Title: The Florida Bar v. Odiator Arugu

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC21-933 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR, 
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
ODIATOR ARUGU, 
Respondent. 
 
November 10, 2022 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review a referee’s report recommending that 
Respondent, Odiator Arugu, be found guilty of professional 
misconduct in violation of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar 
(Bar Rules), and that he be suspended from the practice of law for 
sixty days as a sanction for his misconduct.  We have jurisdiction.  
See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  For the reasons discussed below, we 
approve the referee’s findings of fact and recommendations as to 
guilt, except as to Bar Rule 4-3.4(a), which we disapprove.  We also 
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disapprove the referee’s recommended discipline and instead 
suspend Arugu from the practice of law for ninety-one days. 
BACKGROUND 
Arugu represented George Rodriguez in his divorce 
proceedings.  Rodriguez’s father-in-law claimed that he owned a 
50% undivided interest in the marital home.  On May 13, 2020, 
Arugu prepared and filed with the circuit court a Notice of 
Production from Non-Party Freedom Mortgage Corporation 
(Freedom), along with a proposed subpoena duces tecum.  The 
proposed subpoena listed seven sets of records Arugu wanted 
Freedom to produce pertaining to Rodriguez’s wife and father-in-
law.  After the ten-day period to serve an objection to the proposed 
subpoena expired,1 Arugu served a modified version of the 
subpoena on Freedom, seeking the production of three additional 
sets of records.  Specifically, Arugu sought credit check reports and 
mortgage loan applications for Rodriguez’s wife and father-in-law, 
and any power of attorney executed by Rodriguez’s father-in-law.  In 
 
1.  Under Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.351(b) 
(Production of Documents and Things Without Deposition) 
(Procedure), a party may serve an objection to production under the 
rule within ten days of service of the notice. 
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a January 4, 2021, sworn statement in the Bar disciplinary case, 
Arugu explained that after the ten-day period to serve an objection 
expired, when he was about to issue the subpoena, it occurred to 
him that he did not request those records and decided to include 
them in the subpoena. 
On May 27, 2020, Arugu filed with the circuit court a copy of 
the modified subpoena that he served on Freedom.  Wade Luther, 
who represented Rodriguez’s wife, emailed a letter to Arugu the 
same day, objecting to the “materially and substantially different” 
subpoena Arugu served on Freedom compared to the one he had 
noticed two weeks earlier.  Luther demanded that Arugu withdraw 
the subpoena.  Arugu responded to Luther’s email stating that the 
modified subpoena was not materially and substantially different 
than the noticed one, and he asked Luther for a clarification of the 
rules and to support his position in respect to the subpoena.  Arugu 
did not contact Freedom to withdraw the modified subpoena, and 
Freedom ultimately produced some records in response to the 
subpoena. 
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In an order dated September 25, 2020, the circuit court later 
found that Arugu had improperly sent a subpoena to Freedom that 
was a different version of the one he provided notice of. 
The referee found that because Arugu failed to provide notice 
that he was seeking the additional records in the subpoena, he 
failed to give interested parties who were served with the subpoena 
an opportunity to object to the production of the additional records. 
The referee recommends that Arugu be found guilty of 
violating Bar Rules 3-4.3 (Misconduct and Minor Misconduct); 
4-3.4(a) (a lawyer must not unlawfully obstruct another party’s 
evidence or otherwise unlawfully alter, destroy, or conceal a 
document or other material that the lawyer knows or reasonably 
should know is relevant to a pending or a reasonably foreseeable 
proceeding); 4-3.4(c) (a lawyer must not knowingly disobey an 
obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal 
based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists); 4-3.4(d) (a 
lawyer must not make a frivolous discovery request or intentionally 
fail to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing 
party); 4-4.1(a) (in the course of representing a client, a lawyer must 
not make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person); 
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4-8.4(c) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); and 4-8.4(d) (a lawyer shall not 
engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice). 
The referee recommends that Arugu be suspended from the 
practice of law for sixty days and that he be assessed the Bar’s 
costs.  Both Arugu and the Bar filed notices of intent to seek review 
of the referee’s report.  Arugu challenges the recommendation that 
he be found guilty of violating Bar Rules 4-3.4, 4-4.1, and 4-8.4(c), 
as well as the recommended sanction.  The Bar challenges the 
recommended sanction. 
ANALYSIS 
A. The Referee’s Recommendation as to Guilt 
First, Arugu challenges the referee’s findings of fact and 
recommendations of guilt as to Bar Rules 4-3.4, 4-4.1, and 4-8.4(c). 
If a referee’s findings of fact are supported by competent, 
substantial evidence in the record, this Court will not reweigh the 
evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the referee.  Fla. 
Bar v. Gwynn, 94 So. 3d 425, 428 (Fla. 2012); see Fla. Bar v. 
Barrett, 897 So. 2d 1269, 1275 (Fla. 2005).  The referee’s factual 
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findings must be sufficient under the applicable rules to support 
the recommendations regarding guilt.  See Fla. Bar v. Shoureas, 913 
So. 2d 554, 557-58 (Fla. 2005); Fla. Bar v. Spear, 887 So. 2d 1242, 
1245 (Fla. 2004).  The party challenging the referee’s finding of fact 
and recommendations as to guilt has the burden to demonstrate 
“that there is no evidence in the record to support those findings or 
that the record evidence clearly contradicts the conclusions.”  Fla. 
Bar v. Germain, 957 So. 2d 613, 620 (Fla. 2007). 
Bar Rule 4-3.4(a) 
Under Bar Rule 4-3.4(a), a lawyer must not “unlawfully 
obstruct another party’s access to evidence or otherwise unlawfully 
alter, destroy, or conceal a document or other material that the 
lawyer knows or reasonably should know is relevant to a pending or 
a reasonably foreseeable proceeding; nor counsel or assist another 
person to do any such act.”  R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-3.4(a).  The 
referee made no findings that Arugu obstructed others’ access to 
evidence; unlawfully modified, destroyed, or concealed a document 
or other material; or that he counseled or assisted another person 
to do any such act.  There are thus insufficient findings to support 
the referee’s recommendation that Arugu be found guilty of violating 
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rule 4-3.4(a).  See Shoureas, 913 So. 2d at 557-58.  Accordingly, we 
disapprove the referee’s recommendation of guilt as to Bar Rule 
4-3.4(a). 
Bar Rule 4-3.4(c) 
Bar Rule 4-3.4(c) states that a lawyer must not “knowingly 
disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal.”  R. Regulating 
Fla. Bar 4-3.4(c).  Under Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 
12.351(a) (Production of Documents and Things Without 
Deposition), a party may seek the production of documents and 
things from a nonparty by issuance of a subpoena.  The party 
desiring the production must serve all other parties with notice of 
the intent to serve the subpoena, and the proposed subpoena must 
be attached to the notice.  See Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.351(b).  If no 
objection is made, the issued subpoena must be “identical” to the 
proposed subpoena attached to the notice.  See Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 
12.351(c).  Here, the record clearly supports the referee’s finding, 
and Arugu does not dispute, that the subpoena he served on 
Freedom was different from the one he attached to his notice of 
intent to serve the subpoena.  Arugu explained that after the ten-
day period for objecting to the proposed subpoena expired, he 
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realized that he had failed to include certain records in the 
proposed subpoena and decided to include them in the subpoena 
he was about to serve on Freedom, nonetheless.  We find that in 
knowingly serving Freedom with a different subpoena than the one 
attached to the notice served on the other parties, Arugu knowingly 
flouted an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, in violation of 
Bar Rule 4-3.4(c). 
Bar Rule 4-3.4(d) 
Bar Rule 4-3.4(d) states that a lawyer must not “in pretrial 
procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or intentionally fail to 
comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing 
party.”  R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-3.4(d).  In Florida Bar v. Broida, 
574 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1991), we found that the respondent, who 
among other things filed a subpoena requesting records previously 
requested and objected to, violated Bar Rule 4-3.4(d) and others. 
Here, Arugu testified that he did not actually send the 
modified subpoena to Freedom until after Luther advised him of his 
objection.  In fact, Luther requested that Arugu not serve the 
modified subpoena if he had not yet done so, or that he contact 
Freedom to advise it that the subpoena was withdrawn.  Arugu 
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declined to do both.  Arugu also could have filed an amended notice 
of intent to serve subpoena, with the amended subpoena attached, 
and waited ten additional days before he served the modified 
subpoena.  He chose not to.  Arugu proceeded to serve the modified 
subpoena despite the known objection and without advising 
Freedom of the objection.  We find that knowingly serving a 
subpoena on Freedom seeking items for which he did not provide 
proper notice to the other parties, and which he knew opposing 
counsel objected to, without first having the court resolve the issue 
constituted a frivolous discovery request.  We find the record 
supports the referee’s finding of fact and that such findings are 
sufficient to support the recommendation that Arugu violated Bar 
Rule 4.3.4(d). 
Bar Rules 4-4.1 and 4-8.4(c) 
Bar Rule 4-4.1 states that in the course of representing a 
client, a lawyer shall not knowingly “make a false statement of 
material fact or law to a third person.”  R. Regulating Fla. Bar 
4-4.1(a).  Partially true but misleading statements as well as 
omissions can constitute a misrepresentation, in violation of Bar 
Rule 4-4.1.  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-4.1, cmt; Fla. Bar v. Scott, 
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39 So. 3d 309, 317 (Fla. 2010) (finding the respondent’s failure to 
tell a third party about several pieces of information violated Bar 
Rule 4-4.1(a) even though the withheld information “was public and 
nonconfidential”).  Similarly, Bar Rule 4-8.4(c) states that a lawyer 
shall “not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation.”  R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-8.4(c). 
Here, the evidence shows that after Arugu filed a copy of the 
modified subpoena, Luther emailed Arugu, objecting to the 
subpoena on grounds that it was materially and substantially 
different from the version that Arugu had filed on May 13, 2020, 
and requesting that Arugu not serve the modified subpoena, if he 
had not done so, or that he contact Freedom to withdraw the 
subpoena.  Under Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.351(b), when a 
party gives notice of a request for the production of records and 
things and another party serves an objection to the production 
within ten days of service of the notice, the records or things must 
not be produced pending resolution of the objection.  Instead, 
however, Arugu proceeded to serve the modified subpoena despite 
being aware of the objection.  The modified subpoena was delivered 
on June 4, 2020, less than ten days after Arugu filed a copy of the 
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modified subpoena with the circuit court.  He failed to inform 
Freedom of Luther’s objection, thereby misrepresenting to Freedom 
that it was required to produce all records listed on the subpoena.  
As a result, Freedom produced many of the requested documents. 
Arugu argues he did not engage in intentional misconduct.  
However, the intent element can be satisfied merely by showing that 
the conduct was deliberate or knowing.  See Fla. Bar v. Head, 27 
So. 3d 1, 9 (Fla. 2010).  Clearly, Arugu was aware that the modified 
subpoena was substantially different from the one attached to his 
notice.  He was also aware of the objection to the modified 
subpoena before he actually served the subpoena.  Therefore, we 
find that the record clearly supports a finding that Arugu knowingly 
engaged in dishonest and deceitful conduct in violation of rules 
4-4.1 and 4-8.4(c). 
Accordingly, we approve the referee’s findings of fact and 
recommendations of guilt, except as to Bar Rule 4-3.4(a), which we 
disapprove. 
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B. Discipline 
We now turn to the referee’s recommended discipline, a sixty-
day suspension.  In reviewing a referee’s recommended discipline, 
this Court’s scope of review is broader than that afforded to the 
referee’s findings of fact because, ultimately, it is this Court’s 
responsibility to order the appropriate sanction.  See Fla. Bar v. 
Picon, 205 So. 3d 759, 765 (Fla. 2016); Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 538 
So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989); see also art. V, § 15, Fla. Const. 
The referee recommended a sixty-day suspension, finding that 
Arugu’s conduct was not as egregious as in other cases relied on by 
the Bar, including Florida Bar v. Berthiaume, 78 So. 3d 503 (Fla. 
2011).  We agree with the referee that a suspension is the 
appropriate sanction in this case.  See Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. 
Sancs. 6.2(b) (“Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly 
violates a court order or rule and causes injury or potential injury 
to client or a party or causes interference or potential interference 
with a legal proceeding.”); 7.1(b) (“Suspension is appropriate when a 
lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty 
owed as a professional and causes injury or potential injury to a 
client, the public, or the legal system.”).  Arugu knowingly served 
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Freedom with a modified version of the subpoena that he had filed 
with the circuit court, even after Luther advised him that he should 
not do so.  As a result, interested parties did not have the 
opportunity to object to the production of the additional records, 
which Freedom ultimately produced in response to the modified 
subpoena.  However, we disagree with the referee’s conclusion that 
Arugu’s conduct was not sufficiently egregious to warrant a more 
severe sanction. 
In Berthiaume, the respondent was suspended for ninety-one 
days for violating Bar Rules 4-8.4(c) and 4-8.4(d) after she served a 
fraudulent subpoena on a bank, outside the context of litigation 
and without legal authority, in an effort to conduct her own 
personal investigation into a client’s private finances.  78 So. 3d at 
511.  We noted then that such dishonest conduct “demonstrates 
the utmost disrespect for the court and is destructive to the legal 
system as a whole.”  Id. at 510. 
While Arugu issued his subpoena in the context of an ongoing 
litigation, his conduct is just as egregious as that at issue in 
Berthiaume.  Arugu served the modified subpoena on Freedom even 
though opposing counsel advised him that doing so was improper 
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and asked him to not serve the modified subpoena.  Arugu claims 
he served the modified subpoena despite the objection because 
opposing counsel did not give a basis for the objection.  However, 
Arugu, who was admitted to the Bar in 1995, could have conducted 
his own research to determine whether he was in compliance with 
the rules of procedure.  Instead, he knowingly disregarded the 
objection and served the subpoena on Freedom with no mention of 
the objection.  We conclude that Arugu’s dishonest behavior 
warrants a ninety-one-day suspension; it demonstrates disrespect 
for the court and is destructive to the legal system as a whole. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, we approve the referee’s findings of fact and 
recommendations as to guilt, except for the recommendation that 
Arugu be found guilty of violating Bar Rule 4-3.4(a), which we 
disapprove.  We disapprove the referee’s recommended sanction 
and instead suspend Arugu from the practice of law for ninety-one 
days.  The suspension will be effective thirty days from the filing of 
this opinion so that Arugu can close out his practice and protect 
the interests of existing clients.  If Arugu notifies this Court in 
writing that he is no longer practicing and does not need the thirty 
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days to protect existing clients, this Court will enter an order 
making the suspension effective immediately.  Arugu shall fully 
comply with Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-5.1(h).  Arugu shall 
also fully comply with Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-6.1, if 
applicable.  In addition, Arugu shall accept no new business from 
the date this opinion is filed until he is reinstated.  Arugu is further 
directed to comply with all other terms and conditions of the report. 
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson 
Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from 
Odiator Arugu in the amount of $3,098.57, for which sum let 
execution issue. 
It is so ordered. 
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, POLSTON, LABARGA, COURIEL, and 
GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. 
FRANCIS, J., did not participate. 
 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER 
THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION. 
 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar 
 
Joshua E. Doyle, Executive Director, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, 
Florida, Patricia Ann Toro Savitz, Staff Counsel, The Florida Bar, 
Tallahassee, Florida, and Daniel James Quinn, Bar Counsel, The 
Florida Bar, Orlando, Florida; and Tiffany A. Roddenberry, Kevin W. 
Cox, and Kathryn Isted of Holland & Knight LLP, Tallahassee, 
Florida, 
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for Complainant 
 
Barry W. Rigby of Law Offices of Barry Rigby, P.A., Winter Park, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent