Title: People v. Walden

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 90976-Agenda 9-January 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
 								DAVID WALDEN, Appellee.

Opinion filed April 18, 2002.


	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	The issue presented is whether the 15-year sentencing
enhancement for armed robbery while in possession of a firearm
(720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2), (b) (West 2000)) is valid and enforceable.
We hold that it is not.

BACKGROUND
	Defendant, David Walden, was charged by information with
one count of armed robbery while in possession of a firearm (720
ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2000)). Although armed robbery is
classified generally as a Class X felony, subsection (b) of the
armed robbery statute provides that, for armed robberies while in
possession of a firearm, "15 years shall be added to the term of
imprisonment imposed by the court." 720 ILCS 5/18-2(b) (West
2000). Prior to trial, defendant moved to dismiss the information,
arguing that the 15-year enhancement violates numerous
constitutional provisions, including the proportionate penalties
clause and the separation of powers clause of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11; art. II, §1). Defendant
also argued that the 15-year increase constitutes an unlawful
double enhancement. The circuit court of Sangamon County
agreed with defendant's proportionate penalties, separation of
powers, and double enhancement arguments and dismissed the
information. The State immediately appealed under Supreme
Court Rule 604(a)(1) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)). Because the trial
court's ruling invalidates a statute of this state, the appeal was
taken directly to this court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 603.


ANALYSIS
Standard of Review
	A statute is presumed constitutional, and the party challenging
the statute bears the burden of demonstrating its invalidity. In re
K.C., 186 Ill. 2d 542, 550 (1999). This court has a duty to construe
a statute in a manner that upholds its validity and constitutionality
if it reasonably can be done. People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413,
418 (2000). Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law
that we review de novo. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d  at 418.

Proportionate Penalties
	We first consider the trial court's conclusion that the 15-year
enhancement violates the proportionate penalties clause of the
Illinois Constitution. In evaluating statutory challenges brought
under that clause, this court has employed three distinct tests. First,
a penalty violates the proportionate penalties clause if it is cruel,
degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed
as to shock the moral sense of the community. People v. Bailey,
167 Ill. 2d 210, 236 (1995). Second, a penalty violates the
proportionate penalties clause where similar offenses are
compared and conduct that creates a less serious threat to the
public health and safety is punished more severely. People v.
Davis, 177 Ill. 2d 495, 503 (1997). Third, the proportionate
penalties clause is violated when identical offenses are given
different sentences. People v. Lewis, 175 Ill. 2d 412, 418-19
(1996). Here, defendant argues that the trial court's decision is
defensible under all three proportionate penalties tests. We need
not address the first and third of these tests, however, as the
second test is clearly dispositive.
	The "similar offenses" that defendant asks us to compare are
armed robbery while in possession of a firearm and armed
violence predicated upon aggravated robbery. The relevant portion
of the armed robbery statute provides that:
			"(a) A person commits armed robbery when he or she
[commits a robbery]; and
				***
				(2) he or she carries on or about his or her person or
is otherwise armed with a firearm[.]" 720 ILCS
5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2000).
Robbery, in turn, is defined as the taking of property, except a
motor vehicle, from the person or presence of another by the use
of force or by threatening the imminent use of force. 720 ILCS
5/18-1 (West 2000). To commit armed violence predicated upon
aggravated robbery, a person must (1) commit a robbery, (2)
indicate to the victim that he or she is presently armed with a
firearm or other dangerous weapon, and (3) in fact be armed with
a firearm or other dangerous weapon. 720 ILCS 5/18-5(a),
33A-2(a) (West 2000).
	Before we can compare the relative seriousness of these two
offenses, we first must determine whether they share "common
statutory purposes." See People v. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d 462, 476
(1998). This is because, with respect to offenses that are enacted
for different purposes, we presume that the legislature considered
different factors in establishing the respective punishments and we
defer to that legislative judgment. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d  at 476.
Here, the two offenses at issue clearly share a common statutory
purpose. With respect to armed robbery while in possession of a
firearm, the legislature specifically found that:
			"The use of a dangerous weapon in the commission of
a felony offense poses a much greater threat to the public
health, safety, and general welfare, than when a weapon
is not used in the commission of the offense." 720 ILCS
5/33A-1(a)(1) (West 2000).
Based upon this finding, the legislature made the following
statement of legislative intent:
			"In order to deter the use of firearms in the commission
of a felony offense, the General Assembly deems it
appropriate for a greater penalty to be imposed when a
firearm is used or discharged in the commission of an
offense than the penalty imposed for using other types of
weapons and for the penalty to increase on more serious
offenses." 720 ILCS 5/33A-1(b)(1) (West 2000).(1)
As for armed violence, this court has explained that the legislative
purpose of that statute is "to deter felons from using dangerous
weapons, thereby minimizing the deadly consequences which may
result when a felony victim resists." People v. Smith, 191 Ill. 2d 408, 412 (2000); see also People v. Condon, 148 Ill. 2d 96, 109
(1992). Thus, armed robbery while in possession of a firearm and
armed violence predicated upon aggravated robbery share an
identical statutory purpose: to deter the use of firearms in the
commission of felonies.
	Having concluded that the two offenses share an identical
statutory purpose, we next must determine whether one offense is
more serious than the other. This is not a difficult inquiry, as
armed violence predicated upon aggravated robbery is clearly the
more serious offense. Both offenses require (1) the taking of
property from the person or presence of another, (2) the use of
force or the threat of imminent use of force, and (3) the possession
of a firearm. But armed violence predicated upon aggravated
robbery also requires that the offender, while using or threatening
the imminent use of force, inform the victim that he or she is
presently armed with a firearm. Thus, armed robbery while in
possession of a firearm may be committed while carrying a
concealed firearm that is neither revealed nor even mentioned to
the victim. Armed violence predicated upon aggravated robbery,
by contrast, cannot be committed unless the offender's use or
threatened use of force is accompanied by the mention of a firearm
in the offender's immediate possession. Clearly, the risk of
violence is enhanced where the offender's use or threatened use of
force is backed up with the express mention of a firearm.
	Our final inquiry, then, is whether armed robbery while in
possession of a firearm is punished more or less severely than
armed violence predicated upon aggravated robbery. Again,
although armed robbery is classified generally as a Class X felony
punishable by 6 to 30 years in prison, subsection (b) of the armed
robbery statute provides that, for armed robberies committed while
in possession of a firearm, "15 years shall be added to the term of
imprisonment imposed by the court." 720 ILCS 5/18-2(b) (West
2000). Thus, in reality, armed robbery while in possession of a
firearm is punishable by 21 to 45 years in prison. Armed violence
predicated upon aggravated robbery is a Class X felony punishable
by either 10 to 30 or 15 to 30 years in prison, depending upon the
type of firearm used in the offense. 720 ILCS 5/33A-3(a), (a-5)
(West 2000). Thus, it the less serious offense-armed robbery while
in possession of a firearm-that is punished more severely. The 15-year enhancement for armed robbery while in possession of a
firearm therefore violates the proportionate penalties clause of the
Illinois Constitution and is unenforceable.

Separation of Powers and Double Enhancement
	Because we conclude that the penalty for armed robbery while
in possession of a firearm is unconstitutionally disproportionate
and therefore unenforceable, we need not address whether the 15-year sentencing enhancement also violates separation of powers
principles or constitutes an unlawful double enhancement.


CONCLUSION


	The judgment of the circuit court of Sangamon County is
affirmed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Affirmed and remanded.
 



1.      1Although codified as part of the armed violence statute, these
legislative findings were enacted as part of Public Act 91-404 (Pub. Act
91-404, eff. January 1, 2000), which enhanced the penalty for numerous
offenses committed while in possession of a firearm, including armed
robbery.