Title: Langley v. Pierce

State: south-carolina

Issuer: South Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

438 S.E.2d 242 (1993) Wilbur M. LANGLEY and Marguerite L. Petersen, Personal Representative of the Estate of Frances F. Langley, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellants, v. Alan D. PIERCE, M.D., Defendant-Respondent. No. 23956. Supreme Court of South Carolina. Heard September 22, 1993. Decided November 8, 1993. Ellis I. Kahn and Justin S. Kahn, of Solomon, Kahn, Budman & Stricker, Charleston, for plaintiff-appellants. James D. Brice and Edwin P. Martin, Jr., of Gibbes & Clarkson, PA, Greenville, for defendant-respondent. CHANDLER, Justice: Pursuant to Rule 228 SCACR, the following question has been certified from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit: In 1979 and 1980, Defendant Dr. Pierce, a resident of South Carolina, removed two lesions from Plaintiff's (Langley's) leg, which lesions he diagnosed benign. In 1984, he moved to Florida. In 1990, a third lesion removed from Langley's leg was diagnosed malignant; the pathologist examining the 1990 sample determined that the 1979 and 1980 lesions, at the time of their removal by Dr. Pierce, were malignant. In 1991, Mrs. Langley filed her diversity suit in Federal District Court.[1] District Court granted Dr. Pierce summary judgment, holding that § 15-3-545(A), the six-year statute of repose for medical malpractice, barred the claim. Langley appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, contending that the six-year statute of repose in § 15-3-545(A) was tolled by § 15-3-30 when Dr. Pierce moved from South Carolina in 1984. The question was certified by the Fourth Circuit to this Court. 993 F.2d 36. Section 15-3-545(A) (Supp.1990), the statute of repose governing medical malpractice *243 actions accruing after April, 1988,[2] provides: Section 15-3-30 (1976), the tolling statute, § 15-3-30 (1976), provides: Langley contends that inclusion of the language "in this chapter" renders the tolling statute applicable to claims under § 15-3-545. We disagree. The "primary function in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intent of the legislature." Browning v. Hartvigsen, 307 S.C. 122, 414 S.E.2d 115, 117 (1992). Generally, specific laws prevail over general laws, and later legislation takes precedence over earlier legislation. Lloyd v. Lloyd, 295 S.C. 55, 367 S.E.2d 153 (1988). Here, § 15-3-545 specifically provides that an action for medical malpractice must be commenced within "six years from date of occurrence, or as tolled by this section." Subsection (D) of 15-3-545 provides a limited tolling provision, applicable only to minors. Inclusion of the phrase "or as tolled by this section" in subsection (A) clearly indicates that the only tolling of § 15-3-545(A) intended by the legislature is that contained in subsection (D). Moreover, this Court has recognized that the six-year repose provision in § 15-3-545 "constitutes an outer limit beyond which a medical malpractice claim is barred, regardless of whether it has or should have been discovered." Hoffman v. Powell, 298 S.C. 338, 339, 380 S.E.2d 821, 821 (1989). In discussing the distinction between a statute of limitations and a statute of repose, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held: First United Methodist Church v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862, 865-866 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070, 110 S. Ct. 1113, 107 L. Ed. 2d 1020 (1990). The Court held, further, that "a statute of repose is typically an absolute time limit beyond which liability no longer exists and is not tolled for any reason because to do so would upset the economic balance struck by the legislative body." Id. (citing Knox v. AC & S, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 752, 759 [S.D. Ind. (1988)]. Similarly, in Kissel v. Rosenbaum, 579 N.E.2d 1322 (Ind.App. 1st Dist.1991), involving a 10-year outside limitation in which to bring suit for defects in construction, the Court discussed the rationale for statutes of repose: 579 N.E.2d at 1326-1328. This Court has previously upheld tolling provisions against absent defendants. See Parker v. S.C. Public Service Comm'n, 285 S.C. 231, 328 S.E.2d 909 (1985); Cutino v. Ramsey, 285 S.C. 74, 328 S.E.2d 72 (1985); Harris v. Dunlap, 285 S.C. 226, 328 S.E.2d 908 (1985). However, each of these cases involved a statute of limitations, not one of repose. We hold that the statute of repose contained in § 15-3-545 (Supp.1992) was not tolled when Dr. Pierce moved from South Carolina in 1984. CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED. HARWELL, C.J., and FINNEY, TOAL and MOORE, JJ., concur. [1] Mrs. Langley passed away in 1992 and the Personal Representative has been substituted. [2] The parties agree that Mrs. Langley's action accrued in 1990, upon discovery of Dr. Pierce's misdiagnosis.