Title: C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School, et al.

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 3/8/12 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
C.A., a Minor, etc., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S188982 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/1 B217982 
WILLIAM S. HART UNION HIGH 
) 
SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
Super. Ct. No. PC044428 
 
____________________________________) 
 
C.A., a minor, sued his public high school guidance counselor and the 
school district for damages arising out of sexual harassment and abuse by the 
counselor.  The trial court sustained the school district’s demurrer, and the Court 
of Appeal affirmed.  On review, the question presented is whether the district may 
be found vicariously liable for the acts of its employees (Gov. Code, § 815.2)1—
not for the acts of the counselor, which were outside the scope of her employment 
(see John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438, 441, 451-452), 
but for the negligence of supervisory or administrative personnel who allegedly 
knew, or should have known, of the counselor’s propensities and nevertheless 
hired, retained and inadequately supervised her. 
                                              
1  
All further unspecified statutory references are to the Government Code. 
2 
We conclude plaintiff’s theory of vicarious liability for negligent hiring, 
retention and supervision is a legally viable one.  Ample case authority establishes 
that school personnel owe students under their supervision a protective duty of 
ordinary care, for breach of which the school district may be held vicariously 
liable.  (See, e.g., Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 741, 
747; Leger v. Stockton Unified School Dist. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1448, 1458-
1461.)  If a supervisory or administrative employee of the school district is proven 
to have breached that duty by negligently exposing plaintiff to a foreseeable 
danger of molestation by his guidance counselor, resulting in his injuries, and 
assuming no immunity provision applies, liability falls on the school district under 
section 815.2. 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
To determine whether a demurrer was properly sustained, we review the 
allegations of the operative complaint for facts sufficient to state a claim for relief.  
In doing so, we treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded.  
“ ‘Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole 
and its parts in their context.’ ”  (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 
1112, 1126, quoting Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) 
Through a guardian ad litem, plaintiff C.A. alleged that while he was a 
student at Golden Valley High School in the William S. Hart Union High School 
District (the District) he was subjected to sexual harassment and abuse by Roselyn 
Hubbell, the head guidance counselor at his school.  Plaintiff was born in 
July 1992, making him 14 to 15 years old at the time of the harassment and abuse, 
which is alleged to have begun in or around January 2007 and continued into 
September 2007. 
3 
Plaintiff was assigned to Hubbell for school counseling.  Representing that 
she wished to help him do well at school, Hubbell began to spend many hours with 
plaintiff both on and off the high school premises and to drive him home from 
school each day.  Exploiting her position of authority and trust, Hubbell engaged 
in sexual activities with plaintiff and required that he engage in sexual activities, 
including sensual embraces and massages, masturbation, oral sex and intercourse.  
As a result of the abuse, plaintiff suffered emotional distress, anxiety, nervousness 
and fear.  
The suit names as defendants Hubbell, the District, and Does 1 through 
100.  In general terms, each defendant is alleged to be the agent and employee of 
the others and to have done the acts alleged within the course and scope of that 
agency and employment.  On information and belief, plaintiff alleges 
“[d]efendants knew that Hubbell had engaged in unlawful sexually-related 
conduct with minors in the past, and/or was continuing to engage in such 
conduct.”  Defendants “knew or should have known and/or were put on notice” of 
Hubbell’s past sexual abuse of minors and her “propensity and disposition” to 
engage in such abuse; consequently, they “knew or should have known that 
Hubbell would commit wrongful sexual acts with minors, including Plaintiff.”  
Plaintiff bases this belief on “personnel and/or school records of Defendants [that] 
reflect numerous incidents of inappropriate sexual contact and conduct with 
minors by teachers, staff, coaches, counselors, advisors, mentors and others, 
including incidents involving Hubbell, both on and off the premises of such 
Defendants.”  Plaintiff’s injuries were the result not only of the molestation but of 
the District’s “employees, administrators and/or agents” failing to “properly hire, 
train and supervise Hubbell and . . . prevent her from harming” plaintiff.   
In a cause of action for negligent supervision, plaintiff alleges (again on 
information and belief) that defendants, through their employees, knew or should 
4 
have known of Hubbell’s “dangerous and exploitive propensities” and 
nevertheless “failed to provide reasonable supervision” over her and “failed to use 
reasonable care in investigating” her.  Specifically, defendants neither had in place 
nor implemented a system or procedure for investigating and supervising 
personnel “to prevent pre-sexual grooming and/or sexual harassment, molestation 
and abuse of children.”  In a cause of action for negligent hiring and retention, 
plaintiff alleges defendants were on notice of Hubbell’s molestation of students 
both before and during her employment by the District, but did not reasonably 
investigate Hubbell and failed to use reasonable care to prevent her abuse of 
plaintiff.  
The District demurred to the complaint, arguing the negligent supervision 
and negligent hiring and retention causes of action failed to state a claim because 
of the lack of statutory authority for holding a public entity liable for negligent 
supervision, hiring or retention of its employees.  The trial court sustained the 
District’s demurrer to the entire complaint without leave to amend and dismissed 
the action as to the District.  (The sole named individual defendant, Hubbell, did 
not join in the District’s demurrer and is not a party to the present appeal.) 
The Court of Appeal affirmed in a divided decision.  The majority first 
rejected the viability of a vicarious liability theory under section 815.2, on the 
ground that “[a]s in John R. [v. Oakland Unified School Dist., supra, 48 Cal.3d 
438], in this case the alleged sexual misconduct of the guidance counselor cannot 
be considered within the scope of her employment.”  Second, the majority held no 
theory of direct liability for negligent hiring, supervision or retention could lie 
because plaintiff had adduced no statutory authority for it.  Quoting de Villers v. 
County of San Diego (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 238, 255-256, the majority 
concluded:  “ ‘[A] direct claim against a governmental entity asserting negligent 
5 
hiring and supervision, when not grounded in the breach of a statutorily imposed 
duty owed by the entity to the injured party, may not be maintained.’ ”  
The Court of Appeal dissenter opined that “[a]lthough the school district 
cannot be held liable for the intentional misconduct of the guidance counselor, it 
may be liable through respondeat superior for the negligence of other employees 
who were responsible for hiring, supervising, training, or retaining her.”  Because 
school personnel were in a special relationship with plaintiff, they owed him a 
duty of taking reasonable care to prevent the abuse by Hubbell.  Consequently, 
“the failure of a school administrator to exercise ordinary care in protecting 
students from harm should render a school district liable under section 815.2 
where the administrator hires an applicant known to have a history of molesting 
students or where, after hiring an applicant, the administrator first learns about the 
employee’s sexual misconduct and does not properly supervise, train, or discharge 
her.” 
We granted plaintiff’s petition for review. 
DISCUSSION 
The statutory framework upon which the District’s vicarious liability 
depends is easily set out.  Section 815 establishes that public entity tort liability is 
exclusively statutory:  “Except as otherwise provided by statute:  [¶] (a) A public 
entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or 
omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.”  Section 
815.2, in turn, provides the statutory basis for liability relied on here:  “(a) A 
public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an 
employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or 
omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action 
against that employee or his personal representative.  [¶] (b) Except as otherwise 
provided by statute, a public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act 
6 
or omission of an employee of the public entity where the employee is immune 
from liability.”  Finally, section 820 delineates the liability of public employees 
themselves:  “(a) Except as otherwise provided by statute (including Section 
820.2), a public employee is liable for injury caused by his act or omission to the 
same extent as a private person.  [¶] (b) The liability of a public employee 
established by this part (commencing with Section 814) is subject to any defenses 
that would be available to the public employee if he were a private person.”  In 
other words, “the general rule is that an employee of a public entity is liable for his 
torts to the same extent as a private person (§ 820, subd. (a)) and the public entity 
is vicariously liable for any injury which its employee causes (§ 815.2, subd. (a)) 
to the same extent as a private employer (§ 815, subd. (b)).”  (Societa per Azioni 
de Navigazione Italia v. City of Los Angeles (1982) 31 Cal.3d 446, 463.) 
The parties’ contentions, as is appropriate under section 815.2, subdivision 
(a), focus on whether supervisory and administrative employees of the District, 
who allegedly knew or had reason to know of Hubbell’s dangerous propensities 
and acted negligently in hiring, supervising and retaining her, would themselves 
be subject to liability to plaintiff for his injuries.  The District maintains its 
employees owed plaintiff no legal duty to protect him against abuse by another 
employee; the responsibility for hiring, supervising and dismissing employees 
belongs exclusively to the District itself, and no statute provides for the District’s 
direct liability in this regard.  Plaintiff, in turn, argues the special relationship 
between public school personnel and students imposes on the District’s 
administrative and supervisory employees a duty of reasonable care to protect a 
7 
student from foreseeable dangers, including those from other school employees.  
For the reasons given below, we agree with plaintiff.2 
“While school districts and their employees have never been considered 
insurers of the physical safety of students, California law has long imposed on 
school authorities a duty to ‘supervise at all times the conduct of the children on 
the school grounds and to enforce those rules and regulations necessary to their 
protection.  [Citations.]’  [Citations.]  The standard of care imposed upon school 
personnel in carrying out this duty to supervise is identical to that required in the 
performance of their other duties.  This uniform standard to which they are held is 
that degree of care ‘which a person of ordinary prudence, charged with 
[comparable] duties, would exercise under the same circumstances.’  [Citations.]  
Either a total lack of supervision [citation] or ineffective supervision [citation] 
may constitute a lack of ordinary care on the part of those responsible for student 
supervision.  Under section 815.2, subdivision (a) of the Government Code, a 
school district is vicariously liable for injuries proximately caused by such 
negligence.”  (Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 747; 
accord, Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 925, 932-933; 
Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City Sch. Dist. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 508, 513.) 
                                              
2 
That public school administrators and supervisors owe students a duty of 
care and may be responsible for their negligence in hiring, supervising and 
retaining staff does not mean they bear the financial risk of damages and defense 
costs for such negligence.  Even when the individual public employee is sued for 
negligence (none has been here), the defense costs and any compensatory damages 
will ordinarily be paid by the employer, as a public employee sued for injuries 
arising out of negligent acts or omissions within the scope of his or her 
employment is generally entitled to a defense and indemnity by the public entity.  
(See §§ 825, 825.2, 995.) 
8 
In addition, a school district and its employees have a special relationship 
with the district’s pupils, a relationship arising from the mandatory character of 
school attendance and the comprehensive control over students exercised by 
school personnel, “analogous in many ways to the relationship between parents 
and their children.”  (Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist., supra, 19 Cal.4th at 
p. 935; see M.W. v. Panama Buena Vista Union School Dist. (2003) 110 
Cal.App.4th 508, 517; Leger v. Stockton Unified School Dist., supra, 202 
Cal.App.3d at pp. 1458-1459.)  Because of this special relationship, imposing 
obligations beyond what each person generally owes others under Civil Code 
section 1714, the duty of care owed by school personnel includes the duty to use 
reasonable measures to protect students from foreseeable injury at the hands of 
third parties acting negligently or intentionally.3  This principle has been applied 
in cases of employees’ alleged negligence resulting in injury to a student by 
another student (J.H. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 
123, 128-129, 141-148; M.W., at pp. 514-515, 517-521), injury to a student by a 
nonstudent (Leger, at pp. 1452-1453, 1458-1459) and—on facts remarkably close 
to the present case—injuries to a student resulting from a teacher’s sexual assault 
(Virginia G. v. ABC Unified School Dist. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1848, 
1851-1855). 
In Virginia G., the plaintiff, a junior high school student, alleged the 
defendant district had performed an inadequate background check before hiring as 
                                              
3  
Such a protective duty is appropriate in light of the fundamental public 
policy favoring measures to ensure the safety of California’s public school 
students.  (See Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (a)(7) [students “have the right to be 
safe and secure in their persons”]; see also Ed. Code, §§ 32228-32228.5, 
35294.10-35294.15 [establishing various school safety and violence prevention 
programs].) 
9 
a teacher Ernest Ferguson, who had been fired from another school for sexual 
misconduct with students and who had then sexually harassed and assaulted the 
plaintiff.  (Virginia G. v. ABC Unified School Dist., supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 1851.)  Analyzing the case within the same statutory framework as applies here 
(see id. at p. 1854, citing §§ 815.2, subd. (a), 820, subd. (a)), the appellate court 
held the district could be liable for Virginia G.’s injuries under a theory of 
vicarious liability for other school personnel’s negligent hiring and supervision of 
the molester:  “In our case, while Ferguson’s conduct in molesting Virginia G. will 
not be imputed to the District, if individual District employees responsible for 
hiring and/or supervising teachers knew or should have known of Ferguson’s 
prior sexual misconduct toward students, and thus, that he posed a reasonably 
foreseeable risk of harm to students under his supervision, including Virginia G., 
the employees owed a duty to protect the students from such harm.”  (Virginia G., 
at p. 1855, italics added.) 
The District acknowledges that a special relationship making an employee 
potentially liable for a student’s injury at the hands of a third party “might exist 
where the individual employee is in direct charge of and supervising the student,” 
but insists that a “principal, school superintendent, or other administrator who 
oversees the overall functioning” of the school cannot be liable on this theory:  
“They have no special relationship with any particular student.  Their relationship 
is with the entity.”  We disagree.  Responsibility for the safety of public school 
students is not borne solely by instructional personnel.  School principals and 
other supervisory employees, to the extent their duties include overseeing the 
educational environment and the performance of teachers and counselors, also 
have the responsibility of taking reasonable measures to guard pupils against 
harassment and abuse from foreseeable sources, including any teachers or 
counselors they know or have reason to know are prone to such abuse.  (See Cal. 
10 
Code Regs., tit. 5, § 5551 [“The principal is responsible for the supervision and 
administration of his school.”]; McGrath v. Burkhard (1955) 131 Cal.App.2d 367, 
372 [“[T]he principal has the necessary power which is inherent in his office to 
properly administer and supervise his school.”].) 
The District further argues that hiring and termination of certificated 
employees, including guidance counselors, is by law the responsibility of its 
governing board, not of individual administrators.  But while the final authority to 
formally hire certificated employees belongs to the governing board (see Ed. 
Code, §§ 44830-44834), and firing a certificated employee requires action by both 
the board and an arbitral body known as a commission on professional 
competence (see id., §§ 44932-44945),4 administrators and supervisors have the 
power to initiate such actions by, for example, proposing to hire a teacher or 
counselor or filing charges that could lead to his or her suspension or termination.  
(See id., § 44934 [dismissal proceedings may be initiated by a governing board 
formulating charges or by a person filing written and verified charges against the 
employee]; see, e.g., California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified 
School Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 627, 631 [school’s athletic director recommended 
to principal that the district hire a particular person as assistant coach; principal 
then referred the matter to district’s governing board]; Johnson v. Taft School Dist. 
(1937) 19 Cal.App.2d 405, 406 [principal filed complaint with district board 
seeking teacher’s dismissal].)  That employment decisions are subject to approval 
by a school district’s governing board does not necessarily absolve district 
administrators and supervisors of liability for their negligence in initiating or 
                                              
4  
The governing board may, however, immediately suspend an employee on 
receipt of written charges of certain types of misconduct.  (Ed. Code, § 44939.) 
11 
failing to initiate those decisions.  (See Fernelius v. Pierce (1943) 22 Cal.2d 226, 
239-241 [civil service board’s ultimate authority to overrule termination decisions 
by police chief and city manager did not preclude liability of those administrators 
for negligent retention of police officers known to be unfit].) 
The complaint, it is true, does not identify by name or position the 
District’s “employees, administrators and/or agents” who allegedly failed to 
“properly hire, train and supervise Hubbell.”  But the District cites no statute or 
decision requiring a plaintiff to specify at the pleading stage which of the 
defendant’s employees committed the negligent acts or omissions for which a 
public entity is allegedly liable under section 815.2.  To survive a demurrer, the 
complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each 
evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be 
alleged.  (See Golceff v. Sugarman (1950) 36 Cal.2d 152, 154 [complaint against 
employer need not include allegation that negligent act was committed by 
employee in order for plaintiff to pursue respondeat superior liability].)  We 
cannot say from the face of the complaint that the District had no supervisory or 
administrative personnel whose responsibilities included hiring, training, 
supervising, disciplining or terminating a guidance counselor. 
In this connection, the District cites Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit 
Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 795, in which we explained that because public entity 
liability is statutory in nature, facts material to the existence of such liability must 
be pleaded with particularity.  We went on to hold, however, that the plaintiff had 
adequately pled a bus driver’s negligence by alleging the driver, aware of a violent 
argument on his bus, “did absolutely nothing to maintain order or protect 
passengers from injury . . . .”  (Id. at pp. 795-796.)  Plaintiff similarly alleges the 
District’s employees knew or should have known of the guidance counselor’s 
dangerous propensities and ongoing misconduct, but did nothing to prevent or stop 
12 
her harassment and abuse of plaintiff.  Lopez does not stand for the proposition 
that a plaintiff must specifically plead, before undertaking discovery, the identity 
of a government employee whose alleged negligence is made the basis for 
vicarious liability under section 815.2, and we doubt such an impracticable rule 
would be consistent with the legislative intent in enacting that statute.  (See Perez 
v. City of Huntington Park (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 817, 820-821; Sen. Legis. Com. 
com., reprinted at 32 West’s Ann. Gov. Code (1995 ed.) foll. § 815.2, p. 179 
[“Under this section, it will not be necessary in every case to identify the particular 
employee upon whose act the liability of the public entity is to be predicated.”].)5 
More broadly, the District argues that “[i]ndividual co-workers, whether 
peers or supervisors, have no personal legal relationship with other employees” 
and therefore cannot be personally liable to third parties for “how they hire, fire, 
retain, or discipline co-workers.”  As applied here, the argument is a non sequitur.  
Plaintiff relies not on the supervisory or administrative employees’ legal 
relationship to Hubbell, their coworker, for the duty of care they owed plaintiff, 
but on their recognized special relationship with plaintiff, a pupil under their 
control and supervision.6 
                                              
5  
The court in Munoz v. City of Union City (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1077, 
1113, opined that vicarious liability under section 815.2 “clearly contemplates that 
the negligent employee whose conduct is sought to be attributed to the employer at 
least be specifically identified, if not joined as a defendant” in order that the trier 
of fact may “determine if the elements needed to assert vicarious liability have 
been proved.”  Munoz, however, was an appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff 
after a jury trial (Munoz, at p. 1083), not an appeal from dismissal after a demurrer 
as here.  Whatever the merits of the quoted remarks as to a jury trial, they have no 
application at the pleading stage.   
6  
The cases the District cites for this argument are inapposite.  In Miklosy v. 
Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, we held a claim for 
wrongful termination in violation of public policy under Tameny v. Atlantic 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
13 
The District relies on three decisions rejecting, on various facts, claims of 
public entities’ liability for negligence.  As discussed below, none of these 
decisions supports the sustaining of a demurrer on the facts alleged here. 
In Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 
we held that because no statute imposed liability on public entities for negligence 
in handling emergency calls, the defendant public entities were not directly liable 
for a 911 dispatcher’s failure to send appropriate personnel and equipment to the 
scene of a household accident; vicarious liability for the dispatcher’s own alleged 
negligence was barred by a statute providing qualified immunity for emergency 
rescue personnel.  (Id. at pp. 1179-1185.)  We did not consider in Eastburn any 
theory of vicarious liability analogous to that presented here (i.e., that the public 
entity was vicariously liable for the actions of administrative or supervisory 
personnel in hiring, supervising and retaining other employees), and the qualified 
immunity defense that governed vicarious liability in Eastburn has no possible 
application here. 
De Villers v. County of San Diego, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th 238, involved a 
claim of public liability for a county toxicologist’s murder of her husband with 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167 “can only be asserted against an employer” 
(Miklosy, at p. 900), and found no justification for imposing individual liability on 
supervisors for “a common law tort that depends on the existence of an employer-
employee relationship between the tortfeasor and the victim” (id. at p. 901).  
Plaintiff’s negligence claims, obviously, do not depend on any employment 
relationship between him and the District’s administrative or supervisory 
personnel.  Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158 
and Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, which involved employees’ or former 
employees’ statutory claims against employers for discrimination and retaliation, 
are even further off point.  Whatever their personal legal obligations to coworkers 
and subordinate employees, school personnel have, as discussed above, a duty of 
ordinary care running to the pupils under their control and supervision. 
14 
poison taken from the county coroner’s office in which she worked.  Conceding 
the county could not be vicariously liable for the toxicologist’s murderous acts, 
which were obviously outside the scope of her employment, the plaintiffs 
proposed theories of direct and vicarious liability for the county’s negligence in 
hiring and supervising her.  (Id. at p. 248.)  The appellate court rejected direct 
liability on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to “identify any statutory basis 
supporting a direct claim against a governmental entity for injuries allegedly 
caused by the entity’s generic negligence in hiring and supervising its employees.”  
(Id. at p. 253.)  Nor, under section 815.2, could the county be vicariously liable for 
its employees’ failure to properly investigate the toxicologist when she was hired 
or to guard against her theft of poisonous drugs, as “there was no evidence 
supporting a conclusion any County employee had undertaken a special protective 
relationship toward de Villers.”  (De Villers, at p. 249.)  In the absence of such a 
special relationship, the toxicologist’s supervisors and coworkers owed her 
husband no duty to prevent his murder and could therefore not be personally liable 
for his death, defeating public entity liability under section 815.2.  (De Villers, at 
pp. 249-251.) 
The de Villers court’s reasoning on vicarious liability distinguishes it from 
the present case.  As Justice Mallano explained, dissenting below, in de Villers 
“[n]o one in the coroner’s office had the responsibility, within the scope of his or 
her employment, to ensure that employees were not going to use laboratory poison 
to murder their relatives.  As a result, section 815.2, authorizing the liability of a 
public entity under the doctrine of respondeat superior, did not come into play.”  
In contrast, school personnel “have a duty to protect students from harm, which 
includes an obligation to exercise ordinary care in hiring, training, supervising, 
and discharging school personnel.  An administrator who hires a known child 
molester as a guidance counselor and fails to provide adequate training, 
15 
supervision, or termination when faced with ongoing sexual misconduct has failed 
to perform the duties within the scope of his or her employment.  Under 
section 815.2, the school district is liable for the administrator’s negligence.” 
Finally, in Munoz v. City of Union City, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at pages 
1081-1082, the relatives of a woman shot by police, who had been summoned 
because of her erratic behavior, sued the officer who shot her and his employing 
city.  The appellate court held the city could be vicariously liable for the officer’s 
unreasonable use of deadly force, but rejected a theory of direct liability based on 
the city’s negligence “in the selection, training, retention, supervision, and 
discipline of police officers.”  (Id. at p. 1112.)  As no statute made a public entity 
liable for this type of negligence, no direct liability could be established under 
section 815 as interpreted in Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority, 
supra, 31 Cal.4th 1175.  (Munoz, at pp. 1110-1113.)  The court went on to reject 
the plaintiffs’ argument that the city’s negligence was actually the basis for 
vicarious liability because public entities’ negligence liability is inherently 
vicarious.  “[W]hile respondents are correct insofar as they state public entities 
always act through individuals, that does not convert a claim for direct negligence 
into one based on vicarious liability. . . .  To accept respondents’ argument would 
render the distinction between direct and vicarious liability completely illusory in 
all cases except where the employer is an individual.”  (Id. at p. 1113.) 
Unlike the theory rejected in Munoz, plaintiff’s theory of the District’s 
liability does not depend on blurring the line between direct and vicarious liability 
or on an assumption that a public entity’s negligence liability is inherently 
vicarious.  Plaintiff alleges the District’s administrators and employees knew or 
should have known of Hubbell’s dangerous propensities, but nevertheless hired, 
retained and failed to properly supervise her.  These allegations, if proven, could 
16 
make the District liable under a vicarious liability theory encompassed by section 
815.2. 
The lead opinion in John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., supra, 48 
Cal.3d at page 446, it is true, referred to the school district’s potential liability for 
negligent hiring and supervision of the molesting teacher as “direct.”  In context, 
however, that label served merely to distinguish the negligent hiring and 
supervision theory from the theory that the district was vicariously liable for the 
teacher’s molestation, a theory we rejected on the ground the molestation was 
beyond the scope of the teacher’s employment.  (Id. at pp. 447-452.)  To the same 
effect is Delfino v. Agilent Technologies, Inc. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 790, 815, 
referring to a negligent supervision and retention theory as one of “direct 
liability,” where the plaintiff had also sought to hold the employer vicariously 
liable for the intentional torts of its employee.  (See also Diaz v. Carcamo (2011) 
51 Cal.4th 1148, 1152 [characterizing negligent entrustment as a theory making 
the employer “liable for its own negligence,” without considering an employer’s 
possible vicarious liability for a manager’s negligent entrustment of a vehicle to a 
subordinate].)  As these decisions did not consider the theory of vicarious liability 
posited here—that the District is liable under section 815.2 for the negligence of 
its administrative and supervisory personnel—they cannot be taken as either 
endorsing or precluding this theory. 
This is not the first time we have held public school personnel may be 
individually liable for their negligent failure to protect students from harm at 
others’ hands.  In Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., supra, 2 Cal.3d 741, 
one high school student unintentionally killed another while roughhousing during 
the lunch recess.  The decedent’s parents sued not only the district, but also two 
individual members of the school’s physical education staff who were responsible 
for the area around the gymnasium where the incident took place but had failed to 
17 
supervise students in the area during the lunch period.  (Id. at pp. 744-746.)  We 
held that because the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of negligence by 
the two instructors, the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict for the 
defendants.  (Id. at pp. 749-751.)  The school district’s liability derived vicariously 
from that of the two instructors, resting, as in the present case, on section 815.2.  
(Dailey, at p. 747; see also J.H. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., supra, 183 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 128, 148-149 [recognizing potential liability on part of 
individual school employees as well as district for failing to protect student from 
attack]; Leger v. Stockton Unified School Dist., supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at pp. 
1452-1453 [same].)7 
Nor does our holding that public school administrators and supervisors may 
be held legally responsible for their negligence in hiring and retaining as well as 
supervising school staff subject the great majority of public school personnel, 
much less other employees, to potential liability for acts committed by their fellow 
workers.  The scope and effect of our holding on individual liability is limited by 
requirements of causation and duty, elements of liability that must be established 
in every tort action.  (Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 
666, 673.) 
With regard to causation, plaintiff alleges he suffered emotional and 
physical injuries “[a]s a result of” defendants’ negligent hiring and retention of the 
guidance counselor, and the District does not argue the causation element is 
inadequately pled.  But where an individual defendant did not have final authority 
over the hiring or firing of the malefactor employee, but was merely in a position 
                                              
7  
As noted earlier, however (see fn. 2, ante), public employees, including 
school personnel, are entitled to a defense and indemnity for negligent torts within 
the scope of their employment. 
18 
to propose or recommend such action, proving causation may present a significant 
obstacle.  Plaintiff here, and those similarly alleging individual negligence in 
hiring and firing, must demonstrate that the individual employee’s proposal or 
recommendation, or failure to take such action, was a substantial factor (Mitchell 
v. Gonzales (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1041, 1052) in causing the malefactor to be hired or 
retained.  While it may well be possible to prove that a public school principal’s 
recommendation, particularly as to hiring, effectively determined the governing 
board’s decision, the same could not be said of every individual employee who 
recommends to management that a particular person be hired into the organization, 
or who could have, but did not, seek a coworker’s discipline or termination.  Even 
if other elements of the tort action were established, then, an employee who did 
not actually make the hiring or retention decision and whose recommendations 
were not, in the particular circumstances of the organization, likely to be highly 
influential to the decision maker would not face the potential for individual 
liability. 
Turning to the duty element, we have explained that the potential legal 
responsibility of District administrators and supervisors for negligently hiring or 
retaining Hubbell arises from the special relationship they had with plaintiff, a 
student under their supervision, which relationship entailed the duty to take 
reasonable measures to protect plaintiff from injuries at the hands of others in the 
school environment.  Absent such a special relationship, there can be no individual 
liability to third parties for negligent hiring, retention or supervision of a fellow 
employee, and hence no vicarious liability under section 815.2 (or, for private 
organizations, under common law respondeat superior principles).  For example, 
in de Villers v. County of San Diego, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at pages 249-250, 
because other employees of the coroner’s office had no special relationship with 
the husband of the homicidal toxicologist, they had no duty to protect him against 
19 
his wife, and there could be no individual liability (or vicarious liability by the 
county) for their failure to investigate the toxicologist before hiring her. 
Additional limits emerge from our consideration, under Rowland v. 
Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 (Rowland),8 of the scope of the duty implicated in 
this and similar cases.  In Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School Dist. (1997) 14 
Cal.4th 1066, 1077-1081, we decided, through a Rowland analysis, that staff at 
school districts previously employing a teacher with a history of sexual contact 
with students bore a duty not to misrepresent the teacher’s qualifications and 
character.  But, by the same analysis, we limited potential liability for letters of 
recommendation to actual misrepresentations, as distinct from nondisclosures, and 
to circumstances in which the misrepresentation “present[ed] a substantial, 
foreseeable risk of physical injury to the third persons.”  (Randi W., at p. 1081.)  
A similar analysis is appropriate here in order to decide under what general 
circumstances the protective duty arising from the special relationship between 
individual school administrators, supervisors and students extends to a duty of care 
in taking or failing to take action to further the hiring or firing of subordinate 
school staff. 
                                              
8 
In Rowland, we outlined several factors to be used in determining a tort 
duty’s existence and scope:  “[T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the 
degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the 
connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral 
blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, 
the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of 
imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the 
availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.”  (Rowland, 
supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 113.)  We have previously used this analysis to decide the 
scope of duty arising from a special relationship.  (See Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 
41 Cal.4th 1205, 1213-1218.) 
20 
In this factual context, foreseeability and its related Rowland factors (see 
Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 774) depend largely on the 
same factual question we have discussed in relation to causation:  whether the 
individual whose negligence allegedly led to the malefactor employee’s hiring or 
retention was, under the circumstances, likely to be highly influential to the actual 
decision maker.  It is not generally foreseeable, for example, that a hiring 
recommendation made by an employee outside an organization’s circles of 
authority and influence will cause harm to a third party.   
Additional duty limits are suggested by the Rowland considerations of the 
extent of moral blame and the policy balance between the prevention of future 
harm and the burdens created by imposing a duty of care.  (See Cabral v. Ralphs 
Grocery Co., supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 781-782.)  Unless the individual alleged to 
be negligent in a hiring or retention decision knew or should have known of the 
dangerous propensities of the employee who injured the plaintiff, there is little or 
no moral blame attached to the person’s action or inaction.  And unless the 
employee’s propensities posed a substantial risk of personal injury to the plaintiff 
or others in the same circumstances, there is again little moral blame to assign, and 
the undesirable consequences of imposing potential liability—the possible chilling 
of recommendations and proposals for hiring and retention—will tend to outweigh 
the policy of preventing harm by imposing costs on negligent conduct.  (See 
Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School Dist., supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1081.) 
In John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., supra, 48 Cal.3d at page 451, 
we noted with concern the undesirable consequences that could flow from 
imposing vicarious liability on public school districts for sexual misconduct by 
teachers, including “the diversion of needed funds from the classroom to cover 
claims” and the likelihood districts would be deterred “from encouraging, or even 
authorizing, extracurricular and/or one-on-one contacts between teachers and 
21 
students.”  To these still valid concerns we should add the possibility that 
unsubstantiated rumors of sexual misconduct might curtail or destroy the careers 
of innocent teachers, counselors or other employees.  Against these concerns, we 
have weighed in this case the value of negligence actions in providing 
compensation to injured parties and preventing future harm of the same nature, 
and have followed John R.’s suggestion that these remedial goals are best 
addressed “by holding school districts to the exercise of due care” in their 
administrators’ and supervisors’ “selection of [instructional] employees and the 
close monitoring of their conduct,” rather than by making districts vicariously 
liable for the intentional sexual misconduct of teachers and other employees.  
(Ibid.)  At the same time, we emphasize that a district’s liability must be based on 
evidence of negligent hiring, supervision or retention, not on assumptions or 
speculation.  That an individual school employee has committed sexual 
misconduct with a student or students does not of itself establish, or raise any 
presumption, that the employing district should bear liability for the resulting 
injuries.  We note, as well, that even when negligence by an administrator or 
supervisor is established, the greater share of fault will ordinarily lie with the 
individual who intentionally abused or harassed the student than with any other 
party, and that fact should be reflected in any allocation of comparative fault.  
Within these limits, we conclude a public school district may be vicariously 
liable under section 815.2 for the negligence of administrators or supervisors in 
hiring, supervising and retaining a school employee who sexually harasses and 
abuses a student.  Whether plaintiff in this case can prove the District’s 
administrative or supervisory personnel were actually negligent in this respect is 
not a question we address in this appeal from dismissal on the sustaining of a 
demurrer. 
22 
 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the matter is 
remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with our opinion. 
  
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School District 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 189 Cal.App.4th 1166 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S188982 
Date Filed: March 8, 2012 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Melvin D. Sandvig 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Manly & Stewart, Vince W. Finaldi, John C. Manly; Esner, Chang & Boyer, Stuart B. Esner and Holly N. 
Boyer for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Robert A. Olson, Feris M. Greenberger, Timothy T. Coates; McCune & 
Harber, Stephen M. Harber and Joseph W. Cheung for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Dannis Woliver Kelley, Sue Ann Salmon Evans and Chad William Herrington for Education Legal 
Alliance of the California School Boards Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and 
Respondents. 
 
Jennifer B. Henning for California State Association of Counties and League of California Cities as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Stuart B. Esner 
Esner, Chang & Boyer 
234 East Colorado Boulevard, Suite 750 
Glendale, CA  91101 
(626) 535-9860 
 
Robert A. Olson 
Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland 
5900 Wilshire Boulevard, 12th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA  90036 
(310) 859-7811