Title: Miserandino v. Resort Prop

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Gerard P. Miserandino and Karen L. Miserandino v.
Resort Properties, Inc. et al.
No. 93, September Term, 1995
[CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DUE PROCESS - SERVICE OF PROCESS. USE OF
FIRST CLASS MAIL TO SERVE NOTICE OF ORIGINAL PROCESS
INSUFFICIENT TO SATISFY DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT FOR OBTAINING
IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION.]
0
 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
   No. 93
                  
September  Term, 1995
            
______________________________________
Gerard P. Miserandino and Karen L.
Miserandino
            
v.
Resort Properties, Inc. et al.
______________________________________
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Bell
Raker
McAuliffe, John F. 
(retired, 
specially assigned), JJ.
    Opinion by McAuliffe, J.
    Rodowsky, Chasanow, and Raker, JJ.
dissent.
     
Filed:  February 12, 1997
This case involves a constitutional attack by judgment
debtors against a judgment entered against them by a state trial
court in Virginia.  The collateral attack 
on the judgment was made in the Circuit Court for Carroll County,
Maryland, where the judgment creditor sought to enroll the
judgment.  The defendants challenge the basis for the exercise of
long-arm personal jurisdiction by the Virginia court, as well as
the constitutional sufficiency of the Virginia statutory scheme
for the giving of notice to nonresidents proceeded against under
that Commonwealth’s long-arm jurisdiction statute.
I.  FACTS
Resort Properties, Inc. (Resort), recorded a judgment
against Gerard and Karen Miserandino, (defendants) in the Circuit
Court for Carroll County on June 3, 1993.  The notice of
judgment, mailed by a court clerk to the defendants, simply
informed them that a judgment of $4,211.82 had been recorded
against them by Resort.  Thereafter, the defendants filed a
motion to strike the entry of the foreign judgment.  From their
inspection of the court’s file, the defendants knew that the
judgment was obtained in Warren County, Virginia and that Resort
was the assignee of North Fork Shenandoah Vacations, Inc.
2
In the motion, the defendants alleged by affidavit made on
personal knowledge that they were not served with process, had no
notice, and did not appear in the Virginia action.  They alleged
further, that:
     Defendants were not subject to the jurisdiction of said
Virginia Court in said action, nor was either of them....  Said
foreign judgment is invalid, null, void and of no effect since
said Virginia Court lacked in personam jurisdiction over
defendants, or either of them, in the action in which that
judgment was entered.
Specifically, the motion alleged that neither of the defendants
resides in Virginia, neither is domiciled in Virginia, neither is
employed in Virginia, carries on any regular business,
occupation, or vocation in Virginia, or maintains a principal
place of business in Virginia.  Finally, they alleged:
     Defendants do not have sufficient contacts with Virginia to 
confer in personam jurisdiction over them, or either of them,
upon the Virginia court in which said foreign judgment was
entered.
In an accompanying memorandum, the defendants argued that
they did not have sufficient contacts with Virginia to “satisfy
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,”
quoting Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565  (1877).
In opposition, Resort stated:  “The underlying transaction
3
was based upon the defendants having an interest in and
possessing real property in Virginia, and the transaction in and
of itself constituted transacting business by the defendants in
Virginia.”  Resort also averred, “Defendants executed a loan
application in July, 1988, in Virginia for an interest in real
property which was located in Virginia, thereby confessing fees
and jurisdiction over both defendants in the State of Virginia.”
At the hearing of defendants’ motion, Resort’s attorney
informed the court that he had a loan application, club
membership contract, and deed in his file, and that he was
willing to provide the court with copies.  The court interrupted
and there ensued an exchange between the judge and the
defendants’ attorney, Mr. Lipsitz, as follows:
THE COURT:  Well . . . I’m not sure Mr. Lipsitz has any
problem with the fact that there was property purchased, or a
loan made, or a contract made in West (sic) Virginia . . . .
          MR. LIPSITZ:  Well, I’m not pressing that point today,
your Honor. . . .I raise the issue because, frankly, until this
morning, I had no idea what the claim was.  You can’t -- from the
record . . . you really can’t tell what the claim is. . . .  If
my people, in fact, own property in Virginia, and if this
transaction involved that -- is involved in this case, I probably
would not prevail on the in personam jurisdiction point. 
Nevertheless, the service point is the critical point.
4
....  I’m willing to accept my brother’s statement as to
what he says is in his file. . .
THE COURT:  For purposes of the hearing (inaudible).
MR. LIPSITZ:  . . .  that’s something that could be
thrashed out at a trial on the merits.  . . maybe
they’re subject to jurisdiction; maybe they’re not.
The court initially granted the defendants’ motion to
strike.  Resort filed a motion to alter or amend because the
court had cited the wrong statute in its order.  After a second
hearing, the court reversed its ruling and recorded the judgment
against the defendants.
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed in an unreported
opinion, and this Court granted certiorari.
II.  PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Virginia, like Maryland, has interpreted its long-arm
statute as an attempt to assert jurisdiction to the extent
possible under the Due Process Clause of the federal
Constitution.  Brown v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 704 F.2d
1296 (4th Cir. 1983).  Section 8.01-328.1 of the Virginia Code
(1950, 1992 Rep. Vol.) provides that:
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person . . . as
5
to a cause of action arising from the person’s:
1.  Transacting any business in this Commonwealth;
                                 *    *   *
6.  Having any interest in, using, or possessing real
property in the Commonwealth.
We note initially that the defendants had the burden of producing
evidence to attack the judgment sought to be recorded.
In Maryland, an authenticated copy of a record is prima 
facie evidence of jurisdiction and the judgment or decree
must be presumed valid until it is declared invalid by a 
competent court.
Imperial Hotel v. Bell Atlantic, 91 Md. App. 266, 271-72, 603
A.2d 1371 (1992).  In Brewster v. Brewster, 204 Md. 501, 105 A.2d
232 (1954), the Court considered the issue of  a divorce obtained
by the husband in Arkansas and another divorce obtained by the
wife in Maryland.  The wife argued the Arkansas divorce should
not take effect until she was given an opportunity to prove it
invalid.  The court ruled, however, that “until [the foreign
judgment] is declared to be invalid by a competent court, it must
be presumed to be valid and given full faith and credit. . . . 
The burden of proof is upon the attacker.”  Id. at 505.  See also
Van Wagenberg v. Van Wagenberg, 241 Md. 154, 160, 215 A.2d 812
(1966).  As noted, defendants offered no evidence to contradict
6
the basis of long-arm jurisdiction asserted by Resort.
To exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant who is
not present in the forum state, “due process requires only that .
. . [the defendant] have certain minimum contacts with [the forum
state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” 
International Shoe Co. v.  Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66
S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945).  “[T]he quality and quantity of
contacts required to support the exercise of  personal
jurisdiction” depend upon the facts of each particular case. 
Camelback Ski Corp. v. Behning, 312 Md. 330, 338, 539 A.2d 1107
(1988),  cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849 (1988).  Ordinarily, cases
involve either “general jurisdiction” where the cause of action
is unrelated to the defendant’s contact with the forum state, or
“specific jurisdiction” where the cause of action arises out of
the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.  Id.
Generally speaking, when the cause of  action does not arise
out of, or is not directly related to, the conduct of the
defendant within the forum, contacts reflecting continuous or
systematic
. . . conduct will be required to sustain
jurisdiction.  On the other hand, when the cause of action arises
out of the contacts that the defendant had with the forum, it may
be entirely fair to permit the exercise of jurisdiction as to
that claim.
7
Id. at 338-39.
The defendants’ allegations were insufficient to raise an
actual controversy regarding the Virginia court’s personal
jurisdiction.  If this were a “general jurisdiction” case, their
assertion that they did not reside in Virginia or conduct
business regularly in Virginia may have been sufficient to raise
an actual controversy.  See International Shoe, supra, 326 U.S.
at 317.  This case, however, may be  classified as a “specific
jurisdiction” case because Resort’s cause of action arises out of
the defendants’ contacts with Virginia, signing a contract and
allegedly purchasing an interest in property in that
jurisdiction.  Thus, under the facts of this case, the
defendants’ allegations did not raise an actual controversy
regarding the existence of a sufficient basis for the exercise of
personal jurisdiction.
In a suit arising out of a contract signed in the forum
state, the contract plus other factors provide a sufficient basis
for the exercise of personal jurisdiction in the forum state.  In
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199,
2 L.Ed. 223 (1957), the Supreme Court ruled that a Texas
insurance company was amenable to suit in California because the
insured was domiciled in California and the suit arose under the
insurance contract.  “It is sufficient for purposes of due
process that the suit was based on a contract which had
8
substantial connection with that State.”  Id. at 223.  Other
factors, however, such as ongoing relationship with the party in
the forum state, are required to establish “minimum contacts.” 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478-79, 105 S.Ct.
2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985).  In this case, the defendants never
alleged or proved that they did not sign a contract in Virginia,
that this case did not arise out of a contract signed in
Virginia, or that there were no other factors to support personal
jurisdiction.
In any event, it is clear from the colloquy we set forth in
Section 1, supra, that for present purposes the defendants waived
any attack they may have had against the assertion of personal
jurisdiction under the Virginia long-arm statute, and acquiesced
in the statement of counsel for the plaintiff that the
documentary evidence he proffered would be sufficient to show a
proper ground for the exercise of that jurisdiction.  Any issues
that might have been raised as to the sufficiency of the
plaintiffs’ original pleadings in Virginia, or as to the grounds
for personal jurisdiction, were effectively waived for purposes
of the circuit court hearing.
III. ADEQUACY OF NOTICE
The more difficult question with respect to the acquisition
of personal jurisdiction by the Virginia court involves the
constitutional adequacy of the means employed to give notice to
the defendants.  The procedure followed by the plaintiff was in
9
accordance with the Virginia statute prescribing the method of
service of process upon a nonresident individual in a case
involving long-arm jurisdiction, but that will not be sufficient
to confer jurisdiction unless the method authorized by the
statute comports with the requirements of federal due process. 
Thus, we are required to address a question not yet resolved by
the United States Supreme Court, and only rarely considered by
other federal and state courts:  whether initial and original
service of process by first-class mail is constitutionally
sufficient to confer in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident
individual in a long-arm jurisdiction case.
The Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment “at a minimum .
. . require[s] that deprivation of life, liberty or property by
adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case.” Mullane v. Central
Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865
(1950).  The importance of giving adequate notice cannot be
overstated.
No better instrument has been devised for
arriving at truth than to give a person in
jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case
against him and opportunity to meet it.  Nor
has a better way been found for generating
the feeling, so important to a popular
government, that justice has been done.
Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72, 71 S.Ct.
624, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951), Frankfurter, J. concurring (footnote
omitted).
10
       No particular procedure is required in all cases.  “On the
contrary, due process is flexible and calls only for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands. 
Procedures adequate under one set of facts may not be sufficient
in a different situation.”  Department of Transportation v.
Armacost, 299 Md. 392, 416, 474 A.2d 191 (1984).  See also,
Golden Sands Club v. Waller, 313 Md. 484, 493, 545 A.2d 1332
(1988) (Maryland Contract Lien Act, requiring notice of lien to
condominium unit owners by certified or registered mail, return
receipt requested, satisfies due process).  
To determine whether notice in a particular case is
constitutionally sufficient, the court “must balance the
interests of the state or the giver of notice against the
individual interest sought to be protected by the fourteenth
amendment.”  Golden Sands, supra, 313 Md. at 496; see also,
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314; Armacost, 229 Md. at 416.  At a
minimum, the notice must be “reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections.”  Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
Among the multiple factors to be considered in determining
what process is due in a given situation is the nature of the
action being brought. 
     What is a sufficient method of notification depends upon the
nature of the action and the circumstances.  The interests to be
11
considered are, on the one hand, those of the state and of the
plaintiff in bringing the issues involved to a final settlement
and, on the other hand, those of the defendant in being afforded
an opportunity to defend.  The practicalities of the situation
must be considered.  A state is not precluded from exercising
such judicial jurisdiction as it may possess by the fact that
under the circumstances it is impossible to make certain that
notice will reach the defendant or because the only sure way of
giving notice to the defendant would be so burdensome and
expensive as to be impracticable.  On the other hand, when actual
notice is practicable, a procedure which is a mere gesture is not
enough.  A method of notification which would be sufficient in
some circumstances may be insufficient in others because another
method would obviously be better calculated to give the defendant
knowledge of the action.         
                        
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §25 cmt. d. (1971).  
Although the distinction between in rem and in personam actions
no longer offers a per se solution to problems of notice, the
nature of the action continues to be relevant.  
[W]e decline to resolve the constitutional question based
upon the determination of whether the particular action is more
properly characterized as one in rem or in personam. . . .  That
is not to say that the nature of the action has no bearing on a
12
constitutional assessment of the reasonableness of the procedures
employed.  The character of the action reflects the extent to
which the court purports to extend its power, and thus may
roughly describe the scope of potential adverse consequences to
the person claiming a right to more effective notice.
Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 450, 102 S.Ct. 1874, 72 L.Ed.2d
249 (1982).  The Supreme Court has recognized that when an action
involves property, the state may indulge certain assumptions.
The ways of an owner with tangible property are such that he
usually arranges means to learn of any direct attack upon his
possessory or proprietary rights.  Hence, libel of a ship,   
attachment of a chattel or entry upon real estate in the name of  
law may reasonably be expected to come promptly to the  
owner’s attention.  When the state within which the owner has
located such property seizes it for some reason, publication or
posting affords an additional measure of notification.  A state
may indulge the assumption that one who has left tangible 
property in the state either has abandoned it, in which case
proceedings against it deprive him of nothing . . . or that he
has left some caretaker under a duty to let him know that it is
being jeopardized. . . .  As phrased long ago by Chief Justice
Marshall in The Mary, 9 Cranch 126, 144 ‘it is the part of 
common prudence for all those who have any interest in [a 
thing], to guard that interest by persons who are in a situation
to protect it.’
13
Mullane, supra, 339 U.S. at 316.  More recently, the Court
said:
    It is, of course, reasonable to assume that a property
owner will maintain superintendence of his property, and to
presume that actions physically disturbing his holdings will
come to his attention.  
Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U. S. at 451.  For a further discussion
of the “caretaker assumption” see R. Greenbaum, The Postman
Never Rings Twice: The Constitutionality Of Process By Posting
After Greene V. Lindsey, 33 Am.Univ.L.R. 601, 616-20 (1984).
When the nature of a case involved judicial settlements
by the trustee of a common trust fund embracing 113 trusts
with resident and nonresident beneficiaries, the Supreme Court
held that personal service of notice of the accounting would
not be required.
This type of trust presupposes a large number of small
interests.
The individual interest does not stand alone but is
identical with that of a class.  The rights of each in the
integrity of the fund and the fidelity of the trustee are
shared by many other beneficiaries.  
Therefore notice reasonably certain to reach most of
those interested in objecting is likely to safeguard the
14
interest of all, since any objection sustained would inure to
the benefit of all.
We think that under such circumstances reasonable risks
that notice might not actually reach every beneficiary are
justifiable.
Mullane, supra, 339 U.S. at 319.  The Court held, however,
that newspaper publication alone was insufficient “not because
in fact it fails to reach everyone, but because under the
circumstances it is not reasonably calculated to reach those
who could easily be informed by other means at hand.”  Id.  
The case before us is not in rem or quasi in rem.  This
case involves an attempt by one party to obtain a money
judgment against another party or parties for an alleged
breach of a promise to pay.  It is a classic example of a case
requiring the acquisition of in personam jurisdiction. 
Historically, in-hand delivery of process has been the
preferred method of service in a case of this kind, but
equivalent methods have been approved and alternative methods
may be utilized when personal service proves difficult or
impossible.
In Maryland, the method of service of process ordinarily
required to obtain original personal jurisdiction over a
resident or nonresident individual is by personal delivery, or
by certified mail with restricted delivery and return receipt
15
1Maryland Rule 2-121(b).
2 Section 6-303 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Maryland Code (1974, 1995 Rep.    Vol.).
3 Maryland Rule 2-121(c).
stating to whom delivered and the date and address of
delivery.  Maryland Rule 2-121(a).  Additionally, personal
service outside the state may be made “in the manner
prescribed by the court or prescribed by the foreign
jurisdiction if reasonably calculated to give actual notice.” 
Id.  Substituted service is permitted when a defendant has
acted to evade service;   when a person resists service by
1
threats, or force;   or when good faith efforts to serve the
2
defendant in person or by certified mail have not succeeded.   
3
In the case before us, there is no indication that any
earlier attempt of service had been made, or that the
defendants were attempting to avoid or resist service. 
Accordingly, the method of service utilized in this case,
service by first-class mail, would not have been sufficient
under Maryland law.  That fact is of no consequence, however,
if the method of service satisfies the requirements of due
process, because the service of process was in accordance with
the applicable Virginia statute.                  Section
8.01-329 of the Code of Virginia (1950, 1992 Repl. Vol.)
provides an alternative method of service of process on a
nonresident subject to long-arm jurisdiction by service “on
the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Virginia ... who, for
16
this purpose, shall be deemed to be the statutory agent of
such person.”  That section of the code further provides that
service on the Secretary shall be sufficient upon the person
to be served, provided that notice of such service, a copy of
the process or notice, and a copy of the affidavit are
forthwith mailed, by the Secretary to the person or persons to
be served at the last known post-office address of such
person, and a certificate of compliance herewith by the
Secretary or someone designated by him for that purpose and
having knowledge of such compliance, shall be forthwith filed
with the papers in the action.
The concept of serving a state officer or agency in
connection with the acquisition of personal jurisdiction over
a nonresident dates to the era of Pennoyer v. Neff, supra,
when it was held that in personam jurisdiction could be
acquired only by service made within the state.  With the
subsequent recognition of long-arm jurisdiction the necessity
for service within the state disappeared, and resort to the
legal fiction of “consent” to service on a local agent or
“appointment” of a local agent for service was no longer
necessary.  See Olberding v. Illinois Central R. Co., 346 U.S.
338, 74 S.Ct. 83, 98 L.Ed. 39 (1953); Com. de Astral v. Boston
Met. Co., 205 Md. 237, 264, 107 A2d. 357, 108 A2d. 372 (1954).
Inasmuch as service no longer is limited in all cases to
the territorial confines of the jurisdiction in which the
17
4 The Secretary is required by statute to maintain a detailed “record of each notice of service sent to a person for a period of two years.”  Section 8.01-
329 (E), Code of Virginia (1950, 1992 Repl. Vol.).
court is sitting, the requirement in the original nonresident
motorist statutes that service be made “within the state” by
serving a state official before process is mailed to defendant
no longer is of constitutional magnitude.  Although it served
its purpose well in an earlier era, it is largely an
anachronism today.
4 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, §1074 at 
p. 459 (1987).  Although no longer required as a condition to
the acquisition of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident,
and insufficient in itself to confer jurisdiction, involvement
of the Secretary of the Commonwealth does serve the important
purposes of ensuring that notice is in fact sent and providing
a neutral and official repository for documentary evidence of
that fact.   The defendants do not contend that the required
4
procedure was not followed in this case.  That the notice was
sent, however, does not answer the question of whether the
means employed for transmittal of the notice was
constitutionally sufficient.  Service on a state official or
agency does not obviate the necessity for constitutionally
sufficient notice to the defendant.  Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276
U.S. 13, 48 S.Ct. 259, 72 L.Ed. 446 (1928); Grote v. Rogers,
158 Md. 685, 149 A. 547 (1930).
Personal delivery of process to a defendant, followed by
18
the filing of written proof of that service, is a time-honored
method of acquiring personal jurisdiction.  This method of
service, properly executed, provides a high degree of
probability that the defendant received the required notice. 
An alternative method of  “personal delivery” is to have an
employee of the United States Postal Service deliver the
process to the defendant.  This method, service by mail, is
often quicker and less expensive than service by a sheriff or
private process server, but may present a problem with respect
to proof of service.
Postal regulations providing an optional service of
restricted delivery of registered or certified mail do,
however, offer a solution to the problem of  proof of service. 
For an additional fee, a person mailing a letter may direct
that the letter be handled as registered or certified mail,
that the letter may be delivered only to the addressee or his
duly authorized representative, and that the person
accomplishing delivery return a receipt to the sender bearing
the signature of the person receiving the letter and showing
the date and address of delivery.  See 39 C.F.R. § 111.1
incorporating by reference the provisions of the Domestic Mail
Manual.  See in addition, the following sections of the
Domestic Mail Manual:  S 911 registered mail; S 912 certified
mail; S 915 return receipts; and S 916 restricted delivery. 
When process is mailed in this fashion a return that includes
19
a postal receipt bearing the signature of the defendant or his
authorized agent and a copy of the process that was mailed is
filed, and the court can proceed with a high level of
confidence that the requisite notice has been given.  
    Service by registered or certified mail should be
regarded as efficacious [as personal service] from a
constitutional perspective
to evoke personal jurisdiction since the return receipt
normally guarantees that defendant or someone related or
associated with him has received the process.
4 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure (1987), §
1074 at p. 457-58.  
Problems have arisen with the use of restricted delivery
mail for service of process principally with respect to mail
that is returned “refused” or “unclaimed.”  Postal regulations
permit an addressee to “refuse to accept a piece of mail when
it is offered for delivery.”  Domestic Mail Manual, D 042.  In
the event of an affirmative refusal, the letter is marked
“refused” and is returned to the sender.  A restricted
delivery letter that is not affirmatively refused, but is not
delivered because the addressee does not claim it after
delivery is attempted and notices have been left at the
address given, is returned to the sender marked “unclaimed.”  
20
Courts in jurisdictions permitting personal service by
registered or certified mail have generally held that a
defendant cannot defeat service by an affirmative refusal to
accept the letter, but that an “unclaimed” letter will not
suffice to confer personal jurisdiction.  See, Note, Service
Of  Process By Mail, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 381, 387-91 (1975);
Note, Constitutional Law; The Validity Of Service Of Process
By Mail When There Is No Return Receipt; The Outer Limits Of
Due Process, 25 Okla. L. Rev. 566, 567-70 (1972).  See also,
Lohman v. Lohman, 331 Md. 113, 626 A.2d 384 (1993) (unclaimed
certified letter insufficient to sustain personal jurisdiction
over individual defendant).  
     In this state we have upheld substituted service on a
corporation when service was made in accordance with the
statute by serving the State Department of  Assessments and
Taxation after multiple attempts to serve the resident agent
were unsuccessful and registered mail notice sent by the
Department to the corporation was “unclaimed.”  Barrie-Peter
Pan Sch. v. Cudmore, 261 Md. 408, 276 A2d. 74 (1971).  We
note, however, that consistent with the flexible nature of due
process, the process that must be afforded a corporation may
differ from that required in the case of an individual.
[I]n the case of foreign corporations a less rigorous
standard may suffice than in the case of individuals, for the
reason that a state is generally without power to exclude an
21
individual non-resident from doing business or making
contracts within the state, but may generally completely
exclude foreign corporations or may admit them only subject to
conditions. Com. de Astral v. Boston Met. Co., supra, 205 Md.
at 262.
Recognition of registered or certified mail as an
effective method of accomplishing personal service of process
is not unusual.  In 1982, the Supreme Court forwarded to
Congress a proposed revision of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4 that would have utilized restricted delivery
registered or certified mail as an alternative to personal
service.  Significant protests were advanced, however,
resulting in a postponement of the effective date of this
proposed rule change, and ultimately resulting in a major
change in the proposed amendment to the Rule.  See 96 F. R. D.
at 116-135 (1982),  detailing the history of the initial
proposal and subsequent modification.  
In a letter dated December 10, 1982, to the Chairman of
the House Judiciary Committee, Assistant Attorney General
Robert McConnell summarized the criticisms of the proposed
rule, as follows:
[C]ritics of that system of mail service have argued that
certified mail is not an effective method of providing actual
notice to defendants of claims against them because signatures
may be illegible or may not match the name of the defendant,
22
or because it may be difficult to determine whether mail has
been ‘unclaimed’ or ‘refused,’ the latter providing the sole
basis for a default judgment.
96 F.R.D. at 116.
The amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 that emerged from
Congress in 1983 did not permit original service by registered
or certified mail as a means of acquiring personal
jurisdiction.  Instead, the Rule permitted an attempt at
service by first-class mail that would be effective only if
the person to be served returned a written acknowledgment
within twenty days after the date of mailing.  If an
acknowledgment of service was not received, service would then
be required under other provisions of the Rule.  As an
incentive to the recipient to accept service by first-class
mail, the Rule further provided that a recipient who declined
to file a written acknowledgment would be charged with the
costs of service by other means.  Changes to Rule 4 effective
in 1993 now make it clear that this use of first-class mail
does not actually achieve service of process, but rather
facilitates the filing by the recipient of a waiver of service
that permits the action to go forward.
This history of recent amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4
suggests the existence of an abiding congressional concern
about the effectiveness about certain types of mail delivery
23
5 This statute does provide, however, that the use of first-class mail for this purpose will be permitted only if this Court, through its rule-making power, does not require personal
service or some other method of notice.  Article 1-103(a)(1) of the Estates and Trusts Article, Maryland Code (1974, 1991 Rep. Vol. 1996 cum. supp.).  This statute also permits the
Orphans Court the option of requiring restricted mail delivery of first notices in any case.  Section 1-103(a)(2).
as a primary means of service to acquire personal
jurisdiction.  Certainly there has been no suggestion that the
use of first-class mail alone to accomplish such service would
be looked upon with favor.
The Maryland legislature has recently enacted a bill that
permits the giving of first notices in an estate case by
first-class mail instead of restricted mail.   Chapter 417 of
5
the Laws of Maryland, 1996, codified at § 1-103 of the Estates
and Trusts Article, Maryland Code (1974, 1991 Rep. Vol., 1996
cum. supp.).  The legislative history indicates that the
principal purpose of the change was to reduce costs now borne
by Registers of Wills.  There is no discussion in the
legislative history or in the brief approval of the proposed
bill by the Attorney General of any due process
considerations.  This Court has not had an opportunity to pass
upon the constitutional sufficiency of notice by first-class
mail in this context, and we intimate no opinion on that
question.
Professor Robert W. Kirst, in his article Nebraska’s
Modern Service of Process Statute, 63 Neb. L. Rev. 1 (1983)
suggests that service by first-class mail as a primary means
of acquiring personal jurisdiction probably does not comport
24
with the requirements of due process.
     Service by first class mail alone, with no receipt, is an
alternative method of substituted service, but it hardly seems
likely to comply with the due process clause, notwithstanding
the Sixth Circuit’s possible endorsement of it in Greene [v.
Lindsey].  The Sixth Circuit clearly had no empirical data to
show that the rate of pilferage from mailboxes in public
housing projects was less than the rate of removal of summons
from doors.  The chance that the summons will be mailed or
delivered to the wrong address must be at least as high,if not
higher, as the chance it will be posted on the wrong door.  
With ordinary mail there is no sheriff’s return of
service to provide some assurance that the summons was
actually posted and when it was posted; in entering a default,
the court can relay only on post office routine to deliver
mail promptly and return undeliverable mail.  Although the
Supreme Court upheld the use of first class mail service in
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., it 
was in
the context of an action more like class litigation than 
individual litigation.  Given these defects in service by
ordinary mail, the wise course is to consider the caveat in
Greene as a warning not to use ordinary mail as a routine
method of substituted service.
Id. at 6 (footnotes omitted).  
25
6 The break down of the aggregate figures is as follows:
Percent on time, overnight to nation -- 90.77 percent
Percent on time, two-day to nation -- 75.90 percent
Percent on time, three-day to nation -- 79.01 percent
The parties did not supply, and we are unable to find,
empirical data reflecting the rate of success of the United
States Postal Service in delivering first-class mail.  The
Postal Service does provide performance data relating to
average days to deliver from overnight service areas, from
two-day service areas, and from three-day service areas.  This
data is compiled by Price Waterhouse under contract to the
Postal Service, and provides figures for 96 cities and the
nation.  Data for September 14, 1996, to December 6, 1996,
disclose that the aggregate on-time delivery ranges from 76
percent to 91 percent.    These figures do not, however,
6
disclose how many pieces of first-class mail were not
delivered. 
Notwithstanding the concerns about the use of mail
without a signed returned receipt or waiver of service to
obtain personal jurisdiction, there is strong precedent and
rather extensive experience that supports the use of first-
class mail for that purpose.  That precedent may be found in
Federal Bankruptcy Rule 7004, and in the 1976 amended version
of its predecessor Rule 704.  Prior to the 1976 amendment,
Rule 704(c) permitted service of summons, complaint, and
notice of trial upon competent individuals “by any form of
26
mail requiring a signed receipt.”  The 1976 amendment
permitted such service anywhere within the United States “by
first-class mail postage prepaid.”  Successor Rule 7004(b),
adopted in 1983, continues the practice of permitted service
of the summons and complaint by first-class mail, and provides
that the mailing may be made “to the individual’s dwelling
house or usual place of abode, or “to the place where the
individual regularly conducts a business or profession.” 
Unlike the procedure specified in Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, no
acknowledgment of waiver of service is required to accomplish
service under this Rule.  Moreover, this method of service may
be made in “non-core” as well as “core” proceedings, so that
it is recognized as an effective means of  acquiring original
personal jurisdiction over a stranger to the bankruptcy
proceedings in a contested matter.
The constitutional sufficiency of notice given pursuant
to Bankruptcy Rule 7004 and its predecessor rule has been
upheld.  Matter of Park Nursing Center, Inc., 766 F.2d 261
(6th Cir. 1985); In Re M & L Business Mach. Co., Inc. 190 B.R.
111 (D.Colo. 1995);  In Re Kim, 163 B.R. 157 (9th Cir. BAP
1994); In Re Cossio, 163 B.R. 150 (9th Cir. BAP 1994), aff’d,
56 F.3d 70 (9th Cir. 1995); Leavell v. Karnes, 143 B.R. 212
(S.D. Ill. 1990); Windsor Communications Group, Inc. v. Grant,
75 B. R. 713 (E.D. Pa. 1985).  It should be noted, however,
that two of the three judges in Matter of Park Nursing Center,
27
Inc. supra, believed that first-class mail service satisfied
due process requirements only if interpreted in the light of 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 55(c) and 60(b) so that
[I]f a default judgment in bankruptcy proceedings is
entered against an individual who, through no fault of his
own, failed to receive actual notice by first-class mail, then
that judgment should be set aside under these rules upon a
showing of meritorious defense.
766 F.2d at 263.  
These rule changes have been upheld on the basis that
special requirements of bankruptcy cases justify a more
expeditious and less costly means of service than might be
required in an ordinary civil case.  
In recognition of the time constraints in bankruptcy
proceedings and to insure simple and expeditious service of
defendants to such proceedings, Congress enacted Bankruptcy
Rule 7004(b) to allow for service by mail alone.
In Re M & L Business Mach. Co., Inc., supra, at 115.
     What is needed in bankruptcy proceedings is a form of
notice which is likely to achieve actual notice in a large
volume of cases but is not overly expensive or time consuming. 
Bankruptcy proceedings occupy a large and important place in
our federal judicial system.  In 1983, there were 490,717 
28
petitions filed in bankruptcy court, and of the 842,229 bank-
ruptcy proceedings pending, 123,442 were adversary 
proceedings.
Matter of Park Nursing Center, Inc., supra, 766 F.2d at 263. 
Additionally, adjudication of the rights of many persons and
entities may be delayed in bankruptcy proceedings pending the
determination of adversary proceedings.
As we pointed out earlier, the concept of due process is
not static -- the process that is due may change according to
the circumstances.  Necessity may, therefore, be a valid
factor in the due process equation in the balancing of the
interest of the state against the interest of the individual. 
Historically, courts have permitted the employment of
potentially less effective methods of service where more
effective methods have been attempted and have failed, or are
otherwise impractical.  Notification of lien holders in tax
sale proceedings by mail instead of individual personal
service may be adequate because of the state’s interest in
facilitating tax sales, the presumption of reasonable interest
in tax sale proceedings by the lien holders, and the
difficulty and expenses of personal service, but notice by
publication may not be sufficient when the identities of
creditors are reasonably ascertainable.  Mennonite Board of
Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791,  103  S.Ct.  2706, 77 
L.Ed.2d 180 (1983).  Reasonable risks that the method of
29
notice employed will not reach each individual affected may be
tolerated when the action is against a class of persons and
notice is reasonably certain to reach most of those interested
in objecting.  Mullane, supra, 339 U.S. at 306.
Turning to the case before us, we consider whether there
are any special or unique circumstances that would justify
relaxation of the ordinary and available methods of service
that offer a considerably higher degree of probability of
actual notice.  In other words, given the availability of
personal service by officials or private process servers, or
service by restricted delivery mail, what state interest is
present in this case that would justify resort to the
significantly less certain procedure of first-class mail?  We
find but one circumstance that may distinguish this case from
any other in personam action: the fact that the defendants are
nonresidents of the Commonwealth of Virginia.
The Supreme Court has recognized that some distinction
may be drawn between the methods employed to serve residents
and some to serve nonresidents.  
Personal service has not in all circumstances been
regarded as indispensable to the process due to residents, and
it has more often been held unnecessary as to nonresidents. 
We disturb none of the established rules on these subjects.
Mullane, supra, 339 U.S. at 314.  Additionally, the fact of
30
nonresidency has been held sufficient in some instances to
uphold disparate treatment when a challenge has been made
under the Equal Protection Clause.  See, e.g., Owens v. I.F.P.
Corp., 374 F.Supp. 1032 (W.D. Ky. 1974); Castelline v.
Goldfine Truck Rental Service, 49 Del. 155, 112 A.2d 840, 844
(1955).
We do not, however, view the factor of nonresidency as
being of such significance or compelling interest as to
justify the shifting of the balance to a point where notice by
first-class mail alone will be sufficient to confer personal
jurisdiction over an individual defendant.  We fail to see why
traditional methods of personal service on residents become so
much more difficult or costly when applied to nonresidents. 
Certainly there may be some additional inconvenience or
expense when dealing with officials or private process servers
in another state, but this small difference hardly justifies
the significant step of permitting first-class mail service. 
Moreover, service by mail requiring a signed return receipt
would be no more difficult or expensive in the case of a
nonresident than that of a resident.  Virginia does not permit
first-class mail service of its residents in personal
jurisdiction cases except where more conventional means have
failed, and then only in conjunction with posting of the
31
7 Interestingly, Virginia’s statutes dealing with long-arm jurisdiction over nonresident motorists and owners or operators of aircraft continue to require
the state agent receiving process to “forthwith send by registered or certified mail, with return receipt requested, a copy of the process to the person
named therein....”  Code of Virginia (1950, 1992 Repl. Vol.) §8.01-312
premises.   Code of Virginia (1950, 1992 Repl. Vol., 1996 Cum.
7
Supp.)  § 8.01-296. 
 
Virginia does permit a direct attack against a void
judgment, if made within two years, § 8.01-428(A)(ii), and a
collateral attack by an independent equity action if a party
can show nonreceipt of the first-class mail notice and the
existence of a defense to the action, § 8.01-428(D).  As the
Supreme Court has said, however, in Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
U.S. 545, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14  L.Ed.2d 62  (1965), actions for
relief from a default judgment that place a burden of proof
upon the petitioner that he would not have borne if the notice
had been sufficient in the first instance are insufficient to
overcome the initial deficiency.  
The heart of the question is whether the means adopted by
the Virginia legislature to notify nonresident defendants of
an in personam action against them amounted to “a reliable
means of acquainting interested parties of the fact that their
rights are before the courts”  and “means . . . such as one
desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably
adopt to accomplish it,”  Mullane, supra, 339 U.S. at 315,
when “the reasonableness of the notice provided . . . [is]
tested with reference provided to the “feasible and customary
1
alternatives and supplements to the form of notice chosen,” 
Greene v. Lindsey, supra, 456 U.S. at 454, quoting in part
from Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315.  We hold that the means
selected by the Virginia legislature to accomplish notice of
service of original process in this case does not measure up
to this test, and are constitutionally inadequate to afford
the due process required by the United States Constitution. 
The method chosen to acquire personal jurisdiction over
nonresident individuals -- notice by first-class mail -- “is
not reasonably calculated to reach those who could easily be
informed by other means at hand.”  Mullane, supra, 339 U.S. at
319.
Accordingly, although the judgment may remain valid where
entered until there is a contrary ruling by a court of
competent jurisdiction, we decline to grant full faith and
credit to the judgment because of our finding that the
Virginia trial court did not acquire personal jurisdiction
over these defendants because of  the constitutional
inadequacy of notice.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL 
APPEALS  REVERSED; CASE REMANDED 
TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO 
REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
CIRCUIT COURT FOR CARROLL 
COUNTY; COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN 
THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE 
PAID BY RESPONDENT.
2
Concurring Opinion follows next page:
Dissenting Opinion by Chasanow, J.:
A majority of this Court decides today that the notice
provisions of Virginia's long-arm statute are
unconstitutional.  I respectfully dissent.  If statutorily
authorized service of process in a long-arm jurisdiction case
is actually received by the defendant, whether effectuated by
first-class mail or certified mail with restricted delivery
and return receipt requested, the court ought to have in
personam jurisdiction.  The focus of this Court should be on
whether the Miserandinos actually received the statutorily
authorized mail service.  If they did, they received all of
the process they were due.  
If the Miserandinos were served with process in the
3
Virginia proceeding, then the judgment against them should be
given full faith and credit.  The Miserandinos maintain that
they did not receive service, but their uncorroborated denial
of service is not necessarily adequate to overcome the
presumption that service was properly made.  Therefore, this
case should be remanded in order to afford the Miserandinos an
opportunity to establish that they were not served.
I.
This case does not arise from a failure to follow the
applicable statute governing service of process.  It is
undisputed that Resort strictly complied with the notice
requirements of Virginia's long-arm statute.  Specifically,
Resort served the Secretary of the Commonwealth with process,
accompanied by an affidavit setting forth the Miserandinos'
address as "418 Ridge Rd., Westminster, Md. 21157," and
stating that the Miserandinos were non-residents of the
Commonwealth.  The Secretary in turn certified that copies of
these papers "were forwarded by first-class mail" to the
Miserandinos. 
The trial judge concluded that the Miserandinos received
due process of law, and denied the Miserandinos' Motion to
Strike Entry of the Judgment.  Although it is not clear from
the record, this ruling may have included a determination that
the Miserandinos received the notice mailed to each of them by
the Virginia Secretary of the Commonwealth.  Certainly, the
Miserandinos' mere affidavit of nonreceipt of service did not
conclusively rebut the strong presumption of service.  Until
there is a hearing to rebut the presumption of service, we
must assume that the Miserandinos received the mailed notice. 
If the Miserandinos received mailed notice of the Virginia
suit pursuant to the Virginia statute, this Court should not
give them standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
notice provision in the Virginia statute.
Recently in Academy of IRM v. LVI Environmental Services,
Inc., ___ Md. ___, ___ A.2d ___ (1997)(No. 3, 1996 Term, Slip
Op. at 12), this Court held that "the return of service ...,
with its accompanying return receipt, prima facie evidences
service of process...."  "In a particular case, [however,] it
may become a question of fact whether the person who signed
the return receipt was an agent for accepting the delivery of
certified mail on behalf of the corporate officer to whom
delivery was restricted."  ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___
(No. 3, 1996 Term, Slip. Op. at 13).  Because no evidence was
produced in Academy of IRM to contradict the prima facie
validity of service, we upheld the service of process.  ___
Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (No. 3, 1996 Term, Slip. Op. at
16).
4
How much of a burden of proof will be placed on a
defendant to prove nonreceipt of service will depend on the
reliability of the method of service chosen.  Where there is a
sheriff's return of service, very strong evidence is necessary
to impeach the return.  In Weinreich, ADM'X v. Walker, 236 Md.
290, 203 A.2d 854 (1964), we said:
"It is true that there may be
successful impeachment of service
seemingly valid on the record but, in all
the Maryland cases in which there has
been, the circumstances have ranged from
virtual demonstration of the lack of
service (as in German v. Slade, 42 Md.
510, in which a defendant swore he had not
been served and the deputy sheriff swore
he had served the other defendants but not
that one and had entered the notation of
service by mistake) to clear and
convincing evidence that there had not
been service, in the form of corroboration
of the defendant's claim that there had
not been, by independent disinterested
witnesses, plus lack of refutation, when
challenged, by the sheriff or others. 
See, for example, Master v. Master, 223
Md. 618[, 166 A.2d 251](the defendant wife
swore she was working in Washington when
she was said to have been summoned and was
corroborated by her employer's payroll
records and check); Little v. Miller,
supra (the defendant, a seaman, swore he
was on a voyage when he was said to have
been served and official Coast Guard
records supported him); Harvey v. Slacum,
supra (husband and wife swore they had
never been summoned and the deputy sheriff
did not know whether he had served the
father or his son, could not recognize the
husband in the courtroom and could not
remember the wife or say that he had
summoned her); Plummer v. Rosenthal, 178
Md. 149[, 12 A.2d 530](sworn denial by
Earl Rosenthal of any service; sheriff
identified the brother of the defendant,
Irvin, as the man he had summoned);
Piedmont-Mt. Airy Guano Co. v. Merritt,
154 Md. 226[, 140 A. 62](father said to
have been served at home of his son; sworn
5
denial of service plus corroboration that
the father never at any time was at son's
home at the hour mentioned by the sheriff;
summons for both father and son were found
by son's wife on his bureau and sheriff
was highly uncertain in attempted
identification); Pattison v. Hughes, 80
Md. 559[, 31 A. 320](four witnesses swore
sheriff was completely drunk when he
called and said only `I want you to come
Ellicott City'; sheriff did not deny it)."
Weinreich, 236 Md. at 297, 203 A.2d at 857.
Compliance with the statutory requirements for service in
the instant case gives rise to a presumption that service was
properly made.  Academy of IRM, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at
___ (No. 3, 1996 Term, Slip Op. at 12).  Hence, the burden is
on the Miserandinos to show by clear and satisfactory evidence
that they did not receive the mailed summons.  The presumption
of service afforded by first-class mail service ought to be
the easiest presumption of service to rebut, but a mere
affidavit of nonreceipt without corroborating facts does not
necessarily rebut the presumption of receipt of mailed
service.  The trial judge did not find that the Miserandinos
failed to receive the mailed service; in fact, the trial
judge's finding that the Miserandinos were not denied due
process may have encompassed a finding that they did receive
the mailed service.  
At a hearing to determine whether the Miserandinos
received the mailed notice, the factors that the trial judge
6
could weigh against the Miserandinos' denial of service are
the presumption of proper mailing based on the affidavit of
the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Virginia; the fact that
the address was the correct home address and that other mailed
service in the Maryland case was received at that address; and
any possible defenses the Miserandinos have to the Virginia
action.  The Miserandinos' possible defenses to the Virginia
action are relevant to receipt of service based on the
assumption that a person with a strong defense would be
unlikely to ignore notice of a suit, but a person with no
defense might be likely to ignore or forget about notice of a
suit.  Instead of refusing to give full faith and credit to
the Virginia judgment, this Court should remand the case to
give the Miserandinos an opportunity to rebut the presumption
of service and to establish a denial of due process by proving
an actual lack of notice and to proffer some defense to the
Virginia action.
II.
The majority clearly defines what it sees as the issue in
this case:  "whether initial and original service of process
by first-class mail is constitutionally sufficient to confer
in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident individual in a
long arm jurisdiction case."  ___ Md. ___, ___, ___ A.2d ___,
___ (1997)(Majority Op. at 7).  It then recognizes the
7
significant body of law and experience which is contrary to
its holding when it says, "there is strong precedent and
rather extensive experience that supports the use of first-
class mail...."  ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (Majority Op.
at 19).  The Court goes on to acknowledge that service by
first-class mail is probably adequate to acquire jurisdiction
in bankruptcy cases.  But, according to the majority, first-
class mail is not adequate to acquire jurisdiction over
nonresidents in long-arm cases because it "`is not reasonably
calculated to reach those who could easily be informed by
other means at hand.'"  ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___
(Majority Op. at 24)(quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover B. &
T. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319, 70 S.Ct. 652, 660, 94 L.Ed. 865,
876 (1950)).  The majority seems to indicate that the only
acceptable form of mail service is "certified mail with
restricted delivery and return receipt stating to whom
delivered and the date and address of delivery."  ___ Md. at
___, ___ A.2d at ___ (Majority Op. at 11)(citing Maryland Rule
2-121(a)).  Hereinafter, I will refer to that kind of mail as
"certified" mail, but the majority's requirement raises
interesting questions, such as, would certified mail without
restricted delivery, but which is signed for by the defendant,
also be inadequate to acquire in personam jurisdiction in the
same manner that ordinary mail actually delivered is
8
insufficient to acquire in personam jurisdiction?
The majority suggests that if "certified" mail were
substituted for first-class mail in Virginia's long-arm
statute, the statute would be constitutional.  This type of
mail does not increase the likelihood that the mail will
arrive at the address to which it was sent.  If the address is
correct, then ultimate receipt by the defendant is about as
likely with first-class mail as with certified mail.  The use
of "certified" mail merely provides corroborative evidence
that the material is actually sent, and further provides a
record of dispatch and delivery.  See State v. Barnes, 273 Md.
195, 209, 328 A.2d 737, 746 (1974)(stating that "[t]he only
logical purpose to be served by directing that the notice be
delivered by certified mail is to provide corroboration for
bald assertions of having given such notice and a means of
tracing and establishing the date of receipt should a dispute
concerning the delivery of notice arise"); Holmes v. Randolph,
610 N.E.2d 839, 845 (Ind. 1993)(stating "use of certified mail
will provide a better record of receipt but not necessarily
increase the probability the addressee will actually receive
the notice.  Certified mail is not insured, and `is dispatched
and handled in transit as ordinary mail.'  U.S. Postal
Service, Domestic Mail Manual subch. 912.11 (Issue 43: June
1992)").
9
Furthermore, the majority appears to equate first-class
mail with the specific method of notice prescribed by
Virginia's long-arm statute.  In fact, the method of notice
under the statute surpasses ordinary first-class mail in that,
like "certified" mail, it too provides a record of dispatch. 
The statute requires the Secretary of the Commonwealth, rather
than the plaintiff, to mail the notice and to certify the date
and fact of mailing.  Hence, a party disinterested in the
litigation issues a record of dispatch.  This feature enhances
the reliability of the notice.  
The majority's insistence on registered or certified mail
also fails to take into account the fact that these types of
mail are not available in certain instances.  The postal
regulations declare certain matters ineligible for
registration.  Mail which is "[a]ddressed to post offices to
which it cannot be transported safely," for example, may not
be registered.  United States Postal Service, DOMESTIC MAIL
MANUAL, Issue 48, S911.1.4, at S-19 (1995)(hereinafter "DMM"). 
In addition, mail that requires a signature is, as a practical
matter, often unavailable in certain rural areas.  Rural
letter carriers must dismount from their vehicles in order to
deliver registered, certified, or return-receipt mail only if
the address is "on the line of travel, or within one-half mile
of the route and has a passable road leading to it."  RURAL
CARRIER DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES § 313.3, at 63 (1991).  If an
10
individual lives farther than one-half mile from the rural
route, a letter carrier need not deviate from his or her
route.  Therefore, return-receipt mail sent to such a remote
address is undeliverable, unless the addressee takes
affirmative steps to retrieve the mail at a post office.  The
Uniform Probate Code specifically references such difficulties
with rural route delivery and in some circumstances permits
service by ordinary mail.  See, e.g., Idaho Code § 15-4-303
(1996)(comment to official text)(stating that "[t]he provision
for ordinary mail as a substitute for registered or certified
mail is provided because ... registered mail may not be
available to reach certain addresses ... and also certified
mail may not be available as a process for service because of
the method of delivery used [rural delivery and star route
delivery]"); Mont. Code Ann. § 72-4-203 (1995)(same); N.D.
Cent. Code § 30.1-25-03 (1995)(same); Utah Code Ann. § 75-4-
303 (1996)(same).
In adopting a long-arm statute that provides for service
by first-class mail the Virginia legislature concluded that
this method is reasonably calculated to inform nonresidents of
the pendency of a judicial proceeding against them.  This
Court should accept the general validity of that
determination, and only deny full faith and credit if the
mailed process has not been received.  Notice by first-class
11
In the instant action, the Miserandinos do not dispute that they had sufficient contacts with
8
the Commonwealth to otherwise subject them to the jurisdiction of the Virginia courts.
mail certainly has been upheld in a number of cases, and ample
authority exists to support Virginia's decision to employ it
in the context of notice to nonresidents who, because of real
estate transactions or other contacts with the Commonwealth,
are amenable to service.8
III.
My primary difficulty with the majority's approach is
that it seems to assume that first-class mailed service
(hereinafter "mailed service") is constitutionally permissible
to establish in personam jurisdiction in some types of law
suits, but not others.  Under the majority's approach, if
mailed service is not constitutionally permissible in a
particular type of lawsuit, then statutorily permissible
mailed service does not establish in personam jurisdiction
even if received.  The majority's test for determining when
mailed service is permissible is at best vague and uncertain,
yet the majority does acknowledge that mailed service is
adequate in some causes of action, such as bankruptcy.  A
better approach would be to hold that mailed service is
constitutionally permissible in any form of action, and the
decision as to when it may be authorized should be left to the
12
Even if first-class mail service is permitted, litigants should be cautious in using this method
9
of service because if the defendant does not respond, any judgment might be vulnerable to a
due process attack.  It is easier to prove nonreceipt of first-class mailed notice than it is to
prove nonreceipt of certified mail notice where there is a written return receipt.
legislative or rule making authorities.   Some legislatures
9
may choose to adopt a statute that comports with merely the
minimum requirements of due process, while others may choose
to enhance the constitutional minimum.  As one legal
commentator has observed:
"Some service-by-mail statutes
require only the satisfaction of minimum
constitutional standards.  Such statutes
permit the use of ordinary mail....
* * *
In contrast ..., most service-by-mail
statutes contain at least some
requirements that are not constitutionally
mandated.  For example, many statutes
demand that the plaintiff use registered
or certified mail...."  (Footnotes
omitted).
Service of Process by Mail, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 381, 385-86
(1975). 
There are numerous Maryland rules and statutes that
authorize service by first-class mail.  These rules and
statutes may be of questionable validity as a result of the
Court's decision in the instant case.  A few examples should
suffice.  
To begin with, it is ironic that the Maryland proceedings
in the instant case were initiated by service on the
13
Miserandinos by statutorily authorized first-class mail
service.  The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act,
codified in Maryland at § 11-801 et seq. of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article, provides in § 11-803:
"(a)  Addresses of debtor and
creditor to be furnished. -- At the time a
foreign judgment is filed, the judgment
creditor or the judgment creditor's
attorney shall file with the clerk of the
court an affidavit showing the name and
last known post office address of the
judgment debtor and the judgment creditor.
(b)  Clerk to mail notice of filing
to debtor. -- (1)  The clerk promptly
shall mail notice of the filing of the
foreign judgment to the judgment debtor at
the address given and shall note the
mailing in the docket."
Notice of the Maryland action against the Miserandinos,
therefore, was addressed and sent to the same address in the
same manner as was used to obtain service in the Virginia
action; yet, this Court today holds that this method of notice
is violative of due process. Several other statutes similarly
provide for service of process by first-class mail.  As the
majority notes, "[t]he Maryland legislature has recently
enacted a bill that permits the giving of first notices in an
estate case by first-class mail...."  ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d
___ (Majority Op. at 17).  This provision is codified in the
Maryland Code (1974, 1996 Supp.), Estates and Trusts Article,
§ 1-103.  Unfortunately, doubt is cast on the
14
constitutionality of that statute when the Court states that
"[t]his Court has not had an opportunity to pass upon the
constitutional sufficiency of notice by first-class mail in
this context, and we intimate no opinion on that question." 
___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (Majority Op. at 18).
Title 6 of the Maryland Rules governs all matters in the
orphan's courts and before the registers of wills relating to
the settlement of decedents' estates.  Rule 6-125 of that
title was recently adopted by this Court and is the general
rule on service.  Rule 6-125 provides:
"RULE 6-125. SERVICE
(a) Method of Service--Generally. --
Except where these rules specifically
require that service shall be made by
certified mail, service may be made by
personal delivery or by ordinary mail. 
Service by certified mail is complete upon
delivery.  Service by ordinary mail is
complete upon mailing.  If a person is
represented by an attorney of record,
service shall be made on the attorney
pursuant to Rule 1-321.  Service need not
be made on any person who has filed a
waiver of notice pursuant to Rule 6-126." 
(Emphasis added).
Did this Court recently adopt an unconstitutional rule?  I
doubt it.
Other actions commenced by first-class mail are now
questionable because first-class mail may be insufficient to
acquire in personam jurisdiction.  These include judicial
review actions in workers' compensation cases initiated by
15
first-class mail service.  Rule 7-202 (d)(2) provides:
"(2) Service by Petitioner in
Workers' Compensation Cases. -- Upon
filing a petition for judicial review of a
decision of the Workers' Compensation
Commission, the petitioner shall serve a
copy of the petition by first-class mail
on the Commission and each other party of
record in the proceeding before the
Commission."
Even process initiating criminal proceedings may be
served on a defendant by first-class mail under Rule 4-212. 
That rule provides:
"(a) General. -- When a charging
document is filed or when a stetted case
is rescheduled pursuant to Rule 4-248, a
summons or warrant shall be issued in
accordance with this Rule.  Title 5 of
these rules does not apply to the issuance
of a summons or warrant.
(b) Summons--Issuance. -- Unless a
warrant has been issued, or the defendant
is in custody, or the charging document is
a citation, a summons shall be issued to
the defendant (1) in the District Court,
by a judicial officer or the clerk, and
(2) in the circuit court, by the clerk. 
The summons shall advise the defendant to
appear in person at the time and place
specified or, in the circuit court, to
appear or have counsel enter an appearance
in writing at or before that time.  A copy
of the charging document shall be attached
to the summons.  A court may order the
reissuance of a summons.
(c) Summons--Service. -- The summons
and charging document shall be served on
the defendant by mail or by personal
service by a sheriff or other peace
officer, as directed (1) by a judicial
officer in the District Court, or (2) by
16
the State's Attorney in the circuit
court."  (Emphasis added).
These statutes and rules are just some of the first-class
mail provisions that may be cast in doubt by the majority's
opinion in the instant case.  Do these statutes and rules have
"special or unique circumstances that would justify relaxation
of the ordinary and available methods of service...?"  ___ Md.
at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (Majority Op. at 22).  We do not know,
and the test for special and unique circumstances seems, at
best, murky.  Apparently bankruptcy proceedings probably pass
the test, estate and probate proceedings might pass the test,
but long-arm suits do not pass the test.
A better rule would be that, where a permissible method
of service of process reasonably designed to reach the
defendant is used but does not reach the defendant through no
fault or lack of diligence of the defendant and where a
judgment is entered against the defendant based on that
service of process, the defendant will be deemed to have been
denied due process when the failure to receive service
prevented the assertion of a viable defense to the cause of
action.  Of course a heavy burden will be placed upon the
defendant to prove nonreceipt of service.  The amount of proof
necessary to establish nonreceipt of service will depend upon
the method of service chosen by the plaintiff.  This rule is
17
It is interesting to speculate that the majority might have held first-class mail service to be
10
constitutional had the Virginia statute required the Secretary of the Commonwealth to give
notice by registered mail return-receipt requested, restricted delivery, but the Secretary only
gave notice to the Miserandinos by first-class mail, as in the instant case.  This Court has
indicated that the use of first-class mail is adequate, even though the statute requires
registered mail, if the first-class mail is actually received.  This Court has said:
"even when a statute requires that a notice be given by
registered mail it has been held that notice actually received,
though by regular mail, is valid.  See 58 Am.Jur.2d, Notice §
27 (1971); Crummer v. Whitehead, 230 Cal. App.2d 264, 40
Cal. Rptr. 826 (1964); Volandri v. Taylor, 124 Cal. App. 356,
12 P.2d 462 (1932); Steele v. Trustees of Pittsburg Schools,
121 Cal. App. 419, 9 P.2d 217 (1932); Drake v. Comptroller
of City of New York, 278 App. Div. 317, 104 N.Y.S.2d 774
(1st Dept. 1951)."
State v. Barnes, 273 Md. 195, 210, 328 A.2d 737, 746 (1974).
entirely consistent with this Court's prior holdings.10
A.
The majority and I agree that:
"At a minimum, the notice must be
`reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present
their objections.'"
___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (Majority Op. at 8)(quoting
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, 70 S.Ct. at 657, 94 L.Ed. at 873). 
First-class mail meets that test, but it is up to the
legislative or rule making body to authorize such service, and
when authorized, it should be up to the litigants to decide
18
First-class mail service would be less expensive and less burdensome to plaintiffs as well as
11
defendants and ought to be available as an optional form of service in many causes of action.
Plaintiffs in some instances, however, should prefer "certified" over first-class mail, not
because the former increases the probability of service, but because it increases the evidence
of service and makes any judgment less vulnerable to a later challenge.  Whether first-class
mail is more or less reliable than "certified" mail often depends upon the individual to be
served, rather than the nature of the cause of action.  If "certified" mail is sent to the home
address of a defendant or defendants who work during postal delivery hours or travel
frequently, and who find it too difficult or inconvenient to go to the post office, such mail will
often be returned as "unclaimed."  A prospective plaintiff who wishes to serve a working
defendant at a home address may wish to use ordinary mail and to consider later a back-up
form of service if the defendant does not respond and there may be some doubt about receipt
of service.
whether to use first-class mail or an easier-to-prove form of
service that would better insulate judgments from later
collateral attack for nonreceipt of service.   
11
The law presumes that a letter properly mailed is in fact
received.  Mohr v. Universal C.I.T. Corp., 216 Md. 197, 204,
140 A.2d 49, 51 (1958)(referring to "the universal rule to the
effect that the receipt of a letter by the addressee is
presumed, when it is shown that the letter, properly stamped
and addressed, was posted in the mails").  Although current
statistics are unavailable, a law review article published in
1987 reported that:
"[R]ecords of complaints of nondelivery of
all first-class mail show an annual figure
of approximately 44,000 claims of
nonreceipt out of a total first class mail
volume of over 72 billion pieces, for a
rate of .00006 of 1 percent (or about 1
claim for every 2 million pieces of mail). 
Actual loss experience is presumably
considerably less than even this tiny
fraction of mail volume."  (Footnotes
19
omitted)
Kent Sinclair, Service of Process:  Rethinking the Theory and
Procedure of Serving Process Under Federal Rule 4(c), 73 VA.
L. REV. 1183, 1206 (1987)(citing United States Postal Serv.,
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL 26 (1985)).  The Supreme
Court has referred to the mails as "`an efficient and
inexpensive means of communication,' upon which prudent men
will ordinarily rely in the conduct of important affairs," see
Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455, 102 S.Ct. 1874, 1880, 72
L.Ed.2d 249, 258 (1982)(citation omitted), and has recognized
mail service as a constitutionally sufficient means of
providing notice in a number of cases.  See Tulsa Collection
Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 490, 108 S.Ct. 1340, 1347, 99
L.Ed.2d 565, 578 (1988)(stating that "[w]e have repeatedly
recognized that mail service is an inexpensive and efficient
mechanism that is reasonably calculated to provide actual
notice").  In Wuchter v. Pizzuti, 276 U.S. 13, 48 S.Ct. 259,
72 L.Ed. 446 (1928), for example, the Supreme Court assessed
the validity of a New Jersey statute that permitted notice to
nonresident motorists to be accomplished by service upon the
Secretary of State.  The Court observed that this method of
service "would not be fair or due process unless such officer
or the plaintiff is required to mail the notice to the
defendant, or to advise him, by some written communication, so
20
as to make it reasonably probable that he will receive actual
notice."  Wuchter, 276 U.S. at 19, 48 S.Ct at 260, 72 L.Ed. at
449 (emphasis added).  Because the New Jersey statute failed
to provide for such communication by mail, the Court found the
statute to be unconstitutional.  The method of notification
provided under the Virginia statute, in contrast, appears to
conform with Wuchter's precise requirements; service was made
upon the Secretary of the Commonwealth, who then mailed the
notice to the defendants. 
The Supreme Court made similar reference to the mail
system as an acceptable method of notification in Schroeder v.
New York, 371 U.S. 208, 83 S.Ct. 279, 9 L.Ed.2d 255 (1962), a
case which involved a municipality's decision to divert a
portion of a river.  With regard to landowners whose property
rights would be adversely affected by this action, the
relevant statute required notice by publication.  Schroeder,
371 U.S. at 209, 83 S.Ct. at 280-81, 9 L.Ed.2d at 257.  The
Supreme Court found that while newspaper publications and
posted notices did not provide the "quality of notice"
required by the Due Process Clause, the municipality's
constitutional obligation would have been discharged by "the
mailing of a single letter."  Schroeder, 371 U.S. at 213-14,
83 S.Ct. at 283, 9 L.Ed.2d at 260.  See also Mennonite Board
of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800, 103 S.Ct. 2706, 2712,
21
For those beneficiaries whose whereabouts could not be ascertained with due diligence,
12
notice by publication was held to be sufficient.  Mullane v. Central Hanover B. & T. Co., 339
U.S. 306, 318, 70 S.Ct. 652, 659, 94 L.Ed. 865, 875 (1950).
77 L.Ed.2d 180, 188 (1983)(stating that "[n]otice by mail or
other means as certain to ensure actual notice is a minimum
constitutional precondition...." in the context of notice to
mortgagee of tax sale).  
In Mullane, supra, the Supreme Court specifically
referenced ordinary mail as an acceptable means of providing
notice.  At issue in Mullane was the validity of notice by
publication to trust fund beneficiaries of a judicial
settlement of fund accounts.  339 U.S. at 307-09, 70 S.Ct. at
654-55, 94 L.Ed. at 869-71.  Some of the beneficiaries were
not residents of the state.  Mullane, 339 U.S. at 309, 70 S.Ct
at 655, 94 L.Ed. at 871.  The Court held that notice by
publication was constitutionally inadequate, and stated that
those beneficiaries whose whereabouts were ascertainable
should have been informed of the accounting "at least by
ordinary mail."   Mullane, 339 U.S. at 318, 70 S.Ct. at 659,
12
94 L.Ed. at 875 (emphasis added). 
In assessing the minimal requirements of due process,
therefore, the Supreme Court has repeatedly referenced the
ordinary mail system as a constitutionally sufficient
mechanism by which to provide notice.  Virginia's decision to
permit service by mail, therefore, seems in accord with the
22
minimum requirements of due process as defined by the Supreme
Court.
B.
Service by ordinary mail also has been upheld by numerous
lower courts.  Service by first-class mail in a bankruptcy
proceeding, for example, withstood direct constitutional
attack in Matter of Park Nursing Center, Inc., 766 F.2d 261
(6th Cir. 1985).  Federal Bankruptcy Rule 7004 provides in
pertinent part:
"(b)  Service by first class mail.  Except
as provided in subdivision (h), in
addition to the methods of service
authorized by [certain Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure], service may be made
within the United States by first class
mail postage prepaid as follows:
(1)  Upon an individual other
than an infant or incompetent,
by mailing a copy of the summons
and complaint to the
individual's dwelling house or
usual place of abode or to the
place where the individual
regularly conducts a business or
profession."
FED. R. BANKR. 7004(b)(1)(1994, 1996 Cum.Supp.)(emphasis added). 
A debtor, against whom a default judgment in a Chapter 11
bankruptcy proceeding had been entered, challenged the
23
FED. R. BANKR. 704(c)(1) similarly permitted service "by mailing a copy of the summons,
13
complaint, and notice to [an individual's] dwelling house or usual place where he regularly
conducts his business or profession."
constitutionality of an earlier version  of this rule on the
13
grounds that:  (1) due process requires personal service; (2)
a method of service more likely to accomplish service should
be attempted before resorting to first-class mail; (3)
safeguards to ensure receipt of a first-class letter were
lacking; and (4) the rule contained no requirement that the
address on the envelope be correct.  Park Nursing Center, 766
F.2d at 263-64.  In rejecting these assertions, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted that
"Mullane does not require the very best means of serving
process, only a means that is reasonably calculated to reach
the party."  Park Nursing Center, 766 F.2d at 264.  In light
of other rules of civil procedure that provide a mechanism by
which to set aside a default judgment, the court concluded
that the rule in question satisfies due process.  Park Nursing
Center, 766 F.2d at 263-64.  Bankruptcy court decisions
subsequent to Park Nursing Center have consistently supported
the constitutionality of service by first-class mail.  See,
e.g., In Re M&L Business Mach. Co., Inc., 190 B.R. 111, 115-16
(D. Colo. 1995)(observing that "strict compliance with Rule
7004 serves to protect due process rights...."); Leavell v.
24
Karnes, 143 B.R. 212, 217 (S.D. Ill. 1990)(stating that
"[s]ervice under Rule 7004(b) comports with the procedural due
process requirements identified by the Supreme Court in
Mullane....").  
The Minnesota Supreme Court, similarly, upheld the
constitutionality of a statute permitting ordinary mail
service upon a nonresident motorist in Schilling v. Odlebak,
224 N.W. 694 (Minn. 1929).  The statute at issue was
strikingly similar to Virginia's long-arm statute. 
Specifically, it allowed substituted service upon the
Secretary of State "`provided, that notice of such service and
a copy of the process are within ten days thereafter sent by
mail by the plaintiff to the defendant at his last known
address and that the plaintiff's affidavit of compliance with
the provisions of this act are attached to the summons.'" 
Schilling, 224 N.W. at 695 (quoting L. 1927, p. 557, c. 409, 1
Mason Minn. St. § 2684-8)(emphasis added).  Relying in part on
Wuchter, supra, the court concluded that "it is reasonably
certain that the defendant will receive actual notice, and
that adequate opportunity is afforded him to defend." 
Schilling, 224 N.W. at 696.
In a more recent decision, the Indiana Supreme Court
upheld a statute that permitted notice of the impoundment and
potential disposal of abandoned vehicles by first-class mail. 
25
Holmes, supra.  The plaintiff in Holmes contended that this
method of notification was constitutionally flawed in that it
"fail[ed] to provide notice in the best available manner to
assure delivery to the known owner prior to depriving the
owner irrevocably of a property interest."  610 N.E.2d at 840. 
Although the trial court entered summary judgment in the
plaintiff's favor, based in part on its conclusion that due
process requires certified mail, return receipt requested, see
id., the Indiana Supreme Court reversed that judgment. 
Holmes, 610 N.E.2d at 846.  The court noted that "[t]he notice
by first class mail given to owners of abandoned vehicles must
be viewed in light of the Supreme Court's acknowledgement in
dicta that `the mails provide an "efficient and inexpensive
means of communication," ... upon which prudent men will
ordinarily rely in the conduct of important affairs.'" 
Holmes, 610 N.E.2d at 844 (quoting Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S.
at 455, 102 S.Ct at 1880, 72 L.Ed.2d at 258, in turn quoting
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319, 70 S.Ct. at 660, 94 L.Ed. at 876). 
Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge test, the court concluded
that the method of notification prescribed by the statute
satisfied due process, see Holmes, 610 N.E.2d at 845
(observing that "[t]he risk that failure of ... notice will
lead to deprivation of an individual's vehicle is modest"),
and that "[f]irst class mail notice sent to the record address
26
of the vehicle owner is reasonably calculated to apprise the
owner of the pendency of abandoned vehicle proceedings." 
Holmes, 610 N.E.2d at 846.  See also Service of Process by
Mail, 74 Mich. L. Rev. at 382, where the author concludes that
"service by mail without a return-receipt requirement complies
with the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments," (citations omitted), and further "concludes that,
in light of the procedures available to a defendant to
challenge service [by ordinary mail] and to reopen default
judgments entered against him, the requirement of a signed
receipt is unduly harsh on plaintiffs."  Id. 
Service by ordinary mail clearly satisfies due process in
a variety of contexts.  Virginia has apparently concluded that
the use of first-class mail under its long-arm statute is
"reasonably calculated" to reach defendants.  Maryland courts
should defer to that assessment and limit their inquiry to
whether the Miserandinos were afforded due process in the
application of this statutory method of service.  Since first-
class mail is "reasonably calculated" to reach a recipient, if
the Miserandinos actually received the mailed service
authorized by the Virginia statute, they have literally
received all the process they were due.  I respectfully
dissent.
Judges Rodowsky and Raker have authorized me to state
27
that they join in the views expressed in this dissenting
opinion.