Title: Public Safety v. Hutchinson

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Secretary of Public Safety and Correctional Services v. Thomas Hutchinson
No. 148, Sept. Term, 1999
Diminution of credits following revocation of mandatory supervision — Correctional Services Article § 7-504(b).
Circuit Court for Washington County
Case No. 21-C-97-3269-AA
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 148
September Term, 1999
______________________________________
SECRETARY OF PUBLIC SAFETY
AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES
v.
THOMAS HUTCHINSON
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Wilner, J.
______________________________________
Filed:   June 23, 2000
We explore once again the arcane world of diminution credits available to prisoners in the State
correctional system.  See Moats v. Scott, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.2d ___ (2000); Dept. of Corrections
v. Henderson, 351 Md. 438, 718 A.2d 1150 (1998); Beshears v. Wickes, 349 Md. 1, 706 A.2d 608
(1998); Md. House of Corrections v. Fields, 348 Md. 245, 703 A.2d 167 (1997).  The question is
whether an inmate who (1) by virtue of accumulated diminution credits is released on mandatory
supervision, prior to the expiration of his sentence(s), (2) while on mandatory supervision commits a new
crime, for which he receives a new sentence, and (3) is returned to prison to serve both the remaining part
of the original sentence(s) and the new sentence, is entitled to good conduct credits against the new
sentence from the time of its effective date or only from the time the original sentence(s) expires.
The dispute between the Secretary of Public Safety and Correctional Services and the Division of
Correction (DOC), on the one hand, and Thomas Hutchinson, on the other, hinges on the proper
construction of Maryland Code, § 7-504(b) of the Correctional Services Article, which states, simply, that
“[a]n inmate may not be awarded any new diminution credits after the inmate’s mandatory supervision has
been revoked.”
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Thomas Hutchinson is no stranger to the Division of Correction; he has been a frequent guest in
its facilities, beginning in 1970, when he was convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon and sentenced
to 20 years.  In 1973, he escaped, which landed him an additional seven years when he was apprehended
two years later.  He was paroled in February, 1982, but was returned 11 months later, with an additional
10-year sentence, upon his conviction for assault with intent to murder.  In October, 1991, after being
convicted of assault with intent to maim, he was given a three-year sentence, with all but three months
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suspended.
Hutchinson was released on mandatory supervision in May, 1993.  Three months later, he was
arrested for possession with intent to distribute heroin, of which he was eventually convicted and sentenced
to seven years, commencing upon his arrest on August 23, 1993.  In June, 1994, the Parole Commission
formally revoked his mandatory supervision, allowed him no “street time,” and rescinded 613 diminution
credits.  As a result of the new sentence and the action of the Parole Commission, the maximum expiration
date of Hutchinson’s term of confinement was calculated to be August 23, 2000.  All of this is prologue.
Hutchinson was released, once again, on mandatory supervision in August, 1995.  Any hope that
he had somehow been habilitated was dashed when, on February 29, 1996, he was convicted of
possession with intent to distribute cocaine, for which he received a 20- year sentence, with all but five
years suspended.  It is the fallout from that conviction and sentence that produced this appeal.  In June,
1996, the Parole Commission revoked Hutchinson’s mandatory supervision, rescinded all of his 1,568 days
of good conduct credits, and allowed him only 61 days of “street time.”  By virtue of those actions,
Hutchinson’s maximum expiration date with respect to the sentences he was serving when  placed on
mandatory supervision became February 15, 2001.  Against that date, DOC applied 132 work and special
project credits, which resulted in a new mandatory supervision release date of October 6, 2000.  Later,
DOC allowed some additional credits that moved the mandatory supervision release date to September
1, 2000.
The full extent of the dispute between Hutchinson and DOC appears to involve an intricate series
of calculations not fully explained in either the record extract or the briefs, but the heart of the dispute
concerns the extent to which Hutchinson is entitled to good conduct diminution credits against the new five-
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year sentence, which would end on February 28, 2001.  DOC takes the position that, by virtue of § 7-
504(b), Hutchinson is not entitled to any good conduct credits against the five-year sentence until he has
served, in full, the term of confinement he was serving when placed on mandatory supervision.  Under that
approach, as best we can determine, he would not begin to receive good conduct credits against that
sentence until September 1, 2000 — the mandatory supervision release date applicable to the “old”
sentences.
Hutchinson, on the other hand, maintains (1) that he is entitled to 92 additional days of work and
special project credits against the “old” sentences, which presumably would move the mandatory release
date applicable to those sentences back to the end of June, 2000, and (2) that he is entitled to good
conduct credits at the rate of five days a month against the five-year sentence from the time it was imposed,
on February 29, 1996, which, according to his calculation, would yield an additional 290 days of credits.
In October, 1996, Hutchinson filed a grievance with the Inmate Grievance Office, complaining
about DOC’s calculations.  His grievance was rejected by the warden, by the Commissioner of Correction,
and by an administrative law judge.  He then sought judicial review in the Circuit Court for Washington
County, which affirmed the ruling of the ALJ.  The Circuit Court concluded that “a prisoner whose
mandatory supervision has been revoked, cannot earn any new diminution credits either on that portion of
the sentence that he must serve resulting from rescission of supervision as well as any new sentence
imposed to be served concurrently with his former sentence.”  The court held that such a prisoner would
begin to earn diminution credits on a subsequent sentence only “upon the completion of the maximum
expiration date of the term of confinement for which mandatory supervision had been revoked.”
Aggrieved, Hutchinson appealed to the Court of Special Appeals which, in an unreported opinion
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filed February 11, 2000, reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court.  The intermediate appellate court
found § 7-504(b) to be ambiguous with respect to whether diminution credits were allowed or disallowed
against any new sentence and, applying the rule of lenity, concluded that the statute did not bar credits on
subsequently imposed, concurrently executed sentences.  It therefore held that DOC erred in refusing to
award good conduct credits from February 29, 1996.  It also held that DOC erred in refusing to credit
Hutchinson with the 92 work and special project credits he had earned from December, 1993 through
August, 1995.  In light of those holdings, the court directed a remand to the Secretary of Public Safety and
Correctional Services for an immediate recalculation of Hutchinson’s mandatory supervision release date.
The case was returned and, on February 16, 2000, DOC released Hutchinson from confinement.  The
basis on which it concluded that Hutchinson was entitled to immediate release is not in the record before
us and has not been explained to us by the parties.
Complaining that the Court of Special Appeals decision, even though unreported, affects the
mandatory supervision release dates of between 2,000 and 3,000 other inmates, the Secretary of Public
Safety and Correctional Services sought our review of that court’s construction of § 7-504(b).  The
Secretary did not complain about the intermediate appellate court’s conclusion regarding the 92 days of
work and special project credits, which applied to the old sentences, but only whether § 7-504(b)
permitted “an award of credits for time to be served on a concurrent sentence imposed after release on
mandatory supervision which overlaps with time the inmate is required to serve on the original, reinstated
term of confinement.”  We granted certiorari to review that limited question.
DISCUSSION
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The Legislature first authorized good conduct diminution credits in 1876.  By 1876 Md. Laws, ch.
162, it provided that convicted prisoners serving sentences in the penitentiary were entitled to have
deducted from their sentences five days for each calendar month during which no charge of misconduct had
been sustained.  The law also required that prisoners be discharged at the expiration of their sentence less
the time so deducted.  As we pointed out in Moats, Henderson, Wickes, and Fields, over the years
the Legislature provided for three other kinds of credits as well — for performing work tasks (five days
a month), for satisfactory progress in vocational or other educational courses (five days a month), and for
special work projects (up to ten days a month).  The work, educational, and special project credits are
awarded monthly, as earned.  Good conduct credits, however, are deducted in advance from the inmate’s
term of confinement, subject to being rescinded if the inmate misbehaves in various ways.
Until 1970, prisoners released early, through the accumulation of credits, were treated as though
they had effectively served their entire sentence; they were not subject to any special restrictions or
encumbrances upon release.  In 1970, the Legislature changed that situation and provided that persons
sentenced after July 1, 1970, who were released early by reason of accrued diminution credits were to be
“deemed as if released on parole until the expiration of the maximum term or terms for which [they were]
sentenced.”  1970 Md. Laws, ch. 406.  The law provided further that such prisoners were subject to all
laws, rules, regulations, and conditions applicable to parolees and were to remain under the supervision of
the Division of Parole and Probation until the expiration of the maximum term.
Notwithstanding the broad language of the 1970 Act, there was apparently some question as to
the extent of the Parole Commission’s authority over prisoners so released, especially over whether any
special, individual conditions could be imposed.  See Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee Bill Analysis
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and Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services Position Statement on Senate Bill 103 (1989).
To address that perceived ambiguity, the General Assembly enacted 1989 Md. Laws, ch. 307, which,
among other things, defined the status of inmates released early through the accumulation of diminution
credits as “mandatory supervision,” required that each person on mandatory supervision be issued a written
order specifying the terms and conditions that must be met, and directed the Division of Parole and
Probation to supervise the person until the expiration of the maximum term of the sentence.
The 1989 Act also, for the first time, addressed the consequences of violating a condition of
mandatory supervision.  It continued the language of the 1970 law that made persons on mandatory
supervision subject to all laws and regulations applicable to parolees, which, at least implicitly,
contemplated a revocation of mandatory release status by the Parole Commission if the person violated
the conditions of the release.  The Act then specified, in a rewritten § 4-612 to Article 41 of the Code:
“(e) The Parole Commissioner presiding may rescind all diminution credits
previously earned on the sentence or any portion thereof in the revocation
proceedings.
 (f) A person under mandatory supervision may not earn any new
diminution credits once the mandatory supervision has been revoked.”
These various provisions are now codified in §§ 7-501, 7-502, and 7-504 of the Correctional
Services Article.  Section 7-501 requires the Division of Correction to grant “a conditional release from
confinement” to an inmate who (1) is serving a term of confinement of 12 months or more imposed after
July 1, 1970, and (2) has served the term less diminution credits awarded under other provisions of the law.
That conditional release is defined in § 7-101(g) as “mandatory supervision.”  Section 7-502 makes clear
that a person on mandatory supervision remains in legal custody until the expiration of his or her full term
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and is subject to all laws, rules, regulations, and conditions applicable to parolees as well as to any special
conditions established by a member of the Maryland Parole Commission.
Sections 4-612(e) and (f), as enacted in 1989, are now codified in § 7-504 of the Correctional
Services Article.  As we indicated earlier, § 7-504(b) provides that “[a]n inmate may not be awarded any
new diminution credits after the inmate’s mandatory supervision has been revoked.”
The parties are in agreement that § 7-504(b) precludes the award of any future diminution credits
against the sentence(s) the inmate was serving when placed on mandatory supervision.  The question is
whether it also precludes the award of credits against any new sentence imposed.  Paradoxically, neither
party regards § 7-504(b) as ambiguous, notwithstanding that they each have very different, and
contradictory, views of what it means.  As we indicated, DOC believes that diminution credits may be
awarded against a new sentence, but not until the “old” sentence has been fully served.  Hutchinson urges
that credits may be awarded against the new sentence from the time of its imposition.  Because, under §
3-701 of the Correctional Services Article, all sentences being served are aggregated into one term of
confinement, commencing on the first day of the sentence that begins first and ending on the last day of the
sentence ending last, he would effectively apply those credits awarded against the new sentence to the
entire term of confinement, which would have the effect of applying them to the “old” sentence as well.
That approach, the Secretary complains, would lead to the absurd result of an inmate who commits a new
crime and receives a new sentence while on mandatory supervision serving less time upon revocation of
the mandatory supervision than an inmate who does not commit a new crime and receives no new sentence
but whose mandatory supervision is revoked for other reasons.
We think that both approaches, as presented, are flawed.  There is a way to read § 7-504(b) in
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a common sense way, consistently with the views we expressed in Moats and  Henderson, and that
carries out what we think was the legislative intent without presenting the anomaly posited by the Secretary.
We begin by noting the obvious.  Neither § 7-504(b) nor any other statute that can be read in
context with it clearly states, one way or the other, whether the prohibition applies to new sentences after
an inmate is released on mandatory supervision.  The statute itself is silent in that regard.  The 1989
legislation that first enacted the provision was a departmental bill sponsored by the Department of Public
Safety and Correctional Services in order, as we indicated, to clarify the authority of the Parole
Commission to supervise persons on mandatory supervision, and there is nothing in the legislative history
of that enactment that sheds any light on the issue now before us.
If there is an inference to be drawn, it would arise from reading former §§ 4-612(e) and (f) —
current §§ 7-504(a) and (b) — together, in light of the circumstances existing at the time of their enactment.
Section 4-612(e) — current § 7-504(a) — permits the Parole Commission, upon revocation of mandatory
supervision, to rescind all diminution credits previously earned, which can only apply to the sentence(s)
being served when the inmate was placed on mandatory supervision.  Section 4-612(f) — current § 7-
504(b) — can then be read as complementing that provision by making clear that no new credits may be
applied against that sentence.  It is not always the case that there will be a new sentence, and it is
reasonable to infer that the Legislature’s focus was only on the sentence still being served by the inmate
while on mandatory supervision.  The penalty for violating a condition of mandatory supervision was service
in full of the existing sentence.  That approach is fully consistent with the fact that, when the provision was
first enacted in 1989, the law did not aggregate multiple sentences into a single term of confinement but
regarded them as separate and independent.  The aggregation of multiple sentences into a single term of
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confinement was not authorized until 1991.  See 1991 Md. Laws. ch. 354.  If the Legislature, in 1989, had
intended that the prohibition against future diminution credits apply to any sentence other than the one the
inmate was serving when placed on mandatory supervision, it likely would have said so.
That was certainly the view, in 1999, of the Correctional Services Article Review Committee,
selected by the General Assembly’s Legislative Policy Committee to superintend the code revision of the
correctional services laws.  The Revisor’s Note to § 7-504 states, in relevant part:
“The Correctional Services Article Review Committee notes, for
consideration by the General Assembly, that subsection (b) of this section
seems to establish a prohibition against awarding an inmate diminution
credits on any sentence after mandatory supervision has been revoked.
However, the Committee assumes that subsection (b) was intended to
apply only to the sentence or sentences for which the inmate was awarded
diminution credits prior to release on mandatory supervision and not to a
new sentence for a crime committed while the inmate was on mandatory
supervision.  The General Assembly may wish to amend subsection (b) to
state expressly that an inmate may not be awarded any diminution credits
‘on the sentence or sentences for which the individual was awarded
diminution credits prior to release on mandatory supervision.’  The
General Assembly may also wish to clarify how good conduct credits
should be calculated for a new sentence for a crime committed while an
inmate was on mandatory supervision, depending on whether all or part
of the new sentence runs concurrent with or consecutive to the sentence
or sentences for which the inmate was awarded diminution credits before
release on mandatory supervision.”
Unfortunately, the General Assembly chose not to address the matter, perhaps in the belief that the
interpretation suggested by the Correctional Services Article Review Committee was correct and that no
clarification was necessary.  Clarification is necessary, however, and it falls to us to provide it.
As we learned from Fields, Wickes, Henderson, and Moats, with an increasing number of
prisoners serving multiple sentences — some concurrent, some consecutive, some imposed at the same
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time, some imposed at different times, some imposed before certain legislative enactments affecting
diminution credits, some imposed after those enactments — 
rules governing diminution credits will affect different prisoners in different ways.  A construction that will
benefit one group will often hurt another group.  A result that appears quite reasonable in one circumstance
may appear to be unreasonable in another.  The issue, ultimately, is one of legislative intent.
One thing that seems abundantly clear is that the General Assembly did not intend for there to be
any future diminution credits applied against the sentence(s) the inmate was serving when placed on
mandatory supervision.  Hutchinson’s approach, founded on the premise of a single term of confinement,
would effectively do that, which is why we reject it.  Just as in Fields and Wickes we subordinated the
general direction to aggregate multiple sentences into a single term of confinement when to do otherwise
would have denied inmates the benefit of a law that the General Assembly intended be applicable to them,
so in this case we must do the same in order to carry out the predominant legislative intent.  For purposes
of applying § 7-504(b), the existing sentence(s), on the one hand, and any new sentence(s), on the other,
must be considered separately.
On that premise, the Secretary’s position also fails to carry out the legislative intent, for it would
deny prisoners the full benefit of the laws (§§ 3-702, and 3-704 through 3-707) allowing diminution credits
against the new sentence(s).  Inmates are entitled to begin earning good conduct credits upon imposition
of the sentence and they are eligible for the other credits as they engage in the requisite programs or
projects.
There is a way in which the legislative intent can be fairly implemented.  Prisoners who receive a
new sentence(s) for conduct committed while on mandatory supervision should receive, and must be given,
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good conduct credits on that sentence(s) as though there were no existing sentence(s).  They are also
eligible for work, education, and special project credits against that sentence(s).  Those credits apply only
to the new sentence(s), however.  The prisoner gets no benefit from them with respect to the existing
sentence, which he or she must serve in full, subject only to whatever preexisting credits are appropriately
allowed against that sentence(s).  Thus, even if the prisoner would be otherwise entitled to mandatory
supervision release on the new sentence(s) prior to expiration of the old sentence(s), the prisoner may not
be released until he or she has served the full extent of the old sentence.  This approach, we believe,
implements the full legislative intent.  If the balance of the existing sentence that must be served in full is
considerably longer than the new sentence, the prisoner will likely receive little or no real benefit from the
credits applied to the new sentence, but that simply gratifies the intent of § 7-504(b).  If, on the other hand,
the new sentence(s) is more proportional to or is longer than the balance of the old sentence(s), the prisoner
will get the benefit of the credits applied to that new sentence(s).
As we indicated, the mandate of the Court of Special Appeals effected a reversal of the judgment
of the Circuit Court and directed a remand to the Secretary to recalculate Hutchinson’s credits in
accordance with the Court of Special Appeals opinion.  We agree that the judgment of the Circuit Court
must be reversed and that the case must be remanded to the Secretary for recalculation of Hutchinson’s
credits and mandatory supervision release date, but that recalculation must be in accordance with this
opinion, not that of the Court of Special Appeals.
JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH
INSTRUCTIONS TO REVERSE JUDGMENT OF CIRCUIT
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COURT FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY AND REMAND
CASE TO THAT COURT FOR REMAND TO PETITIONER
FOR 
RECALCULATION 
OF 
RESPONDENT’S
MANDATORY SUPERVISION RELEASE DATE IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THIS OPINION; COSTS IN THIS
COURT AND IN COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE
PAID BY PETITIONER.