Title: Adams v. Industrial Commission

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

490 S.W.2d 77 (1973)
Horace ADAMS et al., Appellants,
v.
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Missouri et al., Respondents.
No. 57175.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.
February 12, 1973.
Robert J. Reinhold of McCullough, Parker, Wareheim & LaBunker, Topeka, Kan., Edwin W. Rooker of McKenzie, Williams, Merrick, Beamer & Wells, Kansas City, for appellants.
Kent E. Whittaker, Charles G. Young, III, Kansas City, for respondent Conchemco, Inc.; Hillix, Brewer & Myers, Kansas City, of counsel.
William C. Nulton of Blackwell, Sanders, Matheny, Weary & Lombardi, Kansas City, for respondents Cook Paint and Varnish Co. and Davis Paint Co.
Lloyd G. Poole, Jefferson City, for respondent The Industrial Comm. of Mo.
Lloyd G. Hanley, Jefferson City, for respondent Div. of Employment Security.
WELBORN, Commissioner.
Appeal from judgment in consolidated cases affirming administrative denial of unemployment compensation to some 300 employees of four paint manufacturing companies in the Kansas City area.
Local No. 754 of the Paint, Varnish and Lacquer Makers Union was the collective bargaining agent for production and maintenance employees of Cook Paint and Varnish Company, Conchemo, Inc., Waggener Paint Company and Davis Paint Manufacturing Company. Collective bargaining agreements between the union and each of the employers expired December 31, 1969. Sixty days before the expiration date, the *78 union business agent wrote each employer that the union wished to commence negotiations with the employers for the purpose of arriving at a new contract.
During December, 1969, several negotiating sessions between representatives of the union and the employers were held. Agreement was reached on several matters, but no agreement was reached on wages and several other matters.
On January 2, 1970, the employers posted notices that, unless there was substantial progress toward a new contract by January 12, the employers would lay off the employees in the bargaining units represented by the union.
In continuing negotiations in the first part of January, 1970, the union reduced its wage demands, but they were still unacceptable to the employers and there was no agreement in other areas. At the request of the employers, their most recent offer was submitted to the union's membership on January 10 and the offer was rejected.
On January 9 and 10, the following notice was posted at the plants:
On January 12, 1970, the employees reported for work and found the doors locked and notices of the lockout posted. The union began picketing the plants with signs indicating that they had been locked out.
Negotiations continued. On April 9, 1970, each of the employers wrote its employees, notifying them that the lockout had ended and requesting that they return to work by April 13. The employees did not return to work until April 20, by which time the parties had agreed upon a new collective bargaining contract.
The employees filed claims for unemployment benefits. Deputies of the Division of Employment Security denied the claims on the grounds that the unemployment was due to the stoppage of work as the result of a labor dispute. An appeals referee upheld the deputies' determination. The employees appealed to the Industrial Commission. The Commission affirmed the deputies' determination, with one member dissenting. On appeal the Jackson County Circuit Court affirmed the "findings and results" of the Industrial Commission.
Appellants here contend that the trial court erred in affirming the findings of the Industrial Commission. They contend that, as a matter of law, the lockout involved is not a "labor dispute" within the meaning of the Missouri Employment Security Act. The provision of that act here involved is § 288.040, RSMo 1969, V.A.M. S., which reads, in part:
The respondents assert that the commission's determination was of facts, not of law. The difference in the positions of the parties is significant, insofar as judicial review is concerned. § 288.210, RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S., provides, in part:
Appellants concede that there is no dispute among the parties as to the facts. Their complaint is that, in applying the law to such facts, the commission omitted to take into consideration provisions of the Employment Security Act relevant to the determination of the issues before it.
Specifically, appellants contend that the commission, in the determination of their claims and in the application of § 288.040, subd. 4., was required to take into consideration the "cause-fault" philosophy of the Employment Security Act, as set out in § 288.020, RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S. Section 288.020 is a statement of policy, to be followed as a guide to the interpretation and application of the act. It provides:
Insofar as the question is one of proper application of the law to the undisputed facts, the matter for review is one of law for the court. Poggemoeller v. Industrial Commission, 371 S.W.2d 488, 499 (Mo. App., 1963).
Appellants do not controvert respondents' position that, in most jurisdictions in which the question has arisen under a statute similar to § 288.040, subd. 4., the courts have held that a work stoppage resulting from a lockout arising from a disagreement in matters subject to collective bargaining is a labor dispute entailing disqualification from unemployment benefits. Poggemoeller v. Industrial Commission, supra; Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 291, 312 (1953).
In the case of In re North River Logging Co., 15 Wash. 2d 204, 130 P.2d 64 (1942), the court, in holding that a lockout was a labor dispute within the meaning of the unemployment compensation disqualification provision, stated (130 P.2d at 66):
See also: Olusczak v. Florida Ind. Comm., 230 So. 2d 31 (Fla.Ct.App., 1970); Buchholz v. Cummins, 6 Ill. 2d 382, 128 N.E.2d 900 (1955); Depaoli v. Ernst, 73 Nev. 79, 309 P.2d 363 (1957); Schoenwiesner v. Board of Review, 44 N.J.Super. 377, 130 A.2d 648 (1957); Henzel v. Cameron, 228 Or. 452, 365 P.2d 498 (1961).
Appellants contend that such an approach is "rigid and mechanical." They urge that the approach to the problem which has been followed in Indiana, and which takes into consideration the causefault philosophy embodied in the legislative *80 policy declaration is the correct and proper approach.
The Indiana approach originated in Bootz Mfg. Co. v. Review Board, 143 Ind. App. 17, 237 N.E. 597, reh. den., 143 Ind. App. 111, 238 N.E.2d 472 (1968). In that case, the court affirmed an administrative finding that employees idled because of a lockout were not disqualified under the "labor dispute" provision when negotiations were in a fluid state between the employer and the union. Finding that no impasse existed, the Board found that the lockout was a unilateral act of the employer, and, therefore, not a "labor dispute." In City Pattern & Foundry Co. v. Review Board, 263 N.E.2d 218 (Ind.App., 1970), the court stated that the Bootz rule brought the labor dispute disqualification provision "into harmony with the act's declared purpose." 263 N.E.2d  at 224.
Other jurisdictions have rejected the contention that the labor dispute provision of unemployment compensation acts should be qualified by the provisions setting forth the general objective and purpose of such act. In the case of In re North River Logging Co., supra, the court stated (130 P.2d at 65):
In Buchholz v. Cummins, supra, the court stated (128 N.E.2d at 902):
The approach in these cases is in accord with settled principles of statutory construction and avoids the pitfalls inherent in any effort to determine cause and fault in labor disputes. It accords also with legislative recognition that a lockout is a labor dispute under the Employment Security Act, as recognized by § 288.050, subd. 1(2) (b):
Therefore, the Industrial Commission did not err as a matter of law in concluding *81 that the unemployment here involved was "due to a stoppage of work * * * [existing] because of a labor dispute * * *," nor in rejecting the claimants' contention that an "impasse" must have been found to have existed before the labor dispute disqualification became operative.
There is no need to dwell upon what appellants assert will be the "absurd" and "chaotic" products of the approach of the Division of Employment Security and the Industrial Commission to the question here presented. Essentially, the approach is the same as that which received prior judicial approval in the Poggemoeller case, supra. That decision has stood for some nine years, without such disastrous consequences as to persuade the General Assembly that remedial action is necessary. The last session of the General Assembly saw bills which would have excluded lockouts from the labor dispute disqualification fail of passage. H.B. 594 and S.C.S.H.B. 594, 76th General Assembly, 1971 session. Furthermore, as in Sweeney v. Board of Review, 43 N.J. 535, 206 A.2d 345, cited by appellants, the Division of Employment Security and Industrial Commission may also inquire into whether or not a particular work stoppage resulting from a lockout is due to a labor dispute or "unrelated economic reasons." 206 A.2d 348.
Judgment affirmed.
HIGGINS, C., concurs.
PER CURIAM:
The foregoing opinion by WELBORN, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court.
HOLMAN, P.J., and SEILER, J., concur.
BARDGETT, J., concurs in result.