Title: Simmons Self-Storage Partners v. Rib Roof

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

127 Nev, Advance Opinion Lo
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

SIMMONS SELF-STORAGE PARTNERS,
LLC, A NEVADA LIMITED LIABILITY.

| No. 56480
COMPANY; ANTHEM MINI-STORAGE, |

FILED

MAR 03.2011

LLC, A NEVADA LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY; HORIZON MINI-STORAGE,
LLC, A NEVADA LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY; MONTECITO MINI-STORAGE
PARTNERS, LLC, A NEVADA LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANY; LAKE MEAD wy
PROPERTY, LLC; SILVER CREEK I, LLC;
COLONIAL BANK, A SUBSIDIARY OF

‘THE COLONIAL BANCGROUP, INC., A

DELAWARE CORPORATION;

SOUTHWEST STEEL SYSTEMS, LLC,

A/K/A SOUTHWEST STEEL, A NEVADA

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY;

SOUTHWEST STEEL ERECTORS, LLC,

‘D/B/A SWS ERECTORS A/K/A

SOUTHWEST STEEL, A NEVADA

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY; WESTAR
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION D/B/A
WESTAR CONSTRUCTION, A NEVADA
CORPORATION; CONTINENTAL

CASUALTY COMPANY, A DELAWARE,
CORPORATION; AND WESTERN SURETY |
COMPANY, |
Appellants, |

RIB ROOF, INC., A CALIFORNIA |
CORPORATION,

Respondent,

 

Appeal from a district court second amended judgment in

consolidated mechanic's lien actions, Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark

County; Susan Johnson, Judge.

U- 0654)

 

 
Dismissed,

Shumway Van & Hansen, Chtd., and Michael Van, Erica L. ‘Tosh, and
Robert A. Ryan, Las Vegas,
{for Appellants,

/Snell & Wilmer, LLP, and Leon F. Mead, I, Las Vegas,
Hor Respondent.
BEFORE SAITTA, HARDESTY and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ.

OPINION
PER CURIAM:
With limited exceptions, this court's jurisdiction to consider an

 

otherwise timely appeal depends on whether the district court has entered
a final judgment in the action below. NRAP 3A(b)(1). A final judgment is
[generally defined as one that resolves all of the parties’ claims and rights
in the action, leaving nothing for the court's future consideration except
{for post-judgment issues. Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 426, 996 P.24
}416, 417 (2000). ‘The final judgment rule is designed to promote judicial
leconomy and efficieney by precluding multiple appeals arising from a
‘single action. Valley Bank of Nevada v. Ginsburg, 110 Nev, 440, 444, 874
P.2d 729, 733 (1994).

Here, we consider whether an order arising out of NRS
[Chapter 108 proceedings to enforce mechanics’ liens constitutes a final
judgment under this rule, when that order implicitly determines the liens’
validity and enters judgment on the lienable amounts, but fails to direct
the subject property's sale. We conclude that, based on the statutory

language governing actions to enforce mechanics’ liens, the purposes

behind Nevada's final judgment rule, and extrajurisdictional authorities,

 

 
[the court must also determine whether the sale may proceed before a
[judgment can be considered final and appealable,

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In the two consolidated actions below, respondent Rib Roof,
JInc., sought to foreclose upon mechanics’ liens pertaining to seven
different properties and also asserted negligence and intentional
misrepresentation claims in both actions against appellants Southwest
‘Steel Systems, LLC, and Southwest Steel Erectors, LLC. The claims in
lone of the consolidated actions, which concerned the Peccole Mini Storage
Project, were dismissed by stipulation and order between all of the parties
lexcept the two Southwest Steel entities. With respect to the other six
properties at issue in the other consolidated action, the liens against four
of the properties (all besides the Simmons and Montecito properties) were
released upon surety bonds, and the district court later determined the
lienable amount due with respect to each of the six properties and entered
Jjudgment thereon. While the district court's judgment implicitly
idetermined the Simmons and Montecito liens’ validity, the court failed to
allow for the sale of the Simmons and Montecito properties or otherwise
[mention Rib Roof's request to foreclose on those properties. And although
the judgment addressed the claims against the Southwest entities
Jasserted in the second action, it did not address the claims asserted
Jagainst those entities in the consolidated case concerning the Peccole
project, Nonetheless, appellants appealed.

Upon completing our jurisdictional review, we ordered
appellants to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack
lof jurisdiction, because it appeared that the district court had not entered

Ja final written judgment in the consolidated actions below. NRAP
3A@)(); Lee, 116 Nev. 424, 996 P.2d 416. In particular, we noted, two

 

 
sets of claims appeared to remain below: (1) Rib Roof's request to foreclose
lupon the mechanics’ liens on the Simmons and Montecito properties, and
(2) Rib Roof's claims against the Southwest entities concerning the Peceole
project.

Both appellants and Rib Roof timely responded, first arguing
that the district court's judgment was final despite its failure to order the
[property sold or foreclosed upon, because doing so is merely a post-
Jjudgment enforcement issue, and that, thus, the second amended
Jiudgment deeming valid the liens on the Simmons and Montecito
[properties and entering judgment thereon is final; and second asserting
{that all Peccole project claims were settled and released before trial and
‘that, therefore, the second amended judgment was complete with respect
to all claims against the Southwest entities. As further explained below,
we disagree.

DISCUSSION

RS 108.239 governs actions to enforce a notice of mechanic's
lien. When a complaint seeking to foreclose on a mechanic's lien is filed, it
must include a description of the property to be charged, and the lien
claimant must also file an NRS 14.010 notice of lis pendens and ensure
that a notice of foreclosure is published in the local newspaper and
delivered to any other recorded lien claimants. NRS 108.239(1), (2), and
(4). ‘The court is to determine priorities and enter judgment on the
lienable amounts. NRS 108.236; NRS 108.289(7) and (9). Once the
lienable amount has been determined, the court generally must order the
property sold:

On ascertaining the whole amount of the liens
with which the property is justly chargeable, as
provided in NRS 108.221 to 108.246, inclusive, the
court shall cause the property to be sold in

 

 

 
satisfaction of all liens and the costs of sale,

including all amounts awarded to all lien

claimants pursuant to NRS 108.237, and any

party in whose favor judgment may be rendered

may cause the property to be sold within the time

and in the manner provided for sales on execution,

issued out of any district court, for the sale of real

property.

NRS 108.239(10).

In providing that “any party in whose favor judgment may be
rendered” can execute on the property, NRS 108.239(10) anticipates that
the final, appealable judgment will include language allowing the property
to be sold; the prevailing party may then enforce the judgment by having
the property sold. By including sale language in the final judgment, the
merits of the complaint are finally resolved, leaving no question as to
whether the foreclosure can proceed, see Lee, 116 Nev. at 426, 996 P.2d at
417, yet aggrieved parties can appeal (and seek a stay) before the property
is actually sold. Cf, NRAP 3A(b)(10) (allowing for appeals from
interlocutory judgments in actions for partition that determine the rights
of the parties and direct a partition, sale, or division).

Other jurisdictions have determined likewise with regard to
lien foreclosure cases in general. For instance, in Kentucky, “an order
which directs property to be sold in satisfaction of a judgment and lists

and determines the priorities is a final and appealable judgment.”
Security Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v, Nesler, 697 S.W.2d 136, 139 (Ky,
1985) (sale of property subject to liens); see also Elam v. Acme Wel
Drilling Company, 411 S.W.2d 468 (Ky. 1967) (sale of attached property).
Additionally, because “a judgment... must confer some right
that may be enforced without further orders of the court and which puts
an end to the litigation,” Kentucky's high court has concluded that an

 

 
order that merely determined the liens’ existence and adjudicated
priorities, “without going further and directing the enforcement of the
liens, was only an interlocutory one that the court might ignore before
entering enforcement orders and determining the final rights of the
parties.” McCormack v, Moore, 117 8.W.2d 952, 957 (Ky. 1938); see also
Hadley v, Citizen Deposit Bank, 186 S.W.d 754, 758 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005)
(citing to Nesler and recognizing that an order adjudicating priorities was
not appealable, while a later order of sale was). And similarly, in Ohio,
final judgments in foreclosure proceedings must determine whether a sale
will be ordered, what liens might be at issue and their priority, and the
amounts due, Eddy v. Matthews, 891 N.E.2d 1211, 1216 (Ohio Ct. App.
2008) (iting, among other authorities, to Oberlin Sav, Bank Co. v.
Fairchild, 194 N-E.2d 580 (Ohio 1963)). As recognized by an Ohio
appellate court,
‘The [Ohio] cases... draw considerable

support from common sense. A mistake in the

foreclosure decree is more efficiently rectified by

an immediate appeal. Tt would save the debtor a

considerable amount of worry if the appeal is

immediate, rather than making him wait until

there is judgment confirming the sale of his

property to some other person. It would save the

purchaser from the uncertainty of an appeal from

the judgment confirming his bid on the foreclosed

property, during which time his downpayment on

the purchase price is held in escrow. It would

prevent the sheriff from wasting his resources on

unnecessary sale proceedings. And it would save

the court from wasting its time and energy

minding the matter and reviewing and approving

the final sale.

[The Ohio equivalent to NRAP 3A(b)(1))
defines a final appealable order as, inter alia, one
that determines the action and prevents a

 

6

 

oon
favorable judgment for the aggrieved party. The
foreclosure decree determines the foreclosure
action, and generally terminates the debtor's
common-law right of equitable redemption.

Because the decree is not self-executing, the
creditor must file a praecipe with the clerk of
courts for an order directing the sheriff to sell the
property. Thus, the second phase of the
proceedings can be understood as a separate
action to enforce the decree.

Ohio Dept. of Taxation v. Plickert, 715 N.E.2d 239, 240-41 (Ohio Ct. App.
1998) (internal citations omitted). ‘Thus, in Kentucky and Ohio, as well as
in other jurisdictions,’ the final judgment in actions to enforce liens on
property determines the liens’ validity and amount, adjudicates priorities,
and allows for the liens’ enforcement through an order of sale.

Based on NRS 108.239 and with a view toward the final
judgment rule's goal of promoting efficiency, we conclude likewise. In
Nevada, the final judgment in a mechanic's lien enforcement action cannot
only enter judgment on the lienable amount, but must also determine
whether the property's sale is to proceed. Any litigation concerning the
actual sale, the distribution of the proceeds, and any deficiency judgment

then occurs in postjudgment enforcement proceedings. See NRS

 

Supply, Inc. v. Diversified Investments, Inc, 463 P.2d
525, 528 (Haw. 1969) (“A judgment of foreclosure of mortgage or other lien
and sale of foreclosed property is final.... This is on the ground that
such judgment finally determines the merits of the controversy, and
subsequent proceedings are simply incidents to its enforcement,” (internal
citations omitted)); Worthy v. Graham, 149 So. 2d 469, 471-72 (Miss. 1963)
(same); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v, Tidwell, 820 P.2d 1388, 1341 (Okla.

1991) (same).

 

 
'108.239(12) (explaining that if the sale proceeds are insufficient to satisfy
[the claim, the claimant is entitled to a personal judgment against the
liable party).
CONCLUSION

Here, Rib Roofs complaint specifically sought, as part of the
requested relief, an order allowing the Simmons and Montecito properties
to be sold in satisfaction of the amount due under the lien. Neither the
district court's second amended judgment nor any other order provided by
the parties to this court resolves that request. Accordingly, as appellants
fhave not demonstrated that a final judgment exists, we lack jurisdiction

and dismiss this appeal?

 

 

 

2This appeal’s dismissal is also warranted because neither the
second amended judgment nor the purported settlement agreement
formally resolved the Peccole project claims against the Southwest
entities, and consequently, those claims remain pending. See Vallev Bank
lof Nevada v. Ginsburg, 110 Nev. 440, 446, 874 P.2d 729, 733-34 (1994)
(noting that a district court order approving a settlement agreement does
not constitute a formal dismissal or otherwise finally resolve the claims
before the court); Mallin v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 106 Nev. 606,
1609, 797 P.2d 978, 980 (1990) (holding that an order resolving less than all
lof the claims in consolidated cases is not a final, appealable order),