Title: NORTHFORK CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT; DAVID JAMISON, an individual; and ROBERT HOSZWA, an individual V. PARK COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS and WORTHINGTON GROUP OF WYOMING, LLC

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

NORTHFORK CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT; DAVID JAMISON, an individual; and ROBERT HOSZWA, an individual V. PARK COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS and WORTHINGTON GROUP OF WYOMING, LLC2008 WY 88189 P.3d 260Case Number: S-07-0258Decided: 07/29/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
NORTHFORK CITIZENS FOR 
RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT; DAVID JAMISON, an individual; and ROBERT HOSZWA, an 
individual,

 
 
Appellants

(Petitioners),

 
 
v.

 
 
PARK COUNTYBOARD 
OF COUNTYCOMMISSIONERS,

 
 
Appellee

(Respondent),

 
 
and

 
 
WORTHINGTON GROUP OF 
WYOMING, 
LLC,

 
 
Appellee

(Intervenor/Respondent).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofParkCounty

The 
Honorable Steven R. Cranfill, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

Anthony Todd Wendtland 
and Debra J. Wendtland, Wendtland & Wendtland, LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming.  
Argument by Ms. Wendtland.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee, ParkCounty Board of CountyCommissioners:

Bryan A. Skoric, 
County Attorney and James F. Davis, Deputy County Attorney, Park County 
Attorney's Office, Cody, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Davis.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee, Worthington Group of Wyoming, LLC:

Dawn Rae Scott and 
Laurence W. Stinson, Bonner Stinson, PC, Powell, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Stinson.

 
 
Before VOIGT, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]           
In a series of 
administrative decisions, the Park County Commissioners approved plans by 
Worthington Group of Wyoming, LLC, to develop a residential 
subdivision known as Copperleaf.  
Northfork Citizens for Responsible Development, David Jamison, and Robert 
Hoszwa sought judicial review.  On 
Worthington's 
motion, the district court dismissed the petition for judicial review on the 
basis that Northfork, Mr. Jamison, and Mr. Hoszwa lacked 
standing.  On appeal, we conclude 
that they do have standing, and so reverse the district court's decision. 

 
 
ISSUE

 
 

[¶2]           
The sole issue is 
whether Northfork, Mr. Jamison, and Mr. Hoszwa have standing to obtain judicial 
review of the County's decisions approving the Copperleaf 
subdivision.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]           
In 2004, Worthington's predecessor in interest began seeking 
approval to develop the Copperleaf subdivision on property along the north fork 
of the Shoshone River in Park 
County, Wyoming.  It proposed to develop 155 residences on 
approximately 550 acres.  Of those 
residences, 131 are planned as single family homes on lots ranging from 1.1 to 
2.6 acres,1 and twelve are planned as duplexes 
with 24 total housing units on twelve acres designated as "Tract F."  A large portion of the remaining acreage 
is proposed for open space, with additional acreage dedicated to uses such as 
roads and utilities.  

 
 

[¶4]           
Mr. Jamison and 
Mr. Hoszwa own and live on property adjoining Copperleaf.  More specifically, their property is 
adjacent to Tract F, the area where Worthington proposes to develop duplexes.  Northfork is a Wyoming nonprofit corporation that purports to represent a 
number of ParkCounty residents, including 
Mr. Jamison and Mr. Hoszwa.  
The organization opposes the development of Copperleaf as proposed by 
Worthington, and 
has expressed its concerns vigorously on numerous occasions. 

 
 

[¶5]           
Park County has established 
administrative requirements and procedures for obtaining approval of a 
subdivision.  Details of how 
Worthington worked through the process are not 
pertinent at this stage, and it is sufficient to note that the County approved 
Worthington's 
proposal for Copperleaf.  Northfork, 
Mr. Jamison, and Mr. Hoszwa appealed to the district court for judicial review 
of the subdivision's approval.  
Worthington filed a motion to dismiss, 
asserting that Northfork, Mr. Jamison, and Mr. Hoszwa lacked standing to 
maintain their appeal.  The district 
court granted the motion, and Northfork, Mr. Jamison, and Mr. Hoszwa 
seek our review of that decision.

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 

[¶6]           
"The 
existence of standing is a legal issue that we review de novo."  Halliburton Energy Services v. Gunter, 
2007 WY 151, ¶ 10, 167 P.3d 645, 649 (Wyo. 2007).  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶7]           
Northfork, 
Mr. Jamison, and Mr. Hoszwa seek judicial review of an administrative agency 
decision pursuant to Wyoming's Administrative Procedure Act, which 
provides in part that

 
 
any 
person aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by a final decision of an agency 
in a contested case, or by other agency action or inaction, or any person 
affected in fact by a rule adopted by an agency, is entitled to judicial review 
in the district court.

 
 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(a) (LexisNexis 2007).  If Northfork, Mr. Jamison, and 
Mr. Hoszwa are "aggrieved or adversely affected in fact" by the decisions 
of the Park County Commissioners, then they have standing to maintain their 
appeal.

 
 

[¶8]           
In 
the parties' briefs, Northfork is variously 
described as a nonprofit corporation, an association, and an organization.  The Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act 
includes corporations, associations, and organizations within the definition of 
a "person" who may seek judicial review.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-101(b)(vii).  Northfork contends that, as an 
association or organization, it has standing if one or more of its members can 
establish standing.  See International Ass'n of Fire Fighters, 
Local No. 279 v. Civil Service Comm'n of Fire Department of City of 
Cheyenne, 702 P.2d 1294, 1298 (Wyo. 1985) (Thomas, C.J., specially 
concurring) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U.S. 490, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1975)).  Northfork's standing as an association 
could be better established if the record more clearly indicated the nature of 
the relationship between Northfork and the people it purports to represent.  The parties' briefs tell us only that 
Mr. Jamison and Mr. Hoszwa are "members" of Northfork, that Northfork 
"includes" Mr. Jamison and Mr. Hoszwa, and that Northfork is 
"comprised of" Mr. Jamison, Mr. Hoszwa, and others.  However, the County and Worthington appear to 
concede that Northfork has standing if Mr. Jamison and Mr. Hoszwa have 
standing.  Accordingly, we proceed 
to consider whether those two individuals have standing. 

 
 

[¶9]           
Standing 
under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act has been explained this way:  

 
 
An 
aggrieved or adversely affected person is one who has a legally recognizable 
interest in that which will be affected by the action.  Hoke v. Moyer, 865 P.2d 624, 628 
(Wyo. 
1993).  A potential litigant must 
show injury or potential injury by "alleg[ing] a perceptible, rather than a 
speculative, harm resulting from the agency action."  Foster's, Inc. v. City of Laramie, 718 P.2d 868, 872 (Wyo. 1986).  "The interest which will sustain a right 
to appeal must generally be substantial, immediate, and pecuniary.  A future, contingent, or merely 
speculative interest is ordinarily not sufficient."  L Slash X Cattle Company, Inc. v. 
Texaco, Inc., 623 P.2d 764, 769 (Wyo. 1981).

 
 

Roe v. Board of 
CountyComm'rs, CampbellCounty, 997 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Wyo. 2000).  More 
specifically, in the context of zoning and land use law, we have stated 
that

 
 
an 
aggrieved or adversely affected person having standing to sue is a person who 
has a legally recognizable interest that is or will be affected by the action of 
the zoning authority in question.  
An individual having standing must have a definite interest exceeding the 
general interest in community good shared in common with all 
citizens.

 
 

Hoke, 
865 P.2d  at 628 (quoting E.C. Yokley, 4 Zoning Law and Practice § 24-3 at 
194 (4th ed. 1979) (footnote omitted)). 

 
 

[¶10]       
Mr. Jamison and Mr. 
Hoszwa emphasize the fact that they own and live on property adjoining 
Copperleaf.  They rely on cases 
holding that landowners have standing to appeal land use decisions that result 
in the doubling of density on adjoining property.  In Hoke, we stated as 
follows:

 
 
Doubling the density 
of adjacent property raises a number of perceptible harms for a property owner 
which are different than the harm to the general public, such as increased 
traffic and congestion; therefore, [the adjacent landowner] was entitled to 
judicial review of the board's action by the district court and now by this 
court.

 
 
865 P.2d  at 628.  We have also "held that an adjoining 
landowner has standing when the effect of the board's decision will be to double 
the density previously permitted."  
Hirschfield v. Board of 
CountyComm'rs of County of Teton, 944 P.2d 1139, 1143 (Wyo. 
1997).

  

[¶11]       
The County and 
Worthington 
contend that the approved development plan for Copperleaf does not double the 
housing density on the property.  
Under the plan, single family homes will be built on property that was 
previously zoned for a density of one house per five acres.2  Worthington opted for what the County 
regulations call a "grouped-lot" plan, which means that the houses are clustered 
on smaller lots, while more open space is preserved.  Copperleaf proposes to build houses on 
lots of approximately one to two acres in size, and a little more than half of 
the subdivision property will be devoted to open space.  Thus, according to the County and 
Worthington, 
Copperleaf's grouped-lot plan changes the configuration of the houses, but with 
no appreciable increase in the total number of houses.  Because the increase in housing density 
is minimal, the County and Worthington assert that Mr. Jamison and 
Mr. Hoszwa cannot rely on Hoke 
and Hirschfield to assert their 
standing.

 
 

[¶12]       
The district court 
apparently agreed with the County and Worthington.  It found that Mr. Jamison and 
Mr. Hoszwa are adjacent landowners, but ruled that they had not "presented 
specific facts that demonstrate how they have been injured by the [County's] 
decision to approve the Copperleaf Subdivision."  Consequently, the district court 
concluded that this case was 

 
 
similar to the 
situation in Roe v. Board of County 
[Commr's of CampbellCounty], 997 P.2d 1021 (Wyo. 2000), 
wherein the Roes did not present specific facts to demonstrate how they have 
been injured by the board's decision to approve [the] 
Subdivision.

 
 

Roe, however, is readily 
distinguishable from the present case.  
For one thing, the Roes never alleged that they were adjacent 
landowners.  For another, the zoning 
decision they wanted to appeal resulted in a substantial decrease in housing 
density on the property, and the Roes failed to plead any facts indicating how 
the decrease in housing density would harm them in any way.  In contrast, Mr. Jamison and Mr. 
Hoszwa have expressly asserted that they are adjacent landowners, and in at 
least two respects they have presented specific facts establishing how they are 
aggrieved and adversely affected by the County's approval of 
Copperleaf.

 
 

[¶13]       
First, 
while Copperleaf's plans may not increase housing density for single family 
houses, there is a portion of the subdivision, referred to as "Tract F," on 
which Worthington proposes to build twelve duplex 
houses.  Worthington's predecessor 
in interest obtained approval in 1985 to develop duplexes on Tract F.  Mr. Jamison and Mr. Hoszwa 
cite Park County Zoning Resolution 3-210 F. 1, which provides that "land use 
changes granted for developments which have been abandoned, inactive, or not 
substantially advanced for 5 years from the effective date of this zoning 
resolution are deemed expired."  
Under this provision, they contend, the County's 1985 approval of 
duplexes on Tract F has expired, and the approved housing density reverted back 
to the level of one house per five acres.  
On this basis, they assert that the County's approval of twelve duplexes 
on twelve acres results in a very substantial increase in the allowed housing 
density on Tract F.  Significantly, 
Tract F is immediately adjacent to the properties owned by Mr. Jamison and 
Mr. Hoszwa.  Based on Hoke and Hirschfield, Mr. Jamison and 
Mr. Hoszwa maintain that these assertions establish their standing to 
appeal the County's decisions approving Copperleaf.  We agree.  

 
 

[¶14]       
It 
is coincidence, we think, that Hoke 
and Hirschfield both discuss a 
doubling of housing density.  The 
real lesson of those cases is that adjoining landowners have standing to appeal 
land use decisions that result in a substantial increase in the allowed housing 
density.  Doubling the density is 
but one example of a substantial increase sufficient to support standing.  It is undisputed that Mr. Jamison 
and Mr. Hoszwa are adjoining landowners.  
If they are correct in their legal contention that the County's 1985 
approval of duplex development has expired,3 then the County's decisions 
approving Copperleaf will result in a substantial increase in housing density on 
Tract F.  Mr. Jamison and 
Mr. Hoszwa therefore have standing to appeal those 
decisions.

 
 

[¶15]       
Second, 
regardless of housing density, Mr. Jamison and Mr. Hoszwa claim that 
Copperleaf violates other County requirements.  They cite, for example, Park County 
Zoning Resolution 2-615E.3, establishing certain requirements for open space in 
a grouped-lot plan:

 
 
A minimum of 50 
percent of the acreage of the parent parcel shall be open space configured as a separate parcel 
owned and managed by a homeowners' association or other entity or as a contiguous area 
comprised of portions of individual building lots restricted against development 
by a conservation easement.

 
 
 (Emphasis added.)  Mr. Jamison and Mr. Hoszwa 
concede that the Copperleaf plan sets aside more than half of the subdivision's 
acreage for open space, but they contend that the open space is neither a 
separate parcel nor a contiguous area.  
They have described the Copperleaf open space as

 
 
a far cry from what 
the County regulations require and the Wyoming Game and Fish encouraged.  Instead of establishing contiguous open 
space . . . the Developer created multiple small isolated pockets and areas that 
are "connected" by roads and then just called those areas and the roads "open 
space".

 
 

[¶16]       
According 
to Mr. Jamison and Mr. Hoszwa, because the Copperleaf open space does not comply 
with the County's requirements, the subdivision will cause them more significant 
harm.  In particular, they have 
complained of interference with their scenic views and adverse impacts on 
wildlife habitat and migration.  To 
establish standing based on these contentions, Mr. Jamison and 
Mr. Hoszwa must demonstrate a "definite interest exceeding the general 
interest in community good shared in common with all citizens."  Hoke, 865 P.2d  at 628.  While the general public may have a 
broad interest in preserving views and protecting wildlife, Mr. Jamison and 
Mr. Hoszwa contend that the subdivision will affect them more adversely than the 
general public because they own and live on property adjoining Copperleaf.  We agree that their interests in 
preserving views from their homes, and their interests in observing and enjoying 
wildlife on their own properties, do exceed the general public's interest in 
community good.  We therefore 
conclude that Mr. Jamison and Mr. Hoszwa have presented facts 
sufficient to establish that they are aggrieved or adversely affected by the 
County's decisions.

 
 

[¶17]       
As 
noted above, because Mr. Jamison and Mr. Hoszwa have established standing in 
this case, Northfork also has standing.  
Accordingly, we find error in the district court's order dismissing their 
appeal.  We reverse that decision, 
and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Different 
numbers are given in the record, but it appears that the lots range in size from 
1.1 or 1.2 acres to either 1.8, 2.3, or 2.6 acres.

2The 
record is unclear on this point, but some portion of the property may have been 
zoned for one house per thirty five acres.  
This would make no difference in our analysis, so we need not resolve the 
confusion.

3The 
County and Worthington dispute the contention that the 
1985 approval of duplex development has expired.  In reviewing an order granting a motion 
to dismiss, however, we do not attempt to resolve such disputes.  Rather, we accept as true the facts 
presented by the parties opposing dismissal.  Cook v. Card, 2007 WY 178, ¶ 8, 170 P.3d 122, 124 (Wyo. 2007); Veile v. Board 
of CountyComm'rs of WashakieCounty, 860 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Wyo. 
1993).