Title: MATTHEW ROBERT FRAZIER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MATTHEW ROBERT FRAZIER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 107236 P.3d 295Case Number: S-09-0205Decided: 07/30/2010
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
MATTHEW 
ROBERT FRAZIER,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Dion 
J. Custis, Dion J. Custis, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Rehurek.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
Appellant, 
Matthew Robert Frazier, entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count of 
possessing marijuana with the intent to deliver.  He reserved the right to appeal the 
district court's denial of his motion to suppress.  Mr. Frazier maintains that evidence 
obtained in the search of the vehicle should have been suppressed because no 
reasonable suspicion existed to detain him for a dog sniff of his vehicle 
following the conclusion of a traffic stop.  We find no error and 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 

[¶2]      
Mr. 
Frazier presents one issue: 

 
 
Did 
the trial court abuse its discretion and commit reversible error when it denied 
Mr. Frazier's motion to suppress?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
On 
October 7, 2008, at approximately 8:50 a.m., Mr. Frazier was traveling east on 
I-80 near Pine Bluffs, Wyoming.  A 
Wyoming Highway Patrol trooper was in his vehicle, parked in the median, when he 
observed the Frazier vehicle.  He 
was unable to view the state name on the rear plate of Mr. Frazier's vehicle 
because it was obstructed by a license plate bracket.  The trooper initiated a traffic stop, 
exited the patrol car, and approached Mr. Frazier's vehicle from the passenger 
side.  He advised Mr. Frazier of the 
reason for the stop.  

 
 

[¶4]        
As 
he spoke with Mr. Frazier, the trooper noticed a bottle of air freshener and two 
bottles of cologne on the front seat.  He also noticed an atlas open to a map of 
the state of California.  The 
trooper observed that Mr. Frazier's right leg was visibly shaking and that his 
arms and hands trembled nervously as he looked for his license and registration. 
 Mr. Frazier explained that he 
had been on a road trip to see the west, but was headed back to Tennessee to see 
his sick grandfather.  

 
 

[¶5]        
The 
trooper had Mr. Frazier join him in his patrol car while he verified the 
driver's license and wrote a warning.  The trooper noted that Mr. Frazier was 
extremely nervous, and continued shaking even after he was told he would only 
receive a warning.  While waiting 
for dispatch to report on the driver's license, the trooper asked Mr. Frazier 
about his travel plans.  Mr. Frazier 
said that he lived in Tennessee but drove to Reno for a road trip.  He had been in Reno for three days and 
had wanted to drive through Idaho on his way back home.  Mr. Frazier volunteered that his 
grandfather, who had been in assisted living, had become very ill.  Mr. Frazier said he had to cut his road 
trip short when he got the news, and was now on his way to see his dying 
grandfather.  

 
 

[¶6]        
The 
trooper issued a written warning and returned Mr. Frazier's license and 
registration.  As Mr. Frazier was 
walking back to his vehicle, the trooper inquired if he could ask a few more 
questions and Mr. Frazier agreed.  
The trooper asked additional questions about Mr. Frazier's travel 
plans.  He also asked if Mr. Frazier 
had any illegal drugs in the vehicle.  
Mr. Frazier replied that he did not, but his face turned "white" and 
"pale."  The trooper twice asked for 
Mr. Frazier's consent to search the vehicle.  Each time Mr. Frazier replied that he 
was in a hurry and had to be on his way.  
The trooper took this as a "no" and informed Mr. Frazier that he was 
within his rights to decline the search.  The trooper then advised Mr. Frazier that 
he suspected Mr. Frazier was transporting controlled substances and that he 
would be detained until a canine unit arrived and conducted an external sniff of 
the vehicle.  The trooper called for 
the canine unit at 9:00 a.m.  It 
arrived at 9:53 a.m.  The dog 
alerted to the presence of drugs in the vehicle.  A subsequent search of the vehicle 
revealed 22 pounds of marijuana and various other drug paraphernalia in the 
trunk.  

 
 

[¶7]        
Mr. 
Frazier was arrested and charged with possession of marijuana, in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(iii) (LexisNexis 2007), and possession of 
marijuana with the intent to deliver, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-7-1031(a)(ii).  He filed a motion 
to suppress alleging the trooper did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him 
while they waited for the canine unit to arrive.  The district court denied the 
motion.  Pursuant 
to a conditional guilty plea agreement, Mr. Frazier pled guilty to possession of 
marijuana with the intent to deliver and reserved the right to appeal the denial 
of his motion to suppress.  In 
exchange, the State dismissed the possession of marijuana charge.  Mr. Frazier was sentenced to two to 
four years of incarceration.  
Execution of the sentence was suspended, and Mr. Frazier was placed on 
three years of probation.  He filed 
this timely appeal.  

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶8]        
When 
reviewing a district court's decision on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer 
to the court's findings on factual issues unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  Lovato v. State, 2010 WY 38, ¶ 11, 228 P.3d 55, 57 (Wyo. 2010).  "We view 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court's decision 
because it is in the best position to assess the witnesses' credibility, weigh 
the evidence and make the necessary inferences, deductions and 
conclusions."  Leyva 
v. State, 
2009 WY 149, ¶ 9, 220 P.3d 791, 794 (Wyo. 2009).  
The constitutionality of a particular search or seizure, however, is a question 
of law that we review de novo.  Id. 

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶9]        
The 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the "right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures."  U.S. Const. amend. IV.1  A routine traffic stop constitutes a 
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment "even though the purpose of 
the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief." 
 Damato 
v. State, 
2003 
WY 13, ¶ 9, 64 P.3d 700, 704 (Wyo. 2003).  
When determining if a "seizure" was reasonable, we apply the two-step 
inquiry established in Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).  Under that inquiry, we must determine: 
1) whether the initial stop was justified, and 2) were the officer's actions 
during the detention "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that 
justified the interference in the first instance."  Wallace v. State, 2009 WY 152, ¶ 12, 221 P.3d 967, 970 (Wyo. 2009). 

 
 
Initial 
Stop

 
 

[¶10]     
Although 
Mr. Frazier describes the offending license plate bracket as a "minor 
infraction," he appears to concede that the obstructed license plate provided a 
valid basis for the traffic stop.  
He also does not take serious issue with the length of the initial 
stop.  He suggests that the 
trooper's questions, as he wrote out the traffic warning, were unreasonable 
because they were unrelated to the purpose of the stop. 

 
 

[¶11]     
We 
have previously recognized that:

 
 
During 
a routine traffic stop, a law enforcement officer may request the driver's proof 
of insurance, operating license, and vehicle registration, run a computer check, 
and issue a citation or warning.  
The officer may detain the driver and his vehicle only for the period of 
time reasonably necessary to complete these routine matters.  Once the driver has produced a valid 
driver's license and proof that he is entitled to operate the vehicle, he must 
be allowed to proceed without further delay.  During the stop, an officer generally 
may not ask the detained motorist questions unrelated to the purpose of the 
stop, including questions about controlled substances, unless the officer has 
reasonable suspicion of other illegal activity.

 
 

Campbell 
v. State, 
2004 WY 106, ¶ 12, 97 P.3d 781, 785 (Wyo. 2004) (internal citations 
omitted).  

 
 

[¶12]     
When 
the trooper initially approached the vehicle, he informed Mr. Frazier of the 
reason for the stop and briefly asked about his travel plans.  Once Mr. Frazier was in the patrol 
car, 
the trooper asked him where he had been on his road trip, how long he had been 
in Reno, and how long he had lived in Tennessee.  Mr. 
Frazier answered these questions and volunteered information about his sick 
grandfather.  The 
trooper 
followed up with two questions about the seriousness of the grandfather's 
condition.  Although these questions 
may not have been directly related to the obstructed license plate, the scope of 
the inquiry was not unreasonable under the circumstances.  We have recognized travel plans as an 
acceptable area of limited inquiry during a routine traffic stop.  Lovato, ¶ 27, 228 P.3d  at 61.  The trooper did not ask Mr. Frazier 
about illegal substances during this exchange.  The questioning also did not unreasonably 
delay the stop.  Mr. Frazier entered 
the patrol car at 8:52 a.m. and the trooper returned his license and 
registration along with the written warning at 8:56 a.m.  Considered in light of all the 
surrounding circumstances, the trooper's few questions relating to travel plans 
were not unreasonable.  Cf. O'Boyle, ¶¶ 7, 59, 117 P.3d  at 404, 417 
(holding an officer's extensive inquiry during initial stop, consisting of more 
than thirty questions which were almost all unrelated to the traffic stop, was 
unreasonable).

 
 
Consent 
to Additional Questioning

 
 

[¶13]     
While 
in the patrol car, the trooper issued a written warning and returned 
Mr. Frazier's driver's license and registration.  Mr. Frazier then exited the patrol car 
and the trooper initiated additional questioning.  Mr. Frazier contends that he did not 
voluntarily consent to the additional questioning and was, therefore, improperly 
detained by the trooper.  

 
 

[¶14]     
In 
determining whether consent is voluntary, we consider the totality of the 
circumstances including how law enforcement phrased the request, whether the 
officer told the individual that he could refuse the request, and the presence 
of other coercive factors.  Grant v. State, 2004 WY 45, ¶ 22, 88 P.3d 1016, 1021 (Wyo. 2004).  "We 
must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine 
whether a reasonable person would have felt free to decline the officers' 
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter."  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  

 
 

[¶15]     
When 
the trooper re-initiated contact with Mr. Frazier, he asked:  "Do you mind if I ask you a few more 
questions?"  Mr. Frazier replied: 
"Yeah, sure," and the trooper followed up by stating: "Just so you know you 
don't have to answer any more questions if you don't want to."  He directed Mr. Frazier to the side of 
the road, apparently for safety reasons, and asked additional questions.  He did not threaten Mr. Frazier or block 
his way.  Mr. Frazier does not 
identify the presence of any other coercive factors which may have affected his 
decision to answer more questions.  
Under these circumstances, a reasonable person would feel free to decline 
the trooper's requests. Indeed, Mr. Frazier declined the trooper's request to 
search the vehicle later in the conversation.  Because Mr. Frazier voluntarily 
consented to the questioning, he was not unlawfully detained during this stage 
of the stop.  

 
 
Detention 
until Canine Unit Arrived

 
 

[¶16]     
The 
State concedes that once the trooper asked for permission to search 
Mr. Frazier's car and he declined, the detention was no longer consensual 
and required reasonable suspicion.

 

The 
law is well settled that a law enforcement officer may detain a motorist if the 
officer has an objectively reasonable suspicion that the person is engaged in 
criminal activity.  Barch 
v. State, 
2004 
WY 79, ¶ 9, 92 P.3d 828, 832 (2004); Damato v. State, 2003 WY 13, ¶ 13, 64 P.3d 700, 706 
(2003); see also United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir. 
2001).  The existence of objectively 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is determined by evaluating the 
totality of the circumstances.  Damato, 
¶ 
16, 64 P.3d  at 707.  The "whole 
picture" must be considered; "[c]ommon sense and ordinary human experience are 
to be employed, and deference is to be accorded a law enforcement officer's 
ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions." Id. 
(citing United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 946 (10th Cir. 
1997)).

 
 

Leyva, 
¶ 12, 220 P.3d  at 794. 
 In 
determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion, we look to the totality of the circumstances and how those 
circumstances developed during the officer's encounter with the occupant of the 
vehicle.  
Sutton v. State, 2009 WY 148, ¶ 11, 
220 P.3d 784, 788 (Wyo. 2009). 

 
 

[¶17]     
At 
the hearing on Mr. Frazier's motion to suppress, the trooper testified about his 
experience and training: 

 
 
[Trooper]: 
. . . In 2004 I attended the first three stages of Desert Snow training. . . . 
It is geared specifically towards highway drug interdiction.  It covers all aspects of that. . . . It 
coversI guess it entails picking up and showing you the vehicle indicators that 
you might come across of somebody that's transporting these types of drugs, body 
behavior.  It talks about what these 
people might display. It covers interview and interrogation.  It also covers where to find these 
vehicles and search techniques.  Also covers courtroom testifying.  Kind of a broad training that covers 
several different aspects. . . . They willthey had examples set up of, like, 
cover[-]ups like air fresheners that are in the vehicle; things to look for such 
as multiple maps, multiple cell phones, luggage, and talking, possibly the lack 
thereof, just the general description of the vehicle, what the vehicle looks 
like.  It could be as specific as 
was the vehicle recently cleaned when every other vehicle is dirty; what that 
might eventually lead to and what that could possibly 
show.

 
 
[Prosecutor]: 
And then you mentioned that you received training on what to look for in the 
persons in those vehicles? 

 
 
A. 
Correct. 

 
 
Q. 
What are some of those things? 

 
 
A. 
Well, obviously, these people can't come out and tell you they're hauling an 
illegal amount of narcotics in the vehicle, who would?  Further, these people have to lie.  These classes are geared around what to 
look for in body language, and stories, and what has been seen in the past, and 
what typically hold[s] true to some person that's conducting these type[s] of 
activities. 

 
 
Q. 
When you say, "stories," what exactly do you mean? 

 
 
A. 
Obviously, "stories," I mean, there again, they can't tell you that they're 
hauling these drugs. They have to make up a story.  In these trainings they provide examples 
of reports and cases of things that have happened in the past, and typically, a 
lot of this stuff is redundant.  It 
happens over and over again.  Things 
to look for in how the person is telling you what he's doing. 

 
 
Q. 
And you mentioned interview and interrogation techniques that you're trained? 

 
 
A. 
Correct. 

 
 
Q. 
Specifically, what do you mean by that? 

 
 
A. 
Well, how to conduct the interview, and basically, for us at the highway patrol 
the interview is done in our vehicle on the side of the road.  It's not like you take somebody to a 
station and do that.  It is the 
interview and interrogation techniques that apply to us, [it] would be reading 
people's body language and trying to put together the totality of the story that 
they're telling you from what you see and how they're coming across and 
explaining this to you. 

 
 
Q. 
All right. And on body language, were you thinking of something in particular? 

 
 
A. 
Particularly, body language, the expressions on their face, their gesturing, 
their tone of voice.  Is their voice 
cracking? Are they trying to control their voice?  It's really pretty hard to lie, and 
especially, when you're in an uncomfortable position, possibly stopped on the 
side of the road, trying to put together a story and lie, it's not easy to do. 

 
 
Q. 
I meant to ask you, have you had experience out on the road stopping vehicles 
that eventually you discovered illegal drugs in them? 

 
 
A. 
I have. I don't have a concrete number, but since about approximately 2005 I 
have anywhere between 25 and 30 felony criminal drug interdiction stops. 

 
 
Q. 
And in those situations you employed your training and the knowledge that you 
learned in reading people, assessing their vehicle and their behaviors and 
applied that, and that turned out there was drugs? 

 
 
A. 
Correct. 

 
 

The 
trooper went on to testify regarding the specific facts of the traffic 
stop.  He was the only witness who 
testified at the hearing.  Relying 
on this testimony, the 
district court concluded that the totality of the circumstances created a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior sufficient to justify Mr. Frazier's 
detention until the canine unit arrived.

 
 

[¶18]     
The 
first factor cited by the district court in concluding the trooper had 
reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Frazier was the presence of air freshener and 
cologne in the vehicle.  The 
presence of odor suppressing agents, alone, does not give rise to reasonable 
suspicion, but can be a factor contributing to the totality of the 
circumstances.  Flood v. State, 2007 WY 167, ¶ 24, 169 P.3d 538, 546 (Wyo. 2007) (scent of cologne contributed to reasonable 
suspicion); Leyva, ¶ 13, 220 P.3d  at 
794 (strong odor of air freshener in car).  
The trooper testified that items such as cologne or air fresheners are 
often used to mask the odor of illegal drugs by those transporting them.  He testified that the presence of odor 
suppressing agents was a factor that aroused his suspicion.  We note that the trooper testified he 
had only observed the items.  He did 
not testify that he smelled the cologne or the air freshener.  We have recognized that the presence of 
odor suppressing items can be a factor contributing to reasonable suspicion, 
even if the items are not in use at the time of the stop.  See Sutton, ¶ 22, 220 P.3d  at 790 
(oven-cooking bags).  As 
the district court observed:

 
 
When 
the Trooper observed immediately on his approach to the car the presence of [air 
freshener] and cologne in it, he would certainly at least be more attuned to 
other indicia than he otherwise would be.  
There was no apparent reason for the odor-masking agents.  

 
 

[¶19]     
Mr. 
Frazier's extreme and prolonged nervousness was a second factor the district 
court relied upon in finding the trooper had reasonable suspicion.  Nervousness is generally considered of 
limited significance because it is not uncommon for most citizens, whether 
innocent or guilty, to exhibit signs of nervousness when confronted by a law 
enforcement officer.  Damato, ¶ 20, 64 P.3d  at 708.  "Extreme and continued nervousness, 
however, is entitled to somewhat more weight." 
 Id., ¶ 
21, 64 P.3d  at 708.  

 

[¶20]     
The 
trooper testified that "right off the bat . . . Mr. Frazier appeared to be 
considerably more nervous than the average person that [he] would come across or 
stop."  Mr. Frazier was notified 
that he would receive only a warning, but he continued to shake nervously.  The trooper observed that Mr. Frazier 
gestured wildly and moved his hands around while he was speaking.  During a lull in the conversation, Mr. 
Frazier continued to fidget in his seat.  
At one point, Mr. Frazier folded his hands between his legs, however the 
muscles in his arms continued to twitch.  The district court 
observed:

 
 
The 
cases indeed, as pointed out by [Mr.] Frazier in his brief, hold that the 
observation of nervousness is to be expected in a citizen-police encounter.  [The trooper's] observation was that 
even accounting for this, the level of shaking and agitation was unusual and it 
did not abate as normally it does when the subject is told that there will be 
only a warning.  There was no 
apparent reason for the condition observed.  

 
 
Mr. 
Frazier's extreme nervousness was a factor the district court could consider in 
determining whether the trooper had reasonable suspicion of illegal 
activity.  

 
 

[¶21]     
The 
district court also found that Mr. Frazier's inconsistent travel plans 
contributed to the trooper's reasonable suspicion.  "[U]nusual or inconsistent travel plans 
are a proper consideration in a reasonable suspicion analysis."  Sutton, ¶ 19, 220 P.3d  at 790.  The trooper stated he was suspicious 
because Mr. Frazier's travel plans seemed implausible.  Mr. Frazier stated that he left Reno last 
night meaning he would have driven 12-15 hours through the night, according to 
the trooper's calculation, to reach Laramie County by 8:00 a.m.  Mr. Frazier did not exhibit the kind of 
fatigue that the trooper would have expected from someone who drove through the 
night.  Mr. Frazier's story also 
changed several times.  When Mr. 
Frazier was answering questions in the patrol car, he told the trooper he 
learned about his grandfather's illness the night before, however, upon further 
questioning, he said he had learned about it three days earlier.  Mr. Frazier had a map open to California, 
yet never mentioned that state in his travel plans.  The trooper testified that the Reno area 
is a source for controlled substances and typically drugs travel from west to 
east.  He stated that he "put things 
together with the nervousness and the totality of the circumstances" and 
suspected that Mr. Frazier was transporting illegal drugs. 

 
 

[¶22]     
These 
factorsthe inconsistent travel plans, odor suppressing agents, the map open to 
California, and the persistent and extreme nervousnesswhen viewed individually 
could be seen as innocent.  As the 
district court stated: 

 
 
Application 
of the facts developed in the record to the law in this case as in most is fact 
intensive and nuanced.  It is so to 
the point that the lay person would see it as "hair-splitting". Each of the 
elements that make up the "totality of the circumstances" viewed alone seem[s] 
tenuous.  

 
 
The 
district court considered the trooper's training and experience in determining 
whether the totality of the circumstances amounted to reasonable 
suspicion:

  

The 
training and experience of the officer in a case like this includes his general 
knowledge of conditions.  It has 
been judicially noticed by the Wyoming Supreme Court that the place of this 
traffic stop is ". . . along a nationally recognized drug trafficking 
corridor."  O'Boyle v. State, 117 P.3d 401, 
411.  In this context, observations 
by an officer that might not otherwise reasonably be expected to arouse 
suspicion do so.  The odor-masking 
agents are a good example.  The 
Trooper's suspicion was reasonable in the totality of 
circumstances.

 
 
This 
conclusion is consistent with previous decisions in which we have said that each 
of the factors considered might be innocent, but under the totality of the 
circumstances test, individually innocuous factors can combine to arouse a 
reasonable suspicion for the experienced officer.  Leyva, ¶ 13, 220 P.3d at 794-95; Feeney v. State, 2009 WY 67, ¶ 22, 208 P.3d 50, 57 (Wyo. 2009).  We find no error in the district 
court's conclusion.

 
 
Length 
of Detention

 
 

[¶23]     
Lastly, 
Mr. Frazier asserts that the fifty-three minute wait for the canine unit to 
arrive was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  "The reasonableness of the detention is 
to be measured by whether the police acted diligently under all the 
circumstances of the case and whether the detention involved delay unnecessary 
to a legitimate police inquiry."  State v. Welch, 873 P.2d 601, 605 (Wyo. 
1994).  The trooper called for the 
canine unit immediately after informing Mr. Frazier that he was detained.  The canine handler, who responded from 
his home, lived north of Cheyenne and had to travel a distance of approximately 
48 miles to reach the trooper's location.  
The record does not reflect any delay in requesting or responding to the 
call for the canine unit and Mr. Frazier suggests none.  We have previously found that similar 
waiting times did not violate the Fourth Amendment.  See id. at 605 (fifty-minute detention 
while canine unit was transported approximately 31 miles was reasonable).  Mr. Frazier's detention while the canine 
unit was dispatched to his location was not unreasonable given the totality of 
the circumstances.

 
 

[¶24]     
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Mr. Frazier also 
asserts that his detention violated his rights under Art. 1, § 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.  He has failed, 
however, to provide a "precise, analytically sound" approach required for this 
Court to undertake an independent state constitutional analysis.  Leyva, 
¶ 11, 220 P.3d  at 794.  We therefore decline to consider the 
issue further.  We note Mr. 
Frazier's argument is very similar to the one we refused to consider in Leyva ("Essentially, Leyva's argument 
is disjointed and consists of little more than a recitation and summary of 
passages from Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476 (Wyo. 1999), 
and O'Boyle v. State, 2005 
WY 83, 117 P.3d 401 (Wyo. 2005), and an assertion, unsupported by any cogent 
analysis, that his continued detention was constitutionally unreasonable.  We therefore decline to consider 
it.").  Id.