Title: PAULEY v. NEWMAN

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

PAULEY v. NEWMAN2004 WY 7692 P.3d 819Case Number: 03-90Decided: 06/29/2004
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

 

ALBERT 
PAULEY,

 

Appellant(Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

DEBORAH 
NEWMAN,

 

Appellee(Defendant).

 

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

 

            
Tom Sedar and Mel Dunn, Casper, Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

 

            
Gary R. Scott of Hirst & Applegate, P.C., Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 

 

 

Before 
GOLDEN, LEHMAN,  and VOIGT, JJ., and 
RYCKMAN, and GUTHRIE, D.JJ.

 

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      In January 2000, 
Albert Pauley slipped on ice and fell on the sidewalk near Deborah Newman's 
garage.  In the ensuing lawsuit, a 
Natrona County jury found that the ice upon which Pauley (the appellant) fell 
was from a natural accumulation of snow or water and the district court entered 
a judgment in favor of Newman (the appellee).  The appellant subsequently filed a 
motion for a new trial, which motion the district court denied.  On appeal, the appellant claims error in 
a jury instruction and the verdict form, and that the district court abused its 
discretion in denying the appellant's motion for a new trial.  We affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

1.         
Whether the jury instructions were erroneous or prejudiced the 
appellant?

 

2.         
Whether the district court erred in denying the appellant's motion for a 
new trial?

 

FACTS

 

[¶2]      The appellant and 
the appellee were neighbors.  On 
January 9, 2000, the appellant took his dog for a morning walk.  According to the appellant, it rained or 
had been "spitting rain" the night before; the weather was clear the morning of 
January 9th, but it remained "kind of wet outside," the sidewalks 
were "damp" and contained a "skiff of sleet . . .."  The appellant did not encounter any 
"slick spots" during his walk until he reached a shaded area on the sidewalk 
near the north side of the appellee's detached garage, where the appellant 
"slipped on ice and fell."  He 
"jammed" his elbow as a result of the fall and subsequently underwent surgery to 
repair a torn rotator cuff.

 

[¶3]      At trial, the 
appellant's expert witness, a mechanical engineer, opined that the water (or 
"most" of the water) that formed the ice upon which the appellant fell came from 
a downspout attached to the appellee's garage, but acknowledged on 
cross-examination that it was "possible" the appellant could have fallen on ice 
that formed due to the precipitation the night before.

 

[¶4]      The appellant 
testified that the appellee "always kept her sidewalk clean" and did not recall 
encountering ice prior to January 9th in the area where he fell, 
although he sometimes encountered snow "right in front of [the appellee's] 
garage because . . . it's shaded . . .."  
The appellant also vaguely recalled1 that when the appellee assisted him 
immediately after the fall, the appellee stated that "somebody [had] just about 
fallen there before."  The appellee 
testified that the appellant's fall was the first time in twenty years of living 
at that location that she was aware of a problem with ice or anyone falling on 
her sidewalk.

 

[¶5]      In August 2002, a 
jury concluded that the appellant fell due to a natural accumulation of snow or 
water.  Based on that finding, the 
district court entered a judgment in favor of the appellee.  The appellant filed a motion for a new 
trial, which motion the district court denied.  The appellant appeals from the judgment 
entered in favor of the appellee, and from the district court's denial of his 
motion for a new trial.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶6]      We review alleged 
jury instruction error as follows:

 

"In 
considering the validity of instructions to a jury, we must determine whether 
the instructions, taken as a whole, adequately advise[d] the jury of the 
applicable law.  Banks v. 
Crowner, 694 P.2d 101 (Wyo.1985).  
Proper instructions should be clear declarations of the pertinent 
law.  Short v. Spring Creek 
Ranch, Inc., 731 P.2d 1195 (Wyo.1987).  
The ruling of a trial court on an instruction will not constitute 
reversible error unless there is a showing of prejudice, which connotes a 
demonstration by the complaining party that the instruction misled or confused 
the jury with respect to the applicable principles of law.  DeJulio v. Foster, 715 P.2d 182 
(Wyo.1986)."

 

Ormsby 
v. Dana Kepner Co. of Wyo., Inc., 
997 P.2d 465, 471 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting L.U. Sheep Co. v. Board of 
County Com'rs of County of Hot Springs, 790 P.2d 663, 672 (Wyo. 
1990)).  See also Jensen v. Fremont Motors 
Cody, Inc., 2002 WY 173, ¶ 12, 58 P.3d 322, 326 (Wyo. 2002).  "To measure the degree of prejudice, 
jury instructions are viewed in the light of the entire trial, including the 
allegations of the complaint, conflict in the evidence on critical issues and 
the arguments of counsel."  State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shrader, 882 P.2d 813, 832 (Wyo. 
1994).

 

[¶7]      The submission 
of, or the failure to submit, "a particular form of special verdict is vested in 
the sound discretion of the trial court."  
Turcq v. Shanahan, 950 P.2d 47, 53 (Wyo. 1997); 
see also Addakai v. Witt, 2001 WY 85, ¶ 16, 31 P.3d 70, 73 (Wyo. 
2001); 
Webb v. ABF Freight System, Inc., 155 F.3d 1230, 1249 (10th 
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1018 (1999); 
and W.R.C.P. 49.

 

"[T]he 
core of our inquiry must reach the question of reasonableness of the choice 
made by the trial court.'  Vaughn 
v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo.1998).  Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means 
a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.'  Id. (quoting Byerly v. 
Madsen, 41 Wash. App. 495, 704 P.2d 1236, 1238 (1985)); Basolo [v. 
Basolo], 907 P.2d [348] at 353 [Wyo. 1995].  We must ask ourselves whether the 
district court could reasonably conclude as it did and whether any facet of its 
ruling was arbitrary or capricious."

 

Young 
v. HAC, LLC, 
2001 WY 50, ¶ 6, 24 P.3d 1142, 1144 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting Carlton v. Carlton, 997 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Wyo. 2000)).

 

DISCUSSION

 

 

[¶8]      The appellant 
argues that the verdict form misled or confused the jury in that it foreclosed 
the jury from properly applying the law contained in other instructions to the 
evidence presented at trial.  In 
particular, the appellant contends that by asking whether the ice at issue was 
from a natural accumulation of precipitation, the verdict form "only allowed the 
jury to choose between an accumulation of snow or water that was wholly natural 
or wholly unnatural" (rather than "a combination of natural and unnatural 
accumulation of snow or ice"), and did not allow the jury to consider whether 
"an unnatural accumulation had occurred, or whether a natural accumulation was 
aggravated or made more dangerous by something the [appellee] did, in this case 
have an improperly located down spout on her garage."

 

[¶9]      The district 
court instructed the jury as follows regarding natural and unnatural 
accumulations of precipitation:

 

 

            
In this case defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of reasonable care under 
the circumstances if the ice upon which the plaintiff slipped and fell was from 
an unnatural accumulation of water or snow.  If the ice upon which the plaintiff fell 
was from a natural accumulation of water or snow, then defendant owed the 
plaintiff no duty [of] care under the law.  
A homeowner of property is not liable for injuries resulting from a slip 
and fall on a natural accumulation of snow or ice, and a homeowner has no legal 
duty to clear her sidewalk of naturally accumulated snow or 
ice.

 

            
To prove that an accumulation of ice or snow is unnatural, the plaintiff 
has the burden to show (1) that the defendant created or aggravated the hazard; 
(2) that the defendant knew or should have known of the hazard; and (3) that the 
hazardous condition was substantially more dangerous than it would have been in 
its natural state.

 

            
Whether the ice upon which the plaintiff slipped and fell was from an 
unnatural accumulation or whether it was from a natural accumulation of water or 
snow, the plaintiff had a duty to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances 
in order to avoid injuring himself while on the defendant's property.[2]

 

[¶10]   The parties each apparently 
submitted a proposed verdict form to the district court.  The district court gave the jury a 
special verdict form based on the appellee's submission, which verdict form 
first asked the jury to determine the following:

 

1.         
Was the ice upon which the Plaintiff Albert Pauley fell from a natural 
accumulation of snow or water?

 

                        
Yes  _____                            
No  
_____

 

If 
you answered this Interrogatory yes, have the Presiding Juror sign this verdict 
form and return it to the Bailiff.

 

The 
appellant objected to this verdict form at trial,3 and offered a verdict form that 
instead asked the jury to determine the following:

 

1.         
Was the defendant, Deborah Newman, negligent?

 

Yes 
______

            
No  
______

 

If 
you have answered Yes to question no. 1, please answer question no. 2.  If you have answered No to question no. 
1, please have the presiding juror sign this verdict and notify the 
bailiff.

 

In 
the alternative, the appellant argued that a verdict form based on the 
appellee's submission should ask either whether the ice upon which the appellant 
fell was "entirely" from a natural accumulation of precipitation, or whether it 
was from an "unnatural" accumulation of precipitation.

 

[¶11]   We cannot say that the district 
court abused its discretion in submitting a special verdict to the jury 
regarding the appellee's duty of care.4  A key, disputed issue at trial was 
whether the appellant fell on a natural, or an unnatural, accumulation of 
precipitation.  We have recognized 
that "in certain instances the question of duty hinges upon the determination of 
certain basic facts and, in those rare circumstances, the question of the 
existence of a duty is properly placed before the trier of fact."  Selby v. Conquistador Apartments, 
Ltd., 990 P.2d 491, 494 (Wyo. 1999).

 

[¶12]   We also cannot say that the form of 
the special verdict misled or confused the jury with respect to the applicable 
principles of law.  The special 
verdict asked the jury to determine whether the ice upon which the appellant 
fell resulted from a natural accumulation of snow or water.  Our standard of review requires that we 
consider the jury instructions as a whole, and not in isolation.  Turcq, 950 P.2d  at 51 (quoting 
L.U. Sheep Co., 790 P.2d at 672); Banks v. Crowner, 694 P.2d 101, 105 
(Wyo. 1985).  It is apparent from 
reading the special verdict together with Instruction No. 8 that 
the jury was not precluded from considering whether the appellant's fall 
resulted from an unnatural accumulation of precipitation or the appellant's 
contentions regarding the role of precipitation from the appellee's garage 
downspout in creating or aggravating the hazard upon which the appellant 
fell.  Both parties agree that 
Instruction No. 8 was a correct statement of the law to the extent it set forth 
the "natural accumulation" rule.  
See Selby, 990 P.2d  at 494.  The instruction clearly explained the 
relationship between natural and unnatural accumulations of precipitation 
vis-a-vis the appellee's legal duty of care,5 and stated what elements the 
appellant was required to prove in order to establish that the accumulation at 
issue was unnatural.  Indeed, an 
unnatural accumulation, as defined in Instruction No. 8, necessarily encompassed 
whether the appellee created or aggravated the hazard and whether the hazardous 
condition was substantially more dangerous than it would have been in its 
natural state.  See Selby, 
990 P.2d  at 495-96.

 

[¶13]   We further note that the 
appellant's counsel referred to Instruction No. 8 during his closing argument, 
and specifically claimed that the ice upon which the appellant fell was due to 
an unnatural accumulation (the increased flow of water to that shaded area of 
the sidewalk from the appellee's garage downspout created or aggravated the 
hazard), the appellee knew or should have known of the hazard, and the hazardous 
condition was substantially more dangerous than it would have been in its 
natural state.  The appellant's 
counsel also argued that the jury should answer "no" to the first question on 
the verdict form because after the natural precipitation had subsided, "there 
was still tons of water rolling off this roof and rolling right to [the spot 
where the appellant fell].  There 
was no way that you could safely say that's a natural accumulation.  That's unnatural.  And that's why he 
fell."

 

[¶14]   The district court exercised its 
discretion in establishing the particular form of the special verdict.  The special verdict could just as easily 
have asked the jury to determine whether the appellant's fall resulted from an 
"unnatural" accumulation of precipitation.  
However, the "fact that an instruction may have been . . . drafted in a 
way more favorable to a party does not warrant reversal for a new trial.'"  Shrader, 882 P.2d at 
832 (quoting Triton Coal Co., Inc. v. 
Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 800 P.2d 505, 512 (Wyo. 1990)).  The appellant has not demonstrated that, 
considering the circumstances of the instant case, he was prejudiced by the form 
of the special verdict.

 

[¶15]   The appellant similarly objected, 
at trial, to the following jury instruction given by the district 
court:

 

 

            
This is a civil lawsuit arising out of an accident that occurred on 
January 9, 2000 here in Casper.  On 
that date the plaintiff, Albert Pauley, was walking his dog around his 
neighborhood block.  As the 
plaintiff walked upon the sidewalk adjacent to defendant Deborah Newman's 
garage, Mr. Pauley slipped on some ice and fell.  Mr. Pauley has brought this lawsuit 
against Ms. Newman for the injuries he claims he received in that accident.  Mr. Pauley contends that he slipped upon 
some ice that resulted from water draining from the plaintiff's garage, which 
water subsequently froze on the sidewalk.  
Mr. Pauley contends that Ms. Newman was negligent in permitting that 
condition to exist, and was negligent in not maintaining her sidewalk.  Mr. Pauley contends that as a result of 
his slip and fall, he injured his shoulder, which has resulted in medical bills, 
disability, and loss of enjoyment of life.

 

            
The defendant Deborah Newman contends that the ice upon which Mr. Pauley 
slipped was the result of snow or mist that had fallen the night before on the 
sidewalk, and frozen.  Ms. Newman 
denies that the icy condition on the sidewalk was created by her.  Ms. Newman also denies that she was at 
fault, and contends that the icy condition was created overnight, with the 
accident then occurring the early morning of the following day.  Ms. Newman also contends that Mr. Pauley 
himself was at fault for his accident in not being more careful walking in 
winter conditions.

 

            
These are only the contentions of the parties, and should not be 
considered by you to be evidence in the case.

 

On 
appeal, the appellant argues that this instruction is a misstatement of the law 
because the "instruction never mentions the possibility of the combination of a 
natural and unnatural accumulation of ice or snow, or that the [appellee] may 
have aggravated a natural accumulation."

 

[¶16]   We note that Jury Instruction No. 5 
merely summarized the parties' contentions.  It did not purport to be a statement of 
the law, a statement of the evidence in the case, or an exhaustive account of 
the parties' contentions.6  We fail to see how the wording of this 
jury instruction conflicts with Instruction No. 8, which instruction the 
appellant concedes is a correct statement of the law with respect to natural and 
unnatural accumulations of precipitation, or how Jury Instruction No. 5 could 
conceivably have misled or confused the jury as to the applicable law.  During his closing argument, the 
appellant was permitted full rein (within the legal framework established by 
Instruction No. 8) in arguing the role of precipitation from the appellee's 
garage downspout in creating or aggravating the hazard upon which the appellant 
slipped and fell.  The appellant has 
not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by Jury Instruction No. 5.  See generally Garnick v. Teton County 
School Dist. No. 1, 2002 WY 18, ¶ 28, 39 P.3d 1034, 1048 (Wyo. 
2002).

 

 

[¶17]   The appellant filed a motion for a 
new trial in August 2002, which motion the district court denied.  In that motion, the appellant presented 
essentially the same arguments we addressed previously in this opinion.  "Trial courts have broad discretion when 
ruling on a motion for new trial, and they will not be reversed absent an abuse 
of that discretion."  Id., 
2002 WY 18, ¶ 6, 39 P.3d  at 1038.  
We have concluded that the jury instructions at issue were not 
erroneous.  Accordingly, we find 
that the district court's denial of the appellant's motion for a new trial was 
not an abuse of discretion.

 

[¶18]   Finding no reversible error, we 
affirm.

 

FOOTNOTES

  1The appellant admitted that he was 
"not sure about" whether the appellee in fact made this 
comment.

 

  2Jury Instruction No. 9 also stated 
that "If you find that the plaintiff owed a duty of care to defendant, that is 
that the ice upon which the [plaintiff] slipped and fell was from an unnatural 
accumulation of ice and snow, then this case must be determined on the basis of 
comparative fault of the parties."

 

  3W.R.C.P. 51(b) 
states:

 

Further 
instructions; objections. 
 At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time during the trial as the 
court reasonably directs, any party may file written requests that the court 
instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the requests.  The court shall inform counsel of its 
proposed action upon the requests prior to their arguments to the jury.  Before the argument of the case to the 
jury has begun, the court shall give to the jury such instructions on the law as 
may be necessary and the same shall be in writing, numbered and signed by the 
judge, and shall be taken by the jury when it retires.  No party may assign as error the giving 
or the failure to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto before 
the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter objected 
to and the grounds of the objection.  
Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of the hearing of 
the jury.

 

  4W.R.C.P. 49(a) 
states:

 

(a)        
Special verdicts.  The court may require a jury to return only a 
special verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each issue of 
fact.  In that event the court may 
submit to the jury written questions susceptible of categorical or other brief 
answer or may submit written forms of the several special findings which might 
properly be made under the pleadings and evidence; or it may use such other 
method of submitting the issues and requiring the written findings thereon as it 
deems most appropriate.  The court 
shall give to the jury such explanation and instruction concerning the matter 
thus submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury to make its findings upon 
each issue.  If in so doing the 
court omits any issue of fact raised by the pleadings or by the evidence, each 
party waives the right to a trial by jury of the issue so omitted unless before 
the jury retires the party demands its submission to the jury.  As to an issue omitted without such 
demand the court may make a finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be 
deemed to have made a finding in accord with the judgment on the special 
verdict.

 

  5The appellant does not argue that 
the district court improperly instructed the jury as to the legal effect of its 
answer to the special verdict.

 

  6The appellant does not argue that he 
was, in effect, denied a "theory of the case" instruction.