Title: Baker v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
JONTREIL LAMAR BAKER 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 120252 
JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR. 
 
 
 
November 1, 2012 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether evidence of the 
possession of one firearm on three separate occasions can 
constitute three separate charges for possession of a firearm 
by a convicted felon in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2(A). 
I. 
Background 
Jontreil Lamar Baker, a convicted felon, and Calvin 
Williams visited Charna Chapman in the home that she shared 
with a roommate in Suffolk.  During their visit, Chapman showed 
Baker her Hi-Point Firearms .380 caliber pistol.  Baker offered 
to purchase the firearm, but Chapman refused to sell. 
The next day, Chapman and her roommate returned home to 
find that the door they had locked just hours before was now 
easily pushed open.  The home had been burglarized and 
Chapman's firearm was missing.  While they were away, Baker had 
entered the home through a window, taken the firearm, and left 
out of the front door.  When Williams picked him up a block 
away from the home just minutes after the burglary, Baker 
displayed the firearm as he entered the car. 
 
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Several weeks later, Baker showed Marvin Donnell McKinney 
a Hi-Point .380 caliber pistol, which he offered to sell.  
After noting his interest, McKinney contacted Detective William 
N. Shockley of the City of Suffolk Police Department to inform 
him of the offer.  Detective Shockley and McKinney organized a 
"controlled purchase" of the firearm to occur the following 
day.  Detective Shockley observed McKinney meet with Baker and 
receive a Hi-Point .380 caliber pistol in exchange for $225.  
The firearm was later confirmed to be Chapman's missing 
firearm. 
Baker was arrested and tried in the Circuit Court of the 
City of Suffolk.  He was convicted of three counts of 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 
Code § 18.2-308.2(A).*  Baker sought review in the Court of 
Appeals, where he argued that the trial court erred in 
convicting him of three counts of possession of a firearm by a 
convicted felon because he should have been convicted of only 
one continuous possession. 
The Court of Appeals disagreed with Baker, holding that 
" 'the number of occasions' appropriately delineates the unit 
                     
 
* Baker was also convicted of statutory burglary in 
violation of Code §§ 18.2-90 and 18.2-91, grand larceny of a 
firearm in violation of Code § 18.2-95, and conspiracy to 
commit statutory burglary and/or grand larceny of a firearm in 
violation of Code § 18.2-22.  On appeal, Baker does not 
challenge these three convictions. 
 
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of prosecution constituting one offense of 'possession' under 
Code § 18.2-308.2."  Baker v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 146, 
153, 717 S.E.2d 442, 445 (2011) (quoting Brown v. Commonwealth, 
Record No. 1438-00-1 (June 12, 2001)).  The Court of Appeals 
upheld all three possession convictions, holding that an 
"occasion" is defined as a "particular occurrence" or a 
"particular time," and that each of the convictions was based 
on "distinguishable incidents." Id. at 152-54, 717 S.E.2d at 
445-46. 
II. 
Analysis 
Baker contends that the Court of Appeals erred in 
affirming his three convictions for possession of a firearm by 
a convicted felon under Code § 18.2-308.2(A) because the 
conduct charged should have constituted one continuous 
possession.  He claims that the use of the concept of separate 
"occasions" as the relevant unit of prosecution fails to 
describe what length or duration of possession is sufficient to 
constitute a separate offense.  Baker argues that under this 
ambiguous standard, a felon who comes into possession of a 
firearm, takes it home, and places it in a safe for a year 
could be convicted of 365 separate violations of Code § 18.2-
308.2(A). 
 
According to the Commonwealth, each separate and distinct 
occasion would constitute a separate possession under Code 
 
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§ 18.2-308.2(A), thereby justifying three separate convictions 
of Baker under the statute.  In response to Baker's contention 
that such a finding could lead to 365 convictions for a year of 
continuous possession of a firearm in a locked safe, the 
Commonwealth points out that such a situation could not occur 
because separate and distinct occasions of possession must be 
proven by the Commonwealth for each individual conviction.  The 
Commonwealth contends that if a firearm remained untouched in a 
safe for 365 days, nothing separate or distinct would occur to 
establish a new occasion under the statute.  Nor would there be 
evidence to prove possession on each of the 365 days of that 
year.  We agree with the Commonwealth that the three 
convictions should be affirmed as each is a separate and 
distinct act or occurrence of possession, however, we reject as 
unclear the term "unit of prosecution" previously employed by 
the Court of Appeals. 
 
In this issue of statutory construction, we conduct a de 
novo review.  Kozmina v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 347, 349, 706 
S.E.2d 860, 862 (2011).  Code § 18.2-308.2(A) provides, in 
pertinent part, "[i]t shall be unlawful for . . . any person 
who has been convicted of a felony . . . to knowingly and 
intentionally possess or transport any firearm . . . or to 
knowingly and intentionally carry about his person, hidden from 
common observation, any weapon described in subsection A of 
 
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§ 18.2-308."  In interpreting this statute, "courts apply the 
plain meaning . . . unless the terms are ambiguous or applying 
the plain language would lead to an absurd result." Boynton v. 
Kilgore, 271 Va. 220, 227, 623 S.E.2d 922, 926 (2006).  A 
statute is considered ambiguous "if the text can be understood 
in more than one way or refers to two or more things 
simultaneously or when the language is difficult to comprehend, 
is of doubtful import, or lacks clearness or definiteness."  
Id. at 227 n.8, 623 S.E.2d at 926 n.8 (citations, internal 
quotation marks, and alteration omitted).  This statute, Code 
§ 18.2-308.2(A), lacks definition and is therefore ambiguous as 
to whether possession of a single firearm on different dates or 
at different times constitutes one continuous offense or 
multiple offenses. 
 
Since we find the statute ambiguous as to when one offense 
ends and the next begins, we join the Court of Appeals of 
Virginia and the appellate courts of many other jurisdictions 
in using the gravamen of the offense to determine the 
legislature's intent.  See, e.g., Acey v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. 
App. 240, 249-50, 511 S.E.2d 429, 433-34 (1999) (finding 
simultaneous possession of multiple firearms does not justify 
multiple convictions for possession because the possession of a 
firearm by a felon is, of itself, the dangerousness that is the 
gravamen of the offense of possession); United States v. Evans, 
 
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854 F.2d 56, 60 (5th Cir. 1988) (determining that the making of 
a false statement, not the acquisition of the firearm, was the 
gravamen of the offense of the crime of furnishing false 
identification made in connection with the purchase of firearms 
and ammunition); Bautista v. State, 863 So. 2d 1180, 1186-87 
(Fla. 2003) (finding the gravamen of the offense of DUI 
manslaughter to be the killing of a human being rather than a 
traffic violation). 
 
In creating this statutory offense, the General Assembly 
recognized that each act of possessing the firearm places the 
public in a heightened level of danger that does not coincide 
with the defendant's initial receipt of the firearm.  This is 
evidenced by the language of Code § 18.2-308.2(A), which, along 
with possession of a firearm, includes specific prohibitions 
against the distinct acts of transporting a firearm and 
"carry[ing] about [the felon's] person, hidden from common 
observation, any weapon" named in the statute.  We have held 
that "every part of a statute is presumed to have some effect 
and no part will be considered meaningless unless absolutely 
necessary."  Hubbard v. Henrico Ltd. P'ship, 255 Va. 335, 340, 
497 S.E.2d 335, 338 (1998).  We therefore find that the 
inclusion of these specific references expresses the General 
Assembly's intent that separate instances of possession, and 
therefore of heightened danger to the community, be punished 
 
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separately.  If the statute was meant to restrict the offense 
only to the receipt, initial possession, or even extended 
possession of the weapon, such a specific reference to the 
transporting or carrying of that weapon would be a frivolous 
and unnecessary addition to the statutory language. The 
implicit danger in each separate instance of possession was 
also noted by the Court in Armstrong v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 
573, 582-83, 562 S.E.2d 139, 144 (2002), where we found a felon 
"unfit to possess firearms," making each possession of a 
firearm by a felon, whether for a lawful or unlawful purpose, 
the conduct the General Assembly intended to curtail.  
 
The General Assembly's goal in punishing a convicted felon 
for possessing or transporting a firearm is therefore not 
limited to preventing a felon's receipt or initial possession 
of a firearm, but extends to the prevention of the heightened 
danger each new instance of possession creates.  In light of 
the legislative intent behind this provision, each separate 
incident of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon proven 
by the Commonwealth establishes a new offense because each 
incident is sufficient to create a new danger to members of the 
community exposed to the armed felon. 
 
This is a position similar to those taken by other 
jurisdictions with regards to the distinction between separate 
offenses of possession, and it is consistent with the harm that 
 
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the General Assembly intended to address with this statute.  
See United States v. Jones, 841 F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir. 
1988) (finding no division between unlawful receipt and 
unlawful possession of a firearm because no new date or 
specific act or transaction was proven by the government); 
Melton v. State, 842 A.2d 743, 757 (Md. 2004) (holding that 
only a single conviction was justified when the defendant 
committed only one act of possession but was a member of more 
than one of the nine listed classes prohibited from possessing 
the firearm); State v. Johnson, No. 52370-8-I, 2004 Wash. App. 
LEXIS 1132, at *8-11 (Wash. Ct. App. June 1, 2004) 
(unpublished) (explaining that "any firearm" in the possession 
statute indicated an intention that each "separate instance of 
unlawful possession . . . constitute a violation"). 
 
In accordance with the gravamen of the offense, we hold 
that a new offense of possession can be established with each 
separate act or occurrence that can be proven by the 
government.  Under this analysis, each of the three convictions 
under Code § 18.2-308.2(A) derive from distinct offenses.  The 
first conviction was based on the possession of the firearm the 
day it was stolen, supported by evidence of the burglary and 
Williams' testimony that the firearm was displayed to him by 
Baker on the same day.  The second conviction was based on the 
possession of the same firearm several weeks later, supported 
 
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by evidence of Baker's attempt to sell the firearm to McKinney.  
The final conviction was for the possession, display, and sale 
of the firearm by Baker the following day, which was observed 
by Detective Shockley and testified to by the recipient of the 
firearm.  These incidents constitute distinct acts or 
occurrences, each reflecting an enhanced danger to the public, 
and convictions for the three separate charges on the facts of 
this case are therefore valid under Code § 18.2-308.2(A). 
III. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Court of 
Appeals did not err in affirming the three convictions under 
Code § 18.2-308.2(A) for separate acts or occurrences as proven 
by the Commonwealth.  We will affirm the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
In my opinion, the majority fails to apply a crucial rule 
of statutory construction applicable to unit of prosecution 
cases such as this one.  In so doing, the majority ignores the 
necessary application of the rule of lenity requiring that we 
construe an ambiguous statute in a criminal defendant’s favor.  
Therefore, I must respectfully dissent. 
As the majority correctly notes, Code § 18.2-308.2(A) is 
ambiguous as to what the proper unit of prosecution is under 
 
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the statute.  Code § 18.2-308.2(A) does not indicate 
unambiguously whether the General Assembly intended to create a 
separate offense for each “occasion” on which a felon possesses 
a firearm during a certain period of time.  To resolve the 
ambiguity, we must look to the General Assembly’s intent in 
enacting the statute. 
In attempting to ascertain the General Assembly’s intent, 
the majority is correct that we must look to the gravamen of 
the offense.  However, we must also be mindful of the fact that 
“[w]hen a penal statute is unclear, the statute must be 
strictly construed against the Commonwealth and in favor of an 
accused’s liberty, and the accused is entitled to the benefit 
of any reasonable doubt concerning the statute's construction.”  
Waldrop v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 210, 214, 495 S.E.2d 822, 825 
(1998) (emphasis added).  Indeed, we have previously recognized 
that, before the accused can be punished, “‘his case must be 
plainly and unmistakably within the statute.’”  Harward v. 
Commonwealth, 229 Va. 363, 365, 330 S.E.2d 89, 90 (1985) 
(quoting United States v. Lacher, 134 U.S. 624, 628 (1890)). 
The United State Supreme Court has provided guidelines for 
the proper application of such a rule of lenity: 
When Congress has the will it has no difficulty in 
expressing it – when it has the will, that is, of 
defining what it desires to make the unit of 
prosecution and, more particularly, to make each 
stick in a faggot a single criminal unit.  When 
 
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Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing 
to Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity should 
be resolved in favor of lenity.  And this not out of 
any sentimental consideration, or for want of 
sympathy with the purpose of Congress in proscribing 
evil or antisocial conduct.  It may fairly be said to 
be a presupposition of our law to resolve doubts in 
the enforcement of a penal code against the 
imposition of a harsher punishment.  This in no wise 
implies that language used in criminal statutes 
should not be read with the saving grace of common 
sense with which other enactments, not cast in 
technical language, are to be read.  Nor does it 
assume that offenders against the law carefully read 
the penal code before they embark on crime.  It 
merely means that if Congress does not fix the 
punishment for a federal offense clearly and without 
ambiguity, doubt will be resolved against turning a 
single transaction into multiple offenses . . . . 
Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83-84 (1955) (emphasis 
added). 
 
In the present case, it is undisputed that the “gravamen 
of the offense” under Code § 18.2-308.2 is “the possession of a 
firearm by a felon.”  Acey v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 240, 
250, 511 S.E.2d 429, 433-34 (1999) (emphasis added).  
Furthermore, it has been recognized that “[p]ossession is by 
nature a continuing offense.”  Jordan v. Virginia, 653 F.2d 
870, 875 (4th Cir. 1980); see also Morris v. Commonwealth, 51 
Va. App. 459, 467, 658 S.E.2d 708, 712 (2008).  “A continuing 
offense is a continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on 
foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent 
force, however long a time it may occupy.”  United States v. 
 
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Midstate Horticultural Co., 306 U.S. 161, 166 (1939) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
It has been recognized that 
cases involving multiple convictions under a single 
statutory provision. . . . are often referred to as 
“unit of prosecution” cases, as they consider whether 
the conduct at issue was intended to give rise to 
more than one offense under the same provision. 
United States v. McLaughlin, 164 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(emphasis added).  The present case is clearly a unit of 
prosecution case as it only involves a single statute: Code 
§ 18.2-308.2(A).  In applying the rule of lenity espoused in 
Bell to a unit of prosecution case involving a continuous 
offense, such as possession, appellate courts have 
overwhelmingly held that a continuous offense can only be 
charged as a single offense.  See United States v. Ellis, 622 
F.3d 784, 793 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Hope, 545 F.3d 
293, 296 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Finley, 245 F.3d 
199, 208 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Rivera, 77 F.3d 1348, 
1351 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Horodner, 993 F.2d 191, 
193 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Jones, 841 F.2d 1022, 
1023 (10th Cir. 1988), (recognizing that “ambiguity in the 
definition of conduct to be punished must be settled against 
turning a single transaction into multiple offenses”). 
 
I am particularly persuaded by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. 
 
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Jones, 533 F.2d 1387 (6th Cir. 1976).  The facts of Jones are 
markedly similar to the present case as both cases involve a 
convicted felon who was observed to have possession of the same 
firearm on three separate occasions over a three year period 
which ultimately resulted in three convictions for possession 
of a firearm by a convicted felon.  Id. at 1389-90.  In 
reversing two of the convictions, the Sixth Circuit explained: 
It is true that in the case at bar the Government is 
claiming that Jones possessed the pistol on three 
separate occasions, not that continuous possession 
existed which has been broken down into arbitrary 
time period[s].  With equal propriety the Government 
might have charged Jones with possession on more than 
1100 separate days and obtained convictions to 
imprison Jones for the rest of his life.  The fact 
that the Government merely has proof that he 
possessed the same weapon on three separate 
occasions, rather than continuously for a three-year 
period, should not dictate the result that Jones 
could receive three times the punishment he would 
face if continuous possession for a three-year period 
were proved.  There is no proof that there was any 
interruption in the possession by Jones of the 
weapon. 
Id. at 1391 (emphasis added).  The majority in this case, 
however, would require a different result. 
I am also not persuaded by the majority’s reliance on the 
General Assembly’s inclusion of “specific prohibitions.”  The 
plain language of Code § 18.2-308.2(A) prohibits a convicted 
felon from  
knowingly and intentionally possess[ing] or 
transport[ing] any firearm or ammunition for a 
firearm, any stun weapon as defined by § 18.2-308.1, 
 
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or any explosive material, or . . . knowingly and 
intentionally carry[ing] about his person, hidden 
from common observation, any weapon described in 
subsection A of § 18.2-308. 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
In making its argument, the majority fails to recognize 
the significance of the disjunctive “or” that immediately 
proceeds the “specific prohibitions” upon which it relies as 
well as the subsequent change in verbiage regarding the 
prohibited acts.  As evidenced by the use of the word “or,” 
possessing a firearm can be distinguished from carrying a 
concealed weapon.  While every weapon that is concealed is 
possessed, not every weapon possessed is concealed.  Indeed, it 
is worth noting that the “specific prohibitions” set forth in 
Code § 18.2-308.2(A) do not prohibit a convicted felon from 
possessing many of the weapons delineated (firearms being the 
obvious exception); rather, that portion of the statute only 
prohibits a convicted felon from carrying and concealing those 
weapons about his person.  Thus, had Baker been charged with 
carrying a concealed firearm on each of the three occasions, 
only then would the specific prohibitions be applicable. 
Moreover, the presence of this change in verbiage clearly 
demonstrates the General Assembly’s ability to distinguish a 
distinct unit of prosecution where it elects to do so.  In the 
absence of such an election by the General Assembly, the 
 
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statute is clearly ambiguous and our jurisprudence requires 
that we apply the rule of lenity.  See Waldrop, 255 Va. at 214, 
495 S.E.2d at 825.  In my opinion, the proper course of action 
is to follow the guidelines established in Bell.  Such 
application would necessarily require this Court to hold that 
the General Assembly only intended to punish as a single 
offense all acts of dominion demonstrating uninterrupted 
possession of the firearm.  If the General Assembly had 
intended to punish each time a felon is witnessed to be in 
possession of a firearm, as the majority suggests, it could 
have done so by forbidding each act of dominion instead of the 
entire course of conduct. 
It is further worth noting that the majority’s stated 
holding necessitates reversal in the present case.  The 
majority specifically holds that “a new offense of possession 
can be established with each separate act or occurrence that 
can be proven by the government.”  However, as previously 
discussed, possession is a continuing offense.  Therefore, it 
is axiomatic that, in order for there to be a separate act or 
occurrence of possession, there must be some form of 
interruption in the initial act or occurrence of possession.  
See, e.g., Rivera, 77 F.3d at 1351 (“Where there is no proof 
that possession of the same weapon is interrupted, the 
Government may not arbitrarily carve a possession into separate 
 
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offenses”); United States v. Conley, 291 F.3d 464, 470 (7th 
Cir. 2002) (“a felon may be charged and convicted of two counts 
of possessing the same firearm only if: (1) he possesses the 
weapon; (2) he is aware that his possession of the weapon has 
been interrupted; and (3) he thereafter reacquires possession 
of the weapon himself.”).  In other words, the defendant must 
have been dispossessed of the firearm before there can be a 
separate act or occurrence of possession.  As there is no 
evidence of Baker being dispossessed of the firearm, there is 
only a single act or occurrence of possession. 
For all the foregoing reasons, I cannot join in the 
majority’s opinion.  Rather, I would hold that a proper 
application of the rule of lenity demonstrates that the 
evidence in the present case only supports one conviction for 
Baker’s continuous possession of the firearm.  Accordingly, I 
would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirm the 
trial court as to one count of possession of a firearm by a 
convicted felon and dismiss the remaining two counts of 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.