Title: In re Odea

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 92-196


 In re Arthur J. O'Dea                        Supreme Court

                                              Original Jurisdiction

                                              December Term, 1992


 Lawrence Miller and Sarah M. Powell of Miller & Faignant, P.C., Rutland,
   for respondent

 Charles E. Finberg of Paul, Frank & Collins, Inc., Burlington, for the
   Judicial Conduct Board


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      PER CURIAM.   Superior Judge Arthur J. O'Dea (respondent) appeals a
 recommendation of the Judicial Conduct Board that he be publicly reprimanded
 for violating Canon 3A(3) of the Code of Judicial Conduct.  We concur with
 the Board's recommendation, and add the further sanction that Judge O'Dea be
 suspended from presiding in family court for a period of two years.
                                     I.
      The Judicial Conduct Board investigated three complaints brought sepa-
 rately against respondent, each charging that he lacked patience, dignity,
 or courtesy to litigants, witnesses, and attorneys in his courtroom, viola-
 tions of Canon 3A(3) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. (FN1) These complaints
 involved three contested cases, respectively Graf v. Graf, Greene v.
 Bordulis, and Georges v. Morris.  The Board also investigated whether there
 was a recurring pattern of judicial misconduct with regard to Canon 3A(3),
 examining and incorporating into the record transcripts from an additional
 five cases.
      All of the cases included in the record involved instances of temper-
 amental behavior by respondent during family court proceedings.  In Greene,
 the transcript shows that he addressed the attorneys and litigants in an
 extremely impatient and discourteous manner, referring to the proceedings as
 "garbage" and "a waste of time," and indicating before hearing the evidence
 that he would summarily dismiss the parties' motions.  He also described the
 litigants as "acting like animals."
      In Georges, which concerned a visitation dispute, respondent exhibited
 similar impatience and discourtesy.  He refused to grant a continuance so
 that the litigant mother could obtain counsel, although she had appeared at
 the court expecting the matter to be mediated or continued.  He cut off the
 mother's attempt to briefly cross-examine the father, gave her no
 opportunity to present testimony or evidence of her own, and questioned in a
 harsh and intimidating fashion the parties' daughter, who was not a party or
 sworn as a witness.  When the mother began to comfort her daughter, who had
 begun to cry, he directed the mother to "just leave her alone and let her
 listen."  He also threatened to transfer custody of the daughter to the
 father if the parties did not adhere to a visitation schedule, although the
 father neither requested nor wanted such a transfer.  Respondent directed
 the parties to agree to a visitation schedule during a recess, which the
 mother, feeling powerless to object, signed with the notation that she was
 agreeing "under duress of the court's order."
      After its preliminary investigation, the Board issued a formal com-
 plaint, which expressly stated the Board's intention to consider the
 transcripts from all eight cases but charged violations of the canon in only
 the first three matters.  The Board eventually dismissed the Graf complaint
 because respondent had apologized to the parties for his behavior on the
 following morning.
      During the period between the issuance of the formal complaint and
 commencement of the hearing before the Board, respondent, his attorney, and
 counsel for the Board entered into a "Stipulation to Findings and
 Recommendation," dated October 25, 1991.  In that document, the parties
 agreed to recommend to the Board that it, in turn, recommend that this Court
 impose no greater sanction than a public reprimand on respondent.(FN2) Further,
 respondent acknowledged the accuracy of the transcripts in all eight cases
 identified in the formal complaint and stipulated they would be part of the
 record.  The parties agreed that "a charge of a pattern of recurring
 conduct is not being made against Judge O'Dea with regard to the transcripts
 of the [five additional] proceedings," but that respondent "shall be allowed
 and be permitted to present his explanations of the events, to call
 witnesses, and present other evidence in response thereto."
      The stipulation also included statements by respondent concerning the
 charged inappropriate behavior.  He stated that he had "addressed and
 recognized the inappropriateness" of his conduct in Greene and assured the
 Board that it would not recur.  He also stated that he had not intended
 discourtesy in Georges but "appreciates how Mrs. Georges could have
 misunderstood his intentions."  Finally, the stipulation provided that
 respondent was to have the opportunity to appear personally before the Board
 and "present such further evidence and argument" as he wished on his behalf.
      Respondent appeared before the Board on October 25, 1991 (the date of
 the stipulation) and January 9, 1992; one of the complainants, Salina Rain
 (formerly Georges), testified at the January hearing.  At the October 25th
 hearing, respondent testified in detail about his actions in the two cases.
 He also stated his belief that the only inappropriate aspect of his conduct
 in the Greene case was his use of the word "animals," and denied any
 misconduct in connection with Georges.  With regard to the stipulation,
 respondent stated that he understood he was not being charged with a sepa-
 rate count of a pattern of misconduct but rather "whether there's a pattern
 of that particular conduct, impatience, indignity, discourtesy, and if there
 is, then it would reflect only upon [the Greene and Georges] charges."  The
 transcripts of all eight proceedings were then entered into evidence.
      On April 14, 1992, the Board filed a final order of recommendation with
 this Court, dismissing the Graf complaint, finding violations of Canon
 3A(3) for Greene and Georges, and recommending a public reprimand as
 sanction for those two violations.  This recommendation was signed by five
 members of the Board, but included the signature of one, Lola Aiken, who had
 not attended all the hearings.  As added support for its recommended
 sanction, the Board found by clear and convincing evidence that, despite the
 text of the stipulation, respondent failed to recognize that "his conduct
 generally, not simply one ill-chosen word, reflected impatience, discourtesy
 and lack of dignity."
      On May 13, 1992, respondent filed a response, stating that he was not
 going to contest the Board's proceedings or its decision.  He requested,
 however, that the Board reverse its decision and dismiss the charges or
 recommend only a private reprimand, and contended that the Board had
 insufficiently recognized his remorse in the Greene case.  He also argued
 that the Board was penalizing him for a pattern of misconduct, although it
 had agreed not to do so.  The Board responded with a memo stating that it
 had, in accordance with the stipulation, considered all of the cases in
 evidence for the purpose of determining the severity of the charged
 incidents, and had recommended a sanction on that basis.
      On June 10, 1992, respondent filed in this Court a motion to vacate the
 Board's recommendation and remand for a new hearing.  He argued that the
 recommendation was defective under Rule 6(17) of the Rules of the Supreme
 Court for the Disciplinary Control of Judges, which requires the concurrence
 of five members of the Board to validate its recommendations.  He argued
 that the fifth signer, Lola Aiken, was disqualified to sign because she had
 not attended all of the hearings.  He also argued that the Board had
 violated the stipulation by its reference to the uncharged cases.  On June
 22, the Board reissued its recommendation, signed also by the two additional
 members.  Those members also filed a "confirmation" of the final order,
 indicating that they concurred.  On June 30, 1992, respondent filed a
 notice of appeal. (FN3)
                                     II.
      Respondent argues that this matter should be remanded to the Board for
 a new hearing or, alternatively, dismissed altogether, because the
 proceedings below violated due process.  He relies on this Court's recent
 opinion in In re Illuzzi, 3 Vt. L.W. 333, 333 (September 4, 1992), for the
 proposition that the Board must strictly adhere to the procedural rules that
 govern it.  He details seven specific procedural "errors" to support this
 claim.
      Before examining the alleged errors, it is important to note that this
 Court makes the only final and ultimate decision in a judicial conduct
 proceeding; the findings and recommendations of the Judicial Conduct Board
 carry great weight but are not binding.  Consequently, it is not the
 function of this Court to review the actions of the Board in matters of
 this kind.  See In re Hill, 152 Vt. 548, 555-56, 568 A.2d 361, 365 (1989).
 Thus, the presence of procedural errors by the Board will not affect our
 consideration of a judicial misconduct case unless, as was true in Illuzzi,
 the errors actually prejudiced respondent.  See id. at 559, 568 A.2d  at
 367.  We emphasize that proceedings before the Judicial Conduct Board must
 be conducted so as to afford the respondent procedural due process of law.
 See, e.g., Matter of Deming,