Title: DEGENHARDT, ADMINISTRATOR v. Degenhardt

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

183 Kan. 260 (1958)
326 P.2d 288
CASPAR DEGENHARDT, Administrator of the Estate of Margaret Degenhardt, Deceased, Appellant,
v.
JOHN J. DEGENHARDT, Appellee.
No. 41,019

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed June 7, 1958.
Harold H. Chase, of Salina, argued the cause, and Delmas L. Haney, of Hays, was with him on the briefs for the appellant.
Norman W. Jeter, of Hays, argued the cause, and was on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
JACKSON, J.:
Appellant brought an action in the court below against appellee to set aside two deeds to two separate pieces of real estate in Ellis county, and for an accounting of rents and profits. Appellee filed certain motions to make definite, to strike, and to compel election. The amended petition containing two causes of action, one cause referring to each piece of real estate, was filed. Thereafter, appellee demurred generally on the ground "that neither of said causes of action as contained in said petition states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendant and in favor of the plaintiff."
After the matter had been fully considered by the trial court, the demurrer was sustained as to both causes of action. Plaintiff has appealed, and we shall refer to the parties hereinafter as plaintiff and defendant.
We are advised that plaintiff and defendant are brothers, and sons of Margaret Degenhardt, deceased, and that there were twelve other children in the family besides these two sons.
The first cause of action in the amended petition involves a half section of land in Ellis county, which the amended petition alleges was conveyed to the defendant son on July 13, 1931; it is further alleged that said deed was recorded on the day of its execution and that defendant went into possession of the farm and since said date occupied said real estate; a copy of the deed is attached to the amended petition as an exhibit. It was further alleged that the deed was executed in accordance with a certain written contract between defendant son and his mother, as recited in the deed, that defendant son would maintain, support, care for and provide a *262 comfortable living for the mother. A copy of the contract was attached as an exhibit and made a part of the petition. It was further alleged that defendant son failed to perform the promises and conditions in said agreement; "that the said Margaret Degenhardt died at the age of 72 years on 18 February 1943, infirm in body and mind and because of her infirmities was unable, and had been unable for at least five years prior to her death, to assert any of the rights granted her under said contract to bring an action for the cancellation of said deed."
It was further alleged in the first cause that the "said agreement and deed was an attempt to make a testamentary disposition of the property of Margaret Degenhardt" and should be declared void, set aside and held of no effect.
It should be noted that the copy of the written agreement attached to the pleading as an exhibit contains provisions relating to the rights of the mother should defendant son fail to carry out his obligations under the contract. They read as follows:
The second cause of action of the amended petition involved a warranty deed to a residence property in the village of Pfeifer, Ellis county, which it was alleged had been filed for record on February 23, 1943, after the death of the mother on February 18, 1943; a copy of the deed was attached to the amended petition and shows that the mother as grantor conveyed the title to the real estate in question to defendant son subject to the reservation of a life estate to the mother therein.
The second cause of action contained the following allegations in relation to the deed to the residence property:
From the above summary of the amended petition it will readily appear that while there are questions whether either of the two causes of action states sufficient facts to be sufficient against the defendant's demurrer, the determinative issue as to both causes is as to the statute of limitations and laches. The deed to the farm was filed of record on July 13, 1931, and the defendant went into possession immediately. Defendant had been in possession of the farm under the deed for almost twenty-six years when the original petition was filed in this suit on March 7, 1956. The mother had been deceased for thirteen years when the suit was filed.
Plaintiff seeks to excuse delay on the ground that it was alleged that the mother was infirm and unable to assert her rights under the contract as to the farm during the last five years of her life. But even as to that, it may be noted that plaintiff as a son and his other brothers and sisters might have sought the appointment of a guardian for her estate and person if they were dissatisfied with the arrangements which must have been known to them. However, assuming that the mother's infirmities, as alleged, did toll the *264 running of the statute of limitations and laches until the mother's death, some thirteen years passed thereafter before the filing of this action.
Plaintiff further argues that the running of all limitations were further tolled until his appointment as administrator of his mother's estate in 1956, and relies upon Carney v. Havens, 23 Kan. 82, and Mills v. Mills, 43 Kan. 699, 23 Pac. 944, to support this contention.
Those cases do not sustain plaintiff's argument. The Carney and Mills cases only purport to apply to causes which did not become due until after the death of the decedent, according to the terms of the contract or situation giving rise to the cause of action. They do not apply under the circumstances surrounding the estate of Margaret Degenhardt, deceased. Obviously, there was no necessity to have an administration of Margaret's estate except for supposed convenience in bringing the purported actions herein. It would seem that plaintiff or any of the other children might well have started such actions at any time after Margaret's death and the payment of debts, as heirs at law and owners of interests in property which allegedly should be a part of her estate.
The case of Glathart v. Madden, 122 Kan. 563, 253 Pac. 426, is quite pertinent to the question of the running of limitations in the case at bar. There a sister had belatedly obtained appointment of herself as administratrix and was suing her brother to obtain an accounting for assets allegedly belonging to the estate of their common ancestor, and so to the sister as an heir of the estate. The court said:
Attention is directed to the cases of Richards v. Tiernan, 150 Kan. 116, p. 120, 91 P.2d 22, and In re Estate of Moore, 161 Kan. 603, p. 609, 170 P.2d 838, in which the decision in Glathart v. Madden, supra, is approved, and the rights of heirs at law are discussed as to situations which do not necessitate administration of the estate of their intestate.
The plaintiff has not suggested any reason why the first cause of action is not barred by the usual five year statute of limitations relating to rights arising from written contracts (G.S. 1949, 60-306, First). The rights of the mother in the farm under her warranty deed and the written contract for support by the defendant son  which plaintiff contends became vested in him as a representative of the heirs at law of the mother  were only for security purposes to insure the carrying out of the contract for support of the mother by the defendant. The mother's interest amounted in fact to a *267 lien on the land to secure performance of the contract. Any claim for non-performance on the part of defendant has clearly been long since barred during the thirteen years since the mother's death in 1943. The situation can be aptly compared to a real estate mortgage. It has long been the law of this state that when the mortgage note has been barred by the five year statute of limitations, the lien of the mortgage can no longer be enforced. (See Hubbard v. Missouri Valley Ins. Co., 25 Kan. 172; Kulp v. Kulp, 51 Kan. 341, 32 Pac. 1118; Hege v. Suderman, 142 Kan. 495, 51 P.2d 23; Troxell v. Cleveland Oil Co., 145 Kan. 658, 66 P.2d 545.)
It will readily appear from the above statements that the court is not impressed with plaintiff's allegations that the deed and contract involved in the first cause of action constituted a testamentary disposition. It also may be pertinent to briefly say that the court is not impressed with the same contention as to the second cause of action. A warranty deed containing a reservation of a life estate to the grantor is certainly not a testamentary disposition. The bare allegations of the amended petition as to testamentary dispositions are controlled by the terms of the deeds and contract attached thereto as exhibits. (See Zane v. International Hod Carriers B. & C.L. Union, 155 Kan. 87, 122 P.2d 715; Wood v. Stewart, 158 Kan. 729, 150 P.2d 331.)
Moreover, considering all of the claims attempted to be set forth in both causes of action contained in plaintiff's amended petition, it is plain that plaintiff is seeking the aid of a court of equity. Courts of equity will regard long passage of time in asserting claims with disfavor apart from any particular statute of limitations. The doctrine of laches is designed to bar stale claims. The plaintiff argues that mere passage of time is not enough to invoke the doctrine. It may be readily assumed that defendant has paid taxes on the real estate, has made repairs and done many other things during all of the years in which plaintiff and the other heirs of Margaret Degenhardt, deceased, have been content to sleep on their alleged rights. Nowhere in the amended petition do we find even an attempted excuse for the delay of thirteen years between the death of the mother and the beginning of this lawsuit.
In the case of Preston v. Shields, 159 Kan. 575, 156 P.2d 543, the court said in part:
In McKee v. McKee, 154 Kan. 340, 118 P.2d 544, it was said:
See also Calkin v. Hudson, 156 Kan. 308, p. 318, 133 P.2d 177; Templing v. Bennett, 156 Kan. 68, p. 72, 131 P.2d 904; Edwards v. Moore, 143 Kan. 447, 54 P.2d 933, and authorities cited.
The trial court correctly sustained the demurrer to both of plaintiff's causes of action and the ruling is affirmed.
It is so ordered.