Title: Vincitore v. New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

Zazzali, J., writing for a majority of the Court. In this appeal, the Court considers whether a reasonable factfinder could have found that the railroad crossing at issue in this matter was a dangerous condition pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (Act). The decedent, Michael Vincitore, trained horses and raced them at various tracks, including the Monmouth Park Race Track (Track). The Track is owned and operated by defendant New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority (Authority). In February 1995, Vincitore went to the Track, which was closed for the season, to retrieve equipment he had left at the stables. Vincitore had been stabled at the Track for approximately ten years. Although he had previously been to the Track during the off-season, he was predominantly there during the racing season. Vincitore had to cross railroad tracks that run north to south across the Track grounds to reach the stables. The tracks were not guarded by flashing lights or crossbucks. Instead, the Authority had installed sliding metal gates made of fencing on both sides of the tracks. Each gate was approximately 47 feet from the tracks. After retrieving his equipment, Vincitore drove through the first gate, which was open. At the same time, a train approached the crossing. The train engineer blew the whistle four times for a total of approximately thirty seconds, and blew the last whistle just as he reached the crossing. The engineer saw Vincitore's car on the tracks. He and Vincitore made eye contact and he saw that Vincitore had a puzzled look on his face. Despite the engineer's attempt to stop the train, it collided with Vincitore's car. Vincitore died from his injuries. The gates were left open during the racing season. When a train approached, a bell would ring in the guard shack and guards would close the gates. Approaching drivers would wait for the guards to reopen the gates after the train passed. During the off-season, however, there were no guards on duty. The record is unclear regarding how the crossing was regulated in the absence of guards. According to two of the Track's employees, the gates were generally locked. If someone needed to cross the tracks, he or she would seek out an employee of the Authority, who would open the gates. The director of facilities for the Track and the former director of security testified, however, that even in the off-season the gates were open during the day. At the close of the day shift, the track firemen were responsible for closing and locking the gates and reopening them the following morning. Despite the lack of clarity on that issue, it is undisputed that the gates were open at the time of the collision. The Track's director of facilities testified that, during the nonracing season, movable stop signs were placed on either side of the crossing to regulate traffic. The former director of security testified that the stop signs were in place year round. There was also a permanent sign just off the roadway facing Vincitore that read Stop Use Caution, and that had a railroad crossing symbol at the bottom. Vincitore's widow filed suit. After a bench trial, the court found the Authority liable because the railroad crossing was a dangerous condition under the Act. The court also found that Vincitore was comparatively negligent and reduced plaintiff's recovery by the percentage of Vincitore's fault, 33%. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the railroad crossing was not a dangerous condition and, therefore, plaintiff did not satisfy the requirements for the imposition of liability under the Act. HELD: The trial court, sitting as factfinder, reasonably found that the railroad crossing met the dangerous condition requirement of N.J.S.A. 59:4-2, and the further requirement that the dangerous condition, rather than the decedent's activity, was responsible for the collision. 2. To impose liability on a public entity, N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 requires that the plaintiff establish the existence of a dangerous condition, that the condition proximately caused the injury, that it created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, that either the dangerous condition was caused by a negligent employee or the entity knew about the condition, and that the entity's conduct was palpably unreasonable. (pp. 7- 8). 3. The Act defines dangerous condition as a condition of property that creates a substantial risk of injury when the property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used. In Garrison v. Twp. of Middletown, 154 N.J. 282 (1998), the Court describes a three-part analysis to assess due care and proximate cause. The first consideration is whether the property poses a danger to the general public when used in the normal, foreseeable manner. The second is whether the nature of the plaintiff's activity is so objectively unreasonable that the condition of the property cannot reasonably be said to have caused the injury. These two considerations determine whether the requirement of due care has been met. The third consideration examines the manner in which the specific plaintiff engaged in the specific activity and is relevant only to proximate causation and comparative fault. (pp. 8 to 11 ). 4. Here, the trial court, sitting as the factfinder, reasonably could have concluded that the railroad crossing posed a substantial risk of injury to objectively reasonable members of the general public who normally use the crossing. A patron or employee familiar with the operation of the gates during the racing season could have understood the open gates in the off-season to constitute a signal that it was safe to cross the tracks. The trial court also reasonably could have concluded that the nature of Vincitore's activity was not so egregiously unreasonable that the injury had little or nothing to do with the condition of the property. Vincitore drove across the tracks at a crossing designed for that purpose. Thus, it reasonably can be said that the condition of the property caused the accident. Whether Vincitore stopped at the stop sign relates to the manner in which he engaged in the activity and thus is relevant to proximate causation and comparative fault only. (pp. 11 to 16 ). 5. The Court declines to decide certain issues regarding damages that were not addressed by the Appellate Division and remands those issues to the Appellate Division for decision. In addition, the Court refers the issue of inconsistencies between the personal injury jury charge and the wrongful death jury charge to the Civil Practice Committee to eliminate any discrepancies that may exist between the current forms of those charges. (pp. 16-19). The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. JUSTICE STEIN, concurring, states that he does not read the Court's opinion in this appeal to rest on the application of the aspect of Garrison with which he disagreed, i.e., that a condition of public property is not dangerous unless the specific plaintiff that brought the litigation satisfies the threshold requirement that he or she used due care when encountering the property. JUSTICE COLEMAN, dissenting, in which JUSTICE LaVECCHIA joins, would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division for the reasons expressed in its opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES LONG and VERNIERO join in JUSTICE ZAZZALI's opinion. JUSTICE STEIN filed a separate concurring opinion. JUSTICE COLEMAN filed a separate dissenting opinion in which JUSTICE LaVECCHIA joins. GERALDINE VINCITORE, Administratrix Ad Prosequendum of the Estate of Michael Vincitore and GERALDINE VINCITORE, Individually Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW JERSEY SPORTS AND EXPOSITION AUTHORITY, Defendant-Respondent, and NEW JERSEY TRANSIT, ROBERT STOCKER, JOHN DOE, RICHARD ROE, ABC CORPORATION, and DEF CORPORATION, said names being fictitious, Defendants. Argued January 30, 2001 -- Decided July 19, 2001 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. John M. Peduto argued the cause for appellant. The opinion of the Court was delivered by ZAZZALI, J. This appeal requires us to decide whether an unguarded railroad crossing through Monmouth Park Race Track was a dangerous condition under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (Act). N.J.S.A. 59:4-2. After a verdict in favor of plaintiff, the Appellate Division reversed in an unpublished opinion, concluding that the crossing was not a dangerous condition. We disagree, and therefore reverse. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 22 September Term 2000 GERALDINE VINCITORE, Administratrix Ad Prosequendum of the Estate of Michael Vincitore and GERALDINE VINCITORE, Individually Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW JERSEY SPORTS AND EXPOSITION AUTHORITY, Defendant-Respondent, and NEW JERSEY TRANSIT, ROBERT STOCKER, JOHN DOE, RICHARD ROE, ABC CORPORATION, and DEF CORPORATION, said names being fictitious, Defendants. STEIN, J., concurring. I concurred in Garrison v. Township of Middletown, 154 N.J. 282, 295-312 (1998), because I disagreed with the Court's holding that a condition of public property is not dangerous unless the specific plaintiff that brought the litigation satisfies the 'threshold requirement' that he or she used due care when encountering the property. Id. at 295. (Stein, J., concurring). Because I do not read the Court's opinion in this appeal to rest on the application of that aspect of Garrison with which I disagreed, I join in the Court's thoughtful and persuasive opinion. GERALDINE VINCITORE, Administratrix Ad Prosequendum of the Estate of Michael Vincitore and GERALDINE VINCITORE, Individually Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW JERSEY SPORTS AND EXPOSITION AUTHORITY, Defendant-Respondent, and NEW JERSEY TRANSIT, ROBERT STOCKER, JOHN DOE, RICHARD ROE, ABC CORPORATION, and DEF CORPORATION, said names being fictitious, Defendants. COLEMAN, J., dissenting. I would affirm the judgment dismissing the complaint substantially for the reasons expressed by the Appellate Division in its well-reasoned opinion. I write separately to state why I believe the majority has misapplied our recent decision in Garrison v. Township of Middletown, 154 N.J. 282 (1998). Unlike the majority, I conclude that the Elkwood railroad crossing did not constitute a dangerous condition within the meaning of the Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 (Act). To recover under the Act, a plaintiff must prove, among other things, that at the time of the injury the public entity's property was in a dangerous condition, that the condition created a foreseeable risk of the kind of injury that occurred, and that the dangerous condition proximately caused the injury. N.J.S.A. 59:4-2. Even if each of the above elements is proven, the Act imposes no liability on a public entity if the action the entity took to protect against the condition or the failure to take such action was not palpably unreasonable. Ibid. Essential to the determination of a public entity's tort liability is the definition of the statutory phrase dangerous condition. The Act defines a dangerous condition as a condition of property that creates a substantial risk of injury when such property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used. N.J.S.A. 59:4- 1a. Thus, by its very terms, the Act explicitly requires that a dangerous condition can be found to exist only when the public entity's property is used with due care. Hence, the real question in this case is whether permitting people to use a flat railroad crossing without operational safety gates created a substantial risk of injury when the property was used with due care. The phrase due care in the context of this case focuses first on the threshold determination of whether the public entity's property was in a dangerous condition. In Garrison, supra, 154 N.J. at 293-94, the Court held that for purposes of the public entity's liability under the Act, a condition of the public property is not dangerous unless the specific plaintiff who brought the action, as opposed to the generic class of potential plaintiffs, satisfies the threshold requirement that he or she used due care in a reasonably foreseeable manner when encountering the property. When the property poses a danger to all users, an injured party may establish that the property was in a dangerous condition notwithstanding his or her failure to exercise due care. In that case, the plaintiff's negligence does not relate to due care but rather to issues of proximate cause or comparative negligence. Unless the property can be said to pose a danger to all users, courts must first concentrate on the activity in which the plaintiff engaged. The purpose of the evaluation is to ascertain whether the plaintiff engaged in an activity that is so objectively unreasonable that liability for resulting injuries may not be attributed to the condition of the property. As we observed in Garrison, [t]he focus of the inquiry is not on the details of the plaintiff's activity, but on the nature of the activity itself. Id. at 292. Application of the Garrison principles to this case leads me to conclude that the record does not establish that the Elkwood unguarded railroad crossing was a dangerous condition to all users. The crossing was visible for some distance__it was flat with unobstructed view in both directions. The accident occurred on a clear day. There was at least one sign posted stating Stop use caution. The train that struck decedent sounded audible warnings before the accident. In light of those facts, the conclusion that plaintiff's use was not 'with due care' is manifest. Id. at 293. The decedent's failure to yield to a clearly visible train that was sounding audible warnings was so objectively unreasonable that the condition of the property cannot reasonably be said to have caused the injury. The crossing was safe when used with due care, and the risk of harm was created only when foreseeable users failed to exercise due care. Id. at 290. I agree with Hawes v. New Jersey Dep't of Transp., 232 N.J. Super. 160 (Law Div.), aff'd, 232 N.J. Super. 159 (App. Div. 1988), and Lopez v. New Jersey Transit, 295 N.J. Super. 196 (App. Div. 1996), that the objectively reasonable member of the public is expected to cross railroad tracks without incident. I also agree with the Appellate Division in this case that this should particularly be so when the train is visible, sounding audible warnings and the crossing contains both a stop sign and a caution sign. Proceeding in the face of these circumstances does not bespeak use of the property with due care. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division. Justice LaVecchia joins in this opinion. NO. A-22 GERALDINE VINCITORE, etc., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW JERSEY SPORTS AND EXPOSITION AUTHORITY, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED July 19, 2001 Chief Justice Poritz