Title: KIMBERLY K. RAGSDALE V. HARTFORD UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

KIMBERLY K. RAGSDALE V. HARTFORD UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY2007 WY 163169 P.3d 78Case Number: 06-130Decided: 10/17/2007
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
KIMBERLY 
K. RAGSDALE,Appellant(Cross-Claim 
Plaintiff),v.HARTFORD UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE 
COMPANY,Appellee(Cross-Claim Defendant).

 
 
Appeal from theDistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Ronald 
E. Triggs of the Law Office of Ronald E. Triggs, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Scott P. 
Klosterman of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, Wyoming

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Kimberly Ragsdale 
was involved in an automobile accident with an uninsured motorist.  At the time of the accident, Ragsdale 
was covered under a personal automobile insurance policy issued by The Hartford 
Underwriters Insurance Company.  
Ragsdale received $45,000 from The Hartford for her bodily injury and 
uninsured motorist claim under the policy and another $30,000 from a settlement 
with a third party in an independent suit arising out of the accident.  The Hartford asserted a subrogation claim for the 
entire $30,000 settlement amount.  
Ragsdale objected, and the instant action ensued.  The district court granted summary 
judgment to The Hartford on its subrogation claim, awarding The Hartford the 
entire $30,000.  

 
 
[¶2]      After the summary 
judgment order was entered, Ragsdale filed what she titled a "Motion to Alter or 
Amend Pursuant to Rule 59(e), W.R.C.P."1  In the motion Ragsdale argued the 
district court had misconstrued the law in refusing to allow her to at least 
retain the reasonable litigation expenses she incurred in generating the $30,000 
settlement proceeds.  The district 
court denied her motion.  Ragsdale 
then appealed both the grant of summary judgment in favor of The Hartford and 
the denial of her "Motion to Alter or Amend."  

 
 
[¶3]      This Court finds 
Ragsdale's "Motion to Alter or Amend" did not comply with W.R.C.P. 59(e).  Consequently, the motion did not toll 
the time for filing the notice of appeal.  
Ragsdale's delay in filing her notice of appeal until after the entry of 
the order denying her "Motion to Alter or Amend" resulted in her notice of 
appeal not being filed within thirty (30) days of the entry of the appealable 
order  the order granting summary judgment to The Hartford  as required by 
W.R.A.P. 2.01(a).2  The failure to timely file a notice of 
appeal deprives this Court of jurisdiction to hear the appeal.  W.R.A.P. 1.03.3  Because this Court never acquired 
jurisdiction over this appeal, this appeal is dismissed.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶4]      This Court is 
obligated to ensure it has jurisdiction over every appeal coming before it.  Birkle v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Safety and Compensation Div., 2007 WY 9, ¶ 2, 150 P.3d 187, 189 (Wyo. 2007); 
Plymale v. Donnelly, 2006 WY 3, ¶ 4, 
125 P.3d 1022, 1023 (Wyo. 2006); Paxton 
Resources, L.L.C. v. Brannaman, 2004 WY 93, ¶ 17, 95 P.3d 796, 802 (Wyo. 
2004).  In this appeal, the decisive 
issue is the categorization of Ragsdale's "Motion to Alter or Amend."  With the exception of motions 
denominated as motions for reconsideration, which are automatically void, this 
Court looks to the substance of a motion in order to determine the 
appropriateness of the motion.  See Plymale, ¶ 6, 125 P.3d  at 1024; Morehouse v. Morehouse, 959 P.2d 179 
(Wyo. 1998); Sherman v. Rose, 943 P.2d 719, 721 (Wyo. 1997).  

 
 
[¶5]      As noted above, 
in her "Motion to Alter or Amend" Ragsdale requested the district court alter or 
amend its order on summary judgment to reflect that she was entitled to retain 
out of the $30,000 settlement funds reasonable expenses incurred in prosecuting 
her claim against the third party.  
A Rule 59(e) motion is only appropriate if one of three grounds exists: 
1) the availability of new evidence not previously available; 2) an intervening 
change in controlling law, or 3) the need to correct a clear error of law 
or to prevent manifest injustice.  
Dudley v. Franklin, 983 P.2d 1223, 1227 (Wyo. 1999); Morehouse 959 P.2d  at 181; Sherman, 943 P.2d  
at 721.  It is not a mechanism to 
relitigate issues that the court has already decided, nor should parties make 
additional arguments which should have been made before judgment.  Sherman, 943 P.2d  
at 721.  

 
 
[¶6]      The record 
reveals that Ragsdale presented to the district court the same argument as she 
presented in her "Motion to Alter or Amend" in both her memorandum of law in 
opposition to The Hartford's motion for summary judgment and during oral 
argument at the hearing on the same.  
The main case relied upon by Ragsdale in her "Motion to Alter or Amend" 
is Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Huntley, 78 
Wyo. 380, 328 P.2d 569 (Wyo. 1958), in which this 
Court, in granting a subrogation claim but allowing the insured to retain 
reasonable costs of litigation, stated:

 
 
In the 
Pennsylvania case above mentioned [Illinois Automobile Ins. Exch. v. Braun, 
280 Pa. 550, 124 A. 691, 692, 36 A.L.R. 1262 
(Pa. 1924)], 
the court held that the insured was not entitled to deduct from the amount 
recovered any attorney's fee or expenses.  
We hardly think that to be just.  
It is said in Annotation, 36 A.L.R. 1267, 1270:

 
 
The 
general rule is that the insured may retain out of the fund recovered from the 
wrongdoer, after the payment of the policy, the costs and reasonable expenses 
incurred in the litigation, for it would be unjust to require him to incur 
expenses for the recovery of money for the benefit of the insurer, without being 
allowed to reimburse himself.

 
 
Furthermore, 
Welch [the agent of the insurance company] agreed that an attorney's fee should 
be paid.  

 
 

Huntley, 78 
Wyo. at 
394-95, 328 P.2d  at 575.  In her 
memorandum of law in opposition to The Hartford's motion for summary judgment, 
Ragsdale stated: 

 
 
Assuming 
arguendo that the Hartford is entitled to a 
subrogation for amounts it paid to Ragsdale, those amounts must be reduced by 
attorney fees, costs and disbursements.  
The Hartford is not entitled to 100% reimbursement. 

 
 
Since 
1958, the Wyoming Supreme Court has adopted the rule that, " the insured may 
retain out of the fund recovered from the wrongdoer, after the payment of the 
policy, the costs and reasonable expenses incurred in the litigation, for it 
would be unjust to require him to incur expenses for the recovery of money for 
the benefit of the insurer, without being allowed to reimburse himself," Iowa Nat'l Mutual Ins. Co. v. Huntley, 
328 P.2d 569 (Wyo. 1958), at 395 [sic], citing Annotation, 36 A.L.R. 1267, 1270. 
. . .  This is the lead case in 
Wyoming on 
this issue and has not been overturned in the last 47 years.  

 
 
Memorandum 
at 16-17.  At the hearing on The 
Hartford's motion for summary judgment, Ragsdale's attorney argued: 

 
 
            
Moreover, Your Honor, there is clear law that this Court has applied many 
times in my experience that deals with the requirements of the Iowa Mutual Insurance Company [sic] 
case.  A subrogor cannot recover 
more than they are [sic] insured recovers.  
Their insured recovers a dollar amount less the attorney's fees, costs, 
and disbursements. 

 
 
[¶7]      As is obvious, 
what Ragsdale titled a Rule 59(e) motion was nothing more than a motion to 
reconsider.  "When a motion to alter 
or amend a judgment does not articulate a new ground which could not have been 
brought during the action and upon which the trial court should utter a 
different ruling, then it is, in essence, a motion to reconsider."  Morehouse, 959 P.2d  at 181.  Motions to reconsider are not recognized 
in Wyoming.  
Plymale, ¶ 5, 125 P.3d  at 
1023-24 (motions for reconsideration are nullities).  

 
 
[¶8]      Needless to say, 
the void motion did not toll the time for appeal.  Thus, Ragsdale was required to file her 
notice of appeal within thirty (30) days of the entry of the order granting 
summary judgment to The Hartford.  
That order was entered on February 8, 2006.  The notice of appeal was filed on March 
31, 2006, fifty-one days later.  
Because Ragsdale failed to properly invoke the jurisdiction of this 
Court, this appeal is dismissed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1W.R.C.P. 
59(e) states:

 
 
(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. -- 
Any motion to alter or amend a judgment shall be filed no later than 10 days 
after entry of the judgment.

 
 

2Rule 2.01(a) 
states in pertinent part:

 
 
(a) An 
appeal from a trial court to an appellate court shall be taken by filing the 
notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days from entry of 
the appealable order . . . .

            

3Rule 1.03 
states in pertinent part:

 
 
The timely filing of a 
notice of appeal, which complies with Rule 2.07(a), is 
jurisdictional.