Title: Jaramillo v. City of Green River

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Jaramillo v. City of Green River1986 WY 122719 P.2d 655Case Number: 85-140Decided: 05/28/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
 
Adon JARAMILLO, Appellant 
(Defendant-Appellant),

v.

The CITY OF 
GREENRIVER, Appellee 
(Plaintiff-Appellee).

Appeal from District 
Court, SweetwaterCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, 
J.

William J. 
Flynn, Green River, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty., Mary B. Guthrie, John W. Renneisen, 
Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, and Lisa A. Botham, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Green 
River, for 
appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and ROONEY*, BROWN, CARDINE and URBIGKIT, 
JJ.

* Retired November 30, 
1985

THOMAS, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Adon Jaramillo was 
sentenced under an ordinance of the City of Green River which authorizes enhanced 
punishment for a subsequent conviction of driving a motor vehicle while under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor. The only issue to be determined in this 
case is whether Jaramillo was entitled to have the question of his prior 
conviction submitted to the jury. Jaramillo also seeks to raise the question of 
whether the prosecution must establish that a prior conviction occurred under 
circumstances in which he either was afforded his right to counsel or knowingly 
and intelligently waived his right to counsel. He has failed to preserve this 
latter question for consideration in this appeal. We conclude that it was not 
error for the municipal court to refuse to submit to the jury the issue of 
whether Jaramillo had a prior conviction. The sentence imposed by the municipal 
court upon the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

[¶2.]     In his brief Jaramillo 
sets forth two questions for this court to determine. They 
are:

"I. Were the Appellant's 
due process and jury trial rights violated when the question of his status as a 
second time D.W.U.I. offender was taken from the jury and decided by the 
Municipal Court over his objection?

"II. Could the trial 
court lawfully consider three alleged prior convictions for D.W.U.I. of the 
Appellant at an enhancement hearing where the prosecution failed to show whether 
the Appellant's convictions to at least one of the alleged prior D.W.U.I. 
charges occurred either with counsel or after knowingly and intelligently 
waiving counsel?"

As we have 
indicated we will not consider the second question because Jaramillo has failed 
to preserve that issue for this appeal.

[¶3.]     Section 24-2, Code of 
Ordinances, City of Green 
River, is substantially similar to § 31-5-233, W.S. 1977. 
The ordinance makes it unlawful for a person under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor, to a degree which renders him incapable of safely driving a motor 
vehicle, to drive or have actual physical control of any vehicle within the 
city, § 24-2(a), Code of Ordinances, City of Green River. The ordinance then provides for 
punishment of not more than six months in jail, or a fine of not more than $750 
or both, and it further provides that for a subsequent conviction within five 
years the punishment shall be not less than seven days nor more than six months 
in jail, and a fine of not less than $200 nor more than $750, § 24-2(d), Code of 
Ordinances, City of Green River. The municipal court under this latter provision 
is authorized to suspend the discretionary portion of the sentence if the 
defendant participates in an appropriate alcohol counseling 
program.

[¶4.]     Jaramillo was charged 
with the commission of a second offense under this ordinance. He entered a plea 
of not guilty and demanded a trial by jury. The jury found him guilty of driving 
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The municipal judge then 
discharged the jury. At this point counsel for Jaramillo urged the municipal 
court to recall the jury to pass on the question of any prior conviction, 
arguing that since Jaramillo had demanded a jury trial he was entitled to have 
the jury consider the question of whether he was a subsequent offender, as 
charged. The municipal judge refused to call the jury back to consider this 
question.

[¶5.]     The prosecution then 
offered certified copies of three judgments against the appellant for driving 
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor all of which occurred in the 
Green River municipal court within the 
preceding five years. At this juncture counsel for Jaramillo complained as 
follows:

"I note, Your Honor, that 
they're signed by Larry Pittman, he's not here, nor is there any indication of 
the custody of these records and I object to them and roughly consider them 
enhancement purposes under Holtz and under the fact that they weren't proper - 
no proper foundation and it's late for the proper introduction of them as 
evidence of whether or not Mr. Jaramillo had an attorney when any of those 
so-called convictions were done or whether they were proper convictions. There's 
simply nothing in the record indicating that they're real 
convictions."

The municipal 
judge then retrieved the court's own copies of the several citations, and 
Jaramillo did not interpose any further objection. Furthermore, when asked if he 
had anything to say Jaramillo did not indicate that he had not had counsel or 
had not knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel with respect to 
these prior convictions. The municipal judge then sentenced Jaramillo to pay a 
fine of $750 and to serve six months in the Sweetwater County Jail, suspending 
four months of that sentence pursuant to terms and conditions which were 
consistent with the ordinance.

[¶6.]     Jaramillo then appealed 
to the district court. He filed a statement of errors in accordance with Rules 
2.02, 5.01(b) and 5.06, W.R.A.P.C.L.J. His statement of errors specified the 
following issues for decision by the district court:

"1. The Appellant's 
constitutional rights were violated when during his jury trial for DWI, second 
offense, the City of Green 
River presented evidence of his prior DWI convictions to 
the jury during its case in chief before any finding by the jury that the 
Appellant was indeed guilty of the underlying DWI charge.

"2. The Appellant was 
denied his right to a fair trial under the due process clause of the Wyoming 
Constitution by the prosecutrix's misleading `definition' of reasonable doubt 
which was given to the jury in final argument."

Jaramillo's 
brief in the district court then stated the following 
question:

"Were the Appellant's due 
process and jury trial rights violated when the question of his status as second 
time D.W.U.I. offender was taken from the jury and decided by the Municipal 
Court over his objection?"

Jaramillo's 
brief in the district court does not address the second issue assigned as a 
claim of error in his appeal to this court. 

The district 
judge noted in his opinion letter that the briefs submitted by Jaramillo's 
counsel did not address either of the errors mentioned in the Statement of 
Errors, and that it argued only that the jury and not the judge should have 
decided Jaramillo's status as a repeat D.W.U.I. offender.

[¶7.]     The appropriate rule 
controlling consideration of Jaramillo's second claim of error is found in 
Hudson Coal Company v. Hauf, 18 Wyo. 425, 435, 109 P. 21 (1910), as 
follows:

"Other questions have 
been urged here, but they were not presented by the petition in error in the 
District Court. It seems to be the general rule, and we think the correct one, 
that where a case is taken on error from an inferior court to an intermediate 
appellate court and the judgment of the inferior court is affirmed and the case 
is then taken on error to court of last resort, that the only questions that can 
be considered are those presented to the intermediate appellate court. That is, 
the Supreme Court will only determine whether or not the intermediate appellate 
court erred in its decision on the record presented to it. [Citations 
omitted.]"

This rule was 
followed in Farmers' State Bank of Riverton v. Johnson, 36 Wyo. 191, 253 P. 858 (1927) and Haney v. Welty, 24 
Wyo. 531, 162 P. 932 (1917). In his dissenting opinion in Dixon v. City of Worland, Wyo., 595 P.2d 84, 88 (1979), then Chief Justice Raper alluded to the continuing validity 
of this rule in commenting that, "[t]his court * * * established the rule that 
where a case is taken to an intermediate appellate court and judgment is 
affirmed and the case is then taken to a court of last resort, the only 
questions that can be considered are those presented to the intermediate 
appellate court * * *."

[¶8.]     The rule is a logical 
result of two propositions. The first is the established appellate rule that 
questions not raised or argued in this court will be considered waived. See 
e.g., Roberts Construction Company v. Vondriska, 
Wyo., 547 P.2d 1171 (1976); Holly Sugar 
Corporation v. Perez, Wyo., 508 P.2d 595 (1973); Pickett v. Associates Discount 
Corporation of Wyoming, Wyo., 435 P.2d 445 
(1967). The second is that "[a] proceeding in error in the district court for 
the purpose of reviewing the judgment of a justice of the peace, is not unlike 
the similar proceeding in this court to review a judgment of the district 
court." Farmers' State Bank v. Johnson, supra, 36 Wyo., at 196, 253 P. 858. 
Jaramillo has made no suggestion that he is entitled to rely upon the doctrine 
of plain error, nor has he made any effort to demonstrate plain error. 
Scheikofsky v. State, Wyo., 636 P.2d 1107 
(1981); Campbell v. State, Wyo., 589 P.2d 358 
(1979). Jaramillo has waived his right to have this court consider his second 
claim of error, and we hold that we are foreclosed from addressing 
it.

[¶9.]     With respect to his 
contention that he was entitled to have the jury determine the issue of prior 
convictions, we recognize that due process rights do attach to a situation in 
which a sentence is enhanced upon the basis of prior convictions. Jaramillo was 
entitled to notice, a hearing, representation by counsel, and an opportunity to 
present evidence. Munoz v. Maschner, Wyo., 590 P.2d 1352 (1979). In that case this 
court decided, however, that there is no constitutional requirement that a jury 
rather than the judge determine the question of whether a prior conviction had 
occurred which would justify the enhancement of a sentence. The court 
said:

"The question of whether 
a determination by the court or a jury of a second or previous conviction or at 
what stage for purposes of enhancing punishment raises no constitutional 
question. It raises only a question of procedure. In Spencer v. State of 
Texas, 1967, 385 U.S. 554 [566], 
87 S. Ct. 642 [655], 17 L. Ed. 2d 606, * * *. [T]he Supreme Court found no 
constitutional fault with a court determining prior convictions for the purpose 
of enhanced punishment * * *." Munoz v. Maschner, supra, at 
1357-1358.

[¶10.]  Jaramillo would rely upon Bandy v. Hehn, 
10 Wyo. 167, 67 P. 979 (1901), in which this court acknowledged that due process 
required that the former convictions be both alleged and proved, and held that 
this particular fact question should be submitted to the jury. This latter 
aspect of Bandy v. Hehn, supra, was overruled in Munoz v. Maschner, supra. In 
the later case we decided that so long as the basic due process guarantees were 
satisfied the judge rather than the jury could decide the question of prior 
convictions stating, "[t]he prior conviction is not relevant to the issue of 
guilt for the crime but goes only to the issue of punishment * * *" and "[t]here 
is no constitutional right to a jury trial on the issue of a second offense, 
where a hearing is for the purposes of sentencing only." Munoz v. Maschner, 
supra, at 1358.

[¶11.]  The rule in Wyoming is that unless a 
statutory right exists to have the question of prior convictions submitted to 
the jury, such as that encompassed in the Wyoming habitual criminal statutes, §§ 
6-10-201 through 6-10-203, W.S. 1977, the court rather than the jury can 
determine the question of prior convictions. Jaramillo contends, however, that 
there is language in State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Division v. Holtz, Wyo., 674 P.2d 732 (1983) which subjects the submission of prior convictions for driving 
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor to the same requirements as the 
habitual criminal statute. The language upon which Jaramillo relies 
is:

"* * * [T]he statutory 
requirement that the sentence to be imposed by the court be more severe as the 
number of prior convictions of the defendant increases makes the [D.W.U.I.] 
statute a habitual criminal act. Before the sentence of a defendant can be 
enhanced under such act, he must have notice of the fact that such is 
contemplated. Generally, the notice must be contained in the information or 
charge under which he is prosecuted. Evans v. State, Wyo., 655 P.2d 1214 
(1982). Section 6-10-203(a), W.S. 1977 (1983 Replacement), 
provides:

`(a) An information or 
indictment which charges a person as an habitual criminal shall set forth the 
charged felony and allege the previous convictions.'

"Although here we are not 
concerned with felonies, the reason upon which this section is predicated is 
pertinent to the requirement of similar notice in DWUI cases." State ex rel. 
Motor Vehicle Division v. Holtz, supra, at 738.

[¶12.]  Jaramillo is mistaken in his contention 
that this language brings this question within the statutory requirement that 
the issue be submitted to a jury. In State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Division v. 
Holtz, supra, the court simply recognized that due process requires notice if a 
former conviction is to be used to enhance punishment. Certainly the Wyoming habitual criminal 
statutes do not by their terms encompass misdemeanor convictions for driving 
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. There is no indication in 
Holtz that the court could or would expand those statutes to encompass these 
misdemeanor offenses. The ordinance of the City of Green River does not 
require a determination by the jury of the issue of prior convictions. We hold 
that with respect to such sentence enhancement proceedings under the state 
statute or a similar city ordinance, unless the statutory language so requires, 
a right to a jury trial with respect to the existence of prior convictions does 
not exist.

[¶13.]  In this instance the requirements of due 
process were satisfied because Jaramillo was given notice, the opportunity for a 
hearing, representation by counsel and the right to submit evidence. The 
existence of the prior convictions was established at that hearing before the 
municipal judge. There was no error in refusing to grant a jury trial on the 
issue of the prior convictions. The judgment of the district court, which 
affirmed Jaramillo's judgment and sentence in the municipal court, is affirmed.