petition for writ of certiorari seeking 
review of the trial court’s order. On 2 May 2017, the Court of Appeals allowed the 
State’s motion for a temporary stay. On 17 May 2017, the Court of Appeals allowed 
the State’s petition for writ of certiorari and petition for writ of supersedeas. On 17 
April 2018, in a unanimous, published decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
trial court’s order, holding that defendant’s appellate counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective for failing to make arguments under Pakulski. State v. Collington 
(Collington II), 259 N.C. App. 127, 141, 814 S.E.2d 874, 885 (2018) (“[H]ad appellate 
counsel proffered the arguments under Pakulski, defendant would have secured a 
new trial upon simply demonstrating that the acting in concert instruction was given 
in error.”) The State petitioned this Court for discretionary review, which we allowed 
on 5 December 2018.   
Discussion 
This Court reviews opinions of the Court of Appeals for errors of law. State v. 
Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 149, 446 S.E.2d 579, 590 (1994). To prove ineffective assistance 
of counsel, a defendant must satisfy the following two-part test: 
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s 
performance was deficient. This requires showing that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by 
the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show 
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel’s error [was] so serious as to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is 
reliable. 
 
State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 562, 324 S.E.2d 241, 248 (1985) (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)). 
The proper standard for effective attorney performance is that of objectively 
reasonable assistance. Id. at 561–62, 324 S.E.2d at 248 (“When a defendant attacks 
his conviction on the basis that counsel was ineffective, he must show that his 
counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”). The reviewing 
court “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the 
broad range of what is reasonable assistance,” State v. Fisher, 318 N.C. 512, 532, 
350 S.E.2d 334, 346 (1986), and “strive to ‘eliminate the distorting effects of 
hindsight,’ ” State v. Augustine, 359 N.C. 709, 719, 616 S.E.2d 515, 524 (2005) 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065).  
The Court of Appeals concluded that appellate counsel was ineffective for 
failing to cite Pakulski. We disagree for two reasons. First, the opinion in Pakulski 
employed a standard of review different from the standard of review applicable in the 
instant case. Second, defendant’s appellate counsel did, in fact, make the arguments 
he should have made, albeit by reference to different authority. 
The standard of review for alleged instructional errors depends on whether the 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-9- 
defendant preserved the error for appeal by raising an objection in the trial court. 
N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1), (4). Where the defendant fails to preserve the issue, he faces 
a greater burden on appeal. In Lawrence, the defendant was convicted of several 
offenses, including conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon. 365 N.C. 
at 510, 723 S.E.2d at 329.  
[I]n its charge on conspiracy to commit robbery with 
a dangerous weapon, the trial court correctly instructed 
that robbery with a dangerous weapon is the taking of 
property from a person ‘while using a firearm,’ but 
erroneously omitted the element that the weapon must 
have been used to endanger or threaten the life of the 
victim.  
Id. Because the defendant did not object to the jury instruction at trial, we applied 
the plain error standard of review. Id. at 512, 723 S.E.2d at 330 (“Because the plain 
error standard of review imposes a heavier burden on the defendant than the 
harmless error standard, it is to the defendant’s advantage to object at trial and 
thereby preserve the error for harmless error review.”). Under the more exacting 
standard of plain error review, we concluded that despite the acknowledged 
instructional error, the defendant had not met the burden of proving “that, after 
examination of the entire record, the error ‘had a probable impact on the jury’s finding 
that the defendant was guilty.’ ” Id. at 518, 723 S.E.2d at 334 (quoting State v. Odom, 
307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983)).  
In this case, the Court of Appeals’ decision appears to be based on a 
misidentification of the standard of review applied in Pakulski. The confusion is 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-10- 
understandable. Admittedly, our opinion in Pakulski lacks clarity. The Court does 
not explicitly state which standard of review the Court applied. Nor does the Court 
explicitly state whether the defendant objected to the jury instructions at trial—the 
fact on which the identity of the applicable standard of review turns.  
In Pakulski, the trial court instructed the jury on the felony-murder rule based 
on two predicate felonies, only one of which was legally supported by the evidence. 
Pakulski, 319 N.C. at 564, 356 S.E.2d at 321. The entirety of the discussion relevant 
to this issue is contained in a single, short section that reads, in relevant part, that  
[w]here the trial judge has submitted the case to the jury 
on alternative theories, one of which is determined to be 
erroneous and the other properly submitted, and we cannot 
discern from the record the theory upon which the jury 
relied, this Court will not assume that the jury based its 
verdict on the theory for which it received a proper 
instruction. Instead, we resolve the ambiguity in favor of 
the defendant. 
 
Id. at 574, 356 S.E.2d at 326.  
Although we failed to explicitly state it in our opinion, it appears that we 
applied the harmless error standard of review in Pakulski. First, we noted that the 
State asked the Court to hold that the trial court’s error was harmless. Id. at 574, 356 
S.E.2d at 326 (“The State contends that error in submitting the breaking or entering 
felony is harmless because the jury could have based its verdict solely on the robbery 
felony.” (Emphasis added.)). If we had believed at the time that the State had 
misidentified the standard of review, it seems reasonable to assume that we would 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-11- 
have noted that fact.1  
This Court’s failure to clearly state the standard of review in Pakulski has been 
rectified by subsequent decisions, which have made clear that the Pakulski rule 
applies when the issue is properly preserved on appeal. As such, the distinction 
between the standard of review to be applied to preserved issues and that which 
should be applied to unpreserved issues was born not in Pakulski, but in the case law 
                                            
1 In fact, we did note a misidentification of the standard of review applicable to a 
different issue in Pakulski, as follows: 
The State requests that we review this assignment of 
error under the plain error rule, inasmuch as the omission was 
not called to the court’s attention prior to jury deliberations. 
However, based on our reading of the record, it appears that 
defense counsel complied with the spirit of [Rule 10(a)(4)] of the 
North Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure], which in pertinent 
part provides: 
No party may assign as error any portion of the 
jury charge or omission therefrom unless he 
objects thereto before the jury retires to consider 
its verdict, stating distinctly that to which he 
objects and the grounds of his objection . . . . An 
exception to the failure to give particular 
instructions to the jury . . . shall identify the 
omitted instruction . . . by setting out its 
substance immediately following the instructions 
given . . . .  
It is clear from the record that the defendant requested 
an instruction on impeaching a witness with a prior inconsistent 
statement. Therefore, our review consists of a determination of 
whether the court erred in failing to give the requested 
instruction and, if so, whether there is a reasonable possibility 
that had the error not been committed, a different result would 
have been reached.  
State v. Pakulski, 319 N.C. 562, 574–75, 356 S.E.2d 319, 327 (1987) (second through fifth 
alterations in original) (quoting N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(4)). 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-12- 
that followed. Secondly, in view of the fact that the defendants 'moved to dismiss on 
the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to permit the court to charge the 
jury on a theory of felony murder,' Pakulski, 319 N.C. at 571, 356 S.E.2d at 325, it is 
clear that the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to support an instruction 
permitting the jury to find the defendants guilty of felony murder on any theory was 
brought to the trial court’s attention in advance of the delivery of the trial court's jury 
instructions, thereby serving the purpose of the contemporaneous objection now 
required by N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(2). In State v. Maddux, 371 N.C. 558, 563, 819 
S.E.2d 367, 370 (2018), we reaffirmed that the plain error standard applies in cases 
involving unpreserved jury instruction issues. There, the trial court erroneously 
instructed the jury that the defendant could be found guilty either through a theory 
of individual guilt or a theory of aiding and abetting. The defendant did not object to 
the jury instructions at trial, and the jury convicted the defendant using a general 
verdict sheet. Thus, the record did not reflect whether the conviction was based on a 
theory of individual guilt or a theory of aiding and abetting. Id. at 562, 819 S.E.2d at 
370. We concluded that the defendant had not met his burden of proving plain error, 
and we rejected defendant’s argument that Pakulski should govern our decision. 
[D]efendant argues that we cannot uphold his conviction 
even though there is ample evidence of his individual guilt 
because we have held that reversible error occurs when a 
jury is presented with alternative theories of guilt when 
(1) one of the theories is not supported by the evidence, and 
(2) it is unclear upon which theory the jury convicted 
defendant. . . . This rule, however, is not applicable to plain 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-13- 
error cases, such as this one, in which the error complained 
of is not preserved. As such, we need not address the 
substance of this argument. 
 
Id. at 567 n.11, 819 S.E.2d at 373 n.11 (emphasis added).  
In State v. Malachi, 371 N.C. 719, 821 S.E.2d 407 (2018), we again referred to 
Pakulski as a harmless error case. See id. at 733 n.5, 821 S.E.2d at 418 n.5 
(“This Court did discuss the harmless error issue in Pakulski, in which the State 
sought a finding of non-prejudice on the grounds that ‘the jury could have based its 
verdict solely on the robbery felony.’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting Pakulski, 319 N.C. 
at 574, 356 S.E.2d at 326)). We also made clear in Malachi that Pakulski did not 
create a rule of per se reversible error in all cases involving disjunctive jury 
instructions. Id. at 726, 821 S.E.2d at 413. Thus, neither the plain error standard of 
review nor the harmless error standard of review will automatically entitle a 
defendant to a new trial as a matter of law. See also State v. Boyd, 366 N.C. 548, 742 
S.E.2d 798 (2013) (reversing a decision of the Court of Appeals on the basis of a 
dissent that concluded that the defendant had failed to establish that the trial court's 
decision to allow the jury to consider whether the defendant was guilty of second 
degree kidnaping on the basis of a theory not supported by the evidence did not 
constitute plain error given the existence of “overwhelming” evidence tending to 
support other theories of guilt). Rather, each case must be resolved under the 
appropriate standard of review. 
Confusion 
over 
Pakulski 
notwithstanding, 
this 
Court’s 
precedent 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-14- 
demonstrates that unpreserved issues related to jury instructions are reviewed under 
a plain error standard, while preserved issues are reviewed under a harmless error 
standard. See, e.g., State v. Mumma, 372 N.C. 226, 241, 827 S.E.2d 288, 298 (2019) 
(“As a result of defendant’s failure to object to the delivery of an ‘aggressor’ instruction 
to the jury before the trial court, defendant is only entitled to argue that the delivery 
of the ‘aggressor’ instruction constituted plain error.”); Malachi, 371 N.C. at 719, 
821 S.E.2d at 407 (holding that the trial court’s error was subject to the harmless 
error standard of review where the defendant lodged an objection at trial); State v. 
Juarez, 369 N.C. 351, 357–58, 794 S.E.2d 293, 299 (2016) (“Because defendant did 
not object to the instruction as given at trial, we consider whether this instruction 
constitutes plain error.”); State v. Galaviz-Torres, 368 N.C. 44, 772 S.E.2d 434 (2015) 
(applying the plain error standard of review where the defendant’s trial counsel did 
not object to any of the trial court’s instructions); State v. Petersilie, 334 N.C. 169, 432 
S.E.2d 832 (1993) (applying the harmless error standard of review where the trial 
court, despite the defendant’s objection, incorrectly instructed the jury regarding one 
of two possible theories upon which the defendant could be convicted).  
The fundamental purpose of such a rule is to incentivize the parties to make 
timely objections so that the trial court may resolve the issue in real time. State v. 
Walker, 316 N.C. 33, 39, 340 S.E.2d 80, 83 (1986) (holding that the test for the plain 
error standard of review places a heavier burden upon the defendant because the 
defendant could have prevented any error by making a timely objection). However, 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-15- 
“[p]lain error review allows appellate courts to alleviate the potential harshness of 
preservation rules,” Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 514, 723 S.E.2d at 332, by allowing 
appellate courts to “take notice of errors for which no objection or exception had been 
made when ‘the errors [were] obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect[ed] the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings,’ ” id. at 515, 723 S.E.2d 
at 332 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S. Ct. 391, 392 
(1936)). This distinction is codified in our Rules of Appellate Procedure and has been 
supported by decades of this Court’s precedent. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(4)2 (“In 
criminal cases, an issue that was not preserved by objection noted at trial and that is 
not deemed preserved by rule or law without any such action nevertheless may be 
made the basis of an issue presented on appeal when the judicial action questioned 
is specifically and distinctly contended to amount to plain error.”).  
The purpose of [Rule 10(a)(4)] is to encourage the parties 
to inform the trial court of errors in its instructions so that 
it can correct the instructions and cure any potential errors 
before the jury deliberates on the case and thereby 
eliminate the need for a new trial. Indeed, even when the 
“plain error” rule is applied, “[i]t is the rare case in which 
an improper instruction will justify reversal of a criminal 
conviction when no objection has been made in the trial 
court.” 
 
Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 517, 723 S.E.2d at 333 (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 
145, 154, 97 S. Ct. 1730, 1736, 52 L. Ed. 2d 203, 212 (1977)). Considering the extensive 
                                            
2 Since this Court’s holding in Lawrence, the Rules of Appellate Procedure have been 
revised such that Rule 10(b)(2) is now codified as Rule 10(a)(4) (“Plain Error”). 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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precedent of this Court and the important interests promoted by clear rules related 
to issue preservation, we see no reason to create a subset of cases in which an 
unpreserved issue relating to jury instructions qualifies for harmless error review. 
Here, defendant did not object at trial to the trial court’s jury instructions.  The 
issue, therefore, was not properly preserved for appeal and could be reviewed only for 
plain error. Because today the standard of review applied in Pakulski applies only to 
preserved issues, it would have had little precedential value in the instant case, and 
appellate counsel’s failure to cite it was not objectively unreasonable. 
Furthermore, appellate counsel’s arguments were appropriate for plain error 
review. Appellate counsel argued that the trial court committed plain error by 
instructing the jury that defendant would be guilty if he had acted in concert to 
commit the offense of possession of a firearm by a felon. Quoting Lawrence, appellate 
counsel argued that “the plain error prejudice standard is not insufficiency of the 
evidence, but is whether ‘the error had a probable impact on the jury verdict.’ ” 
Appellate counsel argued that the error did in fact have a probable impact on the 
jury’s verdict by demonstrating the probability that the jury found defendant guilty 
merely for accompanying Featherstone when Featherstone acquired the firearm from 
Sapp. Ultimately, appellate counsel argued that the jury was presented with multiple 
theories of guilt, one of which was erroneous, and that the error “had a probable 
impact on the jury’s finding that the defendant was guilty.” See Lawrence, 365 N.C. 
at 518, 723 S.E.2d at 334. This was the appropriate argument and employed the 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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correct standard of review. 
It is important to note that the underlying issue of whether the trial court 
committed reversible error is not before this Court. The issue brought before the 
Court is whether defendant’s appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to cite to 
the Pakulski line of cases. We make no determination as to whether the trial court 
erred by instructing the jury on the acting in concert theory of guilt for the possession 
of a firearm by a felon charge, as that is not the issue before us. Our task today is 
merely to determine whether appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective. Even 
assuming arguendo that the trial court committed plain error, we cannot fault 
appellate counsel for the Court of Appeals’ failure to so hold. 
Accordingly, we hold that defendant failed to prove that his appellate counsel’s 
conduct “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Braswell, 312 N.C. 
at 561–62, 324 S.E.2d at 248.3 We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals to the 
contrary. 
 
REVERSED. 
                                            
3 Because defendant fails to demonstrate the deficiency of appellate counsel’s 
performance we need not and do not address the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance 
of counsel analysis. See State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 563, 324 S.E.2d 241, 248 (1985); 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2069 (1984) (“[T]here is no 
reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to . . . address both components of 
the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.”). 
 
Justice ERVIN, concurring. 
 
I agree with the Court’s interpretation of our earlier decision in State v. 
Pakulski, 319 N.C. 562, 356 S.E.2d 319 (1987), and the Court’s determination that 
defendant has failed to demonstrate that the representation that he received from his 
appellate counsel “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” State v. 
Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 561–62, 324 S.E.2d 241, 248 (1985) (quoting Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984)), in 
spite of the fact that defendant’s appellate counsel did not cite Pakulski when 
defendant’s appeal was initially decided by the Court of Appeals and join the Court’s 
opinion for that reason.  I am, however, concerned that the Court’s opinion can be 
read to suggest that a defendant cannot, regardless of the state of the evidentiary 
record, be convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon based upon the theory of 
acting in concert and write separately in an attempt to make sure that our decision 
does not create any unnecessary confusion with respect to this issue. 
In his initial appeal to the Court of Appeals, defendant contended that the trial 
court committed plain error by instructing the jury that it could convict defendant of 
possession of a firearm by a felon on the basis of the acting in concert doctrine.  More 
specifically, defendant asserted that the trial court had committed plain error by 
“allow[ing] the jury to find [defendant] guilty of possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon for Featherstone’s possession of the Glock pistol which [defendant] testified 
Sapp handed to Featherstone at the McDonald’s later that night after whatever had 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Ervin, J., concurring 
 
 
-2- 
occurred at the recording studio.”  In its initial, unpublished decision in this case, the 
Court of Appeals determined that, in light of defendant’s concession that there was 
sufficient evidence to permit the jury to find defendant guilty of possession of a 
firearm by a convicted felon on the basis of actual or constructive possession, 
“[d]efendant has not established plain error in the present case, even assuming 
arguendo that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on an acting in concert 
theory for the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,” State v. 
Collington, No. COA14-1244, 2015 WL 4081786, at *8 (July 7, 2015) (Collington I) 
(citing State v. Diaz, 155 N.C. App. 307, 314, 575 S.E.2d 523, 528 (2002)), while noting 
that “[d]efendant ha[d] not presented [that Court] with any arguments under State 
v. Pakulski, 319 N.C. 562, 574, 356 S.E.2d 319, 326 (1987).”  Id. at *9. 
In the aftermath of the Court of Appeals’ decision, defendant filed a motion for 
appropriate relief in which he alleged that he had received ineffective assistance of 
counsel on appeal.  Defendant argued that, “[a]s a general rule, the acting in concert 
theory is not applicable to possession offenses,” citing Diaz, 155 N.C. App. at 314–15, 
575 S.E.2d at 528–29 (2002) (stating that “[t]he acting in concert theory is not 
generally applicable to possession offenses, as it tends to become confused with other 
theories of guilt”), and  State v. Baize, 71 N.C. App. 521, 530, 323 S.E.2d 36, 42 (1984) 
(stating that “[w]e have found no acting in concert case in which the State was allowed 
to leap, in one single bound, the double hurdles of constructive presence and 
constructive possession”).  In defendant’s view, while “acting in concert may be 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Ervin, J., concurring 
 
 
-3- 
instructed properly in cases charging possession of contraband,” citing State v. Diaz, 
317 N.C. 545, 552, 346 S.E.2d 488, 493 (1986), “[f]irearms . . . are not contraband per 
se” and, since “possession of a firearm by a felon [includes] an element personal to 
defendant–his or her status as a convicted felon–that only the defendant can satisfy,” 
“acting in concert is not a valid theory for the possession of a firearm by a felon 
charge.”  As a result, defendant argued that, “[l]ike Pakulski, the present case 
involves a situation where both valid and invalid instructions were presented to the 
jury”; that it was impossible to determine whether the jury convicted defendant of 
possession of a firearm by a felon based upon the theory of actual or constructive 
possession or the theory of acting in concert; and that, “had [appellate] counsel made 
an argument pursuant to Pakulski, the remedy would have been a new trial.”  As a 
result, defendant contended that he was entitled to a new trial. 
On 13 October 2016, the trial court entered an order denying defendant’s 
motion for appropriate relief on the grounds “that no actual prejudice ha[d] been 
shown by the failure of the [d]efendant’s appellate counsel to argue Pakulski, and 
that failure now to consider said argument [would] not result in a fundamental 
miscarriage of justice.”  On 13 December 2016, defendant filed a petition seeking the 
issuance of a writ of certiorari in the Court of Appeals authorizing review of the trial 
court’s denial of defendant’s motion for appropriate relief.  On 29 December 2016, the 
Court of Appeals entered an order providing, among other things, that it had not held 
in Collington I “that defendant’s claim of plain error was meritless irrespective of 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Ervin, J., concurring 
 
 
-4- 
whether his appellate counsel raised any arguments under [Pakulski]” and ordering 
that this case be remanded “to the trial court to enter an appropriate . . . order 
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1420(c)(7).  On 3 April 2017, the trial court entered an 
order granting defendant’s motion for appropriate relief and awarding defendant a 
new trial in which it concluded, in pertinent part, that: 
(2)  The jury was incorrectly instructed on the theory of 
acting in concert but correctly instructed on actual and 
constructive possession. 
 
(3)  With no way to determine the jury’s rationale for its 
guilty verdict, [d]efendant would have been entitled to 
a new trial if appellate counsel had made the proper 
argument pursuant to Pakulski on appeal.   
 
(4)  A reasonable attorney would have been aware of 
Pakulski, its application to [d]efendant’s case, and the 
remedy of a new trial that it would provide. 
  
(5)  Appellate counsel’s performance fell below an objective 
standard of professional reasonableness.  While 
appellate counsel did argue that the instruction on 
acting in concert was invalid, he did not complete the 
argument by arguing that because disjunctive jury 
instructions were given, one of which was improper, 
and there was no finding as to the jury’s chosen theory, 
there was plain error under Pakulski and [d]efendant 
is entitled to a new trial. 
  
(6)  But for appellate counsel’s error, there is a reasonable 
probability that the Court of Appeals would have found 
plain error and granted [d]efendant a new trial. 
  
(7)  Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment. 
 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Ervin, J., concurring 
 
 
-5- 
On 17 May 2017, the Court of Appeals allowed the State’s request for certiorari review 
of the trial court’s order. 
In seeking relief from the trial court’s order before the Court of Appeals, the 
State argued that an acting in concert instruction “has never been held to be 
improper” in cases like this one and that, even if the delivery of the acting in concert 
instruction in this case was erroneous, the failure of defendant’s appellate counsel to 
advance an argument in reliance upon Pakulski did not constitute deficient 
performance for purposes of the test enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).  In affirming the trial court’s order, 
the Court of Appeals noted that, in Collington I, it had been “left to determine” merely 
“whether ‘[t]he jury reasonably could have believed that [d]efendant was in [actual or 
constructive] possession of’ a gun from the evidence presented, regardless of the 
impropriety of the acting in concert instruction.”  State v. Collington, 259 N.C. App. 
127, 138, 814 S.E.2d 874, 884 (2018) (Collington II) (first and third alteration in 
original).  The Court of Appeals stated that, “had appellate counsel proffered the 
arguments under Pakulski [in Collington I], defendant would have secured a new 
trial upon simply demonstrating that the acting in concert instruction was given in 
error—plain error would be shown irrespective of the evidence admitted at trial in 
support of defendant’s actual or constructive possession of a firearm.”  Id. at 141, 814 
S.E.2d at 885.  However, the Court of Appeals pointed out that “[a]ppellate counsel 
simply argued [in Collington I] that the theory of acting in concert is inapplicable to 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Ervin, J., concurring 
 
 
-6- 
the crime of possession of a firearm by a felon, without proffering any supporting 
authority as to why such an error would require a new trial.”  Id. at 141, 814 S.E.2d 
at 886.  Had defendant’s “appellate counsel . . . argued [in Collington I] that plain 
error was established pursuant to Pakulski, . . . [the Court of Appeals] would have, 
under the direction of Pakulski, been required to examine . . . whether the jury 
instruction on acting in concert was in fact improper.”  Id. at 143, 814 S.E.2d at 887.  
In addition, the Court of Appeals held that, “given the persuasiveness of defendant’s 
argument that acting in concert is not an appropriate theory upon which to base a 
conviction of possession of a firearm by a felon, there is a reasonable probability that, 
had appellate counsel cited Pakulski [in Collington I], [the Court of Appeals] would 
have concluded [in that case] that defendant was entitled to a new trial.”  Id.  As a 
result, the record seems to reflect that the substantive premise upon which 
defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal claim rested and upon which 
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals relied in granting defendant’s motion 
for appropriate relief was a determination that defendant could not have been 
properly convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon on the basis of an acting in 
concert theory regardless of the state of the evidentiary record. 
Although the manner in which the Court has chosen to decide this case rests 
upon what appears to me to be a correct analysis of the applicable legal principles, I 
am concerned that certain statements contained in our opinion may create 
unnecessary confusion in the substantive criminal law of North Carolina.  In order to 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Ervin, J., concurring 
 
 
-7- 
obtain relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in light of the 
theory alleged in defendant’s motion for appropriate relief, a reviewing court would 
have to determine that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that it could 
convict defendant of possession of a firearm by a felon and that the delivery of this 
instruction constituted plain error.  State v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285, 120 S. Ct. 
746, 764, 145 L. Ed. 2d 756, 780 (2000).  Although the Court states that “the 
underlying issue of whether the trial court committed reversible error is not before 
this Court”; that “[t]he issue brought before the Court is whether defendant’s 
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to cite to the Pakulski line of cases”; and 
that “[w]e make no determination as to whether the trial court erred by instructing 
the jury on the acting in concert theory of guilt for the possession of a firearm by a 
felon charge,” both the State and defendant presented arguments to this Court 
concerning the extent, if any, to which a defendant could lawfully be convicted of 
possession of a firearm by a felon in the briefs that they submitted for our 
consideration in this case.  For that reason, the issue of whether defendant could have 
lawfully been convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon on the basis of an acting 
in concert theory does seem to me to be before us in this case. 
Admittedly, neither this Court nor the Court of Appeals has directly held that 
a defendant can be convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon on the basis of an 
acting in concert theory.  However, given that the Court of Appeals described 
defendant’s argument that “acting in concert is not an appropriate theory upon which 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Ervin, J., concurring 
 
 
-8- 
to base a conviction of possession of a firearm” as “persuasive[ ],” Collington II, 259 
N.C. App. at 143, 814 S.E.2d at 887, I think that it is important to note that both this 
Court, see Diaz, 317 N.C. at 552, 346 S.E.2d at 493 (holding that the record contained 
sufficient evidence “to support the jury’s conclusion that defendant acted in concert 
with the traffickers to possess or transport in excess of 10,000 pounds of marijuana”), 
and the Court of Appeals, see Diaz, 155 N.C. App. at 314–15, 575 S.E.2d at 528–29 
(holding that the trial court did not err by instructing the jury that it could convict 
defendant of possession of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver on the basis of an 
acting in concert theory given that “there was evidence that the defendant had 
constructive possession and was acting in concert”); State v. Garcia, 111 N.C. App. 
636, 640–41, 433 S.E.2d 187, 189 (1993) (holding that “[t]he evidence was sufficient 
for the trial court, when considering it in a light most favorable to the State, to find 
that defendant acted in concert with [another individual] to possess the cocaine”); 
State v. Cotton, 102 N.C. App. 93, 98, 401 S.E.2d 376, 379 (1991) (holding that “the 
trial court did not err in instructing on acting in concert for the [possession of cocaine 
with the intent to sell or deliver] offense”), have upheld controlled substance 
possession convictions on the basis of an acting in concert theory.1  In addition, this 
                                            
1 Although the Court of Appeals awarded appellate relief to the defendants in State v. 
Autry, 101 N.C. App. 245, 254, 399 S.E.2d 357, 363 (1991); State v. James, 81 N.C. App. 91, 
96–97, 344 S.E.2d 77, 81 (1986); and Baize, 71 N.C. App. at 530, 323 S.E.2d at 42, based upon 
an erroneous use of the acting in concert doctrine, those decisions rested upon a 
determination that the record before the Court did not contain sufficient information to prove 
that the individuals in question had engaged in concerted action rather than upon a 
determination that the doctrine of acting in concert had no application to possessory offenses. 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Ervin, J., concurring 
 
 
-9- 
Court held in State v. Lovelace, 272 N.C. 496, 498–99, 158 S.E.2d 624, 625 (1968), 
that the defendant had been properly convicted of possession of implements of 
housebreaking, with the items in question being a large screwdriver and a hammer, 
on the basis of evidence tending to show that the defendant and another man “were 
acting together” and “were attempting to use [the tools] to force entry into the 
restaurant” even though “the tools were only seen in the hands of [the other man],” 
suggesting that the doctrine of acting in concert is available to show a defendant’s 
guilt of possessory offenses other than those involving contraband.  See also State v. 
Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 456–58, 533 S.E.2d 168, 228–29 (2000) (finding no error in the 
trial court’s decision to instruct the jury that it could find that the defendant was 
guilty of possession of a stolen vehicle on the basis of an acting in concert theory in 
the course of also allowing the jury to convict the defendant of robbery with a 
dangerous weapon and first-degree murder in reliance upon the doctrine of acting in 
concert). 
In apparent recognition of the general availability of the acting in concert 
doctrine in possession-related cases, defendant argues that “applying acting in 
concert to possession of a firearm by a felon impermissibly exceeds the plain statutory 
language that bans possession of a firearm only by a person with a felony conviction,” 
citing State v. Camp, 286 N.C. 148, 151, 209 S.E.2d 754, 756 (1974) (stating that 
“where a statute is intelligible without any additional words, no additional words may 
be supplied”) (citations omitted); N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1(a) (2019) (providing that “[i]t 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Ervin, J., concurring 
 
 
-10- 
shall be unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a felony to purchase, own, 
possess, or have in his custody, care, or control any firearm”).  However, the same 
statutory language from N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1(a) upon which defendant relies in 
support of this argument also appears, in essence, in the criminal statutes relating to 
the unlawful possession of controlled substances, N.C.G.S. § 90-95(a)(1) and (a)(2) 
(2019) (providing that “it is unlawful for any person” to “possess” or “possess with 
intent to . . . sell or deliver” “a controlled substance”); the possession of implements 
of housebreaking, N.C.G.S. § 14-55 (making it unlawful to “be found having in his 
possession, without lawful excuse, any picklock, key, bit, or other implement of 
housebreaking”); and the possession of a stolen motor vehicle, N.C.G.S. § 14-71.2 
(providing that “[a]ny person . . . who has in his possession any vehicle which he 
knows or has reason to believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken” “shall be 
punished as a Class H felon”).  For that reason, I am not persuaded, contrary to the 
suggestion made in the Court of Appeals’ opinion, that the doctrine of acting in 
concert is not available in cases in which a defendant is charged with possession of a 
firearm by a felon as long as the State has presented sufficient evidence that the 
defendant has been previously convicted of a felony and has, acting in concert with 
another, had a firearm in his possession.  Furthermore, I trust that the Court’s 
statement that “[w]e make no determination as to whether the trial court erred by 
instructing the jury on the acting in concert theory of guilt for the possession of a 
firearm by a felon charge” will not be understood to cast doubt upon the potential 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Ervin, J., concurring 
 
 
-11- 
applicability of the doctrine of acting in concert to cases in which a defendant is 
charged with possession of a firearm by a felon and will be understood to be doing 
nothing more than expressing the Court’s decision to refrain from deciding whether 
the acting in concert doctrine has any application in this case as a matter of fact. 
Justice NEWBY joins in this concurring opinion. 
 
Justice EARLS dissenting. 
 
Mr. Collington’s appellate counsel failed to make an argument on appeal that 
would have entitled him to relief.  There is no record evidence to suggest that the 
oversight was a matter of strategy or consistent with the law as it existed at the time.  
The Court of Appeals, in two separate opinions, stated that this failure resulted in 
Mr. Collington’s inability to obtain relief on appeal.  The majority, however, holds 
that this was not ineffective assistance of counsel.  I disagree, and therefore 
respectfully dissent. 
On 3 April 2017, the Superior Court, Transylvania County, granted Mr. 
Collington’s motion for appropriate relief (MAR), vacating his conviction and ordering 
a new trial.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order in a unanimous, 
published opinion filed on 17 April 2018.  State v. Collington (Collington II), 259 N.C. 
App. 127, 814 S.E.2d 874 (2018).  We allowed the State’s petition for discretionary 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
-2- 
review on 5 December 2018.1  Given the procedural posture and that neither party 
has contested the trial court’s findings of fact, those facts are binding on appeal.  
Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991).   
The trial court made the following findings of fact, from which it concluded that 
Mr. Collington’s appellate counsel had rendered ineffective assistance: 
(1) 
Defendant Jeffrey Tryon Collington went to trial on 
charges of possession of firearm by a felon, conspiracy to 
commit robbery with a dangerous weapon, and robbery 
with a dangerous weapon.  On 5 February 2014, a jury 
found Defendant not guilty of the robbery and conspiracy 
charges, and guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon.  He 
was sentenced as a habitual felon to a consolidated 
sentence of 86–115 months. 
(2) 
On the possession of a firearm by a felon charge, the 
jury was instructed that it could find Defendant guilty 
under the theories of actual possession, constructive 
                                            
1 Review of non-capital motions for appropriate relief by this Court is presumably 
limited to extreme situations.  Compare N.C.G.S. § 15A-1422(f) (2019) (“Decisions of the 
Court of Appeals on motions for appropriate relief that embrace matter set forth in G.S. 15A-
1415(b) are final and not subject to further review by appeal, certification, writ, motion, or 
otherwise.”); N.C.G.S. § 7A-28 (2019) (same); N.C. R. App. P. 15(a) (prohibiting the filing of a 
petition for discretionary review of proceedings on motions for appropriate relief); 
N.C. R. App. P. 21(e) (stating that “the Supreme Court will not entertain . . . petitions for 
further discretionary review” in non-capital cases of motions for appropriate relief 
“determined by the Court of Appeals”); with State v. Todd, 369 N.C. 707, 710, 799 S.E.2d 834, 
837 (2017) (holding that this Court may “exercise its rarely used general supervisory 
authority” to review otherwise-final Court of Appeals determinations on motions for 
appropriate relief).  It is striking that we should engage such rarely used constitutional 
authority in a case such as this, where there was no dissent in the Court of Appeals and even 
the majority suggests that the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of our precedent was 
reasonable.  Until recently, the Court of Appeals’ interpretation was also the interpretation 
of this Court.  See State v. Lynch, 327 N.C. 210, 219, 393 S.E.2d 811, 816 (1990) (applying our 
decision in Pakulski in a case involving plain error review). 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
-3- 
possession, or acting in concert.  The verdict sheets did not 
indicate under which theory the jury convicted Defendant. 
(3) 
On 22 December 2014, appellate counsel filed a brief 
arguing that 1) the Superior[ ] Court’s jury instruction that 
Defendant would be guilty if he had acted in concert to 
commit the crime of possession of a firearm by a felon was 
plain error and 2) [t]he Superior Court’s jury instruction 
that ‘If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable 
doubt that on or about the alleged date the defendant . . . 
acting together with Clarence Featherstone with a common 
purpose to commit the crime of . . . possession of a firearm 
by felon, each of them if actually or constructively present, 
is guilty of possession of a firearm by felon,’ was plain error. 
(4) 
Appellate counsel failed to argue that under State v. 
Pakulski, when disjunctive jury instructions are paired 
with an improper jury instruction, and there is no finding 
as to the jury’s chosen theory, the defendant is entitled to 
a new trial.  State v. Pakulski, 319 N.C. 562, 356 S.E.2d 
319 (1987). 
(5) 
On 7 July 2015, the Court of Appeals ruled that 
assuming the acting in concert instruction was improper, 
that alone does not rise to the level of plain error.  As 
appellate counsel did not raise a Pakulski argument, the 
Court of Appeals was not able to consider it. 
(6) 
Defendant, through appellate counsel, filed a 
Petition for Discretionary Review to the North Carolina 
Supreme Court, and it was denied on 24 September 2015. 
(7) 
On 30 March 2016, Defendant filed a Motion for 
Appropriate Relief on the grounds that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution because his appellate counsel failed to raise 
the Pakulski argument on appeal that plain error was 
committed because the trial court instructed the jury on 
disjunctive theories of a crime, one of which was improper, 
and the record does not show upon which theory the jury 
relied.  Defendant’s MAR was denied on 13 October 2016. 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
-4- 
(8) 
Defendant filed a petition for Writ of Certiorari in 
the North Carolina Court of Appeals on 13 December 2016.  
On 29 December 2016, the Court of Appeals issued an order 
vacating the 13 October 2016 order on Defendant’s MAR 
and remanding the case to the trial court to enter an 
appropriate dispositional order.   
When evaluating whether a defendant received effective assistance of counsel, 
we conduct a Strickland analysis.  State v. McNeill, 371 N.C. 198, 218, 813 S.E.2d 
797, 812 (2018); see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).  
The first step of the analysis is “whether counsel’s representation ‘fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness.’ ”  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366, 
130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2064).  
“[E]ven an isolated error of counsel” may violate the Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel “if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”  
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986).  Where appellate 
counsel “ha[s] researched the question, but ha[s] determined that the claim [is] 
unlikely to succeed,” Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 531–32, 106 S. Ct. 2661, 
2665 (1986), and therefore does not pursue the claim on appeal, counsel has not 
rendered ineffective assistance, id. at 535–36, 106 S. Ct. at 2667.  The important 
question, however, is whether the decision not to pursue a claim was the result of 
reasoned judgment or merely an error.  See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 
103 S. Ct. 3308, 3312 (1983) (“Neither Anders nor any other decision of this Court 
suggests, however, that the indigent defendant has a constitutional right to compel 
appointed counsel to press nonfrivolous points requested by the client, if counsel, as 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
-5- 
a matter of professional judgment, decides not to present those points.” (Second 
emphasis added.)).  Where “counsel unreasonably failed to discover nonfrivolous 
issues and to file a merits brief raising them,” the first prong of the Strickland test 
has been met.  Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285, 120 S. Ct. 746, 764 (2000).   
The majority provides two reasons for reversing the decision of the Court of 
Appeals, stating (1) that “defendant’s appellate counsel did, in fact, make the 
arguments he should have made, albeit by reference to different authority” and (2) 
that “the opinion in Pakulski employed a standard of review different from the 
standard of review applicable in the instant case.”  Both statements are inaccurate.  
First, the majority mischaracterizes the failure of appellate counsel and, in doing so, 
ignores both the trial court’s findings of fact and the statements of the Court of 
Appeals.  Second, the majority misidentifies the standard of review employed in 
Pakulski and, as a result, misstates Pakulski’s applicability to this case.2  
                                            
2 The majority goes to great lengths to explain the importance of distinguishing 
between plain error review, applied to unpreserved instructional error in criminal cases, and 
harmless error review, applied to preserved instructional error.  The majority even goes so 
far as to invoke “the extensive precedent of this Court” distinguishing preserved error from 
unpreserved error to justify its decision.  There is no question that, as the majority notes, 
“unpreserved issues related to jury instructions are reviewed under a plain error standard, 
while preserved issues are reviewed under a harmless error standard.”  The difference 
between the two types of review is not at issue in this case.  The rule stated by this Court in 
State v. Pakulski, 319 N.C. 562, 574, 356 S.E.2d 319, 326 (1987) is one of plain error review.  
As a result, in arguing for Pakulski’s applicability to this case, this dissent does not suggest 
that harmless error review should apply to unpreserved issues.   
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
-6- 
I. 
Mr. Collington’s appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to 
properly identify the error in the jury instruction.  The majority states that “[t]he 
Court of Appeals concluded that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to cite 
Pakulski.”  This is incorrect.  The trial court’s finding on this fact is instructive.  It 
stated the following: 
(4) 
Appellate counsel failed to argue that under State v. 
Pakulski, when disjunctive jury instructions are paired 
with an improper jury instruction, and there is no finding 
as to the jury’s chosen theory, the defendant is entitled to 
a new trial.  State v. Pakulski, 319 N.C. 562, 356 S.E.2d 
319 (1987).   
The Court of Appeals decision below is similarly instructive.  In describing the 
argument of Mr. Collington’s appellate counsel, the Court of Appeals stated the 
following:  
Defendant appealed his conviction of possession of a 
firearm by a felon to this Court, arguing “that the trial 
court committed plain error by providing the jury with an 
instruction on acting in concert with respect to the charge 
of possession of a firearm by a felon.” [State v. Collington 
(Collington I), No. COA-14-1244, 2015 WL 4081786, at] *7 
[(N.C. 
Ct. 
App. 
2015) 
(unpublished)]. 
Defendant 
specifically argued “that this instruction impermissibly 
allowed the jury to convict Defendant of possession of a 
firearm by a felon based on [his brother]—also a convicted 
felon—reportedly receiving the gun from Mr. Sapp in a 
McDonald’s parking lot on the evening of 1 October 2012.” 
Id. 
Collington II, 259 N.C. App. at 130, 814 S.E.2d at 879. 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
-7- 
While this may seem like a minor point, it is actually very important in the 
context of this case.  The majority attempts to recast the argument that appellate 
counsel actually made, writing that “appellate counsel argued that the jury was 
presented with multiple theories of guilt, one of which was erroneous, and that the 
error ‘had a probable impact on the jury’s finding that the defendant was guilty.’ ”  
This statement is wrong when measured against the trial court’s findings of fact and 
the Court of Appeals decision below.  But more importantly, it obfuscates the import 
of appellate counsel’s error.  The problem with the jury instruction was not only that 
the trial court submitted an erroneous instruction to the jury.  The instructional error 
was that an erroneous instruction was paired with a non-erroneous instruction, 
which allowed the jury to return a guilty verdict in an array of circumstances wider 
than the law permits.3  That instructional error is what appellate counsel failed to 
identify and argue to the Court of Appeals in Collington I.   
As a result, the majority is incorrect when it states that “defendant’s appellate 
counsel did, in fact, make the arguments he should have made, albeit by reference to 
different authority.”  As the Court of Appeals stated, “defendant’s appellate counsel 
did not . . . argue that because it could not be determined from the record whether 
                                            
3 It is, of course, the inability of an appellate court to determine where in that array 
of circumstances a jury has situated its verdict when “we cannot discern from the record the 
theory upon which the jury relied” which leads to Pakulski’s rule that “we resolve the 
ambiguity in favor of the defendant.”  Pakulski, 319 N.C. at 574, 356 S.E.2d at 326.  The 
important point, though, is that the problem of appellate review and attendant remedy 
presented in Pakulski is distinct from the identification of the error.  The former is, in the 
majority’s view, implicated by the relevant standard of review.  The latter, however, is not. 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
-8- 
the jury relied upon the improper or the proper instruction, plain error was 
established.”  Collington II, 259 N.C. App. at 138, 814 S.E.2d at 883.  As the trial 
court’s findings of fact note, “[a]ppellate counsel failed to argue that . . . when 
disjunctive jury instructions are paired with an improper jury instruction, and there 
is no finding as to the jury’s chosen theory, the defendant is entitled to a new trial.”   
Appellate counsel instead argued, as the trial court notes in its findings of fact, 
that “the Superior[ ] Court’s jury instruction that Defendant would be guilty if he had 
acted in concert to commit the crime of possession of a firearm by a felon was plain 
error.”  The effect of counsel’s mistake is apparent in the first Court of Appeals 
opinion.  See Collington I, 2015 WL 4081786, at *1–4.  Had counsel made the 
appropriate argument, the Court of Appeals would have first considered the full 
extent of the instructional error and would have second considered whether the trial 
court’s error “had a probable impact on the jury’s finding that the defendant was 
guilty.”  See State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 518, 723 S.E.2d 326, 334 (2012).  
However, because counsel failed to accurately describe the error, arguing only that a 
theory of guilt presented to the jury was erroneous, the Court of Appeals instead 
conducted a sufficiency of the evidence analysis. See Collington I, 2015 WL 4081786, 
at *4 (concluding that there was not plain error because “[t]he jury reasonably could 
have believed that Defendant was in possession of Mr. Sapp’s gun” after noting that 
defendant conceded in his brief that the evidence was legally sufficient to convict on 
a proper instruction and discounting any evidence put on by defendant at trial).  If 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
-9- 
counsel had appropriately framed the argument, the Court of Appeals would have 
reached a different result.  The Court of Appeals itself noted this fact, as follows: 
Finally, Defendant has not presented this Court with any 
arguments under State v. Pakulski, 319 N.C. 562, 574, 356 
S.E.2d 319, 326 (1987), which held that a trial court 
commits plain error when it instructs a jury on disjunctive 
theories of a crime, where one of the theories is improper, 
and “we cannot discern from the record the theory upon 
which the jury relied[.]” “It is not the role of the appellate 
courts . . . to create an appeal for an appellant.” Viar v. N.C. 
Dep’t of Transp., 359 N.C. 400, 402, 610 S.E.2d 360, 
361 (2005). Therefore, Defendant has not met his “burden” 
of establishing that the trial court committed plain error in 
the present case. See Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 516, 723 S.E.2d 
at 333. 
 
Id. (alteration in original).  Given this failure by appellate counsel, the majority’s 
discussion of whether plain error or harmless error review applies is beside the point.  
Regardless of the appropriate standard of review, appellate counsel failed to correctly 
identify the error and pursue it on appeal.  The record contains no evidence that this 
mistake resulted from reasoned judgment or that it was a strategic decision.  As a 
result, Mr. Collington received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and there 
is no basis for this Court to overturn the decisions to the contrary by both the trial 
court and the Court of Appeals.  
II. 
The majority is also wrong to assert that Pakulski does not apply to this case.  
The majority describes the analysis of the Court of Appeals as a “misidentification of 
the standard of review applied in Pakulski.”  However, it is the majority which 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
-10- 
incorrectly identifies Pakulski’s standard of review.  In reality, Pakulski applied the 
plain error standard of review and Pakulski is applicable to Mr. Collington’s case. 
The majority writes that “it appears that we applied the harmless error 
standard of review in Pakulski” because the opinion uses the word “harmless” once 
when describing one of the State’s arguments.  It is more instructive, I think, to look 
at the briefs actually filed in that case, as well as the transcripts of the trial court 
proceedings, which reveal (1) that the instructional error was not preserved and (2) 
that both the State and defense counsel argued in their briefs that the appropriate 
standard of review was plain error.   
The record in Pakulski makes clear that the error in that case was 
unpreserved, as neither defense counsel objected to any instruction proposed at the 
charge conference.  Instead, defense counsel requested additional instructions and 
did not object when the felony murder instruction was discussed.  The following is 
the transcript of the trial proceedings in Pakulski as they relate to this question.  Mr. 
Buchanan is the prosecutor, Mr. Moody is Pakulski’s defense attorney, and Mr. 
McLean is the attorney for Pakulski’s co-defendant: 
COURT: 
Well– All right.  I’m waiting on that bill.  I 
don’t have it before me.  Now, let’s talk about the precharge 
conference.  I think we’d better do it before the arguments.  
On the murder charge what– First, what does the State say 
how the case ought to be submitted to the jury? 
MR. BUCHANAN: May it please Your Honor, the State is 
of the opinion that the evidence would support possibly 4 
verdicts in the murder case of guilty of murder in the first 
degree in the perpetration of a felony; two, guilty of first 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
-11- 
degree murder with malice and premeditation and 
deliberation; or thirdly, guilty of murder in the 
perpetration of a felony and with malice and premeditation 
and deliberation; not guilty. 
COURT: 
Well, it can’t be–    
MR. BUCHANAN: You asked me. 
COURT: 
Let me ask:  Do you think that there was 
premeditation? 
MR. BUCHANAN: Yes, Your Honor, the State does feel 
that there is sufficient evidence to support such a charge. 
COURT: 
Because of the evidence that Pakulski said 
that he was going to kill–    
MR. BUCHANAN: Yes, Your Honor. 
COURT: 
The evidence also shows that he wasn’t 
looking for him at that time and it was just a chance that 
he happened to see him. 
MR. BUCHANAN: Yes, Your Honor.  The State certainly 
concedes that. 
COURT: 
Let me look at this other bill I didn’t have. 
(The court examined a document.) 
COURT: 
Well, I think I’ll submit it only on the theory 
of murder in the perpetration of a felony. 
MR. BUCHANAN: Yes, Your Honor. 
MR. MOODY: 
Your Honor, might we inquire what 
would be the underlying felony? 
COURT: 
Well, I think there are two, but actually the 
felony would be breaking and entering and robbery.  I think 
robbery is of the-- Well, they are just so interlocking that–   
MR. MOODY: 
Yes, sir. 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
-12- 
COURT: 
I may submit the breaking and entering.  I 
don’t know.  Well, I probably will.  Now, on the– Well, let 
me say this before we go any further.  Let me give you this.  
If you’ll come up here, let me show you how I’d like you to 
make the form for the verdict sheet. 
. . .  
COURT: 
Anything else you gentlemen want to say 
about any particular thing concerning the charge?  I’ll give 
them the routine charge on each of those alleged offenses, 
and if you like I want to inquire now if you want me to 
instruct the jury concerning the defendants not testifying. 
MR. MOODY: 
Yes, sir.  The defendant Pakulski 
would request that instruction, just a standard instruction 
on that–   
COURT: 
All right. 
MR. MOODY: 
–as 
well 
as 
an 
instruction 
on 
reasonable doubt and the effect of the immunity granted to 
Mr. Chambers. 
COURT: 
Yes, sir, I’ll do all that.  What about you?  Do 
you want me to instruct them on the defendant’s failure to 
testify? 
MR. MCLEAN: 
Yes, sir.  I would ask the Court– I 
believe it’s 101.30. 
COURT: 
I don’t know what you are talking about. 
MR. MCLEAN: 
It’s the effect of the defendant’s 
decision not to testify.  That’s that pattern instruction.  
COURT: 
Well, I don’t have that with me. 
MR. MCLEAN: 
I’ve got it here, Your Honor.  I’ll present 
it to you. 
COURT: 
Well, I don’t need it. 
MR. MCLEAN: 
Okay.  And also I would ask that the 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
-13- 
Court instruct–this is called in pattern of jury instruction 
105.20, but let me tell you what it’s about.  It’s about prior 
inconsistent statements.  We would ask that this 
instruction be given based on Mr. Chambers prior–    
COURT:  
Excuse me just a minute.  Let me get it down. 
MR. MCLEAN: 
Yes, sir. 
COURT:  
And the accomplice charge would be part of 
that.  All right, now. 
MR. MCLEAN: 
And along that same thing since we’ve 
asked for that charge, we were asking in addition or I am 
to charge impeachment by prior inconsistent statement 
under–   
COURT: 
Well, let me see what you’ve got on that.  I 
know about what I would tell them. 
MR. MCLEAN: 
Yes, sir.  It may be the same thing.  I’m 
just wanting to–   
COURT: 
Well, I don’t know.  I don’t have any set–   
(Mr. McLean handed the Court a document.) 
COURT:  
Okay.  All right. 
MR. MCLEAN: 
And the other that mister–   
COURT: 
If I overlook that, call it to my attention.  I 
don’t think I will. 
MR. MCLEAN: 
Yes, sir.  Of course, the standard 
burden of proof and those types of charges we would ask. 
COURT: 
All right, Okay.  Does that cover it? 
MR. MOODY: 
Yes, sir, Your Honor.  [The discussion 
continues on other matters.]   
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
-14- 
Transcript of Record at 1242–48, Pakulski, 319 N.C. 562, 356 S.E.2d 319 (No. 
256PA85) [hereinafter Pakulski Transcript]. 
Defense counsel also did not object to the instruction when it was given.  After 
closing arguments, the trial court instructed counsel that it would ask if there were 
any objections to the jury charge after the instructions were given and that any 
objections would be included in the record at that point.  Pakulski Transcript at 1339.  
Defense counsel agreed.  Id.  After giving the instructions to the jury, the trial court 
asked whether counsel had any objections, and counsel replied that they did not.  
Id. at 1365.  The next morning, after the jury left the courtroom to begin their 
deliberations, the State approached the bench and had a discussion with the trial 
court, the contents of which were not recorded.  Id. at 1366.  The trial court then 
stated the following: “Let the record show further that at the conclusion of the charge 
the defendants make a general objection to the charge.”  Id.4   
                                            
4 The record in Pakulski shows that defense counsel did not object to the felony-murder 
jury instruction at the charge conference, before the instructions were given, or after the 
instructions were given.  The majority points to a line in the Pakulski opinion indicating that 
defense counsel moved to dismiss on the grounds of insufficient evidence to charge the jury 
on a theory of felony murder.  See Pakulski, 319 N.C. at 571, 356 S.E.2d at 325.  The majority 
suggests that this was sufficient to preserve an exception to the jury instruction because it 
“serv[ed] the purpose of the contemporaneous objection now required by N.C. R. App. P. 
10(a)(2).”  I note that the preservation requirements for exceptions to jury instructions 
remain substantially unchanged from those in existence at the time Pakulski was decided.  
Compare N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(2), 312 N.C. 814 (1984) (repealed 1989) with N.C. R. App. P. 
10(a)(2).  Indeed, the requirements in effect at the time that Pakulski was decided were more 
onerous, requiring that “an exception to instructions given the jury shall identify the portion 
in question by setting it within brackets” or making other clear reference in the record on 
appeal. 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
-15- 
This Court in Pakulski ruled that the felony-murder instruction given to the 
jury was erroneous and warranted reversal.  Pakulski, 319 N.C. at 574, 356 S.E.2d 
at 326.  The record very clearly indicates that defense counsel in Pakulski never 
objected to the jury instruction at trial that we subsequently ruled was in error.5  As 
the majority notes, “unpreserved issues related to jury instructions are reviewed 
under a plain error standard.”  This makes Pakulski a plain error case.  See State v. 
Tucker, 317 N.C. 532, 536, 346 S.E.2d 417, 420 (1986) (“Since defendant failed to 
object to these instructions at trial, we consequently must consider whether they rise 
to the level of plain error . . . .”); see also N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(4) (“In criminal cases, 
an issue that was not preserved by objection noted at trial and that is not deemed 
preserved by rule or law without any such action nevertheless may be made the basis 
of an issue presented on appeal when the judicial action questioned is specifically and 
distinctly contended to amount to plain error.”).6  The majority is wrong to assert that 
the Court in Pakulski applied the harmless error standard of review.   
                                            
5 The trial transcript does indicate that the defendant made a general motion to 
dismiss at the close of the State’s evidence, and another at the close of all evidence.  
Pakulski Transcript at 725, 1249.  Both motions were denied.  Id. at 728, 1249.   
6 In fact, the parties in Pakulski did “specifically and distinctly contend[]” that “the 
judicial action questioned . . . amount[ed] to plain error.”  See N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(4).  Both 
defense counsel and the State argued in their briefs that the appropriate standard for our 
decision was plain error.  Brief for Defendant-Appellant Pakulski at 34, Pakulski, 319 N.C. 
562, 356 S.E.2d 319 (No. 256PA85) (“On the facts of this case, the instructions on felony 
murder based on breaking or entering were plainly erroneous.”); Brief for State-Appellee at 
22, Pakulski, 319 N.C. 562, 356 S.E.2d 319 (No. 256PA85) (“Thus, [the trial court’s] jury 
charge appears reviewable only for plain error.  See State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 355, 300 S.E. 
2d 375 (1983).”). 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
-16- 
It does not aid the majority that Pakulski is paired with the words “harmless 
error” in a scant reference thirty-one years7 after Pakulski was issued.  In State v. 
Maddux, we stated in a footnote that Pakulski did not apply to the defendant’s case 
because it “is not applicable to plain error cases.”  371 N.C. 558, 567 n.11, 819 S.E.2d 
367, 373 n.11 (2018).  Two months later in State v. Malachi, in another footnote, we 
stated that “[t]his Court did discuss the harmless error issue in Pakulski.”  371 N.C. 
719, 732 n.5, 821 S.E.2d 407, 417 n.5 (2018).  These passing references do not, as the 
majority claims, clarify that Pakulski is a harmless error case.  Indeed, those two 
passing references are simply wrong.  See State v. Lynch, 327 N.C. 210, 219, 393 
S.E.2d 811, 816 (1990) (applying Pakulski where it does not appear that the 
defendant objected to the jury instruction at trial); see generally Pakulski, 319 N.C. 
562, 356 S.E.2d 319 (containing no indication that the defendant specifically objected 
to any jury instruction).  Given that the actual record in Pakulski clearly shows that 
Pakulski is a plain error case, the majority should not read it otherwise.8   
                                            
7 The long-standing nature of our decision in Pakulski, along with the fact that it 
seems to have been consistently applied as a plain error case for thirty-one years after its 
issuance, suggest that the majority’s concern about “creat[ing] a subset of cases in which an 
unpreserved issue relating to jury instructions qualifies for harmless error review” is 
unfounded.   
8 The majority seems concerned that acknowledging that Pakulski is a plain error 
case, thereby applying its rule to cases of unpreserved error, would apply too lenient a 
standard of review and undermine “the important interests promoted by clear rules related 
to issue preservation.”  Honoring Pakulski’s promise would do no such thing.  Instead, it 
would prevent appellate courts from keeping defendants in prison on an impermissible theory 
of guilt when “we cannot discern from the record the theory upon which the jury relied.”  
Pakulski, 319 N.C. at 574, 356 S.E.2d at 326.  Thus, the rule in Pakulski is designed to 
address precisely the type of “fundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
-17- 
Thus, Pakulski is a plain error case, and Mr. Collington is entitled to relief.9  
At trial, according to the trial court’s findings of fact, Mr. Collington’s jury was 
instructed with respect to the possession of a firearm by a felon charge “that it could 
find Defendant guilty under the theories of actual possession, constructive 
possession, or acting in concert.”  The jury found him guilty of possession of a firearm 
by a felon and the “verdict sheets did not indicate under which theory the jury 
convicted Defendant.”   
In Pakulski, we held: 
Where the trial judge has submitted the case to the jury on 
alternative theories, one of which is determined to be 
erroneous and the other properly submitted, and we cannot 
discern from the record the theory upon which the jury 
relied, this Court will not assume that the jury based its 
verdict on the theory for which it received a proper 
instruction.  Instead, we resolve the ambiguity in favor of 
the defendant.   
 
319 N.C. at 574, 356 S.E.2d at 326.  It does not matter if “the jury could have based 
its verdict solely” on the permissible theory if “the verdict form does not reflect the 
theory upon which the jury based its finding of guilty.”  Id.  Mr. Collington’s appellate 
counsel did not make that argument.  For that reason, his appellate counsel was 
deficient.  See Robbins, 528 U.S. at 285, 120 S. Ct. at 764 (stating that appellate 
                                            
lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done” to which the plain error rule is 
directed.  See State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 516–17, 723 S.E.2d 326, 333 (2012) (emphasis 
in original) (quoting State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983)). 
9 As discussed in Part I of this dissent, Mr. Collington is entitled to relief even if 
Pakulski were a harmless error case. 
STATE V. COLLINGTON 
 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
-18- 
counsel is deficient where “counsel unreasonably failed to discover nonfrivolous 
issues and to file a merits brief raising them”).   
The deficiency is particularly egregious in this case because of the facts.  The 
only evidence presented at trial that Mr. Collington possessed a firearm, either 
actually or constructively, came from the testimony of Christopher Hoskins.  Mr. 
Hoskins testified that Mr. Collington held a gun while Mr. Collington was robbing 
him.  However, while the jury found Mr. Collington guilty of possession of a firearm 
by a felon, the jury found him not guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon and 
conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon.  It seems more likely, then, 
that the jury found Mr. Collington guilty of possession of a firearm based on his own 
testimony.  During trial, Mr. Collington testified that his brother, Clarence 
Featherstone, received a gun from Dade Sapp later in the evening.  This supports the 
conclusion that the jury based its verdict on the acting in concert theory rather than 
on actual or constructive possession.   
Mr. Collington’s appellate counsel had an obligation to present the argument 
to the Court of Appeals which would have allowed that court to ensure that 
Mr. Collington was not convicted of possession of a firearm based on someone else’s 
possession.  Because Mr. Collington’s counsel did not meet that obligation, 
Mr. Collington clearly received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and is 
entitled to a new trial.  I respectfully dissent. 
Justice DAVIS joins in this dissenting opinion.