Title: Waukesha County v. S.L.L.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2019 WI 66 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP1468 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the matter of the mental commitment of 
S.L.L.: 
 
Waukesha County, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
S.L.L., 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 382 Wis. 2d 832,917 N.W.2d 234 
(2018 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 12, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 11, 2019 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
William Domina 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
CONCURRED:  
 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
A.W. BRADLEY, J. dissents, joined by ABRAHAMSON, 
J. and DALLET, J. (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Colleen D. Ball, assistant state public defender. There 
was an oral argument by Colleen D. Ball. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Robert J. Mueller, corporation counsel. There was an oral 
argument by Robert J. Mueller. 
  
2019 WI 66 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2017AP1468   
(L.C. No. 
2016ME478) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the matter of the mental commitment of 
S.L.L.: 
 
 
 
Waukesha County, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
S.L.L., 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 12, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DANIEL 
KELLY, 
J.   Ms. 
L. 
challenges 
an 
order 
extending her commitment to the care and custody of Waukesha 
County pursuant to Chapter 51 of our Wisconsin statutes.  She 
raises three issues for our review.  First, she says the circuit 
court lacked jurisdiction over her when it entered an order 
extending her commitment.  Second, she says the circuit court 
had no statutory authority to enter a default judgment against 
her for failing to appear at a scheduled hearing.  And third, 
she asserts there was insufficient evidence of record to support 
No.  2017AP1468 
 
2 
 
 
the circuit court's order extending her commitment.  All three 
issues are moot, but we choose to address the first two.  For 
the reasons below, we affirm the court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
On August 10, 2016, the Waukesha County Sheriff's 
Department detained Ms. L. on an emergency basis pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 51.15(1) (2017-18).1  That statute allows emergency 
detention when an individual:  (1) is mentally ill, drug 
dependent, or developmentally disabled; (2) demonstrates one or 
more of the behaviors listed in the statute; and (3) gives 
reason to believe the individual is unable or unwilling to 
cooperate with voluntary treatment.2 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 51.15(1) provides, in relevant part: 
(ag)  The purpose of this section is to provide, on an 
emergency basis, treatment by the least restrictive 
means appropriate to the individual's needs, to 
individuals who meet all of the following criteria: 
1.  Are 
mentally 
ill, 
drug 
dependent, 
or 
developmentally disabled. 
2.  Evidence one of the standards set forth in 
par. (ar) 1. to 4. 
3.  Are reasonably believed to be unable or unwilling 
to cooperate with voluntary treatment. 
(continued) 
No.  2017AP1468 
 
3 
 
 
¶3 
An emergency detention under Wis. Stat. § 51.15 is 
initiated 
by 
completing 
the 
form 
entitled 
"Statement 
of 
Emergency 
Detention 
by 
Law 
Enforcement 
Officer" 
(the 
"Statement").  The completed Statement must detail the subject's 
condition and the reasons that make detention necessary.  In 
this case, the Statement says Ms. L. suffered from anxiety and 
depression (for which she was taking no medication), was 
homeless and without money or food, exhibited very poor hygiene, 
and experienced at least six encounters with law enforcement 
over the preceding 48 hours for "disorderly issues," which 
included having taken "a swing at a courthouse employee."  The 
Deputy who completed the Statement concluded that Ms. L. was 
"mentally ill, drug dependent, or developmentally disabled," 
"evidence[d] 
behavior 
which 
constitutes 
a 
substantial 
                                                                                                                                                             
 (ar)  A law enforcement officer . . . may take an 
individual into custody if the officer or person has 
cause to believe that the individual is mentally ill, 
is drug dependent, or is developmentally disabled, 
that taking the person into custody is the least 
restrictive alternative appropriate to the person's 
needs, and that the individual evidences any of the 
following: 
. . . . 
4.  Behavior manifested by a recent act or omission 
that, due to mental illness, he or she is unable to 
satisfy basic needs for nourishment, medical care, 
shelter, 
or 
safety 
without 
prompt 
and 
adequate 
treatment so that a substantial probability exists 
that death, serious physical injury, serious physical 
debilitation, 
or 
serious 
physical 
disease 
will 
imminently ensue unless the individual receives prompt 
and adequate treatment for this mental illness. 
No.  2017AP1468 
 
4 
 
 
probability of physical harm to self or to others," and that 
taking 
Ms. 
L. 
into 
custody 
was 
"the 
least 
restrictive 
alternative appropriate" to her needs.  The Deputy also noted 
that Ms. L. was dangerous, appeared to talk to others when no 
one else was present, and "had no rational explanation for her 
basic needs[.]"  Ms. L. was taken into custody, transported to 
Waukesha Memorial Hospital for medical clearance, and then 
brought to the Waukesha County Mental Health Center ("MHC"). 
¶4 
The Sheriff's Department filed the Statement with the 
Waukesha County Circuit Court on August 11, 2016.  This "has the 
same effect as a petition for commitment under s. 51.20," and 
requires a probable-cause hearing pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(7) within 72 hours.  Wis. Stat. § 51.15(5).  The hearing 
occurred the next day, and the circuit court commissioner found 
probable cause to believe Ms. L. was "dangerous to self or 
others."  The circuit court scheduled a final hearing for August 
30, 2016. 
¶5 
Ms. L. appeared and testified at the final hearing as 
scheduled.  The circuit court found her mentally ill and ordered 
her committed to the care and custody of Waukesha County for six 
months with inpatient placement at the MHC (the "Initial 
Commitment").3  The circuit court also found she was not 
competent to refuse psychotropic medication or treatment, and so 
authorized the involuntary administration of medication during 
the period of commitment.  Ms. L. responded well to the 
                                                 
3 The Honorable William J. Domina presided. 
No.  2017AP1468 
 
5 
 
 
treatment, so the County executed a Conditional Transfer 
allowing her to leave the MHC and reside elsewhere (the 
"Transfer").  Ms. L. signed the Transfer, thereby evidencing her 
agreement that she would abide by the Transfer's requirements, 
which included taking all prescribed medications, complying with 
all ongoing treatment and activities recommended by the Waukesha 
County Health and Human Services Department, and notifying the 
County if she changed her address from the one listed in the 
Transfer.  The Transfer also stated that if she failed to comply 
with its conditions she would "be returned to an inpatient 
facility for further disposition and treatment."  Ms. L. left 
the MHC on September 8, 2016.  She attended an appointment to 
receive medication on November 2, 2016, but thereafter absconded 
from treatment.4  She also failed to keep the County updated on 
her current address. 
¶6 
Prior to expiration of Ms. L.'s Initial Commitment, 
the County applied to the circuit court for a 12-month extension 
of her commitment (the "Extension Petition").  It alleged that 
Ms. L. had fallen out of compliance with the Transfer's 
conditions by missing scheduled treatments and failing to keep a 
                                                 
4 The dissent says our use of the word "abscond" is 
misleading because Black's Law Dictionary defines that term to 
mean "[t]o depart secretly or suddenly, esp. to avoid arrest, 
prosecution, or service of process."  Dissent, ¶50 n.3.  She 
departed from her treatment program "secretly" by failing to 
periodically return for therapy, and by moving from her declared 
address without letting the County know.  That is to say, 
according 
to 
Black's 
Law 
Dictionary, 
she 
absconded 
from 
treatment. 
No.  2017AP1468 
 
6 
 
 
current address on file.5  The circuit court scheduled a hearing 
on the Extension Petition for February 28, 2017 (the "Extension 
Hearing").  It also ordered a pre-hearing examination of Ms. 
L.'s mental condition.6  Notice of the Extension Hearing was sent 
to Ms. L.'s last known address and to her appointed counsel.  
The notice included the time and place of the hearing, identity 
of the witnesses who would appear, the topics of their 
anticipated testimony, and the Extension Petition.  The copy of 
the notice sent to Ms. L. was returned as undeliverable. 
¶7 
The Extension Hearing commenced as scheduled, with Ms. 
L. in absentia but represented by appointed counsel.7  Because of 
Ms. L.'s absence, the County asked the circuit court to issue a 
writ of capias and to reschedule the hearing for a week 
following her return to the MHC.  It also asked the circuit 
court to toll the expiration of the Initial Commitment pending 
                                                 
5 The County notes that her last listed address (as of 
October 3, 2016) was the Cathedral Center in Milwaukee.  But 
upon contacting the Cathedral Center, the County discovered that 
the center banned her from staying there "due to her behavior."  
6 Ms. L. failed to either schedule or appear for these 
examinations.  However, both physicians, without examining her, 
opined that she was mentally ill, that she was dangerous, and 
that she was a proper subject for treatment.  They both relied 
on the recommitment report prepared by Ms. L.'s caseworker a few 
weeks before the Extension Hearing.  The physician reports were 
similar in most respects except that one physician recommended 
out-patient treatment and the other recommended locked inpatient 
treatment. 
7 Her counsel said he had not communicated with Ms. L. prior 
to the hearing and did not know her whereabouts.  The County did 
not know where she was either. 
No.  2017AP1468 
 
7 
 
 
the rescheduled hearing date.  The circuit court, however, 
turned its attention to whether it had jurisdiction over Ms. L. 
Her attorney affirmed she was "subject to the jurisdiction of 
the Court through the pendency of the order."  The circuit court 
then concluded that Ms. L. had "submitted to the jurisdiction of 
the Court," and that "[s]he has not appeared here today" so 
"[s]he's in default of her right to object."  Relying on the 
physician reports and the County's extension petition, the 
circuit court found that Ms. L. was still mentally ill, a 
resident of Waukesha County, and a proper subject for inpatient 
treatment and commitment.  So it entered an order extending her 
commitment for twelve months, and a separate order authorizing 
the County to involuntarily medicate her during the pendency of 
the commitment (we will refer to the two orders collectively as 
the "Extension Order").  The circuit court also issued a writ of 
capias.   
¶8 
Ms. L. appealed.  During the pendency of the appeal, 
the County moved the circuit court to dismiss the matter because 
the Extension Order would accomplish nothing unless Ms. L. could 
be located and returned to treatment.  The circuit court granted 
the motion and cancelled both the writ of capias and the 
Extension Order.  The County then moved to dismiss the appeal as 
moot.  The court of appeals initially denied the County's 
request, but subsequently issued a one-judge opinion granting 
the motion. 
¶9 
Ms. L.'s petition for review (which we granted) 
presents the following three substantive issues.  First, whether 
No.  2017AP1468 
 
8 
 
 
the circuit court had personal jurisdiction over her for the 
purpose of issuing the Extension Order.8  Second, whether she is 
subject to a default ruling for failing to appear at the 
Extension Hearing.  And third, whether a Chapter 51 extension 
order based on reports of physicians who never examined her nor 
testified at the Extension Hearing is defective for lack of 
sufficient evidence or because it violates the respondent's due 
process rights.  Ms. L. recognizes that her case's procedural 
posture potentially implicates our mootness doctrine, but argues 
her issues are either not moot or are of the type we address 
even when they are. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶10 We review the circuit court's jurisdiction over Ms. L. 
de novo.  Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp. v. 
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 2017 WI 71, ¶7, 376 Wis. 2d 528, 
898 
N.W.2d 70 
("Whether 
Wisconsin 
courts 
have 
personal 
jurisdiction . . . is a question of law we review de novo, 
although we benefit from the analyses of the circuit court and 
court of appeals."); State v. Aufderhaar, 2005 WI 108, ¶10, 283 
Wis. 2d 336, 700 N.W.2d 4 ("Due process determinations are 
questions of law we decide de novo.").  Whether Chapter 51 
allows for entry of default against a respondent for failing to 
appear at a final recommitment hearing is also a question of law 
we review de novo.  State v. Alger, 2015 WI 3, ¶21, 360 
                                                 
8 
Chapter 
51 
indifferently 
uses 
"recommitment" 
and 
"extension of a commitment," so we will as well.  Portage Cty. 
v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, ¶1 n.1, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __. 
No.  2017AP1468 
 
9 
 
 
Wis. 2d 193, 858 N.W.2d 346 ("The interpretation and application 
of a statute present questions of law that this court reviews de 
novo while benefitting from the analyses of the court of appeals 
and circuit court.").  We review a circuit court's decision on 
whether default judgment is warranted for an erroneous exercise 
of discretion because "the decision to grant a motion for 
default judgment is within the sound discretion of the circuit 
court."  Shirk v. Bowling, Inc., 2001 WI 36, ¶15, 242 
Wis. 2d 153, 624 N.W.2d 375.  We review the threshold issue 
(mootness) de novo:  "Mootness is a question of law that we 
review independently of the determinations rendered by the 
circuit court and the court of appeals."  PRN Assocs. LLC v. 
DOA, 2009 WI 53, ¶25, 317 Wis. 2d 656, 766 N.W.2d 559.   
III.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Personal Jurisdiction 
¶11 Ms. 
L. 
says 
the 
circuit 
court 
did 
not 
have 
jurisdiction over her when it entered the Extension Order.  Her 
challenge is two-fold.  First, she argues that the County was 
obliged to personally serve her with notice of the Extension 
Hearing.  Second, she asserts that the Extension Petition and 
accompanying documents were deficient.  An extension petition, 
she says, must satisfy the conditions of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1), 
which requires the petition to allege she is mentally ill, a 
proper subject for treatment, and dangerous.  She says the 
petition must also contain a clear and concise statement of 
facts in support of those allegations.  If the County fails with 
No.  2017AP1468 
 
10 
 
 
respect to either prong of her challenge, she argues, the 
circuit court can exercise no jurisdiction over her. 
¶12 Ms. L. is correct that a court does not have 
jurisdiction over a party unless the circumstances of the case 
satisfy both statutory and constitutional requirements.  We have 
noted before that complying with the "statutory provisions 
regarding service of process is required before a [] court has 
personal jurisdiction."  Aufderhaar, 283 Wis. 2d 336, ¶27.  
Naturally, the assertion of personal jurisdiction must also 
comport with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 
S. Ct. 1773, 1779 (2017) ("It has long been established that the 
Fourteenth Amendment limits the personal jurisdiction of state 
courts."). 
¶13 So if Ms. L. is right about having not received proper 
notice, the Extension Order was void from the beginning.  
"Personal jurisdiction" embodies the court's power over a party, 
without which it can enter no valid judgment.  State v. Smith, 
2005 WI 104, ¶18, 283 Wis. 2d 57, 699 N.W.2d 508 ("Personal 
jurisdiction . . . refers to a court's power 'to enter a 
judgment in personam against an individual party.'") (quoted 
source omitted); West v. West, 82 Wis. 2d 158, 167–68, 262 
N.W.2d 87 
(1978) 
("Because 
personal 
jurisdiction 
was 
not 
acquired over the defendant . . . the trial judge correctly 
concluded that the judgment . . . was void."); see also 21 
C.J.S. Courts § 44 ("Jurisdiction of the person is the power of 
a court to bring before it the person to be affected by the 
No.  2017AP1468 
 
11 
 
 
judgment and to render a judgment binding on that person.").  
Before reaching the merits of the jurisdictional issue, however, 
we must first decide whether it is prudent to do so. 
1.  Mootness 
¶14 When a court purports to exercise authority with 
respect to a party over whom it has no jurisdiction, the remedy 
is normally vacatur of the offending order.  As a practical 
matter, however, that has already occurred in this case.  The 
Extension Order was valid for only one year, so by its own terms 
it could have no authority beyond the end of February 2018.  And 
the circuit court dismissed the entirety of this matter and 
canceled the writ of capias, so there are no further orders that 
could even potentially issue from this case.  Regardless of how 
we resolve the jurisdictional question, therefore, our answer 
will not affect Ms. L.'s rights.  "Ordinarily, this court, like 
courts in general, will not consider a question the answer to 
which cannot have any practical effect upon an existing 
controversy." 
 
State 
v. 
Leitner, 
2002 
WI 77, 
¶13, 
253 
Wis. 2d 449, 646 N.W.2d 341 (footnote omitted).  Such questions 
are moot, and we generally do not review them.  Id. 
¶15 But sometimes issues come to us that present, because 
of their characteristics or procedural posture, a need for an 
answer that outweighs our concern for judicial economy.  We 
might decide a moot question, for example, if it is "capable and 
likely of repetition and yet evades review because the appellate 
process usually cannot be completed and frequently cannot even 
be undertaken within the time that would have a practical effect 
No.  2017AP1468 
 
12 
 
 
upon the parties."  Id., ¶14 (footnote omitted).  We also might 
decide such a question if it is one "of great public 
importance."  Id.   
¶16 Both 
of 
these 
considerations 
bear 
on 
Ms. 
L.'s 
jurisdictional challenge.  In the normal course of appellate 
proceedings, Chapter 51 commitment orders will expire before we 
have a chance to review them because their maximum statutory 
duration is only one year.  Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(g)1. ("[A]ll 
subsequent consecutive orders of commitment of the individual 
may be for a period not to exceed one year.").  And because 
commitment orders affect a profound liberty interest, it is a 
matter of great public importance that issuing courts properly 
evaluate their jurisdiction over respondents.  Addington v. 
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) ("This Court repeatedly has 
recognized that civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a 
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process 
protection.").  These two considerations convince us that we 
must address the merits of Ms. L.'s jurisdictional issue, even 
though it is moot. 
2.  Persistency of Personal Jurisdiction 
¶17 The success of Ms. L.'s argument depends, in large 
part, on her position that the Extension Petition represents the 
initiation of a new proceeding that cannot commence without all 
of the statutory and constitutional requirements attendant upon 
the commencement of an initial commitment proceeding.  That is 
to say, Ms. L. assumes the circuit court lost jurisdiction over 
her sometime before the Extension Hearing, and that service of a 
No.  2017AP1468 
 
13 
 
 
new petition (containing all of the material required by Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20(1)) was necessary before it could regain that 
jurisdiction.  Neither the relevant statutory provisions nor our 
cases support that proposition. 
¶18 Our analysis begins with Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(g)3., 
which contains the statutory basis for extending an individual's 
commitment.9  In relevant part, it says: 
Upon application for extension of a commitment by the 
department or the county department having custody of 
the subject, the court shall proceed under subs. (10) 
to (13). If the court determines that the individual 
is a proper subject for commitment as prescribed in 
sub. (1) (a) 1. and evidences the conditions under 
sub. (1) (a) 2. or (am) or is a proper subject for 
commitment as prescribed in sub. (1) (ar), it shall 
order judgment to that effect and continue the 
commitment. The burden of proof is upon the county 
department or other person seeking commitment to 
establish evidence that the subject individual is in 
need of continued commitment. 
§ 51.20(13)(g)3. 
¶19 This 
paragraph 
provides 
textual 
indications 
that 
extension of a commitment does not comprise a new and separate 
proceeding.  The first indication lies in the fact that the 
County files an "application for extension of a commitment."  
This necessarily establishes that there is a pre-existing 
commitment because one cannot extend what does not already 
                                                 
9 See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 ("[S]tatutory 
interpretation 'begins with the language of the statute. If the 
meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the 
inquiry.'") (quoted source omitted). 
No.  2017AP1468 
 
14 
 
 
exist.  It also demonstrates the essential connection between 
the commitment and the extension proceeding inasmuch as a 
successful 
application 
will 
affect——"extend"——the 
original 
commitment.  Second, the circuit court may only extend the 
commitment of an individual already in the County's custody.  
Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(g)3. ("Upon application for extension of 
a commitment by the department or the county department having 
custody 
of 
the 
subject . . . .") 
(emphasis 
added). 
 
The 
"custody" to which this refers, of course, is "care and 
commitment" pursuant to an existing order.  Third, the County 
bears the burden of proving the need for "continued" commitment.  
Id. ("The burden of proof is upon the county department or other 
person seeking commitment to establish evidence that the subject 
individual is in need of continued commitment.").  And finally, 
if the County's request is successful, then the circuit court 
orders the subject's commitment to continue, not commence:  "If 
the court determines that the individual is a proper subject for 
commitment . . . it shall order judgment to that effect and 
continue the commitment."  Id.  Nothing in this paragraph so 
much as hints that a commitment extension is a proceeding that 
is either new, or separate from, the initial commitment.  To the 
contrary, the statute's language demonstrates a logical and 
textual continuity that cannot be interrupted without loss of 
meaning. 
¶20 The continuity of original and extended commitment 
proceedings is not a new subject for us.  We addressed this 
issue in the context of a request for substitution of judge in 
No.  2017AP1468 
 
15 
 
 
State ex rel. Serocki v. Circuit Court For Clark County, 163 
Wis. 2d 152, 471 N.W.2d 49 (1991).  There, we concentrated on 
the purpose of the extension proceeding, which was to evaluate 
the continuing needs of the committed individual.  Id. at 159-60 
(quoting M.J. v. Milwaukee Cty. Combined Cmty. Serv. Bd., 122 
Wis. 2d 525, 530-31, 362 N.W.2d 190 (Ct. App. 1984)).  We 
reasoned that "[t]his description of the purpose of the 
recommitment hearing and the evidence to be presented support 
the respondent's argument that at the recommitment hearing the 
circuit court continues to receive evidence in the same case."  
Serocki, 163 Wis. 2d at 160 (emphasis added).  We concluded, 
therefore, "that the legislature intended an individual's 
recommitment hearing to be, in the context of a request for 
substitution, 
a 
continuation 
of 
the 
original 
commitment 
proceeding and previous recommitment hearings."  Id.10 
¶21 Although Serocki's specific holding was limited to the 
context 
of 
a 
substitution 
of 
judge 
request, 
its 
logic 
inescapably applies here as well.  In fact, Serocki and Ms. L.'s 
argument are entirely incompatible.  Ms. L. says the extension 
petition institutes a new proceeding, separate and apart from 
                                                 
10 We said the same thing inversely, too.  If the person is 
not already subject to a commitment order, then a proceeding 
that results in commitment is an original proceeding:  "The 
petitioner apparently was not under any commitment order or in 
custody from September 9, 1988, until September 18, 1989. Thus 
the 
September 
1989 
commitment 
proceeding 
is 
an 
original 
commitment proceeding."  State ex rel. Serocki v. Circuit Court 
For Clark Cty., 163 Wis. 2d 152, 155 n.2, 471 N.W.2d 49 (1991). 
 
No.  2017AP1468 
 
16 
 
 
the initial commitment.  But Serocki says the extension hearing 
is part of the same case from whence the initial commitment 
arose:  "[A]t the recommitment hearing the circuit court 
continues to receive evidence in the same case."  Id. (emphasis 
added).  During the pendency of a case, personal jurisdiction is 
not perishable; there is no need to periodically refresh it.  
The court either does, or it does not, have jurisdiction over 
the person.  If it does, it persists to the end of the case.  
Ms. L. has presented no authority, or argument, to the contrary.  
We conclude that, for purposes of personal jurisdiction, an 
extension hearing is "a continuation of the original commitment 
proceeding and previous recommitment hearings."  Id.  Therefore, 
the circuit court still had jurisdiction over Ms. L. when it 
conducted the Extension Hearing and entered the Extension 
Order.11 
3.  Required Notice Content 
¶22 With that backdrop, we now consider the nature of 
notice the County must provide to Ms. L. before conducting the 
                                                 
11 Although the dissent does not say so explicitly, the 
author appears to disagree with our conclusion that, for 
jurisdictional purposes, an extension hearing is a continuation 
of the original commitment proceedings.  So the dissent says 
"because the service provisions of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10) were 
not followed [with respect to notice of the Extension Hearing], 
the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over S.L.L."  
Dissent, ¶57 n.9.  However, based on our conclusion above, 
service of the notice can have no jurisdictional impact because 
at no point prior to the Extension Hearing did the circuit 
court's jurisdiction over Ms. L. lapse. 
 
No.  2017AP1468 
 
17 
 
 
Extension Hearing.  The procedural rules governing extension 
hearings 
appear 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.20(13)(g)3: 
 
"Upon 
application for extension of a commitment by the department or 
the county department having custody of the subject, the court 
shall proceed under subs. (10) to (13)."  This, in turn, 
incorporates our rules of civil procedure (except to the extent 
they conflict with Chapter 51):  "Except as otherwise provided 
in this chapter, the rules of evidence in civil actions and s. 
801.01(2)[12] apply to any judicial proceeding or hearing under 
this chapter." § 51.20(10)(c). 
¶23 The combination of these procedural rules require the 
County to serve on Ms. L. three items prior to the Extension 
Hearing.  First, by virtue of the incorporation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.14,13 the County must serve the Extension Petition itself.  
                                                 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.01(2) provides: 
 
Chapters 801 to 847 govern procedure and practice in 
circuit courts of this state in all civil actions and 
special proceedings whether cognizable as cases at 
law, in equity or of statutory origin except where 
different procedure is prescribed by statute or rule. 
Chapters 801 to 847 shall be construed, administered, 
and employed by the court and the parties to secure 
the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of 
every action and proceeding. 
 
13 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.14(1), in pertinent part, 
provides: 
 
Every order required by its terms to be served, every 
pleading unless the court otherwise orders because of 
numerous defendants, every paper relating to discovery 
required to be served upon a party unless the court 
otherwise orders, every written motion other than one 
which may be heard ex parte, and every written notice, 
(continued) 
No.  2017AP1468 
 
18 
 
 
Second, notice of the Extension Hearing must be served pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(a) ("Within a reasonable time prior to 
the final hearing, the petitioner's counsel shall notify the 
subject individual and his or her counsel of the time and place 
of final hearing.").  And third, "[w]ithin a reasonable time 
prior to the final hearing, each party shall notify all other 
parties of all witnesses he or she intends to call at the 
hearing and of the substance of their proposed testimony."  Id.  
And although they need not be served, Ms. L.'s counsel must have 
"access to all psychiatric and other reports 48 hours in advance 
of the final hearing." § 51.20(10)(b). 
¶24 Ms. L. says that is not enough.  She contends that the 
County must serve on her, prior to the Extension Hearing, a 
"clear and concise statement of the facts that constitute 
probable cause to believe the allegations of the petition."  
According to Ms. L., the Extension Petition was deficient 
because it did not establish probable cause to believe she is 
mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and dangerous 
within 
the 
meaning 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 51.20(1)(a)2. 
or 
51.20(1)(am).  But Ms. L. takes those specifics from § 51.20(1), 
which governs an initial petition for examination, not a 
petition for extension of a commitment.  Although the County 
must establish all of those elements at the Extension Hearing, 
                                                                                                                                                             
appearance, demand, offer of judgment, undertaking, 
and similar paper shall be served upon each of the 
parties. . . . 
 
 
No.  2017AP1468 
 
19 
 
 
there is no statutory mandate that it must serve a document with 
such a factual recitation in advance.14  As discussed above, the 
procedure for extending a person's commitment is governed by 
Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10) through (13), not § 51.20(1).  Ms. L. 
identifies 
nothing 
in 
the 
procedures 
governing 
extension 
hearings that requires service of a document containing the 
information she demands.  Therefore, there is no statutory 
support for Ms. L.'s position. 
¶25 Nor did the content of the County's notice fail any 
due process requirements.  "[D]ue process is flexible and calls 
for such procedural protections as the particular situation 
demands."  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) 
(quoting 
Morrissey 
v. 
Brewer, 
408 
U.S. 471, 
481 
(1972) 
(alteration in original)).  That broad principle applies to the 
contents of the Extension Hearing notice.  "The notice must be 
of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information 
and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to 
                                                 
14 In Waukesha Cty. v. J.W.J., 2017 WI 57, ¶20, 375 
Wis. 2d 542, 895 N.W.2d 783, we held: 
Upon each petition to extend a term of commitment, a 
county must establish the same elements with the same 
quantum of proof.  Fond du lac Cty. v. Helen E.F., 
2012 WI 50, ¶20, 340 Wis. 2d 500, 814 N.W.2d 179.  
However, it may satisfy the "dangerousness" prong by 
showing "a substantial likelihood, based on the 
subject 
individual's 
treatment 
record, 
that 
the 
individual would be a proper subject for commitment if 
treatment were withdrawn."  
(quoting Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(am)). 
No.  2017AP1468 
 
20 
 
 
make their appearance."  Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. 
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (citations omitted).  It is true 
that, to assert personal jurisdiction over a respondent, the 
initiating documents must contain all of the information Ms. L. 
has identified.  See Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1).  But the court 
already had jurisdiction over Ms. L. because an extension 
hearing is not the commencement of a new proceeding, it is the 
continuation of an existing case.  Ms. L. has identified no 
constitutional principle requiring a respondent to receive a 
jurisdiction-conferring quantum of information every time the 
circuit court conducts a hearing.  The notice sent to Ms. L. and 
her attorney provided the date, time, location, and subject 
matter of the Extension Hearing.  Because the circuit court 
already 
had 
jurisdiction 
over 
Ms. 
L., 
nothing 
more 
was 
necessary. 
4.  Service of Notice 
¶26 In addition to challenging the notice's content, Ms. 
L. also faults the County for not serving the notice on her 
personally.  She turns to Wis. Stat. § 51.20(2)(b) for the 
service requirements she believes are applicable to extension 
hearings.  This provision instructs that: 
If the subject individual is to be detained, a law 
enforcement 
officer 
shall 
present 
the 
subject 
individual with a notice of hearing, a copy of the 
petition and detention order and a written statement 
of the individual's right to an attorney, a jury trial 
if requested more than 48 hours prior to the final 
hearing, the standard upon which he or she may be 
committed under this section and the right to a 
hearing to determine probable cause for commitment 
within 72 hours after the individual is taken into 
No.  2017AP1468 
 
21 
 
 
custody under s. 51.15 . . . .  The officer shall 
orally inform the individual that he or she is being 
detained as the result of a petition and detention 
order issued under this chapter. If the individual is 
not to be detained, the law enforcement officer shall 
serve these documents on the subject individual and 
shall also orally inform the individual of these 
rights. 
§ 51.20(2)(b) (emphasis added). 
¶27 But those service provisions are not applicable to a 
petition 
to 
extend 
a 
commitment. 
 
As 
we 
have 
already 
established, the procedures governing commitment extensions are 
located in Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)-(13), not § 51.20(2).  Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20(13)(g)3. ("Upon application for extension of a 
commitment by the department or the county department having 
custody of the subject, the court shall proceed under subs. (10) 
to (13).").15  While the governing subsections specify the 
                                                 
15 The dissent is worried that our statement that "the 
procedures governing commitment extensions are located in Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20(10)-(13), not § 51.20(2)," supra, ¶27, will 
displace every other provision in § 51.20.  But this statement 
does not negate the generally-applicable provisions of § 51.20 
any more than it negates the application of the Wisconsin 
Constitution to extension proceedings.  The question at hand, of 
course, involves identifying which procedures are specific to a 
petition to extend a defendant's commitment.  And even more 
specifically, the question bears on how the County must serve 
notice of an extension hearing.  While it is true that 
§ 51.20(2) directs how service must be made, by its own terms it 
applies only to the commencement of a commitment proceeding.  
Id.  (Section 51.20(2) applies "[u]pon the filing of a petition 
for examination.") (emphasis added).  Because a petition to 
extend a commitment is a continuation of an existing commitment 
proceeding, § 51.20(2) cannot control how notice of an extension 
hearing must be accomplished. 
No.  2017AP1468 
 
22 
 
 
content of the notice, and who must be notified,16 they provide 
no specific directions with respect to the notification method.17  
They 
do, 
however, 
point 
us 
to 
the 
answer. 
 
Because 
§ 51.20(10)(c) incorporates the rules of civil procedure to the 
extent they do not conflict with Chapter 51, we need go no 
further than Wis. Stat. § 801.14(2).  There, we see that service 
on a party represented by an attorney may be accomplished by 
serving the attorney: 
Whenever under these statutes, service of pleadings 
and other papers is required or permitted to be made 
upon a party represented by an attorney, the service 
shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon 
the party in person is ordered by the court. Service 
upon the attorney or upon a party shall be made by 
delivering a copy or by mailing it to the last-known 
address, or, if no address is known, by leaving it 
with the clerk of the court. 
                                                 
16 "Within a reasonable time prior to the final hearing, the 
petitioner's counsel shall notify the subject individual and his 
or her counsel of the time and place of final hearing."  Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20(10)(a). 
17 
The 
dissent, 
to 
the 
contrary, 
says 
"the 
notice 
requirements set forth in § 51.20(2) apply to all petitions 
under Ch. 51, including petitions to extend an individual's 
commitment."  Dissent, ¶56.  But if that were true, it would 
make the notice requirement of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(a) 
entirely superfluous.  We try not to read statutory provisions 
as surplusage.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45 ("Statutory language 
is read where possible to give reasonable effect to every word, 
in order to avoid surplusage."). 
No.  2017AP1468 
 
23 
 
 
§ 801.14(2) (emphasis added).  No part of this conflicts with 
§ 51.20(10)-(13), and so it controls service of the Extension 
Hearing notice.18  
¶28 The County mailed a copy of the Extension Petition and 
the Extension Hearing notice to both Ms. L. at her last known 
address and her counsel.  Because notice to her counsel was 
sufficient pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 801.14(2), it is irrelevant 
that the copy mailed to Ms. L. was returned as undeliverable.  
There was no statutory violation in the method of service chosen 
by the County. 
                                                 
18 The dissent says we are mistaken, and that there really 
is a conflict between the "notification" provisions of Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20(10)(a) and the "service" provisions of Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.14(2). Dissent, ¶57 n.7.  The dissent's argument, while 
not adopted by any party to these proceedings, merits some 
attention. 
Ms. 
L. 
concentrated 
solely 
on 
the 
personal 
service 
requirement of § 51.20(2)(b).  She maintained her focus on that 
provision even after the County argued in its response brief 
that § 51.20(10)(c) incorporated the service provisions of 
§ 801.14(2).  Perhaps she did not make the dissent's argument 
because reading a personal-service mandate into the phrase 
"petitioner's counsel shall notify the subject individual and 
his or her counsel of the time and place of final hearing" would 
be a difficult task.  § 51.20(10)(a).  The legislature is 
familiar with language that requires personal service of a 
document, as demonstrated by the mandate in § 51.20(2)(b), which 
requires that "a law enforcement officer shall present the 
subject individual with a notice of hearing . . . ."  There are 
many ways one may provide "notice."  But to "present" something 
to an individual, one must be (as the word implies) in the 
person's presence.  The dissent would have us read the two 
provisions as requiring the same thing.  Apparently, not even 
Ms. L. was willing to attempt that equation. 
No.  2017AP1468 
 
24 
 
 
¶29 Ms. L. also contends that the County's chosen method 
of service was constitutionally defective.  It is not enough, 
she says, to go through the motions of sending notice to an 
affected party.  One must use such methods as have a reasonable 
chance of actually reaching the one to be notified.  She directs 
our attention to Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, which observed that 
"[a]n 
elementary 
and 
fundamental 
requirement 
of 
due 
process . . . is notice reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of 
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their 
objections." 
 
Most 
of 
Ms. 
L.'s 
concerns 
regarding 
the 
constitutional dimension of this method of service, however, 
were bound up with her belief that the Extension Hearing is a 
new proceeding for which the County must serve a jurisdiction-
conferring 
document.19 
 
Because 
we 
have 
rejected 
that 
                                                 
19 The dissent's insistence that Jones v. Flowers, 547 
U.S. 220 (2006), supports Ms. L.'s position is apparently also 
bound up in that belief.  Jones addressed the manner in which 
the State must provide notice to a homeowner before his house 
becomes subject to a tax sale.  After observing that Ms. L.'s 
interest in her own well-being is more compelling than Mr. 
Jones' interest in his property, the dissent asks:  "Why, then, 
is Jones afforded more due process protections than S.L.L.?"  
Dissent, ¶71. 
The answer is that Mr. Jones was not already subject to a 
court's personal jurisdiction.  It is unsurprising that, under 
that circumstance, the Supreme Court should conclude that 
something more than a certified letter was necessary before the 
State took steps to deprive him of his property interest.  
Because Ms. L. was already subject to the circuit court's 
jurisdiction, there was no need to use a jurisdiction-conferring 
method of service for the notice of hearing.   
(continued) 
No.  2017AP1468 
 
25 
 
 
proposition, she must demonstrate that service pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 801.14(2) suffers some constitutional defect when the 
court has already established jurisdiction over her.  She has 
advanced no such argument, and this method of service long ago 
passed into the realm of settled law: 
[I]t is well-accepted, black-letter law that an 
attorney is not authorized by general principles of 
agency to accept on behalf of a client service of 
process commencing an action. . . .  In contrast, the 
black-letter law is that once an action has begun and 
the attorney has appeared in the action on behalf of a 
party, service of papers may be upon the attorney. 
Gangler v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 110 Wis. 2d 649, 657, 329 
N.W.2d 186 (1983) (citing § 801.14(2) (1979-80)).   
¶30 Further, the very case on which Ms. L. founds her 
argument adequately answers her constitutional challenge to the 
method of service employed by the County:  "Thus it has been 
                                                                                                                                                             
In any event, even if we granted the dissent's premises, 
there are two reasons Jones does not create a path to Justice 
Ann Walsh Bradley's conclusion.  First, the Court did not change 
the long standing rule that "[d]ue process does not require that 
a property owner receive actual notice before the government may 
take his property."  Jones, 547 U.S. at 226 (citation omitted).  
And second, the Court also said "that when mailed notice of a 
tax sale is returned unclaimed, the State must take additional 
reasonable steps to attempt to provide notice to the property 
owner before selling his property, if it is practicable to do 
so."  Id. at 225 (emphasis added).  
Even today, Ms. L. does not say what the County should have 
done to reach her.  Neither does the dissent.  That point cannot 
be emphasized enough.  They both fault the County for the method 
of service, but offer nothing but a shrug as an alternative.  
That is not an argument, and there is no need to consider it 
further. 
No.  2017AP1468 
 
26 
 
 
recognized that, in the case of persons missing or unknown, 
employment of an indirect and even a probably futile means of 
notification is all that the situation permits and creates no 
constitutional bar to a final decree foreclosing their rights."  
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317.  One of the responsibilities Ms. L. 
agreed to undertake as a condition of leaving the MHC was 
keeping the County apprised of her current address.  She failed 
to do that.  We are not unmindful of the difficulties that 
mental 
health 
issues 
and 
homelessness 
present 
in 
these 
circumstances.  But they do not relieve Ms. L. of her 
obligations, and they do not defeat otherwise constitutional 
methods of service.  Sending notice to her at the homeless 
shelter was probably a foreseeably futile attempt when made, and 
we know as a historical matter that she did not receive it.  But 
Ms. L. has not suggested, even now, how the County was supposed 
to reach her (short of a multi-county manhunt).  Ms. L. may not 
excuse herself from these proceedings through neglect of her 
duties.  Because the County employed a proper method of service, 
and Ms. L.'s counsel actually did receive notice of the 
Extension Hearing, we conclude there was no statutory or 
constitutional infirmity in service of the notice. 
B.  Default at a Recommitment Hearing 
¶31 The Extension Order was the product, at least in part, 
of the circuit court's determination that Ms. L. was in default 
of her obligation to appear at the Extension Hearing.  The 
County says default judgment was appropriate pursuant to the 
terms of Wis. Stat. § 806.02(5), which provides that "[a] 
No.  2017AP1468 
 
27 
 
 
default judgment may be rendered against any party who has 
appeared in the action but who fails to appear at trial.  If 
proof of any fact is necessary for the court to render judgment, 
the court shall receive the proof."   
¶32 Ms. L. disagrees, and asserts there are two reasons 
circuit courts may not enter default judgments in Chapter 51 
proceedings.  First, she says she has a statutory and 
constitutionally-protected right to be present at the hearing.  
And second, she says that because Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(d) 
identifies what a circuit court may do when someone fails to 
appear for a hearing, it may not import the default judgment 
protocols of Wis. Stat. § 806.02.20 
¶33 Ms. L. unquestionably had a right to appear at the 
Extension Hearing:  "Except as may otherwise be provided by 
law, . . . a respondent in a matter listed in sub. (1) is 
entitled to be physically present in the courtroom at all trials 
and 
sentencing 
or 
dispositional 
hearings." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 885.60(2)(a).  Matters listed in subsection 1 include Chapter 
51 proceedings.  § 885.60(1).  Ms. L. also says her right to 
appear at the Extension Hearing is constitutionally protected.  
For that proposition, she cites Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 
(1979); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); In re Gault, 387 
                                                 
20 This issue is moot for the same reasons Ms. L.'s 
jurisdictional challenge is moot.  However, we will nonetheless 
address it for the same reasons we chose to resolve the first 
issue. 
No.  2017AP1468 
 
28 
 
 
U.S. 1, (1967); and Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).21  
We have no doubt that "civil commitment for any purpose 
constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires 
due process protection."  Addington, 441 U.S. at 425.  And we 
also do not doubt that Chapter 51 proceedings are subject to the 
full complement of due process guarantees.  Having said that, 
none of the cases Ms. L. cited support the proposition that 
these due process considerations guarantee the right to appear 
at a Chapter 51 trial in the same way they guarantee the right 
to appear in a criminal trial.  Although we have never directly 
considered this proposition, we will treat it as established for 
present purposes.   
¶34 To the extent Ms. L. asserts default judgment was 
inappropriate because she had the right to appear at the 
Extension Hearing, her argument does not go far enough.  Rights 
may be waived or forfeited——even constitutionally-protected 
                                                 
21 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 419 (1979) (a civil 
commitment case that answered the question of what "standard of 
proof 
is 
required 
by 
the 
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
Constitution in a civil proceeding brought under state law[.]"); 
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 505 (1972) (a writ of federal 
habeas corpus is not barred by every state procedural default, 
and an evidentiary hearing is required to determine whether 
petitioner 
knowingly 
and 
intelligently 
made 
a 
deliberate 
strategic waiver of his claims in state court); In re Gault, 387 
U.S. 1 (1967) (a review of a writ of habeas corpus where the 
Court held that a juvenile has right to notice of charges, to 
counsel, to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, 
and 
to 
privilege 
against 
self-incrimination); 
Specht 
v. 
Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967)(a review of a writ of habeas 
corpus where the Court held that applying a new act to bring new 
charges against defendant requires compliance with due process). 
No.  2017AP1468 
 
29 
 
 
rights.22  If Ms. L. is to prevail on this argument, she must do 
more than just posit the existence of her right.  She must also 
explain why her failure to appear should not be counted as a 
forfeiture of that right.  The fact that she did not personally 
know about the hearing is, in this case, an inadequate response 
because her own actions made it impossible for her to learn of 
it.  A respondent may not insulate her rights against forfeiture 
by failing to comply with the obligations to which she agreed.23  
Because Ms. L. did not explain why the right to appear at an 
                                                 
22 See, e.g., State v. Anthony, 2015 WI 20, ¶56, 361 
Wis. 2d 116, 860 N.W.2d 10 ("We now conclude that the right to 
testify may, in appropriate cases, be subject to forfeiture 
where conduct incompatible with the assertion of the right is at 
issue."); 
State 
v. 
Cummings, 
199 
Wis. 2d 721, 
756, 
546 
N.W.2d 406 (1996) ("Therefore, this court holds that there may 
be situations . . . where a circuit court must have the ability 
to find that a defendant has forfeited his right to counsel."); 
Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178, 190 (2013) ("[F]orfeiture of the 
privilege against self-incrimination need not be knowing."); 
State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶26, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 
N.W.2d 727 ("By failing to raise his objection to the use of a 
six-person jury, [defendant] forfeited his right to a twelve-
person jury."); Ness v. Digital Dial Commc'ns, Inc., 227 
Wis. 2d 592, 602, 596 N.W.2d 365 (1999) ("A party in default for 
failing to answer forfeits its due process right to notice of 
further pleadings.");  State v. Jensen, 2007 WI 26, ¶51, 299 
Wis. 2d 267, 727 N.W.2d 518 (holding that a defendant can 
forfeit his right to confront the witnesses against him if he 
wrongfully causes them to be unavailable to testify against 
him). 
 
23 The Transfer, to which Ms. L. agreed, required her to 
keep a current address on file with the County.  This was no 
mere technicality.  This was a condition precedent to release 
from the MHC.  If she had not agreed to it, presumably her 
inpatient status would have continued, and she would have 
received actual notice of the Extension Hearing in due course. 
 
No.  2017AP1468 
 
30 
 
 
extension hearing cannot be forfeited, or at least should not be 
forfeited under these circumstances, this aspect of her argument 
against default judgment is insufficiently developed for us to 
consider further.  Clean Wisconsin, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of 
Wisconsin, 
2005 
WI 93, 
¶180 
n.40, 
282 
Wis. 2d 250, 
700 
N.W.2d 768 ("We will not address undeveloped arguments.").24 
¶35 Ms. L.'s second argument against default judgment is 
that 
Chapter 
51 
contains 
a 
procedure 
for 
dealing 
with 
respondents who do not appear at hearings that is inconsistent 
with the default protocols of Wis. Stat. § 806.02(5).  If that 
                                                 
24 The dissent apparently does not believe a defendant in a 
Chapter 51 proceeding can forfeit her rights.  Dissent, ¶¶73-74.  
The author says we should be governed by Shirley J.C. v. 
Walworth Cty., 172 Wis. 2d 371, 379, 493 N.W.2d 382 (Ct. App. 
1992), in which the court of appeals held that summary judgment 
is not available in Chapter 51 proceedings in which the 
defendant "contests the commitment request."  Id. at 373.  But 
Shirley J.C. said nothing about situations in which a defendant 
does not contest the commitment request.  As discussed above, 
defendants can forfeit even constitutionally-protected rights 
through their choices and actions.  So Shirley J.C. can teach us 
nothing here unless we were to first hold that Chapter 51 
defendants, uniquely amongst all defendants in Wisconsin's 
courts, are incapable of forfeiting their rights, regardless of 
what they do or fail to do.  There is no "binding caselaw," as 
the dissent claims, that requires such an unusual conclusion. 
Dissent, ¶75. 
The dissent also says there is no evidence "to support the 
proposition that S.L.L. forfeited her right to a hearing 
'through [her] choices and actions.'"  Id., ¶74 n.12 (citation 
omitted and bracketing in original).  But this mischaracterizes 
the posture of the question.  We are not considering whether Ms. 
L. did forfeit the right to appear at the Extension Hearing.  We 
are merely considering whether it is possible to forfeit the 
right. 
 
No.  2017AP1468 
 
31 
 
 
is true, then Ms. L.'s position would be well founded inasmuch 
as Chapter 51 incorporates the rules of civil procedure 
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this chapter[.]"  Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(10)(c).  Therefore, a circuit court may not grant 
default judgment if doing so conflicts with a procedure 
prescribed by Chapter 51. 
¶36 Ms. L. identifies Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(d) as the 
provision offended by incorporation of a default judgment 
option.  That provision says that "[i]n the event that the 
subject individual is not detained and fails to appear for the 
final hearing the court may issue an order for the subject 
individual's detention and shall hold the final commitment 
hearing 
within 
7 
days 
from 
the 
time 
of 
detention."  
§ 51.20(10)(d).  From this, she concludes that "[w]hen a person 
fails to appear for a final commitment hearing, the statute only 
gives the circuit court the option of issuing a detention order 
or not issuing a detention order."  "It does not," she says, 
"give the circuit court the option of dispensing with Chapter 
51."  Ms. L. correctly notes that issuance of a detention order 
is optional——the statute says "the court may issue," and we 
traditionally interpret "may" as permissive.  Heritage Farms, 
Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2012 WI 26, ¶32, 339 Wis. 2d 125, 810 
N.W.2d 465 ("Accordingly, when interpreting a statute, we 
generally construe the word 'may' as permissive."); see also 
Zellner 
v. 
Cedarburg 
Sch. 
Dist., 
2007 
WI 53, 
¶54, 
300 
Wis. 2d 290, 731 N.W.2d 240 (citing City of Wauwatosa v. 
Milwaukee Cty., 22 Wis. 2d 184, 191, 125 N.W.2d 386 (1963)) 
No.  2017AP1468 
 
32 
 
 
("Generally, in construing statutes, the word 'may' is construed 
as permissive.").  But she incorrectly concludes that, having 
opted not to issue an order for her detention, the circuit 
court's hands were tied and it could do nothing else.  The 
statute does not say the circuit court's only options are to 
issue or not issue a detention order.  It simply made a 
detention order an available tool in Chapter 51 proceedings; it 
did not displace all of the other tools already in the toolbox.25 
¶37 Nonetheless, Ms. L. says we should be guided by our 
decision in Walworth County v. Spalding, in which we concluded 
the circuit court lacked authority to enter default judgment 
against a defendant who failed to appear at his trial on a 
charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
an intoxicant.  111 Wis. 2d 19, 22, 329 N.W.2d 925 (1983).  The 
Spalding circuit court borrowed from Wis. Stat. § 799.22(2) 
                                                 
25 The dissent acknowledges that Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(d) 
makes issuance of a detention order a discretionary decision, 
but then inexplicably agrees with Ms. L. that the statute's 
permission to issue such an order simultaneously prohibited the 
circuit court from employing any other remedy against an absent 
defendant.  That's an awful lot of responsibility to place on 
the word "may," especially when there is no textual suggestion 
that the legislature offered courts the option of a detention 
order in exchange for forfeiting all of the other compliance 
tools in the toolbox.  So the circuit court may enter a default 
judgment, it may issue a writ of capias, or it may do both.  The 
statute does not foreclose any of these options. 
No.  2017AP1468 
 
33 
 
 
(1981-82) for authority to enter default judgment.26  We held 
this was error because the traffic code, specifically Wis. Stat. 
§ 345.36 (1981-82), provided the procedure for dealing with 
defendants who do not appear for trial.  That provision says:  
"If a defendant fails to appear at the date set under this 
section, the court shall issue a warrant under ch. 968 and, if 
the alleged violator has posted bond for his appearance at that 
date, the court may order the bond forfeited."  Id. (emphasis 
added).  Because the "shall issue" language was mandatory, we 
held that "[t]he plain meaning of the statute clearly requires 
the court to issue a warrant upon the defendant's failure to 
appear . . . ."  Spalding, 111 Wis. 2d at 24.  Consequently, 
"[t]he trial court's entry of the default judgment was contrary 
to this specific procedure contained in ch. 345 and therefore 
inappropriate."  Id.  That is to say, the mandatory warrant 
procedure in § 345.36 (1981-82) emptied the circuit court's 
toolbox of all other tools for addressing a failure to appear at 
trial. 
¶38 The lesson to take from Spalding, therefore, is that a 
context-specific 
and 
mandatory 
procedure 
will 
displace 
a 
contrary general rule of civil procedure.  Here, issuance of a 
detention order under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(d) is context 
                                                 
26 This statute provides:  "When defendant fails to appear.  
If the defendant fails to appear on the return date or on the 
date set for trial, the court may enter a judgment upon due 
proof of facts which show the plaintiff entitled thereto."  Wis. 
Stat. § 799.22(2) (1981-82) (emphasis in original). 
No.  2017AP1468 
 
34 
 
 
specific, but it is not mandatory.  Therefore, it does not 
preclude the use of non-conflicting general rules of civil 
procedure.  Circuit courts have the authority, pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 806.02(5), as incorporated by § 51.20(10)(c), to enter 
default judgment for failing to appear at properly-noticed 
hearings in which the court has jurisdiction over the person.  
In this case, the circuit court had jurisdiction over Ms. L., 
the Extension Hearing had been properly noticed, Ms. L. had 
previously appeared in the action (specifically, at the initial 
commitment hearing), and she failed to appear for trial.  That 
satisfies 
the 
prerequisites 
for 
entry 
of 
default 
under 
§ 806.02(5).  Whether the circuit court had adequate evidence 
available upon which to make the findings necessary to support 
the Extension Order is the subject of Ms. L.'s third issue. 
C. 
Sufficiency of Evidence/Due Process 
¶39 Ms. L. says there was insufficient evidence of record 
to support the circuit court's entry of the Extension Order, and 
so she asks us to vacate it.  But as we discussed above, the 
passage of time has acted as a functional (if not de jure) 
vacatur because the Extension Order no longer has any force or 
effect.  And that would seem to make this issue moot just like 
the first two.  Ms. L., however, insists this issue is not like 
the others.  She believes she is still subject to legal injury 
because the simple expiration of the Extension Order does not 
"expunge 
the 
court 
records, 
or 
invalidate 
the 
examining 
physician reports."  She is also concerned that Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.30(3)(b) allows any corporation counsel to access her files 
No.  2017AP1468 
 
35 
 
 
and court records for the purpose of preparing for "commitment 
and 
recommitment 
proceedings, 
reexaminations, 
appeals, 
detentions, and commitments under Chapters 55, 971, 975 or 980."   
Not only that, she says, § 51.30(4)(b)(5) "gives DHS [Department 
of Health Services] staff access to all of S.L.L.'s treatment 
records to determine her progress and the least restrictive or 
more appropriate treatment modalities and facilities," and 
§ 51.30(4)(b)(11) "gives corporation counsel full access to 
treatment records 'without modification, at any time' to prepare 
for commitments, recommitments, patient's rights claims, or 
actions under Chapters 48, 971, 975, or 980." 
¶40 For the purpose of determining whether this issue is 
moot, we will assume that Ms. L. correctly recites what may be 
done with her records.  But even accepting all of that, we do 
not agree that resolving this issue can "have any practical 
effect upon an existing controversy."  Leitner, 253 Wis. 2d 449, 
¶13.  If we reviewed the evidentiary basis for the Extension 
Order and found it lacking, the proper response would be to 
reverse the court of appeals and direct vacatur of the order.  
But vacatur is not the same thing as expungement.  The Extension 
Order would still be a matter of record; it would simply have no 
operative effect.  And vacating the Extension Order would have 
absolutely no effect at all on Ms. L.'s examining physician 
reports, treatment records, court files, or records relating to 
previous proceedings in this case.  So corporation counsel and 
DHS staff would still be able to access them for the purposes 
Ms. L. described.  Therefore, successfully challenging the 
No.  2017AP1468 
 
36 
 
 
evidentiary basis of the Extension Order would not protect Ms. 
L. against any of the consequences that give her concern.  This 
issue is moot.  
¶41 As we demonstrated above, we sometimes review issues 
even though they are moot.  There are five recognized 
circumstances in which we will do so, two of which we have 
already discussed.  The other three involve situations in which 
"the constitutionality of a statute is involved" (which is 
obviously not the case here), or "where the precise situation 
under consideration arises so frequently that a definitive 
decision is essential to guide the trial courts," or "where the 
issue is likely to arise again and should be resolved by the 
court to avoid uncertainty."  Id., ¶14.  Challenges to the 
sufficiency of evidence are necessarily fact-bound inquiries 
that will vary from case to case.  Therefore, a definitive 
decision in this case would provide no guidance to circuit 
courts, nor would it preclude uncertainty in evaluation of 
evidentiary sufficiency in other cases.  There is no reason to 
deviate from our mootness doctrine with respect to this issue. 
¶42 Additionally, the County argued that Ms. L. did not 
preserve this issue for appellate review.  The Extension Hearing 
transcript reveals that Ms. L.'s counsel raised no objection 
with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence.  To avoid 
waiver, 
litigants 
must 
lodge 
their 
trial 
objections 
contemporaneously with the error.  See Wis. Stat. § 805.11(1) 
("Any party who has fair opportunity to object before a ruling 
or order is made must do so in order to avoid waiving error.").  
No.  2017AP1468 
 
37 
 
 
And when a party raises an objection, it "must specify the 
grounds on which the party predicates the objection or claim of 
error."  § 805.11(2).  There are no exceptions to these 
requirements.  § 805.11(3) ("Exceptions shall never be made.").  
Ms. L. did not respond to the County's argument on this point, 
and so we take it as conceded.  Hoffman v. Econ. Preferred Ins. 
Co., 2000 WI App 22, ¶9, 232 Wis. 2d 53, 606 N.W.2d 590 (Ct. 
App. 1999) ("An argument to which no response is made may be 
deemed conceded for purposes of appeal."). 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶43 We hold that, for purposes of personal jurisdiction in 
a Chapter 51 proceeding, an extension hearing is a continuation 
of the original commitment proceeding and previous extension 
hearings.  Therefore, the circuit court had jurisdiction over 
Ms. L. both at the Extension Hearing and when it entered the 
Extension Order because both occurred prior to expiration of the 
Initial Commitment.  Consequently, the method of service and 
content of the notice of the Extension Hearing were neither 
statutorily nor constitutionally infirm.  We also hold that, 
with respect to extension hearings conducted pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20(13)(g)3., circuit courts have the authority to 
enter 
default 
judgments 
in 
compliance 
with 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 806.02(5).  We choose not to review the evidentiary foundation 
for the Extension Order because the issue is moot and was not 
preserved for appellate review. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.
No.  2017AP1468.awb 
 
1 
 
¶44 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  In seeking to 
extend the involuntary commitment of S.L.L., Waukesha County 
encountered a problem:  S.L.L., a homeless individual, was 
nowhere to be found.  As a result, she did not receive notice of 
the County's intent to extend her commitment. 
¶45 Regardless, the County forged ahead with commitment 
proceedings.  In S.L.L.'s absence, it obtained from the circuit 
court 
a 
default 
order 
extending 
S.L.L.'s 
commitment.  
Additionally, it sought and received an order authorizing the 
involuntary administration of psychotropic medication. 
¶46 Despite the injustice apparent on the face of such an 
in absentia procedure, the majority declares that individuals 
may be defaulted into civil commitment without notice of the 
commitment hearing.  It creates a procedural end-run around a 
merits hearing in which an individual's physical liberty hangs 
in the balance. 
¶47 Worse yet, it permits subjecting an individual to 
involuntary——including forced——administration of psychotropic 
medication immediately upon the individual's detention, without 
assessing dangerousness and without providing notice or an 
opportunity to be heard. 
No.  2017AP1468.awb 
 
2 
 
¶48 Psychotropic medication is not aspirin.  Such powerful 
medications 
are 
mind-altering 
and 
can 
have 
severe 
and 
irreversible side effects——immobilizing mind and body.1 
¶49 Because neither Wisconsin statutes nor due process 
countenance such in absentia orders, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶50 S.L.L. had been previously subject to a Chapter 51 
mental commitment.  Before that commitment expired, the County 
applied to the circuit court for a 12-month extension of her 
commitment.  Majority op., ¶6.  The circuit court scheduled a 
hearing on the petition and sent a notice of the hearing to 
S.L.L.'s attorney and to her last known address——a homeless 
shelter from which she had been banned.2  Id.  Not surprisingly, 
the notice directed to S.L.L. was returned as undeliverable.3  
Id. 
                                                 
1 The administration of psychotropic drugs is no trifling 
matter.  See K.N.K v. Buhler, 139 Wis. 2d 190, 207 n.3, 407 
N.W.2d 281 (Ct. App. 1987); In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 
N.E.2d 40, 436-37 (Mass. 1981) (explaining that antipsychotic 
medication "[is] powerful enough to immobilize mind and body[,]" 
has a "profound effect . . . on the thought processes of an 
individual[,]" and has a "well-established likelihood of severe 
and irreversible adverse side effects . . . ."). 
2 A report from the Waukesha County Community Human Services 
Department in the record notes that S.L.L. was "not permitted to 
be [at the homeless shelter] due to her behavior." 
3 The 
majority's 
characterization 
of 
the 
facts 
is 
misleading.  It accuses S.L.L. of "absconding" from treatment.  
Majority op., ¶5.  To "abscond" means "[t]o depart secretly or 
suddenly, esp. to avoid arrest, prosecution, or service of 
process."  Black's Law Dictionary 8 (10th ed. 2014). 
(continued) 
No.  2017AP1468.awb 
 
3 
 
¶51 On the appointed day for the extension hearing, 
S.L.L., having received no notice, was not present.  Id., ¶7.  
Nevertheless, the circuit court proceeded in her absence.  Id.  
Her attorney attended and made arguments on her behalf.4  Id. 
¶52 After determining that S.L.L. remained subject to its 
jurisdiction, the circuit court found:  "She has not appeared 
here today.  She's in default of her right to object."  See id.  
Based on S.L.L.'s alleged default, the circuit court extended 
her commitment:  "I'm [going to find] the elements, based upon 
that default, to extend. . . . I'll find that she continues to 
be mentally ill.  I'll find that she is a proper subject for 
treatment . . . ." 
¶53 Accordingly, 
the 
circuit 
court 
extended 
S.L.L.'s 
commitment for twelve months.  Id.  It further ordered that the 
County be authorized to involuntarily medicate S.L.L. for the 
duration of her commitment.  Id. 
¶54 The majority determines that the circuit court's 
procedure as delineated above complied with both statutory and 
constitutional requirements.  In the majority's view, service of 
the notice of hearing on S.L.L.'s attorney was sufficient and it 
is "irrelevant that the copy mailed to Ms. L. was returned as 
                                                                                                                                                             
There is not a single shred of evidence in the record to 
support the assertion that S.L.L. "absconded" from treatment.  
Indeed, there is no evidence in the record to support any 
conclusions as to why S.L.L. stopped showing up for her 
scheduled treatments. 
4 S.L.L.'s attorney had not heard from S.L.L. and had no 
information as to her whereabouts.  Majority op., ¶7 n.7. 
No.  2017AP1468.awb 
 
4 
 
undeliverable."  Id., ¶28.  It further posits that although 
"[s]ending notice to her at the homeless shelter was probably a 
foreseeably futile attempt when made," it was nevertheless 
constitutionally sufficient due to S.L.L.'s "failure" to "keep[] 
the County apprised of her current address."  Id., ¶30. 
II 
¶55 The majority errs in its interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20. 
¶56 In an initial misstep, the majority erroneously claims 
that Wis. Stat. §§ 51.20(10)-(13) are the only provisions that 
govern the procedure for commitment extension hearings.  See 
majority op., ¶27.  It is true that § 51.20(13)(g)3. directs the 
court to subsections (10)-(13) "[u]pon application for extension 
of a commitment[,]" but in order to "apply" for a commitment 
extension, the government is required to file a petition under 
§ 51.20(1).5  The notice requirements set forth in § 51.20(2) 
apply to all petitions under ch. 51, including petitions to 
extend an individual's commitment.  Additionally, even a cursory 
                                                 
5 We know that compliance with Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1) is 
required 
for 
commitment 
extension 
proceedings 
because 
§ 51.20(1)(am) 
provides 
an 
alternate 
path 
to 
prove 
an 
individual's dangerousness that can only be taken "[i]f the 
individual 
has 
been 
the 
subject 
of 
inpatient 
treatment . . . immediately 
prior 
to 
commencement 
of 
the 
proceedings . . . ." 
No.  2017AP1468.awb 
 
5 
 
review of § 51.20 as a whole reveals that other subsections are 
applicable as well.6 
¶57 Even if one were to wear textual blinders as the 
majority wishes, Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(a) explicitly requires 
the government to notify "the subject individual and his or her 
counsel of the time and place of final hearing."7  This stands in 
contrast 
to 
other 
provisions 
in 
§ 51.20, 
under 
which 
statutorily-sufficient service can be accomplished by serving 
                                                 
6 For example, Wis. Stat. § 51.20(3) provides that at the 
time a petition for commitment is filed, the court is required 
to ensure that the subject individual is represented by 
adversary counsel by referring the individual to the state 
public defender.  Is it the majority's position that this 
subsection does not apply to commitment extension proceedings? 
Similarly, § 51.20(5)(a) states that all hearings required 
to be held under Chapter 51 "shall conform to the essentials of 
due process and fair treatment including the right to an open 
hearing, the right to request a closed hearing, the right to 
counsel, the right to present and cross-examine witnesses, the 
right to remain silent and the right to a jury trial if 
requested under sub. (11)."  Is it the majority's position that 
this 
subsection 
does 
not 
apply 
to 
commitment 
extension 
proceedings? 
7 The majority relies on Wis. Stat. § 801.14(2), asserting 
that service upon S.L.L.'s attorney is sufficient.  Majority 
op., ¶27.  It contends that "[n]o part of this [statute] 
conflicts with § 51.20(10)-(13), and so it controls service of 
the Extension Hearing notice."  Id. 
However, the majority acknowledges that Chapter 801 is 
incorporated into Chapter 51 only to the extent it does not 
conflict with Chapter 51.  Id., ¶22.  Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(a) 
requires the government to notify "the subject individual and 
his or her counsel of the time and place of final hearing" 
(emphasis added).  Section 801.14(2) does not require service on 
the 
subject 
individual 
and 
therefore 
conflicts 
with 
§ 51.20(10)(a).  There is no need to go to Chapter 801 for an 
answer that Chapter 51 already provides. 
No.  2017AP1468.awb 
 
6 
 
only the subject individual's counsel.8  "And" does not mean 
"or."  Pursuant to § 51.20(10), service of notice upon S.L.L.'s 
attorney, but not S.L.L., was statutorily insufficient.9 
¶58 The 
majority 
compounds 
its 
error 
in 
statutory 
interpretation by misreading Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(d).  This 
subsection provides a procedure to follow in just the situation 
that arose here:  "In the event that the subject individual is 
not detained and fails to appear for the final hearing the court 
may issue an order for the subject individual's detention and 
shall hold the final commitment hearing within 7 days from the 
time of detention."  § 51.20(10)(d). 
¶59 Although I acknowledge, as the majority does, that the 
first clause of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(d) contains permissive 
"may" language, the second clause of the statute contains 
mandatory "shall" language.  See majority op., ¶36.  The statute 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 51.20(8)(bg) (notice of subject 
individual's noncompliance with treatment agreement sent only to 
subject individual's counsel, not the subject individual); 
§ 51.20(11) (right to jury trial deemed waived unless demanded 
at least 48 hours in advance of final hearing provided that 
either the subject individual or her counsel received notice of 
the final hearing). 
9 As the majority acknowledges, compliance with "statutory 
provisions regarding service of process is required before a [] 
court has personal jurisdiction."  Majority op., ¶12 (citing 
State v. Aufderhaar, 2005 WI 108, ¶27, 283 Wis. 2d 336, 700 
N.W.2d 4).  The majority further acknowledges that "if Ms. L. is 
right about having not received proper notice, the Extension 
Order was void from the beginning" for want of personal 
jurisdiction.  Majority op., ¶13.  This is a correct statement.  
Accordingly, because the service provisions of Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(10) were not followed, the circuit court lacked personal 
jurisdiction over S.L.L. 
No.  2017AP1468.awb 
 
7 
 
provides that the final commitment hearing shall be held within 
seven days from the time of detention.  Pursuant to the statute, 
if there is no detention, the final hearing cannot be held.  As 
S.L.L. argues in her reply brief, "When a person fails to appear 
for a final commitment hearing, the statute only gives the 
circuit court the option of issuing a detention order or not 
issuing a detention order.  It does not give the circuit court 
the option of dispensing with Chapter 51." 
¶60 Chapter 51 contains no default judgment provision.  
Nevertheless, the majority ignores the statutorily mandated 
procedure and reaches out to utilize a default judgment 
procedure found nowhere in the text of the chapter.10  This 
allows for the involuntary commitment and medication of an 
                                                 
10 The majority says that "there is no textual suggestion 
that the legislature offered courts the option of a detention 
order in exchange for forfeiting all of the other compliance 
tools in the toolbox."  Majority op., ¶36 n.25. 
The issuance of a default judgment is not a "compliance 
tool."  The statutorily-prescribed "compliance tool" is the 
issuance of a detention order.  The subject individual's 
"compliance" is compelled by being detained and brought before 
the court within a short period of time for the purpose of 
conducting 
a 
hearing 
on 
the 
merits 
of 
the 
government's 
commitment petition.  Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(d). 
Here, the circuit court issued both a default judgment and 
a detention order.  One wonders whether the detention order was 
a pointless "compliance tool" when issued in conjunction with a 
default judgment.  That is, why would a court issue a detention 
order for the purpose of detaining the individual and holding a 
final hearing on the merits if a default order for commitment 
extension has already been issued, and the individual must first 
obtain relief from the default judgment before proceeding to the 
final ch. 51 merits hearing? 
No.  2017AP1468.awb 
 
8 
 
individual without any in-person assessment regarding the 
individual's dangerousness.  See Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.  
Additionally, 
it 
permits 
subjecting 
an 
individual 
to 
involuntary——even 
forced——administration 
of 
psychotropic 
medication immediately upon detention without any notice or the 
opportunity to be heard. 
III 
 
¶61 The majority further errs by approving an egregious 
violation of due process. 
¶62 "The essence of due process is the requirement that 'a 
person in jeopardy of serious loss (be given) notice of the case 
against him and opportunity to meet it.'"  Mathews v. Eldridge, 
424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976).  Although due process does not require 
actual notice, due process does require the government to 
provide 
"notice 
reasonably 
calculated, 
under 
all 
the 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of 
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their 
objections."  Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 
306, 314 (1950). 
¶63 Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006), provides an apt 
comparison.  In Jones, the Supreme Court discussed the notice 
that is due before the government may extinguish an individual's 
rights in real property to satisfy a tax delinquency.  Id. at 
223. 
¶64 Jones was delinquent on his property taxes, and the 
State of Arkansas sought to sell his property to satisfy the 
delinquency.  Id. at 223-24.  The Commissioner of State Lands 
No.  2017AP1468.awb 
 
9 
 
attempted to notify Jones of his delinquency and his right to 
redeem the property by mailing a certified letter to Jones at 
the delinquent property, but the letter was returned, unopened, 
and marked "unclaimed".  Id. 
¶65 Two years later, and just a few weeks before the 
public sale, the Commissioner published a notice of public sale 
in a local newspaper.  Id. at 224.  The Commissioner mailed 
another certified letter to Jones at the delinquent property 
attempting to notify him that his house would be sold if he did 
not pay his taxes.  Id.  This second letter was also returned, 
unopened, and marked "unclaimed," and the property was sold.  
Id. 
¶66 The Supreme Court concluded "that when mailed notice 
of a tax sale is returned unclaimed, the State must take 
additional reasonable steps to attempt to provide notice to the 
property owner before selling his property."  Id. at 225.  Its 
determination rested on the principle that "when notice is a 
person's due . . . [t]he means employed must be such as one 
desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably 
adopt to accomplish it, and that assessing the adequacy of a 
particular form of notice requires balancing the interest of the 
State against the individual interest sought to be protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment."  Id. at 229 (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). 
¶67 By 
way 
of 
analogy, 
the 
Court 
likened 
the 
Commissioner's inaction in the face of the unclaimed letters as 
akin to the Commissioner watching the postman accidentally drop 
No.  2017AP1468.awb 
 
10 
 
the notice down a storm drain without bothering to prepare and 
send a new notice.  Id.  "No one 'desirous of actually 
informing' the owners would simply shrug his shoulders as the 
letters disappeared and say 'I tried.'"  Id. 
¶68 Here, the facts and consequences are even more 
egregious than those in Jones.  In Jones, the Commissioner did 
not know that notice would be ineffective at the time he sent 
the certified letters to the delinquent property.  On the other 
hand, in this case, the County sent notice to the one location 
in Wisconsin that it knew S.L.L. would not be——the homeless 
shelter from which she had been banned.  No one desirous of 
actually informing S.L.L. of the commitment extension hearing 
would have mailed notice to a place known to have banned S.L.L. 
and then called it quits.  The Constitution requires that 
additional reasonable steps be taken to attempt to provide 
notice to the affected party. 
¶69 Yet, the majority today accepts the very argument that 
was rejected by the Supreme Court in Jones.  The Commissioner in 
Jones argued that reasonable follow-up measures were not 
required because "notice was sent to an address that Jones 
provided and had a legal obligation to keep updated."  Id. at 
231.  Rejecting this argument, the Court determined that Jones' 
failure to comply with a statutory obligation to keep his 
address updated did not forfeit his right to constitutionally-
sufficient notice.  Id. at 232 (citations omitted). 
¶70 The County makes the same argument in this case.  
Rather than follow Jones, however, the majority instead places 
No.  2017AP1468.awb 
 
11 
 
the blame for not receiving notice at the feet of S.L.L.  This 
is particularly troubling because S.L.L., who previously was 
determined to be mentally ill, has experienced homelessness and 
may still be homeless.  The government is required "to consider 
unique information about an intended recipient regardless of 
whether a statutory scheme is reasonably calculated to provide 
notice in the ordinary case."  Id. at 230.  Yet, the majority 
relieves the County of this requirement. 
¶71 Jones dealt with the process due before extinguishing 
an individual's property rights.  Id. at 223.  S.L.L.'s interest 
in this case, i.e., her physical liberty and interest in 
avoiding 
the 
involuntary 
administration 
of 
psychotropic 
medication, must be at least as important as Jones' property 
rights.  Why, then, is Jones afforded more due process 
protections than S.L.L.?  The majority does not (and cannot) 
explain.11 
¶72 In addition to disregarding binding federal case law, 
the majority also contradicts binding Wisconsin case law.  
Specifically, in Shirley J.C. v. Walworth Cty., 172 Wis. 2d 371, 
373, 493 N.W.2d 382 (Ct. App. 1992), the court of appeals 
concluded that granting summary judgment to the county in the 
context of a Chapter 51 commitment violated due process. 
                                                 
11 If the Supreme Court in Jones had based its analysis on 
the court's lack of personal jurisdiction over Jones, as the 
majority claims, one would expect a discussion of personal 
jurisdiction in the opinion.  See majority op., ¶29 n.19.  Not 
only did the Supreme Court not discuss personal jurisdiction in 
Jones, it did not even mention the term. 
No.  2017AP1468.awb 
 
12 
 
¶73 It observed that Wis. Stat. § 51.20 does not allow 
commitment without a hearing, and if summary judgment were 
allowed, "the hearing requirement in the statute would be 
meaningless."  Id. at 378.  Paramount to the court of appeals' 
analysis was that the final hearing in a Chapter 51 case 
determines whether the subject individual will lose her liberty.  
Id. at 379-80. 
¶74 If summary judgment is disallowed in a Chapter 51 
commitment case, how can it be that default judgments are 
allowed?12  Chapter 51 is explicit that a final hearing on the 
merits must be held before the subject individual is committed.  
Id. at 378 (citing Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(c)).  Yet, by allowing 
an individual to be defaulted into commitment, the majority 
creates a loophole by which that final hearing can be avoided 
and involuntary psychotropic medication can be administered 
immediately 
upon 
the 
individual's 
detention 
without 
an 
assessment of dangerousness and with no hearing whatsoever. 
¶75 Unlike the majority, I would follow binding case law 
and conclude that the County failed to take constitutionally-
sufficient steps to provide notice of the commitment extension 
                                                 
12 The majority claims that its analysis can live in harmony 
with Shirley J.C. v. Walworth Cty., 172 Wis. 2d 371, 493 
N.W.2d 382 (Ct. App. 1992).  It says that default judgments in 
ch. 
51 
cases 
are 
justified 
because, 
in 
such 
instances, 
individuals have "forfeited" their rights "through their choices 
and actions."  Majority op., ¶34 n.24.  This statement ignores 
the fact that S.L.L. received no notice of her final hearing, 
and there is no evidence whatsoever to support the proposition 
that S.L.L. forfeited her right to a hearing "through [her] 
choices and actions."  See supra, ¶7 n.3. 
No.  2017AP1468.awb 
 
13 
 
hearing to S.L.L., resulting in a default judgment of commitment 
that violates due process. 
¶76 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶77 I am authorized to state that Justices SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and REBECCA FRANK DALLET join this dissent. 
 
No.  2017AP1468.awb 
 
1