Title: White v. Liberty Insurance Co.

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
EDITH WHITE,  
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§   No. 630, 2008 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   Court Below – Superior Court 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for New Castle County 
LIBERTY INSURANCE 
 
 
§  
CORPORATION,  
 
 
§   C.A. No. 08C-07-048 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§  
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
    Submitted:  June 3, 2009 
 
 
 
 
    Decided:  June 17, 2009 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and 
RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Beverly L. Bove, Esquire, and Vincent J. X. Hedrick, II, Esquire, 
Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant. 
 
Nancy Chrissinger Cobb, Esquire, Chrissinger & Baumberger, 
Wilmington, Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
2
The plaintiff-appellant, Edith White, appeals from the final judgment 
of the Superior Court granting the motion to dismiss of the defendant-
appellee, Liberty Insurance Corp. (“Liberty”).  White contends that the 
Superior Court erred when it granted Liberty’s motion to dismiss her 
complaint.  First, she claims that a proper analysis under title 18, section 
3902 of the Delaware Code focuses on the plaintiff’s damages and not the 
limits of his or her coverage.1  Second, she asserts that section 3902 is 
ambiguous and that the Superior Court failed to consider that the purpose of 
the statute is to protect insured persons from the negligence of unknown or 
impecunious tortfeasors.  Third, she argues that this Court is not bound by 
the judicial doctrine of stare decisis in this case because our prior decisions 
may be revisited if they compel unfair or arbitrary results.   
We have concluded that, in deciding White’s case, the Superior Court 
properly relied on this Court’s interpretation of section 3902 in Nationwide 
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Williams.2  We also ratify and reaffirm our holding 
in Williams.  Therefore, the judgment of the Superior Court must be 
affirmed. 
                                          
 
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 3902. 
2 Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 695 A.2d 1124 (Del. 1997). 
 
3
Facts  
 
On July 16, 2005, White was driving her vehicle with two passengers 
when another driver ran a red light and crashed into the driver’s side of 
White’s vehicle.  The collision injured White3 and both of her passengers.  
There is no dispute that for purposes of this appeal the other driver (“the 
tortfeasor”) was at fault.   
The tortfeasor had an automobile insurance policy with Progressive 
that provided coverage of up to $15,000 per person or $30,000 per accident.  
White received a payment from Progressive on September 24, 2007.  There 
is some dispute as to the exact amount she received.  Liberty claims that 
White’s initial and amended complaints indicate she received the per-person 
payment of $15,000.  White claims that she received the per-accident 
payment of $30,000, which she split with her two passengers so that each 
received $10,000.  Regardless, it is undisputed that White received some 
amount less than the per-person limit of the tortfeasor’s available liability 
coverage.  
                                          
 
3 White sustained serious injuries as a result of the accident. Her injuries included 
permanent chronic cervicothoracic spine pain with myofascial pain and somatic 
dysfunction, permanent chronic lumbosacral spine pain with myofascial pain and somatic 
dysfunction, myofascial pain versus cervical nerve root irritation, and contusion to the 
right upper and lower extremities.   
 
4
At the time of the accident, White had an automobile insurance policy 
with Liberty that included underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage in the 
amount of $15,000 per person or $30,000 per accident.  White filed a UIM 
claim under this policy.  Liberty declined to pay the claim on the grounds 
that the tortfeasor was not an underinsured motorist. 
Procedural History 
On July 7, 2008, White filed a complaint against Liberty in the 
Superior Court, which she later amended, alleging that she was entitled to 
UIM benefits under her policy.  Liberty filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant 
to Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6), on September 3, 2008.  White filed 
her opposition to that motion on October 14, 2008.   
On December 23, 2008, the Superior Court granted Liberty’s motion 
to dismiss.  Relying on this Court’s opinion in Nationwide Mutual Insurance 
Co. v. Williams,4 the Superior Court determined that White was not entitled 
to receive UIM benefits under her policy because the limits of her UIM 
coverage were identical to the limits of the tortfeasor’s bodily injury 
coverage.  White filed a timely direct appeal with this Court. 
                                          
 
4 Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 695 A.2d 1124 (Del. 1997). 
 
5
Motion to Dismiss Granted 
 
After hearing oral arguments, the trial judge granted Liberty’s motion 
to dismiss, explaining that “in this case, the tortfeasor and the injured party 
had identical policies of 15 and 30.”  The trial judge determined that White’s 
case was “controlled by the Williams decision and also by the statute,” in 
defining an underinsured motor vehicle as one for which the limits of bodily 
injury liability coverage are less than the limits of coverage provided by the 
injured party’s UIM policy.  The policy limits were “identical” in this case.  
Therefore, the trial judge determined that White could not access her UIM 
coverage and dismissed her complaint.  
Standard of Review 
We review the judicial construction of a statute de novo to determine 
whether the Superior Court “erred in formulating or applying legal 
precepts.” 5 
Underinsured Motorist Statute 
 
Title 18, section 3902(b)(1) of the Delaware Code permits a claim for 
UIM benefits where an operator of an underinsured motor vehicle causes the 
                                          
 
5 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clarendon Nat. Ins. Co., 604 A.2d 384, 387 (Del. 
1992) (quoting Hudson v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 569 A.2d 1168, 1170 (Del. 1990)); 
accord Colonial Ins. Co. of Wisconsin v. Ayers, 772 A.2d 177 (Del. 2001). 
 
6
claimant bodily injury.6  A claimant may not recover under her UIM policy, 
however, unless the definition of underinsurance in section 3902(b)(2) has 
been met.7  Thus, the claimant must be able to show that she was injured by 
an underinsured vehicle within the meaning of the statute to collect on her 
UIM policy.   
Section 3902(b)(2) defines an “underinsured vehicle” as “one for 
which there may be bodily injury liability coverage in effect, but the limits 
of bodily injury liability coverage under all bonds and insurance policies 
applicable at the time of the accident total less than the limits provided by 
the uninsured motorist coverage.”  That section also states that “[t]hese 
limits shall be stated in the declaration sheet of the policy.”8  Accordingly, 
the plain language of section 3902(b)(2) indicates that whether a claimant is 
entitled to UIM benefits depends upon the applicable policy limits.   
Prior Precedent in Williams 
 
This Court has held previously, and we reaffirm now, that when the 
limits of the claimant’s UIM coverage and the limits of the tortfeasor’s 
bodily injury coverage are identical, the tortfeasor is not an underinsured 
                                          
 
6 Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 3902(b)(1). 
7 Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Peebles, 688 A.2d 1374, 1378 n.2 (Del. 1997) (“The 
presentation of record evidence which comports with the unambiguous definition in 18 
Del. C. § 3902(b)(2) is a condition precedent to pursuing an underinsurance claim.”). 
8 Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 3902(b)(2); accord Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 695 
A.2d 1124 (Del. 1997). 
 
7
motorist within the meaning of section 3902(b)(2).9  In Nationwide Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Williams, the plaintiff and her three passengers were 
injured when the driver of another vehicle ran a stop sign and collided with 
the plaintiff’s vehicle.10  There was no dispute that the other driver (“the 
tortfeasor”) caused the accident.11   
In Williams, the tortfeasor was covered under a policy of automobile 
liability insurance issued by Allstate Insurance Co. (“Allstate”).12  The total 
limits of the tortfeasor’s liability coverage were $100,000 per person and 
$300,000 per accident.13  The plaintiff was covered by a policy of 
automobile liability insurance with Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. 
(“Nationwide”) that included UIM coverage.14  The total limits of the 
plaintiff’s UIM coverage with Nationwide were identical to the liability 
limits of the tortfeasor’s policy with Allstate.15   
In Williams, the plaintiff and her three passengers divided the 
$300,000 per-accident coverage provided by the tortfeasor’s policy with 
Allstate.16  The plaintiff received $98,000 from Allstate, which was less than 
                                          
 
9 Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.  v. Williams, 695 A.2d 1124, 1127 (Del. 1997). 
10 Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 695 A.2d at 1125. 
11 Id.  
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
 
8
the per-person limit of the tortfeasor’s liability coverage.17  Nationwide 
denied the plaintiff’s claim for UIM benefits under her policy because the 
limits of her UIM coverage and the limits of the tortfeasor’s bodily injury 
policy were identical.18  On appeal, we held that the plaintiff could not 
access her UIM coverage because a tortfeasor is not an underinsured 
motorist within the meaning of section 3902(b)(2) where the limits of the 
claimant’s UIM coverage and the limits of the tortfeasor’s bodily injury 
coverage are identical.19 
Williams Holding Reaffirmed 
 
In this case, White’s UIM policy limits were identical to the 
tortfeasor’s liability limits.  White argues in this appeal that because the 
actual compensation she received from the tortfeasor’s insurance policy was 
less than the maximum allowed by her UIM policy, she should be able to 
access her UIM coverage.  She asserts that the total amount she received 
from Progressive for her injuries was $10,000 but she was entitled to 
$15,000.   
White relies on Hurst v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.20 and 
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Peebles21 to support her argument that 
                                          
 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 695 A.2d at 1127. 
20 Hurst v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 652 A.2d 10 (Del. 1995). 
 
9
the focus of the inquiry should be the actual amount she received for her 
injuries and not the limits of coverage.  Hurst and Peebles are inapplicable, 
however, because they speak only to situations where a UIM policy has 
already been triggered under section 3902(b)(2).22  Here, as in Williams, 
White’s policy limits and the tortfeasor’s policy limits were identical.   
Section 3902(b)(2) expressly states that the limits of the insurance 
policy control when determining whether the claimant can access her UIM 
benefits.23  The Superior Court concluded that, because the policy limits 
were identical, Williams controls and the court could not consider the actual 
amount White received to determine whether she could access her UIM 
benefits.  We agree.  The Superior Court properly concluded that the 
tortfeasor in this case cannot be classified as an underinsured motorist and, 
therefore, White cannot access her UIM benefits.   
Statute Unambiguous 
 
White next argues that section 3902(b)(2) is ambiguously drafted and 
requires outside sources to explain its true meaning.  While the dissent in 
                                                                                                                             
 
21 Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Peebles, 688 A.2d 1374 (Del. 1997).   
22 See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.  v. Williams, 695 A.2d 1124, 1126 (Del. 1997) (citing 
Hurst v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 652 A.2d at 13-14; Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Peebles, 688 A.2d at 1377).  
23 In other words, if the tortfeasor’s insurance was less than the amount of coverage on 
White’s car, then White may recover her UIM benefits.  If the tortfeasor’s insurance was 
greater than the policy limits on White’s car, then White may not recover her UIM 
benefits.  In this case, however, both White’s policy limits and the tortfeasor’s policy 
limits were identical. 
 
10
Peebles referred to section 3902(b)(2) as “arguably ambiguous,”24 just three 
months later in Williams, this Court, sitting en banc, characterized the 
definition of underinsurance in section 3902(b)(2) as “unambiguous.”25  We 
reaffirm our holding in Williams that section 3902(b)(2) is clear on its face.  
Accordingly, a claimant may access her UIM benefits only if “the limits of 
bodily injury liability coverage under all bonds and insurance policies 
applicable at the time of the accident total less than the limits provided by 
the uninsured motorist coverage.”26  In this case, the policy limits are 
identical and the plaintiff cannot access her UIM benefits.   
Stare Decisis 
 
Finally, White argues that the doctrine of stare decisis does not bar 
this Court from revisiting our prior interpretation of section 3902(b)(2).  It is 
well-established in Delaware jurisprudence that once an issue of law has 
been settled by a decision of this Court, “it forms a precedent which is not 
afterwards to be departed from or lightly overruled or set aside … and [it] 
should be followed except for urgent reasons and upon clear manifestation 
of error.”27  White has not identified any urgent reason for this Court to 
                                          
 
24 Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Peebles, 688 A.2d at 1380 n.2. 
25 Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 695 A.2d at 1127. 
26 Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 3902(b)(2). 
27 Account v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 780 A.2d 245, 248 (Del. 2001) (quoting Oscar 
George, Inc. v. Potts, 115 A.2d 479, 481 (Del. 1955)); see Seinfeld v. Verizon Commc’ns, 
Inc., 909 A.2d 117, 124 (Del. 2006). 
 
11
depart from the holding in Williams.  White has also not demonstrated any 
manifest error.  Accordingly, we adhere to our holding in Williams.  
Conclusion 
 
The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.