Title: Joye v. Hunterdon Central Bd. of Educ.

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HUNTERDON CENTRAL REGIONAL HIGH SCHOOL BOARD OF EDUCATION and ACTING SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS, JUDITH GRAY, in her official capacity, Defendants-Respondents. Argued February 19, 2003 Decided July 9, 2003 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 353 N.J. Super. 600 (2002). J.C. Salyer argued the cause for appellants (Mr. Salyer, Edward Barocas and Krovatin & Associates, attorneys; Mr. Salyer, Mr. Barocas and Ravinder S. Bhalla, on the briefs). Kevin P. Kovacs argued the cause for respondents (Purcell, Ries, Shannon, Mulcahy & O Neill, attorneys). Donna M. Kaye, Senior Associate Counsel, submitted a letter in lieu of brief on behalf of amicus curiae New Jersey School Boards Association (Cynthia J. Jahn, General Counsel, attorney). Michael O. Dermody submitted a brief on behalf of amici curiae Drug-Free Schools Coalition, Geraldine Silverman, Treasurer, New Jersey Federation for Drug-Free Communities, The Livingston Municipal Alliance, Dr. Eric Voth, Chairman, Institute for Global Drug Policy of the Drug-Free America Foundation, DeForest Rathbone, Chairman, National Institute of Citizen Anti-Drug Policy, Malcolm K. Beyer, Jr., Joyce Nalepka, Carolyn Burns, Mary Jo Green, Drug-Free Kids, America s Challenge, National Families in Action, Legal Foundation Against Illicit Drugs, Ginger and Larry Katz, Courage to Speak Foundation, Nancy Starr, Pennsylvania Delegate, Drug Watch International, Stephanie Haynes, Save our Society from Drugs, Kathleen A. Berry, Momstell Coalition, Philadelphia Chapter, Theresa Costello, Mother of Divine Grace Drug Awareness Program and Dawn Engel. The opinion of the Court was delivered by VERNIERO, J. We are called on to evaluate the constitutionality of a high school s random drug and alcohol testing program. The program applies to all students who participate in athletic and non-athletic extracurricular activities, or who possess school parking permits. Students who test positive for drug or alcohol use are suspended temporarily from those activities or must relinquish their parking permits. They also are required to receive counseling and to seek other treatment if necessary. They are not, however, prosecuted or otherwise exposed to criminal liability. The United States Supreme Court has upheld similar programs of other states, concluding that they do not offend the United States Constitution. We hold that the program before us does not violate the New Jersey Constitution. Specifically, the school s substance-abuse problem has been documented by survey results showing that a third of the students in the upper grades have used illegal drugs and that forty percent of students in the same grades have been intoxicated within the survey s prior twelve-month period. Those results are consistent with other data, including information regarding three deaths due to heroin overdoses in municipalities within the school district, and consistent with testimony of counselors and other school personnel. Against that record, we reject the suggestion of our dissenting colleagues that the New Jersey Constitution requires school officials to wait for the problem to worsen before addressing it in the manner sought here. In following the course charted by our federal counterpart, we do not signal a retreat from this Court s history of affording citizens enhanced protections under our State s constitution. The New Jersey Constitution remains a critical safeguard against unreasonable, unfair, and overbearing governmental action. The program before us, however, reflects no such conduct. Instead, it is consistent with existing law recognizing that students have a diminished expectation of privacy in a public-school context. Equally important, our law further provides that school officials are responsible for the children entrusted to their care. From that perspective, the program represents a rational attempt by those officials and by approving parents to address a documented problem of illegal drug and alcohol use affecting a sizable portion of the student population. The program is reasonable and, therefore, constitutional. Finally, we do not share the dissent s apparent view that every public high school automatically will satisfy the special-needs test that we more fully describe below. Although some of the test s factors, such as the students diminished expectation of privacy, are common to all schools, other factors, such as the scope of specific drug or alcohol use, might vary from school to school. We leave open the possibility that a future program will not pass constitutional muster either because the school s chosen method of specimen collection is overly intrusive in view of alternative methods, or because the underlying drug and alcohol use at the particular school simply is inadequate to justify it. The task force solicited public input by sending letters to parents and holding a public meeting in October 1998. It also obtained law enforcement data, including arrest reports and drug overdoses, from the municipalities that send students to Hunterdon Central. The task force member who gathered that data reported: [I]n the 1996-1997 school year the police statistics from the Township of Raritan, one of Hunterdon Central s sending districts[,] reported 103 arrests for drug-related offenses. Of these 103 arrests, 41 were juveniles. There were 15 juveniles arrested for alcohol related offenses and three deaths associated with heroin overdose. For the 1997-1998 school year, the police statistics for the Raritan sending district showed 91 arrests for drug related offenses. Of these 91 arrests, 33 were juvenile. The task force issued its final report in November 1998. Over Joan Greiner s lone objection, task force members voted to expand the school s random drug and alcohol testing program to include students who held parking permits or who engaged in non-athletic extracurricular activities. The Board reviewed the task force s report and continued to hold public meetings to address the subject. The Board also re-commissioned the RMBSI in 1999 to conduct a follow-up survey for the 1999-2000 school year. Although the survey revealed that illegal drug use had declined, the Board concluded that student use of alcohol, marijuana, cocaine, and other drugs still was at an unacceptable level. Brady described the Board s reaction: The School Board commissioned RMBSI to do a follow up survey in 1999-2000. According to [the 1999-2000] survey, drug use was thankfully down in most categories. We believe it was down due, in part, to the success of random drug testing among the substantial number of students who engage in athletics. While drug use was generally down, however, use of marijuana was up slightly among seniors, use of cocaine was still at 7% for juniors, and there was still an unacceptably significant use of drugs among students in general. Other school personnel spoke of their experiences with student drug and alcohol use, which appeared consistent with the survey results. A retired student assistance coordinator stated that during her thirteen-year tenure at Hunterdon Central she had observed a steady increase in the number of students using drugs and a major increase in the frequency and amount of drugs. Another coordinator, who also served as a task force member, reported that during her twenty-seven-year tenure at the school she had observed a measurable increase in student referrals to the SAP. The work load of [c]ounselors dealing with drug and alcohol problems increased at least 33% from the [1996-97] to [1999-2000] school year[s,] requiring a third [s]tudent [a]ssistance [c]ounselor position to be established and filled. During that same period, the SAP handled over 300 referrals per year. The coordinator also indicated that many of the referrals are athletes and students engaged in extracurricular activities. According to Brady, while the Board undertook its review, illegal drug and alcohol use continued to be a problem among the student body in general. The school maintained its suspicion-based program during that period. Under that program, the school tested thirty-one students during the 1998-99 school year, twenty-eight (or ninety percent) of whom tested positive. In the 1999-2000 school year, the school tested forty-six students, thirty-eight (or eighty-two percent) of whom tested positive. Brady also stated that [m]ost recently in the Spring of 2000, four students who ingested illegal drugs became sick at school[.] The Board ultimately accepted the task force s recommendation in December 1999. Fully implemented as of September 2000, the expanded policy authorizes the [school s] Administration to conduct random drug testing of all students engaged in extracurricular activities and all students authorized to park on school premises. It defines extracurricular activity as [a]ny non-credit activity in which a student participates. When the Board announced its decision it listed promotion of health and safety as one of its primary objectives. It also stated that the policy sought to deter drug use, thereby countering peer pressure which may encourage indulgence and to encourage students who use alcohol and drugs to participate in rehabilitative programs[.] The program requires both the student and his or her parent or guardian to execute a consent form. The form includes an acknowledgment that the student is eligible for testing throughout the designated time of participation in an athletic or non-athletic extracurricular activity or while the student holds a parking permit. By signing the form, the student also indicates: I understand fully that my performance as a participant and the reputation of my school are dependent, in part, on my conduct as an individual. I hereby agree to accept and abide by the standards, rules and regulations set forth by the [Board] and the sponsors for the activity in which I participate. I authorize the Hunterdon Central Regional High School District to conduct a test on a urine specimen and saliva specimen and/or breath specimen that I provide on site to test for alcohol and drug use if my name is drawn from the random pool. Pursuant to the Student Random Drug and Alcohol Policy, I also authorize the release of information concerning the results of such test to designated District personnel. As of the trial court s opinion (January 4, 2001), students and their parents or guardians had executed 866 consent forms. The trial court succinctly summarized the testing procedure used for students engaged in either athletic or non-athletic extracurricular activities: Specifically, each week the Athletic Director contacts a grade level Vice Principal and oversees the drawing from a box of ID numbers on the morning of testing. Parents are called to be informed that their child has been selected to be tested and they are given the right to attend if they so [choose]. The Athletic Director then contacts the appropriate grade level Vice Principal and the student s schedule is pulled to ascertain the least disruptive time for the testing. At that time, the student is contacted by the Vice Principal and informed that he or she has been selected for a random drug test. The Vice Principal then accompanies the student to the nearest Health Office where the student is interviewed by the nurse and is required to provide a urine sample. The sample is provided in a rest room with the door closed. The sample is tested for adulteration. If the test [for illegal substances] is positive, the parents are called if they are not already there. A second test based on the sample provided is then performed by . . . an outside testing laboratory. [The laboratory] conducts a gas chromatography mass spectrometry . . . test which lists the exact chemical nature of the drug. The results of that test are returned to the school within 24 hours. The second test is designed to ensure against false positives. The policy sets forth the consequences should a student test positive for drugs or alcohol. For a first infraction, the school suspends the student from participating in the sport or other extracurricular activity, and similarly suspends his or her parking privilege. Those suspensions remain in effect until the student completes a five-day preventative education program and submits a urinalysis indicating no alcohol or drug use. The school also requires the student to attend a minimum of five counseling sessions with a student assistance coordinator and to undergo further treatment if necessary. For a second infraction, the school suspends the student from the athletic or non-athletic activity and revokes his or her parking privilege for sixty days, starting from the date of the test that indicated the second violation. The school requires the student to attend a five-day education program, to attend a minimum of ten counseling sessions with a student assistance coordinator, and to resubmit a urinalysis free of alcohol or illegal drugs as of the conclusion of the suspension period. The school also reserves the right to conduct periodic, unannounced tests on any student found to have committed a second infraction. Hunterdon Central treats a student s test result as a confidential health record pursuant to regulations of the New Jersey Department of Education. Those regulations provide that [i]nformation obtained by the school s alcohol and other drug testing program which would identify the student as an alcohol or other drug user may be disclosed only for those purposes and under those conditions permitted by [federal regulations]. N.J.A.C. 6A:16-1.5(c)(2). Federal regulations, in turn, prohibit the release of such records except under highly limited circumstances (such as when a court directs their disclosure). 42 C.F.R. 2.1, 2.2. Federal regulations also provide that no record may be used to initiate or substantiate any criminal charges against a patient or to conduct any investigation of a patient. Id. at 2.1(c), 2.2(c). Accordingly, Hunterdon Central does not share individual test results with law enforcement authorities. Challenging the program s constitutionality on behalf of themselves and their respective children, three sets of parents (collectively, plaintiffs) filed this suit in August 2000. Their complaint seeks to overturn the school s entire random-based policy, including its athletic and non-athletic components. Defendants are the Board and the Superintendent of Schools. Joan Greiner, formerly the task force s vice chair, is one of the plaintiffs. She submitted a certification on behalf of herself and her husband contending that the Board s policy violated their daughter s right to privacy and interfer[ed] with our parental rights to raise our daughter as we think best and to teach her the personal responsibility she needs as a young adult. The complaint asserts a similar contention on behalf of the other two sets of plaintiffs. Greiner also expressed a concern that if subjected to the program, her daughter would have had to reveal medical information if she [had been] selected for random testing. More broadly, Greiner stated that there was no evidence of the existence of drug or alcohol problems specifically among students who participate in sports, extracurricular activities, or who have parking permits. John Brasell, Jr., the Board s president, submitted a certification defending the Board s decision. He described the development of the program s athletic and non-athletic components, outlining the chronology noted above. He also stated that, in his years as a Board member, he has observed that parents have a tendency to react openly when opposing a program or policy[.] He further noted that [i]n a school district representing approximately 2,500 students, 4,000 parents and over 15,000 households only 3 students and their parents are in opposition [to the program]. In Brasell s view, that fact speak[s] very loudly in favor of the Board s policy. The Board president also certified: I believe this Board has taken the steps to ensure that due diligence was applied and that our policy fairly balances the privacy rights of students and the obligation we have as public officials to protect students in the care of our school. I further believe we have taken the patient, well-thought out approach to implement a policy that we believe will assist our students in combating one of the leading killers of our youth today. This program has proven to be successful with our athletes and will continue to work to deter drug use if expanded to include our students with parking permits and those engaged in extracurricular activities. The trial court agreed with plaintiffs, invalidating the entire program. The court determined that the program violated the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures under Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, a provision analogous to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. With one member of the panel dissenting, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court s determination in a reported opinion written by Judge Stern. Joye v. Hunterdon Cent. Bd. of Educ., 353 N.J. Super. 600 (2002). Plaintiffs appealed to this Court as of right. R. 2:2-1(a)(2). We granted amicus curiae status to the New Jersey School Boards Association and to numerous anti-drug organizations (the organizational amici), all of which join defendants in defending the school s expanded policy. In evaluating the policy under a special-needs balancing test, the Court first considered the nature of the privacy interest at stake. The Court explained that [p]articularly with regard to medical examinations and procedures, . . . students within the school environment have a lesser expectation of privacy than members of the population generally. Id. at 657, 115 S. Ct. at 2392, 132 L. Ed 2d at 577 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 348, 105 S. Ct. 733, 746, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720, 739 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring)). It further observed that student athletes have an expectation of privacy even lower than that of other students. The Court stated that [b]y choosing to go out for the team, [student athletes] voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of regulation even higher than that imposed on students generally. Id. at 657, 115 S. Ct. at 2393, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 577. The Court next considered the nature of the intrusion engendered by the policy. In the Court s view, even though the collection of urine intrudes on an excretory function traditionally shielded by great privacy, . . . the degree of intrusion depends upon the manner in which production of the urine sample is monitored. Id. at 658, 115 S. Ct. at 2393, 132 L. Ed 2d at 577 (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass n, 489 U.S. 602, 626, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1418, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639, 666 (1989)). The Court noted that the school collected urine samples under conditions nearly identical to those typically encountered in public restrooms[.] Ibid. Under those circumstances, the Court concluded that the privacy interests compromised by the process were negligible. Ibid. The Court s privacy analysis also included the scope of the urinalysis itself. In that regard, the Court found it significant that the tests sought to reveal only drug use and not whether the student is, for example, epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic[.] Id. at 658, 115 S. Ct. at 239, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 578. Moreover, the Court emphasized that the school disclosed the test results only to a limited number of personnel on a need-to-know basis, and that it did not forward the results to law enforcement authorities for criminal prosecution. Ibid. The Court then examined the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue[,] id. at 660, 115 S. Ct. at 2394, 132 L. Ed 2d at 579, and expressed no doubt that deterring student drug use is important indeed, perhaps compelling. Id. at 661, 115 S. Ct. at 2395, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 579. The Court also viewed the policy as being narrowly tailored to detect drug use by school athletes, where the risk of immediate physical harm to the drug user or those with whom he is playing his sport is particularly high. Id. at 662, 115 S. Ct. at 2395, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 580. Along those same lines, the Court found that the particular drugs screened by the [drug testing policy] have been demonstrated to pose substantial physical risks to athletes. Ibid. Considering those three factors, the decreased expectation of privacy, the relative unobtrusiveness of the search, and the severity of the need met by the search, the Court held that the school district s policy was reasonable and hence constitutional. Id. at 664-65, 115 S. Ct. at 2396, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 582. Lastly, the Court cautioned that suspicionless drug testing might not pass constitutional muster in other contexts. Id. at 665, 115 S. Ct. at 2396, 132 L. Ed. 2d 582. It emphasized that [t]he most significant element in this case is the first we discussed: that the [drug policy] was undertaken in furtherance of the government s responsibilities, under a public school system, as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its care. Ibid. The Supreme Court extended Vernonia s holding in Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 122 S. Ct. 2559, 153 L. Ed. 2d 735 (2002). The drug policy at issue in that case applied to competitive extracurricular activities such as the Academic Team, Future Farmers of America, Future Homemakers of America, band, choir, pom-pom, cheerleading, and athletics. Id. at 826, 122 S. Ct. at 2562-63, 153 L. Ed 2d at ___. The policy required all students to submit to an initial drug test before beginning an extracurricular activity, to submit to random drug testing during the period of participation, and to agree to be tested at any time upon reasonable suspicion. Id. at 826, 122 S. Ct. at 2563, 153 L. Ed 2d at ___. In applying essentially the same balancing test articulated in Vernonia, the Earls Court first looked to the nature of the privacy interests allegedly compromised by the drug testing. Earls, supra, 536 U.S. at 830, 122 S. Ct. at 2565, 153 L. Ed 2d at ___. It reaffirmed that [a]s in Vernonia, the context of the public school environment serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy interest at stake and the reasonableness of the drug testing policy in general. Id. at 830, 122 S. Ct. at 2565, 153 L. Ed 2d at ___ (citation omitted). The Court noted that [i]n upholding the drug testing program in Vernonia, we considered the school context [c]entral and [t]he most significant element. Id. at 831 n.3, 122 S. Ct. at 2565 n.3, 153 L. Ed 2d at ___ n.3 (citation omitted). The Court next reiterated that the privacy interests of students are limited in a public school environment where the State is responsible for maintaining discipline, health, and safety. Id. at 830, 122 S. Ct. at 2565, 153 L. Ed. 2d at ___. It rejected the notion that because children participating in non-athletic extracurricular activities are not subject to regular physicals and communal undress, they have a stronger expectation of privacy than the athletes tested in Vernonia. Id. at 831, 122 S. Ct. at 2565, 153 L. Ed 2d at ___. Instead, the Court found that like athletes, students who engage in non-athletic extracurricular activities voluntarily subject themselves to many of the same intrusions on their privacy[.] Id. at 831, 122 S. Ct. at 2566, 153 L. Ed 2d at ___. Such intrusions involve occasional off-campus travel, communal undress, and special rules and requirements for participating students that do not apply to the student body as a whole. Id. at 832, 122 S. Ct. at 2566, 153 L. Ed 2d at ___. As it did in Vernonia, the Court in Earls concluded that the process of collecting urine was minimally intrusive[.] Id. at 834, 122 S. Ct. at 2567, 153 L. Ed 2d at ___. The Court observed that the students test results were kept confidential and were not forwarded to law enforcement authorities. Id. at 833, 122 S. Ct. at 2566, 153 L. Ed 2d at ___. It further noted that positive test results did not lead to the imposition of discipline or have any academic consequences, except to limit the student s privilege of participating in extracurricular activities. Id. at 833, 122 S. Ct. at 2566-67, 153 L. Ed 2d at ___. Concerning the immediacy and nature of the government s interests, the Court considered the nationwide drug epidemic, id. at 834, 122 S. Ct. at 2567, 153 L. Ed 2d at ___, as well as the need to prevent and deter the substantial harm of childhood drug use[.] Id. at 836, 122 S. Ct. at 2568, 153 L. Ed 2d at ___. The Court refused to require the respondent school district to demonstrate some identifiable drug abuse problem among a sufficient number of those subject to the testing[.] Ibid. The Court reasoned: [I]t would make little sense to require a school district to wait for a substantial portion of its students to begin using drugs before it was allowed to institute a drug testing program designed to deter drug use. Ibid. The Court also rejected the argument that suspicion-based testing is less intrusive than random testing and that schools should limit their policies accordingly. The Court stated: [T]he Fourth Amendment does not require a finding of individualized suspicion, and we decline to impose such a requirement on schools attempting to prevent and detect drug use by students. Moreover, we question whether testing based on individualized suspicion in fact would be less intrusive. Such a regime would place an additional burden on public school teachers who are already tasked with the difficult job of maintaining order and discipline. A program of individualized suspicion might unfairly target members of unpopular groups. The fear of lawsuits resulting from such targeted searches may chill enforcement of the program, rendering it ineffective in combating drug use. [Id. at 837, 122 S. Ct. at 2568-69, 153 L. Ed 2d at ___ (internal citations omitted).] Finally, the Court explained that [w]hile in Vernonia there might have been a closer fit between the testing of athletes and the . . . finding that the drug problem was fueled by the role model effect of athletes drug use, such a finding was not essential to the holding. Id. at 837-38, 122 S. Ct. at 2569, 153 L. Ed 2d at ___ (citation omitted). It stated that Vernonia did not require the school to test the group of students most likely to use drugs, but rather considered the constitutionality of the program in the context of the public school s custodial responsibilities. Id. at 838, 122 S. Ct. at 2569, 153 L. Ed 2d at ___. The Court, therefore, found that the drug testing policy was a reasonable means of furthering the School District s important interest in preventing and deterring drug use among its schoolchildren. Ibid. In a thoughtful concurring opinion, Justice Breyer emphasized the policy considerations that, in his view, favored the Court s holding: First, the drug problem in our Nation s schools is serious in terms of size, the kinds of drugs being used, and the consequences of that use both for our children and the rest of us. Second, the government s emphasis upon supply side interdiction apparently has not reduced teenage use in recent years. Third, public school systems must find effective ways to deal with this problem . . . . The law itself recognizes these responsibilities with the phrase in loco parentis a phrase that draws its legal force primarily from the needs of younger students . . . and which reflects, not that a child or adolescent lacks an interest in privacy, but that a child s or adolescent s school-related privacy interest, when compared to the privacy interests of an adult, has different dimensions[.] Fourth, the program . . . seeks to discourage demand for drugs by changing the school s environment in order to combat the single most important factor leading school children to take drugs, namely, peer pressure. It offers the adolescent a non-threatening reason to decline his friend s drug-use invitations, namely, that he intends to play baseball, participate in debate, join the band, or engage in any one of half a dozen useful, interesting, and important activities. [Id. at 839, 122 S. Ct. at 2569-70, 153 L. Ed 2d at ___ (Breyer, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).] Justice Breyer also noted that the school district s policy had engendered little community opposition, suggesting that that factor is relevant when evaluating whether a policy unduly infringes on a student s privacy interests. He noted other practical considerations as well: First, not everyone would agree with this Court s characterization of the privacy-related significance of urine sampling as negligible. Some find the procedure no more intrusive than a routine medical examination, but others are seriously embarrassed by the need to provide a urine sample with someone listening outside the closed restroom stall[.] When trying to resolve this kind of close question involving the interpretation of constitutional values, I believe it important that the school board provided an opportunity for the airing of these differences at public meetings designed to give the entire community the opportunity to be able to participate in developing the drug policy. The board used this democratic, participatory process to uncover and to resolve differences, giving weight to the fact that the process, in this instance, revealed little, if any, objection to the proposed testing program. Second, the testing program avoids subjecting the entire school to testing. And it preserves an option for a conscientious objector. He can refuse testing while paying a price (nonparticipation) that is serious, but less severe than expulsion from the school. Third, a contrary reading of the Constitution, as requiring individualized suspicion in this public school context, could well lead schools to push the boundaries of individualized suspicion to its outer limits, using subjective criteria that may unfairly target members of unpopular groups, or leave those whose behavior is slightly abnormal stigmatized in the minds of others[.] [Id. at 841-42, 122 S. Ct. at 2570-71, 153 L. Ed 2d at ___ (Breyer, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).] A. That provision and its Fourth Amendment analogue contain nearly identical language designed to prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures by government agents. N.J. Transit PBA Local 304 v. N.J. Transit Corp., 151 N.J. 531, 543 (1997). Generally, reasonableness under Article I, paragraph 7 requires the police to undertake a search of a person only when authorized by a warrant issued by a neutral judicial officer. Id. at 543-44. In applying for the warrant, the government must have probable cause to believe that the person to be searched has violated the law. Ibid. Those strictures, however, are not absolute. We will uphold a warrantless search whenever it falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id. at 544. One such exception is that administrative searches of highly or pervasively regulated industries have been permitted without probable cause or individualized suspicion. Id. at 545 (citing In re Martin, 90 N.J. 295, 310-16 (1982) (allowing New Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcement to conduct suspicionless searches of casino licensees)). Our willingness to tolerate a warrantless search often turns on the overall reasonableness of the government s conduct and the degree to which a citizen has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place. State v. Stott, 171 N.J. 343, 354 (2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We have observed that [a] subjective expectation of privacy is legitimate if it is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable[.] Ibid. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (alterations in original). In that respect, this Court has found that [t]here is a lesser expectation of privacy in one s automobile, and in one s office, than in one s home. State v. Johnson, 168 N.J. 608, 625 (2001) (internal citations omitted). Our law also reflects that schoolchildren possess a diminished expectation of privacy and, correspondingly, that school officials must have authority to maintain order, safety and discipline [within a school]. State in re T.L.O., 94 N.J. 331, 342 (1983), rev d on other grounds, T.L.O., supra, 469 U.S. 325, 105 S. Ct. 733, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720. Traditionally, the schoolmaster-student relationship was thought to be legally analogous to that of parent and child. Joanna Raby, Reclaiming Our Public Schools: A Proposal for School-wide Drug Testing, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 999, 1000 (1999). Given their special status, school officials were permitted a degree of latitude in enforcing behavior within the schools that other governmental bodies did not enjoy. Ibid. Consistent with those principles, this Court has observed that [i]n a limited sense the teacher stands in the parent s place in his relationship to a pupil under his care and charge, and has such a portion of the powers of the parent over the pupil as is necessary to carry out his employment. Titus v. Lindberg, 49 N.J. 66, 74 (1967) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We also have noted that the relationship between students and school officials is highly regulated. In that context, we have instructed: It must be borne in mind that the relationship between the child and the school authorities is not a voluntary one but is compelled by law. The child must attend school and is subject to school rules and disciplines. In turn the school authorities are obligated to take reasonable precautions for his safety and well-being. [Jackson v. Hankinson and Bd. of Educ. of New Shrewsbury, 51 N.J. 230, 235 (1968) (internal citations omitted).] The foregoing does not mean, however, that school officials enjoy absolute constitutional immunity. See Raby, supra, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. at 999 (tracing evolution of law in this area). Rather, courts have held that constitutional protections extend to students within the public-school context, but not to the full extent that such protections extend to adult citizens in other settings. Ibid. T.L.O., supra, 94 N.J. 331, illustrates the evolution of case law in which courts have sought to balance the rights of students against the duty of officials to maintain a safe and orderly school environment. In that case, a high school assistant principal conducted a warrantless search of a student s purse, finding rolling papers that he suspected were drug paraphernalia. Id. at 336. He therefore looked further into the purse and found a metal pipe of the kind used for smoking marijuana, empty plastic bags and one plastic bag containing a tobacco-like substance. Ibid. The assistant principal contacted the student s mother and the police. Id. at 337. The State eventually charged the student with delinquency based on possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute. Id. at 336. The trial court (then called the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court) denied the student s motion to suppress the items seized from the purse. Ibid. A divided panel of the Appellate Division affirmed. Id. at 338. We reversed. In so doing, however, we articulated a reduced constitutional standard for evaluating searches by school officials. We stated that school officials are authorized to conduct such administrative searches, without a warrant and without probable cause, provided that they have reasonable grounds to believe that a student possesses evidence of illegal activity or activity that would interfere with school discipline and order[.] Id. at 346. Concluding that the assistant principal had not satisfied that test, we reversed the lower courts denial of the student s suppression motion. Id. at 347. We decided T.L.O. solely on Fourth Amendment grounds. Id. at 336. The United States Supreme Court ultimately rejected our conclusion that the assistant principal did not have a reasonable basis to conduct the search. Accordingly, it reversed our judgment. Yet, the Court echoed our observations concerning the public-school context, concluding that the school setting required some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject. T.L.O., supra, 469 U.S. at 340, 105 S. Ct. at 742, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 733. The Court determined, as did we, that the warrant requirement is unsuited to the school environment, ibid., and that the legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search. Id. at 341, 105 S. Ct. at 742, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 734. In a passage that now appears to have anticipated the drug-testing cases that would come a decade later, the Supreme Court also observed: Against the child s interest in privacy must be set the substantial interest of teachers and administrators in maintaining discipline in the classroom and on school grounds. Maintaining order in the classroom has never been easy, but in recent years, school disorder has often taken particularly ugly forms: drug use and violent crime in the schools have become major social problems. Even in schools that have been spared the most severe disciplinary problems, the preservation of order and a proper educational environment requires close supervision of schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of rules against conduct that would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an adult. [Id. at 339, 105 S. Ct. at 741, 83 L. Ed 2d at 733 (internal citation omitted).] T.L.O., therefore, established two critical principles. First, the right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures extends to students within a public school. Second, the nature of the schoolhouse environment, with its emphasis on safety, order, and discipline, requires a relaxed application of traditional search-and-seizure rules. Like our decisional law, New Jersey statutory law similarly reflects the notion that school officials must be empowered to supervise and ensure the safety of students within reasonable limits. See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 18A:6-1 (prohibiting use of corporal punishment but authorizing school officials to apply reasonable force to quell disturbances, obtain control of weapons, protect themselves, and protect other persons or property); N.J.S.A. 18A:37-1 (requiring pupils to submit to the authority of the teachers ). We included Vernonia in our discussion of the federal special-needs framework that this Court unanimously adopted in evaluating the testing policy for transit officers. That inclusion raised the possibility that such a framework might be appropriate in analyzing the kind of challenge now before us. In sum, we conclude that Vernonia s special-needs approach provides an appropriate framework for evaluating plaintiffs State constitutional claims. The analysis, however, does not end there. Within the special-needs framework, we now must determine whether Hunterdon Central s random drug and alcohol testing policy is reasonable based on a weighing of three factors. They are: the affected students expectation of privacy, the search s degree of obtrusiveness, and the strength of the government s asserted need in conducting the search. We will address each factor separately and in that order. [N.J.S.A. 18A:40-5.] The above regulations apply equally to every student, not just to student athletes. Compare N.J.A.C. 6A:16-2.2(e) (regulating all students) and (h) (mandating more particular requirements for student athletes). We find that the school s test policy limits the intrusion on the students privacy interests and protects their personal dignity to the extent possible under the circumstances. Although the policy s intrusiveness sufficiently is circumscribed under current procedures, we observe that advances in the science of drug testing have made possible other collection techniques even less intrusive than urine collection. One such technique is oral-swab testing. According to the United States Office of National Drug Control Policy, [t]races of drugs, drug metabolites, and alcohol can be detected in oral fluids, the generic term for saliva and other material collected from the mouth. Oral fluids are easy to collect a swab of the inner cheek is the most common way. They are harder to adulterate or substitute, and collection is less invasive than with urine or hair testing. Because drugs and drug metabolites do not remain in oral fluids as long as they do in urine, this method shows more promise in determining current use and impairment. [United States Office of National Drug Control Policy, What You Need To Know About Drug Testing in Schools, at 10 available at www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/pdf/drug_testing.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2003).] Defendants acknowledge that [s]ubsequent to this suit being filed, the science of drug testing has advanced and a urine sample is no longer necessary for accurate results. Rather, school districts may now opt for oral fluid testing with a swab. Defendants further indicate that Hunterdon Central now uses an oral-swab test for its suspicion-based program. We construe defendants acknowledgment as an indication that the school will convert to oral-swab tests for its random-based program, provided that the Board is satisfied that using such tests will not unduly diminish the program s effectiveness. Because invasiveness to some degree is a dynamic factor, our analysis here is premised on that eventuality. [McKinney Study, supra, at 4.] Researchers connected with a third study looked at two Oregon high schools during the 1999-2000 school year, one with mandatory drug testing as a condition of sports participation, and a control school without drug testing. Lynn Goldberg, Diane Elliot, David P. MacKinnon, Esther Moe, Kerry S. Kuehl, Liva Nohre & Chondra M. Lockwood, Drug Testing Athletes to Prevent Substance Abuse: Background and Pilot Study Results of the SATURN (Student Athlete Testing Using Random Notification) Study, Journal of Adolescent Health, at 16-17 (Jan. 2003). The school that drug-tested student athletes had a rate of illicit drug use that was about one-fourth that of the control school. Id. at 24. After warning that there were limitations to their study, the authors concluded that [a] policy of random drug testing surveillance appears to have significantly reduced recent drug use among adolescent athletes. Ibid. A recently published fourth study suggests a contrary result, namely, that drug testing in schools may not provide a panacea for reducing student drug use that some . . . had hoped. Ryoko Yamaguchi, Lloyd D. Johnston & Patrick M. O Malley, Relationship Between Student Illicit Drug Use and School Drug-Testing Policies, Journal of School Health, at 164 (Apr. 2003) (Michigan Study). In that study, which surveyed 76,000 students nationwide, researchers found that drug testing (of any kind) was not a significant predictor of student marijuana use in the past 12 months. Neither was drug testing for cause or suspicion. Id. at 163. Both the SATURN Study and the Michigan Study were supported by grants from the National Institute on Drug Abuse. And like the prior studies suggesting more favorable results from the school s perspective, the Michigan Study has limitations. [The Michigan Study] does not differentiate between schools that do intensive, regular random screening and those that test only occasionally. As a result, it does not rule out the possibility that the most vigilant schools do a better job of curbing drug use. Thus, research in this area is not complete and to date has yielded mixed results. As a whole, the research is relatively new. Presumably, a school s testing program gains effectiveness as a deterrent only gradually, as consistent implementation signals to students a new consequence to illicit drug use. The three studies that suggest that random testing curbs student drug and alcohol use, and the one study that suggests no such effect, are simply competing factors to be weighed when evaluating the reasonableness of the challenged program. We also consider the data related specifically to Hunterdon Central, in addition to the certifications of school officials described above. On balance, we conclude that reasonableness under Article I, paragraph 7 does not require the Board to wait for a definitive study regarding drug-testing efficacy before addressing a problem that it already knows affects a sizable number of students. . . . . We are persuaded that the search was justified at its inception by the unique burdens placed on school personnel in the field trip context and that the search limited to hand luggage was reasonably related to the school s duty to provide discipline, supervision and control. [Id. at 380, 382.] The court also rejected the parent s contention that, in conducting the suspicionless search, school officials had violated Article I, paragraph 7. The panel unanimously concluded: We are not persuaded that the New Jersey Constitution provides greater protection under the circumstances of this case than its federal counterpart. We note that in its T.L.O. opinion the New Jersey Supreme Court analyzed the search and seizure issue under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and did not suggest that New Jersey s organic law imposed more stringent standards. [Id. at 382.] SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 27 September Term 2002 MICHAEL and DEBORAH JOYE, on behalf of themselves and their minor child, SHAUN JOYE; PHIL and JOAN GREINER, on behalf of themselves and their minor child, MELISSA GREINER; MARK and LINDA ZDEPSKI, on behalf of themselves and their minor child, ANNA ZDEPSKI, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HUNTERDON CENTRAL REGIONAL HIGH SCHOOL BOARD OF EDUCATION and ACTING SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS, JUDITH GRAY, in her official capacity, Defendants-Respondents. LaVECCHIA, J., dissenting. A majority of our Court today holds that it is permissible under our State Constitution to subject public school students to mass suspicionless drug testing. I respectfully dissent. The desire to wage war on drugs should not be permitted to coarsen our sensitivity to constitutional protections. The requirement that searches be reasonable and, at a minimum, based on some particularized suspicion is a constitutional mandate that applies to juveniles as well as adults. The protections of our State Constitution should not be shut out of our schoolhouses. In my view, the majority s application of the special-needs doctrine to support the school drug-testing program at issue here seriously erodes the traditional jurisprudential analysis governing searches and seizures. Simply put, a routine regimen of random drug testing of students who wish to avail themselves of the educational and social enhancements offered through extracurricular school activities ought not be permitted certainly not on the showing made by this school district that in no way ties any drug use to the group targeted for suspicionless testing. The record is devoid of any special need to permit this random drug testing. The Court s holding will reverberate throughout the State s system of public school education, and result in shearing an estimated quarter of a million New Jersey public school students of the right to be free of suspicionless drug testing. For those students, state constitutional protection against government-initiated suspicionless searches of their bodily fluids is now conditioned on their giving up the opportunity to participate in extracurricular activities. That is the wrong lesson for our system of public school education to teach the young citizens entrusted to its care. As Justice Brandeis recognized, [o]ur Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485, 48 S. Ct. 564, 575, 72 L. Ed. 944, 960 (1928). I would conclude, as did the Honorable Naomi Eichen in her thoughtful and compelling dissent below, that the expansive random drug-testing program of the Hunterdon Central Regional High School Board of Education (Hunterdon Central) violates Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution. Joye v. Hunterdon Cent. Reg l High Sch., 353 N.J. Super. 600, 615 (App. Div. 2002). The Court cautioned, however, that a reasonableness standard may not invade the interests of students any more than is necessary to achieve the legitimate end of preserving order in the schools. Id. at 343, 105 S. Ct. at 743, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 735-36. Justice Blackmun underscored that warning in a concurring opinion that introduced the phrase special needs to emphasize that the reasonableness standard is an exception, not the rule: Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers. Id. at 351, 105 S. Ct. at 748, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 741. (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis added). The question whether special needs could support suspicionless searches of persons would be addressed thereafter in a series of cases in which the Supreme Court recognized that [i]n limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass n, 489 U.S. 602, 624, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1417, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639, 664 (1989). Accordingly, in certain circumstances the Court has placed its imprimatur on the use of random drug testing of categories of individuals. Id. at 633, 109 S. Ct. at 1421-22, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 670 (authorizing suspicionless program of drug testing of train operators); Nat l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 677, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1396-97, 103 L. Ed. 2d 685, 709 (1989) (allowing random drug testing of certain treasury employees involved in drug interdiction). But see Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 1303, 137 L. Ed. 2d 513, 526 (1997)(finding unconstitutional Georgia s policy requiring candidates for public office to submit to drug testing because, to demonstrate special need, government must show concrete danger demanding departure from the Fourth Amendment s main rule ). In Chandler, supra, the Court held that absent an adequate explanation for the need to target the specified category of person for the non-individualized, suspicionless drug testing, a generalized statement of salutary motive for the search was held insufficient to overcome the constitutional protection against such governmental action. 520 U.S. at 319, 117 S. Ct. at 1303, 103 L. Ed 2d at 526. In Vernonia, supra, 515 U.S. at 665, 115 S. Ct. at 2396, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 582, the United States Supreme Court first upheld the use of random drug testing in a school setting. The school district s policy of requiring the random drug testing of student athletes was implemented after district officials noticed a sharp increase in drug use among students in general and student athletes in particular. Id. at 648, 115 S. Ct. at 2388, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 571. The high school football and wrestling coach attributed at least one severe injury, as well as omissions of safety procedures among athletes, to the effects of drug use. Id. at 649, 115 S. Ct. at 2389, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 572. The increase in drug use by student athletes was described as having reached epidemic proportions and, so, the school district resorted to random drug testing of all interscholastic athletes. Ibid. Suspicion-based testing was deemed inadequate to address the school district s problems: The danger to students participating in the sports activities while under the influence of drugs and the role-model effect at work in the school district rendered the school officials unable to exercise appropriate control and order necessary for an educational environment. Ibid. In reviewing the drug-testing policy, the Court stated that special needs that make the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable can exist in the public school context, where requiring a warrant would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures [that are] needed and would undercut the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools. Id. at 653, 115 S. Ct. at 2391, 132 L. Ed 2d at 574 (alteration in original) (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., supra, 469 U.S. at 340-41, 105 S. Ct. at 742, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 741-42). The Court noted that while children do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate . . . the nature of those rights is what is appropriate for children in school. Id. at 655-56, 115 S. Ct. at 2392, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 576. The Court observed that children in school are subject to close supervisory conditions and therefore generally enjoy a lesser expectation of privacy than adult members of the general population, and that privacy expectations were even less with regard to student athletes. Id. at 657, 115 S. Ct. at 2392-93, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 577 (noting communal changing and showering involved in school sports participation). In respect of the intrusion associated with the method of sample collection being utilized, the Court found privacy interests to be compromised only to a negligible degree because the conditions were nearly identical to those one would encounter in a public restroom. Id. at 658, 115 S. Ct. at 2393, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 577. Although it was clear that the testing of bodily fluids constituted a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, in terms of the search s intrusion upon privacy interests, the Court viewed as significant that the test detected only drugs; no other information about the subject s body was revealed by the testing and the test results were disclosed to few individuals. Id. at 658, 115 S. Ct. at 2393, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 577-78. Regarding the governmental-interest question, the Court stated that curbing drug use by children is important and found the rampant epidemic-like use of drugs in Vernonia, particularly by athletes, created a crisis because sports team members faced special health risks and, within the school community, they were the leaders of the drug culture. Id. at 649, 663, 115 S. Ct. at 2388-89, 2395-96, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 571, 580. The Court concluded, on balance, that the policy of random testing of the student athletes was an effective means of curbing the drug problem in the Vernonia school district that was largely fueled by the role model effect of athletes drug use, and that was of particular danger to athletes. Id. at 663, 115 S. Ct. at 2395-96, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 581. Thus, a six-member majority of the Court upheld the school district s policy of drug testing school athletes upon a balancing of the interests because the majority determined that 1) students, and in particular student athletes, had a decreased expectation of privacy, 2) the search was relatively unobtrusive, and 3) the need for the random testing of the circumscribed class of student athletes was demonstrated to be immediate and severe. Id. at 664-65, 115 S. Ct. at 2396, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 581-82. The dissent written by Justice O Connor (joined by Justices Stevens and Souter) chastised the majority for treat[ing] a suspicion-based regime as if it were just any run-of-the-mill, less intrusive alternative - - that is, an alternative that officials may bypass if the lesser intrusion, in their reasonable estimation, is outweighed by policy concerns unrelated to practicability. Id. at 676, 115 S. Ct. at 2402, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 589 (O Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent viewed the case as addressing the question whether the Fourth Amendment is so lenient that students may be deprived of [its] only remaining, and most basic, categorical protection: its strong preference for an individualized suspicion requirement, with its accompanying antipathy toward personally intrusive, blanket searches of mostly innocent people, and said that the answer must plainly be no. Id. at 681, 115 S. Ct. at 2404, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 592 (O Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent also detailed inadequacies it perceived in the record, and additionally concluded that the particular policy of suspicionless testing swept too broadly and too imprecisely. Id. at 684-86, 115 S. Ct. at 2406-07, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 594-95 (O Connor, J., dissenting). B. One could not have predicted from the holding in Vernonia the United States Supreme Court s expansion of the special-needs exception to Fourth Amendment protections. The new liberality with which special needs would be found in a school setting manifested itself in Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 122 S. Ct. 2559, 153 L. Ed. 2d 735 (2002). In a five-to-four opinion, the Court upheld random drug testing of all students involved in school extracurricular activities without any demonstration by the school district of a severe or pervasive drug problem among the students to be tested and without any specific concern about a safety risk caused by particularized drug use. Ibid. The school district s policy simply conditioned participation in school-sponsored extracurricular activities on a student s consent to submit to random drug testing based on a generalized desire to deter drug use by young people. Id. at 826, 122 S. Ct. at 2562, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 741-42. Despite the Earls majority s assertion that the Court s earlier holding in Vernonia did not simply authorize all school drug testing, but rather conducted a fact-specific balancing of the intrusion on the child s Fourth Amendment rights against the promotion of legitimate government interests, id. at 830, 122 S. Ct. at 2565, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 744, notably absent from the remainder of the Court s discussion was any justification for employing, in the first instance, a balancing of interests for this category of student population. The majority did not explain why suspicion-based testing of the targeted students (those involved in extracurricular activities) was inadequate to meet government s substantial need, thereby warranting resort to special-needs balancing, as was the case with the student athletes in Vernonia. See T.L.O., supra, 469 U.S. at 351, 105 S. Ct. at 748, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 740 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Also, in its application of a fact-sensitive analysis to the drug testing in dispute in Earls, the majority stated that the reduced expectation of privacy among the student athletes was not essential to its determination in Vernonia that students generally have a reduced overall expectation of privacy. Earls, supra, 536 U.S. at 831, 122 S. Ct. at 2565, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 745. The reduced student privacy expectations ascertained in Vernonia were described as instead depending primarily upon the school s custodial responsibility and authority. Ibid. Nonetheless, the majority added that students who participate in extracurricular activities voluntarily subject themselves to many of the same intrusions on their privacy as do athletes. Ibid. The diminished respect given to students privacy markedly contrasts with the Court s heightened deference to the assertion of government need. In addressing the immediacy of the government s concerns, the Court accepted the school district s generalized assertion that the nationwide drug epidemic makes the war against drugs a pressing concern in every school. Id. at 834, 122 S. Ct. at 2567, 153 L. Ed 2d at 747. The Court eschewed any requirement that a particularized degree of drug problem be demonstrated in the schools notwithstanding that seven years earlier the Court relied on such findings in its decision in Vernonia. Id. at 835, 122 S. Ct. at 2568, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 748. The Earls Court perceived the drug problem among students to have only grown worse since its decision in Vernonia, and accordingly refused to fashion what would in effect be a constitutional quantum of drug use necessary to show a drug problem. Id. at 836, 122 S. Ct. at 2575, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 747. Although the Court recognized that in Vernonia there might have been a closer fit between the testing of student athletes and the trial court s finding that the drug problem was fueled by the role model effect of athletes drug use, it concluded that the drug testing of students who participate in extracurricular activities effectively serves the School District s interest in protecting the safety and health of its students. Id. at 837-38, 122 S. Ct. at 2569, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 749. In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices O Connor, Stevens, and Souter, objected to the majority s revisionist characterization of Vernonia: Vernonia cannot be read to endorse invasive and suspicionless drug testing of all students upon any evidence of drug use, solely because drugs jeopardize the life and health of those who use them. Id. at 844, 122 S. Ct. at 2572, 153 L. Ed 2d at 754 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Rather, the dissent viewed the particularized problem of student athletes drug use in Vernonia as essential to the Vernonia judgment, noting that the Court ha[s] since confirmed that [the] special risks [involved in student athletes drug use] were necessary to [the] decision in Vernonia. Id. at 851, 122 S. Ct. at 2576, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 758 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Chandler, supra, 520 U.S. at 317, 117 S. Ct. at 1302, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 525; Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 87, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 1293, 149 L. Ed. 2d 205, 222 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). According to the dissenting members, [the Earls] case resembles Vernonia only in that the School Districts in both cases conditioned engagement in activities outside the obligatory curriculum on random subjection to urinalysis and concluded, contrary to the majority s effort to fit Earls within Vernonia, that a program so sweeping is not sheltered by Vernonia; its unreasonable reach renders it impermissible under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 853-54, 122 S. Ct. at 2577, 153 L. Ed 2d at 759-60 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). C. The majority s analysis in Earls now readily permits a reasonableness or balancing test. Unlike Vernonia, the record developed in Earls was devoid of any allegation of a crisis or epidemic of drug use either occurring among the students targeted for testing, or fueled by them, rendering suspicion-based testing inadequate to stem an identified problem caused by the students to be tested. The majority in Earls was content to base its conclusion of government need on a generalized reference to evidence of a nationwide drug epidemic, relying on that to justify random drug testing of a student subset that had no demonstrated connection to drug use. Plainly, the Court was satisfied to forego the requirement of a demonstrated need to target a particular group of students for random drug testing. Moreover, to the extent that safety concerns had been vital to the determination that a special need existed permitting a departure from traditional Fourth Amendment protections and allowing mass suspicionless drug testing, the Court abandoned that as well. Compare Von Raab, supra, 489 U.S. 656, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 103 L. Ed. 2d 685, and Skinner, supra, 489 U.S. 602, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639, with Chandler, supra, 520 U.S. 305, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 137 L. Ed. 2d 513. The Earls Court disavowed that its holding in Vernonia ever hinged on the conclusion that when a student athlete participates in sports while impaired by drugs or alcohol, a danger arises for the student athlete, as well as for his or her comrades in competition. Despite those protestations, scholars recognize that Earls is a change from Vernonia. See, e.g., Supreme Court Expands Random Drug Testing: Does the Fourth Amendment Still Protect Students?, 170 Ed. Law Rep. 15, 25 (2002) (noting that evolution in jurisprudence demonstrates a clear shift that gives less weight to the student s privacy interests and much greater weight to the school s health and safety concerns ); Comment, Random Suspicionless Drug Testing: Are Students No Longer Afforded Fourth Amendment Protections?, 19 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 451, 479 (stating that the Court s deviation from the warrant requirement . . . has provided school districts with a malleable solution devoid of individualized suspicion and a requirement that a substantial drug problem be present before subjecting students to tests ); Note, Testing Students Beyond the Academic Curriculum: Public Schools, the Fourth Amendment, and the Supreme Court, 11 Widener J. Pub. L. 551, 590 (2002) (stating that armed with Earls, school districts certainly have the autonomy to push the constitutional envelope and further experiment with the rights of public school students ). III. Between Vernonia and Earls we embraced a special-needs test in New Jersey Transit PBA Local 304 v. New Jersey Transit Corp., 151 N.J. 531 (1997). There we applied a special-needs standard to a program of random drug testing of New Jersey Transit (NJT) police officers. 151 N.J. at 558. Mindful that, under the New Jersey Constitution, exceptions to the warrant requirement are more limited than under the federal constitution, we nonetheless concluded that the special-needs test provided a useful analytical framework. Id. at 556-57. The fact-specific inquiry of the special-needs test compels a court to assess first, in context, the practicality of the warrant and probable-cause requirement. Id. at 548 (citation omitted). See footnote 3 The test then enables a court to take into account the complex factors relevant in each case and to balance those factors in such a manner as to ensure that that right against unreasonable searches and seizures is adequately protected. Id. at 556 (citation omitted). In applying that analysis to the NJT drug-testing policy, we first observed that the nature of the police officers patrol duties rendered impractical detection of drug use by observation. Id. at 558. A requirement of individualized suspicion of drug use would compromise NJT s legitimate safety concerns in that drug impaired officers could cause great human loss before any signs of impairment become noticeable to supervisors or others. Id. at 559 (citing Skinner, supra, 489 U.S. at 628, 109 S. Ct. at 1419, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 667). Convinced that individualized suspicion of drug use was an imperfect approach to the problem, we turned then to the balancing of relevant factors. We found the NJT program to be tailored narrowly in that it applied only to employees who performed functions affecting public safety. Ibid. Although we recognized that urine testing is an intrusion on privacy during both collection and testing, even if collected in a manner that ensures the modesty and privacy of employees, we determined that transit officers have a diminished expectation of privacy due to their law enforcement status. Id. at 560-61. Moreover, we determined that the threat to public safety from officers acting under the influence of drugs was manifest. Id. at 562. They are permitted to carry firearms, and to exercise the most awesome and dangerous power that a democratic state possesses . . . the power to use lawful force to arrest and detain. Id. at 561 (citation omitted). That is, at any time . . . [transit officers] may be called upon to exercise discretion in the use of a weapon. At that moment, the officer s judgment is critical. Id. at 562. The duties of armed transit officers were viewed as fraught with such risk of injury to others that even a momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences. Id. at 562-63 (quoting Von Raab, supra, 489 U.S. at 670, 109 S. Ct. at 1393, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 705). And finally, we were persuaded from the record that drug use was a problem among the ranks of NJT s police officers. Id. at 563. Thus, considering the safety-sensitive nature of the officers duties, along with the difficulty in detecting individualized drug use among a mobile force not subject to day-to-day scrutiny, we concluded that special needs existed to justify suspicionless drug testing of this particular category of NJT employee. Ibid. The question for us is whether, having adopted in N.J. Transit the special-needs test as it was understood and applied in Vernonia, we are willing to change horses in midstream and adopt the lesser Earls standard as satisfying our own state constitutional requirements for searches. In determining whether to part company from the Supreme Court on interpretations of federal constitutional requirements when we interpret cognate provisions of our own Constitution, we have employed a criteria approach. State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39, 57 (1983). That approach, first announced by Justice Handler in State v. Hunt, analyzes numerous factors, including (and most significant for this case) matters of particular state interest or local concern, state traditions, and public attitudes, to determine whether a particular situation calls for greater protections under the state constitution. 91 N.J. 338, 364-67 (Handler, J., concurring). Where particular questions are local in character and do not appear to require a uniform national policy, they may be suited for independent action based on state constitutional law. Id. at 367. The State s history and traditions also weigh heavily in the determination. Ibid. B. Consistent with those principles, we have been willing to afford some greater protection under the State Constitution in the areas of search and seizure and individual privacy. Hempele, supra, 120 N.J. at 197; see also Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 300 (1982) (observing that the United States Supreme Court itself has long proclaimed that state Constitutions may provide more expansive protection of individual liberties than the United States Constitution ) (citations omitted). Accordingly, on numerous occasions we have declined to follow the approach of the Supreme Court on search and seizure standards. See, e.g., State v. Cooke, 163 N.J. 657, 670 (2000) (concluding New Jersey Constitution requires existence of exigent circumstances for application of automobile exception to warrant requirement, notwithstanding Supreme Court decision to contrary); State v. Pierce, 136 N.J. 184, 213 (1994) (holding that vehicular search incident to traffic offense is unreasonable under State Constitution); Hempele, supra, 120 N.J. at 195 (holding that citizens of New Jersey have privacy interest in curbside garbage); State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 154 (1987) (declining to recognize good-faith exception to exclusionary rule in New Jersey); Hunt, supra, 91 N.J. at 344-47 (holding that State Constitution protects privacy interest in telephone billing records); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 353 (1975) (affording greater protections in context of consent to search). State v. Cooke, supra, exemplifies our disinclination to follow in lockstep the evolution of United States Supreme Court precedent that has loosened requirements concerning the reasonableness of searches. 163 N.J. at 670. At the time of our decision in Cooke, several recent United States Supreme Court cases had essentially disposed of the additional requirement of exigent circumstances in the context of automobile searches. 163 N.J. at 666 (citing Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 116 S. Ct. 2485, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1031 (1996)). Perceiving those cases as rendering virtually all warrantless searches of vehicles . . . valid under the automobile exception as long as the search is supported by probable cause, we refused to modify our jurisprudence to follow federal precedent. Id. at 666, 670. Here, where the school board s policy is challenged under Article I, paragraph 1, in addition to Article I, paragraph 7, we are informed by our prior holdings under our State Constitution that provide greater individual privacy protections than under the federal constitution. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 165 N.J. 609, 629 (2000) (recognizing that in New Jersey, we have a long-standing history . . . demonstrating a commitment to the protection of individual rights under the State Constitution ). Accordingly, governmental intrusion into privacy rights may require a more persuasive showing of a public interest under our State Constitution than under the federal Constitution. In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 249-50 (1981) (holding right to be sterilized comes within privacy rights protected from undue governmental influence by our State Constitution ); see also State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 220 (1977) (Schreiber, J., concurring) (fornication statute violates right of privacy under State Constitution). V. The starting point in the analysis under Article I, paragraph 7 is that suspicionless searches, such as that involved in random drug testing, are prohibited and must be justified by a special need. Only when that special need is established may one proceed to balance the nature of the intrusion on privacy against the severity of the demonstrated government need. By adhering to that requirement we prevent the special-needs exception from swallowing the rule, as Justice Blackmun cautioned in T.L.O., supra. That served as our premise in N.J. Transit, supra. 151 N.J. at 544 (stating that only in certain limited circumstances have warrantless searches, conducted without individualized suspicion or probable cause, been upheld). And, that special showing was required and satisfied in both Vernonia and N.J. Transit. In each, suspicion-based methods were insufficient to detect and stop drug use in the circumscribed populations impacted by the testing program. The use of drugs by members of the targeted populations posed a danger to them, as well as to other innocent individuals interacting with them. Drug use among the population of persons targeted for the random drug testing also was demonstrated clearly. The random program of routine testing that was devised in each case was tailored narrowly to the specific problem population only and it was necessary for safety s sake, other methods of preventing drug use having proven inadequate. The record here is unlike those in Vernonia and N.J. Transit in each of those respects. It fails on every level. No special showing has been made to justify the right to employ a balancing-of-interests test in lieu of typical Article I, paragraph 7 protections for the classification of students targeted for suspicionless testing. The majority s apparent satisfaction with the level of proof on that threshold point effectively eliminates the first step of the analysis for the population of students affected. We should not even get to the balancing-of-interests step in the analysis, but if we did, the record fails that test as well. A. First, nowhere in this record is there justification for singling out these students for required drug testing. There is no doubt that we would not countenance mass drug testing, without any demonstration of cause, of individuals found to loiter on street corners in known drug-infested neighborhoods. Public school students, unconnected with drug use or its promotion in any way, should enjoy no less protection from random bodily searches. Students privacy interests are not ephemeral. Here, those interests are being cast aside without any justification for the targeting of this subset of students. The surveys conducted do not demonstrate a drug problem among the extracurricular-program-involved students to be tested. Even the majority recognizes that the RMBSI survey results do not distinguish between those who engage in extracurricular activities and those who do not. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 60-61). And, no attempt has been made to show that suspicion-based methods are inadequate to further the district s desire to curtail student drug use. The general statistics cited are not persuasive on either topic. There simply is no crisis or problem of epidemic proportion within the targeted population, or fueled by it. The statistics reflect some drug usage by students generally, but they also suggest that usage may, indeed, be lessening. Fundamentally, the statistics fail to demonstrate any nexus tying the group of students targeted for mass testing to the reason for the school board s testing program. One cannot but conclude that the program is not narrowly tailored. Any protestation about that point based on a generalized assertion of the need to use random drug testing as a means of deterrence is further belied by the current most comprehensive study of the effect of drug testing performed by a grant from the National Institute on Drug Abuse and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, recently published in the Journal of School Health, April 2003, Vol. 73, No.4, 159-64. That study demonstrates, contrary to the assumption of proponents of drug testing, a lack of deterrent effect from testing regimens implemented in school districts throughout the county. The study, the largest of its kind, encompassed 75,000 students. Its conclusions are not undermined by any competent proof in this record. In any event, invocation of a desire to deter drug use, albeit a salutary purpose, does not insulate government officials from compliance with attendant Article I, paragraph 7 protections. Cf. State v. Johnson, 168 N.J. 608 (2001)(holding that mere reference to preventing evidence destruction in drug trafficking investigation is insufficient justification for trial court s issuance of no-knock warrant to search home). Here, there is no basis for finding special need to engage in a balancing of interests concerning the right of students in extracurricular activities to be free of the presumptively unreasonable search entailed by random drug testing. The majority avoids this failing in the Earls analysis by attempting to find an analogy here to administrative searches. The analogy is a poor one. Administrative searches of pervasively regulated industries have been permitted without individualized suspicion because of the intensive government involvement that is a condition of the permitted activity. See, e.g., In re Martin, 90 N.J. 295, 313-14 (1982) (finding that casino employees have limited expectation of privacy based on pervasive agency regulation of industry); State v. Turcotte, 239 N.J. Super. 285, 290 (App. Div. 1990) (noting that horse racing is pervasively regulated industry). Warrantless searches conducted under that exception are permitted if three criteria are satisfied: First there must be a substantial government interest that informs the regulatory scheme pursuant to which the inspection is made . . . . Second, the warrantless inspections must be necessary to further [the] regulatory scheme. . . . [And f]inally, the statute s inspection program, in terms of the certainty and regularity of its application [must] provid[e] a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. [N.J. Transit, supra, 151 N.J. at 546 (alterations in original) (quoting New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-03, 107 S. Ct. 2636, 2644, 96 L. Ed. 2d 601, 614 (1987)).] NO. A-27 SEPTEMBER TERM 2002 ON APPEAL FROM Appellate Division, Superior Court MICHAEL and DEBORAH JOYE, on behalf of themselves and their minor child, SHAUN JOYE; PHIL and JOAN GREINER, on behalf of themselves and their minor child, MELISSA GREINER; MARK and LINDA DZEPSKI, on behalf of themselves and their minor child, ANNA ZDEPSKI, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HUNTERDON CENTRAL REGIONAL HIGH SCHOOL BOARD O EDUCATION and ACTING SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS, JUDITH GRAY, in her official capacity, Defendants-Respondents. DECIDED July 9, 2003 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Verniero CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice LaVecchia