Title: Wright v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

Wright, Appellant, v. Honda of America Manufacturing, Inc., Appellee. 
 [Cite as Wright v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc. (1995), ___ Ohio St.3d 
___.] 
Contracts -- Employment relations -- Evidence that trier of fact may consider 
in deciding factual issue of whether an employment-at-will agreement 
has been altered by an implied agreement -- Civil procedure -- 
Depositions -- When deponent reviews deposition testimony under 
Civ.R. 30(E) and makes changes in form and substance of such 
deposition testimony, original testimony as well as the change remains 
in the record. 
When a deponent reviews his or her deposition testimony under Civ.R. 30(E) 
and makes changes in the form and substance of such deposition 
testimony, both the original testimony as well as the changes remain in 
the record and are to be considered by the trier of fact. 
 
(No. 94-982 -- Submitted May 24, 1995 -- Decided August 30, 1995.) 
 
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Logan County, No. 8-93-24. 
 
This appeal stems from a lawsuit brought by Melissa Wright, appellant, 
against Honda of America Manufacturing, Inc. (“Honda”), appellee, 
challenging Honda’s decision to terminate her for violating its anti-nepotism 
policy.  Appellant alleged in her complaint that there was an express or implied 
 
2 
contract of employment between herself and Honda, and that Honda breached 
this contract, and/or was estopped from terminating her.  Honda filed a motion 
for summary judgment asserting that appellant was an employee-at-will and 
that it was free to terminate her.  The trial court granted summary judgment in 
favor of Honda.  The court of appeals affirmed. 
 
The following facts underlying appellant’s discharge were before the 
trial court in the summary judgment proceeding.  The depositions, affidavits 
and exhibits reveal that in January 1984, Wright applied for a position of 
employment with Honda.  She was hired and subsequently started work in 
August 1984.  Six to eight weeks after beginning work, Wright learned that her 
half-brother, with whom she had had little contact, had been working for 
Honda in a different department prior to the time she accepted her position.  It 
was also at this time that Wright said she became aware that Honda had in 
effect an anti-nepotism policy. 
 
Wright was concerned and phoned a friend in management for advice 
and clarification of this policy.  Wright was told that there were other cases of 
relatives working together and not to worry about the situation concerning her 
 
3 
half-brother.  Wright also reviewed the Honda Associate Handbook, which 
management referred to in orientation as the “Honda bible,” and found that the 
handbook contained a provision which states that it is Honda’s policy to 
transfer family members who worked within the same department rather than 
terminate an employee under these circumstances.  Thus, appellant felt 
confident that there was no problem.  In 1988, a Honda supervisor reinforced 
this feeling when he told Wright that he was aware that her half-brother also 
worked for Honda but that she need not be concerned. 
 
For the next seven years, Wright demonstrated that she was an 
exemplary and loyal employee.  She was promoted twice and received two 
perfect attendance awards as well as a number of manager awards.  Wright 
received high praise in progress reports and was described by her superiors as 
an employee who showed a willingness to accept tasks. 
 
Wright continued working and excelling in her job at Honda without 
incident until July 17, 1991, at which time she was called into a meeting with 
one or two supervisors and the administrative manager of the plant, Sandra Sue 
Boggs.  Boggs questioned Wright about her half-brother and also asked Wright 
 
4 
whether she was aware of Honda’s anti-nepotism policy, which she said 
prevented the hiring of “direct relatives.”1  Wright admitted that her half-bother 
worked for Honda, but said that when she interviewed for a position with the 
company she was never questioned about having any direct relatives and was 
not told that Honda had an anti-nepotism policy.  In fact, it appears that she did 
not become aware of this policy until after she was hired.2  Boggs told Wright 
to go home and that management would investigate the matter and call her the 
next day to let her know whether she could return to work. 
 
Rather than contact her the next day, Boggs called Wright that same 
afternoon at 5:00.  According to Wright, Boggs told her that Honda had made a 
mistake and that she should come back to work the next day as if nothing had 
happened.  Boggs disputes telling Wright this, but instead recalls advising 
Wright that she would not be terminated at that time. 
 
Wright states that she returned to work the next day and was told by her 
supervisor that “[i]t’s over,” and that what happened does not affect the way 
management feels about her or her work.  Wright believed that the matter was 
closed and worked for over a month without any mention of the July meeting.  
 
5 
However, on August 27, 1991, Wright was called into another meeting with 
management.  Wright was told that management had discovered a “check 
sheet” from her initial interview with Honda, which confirmed by check mark 
that Wright was asked about direct relatives during her interview.  Boggs also 
told Wright that Frank Henry, the man who had interviewed her, verified this 
information.  However, Henry did not recall his interview with Wright and 
could not confirm the fact that he had made the check mark by Wright’s name 
which would indicate she was asked about direct relatives.3  Wright was then 
terminated for violating the company’s anti-nepotism policy. 
 
Following the court of appeals’ affirmance of appellee’s motion for 
summary judgment, appellant appealed to this court.  The cause is now before 
this court pursuant to the allowance of a discretionary appeal. 
__________ 
 
Cloppert, Portman, Sauter, Latanick & Foley, Grant D. Shoub and 
Charles J. Smith, for appellant. 
 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, Mary Ellen Fairfield and Ellen L. Seats, 
for appellee. 
 
6 
 
Stewart Jaffy & Associates Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy and Marc J. 
Jaffy, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
Spater, Gittes, Schulte & Kolman and Frederick M. Gittes; and Louis A. 
Jacobs, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Employment Lawyers 
Association. 
__________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.   In this appeal, we must decide whether this 
was an appropriate case for summary judgment.  To answer this question, we 
need to determine whether appellant is an employee-at-will, as the lower courts 
found, or whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact to support 
appellant’s position that there was an implied contract of employment which 
limited appellee’s right to terminate her.4  For the following reasons, we find 
that summary judgment was inappropriate, as sufficient evidence was presented 
to rebut the employment-at-will presumption and to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether an implied employment agreement exists.  
Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this 
cause to the trial court. 
 
7 
 
In general, under the employment-at-will doctrine, the employment 
relationship between employer and employee is terminable at the will of either; 
thus, an employee is subject to discharge by an employer at any time, even 
without cause.  See Henkel v. Educational Research Council of Am. (1976), 45 
Ohio St.2d 249, 255, 74 O.O.2d 415, 418, 344 N.E.2d 118, 121-122.  However, 
in Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co. (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 100, 104-105, 19 OBR 
261, 264-265, 483 N.E.2d 150, 154-155, we first recognized the harshness of 
this rule and carved out two exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine:  (1) 
the existence of implied or express contractual provisions which alter the terms 
of discharge; and (2) the existence of promissory estoppel where 
representations or promises have been made to an employee. 
 
In Mers, we recognized that in order to ascertain the explicit and implicit 
terms concerning discharge in an oral employment agreement, it is important 
for the trier of fact to review the history of relations between the employer and 
employee and the “facts and circumstances” surrounding the employment-at-
will relationship.  These “facts and circumstances” include the “the character of 
the employment, custom, the course of dealing between the parties, company 
 
8 
policy, or any other fact which may illuminate the question ***.”  Id. at 104, 19 
OBR at 264, 483 N.E.2d at 154. 
 
Today we take the opportunity to decide what other facts and 
circumstances can be considered by the trial court.  Thus, in order to overcome 
a summary judgment motion and to raise a factual issue as to whether an 
employment-at-will agreement has been altered by an implied agreement, the 
trier of fact can consider, in addition to the facts and circumstances set forth in 
Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., supra, such evidence, which includes, but is not 
limited to, that information contained in employee handbooks, oral 
representations made by supervisory personnel that employees have been 
promised job security in exchange for good performance, and written 
assurances reflecting company policy. 
 
In this case, in response to appellee’s summary judgment motion, 
appellant submitted an array of evidence to raise a factual issue that an implied 
employment agreement existed in which appellant could not be terminated 
unless she failed to perform her job adequately.  Beginning at orientation, 
Honda stressed to its employees the importance of attendance and performing 
 
9 
quality work.  The expectation of continued employment based upon these 
principles was further reinforced by language contained in Honda’s Associate 
Handbook.  For instance, Part V of the handbook provides that “[t]he job 
security of each of you depends on you doing your very best on your job with 
the spirit of cooperation.”  Although employee handbooks are not in and of 
themselves a contract of employment, they are nevertheless evidence of the 
employment contract.  Kelly v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 
134, 139, 545 N.E.2d 1244, 1249. 
 
Progress reports and promotion letters also stressed appellant’s 
“continued growth” with the company and future opportunity “to help [Honda] 
achieve the goal of becoming the best place to work in the motor vehicle 
industry.”  In further evidence, appellant’s supervisor commented in a progress 
report that appellant was destined “to go as far as she wants to if she has the 
ability to maintain her good work ethic and determination.”  Thus, based upon 
Honda’s oral and written assurances that good attendance and quality work 
were linked to job security, Wright believed that if she attained these goals and 
 
10 
performed her job well, she could expect continued employment with the 
company. 
 
There is also evidence that management believed that this was Honda 
policy.  Susan Boggs, the person who was ultimately responsible for 
terminating appellant, testified by deposition that if an employee performs his 
or her job in an acceptable manner and does not violate any practices of the 
company, the employee can expect to have continued employment with Honda.  
Boggs later “clarified” this response, upon review of her transcribed 
deposition, by stating that Honda does not promise continuous employment to 
any associate.  The fact that Boggs changed her response does not mean that 
her original testimony should be ignored.  Instead, when a deponent reviews 
his or her deposition testimony under Civ.R. 30(E)5 and makes changes in the 
form and substance of such deposition testimony, both the original testimony as 
well as the changes remain in the record and are to be considered by the trier of 
fact.  See Lugtig v. Thomas (N.D.Ill.1981), 89 F.R.D. 639.6 
 
Furthermore, Honda’s course of dealing with appellant regarding her 
alleged violation of its anti-nepotism policy reinforced appellant’s belief that 
 
11 
she could expect job security.  According to appellant, when she was 
interviewed, she was neither asked about direct relatives nor told that Honda 
has an anti-nepotism policy.  Once she became aware of such a policy, she was 
told by two individuals in management that she had no reason to be concerned 
and that there were other employees who retained their positions under similar 
circumstances.  Based upon these assurances and upon her reliance on the 
Associate Handbook, which called for the transfer, not termination of, direct 
relatives, appellant felt secure and continued to work diligently for Honda. 
 
Honda claims that its anti-nepotism policy clearly calls for the 
termination of an employee once it is discovered that the employee was asked 
and answered the question of whether he or she has any direct relatives 
employed by the company.  Relying on the interview check sheet as proof that 
appellant was asked this question, Honda states that it terminated her.  Honda 
concedes that it did allow some “direct relatives” to slip through the cracks as 
the time of its original mass hiring, but says this was not the case when 
appellant was hired.  Thus, according to Honda, the transfer provision in the 
 
12 
employee handbook applies only to this small number of employees who were 
hired at the time of the mass hiring. 
 
Certainly, this dispute in facts surrounding appellant’s termination can 
only be resolved by the trier of fact.  Nevertheless, we find that the manner in 
which Honda terminated appellant cannot be condoned.  Particularly egregious 
is that Honda chose to bring appellant back to work the day after she was 
ordered home, permitted her to work for a month, and then terminated her.  
Whether this is routine procedure as Honda suggests belies the point if, in 
construing the evidence in appellant’s favor, we accept as true that appellant 
was told that Honda had made a mistake in sending her home and that the 
matter was closed. 
 
Honda’s president, in his message to employees, states in the Associate 
Handbook the following:  “The management policy of Honda of America has at 
its core the belief that the human being is the most important asset in a 
manufacturing operation.  Under this policy, each of you is to be treated fairly, 
equally, and with respect.”  Unfortunately, Honda has failed to practice what it 
preaches.  Instead, Honda has made a mockery of this well-meaning message 
 
13 
by terminating appellant, a loyal, hard-working employee who intended to 
make Honda her career employer, in the manner described. 
 
We are persuaded that appellant has presented sufficient evidence to 
create a fact question as to whether Honda, through its policies, past practices 
and representations altered the at-will nature of the employment agreement by 
creating an expectation of continued employment.  Consequently, under Civ.R. 
56(C), since the facts are subject to reasonable dispute, the matter should not 
have been disposed of by a motion for summary judgment.  Instead, the merits 
of appellant’s claims should be decided at trial.  Jackson v. Kings Island 
(1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 357, 360, 12 O.O.3d 321, 323, 390 N.E.2d 810, 813. 
 
We find that the court of appeals erred in affirming the grant of summary 
judgment for Honda.  Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
DOUGLAS and RESNICK, JJ., concur. 
 
14 
 
MOYER, C.J., WRIGHT and PFEIFER, JJ., concur in the sullabus and 
judgment. 
 
COOK, J., dissents. 
 
Footnotes: 
1 
Honda defines “direct relatives” as parents, children, spouses, brothers, 
sisters, half-brothers, half-sisters and grandparents. 
2 
At this interview, Wright admits that she may have told management that 
she first learned about this policy at orientation.  However, according to 
her deposition testimony and affidavit, she said that she really became 
aware of this policy at a later time, in October 1984. 
3 
Subsequently, Honda developed a form in which it asked associates to 
confirm in writing that they had no direct relatives working for Honda.  
Wright was never asked to sign such a form. 
4 
Although appellant also claims that promissory estoppel is applicable, 
we believe that the implied contract exception to the employment-at-will 
doctrine is pertinent to this case. 
 
15 
5 
Civ.R. 30(E) provides:  “When testimony is fully transcribed the 
deposition shall be submitted to the witness for examination and shall be 
read to or by the witness, unless examination and reading are waived by 
the witness and by the parties.  Any changes in form or substance which 
the witness desires to make shall be entered upon the deposition by the 
officer with a statement of the reasons given by the witness for making 
them.  ***” 
6 
We note that other Honda deponents, in reviewing their deposition 
answers, made substantive changes on key points, apparently to bolster 
Honda’s position that appellant is nothing more than an employee-at-
will.  These substantive changes in deposition testimony bring the 
credibility of these deponents into play, which is another reason why 
summary judgment is inappropriate.  See Turner v. Turner (1993), 67 
Ohio St.3d 337, 617 N.E.2d 1123, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurring.  I concur in Justice Pfeifer’s separate 
concurrence, except the discussion regarding anti-nepotism policies. 
 
WRIGHT, J., concurs in the foregoing concurring opinion. 
 
16 
PFEIFER, J., concurring in judgment and in the syllabus.  I 
concur with the majority that summary judgment was inappropriate 
in this case, but do so for mostly different reasons.   
I 
The only facts relevant to whether there was an employment 
contract between Wright and Honda are those facts concerning a 
specific term or condition of employment.  Among the factors cited 
by the majority, only Honda’s words and actions concerning its 
nepotism policy could have created an implied contract between 
Wright and Honda.  That contract would be limited to a specific 
term of employment, i.e., that Wright would not be terminated 
simply because she had a half-brother who also worked at the huge 
manufacturing facility. 
I do not concur that the other factors cited by the majority can 
give rise to an implied contract.  Corporate cheerleading calculated 
to build an “esprit de corporation” is a motivational device 
designed to increase productivity by making workers feel as though 
 
17 
they are an important part of a team.  A corporate desire to make 
employees feel appreciated does not transform those employees into 
something other than at-will employees.  Therefore, inspirational 
orientation remarks, employee handbook platitudes, bright-eyed 
promotion letters, and complimentary progress reports, all lacking 
any direct promise of continued employment or reference to terms 
of employment, do not imply a contract between an employer and an 
employee. 
A genuine issue of fact exists as to whether a limited implied 
contract existed between Wright and Honda, such that Honda agreed 
not to terminate Wright because a relative also worked at Honda.  
There is testimony that someone in management told Wright that 
there were other cases of relatives working together at Honda with 
no repercussions, and that Wright should not worry about the 
situation.  Wright’s employee handbook also stated that Honda’s 
policy was to transfer relatives who worked in the same department 
to other departments.  Also, a Honda supervisor apparently told 
 
18 
Wright in 1988 not to worry about the situation with her half-
brother. 
The most egregious facts occurred in 1991, when Wright was 
sent home from work one day for violating the anti-nepotism policy, 
but was called later that day by the plant’s administrative manager 
and was told that Honda had made a mistake and that she should 
come back to work as though nothing had happened.  A little more 
than a month later, Wright was fired for violating Honda’s anti-
nepotism policy. 
All of those instances which directly referred to specific terms 
of employment, from supervisors’ comments, to employee handbook 
statements, to the original decision not to fire Wright, could be 
used to determine that a limited implied contract existed between 
Wright and Honda. 
 
Therefore at trial, Wright should be given a chance to 
prove the existence of an implied contract.  Still, while Wright has 
succeeded here today, the real battle should focus on the 
 
19 
questionable merits of anti-employment anti-nepotism policies.  
Employer anti-nepotism policies can be just as pernicious as other 
prohibited forms of discrimination, since they have nothing to do 
with an individual’s merit.  Does a relative’s job have any more to 
do with the one’s ability to perform than does one’s race, creed, 
color, or sex? 
At Honda, as with all employers from supermarkets to law 
firms, other internal controls should already exist to deal with any 
perceived problems of nepotism.  There are less onerous ways to 
protect corporate integrity than a blanket anti-employment anti-
nepotism policy.  Instead, in this case, Ohioans are deprived of the 
opportunity to be employed at a major regional employer because 
they may share some common blood with another worker. 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  I respectfully dissent from the opinion and 
judgment of the majority.  Like the court of appeals, I would affirm the 
summary judgment in favor of Honda because the circumstances surrounding 
Wright’s employment did not clearly manifest that the parties intended to bind 
 
20 
each other in a manner different from the strongly presumed relationship of 
employment-at-will. Wright’s summary-judgment evidence presented on her 
theory of implied contract fell short of showing the elements of contract:  an 
intent by Honda to be bound, a meeting of the minds, a bargained-for 
exchange, and consideration supporting modification of the at-will status. 
 
In my view, not one of the statements or writings from Honda, or the 
cumulative impact of those communications, suffices to alter the at-will nature 
of Wright’s employment to that of an implied contract to discharge only for just 
cause.  First, Honda’s distribution of a handbook stressing the importance of 
attendance and quality work should not be elevated to evidence of a “meeting 
of the minds” sufficient to alter the admittedly at-will status of Wright’s hiring.  
Second, any rational employer would agree with the statement made by Susan 
Boggs in her deposition that “if somebody is performing their job in an 
acceptable manner *** [and does not] violate any practices of the company 
***[,] they can expect to have continued employment.”  Such expectation of an 
employee, however, should not be deemed sufficient to raise an issue of fact as 
to whether or not the employee and employer entered into a contract by 
 
21 
implication.  Likewise, the handbook language providing that “[t]he job 
security of each of you depends on your doing your very best on your job with 
the spirit of cooperation” cannot reasonably be considered a promise to all 
Honda employees that they may be discharged only for just cause.  In fact, it 
may be read just as easily as a warning about the potential for discharge for 
subjective reasons.  The president’s message regarding the management policy 
to treat employees “fairly, equally, and with respect” is not put in terms of a 
legal contract.  At most, it is an expression of goodwill.  Finally, Wright’s 
positive evaluations referencing “continued growth” with the company and 
comments on her destiny to “go as far as she wants to” with the company are 
not inconsistent with at-will employment. 
 
As for the anti-nepotism-rule issue, Wright does not argue it in support 
of her implied contract claim.  The anti-nepotism rule is of no consequence 
unless Wright has an implied contract to be discharged only for cause.  If 
Wright could have proved she had this implied contract to be discharged only 
for cause, the breach of the anti-nepotism rule could serve as “just cause” for 
her termination.  She, therefore, needed to produce evidence that the anti-
 
22 
nepotism rule was waived as to her.  Wright’s evidence that certain managers 
assured her that she need not be concerned about being in violation of the anti-
nepotism rule and that she was called back to work after being told to go home 
is not additional evidence of  a contractual right to employment, as the majority 
utilizes it.  Instead, it related only to whether the rule could be enforced against 
her, thereby rendering her discharge lawful even if she established that she had 
an employment contract with Honda.   
 
Moreover, Wright’s evidence on the waiver issue should not have 
withstood summary judgment. Wright acknowledged that, upon discovery that 
she might be in violation of the anti-nepotism rule, she did not ask questions of 
her supervisor or an Associate Relations representative as the handbook 
advised.  Instead, outside work, she phoned a friend whose husband was a 
coordinator in another Honda department.  Through his wife, this coordinator 
told Wright “not to worry about it.”  Neither this statement nor the one 
allegedly made by another coordinator was claimed to have been made in an 
official capacity.  Accordingly, even if the issue of waiver were not rendered 
moot by the conclusion that Wright was an at-will employee (and therefore 
 
23 
could be terminated for any reason), Wright failed to come forward with 
evidence sufficient to raise a material-fact issue as to whether Honda waived its 
right to enforce the rule against her. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals upholding summary judgment in favor of Honda.