Title: Ex parte Willie Albert McCall. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURTOF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Willie Albert McCall v. State of Alabama)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 11/7/08
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
_________________________
1070633
_________________________
Ex parte Willie Albert McCall
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re:  Willie Albert McCall
v.
State of Alabama)
(Mobile Circuit Court, CC-03-1276.60 and CC-03-1277.60;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-06-0021)
SEE, Justice.
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's
dismissal of Willie Albert McCall's Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P.,
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2
petition for postconviction relief.  This Court granted
McCall's petition for the writ of certiorari to address a
possible conflict between the Court of Criminal Appeals'
decision and this Court's decision in Ex parte Grau, 791 So.
2d 345 (Ala. 2000).  We hold that the Court of Criminal
Appeals' judgment conflicts with prior caselaw, and we
therefore reverse that judgment and remand this case.
Facts and Procedural History
Willie Albert McCall was indicted and tried for capital
murder and attempted murder and for being a convicted felon in
possession of a firearm.  He was convicted on the firearm
charge and was sentenced to five years' imprisonment.  The
jury, however, could not reach a unanimous verdict on the
other two charges, and the trial court therefore declared a
mistrial.  McCall was reindicted and was eventually convicted
of murder and attempted murder.  He was sentenced to life
imprisonment without parole on each conviction.  McCall
appealed his convictions for murder and attempted murder, and
the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's
judgment, without an opinion. McCall v. State, 919 So. 2d 1237
(Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (table).
1070633
The same attorney represented McCall at his trial and on
1
appeal.
McCall alleged in his Rule 32 petition that the agreement
2
to nol-pros related to his indictments for capital murder and
attempted murder.  However, his testimony at the evidentiary
hearing was that the agreement related to "the capital murder
case and first degree robbery."  McCall was not convicted of
first-degree robbery, nor is there any indication in the
record that he was actually indicted for that offense. 
3
McCall then petitioned the trial court for post-
conviction relief under Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel at both his trial and on
appeal.   He later amended his petition to allege 12 instances
1
of ineffective assistance.  The trial court held a hearing on
his motion, at which McCall offered testimony on only 1 of his
12 claims: that his trial counsel's performance was deficient
because counsel had failed to move the trial court to dismiss
his capital-murder and attempted-murder indictments  even
2
though, he argued, the State had promised to nol-pros those
indictments if he withdrew his appeal of the firearms
conviction.  McCall contends that he withdrew his appeal of
the firearms conviction but that the State tried him on the
charges of capital murder and attempted murder anyway.  McCall
entered into evidence an appellate brief filed by counsel in
the Court of Criminal Appeals, the State's brief in response,
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4
and the Court of Criminal Appeals' unpublished memorandum,
which, McCall stated, were offered to show ineffective
assistance of counsel "on the appeal process." 
In response to his claims, the State offered the
testimony of McCall's counsel and of the prosecutor.  McCall's
counsel explained his trial strategy.  The trial court
dismissed McCall's Rule 32 petition, stating: 
"[McCall's] allegations that the failure of the
trial and appellate counsel to do certain things
does not indicate how he believes any of those
actions would have made a difference in the jury's
findings of guilt.  The bare allegations of [McCall]
do not rise to the level, either on a legal or
practical trial level, of showing the reasonable
probability of a different result, and they do not
meet the requirements of Strickland[ v. Washington],
466 U.S. 688 (1984)]." 
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 694 (1984) ("The
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable
probability 
is 
a 
probability 
sufficient 
to 
undermine
confidence in the outcome.").
McCall moved the trial court to alter, amend, or vacate
its order, arguing that the trial court erred in not making
specific findings of fact as required by Rule 32.9, Ala. R.
1070633
Rule 32.9(d) provides: "The court shall make specific
3
findings of fact relating to each material issue of fact
presented."
5
Crim. P.   The trial court denied that motion.  McCall
3
appealed the trial court's decision, and the Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed, by unpublished memorandum. McCall v. State
(No. CR-06-0021, Dec. 14, 2007), ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. Crim.
App. 2007) (table).  McCall then petitioned this Court for the
writ of certiorari.  We granted the writ to determine whether
the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision conflicts with Ex
parte Grau, 791 So. 2d 345 (Ala. 2000).
Issue
McCall argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals'
decision affirming the trial court's dismissal of his Rule 32,
Ala. R. Crim. P., petition, which was issued after an
evidentiary hearing and which did not contain specific
findings of fact, conflicts with Ex parte Grau.
Analysis
McCall argues here that the Court of Criminal Appeals'
decision conflicts with Ex parte Grau because the trial court
did not make specific findings as to the material issues of
fact presented in his Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., petition for
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6
postconviction relief.  Grau was convicted of possession of a
controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia.
The arresting officer found cocaine and drug paraphernalia in
the pocket of Grau's companion, Holly Simmons.  The Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed Grau's conviction without an
opinion. 
Grau petitioned the trial court for postconviction relief
under Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., alleging that his counsel
should have solicited the testimony of an expert witness as to
a drug test Grau had taken a few days after his arrest.  Grau
argued that the "expert testimony would have indicated that,
because there was no cocaine in Grau's system at the time of
the test, Grau could not have ingested cocaine shortly before
his arrest." Grau, 791 So. 2d at 346.  Grau also argued that
"his trial counsel should have subpoenaed Simmons to establish
that he did not use the cocaine and did not know that Simmons
was in possession of the cocaine and drug paraphernalia."
Grau, 791 So. 2d at 346.  The trial court denied Grau's Rule
32 petition without making any findings of fact on his
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
claim. 
 
The 
Court 
of
Criminal Appeals affirmed.  
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7
On certiorari review, this Court concluded that "because
the circuit court did not make specific findings of fact, any
review of Grau's claims by the Court would be premature." Ex
parte Grau, 791 So. 2d at 346-47.  We stated: "'Rule 32.9(d),
Ala. R. Crim. P., requires that if an evidentiary hearing is
conducted on the Rule 32 petition, "[t]he court shall make
specific findings of fact relating to each material issue of
fact presented."'" 791 So. 2d at 347 (quoting Anglin v. State,
719 So. 2d 855, 857 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996)).  We went on to
note that "'[a] statement of the basis of the trial court's
decision is essential to afford the appellant due process.'"
791 So. 2d at 347 (quoting Owens v. State, 666 So. 2d 31, 32
(Ala. Crim. App. 1994)).  We then reversed the judgment and
remanded the case to the Court of Criminal Appeals, with
instructions for that court to remand the case to the trial
court to make specific findings of fact and to state the basis
of its ruling.
Here, McCall, like Grau, petitioned for postconviction
relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, and the
trial court, like the trial court in Ex parte Grau, held an
evidentiary hearing, but it did not issue specific findings of
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This Court has stated:
4
"[T]o establish a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, a petitioner must prove (1) that counsel
did not provide reasonably effective assistance and
(2) that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced
8
fact when it dismissed McCall's petition.  McCall argues,
therefore, that the Court of Criminal Appeals should have
reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case to
allow the trial court to issue specific findings of fact.  The
Court of Criminal Appeals' failure to do so, McCall argues, is
in conflict with the precedent set forth in Ex parte Grau;
therefore, its judgment should be reversed and the case
remanded.  We agree.
The State argues that "[a]lthough McCall sufficiently
pleaded some of his claims warranting him an evidentiary
hearing, he failed to present any evidence at his evidentiary
hearing showing that there was a material issue of fact
concerning any of those claims." State's brief at 11.
Specifically, the State argues that the trial court's judgment
was sufficient because McCall, unlike the petitioner in Ex
parte Grau, did not present sufficient evidence of any
prejudice he suffered as a result of counsel's allegedly
deficient performance.   Therefore, the State argues, there
4
1070633
the petitioner. ... '[To show prejudice, the]
defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result would have been different.  A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome.'" 
Ex parte Land, 775 So. 2d 847, 850 (Ala. 2000) (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  
The State apparently confuses a "material issue of fact,"
5
that is, a factual issue that is material to the claim for
relief, with a "genuine issue of material fact," that is, an
issue of material fact that is supported by substantial
evidence.  See Black's Law Dictionary 708 (8th ed. 2004)
(defining genuine issue of material fact as "a triable,
substantial, or real question of fact supported by substantial
evidence"). 
9
was no violation of the Rule 32.9(d) requirement that "[t]he
court shall make specific findings of fact relating to each
material issue of fact presented."   
5
We note that Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R. Crim. P., provides:
"If the court determines that the petition is not
sufficiently specific, or is precluded, or fails to
state a claim, or that no material issue of fact or
law exists which would entitle the petitioner to
relief under this rule and that no purpose would be
served by any further proceedings, the court may
either dismiss the petition or grant leave to file
an amended petition.  Leave to amend shall be freely
granted.  Otherwise, the court shall direct that the
proceedings continue and set a date for hearing."
Thus, a hearing need not be held if the petitioner fails to
adequately present a material issue.  If, however, the court
1070633
We stated in Ex parte Grau:
6
"'Rule 32.9(d), Ala. R.Crim. P., requires that
if an evidentiary hearing is conducted on the Rule
32 petition, "[t]he court shall make specific
findings of fact relating to each material issue of
fact presented."' ... 
"Although the circuit court held an evidentiary
hearing on Grau's claims, the only order that court
entered is this notation in the case action summary
sheet: 'Petition for relief from conviction or
sentence denied.'  Accordingly, the judgment of the
10
holds a hearing, then Rule 32.9, Ala. R. Crim. P., provides,
in pertinent part, as follows:
"(a) Hearing.  Unless the court dismisses the
petition, the petitioner shall be entitled to an
evidentiary hearing to determine disputed issues of
material fact ....
"....
"(d) Findings of Fact.  The court shall make
specific findings of fact relating to each material
issue of fact presented."
Thus, the trial court must first determine whether the
petition raises "material issue[s] of fact or law ... which
would entitle the petitioner to relief under [Rule 32]." Rule
32.7(d).  Once a hearing is held on those issues, the trial
court is required to make findings of fact as to each of the
material issues upon which the hearing was held.  See Ex parte
Grau, supra.6
1070633
Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed and the case
is remanded for that court to remand the case for
the circuit court to enter an order pursuant to Rule
32.9, Ala. R. Crim. P., making specific findings of
fact as to each issue of fact presented and clearly
stating the basis of its ruling on the petition." 
791 So. 2d at 347 (quoting Anglin, 719 So. 2d at 857).  
McCall raised the following grounds for postconviction
7
relief: (1) trial counsel failed to invoke Rule 9.3, Ala. R.
Crim. P., which requires that all witnesses who testify on the
State's behalf be removed from the courtroom; (2) trial
counsel deprived him of his right to take the witness stand
and testify in his own defense; (3) trial counsel failed to
object or to move for a mistrial on the ground that the court
failed to admonish the jurors before allowing them to separate
during their deliberation; (4) trial counsel failed to secure
funds to hire an identification expert to testify in McCall's
defense; (5) trial counsel failed to move to dismiss the
indictment on the ground that the State had breached the
agreement it reached to nol-pros the original charges; (6)
trial counsel failed to request that the jury be polled when
it returned the verdict; (7) trial counsel failed to move that
the indictment be dismissed on the ground that favorable and
material evidence had been intentionally destroyed or lost;
(8) trial counsel failed to pursue and present as a defense
the planting of or tampering with evidence by the corrupted
officers; (9) trial counsel failed to request a mistrial or
curative instructions when the trial court erroneously allowed
the jury to consider inadmissible hearsay evidence; (10)
appellate counsel failed to raise on appeal McCall's challenge
to the composition of the venire from which the petit jury was
selected; (11) appellate counsel failed to raise on appeal
McCall's challenge to the prosecution's exercise of its
peremptory strikes to remove males from serving on the petit
jury; and (12) appellate counsel failed to properly present on
appeal McCall's claim that he was denied a speedy trial.
11
In this case, McCall petitioned for postconviction relief
alleging 12 grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel.7
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12
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the petition.
By holding that hearing, the trial court implicitly found that
the issues presented were "material issue[s] of law or fact
... which would entitle [McCall] to relief," Rule 32.7(d),
and, under Rule 32.9(d), the trial court therefore had a
responsibility to make findings of fact as to each of those
issues.  Instead of issuing any such findings, however, the
trial court dismissed McCall's petition on the ground that his
"bare allegations" of prejudice were not sufficient to state
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Although this
conclusion may have been an appropriate basis for a summary
dismissal of the petition before a hearing was held, once a
hearing has been held Rule 32.9(d) requires findings of fact
in support of the judgment.  Under our decision in Ex parte
Grau, the trial court's failure to issue such findings is
grounds for reversal.  Therefore, the Court of Criminal
Appeals' decision to affirm the trial court's judgment
conflicts with Ex parte Grau, and we reverse the Court of
Criminal Appeals' decision and remand the case to that court
for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Conclusion
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13
Because the trial court failed to issue findings of fact
in support of its judgment as required by Rule 32.9(d), Ala.
R. Crim. P., the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision affirming
its judgment is in conflict with Ex parte Grau.  Therefore, we
reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment and remand the
case for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, Parker, and
Murdock, JJ., concur.
Cobb, C.J., recuses herself.