Title: State ex rel. Stiller v. Columbiana Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of Edn.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

The State ex rel. Stiller, Appellant, v. Columbiana Exempted Village School 
District Board of Education, Appellee. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Stiller v. Columbiana Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of 
Edn. (1995),   Ohio St.3d      .] 
Mandamus to compel Columbiana Exempted Village School District Board of 
Education to reemploy relator as superintendent for a one-year term -- 
Writ denied, when. 
 
(No. 95-320 -- Submitted October 10, 1995 -- Decided November 22, 1995.) 
 
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Columbiana County, No. 94-C-13. 
 
Appellee, Columbiana Exempted Village School District Board of 
Education (“board”), employed appellant, Roger M. Stiller, as the superintendent 
of the district under a five-year contract for a term expiring on July 31, 1994.   
Pursuant to R.C. 3319.01, the board adopted procedures for evaluating its 
superintendent and determining whether to renew the superintendent’s contract.    
Board Policy 1240.01, which has been in effect during all pertinent times, 
provides: 
 
“*** 
 
“If the services of the Superintendent are found to be unsatisfactory to the 
Board, s/he shall be notified through the evaluation process as established. 
 
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“If his/her services continue to be unsatisfactory, the Superintendent shall 
be notified in writing by the Treasurer, as approved by the Board, of its intent, at 
least sixty (60) days prior to March 1st of the expiration date of his/her contract, 
that his/her contract will not be renewed.”  
 
On January 26, 1994, the board adopted  its January 1994 evaluation of 
Stiller and presented it to him.  The board’s evaluation specified that Stiller was 
unsatisfactory in four areas and needed improvement in twenty-one areas.  At a 
regular meeting held on February 7, 1994, the board held an executive session at 
which it performed a second evaluation of Stiller’s performance as superintendent.  
The board found no improvement by Stiller in any of the areas specified as 
unsatisfactory or needing improvement on his previous evaluation.  The board 
noted on the second evaluation that Stiller had denied many of the problems set 
forth in his initial evaluation, “exhibited a hostile attitude toward the evaluation 
process,” and had been “noncommunicative” and “combative.”   The board further 
decided at its February 7 meeting to conduct a special meeting on February 15, 
1994 to “vote on the Superintendent’s contract.”  An agenda for the February 15, 
1994 special meeting of the board listed the following items: 
 
“5. 
Consider adoption of second Superintendent’s evaluation.  *** 
 
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“6.   Executive Session to discuss the employment of personnel, 
specifically the expiring contract of Superintendent Roger M. Stiller.  *** 
 
“7.  
Consider resolution to not reemploy the Superintendent.  ***”   
 
At the special meeting held on February 15, the board adopted its second 
evaluation of Stiller, met in executive session to discuss Stiller’s contract, and 
passed a resolution not to renew Stiller’s superintendent contract.  Stiller was 
present at the special meeting, and he received written notice of the board’s 
decision not to renew his contract on that date.   
 
On February 23, 1994, Stiller filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for 
Columbiana County for a writ of mandamus compelling the board to reemploy him 
as superintendent for a one-year term commencing August 1, 1994.  The court of 
appeals granted the board’s motion for summary judgment and denied the writ.   
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
____________________ 
 
Rosenzweig, Schulz & Gillombardo Co., L.P.A., Issac Schulz and Bill J. 
Gagliano, for appellant. 
 
Horning & Horning, Richard A. Horning and J. David Horning, for 
appellee. 
 
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____________________  
 
Per Curiam.  In order to be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Stiller had to 
establish that he possesses a clear legal right to reemployment, that the board is 
under a clear legal duty to reemploy him, and that he has no plain and adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Carter v. Wilkinson (1994), 70 
Ohio St.3d 65, 637 N.E.2d 1.  In addition, Civ.R. 56(C) provides that before 
summary judgment may be granted, it must be determined that (1) no genuine 
issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) it appears from the evidence that 
reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing the evidence most 
strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to the 
nonmoving party.  Davis v. Loopco Industries, Inc. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 64, 65-
66, 609 N.E.2d 144, 145. 
 
Stiller contends in his first and second propositions of law that the court of 
appeals erred in denying him relief in mandamus when the board failed to give 
him timely notice of nonrenewal in accordance with the board’s procedures 
adopted pursuant to R.C. 3319.01.  Stiller claims that he has a clear legal right 
under R.C. 3319.01, as modified by Board Policy 1240.01, to reemployment for an 
 
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additional year as superintendent and that the board had a clear legal duty to 
provide notice of nonrenewal at least sixty days prior to March 1, 1994, in 
accordance with Board Policy 1240.01. 
 
R.C. 3319.01 provides: 
 
“*** [The] superintendent is, at the expiration of his current term of 
employment, deemed reemployed for a term of one year at the same salary plus 
any increments that may be authorized by the board of education, unless such 
board, on or before the first day of March of the year in which his contract of 
employment expires, either reemploys the superintendent for a succeeding term as 
provided in this section or gives the superintendent written notice of its intention 
not to reemploy him.  *** 
 
“*** 
 
“Each board of education shall adopt procedures for the evaluation of its 
superintendent and shall evaluate its superintendent in accordance with those 
procedures.  An evaluation based upon such procedures shall be considered by the 
board in deciding whether to renew the superintendent’s contract.  The 
establishment of an evaluation procedure shall not create an expectancy of 
continued employment.  Nothing in this section shall prevent a board of education 
 
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from making the final determination regarding the renewal or failure to renew of a 
superintendent’s contract.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Stiller received written notice of the board’s intent not to renew his 
superintendent’s contract on February 15, 1994, which is before March 1, the date 
specified in R.C. 3319.01.  However, the nonrenewal notice was not given to 
Stiller at least sixty days prior to March 1, i.e., December 31, 1993, as required by 
Board Policy 1240.01. 
 
The court of appeals determined that the board’s failure to follow its own 
procedures enacted under R.C. 3319.01 did not require that statute’s remedy of 
reemployment for one year.  The court of appeals relied on our recent decisions 
involving R.C. 3319.02’s analogous provisions regarding administrators in State 
ex rel. Cassels v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 217, 
631 N.E.2d 150, and State ex rel. Martines v. Cleveland City School Dist. Bd. of 
Edn. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 416, 639 N.E.2d 80. 
 
In Cassels, we unanimously held that a failure by a board of education to 
comply with R.C. 3319.02(D) evaluation procedures will not invalidate the 
board’s action not to renew an administrative contract where the administrator 
 
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received timely notice of nonrenewal pursuant to R.C. 3319.02(C).  In so holding, 
the court stated: 
 
“It is apparent that the court of appeals misinterpreted *** R.C. 3319.02(D).  
Although R.C. 3319.02(D) mandates the evaluation procedure, it provides no 
remedy of reemployment for failure on the part of the board to comply with that 
procedure.  Indeed, R.C. 3319.02(C) deems an administrator reemployed by 
operation of law only if a timely written notice of the board’s intention not to 
reemploy is not given.  By contrast, as appellee notes, R.C. 3319.11 specifically 
provides that a board’s failure to comply with the teacher evaluation requirements 
of R.C. 3319.111 results in reemployment of the teacher.  In other words, if the 
General Assembly had intended that board compliance with the administrative 
evaluation provisions of R.C. 3319.02(D) be a prerequisite to a valid board 
decision not to renew an administrative contract, it would have so provided, as it 
did in R.C. 3319.11 for teachers’ contracts. 
 
“Furthermore, R.C. 3319.02(D) expressly states that ‘[n]othing in this 
section shall prevent a board of education from making the final determination 
regarding the renewal of or failure to renew the contract of any *** administrator.’  
This manifestly indicates that noncompliance with any or all of the R.C. 
 
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3319.02(D) evaluation procedures does not invalidate a board’s action not to 
renew an administrative contract .*** 
 
“*** [A] failure to comply with the R.C. 3319.02(D) evaluation procedures 
will not invalidate a board’s action not to renew an administrative contract.  This 
result comports with the language of R.C. 3319.02(C) and (D).  *** Since 
appellant *** readily admitted that she was sent a timely notice of nonrenewal 
pursuant to R.C. 3319.02(C), she was, as a matter of law, not entitled to a writ of 
mandamus to compel her reemployment as an assistant principal.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Cassels, supra, 69 Ohio St.3d at 222, 631 N.E.2d at 154. 
 
In Martines, we followed Cassels in holding that only a violation of the 
R.C. 3319.02(C) requirement of timely written notice of a board of education’s 
intention not to renew an administrative contract requires relief in mandamus to 
compel reemployment.  Again, we determined that violations of the R.C. 
3319.02(D) evaluation procedure did not warrant the R.C. 3319.02(C) remedy of 
reemployment. 
 
This case involves R.C. 3319.01, pertaining to superintendents, rather than 
R.C. 3319.02 (administrators).  Like R.C. 3319.02(C) and unlike R.C. 3319.11 
(teachers), R.C. 3319.01 deems a superintendent reemployed only where the board 
 
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either reemploys him or fails to give written notice, prior to March 1 of the year in 
which his contract expires, of its intention not to reemploy him.  Additionally, 
R.C. 3319.01 and 3319.02 both mandate that boards of education adopt evaluation 
procedures, but further emphasize that nothing regarding those procedures 
prevents the board from “making the final determination regarding the renewal or 
failure to renew” a superintendent or administrator’s contract. 
 
In that Stiller received timely written notice of nonrenewal under R.C. 
3319.01 and Board Policy 1240.01 was adopted as part of the evaluation 
procedure required by R.C. 3319.01, any failure by the board to comply with 
Policy 1240.01 does not entitle Stiller to reemployment as a superintendent for an 
additional one-year term.  Cassels and Martines, supra; see, also, State ex rel. 
Floyd v. Rock Hill Local School Bd. of Edn. (Feb. 10, 1988), Lawrence App. No. 
1862, unreported (“Although R.C. 3319.02 states that principals who are not 
notified by the end of March are deemed re-employed for the following year, 
nothing in the Revised Code or in the board’s policies states what remedy a 
principal has when the board violates its own policy which requires action on a 
principal’s contract to be taken at ‘the’ March meeting.  *** [T]he court below 
 
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erred by applying the drastic remedy provided in R.C. 3319.02 to the situation at 
bar.”  Emphasis sic.). 
 
Although Stiller contends that Cassels and Martines are distinguishable, 
they are not.  Further, neither liberal construction nor the cases cited by Stiller 
from other jurisdictions analyzing statutory provisions which are different from 
R.C. 3319.01 and 3319.02 require a contrary conclusion.  See Cassels, supra, 
where the court applied the plain language of R.C. 3319.02 while noting that it is a 
remedial statute that must be liberally construed in favor of administrators; see, 
also, Miller v. Indep. School Dist. No. 56 of Garfield Cty. (Okla.1980), 609 P.2d 
756, 760, one of the cases relied upon by Stiller, where the Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma emphasized that its holding that a teacher was entitled to reasons for 
nonrenewal of her contract did not mean that she was necessarily also entitled to 
reinstatement. 
 
The court of appeals properly held that under the precedent of this court, 
“the only instance where a contract will be automatically renewed under either 
R.C. 3319.01 or 3319.02 is where timely notice under that statute has not been 
given” and “other violations under any administrative by-law or policy which has 
been violated do[ ] not rise to that of the statutory responsibility.”  As a result, the 
 
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court need not consider the court of appeals’ dictum as to whether Board Policy 
1240.01 even applied as to Stiller where there was no express determination by the 
board that his services were unsatisfactory.  Stiller established neither a clear legal 
right to reemployment nor a clear legal duty on the part of the board to reemploy 
him as a result of the board’s alleged failure to comply with Policy 1240.01.  
Stiller’s first and second propositions of law are meritless and are overruled. 
 
Stiller asserts in his third proposition of law that the board’s failure to give 
timely public notice of each action to be taken at its February 15, 1994 special 
meeting rendered invalid its decision to nonrenew his contract of employment as 
superintendent.  R.C. 121.22, Ohio’s Sunshine Law, provides: 
 
“(F) Every public body shall, by rule, establish a reasonable method 
whereby any person may determine the time and place of all regularly scheduled 
meetings and the time, place, and purpose of all special meetings.  A public body 
shall not hold a special meeting unless it gives at least twenty-four hours’ advance 
notice to the news media that have requested notification, except in the event of an 
emergency requiring immediate official action.  ***”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Board Policy 0164.4 provides: 
 
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“[T]he Treasurer shall, no later than twelve (12) hours before the time of a 
special meeting of a Board body, post a statement of the time, place, and purposes 
of such special meeting. 
 
“The statement above and the notifications under news media shall state 
such specific or general purpose or purposes then known to the Treasurer to be 
intended to be considered at such special meeting and may state, as an additional 
general purpose, that any other business as may properly come before such Board 
body at such meeting may be considered and acted upon.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
R.C. 121.22(H) provides that “[a] resolution, rule, or formal action adopted 
in an open meeting is invalid if the public body that adopted the resolution, rule, 
or formal action violated [R.C. 121.22(F)].”  Prior to the enactment of the 
foregoing provision, courts had held that violations of the R.C. 121.22(F) notice 
provisions did not invalidate the public board’s action.  See, e.g., Barbeck v. 
Twinsburg Twp. (1992), 73 Ohio App.3d 587, 594-595, 597 N.E.2d 1204, 1209; 
Holeski v. Lawrence (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 824, 832, 621 N.E.2d 802, 807.  
Effective April 16, 1993, Am.S.B. No. 326 amended R.C. 121.22(H) “to invalidate 
actions taken at an open meeting of a public body if notice of the meeting was not 
 
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given in the manner required by [R.C. 121.22(F)].”  Title to Am.S.B. No. 326; 144 
Ohio Laws, Part II, 1855. 
 
Stiller claims that the applicable notice was the February 7, 1994 action by 
the board at its regular meeting setting a special meeting for February 15 “to vote 
on the Superintendent’s contract.”  Because this notice did not include anything 
about considering adoption of the board’s February 7 evaluation of Stiller, Stiller 
contends that the board failed to comply with R.C. 121.22(F) and Board Policy 
0164.4, rendering the board’s action nonrenewing him invalid under R.C. 
121.22(H). 
 
The court of appeals determined that Stiller’s Sunshine Law argument was 
without merit because the agenda for the February 15, 1994 special meeting, 
which included both the consideration concerning adoption of Stiller’s second 
evaluation and an executive session to consider Stiller’s expiring contract,  
constituted the applicable notice.  The court of appeals’ determination is supported 
by the affidavit of Teresa Emmerling, the board treasurer, who stated that the 
agenda constituted the notice for the February 15, 1994 special meeting and that 
the notice listed all of the purposes for the meeting.  However, the court of appeals 
did not consider Stiller’s affidavit attached to his brief in opposition to the board’s 
 
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motion for summary judgment, in which he stated that the agenda was not the 
notice for the special meeting and that the agenda was not delivered to the 
treasurer until the afternoon of February 15, which meant that it could not have 
been sent to the news media at least twenty-four hours in advance of the meeting 
as required by R.C. 121.22(F).  Construing the summary judgment evidence most 
strongly in favor of Stiller, there remains a genuine issue of fact as to whether the 
agenda was the notice specified in R.C. 121.22(F) and Board Policy 0164.4. 
 
Nevertheless, summary judgment is only inappropriate where there is an 
extant genuine issue of material fact.  Assuming, arguendo, that the agenda for the 
February 15 special meeting was not the required notice, the issue is whether the 
February 7 board action setting the February 15 special meeting “to vote on the 
Superintendent’s contract” complied with the Sunshine Law and applicable board 
policy.   
 
R.C. 121.22(F) requires only that the notice state the “purpose” of the 
special meeting.  Board Policy 0164.4, adopted pursuant to R.C. 121.22(F), 
requires that the “purposes” of the special meeting be included in the notice but 
then clarifies that to refer only to those “specific or general purpose or purposes 
then known to the Treasurer to be considered at such special meeting.”  Board 
 
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Policy 1240.01, which Stiller claims entitles him to the earlier notice of 
nonrenewal, specifically ties the board’s evaluation process to its decision to 
nonrenew the superintendent’s contract.  Therefore, voting on the adoption of a 
superintendent’s evaluation is ancillary to the general purpose of voting on his 
contract.  This conclusion is further supported by the language of R.C. 3319.01, 
which provides that “[a]n evaluation based upon such procedures shall be 
considered by the board in deciding whether to renew the superintendent’s 
contract.”  Consequently, considering adoption of its prior evaluation was not a  
“purpose” that was required to be separately set forth in the February 7 notice. 
 
Since the February 7 notice complied with R.C. 121.22(F), the board’s 
action to nonrenew Stiller’s superintendent’s contract was not invalidated by R.C. 
121.22(H).  Stiller does not deny that he received proper notice of the action he is 
attacking, i.e., the nonrenewal.  Stiller also claims no impropriety by the board in 
holding an executive session during the special meeting to discuss the matter.  The 
alleged violation does not involve the relief sought by Stiller.  See Electrical 
Protection Assn. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 169, 174, 4 O.O.3d 
369, 372, 364 N.E.2d 3, 6 (court will not reverse commission order where there 
was no prejudice claimed from alleged violation of R.C. 121.22[F] notice 
 
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provisions); see, also, Holeski, supra, 85 Ohio App.3d at 832-833, 621 N.E.2d at 
808 (R.C. 121.22[I][3] presumption of prejudice applies only upon proof of a 
violation or threatened violation of R.C. 121.22).  Here, as in Holeski, since there 
was no proof of any violation of R.C. 121.22 by the board, there can be no 
presumption of prejudice.  Stiller’s third proposition is overruled. 
 
In sum, the court of appeals did not err in granting summary judgment in 
favor of the board and denying the writ, since Stiller failed to establish the first 
two requirements for extraordinary relief in mandamus.  Accordingly, the 
judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and 
COOK, JJ., CONCUR.