Title: Rodriguez v. Miami-Dade County

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC11-1913 
____________ 
 
JOSE LAZARO RODRIGUEZ,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[June 27, 2013] 
 
PARIENTE, J. 
 
In this case, the Court once again addresses the proper use of the writ of 
certiorari when a governmental entity raises sovereign immunity as a basis for a 
motion for summary judgment, which the trial court denied.  See Citizens Prop. 
Ins. Corp. v. San Perdido Ass’n, 104 So. 3d 344 (Fla. 2012); Keck v. Eminisor, 
104 So. 3d 359 (Fla. 2012).  In the case before the Court, Miami-Dade County v. 
Rodriguez, 67 So. 3d 1213, 1219 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011), Jose Lazaro Rodriguez, a 
business owner, filed suit against Miami-Dade County, alleging that he was 
negligently shot by a police officer responding to a burglary alarm at his place of 
business.  Concluding that review by certiorari was appropriate and that the County 
 
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was entitled to sovereign immunity as a matter of law, the Third District Court of 
Appeal certified that its decision was in direct conflict with the decisions of the 
Fifth District Court of Appeal in Florida A&M University Board of Trustees v. 
Thomas, 19 So. 3d 445, 446 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009), and of the Second District Court 
of Appeal in Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority v. Wrye, 750 So. 2d 30, 30 (Fla. 
2d DCA 1996), as to the scope of certiorari review.  Rodriguez, 67 So. 3d at 1223.1
For the reasons that follow and in keeping with our recent precedent in 
Citizens and Keck, we hold that Miami-Dade County’s claim that it is entitled to 
sovereign immunity is not reviewable by the appellate courts through a petition for 
writ of certiorari because there is no irreparable harm and because there are 
essential facts in dispute.  We further hold that the Third District erred in 
concluding that a “police emergency exception” conferred planning-level 
sovereign immunity on the County in this case.  Accordingly, we quash the Third 
District’s decision. 
         
FACTS 
This case stems from an unfortunate factual scenario, where police officers 
and the business owner, Jose Lazaro Rodriguez, both responded to a burglary 
alarm at Rodriguez’s business, and during this incident, Rodriguez was shot by one 
                                         
 
1.  Based on this certified direct conflict, we have jurisdiction.  See art. V, 
§ 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. 
 
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of the responding police officers.  A video camera at the business recorded part of 
the incident but did not show the circumstances of the actual shooting because the 
police officer and Rodriguez were out of the view of the camera at that precise 
time.  
Rodriguez filed a complaint against Miami-Dade County for negligence 
based on the wrongful shooting and for negligent retention and supervision of 
Officer Hernandez, one of the responding officers.2  Officer Hernandez was not 
sued individually.3
After the County obtained a recording from security cameras that had 
captured the events surrounding the shooting, the County filed a motion for 
summary judgment, asserting that the video footage definitively established that 
Officer Hernandez was not negligent because it showed that before he fired his 
  In his complaint, Rodriguez asserted that after his alarm 
service informed him of the burglary, he drove to the business with his lawfully 
owned firearm.  He alleged that after exiting his vehicle, he was shot from behind 
four times by Officer Hernandez, who failed to provide any prior warning before 
firing his gun. 
                                         
 
2.  Rodriguez also initially claimed that the police delayed providing prompt 
medical attention, a claim that he later abandoned.  
 
3.  In fact, section 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes (2008), entitles an 
individual employed by a governmental entity to be immune from suit unless the 
employee has acted “in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner 
exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.”     
 
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gun, Rodriguez pointed a firearm toward him.  In addition to other defenses, the 
County argued that it had immunity because Officer Hernandez acted in self-
defense and that it was entitled to sovereign immunity because the officer’s actions 
were discretionary and fell under the police emergency exception.   
Rodriguez opposed the motion for summary judgment, asserting that the 
video footage was inconclusive as to several key points and demonstrated that 
Officer Hernandez responded recklessly to the scene of the burglary alarm, 
violated basic safety procedures, and negligently created the situation where he 
shot an innocent civilian.  Rodriguez contended that there was no emergency 
situation that required the officer to shoot anybody, until the officer himself 
recklessly created a dangerous situation by charging on the scene without 
providing any warning.   
In support, Rodriguez relied on the affidavit of Michael Manning, a retired 
lieutenant from the City of Miami Police Department, who discussed numerous 
errors that he believed the responding officers committed, including his assertion 
that Officer Hernandez improperly rushed into the situation, separated from his 
partner, and placed himself in a dangerous position where he might need to use 
deadly force.  Rodriguez also filed an affidavit to oppose the motion for summary 
judgment, in which he contested the facts.  The affidavit stated that when 
Rodriguez drove to the store in response to the burglary alarm, he did not see any 
 
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police.  However, he did notice a person crawling into the store through a hole in 
the glass of the front door to his store.  Rodriguez asserted that he had his gun in 
his hand and had planned to detain the robber from a distance until the police 
arrived.  Rodriguez stated that after he exited his truck, he was shot in the left 
buttock from behind and the impact spun him around clockwise so that he was 
rotated in the direction of the shooter.  He never heard anybody shout “Police” or 
“Freeze!”   
At a hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the trial court indicated 
that it was troubled because the video did not “tell the entire story,” especially 
since the shooting itself was not visible on the video.  Further, the trial court 
questioned whether it could determine as a matter of law that the officer was 
responding to an emergency, as the County asserted.  The trial court denied the 
County’s motion as to Count I (the negligence claim) and granted the County’s 
motion as to Count II (the negligent retention claim).   
The County filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Third District, 
which the Third District granted.  The district court recognized that generally it 
would not use its certiorari jurisdiction “to review orders either denying motions to 
dismiss or denying motions for summary judgment where the sovereign argues that 
it is not liable as alleged because no duty can be demonstrated” in a negligence 
action.  Rodriguez, 67 So. 3d at 1216.  However, the Third District distinguished 
 
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that type of case from those involving sovereign immunity, which traditionally 
prevented a sovereign from being sued in its own courts until the Legislature 
waived its sovereign immunity for torts.  Id. at 1216-17.  The Third District 
reviewed this Court’s decision in Wallace v. Dean , 3 So. 3d 1035, 1044-45 (Fla. 
2009), and concluded that “in those cases in which the conduct and function at 
issue clearly do not fall within the tort liability waiver, we believe that we should 
exercise our jurisdiction to preclude prosecution of an action where the sovereign 
remains immune from suit.”  Rodriguez, 67 So. 3d at 1219. 
 
Finally, in its opinion, the Third District recognized that determining the 
applicability of sovereign immunity is often “inextricably tied to the underlying 
facts.”  Id. (quoting Dep’t of Educ. v. Roe, 679 So. 2d 756, 758 (Fla. 1996)).  
Nevertheless, the Third District characterized this case as “predicated on the 
doctrine of separation of powers” that it considered “distinct from immunity 
resting on the sovereign character of the state or municipality in the performance of 
its governmental functions.”  Id. at 1221.  The Third District invoked the 
“emergency exception” as a basis for essentially determining that the question in 
the case was a “nonjusticiable political question that is more appropriately 
committed to the resolution of a coordinate or constituent branch of government.”  
Id. at 1218 (quoting Wallace, 3 So. 3d at 1053-54). 
 
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In invoking the police emergency exception, the Third District stated that 
this Court had “created a clear exception for police action in emergency 
situations.”  Id. at 1221 (citing City of Pinellas Park v. Brown, 604 So. 2d 1222, 
1226-27 (Fla. 1992) (citing Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So. 2d 732, 738 n.3 (Fla. 1989))).  
The Third District determined that the undisputed facts showed that “(a) a serious 
emergency existed, (b) the emergency was thrust upon the police by the acts of 
others, and (c) [the officers] were required to make split-second choices that could 
result in harm either way.”  Id.  
ANALYSIS 
The certified conflict issue in this case is whether the Third District erred in 
holding that it had certiorari jurisdiction to review a non-final order denying the 
County’s motion for summary judgment.  However, because the Third District 
relied on the “emergency exception” as a basis for concluding that the County was 
immune from suit as a matter of law, we also must review the application of that 
doctrine to the facts of this case. 
Certiorari Review 
Subsequent to the Third District’s decision in Rodriguez, we recently 
clarified the extremely narrow scope of a district court’s ability to use its certiorari 
jurisdiction to address a non-final order where the trial court denied the 
defendant’s claim that the suit was barred by sovereign immunity.  Accordingly, 
 
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we first review this Court’s decisions in Citizens Property Insurance Corp. v. San 
Perdido Ass’n, 104 So. 3d 344 (Fla. 2012), and Keck v. Eminisor, 104 So. 3d 359 
(Fla. 2012).  With those principles in place, we then turn to whether the Third 
District properly used a writ of certiorari under the circumstances presented in this 
case.  
Generally, parties must wait until after a final order is issued before seeking 
appellate review.  As we explained in Citizens Property Insurance, “[v]ery few 
categories of non-final orders qualify for the use of th[e] extraordinary writ” of 
common law certiorari.  Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 104 So. 3d at 351-52.  In order 
to be entitled to certiorari relief from the denial of a motion for summary judgment, 
the petitioner must establish three elements: (1) the ruling “depart[s] from the 
essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material injury for the remainder 
of the case (3) that cannot be corrected on postjudgment appeal.”  Williams v. 
Oken, 62 So. 3d 1129, 1132 (Fla. 2011) (quoting Reeves v. Fleetwood Homes of 
Fla., Inc., 889 So. 2d 812, 822 (Fla. 2004)).  The threshold question that must be 
reached first is whether there is a material injury that cannot be corrected on 
appeal, otherwise termed as irreparable harm.  See id.  Only after irreparable harm 
has been established can an appellate court then review whether the petitioner has 
also shown a departure from the essential requirements of law.  Id. at 1132-33. 
 
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In Citizens Property Insurance, this Court analyzed whether an appellate 
court could use certiorari jurisdiction to address a non-final order where the trial 
court denied the defendant’s claim that the suit was barred by sovereign immunity.  
This Court agreed with the First District, in which the First District held that 
Citizens Property Insurance was not entitled to certiorari review of a non-final 
order because it did not suffer from irreparable harm “in requiring that appellate 
consideration of the sovereign immunity claim await the entry of a final 
judgment.”  Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. San Perdido Ass’n, 46 So. 3d 1051, 1053 
(Fla. 1st DCA 2010).  As we stressed in Citizens Property Insurance, “equating the 
defense of a lawsuit with the type of irreparable harm necessary for the threshold 
decision to invoke certiorari has the potential to eviscerate any limitations on the 
use of this common law writ, which has always been narrowly applied.”  Citizens 
Prop. Ins. Corp., 104 So. 3d at 356. 
On the same day that we issued our decision in Citizens Property Insurance, 
we also issued our decision in Keck v. Eminisor, 104 So. 3d 359, a related case 
involving sovereign immunity and certiorari review.  In that case, the defendant 
asserted that, pursuant to section 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes (2005), he was 
entitled to sovereign immunity for actions taken within the scope of his 
employment as an employee of a corporation acting primarily as an instrumentality 
of a State agency.  Keck, 104 So. 3d at 361.  The First District declined to exercise 
 
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its certiorari jurisdiction, but presented a certified question to this Court as to 
whether Keck was entitled to interlocutory review.  Id.  On review, this Court held 
that, based on important policy reasons similar to those present in the case of 
Tucker v. Resha, 648 So. 2d 1187, 1189-90 (Fla. 1994), Keck was entitled to 
interlocutory review of an order denying summary judgment based on a claim of 
individual immunity under section 768.28(9)(a), where the issue turned on a 
question of law.  Keck, 104 So. 3d at 366.   
In Keck, we emphasized that the applicable statute, section 768.28(9)(a), 
specifically entitled a governmental employee not to “be named as a party 
defendant” for acts within the scope of his or her employment.  Id.  The Court 
reasoned that “if a defendant who is entitled to the immunity granted in section 
768.28(9)(a) is erroneously named as a party defendant and is required to stand 
trial, that individual has effectively lost the right bestowed by statute to be 
protected from even being named as a defendant.”  Id.  Despite recognizing that 
statutory immunity, we did not utilize the common law writ of certiorari, but as in 
Tucker, we requested the Florida Bar Appellate Court Rules Committee to submit 
a proposed narrow amendment to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130.  Id.   
Noting the inconsistent use of certiorari to review claims of sovereign immunity, a 
majority of the Court requested that the Committee “undertake a comprehensive 
review of whether the categories of non-final orders in rule 9.130(a)(3) should be 
 
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expanded to include the denial of any claim of immunity where the question 
presented is solely a question of law.”  Id. at 370 (Pariente, J., concurring with an 
opinion, in which Lewis, Labarga, and Perry, JJ., joined).   
Consistent with our recent holdings in Citizens and Keck, we reiterate that 
the continuation of litigation and any ensuing costs, time, and effort in defending 
such litigation does not constitute irreparable harm.  Thus, the use of certiorari 
review is improper in such an instance.  Moreover, in addition to irreparable harm 
that cannot be remedied on appeal, before granting certiorari relief, the district 
court must also find that the ruling at issue “depart[s] from the essential 
requirements of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice.”  Nader v. Fla. Dep’t of 
Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 87 So. 3d 712, 725 (Fla. 2012).   
In this case, the Third District did not analyze whether the error it discussed 
amounted to a departure from the essential requirements of law.  It is unclear 
whether the district court considered this prong, particularly in light of its 
statement that “[i]t is the imminent threat or existence of irreparable harm that 
gives us jurisdiction in this case.”  Rodriguez, 67 So. 3d at 1220 n.4.   
We again emphasize, consistent with our precedent, that an appellate court 
can grant a petition for writ of certiorari only where there is “(1) a departure from 
the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material injury for the 
remainder of the case (3) that cannot be corrected on postjudgment appeal.”  
 
- 12 - 
Williams, 62 So. 3d at 1132 (quoting Reeves, 889 So. 2d at 822).  The latter two 
elements, referred to as irreparable harm, are jurisdictional, but a court must also 
find that the decision below departed from the essential requirements of law before 
it can grant the writ.  Id.  Accordingly, the Third District erred in using its 
certiorari jurisdiction in order to reverse the trial court’s non-final order. 
The Viability of a Police Emergency Exception in This Case  
The Third District also erred when, relying on Kaisner and Pinellas Park, it 
applied the police emergency exception as a basis for invoking certiorari 
jurisdiction and declaring that Miami-Dade County was immune from suit as a 
result of the actions of its police officers in this case.  For the reasons addressed 
below, we hold that the circumstances present in this case do not rise to the level of 
invoking the narrow emergency exception because this is not the kind of situation 
implicating police planning-level decisions.  Further, we disapprove the Third 
District’s broad statement that this Court has “created a clear exception for police 
action in emergency situations,” Rodriguez, 67 So. 3d at 1221, which would create 
immunity from suit as a matter of law whenever police respond to an emergency.   
A review of Kaisner and Pinellas Park reveals that neither case utilized a 
writ of certiorari.  In addition, neither of those cases concluded that the police 
emergency exception was applicable.  In Kaisner, the plaintiffs brought an action 
against two officers after the plaintiff was struck by another vehicle when the 
 
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deputies stopped him for an expired inspection sticker.  Kaisner, 543 So. 2d at 733.  
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of all of the defendants, and the 
Second District affirmed, concluding that the actions were discretionary and 
immune from suit.  Id.  This Court disagreed, noting that sovereign immunity 
shields only actions that are “discretionary,” not those that are “operational” in 
nature.  Id. at 737.  The Court explained that a discretionary act was one involving 
“an exercise of executive or legislative power such that, for the court to intervene 
by way of tort law, it inappropriately would entangle itself in fundamental 
questions of policy and planning,” while an operational act was one that is “not 
necessary to or inherent in policy or planning, that merely reflects a secondary 
decision as to how those policies or plans will be implemented.”  Id.  After 
reviewing those definitions and the four-part test in Commercial Carrier Corp. v. 
Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010, 1019 (Fla. 1979),4
                                         
 
4.  The four-part test of Commercial Carrier asks the following:  
 this Court determined 
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily involve 
a basic governmental policy, program, or objective?  (2) Is the 
questioned act, omission, or decision essential to the realization or 
accomplishment of that policy, program, or objective as opposed to 
one which would not change the course or direction of the policy, 
program, or objective?  (3) Does the act, omission, or decision require 
the exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the 
part of the governmental agency involved?  (4) Does the 
governmental agency involved possess the requisite constitutional, 
statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do or make the challenged 
act, omission, or decision?  If these preliminary questions can be 
 
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that the manner in which an officer orders a motorist to the side of the road is not a 
policy-making or planning decision that is protected from tort liability.  Kaisner, 
543 So. 2d at 737-38.  
In a footnote, the Court emphasized that it would not necessarily reach the 
same decision if the issue involved “an emergency requiring swift action to prevent 
harm to others, albeit at the risk of harm to petitioners” because those types of 
decisions with a high level of urgency would be “entitled to great deference, and 
may in fact reach a level of such urgency as to be considered discretionary and not 
operational.”  Id. at 738 n.3 (emphasis added).  While the statements in this 
footnote are dicta, they illustrate the extremely limited scope of a serious police 
emergency exception, where the actions of the police would constitute a planning 
decision immune from suit rather than an operational one scrutinized under the 
principles of negligence.     
In the second case relied on by the Third District, Pinellas Park, 604 So. 2d 
at 1224-25, the police raised the police emergency exception mentioned in Kaisner 
                                                                                                                                   
clearly and unequivocally answered in the affirmative, then the 
challenged act, omission, or decision can, with a reasonable degree of 
assurance, be classified as a discretionary governmental process and 
nontortious, regardless of its unwisdom. 
Kaisner, 543 So. 2d at 736 (quoting Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State, 
407 P.2d 440, 445 (Wash. 1965), and recognizing that this test was adopted in 
Commercial Carrier). 
 
- 15 - 
after twenty police vehicles engaged in a twenty-five mile long, high-speed chase 
through densely populated portions of Tampa in order to pursue a vehicle that ran a 
red light.  This chase ultimately culminated in the death of three people.  Id.  The 
Court held that sovereign immunity did not apply because the action was clearly 
operational and could not be considered as either policy or planning, especially 
when the actions taken were actually contrary to adopted policies.  Id. at 1226.  
The Court again stressed that “sovereign immunity does not shield acts that are 
‘operational’ in nature but only those that are ‘discretionary.’ ”  Id.  As to this 
question, we reiterated that “an act is operational if it ‘is one not necessary to or 
inherent in policy or planning, that merely reflects a secondary decision as to how 
those policies or plans will be implemented.’ ”  Id. (quoting Kaisner, 543 So. 2d at 
737). 
Further, the Court rejected the argument that the conduct at issue fell within 
the police emergency exception because to fall within the exception, “the serious 
emergency must be one thrust upon the police by lawbreakers or other external 
forces, that requires them to choose between different risks posed to the public.”  
Id. at 1227.  The Court stressed that under the police emergency exception, officers 
had “no option but to choose between two different evils.  It is this choice between 
risks that is entitled to the protection of sovereign immunity in appropriate cases, 
because it involves what essentially is a discretionary act of executive decision-
 
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making.”  Id. (emphasis added).  However, the Court also stressed that “this does 
not mean that state agents can escape liability if they themselves have created or 
substantially contributed to the emergency through their own negligent acts or 
failure to adhere to reasonable standards of public safety.”  Id.   
Neither Pinellas Park nor Kaisner applied the police emergency exception as 
a basis for immunity.  Thus, this Court has never had the occasion to determine 
under what circumstances, if any, the police emergency exception would constitute 
a planning-level decision under the Commercial Carrier test so as to render the 
responsible governmental entity immune from liability, as opposed to 
circumstances surrounding whether the responding police were negligent under the 
totality of the circumstances.  Because we conclude that the circumstances of this 
case would not fall under the narrow exception outlined in Pinellas Park and 
Kaisner, we do not reach the viability of that doctrine here. 
In this case, the motion for summary judgment was based on the County’s 
assertion that it was immune from suit as a matter of law because the officers were 
responding to an emergency—a motion Rodriguez opposed by presenting evidence 
that the police failed to adhere to reasonable standards of public safety.  Here, the 
trial judge, while recognizing that there was a recording of most of the facts 
surrounding the shooting, concluded that the video did not include all of the 
relevant chain of events and did not include any auditory track.  Further, in this 
 
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case, the affidavit of the expert retired police officer asserted that the responding 
officers committed a number of errors that created a dangerous situation.  The trial 
court denied the summary judgment motion, stating that there were disputed issues 
of fact as to whether a serious emergency existed and whether the police response 
created or added to the danger. 
We conclude that the trial court properly denied summary judgment. 
Although the County moved for summary judgment, disputed issues of fact 
remain, including whether the police created or substantially contributed to the 
shooting through negligent acts, as alleged by Rodriguez.  In addition, the video 
upon which the County relies does not provide the entire story.  Thus, we agree 
that the police emergency exception does not apply as a matter of law to immunize 
the County from suit in this case.  Rather, the focus is on whether or not the police 
officers were negligent under all the circumstances, which would include the fact 
that the police officers were responding to a burglary, and whether they perceived 
that they were facing a serious threat that required immediate action through the 
use of deadly force.  On the other hand, assuming the jury finds negligence, the 
actions of Rodriguez could be considered by the jury as comparative negligence in 
contributing to causing, or being the cause of, his own injuries.  
There is no question that, by virtue of what police officers do every day, 
they are often exposed to dangerous situations, especially when responding to calls 
 
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involving crimes in progress.  But it is quite another thing to say that when the 
police respond to those situations, their employer is always immune from suit 
arising from negligent acts.  If police agencies were immune from tort suits in all 
situations where the police are called to respond to an ongoing crime, the police 
emergency exception could eviscerate the waiver of sovereign immunity for 
negligent conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the County has failed to show the necessary prongs for certiorari, 
we hold that a writ of certiorari is not available to review the merits of the 
County’s claim of sovereign immunity.  We further hold that the Third District 
erred in concluding that the County was entitled to summary judgment based on 
the narrow police emergency exception.  We thus quash the Third District’s 
decision below and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.  We 
further approve the conflict cases, Florida A&M and Pinellas Suncoast Transit 
Authority, which both held that certiorari review was unavailable in such 
circumstances. 5
                                         
 
5.  Both Florida A&M and Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority denied 
jurisdiction based on the reasoning of Roe.  Specifically, in Florida A&M, 19 So. 
3d at 446, the Fifth District stated in a short decision that it “lack[ed] jurisdiction to 
review this interlocutory order,” citing Department of Education v. Roe, 679 
So. 2d 756 (Fla. 1996), and School Board of Miami-Dade County v. Leyva, 975 
So. 2d 576 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).  Likewise, Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority 
involved a very brief decision in which the Second District summarily stated that it 
  
 
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It is so ordered. 
 
LEWIS, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, J., concurs in result only with an opinion, in which POLSTON, C.J., 
concurs. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
CANADY, J., concurring in result only. 
Although I agree that the decision on review should be quashed, I disagree 
with the analysis employed by the majority.  I would quash the Third District’s 
decision simply because there was no basis for the Third District to determine that 
the circuit court’s denial of summary judgment constituted a departure from the 
essential requirements of law. 
I am inclined to agree with the Third District’s analysis regarding the proper 
scope of the emergency exception from the waiver of sovereign immunity.  But the 
issue on which this case properly turns is not whether the Third District correctly 
applied the emergency exception.  Instead, the issue is whether the Third District 
could properly conclude that the circuit court departed from the essential 
requirements of law. 
                                                                                                                                   
“d[id] not have jurisdiction to review the denial of the motion to dismiss based on 
sovereign immunity either as a nonfinal appeal or as a certiorari proceeding.”  
Pinellas Suncoast Transit Auth., 750 So. 2d at 30. 
 
- 20 - 
A determination that the circuit court departed from the essential 
requirements of law in failing to apply the emergency exception is unwarranted 
because the scope of the emergency exception remains ill-defined in the Florida 
case law.  Although the emergency exception is mentioned in the majority opinion 
in Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So. 2d 732, 738 n.3 (Fla. 1989), and in the plurality 
opinion in City of Pinellas Park v. Brown, 604 So. 2d 1222, 1227-28 (Fla. 1992), 
neither of those cases contains any holding regarding the emergency exception.  
The Third District’s decision in Robles v. Metropolitan Dade County, 802 So. 2d 
453, 454 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001), does contain such a holding, but the factual context 
of that case—which involved the hijacking of a school bus in which the hijacker 
was “potentially armed with an explosive device”—is quite dissimilar from the 
factual context here.  Given the state of the case law, the Third District had no 
basis for determining that the circuit court departed from the essential requirements 
of law.  Such a determination is warranted “only when there has been a violation of 
a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice.”  Combs 
v. State, 436 So. 2d 93, 96 (Fla. 1983).  There is no “clearly established principle 
of law” that would require application of the emergency exception to a factual 
situation like the one presented by this case.  Id.  Accordingly, the decision of the 
Third District should be quashed. 
 
- 21 - 
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that legal immunity from suit is not 
a proper basis for determining that the jurisdictional requirements for certiorari are 
satisfied.  Once it is legally established that the statutory waiver of sovereign 
immunity is inapplicable, the sovereignly immune entity is both immune from 
liability and immune from suit.  At that point, the erroneous continuation of legal 
proceedings against the immune governmental entity constitutes irreparable harm 
because the full benefit of the legal immunity from suit cannot be restored on 
appeal.  The Court has never offered any cogent explanation of why the violation 
of immunity from suit does not constitute irreparable harm.  The Court’s attempt to 
provide an explanation in Citizens Property Insurance Corp. v. San Perdido Ass’n, 
104 So. 3d 344, 355 (Fla. 2012), illogically rests on the assertion that if an immune 
party was allowed to “show irreparable harm simply through the continuation of 
defending a lawsuit, such harm would apply to a multitude of situations” such as 
the erroneous denials of motions to dismiss.  The violation of immunity from suit 
is of an entirely different character from the run-of-the-mill erroneous denial of a 
motion to dismiss or of a defendant’s motion for summary judgment.  The majority 
in effect equates “immune from suit” with “not liable.”  This fundamentally 
degrades the meaning of immunity from suit. 
POLSTON, C.J., concurs. 
 
 
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Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Third District – Case No. 3D10-856 
 
 
(Dade County) 
 
Barbara A. Silverman, Curtis B. Miner, and Ervin A. Gonzalez of Colson Hicks 
Eidson, Coral Gables, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
R. A. Cuevas, Jr., Miami-Dade County Attorney, and Erica S. Zaron and Albert D. 
Lichy, Assistant County Attorneys, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Louis F. Hubener, Chief Deputy Solicitor 
General and Diane G. DeWolf, Deputy Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Amicus Curiae State of Florida 
 
Thomas W. Poulton of DeBevoise & Poulton, P.A., Winter Park, Florida, 
 
for Amicus Curiae the Florida Sheriffs Association, the Florida Association 
of Police Attorneys, the Miami-Dade County Association of Chiefs of 
Police, the Florida Police Chiefs Association. the Florida League of Cities, 
Inc., and the Florida Association of County Attorneys, Inc.