Title: State v. Doyen

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Doyen  (94-627); 165 Vt 43; 676 A.2d 345

[Opinion Filed 15-Mar-1996]

  NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 No. 94-627


State of Vermont                                  Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
     v.                                            District Court of Vermont,
                                                  Unit No. 1, Bennington Circuit

Phillip J. Doyen                                  November Term, 1995


Robert Grussing III, J.

       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Susan R. Harritt, Assistant
  Attorney General, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellant

       Robert M. Paolini of Martin & Paolini, Barre, for defendant-appellee


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.

       JOHNSON, J.  In this case, we decide whether Vermont has jurisdiction
  to prosecute the offense of custodial interference, 13 V.S.A. § 2451, where
  the defendant commits no act within Vermont.  The trial court dismissed the
  charge against defendant, reasoning that the alleged conduct took place in
  New Hampshire, Hawaii, and other states, but not in Vermont. The State
  contends that where the child and the child's lawful custodian are
  residents of Vermont, Vermont retains jurisdiction to prosecute the
  offense, regardless of where the child is held or kept by defendant.  We
  reverse the trial court's dismissal and reinstate the charge against
  defendant.

                                     I.

       The parties stipulated to the following facts.  Defendant exercised
  his visitation rights under a court order and, with the permission of the
  custodial parent, obtained custody of his daughter in Vermont on June 30,
  1994.  The visitation period ended on July 17, 1994, but defendant failed
  to return his daughter to her mother, the custodial parent, on that date. 
  Instead,

 

  sometime after June 30, 1994, defendant left Vermont with the child and
  traveled to a number of places, including New Hampshire, California, and
  Hawaii.  Although defendant returned to Vermont with the child on July 5,
  1994, for a doctor's appointment, after July 17, 1994 defendant was not in
  Vermont with the child.

       Defendant was eventually found in Hawaii, where he waived extradition,
  and returned to Vermont.  In October 1994, he was arraigned on the charge
  of custodial interference. Defendant moved to dismiss the charge for lack
  of subject matter jurisdiction.  The trial court granted the motion, and
  the State appeals.

                                     II.

       Defendant argues that his conduct cannot be punished by the State of
  Vermont because he acted exclusively outside of Vermont.  Defendant
  apparently assumes that the crime of "keeping a child from the child's
  lawful custodian" occurs where the child is kept, not where the lawful
  custodian is located.  Neither the language of the statute nor the weight
  of precedent from other states supports defendant's position.

     13 V.S.A. § 2451 states, in relevant part:

       (a) A person commits custodial interference by taking, enticing or
  keeping a child from the child's lawful custodian, knowingly, without a
  legal right to do so, when the person is a relative of the child and the
  child is less than eighteen years old.
     
          . . . .

       (c) It shall be a defense to a charge of keeping a child from the
  child's lawful custodian that the person charged with the offense was
  acting in good faith to protect the child from real and imminent physical
  danger. . . . This defense shall not be available if the person charged
  with the offense has left the state with the child.

  The statute explicitly contemplates application to a person who has kept a
  child outside of Vermont.  Defendant, however, argues that the language in
  subsection (c) refers only to those who "snatch" a child in Vermont and
  then leave the state to avoid detection, unlike defendant, who had a legal
  right to pick up the child in Vermont and to leave the state during the
  visitation

 

  period.  This interpretation would have some merit if subsection (c)
  established a defense to "taking" or "enticing" the child from the child's
  lawful custodian.  But subsection (c) applies only to a charge of "keeping"
  a child.  The only plausible interpretation of this language is that the
  statute is intended to apply to a person, like defendant, who keeps a child
  outside of Vermont when the child's lawful custodian is a resident of
  Vermont.

       We also find persuasive the reasoning of courts from other
  jurisdictions that have held that the custodial parent's state of residence
  has jurisdiction over the crime of custodial interference, regardless of
  where the defendant flees with the child.  At least four other state
  supreme courts have considered this issue and ruled in favor of exercising
  jurisdiction.  See State v. Doyle, 828 P.2d 1316, 1321 (Idaho 1992) (act of
  "keeping" or "withholding" child from lawful custodian occurred in Idaho,
  although parents exchanged custody in Oregon and defendant remained outside
  of Idaho); Trindle v. State, 602 A.2d 1232, 1235 (Md. 1990) (intended
  result of defendant's conduct -- i.e., depriving lawful custodian of
  custody -- formed "an essential ingredient of her offense" and had effect
  in Maryland, although defendant acted entirely outside of state); State v.
  Kane,