Title: Peterson v. Bachar

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

193 Kan. 161 (1964)
392 P.2d 853
V.E. PETERSON, d/b/a MEMORIAL ART COMPANY, Appellee,
v.
KENT A. BACHAR, Appellant.
No. 43,597

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed June 6, 1964.
J. Eugene Balloun, of Great Bend, argued the cause, and H. Lee Turner and James Bergland, both of Great Bend, were with him on the briefs for the appellant.
Harold W. McCombs, of Russell, argued the cause, and was on the briefs for the appellee.
*162 The opinion of the court was delivered by
HATCHER, C.:
This controversy stems from a motor vehicle collision. The appeal is from judgments of the district court overruling a motion to strike from, and a demurrer to, plaintiff's petition.
The limited issues on appeal permit an abbreviated statement of the contents of the petition.
The plaintiff commenced this action to recover the value of a truck which was completely demolished in a motor vehicle collision on a highway. The petition alleged that plaintiff was in the business of selling tombstones and memorial markers in Salina; that he owned and used a 1960 International 2-ton truck which was especially designed for use in his business, and that the defendant negligently drove his automobile in such a way as to cause a collision between the plaintiff's truck and the defendant's automobile.
The allegation of the petition as to damages reads:
The defendant lodged a motion to make definite and certain and a motion to strike against the petition in numerous particulars. The *163 motions were overruled. Defendant then attacked the petition by a general demurrer which was also overruled.
The defendant has appealed, specifying as error the overruling of the motion to strike, the overruling of the demurrer and specifically contending that:
The appellant in his brief limits the controversy to a single issue as follows:
The only question before us is  where a motor vehicle is completely demolished, is the recovery of damages limited to the reasonable value of the vehicle immediately before its destruction?
The appellant contends that the recovery is so limited. The appellee contends that he not only has a right to recover the value of the vehicle but may also recover for all losses that are the natural and probable result of defendant's wrongful act, which includes the items of damage numbered [3] to [6] in plaintiff's claim for damages as previously quoted.
The appellee calls our attention to the general rule that in all negligence cases the injured party is entitled to recover damages for all injuries which are the natural and probable result of the wrongful or negligent act complained of. Appellee also suggests that there is no reason why there should be a different rule applicable to the negligent destruction of a motor vehicle than that applicable to the destruction of any other type of personal property. We are inclined to agree with the logic of appellee's suggestion. In 8 Am. Jur., 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 1041, p. 601, the general rule is stated:
However, in considering the general rule it must be understood that where the loss of profits or earnings from the use of a motor vehicle is being considered the damage or loss must be capable of computation with reasonable certainty and recovery cannot be based on speculative and problematical loss of profits or earnings because of loss of use of the motor vehicle.
Both parties cite the numerous Kansas cases which have touched on the question in support of their contentions. It must be conceded that this court, in considering the particular facts, circumstances and issues in each individual case, has left some speculation as to the exact rule to be applied in measuring damages for the complete destruction of a motor vehicle.
The appellant relies chiefly on the case of Lester v. Doyle, 165 Kan. 354, 194 P.2d 917 and the earlier cases cited in the opinion. The first paragraph of the syllabus reads:
The appellant contends that the corollary to this rule is that when the vehicle is completely destroyed, the measure of the damages is limited to the value of the property at the time of the destruction.
The appellee contends:
We cannot agree with the contention of either party. The Lester case simply holds that if a party so elects he may recover the difference in the value of the motor vehicle immediately before a collision and immediately thereafter and if he so elects he cannot recover in addition the cost of repairs and for the loss of the use of *165 the vehicle. On the other hand, if a party so elects he may have the vehicle repaired and recover as damages the reasonable cost of the repairs, plus the reasonable value of the use of the vehicle while it is being repaired with ordinary diligence, but the cost of the repairs and the loss of the use cannot exceed the value of the vehicle before the injury.
The reason for the rule and its application is not difficult to determine. The injured party should not be permitted to indulge in excessive repairs and loss of the use of a vehicle in amount greatly in excess of the value of the vehicle immediately before the injury. If such a situation is going to result the injured party can best mitigate his damages by taking as damages the difference in the value of the vehicle immediately before and after the injury and acquiring a substitute vehicle. It should be suggested, however, that a different rule might well apply where a vehicle was specially constructed for the performance of a particular service and a substitute vehicle was not available.
It may be stated as a general rule that in the case of the complete destruction of a motor vehicle the measure of damages is the reasonable market value thereof immediately before the destruction. (169 A.L.R. 1080.) However, this rule, like most general rules, has its exceptions depending on the particular facts and circumstances. In Foster v. Humburg, 180 Kan. 64, 299 P.2d 46, another general rule is stated:
The case now before us must be decided on the particular facts and circumstances as alleged in the petition. The petition alleges the unusual features of the truck to be as follows:
The allegations as to the inability to obtain a substitute vehicle read:
*166 Both parties rely on the case of Billups v. American Surety Co., 173 Kan. 646, 251 P.2d 237. The case does throw some light on this controversy. The action was brought for damages to a tractor truck constructed for the purpose of hauling cattle and for the loss of use thereof. The plaintiff recovered for the cost of repairs to the truck in the amount of $2,328.11, the loss of the use of the truck in the amount of $500.00 and wreckage expense in the amount of $350.00. The plaintiff appealed contending that the trial court erroneously rejected evidence as to additional loss of the use of the truck in the sum of $6,145.00. The loss of use as it pertains to the item was based on the contention that plaintiff was unable to lease the truck to the War Department for the purpose of transporting feed and other commodities during a severe snow storm in Wyoming and the Dakotas. This court disposed of the controversy with the following statement:
In discussing the matter the court laid down the general principles of law applicable. It stated:
We must conclude that loss of profits from earnings or the use of the motor vehicle may be allowed as an element of damages for the complete demolition of the vehicle if they are not too speculative or contentious. However, loss of profits or earnings to be derived from the use of a motor vehicle cannot be recovered in an action for injury thereto unless it is shown that the owner could *167 not obtain a suitable substitute vehicle, or that there was a necessary lapse of time between the date of the accident and the time in which the owner was reasonably able to obtain a suitable substitute vehicle. Loss of earning or loss of profit cannot be considered as an element of damages unless the computation can be made with reasonable certainty. They cannot be recovered where such loss is speculative or problematical.
In the trial of the case on its merits it will be the responsibility of the trial court to see that speculative or problematical evidence as to loss of use or loss of earnings does not reach the jury.
There is some merit to appellant's contention that the allegations in the petition as to the amount of damages from loss of use of the vehicle indicate speculation. However, it should be understood that while allegations as to the amount of damages are essential in a petition, they do not constitute a part of the cause of action. The evidence may establish less damages than the amount alleged in the petition, yet the plaintiff may recover the amount proven. In Foster v. Humburg, supra, it is stated at page 67 of the opinion:
Under the particular facts and circumstances alleged in the petition the motion to strike from, and the demurrer to, the petition were properly overruled.
The judgment is affirmed.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.