Title: State ex rel. Pyle v. Bessey

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Pyle v. Bessey, 112 Ohio St.3d 119, 2006-Ohio-6514.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. PYLE, APPELLANT, v. BESSEY, JUDGE, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Pyle v. Bessey, 112 Ohio St.3d 119, 2006-Ohio-6514.] 
Writs of mandamus and procedendo sought to compel trial court to permit 
discovery and conduct a trial on the merits of an arbitration issue — Writ 
of prohibition sought to prevent trial court from issuing further orders 
denying discovery and a trial on the merits — Court of appeals’ denial of 
writs affirmed. 
(No. 2006-1115 ─ Submitted November 29, 2006 ─ Decided  
December 27, 2006.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
No. 05AP-394, 2006-Ohio-2047. 
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Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing claims for writs of 
mandamus, procedendo, and prohibition to compel a trial court judge to permit 
discovery and to conduct a trial on the issue of whether a valid and enforceable 
arbitration agreement exists between the parties in an underlying case.1  Because 
appellant is collaterally estopped from raising his claims and the appellate court’s 
mandate was not patently and unambiguously disregarded, we affirm. 
{¶ 2} On June 7, 1999, appellant, Walter D. Pyle, obtained a loan from 
Wells Fargo Financial in order to buy a used truck.  Pyle also entered into an 
involuntary-unemployment credit-insurance agreement underwritten by Centurion 
Casualty Company.  Under the insurance agreement, Wells Fargo purchased a 
                                                 
1 The following facts are taken from the court of appeals’ decisions in Pyle v. Wells Fargo 
Financial, Franklin App. No. 05AP-644, 2005-Ohio-6478, and Pyle v. Wells Fargo Financial, 
Franklin App. No. 04AP-6, 2004-Ohio-4892. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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collateral protection insurance policy from Centurion on Pyle’s behalf and 
increased Pyle’s monthly loan payments to cover the policy cost. 
{¶ 3} Shortly after buying the truck, Pyle lost his job and was unable to 
make payments on the loan.  Wells Fargo repossessed the truck, sold it at an 
auction, and obtained a deficiency judgment against Pyle and his father, who had 
cosigned for the loan. 
{¶ 4} In January 2003, Pyle filed an action in the Franklin County Court 
of Common Pleas against Wells Fargo and Centurion alleging misrepresentation, 
breach of contract, bad faith, civil conspiracy, and violations of the Ohio 
Consumer Sales Practices Act, R.C. 1395.01 et seq., and the Truth in Lending 
Act, Section 1601 et seq., Title 15, U.S.Code.  In February 2003, Wells Fargo and 
Centurion filed a motion to compel arbitration and to stay or dismiss the case; 
they claimed that Pyle executed two arbitration agreements that encompassed all 
of Pyle’s claims.  In May 2003, Wells Fargo and Centurion filed a motion to stay 
discovery.  In November and December 2003, the trial court granted the motion to 
compel arbitration and dismissed the case subject to arbitration. 
{¶ 5} Pyle appealed the trial court’s judgment, and on September 16, 
2004, the court of appeals held that (1) the trial court was not required to hold a 
hearing or trial on the motion to stay the proceedings pending arbitration, (2) the 
trial court was required to conduct a trial before ruling on the motion to compel 
arbitration, and (3) the trial court erred in finding that the discovery motions were 
moot.  Pyle v. Wells Fargo Financial, Franklin App. No. 04AP-6, 2004-Ohio-
4892, ¶ 13, 19, 20 (“Pyle I”).  The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the 
trial court and remanded the cause to the trial court for further proceedings 
consistent with the opinion.  Id. at ¶ 22. 
{¶ 6} On remand, Wells Fargo and Centurion withdrew their motion to 
compel arbitration and renewed their motion to stay the proceedings pending 
arbitration.  On March 22, 2005, without a hearing, the trial court granted the 
January Term, 2006 
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motion to stay the proceedings pending arbitration and denied Pyle’s requests for 
discovery. 
{¶ 7} On appeal from the March 22, 2005 judgment, Pyle asserted that 
the trial court ignored the law of the case and the court of appeals’ mandate in 
Pyle I.  On December 6, 2005, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the 
trial court on remand.  Pyle v. Wells Fargo Financial, Franklin App. No. 05AP-
644, 2005-Ohio-6478 (“Pyle II”). 
{¶ 8} On April 21, 2005, while his appeal in Pyle II was pending, Pyle 
filed a petition in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County for writs of 
mandamus and procedendo to compel appellee, Judge John P. Bessey, who 
presides over the common pleas court case, to permit discovery and conduct a 
trial on the merits of the arbitration issue.  Pyle also requested a writ of 
prohibition to prevent Judge Bessey from issuing further orders denying discovery 
and a trial on the merits of the arbitration issue.  Pyle claimed that Judge Bessey 
was disregarding the court of appeals’ mandate in Pyle I.  Judge Bessey submitted 
an answer.  The court of appeals stayed further proceedings in the writ case 
pending its resolution of Pyle II. 
{¶ 9} On January 23, 2006, after Pyle II had been decided, the court of 
appeals magistrate issued a decision recommending that Pyle’s petition for the 
various writs be dismissed because the court’s decision in Pyle II had collaterally 
estopped Pyle from raising his claims.  Pyle objected to the magistrate’s decision.  
Pyle claimed that Pyle II was incorrectly decided and that Pyle I controlled the 
case.  On April 25, 2006, the court of appeals overruled Pyle’s objections, 
adopted the magistrate’s decision, and dismissed Pyle’s petition. 
{¶ 10} In his appeal as of right, Pyle asserts that the court of appeals erred 
in dismissing his petition.  For the reasons that follow, Pyle’s contentions lack 
merit. 
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{¶ 11} First, collateral estoppel barred Pyle from raising his claims that 
Judge Bessey failed to adhere to the court of appeals’ ruling in Pyle I.  
“[C]ollateral estoppel prevents parties from relitigating in a subsequent case facts 
and issues that were fully litigated in a previous case.”  State ex rel. Stacy v. 
Batavia Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 97 Ohio St.3d 269, 2002-Ohio-6322, 779 
N.E.2d 216, ¶ 16.  The court of appeals had already considered and rejected these 
claims in Pyle II, which was decided before the court of appeals dismissed Pyle’s 
writ claims. Pyle had an adequate remedy by discretionary appeal from Pyle II to 
raise his contention that Pyle II was wrongly decided.  On April 26, 2006, 
however, we refused to accept Pyle’s discretionary appeal from Pyle II.  109 Ohio 
St.3d 1424, 2006-Ohio-1967, 846 N.E.2d 534. 
{¶ 12} Second, the court of appeals, in its decision in Pyle II, did not 
patently and unambiguously disregard its mandate in Pyle I.  The court of appeals 
was in the best position to determine whether Judge Bessey violated its mandate 
in Pyle I, and it concluded that he had not done so by affirming his judgment in 
Pyle II and dismissing Pyle’s writ action.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Borden v. 
Hendon, 96 Ohio St.3d 64, 2002-Ohio-3525, 771 N.E.2d 247, ¶ 9; Dzina v. 
Celebrezze, 108 Ohio St.3d 385, 2006-Ohio-1195, 843 N.E.2d 1202, ¶ 13. 
{¶ 13} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals properly dismissed 
Pyle’s writ action.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL 
and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents and would reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
__________________ 
 
Law Offices of James P. Connors and James P. Connors, for appellant. 
January Term, 2006 
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Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mary Jane 
Martin, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
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