Title: Dennis Sochor v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida
_________________________
Nos. SC01-885 & SC02-1797
_________________________
DENNIS SOCHOR,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
_________________________
DENNIS SOCHOR,
Petitioner,
vs.
JAMES V. CROSBY, JR., etc.,
Respondent.
[July 8, 2004]
PER CURIAM.
Dennis Sochor, an inmate under sentence of death, appeals an order of the
circuit court denying his motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.850.  He also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.
2.  For a description of the underlying facts, see Sochor v. State, 580 So. 2d
595, 598-99 (Fla. 1991), vacated, 504 U.S. 527 (1992).
3. The trial judge found the following aggravating circumstances:  (1) Sochor
had previously been convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to
the person; (2) the murder was committed while Sochor was engaged in the
commission of a felony; (3) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel;
and (4) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner
without any pretense of moral or legal justification.  Id. at 599 n.2.
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corpus.1  For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the order of the circuit court
and deny the habeas petition.
I.  BACKGROUND
Sochor was convicted of kidnapping and first-degree murder.2  In
accordance with the jury's ten-to-two recommendation, the judge sentenced Sochor
to death, finding four aggravating circumstances3 and no mitigating circumstances. 
Sochor v. State, 580 So. 2d 595, 599 (Fla. 1991).  On direct appeal, we found that
the evidence was not sufficient to meet the heightened level of premeditation
necessary for the "cold, calculated, and premeditated" aggravating circumstance. 
Id. at 603.  Nevertheless, we affirmed the convictions and the death sentence,
holding that in light of the other aggravating circumstances which the trial court
found and the absence of mitigating circumstances, the death sentence was
proportionate and no resentencing was required.  Id. at 604.
4. Sochor claimed that:  (1) the State withheld certain public records in
violation of chapter 119, Florida Statutes; (2) the rules prohibiting Sochor's lawyers
from interviewing jurors are unconstitutional and deny him adequate assistance of
counsel in his postconviction proceedings; (3) the State failed to reveal, or trial
counsel unreasonably failed to discover, that the State had made promises of
lenient treatment to jailhouse informants or that jailhouse informants were operating
as agents of the State; (4) trial counsel was ineffective, and the State violated Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), at the guilt phase; (5) the State violated Brady and
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), at the guilt phase; (6) the State made
improper arguments at trial; (7) newly discovered evidence shows that Sochor's
conviction and sentence are constitutionally unreliable; (8) Sochor is innocent of
first-degree murder and innocent of the death penalty; (9) trial counsel was
ineffective pretrial, during voir dire, and during the guilt phase; (10) Sochor was not
competent to stand trial, and his counsel was ineffective for failing to secure an
adequate mental health evaluation; (11) Sochor's mental health evaluations were
constitutionally inadequate; (12) Sochor did not make a knowing and intelligent
waiver of his constitutional rights, and his statements to police were admitted into
evidence unconstitutionally; (13) Sochor did not make a knowing and intelligent
waiver of extradition, and counsel was ineffective for failing to argue this point; (14)
Sochor was not given notice that he would have to defend against a felony-murder
charge; (15) the jury received improper instructions at the guilt phase, and trial and
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the sentence,
and remanded the case, holding that we failed to perform a harmless error analysis. 
Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 540 (1992).  On remand, we held that the trial
judge's weighing of the invalid aggravating factor was "harmless error," and we
therefore affirmed Sochor's death sentence.  Sochor v. State, 619 So. 2d 285, 293
(Fla. 1993).
Sochor then filed a rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief in which he
raised thirty claims.4   Following a Huff hearing,5 the circuit court granted a 
appellate counsel were ineffective to the extent they failed to preserve or raise this
issue at trial and on appeal; (16) the procedure by which special public defenders
and expert witnesses are appointed and funded creates an irreconcilable conflict of
interest; (17) trial counsel was ineffective at the penalty phase; (18) the prosecutor
and the judge unconstitutionally diluted the jury's sense of its role in sentencing;
(19) the "cold, calculated, and premeditated" aggravating circumstance is
unconstitutionally vague; (20) the "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" jury instruction was
unconstitutionally vague; (21) the Florida Supreme Court did not conduct a proper
harmless error analysis on remand from the United States Supreme Court; (22) the
jury was improperly instructed on, and the judge improperly found, the "prior
violent felony" aggravating circumstance; (23) Sochor's sentence rests upon an
unconstitutionally automatic and illusory aggravating circumstance; (24) the jury and
judge both unconstitutionally considered nonstatutory aggravating circumstances;
(25) the judge unconstitutionally refused to find and weigh the mitigating
circumstances set out in the record; (26) the State did not give notice of the
aggravating circumstances it would allege; (27) the penalty phase jury instructions
unconstitutionally shifted the burden to Sochor to prove that death was not the
appropriate sentence; (28) Florida's death penalty statute is unconstitutional; (29)
the cumulative effect of the errors at trial were not harmless and deprived Sochor of
a fair trial; and (30) the State violated Brady by not revealing the results of
polygraph tests administered to Gary Sochor, and counsel was ineffective for
failing to discover and present this information.
5.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993).
6. The circuit court granted an evidentiary hearing on the following claims,
summarily denying the remainder:  the Brady and Giglio issues raised in claims (3),
(4), and (5) regarding the testimony of the jailhouse informant and Gary Sochor;
and the issues raised in claims (10), (11), and (17) regarding Sochor's competency
to stand trial, the adequacy of the mental health evaluations, and the effectiveness of
counsel's assistance at the penalty phase.
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limited evidentiary hearing.6  After the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied
the motion for postconviction relief.  Sochor now appeals the circuit court's
7.  On appeal of the circuit court's denial of his rule 3.850 motion, Sochor
raises ten claims.  He claims that:  (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel
at the penalty phase of his trial; (2) the State committed a Brady violation by not
revealing that it had given Gary Sochor immunity in exchange for his testimony; (3)
he received a constitutionally inadequate mental health evaluation; (4) the
postconviction circuit court judge should have granted Sochor's motion to
disqualify himself; (5) several of his claims were improperly denied by the circuit
court without an evidentiary hearing; (6) his trial counsel's failure to object to certain
jury instructions was ineffective assistance; (7) he is innocent of the death penalty;
(8) the rules that prohibit lawyers from contacting jurors are unconstitutional; (9) the
death penalty statute is unconstitutional; and (10) the cumulative effect of the errors
at trial deprived him of a fair trial.
8.  Sochor raises five claims in his habeas petition: (1) that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal; (2) that this Court did not
conduct a proper harmless error analysis on remand from the United States
Supreme Court; (3) that the instruction for the "heinous, atrocious, or cruel"
aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally vague; (4) that he did not receive a
proper appeal because the appellate record was incomplete; and (5) that Florida's
capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584
(2002).
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denial. 7  He also petitions for a writ of habeas corpus.8  As stated above, we affirm
the circuit court's denial of relief and deny the habeas petition.
II.  RULE 3.850
A.  Penalty Phase Ineffectiveness of Counsel
Sochor argues that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel because his lawyer failed to investigate, prepare, and
present evidence that would support the existence of two statutory mitigating
circumstances and several nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.  He claims that
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counsel did not thoroughly investigate his background and did not provide any
information about his background to the mental health experts who evaluated him,
rendering their evaluations inadequate for the purpose of developing evidence of
mitigating circumstances.  He also claims that counsel did not adequately prepare
his penalty phase lay witnesses before they testified.  Sochor argues that this
deficiency in his counsel's performance prevented the jury and the judge from
understanding the true nature and extent of his troubled background and mental
health status.  As a result, he argues, the outcome of the penalty phase was
unreliable.  He argues that there is a reasonable probability that he would not have
been sentenced to death had counsel not been deficient.
To be entitled to relief on this claim, Sochor must show that his attorney's
performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his
defense.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also Wiggins v.
Smith, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). 
To satisfy the deficiency prong, Sochor must show "that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant
by the Sixth Amendment."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  Sochor must demonstrate
that counsel's representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." 
Id. at 688.  If Sochor can establish that counsel's performance was deficient, he
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must then "show[ ] that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive [him] of a
fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable."  Id. at 687.  In other words, in order to
establish the prejudice prong, Sochor "must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different."  Id. at 694.  As the Court explained in
Strickland, "[a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome."  Id.  In the penalty phase context, "the question is
whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer . . .
would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
did not warrant death."  Id. at 695.
When we review a circuit court's resolution of a Strickland claim, as we do
here, we apply a mixed standard of review because both the performance and the
prejudice prongs of the Strickland test present mixed questions of law and fact. 
See id. at 698 ("Ineffectiveness is . . . a mixed question of law and fact."); Stephens
v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1033 (Fla. 1999).  We defer to the circuit court's factual
findings, but we review de novo the circuit court's legal conclusions.  Stephens,
748 So. 2d at 1033 ("Thus, under Strickland, both the performance and prejudice
prongs are mixed questions of law and fact, with deference to be given only to the
lower court's factual findings."); see also Hodges v. State, 28 Fla. L. Weekly S475,
9.  Sochor's trial counsel was not alive to testify at Sochor's evidentiary
hearing.  Our review of the trial record and the evidentiary-hearing testimony reveals
that Sochor's counsel probably employed the same "strategy" in preparing for
Sochor's penalty phase as he did in preparing for the penalty phase in a different
trial conducted before Sochor's trial.  At the postconviction evidentiary hearing in
that other case, conducted after Sochor's trial but before Sochor's evidentiary
hearing, Sochor's counsel testified about his general approach to penalty-phase
preparation.  See Deaton v. Dugger, 635 So. 2d 4, 8-9 (Fla. 1993).  It appears that
he employed the same "strategy" in both cases.
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S476 (Fla. June 19, 2003) ("Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are mixed
questions of law and fact, and are thus subject to plenary review based on the
Strickland test.  Under this standard, the Court conducts an independent review of
the trial court's legal conclusions, while giving deference to the trial court's factual
findings.") (citation omitted).  With these principles in mind, we now analyze
Sochor's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
1.  The Deficiency Prong
We agree with Sochor that his counsel's penalty-phase performance was
deficient.  Our review of the penalty-phase transcript and the evidentiary-hearing
testimony reveals that Sochor's counsel put little time or effort into preparing
expressly for the penalty phase.9 
The only witnesses counsel presented at the penalty phase were four
members of Sochor's family.  One of these witnesses, a sister, was not even
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contacted by counsel.  She learned about the penalty phase from another relative
and traveled to Florida on her own.  When she arrived, she told counsel that she
wanted to testify; counsel quickly glanced at a statement she had prepared and told
her she could read it to the jury.  The other three witnesses received no more
preparation from counsel.  Counsel simply asked them to prepare statements to
read to the jury.  In addition to these lay witnesses, counsel introduced the reports
of three mental health experts who testified during the guilt phase.  However,
counsel did not provide these experts with any information about Sochor's
background, nor did he specifically instruct them to examine and evaluate Sochor
for the purpose of establishing mitigating evidence.
Based on these undisputed facts, counsel's performance was clearly
deficient, and the circuit court's holding to the contrary was erroneous.  See State
v. Lewis, 838 So. 2d 1102, 1113 (Fla. 2002) ("[T]he obligation to investigate and
prepare for the penalty portion of a capital case cannot be overstated—this is an
integral part of a capital case."); Rose v. State, 675 So. 2d 567, 571 (Fla. 1996)
("An attorney has a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation, including an
investigation of the defendant's background, for possible mitigating evidence.")
(quoting Porter v. Singletary, 14 F.3d 554, 557 (11th Cir. 1994)).
2.  The Prejudice Prong
10.  The United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Bell v. Cone, 535
U.S. 685 (2002), makes clear that Sochor's claim is properly analyzed under the
two-pronged test of Strickland—not under the presumed-prejudice standard of
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).  Cronic held that "[t]here are . . .
circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating
their effect in a particular case is unjustified."  Id. at 658.  One of those
circumstances is when "counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to
meaningful adversarial testing."  Id. at 659.  However, in Bell, the Court stressed
that "the attorney's failure must be complete."  535 U.S. at 697.  The Court rejected
the defendant's claim that prejudice should be presumed because counsel failed to
introduce mitigating evidence and did not make a closing argument at the penalty
phase, holding that "[t]he aspects of counsel's performance challenged by [the
defendant] . . . are plainly of the same ilk as other specific attorney errors we have
held subject to Strickland's performance and prejudice components."  Id. at 697-
98.  The Court distinguished claims that "counsel failed to oppose the prosecution
throughout the sentencing proceeding as a whole" from claims that "counsel failed
to do so at specific points," holding that "[f]or purposes of distinguishing between
the rule of Strickland and that of Cronic, this difference is not of degree but of
kind."  Id. at 697.
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We now must determine whether Sochor established that he was prejudiced
by counsel's deficient performance.  See Wiggins, 123 S. Ct. at 2542 ("In order for
counsel's inadequate performance to constitute a Sixth Amendment violation,
petitioner must show that counsel's failures prejudiced his defense.").10  As we
noted above, in order for Sochor to establish that counsel's deficient performance
prejudiced his defense, he "must show that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the [penalty-phase] proceeding
would have been different."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see also Wiggins, 123 S.
11.  The dissent mischaracterizes the prejudice inquiry as whether counsel's
deficiencies "prejudice[d] the defendant's entitlement to have his plea for life
presented to the jury by a competent lawyer."  Dissenting opinion at 50.  This
formulation reads the required showing of prejudice out of the Strickland test
completely: if a defendant established that his counsel's performance was deficient,
that defendant would establish ipso facto that his right to have his case "presented
to the jury by a competent lawyer" was prejudiced.  The dissent also states that we
have "render[ed] meaningless the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to
counsel" and have essentially "direct[ed] a judgment of death by concluding that
having competent representation could not possibly have made a difference." 
Dissenting op. at 51 (emphasis added).  But this too misstates the law.  As the
United States Supreme Court held in Strickland, to be entitled to relief on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, "[i]t is not enough for the defendant to show that
[counsel's] errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 (emphasis added).  Rather, "the appropriate test for
prejudice" requires the defendant to "show that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different."  Id. at 694.  In other words, in addition to showing that
counsel's performance was deficient, Sochor must also show a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's deficiencies, he would have received a sentence
of life imprisonment rather than death.  Strickland defined a "reasonable
probability" as "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 
Id.
We also note that whether or not the State's brief argued the prejudice issue,
see dissenting op. at 51 n.28, is irrelevant.  At all times throughout the
postconviction process, the burden fell on Sochor to "affirmatively prove
prejudice."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693.  Even if the State focused primarily (or
even exclusively) on the deficiency issue, that does not mean that the State either
conceded or waived the prejudice issue, particularly in light of the fact that the trial
court held that Sochor failed to establish prejudice.  As we explain below, after
reviewing the record and the evidentiary-hearing testimony, we have concluded that
the trial court's factual findings relative to the prejudice issue are supported by
competent, substantial evidence and, therefore, are entitled to our deference.    
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Ct. at 2542.11  
The circuit court held that Sochor had not established prejudice.  As we
12.  The circuit court's order certainly was not a model of clarity, but we will
make this point clearer below by recounting the relevant trial testimony and the
relevant evidentiary-hearing testimony, and referencing the circuit court's relevant
findings related thereto.  See, e.g., infra at 27-28 (quoting State v. Sochor, No. 86-
15270CF10A order at 9-12 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. order filed Mar. 28, 2001))
("Postconviction order") ("Dr. Ceros-Livingston [one of Sochor's trial experts]
testified at the evidentiary hearing that considering her previous evaluation in
conjunction with the records and background material provided to her by the
Defendant's appellate counsel in 1999, her diagnosis of the Defendant and
testimony at the time of trial would have been the same.  Dr. Ceros-Livingston
testified at the evidentiary hearing that when the Defendant was evaluated in 1987,
he did not have manic depressive disorder.  Moreover, based upon the additional
information provided to her in 1999, Dr. Ceros-Livingston did not think that the
Defendant had bipolar disorder or organic brain damage at the time of the murder. .
. . Dr. Ceros-Livingston clearly stated that her opinion would remain the same after
considering the additional records.").
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explain below, inherent in the circuit court's conclusion, made after hearing the
conflicting testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing, is the factual finding
(which we conclude is supported by competent, substantial evidence) that even if
defense counsel had adequately investigated Sochor's background and prepared
for the penalty phase, he would not have been able to present at the penalty phase
any evidence significantly different from the evidence actually presented.12 
Deferring to this factual finding, we agree with the circuit court's conclusion that
Sochor failed to show a reasonable probability that absent counsel's errors, he
would not have been sentenced to death.  To explain why, we will recount the
pertinent penalty-phase lay testimony and the guilt-phase expert testimony that the
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jury heard as well as the testimony Sochor presented at the postconviction
evidentiary hearing.
a.  Penalty-Phase Evidence
As we mentioned earlier, four of Sochor's family members testified at the
penalty phase:  his parents, Charles and Rose Sochor; his brother, Gary Sochor;
and his sister, Kathy Cooper.  Their testimony revealed the following facts about
Sochor:  he was one of ten children; his father singled him out for repeated and
brutal beatings; his mother also beat him; when he was four years old, he fell while
running with a tin horn in his mouth and the tin horn went through the roof of his
mouth; for a period of time when his father had been demoted at work, Sochor
gave the family his paychecks; his parents noticed that he changed after he was
discharged from the army—specifically, he became violent, especially when under
the influence of alcohol; at one point, his parents thought he needed psychiatric
help and were able to get him involuntarily committed to a hospital, but he was
quickly released when the hospital told the family that although he needed
psychiatric help, he was "not severe enough" to be kept there; and he attempted to
commit suicide.
Sochor's father, Charles, recounted a time when he had come home from
work to learn that Sochor's mother, Rose, had "lost her temper and beat Denn[is],
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then banged his head against the wall."  Charles testified that he too would to lose
his temper and beat the children, with "Denny always getting the worst of it."  He
told the jury of the head injury suffered by Sochor when he was four years old:
Sochor had fallen while running with a tin horn in his mouth, and the horn went
through the roof of his mouth, "opening a hole that you could see right into his
head."  Charles also told the jury that he began to notice changes in Sochor after he
was released from the army, saying that he "was violent, especially when alcohol
was involved.  He was completely out of control."  Charles testified that he and
Rose realized at this point that Sochor "needed mental help," and he told the jury
about their attempt "to get him institutionalized."  After they convinced a judge to
commit him to a mental hospital, Sochor was released after "less than a week," on
the condition that he would report once a week.  Sochor was upset that his parents
had him committed to the hospital, so he left home.  Sochor's father testified that
he had not seen or spoken to Sochor since that incident, with the exception of one
phone call he received from Sochor in which Sochor told him that he had
attempted to commit suicide.
Sochor's mother told the jury that Sochor had a "difficult childhood" and
that she was "an abusive mother."  She testified that Sochor had "a lot of hostility
and problems" as he got older and things became worse after he was discharged
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from the army, especially when he drank alcohol.  She discussed the time she and
Sochor's father tried to get Sochor mental help, telling the jury that the counselors
"told [them] that he definitely needed psychiatric help, but was not severe enough"
to be kept there.
Sochor's brother, Gary, testified that Sochor was beaten a lot as a child, that
he took the brunt of their father's beatings, and that their father used to beat them
with a "big belt."
Sochor's sister, Kathy Cooper, gave the most in-depth and descriptive
penalty-phase testimony about the beatings suffered by Sochor as a child.  She told
the jury that Sochor "had a pretty rough life" and that most of their parents'
frustrations were taken out on Sochor.  She described their father as a former
boxer who was "very strong," "knew how to hit," and had "a very quick and
violent temper."  She told the jury that there were times when the other children
would have to pull their father off Sochor.  She testified that their father would go
into "a rage" and would trap Sochor in a corner and hit him over and over—in the
face, arms, and the rest of his body—resulting in Sochor "constantly [having] his
lips split open, black eyes, [and] bruises all over his body."  She described an
incident where their father grabbed Sochor's hair and "kept banging his head
against the wall."  She told the jury that their mother watched this happen and did
13.  Drs. Zager and Ceros-Livingston testified for the defense; Dr. Castillo
testified for the State.
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nothing to stop it.  Like her parents, Kathy testified that the family tried to get
mental help for Sochor but the psychiatric hospital told them that "he wasn't bad
enough to where he needed help."
Sochor's trial counsel also introduced the reports of three mental health
experts who had evaluated Sochor and testified during the guilt phase:  Dr. Zager, a
psychiatrist; Dr. Ceros-Livingston, a clinical psychologist; and Dr. Castillo, a
psychiatrist.13  As mentioned previously, counsel did not provide any background
materials to these experts; their evaluations were based solely on information
gathered from their clinical interviews with Sochor.  Nor did counsel instruct the
experts to conduct their evaluations with an eye towards developing evidence of
mitigating circumstances; rather, their evaluations were done for the purpose of
determining Sochor's competency to stand trial and his sanity at the time of the
crime.  They all testified that Sochor was competent to stand trial and was sane at
the time of the crime.  However, their testimony went beyond merely answering
these questions, and counsel referred to their testimony and their reports in his
penalty-phase closing argument.
Dr. Zager interviewed Sochor, during which he observed Sochor and
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gathered his "history," which Dr. Zager defined as emotional and psychiatric
problems, present legal circumstances, medical history, history of drug or alcohol
use, educational history, family history, childhood experiences, and relationship
history.  Dr. Zager also conducted a mental status examination, which consisted of
his observations not only of what Sochor said to him, but also how he said it, his
stream of thought, and his orientation and awareness of present circumstances.  In
his guilt-phase testimony, Dr. Zager told the jury the following facts about Sochor: 
he had a history of drug and alcohol problems and a history of alcoholic blackouts;
he claimed to have had an alcoholic blackout the night of the murder; he reported
having suffered two concussions and having fallen off a horse and hitting his head
as a child; and he believed his mother physically abused him as a child.  Dr. Zager
also told the jury that after Sochor was arrested, he was prescribed Lithium, a
psychotropic medication that Dr. Zager described as a mood-stabilizing drug, and
Sinequan, which he described as an antidepressant.
Dr. Zager told the jury that Sochor appeared to manifest evidence of a
"longstanding problem of drug and alcohol abuse" and of a "conduct disorder,
socialized, aggressive type" as a child.  He suspected that Sochor suffered from
"anti-social personality disorder," and he believed Sochor was "a much more
aggressive, potentially very violent, individual under the influence of intoxicants." 
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He believed that Sochor acted impulsively and with impaired judgment while under
the influence of alcohol.  Although he did not believe Sochor met the requirements
for involuntary hospitalization under the Baker Act, see §§ 394.451-.4789, Fla. Stat.
(2003), he did believe that Sochor was "extremely dangerous to the public."
Dr. Ceros-Livingston also evaluated Sochor and testified during the guilt
phase.  She told the jury that Sochor reported a long-term history of drug and
alcohol abuse, starting at a very young age; that Sochor reported that the United
States Army, upon discharging him, recommended that he get psychiatric care; and
that Sochor reported that he had attempted to commit suicide by drowning.  Dr.
Ceros-Livingston also administered two psychological tests:  the Carlson
Psychological Survey (CPS) and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory
(MMPI).  She testified that results of the CPS revealed a profile similar to those
obtained from people who have alcohol and drug abuse as a major characteristic; it
also matched the profile of a person with a quick temper which might result in
impulsive and destructive behavior.  She testified that the profile obtained from the
MMPI was invalid ("fake-bad"), which means that the person is trying to "make
[himself] look psychopathological."  Based on the "fake-bad" MMPI profile, and
noting that Sochor had recounted "some things that had happened in his feelings
and what he allegedly said around the alleged crime," Dr. Ceros-Livingston testified
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that Sochor possibly was "malingering."
Finally, Dr. Castillo testified for the State at the guilt phase.  Like Dr. Zager,
Dr. Castillo told the jury that Sochor was being medicated with Lithium, which he
described to the jury as a medicine used mostly to treat manic depressive illness. 
He described manic depressive illness as a mood- and behavior-affecting condition. 
However, Dr. Castillo also told the jury that he did not believe that Sochor suffered
from manic depressive illness.  Nor did he believe that Sochor had blacked out on
the night of the murder.  He believed that Sochor was suffering from "a type of
selective amnesia."  Like Dr. Zager, Dr. Castillo concluded that Sochor suffered
from antisocial personality disorder.
b.  Postconviction Evidence
At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Sochor presented the testimony of
the same four family members who had testified at the penalty phase.  He also
presented the testimony of additional family members and some lay acquaintances
whom trial counsel never contacted.  Sochor's father testified that he began to beat
Sochor with a belt "a couple times a week" when Sochor was between six and eight
years old.  When Sochor was older, he would hit him with his fists.  He also
testified that when Sochor was about five or six years old, his older brother was
severely burned.  Sochor's mother testified that she had a "difficult labor" when
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Sochor was born and that Sochor had marks on his head from the forceps and his
head was "very pointed and blue."  She also told the jury that Sochor's older
brother had been severely burned when Sochor was a child.  She again testified that
she would sometimes hit Sochor and that Charles would beat the children too. 
Sochor's sister, Kathy Cooper, again testified about the time Sochor's father
grabbed Sochor's hair and beat his head against the wall.  She also testified about a
time when Sochor's father kicked Sochor and then repeatedly punched him in the
face.  She testified that she was sexually molested by their father when she was a
teenager.  Sochor's brother, Gary, testified that their father would beat the children
with his "belt, fist, open hands, whatever," and he would beat Sochor until he was
bleeding, knocked out, or knocked down and in so much pain that he did not get
up.  He also testified that Sochor used a lot of drugs. 
In addition to these four family members, Sochor presented testimony at the
evidentiary hearing from other family members, friends, and teachers.  One of
Sochor's high school friends, Earl Mitchell, testified about a time when Sochor got
into a fight with a man much larger than he.  The man picked Sochor up, threw him
to the ground, and slammed his head into the pavement.  He also estimated that he
and Sochor "drop[ped] acid" over 150 times in 1971.  One of Sochor's childhood
friends, Marvin Droste, testified that Sochor's childhood home was "disheveled"
-21-
and "unkempt," and Sochor's family was poor.  He testified that Sochor's father
had a reputation for being "tough on the kids," and Sochor would often tell him that
his father had "whipped on" him.  He testified about Sochor's drug use and said
that Sochor was "prone to quick changes and moods, quick mood swings and
bouts of depression."
Christine Thatcher testified that she worked with Sochor one summer at a
professional acting company where Sochor was an intern.  She testified that
Sochor performed a dance number that was "stunning," but that he was "untrained"
and "unskilled."  He was "unfocused" and "undisciplined" at the beginning of the
summer, but was "working extremely diligently" by the end.  Louis Lascala,
Sochor's high school teacher and junior varsity basketball coach, testified that
Sochor lacked "team skills" and was quiet and withdrawn from the other kids on
the team.  Father Melvin Cox, a Catholic priest and high school teacher, testified
that Sochor was "very unmotivated" and showed "signs of depression."  Helen
Foley, a family friend, testified that Sochor's father was quiet and severe and his
mother was more laid back.  She also testified that Sochor was artistic.
Sochor's younger brother, Blaine, and his younger sisters, Lisa Elaine Fisher
and Melanie Wheeler, testified that their father used to beat Sochor.  Blaine also
testified that there were times when they were so hungry they would hunt for food,
-22-
and Sochor was a "very good" brother who taught him to play sports and fish. 
Lisa Elaine and Melanie testified that Sochor was very protective of them.  Melanie
also testified that their older brother, Gary, molested and sexually abused her when
she was eleven or twelve years old, and her parents did not believe her when she
reported it to them.  She also testified that she caught her father peeking in on her
when she was in the shower and feared that he would abuse her too.   
Sochor also presented the testimony of two new mental health experts:  Dr.
Greer, a neuropsychiatrist; and Dr. Froming, a clinical psychologist and
neuropsychologist.  In addition, the State presented the testimony of Dr. Ceros-
Livingston, the clinical psychologist who had evaluated Sochor and testified for the
defense during the guilt phase.  Sochor's postconviction counsel provided these
new mental health experts, as well as Dr. Ceros-Livingston, with the background
materials—jail and prison records, school records, military records—that Sochor
claims trial counsel should have provided to the original experts.  The new experts
evaluated Sochor to determine if any mitigating circumstances could have been
presented at the penalty phase.
Dr. Greer testified that Sochor suffers from manic depressive illness and
alcohol and polysubstance abuse disorder.  He testified that he diagnosed Sochor
with manic depressive illness based on his review of Sochor's prison records,
-23-
which indicated that Sochor had been repeatedly diagnosed as having such illness
and was being treated with Lithium.  He testified that his clinical interview with
Sochor confirmed this diagnosis.  In the interview, Sochor exhibited tangentiality,
"flight of ideas," rapid or pressured speech, grandiosity, and a hypomanic or
somewhat manic mood.  Dr. Greer believed that Sochor suffers from "mixed type"
manic depression, which means that he has florid or full-blown manic episodes as
well as depressive episodes.   
Based on his evaluation of Sochor, Dr. Greer testified that there was
evidence to support two mental health-related statutory mitigating circumstances. 
He believed the combination of manic depressive disorder and Sochor's
consumption of alcohol on the night of the murder resulted in Sochor's lacking the
ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.  He testified that
although a person in the manic phase of the illness may know that what he is doing
is wrong, his hyperactive state prevents him from being able to stop himself.  Dr.
Greer also believed that Sochor had been under extreme mental or emotional
disturbance at the time of the murder.  He believed that manic depression, being a
chronic illness, was likely to have been present at the time of the murder and it was
likely that when combined with alcohol, the manic phase of the illness would have
14.  Dr. Greer also believed that alcohol consumption on the night of the
murder would have had an especially intense effect because Sochor had abstained
from alcohol for a period of time prior to the night of the murder. 
15.  Dr. Greer did not believe Sochor had antisocial personality disorder
because his history did not indicate the trait of calculated monetary gain.  He
believed his history was more consistent with manic depressive illness than with
antisocial personality disorder. 
16.  Two of Sochor's sisters testified at the evidentiary hearing that they had
been sexually abused, but there is no evidence in the record that Sochor himself
had been the victim of sexual abuse, or that Sochor knew that his sisters had been
abused.
-24-
been a problem for him.14  He believed Sochor was in the manic phase of the illness
at the time of the murder based on the testimony of those who witnessed him at the
time and based on Sochor's own statements that he had the illness, had consumed
alcohol, and was in a hypermotoric state.15
Dr. Froming, the clinical psychologist and neuropsychologist, testified that
Sochor had "moderately severe" brain impairment, a substance dependence
disorder, bipolar affective disorder (mild with a mixed episode), and posttraumatic
stress disorder as a result of the severe childhood physical and sexual abuse that
was in the home.16  She believed that the background records provided by
Sochor's postconviction counsel indicated the presence of several potential risk
factors for brain damage:  Sochor's mother smoked during pregnancy; she had an
extended labor with forceps delivery; Sochor had suffered head injuries, inflicted
17.  Dr. Froming also noted that "blackouts can occur at less alcohol
[consumption] than that in someone who has been in partial remission" from
substance abuse.
-25-
by his parents and incurred in various accidents; he had a history of alcohol abuse;
and he grew up in an environment characterized by severe family violence and
abuse.  Dr. Froming testified that in her clinical interview with Sochor, she noted his
rapid, pressured speech; flight of ideas; tangentiality; and depressed mood.  She
also testified that she conducted a battery of neuropsychological tests.
Like Dr. Greer, Dr. Froming believed that Sochor had been under extreme
mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the murder and had been unable to
conform his conduct to the law.  She testified that the synergistic effect of
combining brain damage with manic depressive illness resulted in "almost no ability
to self-regulate" and "no ability to inhibit impulse."  She believed that because
Sochor had abstained from alcohol in the period leading up to the night of the
murder, "as little as one to three drinks" would have made him "acutely
intoxicated."17  Dr. Froming criticized the evaluations and testimony of the original
experts.  She criticized their lack of attention to the fact that Sochor had been
prescribed Lithium.  She was also critical of Dr. Ceros-Livingston's MMPI
analysis.  Dr. Froming testified that the raw data could have supported Dr. Ceros-
Livingston's "fake-bad" conclusion, but she believed it also could have supported a
-26-
"cry for help" profile or an exaggeration of symptoms due to distress.  She
believed that Dr. Ceros-Livingston's evaluation was "far too brief" and there were
"other things that she could have done to expand and corroborate or refute her fake
bad interpretation."
Finally, Dr. Ceros-Livingston, the psychologist who had evaluated Sochor
and testified for the defense at the guilt phase of the trial, testified for the State at
the evidentiary hearing.  At this point, she had reviewed the background materials
that Sochor's postconviction counsel had provided to the new experts.  She stated
that her original diagnosis and testimony were unaffected by her review of these
new materials.  She testified that nothing in the background materials indicated that
Sochor suffered from manic depression or organic brain damage.  She believed
that a diagnosis of manic depressive illness was inconsistent with the fact that
Sochor was able to sit still and concentrate during the eight-hour examination
conducted by Dr. Froming.  She also disputed the significance of the notations in
the prison records that Sochor had been prescribed Lithium—a factor relied on by
the new experts to support their diagnoses of manic depression.  Dr. Ceros-
Livingston noted that none of the records actually recorded any symptoms of
manic depression, e.g., pressured speech, flight of ideas, distractibility, grandiosity,
etc.  She also noted that none of the many mental status exams included in the
-27-
prison records ever reported that Sochor was having mood problems.  Even more
importantly, she stressed that even though Sochor had been prescribed Lithium in
prison, he was at various times taken off the drug and the prison records never
indicated that he exhibited any symptoms of manic depression during these
Lithium-free periods.  She also noted that the military conducts extensive physical
exams, and none of Sochor's military records indicated a diagnosis (or even the
presence of any symptoms) of manic depression.  Finally, she testified that there
was nothing in the record that suggested to her that Sochor was in a manic phase at
the time of the murder.
c.  The Circuit Court's Findings
After the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied relief.  The court found
that the lay testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing was either cumulative with
respect to the penalty phase testimony or insignificant.  As for Sochor's relatives
who testified at both the penalty phase and the evidentiary hearing, the court found
that they "testified about the same facts" at the evidentiary hearing as they did at the
penalty phase.  State v. Sochor, Case No. 86-15270CF10A (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct.
order filed Mar. 28, 2001) ("Postconviction order") at 13.  The court also found
that the additional family-member testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing
was "cumulative" and "was presented at the penalty phase by other family
-28-
members," and the additional lay testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing was
"cumulative and not significant."  Id. at 13-14.   
With respect to the mental-health testimony, the circuit court gave great
weight to Dr. Ceros-Livingston's testimony at the evidentiary hearing.  For instance,
the court stated:
At the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Ceros-Livingston testified that, even
after reviewing the new information provided by the Defendant's
appellate counsel, her original opinions regarding the Defendant
remained the same.  In her opinion, the records presented to her did
not indicate manic depression or organic brain damage.  There was no
indication that the Defendant's behavior changed whether he was on
Lithium or not.
Postconviction order at 8 (citations omitted).  The court found that:
Despite the fact that "mitigation" was not specifically discussed with
Dr. Ceros-Livingston, the record indicates that the tests that she
performed on Defendant allowed her to draw opinions in regards to
his mental health, which were properly presented by defense counsel
to the judge and jury during the penalty phase as mitigating factors. 
Furthermore, Dr. Ceros-Livingston testified at the evidentiary hearing
that considering her previous evaluation in conjunction with the
records and background material provided to her by the Defendant's
appellate counsel in 1999, her diagnosis of the Defendant and
testimony at the time of trial would have been the same.  Dr. Ceros-
Livingston testified at the evidentiary hearing that when the Defendant
was evaluated in 1987, he did not have manic depressive disorder. 
Moreover, based upon the additional information provided to her in
1999, Dr. Ceros-Livingston did not think that the Defendant had
bipolar disorder or organic brain damage at the time of the murder.
Postconviction order at 9-10 (emphasis added); see also id. at 12 ("Dr. Ceros-
-29-
Livingston clearly stated that her opinion would remain the same after considering
the additional records.").
d.  Our Independent Review
As we stated above, our job is to review independently the circuit court's
legal conclusion—that is, whether Sochor has carried his burden of demonstrating
a reasonable probability that the result of the penalty phase would have been
different had counsel not been deficient.  But in doing so, we must defer to the
circuit court's factual findings if those findings are supported by competent,
substantial evidence.  As we stated in Porter v. State, 788 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 2001): 
The reason we have required postconviction evidentiary hearings on
capital postconviction motions claiming ineffective assistance of
counsel is to provide a defendant an opportunity to present factual and
expert evidence which was not presented at the trial of the case and to
have the trial court evaluate and weigh that additional evidence. 
Following such an evidentiary hearing, we have held that the
performance and prejudice prongs are mixed questions of law and fact
subject to a de novo review standard but that the trial court's factual
findings are to be given deference.  So long as [the trial court's]
decisions are supported by competent, substantial evidence, this
Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on
questions of fact and, likewise, on the credibility of the witnesses and
the weight to be given to the evidence by the trial court.  We recognize
and honor the trial court's superior vantage point in assessing the
credibility of witnesses and in making findings of fact.
Id. at 923 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
As our review of both the penalty phase and the evidentiary hearing
-30-
testimony reveals, the circuit court's finding that Sochor presented no significant,
noncumulative lay testimony at the evidentiary hearing is supported by competent,
substantial evidence.  The main lay-witness testimony at the evidentiary hearing
concerned Sochor's abusive childhood and drug abuse.  Testimony about
Sochor's abusive childhood was presented at the penalty phase, and the guilt-phase
experts told the jury about his history of drug abuse.
The closer question in this case is whether significant additional mental-
health-related mitigation evidence was available that could have been presented at
trial if counsel had not been deficient in his investigation and preparation.  The
answer to this question depends on whose evidentiary hearing testimony should be
believed.  Drs. Greer and Froming said such evidence was available.  Dr. Ceros-
Livingston said it was not.  The postconviction trial judge heard all the evidence
and was in a much better position than we are to "assess[ ] the credibility of [the]
witnesses and . . . mak[e] findings of fact."  Id. at 923.  After reviewing the record
and affording due deference to the trial court's superior vantage point from which
to make credibility assessments, we believe that the trial court's decision to give Dr.
Ceros-Livingston's testimony greater weight than the testimony of Sochor's new
18.  The dissent argues that we have "fail[ed] to acknowledge the quantitative
as well as qualitative differences between the evidence presented by incompetent
counsel at the penalty phase and the mitigation we now know existed but was not
discovered or used."  Dissenting op. at 48-49.  This argument, however, begs the
question.  As we stated in the text, the question we must answer in determining
whether counsel's failure to investigate and present mental-health mitigation (a
failure which we already held to constitute deficient performance) was prejudicial to
Sochor's defense is whether significant additional mental-health-related mitigation
evidence was available that could have been presented had counsel not been
deficient in his investigation.  Whether such evidence in fact was available was a
point which was disputed at the evidentiary hearing—Sochor's two new experts
testified that such evidence did exist; the State's expert (who was one of Sochor's
trial experts) testified that such evidence did not exist.  The postconviction trial
judge gave greater weight to the testimony of the State's expert and found that such
evidence in fact did not exist.  So contrary to the dissent's contention, we have not
"fail[ed] to acknowledge" the differences between the evidence presented at the
penalty phase and the evidence that Sochor now claims could have been presented. 
Rather, we have deferred to a factual finding of the postconviction trial court—a
finding that is supported by competent, substantial evidence—and conducted our
independent analysis of the trial court's legal conclusion (i.e., whether Sochor has
established prejudice) accordingly.  See Porter, 788 So. 2d at 923.
-31-
experts was supported by competent, substantial evidence.18
Dr. Ceros-Livingston evaluated Sochor much closer to the time of the
murder than Sochor's new experts did.  At the time of her trial testimony, Dr.
Ceros-Livingston was aware of Sochor's history of alcohol and drug abuse.  She
was also told by Sochor that the army had recommended that he get psychiatric
care and that he once attempted to commit suicide.  After administering the MMPI,
she concluded that Sochor possibly was "malingering."  This was confirmed by
Dr. Castillo, who believed that Sochor was suffering from "a type of selective
-32-
amnesia."  While Dr. Froming criticized Dr. Ceros-Livingston's MMPI analysis, she
did admit that the raw data could have supported the "fake-bad" profile.
Furthermore, the evidentiary hearing experts' diagnoses of manic depressive
disorder were contradicted by Dr. Ceros-Livingston's evidentiary hearing testimony
and by the trial testimony of Drs. Zager and Castillo.  Dr. Ceros-Livingston testified
that even after reviewing the background records that were made available to the
new experts, her original diagnosis did not change; she did not see anything in the
records that suggested to her that Sochor suffered from manic depression.  She
noted that the new experts' reliance on the prison records was misplaced because
those records did not actually indicate that Sochor had been suffering from any of
the symptoms of manic depression; they indicated only that he had been prescribed
Lithium.  Furthermore, while both Drs. Greer and Froming testified that Sochor
exhibited tangentiality, flight of ideas, rapid speech, grandiosity, and a manic
mood—all symptoms of manic depression—such behavior was not observed by
the trial experts who examined Sochor much closer to the date of the crime.  Dr.
Zager testified that in his interview with Sochor, he observed not only what Sochor
was saying, but also how he said it and his stream of thought.  At the time Dr.
Zager made these observations, he was aware that Sochor had been prescribed
Lithium and Sinequan, but he did not diagnose Sochor with manic depression. 
19.  Porter's expert testified that Porter "suffered from a mental condition
that substantially impaired his ability to comply with the law."  The State's expert
disagreed and testified that "this mitigation was not present."  788 So. 2d at 922-23. 
We noted that the circuit court "reject[ed] [Porter's expert's] testimony, and rather
accept[ed] the testimony of [the State's expert] (who specifically disagreed with
[Porter's expert]), on this issue."  Id. at 923.
-33-
Rather, he believed that Sochor suffered from a "longstanding problem of drug and
alcohol abuse" and a "conduct disorder, socialized, aggressive type."  Similarly,
Dr. Castillo was aware that Sochor had been prescribed Lithium, but he
affirmatively ruled out a diagnosis of manic depression.
We are faced with a situation like the one we were faced with in Porter.19  As
we noted there:
 
At the conclusion of the postconviction evidentiary hearing in
this case, the trial court had before it two conflicting expert opinions
over the existence of mitigation.  Based upon our case law, it was then
for the trial court to resolve the conflict by the weight the trial court
afforded one expert's opinion as compared to the other.  The trial
court did this and resolved the conflict by determining that the greatest
weight was to be afforded the State's expert.  We accept this finding
by the trial court because it was based upon competent, substantial
evidence.
788 So. 2d at 923.  Another similar case was Cherry v. State, 781 So. 2d 1040 (Fla.
2000), where we deferred to the circuit court's factual findings and affirmed its
denial of relief, even though Cherry's evidentiary hearing expert testified that Cherry
suffered from fetal alcohol syndrome, organic brain damage, and mental
20.  We also noted in our opinion in Cherry that Dr. Barnard's original
evaluation was limited to competency and sanity issues and that counsel did not
request an evaluation for purposes of providing mitigating evidence during the
penalty phase.  Id. at 1052.  We held, however, that even if counsel's performance
was deficient, Cherry had not been prejudiced:
Dr. Barnard's report indicates that he was aware of Cherry's
background and possible alcohol and drug use.  Further . . . [a]fter
reviewing the materials [provided by postconviction counsel], Dr.
Barnard concluded that no statutory mitigators existed . . . .
Id.
-34-
retardation.  Id. at 1044.  We wrote the following:
Unlike Rose [v. State, 675 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1996)], however,
the testimony concerning the statutory mitigating evidence and some
of the nonstatutory mitigating evidence was controverted either by the
State during cross-examination or by Dr. Barnard [whose report was
introduced into evidence at the penalty phase of Cherry's trial and who
subsequently testified for the State at the evidentiary hearing].  The trial
court rejected Dr. Crown's conclusions as to organic brain damage,
fetal alcohol syndrome, and mental retardation to the extent they were
based on mere speculation from the fact that Cherry's mother drank
while pregnant and Cherry had been exposed to toxins as a child.  Dr.
Crown admitted that he had not performed any physical tests on
Cherry to confirm these conclusions.  The trial court also found that
Dr. Crown's findings as to Cherry's borderline retardation and
antisocial personality were contradicted by Dr. Barnard's reassessment
of Cherry.  Most significantly, Dr. Barnard, after considering the same
background materials supplied to Dr. Crown, did not find any
indication of organic brain damage and maintained the information did
not support any statutory mitigating factors.  The applicability of
mitigating circumstances and the credibility of expert testimony are
matters within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Cherry, 781 So. 2d at 1051 (emphasis added).20
21.  The dissent also refers to our decision in Deaton, see dissenting op. at
49-52, where we affirmed the postconviction trial court's order granting Deaton
(who had been represented by the same counsel as Sochor) a new penalty phase. 
See Deaton, 635 So. 2d at 8-9; see also majority op. at 8 n.9.  The dissent argues
that our decision today is inconsistent with our decision in Deaton.  The dissent
seems to suggest that we did not require Deaton to demonstrate that he was
prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance, and by requiring Sochor to make
such a showing we are "inconsistently enforc[ing] one defendant's right to
competent counsel while denying that right to another defendant represented by the
same incompetent lawyer."  Dissenting op. at 52; see also majority op. at 11 n.11
(discussing the dissent's mischaracterization of the prejudice inquiry).  The dissent,
however, misreads Deaton.  We recognized in Deaton that "prejudice is established
by a finding that, but for the ineffective assistance of counsel, a reasonable
probability exists that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different, or
that, as a result of the ineffective assistance the proceeding was rendered
fundamentally unfair."  635 So. 2d at 8.  In holding that Deaton had established that
he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to investigate mitigation evidence, we noted
that "no evidence whatsoever was presented to the jury . . . even though evidence
presented at the rule 3. 850 evidentiary hearing established that a number of
-35-
As in Porter and Cherry, we find that the circuit court's decision to credit the
testimony of the State's mental health expert over the testimony of Sochor's new
experts is supported by competent, substantial evidence.  We also conclude that
the circuit court's finding that the evidentiary hearing lay testimony was either
cumulative or insignificant is also based on competent, substantial evidence.  Based
on our deference to the circuit court's factual findings and our independent review
of the circuit court's legal conclusion with respect to those factual findings, we hold
that Sochor has not established that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient
performance.21  Sochor has not demonstrated that but for counsel's 
mitigating circumstances existed."  Id. (emphasis added).  The critical distinction
between the case before us and Deaton is that, contrary to the facts before us here,
it appears that the evidentiary-hearing testimony presented by Deaton to establish
the existence of mitigation evidence which could have been presented but for
counsel's deficient performance was not controverted.  Here, by contrast, the
evidentiary-hearing testimony presented by Sochor was controverted by testimony
presented by the State, and in resolving the conflict in testimony, the trial court gave
greater weight to the testimony presented by the State.  Cf. Cherry v. State, 781 So.
2d 1040, 1051 (Fla. 2000).
It is not inconsistent, therefore, in applying the two-pronged test for
ineffective assistance of counsel articulated in Strickland to grant relief to one
defendant and deny relief to another defendant whose counsel was similarly
deficient—each defendant must prove independently that had counsel not been
deficient, there is a reasonable probability (a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome) that he would not have been sentenced to death. 
Similar deficiencies will affect different proceedings differently.  "[T]he ultimate
focus of inquiry must be on fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is
being challenged."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696 (emphasis added); see also id. ("In
every case the court should be concerned with whether . . . the result of the
particular proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial
process . . . .") (emphasis added).  The fact that Deaton's penalty-phase
proceeding was rendered fundamentally unfair by counsel's deficient performance
does not answer the relevant question before us:  whether Sochor's penalty-phase
proceeding was rendered fundamentally unfair.
22.  We also reject Sochor's claim that he received a constitutionally
inadequate mental health evaluation in violation of Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68
(1985), as a result of his counsel's ineffective assistance.  To the extent this claim is
identical to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase, we
reject it for the same reasons discussed above.  To the extent Sochor claims that he
was incompetent to stand trial, we note that none of his evidentiary hearing experts
testified that he was incompetent.
-36-
deficient performance the result of the penalty phase would have been different. 
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's denial of relief on this claim.22
23.  Brady requires the State to disclose material information within its
possession or control that tends to negate the guilt of the defendant.  To establish a
Brady violation, the defendant must show the following:  (1) that the evidence at
issue is favorable to him, either because it is exculpatory or because it is
impeaching; (2) that the evidence was suppressed by the State, either willfully or
inadvertently; and (3) that the suppression resulted in prejudice.  Rogers v. State,
782 So. 2d 373, 378 (Fla. 2001) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280-82
(1999)). 
24.  A Giglio violation is established when a petitioner shows that: (1) a
witness gave false testimony; (2) the prosecutor knew the testimony was false; and
(3) the statement was material.  Guzman v. State, 868 So. 2d 498, 505 (Fla. 2003) 
(citing Ventura v. State, 794 So. 2d 553, 562 (Fla. 2001)).
-37-
B.  Brady and Giglio Claims
Sochor claims that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963),23 by failing to disclose that it gave Gary Sochor immunity from prosecution
in exchange for his testimony.  Sochor also claims that the State violated Giglio v.
United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972),24 by failing to correct the record when Gary
testified that he had not been given immunity and by instructing Gary not to testify
that he kissed and fondled the victim in the car before the murder.
Such claims present mixed questions of law and fact.  Rogers, 782 So. 2d at
376-77.  We therefore apply a mixed standard of review, "defer[ring] to the factual
findings made by the trial court to the extent they are supported by competent,
substantial evidence, but review[ing] de novo the application of those facts to the
law."  Lightbourne v. State, 841 So. 2d 431, 437-38 (Fla. 2003) (citing Stephens,
-38-
748 So. 2d at 1031-32).
The circuit court found that the State did not offer Gary immunity in
exchange for his testimony.  At the evidentiary hearing, Gary testified that the police
officer who escorted him into the courtroom told him that he had been given
immunity.  On cross-examination, however, he testified that at trial, in response to
questioning from Sochor's counsel, he had stated that he never thought the police
viewed him as a suspect.  Kelly Hancock, the prosecutor at Sochor's trial, testified
that he never offered Gary immunity and that police officers do not have the power
to grant witnesses immunity.
The circuit court found Gary's evidentiary hearing testimony to be "unreliable
and not credible."  On the other hand, it found Hancock's testimony to be "candid,
trustworthy, and credible."  On appeal, Sochor simply argues that the circuit
court's finding of fact was incorrect.  He argues that the court should have believed
Gary rather than Hancock.  We defer to the circuit court's resolution of the issue
because its finding that the State did not give Gary immunity in exchange for his
testimony is supported by competent, substantial evidence.  Cf. Kight v. Dugger,
574 So. 2d 1066, 1073 (Fla. 1990) ("There was sufficient competent evidence
adduced at the rule 3.850 hearing to support the trial court's denial of this [Brady]
claim.  While there was conflicting testimony concerning whether the state made
-39-
concessions in exchange for the informants' testimony, it was within the trial court's
discretion to find the state's witnesses more credible than those of the defense.").
We also defer to the circuit court's factual finding that Hancock never
instructed Gary to lie about his alleged sexual contact with the victim.  This, too,
was a matter of Gary's testimony versus Hancock's testimony.  Gary testified at the
evidentiary hearing that Hancock told him not to mention in his testimony that he
had kissed and fondled the victim.  Hancock, on the other hand, testified that Gary
never told him that he had kissed and fondled the victim.  Furthermore, at trial, in
response to a question from Hancock, Gary testified that no one had told him what
to say, and that Hancock had told him to tell the truth.  The only evidence
suggesting that Hancock told Gary to lie was Gary's evidentiary hearing testimony,
which was contradicted by Hancock's evidentiary hearing testimony and by Gary's
own trial testimony.  We cannot say that the circuit court's decision to discredit
Gary's evidentiary hearing testimony was unreasonable or unsupported.  See
Armstrong v. State, 642 So. 2d 730, 735 (Fla. 1994) (stating that recanted
testimony, especially when it involves a confession of perjury, is exceedingly
unreliable).  We therefore affirm the circuit court's denial of Sochor's Brady and
Giglio claims.
C.  Motion to Disqualify
-40-
The postconviction circuit court denied some of Sochor's motions (to
compel production of public records and to clarify other orders of the court related
to public records production) during a hearing at which Sochor's counsel was not
present.  Thereafter, Sochor filed a motion to disqualify the judge and now argues
that the circuit court erred in denying the motion.  In Arbelaez v. State, 775 So. 2d
909 (Fla. 2000), we defined the relevant test as follows:
A motion to disqualify will be dismissed as legally insufficient if
it fails to establish a well-grounded fear on the part of the movant that
he will not receive a fair hearing.  To determine if a motion to
disqualify is legally sufficient, this Court looks to see whether the facts
alleged would place a reasonably prudent person in the fear of not
receiving a fair and impartial trial.
Id. at 916 (citation omitted).  We conclude that Sochor's motion to disqualify was
legally insufficient and the circuit court did not err in refusing to grant the motion.
The record reveals that Sochor's lawyer's absence from the hearing in
question was the result of a scheduling mistake.  At that hearing, the circuit court,
without hearing argument by the State, "presently denied" the motions for
clarification and denied the motion to compel disclosure as "duplicative" of a
motion previously denied.  This was all done in open court and was transcribed. 
The court later held more public records hearings with both sides present. 
We rejected a claim similar to Sochor's in Barwick v. State, 660 So. 2d 685
-41-
(Fla. 1995).  Barwick filed a motion to disqualify, alleging that the judge had denied
his motion to appoint a psychiatrist "after an ex parte communication with the
prosecution."  Id. at 692.  Barwick claimed that in open court, but without defense
counsel present, the prosecutor requested that the judge hold a hearing on the
defense motion to appoint a psychiatrist.  Instead, the court denied the defense
motion.  Id.  We held that Barwick's allegation did "not support an inference that
there was an ex parte communication . . . as to anything other than a request by the
assistant state attorney for another hearing on the motion."  Id.  We reaffirmed our
prior statement "that a judge is not to have any substantive communication with
counsel for any party," but held that Barwick's allegation was not sufficient to
establish that "such an ex parte communication occurred.  Nor did the allegation
establish that any ex parte communication that might have occurred was a legally
sufficient basis for granting the motion for disqualification."  Id.
We believe the same is true here.  Like the hearing in Barwick, the transcript
of the hearing here demonstrates that it was not "such an ex parte communication"
that provides a legally sufficient basis for a motion to disqualify. 
D.  Claims Summarily Denied by Circuit Court
Sochor contests the circuit court's summary denial of five of his claims:  (1)
that the State violated Brady by withholding, or that trial counsel was ineffective for
25.  Sochor cites the following as errors to which trial counsel failed to
object:  (1) prosecutorial comments on facts not in evidence; (2) State witnesses'
opinions regarding Sochor's truthfulness and guilt; (3) a defense witness' statement
on cross-examination that someone in the prosecutor's office said Sochor was
another Ted Bundy; (4) the State's arguments that this trial was the only time the
State could try Sochor for his crimes; (5) the State's presentation of evidence
regarding Sochor's bad character; (6) perjured testimony by a jailhouse informant
regarding his deals with the State; (7) the court's failure to properly instruct the jury
on noncapital lesser-included offenses, manslaughter, third-degree murder, and
kidnapping; (8) the court's failure to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication as a
defense to felony murder based on kidnapping; (9) the court's failure to instruct the
jury on the statute of limitations as an absolute defense to felony murder and
kidnapping; and (10) the court's failure to give the long-form excusable homicide
instructions. 
-42-
failing to discover and present, evidence that Sochor could have used to impeach
witness Gary Sochor, specifically police interviews with Gary and reports of
polygraph tests given to Gary by the police that were inconsistent with Gary's trial
testimony; (2) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing adequately to investigate
the circumstances surrounding Sochor's statements to police and for failing
adequately to litigate the motion to suppress the statements; (3) that trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to raise proper objections at trial and thereby preserve
numerous meritorious issues for appeal;25 (4) that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to present evidence of Sochor's mental health in support of his motion to
suppress Sochor's statements to police; and (5) that the procedure by which trial
courts in Broward County appoint special public defenders and expert witnesses
26.  Claim (4) is also conclusively refuted by the record.  Three mental health
experts testified at trial that Sochor was competent and sane.    
-43-
creates conflicts of interest for the trial court judges that prevent them from being
independent and neutral.  We reject each of these claims.
We reject claim (1) because the record conclusively establishes that Sochor
is not entitled to relief on this claim and, therefore, was not entitled to an evidentiary
hearing on the matter.  See Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1061 (Fla. 1999). 
The transcript of defense counsel's cross-examination of Gary Sochor reveals that
counsel was indeed aware of Gary's prior statements to police and used them in an
attempt to impeach Gary's trial testimony.  As for the polygraph tests, their results
would not have been admissible at trial without the consent of both parties.  See
Walsh v. State, 418 So. 2d 1000, 1002 (Fla. 1982).  We reject claims (2), (3) and
(4) because the allegations are merely conclusory.26  See Gaskin v. State, 737 So.
2d 509, 513 n.7 (Fla. 1999) (finding ineffective-assistance claims to be insufficient
to warrant relief because petitioner did "not allege[ ] how the outcome of his trial
would have been different had counsel properly objected to the asserted error");
see also Lawrence v. State, 831 So. 2d 121, 133 (Fla. 2002) ("A defendant may not
simply file a motion for postconviction relief containing conclusory allegations that
his or her trial counsel was ineffective and then expect to receive an evidentiary
-44-
hearing.") (quoting Kennedy v. State, 547 So. 2d 912, 913 (Fla. 1989)).  And
finally, we reject claim (5) because it is "meritless on its face."  See Rivera v. State,
717 So. 2d 477, 480 n.2 (Fla. 1998).
E.  Counsel's Failure to Object to Jury Instructions
Sochor argues that his attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the
following jury instructions: (1) the instructions regarding the "prior violent felony,"
"committed during the course of a felony," "cold, calculated, and premeditated,"
and "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstances; (2) the instruction
that he claims improperly shifted to him the burden of proving that a death sentence
was inappropriate; (3) the instruction that he claims led the jury to believe that its
role was merely "advisory," in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320
(1985); and (4) the instruction concerning the "murder in the course of a felony"
aggravating circumstance, which he claims violated Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222
(1992), by rendering that aggravating circumstance "illusory."
We reject each of these claims because Sochor cannot demonstrate the
prejudice required to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  On
direct appeal, we found that the "prior violent felony," "committed during the
course of a felony," and "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstances
-45-
were supported by the evidence.  Sochor, 619 So. 2d at 292.  And although we
found on direct appeal that the "cold, calculated, and premeditated" aggravating
circumstance was not supported by the evidence, we held the error to be harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 292-93.  We also held that the burden-shifting
claim, while not preserved for review, was nevertheless without merit.  Id. at 291
n.10; see also Demps v. Dugger, 714 So. 2d 365, 367-68 & n.8 (Fla. 1998)
(holding such a claim to be procedurally barred as an issue that should have been
raised on direct appeal and noting that such claims repeatedly have been rejected on
the merits).  We also stated on direct appeal that Florida's standard jury instructions
do not violate Caldwell.  See Sochor, 619 So. 2d at 291.  And finally, we
previously have held that there is no merit to the argument that an underlying felony
cannot be used as an aggravating circumstance.  See Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d
1055, 1067 (Fla. 2000).
F.  Remaining 3.850 Claims
Sochor claims that he is entitled to relief for constitutional errors, even
though otherwise procedurally barred, because he is "innocent of the death
penalty."  We reject the claim because we found on direct appeal that the evidence
supported the existence of three aggravating circumstances.  Sochor, 619 So. 2d at
-46-
292; see also Allen v. State, 854 So. 2d 1255, 1258 n.5 (Fla. 2003) (holding that
innocence of death penalty claim lacks merit because defendant did not allege that
all the aggravating circumstances supporting his death sentence were invalid, and
because this Court had already conducted a proportionality review on direct
appeal).  We also reject Sochor's constitutional attack on the rules prohibiting
lawyers from contacting jurors because the claim should have been raised on direct
appeal and, therefore, is procedurally barred.  See Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d
650, 667 n.12 (Fla. 2000).  Sochor's claim that Florida's death penalty statute is
unconstitutional is also procedurally barred.  We rejected this claim on direct
appeal.  Sochor, 619 So. 2d at 293.  And Sochor's claim that execution by
electrocution or by lethal injection constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is
without merit.  See Provenzano v. Moore, 744 So. 2d 413, 415 (Fla. 1999) (holding
that execution by electrocution is not cruel and unusual punishment); Sims v. State,
754 So. 2d 657, 668 (Fla. 2000) (holding that execution by lethal injection is not
cruel and unusual punishment).  Finally, our resolution of the preceding claims
leads us to reject Sochor's "cumulative errors" argument.  See Bryan v. State, 748
So. 2d 1003, 1008 (Fla. 1999) ("[W]here allegations of individual error are found
without merit, a cumulative-error argument based thereon must also fail.").
III.  HABEAS CORPUS
27.  We also reject Sochor's related claim that he did not receive a proper
appeal because of omissions in the appellate record.  The claim is procedurally
barred.  See Thompson, 759 So. 2d at 660 (holding that because of petitioner's
failure to raise the issue of the record's inadequacy on direct appeal, his
postconviction claim on this basis was procedurally barred).
-47-
A.  Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel
Sochor argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise
the "cumulative error" issue and for failing to ensure a complete appellate record. 
We reject the first claim because our opinion on direct appeal indicates that
appellate counsel did raise the issue of cumulative error.  See Sochor, 619 So. 2d at
290 ("After carefully reviewing the record, we find that the claimed errors, taken
individually or collectively, do not constitute fundamental error.").  We reject the
second claim because Sochor has not pointed to any errors that occurred during
the untranscribed portions of the proceedings; he therefore has not established the
necessary element of prejudice.  See Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 660 (Fla.
2000).27
B.  Harmless Error Analysis on Direct Appeal
Sochor's claim that this Court did not conduct a proper harmless error
analysis is without merit.  On remand from the United States Supreme Court, we
held that "beyond a reasonable doubt, eliminating the invalid [aggravating] factor
-48-
would have made no difference in Sochor's sentence.  The trial court's reliance on
the unsupported aggravator, therefore, was harmless error."  Sochor, 619 So. 2d at
293.  In any event, such a claim is procedurally barred.  See Bottoson v. State, 813
So. 2d 31, 35 (Fla. 2002) ("This Court has consistently held that habeas claims
wherein the defendant challenges this Court's previous standard of review in the
case are procedurally barred."); Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 657 n.6 (Fla.
2000) (rejecting claim that this Court conducted an improper harmless error
analysis during direct appeal and characterizing the claim as an improper "invitation
to utilize the writ of habeas [corpus] as a vehicle for the re-argument of issues
which have been raised and ruled on by this Court.").
C.  Constitutionality of "HAC" Aggravator
We reject Sochor's claim that the jury instruction on the "heinous, atrocious,
or cruel" aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally vague.  We rejected the
issue on direct appeal.  Sochor, 619 So. 2d at 291 & n.10.  Furthermore, we found
that the evidence was sufficient to support this aggravating factor.  Sochor, 619 So.
2d at 292.
D.  Ring Claim
Sochor argues that Florida's capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional
28.  We also reject Sochor's claim that the jury instructions unconstitutionally
shifted to him the burden of proving that the mitigating circumstances outweighed
the aggravating circumstances.  We rejected this issue on direct appeal because it
had not been properly preserved for review.  Sochor, 619 So. 2d at 291.  We
further held that the claim was without merit.  Id. at 291 n.10; see also Demps v.
State, 714 So. 2d 365, 368 n.8 (Fla. 1998) (holding claim to be procedurally barred
as an issue that should have been raised on direct appeal and noting that such
claims have repeatedly been rejected on the merits).
-49-
under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  We previously have addressed this
claim and denied relief.  See Jones v. State, 845 So. 2d 55, 74 (Fla. 2003);
Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1070 (2002);
King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143 (Fla.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1067 (2002).
Furthermore, two of the aggravating circumstances found by the trial court
were that Sochor had been convicted of a prior violent felony and that the killing
was committed while Sochor was engaged in the commission of a felony.  We have
previously denied relief in similar cases.  See, e.g., Doorbal v. State, 837 So. 2d
940, 963 (Fla.) (rejecting Ring claim where one of the aggravating circumstances
found by the trial judge was defendant's prior conviction for a violent felony), cert.
denied, 123 S. Ct. 2647 (2003); Belcher v. State, 851 So.2d 678, 685 (Fla.)
(rejecting Ring claim where two of the aggravating circumstances found by the trial
judge were defendant's prior violent felony and that the murder was committed in
the course of a felony), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 816 (2003).28
-50-
IV.  CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, we affirm the circuit court's denial of
Sochor's rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief and deny Sochor's petition for
a writ of habeas corpus.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.
LEWIS, J., concurs in result only.
ANSTEAD, J., dissents with an opinion, in which PARIENTE, C.J., concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
ANSTEAD, J., dissenting.
While I agree with the majority that trial counsel's performance was patently
deficient, I cannot agree that counsel's deficient performance did not prejudice the
defendant's entitlement to have his plea for life presented to the jury by a competent
lawyer.  Among the factors that the majority overlooks is the fact that the death
recommendation here, in spite of the incompetency of counsel, was not unanimous,
and the fact that this Court itself later set aside the serious aggravator of CCP used
29.Because appellant's reply brief more than adequately refutes the majority's
analysis, I attach those relevant portions of the reply brief to this opinion.  I
especially note the closing comment in the reply brief that the State has made no
argument on the prejudice issue, but rather has based its entire argument on its
position that defense counsel's performance was not ineffective, a position this
Court has unanimously rejected.
-51-
to justify the sentence of death.  In addition, the majority fails to acknowledge the
quantitative as well as qualitative differences between the evidence presented by
incompetent counsel at the penalty phase and the mitigation we now know existed
but was not discovered or used.  The majority has also mistakenly relied on the
irrelevant guilt phase evidence of insanity and competency that was actually harmful
to the defendant, to substitute for the mental health mitigation that was neither
investigated nor presented at the penalty phase of Sochor's trial. 29  
The majority's decision renders meaningless the Sixth Amendment guarantee
of the right to counsel, and is tantamount to directing a judgment of death by
concluding that having competent representation could not possibly have made a
difference in the outcome.  To the contrary, common sense and experience tell us
that the presence of a competent lawyer is the thing that makes the most difference
in capital cases.
Ironically, as the majority notes, the lawyer who represented Sochor was the
same lawyer whose representation was found incompetent in Deaton v. Dugger,
-52-
635 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1993).  However, this Court unanimously ordered a new penalty
phase in Deaton while the majority today has effectively deprived Sochor of his
Eighth Amendment right to have a competent lawyer try to save his life.  Consider
our analysis in Deaton:
At the evidentiary hearing, the following colloquy took place between
Deaton's postconviction counsel ["Q"] and Deaton's trial counsel
["A"]: 
Q.  In terms of preparing for trial in advance of
conviction, what did you do to prepare for the penalty
phase? 
A.  Very little.  I usually don't try to prepare the penalty
phase in advance of the verdict, so for some reason I just
don't like to get psyched up and get a defeated attitude.  I
usually don't prepare until I lose [the conviction phase],
then I started scrambling for something to do about the
penalty phase. 
. . . . 
Q.  In terms of the penalty phase, did you explain to
[Deaton] mitigating circumstances that you could pursue? 
A.  No, except he could testify as to his treatment and
how he was emotionally abused as a child.  Just very
briefly, if he wanted to testify. 
. . . . 
-53-
Q.  Now in terms of documentation, records such as the
hospital reports or divorce records or any of those
H.R.S. files, did you talk to Jason about finding those
records in order to try to introduce them at the penalty
phase? 
A.  No. 
Q.  Were you aware that documents such as that may be
admissible even if it's hearsay at the penalty phase? 
A.  Yes. 
Q.  Was there any reason why you didn't try and locate
any of those documents prior to trial? 
A.  No, no reason. 
. . . . 
Q.  Now, do you recall how much time you had spent
between the return of the guilty verdict and the start of the
penalty phase? 
A.  Very little time. 
Q.  Was it like overnight? 
A.  I think overnight or the next day, couple of days.  It
was very little time. 
-54-
Q.  Do you recall what you tried to do in terms of
developing the record or witnesses to testify? 
A.  Nothing at that point.  There wasn't time to do it,
except to wonder where his mother was.  She indicated
she would be back to ask Jason if he would like her to
testify on his own behalf on the penalty phase.
In view of this testimony and other substantial evidence presented at
the postconviction hearing, including the testimony of two mental
health experts, we believe that counsel's shortcomings were
sufficiently serious to have deprived Deaton of a reliable penalty phase
proceeding.  Consequently, under the circumstances of this case, we
must find that Deaton's counsel was ineffective and that such
ineffective assistance was prejudicial.
Deaton v. Dugger, 635 So. 2d at 8-9.  Unlike the unanimous majority in Deaton,
today's majority misreads Strickland to impose a burden on the defendant to prove
that the result in his case would have been different, an almost impossible burden. 
The majority appears to have applied an erroneous new trial standard expressly
rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in its analysis.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693
("On the other hand, we believe that a defendant need not show that counsel's
deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case.").  Under the
correct standard, it is difficult, if not impossible, to conclude, as we did in Deaton,
that our confidence in the outcome of this proceeding is not undermined by the
incompetence of this counsel's representation.  
-55-
As the U.S. Supreme Court made abundantly clear in Strickland, "the
ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding
whose result is being challenged.  In every case the court should be concerned with
whether, despite the strong presumption of reliability, the result of the particular
proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our
system counts on to produce just results."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. 
Obviously, there is a breakdown in the adversarial process when one side goes
virtually unrepresented while the other side has the awesome power of the state
behind it.  As a result we have inconsistently enforced one defendant's right to
competent counsel while denying that right to another defendant represented by the
same incompetent lawyer.
PARIENTE, C.J., concurs.
-56-
APPENDIX
ARGUMENT IN REPLY
ARGUMENT I 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE LOWER COURT TO DENY
MR. SOCHOR A NEW PENALTY PHASE FOLLOWING
THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING
The State asserts that the trial court correctly denied Mr.
Sochor's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective at his
penalty phase.  In its argument the State echoes the lower
court's finding that trial counsel's strategy was "reasonable,"
that the additional testimony presented at the evidentiary
hearing was "cumulative" and that the mental health evidence
presented was "almost identical" to that adduced at trial.  This
argument is at odds with the prevailing law and is not borne out
by the record.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has set forth the
proper analysis for investigation omission in death penalty
cases:
First it must be determined whether a
reasonable 
investigation 
should 
have
uncovered such mitigating evidence.  If so,
then a determination must be made whether
the failure to put this evidence before the
jury was a tactical choice by trial counsel.
If so, such a choice must be given a strong
-57-
presumption of correctness and the enquiry
is generally at an end.  If however the
failure to present the mitigating evidence
was 
an 
oversight 
and 
not 
a 
tactical
decision, then a harmlessness review must be
made to determine if there is reasonable
probability 
that, 
but 
for 
counsel's
unprofessional errors the result of the
proceeding would have been different.
Middleton v. Dugger, 849 F.2d 491, 493 (11th Cir. 1988).
Both the lower court's and the State's analysis fall well short
of this standard.
The 
record 
of 
the 
Rule 
3.850 
evidentiary 
hearing 
established
unequivocally that trial counsel did not start his penalty phase
investigation until after the guilt phase was over.  Both
Charles and Rosemary Sochor testified that they were not
contacted by trial counsel until the trial was under way (T.
135, T. 198) and that counsel neither enquired about Mr.
Sochor's background nor spent any more than half an hour
preparing them (T. 198).  Kathy Cooper testified that she was
not contacted by anyone until her mother called her the night
that Mr. Sochor was found guilty (T. 210) and that she only
testified at her own insistence and not on any request from
trial counsel (T. 212).  She spent "maybe two minutes" talking
with trial counsel before taking the stand (T. 212).  The record
of the penalty phase shows that Kathy Cooper, Rosemary Sochor
-58-
and Charles Sochor were not subjected to traditional direct
examination about Mr. Sochor's life but rather asked to prepare
statements that they would like the jury to hear.  Trial counsel
was actually delegating the responsibility of developing
mitigation to the witnesses themselves.  Essentially trial
counsel abandoned his responsibility to Mr. Sochor to three lay
witnesses who could not be expected to have a thorough
understanding of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and understand
the nature of mitigation in a penalty phase of a capital trial.
This was not "reasonable" and did not represent a "very thorough
investigation."  (Answer Brief at 11).
Moreover, the numerous other witnesses presented at Mr.
Sochor's evidentiary hearing were not even contacted by trial
counsel.  Several other family members, school teachers and
friends who would have been ably willing and ready to testify
were never even telephoned by trial counsel.  Had they been
asked, they would have been willing to testify at Mr. Sochor's
capital trial.  This does not constitute the "very thorough
investigation" claimed by the State, (Answer Brief at 11), nor
does it pass constitutional muster.
Trial 
counsel 
was 
similarly 
incompetent 
in 
his 
investigation
of Mr. Sochor's mental health mitigation.  The State claims that
the evidence presented by Mr. Sochor's post conviction counsel
-59-
at his evidentiary hearing was "almost identical" to that
adduced at trial from Dr. Zager, Dr Ceros-Livingston and the
State's trial expert, Dr. Castillo.  Answer Brief at 16.  This
is not borne out by the record.  First of all, the purpose of
Dr. Zager and Dr. Ceros-Livingston's evaluation was not to
develop mental health mitigation, but simply to evaluate Mr.
Sochor for competency and sanity, a fact which the State notably
omits form its argument.  The reports of Dr. Zager and Dr.
Castillo indicate that they were merely asked to address
competency and sanity and make no reference to the presence or
absence of mitigating factors.  See Defense exhibit 3, October
21, 1987.  See also Dr. Ceros-Livingston's evidentiary hearing
testimony, T. 553-554.  The Eleventh Circuit has held that
Regarding mental health mitigating evidence
our court has distinguished between its use
during 
the 
guilt 
phase 
to 
establish
competency to stand trial and presenting
mental health mitigating evidence at the
penalty phase:
"There 
is 
a 
great 
difference 
between
presenting 
evidence 
to 
establish
incompetency at trail and failing to pursue
mental health mitigating evidence at all.
One can be competent to stand trial and yet
suffer form mental health problems that the
sentencing jury and judge should have had an
opportunity 
to 
consider. 
 
Blanco 
v.
Singletary, 943 F.2d 1503 n. 147 (11th Cir.
1991).
-60-
Where mental health mitigating evidence was
available and absolutely none was presented
[by counsel] to the sentencing body and no
strategic reason was put forward for this
failure" our court determined that this
omission was objectively unreasonable."  Id.
citing Middleton v. Dugger, 849 F.2d 491,
493-95 (11th Cir. 1988).
Hardwick v. Crosby, 320 F.3d 1127, 1163-64 (11th Cir. 2003).
The same considerations apply equally to Mr. Sochor's case.
"The primary purpose of the penalty phase is to ensure that the
sentence is individualized by focussing on the particularized
characteristics of the defendant."  Brownlee v. Haley, 396 F.3d
1043, 1074 (11th Cir. 2002), citing Cunningham v. Zant, 928 F.2d
1006, 1019 (11th Cir. 1991).  To address the particularized
characteristics of a defendant in any meaningful way it is
necessary to perform a much more in-depth evaluation than that
required for the determination of competency and/or sanity.
Competency and sanity are purely legal concepts.  As such they
are narrowly defined, and to determine their presence or
absence, only a relatively few number of questions have to be
answered.  By contrast, mental health mitigation is a much more
open ended concept.  Since the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
require that sentencer "not be precluded from considering as a
mitigating factor any aspect of a defendant's character or
record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the
30.
The State complains that much of the material
supplied to Mr. Sochor's experts prior to the
evidentiary hearing were prison records generated after
Mr. Sochor's death sentence was imposed.  Admittedly,
-61-
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence of less than
death," Lockett v. Ohio, 486 U.S. 586, 604, it requires a much
more thorough evaluation on the part of the mental health
professional.  Thus the development of mental health mitigation
requires a much more thorough investigation in to the
defendant's 
background, 
including 
obtaining 
collateral
information in order to find out about those aspects of the
defendant's life and the offense that would allow the sentencer
to make a meaningful decision as to sentence.  This was
manifestly not done in Mr. Sochor's case.
Trial 
counsel's 
preparation 
and 
examination 
of 
Dr. 
Zager 
and
Dr. Ceros-Livingston revealed a total lack of awareness of the
nature of mitigation.  As Dr. Ceros-Livingston testified on
cross examination at the evidentiary hearing, no background
materials had been supplied to the experts up front.  No jail
records, school records or military records were provided to the
doctors.  See T. 555-556.  They had not been given any access to
any family or friends of Mr. Sochor for any independent
verification of his childhood experiences and substance abuse
history.  Id.30  Nor indeed could they have been, since at that
the background materials provided to Dr. Froming and Dr.
Greer contained prison records generated after Mr.
Sochor's capital trial and sentence of death, in
addition to the aforementioned records dating from
before his trial.  However, to the eextant that any of
the experts relied on these records, they served merely
to supplement the information contained within the
documents generated prior to Mr. Sochor's trial.  For
example, Dr. Greer testified that prison medical records
indicated that Mr. Sochor was being treated with Lithium
for manic depressive illness, and that this was
consistent with the jail records and Dr. Greer's own
clinical diagnosis.
-62-
time Mr. Rich had no idea of what the family members knew and
could describe.  Whether these evaluations were adequate for
sanity and competency determinations is a separate and distinct
issue from that of mitigation.
Dr. Zager and Dr. Ceros-Livingston were obliged to rely
entirely on their own observations and testing of Mr. Sochor,
based on Mr. Sochor's self-reporting.  This inevitably
diminished the value of the testimony of Dr. Zager and Dr.
Ceros-Livingston.  In particular, it opened the door to an
accusation by the State that Mr. Sochor was self-serving, which
in turn rendered their testimony less compelling.  Had Dr. Zager
and Dr. Ceros-Livingston had the benefit of such independent
corroboration of Mr. Sochor's life history as well as proper
instructions from counsel, the outcome would have been
31.
This is particularly true given Dr Ceros-
Livingston's conclusion that Mr. Sochor exhibited a
tendency to malinger.  Had she had access to family
members to verify Mr. Sochor's history of poverty,
abuse, neglect, physical abuse and emotional trauma, as
well as substance abuse, her findings would have been
different.  While admittedly Dr. Ceros-Livingston did
not think that her conclusions would have been different
had she had access to the documents provided to Dr.
Froming and Dr Greer, she never was afforded the chance
to speak to any family members.  She was not in a
position to know or say what her conclusion would have
been had she been afforded that opportunity.  The
State's reliance on her evidentiary hearing testimony as
rebuttal is therefore misplaced.
-63-
different.31
At the evidentiary hearing Dr. Froming established the
absolute necessity of 
reviewing 
extensive 
background 
information
about the subject, including documentary evidence 
and 
interviews
with family members:
[by Dr. Froming]
Okay, first of all in
doing a neuropsychological evaluation you're
looking for various areas of potential risk
factors.  And when you look at these various
areas, you are attempting to determine
whether or not there is a possibility of the
existence of brain damage.
If there are no risk factors there, then I
generally 
will 
not 
proceed 
with 
the
evaluation.  So I was very careful to kind
of comb through all of this and see if, in
fact, 
there 
was 
an 
evaluation 
really
warranted.
32.
The State contends that Dr. Froming's testimony
should not be considered in determining Mr. Sochor's
claims because she was not personally available in 1989
for the penalty phase.  The State's assertion is absurd. 
-64-
(T. 435).
Thus, 
while 
Dr. 
Froming 
determined 
the 
need 
for
neuropsychological testing from her review of background
information, such a course was not open to Dr. Ceros-Livingston
or Dr. Zager because they were not provided with these
resources.  Had such background information been made available,
the multiple risk factors for potential brain damage were
apparent.  Dr. Froming noted risk factors including Mr. Sochor's
mother's smoking during pregnancy; 
a 
complicated birth involving
the use of forceps; numerous head injuries caused by physical
abuse; Mr. Sochor's childhood head banging; his fall from a
horse; a fall from the bleachers at school; his fall onto a toy
tin horn resulting in the horn being rammed up into his soft
palate; a motor cycle accident involving loss of consciousness;
alcohol abuse; binge drinking; and severe family violence (T.
435-436).  All of these factors indicate possible brain injury
and dysfunction and should have been factored into the Doctors'
evaluations.  Because they were not, the evidence of Mr.
Sochor's brain damage was not discovered or presented to the
jury.32
The issue is not whether Dr. Froming was personably
available, but whether competent neuropsychological
testing should have been afforded Mr. Sochor at the time
of his trial.  The State does not contend that the type
of evaluation performed by Dr. Froming was not available
in 1989.
-65-
Additionally, 
trial 
counsel's 
failure 
to 
provide 
his 
experts
with access to family members meant that the experts never heard
the true nature and extent of the endemic family violence within
the Sochor home.  While it is true that Mr. Sochor did report
some childhood physical abuse, the extent and gravity of his
childhood trauma could only have been made available through
interviews of family members.  Had this been considered,
evidence of Mr. Sochor's post traumatic stress disorder would
have been uncovered and available to be presented to the jury.
Even despite the shortcomings of the findings of Dr. Zager
and Dr. Ceros-Livingston in terms of developing mental health
mitigation, the self-revelations made to these doctors by Mr.
Sochor should have put trial counsel on notice that further
mental health investigation was necessary.  Dr. Zager found that
Mr. Sochor had a history of substance and alcohol abuse,
including a history of alcoholic blackouts.  However trial
counsel failed to investigate the logical corollary of this
finding by having Mr. Sochor's brain functioning evaluated.
-66-
Trial counsel should have been aware that excessive substance
abuse can lead to brain injury and functional deficits.  Had he
done so through the use of a neuropsychologist he would have
discovered extensive brain damage which would have supported
statutory and non-statutory mental health mitigation.  Dr.
Froming testified that Mr. Sochor sufferers from brain damage
caused in part by his excessive ingestion of LSD.  The failure
to follow up Mr. Sochor's reports to Dr. Zager about his alcohol
and substance abuse thorough appropriate neuropsychological
testing is not "reasonable" and does not constitute "a very
thorough investigation".
Similarly, trial counsel was on notice that Mr. Sochor was
being medicated with Lithium.  He should have investigated the
uses of Lithium and would thus have discovered that it is a
psychiatric medication used in the treatment of manic depressive
illness or bipolar disorder.  Had he investigated further, he
would have been able to ascertain that Mr. Sochor does indeed
suffer from bipolar disorder.  At the evidentiary hearing Dr.
Greer testified that Mr. Sochor exhibited "tangentiality" and
"flight of ideas" both typical of manic depressive illness (T.
391) and that he exhibited inappropriately euphoric behavior (T.
393).  If trial counsel had followed up the avenue of Mr.
Sochor's bipolar disorder, he would have been able to present
-67-
Mr. Sochor as an individual with major psychiatric disorder
which 
would 
better 
explain 
his 
actions 
and 
pride 
an
individualized sentence which took account of Mr. Sochor's
individual circumstances.  These mental health issues form the
basis of statutory and non statutory mitigating circumstances
which should have been presented to the triers of fact who would
have been obliged to consider them:
[T]he 
Eighth 
and 
Fourteenth 
Amendments
require that the sentencer not be precluded
from considering as a mitigating factor any
aspect of a defendant's character or record
and any of the circumstance of the offense
that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death.
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 465 U.S. 104, 110, quoting Lockett v. Ohio,
486 U.S. 586, 604.  Mr. Sochor's brain damage, his bipolar
disorder and his post traumatic stress disorder, together with
the statutory mental health mitigating circumstances they
support, should have been considered by the jury.  Because of
trial counsel's incompetence they were not.
By no stretch of the imagination can these significant
disabilities be described as "in most respects identical" to the
substance 
abuse disorder and antisocial personality suggested 
by
the trial experts.  The only way in which they are similar is
that there is a diagnosis at all, as opposed to a conclusion
-68-
that Mr. Sochor was in sound mental health.  The diagnoses of
manic depressive illness, brain damage, PTSD, and substance
abuse disorder are not fungible.  They are separate and distinct
psychiatric and psychological conditions with different causes,
manifestations and symptoms.  The State's allegation that this
mental heath evidence was "in most respects identical" to that
adduced at trial (Answer Brief at 13) is inaccurate to the point
of frivolity.
The State similarly complains that the lay witnesses'
testimony is cumulative and offers little to that adduced at
trial.  The record shows that this is not so.  First of all,
there were certain mitigating circumstances that were briefly
touched on at trial but of which the true extent and severity
was not disclosed.  The graphic horror of the physical abuse
that Mr. Sochor suffered growing up is a case in point.  That
Mr. Sochor was beaten frequently with a belt (T. 215) that was
doubled up to fashion a very thick strap (T. 240), and that he
was kicked repeatedly and punched with a fist (T. 216) was not
graphically described to the jury.  The fact that these beatings
sometimes resulted in Mr. Sochor being rendered unconscious (T.
241) was not presented to the jury.  This was relevant, not only
as mitigation its own right, but also to show an etiology for
the brain damage that should have been presented as a mental
-69-
health mitigating circumstance.
The same argument applies to the neglect and poverty
suffered by Mr. Sochor as a child.  While this was alluded to by
Rosemary Sochor in her prepared statement that was read to the
jury, the true extent of the childhood neglect was not brought
out at Mr. Sochor's penalty phase.  The neglect by Rose Sochor
is evident from her evidentiary hearing testimony that she
refused to interfere when her husband beat Dennis and the other
children because she loved Charles and was afraid that he would
leave (T. 114, 218).  Mrs. Sochor's neglect of her son was a
nonstatutory mitigator that should have been presented to the
jury.  Livingston v. State, 565 So. 2d 1288, 1292 (Fla. 1988).
Similarly, the true extent of Mr. Sochor's childhood poverty was
not presented to the jury.  Blaine Sochor testified at the
evidentiary hearing that it was not uncommon for the children to
have to hunt for food (T. 247).  He also remembered suffering
from boils on his legs which he attributed to malnutrition (T.
247).  See Foster v. State, 654 So. 2d 112, FN5 (Fla. 1995)
(trial court found as nonstatutory mitigation (among others) the
defendant's poverty).
Several family members and others testified to positive
character traits which were not presented at trial, a point
which the State conveniently omits to mention.  For example,
-70-
Helen Foley testified as to Mr. Sochor's artistic ability
(T.303).  This was something which was not brought out at trial
at all despite the State's argument.
The State completely 
mischaracterizes 
the testimony offered
by Louis LaScala and Christine Thatcher as "limited" to Mr.
Sochor having "basketball talent" and "acting talent" (Answer at
26, 27).  To the contrary, these witnesses offered first-hand
testimony regarding Mr. Sochor's inabilities to function.  Mr.
LaScala testified that Mr. Sochor some basketball abilities
limited to shooting, but that he was introverted, could not
interact with other members of the team, and would "disappear"
on the court (T. 280).  Mrs. Thatcher testified that Mr.
Sochor's performances were strange, and that people were
uncomfortable and unable to accept how different Mr. Sochor was
(T. 266).
The State similarly tries to dismiss the fact that "Lascala
never meet [sic] Sochor's parents" (Answer 27).  This fact is
significant because Mr. LaScala testified that as a basketball
coach in a small town, he knew "90 to 95 percent" of the
players' parents, and that it was "very unusual" (T. 276) to not
know Mr. Sochor's parents.  This again is symptomatic of Mr.
Sochor's dysfunctional upbringing.
-71-
The State fails to address the testimony of Father Melvin
Fox that within one school year Mr. Sochor's personality
changed, he was on a "downward spiral," he became unmotivated
and depressed, and he no longer participated in student life (T.
293).  Fr. Fox also testified that Mr. Sochor was a loner, a
follower, and that he suspected an "abusive situation" (T. 294).
None of this significant information was elicited at trial.
The same considerations apply to the presentation of Mr.
Sochor's childhood trauma, another recognized mitigating
circumstance.  Mr. Sochor's early years were marked by numerous
physical accidents which should have given trial counsel further
clues as to the possibility of brain impairment.  Admittedly,
Charles Sochor had testified at the penalty phase as to Mr.
Sochor's accident with the toy tin horn which punctured his soft
palate.  However, the effects of such an injury, or the numerous
other instances of physical trauma, some of which resulted in
loss of consciousness to Mr. Sochor, were not fully developed.
Furthermore, there was no mention at all at the penalty
phase of the pervasive sexual and emotional abuse that permeated
the Sochor household during Mr. Sochor's childhood and teenage
years.  The State complains that "the only additional
information provided by the parents and the siblings involved
events not directly related to or even known by Appellant."
-72-
Answer Brief at 26.  However, the State notably fails to mention
the fact that this kind of childhood trauma can result from
factors which are not specifically known to the patient but
cause an atmosphere of mistrust and uncertainty in the home.  As
Dr. Froming testified, it is not necessary to be consciously
aware of the traumas experienced by other family members to be
traumatized in turn by them:
[by Dr. Froming]  [F]amily members knew
something had happened to Melanie.  When I
would ask them about it they knew that there
was a severe change in her personality
around the age of 11 or 12 and she became
regressive and began withdrawing form the
family.  She had developed a significant
hatred 
of 
Gary 
and 
to 
this 
day 
has
difficulty even being in the same hotel with
him.
So, I mean it's apparent in the family
tensions that kids pick up that something is
going wrong in the family.
(T. 457).
Similar 
considerations 
apply 
to 
the 
family 
histories 
related
by Charles and Rosemary Sochor.  Charles Sochor's own traumatic
childhood in turn adversely reduced his ability to function in
the role of a caring parent to his ten children.  Because he
never knew what a normal childhood was, he was never able to
provide it for his children.  This, together with the effects of
his own traumas on his actions, made for additional family
-73-
tensions which affected Mr. Sochor, even though he was not aware
of their specific cause.  These facts are part of the picture
that should have been painted at trial to ensure Mr. Sochor was
afforded the requisite individualized sentencing, but which the
jury never heard.  The presentation of mitigation is not a mere
list of factors that can be checked off on a list, and the
State's insistence that this information is not relevant shows
a 
concrete 
approach 
in 
conflict 
with 
Eighth 
Amendment
jurisprudence.
The State's dismissal of the evidentiary hearing testimony
as to Mr. Sochor's drug and alcohol habit is similarly
misplaced.  Again, while some superficial reference was made to
these issues by Charles Sochor at the penalty phase, the graphic
extent of Mr. Sochor's prior drug habit was not presented to the
jury.  As Bill Mitchell testified at the evidentiary hearing,
"During the year 1971, we'll say, Dennis and I together
conservatively tripped over 150 times" (T. 154).  The penalty
phase jury was not presented with anything like this specific
graphic testimony.  Once again, it is quantitatively and
qualitatively superior to that presented by defense counsel at
the penalty phase."  State v. Lara, 581 So. 2d 1288, 1290 (Fla.
1991).  Again the State's argument is misleading and not borne
out by the record.
-74-
Moreover the State's assertions regarding Mr. Sochor's
intoxication on the night of the crime are fatally inconsistent.
First of all, the State alleges that, "Critical to [the]
diagnosis that statutory mitigation existed is a requirement
that Sochor was significantly intoxicated on the night of the
murder."  Answer Brief at 24.  This is not actually the case.
Dr. Greer's finding of statutory mental health mitigating
circumstances was predicated on a combination of some alcohol
consumption combined with Mr. Sochor's pre-existing bipolar
disorder.  Dr. Greer further testified that even a small amount
of alcohol would have had an effect given Mr. Sochor's condition
and his previous abstinence for over a year (T. 399).  Mr.
Sochor's appearance some hours before or after the murder are
simply not germane to his state at the time of the crime.
Furthermore, 
the 
State's 
position 
is 
internally
inconsistent.  In arguing that the mental health mitigation
adduced at the evidentiary hearing was "virtually identical" to
that presented during the guilt phase of Mr. Sochor's capital
trial, the State argues that Dr. Zager was of the opinion that
Mr. Sochor suffered from an alcoholic blackout at the time of
the crime.  Yet now it says that there is no evidence that Mr.
Sochor was intoxicated at all.  The State cannot have it both
ways.  On the one hand the State seeks to bolster Dr. Zager's
-75-
testimony by stating that the evidence adduced at the
evidentiary hearing was "virtually identical" to that at the
trial, 
and 
then 
it 
disputes 
any 
intoxication 
at 
all,
notwithstanding its complete failure to rebut Dr. Greer's
testimony regarding the interaction of alcohol with manic
depressive illness.
Additionally the State completely ignores the testimony of
Gary Sochor regarding his conduct on the evening of the crime.
At the evidentiary hearing Gary Sochor testified that Dennis
Sochor had become agitated because he (Gary Sochor) had begun
kissing the victim in the car (T. 347).  It is the combination
of Gary Sochor's admitted provocative behavior with Mr. Dennis
Sochor's consumption of alcohol after a long abstinence, and his
preexisting brain 
damage 
and bipolar disorder, which establishes
the existence of the statutory mental health mitigation.  The
State's argument is misplaced.
Both the State and the lower court apparently failed to
understand the interplay and connections between the expert
testimony and lay witness testimony.  The State ignores that
fact that even that evidence that was presented at the penalty
phase was done in a piecemeal and haphazard fashion without
regard for the integrated picture of Mr. Sochor that would have
permitted a truly individualized sentencing.  This is evidenced
-76-
by trial counsel's delegation of his duty to present mitigating
evidence to his witnesses and instructing them to read a
statement to the jury rather than any independent planning or
strategy.  Without expert testimony to explain the significance
of many of the events relayed by the witnesses, the true impact
on Mr. Sochor was lost and the jury was not able to consider the
individualized sentencing that Mr. Sochor was entitled to.
The record of the evidentiary hearing shows clearly that it
was only after Mr. Sochor's conviction for first degree murder
that trial counsel began to give any thought to the penalty
phase.  As this court has recently emphasized, "a defendant's
penalty phase attorney clearly must have adequate time to
prepare 
for 
the 
proceeding 
to 
protest 
the 
Defendant
constitutional rights."  State v. Lewis, 838 So. 2d 1102, (Fla.
2002).  In doing so, this Court affirmed the standard set forth
in Deaton v. Dugger, 635 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1993).  As this Curt
noted in Lewis, "In Deaton the record revealed that defense
counsel did not prepare for the penalty phase until after the
guilty verdict was returned and then spent only a minimal amount
of time in preparation .  .  .  and did not search for any
records to establish mitigating circumstances.  State v. Lewis,
838 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2002).  Just as in Lewis and Deaton, this
constituted deficient performance in Mr. Sochor's case.
-77-
Trial counsel's omissions can not be put down to strategy.
As noted in Mr. Sochor's initial brief, Mr. Sochor's trial
counsel, Charles Rich, was also Mr. Deaton's trial counsel.  The
State asserts that Mr. Sochor is attempting to rely on Mr.
Rich's testimony in Deaton as evidence of what he did in Mr.
Sochor's case.  This is not the case.  The unrebutted testimony
of Charles Sochor, Rosemary Sochor and Kathy cooper, as well as
that of the other witnesses who never testified at Mr. Sochor's
capital penalty phase, shows that Mr. Rich unreasonably failed
to instigate penalty phase investigation before the trial began.
Since Mr. Rich was not available to testify at Mr. Sochor's
evidentiary hearing, nobody knows whether he would have ascribed
his omissions to strategy, as in Deaton, or to oversight.  Mr.
Sochor's argument is thus that even if Mr. Rich had been
available to testify at Mr. Sochor's hearing, and even if he had
testified the same way as in Deaton that his last minute
preparation was "strategy," just as in Deaton, this would not
have cured a finding of deficient performance.  As the Eleventh
Circuit has made plain, a "tactical or strategic decision is
unreasonable if it is based on a failure to understand the law."
Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1991).  Thus, even in
the absence of testimony from Mr. Rich, it is of no consequence
whether his performance was based on purported strategy as in
-78-
Deaton or not.
The State does not address the issue of prejudice as it
appears to be confident that no deficient performance occurred.
The appropriate analysis of the prejudice prong of Strickland
requires an evaluation of the totality of the available
mitigation evidence -- both that adduced at trial and the
evidence adduced in the [evidentiary hearing] in reweighing it
against the evidence in aggravation.  Bottoson v. Moore, 234
F.3d 526, 534 (11th Cir.  2002) (quoting Williams, 529 U. S. at
397-98).  It is clear from the record that "a reasonable
probability that the result of the sentencing proceeding would
have been different if competent counsel had presented and
explained the significance of all the available evidence.
Hardwick, 320 F.3d at 1191 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 399.
Relief is warranted.
-79-
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Broward County,
Paul Blackman, Judge - Case No. 86-15270
Rachel L. Day, Assistant CCRC, Kenneth M. Malnik, Assistant CCRC and Paul E.
Kalil, Assistant CCRC, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel - Southern Region, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida,
for Appellant
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General and  Celia A. Terenzio, Assistant Attorney
General, West Palm Beach, Florida
for Appellee