Title: In re Application of 6011 Greenwich Windpark, LLC

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In 
re Application of 6011 Greenwich Windpark, L.L.C., Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-2406.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2019-OHIO-2406 
IN RE APPLICATION OF 6011 GREENWICH WINDPARK, L.L.C., REGARDING ITS 
CERTIFICATE OF ENVIRONMENTAL COMPATIBILITY AND PUBLIC NEED ISSUED 
IN CASE NO. 13-990-EL-BGN; GREENWICH NEIGHBORS UNITED, APPELLANT; 
POWER SITING BOARD ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as In re Application of 6011 Greenwich Windpark, L.L.C., Slip 
Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-2406.] 
Power Siting Board—Application to modify previously issued siting certificate for 
wind-powered electric-generation facility to add new turbine models—
Power Siting Board’s approval of new wind-turbine models was not an 
“amendment” of the certificate for purposes of applying the current 
turbine-setback requirements stated in R.C. 4906.20 and 4906.201—Power 
Siting Board reasonably interpreted R.C. 4906.20(B)(2)(c)’s wind-turbine-
setback-waiver provision—R.C. 4906.07(B) gives Power Siting Board 
discretion in certain situations to determine whether to hold a hearing on 
an application to amend a siting certificate—Orders affirmed. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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(No. 2017-1375—Submitted March 5, 2019—Decided June 20, 2019.) 
APPEAL from the Power Siting Board, No. 15-1921-EL-BGA. 
__________________ 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Greenwich Neighbors United (“GNU”), appeals from 
orders of appellee Ohio Power Siting Board approving the application of 6011 
Greenwich Windpark, L.L.C. (“Greenwich Windpark”), to add three new wind-
turbine models to the list of turbines suitable for Greenwich Windpark’s proposed 
wind farm in Huron County.  GNU primarily argues that in approving the proposed 
changes, the board should have amended Greenwich Windpark’s siting certificate 
and should have applied the enhanced minimum turbine-setback requirements 
applicable to any certificate “amendment” under the current versions of R.C. 
4906.20 and 4906.201, which became effective September 15, 2014. 
{¶ 2} For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the board’s 
approval of Greenwich Windpark’s application did not require an amendment of its 
certificate, and we therefore affirm the board’s orders. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
{¶ 3} The Power Siting Board has exclusive authority to issue a certificate 
of environmental compatibility and public need for construction, operation, and 
maintenance of a “major utility facility,” R.C. 4906.01(B)(1), such as a wind-
powered electric-generation facility, also known as a wind farm or wind park.  See 
R.C. 4906.01(D), 4906.03, and 4906.13. 
{¶ 4} In August 2014, the board approved Greenwich Windpark’s 
application to construct a wind farm, subject to 53 conditions agreed to by 
Greenwich Windpark and the board’s staff.  According to the board’s order, the 
proposed facility will be located on 4,650 acres of land leased from 26 landowners 
in Greenwich Township, Huron County—about 15 miles north of Mansfield.  The 
wind farm will consist of up to 25 wind turbines and is designed to operate at an 
January Term, 2019 
 
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aggregate capacity of 60 megawatts and to generate 210,000 megawatts of 
electricity per year.  In its original application for the certificate, Greenwich 
Windpark proposed only one turbine model for its project. 
{¶ 5} In November 2015, Greenwich Windpark initiated a new board 
proceeding by filing an application to amend its certificate.  Greenwich Windpark’s 
application noted that turbine technology had advanced since it initially requested 
a certificate, and it therefore sought to add three new turbine models to the list of 
acceptable turbines for its wind farm.1  Greenwich Windpark’s application also 
noted that two of the new turbine models were slightly larger than the certified 
model but none of the turbine locations would change and that all new models 
would either comply with the minimum setbacks in place when the board originally 
issued Greenwich Windpark’s certificate or the turbines were subject to setback 
waivers that Greenwich Windpark had obtained in the certification case. 
{¶ 6} Although GNU had not participated in the original certification 
proceeding, GNU intervened in the newly filed matter.  According to GNU, some 
of its members own property near the proposed wind farm and it filed comments 
and objections opposing Greenwich Windpark’s application. 
{¶ 7} The board’s staff investigated Greenwich Windpark’s application 
and, in April 2016, issued a report recommending approval of the proposed turbine 
changes.  In May 2016, the board approved Greenwich Windpark’s application 
without holding a hearing, and in August 2017, the board denied GNU’s request 
for a rehearing. 
{¶ 8} GNU thereafter commenced this appeal, raising six assignments of 
error.  We granted Greenwich Windpark’s motion for leave to intervene to defend 
                                                 
1.  In a supplemental application, Greenwich Windpark withdrew one of the proposed new turbine 
models and replaced it with another comparable model.  For purposes of this appeal, we will refer 
to Greenwich Windpark’s initial amendment application and supplemental application as one 
application. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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the board’s orders.  151 Ohio St.3d 1422, 2017-Ohio-8365, 84 N.E.3d 1061.  We 
later dismissed GNU’s second assignment of error.  152 Ohio St.3d 1403, 2018-
Ohio-723, 92 N.E.3d 876. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
{¶ 9} We will reverse, modify, or vacate an order of the Power Siting Board 
“only when our review of the record reveals that the order is unlawful or 
unreasonable.”  In re Application of Champaign Wind, L.L.C., 146 Ohio St.3d 489, 
2016-Ohio-1513, 58 N.E.3d 1142, ¶ 7; see R.C. 4906.12 (incorporating the 
standard of review from R.C. 4903.13).  We will not reverse or modify a board’s 
order as to questions of fact when the record contains sufficient probative evidence 
to show that the order was not manifestly against the weight of the evidence and 
was not so clearly unsupported by the record as to show misapprehension, mistake, 
or willful disregard of duty.  Champaign Wind at ¶ 7.  As to questions of law, we 
have complete and independent power of review in appeals from the board.  Id. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Proposition of law No. 1: whether the board acted unlawfully or 
unreasonably by refusing to subject Greenwich Windpark’s application to 
the current minimum setback requirements in R.C. 4906.20 and 4906.201 
1.  The relevant statutory framework and the board’s orders 
{¶ 10} The primary issues on appeal involve the interpretation of R.C. 
4906.20 and 4906.201—power-siting statutes applicable only to wind farms.  R.C. 
4906.20 applies to an “economically significant wind farm,” which is a wind farm 
capable of operating at an aggregate capacity between 5 and 50 megawatts, R.C. 
4906.13(A).  R.C. 4906.201 applies to a wind farm capable of operating at an 
aggregate capacity of 50 megawatts or more, such as Greenwich Windpark’s 
project.  R.C. 4906.201(A), however, incorporates the “minimum setback 
requirements” established by the board under R.C. 4906.20(B)(2). 
January Term, 2019 
 
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{¶ 11} In 2014—after the board had originally certified Greenwich 
Windpark’s wind farm—the legislature amended R.C. 4906.20 and 4906.201 to 
significantly increase the minimum turbine-setback requirements for new wind-
farm certificates.  In addition, the legislature enacted R.C. 4906.20(B)(2)(b)(ii) and 
4906.201(B)(2), both of which state that those new setback requirements apply to 
“[a]ny amendment made to an existing certificate” after the effective date of the 
new enhanced setbacks—that is, September 15, 2014.  The legislature also 
instructed in both statutes, however, that the amendments to R.C. 4906.20 and 
4906.201 “shall not be construed to limit or abridge any rights or remedies in equity 
or under the common law.” 
{¶ 12} In November 2015, Greenwich Windpark filed an application 
seeking to amend its certificate to, as described above, add three new turbine 
models.  Although the board approved the application, the board concluded that 
Greenwich Windpark’s requested turbine changes did not constitute an 
“amendment” for purposes of R.C. 4906.20 and 4906.201.  According to the board, 
the term “amendment” in those two statutes has a very specific meaning based on 
the way the legislature chose to word the statutes: 
 
The Board interprets the amendment addressed in R.C. 4906.20 and 
4906.201 to apply specifically in those instances where an 
amendment results in a substantial change in the location of a turbine 
or an amendment results in a material increase in an environmental 
impact caused by a turbine that is not already addressed by 
conditions placed on the certificate. 
 
Power Siting Bd. No. 15-1921-EL-BGA, 2016 Ohio PUC LEXIS 471, *10 (May 
19, 2016). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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{¶ 13} Relying on that definition, the board concluded that Greenwich 
Windpark’s “application [did] not constitute an amendment that triggers the 
enhanced setbacks under R.C. 4906.201(B)(2),” because the application did not 
relocate any turbines or create any new environmental impacts beyond those 
already addressed in the original certificate.  Id. at *22. 
{¶ 14} In its entry denying GNU’s application for rehearing, the board 
further clarified its interpretation of R.C. 4906.20 and 4906.201.  Because those 
statutes do not define the meaning of the phrase “[a]ny amendment made to an 
existing certificate,” the board noted that it “used its discretion and expertise to 
determine what qualifies” as an amendment, in the same way it must create 
parameters for undefined terms when fulfilling its statutory duty to “ ‘prescribe 
reasonable regulations regarding any wind turbines * * *, including, but not limited 
to, their * * * change, alteration, maintenance, removal, use, or enlargement.’ ”  
(Emphasis added by the board.)  Power Siting Bd. No. 15-1921-EL-BGA, 2017 
Ohio PUC LEXIS 726, *12-13 (Aug. 17, 2017), quoting R.C 4906.20(B)(2).  
“[P]roject changes that are adequately addressed by existing certificate conditions,” 
the board concluded, “do not require an amendment to the original certificate.”  Id. 
at *16.  To support its interpretation, the board noted that construction of wind 
farms is often delayed for years after initial certification, id. at *15, and that a 
change it sees “with frequency” involves updates to turbine models “that could 
serve to make wind turbines more efficient and in many circumstances, less 
obtrusive to surrounding property owners,” id. at *16.  Applying the enhanced 
setbacks to every type of minor change “could prove detrimental to the originally 
certificated project.”  Id.  The board noted that “[n]ot every proposed change to a 
major utility facility requires an amendment to an existing certificate.”  Id. at *14. 
{¶ 15} The board therefore refused to adopt GNU’s interpretation of 
“amendment”; the board reasoned that GNU’s interpretation “would serve to 
eliminate existing wind farm projects from commerce for minor modifications.”  
January Term, 2019 
 
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Id. at *17.  The board noted that if the General Assembly had intended such a result, 
that intent “could have been explicitly stated.”  Id.  And considering that the 
legislature has entrusted the board with the responsibility of interpreting the words 
“change” and “alteration” regarding turbines in R.C. 4906.20(B)(2), the board 
concluded that it is required to use “its expertise of the siting process to interpret 
these words in a manner that recognizes the practicality of siting commercial wind 
farms while also adhering to the words of the statute.”  Id. at *17.  Indeed, here it 
was clear to the board that upgrading the turbine models was a minor change that 
merely allowed Greenwich Windpark “to take advantage of technological 
advancements.”  Id.  The board further concluded that its interpretation of “[a]ny 
amendment made to an existing certificate” is consistent with the legislature’s 
instruction that the amendments to R.C. 4906.20 and 4906.201 enacted by the 
General Assembly in 2014 “ ‘shall not be construed to limit or abridge any rights 
or remedies in equity or under the common law.’ ”  Id. at *14, quoting R.C. 
4906.20(B)(2)(b)(ii) and 4906.201(B)(2). 
{¶ 16} On appeal, GNU argues that the board acted unreasonably and 
unlawfully by refusing to subject Greenwich Windpark’s application to the current 
minimum turbine setbacks applicable to any certificate “amendment.”  GNU 
contends that our recent decision in In re Application of Black Fork Wind Energy, 
L.L.C., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2018-Ohio-5206, ___ N.E.3d ___, controls the 
outcome here and that under the plain and ordinary meaning of the term 
“amendment,” Greenwich Windpark sought and received an amendment to its 
certificate, which triggered application of the enhanced setback requirements under 
R.C. 4906.201(B)(2). 
2.  Analysis of the issue 
{¶ 17} We conclude that the board reasonably determined that Greenwich 
Windpark’s turbine changes here did not require an “amendment” to its certificate 
for purposes of applying the enhanced setback requirements in R.C. 4906.20 and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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4906.201.  Although our recent decision in Black Fork guides our analysis in this 
case, it does not require a conclusion that the approved turbine changes amounted 
to an “amendment” for purposes of R.C. 4906.20 and 4906.201. 
{¶ 18} The issue in Black Fork was whether the board could lawfully extend 
the commencement-of-construction deadline in a siting certificate by granting a 
party’s motion rather than complying with the statutory process for amending a 
certificate, which requires an application, staff investigation, and staff investigative 
report.  Id. at ¶ 1-2, 12-14, 20-22.  The board had argued that changes to a 
certificate’s procedural timelines did not require an “amendment” and, in support, 
pointed to its long-standing administrative practice—in a range of power-siting 
matters—of extending certificates by granting motions.  Id. at ¶ 16.  We reviewed 
the statutes and rules applicable to amending a siting certificate and concluded that 
the board acted unlawfully in granting Black Fork’s motion rather than following 
the statutory procedures for amending a certificate.  Id. at ¶ 20, 30. 
{¶ 19} Black Fork is distinguishable because it involved the meaning of 
“amendment” for purposes of R.C. 4906.06 and 4906.07, two general statutes 
applicable to all power-siting matters.  Because the legislature had not defined 
“amendment” as it is used in R.C. 4906.06(E) and 4906.07(B), we looked to the 
common, ordinary, and accepted meaning of the term to resolve the question before 
us.  “In construing statutes, it is customary to give words their plain ordinary 
meaning unless the legislative body has clearly expressed a contrary intention.”  
Youngstown Club v. Porterfield, 21 Ohio St.2d 83, 86, 255 N.E.2d 262 (1970). 
{¶ 20} This case has a different procedural posture than Black Fork and 
therefore warrants a separate analysis.  In this case, rather than filing a motion like 
the wind-farm developer did in Black Fork, Greenwich Windpark filed an 
application to amend its certificate.  Making revisions by application requires a 
more stringent process than making them by motion.  For example, Greenwich 
Windpark gave public notice of the application.  Interested parties were allowed to 
January Term, 2019 
 
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intervene in the action to address the proposed changes to the wind farm.  And the 
board’s staff conducted a full investigation into the substantive differences between 
the turbine approved in the original certificate and those proposed in the 
application.  After following the statutory procedures for amending a certificate, 
the board concluded that the proposed changes did not constitute an amendment for 
purposes of R.C. 4906.20 and 4906.201.  Those two statutes are specific to wind 
farms.  The General Assembly, through R.C. 4906.20 and 4906.201, vested the 
board with broad authority to regulate wind turbines and their associated facilities, 
including changes and alterations to turbines.  R.C. 4906.20(B)(2) specifically 
requires the board to “prescribe reasonable regulations regarding any wind turbines 
and associated facilities of an economically significant wind farm, including, but 
not limited to, their location, erection, construction, reconstruction, change, 
alteration, maintenance, removal, use, or enlargement.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 21} The board here found that Greenwich Windpark’s new turbine 
models were “adequately covered by the existing conditions of the certificate” and 
that the impacts of the proposal did “not require a change to the existing certificate.”  
2017 Ohio PUC LEXIS 726 at *13.  The legislature delegated regulatory authority 
to the board to regulate wind turbines.  In addition, the legislature in R.C. 
4906.20(B)(2)(b)(ii) and 4906.201(B)(2) expressly instructed that the 2014 
amendments to R.C. 4906.20 and 4906.201 “shall not be construed to limit or 
abridge any rights or remedies in equity or under the common law”—another 
difference from the statutes at issue in Black Fork.  Accordingly, and pursuant to 
its statutory authority on these issues, the board considered the facts and the parties’ 
arguments and determined that the proposed change did not constitute an 
amendment under R.C. 4906.20 or 4906.201. 
{¶ 22} Although the dissenting opinion asserts that our analysis here must 
be identical to that in Black Fork, the dissent fails to account for the differences in 
the statutes at issue in the two cases.  “ ‘[T]he natural meaning of * * * words is not 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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always conclusive as to the construction of statutes.’ ”  State ex rel. Myers v. 
Spencer Twp. Rural School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 95 Ohio St. 367, 373, 116 N.E. 516 
(1917), quoting State v. Budd, 65 Ohio St. 1, 5, 60 N.E. 988 (1901).  And although 
it is generally true that the words and phrases used by the General Assembly will 
be construed in their usual, ordinary meaning, that is not so when a contrary 
intention of the legislature clearly appears.  S. Sur. Co. v. Std. Slag Co., 117 Ohio 
St. 512, 519, 159 N.E. 559 (1927).  Here, we have identified several important 
differences between the relevant statutes in this case, R.C. 4906.20 and 4906.201, 
and the ones analyzed in Black Fork, R.C. 4906.06 and 4906.07, that require us to 
independently construe the term amendment.  The dissent complains that “[t]hese 
distinctions are strained and unpersuasive,” dissenting opinion at ¶ 68, while failing 
to make any effort to account for those differences.  Instead, the dissent offers an 
interpretation that ignores the context of the statutory scheme and is unworkable in 
practice. 
{¶ 23} Our decision in Black Fork should not be interpreted as requiring 
that every proposed change to a wind farm’s certificate—no matter how minor or 
immaterial—is an amendment for purposes of applying the enhanced setback 
requirements.  In this case, the board adopted a reasonable and practical approach 
for determining when an amendment is necessary for purposes of R.C. 4906.20 and 
4906.201.  Under the circumstances, GNU has not demonstrated that the board’s 
decision here was unlawful or unreasonable. 
{¶ 24} Accordingly, we reject GNU’s first proposition of law.2 
 
 
                                                 
2.  Because we dismissed the second assignment of error stated in GNU’s notice of appeal, there is 
no second proposition of law in GNU’s merit brief. 
January Term, 2019 
 
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B.  Proposition of law No. 3: whether the board unlawfully or unreasonably 
interpreted the setback-waiver provision in R.C. 4906.20(B)(2)(c) and 
whether the board failed to establish required procedural rules 
1.  The relevant statutory framework and the board’s orders 
{¶ 25} R.C. 4906.20(B)(2)(c) provides that the statutory minimum setbacks 
apply “in all cases except those in which all owners of property adjacent to the wind 
farm property waive application of the setback to that property pursuant to a 
procedure the board shall establish by rule and except in which, in a particular case, 
the board determines that a setback greater than the minimum is necessary.” 
{¶ 26} In its order issuing Greenwich Windpark’s original certificate, the 
board noted that some of Greenwich Windpark’s proposed turbines fell within the 
minimum setbacks but that Greenwich Windpark had either obtained or was in the 
process of obtaining waivers from the landowners adjacent to each of those 
particular turbines.  During the proceedings in this matter, GNU argued that 
Greenwich Windpark had failed to secure all required waivers from neighboring 
landowners.  The board rejected GNU’s argument and concluded that Greenwich 
Windpark had already obtained the necessary waivers in the original certification 
case and that no additional waivers were necessary as a result of adding the new 
turbine models. 
{¶ 27} On appeal, GNU argues that the board acted unlawfully by 
permitting Greenwich Windpark to waive the minimum setback requirements 
without first obtaining waivers from “all owners” of property adjacent to any 
portion of the proposed wind farm.  According to GNU, the meaning of “all” in 
R.C. 4906.20(B)(2)(c) is “obvious” and requires that “each and every owner of 
property with land adjacent to the wind farm property” must sign a waiver in order 
for any turbine to be built within a minimum setback.  GNU also argues that it was 
“legally impossible” for Greenwich Windpark to secure setback waivers because 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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the board had failed to comply with its statutory duty to establish rules outlining 
the procedure for obtaining a waiver. 
{¶ 28} In response, the board asserts that R.C. 4906.20(B)(2)(c) requires a 
waiver only from those landowners who own property adjacent to a turbine that 
falls within the minimum setback.  According to the board, the purpose of the 
statute is to give a landowner the right to consent for a turbine to be sited within the 
minimum setback from his or her property and GNU’s “all or nothing” 
interpretation is contrary to the statute’s intent. 
2.  Analysis of the issue 
{¶ 29} We conclude that the board’s decision relied on the only reasonable 
interpretation of R.C. 4906.20(B)(2)(c). 
{¶ 30} R.C. 4906.20(B)(2)(c) sets forth an exception to the minimum 
setback when “all owners of property adjacent to the wind farm property waive 
application of the setback to that property.”  A property owner may “waive 
application of the setback to that property” only if he or she has something to 
waive—that is, if the turbine adjacent to his or her property falls within the 
minimum setback.  If an owner’s property is adjacent to a turbine that exceeds the 
minimum setback or is near a portion of the wind-farm property that does not have 
a turbine—such as the maintenance facility or the substation—there would be no 
setback to waive.  Accordingly, by use of the phrase “waive application of the 
setback to that property,” the legislature indicated that only those property owners 
with rights to waive are required to execute a waiver to permit a turbine to be sited 
inside the minimum setback distance.  The General Assembly must be “presumed 
to know the meaning of words, to have used the words of a statute advisedly and to 
have expressed legislative intent by the use of the words found in the statute.”  
Wachendorf v. Shaver, 149 Ohio St. 231, 237, 78 N.E.2d 370 (1948). 
{¶ 31} GNU’s interpretation of R.C. 4906.20(B)(2)(c) is untenable.  Under 
GNU’s theory, an owner of property adjacent to any portion of a wind farm, which 
January Term, 2019 
 
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can cover thousands of acres and be the equivalent of dozens of square miles, could 
prevent the construction of a turbine miles away.  Indeed, GNU suggests that R.C. 
4906.20(B)(2)(c) gives one landowner the right to “veto” another landowner’s 
decision to waive application of the minimum setback to the second landowner’s 
property.  But nothing in the statutory scheme supports permitting that type of 
interference with a property owner’s rights.  Rather, R.C. 4906.20(B)(2)(c) 
provides a process by which a property owner may waive the minimum setback “to 
that property.”  (Emphasis added.)  In other words, the statute allows a turbine to 
be placed within the minimum setback but only if the neighboring landowners who 
are directly impacted have waived application of the setback to their particular 
properties. 
{¶ 32} In addition, GNU’s heavy reliance on the term “all” is misplaced.  
“Parsing individual words is useful only within a context.”  State v. Porterfield, 106 
Ohio St.3d 5, 2005-Ohio-3095, 829 N.E.2d 690, ¶ 12.  Here, the term “all” in R.C. 
4906.20(B)(2)(c) modifies “owners,” which ensures that every owner of property 
located adjacent to a turbine within the minimum setback waives application of the 
setback “to that property.” 
{¶ 33} Finally, GNU has not sufficiently developed its argument that it was 
“legally impossible” for Greenwich Windpark to secure setback waivers due to the 
board’s alleged failure to establish procedural rules governing waivers.  At the time 
the board issued the orders on appeal, it had adopted rules regarding setback 
waivers.  See former Ohio Adm.Code 4906-17-08(C)(1)(c)(iii), 2008-2009 Ohio 
Monthly Record 2-3671, effective May 7, 2009, and former Ohio Adm.Code 4906-
4-08(C)(2)(d), 2015-2016 Ohio Monthly Record 2-4868, effective June 26, 2016.  
GNU is apparently dissatisfied with the substance of those rules because they did 
not accord with GNU’s interpretation of R.C. 4906.20(B)(2)(c).  But the rules 
nevertheless existed.  GNU bears the burden of demonstrating reversible error, but 
it has failed to develop this argument beyond conclusory statements.  See In re 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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Complaint of Toliver v. Vectren Energy Delivery of Ohio, Inc., 145 Ohio St.3d 346, 
2015-Ohio-5055, 49 N.E.3d 1240, ¶ 30. 
{¶ 34} Accordingly, we reject GNU’s third proposition of law. 
C.  Proposition of law No. 4: whether the board acted unlawfully or 
unreasonably by failing to hold a hearing on Greenwich Windpark’s 
application or by failing to take other actions 
1.  The relevant statutory framework and the board’s orders 
{¶ 35} R.C. 4906.07(B) requires the board to hold a hearing on an 
application to amend a certificate “if the proposed change in the facility would 
result in any material increase in any environmental impact of the facility or a 
substantial change in the location of all or a portion of such facility.” 
{¶ 36} As noted above, Greenwich Windpark filed an application for an 
amendment of its certificate.  Although the board ultimately determined that 
Greenwich Windpark’s proposed changes did not require an “amendment” for 
purposes of R.C. 4906.20 and 4906.201, the board nonetheless treated Greenwich 
Windpark’s filing as an amendment application for purposes of review and 
compliance with the procedural requirements of R.C. 4906.06 and 4906.07.  In both 
of the orders on appeal, the board concluded that a hearing was unnecessary under 
R.C. 4906.07(B) because “there [was] no material increase in any environmental 
impact of the facility and no substantial change in any portion of the facility’s 
location.”  2016 Ohio PUC LEXIS 471 at *20; 2017 Ohio PUC LEXIS 726 at *7. 
{¶ 37} On appeal, GNU argues that the board was required to hold a hearing 
and that by refusing to do so, the board violated R.C. 4906.07(B) and deprived 
GNU of due process. 
2.  Analysis of the issue 
{¶ 38} GNU has failed to establish that it was entitled to a hearing in this 
case. 
January Term, 2019 
 
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{¶ 39} R.C. 4906.07(B), especially when read in the context of the entire 
statute, gives the board some discretion to determine when a hearing is necessary.  
R.C. 4906.07(B) provides that upon receipt of an amendment application, the board 
shall hold a hearing “if” the proposal would result in certain changes to the facility.  
The wording of the statute presupposes that a hearing is not always necessary and 
accordingly demonstrates that the legislature intended to authorize the board to rule 
on some amendment applications without the delay of a hearing.  And in a prior 
wind-farm case, a plurality of this court explained that under R.C. 4906.07(B), the 
board retains “authority to determine what is subject to hearing,” because “not 
every issue” requires a hearing, “as that would be unworkable.”  In re Application 
of Buckeye Wind, L.L.C., 131 Ohio St.3d 449, 2012-Ohio-878, 966 N.E.2d 869, 
¶ 30; see also id. at ¶ 31 (acknowledging that a hearing on an amendment 
application is available when significant changes are proposed to the certificate). 
{¶ 40} Here, after reviewing Greenwich Windpark’s application, GNU’s 
comments and objections to the application, and the investigative report prepared 
by the board’s staff, the board determined that Greenwich Windpark’s proposed 
changes did not require a hearing under R.C. 4906.07(B).  On appeal, GNU has not 
demonstrated that the board’s factual determination was manifestly against the 
weight of evidence or clearly unsupported by the record. 
{¶ 41} Specifically, GNU claims that a hearing was required because the 
three new turbine models “will result in substantial changes to the facility,” and 
GNU points to differences in size, noise, shadow flicker (occurring when the sun 
shines through the rotating blades of a turbine), and ice throw between the new 
turbines and the originally certified model.  The board’s staff, however, reviewed 
those differences and concluded in its report filed with the board that adding the 
three turbine models “would not require a change in location of any turbine sites” 
and that the conditions of the original certificate—plus a minor clarification to one 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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condition—were “adequate to ensure that adverse environmental impacts would 
continue to be minimized for this project.”  GNU has not proved otherwise. 
{¶ 42} For example, after reviewing the potential noise impact of the new 
turbines, the board’s staff noted that even if the new turbines produced slightly 
more noise than the originally certified model, the new models would adhere to the 
noise-limit condition imposed in the original certificate.  GNU has not explained 
how a minimal increase in noise amounts to a “material increase in any 
environmental impact” requiring a hearing under R.C. 4906.07(B)—especially 
considering that the board’s staff concluded that the new turbine models will adhere 
to the original noise-limit condition. 
{¶ 43} GNU has also failed to establish any due-process violation.  In the 
public-utility context, “we have repeatedly held that there is no constitutional right 
to notice and hearing in utility-related matters if no statutory right to a hearing 
exists.”  Discount Cellular, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 112 Ohio St.3d 360, 2007-
Ohio-53, 859 N.E.2d 957, ¶ 38; see also Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm., 
70 Ohio St.3d 244, 248, 638 N.E.2d 550 (1994) (“the right to participate in a 
ratemaking proceeding is statutory, not constitutional”).  GNU attempts to 
distinguish this precedent by arguing that because property rights are involved 
here—rather than public-utility-rate matters—GNU had a constitutional right to a 
hearing.  To support this argument, GNU cites Moore v. Middletown, 133 Ohio 
St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-3897, 975 N.E.2d 977, in which we held that owners of 
property adjacent to property rezoned by a foreign municipality had standing to 
bring a declaratory-judgment action challenging the constitutionality of the zoning 
action, id. at syllabus. 
{¶ 44} GNU has not adequately explained how Moore supports its theory 
that it had a constitutional right to a hearing merely because Greenwich Windpark 
requested turbine changes to its previously certified wind farm.  “[I]t is not 
generally the proper role of this court to develop a party’s arguments.”  In re 
January Term, 2019 
 
17 
Application of Columbus S. Power Co., 129 Ohio St.3d 271, 2011-Ohio-2638, 951 
N.E.2d 751, ¶ 19.  By citing Moore, GNU seems to be challenging Greenwich 
Windpark’s ability to construct a wind farm at all.  To do that, it should have 
participated in the original proceeding when the certificate was issued.  Absent 
further explanation from GNU, any legal right that it had to a hearing on Greenwich 
Windpark’s amendment application stemmed directly from R.C. 4906.07(B).  And 
if GNU had no right to a hearing under that statute, it also had no constitutional 
right to one. 
{¶ 45} Under this proposition of law, GNU also asserts that the board failed 
to require public notice of Greenwich Windpark’s application, failed to hold 
informational and local public hearings, failed to respond to GNU’s objections, and 
violated R.C. 4906.10(A), 4906.11, and 4906.12.  GNU, however, has failed to 
develop these arguments or otherwise explain how the board violated these statutes.  
“Unsupported legal conclusions do not demonstrate error.”  Toliver, 145 Ohio St.3d 
346, 2015-Ohio-5055, 49 N.E.3d 1240, at ¶ 30. 
{¶ 46} For these reasons, we reject GNU’s fourth proposition of law. 
D.  Proposition of law No. 5: whether the board acted unlawfully or 
unreasonably by limiting the scope of GNU’s intervention 
{¶ 47} In GNU’s reply brief, it acknowledges that this issue is “moot.”  
Because the board and GNU ultimately agree that the board did not limit the scope 
of GNU’s intervention, there is no actual controversy on this point.  We therefore 
do not address GNU’s fifth proposition of law. 
E.  Proposition of law No. 6: whether the board acted unlawfully or 
unreasonably by stating that it had promulgated the rules that the General 
Assembly required it to adopt 
{¶ 48} R.C. 4906.20(B)(2) requires the board to “prescribe reasonable 
regulations regarding any wind turbines and associated facilities of an economically 
significant wind farm.”  In the order granting Greenwich Windpark’s amendment 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
18 
application, the board noted that it had “promulgated the required rules” in the 
relevant portions of the Ohio Administrative Code.  2016 Ohio PUC LEXIS 471 at 
*8.  On appeal, GNU takes issues with that statement of the board.  According to 
GNU, the board failed to adopt “reasonable substantive regulations” and instead 
promulgated rules “devoid of any reasonable standard,” which has resulted in the 
board’s operating in an “ad hoc” manner that relies too much on studies and 
methodologies provided by wind-farm developers. 
{¶ 49} GNU’s argument is outside the scope of this appeal.  If GNU is 
dissatisfied with the content of the board’s administrative rules, it should have 
challenged those rules in a rulemaking proceeding.  The issue here is whether the 
board’s approval of Greenwich Windpark’s amendment application was unlawful 
or unreasonable—not whether the board properly complied with the legislative 
mandate to establish reasonable regulations for wind farms. 
{¶ 50} We therefore reject this proposition of law. 
F.  Greenwich Windpark’s motion to strike 
{¶ 51} After the parties completed briefing, Greenwich Windpark moved to 
strike the supplement GNU filed with its reply brief and the portions of the reply 
brief that rely on that supplement.  Greenwich Windpark argues that the supplement 
contains materials that are not part of the record.  Indeed, most of the materials are 
dated after the board issued the orders on appeal. 
{¶ 52} “We generally strike evidence submitted by a party to a case here on 
appeal when the evidence was not submitted below.”  Hilliard City Schools Bd. of 
Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 154 Ohio St.3d 449, 2018-Ohio-2046, 114 
N.E.3d 1185, ¶ 41, citing Orange City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. 
Bd. of Revision, 152 Ohio St.3d 325, 2017-Ohio-8817, 96 N.E.3d 223, ¶ 11, fn. 3. 
{¶ 53} The challenged documents here refer to facts outside the record.  
Because appellate counsel cannot properly refer to such facts—and GNU has not 
identified a compelling reason to do so in this case—we grant the motion to strike 
January Term, 2019 
 
19 
the documents that are not part of the record and the portions of GNU’s reply brief 
that rely on those documents. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 54} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the board’s orders and grant 
Greenwich Windpark’s motion to strike. 
Orders affirmed. 
FRENCH, FISCHER, and DONNELLY, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by DEWINE and STEWART, 
JJ. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 55} Because the majority abdicates this court’s judicial duty and 
authority to “say what the law is,” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 
60 (1803), when it defers to appellee Ohio Power Siting Board’s interpretation of 
two unambiguous statutes, R.C. 4906.20(B)(2)(b)(ii) and 4906.201(B)(2), I dissent.  
Contrary to the majority’s analysis, the General Assembly—the ultimate arbiter of 
public policy in this state—has unambiguously provided that any amendment to a 
wind farm’s certificate shall be subject to the new setback provisions enacted in 
those statutes. 
{¶ 56} In this case, the board granted the request of 6011 Greenwich 
Windpark, L.L.C., for “an Amendment to its Certificate of Environmental 
Compatibility” to add three new wind-turbine models for use on its proposed wind 
farm.  That alteration of the certificate is an “amendment” within the plain meaning 
of R.C. 4906.20(B)(2)(b)(ii) and 4906.201(B)(2), and it is therefore subject to the 
new, more restrictive turbine-setback requirements in R.C. 4906.20 and 4906.201.  
And because the board lacks statutory authority to decide on a case-by-case basis 
whether an amendment is significant enough that the new setbacks apply, its orders 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
20 
declining to apply the current setbacks to the amendment of Greenwich Windpark’s 
certificate should be reversed. 
Statutory Construction 
{¶ 57} This case presents a straightforward question of statutory 
interpretation.  Our duty in construing a statute is to determine and give effect to 
the intent of the General Assembly as expressed in the language it enacted.  Griffith 
v. Aultman Hosp., 146 Ohio St.3d 196, 2016-Ohio-1138, 54 N.E.3d 1196, ¶ 18; 
Fisher v. Hasenjager, 116 Ohio St.3d 53, 2007-Ohio-5589, 876 N.E.2d 546, ¶ 20.  
A court therefore cannot insert language into a statute under the guise of statutory 
interpretation.  Doe v. Marlington Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 122 Ohio St.3d 
12, 2009-Ohio-1360, 907 N.E.2d 706, ¶ 29.  Instead, when the language of a statute 
is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, our role is to 
apply it as written.  Pelletier v. Campbell, 153 Ohio St.3d 611, 2018-Ohio-2121, 
109 N.E.3d 1210, ¶ 14. 
{¶ 58} Effective September 15, 2014, the General Assembly amended R.C. 
4906.20 and 4906.201 as part of 2014 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 483 (“H.B. 483”).  This 
legislation, specifically R.C. 4906.20(B)(2)(a), had the effect of significantly 
increasing the minimum setback for wind turbines from a wind farm’s property 
lines.  Although these more restrictive setbacks do not apply to certificates, 
certificate amendments, and qualifying certificate applications in existence prior to 
the effective date of H.B. 483, the General Assembly expressly provided: 
 
 
Any amendment made to an existing certificate after the 
effective date of the amendment of this section by H.B. 483 of the 
130th general assembly, shall be subject to the setback provision of 
this section as amended by that act.  The amendments to this section 
by that act shall not be construed to limit or abridge any rights or 
remedies in equity or under the common law. 
January Term, 2019 
 
21 
 
R.C. 4906.201(B)(2).  The General Assembly in H.B. 483 also codified this same 
provision as R.C. 4906.20(B)(2)(b)(ii). 
{¶ 59} We recently examined the statutory scheme for amending a 
certificate in In re Application of Black Fork Wind Energy, L.L.C., ___ Ohio St.3d 
___, 2018-Ohio-5206, ___ N.E.3d ___.  The issue in that case was whether altering 
the certificate to extend the time for the holder to commence construction of the 
wind farm amounted to an amendment of the certificate.  We explained that the 
word “amendment” has a plain and ordinary meaning: 
 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “amendment” as “[a] formal 
and usu. minor revision or addition proposed or made to a statute, 
constitution, pleading, order, or other instrument; specif., a change 
made by addition, deletion, or correction; esp., an alteration in 
wording.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 98 (10th Ed.2014).  Webster’s 
Third New International Dictionary defines “amendment” as the 
“act of amending esp. for the better; correction of a fault or faults; 
reformation,” “the process of amending (as a motion, bill, act, or 
constitution),” and “an alteration proposed or effected by such 
process.”  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 68 (2002).  
And “amend” is defined as “to change or alter in any way esp. in 
phraseology” or “to alter (as a motion, bill, or law) formally by 
modification, deletion, or addition.”  Id. 
 
Id. at ¶ 18. 
{¶ 60} Applying this plain and ordinary meaning, we concluded that the 
Power Siting Board had amended a condition of the certificate “by changing the 
compliance deadline.”  Id. at ¶ 19.  We also noted that “had the board treated the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
22 
motion for an extension as an application for an amendment, the current setback 
provisions in R.C. 4906.20 and 4906.201 may have been triggered.”  Id. at ¶ 25. 
{¶ 61} As we have already decided in Black Fork Wind Energy, an 
“amendment” is simply a change of or an alteration to a document such as an order 
of the board granting a certificate.  It can be a minor revision or even something as 
small as an alteration in wording.  ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2018-Ohio-5206, ___ 
N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 21.  Nothing in the word’s plain meaning indicates that the 
existence of an amendment is a matter of degree or interpretation or that only a 
significant change constitutes an amendment. 
{¶ 62} Moreover, the current setbacks apply to “[a]ny amendment.”  
(Emphasis added.)  R.C. 4906.20(B)(2)(b)(ii) and 4906.201(B)(2).  “ ‘ “Any” 
means “one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.” ’ ”  Weiss v. Pub. Util. 
Comm., 90 Ohio St.3d 15, 17, 734 N.E.2d 775 (2000), quoting State ex rel. Purdy 
v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Elections, 77 Ohio St.3d 338, 340, 673 N.E.2d 1351 (1997), 
quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 97 (1971).  As we recently 
explained in Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. Buell, “the use of the term ‘any’ in 
a phrase encompasses ‘every’ and ‘all’ examples of the subject described.”  144 
Ohio St.3d 490, 2015-Ohio-4551, 45 N.E.3d 185, ¶ 34.  Because any amendment 
includes all amendments and every amendment, it necessarily includes a minor 
amendment as well as a more significant one. 
{¶ 63} Applying R.C. 4906.20(B)(2)(b)(ii) and 4906.201(B)(2), and in 
accordance with our analysis in Black Fork Wind Energy, the modification of 
Greenwich Windpark’s certificate to add new turbine models to the one previously 
approved for its wind farm is an amendment to that certificate. 
{¶ 64} This conclusion is buttressed by uncodified law enacted by the 
General Assembly.  Uncodified law is the law of Ohio, but because it is has limited 
duration or operation, it is not assigned a permanent section number in the Revised 
January Term, 2019 
 
23 
Code.  Maynard v. Eaton Corp., 119 Ohio St.3d 443, 2008-Ohio-4542, 895 N.E.2d 
145, ¶ 7. 
{¶ 65} Effective September 29, 2015, Section 749.20 of 2015 Am.Sub.H.B. 
No. 64 (“H.B. 64”) provided a grace period of 180 days in which a certificate could 
be amended to change a wind farm’s turbines without triggering the new setbacks 
enacted by H.B. 483, “[n]otwithstanding division (B)(2)(b)(ii) of section 4906.20 
of the Revised Code and division (B)(2) of section 4906.201 of the Revised Code.”  
The grace period applied when “[t]he sole purpose of the amendment [was] to make 
changes to one or more turbines that [were] approved under the existing certificate 
but [had] not yet been installed” and when other conditions were met, including 
that the new turbines be more efficient or otherwise more technologically advanced, 
that the number of turbines not be increased, and that their locations be the same as 
those established by the certificate.  The General Assembly therefore recognized 
that a certificate is amended for purposes of R.C. 4906.20(B)(2)(b)(ii) and 
4906.201(B)(2) when new turbine models are added or substituted.  Otherwise, if 
upgrading the turbine models that may be used on a wind farm did not require an 
amendment of the certificate, there would have been no reason for the General 
Assembly to enact Section 749.20 of H.B. 64 as an exception to that requirement.  
See Rhodes v. New Philadelphia, 129 Ohio St.3d 304, 2011-Ohio-3279, 951 N.E.2d 
782, ¶ 23 (“We must give effect to every term in a statute and avoid a construction 
that would render any provision meaningless, inoperative, or superfluous”). 
{¶ 66} For 
these 
reasons, 
the 
board’s 
interpretation 
of 
R.C. 
4906.20(B)(2)(b)(ii) and 4906.201(B)(2)—that only a significant amendment 
triggers the new setbacks—is irreconcilable with the language that the legislature 
enacted. 
Black Fork Wind Energy Is Not Distinguishable 
{¶ 67} Notably, in Black Fork Wind Energy, we rejected the board’s 
argument that it has broad discretion to determine whether a particular change to a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
24 
certificate is an “amendment” and instead applied the plain and ordinary meaning 
of the word “amendment” as a change or alteration of the certificate.  ___ Ohio 
St.3d ___, 2018-Ohio-5206, ___ N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 16, 19.  The majority, however, 
attempts to distinguish Black Fork Wind Energy “because it involved the meaning 
of ‘amendment’ for purposes of R.C. 4906.06 and 4906.07, two general statutes 
applicable to all power-siting matters,” majority opinion at ¶ 19, while R.C. 
4906.20 and 4906.201 “are specific to wind farms,” id. at ¶ 20.  The majority also 
points out that R.C. 4906.20(B)(2)(b)(ii) and 4906.201(B)(2) state that the 
amendments enacted by H.B. 483 “shall not be construed to limit or abridge any 
rights or remedies in equity or under the common law” while R.C. 4906.06 and 
4906.07 do not contain that language.  Id. at ¶ 21.  The majority claims that the 
statutes at issue in this case therefore “warrant[] a separate analysis.”  Id. at ¶ 20. 
{¶ 68} These distinctions are strained and unpersuasive.  The fact that R.C. 
4906.20 and 4906.201 apply specifically to wind farms is a distinction without a 
difference; R.C. 4906.20(B)(1) expressly incorporates the statutory procedures for 
amending a certificate to cover wind farms, stating that the board must adopt rules 
that “provide for an application process for certificating economically significant 
wind farms that is identical to the extent practicable to the process applicable to 
certificating major utility facilities under sections 4906.06, 4906.07, 4906.08, 
4906.09, 4906.10, 4906.11, and 4906.12 of the Revised Code.”  All of these statutes 
are part of the same statutory scheme. 
{¶ 69} Similarly, the majority fails to explain why it matters that the 
amendments enacted by H.B. 483 “shall not be construed to limit or abridge any 
rights or remedies in equity or under the common law,” R.C. 4906.20(B)(2)(b)(ii) 
and 4906.201(B)(2).  No rights or remedies in equity or under the common law are 
in play here.  And in any case, when a statute is plain and unambiguous, there is 
nothing to construe.  Zumwalde v. Madeira & Indian Hill Joint Fire Dist., 128 Ohio 
St.3d 492, 2011-Ohio-1603, 946 N.E.2d 748, ¶ 22. 
January Term, 2019 
 
25 
{¶ 70} Putting these false distinctions aside reveals that at the core of the 
majority’s analysis is the assertion that the word “amendment” can mean something 
different in R.C. 4906.06 and 4906.07 than it does in R.C. 4906.20(B)(2)(b)(ii) and 
4906.201(B)(2).  But we should not assume that the General Assembly intended to 
give different meanings to the same word relating to the same subject matter in the 
same statutory scheme.  See In re Lord Baltimore Press, Inc., 4 Ohio St.2d 68, 73, 
212 N.E.2d 590 (1965).  Nothing in the language that the General Assembly 
enacted supports the view that a proposed change to the certificate is an amendment 
triggering the statutory procedures for amending a certificate but at the same time 
not an amendment for purposes of applying the current setbacks.  The majority 
cannot have it both ways. 
{¶ 71} Stare decisis is most compelling when precedent involves statutory 
construction.  Rocky River v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 43 Ohio St.3d 1, 6, 539 
N.E.2d 103 (1989).  And because Black Fork is not distinguishable on any genuine 
and material basis, its holding should provide the rule of decision in this case. 
Deference to the Board 
{¶ 72} Although it avoids using the word “deference” and addressing any 
of our caselaw explaining when it is appropriate to defer to an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute, the majority upholds the board’s orders because “the 
board adopted a reasonable and practical approach for determining when an 
amendment is necessary for purposes of R.C. 4906.20 and 4906.201.”  Majority 
opinion at ¶ 23.  In other words, the majority defers to the board’s interpretation of 
R.C. 4906.20(B)(2)(b)(ii) and 4906.201(B)(2) rather than engaging in its own 
statutory interpretation or following our precedent.  Regardless of its terminology, 
the majority’s analysis fails. 
{¶ 73} Our caselaw recognizes that we may rely on an agency’s expertise 
in interpreting a law when “highly specialized issues” are involved and when 
“agency expertise would * * * be of assistance in discerning the presumed intent of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
26 
our General Assembly.”  Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm., 58 Ohio St.2d 
108, 110, 388 N.E.2d 1370 (1979).  And we have recognized that “[d]ue deference 
should be given to statutory interpretations by an agency that has accumulated 
substantial expertise and to which the General Assembly has delegated enforcement 
responsibility.”  Weiss, 90 Ohio St.3d at 17-18, 734 N.E.2d 775, citing Collinsworth 
v. W. Elec. Co., 63 Ohio St.3d 268, 272, 586 N.E.2d 1071 (1992). 
{¶ 74} But here, the issue before us is neither highly specialized nor one 
related to the board’s enforcement responsibility.  Rather, this case requires us to 
simply engage in a familiar function—statutory construction—in which we apply 
established principles.  And because the interpretation of a statute is a question of 
law, we review the board’s interpretation de novo and without deference.  Stewart 
v. Vivian, 151 Ohio St.3d 574, 2017-Ohio-7526, 91 N.E.3d 716, ¶ 23.  Not only 
does deferring to the board’s construction of R.C. 4906.20(B)(2)(b)(ii) and 
4906.201(B)(2) abdicate our function and responsibility as members of the 
judiciary to “say what the law is,” Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177, 2 L.Ed. 60, but we also 
“abandon our role as an independent check on the executive branch” when we defer 
to an administrative agency’s interpretation of the law, State ex rel. McCann v. 
Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections, 155 Ohio St.3d 14, 2018-Ohio-3342, 118 N.E.3d 
224, ¶ 31 (DeWine, J., concurring in judgment only). 
{¶ 75} In any case, “[t]o interpret what is already plain ‘is not interpretation 
but legislation.’ ”  Hudson v. Petrosurance, Inc., 127 Ohio St.3d 54, 2010-Ohio-
4505, 936 N.E.2d 481, ¶ 31, quoting Iddings v. Jefferson Cty. School Dist. Bd. of 
Edn., 155 Ohio St. 287, 290, 98 N.E.2d 827 (1951).  R.C. 4906.20(B)(2)(b)(ii) and 
4906.201(B)(2) are unambiguous, and the board’s “interpretation” of these statutes 
is nothing more than policymaking in disguise.  Rather than simply considering 
whether a project change requires an amendment to the certificate pursuant to the 
statutes, the board has instead adopted a case-by-case, cost-benefit analysis to 
decide when the new setbacks should apply to the amendment. 
January Term, 2019 
 
27 
{¶ 76} In this case, for example, the board in its entry denying rehearing 
explained that applying the new setbacks based on a change in acceptable turbines 
“could result in a previously certificated wind farm project, wherein significant 
investment has been made over a span of years, to be irreparably impeded,” Power 
Siting Bd. No. 15-1921-EL-BGA, 2017 Ohio PUC LEXIS 726, *16 (Aug. 17, 
2017), even when “neighboring landowners would not experience adverse effects 
that have not already been contemplated and mitigated under the existing 
certificate,” id. at *17.  Essentially, the board concluded that the costs of applying 
the new setbacks to Greenwich Windpark’s proposed wind farm outweighed the 
benefits, and for this reason, it determined that the change did not qualify as an 
amendment. 
{¶ 77} But nothing in R.C. 4906.20(B)(2)(b)(ii) and 4906.201(B)(2) grants 
the board that authority to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the new setbacks 
should apply.  The legislature could have given the board that discretion to weigh 
the significance of an amendment, but it did not.  Rather, the General Assembly—
the ultimate arbiter of public policy of this state—provided in R.C. 4906.201(B)(2) 
that “[a]ny amendment made to an existing certificate * * * shall be subject to the 
setback provision.”  (Emphasis added.)  “[A] court may not rewrite the plain and 
unambiguous language of a statute under the guise of statutory interpretation,” 
Pelletier, 153 Ohio St.3d 611, 2018-Ohio-2121, 109 N.E.3d 1210, at ¶ 20, and 
neither may an administrative agency, see Black Fork Wind Energy, ___ Ohio St.3d 
___, 2018-Ohio-5206, ___ N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 21 (declining to defer to the board’s 
interpretation of an unambiguous statute).  The majority’s deference to the board’s 
interpretation of R.C. 4906.20(B)(2)(b)(ii) and 4906.201(B)(2) is unwarranted. 
{¶ 78} In the last analysis, Greenwich Windpark expressly applied for an 
amendment to its certificate.  It understood—or should have understood—that the 
amendment would be subject to the new setbacks pursuant to R.C. 
4906.20(B)(2)(b)(ii) and 4906.201(B)(2), and the board properly followed the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
28 
required procedures for amending a certificate before granting that application.  
However, the board lacked discretion to decide that changing a certificate condition 
to add or substitute turbine models does not qualify as an amendment to the existing 
certificate or trigger the new setbacks.  The board’s orders are therefore 
unreasonable and unlawful. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 79} In H.B. 483, the General Assembly enacted more stringent setback 
requirements for wind farms.  In doing so, it necessarily had to draw lines regarding 
when the new setbacks would apply.  Recognizing that existing certificate holders 
and applicants had relied on the existing law in investing in wind-farm projects, it 
did not make the new setbacks applicable to applications made and certificates 
issued prior to the effective date of this legislation.  But the legislature provided in 
R.C. 4906.20(B)(2)(b)(ii) and 4906.201(B)(2) that if an existing certificate holder 
chose to amend its certificate after the effective date of H.B. 483, it would be 
subjecting itself to the new setback provision. 
{¶ 80} It is the function of the General Assembly to weigh competing policy 
concerns and draw lines in enacting legislation.  See Schwan v. Riverside Methodist 
Hosp., 6 Ohio St.3d 300, 302, 452 N.E.2d 1337 (1983).  In contrast, our role “in 
reviewing legislative enactments is limited to interpreting the meaning of statutory 
provisions and determining whether they are in accord with the federal and state 
Constitutions.”  Toledo v. State, 154 Ohio St.3d 41, 2018-Ohio-2358, 110 N.E.3d 
1257, ¶ 31.  Second-guessing the wisdom of the legislature’s public-policy 
decisions does not fall within the scope of that review.  State ex rel. Ohio Congress 
of Parents & Teachers v. State Bd. of Edn., 111 Ohio St.3d 568, 2006-Ohio-5512, 
857 N.E.2d 1148, ¶ 20. 
{¶ 81} The General Assembly’s intent is manifest—the new setbacks 
enacted by H.B. 483 apply when a wind-farm certificate is amended to add or 
January Term, 2019 
 
29 
substitute a new model of turbine for use on the project.  The new setback provision 
therefore applies to the amendment of Greenwich Windpark’s certificate. 
{¶ 82} Accordingly, I would reverse the orders of the Power Siting Board. 
 
DEWINE and STEWART, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
McNees, Wallace & Nurick, L.L.C., and Matthew R. Pritchard, for 
appellant. 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, William L. Wright, Section Chief, and Jodi 
J. Bair, Thomas G. Lindgren, and John H. Jones, Assistant Attorneys General, for 
appellee Ohio Power Siting Board. 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., Michael J. Settineri, and Daniel E. 
Shuey; Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Daniel C. Gibson, Anne Marie Sferra, Sally W. 
Bloomfield, Dylan F. Borchers, and Devin D. Parram, for intervening appellee, 
6011 Greenwich Windpark, L.L.C. 
Dickinson Wright, P.L.L.C., Jonathan R. Secrest, Christine M.T. Pirik, and 
William V. Vorys, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Mid-Atlantic Renewable 
Energy Coalition. 
_________________