Title: Daniel D. Drow v. David H. Schwarz

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-1867 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Daniel D. Drow,  
 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
v. 
David H. Schwarz and Division of Hearings  
and Appeals, State of Wisconsin,  
 
Respondents-Respondents-Petitioners.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  220 Wis. 2d 415, 583 N.W.2d 655 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998, Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 5, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
March 4, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Marathon 
 
JUDGE: 
Vincent K. Howard 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the respondents-respondents-petitioners the 
cause was argued by Pamela Magee, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the petitioner-appellant there was a brief by 
Amy K. McDavid and Frank J. Remington, University of WI Law 
School, Madison and oral argument by Amy K. McDavid. 
 
No. 
97-1867 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-1867 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Daniel D. Drow,  
 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
David H. Schwarz and Division of Hearings  
and Appeals, State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Respondents-Respondents- 
          Petitioners.  
FILED 
 
MAY 5, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is a 
review of a published decision of the court of appeals, Drow v. 
Schwartz, 220 Wis. 2d 415, 583 N.W.2d 655 (Ct. App. 1998), which 
reversed an order of the Circuit Court for Marathon County, 
Vincent K. Howard, Judge.  The circuit court order denied  
Daniel D. Drow's petition for a writ of certiorari to review 
revocation of his probation. 
¶2 
Relying on State ex. rel Johnson v. Cady, 50 Wis. 2d 
540, 
550, 
185 
N.W.2d 
360 
(1971), 
which 
concluded 
that 
"petitioner's right of review of a revocation hearing is by 
certiorari to the court of conviction," the court of appeals 
held that "court of conviction," means "the same branch of the 
circuit court in which he was convicted" rather than in a branch 
No. 
97-1867 
 
2 
of the "circuit court in the county of conviction."
1  Because 
Drow was convicted in Branch 2 of the Circuit Court for Marathon 
County, the court of appeals held that Branch 3 of the Circuit 
Court for Marathon County had no jurisdiction to review Drow's 
certiorari petition. 
¶3 
The only issue presented for our review is whether a 
certiorari proceeding to review a probation revocation must be 
heard by the same branch of the circuit court in the county in 
which the probationer was convicted of the offense for which he 
was on probation.  We hold that a certiorari proceeding to 
review a probation revocation need not be heard by the same 
branch of the circuit court in the county in which the 
probationer was convicted of the offense for which he was on 
probation; a certiorari proceeding to review a probation 
revocation may be heard in any branch of the circuit court in 
the county in which the probationer was last convicted of an 
offense for which he or she was on probation.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.50(5) (1997-98).
2  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals. 
¶4 
The facts necessary to this review are undisputed.  On 
October 8, 1993, Daniel D. Drow entered pleas of no contest to 
                     
1 The court of appeals did not suggest that State ex. rel 
Johnson v. Cady, 50 Wis. 2d 540, 550, 185 N.W.2d 360 (1971), 
requires 
that 
the 
judge 
who 
presided 
at 
the 
conviction 
proceeding need be the same judge who hears the certiorari 
proceeding. 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
97-1867 
 
3 
charges of sexual assault of a child in the second degree in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) (1991-92), exposing a child 
to harmful materials in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2)(a) 
(1991-92) and two counts of bail jumping in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 946.49(1)(b) (1991-92).  Branch 2 of the Circuit Court 
for Marathon County withheld Drow's sentence and ordered 25 
years of supervised probation.  Branch 2 of the Circuit Court 
for 
Marathon 
County 
imposed 
the 
requirement 
that 
Drow 
participate in a sex offender treatment program as one of the 
conditions of probation.  On March 20, 1996, the Department of 
Corrections charged Drow with violating this condition of 
probation.  After a hearing by the Division of Hearings and 
Appeals, Drow's probation was revoked.  Subsequently, Drow filed 
a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Circuit Court for 
Marathon County, the county in which he was convicted of the 
offense for which he was on probation, seeking judicial review 
of his probation revocation.  The certiorari review was assigned 
to Branch 3 of the Circuit Court for Marathon County. 
¶5 
The issue presented is whether a certiorari proceeding 
to review a probation revocation must be heard by the same 
branch of circuit court in the county in which the probationer 
was convicted of the offense for which he was on probation.  
This court decides this question of law independent of the 
circuit court and court of appeals, benefiting from their 
analyses. 
¶6 
We begin by examining the statutory powers of each 
branch of a circuit court in a county and the statutory venue 
No. 
97-1867 
 
4 
provision for review of probation revocation.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 753.061(1) states that "[e]ach branch constitutes a circuit 
court with all the powers and jurisdiction possessed by circuit 
courts in circuits having one judge only."  Drow argues that 
this statute means that all references to "circuit court" are to 
be interpreted as meaning a "branch of a circuit court."  
Section § 753.061(1) simply provides no support for such an 
interpretation.  We read § 753.061(1) as stating that each 
branch of a circuit court is endowed with the full powers of a 
circuit court and that each branch of a circuit court has the 
same powers as every other branch of the circuit court.  Thus, 
any branch of the Circuit Court for Marathon County has the 
power to review a probation revocation. 
¶7 
The only statutory provision referring to the venue of 
probation revocation proceedings is Wis. Stat. § 801.50(5) 
providing 
that 
"venue 
of 
an 
action 
to 
review 
a 
probation . . . revocation . . . shall be the county in which 
the relator was last convicted of an offense for which the 
relator was on probation . . . ."
3  This provision mandates, for 
example, that the venue of a certiorari review of a probation 
revocation is the county in which the probationer was convicted 
                     
3 Wis. Stat. § 801.02(5) provides:  
Venue of an action to review a probation or parole 
revocation or a refusal of parole by certiorari shall 
be the county in which the relator was last convicted 
of an offense for which the relator was on probation 
or parole or for which the relator is currently 
incarcerated. 
 
No. 
97-1867 
 
5 
of the offense for which he or she was on probation; the 
provision does not require that certiorari review of a probation 
revocation be conducted by any particular branch of the circuit 
court in the county of conviction.
4  Thus this statute 
establishes that in the present case, venue is in the Circuit 
Court for Marathon County, not in any particular branch of the 
Circuit Court for Marathon County. 
¶8 
Examining only Wis. Stat. §§ 753.061 and 801.50(5) 
would lead us to conclude that any branch of the Circuit Court 
for Marathon County could hear Drow's certiorari petition for 
review of probation revocation. 
¶9 
The court of appeals, however, looked beyond these 
statutes to Johnson, a 1971 case, which it reads as requiring 
that a petition to review probation revocation is to be heard 
"in the same branch of circuit court in which the petitioner was 
convicted."  Drow, 220 Wis. 2d at 417-18. 
¶10 We do not read Johnson in this manner.  The issue 
presented in Johnson was whether a probationer had a right to a 
hearing at the administrative agency before probation was 
revoked.  The Johnson court concluded that a probationer had the 
right to an administrative hearing and further concluded that it 
                     
4 The administrative agency has interpreted the statute 
similarly.  The form letter sent to Drow from the Division of 
Hearings and Appeals along with a copy of its decision set forth 
the following procedure for seeking judicial review: 
Judicial review of a revocation decision may be 
obtained by Writ of Certiorari in the county in which 
you were last convicted of an offense for which you 
were on supervision.  See sec. 801.50(5). 
No. 
97-1867 
 
6 
is "well established in this state that where there are no 
statutory provisions for judicial review, the action of a board 
or commission may be reviewed by way of certiorari."  Johnson, 
50 Wis. 2d at 550.  The Johnson court went on to hold that 
judicial review of probation revocation was "by certiorari 
directed to the court of conviction."  Johnson, 50 Wis. 2d at 
550 (emphasis added).  Reading the words "court of conviction" 
to mean the branch of the circuit court in the county in which 
the probationer was convicted of the offense for which he or she 
was on probation, as the court of appeals did, is not supported 
by Johnson because Johnson makes no mention of a branch of 
circuit court. 
¶11 We 
conclude 
that 
Johnson 
should 
be 
read 
with 
§ 801.50(5) to mean that certiorari review is to be directed to 
a circuit court in the county of conviction of the offense for 
which he was on probation.  In Bartus v. Wisconsin DHSS, 176 
Wis. 2d 1063, 1079, 501 N.W.2d 419 (1993), this court cited both 
the venue provision of Wis. Stat. § 801.50(5) and Johnson, 
stating the following rule: "A probationer whose term has been 
revoked may seek review of the Administrator's determination by 
certiorari in the county in which the probationer was convicted 
of the offense for which the now revoked probation was imposed." 
 In other words, we view Johnson's phrase "court of conviction" 
as being the same as the statutory phrase "county of conviction" 
in the context of the judicial review of a probation revocation. 
¶12 We 
therefore 
hold 
that 
the 
phrase 
"court 
of 
conviction" as used in Johnson does not refer to the exact 
No. 
97-1867 
 
7 
branch in the county in which the probationer was convicted of 
the offense for which he was on probation, but instead refers 
more generally to the circuit court in the county in which the 
probationer was convicted of the offense for which he was on 
probation. 
¶13 Drow advances two reasons to support his thesis that 
the same branch of the Circuit Court for Marathon County in 
which he was convicted and placed on probation should also 
review the revocation of his probation.  First, he argues that 
allowing review by a different branch deprives the sentencing 
branch of the opportunity to ensure that its intentions in 
imposing the relevant conditions of probation were followed.  
Second, Drow contends that the sentencing branch is in the best 
position to determine whether the violation of probation found 
by the department was reasonably supported by the evidence. 
¶14 Both arguments are based on a misconception of the 
scope of certiorari review.  The well-settled rule in Wisconsin 
is that on review by certiorari, the reviewing court examines 
the record of the administrative agency and is limited to 
determining: 
 
(1) 
whether 
the 
board 
kept 
within 
its 
jurisdiction, (2) whether the board acted according to law, (3) 
whether 
the 
board's 
action 
was 
arbitrary, 
oppressive 
or 
unreasonable and represented its will and not its judgment, and 
(4) whether the evidence was such that the board might 
reasonably make the order or determination in question.  State 
No. 
97-1867 
 
8 
v. Goulette, 65 Wis. 2d 207, 215, 222 N.W.2d 622 (1974).
5  
Because 
of 
the 
limited 
judicial 
review 
based 
on 
the 
administrative record, the branch of the circuit court that 
imposed sentence has no greater expertise in a certiorari 
proceeding than any other branch of the circuit court for that 
county. 
¶15 Finally, Drow claims that he is entitled to certiorari 
review by Branch 3 of the Circuit Court for Marathon County 
under Rule 1.12 of the Marathon County Circuit Court Rules.  
Rule 1.12 provides that writs "are to be assigned to the 
designated Intake Court" except that "certiorari in criminal 
matters [are] to be heard by the sentencing court."
6  We agree 
with the State that this rule is ambiguous.  A probation 
revocation proceeding "is a civil proceeding in Wisconsin" and 
"not, 
as 
a 
constitutional 
matter, 
a 
stage 
of 
criminal 
prosecution."
7  Thus the certiorari proceeding in the present 
case does not unambiguously fall within Rule 1.12.  Even 
assuming that Rule 1.12 requires that Drow's certiorari petition 
be assigned to the branch of circuit court in which Drow was 
                     
5 See also Coleman v. Percy, 96 Wis. 2d 578, 588, 292 N.W.2d 
615 (1980); Van Ermen v. Wisconsin DHSS, 84 Wis. 2d 57, 63, 267 
N.W.2d 17 (1978); Snajder v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 303, 310, 246 
N.W.2d 665 (1976); Von Arx v. Schwartz, 185 Wis. 2d 645, 655-56, 
517 N.W.2d 540, 544 (Ct. App. 1994). 
6 Wisconsin Circuit Court Rules, Marathon County Rules 2 
(Wis. Jury Verdict, Inc. 1999). 
7 State ex rel. Vanderbeke v. Endicott, 210 Wis. 2d 502, 
513, 563 N.W.2d 883 (1997). 
No. 
97-1867 
 
9 
convicted of the offense for which he was on probation, 
violation of a local administrative rule of the Circuit Court 
for Marathon County regarding assignment of cases to the 
branches would not ordinarily render the proceedings null and 
void. 
¶16 Our holding does not restrict circuit courts from 
developing 
and 
implementing 
local 
rules 
relating 
to 
the 
assignment of certiorari petitions for review of probation 
revocations as long as the rules are consistent with law and 
this court's rules of judicial administration.  See SCR 70.34.  
We merely hold that certiorari review of probation revocations 
need not be conducted by the same branch of circuit court in the 
county in which the probationer was convicted of the offense for 
which he or she was on probation. 
¶17 In sum, we hold that a certiorari proceeding to review 
a probation revocation need not be heard by the same branch of 
circuit court in the county in which the probationer was 
convicted of the offense for which he or she was on probation; a 
certiorari proceeding to review a probation revocation may be 
heard in any branch of the circuit court in the county in which 
the probationer was last convicted of an offense for which he or 
she was on probation.  See Wis. Stat. § 801.50(5).  Accordingly 
we reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
By the court.-The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
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