Title: Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
LISA MILLER-JENKINS  
 
v.   Record No. 070933    
 
    OPINION BY 
JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
               June 6, 2008 
JANET MILLER-JENKINS 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals 
erred in directing a circuit court to register a custody and 
visitation order rendered by a Vermont court, based on the 
Court of Appeals’ previous holding in the same custody and 
visitation dispute that the federal Parental Kidnapping 
Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2000 & Supp. V 2005), 
requires that the courts of this Commonwealth give full faith 
and credit to the Vermont order. 
 
In 2000, Lisa Miller-Jenkins (Lisa) and Janet Miller-
Jenkins (Janet) entered into a civil union (the civil union) 
in Vermont that was permitted under Vermont law.1  Lisa and 
Janet decided that Lisa would bear a child, and in April 2002, 
after successful artificial insemination, Lisa gave birth to 
IMJ2 in Virginia.  Lisa, Janet, and IMJ lived together in 
Virginia until July 2002, when they moved to Vermont, where 
                     
1 Because the parties have the same last name, we will 
refer to them by their first names. 
2 Because IMJ is a minor, we refer to her by pseudonym. 
they lived until September 2003.  At that time, Lisa and IMJ 
returned permanently to Virginia over Janet’s objection. 
 
In November 2003, Lisa filed a petition in a Vermont 
family court (the Vermont court), seeking to dissolve the 
civil union and to gain custody of IMJ.  The Vermont court 
dissolved the civil union and entered a custody and visitation 
order (the Vermont custody order) granting temporary custody 
of IMJ to Lisa and temporary visitation rights to Janet.  
After initially allowing Janet to visit IMJ in June, Lisa 
thereafter refused to permit Janet to have contact with IMJ as 
required by the terms of the Vermont custody order. 
 
On July 1, 2004, Lisa filed a petition in the Frederick 
County Circuit Court (the circuit court), asking the circuit 
court to determine that Lisa was IMJ’s “sole parent” and 
seeking sole custody of IMJ.  On July 7, 2004, Janet filed a 
motion in the Vermont court seeking enforcement of the Vermont 
custody order and a determination that Lisa was in contempt of 
that court for her failure to abide by the terms of the 
Vermont custody order.  On July 19, 2004, the Vermont court 
entered an order holding that the Vermont court had continuing 
jurisdiction over all custody matters in the case, and that 
the Vermont court would not defer to an order entered by a 
court in another state purporting to resolve the issue of 
custody. 
 
2
 
In August 2004, the circuit court entered an order 
temporarily awarding sole custody of IMJ to Lisa and ordered 
that IMJ not be removed from Virginia (the Virginia custody 
order).  Because the Vermont custody order included a 
provision granting Janet scheduled visitation with IMJ in 
Vermont, the Virginia custody order was in direct conflict 
with the Vermont custody order.  In September 2004, the 
Vermont court issued an order holding Lisa in contempt for 
violating the terms of the Vermont custody order. 
 
In October 2004, the circuit court concluded that it had 
jurisdiction over the custody dispute and entered an order 
awarding sole custody to Lisa, holding that Janet did not have 
any parental rights, and that Lisa was IMJ’s “sole” parent.  
In November 2004, the Vermont court issued a contrary order 
holding that Lisa and Janet were both “parents” of IMJ. 
 
In January 2005, Janet appealed the Virginia custody 
order to the Court of Appeals (the first Virginia appeal).  
See Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 49 Va. App. 88, 637 
S.E.2d 330 (2006).  In November 2006, the Court of Appeals 
reversed the circuit court’s judgment entering the Virginia 
custody order, holding that the circuit court did not have 
jurisdiction to enter the order because the dispute was a 
“custody and visitation determination” subject to the 
provisions of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 
 
3
U.S.C. § 1738A (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (the PKPA), which 
accorded Vermont sole jurisdiction over the custody and 
visitation dispute.  Id. at 103, 637 S.E.2d 337-38.  The Court 
of Appeals concluded that the provisions of the Defense of 
Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (the 
DOMA), did not alter the applicability of the PKPA to the 
custody and visitation dispute, and that the PKPA preempted 
all state law to the contrary, including Code § 20-45.3 (the 
Marriage Affirmation Act).  Id. at 102-03, 637 S.E.2d at 337. 
 
The Court of Appeals further held in the first Virginia 
appeal that Vermont law governed the parties’ dispute, and 
that the courts of Virginia were bound by Vermont’s 
interpretation of its own law.  Id. at 96-97, 637 S.E.2d at 
334-35.  Accordingly, based on its holding that Vermont had 
sole jurisdiction over the case, the Court of Appeals declined 
to address the issue whether the civil union would have been 
recognized under Virginia law.  Id. at 103, 637 S.E.2d at 337-
38. 
 
Following the Court of Appeals’ entry of judgment in the 
first Virginia appeal, Lisa filed a petition for appeal to 
this Court.  We dismissed Lisa’s petition because she failed 
to file a notice of appeal.  Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 
Record No. 070355 (May 7, 2007). 
 
4
 
Meanwhile, in March 2005, Janet sought to register the 
Vermont custody order in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations 
District Court of Frederick County (the juvenile and domestic 
relations court).  The juvenile and domestic relations court 
registered the Vermont custody order, and Lisa appealed that 
decision to the circuit court.  The circuit court reversed the 
juvenile and domestic relations court’s judgment mandating 
registration of the Vermont custody order. 
 
Janet appealed from the circuit court’s judgment to the 
Court of Appeals.  In an unpublished opinion, the Court of 
Appeals summarily reversed the circuit court’s order and 
reinstated the registration of the Vermont custody order, 
holding that this result was mandated by the Court of Appeals’ 
decision in the first Virginia appeal.  Miller-Jenkins v. 
Miller-Jenkins, Record No. 0688-06-4 (April 17, 2007).  Lisa 
appeals from the Court of Appeals’ judgment. 
 
Addressing the merits of her appeal, Lisa argues that the 
Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the PKPA requires 
that Virginia courts give full faith and credit to the Vermont 
custody order.  Lisa maintains that the DOMA, not the PKPA, is 
applicable in determining whether Virginia must accord full 
faith and credit to Vermont’s child custody orders, and that 
the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the PKPA preempts 
the Marriage Affirmation Act and in not addressing whether the 
 
5
PKPA also preempts Article I, § 15-A of the Constitution of 
Virginia (the Virginia Marriage Amendment).  Lisa also 
contends, among other things, that both the Court of Appeals’ 
judgment and the Vermont judgment violated her fundamental 
parental rights. 
 
Janet argues, however, that this Court should not reach 
the merits of Lisa’s appeal.  Janet contends that Lisa’s 
claims are barred by the “law of the case” doctrine because 
all the issues presented in this appeal were resolved by the 
Court of Appeals’ decision in the first Virginia appeal, which 
Lisa failed to timely appeal to this Court.  Janet maintains 
that the first Virginia appeal and the present appeal are the 
same “case,” because the present appeal involves the same 
parties and the same issue of custody and visitation.  Thus, 
Janet asserts that under the “law of the case” doctrine, the 
Court of Appeals’ holding in the first Virginia appeal that 
the PKPA requires Virginia to give full faith and credit to 
the Vermont custody order was a binding adjudication that 
resolves the issues before us in the present appeal. 
 
In response, Lisa contends that the “law of the case” 
doctrine does not apply to the present appeal, because the 
present appeal is not the same “case” that was before the 
Court of Appeals in the first Virginia appeal.  According to 
Lisa, the issue in the first Virginia appeal was whether the 
 
6
courts of Virginia had jurisdiction to entertain Lisa’s 
custody petition, while the issue in the present appeal is 
whether the courts of Virginia must give full faith and credit 
to the Vermont custody order.  Lisa further maintains that the 
Court of Appeals could not have addressed in the first appeal 
whether the PKPA preempted the Virginia Marriage Amendment, 
because that amendment was not effective when the Court of 
Appeals rendered its decision in the first appeal.  We 
disagree with Lisa’s arguments. 
 
The “law of the case” doctrine is well established in the 
courts of this Commonwealth.  Under this doctrine, 
[when] there have been two appeals in the same case, 
between the same parties, and the facts are the same, 
nothing decided on the first appeal can be re-examined on 
a second appeal.  Right or wrong, it is binding on both 
the trial court and the appellate court, and is not 
subject to re-examination by either.  For the purpose of 
that case, though only for that case, the decision on the 
first appeal is the law. 
 
Steinman v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 121 Va. 611, 620, 93 S.E. 
684, 687 (1917); see Uninsured Employer’s Fund v. Thrush, 255 
Va. 14, 18, 496 S.E.2d 57, 59 (1998); Chappell v. White, 184 
Va. 810, 816, 36 S.E.2d 524, 526-27 (1946); Kemp v. Miller, 
160 Va. 280, 284, 168 S.E. 430, 431 (1933). 
 
Pursuant to the “law of the case” doctrine, when a party 
fails to challenge a decision rendered by a court at one stage 
of litigation, that party is deemed to have waived her right 
 
7
to challenge that decision during later stages of the “same 
litigation.”  See Kondaurov v. Kerdasha, 271 Va. 646, 658, 629 
S.E.2d 181, 188 (2006).  The “law of the case” doctrine 
applies both to issues that were actually decided by the 
court, and also to issues “necessarily involved in the first 
appeal, whether actually adjudicated or not.”  Kemp, 160 Va. 
at 285, 168 S.E. at 431; Searles v. Gordon, 156 Va. 289, 296, 
157 S.E. 759, 761 (1931); Norfolk & W.R. Co. v. Duke, 107 Va. 
764, 766, 60 S.E. 96, 97 (1908). 
 
Our decisions applying the “law of the case” doctrine 
generally have involved litigation that has proceeded in a 
“linear” sequence to trial, appeal, trial on remand, and 
second appeal, all under the same set of pleadings.  See, 
e.g., Lockheed Info. Mgmt. Sys. Co. v. Maximus, Inc., 259 Va. 
92, 108, 524 S.E.2d 420, 429 (2000) (stating that issue 
decided in first case and not appealed was not subject to 
relitigation on remand); Kemp, 160 Va. at 284, 168 S.E. at 431 
(holding that issues decided on appeal were binding law of 
case on remand).  However, we have never limited the “law of 
the case” doctrine to litigation that occurs in such 
sequential fashion under one set of pleadings. 
 
In our decision in Kondaurov, we explained that our 
application of the “law of the case” doctrine extends to 
“future stages of the same litigation.”  271 Va. at 658, 629 
 
8
S.E.2d at 188.  Thus, when two cases involve identical parties 
and issues, and one case has been resolved finally on appeal, 
we will not re-examine the merits of issues necessarily 
involved in the first appeal, because those issues have been 
resolved as part of the “same litigation” and have become the 
“law of the case.” 
 
Under the “law of the case” doctrine, courts assume 
without deciding that there may be error in the decision of 
the court below.  See Chappell, 184 Va. at 816, 36 S.E.2d at 
527; Kemp, 160 Va. at 284, 168 S.E. at 431; Peterson v. 
Haynes, 145 Va. 653, 660, 134 S.E. 675, 677 (1926); Steinman, 
121 Va. at 622, 93 S.E. at 688.  As a result, a decision that 
becomes the “law of the case” is adhered to only in the case 
in which it arose and does not become binding precedent in 
other cases.  See Chappell, 184 Va. at 816, 36 S.E.2d at 527; 
Kemp, 160 Va. at 284, 168 S.E. at 431; Steinman, 121 Va. at 
622, 93 S.E. at 688. 
With these principles in mind, we first decline Lisa’s 
request that we consider the effect of the Virginia Marriage 
Amendment on the arguments presented in this appeal.  Lisa did 
not ask the Court of Appeals to consider the Virginia Marriage 
Amendment, despite the fact that it became effective on 
January 1, 2007, several months before the Court of Appeals 
issued its opinion in the present appeal.  In addition, Lisa 
 
9
did not assign error in this Court to the Court of Appeals’ 
failure to consider the Virginia Marriage Amendment.  
Therefore, we conclude that this part of Lisa’s argument is 
procedurally barred.  See Rule 5:17(c). 
We also observe that Lisa’s petition and brief filed in 
this Court contain the identical assignments of error that she 
presented in her petition to this Court in the first Virginia 
appeal.  Because Lisa sought to appeal these same issues in 
the first Virginia appeal, we find no merit in her assertion 
that those issues were not before the Court of Appeals in the 
first Virginia appeal. 
We have compared Lisa’s arguments in the present appeal 
and the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in the first 
Virginia appeal.  We agree with the Court of Appeals’ 
conclusion that each of the issues Lisa raises in this appeal 
was addressed and resolved in the first Virginia appeal.  See 
Miller-Jenkins, 49 Va. App. 88, 637 S.E.2d 330 (2006); Miller-
Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, Record No. 0688-06-4 (April 17, 
2007). 
The Court of Appeals’ holding in the present appeal 
merely reflects the issues actually decided in the first 
Virginia appeal, including the issues whether the PKPA applied 
to the custody and visitation dispute and whether the Vermont 
custody order was entitled to full faith and credit.  See 
 
10
Kemp, 160 Va. at 285, 168 S.E. at 431; Searles, 156 Va. at 
296, 157 S.E. at 761; Norfolk & W.R. Co., 107 Va. at 766, 60 
S.E. at 97.  Thus, we conclude that the “law of the case” 
doctrine prevents Lisa from reasserting the issues she raises 
in the present appeal because each of those issues was decided 
finally by the first Virginia appeal, which Lisa failed to 
perfect in this Court.  See Lockheed, 259 Va. at 108, 524 
S.E.2d at 429; Searles, 156 Va. at 295-96, 157 S.E. at 761. 
 
Our conclusion is not altered by Lisa’s argument that the 
“law of the case” doctrine is inapplicable to the present 
appeal because this appeal is not the same “case” as the first 
Virginia appeal.  Although Lisa and Janet separately filed the 
cases from which the two appeals arose, both cases involved 
these same parties and sought adjudication of the same issue, 
custody and visitation regarding IMJ.  The two Virginia 
appeals were part of the “same litigation” seeking to resolve 
the single question which custody order, the Vermont custody 
order or the circuit court’s order, would govern the parties’ 
custody and visitation dispute.  See Kondaurov, 271 Va. at 
658, 629 S.E.2d at 188. 
 
Finally, we observe that the Court of Appeals’ holding in 
the first Virginia appeal is binding under the “law of the 
case” doctrine only with respect to the parties and the issues 
in the case before us.  See Chappell, 184 Va. at 816, 36 
 
11
 
12
S.E.2d at 527; Steinman, 121 Va. at 620, 93 S.E. at 687.  
Thus, based on our holding that the Court of Appeals’ decision 
in the first Virginia appeal is the “law of the case,” we do 
not reach the merits of the underlying issues presented in 
this appeal.  See Chappell, 184 Va. at 816, 36 S.E.2d at 527; 
Kemp, 160 Va. at 284, 168 S.E. at 431; Peterson, 145 Va. at 
660, 134 S.E. at 677; Steinman, 121 Va. at 622, 93 S.E. at 
688. 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the Court of Appeals’ 
judgment. 
Affirmed. 
CHIEF JUSTICE HASSELL, concurring. 
 
I join the opinion of the Court.  However, I write 
separately to state that I have serious concerns about the 
Court of Appeals' opinion in the former appeal, Miller-Jenkins 
v. Miller-Jenkins, 49 Va. App. 88, 637 S.E.2d 330 (2006).  I 
do not believe that this decision was correctly decided.  Lisa 
Miller-Jenkins failed to perfect an appeal from that decision 
in the manner required by law, see Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-
Jenkins, Record No. 070355 (May 7, 2007), and, therefore, this 
Court could not review that decision.  As the majority 
correctly holds, the law of the case doctrine prohibits this 
Court from considering the merits of the former appeal in this 
proceeding.