Title: Nash v. Cosby

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

597 So. 2d 209 (1992)
Deborah NASH
v.
Dr. Joseph COSBY, et al.
1910215.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
March 27, 1992.
Robert H. Ford of Emond & Vines, Birmingham, for appellant.
W. Stanley Rodgers, James E. Davis, Jr. and George E. Knox, Jr. of Lanier Ford Shaver & Payne P.C., Huntsville, for appellees.
STEAGALL, Justice.
The plaintiff, Deborah Nash, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of a lawsuit for lack of prosecution. We reverse the judgment and remand the cause for reinstatement of Nash's lawsuit.
Nash sued Dr. Joseph Cosby and Dr. Wilhelm Tietke, alleging medical malpractice. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants, and this Court, in Nash v. Cosby, 574 So. 2d 700 (Ala. 1990), reversed the judgment entered pursuant to the jury verdict and remanded the cause.
The case was set for trial on June 24, 1991. On June 17, 1991, Stephanie Christian, secretary to Robert H. Ford, Nash's lead counsel, wrote a letter to the trial court apprising it of the fact that Ford was involved in a trial of another suit, which could continue into the week of June 24. On Friday, June 21, at 4:42 p.m., Nash filed a motion to continue the case until later in the week of trial and until the jury had returned a verdict in Garner v. Collins, in Jackson County, Alabama. On Monday, June 24, 1991, at approximately 9:02 a.m., the trial court called the case for trial; Jerrilee Sutherlin, Nash's assistant counsel, then argued the motion to continue:
"I have not ever tried a medical malpractice case.
"Mr. Ford believes that he should remain with his clients in Garner v. Collins until that case is returned because the jury may come back and have questions and he is already over there in that case, the only one that the jury recognizes representing the Garners; and, therefore, he believes he owes it to the Garners to remain there until such time as that case has been returned.
"THE COURT: Mr. Davis, do you want to be heard?
"MS. SUTHERLIN: They are doing closing arguments this morning.
"MS. SUTHERLIN: Yes.
"THE COURT: Were they to start at 9 o'clock?
"MS. SUTHERLIN: As far as I know.
"MS. SUTHERLIN: Not at 1:30 this afternoon, no.
"THE COURT: All right. Case dismissed."
On June 28, 1991, the trial court entered a written judgment dismissing the case for lack of prosecution. The trial court denied Nash's order to vacate the judgment, and Nash appeals.
While dismissal of an action under Rule 41(b), A.R.Civ.P., is within the trial court's discretion and will not be reversed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of that discretion, in reviewing the trial court's dismissal of an action this Court must determine whether the ruling is supported by the evidence. Atkins v. Shirley, 561 So. 2d 1075 (Ala.1990), and Riddlesprigger v. Ervin, 519 So. 2d 486 (Ala.1987).
Based on the facts of this case, this Court concludes that the dismissal of this action for lack of prosecution was an abuse *211 of discretion. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX and INGRAM, JJ., concur.
HOUSTON, J., concurs specially.
HOUSTON, Justice (concurring specially).
I did not participate in the previous appeal in this case.
I have reviewed the authorities presented by Drs. Cosby and Tietke in their brief, and I find them persuasive. I am aware of the inherent power of the trial court to act sua sponte to dismiss an action for want of prosecution. Atkins v. Shirley, 561 So. 2d 1075, 1077 (Ala.1990). A trial court must be able to control its calendar and move cases through the system with as little interference from this Court as possible. In each case there comes a point "`when the interest of the court in controlling its calendar and the risk to the defendant[s] outweigh the interest in disposing of the litigation on the merits.'" Scullin v. Cameron, 518 So. 2d 695, 699 (Ala.1987), quoting Selby v. Money, 403 So. 2d 218, 220 (Ala.1981). See, also, Burdeshaw v. White, 585 So. 2d 842 (Ala.1991). I am not persuaded that that point has been reached in this case, and I am firm in my belief that litigation should be disposed of on the merits. If the roles of the lawyers were reversed and a default judgment had been entered against these defendants, under these facts and at this point in the trial of the case, I would vote to set it aside. See, e.g., Sanders v. Weaver, 583 So. 2d 1326 (Ala.1991). The Court must provide a level playing field; therefore, I concur to reverse and remand.