Title: Commonwealth v. Curran

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
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SJC-13093 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MARTIN P. CURRAN. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     September 10, 2021. – December 30, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Assault and Battery.  Practice, Criminal, Trial jury-waived, 
Presence of defendant, Confrontation of witnesses, Public 
trial, Assistance of counsel.  Due Process of Law, Presence 
of defendant in courtroom.  Constitutional Law, 
Confrontation of witnesses, Assistance of counsel.  Supreme 
Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Fitchburg Division 
of the District Court Department on March 10, 2020. 
 
 
The case was heard by Christopher P. LoConto, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Robert Spavento for the defendant. 
 
Michelle R. King, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Rebecca Kiley, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
Martin F. Murphy, Katharine Naples-Mitchell, & Chauncey B. Wood, 
for Committee for Public Counsel Services & others, amici 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
BUDD, C.J.  In Vazquez Diaz v. Commonwealth, 487 Mass. 336, 
336, 340 (2021), we held that a suppression hearing conducted 
over an Internet-based video conferencing platform in the midst 
of the COVID-19 pandemic was not a per se violation of a 
defendant's rights to confrontation, presence, public 
proceedings, or effective assistance of counsel.  Here, the 
defendant, Martin P. Curran, argues that his bench trial, 
similarly held via video conference during the same pandemic, 
was a violation of his constitutional rights.  He did not 
preserve any of these claims for appeal.  On September 29, 2021, 
we issued an order affirming the defendant's conviction and 
providing prospective guidance regarding virtual bench trials in 
criminal cases. See 488 Mass. 1051 (2021).  This opinion states 
the reasons for that order.1 
Background.  In March of 2020, shortly after the Governor 
declared a state of emergency due to the exponential spread of 
COVID-19, a respiratory illness caused by a novel coronavirus, 
this court, pursuant to its superintendence and rulemaking 
authority, began to issue orders regarding court operations.  
See generally Vazquez Diaz, 487 Mass. at 337-338.  From March 
18, 2020, until July 13, 2020, we limited in-person court 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief of the Committee for 
Public Counsel Services, the Boston Bar Association, the Charles 
Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice, and the 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
3 
proceedings to emergency matters that could not be held by video 
conference or telephone.  Nonemergency matters were conducted 
virtually where practicable.  Beginning on July 13, we directed 
the trial court departments gradually to resume in-person 
proceedings for nonemergency matters.  However, even as in-
person proceedings were phased in, Massachusetts courts 
continued to conduct many matters virtually. 
On the same day that the Governor declared a state of 
emergency, the defendant was arraigned in the District Court on 
one count of assault and battery on a family member2 and one 
count of strangulation or suffocation, and he was held without 
bail after a dangerousness hearing.  See G. L. c. 265, 
§§ 13M (a), 15D (b); G. L. c. 276, § 58A. 
In August of 2020, after the defendant waived his right to 
a trial by jury, he received a bench trial conducted partly 
through an Internet-based video conferencing platform, Zoom 
Video Communications, Inc. (Zoom).  All participants appeared in 
person except for the defendant and the Commonwealth's first 
witness (the defendant's neighbor), both of whom appeared via 
Zoom.  The neighbor testified that she had called the police 
 
2 Although the criminal complaint as well as the District 
Court docket state that the defendant was charged as a 
subsequent offender pursuant to G. L. c. 265, § 13M (b), it 
appears that the defendant was arraigned and tried pursuant to 
G. L. c. 265, § 13M (a). 
4 
upon observing the defendant choking the victim and ripping out 
her hair.  The Commonwealth's second witness, the police officer 
who responded to the neighbor's call, testified that when he 
arrived at the scene, he spoke with the neighbor and observed 
the victim, who was shaking and missing patches of hair.  The 
sole witness for the defense, the victim, testified that the 
defendant had not assaulted her on the night in question.  The 
judge found the defendant guilty of simple assault and battery3 
and sentenced him to one year of imprisonment in a house of 
correction.  The defendant timely appealed, and we granted his 
application for direct appellate review. 
Discussion.  The defendant contends that his bench trial, 
conducted partly via Zoom, violated several of his 
constitutional rights and that, as a result, his conviction must 
be vacated.  For the reasons discussed infra, we affirm his 
conviction.  This decision notwithstanding, we recognize that 
constitutional rights are implicated when court events are held 
remotely.  See Vasquez Diaz, 487 Mass. at 341, 347.  
Accordingly, pursuant to our general superintendence powers, see 
 
3 Because the Commonwealth failed to put forth any evidence 
that the defendant had strangled or suffocated the victim, the 
judge dismissed the second count of the complaint.  Likewise, 
the judge also dismissed the portion of the first count alleging 
that the victim was a member of the defendant's household or 
family. 
5 
G. L. c. 211, § 3, we provide guidelines to be followed when 
remote bench trials are contemplated in criminal cases. 
1.  Analysis.  The defendant argues that his constitutional 
rights to confront the witnesses against him, to be present at 
trial, to have a public trial, and to have effective assistance 
of counsel were violated by the format of his bench trial.  
Because he failed to preserve these claims at the time of trial, 
they warrant relief only if any alleged error created a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth 
v. Francis, 485 Mass. 86, 106 (2020).  "A substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice exists when we have a 'serious doubt 
whether the result of the trial might have been different had 
the error not been made.'"  Commonwealth v. Valentin, 470 Mass. 
186, 189 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 
687 (2002), S.C., 444 Mass. 72 (2005).  In other words, an 
unpreserved claim of constitutional error warrants relief only 
if (1) there was indeed error, (2) "the defendant [was] 
prejudiced by the error," and (3) "it [would] be reasonable to 
conclude that the error materially influenced the verdict [or 
finding]."  Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 298 (2002).  
Here, none of the defendant's allegations of constitutional 
error warrants relief because the defendant was not prejudiced 
materially by any alleged error.  We therefore discern no 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice and affirm the 
6 
defendant's conviction without reaching the merits of his 
constitutional claims.  See Commonwealth v. Keevan, 400 Mass. 
557, 565 n.5 (1987) ("even if we were to assume error . . . the 
conviction should stand because the record discloses no 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice"); Commonwealth v. 
Comtois, 399 Mass. 668, 674-675 (1987); Commonwealth v. Castro, 
99 Mass. App. Ct. 502, 511 n.11 (2021). 
a.  Confrontation.  Article 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights provides that a criminal defendant has the 
right "to meet the witnesses against him face to face."  
Similarly, the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that a criminal defendant "shall enjoy the right . . . 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him." 
A defendant's right to confront adverse witnesses 
encompasses not only the right to question those witnesses, but 
also the right to see and be seen by them, "face-to-face," as 
they testify.  Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 402 Mass. 534, 542 
(1988) ("The plain meaning of assuring a defendant the right 'to 
meet the witnesses against him face to face' is that the accused 
shall not be tried without the presence, in a court of law, of 
both himself and the witnesses testifying against him").  See 
Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017 (1988), quoting Pennsylvania v. 
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987) (Sixth Amendment "provides two 
types of protections for a criminal defendant:  the right 
7 
physically to face those who testify against him, and the right 
to conduct cross-examination"). 
Citing several cases in which courts recognized that 
confrontation mediated through a video monitor generally is 
inferior to confrontation in person,4 the defendant contends that 
his confrontation rights were violated, not because he was 
denied the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, but because 
the video monitor denied him physical, face-to-face 
confrontation with those witnesses.  Although we acknowledge the 
importance of physical, in-person confrontation at trial, we 
have noted that there is not an "absolute" right to this form of 
confrontation.  Vazquez Diaz, 487 Mass. at 348. 
In reviewing the defendant's unpreserved confrontation 
clause claim for a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice, 
we must determine whether "it [would] be reasonable to conclude" 
that his confrontation of witnesses via video monitor rather 
than in person "materially influenced the [finding]."  Randolph, 
438 Mass. at 298.  As the defendant makes no such assertion, we 
identify no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice under 
the circumstances presented.  See Francis, 485 Mass. at 106. 
 
4 See, e.g., United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1315 
(11th Cir. 2006); Thornton v. Snyder, 428 F.3d 690, 697 (7th 
Cir. 2005); United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 554-555 
(8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Lawrence, 248 F.3d 300, 304 
(4th Cir. 2001). 
8 
b.  Presence.  Rule 18 (a) of the Massachusetts Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, 378 Mass. 887 (1979), provides that criminal 
defendants have the right "to be present at all critical stages" 
of a court proceeding.  This right derives from the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution (through 
their confrontation and due process clauses, respectively), as 
well as from art. 12.  See Robinson v. Commonwealth, 445 Mass. 
280, 285 (2005). 
The defendant claims for the first time on appeal that his 
right "to be present" at his bench trial was violated because he 
was not physically present in the court room.  As with his 
unpreserved confrontation clause claim, this unpreserved claim 
also misses the mark because the defendant has failed to point 
to anything about his virtual presence at trial that causes us 
to seriously doubt whether he would still have been convicted 
had he been present in person.  See Valentin, 470 Mass. at 189.  
Rather, he erroneously assumes that a criminal defendant's 
appearance at trial via Zoom is necessarily inconsistent with 
the right to be present, see Vazquez Diaz, 487 Mass. at 343 (no 
per se violation of right to be present at critical stage of 
criminal proceeding where defendant participates virtually), and 
does not argue that he was actually prejudiced by his appearance 
in this manner at his trial. 
9 
From our own review, it does not appear that he was so 
prejudiced.  During the trial, the defendant was able to view 
his attorney, the judge, and witnesses as they testified on a 
single monitor.  See Vazquez Diaz, 487 Mass. at 342 & n.9 (right 
to be present "effectively safeguard[ed]" in Zoom hearing where 
defendant could "listen to the evidence" and "adequately observe 
the witnesses who testify").  There were no significant 
technological problems,5 and the judge periodically confirmed 
that the defendant could hear and see the proceedings during the 
trial.  Moreover, the District Court provided a separate room 
(the "Zoom room") where attorneys participating in trials from 
the physical court room could converse privately with clients 
participating via Zoom.  See id. (right to be present 
"effectively safeguard[ed]" in Zoom hearing where defendant 
could "privately consult with his attorney at any time"). 
We therefore discern nothing about these circumstances that 
leaves us with a "serious doubt whether the result of the trial 
might have been different" had the defendant attended in person.  
Valentin, 470 Mass. at 189, quoting Azar, 435 Mass. at 687. 
c.  Public trial.  The Sixth Amendment expressly grants 
criminal defendants "the right to a . . . public trial."  
 
5 There were some minor technological disruptions during the 
course of the trial that are comparable to irregularities that 
routinely occur during in-person proceedings.  Nothing that 
occurred causes us to doubt the integrity of the trial. 
10 
Because an open court room enhances both fairness at trial and 
public confidence in the judicial system, trials must be open to 
the public unless "closure is essential to preserve higher 
values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest."  
Commonwealth v. Cohen (No.1), 456 Mass. 94, 107 (2010), quoting 
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 
(1984). 
Although he did not raise the issue at trial, the defendant 
now claims that his right to a public trial was violated because 
the public could not attend his trial in person.  Here, too, we 
discern no risk, let alone a substantial risk, of a miscarriage 
of justice.6 
Any defendant claiming a violation of the right to a public 
trial has the burden to "demonstrate that the public was 
excluded from his trial."  Cohen (No. 1), 456 Mass. at 107, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 379 Mass. 874, 875 (1980).  
Here, because the defendant's claim is unpreserved, he 
additionally must demonstrate that he was actually prejudiced as 
a result of the closed court room.  See Commonwealth v. 
LaChance, 469 Mass. 854, 857 (2014).  The defendant has not met 
either requirement. 
 
6 The substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice standard 
applies to unpreserved claims of structural error, including an 
alleged violation of a defendant's right to a public trial.  See 
Commonwealth v. LaChance, 469 Mass. 854, 857 (2014). 
11 
First, the defendant has not shown that the public was 
excluded.  At the time of his trial, the District Court's policy 
regarding virtual hearings was to send to all parties and 
witnesses, via e-mail, an explanation of the procedure for 
attending virtual hearings as well as a link to the proceedings, 
which they could disseminate to the public.  The defendant's 
argument that nothing in the record shows that he or members of 
the public actually knew of this policy is unavailing because 
the defendant has the burden of proving that the public was 
excluded from his trial, see Cohen (No. 1), 456 Mass. at 107, 
and that the public may not have known how to attend virtually 
the defendant's trial is not proof that they were excluded, see 
id. at 108, quoting United States v. Al–Smadi, 15 F.3d 153, 154 
(10th Cir. 1994) ("It has been stated that a defendant's right 
to a public trial is not denied absent 'some affirmative act by 
the trial court meant to exclude persons from the courtroom'"). 
Second, as with his other claims, the defendant does not 
argue that he was actually prejudiced by the purported exclusion 
of the public from his trial.  See LaChance, 469 Mass. at 857; 
Randolph, 438 Mass. at 298. 
d.  Effective assistance of counsel.  A criminal defendant 
is guaranteed the right to effective assistance of counsel by 
both the Sixth Amendment and art. 12.  See Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684, 686 (1984); Vazquez Diaz, 487 
12 
Mass. at 354.  Although he did not raise this issue at trial, 
the defendant now contends that he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel because he "could not participate in the 
trial (except to observe)" and "could not discuss the trial with 
his attorney" because "they were in different locations."  Here, 
too, we discern no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  
See Francis, 485 Mass. at 106; Valentin, 470 Mass. at 189.  See 
also Randolph, 438 Mass. at 295-296 (substantial risk standard 
of review applies even where failure to preserve issue may stem 
from ineffective assistance of counsel). 
The defendant could have requested that his trial counsel 
move to the court's "Zoom room" so that the defendant and his 
counsel could communicate privately during the proceedings.  See 
Vazquez Diaz, 487 Mass. at 354-356 (rejecting ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim in similar circumstances).  See also 
Guerin v. Commonwealth, 339 Mass. 731, 733, 735 (1959) 
(rejecting ineffective assistance of counsel claim where 
defendant was seated apart from counsel but could have asked 
judge during trial for permission to speak with counsel).  
Further, the defendant has identified no error that occurred 
during his trial at all, much less one that might have been 
mitigated had he been physically adjacent to his trial counsel.  
See Randolph, 438 Mass. at 298. 
13 
e.  Colloquy.  The defendant additionally argues that he 
was deprived of a colloquy informing him of the constitutional 
rights that he might have been waiving by agreeing to a virtual 
bench trial.  Cf. Ciummei v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 504, 506-
507 (1979) (adequate colloquy required prior to guilty plea).  
This argument assumes that a defendant's constitutional rights 
are compromised during a virtual bench trial.  We have not made 
such a determination previously, and because the defendant's 
constitutional claims are unpreserved, we do not have occasion 
to do so here. 
2.  Guidelines.  Although we conclude that the format of 
the defendant's virtual bench trial did not create a substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice, we nevertheless recognize that 
a criminal defendant's constitutional rights may be implicated 
when critical stages of court proceedings are conducted 
remotely.  See Vazquez Diaz, 487 Mass. at 341, 347.  
Accordingly, we use this opportunity to provide guidance to 
trial courts that offer defendants the opportunity to receive 
virtual or partly virtual bench trials during the COVID-19 
pandemic.  See G. L. c. 211, § 3.  As we stated in our order in 
this matter issued on September 29, 2021, moving forward, 
"[a] judge shall obtain a defendant's assent to a virtual 
bench trial on the record.  In so doing, the judge shall 
satisfy him- or herself that the defendant understands that 
he or she has the option of appearing in person.  In 
addition, the judge shall explain to the defendant the 
14 
procedure to be followed during the trial, including how to 
communicate with counsel, and the arrangements made for 
witness testimony and the public's access to the 
proceedings.  Finally, the judge shall ensure that the 
defendant has had an opportunity to discuss the decision to 
proceed with a virtual bench trial with trial counsel." 
 
See 488 Mass. 1051.  We also made clear in that order that this 
guidance applies only to trials conducted after September 29, 
2021.  See id.  See also Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 481 Mass. 
582, 602 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Dagley, 442 Mass. 713, 
721 n.10 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 930 (2005) (explaining 
that when we announce "a new rule in the exercise of our 
superintendence power," we freely may "determine whether it 
should be applied only prospectively"). 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we issued an order 
on September 29, 2021, affirming the judgment.