Title: Lilly v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
BENJAMIN LEE LILLY 
 
 
 
      OPINION BY 
v.  Record Nos. 972385, 972386  JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
   November 5, 1999 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
 
Pursuant to a jury trial held in the Circuit Court of 
Montgomery County in 1996, Benjamin Lee Lilly (Lilly) was 
convicted and sentenced to death for the willful, deliberate, 
and premeditated killing of Alexander V. DeFilippis in the 
commission of robbery in violation of Code § 18.2-31(4).  In 
Lilly v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 558, 499 S.E.2d 522 (1998), we 
affirmed the trial court’s judgment and the death sentence.∗  
Thereafter, Lilly successfully petitioned the Supreme Court of 
the United States for a writ of certiorari.  The Supreme Court 
                     
∗We also affirmed Lilly’s conviction for the abduction and 
robbery of DeFilippis, Code §§ 18.2-47 and 18.2-58, the 
carjacking of DeFilippis’ vehicle, Code § 18.2-58.1, the use of 
a firearm in the principal offenses and the possession of a 
firearm after having previously been convicted of a felony, Code 
§§ 18.2-53.1 and 18.2-308.2(A)(i).  On brief and during oral 
argument, Lilly’s counsel conceded that the untainted evidence 
was sufficient to sustain Lilly’s convictions for these 
offenses.  Indeed, Lilly stresses on brief that “[t]he sole 
issue on this remand is whether the unconstitutional admission 
of Mark Lilly’s statements was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt on the question of whether Ben Lilly . . . was the 
triggerman.”  Accordingly, our prior decision affirming these 
convictions and the sentences imposed thereon remains 
undisturbed with the exception of the firearm charge related to 
the capital murder offense.  
 
reversed a portion of our judgment, holding that the admission 
into evidence at Lilly’s trial of two confessions made by 
Lilly’s brother Mark Lilly (Mark), who refused to testify, 
violated Lilly’s Sixth Amendment right to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him.  Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. ___, 119 
S.Ct. 1887 (1999).  The Supreme Court remanded the case with 
directions to this Court to determine whether this error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Having now considered the 
briefs and oral argument of Lilly and the Commonwealth and again 
reviewing the trial record, we address the issue of harmless 
error in this case. 
 
The standard that guides our analysis of the harmless error 
issue in this case is clear.  Thus, “before a federal 
constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be 
able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt;” otherwise the conviction under review must be 
set aside.  Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).  This 
standard requires a determination of “whether there is a 
reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might 
have contributed to the conviction.”  Id. at 23.  In making that 
determination, the reviewing court is to consider a host of 
factors, including the importance of the tainted evidence in the 
prosecution’s case, whether that evidence was cumulative, the 
presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting 
 
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the tainted evidence on material points, and the overall 
strength of the prosecution’s case.  Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 
475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986); see also Harrington v. California, 395 
U.S. 250, 254 (1969); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 432 
(1972)(erroneously admitted evidence harmless where it was 
merely cumulative of other overwhelming evidence of guilt). 
 
We have recited the evidence in the record in our prior 
decision and we need not repeat it here.  Rather, we will focus 
on the facts that are pertinent to our resolution of the present 
issue.  In that regard, we initially note that in order to 
convict Lilly of capital murder and to subject him to a death 
sentence for the murder of DeFilippis, the Commonwealth had the 
burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Lilly was the 
actual perpetrator of the crime or the “triggerman” in the 
murder.  Graham v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 487, 492, 464 S.E.2d 
128, 130, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 997 (1995); Johnson v. 
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 146, 155-56, 255 S.E.2d 525, 530 (1979), 
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 920 (1981). 
 
Contrary to the Commonwealth’s assertions, the evidence of 
Lilly’s guilt as the actual perpetrator, or the triggerman, in 
the murder of DeFilippis was not “simply overwhelming.”  There 
was no physical evidence such as fingerprints on the murder 
weapon or human blood evidence to link Lilly to the killing.  
Indeed, the murder weapon was not found in the possession of 
 
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Lilly after the murder and there was evidence that prior to the 
murder the weapon was at various times in the possession of 
Lilly, his brother Mark, and the other co-defendant, Gary Wayne 
Barker.  In addition, Lilly’s remark to Police Chief Whitsett 
after Lilly was detained to the effect that Lilly “looked like a 
murderer” in no way amounts to an actual confession to capital 
murder as contended by the Commonwealth.  That remark, even 
viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, does no 
more than implicate Lilly as a participant in the murder of 
DeFilippis and, thus, is indicative of his guilt of first degree 
murder only.  See Harrison v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 188, 191, 
257 S.E.2d 777, 779 (1979).  It does not establish that he was 
the triggerman. 
 
There is no dispute that following the abduction of 
DeFilippis, there came a time when only Lilly, Mark, Barker, and 
DeFilippis were at the murder scene.  It is self-evident that 
the account of what happened there was crucial to the 
determination by the jury of which of the co-defendants 
inflicted the fatal gunshot wounds upon DeFilippis.  Lilly did 
not confess and did not testify.  Accordingly, as the 
Commonwealth concedes on brief, “Barker’s eyewitness testimony 
unquestionably was the centerpiece of, or . . . the ‘key to’ the 
Commonwealth’s case.”  Barker testified that Lilly fatally shot 
 
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DeFilippis three times in the head.  Mark’s statements also 
identified Lilly as the triggerman. 
 
The Commonwealth asserts that this Court should be 
confident that the admission of Mark’s statements was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  In support of that assertion it 
argues that Barker’s testimony was corroborated by other 
evidence, independent of Mark’s statements, on every material 
point.  We disagree.  While it is true that much of Barker’s 
testimony was corroborated by other evidence, that evidence 
related to the various criminal acts committed by Lilly, Mark, 
and Barker leading up to and surrounding the murder of 
DeFilippis.  The fallacy of the Commonwealth’s argument is that 
this other evidence upon which it relies did not relate to or 
corroborate Barker’s testimony on the critical issue whether 
Lilly, as opposed to Mark or Barker, was the triggerman in the 
murder.  Only Mark’s statements implicating Lilly as the 
triggerman corroborated Barker’s testimony on that issue.  Thus, 
on that critical issue, the Commonwealth’s evidence was not 
overwhelming. 
 
Clearly, where the principal direct evidence against the 
accused is the testimony of an accomplice, the credibility of 
that witness will be a significant factor in the jury’s 
determination of the accused’s level of culpability.  We have 
consistently held that this credibility determination rests with 
 
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the jury and is not subject to challenge on appeal merely 
because the testimony is self-serving, results from a favorable 
plea arrangement, or because the witness is himself a felon.  
See Joseph v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 78, 86, 452 S.E.2d 862, 867-
68, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 876 (1995).  However, here the issue 
is not the credibility of the witness, but rather the potential 
for harm caused by the erroneous admission of evidence which 
tends to support the jury’s credibility determination.  In that 
context we must presume that such evidence had the potential to 
influence the jury into accepting the properly admitted evidence 
as more credible and, thus, to taint the jury’s determination of 
the facts. 
 
This is precisely the circumstance with which we are faced 
in considering the harm of the erroneous admission of Mark’s 
statements implicating Lilly as the triggerman.  In the absence 
of these statements, Barker’s testimony that Lilly was the 
triggerman was supported only by the evidence that Lilly was 
present and had the opportunity to shoot DeFilippis.  It is 
therefore inconceivable that the jury would not have weighed 
Barker’s credibility in light of the concurring evidence of 
Mark’s statements.  Moreover, those statements, coming as they 
did, from Lilly’s brother undoubtedly carried weight with the 
jury.  Thus, there is a reasonable possibility that those 
statements contributed to Lilly’s conviction for capital murder.  
 
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Accordingly, we cannot say that the error in admitting Mark’s 
statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm Lilly’s conviction for 
the carjacking, robbery, abduction, and the four related firearm 
charges, reverse Lilly’s conviction for capital murder and the 
related firearm charge, and remand the case for a new trial 
consistent with the views expressed herein and in the opinion of 
the United States Supreme Court, if the Commonwealth be so 
advised.   
Record No. 972385 — Reversed and remanded.
                       Record No. 972386 — Affirmed in part, 
 
 
 
        reversed in part, 
 
 
 
 
    and remanded. 
 
JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE COMPTON joins, dissenting. 
As the majority correctly notes, affirmation of the 
defendant’s convictions requires a belief beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the error was harmless.  Chapman v. Commonwealth, 386 
U.S. 18, 24 (1967).  Because I believe beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the admission into evidence of Mark Lilly’s out-of-court 
statements, while error, was harmless in that it did not 
unfairly “‘contribute to the [jury’s] verdict,’” Yates v. Evatt, 
500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991) (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24), I 
would affirm the defendant’s convictions for capital murder and 
use of a firearm in the commission of capital murder. 
 
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I reach this result because the defendant has conceded that 
the admission into evidence of the challenged statements was 
harmless error in the several related convictions, a concession 
fully supported by the record.  Thus, his claim that admission 
of the statements was not harmless as to the two convictions at 
issue here simply does not ring true.  On brief, the defendant 
specifically stated that he “does not challenge that the 
admission of Mark Lilly’s statements was harmless error on [the 
defendant’s] convictions for robbery, abduction, carjacking, 
possession of a firearm[, and] illegal use of a firearm (except 
with respect to the use of a firearm to kill Alexander 
DeFilippis).”2  The defendant asserts that the admission of his 
brother’s statements into evidence was not harmless error only 
with regard to his convictions for capital murder and use of a 
firearm in the commission of that murder.  He characterizes the 
sole issue on remand as “whether the unconstitutional admission 
of Mark Lilly’s statements was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt on the question of whether Ben Lilly . . . was the 
triggerman.” 
The defendant’s position that the admission of Mark’s  
statements was not harmless error as to the “triggerman” issue 
is predicated upon the defendant’s contention, which the 
                     
2 At oral argument, he also conceded that he was guilty of 
murder. 
 
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majority accepts, that the statements improperly influenced the 
jury, since they corroborated the testimony of Gary Wayne 
Barker, and thus may have caused the jury to find that Barker 
was more credible than it otherwise might have found.  The 
defendant contends that this Court should reverse his 
convictions for capital murder and the related firearms charge 
because “the Commonwealth is left with only with [sic] the 
testimony of Gary Barker that Ben Lilly was the triggerman,” and 
that “[s]uch evidence is insufficient to make the admission of 
Mark Lilly’s statements harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
However, the defendant fails to acknowledge that the only 
evidence supporting the elements of the offenses of carjacking, 
abduction, and the use of a firearm in the commission of those 
crimes is also the testimony of Barker, coupled with the 
erroneously admitted statements of Mark.3  In other words, those 
                     
3 For example, the only evidence establishing that the 
defendant committed the crime of carjacking was the testimony of 
Barker, along with Mark’s statements.  There were no other 
eyewitnesses to the carjacking, nor any forensic evidence 
linking the defendant to that crime.  DeFilippis’ roommate 
testified that DeFilippis and his car disappeared near the 
location where defendant’s car was abandoned.  However, that 
testimony was insufficient to prove that defendant was guilty of 
carjacking.  The same analysis also applies to the charge of 
abduction. 
With regard to the charge for the robbery of DeFilippis, 
Barker’s testimony is the sole evidence linking the defendant to 
that crime.  Mark’s only comment that could be construed as 
being related to that robbery was that DeFillipis took his shirt 
and shoes off when DeFilippis and the defendant, who had a 
pistol, were alone outside the car.  However, Mark stated that 
 
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charges stand in the same evidentiary posture as the 
“triggerman” issue.  If Barker’s testimony was sufficient to 
convict the defendant of the numerous offenses for which he was 
sentenced to life imprisonment, and the credibility of his 
testimony as to those offenses was not improperly supported by 
the admission of Mark’s statements, as the defendant concedes, I 
see no reason why the same is not true with regard to his 
convictions for capital murder and the related firearms charge. 
I recognize that the defendant could have been found guilty 
of these other crimes as a principal in the second degree, 
rather than as the actual perpetrator, and that he could have 
been found guilty of the capital murder of DeFillipis only if he 
were the “triggerman.”  However, that distinction does not 
change the fact that the only evidence supporting the 
defendant’s convictions for abduction, carjacking, capital 
murder, and use of a firearm in committing those offenses is the 
same.  Thus, if the admission into evidence of Mark’s out-of-
court statements is harmless error as to any of the defendant’s 
                                                                  
he could not hear anything that was being said by either man.  
Thus, I will not include the robbery conviction in my discussion 
with regard to the import of the defendant’s concession that the 
admission of Mark’s statements into evidence was harmless error 
with regard to all his convictions except those for capital 
murder and the use of a firearm in the commission of such 
murder.  However, the defendant’s acknowledgement that his 
robbery conviction was proper demonstrates that Barker’s 
uncorroborated testimony was sufficient to convict the defendant 
of that charge. 
 
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convictions, it must be harmless error as to all of his 
convictions. 
I also believe that the majority focuses too narrowly on 
whether the admission of Mark’s statements might have affected 
the jury’s credibility determination, and thus contributed to 
the conviction, without looking at the credibility issue in 
light of the whole record.  See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 
U.S. 673, 681 (1986) (“an otherwise valid conviction should not 
be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the 
whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt”).  The defendant’s statement to Pearisburg 
Police Chief Whitsett shortly after being apprehended in Giles 
County4 that the defendant “looked like a murderer” lends 
credence to Barker’s testimony that the defendant was the 
“triggerman.”  While the majority contends that this statement 
establishes only guilt of first degree murder,5 the statement, 
viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, Horton 
v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 606, 608, 499 S.E.2d 258, 259 (1998), 
suggests that the defendant believed he looked like a murderer 
                     
4 The defendant, Mark and Barker were arrested in Giles 
County and charged with two robberies that occurred there after 
the murder of DeFilippis. 
 
5 Harrison v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 188, 191, 257 S.E.2d 
777, 779 (1979), the case cited by the majority, does not 
support the majority’s position, but stands solely for the 
 
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because he had pulled the trigger of the gun.  Indeed, I believe 
that a defendant who confesses to murder does not necessarily 
make, understand or draw the distinctions between capital, first 
degree and other types of murder that the law recognizes.  Thus, 
the defendant’s statement could properly be considered by the 
jury as an admission of guilt to being the “triggerman” in the 
murder of DeFilippis.  Likewise, the defendant’s statement after 
being apprehended that Mark was not “the one that’s really done 
anything wrong” is probative of the defendant’s guilt. 
In addition to these statements, the defendant’s 
confession, which was introduced into evidence at his trial, 
contained a number of false or inconsistent statements.  For 
example, he stated that four people were involved in the Giles 
County robberies, and he gave inconsistent information regarding 
what time he joined Mark and Barker on the evening of the murder 
of DeFilippis.  Notably, the defendant did not mention any of 
the crimes or events involving DeFilippis.  False statements by 
a defendant may be probative of guilt.  Sheppard v. 
Commonwealth, 250 Va. 379, 389, 464 S.E.2d 131, 137 (1995), 
cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1110 (1996); Black v. Commonwealth, 222 
Va. 838, 842, 284 S.E.2d 608, 610 (1981). 
                                                                  
established proposition that only the “triggerman” may be 
convicted of capital murder. 
 
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Finally, I conclude that the majority failed to determine 
whether, even if “the damaging potential of the cross-
examination were fully realized,” the jury’s verdict would still 
have been the same.  Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684.  In my 
opinion, cross-examination of Mark in this case would not have 
adversely affected the credibility of Barker.  Defense counsel 
called Mark during the sentencing phase of the defendant’s 
trial.  There, Mark was a wholly unconvincing witness.  In his 
haste to attempt to retract his out-of-court statements 
implicating his brother, he went so far as to attempt to retract 
his claim that the defendant robbed DeFilippis.  However, 
nothing in Mark’s prior statements had directly implicated the 
defendant in the commission of that crime.  The fact that the 
jury sentenced the defendant to death after hearing Mark’s 
retraction lends further support to my conclusion that the 
“‘minds of an average jury’ would not have found the 
[Commonwealth’s] case significantly less persuasive” had Mark’s 
statements been excluded.  Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 
432 (1972)(quoting Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 
(1969)). 
 
Thus, I am convinced that the admission into evidence of 
Mark’s out-of-court statements did not unfairly “‘contribute to 
the [jury’s] verdict’” convicting the defendant of capital 
murder and use of a firearm in committing that murder.  Yates, 
 
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500 U.S. at 403, (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24).  For these 
reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
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