Title: State v. Gustin

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Reversed October 26, 1966.
Oscar D. Howlett, Portland, argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant.
George Joseph, Deputy District Attorney, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. With him on *532 the brief was George Van Hoomissen, District Attorney, Portland.
Before McALLISTER, Chief Justice, and PERRY, SLOAN, GOODWIN, DENECKE, HOLMAN and HAMMOND[*], Justices.
REVERSED.
PERRY, J.
The defendant was convicted of vagrancy under ORS 166.060 and from the judgment entered appeals.
The matter was tried to the trial court on the following stipulation:
*533 The defendant attacks the constitutionality of the statute and also contends that the facts admitted are insufficient to establish the crime.
ORS 166.060, insofar as is pertinent, reads as follows:
The precise question then is: Does a single act of solicitation establish the fact that the defendant is a common prostitute?
In Davis v. Sladden, 17 Or 259-264, 21 P 140, approved in Barnett v. Phelps, 97 Or 242, 191 P 502, 11 ALR 663, this court said:
*534 1. The use of the word "common" in describing the word "prostitute" in the statute emphasizes the fact that the statute is directed against those women who are given to the practice of offering themselves for promiscuous intercourse with men.
2. The stipulation discloses but a single offer of illicit intercourse. No circumstances surrounding defendant's offer, or evidence of relevant prior conduct of the defendant, is disclosed in the stipulation from which a reasonable conclusion could be drawn that the defendant was engaged in the practice of offering her body for gainful indiscriminate intercourse.
Since the evidence fails to sustain the charge, we decline to pass upon the constitutionality of the statute itself.
The judgment is reversed.
[*]  Hammond, J., did not participate in the decision of this case.