Title: Advisory Opinion to the Governor Re: Judicial Vacancy Due to Mandatory Retirement

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

No, SC06-1 184
ADVISORY
OPINION
TO THE GOVERNOR
RE: JUDICIAL
VACANCY
DUE TO MANDATORY
RETIREMENT.
[September
15, 2006]
The Honorable
Jeb Bush
Governor,
State of Florida
The Capitol
Tallahassee,
Florida 32399
Dear Governor Bush:
By letter dated June 20, 2006, you requested
our opinion on a question of
constitutional
interpretation
involving your executive
powers and duties with
regard to a mandatory judicial
vacancy in the First District Court of Appeal.
This
request and our response
is pursuant to article IV, section (1)(c) of the Florida
Constitution.’
1. Article IV, section (1)(c) provides in fill:
The governor may request in writing the opinion of the justices
of the
supreme court as to the interpretation
of any portion of this
constitution
upon any question affecting the governor’s executive
powers and duties. The justices
shall, subject to their rules of
Your letter provided the relevant facts as follows:
Judge Richard Ervin, III, a judge of the First District Court of
Appeal, was born on October
16, 1934. On that day in 2004, Judge
Ervin turned seventy years old. Article V, section 8 of the Florida
Constitution
provides that “[n]o judge or justice
shall serve after
attaining the age of seventy years except upon temporary
assignment
or to complete
a term, one-half of which has been served.”
Judge
Ervin’s term ends on January
1, 2007.
Because of mandatory
retirement,
he was ineligible for retention and did not seek to quaIify
for retention
during the quali~ing
period, May 8-12,2006.
Article V, section 10 provides that “[i]f a justice
or judge is
ineligible
or fails to quali@ for retention,
a vacancy shall exist in that
office upon the expiration
of the term being served by the justice or
judge.”
Article V, section 11(a) provides for the Governor to fill a
vacancy in a judicial
office to which election for retention applies.
Although
I understand
that a physical vacancy occurs upon the
termination
of the term, a question has arisen as to when a
constitutional
vacancy occurs, effectuating
the process to fill it. If a
constitutional
vacancy occurs upon the failure of a judge to qualify for
retention,
the judicial nominations
commission
must submit
nominations
to me within 30 days from the occurrence
of the vacancy,
unless extended by me for another 30 days.
Art. V, sec. 11(c), Fla.
Const.
In such instance, I will be able to appoint a successor who can
take office immediately
after the conclusion
of Judge Ervin’s term,
and there will be no prolonged
vacancy on the First District Court of
Appeal.
If a constitutional
vacancy occurs only at the expiration
of
his term, the nominations
may not be made until thirty to sixty days
thereafter,
and it maybe
as late as May 2007 before a successor is
appointed,
leaving a four month vacancy on the court.
Therefore,
I respectfully
request an opinion of the Justices of
the Supreme Court as to the question of when a vacancy occurs
procedure,
permit interested persons to be heard on the questions
presented
and shall render their written opinion not earlier than ten
days from the filing and docketing
of the request, unless in their
judgment
the delay would cause public injury.
-2-
resulting
from the mandatory
retirement
of the judge who is not
eligible for retention.
Letter from Governor
Jeb Bush to former Chief Justice Barbara Pariente (June 20,
f
006) (on file with Clerk, Supreme Court of Fla.), at 1-2. Judge Ervin two days
later wrote a letter to you announcing
that he would complete his term on the First
District Court of Appeal, but was constitutionally
prohibited
from serving an
additional
term.
ANALYSIS
Article V, section 8, of the Florida Constitution
provides,
in pertinent part,
“No justice
or judge shall serve after attaining the age of seventy years except upon
temporary
assignment
or to complete a term, one-half of which has been served.”
Art. V, $8, Fla. Const.
Article V, section 11 of the Florida Constitution,
titled
Vacancies,
delineates
the Governor’s
duties when a vacancy occurs in a judicial
office:
(a) Whenever
a vacancy occurs in a judicial
office to which
election for retention applies, the governor shall fill the vacancy by
appointing
for a term ending on the first Tuesday after the first
Monday in January of the year following the next general election
occurring
at least one year after the date of appointment,
one of not
fewer than three persons nor more than six persons nominated
by the
appropriate
judicial nominating
commission.
~c)’The nominations
shall be made within thirty days from the
occurrence
of a vacancy unless the period is extended by the governor
for a time not to exceed thirty days. The governor shall make the
appointment
within sixty days after the nominations
have been
certified to the governor.
-3-
Art. V, $ 11(a),(c), Fla. Const.
Our response to your question is compelled by the fact that there is a specific
constitutional
provision that expressly provides that a vacancy in a merit retention
judicial
office does not occur until the end of the judge or justice’s
term.
Article
V, section 10(a), of the Florida Constitution
states: “If a justice or judge is
ineligible
or fails to qualifi
for retention,
a vacancy shall exist in that office upon
the expiration
of the term being served by the iustice or iud~e.”
(Emphasis
added.)
The letter of a merit retention judge or justice announcing
his or her mandatory
retirement
at the end of the term does not create a vacancy in that judicial
office
until the actual date that the judge or justice’s
term expires pursuant to the specific
constitutional
provision
which addresses when a “vacancy”
occurs.
To understand
the distinction
between elected and retained judges, it is
instructive
to review the constitutional
history regarding judicial
vacancies.
Prior
to a 1976 amendment
implementing
the merit retention of Florida Supreme Court
justices
and district court of appeal judges,
the Florida Constitution
did not contain
a specific explanation
of when judicial
positions become “vacant.”
This Court in
Spector v. Glisson, 305 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1974), a case involving
a non-merit
retention judicial
resignation
prior to the amendment,
noted:
A thorough search of the Florida Constitution
reveals that
ONLY in general Art. X, $3, new in the 1968 Constitution,
is there a
definition
of when a vacancy occurs, that section providing
that a
vacancy in office “shall occur” upon inter alia “resignation.”
Nowhere
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else therein is a vacancy in office defined; the other related provisions,
including the specific one as to judges, state how and when it is to be
filled, but not when it OCCURS.
~
at 779. In the absence of a specific provision governing judicial
vacancies,
the
Court in Spector referred to article X, section 3, the provision
of the Florida
Constitution
that governed vacancies
in office in general, to determine
when a
judicial
vacancy occurred:2
The 1885 Constitution
in Art. IV, $7, authorized
the Governor to fill
a vacancy “(W)hen any office, from any cause, shall become vacant . .
. .“ Now, however,
the current 1968 constitutional
provision
controls
and also takes precedence
over statutes such as Fla. Stat. $ 114.01
providing
that an office shall be “deemed vacant” in cases there
enumerated,
one being “resignation.”
. . . Thus, absent a specific
provision
in the 1968 Constitution
as to judges (as there is in Art. V,
$$10 and 11 regarding
the manner of filling the vacancy) the general
provision
must apply, that a vacancy “shall occur” upon “resignation.”
~
Relying on article X, section 3, the Court in Glisson concluded
that the elected
justice’s
resignation
letter created a vacancy in that elected position.
See id. at
780. However, this constitutional
provision
does not apply to the vacancy in Judge
Ervin’s position.
2. Article X, section 3, of the Florida Constitution
currently provides:
Vacancy in office shall occur upon the creation of an office, upon the
death, removal from office, or resignation
of the incumbent
or the
incumbent’s
succession
to another office, unexplained
absence for
sixty consecutive
days, or failure to maintain the residence
required
when elected or appointed,
and upon failure of one elected or
appointed to office to qualifi
within thirty days from the
commencement
of the term.
This provision
clearly has no application
to the current facts.
-5-
In 1976, the Florida Constitution
was amended to implement
a merit
retention
system for district court judges and Florida Supreme Court justices,
and
this amendment
provided a specific explanation
of when a vacancy occurs if a
justice or judge is ineligible to qualifi
for merit retention:
If a justice
or judge is ineligible or fails to qualifi
for retention,
a
vacancy shall exist in that office upon the expiration
of the term being
served by the justice or judge.
Art. V, $ 10(a), Fla. Const, (emphasis
supplied).3
This Court has determined
that “[t]he rules which govern the construction
of
statutes are generally
applicable to the construction
of constitutional
provisions.”
Coastal Fla. Police Benev. Ass’n, Inc. v. Williams,
838 So. 2d 543, 548 (Fla.
2003).
This Court has consistently
stated that “[a]ny inquiry into the proper
interpretation
of a constitutional
provision
must begin with an examination
of that
provision’s
explicit language.
If that language is clear, unambiguous,
and
addresses
the matter in issue, then it must be enforced as written.”
~
(quoting Fla.
Soc’y of OPhthalmoloR Yv. Fla. Optometric
Ass’n, 489 So. 2d 1118, 1119 (Fla.
1986)). We have fbrther noted that “[t]he words and terms of a Constitution
are to
be interpreted
in their most usual and obvious meaning, unless the text suggests
that they have been used in a technical sense. The presumption
is in favor of the
3. This language has not changed since the Florida Constitution
was
amended in 1976.
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natural and popular meaning in which the words are usually understood
by the
people who have adopted them.”
Butterworth
v. CagRiano, 605 So. 2d 56, 58 (Fla.
1992) (quoting City of Jacksonville
v. Cent’1 Can Co., 151 So. 488,489-90
(Fla.
1933)).
The definition
for when a vacancy occurs with regard to merit retention
judges is clear and unambiguous—a
vacancy exists upon the expiration
of the term
of the judge or justice.
&
art. V, $ 10(a), Fla. Const.
Therefore,
we conclude that
this constitutional
provision must be applied in this circumstance
as it is clearly
written and as it was adopted by the voters.
&
Williams,
838 So. 2d at 550;
CaRRiano, 605 So. 2d at 58.4 Moreover,
the lack of ambiguity
in the Florida
Constitution
renders it unnecessary
to review the history of the 1976 revision to
article V, section
10, to determine when a vacancy in a merit retention judgeship
4. The language that was placed on the 1976 ballot fin-ther supports the
conclusion
that a vacancy is created upon the expiration
of the term of a judge
justice
who is ineligible to qualify for merit retention.
The ballot language
provided:
Proposing
an amendment
to the State Constitution
to provide
. .
. that justices
of the supreme court and judges of district courts of
appeal submit themselves
for retention
or rejection by the electors in a
general election every six years, and that failure to submit to a vote for
retention
or rejection, or a vote of rejection by the electors, will result
in a vacancy in the office upon expiration
of the current term . . . .
or
CS for SJR 49, 81 (1976) (proposed
art. V, $$3,
10-11, Fla. Const.) (emphasis
supplied).
-7-
occurs.
&
Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Lopez, 531 So. 2d 946, 949
(Fla. 1988) (“When the language
of the statute is clear and unambiguous
and
conveys a clear and definite meaning,
there is no occasion for resorting to the rules
of statutory interpretation
and construction;
the statute must be given its plain and
obvious meaning”)
(quoting HoIIY v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) ).5
Finally, since there is a specific provision
in article V governing judges and
justices
who are subject to merit retention, the instant case is totally distinguishable
from earlier judicial vacancy cases which involved elected judicial
officials and in
5. Nonetheless,
a commentary
to the 1976 amendment
to section 10(a) may
be read to support the express language in the constitution
that a vacancy occurs
upon the expiration
of the judge or justice’s
term.
The commentary
provides
in
pertinent
part:
The retention election poses the simple question “Shall the justice or
judge be retained in office?” If the answer is yes, the justice or judge
will serve a six-year term; if the answer is no, a vacancy is created and
it will be filled through the nominating
commission
process.
Art. V, $10, Fla. Const., 26 Fla. Stat. Ann. 51 cmt. (Supp. 2006).
Under this
commentary,
if the electors vote for retention, it is clear that the justice
or judge
“will serve a six-year term” from the date that his or her prior term expires (i.e., the
six-year term does not commence
at the time that the electors vote to retain the
judge or justice).
Thus, if the electors vote not to retain a judge, the vacancy
similarly will occur at the expiration
of the term served by that judge.
There is no
indication
from the commentary
that the date a judge or justice’s
term “expires,”
thereby leading to either the commencement
of a new six-year term or a vacancy in
that judgeship,
varies based on whether the judge or justice has been, or is eligible
to be, retained.
Analogously,
and more pertinent to the instant case, a judge who is
subject to mandatory
retirement
under the constitution
cannot control when the
vacancy in his or her office will occur by writing a letter to the Governor
announcing
that he or she is prohibited
from serving an additional
term.
-8-
CANTERO,
J., concurring.
I agree with the majority that the plain language of the Florida Constitution
dictates our answer to the Governor’s
question.
I write only to emphasize
that in
these circumstances,
nothing in the Florida Constitution
prevents the relevant
judicial
nominating
commission
(“JNC”) from beginning
the process of
nominating
the retiring judge’s successor before the vacancy actually occurs—that
is, before expiration
of the judge or justice’s
term.
In terms of the nominating
process, the Constitution
requires only that “nominations
shall be made within
thirty days from the occurrence
of the vacancy unless the period is extended by the
governor for a time not to exceed thirty days.”
The constitution
is silent on when
the process must begin.b We have previously
emphasized,
however, that
“[vacancies
in office are to be avoided whenever possible.
We are confident
that
the framers of article V intended that the nominating
and appointment
process
would be conducted
in such a way as to avoid or at least minimize the time that
vacancies
exist.”
In re Advisow
Opinion to the Governor (Judicial Vacancies),
600 So. 2d 460,462
(Fla. 1992).
Today’s opinion renders some period of vacancy virtually unavoidable
when
a justice or judge fails to quali~
for a retention
election.
Unless the JNCS begin
6. There may well be provisions
of the Uniform Rules of Procedure
for
District Courts of Appeal Judicial Nominating
Commissions
relevant to this issue.
I consider here only the requirements
of the Florida Constitution.
-1o-
the nominating
process before the vacancies
actually occur, by requesting
applications,
interviewing
applicants,
and deliberating
about potential
nominees,
that period may extend for up to four months before the governor appoints a
successor.
This period does not even account for the inevitable
delay between the
date of the appointment
and the date the appointee actually takes office,
Many
appointments
to the state appellate
courts and to this Court entail relocations
to
another city, which can delay the process by several weeks.
Thus, if JNCS were
forced to wait until the outgoing judge leaves office before even advertising
the
opening, the affected court may be left without a necessary judge for months.
In a
court such as ours, where most cases are heard en bane, the burden on the
remaining
justices
would be enormous.
In my opinion, the Florida Constitution
grants the JNCS the flexibility
to
begin the nomination
process before the vacancy actually occurs, therefore
allowing
them to minimize the period in which the position remains vacant.
It is in
the interest of the people of Florida that such vacancies be filled as quickly as
possible.
BELL, J., concurs.
-11-
Original Proceeding
– Advisory Opinion to the Governor
Raquel A. Rodriguez,
General Counsel, Nathan A. Adams, IV, Deputy General
Counsel, and Gladys Perez, Assistant
General Counsel, Office of the Governor,
Tallahassee,
Florida,
for Petitioner,
The Honorable
Jeb Bush
Jason Brent Gonzalez,
Chairman,
Judicial Nominating
Commission
for the First
District Court of Appeal, Tallahassee,
Florida,
responding
with comments
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