Title: State v. Solomon.

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

LAW LIBRARY.

‘#** FOR PUBLICATION ***

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

 

No. 24470

APPEAL FROM THE FAMILY COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(Fo-cR. NO. 01-1-1353)

APRIL 29, 2005

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY NAKAYAMA, J.
Defendant-appellant James Franklin Solomon, Jr.
(Solomon) appeals from the May 4, 2001 order of the family court
of the first circuit, the Honorable Michael D. Wilson presiding,
convicting Solonen of abuse of a family or household menber, in
violation of Hawai'i Revised statutes (HRS) § 709-906 (Supp.

2001),! and sentencing him to one year probation, subject to the

At the time Solonon committed the offense charged, HRS $ 709-906
provided, in relevant part:

(2) Te shail be uniawtl for any person, singly oF
in concert, to physically abuse a fanily or household member
of to refuse compliance with the lawful order of a police
officer under subsection (4). The police, in investigating
Sny complaint of abuse of & fanily or household mesber, upon
Tequest, may transport the abused perecn toa hospital or
sete snelter.

For the purposes of this section, “fanily or household
nenber” means spouses or reciprocal beneficiaries, former
spouses or reciprocal beneficiaries, persons who have
child in connon, parents, children, persons related by
Consanguinity, and persone jointly residing or formerly

(continued.

 

 

 
 

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conditions that he (1) pay @ $50.00 criminal injuries
compensation fee, and (2) undergo (a) domestic violence
intervention/anger management, (b) parenting classes, (c) sex
offender evaluation and treatment, if necessary, and (d) mental
health evaluation and treatment, if necessary. On appeal,

Solomon argues that (1) the family court’s acceptance of his

 

Mss -eontdnued)

Yesiing in the same dwelling unit.

is] "Abuse of family or household member and refusal
to comply with the lawful order of a police officer under

Subsection (4) are misdeneanors and the person shall be

Sentences af follows:

a) For the frat offense the person shalt
inimun jail sentence of forty-eight hours; and

(b) For _a second offense and any other subsequent
Offense that occurs within one year of the
previous offense, the person shall be termed &
Pfepest offender” and serve @ sinimun Jail
sentence of thirty days:

pon conviction and sentencing of the defendant, the court

Shali order that the defendant inmedistely be incarcerated

seve the mandatory minimum sentence imposed; proviced
that the defendant nay be admitted to bail pending appeal
Pursuant to chapter #04, The court may stay the imposition
bf the sentence if special circumstances exist.

(6) Wienever's court sentences @ persoa pursuant to
subsection (5), it also shall require that the offender
Gndergo ony available domestic vsolence intervention
prograns ordered by the court. However, the court may
Buspend any portion of a jail sentence, except for the
mandatory sentences under subsection (5) (a) and (b), upon
the condition that the defendant remain arrest-free and
Elnviction-free or complete court-ordered intervention

(2) For any subsequent offense occurring within two
years after a second misdeneenor conviction, the person
Shall be charged with a class © felony.

 

 

 

 

 

 

  

 

 

 

In 2002, the legislature amended HRS § 703-806(5) (b) to provide that a person
shall be deened 2 "repeat offender” if they commit a second offense of abuse
of # fansiy oF household rember within one year of the “first conviction.”
See" 2002 Haw. Sess. L. Act 5, § lat S¢. The legislature further amended ERS
$"F09-906(7) "to provide that, for the “third or any subsequent offense” of
abuse of s fenily or household menber ocosrring "within two years of a second
Gr subsequent corviction, the person shall be charged with 2 class C felony.”
See 2002 Haw. Seas, L. Act S, $1 at 54, However, because the subject.
incident occurred on Febroary 22, 2001, the snended version of the statute is
not implicated in the present matter.

 

 

 
   

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guilty plea without an affirmative showing that he voluntarily,
intelligently, and knowingly pled guilty constituted an abuse of
discretion amounting to plain error, (2) the family court abused
its discretion when it ordered him to undergo sex offender
evaluation and treatment as a condition of his probation
sentence, and (3) the imposition of sex offender treatment
constituted cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the
eighth anendnent to the United States Constitution? and article
I, section 12 of the Hawai'i Constitution.’ The State of Hawai'i
(hereinafter, “the prosecution") concedes that the record is
insufficient to affirmatively show that Solomon’s guilty plea was
knowing and voluntary, but argues that the fanily court did not
abuse its discretion by sentencing Solomon to undergo sex
offender evaluation and treatment, and, moreover, that such
sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
Inasmuch as the record fails to affirmatively
demonstrate that Solonon’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary,
we vacate Solomon’ conviction and sentence, and remand to the
family court for a new change of plea hearing. Although this
issue is outcome-dispositive of the instant appeal, we address
Solonon’s remaining points of error in order to provide guidance

to the family court on remand.

2 The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that “(e]xcessive bail shell not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
Gruel and unusual punishnents inflicted.”

 

2 article I, section 12 of the Hawai's Constitution provides, in
relevant part, that "{e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines inpesed, ner cruel and unusual punishment inflicted

 

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11. BACKGROUND
on March 5, 2001, Solomon was charged by complaint with
one count of abuse of a family or household member, in violation

of HRS § 709-906, see supra note 1, after he tied up his four-
year-old nephew by the wrists and ankles to a bed or a tree and

hit him with a belt.
on March 27, 2001, Solomon pled guilty to the charged
offense. Prior to accepting Solomon's guilty plea, the family
court conducted the following colloquy to determine whether
Solomon's guilty plea was made knowingly, voluntarily, and

intelligently:

THE COURT: . .. . Mr. Solomon, it’s my
understanding, siz, that’ you've decided to plead guilty to
the chatge of abuse of family household menber this mornings
ie that correct, sir?

isovouon) + “Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Then let me ask you # few

How old are you?
{(Sciowox] +" Forty-three.

THE COURT: And how much education do you ha

(SOLOMON; Up to the tenth grade.

THE COURT; Are you under the infivence of alcohol or
any drugs this morning?

[SoLowoN) : No.

THE COURT: YoU understand the maximum penalty in this
case iz one year in ail and 2 82,000 Fine?

{soLowon}: Yes.

THE COURT: Also you understand you have the right to
go to trial in this case, and by pleading guilty you give up
Sertain rights you'd have if you went to trial?

{(sovawon)? Yee

THE COURT: AlsS you understand that if the {clourt
imposes a sentence you de not agree with, you cannot at that
eine withdraw your guilty plea. You understand that?

[soLowon! : yes.

THE COURT: las anybody threatened or coerced you to
plead guilty in this case?

{sovoMox] : No.

THE COURT: $0 you're doing so of your oun fr
is that correct?

{soLoWON): Ye

THE COURT: Are you satisfied with the advice of your
attorney?

{SoLowon): yes.

THE COURT: All right, 1°11 ask for a statement of

 

 

 

 

 

wits

 

 

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facts from the (prosecstion]
Following a brief factual synopsis from the prosecution, Solomon
again entered a guilty plea. Finding that Solomon “voluntarily
entered his plea of guilty with an understanding of the nature of
the charge against him and the consequences of his plea[,]” the
family court accepted Solomon's guilty plea and adjudged him
guilty.

After adjudging Solomon guilty, the family court
Snmediately commenced sentencing proceedings. During the
proceedings, the prosecution asked the family court to order a

ntence investigation, and requested that Solomon be

 

pe
sentenced to a three-day jail term, as agreed. Defense counsel
also requested that Solomon receive a three-day jail sentence,
but urged the family court to credit Solomon for time already
served. Defense counsel, however, deferred all other conditions
of Solomon's sentence to the presentence investigation

fter credited Solomon for

 

recommendation. The family court the:
time served and informed the parties that Solomon would not serve
any additional period of incarceration. The family court,
however, continued sentencing until May 4, 2001 to afford the
probation department sufficient time to prepare a presentence
investigation report to assist the court in determining the
appropriate terms and conditions for Solomon's sentence.

on May 4, 2001, the family court heard arguments to
determine the terms and conditions of Solomon's sentence. The

arguments, however, were made in the absence of a presentence

 

investigation report because Solomon “was not aware that he was

supposed to initiate the contact with the -- with the [probation

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officer].” At the hearing, the prosecution requested one year
probation, with the conditions that Solomon undergo “{domestic
violence intervention], parenting [classes], mental health

assessment and treatment, and sex offender evaluation and

 

treatment but not registration.” In support of its position that
Solomon undergo sex offender evaluation and treatment, the
prosecution explained that

[t]he sex offender evaluation and ers
major stumbling block, Your Honor.

 

ment sens to be the
[alefense aay argu

   

 

 

that it's unwarranted by the facts of this matter. However,
this was s four-year-old child whe was bound to, depending
on whose account, a bed of a tree and hit with « belt

      

There's an onnistakable bondage-type elenent here that the
[prosecution] would argue at least needs to be evaluated and
explored.

[e'no treatment is deemed necessary, then that’s fine.
ot the [prosecution] would ask this (clourt to take the
prudent path and at Least have the evaluation done to see if
further treatment is necessary. Not to do so would —~ in
Ligne of what has already happened to one four-year-old boy,
would be very difficult to explein should thie happen again:

The [prosecution] would argue that (Solomon) had an
opportunity’ to go and neve a presentence investigation
Conducted. If the presentence investigation had come back
with sex offender evalustion and treatment not necessary,
Swell the [prosecution's] grounds for asking for such would
Be much weaker. However, (Solomon) neglected to go into
[ine Adult Service Branch) and have the presentence
investigation conducted.

‘AE such, the [prosecutien] would argue that the
[clout should take the prudent path snd perhaps e%
the woret in this matter and order the sex
offender evalu ~~ or the sex offender evaluation and
treatment

“fithout the [presentence investigation], Your Honor,
tthe (prosecution) would really be arguing that the (clourt
should err on the side of caution in this matter as there is
binding and beating element of ~~ a Dondage-type element
fo this exine.

 

 

 

   

    

 

 

(Some formatting omitted.) Defense counsel, however, argued that
the facts of the case did not warrant the imposition of sex
offender evaluation and treatment as a condition of Solomon’ s
probation and would amount to cruel and unusual punishment:

Considering what's being asked here, the sex offender
   

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evaluation and treatment is a very rigorous and demanding
program, Your Honor. Saeed on the mere facts alone that. was
Presenced in thie case, the fects alone do not warrant such
Feondition of probation. And without any other indication
ore, i don’t think that it's appropriate sentencing:
T'would be overly -- the sentence in this case would
be extremely untair and possibly a violation of his [eighth
\dnent fights, Your Honor, because the facts in this
Just the mere fact that it's a four-year-old child ~

 

 

 

    

s*that was possibly tied at the wrists, Your Honor, that

 

 

Goean't indicate a sex offender “~ sexual predator here.

And I realize the [clourt's concern with the
possibility of that. Sut becouse there 4s concern and
Because it's Just a mere possibility, I think the
[presentence investigation} would be critical in this case
iF'the (cloure were to impose such a condition. So we would
be objecting -- strenuously objecting to any kind of sex
offender eval(uation] of t¥eatment in this ci

 

 

 

ut is’ tar as the sex offender eval (uation) and
treataent “= there's aise nothing in his criminal history
that would ingicate that's necessary here. This is the very
Hirst abuse-type case. He has nothing ~~ no other criminal.
Convictions that would indicate that's the path that he's
taking here, Your Honor

 

After hearing the arguments presented, the family court ordered

Solomon to pay $50.00 to the criminal injury compensation fund

‘and sentenced him to one year probation, subject to the special

conditions that he undergo domestic violation intervention

counseling, parenting classes, sex offender evaluation and

treatment,

treatment,

if necessary, and mental health assessment and
if necessary:

‘The presentence investigation was something that was
‘the responsibility of [Solenon] to follow up on.” I haven't
Feceived any evidence that there was any sort of particular
fettered communication. 1 haven't heard anything fron the
public defender that was involved in this case. There has
Been no evidence that’s been presented to the (clourt, othe:
than the opinion of counsel, this would be an overly
Higorous or costly procedure

‘There were concerns on the part of the {cJourt about
the possibitity of the issues snvelving sex offender perhaps
being involved: And those concerns have not been lessened
by the fact that there's been no presentence investigation,
apparently no coordinstion with the public defender’ s
Gftice. And now, even after this matter was set for
hearing, there hasn't been what 1 would consider to be an

 

   

 

 

 
 

 

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adequate explanation ss to why the presentence investigation
dig'not take place.

T know that {defense counsel) is an able attorney and
has skile of conmunication that generally T would think
would be adequate to infor Mr. Solomon about his need to
Contact the probation office. But certainly before coming
fo court tedey, the public defender’ s office could have been
able to contact either the probation office or (defense
Geunsel) to find cut nore facts.

‘So based on these circumstances, I am going to order
the sex offender evaluation and treatnent. Hewever, Becau
Br. Solonon has teken responsinilicy for this matter, the
(cjourt would not be imposing any additional period of
Incarceration.” Although the facts =~ were you not to
recognize the fact that you have violated the law and
Fecognize your unlawful conduct, the [cJourt would be
inclined to give you nore incarceration, Mr. Solomon.

Trunderstand you have an attachment £9 your nephew.
It may well be that you're able to be returned to the
relationship with your nephew at sone point. And it may be
that this sex offender evaluation snd ereatment helps you 30
that regard to be able to be reunited with nin.

Tn the event thet for sone reasons it does appear
overly rigorous oF costly, the public defender’s office does
have the option ts file a motion for reconsideration. But
Af that was done, it certainly should be done with some
facts and sone consultation with a probation officer:

50 the [clourt will impose the following sentence of
fone year probation. General. conditions of probation to
apply which would be po possession oF ownership of firearms
Suring that period of time. special conditions of domestic
Violence intervention counselling [sic], and parenting also
to be ordered. A sex offender evaluation and treatment Will
be orderes ss well as mental Health assessment and

 

    

 

 

 

 

 

   

 

 

A $9600) criminal injury compensation fee should be
paid within 60 days. I'll waive the £75(.00] probation fee
To this ca

 

on May 23, 2001, Solomon filed a motion for

consideration of his sentence, urging the family court to

eliminate the special condition that he undergo sex offender

evaluation and treatment. In support of his position, Solomon

argued that sex offender treatment was not “reasonably related”

to the charged offense, in violation of HRS § 706-624(2) (1993),

or his criminal history, in violation of HRS § 706-606(2) (1993).

Solonon further argued that the family court's imposition of sex

e
 

offender evaluation and treatment as a condition of his probation
constituted cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of article
1, section 12 of the Hawai'i Constitution and the eighth
avendent to the United States Constitution, because “it severely
stignatize[d hin)” and vas unduly burdensome.

on June 18, 2002, the fanily court held @ hearing on
solonon’s notion for reconsideration of sentence. At the
beginning of the hearing, the family court expressed its
Inclination to grant Solomon's motion. The prosecution,
thereafter, argued that Solonon’s actions of tying up his nephew
and hitting him with a belt imparted a “distinct bondage-type
Hlavor{.}" the prosecstion farther explained that “the (Ch&Id
protective Services (Cf5)] investigation into this matter did
pote that there had been prior allegations of sexual misconduct
gn the part of (Solonon]." In addition, the prosecution noted

that Solomon was previously convicted for sexual assault in the

 

fourth degree on October 3, 1991. In light of the evidence, the
prosecution argued that

[alt this point getting the assessment and treatment would
Ghly serve to benefit perhaps himself and no doubt his
fenlty.. The Ces Teport indicates quite strongly the
possibility that, if the mother were to retain custody of
her children, hat [Solomon] in the future would have
Contact with them, quite possibly unsupervised contact with
fhe'chiadren. the [prosecution] finds that, quite frenkly,
a horrific possibitity.

[the prosecution] would also note in terms of the
current allegations and the bondage-type discipline which
Me. Selomen engages in, he has in the past apparently also
engaged in other bondage-type activities including
Rondeufting his daughter to a lawn chair to keep her from
Uiolating curfew, The [prosecution] would urge this (c]ourt
to reconsider if it is thinking of allowing Mr. Solomon to
Giapose of the sex offender treatment.

‘This is net a call for registzation which the
[alefense might argue would carry the stigna oF sone type of

    

 
 

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onerous public ridicule regarding his sexual offender
Status. “This is just an assessment which could lead to
possible treatment. At minimum, if the assessment were to
Gene back negative, would not require sone classes, would
hot require hin to’ go further bot just in terms of safety,
We'd be sure that the complainant and other children in this
Batter would be safe. It seens that the

xual assessment and treatnent, if it's
would be Justified in this case:

 

      

(Some formatting omitted.) In response to the prosecution's
azgunent regarding Solomon’s previous conviction of sexual
assault in the fourth degree, defense counsel explained that
Solomon pled guilty to the sexual assault charge, and, unlike the
instant case, “the complaining witness was {) one that Mr.
Solonon was not familiar with. But she was approximately in her
40's. So it was not a young child.”

The family court, thereafter, informed the parties that
At would reconsider that part of Solomon's sentence requiring sex
offender evaluation and treatment “given the lack of facts
(Anaudible) and the additional burden that it places on [Solomon]
which the [clourt was not specifically aware of at the time.”
Based on the family court's decision, the prosecution proposed
that the fanily court order a presentence investigation to
address whether it would be appropriate to sentence Solomon to
sex offender evaluation and treatment in light of the information
provided in CPS reports the prosecution was in receipt of and the
prosecution's concern for the welfare of the minor children
involved:

{he prosecution) would note this (CFS) intake ss
Fourtyearcols niece] by. [eelonon]s On dune 26th, 200,
{Soloten's tour-yesr-old niece] reported co her 25-yest~ole

father, [], during a supervised visit that Uncle Janes
Soloneh had been touching her down there, pointing to her

 

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genital area, while he gave her baths. Minor stated, “I
Son’ t Like that.”
hen the active CPS investigator followed up with
[Solomon's four-year-old niece, she) stated that she aid not
Like Uncle Janes bathing her. “I don’t want to go there,”
Feferring to {Solomon's} hone. She cried and appeared
Feally #fightened. (Solomon's) actions appeared to be
Sexually motivated. Complainant assessed the child to be
Eredibia.” Specific in this factor as to (Solomon's fours
year-old niece's) disclosure is unknown
Confirm CPS proof of sexcal abuse is serious
reservations to his ows children when’ [Solomon's eight-year
eld son], and nine-year-old (daughter), by her uncle, due to
Ellegea ansl penetration there were concern of no supporting
Inconsistent statements by (Solomon's
‘And (Solomon) had passed the polygraph

 

 

 

 

However, the then-investigator, Tan Young, also noted
that he assessed [Solenon's eight-year-old son)’ incredible
and that his inconsistent ststenent may be attribuved to
This} low cognitive functioning. in 1390. (Solenen}
handouffed his own daughter (] to @ lawn chair in order to
Prevent her fron violating curfew.

According to another report, [Solomon] knowingly
atiowed his ows son [] to remain with maternal aunts {], who
Burnt his eyelashes and hair. In conjunction, (Solomon)
failed to protect his own daughter {] who had been sexvally
abused by Imaternal aunt"s husband), who currently Lives
with the family.

 

 

  

After adnonishing the prosecution for failing to supply the CPS
information in response to Solonon’s motion for reconsideration
of sentence, the family court continued the hearing on Solomon's
motion for reconsideration to provide the probation officer an
opportunity to review the CPS materials and prepare a report and
reconmendation as to whether sex offender evaluation was
ry.

On August 6, 2001, Robert R. Tangonan (Tangonan),

nece!

 

probation supervisor, filed @ letter addressed to Judge Wilson of
the family court and attached (1) @ “psycho-sexual assessment”
report prepared by Joseph Giovannoni (Giovannoni), a certified
clinical specialist in psychiatric and mental health nursing and

a
   

FOR PUBLICATION
a certified sex therapist, and (2) a polygraph examination report
prepared by Michael Orian (Orian). In the psycho-sexual
assessment report, Giovannoni first noted that Solomon was
convicted of sexual assault in the fourth degree in 1991 and did
not undergo 2 psycho-sexual assessment until May 12, 1993, at
which time Solomon “admitted to exposing his genitalia to an
adult female." Solomon subsequently began a relapse prevention
group but was terminated for noncompliance. After surmarizing

Solomon’s history, Giovannoni posed a serie;

 

of questions to
Solomon and scored his responses. Based on Solomon's score and
polygraph results, Giovannoni assessed that

Me. S{o]lonon is an untreated sex offender who has not
complied with treatment in the past and who ie likely to
ate excuses in order to avoid treatment at the present
tine. Thad an eppeintment with him on May 24, 2001 and he
canceled it.

Me. So] lemon was deceptive on the polygraph suggesting thet
he continues to engage in sexually sbusive behavior. The
Polygraph suggests that the abuse has escalated to hands on
buge and chav both Nis niece and his nephew are victims of
Ris sexual abuse. Mr. S{o]ionon is super optimistic that he
can circumvent the system as he believes he did in 1993.

 

     

The salient events to which he admits to tying up his nephew
soggests sadistic tendencies. Wr. S{o) omen’ s affect
Geaonstrates no remorse. He justifies and excuses his
Setions, He Se at risk of being violent, sadistic, and
ISkely to sexually exploit chitcren. Mis present girlfriend
enables him and does not believe that he hes (e] sexual
problem. Therefore she is likely to overlook any children
Re may be grocning to sexually abuse, ME. S(o)lomon’s
otivation for treatment 1s poor and he poses a risk to
Children, especially those who are in his extended family

 

 

 

Giovannoni thus recommended that Solomon “participate in a sex

offender progran until he completes the objectives of relaps

 

prevention treatment and he is clinically discharged.”

In the polygraph examination report, Orian first noted

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that, during his interview with Solomon, Solomon stated that he
was discharged from the army “because he grabbed a high school
Girl while he was in the [a]zmy and stationed in Germany.” Orian
then noted that, during the polygraph examination, Solomon

(2) Since 1993, did

 

answered “no” to the following question:
you ever expose yourself to anyone in public? (2) Did you ever
touch or put your hand on your niece's vagina?; (3) Since 1993,
did you ever put your hand, mouth or penis on any minor girl's
breast, vagina or buttocks?; and (4) Did you ever do anything
sexual with your nephew? Orian reported that, based on Solomon’ s
responses, Solonen “[was] being completely deceptive.” when
Solomon was informed that he displayed deceptive responses,
Solomon admitted “that since 1993, he has sat in his car and
masturbated while looking at girls at the beach or at a park.”
Solomon, however, explained that “the girls were away from his
car, never saw his penis, and did not see him masturbating[,]”
and that he did not have any sexual activity or contact with any
minor child, including his niece and nephew.

Accordingly, based on Giovannoni’s psycho-sexual
assessment report and the polygraph examination results, Tangonan
informed Judge Wilson that “[Solomon] should be supervised by the
Special Services Section that includes specialized supervision of
sex abuse defendants that requires sex therapy: close monitoring
and supervision, more random drug testing for mood altering drugs
including alcohol and polygraph testing to monitor his compliance

to the treatment plan and the conditions of probation.”

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on August 6, 2001, the parties returned to family court
for further proceedings on Solonon’s moticn for reconsideration.
Based on Giovannoni’s and Orian’s reports, the family court
denied Solomon’ s motion for reconsideration and maintained its
imposition of sex offender evaluation and treatment as @

condition of Solomon's sentence:

ALL right. Me. Solonon, az you can see, the (clourt
has -- "we've invested a Lot of time in taking’s lock at your
case, And I an sensitive to the fact that the sex offender
Ereatnent would be something that would involve a lot of
effort on your part.

‘on the other hand, this Ss a case in which the:
no period of incarcerstion imposed, and it's a =~ it
Sentence that takes into consideration that there were
Certain facts about this case that also involved the tying
bop a juvenile that made the (clourt consider the concept of
Bex offender treatment.

‘The further evaluation that has been done in this case
by Dr, Glovannoni has confirmed that the condition that was
ofiginally imposed a part of your sentence, that is, sex
offender evaluation and treatment, would be appropriate.

T'can only recomend to you that you keep in mind thet
this is s misdenesnor case for which you would be sentences
fe a condition of your probation to undergo this treatment,
and then it’s finished.” When your probation is finishes,
then that will be the end of your treatment.

This is not something that is a Lifetime matter, You
are not being told to register at a sex offender, This is a
Risdeneancr case, the conditions of which for your
Sentencing include the sex offender trestment

Vionever, that is an important difference, between
being convicted of a sexual offense and having to register
as a sex offender for the state. So 1 don't want you to
misunderstand the situation.

‘Risoy the treatment that is to be provided to you to
the extent that this 1s senething that hopefully will help
you with your -- the way you approach the treatment, this
Treatment is being done for your own good. This Ante
treatment that's Being done to, you know, ‘ponish (James)
Franklin Solonon. It's also being done of course to protect
other people that you'll come into contact with, but it is
Smportant for you to remember that it is something that’s
neant for your Benefit.

If you complete it successfully, it’s behind your and
that’s ity So it's very isportant =~ the reason I'm saying
this, st's very important for you to have the right attitude
for you to be able £0 benefit fron this. So just try to
keep that in mind.

 

   

    

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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ALL right. So the motion for reconsideration is
denied in this case. Ido see that there's an adequate
exus in the facts and also, given the report of the expert,
fn adequate nexus for the imposition of the sex offender
treatment a2 s conaition of sentencing.

 

Solomon thereafter appealed.‘
IX, STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Plain Error
“We may recognize plain error when the error committed

affects substantial rights of the defendant.” State v. cullen,

86 Hawai'i 1, 8, 946 P.2d 955, 962 (1997) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted) .
B. Confession of Error

When the prosecution concedes error,

* onder Hawai'i Roles of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule ¢(b) (1), 2
notice of appeal must be filed “within 30 days after the entry of the judgment
Of order appesied from.” In the instent case, Solenon filed his notice of
‘Sppeal on August 13, 2001 -- seven days after the family court denied his
Rotion for reconsideration of sentence. Disposition of a motion for
feconsideration of sentence, however, “does not qualify under HRAP Rule 4(b)
ie a tolling notion chat extends the {ling deadline for a notice of appeal.”
States. Magne, 92 Havei't 289, 300, 990 P.2d 2171, 1162 (App. 1999).
Notwithstanding, trial court has authority to extend the time for filing
hotice of appeal for a period not to exceed 30 days fron the expiration of the
tine otherwise prescribed by this subdivision (b)-” HRAP Rule 4(b) (3)
However, because the family court granted Solomon # seventy-day extension
Within which to file his notice of appesl, Solomon's notice of appeal was
uintimeay.

Nevertheless, this court has recognized that a criminal defendant

 

 

   

 

As entitled, on his first appeal, to effective counsel who

ay not deprive him of his appeal by failure to comply with
Procedural rules, -; - such es (MRAP) Rule 4(b), wnich

Fequires that the notice of appeal oe filed within chirty:
ye after the entry of the judgment or order appealed from,

   

States Aplaca, 96 Hawai'i 17, 23, 25 P.36 792, 798 (2001) (citations and
internel quotation marks omitted). Thezefore, because Solomon is asserting
his first eppeal, and hie failure to file @ tinely notice ef appeal seens to
be the result of’ his attorney's failure to comply with MRAP (Role) 4(b),
Scloncn should not be deprived of his appeal.

15

 
** FOR PUBLICATION ***

—_____*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

At {s incumbent on the appellate court first to ascertain
that the confession of error is supported by the record and
Weli-foundes in low and second to determine chat such error
is properly preserved and prejudicial. In other words,
confession of error by the prosecution is not binding upon
Gn appellate coure, nor may a conviction be reversed on the
Strengen of the prosecutor's official action alone,

State v, Hoang, 93 Hawai'i 333, 336, 3 P.3d 499, 502 (2000)

(citations, internal quotation marks, ellipsis points, and

 

 

 

 

brackets omitted).

Cc. Acceptance of a Guilty Plea

A trial Judge is constitutionally required to ensure
thet a guilty ples 4s voluntarily and knowingly entered,
Although no specific dislogue is required, the court should
hnake “an affirmative showing by an on-the-record colloquy
Between the court and the defendant wherein the defendant ‘3
Shown co have 2 f0ll understanging of what the plea of
Guilty connotes and ite consequences.”

 

State v. Willians, 68 Haw. 498, 499, 720 P.2d 1020, 1012 (1986)
(citations and emphasis omitted).

D. Sentencing

a) sentencing judge generally has broad
discretion in inposing a sentence. State v. Gaylord,
Se aawai't 127, 143-44, 090 P24 1167, 1163-84 (1999);
Beate ts Valera, 14 Haw. 424, 435, 648 P.2d 376, 281
1953]. the applicable standard of review for
fontencing or resentencing matters is whether the
court committed plain and manifest fof discretion
{nits cecision. Gaylord, "76 #
at 1164; State 2 Kumukau, 72 Haw, 228, .
2.20 682, 687-86 {1990}; State v. Murray(,] 63’ How.
12, 25, 621 P.24 334, 342-43 (1900); State vy Fry, 61
Haw. 226, 231, 602 P.2d 13, 16 (1979)
Keaue 2. State’ 79 Hawai" 261, 204, 90: P.2d 481, 484
(S338) "TFleccors which indicate ‘a plain and manifest
abuse of discretion are arbitrary or capricious action by
the Judge ond a rigid refusal to consider the defendant’ s
Contentions,” “Etye 61 Saw. at 231, 602 P.2 at 17. And,
SSigienereiiy, tovconseitute an ablse it must appear that
the court clesrly exceeded the bounds of reason or
Giscegardes roles oF principles of law or practice to. the
Substantial detrinent’ of s party Litigant.’" Keawe, 79
Rowaii at 266, 902 P.2a ot 486 (quoting Gaviorg, 76 Hawai'i
ae 144, 090 P24 at 1184 (quoting Mumukau, 71 Haw, at 227

   

 

 

   

  

   

16
 

+#* FOR PUBLICATION

28, 187 P.24 at 688))
State v. Kaua, 102 Hawai'i 1, 7, 72 P.3d 473, 479 (2003) (quoting
State v. Rauch, 94 Hawai'l 315, 322, 13 P.3d 324, 331 (2000)
(brackets and ellipsis points in the original).
E. | Questions of Constitutional Law

“We answer questions of constitutional law by
exercising our own independent judgment based on the facts of the
case, and, thus, questions of constitutional law are reviewed on
appeal under the right/wrong standard.” State v, Peseti, 101
Hawai'i 172, 178, 65 P.3d 119, 125 (2003) (citing Aplaca, 96
Hawai'i at 22, 25 P.3d at 797) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).

XII, DrscussroN

A. The family court’s failure to establish on the record that
Solomon's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary constituted
an abuse of discretion amounting to plain error.

 

 

on appeal, Solomon argues that the family court's
acceptance of his guilty plea without an affirmative showing that
he voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly pled guilty
constituted an abuse of discretion amounting to plain error.
Solomon specifically contends that the family court failed to:
(1) advise him that “by pleading guilty, he was specifically
waiving his right against self-incrimination and his right to
confront his accusers[;]" (2) advise him that he had a right toa
trial by jury; (3) inguire whether his “willingness to plead
guilty was 2 result from a plea agreement as required by [Hawai'i

Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP)] Rule 11(d)(7]" and (4) inform

uv
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

him that it was not bound by the plea agreement. Solomon thus
maintains that the family court’s failure to ascertain that he

understood the specific consequences of his guilty plea was plain
error. The prosecution concedes that the record is insufficient

to show that Solomon's guilty pl

 

vas knowing and voluntary,
and, therefore, requests that this court vacate Solomon's
conviction and remand for a new change of plea hearing or for
resentencing by another court. Inasmuch as the record fails to
affimatively demonstrate that Solomon knowingly, voluntarily,
and intelligently pled guilty, the family court’s acceptance of
Solonon’s guilty plea was plain error.

This court has acknowledged that, “even when the
prosecutor concedes error, . . . it is incumbent on the appellate

court first to ascertain . . . that the confession of error is

 

supported by the record and well-founded in law and second to
determine that such error is properly preserved and prejudicial.”
Hoang, 93 Hawai'i at 336, 3 P.3d at 502 (internal brackets,
quotation marks, and citations omitted) (some ellipsis points in
the original and some added). “In other words, a confession of
exror by the prosecution is not binding upon an appellate court,
nor may @ conviction be reversed on the strength of the
prosecutor's official action alone.” Id, (internal quotation
marks, brackets, and citation omitted).

Tt is well-recognized that a guilty plea “in itself is
a conviction and a simultaneous vaiver of several important

constitutional guarantees(,]” namely, the privilege against

18
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a trial by jury, and
the right to confront one’s accusers, and, thus, the waiver of
these guarantees “is not constitutionally acceptable unless made
voluntarily and with full understanding of the consequences.”
Wing v. Anong, 52 Haw. 420, 425, 477 P.2d 630, 634 (1970).
Generally, therefore, “[a] trial judge is constitutionally
required to ensure that a guilty plea is voluntarily and
knowingly entered.” Milliams, 68 Haw. at 499, 720 P.2d at 1012
(citations and emphasis omitted). In determining the
voluntariness of a defendant's proffered guilty plea, the trial
court “should make an affirmative showing by an on-the-record
colloquy between the court and the defendant wherein the
defendant is shown to have a full understanding of what the plea
of guilty connotes and its consequences.” State v. Vaitoai, 59
Haw. $92, 602, 585 P.24 1259, 1265 (1978). Tt 1s plain error for
the trial judge to accept a defendant’s guilty plea without an
affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary. Id.
at 601-02, $85 P.2d at 1264-65.

Additionally, when a trial court accepts a guilty plea,
FRPP Rule 11 requires the court to first address the defendant
personally in open court and then determine that the plea is

voluntar;

 

(c) Advice to defendant. the court shail not accept
a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first addressing
the defendant personally in open court and determining that
he uncerstands' the follows
(2) the nature of the charge to which the plea
Ae offered; and
(2) the maximum penalty provided by law, and the
smaxinum sentence of extended tern of imprisonment,
Shich may be imposed for the offense to which the plea

 

 

 

 

19
+** FOR PUBLICATION ***

Ae offered; and

(3) that he has the right to plead not guilty,
or to persist in thet plea if it has already been
nade? and

(2) that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere
here will not be a further trial of any king, so thet
by pleading guilty of nolo contendere he waives the
Fight to atrial: and

(5) that if he Le not a citizen of the United
7a conviction of the offense for which he has

   

seat

 

Been charged may have the consequences of deportation,

exclusion fron admission to the United States, oF

Genial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the

United Staves

{d)  Zasuring that the ples is voluatary. The court
‘of guilty or nolo contendere without

snail not accept & pl
Eitet Sacessing
determining that the pl
force of threats or of promises apert fron a Piet
The court shall also inguire #3 te whether the a
wilingness to plead guilty of nolo contendere F
Gay ples sgreenent.

HRPP Rule 11(c), (4). Moreover, if a defendant enters a guilty

    

   

plea pursuant to a plea agreement, it is incumbent upon the trial
court to inform the defendant that it is not bound by the plea
agreement. HRPP Rule 11(e) (3) ("Upon disclosure of any plea

 

agreenent, the court shall not accept the tendered plea unless
the defendant is informed that the court is not bound by such
agreement, unless the court agreed otherwise.”).

In the instant case, the family court accepted
Solonon’s guilty plea without an affirmative showing that Solonon
had a full and complete understanding of what his guilty ple
connoted and its consequences. Although the family court

conducted an on-th

 

record colloquy with Solomon prior to
accepting hie plea and advised him that “you have the right to go
to trial in this case, and by pl

 

ding guilty you give up certain
xights you’d have if you went to trial[,]” (emphasis added), the

 

20
 

*** FOR PUBLICATION

family court did not explain the specific rights Solomon would
“give up” by pleading guilty. Specifically, the family court did
not ascertain whether Solomon understood that by pleading guilty,
he was waiving his privilege against self-incrimination, the
right toa trial by Jury, and the right to confront his accuser.
In addition, the family court failed to (1) inquire whether
Solomon's willingness to plead guilty was the result of a plea
agreement, gage HRPP Rule 11(d), and (2) inform Solomon that it
was not bound by the plea agreement, sce HRPP Rule 11(e) (3).
‘thus, Solomon's guilty plea was not made knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily.

Inasmuch as the record affirmatively demonstrates that
Solomon did not have a full and complete understanding of what
his guilty plea connoted and its consequences, the family court's
acceptance of Solomon's guilty plea constituted an abuse of
discretion anounting to plain error. Accordingly, we vacate
Solonen’s conviction and remand the case to the family court for
a new change of plea hearing.

B. The family court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing
Solomon to undergo sex offender evaluation and treatment, if
jecessary, as a condition of his probation.

Solomon further argues that the family court abused its
discretion in sentencing him to sex offender evaluation and

treatment as a condition of his probation. Solomon specifically
contends that the family court’s sentence ordering him to undergo
sex offender evaluation and treatment was illegal because he did

not commit a sexual offense and it was not reasonably related to

2
   

FOR PUBLICATION.
his character and history. In addition, Solomon alleges that the
family court deprived him of liberty because no evidence was
presented suggesting the need for sex offender evaluation and
treatment. We disagree.

“the legislature prescribes penalties for criminal
offenses and its inclination has been to vest in the courts ‘wide
latitude in the selection of penalties from those prescribed and
in the determination of their severity.’” Kumukay, 71 Haw. at
224, 787 P.2d at 686 (quoting State v. Johnson, 68 Haw. 292, 296,
711 P.2d 1295, 1298 (1985)), “In determining the particular
sentence to be imposed, the court must consider a variety of
factors in exercising its discretion in fitting the punishment to
the crime ‘as well as the needs of the individual defendant and
the community.’” Id, at 225, 787 P.2d at 686-87 (quoting State
waTeves, 4 Haw. App. $66, 576, 670 P.2d 834, 838 (1963).

“abuse of a family or household member (is a]
misdemeanor.” HRS § 709-906(5). Under HRS § 709-906(5) (a), @
person convicted for the first time of abuse of a family or
household menber “shall serve a minimum jail sentence of forty-
eight hours[.]” Moreover, pursuant to sentencing guidelines, 2
sentencing court may sentence a defendant convicted of abuse of a
family or household member “to imprisonment for a definite term
to be fixed by the court and not to exceed one year in the case
of a misdemeanor[.]” HRS § 706-663. Notwithstanding, within the
range of discretion that the Hawai'i Penal Code affords courts in

imposing sentences, a sentencing court may also sentence a

22
*#* FOR PUBLICATION ***

defendant convicted of abuse of @ family or household member to
probation, rather than imprisonment.* HRS § 706-620 (Supp.
2004). Once a probation sentence is imposed, a defendant must
comply with the mandatory and discretionary conditions set by the
sentencing court. HRS § 706-624 (1993).

A sentencing court’s authority to impose conditions on
a term of probation is statutorily prescribed under HRS § 706-
624. Notwithstanding the mandatory conditions of probation, a

 

+ in determining whether to ‘spose a term of probstion, the
sentencing court Ls guided by the following factors

 

(1) The factors set forth in section 706-606 to the extent
that they are applicable;
(2) The following factors, Co be accorded weight in favor

Of withholding @ sentence of imprisonnent

ia)" the defendant's criminal conduct neither caused
Ror threstened serious. ha:

(>) The defendant acted under a strong provocation;

{ec} There were substantial grounds tending to excuse
or justify the defendant's criminal conduct,
Ehough failing to establish a defense;

(a) The victim of the defendant’s criminal conduct
Induces or facilitated its commiseion;

le) The defendant has no history of prior
delinquency or criminal activity or has led =
Iseabiaing life for a substantial period of
Eine before the consission of the present crime:

(£) The defendant's criminal conduct was the result
of circumstances unlikely to recur

[g) The character snd attitudes of the defendant
Indicate thet the defendant is unlikely to
commit another crime:

(h) The defendant is particularly Likely to respond
aeisematively to a program of restitution or a
probationary program or both;

(4) Phe imprisonment of the defendant would entail
Guceesive herdenip to the defensant or the
Sefendent's dependente; and

(3) The expedited sentencing program set forth
in section 706-606.3, if the defendant has
Quelified for that sentencing progran.

   

 

 

 

   

 

 

RS § 706-621 (1993).

23
#** FOR PUBLICATION ***

sentencing court may, in its discretion, impose additional
conditions that are reasonable:

‘te court may provide, as further conditions of «
sentence of probation,

‘fie eng tothe extent that the consitions involve only
Gaprivations of Liberty of property as are reasonably

fora eats gen
That the defendant

 

 

(a). Seve a term of inpriscnment . . . not exceeding six
onthe in nisdeneenor cases; |

 

iki " Ondergo available medical, psychiatric, or
peychelogical treatment, including treatment for
Brug er alcohol dependency, and reaain in a
Specified institution if required for that.
purposes

inj’ Satisfy otner re
may Impose(-]

 

jonable conditions as the court

HRS § 706-624(2) (emphasis added). A sentencing court,
therefore, must consider the following factors when imposing
additional probationary conditions:

(2) The nature and circumstance
Rstory and characteristics of the defensant?
(2) The need for the sentence imposed:
ia) “te reflect the seriousness of the offense, to
Promote respect for lew, and to provide Just
Bunishsent for the offense:

  

 

 

 

to) Fo afford adequate deterrence to criminal
Gonduee?
(c) Fe protect the public from further crines of the

defendant; and
(a) To provide the defendant with needed educational
Gr vocational training, medical care, or other
Correctional treatnent’ in the most effective
(2) the kings of
(0 the need to
fanong defendants with
found guilty of similar conduct.

HRS § 706-606 (1993) .

  
 

In the instant case, Solomon was convicted of abuse of

a family or household menber after he pled guilty to tying up his

24
 

#** FOR PUBLICATION ***
four-year-old nephew by the wrists and ankles, and hitting him
with a belt. The family court therefore had discretion to
sentence Solomon to probation, subject to mandatory and
discretionary conditions. The family court subsequently
sentenced Solomon to one year probation subject to the condition
that he, inter alia, undergo sex offender evaluation and
treatment. In imposing sex offender evaluation and treatment as
a condition of Solomon’s probation, the scope of the family

court’s inquiry must ensure that this condition was “reasonably

 

related to the factors set forth in [HRS §] 706-606 and to the
extent that [it] involve[d] only deprivations of Liberty or
property as are reasonably necessary for the purposes indicated
in (HRS §] 706-606(2)(.]" HRS § 706-624(2). Although the record

demonstrates that the family court initially lacked information

 

regarding Solomon's need for sex offender treatment at the time

 

of nis sentencing because of the absence of a presentence report,
the family court nevertheless had sufficient information after

considering Solomon's motion for reconsideration of his

   

sentence.‘ Specifically, the family court learned that: (1)

 

«this court recently held that the imposition of @ consecutive
sentence based on alleged but uncharged misconduct constituted plain error in
State ws Welling, 106 Hawai'i 441, 449-90, 106 P.3¢ 364, 372-79 (2005). In
Gelling, the circuit court sentenced Vellina to consecutive terms of
TEprischnent based on the prosecution's allegation that he “sold” a set
automatic firearm he stole during a burglary to a érug dealer in exchange for
aruge:

 

At Vellina’s sentencing hearing, the deputy

prosecuting ateorney (OPA) argued for’ the imposition of

Ecnsecutive sentences based upon the DPA's claim that

Vellina bed “sold those fireares toa drug dealer for
continued...)

 

25
¥** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

-continved)
drugs.” The DPA offered no proof to substantiate his
Gllegation that Vellins hed Sold the semi-automatic rifle
That he stole to a “drug dealer.” the circuit court
Likewise eid not question the BPA regarding the Basis for
hie belief that Vellina had sold the firearm to a drug
dealer.

in sentencing Vellina, the circuit court stated, "Now,
when Z hear that. . some drug dealer now has... an
Lilegar semi-automatic weapon that you stole snd’ transferred
to him, T'mean, that’s pretty damaging to the community.”
The eirouse court proceeded to sentence Vellins, “taking
into consideration. ..., particularly, the need to make an
enample of this kind of behavior to the community and to
Promote comunity safety,” to consecutive terms of
Teprisonment cotsiing ewonty years

 

 

 

Ada at 449-50, 106 P.36 at 372-73. Vellina subsequently appealed his
Sentence, arguing that the imposition of consecutive terms of imprisonment
Dased upon uncharged misconduct alleged by the prosecution at sentencing was
plain error. ddy at 643, 106 P.3d at 372, This court agreed, Reaffirming
the mandate set forth in State, lunes, 72 Haw. $21, 824 P.2d 837 (1982) ,
that "a judge cannot punish a efendant for an uncharged crime in the belief
thet st too deserves punishment (,]” ig. at 526, 624 P.2d at 640, this court
held that the circuit court "clearly exceeded the bounds of reason in
Sentencing Vellina{]" because the record failed to provide any evidence that
Vellina actually transferred a seni-automatic firearm to a drug dealer in
‘exchange for drugs as relied upon by the circuit court in sentencing Vellina
out die

 

 

 

 

 

(t]he cireust court unquestionably determined that Vellina
had “transferred” the semi-autonatic firearm to a drug
Gesler and sentenced him with that in sind. Siniler to
Nunes, the circuit court imposed punishment for uncharged
Efines =~ possibly either transfer and possession of
firearms, porsuant to BRS § 134-4 (1993), oF the prohibited
transfer of firearms, pursuant to HAS § 134-0 (1993). Ld.
at 526, 624 P.24 a 040. Me see nothing in the record £2
Support the circuit court's conclusion that Vellins
Eraneferred a semi-automatic firearm toa drug dealer
Indeed, a presentence investigation report was not even
prepared for the present matter.

 

     

 

 

Yelling, 106 Hawas's at 450, 106 P.3d at 373. As such, this court held that
‘the circuit court plainly erred in sentencing Velline to consecutive terms of
imprisonment based on the unsubstantiated allegation that he had transferred
the senivautonatic firearm to a drug dealer.” [ds

in distinct contrast to Usllina, the record in the instant case aptly
supported the fanily court's sentence. Specifically, the record included &
“psyeho-serual assessment report,” polygraph examination report, and
testimony confirming Soloncn's sexually abusive behavior and the likelihood of

(continued. .-)

 

 

 

26
   

FOR PUBLICATION

 

Solomon had a prior conviction of sexual assault in the fourth
degree; (2) a CPS report noted that (a) Solomon previously
engaged in “handouffing his daughter to a lawn chair to keep her
from violating curfew{,)” and (b) Solomon's four-year-old niece
reported that he inappropriately touched her genital area while
giving her a bath; (3), Solomon admitted during his polygraph
examination that (a) he was discharged from the army “because he
grabbed a high school girl while he was in the [alrmy and
stationed in Germany(,]”" and (b) “since 1993, he has sat in his
car and masturbated while looking at girls at the beach or at @
park[:]” and (4) a “psycho-sexual assessment” concluded that (a)
Solomon “is an untreated sex offender who has not complied with
treatment in the past and who is likely to make excuses in order
to avoid treatment at the present time[,]” (b) Solomon “was
deceptive on the polygraph suggesting that he continues to engage
alated to

 

javior [and] the abuse has

 

in sexually abusive be!
hands on abuse and that both his niece and his nephew are victims
of his sexual abuse[,]” and (c) Solomon “is at risk of being
violent, sadistic, and likely to sexually exploit children[.]”
Based on Solomon's history, the circumstances of this case, and
the seriousness of the offense, we cannot say that the family
court exceeded the bounds of reason or disregarded rules or

principles of law to the substantial detriment of Solomon when it

 

continued)
Solomon sexually exploiting young children. Accordingly, unlike
the family court sentenced Sclonen to undergo sex offender evaluation and
treatment es 8 condition of his probation, substantial evidence existed in the
record £0 support Solomon's history of sexual misconduct.

 

 

2
 

FOR PUBLICATION ***

sentenced him to undergo sex offender evaluation and treatment as
a condition of his probation. Accordingly, the family court did
not abuse its discretion in sentencing Solomon as it did.

C. The family court’s imposition of sex offender evaluation and
treatment as a condition of Solomon’s sentence did not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

 

As a final note, Solomon argues that the family court’s
Amposition of sex offender evaluation and treatment as a
condition of his sentence constituted cruel and unusual
punishment, in violation of the eighth amendment to the United
States Constitution, see supra note 2, and article I, section 12
of the Hawai'i Constitution, see supra note 3. Solomon
specifically maintains that the imposition of sex offender
evaluation and treatment was manifestly cruel and unusual,
inasmuch as (1) he was not convicted of a sex offense, (2) he was
not 2 danger to the public, (3) he would be severely stigmatized,
and (4) it deviated from sentences imposed upon other individuals
convicted of abuse of a family or household member. We disagree.

‘This court addresses arguments of cruel and unusual
punishment pursuant to the following standard:

“mhe standard by which punishment is to be judged

tonder the ‘eruel and unusual’ punishment provisions of both

the United States and Hawaii Constitutions is whether{.] in

the Light of developing concepts of decency and faire

the prescribed punishment ie £0 disproportionate to th

Conduct proseribed and 1 of such duration as to shock the

conscience of reasonable persons or to outrage the moral
Sense of the community.”

State v. Jenkins, 93 Hawai'i 87, 114, 997 P.2d 13, 40 (2000)
(quoting Kumukau, 71 Haw. at 226-27, 787 P.2d at 687 (quoting

 

 

 

 

28
 

FOR PUBLICATION *

FOR PUBLICATION 758

State v. Freitas, 61 Haw. 262, 267-68, 602 P.2d 914, 920
(1979))). “*the question of what constitutes an adequate penalty

necessary for the prevention of crime is addressed to the sound
judgment of the legislature and the courts will not interfere
with its exercise, unless the punishnent prescribed appears
clearly and manifestly to be cruel and unusual.’" Id. at 114,
997 P.2d at 40 (quoting Freitag, 62 Haw. at 267, 602 P.2d at

 

920). In determining whether a punishment is “clearly and
manifestly” cruel and unusual, this court, in Freitas, borrowed a
three-pronged test set forth in In ze Lunch, @ Cal. 34 410, 105
cal. Rptr. 217, 503 P.2d 921 (1972), superseded by statute on
other grounds by Cal. Penal Code $§ 1170 et seg., which directs
this court to consider

(2) the nature of the offense and/or the offender, with

Sareleniar regard to the degree of danger posed by both to

Societys (2) the extent of the challenged penalty as

Zcopared te the punishments prescrised for more serious

Eeimes within the same Jurisdiction; and (3) the extent of

fhe challenged penalty as compared to the punishment
Prescribed for che sane offense in other jurisdictions.

 

 

 

 

Jenkins, 93 Hawai'i at 114, 997 P.2d at 40 (quoting Freitas, 61
Hew, at 268, 602 P.2d at 920). “In using this test, the nature
of the offense and the danger the offender poses to society are
the key factors in this determination.” Jd, (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).

In the instant case, with regard to the first prong of
the Exeitas/Lynch test, the nature of Solomon's offi
the imposition of strict penalty, especially because the victim

warranted

 

was a child. ‘The legislature's purpose in enacting a family

29
 

FOR PUBLICATION ***

abuse statute reflects Hawai'i’s concern for the increasing
frequency of family abuse and its impact upon children and the

community:

Your Comittee is concerned with effectively
addressing and conbatting [sic] family violence. The
Tanifications of family violence spread far beyond the
confines of the family. Children who are the victins of, or

1s £0, violence learn to view it as accepted and
ermal Denavicr.’ They may perpetuate the violence as
faaatee.

 

   

 

«Your Committ: 2 that extending the
protection of this criminal statute to family and housenolé
ist in mitigating family violence and ite

  

 

Sen. Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 6, in 1985 Senate Journal, at 848. See
also State v. Friedman, 93 Hawai'i 63, 72, 966 P.2d 268, 277
(2000). As such, in order to prevent and deter the risk of harm
to family members and the community, a person who abuses a family
or household menber could be imprisoned for as long as a year.
correlatively, on the record before the family court, Solomon's
actions of binding his four-year-old nephew by his wrists and
ankles and hitting him with s belt could also warrant a one-year
term of probation subject to the condition that he undergo sex
offender evaluation and treatment, if necessary.

With regard to the second prong of the Freitas/Lynch
test, a person convicted of the more serious offense of
endangering the welfare of a minor in the first degree may be
sentenced to an extended indeterminate term of ten years’
imprisonment and ordered to pay @ $10,000 fine, or five years’
probation. See HRS § 709-903.5(3) (1993) ("Endangering the
welfare of a minor in the first degree is 2 class C felony.”).

Moreover, a person convicted of endangering the welfare of a

30
+++ FOR PUBLICATION ***

minor child in the second degree may be sentenced to up to one
year in jail and ordered to pay @ $2,000 fine, or one year
probation. See HRS § 709-904(3) (1983) ("Endangering the welfare
of @ minor is a misdemeanor.”). Compared with the possibility of
a ten-year jail term and a $10,000 fine, or five years’

 

probation, Solomon’s sentence of one-year probation subject to
the condition that he undergo sex offender evaluation and
treatment, if necessary, does not appear to be disproportionately
onerous.

Finally, with regard to the third prong of the
Ereitas/Lynch test, a perusal of cases from other jurisdictions
reveals that some states impose similar sentences upon persons
convicted of physically abusing a family or household member.
See, Q.a., Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-206(3) (a) (4), (444) (2003)
(providing that a person convicted of assaulting a partner or
family member shall be sentenced to not more than one-year
imprisonment or be ordered into misdemeanor probation for the
first or second conviction); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 639:3(V)
(2003) (providing that endangering the welfare of a child is a
misdemeanor). The statutory schemes from other states, however,

ae

  

mandate harsher sentences. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:
4(a) (West 2001) (providing that a person convicted of harming a
child under the age of sixteen shall be sentenced to a seven-year

term of imprisonment); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.508(1) (b) (1) (2003)

 

(mandating that a first-time offender convicted of physically or
mentally abusing a child, which does not result in substantial

3
** FOR PUBLICATION ***

bodily or mental harm, “shall be punished by imprisonment in the
state prison for a minimum term of not less than 1 year and @
maximum term of not more than 6 years”). By comparison,
therefore, the extent of the family court’s imposition of a one
year term of probation, subject to the condition that Solomon
undergo sex offender evaluation and treatment, is far less
severe.

‘The family court had ample grounds on which to punish
Solomon as it did, Inasmuch as the imposition of a one-year term
of probation, subject to the condition that Solomon undergo sex
offender evaluation and treatment, for tying up his four-year-old
nephew by the wrists and ankles and hitting him with a belt (1)
fell within the range of punishment prescribed by the applicable

statutory provisions, (2) does not “shock the conscience” of

 

reasonable persons, and (3) does not outrage the moral sense of
the conmunity, it was not cruel and unusual punishment for the
family court to impose the sentence that it did. Accordingly,
Solomon's sentence did not violate the eighth amendment to the
united States Constitution or article I, section 12 of the

Hawai'i Constitution.

32
 

FOR PUBLICATION ***

IV. concLUsrox
Based on the foregoing, we vacate the family court’s
May 4, 2001 order and remand the case to the family court for a

new change of plea hearing.

James S. Tabe,

Deputy Public’ Defender,

for defendant-appellant

Daniel H. Shimizu, eR Gena

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,

for plaintiff-appellee recess Cu

pa

Von Batly