Title: In re William M.

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 93760-Agenda 5-March 2003.
In re WILLIAM M., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, 
 								Appellant, v. William M., Appellee).
Opinion filed June 19, 2003.
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	At issue in this case is the issue left open in In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313 (2001): whether a postadmission motion pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)) is a
jurisdictional prerequisite to taking a delinquency appeal. For the
following reasons, we hold that it is not.

BACKGROUND
	The State filed a four-count delinquency petition against
respondent, William M., in the circuit court of Kankakee County
charging him with burglary and criminal trespass to two
automobiles. On October 2, 2000, respondent appeared in court
with his appointed counsel. Respondent's counsel informed the
court that pursuant to a plea agreement, respondent would admit
to the burglary allegations in exchange for the dismissal of the
criminal trespass charges, as well as the dismissal of an unrelated
domestic battery charge. The trial court admonished respondent
that an admission waived his right to remain silent, to require the
State to prove the charges, to a hearing, to present evidence and
witnesses, and to cross-examine the State's witnesses. The trial
court also informed respondent that the burglary charges would
have been Class 2 felonies if he had been charged as an adult.
Respondent acknowledged that he had not been coerced and was
acting voluntarily. The trial court entered a finding of delinquency
and adjudicated respondent a ward of the court.
	On November 15, 2000, a dispositional hearing was held.
Respondent was committed to the Department of Corrections,
Juvenile Division, for an indeterminate period. The trial court
advised respondent of his right to appeal and further advised
respondent that if he planned to appeal, he had to file a motion to
withdraw his plea or a motion to reconsider his sentence within 30
days. At the conclusion of the dispositional hearing, respondent's
counsel requested the filing of a notice of appeal and the
appointment of the appellate defender. The trial court granted both
requests. The clerk of the court filed the notice of appeal on
November 27, 2000. Respondent's counsel, however, did not file
a motion to withdraw respondent's guilty plea or a motion to
reconsider his sentence.
	On appeal, respondent argued that the adjudication of
delinquency must be vacated because the record failed to show
that he was aware of the consequences of his admissions or that he
was informed of the potential dispositions he could receive if he
was adjudicated a delinquent minor. 328 Ill. App. 3d 974, 976.
Respondent acknowledged, however, that he had failed to file a
postadmission or postdisposition motion pursuant to Rule 604(d)
prior to filing his notice of appeal. 328 Ill. App. 3d at 976. The
State argued that the appellate court was required to dismiss
respondent's appeal. 328 Ill. App. 3d at 976. The State claimed
that because respondent had failed to file a motion pursuant to
Rule 604(d), the appellate court was without jurisdiction to
consider respondent's appeal. 328 Ill. App. 3d at 976.
	Citing People v. McKay, 282 Ill. App. 3d 108 (1996), the
appellate court held that a Rule 604(d) motion is not jurisdictional
in the same sense that a notice of appeal is jurisdictional. 328 Ill.
App. 3d at 976-77. The appellate court stated that the failure to file
a Rule 604(d) motion raises questions of waiver as opposed to
questions of jurisdiction. 328 Ill. App. 3d at 977. Consequently,
the appellate court characterized the issue before it as whether it
should consider respondent's appeal, rather than whether it could
consider the appeal. 328 Ill. App. 3d at 977. The appellate court
noted that if the case were a criminal case, the proper procedure
would be to dismiss the case and allow respondent to pursue his
remedy under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS
5/122-1 et seq. (West 2000)). 328 Ill. App. 3d at 977. However,
because the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not apply to
juvenile proceedings, dismissal of respondent's appeal would
foreclose all review of respondent's claims, including a claim with
constitutional implications and a claim of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel. 328 Ill. App. 3d at 977. Consequently, the appellate
court held that respondent's failure to file a postdisposition motion
in accordance with Rule 604(d) did not require dismissal of his
appeal. 328 Ill. App. 3d at 977. The appellate court, however, did
not consider the merits of respondent's appeal, but instead
remanded the cause to the trial court for further proceedings in
compliance with Rule 604(d). 328 Ill. App. 3d at 978. This court
then granted the State's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R.
315(a).

ANALYSIS
	This court recently held that Rule 604(d) applies to juvenile
proceedings. In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313, 322 (2001). Because the
minor in that case had filed a postadmission motion, however, this
court left open the issue of whether the filing of such a motion is
a jurisdictional prerequisite to taking a delinquency appeal. In re
A.G., 195 Ill. 2d  at 322.
	In the context of adult defendants, this court has stated that a
Rule 604(d) motion is a condition precedent to an appeal from a
guilty plea. People v. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d 93, 107 (1988).
Consequently, this court held in Wilk that the appellate court
properly dismissed the appeals of those defendants who had not
filed motions to withdraw their guilty pleas in accordance with
Rule 604(d) prior to filing the appeals. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d  at 105-06.
This court recognized that a defendant is denied the effective
assistance of counsel, appellate review, and other potential
constitutional issues when his attorney fails to adhere to Rule
604(d) despite hearing the admonishments required by Supreme
Court Rule 605(b) (188 Ill. 2d R. 605(b)). We noted, however, that
the dismissal of the defendants' appeals did not leave those
defendants without a remedy, because relief was available to those
defendants pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d  at 107.
	At issue in this case is the interpretation of the "condition
precedent" language in Wilk. The State interprets the "condition
precedent" language in Wilk as establishing that the failure to file
a Rule 604(d) motion deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction
over an appeal. The State further argues that because Rule 604(d)
has been held to apply in the juvenile context, its jurisdictional
component must also apply. In support of its argument that Rule
604(d) is jurisdictional, the State cites In re A.W., 185 Ill. App. 3d
473 (1989).
	In In re A.W., the appellate court relied on Wilk in holding that
a juvenile's failure to file a motion to withdraw his admission of
juvenile delinquency prior to filing his notice of appeal required
dismissal of the appeal. In re A.W., 185 Ill. App. 3d at 474. The
appellate court rejected the juvenile's attempt to distinguish Wilk
on the ground that a defendant in a criminal case has the right to
a hearing under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, while a juvenile
has no corresponding right. In re A.W., 185 Ill. App. 3d at 475.
The appellate court acknowledged that there was language in Wilk
indicating that the holding in that case would not leave defendants
without a remedy. In re A.W., 185 Ill. App. 3d at 475. The court
concluded, however, that the language was not central to the
court's holding and dismissed the juvenile's appeal. In re A.W.,
185 Ill. App. 3d at 475.
	In contrast, respondent argues in favor of the appellate court's
interpretation of the "condition precedent" language in Wilk. As
noted, the appellate court in this case relied upon People v.
McKay, 282 Ill. App. 3d 108 (1996), in holding that a juvenile's
failure to file a Rule 604(d) motion does not require dismissal of
his appeal. The McKay court held that Wilk and its progeny do not
withdraw jurisdiction from the appellate court, but instead
withdraw the decision whether waiver should bar the appeal of a
defendant who has not filed a Rule 604(d) motion. McKay, 282 Ill.
App. 3d at 111. In following McKay, the appellate court in this
case acknowledged that its decision was in direct conflict with In
re A.W., 185 Ill. App. 3d 473 (1989), but nonetheless held that
respondent's failure to comply with Rule 604(d) did not require
dismissal of his appeal. 328 Ill. App. 3d at 977.
	Upon review, we find that the court in McKay was correct in
its determination that Wilk and its progeny do not stand for the
proposition that the filing of a Rule 604(d) motion is required to
vest the appellate court with jurisdiction. In arguing that Rule
604(d) is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a notice of appeal,
the State points to language from of decision of this court
subsequent to Wilk. Specifically, the State notes that in People v.
Foster, 171 Ill. 2d 469 (1996), this court stated that when a
defendant fails to file a motion pursuant to Rule 604(d), "the
appellate court must dismiss the appeal, leaving the Post-Conviction Hearing Act as a defendant's only recourse."
(Emphasis added.) Foster, 171 Ill. 2d  at 471. The State contends
that the use of the word "must" indicates that compliance with
Rule 604(d) is jurisdictional. The State, however, overlooks the
preceding sentence, which provides that "[t]hough the appellate
court may have jurisdiction, Rule 604(d) precludes it from
considering the appeal of such an error unless the defendant" first
files a written motion pursuant to Rule 604(d). (Emphasis added.)
Foster, 171 Ill. 2d  at 471. Contrary to the State's argument, then,
a written motion pursuant Rule 604(d) is not required in order to
vest the appellate court with jurisdiction over a defendant's appeal.
	Moreover, as respondent argues, if the failure to comply with
Rule 604(d) deprived a court of jurisdiction, such noncompliance
would always require dismissal of a defendant's appeal. However,
since our decision in Wilk, this court has recognized certain
exceptions to the written motion requirement of Rule 604(d). For
example, in Foster this court recognized an "admonition
exception" to Rule 604(d). Specifically, this court held that where
a trial court fails to issue Rule 605(b) admonitions, the appellate
court may entertain an appeal from a sentence despite defendant's
noncompliance with the written motion requirement of Rule
604(d). Foster, 171 Ill. 2d  at 473. We explained, however, that
"[w]here the appellate court may consider an appeal despite a
defendant's noncompliance with Rule 604(d), the appellate court
has no discretion and must remand for strict compliance
therewith." Foster, 171 Ill. 2d  at 474.
	Similarly, in People v. Belcher, 199 Ill. 2d 378 (2002), this
court again addressed the written motion requirement of Rule
604(d). There, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of first
degree murder after his court-appointed psychiatrist found him fit
to stand trial. Belcher, 199 Ill. 2d  at 379. At the defendant's
sentencing hearing, the psychiatrist testified that he would have
found the defendant insane at the time of the alleged offense under
the prior version of the insanity statute. Belcher, 199 Ill. 2d  at 380.
While the defendant's appeal was pending before the appellate
court, the defendant alerted the appellate court to the fact that the
public act creating the new version of the insanity statute had been
declared unconstitutional by this court. Belcher, 199 Ill. 2d  at 381.
Nonetheless, the appellate court denied the defendant's request to
vacate his guilty plea or to allow him leave to file a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea in the trial court. Belcher, 199 Ill. 2d  at
381.
	On appeal to this court, the defendant claimed that the
appellate court had erred in denying his request to vacate his guilty
plea. Belcher, 199 Ill. 2d  at 382. The State argued that the
defendant could not challenge the validity of his guilty plea
because he did not file a written motion to vacate his guilty plea in
the trial court prior to challenging that plea on appeal. Belcher,
199 Ill. 2d  at 382. This court agreed that, in the usual case, the
defendant's failure to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea
within the time allotted by Rule 604(d) would leave him without
a remedy. Belcher, 199 Ill. 2d  at 382. We stated, however, that:
		"[w]hile it is true this court does not approve of any
failure to comply strictly with the explicitly stated
requirements of Rule 604(d) (People v. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d 93, 103 (1988)), the unusual and fact-specific
circumstances found in this case lead us to believe that the
ends of justice will be better served by permitting
defendant leave to file a motion to withdraw his guilty
plea in the trial court." Belcher, 199 Ill. 2d  at 382.
We therefore remanded the cause to the trial court to give the
defendant an opportunity to file a motion to vacate his guilty plea.
Belcher, 199 Ill. 2d  at 383-84.
	The fact that this court has recognized exceptions to the
written motion requirements of Rule 604(d), then, reinforces our
statement in Foster that those requirements are not jurisdictional.
Because failure to comply with the written motion requirement of
Rule 604(d) does not deprive a court of jurisdiction in the adult
context, it follows that the failure to comply with the written
motion requirement does not deprive the appellate court of
jurisdiction in the juvenile context. Consequently, we affirm the
appellate court's finding that respondent's failure to file a written
motion pursuant to Rule 604(d) did not deprive the court of
jurisdiction over the appeal. To the extent that the appellate court's
decision in In re A.W., 185 Ill. App. 3d 473 (1989), suggests that
the appellate court must dismiss a juvenile's appeal for lack of
jurisdiction when the minor fails to comply with the written
motion requirement of Rule 604(d), that decision is hereby
overruled.
	We next must determine whether the appellate court properly
remanded this cause to the circuit court for further proceedings in
compliance with Rule 604(d). As discussed, in the context of adult
defendants, we have acknowledged that an attorney's failure to
adhere to Rule 604(d) despite hearing the admonishments required
by Rule 605(b) falls "short of providing competent
representation." Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d  at 105-06. We recognized that:
		"[t]he defendant, through no fault of his, is deprived of a
right to be heard in the appellate court. Such assistance of
counsel, coupled with the denial of appellate review,
raises effective assistance of counsel constitutional
questions. Furthermore, many of the grounds for
withdrawal of guilty pleas, consideration of which is
denied because of counsel's failure, themselves may raise
constitutional questions." Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d  at 106.
We observed, however, that a defendant is not left without a
remedy because the defendant can raise his claims in a
postconviction petition.
	The Post-Conviction Hearing Act, however, has never been
held to apply in juvenile proceedings. See In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d  at
321-22 ("this court has not reviewed holdings of the appellate
court concluding that relief from such [juvenile court] proceedings
is unavailable under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act").
Consequently, dismissing a juvenile defendant's appeal for failing
to comply with the written motion requirements of Rule 604(d)
may leave a juvenile without a remedy for his claims, including
those claims alleging constitutional violations.
	The State contends that juveniles would not be left without a
remedy in this situation because they could present their claims in
a section 2-1401 motion (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2000)).
Section 2-1401, however, does not provide a juvenile defendant
with a remedy equivalent to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.
Although the remedial powers of section 2-1401 have been held
to extend to criminal cases, such a motion is intended "to correct
all errors of fact occurring in the prosecution of a cause, unknown
to the petitioner and court at the time judgment was entered,
which, if then known, would have prevented its rendition." People
v. Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d 437, 461 (2000). A juvenile's claim that his
counsel was ineffective for failing to file a written motion pursuant
to Rule 604(d) does not fall within those parameters. Moreover, a
section 2-1401 petition is not intended to provide for a general
review of all trial errors or as a substitute for a direct appeal.
Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d  at 461, quoting People v. Berland, 74 Ill. 2d 286, 314 (1978). Consequently, we find that section 2-1401 is not
adequate to preserve a juvenile's claims on appeal when his
attorney fails to comply with the written motion requirements of
Rule 604(d).
	Because a juvenile does not have an adequate means for
presenting his claims when his attorney fails to file a written
motion pursuant to Rule 604(d), we find that dismissal is too harsh
a sanction for a juvenile defendant's failure to comply with Rule
604(d). We emphasize, however, that this court requires strict
compliance with Rule 604(d) in both the juvenile and the adult
context. We therefore hold that when a juvenile defendant fails to
comply with the written motion requirements of Rule 604(d) prior
to filing an appeal, the appellate court has no discretion and must
remand the cause to the circuit court for strict compliance with
Rule 604(d). Accordingly, we affirm the appellate court's order in
this case remanding this cause to the circuit court for further
proceedings in compliance with Rule 604(d).
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court
is affirmed.
Affirmed.
	I write separately to address the dissents' related contentions
that certain statements in the majority opinion are irreconcilably
inconsistent and that the majority's conclusion is improperly based
on the implicit assumption that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
does not apply to juvenile proceedings. I believe that the
statements can be reconciled and that our conclusion is supported
by sound reasoning.
	As the majority opinion states, the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act has never been held to apply to juvenile proceedings. Slip op.
at 7. In the absence of such an affirmative holding, juvenile
defendants necessarily face the possibility that no avenue of
review exists for their claims, even when those claims allege
constitutional violations. Slip op. at 7. In this case, however, the
State argues that section 2-1401 offers such an avenue. We
explicitly reject that argument, holding that a juvenile cannot use
a section 2-1401 motion to present a claim that trial counsel failed
to comply with the mandates of Rule 604(d). Slip op. at 8. After
addressing these initial matters, we conclude that "[b]ecause a
juvenile does not have an adequate means for presenting his
claims when his attorney fails to file a written motion pursuant to
Rule 604(d), *** dismissal is too harsh a sanction." Slip op. at 8.
	This last statement forms the basis for the dissenters'
contentions that the opinion is internally inconsistent because it
both claims that the application of the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act in juvenile cases is an open question and implicitly assumes
that it does not apply. I believe these contentions are premised on
an unduly loose interpretation of our statements and, thus, write
separately to explain that the majority's conclusion, read in its
proper context, does not suffer from a fatal flaw.
	In this opinion, we recognize the absence of any holding
authorizing the use of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act for review
of juveniles' claims. Slip op. at 7. We also reject juveniles' use of
section 2-1401 for this purpose. Slip op. at 8. Properly read in this
limited context, our statement that "a juvenile does not have an
adequate means for presenting his claims when his attorney fails
to file a written motion pursuant to Rule 604(d)" merely
acknowledges the absence of any precedential authority supporting
the conclusion that juveniles such as the respondent have a viable
means of appellate redress. See Slip op. at 8. It neither creates an
inherent conflict with our prior statements nor necessarily relies on
an implicit assumption that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act is
inapplicable in juvenile proceedings. It merely recognizes the
unsettled state of the law in this matter.
	As for the dissenters' contention that the majority should
address the issue of whether the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
applies to juveniles in this case, I believe that our decision to
decline that opportunity is well justified. The parties offer minimal
argument on the issue. Indeed, as appellant, the State does not
even raise the issue in its opening brief. Even more telling, the
respondent's brief explicitly requests that we simply affirm the
appellate court's remand, arguing that doing so would have the
same effect as a decision on the merits of the substantive issue,
plus have the additional benefits of serving the court's interest in
judicial economy, and avoiding the potential for overburdening
relatively uneducated juveniles with the filing of pro se
postconviction petitions capable of surviving first stage review.
Based on only this limited adversarial context, resolving an issue
as important as the applicability of the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act in juvenile proceedings would be premature and unwise. A
question of such magnitude should be fully briefed and argued by
opposing parties zealously advocating the relevant arguments prior
to its definitive resolution by this court. Lacking the benefit of
such strong adversarial testing, this court declined to address the
merits of the issue in this case. Thus, it remains an open question
wisely left for another day.
	I join fully in Justice Freeman's partial concurrence and
partial dissent. I write separately only to underscore the internal
inconsistency in the majority's resolution of the appeal in the case
at bar.
	The majority concludes that "dismissal is too harsh a sanction
for a juvenile defendant's failure to comply with Rule 604(d)"
because "a juvenile does not have an adequate means for
presenting his claims when his attorney fails to file a written
motion pursuant to Rule 604(d)." Slip op. at 8. Necessarily
implicit in this conclusion is the determination that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not apply to juvenile proceedings.
Otherwise there would be adequate means for a juvenile to present
his claims when his attorney fails to file a written motion pursuant
to Rule 604(d). See People v. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d 93, 107-09 (1988)
(when a defendant's attorney fails to file a motion to withdraw
defendant's guilty plea in compliance with Rule 604(d), defendant
may not pursue appellate review, "[t]he appropriate remedy for
these defendants lies in our Post-Conviction Hearing Act").
	 However, only a few paragraphs earlier, the majority states
that it is leaving as an open question whether the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act applies to juvenile proceedings. Quoting In re A.G.,
195 Ill. 2d 313, 321-22 (2001), the majority notes that " 'this court
has not reviewed holdings of the appellate court concluding that
relief from such [juvenile court] proceedings is unavailable under
the Post-Conviction Hearing Act' " and concludes that "dismissing
a juvenile defendant's appeal for failing to comply with the written
motion requirements of Rule 604(d) may leave a juvenile without
a remedy for his claims." (Emphasis added.) See slip op. at 7.
	If the question whether the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
applies to juvenile proceedings is truly an open one, as the
majority claims, the majority should not be deciding this appeal as
it does, based on the assumption that the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act does not apply to juvenile proceedings. As Justice Freeman
points out, this court could just as readily assume that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does apply to juvenile proceedings. In so
doing, however, the appeal in the case before us would necessarily
be decided differently.
	It should be apparent that resolution of the appeal in the case
at bar is dependent on deciding whether the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act applies to juvenile proceedings. For this reason, the
court has no discretion to avoid addressing the issue. The issue
needs to be confronted head on.
	Like Justice Freeman, I concur in the majority's holding that
a defendant's failure to comply with Rule 604(d) does not deprive
an appellate court of jurisdiction to consider the defendant's
appeal. However, because the majority assumes, without deciding,
that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not apply to juvenile
proceedings in reaching its conclusion that "dismissal is too harsh
a sanction for a juvenile defendant's failure to comply with Rule
604(d)" (slip op. at 8), I, like Justice Freeman, cannot join fully in
the majority opinion.
	JUSTICES FREEMAN and RARICK join in this partial
concurrence and partial dissent.
	I agree with the majority's initial determination that a
defendant's failure to comply with Rule 604(d) (188 Ill. 2d R.
604(d)) does not deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction to
consider the defendant's appeal. I also agree with the majority that,
where the circuit court gives proper Rule 604(d) and Rule 605(b)
(188 Ill. 2d R. 605(b)) admonitions to an adult defendant and the
defendant fails to comply with Rule 604(d), it is not appropriate
for the appellate court to remand the cause to the circuit court for
strict compliance with Rule 604(d). Instead, the appellate court
must dismiss the appeal because the defendant has an adequate
remedy under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS
5/122-1 et seq. (West 2000)). See People v. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d 93
(1988). I part company with the majority, however, because it
assumes, without analysis or citation to authority, that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not apply to juvenile proceedings,
and does not provide an adequate remedy for the juvenile in the
case at bar. Moreover, the assumption the majority makes affects
the very outcome of the present cause and is therefore contrary to
principled judicial review. In my opinion, whether the Post-Conviction Hearing Act applies to juvenile proceedings is an issue
of great import which this court must decide to reach the proper
resolution of this cause.

ANALYSIS
	In Wilk, in the context of criminal proceedings, this court
considered what should be the effect of the defendants' failure to
comply with Rule 604(d). Both defendants had filed notices of
appeal of their guilty pleas without prior Rule 604(d) motions to
withdraw the guilty pleas. This court first acknowledged the
impact upon a defendant's rights when there is a failure to comply
with Rule 604(d):
			"[A]n attorney who stands with his client in a criminal
proceeding, hears the admonishments of the court
required by Rule 605(b), and fails to adhere to Rule
604(d) by moving to withdraw the plea prior to filing a
notice of appeal has fallen short of providing competent
representation. *** The defendant, through no fault of his,
is deprived of a right to be heard in the appellate court.
Such assistance of counsel, coupled with the denial of
appellate review, raises effective assistance of counsel
constitutional questions. Furthermore, many of the
grounds for withdrawal of guilty pleas, consideration of
which is denied because of counsel's failure, themselves
may raise constitutional questions." Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d  at
105-06.
This court also emphasized, however, the importance of Rule
604(d): 
		"[The] purpose [of Rule 604(d)] is to ensure that before a
criminal appeal can be taken from a guilty plea, the trial
judge who accepted the plea and imposed sentence be
given the opportunity to hear the allegations of
improprieties that took place outside the official
proceedings and dehors the record, but nevertheless were
unwittingly given sanction in the courtroom. Rule 604(d)
provides for fact finding to take place at a time when
witnesses are still available and memories are fresh.
[Citation.] A hearing under Rule 604(d) allows a trial
court to immediately correct any improper conduct or any
errors of the trial court that may have produced a guilty
plea." Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d  at 104.
The court then noted that exceptions to Rule 604(d) fashioned by
various panels of the appellate court had circumvented and
defeated the purpose of the rule:
		"If the appellate court elects to retain jurisdiction of the
appeal and considers the merits of the defendant's
contentions, the rule has been ignored. If the appellate
court remands the case for a motion to withdraw, to be
filed and to be considered by the trial court, the case has
taken a needless trip to the appellate court, wasted that
court's time, extended the time within which the motion
to withdraw must be filed under Rule 604(d), and attaches
no consequences to the ignoring of the requirements of
the rule of this court." Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d  at 106-07.
Balancing the various interests at issue, this court affirmed the
dismissal of the defendants' appeals. The court noted that,
pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, the defendants had
an appropriate vehicle for the vindication of their rights. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d  at 107.
	In the case at bar, as in Wilk, respondent's attorney failed to
comply with Rule 604(d). Counsel did not file a motion to
withdraw respondent's guilty plea or a motion to reconsider the
sentence. Since respondent is a juvenile and not an adult, the
question then becomes whether the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
applies to juvenile proceedings. If the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act applies to juvenile proceedings, respondent, like the adult
defendants in Wilk, has an adequate remedy for counsel's failure
to comply with Rule 604(d). Conversely, if the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act does not apply to juvenile proceedings, respondent
does not have an adequate remedy for counsel's failure to comply
with the rule. Due process considerations would dictate that, rather
than dismiss respondent's appeal, this court remand to the circuit
court for strict compliance with Rule 604(d). See People v. Foster,
171 Ill. 2d 469 (1996) (this court remanded the cause for strict
compliance with Rule 604(d) where the trial court failed to give
the defendant the Rule 605(b) admonitions regarding Rule 604(d)). 
	The appellate court recognized that whether the Post-Conviction Hearing Act applies to juvenile proceedings is a crucial
issue in this case. The court observed:
			"Since the issue is one of waiver rather than
jurisdiction, the question is not whether we can consider
respondent's appeal but whether we should. Of course, if
this were a criminal case Wilk would dictate dismissal,
leaving the respondent to his remedy under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act ***." (Emphases in original.) 328
Ill. App. 3d at 977.
The court then held that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not
apply to juvenile proceedings. 328 Ill. App. 3d at 977. Being
aware, however, that by its holding the juvenile's claim of
constitutional violations would escape scrutiny, the court advanced
an alternate resolution of the case:
	"Because a juvenile, unlike an adult offender, has no
alternative means of presenting his claims, we believe it is
appropriate to invoke Supreme Court Rule 615(a): 'Plain
errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed
although they were not brought to the attention of the trial
court.' " 328 Ill. App. 3d at 977-78.
The appellate court remanded the cause to the circuit court for
strict compliance with Rule 604(d). 328 Ill. App. 3d at 978.
	The majority opinion tracks the reasoning of the appellate
court in determining that compliance with Rule 604(d) is not
jurisdictional. However, unlike the appellate court opinion, the
majority opinion does not determine, with proper analysis and
citation to authority, whether the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
applies to juvenile proceedings. Rather than determine this crucial
question, the majority merely assumes that the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act does not apply to juvenile proceedings. The majority
states:
		"The Post-Conviction Hearing Act, however, has never
been held to apply in juvenile proceedings. See In re A.G.,
195 Ill. 2d  at 321-22 ('this court has not reviewed holdings of
the appellate court concluding that relief from such [juvenile
court] proceedings is unavailable under the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act'). Consequently, dismissing a juvenile
defendant's appeal for failing to comply with the written
motion requirements of Rule 604(d) may leave a juvenile
without a remedy for his claims, including those claims
alleging constitutional violations." Slip op. at 7.
Further, in rejecting the State's contention that a juvenile would
not be left without a remedy but could resort to a section 2-1401
motion (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2000)), the majority states:
		"Section 2-1401, however, does not provide a juvenile
defendant with a remedy equivalent to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Although the remedial powers of
section 2-1401 have been held to extend to criminal
cases, such a motion is intended 'to correct all errors of
fact occurring in the prosecution of a cause, unknown to
the petitioner and court at the time judgment was entered,
which, if then known, would have prevented its
rendition.' [Citation.] A juvenile's claim that his counsel
was ineffective for failing to file a written motion
pursuant to Rule 604(d) does not fall within those
parameters." Slip op. at 7-8.
The majority concludes that:
			"Because a juvenile does not have an adequate means
for presenting his claims when his attorney fails to file a
written motion pursuant to Rule 604(d), we find that
dismissal is too harsh a sanction for a juvenile defendant's
failure to comply with Rule 604(d). We emphasize,
however, that this court requires strict compliance with
Rule 604(d) in both the juvenile and the adult context. We
therefore hold that when a juvenile defendant fails to
comply with the written motion requirements of Rule
604(d) prior to filing an appeal, the appellate court has no
discretion and must remand the cause to the circuit court
for strict compliance with Rule 604(d)." Slip op. at 8.
	With due respect, my colleagues of the majority err in that
they make an assumption which affects the very outcome of this
case. Consider the alternate assumption, that the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act applies to juvenile proceedings. In that case,
respondent, like the defendants in Wilk, has an adequate remedy
for counsel's failure to comply with Rule 604(d). Applying Wilk,
it would also follow that the proper resolution of this case is to
dismiss respondent's appeal.
	I note that this court is entrusted with the responsibility for a
just result and the maintenance of a sound and uniform body of
precedent. People v. Wilson, 155 Ill. 2d 374, 379 (1993), quoting
American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees,
Council 31 v. County of Cook, 145 Ill. 2d 475, 480 (1991), citing
Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill. 2d 223, 225 (1967). Where, as here, an issue
of import is relevant to the final determination of the cause and is
not yet decided by this court, the court is duty bound to consider
the issue and arrive at a reasoned decision concerning the issue.
The court should not assume, without analysis or authority, that
the issue has been decided in a particular manner. Nor should the
court divorce itself from its responsibility by observing that no
other court has ever decided the issue in a particular manner. In the
case at bar, this court is duty bound to consider whether the Post-Conviction Hearing Act applies to juvenile proceedings. The court
may not merely assume that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does
not apply to juvenile proceedings. 
	The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a remedy for a
defendant who has suffered a substantial violation of his or her
constitutional rights in the proceedings which resulted in the
conviction. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 2000). In assuming that
the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not apply to juvenile
proceedings, this court has, without analysis, deprived all juveniles
of the comprehensive remedies afforded by the Act. I do not here
imply that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act should apply to
juvenile proceedings. Rather, I suggest that this court, as the
supreme judicial body of this state, must shoulder its
responsibilities and come to a reasoned decision about the issue.
 
CONCLUSION
	I cannot join fully in the majority opinion because the
majority refuses to decide an important issue in the case at bar, and
because the majority makes an assumption about that issue which
controls the very outcome of the case. While I concur in the
majority's holding that a defendant's failure to comply with Rule
604(d) does not deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction to
consider the defendant's appeal, I respectfully dissent from the
balance of the opinion.
	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW and JUSTICE RARICK join
in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.