Title: Cummings v. State

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'

 

REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,

No. 26975

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
WARREN C. CUMMINGS,

Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

STATE OF HAWAI'I,
Defendant-Appel lant /Cross-Appellee,

and

DOE ENTITIES 1-10, Defendants.

lessiiny 62 9309002

 

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
ety. No. 021-1833)
(ay: Moon, c.d., Levinson, Nakayama; Acoba, and Duffy 3J.)
Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appeliee the State of Hawai'i

(hereinafter, State] appeals, and Plaintif£-nppeliee/Cross-
Appeliant Warren C. Cummings cross-appeals, from the Novenber 3,
2004 final judgment of the Circuit Court of the First Circuit! on
its findings of fact and conclusions of law and order in which
the court: (2) found the State Liable for the negligence of its
Department of Public Safety (OPS) in the operation and
maintenance of its correctional facilities that resulted in an
attack at the Halawa Correctional Facility (HCE) by an innate,
Douglas Hook, causing severe personal injury to another innate,
cummings; (2) found Mook 508, the state 258, and Cummings 158

comparatively negligent; and (3) awarded $126,240.68 in damages

| the Honorable Richard W. Pollack presided over this matter.

aan
   

[NOT-FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

to Cunmings for medical expenses and pain and suffering, and
$1,696.13 in costs. ‘The State contends that: (1) the circuit
court clearly erred in finding that (a) Mook’s July 22, 1998 Jail
Initial Custody Screening Instrument was the “controlling
classification instrunent{,]" and as such, (b) “Mook should have
been housed in Maximum Custody upon his return from (the Hawal't
State Hospital (HS#),]" and (c) “not placing Mook in maximum
custody upon his discharge from treatment violated DPS’ [s] own
policies and procedures”; (2) the circuit court erred in ruling
that the attack on Cummings was reasonably foreseeable by the
States (3) the circuit court erzed in ruling that (a) the
administrative duties and procedures contained in the DPS
employee instructions and policies regarding the custody
classification of inmates created a tort duty in favor of
Cummings and established a standard of care and (b) the failure
to follow those employee policies and instructions gave rise to a
claim for relief sounding in negligence: and (4) the circuit
court erred in ruling that it had subject matter jurisdiction
because the State is exempted from liability by the discretionary
function exception of the State Tort Liability Act (STLA),
Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 662-15(1) (1993). Cunmings
replies: (1) it is well-settled law that the State oves a duty
of care to its prisoners to take reasonable action to protect

them against the risk of foreseeable harm; (2) the State owed a

 
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duty of care to Cummings to properly house Mook in order to
prevent Mook from harming other inmates; (3) based on Mook’ s
extensive history of unprovoked violence and the knowledge DPS
staff had of that history, the circuit court's finding of
foreseeability is not clearly erroneous; (4) the circuit court
did not clearly err in finding that the State breached its duty
of care; and (5) the circuit court correctly ruled that the
discretionary function exception does not apply here. Finally,
Cummings asserts that the State’s appeal is frivolous and moves
for sanctions pursuant to Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure
(HRAP) Rule 38.

on cross-appeal, Cunmings raises the following points
of error: (1) the circuit court erred in granting the state's
motion for order to apportion liability? (2) the circuit court
erred in failing to impose liability on the State for being
responsible for the acts of Nook, a ward of the State; (3) the
circuit court clearly erred in finding Cunmings 15% comparatively
negligent; (4) the cizcuit court abused its discretion by failing
to sanction the State for a pattern of egregious discovery
violations; and (5) the circuit court abused its discretion in
modifying Cunmings’ taxation of costs. In reply, the State

contends: (1) the circuit court properly applied HRS § 663-10.5

 

(Supp. 2001) to apportion liability to Mook; (2) Cummings waived

any claim based on a theory of vicarious liability; (3) the State
 

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

is not vicariously Liable for Mook’s conduct; (4) the circuit
court correctly determined that Cunmings contributed to the
altercation that caused his injuries; (5) the circuit court did
not abuse its discretion in resolving the discovery issues; and
(6) the circuit court’s award of costs was not an abuse of
discretion.

Upon carefully reviewing the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to
the arguments advocated and the issues raised, we hold as
follows:

(1) The circuit court did not err in ruling that the
discretionary function exception, HRS § 662-15(1),? did not apply
to the instant case because the classification of inmates is an
operational level act concerning “routine, everyday matters, not
requiring evaluation of broad policy factors” inasmuch as the
classification instruments are to be completed by DPS personnel
in an objective fashion, using the point system in a mathematical
process resulting in a score that determines the custody level of
the inmate, See Tseu ex rel. Hobbs v. Jevte, 88 Hawai'i 95, 68,

962 P.2d 344, 347 (1998) (stating that in deciding whether

 

# HRS § 662-15 provides in relevant part

‘This chapter shall not apply to:
(2) Any claim based upon’ . . the exercise or performance
of the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
fonction of duty on the part of a state officer or employee,
whether of not the discretion involved has Dees abssed(-)

 
 

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actions of state officials fall within the discretionary function
exception, this court must “determine whether the challenged
action involves the effectuation of a ‘broad public policyl,]‘ on
the one hand, or routine, ‘operational level activity(,)’ on the
other”); Breed v. Shaner, 57 Haw. 656, 666, 562 P.2d 436, 442
(1977) (noting that operational level acts are “those which

concern routine, everyday matters, not requiring evaluation of

broad policy factors”) (quoting Rogers v. State, 51 Haw. 293,
297, 459 P.2d 378, 381 (1969)); Upchurch v, State, 51 Haw. 150,

154, 454 P-2d 112, 115 (1969) (“[I]£ the acts of negligence
alleged and proven were the failure of employees to carry out
their duties as prescribed by the rules, or their failure to
exercise due care in the performance of their duties, such acts
or omissions would not be exempted and would be actionable under
+ cf. Taylor-Rice v, State, 91 Hawai'i 60, 78, 979
P.2d 1086, 1104 (1999) (stating that where “the State's own

 

the (STLA]

policy indicated that the guardrails should have been brought
into compliance with contemporary engineering standards,

the decision not to improve the guardrail constituted an
‘operational level’ decision and not a ‘broad public policy’
decision protected under the ‘discretionary function
exception’ ”)

(2) The circuit court did not err in ruling that the

State, by reason of the special relationship created by its
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custody of Cunmings, was under a duty to take reasonable action
to protect Cummings against unreasonable risk of physical harm.
See Knodle v. Waikiki Gateway Hotel, Inc., 69 Haw. 376, 385, 742
P.2d 377, 383 (1987) (“The existence of a duty owed by the
defendant to the plaintiff, that is, whether such a relation
exists between the parties that the community will impose a legal
obligation upon one for the benefit of the other -~ or, more
simply, whether the interest of the plaintiff which has suffered
invasion was entitled to legal protection at the hands of the
defendant, is entirely a question of law.” (Quotation signals,
ellipsis, and citations omitted.)); Buf vs Honolulu Police Dep't,
89 Hawai'i 315, 320, 972 P.2d 1081, 1086 (1999) (stating that
this court reviews a trial court’s conclusion of law with regard
to the duty of care that a defendant owes to a plaintiff ina
.gligence action “de novol,] under the right/wrong standard” of
Pulawa v, GDE Havaiian Tel, 112

Hawai'i 3, 13, 143 P,3d 1205, 1215 (2006) (“[I}n the context of

 

 

review) (citations omitted

determining the existence and scope of a duty, foreseeability is
a question of law for the court to resolve.” (Citations
onitted.)); Haworth v. State, 60 Haw. 557, 563-64, 592 P.2d 820,
624-25 (1979) (“It is well settled that a state, by reason of the
special relationship created by its custody of a prisoner, is
under a duty to the prisoner to take reasonable action to protect

the prisoner against unreasonable risk of physical harm. The
++ NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWALT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

duty arises out of the deprivation by the state of the prisoner’s

normal opportunities to protect himself, particularly through

 

avoidance of places or situations which involve risk.”)
(3) There is substantial evidence in the record to
support the circuit court's finding that Mook’s attack on
Cummings was reasonably foreseeable, including: (1) Mook’ s
Initial Custody Instrument classified him as maximum custody,
based on his extensive history of viclence, including his assault
on Adult Correction Officer (ACO) Craig Massey in 1997 and his
threats against ACO Alan Wong and Unit Team Manager Milton
Kotsuba in July 1998 (2) numezous court-ordered examiners, whose
reports were forvarded to Oahu Community Correctional Center
(occe) and HCE, reported that Mook’s violence and mental illness
continued throughout his stay at HSH including kicking and
punching the nurses station in May 1999 and slapping another
patient in June 1999; and (3) upon Mook's arrival at OCCC during
the warden-to-warden transfer, Sgt. Antonio placed him in
solitary confinenent because Mook was known to be extremely
violent and prone to erratic behavior, and Sgt. Anotonic did not
want to allow Nock back into the general population even after
being assured, incorrectly, that Mook had been cleared to be
there. Sea Bulawa, 112 Hawai"i at 13, 143 P.3d at 1215 (stating
that foreseeability in the context of breach is a question of

fact); Doe Parents No, 1v. State, Dep‘t of Educ., 100 Hawai'i
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34, 82, 58 P.3d 545, $93 (2002) ("The test of what is reasonably
foreseeable is not one of a balance of probabilities. That the
danger will more probably than cthervise not be encountered on 2
particular occasion does not dispense with the exercise of care.
the test is whether there is sone probability of harm

sonable and prudent person would

 

sufficiently serious that a r
take precautions to avoid it.” (Brackets, quotation marks, and
citations omitted.));

(4) There is substantial evidence in the record to
support the circuit court’s finding that the State breached its
duty of care because the State failed to exercise reasonable care
to protect Cummings from the reasonably foreseeable attack of
Mook by failing to properly house Mook in maximum custody. See
Doe Parents No. 1, 100 Hawai'i at 62, 58 P.3d at 593 (“Whether
there was @ breach of duty or not, ice., whether there was a
failure on the defendant’s part to exercise reasonable care, is a
question for the trier of fact.” (Quoting Knodle, 69 Haw. at
386, 742 P.2d at 383.) (Brackets omitted.)). Given Mook’s
extensive history of violence of which DPS employees knew or, in
the exercise of reasonable care, should have known, the circuit
court did not clearly err in finding that it was not reasonable
for DPS employees to ignore the innate classification system and
(a) allow Mook to remain in HCF’s medium security module upon his

return from HSH, (b) transfer Mook to OCCC in the warden-to-
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

 

warden transfers, and (c) allow Nook to remain in OCcc’s medium
security module upon his transfer thereto, See Tavlor-Rice, 91
Hawai'l at 69, 979 P.2d at 1095 (stating that findings of facts
shall not be set aside unless clearly ezroneous); State vw.
Okumura, 78 Hawai'i 363, 392, 894 P.2d 60, 69 (1995) ("A finding
of fact is clearly erroneous when (1) the record lacks
substantial evidence to support the finding, or (2) despite
substantial evidence in support of the finding, the appellate
court is nonetheless left with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made.” (Citation onitted.)). Contrary
ko the State’s assertions, it was not reasonable for DPS
employees to assume that (a) Mock was “cured” of his mental
Alinesses and propensity towards violence upon his return from
Si and (b) the determination that Mook vas “fit to proceed”
meant that he was no longer violent and dangerous. Sse HRS
§ 704-403 (1993) (stating by implication that a person is “fit to
proceed” if the person has the “capacity to understand the
proceedings against the person” and can “assist in the person's
own defense”) ?

(5) Sanctions against the State are not warranted here.

See HRAP Rule 38 (“If a Hawai'i appellate court determines that

> gnasmuch ae the State did not contest the circuit court's
determination that the State's failure to exercise reasonable cere to pr
hare from cecurring to Canmings was 2 substantial factor in bringing about
CGmminge” Injuries, any objections thereto are waived, gag HRAP Rule 26(b] (4)
(points not presented in accordance with this section will be
Gisregerdedi.)°1) HRAP Rule 28(b)(7) ("Points not argued may be deened
waivea.").

 

    

 
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an appeal decided by it was frivolous, it may, after a separately
filed motion or notice from the appellate court and reasonable
opportunity to respond, award damages, including reasonable
attorneys’ fees and costs, to the appellee.”); Canalez v. Bob's
Appliance Serv. Ctr., Inc., 89 Hawai'i 292, 300, 972 P.2d 295,
303 (1999) (defining a frivolous claim as “a claim so manifestly
and palpably without merit, so as to indicate bad faith on the
pleader’s part such that argument to the court was not required”)
(quoting Coll _v. McCarthy, 72 Haw. 20, 29, 804 P.2d 881, 887
(1991)

(6) The circuit court did not err in interpreting HRS
§ 663-10.5' and granting the State’s motion for order to
apportion liability. See State v. Levi, 102 Hawai'i 282, 285, 75
P.3d 1173, 1176 (2003) (stating that statutory interpretation is
a question of law reviewable de novo”) (quoting State v. Arce,
84 Hawai'i 1, 10, 928 P.2d 843, 852 (1996).

First, the State and Mook are joint tortfeasors. See
HRS § 663-11 (1993) (**[JJoint tortfeasors’ means two or more

persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury

 

as a torts

 

+ Rs, § €63-10.5, ontitied “sovernment enti
abolition of Joint and ‘several Liability,” provides:

 

   

Notwithstanding sections 663-11 to 663-13, 663-16,
663-11, and section 663-31, in any case where a government
entity’ it determined to be'a tortfeasor along with one oF

Rore other tortfeasors, ihe government enticy shall be

‘izeibucanle to the government entity.
(Emphasis added.)

 

 

10
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

 

to person or property, whether or not judgnent has been recovered
against all or some of them.”); Gump v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 93
Hawai'i 417, 422, 5 P.3d 407, 412 (2000) (*A party is liable
within the meaning of section 663-11 if the injured person could
have recovered damages in a direct action against that party, had
the injured person chosen to pursue such an action.” (Citation
omitted.)).

Second, the plain language of the statute does not
require the State to file a claim against Mook to have liability
apportioned to him. See Hawai'i Pub, Employment Relations Bd. v.
United Pub, Workers, 66 Haw. 461, 469-70, 667 P.2d 783, 789
(1963) (“statutory construction . . . does not authorize the
interpolation of conditions into a statute -- additional terms --
not found in the statute considered as a whole.” (Citation
omitted.) +

Finally, apportioning Mook's liability pursuant to HRS
$ 663-10.5 did not violate Cunmings’ constitutional right to due
process inasmuch as the statute is rationally related to the
legitimate state interest of insulating the State from being
accountable to plaintiffs for more than that percentage share of

the damages attributable to the State.’ See In re Applications

* cummings has not alleged that he was deprived of notice or of an
opportunity to be heard at needed to sustain 4 procedural due process clain,
see for Hawai'i 73, 80, 110 P.3d 397, 404 (2008) ("The basic
Set IG cafes “Eeadoral due process of law require notice and an opportunity to
be heard at a Reaningful tine snd in a seaningful manner before governnental
Seprivation of @ aignificane property interest.” (Citation omitted.))7 nor

(continued...)

 
 

    

 

a
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k sh, 82 Hawai'i 329, 349, 922 P.2d 942, 962

(1996) ("To establish an ‘as applied’ violation of substantive
due process, an aggrieved person must prove that the governnent’s
action was clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare.” (Citation omitted.}}; Doe Parents No. 1, 100
Hawai'i at €7, 58 P.3d at 598 ("The legislative intent underlying
HRS § 663-10.5 was clearly to insulate governmental entities . .

from being held accountable to plaintiffs for more than the
degree of fault associated with its employee's tortious
contribution to the plaintiff’s injury(.]”); cf. Plumb v. Fourth
Jud. Dist. Court, $27 P.2d 1011, 1016 (Mont. 1996) (reaffirming
that “apportionment of Liability among those responsible for a
person’s danage is a legitimate government concern”) (citing
Newville v. State, 883 P.2d 793, 803 (Mont. 1994)); Hatt v
Hettich, 593 N.W.2d 383, 390 (N.D, 1999) (stating that it is a
“Legitimate legislative goal” to “apportion{] responsibility for
damages based upon fault”); Snilev v, Corrigan, 638 N.W.2d 151,
154 n.7 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (stating by implication that

holding defendants accountable only for damages in proportion to

 

*(. continued)
has Cumings denonstrated that he uas deprived of a fundamental right
protected by substantive due process, gaa Ek vs Boas, 102 Hawai'i 269, 297,
‘5 Bsa 1260, 1186 (2003) ("Substantive due process has been defined ag thet
which protects those fundamental rights and Liberties which are impiieit in
the concept of ordered liberty.” "(Internal quotation signals, ellipsis,
citations, and Brackets omitted.)}, Ae such, these argonents will not be
Sdaressed further herein.

 

12
 

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their percentage of fault is a legitimate state interest and
finding “no logical basis to conclude that evidence regarding the
culpability of all tortfeasors involved in an incident,
including non-parties, would) render the jury’s verdict less
accurate") (citation omitted);

(7) ‘The circuit court did not err in failing to impose
liability on the State for being responsible for the acts of
Mook. See Tavlor-Rice, 105 Hawai'i at 109-10, 94 P.3d at 664-65
("[T)he State’s liability is limited by its sovereign immunity,
except where there has been a ‘clear relinguishment’ of immunity
and the State has consented to be sued. This court has noted
that the State has waived immunity to suit only to the extent as
specified in HRS chapters 661 and 662.” (Citations omitted.)):
HRS § 662-2 (1993) ("The State hereby waives its immunity for
Liability for the torts of its emplovees and shall be liable in
the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances[.]” (Emphasis added.});

(8) Notwithstanding Cummings’ assertions that he did
not contribute at all to Mook’s attack, there is substantial
‘evidence in the record to support the circuit court's finding
that Cummings was 15% comparatively negligent. See Okumura, 78
Hawai'i at 392, 894 P.2d at 89 (“A finding of fact is clearly
erroneous when (1) the record lacks substantial evidence to

support the finding, or (2) despite substantial evidence in

a3
++ NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

 

support of the finding, the appellate court is nonetheless left
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made.” (Citation omitted.)); Geldert v. State, 3 Haw. App. 25%,
266, 649 P.2d 1165, 1170 (1982) (stating that “[a]n appellate
court ‘should exercise considerable restraint in reviewing the
conclusion of the fact-finder’” on the subject of negligence and
comparative negligence) (citation omitted);

(9) The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in
resolving the discovery issues inasmuch as, notwithstanding the
delays and difficulties caused by the State’s untimely production
of certain documents, there is no indication that the State
intentionally withheld documents and it cannot be said that the
State accrued any significant benefit from, or that Cummings was
ultimately prejudiced by, the State’s conduct. See Lester v.
Rapp, 85 Hawai'i 238, 241, 942 P.2d $02, 505 (1997) ("We review
the grant or denial of . . . sanctions for abusive litigation
practices under the abuse of discretion standard.” (Citations
omitted.)1; Office of Hawaiian Affairs v, State, 110 Hawai'i 338,
351, 133 P.3d 767, 780 (2006) (“[AJn abuse of discretion occurs
where the trial court has clearly exceeded the bounds of reason
or disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the
substantial detriment of a party litigant.” (Quoting Ranger Ins.
Co. vs Hinshaw, 103 Hawai'i 26, 30, 79 P.3d 129, 123 (2003).))+
Kawamata Farms, Inc, v. United Agri Products, 86 Hawai'i 214,

ua
   

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242-43, 948 P.2d 1055, 1083-84 (1997) (noting that this court
reviews cases of alleged discovery violations with three factors
in mind: (a) “the offending party’s culpability, if any, in
destroying or withholding discoverable evidence that the opposing
party had formally requested through discovery”; (b) “whether the
opposing party suffered any resulting prejudice as a result of
the offending party’s destroying or withholding the discoverable
evidence”; and (ce) “the inequity that would occur in allowing the
offending party to accrue a benefit from its conduct”) (citing
Richardson v, Sport Shinko (Waikiki Corp.), 76 Hawai'i 494, 507,
880 P.2d 169, 182 (1994))5

(20) the circuit court did not clearly exceed the
bounds of reason or disregard rules or principles of law or
practice to the substantial detriment of Cummings in denying his
mediation costs. See Schefke v. Reliable Collection Agency,
Ltd, 96 Hawai'i 408, 456, 32 P.34 52, 100 (2001) (“An award or
denial of costs is reviewed under the abuse of discretion
standard.” (Citation omitted.)}; Wong v. Takeuchi, 86 Hawai'i
46, 54, 961 P.2d 611, 619 (1998) (“Although the trial court has
discretion in the matter of allowing or disallowing costs, that
discretion should be exercised sparingly when the requested
expenses are not specifically allowed by statute or precedent.”
(Quoting Tradewinds Hotel, Inc, v, Cochran, @ Haw. App. 256, 271,
799 P.2d 60, 68-69 (1990).))+

as
 

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S

(11) The cizcust court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Cummings’ taxation of transcript costs. See idai‘

(22) The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in
reducing Cummings’ costs for in-house copying charges from $0.25
per copy to $0.10 per copy. See id, at 53, 962 P.2d at 618
(stating that the burden of proving the correctness of a
particular cost request shifts to the party claiming it after
objections have been filed to the specific item):

(23) The ciroust court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Cunmings’ request for trial exhibits, photographs, and
trial binders. See id, at §5, 961 P.2d at 619 ("As a general
rule, routine expenses related to operating a law practice are
not taxable costs."); id. at $4, 961 P.2d at 619 (“Although the
trial court has discretion in the matter of allowing or

disallowing costs, that discretion should be exercised sparingly

 

+ to the extent that the cizcuit court interpreted HRS § 607-9 (1992)
and the cese lav to mean that the court did not have discretion to award costs
ot enumerated in the statute, the circuit court erred. See Schethe, 96
Hawaii at 459, 32 P.36 at 103 (HRS $ 607-3 gives courts discretion in
determining what costs should be avarded.”); ond, 60 Hawai'i at §4, 961 P.2d
St 619 (stating by implication that courts have discretion to award costs not
enumerates by statute or case law). Tt is well established, however, that “an
Sppeliate court nay affirm a judguont of the lower court on’ any ground in the
Fecord which supports affirmance(.]” Bios v. fac, Thansfer 4 Karehouse, Inc.,
433 Hawai'i 452, 459, 903 P.24 1273, 1280 (1995) (citation and brackets
omitted); soe also Kawanats Fame, 56 Hawai'i at 247, 948 P.2d at 1088
(slwjhere the circuit court™s decision is correct, its conclusion will not be
disturbed on the groung that it geve the wrong reason for sterling.”
(Geoting Raves v.-kubovana, 76 Hawai'i 137, 140, 670 P.2d 1261, 1286
(G304)))+ Here, the cireait court’ s decision does nct warrant vacatur
inasmuch as this court has stated that “[ajlthough the trial court has
discretion in the matter of allowing or disallowing costs, that discretion
Should be exercises sparingly when the requested expenses are not specifically
fallowes by statute or precedent (,]” Hong, 88 Hawai at 54, at 961 F.2d at 619
[quoting Teadswings, 8 Haw. App. at 211, 799 P.2d at 68-68), and neither HRS §
67-9 nor case Law authorizes the cost of copies of trial transcripts.

 

 

 

16
   

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when the requested expenses are not specifically allowed by
statute oF precedent.” (Quoting Tradewinds, @ Haw. App. at 271,
799 P.2d at 68-69.))7

(14) The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Cummings’ request for parking costs. See id. (allowing
parking costs as part of intrastate travel expenses requested in

conjunction with interisland travel); id. ("Although the trial

 

court has discretion in the matter of allowing or disallowing
costs, that discretion should be exercised sparingly when the
requested expenses are not specifically allowed by statute or
precedent.” (Quoting Tradewinds, 8 Haw. App. at 271, 799 P.2d at
68-69.)). Therefore,
TT 18 HEREBY ORDERED that the circuit court's
November 3, 2004 final judgment is affirmed, but for the reasons
stated herein.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai"i, December 29, 2006

on the briefs:

Dennis K. Ferm and Gorm

Cindy 8. Inouye, Deputy .

Attorneys General, for SPE

defendant -appel lant /cross-

Sppeliee State of Naval! Prsstas Gretta

steven T, Barta

(of Law Offices of

Steven T. Barta) and Yom. Dee by

Theodore Y.#. Chinn

(of Law Offices of Theodore

Chinn) for plaintiff-appellee/

crose-appellant Wazren C.

Cummings

7