Title: WILSON v. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

WILSON v. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION2003 WY 10575 P.3d 669Case Number: 02-230Decided: 08/29/2003
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                            

 

IN 
THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S

COMPENSATION 
CLAIM OF

RAYMOND 
E. WILSON, AN EMPLOYEE

OF 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN FOREST

PRODUCTS:

 

RAYMOND 
E. WILSON,

 

Appellant(Claimant) 
,

 

v.

                                                                                                

STATE 
OF WYOMING ex rel.

WYOMING 
WORKERS' SAFETY AND

COMPENSATION 
DIVISION,

 

Appellee(Respondent) 
.

 

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Albany County

The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Michael H. Schilling of Schilling & Winn, P.C., Laramie, 
Wyoming

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Steve 
Czoschke, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and David L. Delicath, Assistant 
Attorney General          

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

            
KITE, Justice.

 

[¶1]      Raymond E. Wilson 
appeals from the district court's order reversing the hearing examiner's award 
of temporary total disability (TTD) benefits based upon his actual monthly 
earnings at the time he was injured.  
The district court concluded Mr. Wilson's earnings should have been 
calculated by averaging his monthly income from the beginning of 2000 through 
the date he was injured in April 2001.  
We hold the hearing examiner's calculation was correct and reverse the 
district court's ruling.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The question for 
our determination is whether Mr. Wilson had "actual monthly earnings at the time 
of injury" within the meaning of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-403(c) (LexisNexis 
2003). 

 

 

 

[¶3]      Mr. Wilson began 
working for Rocky Mountain Forest Products (RMFP) on April 3, 2001.  Six days later, on April 9, 2001, he was 
lifting a bundle of wood at work and injured his back.  Mr. Wilson completed his shift, but, 
when the pain did not subside that evening, his wife took him to the emergency 
room.  The attending physician 
examined him, prescribed medication, and told him not to return to work until a 
doctor released him.  Mr. Wilson 
later saw Lawrence A. Jenkins, M.D., who determined he had a large left 
paracentral disc herniation at L5-S1 and was temporarily totally disabled.  In November 2001, Dr. Jenkins performed 
a left L5 laminotomy and discectomy on Mr. Wilson's back. 

 

[¶4]      Following his 
injury, Mr. Wilson filed an employee's report of injury with the Wyoming 
Workers' Safety & Compensation Division (division) and applied for TTD 
benefits.  On October 31, 2001, the 
division awarded him $200.32 per month in benefits based upon average actual 
monthly earnings of $300.47.  Mr. 
Wilson objected to the award, claiming the division did not correctly calculate 
his benefits.  The Office of 
Administrative Hearings held a hearing on January 29, 2002, where Mr. Wilson 
presented evidence showing RMFP hired him to work forty hours per week at $6.75 
per hour resulting in actual monthly earnings of $1,170.  Therefore, he argued, pursuant to § 
27-14-403(c), he was entitled to TTD benefits in the amount of $780.03 per 
month.  The division argued Mr. 
Wilson did not have an established full-time work history at the time he was 
injured and, in accordance with Goe v. 
State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, 2002 WY 6, 38 P.3d 1063 (Wyo. 2002), an average of his earnings should be used in calculating his 
TTD benefits.  The division pointed 
to evidence that Mr. Wilson held numerous jobs prior to working for 
RMFP­jobs which in some cases lasted just a few daysand had worked at RMFP 
for only five days when he was injured.  
Given this history, the division argued averaging his earnings up to and 
including the date of the injury constituted a fairer method of determining his 
actual monthly earnings under § 27-14-403(c). 

 

[¶5]      On February 25, 
2002, the hearing examiner awarded Mr. Wilson TTD benefits based upon his actual 
monthly earnings of $1,170 at the time of his injury.  The division filed a petition for review 
of the order in district court.  
Upon reviewing the record and the parties' briefs, the district court 
found Mr. Wilson's earnings were sporadic and fluctuating, warranting 
calculation of TTD benefits on the basis of his average earnings up to the time 
of his injury rather than his actual earnings at the time of his injury.  The district court issued a decision 
letter stating:

 

Because 
of the extreme variance in jobs and pay [Mr. Wilson] held in the 2.5 years 
prior, the Court finds an appropriate and reasonable period of time to use in 
determining [his] average monthly income should run from the beginning of 2000 
through those days in April 2001 reflected on [his] timesheet with RMFP prior to 
the injury.  Considering the age of 
[Mr. Wilson] and the various types of jobs he held, such a time span seems 
reasonable for the purpose of approximating an accurate reflection of [his] 
average monthly income.  The Court 
will order, therefore, that [Mr. Wilson's] actual monthly income be computed as 
an average over this period of time and that the TTD benefits be paid in 
accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-403(c).

 

The 
district court entered an order consistent with the decision letter on September 
26, 2002.   

 

 

 

[¶6]      To resolve the 
question before us, we must interpret the statutory provisions governing the 
calculation of TTD benefits.  
Statutory interpretation is a question of law.  Goe, 2002 WY 6, ¶6.  We are governed by the following 
standards:  

 

We 
decide initially whether the statute is clear or ambiguous. This Court makes 
that determination as a matter of law. If we determine that a statute is clear 
and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain language of the statute. In 
effectuating the plain language of the statute,

 

[w]e 
begin by making an "inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the 
words employed according to their arrangement and connection.'"  Parker Land and Cattle Company v. Wyoming 
Game and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)).  We construe 
the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and 
we construe together all parts of the statute in pari 
materia.

 

State 
Department of Revenue and Taxation v. Pacificorp, 
872 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wyo. 1994).  
If, on the other hand, we determine that the statute is ambiguous, we 
resort to general principles of statutory construction to determine the 
legislature's intent.

 

Wyoming 
Department of Transportation v. Haglund, 
982 P.2d 699, 701 (Wyo. 1999) (some citations omitted); see also Brierley v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 2002 WY 121, ¶10, 52 P.3d 564, 
¶10 (Wyo. 2002).  We affirm agency 
decisions when they are in accordance with the law and correct those that are 
contrary to the law.  Powder 
River Coal Company v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 2002 WY 5, ¶6, 38 P.3d 423, ¶6 (Wyo. 2002).  When 
considering an appeal from a district court's review of an agency's action, we 
accord no special deference to the district court's conclusions.  Newman v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Safety and Compensation Division, 2002 WY 91, ¶7, 49 P.3d 163, ¶7 (Wyo. 
2002).  Instead, we review the case 
as if it had come directly to us from the administrative agency.  Id.  When an appeal is from a contested case 
proceeding under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act in which both parties 
presented evidence and factual findings were made, we review the findings for 
substantial evidence.  Id. at 
¶22.  Substantial evidence is 
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions.  Voss v. Albany 
County Commissioners, 2003 WY 94, ¶10.  

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶7]      The calculation 
of TTD benefits is governed by § 27-14-403(c), which provides in pertinent 
part:

 

For 
temporary total disability under paragraph (a)(i) of this section, the award 
shall be paid monthly at the rate of two-thirds (2/3) of the injured employee's 
actual monthly earnings at the time of 
injury but not to exceed the statewide average monthly wage for the 
twelve (12) month period immediately preceding the quarterly period in which the 
injury occurred as determined pursuant to W.S. 27-14-802.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)  The term "actual monthly 
earnings" is defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-403(j)(i) 
(LexisNexis 2003) as "the injured employee's actual monthly earnings at the time of 
injury excluding any payment for casual or unscheduled overtime and any 
fringe benefit."  (Emphasis 
added.)  The rules and regulations 
governing worker's compensation claims provide the following procedure for 
determining TTD benefits:

 

(A)  Temporary 
wage rate is computed as follows:

 

(I)  Hourly 
rate multiplied by the total number of hours worked within the employer's 
established work week = weekly rate.

 

(II)  Weekly 
rate multiplied by fifty-two (52) and divided by twelve (12) = monthly 
rate.

 

(III)  Monthly 
rate multiplied by .6667 = temporary total disability wage rate (not to exceed 
the maximum wage established by the division for the quarter of injury).  W.S. § 
27-14-802(b).

 

(B)  Overtime 
will be considered if verification is received from the 
employer.

 

(C)  In 
the case where the worker was paid by other than hourly[,] weekly or monthly 
rate of pay, verification of average monthly wage must be obtained by the worker 
from the employer.  The worker must 
be able to provide copies of at least three (3) months of wage history with the 
current employer.  If three (3) 
months of information is not available from the worker, verification of average 
monthly wage must be obtained from the employer. 

 

Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Rules, Regulations and Fee Schedules, ch. 6, § 2(a)(i) 
(Sept. 10, 1999) (amended Nov. 20, 2001). 

 

[¶8]      Giving effect to 
the plain and ordinary meaning of the words contained in these provisions, we 
hold that Mr. Wilson's TTD benefits were to be calculated on the basis of his 
actual monthly earnings at the time of his injury.  It is undisputed that, at the time of 
his injury, Mr. Wilson was earning $6.75 per hour and was hired to work forty 
hours per week, resulting in actual earnings of $1,170 per month as the hearing 
examiner concluded.  The division 
argues, however, and the district court held that Mr. Wilson's benefits could 
not be calculated based upon "actual monthly earnings" because his earnings were 
sporadic and fluctuating.  Relying 
on Goe, 2002 WY 6, the division 
contends the district court properly concluded Mr. Wilson's work history did not 
support a calculation based upon the $6.75 wage at forty hours per week and 
averaging his earnings over some period of time prior and up to his injury more 
accurately reflected his actual earnings.   

            

[¶9]      In Goe, a horse kicked and injured Mr. Goe 
while he was working as a hunting guide for an outfitter.  The evidence showed that the wages paid 
by the employer fluctuated widely from pay period to pay periodMr. Goe earned 
$560.75 in July, $1,000 in August, and $1,500 in September.  2002 WY 6, ¶14.  Mr. Goe argued his actual monthly 
earnings for the purpose of computing TTD benefits were $1600, the amount he and 
his employer agreed he would have earned in October had he not been injured and 
been able to finish out the month.  
Id.  We held:  "[T]he hearing examiner's decision to 
average Goe's income to determine the appropriate amount of TTD benefits was 
appropriate because Goe did not meet his burden to prove his actual monthly 
earnings were $1,600.00 per month."  
Id. at 
¶13.

 

[¶10]   In reaching this result, we cited 
Hasser v. Flint Engineering, 647 P.2d 66 (Wyo. 1982), another case in which the employee's hours and rate of pay 
fluctuated, and we upheld a TTD award based upon an average of his wages rather 
than his actual pay the week of the injury.  We said:  

 

[T]hose 
administering the Worker's Compensation Act have devised a method of computing 
an hourly wage earner's monthly rate.  
They multiply the hourly rate by the hours worked in a week, times the 
fifty-two weeks in the year, and divide by twelve months.  This formula seems to work reasonably 
well and does result in a figure which approximates a monthly rate of pay.  Accordingly we have no quarrel with its 
use so long as the resulting figure fairly represents the parties' 
understanding.  It 
cannot be applied with precision here because of the variable hours per week put 
in by appellant under the terms of his employment.

 

647 P.2d  at 69 (emphasis added).  In Goe, we rejected the employee's efforts 
to distinguish Hasser, concluding 
that, like the latter case, the evidence in Goe "demonstrated that [the employee's] 
earnings fluctuated widely from pay period to pay period."  2002 WY 6, ¶11.  We concluded the definition of "actual 
monthly earnings" was not applicable in Goe because the employee's earnings were 
"not consistent and fixed month after month."  Id.  
Because the evidence showed Mr. Goe did not have actual monthly 
earnings as defined in § 27-14-403(j)(i), we applied Chapter 6, Section 
2(a)(i)(C) of the division's rules which expressly references averaging monthly 
wages in cases where the worker is "paid by other than hourly, 
weekly or monthly rate of pay."

 

[¶11]   Unlike the situations in Hasser and Goe, Mr. Wilson had actual monthly 
earnings at the time of his injury within the meaning of § 
27-14-403(c).  In contrast to Goe, Mr. Wilson's earnings at the time 
of his injury did not fluctuate widely from pay period to pay period but were 
consistent and fixed month after month at a specified hourly rate and number of 
hours per week.  Unlike in Hasser, the formula prescribed in § 
27-14-403(c) could be applied with precision to the terms of Mr. Wilson's 
employment because his hours were fixed rather than variable.  Given the terms of his employment with 
RMFP, Mr. Wilson was not "paid by other than hourly, weekly or monthly rate of 
pay," and, therefore, Chapter 6, Section 2(a)(i)(C) of the division's rules was 
not applicable.  We hold that Mr. 
Wilson had "actual monthly earnings at the time of injury" as provided in § 
27-14-403(c) and the hearing examiner properly calculated his benefits by 
applying the formula set out in Chapter 6, Section 2(a)(i)(A) of the division's 
rules.  

 

[¶12]   In reaching this result, we note 
that the district court's ruling appears to have been based on what seemed fair 
and reasonable under the circumstances rather than the governing statutes and 
rules.  While the evidence 
undoubtedly raised questions about Mr. Wilson's work history and the longevity 
of his employment with RMFP, the answers to such questions are speculative and 
irrelevant to the statutory framework of the worker's compensation law, which 
focuses on the circumstances at the time of the injury.  Section 27-14-403(c) unequivocally 
requires that TTD benefits are to be based upon an employee's actual earnings at 
the time of injury, and we are not free to reach a different result simply 
because the employee only recently began working at a higher wage than he earned 
in the past.

 

[¶13]   We reverse the district court's 
order, thereby affirming the hearing examiner's award.