Title: State v. Christopher Romero

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

In this appeal, the Court must determine whether the trial judge should have given the jury a cross-racial identification charge, called a Cromedy charge, tailored to address this cross-ethnic identification when the eyewitness victim is a non-Hispanic Caucasian and the defendant is a Hispanic Caucasian. Defendant, Christopher Romero, was convicted of first-degree robbery and related offenses in connection with the mugging of Carmine Cavaliere. Cavaliere was attacked from behind by two men while walking home. One attacker retreated quickly, but the other remained and wrestled with Cavaliere for several minutes, chopping at Cavaliere s hand with a knife, cutting four tendons. Cavaliere described the attack as lasting anywhere from three to five minutes, during which his attacker was about six to eight inches away. He said that during a minute and a half of the attack he was able to see his attacker s face and that, when the outside light came on from the house one door down, he was able to get a good look at his attacker because they were face-to-face. The night of the mugging Cavaliere told investigating police that the man who attacked him with the knife was Spanish, aged twenty to twenty-five, and had something wrapped around his head. Four days later, after he was released from the hospital, Cavaliere elaborated on the description, adding that the man had dark hair and dark skin. Three days later, while driving down his street, Cavaliere saw Romero walking past. He immediately telephoned the police to report that he had just seen the man who had attacked and stabbed him. When the police arrived, Cavaliere described the clothing being worn by his alleged attacker that day. The officers and Cavaliere then canvassed the neighborhood in a police vehicle looking for the man Cavaliere had described. Unable to locate the person, the officers brought Cavaliere home. Fifteen or twenty minutes later, the officers returned and told him that in the back of their police vehicle they had someone who fit the description given earlier by Cavaliere. Cavaliere identified Romero. Romero was charged with first-degree robbery, third-degree attempted theft, third-degree aggravated assault, third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, and fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon. Romero requested a cross-racial identification charge. See State v. Cromedy, 158 N.J. 112 (1999) (establishing when a jury must receive instruction warning about potential shortcomings of cross-racial identification testimony). Because the witness-victim is a non-Hispanic Caucasian male and Romero is a Hispanic male, the trial court held a mini-charge conference to hear Romero s request, after which the court refused to give the Cromedy charge. In lieu of the Cromedy charge, the court instructed the jury consistent with the model charge on out-of-court identifications. The jury convicted Romero on all counts. The Appellate Division rejected Romero s arguments that the failure to give a Cromedy charge deprived him of a fair trial and that the showup identification was impermissibly suggestive. This Court granted Romero s petition for certification. HELD: The jury received ample instruction about the need to examine carefully the identification made by the eyewitness, and Romero was not denied a fair trial without a tailored cross-ethnic identification charge. The Court uses this opportunity to refine the out-of-court identification charge so that it will alert jurors in all eyewitness identification cases that such testimony requires close scrutiny. 1. In Cromedy, this Court approved the use of a cross-racial jury instruction when identification is a critical issue in the case, and an eyewitness s cross-racial identification is not corroborated by other evidence giving it independent reliability. In that decision, the Court considered several studies that concluded that eyewitnesses are superior at identifying persons of their own race and have difficulty identifying members of another race. (pp. 9-10) 2. Cromedy focused plainly on the impact of race on eyewitness identifications. Ethnicity, or ethnic differences, was not the subject of Cromedy s compilation of studies of racial impact on identification. Romero argues that Cromedy s mandate should apply in the present setting, one he describes as involving a non-Hispanic Caucasian eyewitness and a Hispanic Caucasian defendant. Those identifying terms used by Romero would require an expansion of the Cromedy instruction to circumstances involving ethnic differences. Ethnicity generally, and Hispanic ethnicity specifically, is accepted as different from race. (pp. 10-12) 3. The charge fashioned in Cromedy was directed at cross-racial identification settings because of the convincing social science data demonstrating the potential unreliability of cross-racial identifications of African-American defendants specifically. Cross-ethnicity, on the other hand, has been described as difficult to define and apply with precision in an identification setting. Few studies have explored the ability of non-Hispanics reliably to identify Hispanics. At present, there is insufficient data to support the conclusion that, as a matter of due process, people of the same race but different ethnicity require a Cromedy instruction whenever they are identified by someone of a different ethnicity. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Romero s request for a Cromedy cross-racial identification charge, tailored to ethnicity, and no error was visited on Romero. (pp. 12-17) 4. In considering the implications of cross-ethnic identifications, the Court has contemplated the impact of eyewitness testimony generally. When the Court perceives, as here, that more might be done to advance the reliability of the criminal justice system, the Court s supervisory authority over the criminal courts enables the Court to act. The Court has examined its model jury charge on out-of-court identifications to determine whether it might stand further improvement. In light of the social science research noting the fallibility of eyewitness identifications, the Court directs that the model jury charge should underscore, for all jurors in all eyewitness identification cases, that eyewitness identification testimony requires close scrutiny and should not be accepted uncritically. The Court requires that additional language be included in the out-of-court identification charge. The Court refers this model jury charge to the Model Jury Charge Committee and instructs trial courts to utilize this new language while the model charge is being reviewed by the Committee. (pp. 17-22) 5. Romero also contends that he was subject to an impermissibly suggestive showup identification procedure. The identification procedure originated from the victim s own observation of someone he believed was his assailant. The police made no representations that Romero was the man who attacked Cavaliere, only that he matched Cavaliere s description. This showup was not impermissibly suggestive, and Cavaliere s identification of Romero was sufficiently reliable. (pp. 22-27) The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED IN PART, and is REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN has filed a separate, CONCURRING opinion, in which JUSTICE LONG joins, to express the view that the Court has an obligation to discourage law enforcement from using highly suggestive identification techniques, such as showups, when there is no exigency, but understands the Court s reluctance to do so here. CHIEF JUSTICE ZAZZALI and JUSTICES WALLACE, RIVERA-SOTO and HOENS join in JUSTICE LAVECCHIA s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a separate concurring opinion, in which JUSTICE LONG joins. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 109 September Term 2005 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CHRISTOPHER ROMERO, Defendant-Appellant. Argued October 31, 2006 Decided May 21, 2007 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Richard W. Berg argued the cause for appellant (Robin Kay Lord, attorney; Mr. Berg and Ms. Lord, of counsel and on the briefs). Hillary K. Horton, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Stuart Rabner, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). Raquel Y. Bristol, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for amicus curiae Office of the Public Defender (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney). Gina Mendola Longarzo argued the cause for amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Hack, Piro, O'Day, Merklinger, Wallace & McKenna and Connell & Foley, attorneys; Ms. Longarzo and Patricia A. Lee, on the brief). JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court. Defendant, Christopher Romero, was convicted of first-degree robbery and related offenses in connection with the mugging of Carmine Cavaliere. Identification was the pivotal issue in the case. Defendant, who is Hispanic, claimed that the victim, a Caucasian, misidentified him. Because of the importance of the identification testimony and the dearth of corroborating evidence to supplement the reliability of that identification, defendant asked the trial court to instruct the jury with a cross-racial identification charge tailored to address this cross-ethnic identification. See State v. Cromedy, 158 N.J. 112 (1999) (establishing when jury must receive instruction warning about potential shortcomings of cross-racial identification testimony). The court provided the jury with an instruction on identification testimony generally, but no special Cromedy charge was given. In this appeal, we are asked whether it was reversible error for the court not to have given a Cromedy charge in this setting. We conclude that the jury received ample instruction about the need to examine carefully the identification made by Cavaliere, and, thus, defendant was not denied a fair trial without a tailored Cromedy charge. Social science research does not tie identification unreliability directly to ethnic differences in the same way that racial differences can affect identification reliability. That said, identification testimony is an area that warrants vigilant supervision. An eyewitness s identification carries significant impact in criminal cases. This appeal highlights the importance of the model charge that guides jurors in the assessment of the reliability of that powerful evidence. We use this opportunity to refine the charge so that it will alert jurors in all eyewitness identification cases that such testimony requires close scrutiny. II. A. (2) The witness s degree of attention to the perpetrator at the time of the offense. (3) The accuracy of any description the witness gave prior to identifying the perpetrator. (4) The degree of certainty expressed by the witness in making the identification. (5) The length of time between the witness s observation of the perpetrator during the offense and the identification. (6) The circumstances under which the identification was made, including whether or not it was the product of a suggestive procedure. . . . (7) Any other factor based on the evidence or lack of evidence in the case which you consider relevant to your determination whether the out-of-court identification was reliable. [Model Jury Charge (Criminal), Identification: Out-of-Court Identification (2007).] That basic instruction does not single out certain identifications as uniquely difficult. In the instance of cross-racial identifications where a demonstrated link to reliability exists, we require the supplementary Cromedy instruction to address that circumstance. In this matter we have concluded that social science research does not support similarly tying the reliability of cross-ethnic identifications directly to a cross-ethnic factor. We hold, therefore, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant s request for a Cromedy cross-racial identification charge, tailored to ethnicity. The model charge, as given, focused the jurors attention on the need to evaluate carefully the reliability of Cavaliere s identification. No error was visited on defendant due to the court s delivery of the model charge. That said, the exercise of considering the implications of cross-ethnic identifications has caused us to pause over the impact of eyewitness testimony generally. Research suggests that people generally are better able to identify persons who resemble themselves or who share familiar physical characteristics. See June Chance et al., Differential Experience and Recognition Memory for Faces, 97 J. of Soc. Psychol. 243, 252 (1975) (concluding that study s subjects apparently were better able to discriminate and later to recognize individual faces belonging to familiar groups of faces than those belonging to less familiar groups ). Recognition of difficulties associated with the identification of strangers is not new. Eighty years ago, Justice Frankfurter called [t]he identification of strangers . . . proverbially untrustworthy. Felix Frankfurter, The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti 30 (1927). Justice Brennan later observed that the influence of improper suggestion upon identifying witnesses probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other single factor - perhaps it is responsible for more such errors than all other factors combined. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 1933, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, 1158 (1967). Indeed, academics have long questioned the reliability of eyewitness identifications. See Hugo Munsterberg, On the Witness Stand: Essays on Psychology and Crime 49-56 (1923) (discussing early twentieth century experiments that revealed people s inability to recall details of witnessed crimes); Edwin Borchard, Convicting the Innocent: Errors of Criminal Justice xiii-xiv (1932) (early case study of sixty-five exonerated defendants finding that the major source of wrongful conviction was witness misidentification); see also Elizabeth F. Loftus & James M. Doyle, Eyewitness Testimony: Civil and Criminal 26-30 (3d ed. 1997) (finding that stress may prevent optimum cognitive functioning in relation to identification); Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: Psychological Research and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 Psychol. Pub. Pol y & L. 765, 774-75 (1995) (finding that eyewitness s confidence can be induced by external sources); see generally Lawrence Taylor, Eyewitness Identification 2 (1982) (noting that eyewitness identification evidence is taken by the average juror as absolute proof even though [t]he unreliability of such evidence is now widely accepted among lawyers and psychologists ). Some have pronounced that mistaken identifications present what is conceivably the greatest single threat to the achievement of our ideal that no innocent man shall be punished. Carl McGowan, Constitutional Interpretation and Criminal Identification, 12 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 235, 238 (1970). It has been estimated that approximately 7,500 of every 1.5 million annual convictions for serious offenses may be based on misidentifications. Brian L. Cutler & Steven D. Penrod, Mistaken Identification: The Eyewitness, Psychology, and the Law 7 (1995). The introduction of DNA analysis and the subsequent exoneration of defendants convicted by faulty witness identification have proven the unreliability of some identifications. Jules Epstein, Tri-State Vagaries: The Varying Responses of Delaware, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania to the Phenomenon of Mistaken Identifications, 12 Widener L. Rev. 327, 328 (2006). The Innocence Project at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law reported that more than seventy-five percent of convictions overturned due to DNA evidence involved eyewitness misidentification. Innocence Project, Fact Sheet: Leading Causes of Wrongful Convictions (2007), http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/351.php. The State s Attorney General already has recognized that eyewitness identification evidence is not fool-proof, and made New Jersey the first state to adopt the United States Department of Justice s procedural recommendations to increase reliability in photo and live lineups. Letter from Attorney General John J. Farmer, Jr., to All County Prosecutors et al., at 1 (Apr. 18, 2001) (accompanying Attorney General Guidelines for Preparing and Conducting Photo and Live Lineup Identification Procedures). Indeed, we commended the Attorney General for having improved pretrial identification procedures. See State v. Delgado, 188 N.J. 48, 62 (2006). However, when we perceive, as we do here, that more might be done to advance the reliability of our criminal justice system, our supervisory authority over the criminal courts enables us constitutionally to act. See N.J. Const. art. VI, 2, 3; Delgado, supra, 188 N.J. at 62. We recognize that the eyewitness is probably the single most common form of witness in many criminal trials. Cutler & Penrod, supra, at 6. Eyewitness identifications are often considered direct evidence of guilt and accorded great importance by juries. Otto H. MacLin & Roy S. Malpass, The Other-Race Effect and Contemporary Criminal Justice: Eyewitness Identification and Jury Decision Making, 7 Psychol. Pub. Pol y & L. 98, 98 (2001). Jurors likely will believe eyewitness testimony when it is offered with a high level of confidence, even though the accuracy of an eyewitness and the confidence of that witness may not be related to one another at all. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352, 101 S. Ct. 654, 661, 66 L. Ed. 2d 549, 558 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Elizabeth F. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony 237-247 (1979)). [T]here is almost nothing more convincing than a live human being who takes the stand, points a finger at the defendant, and says That s the one! Id. at 352, 101 S. Ct. at 661, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 558-59. We believe that particular care need be taken in respect of this powerful evidence -- the eyewitness. Thus, although our present model charge on out-of-court identifications adequately cautions juries in that respect, and did so for defendant, we have been prompted to examine our model charge to determine whether it might stand further improvement. In light of the social science research noting the fallibility of eyewitness identifications, we direct that the charge should underscore, for jurors in all eyewitness identification cases, that eyewitness identification testimony requires close scrutiny and should not be accepted uncritically. Accordingly, we shall require that the following additional language be included in the out-of-court identification charge immediately before the enumeration of factors to be considered by the jury when it gauges the reliability and believability of an eyewitness s identification: Although nothing may appear more convincing than a witness s categorical identification of a perpetrator, you must critically analyze such testimony. Such identifications, although made in good faith, may be mistaken. Therefore, when analyzing such testimony, be advised that a witness s level of confidence, standing alone, may not be an indication of the reliability of the identification. In deciding what weight, if any, to give to the identification testimony, you may consider the following factors: [Model Jury Charge (Criminal), Identification: Out-of-Court Identification (2007) (New language underscored).] We refer the model charge on out-of-court identifications to the Model Jury Charge Committee for action implementing the direction contained in this opinion. Trial courts, however, should utilize the above language while the model charge is being revised by the Committee. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 109 September Term 2005 Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CHRISTOPHER ROMERO, Defendant-Appellant. JUSTICE ALBIN, concurring. I concur with the majority that the out-of-court identification procedure and the identification charge to the jury in this case complied with constitutional norms, and concur with its resolution of the sentencing issues. I am also pleased that Justice LaVecchia s thoughtful opinion has refined the identification charge to alert jurors to the inherent dangers associated with identification testimony. However, I continue to adhere to my dissent in State v. Herrera, 187 N.J. 493, 528 (2006), in which I stated that [i]t is time for this Court to announce that the use of unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures violates the due process guarantees of Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution. The current standard permits highly suggestive identification procedures, however unnecessary, so long as a court later ratifies the identification as otherwise reliable. See id. at 506-07 (majority opinion). Because we recognize that misidentifications are the single greatest cause of wrongful convictions, I believe that this Court has an obligation to discourage law enforcement from using highly suggestive identification techniques, such as showups, when there is no exigency. A showup -- the displaying of only one suspect to a witness -- is particularly conducive to misidentification[], and for that reason the practice has been widely condemned. Id. at 525-26 (Albin, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). One commentator has described the showup as the most grossly suggestive identification procedure now or ever used by the police. Id. at 525 (quoting Patrick M. Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in Criminal Cases 28 (1965)). As I indicated in my dissent in Herrera, [t]o a person whose fate depends on the accuracy of an identification, it is fundamentally unfair for the police to unnecessarily employ a technique that maximizes the potential for error. Id. at 528. The Court in Herrera did not dismiss out-of-hand my call for a new identification standard discouraging unnecessary showups, but rather concluded that the issue had not been properly raised at trial. The Court noted: We have no reason to doubt that if defendant had raised these arguments before the trial court and submitted the current research in support of his request for a new standard for determining the admissibility of showup identification, a different record would have been made. The trial court would have received the evidence and made its decision, and the Appellate Division then would have had a full record to review. In that event, the arguments defendant now makes would be properly before us. In the absence of such a record, and in light of our consistent application of federal constitutional precedent in deciding the admissibility of identification evidence, we decline to adopt a new standard under our state constitution. [Id. at 501 (majority opinion).] In this case as well, defendant did not challenge the current identification standard that allows the unnecessary use of highly suggestive identification procedures such as the showup. Although I am prepared to address the issue now, I understand the Court s reluctance to entertain a matter that has not been raised below. I anticipate that in an appropriate case the issue will be raised and a proper record developed so that the Court will have an opportunity to revisit a standard that, I fear, is responsible for increasing the number of misidentifications and wrongful convictions. I am nonetheless heartened that the Court today has taken a positive step toward addressing the general problem of mistaken identifications. Because in this case I conclude that the showup was not an unnecessary identification procedure (the police had picked up defendant who fit the precise description given by the victim minutes earlier and could not continue to hold him unless the victim confirmed that he was the perpetrator), I would affirm the judgment of conviction. Justice Long joins in this opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY NO. A-109 SEPTEMBER TERM 2005 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CHRISTOPHER ROMERO, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED May 21, 2007 Chief Justice Zazzali PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice LaVecchia CONCURRING OPINION BY Justice Albin DISSENTING OPINION BY