Title: In re Adoption of G.V.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In 
re Adoption of G.V., Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-4879.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-4879 
IN RE ADOPTION OF G.V. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as In re Adoption of G.V., Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-4879.] 
Motion for reconsideration denied. 
(No. 2009-2355 — Submitted September 14, 2010 — Decided October 7, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, No. L-09-1160, 
2009-Ohio-6338. 
ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
__________________ 
{¶ 1} On July 22, 2010, the court affirmed the judgment of the court of 
appeals in this case.  In re Adoption of G.V., 126 Ohio St.3d 249, 2010-Ohio-
3349, 933 N.E.2d 245. 
{¶ 2} Appellants, Jason and Christy Vaughn, have filed a motion for 
reconsideration. 
{¶ 3} The motion for reconsideration is denied.  The stay issued in this 
case on September 28, 2010, is lifted. 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
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BROWN, C.J., and LANZINGER and CUPP, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., concurring. 
{¶ 4} I concur in the majority’s decision to deny the motion for 
reconsideration, for the following reasons. 
{¶ 5} In a series of paternity and adoption decisions involving issues of 
statutory interpretation, this court has charted a course to guide juvenile, family, 
and probate court judges who confront difficult, emotional, and significantly 
consequential questions in trying to decide which party ought to have care and 
custody of minor children. 
{¶ 6} The separation of children from family members is a matter of 
grave consequence with lasting implication.  While we endeavor to utilize our 
individual and collective best judgment in resolving cases, differences of opinion 
have divided our court as we interpret R.C. Chapter 3107, specifically, R.C. 
3107.06 and 3107.07.  Although our opinions have provided a framework for 
judges to follow, questions still exist in this difficult area of law. 
{¶ 7} Our decision in In re Adoption of Pushcar, 110 Ohio St.3d 332, 
2006-Ohio-4572, 853 N.E.2d 647, directs that when an issue concerning parenting 
of a minor is pending in a juvenile court, a probate court must refrain from 
proceeding with the adoption of that child.  That holding affords litigants an 
opportunity to present a case to the juvenile court in a timely fashion and affords 
the juvenile court a reasonable opportunity to adjudicate the matter without regard 
to the pendency of a related matter in the probate court, thus avoiding the 
circumstance of a race to judgment in different courts. 
{¶ 8} In the instant matter, we confront a related question where a 
litigant has timely registered with the Putative Father Registry and timely filed a 
petition in juvenile court to establish parentage of his minor child.  Subsequent to 
filing that complaint in the juvenile court, the prospective adoptive parents filed a 
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petition for adoption in the probate court.  Although the putative father asked the 
juvenile court to determine whether he is the biological father, the prospective 
adoptive parents alleged in probate court that as a putative father, he failed to 
meet statutory obligations for support, and hence, his consent to adoption was not 
necessary.  The probate court stayed the adoption proceeding pursuant to 
Pushcar, pending the paternity determination in the juvenile court.  Thereafter, 
the juvenile court ruled that Benjamin Wyrembek is the biological father of G.V., 
and the probate court then lifted its stay and adjudicated the adoption petition.  
The probate court deemed Wyrembek to be the legal father, although it also 
recognized him as a putative father at the time of the filing of the adoption 
petition.  The court held that R.C. 3107.07(B) no longer applied and ruled that 
since one year had not expired since the paternity finding, it could not be shown 
that Wyrembek’s consent was not required for the adoption. 
{¶ 9} Thus, the facts present this court with a situation in which a 
putative father timely registers with the Putative Father Registry and files a 
complaint for determination of parentage in the juvenile court, the prospective 
adoptive parents file a petition for adoption in the probate court while the 
parentage action is pending in the juvenile court, and the probate court stays that 
adoption awaiting a determination from the juvenile court. 
{¶ 10} The parties to the adoption proceeding assert that different 
statutory provisions should be applied to ascertain whether Wyrembek’s consent 
is necessary for the pending adoption.  The prospective adoptive parents urge that 
R.C. 3107.07(B)(2)(b) and (c) apply because they assert Wyrembek was a 
putative father when they filed the adoption petition.  Those sections provide that 
the consent of a putative father is not required if he has willfully abandoned or 
failed to care for and support the minor or has willfully abandoned the mother of 
the child during her pregnancy and up to the time she surrendered the child or 
placed the child in petitioner’s home. Wyrembek contends that R.C. 3107.07(A) 
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applies because the juvenile court found him to be the biological father of G.V. 
and he has not failed to communicate with G.V. or provide maintenance and 
support for a period of at least one year preceding the filing of the adoption 
petition.  Our decision in In re Adoption of Sunderhaus (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 
127, 585 N.E.2d 418, directs courts to calculate the one year from the date 
paternity is established. 
{¶ 11} The issue dividing our court is whether for purposes of the 
statutory consent requirement, the status of the father can change - from putative 
to biological - after the petition for adoption is filed or whether that status is fixed 
as of the date petitioner files the adoption  petition.  This seems to me to be settled 
by our case authority.  This question is critical to the parties in this case, because 
as a putative father, the prospective adoptive parents assert they would prevail 
because Wyrembek failed to comply with R.C. 3107.07(B)(2)(b) and (c).  But 
because the juvenile court has determined Wyrembek to be G.V.’s biological 
father, R.C. 3107.07(A) specifies when consent of a biological father is required, 
and that statute, for whatever reason, does not contain the obligation of a putative 
father not to willfully abandon or fail to care for and support the minor or 
willfully abandon the mother during her pregnancy and until she surrenders the 
minor or the minor is placed in the home of the petitioner.  Accordingly, 
Wyrembek maintains that his consent to adoption is necessary and he would 
prevail if R.C. 3107.07(A) applies. 
{¶ 12} It is apparent to me that the General Assembly is aware of our 
decisions in this area.  Following Sunderhaus, 63 Ohio St.3d 127, 585 N.E.2d 
418, where we clarified that a putative father had no duty to support a mother or 
minor child, the legislature enacted a statutory duty for a putative father and 
provided that if such support was not demonstrated, his consent for adoption was 
not required.  However, it never incorporated an obligation on a biological father 
to support a mother during pregnancy and provided that a biological father’s 
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consent was necessary unless support and communication had not been provided 
for at least one year. 
{¶ 13} The father of a child who registers with the Putative Father 
Registry in a timely fashion and who pursues a juvenile court determination of 
parentage cannot control either the timing of the juvenile court’s decision or the 
timing of the filing of a petition to adopt by prospective adoptive parents.  I would 
urge juvenile courts to give priority to parentage cases and decide them with 
dispatch.  I would also encourage the General Assembly to carefully scrutinize 
our caselaw and revisit these statutes to clarify its intent if contrary to our result. 
{¶ 14} We are not a policy-making branch of government, as we are not 
structured to weigh considerations of interest groups or to conduct public hearings 
on this matter.  Rather, our responsibilities are only to decide disputed questions 
of fact and interpret and apply the law as enacted by the General Assembly.  In 
accord with our role to interpret statutes, it is apparent to me that for purposes of 
consent to adoption, a biological father has no statutory duty to care for and 
support a minor other than that required by R.C. 3107.07(A) or to care or support 
the mother of a minor during pregnancy or up to the time of placement. 
{¶ 15} Accordingly, I agree with the court’s decision to deny 
reconsideration in this case. 
__________________ 
 
Voorhees & Levy, L.L.C., and Michael R. Voorhees, for appellants. 
McQuades Co., L.P.A., and Alan J. Lehenbauer, for appellee, Benjamin 
Wyrembek. 
Susan Garner Eisenman and Mary Beck, urging reconsideration on behalf 
of amicus curiae, American Academy of Adoption Attorneys. 
______________________