Title: Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Judge

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Judge, 96 Ohio St.3d 467, 2002-Ohio-4741.] 
 
 
CUYAHOGA COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION v. JUDGE. 
[Cite as Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Judge, 96 Ohio St.3d 467, 2002-Ohio-
4741.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Indefinite suspension — Attorney neglected 
client, refused to cooperate in the investigation of that misconduct, and 
has since been indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in Ohio 
for similar conduct. 
(No. 2002-0681 — Submitted June 5, 2002 — Decided October 2, 2002.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 01-89. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
We must decide in this case how to appropriately sanction an 
attorney who neglected his client, refused to cooperate in the investigation of this 
misconduct, and has since been indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in 
Ohio for similar misconduct.  The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline recommended that respondent, Thomas J. Judge of Cleveland, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0024839, be indefinitely suspended for this conduct 
after it found him in violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) (dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation), (5) (conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice), and (6) (conduct that adversely reflects on an attorney’s fitness to 
practice law), 6-101(A)(3) (neglect of an entrusted legal matter), and Gov.Bar R. 
V(4)(G) (failure to cooperate in an investigation of misconduct).  We agree that 
respondent neglected his client, that he failed to cooperate, and that his conduct 
reflected adversely on his fitness to practice law.  But because DR 1-102(A)(4) 
and (5) were not charged in the complaint against respondent, due process 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
prevents us from also finding these violations.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Simecek (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 320, 699 N.E.2d 933.  Therefore, based on the 
misconduct before us today, respondent is indefinitely suspended from the 
practice of law. 
{¶2} 
Upon reviewing the motion for default, a master commissioner for 
the board found that respondent did not file an appeal that he was retained to file; 
he did not return the client’s telephone calls over the succeeding years; and when 
the client finally came to his office in 2000, respondent told the client that the 
appeal had been denied.  Respondent further did not respond to investigative 
telephone inquiries about the client’s grievance.  The master commissioner 
determined that respondent had thereby violated DR 1-102(A)(4), (5) and (6), 6-
101(A)(3), and Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G).  After recognizing that respondent was 
already under indefinite suspension for previous similar misconduct, he 
recommended that respondent be indefinitely suspended.  The board adopted the 
master commissioner’s findings of misconduct and recommended that respondent 
be indefinitely suspended. 
{¶3} 
We adopt the board’s findings as to the violations of DR 1-
102(A)(6) and 6-101(A)(3) and Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G).  We do not adopt, however, 
the board’s conclusion that respondent also violated DR 1-102(A)(4) and (5). 
{¶4} 
Presumably, the board found the DR 1-102(A)(4) and (5) 
violations because evidence showed that respondent had lied to his client and 
because Section 1(A) of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on 
Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline purports to allow the board, with sufficient evidence, to find violations 
of Disciplinary Rules not cited in the complaint.  We specifically denounced this 
practice as a violation of due process in Simecek, 83 Ohio St.3d 320, 699 N.E.2d 
933.  In that case, the board found that Simecek had violated Disciplinary Rules 
that had not been cited in the complaint.  We held that imposing punishment for 
January Term, 2002 
3 
an uncharged violation is untenable because “ ‘[t]he absence of fair notice as to 
the reach of the grievance procedure and the precise nature of the charges 
deprive[s] [an attorney] of procedural due process.’ ”  Id. at 322, 699 N.E.2d 933, 
quoting In re Ruffalo (1968), 390 U.S. 544, 552, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 20 L.Ed.2d 117. 
{¶5} 
Nonetheless, we agree that an indefinite suspension is appropriate 
under these circumstances.  Respondent’s misconduct in this case is part of the 
pattern of neglect that was discussed in his prior disciplinary case, and he has 
manifested here the same cavalier attitude toward investigative efforts that he did 
in the earlier proceeding.  These factors have an aggravating impact when 
determining how to sanction misconduct.  See Section 10(B)(1) of the Rules and 
Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the Board 
of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline.  Moreover, the rule is that 
“[n]eglect of legal matters and a failure to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary 
investigation generally warrant an indefinite suspension from the practice of law 
in Ohio.”  Akron Bar Assn. v. Snyder (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 211, 212, 718 N.E.2d 
1271. 
{¶6} 
Respondent is currently indefinitely suspended from the practice of 
law.  See Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Judge (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 331, 763 N.E.2d 
114.  This decision imposes another indefinite suspension..  Under Gov.Bar R. 
V(10)(B), respondent must wait two years from the date of this order before 
applying for reinstatement.  Accordingly, we order that respondent may not file a 
petition for reinstatement for two years from the date of this order.  Costs are 
taxed to respondent. 
 
 
 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
COOK, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting. 
{¶7} 
We have already imposed an indefinite suspension upon the 
respondent for conduct similar to that involved in this case.  See Cleveland Bar 
Assn. v. Judge (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 331, 763 N.E.2d 114.  Despite that sanction, 
the respondent continued to show a complete disregard for the disciplinary 
process and this court.  As the majority itself acknowledges, this “cavalier 
attitude” of the respondent is an aggravating factor.  I would accordingly disbar 
the respondent. 
__________________ 
 
Gary S. Fishman; Fay, Sharpe, Fagan, Minnich & McKee, L.L.P., and 
Thomas Kocovsky, for relator. 
__________________