Title: Barber v. Watson

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Gerald BARBER et al. v. Mike Watson

97-77                                              ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered October 16, 1997


1.   Appeal & error -- chancery cases tried de novo on record -- when reversed.
     -- The appellate court tries chancery cases de novo on the
     record but does not reverse a finding of fact by the
     chancellor unless it is clearly erroneous; to demonstrate that
     the chancellor's ruling was erroneous, an appellant must show
     that the trial court abused its discretion by making a
     judgment call that was arbitrary or groundless.

2.   Property -- land use -- restrictions must be clearly apparent. -- Courts
     do not favor restrictions upon the use of land; if such
     restrictions exist, they must be clearly apparent.

3.   Property -- restrictive covenants -- general rule. -- The general rule
     governing the interpretation, application, and enforcement of
     restrictive covenants is the intention of the parties as shown
     by the covenant; where, however, the language of the
     restrictive covenant is clear and unambiguous, the parties
     will be confined to the meaning of the language employed, so
     long as the meaning does not defeat the plain and obvious
     purpose of the restriction.

4.   Property -- restrictive covenants -- not enforceable where no general plan
     of development exists. -- Where no general plan of development
     exists, restrictive covenants contained in a bill of assurance
     are not enforceable.  

5.   Property -- restrictive covenants -- amended bill of assurance not timely
     filed and not valid. -- The supreme court concluded that the
     language in the original bill of assurance for the subdivision
     was clear and unambiguous and that giving the language of the
     document its plain meaning did not defeat the plain and
     obvious purpose of the restrictions; accordingly, the court
     agreed with the chancellor's determination that appellants
     should have had the agreement, signed by a majority of the
     owners, filed of record before the expiration of the twenty-
     five-year period provided in the original bill of assurance,
     reflecting that the amendment was to take effect as of the day
     of the original bill's expiration; where that was not done,
     the amended bill of assurance was not valid.

6.   Appeal & error -- argument not abstracted -- merits not reached on appeal.
     -- Where the abstract does not reflect that a particular
     argument, or any similar argument, was made in the trial
     court, the supreme court will not reach the merits of the
     argument on appeal; nor will the court turn to the record to
     decide such an issue; it is critical that the court not be
     placed in a position of considering an issue for the first
     time on appeal.
7.   Appeal & error -- review limited to record as abstracted. -- Even though
     the supreme court's review of a chancery appeal is de novo, it
     is nonetheless limited to the record as abstracted; where the
     abstract fails to show the specific arguments made regarding
     the proffered evidence, the court will not consider the
     argument on appeal.


     Appeal from Craighead Chancery Court; Howard Templeton,
Chancellor; affirmed.
     Mixon & McCauley, P.A., by: Donn Mixon, for appellants.
     Mooney Law Firm, by: Charles M. Mooney, Sr., for appellee.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
     Appellants, some seventy residents of two subdivisions in
Jonesboro, appeal the judgment of the Craighead County Chancery
Court, Western District, denying their request for an injunction to
prevent Appellee Mike Watson from constructing multi-family
dwellings in one of the subdivisions.  Appellants raise three
points on appeal, which require us to construe a deed and bills of
assurance; hence, our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R.
1-2(a)(16).  We find no error and affirm.
     We can discern the following information from the abstract
provided.  Appellants are owners and residents of thirty-six and
one-half lots in Meadow Lark Acres Subdivision ("Meadow Lark") and
twelve lots in Meadow Lark Acres Extended Subdivision ("Meadow Lark
Extended"), which are contiguous subdivisions comprised of fifty-
two lots and twenty lots, respectively.  Appellee is the owner of
Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Block H in Meadow Lark Extended.  Meadow
Lark was established and a bill of assurance was executed on
November 15, 1967.  Meadow Lark Extended was established and a bill
of assurance was executed on November 18, 1968.  The original bill
of assurance for Meadow Lark Extended prohibited the construction
of any building other than single-family dwellings except on
certain lots, including the four lots owned by Appellee.  On those
excepted lots, the bill of assurance provided that apartments may
be constructed with the approval of the developers.  An amended
bill of assurance for Meadow Lark Extended was executed on
August 18, 1995, prohibiting any construction of apartment
buildings in Meadow Lark Extended.  The amended bill of assurance
was signed by owners of lots in both subdivisions.
     Appellants filed this suit seeking an injunction from the
chancery court prohibiting Appellee's planned construction of two
additional apartment units on an already existing fourplex situated
on one of his lots in Meadow Lark Extended.  Appellants claimed
that the area was not equipped to handle the increased traffic,
that Appellee's plan violated all the bills of assurance, and that
the use of the land for apartments would materially and
substantially lessen the use and enjoyment of Appellants' property,
thus constituting a nuisance.  
     Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds that some of the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the
action because they did not live in or own property in Meadow Lark
Extended, and that pursuant to ARCP Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint
failed to state facts upon which relief could be granted.  A
hearing was conducted on the matter on July 9, 1996.  A letter
order was subsequently entered by the chancellor granting
Appellee's motion to dismiss.  On the issue of standing, the
chancellor agreed with Appellee that those plaintiffs who lived in
or owned property in Meadow Lark had no standing to challenge any
proposed construction in Meadow Lark Extended.  The chancellor did
find, however, that the amended bill of assurance had been signed
by a majority of the lot owners of Meadow Lark Extended. 
Notwithstanding that finding, the chancellor concluded that the
amended bill of assurance was not valid because it had not been
timely executed in accordance with the procedure set out in the
original bill of assurance.  Appellants now assert that the
chancellor's findings and conclusions were erroneous.  We disagree. 
     We try chancery cases de novo on the record, but we do not
reverse a finding of fact by the chancellor unless it is clearly
erroneous.  Holaday v. Fraker, 323 Ark. 522, 920 S.W.2d 4 (1996). 
In order to demonstrate that the chancellor's ruling was erroneous,
Appellants must show that the trial court abused its discretion by
making a judgment call that was arbitrary or groundless.  Id.
     For the first point for reversal, Appellants assert that the
trial court erred in finding that the amended bill of assurance was
not timely executed.  In order for us to determine whether the
chancellor correctly interpreted the provisions of the original
bill of assurance, we must consider the language of the document. 
The pertinent provisions, as abstracted, read:
          We, W. R. Kitterman and Esther Lea Kitterman, his
     wife, Alton D. Holmes and Maralyn Holmes, his wife, and
     B. Frank Hyneman and Marzee Ann Hyneman, his wife, are
     the owners of the property that we plat and designate as
     Meadow Lark Acres Extended Subdivision to Craighead
     County, Arkansas.  No lots shall be used except for
     residential purposes and no building shall be erected
     other than a single-family dwelling except that a duplex
     dwelling may be permitted under certain restrictions and
     apartment buildings shall be permitted on Lots 1, 2, 3,
     and 4 of Block H of the subdivision, and certain other
     lots, with the approval of the developers herein.  The
     covenants and the restrictions of the Bill of Assurance
     shall be binding for a period of 25 years from the date
     of recording, after which time the covenants and
     restrictions shall be automatically extended for
     successive periods of ten years unless an instrument
     signed by a majority of the owners has been recorded
     agreeing to change or to terminate the covenants and
     restrictions.  
     The twenty-five-year period provided in the original bill of
assurance would have expired in November 1993.  The amended bill of
assurance was not executed until August 18, 1995.  The chancellor
concluded that because Appellants had not executed the amended bill
of assurance prior to the time the original bill of assurance had
expired, the provisions of the original bill of assurance were
automatically extended for an additional ten years.  The chancellor
determined that the proper way to amend or terminate the original
bill of assurance was for a majority of the owners to agree and
then file the agreement of record to take effect at the time the
original bill of assurance expired.  Because the amended bill of
assurance was not timely filed, the chancellor reasoned, the
original bill of assurance, which allowed apartments on certain
lots with the developers' approval, was still in effect at the time
Appellants filed their complaint.  We conclude the chancellor's
interpretation was correct.
     Courts do not favor restrictions upon the use of land; if such
restrictions exist, they must be clearly apparent.  Holaday, 323
Ark. 522, 920 S.W.2d 4; McGuire v. Bell, 297 Ark. 282,