Title: DAVID LABON BUSH v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DAVID LABON BUSH v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 108193 P.3d 203Case Number: No. S-07-0247Decided: 09/17/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
DAVID 
LABON BUSH,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable David B. Park, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Kirk A. 
Morgan, Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Morgan.  

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Craig.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]  In 1990, Lynn Bush, the 26-year-old wife 
of David Labon Bush, disappeared.  Fifteen and one-half years later, in 
2006, the State charged Mr. Bush with first degree murder in connection with his 
wife's disappearance, although her body was never found.  In 2007, after a 12 day trial, a jury 
convicted him of second degree murder. 

 
 
[¶2] 
Mr. Bush appeals his conviction, claiming the district court violated his 
constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him and abused its 
discretion when it permitted two witnesses to testify about statements his 
daughter made to them during counseling and two other witnesses to testify by 
video teleconference.  He also 
claims the district court violated his constitutional right to present a defense 
when it prohibited him from introducing evidence of an alternative suspect.  Finally, he claims the State violated 
his right to due process when it waited fifteen and one-half years to file 
charges against him.  Finding no 
reversible error, we affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]  Stated succinctly, the issues Mr. Bush 
asks this Court to consider are:

 
 

1.                  
Whether 
the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses 
against him or abused its discretion when it allowed a counselor and a 
psychiatrist to testify concerning statements his daughter made to 
them.

 
 

2.                  
Whether 
the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses 
against him when it allowed two witnesses to testify by video 
teleconference.

 
 

3.                  
Whether 
the district court committed reversible error when it excluded evidence of an 
alternative suspect.

 
 

4.                  
Whether 
the delay in filing charges against him prejudiced his defense, thereby 
violating his right to due process.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]  On December 9, 1990, Officer Mike 
Thompson responded to a call at a grocery store parking lot in Casper, Wyoming.  
When he arrived, Mr. Bush told the officer that his wife, Lynn, had gone 
to the store the previous day and never returned home.  Mr. Bush said that he found her pickup 
truck parked in the lot, the driver's side door ajar and the keys lying on the 
ground nearby.  

 
 
[¶5]  On December 13, 1990, police officers 
served Mr. Bush with a search warrant and seized the pickup truck.  They searched the pickup and found what 
appeared to be blood stains in numerous locations throughout the cab.  According to one officer, as he was 
watching the search, Mr. Bush commented, "[W]hy are you doing this?  I'm the murderer."     

 
 
[¶6]  Officers also sprayed the inside of the 
pickup with luminol1 which indicated that a large amount 
of blood may have been in the passenger area.  Police officers searched the Bush home 
and found a vodka bottle with what appeared to be blood on it.  Police interviews of friends and family 
indicated that it was unlikely Mrs. Bush would have left home voluntarily 
without her daughter.  Some of those 
interviewed also expressed their belief that Mr. Bush was somehow involved in 
her disappearance, in part because of comments he allegedly made about 
committing the perfect murder and disposing of a human body where it would never 
be found.  

 
 
[¶7]  Subsequent DNA testing identified the 
blood found in the pickup truck and on the vodka bottle as most probably that of 
Mrs. Bush.  On July 31, 2006, 
fifteen and one-half years after Mr. Bush reported his wife missing, the State 
charged him with first degree murder in connection with his wife's 
disappearance.  Mr. Bush entered a 
plea of not guilty and filed a motion to dismiss for violation of his due 
process rights, claiming the lengthy delay in charging him was prejudicial to 
his defense.  The district court 
denied the motion after a hearing.  

 
 
[¶8]  Subsequently, the State filed a motion 
to exclude evidence of an alternative suspect.  The district court heard argument on the 
motion and ruled that Mr. Bush must first demonstrate to the court that 
sufficient evidence supported his theory that someone else murdered his wife 
before he would be allowed to present the evidence to the jury.  Mr. Bush filed an offer of proof and 
request for admission of alternative suspect evidence.  The district court convened another 
hearing and concluded the evidence Mr. Bush presented was not sufficient to 
allow him to present the matter to the jury.  The district court indicated, however, 
that Mr. Bush could ask for reconsideration of its ruling as the trial 
proceeded.                

 
 
[¶9]  A jury trial began on March 5, 
2007.  On March 20, 2007, the jury 
found Mr. Bush not guilty of first degree murder but guilty of second degree 
murder.  Mr. Bush filed a motion for 
a new trial claiming that, given the ruling prohibiting him from presenting 
evidence of an alternative suspect, it was improper for the State to tell the 
jury in closing argument that he was the only person who had the opportunity to 
kill Mrs. Bush.  After a hearing, 
the district court denied the motion.  
The district court sentenced Mr. Bush to a term of 45 years to life in 
the state penitentiary with credit for 325 days served prior to sentencing.  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

1.                  
Admission 
of Evidence of Mr. Bush's Daughter's Out-of-Court Statements  Abuse of 
Discretion or Violation of Confrontation Right

 

[¶10]  During the trial, the district court 
allowed Lynn Gordon, a licensed professional counselor, and Dr. Robin Eicher, a 
board certified licensed psychiatrist, to testify concerning statements Mr. 
Bush's daughter made to them during their treatment of the child in 1991, 1992 
and 1993, when the child was not yet five years old.  Mr. Bush claims the district court 
abused its discretion in allowing the hearsay testimony and that its admission 
violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.  The State responds that the district 
court properly admitted the statements under W.R.E. 803(4) and that Mr. Bush's 
Sixth Amendment right was not violated because the child's out-of-court 
statements were not testimonial and did not implicate the confrontation 
clause.  

 
 
[¶11]  The facts underlying the statements at 
issue are these:  After Mrs. Bush 
disappeared, her daughter was removed from Mr. Bush's custody and placed in the 
legal custody of the Wyoming Department of Family Services (DFS) and the 
physical custody of her maternal grandparents.2  The grandparents observed some unusual 
behaviors by the child and sought treatment for her at Northwestern Mental 
Health Society in Sheridan.  
Initially, Bruce Andrews cared for the child.  In April of 1991, when the child was 
almost three years old, Ms. Gordon took over her care.  Ms. Gordon treated the child for over 
two years, typically seeing her once per week.  Over the course of the treatment, the 
child made statements to Ms. Gordon implicating Mr. Bush in her mother's 
disappearance. 

 
 
[¶12]  In the course of the custody 
proceedings, DFS referred the child to Dr. Eicher for an evaluation.  Dr. Eicher saw the child twice in 1992 
and once in 1993.  During these 
sessions, the child made statements to her implicating Mr. Bush in her mother's 
disappearance.   

 
 
[¶13]  At the trial in 2007, the State called 
Mr. Bush's daughter, who was then 18 years old, to testify.  She testified on direct examination that 
she could not remember any of the events in 1990.  She testified that the counseling she 
had as a child pretty much made her unable to remember what had happened.  Defense counsel did not cross-examine 
her.  

 
 
[¶14] 
The State then called Ms. Gordon and Dr. Eicher to testify about the statements 
Mr. Bush's daughter had made as a child during therapy.  Defense counsel objected to the 
testimony on hearsay grounds but did not object on the basis of the 
confrontation clause.  Responding to 
the objection posed, the district court ruled that the statements were 
admissible under W.R.E. 803(4), as statements made for purposes of medical 
diagnosis or treatment.

 
 
[¶15]  Ms. Gordon proceeded to testify that the 
child "talked about seeing mommy cut in two and put in two holes, and seeing 
mommy with blood wiped off of her."  Ms. Gordon testified that the child told 
her that "daddy had hurt mommy and gave her an owie" and "would talk about mommy 
being cut and daddy cutting mommy."  
She testified that the child told her "Mommy is where the Christmas trees 
are," "Mommy got her head split open," "Daddy shot Mommy," and "Mommy is in 
Kaycee."  Ms. Gordon testified that 
on one occasion the child took a toy knife, acted out cutting her belly and 
said, "This is how my mommy got cut."  
Ms. Gordon testified that the child consistently indicated that it was 
"daddy" that had hurt "mommy."  The 
child also said that "daddy said don't say anything to [Ms. Gordon]" and "daddy 
said he would kill [me]."  During 
one counseling session, she told Ms. Gordon her "mommy is dead," she is "in the 
mountain," and "Daddy is bad."              

  

[¶16]  Dr. Eicher testified that during her 
first meeting with the child, who was then four years old, she drew a picture of 
her mommy, put tape on the picture and said, "We have to put [tape] on our 
mommies' owies" and "let's just pretend she doesn't have an owie."  She testified that the child said she 
did not "want to live with daddy; he might cut me, too."  Dr. Eicher testified the child also told 
her that she "had a dream about my daddy killing my mommy."  Dr. Eicher asked her what the dream was 
like, if it was like her memories or if it was different from her memories.  She responded, "It was like what really 
happened."  At the last session, the 
child told Dr. Eicher, "I don't like [my daddy] because he killed my 
mommy."  We address first Mr. Bush's 
claim that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the hearsay 
testimony without limiting the purpose for which it could be considered.  

 
 
a.         
Admissibility of Hearsay Statements Under W.R.E. 
803(4)

 
 
[¶17] 
 The record discloses that defense 
counsel objected to the testimony on the ground that the child's statements were 
not admissible for the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., that Mr. Bush killed 
Mrs. Bush, but only for the purpose of showing what information Ms. Gordon and 
Dr. Eicher relied upon in arriving at a diagnosis.  Initially, therefore, the defense did 
not object to admission of the statements but only to the purpose for which they 
were admitted.  The district court 
withheld ruling until the State established foundation for the statements during 
direct examination of Ms. Gordon.  
At that point, counsel approached the bench and the State argued that the 
foundation had been laid for admitting the statements under W.R.E. 803(4).  Defense counsel asserted the testimony 
was not admissible because the purpose of Ms. Gordon's counseling was to assist 
the police with the criminal investigation; therefore, it did not fall within 
the medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule.  Defense counsel asked to voir dire Ms. Gordon and the district 
court granted the request.  

 
 
[¶18]  During the voir dire, Ms. Gordon testified that she 
was in contact with the police department and the district attorney's office 
while she was treating the child.  
She testified that her purpose for those contacts was to find out what 
had happened to the child before she went to live with her grandparents.  Ms. Gordon denied that she was assisting 
the police department or the district attorney's office with their investigation 
into Mrs. Bush's disappearance and testified that her only reason for seeing the 
child was to help her.

 
 
[¶19]  After the voir dire, counsel again approached the 
bench and defense counsel argued that Ms. Gordon had served a dual purposeshe 
treated the child and assisted the police with the criminal investigation.  Defense counsel asked for a limiting 
instruction telling the jury that the statements were admitted for the purpose 
of showing what information Ms. Gordon relied upon in treating the child but not 
for the truth of the child's statements that Mr. Bush killed Mrs. Bush.  The district court ruled as 
follows:

 
 
I 
think the statements can come in as an exception to the hearsay rule under 803, 
sub (4).  I can envision 
circumstances where a witness is sent to medical treatment to get around the 
rule; and in that case, I think that kind of subterfuge would not allow the 
statements to be used substantively.  
There is no indication here.  
Ms. Gordon has indicated her primary purpose was diagnosis and treatment 
of [the child].  If those statements 
were used secondarily for law enforcement purposes, that does not render them 
not available under the exception.  
So I'm not going to give the limiting instruction.  I'm ruling they may come in and be 
considered by the jury for substantive purposes.

 
 
[¶20]  We review a district court ruling on the 
admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion and will not disturb its 
ruling absent a clear abuse.  Negrette v. State, 2007 WY 88, ¶ 11, 158 P.3d 679, 682 (Wyo. 2007).  An abuse 
of discretion occurs when it is shown the trial court reasonably could not have 
concluded as it did.  Id.  

 
 
[¶21]  W.R.E. 801(c) defines hearsay as "a 
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or 
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."3  Pursuant to W.R.E. 802, hearsay 
generally is not admissible unless it falls within an exception.  Rule 803 provides in pertinent part: 

 

The 
following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is 
available as a witness:

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
(4)  Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis 
or treatment.  Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or 
treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or 
sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external 
source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment[.] 

 
 
[¶22]  Pursuant to this provision, we have held 
that a child's statements to a medical professional or professional counselor 
may be admitted into evidence provided the proper foundation is laidthat the 
child's statements were consistent with the purposes for which the witness 
became involved with the child, and the witness relied on the statements in 
connection with diagnosis and treatment of the child.  Simmers v. State, 943 P.2d 1189, 
1197-1198 (Wyo. 1997).  

 
 
[¶23]  Ms. Gordon testified that she began 
seeing the child at the request of her maternal grandparents, who were concerned 
about her behavior after her mother's disappearance.  Her grandmother testified that the child 
was having nightmares, was angry and scared and was losing weight.  She said she sought treatment for the 
child because she believed the child needed help.

 
 
[¶24]  Ms. Gordon testified that her sole 
purpose for seeing the child was treatment.  She testified that she relied on the 
child's statements to arrive at a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress 
disorder.  Ms. Gordon testified that 
it is particularly important in her field to collect a history of the patient 
from family members and the patient herself.  She testified it is also important when 
dealing with post-traumatic stress disorder to identify the source of the 
disorder.  

 
 
[¶25] 
Dr. Eicher testified that DFS referred the child to her for evaluation during 
the custody matter.  She testified 
that she did not conduct a forensic interview for purposes of criminal or 
custodial proceedings.  She saw the 
child three times and diagnosed her as having severe post-traumatic stress 
disorder as a result of having seen her mother hurt by her father.  In arriving at her diagnosis, Dr. Eicher 
relied primarily on the child's statements and play during the sessions.           

 
 
[¶26]  The witnesses' testimony showed that the 
child's statements were consistent with their purpose for seeing the 
childtreatment and diagnosis.  
Their testimony also showed that they relied on the child's statements in 
connection with diagnosing and treating her.  Therefore, the district court properly 
admitted the statements under W.R.E. 803(4) and did not abuse its discretion in 
doing so.  We turn to Mr. Bush's 
contention that admission of the statements violated his Sixth Amendment right 
to confront the witnesses against him.  

 
 
b.         
Admissibility of the Statements in Light of the Confrontation 
Clause

 
 
[¶27]  Mr. Bush claims that his constitutional 
right to confront the witnesses against him was violated when his daughter 
testified that she could not remember what happened in 1990, effectively making 
her unavailable, and the district court allowed her testimonial hearsay 
statements to be presented through Ms. Gordon and Dr. Eicher.  The State likewise treats the daughter 
as having been unavailable to testify at trial but responds that Mr. Bush's 
confrontation rights were not violated because his daughter's out-of-court 
statements were non-testimonial and did not implicate the confrontation 
clause.  The State also contends 
that we must review this issue for plain error because, although Mr. Bush 
objected to the testimony on the basis of the hearsay rules, he did not 
specifically object on the grounds that it violated his confrontation 
right.  We begin our discussion by 
considering whether the plain error standard applies.     

 
 
[¶28]  The State cites Vigil v. State, 2004 WY 110, ¶ 15, 98 P.3d 172, 177 (Wyo. 2004), in which we said:

 
 
While 
the Confrontation Clause and hearsay may overlap, they are distinct concepts and 
objections grounded upon these principles incorporate separate analyses.  Hence, separate objections should be 
made for hearsay violations and confrontation clause violations in order to 
fairly alert the trial court so it can make an informed decision based upon the 
specific legal issues involved.  
(Citations omitted).

 
 
In 
Vigil, we reviewed the alleged error 
for abuse of discretion because the attorney referred to the declarant's 
unavailability during the objection.  
We found that reference sufficient to place the trial court on notice 
that the objection implicated the confrontation clause.  Quoting a Nevada case, we 
concluded:  

 
 
When 
a hearsay objection is lodged, as here, on the grounds that the declarant has 
not been made available at trial and, as a result, cannot be subjected to 
cross-examination, the policy of the confrontation clause is invoked equally 
with that of the hearsay rule.  We 
therefore hold that the hearsay objection lodged in the instant case adequately 
preserved the confrontation clause issue for review.                 

 
 

Id., 
¶ 16, 98 P.3d  at 177 (citation omitted).

 
 
[¶29]  In Mr. Bush's case, defense counsel's 
objection was based exclusively on the hearsay rule.  In the ten pages of trial transcript in 
which the district court and counsel discussed the objection, there is no 
reference to the confrontation clause or the declarant's unavailability.  Rather, the focus of defense counsel's 
objection was that the testimony should not be admitted for the truth of the 
matter asserted, but instead for the limited purpose of showing what information 
the witnesses relied on in reaching their opinions.  Defense counsel attempted to show that 
the primary purpose of the counseling was not treatment but to help with law 
enforcement's investigation. Given that the confrontation clause was never 
mentioned, we review Mr. Bush's claim that admission of the testimony violated 
his right of confrontation for plain error.  Plain error exists when:  1) the record is clear about the 
incident alleged as error; 2) there was a transgression of a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law; and 3) the party claiming the error was denied a 
substantial right which materially prejudiced him.  Szymanski v. State, 2007 WY 139, ¶ 28, 
166 P.3d 879, 886 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
[¶30]  Applying these factors, we hold that the 
admission of the daughter's out-of-court statements did not violate the 
confrontation clause and there was no plain error.  We reach this result, however, on 
different grounds than those argued by the parties.  We conclude the daughter was not 
unavailable for purposes of the confrontation clause.  Rather, she appeared at trial, was 
placed under oath and testified.  
Thus, Mr. Bush was confronted with the witness and had the opportunity to 
cross-examine her and the Sixth Amendment was satisfied.  

 
 
[¶31]  The confrontation clause of the Sixth 
Amendment gives the accused the right to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him.  This has long been 
read as securing an adequate opportunity to cross-examine adverse 
witnesses.  United 
States v. Owens, 
484 U.S. 554, 108 S. Ct. 838, 98 L. Ed. 2d 951 (1988).  Thus, in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1970), the Court held the admission at trial of 
preliminary hearing testimony did not violate the confrontation clause when the 
witness who gave the testimony subsequently appeared at trial and was subject to 
cross-examination about his earlier testimony.  Similarly, in Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 106 S. Ct. 292, 88 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1985), the Court held there was no confrontation 
clause violation when the State's expert witness testified at trial concerning 
his opinion but said he could not remember the method he used to form his 
opinion.  The Court said:  

 
 
The 
main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the 
opportunity of cross-examination.  
Generally speaking, the Confrontation Clause guarantees an 
opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that 
is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish. 
This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that the assurances of reliability our 
cases have found in the right of cross-examination are fully satisfied in cases 
such as this one, notwithstanding the witness' inability to recall the basis for 
his opinion: the factfinder can observe the witness' demeanor under 
cross-examination, and the witness is testifying under oath and in the presence 
of the accused.      

 
 

Id. 
at 19 (citations omitted; emphasis in original).

 
 
[¶32]  Neither Green nor Fensterer considered the admissibility 
of a witness's unsworn, out-of-court statement concerning events he was unable 
to remember by the time of trial.  
In Owens, 484 U.S.  at 559-60, the Court 
specifically addressed that issue.  
There, the victim identified the defendant as his assailant a couple of 
weeks after he was assaulted.  At 
trial 18 months later, the victim testified that he remembered identifying the 
defendant a year and a half before but, because of profound memory loss 
resulting from the assault, presently had no memory of who attacked him. The 
trial court admitted the earlier out-of-court statement in which the victim 
identified the defendant.  

 
 
[¶33]  The defendant appealed claiming the 
admission of the out-of-court statement violated his confrontation right because 
the witness's profound memory loss deprived him of the opportunity to effective 
cross-examination.  The circuit 
court of appeals agreed and reversed the conviction.  On certiorari, the United States Supreme 
Court reversed, holding the admission of the out-of-court statement did not 
violate the confrontation clause because the witness appeared at trial, was 
sworn and was subject to cross-examination.  The defendant had the opportunity to 
confront the witness; confrontation is what the Sixth Amendment is intended to 
protect; consequently, the defendant's right was not violated.    

 
 
[¶34]  More recently, in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004), the Court 
re-affirmed that confrontation is the foundation of the Sixth Amendment 
right:

 
 
Finally, 
we reiterate that, when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, 
the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior 
statements . . . .  The Clause does 
not bar admission of a statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to 
defend or explain it.       

 
 

Id. 
at 59, n. 9.

 
 
[¶35]  Following the lead of the United States 
Supreme Court, a number of state courts have held that the admission of 
out-of-court statements of a witness who appears at trial and testifies that he 
or she cannot remember the relevant events or his or her statements does not 
violate the confrontation clause.  
In State v. Price, 146 P.3d 1183 (Wash. 
2006), for example, a child told her mother and a police officer that the 
defendant had sexually abused her.  
At trial, the prosecution called the child as a witness and when asked 
about the events and what she had told her mom she answered, "Me forgot" or 
shrugged her shoulders.  The trial 
court allowed the child's mother and the police officer to testify concerning 
what the child had told them.      

 
 
[¶36]  On appeal, the defendant argued that the 
child's inability to remember rendered her unavailable for purposes of the 
confrontation clause and that he had no prior opportunity to cross-examine her 
concerning her statements to her mother and the police.  The Washington Supreme Court concluded 
the confrontation clause was not violated because the child was physically 
present in the courtroom and confronted the defendant face to face; she was 
competent to testify and did so under oath; the defense had a full opportunity 
to cross-examine her; and the judge, jury and defendant were able to view her 
demeanor and evaluate for themselves whether she was being truthful about her 
lack of memory.  Thus, the court 
concluded, all of the purposes of the confrontation clause were satisfied even 
though the witness indicated she was unable to recall.  As in Owens, the court held that an inability 
to remember does not render a witness unavailable for confrontation clause 
purposes.  

 
 
[¶37]  Other courts have also addressed the 
issue and concluded that admission of an out-of-court statement when a witness 
testifies he or she does not remember the statement or the events described in 
the statement does not violate the confrontation clause.  See Tucker v. State, 564 A.2d 1110 (Del. 
1989) (holding that the confrontation clause was not violated when a child's 
out-of-court statements were admitted after she testified and was unable or 
unwilling to respond to questioning); State v. Desantiago, 850 N.E.2d 866 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (holding that one witness's trial testimony concerning a 
second witness's grand jury testimony did not violate the confrontation clause 
when the second witness testified at trial that he had no memory of the grand 
jury proceeding); Fowler v. State, 
829 N.E.2d 459 (Ind. 2005) (holding that an officer's trial testimony concerning 
a domestic violence victim's statements did not violate the confrontation clause 
when the victim appeared at trial and refused to answer questions and the 
defense allowed her to leave the stand without challenging her refusal). 

 
 
[¶38]  As these cases reflect, what is 
important for purposes of the Sixth Amendment is that the defendant is 
confronted by the witnesses against him at trial and has the opportunity to 
cross-examine them.  Mr. Bush was 
confronted by his daughter at trial, she testified under oath and he had the 
opportunity to cross-examine her.  
Her testimony on direct examination that she did not remember the 1990 
events does not affect our conclusion that the admission of her statements did 
not violate the confrontation clause.4  

 
 
[¶39]   As previously mentioned, the 
starting point for both Mr. Bush's argument and the State's response was that 
the daughter's lack of memory made her unavailable to testify and be 
cross-examined.  Based upon the 
authorities cited, we have concluded otherwise.  However, our ultimate holding that Mr. 
Bush's confrontation right was not violated by the admission of his daughter's 
out-of-court statements would be the same under the parties' approach.  Even if the daughter had been 
unavailable for purposes of the confrontation clause, the admission of her 
out-of-court statements did not violate the Sixth Amendment because they were 
not testimonial, i.e.,  their 
primary purpose was not to establish or prove past events potentially related to 
later criminal prosecution. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224 (2006).  As reflected in Ms. Gordon's and Dr. 
Eicher's testimony, the primary purpose of the statements was for treatment and 
diagnosis.  Such non-testimonial 
statements do not implicate the confrontation clause.  Crawford, 541 U.S.  at 68.     

 
 
[¶40]  Mr. Bush also argues that the admission 
of his daughter's statements violated his confrontation right because there was 
no way to show at trial in 2007 that she was competent at three, four or five 
years old to make the statements she made.  
In support of this argument, he cites King v. Brasier, 1 Leach 199, 168 Eng. 
Rep. 202 (1779), a case decided before the existence of either the confrontation 
clause or the exceptions to the hearsay rule, in which the court held that a 
mother could not testify concerning statements her child made to her because the 
child had been found incompetent to take the oath and testify.  Mr. Bush also cites Morganflash v. State, 2003 WY 120, ¶ 6, 
76 P.3d 830, 833 (Wyo. 2003), in which we reiterated the rule requiring trial 
courts to conduct an independent competency examination when a child is called 
to testify and his or her competency is called into question.  Both King and Morganflash addressed the competency of 
a child, who has been called to testify as a witness, to understand the oath and 
the importance of telling the truth.  
Neither case addressed the situation Mr. Bush raises where the 
three-year-old child who made the statements was 18 years old when she was 
called as a witness, her competency at the time of trial was not questioned, and 
her competency as a three-year-old could not be directly examined.  The parties cite no case involving 
similar circumstances and we have found none.

 
 

[¶41]   However, in State v. Muttart, 875 N.E.2d 944, 
954  (Ohio 2007),  cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2473, 171 L. Ed. 2d 769, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 4278, 76 U.S.L.W. 3619 (U.S. 
2008), the Ohio Supreme Court held 
that regardless of whether a child was determined to be competent to testify, 
the child's out-of-court statements were admissible as an exception to the 
hearsay rule if they were made for purposes of medical diagnosis or 
treatment.  The court held further 
that because the statements were made for purposes of medical diagnosis and 
treatment, they were not testimonial and their admission did not violate the 
confrontation clause.

 
 
[¶42]  We have already concluded the child's 
statements in the present case were made for purposes of medical treatment and 
diagnosis.  Thus, they were 
admissible under W.R.E. 803(4) whether or not the child was competent at the age 
of three when she made them.  Muttart, 875 N.E.2d  at 954.  See also Christopher B. Mueller and 
Laird Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 
8.5, 48 (3rd ed. 2008) (stating, "Competency restrictions do not 
affect the admissibility of statements offered under hearsay exceptions.")  Because the statements were made for 
purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment, they also were not testimonial and 
their admission would not have violated the confrontation clause even if the 
declarant had not appeared at trial, testified and been subject to 
cross-examination.  

 
 

2.                  
Violation 
of Confrontation Clause  Witness Testimony by Video 
Teleconference

 
 
[¶43]  The State intended to call Paul and 
Caroline Martin to testify at trial that they were traveling on I-25 from 
Casper to Story, Wyoming 
early in the morning on December 8, 1990, when the Bushes' pickup truck passed 
them at a high rate of speed.  They 
recognized the pickup as belonging to the Bushes because they worked at 
CasperCollege where Mrs. Bush 
also worked, they had gotten to know her and Mr. Bush and they knew the Bushes 
drove a black Ford pickup truck with the license plate 1-BUSH.  Inside the cab, the Martins saw two 
people, a driver and a smaller passenger seated immediately next to the 
driver.  In the bed of the pickup, 
they saw several large plastic bags.

 
 
[¶44] 
On the eighth day of trial, the State asked the district court to allow it to 
present the Martins' testimony by telephone.  The State informed the court that Mr. 
Martin had suffered congestive heart failure one week before and was unable to 
travel from his home in La Junta, Colorado to 
Wyoming.  The State represented to the court that 
Mr. Martin was seriously ill and Mrs. Martin was reluctant to leave him.  The State indicated the Martins could 
travel to the district attorney's office in La Junta and testify by telephone or 
video teleconference.  

 
 
[¶45]  Defense counsel objected to the 
presentation of the Martins' testimony by telephone or video teleconference as 
violating Mr. Bush's right to confront the witnesses against him.  After a lengthy discussion of the law, 
the district court denied the request but advised the State it would reconsider 
the issue if new information came to light.  

 
 
[¶46]  The following day, the State brought the 
matter of the Martins' testimony to the court's attention again.  The State informed the district court 
that new information from Mr. Martin's physician indicated that he suffered from 
congestive heart failure with severe left ventricular dysfunction, 
cardiomyopathy, chronic renal failure, and anemia of chronic disease, and his 
condition was profoundly poor.  The 
State further informed the district court that arrangements had been made for 
the Martins to appear and testify by video teleconference, rather than by 
telephone, at the La Junta district attorney's office.  

 
 
[¶47]  Defense counsel maintained her objection 
on the basis of the confrontation clause as to both of the Martins' testimony 
and, with respect to Mrs. Martin, argued that she was able to travel and ought 
to be required to appear if the State intended her to testify.  The State responded that Mrs. Martin's 
testimony would be merely corroborative of Mr. Martin's testimony and so, under 
Ryan v. State, 988 P.2d 46, 59 (Wyo. 
1999), its admission by video teleconference did not violate Mr. Bush's 
confrontation right.  The district 
court ruled that it would allow the testimony of both Mr. and Mrs. Martin by 
video teleconference, finding that Mr. Martin's condition was serious and severe 
and he should not travel; under the circumstances, it would be greatly stressful 
for Mrs. Martin to leave her husband of 60 years to travel to Wyoming to 
testify; and the State's arrangements for video teleconferencing resolved many 
of the confrontation concerns.    

 
 
[¶48]  Mr. Bush's claim that he was denied the 
right of confrontation arises under the Sixth Amendment.  Issues arising under the constitution 
are questions of law which we review de 
novo.  Hannon v. State, 2004 WY 8, ¶ 11, 84 P.3d 320, 328 (Wyo. 2004).  
Evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court 
and will not be disturbed absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion. Vigil, ¶ 17, 98 P.3d  at 177.  Because the matter at hand involves a 
mixed question of fact and constitutional law, we independently review the 
record.  Id.  

 
 
[¶49]  The Sixth Amendment protects the right 
of an accused to confront the witnesses against him.  Generally, this means witnesses who 
testify against a defendant in a criminal proceeding must appear at trial.  The right, however, is not absolute and 
may be compromised under limited circumstances. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 848, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3165, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666 (1990).  The confrontation clause reflects a preference for face-to-face 
confrontation at trial, a preference that must occasionally give way to 
considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.  
Id.  
(emphasis added).

 
 
A 
defendant's right to confront accusatory witnesses may be satisfied absent a 
physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial only where the denial of such 
confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy and only where 
the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.

 
 

Id.  Accordingly, the presentation of witness 
testimony by video teleconference is not permissible unless:  1) it is necessary to further an 
important public policy, and 2) the reliability of the testimony is otherwise 
assured.

 
 
[¶50]  This Court has not previously addressed 
the issue of whether a defendant's confrontation right was violated by 
presentation of witness testimony via video teleconference.5  Other jurisdictions that have applied 
the Craig test have reached varying 
results depending upon the particular circumstances of the case.  In Horn v. Quarterman, 508 F.3d 306, 320 
(5th Cir. 2007), the court upheld a district court ruling allowing a 
terminally ill witness to testify via two-way closed-circuit television.  The appellate court based its ruling 
primarily on two factors.  First, 
the district court had confirmed that the treating physician advised that it 
would be medically unsafe for the witness to travel and strongly recommended 
against it.  Second, the district 
court had expressly found that the two-way closed-circuit television preserved 
the constitutional safeguards of administering the oath and having the witness 
testify on direct and cross examination in full view of the jury, defendant, 
defense counsel and court.  
Similarly, in Marx v. State, 
987 S.W.2d 577, 580-81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), the court upheld the admission of 
testimony via two-way-closed circuit television, finding that it was necessary 
to protect the witnesses from emotional trauma, and the reliability of their 
testimony was assured because they testified after promising to do so 
truthfully, they were subject to cross-examination, and the jury was able to 
observe their demeanor.  

 
 
[¶51]  In contrast, in U.S. v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307 
(11th Cir. 2006), the court reversed a district court ruling allowing 
two witnesses to testify from Australia by two-way video conference.   The State had asserted the 
witnesses were unwilling to appear at trial, their testimony was important, and 
allowing them to appear by video conference was convenient and would 
expeditiously resolve the case. The district court allowed the testimony without 
applying the two-part Craig 
test.  The court of appeals 
concluded the State had failed to make the requisite showing that denial of the 
confrontation right was necessary to further an important public policy 
(convenience, the importance of testimony and expeditious resolution are factors 
in every criminal case) and the district court had failed to apply the Craig test.

 
 
[¶52]  Pursuant to Craig, presentation of the Martins' 
testimony by video teleconference was appropriate only upon a showing that it 
was necessary to further an important public policy and its reliability was 
otherwise assured.  As in Horn, the district court in Mr. Bush's 
case confirmed through medical records that Mr. Martin's condition was "serious 
and severe and not temporary" and that his physician advised against him 
traveling from La Junta, Colorado to Casper, Wyoming.  
The district court concluded that it would not be appropriate to recess 
and wait for Mr. Martin to recover because, if he recovered, it would be a long 
time.  The district court also 
considered the reliability of the testimony, first, by telephone and, then, by 
video conference.  The district 
court indicated its concerns about the testimony were substantially reduced when 
the State arranged to present the testimony by video 
conference.

 
 
[¶53]  We conclude the district court properly 
applied the Craig test.  Mr. Martin's testimony via video 
conference was necessary to further the important public policy of preventing 
further harm to his already serious medical condition.  The reliability of his testimony was 
otherwise assured by the facts that he appeared in the La Junta district 
attorney's office and was sworn by the district court, gave testimony and was 
subjected to cross-examination before the jury, Mr. Bush, defense counsel and 
the court via live broadcast. The district court further assured the reliability 
of his testimony by ordering Mrs. Martin to be out of the room during her 
husband's testimony. We hold that the district court properly admitted Mr. 
Martin's testimony by video conference and did not violate Mr. Bush's 
confrontation right.   

     

[¶54]  Our conclusion concerning Mr. Martin's 
testimony does not resolve the issue with respect to Mrs. Martin's 
testimony.  Although the reliability 
of her testimony was otherwise assured for the same reasons as Mr. Martin's, 
Mrs. Martin was not ill and there was no medical recommendation against her 
traveling.  The district court 
acknowledged these different circumstances but allowed her testimony by video 
conference because she and Mr. Martin had been married for 60 years, she was 
justifiably concerned about her husband, it "would be greatly stressful for her 
to have to come here" and "her time away would be very difficult for her given 
her husband's circumstances."  We 
have found no cases in which any court has considered whether circumstances such 
as these were sufficient to show testimony by video conference was necessary to 
further an important public policy.  
We hold that the district court erred in allowing Mrs. Martin to testify 
by video teleconference.  However, 
the error was harmless because her testimony was cumulative of her husband's 
testimony.  Ryan, 988 P.2d  at 59.  

 
 

3.                  
Denial 
of Alternative Suspect Evidence

 
 
[¶55]  Prior to trial, the State filed a motion 
to exclude evidence of alternative suspects until Mr. Bush produced an adequate 
evidentiary basis for its admission.  
The State asserted that Mr. Bush had attempted to blame his half brother, 
Glendol Bush, who was an escapee from the Wyoming State Conservation Camp at the 
time Mrs. Bush disappeared.  The 
State alleged that a law enforcement investigation showed Glendol Bush was not 
in Wyoming 
during the period in question.  
Citing case law from a variety of jurisdictions, the State asserted that 
alternative suspect evidence was not admissible unless it showed a chain of 
circumstances clearly pointing to someone other than the defendant.  The district court entered an order 
granting the State's motion to exclude evidence of alternative suspects until 
such time as the defense demonstrated to the court "that a quantum of evidence 
exists that would allow such evidence to be introduced" at trial.    

 
 
[¶56]  Following the court's order, Mr. Bush 
submitted an offer of proof and request for admission of alternative suspect 
evidence.  He listed the following 
evidence in support of his request:

 
 
Theresa 
Bush's recorded statement to the police on August 1, 2005 in which she said that 
when she called on December 9, 1990 to report her daughter-in-law's 
disappearance, she told the police that she was very concerned about David's 
step brother who had escaped from the conservation camp.  She also stated that she told the police 
they needed to take this seriously.  
In her August 2005 statement, she said her concern at the time "was not 
about David.  It was more about 
Glenn."  

 
 
Julia 
Hayfield's statement that she was in the Buttrey parking lot late in the 
afternoon on December 8, 1990 and saw a dark colored truck with the license 
plate 1-BUSH driven by a dark haired woman pull into the lot.  She saw the woman get out of the truck. 
She was big across the shoulders and wearing stone washed jeans and a waist 
length jacket.

 
 
Doris 
Lore's statement that she was in the Buttrey parking lot at approximately 5:30 
p.m. on December 8, 1990 and saw a tall male and a short female arguing in the 
parking lot.  They got into a Datsun 
and drove away.

 
 
On 
Monday, December 10, 1990, Deputy Rodstad of the Natrona County Sheriff's Office 
observed a small pickup by Red Draw in NatronaCounty.  The registration was for a black 
Datsun.

 
 
Sue 
Moore's statement to the sheriff's office on December 13, 1990 that on Sunday, 
December 9, 1990, around 4:00 p.m., she saw a man walking around FremontCanyon.  He was 5'6" tall and wore glasses and a 
cap.  When shown a picture of David 
Bush, she said he was not the man she saw.

 
 
Lucille 
Mark's statement to the sheriff's office on July 16, 1991 that her nephew 
Glendol Bush had been calling her that evening and told her that Mrs. Bush's 
body could be found at Hell's Half Acre.  
She stated that he told her he did not kill Mrs. Bush, his brother David 
committed the murder.

 
 
Trudy 
Dooling's statement to police in 1992 that she believed Glendol Bush was in 
Casper at the 
time Mrs. Bush disappeared.

 
 
Michelle 
Longwedl's statement to police in June of 2005 that she thought Glendol Bush was 
important to the case involving her sister's disappearance.  She also said that about two weeks 
before she disappeared her sister had told her she did not want Glendol Bush in 
her house.

 
 
David 
Christopher Dryden's statement to police in May of 2006 that sometime between 
1992 and 1994 Glendol Bush confessed to him in prison that he had killed Mrs. 
Bush.  In his statement, Mr. Dryden 
indicated Glendol said he shot Mrs. Bush on MuddyMountain, cut her up with a military 
shovel and stuffed her into a green army duffle bag.  Mr. Dryden could not remember for sure, 
but thought maybe Glendol had said he buried her body.     

  

The 
defense also asserted in its offer of proof that law enforcement's investigation 
into the whereabouts of Glendol Bush on December 8 and 9, 1990 showed only that 
someone used David Bush's name in Texas and New Mexico that weekend.  It did not provide a description of the 
individual and did not definitively show that Glendol Bush was the individual 
using David Bush's name. 

 
 
[¶57]  Following a hearing, the district court 
concluded that the evidence the defense presented in its offer of proof was not 
sufficient to allow its presentation to the jury.  In support of its ruling, the district 
court referenced Holmes v. South 
Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 327, 126 S. Ct. 1727, 1733, 164 L. Ed. 2d 503 
(2006) in which the Court quoted with approval the following rule: 

 
 
[T]he 
accused may introduce any legal evidence . . . tending to prove that another 
person may have committed the crime with which the defendant is charged.  Such evidence may be excluded where it 
does not sufficiently connect the other person to the crime, . . . is 
speculative or remote, or does not tend to prove or disprove a material fact in 
issue.  

 
 
Emphasizing 
that Holmes allows the introduction 
of "legal" evidence, the district court stated:    

 
 
[T]he 
suspicions of some of the other proposed witnesses that Glendol Bush may have 
been here and committed the crime [are] not sufficient.  I am inclined to think that the 
descriptions are so general as to not be helpful, and confusing.  I have reservations about the testimony 
of Mr. Dryden.

 
 
The 
district court continued its previous ruling granting the State's motion in 
limine but indicated the defense could raise the issue again at any point during 
the trial.  

 
 
[¶58]  Mr. Bush contends the district court 
denied his constitutional right to present a complete defense when it prohibited 
him from presenting evidence implicating his brother in his wife's 
disappearance.  To the extent his 
claim involves a constitutional issue, we review it de novo.  Hannon, ¶ 13, 84 P.3d  at 328.  We review the evidentiary issue for 
abuse of discretion.  Vigil, ¶ 17, 98 P.3d  at 
177.

 
 
[¶59]  The United States Constitution 
guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete 
defense.  Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S. Ct. 2142, 1246, 90 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1986); Hannon, ¶ 62, 84 P.3d  at 346. "[T]he 
Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that 
serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they 
are asserted to promote."  Holmes, 547 U.S.  at 
327.  However, the Constitution does 
not prevent trial judges from applying well-established rules of evidence to 
exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors 
such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the 
jury.  Id.  The Constitution permits judges to 
exclude evidence that is repetitive, only marginally relevant, or poses an undue 
risk of harassment, prejudice or confusion of the issues. Id.  "A specific application of this 
principle is found in rules regulating the admission of evidence proffered by 
criminal defendants to show that someone else committed the crime with which 
they are charged."  Id.

 

[¶60]   This Court has not had occasion to 
address for many years the propriety of excluding defense evidence that someone 
other than the defendant committed the offense charged.  In Horn v. State, 12 Wyo. 80, 133, 73 P. 705, 715 (1903), the defendant claimed the trial court erred in excluding 
evidence that there had been trouble between the murder victim's family members 
and their neighbors, including an altercation in which the victim ran a 
neighbor's son down with his horse and the neighbor pulled a gun and threatened 
to shoot the horse.  In ruling that 
the evidence was properly excluded, the Court said:

 
 
The 
offer in the case at bar was not to show an ill feeling on the part of one 
individual, but of several, and it was not connected with any other offer to 
show overt acts on the part of such individuals toward the commission of the 
crime charged against the prisoner, nor even an opportunity on their part to 
have perpetrated the crime.   * 
* *  The offer was limited to the 
showing of a possible motive on the part of some one to do some injury to some 
member of the Nickell family, and perhaps to take the life of some member of 
that family.   * * *  We do not perceive that the offered 
testimony would have had any reasonable tendency to establish the innocence of 
the defendant.  Its effect, if any, 
could have been no greater than to generate a mere suspicion that some other 
person might have committed the crime solely because he entertained a feeling of 
ill will or hatred against the Nickell family at some time and may have uttered 
threats of taking life.  The 
evidence offered does not come within the rule relied on by counsel for 
plaintiff in error, and the court did not err in excluding 
it.

 
 
[¶61]  Only slightly more recently, this Court 
addressed the issue again in Lampitt v. 
State, 34 Wyo. 247, 242 P. 812 (1926).   Mr. Lampitt was convicted of first 
degree murder in connection with an explosion that killed a man.  He claimed the trial court erred in 
excluding evidence that vehicles were was in the area a few minutes before and 
after the explosion.  This Court 
said:

 
 
No 
offer was made to connect up such facts with other facts tending to show in any 
way that the occupants of these cars had anything whatever to do with the 
explosion.  The offered testimony 
could, accordingly, have no other effect than to raise a possible suspicion that 
the person or persons in these cars might have had something to do with the 
crime for which defendant was tried, and comes accordingly clearly within the 
rule laid down in Horn v. State, 12 
Wyo. 80, 73 P. 705, where it was held that testimony offered by a defendant on 
trial for murder, which would merely have generated a suspicion that some other 
person might have committed the crime, is properly 
excluded.

 
 

Id. 
at 817.          

            

[¶62]  We have not had occasion to address the 
issue since.  However, other courts 
that have addressed the issue more recently have applied similar standards to 
those this Court applied long ago in Horn and Lampitt.  These standards require that the 
proffered evidence demonstrate a direct nexus between the third party and the 
crime charged.  

 
 
[¶63]  In U.S. v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 
(10th Cir. 1998), for example, the court considered evidence 
suggesting that persons connected with a white-supremacist, anti-government 
group known as Elohim City were involved in the conspiracy to bomb the Murrah 
Building. Specifically, the defendant proffered testimony from an undercover 
government informant who would have testified that the group's leaders violently 
opposed the federal government, had instructed her in preparing napalm, had 
shown her bomb components, discussed their experience in building and exploding 
a 500-pound ammonium nitrate bomb and discussed targeting a federal building in 
Oklahoma.  The informant also would have testified 
that a man who came to ElohimCity in 1995 previously had developed 
plans to bomb the MurrahBuilding.  She also would have testified that she 
saw two men in the group who resembled the suspects the government originally 
sought after the bombing.  

 
 
[¶64]  The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
upheld the exclusion of this evidence, finding that even if the proffered 
testimony had some marginal relevance, its probative value was slight because of 
its generalized and speculative nature.  
The Court said:

 
 
The 
fact that another group held similar anti-government views as did McVeigh 
and that some of its members expressed vague threats to bomb a variety of 
potential targets in Oklahoma, possibly including a federal building in Oklahoma 
City, says very little about whether this group actually bombed the Murrah 
Building. That others shared McVeigh's political views is a slender reed upon 
which to vault the dangers of unfair prejudice and jury confusion. Howe's 
alleged identification of "John Doe 1" and "John Doe 2" arguably increases the 
probative value of her other testimony. However, the composite sketches included 
no particular identifying features that would strengthen the significance of 
Howe's allegation of two matches. In fact, there are undoubtedly thousands of 
men across America who resembled the 
government's composite sketches. Finally, there was no evidence in this proffer, 
or in the record, that would establish a probative nexus between the alleged 
ElohimCity conspiracy and the bombing of the MurrahBuilding.

 
 
[¶65]  Similarly, in State v. Brown, 173 P.3d 612 (Kan. 
2007), the Kansas Supreme Court considered the following alternate suspect 
evidence:  (1) an individual with an 
allegedly similar physical description to Brown and allegedly similar motive, 
was involved in a fight at the scene of the killing; (2) another individual was 
also involved in a fight at the scene and had a similar physical description to 
Brown; (3) a police officer stopped two individuals leaving the scene of the 
shooting with the lights of their vehicle turned off; (4) another officer 
received a telephone call from an individual who said the  police had the 
wrong person in custody for the shooting; and (5) hearsay evidence a woman 
contacted law enforcement and told them another man called her around the time 
of the shooting and told her he had just shot someone in the head in "Old 
Town."  Id. at 640.  The Court upheld the exclusion of this 
evidence, concluding that some of it was pure hearsay, most of it was baseless 
innuendo and none of it connected the third parties to the shooting. Id. at 641.    

 
 
[¶66]  In State v. Cotto, 865 A.2d 660 (N.J. 
2005), the Court applied a similar standard.  There, a fellow inmate of the defendant 
made statements implicating a relative in committing the crime.  The court said that to be admissible the 
evidence must demonstrate a link between the relative and the victim or the 
crime.  Id. at 670.  Concluding that no such link was 
demonstrated, the court held the evidence was properly excluded. The court 
further held that even if the evidence had demonstrated a link between the third 
party and the crime, the district court could have excluded it on the ground 
that it consisted entirely of inadmissible hearsay.  Id.    

 
 
[¶67]  Taking this same approach, in United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095 
(7th Cir. 1999), the court upheld the 
exclusion of alternate suspect evidence in a case involving kidnapping and 
transportation of the victim across state lines where the victim's body was 
found several weeks later in an Indiana cornfield.  Prior to trial, the defendant filed a 
motion seeking the admission of statements indicating a third party committed 
the crime.  Some of the statements 
implicated an individual who, according to witnesses, stated that he needed to 
get out of town because of the abduction and the victim would "be found in 
harvest time."  Id. at 
1108.  The defendant also sought to 
introduce a confession by another individual that he picked up the victim, had 
sex with her and dropped her off in a cornfield in Indiana.  Id.  In upholding the exclusion of the 
statements and the confession, the appellate court concluded, first, there was 
an insufficient showing as to the trustworthiness of the statements as required 
under F.R.E. 803(24) and 804(b)(3) and, second, the exclusion did not violate 
due process because there was an inadequate showing that the statements were 
reliable.      

 
 
[¶68]  With these cases in mind, we consider 
the evidence Mr. Bush sought to have admitted to show that his step brother, 
Glendol, committed the offense charged.  
The statements of Theresa Bush, Ms. Longwedl and Ms. Dooling that they 
were concerned about Glendol Bush or thought he was important to the case or 
believed he may have been in Casper around the time Mrs. Bush disappeared did 
not connect Glendol to the crime charged.  
This evidence did nothing more than raise a suspicion that Glendol may 
possibly have been in the area and may possibly have had something to do with 
the disappearance.  We conclude the 
district court properly excluded this evidence.    

 
 
[¶69]  The statements of Ms. Hayfield, Ms. 
Lore, Deputy Rodstad and Ms. Moore, considered together, were apparently 
intended to show that Mrs. Bush was in the grocery store parking lot in the 
Bushes' pickup truck in the late afternoon on December 8, 1990; she argued with 
and left with a man in a Datsun pickup truck; and the man and the Datsun pickup 
were seen outside of Casper the following day.  The difficulty with this proffered 
evidence is that there was no direct evidence that Glendol Bush was in Casper on December 8, 
1990, or in the grocery store parking lot or that he was driving or ever drove a 
Datsun pickup.  There was also no 
evidence that the Datsun pickup seen in the parking lot was the same Datsun 
pickup seen outside of Casper or that Glendol Bush had any connection 
with either one.  There was also no 
evidence that the man seen walking near Fremont Canyon had any connection with 
the Datsun, was Glendol Bush, or was linked in any way with Mrs. Bush's 
disappearance.  This evidence was 
speculative and did not link Glendol Bush to the crime charged.  Therefore, we hold that the district 
court properly excluded it. 

 
 
[¶70]  Mr. Bush asserts most strenuously that 
the district court violated his right to present his defense when it excluded 
the statements of Ms. Marks and Mr. Dryden that Glendol told them he was 
involved in the crime.  The alleged 
statement to Ms. Marks implicated Mr. Bush, not Glendol; therefore, it is not 
clear how its exclusion violated Mr. Bush's right to present a defense.  As for Mr. Dryden's proffered testimony, 
there was no showing that it was trustworthy or reliable.  There was no independent evidence 
corroborating the hearsay statement that Glendol shot Mrs. Bush on MuddyMountain, cut her up with a military 
shovel, stuffed her into a green army duffle bag and, perhaps, buried her.  There also was no independent evidence 
corroborating that the Bushes' daughter, who according to the hearsay statement 
witnessed Glendol kill her mother, had stomach aches in the same place where he 
shot her.  In fact, other evidence 
contradicted the statements Glendol Bush allegedly made to Mr. Dryden.  For example, Ms. Marks' proffered 
testimony was that Glendol denied killing Mrs. Bush and stated that David Bush 
killed her. Additionally, all of the child's statements implicated her father in 
her mother's death. 

 
 
[¶71]  As the district court emphasized, 
pursuant to Holmes, 547 U.S.  at 327, the accused may 
introduce any legal evidence tending 
to prove that another person may have committed the crime with which the 
defendant is charged.  Legal 
evidence is evidence that would be admissible at trial.  Given that Mr. Dryden's testimony 
concerning Glendol Bush's statements to him was hearsay, the defense had the 
choice of proffering Glendol Bush's testimony or, if he was unavailable, showing 
that he was unavailable and proffering Mr. Dryden's testimony.  In proffering Mr. Dryden's testimony, 
the defense had to show that Glendol Bush's statements to him were admissible as 
a statement against interest under W.R.E. 804(b)(3)6 or within the catch-all exception 
under W.R.E. 803(24).7  The defense did none of this.  Under these circumstances, we hold that 
the district court properly concluded Mr. Bush's offer of proof was insufficient 
and adhered to its original order excluding the testimony.8        

 
 

4.                  
Delay 
in Filing Charges

 
 
[¶72]  Mr. Bush's final argument is that his 
Fifth Amendment due process rights were violated as a result of the fifteen and 
one-half year delay between his wife's disappearance and the filing of the 
murder charges.  Given the delay, he 
asserts, evidence was lost, memories changed and he was prejudiced in preparing 
his defense.  On this basis, Mr. 
Bush claims the district court erred in denying his pretrial motion to dismiss 
for violation of his due process rights.  
The State responds that Mr. Bush's Fifth Amendment due process rights 
were not violated by the delay because Mr. Bush cannot show that the delay 
caused substantial prejudice or that the prosecution intentionally delayed to 
gain tactical advantage.  Whether 
Mr. Bush's constitutional right to due process was violated is a question of law 
that we review de novo.  Humphrey v. State, 2008 WY 67, ¶ 32, 185 P.3d 1236, 1246 (Wyo. 2008).     

 
 
[¶73]  In states like Wyoming, where there is 
no statute of limitations for criminal offenses, charges may be filed at any 
time during the accused's lifetime unless the delay is found to have violated 
his constitutional right to due process.  
Id., ¶ 34, 185 P.3d  at 1247.  Adopting the rule 
articulated in United States v. 
Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 323-26, 92 S. Ct. 455, 465-66, 30 L. Ed. 2d 468 
(1971), we have held that pre-charging delay is not a violation of due process 
absent a showing of both an intentional delay by the state to gain a tactical 
advantage over the accused and actual prejudice resulting from the delay.  Humphrey, ¶ 34, 185 P.3d  at 1247.  The burden of proving both intentional 
delay and actual prejudice lies with the accused.  Id.  

 
 
[¶74]  Addressing the first prong of the test, 
Mr. Bush alleges that the only new evidence obtained during the fifteen and 
one-half year delay was the fact that Mrs. Bush was never found and this gave 
the State a tactical advantage.  Mr. 
Bush makes no showing that this was in fact the reason for the delay.  Under the circumstances of this case, 
where the victim's body had not been found, we are not willing to second guess 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.  
The prosecutor at the time may have exercised his discretion to withhold 
prosecution until the body was found.  
Later, with new evidence in hand, most importantly the results of more 
advanced DNA technology, a different prosecutor exercised his discretion to 
proceed with prosecution.  From 
these facts, we cannot conclude that the delay was intentional to gain a 
tactical advantage.  Mr. Bush has 
not met his burden of proving the first prong of the test required to show his 
due process rights were violated by the delay. 

 

[¶75]  Turning to the second prong, Mr. Bush 
alleges that actual prejudice resulted in his case because evidence was 
destroyed or lost.  He points to the 
pickup truck that his wife was driving when she disappeared, which the police 
searched and took blood samples from and then released to Mrs. Bush's parents 
who later sold it.  He asserts that 
he had no opportunity to test, examine or perform an independent forensic 
examination of the truck and its contents to determine whether anyone else's DNA 
or fingerprints were present.    
He also points to a lost roll of film containing photographs taken by 
police during the search of his home.  
He claims the photographs would have answered questions concerning items 
the State claims were present or not present in the house at the time of the 
search.  Finally, without 
referencing any particular witness, he asserts that witnesses' memories changed 
over the fifteen and one-half years and those who testified for him remembered 
less while witnesses for the State seemed to remember more.    

            

[¶76]  Actual prejudice, not possible 
prejudice, is the standard invoked with respect to the second prong of the 
test.  Vernier v. State, 909 P.2d 1344, 1350 
(Wyo. 
1996).  Testimony at trial showed 
that police thoroughly searched and examined the pickup truck within a few days 
after Mrs. Bush disappeared in 1990 and submitted various parts for DNA testing, 
including the sun visor, seat covers, floor mats, passenger side metal 
threshold, gear shift knob, headlight switch, a dried blood flake and several 
swabs taken from the passenger and driver side doors and rear window.  These items were preserved and available 
for additional testing prior to trial.  
Mr. Bush made no request to re-test any of the preserved items.  These items were also produced at trial 
and Mr. Bush had a full opportunity to cross-examine the State's witnesses 
concerning removal and testing of the items.  He does not specify other items from the 
truck that he would have tested had they been available nor does he indicate 
specifically what such testing would have revealed.

 
 
[¶77]  Similarly, Mr. Bush fails to specify 
what the lost photographs would have shown or how they would have helped his 
case more than the photographs that were available and used at trial.  Numerous photographs of the pickup truck 
and the interior of the Bush home were presented at trial and the defense had 
the opportunity to cross-examine the State's witness concerning the photographs. 
As previously noted, Mr. Bush does not identify any witness or testimony that 
changed over time or how it prejudiced his defense.  Mr. Bush has failed to meet his burden 
of showing actual prejudice from the delay.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶78]  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion or violate Mr. Bush's Sixth Amendment confrontation right when it 
allowed a counselor and a psychiatrist to testify concerning statements made to 
them by the Bushes' daughter.  The 
statements were properly admitted under W.R.E. 803(4) as statements made for 
purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment. Additionally, the daughter appeared 
at trial, took the oath, testified and was subject to cross-examination, thus 
satisfying the confrontation clause.  
The district court likewise did not abuse its discretion or violate Mr. 
Bush's confrontation right when it allowed Mr. Martin to testify by video 
teleconference.  Under the 
circumstances, presentation of his testimony in that manner was necessary to 
further an important public policy and the reliability of the testimony was 
otherwise assured.  The error in 
allowing Mrs. Martin to testify by video teleconference was harmless.  

 
 
[¶79]  The district court properly excluded 
evidence of an alternate suspect.  
Much of the proffered evidence was speculative and did not provide a 
nexus between the suspect and the crime charged.  As for the proffered testimony 
concerning the alternate suspect's hearsay statements, the defense failed to 
show that the statements were trustworthy and reliable.  The district court also did not err in 
denying Mr. Bush's motion to dismiss on the basis of due process violations 
caused by the delay in charging him.  
Mr. Bush did not show actual prejudice or intentional prosecutorial delay 
to gain a tactical advantage.

 
 
[¶80]  Affirmed.          

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Officer 
James Keeran, a crime scene investigator with the Casper Police Department, 
testified that luminol is used to detect blood patterns that cannot be detected 
with the human eye.  When sprayed on 
surfaces where blood is suspected to have been, including surfaces that have 
been wiped clean, it glows if blood is indicated.

 
 

2The record 
is not clear but it appears that law enforcement removed the child from Mr. 
Bush's home in late December 1990 because of concerns expressed by family 
members that she was not safe in his custody.  She was placed in the temporary custody 
of her maternal grandparents where she remained, with scheduled supervised 
visits with Mr. Bush, until a custody hearing.  After the hearing, the child remained in 
the custody of the grandparents.      

 
 

3Pursuant to 
W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(C), a statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at 
the trial or hearing, is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, 
and the statement is one of identification of a person made after perceiving 
him.  Arguably, the child's 
statements were not hearsay because she testified at the trial, was subject to 
cross-examination concerning her statements to Ms. Gordon and Dr. Eicher and her 
statements identified Mr. Bush as having killed her mother.  The State did not make this argument and 
the district court treated the statements as hearsay. Consequently, we accept, 
without deciding, that the statements were hearsay.  

 
 

4In reaching 
this result, we are cognizant of the following paradox:  the same person can be both "subject to 
cross-examination" under W.R.E. 801(d)(1) and "unavailable as a witness" under 
W.R.E. 804(a), which provides in relevant part:

 
 

(a)     
Definition of 
unavailability  "Unavailability as a 
witness" includes situations in which the 
declarant:

  . . . .

 
 
               
(3)  Testifies to a lack of 
memory of the subject matter of his statement[.]  

 
 
In Owens, 484 U.S.  at 563, the 
United States Supreme Court characterized this paradox as a "semantic oddity," 
and not an "internal" or "substantive" inconsistency.  For purposes of Mr. Bush's confrontation 
claim, what is important is that his daughter was present, testified and was 
subject to cross-examination concerning her statements.  That the defense chose not to 
cross-examine her also does not affect our conclusion.  Fowler, 829 N.E.2d  at 469; Torres, 971 P.2d  at 1275-76.   Had it done so and had she 
continued to deny any memory of the events or her statements, an argument could 
have been made that she was "unavailable" because she was not 
cross-examinable.    

 
 

5In Ryan, 988 P.2d  at 59, we considered 
whether the defendant's confrontation right was violated when a witness 
testified by video teleconference and the quality of the technology was 
poor.  The defendant did not object 
to the quality of the sound or complain that he could not hear the 
testimony.  Additionally, the 
witness testimony was cumulative of other testimony. Under those circumstances, 
we held that the district court properly denied the motion to strike the 
testimony. We did not address the question of whether his confrontation right 
would have been violated if the technology had worked properly.  

 
 

6W.R.E. 
804(b)(3) provides in pertinent part:

 
 
Rule 
804.  Hearsay exceptions; declarant 
unavailable.

  (b) Hearsay exceptions.  The following are 
not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a 
witness:

. . . 
.

(3)  Statement Against Interest.  A 
statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's 
pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or 
criminal liability, . . . that a reasonable man in his position would not have 
made the statement unless he believed it to be true.  A statement tending to expose the 
declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not 
admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the 
trustworthiness of the statement[.] 

 

7W.R.E. 
803(24) provides:

 
 
Other 
exceptions.  A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing 
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, 
if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a 
material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is 
offered than any other evidence on which the proponent can procure through 
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the 
interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into 
evidence.

 
 

8In 
ruling that the defense offer of proof was not sufficient to admit the alternate 
suspect evidence, the district court specifically advised 
counsel:

 
 
At this 
point, I am going to continue with my ruling granting the liminal motion without 
prejudice to the defense to raise that at any such time as they think it might 
be appropriate during the trial.

. . . 
.

It is 
not to be referred to in opening unless something comes up and you bring it to 
my attention first.

* * 
*  I can't imagine it being 
appropriate in voir dire; but it is 
not to be used in opening without my specific permission.  

But I'm 
not precluding you from reapproaching the Court and asking for permission to 
probe into these things and specifically to be able to argue it in your closing 
statement if you think that is appropriate based on the evidence that has been 
established.   

 
 
As this 
excerpt reflects, the district court's ruling on the matter was not final and 
left the defense the opportunity to show why Mr. Dryden's testimony was relevant 
and admissible. Apparently misunderstanding the ruling, the defense did not 
pursue efforts to present Mr. Dryden's 
testimony.