Title: State v. Conway

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Conway, 108 Ohio St.3d 214, 2006-Ohio-791.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. CONWAY, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Conway, 108 Ohio St.3d 214, 2006-Ohio-791.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Death penalty upheld. 
(No. 2003-0647 — Submitted August 23, 2005 — Decided March 8, 2006.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, No. 02CR-1153. 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} On January 19, 2002, Jason Gervais was shot and killed and 
Mandel Williams was shot and wounded outside a strip bar in Columbus, Ohio. 
James T. Conway III was indicted, tried, and convicted by a jury of the 
aggravated murder of Gervais.  He now appeals his convictions and sentence of 
death. 
{¶ 2} Evidence at the trial revealed that on the evening of January 18, 
2002, Conway met a group of friends at Dockside Dolls, a strip bar in Columbus, 
Ohio.  Among the group was Conway’s brother, Jeff Conway.  Conway and his 
friends had visited Dockside Dolls (“Dockside”) regularly during the previous 
month.  The group was well known at Dockside, having spent large sums of 
money buying expensive bottles of champagne and giving generous tips to the 
dancers and staff. 
{¶ 3} At closing time, approximately 2:30 a.m. on January 19, 2002, a 
fight erupted in the Dockside parking lot.  Witness accounts varied.  Some 
described the fight as a racial confrontation between a large group of white males 
(Conway’s group) and a smaller group of black males.  Others did not believe that 
the fight was racially charged.  The brawl lasted several minutes and involved 
between 25 and 40 people. 
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{¶ 4} During the fighting, Mandel Williams, who was part of the group 
of black males, cut Conway’s brother Jeff with a knife.  Jeff told his brother that 
he had been cut and pointed out Williams as his attacker. 
{¶ 5} At this point, some witnesses heard someone say, “I’m going to get 
my gun.”  Conway and his friend, Rob Myers, went to a car parked just east of the 
club’s entrance, from which Myers retrieved a .45-caliber semiautomatic 
handgun.  Either Conway or Myers cleared a round from the gun and chambered a 
live round.  When Conway took the gun from Myers, one witness heard Conway 
say, “I’ll kill you guys.” 
{¶ 6} Conway then moved fast through the parking lot toward Williams.  
When he was within 30 feet, Conway began shooting at Williams.  According to 
some witnesses, after Conway began shooting, Williams and Jason Gervais, an 
innocent bystander, became entangled.  Others testified that Williams had pulled 
Gervais into the line of fire in an effort to avoid being shot.  In either event, 
Conway continued to shoot at both Williams and Gervais as he walked toward 
them.  In the end, Conway emptied his weapon, firing a total of eight shots at the 
two.  Conway was within eight feet of Williams and Gervais when he fired the 
last shots into them as they lay on the ground.  After the shooting, Conway and 
the other members of his group, including his brother, fled the scene and went to 
Big Mike’s Palace, an after-hours nightclub. 
{¶ 7} Gervais had been hit four times — once in his left lower back, 
once in his upper left leg, once in his right buttock, and once in his lower left leg 
— and died as a result of the bullet that entered his back, which penetrated his left 
lung.  Williams had also been hit four times — once in his left shoulder, once in 
his left wrist, once in his left knee, and once in his right ankle — but survived. 
{¶ 8} Conway was indicted on three counts, including one count of 
aggravated murder.  Count 1 charged that he purposely and with prior calculation 
and design caused the death of Gervais, R.C. 2903.01(A);  Count 2 charged him 
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3 
with the attempted aggravated murder of Williams, R.C. 2923.02(A) and 
2903.01(A);  Count 3 charged him with having a weapon while under a disability, 
R.C. 2923.13. 
{¶ 9} The 
aggravated-murder 
count 
contained 
a 
death-penalty 
specification, charging aggravated murder as part of a course of conduct involving 
the purposeful killing or attempt to kill two or more persons.  R.C. 2929.04(A)(5).  
Counts 1 and 2 also contained firearm specifications. 
{¶ 10} During the jury trial, the state called Ronald Trent as a witness.  
Trent was Conway’s cellmate following Conway’s arrest on February 23, 2002.  
After discovering that Trent was a distant cousin, Conway confided to Trent that 
he was the Dockside shooter.  Conway told Trent that he had shot Williams for 
cutting his brother, Jeff.  According to Trent, Conway was not concerned when 
Gervais had gotten in the way, because Conway had had a .45-caliber handgun 
and knew that the bullets would go through Gervais and hit Williams. 
{¶ 11} During their incarceration, Conway also attempted to involve Trent 
in a plot to kill Brian McWhorter, who had been with Conway at Dockside on the 
night of the shooting.  Because Conway was concerned that McWhorter would 
testify against him, he offered Trent $30,000 to kill McWhorter and gave him 
$5,000 as an advance payment.  In addition, Conway wanted Trent’s help in a 
scheme to manufacture evidence by videotaping a person who resembled Conway 
confessing to the Dockside shooting. 
{¶ 12} The state called Mark J. Hardy, a firearms and ballistic expert with 
the Columbus Police Department.  Hardy identified all spent shell casings and 
bullets and one live round recovered from the scene as .45-caliber ammunition.  
No weapon was recovered, but Hardy was able to establish that all spent bullets 
and casings had been fired from the same weapon. 
Defense Case 
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{¶ 13} At trial, the defense called Ron Edwards, a criminal investigator, 
and Conway’s brother, Jeff Conway, also testified. 
{¶ 14} Edwards had photographed the crime scene and testified regarding 
what he believed to be bullet strikes on the side of the Dockside building where 
the shooting had occurred.  Edwards testified that the bullet strikes were knee-
high.  On cross-examination, Edwards admitted that he did not know how long 
these marks had been on the building or whether they were even related to this 
shooting. 
{¶ 15} Jeff Conway testified that as he was leaving Dockside on the night 
of the shooting, a man named Corey started an argument with him, and they 
began to fight.  The two had been on bad terms since high school.  During the 
fight, one of Corey’s friends grabbed Jeff and placed him in a headlock.  Corey 
hit Jeff, and then Williams cut Jeff twice across his midsection.  Jeff testified that 
he was “cut open pretty bad” and felt blood running down his stomach. 
{¶ 16} After Jeff was cut, he was scared and went to his brother in the 
parking lot, telling him he had been cut.  Jeff then started walking to his car.  
Before he reached the car, he saw Williams coming at him again.  Jeff testified 
that he had seen that Williams had something in his hand.  Jeff testified, “I 
thought he was coming back to finish me off.”  He pointed at Williams and 
yelled, “He’s coming at me.”  Jeff then heard gunshots and saw Williams jump 
back and pull Gervais in front of him, both falling to the ground. 
{¶ 17} On cross-examination, Jeff said that he had not seen who had shot 
Williams and Gervais.  Jeff insisted that he did not know whether his brother was 
the Dockside shooter and denied ever discussing the shooting with Conway.  Jeff 
could not explain why he did not report the knife attack to the police. 
{¶ 18} Conway testified that after the fighting in the parking lot had 
stopped, Jeff walked up to him and said he had been cut.  Jeff lifted his shirt, and 
Conway could see blood flowing from the wound.  Conway thought that Jeff was 
January Term, 2006 
5 
seriously injured and decided to walk Jeff to his car.  As they walked to Jeff’s car, 
Conway stopped to talk with the owner of the bar about the fight. 
{¶ 19} Conway then heard Jeff screaming, “There’s the guy; that’s him.”  
Conway testified that he looked up and saw Williams charging down the sidewalk 
at Jeff.  Conway saw no weapon, but Williams was holding his hand down at his 
side, and Conway was sure that Williams still had a knife.  Conway testified, 
“[W]hen I seen him coming at my brother, I looked around and Rob’s standing 
right beside me and he has a gun in his hand, so I just snatched it out of his hand 
and just started shooting at the ground, like trying to cut off where [Williams] was 
coming from.”  Conway claimed that he had not been trying to kill Williams and 
so shot low, “like at his hip * * * to stop him from getting to [Jeff].”  Conway said 
he was pulling the trigger as fast as he could and did not pause between shots.  He 
claimed that he had had tunnel vision and had not seen Williams pull Gervais into 
the line of fire.  He said he did not realize that he had shot Gervais until he 
stopped shooting and both Williams and Gervais were lying on the ground. 
{¶ 20} Conway testified that when he saw Williams and Gervais on the 
ground, he was in shock, and his friends quickly pushed him into a car.  Conway’s 
first thought was not to go to the police but to make sure Jeff was all right.  
Conway left the scene with his friends and went to Big Mike’s Palace because 
that was where Jeff had gone. 
{¶ 21} On cross-examination, Conway testified that he had never talked 
about the Dockside shooting with his brother.  Conway said he was mad that Jeff 
had been cut, but that his first concern was his brother and not going after 
Williams.  Conway denied retrieving the gun from the car and did not see Myers 
remove the gun from the trunk.  Conway described the gun as silver, with a gold 
Colt emblem on the handle.  Police seized an empty Colt gun box from his house, 
but Conway denied owning a Colt handgun.  Conway said he did not know what 
happened to the gun after the shooting.  He also could not explain why he fired 
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eight shots and emptied his weapon if he was trying only to stop Williams and not 
kill him. 
{¶ 22} Conway initially denied telling Trent anything about the Dockside 
shooting, but later admitted discussing details about the Dockside shooting 
because Trent kept asking for information.  Conway denied talking with Trent 
about killing McWhorter and also denied paying Trent $5,000.  Conway also said 
that it was Trent’s idea to make a video staging a false confession. 
Trial Result 
{¶ 23} The jury convicted Conway of aggravated murder and of having a 
weapon while under a disability.  The trial court mistakenly instructed the jury 
that the charge in Count 2 was attempted murder instead of attempted aggravated 
murder, as set forth in the indictment.  As a result, the jury found Conway guilty 
of attempted murder in Count 2.  (See discussion of proposition of law ten.)  The 
jury also convicted Conway of the course-of-conduct death-penalty specification 
and the firearm specifications.  After the penalty phase, the trial court sentenced 
Conway to death for the aggravated murder of Jason Gervais, consistent with the 
jury’s recommendation.  The trial court imposed a prison sentence of ten years for 
Conway’s conviction for attempted murder, a three-year sentence for the firearm 
specification (the court merged the two specifications), and a 12-month sentence 
for having a weapon while under a disability, with all terms to be served 
consecutively. 
{¶ 24} Following sentencing, Conway filed a motion for new trial.  After 
an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion. 
{¶ 25} The matter is now before us on a direct appeal from the trial court. 
PRETRIAL ISSUES 
Transferred Intent and Prior Calculation and Design 
{¶ 26} In proposition of law ten, Conway claims that he could not be 
convicted of the aggravated murder of Gervais in Count 1, because Count 2 of the 
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7 
indictment charged only attempted murder (as opposed to attempted aggravated 
murder) of Williams.  Conway submits that the absence of prior calculation and 
design from Count 2 bars his aggravated-murder conviction because that element 
could not be transferred to Count 1 under the state’s theory that the aggravated-
murder charge rested on the doctrine of transferred intent. 
{¶ 27} Contrary to Conway’s claim, Count 2 of the indictment did in fact 
charge him with attempted aggravated murder of Williams.  Although the trial 
court mistakenly instructed the jury on attempted murder, and not attempted 
aggravated murder as set forth in Count 2 of the indictment, no prejudicial error 
resulted.  The jury’s verdict finding Conway guilty of attempted murder was 
consistent with the trial court’s instructions and with the verdict forms.  In 
addition, we have long held that counts of an indictment are not interdependent 
and that consistency between verdicts on multiple counts of an indictment is 
unnecessary.  State v. Adams (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 223, 7 O.O.3d 393, 374 
N.E.2d 137, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 28} We also find no merit to Conway’s contention that the jury failed 
to make the factual determination as to the existence of prior calculation and 
design.  The trial court correctly instructed the jury on the elements of aggravated 
murder. 
{¶ 29} Thus, we reject Conway’s claim that the aggravated-murder 
conviction was improper because of any perceived inconsistencies between the 
counts charged in the indictment or in the jury’s verdicts on Counts 1 and 2.  
Therefore, we overrule proposition of law ten. 
Voir Dire 
{¶ 30} In his eighth proposition of law, Conway claims that the trial 
court’s use of the word “recommendation” throughout voir dire deprived him of a 
fair trial.  We conclude that there was no error. 
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{¶ 31} The trial court’s references to the jury’s penalty determination as a 
“recommendation” accurately reflected Ohio law, R.C. 2929.03(D), and were not 
made in a way that would diminish the jury’s sense of responsibility in voting for 
the death penalty.  In fact, in the penalty phase, the trial court instructed that it 
was the jury’s “duty to determine the appropriate sentence for the Defendant in 
this case.”  Therefore, we overrule Conway’s eighth proposition of law. 
{¶ 32} Conway contends in his 14th proposition of law that error occurred 
during voir dire when prospective jurors were not questioned about racial bias.  
Conway claims that because racial issues permeated his entire case, the trial court 
was constitutionally required to question prospective jurors on racial prejudice. 
{¶ 33} Conway relies primarily on Turner v. Murray (1986), 476 U.S. 28, 
106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 L.Ed.2d 27.  In Turner, the Supreme Court held that a “capital 
defendant accused of an interracial crime is entitled to have prospective jurors 
informed of the race of the victim and questioned on the issue of racial bias.”  Id. 
at 36-37, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 L.Ed.2d 27.  However, the court further held that “a 
defendant cannot complain of a judge’s failure to question the venire on racial 
prejudice unless the defendant has specifically requested such an inquiry.”  Id. at 
37, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 L.Ed.2d 27.  The Turner court noted that the actual 
decision to question on racial prejudice is a choice best left to a capital 
defendant’s counsel.  If defendant’s counsel declines to request voir dire on the 
subject of racial prejudice, the trial court need not broach the topic sua sponte.  Id. 
at 37, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 L.Ed.2d 27, fn. 10; State v. Watson (1991), 61 Ohio 
St.3d 1, 13, 572 N.E.2d 97. 
{¶ 34} Conway never sought to question prospective jurors about racial 
bias.  Thus, the trial court did not commit error in failing to inquire on the subject.  
Therefore, we reject Conway’s 14th proposition of law. 
GUILT-PHASE ISSUES 
Sufficiency of Evidence 
January Term, 2006 
9 
{¶ 35} In proposition of law two, Conway argues that his conviction for 
aggravated murder was not supported by sufficient evidence.  Specifically, 
Conway contends that the state failed to prove the element of prior calculation 
and design, as R.C. 2903.01(A) requires. 
{¶ 36} In reviewing a record for sufficiency, “[t]he relevant inquiry is 
whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, 
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 
574 N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia 
(1979), 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560.  The weight to be given the 
evidence and the credibility of witnesses are primarily jury issues.  State v. Waddy 
(1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 430, 588 N.E.2d 819; State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio 
St.2d 230, 39 O.O.2d 366, 227 N.E.2d 212. 
{¶ 37} Conway was convicted of one count of aggravated murder under 
R.C. 2903.01(A), which states:  “No person shall purposely, and with prior 
calculation and design, cause the death of another * * *.” 
{¶ 38} Although the Revised Code does not define “prior calculation and 
design,” we have interpreted the phrase to require evidence of “more than the few 
moments of deliberation permitted in common law interpretations of the former 
murder statute, and to require a scheme designed to implement the calculated 
decision to kill.”  State v. Cotton (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 8, 11, 10 O.O.3d 4, 381 
N.E.2d 190.  While “ ‘[n]either the degree of care nor the length of time the 
offender takes to ponder the crime beforehand are critical factors in themselves,’ ” 
momentary deliberation is insufficient.  State v. D’Ambrosio (1993), 67 Ohio 
St.3d 185, 196, 616 N.E.2d 909, quoting the 1973 Legislative Service 
Commission Comment to R.C. 2903.01. 
{¶ 39} Nevertheless, where the evidence presented at trial “reveals the 
presence of sufficient time and opportunity for the planning of an act of homicide 
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to constitute prior calculation, and the circumstances surrounding the homicide 
show a scheme designed to implement the calculated decision to kill, a finding by 
the trier of fact of prior calculation and design is justified.”  State v. Cotton, 56 
Ohio St.2d 8, 10 O.O.3d 4, 381 N.E.2d 190, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶ 40} Evidence was presented at trial that as Dockside closed for 
business in the early morning hours of January 19, 2002, a fight broke out in the 
parking lot between Conway’s group and a group including Mandel Williams.  
During the altercation, Williams cut Conway’s brother, Jeff, with a knife.  Jeff 
told his brother that he had been cut and identified Williams as the person who 
had cut him. 
{¶ 41} At that point, some witnesses recalled hearing someone say, “I’m 
going to get my gun.”  Conway and Rob Myers went to a parked car just east of 
the club’s entrance, and Myers retrieved a .45-caliber semiautomatic handgun 
from the trunk.  Either Conway or Myers cleared a round from the gun and 
chambered a live round to make sure the gun was loaded.  One witness testified 
that when Conway took the gun from Myers, Conway said, “I’ll kill you guys.” 
{¶ 42} Conway then moved rapidly through the parking lot toward 
Williams and began shooting at Williams from a distance of approximately 30 
feet.  After Conway’s first shot struck Williams in the shoulder, Williams either 
grabbed Jason Gervais or they accidentally became entangled, and both Williams 
and Gervais fell to the ground as Conway continued to fire as he advanced toward 
them.  Conway emptied his weapon into Williams and Gervais while they lay on 
the ground.  By the time the last shots were fired, Conway was within eight feet of 
Williams and Gervais.  According to Trent, Conway later told Trent that although 
Gervais was in the line of fire, he kept shooting because he had a .45 “and it 
would go through him [Gervais].” 
{¶ 43} Construing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution, any rational juror could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt 
January Term, 2006 
11 
that Conway had formulated a plan to kill Williams in retaliation for Jeff 
Conway’s injury.  After discovering that his brother had been cut, Conway 
announced his intention to get his gun and kill.  After Jeff pointed out Williams as 
his attacker, Conway obtained and readied his weapon, fired shots while 
advancing toward Williams, and continued to shoot after Williams and Gervais 
lay wounded on the ground.  Conway’s plan was to shoot and kill Williams.  He 
never abandoned his scheme, even after Gervais entered his line of fire. 
{¶ 44} Conway’s killing of Gervais instead of his intended victim, 
Williams, does not prevent a finding by the jury of prior calculation and design.  
“If one purposely causes the death of another and the death is the result of a 
scheme designed to implement the calculated decision to kill someone other than 
the victim, the offender is guilty of aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 
2903.01(A).”  State v. Solomon (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 214, 20 O.O.3d 213, 421 
N.E.2d 139, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 45} We have previously held that a defendant’s threat to obtain a 
weapon and kill his victim and his later actions carrying out the threat are enough 
to prove prior calculation and design.  State v. Sowell (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 322, 
333, 530 N.E.2d 1294; see, also, State v. Toth (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 206, 213, 6 
O.O.3d 461, 371 N.E.2d 831; State v. Cassano, 96 Ohio St.3d 94, 2002-Ohio-
3751, 772 N.E.2d 81, at ¶ 80-84.  Pursuit of a wounded, helpless victim also has 
been held to be evidence of prior calculation and design.  See, e.g., State v. 
Robbins (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 74, 78-79, 12 O.O.3d 84, 388 N.E.2d 755 
(defendant obtained a weapon from his apartment after fighting with victim in 
hallway, returned to hallway, and stabbed wounded, helpless victim to death); 
State v. Claytor (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 234, 241, 574 N.E.2d 472 (defendant 
pursued wounded victim and shot him in the face); State v. Cotton, 56 Ohio St.2d 
at 9-10, 10 O.O.3d 4, 381 N.E.2d 190 (defendant wounded first police officer and, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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after shooting second officer, returned to kill first officer, who was trying to crawl 
away). 
{¶ 46} We also find that there was sufficient time for Conway to 
formulate a plan to kill Williams.  Damien LeCaptain, head of security for 
Dockside, testified that one and a half to two minutes passed between the time 
that Williams cut Conway’s brother and the time that Conway went to retrieve the 
gun from the car.  Paris Long, a bouncer at the club, testified that from the time 
that Jeff said he was cut, two to two and half minutes passed until the first shots 
were fired.  Finally, Michael Small, the floor manager at Dockside, testified that 
in the length of time between Jeff’s saying that he was cut and shots being fired, 
Small was able to help an injured security guard from the parking lot to the front 
door of the bar, unlock the door, take the guard inside, and start walking back to 
the parking lot.  Although they took only a few minutes, Conway’s actions went 
beyond a momentary impulse and show that he was determined to complete a 
specific course of action.  Such facts show that he had adopted a plan to kill.  See 
State v. Claytor, 61 Ohio St.3d at 241, 574 N.E.2d 472; State v. D’Ambrosio, 67 
Ohio St.3d at 196, 616 N.E.2d 909. 
{¶ 47} Furthermore, Conway’s confession to Trent, the government 
informant, essentially mirrors the evidence of prior calculation and design found 
in the eyewitness testimony.  According to Trent, Conway told him that after Jeff 
was cut, Conway had Myers get a gun from the car and asked Jeff to point out the 
man who had cut him.  Conway said that after Jeff identified Williams, he cocked 
the gun to make sure it was loaded and when a live round fell out, cocked it again.  
Conway then started shooting at Williams, whom Conway described as running 
away from him. 
{¶ 48} When viewed in a light most favorable to the state, this evidence 
was sufficient to show that Conway had adopted a plan to kill Williams upon 
January Term, 2006 
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discovering that Williams had cut his brother and that Conway had carried out his 
plan.  Therefore, we reject Conway’s second proposition of law. 
Defendant’s Absence from Jury-Instruction Conference 
{¶ 49} Conway argues in proposition of law three that the trial court 
violated his right to a fair trial by conducting critical stages of the trial outside his 
presence.  Conway complains that he was not present for two conferences when 
proposed guilt-phase jury instructions were discussed. 
{¶ 50} An accused has a fundamental right to be present at all critical 
stages of his criminal trial.  Section 10, Article I, Ohio Constitution; Crim.R. 
43(A).  An accused’s absence, however, does not result in prejudicial or 
constitutional error unless “a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by 
[defendant’s] absence.”  Snyder v. Massachusetts (1934), 291 U.S. 97, 107-108, 
54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674.  In United States v. Gagnon (1985), 470 U.S. 522, 
527, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 84 L.E.2d 486, the Supreme Court held that, in certain 
circumstances, a defendant’s absence from a discussion at which his counsel are 
present does not offend due process.  See, also, e.g., State v. Williams (1983), 6 
Ohio St.3d 281, 285-286, 6 OBR 345, 452 N.E.2d 1323 (defendant’s absence 
from in camera voir dire of allegedly tainted jurors was harmless error). 
{¶ 51} The conference on jury instructions was held on January 29 and 
was continued on January 30, 2003.  On January 29, before the conference began, 
the trial judge announced in open court that the parties would be meeting that 
afternoon to discuss the guilt-phase jury charge.  No objection to Conway’s 
absence was raised until February 5, 2003, just before the start of the penalty 
phase.  Conway’s failure to timely object constituted a waiver of his right to be 
present.  State v. Palmer (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 543, 559, 687 N.E.2d 685. 
{¶ 52} We rejected the same argument in State v. White (1998), 82 Ohio 
St.3d 16, 26, 693 N.E.2d 772, finding that defendant’s absence during a hearing 
on proposed jury instructions did not deprive him of a fair trial.  Other than 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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claiming that he would have provided “invaluable” assistance to his counsel, 
Conway does not advance any argument that his absence prevented a fair trial.  
Therefore, we overrule proposition of law three. 
Administration of Oath to Jury 
{¶ 53} In his sixth proposition of law, Conway maintains that the trial 
court’s having the bailiff, rather than the clerk of the common pleas court, 
administer the oath to the jurors, as R.C. 2945.28 directs, was prejudicial.  R.C. 
2945.28 provides, “In criminal cases jurors and the jury shall take the following 
oath to be administered by the trial court or the clerk of the court of common 
pleas * * *.” 
{¶ 54} After the jury was selected, the trial judge directed his bailiff to 
administer the oath to the members of the jury and the alternate jurors.  Conway, 
however, did not object to the bailiff’s administering the oath and has waived all 
but plain error.  See Crim.R. 52(B); State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d at 27, 759 
N.E.2d 1240.  Conway presented no evidence demonstrating that he was 
prejudiced by the failure of the trial court or clerk to administer the oath.  Without 
a showing of prejudice, the trial court’s failure to strictly comply with R.C. 
2945.28 does not require reversal of the jury’s verdict.  See, e.g., State v. Boykin, 
Montgomery App. No. 19896, 2004-Ohio-1701, 2004 WL 690799, at ¶ 159-166; 
State v. Vanblarcome, Franklin App. No. 02AP-417, 2003-Ohio-579, 2003 WL 
257408, at ¶ 6-22.  See, also, State v. Glaros (1960), 170 Ohio St. 471, 11 O.O.2d 
215, 166 N.E.2d 379. 
{¶ 55} Conway’s contention that the trial court committed structural error 
in this regard is equally without merit.  The “trial-error/structural-error distinction 
is irrelevant unless it is first established that constitutional error has occurred.”  
(Emphasis sic.)  State v. Esparza (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 660, 662, 660 N.E.2d 
1194.  See, also, State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118, 2004-Ohio-297, 802 N.E.2d 
643, at ¶ 23 (cautioning against applying a structural-error analysis in a plain-
January Term, 2006 
15 
error situation).  Any error here was, at most, a statutory violation and not a 
constitutional error.  Thus, we overrule Conway’s sixth proposition of law. 
Government Agent 
{¶ 56} In propositions of law 12 and 13, Conway contends that the trial 
court admitted evidence at trial in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.  Conway complains about evidence obtained by Ronald Trent, a 
government informant, after Conway was indicted in this matter. 
{¶ 57} The following facts are relevant to the issues raised in propositions 
12 and 13.  Conway was arrested on February 23, 2002, in connection with the 
Dockside shooting and was jailed in the same cellblock as Trent.  Trent had been 
in jail for six months before Conway’s arrest, and Conway and Trent had not 
previously known each other.  On March 5, 2002, Conway was indicted for the 
Dockside shooting. 
{¶ 58} Approximately two weeks after he was arrested, Conway 
discovered that Trent was a distant cousin.  Later, Conway confided to Trent that 
he was the Dockside shooter.  Conway also attempted to enlist Trent to kill a 
witness to the Dockside shooting and to stage a false confession by coercing 
someone else to admit on videotape to the Dockside shooting.  Conway promised 
Trent $30,000 for killing a witness and arranged for $5,000 to be deposited in 
Trent’s jail commissary account as an advance payment. 
{¶ 59} On April 4, 2002, Trent wrote a letter to a prosecutor in the 
Dockside-shooting case, informing her that he had information regarding 
Conway’s involvement in the shooting.  Trent wrote her a second letter, dated 
April 10, 2002, reiterating that Conway was involved in the Dockside shooting 
and added that Conway had offered a contract to kill a witness testifying against 
him. 
{¶ 60} On April 25, 2002, sheriff’s detectives interviewed Trent.  During 
this interview, Trent provided information about the Dockside shooting, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
Conway’s plan to murder a witness, and his intent to manufacture evidence by 
staging a false confession.  Trent and law-enforcement officials also discussed a 
plan to record Trent’s conversations with Conway. 
{¶ 61} On May 16, 2002, the state placed Trent on work release from jail, 
and he began working with the Franklin County Sheriff’s Office in its 
investigation of Conway.  Between May 17 and May 24, 2002, a series of 
conversations was recorded in which Trent and Conway talked about Conway’s 
plans to kill a witness and stage a false confession. 
{¶ 62} Before trial, Conway moved to suppress the evidence collected by 
Trent.  After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion.  During the state’s case-
in-chief, Trent testified on direct examination about his conversations with 
Conway that occurred both before and after he began working with sheriff’s 
detectives.  In addition, the state was permitted to cross-examine Conway about 
his recorded conversations with Trent after Trent became a confidential 
informant. 
{¶ 63} Conway claims in proposition of law 13 that evidence gathered by 
Trent after he became an informant on May 16, 2002, was introduced during the 
prosecutor’s case-in-chief in violation of the Sixth Amendment. 
{¶ 64} The Sixth Amendment provides, “In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right * * * to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence.”  In McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991), 501 U.S. 171, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 
L.Ed.2d 158, the Supreme Court explained that this right to counsel is offense-
specific.  “It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions, for it does not 
attach until a prosecution is commenced, that is, ‘ “at or after the initiation of 
adversary judicial criminal proceedings — whether by way of formal charge, 
preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.” ’ ”   Id. at 175, 111 
S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158, quoting United States v. Gouveia (1984), 467 U.S. 
January Term, 2006 
17 
180, 188, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 81 L.Ed.2d 146, quoting Kirby v. Illinois (1972), 406 
U.S. 682, 689, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411. 
{¶ 65} In a line of cases involving incriminating statements made to 
police informants, the United States Supreme Court has held that an accused who 
stands indicted of a crime is denied the basic protections of the Sixth Amendment 
“when there [is] used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating 
words” that government agents “deliberately elicited” from him in the absence of 
his counsel.  Massiah v. United States (1964), 377 U.S. 201, 206, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 
12 L.Ed.2d 246; United States v. Henry (1980), 447 U.S. 264, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 65 
L.Ed.2d 115; Maine v. Moulton (1985), 474 U.S. 159, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 
481.  Cf. Kuhlmann v. Wilson (1986), 477 U.S. 436, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 91 L.Ed.2d 
364 (no Sixth Amendment violation unless the defendant shows that police and 
their informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed 
deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks).  See, also, Patterson v. Illinois 
(1988), 487 U.S. 285, 108 S.Ct. 2389, 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (the Sixth Amendment 
does not bar postindictment questioning in the absence of counsel if the accused 
waives the right to counsel). 
{¶ 66} The deliberate-elicitation standard was first recognized in Massiah.  
In that case, Massiah, released on bail, made numerous incriminating statements 
to a coindictee who was acting as a government informant and using a 
surveillance device.  The court held that the protections of the Sixth Amendment 
apply to “ ‘indirect and surreptitious interrogations’ ” as well as those conducted 
at the police station.  Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246, 
quoting a dissenter from a court of appeals’ decision, United States v. Massiah 
(C.A.2, 1962), 307 F.2d 62, 72 (Hays, J., dissenting).  Accordingly, the court held 
that the prosecutor could not constitutionally use Massiah’s incriminating 
statements, because federal agents had deliberately elicited those statements after 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
Massiah had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel.  Id. at 206-207, 84 
S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246. 
{¶ 67} In Henry, an accused made postindictment incriminating 
statements to a government informant while both were in custody.  The court 
applied Massiah’s deliberate-elicitation standard and held that “[b]y intentionally 
creating a situation likely to induce Henry to make incriminating statements 
without the assistance of counsel, the Government violated Henry’s Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.”  Henry, 447 U.S. at 274, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 65 
L.Ed.2d 115.  The court noted that the informant “was not a passive listener; 
rather, he had ‘some conversations with Mr. Henry’ * * * and Henry’s 
incriminating statements were ‘the product of this conversation.’ ”  Id. at 271, 100 
S.Ct. 2183, 65 L.Ed.2d 115, quoting the informant’s testimony. 
{¶ 68} The court also found a Sixth Amendment violation in Moulton, 
where incriminating statements were obtained by Moulton’s codefendant, who 
secretly transmitted or recorded conversations with Moulton after both had been 
released on bail pending trial.  The codefendant obtained several incriminating 
statements by professing to have a poor memory and asking Moulton to remind 
him of the circumstances of the crimes and by reminiscing about events 
surrounding various thefts.  The court invoked Massiah and Henry and articulated 
the following principle: 
{¶ 69} “[K]nowing exploitation by the State of an opportunity to confront 
the accused without counsel being present is as much a breach of the State’s 
obligation not to circumvent the right to the assistance of counsel as is the 
intentional creation of such an opportunity.”  By arranging to record 
conversations between Moulton and the informant and concealing the fact that the 
informant was an agent of the state, the court found, the police denied Moulton an 
opportunity to consult with counsel and thus had denied him the assistance of 
January Term, 2006 
19 
counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.  Id. at 177, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 
L.Ed.2d 481. 
{¶ 70} Massiah, Henry, and Moulton all rest squarely on the prohibition 
against interference with the right to counsel.  The nature of the right recognized 
in these cases is that the “Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused, at least after 
the initiation of formal charges, the right to rely on counsel as a ‘medium’ 
between him and the State.”  Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 
481.  “[T]he primary concern of the Massiah line of decisions is secret 
interrogation by investigatory techniques that are the equivalent of direct police 
interrogation.”  Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. at 459, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 91 L.Ed.2d 
364.  Once an accused is charged, he may not be interrogated, either directly or 
indirectly, about the subject matter of those charges unless counsel is present. 
{¶ 71} In this case, Conway’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel had 
attached regarding the Dockside-shooting prosecution when he was indicted on 
March 5, 2002.  The state concedes that Trent became an agent for the state on 
May 16, 2002, and Conway does not argue on appeal that Trent became a 
government agent before then. 
{¶ 72} The state does not deny that law-enforcement officials used Trent 
as a government informant to deliberately elicit incriminating statements from 
Conway after he was indicted for the Dockside shooting.  Instead, the state 
contends that because the incriminating statements concerned crimes unrelated to 
the Dockside shooting with which Conway had not yet been charged, Conway’s 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated.  The state claims that from 
May 16, 2002, when Trent began working with sheriff’s detectives, Trent elicited 
incriminating evidence regarding only criminal acts that Conway had not yet been 
charged with committing. 
{¶ 73} Contrary to the state’s assertion, the record demonstrates that Trent 
did deliberately draw out incriminating evidence from Conway relating to the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
Dockside shooting after he became a government informant.  After becoming a 
state agent, Trent recorded statements about Conway’s desire to kill a witness to 
the Dockside shooting and elicited evidence about Conway’s plan to manufacture 
evidence by staging a false, videotaped confession.  This evidence was 
incriminating on the pending Dockside charges as well as on potential future 
charges (conspiracy to commit murder and tampering with evidence). 
{¶ 74} The state wishes to limit the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to 
only direct statements by the accused about the indicted offense.  Nothing in 
Massiah or its progeny, however, supports this limitation.  Moulton’s government 
informant surreptitiously transmitted or recorded postindictment conversations 
during which Moulton recounted his part in the charged offenses and discussed 
eliminating witnesses and creating a false alibi.  The prosecutor was allowed to 
admit at trial the incriminating statements about Moulton’s participation in the 
indicted theft offenses as well as the false-alibi plan.  Moulton, 474 U.S. at 167, 
106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481.  The Supreme Court held that “incriminating 
statements pertaining to pending charges are inadmissible at the trial of those 
charges, notwithstanding the fact that the police were also investigating other 
crimes, if, in obtaining this evidence, the State violated the Sixth Amendment by 
knowingly circumventing the accused’s right to the assistance of counsel.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Id. at 180, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481. 
{¶ 75} The court of appeals in United States v. Bender (C.A.1, 2000), 221 
F.3d 265, rejected an argument similar to the state’s argument here.  Bender, 
while in prison awaiting trial on charges of being a felon in possession of a 
firearm, spoke with an undercover government agent about his plans to falsify an 
alibi and kidnap and murder prosecution witnesses.  The First Circuit rejected the 
government’s argument that the statements concerned unindicted crimes unrelated 
to the pending firearm charges and were not obtained in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment.  The court found that it was obvious that questioning Bender about 
January Term, 2006 
21 
the false alibi and the plot to kill witnesses would lead to incriminating statements 
on the indicted firearm charges.  Id. at 269.  While Bender’s statements about his 
plans to kill witnesses and suborn perjury did not provide direct evidence of the 
pending charges or amount to an explicit confession, “they ‘strongly tended to 
show that a guilty mind was at work.’ ”  Id. at 269, quoting United States v. 
Lozada-Rivera (C.A.1, 1999), 177 F.3d 98, 107. 
{¶ 76} That same analysis applies here.  Conway’s statements to Trent 
concerning his intention to kill a witness and to manufacture evidence were 
material evidence of Conway’s guilty mind involving the Dockside charges. 
{¶ 77} Although the police have a legitimate interest in investigating new 
or additional crimes, the state’s “investigative powers are limited by the Sixth 
Amendment rights of the accused.”  Moulton, 474 U.S. at 180, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 
L.Ed.2d 481.  The right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment is violated when 
the state’s agent engages the accused in conversation designed to uncover 
incriminating information about the charges pending against him.  See id. at 177, 
106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481.  Accordingly, the Sixth Amendment bars the 
prosecution from using evidence in its case-in-chief that Trent had obtained from 
Conway after becoming a state agent on May 16, 2002.  Because Trent’s direct 
testimony during the state’s case presented this evidence, we find that Conway’s 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated. 
{¶ 78} Nevertheless, our finding does not require an automatic reversal.  
A constitutional error can be held harmless if we determine that it was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 
S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705.  Whether a Sixth Amendment error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt is not simply an inquiry into the sufficiency of the 
remaining evidence.  Instead, the question is whether there is a reasonable 
possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the 
conviction.  Id. at 23, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705; State v. Madrigal (2000), 87 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
Ohio St.3d 378, 388, 721 N.E.2d 52.  For the following reasons, we conclude that 
the admission of this evidence during the prosecution’s case-in-chief was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
{¶ 79} First, the evidence erroneously admitted was largely cumulative of 
evidence that Trent had obtained before becoming a state agent.  That is, before 
May 16, 2002, when Trent agreed with the prosecutor’s office to act as a 
government informant, Conway had already admitted to Trent that he was the 
Dockside shooter, that he wanted to murder a witness to the Dockside shooting, 
and that he planned to manufacture evidence for the Dockside case by staging a 
false, videotaped confession.  In addition, by April 9, more than one month before 
Trent became a state agent, Conway had $5,000 placed in Trent’s jail commissary 
account as a down payment for killing a government witness. 
{¶ 80} Any statements that Conway made to Trent before Trent became a 
government informant did not violate Conway’s right to counsel and were 
properly admitted during the state’s case.  “[T]he Sixth Amendment is not 
violated whenever – by luck or happenstance – the State obtains incriminating 
statements from the accused after the right to counsel has attached.”  Moulton, 
474 U.S. at 176, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481, citing Henry, 447 U.S. at 276, 
100 S.Ct. 2183, 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (Powell, J., concurring).  The record reflects that 
Conway trusted Trent because they were cousins and that Conway’s statements 
during their joint incarceration were voluntarily made. 
{¶ 81} The only evidence obtained in violation of Conway’s right to 
counsel that was not uncovered by Trent before he became a state agent involved 
discussions about Trent’s having carried out the plan to make a videotaped 
confession and kill the person who made the confession.  Nonetheless, Conway 
had already discussed with Trent his plot to kidnap someone who resembled 
himself, make a video of this person’s confession to the Dockside shooting, and 
then kill that person.  In fact, before Trent became a state agent, Conway had 
January Term, 2006 
23 
instructed Trent on specific details to include in the video.  For instance, Conway 
reminded Trent to include a reference in the video to the live bullet found at the 
crime scene, which had been ejected when Conway or Myers was making sure 
that the gun was loaded.  Conway also urged Trent to use Randy Price in the 
video because Price resembled Conway.  Thus, although evidence of Conway and 
Trent’s discussions after the videotape had been made and the confessor had 
purportedly been killed should not have been admitted during the state’s case, 
Conway was not prejudiced, because evidence was properly admitted at trial that 
Conway had plotted to make the false, videotaped confession with Trent before 
Trent became an agent. 
{¶ 82} Second, the question of Conway’s guilt is not close in this case.  
Strong evidence exists, including eyewitness testimony, that Conway retrieved a 
loaded gun from a car, pursued Williams through the Dockside parking lot, and 
fired eight shots at his victims – including shots from close range while Williams 
and Gervais lay defenseless on the ground.  Conway also testified during trial that 
he had shot Williams and Gervais. 
{¶ 83} Because the tainted evidence simply repeated properly admitted 
evidence and the state’s case against Conway was so strong, we hold that the error 
here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Therefore, we overrule Conway’s 
13th proposition of law. 
{¶ 84} In proposition of law 12, Conway contends that his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel was violated when the trial court allowed the 
prosecutor to cross-examine him about the recorded conversations he had with 
Trent after May 16, 2002. 
{¶ 85} During cross-examination, Conway first denied telling Trent 
anything about the Dockside shooting or talking with him about killing a witness.  
He testified that staging the false confession was Trent’s idea.  The prosecutor 
then attempted to impeach Conway by referring to recorded conversations 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
between Trent and Conway that occurred after Trent became a state agent on May 
16. 
{¶ 86} On cross-examination, Conway claimed that his attorneys had not 
provided him with the Trent tapes before trial, although he did admit to having 
read through some transcripts of those recorded conversations.  The trial court 
allowed the prosecutor to question Conway outside the presence of the jury in 
order to give Conway an opportunity to listen to the tapes and to compare them 
with the transcripts.  After that, the prosecutor was allowed to cross-examine 
Conway about the tape-recorded conversations.  Neither the tape recordings nor 
the transcripts were admitted into evidence. 
{¶ 87} Conway argues that the trial court committed prejudicial error 
when it allowed the prosecutor to impeach him by using statements obtained in 
violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  In State v. Hill (1996), 75 
Ohio St.3d 195, 661 N.E.2d 1068, we considered whether a defendant’s pretrial 
statements made during a court-ordered psychiatric interview could be used to 
impeach his trial testimony.  Hill claimed on appeal that the statements were 
inadmissible because his counsel was not present during the psychiatric interview 
and he was not advised of his Miranda rights.  We recognized that “an accused’s 
voluntary statement could be used to impeach even when the statement was taken 
in violation of the right to have counsel present.”  Id. at 207, 661 N.E.2d 1068, 
citing Michigan v. Harvey (1990), 494 U.S. 344, 110 S.Ct. 1176, 108 L.Ed.2d 
293. 
{¶ 88} Harvey held that a statement taken in violation of Michigan v. 
Jackson (1986), 475 U.S. 625, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631, while 
inadmissible during the prosecution’s case-in-chief, may be used to impeach a 
defendant’s trial testimony.  Harvey, 494 U.S. at 349-352, 110 S.Ct. 1176, 108 
L.Ed.2d 293.  Several federal circuit courts of appeals have, as we did in Hill, 
construed Harvey as holding that a voluntary statement taken in violation of the 
January Term, 2006 
25 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is admissible for impeachment purposes.  
United States v. Ortega (C.A.9, 2000), 203 F.3d 675, 681; United States v. Yancey 
(C.A.4, 1998), 155 F.3d 564 (unpublished opinion); United States v. Bender, 221 
F.3d at 271; United States v. Fellers (C.A.8, 2005), 397 F.3d 1090, 1097; United 
States v. Denetclaw (C.A.10, 1996), 96 F.3d 454, 457.  But, see, United States v. 
Spencer (C.A.2, 1992), 955 F.2d 814 (reading Harvey narrowly and holding that 
statements taken in violation of an accused’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
are inadmissible for all purposes, absent a valid waiver); United States v. Abdi 
(C.A.2, 1998), 142 F.3d 566 (following Spencer). 
{¶ 89} The rationale employed by Harvey, and adopted by this court in 
Hill, is that a defendant should not be allowed to “ ‘ “turn the illegal method by 
which evidence in the Government’s possession was obtained to his own 
advantage, and provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his 
untruths.” ’ ”  Harvey, 494 U.S. at 351, 110 S.Ct. 1176, 108 L.Ed.2d 293, quoting 
Harris v. New York (1971), 401 U.S. 222, 224, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1, 
quoting Walder v. United States (1954), 347 U.S. 62, 65, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 
503.  “If a defendant exercises his right to testify on his own behalf, he assumes a 
reciprocal ‘obligation to speak truthfully and accurately.’ ”  Id., quoting Harris, 
401 U.S. at 225, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1. 
{¶ 90} On this basis, we hold that Conway’s recorded statements to Trent, 
although obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, were 
admissible solely to impeach his untruthful trial testimony.  Therefore, we deny 
proposition of law 12. 
Denial of Counsel 
{¶ 91} Conway claims in proposition of law 16 that the trial court 
committed constitutional error when it ordered Conway not to discuss his 
testimony with counsel during an overnight recess.  During the state’s cross-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
examination of Conway, the trial court decided to recess for the day.  After the 
jury was excused, the trial court instructed Conway: 
{¶ 92} “Mr. Conway, you can leave the stand.  You’re not to discuss your 
testimony with anybody till you resume the stand, you’re in the middle of 
examination.” 
{¶ 93} At the time, defense counsel did not object to the trial court’s 
admonition.  The following morning, defense counsel stated, “I object to the 
separation order of the Court last night on the basis that I was not to see my client 
last night or to talk about this case.”  The trial court explained that it did not order 
counsel not to visit or consult with their client but, rather, that Conway was not to 
discuss his testimony with anyone until his examination was completed.  Defense 
counsel made no further objection at that point.  Conway raised the issue again in 
his motion for new trial.  After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court again 
rejected Conway’s claim. 
{¶ 94} On appeal, Conway maintains that Geders v. United States (1976), 
425 U.S. 80, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 47 L.Ed.2d 592, and Perry v. Leeke (1989), 488 U.S. 
272, 109 S.Ct. 594, 102 L.Ed.2d 624, demonstrate that the trial court committed 
constitutional error when it ordered Conway not to discuss his testimony with 
counsel.  We find that neither case supports Conway’s claim. 
{¶ 95} Geders held that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
was infringed when the trial court prevented him from consulting with counsel 
“about anything” during an overnight recess.  Geders, 425 U.S. at 91, 96 S.Ct. 
1330, 47 L.Ed.2d 592.  Thus, Geders concerned a complete deprivation of access 
to counsel.  This matter is not analogous to Geders because the trial court did not 
restrict Conway’s access to his lawyers during the overnight recess. 
{¶ 96} Perry held that a defendant has no constitutional right to consult 
with his attorney about his testimony while testifying.  Perry, 488 U.S. at 284-
285, 109 S.Ct. 594, 102 L.Ed.2d 624.  The court found that while a defendant has 
January Term, 2006 
27 
an absolute right to consultation before he begins to testify, a trial judge can 
decide that cross-examination is more likely to elicit truthful responses if it goes 
forward without allowing the defendant an opportunity to consult with his or her 
attorney.  Id. at 281-282, 109 S.Ct. 594, 102 L.Ed.2d 624. 
{¶ 97} Admittedly, Perry involved a decidedly brief recess – 15 minutes – 
as opposed to the overnight recess at issue here.  Nevertheless, Geders and Perry 
made clear that “[i]t is the defendant’s right to unrestricted access to his lawyer 
for advice on a variety of trial-related matters that is controlling in the context of a 
long recess.”  Perry, 488 U.S. at 284, 109 S.Ct. 594, 102 L.E.2d 624, citing 
Geders, 425 U.S. at 88, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 47 L.Ed.2d 592.  Although Conway was 
prohibited from discussing his uncompleted testimony with counsel, the trial court 
did not order him not to meet or consult with counsel about other matters during 
the overnight recess.  See Perry, 488 U.S. at 284, 109 S.Ct. 594, 102 L.Ed.2d 624, 
fn. 8, citing with approval People v. Stroner (1982), 104 Ill.App.3d 1, 5-6, 59 
Ill.Dec. 764, 432 N.E.2d 348.  Therefore, we deny Conway’s 16th proposition of 
law. 
Right to Public Trial 
{¶ 98} In proposition of law 17, Conway contends that the government 
intruded on his right to a public trial.  Conway’s claim is devoid of merit. 
{¶ 99} The Sixth Amendment provides that a defendant “shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial.”  We have “long recognized that ‘the right to a 
public trial * * * is a fundamental guarantee of both the United States and Ohio 
Constitutions.’ ”  State v. Cassano, 96 Ohio St.3d 94, 2002-Ohio-3751, 772 
N.E.2d 81, at ¶ 62, quoting State v. Lane (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 112, 14 O.O.3d 
342, 397 N.E.2d 1338, paragraph two of the syllabus.  In Waller v. Georgia 
(1984), 467 U.S. 39, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31, the Supreme Court addressed 
the scope of a criminal defendant’s right to a public trial.  The court noted that the 
central aim of a criminal proceeding is to try the accused fairly and recognized 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
that the public-trial guarantee allows the public to see for itself that the accused is 
fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned.  In addition, a public trial ensures 
that the judge and prosecutor carry out their duties responsibly, encourages 
witnesses to come forward, and discourages perjury.  Id. at 46, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 
L.Ed.2d 31. 
{¶ 100} Waller dealt with a trial court’s barring from a suppression 
hearing all persons other than the parties, their lawyers, witnesses, and court 
personnel.  Waller, 467 U.S. at 42, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31.  Conway 
concedes that the trial judge did not order any part of his trial closed to the public.  
Nevertheless, Conway maintains that the prosecutor interfered with his right to a 
public trial.  While Conway’s argument is somewhat difficult to decipher, he 
apparently contends that prosecutors prevented certain people from attending his 
trial. 
{¶ 101} Yet there is no credible evidence to support Conway’s claim.  
The only restrictions imposed on spectators entering the courtroom related to 
enforcing the court’s separation-of-witnesses order, an order that defense counsel 
requested.  See Evid.R. 615.  Sheriff’s deputies were placed at the courtroom 
entrance for security purposes, and spectators were asked to show identification 
before entering the courtroom.  Defense counsel and the prosecuting attorneys 
conferred with deputies, as well as with each other, to determine whether certain 
spectators were potential witnesses and should be excluded from the courtroom. 
{¶ 102} Conway’s claim that prosecutors intimidated spectators who 
supported Conway is equally without merit.  In his brief, Conway refers to 
Gretchen Roese and Susan Doering as subjects of the alleged improper 
government conduct.  An evidentiary hearing on this issue was held in 
conjunction with Conway’s motion for a new trial, at which both women testified 
that they had not been prevented from attending Conway’s trial.  Roese and 
Doering testified that they had been required to present identification before 
January Term, 2006 
29 
entering the courtroom, but conceded that this request was made after they had 
refused to reveal their names to deputies.  Both were informed that the 
prosecutors were merely trying to identify potential witnesses.  Each was 
questioned by prosecuting attorneys, but only because each agreed to talk to them.  
Therefore, there is no evidence that either woman was singled out or intimidated, 
and Conway has not established that his right to a public trial was violated. 
{¶ 103} In any event, Conway did not complain until after the guilt phase 
of his trial that his family and friends were intimidated or barred from the 
courtroom.  Thus, this issue has been waived.  See Crim.R. 52(B); State v. Long 
(1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804, paragraph one of the 
syllabus. 
{¶ 104} Thus, we reject his 17th proposition of law. 
Testimony of Former Assistant Prosecutor 
{¶ 105} Conway argues in proposition of law 18 that prejudicial error 
occurred when a former assistant prosecuting attorney, previously active in his 
case, was allowed to testify.  During the state’s case, the prosecutor called a 
former assistant prosecutor, David DeVillers, to rebut an implication by defense 
counsel that the government’s informant, Trent, had gained information about the 
Dockside shooting from reading Conway’s discovery documents during their joint 
incarceration.  Conway did not object to DeVillers’s testimony at trial and has 
waived all but plain error.  Plain error will not be found unless Conway 
establishes that the outcome of his trial clearly would have been otherwise except 
for the trial court’s alleged improper action of allowing the testimony.  State v. 
Waddell (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 163, 166, 661 N.E.2d 1043. 
{¶ 106} Prosecuting attorneys are not disqualified as witnesses solely by 
virtue of their employment in cases in which they play no other role.  United 
States v. Armedo-Sarmiento (C.A.2, 1976), 545 F.2d 785, 793.  See, also, State v. 
Daniels (1993), 92 Ohio App.3d 473, 488, 636 N.E.2d 336 (testimony of juvenile-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
division assistant prosecutor allowed because he was not engaged as active 
counsel for prosecution).  In State v. Coleman (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 298, 544 
N.E.2d 622, paragraph two of the syllabus, we held, “A prosecuting attorney 
should avoid being a witness in a criminal prosecution, but where it is a complex 
proceeding and substitution of counsel is impractical, and where the attorney so 
testifying is not engaged in the active trial of the cause and it is the only testimony 
available, such testimony is admissible and not in violation of DR 5-102.”  See, 
also, United States v. Johnston (C.A.7, 1982), 690 F.2d 638, 644 (prosecutor’s 
testimony may be permitted in extraordinary circumstances and for compelling 
reasons, usually where the evidence is otherwise unavailable). 
{¶ 107} Conway relies primarily on Coleman and Johnston in support of 
this proposition.  But this is not a case in which DeVillers was engaged in the dual 
role of advocate-witness.  Cf. United States v. Johnston, 690 F.2d at 642 (the 
advocate-witness rule “articulates the professional impropriety of assuming the 
dual role of advocate and witness in a single proceeding”).  DeVillers participated 
in the criminal investigation of Conway and presented the Dockside shooting to 
the grand jury, but did not act as counsel for the state during Conway’s trial. 
{¶ 108} Although Conway contends that the information in DeVillers’s 
testimony was available through a stipulated exhibit, DeVillers’s testimony was 
probative of whether Trent could have gained any knowledge about Conway’s 
involvement in the Dockside shooting from discovery materials in Conway’s cell.  
See Evid.R. 401 and 402. 
{¶ 109} Thus, there was no error, plain or otherwise.  DeVillers had no 
other role at Conway’s trial beyond his testimony, and his testimony was relevant.  
Therefore, we overrule Conway’s 18th proposition of law. 
Denial of Expert Witness and Limitation on Cross-Examination 
{¶ 110} In proposition of law 21, Conway argues that the trial court erred 
when it did not allow testimony and evidence from James Cope, whom the 
January Term, 2006 
31 
defense wished to call as an expert witness.  He also contends under this 
proposition that defense counsel were severely limited in their ability to cross-
examine Trent, the state’s informant. 
{¶ 111} Denial of expert witness.  After the state rested, the defense 
informed the court that it intended to call Cope, a mechanical engineer, as an 
expert witness.  The defense had hired Cope to make a computer-animated 
reenactment of the crime.  Cope’s video purported to show how Williams had 
pulled Gervais into the line of fire as Conway was shooting at Williams. 
{¶ 112} The trial court denied defense counsel’s request to call Cope and 
to introduce the video into evidence.  The court also precluded the defense from 
calling Cope to introduce still photographs produced from the video.  The court 
found that defense counsel had violated pretrial discovery by not providing the 
state with the video or Cope’s curriculum vitae (“CV”) or any other documents 
establishing his credentials until immediately before the defense intended to 
introduce the evidence.  The court also noted that the video did not accurately 
depict the evidence introduced at trial and indicated that the video might mislead 
the jury. 
{¶ 113} Conway contends on appeal that the trial court severely restricted 
his right to present a defense by excluding Cope’s testimony and the video.  
However, “[a] party may not predicate error on the exclusion of evidence during 
the examination in chief unless two conditions are met: (1) the exclusion of such 
evidence must affect a substantial right of the party and (2) the substance of the 
excluded evidence was made known to the court by proffer or was apparent from 
the context within which questions were asked.”  (Emphasis sic.)  State v. 
Gilmore (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 190, 28 OBR 278, 503 N.E.2d 147, syllabus.  
Conway has not met either requirement. 
{¶ 114} The record is insufficient to support a finding that this evidence 
was improperly excluded.  After the trial court rejected Cope’s evidence, defense 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
32 
counsel proffered defense exhibits 34 through 37 (still photos taken from the 
video), exhibit 38 (video reenactment), and exhibit 39 (Cope’s CV).  Defense 
counsel then added: 
{¶ 115} “I merely proffer that we have the engineer, James Cope, * * * 
here outside the courtroom, that he would testify, if permitted, that he analyzed 
the coroner’s report, talked to the [defense] investigator in this case, * * * and he 
presented a piece of demonstrative evidence that’s on this tape, Defendant’s 
Exhibit 38, and also * * * [exhibits] 34 through 37, which are stills coming from 
the tape which would demonstrate, if permitted, the testimony of the investigator 
as to his theory of what happened in this case.” 
{¶ 116} First, defense counsel did not proffer sufficient information 
establishing Cope’s qualifications as an expert witness.  “Evid.R. 702(B) provides 
that a witness may qualify as an expert by reason of his or her specialized 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.  Neither special education 
nor certification is necessary to confer expert status upon a witness.  The 
individual offered as an expert need not have complete knowledge of the field in 
question, as long as the knowledge he or she possesses will aid the trier of fact in 
performing its fact-finding function.”  State v. Hartman (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 
274, 285, 754 N.E.2d 1150. 
{¶ 117} The only information in the record regarding Cope’s 
qualifications is contained in his CV.  His CV provides that he earned a bachelor 
of science degree in mechanical engineering from Washington University in 1992 
and that he earned several awards for creating animated films.  His CV lists three 
instances of experience creating films for lawsuit purposes: one depicting an 
industrial accident, one depicting an auto accident, and one depicting building 
construction.  Only the auto-accident video is described as a reenactment.  There 
is no indication in his CV, or anywhere else in the record, that Cope has any 
specialized knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education in the field of 
January Term, 2006 
33 
crime-scene reconstruction.  In fact, there is nothing in the record that Cope had 
ever done a crime-scene reconstruction.  Nor is there any evidence that Cope had 
ever testified as an expert witness in crime-scene reconstruction or in any related 
field.  Cf. State v. Clark (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 389, 411-412, 655 N.E.2d 795 
(listing qualifications of expert witness in field of crime-scene reconstruction). 
{¶ 118} Under Evid.R. 104(A), the trial court has discretion in 
determining whether someone qualifies as an expert witness. Conway has 
provided no basis for us to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in 
deeming that Cope was not qualified as an expert witness.  See State v. Williams 
(1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 53, 58, 446 N.E.2d 444. 
{¶ 119} Second, Conway did not proffer Cope’s testimony; nor is the 
substance of Cope’s expected testimony apparent from the record.  Defense 
counsel’s proffer failed to indicate the specific data used to make the video. 
{¶ 120} Evid.R. 702(C) requires that an expert’s testimony be based on 
“reliable scientific, technical, or other specialized information.”  Under Evid.R. 
702(C), if the expert’s “testimony reports the result of a procedure, test, or 
experiment, the testimony is reliable only if all of the following apply: (1) The 
theory upon which the procedure, test, or experiment is based is objectively 
verifiable or is validly derived from widely accepted knowledge, facts, or 
principles; (2) The design of the procedure, test, or experiment reliably 
implements the theory; (3) The particular procedure, test, or experiment was 
conducted in a way that will yield an accurate result.” 
{¶ 121} “The reliability requirement in Evid.R. 702 is a threshold 
determination that should focus on a particular type of scientific evidence, not the 
truth or falsity of alleged scientific fact or truth.”  State v. Nemeth (1998), 82 Ohio 
St.3d 202, 211, 694 N.E.2d 1332.  The Staff Note to Evid.R. 702 directs that 
questions of reliability are to be directed at principles and methods used by an 
expert in reaching his or her conclusions, rather than at the correctness or 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
34 
credibility of the conclusions themselves.  “Relevant evidence based on valid 
principles will satisfy the threshold reliability standard for admission of expert 
testimony.”  State v. Nemeth, 82 Ohio St.3d at 211, 694 N.E.2d 1332; see, also, 
Miller v. Bike Athletic Co. (1998), 80 Ohio St.3d 607, 611, 687 N.E.2d 735. 
{¶ 122} Nothing in the record indicates what principles or methods Cope 
employed in creating the crime-scene reenactment.  Because defense counsel 
failed to proffer Cope’s testimony, we are unable to determine whether the 
excluded evidence is reliable for purposes of Evid.R. 702. 
{¶ 123} Finally, Conway has not met the first prong of Gilmore that “the 
exclusion of such evidence must affect a substantial right of the party.”  28 Ohio 
St.3d 190, 28 OBR 278, 503 N.E.2d 147, syllabus.  Although Conway argues that 
the trial court’s ruling was prejudicial, he offers no evidence or legal argument to 
buttress his claim.  The information from Cope’s video that the defense sought to 
put before the jury — that Williams had pulled Gervais into the line of fire — was 
admitted nevertheless in the testimony of two prosecution witnesses.  Thus, 
defense counsel were able to present this information to the jury, and we find no 
merit to Conway’s claim that the exclusion of Cope’s testimony and exhibits 
restricted Conway’s right to present a defense. 
{¶ 124} Restrictions on cross-examination.  Conway also argues under 
this proposition of law that his defense was hampered because the trial court 
severely limited the cross-examination of Trent.  Specifically, Conway contends 
that he was restricted in challenging Trent’s credibility. 
{¶ 125} Trent admitted during his testimony that some time before 
Conway’s trial, he had tried to take responsibility for a shooting he did not 
commit.  The shooting was actually committed by Terry Mayle, a friend of 
Trent’s.  In October 2000, Trent executed a false affidavit for Mayle’s 
postconviction case, claiming that he, not Mayle, was the actual shooter.  
Contrary to Conway’s assertion, the trial court did allow defense counsel to cross-
January Term, 2006 
35 
examine Trent regarding his signing of this false affidavit.  Nevertheless, Conway 
contends that he was prevented from cross-examining Trent regarding “specific 
instances of his previous lying.” 
{¶ 126} The trial court did preclude counsel from cross-examining Trent 
on the facts of Mayle’s criminal case and the details of the false affidavit.  But 
this was not error.  Evid.R. 608(B) provides that a witness may, in the court’s 
discretion, be cross-examined as to specific instances of a witness’s conduct 
concerning the witness’s character for truthfulness if the conduct is “clearly 
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness.”  Conway has failed to show that the 
evidence sought to be elicited was clearly probative of Trent’s truthfulness or 
untruthfulness.  The facts of Mayle’s criminal case were not relevant to Trent’s 
veracity and were therefore not the proper subject of cross-examination under 
Evid.R. 608(B).  The trial court also did not commit error in preventing cross-
examination of the details within Trent’s affidavit.  The jury was well aware that 
Trent had previously lied under oath.  The affidavit did not contain information 
about Conway’s case and possessed limited probative value relating to Trent’s 
untruthfulness. 
{¶ 127} We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.  The jury 
had all the information it needed to assess Trent’s credibility, and Conway does 
not cite any other instance in which the trial court unduly restricted his counsel’s 
cross-examination.  See, e.g., State v. Brinkley, 105 Ohio St.3d 231, 2005-Ohio-
1507, 824 N.E.2d 959, at ¶ 106-111.  For the reasons stated, proposition of law 21 
is rejected. 
Guilt-Phase Jury Instructions 
{¶ 128} In proposition of law one, Conway contends that the trial court 
abused its discretion by denying his requests for jury instructions on voluntary 
manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
36 
{¶ 129} Voluntary Manslaughter.  R.C. 2903.03(A), which defines 
voluntary manslaughter, provides, “No person, while under the influence of 
sudden passion or in a sudden fit of rage, either of which is brought on by serious 
provocation occasioned by the victim that is reasonably sufficient to incite the 
person into using deadly force, shall knowingly cause the death of another * * *.”  
Voluntary manslaughter is an inferior degree of aggravated murder.  State v. Tyler 
(1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 24, 36, 553 N.E.2d 576. 
{¶ 130} A defendant charged with aggravated murder is entitled to an 
instruction on voluntary manslaughter when the evidence presented at trial would 
reasonably support both an acquittal on the aggravated murder charge and a 
conviction of voluntary manslaughter.  State v. Shane (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 630, 
632, 590 N.E.2d 272.  Before giving a voluntary-manslaughter instruction in a 
murder case, the trial court must determine “whether evidence of reasonably 
sufficient provocation occasioned by the victim has been presented to warrant 
such an instruction.”  Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 131} In this case, the deceased victim, Gervais, did nothing to provoke 
Conway.  Under R.C. 2903.03(A), the provocation must be “occasioned by the 
victim.”  The voluntary-manslaughter statute was amended in 1982 to include the 
phrase “occasioned by the victim,” which forecloses application of the statute to 
situations, as here, where the provocation came from someone other than the 
person killed.  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 103, 139 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1761, 1763.  See, 
also, 2 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law (2003) 510-511, Section 
15.2(g).  Thus, we find that the trial court did not commit error in refusing to 
instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter. 
{¶ 132} Involuntary Manslaughter.  Involuntary manslaughter is a lesser 
included offense of aggravated murder.  State v. Thomas (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 
213, 533 N.E.2d 286, paragraph one of the syllabus.  The difference between the 
two offenses is the mental state of the accused.  Aggravated murder under R.C. 
January Term, 2006 
37 
2903.01(A) requires a purpose to kill, with prior calculation and design, while 
involuntary manslaughter requires only that the killing occur as a proximate result 
of committing or attempting to commit a felony.  R.C. 2903.04(A); Thomas at 
216-217, 533 N.E.2d 286. 
{¶ 133} “Even though an offense may be statutorily defined as a lesser 
included offense of another, a charge on such lesser included offense is required 
only where the evidence presented at trial would reasonably support both an 
acquittal on the crime charged and a conviction upon the lesser included offense.”  
State v. Thomas, 40 Ohio St.3d 213, 533 N.E.2d 286, paragraph two of the 
syllabus.  In making this determination, the court must view the evidence in a 
light most favorable to defendant.  State v. Smith (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 323, 331, 
731 N.E.2d 645; State v. Wilkins (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 382, 388, 18 O.O.3d 528, 
415 N.E.2d 303. 
{¶ 134} Nevertheless, an instruction is not warranted every time any 
evidence is presented on a lesser included offense.  There must be “sufficient 
evidence” to “allow a jury to reasonably reject the greater offense and find the 
defendant guilty on a lesser included (or inferior-degree) offense.”  (Emphasis 
sic.)  State v. Shane, 63 Ohio St.3d at 632-633, 590 N.E.2d 272.  In view of the 
evidence presented at trial, even when construed in a light most favorable to 
Conway, the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct on involuntary 
manslaughter. 
{¶ 135} The basis for an involuntary-manslaughter instruction was 
Conway’s claim that he did not intend to kill Gervais or Williams.  Conway did 
testify that he was not trying to kill anyone.  Conway testified that Williams was 
charging at his brother, that he believed Williams had a knife, and that he grabbed 
the gun from Myers and started shooting low, “at his hip,” in order to stop 
Williams from advancing.  But this evidence, if accepted by the jury, would 
constitute a complete defense to the charges of aggravated murder and attempted 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
38 
murder.  That is, the jury was obligated to choose between a complete defense – 
defense of another – and therefore acquittal, or the commission of the crimes of 
aggravated murder and attempted murder.  Although presentation of a complete 
defense does not automatically preclude a lesser-included-offense instruction, 
State v. Wilkins, 64 Ohio St.2d at 387-388, 18 O.O.3d 528, 415 N.E.2d 303, 
Conway has not presented any other evidence that the shooting was unintentional. 
{¶ 136} Conway’s evidence actually shows intentional killing.  He 
testified that he pulled the trigger as fast as he could and fired eight shots at 
Williams.  Gervais and Williams were each hit four times.  That Conway hit 
Gervais and Williams four times each and that the final shots were fired at 
defenseless victims and at close range belie his denial of a purpose to kill.  See, 
e.g., State v. Raglin (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 253, 257-258, 699 N.E.2d 482; State v. 
Sheppard (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 230, 236-237, 703 N.E.2d 286; State v. Palmer, 
80 Ohio St.3d at 562-563, 687 N.E.2d 685. 
{¶ 137} Additionally, we have held that “where an inherently dangerous 
instrumentality was employed, a homicide occurring during the commission of a 
felony is a natural and probable consequence presumed to have been intended.  
Such evidence is sufficient to allow a jury to find a purposeful intent to kill.”  
State v. Jester (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 147, 152, 512 N.E.2d 962; State v. Esparza 
(1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 8, 14, 529 N.E.2d 192.  This presumption was one of the 
factors that led us to hold in Thomas that an instruction on involuntary 
manslaughter was not required.  Thomas, 40 Ohio St.3d at 217-218, 533 N.E.2d 
286. 
{¶ 138} Any reasonable view of the evidence here shows that Conway 
possessed an intent to kill.  Thus, the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct 
the jury on the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter. 
{¶ 139} Even if the refusal to instruct on involuntary manslaughter was 
error, it was harmless.  If the jurors had any doubt about prior calculation and 
January Term, 2006 
39 
design but were reluctant to acquit, they could have found Conway guilty of 
murder instead because the trial court did instruct on murder as a lesser included 
offense in Count 1.  The jurors’ rejection of  that option shows that they would 
also have rejected the still lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter.  See, e.g., 
State v. Robb, 88 Ohio St.3d at 75, 723 N.E.2d 1019.  Accordingly, we overrule 
proposition of law one. 
{¶ 140} In proposition of law 11, Conway asserts that the trial court erred 
in instructing the jury that the doctrine of transferred intent also applied with 
respect to the R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) aggravating circumstance.  As Conway argues, 
this instruction permitted the jury to convict him of the R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) 
course-of-conduct specification even if the jury believed he had a purpose to kill 
only one person (Williams). 
{¶ 141} Under R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), the death penalty may be imposed for 
aggravated murder if the state proves beyond a reasonable doubt that “the offense 
at bar was part of a course of conduct involving the purposeful killing of or 
attempt to kill two or more persons by the offender.”  Conway failed to object on 
this basis at trial, however, and waived all but plain error.  We find no plain error. 
{¶ 142} Conway contends that it would be legally impossible for him to 
be guilty of the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill two or more persons if the 
jury believed that he did not actually intend to kill Gervais. 
{¶ 143} Even disregarding the doctrine of transferred intent, the jury had 
overwhelming evidence that Conway had a purpose to kill Gervais.  “It is a 
fundamental principle that a person is presumed to intend the natural, reasonable 
and probable consequences of his voluntary acts.”  State v. Johnson (1978), 56 
Ohio St.2d 35, 39, 10 O.O.3d 78, 381 N.E.2d 637.  Intent is gathered from the 
surrounding facts and circumstances.  Id. at 38, 10 O.O.3d 78, 381 N.E.2d 637; 
State v. Lott (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 168, 555 N.E.2d 293.  As previously 
discussed, Conway armed himself with a loaded firearm and fired eight shots, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
40 
with the final shots fired from close range at defenseless victims.  With this 
evidence, no reasonable jury could have found that Conway did not purposely 
intend to kill both Williams and Gervais.  The jurors were also instructed that if 
they found that the state had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any part of 
the course-of-conduct specification, they must find Conway not guilty of the 
specification.  Therefore, we reject proposition of law 11. 
PENALTY-PHASE ISSUES 
Penalty-Phase Jury Instructions 
{¶ 144} Conway argues in proposition of law five that he was prejudiced 
by the trial court’s penalty-phase instruction that a life-sentence recommendation 
must be unanimous.  Conway, however, waived this issue by not objecting to the 
court’s instruction or to the life-sentence verdict forms.  State v. Underwood 
(1983), 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 3 OBR 360, 444 N.E.2d 1332, syllabus.  Plain error is 
absent because R.C. 2929.03(D)(2) and Crim.R. 31(A) require that a verdict of 
life imprisonment be unanimous, and that requirement has been upheld as 
constitutional.  State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 213, 15 OBR 311, 473 
N.E.2d 264.  Therefore, proposition five is overruled. 
Failure to Grant Continuance 
{¶ 145} Conway argues in proposition of law 15 that the trial court 
committed prejudicial error at the outset of the penalty phase in refusing his 
request for a continuance so that he could retain new counsel. 
{¶ 146} On the day that the penalty phase was to begin, defense counsel 
indicated that Conway’s family wanted the mitigation hearing postponed so that 
Conway could hire new counsel.  Conway apparently had wanted to dismiss his 
attorneys at one point, but defense counsel told the court that they believed that 
Conway wanted them to represent him in the penalty phase.  Nevertheless, the 
trial court allowed Conway to identify the problems he was having with defense 
January Term, 2006 
41 
counsel for the record.  After a lengthy discussion, the trial court denied the 
request for a continuance to retain new counsel. 
{¶ 147} The determination whether to grant a continuance is entrusted to 
the broad discretion of the trial court.  State v. Unger (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 21 
O.O.3d 41, 423 N.E.2d 1078, syllabus.  Relevant factors include the length of the 
delay requested, prior continuances, inconvenience, and the reasons for the delay.  
State v. Landrum (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 107, 115, 559 N.E.2d 710. 
{¶ 148} In addition, “ ‘[a]n indigent defendant has no right to have a 
particular attorney represent him and therefore must demonstrate “good cause” to 
warrant substitution of counsel.’ ”  State v. Cowans (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 68, 72, 
717 N.E.2d 298, quoting United States v. Iles (C.A.6, 1990), 906 F.2d 1122, 1130.  
The trial court may deny the request to substitute counsel if the complaint is 
unreasonable.  State v. Deal (1969), 17 Ohio St.2d 17, 46 O.O.2d 154, 244 N.E.2d 
742, syllabus.  The trial court’s decision is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion 
standard.  Cowans, 87 Ohio St.3d at 73, 717 N.E.2d 298. 
{¶ 149} Conway informed the trial court that his chief complaint about 
his attorneys was their failure to do specific things that he requested.  Conway 
complained that trial counsel had ignored his wishes to show the surveillance tape 
of the Dockside parking lot on the night of the shooting and had refused to call 
Britnee Stallings, Conway’s girlfriend, as a defense witness.  He also complained 
that he had not been allowed to attend jury-instruction conferences. (See 
discussion in proposition of law three.) 
{¶ 150} Disagreements between attorney and client over trial strategy do 
not warrant substitution of counsel.  See, e.g., State v. Henness (1997), 79 Ohio 
St.3d 53, 65-66, 679 N.E.2d 686; State v. Hill, 75 Ohio St.3d at 212, 661 N.E.2d 
1068 (“trial courts cannot interfere with counsel’s trial tactics or representation of 
their clients”).  Defendants have no constitutional right to determine strategy, and 
decisions about viable defenses are “ ‘within the exclusive province of defense 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
42 
counsel to make after consultation with his client.’ ”  State v. Murphy (2001), 91 
Ohio St.3d 516, 524, 747 N.E.2d 765, quoting Lewis v. Alexander (C.A.6, 1993), 
11 F.3d 1349, 1354. 
{¶ 151} Conway makes no claim that defense counsel failed to discuss 
strategy concerning presentation of evidence or the calling of witnesses.  Conway 
does not demonstrate a complete breakdown in the attorney-client relationship 
that jeopardized his right to the effective assistance of counsel.  See State v. 
Coleman (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 286, 525 N.E.2d 792, paragraph four of the 
syllabus; State v. Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d at 523-524, 747 N.E.2d 765.  In fact, the 
record reflects that defense counsel and Conway were engaged in discussions 
about his mitigation. 
{¶ 152} Furthermore, Conway has not demonstrated that trial counsel’s 
failure to introduce the surveillance tape or call Britnee Stallings as a witness was 
unreasonable trial strategy.  See Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 
104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.  Defense counsel explained that the surveillance 
tape had little to no value to the defense because it recorded only the order in 
which people had arrived at the bar and did not record the fight or the shooting.  
With respect to Britnee Stallings, Conway wanted her called as a witness to 
establish that he was not carrying a weapon when he arrived at Dockside.  That 
fact was not disputed.  Defense counsel also exercised sound strategy in not 
calling Stallings, because she had served as a conduit to conversations between 
Conway and Trent, the government’s agent, and her testimony might have been 
damaging to Conway’s defense. 
{¶ 153} Finally, Conway did not formally request a continuance or 
substitution of counsel.  There was no written request for a continuance or for 
new counsel, nor did trial counsel request leave to withdraw.  In fact, when 
defense counsel represented to the court that Conway wanted them to go forward 
with his mitigation case, Conway did not dispute this statement. 
January Term, 2006 
43 
{¶ 154} In any event, Conway did not demonstrate good cause to warrant 
a substitution of counsel.  As a result, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
denying a continuance to obtain new counsel.  Therefore, we reject proposition of 
law 15. 
Juror Misconduct 
{¶ 155} In proposition of law 20, Conway contends that the trial court 
erred in not granting a mistrial when, according to Conway, it was revealed that 
jurors had discussed the issue of punishment before the penalty phase. 
{¶ 156} Before beginning the penalty phase, juror Guisinger notified the 
bailiff about a conversation she had had with the first alternate juror, Ms. 
Benedetti, shortly after the jury had rendered guilty verdicts on all counts and 
specifications.  The trial court conducted a hearing and questioned Guisinger 
about the conversation.  Referring to the jury’s verdict, Benedetti had said to 
Guisinger, “I could never do what you just did.”  Guisinger responded, “[Y]es, 
you could.”  Benedetti then replied, “[T]hat young man looks no worse than the 
rest of them.”  After this comment, Guisinger said she changed the subject.  
Guisinger told the court and counsel that Benedetti’s comments would not affect 
her ability to deliberate impartially in the penalty phase.  The trial court then 
asked counsel whether there were any objections to allowing Guisinger to 
continue as a juror, and both sides agreed that she should remain on the jury. 
{¶ 157} The trial court then examined Benedetti, who denied initiating 
any conversation about the case or expressing any opinions.  Upon further 
questioning, however, Benedetti admitted that she had asked the other alternate 
jurors how they would have voted.  After questioning the remaining alternates and 
requestioning Guisinger, the trial court dismissed Benedetti as an alternate juror. 
{¶ 158} Defense counsel then said, “Judge, we’re going to have to make 
a motion for a mistrial on all the jurors, especially * * * Guisinger.  The other two 
alternates we don’t feel could fill their position.”  The motion was based on the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
44 
jurors’ and alternate jurors’ violation of the court’s order not to discuss the case 
outside the deliberating room.  The trial court denied the motion. 
{¶ 159} Conway contends on appeal that the trial court erred in not 
granting a mistrial, because Guisinger could no longer act as an impartial juror 
during the penalty phase due to her conversation with Benedetti.  However, we 
reject this argument. 
{¶ 160} The granting of a mistrial is necessary only when a fair trial is no 
longer possible.  State v. Franklin (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 127, 580 N.E.2d 1.  
The remedy for claims of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has 
an opportunity to prove actual bias.  State v. Phillips (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 88, 
656 N.E.2d 643, citing Smith v. Phillips (1982), 455 U.S. 209, 215-216, 102 S.Ct. 
940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78;  Remmer v. United States (1954), 347 U.S. 227, 229-230, 74 
S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654.  The defense must establish that the improper 
communication biased the juror.  State v. Keith (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 514, 526, 
684 N.E.2d 47; United States v. Zelinka (C.A.6, 1988), 862 F.2d 92, 95.  “In cases 
involving outside influences on jurors, trial courts are granted broad discretion in 
dealing with the contact and determining whether to declare a mistrial or to 
replace an affected juror.”  Phillips, 74 Ohio St.3d at 89, 656 N.E.2d 643. 
{¶ 161} The trial court conducted a hearing on this matter, during which 
Conway failed to establish that Guisinger was biased or that Conway suffered 
prejudice as a result of the conversation between Guisinger and Benedetti.  
Contrary to Conway’s claim, the discussion between Benedetti and Guisinger did 
not involve the issue of punishment, the only matter remaining before the jury.  
See, e.g., State v. Murphy (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 554, 575, 605 N.E.2d 884 (“The 
presumption of prejudice to which Remmer, supra, refers obtains only where 
communication with the juror concerns ‘the matter pending before the jury’ ”).  
Instead, Benedetti’s comments to Guisinger concerned the jury’s guilt-phase 
verdicts and occurred after those verdicts were rendered. 
January Term, 2006 
45 
{¶ 162} During the hearing, Guisinger testified that Benedetti had 
initiated the conversation, and presumably upon recognizing that discussing the 
jury’s verdict was improper, Guisinger had “changed the subject.”  Guisinger also 
stated that she would not be affected by Benedetti’s comments and could remain 
fair and impartial. 
{¶ 163} Although Benedetti claimed that Guisinger had initiated the 
conversation, the trial court’s ruling reflects that the court believed Guisinger and 
not Benedetti.  A trial court is permitted to rely on a juror’s testimony in 
determining that juror’s impartiality.  State v. Herring (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 246, 
259, 762 N.E.2d 940; State v. Gross, 97 Ohio St.3d 121, 2002-Ohio-5524, 776 
N.E.2d 1061, at ¶ 114.  Cf. State v. Fears (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 329, 337-338, 
715 N.E.2d 136 (acknowledging that a trial judge is in the best position to observe 
prospective jurors and decide whether they can be impartial).  It was Guisinger, 
not Benedetti, who first brought the improper contact to the trial court’s attention.  
Benedetti also had engaged in improper discussions with the other alternate 
jurors. 
{¶ 164} The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to order a 
mistrial.  We therefore overrule proposition 20. 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
{¶ 165} Conway makes various claims relating to ineffective assistance 
of counsel.  Reversal of a conviction or sentence based upon ineffective assistance 
of counsel requires satisfying the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.  Strickland requires 
that the defendant show, first, that counsel’s performance was deficient and, 
second, that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial.  Id. at 687-696, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674.  In order to show deficient performance, defendant must prove that counsel’s 
performance fell below an objective level of reasonable representation.  To show 
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prejudice, defendant must show a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  Strickland v. 
Washington; State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373. 
Guilt Phase 
{¶ 166} Conway contends in proposition of law four that trial counsel 
were ineffective in failing to object to inadmissible character evidence about 
Gervais.  Conway claims that trial counsel should have objected to testimony 
from Benjamin Bechtel that he and Gervais had been friends since high school, 
testimony describing their high school activities, and testimony about Gervais’s 
college studies and his newly founded business. 
{¶ 167} Much of Bechtel’s testimony about the victim was admissible 
during the guilt phase because it depicted the circumstances surrounding the 
commission of the murder.  See State v. Fautenberry (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 435, 
439-440, 650 N.E.2d 878.  For instance, Bechtel’s testimony established his 
connection to Gervais and why and how Gervais ended up at Dockside on the 
night he was shot.  However, testimony about Gervais’s high school activities, his 
college studies, and how he had formed his new business was not relevant.  See 
Evid.R. 401. 
{¶ 168} Nevertheless, the failure to make objections alone is not enough 
to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  State v. Holloway (1988), 
38 Ohio St.3d 239, 244, 527 N.E.2d 831; State v. Gumm (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 
413, 428, 653 N.E.2d 253.  To prevail on such a claim, Conway must show both 
that there was a substantial violation of counsel’s duties and that he was 
materially prejudiced by counsel’s ineffectiveness.  Holloway at 244, 527 N.E.2d 
831.  Even if defense counsel should have objected to this testimony, Conway has 
failed to show that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial 
would have been different had counsel objected.  Thus, we reject proposition of 
law four. 
January Term, 2006 
47 
{¶ 169} In proposition of law 19, Conway contends that counsel failed to 
provide effective assistance in four instances during the guilt phase. 
{¶ 170} Failure to voir dire on racial issues.  Conway claims that 
counsel rendered ineffective assistance when they failed to request voir dire on 
racial bias.  However, “[t]he conduct of voir dire by defense counsel does not 
have to take a particular form, nor do specific questions have to be asked.”  State 
v. Evans (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 231, 247, 586 N.E.2d 1042.  The decision to voir 
dire on racial prejudice is a choice best left to a capital defendant’s counsel.  State 
v. Watson, 61 Ohio St.3d at 13, 572 N.E.2d 97, citing Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 
at 37, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 L.Ed.2d 27, fn. 10; State v. Smith, 89 Ohio St.3d at 327, 
731 N.E.2d 645. 
{¶ 171} Contrary to Conway’s assertion, it does not appear that racial 
bias permeated this case.  Some witnesses testified that racial slurs had been 
exchanged between Conway’s group and Williams’s group on the night of the 
shooting.  But others, including Conway and his brother, Jeff, did not mention 
race as a motivating factor in the parking-lot fight or in the shooting.  In addition, 
because Conway and the person he killed were the same race, defense counsel 
may have reasonably concluded that race was not an important factor.  See State 
v. Group, 98 Ohio St.3d 248, 2002-Ohio-7247, 781 N.E.2d 980, at ¶ 138-139.  
Thus, there is no legitimate basis to conclude that counsel were ineffective for not 
examining the venire on racial bias. 
{¶ 172} Failure to have Conway review recorded conversations.  
Conway claims that trial counsel were ineffective in failing to have him review 
the tape-recorded conversations between him and Trent before he was cross-
examined.  We find that counsel did not render ineffective assistance in this 
regard. 
{¶ 173} Although defense counsel did not provide Conway with the tape 
recordings of his conversations with Trent, they did give him at least some of the 
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transcripts of these tape recordings.  The record does not reflect whether Conway 
had access to all the transcripts, but Conway admitted having reviewed some of 
them before testifying. 
{¶ 174} Even if we determined that counsel were deficient in failing to 
provide the audiotapes to Conway, there was no prejudice.  Before being cross-
examined about the taped conversations, Conway was permitted to review the 
pertinent portions of the tapes and transcripts. 
{¶ 175} Failure to object to testimony of former prosecutor.  Conway 
maintains that counsel’s failure to object to the testimony of former assistant 
prosecutor DeVillers amounted to ineffective assistance.  As we discussed in 
proposition of law 18, the trial court did not commit error in allowing DeVillers to 
testify.  In addition, Conway claims that DeVillers implied that Conway was a 
member of a gang.  The defense was given the opportunity to clarify that 
Conway’s case did not involve any gang-related activity.  Therefore, no basis 
exists to find deficient performance or prejudice. 
{¶ 176} Defendant’s 
absence 
from 
jury-instruction 
conference.  
Conway asserts that counsel were ineffective because he did not attend 
conferences on proposed jury instructions.  As we discussed in proposition of law 
three, Conway’s absence did not deprive him of a fair trial.  Thus, Conway has 
not shown that counsel’s allegedly deficient performance affected the outcome of 
his trial.  Defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance during the guilt 
phase.  Therefore, we overrule proposition of law 19. 
Penalty Phase 
{¶ 177} In proposition of law seven, Conway raises two claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel that allegedly occurred during the penalty phase. 
{¶ 178} Failure to present mitigation evidence.  Conway claims that 
counsel were ineffective during the penalty phase of his trial because they failed 
to present relevant mitigating evidence; however, Conway does not identify the 
January Term, 2006 
49 
mitigating evidence that counsel failed to present.  Nor does the record before the 
court indicate that other mitigating evidence was available.  See State v. Dixon, 
101 Ohio St.3d 328, 2004-Ohio-1585, 805 N.E.2d 1042, at ¶ 59-62.  See, also, 
Wiggins v. Smith (2003), 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471.  
Therefore, this claim is denied. 
{¶ 179} Failure to object to defective penalty-phase instructions.  
Conway contends that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object to 
defective jury instructions and to the trial court’s use of the word “recommend” in 
conjunction with the jury’s decision on the death penalty.  These claims are based 
on alleged errors that we rejected in propositions of law five (penalty-phase jury 
instructions) and eight (use of word “recommendation”).  Thus, we overrule 
Conway’s seventh proposition of law. 
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
{¶ 180} In proposition of law nine, Conway raises various constitutional 
challenges to Ohio death-penalty statutes, which we reject.  Ohio’s capital-
sentencing scheme is constitutional.  See, e.g., State v. Clemons (1998), 82 Ohio 
St.3d 438, 454, 696 N.E.2d 1009; State v. Smith (1997) 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 684 
N.E.2d 668; State v. Evans, 63 Ohio St.3d at 253-254, 586 N.E.2d 1042. 
INDEPENDENT SENTENCE EVALUATION 
Penalty Phase 
{¶ 181} At the penalty phase, Conway called two mitigation witnesses 
and gave an unsworn statement. 
{¶ 182} James T. Conway Jr., Conway’s father, was called as a defense 
mitigation witness.  He testified that Conway is the oldest of his three children.  
When Conway was a baby, his father was incarcerated for six months for carrying 
a concealed weapon.  His father was also imprisoned for two years when Conway 
was four or five years old, and Conway visited his father in prison.  The father, 
after serving his sentence, moved back with his family. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
50 
{¶ 183} Conway’s father said that he had been strict with his children and 
had tried to get his son to do the right things by ridiculing him.  Conway’s father 
said that he had done this to provide Conway a “good start in life,” but that 
Conway had resented him as a result. 
{¶ 184} Conway did well in school.  In high school, Conway took 
advanced and college-preparatory courses and was in the band.  Conway 
participated in ROTC and wanted to become a Navy pilot.  After high school, he 
went to Columbus State Community College.  Before attending college, Conway 
worked for his great-uncle’s concrete company and was a good worker. 
{¶ 185} Conway has two children, a son and a daughter.  Before he was 
arrested for the Dockside shooting, Conway and his son spent a lot of time 
together.  Finally, Conway’s father said that he believes that Conway is sorry for 
killing Gervais. 
{¶ 186} Janice Conway, Conway’s mother, also testified.  Janice said that 
during her husband’s incarceration, the family’s financial situation was not good, 
and she worked two jobs to support the family.  Nevertheless, Conway’s family 
provided him with adequate food, clothing, and shelter.  Conway’s mother said 
that Conway looked up to his father and had handled his father’s incarceration 
well.  She also said that Conway “always helped with his brother and sister * * 
*[and] he was just a good boy.” 
{¶ 187} Conway did well in college.  His parents financially supported 
his efforts to obtain a college degree and helped care for his children while he was 
taking courses at Columbus State Community College.  Conway has the love and 
support of his siblings and his extended family of grandparents, aunts, uncles, and 
cousins. 
{¶ 188} Conway’s mother said that her son was always respectful and 
helpful around the house.  She is sorry for what happened, but she loves her son 
and does not want him to be executed. 
January Term, 2006 
51 
{¶ 189} In Conway’s unsworn statement, he told the jury that he wanted 
to apologize “for putting everyone through this, including all of you guys, the 
Gervais family, my family, my mom, everybody.”  Conway said he was not trying 
to excuse his actions, but he hoped that the jury could “understand the situation 
and that it wasn’t a premeditated thing, it was something that just occurred and 
there’s nothing that I can do to change that * * *.  * * * I just hope that you can 
understand the situation and that it was, just exploded out of hand, went beyond 
anybody’s control in a short period of time, and there’s nothing that you can ever 
do to go back and change it no matter what.” 
Sentence Evaluation 
{¶ 190} The jury convicted Conway of one death-penalty specification:  
R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), aggravated murder as part of a course of conduct involving 
the purposeful killing, or attempt to kill, two or more persons.  After independent 
assessment, we find that the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt the 
aggravating circumstance charged against Conway.  Conway formulated a plan to 
arm himself with a loaded handgun after learning that his brother had been cut.  
Conway pursued his brother’s attacker, Williams, through a crowded parking lot.  
Once Williams was in his sight, Conway began shooting and continued to fire 
while advancing toward Williams.  Conway continued to shoot even after Gervais 
was in his line of fire.  Conway fired eight shots, emptying his weapon and 
shooting Williams and Gervais four times each.  The last shots were fired from 
close range while the two victims lay on the ground injured and defenseless. 
{¶ 191} The evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder 
of Jason Gervais and the attempted murder of Mandel Williams were part of a 
course of conduct involving the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill two or 
more persons. 
{¶ 192} The circumstances surrounding the offense do prove the 
existence of the mitigating factor listed in R.C. 2929.04(B)(2).  Under this 
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52 
section, a mitigating factor exists if “it is unlikely that the offense would have 
been committed, but for the fact that the offender was under * * * strong 
provocation.”  Witnesses at the scene testified that the shooting occurred after Jeff 
Conway announced that he had been cut and identified his attacker to Conway.  It 
is reasonable to believe that Conway resorted to the use of a firearm in response 
to his brother’s being cut.  Thus, the evidence is sufficient to establish the (B)(2) 
mitigating factor that Conway acted under strong provocation.  See, e.g., State v. 
Taylor (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 15, 33, 676 N.E.2d 82; State v. Lawrence (1989), 44 
Ohio St.3d 24, 31-32, 541 N.E.2d 451. 
{¶ 193} Nevertheless, we accord minimal weight to this factor.  Any 
effect that provocation has in diminishing the appropriateness of the death 
sentence is lessened because Gervais, the murder victim, did not himself provoke 
Conway in any way.  See, e.g., State v. Sowell, 39 Ohio St.3d at 336, 530 N.E.2d 
1294; State v. Gillard (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 548, 556-557, 679 N.E.2d 276.  We 
find nothing else mitigating in the nature and circumstances of the offenses. 
{¶ 194} Conway’s history, character, and background do provide some 
mitigation.  Yet unlike most convicted murderers that come before us, Conway 
had a relatively normal childhood.  Despite his father’s incarceration, Conway 
grew up in a loving, supportive, and tight-knit family.  His parents testified about 
Conway’s moral upbringing, his academic achievements in high school and 
college, and his gainful employment before attending college.  They also testified 
that Conway had adjusted well to his father’s imprisonment and that he had 
helped his mother with his siblings throughout the ordeal.  Conway also has a son 
and a daughter, whom he apparently supports.  He enjoys a close relationship with 
his son.  We therefore conclude that his history, character, and background are 
entitled to some weight in mitigation.  See, e.g., State v. Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 
54, 2004-Ohio-6235, 818 N.E.2d 229, at ¶ 198; State v. Fox (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 
183, 194, 631 N.E.2d 124. 
January Term, 2006 
53 
{¶ 195} Conway’s age of 23 years at the time of the offense qualifies as a 
mitigating factor under R.C. 2929.04(B)(4) (youth of offender). However, we 
accord this factor little weight.  See, e.g., State v. Fears, 86 Ohio St.3d at 349, 715 
N.E.2d 136; State v. Dunlap (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 319, 652 N.E.2d 988. 
{¶ 196} The love and support of Conway’s family qualify as other factors 
worthy of mitigating weight under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7).  Conway’s expression of 
remorse in his unsworn statement, however, is entitled to little weight.  See, e.g., 
State v. Keene (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 646, 671, 693 N.E.2d 246.  In his statement, 
as well as during his testimony, Conway steadfastly maintained that he did not 
intend to kill anyone, a claim inconsistent with the evidence at trial.  See, e.g., 
State v. White (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 433, 456, 709 N.E.2d 140. 
{¶ 197} No evidence was presented on the remaining statutory mitigating 
factors, R.C. 2929.04(B)(1) (victim inducement), (B)(3) (mental disease or 
defect), and (B)(6) (accomplice rather than principal offender). Because Conway 
has a prior conviction for assault on a police officer, R.C. 2929.04(B)(5) (lack of a 
significant criminal history) is inapplicable. 
{¶ 198} We find that the course-of-conduct aggravating circumstance, of 
which Conway was convicted, outweighs his combined mitigating factors beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
{¶ 199} Finally, we conclude that the death penalty imposed here is 
proportionate to death sentences approved in other cases of murder as a course of 
conduct involving the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill two or more persons.  
See, e.g., State v. Davie (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 311, 686 N.E.2d 245; State v. Keith 
(1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 514, 684 N.E.2d 47; State v. Frazier (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 
247, 574 N.E.2d 483. 
{¶ 200} Accordingly, we affirm Conway’s convictions and sentences, 
including his sentence of death. 
Judgment affirmed. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
54 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
RESNICK, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR 
and 
O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 201} I concur in the majority’s affirmance of Conway’s conviction, 
but I dissent from its affirmance of the sentence of death.  This court’s duty to 
provide an independent sentence review requires us to consider the nature and 
circumstances of the offense and specifically requires us, pursuant to R.C. 
2929.04(B)(2), to consider “[w]hether it is unlikely that the offense would have 
been committed, but for the fact that the offender was under duress, coercion, or 
strong provocation.”  Unlike R.C. 2903.03(A), which requires provocation 
“occasioned by the victim” for a finding of voluntary manslaughter, R.C. 
2929.04(B)(2) does not so limit our consideration of the passions surrounding a 
crime.  Had Conway not been confronted by the situation in which his brother had 
just been cut by Mandel Williams, it is unlikely he would have shot Williams and 
killed Jason Gervais.  Had Williams not become entangled with Gervais, possibly 
on purpose, this could well have been a voluntary-manslaughter case.  The 
circumstances of this offense take it outside the realm of what I consider 
appropriate for the death penalty. 
__________________ 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, Jennifer L. Coriell, 
and Susan E. Day, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. 
 
Todd W. Barstow and David J. Graeff, for appellant. 
______________________