Title: DeWald v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DeWald v. State1986 WY 120719 P.2d 643Case Number: 84-269, 84-270Decided: 05/23/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Lola J. 
DeWALD, Executrix and Personal Representative of the Estate of Allan F. DeWald, 
Deceased, Appellant (Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
The STATE 
of Wyoming and State Highway Commission of Wyoming and Jeff Baltimore and Steve 
Keigley, Appellees (Defendants), and Harold Maddox 
(Defendant).

 
 
The STATE 
of Wyoming and State Highway Commission of Wyoming and Jeff Baltimore and Steve 
Keigley, Appellants (Defendants), and Harold Maddox 
(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
Lola J. 
DeWALD, Executrix and Personal Representative of the Estate of Allan F. DeWald, 
Deceased, Appellee (Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from District Court, Albany County, Arthur T. Hanscum, J.

 
 
John E. 
Stanfield (argued) John B. Scott, and Michael Sue Kern of Smith, Stanfield & 
Scott, Laramie, for appellant DeWald.

 
 
Robert W. 
Tiedeken (argued) and Richard Rideout, Amicus Curiae Committee, Wyoming Trial 
Lawyers Ass'n, in support of appellant DeWald.

 
 
Craig 
Kirkwood (argued), and Kennard F. Nelson of Kirkwood, Copenhaver & Nelson, 
Laramie, for appellees State of Wyo., et al.

 
 
Before 
THOMAS, C.J., and ROSE,* ROONEY,** BROWN and CARDINE, 
JJ.

 
 

*Retired 
November 1, 1985.

**Retired 
November 30, 1985.

 
 
Thomas, 
C.J., filed specially concurring opinion.

 
 
Rose, J., 
filed dissenting opinion.

 
 
CARDINE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
a summary judgment granted the State of Wyoming and its employees in an action 
brought under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act.

 
 

[¶2.]     The issues we must 
determine in this appeal are whether patrolmen Baltimore and Keigley had a 
qualified immunity for their actions in operating their patrol cars at the time 
of this accident; whether summary judgment in favor of appellees, Officers 
Baltimore and Keigley and the State of Wyoming, was appropriate; and whether the 
officers owed a duty only to the public and not to appellant, Allan DeWald, as 
an individual.

 
 

[¶3.]     We 
affirm.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶4.]     On the afternoon of 
July 21, 1982, Officer Steve Keigley of the Wyoming Highway Patrol Department 
was on duty in Laramie, Wyoming. As he left town in his patrol car, he was waved 
down by a citizen who informed him that a man driving a large yellow car had 
just headed north on U.S. Highway 30 and appeared to be extremely intoxicated. 
In response to that report, Officer Keigley proceeded north on Highway 30 until 
he spotted a yellow Oldsmobile making a U-turn. He watched as the vehicle 
completed its turn and headed south, back toward Laramie. He turned, followed 
the vehicle, and saw it cross over the no-passing line twice and weave within 
its lane a couple of times. Based on the report and his own observations, 
Officer Keigley concluded that the driver had been drinking. He called in a 
"possible 10-55" (driving while intoxicated) and turned on his overhead lights. 
When the driver, Harold Maddox, did not respond, Officer Keigley touched his 
siren a couple of times to get his attention. Maddox still did not respond. 
Officer Keigley continued to follow the Maddox vehicle as it travelled south in 
the right-hand lane on Third Street. As the vehicles approached downtown Laramie 
they were intercepted by a second highway patrol car driven by Officer Jeff 
Baltimore. Officer Baltimore was travelling north on Third and heard Officer 
Keigley's radio transmission. He turned on his red lights and made a U-turn, 
pulling up next to the Maddox vehicle in the left-hand, south-bound lane. He 
signaled Maddox to pull over. Harold Maddox turned and looked at Patrolman 
Baltimore and then accelerated rapidly. Officers Keigley and Baltimore pursued 
the Maddox vehicle as it sped toward downtown Laramie. The pursuit reached 
speeds of approximately 55 m.p.h. and covered several blocks before the officers 
backed off. It ended when the Maddox vehicle collided with a vehicle stopped at 
a red light at the intersection of Third and Clark streets. Neither of the 
officers' vehicles were involved in the collision. The driver of the stopped 
vehicle, Allan DeWald, was killed instantly.

 
 

[¶5.]     Lola J. DeWald, wife of 
the decedent, brought suit against Harold Maddox, the State of Wyoming, the 
State Highway Commission, and the two highway patrolmen. She settled her 
wrongful death claim against Maddox, and he was dismissed from the case. She 
pursued her action against the remaining defendants under the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act charging them with negligence "in one or more of the 
following respects:

 
 
"(a) The 
manner in which the said Harold Maddox was chased or pursued by Defendant 
Patrolman Baltimore and/or Defendant Patrolman Keigley in view of the 
circumstances then existing and the risk of harm or damage to persons using the 
streets within the City of Laramie including Decedent DeWald; 
and

 
 
"(b) The 
failure of Defendant Patrolman Baltimore and/or Defendant Patrolman Keigley to 
take such action as was reasonable and prudent in order to avoid the risk of 
harm to the public and Decedent DeWald under the circumstances in this matter; 
and

 
 
"(c) The 
negligent or improper training and/or supervision of Defendant Patrolman 
Baltimore and/or Defendant Patrolman Keigley; and

 
 
"(d) The 
failure to establish and/or enforce safe and proper and appropriate procedures 
for the apprehension of violators of the law (actual or suspected); 
and

 
 
"(e) The 
failure to establish and/or enforce safe and proper and appropriate procedures 
for the apprehension of violators of the law (actual or suspected) who are 
evading or appear to be attempting to evade arrest or capture within an urban 
area or under circumstances where the danger or existence of other traffic and 
conditions is known or should be known; and

 
 
"(f) The 
failure to establish and/or enforce reasonable and safe and proper and 
appropriate procedures for the arrest or apprehension of a person known or 
suspected to have committed a traffic offense; and

 
 
"(g) The 
failure to establish and/or enforce reasonable or safe or proper or appropriate 
procedures or regulations which would govern or control the actions of Defendant 
Patrolman Baltimore and/or Defendant Patrolman Keigley under the circumstances 
in this matter."

 
 

[¶6.]     Claiming immunity from 
suit, the State of Wyoming, State Highway Commission, and Officers Baltimore and 
Keigley moved for summary judgment. In granting the motion, the court found that 
Officers Baltimore and Keigley acted in good faith and reasonably under the 
circumstances and that they, therefore, as a matter of law, had a qualified 
immunity from liability for the death of Allan F. DeWald. The court concluded 
further that, as a matter of law, the State of Wyoming and State Highway 
Commission were immune from liability for the actions of Officers Baltimore and 
Keigley. Finally, the court found that there was no dispute as to any genuine 
issue of material fact which would alter or change the conclusion of immunity 
and, therefore, defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.

 
 
STATUTORY 
IMMUNITY

 
 

[¶7.]     The Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act was adopted in 1979. The act retained governmental 
immunity as provided in § 1-39-104(a), W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1985, unless 
legislation provided an exception to immunity. Thus, in Hurst v. State, Wyo., 
698 P.2d 1130, 1132 (1985), we said:

 
 
"The 
Wyoming Governmental Claims Act reaffirmed and retained immunity from claims in 
tort against governmental entities and their employees. Unless that immunity was 
expressly waived, immunity was to be the rule; liability was to be the exception 
and then only when expressly provided for within the Wyoming Governmental Claims 
Act." (Footnote omitted.)

 
 
The 
statutory exceptions to immunity relevant here are:

 
 
"A 
governmental entity is liable for damages resulting from bodily injury, wrongful 
death or property damage caused by the negligence of public employees while 
acting within the scope of their duties in the operation of any motor vehicle, 
aircraft or watercraft." Section 1-39-105, W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 
1985.

 
 
"A 
governmental entity is liable for damages resulting from tortious conduct of law 
enforcement officers while acting within the scope of their duties." Section 
1-39-112, W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1985.

 
 
COMMON LAW 
IMMUNITY

 
 

[¶8.]     The quoted statutes 
provide an express waiver of immunity as to both public employees operating 
motor vehicles and police officers. In this case, therefore, the officers were 
not immune unless there was a common law immunity preserved by § 1-39-102(a), 
W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1985, which provides in part:

 
 
"This act 
is intended to retain any common law defenses which a defendant may have by 
virtue of decisions from this or other jurisdictions."

 
 
It is not 
entirely clear whether the legislature intended, by this section of the 
Governmental Claims Act, to retain common law immunities as well as common law 
defenses. One could argue that the term "common law defenses" meant defenses 
such as contributory negligence which, when compared with other negligence, 
might bar recovery but would not include immunity. In Kimbley v. City of Green 
River, Wyo., 663 P.2d 871, 883 (1983), however, we gave the term "common law 
defenses" a broad interpretation. The Governmental Claims Act, including § 
1-39-102(a), was in effect when we decided that case, and we freely discussed 
and applied a qualified immunity for police officers. Therefore, we implicitly 
held in Kimbley v. City of Green River, supra, that a common law qualified 
immunity survived the passage of the Governmental Claims Act. If there is a 
legitimate common law qualified immunity applicable to the operation of a motor 
vehicle, then that immunity might bar recovery by 
appellant.

 
 

[¶9.]     The trial court, upon 
the depositions, exhibits and extensive record before it, first found that 
Officers Baltimore and Keigley, in pursuing Maddox, acted reasonably and in good 
faith. The court then held that they should have summary judgment as a matter of 
law based upon a common law qualified immunity available for reasonable acts of 
police officers done in good faith. The source of the common law qualified 
immunity articulated by the district court was Kimbley v. City of Green River, 
supra, 663 P.2d  at 878, wherein we stated:

 
 
"We * * * 
have dealt with the civil liability of 
law enforcement officers for tortious conduct. * * * They have a qualified 
immunity, as distinguished from an absolute immunity as in the case of 
prosecuting attorneys. We set out as a general rule in Blake v. Rupe, Wyo., 651 P.2d 1096, 1109 (1982), citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 
40 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1974):

 
 
""[A] 
qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of 
government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and 
responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably 
appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based. It 
is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in 
light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a 
basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the 
course of official conduct."'" (Footnote omitted.)

 
 
The rule 
we pronounced in Blake v. Rupe, Wyo., 651 P.2d 1096 (1982), was based upon 
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1974). Thus, we 
stated:

 
 
"The rule 
of Scheuer is more simply stated to be that a public official enjoys a qualified 
immunity if he in good faith entertains a reasonable belief that his actions are 
lawful, notwithstanding a subsequent judicial determination that they are not; 
courts will not unfairly use hindsight in assessing official actions challenged 
in litigation. Apton v. Wilson, supra, [165 D.C.App. 22,] 506 F.2d 83 [1974]." 
651 P.2d  at 1109.

 
 

[¶10.]  Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra, was precedent 
for the rule in Blake v. Rupe, supra, which was followed by Kimbley v. City of 
Green River, supra. Scheuer v. Rhodes involved a suit against the governor and 
other officials of the State of Ohio because of executive orders issued to deal 
with civil disorder at Kent State University. The question presented was that of 
the immunity of an executive required to make important decisions in the 
business of governing. Blake v. Rupe, supra, involved the immunity accorded a 
prosecutor who initiates criminal charges and an investigator involved in the 
investigation of the incident which was a basis for the charges. We stated 
that:

 
 
"[A] 
public official enjoys a qualified immunity if he in good faith entertains a 
reasonable belief that his actions are lawful, notwithstanding a subsequent 
judicial determination that they are not * *." 651 P.2d  at 
1109.

 
 
We then 
noted that although the rule had arisen in cases brought under the Federal Civil 
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "* * * we adopt it as equally applicable to the 
allegedly tortious conduct of public officers against whom damages are sought." 
Id. at 1109. In adopting the above rule, we relied upon Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Atkins v. Lanning, 556 F.2d 485 (10th Cir. 1977); Ross 
v. Meagan, 638 F.2d 646 (3rd Cir. 1981); and Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203 (3rd Cir. 1979). Apton involved a damage suit against public officials 
because of arrest, detention, fingerprinting and prosecution of certain 
individuals; Atkins concerned an action against a district attorney for wrongful 
arrest and imprisonment; Ross involved civil rights actions against public 
officials for violation of constitutional rights to hearings; and Forsyth 
involved actions against two attorneys general for warrantless electronic 
surveilances. Not a single case cited in Blake v. Rupe, supra, applied the rule 
of qualified immunity to driving an automobile.

 
 

[¶11.]  We observed in Blake v. Rupe, supra, 651 P.2d  at 1109, that our immunity rule was consistent with § 895D Restatement, 
Torts 2d. But the Restatement concerns an administrative act or omission, a 
so-called discretionary function. Surely we are not prepared to say that 
operation of an automobile is an administrative act or omission or an executive 
policy decision. Neither our holding in Blake v. Rupe, supra, nor the cases we 
cited therein will support such a result. And our decision in Kimbley v. City of 
Green River, supra, does not establish a qualified immunity for the act of 
driving a patrol car. Despite some overly broad language in Kimbley, our limited 
holding was that an officer has a qualified immunity from tort liability when he 
makes an arrest under a facially valid warrant. Kimbley v. City of Green River, 
supra, 663 P.2d  at 878-883.

 
 

[¶12.]  A pertinent discussion of qualified 
immunity for public officials is found in Mason v. Bitton, 85 Wn.2d 321, 534 P.2d 1360 (1975). Following enactment of legislation abolishing governmental 
immunity, the Washington Supreme Court provided an exclusion from tort liability 
under which "government could still govern," stating, "[t]he exclusion from tort 
liability was strictly limited to those acts involving basic policy discretion" 
at the executive level. Id. 534 P.2d  at 1364. In Mason an officer pursued a 
speeder who was involved in an accident. As in the instant case, the victim of 
the accident sued the officer for damages. With respect to immunity, the court 
stated:

 
 
"We are 
fully convinced that the initial decision to give or not to give chase, and the 
decision as to whether to continue the pursuit are properly characterized as 
operational, and not the basic policy decision' discussed in King [v. Seattle, 
84 Wn.2d 239,] 525 P.2d 228 [246 (1974)]. To now hold that this type of 
discretion, exercised by police officers in the field, cannot result in 
liability under RCW 46.61.035, due to an exception provided for basic policy 
discretion, would require this Court to close its eyes to the clear intent and 
purpose of the legislature when it abolished sovereign immunity under RCW 
4.96.010. If this type of conduct were immune from liability, the exception 
would surely engulf the rule, if not totally destroy it. Therefore, we conclude 
the exception for basic policy discretion does not apply to the facts of this 
case." 534 P.2d  at 1365.

 
 

[¶13.]  In summary, the trial court was incorrect 
when it held that the officers and their employer, the State of Wyoming, were 
protected from liability by a common law immunity. Police officers are not 
immune from liability if they negligently perform an operational duty such as 
driving a patrol car. A qualified immunity is available only with respect to 
executive policy functions. Without an immunity under either the common law or 
the Governmental Claims Act, the officers and the State were entitled to summary 
judgment only if it was proper under negligence 
principles.

 
 
LIABILITY 
OF POLICE OFFICERS UNDER NEGLIGENCE PRINCIPLES

 
 

[¶14.]  The liability of a police officer for 
pursuing a law violator who becomes involved in an accident causing damage to a 
third person has not before been considered by this court. A review of the 
decided cases exhibits a considerable reluctance to find the officers liable 
where they are not involved in the accident.

 
 

[¶15.]  The policy reasons stated are that the 
officer has a duty to apprehend, arrest and remove from the highways drunk 
drivers; that if, in the performance of his job as a patrolman, he must choose 
whether to pursue or allow a lawbreaker to escape, he should not be liable for 
either choice in the absence of gross or wanton conduct almost amounting to bad 
faith; that he should be responsible only for the careful operation of his own 
car; and that he should not be liable for the unpredictable actions of the 
driver being pursued for that would make him an insurer of the wrongful acts of 
a lawbreaker. All of the above seem to essentially say that, except in extreme 
or outrageous circumstances, an officer's pursuit of a vehicle which is involved 
in an accident not involving the officer's vehicle is not the proximate cause of 
that accident.

 
 

[¶16.]  Thus, in Roll v. Timberman, 94 N.J. 
Super. 530, 229 A.2d 281 (1967), a police officer was charged with negligence in 
pursuing the vehicle of a lawbreaker at high speeds. The court 
stated:

 
 
"[T]he 
majority view expressed in other jurisdictions in similar cases holds that the 
police officer is not liable.

 
 
"The 
reasoning which underlies the rejection of liability in these cases is two-fold: 
(1) it is the duty of a police officer to apprehend those whose reckless driving 
makes use of the highway dangerous to others; (2) the proximate cause of the 
accident is the reckless driving of the pursued, notwithstanding recognition of 
the fact that the police pursuit contributed to the pursued's reckless driving." 
(Citations omitted.) Id. 229 A.2d  at 284.

 
 

[¶17.]  In Chambers v. Ideal Pure Milk Company, 
Ky. Ct. App., 245 S.W.2d 589 (1952), the police pursued a vehicle at speeds of 
70 to 75 m.p.h. At an intersection, the pursued vehicle was involved in a 
collision with plaintiff's vehicle. The court stated:

 
 
"To argue 
that the officers' pursuit caused Scheare to speed may be factually true, but it 
does not follow that the officers are liable at law for the results of Scheare's 
negligent speed. Police cannot be made insurers of the conduct of the culprits 
they chase." 245 S.W.2d  at 591.

 
 

[¶18.]  In Reenders v. City of Ontario, 68 Cal. App. 3d 1045, 137 Cal. Rptr. 736 (1977), the court affirmed a summary 
judgment in favor of the city holding that plaintiff's injury was not 
proximately caused by the police officers' pursuit of a vehicle. It concluded 
that policy matters such as preventing future harm by apprehending a lawbreaker 
operating a vehicle in a dangerous and reckless manner outweighed other 
considerations.

 
 

[¶19.]  In State of West Virginia ex rel. Poulos 
v. Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York, 263 F. Supp. 88 (S.D.W. Va. 1967), 
the court granted summary judgment in favor of the police officer who pursued 
the vehicle driven by an escapee upon the grounds that the officer's pursuit was 
not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. The court 
stated:

 
 
"It is 
hardly necessary to point out the eoverriding public policy of apprehending 
criminals as rapidly as possible, thus eliminating continued criminal acts, as a 
factor outweighing the undesirable consequences of holding an officer liable for 
damages sustained by a third party as a result of negligence such as described 
in the complaint.

 
 
"We are 
not prepared to hold an officer liable for damages inflicted by the driver of a 
stolen vehicle whom he was lawfully attempting to apprehend for the fortuitous 
reason only that the criminal drove through an urban area. To do so would open 
the door for every desperado to seek sanctuary in the congested confines of our 
municipalities * * *." Id. at 91.

 
 

[¶20.]  City of Miami v. Horne, Fla., 198 So. 2d 10 (1967), was an action for wrongful death resulting from a collision between 
plaintiff's vehicle and a driver being pursued by a police officer. The trial 
court granted summary judgment holding that the officer's negligence, if any, 
was not the proximate cause of the damages. The Florida Supreme Court 
stated:

 
 
"The rule 
governing the conduct of police in pursuit of an escaping offender is that he 
must operate his car with due care and, in doing so, he is not responsible for 
the acts of the offender. Although pursuit may contribute to the reckless 
driving of the pursued, the officer is not obliged to allow him to escape." Id. 
at 13.

 
 
The court 
further stated:

 
 
"[T]he 
standard of care exercised by him must be judged liberally and that the city * * 
* should not be liable in damages for every mistake of judgment by its officers 
* * *." Id. at 13.

 
 

[¶21.]  In Thornton v. Shore, 233 Kan. 737, 666 P.2d 655 (1983), a police officer pursued a speeding vehicle which ran stop 
signs and was driven recklessly until it was involved in a collision with 
plaintiff. The officer's vehicle was not involved in the collision. The court 
stated:

 
 
"We 
conclude the due care' requirement of K.S.A. 8-1506(d) applies only to the 
police officer's physical operation of his own vehicle and not to the decision 
to chase or continue to chase a law violator.

 
 
If the 
officer is in compliance with the statute in the operation of his own vehicle, 
he is entitled to the privileges and immunities afforded by the statute and is 
not vicariously liable or responsible for the reckless or negligent acts of the 
law violator he is pursuing." 666 P.2d  at 668.

 
 
The 
statute referred to is almost identical to a similar statute in effect in the 
State of Wyoming; and, in effect, the Kansas court is really saying that the 
officer's manner of driving his patrol car was not a proximate cause of the 
accident. Summary judgment was affirmed in favor of the 
officer.

 
 

[¶22.]  In Rubinow v. County of San Bernardino, 
169 Cal. App. 2d 67, 336 P.2d 968 (1959), suit was brought against the county 
because of the failure of an officer to arrest a motorist driving his vehicle 
erratically who was involved in an accident with a third vehicle causing the 
death of that driver. The officer was following the vehicle which struck 
plaintiff. Plaintiff contended the officer was negligent in failing to apprehend 
and arrest that driver and that his negligence was the proximate cause of the 
accident and death of the decedent. The court stated:

 
 
"It 
appears to us that in a case of the type here at hand there is at least some 
degree of discretion required to be exercised by the officer, and where that is 
true [the duty must be] clear and unequivocal." 336 P.2d  at 
970.

 
 
Dismissal 
was affirmed.

 
 

[¶23.]  We agree with these courts and hold that 
when a police officer pursues a fleeing violator and the violator injures a 
third party as a result of the chase, the officer's pursuit is not the proximate 
cause of those injuries unless the circumstances indicate extreme or outrageous 
conduct by the officer. To put it another way, the possibility that the violator 
will injure a third party is too remote to create liability until the conduct of 
the officer becomes extreme.

 
 
SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE

 
 

[¶24.]  We have often said that if the trial 
court's judgment is sustainable on any theory, it will not be disturbed on 
appeal. ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, Wyo., 632 P.2d 925, 935 (1981). With 
this in mind, we affirm the district court's entry of summary 
judgment.

 
 
This court 
has stated that:

 
 
"The 
propriety of granting a motion for summary judgment depends upon the correctness 
of a court's dual findings that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
Reno Livestock Corporation v. Sun Oil Company (Delaware), Wyo., 638 P.2d 147, 
150 (1981).

 
 

[¶25.]  Summary judgment will not often be proper 
in a negligence case. Keller v. Anderson, Wyo., 554 P.2d 1253 (1976). The 
question of negligence will be taken from the jury in only the most exceptional 
cases. 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 252. However, where the record fails to establish 
an issue of material fact, the entry of summary judgment is proper, even in a 
negligence case. Keller v. Anderson, supra.

 
 

[¶26.]  Viewing the record before us in the light 
most favorable to the appellant, as we are required to do, Reno Livestock 
Corporation v. Sun Oil Company (Delaware), supra, we conclude that appellees 
were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

 
 

[¶27.]  Appellant contends that the record 
establishes questions of fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment. 
Specifically, appellant asserts that the reasonableness of the officers' 
decision to pursue the Maddox vehicle once it became apparent that he intended 
to outrun them is a question for the jury. We cannot agree. Officer Keigley 
began his pursuit in response to a citizen report of a drunk driver. Police 
officers are expected to respond to such reports by observing, pursuing, and, 
where reasonable cause exists, stopping the suspect. Based upon the citizen 
report and his own observations, Officer Keigley had reason to believe that 
Harold Maddox was drunk and, therefore, had a duty to attempt to stop him. In 
doing so, Officers Keigley and Baltimore were met with unusual resistance and 
were forced to make a choice - to pursue Maddox and attempt to stop him 
forthwith or to drop back and allow him to proceed through downtown Laramie. 
Clearly, either choice posed a risk to the citizens of 
Laramie.

 
 

[¶28.]  Faced with circumstances requiring a 
quick decision without time for reflection, the officers chose to pursue Harold 
Maddox and attempt to stop him before he reached the more congested downtown 
area. It was broad daylight, the weather conditions were clear, Third Street was 
a straight, level, wide four-lane street and was paved and dry. The intersection 
of Third and Clark streets was clearly marked by traffic lights. Officers 
Keigley and Baltimore's speed at one point reached approximately 55 m.p.h.; they 
ceased the pursuit sometime before the collision; and they were not involved in 
the collision. Their conduct was not extreme or outrageous. To find that there 
would have been no collision if they had stopped sooner is conjecture. They had 
no control over Harold Maddox. There is no explanation for Maddox colliding with 
the DeWald vehicle under the circumstances present here.

 
 

[¶29.]  In order to recover, appellant must show 
that the officers' actions were the proximate cause of the accident. Apperson v. 
Kay, Wyo., 546 P.2d 995 (1976). Proximate cause means that the accident or 
injury must be the natural and probable consequence of the act of negligence. 
McClellan v. Tottenhoff, Wyo., 666 P.2d 408 (1983). The law does not charge a 
person with all the consequences of a wrongful act, but ignores remote causes 
and looks only to the proximate cause. Caterpillar Tractor Company v. Donahue, 
Wyo., 674 P.2d 1276 (1983).

 
 

[¶30.]  Where the causal connection between 
defendant's acts and plaintiff's damage is almost entirely subject to conjecture 
and speculation, summary judgment may be proper. Hoyle v. Southern Bell 
Telephone and Telegraph Company, 474 F. Supp. 1350 (W.D.N.C. 1979). In Hoyle the 
plaintiff claimed that the defendant negligently failed to repair a customer's 
telephone and as a result the customer was delayed in getting to the hospital 
and died. The court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment finding that 
the case hinged on many facts which could never be determined. The court based 
its judgment primarily upon the fact that it was impossible to show that, absent 
the delay, the deceased would have lived.

 
 

[¶31.]  The principle stated in Hoyle and our 
pronouncements in this case clearly show that the officers' actions were not a 
proximate cause of this accident. No matter what course of action they chose to 
take, the accident still might have happened. To say that Maddox would have 
slowed down or stopped had the officers dropped the pursuit is sheer 
speculation. What might have happened had they dropped back and allowed Maddox 
to proceed into downtown Laramie is totally unclear. He might have hit the 
DeWald vehicle anyway. Or he might have run over a child or a pedestrian. The 
possibilities are endless. Furthermore, had the officers allowed Maddox to 
continue to drive in a drunken condition, as appellant suggests should have been 
allowed, and had someone been injured, they in all probability would have been 
subject to suit for failing to stop him. The officers' actions were not extreme 
or outrageous as a matter of law and were, therefore, too remote to be the 
proximate cause of the accident.

 
 

[¶32.]  We have said that negligence must be 
determined based upon the facts as they appeared at the time - not by a judgment 
from actual consequences which were not then to be apprehended by a prudent and 
competent man. Endresen v. Allen, Wyo., 574 P.2d 1219 (1978). We will not 
unfairly use hindsight in assessing official actions challenged in litigation. 
Blake v. Rupe, supra, 651 P.2d 1096. The record indicates that Officers Keigley 
and Baltimore acted pursuant to a duty arising from their employment requiring 
that they attempt to apprehend and stop drunk drivers. There is necessarily some 
risk in that undertaking, and we will not subject them to liability on the 
theory that some other possible action "might" have led to a less tragic result. 
Negligence and proximate cause are never presumed from the happening of an 
accident, and mere conjecture cannot form the basis of liability. Apperson v. 
Kay, supra, 546 P.2d 995.

 
 

[¶33.]  The Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, 
under which this suit was brought, was intended to mitigate the harsh results of 
the strict application of governmental immunity. It was enacted so that 
governmental entities and employees, like everyone else, could be held liable 
for their negligent acts. Had the officers negligently operated their vehicles 
and become involved in an accident which would have resulted in liability in 
ordinary circumstances, we would have no hesitancy about the case. But, where 
the officers are performing a duty required of them by law and the course of 
action they must choose is about evenly balanced, more is required than 
speculation as to the result from choosing either course.

 
 

[¶34.]  Having held the patrolmen not liable, we 
must also hold that the appellee, State of Wyoming, cannot be held liable, the 
reason being that if the conduct of the patrolmen did not amount to negligence 
that caused the accident, then neither could their training by the State nor 
could rules have been a cause of the accident. Stated another way, it would have 
had to appear that, because of inadequate training or failure to follow 
departmental rules, the officers acted in a negligent manner and caused this 
accident. We have held that did not occur.

 
 
THE 
PUBLIC-DUTY RULE

 
 

[¶35.]  The State of Wyoming and Officers 
Baltimore and Keigley have appealed the court's finding that in the absence of 
qualified immunity, a duty was owed DeWald. They contend that the duty owed by 
the officers is a public duty only - that, therefore, no duty was owed to DeWald 
individually and the officers cannot be liable for his death. The source of the 
"public duty only" rule seems to be Cooley on Torts § 300 at 389 (4th ed. 1932) 
wherein, referring to policemen's duty, it is stated:

 
 
"His duty 
is to serve criminal warrants, to arrest persons who commit offenses in his 
view, to bring nightwalkers to account, and to perform various offices of 
similar nature. Within his beat he should watch the premises of individuals, and 
protect them against burglaries and arsons. But suppose he goes to sleep on his 
beat, and while thus off duty a robbery is committed or a house burned down, 
either of which might have been prevented had he been vigilant, - who shall 
bring him to account for this neglect of duty? Not the individual who has 
suffered from the crime, certainly, for the officer was not his policeman; was 
not hired by him, paid by him, or controlled by him; and consequently owed to 
him no legal duty." (Footnote omitted)

 
 

[¶36.]  The public-duty/special-duty rule was in 
essence a form of sovereign immunity and viable when sovereign immunity was the 
rule. The legislature has abolished sovereign immunity in this area. The public 
duty only rule, if it ever was recognized in Wyoming, is no longer 
viable.

 
 

[¶37.]  In Schear v. Board of County 
Commissioners of Bernalillo County, 101 N.M. 671, 687 P.2d 728, 731 (1984), the 
court stated:

 
 
"[T]he 
development in the law has been to abolish it in those jurisdictions where the 
matter has been more recently considered or reconsidered. See Ryan v. State, 134 
Ariz. 308, 656 P.2d 597 (1982) (overruling Massengill); Adams v. State; Martinez 
v. City of Lakewood [655 P.2d 1388 (Colo. App. 1982)]; Commercial Carrier Corp. 
v. Indian River County [371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979)] (declaring Modlin v. City of 
Miami Beach, 201 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1967) to have no effect following legislative 
waiver of governmental immunity); Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1979); 
Brennen v. City of Eugene, 285 Or. 401, 591 P.2d 719 (1979); Coffey v. City of 
Milwaukee, 74 Wis.2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976).

 
 
[T]he 
trend in this area is toward liability. The "public duty" doctrine has lost 
support in four of the eight jurisdictions relied upon by the city [for its 
argument that it owed no duty of ordinary care to an individual citizen].' 
Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d  at 667. Those courts have demonstrated a reasoned 
reluctance to apply a doctrine that results in a duty to none where there is a 
duty to all. See Adams v. State [Alaska, 555 P.2d 235 (1976)] * * 
*."

 
 
We are in 
agreement with these statements. The duty owed in the circumstances of this case 
has been clearly stated by us and need not be restated 
now.

 
 
THE 
SPECIALLY CONCURRING OPINION

 
 

[¶38.]  The specially concurring opinion suggests 
that the holding in this case is at odds with the basis for the district court's 
decision. The district court found a qualified immunity. The basis of that 
finding was that the officers had acted reasonably and in good faith. The 
specially concurring opinion suggests that we should adopt a rule that there is 
a qualified immunity for "actions by law enforcement officers which are 
determined to be reasonable and accomplished in good faith." If reasonable means 
the exercise of due care, then perhaps the district court found the officers not 
negligent either because they acted with due care or because their actions were 
not the proximate cause of the accident. If reasonable means the actions of the 
officers were lawful according to § 31-5-106, W.S. 1977, that would also involve 
a finding that they acted with due care. Such a finding, in either case, would 
be in conformance with our holding in this case.

 
 

[¶39.]  The specially concurring opinion finally 
questions whether we considered the exception to immunity found in § 1-39-112, 
W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1985. That statute was expressly considered in the majority 
opinion.

 
 

[¶40.]  To hold as the specially concurring 
opinion suggests would be to readopt governmental immunity for law enforcement 
officers contrary to the express enactment by the legislature of the 
Governmental Claims Act.

 
 

[¶41.]  For all the reasons stated, the judgment 
of the district court is affirmed.

 
 
THOMAS, 
C.J., filed a specially concurring opinion.

 
 
ROSE, J., 
filed a dissenting opinion.

 
 
THOMAS, 
Chief Justice, specially concurring.

 
 

[¶42.]  I am in full accord that the summary 
judgment entered by the district court in this case must be affirmed. I am, 
however, troubled by the justification for that result found in the majority 
opinion which does not account for the difference in Wyoming law from law in the 
jurisdictions from which persuasive authorities are drawn. It seems to me that 
the majority opinion also fails to address the dual bases for potential 
liability upon which the plaintiff relied in the district court and with respect 
to which the district court granted the summary judgment.

 
 

[¶43.]  I also am troubled by an apparent 
vacillation in the majority opinion with respect to the statutory posture in 
Wyoming. In the latter portion of the opinion dealing with the public-duty rule, 
the majority indicates an abolition of sovereign immunity in the specific 
context. Earlier, however, the majority opinion at least acknowledges that in 
Wyoming the legislature adopted a statutory scheme which preserves sovereign 
immunity save for specific exceptions. I note that this does differentiate the 
situation in Wyoming from the statutory posture in all the jurisdictions from 
which authorities are cited save for New Mexico.

 
 

[¶44.]  My specific concern with respect to the 
majority opinion is that the cases from other jurisdictions upon which the 
majority opinion relies appear to me to deal with the potential liability 
arising from the exception created in § 1-39-105, W.S. 1977 (Cum. Supp. 1984), 
in which an exception to sovereign immunity is created for negligence in the 
operation of motor vehicles. I am not certain that the majority opinion really 
addresses the exception from sovereign immunity found in § 1-39-112, W.S. 1977 
(Cum.Supp. 1984), relating to tortious conduct of law enforcement officers while 
acting within the scope of their duties, upon which the plaintiff relied in this 
action.

 
 

[¶45.]  In its judgment in this case the district 
court articulated the proposition that it would conclude as a matter of law that 
except for the qualified immunity available to these law enforcement officers it 
would have held that the law enforcement officers in the State of Wyoming and 
the State Highway Commission owed specific duties to the decedent. It is clear 
to me that in those comments, the district court signaled that it would not have 
granted a summary judgment in this case but would have permitted the case to be 
tried to a jury except for the qualified immunity available to the law 
enforcement officers. That qualified immunity flows from Kimbley v. City of 
Green River, Wyo., 663 P.2d 871 (1983) and Blake v. Rupe, Wyo., 651 P.2d 1096 
(1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1208, 103 S. Ct. 1199, 75 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1983). It 
follows that the district court would not have concluded that there was no 
proximate cause relating the conduct of the law enforcement officers to the 
death of plaintiff's decedent, at least as a matter of law. I understand the 
majority opinion to take issue with this position of the district court, but I 
think the disposition made in the majority opinion logically is limited to that 
exception to sovereign immunity found in § 1-39-105, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1984). 
On this issue I might well prefer the approach by the district court, because 
issues of proximate cause ordinarily are determined by a jury as issues of fact. 
McClellan v. Tottenhoff, Wyo., 666 P.2d 408 (1983). That in fact was the posture 
of several of the cases upon which the majority premises the disposition of this 
appeal.

 
 

[¶46.]  I would affirm the district court on the 
premise of qualified immunity available to the law enforcement officers. In my 
judgment the qualified immunity available to law enforcement officers properly 
was found to be present in this instance by the district court. The qualified 
immunity which is identified in Kimbley v. City of Green River, supra, attaches 
to the officers individually and is separate and apart from any sovereign or 
governmental immunity. Simply put, those actions by law enforcement officers 
which are determined to be reasonable and accomplished in good faith are not 
tortious. This ground for disposing of the plaintiff's claim reaches not only 
the claimed exception in § 1-39-105, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1984), but also the 
exception found in § 1-39-112, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1984). Effectuating the 
concept of immunity for those actions determined to be reasonable and 
accomplished in good faith disposes of all bases of claimed liability against 
the defendants in this case. If the conduct of the law enforcement officers is 
not tortious under the common-law doctrine of qualified immunity, then of course 
no vicarious liability exists on the part of the State of 
Wyoming.

 
 
ROSE 
Justice, dissenting.

 
 

[¶47.]  I would take issue with the majority 
opinion as well as the specially concurring opinion of Chief Justice Thomas for 
these following reasons:

 
 

[¶48.]  Initially, under § 1-39-104(a), W.S. 
1977, 1985 Cum.Supp., the Governmental Claims Act grants law enforcement 
officers absolute immunity, along with other public employees. Thereafter, under 
§ 1-39-112, W.S. 1977, 1985 Cum.Supp., the immunity for law enforcement officers 
is removed. By reason of this withdrawal of immunity, law enforcement officers 
and their governmental-entity employers become subject to suit for an officer's 
tortious behavior while acting within the scope of employment. However, even 
though the immunity of police officers is removed by § 1-39-112, the 
Governmental Claims Act, § 1-39-107(a), W.S. 1977, 1985 Cum.Supp., provides for 
the retention of all common-law defenses. One of those defenses, which is 
available to law enforcement officers at common law and under our prior opinion, 
Kimbley v. City of Green River, Wyo., 663 P.2d 871 (1983), is that of qualified 
immunity. This immunity defense depends upon whether the officer acted 
reasonably and in good faith at the time and place in question. If the officer 
was so acting, then, at common law and under our relevant decisions, he is held 
to be immune. If he was not acting reasonably and in good faith, then he could 
be held liable for negligence.

 
 

[¶49.]  The trial court in this case held that 
the officers were acting reasonably and in good faith - as a matter of law (and 
the Chief Justice agrees) - thereby making them eligible for protection by 
reason of their common-law immunity, thus justifying the summary judgment. This 
is where I part company with the trial court and the Chief Justice. I think that 
the good faith and the reasonableness of the officers' behavior under the facts 
of this case were questions for the jury. This conclusion not only causes me to 
disagree with the district court and the Chief Justice, but also places me in a 
dissenting position with respect to the majority 
opinion.