Title: State v. Brent R. Reed

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 53 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP1781-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Brent R. Reed,  
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2004 WI App 98 
Reported at:  273 Wis. 2d 661, 681 N.W.2d 568 
(Ct. App. 2004-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 27, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 14, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Columbia   
 
JUDGE: 
Richard Rehm   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins the concurrence. 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
David H. Weber and Liebmann, Conway, Olejniczak & Jerry, S.C., 
Green Bay, and oral argument by David H. Weber. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by David 
J. Becker, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2005 WI 53 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP1781-CR 
(L.C. No. 
03 CM 189) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Brent R. Reed,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 27, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed and 
remanded. 
 
¶1 
LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   Brent Reed seeks review of 
a published court of appeals' decision that affirmed a circuit 
court's non-final order denying his motion to dismiss an 
obstructing an officer charge.1  State v. Reed, 2004 WI App 98, 
273 Wis. 2d 661, 681 N.W.2d 568.  The obstructing charge 
accompanies an operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated 
charge and stems from Reed's falsely telling a police officer 
                                                 
1 See Wis. Stat. § 946.41 (2003-04).  All references to the 
Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-04 version unless otherwise 
noted. 
No. 
2003AP1781-CR   
 
2 
 
that another individual was operating the vehicle.  The court of 
appeals concluded that the "exculpatory denial" exception to the 
obstructing statute set forth in State v. Espinoza, 2002 WI App 
51, 250 Wis. 2d 804, 641 N.W.2d 484, which absolves a defendant 
for falsely denying guilt of a crime when questioned by police, 
did not extend to these circumstances.  Reed, 273 Wis. 2d 661, 
¶10.  
¶2 
Reed asks this court to reverse the court of appeals' 
decision by upholding, and concluding that his statements fall 
within, Espinoza's exculpatory denial exception. We affirm the 
court of appeals' decision, but conclude that there is no reason 
to depart from the clear text of the obstructing statute to 
write in an exculpatory denial exception.  Although we reaffirm 
that the State should have sound reasons for believing that a 
defendant's statements were falsely made with intent to mislead 
the police and were not made out of a good-faith attempt to 
defend against accusations of a crime, we conclude that 
knowingly giving false information with intent to mislead the 
police is the antithesis of a good-faith attempt to defend 
against accusations of criminal wrongdoing.  Accordingly, we 
overrule Espinoza and remand this case for further proceedings. 
I 
 
¶3 
The following facts are undisputed.  On March 1, 2003, 
around 11:00 p.m. on a Saturday, a highway patrol officer passed 
a car that was parked alongside the highway and saw a person 
sitting in the driver's seat.  The officer turned back to 
No. 
2003AP1781-CR   
 
3 
 
investigate and found the person, Reed, now sitting in the 
passenger's seat. 
 
¶4 
After the officer approached the vehicle, he noticed a 
strong odor of intoxicants emanating from the vehicle.  Reed 
identified himself with his driver license and then immediately 
stated he was not driving because he knew he had too much to 
drink.  The officer observed that Reed's eyes were glassy and 
bloodshot and that Reed had slurred speech.  Reed stated that a 
"Mr. Triller" was driving but pulled the vehicle over after they 
had an argument and then walked away.   
¶5 
Reed told the officer that Triller left about ten 
minutes ago, though he could not tell the officer which 
direction Triller walked.  Reed was unable to give the officer 
Triller's phone number, stating he only knew Triller lived in 
Milwaukee.  The officer ran the vehicle's license plate number 
and found that the vehicle was registered to Reed.   
 
¶6 
A backup officer arrived, and Reed was asked to 
perform sobriety tests.  After he refused, insisting that he had 
not been driving, the officers arrested him.  The backup officer 
then drove up the highway approximately five miles to see if 
anyone was walking along it.  He did not find anyone.  
 
¶7 
Later that night, the officer obtained Triller's 
father's telephone number after calling Reed's brother, which 
eventually led him to Triller's telephone number.  The officer 
called Triller and asked if he had been with Reed or in the area 
where Reed's car was parked alongside the highway on March 1.  
Triller said he had not. 
No. 
2003AP1781-CR   
 
4 
 
 
¶8 
The State charged Reed with obstructing an officer, 
and with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
an intoxicant and with a prohibited alcohol concentration, each 
of the latter as third offenses.  Reed moved to dismiss the 
obstruction charge, and the circuit court, the Honorable Richard 
L. Rehm, denied the motion.  The circuit court concluded Reed 
went beyond an exculpatory denial by misdirecting the police 
investigation as to who was driving the vehicle. 
 
¶9 
Reed petitioned the court of appeals to review the 
nonfinal 
order, 
and 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
granted 
the 
interlocutory appeal to clarify the exculpatory denial exception 
to the obstructing statute set forth in Espinoza.  Reed, 273 
Wis. 2d 661, ¶1.  The court of appeals concluded that Reed's 
statements fell outside Espinoza's exculpatory denial exception 
because Reed did more than simply provide an exculpatory denial; 
he gave false information related to the crime.  Id., ¶10.  
Thus, the court of appeals concluded he frustrated the police 
function, and, therefore, it affirmed the circuit court's order.  
Id.   
 
¶10 Reed seeks review of the court of appeals' decision.   
II  
¶11 Reed challenges whether the complaint adequately sets 
forth a basis for an obstructing charge.  Whether a criminal 
complaint sets forth probable cause to justify a criminal charge 
is a legal determination this court reviews de novo.  State v. 
Gaudesi, 112 Wis. 2d 213, 219-21, 332 N.W.2d 302 (1983).   
No. 
2003AP1781-CR   
 
5 
 
¶12 We look within the four corners of the complaint to 
see whether there are facts or reasonable inferences set forth 
that are sufficient to allow a reasonable person to conclude 
that a crime was probably committed and that the defendant 
probably committed it.  State v. Haugen, 52 Wis. 2d 791, 793, 
191 N.W.2d 12 (1971).  A complaint is sufficient if it answers 
the following questions: "(1) Who is charged?; (2) What is the 
person charged with?; (3) When and where did the alleged offense 
take place?; (4) Why is this particular person being charged?; 
and (5) Who says so? or how reliable is the informant?"  State 
v. White, 97 Wis. 2d 193, 203, 295 N.W.2d 346 (1980); see State 
ex rel. Evanow v. Seraphim, 40 Wis. 2d 223, 229-30, 161 N.W.2d 
369 (1968).  Only the fourth question is at issue in this case. 
¶13 Finally, this case requires us to interpret the 
obstructing statute, a task that presents a question of law we 
review de novo.  The purpose of statutory interpretation is to 
determine what a statute means so that it may be given its full, 
proper, and intended effect.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110.  We begin with the statute's language because we 
assume that the legislature's intent is expressed in the words 
it used.  Id., ¶45.  Generally, language is given its common, 
ordinary, and accepted meaning.  Id.  If the meaning is plain, 
we ordinarily stop the inquiry.  Id.   
III 
¶14 We begin with a discussion of Espinoza.  In that case, 
although not expressly articulated, the court of appeals adopted 
No. 
2003AP1781-CR   
 
6 
 
an "exculpatory denial," also known as the "exculpatory no," 
exception to the obstructing statute.  After being confronted by 
the police with allegations of stealing a tire from a car, 
Espinoza denied the accusation, threatened to sue the officers, 
and told the officers they had "the wrong guy."  Espinoza, 250 
Wis. 2d 804, ¶6.  The State charged Espinoza with obstructing, 
and he moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that his mere denial 
of guilt, in and of itself, was an insufficient basis to support 
an obstructing charge. Id., ¶8.  Both the trial court and the 
court of appeals agreed.   
¶15 The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal for the 
following three reasons.  First, it noted that in Peters v. 
State, 70 Wis. 2d 22, 29, 233 N.W.2d 420 (1975), this court 
stated that the district attorney should have sound reasons to 
believe that statements made by a suspected defendant to the 
police were knowingly and intentionally made for the purpose of 
deceiving and misleading the police, and not simply out of a 
good faith desire to defend against an accusation of crime.  
Espinoza, 250 Wis. 2d 804, ¶12.  The court found Peters 
instructive, but not dispositive, as it dealt with a defendant 
who provided a false alibi to the police.  Id., ¶13. 
¶16 Second, because Peters was not directly on point, the 
court took into consideration similar obstructing statutes in 
other 
jurisdictions 
and 
concluded 
that 
these 
obstructing 
statutes "have been generally construed to exclude prosecution 
for statements made by a defendant in defense of an accusation 
of a crime."  Id., ¶13.  In support of this conclusion, the 
No. 
2003AP1781-CR   
 
7 
 
court of appeals turned to a single case from the Illinois 
Appellate Court, People v. Brooks, 367 N.E.2d 236 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1977).  The Espinoza court indicated that the Brooks court "held 
that the Illinois obstruction of justice statute excepts the 
exculpatory denials falsely made by a defendant in answer to 
police questioning in regard to his or her own involvement in a 
crime." Espinoza, 250 Wis. 2d 804, ¶14.  The Espinoza court 
wrote that the Illinois Appellate Court concluded that the 
Illinois legislature did not intend for Illinois' obstructing 
statute to criminalize all false answers or statements that a 
defendant makes intending to exculpate him or herself against a 
criminal charge.  Id., ¶19.  Using Brooks, and without turning 
to the obstructing statute's language or legislative history, 
the Espinoza court concluded, "[w]e also believe that the 
Wisconsin legislature did not intend such a broad result and 
adopt this reasoning."  See id., ¶20. 
¶17 Third, the court was mindful that "'[t]he function of 
law enforcement is the prevention of crime and the apprehension 
of criminals.  Manifestly, that function does not include the 
manufacturing of crime.'"  Id., ¶21 (quoting Sherman v. United 
States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958)).   
¶18 Therefore, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
held 
that 
the 
legislature did not intend "to include within the statute all 
false answers or false statements which a defendant utters 
intending to exculpate himself or herself against a charge of a 
crime and to prevent his or her prosecution."  Id., ¶20.  
Instead, the court concluded that the legislature's intent was 
No. 
2003AP1781-CR   
 
8 
 
"to prevent the waste of time, energy and expense involved in 
having law enforcement officers running down false leads 
concerning criminal conduct."  Id., ¶22.  In other words, only 
"conduct which would frustrate or thwart the police function" 
fell within the statute's purview.  Id.  Because the State did 
not contend that Espinoza's mere denial of wrongdoing thwarted 
the police function, the court affirmed the trial court's 
dismissal of the obstructing charge.  Id. 
 
¶19 Reed asks this court to affirm Espinoza's exculpatory 
denial exception for three reasons.  First, Reed claims that the 
exculpatory denial exception properly recognizes that false 
answers to police questions do not thwart the police function.  
Second, without the exculpatory denial, Reed argues that 
suspects would otherwise have only an illusory opportunity to 
avoid incriminating himself or herself.  And third, Reed submits 
that a literal reading of the obstruction statute to preclude 
the exculpatory denial exception would lead to absurd results 
because the obstruction statute could become an instrument of 
prosecutorial abuse.  Reed then argues that his statements fall 
within the exception because the police were not thwarted by 
Reed's statements but rather conducted nothing more than a 
routine follow-up investigation concerning the whereabouts of 
the enigmatic Mr. Triller. 
 
¶20 The State responds that Espinoza should be overturned 
for two reasons.  First, the State notes that all of Reed's 
arguments were rejected by the United States Supreme Court in 
Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998).  Second, aside 
No. 
2003AP1781-CR   
 
9 
 
from Brogan, the State argues Espinoza collapses on its own 
reasoning.2  We agree with the State on both points. 
A 
¶21 We 
start 
with 
the 
obstructing 
statute's 
text.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 946.41 reads in relevant part: 
(1) Whoever knowingly resists or obstructs an 
officer while such officer is doing any act in an 
official capacity and with lawful authority, is guilty 
of a Class A misdemeanor. 
(2) In this section: 
(a)  "Obstructs" includes without limitation 
knowingly giving false information to the officer 
. . . with intent to mislead the officer in the 
performance of his or her duty including the service 
of any summons or civil process. 
Wisconsin JI——Criminal 1766A (2003) accurately sets forth the 
elements of obstructing an officer based on giving false 
information to police as follows:   
1. 
The defendant knowingly gave false information to an 
officer. 
2. 
The officer was doing an act in an official 
capacity. 
3. 
The officer was acting with lawful authority. 
4. 
The defendant intended to mislead the officer.3 
                                                 
2 Alternatively, the State argues that Reed's statements 
nonetheless fall outside the exculpatory denial because he did 
more than simply deny criminal activity by affirmatively making 
misrepresentations concerning who was driving.  See United 
States v. Moore, 27 F.3d 969 (4th Cir. 1994) (surveying 
exculpatory no cases in federal circuits pre-Brogan v. United 
States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998)). 
3 The second and third elements are not in dispute here.   
 
No. 
2003AP1781-CR   
 
10 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
To be clear, this case involves obstructing by giving false 
information.  It does not involve obstructing an officer by 
making the performance of the officer's duties more difficult.  
See Wis JI——Criminal 1766.  As such, our decision today does not 
overrule, indeed it does not even implicate, Henes v. Morrissey, 
194 Wis. 2d 338, 533 N.W.2d 802 (1995), or State v. Hamilton, 
120 Wis. 2d 532, 356 N.W.2d 169 (1984).  See Abrahamson, C.J., 
concurring, ¶ 53 n.3. 
 
As Chief Justice Abrahamson's concurrence notes, the court 
of appeals has recognized that the word "obstructs" has two 
meanings: 
"'mak[es] 
more 
difficult'" 
and 
"'giv[es] 
false 
information with intent to mislead.'"  Abrahamson, C.J., 
concurring, ¶53 n.3, quoting State v. Caldwell, 154 Wis. 2d 683, 
690, 454 N.W.2d 13 (Ct. App. 1990).  In Henes, this court 
considered 
whether 
a 
defendant's 
remaining 
silent 
when 
confronted with police questioning constituted obstruction by 
either knowingly giving false information or by impeding an 
officer's investigation.  Henes, 194 Wis. 2d at 353-54.  Turning 
to the first form of obstruction, knowingly giving false 
information, this court concluded that the defendant's remaining 
silent and refusing to identify himself at the police officers' 
request was not obstructing by providing false information. As 
this court held, "[w]e do not equate the failure to identify 
oneself with the act of giving false information.  Mere silence, 
standing alone, is insufficient to constitute obstruction under 
the statute."  Id. at 354 (citation omitted).  Turning to the 
second form of obstruction, impeding an officer's investigation, 
this court determined that the police officers "did not prove 
that obtaining [the defendant's] name would have confirmed or 
refuted their suspicions or in fact made any difference in their 
investigation."  Id.  Therefore, this court concluded that the 
defendant did not obstruct the officers under either form of 
obstructing.   
 
In Hamilton, 120 Wis. 2d at 536-37, this court was 
confronted with a defendant who also refused to identify himself 
to a police officer.  The defendant was not charged with 
obstructing by providing false information.  Apparently, the 
defendant was charged only with "obstructing," so this court had 
to determine what that term meant.  This court assumed, but did 
not decide, that "obstructing" meant to hinder, delay, impede, 
frustrate or prevent an officer from performing his or her 
duties.  Id. at 541.  Because the officer did not testify the 
defendant's 
failure 
to 
identify 
himself 
impeded 
the 
investigation in any way, and because no reasonable inference 
No. 
2003AP1781-CR   
 
11 
 
In order to be convicted of this crime, Reed would have to have 
knowingly given an officer false information and done so with 
the intent to mislead the officer.  As long as the officer was 
doing an act in an official capacity, and was acting with lawful 
authority, the statute has been satisfied.  Absent a statutory 
or common law defense to the contrary, there is simply no basis 
to conclude that false denials of guilt that are knowingly made 
with intent to mislead the officer are somehow lawful.  We now 
consider the relevant statutory elements of the offense of 
obstructing and Reed's three arguments for urging this court to 
depart 
from 
the 
statute's 
clear 
language 
and 
accept 
an 
exculpatory denial defense to this offense. 
1 
 
¶22 Reed first argues that knowingly and falsely telling 
the police "I didn't do it" does not thwart the police function.  
                                                                                                                                                             
could be drawn to that effect, this court concluded the 
defendant could not have obstructed the officer.  Id. at 543-44. 
 
Contrary to Chief Justice Abrahamson's concurrence, neither 
Henes nor Hamilton requires actual obstruction of the police 
function to exist for an obstructing by giving false information 
charge to be satisfied.  Both cases essentially involved 
obstructing by making the performance of the officer's duties 
more difficult.  In those situations, the Henes and Hamilton 
courts agreed that the defendant's action must make a difference 
in an official's ability to do an official act.  Henes, 194 Wis. 
2d at 354; and Hamilton, 120 Wis. 2d at 543.  On the other hand, 
the legislature has already determined that "knowingly giving 
false information to the officer with intent to mislead him in 
the performance of his duty" constitutes "obstruction" as a 
matter of law.  Caldwell, 154 Wis. 2d at 688.  Therefore, 
contrary to Chief Justice Abrahamson's concurrence, our decision 
today does not overrule any aspects of Henes or Hamilton.  
 
No. 
2003AP1781-CR   
 
12 
 
Reed relies on United States v. Cogdell, 844 F.2d 179, 194 (4th 
Cir. 1988), where the Fourth Circuit concluded that a false 
denial of guilt "is merely one of the ordinary obstacles 
confronted in a criminal investigation."  The shortcoming with 
this argument is that the obstructing statute does not require 
the knowingly made false statements to thwart the police 
function.  Instead, the statute requires the defendant to 
knowingly give false statements with intent to mislead the 
police officer in the performance of his or her duties.4 
 
¶23 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 939.23(2) 
defines 
"know" 
as 
requiring "only that the actor believes that the specified fact 
exists."  See also State v. Lossman, 118 Wis. 2d 526, 535, 348 
N.W.2d 159 (1984).  The specified facts, in this case, are 
giving false information to the officer, while the officer is 
                                                 
4 Even if our statute did require the police function to be 
perverted, we note that the United States Supreme Court rejected 
the import of Reed's argument in Brogan, 522 U.S. at 402, 
stating: 
We cannot imagine how it could be true that falsely 
denying guilt in a Government investigation does not 
pervert a 
governmental 
function. 
 
Certainly the 
investigation of wrongdoing is a proper governmental 
function; and since it is the very purpose of an 
investigation to uncover the truth, any falsehood 
relating to the subject of the investigation perverts 
that function.  (Emphasis in original.) 
We note that Brogan is not directly on point, as the statute 
interpreted in that case, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988 ed.), does not 
contain an "intent to mislead" element. 
No. 
2003AP1781-CR   
 
13 
 
doing an act in an official capacity and with lawful authority.5  
See id. at 536.  Information is "false" when it does "not 
correspond[] to truth or reality: not true: erroneous, incorrect 
. . . intentionally untrue: lying."  Webster's Third New Int'l 
Dictionary 819 (unabr. 1986).   
¶24 What is most significant here, however, is that the 
actor must knowingly give the false information with intent to 
mislead the officer in the performance of his or her duty.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 939.23(4) defines "with intent to" as meaning 
"the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the 
result specified, or is aware that his or her conduct is 
practically certain to cause that result."  To "mislead" means 
"to lead in a wrong direction or into a mistaken action or 
belief:  deceive."  Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1444 
(unabr. 1986); see also Black's Law Dictionary 1000 (6th ed. 
1990) (defining "misleading" as "[d]elusive; calculated to lead 
astray or to lead into error.").6   
¶25 The focus is clearly on what the defendant intended to 
do by knowingly making false statements, not on the eventual 
outcome.  If the intent was to purposefully deceive, or if the 
                                                 
5 As our discussion below explains, the actor must also 
intend to mislead the officer in the performance of his or her 
duties. 
6 The defendant's subjective intent "must be ascertained, 
based on the totality of the circumstances, including what the 
defendant said or did, what the officer said or did, and any 
objective evidence which is available."  State v. Lossman, 118 
Wis. 2d 526, 543, 348 N.W.2d 159 (1984). 
No. 
2003AP1781-CR   
 
14 
 
defendant was aware that making the false statement was 
practically certain to deceive, the statute is satisfied.  
Whether the police were thwarted, therefore, is immaterial. 
¶26 The obstructing statute also does not distinguish 
between knowing falsehoods said with intent to mislead that are 
lawful and those that are criminal.  As long as the false 
statement is made knowingly and with intent to mislead the 
police, the conduct constitutes obstructing. 
¶27 The 
following 
cases 
are 
in 
accord 
with 
these 
principles.  In State v. Griffith, 2000 WI 72, ¶52, 236 Wis. 2d 
48, 613 N.W.2d 72, a person falsely identified himself to police 
during a traffic stop.  This court held that a person detained 
in a traffic stop has "every right to decline to answer" police 
questioning.  Id.  Exercising that right cannot result in a 
prosecution for obstructing, this court noted.  Id.  "However, 
if a passenger chooses to answer but gives the officer false 
information, the passenger can be charged with obstructing an 
officer in violation of Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1)."7  Id., ¶65.   
¶28 Likewise, in Peters, 70 Wis. 2d at 29, this court was 
confronted with a defendant who furnished a false alibi in order 
to exculpate himself during a police burglary investigation.  
This court held that "the statute permits conviction for 
obstruction of an officer under circumstances where efforts to 
                                                 
7 Accord Henes, 194 Wis. 2d at 353 (defendant's remaining 
silent and refusing to identify himself at police officers' 
request was not obstructing by providing false information). 
No. 
2003AP1781-CR   
 
15 
 
intentionally mislead an officer may be involved as were 
allegedly present here."  Id.   
¶29 Consistent with these cases is State v. Caldwell, 154 
Wis. 2d 683, 686, 454 N.W.2d 13 (Ct. App. 1990).  In that case, 
the defendant was detained for suspected retail theft, during 
which time he provided the police with a false name.  Id. at 
687.  The defendant was later convicted of obstructing.  He 
appealed, arguing that the conviction should be reversed because 
the officer's performance of his duties was not in fact 
prevented or made more difficult by the false information.  Id. 
The court of appeals disagreed.  The court held "that proof of 
knowingly giving false information with intent to mislead 
constitutes an obstruction as a matter of law."  Id. at 686.  
"No other proof," the court wrote, "is needed."8  Id. 
¶30 In sum, it is well-established that obstruction in 
this context need not focus on whether the police were actually 
                                                 
8 Although Chief Justice Abrahamson's concurrence complains 
that we have erroneously overturned State v. Espinoza, 2002 WI 
App 51, 250 Wis. 2d 804, 641 N.W.2d 484, because it was a 
judicial interpretation of a statute that became part of the 
statute due to the legislature's inaction, see Abrahamson, C.J., 
concurring, ¶52, Espinoza clearly conflicts with State v. 
Caldwell, 154 Wis. 2d 683, 686, 454 N.W.2d 13 (Ct. App. 1990).  
Either Espinoza, which holds that lying to the police to 
exculpate oneself may not be criminal, or Caldwell, which holds 
that knowingly providing false information with intent to 
mislead is obstruction as a matter of law, must be overturned.  
We therefore have to resolve the conflict, and we resolve it by 
siding with Caldwell.  The same reasoning applies to Chief 
Justice Abrahamson's plea to stare decisis to uphold Espinoza.  
See Abrahamson, C.J., concurring, ¶53.  We conclude that 
Caldwell represents the proper view of the law. 
No. 
2003AP1781-CR   
 
16 
 
thwarted in their investigation.  "Obstruction" occurs where a 
person knowingly gives false information to the officer with 
intent to mislead the officer in the performance of his or her 
duty.  Concluding otherwise not only unwarrantedly strays from 
the clear language of the obstructing statute, it encourages 
people to lie to police.  We cannot, as a matter of good public 
policy, condone this.  
2 
 
¶31 Reed next argues that without the exculpatory denial, 
suspects who are posed questions by the police are faced with a 
"cruel trilemma":  they can either (1) admit guilt; (2) remain 
silent; (3) falsely deny guilt.  Reed argues that admitting 
guilt is not a viable option because a defendant has the right 
against self-incrimination.  Exercising the right to remain 
silent, Reed submits, is illusory because it is an unnatural and 
illogical response to an accusation of wrongdoing by police and 
because silence can be used against the person to impeach 
credibility if the defendant takes the stand at trial. See State 
v. Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d 226, 258, 421 N.W.2d 77 (1988) 
(allowing 
"probative comment 
on a 
defendant's 
pre-Miranda 
silence when the defendant elects to testify on his or her own 
behalf.").  Thus, he reasons, the only viable avenue a cornered 
suspect has is to lie.  Failure to recognize the exculpatory 
denial, Reed maintains, renders his Fifth Amendment privileges 
meaningless.  We find the United States Supreme Court's analysis 
in Brogan rejecting this argument instructive.  
No. 
2003AP1781-CR   
 
17 
 
¶32 In Brogan, the Supreme Court was confronted with 
whether the exculpatory denial was an exception to criminal 
liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988 ed.).9  Brogan, 522 U.S. 
at 399.  Brogan, a union officer, lied to federal agents about 
cash payments he unlawfully accepted from an employer.  Id. at 
399-400.  Among other crimes, he was indicted, tried, and 
convicted for making a false statement within the jurisdiction 
of a federal agency in violation of § 1001.  Brogan appealed, 
claiming the conviction should be overturned because his false 
denial of wrongdoing fell within the exculpatory no exception.  
Although several circuit courts of appeals recognized the 
exculpatory no exception, the Supreme Court rejected it. 
¶33 Like Reed, Brogan argued that "a literal reading of 
§ 1001 violates the 'spirit' of the Fifth Amendment because it 
places a 'cornered suspect' in the 'cruel trilemma' of admitting 
guilty, remaining silent, or falsely denying guilt."  Id. at 
404.  The Court was not persuaded. 
¶34 At 
the 
outset, 
the 
Court 
quipped 
that 
"[t]his 
'trilemma' is wholly of the guilty suspect's own making, of 
                                                 
9 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988 ed.) provided: 
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any 
department or agency of the United States knowingly 
and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any 
trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any 
false, 
fictitious 
or 
fraudulent 
statements 
or 
representations, or makes or uses any false writing or 
document knowing the same to contain any false, 
fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be 
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more 
than five years, or both. 
No. 
2003AP1781-CR   
 
18 
 
course.  An innocent person will not find himself in a similar 
quandary (as one commentator has put it, the innocent person 
lacks even a 'lemma,' . . .)."  Id. (citation omitted).  The 
Court then observed that the "cruel trilemma" aphorism was first 
used "to explain the importance of a suspect's Fifth Amendment 
right to remain silent when subpoenaed to testify in an official 
inquiry."  Id. (citing Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. 
Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964)).  Without the right to remain 
silent, the suspect would be exposed to the cruel trilemma of 
"self-accusation, perjury or contempt."  Id.  From this 
backdrop, the Court explained: 
In order to validate the "exculpatory no," the 
elements of this "cruel trilemma" have now been 
altered——ratcheted up, as it were, so that the right 
to remain silent, which was the liberation from the 
original trilemma, is now itself a cruelty.  We are 
not disposed to write into our law this species of 
compassion inflation.  (Emphasis in original.)  
Brogan, 522 U.S. at 404.     
¶35 The Court then declined to conclude that the Fifth 
Amendment incorporated a "right to lie," writing: 
Whether or not the predicament of the wrongdoer 
run to ground tugs at the heartstrings, neither the 
text nor the spirit of the Fifth Amendment confers a 
privilege to lie.  Proper invocation of the Fifth 
Amendment 
privilege 
against 
compulsory 
self-
incrimination allows a witness to remain silent, but 
not to swear falsely. 
Id. (citation omitted).  No matter how illusory the right to 
silence may seem to the defendant, that "does not exert a form 
of pressure that exonerates an otherwise unlawful lie."  Id. at 
405.   
No. 
2003AP1781-CR   
 
19 
 
¶36 For these same reasons, we reject Reed's "cruel 
trilemma" arguments.  We have no doubt that suspects accused of 
criminal conduct face difficult choices.  While the Fifth 
Amendment provides them with a shield against compelled self-
incrimination, it does not provide them with a sword upon which 
to thrust a lie. 
3 
 
¶37 Last, Reed maintains that a literal reading of the 
obstruction statute to preclude the exculpatory denial exception 
would lead to absurd results because the obstruction statute 
could become an instrument of prosecutorial abuse.  We are not 
convinced.   
¶38 In Brogan, the defendant made the same argument, "that 
overzealous prosecutors will use [§ 1001] as a means of 'piling 
on' offenses——sometimes punishing the denial of wrongdoing more 
severely than the wrongdoing itself."  Id.  The Court was not 
swayed: 
The objectors' principal grievance . . . lies not with 
the hypothetical prosecutors but with Congress itself, 
which has decreed the obstruction of a legitimate 
investigation to be a separate offense, and a serious 
one.  It is not for us to revise that judgment.  
Petitioner has been unable to demonstrate, moreover, 
any history of prosecutorial excess, either before or 
after 
widespread 
judicial 
acceptance 
of 
the 
"exculpatory no."  And finally, if there is a problem 
of supposed "overreaching" it is hard to see how the 
doctrine of the "exculpatory no" could solve it.  It 
is easy enough for an interrogator to press the liar 
from the initial simple denial to a more detailed 
fabrication that would not qualify for the exemption. 
Id. at 405-06.   
No. 
2003AP1781-CR   
 
20 
 
¶39 We agree with the Court's analysis.  At the outset, we 
note that our legislature has similarly drafted our obstructing 
statute in broad and unqualified terms.  The legislature 
declared that anyone who knowingly gives false information with 
the intent to mislead an officer in the performance of his or 
her duties engages in criminal conduct.  If there is to be an 
exception in this statute for exculpatory lying, the legislature 
is the appropriate body to include it.   
¶40 In addition, Reed's argument is entirely speculative.  
He has not presented us with any evidence of prosecutorial abuse 
that could have arguably required spawning the exculpatory 
denial exception or that requires its continuation today.  
Beyond that, we agree with the State that there is nothing 
absurd about requiring people who decide not to remain silent in 
the face of police questioning to tell the truth. 
B 
 
¶41 The State also argues that Espinoza must fall based on 
its own reasoning.  We agree. 
¶42 Aside from the fact that Espinoza declared the 
legislature's 
intent 
in 
the 
obstructing 
statute 
without 
utilizing any statutory interpretation tools, the single out-of-
state case Espinoza relied on to determine our legislature's 
intent, the Illinois Appellate Court decision in Brooks, has 
since been overturned.  In People v. Ellis, 765 N.E.2d 991, 997 
(Ill. 2002), the Illinois Supreme Court noted that it had never 
considered whether the exculpatory denial exception could shield 
a defendant from criminal liability under its obstructing 
No. 
2003AP1781-CR   
 
21 
 
statute.10  The court also stated that it had never commented on 
the doctrine's breadth or requirements.  Id.  "We need not 
address the latter question," the court stated, "because, for 
the reasons that follow, we answer the former in the negative."11  
Id. 
¶43 More critically, the Espinoza court found instructive 
this court's admonition in Peters, 70 Wis. 2d at 29, to district 
attorneys that they "should have sound reasons for believing 
that statements made by a suspected defendant to the police 
 . . .  were knowingly and intentionally made for the purpose of 
deceiving and misleading the police, and not simply out of a 
good-faith desire to defend against an accusation of crime."  
                                                 
10 Illinois' obstruction of justice statute, 720 Ill. Comp. 
Stat. Ann. 5/31-4 (West 1996) provided in pertinent part: 
A person obstructs justice when, with intent to 
prevent the apprehension or obstruct the prosecution 
or defense of any person, he knowingly commits any of 
the following acts: 
(a) . . . furnishes false information . . . . 
 
11 The Ellis court first underwent a plain-meaning analysis 
of its obstruction statute and concluded that it did not include 
an exculpatory denial exception.  People v. Ellis, 765 N.E.2d 
991, 997-98 (Ill. 2002).  The court then observed the United 
States Supreme Court in Brogan eviscerated the exception and 
concluded that there was no federal constitutional right to lie.  
Id. at 998-99.  The Ellis court held the same for the Illinois 
constitution.  Id. at 999.  Finally, the Ellis court disagreed 
that the exculpatory denial exception was required to protect 
the 
Illinois 
citizens 
from 
prosecutorial 
overzealousness, 
particularly because the police in that case did not press the 
defendant in order to obtain an obstruction charge.  Id. at 
1000-01. 
No. 
2003AP1781-CR   
 
22 
 
See Espinoza, 250 Wis. 2d 804, ¶¶12-13.  Based on this language, 
the court of appeals rejected what it called the State's "broad 
sweeping contention" that "Espinoza's denial of involvement in a 
crime which there is probable cause to believe he committed, as 
a matter of law, establishes probable cause that he also 
committed the crime of obstructing."  Id., ¶21.  Espinoza 
misconstrued Peters' admonition. 
¶44 As noted above, Peters involved a defendant who 
provided a false alibi in an attempt to exculpate himself during 
a police burglary investigation.  Id. at 26-27.  The State 
charged the defendant with obstruction only after a John Doe 
hearing was held regarding the burglary.  Id. at 27.  This court 
held that "the [obstruction] statute permits conviction for 
obstruction of an officer under circumstances where efforts to 
intentionally mislead an officer may be involved as were 
allegedly present here."  Id. at 29.  However, this court wrote: 
[B]efore such a charge should be made  . . . , the 
district 
attorney 
should 
have sound reasons for 
believing 
that 
statements 
made 
by 
a 
suspected 
defendant to the police in terms of an alibi were 
knowingly and intentionally made for the purpose of 
deceiving and misleading the police, and not simply 
out of a good-faith desire to defend against an 
accusation of crime. 
Id.   
¶45  This court's admonition to district attorneys that a 
defendant's good-faith desire to defend against an accusation of 
criminal conduct cannot be stretched to exonerate any falsehoods 
knowingly made with intent to mislead the police.  In common 
No. 
2003AP1781-CR   
 
23 
 
usage, "good-faith" is "a state of mind indicating honesty and 
lawfulness of purpose."  Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 
978 (unabr. 1986).  A good-faith desire to defend against 
accusations is the antithesis of knowingly providing the police 
with falsehoods with intent to mislead.  Contrary to the court 
of appeals' suggestion in Espinoza, Peters cannot be construed 
to allow such results. 
¶46 People make mistakes, and people can provide mistaken 
answers to police questioning.  Mistaken answers, however, are 
not false statements made with intent to mislead the police.  
People 
can 
also 
disagree. 
 
People 
can 
have 
legitimate 
disagreements about what the facts are.  People can also 
legitimately disagree on what the facts mean.  Legitimate 
disagreements cannot form the basis for an obstructing charge.  
Knowingly made false statements that are not made with intent to 
mislead cannot form a basis for the charge of obstructing.  
Surely there will be close cases where a suspect's statements 
push these boundaries, but that is why this court previously 
cautioned that district attorneys should have sound reasons for 
believing that a suspect's statements made to the police were 
knowingly made with the intent to mislead the police.  We renew 
that admonition today. 
IV 
¶47 Turning to the four corners of the complaint, we 
conclude it contains sufficient facts and reasonable inferences 
to allow a reasonable person to conclude that a crime was 
probably committed and that Reed probably committed it.  See 
No. 
2003AP1781-CR   
 
24 
 
Haugen, 52 Wis. 2d at 793.  Of the five questions we are to 
answer when analyzing the sufficiency of the complaint, the only 
question at issue is the fourth one:  why is Reed being charged?  
In light of our discussion above, Reed is being charged for 
falsely stating that he was not driving and that another person, 
Mr. Triller, was.  Under the circumstances presented in the 
complaint, reasonable inferences can be drawn that those 
statements were not true, that Reed knew that the statements 
were not true, and that the statements were said with intent to 
mislead the police. 
V 
 
¶48 In sum, we conclude that there is no exculpatory 
denial exception in the obstructing statute.  The statute 
criminalizes all false statements knowingly made and with intent 
to mislead the police.  Although the State should have sound 
reasons for believing that a defendant knowingly made false 
statements with intent to mislead the police and were not made 
out of a good-faith attempt to defend against accusations of a 
crime, we conclude that the latter can never include the former; 
knowingly providing false information with intent to mislead the 
police is the antithesis of a good-faith attempt to defend 
against accusations of criminal wrongdoing.  Accordingly, we 
overrule Espinoza.  Because the complaint in this case is 
satisfactory, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals and 
remand the matter to the circuit court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
No. 
2003AP1781-CR   
 
25 
 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2003AP1781-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶49 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I agree 
with the majority opinion and the State that the charge against 
Reed for obstructing an officer should stand and that the cause 
should be remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.  
I write because I view the majority's overruling of State v. 
Espinoza, 2002 WI App 51, 250 Wis. 2d 804, 641 N.W.2d 484, as 
unnecessary and unwise. 
I 
¶50 Overruling Espinoza is unnecessary because, as the 
court of appeals held and the State agrees, Reed's statements 
fall outside the "exculpatory no" exception to the obstructing 
statute set forth in Espinoza.  Reed falsely implicated someone 
else as the driver of the car.  Reed went beyond "a good faith 
desire to defend against an accusation."12  Thus the majority 
opinion 
needlessly 
overreaches 
to 
overrule 
Espinoza 
and 
adjudicates an issue that this court need not decide on the 
facts present in the instant case.   
II 
¶51 In addition to being unnecessary, overruling Espinoza 
is unwise for several reasons.  
¶52 First, Espinoza is a statutory interpretation case, 
interpreting Wis. Stat. § 946.41.  Without even mentioning the 
rule and without providing sufficiently strong reasons, the 
majority opinion disregards the rule that this court does not 
                                                 
12 State v. Espinoza, 2002 WI App 51, ¶12, 250 Wis. 2d 804, 
641 N.W.2d 484. 
No.  2003AP1781-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
overturn a judicial interpretation of a statute.  The judicial 
interpretation of a statute ordinarily becomes part of the 
statute 
that 
only 
the 
legislature 
can 
overturn.13 
 
The 
legislature has not reacted to Espinoza.      
¶53 Second, in overturning Espinoza, the majority opinion 
overturns previous cases supporting the court of appeals' 
conclusion in Espinoza that to sustain an obstructing charge, 
some actual obstruction of the police function must exist.14  
                                                 
13 See, e.g., State v. Rosenburg, 208 Wis. 2d 191, 196, 560 
N.W.2d 266 (1997); State ex rel. LaFollette v. Circuit Court, 37 
Wis. 2d 329, 341, 155 N.W.2d 141 (1967). 
14 Espinoza, 250 Wis. 2d 804, ¶22.  For other cases 
indicating that actual obstruction is needed in an obstruction 
conviction, see, e.g., State v. Grobstick, 200 Wis. 2d 242, 249-
54, 546 N.W.2d 187 (Ct. App. 1996) (jury was instructed that 
obstructing means "that the conduct of the defendant prevents or 
makes more difficult the performance of the officer's duties," 
and court held that evidence was sufficient for jury to find 
that defendant's conduct of jumping out window and hiding made 
officer's 
task 
more 
difficult); 
Henes 
v. 
Morrissey, 
194 
Wis. 2d 338, 354, 533 N.W.2d 802 (1995) (court held that not 
only did Henes' refusal to identify himself not constitute 
"giving" false information, but that "the deputies have not 
shown how Henes' refusal to identify himself 'obstructed' their 
investigation as required under the first element of the 
offense."); State v. Hamilton, 120 Wis. 2d 532, 356 N.W.2d 169 
(1984) (like in Henes, defendant refused to identify himself and 
officer arrested him for obstructing an officer contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 946.41(1); State defined word "obstructed" to mean 
hindered, delayed, impeded, frustrated or prevented officer from 
performing duties and argued that defendant's failure to provide 
information is per se violation of statute; court assumed that 
State's definition of obstruction was correct and held that 
without 
a 
showing 
that 
defendant's 
failure 
to 
furnish 
information adversely affected officer's performance of duties, 
conviction had to be reversed for insufficient evidence; actual 
hindrance is necessary component of Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1)).   
No.  2003AP1781-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
Stare decisis, let the decision stand, is a bedrock principle in 
our system of justice that should govern the present case.   
¶54 Third, the majority opinion contravenes the intent of 
the 
legislature. 
 
As 
the 
Espinoza 
court 
explained, 
the 
legislature intended to circumscribe a suspect's conduct that 
would thwart or frustrate the police function.15  The legislature 
sought to prevent the waste of time, energy, and expense of 
having law enforcement officers run down false leads concerning 
criminal conduct.  Thus, the Espinoza court of appeals held that 
a person's denial of guilt when confronted by a police officer 
about an alleged crime cannot be a basis for an obstructing-an-
officer charge.16    
¶55 The Espinoza court got it right: "And though truth and 
morality may have required Espinoza to answer in the affirmative 
                                                                                                                                                             
In State v. Caldwell, 154 Wis. 2d 683, 690, 454 N.W.2d 13 
(Ct. App. 1990), the court of appeals concluded that the word 
"obstructs" has two discrete meanings: "mak[es] more difficult" 
and "giv[es] false information with intent to mislead."  The 
court of appeals concluded that under the first meaning the 
effect of the defendant's conduct on the officer was relevant; 
under the second, it was not.  The court of appeals further 
concluded that it need not determine the precise definition of 
obstruction.  Id. at 688.  The evidence was sufficient for a 
conviction under both meanings of the word "obstruct"; the false 
information made the officer's performance of his duty more 
difficult.      
But see State v. Hinchey, No. 89-0334-CR, unpublished slip 
op. (Ct. App. Sept. 20, 1989) (rejecting the "exculpatory no" 
doctrine). 
15 Espinoza, 250 Wis. 2d 804, ¶22. 
16 State v. Reed, 2004 WI App 98, ¶¶7-8, 273 Wis. 2d 661, 
681 N.W.2d 568.  
No.  2003AP1781-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
when he was questioned regarding the tire incident, we cannot 
say that the law required him to do so."17 
¶56 Fourth, the majority opinion ignores the rationale of 
Espinoza and this court's decision in Peters v. State, 70 
Wis. 2d 22, 233 N.W.2d 420 (1975), upon which Espinoza is based.  
Peters correctly interpreted Wis. Stat. § 946.41.  The Peters 
court distinguished between statements by a suspect  "knowingly 
and intentionally made for the purpose of deceiving and 
misleading the police, and not simply [made] out of a good-faith 
desire to defend against an accusation of crime."18   
¶57 Peters and Espinoza got it right.  The statute does 
not encompass all of a suspect's false answers or false 
statements uttered with the intent to exculpate himself or 
herself against a criminal charge in the hope of preventing 
prosecution.19   
¶58 In 
contrast, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
recapitulates 
various dictionary definitions and employs a literal reading of 
the statute to reinterpret Wis. Stat. § 946.41.20  In declaring 
that suspects have the right to remain silent and should not 
lie, the majority opinion renders an illogical result logical 
and gives the result an appearance of being morally acceptable. 
The majority opinion errs.  The majority opinion has disregarded 
                                                 
17 Espinoza, 250 Wis. 2d 804, ¶22. 
18 Peters v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 22, 29, 233 N.W.2d 420 
(1975). 
19 Espinoza, 250 Wis. 2d 804, ¶20. 
20 Majority op., ¶¶23, 24, 45. 
No.  2003AP1781-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
the principles underlying the Fifth Amendment, the guarantee 
against self-incrimination. The result is fiction built on 
fiction.  
¶59 The majority opinion forgets that the "exculpatory no" 
doctrine has its roots in a "latent distaste for an application 
of the statute that is uncomfortably close to the Fifth 
Amendment."21  Numerous federal and state court decisions 
starting as far back as 195322 have adopted the Espinoza 
approach, cognizant of the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination 
implications.23  Remaining insensitive to the dangers to liberty 
interests inherent in a literal reading of the statute, the 
majority opinion discards Espinoza and fails to replace the 
"exculpatory no" doctrine with any other safeguard.     
¶60 Fifth, the majority opinion unwisely utilizes a 5-4 
majority opinion in Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 
                                                 
21 United States v. Lambert, 501 F.2d 943, 946 n.4 (5th Cir. 
1974) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 1001, federal false statement 
statute). 
22 United States v. Levin, 133 F. Supp. 88 (D. Colo. 1953). 
23 See United States v. Moore, 27 F.3d 969 (4th Cir. 1994); 
United States v. Cogdell, 844 F.2d 179, 182 (4th Cir. 1988); 
United States v. Medina de Perez, 799 F.2d 540, 544 (9th Cir. 
1986); State v. Valentin, 519 A.2d 322 (N.J. 1987); New Jersey 
v. Pandozzi, 347 A.2d 1, 3 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1975) (citing 
numerous cases).  
For discussions of the "exculpatory no" doctrine, see Erica 
S. Perl, United States v. Rodriguez-Rios: The Fifth Circuit Says 
"Adios!" to the "Exculpatory No" Doctrine, 69 Tul. L. Rev. 621 
(1994) (supporting doctrine); Giles A. Birch, False Statements 
to Federal Agents: Induced Lies and the Exculpatory No, 57 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1273 (1990) (proposes affirmative defense of the 
"induced lie" to replace exculpatory no doctrine).     
No.  2003AP1781-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
(1998), interpreting not the federal constitution, but a federal 
criminal statute that differs from Wis. Stat. § 946.41.  The 
Brogan case was decided on January 26, 1998, four years before 
Espinoza was decided on January 23, 2002.  A U.S. Supreme Court 
decision interpreting a federal statute (that differs from the 
Wisconsin statute) is not persuasive in overruling a Wisconsin 
decision that was handed down subsequent to the U.S. Supreme 
Court decision.     
¶61 Smitten with the lead opinion in Brogan, the majority 
opinion in the present case overlooks the concurrences and 
dissents in Brogan.  Concurring Justices Souter and Ginsburg 
describe 
in dismay 
"the 
extraordinary 
authority 
Congress, 
perhaps unwittingly, has conferred on prosecutors to manufacture 
crimes."24  They call on Congress to examine the statute to 
remove the risks inherent in the statute.   
¶62 Dissenting Justices Stevens and Breyer agree with the 
litany of horrors Justices Souter and Ginsburg describe.  These 
dissenting justices contend that the majority is overturning a 
long-standing interpretation of the federal statute.  They urge 
the Court to "show greater respect for the virtually uniform 
understanding of the bench and bar [about the meaning of the 
statute] that persisted for decades with . . . the approval of 
this Court as well as the Department of Justice."25  The four 
justices (straddling both sides of the outcome in Brogan) have 
                                                 
24 Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 408 (1998) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
25 Brogan, 522 U.S. at 420 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
No.  2003AP1781-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
the better argument than the five justices, as far as I am 
concerned.   
¶63 Also 
supporting 
my 
position 
is 
the 
influential 
American Law Institute Model Penal Code.  Under the Code, giving 
false answers to inquiries initiated by law enforcement does not 
confer liability for hindering prosecution on an obstruction of 
justice theory.  A person commits an offense when he or she 
volunteers false information to a law enforcement officer.26  The 
commentary explains that the exclusion of false answers in 
response to police questioning "represents a delicate policy 
judgment, 
premised 
in 
part 
on 
the 
fear 
that 
a 
wider 
reach . . . would invite abusive charges by police against 
persons interviewed in the course of investigating crime."27  
Other sections of the criminal code are better suited, say the 
commentators, to implement a penal policy on false statements to 
the police.28           
¶64 Sixth, a literal reading of the obstruction statute 
enables the statute to become an instrument for abuse. The 
Espinoza court declared "We must keep in mind: 'The function of 
law enforcement is the prevention of crime and the apprehension 
                                                 
26 Model Penal Code § 242.3(5) at 223 (1980).  
27 Model Penal Code § 242.3, Commentary at 235 (1980).  
28 See, e.g., Model Penal Code §§ 241.3 (unsworn written 
false 
statements), 
241.4 
(false 
alarms 
to 
public 
safety 
agencies) (1980). 
For similar Wisconsin statutes, see Wis. Stat. § 941.13 
(false alarms to firefighters); § 946.31 (perjury); § 946.32 
(false swearing).   
No.  2003AP1781-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
of criminals.  Manifestly, that function does not include the 
manufacturing of crime.'  Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 
369, 372 (1958)."29 
¶65 Under the majority opinion, law enforcement officers 
are empowered to manufacture crimes when none existed by posing 
questions to suspects who are not entitled to (or given) a 
Miranda warning because the suspects are not yet "in custody."30  
At oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court in Brogan, the 
U.S. Solicitor General conceded that the federal false statement 
statute could be used to "escalate completely innocent conduct 
into a felony."31    
¶66 Here are some examples of what may be coming under the 
majority opinion's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 946.41.  
¶67 A driver is stopped for a civil speeding violation.  
In response to the question whether she was going over the 35 
mile an hour speed limit, she says no.  She can be criminally 
prosecuted for denying that she was speeding. 
¶68 Another example:  An officer is on the lookout for a 
robbery suspect.  The officer stops a suspect.  The suspect 
somewhat matches the description but the car the suspect claims 
as his does not.  The following dialogue ensues: 
Q. Do you know anything about a robbery tonight? 
A. No.   
                                                 
29 Espinoza, 
250 
Wis. 2d 804, 
¶21 
(parallel 
citations 
omitted). 
30 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 441 (1984).  
31 Brogan, 522 U.S. at 411.   
No.  2003AP1781-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
Q. Did you drive a different car earlier this evening? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you have a gun earlier tonight? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you have any illegal substances on you or in your 
car? 
A. No. 
¶69 Each of the responses is an "exculpatory no." The 
suspect appears nervous at the questioning, and the officer 
believes the suspect is lying.  She concludes that she has 
probable cause to arrest the suspect on a charge of obstructing 
an officer by lying but does not make an arrest.32  The officer 
searches the suspect and the area surrounding the suspect, finds 
marijuana, and immediately arrests the suspect for possession of 
a controlled substance.  The suspect is never arrested for or 
charged with or convicted of robbery or obstructing an officer. 
The only charge and conviction is for possession of marijuana.   
The search and the conviction will be upheld. See State v. 
Sykes, 2005 WI 48, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (search 
preceding arrest when there is probable cause to arrest; arrest 
for different offense on basis of evidence found in the search; 
search valid).    
                                                 
32 For a discussion of the minimal quantum of evidence 
needed for probable cause, see Jefferson County v. Renz, 231 
Wis. 2d 293, 317-27, 603 N.W.2d 541 (1998) (Abrahamson, C.J., 
concurring).   
No.  2003AP1781-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶70 Far-fetched?  I think not.  Look at the reported cases 
described in Justice Ginsburg's concurrence in the Brogan case.33  
In those cases federal law enforcement officers induced a denial 
for the express purpose of obtaining incriminating statements 
for prosecution under the obstruction statute rather than to 
obtain information.      
¶71 When the legislature enacts a statute, it intends the 
statute to make sense in application.  A court's interpretation 
of a statute should likewise make sense.  The court should not 
interpret 
a statute to 
set 
up suspects 
and 
enable law 
enforcement to "manufacture" crimes or engage in warrantless 
searches on the basis of manufactured crimes.  The majority 
opinion's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 946.41 unnecessarily 
removes the Espinoza safety net preventing the unfortunate 
results anticipated by this court in 1970 in Peters.  This case 
is a step backwards for law enforcement, public safety, and 
constitutional rights.       
¶72 For the reasons set forth, I cannot join the majority 
opinion. 
¶73 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
                                                 
33 Brogan, 522 U.S. at 409-12 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).  
2003AP1781-CR.dtp 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
¶74 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  I concur in the 
conclusion 
that 
the 
State 
may 
prosecute 
Brent 
Reed 
for 
obstructing an officer under Wis. Stat. § 946.41.  Both the 
majority opinion of Justice Butler and the concurring opinion of 
Chief Justice Abrahamson reason persuasively that if a jury 
finds that Reed not only falsely denied driving his car but also 
falsely identified another person as the driver, it may find 
that Reed violated the statute.   
 
¶75 The majority opinion celebrates truth telling but it 
does so by delivering a literal, inflexible interpretation of 
the statute.  I see the opinion as long on philosophy but short 
on reality.  The concurrence, by contrast, recognizes reality 
but it ends up authorizing deception.  I am unable to join 
either of these two opinions and thus write separately. 
¶76 The majority opinion is not likely to change the 
behavior of people who have something to hide.  "Denial," Mark 
Twain once quipped, "ain't just a river in Egypt."  It is a 
human flaw dating back to the Garden of Eden. 
¶77 What the majority opinion may change is the behavior 
of law enforcement.  Law enforcement officers may try harder to 
pose questions that will incriminate suspects if they are 
answered truthfully, or subject them to additional charges if 
they are denied.  Because police officers are not jurors, a 
suspect who remains silent is often presumed to deserve 
increased investigation. 
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¶78 Courts are likely to respond to this in the manner so 
clearly foreshadowed by the Chief Justice in her concurrence, by 
fashioning 
new 
warnings 
to 
suspects 
and 
developing 
new 
rationales for suppressing evidence.  Thus, for prosecutors, the 
happiness derived from the majority opinion may be short lived. 
¶79 While it is hard to deny the appeal of the majority 
opinion, I am fearful that its broad language opens a Pandora's 
box.  I would prefer that we decide the case very narrowly and 
then move on. 
 
 
 
 
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