Title: State v. Ramsey

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

475 So. 2d 671 (1985)
STATE of Florida, Petitioner,
v.
Jimmie RAMSEY, Respondent.
No. 64776.

Supreme Court of Florida.
July 11, 1985.
Rehearing Denied October 7, 1985.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and W. Brian Bayly, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for petitioner.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender and Larry B. Henderson, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for respondent.
ADKINS, Justice.
We have for review Ramsey v. State, 442 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), which expressly and directly conflicts with State v. Akers, 367 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
Ramsey was stopped for several traffic infractions. While making a routine computer check, the deputy learned of two outstanding capiases against Ramsey. He then informed Ramsey of the capiases, placed him under arrest, and instructed him to put his hands on the trunk of the patrol car. Ramsey then turned around and said, "No way", and ran from the scene. Ramsey had not been restrained and the arrest procedure had not progressed to the point where the deputy had removed his handcuffs from their carrying place.
*672 Ramsey was charged with escape in violation of section 944.40, Florida Statutes (1981). That statute provides:
"Prisoner" is defined in section 944.02(5), Florida Statutes (1981), as follows:
On appeal from Ramsey's judgment and sentence, the district court of appeal reversed. It concluded that the legislature did not, by this statute, intend to punish the conduct of fleeing from an arresting officer. "Instead, it required that the escape, in order to come within the confines of the statute, occur while the prisoner is being transported." 442 So. 2d  at 304.
The Fifth District did not discuss the issue of when "transportation" of the prisoner begins, but held that it is an issue to be determined by the jury. Id. In the instant case, however, the court held that since the undisputed facts showed that Ramsey had not been handcuffed, had not been placed in the police car and the officer had not announced that he was taking him to jail, transportation of the prisoner had not yet begun.
In State v. Akers the facts were the same except Akers had been handcuffed while Ramsey had not. The Akers court did not discuss the issue of whether transportation had begun. Instead, the court held:
367 So. 2d  at 702.
We approve the Akers decision. This rationale eliminates some difficult questions concerning when transportation begins. As stated by Judge Orfinger in his special concurrence in State v. Iafornaro, 447 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984):
Thus a literal interpretation of the words of the statute itself leads to the conclusion that one who meets the definition of prisoner is being transported to a place of confinement at the point in time when he becomes a prisoner.
*673 The case of Johnson v. State, 357 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 362 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 1978), is analogous to the instant case. The defendant in Johnson was already confined in a county jail but became ill inside the jail. He was escorted to the hospital where he subsequently escaped.
After a trial on the charge of escape in violation of section 944.40, Florida Statutes (1975), the defendant in Johnson claimed that there was a variance between the proof and the allegations in that the proof did not show that the defendant escaped while confined in a county jail. The First District rejected the argument of defendant as follows:
357 So. 2d  at 204. Likewise, in the instant case, the terms "transported to or from a place of confinement" should not be so narrowly construed as to vitiate the intent of the statute.
However, even were we not to conclude that the words of the statute lend themselves to this interpretation, we would reach the same conclusion based on the purpose of the legislature in enacting this law. The intent of the legislature in enacting this statute was obviously to prevent lawfully arrested prisoners from escaping the custody of the arresting officer. The intent of the legislature is controlling over the literal interpretation of the words of the statute.
George v. State, 203 So. 2d 173, 175-76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967).
In conclusion, we quash the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in this case, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, ALDERMAN, McDONALD, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur.
BOYD, C.J., dissents with an opinion.
BOYD, Chief Justice, dissenting.
The majority holds that a suspect who is the subject of an attempted arrest but is not effectively taken into custody and confined, who successfully resists arrest in that he evades and eludes the arresting officer by departing the scene before custody and confinement are effectuated, can be found guilty of escape. I must dissent because this holding is in clear contravention of the plain language of the escape statute and is therefore erroneous.
The district court of appeal correctly analysed the situation and the statutes as follows:
*674 442 So. 2d  at 304-05. An essential element of the crime of escape is the fact of lawful custody or confinement; the mere right to custody is not enough. See, e.g., Sullivan v. State, 430 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Williamson v. State, 388 So. 2d 1345 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
I believe the conduct shown by the facts of this case was obviously intended by the legislature to be punished as the offense of resisting an officer under section 843.02, Florida Statutes (1981). See M.C. v. State, 450 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). It is an error to allow that conduct to be punished as the more serious offense of escape.
I believe that under the facts of this case, there arises an ambiguity in the language of the escape statute. The ambiguity calls for judicial construction. It is well established that criminal statutes requiring judicial construction must be strictly construed against the state and in favor of the accused person.
Because the facts shown by the evidence established the crime of resisting an officer without violence, and because the facts alleged in the charging document were sufficient to notify the defendant that conviction on that charge was possible, I would remand for the entry of judgment finding him guilty of that less serious offense.