Title: I. H. v. Ammi

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

406	
November 10, 2022	
No. 46
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF OREGON
I. H.,
Petitioner-Relator,
v.
Azzdine Yahya AMMI,
Respondent-Adverse Party.
(CC 21PO10337) (SC S069072)
En Banc
Original proceeding in mandamus.*
Argued and submitted September 23, 2022.
Bernadette E. Valdellon, Legal Aid Services of Oregon, 
Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner- 
relator. Also on the briefs were Emily Brown-Sitnick, 
Portland, and Emily Rena-Dozier, Oregon Law Center, 
Portland.
Christopher Cauble, Cauble & Whittington, LLP, Grants 
Pass, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent- 
adverse party. Also on the brief was Leigh Shepley Miranda, 
Grants Pass.
Matthew J. Mertens, Perkins Coie LLP, Portland, filed 
the brief for amici curiae Victim Rights Law Center, Oregon 
Coalition Against Domestic and Sexual Violence, Oregon 
Attorney General’s Sexual Assault Task Force, National 
Crime Victim Law Institute, and Oregon Crime Victims 
Legal Center. Also on the brief were Julia E. Markley, Bryan 
D. Beel, and Jessica Mindlin, Victim Rights Law Center, 
Portland.
BALMER, J.
A peremptory writ of mandamus shall issue.
______________
	
*  On petition for alternative writ of mandamus from an order of the 
Washington County Circuit Court, D. Charles Bailey, Judge.
Cite as 370 Or 406 (2022)	
407
408	
I. H. v. Ammi
	
BALMER, J.
	
This original mandamus proceeding involves the 
scope and application of the certified advocate-victim privi-
lege, OEC 507-1.
	
Relator petitioned for a restraining order against her 
husband (respondent) under the Family Abuse Prevention 
Act (FAPA), ORS 107.700 
- 
107.735. During a hearing on her 
petition, relator offered as exhibits six videos from a dash-
mounted camera in the parties’ car in connection with an 
alleged incident of abuse. One of the videos showed relator 
speaking on a cell phone to a “certified advocate,” who is 
someone trained to support victims of certain kinds of vio-
lence and harassment. See OEC 507-1(1)(a) (defining “certi-
fied advocate” as someone who has “completed at least 40 
hours of training in advocacy for victims of domestic vio-
lence, sexual assault or stalking, approved by the Attorney 
General by rule,” and is “an employee or a volunteer of a 
qualified victim services program”). That video exhibit was 
offered to support relator’s testimony about her fear for her 
physical safety. Relator also indicated that she had some-
times texted that advocate. Respondent requested produc-
tion of the entire memory card from the dash-mounted cam-
era, as well as “[a]ll correspondence, memoranda, e-mail, 
text messages, recordings of any kind, and any other doc-
uments from any advocate assisting [relator] in this case 
to [relator] or from [relator to her] advocate relating to the 
alleged events in this case.”
	
Relator refused to produce those items. She argued, 
as relevant here, that respondent’s request for the entire 
memory card violated ORCP 36 because it was oppressive, 
overly broad, and unduly burdensome, and was not “reason-
ably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evi-
dence.” Relator also argued that her communications with 
her certified advocate were privileged under OEC 507-1.
	
On respondent’s motion, the trial court issued an 
order compelling production of those items. The court’s 
stated reason for the order read, in its entirety: “FAPA hear-
ings can lead to loss of liberty and Constitutional Freedoms. 
Pre-trial discovery is a must.”
Cite as 370 Or 406 (2022)	
409
	
Relator petitioned this court for a writ of manda-
mus seeking to vacate the trial court’s discovery order, and 
concurrently moved for a stay of that order in the trial court. 
The trial court denied the stay, citing OEC 507-1(3), which 
limits the applicability of the certified advocate-victim priv-
ilege in certain circumstances. Relator continued to refuse 
to produce the memory card and her communications with 
her advocate, and, on respondent’s motion, the trial court 
dismissed the FAPA proceeding as a sanction.
	
This court granted relator’s mandamus petition, 
issued a peremptory writ directing the trial court to vacate 
its order dismissing the FAPA proceeding, and issued an 
alternative writ directing the court to vacate its order com-
pelling production or to show cause for not doing so. The 
court vacated its order of dismissal and stayed the proceed-
ings, but it did not vacate its order compelling production.
	
We are presented with two questions. The first is 
whether and to what extent the certified advocate-victim 
privilege applies in this case. The second is whether the 
request for production of the entire memory card violated 
ORCP 36 C, such that the order compelling production was 
an abuse of discretion by the trial court. See Longo v. Premo, 
355 Or 525, 531, 326 P3d 1152 (2014) (“Mandamus may be 
appropriate * 
* 
* when the trial court’s decision amounts to 
fundamental legal error or is outside the permissible range of 
discretionary choices available.” (Internal quotation marks 
omitted.)). Because this case comes to us on mandamus, “our 
task is not to conduct our own review of the facts; rather, 
it is to decide whether the evidence in the record, assessed 
under the correct legal standard, would have compelled a 
decision in relator’s favor.” State ex rel Kristof v. Fagan, 369 
Or 261, 279, 504 P3d 1163 (2022) (emphasis in original). As 
to factual findings, “our function is to decide whether there 
was any evidence to substantiate the circuit court’s ruling.” 
State ex rel Ware v. Hieber, 267 Or 124, 127, 515 P2d 721 
(1973).
	
We begin with the certified advocate-victim privi-
lege. OEC 507-1. That privilege was added to the Oregon 
Evidence Code in 2015. Or Laws 2015, ch 265, § 2. Subsec-
tion (1) of OEC 507-1 defines, among other terms, “certified 
410	
I. H. v. Ammi
advocate” and “confidential communication.” Subsection (2) 
then provides that certain advocate-victim communications 
are privileged, and subsection (3) sets out an exception to 
that privilege:
	
“(2)  Except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, 
a victim has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent 
any other person from disclosing:
	
“(a)  Confidential communications made by the victim 
to a certified advocate in the course of safety planning, 
counseling, support or advocacy services.
	
“(b)  Records that are created or maintained in the 
course of providing services regarding the victim.
	
“(3)  The privilege established by this section does not 
apply to the disclosure of confidential communications, 
only to the extent disclosure is necessary for defense, in 
any civil, criminal or administrative action that is brought 
against the certified advocate, or against the qualified vic-
tim services program, by or on behalf of the victim.”
In other words, advocate-victim communications are gener-
ally privileged and need not be disclosed, except in certain 
cases brought by or on behalf of the victim against the certi-
fied advocate or qualified victim services program.
	
Here, relator asserted the certified advocate-victim 
privilege in opposing respondent’s request for production of 
relator’s communications with her advocate in the FAPA pro-
ceeding. The trial court nevertheless compelled production 
of those communications. The court’s order did not address 
the applicability of the privilege, noting only that discov-
ery was “a must.” The court revealed more of its reasoning 
in its order denying relator’s motion to stay the proceed-
ings, where it cited the exception set out in OEC 507-1(3). 
 
In quoting that section, however, the court omitted a critical 
phrase: that the exception to the privilege applies only in 
cases “against the certified advocate, or against the quali-
fied victim services program.”
	
The trial court’s interpretation and application of 
subsection (3) was legal error. By its plain text, subsection 
(3) does not apply here, because the underlying action was 
not brought against the certified advocate or against the 
Cite as 370 Or 406 (2022)	
411
qualified victim services program. Relator’s FAPA proceed-
ing was brought against respondent, her husband, who is 
neither the advocate nor the described program. We there-
fore turn to application of the privilege to the communica-
tions between relator and her certified advocate.
	
The parties dispute exactly what evidence here is 
privileged under OEC 507-1 and whether relator waived all 
or a part of that privilege by introducing certain evidence 
during the FAPA proceedings. Those are legal questions 
that depend on preliminary factual findings to be made by 
the trial court. See OEC 104(1); State v. Langley, 314 Or 247, 
263, 839 P2d 692 (1992), adh’d to on recons, 318 Or 28, 861 
P2d 1012 (1993). Nothing in the record indicates that the 
trial court ruled on the extent to which the privilege applies 
to any specific communications between relator and her cer-
tified advocate. The court also did not rule on the extent 
to which relator, by using certain video clips at the FAPA 
hearing, may have waived that privilege under OEC 511 as 
to some or all of her privileged communications.
	
As noted, the trial court based its order compelling 
production on the exception in OEC 507-1(3) and the cryp-
tic statement that pretrial discovery “is a must” in FAPA 
proceedings, which can lead to the “loss of liberty” and of 
“Constitutional Freedoms.” We have concluded that apply-
ing the exception in OEC 507-1(3) was legal error. In later 
proceedings before the trial court, the parties will have 
an opportunity to build a factual record and to make legal 
arguments regarding the application and potential waiver 
of the privilege as to specific communications or other evi-
dence under OEC 507-1.
	
We turn to the memory card. The trial court com-
pelled production of the entire physical memory card. Relator 
argues that respondent’s request for production of the mem-
ory card violates ORCP 36 because it is overly broad and 
unduly burdensome.
	
ORCP 36, which governs discovery, generally allows 
parties to “inquire regarding any matter, not privileged, 
that is relevant” to any party’s claims or defenses. ORCP 36 
B(1). The information sought, however, must be “reasonably 
412	
I. H. v. Ammi
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” 
Id. On the motion of the party from whom discovery is 
sought, ORCP 36 C(1) permits the trial court to restrict 
or limit the terms and conditions of discovery, as “justice 
requires[,] to protect a party or person from annoyance, 
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” 
The decision of whether to do so is discretionary. See Doe v. 
Corp. of Presiding Bishop, 352 Or 77, 86, 280 P3d 377 (2012) 
(“The issuance and vacation of protective orders are matters 
of a trial court’s discretion.”). In these circumstances, for 
mandamus to lie, as noted above, the trial court’s decision 
must amount to “fundamental legal error” or be “outside the 
permissible range of discretionary choices available.” Longo, 
355 Or at 531 (internal quotation marks omitted).
	
At the FAPA hearing, relator offered six video 
exhibits that were clips from six different videos on the 
memory card. After they were admitted, relator provided 
the full versions of those six videos, along with their meta-
data (including the time and date of each recording, as 
logged by the camera) to respondent. In his first request for 
production, respondent asked for “[t]he unaltered memory 
card from the dash camera of the parties[’] vehicle.” Relator 
objected, explaining that the memory card included numer-
ous additional videos, none of which was relevant or submit-
ted as evidence at the hearing. Relator further explained 
that divulging the videos to respondent could expose relator 
to further danger of abuse by informing respondent about 
relator’s destinations, traveling times, and whereabouts.
	
In respondent’s motion to compel, he cited OEC 106, 
which he called the “Rule of Completeness,” and argued that 
he was entitled to inspect the entire memory card because 
relator had introduced parts of files that were stored on that 
card. As noted above, the trial court granted the motion to 
compel without addressing ORCP 36 C or OEC 106.
	
OEC 106, the rule respondent relies upon, does not 
compel the result that respondent seeks. OEC 106 provides:
	
“When part of an act, declaration, conversation or writ-
ing is given in evidence by one party, the whole on the same 
subject, where otherwise admissible, may at that time be 
inquired into by the other; when a letter is read, the answer 
Cite as 370 Or 406 (2022)	
413
may at that time be given; and when a detached act, dec-
laration, conversation or writing is given in evidence, any 
other act, declaration, conversation or writing which is 
necessary to make it understood may at that time also be 
given in evidence.”
Assuming without deciding that OEC 106—an evidentiary 
rule regarding admissibility, not discovery—applies here, it 
would not extend so far as to require producing the entire 
memory card as part of discovery. Relator concedes that, 
as applied to this case, OEC 106 required relator to pro-
vide respondent with the complete videos from which the 
evidentiary clips admitted into evidence were taken, and it 
appears that she has already produced those videos. The 
other videos on the memory card, however, are not part of 
the same “act, declaration, conversation or writing,” nor are 
they “necessary to make [the offered clips] understood.” 
OEC 106. Therefore, OEC 106 does not support compelling 
production of the entire memory card.
	
Because, contrary to respondent’s position, OEC 
106 does not require relator to produce the physical memory 
card itself, the trial court was presented with no meritorious 
argument to support compelling production. Without such 
an argument, and with no alternative explanation from the 
court for its ruling, the court’s order to produce the memory 
card is legally unsupported and cannot stand. It is possi-
ble that further proceedings before the court could provide 
a factual and legal basis for production, with appropriate 
limitations or restrictions, of the memory card or the infor-
mation it contains, but the current record provides no such 
grounds. On this record, the order compelling production 
must be vacated.
	
A peremptory writ of mandamus shall issue.