Title: Dept. of Health v. Campbell

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

No. 89, September Term, 1999
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene v. Minnie Campbell, et al.
HEADNOTE– GUARDIANSHIP COMMISSIONS –ATTORNEYS’ FEES– The guardianship
commissions and attorneys’ fees of an attorney appointed guardian of the property of mentally incompetent
Medicaid recipients does not constitute available income under the Maryland Medicaid Assistance
Program.  
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 98196119
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 89
   
 September Term, 1999
                                                                            
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 
MENTAL HYGIENE 
v.
MINNIE CAMPBELL, ET AL.
                                                                           
                    Bell, C.J.
                    Eldridge
                  *Rodowsky 
                    Wilner
                    Cathell
                    Harrell
                    Bloom, Theodore G. (Retired,                   
                          Specially Assigned)
                              JJ.
                                                                            
Opinion by Bell, C.J.
                                                                         
                        Filed: May 9, 2001
*Rodowsky, J., now retired, participated in the hearing
and conference of this case while an active member of
this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the
Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated
in the decision and adoption of this opinion.
1  In their brief in this Court, the appellees argue that the commissions and attorneys’ fees qualify as
“incurred medical expenses,” see  COMAR 10.09.24.10D(2) (d), that are not subject to payment by a
third party, abandoning the “personal needs allowance” argument they had heretofore made.  At each
prior stage of the proceedings, however, before the Administrative Law Judges, before the Review
Board and before the Circuit Court, the only basis argued by the appellees was the “personal needs
allowance.”  We have said time and time again, that we will review an adjudicatory agency decision
solely on the grounds relied upon by the agency.  See County Council of Prince George’s County v.
Brandywine Enterprises, Inc., 350 Md. 339, 349, 711 A.2d 1346, 1350-51 (1998); Insurance
Commissioner v. Equitable, 339 Md. 596, 634, 664 A.2d 862, 881 (1995);  United Parcel v. People’s
Counsel, 336 Md. 569, 585-587, 650 A.2d 226, 234-235 (1994);  Mossburg v. Montgomery
County, 329 Md. 494, 507-508, 620 A.2d 886, 893 (1993);  Harford County v. Preston, 322 Md.
493, 505, 588 A.2d 772, 778 (1991);  Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Mohler, 318 Md. 219, 231, 567
A.2d 929, 935 (1990); Baltimore Heritage, Inc.  v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 316 Md.
109, 113, 557 A.2d 256, 258 (1989);  United Steelworkers v. Bethlehem Steel, 298 Md. 665, 679,
472 A.2d 62, 69 (1984);  Turner v. Hammond, 270 Md. 41, 55-56, 310 A.2d 543, 551 (1973); 
Pistorio v. Zoning Board, 268 Md. 558, 570, 302 A.2d 614, 619 (1973).  The administrative agency
decided the cases on the basis of the “personal needs allowance,” not the “incurred medical expenses”
rationale.   An administrative agency may be affirmed only on the basis of the grounds on which it
decided the case.   See United Parcel, 336 Md. at 577, 650 A.2d at 230;  Washington Nat’l Arena
Ltd. Partnership v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 308 Md. 370, 380, 519 A.2d 1277, 1282 (1987);
United Steelworkers, 298 Md. at 679, 472 A.2d at 69. 
Of course, our refusal to address the “incurred medical expense” issue is without prejudice to it,
or any other basis, being raised as the basis for recovery in another case.   
This case presents the issue of whether guardianship commissions and attorneys’ fees of an attorney
appointed guardian of the property of mentally incompetent Medicaid recipients constitute available income
under the Maryland Medicaid Assistance Program, specifically whether such fees qualify as a personal
needs allowance.1  We shall hold, contrary to the conclusion of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, that
they are not. 
The Medicaid program, a jointly funded collaboration between a State and the federal government
providing medical assistance to low income persons unable to afford to pay for their medical care, is a
voluntary program, in which a State may elect, but is not compelled, to participate.  42 U.S.C. § 1396 et
seq.; 42  C. F. R. §§ 430-456.  When  a State elects to participate in the Medicaid program, it is required
2  “Indigent individuals and medically indigent individuals” are not defined; however, the Secretary is
authorized to “adopt rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of law that are within the
jurisdiction of the Secretary.”  Md. Code (1982, 2000 Repl. Vol.) § 2-104 (b)(1) of the Health
General Article.   See also § 15-105 (a) (“The Department shall adopt rules and regulations for the
reimbursement of providers under the Program”).  COMAR 10.09.24.02, .03, and .04 address 
eligibility under the program.   
 
3  COMAR 10.09.24.03D provides:
“D. The following persons who apply for and meet the requirements of these regulations
are covered as Medically Needy: 
2
to develop, and submit for federal approval by the Health Care Financing Administration (hereinafter
“HCFA”), the federal agency that administers the Federal Medical Assistance Program, 42 U.S.C. § 1396,
a State Medicaid Plan for the provision of medical assistance that complies with the Medicaid Act and the
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services.    42 U.S.C.
§ 1396; 42 C.F.R. § 430-456.  If HCFA approves the State plan, then the State qualifies for federal
funding.  After the plan receives federal approval, alteration of it   without federal approval, would
jeopardize its federal funding.  42 U.S.C. § 1396 (c).
Maryland has chosen to participate in the Medicaid program.    It does so through the Maryland
Medical Assistance Program, operated by the appellant.  See Md. Code (1982, 2000 Repl. Vol.) § 15-
103 of the Health General Article.    The Medical Assistance program provides reimbursement for the cost
of health care services provided to certain indigent persons, i.e. “for indigent individuals or medically
indigent individuals.”
2 § 15-103 (a) (2) (i).   See COMAR 10.09.24.01 (including aged, blind or disabled
persons within the category of persons for whom eligibility may be determined); COMAR
10.09.24.03D(4) (including “an aged, blind or disabled person” in the list of the “Medically Needy”).    
 
Thus, in Maryland, an individual who is aged, blind, or disabled, COMAR 10.09.24.03D(4),3 and
“(1) A pregnant woman who has been denied AFDC solely because
her income or resources exceed the cash assistance level; 
“(2) A person younger than 21 years old; 
“(3) A caretaker relative (and spouse); 
“(4) An aged, blind, or disabled person; and 
“(5) A person who was eligible as Medically Needy in December,
1973, on the basis of the blindness or disability criteria of Aid to the
Permanently and Totally Disabled or Public Assistance to the Needy
Blind and who continues to meet current requirements except for
blindness or disability criteria.” 
4  COMAR 10.09.24.10D(3) provides:
“(3) If, after application of the disregards in §D(2) of this regulation, the person’s
income equals or is less than the projected cost-of-care, eligibility exists and may begin
on the first day of the period under consideration. The amount remaining after
application of the disregards in §D(2) of this regulation is available income to be applied
to the person’s cost-of-care. Certification is established under Regulation .12E(3) of
this chapter.”
3
has an income that does not exceed $ 2500, Health Gen. § 15-109 (b) (1), COMAR 10.09.24.08L and
M, qualifies for Medical Assistance benefits.   An individual with assets that exceed the resource limit, but
whose income is insufficient to meet the cost of care,  may enter a long-term care facility, such as a nursing
home.  Such an individual is required to contribute all of his or her “available income” to the nursing facility
to pay for the cost of care, with the program making up the difference.  COMAR 10.09.24.10D (3);4 see
42 C.F.R. § 435.832 (a).    
The Maryland Medical Assistance Program regulations do not define “available income.”  COMAR
10.09.24.10D(2), however, prescribes how to determine “available income.”  And the regulations define
income as “any property or service received by a person in cash or in-kind which can be applied directly,
or by sale or conversion, to meet basic needs for food, shelter, and medical expenses.”  COMAR
10.09.24.02B(23)(a).   Thus, available income is  the difference between total income and any allowable
5  42 U.S.C. § 1396a (q)(1)(A), in pertinent part, states:
“In order to meet the requirement of subsection (a)(50), the State plan must provide
that, in the case of an institutionalized individual or couple described in subparagraph
(B), in determining the amount of the individual’s or couple’s income to be applied
monthly to payment for the cost of care in an institution, there shall be deducted from
the monthly income (in addition to other allowances otherwise provided under the State
plan) a monthly personal needs allowance--
(i)  which is reasonable in amount for clothing and other personal needs of the
individual (or couple) while in an institution, and
(ii) which is not less (and may be greater) than the minimum monthly personal
needs allowance described in paragraph (2).
(B) In this subsection, the term ‘institutionalized individual or couple’ means an
individual or married couple --
(i) who is an inpatient (or who are inpatients) in a medical institution or nursing
facility for which payments are made under this title throughout a month, and
(ii) who is or are determined to be eligible for medical assistance under the
State plan.
“(2) The minimum monthly personal needs allowance described in this paragraph is $30
for an institutionalized individual and $60 for an institutionalized couple (if both are
aged, blind, or disabled, and their incomes are considered available to each other in
determining eligibility).”
 
6  Maryland Code (1974, 2001 Repl. Vol.) §13-705 of the Estates and Trusts Article addresses the
appointment of guardians of the property of disabled persons.   It provides, as relevant, that “if the court
determines from clear and convincing evidence that a person lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to
make or communicate responsible decisions concerning his person, including provisions for health care,
food, clothing, or shelter, because of any mental disability, disease, habitual drunkenness, or addiction to
drugs, and that no less restrictive form of intervention is available which is consistent with the person’s
welfare and safety,” § 13-705 (b), “[o]n petition and after any notice or hearing prescribed by law or the
4
deductions. See id.  
For institutionalized recipients, the following deductions are allowed from the
recipient’s total income to determine available income: (1) a personal needs allowance5; (2) a spousal or
family allowance; (3) a residential maintenance allowance for a single person; and (4) incurred medical
expenses that are not subject to payment by a third party.  See COMAR 10.09.24.10D(2)(a)-(d).  
I 
Arthur L. Drager is the guardian of the property6 for each of seven Medicaid recipients (the
Maryland Rules,” it may appoint a guardian of the person of a disabled person. § 13-705 (a).  The
functions of the guardian are provided in § 13-708.
7  The Medicaid recipients and the date on which the guardian of the person was appointed are: Minnie
Campbell, May 1996; Lillian Cheatham, September 1993 Melster Dysart, September, 1993;  Mahalia
LaCruze, May, 1996; Thomas Roundtree, August, 1995, Vivian Tazewell, February 1996; and  Daisy
Watts, April, 1991.
8  These cases were not consolidated until the judicial review proceedings in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore.  Before then, each was processed separately before the Agency and tried separately before
several different Administrative Law Judges.   Nevertheless, we will refer to the proceedings, except
where necessary to do otherwise, as if there was but one proceeding.
5
appellees).7  Each appellee is a resident of a nursing facility and receives Medicaid benefits to help pay for
his or her care.  The present controversy began when Mr. Drager requested that the Maryland Medical
Assistance Program (“Program”) of the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (the appellant) deduct
his guardianship commissions with respect to his wards from their available incomes.8  He sought
commissions in the following amounts:  $522.78 for Minnie Campbell, $294.62 for Lillian Cheatham,
$416.27 for Melster Dystart, $ 689.04 for Mahalia LaCruze, $263.42 for Thomas Roundtree, $925.36
for Vivian Tazewell, and $829.37 for Daisy Watts.  These requests were denied by the Medicaid Program,
which advised Mr. Drager that the Department has “no provisions in  [the] regulations to allow for such
deductions.”     
Mr. Drager, on behalf of the appellees, appealed to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH),
arguing  that  the commissions should be permitted as part of the personal needs allowance of each
Medicaid recipient, that the Administrative Law Judges should follow prior OAH, Board of Review, and
Circuit Court decisions that permitted the deduction of such commissions, and that public policy
considerations required a ruling favorable to the appellees.  In each case, the ALJ affirmed the appellant’s
9  The ALJ that decided the Campbell and Cheatham cases, which were consolidated for argument,
found that “the personal needs that are contemplated by the statutory personal needs allowance are
incidental items used for clothing or for grooming one’s body.”  Similarly, in the case of Vivian
Tazewell, the ALJ determined that the personal needs allowance was intended to cover items such as
“haircuts, pedicures, shampoos and chewing gum, not to pay guardian’s commissions or other legal
fees.”  In the cases of Melster Dysart, Mahalia LaCruze and Daisy Watts, the ALJs found that the
Department’s reading of the regulation at issue was correct, and “bolstered by the State’s need to
comply with federal requirements . . . .” 
    
 
6
decision, concluding that it had correctly held that the guardianship commissions are not a part of the
personal needs allowance and, thus, are not a permissible deduction in calculating a Medicaid recipient’s
available income.9    The appellees’ other arguments were also rejected.     The Board of Review, to which
the decisions were appealed, affirmed.
 The appellees sought judicial review in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City,  and the  cases were
consolidated for hearing.  Pressing the same arguments they had made before the ALJs, the appellees
sought, in the Circuit Court,  not just the deduction of the guardianship commissions, but attorneys’ fees
to be paid on the same basis.  Accepting their argument that guardianship commissions should be deducted
from a recipient’s income as a part of the personal needs allowance, the Circuit Court  reversed.   As to
the  guardianship commissions, the court ordered:
“that the guardianship commissions calculated in accordance with the Annotated Code of
Maryland, Estates and Trusts Article Sections 13-218 and 14-103, and approved by the
Trust Clerk for the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for services rendered on behalf of [the
named appellee] shall not be considered as ‘available income’ as set forth in COMAR
10.09.24.10D and shall be deducted prior to the calculation of available income for [the
named appellee] . . . .” 
and 
7
“That the Baltimore City Department of Social Services Long Term Medical Assistance
Unit be and is hereby directed to allow guardianship commissions in [a stated amount] to
be paid unto Arthur L. Drager for services rendered by him in his capacity as Guardian of
the Property of [the named appellee].”
The trial court reasoned: 
“[I]n our guardianship docket, a lot of indigent people would be out on the street but for
our appointing guardians and having Counsel represent the guardian, and then be able to
get the benefits that they’re entitled to under the law.    So, I don’t view it as sort of gilding
the lily, I view it as essential to life and to living, and, therefore I will sign the Orders
authorizing the fees be paid.”
The court  also granted the appellee’s  request for, and ordered the Department to allow, a counsel fee of
$600, for each case.
We issued the  writ of certiorari on our own motion, while this case was pending in the Court of
Special Appeals.  We now reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.  
II.
Our review of a decision by the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, an administrative
agency of the State, is governed by  Md. Code (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol.)  § 10-222 of the State
Government Article, section (h) of which provides:
“(h) In a proceeding under this section, the court may:
“1.  remand the case for further proceedings;
“2.  affirm the decision of the agency; or
“3.  reverse or modify the decision if any substantial right of the petitioner
may have been prejudiced because a finding, conclusion, or decision of
the agency:
* * *
“c)  results from an unlawful procedure;
“d)  is affected by any other error of law;
“e)  is unsupported by competent, material, and
substantial evidence in light of the entire record as
submitted; or
8
“f)  is arbitrary or capricious.”
Thus, the issue for the reviewing court is whether the administrative agency committed an error of law, or
whether its decision is supported by substantial evidence, or is “arbitrary or capricious.”  Insurance
Comm’r of State of Md. v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of U.S., 339 Md. 596, 614-15, 664 A.2d
862, 871-72 (1995).     
The question  whether guardianship commissions are an allowable deduction from a Medical
Assistance recipient’s available income under COMAR 10.09.24.10D(2)(d), as a “personal needs
allowance,” is solely one of law.    As to the review of questions of law,  we have pointed out, see Office
of People’s Counsel v. Maryland Public Service Comm’n, 355 Md. 1, 14, 733 A.2d 996, 1003
(1999)(quoting Commissioners of Cambridge v. Eastern Shore Public Serv. Co., 192 Md. 333, 339, 64
A.2d 151, 154 (1949)) and citing Mayor & Council of Crisfield v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 183 Md. 179,
189, 36 A.2d 705, 710 (1944) and  Baltimore Gas and Elec. Co. v. Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene,
284 Md. 216, 230-31, 395 A.2d 1174, 1181 (1979)), that “[q]uestions of law . . . are ‘completely subject
to review by the courts,’. . . although the agency’s interpretation of a statute may be entitled to some
deference.”  See also, Total Audio-Visual Systems, Inc. v. Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation,
360 Md. 387, 394, 758 A.2d 124, 128 (2000); Board of Physician Quality Assurance v. Banks, 354 Md.
59, 69, 729 A.2d 376, 381 (1999).  We have noted also that the deference under these circumstances is
by no means dispositive,  nor otherwise as great as that applicable to factual findings or mixed questions
of law and fact.  See Baltimore Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council v. Barnes, 290 Md. 9, 14, 427 A.2d
979, 982 (1981).   Accordingly, this Court is not bound by the agency’s legal conclusions; we are, in short,
“under no constraints in reversing an administrative decision which is premised solely upon an erroneous
10  Before the Circuit Court, counsel for the appellant argued:
“Finally, the appellant [the appellees in this Court] has raised a number of public policy
arguments.   And, this simply is [not] the forum to address public policy concerns.   The
Regulations are passed through a specific process and there is notice to the public and
an opportunity for comment, and opinions on that, and that is the time to raise public
policy concerns with respect to COMAR.   So I would suggest that this is the
inappropriate forum for that.”
11The appellant also addressed the issue of whether guardianship commissions may be deducted from
total income to determine “available income,” the threshold for assessing whether an individual is
medically needy.   In the cases of appellees Cheatham and Campbell, the Administrative Law Judge
decided the issue, concluding that “the court-ordered obligation for [those appellees] to . . .  support
[themselves] by paying a guardian of the property to protect [their] property, is . . . a court-ordered
support obligation that can not be excluded from available income.”   In support, the ALJ relied on
cases holding that available income is not reduced by court-ordered support payments or mandatory
withholdings. See  Himes v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 684, 689 (2d Cir. 1993);  Peura  by Herman v. Mala,
9
conclusion of law.” People’s Counsel for Baltimore County v. Maryland Marine Mfg. Co., 316 Md. 491,
497, 560 A.2d 32,  38 (1989); See also Board of Physician Quality Assurance  v. Banks, 354 Md. 59,
67, 729 A.2d 376, 380 (1999).
III.
As noted above, the trial court ordered, in respect to each appellee, that the guardianship
commissions “be considered as ‘available income’ . . . and shall be deducted prior to calculation of
available income.”  That order must have been premised on the appellees’ written memorandum of law,
which the court indicated it considered, because the appellees’ oral argument consisted only of rebuttal of
some of the arguments advanced by the appellant.  Other than the policy arguments that the trial court
specifically rejected as  “for a legislative body or regulatory body,”
10 the only basis for relief offered by the
appellees in their written memorandum was that the commissions were a part of the “personal needs
allowance.”  We must assume, therefore, that the “personal needs allowance”is the basis on which the court
decided the case, and we review its judgment with that in mind.11
977 F.2d 484, 491 (9th Cir. 1992);  Clark by Clark v. Iowa Dept. Of Human Services, 513 N.W. 2d
710, 711 (Iowa 1994).  The appellant agrees, citing, in addition to those cited by the ALJ, the cases of
Ussery v. Kan. Dept of Social and Rehabilitation Servs., 899 P. 2d 461, 466 (Kan. 1995) and Crider
v. Fla. Dep’t of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 555 So. 2d 408, 413-14 (Fla. App. 1989).   We do
not decide the issue and intimate no opinion as to the correctness of this basis for the ALJ’s decision.  
12Regulations that are consistent with the letter and spirit of the law under which they are promulgated
and under which the agency acts are not subject to successful challenge.  Christ by Christ v. Md. Dep’t
of Natural Resources, 335 Md. 427, 437, 644 A.2d 34, 38 (1994); Lussier v. Md. Racing Comm’n,
343 Md. 681, 687, 684 A.2d 804-07 (1996). 
13Regulation 10.09.24.10D (2) (a) (iii) pertains to a “person who resides in an ICF-MR or mental
hospital, participates in therapeutic work activities, and receives remuneration for participating in these
10
By statute, Maryland prescribes the eligibility requirements for the Medical Assistance Program -
as relevant to the case sub judice, indigence or medical indigence, § 15-103 (a) (2) (1), and an income,
for one person, of $2500, § 15-109 (b) (1).  These requirements have been elucidated and further refined
by regulations, the validity of which, substantively and procedurally, have not been, and are not now being,
challenged.12  As noted, COMAR 10.09.24.04D (4) defines “Medically Needy” as including “an aged,
blind, or disabled person” and COMAR 10.09.24.08L and M confirm the eligibility limitation for the
Medical Assistance Program.    COMAR 10.09.24.10D, in pertinent part, provides:
“D. Current Eligibility.
“(1) Excess Resources.  When the countable resources are greater than
the medically needy resource level, eligibility does not exist.
“(2) Determination of Available Income.  The following amounts shall be
deducted from total income in the following order:
“(a) A personal needs allowance of:
“(i) $40 a month for an institutionalized
person other than a person who meets
the requirements of § D(2) (a) (iii) of this
regulation.”
[13]
activities,” for whom the “personal needs allowance” is greater.
11
“Personal needs allowance” is not further defined in the regulations.   Insight into meaning may be
obtained from perusal of the pertinent sections of the federal statute and the accompanying regulations. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(50) provides for a monthly personal needs allowance for certain institutionalized
individuals and couples.  Section 1396a (q)(1)(A) elaborates.  In pertinent part, it provides:
“(q) Minimum monthly personal needs allowance deduction; ‘institutionalized individual or
couple’ defined. 
“(1) (A) In order to meet the requirement of subsection (a)(50), the State plan must
provide that, in the case of an institutionalized individual or couple described in
subparagraph (B), in determining the amount of the individual’s or couple’s income to be
applied monthly to payment for the cost of care in an institution, there shall be deducted
from the monthly income (in addition to other allowances otherwise provided under the
State plan) a monthly personal needs allowance-- 
“(i) which is reasonable in amount for clothing and other
personal needs of the individual (or couple) while in an
institution, and 
“(ii) which is not less (and may be greater) than the
minimum monthly personal needs allowance described in
paragraph (2). 
“(B) In this subsection, the term ‘institutionalized individual or couple’
means an individual or married couple-- 
“(i) who is an inpatient (or who are inpatients) in a
medical institution or nursing facility for which payments
are made under this title throughout a month and 
“(ii) who is or are determined to be eligible for medical assistance under
the State plan.
“(2) The minimum monthly personal needs allowance described in this paragraph
[subsection] is $ 30 for an institutionalized individual and $ 60 for an institutionalized couple
(if both are aged, blind, or disabled, and their incomes are considered available to each
other in determining eligibility).”
As the federal regulations, 42 C.F.R. § 435.832 (c) (1), confirm, the deduction is for “clothing and other
personal needs of the individual while in the institution.”  
As noted above, the Administrative Law Judges determined that the appellant’s reading of the
applicable regulation was the correct one, that “the personal needs that are contemplated by the statutory
12
personal needs allowance are incidental items used for clothing or for grooming one’s body,” items such
as “haircuts, pedicures, shampoos and chewing gum, and not guardian’s commissions or other legal fees”
and, accordingly,  concluded that  such fees could not be designated as a part of the “personal needs
allowance” and excluded from available income.     We agree.   Guardianship commissions  are not
clothing, and they are not the kind of personal needs contemplated by the COMAR 10.09.24.10D.   The
amount of the “personal needs allowance” is $40.00.  That amount will accommodate, to be sure, the cost
of personal items necessary for grooming and even some entertainment.  It will not accommodate the cost
of an item such as guardianship fees, which, as in this case, is likely to exceed, by far, the maximum amount
of the allowance.  Again, we agree with the appellant when it argues:
“. . . Maryland’s regulatory scheme demonstrates that the Maryland regulation does not
include guardianship commissions within the personal needs allowance.   While the $40
provided for in the regulation may be sufficient to pay for toiletries, clothing and other small
items, it clearly is not sufficient to pay for larger and more expensive items such as
guardianship commissions, which, as this case demonstrates, can be hundreds of dollars.
 If the regulation were intended to permit payments for such items, it would have provided
for a deduction larger than $40 per month. COMAR 10.09.24.10D (2) (a) (i).”
IV
For the first time in the Circuit Court, the appellees requested reasonable attorneys’
fees of $ 600 per case, plus court costs.  The trial court granted the request and signed an order directing
the appellant “to allow a counsel fee in the amount of six Hundred Dollars ($600,00) to be paid unto Arthur
L. Drager for services rendered by him in his capacity as Guardian of the Property.”  We agree with the
appellant that the trial court erred in so ordering for any one of several reasons.
The appellant is correct; the attorneys fee order is ambiguous.   It is not clear from the order
whether, as was the case with the guardianship commissions, the court considered  the fees  as a part of
13
the “personal needs allowance” and, as such, deductible  from the appellees’ income to determine their
“available income,” or whether the court awarded the attorneys’ fees in respect to the prosecution of the
appeal.  In either event, the award can not withstand review.
Maryland Code (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol.) § 10-222 (a) of the State Government Article  provides
that “a party who is aggrieved by the final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review of the
decision.”  Thus, it is the final decision of the final decision maker at the administrative level, not that of the
reviewing court,  that is subject to judicial review.    Accordingly, the reviewing court, restricted to the
record made before the administrative agency, see  Cicala v. Disability Review Bd. for Prince George’s
County, 288 Md. 254, 260, 418 A.2d 205, 209 (1980), may not pass upon issues presented to it for the
first time on judicial review and that are not encompassed in the final decision of the administrative agency.
Stated differently, an appellate court will review an adjudicatory agency decision solely on the grounds
relied upon by the agency.  See County Council of Prince George’s County v. Brandywine Enterprises,
Inc., 350 Md. 339, 349, 711 A.2d 1346, 1350-51 (1998) and cases cited in note 1, supra.  See also  Md.
State Retirement Pension Sys. v. Martin, 75 Md. App. 240, 246-48, 540 A.2d 1188, 1190-92 (1988).
Because the issue of the attorneys’ fees were been presented to the Circuit Court for the first time and
never raised in, or decided by the Administrative Law Judges, that court erred in awarding them.
Similarly, if the fees were intended to reimburse the appellees for the cost of litigating the judicial
review proceedings, the court still erred in awarding them.  The “American Rule” is the name given the
principle that costs awarded to a prevailing party in litigation ordinarily do not include the counsel fees of
the prevailing party.  Blitz v. Beth Isaac Adas Israel Congregation, 352 Md. 31, 39, 720 A.2d 912, 916
(1998);  Collier v. MD-Individual Practice Ass’n, Inc., 327 Md. 1, 13, 607 A.2d 537, 543 (1992).  See
14
Talley v.Talley, 317 Md. 428, 438, 564 A.2d 777, 782 (1989).  We have pointed out that “[t]he power
to award attorney’s fees, being contrary to the established practice in this country, may be expressly
conferred but will not be presumed from general language.”  Talley, 317 Md. at 438, 564 A.2d at 782,
citing Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 759-63, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 2460-62, 65 L.Ed.2d
488, 499 (1980).    This principle is no less applicable in the administrative context.   Section 10-222 (h)
empowers the reviewing court to remand the case for further proceedings, affirm the decision, or reverse
or modify it; there is no provision for the reviewing court to award attorneys’ fees.   If general language will
not suffice as a predicate for the award of attorneys’ fees, then certainly the absence of language will not
suffice.  By way of contrast, see Md. Code (1984 , 1999 Repl. Vol.) § 10-224 of the State Government
Article, “Litigation expenses for small businesses and non-profit organizations,” which, as relevant,
provides:
“(c) Subject to the limitations in this section, an agency or court may award to a business
or nonprofit organization reimbursement for expenses that the business or nonprofit
organization reasonably incurs in connection with a contested case or civil action that:
“(1) is initiated against the business or nonprofit organization by an agency
as part of an administrative or regulatory function;
“(2) is initiated without substantial justification or in bad faith;  and
“(3) does not result in:
“(i) an adjudication, stipulation, or acceptance of liability
of the business or nonprofit organization;
“(ii) a determination of noncompliance, violation,
infringement, deficiency, or breach on the part of the
business or nonprofit organization;  or
“(iii) a settlement agreement under which the business or
nonprofit organization agrees to take corrective action or
to pay a monetary sum.
*      *     *     *
“(e) (1) An award under this section may include:
“(i) the expenses incurred in the contested case;
15
“(ii) court costs;
“(iii) counsel fees;  and
“(iv) the fees of necessary witnesses.”
See also Md. Code (1997, 1999 Repl. Vol.) § 5-111of the Commercial Law Article (“Reasonable
attorney’s fees and other expenses of litigation must be awarded”);  Md. Code (1973, 1998 Repl. Vol.)
§ 10-410 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“[E]ntitled to . . . a reasonable attorney’s fees
and other litigation costs reasonably incurred”);  Md. Code (1980, 1998 Repl. Vol.) § 10-120 of the
Financial Institutions Article  (“All attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses . . . shall be assessed as part of any
judgment”);   Md. Code (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol.) §10-510 of the State Government Article (“As part of
its judgment . . .[court] may assess . . . reasonable counsel fees and other litigation expenses . . . .”);  Md.
Code (1993, 1997 Repl. Vol.) § 5-311 of the State Personnel and Pensions Article (“[C]ourt may award
costs of litigation and reasonable attorney’s fees . . . .”).
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR BALTIMORE CITY REVERSED.  CASE
REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH
INSTRUCTIONS TO AFFIRM THE
DECISION OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW
IN EACH OF THESE CASES.  COSTS TO
BE PAID BY THE APPELLEES.