Title: MARCO PEDRO LEMUS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Cite as: 2007 WY 111, 162 P.3d 497

APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
MARCO 
PEDRO LEMUS,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLincolnCounty

The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Daniel 
G. Blythe* and Karen Ashcraft Byrne, Cheyenne, Wyoming.  
Argument by Ms. Byrne.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and James Michael Causey, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Causey.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Order 
allowing Daniel G. Blythe to withdraw entered on Nov. 15, 
2006.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Marco 
Pedro Lemus (Lemus), challenges his convictions for first degree felony murder 
(murder committed during the course of a robbery1) and conspiracy to commit 
aggravated robbery.  We will 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Lemus raises 
these issues:

 
 
1.  Uncharged 
evidence was improperly presented to the jury when the State showed the jury a 
video without redacting evidence of other crimes.

 
 
2.  The 
pathologist's testimony was improperly admitted without adequate foundation when 
he was not the pathologist who performed the autopsy.

 
 
3.  The 
prosecutor's remarks in closing argument constituted impermissible prosecutorial 
misconduct when he professed a belief that he had put on enough evidence to 
indicate guilt.

 
 
4.  It 
was improper not to allow and pay for [Lemus] to have his own expert 
witnesses.

 
 
5.  If 
the prosecutor used fake pictures and allowed perjured testimony to be 
presented, then a new trial should be granted.

 
 
6.  It 
was error for the trial court not to allow [Lemus] to talk with the alleged 
co-conspirators.

 
 
7.  If 
the trial court were not allowing [Lemus] to issue his own trial subpoenas, 
error was created.

 
 
8.  It 
was error for the trial court to deny [Lemus's] motion for a change of 
venue.

 
 
9.  [Lemus] 
maintains that jury selection was improperly conducted.

 
 
10.  [Lemus] 
maintains the prosecutor improperly threatened and intimidated 
witnesses.

 
 
11.  The 
prosecutor's opening statement was improper when he announced he would call 
several witnesses and then did not call them.

 
 
12.  Insufficient 
evidence was produced to sustain a conviction of 
conspiracy.

 
 
The 
State has reorganized the issues into five categories:

 
 
I.          
The prosecutor did not commit misconduct, sufficient to warrant reversal 
of [Lemus's] convictions, in his opening and closing arguments, in his alleged 
threatening and intimidation of witnesses, or in his alleged use of "fake 
pictures" and perjured testimony.

 
 
II.         
The district court did not hinder [Lemus's] right to present his defense 
when it allegedly did not offer him experts to assist with his defense, 
allegedly refused to allow him to speak with his coconspirators, and allegedly 
refused to allow him to issue his own subpoenas.

 
 
III.        The 
district court did not commit error in allowing [Lemus's] videotaped confession 
 which [Lemus] insists contained W.R.E. 404(b) evidence  to be played in its 
entirety, or in allowing the admission of testimony from Dr. Robert Deters 
concerning the nature of the victim's wounds.

 
 
IV.       The 
district court did not interfere with [Lemus's] right to a trial by an impartial 
jury when it denied his motion for change of venue, or in its method of jury 
selection.

 
 
V.        
Sufficient evidence supported [Lemus's] conviction for conspiracy to 
commit aggravated robbery.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

General 
Matters

 
 
[¶3]      When the 
proceedings in this case were initiated, Lemus was represented by a public 
defender.  Later in the proceedings, 
he undertook to represent himself at the pretrial proceedings and during his 
jury trial.2  He was assisted by standby counsel.  As is so often the result in cases where 
a defendant chooses to represent himself, this case became somewhat muddled 
because of Lemus's performance as his own attorney, as well as because of other 
circumstances related to Lemus's family and codefendants.  No claim is made in this appeal that the 
district court erred in its rather thorough effort to warn Lemus of the dangers 
and disadvantages of representing himself.

 
 
[¶4]      This is the third 
in a series of cases that arose out of the robbery and murder of Manuel 
Leon-Leyva, in LincolnCounty, in February of 2004.  See Rawle v. State, 2007 WY 59, 155 P.3d 1024 (Wyo. 2007); and Talley v. 
State, 2007 WY 37, 153 P.3d 256 (Wyo. 2007).  Although we will, of course, rely only 
upon the evidence presented at Lemus's trial in resolving whether or not the 
evidence was sufficient in his case, we provide this summary of the evidence 
taken from the Rawle case for 
purposes of background, clarity, and structure in addressing the issues raised 
by Lemus.

 
 

In 
early February of 2004, Mr. Rawle departed from South Dakota with his girlfriend, Eyvette 
Talley, and her three children, along with Ms. Talley's brother, Marco Lemus, 
his wife, Tiffany Lemus, and their three children.  The group traveled in a 1989 Cadillac 
and headed to Arizona.  
They passed through Wyoming and planned 
a stop in Kemmerer, 
Wyoming, where Mr. Rawle had a 
connection with a drug dealer that he had established when he was previously 
employed in the area.  At some point 
during their trip, Mr. Lemus, Ms. Talley, and Mr. Rawle devised a plan to rob 
the drug dealer, Manuel Leon-Leyva.

When 
they arrived in Kemmerer, Mr. Rawle contacted Mr. Leon-Leyva and requested that 
they meet for a drug transaction at a local grocery store.  Mr. Lemus, Ms. Talley, and Mr. Rawle 
armed themselves with steak knives.  
They left Mrs. Lemus and the children in the Cadillac to meet Mr. 
Leon-Leyva, who arrived at the meeting location driving his vehicle.  Mr. Leon-Leyva was then robbed and 
stabbed to death in his vehicle.

Mr. 
Rawle drove Mr. Leon-Leyva's vehicle, followed by the Cadillac driven by Ms. 
Talley, to a remote location.   
The three perpetrators burned the victim's vehicle and body in an attempt 
to destroy the evidence of their crimes.  
The charred vehicle and remains were later discovered and an 
investigation ensued.

 
 

Rawle, 
¶¶ 3-6, 155 P.3d  at 1026.

 
 

[¶5]      On June 14, 2004, 
a felony information was filed 
against Lemus, charging him with second-degree homicide.  The State amended the information to include the charges for which he was 
convicted, as set out above.  Lemus 
was living in Florida at the time of his 
arrest, and he waived extradition back to Wyoming on June 22, 2004.  The Wyoming Public Defender was 
appointed to represent Lemus on August 20, 2004.

 
 
[¶6]      Lemus appeared 
before the district court for arraignment on September 30, 2004, at which time 
his appointed public defender requested a mental health examination for his 
client (over Lemus's objections).  
On September 30, 2004, the district court suspended the proceedings and 
sent Lemus to the WyomingStateHospital for an evaluation 
for the following purposes:

                        

(ii)  An 
opinion as to whether the accused has a mental illness or deficiency, and its 
probable duration;

 
 
(iii)  An 
opinion as to whether the accused, as a result of mental illness or deficiency, 
lacks capacity to comprehend his position, to understand the nature and object 
of the proceedings against him, to conduct his defense in a rational manner and 
to cooperate with his counsel to the end that any available defense may be 
interposed;

 
 
(iv)  An 
opinion as to whether at the time of the alleged criminal conduct the accused, 
as a result of mental illness or deficiency, lacked substantial capacity to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law;

 
 
(v)  A 
recommendation as to whether the accused should be held in a designated facility 
for treatment pending determination by the court of the issue of mental fitness 
to proceed; and

 
 
(vi)  A 
recommendation as to whether the accused, if found by the court to be mentally 
fit to proceed, should be detained in a designated facility pending further 
proceedings.

 
 
The 
evaluation was received by the district court on November 24, 2004, and all 
questions were essentially answered in the negative.

 
 
[¶7]      It is apparent 
from the record that there was conflict between Lemus and the attorney who was 
initially appointed to represent him.  
In part, this conflict arose because Lemus did not want a mental health 
evaluation.  That attorney was 
permitted to withdraw, and a new public defender entered an appearance on 
Lemus's behalf on January 5, 2005.  
At first, Lemus very reluctantly agreed to allow that attorney to 
represent him.

 
 
[¶8]      On January 19, 
2005, the State filed its notice of intent to use W.R.E. 404(b) evidence.  The State was thorough in its advocacy 
for use of this sort of evidence:

 
 
1.  Evidence 
that [Lemus] and the other co-defendants and alleged co-conspirators used 
controlled substances on their trip from Sioux 
Falls, South Dakota, to Kemmerer, Wyoming.  
This evidence will not be introduced to prove the character of a person 
in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith, but to prove motive, 
intent, preparation, and a common plan.  
Further, the State plans to use said evidence because it is part of a 
continuing course of conduct that includes the crimes charged in the 
information.  Events do not occur in a vacuum and 
jurors need to know about this uncharged conduct to realistically evaluate the 
evidence in this case.  The jury has 
a right to hear what occurred immediately before and after the 
crime.

            
2.  Evidence of various shopliftings that [Lemus] and 
co-defendants are alleged to have participated in between the time they left 
Sioux Falls, South 
Dakota, and arrived in Kemmerer, Wyoming, on the 6th day of 
February, 2004.  Specifically the 
State intends to show that [Lemus] and co-defendants participated in shoplifting 
whereby the knives that were allegedly used to kill the victim were 
obtained.  This evidence will not be 
introduced to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith, but to prove motive, intent, preparation, and a common 
plan.  Further, the State plans to 
use said evidence because it is part of a continuing course of conduct that 
includes the crimes charged in the information.  Events do not occur in a vacuum and 
jurors need to know about this uncharged conduct to realistically evaluate the 
evidence in this case.  The jury has 
a right to hear what occurred immediately before and after the charged 
crime.

            
3.  The burning of the vehicle belonging to Manuel Leon-Leyva 
and also the burned body contained in that vehicle.  This evidence will not be introduced to 
prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith, but to prove motive, intent, preparation, and a common plan.  Further, the State plans to use said 
evidence because it is part of a continuing course of conduct that includes the 
crimes charged in the information.  
Events do not occur in a vacuum and jurors need to know about this 
uncharged conduct to realistically evaluate the evidence in this case.  The jury has a right to hear what 
occurred immediately before and after the crime.

 
 
The 
State knew about this evidence from Lemus's confession.  The State also gave notice of its intent 
to use hearsay evidence as provided for in W.R.E. 804(b)(6), specifically 
testimony from the victim's widow that her deceased husband told her that a 
person who turned out to be Rawle was in town the day the victim was 
murdered.

 
 
[¶9]      Lemus filed a 
motion for change of venue and the State responded to it, contending that it 
should not be considered unless it was not possible to seat an impartial 
jury.  Eventually, the district 
court denied that motion and proceeded to jury selection.  A jury was selected with dispatch and 
that process gave no sign that a change of venue was necessary.  Thereafter, Lemus did not further pursue 
his request for a change of venue.

 
 
[¶10]   On January 24, 2005, Lemus's 
appointed public defender filed a notice that Lemus intended to represent 
himself in all additional proceedings and made a request to act as standby 
counsel only.  On January 28, 2005, 
the presiding judge recused himself from Lemus's case because the judge's son 
was an assistant county attorney in LincolnCounty.  The case was then assigned to the 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, from the Second Judicial District (CarbonCounty).  On February 22, 2005, Lemus waived his 
right to a speedy trial.  An initial 
pretrial order setting a trial date in CarbonCounty was inadvertently sent out.  At the first hearing on motions in the 
case, Judge Waldrip made clear that 
there had been no change of venue, that the indication that the trial was to be 
in CarbonCounty was an inadvertent error, and that the trial 
would be in LincolnCounty, where the crime 
occurred.

 
 
[¶11]   On May 3, 2005, Lemus filed 
approximately 62 motions asking that subpoenas be issued for witnesses for the 
defense.  On that same date, he also 
filed approximately 20 substantive motions, including motions to suppress 
various statements he made to authorities, to suppress the mental evaluation 
from the State Hospital, to suppress the statements of other witnesses, for a 
Spanish interpreter because he intended to have many Spanish speaking witnesses, 
a motion for a gag order on himself and his co-defendants, and a motion to 
preclude his wife from testifying against him.  The State provided individualized 
responses to all of these motions, as required by the district court.  With respect to the motions for 
subpoenas, the State made clear that it understood that Lemus could request such 
subpoenas; however, the State reserved the right to object to them on the 
grounds of relevancy, competency, cumulativeness, or other applicable 
reasons.  The district court also 
forewarned Lemus that subpoenas would issue only if he demonstrated the 
relevancy of the proposed witnesses' testimony.

 
 
[¶12]   On June 3, 2005, the district court 
issued a scheduling order setting the trial in LincolnCounty and acknowledging that Lemus would 
be permitted to represent himself, with the public defender acting as standby 
counsel.

 
 
[¶13]   On June 22, 2005, Lemus filed 27 
substantive motions which were, for the most part, duplicative of those filed in 
May.  However, this set of motions 
included one for a team of expert witnesses.  On that same date, he filed 
approximately 56 motions to subpoena witnesses for his defense, and most of 
those were also duplicative of the subpoenas requested in May.  An additional 20 motions and petitions 
were filed in the district court by Lemus on August 1, 2005, and August 8, 
2005.  The State submitted its 
request for jury instructions and its lists of witnesses and exhibits on August 
12, 2005.  On August 12, 2005, Lemus 
filed two motions and a list of witnesses.  
On August 16 and 17, 2005, Lemus filed several hundred pages of documents 
that appeared to be his way of complying with the district court's pretrial 
order.  At a hearing on motions held 
on August 23, 2005, the district court went through all of Lemus's motions and 
requests for subpoenas and heard argument on them and ruled on them, one by 
one.

 
 
[¶14]   As the time of trial approached, 
Lemus shortened his witness list considerably.  However, as was the circumstance 
throughout this case, Lemus did not have a physical address for many of his 
selected trial witnesses.  Instead, 
he provided a sort of metes and bounds description of a location, or a name of 
an employer, or just a city.  In 
some instances, he provided no address whatsoever.  The record reflects that extraordinary 
efforts were made to locate witnesses and serve subpoenas, but not all such 
efforts were successful.

 
 
[¶15]   On October 3, 2005, the day before 
Lemus's trial began, the district court held a final motions hearing to take 
care of last minute details.  
However, much of that hearing was devoted to a sort of dress rehearsal of 
the trial procedures for the benefit of Mr. Lemus.

 
 
The 
Evidence Presented at Lemus's Trial

 
 
[¶16]   On February 7, 2004, a pumper for 
EOG Resources was checking on wells near Exxon's Shute Creek facility in 
LincolnCounty when he found a 
burnt vehicle with a dead human body in it.  The vehicle had not been there when he 
was at that same site the day before.  
He also found a road map atlas near the burnt vehicle.  That atlas was eventually tied to Lemus 
and his coconspirators.  
Cross-examination by Lemus revealed that the passenger door of the 
vehicle was open.  This took on some 
significance as the trial progressed because, in his confession, Lemus related 
how his group had to return to the vehicle because they could see from their 
vantage point that the first fire they started in the vehicle had gone out.  They figured out that the fire went out 
because it had no oxygen source.  
Thus, they returned to the vehicle and lit the fire again leaving two 
windows and the passenger door open.  
An investigating officer found a gas cap near the crime scene.  That was significant because Lemus 
related that it was removed from Leon-Leyva's car so that they could try to get 
gas to use as an accelerant to hasten the ignition of the 
fire.

 
 
[¶17]   The body found in the vehicle was 
first identified by associating it with the owner of the burned vehicle, Manuel 
Leon-Leyva.  From Leon-Leyva's wife, 
it was ascertained that he had left home the night before to meet a friend he 
knew as "Cowboy."  The nickname 
"Cowboy" was later tracked to Brian Rawle.  
DNA tests established that the body in the burnt vehicle was that of 
Leon-Leyva.

 
 
[¶18]   It was not until the police 
received a phone call from Tiffany Lemus on June 11, 2004, that they identified 
Lemus as a suspect.  Lemus was 
arrested in Orlando, 
Florida on June 16, 2004, on 
unrelated charges (apparently instigated by his wife).  While he was in custody on that matter, 
he was questioned by Deputy Sheriff John Stetzenbach from LincolnCounty and Agent James T. Whinnery of the 
Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation.  The interview with Lemus was preserved 
on video tape and was played for the jury in its entirety.  Lemus made no objection to the tape 
being shown in an unedited format to the jury.

 
 
[¶19]   There was no audio at the beginning 
of the tape, just Lemus pacing around in an interview room.  Lemus insisted that he was praying at 
that time and that there should have been audio.  The trial court, with the jury present, 
accepted Lemus's contention that he was praying and the viewing of the tape 
continued.  In the video taped 
interview, Lemus admits many times that he was an active participant in the plan 
to rob Leon-Leyva and the actual murder of him, as well as the burning of his 
body.

 
 
[¶20]   Although there are a few points in 
the tape where the transcription is noted to be inaudible, our review of it 
established that nothing of apparent substance was inaudible.  In addition, we note that Lemus talked 
at length about many things, some pertinent to the questions asked of him and 
some just volunteered information.  
Although what he had to say did not always make "sense," we are satisfied 
that the vast majority of the tape was audible, and that the transcript in the 
record is an accurate repetition of the taped interviews.

 
 
[¶21]   We also note that Lemus believed, 
or feigned a belief, that the police officers were there to talk to him about 
his wife's claim that he was stalking her.  
After several minutes of bantering back and forth, the police officers 
redirected Lemus's attention to why they were there.  Lemus seemed to know why they were there 
and initially he wanted to know where his wife was and indicated that he would 
talk with them, but first he wanted to know where his wife was, and later wanted 
to know exactly who told them about what had happened in Wyoming.  Eventually, Lemus agreed that he would 
"give it to you guys on a silver platter as long as we are all charged the 
same."  Once the police officers 
told Lemus that it was his wife Tiffany that they had talked to, Lemus related 
that there were four of them involved:  
He was involved, his wife Tiffany was involved, his sister Eyvette Talley 
was involved, and Eyvette's boyfriend Brian Rawle was involved.  They made a plan to contact Leon-Leyva 
and to rob him for the drugs and money he might have.  That plan included that if anything 
"goes bad," they were all going to cover it up together.  They were all armed with steak knives, 
and it was also understood that if things "went bad," they would kill 
Leon-Leyva.  After stabbing him to 
death, they then drove Leon-Leyva's car into the countryside near Kemmerer and 
lit it afire.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Change 
of Venue

 
 
[¶22]   Lemus filed a motion for change of 
venue.  That motion was never 
supported by either cogent argument or pertinent authority.  As noted above in the facts section, 
Lemus thought he had been granted a change of venue because of an error in the 
district court's trial setting order.  
The record makes clear that it was an error, and that the district court 
did not intend to consider the motion for change of venue until after jury 
selection was completed.

 
 
[¶23]   We review the denial of a motion to 
change venue under the abuse of discretion standard.  Urbigkit v. State, 2003 WY 57, 
¶ 26, 67 P.3d 1207, 1220 (Wyo. 2003).  
We employ this analytical process to that review:

 
 
Criminal 
defendants in Wyoming have a constitutional right to a trial 
by an impartial jury.  Wyoming's constitutional 
provision grants the right to trial "by an impartial jury of the county or 
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed."  Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10.  The legislative provision mirroring the 
constitution requires "[e]very criminal case shall be tried in the county in 
which the indictment or offense charged is found, except as otherwise provided 
by law."  Wyo. Stat.  Ann. § 1-7-102(a) (LEXIS 1999).  Trial proceedings are transferred to 
another county "only if the court is satisfied that there exists within the 
county where the prosecution is pending so great a prejudice against the 
defendant that the defendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial in that 
county."  W.R.Cr.P. 21(a).  

            
This Court has adopted a two-part test for determining whether a change 
of venue should be granted after voir 
dire because of pre-trial publicity:  
" 'First, the nature and extent of the publicity must be considered;  second, the difficulty or ease in 
selecting a jury must be considered along with the amount of prejudice which 
actually appears during voir dire 
examination.' "  Sides [v. State], 963 P.2d [227,] 231 
[(Wyo.1998)] (quoting Murry [v. 
State], 713 P.2d [202,] 208 [ (Wyo.1986) ] ).

 
 

Id., 
¶ 27 (quoting Nixon v. State, 
994 P.2d 324, 326-27 (Wyo. 1999)); and see Schwenke v. State, 768 P.2d 1031, 1033 
(Wyo. 
1989).

 
 
[¶24]   Lemus made no attempt to 
demonstrate the level of pretrial publicity, although we will take note that 
this was a high profile crime in LincolnCounty and that his codefendants were also 
tried there before Lemus was.  In 
neither of those cases was venue an issue on appeal.  Rawle, 155 P.3d 1024; Talley, 153 P.3d 256.  Sixty-five jurors were summoned for 
Lemus's trial.  Of those, 12 had 
heard about the case in the media or from other sources, such as friends, 
co-workers, etc.  Each of those 
jurors was closely examined.  One 
juror expressed a view that he could not put aside the opinion that he had 
adopted (he was not asked what that opinion was).  He was excused for cause.  At the close of voir dire, Lemus passed 
the jury for cause and had no objections to the jury selection 
process.

 
 
[¶25]   We have applied the standard of 
review outlined above, and we conclude that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying the motion for a change of venue.

 
 
Challenge 
to Jury Selection Process

 
 
[¶26]   We need not spend much additional 
time on this issue.  At trial, Lemus 
had no objections to the jury selection process, and he passed the jury that was 
selected for cause.  He exercised 
all of his peremptory challenges.  
We have carefully examined the voir dire and we find no irregularities of 
any sort.  Lemus's brief fails to 
present cogent argument or pertinent authority that persuades us to examine this 
issue further.  See, e.g., Statezny v. State, 2001 WY 22, 
¶ 11, 18 P.3d 641, 644-45 (Wyo. 2001).  For these reasons, we conclude that the 
jury selection process was not erroneous in any way.

 
 
Defendant's 
Subpoenas

 
 
[¶27]   As a part of the lengthy and very 
complete warnings the district court gave Lemus with respect to disadvantages of 
representing himself at trial (with standby counsel), the district court 
specifically called Lemus's attention to the circumstance that the district 
court could not aid Lemus in subpoenaing witnesses, and that he would be 
required to demonstrate the relevance of the testimony of all proposed 
witnesses.  Moreover, the trial 
court emphasized that it could not aid Lemus in arranging interviews with 
witnesses from his jail cell, or with witnesses who were incarcerated 
elsewhere.

 
 
[¶28]   We need not get too far beyond 
generalities in this regard, because the record supports only a conclusion that 
all the witnesses Lemus wanted to call either appeared voluntarily (with or 
without subpoena) or were summoned by means of subpoena.  It is unquestioned that a defendant in a 
criminal case has a constitutional right to a fair trial, and that includes the 
right to summon witnesses in his defense.  
U.S. Const Amend. VI  ("to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor."); Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10 ("In all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall have the right  to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process served for obtaining 
witnesses.").  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
7-11-402 and 7-11-405 (LexisNexis 2007).  
It is, however, the defendant's burden to ensure that the witnesses he 
wants are summoned.  81 Am. Jur.2d 
Witnesses § 4 (2004 and Supp. 
2006).

 
 
[¶29]   It is transparent in the record 
that Lemus's concept of a "material witness" was very broad.  For instance, for reasons that Lemus did 
not articulate, he wanted to subpoena all the members of the Commission on 
Judicial Conduct and Ethics.  The 
district court would not approve that.  
However, the district court did allow Lemus to subpoena an employee of 
the State Crime Lab whose testimony appeared to be relevant.  In addition, the clerk of the district 
court in LincolnCounty met with Lemus in 
his cell in an effort to further identify, locate, and serve Lemus's 
witnesses.  See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Sufficiency of Evidence to Support or 
Require Finding that Out-of-State Witness in Criminal Case is "Material Witness" 
Justifying Certificate to Secure Attendance Under Uniform Act to Secure the 
Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal Proceedings, 12 
A.L.R.4th 742 (1982 and Supp. 2006); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Sufficiency of Evidence to Support or 
Require Finding that In-State Witness in Criminal Case is "Material and 
Necessary" Justifying Issuance of Summons Directing Attendance of Witness Under 
Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in 
Criminal Proceedings, 12 A.L.R.4th 771 (1982 and Supp. 2006); 
Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Right of 
Indigent Defendant Under Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
to Appearance of Witnesses Necessary to Adequate Defense, 42 A.L.R.Fed 233 
(1979 and Supp. 2006).

 
 
[¶30]   So far as the record shows, all 
witnesses who Lemus wanted to call were summoned.  Even the many witnesses for whom Lemus 
could not provide a street/delivery address were sought and served, if 
possible.  However, at no point in 
the record does Lemus complain that there was a witness, whose testimony was 
material to his trial, who he was unable to call to the witness stand.  We have examined the record with care 
and find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in any way with 
respect to requiring the issuance of subpoenas on Lemus's behalf. 

 
 
Lemus's 
Contact with Coconspirators/Codefendants

 
 
[¶31]   It is evident from Lemus's brief 
that this particular issue, as well as many other issues, were raised in this 
appeal because he wanted them to be raised and not necessarily because they had 
any merit.  In addition, contrary to 
an allegation stated in his brief, Lemus received copies of the transcripts of 
his codefendants' trials.

 
 
[¶32]   We conclude that, with respect to 
this issue, it suffices to note that neither in the trial court below, nor in 
this appeal, has Lemus articulated a desire to have his codefendants called as 
witnesses, nor has he provided any cogent argument to suggest that the district 
court abused its discretion with respect to a request made by Lemus to 
communicate with his codefendants or to call them as witnesses on his 
behalf.  See, e.g., Doles v. State, 2002 WY 146, ¶ 5, 
55 P.3d 29, 31 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 
Lack of 
Expert Witnesses for Defense

 
 
[¶33]   As a general statement of the 
applicable rule, a defendant in a criminal case may be entitled to access to 
expert witnesses if there is a reasonable probability that an expert would aid 
in his defense and that the denial of an expert would result in an unfair 
trial.  Such decisions rest in the 
sound discretion of the trial court.  
Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1980); and see 
generally Ruby B. Weeks, Annotation, Right of Indigent Defendant in Criminal Case 
to Aid of State by Appointment of Investigator or Expert, 34 A.L.R.3d 1256, 
§§ 2-4 (1970 and Supp 2007).

 
 
[¶34]   At trial, Lemus asked for expert 
witnesses.  He had a theory of the 
case that he attempted to present to the jury, even though it was not supported 
by any testimony or other evidence.  
That theory was that he acted in self-defense when he killed 
Leon-Leyva.  To a large extent, this 
theory was supported only by his "assertion" that Leon-Leyva attacked first, and 
not by testimony or other evidence to that effect.  Lemus did not testify on his own 
behalf.  However, in many of his 
cross-examinations, Lemus suggested that what the witness had to say was not 
quite the truth, or at least not the whole truth, and Lemus knew that because he 
was there.  As we will discuss in 
more detail in the final issue (sufficiency of the evidence), Lemus's 
confession, conjoined with other circumstantial evidence, sufficed to provide 
evidence of all the elements of the crimes for which he was convicted.  The confession did not intimate in any 
way that he acted in self-defense, but only that when the Lemus/Rawle/Talley 
threesome tried to effectuate the robbery plan, Leon-Leyva ferociously fought 
back.  Another prong of Lemus's 
defense was that he lied in his confession about many things.  His ostensible motive for lying was to 
implicate his wife as a principal in the commission of the crimes, and he agreed 
to confess only if the State would promise that his wife would face the same 
charges as the other three.  Indeed, 
Lemus suggested that he, Rawle, and Talley agreed to adjust their "stories" to 
achieve that result, i.e., to get his 
wife (or ex-wife) convicted of murder.

 
 
[¶35]   Lemus wanted experts to testify on 
his behalf in order to bolster his contentions that he lied in making his 
confession and to bolster his self-defense claims.  In his confession, Lemus said that 
although he had drawn the first blood, Leon-Leyva overpowered him and managed to 
cut him on the face quite severely.  
A codefendant then proceeded to stab Leon-Leyva in the throat and did so 
with such violence that Leon-Leyva's head was nearly severed.  Lemus attempted to show this was a lie 
on his part during his cross-examination of Robert Deters, M.D., a pathologist 
with a specialty in forensic pathology.  
However, Dr. Deters did not share Lemus's view of the evidence largely 
because Leon-Leyva's body was so consumed by fire that no such evidence 
existed.

 
 
[¶36]   Another of Lemus's theories was 
that he was lying because Leon-Leyva's body could not have been found in the 
position in which it was found, based upon his confession.  Lemus believed that an expert could help 
him establish that theory, and that establishing his theory would support his 
self-defense theory, thus mandating reversal of his 
conviction.

 
 
[¶37]   We conclude that the district court 
did not err in not ordering Lemus to have access to expert witnesses because of 
Lemus's failure to establish any foundational facts that 
would have justified expert testimony.

 
 
Errors 
in State's Opening and Closing

 
 
[¶38]   Lemus contends that a combination 
of errors/misconduct by the prosecutor in opening argument and closing argument 
combined to deprive him of a fair trial and necessitates the reversal of his 
convictions.  We note here that 
Lemus did not object to the arguments in either opening or closing.  However, Lemus would have had no cause 
to object to the opening statement because it was merely the prosecutor 
summarizing the evidence that he intended to present.  The "error" asserted here did not take 
on substance until the prosecutor then "explained" in closing argument his 
reasons for not calling certain witnesses.  
The jury was instructed that the arguments of counsel were not evidence 
(this included Lemus's argument, as well as that of the 
prosecutor).

 
 
[¶39]   Our standard of review is well 
known.  Before we will hold that an 
error in the nature of prosecutorial misconduct has affected an accused's 
substantial right, thus requiring reversal of a conviction, we must conclude 
that based upon the entire record, a reasonable possibility exists that in the 
absence of the error, the verdict might have been more favorable to the 
accused.  E.g., Williams v. State, 2006 WY 131, 
¶ 37, 143 P.3d 924, 934 (Wyo. 2006); Jensen v. State, 2005 WY 85, ¶ 23, 
116 P.3d 1088, 1098 (Wyo. 2005) (and cases cited therein); Butcher v. State, 2005 WY 146, 
¶ 38, 123 P.3d 543, 554 (Wyo. 2005).  
In reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument, the 
court looks at the entire record to determine whether or not the defendant's 
case was so prejudiced by the improper comments as to result in the denial of a 
fair trial.  We judge the challenged 
comments in the context of the prosecutor's entire argument, considering the 
context of the statements and comparing them with the evidence produced at the 
trial.  The burden of establishing 
prosecutorial misconduct rests upon the appellant who raises the 
issue.

 
 
[¶40]   The prosecutor told the jury that 
he intended to call Tiffany Lemus, wife of the defendant, as a witness in his 
case.  He also said that he would 
call FT (a juvenile), niece to Lemus, as a witness.  Both had testified in the trials of 
coconspirators Talley and Rawle.  
The prosecutor suggested that their testimony would corroborate much of 
Lemus's confession.  The record 
reflects that these witnesses created a dilemma for the prosecutor.  Of course, Lemus had objected to the 
testimony of his wife.  Lemus 
proposed to have them testify that the prosecutor threatened and intimidated 
them in order to get them to testify, and it appeared that they could well have 
been "hostile" to the prosecution's case.  
The record reflects that both witnesses were present at the trial and 
Lemus could have called them to the stand if he wanted to do so.  He opted not to call them himself.  In his closing argument, the prosecutor 
chose to make a pre-emptive strike on this point, before Lemus could broach the 
subject, telling the jury:

 
 
Now, if 
you remember back last Tuesday in my opening statement, I told [you] what I 
thought the evidence would show and the evidence that would come on.  I told you you'd hear from some 
witnesses that you didn't hear from.  
Any of you familiar with sports, baseball?  It's October [the trial is underway in 
October of 2005].  A lot of people 
who don't watch baseball throughout the rest of the year start watching baseball 
in October.  There are strategies 
involved in a game of baseball and there are strategies involved when a lawyer 
presents his case.  And sometimes 
the lawyer's strategy changes midway between the case, just like a ball game 
will change within even an inning of baseball.  The State did not put on [FT] like I 
told you I would.  We did not put on 
Tiffany Lemus like I told you I would.  
I changed my strategy.  The 
reason I did that is because I believed that I had sufficient evidence to show 
to you at that point to convict the Defendant with proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt without their testimony.  So I 
made that decision.

 
 
The 
prosecutor then went on to catalogue the evidence that he did present which 
proved Lemus's guilt.  Lemus did not 
object to these comments, and so we review this assertion of error under the 
plain error standard.  First, the 
record must clearly present the incident alleged to be error.  Second, Lemus must demonstrate that a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated in a clear and obvious, not 
merely arguable, way.  Last, Lemus 
must prove that he was denied a substantial right resulting in material 
prejudice to him.  Lopez v. State, 2006 WY 97, ¶ 18, 
139 P.3d 445, 453 (Wyo. 2006)

 
 
[¶41]   The record clearly reflects the 
argument made by the prosecutor, but the error of it, if any, is not so 
patent.  We have repeatedly held 
that a prosecutor may not vouch for the credibility of the State's witnesses, 
even in responding to defense arguments.  
Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, 
¶ 29, 63 P.3d 875, 886 (Wyo. 2003).  
That is a clear and unequivocal rule.  However, that the rule was violated in a 
clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way is not so clear.  The prosecutor did not directly vouch 
for the credibility of his witnesses, only that the evidence he did present 
sufficed to meet the burden that the State carries to prove its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Of course, the 
State's principal witness was Lemus himself.  All the other witnesses merely tied up 
loose ends.  Misconduct by a 
prosecutor invokes a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial and can be an 
error of constitutional magnitude.  
However, under the somewhat unique circumstances of this case we conclude 
that the argument challenged did not violate the relevant rule in a clear and 
obvious way.  Moreover, to the 
extent the argument could be said to have been ill advised, it did not serve to 
prejudice Lemus.

 
 
Prosecutor's 
Threatening/Intimidating Witnesses

 
 
[¶42]   Lemus contends that the prosecutor 
threatened/intimidated witnesses.  
This is an issue that appears in the record only as a contention made by 
Lemus, but was never supported by any evidence admitted during the trial or in 
any pretrial proceeding.  Because 
there is no material in the record to support it, we will not consider 
it.

 
 
State's 
Use of Fake Pictures and Perjured Testimony

 
 
[¶43]   Much like the contention discussed 
immediately above, this one also has no support in the record.  Lemus looked at the pictures offered by 
the State and contended that they had to be fakes because he was there and they 
did not correspond with his memory of the events he related in his 
confession.  Because there is 
nothing in the record to support his contention that the pictures were "fakes," 
we will not consider it further.  
Likewise, Lemus says that witnesses perjured themselves because they said 
things that he did not agree with.  
This contention is unsupported by anything in the record, and we will not 
consider it further.  In fairness, 
we take note that Lemus's brief suggests that some matters raised in the brief 
(perhaps many of them) are broached so as not to waive them in future 
post-conviction proceedings, should there be any.

 
 
State's 
Use of Substitute Pathologist

 
 
[¶44]   J. Wallace Graham, M.D., performed 
the autopsy on Leon-Leyva's body.  
Dr. Graham was not available at the time of Lemus's trial because he was 
out of the country.  In his place, 
Robert Deters, M.D., testified concerning the autopsy and the cause of the 
victim's death, using the materials developed by Dr. Graham during the 
autopsy.  It is unclear exactly what 
Lemus's objections are in this appeal, but he voiced no objections below.  Indeed, Lemus sought to use Dr. Deter's 
testimony to his advantage.  Lemus's 
contentions with respect to Dr. Deter's testimony are not supported by cogent 
argument or pertinent authority, and we will not consider them 
further.

 
 

Introduction 
of W.R.E. 404(b) Evidence in Video Taped Confession

 
 
[¶45]   Lemus contends that the video tape 
of his confession should have been edited because it contained so much W.R.E. 
404(b) evidence.  The State contends 
that it is relevant because it tells the whole story that unfolded over the few 
days which bracket the crime.  In 
his confession, Lemus talks quite a bit about his drug use.  It appears he wanted much of that to be 
included because he intimated that it mitigated his conduct (he had been up for 
days on methamphetamines).  Lemus 
also related that his group shoplifted in order to live as they traveled 
nomadically through Nebraska, South Dakota, Wyoming, 
Utah, and Arizona.  
Although Lemus attempted to suppress his confession, once the district 
court determined it was admissible, he wanted the entirety of it to be presented 
to the jury.  The district court 
allowed the entire tape to be played for the jury (and a transcript of the tape 
appears in the record).

 
 
[¶46]   The district court fully considered 
all of Lemus's objections to the confession and its content and determined that 
it was admissible even in light of Rule 404(b). There was no error in that 
ruling.  However, we also agree with 
the State that, under the circumstances presented here, the disputed evidence 
was not Rule 404(b) evidence.

 
 
Sufficiency 
of the Evidence

 
 
[¶47]   Lemus contends that the evidence 
was not sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict finding him guilty of 
conspiracy.  It is his assertion 
that the only evidence of the conspiracy came through his video taped 
confession, and that evidence does not suffice to sustain the conspiracy 
verdict.  In addressing a claim of 
insufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether or not any rational 
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  When considering 
a claim of the sufficiency of the evidence, we review that evidence with the 
assumption that the evidence of the prevailing party is true, disregard the 
evidence favoring the unsuccessful party, and give the prevailing party the 
benefit of every favorable inference that we may reasonably draw from the 
evidence.  We will not reweigh the 
evidence nor will we re-examine the credibility of the witnesses.  Williams v. State, 2006 WY 131, 
¶ 45, 143 P.3d 924, 935 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
[¶48]   In making this argument, Lemus 
relies solely upon our decision in Wehr 
v. State, 841 P.2d 104, 110-111 (Wyo. 1992):

 
 
An 
analysis of the evidence of the conspiracy in this case persuades us the State 
produced ample evidence at trial from which a jury rationally might conclude 
Wehr and Thompson were co-conspirators in a drug distribution chain.  First, the State introduced evidence 
Thompson and Wehr were engaged in an ongoing source-to-middleman for resale 
relationship that was mutually beneficial.  
Thompson testified she was a drug addict and she supported her habit by 
selling drugs to others.  She said 
she had known Wehr for a number of years and she had sold drugs to him 
repeatedly for his personal use and for resale.  Her testimony was that Wehr would buy 
only a quarter gram or half gram for his personal use but, when reselling drugs 
to others, he would buy substantially larger quantities.  Thompson told the jury Wehr had admitted 
to her in the past that he resold drugs obtained from her to support his own 
habit.

 
 
            
The State also established by Thompson's testimony that Wehr and Thompson 
knowingly engaged in the source-to-middleman resale transaction on the date at 
issue.  Thompson testified she sold 
three grams of methamphetamine to Wehr on December 23, 1988 and she had "no 
doubt" Wehr then would deliver the drugs to someone else.  Furthermore, one of the DCI agents 
testified Wehr admitted, in the course of the March 2, 1989 interview, he had 
purchased methamphetamine from Thompson on December 23, 1988 which he later sold 
to Greenhalgh.

 
 
            
Finally, the State presented evidence that Thompson's interest in drug 
transactions extended well beyond simply satisfying the immediate customer.  Thompson testified at trial that, after 
she had made the sale to Wehr, she was advised her name and that of Greenhalgh 
were being discussed over the police radio.  Thompson immediately telephoned Wehr and 
told him someone was "wired" and he should not sell the methamphetamine to 
Greenhalgh.  Thompson earlier had 
testified she would not sell controlled substances to Greenhalgh because he 
resold the drugs to "youngsters."   
When she was asked at trial why she phoned Wehr, Thompson responded, 
"[s]o he would not sell to Perry [Greenhalgh] because Perry's name had come over 
the scanner too, and Paul knows if he was going to sell to Perry I would never 
sell to him again."

 
 
            
We hold, given the admissibility of Thompson's testimony relative to the 
prior transactions with Wehr, the jury rationally could infer from all of this 
evidence, along with all of the other evidence introduced at the trial, that 
Wehr and Thompson had an ongoing conspiratorial relationship to distribute drugs 
in violation of Wyoming's Controlled Substances Act.  The jury further could infer the 
transaction on December 23, 1988 was a product of the ongoing conspiracy and 
simply an example of the method Wehr and Thompson used to distribute controlled 
substances in violation of the Wyoming Controlled Substances 
Act.

 
 
[¶49]   From the above-cited discussion, 
Lemus concludes that he could not be convicted of conspiracy without one of his 
coconspirators testifying against him, which neither did.  This question is answered by our 
discussion of the evidence needed to sustain a conspiracy conviction found in Miller v. State, 955 P.2d 892, 896-98 
(Wyo. 1998):

 
 
While 
Miller primary relies upon his claim of entitlement to relief under the law of 
the case doctrine, the instruction on the unilateral theory of conspiracy poses 
a novel question for Wyoming.  
For that reason we consider whether that instruction was a correct 
instruction on the law.  The Supreme 
Court of North Dakota has distinguished the bilateral theory of conspiracy from 
the unilateral theory in this way:

 
 
"Under a 
unilateral formulation, the crime is committed when a person agrees to proceed in a 
prohibited manner; under a bilateral formulation, the crime of conspiracy is 
committed when two or more persons 
agree to proceed in such manner.  
See Note [Conspiracy; 
Statutory Reform Since the Model Penal Code, 75 Colum.L.Rev. 1122, 1136 
(1975)].  Under either approach, the 
agreement is all-important to conspiracy.  
Under the unilateral approach, as distinguished from the bilateral 
approach, the trier-of-fact assesses the subjective individual behavior of a 
defendant * * *.  Under the 
traditional bilateral approach, there must be at least two 'guilty' persons, two 
persons who have agreed"

 
 

State v. 
Rambousek, 479 N.W.2d 832, 833-34 (N.D.1992), citing 
State v. Kihnel, 488 So. 2d 1238, 1240 (La.App.1986).

 
 
            
Prior to its revision in 1982, as amended in 1983, the statute making 
conspiracy a crime in Wyoming read:

 
 
      If two (2) or 
more persons conspire to (a) commit a felony in the state of Wyoming or to 
commit an act beyond the state of Wyoming which if done in this state would be a 
felony, and (b) one (1) or more of such persons do any act, within or without 
the state of Wyoming, to effect the object of the conspiracy, each, upon 
conviction, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or 
imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than ten (10) years or both.  A conspiracy may be prosecuted in the 
county where the conspiratorial agreement or combination was entered into, or in 
any county where any act or acts evidencing the conspiracy or in any county 
wherein the furtherance of its purpose took place.

 
 

Wyo. 
Stat.  § 6-1-117 (1977).  As revised in 1982, and then amended in 
1983, this statute now reads:

 
 
            
(a)  A person is guilty of conspiracy to commit a crime if he 
agrees with one (1) or more persons that they or one (1) or more of them will 
commit a crime and one (1) or more of them does an overt act to effect the 
objective of the agreement.

            
(b)  A person is not liable under this section if after 
conspiring he withdraws from the conspiracy and thwarts its success under 
circumstances manifesting voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal 
intention.

            
(c)  A conspiracy may be prosecuted in the county where the 
agreement was entered into, or in any county where any act evidencing the 
conspiracy or furthering the purpose took place.

 
 

Wyo. Stat. § 
6-1-303 (1988).

 
 
The new 
version was adopted from both the Model Penal Code and the laws of neighboring 
states.  See Theodore E. Lauer, Goodbye 3-Card Monte:  The Wyoming Criminal Act of 1982, 19 Land 
& Water L.Rev. 107, 119 (1984).  
The Model Penal Code, like the new version of the Wyoming statute, defines 
conspiracy in the context of a single actor agreeing with another, and this 
language is said to adopt the unilateral approach.  Model Penal Code & Commentaries 
§  5.03(b) at 382-398 (Official 
Draft & Revised Comments 1985).  
While federal courts have continued to follow the bilateral theory of 
conspiracy, the modern trend in state courts is to rule that a conspiracy count 
is viable even when one of the participants is a government agent or is feigning 
agreement.  See generally, Model Penal Code & Commentaries § 
5.03(b) at 382-398 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985); 2 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, 
Jr., Substantive Criminal Law 
§ 6.4(d).   Compare U.S. v. Barboa, 777 F.2d 1420, 1422 (10th 
Cir. (N.M.) 1985) with State v. Null, 
247 Neb. 192, 526 N.W.2d 220, 229 (1995); Com. v. Sego, 872 S.W.2d 441, 443 
(Ky.1994); State v. Conway, 193 N.J.Super. 
133, 472 A.2d 588 (1984); State v. 
Hohensee, 650 S.W.2d 268, 275 (Mo.App.1982) (rev'd in part on other grounds).  The focus under the unilateral theory is 
on the culpability of the defendant, without any necessity to establish the 
guilty mind of one or more co-conspirators.

 
 
            
When we compare the first sentences of the earlier and current statutes 
in Wyoming, we find that the old statute began "[i]f two (2) or more persons conspire to 
(a) commit a felony in the state of Wyoming * * *," while the new statute reads, 
"[a] person is guilty of conspiracy 
to commit a crime if he agrees with one (1) or more persons that they or one (1) 
or more of them will commit a crime * * *."  (Emphasis added.)   Our research discloses that most 
states that have adopted this second definition of the crime of conspiracy have 
embraced a unilateral approach to conspiracy, and we hold that is appropriate in 
Wyoming.

 
 
            
Other states have justified the unilateral theory of conspiracy as sound 
public policy.  A person who 
believes he is conspiring with another to commit a crime is a danger to the 
public regardless of whether the other person in fact has agreed to commit the 
crime.  As one text writer has 
expressed the proposition, "such an approach is justified in that a man who 
believes that he is conspiring to commit a crime and wishes to conspire to 
commit a crime has a guilty mind and has done all in his power to plot the 
commission of an unlawful purpose."   
Friedman, Mens Rea in Conspiracy, 19 Modern L.Rev. 
276, 283 (1956), adopted in, 2 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, 
Jr., Substantive Criminal Law 
§ 6.4(d) n. 109 at 73.  Miller's 
case furnishes a textbook example of the justification for a unilateral 
approach.  Miller's guilty mind was 
not diminished by the fact that Powell had made an agreement to serve as a law 
enforcement informant.  It is true 
that Miller's chance of succeeding in kidnapping his family under the 
circumstances was minimal, but Miller has "nonetheless engaged in conduct which 
provides unequivocal evidence of his firm purpose to commit a crime."   2 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, 
Jr.., Substantive Criminal Law 
§ 6.4(d) at 73 (footnote omitted).  
It is our conclusion that we should follow the majority rule of our 
sister states, and we hold that valid public policy as well as the language and 
the legislative history of our conspiracy statute make the unilateral approach 
to conspiracy the law of Wyoming.

 
 
            
In his second issue, Miller argues that there is insufficient evidence to 
establish a conspiracy to commit the crime of kidnapping between Miller and 
Ingersoll.  This argument is 
premised upon the assumption that the bilateral theory of conspiracy is the law 
of the case, and the concession on the part of the State that Powell could not 
be a member of the conspiracy.  In 
light of our conclusion that the instruction on the unilateral theory of 
conspiracy is correct, we have examined the record and are satisfied that there 
is more than sufficient evidence to sustain Miller's conviction for the crime of 
conspiracy since under a unilateral theory of conspiracy, the capacity of Powell 
to engage in the crime of conspiracy is not an issue.

 
 
[¶50]   With respect to the conspiracy, the 
district court gave this instruction (to which there was no 
objection):

 
 
INSTRUCTION 
NO. 17

 
 
            
The elements of the crime of Conspiracy to Commit Aggravated Robbery as 
charged in this case are:

 
 
            
1.  On or about the 6th or 7th day of February 2004

            
2.  The Defendant, Marco Pedro Lemus

            
3.  Agreed with one or more persons

            
4.  That they or one of them would commit the crime of 
aggravated robbery; and

            
5.  One or more of them did an overt act in Lincoln County, Wyoming, to effect the objective of the 
agreement.

 
 
[¶51]   Lemus contends that the evidence is 
insufficient to sustain the conviction.  
However, when the evidence adduced at his trial is considered in light of 
the above instruction, it is clear that the evidence does suffice.  Lemus confessed that he and the others 
agreed to contact Leon-Leyva, using Lemus's cell phone at least once for that 
purpose, so as to arrange a meeting with Leon-Leyva to rob him of the drugs 
and/or valuables that he might possess.  
The group obtained steak knives to use as leverage in the proposed 
robbery.  Each of the three 
conspirators was armed with at least one knife (Lemus had two, and he brandished 
both as the first to act in the effectuation of the robbery).  A member of the conspiracy called 
Leon-Leyva from a grocery store in Kemmerer to ascertain an exact meeting place 
in LincolnCounty.  They did meet up with Leon-Leyva, and he 
drove into an alley for the purpose of doing a drug transaction.  At that time, the robbery plan was 
executed.  The conspiracy included a 
contingency plan that if Leon-Leyva resisted, they would kill him.  That circumstance came to pass and Lemus 
was the first to set it in motion.  
The other conspirators joined in that effort, and Lemus contends that it 
was the others that dealt the death blows.  
Although there is no testimony to this effect, only argument, Lemus 
contended that this whole scenario was a lie he concocted to get his wife in 
trouble.  Lemus asserted that the 
truth was that they did intend to purchase drugs, but Leon-Leyva had none, and 
that he attacked Lemus first, intending to rob him.  In addition to the fact that there is no 
testimony to that effect in the record, the jury could, of course, believe 
Lemus's first story and disbelieve his proposed defense.  However, the district court, in an 
abundance of caution, gave the jury self-defense instructions, and the jury was 
permitted to consider Lemus's theory of the case.

 
 
[¶52]   We conclude that the evidence was 
sufficient to sustain the conspiracy conviction, as well as the conviction for 
felony murder.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶53]   Having found no error in these 
proceedings, the judgment and sentence of the district court are affirmed in all 
respects.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Lemus was 
also convicted of attempted aggravated robbery, but that merged into the felony 
murder conviction for purposes of sentencing.  Lemus was sentenced to 8 to 10 years for 
the conspiracy and to a consecutive life sentence for the felony 
murder.