Title: State v. Roosevelt Williams

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2001 WI 21 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-1821-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Roosevelt Williams,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
 
ON REMAND FROM THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
Previously reported at: 
225 Wis. 2d 159, 591 N.W.2d 823 (Wis. 1999) 
214 Wis. 2d 412, 570 N.W.2d 892 (Ct. App. 1997) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
March 13, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
November 2, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Maxine A. White 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
Dissented: 
BABLITCH, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., and BRADLEY, J., join dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Warren D. Weinstein, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and 
oral argument by Melinda A. Swartz, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
2001 WI 21 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-1821-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Roosevelt Williams,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   We review again the court of 
appeals decision that reversed the conviction of the defendant, 
Roosevelt Williams, State v. Williams, 214 Wis. 2d 412, 570 
N.W.2d 892 (Ct. App. 1997).  On April 27, 1999, this court 
issued a decision, State v. Williams, 225 Wis. 2d 159, 591 
N.W.2d 823 (1999), that reversed the court of appeals decision. 
 However, on April 3, 2000, the United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and vacated (without review) our decision, 
and remanded the case for further consideration in light of 
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S. Ct. 1375 (2000).  Williams 
v. Wisconsin, 529 U.S. 1050, 120 S. Ct. 1552 (2000).  
FILED 
 
      
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 13, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 96-1821 
 
2 
¶2 
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000), relates to the 
first of the two issues facing this court, whether an anonymous 
tip containing a contemporaneous report of drug trafficking, 
combined with independent observations and corroboration of 
details from the tip justified the investigatory stop of 
Williams.  Judge James Eaton, assigned to Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court, found that there was reasonable suspicion to 
justify the stop.  The court of appeals reversed, concluding 
that the police officers did not have the requisite reasonable 
suspicion based upon the information before them.  Now having 
the benefit of the Supreme Court's guidance in Florida v. J.L., 
we conclude that, considering the totality of the circumstances, 
including the indicia of reliability surrounding the anonymous 
tip and the police officers' additional observations, the 
officers reasonably suspected that criminal activity was afoot. 
¶3 
The second issue before us is whether there was 
reasonable suspicion for the police officers' subsequent search 
of the vehicle.  The circuit court found that there was, and the 
court of appeals did not reach that question.   We agree with 
the circuit court that under the circumstances, the officers 
reasonably 
suspected 
that 
they 
were 
in 
physical 
danger, 
justifying the protective search.  We therefore reverse the 
court of appeals, and approve the decision of the circuit court, 
which denied Williams' motion to suppress evidence obtained from 
the search.  Accordingly, we uphold the circuit court's judgment 
of conviction.  
 
No. 96-1821 
 
3 
I 
¶4 
Sometime during the afternoon of November 2, 1995, a 
9-1-1 telephone call1 was received from an anonymous caller.  The 
transcript of the call is as follows: 
 
OPERATOR: Milwaukee Emergency Operator Number 62.  How 
may I help you? 
 
CALLER: Yes, I'm calling  . . .  O.K., I don't want to 
get involved but there's some activity that's going in 
 . . .  going around in the back alley of my house 
where they're selling drugs and everything and I want 
to know who I can call to report so they can come 
around here. 
 
OPERATOR: Are they outside or is (unintelligible) 
 . . . already  . . .  dealing from a house or what? 
 
CALLER: They're in the van and they [are] giving 
customers, you know, drugs. 
 
OPERATOR: Do you have a description of the van? 
 
CALLER: Um, hold on, I can get [it] for you. 
 
OPERATOR: Okay. 
 
CALLER: It's a blue and burgundy Bronco.  Hello? 
 
OPERATOR: Okay.  A blue and burgundy? 
 
CALLER: Ah hah.  Bronco.  It's right beside, it's 
right beside my apartment building. 
 
OPERATOR: Okay.  Is it in the alley or is it  . . .  
it 
 
                     
1 The term "9-1-1" refers to emergency assistance telephone 
number.  See Wis. Stat. § 146.70 (1995-96).  All subsequent 
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1995-96 version 
unless otherwise indicated.  
No. 96-1821 
 
4 
CALLER: It's right in the driveway.  Beca  . . . ah, I 
stay at 4261 North Teutonia. 
 
OPERATOR: Um hmm. 
 
CALLER: And we have like this big parking lot on the 
side of our apartment. 
 
OPERATOR: Okay. 
 
CALLER: And it is right in between the  . . .  um 
 . . .  the parking way and the alley. 
 
OPERATOR: So they're in the driveway? 
 
CALLER: Right.  It's a dark blue and burgundy. 
 
OPERATOR: Okay, we'll send someone. 
 
CALLER: Okay.  Thank you. 
 
OPERATOR: Thank you.  Bye. 
¶5 
The above information was dispatched by radio to 
Police Officers Johnny Norred and Phillip Henschel, who were 
driving a general patrol squad car: 
 
OPERATOR: Disrestrict (sic) until further notice. 
OPERATOR2: 73R. 
SQUAD 73R: 73R. 
OPERATOR2: 73R drug dealing complaint, 4261 North 
Teutonia and the alley.  Somebody's dealing drugs from 
a blue and burgundy Ford Bronco that's parked in the 
driveway on the side of the building.  Complaint 
number is 1119. 
SQUAD 73R: 10-4. 
 
¶6 
Four 
minutes 
after 
receiving 
the 
dispatch, 
the 
officers arrived at 4261 Teutonia.  It was daylight.  As they 
drove past the building, they saw a vehicle matching the general 
description in the dispatch.  The vehicle was a Chevy Blazer 
instead of a Ford Bronco at the rear, instead of the side, of 
No. 96-1821 
 
5 
the building.2  The Chevy Blazer was parked in an alley or 
driveway alongside an empty lot behind the building.  The 
officers drove around the block in an attempt to approach the 
vehicle without being spotted.  They conducted no surveillance 
and observed no drug trafficking.  
¶7 
The officers drove down an alley, and then turned to 
approach the vehicle so that the front of the police car faced 
the front of the Blazer.  At this point, the officers observed 
that the Blazer had no license plates.3  Two persons were sitting 
in the front seat.  Williams was seated in the driver's seat and 
a female was seated in the passenger's seat.   
¶8 
The officers also observed, as they pulled up, that 
Williams' right hand was out of view, reaching down and behind 
the passenger front seat.  The officers approached the vehicle, 
drew their weapons, and told the occupants to put their hands 
where they could see them.  Neither of the occupants was holding 
weapons.  Officer Norred opened the driver's car door and 
ordered them out of the vehicle.  The officers conducted a pat-
                     
2 Williams does not argue that these minor discrepancies 
impact the determination of whether there was a lawful stop and 
search.  
3 The 
testimony from 
the 
evidentiary 
hearing on the 
suppression motion indicates that there were "no plates."  Even 
though the context of the questioning involves the officers' 
initial approach to the vehicle, it is unclear from the record 
at what point the officers observed that the vehicle had no 
license plates.   
No. 96-1821 
 
6 
down search of each occupant for weapons.4  Finding none, the 
officers secured Williams and the passenger in the back seat of 
the squad car.  
¶9 
Officer Norred returned to the Blazer and searched the 
area behind the passenger seat where he had observed Williams' 
hand hidden earlier.  Having noted that Williams had long arms, 
the officer searched wherever Williams could have reached.  The 
officer also searched the area within reach of the passenger's 
arm. 
¶10 Within the area that he searched, Officer Norred found 
a green leafy substance that appeared to be marijuana, a 
container with 26 rocks he suspected to be cocaine base and 
another small bag of marijuana.  At this point, Williams was 
placed under arrest. 
¶11 Williams was charged with knowing possession, with 
intent to deliver, five grams or less of cocaine, in violation 
of Wis. Stat. §§ 161.16(2)(b)(1) and 161.41(1m)(cm)(1) (1995-
96).  Williams moved to suppress the evidence seized as a result 
of the search, asserting that the officers did not have a search 
warrant and the circumstances leading up to the search did not 
provide an exception to the search warrant requirement.  On 
January 10, 1996, the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing 
on the defendant's motion.  The parties stipulated to the 
                     
4 Officer Henschel conducted a "look" pat-down search of the 
female passenger occupant, asking her to remove any objects from 
her pockets and looked at her waistband to check for bulges. 
No. 96-1821 
 
7 
admission into evidence of the transcript of the 9-1-1 call and 
the subsequent dispatch. 
¶12 In addition, Officer Norred testified that even though 
he and Officer Henschel took a "concealed route" in approaching 
the Chevy Blazer, he did not know if Williams had seen them or 
if Williams had a gun in his hand.  This prospect made him fear 
for his safety.  Officer Henschel testified that he, too, feared 
for his safety. 
¶13 Officer Norred testified that the purpose of his 
search of the Blazer was to secure his and Officer Henschel's 
safety.  He stated that Williams "may have had a gun in his 
hands, and he possibly may have dropped it [behind the seat]."  
Officer Norred explained that "drug dealers have been known to 
carry gunsand my life is on the line.  I don't know if he has a 
weapon there or not, and I certainly wouldfelt there was a 
possibility of danger to myself."  He also testified that he 
would have released Williams and the passenger to return to the 
vehicle had he not found what appeared to be cocaine base and 
marijuana.  
¶14 The circuit court denied the suppression motion, 
finding that the officers reasonably relied upon the anonymous 
tip and verified the readily observable information contained in 
the tip.  The circuit court also found that the defendant's hand 
was behind the passenger seat as the officers approached the 
vehicle.  The court ruled that together, these considerations 
supported the officers' reasonable suspicion in making the stop 
No. 96-1821 
 
8 
and the subsequent protective search of the occupants and the 
Blazer. 
¶15 Williams pled guilty.  The circuit court entered a 
judgment of conviction and sentenced Williams to 30 months in 
state prison.5  Williams appealed, and the court of appeals 
reversed the circuit court's ruling.  The court of appeals held 
that the officers could not have had reasonable suspicion in 
these circumstances where the anonymous tip "provide[d] only 
readily observable information, and they themselves observe[d] 
no suspicious behavior."  State v. Williams, 214 Wis. 2d at 423. 
Because the court of appeals concluded that the initial stop was 
unlawful, it did not reach the issue of whether the subsequent 
search was lawful.  Id. at 418, n.6. 
¶16 We granted review and reversed the court of appeals.  
We found that the court of appeals focused only upon the 
anonymous tip, rather than the totality of the circumstances 
facing the officers at the time of the stop.  State v. Williams, 
225 Wis. 2d at 180.  Considering both the quality and quantity 
of the information known to the officers, and the surrounding 
circumstances, we held that the officers had the necessary 
reasonable suspicion for both the investigatory stop and the 
protective search.  Id. at 180-81. 
                     
5 Judge James Eaton presided over the evidentiary hearing on 
the motion to suppress and Williams' plea hearing.  He also 
entered the judgment of conviction.  Judge Maxine A. White 
presided over the sentencing hearing.  
No. 96-1821 
 
9 
¶17 As noted above, Williams appealed our decision to the 
United States Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court granted the 
petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated our decision and 
remanded for further consideration in light of Florida v. J.L., 
529 U.S. 266, 120 S. Ct. 1375 (2000).  Williams v. Wisconsin, 
529 U.S. 1050, 120 S. Ct. 1552 (2000).   
II 
¶18 Whether there is reasonable suspicion that justifies a 
warrantless search implicates the constitutional protections 
against unreasonable searches and seizures contained in the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 
I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.6  State v. Martwick, 
                     
6  The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides:  
[t]he right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath 
or 
affirmation, 
and 
particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Article I, § 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides:  
[t]he right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause, supported by 
oath 
or 
affirmation, 
and 
particularly 
describing the place to be searched and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
No. 96-1821 
 
10
2000 WI 5, ¶21, 231 Wis. 2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552.  Accordingly, 
the determination of reasonable suspicion for an investigatory 
stop 
and 
subsequent 
protective 
search 
is 
a 
question 
of 
constitutional fact.  Id. at ¶19 (citing Ornelas v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)).  We apply a two-step standard 
of review to questions of constitutional fact.  First, we review 
the circuit court's findings of historical fact, and uphold them 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  Id. at ¶19.  Second, we 
review the determination of reasonable suspicion de novo.  Id.  
Accordingly, we apply the two-step standard of review to both of 
the determinations of reasonable suspicion at issue here: first, 
whether there was reasonable suspicion for the investigatory 
stop, and then, whether there was reasonable suspicion for the 
protective search.  
A 
¶19 In support of its determination that there was 
reasonable suspicion to stop and detain Williams and his 
companion, the circuit court made a number of findings of fact. 
 According to the circuit court, the caller was a citizen 
complaining of overt drug dealing in broad daylight.  She was 
observing a crime in progress.7  The caller responded to 9-1-1 
                                                                  
We ordinarily interpret Article I, Section 11 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution in accordance with the United States 
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.  State 
v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 195, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998).   
7 The gender of the anonymous caller was not specifically 
identified in the record, however, the caller was referred to as 
a "she" by defense counsel who had listened to the tape 
recording of the call.  
No. 96-1821 
 
11
operator's request for a description of the vehicle with "hold 
on, I can get it for you" and indicated that the vehicle was 
right beside the caller's apartment building.  The court found 
that the police officers then confirmed the information from the 
telephone call.  The vehicle's description and location matched 
the information given by the caller.  The officers, in uniform, 
in a marked police car, in broad daylight, approached the 
vehicle, and saw that Williams' hand was reaching behind the 
passenger seat.  The court did not, however, find that Williams' 
gesture was furtive.  The circuit court also found the officers' 
testimony to be credible, including their testimony that they 
feared for their physical safety upon approaching the vehicle 
and seeing that Williams' hand was concealed.  The court also 
imputed to them the information in the 9-1-1 call.  State v. 
Mabra, 61 Wis. 2d 613, 625-26, 213 N.W.2d 545 (1974).   
¶20 We do not find the circuit court's findings to be 
clearly erroneous.  The findings are supported by the record, as 
it was developed at the evidentiary hearing on Williams' motion 
to suppress.  
¶21 We next determine, upon de novo review of the record 
before us, whether there was reasonable suspicion.  A law 
enforcement officer may lawfully stop an individual if, based 
upon the officer's experience, she or he reasonably suspects 
"that criminal activity may be afoot."  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1 (1968).  Wisconsin codified the Terry stop standard in Wis. 
No. 96-1821 
 
12
Stat. § 968.24.8  We determine whether a stop was lawful in light 
of Terry and the cases following it.  State v. Waldner, 205 
Wis. 2d 51, 55, 556 N.W.2d 681 (1996).  
¶22 In determining whether the 
police 
have lawfully 
conducted a Terry stop, we consider the totality of the 
circumstances.  Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328 (1990).  
"Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon 
both the content of information possessed by police and its 
degree of reliability.  Both factorsquantity and qualityare 
considered in the 'totality of the circumstancesthe whole 
picture,' . . . ."  Id. at 330, quoting United States v. Cortez, 
449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981).  The totality-of-the-circumstances 
approach views the quantity and the quality of the information 
as inversely proportional to each other.  "Thus, if a tip has a 
relatively low degree of reliability, more information will be 
required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than 
would be required if the tip were more reliable."  Id.  
Conversely, 
if 
the 
tip 
contains 
a 
number 
of 
components 
                     
8 Section 968.24 provides as follows: 
    After having identified himself or herself as a 
law enforcement officer, a law enforcement officer may 
stop a person in a public place for a reasonable 
period of time when the officer reasonably suspects 
that such person is committing, is about to commit or 
has committed a crime, and may demand the name and 
address of the person and an explanation of the 
person's 
conduct. 
 
Such 
detention 
and 
temporary 
questioning shall be conducted in the vicinity where 
the person was stopped.    
No. 96-1821 
 
13
indicating its reliability, then the police need not have as 
much additional information to establish reasonable suspicion. 
¶23 In considering the totality of the circumstances, 
however, our focus is upon the reasonableness of the officers' 
actions in the situation facing them.  "The essential question 
is whether the action of the law enforcement officer was 
reasonable under all the facts and circumstances present."  
State v. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 139-40, 456 N.W.2d 830 
(1990). 
¶24 Here, the circumstances include an anonymous tip, 
which brings to bear the latest of Terry's progeny, Florida v. 
J.L.. 
¶25 In Florida v. J.L.,  
 
[A]n anonymous caller reported to the Miami-Dade 
Police 
that 
a 
young 
black 
male 
standing 
at 
a 
particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was 
carrying a gun.  So far as the record reveals, there 
is no audio recording of the tip, and nothing is known 
about the informant.  Sometime after the police 
received the tipthe record does not say how longtwo 
officers were instructed to respond.  They arrived at 
the bus stop about six minutes later and saw three 
black males "just hanging out [there]."  One of the 
three, respondent J.L., was wearing a plaid shirt.  
Apart from the tip, the officers had no reason to 
suspect any of the three of illegal conduct.  The 
officers did not see a firearm, and J.L. made no 
threatening or otherwise unusual movements.  One of 
the officers approached J.L., told him to put his 
hands up on the bus stop, frisked him, and seized a 
gun from J.L.'s pocket. 
120 S. Ct. at 1377 (citations to the Petitioner's Appendix 
omitted).   
No. 96-1821 
 
14
 
¶26 J.L., who was nearly 16 years old at the time, was 
charged with carrying a concealed weapon without a license and 
possessing a firearm while under the age of 18.  Id.  J.L. moved 
to suppress the gun, and the trial court granted the motion.  
Id.  The court of appeals reversed, but the Florida Supreme 
Court quashed that decision, finding that the anonymous tip had 
no "qualifying indicia of reliability."  Id. at 1377-78.  The 
Florida Supreme Court also held that no "firearm exception" 
existed to justify a stop and frisk based upon a "bare-boned 
anonymous tip[]."  Id. at 1378.   
¶27 The United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that 
"an anonymous tip that a person carrying a gun is, without more, 
[in]sufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of 
that person."  Id. at 1377.  The Court concluded that the tip 
lacked "the indicia of reliability of the kind contemplated in 
Adams [v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972)] and White."  Id. at 
1380.   
¶28 The indicia of reliability in White related to the 
predictions contained in the anonymous tip.  In White, an 
anonymous call relayed that Vanessa White would be leaving a 
specific address at a particular time, and would be going to a 
named motel, carrying cocaine located in a brown attaché case.  
496 U.S. at 327.  The call also provided a detailed description 
of the car White would be driving.  Id.  Within the timeframe 
given by the caller, White departed, without an attaché case, 
and headed towards the motel, where the police stopped her and 
found the case in her car pursuant to a consensual search.  The 
No. 96-1821 
 
15
case contained marijuana; later, the police found that White's 
purse 
contained 
the 
cocaine. 
 
The 
Court 
concluded 
that 
independent corroboration of the anonymous tipster's predictions 
indicated that the tip was reliable.  "When significant aspects 
of the caller's predictions were verified, there was reason to 
believe not only that the caller was honest but also that he was 
well informed, at least well enough to justify the stop."  Id. 
at 332.  
¶29 In Adams, the tip contained no predictive information, 
but merely relayed that "an individual seated in a nearby 
vehicle was carrying narcotics and had a gun at his waist."  407 
U.S. at 145.  However, the tipster was a known informant who 
personally delivered the tip, and thus could be held accountable 
if the tip proved false.  Id. at 146-47. 
¶30 Comparing the tip before the Court in Florida v. J.L., 
the Court found none of the indicia of reliability that had 
existed in either White or Adams.  The tip was from "an unknown, 
unaccountable informant."  Florida v. J.L., 120 S. Ct. at 1379. 
 Indeed, the tip contained only information readily observable 
by passersby, J.L.'s locationa bus stop, and a very general 
descriptiona young black man wearing a plaid shirt.  Id. at 
1377. 
¶31 However, "there are situations in which an anonymous 
tip, suitably corroborated, exhibits 'sufficient indicia of 
reliability 
to 
provide 
reasonable 
suspicion 
to 
make 
the 
investigatory stop.'"  Id. at 1378 (quoting White, 496 U.S. at 
327).  Florida v. J.L. requires us to examine the indicia of 
No. 96-1821 
 
16
reliability surrounding the tip to determine the quality of the 
information 
provided 
to 
the 
police. 
 
There 
are 
myriad 
distinctions between the anonymous tip before us and the tip in 
Florida v. J.L., all indicating that the tip here was reliable. 
¶32 The tip in Florida v. J.L. was a "bare-boned" tip 
about a gun.  "All the police had to go on . . . was the bare 
report of an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither 
explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for 
believing he had inside information about J.L." 
 Id. at 1379. 
 Because the tip contained only identifying information that was 
readily observable, the tip could not, standing alone, establish 
reasonable suspicion.9  
¶33 In contrast, here, the anonymous tipster explains 
exactly how she knows about the criminal activity she is 
reporting: she is observing it.  She says, "there's some 
activity that's going in . . . going around in the back alley of 
my house . . . .  They're selling drugs," and "they [are] giving 
customers, you know, drugs."  She then steps away from the phone 
momentarily to obtain a description of the vehicle.  Quite 
                     
9 The tip was particularly insufficient in Florida v. J.L. 
because it alleged concealed criminal activity, carrying a 
concealed weapon, and yet provided no basis for determining how 
the 
tipster 
knew 
about 
the 
concealed 
crime. 
 
"Such 
a 
tip . . . does not show that the tipster has knowledge of 
concealed criminal activity.  The reasonable suspicion here at 
issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of 
illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate 
person."  Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S. Ct. 1375, 1379 
(2000).  
No. 96-1821 
 
17
simply, in contrast to the tipster in Florida v. J.L., the 
tipster here has made plain that she is an eyewitness.   
¶34 Also in stark contrast to Florida v. J.L., where 
nothing was known about the informantthe tip was "from an 
unknown location by an unknown caller"the informant here 
identified her location, 4261 North Teutonia.  And, more than 
merely identifying her location, she repeatedly identified it as 
her home: "my house," "my apartment building," "our apartment." 
 She also described the immediate surroundings: the alley, the 
parking lot on the side of her apartment building.  Even though 
the caller did not identify herself, she did provide self-
identifying information, that is, her address. 
¶35 Although the caller said that she did not "want to get 
involved," by providing self-identifying information, she risked 
that her identity would be discovered.  Consequently, the 9-1-1 
caller put her anonymity at risk, contrary to Williams' 
contention.  We agree with the concurrence in Florida v. J.L. 
that if "an informant places his [or her] anonymity at risk, a 
court can consider this factor in weighing the reliability of 
the tip." Florida v. J.L., 120 S. Ct. at 1381 (Kennedy, J., 
No. 96-1821 
 
18
concurring).10  Risking one's identification intimates that, more 
likely than not, the informant is a genuinely concerned citizen 
as opposed to a fallacious prankster.11 
¶36 In fact, the circuit court found that the caller here 
was a citizen informant.  We have recognized the importance of 
citizen informants, and, accordingly, apply a relaxed test of 
reliability, 
that 
"shifts 
from 
a 
question 
of 
personal 
reliability to 'observational' reliability."  State v. Boggess, 
110 Wis. 2d 309, 316, 328 N.W.2d 878 (Ct. App. 1982) (citing 
State v. Doyle, 96 Wis. 2d 272, 287, 291 N.W.2d 545 (1980), 
overruled on other grounds by State v. Swanson, 164 Wis. 2d 437, 
                     
10 The dissent seems to suggest at ¶115 that a tipster is 
reliable only if he or she knowingly or intentionally risks his 
or her anonymity.  There is no authority for such a contention. 
Where a tipster has reliable and accurate information about 
ongoing criminal activity he or she observes in a neighborhood, 
we want to encourage contemporaneous reporting of that activity. 
 Such a person need not intentionally or knowingly put himself 
or herself at risk by personal identification. We dare not 
speculate what a caller risks when he or she reports criminal 
activity observed, but it may be much more than anonymity. 
Moreover, it would be difficult, if not impossible, in many 
instances, for a court to determine whether a tipster has 
knowingly or intentionally put at risk his or her anonymity by 
calling a police station and giving identifying information, but 
not specifically identifying himself or herself.  
11 All indications here point to the conclusion that the   
9-1-1 caller was not a prankster.  Originally, she had 
identified the vehicle as a van, but then, after leaving the 
phone to get a better description, she describes the vehicle as 
a Ford Bronco.  Actually, it was a Chevy Blazer, although, as 
the officers testified, the two vehicles are similar in 
appearance.  That the caller misidentified the vehicle as well 
as left the phone to obtain a more detailed description 
indicates that clearly the call was not likely rehearsed.  
No. 96-1821 
 
19
475 N.W.2d 148 (1991)).12  In particular, we view citizens who 
purport to have witnessed a crime as reliable, and allow the 
police to act accordingly, even though other indicia of 
reliability have not yet been established.  See Doyle, 96 
Wis. 2d at 287.    
¶37 There are still other distinctions between the tip at 
hand and in Florida v. J.L..  In Florida v. J.L., there was no 
audio recording of the tip.  120 S. Ct. at 1377.  Here, there 
was an audio recording, a transcript of which was admitted at 
the suppression hearing.  The recording adds to the reliability 
of the tip in a number of ways.  It provides a record of the tip 
and its specific content.  It provides an opportunity for 
review, albeit somewhat limited, of the tipster's veracity, not 
                     
12 The dissent suggests that a tip from a citizen who 
contemporaneously witnesses and reports an on-going crime is not 
entitled to any "relaxed test of reliability" since the U.S. 
Supreme Court overruled Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) 
(upon which State v. Doyle, 96 Wis. 2d 272, 291 N.W.2d 545 
(1980) relies), in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).  
(Dissent at ¶111).  This runs counter to the reason that the 
Court abandoned Aguilar's two-pronged test for determining 
probable cause (and reasonable suspicion) in favor of a totality 
of circumstances test we use today.  "We rejected it as 
hypertechnical and divorced from 'the factual and practical 
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent 
men, not legal technicians, act.'"  Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 
U.S. 727, 732 (1984) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 
U.S. 160, 175 (1949)).  Under the totality of the circumstances, 
the fact that the tip here came from an obviously concerned 
citizen who was witnessing a crime as she reported it, must be 
considered.  It would be hypertechnical and impractical of us to 
do otherwise, and, notably, the dissent offers no authority for 
the proposition that the Court's abrogation of Aguilar requires 
this court to view citizen-witness complaints with a greater 
degree of suspicion than we have in the past.  
No. 96-1821 
 
20
only based upon content, but also based upon its tone and 
delivery.  The recording would also aid in the event that the 
police need to find the anonymous caller.  "Voice recording of 
telephone tips might, in appropriate cases, be used by police to 
locate the caller. . . .  [T]he ability of the police to trace 
the identity of anonymous telephone informants may be a factor 
which lends reliability to what, years earlier, might have been 
considered unreliable anonymous tips."  Id. at 1381 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring). 
¶38 We note that the call came in on the 9-1-1 emergency 
services line to a Milwaukee Emergency Operator.  According to 
Wis. Stat. § 146.70(2)(e), Milwaukee may have developed a 
"sophisticated" emergency phone system.13  A "sophisticated 
system" 
refers 
to 
a 
system 
with 
"automatic 
location 
identification 
and 
automatic 
number 
identification."  
§ 146.70(1)(i).  The record does not indicate that the caller 
called into the sophisticated 9-1-1 system, or that, if she did, 
it was fully operational at the time she called.  It is 
noteworthy, however, that the operator did not ask the caller 
for 
her 
address. 
 
Instead, 
the 
caller 
volunteered 
that 
                     
13 Section 146.70(2)(e) provides: 
If a public agency or group of public agencies 
combined to establish an emergency phone system under 
par. (d) has a population of 250,000 or more, such 
agency 
or 
group 
of 
agencies 
shall 
establish 
a 
sophisticated system.  
No. 96-1821 
 
21
information.14  Regardless of whether the caller called into a 
basic 
or 
sophisticated 
system, 
she 
exposed 
herself 
to 
prosecution 
and 
penalties 
for 
making 
a 
false 
report.  
§ 146.70(10)(a).15  Potentially, the caller could "be held 
                     
14 There is further support for the inference that the 
caller's address was automatically identified for the emergency 
operator in the transcript of the 9-1-1 call.  In response to 
the caller volunteering her address, the operator responded with 
a confirming "um hmm." 
While we applaud the efforts of the concurrence to bolster 
the majority's opinion, we again note that the record does not 
clearly establish that there was an operational 9-1-1 system 
here.  Hence, while we wish we could adopt the concurrence's 
position that this is not an anonymous informant case, there is 
nothing in the record, and nothing of which we can take judicial 
notice, which would establish that a sophisticated 9-1-1 system 
was operating at the time the call came in to the Milwaukee 
Emergency Operator.  See Wis. Stat. § 902.01(2):  "A judicially 
noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in 
that it is either (a) generally known within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the trial court or (b) capable of accurate and 
ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot 
reasonably be questioned."  Moreover, neither the court nor the 
parties requested that the court take judicial notice that a 
sophisticated 9-1-1 system was in operation at the time of the 
call here.  We have established that where a court or a party 
desires to take judicial notice of a fact, notice should be 
given to the parties or the adversary, "so as to afford them an 
opportunity of consulting the same sources or of producing 
others."  State v. Barnes, 52 Wis. 2d 82, 88, 187 N.W.2d 845 
(1971) (quoting Fringer v. Venema, 26 Wis. 2d 366, 373, 132 
N.W.2d 565, 133 N.W.2d 809 (1965)).   
Nonetheless, we emphasize the content of the 9-1-1 call.  
The content of that call indicates that the caller volunteered 
identifying information, such as her address, and the relative 
location of her apartment at that address by describing her 
view.  The caller clearly risked that the police might identify 
her. 
15 Wisconsin Stat. § 146.70(10)(a) provides:  
No. 96-1821 
 
22
responsible if her allegations turn[ed] out to [have been] 
fabricated."  Florida v. J.L., 120 S. Ct. at 1378.   
¶39 The 
reliability 
of 
the 
anonymous 
tip 
here 
was 
furthered bolstered by the police corroboration of innocent, 
although significant, details of the tip.  The police, who 
arrived within four minutes of the dispatch, found the scene 
much as the 9-1-1 caller described it.  The caller correctly 
identified that there was more than one person in the vehicle.  
She also accurately described the location of the vehicle, the 
general description of the vehicle, and the relative layout of 
the surroundings, the alley/driveway and adjacent empty lot. 
  
¶40 We have found previously that "the corroboration by 
police 
of 
innocent 
details 
of 
an 
anonymous 
tip" 
lends 
credibility to that tip.  Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d at 142.16  In 
                                                                  
Any person who intentionally dials the telephone 
number "911" to report an emergency, knowing that the 
fact situation which he or she reports does not exist, 
shall be fined not less than $50 nor more than $300 or 
imprisoned not more than 90 days or both for the first 
offense and shall be fined not more than $10,000 or 
imprisoned not more than 5 years or both for any other 
offense committed within 4 years after the first 
offense.   
16 In 
Richardson, 
an 
anonymous 
caller 
from 
a 
public 
telephone booth informed the police that the defendant would be 
travelling from Viroqua to La Crosse to sell cocaine.  State v. 
Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 133, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990).  The 
caller indicated that he had been with the defendant that day 
and seen the cocaine, and gave a detailed description of the two 
men involved, including the defendant, the car they would be 
using, and their expected route.  Id.  The police had not 
observed any suspicious activity and corroborated only the 
"innocent details" of the anonymous tip.  Id. at 135-36.    
No. 96-1821 
 
23
addition to asserting criminal activity, the tips in Richardson, 
White and Adams all relayed details about apparently innocent 
activities.  The police subsequently independently observed 
these 
activities, 
and 
thus 
found 
corroboration 
for 
the 
information contained in the tips.  The corroboration also lent 
reliability to the tips.  Consequently, in Richardson, for 
example, we concluded that "when significant aspects of an 
anonymous tip are independently corroborated by the police, the 
inference arises that the anonymous informant is telling the 
truth about the allegations of criminal activity."  Id.  Here, 
also, there arises an inference that the anonymous caller was 
telling the truth about the alleged drug trafficking based upon 
the corroboration of significant details of the tip.17   
 
¶41 Williams contends, however, that the corroboration of 
significant aspects of the 9-1-1 call here is not enough.  
Instead, he argues, the police needed to corroborate the tip's 
asserted illegal activity to reasonably rely upon the tip.  We 
have 
specifically 
rejected 
a 
similar 
argument 
made 
in 
Richardson, "that verified details of an anonymous tip must 
carry with them a degree of articulable, suspicious conduct."  
156 Wis. 2d at 141.  There we held that "[t]he corroborated 
                     
17 It is also noteworthy that the officers arrived at the 
scene four minutes after the dispatch.  Consequently, they were 
able to, nearly contemporaneously, verify details of the 
anonymous tip.  The proximity of the dispatch and the police 
arrival makes it much less likely that the tip was a prank or 
otherwise unreliable.  The timing here also makes it less likely 
that there would be an improvident detention. 
No. 96-1821 
 
24
actions of the suspect, as viewed by police acting on an 
anonymous tip, need not be inherently suspicious or criminal in 
and of themselves."  Id. at 142.  Also, requiring independent 
corroboration of the alleged criminal conduct is another way of 
saying that "reasonable cause for a stop and frisk can only be 
based on the officer's personal observation, rather than on 
information supplied by another person."  Adams, 407 U.S. at 
147.  The Supreme Court specifically rejected this argument in 
Adams.  Id.  The police officers need not have corroborated the 
tip's assertion that there was drug dealing here, even, as 
suggested, by conducting surveillance.18   
¶42 Williams also contends that Florida v. J.L. requires 
that an anonymous tip contain predictive information in order to 
be reliable.  The tips in both White and Richardson contained 
predictions; however, it was not the predictions in and of 
themselves 
that 
lent 
reliability 
to 
the 
tips. 
 
Rather, 
predictions, if they are or are not verified, facilitate an 
evaluation of the quality of the tip.  In Florida v. J.L., the 
Court indicated that predictions provide one "means to test the 
informant's knowledge or credibility." 120 S. Ct. at 1379.  
However, the Court did not mandate that predictions provided the 
                     
18 The record reflects that surveillance may not have been 
feasible under the circumstances facing the officers.  The 
officers arrived at the scene during daylight hours.  They 
circled the block to avoid being seen by the individuals in the 
Chevy Blazer, and to approach it from a concealed route.  
Simply, the officers likely could not see without also being 
seen.  Consequently, they acted reasonably by not conducting 
surveillance.  
No. 96-1821 
 
25
only means to test a tip's reliability.  Indeed, "there are many 
indicia of reliability respecting anonymous tips that we have 
yet to explore in our cases."  Id. at 1380-81 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 
Where 
other 
indicia 
of 
reliability 
exist, 
predictive information is not necessary to test an anonymous 
tipster's "veracity," "reliability," and "basis of knowledge."  
White, 496 U.S. at 328 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 
230 (1983)).19 
¶43 There is yet another distinction between this case and 
Florida v. J.L., that relates to the reliability of the 
anonymous tip here and the totality of circumstances that gave 
rise to the officers' reasonable suspicion.  In Florida v. J.L., 
the Court noted that there was no visible reason to suspect J.L. 
or his companions of illegal conduct apart from the tip.  Id. at 
1377.  Here, arguably, there are two facts, apart from the 
anonymous tip, that gave the officers reason to suspect that 
criminal activity was afoot.  First, as the officers approached 
the Blazer, they observed Williams' hand extended behind the 
passenger seat.  The gesture, though not furtive, may have 
                     
19 A rule that requires an anonymous tip to include 
predictive information would have the untoward effect of 
undermining citizen complaints.  As the White Court found, 
predictive information indicates that the caller has inside 
information with the alleged criminal's affairs.  Alabama v. 
White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990).  If predictive information were 
required, only insiders, as opposed to concerned eyewitness 
citizens, would have their tips heeded.  Such a rule would 
hardly 
be 
conducive 
to 
encouraging 
citizen 
and 
police 
cooperation. 
No. 96-1821 
 
26
indicated that Williams was either reaching for a weapon or 
concealing evidence as he saw the officers' approach.   
¶44 The 
dissent's 
suggestion 
at 
¶121 
that 
because 
Williams' action was not furtive it was unreasonable for the 
officers to conclude he was reaching for a weapon or concealing 
evidence, is, in itself, unreasonable. We agree with the circuit 
court's conclusion that, given what the officers observed and 
could have been facing, the officers acted reasonably:  
 
It's broad daylight.  The officers are dressed in 
police uniforms operating a marked car.  Nothing 
surreptitious about that.  They're approaching from 
the bow of the defendant's vehicle.  They're within 
easy observation. 
Who can tell, given those facts, when Mr. 
Williams began his reach. 
But, in any case, there was a reach.  His arm was 
extended.  We don't know precisely when he extended 
it, but his arm was extended behind the passenger van 
or the passenger seat. . . .  
I will tell counsel and I'll tell the appellate 
court that, recently, the court had an opportunity to 
see just how acute an officer's fear can be about 
having themselves put upon or their life taken.  I 
think, when I balance the officers' concern for their 
safety against the possibility that they're going to 
suffer bodily harm, grievous bodily harm or death, if 
they guess wrong, or if they determine wrongly, that 
it's better toto be thorough. 
(R. at 22:59-60.) 
¶45 Second, the Blazer had no license plates.  Although 
the lack of plates was not specifically developed or relied upon 
by the circuit court, we consider instead whether the officers 
No. 96-1821 
 
27
relied upon that fact.20  As noted above, the record is unclear 
on this point.  Accordingly, we do not solely rely upon the 
absence of the plates to justify the stop.21  See State v. 
McGill, 2000 WI 38, ¶15 n.2, 234 Wis. 2d 560, 609 N.W.2d 795.  
¶46 Williams contends that the police could not reasonably 
rely upon either the outstretched arm or the lack of license 
plates because innocent explanations exist.  Nonetheless, 
 
[P]olice officers are not required to rule out the 
possibility of innocent behavior before initiating a 
brief stop . . . . [I]f any reasonable inference of 
wrongful 
conduct 
can 
be 
objectively 
discerned, 
notwithstanding 
the 
existence 
of 
other 
innocent 
inferences that could be drawn, the officers have the 
right to temporarily detain the individual for the 
purpose of inquiry. 
State v. Griffin, 183 Wis. 2d 327, 333, 515 N.W.2d 535 (Ct. App. 
1994) (quoting State v. Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d 77, 84, 454 N.W.2d 
763 (1990)). 
                     
20 One of the officers noted that the Blazer had "no 
plates," and so testified at the suppression hearing.  The issue 
came up during questioning about the officers' approach of the 
vehicle.  
21 The absence of license plates alone can reasonably 
justify a stop because, without investigation, the police are 
unable to determine whether the vehicle is stolen or otherwise 
properly registered. See State v. Griffin, 183 Wis. 2d 327, 329, 
515 N.W.2d 535 (Ct. App. 1994); see also Wis. Stat. § 341.04 
(prohibits operation of a motor vehicle without registration or 
pending application for registration); § 341.15(3) (requires 
display of registration plates). 
Nonetheless, we do not suggest, as the dissent contends (at 
¶123), that the officers here were investigating a traffic 
violation.  
No. 96-1821 
 
28
 
¶47 In Florida v. J.L., the Supreme Court held that "an 
anonymous tip that a person carrying a gun is, without more, 
[in]sufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of 
that person."  120 S. Ct. at 1377 (emphasis added).  Here, there 
is plainly so much more than a "bare-boned" tip.  Id. at 1380.  
The information upon which the police proceeded was substantial 
in both quality and quantity.  The anonymous tip was supported 
by a wide array of indicia of reliabilitycontemporaneous 
eyewitness account accompanied by details promptly verified by 
the police.  A reliable tip, such as this one, provided 
information 
of 
substantial 
quality. 
 
Added 
to 
that 
was 
information of not insignificant quantitya vehicle parked in an 
alleyway in broad daylight with no plates, containing two 
persons, one of whom was reaching behind the passenger's seat 
upon the police's arrival.  Accordingly, consideration of the 
totality of circumstances compels the conclusion that the 
officers' acted reasonably in deciding to detain Williams.  We 
have 
here 
the 
necessary 
"cumulative 
detail, 
along 
with 
reasonable inferences and deductions which a reasonable officer 
could glean therefrom, [that] is sufficient to supply the 
reasonable suspicion that crime is afoot and to justify the 
stop."  Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d at 142.22  We therefore conclude 
                     
22 However, 
"we do not attempt to assign a definitive number of 
details or list the types of detail that would give 
rise 
to 
reasonable 
suspicion 
under 
these 
circumstances.  The analysis of reasonableness of an 
officer's reliance upon the corroborated, innocent 
No. 96-1821 
 
29
that the State has met its burden of showing that the 
investigatory stop of Williams was justifiedthat there was 
reasonable suspicion.23  
                                                                  
details of an anonymous tip is necessarily governed by 
the unique facts and circumstances of the given case." 
 
Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d at 143 n.5. 
 
We also reject the dissent's suggestion at ¶¶115-117 that 
the only reliable tips are from persons who are "intimate with 
the suspect's affairs."  (Dissent at ¶117.)  If that were the 
case, only those who associate with alleged criminals, rather 
than citizen informants, could provide reliable tips. 
23 Because we conclude that the anonymous tip here has 
sufficient indicia of reliability, and that, combined with the 
officers' other observations, gave rise to reasonable suspicion, 
we need not consider whether there was imminent danger due to 
drug dealing, akin to firearm possession, to otherwise support a 
finding of reasonable suspicion as we considered in our previous 
decision.  State v. Williams, 225 Wis. 2d 159, 178-80, 591 
N.W.2d 823 (1999).  In Florida v. J.L., the Supreme Court 
directed us not to pursue such a path, insofar as the Court 
refused to create a "firearm exception;" that is, where the tip 
alleged the possession of a firearm and otherwise lacked the 
requisite indicia of reliability, that allegation alone would 
justify an investigatory stop and protective search.  
If police officers may properly conduct Terry frisks 
on the basis of bare-boned tips about guns, it would 
be reasonable to maintain . . . that the police should 
similarly have discretion to frisk based on bare-boned 
tips about narcotics.  As we clarified when we made 
indicia of reliability critical in Adams and White, 
the Fourth Amendment is not so easily satisfied. Cf. 
Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393-94 . . . 
(1997) (rejecting a per se exception to the "knock and 
announce" rule for narcotics cases partly because "the 
reasons for creating an exception in one category [of 
Fourth Amendment cases] can, relatively easily, be 
applied to others," thus allowing the exception to 
swallow the rule). 
 
No. 96-1821 
 
30
B 
¶48 We next determine whether the protective search of the 
Chevy Blazer that followed the stop was justified.  The Supreme 
Court noted in Florida v. J.L. that its holding "in no way 
diminishes a police officer's prerogative, in accord with Terry, 
to conduct a protective search of a person who has already been 
legitimately stopped."  120 S. Ct. at 1380.  The circuit court 
found that the officers feared for their physical safety based 
upon the circumstances at hand, and so testified credibly.  
These findings are supported by the record and thus, are not 
clearly erroneous.  Accordingly, we view those facts de novo to 
determine whether there was reasonable suspicion for the 
protective search.  Martwick, 2000 WI 5 at ¶19.   
¶49 Wisconsin 
has 
codified 
the 
Terry 
standard 
for 
protective searches in Wis. Stat. § 968.25, and, as with the 
Terry stop standard, we follow those cases interpreting Terry.  
Section 968.25 provides in pertinent part: 
 
When a law enforcement officer has stopped a person 
for temporary questioning pursuant to s. 968.24 and 
reasonably suspects that he or she or another is in 
danger of physical injury, the law enforcement officer 
may search such person for weapons or any instrument 
or article or substance readily capable of causing 
                                                                  
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S. Ct. 1375, 1379-80 (2000). 
Accordingly, we no longer rely upon United States v. Clipper, 
297 U.S. App. D.C. 372, 973 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. 
denied, 506 U.S. 1070 (1993), and other similar cases which 
suggested a per se rule, and note, as the Supreme Court did, 
that these cases directly conflict with the Florida Supreme 
Court's decision that the United States Supreme Court affirmed 
in Florida v. J.L..  120 S. Ct. at 1378. 
No. 96-1821 
 
31
physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried 
in public places by law abiding persons. 
¶50 In State v. Moretto, 144 Wis. 2d 171, 174, 423 N.W.2d 
841 (1988), we held that Wis. Stat. § 968.25 "permits an officer 
to search the passenger compartment of a vehicle for weapons 
where the individual who recently occupied the vehicle is 
stopped for temporary questioning under sec. 968.24, and the 
officer 'reasonably suspects that he or another is in danger of 
physical injury.'"  Such a search is justified as a preventive 
measure to ensure that there are no weapons that could be used 
against the police officers once those detained are allowed to 
reenter their vehicle.  Id. at 187.  
¶51 Here, 
the 
officers 
approached 
the 
vehicle, 
and 
observed that Williams had his arm extended and his right hand 
behind the passenger car seat.  It was broad daylight, the 
officers arrived in a marked squad car, in full uniform.  In 
addition, as Officer Norred testified, "drug dealers have been 
known to carry guns."  Both officers testified that they feared 
for their safety.  After finding no weapon on Williams, Officer 
Norred suspected that Williams had dropped or hid a weapon while 
his hand was concealed.  Consequently, he searched the passenger 
compartment, having noted that Williams had long arms.   
¶52 The concern that Williams may have dropped or hid a 
weapon is significant because the officers intended to release 
Williams and the passenger to return to the Blazer after the 
investigatory detention.  The two vehicles were apparently nose 
to nose in an alley, or alley-like driveway.  Had Williams and 
No. 96-1821 
 
32
his companion been released to return to the Chevy Blazer, the 
officers would have been in the vulnerable position of having to 
back out of the alley from whence they came.  Indeed, the entire 
situation 
rendered 
the 
officers 
particularly 
vulnerable.  
Because 
"a 
Terry 
investigation . . . involves 
a 
police 
investigation 'at close range,' . . . when the officer remains 
particularly vulnerable in part because a full custodial arrest 
has not been effected, and the officer must make a 'quick 
decision as to how to protect himself and others from possible 
danger . . . .'"  Moretto, 144 Wis. 2d at 180 (quoting Michigan 
v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1050-1052 (1983). 
 
¶53 Contrary to Williams' contention, the scope of the 
Terry search here was "'strictly tied to and justified by' the 
circumstances 
which 
rendered 
its 
initiation 
permissible."  
Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 
310 
(1967) 
(Fortas, 
J., 
concurring)). 
 
The 
justifying 
circumstances here are not, as Williams argues and the dissent 
suggests, 
drug 
dealing 
per 
se. 
 
Instead, 
the 
pertinent 
circumstance is that the officers intended to release Williams 
and the passenger to reenter the vehicle.  Consequently, in 
order to protect themselvesespecially in light of the fact that 
Williams' hand had been extended behind the passenger seat when 
they arrivedthere was a search of the passenger compartment. 
 
¶54 These same circumstances rebut Williams' contention 
that, by finding there was reasonable suspicion here, we will 
create a categorical exception to the warrant requirement based 
upon a connection between drugs and weapons.  Williams relies 
No. 96-1821 
 
33
upon the Supreme Court's statement in Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 
U.S. 385, 393 (1997), that "while drug investigation frequently 
does pose special risks to officer safety . . . not every drug 
investigation will pose these risks to a substantial degree."  
However, that the officers were responding to a drug complaint 
is not the only reason to justify the protective search here.  
The more compelling reason is that Williams' hand was concealed 
from 
view 
when 
the 
officers 
approached. 
 
This 
alone 
distinguishes this case from Richards.24  
 
¶55 In view of the particularly vulnerable situation 
facing the officers here, we conclude that the officers acted 
reasonably.  The officers reasonably suspected that they were in 
danger of physical injury and the circumstances warranted their 
search of the vehicle.  Accordingly, the State has met its 
burden of showing that the protective search was justified.  
III 
¶56 We hold that the officers had the requisite reasonable 
suspicion to detain Williams in consideration of the totality of 
the circumstances.  Those circumstances include the anonymous 
tip, viewed in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision, 
Florida 
v. 
J.L., 
and 
the 
police 
officers' 
additional 
observations of Williams' hand extended behind the passenger 
seat upon the officers arrival, and the absence of license 
plates on the suspects' vehicle.  
                     
24 We have appropriately applied Richards where appropriate. 
 See State v. Meyer, 216 Wis. 2d 729, 576 N.W.2d 260 (1998).    
No. 96-1821 
 
34
¶57 We further hold that the subsequent protective search 
was valid.  The officers were reasonable in fearing for their 
safety and executed a limited search of the vehicle to quell 
that fear.  We therefore reverse the court of appeals and uphold 
the judgment of conviction.  
 
¶By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 96-1821.dp 
 
1 
¶58 DAVID T. PROSSER, J. (concurring).  We are asked in 
this 
case 
to 
determine 
whether 
two 
police 
officers 
had 
reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop of the 
defendant and his companion as they sat in the front seat of a 
blue and burgundy-colored automobile parked behind an apartment 
building at 4261 North Teutonia Avenue in Milwaukee.  We know 
that the officers did not arrive at this site by happenstance.  
They were responding to an informant's tip that "they're selling 
drugs" out of a blue and burgundy vehicle behind her apartment. 
 Thus, the issue presented is "whether the tip, as corroborated 
by independent police work, exhibited sufficient indicia of 
reliability 
to 
provide 
reasonable 
suspicion 
to 
make 
the 
investigatory stop."  Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 326-27 
(1990).  I join the mandate of the court but write separately 
because I do not believe this case should be analyzed as an 
anonymous informant case. 
¶59 Several cases discussed in 
the majority opinion 
involve police informants who were totally anonymous.  In White, 
the Montgomery Police Department "received a telephone call from 
an anonymous person."  Id. at 327.  The date was April 22, 1987. 
 Id.  In State v. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 133, 456 N.W.2d 
830 (1990), the La Crosse Police Department received an 
anonymous telephone call from a public telephone booth.  The 
date was November 4, 1988.  In Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 
268 (2000), the Miami-Dade Police received a tip from an 
"anonymous caller" who made a call from an unknown location.  
The date was October 13, 1995.  Id. 
No. 96-1821.dp 
 
2 
¶60 Police officials knew nothing about the identity of 
the three informants in these cases.  Hence, the reliability of 
the tips they received depended upon the richness of the detail 
provided by the informants, the bases of their information, and 
the corroboration of at least some of the detail through police 
investigation. 
¶61 The Supreme Court explained in White why anonymous 
tips must be treated with great caution: 
 
The opinion in [Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 
(1983)] recognized that an anonymous tip alone seldom 
demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or 
veracity inasmuch as ordinary citizens generally do 
not provide extensive recitations of the basis of 
their 
everyday 
observations 
and 
given 
that 
the 
veracity of persons supplying anonymous tips is "by 
hypothesis largely unknown, and unknowable."  This is 
not to say that an anonymous caller could never 
provide the reasonable suspicion necessary for a Terry 
stop. 
White, 496 U.S. at 329 (citation omitted).  The Court then 
concluded that when an anonymous tip provides virtually nothing 
to show that the tipster is honest or that the tipster's 
information is reliable (including the basis of the tipster's 
information), "something more" is required before reasonable 
suspicion is established.  Id. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 227). 
¶62 The Court was satisfied in White that the tip and its 
partial corroboration established reasonable suspicion.  Id. at 
332.  The anonymous caller spelled out in some detail that 
Vanessa White would follow a particular course of conduct at a 
specific time as she headed toward a particular destination 
carrying cocaine.  Several of these predictions were thereafter 
No. 96-1821.dp 
 
3 
confirmed through surveillance.  The Court was impressed not 
only with the tip's "range of details" relating to easily 
obtained facts but also the prediction of future activities "not 
easily predicted."  Id.  "What was important," the Court said, 
"was the caller's ability to predict respondent's future 
behavior, because it demonstrated inside informationa special 
familiarity with respondent's affairs."  Id. 
 
¶63 When the Supreme Court took up Florida v. J.L., it was 
confronted 
with 
a 
fact 
situation 
involving 
an 
anonymous 
informant but no predicted future activities.  Hence, the 
question was "whether an anonymous tip that a person is carrying 
a gun is, without more, sufficient to justify a police officer's 
stop and frisk of that person."  Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. at 
268.  The Court held that it was not.  Id.  The Court determined 
that the additional information required in these circumstances 
was information "reliable in its assertion of illegality, not 
just in its tendency to identify a determinate person."  Id. at 
272.  The Court cited Professor LaFave, stressing "reliability 
as to the likelihood of criminal activity, which is central in 
anonymous-tip cases."  Id. at 272 (citing 4 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 9.4(h), at 213 (3d ed. 1996)). 
911 caller 
 
¶64 Two years ago, I argued that this case is not governed 
by the analysis above because it is not an anonymous informant 
case.  State v. Williams, 225 Wis. 2d 159, 189-93, 591 N.W.2d 
823 (1999) (Prosser, J., concurring), vacated by Williams v. 
No. 96-1821.dp 
 
4 
Wisconsin, 529 U.S. 1050 (2000).  It is not an anonymous 
informant case because the informant made a 911 call in an 
"enhanced" 911 system.  Hence, "[t]he police knew the caller's 
identity or could easily have discovered it because of the 
information provided by 911."  Id. at 189.  Thus, this case is 
close to the Court's decision in Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 
(1972), in which the tip was not reliable in its assertion of 
illegality but the informant, the source of the tip, increased 
his reliability by putting himself at risk inasmuch as his 
identity was clearly known. 
 
¶65 My colleagues appear unwilling to draw upon the 
dramatic 
technological 
advances in 
modern 
law 
enforcement 
because those advances are not fully documented in the record.  
By contrast, I am willing to take judicial notice of facts that 
are beyond dispute, recognizing that the enhanced 911 system in 
effect in Milwaukee County in late 1995 was not in effect in all 
other areas at that time, or even now. 
 
¶66 In 
1978, 
the 
Wisconsin 
legislature 
approved 
legislation 
establishing 
a 
statewide 
emergency 
services 
telephone number, 911.  Ch. 392, Laws of 1977 (effective May 29, 
1978). 
 
The 
legislation 
defined 
"automatic 
location 
identification" 
as 
a 
"system 
which 
has 
the 
ability 
to 
automatically identify the address of the telephone being used 
by the caller and to provide a display at the central location 
of a sophisticated system."  § 3, ch. 392, Laws of 1977 
(creating Wis. Stat. § 146.70(1)(a)).  The legislation defined 
"sophisticated system" as "a basic system with automatic 
No. 96-1821.dp 
 
5 
location identification and automatic number identification."  
§ 3, ch. 392, Laws of 1977 (creating Wis. Stat. § 146.70(1)(i)). 
¶67 According to a 1997 audit by the Legislative Audit 
Bureau, "[a]s of May 1997, an estimated 94 percent of the 
State's population was receiving 9-1-1 service from one of 121 
answering points being operated in the 57 counties that provide 
9-1-1 service." State of Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau, A 
Best Practices Review: 9-1-1 Services 3 (July 1997).  The audit 
indicated that 105 of the 121 answering points operated an 
"enhanced 9-1-1 system," which automatically identifies and 
displays the caller's telephone number and location.  Id. at 4. 
 The "sophisticated system" defined in the statutes and the 
enhanced system referred to in the audit are the same thing. 
¶68 The 1997 audit states that Milwaukee County has had an 
enhanced 
system since 
1989. 
 
Id., 
Appendix 
III, 
at 2.  
Establishment of an enhanced system was preceded by a county-
wide referendum on 911 services in November 1986.  "By nearly 8 
to 1, voters said in a referendum that they wanted [Milwaukee] 
County to establish a 911 system, which automatically records a 
caller's telephone number and address at a central dispatch 
location, even if the caller cannot speak."  911 System Wins Big 
in County Referendum, Milwaukee Journal, Nov. 5, 1986, at 3B. 
¶69 Today, 
an 
enhanced 
system 
normally 
provides 
authorities with (1) the telephone number of the telephone from 
which an incoming call is made, (2) the address of the residence 
or place of business where an incoming call is made, and (3) the 
name of the person or place of business to whom the telephone in 
No. 96-1821.dp 
 
6 
question is registered.  The third feature is equivalent to 
"Caller ID with Name."  Because Milwaukee County had an enhanced 
911 system beginning in 1989, it unquestionably was recording 
the phone number and address of incoming calls in late 1995.25  
Whether the system also included a "Caller ID with Name" feature 
in 1995 has not been documented, but the 1995 Milwaukee 
telephone directory offered "Caller ID with Name" to residential 
customers, Ameritech Milwaukee Telephone Directory 1995-96 (Nov. 
1995), at 6, and the 1995 Annual Report of the Milwaukee County 
Sheriff states that in 1995 "[p]rovisions were made to modernize 
communications to include . . . state-of-the-art communications 
equipment, new and improved radio consoles, and upgraded 
communications support equipment."  1995 Annual Report of the 
Milwaukee County Sheriff, at 39. 
¶70 My reading of the evidence is that when the police 
dispatcher received the 911 call in this case, he or she knew at 
a minimum the address and telephone number of the caller.  
Moreover, the call was recorded.  This means that the police had 
on tape the voice of the person making a 911 telephone call from 
a specific address at a specific time.  This caller cannot be 
                     
25 At the time of this incident, cellular phone calls did 
not provide this information.  When such calls were received, 
the dispatcher would have to ask the caller for identification 
if such information were not offered.  State of Wisconsin 
Legislative Audit Bureau, A Best Practices Review: 9-1-1 
Services 7 (July 1997).  The dispatcher in this case did not ask 
for any form of identification or location.  The caller did not 
volunteer her home address until well into the conversation.  
No. 96-1821.dp 
 
7 
described as an anonymous informant in the same sense as the 
callers in White, Richardson, and J.L. 
¶71 The transcript of the call reveals that the dispatcher 
never asked the caller's name, address, or telephone number, 
implying 
that 
the 
dispatcher 
already 
knew 
most 
of 
this 
information.  Drawing this inference is reasonable because the 
dispatcher 
replied 
"Um 
hmm" 
when 
the 
caller 
voluntarily 
disclosed that "I stay at 4261 North Teutonia." 
¶72 As the majority opinion skillfully observes in ¶34, 
the caller used the terms "my house," "my apartment building," 
and "our apartment" in addition to the statement "I stay at 4261 
North Teutonia."  Had the incoming call been made from an 
address different from 4261 North Teutonia, the dispatcher would 
likely have asked the caller for an explanation. 
¶73 The dispatcher did ask whether the caller had a 
description of the van, and the caller replied: "Um, hold on, I 
can get for you."  Thereafter, the caller returned to the phone 
and gave a more detailed description of the vehicle.  The color 
of the vehicle, the location of the vehicle, and the fact that 
more than one person was in the vehicle were either described or 
alluded 
to 
by 
the 
caller 
and 
later 
confirmed 
by 
the 
investigating 
officers. 
 
The 
caller 
reported 
as 
a 
contemporaneous eyewitness and answered all questions asked by 
the dispatcher. 
¶74 The recorded call and its subsequent transcript show 
both the caller's basis of information and the caller's 
reliability.  The fact that the police agency either knew the 
No. 96-1821.dp 
 
8 
identity of the caller or had the means to discover the caller's 
identity enhances the caller's credibility.  The police were in 
a position to go back to their source.  If the information 
provided had turned out to be untrue, the police would have been 
able 
to 
follow 
up 
and 
confront 
the 
caller, 
demand 
an 
explanation, and pursue criminal charges. 
¶75 It is a violation of Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1) to 
"obstruct[]" a police officer by "knowingly giving false 
information to the officer . . . with intent to mislead the 
officer in the performance of his or her duty."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 946.41(2)(a).26  This is the type of statute applauded by the 
Supreme Court in Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. at 147 (citing 
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-168 and stating "the informant might have 
been subject to immediate arrest for making a false complaint 
had [the officer's] investigation proved the tip incorrect"). 
                     
26 State v. Griffith, 2000 WI 72, ¶65, 236 Wis. 2d 48, 613 
N.W.2d 
72 
("[I]f 
a 
passenger 
chooses 
to 
answer 
[police 
questioning] but gives the officer false information, the 
passenger can be charged with obstructing an officer in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1)."); Peters v. State, 70 Wis. 
2d 22, 29, 233 N.W.2d 420 (1975) ("[T]he statute permits 
conviction for obstruction of an officer under circumstances 
where efforts to intentionally mislead an officer may be 
involved . . . ."); State v. Caldwell, 154 Wis. 2d 683, 688, 454 
N.W.2d 13 (Ct. App. 1990) (Section 946.41(2) "embodies a 
legislative 
determination 
that 
'knowingly 
giving 
false 
information to the officer with intent to mislead him in the 
performance of his duty' constitutes an 'obstruction' as a 
matter of Wisconsin law."); see also WisJI Criminal 1766A 
(entitled "Obstructing an Officer: Giving False Information"); 
WisJI Criminal 1766 ("To obstruct an officer" is the first 
element of this offense, which "means that the conduct of the 
defendant prevents or makes more difficult the performance of 
the officer's duties"). 
No. 96-1821.dp 
 
9 
¶76 From the outset, officials understood the possibility 
that the 911 system could be used to make false reports.  The 
legislature created a monetary penalty for false reports in the 
initial legislation.  § 3, ch. 392, Laws of 1977.  The 
legislature added criminal penalties in 1987.  1987 Wis. Act 27, 
§ 1836gr.  In 1995, Wis. Stat. § 146.70(10)(a) (1995-96) read: 
 
Any person who intentionally dials the telephone 
number "911" to report an emergency, knowing that the 
fact situation which he or she reports does not exist, 
shall be fined not less than $50 nor more than $300 or 
imprisoned not more than 90 days or both for the first 
offense and shall be fined not more than $10,000 or 
imprisoned not more than 5 years or both for any other 
offense committed within 4 years after the first 
offense. 
A criminal penalty for false reporting in a 911 call existed for 
eight years before the 911 call in this case. 
 
¶77 The enhanced 911 system increased the likelihood of 
enforcing these penalties.  Leverett F. Baldwin, the former 
emergency government services director of Milwaukee County, now 
Milwaukee County Sheriff, said in 1988 that the new 911 system 
was expected to eliminate most prank calls because the caller's 
telephone number and address would be recorded and would be easy 
to track down.  Ralph D. Olive, Single Number May Call for Help, 
Milwaukee Journal, Jan. 18, 1988, at 3B. 
¶78 Florida has a criminal penalty for false 911 calls 
similar to that of Wisconsin.  In United States v. Gibson, 64 
F.3d 617, 625 (11th Cir. 1995), the court observed: "The state 
of Florida provides a significant deterrent against reporting 
false information to its law enforcement agencies and officers 
No. 96-1821.dp 
 
10
by making such acts punishable by law.  Fla. Stat. Ann. 
§ 365.171(16) (West 1995) (false '911' calls); Id. § 817.49 
(false reports of commission of crimes to law enforcement 
officers).  This deterrent increases the odds that an anonymous 
tip is legitimate."  (Emphasis added.)  Justice Anthony Kennedy 
cited the Florida statutes in his concurrence in Florida v. 
J.L., declaring: 
 
Instant caller identification is widely available to 
police, and, if anonymous tips are proving unreliable 
and distracting to police, squad cars can be sent 
within seconds to the location of the telephone used 
by the informant. Voice recording of telephone tips 
might, in appropriate cases, be used by police to 
locate the caller. It is unlawful to make false 
reports to the police . . . and the ability of the 
police to trace the identity of anonymous telephone 
informants may be a factor which lends reliability to 
what, 
years earlier, 
might have 
been 
considered 
unreliable anonymous tips. 
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 
¶79 Professor 
LaFave 
argues 
that 
this 
analysis 
is 
insufficient: 
 
[I]t seems that the Williams concurrence ends one step 
short; it stresses that the police were aware of these 
characteristics of their 911 system, but surely that 
in and of itself is unimportant, for if the Williams 
caller deserves to be viewed as not anonymous and thus 
more reliable than the White informant, then surely 
the question is the informer's perception that his or 
her identity could easily be determined by the police 
and that false information might lead to criminal 
prosecution.  And thus the ultimate question . . . is 
whether in the locale in question there exists such 
widespread public awareness of the characteristics of 
the 911 system and of criminal sanctions for false 
information that it is permissible for the police to 
presume 
that 
each 
911 
caller 
possesses 
such 
information. 
No. 96-1821.dp 
 
11
4 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.4(h), at 64 (Supp. 2001) 
(footnote omitted). 
 
¶80 This analysis deserves a response in the factual 
context of this case. 
¶81 First, a Milwaukee resident observed what she thought 
was criminal conduct in progress in an alley behind her 
apartment building.  She picked up the telephone to inform 
police, dialing the emergency number (911) provided in bold 
three and five-sixteenths inch type on the inside front cover of 
her telephone book.27  She reported her conclusions to a 
dispatcher.  She answered all the questions posed by the 
dispatcher and voluntarily offered her address.  Normally, we 
commend this sort of conscientious conduct on the part of a 
citizen. 
¶82 Second, the dispatcher believed the caller.  The 
dispatcher had the opportunity to hear the caller's voice.  The 
dispatcher asked questions and received direct, polite answers. 
 The dispatcher confirmed that the caller was calling from the 
address she said she was.  The dispatcher then radioed Squad 73R 
with the succinct message that "somebody's dealing drugs from a 
blue and burgundy Ford Bronco" in an alley at 4261 North 
Teutonia.  The public expects a dispatcher like Emergency 
Operator 62 to make an immediate good faith judgment in response 
to a 911 telephone call, whether the issue at hand is a health 
                     
27 Ameritech Milwaukee Telephone Directory 1995-96 (Nov. 
1995).  
No. 96-1821.dp 
 
12
emergency, a fire, or a crime in progress.  That is what this 
dispatcher did.  The dispatcher's performance was reasonable. 
¶83 Third, the two officers sent to North Teutonia did not 
know the source of the drug complaint.  They were not able to 
interrogate the caller.  They were required to rely upon the 
dispatcher, quickly follow up the complaint, and attempt to 
corroborate the information as best they could.  The officers 
proceeded to the site and confirmed that a blue and burgundy 
vehicle was parked in an alley behind 4261 North Teutonia.  They 
saw the vehicle "from quite a distance" but ran the risk of 
being seen themselves if they stopped to observe.  Consequently, 
they 
drove 
around 
the 
block 
and 
approached 
the 
vehicle 
cautiously 
for 
further 
investigation. 
 
This 
conduct 
was 
reasonable.  The officers did exactly what the public expected 
them to do. 
¶84 This case, then, raises important issues about the 
operation of the 911 system as well as issues about search and 
seizure.  Today, there is widespread public understanding of the 
911 system.  "In our modern society we are trained, almost from 
birth, that we should telephone 911 to summon help in the event 
of a medical emergency."  Jeffrey D. Hickman, Note, It's Time to 
Call 911 for Government Immunity, 43 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1067, 
1067 (1993).  "It is estimated that 99% of adult Americans 
living in an area serviced by a 911 system know to dial 911 in 
the event of an emergency; even children as young as three years 
old can be trained to dial 911."  Id. at n.2 (citing David 
No. 96-1821.dp 
 
13
Foster, 'Help Officer, My Soufflé is Falling . . .' Non-
Emergencies Clog 911 Lines, L.A. Times, Mar. 15, 1992, at A1). 
¶85 In Wisconsin the Department of Public Instruction has 
for years encouraged public schools to train children to use 911 
for 
emergency 
referrals, 
beginning 
in 
the 
first 
grade.  
Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Public 
Instruction, 
A 
Guide 
to 
Curriculum Planning in Health Education, Table 1 (Curriculum 
Progress Chart) (1985).  The Department recommends that young 
children go through the experience of dialing the emergency 
phone number.  Moreover, the Department suggests that students 
in fourth grade develop a list of telephone numbers for 
emergency contacts.  Id.  This kind of early training is not 
likely 
confined 
to 
Wisconsin, 
and, 
along 
with 
parental 
instruction, explains the remarkable stories of small children 
calling 911 to report fires, crimes, and health emergencies. 
¶86 The emergency number 911 has become ingrained in our 
popular culture.28  For example, it was featured in a nationally 
syndicated television program, Rescue 911, which aired weekly on 
the CBS television network in the early 1990s and once ranked 
                     
28 The rap music group "Public Enemy" scored a hit with a 
single entitled 911 Is a Joke on an album that reached the top 
ten Billboard album chart in 1990.  See Neil Drumming, Public 
Enemy, in 20th Century A . . . Z, at http://www.billboard-
online.com/atoz/p/publicenemy.asp (last visited Mar. 8, 2001).  
911 Is a Joke criticized officials for alleged slow response 
time to 911 calls.  See Public Enemy, 911 Is a Joke, on Fear of 
a Black Planet (Def Jam Records 1990) (lyrics available at 
http://www.public-enemy.com/lyrics/lyrics/911-is-a-joke.php) 
(last visited Mar. 8, 2001).  Unresponsive 911 systems have been 
sued.  See, e.g., Chicago Pays $825,000 To Estate of Woman Who 
Died After 911 Responded Late, 83 Jet 24 (April 12, 1993). 
No. 96-1821.dp 
 
14
twelfth in the Nielsen ratings.29  A special report in Ladies' 
Home Journal in 1995 asserted that Rescue 911 "has probably done 
more than anything else to raise our expectations of what would 
happen should we have to call the nationally recognized 
emergency number."  Paula Lyons, Before You Call 911: Is the 
Emergency Number the Lifesaver It Should Be?, 112 Ladies' Home 
J. 60 (May 1995).  "Every statethough not every region in each 
statehas systems (called enhanced 911) that automatically 
provide the dispatcher with the caller's phone number and 
address, through a device similar to caller I.D."  Id. at 66. 
¶87 Public knowledge of 911 emergency calls was reinforced 
in the murder trial of O.J. Simpson.  Simpson was charged with 
murdering his former wife Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald 
Goldman on June 12, 1994.  The case was the subject of 
unprecedented national exposure and television coverage until 
Simpson was found not guilty on October 3, 1995.  One of the key 
pieces of evidence in the case was the tape of a 1993 911 
telephone call from Nicole Brown Simpson to police reporting 
domestic abuse.  The tape was repeatedly discussed and played 
during the lengthy proceedings.30 
                     
29 See 
Nielsen 
Ratings 
1990-1995, 
at  
http://www.angelfire.com/ny2/televisioncity/9095.html 
 
(last 
visited Mar. 8, 2001). 
30 Marcia Clark & Teresa Carpenter, Without a Doubt 79 
(1997); Christopher A. Darden & Jess Walter, In Contempt 365 
(1996); Jeffrey Toobin, The Run of His Life 262 (1996). 
No. 96-1821.dp 
 
15
¶88 One 
of O.J. Simpson's attorneys, 
Gerald Uelmen, 
described the initial appearance of the tape in his book, 
Lessons From The Trial 21 (1996): 
 
On Wednesday, June 22, two days after Simpson's 
arraignment, the airwaves were filled with explosive 
excerpts from 911 emergency telephone calls made to 
police by Nicole Brown Simpson in both the 1989 
incident and an October 1993 incident in which Simpson 
broke down a door.  Every television news broadcast in 
America led off with audio recordings of the calls, 
with a rolling transcript and photos and video clips 
of Nicole Brown Simpson.  Her sobbing voice was heard 
saying, "he's back," "I think you know his record," 
and "he's crazy."  The 911 tapes had the desired 
effect.  Before they were aired, public opinion polls 
were reporting that more than 60 percent of the 
American 
population 
thought 
Simpson 
was 
probably 
innocent.  After the 911 tapes, the polls showed that 
60 percent thought that he was probably guilty.  The 
only problem, of course, was that the admissibility of 
the tapes as evidence was yet to be determined, and 
the only potential jurors who hadn't heard the tapes 
at least a half dozen times were those who lived in 
caves or trees. 
¶89 The 911 call in this case occurred less than one month 
after the conclusion of the O.J. Simpson trial.  One would be 
hard pressed to argue that by November 1995 the overwhelming 
majority of the American people did not understand that a 911 
call is recorded and that it usually provides information about 
the source of the call.  In any event, the caller here 
voluntarily gave her address.  It would also be hard to argue 
that Wisconsin citizens do not understand that they are not free 
to 
initiate 
false 
statements 
to 
911 
dispatchers 
without 
suffering 
adverse 
consequences. 
 
The 
911 
system 
enjoys 
substantial public support.  It is a system that citizens expect 
No. 96-1821.dp 
 
16
to depend upon in their own emergencies.  It is not a system 
that a thinking person would seek to undermine.  Milwaukee 
police were entitled to presume in 1995 that 911 callers knew 
how the 911 system worked and that they could not make false 
calls to 911 without risking prosecution. 
¶90 The question of whether this investigatory stop was 
supported by reasonable suspicion is not an overly technical 
exercise.  Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d at 140.  Rather, it is a 
question about "common sense," id. at 139 (citation omitted), 
"along with reasonable inferences and deductions which a 
reasonable officer could glean" from "the cumulative detail" of 
this situation.  Id. at 142.  Leaning firmly on a 911 tip, with 
all its attendant ability to identify callers, was entirely 
reasonable and within common sense in the "cumulative detail" of 
this case. 
absence of license plates 
 
¶91 When they arrived at the scene and spotted the 
vehicle, Officers Johnny Norred and Phillip Henschel drove past 
the apartment building and then turned west on Roosevelt Drive. 
 Eventually, they entered the alley at the point where they 
thought their squad car would be concealed.  They drove through 
the alley, coming up to the front of a Chevy Blazer.  There was 
no front license plate on the vehicle. 
No. 96-1821.dp 
 
17
 
¶92 Like 29 other states and the District of Columbia, 
Wisconsin requires two license plates on a motor vehicle.31  For 
more than 20 years, there have been efforts in the Wisconsin 
legislature to move from two license plates to one license 
plate.  According to the Legislative Fiscal Bureau, "the major 
objection to the single license plate proposal has been 
expressed by law enforcement officials.  They contend that the 
front license plate has value because it allows identification 
of oncoming and parked vehicles."32 
¶93 In this case, there were no plates on the automobile. 
 Under the circumstances, the primary concern of the officers 
would have been identifying the vehicle, not ticketing the 
driver for a motor vehicle violation.  From the point of view of 
the officers, the suspected drug vehicle had been stripped of 
the standard means of identifying it.  The absence of license 
plates added to the evidence which permitted the officers 
reasonably to conclude in light of their training and experience 
that criminal activity might be afoot.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 30 (1968). 
¶94 Police routinely view missing plates as unusual enough 
to warrant attention.  See United States v. Sowers, 136 F.3d 24 
                     
31 See Wis. Stat. §§ 341.12(1) and 341.15(1).  See also 
American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, The Fast 
Track to Vehicle Services Facts, A Motor Vehicle Regulations and 
Procedures Information Guide 83 (1999). 
32 Cheryl McIlquham, State of Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal 
Bureau, Issue Paper #864, 1997-99 Budget, Single License Plate 2 
(May 22, 1997).  
No. 96-1821.dp 
 
18
(1st Cir. 1998) (missing front plate and troubled exhaust system 
led officer to stop car found to contain cocaine); United States 
v. Murray, 89 F.3d 459 (7th Cir. 1996) (missing rear license 
plate led police to stop driver found to have crack cocaine and 
handgun within car); United States v. Mitchell, 82 F.3d 146 (7th 
Cir. 1996) (missing front plate led officer to investigate 
driver found to have a loaded semi-automatic pistol inside 
vehicle within easy reach); United States v. Faulkner, 488 F.2d 
328 (5th Cir. 1974) (sufficient nexus found between stop for 
missing front plate and police discovery of counterfeit bills in 
vehicle); United States v. Scott, 878 F. Supp. 968 (E.D. Texas 
1995) (stop based on lack of visible license plate reasonable); 
United States v. $64,765,000 in United States Currency, 786 F. 
Supp. 906 (D. Ore. 1991) (missing plate on parked vehicle 
constituted reasonable suspicion for Terry stop); People v. 
Ryan, 672 N.E.2d 47 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (missing front plate 
prompted stop in which driver was found to be transporting 
marijuana); People v. Williams, 640 N.E.2d 981 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1994) (missing front plate led to legal stop); People v. 
Ramirez, 618 N.E.2d 638 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (search following 
stop based on missing license plates led to arrest and weapons 
search). 
¶95 The leading case in Wisconsin is State v. Griffin, 183 
Wis. 2d 327, 329, 515 N.W.2d 535 (Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 
520 N.W.2d 88 (Wis. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 950 (1994), in 
which the court of appeals held that the absence of license 
plates, and reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that 
No. 96-1821.dp 
 
19
fact, provide reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify an 
investigatory stop of a motor vehicle.  In addition, in State v. 
Mata, 230 Wis. 2d 567, 576, 602 N.W.2d 158 (Ct. App. 1999), the 
court of appeals ruled a weapons search following a stop of a 
car with no license plates was properly based upon probable 
cause.  The court there did not find the need to address the 
validity of an investigatory stop for lack of license plates, 
nor apparently did the defendant.  Id. at 568-76.  Earlier this 
term, this court considered a case in which a van was stopped 
because the "van had no front license plate."  State v. Matejka, 
2001 WI 5, ¶3, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 621 N.W.2d 891.  The validity of 
the stop in that case was not questioned by this court or the 
defendant, Matejka.  See id. at ¶36 (addressing only defendant's 
argument about consent to search, not the validity of the stop). 
 Apparently, the notion that a missing license plate permits an 
investigatory stop of a motor vehicle has become so well 
established that defendants and courts accept it.  
 
¶96 In this case, the police investigated a tip that 
people were selling drugs out of a vehicle parked in an alley 
behind 4261 North Teutonia Avenue.  They cautiously approached 
the vehicle.  The absence of license plates on that vehicle, 
obstructing all possibility of running a license check on the 
vehicle 
without 
first 
dealing 
with 
its 
occupants, 
added 
significantly to the reasonable suspicion for an investigatory 
stop. 
 
¶97 Reasonable suspicion is a smaller quantum of evidence 
than probable cause.  Reasonable suspicion is all that is 
No. 96-1821.dp 
 
20
required for an investigatory stop because the temporary seizure 
of a person in an investigatory stop is less than the complete 
and lasting seizure of a person in an arrest. 
¶98 In my view, under the totality of the circumstances, 
the two officers here had reasonable suspicion to make an 
investigatory stop of Roosevelt Williams.  They were acting on a 
tip from a known or readily identifiable informant who had put 
herself at risk of prosecution for any false statements to 
police.  The informant said she was observing a crime in 
progress.  The informant's assertions were partially confirmed 
by the dispatcher and partially corroborated by officers when 
they arrived at the scene four minutes later.  The officers then 
found a vehicle without a front license plate, with two 
occupants, one of whom created fear for the officers because of 
the position of his arm.  I agree with a great deal of the 
majority's opinion but find it more accurate and compelling to 
analyze this case as one that does not involve an anonymous 
informant.  Accordingly, I concur in the mandate. 
 
 
No.96-1821.wb 
 
1 
 
¶99 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J. (dissenting).  "There is no 
there there."   Gertrude Stein, commenting on the city of 
Oakland.33 
¶100 Two years ago, a majority of this court upheld the 
same stop and frisk at issue here.  State v. Williams, 225 
Wis. 2d 159, 591 N.W.2d 823 (1999) (Bablitch, J. dissenting) 
(hereinafter Williams I).  Williams appealed to the United 
States Supreme Court, and the Court sent this case back for 
reconsideration in light of its decision in Florida v. J.L., 529 
U.S. 266 (2000). 
¶101 In a yeoman-like effort to once again uphold this stop 
and frisk, the majority finds reasonable suspicion from three 
factors: (1) an anonymous tip placed over a 9-1-1 line; (2) an 
observation by the police that 57-year-old Williams, sitting in 
a parked Chevy Blazer with a female passenger, had his hand 
behind the Blazer's passenger seat; and (3) an observation by 
the police that the vehicle had no license plates.  I disagree. 
 When closely examined, these facts do not add up to a 
constitutionally permissible basis for conducting either an 
investigatory stop or a limited search for weapons.  As with 
Gertrude Stein's memorable quip, so too with the majority's 
factors: there is no there there.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent.  
                     
33 John Bartlett, Bartlett's Familiar Quotations 627 (Justin 
Kaplan, ed., 16th ed. 1992). 
No.96-1821.wb 
 
2 
I 
¶102 Turning first to the anonymous tip, I conclude that it 
has none of the indicia of reliability that may provide a basis 
for an investigatory stop that is compatible with the Fourth 
Amendment.  An informant's veracity, reliability and basis of 
knowledge are relevant factors to be considered in determining 
the value of the tipster's report for the purposes of applying 
the reasonable suspicion standard.  Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 
325, 328-29 (1990).  Importantly, in J.L. the Supreme Court 
emphasized that reasonable suspicion requires that the tip be 
"reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its 
tendency to identify a determinate person."  J.L., 529 U.S. at 
272.  Analyzing the tip in this case with these factors in mind, 
the only reasonable conclusion to draw is that this tip is 
indistinguishable from the unknown, unaccountable informant in 
J.L. 
¶103 Here, the majority asserts that the anonymous caller's 
basis of knowledge adds reliability to the tip.  What is the 
caller's basis of knowledge in this case?  
¶104 The majority repeatedly asserts that this tipster is 
an eyewitness to criminal activity.  The majority asserts that 
"the anonymous tipster explains exactly how she knows about the 
criminal activity she is reporting: she is observing it."  
Majority op. at ¶33.  "Quite simply . . . the tipster here has 
made plain that she is an eyewitness."  Id.  
¶105 The majority's assertions are incorrect and are not 
borne out by the record of the call.  The anonymous caller 
No.96-1821.wb 
 
3 
described the car, but there is absolutely nothing else in the 
caller's statement to lead to the conclusion that she actually 
witnessed criminal activity.   Instead, the caller's statement 
provides only a conclusory assertion of illegal conduct.  For 
all we can tell from the record, her allegation of criminal 
wrongdoing is based upon nothing more than "'idle rumor or 
irresponsible conjecture.'"  United States v. Phillips, 727 F.2d 
392, 397 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting United States v. Bell, 457 
F.2d 1231, 1238 (5th Cir. 1972)).   
¶106 Professor LaFave's commentary is noteworthy: 
 
It makes no sense to require some "indicia of 
reliability" that the informer is personally reliable 
but nothing at all concerning the source of his 
information, considering that one possible source 
would be another person who was totally unreliable.  
It may be argued, of course, that most informers 
report personal observations, and thus such should be 
assumed to be the case when the lesser standard for a 
stop 
rather 
than 
the 
arrest 
standard 
is 
being 
considered.  But there is simply no established need 
to go to this extreme; as Justice White once observed, 
"if it may be so easily inferred * * * that the 
informant has himself observed the facts or has them 
from an actor in the event, no possible harm could 
come from requiring a statement to that effect." 
4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.4(h) 221 (3d ed. 1996) 
(quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) (White, 
J. concurring) (footnotes omitted)).   
¶107 The anonymous caller in this case is no more reliable 
than the anonymous caller in J.L., "who neither explained how he 
knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had 
inside information about J.L."  J.L., 529 U.S. at 271.  
No.96-1821.wb 
 
4 
¶108 The majority also concludes that the tipster was 
reliable because, unlike the unknown caller at an unknown 
location 
in 
J.L., 
this 
caller 
revealed 
self-identifying 
information by giving her address.  Majority op. at ¶34.  In 
this instance, that information revealed little because the 
address was for an apartment building.  The record does not tell 
us if 50 people or 500 lived at this address.  As a result, no 
greater veracity or reliability can be attributed to the caller 
in this case than to any other nameless, unknown informant.   
¶109 There is little support for the majority's contention 
that the caller's information is reliable because she put her 
anonymity at risk.  Majority op. at ¶35.  All of the evidence 
points to the conclusion that the caller thought she was placing 
an anonymous call.  She started the call by saying she did not 
want to get involved.  She did not provide her name, her 
telephone number, or her apartment number at 4261 North 
Teutonia.  Despite this absence of meaningful identifying 
information, the majority opinion attempts to bolster the tip's 
reliability by characterizing the caller as a citizen informant, 
and accordingly more reliable than an anonymous tipster.  
Majority op. at ¶36.  However, there is no basis in the record 
from which to conclude that the caller was what could be viewed 
as the classic citizen informant, an identified informant who 
either actually witnessed a crime or was the victim of a crime.  
¶110 This classic citizen informant case was presented in 
State v. Doyle, 96 Wis. 2d 272, 291 N.W.2d 545 (1980), overruled 
on other grounds by State v. Swanson, 164 Wis. 2d 437, 475 
No.96-1821.wb 
 
5 
N.W.2d 148 (1991).  In Doyle, two named informants – Mark and 
Leigh Livermore – contacted police and reported witnessing drug 
dealing.  Id. at 286.  This court characterized the Livermores 
as "two knowledgeable citizen eyewitnesses," and distinguished 
citizen informers from "'police contacts or informers who 
usually themselves are criminals.'"  Id. at 286-87 (quoting 
State v. Paszek, 50 Wis. 2d 619, 630, 184 N.W.2d 836 (1971)). 
¶111 The majority's reliance upon the citizen informant 
analysis in Doyle, and in State v. Boggess, 110 Wis. 2d 309, 
316, 328 N.W.2d 878 (Ct. App. 1982), must be approached 
cautiously.  Majority op. at ¶36.  Categorization of a tip as 
one from a "citizen" informant, as opposed to an "anonymous" 
informant, 
may 
be 
relevant 
to 
assessing 
an 
informant's 
reliability under the totality of the circumstances analysis.  
However, both Doyle and Boggess were decided before the Supreme 
Court abrogated Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).34  
Accordingly, it is questionable whether a tip labeled as one 
from a citizen informant should receive a "relaxed test of 
reliability," majority op. at ¶36, when the issue before the 
court is an assessment of reasonable suspicion under the 
totality of the circumstances. 
¶112 In a further attempt to distinguish the present case 
from J.L., the majority points out that in J.L. there was no 
audio recording of the anonymous call, while in the present case 
                     
34 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) was abrogated by 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).    
No.96-1821.wb 
 
6 
a recording was made of the call.  But the recording of the 9-1-
1 conversation does nothing to establish the reliability of the 
caller.  Majority op. at ¶37.  The recording merely supports the 
officers' 
testimony 
that 
the 
call 
actually 
occurred 
and 
eliminates any speculation that the anonymous tip was fabricated 
by the police. 
¶113  Again attempting to distinguish J.L., the majority 
relies upon the fact that the anonymous call was placed over the 
9-1-1 system.  It is argued that Milwaukee may have developed a 
"sophisticated 
emergency 
phone 
system" 
that 
contains 
an 
"automatic 
location 
identification 
and 
automatic 
number 
identification."  According to the majority, the caller exposed 
herself to risk of prosecution for making a false report because 
the 9-1-1 system may assist the police in tracing the anonymous 
caller.  This is total speculation.  The majority concedes, as 
it must, that there is nothing in the record to support the 
conclusion that Milwaukee actually had in place such a system at 
the time the call in this case occurred.  Majority op. at ¶38.  
Instead, it relies upon the fragile inference that because the 
operator said "um hmm" after the caller volunteered her address 
that the caller's address was in fact automatically identified 
in the 9-1-1 system.  Majority op. at n. 14.  This analysis 
illustrates the lengths the majority must stretch to find 
anything in the record that would support a contention that 
Milwaukee 
had 
an 
operating 
"sophisticated 
emergency 
phone 
system" at the time the events in this case took place; it is 
simply unpersuasive. 
No.96-1821.wb 
 
7 
¶114 In Williams I the argument was also made that a tip 
over the 9-1-1 system has a higher degree of reliability.  
Professor LaFave, commenting upon this court's decision in 
Williams I, pointed out that there is no reason to conclude that 
the caller was aware she had put her identity at risk.   
 
[I]t seems that the Williams concurrence ends one step 
short; it stresses that the police were aware of these 
characteristics of their 911 system, but surely that 
in and of itself is unimportant, for if the Williams 
caller deserves to be viewed as not anonymous and thus 
more reliable than the White informant, then surely 
the question is the informer's perception that his or 
her identity could easily be determined by the police 
and that false information might lead to criminal 
prosecution.  And thus the ultimate question, at best 
alluded to only indirectly in Williams, is whether in 
the locale in question there exists such widespread 
public awareness of the characteristics of the 911 
system and of criminal sanctions for false information 
that it is permissible for the police to presume that 
each 911 caller possesses such information. 
4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §9.4(h) (Supp. 2001) 
(footnotes omitted).   
¶115 In short, the majority's assertion that the caller is 
reliable because she put her identity at risk is incorrect 
because there is no reason to believe that she knowingly did so. 
 And on that point, it is more reasonable to assume that the 
caller was unaware that her identity would possibly be at risk, 
for she began the conversation by stating that she did not "want 
to get involved."  It is essential to keep in mind that our 
analysis here is whether or not the officers had reasonable 
suspicion to conduct a Terry stop, and not simply whether or not 
the police should investigate anonymous calls reporting ongoing 
No.96-1821.wb 
 
8 
criminal activity.  Because the caller did not knowingly or 
intentionally risk her anonymity, her assertion of criminal 
activity is less reliable and the officers were accordingly 
required to obtain more information to establish reasonable 
suspicion.   
¶116 Finally, 
the 
majority 
contends 
that 
the 
tip's 
assertion of criminal activity is reliable because the police 
corroborated the innocent details provided in the tip.  Majority 
op. at ¶40-41.  However, corroboration of innocent details 
relayed by an anonymous tipster only gives rise to an inference 
that the caller is telling the truth about the alleged criminal 
activity when the detail from the tip establishes that the 
informant had an adequate basis of knowledge.  State v. 
Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 142, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990).  For 
example, in White, the quintessential anonymous tip case, a 
tipster reported that Vanessa White would leave a specific 
apartment, at a particular time, in a particular vehicle, and 
would proceed to a specific location.  White, 496 U.S. at 327.  
The caller also alleged that she would be carrying cocaine.  Id. 
 A 
majority 
of 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
concluded 
that 
police 
corroboration of the tip information established that the tip 
was reliable and that the anonymous caller's ability to predict 
White's behavior established the caller's basis of knowledge.  
Id. at 332.  The Court concluded that "[b]ecause only a small 
number of people are generally privy to an individual's 
itinerary, it is reasonable for police to believe that a person 
with access to such information is likely to also have access to 
No.96-1821.wb 
 
9 
reliable information about that individuals illegal activities." 
 Id.  In J.L., the Court restated this principle:  "The 
reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be 
reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its 
tendency to identify a determinate person."  J.L., 529 U.S. at 
272. 
¶117 This court followed the reasoning of White, in 
Richardson, where an anonymous caller provided police with a 
highly detailed tip containing unique and specific facts.  
Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d at 142.  The corroboration of this 
cumulative detail, along with reasonable inferences, supplied 
reasonable suspicion to justify a stop. Id.  In other words, in 
Richardson, it was not the mere fact that the caller provided 
innocent details that were subsequently corroborated that made 
the tip reliable.  The tip was reliable because the details 
provided by the caller would be known by someone intimate with 
the suspect's affairs; therefore, because the tipster knew these 
intimate details he or she likely was correct in asserting 
criminal conduct. 
¶118 In contrast, the case at hand presents precisely the 
type of corroboration of the innocent aspects of a tip that the 
Supreme Court has indicated are not sufficient.  As J.L. has 
instructed, information about readily observable details alone 
does not make a tip reliable in its assertion of illegality.  
J.L., 529 U.S. at 272.  The only detail provided by the caller 
in this case is a description of a parked vehicle that she 
observed through her apartment window.  Corroboration of these 
No.96-1821.wb 
 
10
few facts does not bring reliability to the caller's allegation 
of criminal activity.  Thus, on the one hand the majority 
contends that the caller is reliable because it construes her 
report to be one in which the caller is observing criminal 
activity first hand. On the other hand, the majority asserts 
that the caller is reliable because police corroboration of 
innocent aspects of the tip lends credibility to the tip's 
assertion of criminal conduct, even though the tip reports only 
what could ostensibly be observed through a window and, 
therefore, neither establishes that the caller had any intimate 
knowledge of the suspect's affairs nor that that caller had any 
inside information concerning illegal conduct.  This tipster is 
apparently both an eyewitness and, pursuant to White and 
Richardson, in a confidential relationship with the suspect. 
¶119 In fact, however, the tip in this case does not 
satisfy the test set forth in J.L., for the caller neither 
explained how she knew about the alleged criminal activity nor 
did her tip supply any basis for believing that she had inside 
information.  J.L., 529 U.S. at 271.  As a result, this tip adds 
no weight to the reasonable suspicion calculation.  Despite the 
sound and fury, these facts signify nothing.   
II 
¶120 "[I]f 
a 
tip 
has 
a 
relatively 
low 
degree 
of 
reliability, more information will be required to establish the 
requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip 
were more reliable."  White, 496 U.S. at 330.  The tip here, in 
my opinion, is unreliable for the purposes of providing a basis 
No.96-1821.wb 
 
11
for reasonable suspicion to stop Williams.  In its analysis of 
the totality of the circumstances the majority relies upon two 
additional facts which, it argues, combine with the tip to 
create reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop.  The 
first of these is that the officers had reason to suspect that 
criminal activity was afoot because Williams' hand was extended 
behind the passenger seat.  The second was the officers' 
observation that the car had no license plates.  Neither of 
these facts, alone or together, sustains its conclusion. 
¶121 In finding the placement of Williams' arm behind the 
passenger seat a reason to be suspicious, the majority notes, as 
it must, that Williams did not make a furtive gesture.  
Accordingly, it is unreasonable to conclude that Williams may 
have been reaching for a weapon or concealing evidence as he saw 
the officers approach the vehicle.  Majority op. at ¶43.  The 
circuit court did not reach a definitive conclusion as to when 
Williams placed his hand behind the seat.  Officer Norred 
testified that when the officers pulled up to the Blazer, he 
"observed the driver's hand was behind the passenger seat."  
During cross-examination by 
defense 
counsel the 
following 
exchange occurred:  
 
Q:  [I]t would not be accurate to say that you observed him 
move his hand from – say from his lap to his right or 
reaching over behind the seat, it was already there, true? 
  
 
A:  As I recall, it was already back there; I mean, from 
the point that I first observed him.  
 
 . . .  
No.96-1821.wb 
 
12
 
When I first noticed him, he had his hand there already, 
and we were right up in front of him at this point.   
¶122 The position of Williams' arm is only an innocent 
detail 
that 
adds 
no 
weight 
to 
the 
reasonable 
suspicion 
calculation.  It is likely that in a significant percentage of 
cases, when an individual is sitting in a parked truck, perhaps 
elevated slightly higher that one would be in a car, his or her 
hand may not be in view.  Furthermore, contrary to the inference 
in the majority opinion, Williams was not "reaching" because he 
saw the officers.  Officer Norred testified that Williams' hand 
was already behind the seat when the officers arrived at the 
scene. 
¶123 Then there is the license plate issue.  The majority 
notes that the lack of license plates on the vehicle was not a 
fact specifically developed or relied upon by the circuit court. 
 Majority op. at ¶45.  The lack of license plates on a vehicle 
is indicative of nothing more than a lack of license plates.  It 
certainly 
provides 
no 
independent 
corroboration 
of 
the 
reliability of the tip, for the lack of license plates was not 
mentioned by the caller.  Neither the officers nor the circuit 
court relied on the lack of plates to justify the stop, and as a 
result, the issue was not explored at the suppression hearing.  
We should not rely on it either for it does not give rise to a 
reasonable suspicion of drug dealing; any argument that the 
officers were investigating a traffic violation is simply post 
hoc reasoning. 
No.96-1821.wb 
 
13
¶124 I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the 
officers had a basis for conducting an investigatory stop.  
However, even if the stop were proper based solely upon the 
vehicle's alleged lack of license plates, the subsequent frisk 
was not.   
 
[T]he 
search 
of 
a 
passenger 
compartment 
of 
an 
automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon 
may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police 
officer 
possesses 
a 
reasonable 
belief 
based 
on 
"specific and articulable facts which, taken together 
with 
the 
rational 
inferences 
from 
those 
facts, 
reasonably warrant" the officer in believing that the 
suspect 
is 
dangerous 
and 
the 
suspect 
may 
gain 
immediate control of weapons. 
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983) (quoting Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).  The majority justifies the frisk 
primarily on the basis of the position of Williams' arm and the 
close quarters in which the stop occurred.  As has already been 
discussed, these events took place during broad daylight.  
Williams did not make a furtive move or engage in any other 
evasive or suspicious actions.  There is no allegation that this 
was a high crime neighborhood.  The anonymous caller did not 
allege that the suspect had a gun.  Because the record is devoid 
of facts that would support a suspicion that Williams was 
dangerous or may have access to weapons, the majority's 
conclusion on this point seems to be that, when there is an 
allegation of drug dealing, officers may reasonably believe that 
the suspect is armed and dangerous.  This conclusion, however, 
is simply a reconstitution of the type of per se, blanket 
reasoning 
that 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
so 
thoroughly 
and 
No.96-1821.wb 
 
14
explicitly held to be impermissible.  See Richards v. Wisconsin, 
520 U.S. 385 (1997).  
¶125 In sum, the facts of this case relied upon by the 
majority 
do 
not 
satisfy 
even 
the 
minimal 
constitutional 
standards required for a lawful stop or frisk.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent. 
¶126 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent. 
 
No.96-1821.wb 
 
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