Title: Vaughn Inc. v. Beck

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and Lemons, 
JJ., and Stephenson, S.J. 
 
VAUGHN, INC. 
 
v.  Record No. 003042   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
November 2, 2001 
HOWARD J. BECK, JR., ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROANOKE COUNTY 
J. Howe Brown, Jr., Judge Designate 
 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider the issue whether under Code 
§ 55-70.1, a purchaser of a new home is required to notify the 
builder of a defect in construction within the statutory 
warranty period before bringing an action against the builder 
for breach of that warranty. 
 
Howard J. Beck, Jr., and his wife, Lauren S. Beck 
(collectively, the Becks), entered into a contract with Vaughn, 
Inc. (Vaughn) to purchase certain real estate, including a house 
and a well, in a residential development in Roanoke County.  The 
Becks obtained title and took possession of the property on 
December 9, 1996. 
 
Within one year of that date, the Becks began to experience 
problems with an inadequate flow of water from their well.  As a 
result of the inadequate water flow, the Becks did not have 
sufficient water to perform routine household functions, such as 
washing dishes, washing clothes, and bathing.  In addition, the 
Becks were not able to provide water for their lawn and 
shrubbery.  Because of the inadequate water flow, the Becks were 
required to dig and install a second well. 
 
The Becks did not notify Vaughn of their difficulties with 
the original well because they thought that the problem was 
caused by a faulty water pump, which Vaughn would not have been 
obligated to correct.  At a later date, however, the Becks 
concluded that Vaughn was responsible for correcting the defect 
in the well, but they took no action to notify Vaughn of the 
defect. 
 
On December 7, 1998, within two years of the date that the 
Becks obtained title and took possession of the property, they 
filed a motion for judgment in the trial court against Vaughn.  
The Becks alleged that the defect in the well installed by 
Vaughn was caused by Vaughn's failure to drill, construct, and 
prepare the well in a workmanlike manner, free from structural 
defects.  The Becks asserted, among other things, that based on 
Vaughn's actions and omissions regarding the well, Vaughn 
breached the statutory warranty for new dwellings provided by 
Code § 55-70.1. 
 
Vaughn filed an answer in which he admitted that "[t]he 
warranties given are the statutory warranties" under Code § 55-
70.1.  However, Vaughn denied any breach of those warranties and 
asserted as an affirmative defense the Becks' failure to provide 
Vaughn notice of the defect within the one-year statutory 
 
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warranty period.  In response, the Becks conceded that they had 
not given Vaughn notice of the defect within one year from the 
date on which they obtained title to the property and took 
possession of the dwelling. 
 
In a preliminary ruling, the trial court addressed Vaughn's 
affirmative defense and held that 
[i]n accordance with rules of statutory construction, 
the Court looks to the plain meaning of the language 
of the statute.  The statute does not require notice 
to the builder or vendor.  In other statutes the 
legislature has required notice. . . .  If notice of 
breach by the buyer is required in every case, there 
would be no reason for the legislature or the 
contractor to specify a notice provision in certain 
cases. 
 
 
The case proceeded to a jury trial.  The jury returned a 
verdict in favor of the Becks in the amount of $20,000, and the 
trial court entered judgment in accordance with the verdict.  
Vaughn appeals from this judgment. 
 
Vaughn argues that Code § 55-70.1 required the Becks to 
give Vaughn notice of the defect in the well within the one-year 
statutory warranty period as a condition precedent to 
maintaining an action against Vaughn for breach of the statutory 
warranty.  Vaughn asserts that a notice requirement is implied 
from the statutory language, and that a contrary result would be 
unreasonable because it would deprive a builder of the 
opportunity to determine whether a homeowner’s claim for damages 
has any merit.  Vaughn also contends that in Davis v. Tazewell 
 
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Place Associates, 254 Va. 257, 492 S.E.2d 162 (1997), this Court 
recognized a builder’s right under Code § 55-70.1 to receive 
such notice of a defect that forms the basis of an action for 
breach of the statutory warranty.  We disagree with Vaughn’s 
arguments. 
 
Under basic rules of statutory construction, we examine the 
language of Code § 55-70.1 in its entirety and determine the 
intent of the General Assembly from the words contained in the 
statute, unless a literal construction of the statute would 
yield an absurd result. Cummings v. Fulghum, 261 Va. 73, 77, 540 
S.E.2d 494, 496 (2001); Earley v. Landsidle, 257 Va. 365, 369, 
514 S.E.2d 153, 155 (1999).  When the language of a statute is 
plain and unambiguous, we are bound by the plain meaning of that 
language.  Cummings, 261 Va. at 77, 540 S.E.2d at 496; Earley, 
257 Va. at 370, 514 S.E.2d at 155; Ragan v. Woodcroft Vill. 
Apartments, 255 Va. 322, 326, 497 S.E.2d 740, 742 (1998).  Thus, 
when the General Assembly has used words of a plain and definite 
import, courts cannot place on them a construction that amounts 
to holding that the General Assembly meant something other than 
that which it actually expressed.  See Advanced Marine Enters., 
Inc. v. PRC Inc., 256 Va. 106, 125, 501 S.E.2d 148, 159 (1998); 
Abbott v. Willey, 253 Va. 88, 91, 479 S.E.2d 528, 530 (1997). 
We also consider the fact that Code § 55-70.1 is a statute 
in derogation of the common law.  At common law, a purchaser of 
 
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a dwelling did not acquire an implied warranty in conjunction 
with the sale of that dwelling.  Davis., 254 Va. at 261, 492 
S.E.2d at 164; see Bruce Farms, Inc. v. Coupe, 219 Va. 287, 289, 
247 S.E.2d 400, 402 (1978).  Because Code § 55-70.1 changed the 
common law by creating certain statutory warranties, those 
warranties are limited to the provisions expressly stated in the 
statute or necessarily implied by its language.  See Mitchem v. 
Counts, 259 Va. 179, 186, 523 S.E.2d 246, 250 (2000); Boyd v. 
Commonwealth, 236 Va. 346, 349, 374 S.E.2d 301, 302 (1988). 
 
Code § 55-70.1 provides, in relevant part: 
B.  In addition, in every contract for the sale of a 
new dwelling, the vendor, if he is in the business of 
building or selling such dwellings, shall be held to 
warrant to the vendee that, at the time of transfer of 
record title or the vendee's taking possession, 
whichever occurs first, the dwelling together with all 
its fixtures is sufficiently (i) free from structural 
defects, so as to pass without objection in the trade, 
(ii) constructed in a workmanlike manner, so as to 
pass without objection in the trade, and (iii) fit for 
habitation. 
. . . . 
 
D.  If there is a breach of warranty under this 
section, the vendee, or his heirs or personal 
representatives in case of his death, shall have a 
cause of action against his vendor for damages. 
 
E.  The warranty shall extend for a period of one year 
from the date of transfer of record title or the 
vendee's taking possession, whichever occurs first, 
except that the warranty pursuant to subdivision (i) 
of subsection B for the foundation of new dwellings 
shall extend for a period of five years from the date 
of transfer of record title or the vendee's taking 
possession, whichever occurs first.  Any action for 
its breach shall be brought within two years after the 
 
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breach thereof.  As used in this section, the term 
"new dwelling" shall mean a dwelling or house which 
has not previously been occupied for a period of more 
than sixty days by anyone other than the vendor or the 
vendee or which has not been occupied by the original 
vendor or subsequent vendor for a cumulative period of 
more than twelve months excluding dwellings 
constructed solely for lease.  The term "new dwelling" 
shall not include a condominium or condominium units 
created pursuant to Chapter 4.2 (§ 55-79.39 et seq.) 
of this title. 
 
 
We conclude that the language of Code § 55-70.1 plainly 
does not require the purchaser of a new dwelling to give notice 
of a defect in construction to the builder within the one-year 
statutory warranty period as a prerequisite for bringing a 
breach of warranty action under the statute based on that 
defect.  Subsection (D) of Code § 55-70.1 provides the purchaser 
of a new dwelling a cause of action against the builder for a 
breach of the warranty created by the statute.  Subsection (E) 
of the statute provides that the warranty shall extend for a 
period of one year from the date that record title is 
transferred to the purchaser, or the date that the purchaser 
takes possession of the property, whichever occurs first.  Any 
action for such breach of warranty must be brought within two 
years after the breach occurs.  Id.  Thus, a breach by the 
builder, not a tendering of notice, is the only condition that 
the statute imposes for bringing an action against that builder 
within two years of the date of the breach. 
 
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The contrary statutory interpretation advanced by Vaughn 
would require us to add new language to the statute.  We reject 
that interpretation because, in the absence of a specific notice 
requirement, we may not construe the statute’s plain language in 
a manner that amounts to holding that the General Assembly meant 
to add a requirement to the statute that it did not actually 
express.  See Advanced Marine Enters., Inc., 256 Va. at 125, 501 
S.E.2d at 159; Haislip v. Southern Heritage Ins. Co., 254 Va. 
265, 268, 492 S.E.2d 135, 137 (1997). 
 
We also disagree with Vaughn's assertion that our decision 
in Davis implicitly recognized a notice requirement under Code 
§ 55-70.1.  The issue presented and decided in Davis was whether 
the defendant builder had met its burden of proving that the 
plaintiffs' cause of action was barred by the two-year statute 
of limitations in Code § 55-70.1.  254 Va. at 260-61, 492 S.E.2d 
at 164.  We did not consider the question whether notice by a 
purchaser is an element of a cause of action under Code § 55-
70.1. 
 
The facts in Davis involved purchasers who, after buying a 
new house, observed various defects in the dwelling.  Although 
not required by Code § 55-70.1 to do so, the purchasers provided 
the builder notice of those defects.  Id. at 259, 492 S.E.2d at 
163.  We stated that when a purchaser notifies the builder of 
any defect covered by the statutory warranty within the one-year 
 
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warranty period, and the builder does not remedy that defect, 
the purchaser may file an action against the builder within two 
years from the date that the notice was given.  Id. at 261, 492 
S.E.2d at 164. 
 
We held that the defendants failed to prove that the 
statute of limitations had expired before the plaintiffs filed 
their action.  Id.  Incorporated in this holding was the fact 
that the purchasers gave notice to the builder within the 
statutory warranty period.  See id.  Thus, our decision in Davis 
is limited to this factual context and does not impose a notice 
requirement under Code § 55-70.1. 
Nevertheless, as Vaughn observes, our interpretation of 
Code § 55-70.1 in Davis may have the effect of permitting an 
extension of the statute of limitations in cases when a 
purchaser has provided timely notice of a construction defect to 
the builder.  This potential result, however, cannot be remedied 
through judicial construction by imposing a notice requirement 
that effectively would add new language to the statute.  Any 
such change to the statute must be a legislative, rather than a 
judicial, undertaking.  See Advanced Marine Enters., Inc., 256 
Va. at 125, 501 S.E.2d at 159; Abbott, 253 Va. at 91, 479 S.E.2d 
at 530.  Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court correctly 
held that Code § 55-70.1 does not impose a notice requirement as 
 
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a prerequisite for maintaining an action for breach of the 
statutory warranty. 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the trial court's 
judgment. 
Affirmed.
 
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