Title: Ex parte Kevin Durrell Brown. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Kevin D. Brown v. State of Alabama)(Russell Circuit Court: CC-11-136; Criminal Appeals : CR-12-0007). Writ Denied. No Opinion.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: 2/07/2014
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
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the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2013-2014
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1130297
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Ex parte Kevin Durrell Brown
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: Kevin D. Brown
v.
State of Alabama)
(Russell Circuit Court, CC-11-136;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-12-0007)
PARKER, Justice.
WRIT DENIED.  NO OPINION.
Stuart, Bolin, Shaw, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur. 
Moore, C.J., and Murdock, J., dissent.
1130297
MOORE, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent because I believe the petition
demonstrates a probability of merit. In particular, the
petition alleges that the unpublished memorandum of the Court
of Criminal Appeals conflicts with C.D.C v. State, 821 So. 2d
1021, 1026 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001) (an accused is not entitled
to the defense of entrapment if he or she was predisposed to
commit the crime at issue), and Johnson v. State, 291 Ala.
639, 640, 285 So. 2d 723, 724 (1973) (the defense of
entrapment is a question for the jury when a court is
presented 
with 
conflicting 
evidence 
regarding 
entrapment). 
The
Court in Johnson opined that "[e]ntrapment occurs when State
officers or persons under their control, incite, 
induce, 
lure,
or instigate a person into committing a criminal offense,
which that person would not have otherwise committed, and had
no intention of committing." Id. In light of this definition,
the following alleged facts provide special and important
reasons to issue the writ of certiorari to consider whether,
based on the holdings in C.D.C. and Johnson, the Court of
Criminal Appeals properly held that the trial court had not
erred when it refused to give a jury charge on entrapment. 
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On February 3, 2011, Investigator Jacob Williams of
Russell County, who was wearing plain clothes, parked a pickup
truck outside Bowman Apartments in Phenix City; the apartment
complex is known for drug activity and is located within three
miles of a school and a housing project. Williams asked Kevin
Durrell Brown, who was walking home from work, whether Brown
had any marijuana to sell. Brown stated that he did not but
that he knew someone who did. He then entered an apartment and
returned to the pickup truck to instruct Williams to come back
in 30 minutes. Williams complied and returned to the apartment
30 minutes later. Brown then informed Williams that Brown
still had not obtained any marijuana but that he had another
source. Brown was unable to reach this source by telephone.
After insisting that he had yet another source, Brown accepted
$20 from Williams to purchase marijuana. Brown left with the
$20 and returned with a bag of marijuana. Two officers then
took Brown into custody, and one of the officers confiscated
the bag of marijuana. 
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In his petition for a writ of certiorari, Brown argues
that, because he was returning from work "and had no
inclination of doing anything for anyone," he was not
predisposed to distribute marijuana; therefore, he reasons,
under C.D.C., he was entitled to a jury charge on the defense
of entrapment. The fact that Brown did not have any marijuana
on his person when Williams approached him only strengthens
Brown's argument in this regard. If the evidence were to show
that Brown was not predisposed to distribute marijuana,
moreover, then the Court of Criminal Appeals' holding in its
unpublished memorandum might conflict with Johnson insofar as
an accused is guaranteed a jury charge on entrapment when the
evidence of entrapment presented by the accused and the State
is contradictory. 
"It is well settled that one may avail himself of the
defense of entrapment where he is instigated, induced, or
lured by an officer of the law, for the purpose of
prosecution, into committing a crime that he otherwise had no
intention of committing." Adams v. State, 585 So. 2d 161, 163
(Ala. 1991). "Where the defense of entrapment is raised, two
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separate issues of fact are presented: first, whether there
was governmental inducement; and second, if there was
inducement, whether the defendant was ready and willing to
commit the act without persuasion." Id. If a defendant has
carried his burden of showing that government conduct induced
him to commit a crime that he otherwise would not have
committed, "the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime."
Lambeth v. State, 562 So. 2d 575, 578 (Ala. 1990). The facts
as presented in Brown's petition merit a closer look to see
whether Brown proffered evidence showing that he would not
have distributed marijuana but for Williams's conduct and,
accordingly, whether the burden shifted to the State to show
beyond a reasonable doubt that Brown was predisposed to
distribute marijuana.    
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