Title: Archer v. Grubhub, Inc.

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13228 
 
VERONICA ARCHER1 & others2  vs.  GRUBHUB, INC. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     May 2, 2022. - July 27, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Federal Arbitration Act.  Arbitration, Arbitrable question, 
Waiver.  Interstate Commerce.  Food.  Statute, 
Construction.  Contract, Arbitration.  Practice, Civil, 
Waiver.  Waiver. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
October 21, 2019. 
 
A motion to compel arbitration was heard by Brian A. Davis, 
J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Theanne Evangelis, of California (Blaine H. Evanson, of 
California, & Joshua M. Wesneski, of the District of Columbia, 
also present) for the defendant. 
Eric R. LeBlanc for the plaintiffs. 
 
1 Individually and on behalf of all others similarly 
situated. 
 
2 Andrea Krautz, Paul Girouard, and Patrick Lee, 
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated. 
2 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
Ben Robbins & Daniel B. Winslow for New England Legal 
Foundation. 
Lee Dawn Daniel, Thomas R. Murphy, & Patrick M. Groulx for 
Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys. 
Maura Healey, Attorney General, & Tallulah Q. Knopp, 
Assistant Attorney General, for Attorney General. 
Rohit K. Singla, of California, Rachel G. Miller-Ziegler, 
of the District of Columbia, & Elaine J. Goldenberg for Lyft, 
Inc. 
Mason A. Kortz for Jonathan Askin & others. 
Jennifer B. Dickey & Jonathan D. Urick, of the District of 
Columbia, Mark C. Fleming, & Charles C. Kelsh for Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States of America. 
Robert F. Friedman, of Texas, Julie M. McGoldrick, of 
California, & Francis J. Bingham for DoorDash, Inc., & another. 
Shannon Liss-Riordan & Adelaide H. Pagano for Massachusetts 
Employment Law Association. 
 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  In this case, we consider whether delivery 
drivers, who delivered takeout food and various prepackaged 
goods from local restaurants, delicatessens, and convenience 
stores to Grubhub, Inc. (Grubhub), customers within the 
Commonwealth, fall within a residual category of workers -- 
namely, "any other class of workers engaged in foreign or 
interstate commerce" -– who, like "seamen" and "railroad 
employees," are exempt from arbitration pursuant to § 1 of the 
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).  9 U.S.C. § 1.  We join the 
numerous courts that have addressed the same question in their 
respective jurisdictions and conclude that they are not.  
Further concluding that the arbitration agreements between the 
plaintiff drivers and Grubhub are binding, we reverse the 
3 
 
Superior Court judge's denial of Grubhub's motion to compel 
arbitration and to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint.3 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  The following facts generally 
are undisputed. 
The plaintiffs are former delivery drivers for Grubhub, an 
online ordering and delivery marketplace that connects customers 
with local restaurants through its website and mobile 
application.  The plaintiffs4 delivered takeout meals and 
prepackaged items, such as a bottle of soda or a bag of potato 
chips, from local restaurants, delicatessens, and convenience 
stores to local customers.  The plaintiffs all worked in 
Massachusetts and did not cross State lines in their work for 
Grubhub. 
In February 2017, Grubhub distributed an arbitration 
agreement entitled "Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims" to its 
drivers, including the plaintiffs, through an online portal.  To 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the New 
England Legal Foundation; Lyft, Inc.; Jonathan Askin, Vivek 
Krishnamurthy, Christopher Morten, and Jason Schultz; the 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America; DoorDash, 
Inc., and Uber Technologies, Inc.; and the Massachusetts 
Employment Law Association; and the amicus letters submitted by 
the Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys and the Attorney 
General. 
 
4 Veronica Archer worked for Grubhub from September 2016 to 
July 2019, Paul Girouard from February 2017 to May 2019, Andrea 
Krautz from January 2016 to September 2019, and Patrick Lee from 
January 2016 to June 2019. 
4 
 
access the agreement, the plaintiffs had to activate a hyperlink 
entitled "Arbitration Agreement," and then had the option to 
select either an icon to view the text of the agreement or the 
document title to navigate to the signature page.5  The signature 
page required the plaintiffs to acknowledge that they "read, 
understand, and/or agree to be bound by the terms" of the 
agreement, and indicated below the signature line that the 
document was an "arbitration agreement."  The plaintiffs each 
signed the agreement electronically before the end of March 
2017. 
The arbitration agreement included a provision requiring 
the plaintiffs to submit all "past, present or future" disputes 
"arising out of or related to [e]mployee's . . . employment 
and/or separation of employment," including "any claims based 
upon or related to . . . retaliation . . . [and] wages or other 
compensation," to final and binding arbitration.  It further 
provided that the terms of the agreement were governed by the 
FAA and included a class action waiver stating that "[t]here 
 
5 The parties dispute whether the plaintiffs would have had 
to view the document containing the text of the agreement before 
proceeding to the signature page.  A senior vice-president of 
Grubhub attested that, once the plaintiffs gained access to the 
portal, they were directed to a list of documents that included 
the arbitration agreement.  They could then "click the 'view' 
icon located directly to the right of the document to open a 
copy" of the agreement, and they "could also click the title of 
the document to proceed to an acknowledgement page" for their 
electronic signature. 
5 
 
will be no right or authority for any dispute to be brought, 
heard, or arbitrated as a class action." 
b.  Procedural history.  In October 2019, the plaintiffs, 
on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, commenced 
the present action against Grubhub in the Superior Court, 
alleging that Grubhub violated the wage act, G. L. c. 149, 
§§ 148 and 150; the tips act, G. L. c. 149, § 152A; and the 
minimum wage act, G. L. c. 151, § 7; and that Grubhub unlawfully 
retaliated against drivers who complained about their wages in 
violation of G. L. c. 149, § 148A. 
In May 2020, Grubhub filed a motion to compel arbitration 
and to dismiss the complaint, asserting that each plaintiff had 
entered into an agreement to arbitrate, which was enforceable 
under the FAA.6  Following a hearing, a Superior Court judge 
denied Grubhub's motion.  The judge found that the plaintiffs 
entered into the arbitration agreement; however, the judge 
concluded that the plaintiffs, by virtue of their transportation 
and delivery of prepackaged food items, some of which were 
manufactured outside Massachusetts, fell within the definition 
 
6 Prior to the filing of the complaint, the plaintiffs 
sought copies of their personnel records, including the 
arbitration agreement.  After initially declining to produce the 
agreement and after the plaintiffs secured the involvement of 
the Attorney General, Grubhub produced a 2015 version of the 
agreement.  Subsequently, and in connection with its motion, 
Grubhub produced the correct agreement from 2017, explaining 
that it had previously produced the 2015 version in error. 
6 
 
of "any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate 
commerce" who are exempt from arbitration under § 1 of the FAA.  
Grubhub appealed, and we transferred the case sua sponte from 
the Appeals Court. 
2.  Discussion.  We review both the denial of a motion to 
compel arbitration and the denial of a motion to dismiss de 
novo.  See Battle v. Howard, 489 Mass. 480, 487 (2022); Landry 
v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 485 Mass. 334, 337 (2020). 
a.  FAA.  Enacted in 1925 in "response to [the] hostility 
of American courts to the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements," Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 
111 (2001) (Circuit City), the FAA evinces a "liberal federal 
policy favoring arbitration" (citation omitted), AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011), and requires 
"courts 'rigorously' to 'enforce arbitration agreements 
according to their terms,'" Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 
1612, 1621 (2018), quoting American Express Co. v. Italian 
Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. 228, 233 (2013).  Thus, in general, 
"any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be 
resolved in favor of arbitration."  Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. 
v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983). 
As sweeping as the FAA is, however, it is not unqualified.  
See Wallace v. Grubhub Holdings, Inc., 970 F.3d 798, 800 (7th 
Cir. 2020).  Relevant to the present appeal, § 1 of the FAA 
7 
 
provides that "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts 
of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class 
of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."  9 U.S.C. 
§ 1.  Thus, the FAA exempts two enumerated categories of workers 
("seamen" and "railroad employees") and a residual category 
("any other class of worker engaged in foreign or interstate 
commerce") from compelled arbitration.  See New Prime Inc. v. 
Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 537 (2019).  The plaintiff drivers 
insist that they fall within the residual category because they 
are transportation workers who transport and deliver goods, such 
as prepackaged chips or soda, in the flow of interstate 
commerce. 
b.  Construction of § 1 residual category.  As with any 
question of statutory interpretation, our inquiry as to the 
meaning of the residual clause of § 1 begins with the words of 
the statute itself.  See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 638 
(2016); Patel v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 489 Mass. 356, 362 (2022), 
citing Tze-Kit Mui v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 478 Mass. 710, 
712 (2018).  We consider the words of the statute "in connection 
with the cause of its enactment, . . . to the end that the 
purpose of its framers may be effectuated."  Boston Police 
Patrolmen's Ass'n, Inc. v. Boston, 435 Mass. 718, 720 (2002), 
quoting O'Brien v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 393 
Mass. 482, 487-488 (1984).  See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain 
8 
 
Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1, 7 (2011) (considering 
language of statute "in conjunction with the purpose and 
context"). 
With these principles in mind, we consider initially that 
the operative unit of the residual category of workers in § 1 is 
a "class of workers."  See Wallace, 970 F.3d at 800.  See also 
Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 142 S. Ct. 1783, 1788 (2022).  
Thus, in determining whether the exemption applies, the question 
is not whether any individual worker was engaged in interstate 
commerce, but whether the class of workers to which the 
individual belonged was engaged in interstate commerce.  "[A] 
member of the class qualifies for the exemption even if [he or] 
she does not personally 'engage in interstate commerce'" so long 
as the class to which he or she belongs is engaged in interstate 
commerce.  Wallace, supra, quoting Bacashihua v. U.S. Postal 
Serv., 859 F.2d 402, 405 (6th Cir. 1988).  "By the same token, 
someone whose occupation is not defined by its engagement in 
interstate commerce does not qualify for the exemption just 
because [he or] she occasionally performs that kind of work."  
Wallace, supra.  Thus, the fact that the plaintiffs here did not 
cross State lines in their work for Grubhub is not dispositive; 
the relevant question is whether the class of workers to which 
the plaintiffs belonged was engaged in interstate commerce.  The 
relevant "class of workers" is defined by the work the workers 
9 
 
do –- here, there is no dispute that the plaintiffs delivered 
food from local restaurants, delis, and convenience stores to 
Grubhub customers in the Commonwealth.  See Southwest Airlines 
Co., supra. 
In addressing this question, we do not write on a blank 
slate.  The United States Supreme Court has instructed that the 
construction of the residual clause is governed by the 
application of the maxim ejusdem generis -- a canon of statutory 
construction that provides that "[w]here general words follow 
specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are 
construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those 
objects enumerated by the preceding specific words."  Circuit 
City, 532 U.S. at 114-115.  Pursuant to the canon, the Court 
concluded that the residual clause's scope is "controlled and 
defined by reference to" the specifically enumerated categories 
of workers directly preceding it -- namely, seamen and railroad 
employees.  Id. at 115.  See Wallace, 970 F.3d at 801 ("Far from 
being superfluous, the enumerated categories play a key role in 
defining the scope of the residual clause . . .").  Applying 
this rule,7 together with the purpose of the FAA to overcome 
 
7 The Court explained that the phrase "engaged in interstate 
commerce" as used in the residual category of § 1 is a narrow 
term of art, which is much less expansive than the phrase 
"involving commerce" used elsewhere in the FAA.  Circuit City, 
532 U.S. at 115-116.  See Southwest Airlines Co., 142 S. Ct. at 
1789-1790. 
10 
 
judicial hostility to arbitration agreements, the Court in 
Circuit City rejected the argument that the residual clause 
extended to exempt a broad category of workers under all 
contracts of employment, and instead limited the residual clause 
to "transportation workers" actually engaged in the movement of 
goods in interstate commerce.  Circuit City, supra at 112, 118-
119.  See Southwest Airlines Co., 142 S. Ct. at 1789-1790. 
To determine whether the plaintiff Grubhub drivers are 
transportation workers actually engaged in the movement of goods 
in interstate commerce, as required by the residual clause of 
§ 1, we again find guidance in Federal jurisprudence.  
Addressing the scope of the residual clause, Federal courts 
first "consider whether the interstate movement of goods is a 
central part of the class members' job description."  Wallace, 
970 F.3d at 801 & n.2 (listing Federal appellate cases 
emphasizing that "transportation workers" under § 1 residual 
clause are those "actually engaged in the movement of goods in 
interstate commerce" [citation omitted]).  Compare New Prime 
Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 536, 539 (observing that driver for 
interstate trucking company was transportation worker), with 
Hill v. Rent-a-Center, Inc., 398 F.3d 1286, 1289-1290 (11th Cir. 
2005) (account manager who "incidentally transported goods 
interstate as part of [his] job" was not transportation worker 
under § 1).  Second, if such a class exists, Federal courts 
11 
 
consider whether the plaintiff is a member of it.  See Wallace, 
970 F.3d at 802.  Compare International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 
Union No. 50 v. Kienstra Precast, LLC, 702 F.3d 954, 957 (7th 
Cir. 2012) (truckers making deliveries across interstate lines 
were part of class of interstate truckers), with Lenz v. Yellow 
Transp., Inc., 431 F.3d 348, 351-352 (8th Cir. 2005) (customer 
service representative employed by transportation company "with 
duties only tangentially related to movement of goods" was not 
member of relevant class of transportation workers).  The 
inquiry is "focused on the [class of] worker[s'] active 
engagement in the enterprise of moving goods across interstate 
lines."  Wallace, supra.  See Southwest Airlines Co., 142 S. Ct. 
at 1790 ("Put another way, transportation workers must be 
actively 'engaged in transportation' of those goods across 
borders via the channels of foreign or interstate commerce"). 
It is instructive that, on nearly identical facts to those 
in the present case, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit concluded that Grubhub drivers were 
"transportation workers,"8 but not engaged in interstate commerce 
as required by the residual clause.  See Wallace, 970 F.3d at 
801-802.  The court rejected the same argument the plaintiffs 
 
8 Grubhub does not dispute that the plaintiffs were 
"transportation workers."  See New Prime Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 
536, 539.  Compare Lenz, 431 F.3d at 351-352; Hill, 398 F.3d at 
1289-1290. 
12 
 
here make –– that they fell within the residual clause because 
they delivered goods (such as a package of potato chips) that 
have moved across State or national lines.  Id. at 802.  The 
court explained that the focus on where the goods have been 
ignored the "governing framework" of the § 1 inquiry; instead, 
the court concluded, the residual clause exemption requires that 
the class of workers "must be connected not simply to the goods, 
but to the act of moving those goods across state or national 
borders.  Put differently, a class of workers must themselves be 
'engaged in the channels of foreign or interstate commerce.'"  
Id., quoting McWilliams v. Logicon, Inc., 143 F.3d 573, 576 
(10th Cir. 1998).  Thus, the court determined that, although 
Grubhub drivers transported goods that "may travel across 
several states before landing in a meal prepared by a local 
restaurant and delivered by a Grubhub driver," they did not fall 
within the residual clause because they were not "connected 
. . . to the act of moving those goods across state or national 
borders."  Wallace, supra. 
Notably, all courts that have considered the applicability 
of the residual clause to delivery drivers similar to the 
plaintiff delivery drivers in this case have reached the same 
conclusion.  See Singh v. Uber Techs., Inc., 939 F.3d 210, 220 
(3d Cir. 2019) (residual clause "only includes those other 
classes of workers who are actually engaged in the movement of 
13 
 
interstate or foreign commerce or in work so closely related 
thereto as to be in practical effect part of it" [quotation and 
citation omitted]); Immediato vs. Postmates, Inc., U.S. Dist. 
Ct., No. 20-12308-RGS (D. Mass. Mar. 4, 2021) (delivery drivers 
delivering merchandise from local retailers and restaurants were 
not engaged in interstate commerce); Grice vs. Uber Techs., 
Inc., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. CV 18-2995 PSG (GJSx) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 
7, 2020) (drivers were not "engaged in interstate commerce" 
where they never crossed State lines and were not carrying goods 
that were in continuous movement throughout streams of 
interstate commerce); Austin vs. DoorDash, Inc., U.S. Dist. Ct., 
No. 1:17-cv-12498-IT (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2019) (driver not 
engaged in interstate commerce because "the final destinations 
from the vantage point of the interstate food distributors are 
the restaurant where [p]laintiff picks up orders, and not the 
customers to whom he makes deliveries"); Magana v. DoorDash, 
Inc., 343 F. Supp. 3d 891, 899 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (compelling 
arbitration because delivery driver was not "engaged in 
interstate commerce"); Lee vs. Postmates Inc., U.S. Dist. Ct., 
No. 18-cv-03421-JCS (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2018) ("The [c]ourt is 
aware of no authority holding that couriers who deliver goods 
from local merchants to local customers are engaged in . . . 
interstate commerce within the meaning of § 1 of the FAA merely 
because some such deliveries might include goods that were 
14 
 
manufactured out of [S]tate . . ." [quotation omitted]); Levin 
v. Caviar, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 3d 1146, 1153-1155 (N.D. Cal. 
2015) (local delivery driver not "engaged in interstate 
commerce"). 
Despite this uniform wave of authority, the plaintiffs urge 
us to conclude that they are like the "last-mile delivery 
workers who haul goods on the final legs of interstate 
journeys," and thus are "engaged in . . . interstate commerce, 
regardless of whether the workers themselves physically cross 
state lines."  Waithaka v. Amazon.com, Inc., 966 F.3d 10, 26 
(1st Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2794 (2021).  See 
Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc., 971 F.3d 904, 915 (9th Cir. 2020), 
cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1374 (2021) (holding Amazon drivers at 
end of network of drivers engaged to deliver goods through 
interstate channels were exempt from FAA even if they did not 
cross State lines).  We decline this invitation. 
Significantly, in the "last-mile driver" cases, from the 
moment the goods entered "the flow of interstate commerce," the 
goods were always "destined for" the customers to whom the last-
mile drivers made deliveries.  Waithaka, 966 F.3d at 13, 20.  
The last leg of the trip, even if it involved only a trip from 
the in-State warehouse to the in-State consumer, was a part of 
the ongoing and continuous nature of the interstate transit of 
15 
 
the good to the customer who ordered it and thus brought the 
last mile drivers within § 1.  Id. at 20-21. 
By contrast, at the moment the goods at issue here entered 
the flow of interstate commerce, the destination was not the 
address of the Grubhub customer ordering the takeout food or 
convenience items for delivery.  At most, the goods were 
destined for the local restaurants, delicatessens, and 
convenience stores that ordered them.  Any subsequent journey 
taken by the goods in the hands of the Grubhub drivers, as part 
of the takeout meal, was not part of the ongoing and continuous 
interstate transmission of these goods.9  Cf. Cunningham v. Lyft, 
Inc., 17 F.4th 244, 250-251 (1st Cir. 2021) (drivers for Lyft, 
who transported passengers to and from Logan Airport, were not 
engaged in interstate commerce because such trips were "not an 
integral part of interstate transportation" [citation omitted]).  
 
9 The Supreme Court recently concluded that airplane cargo 
loaders who "physically load and unload cargo on and off planes 
traveling in interstate commerce" are "directly involved in 
transporting goods across state or international borders" such 
that they fall within § 1.  Southwest Airlines Co., 142 S. Ct. 
at 1789.  In the case of cargo loaders, "[t]here could be no 
doubt that [interstate] transportation [is] still in progress" 
when the worker loads or unloads cargo that has not yet reached 
its destination.  Id. at 1790, quoting Erie R.R. Co. v. Shuart, 
250 U.S. 465, 468 (1919).  The Court acknowledged that "the 
answer will not always be so plain when," as here, "the class of 
workers carries out duties further removed from the channels of 
interstate commerce," and did not address the question posed by 
the present case or other cases concerning food delivery 
drivers.  Southwest Airlines Co., 142 S. Ct. at 1789 n.2. 
16 
 
Thus, as in Wallace, the plaintiffs do not fit within the 
narrowly defined class of workers engaged in interstate 
commerce; they were not "connected . . . to the act of moving 
. . . goods across [S]tate or national borders."  Wallace, 970 
F.3d at 802.  Rather, they transported goods that had already 
completed the interstate journey by the time the goods arrived 
at the restaurant, delicatessen, or convenience store to which 
they were sent; as such, the plaintiffs are dissimilar to the 
railroad workers, seamen, or the other limited, interstate class 
of workers contemplated by Congress when enacting § 1 of the 
FAA.  Therefore, the plaintiffs do not fall into the § 1 
exclusion for "any other class of workers engaged in foreign or 
interstate commerce" and are subject to the FAA. 
c.  Validity of contract.  The plaintiffs next argue that 
Grubhub failed to demonstrate that a binding arbitration 
agreement exists between the parties, asserting that they could 
not have assented to the agreement because Grubhub did not 
reasonably communicate the agreement to the plaintiffs, and that 
they did not reasonably assent to the agreement because the 
signature page used language that the drivers "read, understand, 
and/or agree to be bound by the terms" of the agreement.  
Grubhub argues that the opportunity to review the agreement 
before signing constituted sufficient notice, and that the 
plaintiffs manifested their assent to the arbitration agreement. 
17 
 
Whether a valid contract was formed is governed by 
Massachusetts law.  See Kauders v. Uber Techs., Inc., 486 Mass. 
557, 571 (2021).  "[T]he fundamentals of online contract 
formation should not be different from ordinary contract 
formation."  Id.  "[F]or there to be an enforceable contract, 
there must be both reasonable notice of the terms and a 
reasonable manifestation of assent to those terms."  Id. at 572.  
"Actual notice will exist where the [party] has reviewed the 
terms."  Id.  Where, as here, there is a dispute whether the 
drivers actually reviewed the agreement, a court must evaluate 
"the totality of the circumstances . . . [to] determin[e] 
whether reasonable notice has been given."  Id. at 573. 
Reasonable notice of a contract's terms exists even if the 
party did not actually view the agreement, so long as the party 
had an adequate opportunity to do so.  See Kauders, 486 Mass. at 
574 ("clickwrap" agreements, where user "expressly and 
affirmatively manifests assent to an online agreement by 
clicking or checking a box that states that the user agrees to 
the terms and conditions," "are regularly enforced"); Ajemian v. 
Yahoo!, Inc., 83 Mass. App. Ct. 565, 576 (2013), S.C., 478 Mass. 
169 (2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1327 (2018) ("forum 
selection clauses have almost uniformly been enforced in 
clickwrap agreements"); Emmanuel v. Handy Techs., Inc., 992 F.3d 
1, 7-10 (1st Cir. 2021) (applying Massachusetts law to conclude 
18 
 
that employee of application-based cleaning services company had 
reasonable notice of arbitration provision in application's 
terms of use, even though she chose not to review it, because 
she had adequate opportunity to do so); Wickberg v. Lyft, Inc., 
356 F. Supp. 3d 179, 183 (D. Mass. 2018) ("These online 
agreements –– where a user selects 'I agree' without necessarily 
reviewing the contract –– are typically called 'clickwrap' 
agreements, and are generally held enforceable"); Bekele v. 
Lyft, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 3d 284, 295-296 (D. Mass. 2016), aff'd, 
918 F.3d 181 (2019) ("Massachusetts courts have routinely 
concluded that clickwrap agreements -- whether they contain 
arbitration provisions or other contractual terms -- provide 
users with reasonable communication of an agreement's terms").  
"This is an objective test:  the sufficiency of the notice turns 
on whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the 
employer's communication would have provided a reasonably 
prudent employee notice of the waiver [of the right to proceed 
in a judicial forum]" (quotation and citation omitted).  Bekele, 
supra at 295.  So long as the party is required to make some 
indication of assent, such as selecting "I agree" or "I accept," 
the fact that the party chooses not to read the agreement does 
not render it unenforceable.  See Kauders, supra at 579-580.  
Compare Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 62 (1st 
Cir. 2018) (holding Uber's user agreement was not reasonably 
19 
 
communicated where Uber did not require users to mark box 
stating they agreed to set of terms before continuing to next 
screen, and instead simply displayed notice of deemed 
acquiescence and link to terms). 
It is undisputed that the plaintiffs were required to 
provide their electronic signature on a page that stated:  "By 
providing your Electronic Signature and clicking 'E-Sign,' you 
are acknowledging that you have read, understand, and/or agree 
to be bound by the terms of any content or document(s) provided 
here within."  The plaintiffs were also specifically informed 
that they were signing an arbitration agreement, both on the 
page preceding the signature page and on the signature page 
itself.  Accordingly, the plaintiffs had reasonable notice of 
the arbitration agreement. 
The plaintiffs' reliance on the use of "and/or" on the 
signature page fares no better.  The "and/or" connector did not 
obscure the fact that the driver would be bound to the terms of 
the agreement.  See Kauders, 486 Mass. at 580 (acknowledging 
that affirmative language such as "I agree," as opposed to use 
of ambiguous word "DONE," manifests assent).  The use of 
"and/or" does not render the "connection between the action" -- 
that is, indicating assent to the agreement through a checkbox 
and signature acknowledging the terms -- "and the terms" of the 
20 
 
agreement so indirect or ambiguous that the agreement cannot be 
enforced.  See id. 
d.  Waiver of right to enforce.  The plaintiffs also 
maintain that Grubhub waived any right to enforce the agreement 
by delaying in providing the arbitration agreement to the 
plaintiffs prior to the filing of the complaint.  Grubhub 
contends that it did not waive its right to compel arbitration, 
as it made clear from the outset of the litigation that it 
wanted to proceed to arbitration and moved to compel arbitration 
before engaging in litigation.  Cf. Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
336 F.3d 8, 12-13 (1st Cir. 2003) (party waived right to enforce 
arbitration agreement when it waited to move to compel 
arbitration "until after discovery had closed and the long-
scheduled trial date had almost arrived").  Because Grubhub 
timely filed its motion to compel arbitration in response to the 
plaintiffs' complaint, it did not waive its right to enforce the 
arbitration agreement.10 
 
10 Following oral argument in this case, the plaintiffs 
pointed to a recent United States Supreme Court decision, Morgan 
v. Sundance, Inc., 142 S. Ct. 1708 (2022), to support the 
proposition that a waiver of the right to arbitrate need not be 
conditioned on a showing of prejudice by the party opposing 
arbitration.  Id. at 1713.  Nothing in that decision, however, 
supports the conclusion that a party waives its right to 
arbitration when it fails to provide documents prior to the 
commencement of the lawsuit.  Indeed, the defendant in Morgan 
engaged in litigation for nearly eight months before moving to 
compel arbitration, id. at 1711, whereas here, Grubhub moved to 
compel arbitration before engaging in any litigation. 
21 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, the Superior 
Court judge's order denying Grubhub's motion to compel 
arbitration and to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint is 
reversed, and the case is remanded for the entry of an order 
compelling arbitration and dismissing the complaint. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.