Title: Graef v. Continental Indemnity Co.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2021 WI 45 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP1782 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Francis G. Graef, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Continental Indemnity Company, 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
ABC Insurance Company, 
          Defendant. 
 
------------------------------------------------ 
Francis G. Graef, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Applied Underwriters, Inc., 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
ABC Insurance Company, 
          Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 391 Wis. 2d 494,942 N.W.2d 492 
(2020 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 20, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 19, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Marinette   
 
JUDGE: 
David G. Miron & James A. Morrison   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ROGGENSACK, DALLET, and 
HAGEDORN, JJ., joined.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by George Burnett and Conway, Olejniczak & Jerry, S.C., 
Green Bay. There was an oral argument by George Burnett. 
 
 
2 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Dustin T. Woehl and Kasdorf Lewis & Swietlik, SC, Milwaukee. 
There was an oral argument by Dustin T. Woehl. 
 
 
2021 WI 45 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2018AP1782 
(L.C.  
Nos. 2017CV73 & 2018CV127) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
: 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Francis G. Graef, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Continental Indemnity Company, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
 
ABC Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendant. 
 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
Francis G. Graef, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Applied Underwriters, Inc., 
 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
 
ABC Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendant. 
FILED 
 
MAY 20, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ROGGENSACK, DALLET, and 
HAGEDORN, JJ., joined.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion. 
 
 
No. 
2018AP1782   
 
2 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.   In this case, we must determine 
whether the exclusive-remedy provision of the Wisconsin Worker's 
Compensation Act (the "Act"), Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2) (2017-18),1 
bars the tort action filed by the petitioner, Francis Graef.  
¶2 
In 2017, Graef filed a tort action in circuit court 
against 
Continental 
Indemnity 
Company 
("Continental"), 
his 
employer's worker's compensation insurance carrier, alleging 
that his self-inflicted gunshot wound was the result of 
Continental's negligence.  More specifically, Graef alleged that 
Continental was negligent in failing to approve payment for a 
refill of his antidepressant medication——prescribed after a 
workplace injury——and as result of that negligence, Graef 
attempted suicide.  Continental moved for summary judgment, 
arguing that Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2) barred Graef's tort action 
because the Act provides the exclusive remedy for his injuries.  
The circuit court concluded that the exclusive-remedy provision 
of the Act did not bar Graef's action.2  The court of appeals 
reversed, concluding that the Act provides Graef's exclusive 
remedy and that to recover for his injuries, Graef must file a 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 The Honorable James A. Morrison of the Marinette County 
Circuit Court presided. 
No. 
2018AP1782   
 
3 
 
worker's compensation claim with the Department of Workforce 
Development (DWD).3   
¶3 
We affirm the decision of the court of appeals, 
conclude that the Act provides Graef's exclusive remedy for the 
injuries alleged in his complaint, and remand the cause to the 
circuit court with directions to grant summary judgment to 
Continental on Graef's negligence claim.  
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶4 
On November 1, 2012, Graef was working in the 
livestock yard at Equity Livestock when a bull gored him, 
causing both physical injuries and depression.  A doctor 
prescribed the antidepressant duloxetine to treat Graef's 
depression, 
and 
Equity 
Livestock's 
worker's 
compensation 
insurance carrier, Continental, bore the responsibility of 
authorizing and paying for the medication. 
¶5 
On May 12, 2015, Graef went to his pharmacy to refill 
the duloxetine prescription.  Continental initially rejected the 
pharmacy's request for payment, but then approved the request 
after the pharmacy called Continental and requested payment a 
second time.  On June 23, 2015, Graef returned to the pharmacy 
for another refill of duloxetine.  Continental once again denied 
the pharmacy's initial request for payment, and Graef left the 
pharmacy without his medication because he could not afford to 
                                                 
3 Graef v. Cont'l Indem. Co., No. 2018AP1782, unpublished 
slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2020). 
No. 
2018AP1782   
 
4 
 
purchase the medication on his own.4  Less than two months later, 
on August 9, 2015, Graef attempted suicide with a firearm and 
suffered a gunshot injury.   
¶6 
Two years later, Graef filed a tort action in circuit 
court, alleging that Continental was "negligent in failing to 
continue to authorize and pay for" the June 2015 duloxetine 
refill.5  Graef additionally claimed that Continental "by 
Wisconsin Statute [ch.] 102 was responsible for paying and 
authorizing worker's compensation medical, prescription and 
indemnity payments to [Graef] for injuries sustained on November 
1, 2012."  According to Graef, the self-inflicted gunshot injury 
"would not have occurred had [Continental] approved and paid for 
the prescription."  Graef sought to recover compensatory damages 
associated with his suicide attempt, including "past and future 
medical expenses, personal injuries, pain, suffering, [and] 
disability." 
¶7 
Continental moved for summary judgment, asserting that 
Graef brought his claim in the wrong forum because the Act 
                                                 
4 Continental asserts that there was no denial of medication 
because it subsequently approved payment for the duloxetine but 
Graef failed to return to the pharmacy to pick up the 
medication.  However, as Continental recognizes, we accept all 
of the allegations in Graef's complaint as true for purposes of 
our 
review. 
 
Cohn 
ex 
rel. 
Shindell 
v. 
Apogee, 
Inc., 
225 Wis. 2d 815, 817, 593 N.W.2d 921 (Ct. App. 1999). 
5 It is undisputed that Graef never filed a worker's 
compensation claim with DWD regarding Continental's alleged 
failure to authorize his prescription refill.  Pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 102.17(4), the statute of limitations for filing such a 
claim is 12 years from the date of injury, which for Graef's 
injuries has yet to expire.  
No. 
2018AP1782   
 
5 
 
provides his exclusive remedy.  The circuit court denied 
Continental's motion, refusing to apply the exclusive-remedy 
provision because Continental would not concede that Graef's 
claim would prevail if filed as a worker's compensation claim.6  
The court of appeals reversed the circuit court and remanded 
with directions to grant summary judgment to Continental.7  Graef 
petitioned this court for review, which we granted. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶8 
"We review a grant of summary judgment independently, 
applying the same methodology as the circuit court."  Pinter v. 
Village of Stetsonville, 2019 WI 74, ¶26, 387 Wis. 2d 475, 
929 N.W.2d 547.  Summary judgment shall be granted where the 
record demonstrates "that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  The 
facts on appeal are undisputed.  The question before us is 
                                                 
6 Prior to orally denying Continental's motion, the circuit 
court granted Graef's pending motion to amend his complaint to 
add allegations against Applied Underwriters, an entity that 
Graef alleged had assisted Continental in processing Graef's 
claims.  Prior to the circuit court entering an order denying 
Continental's motion, Applied Underwriters filed a motion to 
dismiss the amended complaint, which the circuit court never 
addressed.  As the court of appeals noted, on remand, the 
circuit court may also address Applied Underwriters' pending 
motion to dismiss.  See Graef, No. 2018AP1782, at ¶39. 
7 We must briefly correct an error in the court of appeals' 
decision.  The court of appeals wrote:  "Second, the alleged 
wrongful conduct in Cohn, harassment, supported the recognized 
common-law tort of wrongful death."  Id., ¶34 (emphasis added).  
However, wrongful death has been a statutory claim since 1857.  
See § 1, ch. 71, Laws of 1857.   
No. 
2018AP1782   
 
6 
 
whether the Act's exclusive-remedy provision prohibits Graef 
from filing this tort action in circuit court, which is a 
question of law that we review independently.  See Ehr v. West 
Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 2018 WI App 14, ¶7, 380 Wis. 2d 138, 
908 N.W.2d 486. 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶9 
We first provide some background regarding Wisconsin's 
worker's compensation laws and then outline the relevant 
provisions.  Next, we examine Graef's pleadings and determine 
whether the facts in the complaint, as alleged, meet the 
conditions of liability under Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1) and 
consequently, whether the Act provides Graef's exclusive remedy.  
Finally, we address Graef's remaining arguments that:  (1) we 
should create an exception for the negligent denial of worker's 
compensation claims; and (2) Continental improperly failed to 
concede that Graef's worker's compensation claim would succeed. 
A. Wisconsin's Worker's Compensation Laws 
¶10 In 1911, Wisconsin became the first state to enact a 
broad, constitutionally valid worker's compensation system.  
Byers v. LIRC, 208 Wis. 2d 388, 395, 561 N.W.2d 678 (1997); 
17 Thomas M. Domer & Charles F. Domer, Wisconsin Practice 
Series: Workers Compensation Law § 2:1 (2017-18).  Worker's 
compensation laws are considered "the grand bargain" "under 
which workers, in exchange for compensation for work-related 
injuries regardless of fault, . . . relinquish the right to sue 
employers and . . . accept smaller but more certain recoveries 
than might be available in a tort action."  County of La Crosse 
No. 
2018AP1782   
 
7 
 
v. WERC, 182 Wis. 2d 15, 30, 513 N.W.2d 579 (1994).  In exchange 
for receiving immunity from tort liability, employers must 
provide benefits regardless of fault.  Guse v. A.O. Smith Corp., 
260 Wis. 403, 406-07, 51 N.W.2d 24 (1952).  In other words, the 
worker's compensation laws "are basically economic regulations 
by which the legislature, as a matter of public policy, has 
balanced competing societal interests."  Mulder v. Acme-
Cleveland Corp., 95 Wis. 2d 173, 180, 290 N.W.2d 275 (1978); see 
Jenkins v. Sabourin, 104 Wis. 2d 309, 322, 311 N.W.2d 600 (1981) 
(describing the worker's compensation provisions as "the result 
of 
decades 
of 
debate 
prior 
to 
[their] 
passage" 
and 
a 
representation of the "delicate balancing of the interests 
represented in our industrial society"). 
¶11 Today, worker's compensation benefits are primarily 
governed by Wisconsin Stat. ch. 102, the Act, which is 
administered by DWD.  See Wis. Stat. § 102.14(1); Mireles v. 
LIRC, 2000 WI 96, ¶6, 237 Wis. 2d 69, 613 N.W.2d 875.  Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 102.03 
sets 
forth 
the 
basic 
requirements 
for 
a 
compensable injury under the Act.  Section 102.03(1) provides a 
list of conditions that impose liability under the Act against 
an "employer, any other employee of the same employer and the 
worker's 
compensation 
insurance 
carrier." 
 
§ 102.03(2).  
Generally, an employer and an employer's insurance carrier's 
obligations to pay worker's compensation accrue under the Act 
when all of the following conditions are present:   
 the employee sustains an injury;  
No. 
2018AP1782   
 
8 
 
 at the time of the injury, both the employer and the 
employee are subject to the Act;  
 at the time of the injury, the employee is performing 
service growing out of and incidental to his or her 
employment;  
 the injury is not intentionally self-inflicted; and  
 the accident or disease causing injury arises out of 
the employment.   
Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1)(a)-(e).8   
¶12 The Act also covers a second or subsequent injury that 
stems from the first work-related injury, as case law has made 
clear:  "[W]hen an employee is treated for a work-related injury 
and incurs an additional injury during the course of treatment, 
the second injury is deemed as one growing out of, and 
incidental to, employment in the sense that the employer [or 
insurance carrier], by virtue of the Act, becomes liable for the 
augmented injury."  Jenkins, 104 Wis. 2d at 316.  In other 
words, employers and worker's compensation insurance carriers 
have a duty to pay for a subsequent injury that naturally flows 
from a covered workplace injury, including any injury caused or 
worsened by the treatment, or lack of treatment, of the original 
work-related injury.   
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.03(1)(f) and (g) contain additional 
provisions that apply only to employees who travel in the course 
of their employment and to members of the state legislature.  
Neither of those provisions is applicable to Graef.   
No. 
2018AP1782   
 
9 
 
¶13 Pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.03(2), 
when 
the 
conditions of liability in § 102.03(1) are satisfied, the Act 
provides the exclusive remedy:  "Where such conditions exist the 
right to the recovery of compensation under this chapter shall 
be the exclusive remedy against the employer, any other employee 
of the same employer and the worker's compensation insurance 
carrier."9  We have referred to this exclusive-remedy provision 
as "an integral feature of the compromise between the interest 
of the employer and the interest of the worker."  Mulder, 
95 Wis. 2d at 181.  Recognizing the "grand bargain," we have 
emphasized that courts must "exercise care to avoid upsetting 
the balance of interests achieved by the [Act]."  Weiss v. City 
of Milwaukee, 208 Wis. 2d 95, 102, 559 N.W.2d 588 (1997).  With 
these provisions in mind, we turn to Graef's allegations against 
Continental. 
B. The Conditions of Liability in Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1) Are 
Met and the Act Provides Graef's Exclusive Remedy. 
¶14 To determine if the Act provides Graef's exclusive 
remedy, barring his circuit court action, we must look to his 
complaint and determine whether, as alleged, the conditions of 
worker's compensation liability are satisfied under Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.03(1).   
                                                 
9 See Walstrom v. Gallagher Bassett Servs., Inc., 2000 WI 
App 247, ¶¶12-13, 239 Wis. 2d 473, 620 N.W.2d 223 (rejecting the 
argument that "different rules should be applied to worker's 
compensation carriers than to employers" under the exclusive-
remedy provision). 
No. 
2018AP1782   
 
10 
 
¶15 Graef's complaint presents an unbroken chain of events 
starting with his November 1, 2012 injury and ending with his 
August 9, 2015 suicide attempt.  According to the complaint, 
Graef was injured in the course of his employment on November 1, 
2012.  As a result of the workplace injury, Graef suffered from 
depression 
which 
his 
doctors 
treated 
with 
duloxetine, 
a 
prescription antidepressant that Continental paid for on Graef's 
behalf.  Continental had a duty to pay for the prescription 
under the Act, specifically Wis. Stat. § 102.42(1), because it 
was Equity Livestock's worker's compensation insurance carrier.  
When Continental failed to approve payment for the duloxetine 
refill on June 23, 2015, Graef left the pharmacy without the 
medication because he was unable to pay for it himself.  Without 
the duloxetine, Graef's depression relapsed and he attempted 
suicide by gunshot on August 9, 2015.  Graef suffered injuries 
as a result of the self-inflicted gunshot.  Graef's complaint 
establishes an unbroken causal chain from his workplace injury 
to his suicide attempt.   
¶16 Continental asserts that Graef's allegations, if true, 
satisfy 
the 
conditions 
of 
liability 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.03(1), and therefore his claim must be filed as a worker's 
compensation claim.  We agree.   
¶17 As a reminder, the conditions of liability under Wis. 
Stat. § 102.03(1)(a)-(e) are: 
 "the employee sustains an injury";  
 "at the time of the injury, both the employer and the 
employee are subject to" the Act;  
No. 
2018AP1782   
 
11 
 
 "at the time of the injury, the employee is performing 
service growing out of and incidental to his or her 
employment";10 
 "the injury is not intentionally self-inflicted"; 
 "the accident or disease causing injury arises out of 
the employee's employment."   
¶18 When we look at the allegations in Graef's complaint, 
we conclude that, if proven, they would satisfy the conditions 
of worker's compensation liability under Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1).  
As a result, his claim must be filed under the Act.  We begin by 
considering the initial injury outlined in the complaint——the 
workplace injury on November 1, 2012.  There is no dispute that 
at the time of the initial injury, Graef and his employer were 
subject to the provisions of the Act and that Graef was working 
in the livestock yard incidental to his employment.  Further, 
there is no dispute that the goring injury was not self-
inflicted, and that the injury occurred at work.  Since these 
allegations, if proven, would satisfy § 102.03(1)(a)-(e), the 
exclusive-remedy 
provision 
dictates 
that 
Graef's 
exclusive 
remedy is under the Act.  
¶19 Next we turn to Graef's second injury.  Our case law 
supports the conclusion that, as pled, Graef's second injury, 
the self-inflicted gunshot wound, grew out of and was incidental 
to his original workplace injury, the resulting depression, and 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.03(1)(c) has five subdivisions, but 
subd. 1 is the one applicable here. 
No. 
2018AP1782   
 
12 
 
the relapse caused by the discontinuation of the prescribed 
duloxetine.  In other words, as alleged, the second injury is a 
direct 
result 
of 
the 
original 
workplace 
accident 
and, 
consequently, must be brought as a worker's compensation claim.  
In Jenkins, we reasoned that "when an employee is treated for a 
work-related injury and incurs an additional injury during the 
course of treatment, the second injury is deemed as one growing 
out of, and incidental to, employment in the sense that the 
employer, by virtue of the Act, becomes liable for the augmented 
injury."  Jenkins, 104 Wis. 2d at 316.  Like the employee in 
Jenkins, Graef suffered a second injury (the self-inflicted 
gunshot wound) that grew out of his original workplace injury, 
because Continental failed to authorize and pay for the 
medication.  It is important to note that even though Graef's 
gunshot wound was intentionally self-inflicted, that injury is 
covered under the Act if "without the [workplace] injury, there 
would have been no suicide [or attempted suicide]," because it 
is viewed as "merely an act, not a cause, intervening between 
the injury and the death [or attempted suicide], and that it was 
part of an unbroken chain of events from the injury to the death 
[or attempted suicide]."  Brenne v. LIRC, 38 Wis. 2d 84, 94, 
156 N.W.2d 497 
(1968). 
 
As 
Continental 
conceded 
at 
oral 
argument, "[i]f [Graef] can show that he [tried to] kill[] 
himself because of depression caused by the original workplace 
injury, the mere fact that it was self-inflicted will not be a 
bar to workplace compensation."   
No. 
2018AP1782   
 
13 
 
¶20 At oral argument, Graef maintained that he could not 
satisfy the conditions of liability under Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1) 
because there was a break in the causal chain when Continental 
failed to authorize and pay for his prescription refill on June 
23, 2015.  As a result, according to Graef, at the time he 
suffered the self-inflicted gunshot wound, he was not performing 
service growing out of and incidental to his employment.  This 
argument fails.  If Graef's depression was not caused by or 
related to the workplace injury, then Continental had no duty to 
authorize and pay for the medication to treat it and no 
responsibility for the effects of the untreated depression.  
Continental's duty was undisputedly created by, and existed 
exclusively because of, the Act.  Graef's own complaint 
acknowledges that Continental's duty to pay stems from the Act 
when it states that Continental's duty was established "by 
Wisconsin Statute 102," i.e., the Act.  Paradoxically, Graef 
wishes to avail himself of the liability created by the Act 
while avoiding the "smaller but more certain recoveries" the Act 
provides.  County of La Crosse, 182 Wis. 2d at 30.  Permitting 
Graef to pursue this action in tort would enable him to take 
advantage of the "grand bargain" while foreclosing Continental 
from doing the same.   
¶21 To summarize, because Graef's tort action consists of 
allegations that, if proven, would satisfy the conditions for 
worker's compensation liability, the exclusive-remedy provision 
applies and the Act provides Graef's exclusive remedy.  See 
Jenson 
v. 
Emps. 
Mut. 
Cas. 
Co., 
161 
Wis. 2d 
253, 
263, 
No. 
2018AP1782   
 
14 
 
468 N.W.2d 1 (1991) (reasoning that the plaintiff's "common law 
action is barred by the exclusivity provisions if she in all 
other respects is entitled to recovery under the Act"). 
C. Graef's Additional Arguments 
¶22 Graef makes two additional arguments that we deem 
unpersuasive.  First, he asserts that this court should create 
an exception for the negligent denial of worker's compensation 
claims which, under Graef's theory, the Act would not cover.  We 
are unpersuaded by Graef's argument because creating such an 
exception 
and 
removing 
the 
negligent 
denial 
of 
worker's 
compensation benefits from the purview of the exclusive-remedy 
provision of the Act would "upset[] the balance of interests 
achieved by the [Act]," Weiss, 208 Wis. 2d at 102, and run 
contrary to this court's decision in Coleman v. Am. Universal 
Ins. Co., 86 Wis. 2d 615, 273 N.W.2d 220 (1979), superseded by 
statute on other grounds, Aslakson v. Gallagher Bassett Servs., 
Inc., 2007 WI 39, ¶75, 300 Wis. 2d 92, 729 N.W.2d 712, and the 
legislative action taken in response to that decision.   
¶23 In Coleman, a plaintiff alleged that his worker's 
compensation 
insurer 
and 
its 
adjusting 
company 
acted 
"arbitrarily, willfully and in bad faith" and "with malice or 
oppression" in arbitrarily cutting off payment of his worker's 
compensation claim multiple times.  Coleman, 86 Wis. 2d at 618.  
We concluded that the allegation of bad faith was separate and 
distinct from the original job-related injury and thus was not 
addressed by the Act.  Id. at 623.  In doing so, we created a 
limited exception allowing for bad-faith denial of benefits to 
No. 
2018AP1782   
 
15 
 
be brought in tort.  The legislature promptly responded by 
enacting Wis. Stat. § 102.18(1)(bp), which specifically and 
explicitly provided an exclusive remedy for bad faith claims 
against employers and their insurers under the Act.  With this 
statute, the legislature indicated that any denial-of-benefits 
claim, whether negligent or in bad faith, must be brought as a 
worker's compensation claim.  As the court of appeals aptly 
noted in this case, "it would be incongruent to conclude that 
our 
legislature 
intended 
for 
a 
claim 
that 
a 
worker's 
compensation insurance carrier acted in bad faith to be pursued 
exclusively under the Act while at the same time allowing a 
claim alleging negligent conduct to proceed in civil court."  
Graef v. Cont'l Indem. Co., No. 2018AP1782, unpublished slip 
op., ¶24 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2020).   
¶24 Second, Graef argues that Continental is "trying to 
have it both ways" since Continental will not concede that 
Graef's worker's compensation claim will succeed, an issue that 
also concerned the circuit court.  The circuit court was 
troubled by Continental's refusal to concede that Graef's claim 
would succeed as a worker's compensation case——"you're telling 
me that you can take a totally different position in [front of 
DWD]"——and insisted that Continental "can't have it both ways."  
This argument fails because Continental is entitled to argue to 
the circuit court that Graef is in the wrong forum and that, 
even if he were in the right forum, his claim would fail.  The 
circuit 
court 
improperly 
imposed 
a 
prerequisite 
to 
the 
No. 
2018AP1782   
 
16 
 
exclusive-remedy provision by conditioning its application on 
Continental's concession that Graef would prevail under the Act.  
¶25 At oral argument, Continental's counsel clarified its 
position.  When asked:  "Is it your position that Graef has no 
claim whatsoever against your client?" Continental's counsel 
responded:   
Our position is that he has a claim that he can 
pursue.  The way he pled it, it must be pursued in 
worker's compensation.  That doesn't mean we have to 
concede that he will prevail.  Nobody is guaranteed to 
prevail on a claim if they can't prove the elements.  
What we will say is:  if he proves what he put in his 
complaint, 
he 
will 
win 
in 
worker's 
compensation . . . . 
But 
that's 
putting 
the 
cart 
before the horse.  He has to prove his claims. 
When pressed about the language in its brief that "Graef 
deserves to lose" his worker's compensation claim, Continental's 
counsel withdrew that language and said, "I don't know if he 
deserves to lose.  We deserve to argue that he deserves to 
lose."  In other words, Continental was simply reserving its 
right to litigate in the proper forum and dispute the underlying 
factual allegations, which it is entitled to do.   
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶26 We affirm the decision of the court of appeals and 
conclude that the Act provides Graef's exclusive remedy for the 
injuries alleged in his complaint.  Therefore, we remand the 
case to the circuit court with directions to grant summary 
judgment to Continental on Graef's negligence claim.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No.  2018AP1782.rgb 
 
1 
 
 
¶27 REBECCA 
GRASSL 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
majority dismisses Francis G. Graef's tort claim prematurely 
without affording him an opportunity to discover or develop 
facts which may establish his right to assert a claim outside of 
Wisconsin's worker's compensation law ("the Act").  Pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1), liability under the Act "shall exist" 
"only where the following conditions concur: 
(a) 
Where the employee sustains an injury. 
(b) 
Where, at the time of the injury, both the employer 
and employee are subject to the provisions of this 
chapter. 
(c)1. Where, at the time of the injury, the employee is 
performing service growing out of and incidental to his or 
her employment. 
 . . . . 
(d) 
Where the injury is not intentionally self-inflicted. 
(e) 
Where the accident or disease causing injury arises 
out of the employee's employment." 
Under § 102.03(2), "[w]here such conditions exist the right to 
the recovery of compensation under this chapter shall be the 
exclusive remedy against the employer, any other employee of the 
same employer and the worker's compensation insurance carrier."  
(Emphasis added.) 
¶28 The plain text of the statute establishes an exclusive 
remedy against the insurer under the Act only when the employee 
possesses the "right" to recover——that is, when the employee has 
No.  2018AP1782.rgb 
 
2 
 
a "legal guarantee" of recovery where the statutory conditions 
are met.  See Right, Black's Law Dictionary 1581 (11th ed. 2019) 
("Something that is due to a person by just claim [or] legal 
guarantee").  Under the plain text of the statute, the exclusive 
remedy is not triggered by the mere possibility of recovery, as 
the majority suggests.  Majority op., ¶24 ("Continental is 
entitled to argue to the circuit court that Graef is in the 
wrong forum and that, even if he were in the right forum, his 
claim would fail.").  The statute, however, designates worker's 
compensation law as the exclusive remedy only if there is a 
"right to the recovery of compensation under" the Act.  Wis. 
Stat. § 102.03(2).  The majority interprets § 102.03(2) to 
establish worker's compensation law as the exclusive avenue for 
any relief but that is not what the statute says.  Keup v. DHFS, 
2004 WI 16, ¶17, 269 Wis. 2d 59, 675 N.W.2d 755 ("When the 
statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we may not look 
beyond the plain words of the statute in question to ascertain 
its meaning."); Bank Mut. v. S.J. Boyer Const., Inc., 2010 WI 
74, ¶24, 326 Wis. 2d 521, 785 N.W.2d 462 ("[W]e apply the plain 
words of the statute and ordinarily proceed no further.").  
Although an employee has the right to recover under the Act 
where the statutory conditions for worker's compensation exist, 
in the absence of such a right to recover, the Act presents no 
impediment to claims based on other theories of law.  The 
employee must, of course, prove his claim under any alternative 
theory of liability against the employer or insurer. 
No.  2018AP1782.rgb 
 
3 
 
¶29 The majority concludes that "[t]he circuit court 
improperly imposed a prerequisite to the exclusive-remedy 
provision by conditioning its application on Continental's 
concession that Graef would prevail under the Act."  Majority 
op., ¶24.  The majority errs.  The plain language of the statute 
supports the circuit court's interpretation.  The prerequisite 
on which the circuit court relied exists in the statutory text 
itself.  Only if the employee has "the right to the recovery of 
compensation under" worker's compensation law does the "recovery 
of compensation under" Chapter 102 constitute "the exclusive 
remedy" against the worker's compensation insurance carrier.  
Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2) (emphasis added). 
¶30 The circuit court concluded that Continental was 
trying to "have it both ways."  Continental maintained in 
Graef's tort case that worker's compensation law afforded the 
exclusive remedy, but would not concede that Graef had the right 
to recover under the Act; in fact, Continental contended that 
Graef "deserves to lose" a worker's compensation claim.  The 
circuit court properly denied Continental's motion to dismiss1 
                                                 
1 Although 
Continental 
brought 
a 
motion 
for 
summary 
judgment, its motion was based on the complaint alone and 
nothing beyond the pleadings.  Summary judgment is appropriate 
if the pleadings and evidence "show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2).  In substance, Continental brought a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted.  Wis. Stat. § 802.06(2)(a)6.  As Continental stated in 
its motion, "[t]he basis of this motion . . . is that the 
Plaintiff's 
claims 
are 
barred 
by 
the 
Wisconsin 
Worker's 
Compensation exclusive remedy provision as set forth in Wis. 
Stat. § 102.03(2) and case law.  Summary judgment is warranted 
because, under the facts as alleged and pleaded by the 
No.  2018AP1782.rgb 
 
4 
 
because the insurer "can't have it both ways.  It either is 
worker's comp[ensation] or it's not" and Graef "has to have a 
forum someplace."  Because Continental refused to concede that 
Graef would recover under worker's compensation law, the Act 
could not constitute the exclusive remedy. 
¶31 This does not necessarily mean that Graef (or any 
other employee) would actually recover under tort or any other 
theory of liability; however, it does mean that Chapter 102 does 
not foreclose bringing a claim outside of worker's compensation 
law.  Unless Graef has the "right" to recover worker's 
compensation benefits, the Act does not furnish his exclusive 
remedy.  This court has previously interpreted the text of the 
Act accordingly.  In Jenson v. Emps. Mut. Cas. Co., 161 Wis. 2d 
253, 468 N.W.2d 1 (1991), this court concluded that "Jenson's 
common law action is barred by the exclusivity provisions if she 
in all other respects is entitled to recovery under the Act."  
Id. at 263 (emphasis added).  The same holds true for Graef.  At 
this stage of the litigation, it remains uncertain whether Graef 
is entitled to any recovery under the Act.  Accordingly, Graef's 
tort claim should survive unless and until his right to recovery 
under the Act is established. 
¶32 The majority certainly suggests that Graef will be 
able to recover under worker's compensation law.  It concludes 
that the suicide attempt was a "direct result of the original 
                                                                                                                                                             
Plaintiff, the case must be dismissed as a matter of law."  
Before this court, Continental reiterated its position that 
Graef's "complaint fails to state an actionable claim and must 
be dismissed." 
No.  2018AP1782.rgb 
 
5 
 
workplace accident."  Majority op., ¶19.  Wisconsin courts have 
repeatedly held that the Act covers any injuries resulting from 
a suicide attempt so long as "without the [original workplace] 
injury, there would have been no suicide."  Cohn ex rel. 
Shindell v. Apogee, Inc., 225 Wis. 2d 815, 820, 593 N.W.2d 921 
(Ct. App. 1999); see also Brenne v. DILHR, 38 Wis. 2d 84, 92-94, 
156 N.W.2d 497 (1968) ("While the act of suicide may be an 
independent intervening cause in some cases, it is certainly not 
so in those cases where the incontrovertible evidence shows 
that, without the injury, there would have been no suicide; that 
the suicide was merely an act, not a cause, intervening between 
the injury and the death, and that it was part of an unbroken 
chain of events from the injury to the death."). 
¶33 The majority further concludes that there was no break 
in the causal chain of events between the 2012 work injury and 
the 2015 suicide attempt.  Majority op., ¶15.  "It is boiler-
plate law that any medical injury as the consequence of 
treatment of a work-related injury relates back to the original 
compensable event and the consequences of medical treatment, 
whether the result of negligence or not, are the liability of 
the employer under the Act."  Jenkins v. Sabourin, 104 Wis. 2d 
309, 315, 311 N.W.2d 600 (1981) (citing Stiger v. Indus. Comm'n, 
220 Wis. 653, 265 N.W. 678 (1936) and Lakeside Bridge & Steel 
Co. v. Pugh, 206 Wis. 62, 238 N.W. 872 (1931)).  "It is beyond 
doubt at this late date in the history of our workers 
compensation law that injury during the course of medical 
No.  2018AP1782.rgb 
 
6 
 
attention 
to 
a 
covered 
industrial 
injury 
is 
in 
itself 
compensable under the Act."  Id. at 316. 
¶34 Continental, however, has consistently contended Graef 
is not entitled to recover under worker's compensation law, 
thereby precluding operation of the exclusive remedy provision 
of the Act.  Rather than seeking recovery under worker's 
compensation law, Graef instead brought a civil tort claim, 
asserting a break in the chain of events between his original 
workplace injury and his suicide attempt, and contending that 
the injuries he suffered as a result of the attempted suicide 
stem from Continental's independent, intervening, and allegedly 
negligent failure to approve payment of Graef's prescribed 
medication to treat his depression.  The majority improperly 
denies Graef the opportunity to prove his claim in civil court. 
¶35 A complaint should not be dismissed "[i]f the facts" 
asserted therein "reveal an apparent right to recover under any 
legal theory" in which case the facts "are sufficient as a cause 
of action."  Cattau v. Nat'l Ins. Serv. of Wisconsin, Inc., 2019 
WI 46, ¶4, 386 Wis. 2d 515, 926 N.W.2d 756 (citing Strid v. 
Converse, 111 Wis. 2d 418, 423, 331 N.W.2d 350 (1983)).  "If 
proof of the well-pleaded facts in a complaint would satisfy 
each element of a cause of action, then the complaint has stated 
a claim upon which relief may be granted."  Id., ¶6.  In his 
complaint, Graef alleges that he was unable to take his 
prescribed depression medication "for approximately three months 
because insurance payment was denied and he could not afford the 
medication without insurance" and that his "self-inflicted 
No.  2018AP1782.rgb 
 
7 
 
gunshot injury . . . would not have occurred had [Continental] 
approved and paid for the prescription."  Graef contends he 
"suffered a new physical and emotional injury as a consequence 
of" Continental's negligence.  Among his claims for damages, 
Graef seeks recovery of compensatory damages for his medical 
expenses, personal injuries, pain, suffering, and disability. 
¶36 Proof of the facts Graef alleges in his complaint 
requires discovery, which Continental failed to provide in full 
prior to the hearing on its motion to dismiss.  After the 
circuit court denied Continental's motion, it addressed the 
parties' 
discovery 
dispute. 
 
At 
that 
time, 
Continental 
reiterated its objection to producing its claim file, including 
"all the decisions and all the internal correspondence going 
back and forth about the claims, handling what was going on in 
this case" but the circuit court ordered Continental to produce 
the "whole file," subject to any claims of privilege.  The 
majority's decision, however, directs the circuit court to 
dismiss Graef's claim, thereby precluding him from obtaining 
full discovery and denying him the opportunity to prove the 
facts asserted in his complaint. 
¶37 By prematurely dismissing Graef's tort claim, the 
majority purports to preserve Continental's "right to litigate 
in the proper forum"——according to the majority, the DWD, under 
worker's compensation law——as well as Continental's right to 
"dispute the underlying factual allegations."  Majority op., 
¶25.  However, if Continental prevails before the DWD under 
worker's compensation law, then Graef has no "right to the 
No.  2018AP1782.rgb 
 
8 
 
recovery of compensation" under Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2), without 
which the Act cannot, as a matter of simple logic, provide the 
"exclusive remedy."  If the Act does not provide the exclusive 
remedy, then as a matter of law there is no statutory bar to 
claims outside of the Act, including Graef's tort claim. 
¶38 As 
the 
text 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.03(2) 
plainly 
provides, absent a right to recover compensation under Chapter 
102, worker's compensation law does not provide the exclusive 
remedy against the insurer.  I would reverse the court of 
appeals decision and remand the matter to the circuit court to 
give Graef an opportunity to develop his case.  Unless and until 
Graef has the "right" to recover under worker's compensation 
law, the law affords him the opportunity to prove his tort 
claim.  Because the majority prematurely closes the courthouse 
doors to Francis G. Graef, I respectfully dissent. 
* * * 
¶39 Aside from the merits, it is important to draw 
attention to footnote 7 of the majority opinion, in which the 
majority mentions the court of appeals' mistake in referring to 
wrongful death as a "common law tort" but fails to withdraw that 
language from the court of appeals' opinion.  This could confuse 
the bench and bar, which may rely on or cite the court of 
appeals opinion for this misstatement of the law.  The majority 
should have withdrawn the errant language from the court of 
appeals opinion.  This court not only has the authority but the 
duty to do so, which it has exercised on many occasions.  See, 
No.  2018AP1782.rgb 
 
9 
 
e.g., In re Samuel J.H., 2013 WI 68, ¶5, 349 Wis. 2d 202, 833 
N.W.2d 109.2 
¶40 This responsibility applies not only to published 
court of appeals opinions but unpublished opinions as well.  
Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 189-90, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997), 
referred to published opinions because at the time of that 
decision, unpublished opinions could not be cited "except to 
support a claim of claim preclusion, issue preclusion, or the 
law of the case."  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.23 (1997-98).  That 
rule changed in 2009 when this court modified Rule 809.23 to 
allow citation to authored but unpublished court of appeals 
opinions 
for 
"persuasive 
value." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 
809.23(3)(b); Supreme Court Order, No. 08-02, In the matter of 
amendment of Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.23(3) regarding citation to 
unpublished opinions (Jan. 6, 2009).  This court must withdraw 
erroneous language from court of appeals unpublished opinions 
because the bar relies upon and cites to them. 
 
                                                 
2 State ex rel. Zignego v. WEC, 2021 WI 32, ¶12 n.7, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, 957 N.W.2d 208; Xcel Energy Servs., Inc. v. LIRC, 
2013 WI 64, ¶2, 349 Wis. 2d 234, 833 N.W.2d 665; State ex rel. 
Town of Delavan v. Cir. Ct. for Walworth Cnty., 167 Wis. 2d 719, 
727, 482 N.W.2d 899 (1992); Hatleberg v. Norwest Bank Wis., 2005 
WI 109, ¶28, 283 Wis. 2d 234, 700 N.W.2d 15; Burbank Grease 
Servs., LLC v. Sokolowski, 2006 WI 103, ¶33, 294 Wis. 2d 274, 
717 N.W.2d 781; 
State v. Reed, 2018 WI 109, ¶106, 384 
Wis. 2d 469, 920 N.W.2d 56 (Ziegler, J., concurring); State v. 
Harris, 2010 WI 79, ¶34 n.12, 326 Wis. 2d 685, 786 N.W.2d 409. 
No.  2018AP1782.rgb 
 
 
 
1