Title: State v. Thompson

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Thompson  (96-183); 167 Vt. 383; 708 A.2d 192

[Filed 16-Jan-1998]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                No. 96-183

State of Vermont                                  Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            District Court of Vermont,
                                                  Unit No. 2, Addison Circuit

                                                  June Term, 1997
Richard Thompson

Matthew I. Katz, J.

       John T. Quinn, Addison County State's Attorney, Middlebury, for
  plaintiff-appellee.

       Robert Appel, Defender General, William A. Nelson, Appellate Attorney,
  Montpelier, and Larry S. Novins, Public Defender, Middlebury, for
  defendant-appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.

       JOHNSON, J.   Defendant, who received a one-year suspended sentence
  after entering a conditional no-contest plea to a charge of simple domestic
  assault, 13 V.S.A. § 1042, argues on appeal that the trial court erred in
  (1) finding him competent to stand trial and enter a plea, and (2) failing
  to engage in the colloquy required by V.R.Cr.P. 11(c).  Because we agree
  with defendant's second argument, we vacate the plea and conviction without
  addressing his first argument.

       At arraignment, after defense counsel stated that he had substantial
  questions about defendant's capacity to understand the proceedings, the
  district court ordered an out-patient evaluation of defendant's competency. 
  The examining psychiatrist's report to the court, which was based on a
  one-hour interview, indicated that defendant is a person with mild mental
  retardation, having an intelligence quotient below 70.  The report also
  noted that defendant is illiterate and has a history of alcohol abuse. 
  According to the report, defendant has a severely

 

  limited fund of information and a severely compromised ability to engage in
  abstract reasoning.

       The examining psychiatrist also addressed in his report, albeit
  briefly, defendant's understanding of the legal process and the specific
  charge against him.  The psychiatrist concluded that defendant was
  "marginally competent" to stand trial, but acknowledged that defendant's
  "incomplete understanding of the events of the assault as well as his
  mental limitations will undoubtedly handicap his defense preparation."

       Both the psychiatrist and defendant testified at the competency
  hearing, held a few months later.  The psychiatrist restated his conclusion
  that defendant was marginally competent.  He testified that defendant had
  "sort of an understanding" of the legal issues, and opined that if the
  situation "were spelled out [defendant] could have a good global
  understanding of what he apparently or allegedly had done."  The
  psychiatrist also stated that he thought defendant would be able to
  understand different aspects of the legal system if they were explained to
  him carefully.  Based on the psychiatrist's testimony, and notwithstanding
  defendant's testimony demonstrating his limited understanding of the
  proceedings against him, the court found defendant competent to stand
  trial.

       Seven months later, defendant appeared for a status conference before
  a different judge. Defense counsel informed the court that defendant did
  not want to have a trial, but expressed serious reservations about his
  client's level of understanding.  Counsel requested that the court be
  especially careful in assuring that defendant understood the rights he was
  giving up.  When the judge asked defendant what a trial was, defendant
  responded, presumably referring to one of the police officers who had
  questioned him on the night of the assault, "He'll come back.  At the trial
  he'll come back here. . . .  Same deal over.  And I don't want it."  The
  judge then asked defendant if he understood that a trial would be about
  whether or not he hit the victim. Defendant replied, "I did hit her.  I'm
  guilty."  The judge explained that at trial, the victim would testify and
  the State would have to prove that defendant hit her.  Defendant responded,
  "I did it. . . .  I don't need to prove it."

 

       Following a few more brief exchanges between defendant and the court,
  the court announced that it would accept the plea.  Defense counsel then
  asked the court if he could question defendant.  In response to further
  questioning from his counsel, defendant explained that the role of the jury
  is to "talk to me."  Asked about the job of the judge, defendant replied,
  "I might win. . . .  Well, she might win and I might lose."  Counsel then
  asked:

     Q: Do you know in a trial who decides if you hit [the victim] or
        didn't hit [the victim]?
     A: Yeah.
     Q: Who?
     A: I hit her.
     Q: But in a trial who would decide that?
     A: Her.
     COUNSEL: This is my concern, Judge.
     THE COURT: Well, it's a valid concern.

  Nevertheless, the court declined to revisit the competency issue, reasoning
  that the first judge had held a full hearing on the issue, with the benefit
  of the psychiatrist's report and testimony.  The court accepted defense
  counsel's request for a conditional plea, which reserved defendant's right
  to appeal the competency issue.  Defense counsel did not raise any issue
  regarding V.R.Cr.P. 11.  This appeal followed.

       Because we conclude that the second judge failed to satisfy Rule 11(c)
  before accepting defendant's plea, we need not decide either whether the
  first judge erred in finding defendant competent to stand trial or whether
  the second judge erred in refusing to reconsider the first judge's
  competency ruling.  Even assuming that the second judge was justified in
  relying on the initial competency determination, the record does not
  support his acceptance of defendant's plea.

       A finding that a defendant is competent to stand trial is not all that
  is necessary before he may be permitted to enter a plea; the trial court
  must satisfy itself that the waiver of constitutional rights is knowing and
  voluntary.  See Godinez v. Moran,