Title: DANA L. GRAHAM v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DANA L. GRAHAM v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 39Case Number: No. S-10-0163Decided: 03/04/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 

DANA 
L. GRAHAM,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Uinta County

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel; and Kirk A. 
Morgan, Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Morgan.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Leda M. 
Pojman, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Pojman.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Dana 
L. Graham (Graham), challenges the district court's Judgment and Sentence 
finding her guilty of delivery of methamphetamine (second or subsequent 
offense).  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
35-7-1031(a)(i) and 35-7-1038 (LexisNexis 2009).  She maintains that the district court 
abused its discretion by denying the State's motion to dismiss the charges 
against her (without prejudice to refile them).  She also contends that the district 
court erred in excluding the testimony of an eye witness to her crime, on the 
basis that the district court was concerned that the witness might exercise his 
right not to incriminate himself (Fifth Amendment protections) and, thereby, 
deflect the jury's attention from Graham's criminal act.  We will affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Graham raises 
these issues:

 
 
1.  Did 
the court abuse its discretion in denying the State's motion to dismiss without 
prejudice, in violation of the separation of powers 
doctrine?

 
 
2.  Did 
the trial court err when it excluded Ms. Graham's witness in violation of her 
Sixth Amendment rights without sufficient showing of the extent the witness 
would exercise his Fifth Amendment rights?

 
 
The 
State's rephrasing of the issues essentially echoes that posited by 
Graham.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      Evanston area 
police officers suspected Graham of dealing in drugs.  The investigators decided to use a 
confidential informant to make a buy from her.  In the briefs, the name of the 
confidential informant is not revealed.  
However, in the record on appeal his name, Terry Christiansen 
(Christiansen), is used frequently, and it will help to keep the narrative of 
this case on track to use it.  He 
had been recruited from the Uinta County Detention Center where he was spending 
time for "some drug crimes" to make a controlled buy of methamphetamine from 
Graham.

 
 
[¶4]      On June 29, 2009, 
Christiansen was given $350.00 in cash by two drug enforcement officers to 
facilitate the purchase of an "eightball" (1/8 ounce) of methamphetamine  the 
going street price in Evanston.  A 
photocopy of that currency was introduced as evidence in the case.  The currency was never recovered, or 
otherwise traced to Graham, because she was not arrested until many months 
later.  Prior to sending 
Christiansen out to make the buy, he was outfitted with a recording device so 
any conversation he had with Graham could be recorded.  In addition, he was informed that he 
would be searched to make sure he did not have any large sums of currency or 
drugs on his person or in his vehicle.  
Christiansen owned up to having some "personal use" crystal 
methamphetamine in his pickup.  
Those drugs were virtually identical to the drugs he bought from 
Graham.  The police officer 
described it as a "very small amount," but its exact weight is not revealed in 
this record.  That matter is still 
an open, pending criminal case in Uinta County.

 
 
[¶5]      Christiansen's 
pickup was searched by one officer and Christiansen himself was searched by the 
other.  Each of the searches took 
only a few minutes and did not involve removal of Christiansen's clothing or an 
invasive inspection of his body or of his pickup.

 
 
[¶6]      After the 
above-described tasks had been accomplished, Christiansen was sent on his way to 
Graham's home and he was followed there by the police officers.  Christiansen parked in front of Graham's 
house, and although the police did not have a clear view of his vehicle, they 
were very nearby and could hear over the wire what Christiansen was doing.  Three voices could be heard on the wire 
 one female (Graham) and two male (Christiansen and Bobby Roberts 
(Roberts)).  Roberts figures in the 
second issue in this appeal.  He 
happened to show up shortly after Christiansen arrived, and he was present 
during the entire transaction.  He 
is the witness that Graham wanted to call as an "eye witness" to the crime, but 
after quite a bit of courtroom maneuvering, he decided not to testify (the 
proceedings were delayed while a public defender was rounded up to come and 
advise Roberts about the legal risks he would be taking if he testified).  Eventually, Roberts decided he did not 
want to testify.  It is not clear if 
any effort was made to get Christiansen to Wyoming so he could testify against 
Graham.  He was in the Golden State 
Medium Correctional Facility in McFarland, CA, in early March of 
2010.

 
 
[¶7]      When the police 
officers attempted to testify about what was said during the drug transaction, 
the district court would not allow it.  
Eventually, a tape recording, of marginal quality, was played for the 
jury.

 
 
Denial 
of motion to dismiss without prejudice

 
 
[¶8]      The first issue 
raised in this case arose because the investigating police officers called 
Graham on October 1, 2009, and asked her to come to their offices at the 
Evanston Police Department to talk about the events of June 29, 2009.  One purpose of that interview was to ask 
her to become a confidential informant for the Evanston Police Department.  She declined to do that.  She spoke with the officers at length 
and incriminated herself, to a limited extent, with respect to the incident on 
June 29, 2009.  Those discussions 
were also recorded.

 
 
[¶9]      At a pretrial 
conference held on March 24, 2010, the prosecutor broached the subject of W.R.E. 
404(b) evidence which could potentially have an impact on Graham's defense.  That evidence was on the tape recorded 
interview that took place on October 1, 2009.  The district court was very concerned 
about the content of the tape recorded discussions Graham had with the police 
and decided that the prosecution could not use the tape.  Instead, if the prosecution wanted to 
make use of the general tenor of the discussions had on October 1, 2009, then 
that would have to be done with questions posed to the police officers, and 
answered by them, but carefully avoiding placing any Rule 404(b) evidence, or 
other objectionable evidence, before the jury.  In response, the prosecutor made a 
motion to dismiss the charges against Graham without prejudice.  The district court refused to grant the 
motion.  The prosecutor did not 
argue to the district court that it was usurping the prosecutor's prerogatives 
and violating the principles of separation of powers.  Defense counsel did not object to the 
motion to dismiss made by the prosecutor.

 
 
[¶10]   Graham contends that the district 
court's refusal to grant that motion to dismiss without prejudice was an abuse 
of discretion that violated the separation of powers doctrine.  We are not persuaded that Graham can use 
the district court's refusal to grant the prosecution's motion to dismiss as a 
sword in these circumstances.  
Graham did not object to the district court's denial of the motion to 
dismiss.  That is, Graham cannot 
construct an injury to her defense strategy based upon the district court's 
insistence that the case proceed to trial in accordance with the planned 
schedule for that trial and in a manner that protected her rights vis-a-vis 
W.R.E. 404(b) evidence.  In 3B 
Charles Alan Wright, Nancy J. King, and Susan R. Klein, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Criminal 3d § 812, at 323-32 (2004 and Supp. 2010), we found this 
very instructive authority:

 
 
            
At common law the prosecutor could enter a nolle prosequi without 
approval of the court.  This was the 
rule recommended to the Supreme Court by the Advisory Committee on Criminal 
Rules, but the Court itself, on promulgating the rules, added the requirement in 
Rule 48(a) that only by leave of court could the prosecution file a 
dismissal.  The reason for this 
action by the Court is unclear.  It 
has been read as an expression by the Court of a belief that entry of a nolle 
prosequi should be a permissive right only, and as intended to prevent 
harassment of a defendant by charging, and then dismissing without placing a 
defendant in jeopardy.

 
 
            
It is difficult indeed to see any real or substantial change or benefit 
achieved by Rule 48(a).  The court 
is powerless to compel a prosecutor to proceed in a case that he believes does 
not warrant prosecution.  If the 
court refuses consent to dismiss, the prosecutor in his opening statement to the 
jury and in his presentation of evidence can indicate to the jury the 
considerations that should work an acquittal.

 
 
Nevertheless 
the requirement of leave is in the rule, and each judge is left to struggle with 
its uncertainties as best he can.  
Since the court must exercise a sound judicial discretion in considering 
a request for dismissal, it must have factual information supporting the 
recommendation.  Leave will be 
granted if the government is without sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction 
or if dismissal is sought for some other bona fide reason that does not involve 
harassment of the defendant.  Courts 
have expressed willingness to deny a prosecutor's motion if it was "clearly 
contrary to manifest public interest," although some courts require, in 
addition, a showing of bad faith.

 
 
[¶11]   Given the circumstances that exist 
here, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
the motion to dismiss without prejudice, that Graham was not injured in any way 
by the district court's ruling and, further, that the district court's action 
did not violate the separation of powers doctrine.

 
 
Error 
in not permitting Bobby Roberts to testify in support of Graham's 
defense

 
 
[¶12]   This issue arose when Graham called 
Roberts as the first witness in her defense.  He was called to the stand at 1:00 p.m., 
on May 6, 2010.  Roberts' testimony 
was to be about his observations of what went on in Graham's home when the 
methamphetamine buy at issue in this case was made.  He was listed as such a witness in 
Graham's pre-trial memorandum.  When 
defense counsel called him to the stand, the prosecutor immediately raised an 
objection.  The objection was that 
Roberts was a co-conspirator and that he needed to be given a warning before he 
testified.  The jury was sent out of 
the courtroom.  The district court 
then warned Roberts that criminal charges could be brought against him based on 
the facts presented during Graham's trial.  
The district court then read Roberts his Miranda warning.  Roberts expressed a lack of 
understanding as to what was going on, and the district court said he did not 
think he could say anymore, but then did explain that if Roberts wanted an 
attorney present while he was testifying, he could have one, and if he could not 
afford one, one would be appointed for him.  Furthermore, he could consult with that 
attorney if he was asked questions that might incriminate him and that he could 
decline to answer such questions.  
The district court then asked Roberts if he wanted to testify in light of 
those warnings.  Roberts said he 
wanted an attorney.

 
 
[¶13]   A search then began for an attorney 
to advise Roberts and eventually, Mike Cornia, an Evanston attorney, was located 
to come and provide advice to Roberts.  
At about 2:00 p.m., there was a conference between the district court, 
the defense attorney, the prosecutor, and Mr. Cornia.  Roberts was not present.  Mr. Cornia told all in attendance about 
his discussions with Roberts.  After 
yet more discussion, Mr. Cornia indicated that Roberts did not want to 
testify.  Although the record is not 
entirely clear on this point, it appears that the district court excluded 
Roberts as a witness because it was likely that he would exercise his Fifth 
Amendment rights if asked many of the questions likely to be posed to 
him.

 
 
[¶14]   Graham contends that she was denied 
her right to compulsory process when Roberts ultimately did not testify.  She further contends that the district 
court's action with respect to Roberts and his ultimate decision not to testify 
violated her right to a fair trial.  
It is our conclusion, after clearly examining the record, that Roberts 
decided not to testify after consultation with his attorney.  Although some of the proceedings 
associated with Roberts' decision not to testify  because of the likelihood 
that he might incriminate himself  were unusual, we conclude that Graham was 
not prejudiced by the State's or the district court's actions with respect to 
this issue.  Graham has not 
presented cogent argument or pertinent authority that these circumstances 
constitute reversible error.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶15]   The district court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying the State's pretrial motion to dismiss the information 
without prejudice.  Graham failed to 
produce a cogent argument or pertinent authority that the district court erred 
in not allowing Graham to call Roberts as a witness once he had clearly 
expressed his intent not to answer any questions that might serve to incriminate 
him with respect to the events of June 29, 2009.  The Judgment and Sentence of the 
district court are affirmed.