Title: Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Schmalz

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Schmalz, 123 Ohio St.3d 130, 2009-Ohio-4159.] 
 
 
CINCINNATI BAR ASSOCIATION v. SCHMALZ. 
[Cite as Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Schmalz,  
123 Ohio St.3d 130, 2009-Ohio-4159.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Public reprimand. 
(No. 2009-0661 — Submitted May 19, 2009 — Decided August 25, 2009.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 08-082. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Relator, Cincinnati Bar Association, filed a complaint against 
Cincinnati lawyer Anna Schmalz, Attorney Registration No. 0078103, for 
violating the Rules of Professional Conduct.  The Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline recommends that we adopt the stipulated facts and 
accede to the respondent’s consent-to-discipline agreement in the form of a public 
reprimand. In the consent-to-discipline agreement, respondent admits that she 
violated her oath of office and also violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.7(a)(2) (a lawyer’s 
representation of a client creates a conflict of interest if there is a substantial risk 
that the lawyer’s representation will be compromised by the lawyer’s personal 
interests) and 1.8(j) (a lawyer shall not solicit or engage in sexual activity with a 
client unless the relationship existed before the representation commenced).  The 
board’s recommendation states that dropping the charges involving lying to the 
investigator is justified by mitigating circumstances. 
{¶ 2} We agree with the recommendation, and we order that respondent 
be publicly reprimanded for her misconduct. 
Background 
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{¶ 3} The facts in this case have been stipulated to by the parties.  On 
December 7, 2006, respondent was appointed to represent a criminal defendant 
with respect to two separate indictments.  Both cases were tried before a jury in 
March 2007, and the jury acquitted the defendant with respect to all charges in the 
first indictment and all but two charges in the second indictment.  As to those 
charges, the jury could not reach a verdict. 
{¶ 4} Prosecutors offered the defendant a plea bargain with respect to the 
remaining charges that would have required him to serve two years, and 
respondent consistently advised her client to accept the offer.  But the defendant 
declined, and at a second trial in November 2007, the defendant was convicted 
and sentenced to five years and five months in prison.  Later in November 2007, 
the defendant filed a grievance against respondent and informed the court of the 
allegations pertinent to this matter:  that respondent had engaged in a romantic 
relationship with him, that that relationship had left the defendant vulnerable and 
had created a conflict of interest, and that the relationship had motivated the 
respondent to seek acquittal rather than a plea bargain so the two could be 
together. 
{¶ 5} The relator investigated the grievance by interviewing the 
respondent twice and serving interrogatories on her.  During the initial interview, 
respondent was unrepresented and stated that she had developed a “friendship” 
with the client but did not admit the sexual nature of the relationship.  
Subsequently, an attorney investigating the defendant’s allegations for the trial 
judge supplied a CD that contained recordings of over 50 hours of telephone calls 
between the defendant and respondent.  The calls had been monitored by the 
Hamilton County Sheriff’s Department with the knowledge of the participants.  
Among the approximately 110 half-hour recorded conversations between 
respondent and her client were explicit descriptions of sexual acts and professions 
January Term, 2009 
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of love between the two.  In at least three calls, respondent requested and/or 
engaged in telephonic sexual activity with her client. 
{¶ 6} In her response to relator’s interrogatories, respondent admitted 
that she had engaged in “personal conversations” that were “inappropriate.”  After 
the CD was supplied to respondent’s counsel, relator’s investigator conducted a 
second interview with respondent in which she acknowledged the sexual 
component of the relationship and admitted that she had discussed with the client 
the possibility of pursuing the relationship following his release from custody.  In 
that context, respondent stated, “I screwed up.  I got too close.” 
{¶ 7} The parties have entered into a consent-to-discipline agreement 
filed pursuant to Section 11 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on 
Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”) and also a stipulation of facts in support of that 
agreement.  The stipulation identifies respondent’s initial minimization of her 
relationship with the client as an aggravating factor pursuant to BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(1)(f), but states in mitigation that respondent has made full disclosure to the 
board and has no prior disciplinary history, see BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a) and 
(d).  The parties have agreed to a public reprimand as an appropriate sanction.  
The board reviewed the stipulation and consent-to-discipline agreement and 
recommended that the court adopt the agreement. 
Disposition 
{¶ 8} The consent agreement seeks a public reprimand for the 
respondent for violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.7(a)(2) and 1.8(j).  Our cases have 
dealt with sexual activity between lawyers and clients in a number of contexts, 
often under circumstances in which the sexual relationship formed part of a larger 
pattern of misconduct.  At the one end of the spectrum, we disbarred a male 
lawyer who preyed upon the vulnerabilities of his clients in an egregious manner, 
engaged in sex with them, lied during the investigation, and showed little 
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acceptance of responsibility for the wrongfulness of his acts.  Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Sturgeon, 111 Ohio St.3d 285, 2006-Ohio-5708, 855 N.E.2d 1221, ¶ 
18, 29-30.  In other cases, a sexual relationship has been linked with other 
disciplinary violations or an actual adverse impact on the quality of the legal 
representation; in such cases, we have ordered a suspension from the practice of 
law.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. Krieger, 108 Ohio St.3d 319, 2006-Ohio-1062, 
843 N.E.2d 765, ¶ 29, 30, and cases cited therein. 
{¶ 9} The present case dwells at the end of the spectrum representing the 
least egregious cases of sexual misconduct.  The parties stipulated that in spite of 
the improprieties, respondent effectively performed her function as attorney in the 
criminal representation and that a public reprimand for the stated violations will 
adequately deter her from further violations.  In such cases, we have imposed a 
public reprimand.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. Engler, 110 Ohio St.3d 138, 2006-
Ohio-3824, 851 N.E.2d 502 ¶ 12-13; Disciplinary Counsel v. DePietro (1994), 71 
Ohio St.3d 391, 392-393, 643 N.E.2d 1145.  Consistent with this case law, we 
adopt the recommendation of the board and order that respondent be publicly 
reprimanded.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Peter Rosenwald and Jean M. Geoppinger, for relator. 
 
John H. Burlew, for respondent. 
______________________