Title: GUNN v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

GUNN v. STATE2003 WY 2464 P.3d 716Case Number: 02-39Decided: 02/26/2003
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

 

ROBERT 
GUNN,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

 

            
Kenneth M. Koski, Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; 
Ryan R. Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

 

            
Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Rebecca A. 
Lewis, Special Assistant Attorney General.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      Robert 
Gunn (Gunn) entered a conditional plea of guilty to an amended charge of 
indecent liberties with a child, a felony, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-3-105 (LexisNexis 2001).  Gunn 
appeals the Judgment and Sentence of the district court sentencing him to a term 
of not less than three years and not more than five years in the state 
penitentiary.  The district court 
suspended the penitentiary term on the condition that Gunn serve six consecutive 
weekends in the Natrona County Detention Center and complete four years of 
supervised probation.  We 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The issues 
presented on appeal are:

 

ISSUE 
I

 

Whether 
statements made by [Gunn] at his home were involuntary and in violation of his 
Miranda rights under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United [States] Constitution and Article 1 § 6 and 
Article 1 § 11 of the Wyoming Constitution?

 

ISSUE 
II

 

Whether 
statements made by [Gunn] to [a] deputy sheriff at the sheriff's office were 
involuntary and in violation of [his] rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United [States] Constitution and Article[] 1 §§ 6 and 11 of 
the Wyoming Constitution?

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      On June 25, 2001, 
Investigator Davis (Davis) arrived at Gunn's residence and questioned him about 
an alleged sexual assault in which he was the suspect.  Davis did not advise Gunn of his 
Miranda rights, and Gunn made an incriminating statement.  Davis then told Gunn that if he would 
accompany Davis to the sheriff's department and discuss the alleged crime and 
his involvement, Davis would thereafter return Gunn to his home.  Gunn concedes that his Miranda 
rights were given to him with respect to the statements made at the sheriff's 
department.

 

[¶4]     An Information filed on 
June 25, 2001, charged Gunn with two counts of third-degree sexual assault in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2001).  The State amended the Information in 
November 2001 to charge Gunn with unlawfully and knowingly taking immodest, 
immoral, or indecent liberties with a child, who was under the age of sixteen, 
while Gunn was at least four years older than the victim, in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105.  Gunn changed 
his plea to guilty, pursuant to a conditional plea agreement with the State, 
under which he reserved the right to appeal the district court's denial of the 
motion to suppress his incriminating statements.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶5]     The district court 
denied Gunn's Motion to Suppress.  
Our standard of review of the denial of such a motion is as 
follows:

 

"When we 
review a district court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we do not 
interfere with the findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  When the district court has not made 
specific findings of fact, we will uphold its general ruling if the ruling is 
supportable by any reasonable view of the evidence.  We consider the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the district court's ruling because of the district court's 
ability to assess the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and 
make the necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions' at the hearing on 
the motion."

 

Meek 
v. State, 
2002 WY 1, ¶ 8, 37 P.3d 1279, 1282 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Frederick v. 
State, 981 P.2d 494, 497 (Wyo. 1999)).  Voluntariness, however, is a question of 
law; thus, it is reviewed de novo.  
Lewis v. State, 2002 WY 92, ¶ 18, 48 P.3d 1063, 1068 (Wyo. 
2002).

DISCUSSION

 

Statement 
at Home

 

[¶6]      Gunn contends 
that he was in "custody" when Davis arrived at his home, separated him from his 
live-in companion, took him outside, and asked him questions that elicited an 
incriminating response.  Gunn claims 
that Davis did not advise him that he was free to leave or that he had the right 
not to speak to the officers.  Gunn 
contends that because he was deprived of his freedom in a significant way and 
was subsequently interrogated without the warnings required by Miranda, 
the incriminating statement should be suppressed.  In addition, Gunn argues that even if 
Miranda was not required, his statement to police was not voluntary as 
required by the federal and state constitutions.

 

[¶7]      Statements made 
by a suspect during custodial interrogation are admissible into evidence, 
providing certain advisements are made.  
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).  Statements made during custodial 
interrogation must be excluded upon a showing that the defendant was not advised 
of his Miranda rights.  
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 147 L. Ed. 2d 405 (2000), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2315 (2002).  In Dickerson, 530 U.S.  at 
435, 
the United States Supreme Court stated:

 

Accordingly, 
we laid down "concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies 
and courts to follow."  . . .  Those guidelines established that the 
admissibility in evidence of any statement given during custodial interrogation 
of a suspect would depend on whether the police provided the suspect with four 
warnings.  These warnings (which 
have come to be known colloquially as "Miranda rights") are:  a suspect "has the right to remain 
silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he 
has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an 
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so 
desires."

 

[¶8]      Custodial 
interrogation means "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a 
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of 
action in any significant way."  
Miranda, 384 U.S.  at 444.  See also Glass v. State, 
853 P.2d 972, 976 (Wyo. 1993) and Wunder v. State, 705 P.2d 333, 
334 (Wyo. 1985).  Neither general on-the-scene questioning 
as to facts surrounding a crime nor statements volunteered freely without 
compelling influences are considered to fall within this definition.  Miranda, 384 U.S.  at 
477-78.

 

[¶9]      The totality of 
the circumstances must be considered in determining whether a suspect is in 
custody when questioned.  In 
Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347, 96 S. Ct. 1612, 48 L. Ed. 2d 1 
(1976), 
the United States Supreme Court rejected the notion that a person who is the 
"focus" of a criminal investigation is, by that fact, "in custody."  The United States Supreme Court made 
clear that "Miranda implicitly defined focus,' for its purposes, as 
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person 
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in 
any significant way.'"  Id. 
at 347 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444) 
(emphasis in original).  The proper 
inquiry is to ask "whether a reasonable man in Appellant's position would have 
considered himself to be in police custody."  Glass, 853 P.2d  at 
976.

 

[¶10]   Several factors are relevant to be 
considered in determining whether a restraint is "custodial" for Miranda 
purposes.  Among these are: (1) 
whether a suspect is questioned in familiar or neutral surroundings; (2) the 
number of police officers present; (3) the degree of physical restraint and 
whether it is comparable to those associated with a formal arrest; and (4) the 
duration and character of the interrogation.  See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. 
Israel and Nancy J. King, Criminal Procedure § 6.6(c) at 527 
(2nd ed. 1999); 
see also Wunder, 705 P.2d  at 335.  The nature of the interrogator, the 
nature of the suspect, the time and place of the interrogation, the progress of 
the investigation at the time of the interrogation, whether the suspect is 
informed that his detention would not be temporary, and the elapsed amount of 
time between questioning and the arrest may be important factors as well.  Wunder, 705 P.2d  at 
335; 
J.F. Ghent, Annotation, What Constitutes "Custodial Interrogation" Within 
Rule of Miranda v. Arizona Requiring that Suspect be Informed of His Federal 
Constitutional Rights Before Custodial Interrogation, 31 A.L.R.3d 565 
(1970).  No one factor alone will necessarily 
establish custody for Miranda purposes, and not all factors will be 
relevant to a given case.

 

[¶11]   The giving of Miranda 
warnings, by itself, does not suffice to render a statement admissible.  The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution, and Wyo. Const. art. 1, §§ 6 and 11, require 
that statements also must be voluntary.  
Lewis, 2002 WY 92, ¶ 18, 48 P.3d  at 1068; 
Mitchell v. State, 982 P.2d 717, 721 (Wyo. 1999); 
Doyle v. State, 954 P.2d 969, 971-72 (Wyo. 1998).

 

"To 
be voluntary, the defendant's statements must result from free and deliberate 
choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.'  Madrid v. State, 910 P.2d 1340, 
1344 (Wyo.1996)  Because we presume 
a defendant's statements to be involuntary, the burden rests on the State to 
show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's statements were 
voluntary.  [State v.] Evans, 
944 P.2d [1120] at 1126-27 [(Wyo.1997)].  
Once the State has met its burden and rebutted the presumption of 
involuntariness, the defendant may be required to present evidence demonstrating 
the involuntariness of his statements.  
Id. at 1126.  If such 
statements resulted from coercion, then the statements are inadmissible at trial 
for any purpose because their validity is suspect.  Id. at 
1125."

 

Lewis, 
2002 WY 92, ¶ 18, 48 P.3d at 1068 (quoting Mitchell, 982 P.2d 
at 721).  We look to the totality of the 
circumstances to determine if the defendant's statements were voluntary.  Lewis, 2002 WY 92, ¶ 18, 48 P.3d 
at 1068 (quoting Mitchell, 982 P.2d at 
721).

 

[¶12]   Factors a trial court may consider 
in determining whether statements were made voluntarily 
include:

 

"[T]he 
atmosphere and events surrounding the elicitation of the statement, such as the 
use of violence, threats, promises, improper influence or official misconduct, 
the conduct of the defendant before and during the interrogation and the 
defendant's mental condition at the time the statement is made[,] . . . whether 
the defendant was in custody or was free to leave and was aware of the 
situation; whether Miranda warnings were given prior to any interrogation 
and whether the defendant understood and waived Miranda rights; 
whether the defendant had the opportunity to confer with counsel or anyone else 
prior to the interrogation; whether the challenged statement was made during the 
course of an interrogation or instead was volunteered; whether any overt or 
implied threat or promise was directed to the defendant; the method and style 
employed by the interrogator in questioning the defendant and the length and 
place of the interrogation; and the defendant's mental and physical condition 
immediately prior to and during the interrogation, as well as educational 
background, employment status, and prior experience with law enforcement and the 
criminal justice system."

 

Simmers 
v. State, 
943 P.2d 1189, 1195-96 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting State v. Evans, 
944 P.2d 1120, 1125-26 (Wyo. 1997); People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839, 845 
(Colo. 1991) and People v. Pearson, 725 P.2d 782, 783 (Colo. 
1986)).

 

[¶13]   In the instant case, Gunn was 
questioned at home while one investigator and two deputy sheriffs were at the 
residence.  Davis testified that he 
went to Gunn's residence, identified himself, told Gunn why he was there, and 
asked Gunn to step outside and speak privately with Davis about the alleged 
sexual assault.  Once outside, Davis 
and Gunn walked down the front yard toward Gunn's truck and stood beside 
it.  Deputy Walters was in close 
proximity and Deputy Frimml was inside the residence with Davis' live-in 
companion, Eva Bibb (Bibb).  Davis 
was standing between Gunn and his residence.  No Miranda warnings were given to 
Gunn at this time.

 

[¶14]   Gunn initially denied any knowledge 
of the matter, but then said that he did not rape the minor; she "wanted 
it."  Davis then asked Gunn if he 
would go to the sheriff's office and make a statement, which Gunn agreed to 
do.  The entire conversation between 
Davis and Gunn lasted only ten to fifteen minutes, and Davis did not arrest or 
handcuff Gunn.

 

[¶15]   Davis next went inside and talked 
with Bibb.  Davis testified that 
Bibb told him that she had left the residence in the early morning hours and 
that upon returning, she entered the bedroom and saw Gunn engaged in sexual 
activity with a fifteen-year-old girl.  
After this conversation, Davis went back outside and talked with 
Gunn.  Davis told Gunn that it was 
imperative that he go to the sheriff's office and speak with Davis about the 
sexual activity.  Davis then asked 
Gunn to go back into the house with Deputy Walters and show him the underwear he 
had on at the time of the sexual encounter so that the underwear could be taken 
into physical evidence.  Davis 
testified that Gunn voluntarily went in and complied with the request.  Deputy Walters took Gunn to the 
sheriff's office, and Gunn admits he went voluntarily.

 

[¶16]   Given the totality of the 
circumstances, we conclude that Gunn was not in police custody when questioned 
at his residence.  He was questioned 
at home, a presumptively non-coercive environment; he was not detained against 
his will; he was not formally arrested; there was no restraint on his freedom of 
movement; only two officers were present during questioning at the residence; 
and the questioning lasted only ten to fifteen minutes.  Viewing these facts as a reasonable man 
in Gunn's position would have understood the situation, we conclude that any 
reasonable person would have felt at liberty to terminate the interview.  Gunn testified that he agreed to talk 
with Davis outside because Davis was "the law."  However, a reasonable person would not 
have considered the ensuing conversation in his front yard to be equivalent to a 
formal arrest or custody.  Because 
Gunn was not in custody at the time of the questioning at his residence, no 
Miranda warnings were required.

 

[¶17]   We further conclude that the 
statement made by Gunn at his home was made voluntarily.  There is no indication in the record 
that the investigator or the deputy sheriffs were standing close to Gunn or 
intimidating him, that they were blocking his physical movements, or that they 
used violence, improper influence or other misconduct. No overt or implied 
threat was directed at Gunn, and Gunn appeared to be mentally and physically 
sound when he volunteered the statement.  
We agree with the district court that the statement made at Gunn's 
residence was voluntary.

 

Statement 
at Sheriff's Office

 

[¶18]   Gunn 
next argues that even though he was read his Miranda rights at the 
sheriff's office and signed a waiver of those rights before any questioning took 
place, "[s]atisfying Miranda does not resolve the question of 
voluntariness.  A confession may be 
found involuntary because of the means used to obtain it."  Evans, 944 P.2d  at 
1125.  Because the law presumes a defendant's 
statements to be involuntary, the State has the burden to show, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that Gunn's statements were voluntary.  Mitchell, 982 P.2d  at 
721.   In determining voluntariness, a 
court examines the totality of the circumstances that existed when the 
statements were made.

 

[¶19]   After arriving at the sheriff's 
office, Davis and Gunn went to an interview room for a tape-recorded 
interview.  Gunn initially provided 
his name, date of birth, Social Security number, address, and other background 
information.  The following dialogue 
then took place:

 

[DAVIS:]  . . .  Before I uh, talk to you about the 
incident this morning, I've already told you that if you'd come in here freely 
and voluntarily and speak with me today, that ir-regardless [sic] the results of 
it, I would take you back home, is that correct?

 

[GUNN:]  Yeah.

 

[DAVIS:]  Fully understand 
it?

 

[GUNN:]  Yes sir.

 

[DAVIS:]  Ok.  And you understand that you're not under 
arrest?

 

[GUNN:]  Yes sir.        

 

[DAVIS:]  Ok.  With that having been said, I want to 
advise you of your rights.  You have 
the right to remain silent.  
Anything you say can be used against you in court.  You have the right to talk to a lawyer 
for advice before we ask any questions and have him with you during 
questioning.  If you cannot afford 
an attorney, one will be appointed for you before any questioning, if you 
wish.  If you decide to answer 
questions now without a lawyer present, you will still have the right to stop 
answering any time.  You will also 
have the right to stop answering anytime until you talk to a lawyer.  Do you understand 
those?

 

[GUNN:]  Yes sir.

 

[DAVIS:]  Ok, what I'd like you to do then, if you 
would, sign that right there.  Read 
that paragraph and sign that.

 

[GUNN:]  Uh huh.

 

[DAVIS:]  Ok.  Acknowledge for the tape that he signed 
the waiver at uh, 9:15.

 

[¶20]   The paragraph Gunn read and signed 
stated:

 

I 
have read this statement of my rights and I understand what my rights are.  I am willing to make a statement and 
answer questions.  I do not want a 
lawyer at this time.  I understand 
and know what I am doing.  No 
promises or threats have been made to me and no pressure or coercion of any kind 
has been used against me.

 

[¶21]   Davis wrote "Yes sir" in the left 
margin of the form next to the advisement of rights, to indicate Gunn's response 
after Davis asked him if he understood his rights.  As the interview continued, Gunn made 
incriminating statements.  At the 
end of the interview, Davis turned the tape recorder off, and Deputy Frimml 
entered the room.  Davis informed 
Gunn that the appropriate charge was going to be indecent liberties and not 
rape.  Davis told Gunn that he had 
two options.  He could either go to 
jail that day and try to get bond to secure his release or Davis could obtain an 
arrest warrant, which could take some time.  Deputy Frimml testified that Gunn 
thought about this and decided to go to jail at that time.  Deputy Frimml transported Gunn to jail 
and booked him for indecent liberties.

 

[¶22]   Before leaving the interview room, 
Gunn became very upset because Davis had initially told him that no matter what 
happened that day, Davis would return him home.  Davis told him that he had decided to go 
to jail, and that was where he was going.  
Gunn admitted at the hearing on the motion to suppress that he had been 
given the two options, but claimed that he really had no 
choice.

 

[¶23]   The district court, in regard to 
the incriminating statements made at the sheriff's department, specifically 
found:  (1) that the statements were 
made subsequent to Miranda warnings and that they were not involuntary; 
and (2) Davis promised Gunn that he could go home after the interview but, at 
the conclusion of the interview, Gunn surrendered his right to go 
home.

 

[¶24]   Gunn argues that his statements at 
the sheriff's office in response to Davis' questioning were not voluntary, but 
he does not specify what made them involuntary.  He claims that he was somehow coerced or 
tricked, after making the incriminating statements, into allowing himself to be 
arrested instead of being taken home.  
Gunn also asserts that he was tricked into waiving his rights and making 
the inculpatory statements by Davis' earlier promise that he could return home 
regardless of what he said.  This 
argument is contrary to the testimony presented by Davis and corroborated by 
Deputy Frimml, that Gunn was given the chance to go home after the interview, 
but chose to be arrested at that time.

 

[¶25]   This Court has stated that 
"[i]nvoluntariness requires coercive state action, such as trickery, 
psychological pressure, or mistreatment.'"  
Evans, 944 P.2d  at 1125 (quoting Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 708, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1762, 123 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1993), cert. 
denied, 510 U.S. 1073 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).  Coercive government action is a 
necessary predicate to finding involuntariness within the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Evans, 944 P.2d  at 1125.  
"Once the evidence establishes state actor coercion, a court must 
consider the effect of that coercion on the defendant's choice to confess or 
make an admission or statement."  
Id. at 1125-26.  The 
use of misstatements or tricks in and of themselves does not render a confession 
or admission involuntary.  
Id. at 1126.  Gunn 
points to no evidence in the record to support a showing of coercive government 
action.  Gunn acknowledged that 
Davis read him his Miranda rights and that he waived those rights.  There was no use of violence, threats, 
promises, improper behavior or official misconduct in regard to the interview, 
other than the promise that Gunn could go home, which Gunn voluntarily 
relinquished.  We conclude that 
Gunn's statements during the custodial interview were made 
voluntarily.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶26]   Gunn was not in custody when 
questioned by an investigator at his home.  
Therefore, no Miranda warnings were required.  Furthermore, the incriminating 
statements made at his home were made voluntarily, as were his statements at the 
sheriff's office after he was properly Mirandized and had waived his 
rights.  We affirm the decision of 
the district court.