Title: Wilson v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
 
JAMES A. WILSON, 
 
 
§ 
§ 
No. 370, 2003  
Defendant Below, 
§ 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below: Superior Court of  
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
              v. 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE 
§ 
Cr. I.D. No. 9912006359 
 
§ 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
Before BERGER, STEELE and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
 
 
 SUBMITTED: 
December 16, 2003 
 
 
 
 DECIDED:  
February     2, 2004 
 
 
This 2nd day of February 2004, upon consideration of the parties’ 
briefs, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
James A. Wilson appeals from an Order of the Superior Court, 
entered on July 2, 2003, denying his pro se motion for postconviction relief.  
For the reasons set forth below, Wilson’s appeal lacks merit, and the Order 
will be affirmed. 
 
(2) 
The facts, succinctly summarized, are as follows:  On 
December 9, 2000, Federal agents and Delaware police received information 
 
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from one Okeman Davis that Wilson could be found at her residence in 
Newark, Delaware.  At that time, Wilson was a fugitive wanted on multiple 
drug charges.  Davis told the police that she had picked up Wilson at a hotel 
in Wilmington earlier that day, and had driven him to her house.  She then 
executed a form authorizing the police to enter and search her residence.  
The police did that, apprehended Wilson, and in the process, discovered on a 
coffee table in the living room drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a large 
quantity of currency.  As a consequence of the search of Ms. Davis’ 
residence, Wilson was charged with, and on May 10, 2001 was convicted by 
a Superior Court jury of, several drug offenses, namely:  Trafficking in 
Cocaine (in violation of  16 Del. C. § 4753A(a)(2)), Possession With Intent 
to Deliver Cocaine (in violation of 16 Del. C. § 4751(a)), Maintaining a 
Dwelling for Keeping Controlled Substances (in violation of 16 Del. C. § 
4755(a)(5)), Possession of Marijuana (in violation of 16 Del. C.§ 4754(a)), 
and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia (in violation of 16 Del. C. §4771)). 
 
(3) 
Wilson’s first trial, at which he was represented by the Office of 
the Public Defender, ended in a mistrial because of an “automatic discovery” 
violation.  At his second trial, at which he was convicted, Wilson elected to 
proceed pro se.  Before his second trial began, however, Wilson, who was 
then represented by an attorney other than the public defender who had 
 
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earlier represented him, moved to dismiss and to suppress evidence, on 
double jeopardy grounds.  At a hearing held on those motions, Wilson 
argued that (1) he had already been placed in jeopardy by virtue of a jury 
having been sworn in his first trial before the mistrial was granted; (2) the 
person who executed the “consent to search” form had no authority to do so; 
and (3) the Dover City Police exceeded the scope of the form while 
conducting its search, (4) the search was not done as part of any legitimate 
“protective sweep” of the premises.  The defendant did not testify at these 
hearings.  The trial court thereafter denied both the motion to dismiss and 
the motion to suppress, assuming without deciding that the defendant had 
standing to contest the search.1 
 
(4) 
On September 7, 2001, Wilson was sentenced to 10 years at 
Level V on the Trafficking charge, three years of which were mandatory; 
with the remaining charges all carrying various probationary sentences.  
Immediately before he was sentenced, Wilson moved for a judgment of 
acquittal and/or a new trial, largely on the grounds that a forensic examiner 
was not called to establish the “chain of custody” relating to the drugs that 
Wilson was charged with possessing and trafficking.  The Court denied the 
                                                 
1 State v. Wilson, I.D. #9912006359 (Del. Super., Mar. 16, 2001) (Bench Ruling). 
 
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motions.2  Wilson’s convictions were thereafter affirmed on direct appeal.3
 
(5) 
Approximately one year later, Wilson filed a motion for 
postconviction relief in which he raised three arguments: (1) his counsel was 
ineffective at his suppression hearing because he (a) failed to establish that 
Wilson had “standing” to assert a constitutional violation (i.e., an illegal 
search and seizure at Ms. Davis’s house), and (b) failed to subpoena the 
forensic examiner for cross-examination on the “chain of custody” issue; (2) 
10 Del. C. § 4332 was violated because the trial court granted Wilson’s 
motion to proceed pro se on May 8, 2001, but his second trial began on May 
10, 2001, only 2 days later; and (3) because his first trial ended in a mistrial 
because of an apparent “automatic discovery” violation, Wilson should not 
have been re-tried. 
(6) 
The Superior Court denied Wilson’s motion. That Court found 
that three of Wilson’s claims were procedurally barred, on the ground that 
they had been formerly adjudicated, under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 
(i) (4).  Those claims were that: (1) trial counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective for failing to establish that Wilson had standing to challenge the 
search of the premises at which he was arrested and the evidence seized; (2) 
                                                 
2 State v. Wilson, I.D. #9912006359 (Del. Super., Sept. 7, 2001)   (Bench Ruling). 
3 Wilson v. State,  No. 446, 2001, 2002 WL 31106354 (Del., Sept. 18, 2002). On appeal 
this Court determined on the merits that the defendant had no standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of the search and seizure that occurred at Ms. Davis’s residence. 
 
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trial counsel was ineffective for failing to insist that the medical examiner 
testify at his trial, and (3) the Superior Court erroneously ruled that his 
second trial was not barred by the Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.  The Court further found that 
to the extent that Wilson’s claims were not procedurally barred, they lacked 
substantive merit.   
(7) 
Generally, this Court will review the trial court’s denial of 
postconviction relief for abuse of discretion.  Questions of law are reviewed  
de novo4 
(8) 
Before addressing the merits of a petitioner’s claims on a 
motion for postconviction relief, the court must first determine the 
applicability of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(1), which provides that 
“[a]ny ground for relief that was formerly adjudicated, whether in the 
proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a 
postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, is 
thereafter barred, unless reconsideration of the claim is required in the 
interest of justice.”5  But, in order to invoke the “interest of justice” 
exception to obtain relitigation of a previously resolved claim, “a movant 
                                                 
4 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190, 1196 (Del. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 844 
(1996).   
5 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61 (i) (4); See,  Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
 
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must show that subsequent legal developments have revealed that the trial 
court lacked the authority to convict or punish him.”6 
(9) 
Measured against these criteria, the trial court’s determination 
that most of Wilson’s claims had been formerly adjudicated, and thus were 
barred under Criminal Rule 61 (i), was correct.  The double jeopardy claim 
was raised on a motion to dismiss before the defendant’s second retrial. The 
trial court denied the motion on the merits, ruling that the discovery 
violation that led to the initial mistrial fell far short of the kind of 
prosecutorial misconduct that would bar a retrial under the Double Jeopardy 
clause.  Thus, that issue was raised, addressed and decided “in the 
proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction [i.e., at trial].” That issue 
was not raised again on appeal, and the defendant has made no credible 
effort to show that the “interests of justice” exception applies to him. 
(10) Equally correct is the Superior Court’s ruling that Wilson’s 
claim that his trial counsel’s assistance was ineffective, was procedurally 
barred because the claim had been formerly adjudicated.  As noted, Wilson 
claimed that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective: (a) for failing 
to establish that Wilson had “standing” to complain that the police entry into 
the premises in which he was arrested violated his constitutional right to be 
                                                 
6 Flamer v. State,  585 A.2d 736, 746 (Del. 1990). 
 
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free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and (b) for failing to insist that 
the medical examiner testify at his trial.  Wilson argues that claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel are not procedurally barred, since such 
claims generally cannot be raised at trial or on direct appeal. 7  The argument 
is unavailing in this case, however, because even though as a general matter 
a claim of ineffective assistance may be not barred, the underlying subject 
matter of the claim cannot be relitigated where, as here, it has been 
previously raised and adjudicated.  In any event, however, the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims fail on their merits. 
(11) To establish constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, 
the defendant must show both that counsel’s performance fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness, and that but for counsel’s defective, 
unprofessional performance, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.8  In presenting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
defendant must make and substantiate concrete allegations of actual 
prejudice or risk summary dismissal. 9  In this case, Wilson’s claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel fail under Strickland’s prejudice prong. 
                                                 
7 See Wright v. State, 513 A.2d 1310, 1315 (Del. 1986). 
8 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984); Albury v. State, 551 A. 2d 
53, 58 (Del. 1988). 
9 Younger, 580 A.2d at 556. 
 
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(12) After the March 16, 2001 suppression hearing, the trial court 
denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence on the grounds that (a) 
Wilson lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises in which 
he was arrested and in which drugs were found, and (2) the legitimate 
resident (Okeman Davis), whether owner or lessee, had validly consented to 
a search of her residence.  On direct appeal, this Court affirmed that ruling, 
holding that Wilson had failed to establish a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the premises searched.10 
(13) Wilson now argues that his attorney was constitutionally 
ineffective because he failed to establish that he (Wilson) did, in fact, have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the premise, to contest the validity of 
the search and seizure.  But even now, more than two years after his 
conviction, Wilson has failed to suggest with particularity what trial counsel 
should have done to establish Wilson’s standing to contest the search.  
Moreover, the defendant ignores the trial court’s alternative ground for 
denying his motion to suppress, i.e., that Ms. Davis had validly consented to 
a police search of her home. Because Wilson had failed to set forth concrete 
allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them as required by 
Strickland, his claim fails. 
                                                 
10 Wilson v. State,  No. 466, 2001  (Del., Sept. 18, 2001) (ORDER). 
 
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(14) For the same reason, the claim that trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance for failing to subpoena the Medical Examiner, is also 
fatally deficient.  After the seizure of the drugs and related paraphernalia, the 
police reported preliminarily that the drugs weighed roughly 16 grams.  The 
Medical Examiner’s report indicated that the drugs actually weighed 13.83 
grams.  That discrepancy, Wilson now claims, established a need to 
subpoena the Medical Examiner as a witness.  As with his other claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, this claim too fails for lack of any showing 
of prejudice.  Wilson failed to make concrete allegations of prejudice and 
substantiate them.  He has not set forth with particularity what advantages he 
would have gained through the Medical Examiner’s in-court testimony, 
because to establish Trafficking, the drugs in the defendant’s possession 
need to have weighed only 5 grams.  In this case, whether they weighed 16 
grams or only 13.83 grams would have made no difference, because either 
weight would have been sufficient to convict.  Hence, Wilson has failed to 
show how his counsel’s failure to subpoena the Medical Examiner to testify 
prejudiced him in any way. 
(15) Finally, the Superior Court correctly rejected Wilson’s 
argument that he should not have been required to go to trial only two days 
after his request to proceed pro se had been granted.  But, Wilson did not 
 
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seek a continuance, and Wilson has not demonstrated that the trial court was 
required to grant a continuance sua sponte, or that by not doing so, the court 
abused its discretion. 
(16) We conclude, for the reasons set forth above, that the Superior 
Court did not commit any errors of law or abuse its discretion in denying the 
defendant’s motion for postconviction relief. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JUSTICE