Title: Honeycutt v. City of Fort Smith

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Danny HONEYCUTT v. CITY of FORT SMITH, George
Fisher, in His Capacity as Chairman of the
Civil Service Commission of Fort Smith,
Arkansas, and Civil Service Commission of
Fort Smith, Arkansas

96-1210                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered March 10, 1997


1.   Judgment -- order styled Summary Judgment of Dismissal was in
     actuality judgment following bench trial -- order was treated
     as such. -- Where the order of the trial court was styled
     Summary Judgment of Dismissal, yet the trial court received
     testimony from appellant at the summary-judgment hearing and,
     by doing so, converted the matter from a proceeding for
     summary judgment to a bench trial, and then entered judgment
     in favor of appellees, the judgment was not an order of
     summary judgment; the judgment followed a bench trial, though
     appellees declined to offer testimony, and was dispositive of
     the issue of whether appellant was denied a trial or hearing
     under state statutes or Commission rules; the supreme court
     will look to the wording of an order or judgment to determine
     its essence.

2.   Municipal corporations -- civil service statutes -- trial for
     ten-day disciplinary suspensions not required by statute. -- 
     Civil service statutes do provide that Commission rules must
     allow for a trial when a fire fighter or police officer is
     discharged or reduced in rank or compensation and when that
     person denies the reasons for the disciplinary action and
     demands a trial; although civil service employees may request
     a trial before the Commission because of discharge, there is
     no specific right to a trial before the Commission when a ten-
     day disciplinary suspension is the issue; both Ark. Code Ann.
      14-51-301 and 14-51-308 (1987 & Supp. 1995) make reference
     to suspensions, but neither statute confers upon a civil
     service employee the right to a trial when a suspension is the
     disciplinary penalty involved.

3.   Municipal corporations -- civil service -- suspension without
     pay does not equate to reduction in pay -- no statutory basis
     for appellant's argument that ten-day suspension carried with
     it right to trial before Commission. -- Where the Commission
     rules specifically stated that "a suspension without pay shall
     not be considered a reduction in pay"; both  14-51-301 and 
     14-51-308 use the terms "suspension" and "reduction in
     compensation" separately and not in a synonymous vein; and
     where the supreme court noted that a suspension without pay
     means no pay, which is the antithesis to a sanction where
     existing pay is reduced, the court found no statutory basis or
     support in the Commission rules or case law for appellant's
     position that a ten-day suspension carried with it the right
     to a trial before the Commission.

4.   Municipal corporations -- appellant elected to file suit and
     forego his right to grievance hearing -- appellant waived
     right to hearing. -- Appellant's complaint that he was denied
     a grievance hearing he was entitled to under the Commission
     rules was without merit where appellant requested a hearing
     date for his grievance, and a grievance hearing was scheduled
     by the Commission but then was cancelled at the request of
     appellant's counsel after suit was filed by him; appellant
     could not decline to have a grievance hearing and then
     proclaim that he was denied one; appellant voluntarily
     relinquished his right to a grievance hearing, which was a
     right known to him at the time he relinquished it; appellant
     failed to show how he was prejudiced by the Commission's
     position that he was entitled to a grievance hearing but not
     to a trial before the Commission.
     

     Appeal from Sebastian Circuit Court; Don Langston, Judge;
affirmed.
     Sam Sexton, III, for appellant.
     Daily, West, Core, Coffman & Canfield, P.L.L.C., by:  Wyman R.
Wade, Jr., for appellees. 

     Robert L. Brown, Justice.
     Appellant Danny Honeycutt appeals a summary judgment against
him relating to the denial of a trial and grievance hearing before
appellee Civil Service Commission of Fort Smith (Commission) in
connection with his ten-day suspension without pay.  We agree with
the trial court that neither proceeding was required under the
facts of this case, and we affirm.
     The events leading up to the ten-day suspension are taken from
Honeycutt's testimony before the trial court and other documents
introduced at the hearing.  On July 30, 1995, Honeycutt, who was a
captain with the Fort Smith Police Department, and Reserve Officer
Pat Wheeler responded to a disturbance call on Albert Pike Avenue
in Fort Smith.  The report received was that Charles Gough, Sr.,
was en route to a residence with a handgun.  Fort Smith police
officers located Gough, and Honeycutt and Wheeler pulled him over. 
Honeycutt concluded that Gough was extremely intoxicated and
ordered him to get out of the car.  Gough opened the car door,
whereupon Wheeler reached into the car, and Gough slammed the car
door on Wheeler's hand.  Wheeler fell back, and Gough sped away, at
which time Honeycutt pulled his revolver and shot at the left rear
tire of the retreating vehicle.  His shot missed the tire.  A
pursuit ensued with other police officers from the Fort Smith
Police Department joining in the chase.  More shots were fired by
police officers.  Gough drove into Oklahoma and was later arrested
by Oklahoma police officers.
     On September 1, 1995, a hearing board of the Fort Smith Police
Department conducted a review of the conduct of the police officers
involved in Gough's arrest.  The board concluded with respect to
Honeycutt that there was not sufficient justification for firing
his revolver at Gough's vehicle and further that Honeycutt "could
have more aggressively exercised command and control of the high
speed pursuit situation which later developed."  The board
recommended a ten-day suspension without pay as a disciplinary
action, and the Fort Smith Chief of Police concurred.
     On September 13, 1995, Honeycutt's counsel wrote the
Commission and requested "a trial and hearing" before the
Commission "and before any other administrative body and/or court
of law or equity" on Honeycutt's suspension in accordance with
Commission rules and Arkansas statutes.  On September 25, 1995, the
Chairman of the Commission replied that Commission rules stated
that a suspension without pay was not considered to be a reduction
in pay and, accordingly, a trial was not required under state
statutes or Commission rules.  On October 5, 1995, Honeycutt's
counsel wrote the Director of Human Resources for the City of Fort
Smith that his initial request was intended to be a request for a
grievance hearing under Commission Rule 5.05.  On October 20,
1995, counsel for the Commission wrote Honeycutt's attorney that a
grievance hearing had been set for November 15, 1995.  The letter
then continued:
     It is the position of the Commission, and a position
     which seems to be obvious from the Rules, that a request
     for a grievance hearing under Rule 5:05 cannot be used as
     a basis to obtain a trial on the disciplinary action
     which is expressly denied by Rule 5:03.  Therefore, the
     Commission does not intend to grant a trial and review
     the action of the Chief of Police in disciplining Captain
     Honeycutt with a ten day suspension without pay.
          Without anticipating what might be the basis for
     Captain Honeycutt's grievance, the Commission will be
     available to hear whatever information Captain Honeycutt
     desires to present regarding his "grievance."  However,
     the Commission reserves the right to discontinue any
     effort which is nothing but an effort to obtain a trial
     and review by the Commission of the disciplinary action
     taken by the Chief of the Police Department.
     On October 25, 1995, Honeycutt sued appellees City of Fort
Smith, Commission, and George Fisher, as Chair of the Commission,
and prayed that the ten-day suspension without pay be reversed, or,
alternatively, for mandamus for a hearing before a neutral body,
and for damages.  The appellees answered that Honeycutt had failed
to exhaust administrative remedies.  Because of the Commission's
denial of a trial and because of the filed complaint, Honeycutt's
counsel informed counsel for the Commission that the grievance
hearing set for November 15, 1995, was not necessary.  The
grievance hearing, accordingly, was cancelled.  Later, the
appellees moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Honeycutt
was not entitled to a hearing before the Commission.  Honeycutt
answered the motion, alleging that the statutes and Commission
rules conflicted and adding that, in any case, he was entitled to
a hearing on his ten-day suspension under Commission rules and
state statutes.
     The trial court conducted a hearing on the summary-judgment
motion.  In doing so, testimony was taken from Honeycutt and
documents gathered through discovery were presented.  Counsel for
the City and Commission objected to the matter "going to trial" at
this hearing, but his objection was overruled.
     By subsequent order entitled "Summary Judgment of Dismissal,"
the trial court granted summary judgment to the City, Commission,
and Chairman of the Commission and dismissed the matter with
prejudice.  In its order, the trial court found that a ten-day
suspension without pay was not a reduction in compensation under
Commission rules and that this interpretation by the Commission did
not run afoul of state statutes.  The trial court also found that
a grievance hearing had been scheduled by the Commission at
Honeycutt's request but then cancelled at the request of
Honeycutt's counsel.

                   I. Order of the Trial Court
     We first address our concern with the order of the trial
court, though this precise matter has not been raised as an issue
in this appeal.  Although the order is styled Summary Judgment of
Dismissal, the trial court received testimony from Honeycutt at the
summary-judgment hearing, and by doing so, went beyond the
pleadings, discovery, and affidavits in reaching its decision.  See
Ark. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  Thus, the court converted the matter from
a proceeding for summary judgment to a bench trial on the question
of whether Honeycutt was afforded his procedural rights before the
Commission.  See Godwin v. Churchman, 305 Ark. 520,