Title: People v. Phelps

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 93830-Agenda 1-November 2003.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. KEVIN PHELPS, Appellee and Cross-Appellant.
Opinion filed January 23, 2004. 
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Kevin Phelps, was convicted by a jury of heinous battery
(720 ILCS 5/12-4.1(a) (West 1996)) and aggravated kidnaping (720
ILCS 5/10-2(a)(3) (West 1996)). The circuit court of Cook County
sentenced defendant to consecutive prison terms of 15 years for the
aggravated kidnaping and 30 years for the heinous battery. The appellate
court affirmed defendant's convictions but modified the sentences to run
concurrently. 329 Ill. App. 3d 1. We allowed the State's petition for leave
to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).

BACKGROUND
	P.H., a high school student, testified that, in late 1996, she befriended
defendant, a paraplegic who she knew also as "Sniper." During the
summer of 1997, P.H. visited defendant almost every other day at his
townhouse on South St. Lawrence in Chicago. In August 1997, P.H. was
grounded and told she could not see defendant anymore.
	On September 4, 1997, as P.H. was leaving school, two men she
had never seen before called out to her, using her nickname. One of the
men said, "Folks said come get your stuff." P.H. knew that the man was
referring to defendant, as she had left some things at defendant's house.
She told the men that she would pick it up later and got on a bus to head
home. When she exited the bus, the same two men drove up behind her.
One of the men grabbed P.H.'s jacket and told her to get into the car. The
two men drove her to defendant's house, escorted her inside, and then left
her alone with defendant.
	Defendant asked P.H. where she had been, what she had been
doing, and whom she had been seeing for the past several weeks.
Although she explained to defendant that her sister had grounded her,
defendant continued to interrogate her for the next hour. During this time,
defendant twice asked P.H. to get him a glass of water from the kitchen,
and P.H. agreed. Defendant then told P.H. to take off her clothes. When
she refused, defendant pulled out a gun, placed it his lap, and again asked
P.H. to take off her clothes. This time she complied. Once P.H.'s clothes
were off, defendant threw a cup of flammable liquid on her and set her on
fire. P.H. ran to an upstairs bathroom, climbed into the tub, and
extinguished the flames with water. Hoping to jump out the window, P.H.
searched for some clothes. Unable to find any, she had no choice but to
return to the room that defendant occupied.
	P.H. remained with defendant for approximately an hour, during
which time she repeatedly asked for her clothes so that she could leave.
P.H. explained that she did not leave immediately after the burning both
because defendant would not return her clothes and because defendant
had a gun. Defendant gave P.H. some Vaseline to rub on her wounds and,
when that proved ineffective, poured hydrogen peroxide over her burns.
Eventually, defendant asked P.H. whether anyone knew where she was,
to which she replied, "my family would think that this would be the first
place I was because this was the place I was told not to come."
Defendant then asked P.H. what she would tell people if he "let [her] go."
P.H. assured defendant that she would blame her attack on someone else.
Defendant then gave P.H. her clothes back, told her to get dressed, and
allowed her to leave. On cross-examination, P.H. admitted that defendant
never actually told her that she could not leave.
	P.H. returned home around 8 p.m., screaming, "Sniper burnt me."
P.H.'s sister called an ambulance, and P.H. was taken to the hospital
where she was diagnosed with second and third degree burns over 36
percent of her body. P.H. spent two weeks in the intensive care unit and
two months in a rehabilitation center. The burns and resulting skin grafts
left P.H. with permanent and prominent scarring over 80% of her body.
	Defendant, in turn, testified that he did not see P.H. on September 4,
1997, and that he was not at the South St. Lawrence townhouse at all that
day. According to defendant, he had lived in the South St. Lawrence
townhouse until June of 1997, at which point he moved onto East 62nd
Street with his mother, his brother, and his stepfather. On the day of
P.H.'s attack, he never left the house on East 62nd Street. Although P.H.
had been his girlfriend for several months at the time of the attack,
defendant had not seen her in several weeks because she was grounded.
He first learned of P.H.'s injuries at approximately 10:30 p.m. on the night
of September 4, 1997, when the police arrived at the house on East 62nd
Street to question him.
	Defendant was charged with kidnaping (720 ILCS 5/10-1(a)(1)
(West 1996)), aggravated kidnaping (720 ILCS 5/10-2(a)(3) (West
1996)), heinous battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4.1(a) (West 1996)), and
attempted first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1(a)(1) (West
1996)). The jury convicted defendant of aggravated kidnaping and
heinous battery, and the trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive
prison terms of 15 and 30 years respectively.
	On appeal, defendant argued that (1) the State failed to prove him
guilty of aggravated kidnaping beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the
prosecutor misstated the evidence in closing argument; (3) the imposition
of consecutive sentences constituted an improper double enhancement;
and (4) the use of the same factor to enhance both of the crimes for which
he was convicted constituted an improper double enhancement. The
appellate court rejected all but the consecutive sentencing argument.
Accordingly, it affirmed defendant's convictions but modified the
sentences to run concurrently. 329 Ill. App. 3d at 12.
	Before this court, the State argues that the imposition of consecutive
sentences in this case does not constitute a double enhancement. By way
of cross-appeal, defendant renews his arguments with respect to the
sufficiency of the evidence, the prosecutor's closing argument, and the use
of the same factor to enhance both of the crimes for which he was
convicted.

ANALYSIS
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence
	We begin with the sufficiency of the evidence. In assessing the
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict on appeal, a reviewing
court's inquiry is "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." (Emphasis in
original.) Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560,
573, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2788-89 (1979); People v. Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d 419, 430-31 (2000). Under this standard, a reviewing court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on issues of the weight of
evidence or the credibility of witnesses. Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d  at 431.
Indeed, it is the responsibility of the trier of fact to "fairly *** resolve
conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable
inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Jackson, 443 U.S.  at 319,
61 L. Ed. 2d  at 573, 99 S. Ct.  at 2789.
	To obtain a conviction for aggravated kidnaping, the State must
prove that the defendant (1) knowingly and secretly confined the victim
against her will, and (2) inflicted great bodily harm upon the victim. 720
ILCS 5/10-1(a)(1), 10-2(a)(3) (West 1996). Here, defendant concedes
that he inflicted great bodily harm when he doused P.H. with a flammable
liquid and set her ablaze. Nevertheless, he insists that P.H.'s ordeal in the
South St. Lawrence townhouse was neither secret nor against her will. As
for the visit not being secret, defendant notes that her presence at the
South St. Lawrence townhouse was known to the two men who forced
her into the car and delivered her to defendant. In addition, defendant
relies upon the fact that, when defendant asked P.H. whether anyone
knew where she was, she replied, "my family would think that this would
be the first place I was because this was the place I was told not to
come." As for the visit not being against her will, defendant relies heavily
upon P.H.'s admission that defendant never actually told her that she
could not leave. In addition, defendant argues that, although P.H. could
have left during either of her trips to the kitchen for a glass of water, she
returned to defendant's presence both times. Finally, defendant maintains
that his paraplegia rendered him physically unable to prevent P.H. from
leaving.
	For purposes of the aggravated kidnaping statute, secret confinement
may be shown by proof of either the secrecy of the confinement or the
secrecy of the place of confinement. People v. Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d 133,
187 (1992). In this context, "secret" has been defined as concealed,
hidden, or not made public. Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d  at 187. "Confinement," in
turn, has been defined as "[t]he act of imprisoning or restraining someone."
Black's Law Dictionary 294 (7th ed. 1999); see also People v. Enoch,
122 Ill. 2d 176, 196 (1988) (assessing "confinement" in terms of
"restraint"). Viewed in a light most favorable to the State, the evidence
here shows that P.H was forced into a car on her way home from school
and delivered to defendant's apartment against her will. Once P.H. was
there, defendant brandished a gun, ordered P.H. to strip naked, set P.H.
on fire, withheld the return of P.H.'s clothing for more than an hour after
the burning, and released P.H. only after she agreed to blame her attack
on a stranger. On these facts, a rational jury easily could have concluded
that defendant knowingly and secretly confined P.H. against her will.
Given that defendant concedes the infliction of great bodily harm, his
conviction for aggravated kidnaping must be affirmed.
	We are unpersuaded by defendant's insistence that both the secrecy
and the involuntariness of P.H.'s confinement "is very much in dispute." To
be sure, P.H. admitted that defendant never actually told her that she was
not free to leave, and defendant's paraplegia certainly limits his range of
motion. Nevertheless, a rational trier of fact could conclude that, his
paraplegia notwithstanding, defendant demonstrated that P.H. was not
free to go by brandishing a gun, ordering her to strip naked, setting her on
fire, and withholding the return of her clothing for more than an hour.
Indeed, P.H. testified that, after extinguishing her burning torso in the
upstairs bathroom, she "was trying to find something to put on so [she]
could jump out the window." A jury certainly could conclude that jumping
out of a second-story window is not the typical exit strategy of a social
guest who is free to come and go as she pleases. And while P.H. twice
returned to defendant's presence after going to the kitchen for a glass of
water, she did so before defendant brandished the gun. Even assuming,
then, that P.H. was not confined against her will when she returned with
the glasses of water, a rational jury could conclude that P.H. was confined
against her will when defendant brandished a gun and set the ensuing
events in motion.
	 As for secrecy, defendant's case is hardly helped by the fact that
P.H.'s presence at the South St. Lawrence townhouse was known to the
two men who forced her into a car and delivered her to defendant's
doorstep. These men either knew what defendant was about to do, in
which case they were accomplices, or they did not know, in which case
P.H.'s confinement remained a secret even to them. Either way, a rational
jury could conclude that, on the afternoon of September 4, 1997, P.H.
was secretly confined in the South St. Lawrence townhouse. Moreover,
P.H.'s assertion that "my family would think that this would be the first
place I was because this was the place I was told not to come" is just as
likely a bluff designed to secure her release as it is an objective statement
of fact. When P.H. made this assertion, she was naked, suffering from
third-degree burns over 36% of her body, attempting to secure the return
of her clothing, and responding to her armed captor's inquiry as to
whether anyone knew where she was. We have no trouble affirming
defendant's aggravated kidnaping conviction.

2. Closing Argument
	Defendant next argues that he was deprived of a fair trial when the
assistant State's Attorney made certain misleading statements during
closing arguments. Specifically, defendant notes that (1) although P.H.
twice testified that defendant never told her that she could not leave, the
assistant State's Attorney told the jury that he did; and (2) although P.H.
testified that the two men who forced her into the car told her that "Folks"
wanted to see her, the assistant State's Attorney told the jury that P.H.
was told that "Sniper" wanted to see her. According to defendant, these
statements "undoubtedly had a prejudicial impact on the jury" and thereby
denied him of his right to a fair trial.
	To preserve an issue for review, a defendant must raise an objection
both at trial and in a written posttrial motion. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176 (1988). Here, defendant did neither. Moreover, defendant does not
even attempt to argue that the alleged misstatements rise to the level of
plain error. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). Accordingly, we find this issue
waived. See People v. Nieves, 192 Ill. 2d 487, 502-03 (2000).

3. Double Enhancement: Sentencing
	Next, the State argues that the appellate court erred in concluding
that the imposition of consecutive sentences in this case constituted an
improper double enhancement. We agree.
	Defendant was found guilty of aggravated kidnaping and heinous
battery. The trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive prison terms
of 15 years for the aggravated kidnaping and 30 years for the heinous
battery. In imposing consecutive sentences, the trial court relied upon
section 5-8-4(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections, which provides:
		"The court shall not impose consecutive sentences for offenses
which were committed as part of a single course of conduct
during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the
criminal objective, unless, one of the offenses for which
defendant was convicted was a Class X or Class 1 felony and
the defendant inflicted severe bodily injury *** in which event the
court shall enter sentences to run consecutively." 730 ILCS
5/5-8-4(a) (West 1996).
On appeal, defendant argued that he was subjected to an improper double
enhancement because the factor relied upon to impose consecutive
sentences-the infliction of severe bodily injury-is already an element of the
offenses for which he was convicted. The appellate court agreed and
modified defendant's sentences to run concurrently. 329 Ill. App. 3d at
12.
	Generally, a factor implicit in the offense for which the defendant has
been convicted cannot be used as an aggravating factor in sentencing for
that offense. People v. Ferguson, 132 Ill. 2d 86, 96 (1989). Stated
differently, a single factor cannot be used both as an element of an offense
and as a basis for imposing "a harsher sentence than might otherwise have
been imposed." People v. Gonzalez, 151 Ill. 2d 79, 83-84 (1992). Such
dual use of a single factor is often referred to as a "double enhancement."
Gonzalez, 151 Ill. 2d  at 85. The prohibition against double enhancements
is based on the assumption that, in designating the appropriate range of
punishment for a criminal offense, the legislature necessarily considered the
factors inherent in the offense. People v. Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d 364, 390
(1995). The double-enhancement rule is one of statutory construction
(Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d at 390), and the standard of review therefore is de
novo (People v. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 457 (1996)).
	A textbook example of double enhancement is found in People v.
White, 114 Ill. 2d 61 (1986). In White, this court held that, although it is
a statutory aggravating factor, the victim's age cannot form the basis for
an extended-term sentence where the defendant is convicted of
aggravated battery of a child. White, 114 Ill. 2d  at 66. As White
explained, in establishing aggravated battery of a child as a statutory
offense separate from aggravated battery, the legislature included the
victim's age as an element of the offense. As importantly, the legislature
attached a higher penalty to aggravated battery of a child (then a Class 2
felony) than it did to mere aggravated battery (a Class 3 felony). Thus, the
victim's age formed not only an element of the offense but also the basis
for an enhanced penalty. By then using the victim's age yet again as the
basis of an extended-term sentence, the trial court did exactly what the
double enhancement rule is designed to prevent-subjected the defendant
to a harsher sentence than might otherwise have been imposed. White,
114 Ill. 2d  at 66.
	Double enhancement also occurs when the same factor is used twice
to elevate the severity of the offense itself. For example, in People v.
Haron, 85 Ill. 2d 261 (1981), the defendant committed a battery, which
ordinarily is a Class A misdemeanor. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par.
12-3(b). However, because the defendant used a deadly weapon in the
course of committing that battery, the State elevated the charge to
aggravated battery, a Class 3 felony. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par.
12-4(e). The State then used the deadly weapon again to elevate the
aggravated battery charge to armed violence, a Class X felony that occurs
when a person commits a felony while armed with a dangerous weapon.
See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, pars. 33A-2, 33A-3(a). In reviewing the
propriety of these charges, this court explained that "the General
Assembly did not intend that the presence of a weapon serve to enhance
an offense from misdemeanor to felony and also to serve as the basis for
charge of armed violence." Haron, 85 Ill. 2d  at 278. Accordingly, the
dismissal of the armed violence charge was affirmed. Haron, 85 Ill. 2d  at
280.
	Applying these principles to the present case, we conclude that
defendant's consecutive sentences do not constitute a double
enhancement. Defendant's heinous battery charge alleged that, in the
course of committing a battery, defendant knowingly caused P.H. to suffer
severe and permanent disability by means of a flammable substance. Thus,
the infliction of severe and permanent disability was used once to enhance
battery, a Class A misdemeanor punishable by less than a year in prison,
to heinous battery, a Class X felony punishable by 6 to 45 years in prison.
Once defendant was convicted of heinous battery, however, no further
enhancements occurred. Defendant stood convicted of a Class X felony
punishable by 6 to 45 years in prison, and he was sentenced to a
nonextended term of 30 years in prison. Likewise, defendant's aggravated
kidnaping charge alleged that, in the course of kidnaping P.H., defendant
inflicted great bodily harm upon her. Thus, the infliction of great bodily
harm was used once to enhance kidnaping, a Class 2 felony punishable by
3 to 7 years in prison, to aggravated kidnaping, a Class X felony
punishable by 6 to 30 years in prison. Once defendant was convicted of
aggravated kidnaping, however, no further enhancements occurred.
Defendant stood convicted of a Class X felony punishable by 6 to 30
years in prison, and he was sentenced to a nonextended term of 15 years
in prison. Thus, the severity of each offense was enhanced only once.
	The fact that the trial court ordered defendant to serve his sentences
consecutively does not change this outcome. To be sure, the consecutive
sentencing order was premised on the fact that defendant "inflicted severe
bodily injury" (see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West 1996)), an element of
both aggravated kidnaping and heinous battery. Nevertheless, no double
enhancement occurred because consecutive sentencing is not a sentencing
enhancement. Again, a double enhancement occurs when a single factor
is used both as an element of an offense and as a basis for imposing "a
harsher sentence than might otherwise have been imposed." Gonzalez,
151 Ill. 2d  at 83-84. In People v. Carney, 196 Ill. 2d 518 (2001), this
court specifically held that a defendant subject to consecutive sentencing
"is not exposed to punishment beyond that authorized by the jury's
verdict, provided that the sentence for each separate offense does not
exceed the maximum permitted by statute for that offense." Carney, 196 Ill. 2d  at 532. This is because consecutive sentencing "determines only the
manner in which a defendant will serve his sentences for multiple offenses."
Carney, 196 Ill. 2d  at 532. Thus, even when subject to consecutive
sentencing, "[e]ach conviction results in a discrete sentence that must be
treated individually." (Emphases added.) Carney, 196 Ill. 2d  at 530. In
the preceding paragraph, we treated defendant's discrete sentences
individually and concluded that no double enhancements occurred. Under
Carney, no further inquiry is warranted.
	We note that, even if defendant's consecutive sentences did
constitute a double enhancement, the appellate court still erred in
modifying those sentences to run concurrently. The general prohibition
against double enhancements is "merely a rule of statutory construction,"
premised on the assumption that the legislature considered the factors
inherent in the offense in fashioning the appropriate range of punishment
for that offense. People v. Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d 364, 390 (1995).
Consequently, where the legislature clearly intends to enhance the penalty
based upon some aspect of the crime, and such an intention is clearly
expressed, there is no prohibition. Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d  at 390. In
determining whether the legislature intended a double enhancement, we
look to the statute itself as the best indication of the legislature's intent.
Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d  at 390-91. The best indication of legislative intent is
the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Illinois
Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 479 (1994).
	Under section 5-8-4(a), consecutive sentencing is mandated where
"one of the offenses for which defendant was convicted was a Class X or
Class 1 felony and the defendant inflicted severe bodily injury." 730 ILCS
5/5-8-4(a) (West 1996). In People v. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d 91 (1999),
this court was asked to construe this provision and decide whether, in
order to qualify for consecutive sentencing, the defendant must inflict great
bodily harm in the course of committing the actual Class X or Class 1
felony. This court held that he must. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d  at 98-99.
Significantly, the next question was not whether consecutive sentencing
applied even to those Class X and Class 1 felonies for which severe
bodily harm is an element. Rather, the question was whether consecutive
sentencing applied only to those Class X and Class 1 felonies for which
severe bodily harm is an element. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d  at 99. In holding
that the statute was not so narrowly drafted, this court explained that "any
Class X or Class 1 felony that results in severe bodily injury being inflicted
on the victim of that felony triggers consecutive sentences." (Emphasis
added.) Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d  at 99. Thus, in Whitney, this court took it as
a given that consecutive sentencing was intended to apply to Class X and
Class 1 felonies for which severe bodily harm is an element. The only
question was what additional Class X and Class 1 felonies are subject to
consecutive sentencing.
	 Again, where the legislature clearly intends to enhance the penalty
based upon some aspect of the crime, and such an intention is clearly
expressed, there is no prohibition. Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d  at 390. As Whitney
teaches, the legislature clearly intended to make consecutive sentencing
applicable to Class X and Class 1 felonies for which severe bodily harm
is an element. Even assuming, then, that defendant's consecutive sentences
did constitute a double enhancement, they constituted a perfectly lawful
double enhancement.
	Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the appellate court's opinion
modifying defendant's sentences to run concurrently.

4. Double Enhancement: Offenses
	Finally, defendant raises another double-enhancement argument. This
time, defendant argues that one of his convictions must be vacated
because a single factor-the infliction of great bodily harm-was used to
enhance both of the offenses for which he was convicted. In support,
defendant notes that the single fact that he inflicted great bodily harm upon
P.H. was used against him twice, once to elevate kidnaping to aggravated
kidnaping and again to elevate battery to heinous battery. According to
defendant, this constitutes an unlawful double enhancement.
	We disagree. As explained above, the double-enhancement rule
prohibits a single factor from being used twice with respect to the same
offense. Gonzalez, 151 Ill. 2d at 83-84; Ferguson, 132 Ill. 2d  at 96.
Defendant does not cite, and we cannot find, any principle that prohibits
the use of a single factor with respect to separate and distinct offenses. In
fact, this court has specifically held that " '[a] person can be guilty of two
offenses when a common act is part of both offenses.' " People v.
Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d 183, 188 (1996), quoting People v. Lobdell, 121
Ill. App. 3d 248, 252 (1983). Such is the case here. Defendant committed
a heinous battery not only by causing bodily harm to P.H. but by also
inflicting severe and permanent disfigurement by means of a flammable
substance. See 720 ILCS 5/12-4.1(a) (West 1996). In addition, he
committed an aggravated kidnaping not only by kidnaping P.H. but also
by inflicting great bodily harm upon her in the process. See 720 ILCS
5/10-2(a)(3) (West 1996). As defined by the legislature, these are entirely
distinct offenses, and the State proved each of their elements beyond a
reasonable doubt. Nothing prohibits such an outcome, and defendant's
heinous battery and aggravated kidnaping convictions therefore will stand.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we reverse that portion of the appellate
court's judgment modifying defendant's sentences to run concurrently. The
balance of the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.