Title: Virginia Broad. Corp. v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
VIRGINIA BROADCASTING CORPORATION 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 122013 
JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
OCTOBER 31, 2013 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHARLOTTESVILLE 
Edward L. Hogshire, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Circuit Court of 
the City of Charlottesville ("trial court") erred in denying 
Virginia Broadcasting Corporation's ("VBC") request to have a 
camera in the courtroom to broadcast the sentencing of George W. 
Huguely, V. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings 
 
George W. Huguely, V ("Huguely") was tried and convicted in 
February 2012, of murdering his former girlfriend, Yeardley Love 
("Love").  Both Huguely and Love were students at the University 
of Virginia at the time of Love's death.  Huguely's subsequent 
trial received extensive publicity.  On April 16, 2012, VBC, the 
owner of a television station in Charlottesville, Virginia, 
filed a "Request for Electronic Media and/or Still Photography 
Coverage of Judicial Proceedings," in the trial court, 
requesting permission to broadcast Huguely's sentencing hearing, 
which was scheduled for August 30, 2012.  The trial court had 
previously denied VBC's request to have a camera in the 
courtroom during Huguely's trial. 
 
2 
 
The trial court held a hearing on VBC's request on July 25, 
2012.  At the hearing, VBC argued that because this was a 
sentencing hearing, many of the trial court's concerns about the 
impact of cameras on jurors and witnesses, which had been 
expressed during the hearing on VBC's request to broadcast the 
portion of the trial to determine guilt or innocence, would no 
longer be implicated.  VBC argued there was no "good cause for 
keeping a camera out of the sentencing" hearing, and that any 
"prejudice to the defendant in this case is just almost de 
minimus at this point in the proceedings." 
 
The Commonwealth and Huguely both opposed having cameras in 
the courtroom for the sentencing hearing.  The Commonwealth 
argued that the cameras would have a detrimental impact on any 
witnesses testifying at the sentencing hearing.  Huguely also 
argued that having a camera in the courtroom and live coverage 
of the hearing would have a negative impact on the proceedings, 
and could influence the testimony of certain witnesses.  Huguely 
asserted that VBC had failed to articulate any substantial 
change in circumstances that would warrant the trial court's 
reconsideration of its previous ruling to keep cameras out of 
the courtroom. 
 
VBC responded that neither the Commonwealth nor Huguely had 
offered evidence of prejudice or established good cause for 
excluding cameras from the sentencing hearing.  The trial court 
 
3 
explained that it was concerned about the effect of cameras on 
the witnesses at the sentencing hearing and the effect of 
coverage on potential witnesses and jurors in a pending civil 
suit that Love's family had filed against Huguely.  The trial 
court denied VBC's request. 
 
VBC filed a motion for reconsideration and maintained that 
the trial court was treating print media and broadcast media 
differently.  VBC asserted and that "[t]he First Amendment to 
the United States Constitution as well as Article [I], Section 
12 of the Constitution of Virginia affords the same protections 
to all newsgathering activities, regardless whether the media 
form is print or broadcast," and therefore the trial court was 
required to grant its request.  VBC also argued that no evidence 
was presented to establish "good cause" for excluding cameras 
from the courtroom.  VBC asserted that the arguments of counsel 
and the court's speculation about the possible effects of 
cameras on witnesses or on some future civil action were not 
evidence and did not constitute "good cause" as required by Code 
§ 19.2-266.  The trial court denied the motion for 
reconsideration without a hearing. 
 
VBC filed a petition for appeal with this Court, and we 
awarded an appeal on the following assignments of error: 
1. 
The trial court erred by failing to apply a "good cause 
shown" standard, instead believing that it had unfettered 
discretion pursuant to Section 19.2-266 of the Code of 
 
4 
Virginia to prohibit the use of a camera during the 
sentencing of Mr. George Huguely. 
 
2. 
The trial court erred in denying Virginia Broadcasting's 
request to use a camera to cover the sentencing of Mr. 
George Huguely because there was no "good cause shown" 
pursuant to Section 19.2-266 of the Code of Virginia since 
no evidence was presented in the record to support that 
finding. 
 
3. 
The trial court erred in relying on its own speculation and 
the speculations of counsel for Mr. George Huguely and the 
Charlottesville Commonwealth's Attorney in denying Virginia 
Broadcasting Corporation's request for electronic media 
coverage of the sentencing of Mr. George Huguely. 
 
4. 
The trial court erred in holding that Virginia Broadcasting 
Corporation's newsgathering and reporting activities via 
electronic media were entitled to no protection under the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution or the 
Constitution of Virginia, including its denial of Virginia 
Broadcasting's request to use a camera to acquire the news 
while allowing the print media to use the primary tools of 
its trade. 
 
II.  Analysis 
A. Standard of Review 
 
The Commonwealth asserts in its brief that because Code § 
19.2-266 provides that the decision whether to permit cameras in 
a courtroom is "solely" within the discretion of the trial 
court, such a decision is not subject to review by this or any 
other court.  The question whether a circuit court’s exercise of 
its discretion under Code § 19.2-266 is subject to appellate 
review involves a matter of statutory interpretation, a pure 
question of law which we review de novo.  See Osman v. Osman, 
285 Va. 384, 389, 737 S.E.2d 876, 878 (2013). 
 
5 
Code § 19.2-266 governs media coverage of judicial 
proceedings.  It states in relevant part: 
In the trial of all criminal cases, whether 
the same be felony or misdemeanor cases, the 
court may, in its discretion, exclude from 
the trial any persons whose presence would 
impair the conduct of a fair trial, provided 
that the right of the accused to a public 
trial shall not be violated. 
 
A court may solely in its discretion permit 
the taking of photographs in the courtroom 
during the progress of judicial proceedings 
and the broadcasting of judicial proceedings 
by radio or television and the use of 
electronic or photographic means for the 
perpetuation of the record or parts thereof 
in criminal and in civil cases, but only in 
accordance with the rules set forth 
hereunder.  In addition to such rules, the 
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals shall 
have the authority to promulgate any other 
rules they deem necessary to govern 
electronic media and still photography 
coverage in their respective courts.  The 
following rules shall serve as guidelines, 
and a violation of these rules may be 
punishable as contempt: 
 
Coverage Allowed. 
 
1. The presiding judge shall at all times 
have authority to prohibit, interrupt or 
terminate electronic media and still 
photography coverage of public judicial 
proceedings.  The presiding judge shall 
advise the parties of such coverage in 
advance of the proceedings and allow the 
parties to object thereto.  For good cause 
shown, the presiding judge may prohibit 
coverage in any case and may restrict 
coverage as he deems appropriate to meet 
the ends of justice. 
 
Code § 19.2-266 (emphasis added). 
 
6 
The General Assembly has used the phrase "sole discretion" 
in several other instances in the Code.  See, e.g., Code § 19.2-
163(2) (granting trial judge "sole discretion" to determine 
amount paid appointed counsel); Code § 22.1-294(D) (granting 
school board "sole discretion" to reassign and reduce salary of 
principal, assistant principal or supervisor); Code § 44-93.2 
(for member of Virginia National Guard, Virginia Defense Force, 
or naval militia, choice of leave to take from nongovernmental 
employment shall be "solely within the discretion of the 
member"); and Code § 51.1-156(H) (Medical Board's decision to 
waive ninety-day notification period is "solely in its own 
discretion"). 
In three other instances, the Code not only grants sole 
discretion to a decision maker, but states that such a decision 
is not subject to judicial review.  See, e.g., Code § 2.2-
4011(D) (allowing Governor in his "sole discretion" to approve 
an extension of emergency regulation and such approval "shall 
not be subject to judicial review"); Code § 10.1-104.6(E) 
(allowing Virginia Soil and Water Conservation Board, director, 
or court sole discretion to agree to supplemental environmental 
project, a decision which "shall not be subject to appeal"); 
Code § 2.2-3014(C) (granting State Inspector General "sole 
discretion" in splitting whistleblower reward and such decision 
"shall not be appealable"). 
 
7 
We have repeatedly said that, "[w]hen interpreting and 
applying a statute, we 'assume that the General Assembly chose, 
with care, the words it used in enacting the statute, and we are 
bound by those words.'"  Kiser v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 285 Va. 
12, 19 n.2, 736 S.E.2d 910, 915 n.2 (2013) (quoting Halifax 
Corp. v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 262 Va. 91, 100, 546 S.E.2d 
696, 702 (2001)); accord Rives v. Commonwealth, 284 Va. 1, 3, 
726 S.E.2d 248, 250 (2012).  Therefore, "'when the General 
Assembly has used specific language in one instance, but omits 
that language or uses different language when addressing a 
similar subject elsewhere in the Code, we must presume that the 
difference in the choice of language was intentional.'" Rives, 
284 Va. at 3, 726 S.E.2d at 250,(quoting Zinone v. Lee's 
Crossing Homeowners Ass'n, 282 Va. 330, 337, 714 S.E.2d 922, 925 
(2011)). 
The General Assembly has granted "sole discretion" to make 
certain decisions in several instances in the Code.  The General 
Assembly has also explicitly stated in at least three of those 
situations that such a decision is not subject to judicial 
review.  Code § 19.2-266 contains no such language removing the 
trial court's decision from judicial review.  We hold that the 
trial court's decision under Code § 19.2-266 is subject to 
judicial review, albeit under a highly deferential abuse of 
discretion standard. 
 
8 
B. Mootness 
Huguely's sentencing hearing has already taken place.  VBC 
was not permitted to broadcast the hearing.  Generally, a case 
is moot and must be dismissed when the controversy that existed 
between litigants has ceased to exist.  The Daily Press, Inc. v. 
Commonwealth, 285 Va. 447, 452, 739 S.E.2d 636, 639 (2013).  
Neither party asserts that the matter is moot, but their 
agreement cannot resolve the question for the Court. "Whenever 
it appears ... that there is no actual controversy between the 
litigants ... it is the duty of every judicial tribunal not to 
proceed to the formal determination of the apparent controversy, 
but to dismiss the case."  E.C. v. Va. Dep't of Juvenile 
Justice, 283 Va. 522, 530, 722 S.E.2d 827, 831 (2012) (quoting 
Franklin v. Peers, 95 Va. 602, 603, 29 S.E. 321, 321 (1898)). 
However, as we recently explained in Daily Press, 
the Supreme Court of the United States has 
recognized that the mootness doctrine may be 
inapplicable when a proceeding is short-
lived by nature. See, e.g., Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 
563 (1980); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 
U.S. 368, 377 (1979); Nebraska Press Ass'n 
v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1976). "If 
the underlying dispute is capable of 
repetition, yet evading review, it is not 
moot." Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. 
at 563 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
 
285 Va. at 452, 739 S.E.2d at 639.  This case fits squarely 
within this exception to the mootness doctrine. 
 
9 
 
First, VBC, as the owner of a television station that 
routinely covers trials in the Central Virginia area, is likely 
to make future requests to broadcast judicial proceedings.  
Second, if we decline to address the issues in this case on the 
grounds of mootness, the dispute will evade review.  The trial 
court entered the order denying VBC's request for electronic 
media coverage of the sentencing hearing on August 30, 2012, the 
day of the hearing VBC wished to broadcast.  VBC had no 
opportunity to appeal that order before the sentencing hearing 
occurred.  As we discussed in Daily Press, "[c]riminal trials 
are typically of short duration," and the trial or other 
judicial proceedings would likely be concluded before our 
appellate review is completed.  Id. at 453, 739 S.E.2d at 639.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the controversy before us is not 
moot, and we now turn to the merits. 
C. Code § 19.2-266 
 
VBC argues that the trial court should have applied the 
good cause shown standard in Rule 1 of the statute when deciding 
whether to deny VBC's request to broadcast the sentencing 
hearing.  The Commonwealth argues that the decision whether to 
permit cameras in the courtroom was solely within the trial 
court's discretion. 
It is well-settled that "we determine the General 
Assembly's intent from the words contained in the statute." 
 
10 
Alger v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 255, 259, 590 S.E.2d 563, 565 
(2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Accordingly, "[w]hen 
a statute is unambiguous, we must apply the plain meaning of 
that language."  Appalachian Power Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 
284 Va. 695, 706, 733 S.E.2d 250, 256 (2012).  "[W]hen the 
language of an enactment is free from ambiguity, resort to 
legislative history and extrinsic facts is not permitted because 
we take the words as written to determine their meaning."  Brown 
v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985). 
A statute is ambiguous when its language is "capable of 
more senses than one, difficult to comprehend or distinguish, of 
doubtful import, of doubtful or uncertain nature, of doubtful 
purport, open to various interpretations, or wanting clearness 
or definiteness," particularly where its words "have either no 
definite sense or else a double one."  Ayres v. Harleysville 
Mut. Casualty Co., 172 Va. 383, 393, 2 S.E.2d 303, 307 (1939) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
This statute is not a model of clarity.  On its face, it 
contains two different standards that arguably apply when a 
trial court decides to prohibit cameras in a courtroom.  We 
therefore will consider the meaning of the statute in light of 
the canons of construction and its legislative history. 
D. Legislative History 
 
11 
 
Prior to 1987, Code § 19.2-266 prohibited cameras in the 
courtroom.  It read, in relevant part, that 
A court shall not permit the taking of 
photographs in the courtroom during the 
progress of judicial proceedings or the 
broadcasting of judicial proceedings by 
radio or television, but may authorize the 
use of electronic or photographic means for 
the perpetuation of the record or parts 
thereof. 
 
Former Code § 19.2-266 (1983 Repl. Vol.) (emphasis added).  In 
1987, the General Assembly created an experimental program, 
administered by this Court, to allow electronic media and still 
photography coverage in a limited number of courts.  1987 Acts 
ch. 580.  Code § 19.2-266 was amended to include language 
describing the experimental program.  The statute was also 
amended to include guidelines for the six courts that were part 
of the experimental program.  Rule 1 of the guidelines stated: 
The presiding judge shall at all times have 
authority to prohibit, interrupt or 
terminate electronic media and still 
photography coverage of public judicial 
proceedings.  The presiding judge shall 
advise the parties of such coverage in 
advance of the proceedings and shall allow 
the parties to object thereto.  For good 
cause shown, the presiding judge may 
prohibit coverage in any case and may 
restrict coverage as he deems appropriate to 
meet the ends of justice. 
 
Former Code § 19.2-266 (1983 Repl. Vol. & Cum. Supp. 1987). 
 
In 1992, the General Assembly ended the experimental 
program and revised Code § 19.2-266 to permit the use of cameras 
 
12 
in courtrooms. 1992 Acts ch. 557.  Specifically, the second and 
third paragraphs of the statute were revised to appear in their 
current form, as follows: 
A court may solely in its discretion permit 
the taking of photographs in the courtroom 
during the progress of judicial proceedings 
and the broadcasting of judicial proceedings 
by radio or television, and the use of 
electronic or photographic means for the 
perpetuation of the record or the parts 
thereof in criminal and in civil cases, but 
only in accordance with the rules hereunder.  
In addition to such rules, the Supreme Court 
and the Court of Appeals shall have the 
authority to promulgate any other rules they 
deem necessary to govern electronic media 
and still photography coverage in their 
respective courts.  The following rules 
shall serve as guidelines, and a violation 
of these rules may be punishable as 
contempt: 
 
Coverage Allowed. 
 
1. The presiding judge shall at all times 
have authority to prohibit, interrupt or 
terminate electronic media and still 
photography coverage of public judicial 
proceedings.  The presiding judge shall 
advise the parties of such coverage in 
advance of the proceedings and shall allow 
the parties to object thereto.  For good 
cause shown, the presiding judge may 
prohibit coverage in any case and may 
restrict coverage as he deems appropriate 
to meet the ends of justice. 
 
Code § 19.2-266 (emphasis added).  The phrase "may solely in its 
discretion" replaced the prior language "shall not."  The 
language that originally stated the guidelines applied only to 
courts in the experimental program was removed, and the 
 
13 
guidelines became part of this statute without any further 
revisions or modifications. 
 
The 1992 revisions to Code § 19.2-266 demonstrate that when 
the General Assembly changed the statute from one which did not 
permit cameras in the courtroom to one which did, it clearly 
intended to give the trial court great discretion in making the 
initial determination whether to permit still photography or 
cameras in the courtroom.  The General Assembly included the 
phrase "solely in its discretion," a phrase which clearly gives 
great discretion to a trial court when making its decision. 
The guidelines, entitled "Coverage Allowed," were 
originally drafted only to apply to the six courts where 
coverage was allowed under the experimental program.  Clearly, 
they were only intended to be implicated once coverage had been 
permitted through the experimental program.  In 1992, when the 
General Assembly ended the experimental program and gave courts 
the power to decide whether to permit coverage, it left the 
guidelines in the statute so that once a court had made a 
decision to permit coverage, that court had the guidelines to 
follow to ensure that such coverage was handled properly. 
E. Application of Legislative History 
to Code § 19.2-266 
 
From this legislative history, we conclude that Code § 
19.2-266 in its current form gives trial courts the sole 
 
14 
discretion to determine whether to permit the taking of 
photographs in the courtroom or the broadcasting of judicial 
proceedings by radio or television.  Logically, the power to 
permit coverage also includes the power to not permit coverage.  
It is only after a trial court has made a decision to permit 
electronic media in the courtroom that the guidelines listed in 
Code § 19.2-266 under the heading "Coverage Allowed" are 
implicated.  If coverage is permitted, the statute provides that 
such coverage must be conducted "in accordance with the rules 
set forth hereunder."  Code § 19.2-266. 
A trial judge who has made the initial decision to permit 
electronic media in the courtroom must then comply with all the 
guidelines, including Rule 1 of the statute, and "shall advise 
the parties of such coverage" in advance of the proceeding.  In 
accordance with Rule 1, if a party objects to the coverage, then 
the party must show good cause why the coverage should be 
restricted or prohibited.  Essentially, the objecting party must 
demonstrate good cause why the trial judge's initial decision to 
permit coverage should be reversed, and coverage prohibited or 
restricted in some manner. 
VBC cites the decisions of the Court of Appeals in Diehl v. 
Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 191, 385 S.E.2d 228 (1989), and Novak 
v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 373, 457 S.E.2d 402 (1995), as 
support for its position that the "good cause" standard applies 
 
15 
to the trial court's decision to permit or prohibit coverage.  
However, in both of those cases the trial court had already made 
an initial determination to permit coverage.  The court, the 
parties, and the media were then required to comply with the 
guidelines, including Rule 1 as set out in Code § 19.2-266.  The 
defendants, who opposed coverage, accordingly had the burden of 
demonstrating "good cause" to prohibit or restrict the coverage.  
The trial court and Court of Appeals found that in both cases 
the defendants had failed to demonstrate "good cause."  Diehl, 9 
Va. App. at 197, 385 S.E.2d at 232; Novak, 20 Va. App. at 390-
91, 457 S.E.2d at 410.  These cases do not support VBC's 
argument that the trial court had to apply the good cause 
standard in its initial determination whether to permit cameras 
in the courtroom. They involve factual scenarios where the trial 
court had already made an initial decision to permit cameras, 
and therefore the guidelines, including Rule 1 and its good 
cause standard, had become applicable. 
The trial court in this case made an initial determination 
not to permit electronic media in the courtroom.  The initial 
decision whether to permit electronic media coverage in the 
courtroom is solely within the discretion of the trial court.  
Code § 19.2-266.  Because coverage was not permitted, the 
"Coverage Allowed" guidelines, including Rule 1, were never 
implicated.  Accordingly, we hold that that the trial court did 
 
16 
not abuse its discretion by failing to apply a good cause shown 
standard in its initial determination whether to permit coverage 
of Huguely's sentencing hearing. 
We acknowledge that, in practice, a request for media 
coverage is filed and a hearing is often held before the trial 
court, "solely in its discretion," makes its initial decision.  
That hearing may consist only of argument from the parties, or 
the parties may put on evidence.  But under the statute, a 
hearing is not required prior to a court’s initial determination 
whether to permit coverage. 
If, however, a trial court makes the decision to permit 
coverage, it is then required to advise the parties of its 
decision in advance of the proceedings.  If a trial court 
permits coverage, then a party requesting further restriction or 
prohibition must demonstrate good cause for such further action. 
The trial court in this case was not required to apply the 
good cause standard for its initial determination whether to 
permit a camera in the courtroom.  Such a decision is made in 
the court’s sole discretion.  There is no requirement that 
evidence be presented to the trial court to support the initial 
decision, and the trial court is not required to explain its 
reasons for denying a request. 
In this case, the trial court did explain its reasons for 
denying VBC's request at the conclusion of the July 25, 2012 
 
17 
hearing.  The trial court articulated its concerns about the 
effect of cameras in the courtroom and the world-wide coverage 
of the case on potential witnesses, and how broadcasting the 
sentencing hearing might impact potential jurors in a pending 
civil suit against Huguely.  The reasons the trial court gave on 
the record for denying this request do not constitute an abuse 
of discretion. 
 
The Supreme Court of the United States has long recognized 
"that witness testimony may be chilled if broadcast."  
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 194, (2010); see also 
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 547 (1965).  The trial judge in 
the present case explained that the witnesses in the Huguely 
case were young, almost all college-aged, that the media 
coverage of the trial had been "intense," and that he was very 
concerned about how the media coverage would impact their 
willingness to come forward and testify.  The Supreme Court of 
the United States has held that cameras in a courtroom can have 
a chilling effect on witnesses.  It was not an abuse of 
discretion for the trial court to consider that factor when 
deciding whether to permit coverage of the sentencing hearing. 
 
The trial court also expressed its concern that enhanced 
media coverage would further impact potential jurors in a 
pending civil suit against Huguely.  The trial court was 
certainly within its discretion to consider the impact media 
 
18 
coverage could have on a pending civil suit involving the 
defendant and the victim's family.  The trial court also 
properly considered the opposition of both the Commonwealth and 
Huguely to the request. 
F. No Constitutional Right to Broadcast 
Criminal Proceedings 
 
 
VBC's last assignment of error contends that "the trial 
court erred in holding that [VBC's] newsgathering and reporting 
activities via electronic media were entitled to no protection 
under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or 
the Constitution of Virginia, including its denial of [VBC's] 
request to use a camera to acquire the news while allowing the 
print media to use the primary tools of its trade."  VBC 
correctly acknowledges in its opening brief to this Court that 
neither the Supreme Court of the United States nor this Court 
have held that a broadcaster has a constitutional right to use 
cameras in court to gather and report the news.  Additionally, 
VBC conceded at oral argument that there is no constitutional 
right to have cameras in a courtroom. 
III. Conclusion 
 
We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
when it denied VBC's request to have a camera in the courtroom 
during Huguely's sentencing hearing, and we will affirm its 
judgment. 
 
19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Affirmed.