Title: Church v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

HEADNOTE:
Kyeron Michael Church v. State of Maryland, No. 53, September Term, 2008
CRIMINAL LAW – REVIEW – PRESENTATION AND RESERVATION IN LOWER
COURT OF GROUNDS OF REVIEW
Defendant was not foreclosed from contesting on appeal a ruling on the State’s motion in
limine to invoke the surveillance location privilege where the defendant made his objections
known at the motion in limine hearing.  The Defendant clearly stated the ground for his
objection to application of the privilege and proffered the type of questions he sought to ask
the testifying officer.  The Defendant did not acquiesce to the ruling on the motion in limine
by refraining from asking the precise location of the surveillance post during the officer’s
trial testimony and prefacing his questions with “I don’t want to know where your location
was[.]”  Defense counsel was acting within the appropriate bounds of professionalism by
pursuing questions in a manner consistent with the court’s ruling that this information was
privileged.  Defendant was not required to restate his objection during the officer’s trial
testimony because it is sufficient that a party, at the time of ruling on a motion in limine –
which results in an order precluding him from introducing certain evidence at trial – makes
known to the court the action that the party desires the court to take or the objection to the
action of the court.
EVIDENCE – PRIVILEGES – GOVERNMENT PRIVILEGES – SURVEILLANCE
LOCATION PRIVILEGE
This case establishes a qualified State privilege in which testifying police officers may refuse
to disclose the exact location from which police have performed surveillance.  This qualified
privilege takes into account the privacy concerns of private citizens, the tools necessary for
police officers to conduct routine surveillance, and the importance of a defendant’s right to
cross-examine witnesses and paint an accurate factual picture of the circumstances under
which he or she was observed.  These policy concerns provide the criteria for trial courts in
considering whether the public interest served by non-disclosure is greater than the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment cross-examination rights.  This balancing test must be
triggered by the State’s showing that it has some legitimate interest in protecting the
particular surveillance location.  The initial burden for invoking the surveillance location
privilege is on the State because such burden allocation appropriately safeguards the
rudimentary right of a defendant to cross-examination of witnesses against him.  The trial
court erred in refusing to allow Defendant to cross-examine about the precise surveillance
location when the State had not demonstrated a threshold interest in protecting against such
disclosure. 
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County , Maryland
Case No. K-06-560
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 53
September Term, 2008
                                                                             
KYERON MICHAEL CHURCH
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
                                                                             
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
JJ.
                                                                             
Opinion by Adkins, J.
Bell, C.J., Greene and Murphy, JJ., Dissent.
                                                                             
Filed:   May 13, 2009
1Kintop described a balaclava as “a hood that goes over top of your head where it has
a circle where only the face can be seen.”
In this case we address for the first time in a criminal law context whether the State
has a privilege to refuse to disclose the exact location from which police have performed
covert surveillance, even when a surveilling law enforcement officer testifies against the
individual regarding the information gleaned from the surveillance.  This privilege has been
previously recognized by the Court of Special Appeals, and we confirm the existence of that
privilege.  We also resolve the question of what burden, if any, rests on the State to
demonstrate the need for application of the privilege in a particular case.
FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
On the evening of January 12, 2006, approximately twelve individuals were gathered
along Tyler Avenue in Annapolis’s Robinwood community.  Unbeknownst to these
congregants, their actions were being monitored by undercover police officer Christopher
Kintop from a concealed location.  With the assistance of binoculars, Kintop noticed a man,
later identified by Kintop as Kyeron Michael Church, wearing a black coat, dark colored
jeans, a grey hooded sweatshirt, and a black balaclava1 that distinguished him from the rest
of the group.  Kintop testified that he saw Church give a woman small white rocks in
exchange for money.  Kintop radioed the description of Church’s clothing to other members
of his unit, who arrived shortly thereafter to detain Church.
When the officers apprehended Church, they witnessed him tightly clench his rubber-
gloved right hand, pull his right arm into his body, and place his fist against his chest.  In the
process of the arrest, Church lay on the ground and when the officers stood him up, they
2
discovered a clear plastic bag containing cocaine on the ground.  Upon searching his person,
the officers discovered $600 in cash.
Church was charged with possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous
substance and possession of a controlled dangerous substance.  On the day of trial, prior to
jury selection, the State made a motion in limine, which is the source of the error assigned
by Church in this appeal.  In the motion, the State asked the court to “prohibit the Defense
from asking [Kintop] or having the State disclose the actual location of where th[e]
surveillance was taking place.”  The State cited Johnson v. State, 148 Md. App. 364, 811
A.2d 898 (2002), cert denied, 374 Md. 83, 821 A.2d 370 (2003) in support of a qualified
privilege not to disclose a covert surveillance location.  The State represented that Kintop
could testify that he had an unobstructed view and that there was no reason to disclose the
actual surveillance location.  When the trial court asked the State to identify the surveillance
location, the State responded:
To tell you the truth, Your Honor, I did not ask him the
specific location because I don’t want to know it at this point.
But I can tell you that what he has told me is that he had an
unobstructed view of what Mr. Church was doing and that there
was nothing that was impairing his vision. 
After reviewing Johnson v. State, the court announced its ruling:
[THE COURT]: In terms of the motion in limine, the Court has
had a chance to review Johnson v. State.  It is a balancing test
dealing with the safety of officers and the citizens.  At this point
in time I do believe that a qualified privilege not to disclose the
exact location would be appropriate.  But I do believe that
[defense counsel] should be given wide latitude to
cross-examine the officer to what he saw, sight-lines, angles,
3
lighting, time of day it might have been, whether there were any
obstructions, question his memory or any potential bias.
But I do believe that it would be appropriate that angles
and distances as it relates to angles and distances which may
triangulate or locate the house or the building or the location
where he was would be a proper subject for a motion in limine
to be granted.
So [defense] counsel you will have wide latitude in terms
of the sight-lines, the angles, the lighting in terms of where he
was.  If it appears that it is going to triangulate or locate the
actual place where he was I will be upholding the State’s motion
in limine. 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Very well.
[THE COURT]: But I certainly think that if you were to
ask the question was there a window between you and what you
were looking at, that’s appropriate.  Was it a window in the
Arundel Center would not be appropriate.
* * *
So I will grant the State’s motion in part and I think actually I’m
going to have to just judge it as it comes up.  I’ll have to rely on
counsel to be close as you ask your questions.
During the trial, Kintop offered the above-referenced testimony about the alleged drug
transaction involving Church.  During cross-examination, Church’s counsel asked Kintop
about the circumstances under which he viewed the transaction – binocular magnification,
distance, lighting, and obstructions – but refrained from asking Kintop about the exact
surveillance location.  Church’s counsel even prefaced one question by saying “I don’t want
to know where your location was” in keeping with the trial court’s ruling. 
A jury convicted Church on both counts and he was sentenced to ten years in prison
4
without parole.  Church appealed his conviction to the Court of Special Appeals, claiming
that he was prejudiced because the court’s ruling on the motion prohibited him from
cross-examining the police about the exact police surveillance location.  We granted
certiorari, on our initiative, before that court decided the appeal to consider the following
question: “Did the trial court err in ruling that the State did not need to divulge the exact
location from which Officer Kintop had observed the alleged narcotics activity?”
DISCUSSION
I.
Preservation
The State relies on Watkins v. State, 328 Md. 95, 613 A.2d 379 (1992) in support of
its argument that Church cannot raise this issue because he acquiesced to the trial judge’s
ruling on the motion in limine.  In Watkins, during the cross-examination of Ronald Brown,
a State’s witness, defense counsel approached the bench, and the following colloquy
occurred:
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Your Honor, I have information that
Mr. Brown has a pending case that’s a theft charge and he goes
to trial on April 3rd.
THE COURT: Don’t mention it.
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: The reason I’m saying that, I believe
that I have a basis for thinking he may have been given some
consideration in exchange for probation.  I want to ask about the
fact this happened.
PROSECUTOR: Your Honor, of course, that’s exculpatory
evidence and I certainly would have told [defense attorney] any
deals that I had made with anybody that is testifying.
THE COURT: Alright.
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Thank you.
5
(In open court.)
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: That’s all I have.
328 Md. at 99, 613 A.2d at 381.  Defense counsel never questioned the prosecutor’s assertion
that there was no deal, nor offered any evidence to the contrary.  Under these circumstances,
we concluded: “Defense counsel clearly accepted the prosecutor’s statement that no ‘deal’
had been made with the witness, and acquiesced in the court’s ruling. Accordingly, there is
no basis for appeal from this ruling.” Id. at 100, 613 A.2d at 381.
Church counters the State’s argument with Beverly v. State, 349 Md. 106, 117, 707
A.2d 91, 96 (1998), which discussed and distinguished Watkins.  In Beverly, we reviewed
the State’s argument that this Court should refuse to answer the questions raised by a
defendant’s claims because the defendant acquiesced to the trial judge’s interpretation of the
law.  The alleged acquiescence in Beverly occurred after a lengthy discussion of whether the
State and the defendant could eschew a mandatory repeat offender sentence by way of a plea
agreement.  The State cited the following dialogue between the trial judge and defense
counsel in support of their acquiescence argument:
THE COURT: [B]ut tell me how I’m wrong. I mean, I’m eager
to hear your point of view, but this is what I read and the only
way I’ve read it. So, tell me what I read wrong.
[BEVERLY’S COUNSEL]: Its sound [sic] right to me, Your
Honor, and I have no argument as to that.
Beverly, 349 Md. at 117, 707 A.2d at 96.  In Beverly, as here, the State cited Watkins in
support of its argument that there was no basis for appeal when a party acquiesced to the
court’s ruling.
6
In our discussion of the preservation argument, we summarized the acquiescence in
Watkins:
In Watkins, we refused to address the defendant’s contention
that the trial judge erred in not allowing the defense to present
evidence of a pending case against one of the witnesses. 328
Md. at 99-100, 613 A.2d at 381.  There, defense counsel asked
if he could present the evidence, the State responded, the court
said “Alright,” and defense counsel merely said “Thank you.”
We ruled that this was acquiescence and, therefore, “there [was]
no basis for appeal.” Watkins, 328 Md. at 100, 613 A.2d at 381.
Id.  We then distinguished Beverly from Watkins: 
Unlike in the brief interchange in Watkins, the above discussion
appears in the transcript after eleven pages of discussion of the
same issue.  Moreover, following that discussion, Mr. Guth,
Beverly’s attorney, continued, “I just think that this defendant
coming into this court is . . . not being given the opportunities
that other individuals are given in other courts just by way of
allowing him to not have the ten years without parole invoked
upon them if they did wish to enter into a plea agreement. So my
argument is that . . . he is not being given the benefit of what
other individuals are given in other courts.”  The court then
responded:
“Okay. I don’t know anything about that. I can’t
tell you the last time I’ve been in anybody else’s
court. . . . I don’t know what other people are
doing. All I know is that’s the way I read the law.
If it’s dead wrong, just show me  how I’m wrong.
Otherwise, this is my decision.  I mean, as far as
I can see this is what the Legislature says you’ve
got to get. It’s like use of a handgun.  You know,
I can give you all the sentences I want to give, but
five of it has to be without parole.  I can give you
only five, but it’s without parole because that’s
what I understand is a mandatory sentence.
Id. at 117-18, 707 A.2d at 96-97 (emphasis in original).  Apparently, defense counsel did not
7
respond to the court’s last statement.  We concluded:
While defense counsel is expected to argue vigorously for his
client, the client also has an interest in defense counsel showing
polite deference to the judge who will hear the trial.  Here, it
appears that once Beverly’s attorney realized that the court
was not going to change its mind, defense counsel, having
vigorously argued the matter, politely continued on with the
matter of the day.  To deem Beverly’s behavior acquiescence
would be to ignore the reality of what goes on at the trial level.
Id. at 118, 707 A.2d at 97 (emphasis added).  
We consider the present case to be closer to Beverly than to Watkins.  Church made
his objection to the motion in limine clear as soon at the State made it:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: [W]e basically have our
hands tied behind our back not to ask or [be] allowed to ask
about the location, et cetera, would be very prejudicial to my
client’s right - -
[THE COURT]: Okay, what is it you would like to ask?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I’d like to know exactly, well
first of all, I’d like to know where he was.  I’d like to know
how far he was from my client.  I’d like to know if he was using
binoculars.  I’d like to know - -
[THE COURT]: I don’t think any of that would be
prohibited.  I think a question of, I mean I haven’t heard
anything that would be prohibited so far. If you ask the actual
address that might be under the Johnson case.  If you ask if it’s
a private home or a building that might be prohibited.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That’s fine. 
(Emphasis added.)
Although the colloquy between defense counsel and the trial court lasted longer in
2At the time  defense counsel said “[t]hat’s fine[,]” there was actually no ruling at that
point.  As we set forth earlier, it wasn’t until after the trial judge read Johnson that he granted
the State’s motion in limine, in part, at which point Church responded “[v]ery well.”
8
Beverly than here, we categorize this case with Beverly rather than Watkins because Church
stated clearly the ground for his objection to application of the privilege and the type of
questions he sought to ask the officer.2  In contrast, Watkins made a tentative statement: “I
believe that I have a basis for thinking he may have been given some consideration in
exchange for probation.” Watkins, 328 Md. at 99, 613 A.2d at 381.  He did not support this
with any proffer of facts, nor did he reassert his claim or ask any questions after the
prosecutor’s assurance that there was no such deal.  Watkins clearly yielded to the
prosecutor’s purportedly greater knowledge of the facts.  Defense counsel in this case, on the
other hand, after clearly stating his objection, deferred to the trial court’s ruling, about which
counsel had no choice.
The State also relies on Gilliam v. State, 331 Md. 651, 692, 629 A.2d 685, 706 (1993),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1077, 114 S. Ct. 891 (1994) and Grandison v. State, 305 Md. 685, 506
A.2d 580 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 873, 107 S. Ct. 38 (1986), both of which are
distinguishable from this case.  Gilliam involved defense counsel’s complete acquiescence,
without objection, to the State’s restrictions upon the testimony of his witness. Gilliam, 331
Md. at 691, 629 A.2d at 705.  In Grandison, the defendant argued for the first time on appeal
that he was entitled to have the jury consider co-conspirator sentences as mitigating factors
in determining his sentence. 305 Md. at 765, 506 A.2d at 620.  At trial, Grandison’s counsel
9
brought up the convictions during closing argument.  The State’s Attorney objected, resulting
in the following dialogue between the court and defense counsel:
THE COURT: Gentlemen, I don’t think you are doing
anybody any good by going into this. I think we all understand
what the problem is.
MR. CRAWFORD: I am not certain I do, but I will drop
that particular subject for the moment.
Id. at 764, 506 A.2d at 620.  Grandison never raised this point again, nor did he receive a trial
court ruling on the admissibility of co-conspirator sentences.  In contrast, Church voiced
clearly his objection to the motion in limine during the motions hearing, and the trial judge
rejected his argument.  Church only “dropped” the matter once the court’s ruling rendered
further dialogue on the matter futile.
During trial, in compliance with the court’s ruling, Church’s counsel prefaced his
questions about the officer’s vantage point with the following caveat: “And I don’t want to
know where your location was, but I do want to ask you how was the lighting like in the area
where you were set up to observe?”  This is not, as the State argues, an indication that Church
acquiesced to the ruling on the motion in limine by not asking the precise location of the
surveillance.  Instead, Church’s counsel was acting within the appropriate bounds of
professionalism by pursuing questions in a manner consistent with the court’s ruling.  Like
the defendant in Beverly, defense counsel stated his opposition to the motion in limine and
3It is possible that defense counsel could have, consistent with counsel’s professional
obligations, asked additional questions regarding the general location that invited the court
to narrow its earlier ruling on the State’s motion in limine, but the appeal point was not lost
by failing to do so.
4Prout made an unusual motion in limine – he filed a motion asking the court to admit,
rather than exclude evidence, which was denied.  “Thus the court’s denial of Prout’s motion
in limine had the same effect as the grant of a traditional motion in limine, i.e. to exclude the
proffered evidence.” Prout v. State, 311 Md. 348, 355 n.4, 535 A.2d 445, 448 n.4 (1988).
10
when the matter was resolved against him, counsel deferred to the court’s ruling.3  In Watkins,
the defense never asked for a ruling, and there was none.
The State’s suggestion that Church had to ask questions during the trial as to the exact
location of the surveillance, notwithstanding the court’s pre-trial ruling, is foreclosed by our
decision in Prout v. State, 311 Md. 348, 535 A.2d 445 (1988).  There we explained:
Rule 4-322(a) [(now recodified as Rule 4-323)] provides that
“[a]n objection to the admission of evidence shall be made at the
time the evidence is offered or as soon thereafter as the grounds
for objection become apparent.  Otherwise the objection is
waived.”  As we see it, Rule 4-322(a) is inapplicable when a trial
judge rules to exclude evidence.  Moreover, subsection (c) of
Rule 4-322 states that to preserve an objection to a “ruling or
order” other than one admitting evidence, “it is sufficient that a
party, at the time the ruling or order is made or sought, makes
known to the court the action that the party desires the court to
take or the objection to the action of the court.”  Thus, when a
trial judge, in response to a motion in limine, makes a ruling to
exclude evidence that is clearly intended to be the final word on
the matter, and that will not be affected by the manner in which
the evidence unfolds at trial, and the proponent of the evidence
makes a contemporaneous objection, his objection ordinarily is
preserved under Rule 4-322(c).[4]
Prout, 311 Md. at 356-57, 535 A.2d at 449 (footnote omitted, emphasis in original).  See also
11
Simmons v. State, 313 Md. 33, 37-38, 542 A.2d 1258, 1260 (1988)(when trial court prohibited
expert testimony by granting State’s motion in limine, defendant was not required to renew
offer of testimony at trial in order to preserve the issue for review).
II.
The Surveillance Location Privilege
The State asserts, and Church does not challenge, that there exists a surveillance
location privilege that permits non-disclosure of a police officer’s watch post when certain
policy considerations favor keeping the location a secret when weighed against a defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him.  Both point to the decision of the
Court of Special Appeals in Johnson v. State, which recognizes the privilege.  As we have
never addressed the issue of a surveillance location privilege, we shall review the rationale
of courts that have recognized the privilege.  Ultimately, as explained in the next subsection,
entitled “Nature of Privilege,” we embrace the privilege for largely the same reasons advanced
by the Court of Special Appeals in Johnson.
In the subsection that follows, entitled “State’s Burden,” we address the parties’
dispute about whether there was sufficient evidence at the hearing below to justify application
of the privilege.  Church argues that “where the State’s only basis for non-disclosure was that
the officer had told the State that he had an unobstructed view, it was error for the trial court
to conclude that the State did not have to divulge the covert location.”  The State counters that
“Church has failed to proffer what else he would have asked Officer Kintop had the exact
location of the covert surveillance been disclosed” and that “Church fail[ed] to proffer exactly
12
how he was prejudiced in this case[.]”
Thus the parties’ contentions boil down to the question of who has the burden to
establish whether the privilege is applicable.  For the reasons discussed below, we conclude
that the State has a burden to show that application of the privilege will protect a legitimate
State interest in each case, and that it failed to make the necessary showing in this case. 
Nature Of Privilege
Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights guarantee criminal defendants the right to cross-examine
adverse witnesses. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1435
(1986); Merzbacher v. State, 346 Md. 391, 411-12, 697 A.2d 432, 442 (1997).  In some
situations, the right may reasonably be limited, but it remains a valuable right essential to an
effective defense. See Marshall v. State, 346 Md. 186, 194-95, 695 A.2d 184, 188
(1997)(“The trial court’s discretion to limit cross-examination is not boundless.  It has no
discretion to limit cross-examination to such an extent as to deprive the accused of a fair
trial.”).  As discussed below, the surveillance location privilege, like its progenitor, the
informer’s privilege, limits the defendant’s right to cross-examination and must be analyzed
in light of the requirement that the defendant receive a fair trial. 
The Supreme Court addressed the informer’s privilege in Roviaro v. United States, 353
U.S. 53, 59, 77 S. Ct. 623, 627 (1957), observing that “[w]hat is usually referred to as the
informer’s privilege is in reality the Government’s privilege to withhold from disclosure the
identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with
13
enforcement of that law.”  In Roviaro, the Supreme Court established a balancing test to
determine the appropriateness of ordering disclosure of a confidential informant in which
courts must weigh “the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the
individual’s right to prepare his defense.” Id. at 62, 77 S. Ct. at 628-29.  In Maryland, “[w]e
have stressed that trial courts must apply the Roviaro balancing test in each case” where the
informant privilege is invoked. Warrick v. State, 326 Md. 696, 701, 607 A.2d 24, 26 (1992).
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has had
occasion to establish similar principles for the surveillance location privilege in a trio of cases,
beginning with United States v. Green, 670 F.2d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1981).  In Green, the court
held that a qualified privilege existed for non-disclosure of covert surveillance and
specifically noted that the surveillance location privilege is built upon the established
informer’s privilege in Roviaro. Id. at 1155, 1157 n.14.  Green left it to trial courts to create
an “appropriately fashioned procedure” in each case. Id. at 1156.  The Green court advised
that “[i]n exercising its discretion, a trial court should endeavor to protect the public interests
that give rise to the surveillance location privilege, while also taking any steps necessary to
ensure accurate fact-finding and to protect the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.” Id.  It
explicitly limited the privilege to suppression hearings. Id. at 1157 n.14.
In United States v. Harley, 682 F.2d 1018, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1982) the court expanded
the application of the surveillance location privilege to trial proceedings.  The court
determined that the privilege applied where a drug deal between an undercover officer and
the defendant was observed and filmed by three officers in a covert location.  The Harley
14
court held that “the surveillance location privilege, like the informer’s privilege, applies at
trials and that it, too, is to be applied through a balancing test controlled by ‘the fundamental
requirements of fairness.’” Id. at 1020 (quoting Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60, 77 S. Ct. at 628).
The court upheld application of the privilege when the surveillance location was in a privately
owned apartment, other evidence regarding visibility and distance from the transaction was
elicited on cross-examination, and a videotape of the transaction showed the jury “the view
the officers in the surveillance post had, the distance, the angle, and the existence or
nonexistence of obstructions in the line of sight.” Id. at 1020-21.
United States v. Foster, 986 F.2d 541 (D.C. Cir. 1993) illustrates how the D.C. Circuit
has applied the Green and Harley factors to protect the defendant’s right of cross-
examination.  It ruled that the covert location must be revealed when knowledge of the precise
location could call into question the police officer’s memory and challenge his perception. Id.
at 543-44.  The Foster court discussed and distinguished Harley in evaluating these factors:
The Harley court discerned nothing more the defendant could
have gained by “learning the number of the apartment from
which the police observed him.”  As to the government’s interest
in maintaining the secrecy of the observation post, the court
relied on “the safety of the cooperating apartment owner or
tenant” and “the willingness of other citizens to cooperate with
the police in this fashion in the future.”
Not one of the considerations mentioned in Harley in
favor of the privilege is present in this case.  Unlike Harley, the
witness claiming the privilege was crucial to the prosecution.
Without [the officer’s] testimony, the government’s case against
Foster would have collapsed.  The more important the witness to
the government’s case, the more important the defendant's right,
derived from the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment,
15
to cross-examine the witness.  Unlike Harley, the defense
challenged [the officer’s] perceptions, his ability to identify
Foster and the accuracy of his identification.  Fifteen other
people were in the vicinity at the time, some playing basketball,
others moving about in the open area.  One officer who arrived
on the scene in response to [the officer’s] call describing Foster
arrested someone else (who was then released).  The defense
understandably wanted to cross-examine [the officer] about his
estimate of the distance between him and Foster and the angle of
his view and his testimony that nothing blocked his line of sight.
Without knowing the location of the observation post, the
defense could not effectively probe the officer’s memory or
veracity about these subjects.  The right of the defense to engage
in such lines of inquiry is at the heart of our system of criminal
justice.
Id. (citations omitted).
Although the surveillance location privilege is a matter of first impression for this
Court, the Court of Special Appeals addressed this privilege in Johnson v. State, 148 Md.
App. 364, 811 A.2d 898 (2002), cert. denied, 374 Md. 83, 821 A.2d 370 (2003).  The Johnson
court recognized that a qualified privilege existed that allowed the withholding of a covert
surveillance location where police were still using the location. Id. at 365, 366-67, 811 A.2d
at 899.  Johnson’s associates threatened action against the location if it was found out, and the
private citizen who permitted police to use the property feared reprisal if the location were
revealed. Id. at 366-67, 811 A.2d at 899-900.  The State filed a motion in limine to protect the
location from disclosure at trial. Id. at 366, 811 A.2d at 899.  The trial court ruled that the
covert location should not be disclosed, “indicating that the primary basis for its ruling was
to protect the person or persons who consented to use of the covert location.” Id. at 367, 811
A.2d at 900. 
16
The Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court correctly applied a qualified
privilege by balancing “the public’s interest in non-disclosure against a defendant’s interest
in cross-examination and accurate fact finding.” Id. at 368, 811 A.2d at 900.  The court
declared that the privilege must be based on a case-specific balancing of these interests, and
utilized language from Green to articulate the balancing process that must be undertaken
when considering whether the privilege applies: “‘the location of a police observation post
may establish whether the observing officer’s view was open or obstructed, whether the angle
of the officer’s view made the observations easy or difficult, and whether the distance from
the criminal activity enhances or detracts from an officer’s claimed observation of detail.’”
Id. at 370-71, 811 A.2d at 902 (quoting Green, 670 F.2d at 1156).  The court explained that
the privilege provided a protection that is essential to successful law enforcement
investigations, because “secret informants and secret locations are helpful only if they remain
undisclosed.  Revealing the hidden location (or unnamed informer) may jeopardize the safety
of officers or citizens and discourage further public cooperation with the police.” Id. at 370,
811 A.2d at 901 (citing Green, 670 F.2d at 1155). 
In applying the privilege to the case before it, the Johnson court noted that “the trial
court recognized a strong interest in protecting the person or persons who cooperated with
police by consenting to the use of the covert location.” Id. at 371, 811 A.2d at 902.  The court
took into account that Johnson had been able to elicit sufficient information on
cross-examination from the officer to establish that his view had not been obstructed and that
the distance was sufficient for him to view the alleged drug transaction. Id. at 371-72, 811
17
A.2d at 902-03. 
The court also considered that Johnson had not demonstrated what purpose would have
been served had he been permitted to question the officer about his specific location:
The officer testified to what he saw, his sight line, the angle of
his view, lighting, timing, obstructions, his memory and potential
bias.  Questioning from both sides elicited answers concerning
the ability of the officer to see the area, significantly diminishing
any prejudice to appellant from non-disclosure of the exact
surveillance location.  Appellant does not proffer what else he
would have been able to ask the officer had the exact location of
his surveillance been disclosed.  We perceive no error.
Id. at 372-73, 821 A.2d at 903.  So, in addition to finding that the State had a legitimate
interest in protecting the people and property involved in the covert investigation, the court
was persuaded that the defendant’s interests were not being compromised by the restriction
on cross-examination because knowledge of the exact location would not have rendered his
cross-examination more effective.
We agree that there is a qualified privilege for the State to refuse to disclose the
location of an ongoing place of surveillance. See Green, 670 F.2d at 1155.  See also, e.g.,
United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 1002 (1st Cir. 1987)(finding “the policy of qualified
privilege to be entirely appropriate in the context of criminal trials where a defendant seeks
disclosure of confidential government surveillance information”); Hicks v. United States, 431
A.2d 18, 19 (D.C. 1981)(holding that “the government has a qualified privilege to withhold
the location of a secret surveillance post”); People v. Knight, 753 N.E.2d 408, 417 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2001)(holding that “a qualified privilege exists at a trial for the disclosure of a surveillance
18
location”); Commonwealth v. Lugo, 548 N.E.2d 1263, 1265 (Mass. 1990)(recognizing that
“[p]olicy reasons comparable to those which favor the nondisclosure of an informer support
the privilege to keep a surveillance location secret”); State v. Garcia, 618 A.2d 326, 328 (N.J.
1993)(recognizing “a ‘surveillance location privilege,’ under which the State can refuse to
disclose the exact location from which law-enforcement officers observe criminal activity”);
Hollins v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 397, 399 (Va. Ct. App. 1994)(holding “that the
Commonwealth has a qualified privilege not to disclose the [observation] location”).
The qualified privilege arises when the State has an interest in protecting persons who
have a property or possessory interest in the covert location, and such State interest(s)
outweighs the defendant’s need for disclosure for the purposes of cross-examination.  We
adopt the qualified privilege because it takes into account the privacy concerns of private
citizens, the tools necessary for police officers to conduct routine surveillance, and the
importance of a defendant’s right to cross-examine witnesses and paint an accurate factual
picture of the circumstances under which he or she was observed.  These policy concerns
provide the criteria for trial courts in considering whether the public interest served by non-
disclosure is greater than the defendant’s Sixth Amendment cross-examination rights.
But, our recognition of the privilege does not resolve the dispositive issue in this case,
i.e. whether this balancing test must be triggered by the State’s showing that it has some
legitimate interest in protecting the particular surveillance location.  A number of other
jurisdictions have articulated that the burden falls on the defendant to establish why the
privilege should be overcome. See, e.g., People v. Montgomery, 252 Cal. Rptr. 779, 785 (Cal.
19
Ct. App. 1988)(“The correct procedure in [surveillance location] cases is for the court first to
ask the defendant to make a prima facie showing for disclosure.”); Bueno v. United States,
761 A.2d 856, 859 (D.C. 2000), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1031, 123 S. Ct. 581 (2002)(“A
defendant who has requested the precise location of a police surveillance post must first show
that he needs the information to conduct his defense before any balancing test is applied.”);
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 631 A.2d 1323, 1327 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), cert. denied, 646
A.2d 1177 (Pa. 1994)(“It is the defendant . . . who has the burden of demonstrating to the trial
court that the [surveillance location] is material and that disclosure is in the interest of
justice.”).  Nevertheless, we conclude, as explained below, that the State has a limited initial
burden: its privilege does not arise just because it invokes a blanket non-disclosure policy.
This issue proves to be dispositive of this appeal.
State’s Burden
Church frames this burden of production issue with his argument that the lower court
erred in honoring the privilege because “there was absolutely no evidence presented that this
covert location was still in use or that revealing the location would place anyone in danger.”
Thus, Church posits that the State’s burden is to make a prima facie showing that the privilege
applies by introducing evidence that the covert location was still in use, or would be used in
the foreseeable future.  The State insists, on the other hand, that “Church has failed to proffer
what else he would have asked Officer Kintop had the exact location of the covert
surveillance been disclosed.”  In its view, the “burden was on Church to make a more detailed
proffer as to why disclosure was necessary in this case.”  
20
We impose this initial burden on the State because such burden allocation appropriately
safeguards the rudimentary right of a defendant to cross-examination of witnesses against
him.  “Testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental principle that
‘the public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence.’” Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,
50, 100 S. Ct. 906, 912 (1980)(quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331, 70 S. Ct.
724, 730 (1950)).  “As such, they must be strictly construed and accepted ‘only to the very
limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public
good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for
ascertaining truth.’” Id. (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234, 80 S. Ct. 1437,
1454 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
Although, as indicated above, a number of states have articulated that the defendant
has the burden to show that his or her interests outweigh the interests of the State, few, if any,
have been faced with facts like these – when the State fails to even show that the police are
continuing to use the surveillance location or that any individual needs protection because of
his or her association with the location. Cf. Montgomery, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 782 (surveilling
officer “explained that the location was still being used and that disclosure of it would tend
to subject someone to serious bodily injury or death”); Bueno, 761 A.2d at 857 (“[o]n
cross-examination, [surveilling officer] testified that his observation post was presently used
and had been so for a number of times”); Santiago, 631 A.2d at 1325 (officer testified that he
“feared that disclosure of the precise location would compromise the safety of the individuals
at the address”).
21
In the absence of a showing that the State even has a legitimate interest in preventing
disclosure, we see no reason why “all rational means for ascertaining truth[,]” including cross-
examination about the specific location of the surveillance, should not be available to the
defendant.  In other words, there is no justification for applying a balancing test if the State
has no legitimate interest to protect.  Under such circumstances, there is nothing to balance
against the defendant’s interest in ascertaining the accuracy or truth of the State’s testimony.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in refusing to allow Church to cross-
examine about the precise location when the State had not demonstrated a threshold interest
in protecting against such disclosure.  We therefore remand this case to the Circuit Court
under Maryland Rule 8-604(d), which provides, in relevant part: “If the Court concludes that
the substantial merits of a case will not be determined by affirming, reversing or modifying
the judgment, or that justice will be served by permitting further proceedings, the Court may
remand the case to a lower court.”
On Remand
This remand is limited in scope, and we do not order a new trial unless and until the
trial court makes certain determinations set forth below. See Warrick, 326 Md. at 713, 607
A.2d at 33 (limited remand instructing the trial court to make certain findings related to the
informer’s privilege; if trial court concluded that defendant was prejudiced, then it should
order new trial).  We direct this remedy because we conclude that it is not necessary that a
new trial be held if: (1) the State makes the threshold showing, to the satisfaction of the trial
court, that use of the surveillance location is ongoing, or that an individual associated with the
22
location has an interest that needs protection; and (2) the trial court balances the interest of
the State against Church’s interest in cross-examination and decides that Church’s need for
the disclosure carries less weight than the State’s need for concealment.  As we recognized
in Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chesson, 399 Md. 314, 334-35, 923 A.2d 939, 950-51 (2007):
Our jurisprudence is replete with examples where a
limited remand is proper. See e.g., Edmonds v. State, 372 Md.
314, 812 A.2d 1034 (2002) (ordering a limited remand to hold a
new Batson hearing to address the credibility of prosecutor’s
race-neutral explanations for the use of peremptory strikes); . . .
Patrick v. State, 329 Md. 24, 617 A.2d 215 (1992) (ordering a
limited remand to determine whether a criminal defendant was
prejudiced by the State’s failure to disclose polygraph test
results); . . . Bailey v. State, 303 Md. 650, 496 A.2d 665 (1985)
(ordering a limited remand to permit the State to provide
discovery material regarding statements made by the defendant
to an out-of-state police trooper and to allow the trial court to
determine the appropriate sanction for the discovery violation)[.]
If, however, the trial court resolves either of these issues in favor of Church, then he shall be
entitled to a new trial. 
We also note that this case differs from Southern v. State, 371 Md. 93, 105, 807 A.2d
13, 20 (2002), in which we held that “Rule 8-604 does not afford parties who fail to meet their
burdens on issues raised in a completed suppression hearing an opportunity to reopen the
suppression proceeding for the taking of additional evidence after the appellate court has held
the party has failed to meet its evidentiary burden.” (Emphasis added.)  The rule of Southern
does not apply here, because this case does not involve a suppression hearing.
Accordingly, the appropriate proceedings on remand are as follows.  First, the Circuit
Court should hold a hearing at which the State bears the initial burden to demonstrate that it
23
has some legitimate interest in protecting the surveillance location, as discussed earlier.  If the
State produces evidence believed by the trial court to demonstrate such interest, then the court
shall take such additional evidence from either party as it deems necessary to balance the
interest of Church in disclosure for purposes of cross-examination against the interest of the
State in concealing the surveillance location.  The question of whether Church is entitled to
a new trial will abide the outcome of these two steps.
CASE 
REMANDED 
WITHOUT
AFFIRMANCE OR REVERSAL FOR
FURTHER 
PROCEEDINGS 
IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THIS OPINION;
COSTS TO ABIDE THE RESULT.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 53
September Term, 2008
                                                                             
KYERON MICHAEL CHURCH
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
                                                                             
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
JJ.
                                                                             
Dissenting Opinion by Greene, J.,
which Bell, C.J., Joins.
                                                                             
Filed:   May 13, 2009
In this case, the State failed to show either that the police continued to use the
surveillance location at issue or that any individuals needed protection in the event that the
surveillance location was disclosed.  Thus, there was no showing that the State had a
legitimate interest in preventing disclosure and no justification for applying a balancing test
or restricting Church’s right of cross-examination in this case.  Therefore, although I agree
with the majority that the trial court erred in refusing to allow Church to cross-examine
Officer Kintop about the precise location of his observations, I disagree with the majority’s
conclusion that a limited remand is the proper remedy in this case.  See Church v. State, ___
Md. ___, ___ A.2d ___, ___ (2009) [slip op. at 22-23].  In my view, Church is entitled to the
benefit of a new trial.  The appropriate mandate is to reverse the judgment of the Court of
Special Appeals, with directions to remand the case to the Circuit Court for purposes of a
new trial.  
In response to the State’s motion in limine, the trial judge ruled promptly on the matter
on the day of trial, but prior to jury selection.  The judge granted  the State’s motion for non-
disclosure, in part, pointing out that the court’s ruling was directed to those questions that
defense counsel might ask during cross-examination of Officer Kintop.  During the trial,
defense counsel made it clear that he was tailoring his cross-examination of Officer Kintop
so as not to violate the trial judge’s order.  Church v. State, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.2d ___, ___
(2009) [slip op. at 3-4].  Here, the majority, instead of focusing on the chilling effects of the
trial judge’s ruling on Church’s right to effective cross-examination, focuses on the State’s
burden of production and the need for the trial judge to have engaged in the proper balancing
2
test.  Id. at 21-22.  In essence, the majority’s discussion focuses more on giving the State
another chance to get it right.  In reaching the conclusion that a limited remand is
appropriate, the majority assumes that the State will pursue the same tactics on remand that
it employed in prosecuting Church the first time.  That course of action, however, is not cast
in stone.  The State is free to elect, on remand, either to make the same motion to prevent
disclosure of Officer Kintop’s observation post or to not call Officer Kintop as a witness in
its case-in-chief.  In following the latter course of action, Officer Kintop’s surveillance
location would not necessarily become an issue in the State’s case.  Church’s fundamental
right to a fair trial is paramount, in my view.  Thus, the only way to ensure that Church
receives a fair trial and that we effectively remedy the violation of his constitutional right to
confrontation and cross-examination is to grant him a new trial.
We have said that a limited remand “is neither an ‘antidote’ for the errors of the State
or of counsel nor a method to correct errors committed during the trial itself.”  Southern v.
State, 371 Md. 93, 104, 807 A.2d 13, 19 (2002) (see cases cited therein); see also Md. Rule
8-604(d) (authorizing remand); Lipinski v. State, 333 Md. 582, 591, 636 A.2d 994, 998
(1994) (noting that although Rule 8-604(d) “‘may be suitable to correct procedures
subsidiary to the criminal trial, it can never be utilized to rectify prejudicial errors committed
during the trial itself’” (quoting Gill v. State, 265 Md. 350, 357, 289 A.2d 575, 579 (1972)));
Jones v. State, 379 Md. 704, 726, 843 A.2d 778, 791 (2004) (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (noting
that “when the error giving rise to the issue to be addressed on limited remand is one that is
3
integral to the proceedings in which it occurred, the appropriate mandate . . . would be a
remand for new trial”).  In Southern we held that a limited remand for the purpose of taking
additional evidence in a reopened suppression hearing in the same case was not proper
because the State failed to meet its initial burden of proof to establish the constitutionality
of the defendant’s detention.  371 Md. at 112, 807 A.2d at 24.  We explained that to grant the
limited remand would give the State “a ‘second bite at the apple’ in the same case,” rather
than “permit [the] court to cure some judicial error that resulted in unfairness to a party.”  Id.;
see also Mitchell v. State, 337 Md. 509, 517, 654 A.2d 1309, 1313 (1995) (pointing out that
the real key to determining the propriety of the limited remand is “whether the error
adversely affected the defendant’s right to a fair trial”).
Here, the State requested that the trial judge exclude in limine evidence concerning
Officer Kintop’s exact surveillance location.  Although the State failed to show it had any
legitimate interest in protecting the particular surveillance location, the trial judge granted
the State’s motion for non-disclosure.  The effect of the court’s ruling unfairly restricted
defense counsel’s cross-examination of Officer Kintop.  That ruling denied Church the
benefit of a fair trial.
Secondly, I disagree with the majority’s assertion that “[t]he rule of Southern does not
apply here, because this case does not involve a suppression hearing.”  Church v. State, ___
Md. ___, ___ A.2d ___, ___ (2009) [slip op. at 23].  In my view, a ruling on a motion in
limine is quite analogous to a ruling on a motion to suppress evidence.  A motion in limine,
4
like a motion to suppress evidence, is a request for a ruling on the admissibility of evidence
before it is actually offered.  Similar to the situation in  Southern, the State, here, failed to
meet its burden of establishing any grounds for Officer Kintop to refuse to disclose the
location of his surveillance post.  As in Southern, it would be unfair, in effect, to remand the
case for the limited purpose of allowing the State to reopen the motion hearing to present
additional evidence.  Fairness dictates that Church receive a new trial.  The trial judge’s
ruling, which restricted Church’s cross-examination of Officer Kintop, constituted an error
that adversely affected the defendant’s right to a fair trial.  Therefore, consistent with our
prior case law, and on the basis of the record before us, where the State wrongfully and with
undue prejudice to the defense was allowed to withhold the officer’s surveillance location,
the appropriate remedy is to remand for a new trial.  We cannot say beyond a reasonable
doubt that the improper restriction placed on Church’s right of cross-examination in no way
influenced the jury’s verdict.  See Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665, 678
(1976).   
Therefore, I dissent.  Chief Judge Bell authorizes me to state that he joins the views
expressed in this dissent.
      
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 53
September Term, 2008
                                                                             
KYERON MICHAEL CHURCH
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
                                                                             
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
JJ.
                                                                         
Dissenting Opinion by Murphy, J.
                                                                             
Filed:   May 13, 2009
Although I have no disagreement with the majority’s analysis of the “surveillance
location privilege” issue, because nothing in the record shows that Petitioner’s trial counsel
did not acquiesce in the in limine ruling at issue, I do not agree that this issue has been
preserved for our review.  In Simmons v. State, 313 Md. 33, 542 A.2d 1258 (1988), this Court
held that when a trial judge’s in limine ruling excludes a line of questions, whether that
ruling is preserved for appellate review depends upon whether the ruling was intended by the
judge to be a final ruling.  Id. at 38, 542 A.2d at 1260.  An in limine ruling that excludes a
line of questions is not appealable unless the record shows that the trial court intended the
ruling to be the “final word on the matter.”  Prout v. State, 311 Md. 348, 358, 535 A.2d 445,
449-50 (1988).
Without doubt, the appropriate bounds of professionalism require that counsel
question witnesses in a manner consistent with the trial court’s in limine ruling.  In the case
at bar, however,  immediately after making the ruling,  the Circuit Court expressly stated that,
“I think actually I’m going to have to just judge it as it comes up.”  Under these
circumstances, to preserve this issue for appellate review, defense counsel was required to
do more than say, “Very well,” or “That’s fine,” when responding  to the Circuit Court,
and/or say, “I don’t want to know where your location was,” when cross examining the
officer.  I would hold that this appeal point was “lost” because at no point during the officer’s
cross-examination did defense counsel request that the Circuit Court reconsider its in limine
ruling.