Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Baumgartner

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Baumgartner, 100 Ohio St.3d 41, 2003-Ohio-4756.] 
 
 
OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. BAUMGARTNER. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Baumgartner, 100 Ohio St.3d 41, 2003-Ohio-
4756.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Permanent disbarment — Repeatedly 
harming clients’ interests — Manipulating the legal system to harass and 
intimidate — Publicly accusing dozens of individuals of criminal 
wrongdoing. 
(No. 2002-2237 — Submitted March 25, 2003 — Decided September 24, 2003.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 01-86. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
Respondent, Elsebeth M. Baumgartner of Oak Harbor, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0064583, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
1995.  In an amended complaint filed on March 1, 2002, relator, Disciplinary 
Counsel, charged respondent with professional misconduct, including allegations 
that she made numerous unfounded accusations of criminal and unethical activity 
against private individuals and public officials and also compromised her clients’ 
interests.  Respondent answered, denying any misconduct, but admitting that she 
had accused various judges, prosecutors, law enforcement officials, and members 
of the local school system, among others, of wrongdoing to expose what she 
considered to be public corruption.  On February 1, 2002, we suspended 
respondent’s license to practice law on an interim remedial basis based on 
substantial evidence that she had violated the Code of Professional Responsibility 
and posed a threat of serious harm to the public.  Disciplinary Counsel v. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
Baumgartner (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 1447, 762 N.E.2d 366.1  See Gov.Bar R. 
V(5a). 
{¶2} 
The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
appointed a three-member panel to hear the cause and make findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and a recommendation.  Prior to the hearing, the parties 
conducted extensive discovery, filed numerous motions, and participated in four 
prehearing conferences at which the panel chairperson presided.  Respondent was 
represented by counsel during these proceedings until August 2002, when she 
discharged her attorney and the chairperson granted the attorney leave to 
withdraw. 
{¶3} 
Proceeding on her own behalf, respondent submitted her witness 
list in anticipation of the panel hearing.  The list identified over 250 witnesses.  
Relator filed a motion to limit the number of respondent’s witnesses and also a 
motion that respondent submit to a psychological examination, both of which the 
chairperson considered at the final prehearing conference.  After considerable 
review, the chairperson determined that the majority of respondent’s witnesses 
had no direct knowledge even arguably relevant to the disciplinary proceeding; 
however, he granted respondent authority to obtain subpoenas for over 70 of these 
witnesses, providing that she filed a proper praecipe.  The chairperson took the 
psychiatric examination request under advisement pending the receipt of records 
from respondent’s treating psychologist, which respondent agreed at that time to 
make available. 
{¶4} 
Respondent thereafter appeared at the panel hearing, but only 
briefly and only after she had just filed a federal lawsuit against the panel 
chairman, Disciplinary Counsel in his individual capacity, and various others she 
claimed to be involved in the extensive public corruption identified in her answer 
                                                 
1. 
We denied respondent’s motion to dissolve the interim suspension on April 23, 2002.  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Baumgartner (2002), 95 Ohio St.3d 1430, 766 N.E.2d 996. 
January Term, 2003 
3 
to the amended complaint.2  Arriving late, respondent informed the panel of her 
federal complaint, but refused to sit at counsel table.  Shortly thereafter, 
respondent turned her back to the panel and abruptly left the hearing room.  The 
hearing proceeded in her absence. 
{¶5} 
The events underlying the charged misconduct began in 1999 after 
two incidents in which respondent believed that her daughter had been mistreated 
while a member of the Oak Harbor High School track and field team.  In February 
of that year, the daughter had an argument with one of the school’s coaches about 
using the weight room.  In the spring of 1999, another coach replaced 
respondent’s daughter with a teammate in a track relay event.  Respondent reacted 
by publicly accusing the coach involved in the weight room argument of having 
committed criminal acts during the incident, including what respondent would 
later refer to as a physical and psychological assault of her daughter. 
{¶6} 
With respect to Count One of the complaint, the evidence shows 
that respondent asserted these charges at a meeting of the Benton Carroll Salem 
Board of Education, on which her husband serves.  In response, the 
superintendent of the school district duly reported the allegations to local law 
enforcement.  The Oak Harbor Police Chief turned over the results of his 
investigation to the Ottawa County Prosecutor, who agreed with the chief that 
there was no evidence to warrant formal charges or prosecution.  Dissatisfied with 
this decision, respondent swore out a series of affidavits and, on November 21, 
2000, filed them in the Ottawa County Municipal Court along with her own 
“citizen’s” complaint.  See Crim.R. 4(A)(1) (complaint based on credible affidavit 
may present probable cause for summons or arrest warrant). 
                                                 
2. 
Respondent’s lawsuit has since been dismissed.  In that decision, the federal district judge 
took judicial notice of the facts that respondent had been convicted of falsification in July 2002, 
after which she was sentenced to jail, eventually released, and then jailed again in September 2002 
for violating the terms of her probation, but released to attend the disciplinary hearing. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶7} 
Respondent’s 
complaint 
and 
affidavits 
accused 
eleven 
individuals—the Ottawa County Prosecutor, the Oak Harbor and Put-in-Bay 
chiefs of police, the school superintendent and his predecessor, and the six 
members of the board of education—of various felony and misdemeanor crimes, 
including intimidation, dereliction of duty, theft in office, obstructing justice, 
retaliation, tampering with evidence, assault, menace by stalking, and 
falsification.  A special prosecutor, whose appointment respondent unjustifiably 
alleged to be the result of an unlawful conspiracy, investigated respondent’s 
charges but found no credible evidence to support them.  In fact, various officials 
have repeatedly asked respondent for evidence to substantiate her charges; 
however, she has never provided any proof other than her own sworn statements, 
and these have been categorically denied by those respondent accused, most 
significantly at the panel hearing under oath.3  Thus, the special prosecutor has 
not filed charges relating to any of respondent’s allegations, nor have federal law 
enforcement authorities to which respondent also reported her charges. 
{¶8} 
With respect to Counts Two, Three, Five, Seven, and Eight, relator 
proved that respondent has also made countless other accusations for which she 
has no credible proof.  In correspondence to various individuals commencing with 
a January 5, 2001 letter to the Board of Commissioners of Ottawa County, 
respondent asserted on her daughter’s, husband’s, or her own behalf a barrage of 
corruption and conspiracy charges, among other crimes, against area judges, 
prosecutors, law enforcement officers, attorneys, school board members, and 
others, many of whom also testified to the falsity of these charges during the 
panel hearing.  Respondent sent one such letter to a juvenile court judge before 
                                                 
3. 
Two of the individuals respondent accused in her complaint did not testify.  Respondent 
did not attach an affidavit against the first of these individuals to the complaint.  The second 
individual was subpoenaed by relator but did not testify for reasons not clear from the record. 
January Term, 2003 
5 
whom a client’s case was pending and with whom she also improperly discussed 
the merits of the client’s case. 
{¶9} 
Moreover, respondent made similar false allegations in documents 
she either filed or attempted to file in court, always using her status as an attorney 
and at times compromising the cases of her clients, to further what can only be 
described as a vendetta.  Respondent has also made disparaging and unfounded 
personal attacks against judges, prosecutors, and others in the community and 
often filed lawsuits, without any discernible cause, against individuals she had 
already charged with criminal or unethical activity.  In July 2002, respondent was 
convicted of falsification for making such public accusations of impropriety. 
{¶10} Consistent with the findings of the panel and board, we conclude 
from this evidence that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 1-102(A)(5) (engaging 
in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), 1-102(A)(6) (engaging in 
conduct that adversely reflects on an attorney’s fitness to practice law), 7-
102(A)(1) (taking legal action on behalf of a client to merely harass or 
maliciously injure another), 7-102(A)(2) (knowingly advancing a claim or defense 
that is unwarranted under existing law), 7-102(A)(5) (making a false statement of 
law or fact), 7-106(C)(1) (while appearing in a professional capacity, stating 
matters that the attorney has no reasonable basis to believe are relevant or capable 
of corroboration through admissible evidence), 7-110(B) (communicating ex parte 
with the judge in a pending case), and 8-102(B) (knowingly making a false 
accusation against a judge or other adjudicatory officer), and Gov.Bar R. IV(2) 
(failure to maintain respectful attitude toward the courts). 
{¶11} However, we do not find that respondent violated DR 3-101(B) 
(practicing law in violation of regulations applicable in the jurisdiction) as the 
panel and board did in connection with Count Eight.  Relator additionally alleged 
in Count Eight that respondent practiced law in violation of our interim 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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suspension order.  We have since heard the parties on this issue in contempt 
proceedings and did not find respondent in contempt of our order.  Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Baumgartner (2002), 95 Ohio St.3d 1402, 765 N.E.2d 871.  
Accordingly, we dismiss this charge against respondent. 
{¶12} With respect to Count Four, the evidence shows that in May 1999, 
respondent sent menacing e-mails to the superintendent and a high school track 
coach in an attempt to have her daughter put back in the track relay event.  In the 
e-mails, respondent threatened criminal prosecutions and civil lawsuits, none with 
any apparent basis, if these school officials did not accede to her demand.  Later, 
in March 2000, respondent attempted to intimidate the school board president and 
vice-president, warning them by letter that she had filed a criminal complaint of 
conspiracy and harassment against them.  In July 2000, respondent sent another 
letter, this one on her husband’s behalf to the school board treasurer, in which she 
asserted 
further 
unfounded 
allegations 
of 
conspiracy 
against 
school 
administrators, board members, and attorneys hired to represent them. 
{¶13} Consistent with the findings of the panel and board, we conclude 
from this evidence that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4), 1-102(A)(5), and 1-
102(A)(6). 
{¶14} With respect to Count Six, the evidence shows that in December 
2000, an acquaintance of respondent filed two citizen’s complaints in the 
Defiance County Municipal Court: one against a Defiance County commissioner 
for theft in office and theft by deception, the other against the Defiance County 
Prosecutor for dereliction of duty.  A visiting judge was appointed and, on motion 
of the Defiance City Law Director, that judge dismissed the cause for lack of 
credible evidence.  The complainant did not pay ordered court costs, and the 
visiting judge issued a show-cause order requiring her to appear on February 7, 
2001. 
January Term, 2003 
7 
{¶15} On February 6, 2001, respondent called the regular municipal 
judge and asked for a continuance of the hearing, advising that she was the 
complainant’s attorney and had the flu.  The judge explained that he could not 
grant a continuance because the case had been reassigned to a visiting judge who 
was coming in to hear it.  On February 7, respondent appeared without her client 
and lied to the visiting judge.  She told him that the Defiance County Prosecutor 
had been removed as special prosecutor in the citizen’s complaint she filed in 
Ottawa County because he had been linked to the corruption there.  In truth, the 
Defiance County Prosecutor had asked to withdraw from the Ottawa County case 
for a legitimate reason, had been granted leave to withdraw, and another special 
prosecutor either had been or was to be appointed.  At the close of the hearing, the 
visiting judge issued a warrant for the arrest of respondent’s client for failure to 
appear. 
{¶16} Respondent and her client later appeared together at a February 16, 
2001 contempt hearing.  Again before the visiting judge, respondent this time 
accused the regular municipal judge of having denied her request for a 
continuance of the February 7 hearing and having threatened her with “trouble” if 
she did not appear in court.  The visiting judge found no merit in respondent’s 
charges and cited her client for contempt for her previous failure to appear. 
{¶17} After the hearing that day, respondent filed her own affidavits in 
Defiance County Common Pleas Court, alleging that the regular municipal judge 
and the law director had improperly influenced the dismissal of charges against 
the county prosecutor and commissioner.  The affidavits sought the arrests or 
prosecutions of the judge and law director for obstruction of justice.  A special 
prosecutor was appointed to the cause, as was another visiting judge.  On the 
special prosecutor’s motions, that visiting judge dismissed respondent’s affidavits 
as unauthorized and unfounded, even ordering the affidavits stricken.  The regular 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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municipal judge and law director also denied the charges under oath at the panel 
hearing. 
{¶18} Consistent with the panel’s and board’s findings, we conclude 
from this evidence that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4), 1-102(A)(5), 7-
102(A)(1), 7-102(A)(2), 7-102(A)(5), and 8-102(B), and Gov.Bar R. IV(2). 
{¶19} With respect to Count Nine, the evidence shows that respondent 
agreed to provide in-house legal services part-time for a biotechnology company 
at a salary of $5,000 per month.  The owner of the company, a physician, 
scientist, and university professor, had had some prior affiliation with respondent 
and also leased office space from her.  Testifying at the panel hearing, the owner 
and former client explained that respondent had promised to begin work in-house 
on February 15, 2001, but never appeared and never performed any work for him 
after that date.  He attributed respondent’s desertion and earlier inability to 
complete various work assignments to her distraction with investigating the 
corruption she perceived in Oak Harbor and elsewhere. 
{¶20} Over the following months, respondent wrote to this client 
demanding $15,000 for her professional services and other claims.  She continued 
to inflate this demand through a series of subsequent letters until she ultimately 
asked for $500,000.  In one of her letters, respondent threatened to reveal valuable 
trade secrets and other confidences to her client’s competitors if her demands 
were not met. 
{¶21} Consistent with the panel’s and board’s findings, we conclude 
from this evidence that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4), 1-102(A)(5), 2-
106(A) (charging an excessive fee), 4-101(B)(2) (using a client’s confidence to 
the client’s disadvantage), and 4-101(B)(3) (using a client’s confidence to the 
attorney’s advantage). 
{¶22} With respect to Count Ten, the evidence shows that in January 
2002, respondent filed a notice of appearance and motion for a continuance in an 
January Term, 2003 
9 
Ottawa County juvenile delinquency case purportedly on the juvenile’s behalf, 
but without the consent of the juvenile or his mother.  The counsel of record in the 
case also did not know of or consent to respondent’s filings.  Thereafter, the 
attorney of record attempted to withdraw her representation, and the juvenile 
court continued a hearing in the cause until February 6, 2002, to allow counsel 
and the client to sort out the situation. 
{¶23} At the February 6 hearing, the juvenile’s mother, who is learning 
disabled, filed a “pro se” response to the withdrawal motion that she later 
admitted respondent helped her to prepare.4  Attached to the motion was 
respondent’s affidavit in which she accused the juvenile court judge and the 
prosecuting attorney of various crimes and ethical violations, all related to her 
theories of conspiracy and corruption.  At the panel hearing, the judge and 
prosecutor denied any such activity. 
{¶24} Consistent with the panel’s and board’s findings, we conclude 
from this evidence that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(2) (attempting to 
circumvent a Disciplinary Rule through the actions of another), 1-102(A)(4), and 
1-102(A)(5). 
{¶25} With respect to Count Eleven, the panel and board found several 
disciplinary violations related to respondent’s continuing to represent clients for a 
short period after the interim suspension of her law license.  Specifically, 
respondent wrote a letter, purportedly as counsel for the juvenile referred to in 
Count Ten, to excuse his absence from school to attend the February 6, 2002 
hearing.  These issues were resolved in Disciplinary Counsel v. Baumgartner 
(2002), 95 Ohio St.3d 1402, 765 N.E.2d 871, in which we did not find respondent 
in contempt.  Accordingly, we dismiss Count Eleven. 
                                                 
4. 
Although this hearing occurred after our interim order suspending respondent’s license, 
we did not find her conduct during the hearing to be contumacious.  Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Baumgartner (2002), 95 Ohio St.3d 1402, 765 N.E.2d 871. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
{¶26} In recommending a sanction for this misconduct, we first consider 
the mitigating and aggravating factors found by the panel and board.  Consistent 
with those findings, we share the concern that respondent, who is apparently also 
a licensed pharmacist and has no history of professional disciplinary sanctions, 
may suffer from some mental illness or other disability that is compromising her 
professional judgment and contributing to the misconduct in this case.  Despite 
considerable encouragement, however, respondent ultimately decided against 
providing evidence from her treating psychologist.  Accordingly, we cannot 
temper our disposition based on the potentially significant mitigating effect of 
what may be respondent’s medical condition. 
{¶27} The 
panel 
and 
board 
identified 
numerous 
aggravating 
considerations, including “dishonest or selfish motive,” “pattern of misconduct,” 
and “multiple offenses.”  See Section 10(B)(1) of the Rules and Regulations 
Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline.  We also conclude that 
respondent’s misconduct manifested a seemingly inexhaustible campaign to 
retaliate against anyone and everyone who defied her.  From high school coaches 
who refused to be bullied at the expense of the team to public officials whose 
integrity she attacked if they resisted her demands, respondent threatened to 
unleash on them all the power and privileges she enjoyed as a licensed attorney.  
And in the thick of her vendetta, respondent attempted to extort money from a 
client for her own financial gain. 
{¶28} The panel and board also found that respondent did not cooperate 
in and resorted to deceptive practices during the disciplinary process, refused to 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of her conduct, harmed particularly vulnerable 
clients and others, and made no attempts to offer restitution.  See Section 10(B)(1) 
of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings 
Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline.  Upon review, 
January Term, 2003 
11 
we find ample evidence to support all of the following findings by the panel and 
board: 
{¶29} “Respondent repeatedly promised to provide the numerous 
documents she claimed to have to support her allegations, but never provided any; 
attempted to pervert the disciplinary case into the next phase of her campaign of 
paper terrorism against public officials by [requesting] subpoenas to be issued 
merely to harass individuals with no involvement in her case and [to] interfere 
with its timely and orderly resolution; engaged in egregiously unprofessional 
behavior at prehearing conferences including [making] ad hominem accusations 
against the panel chair and others * * *; and refusing to participate in the hearing, 
disregarding a direct request from the panel chair to be seated at the trial table and 
walking out of the hearing. 
{¶30} “* * * Respondent repeated her false accusations against the 
numerous judges and public officials during the disciplinary process in her 
personally prepared, signed, and filed motions, affidavits and statements made on 
the record at the final pre-hearing conference. 
{¶31} “* * * Respondent admitted almost all of the facts but never 
acknowledged that any of her conduct was even arguably contrary to the ethical 
standards of Ohio lawyers.  In addition, she persistently denied the authority of 
the panel, the board and the Ohio Supreme Court to regulate her conduct as a 
lawyer. 
{¶32} “* * * Respondent’s victims were highly vulnerable to her course 
of misconduct.  The nature and wording of her charges against the judges and 
public officials were calculated to generate the maximum media attention in a 
relatively small community and to inflict the maximum damage on these public 
officials.  The school employees and board members could not effectively defend 
against her accusations without engaging counsel, either at personal or public 
expense.  The school district was effectively paralyzed for a period of years by the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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numerous unfounded accusations, investigations and lawsuits.  The clients whose 
cases respondent took over to press her own agenda were juvenile, women of 
diminished capacity or prison inmates who were misled and then left in worse 
circumstances than when she found them. 
{¶33} “* * * There is no evidence that respondent has ever attempted to 
make restitution for the financial costs of the misconduct to her victims.  On the 
contrary, the evidence is clear and convincing that her pattern of misconduct 
continues, as she filed a federal lawsuit on the day of her disciplinary hearing 
against many of the same individuals whom she had previously victimized and 
who were subpoenaed to testify against her (most of whom she had listed as her 
witnesses as well).” 
{¶34} Considering the overwhelming evidence of her misconduct, both 
the panel and the board recommended that respondent be permanently disbarred. 
{¶35} In a list of 18 objections to the board’s report, respondent asserts 
that various errors and denials of due process occurred during the disciplinary 
proceeding.  Her objections are succeeded by 6 propositions of law.  Some of 
these objections and propositions are lucid, others are sweeping and devoid of 
detail, and some are simply nonsense, usually complete with outrageous 
accusations characteristic of those on which this complaint is largely based.  Thus, 
we review only those objections and propositions that are amenable to rational 
analysis. 
{¶36} Respondent initially claims a violation of Gov.Bar R. V(4)(D) (a 
disciplinary investigation is to be completed within 60 days after the filing of a 
grievance, unless an extension is granted for good cause, and the disposition is to 
be decided within 30 days of the close of the investigation).  Relator represents 
that the grievance against respondent was filed on March 7, 2001, that a timely 
requested extension to conclude the investigation was granted until July 23, 2001, 
and that respondent was provided written notice of the complaint within 30 days.  
January Term, 2003 
13 
Respondent does not assert, much less demonstrate, that she was prejudiced by 
these efforts.  Gov.Bar R. V(4)(D)(3) requires a showing of prejudice before a 
grievance may be dismissed.  Therefore, we overrule this objection. 
{¶37} Respondent also claims that her discovery was unfairly restricted.  
The parties were given ample opportunity to depose witnesses and formally 
request other information; however, all their efforts were subject to the panel 
chairperson’s scrutiny on motions to quash or other objections as to relevance.  
Gov.Bar R. V(6)(D)(3); Civ.R. 26(B).  Respondent cites no example with which 
we can agree that the chairperson improperly denied her access to relevant 
evidence.  Accordingly, this objection is overruled. 
{¶38} Respondent further complains that she was not provided notice 
when transcripts were filed and that our interim suspension order did not specify 
findings of fact and conclusions of law signed by all the justices.  Respondent 
cites no notice requirement applicable in these proceedings, nor does she cite 
authority suggesting that our interim order, assuming arguendo that it can be 
contested at this juncture, was insufficient.  These objections, therefore, are 
overruled. 
{¶39} Respondent additionally asserts our lack of jurisdiction on the 
ground that she was not served with “a Copy of the Complaint filed with the 
Supreme Court.”  Respondent was served and answered the original and amended 
complaints in this cause.  She was not entitled to service of these pleadings again 
when the board filed its report to this court pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(6)(L).  
Accordingly, we overrule this objection. 
{¶40} Respondent next objects to the fact that two panel members resided 
in Cuyahoga County, where incidents charged in Counts 8 and 9 of the amended 
complaint took place.  Indeed, under Gov.Bar R. V(6)(D)(3), no one who is a 
resident of the appellate district from which the complaint “originated” may serve 
on a hearing panel.  Relator claims that this complaint originated in Ottawa 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
County because the misconduct alleged in the initial version of the complaint 
occurred there.  We, however, do not read Gov.Bar R. V(6)(D)(3), which is 
intended as prophylactic against bias among local professionals, so narrowly.  
Relator, however, also insists that the disciplinary process cannot be considered 
compromised for a failure to comply with Gov.Bar R. V(6)(D)(3) unless 
respondent has shown bias or prejudice, which she has not.  We agree.  The 
objection is therefore overruled. 
{¶41} Again assuming arguendo that our interim suspension order may 
be contested at this stage, we also overrule respondent’s objections that she was 
not permitted to present and confront witnesses in that proceeding or this one.  
Gov.Bar R. V(5a) provides for argument and evidence in response to relator’s 
motion for the interim suspension, and she submitted both.  Moreover, while 
respondent asserts that she was denied the opportunity to defend herself at the 
panel hearing and that the panel presumed that her affidavits and other “writings” 
were false, neither of these assertions is true. 
{¶42} Also untrue is respondent’s assertion that the witnesses at the panel 
hearing were either incompetent or perjurers.  Nothing in this record supports a 
finding that the witnesses did not honor their oaths.  This objection is therefore 
overruled. 
{¶43} Respondent further objects to the panel chairperson’s appointment, 
citing a conflict of interest.  Several years before the panel hearing, the 
chairperson was appointed as a special prosecutor to investigate suspicions of 
criminal activity involving the brother of the Erie County Prosecutor.  Respondent 
is acquainted with the Erie County Prosecutor’s brother, and she asserts that the 
brother has knowledge of corruption in that county. 
{¶44} The chairperson, whose investigation did not result in any charges 
or report, advised the parties early on during these proceedings of his special-
prosecutor appointment because the Erie County Prosecutor and his brother were 
January Term, 2003 
15 
possible witnesses in this case.  In fact, the Erie County Prosecutor was one of the 
officials respondent had accused of corruption, and he did testify.  The 
chairperson relayed this information before the prosecutor’s deposition, 
conducted on June 19, 2002, after which “[r]elator and respondent’s counsel, with 
respondent present and participating, acknowledged that they were fully aware of 
the circumstances, expressed their satisfaction with [the panel chair], declined to 
request recusal, and remitted any disqualification relating to his former status as 
special prosecutor in Erie County.” 
{¶45} In reviewing the record, we find no evidence that the chairperson 
acted with bias prior to or during the panel hearing.  Moreover, respondent, while 
represented by counsel, consented to his participation.  We thus overrule this 
objection. 
{¶46} Finally, the gravamen of respondent’s remaining arguments is that 
disbarment is an unjust and unlawful sanction for what she describes as “whistle 
blowing,” that is, her efforts to report and combat corruption.  We disagree.  
Respondent has made innumerable false accusations of wrongdoing that a 
reasonable attorney in her situation would know were false.  There is no 
protection for such statements and attorneys are subject to discipline for them.  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Gardner, 99 Ohio St.3d 416, 2003-Ohio-4048, 793 
N.E.2d 425.  Moreover, when an attorney repeatedly harms her clients’ interests, 
manipulates the legal system to harass and intimidate, and publicly accuses 
dozens of people of criminal wrongdoing, our constitutional duty to regulate the 
legal profession for the public’s protection compels us to impose the most 
extreme sanction:  disbarment. 
{¶47} Accordingly, we adopt the board and the panel’s recommendation.  
Respondent is hereby permanently disbarred from the practice of law in Ohio.  
Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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MOYER, C.J., KLINE, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, FAIN, LUNDBERG STRATTON 
and O’CONNOR, JJ., concur. 
 
ROGER L. KLINE, J., of the Fourth Appellate District, sitting for RESNICK, 
J. 
 
MIKE FAIN, J., of the Second Appellate District, sitting for COOK, J. 
__________________ 
 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Lori J. Brown, First 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
Elsebeth M. Baumgartner, pro se. 
__________________