Title: Gilstrap v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Gilstrap v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div.1994 WY 67875 P.2d 1272Case Number: 93-221Decided: 06/15/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
In 
the Matter of the Worker's Compensation Claim Of Deborah K. 
GILSTRAP,

Appellant 
(Employee-Claimant),

v.

STATE 
of Wyoming ex rel. WYOMING WORKERS' COMPENSATION DIVISION,

Appellee 
(Respondent-Objector).

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Donald 
L. Painter, Casper.

Representing 
Appellee:

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Kenneth E. Spurrier, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., and Courtney R. Kepler, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen. 

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

MACY, 
Chief Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Deborah 
K. Gilstrap appeals from the district court's order which affirmed the hearing 
examiner's decision to deny her claim for permanent-total-disability benefits or 
an increase in her permanent-partial-disability award.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Ms. Gilstrap 
presents the following issue for our review:

1. 
Whether Employee-Claimant is entitled to any additional award for permanent 
partial physical impairment for loss of earning capacity in this 
case.

[¶4]      Ms. Gilstrap was 
employed as a waitress at Benham's Inc., a restaurant located in Casper. In 
March of 1990, she injured her back while she was lifting a loaded food service 
tray. Ms. Gilstrap received a permanent-partial-disability award which was given 
on the basis of a twenty-one-percent-whole-body-physical-impairment 
rating.

[¶5]      Subsequently, she 
applied for permanent-total-disability benefits or an additional award of 
permanent-partial-disability benefits. She contended that she was entitled to 
receive an additional award because she had lost her earning capacity as a 
result of her work-related injury.

[¶6]      The Workers' 
Compensation Division denied Ms. Gilstrap's application, and Ms. Gilstrap 
objected to that decision. After holding a contested case hearing, the hearing 
examiner denied Ms. Gilstrap's claims. The hearing examiner issued the following 
conclusions of law:

1. 
The burden of proving entitlement to benefits is upon the Employee-Claimant who 
must prove her case by a preponderance of the evidence.

2. 
Employee-Claimant has not met her burden in showing that she is permanently 
totally disabled. The medical and clinical reports are substantial evidence that 
there is an occupation for continuous employment available to the 
Employee-Claimant at this time, at a wage equal to or greater than what she 
received before the injury.

3. 
The Employee-Claimant has not met her burden of proof in showing that her 
permanent partial disability exceeds the 21% physical impairment award she has 
already received.

After 
the district court affirmed the hearing examiner's decision, Ms. Gilstrap 
appealed to this Court.

[¶7]      The standard 
which we use to review agency actions is articulated in WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c) 
(1990). See also W.R.A.P. 12.09. "`The extent and degree of disability 
are questions of fact.'" Leonard v. McDonalds of Jackson Hole, 746 P.2d 1261, 1262 (Wyo. 1987) (quoting State ex rel. Worker's Compensation Division 
v. Lewis, 739 P.2d 1225, 1226 (Wyo. 1987)). See also Sims v. State ex 
rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 872 P.2d 555, 556 (Wyo. 1994). 
The claimant has the burden of proving each essential element of her claim by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Leonard, 746 P.2d  at 1263 (citing 
Potter v. RMT Properties, Inc., 715 P.2d 214 (Wyo. 
1986)).

[¶8]      Pursuant to § 
16-3-114(c)(ii)(E), we review questions of fact under the substantial evidence 
standard:

"Our 
task is to examine the entire record to determine if substantial evidence exists 
to support the hearing examiner's findings. We will not substitute our judgment 
for that of the hearing examiner if his decision is supported by substantial 
evidence. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind 
might accept in support of the agency's conclusions."

Romero 
v. Davy McKee Corporation, 
854 P.2d 59, 61 (Wyo. 1993) (citing Farman v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Division, 841 P.2d 99, 102 (Wyo. 1992)).

Bearden 
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 868 P.2d 268, 269 (Wyo. 
1994).

[¶9]      Ms. Gilstrap 
contends that she was entitled to receive an award for permanent total 
disability because she was permanently incapacitated and could not work as a 
result of her work-related injury. Specifically, she claims that she was 
entitled to receive permanent-total-disability benefits because her situation 
fell within the odd lot doctrine.

(xvi) 
"Permanent total disability" means the loss of both legs or both arms, total 
loss of eyesight, paralysis or other conditions permanently incapacitating 
the employee from performing work at any gainful occupation for which [s]he is 
reasonably suited by experience or training [.]

WYO. 
STAT. § 27-14-102(a)(xvi) (Supp. 1993) (emphasis added). The statutory 
definition for permanent total disability is consistent with the odd lot 
doctrine. City of Casper v. Bowdish, 713 P.2d 763, 765 (Wyo. 1986). The 
odd lot doctrine provides: "[P]ermanent total disability `may be found in the 
case of workers who, while not altogether incapacitated for work, are so 
handicapped that they will not be employed regularly in any well known branch of 
the labor market.'" Cardin v. Morrison-Knudsen, 603 P.2d 862, 863-64 
(Wyo. 1979).

[¶10]   [I]n order to come within the 
odd-lot doctrine,

"it 
is the burden of the employee to establish not only that [s]he is no longer 
capable of working at the job in which [s]he was employed at the time of h[er] 
injury, but that the degree of obvious physical impairment, coupled with other 
facts, such as mental capacity, education, training, or age, must prima facie 
place h[er] in that category." City of Casper v. Bowdish, Wyo., 713 P.2d 763 (1986).

Worker's 
Compensation Claim of Cannon v. FMC Corporation, 
718 P.2d 879, 884-85 (Wyo. 1986). To satisfy this burden, a claimant normally 
must make "a showing that [s]he made reasonable efforts to secure suitable 
employment." 718 P.2d  at 885. The worker may also satisfy her burden by showing 
that she "was so disabled by virtue of [her] injuries that any [efforts to 
secure employment] would have been futile." Schepanovich v. United States 
Steel Corporation, 669 P.2d 522, 529 (Wyo. 1983).

[¶11]   If the employee meets her burden, 
the burden of proof shifts to the employer to demonstrate that "light work of a 
special nature which the employee could perform but which is not generally 
available in fact is available to the employee." 669 P.2d  at 528. The hearing 
examiner ruled that Ms. Gilstrap's situation did not come within the odd lot 
doctrine because Ms. Gilstrap failed to meet her initial burden of proof. We 
agree.

[¶12]   Evidence was presented which 
indicated that Ms. Gilstrap probably could not return to her former occupation 
as a waitress because she was physically limited in the amount of weight she 
could lift and the amount of time which she could spend standing. However, the 
record also showed that jobs were available which Ms. Gilstrap could perform on 
a continuous basis in spite of her physical limitations. Her vocational 
assessment listed five occupations which had only sedentary to light physical 
requirements. Ms. Gilstrap was generally qualified for these occupations, and 
she could earn wages in these occupations equal to or greater than she could 
earn in her previous position. A Job Service employee testified that positions 
in each of those occupations were available in Casper.

[¶13]   Ms. Gilstrap did not attempt to 
secure any employment after she was injured. She contends that such a search 
would have been futile. A worker's subjective determination that she could not 
work or that a job search would be futile is not sufficient to meet her burden 
of proof. 669 P.2d  at 529. The evidence described above indicated that Ms. 
Gilstrap's job search probably would not have been futile. FMC 
Corporation, 718 P.2d  at 885.

[¶14]   Ms. Gilstrap was not entitled to 
receive permanent-total-disability benefits because she failed to meet her 
initial burden of proving that she qualified for benefits under the odd lot 
doctrine. Substantial evidence supported the hearing examiner's 
decision.

[¶15]   Ms. Gilstrap also sought an award 
of permanent-partial-disability benefits in excess of the award which she had 
previously received. The hearing examiner denied her claim because he found that 
she had failed to prove that she suffered from a disability greater than the 
twenty-one percent rating she had been given. 

[¶16]   WYO. STAT. § 27-14-405(b)(xvi) 
(1991) provides the source for a permanent-partial-disability award for a loss 
of earning capacity:

(b) 
For any permanent partial disability described in this section, the employee 
shall receive for the number of months indicated a monthly payment as provided 
by W.S. 27-14-403(c), less any previous awards for the same body 
part:

. 
. . . .

(xvi) 
Any other injury resulting in permanent and complete loss of use and not 
enumerated in this subsection shall be rated as an impairment of the body as a 
whole. One (1) factor to be considered is the ability of the employee to 
continue to perform work for which [s]he was reasonably suited by experience or 
training prior to the injury. . . . not more than 60 
months[.]

In 
State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division v. White, 837 P.2d 1095, 1097 (Wyo. 1992), we stated:

Impairment 
of earning capacity is determined by taking into consideration the following 
factors:

(a) 
Physical impairment - the nature and extent of injury.

(b) 
The worker's age.

(c) 
The worker's education.

(d) 
Ability to continue pre-injury employment.

(e) 
Post-injury employment prospects.

(f) 
Pre-injury earnings.

(g) 
Post-injury earnings.

No 
single factor of those listed above is determinative of the extent or existence 
of loss of earning capacity. They are all evidence to be considered together 
with all of the other facts and circumstances in determining whether a loss of 
earning capacity in fact occurred and, if so, the percentage of 
loss.

See 
also McCarty v. Bear Creek Uranium Company, 
694 P.2d 93 (Wyo. 1985). The hearing examiner considered the evidence offered on 
each factor in reaching his conclusion that Ms. Gilstrap had not met her burden 
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that she suffered from a 
disability greater than the twenty-one percent rating which had been awarded to 
her.

[¶17]   No new medical evidence was offered 
to show that Ms. Gilstrap's physical state was any different from what it had 
been when the initial award was made. Ms. Gilstrap was thirty-eight years old at 
the time of the hearing. She had a high school education and had attended a 
beauty school program. The hearing examiner found that Ms. Gilstrap could not 
resume her pre-injury employment as a waitress. Ms. Gilstrap's own testimony, 
the vocational assessment, and the testimony of a vocational rehabilitation 
counselor supported the hearing examiner's conclusion. Ms. Gilstrap's pre-injury 
earnings were approximately $580 per month, including 
tips.

[¶18]   With regard to Ms. Gilstrap's 
post-injury employment prospects, the hearing examiner relied upon the expert 
testimony given by a doctor and the functional capacity evaluation prepared by a 
physical therapist which suggested that Ms. Gilstrap had not put forth a full 
effort in the tests which were conducted during her physical examinations. He 
also considered the vocational assessment and the testimony of the Job Service 
employee which indicated that work was available in Casper which Ms. Gilstrap 
could perform on a continuous basis for wages which were equal to or greater 
than her pre-injury wages. The hearing examiner emphasized the clinical 
psychologist's report which indicated that Ms. Gilstrap's subjective belief that 
she could not work was responsible for her inability to work. The hearing 
examiner found:

[M]y 
finding with regard to the post-injury employment prospects, as I stated before, 
was that they look poor; but I'm finding that it's because of her belief that 
she is unemployable; and that if that attitude could change, you know, based on 
the testimony of [the Job Service employee] and the [vocational assessment], 
along with the report of [the physical therapist] and [the doctor], I find that 
there should be some type of job out there that this person is reasonably 
suit[ed] for.

Because 
Ms. Gilstrap had not worked since she was injured in March 1990, she had no 
post-injury earnings. 

[¶19]   We have reviewed the record and 
hold that substantial evidence supported the hearing examiner's conclusion: 
"[T]aking all of these factors together, in terms of trying to determine a loss 
of earnings capacity, I can't - I don't think that [Ms. Gilstrap] has met the 
burden of proving any loss of earnings capacity in excess of the amount of the 
award that she has already received."

[¶20]   Affirmed.