Title: City of Selma v. Dallas County

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 03/09/07 City of Selma v. Dallas County
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
242-4621), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
_________________________
1051711
_________________________
City of Selma
v.
Dallas County
Appeal from Dallas Circuit Court
(CV-06-128)
WOODALL, Justice.
The City of Selma ("the City") appeals from a summary
judgment in favor of Dallas County ("the County") in the
City's declaratory-judgment action challenging the right of
the County to erect a communications tower at the Dallas
1051711
2
County courthouse, which is located within the geographical
limits of the City.  We affirm.
I. Factual Background
In May 2006, the County began construction of a
communications tower on the premises of the Dallas County
courthouse.  The City commenced this action, seeking to enjoin
the construction of the tower on the ground that the location
of the tower violated two of the City's ordinances: Ord. 01-
9091, "An Ordinance to Provide for Designation of Historic
Properties or Historic Districts" ("the historic ordinance"),
and Ord. COS 013-00/01, "A Local Ordinance Regulating the
Siting of Wireless Telecommunications Facilities" ("the tower
ordinance").  It also alleged that construction of the tower
violated Ala. Const. 1901, § 220. 
The City and the County filed cross-motions for a summary
judgment.  The trial court granted the County's motion and
denied the City's motion.  It found that the tower ordinance
and the historic ordinance were zoning ordinances and held
that neither ordinance was enforceable against the County.  It
also held that construction of the tower did not offend § 220.
From that judgment, the City appealed.
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3
We provide the underlying facts, which are undisputed or
unchallenged, as well as much of the relevant statutory
authority, from the affidavit of Brett H. Howard, director of
the Dallas County Department of Homeland Security and
Emergency Management:
"1. [Brett H. Howard]. ... serve[s] as the
Director of the Dallas County Department of Homeland
Security and Emergency Management. [He is] also a
member of the Board of Commissioners of the Dallas
County Telecommunications District, commonly known
as the Dallas County E-911 Board, and [has] been
designated as the 'point of contact' or 'POC'
between Dallas County, Alabama, and the [Alabama]
Department 
of 
Homeland 
Security 
['the 
state
department']. ...
"2. The Dallas County Department of Homeland
Security and Emergency Management ['the county
department'] was created by the Dallas County
Commission pursuant to § 31-9-10 of the [Alabama
Emergency Management Act of 1955, Ala. Code 1975, §
31-9-1 et seq.,] as amended, which authorized and
directed each political subdivision of this state to
establish an organization for emergency management.
[The county] department was created to perform
emergency management functions within Dallas County,
which was given those powers and authorities set
forth in § 31-9-10(b) ..., including the power to
appropriate and expend funds, make contracts, obtain
and distribute equipment, materials and supplies for
emergency management purposes; to provide for the
health and safety of persons and property, including
emergency assistance to the victims of any disaster;
and to direct and coordinate the development of
emergency 
management 
plans 
and 
programs 
in
accordance with the policies and plans set by the
federal and state emergency agencies.  The authority
1051711
4
of [the county] department is further defined in §
31-9-3(1) of the 1975 Code of Alabama, as amended,
and includes:
"'[the] carrying out [of] all emergency
functions, other than [functions] for which
[military forces or other] federal agencies
are primarily responsible, to prevent,
minimize, and repair injury and damage
resulting from disasters caused by enemy
attack, sabotage, or other hostile action,
or by fire, flood, earthquake, or other
natural cause.  These functions include,
without 
limitation, 
fire-fighting 
services;
police 
services; 
communications;
radiological, chemical and other special
weapons of defense; evacuation of persons
from stricken areas; emergency welfare
services (civilian war aid); emergency
transportation; 
plant 
protection; 
temporary
restoration of public utility services; and
other 
functions 
related 
to 
civilian
protections, 
together 
with 
all 
other
activities necessary or incidental to the
preparation for and carrying out of the
foregoing functions.'  
"(Emphasis added [in Howard's affidavit].)
"3. [The state department] is a state agency
established by the Alabama Homeland Security Act of
2003, appearing in § 31-9A-1, et seq., Code of
Alabama 1975, as amended ['the AHSA'].  It was
established in order to ensure that the preparations
in the state of Alabama will be adequate to deal
with events of the nature of the unprecedented and
devastating attack of September 11, 2001, upon the
people and the vital infrastructure of the United
States and to protect and preserve the life, health,
welfare, and property of the people of Alabama.
(See § 31-9A-2, Code of Alabama, 1975, as amended.)
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5
The duties of the [director of the state department]
include:
"'Coordinat[ing] 
the 
efforts 
to
protect the people of Alabama and the
state's 
critical 
infrastructure 
from
terrorist 
attack, 
including, 
but 
not
limited 
to, 
energy 
production, 
transmission
a n d  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  
s y s t e m s ,
telecommunications, 
nuclear 
facilities,
public and privately owned information
systems, special public and private events,
transportation 
hubs 
and 
networks,
livestock, 
water, 
food 
supplies, 
and
research 
institutions. 
 
(§ 
31-9A-[5(c)(5)],
emphasis added [in Howard's affidavit]).'
"[The state department] was further established for
the 
purpose 
of 
assisting, 
coordinating, 
and
encouraging homeland security preparedness by state
departments and agencies and political subdivisions
of the state by authorizing the making of grants to
the political subdivisions of this state for the
purpose of promoting homeland security.  (See § 31-
9A-2(b).)  As such, the [state department] is the
principal state agency which coordinates the receipt
and distribution of funds available from any source
with regard to Homeland Security related items,
issues, and services.  (See  § 31-9A-4(b).)
"4. 
The 
[AHSA] 
further 
provides 
for 
the
coordination of functions and activities with the
federal government and with  federal legislation and
regulations (see § 31-9A-8).  [It also] empowers the
[state-department] 
director 
to 
prepare 
a
comprehensive plan and program for homeland security
'to be integrated and coordinated with the plans of
the federal government and of other states to the
fullest possible extent'; and 'to cooperate with the
United States Department of Homeland Security in
matters pertaining to security and the defense of
the state and nation.'  Section 31-9A-10 ...
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authorizes the [state-department] director to accept
offers 
to 
the 
state 
and 
to 
its 
political
subdivisions of equipment, supplies, materials, or
funds by way of gift, grant, or loan for the
purposes of homeland security.
"5. In fiscal year 2004, the [state department]
set aside federal grant funds for the purchase of
interoperable communications 
equipment 
for 
Alabama's
counties.  This equipment is commonly known as
'bridging 
equipment,' 
designed 
to 
allow 
all
emergency 
responders 
within 
each 
county 
to
communicate with each other over existing radio
frequencies.  The greatest obstacle faced by
emergency responders in responding to a disaster is
the inability to communicate. ... For example, ...
the city police operate on a different frequency
than the county sheriff's department[s] and county
volunteer 
fire 
departments. 
... 
Interoperable
communications are part of a multi-phased, multi-
year plan by the National Department of Homeland
Security. ... [The County's] plan to obtain a tower
and bridging equipment is a part of Homeland
Security's 
plan 
to 
ensure 
county 
emergency
responders 
can 
communicate 
with 
each 
other
effectively across the state, and it meets the
deadlines and goal of the National Homeland Security
plan. ... The Homeland Security Grant Program exists
to help states to obtain resources 'critical to
building and sustaining capabilities to achieve the
Interim National preparedness Goal and implement
State and Urban Area Homeland Security Strategies.'
... As a small cog in the larger machine, i.e.,
Homeland 
Security's 
national 
goal 
of 
greater
security, the lack of interoperable communications
in Dallas County this year would set not only Dallas
County back, but, also, the State of Alabama in its
attempt to continue to advance along with the
national goal of greater security in each locality.
"6. 
The 
interoperable 
communications 
plan
developed by the [state department] is to provide
1051711
7
funding for a communications bridge in every county.
The tower and bridging equipment is critical because
it will allow all emergency responders, including
the 
Dallas 
County 
sheriff's 
department, 
the
municipal police and fire departments, and the
various volunteer fire departments to communicate
with one another regardless of the radio frequency
utilized 
by 
them. 
 
In 
addition, 
this
interoperability 
would 
allow 
for 
emergency
responders who come to Alabama in the event of
disaster to communicate, no matter on what frequency
their communications systems may operate.  The tower
and bridging equipment will also provide means to
tie communications together statewide and possibly
nationwide. 
 
The 
[state 
department] 
reserved
$112,000 for the acquisition of this bridging
equipment and communications tower.
"7. [Howard] subsequently executed in [his]
capacity 
as 
Dallas 
County 
POC 
a 
cooperative
agreement with the [state department] for the
allocation of funds in the amount of $75,000 to be
used for the construction of [the] communications
tower.  It was a requirement of the grant that these
funds be allocated for the purchase of a tower by
March 1, 2006. ...
"....
"9. 
The 
communications 
tower 
was 
erected
adjacent to the Dallas County Courthouse Annex on
May 
5-6, 
2006. 
... 
The 
placement 
of 
the
communications tower at [that] location enables the
[county department] to fulfill the purpose of the
grant.  This is a suitable location for the
following reasons: The [county department] and the
Dallas County sheriff's office [are] located in the
Dallas County Courthouse Annex building; [the]
location will allow voice communication throughout
the 
entire 
county, 
benefitting 
all 
emergency
responders in Dallas County, no matter what agency
they work with ...; [and] this location is equipped
1051711
8
with a 'T-1' communications line, which is necessary
to connect the communications bridging equipment
with the dispatchers located at the 911 center."
(Emphasis added except where otherwise noted.)  
On appeal, the City contends that the trial court erred
in holding that the County was immune from the application of
the two ordinances and that it was not subject to § 220.  The
trial court's finding that the historic ordinance and the
tower ordinance are zoning ordinances is unchallenged.  It is
further 
undisputed 
that 
the 
communications 
tower 
was
constructed in violation of both ordinances without the City's
permission.  The County argues that the construction and
operation of the tower is a "governmental function" and,
therefore, that in constructing and operating the tower it
need not comply with the ordinances.
II. Immunity
It was once "well settled that city zoning ordinances
[did] not apply to the operation of a governmental function by
a governing body, as opposed to a proprietary function."  Lane
v. Zoning Bd. of Talladega, 669 So. 2d 958, 959 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1995) (emphasis added).  See City of Birmingham v.
Scogin, 269 Ala. 679, 690, 115 So. 2d 505, 514 (1959) ("The
1051711
9
Alabama cases have long held that zoning does not apply to the
operation of a governmental function by a municipality.");
Lauderdale County Bd. of Educ. v. Alexander, 269 Ala. 79, 86,
110 So. 2d 911, 918 (1959) ("If a city engaged in a
governmental function is not subject to its own zoning
regulations, certainly a county engaged in a governmental
function is not subject to a city's zoning regulations.");
Water Works Bd. of Birmingham v. Stephens, 262 Ala. 203, 78
So. 2d 267 (1955); Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd. v.
City of Birmingham, 253 Ala. 402, 44 So. 2d 593 (1950).
"'This distinction is of ancient vintage ....'"  Cunningham v.
City of Attalla, 918 So. 2d 119, 125 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005)
(quoting 2 Kenneth H. Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning
§ 12.03 (4th ed. 1996)).  The City, however, questions whether
the rule "remains viable" in light of Jackson v. City of
Florence, 294 Ala. 592, 320 So. 2d 68 (1975), City's brief, at
13, and, if it does, argues that the construction and
operation of the communications tower is not a governmental
function. 
The 
first 
question, therefore, concerns the
continued viability of the governmental/proprietary-function
distinction. 
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10
A. Continued Viability
of the Governmental/Proprietary-Function Dichotomy
According to the City, Jackson called into question the
continued viability of a distinction between governmental
functions and proprietary functions.  We disagree.  To be
sure, Jackson "abolished the judicial doctrine of municipal
immunity" 
from 
tort 
liability, 
Neighbors 
v. 
City 
of
Birmingham, 384 So. 2d 113, 113 (Ala. 1980) (discussing
Jackson), which traditionally rested on the distinction
between governmental and proprietary functions.   In so doing,
however, Jackson did no more than give effect to the intent of
the legislature evident in Ala. Code 1940, Tit. 37, § 502, now
codified at Ala. Code 1975, § 11-47-190.  That section
provides, in pertinent part:
"No city or town shall be liable for damages for
injury done to or wrong suffered by any person or
corporation unless said injury or wrong was done or
suffered 
through the neglect, carelessness or
unskillfulness of some agent, officer or employee of
the municipality engaged in work therefor and while
acting in the line of his or her duty. ..."
(Emphasis added.)  This Court in Jackson merely acknowledged
what was obvious on the face of the statute, that is, that the
legislature had abrogated tort immunity for municipalities to
the extent the alleged wrongful acts occurred "through the
1051711
11
neglect, carelessness or unskillfulness of ... agent[s],
officer[s] or employee[s] of the municipality engaged in work
therefor and while acting in the line of [their] dut[ies]."
The Court "recognize[d] the authority of the legislature to
enter the entire field, and further recognize[d] its superior
position to provide with proper legislation any limitations or
protections it deem[ed] necessary."  Jackson, 294 Ala. at 600,
320 So. 2d at 75.
We are directed to no legislation suggesting that the
legislature has acted similarly with respect to immunity from
zoning regulations.  On the contrary, the Alabama Homeland
Security Act of 2003, Ala. Code 1975, § 31-9A-1 et seq. ("the
AHSA), includes a section titled "Immunity of state from
liability."  That section provides: "All functions under this
chapter and all other activities relating to homeland security
are declared to be governmental functions and protected by the
State of Alabama governmental immunity." § 31-9A-13 (emphasis
added).  Additionally, § 31-9-16(a), a part of the Alabama
Emergency Management Act of 1955, provides: "All functions
under this chapter and all other activities relating to
1051711
12
emergency management are hereby declared to be governmental
functions."  (Emphasis added.)  
It might be said that such statements are not conclusive
upon this Court for all purposes, that "the question is
judicial and not legislative in its nature, and that the
Legislature cannot by a declaration make a public governmental
function out of one which is inherently merely corporate in
its nature."  Williams v. City of Birmingham, 219 Ala. 19, 21,
121 So. 14, 16 (1929).  At a minimum, however, such statements
may be regarded as evidence indicating that the legislature
did 
not 
intend 
to 
abrogate 
the 
distinction 
between
governmental and proprietary functions for all purposes.
Courts have also recognized the governmental/propriety-
function dichotomy since Jackson.  For example, in Pennick v.
City of Florala, 529 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1976), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the
operation of a sanitary landfill by the City of Florala "in a
neighborhood zoned for residential use" was within the
municipality's authority, because the operation of the
landfill was "not subject to" the municipality's "own zoning"
regulations.  529 F.2d at 1243.  In so holding, the court
1051711
13
rejected the plaintiffs' "suggest[ion]" that the underlying
principles may have been abrogated by Jackson.  529 F.2d at
1244.  The court stated: "Since the rules on which we rely do
not involve the line of authority or reasoning repudiated in
Jackson, we believe that they remain good."  529 F.2d at 1244.
Moreover, in Jefferson County v. City of Birmingham, 256
Ala. 436, 55 So. 2d 196 (1951), this Court recognized a
difference between tort liability and zoning for purposes of
a governmental-function analysis.  Also, in Neighbors, supra,
decided five years after Jackson, this Court rejected the
argument that Jackson "absolutely abolished governmental
immunity in Alabama."  384 So. 2d at 113.  In other words, the
Court rejected the contention that Jackson had abrogated the
rule, settled in McCarter v. City of Florence, 216 Ala. 72,
112 So. 335 (1927), that a municipality could not be liable
for malicious prosecution.  384 So. 2d at 113-14.  Neighbors
reaffirmed the applicability of § 11-47-190 in the tort
context and refused to expand the statute beyond its obvious
scope.  See also Hilliard v. City of Huntsville, 585 So. 2d
889 (Ala. 1991) (city was immune from liability for alleged
negligent inspection of wiring at an apartment complex).
1051711
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In Town of Mulga v. Town of Maytown, 502 So. 2d 731 (Ala.
1987), a case more on point, this Court based its rationale,
in part, on the distinction between governmental functions and
proprietary functions.  In that case, the Town of Maytown
"enacted a business license ordinance imposing an excise tax
on businesses engaged in the manufacture or distribution of
gas within its municipal limits."  502 So. 2d at 732.  One of
the businesses purportedly subject to the tax was the Town of
"Mulga, a municipal corporation, [which was] engaged in the
business of selling and distributing gas to customers residing
in Maytown ...."  502 So. 2d at 732.  Maytown sued Mulga,
after "Mulga refused to purchase a license" on the ground that
it was exempt from the ordinance.  The trial court held that
Mulga was not exempt, and this Court agreed. 
In so doing, this Court stated:
"It appears well established that the state may
levy an excise tax on a municipality, provided the
intention to tax is clear and no constitutional
inhibition exists.  Likewise, it also appears that
when the power of the state to tax is delegated to
a municipality, as in this case, the intention to
allow that municipality to levy a tax on another
municipality must clearly appear.
"In the present case, Maytown was delegated the
authority pursuant to § 11-51-90, Code 1975, to
license any 'business ... not prohibited by the
1051711
15
Constitution or laws of the state which may be
engaged in or carried on in the city or town.'
Maytown has by clear language imposed an excise tax
on 'businesses' engaged in the distribution of gas
within its municipal limits.  While it is true, as
Mulga 
insists, 
that 
the 
ordinance 
does 
not
specifically refer to municipalities, we do not
consider that omission to be fatal.  'Where a
municipality engages in the business of furnishing
electricity, lights, water, or gas to the public, it
is not then discharging or exercising governmental
functions or powers, but is exercising proprietary
or business powers, and as to such business it is
governed by the same rules of law which are
applicable to ordinary business corporations.'  Town
of Hackleburg v. Northwest Gas. Dist., [277 Ala.
355, 170 So. 2d 792 (1964)]; City of Decatur v.
Parham, 268 Ala. 585, 109 So. 2d 692 (1959).
"....
"Therefore, it is clear to us, and we so hold,
that in enacting § 11-51-90, supra, the legislature
intended for a municipality like Mulga (i.e., one
which is engaged in a business within the corporate
limits of another municipality) to be subject to
taxation as is any other business."
502 So. 2d at 734 (emphasis added).  In other words, Mulga was
subject to the provisions of the Maytown ordinance because it
was engaged in a proprietary, as opposed to a governmental,
function.  
Since Jackson, the Court of Civil Appeals has, at least
three 
times, 
directly 
applied the distinction between
1051711
In none of these cases was the Court of Civil Appeals
1
presented with the argument that the distinction did not
survive Jackson. 
16
governmental functions and proprietary functions in the zoning
context in order to hold that a county, in the case of Lane v.
Zoning 
Board 
of 
Adjustment 
of 
Talladega, 
supra; 
a
municipality, in the case of Cunningham v. City of Attalla,
supra; and a city board of education, in the case of Alves v.
Board of Education for Guntersville, 922 So. 2d 129 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2005), were exempt from municipal zoning regulations in
the operation of a governmental function.   The City cites no
1
contrary authority.  It is evident, therefore, that neither
the judiciary nor 
the 
legislature 
has heretofore 
manifested an
intent to abrogate the immunity from zoning ordinances that
has long been afforded to political subdivisions in the
operation of their governmental functions.  The City does not,
in fact, urge us to do so at this time.  Consequently, we hold
that Jackson did not abrogate the distinction between
governmental functions and proprietary functions for the
purpose of applying zoning ordinances.  The next question is
whether the County's construction and operation of the
communications tower is a governmental function.
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B. Status of the Tower
"The governmental functions of a municipal corporation
include the promotion of the public peace, health, safety, and
morals, as well as the expenditure of money for public
improvements, the expense of which ultimately is borne by the
property owners."  56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal Corporations § 183
(2000) (emphasis added).  "A function is a governmental
function if it is the means by which the governing entity
exercises the sovereign power for the benefit of all
citizens."  Lane, 669 So. 2d at 959-60.  It is "done by
authority of law .... [a]nd ... not ... for profit .... It is
not of a proprietary nature, but under the police power to
promote the health and well-being of the people."  Downey v.
Jackson, 259 Ala. 189, 193, 65 So. 2d 825, 827 (1953).  "The
police powers of a city are among its major governmental
functions.  Broadly speaking, they extend to all appropriate
ordinances for the protection of the peace, safety, health,
and good morals of the people affected thereby.  The general
'welfare' 
is 
a 
generic 
term 
often 
employed 
in 
this
connection."  City of Homewood v. Wofford Oil Co., 232 Ala.
634, 636, 169 So. 288, 290 (1936).
1051711
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"Proprietary ... functions include essentially
commercial transactions involving the purchase or
sale of goods and services and other activities for
the commercial benefit of a particular government
agency. 
Whereas 
in 
its 
sovereign 
role, 
the
government carries out unique governmental functions
for the benefit of the whole public, in its
proprietary capacity the government's activities are
analogous to those of a private concern."
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Harrison, 735 F.2d 408, 411
(11th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added).
Examples of governmental functions in cases challenging
the entity's operating authority include a "sanitary landfill
garbage disposal" expressly authorized by statute, operated by
a municipality, Scogin, supra; the operation, expressly
authorized by statute, of a baseball diamond by the "Park and
Recreation Board of the City of Birmingham," Downey, supra;
the location, construction, and operation by a county board of
education of a facility in which to store, repair, and
maintain school property, such as school buses and supplies,
Alexander, supra; the operation, expressly authorized by
statute, of a garbage incinerator by the City of Bessemer,
City of Bessemer v. Abbott, 212 Ala. 472, 103 So. 446 (1925);
the construction and operation of a jail by the county, Lane,
supra; the use by a municipality of a building as a warehouse,
1051711
19
Cunningham, supra; and the choice of a location for a new
school building by a city board of education, Alves, supra.
Cf. State ex rel. Hyland v. Baumhauer, 244 Ala. 1, 8, 12 So.
2d 326, 330 (1942)("A fire department, when organized and
functioning, is performing a governmental rather than a
proprietary function.").    
On the other hand, "when a city is engaged in the
business of supplying for compensation water service to the
people, within its lawful power, it is engaged in a
proprietary business."  Stephens, 262 Ala. at 209, 78 So. 2d
at 272 (emphasis added).  Similarly, the operation of a
sewage-disposal plant is, for zoning purposes, a proprietary
function.  Jefferson County v. City of Birmingham, supra. 
The trial court held, "as a matter of law, that
communicating 
with 
emergency 
service 
providers 
by 
governmental
bodies is a governmental function and not a proprietary
function."  We agree.
Kent County Aeronautics Board v. Department of State
Police, 239 Mich. App. 563, 609 N.W.2d 593 (2000), aff'd sub
nom. Byrne v. State, 463 Mich. 652, 624 N.W.2d 906 (2001),
involved a challenge to the authority of the "Michigan
1051711
20
Department of State Police" ("the State Police") to construct
and operate a "475-foot radio communications tower."  239
Mich. App. at 567, 609 N.W.2d at 597.  The tower was to be 1
of 181 such towers in "an integrated radio tower network
communications system," which was intended to "provide radio
coverage over the entire state enabling state and local public
safety officers, as well as law enforcement agencies and other
state 
departments, 
to 
communicate 
with 
each 
other
simultaneously."  Id.  A state statute expressly authorized
the State Police to "'sit[e] the buildings and equipment
necessary'" for the "'construction, implementation, operation
and maintenance of the Michigan public safety communications
system.'"  239 Mich. App. at 574, 609 N.W.2d at 600.  The
appellate court, in rejecting various challenges to the
authority for the construction, held, among other things, that
"the construction of the communications tower by the State
Police ... was authorized by statute ... and clearly
constituted a governmental function."  239 Mich. App. at 586,
609 N.W.2d at 605 (emphasis added).
This dispute arose out of federal and state legislation
primarily generated by the terrorist attacks that occurred on
1051711
21
September 11, 2001.  First, Congress passed the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135,
codified, as amended by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638,
at 6 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. ("the Act").  The Act created the
United States Department of Homeland Security and assigned it
the duty of, among other things, "prevent[ing] terrorist
attacks within the United States," 6 U.S.C. § 111(b)(1)(A),
and "reduc[ing] the vulnerability of the United States to
terrorism." § 111(b)(1)(B).  To that end, the Act charged the
Secretary of Homeland Security ("the Secretary") with the duty
to:
"coordinate ... with State and local government
personnel ... by --
"(1) coordinating ... to ensure adequate
planning, [and] equipment ...;
"(2) coordinating and, as appropriate,
consolidating, the Federal Government's
communications 
and 
systems 
of
communications 
relating 
to 
homeland
security with State and local government
personnel, agencies, and authorities ...;
and
"(3) distributing or, as appropriate,
coordinating 
the 
distribution 
of, 
warnings,
1051711
22
and 
information 
to 
State 
and 
local
government 
personnel, 
agencies 
and
authorities and to the public."
6 U.S.C. § 112 (emphasis added).
Congress found that "(A) many first responders working in
the same jurisdiction or in different jurisdictions cannot
effectively and efficiently communicate with one another"; and
that "(B) their inability to do so threatens the public's
safety and may result in unnecessary loss of lives and
property."  6 U.S.C. § 194(i)(1) (emphasis added).  Thus, it
was the "sense of Congress that interoperable emergency
communications systems and radios should ... be deployed as
soon as practicable for use by the first responder community
...."  § 194(i)(2) (emphasis added).  The Act defines
"interoperable communications" as "the ability of emergency
response providers and relevant Federal, State, and local
government agencies to communicate with each other ...,
through 
a 
dedicated 
public 
safety 
network 
utilizing
information technology systems and radio communications
systems, and to exchange voice, data, or video with one
another on demand, in real time, as necessary." § 194(g)(1).
1051711
23
The Act further authorized the Secretary to "establish a
comprehensive national approach to achieving public safety
interoperable 
communications," 
§ 
194(a)(1)(A) 
(emphasis
added);  to "develop ... appropriate minimum capabilities for
communications interoperability for Federal, State, and local
public safety agencies," § 194(a)(1)(C); and to "establish
coordinated guidance for Federal grant programs for public
safety 
interoperable 
communications," 
§ 
194(a)(1)(H) 
(emphasis
added). The Act provided for the awarding of "interoperability
grants" to states and local governments "for the purposes of
enhancing 
interoperable 
communications 
capabilities 
for
emergency response providers." § 194(e)(1).  Subsequently, the
Alabama Legislature passed its own version of the Act, namely,
the AHSA, "to assist, coordinate, and encourage homeland
security preparedness by ... authorizing the making of grants,
as funds are appropriated for such purpose, to any political
subdivision of the state ...."  § 31-9A-2(b).  
It is undisputed that the communications tower at issue
in this case is "interoperable emergency communications"
equipment of the sort contemplated by Congress and funded by
grants made available through the Act and the AHSA.  Operation
1051711
24
of the tower is not a business for profit.  The City concedes
that the tower is federally funded, and it does not allege
that the cost of constructing and operating the tower will be
charged to the City or its inhabitants.  The "customers" are
emergency first responders, who fulfill traditional police-
power functions of promoting "public peace, health, [and]
safety."  56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal Corporations § 183.  It is
not analogous to a city-operated "water service business,"
which is "proprietary in nature."  Stephens, 262 Ala. at 208,
78 So. 2d at 272.  It redounds to the benefit of not only
citizens of Dallas County, but also emergency personnel from
other counties or states in any multijurisdictional response
to a crisis in Dallas County.
The undisputed purpose of the communications tower is to
remedy the specific problem addressed by Congress in 6 U.S.C.
§ 194, that is, the inability of emergency first responders to
communicate with one another in a time of crisis.  Thus, the
construction and operation of the tower is "done by authority
of law .... to promote the health and well-being of the
people."  Downey v. Jackson, 259 Ala. at 193, 65 So. 2d at
827.  It is a vital "cog" in the larger machine -- an
1051711
We need not, and do not, decide whether the legislature
2
may conclusively categorize all conduct arising under the AHSA
as a governmental function. 
25
indispensable link in the national communications network
envisioned by Congress and reflected in the Act. 
Although more could be said in this regard, we can
readily conclude that the construction and operation of the
communications tower -- impelled by federal and state
legislation in response to the urgencies of the post-9/11 era
-- 
is 
a 
governmental 
function.  
 
Accord 
Kent 
County
2
Aeronautics Board v. Department of State Police, supra.
Consequently, the trial court correctly held that the tower
ordinance and the historic ordinance are not enforceable
against the County.
III. Alabama Constitution, § 220
Finally, the City contends that the trial court erred in
holding that the construction and operation of the tower did
not offend § 220 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901, which
provides: 
"No person, firm, association, or corporation
shall be authorized or permitted to use the streets,
avenues, alleys, or public places of any city, town,
or village for the construction or operation of any
1051711
26
public utility or private enterprise without first
obtaining the consent of the proper authorities of
such city, town, or village."
(Emphasis added.)  The City insists that the communications
tower is a "public utility" and, therefore, that § 220
prohibits the construction and operation of the tower without
the City's permission.
A "public utility" is defined as a "business organization
(as an electric company) performing a public service and
subject to special governmental regulation."  Merriam-
Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1006 (11th ed. 1997) (emphasis
added).  It is also more specifically defined as follows:
"'A privately owned and operated business whose
services are so essential to the general public as
to justify the grant of special franchises for the
use of public property or of the right of eminent
domain, in consideration of which the owners must
serve all persons who apply, without discrimination.
It is always a virtual monopoly.  
"'A business or service which is engaged in
regularly supplying the public with some commodity
or service which is of public consequence and need,
such as electricity, gas, water, transportation, or
telephone or telegraph service. ... Any agency,
instrumentality, business, industry or service which
is used or conducted in such manner as to affect the
community at large, that is, which is not limited or
restricted to any particular class of the community.
The test for determining if a concern is a public
1051711
27
utility is whether it has held itself out as ready,
able and willing to serve the public.  The term
implies a public use of an article, product, or
service, carrying with it the duty of the producer
or manufacturer, or one attempting to furnish the
service, to serve the public and treat all persons
alike, without discrimination.'"
Coastal States Gas Transmission Co. v. Alabama Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 524 So. 2d 357, 360-61 (Ala. 1988) (quoting Black's
Law Dictionary 1104 (5th ed. 1979)) (emphasis added). 
In addition, the legislature has supplied the following
definition and examples from Title 37, Chapter 4, involving
"Public Utilities Other than Transportation Companies or Motor
Vehicle Carriers":
"(7) Utility. Such term shall mean and include
every person, not engaged solely in interstate
business, that now or may hereafter own, operate,
lease or control:
"a. Any plant, property or facility
for 
the 
generation, 
transmission 
or
distribution, sale or furnishing to or for
the public of electricity for light, heat
or power or other uses, including any
conduits, 
ducts, 
or 
other 
devices,
materials, apparatus, or property for
containing, holding or carrying conductors
used or to be used for the transmission of
electricity for light, heat, or power, or
other uses.
1051711
28
"b. Any plant, property, or facility
for 
the 
manufacture, 
storage, 
distribution,
sale or furnishing to or for the public of
natural or 
manufactured gas for light, heat
or power or other uses.
"c. Any plant, property or facility
for the supply, storage, distribution, or
furnishing to or for the public of water
for manufacturing, municipal, domestic or
other uses.
"d. Any plant, property or facility
for 
the 
production, 
transmission,
conveyance, delivery or furnishing to or
for the public of steam for heat or power,
or other uses.
"e. 
Any 
public 
wharf, 
dock 
or
terminal.
"f. Any boat line propelled by any
power and not regulated by the laws of this
state heretofore or hereafter enacted as a
steamboat or steam packet line.
"The term 'utility' shall also mean and include
two or more utilities rendering joint service."
Ala. Code 1975, § 37-4-1(7).
The City does not cite a case from this, or any other,
jurisdiction holding that the operation of a tower to provide
"interoperable communications" among emergency responders is
1051711
29
a public utility.  Indeed, it is often stated that "[t]he
operation by a municipality of a public utility is a
proprietary, not a governmental, function."  Schmidt v.
Village of Kimberly, 74 Idaho 48, 60, 256 P.2d 515, 522 (1953)
(emphasis added).  See Cobb County Rural Elec. Membership
Corp. v. Board of Lights & Water Works of Marietta, 211 Ga.
535, 87 S.E.2d 80 (1955); IBP, Inc. v. City of Council Bluffs,
511 N.W.2d 413 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993); 2 Eugene McQuillin, The
Law of Municipal Corporations § 4:154 (3d ed. rev. vol. 2006)
("a municipality, in the operation of a public utility, acts
in its private and proprietary capacity rather than in a
legislative or governmental capacity").
Having determined in the preceding part of this opinion
that the construction and operation of the communications
tower is a governmental function, we would have to strain to
hold, in this part, that it is proprietary in nature.  It is
difficult to avoid the logic that if the operation of a public
utility is a proprietary function, then it is not a public
utility if it is not a proprietary function.  The City cites
only two cases in support of its argument that the
communications tower is a "public utility," namely, Mobile
1051711
30
County v. City of Saraland, 501 So. 2d 438 (Ala. 1986)
(drainage pipe under a city street), and Coastal States Gas
Transmission Co., supra (pipeline owned and operated for the
sale of "natural gas to select customers under private
contracts").  In both cases, however, this Court held that the
concern at issue was not a public utility. 
The City focuses on the "public" aspect of the definition
of a public utility.  It states: "Dallas County made it clear
that [it is] constructing this radio tower 'for the public
good' and for the welfare of the county as a whole .... and
the County made it clear that it was ready, able and willing
to serve the public."  The City's brief, at 24-25.  In
response, the County states: "If this Court was to focus on
that one element as argued by [the City], no function of civil
government would be safe from falling within that definition,"
including every operation or facility that our cases have
defined as serving a governmental function.  The County's
brief, at 60.  We agree with the County. 
In City of Bessemer v. Personnel Board for Jefferson
County, 240 Ala. 411, 199 So. 815 (1941), this Court said: "A
proprietary function or power of a city operated for the
1051711
31
public is none the less a public function though for some
purposes it may not be strictly a governmental function."  240
Ala. at 413, 199 So. at 816 (emphasis added).  "[T]he
distinction between governmental and proprietary functions of
a city was worked out by the courts to support liability for
negligence, and in order that injustice may not result. But
all its functions are public and are dependent upon authority
by the state."  240 Ala. at 413, 199 So. at 816 (emphasis
added). 
In fact, in operating the communications tower, the
County does not purport to "serve the public," in the sense
that it "treat[s] all persons alike, without discrimination."
Black's Law Dictionary 1104 (5th ed. 1979)(quoted in Coastal
States, 524 So. 2d at 361).  The interoperability feature, the
tower's raison d'etre, specifically serves only emergency
responders, 
such 
as 
fire, law-enforcement, 
and rescue
personnel.  Members of the general public are not charged for
the operations of the tower and have no right to demand
interoperable service from the tower.  Thus, consistent with
the logic of Part II.B. of this opinion, and based, moreover,
on the facts and authorities presented by the parties in this
1051711
32
case, we hold that the communications tower is not a public
utility.
IV. Conclusion
In conclusion, the interoperable communications tower
constructed at the Dallas County courthouse is neither
proprietary in nature, nor is it a public utility.  The trial
court did not err, therefore, in entering a summary judgment
for the County.  That judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Smith, and Parker, JJ., concur.