Title: SHEILA HARVEY V HARRY LOUIS HARVEY

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice  
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
Opinion 
FILED JUNE 9, 2004 
SHEILA HARVEY, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 124234 
HARRY LOUIS HARVEY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
PER CURIAM 
In this divorce proceeding, the parties agreed that 
the friend of the court would determine the custody of 
their children and that the circuit court could not review 
the decision. Honoring this, the circuit court entered the 
friend of the court’s recommended order awarding sole 
custody of the children to defendant and denied plaintiff’s 
motion for a hearing to review the matter. 
The Court of Appeals vacated the circuit court’s order 
and remanded the case for a hearing de novo.  We affirm 
that 
opinion, 
but 
write 
to 
provide 
clarification. 
Regardless of the type of alternative dispute resolution 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
that parties use, the Child Custody Act1 requires the 
circuit court to determine independently what custodial 
placement is in the best interests of the children.2
 We 
write to clarify the responsibility of the trial court in 
making that determination. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Trial Court Proceedings 
Two daughters were born during the parties’ marriage, 
one in 1994 and the other in 1996. 
In February 2000, 
plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce with the Family 
Division of the Oakland Circuit Court. A variety of issues 
were disputed, including custody of the children. 
Instead of proceeding directly to trial, the parties 
opted for a form of alternative dispute resolution. On May 
1MCL 722.21 et seq. 
2 We recognize that parents sometimes reach agreements
regarding custody and visitation matters either informally
through direct negotiations or through mediation procedures
made available by dispute resolution organizations. 
Our 
decision does not restrict the ability of parties to 
address disputes through alternative dispute resolution 
processes. 
We 
hold 
only 
that 
the 
statutory 
“best 
interests” factors control whenever a court enters an order 
affecting child custody. 
An initial agreement between the
parties 
cannot 
relieve 
the 
court 
of 
its 
statutory
responsibility to ensure that its adjudication of custody
disputes is in a child’s best interests. 
Likewise, parties must understand that a child custody
determination resulting from alternative dispute resolution
processes is not enforceable absent a court order. 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15, 2001, the circuit court entered a consent order, 
approved by both parties’ counsel, for binding arbitration. 
Its object was to resolve all property matters3 and provide 
for an evidentiary hearing and binding decision by the 
friend of the court referee regarding custody, parenting 
time, and child support issues. 
The order stated that the 
referee’s decision could not be reviewed by the circuit 
court: 
7. 
Issues of custody, parenting time and
child support shall be referred to the Oakland 
County Friend of the Court for an Evidentiary
Hearing in front of a Referee. 
8. 
The decision of the Referee, after 
hearing, shall be binding on the parties and
shall not be reviewable by the trial court. 
The 
Appellate rights to the Court of Appeals are
again preserved. 
Following an evidentiary hearing, the friend of the 
court submitted findings to the circuit court with a 
recommended order awarding legal and physical custody of 
the children solely to defendant. 
Plaintiff filed timely 
written objections to the order. 
The circuit court entered the recommended order, over 
plaintiff’s objection, changing the existing custodial 
arrangement. 
The 
court 
denied 
her 
motion 
for 
an 
3 The parties subsequently signed a binding arbitration
agreement and arbitrated the marital property issues, which
are not on appeal. 
3  
 
 
 
 
evidentiary hearing de novo and refused to set aside the 
order when defendant argued that the parties’ stipulation 
restricted its authority to review the order. 
B. Appellate Court Proceedings 
Plaintiff appealed as of right. 
The Court of Appeals 
vacated the custody order and remanded for a hearing de 
novo in the circuit court. 
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that 
the Child Custody Act governs all child custody disputes 
and gives the circuit court continuing jurisdiction over 
custody proceedings. 
MCL 722.26. 
The Court discussed two 
statutory schemes that operate concurrently with the Child 
Custody Act to provide the parties with alternative methods 
of dispute resolution: 
the domestic relations arbitration 
act and the Friend of the Court Act. MCL 600.5070 et seq. 
and 552.501 et seq. 
The domestic relations arbitration act permits parties 
to agree to binding arbitration of child custody disputes. 
It contains numerous protections for them, including 
mandatory 
prearbitration 
disclosures 
and 
detailed 
procedural requirements. 
MCL 600.5072. 
The parties can 
seek circuit court review of the arbitration award. 
MCL 
600.5080 specifically addresses awards concerning child 
custody: 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
Subject to subsection (2), the circuit
court shall not vacate or modify an award 
concerning child support, custody, or parenting
time unless the court finds that the award is 
adverse to the best interests of the child who is 
the subject of the award or under the provisions
of section 5081. 
(2) 
A review or modification of a child 
support amount, child custody, or parenting time
shall 
be 
conducted 
and 
is 
subject 
to 
the 
standards 
and 
procedures 
provided 
in 
other 
statutes, in other applicable law, and by court
rule 
that 
are 
applicable 
to 
child 
support
amounts, child custody, or parenting time. 
(3) Other 
standards 
and 
procedures
regarding review of arbitration awards described
in this section are governed by court rule. 
A separate provision, MCL 600.5081, generally addresses the 
manner in which the circuit court shall review a motion to 
vacate or modify an arbitration award. 
Alternatively, parties to a custody dispute can 
present the issue to a friend of the court referee.  If 
they elect this option, the circuit court may review the 
referee’s recommendation in accordance with MCL 552.507(5). 
That subsection provides that the circuit court “shall hold 
a de novo hearing on any matter that has been the subject 
of a referee hearing” if either party requests such a 
hearing 
within 
twenty-one 
days 
after 
receiving 
the 
referee’s recommendation. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that, under either 
statute, the parties were entitled to have the circuit 
5  
 
 
 
 
court review the custody determination. 
For this reason, 
it held, “an agreement for a binding decision in a 
domestic-relations matter with no right of review in the 
court, as in this case, is without statutory support under 
either scheme.” 
257 Mich App 278, 289; 668 NW2d 187 
(2003). 
The Court then determined that the parties had not 
complied with the detailed procedural requirements of the 
domestic relations arbitration act. 
As a consequence, it 
held that the parties’ agreement was governed by the Friend 
of the Court Act, MCL 552.507(5). 
The trial court should 
have addressed plaintiff’s objections by holding a hearing 
de novo to review whether the custody recommendation was in 
the best interests of the children. 
The Court of Appeals 
summed up as follows: 
In the absence of any review by the trial
court, as discussed above, and in the absence of
a valid agreement for binding arbitration or an
otherwise 
valid 
waiver 
of 
procedural
requirements, plaintiff was improperly denied a
hearing regarding her objections to the friend of
the court’s findings and recommendation. 
[257
Mich App 292.] 
It vacated the custody order and remanded for a hearing de 
novo in the circuit court. 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defendant now seeks leave to appeal, asking this Court 
to reinstate the custody order awarding him sole legal and 
physical custody of the children. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether parties to a divorce can by stipulation 
restrict the circuit court’s authority to decide a custody 
issue is a question of law that we review de novo. 
Cardinal Mooney High School v Michigan High School Athletic 
Ass'n, 437 Mich 75, 80; 467 NW2d 21 (1991). 
III. ANALYSIS 
The Child Custody Act is a comprehensive statutory 
scheme for resolving custody disputes. 
Van v Zahorik, 460 
Mich 320, 327; 597 NW2d 15 (1999). 
With it, the 
Legislature sought to “promote the best interests and 
welfare of children.” 
Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 
877; 526 NW2d 889 (1994). 
The act applies to all custody 
disputes and vests the circuit court with continuing 
jurisdiction. MCL 722.26. 
The act makes clear that the best interests of the 
child control the resolution of a custody dispute between 
parents, as gauged by the factors set forth at MCL 722.23. 
MCL 722.25(1). 
It places an affirmative obligation on the 
circuit court to “declare the child’s inherent rights and 
establish the rights and duties as to the child’s custody, 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
support, and parenting time in accordance with this act” 
whenever the court is required to adjudicate an action 
“involving dispute of a minor child’s custody.” 
MCL 
722.24(1); Van, supra at 328. 
Taken together, these 
statutory provisions impose on the trial court the duty to 
ensure that the resolution of any custody dispute is in the 
best interests of the child. 
Thus, we affirm the Court of Appeals decision to 
remand this case to the circuit court for a hearing de 
novo, but not for the reason stated by the Court of 
Appeals. 
It is irrelevant that the parties did not have a 
“valid agreement for binding arbitration or an otherwise 
valid waiver of procedural requirements . . . .” 
257 Mich 
App 292. 
The Child Custody Act required the circuit court 
to determine the best interests of the children before 
entering an order resolving the custody dispute. 
Our holding should not be interpreted, where the 
parties have agreed to a custody arrangement, to require 
the court to conduct a hearing or otherwise engage in 
intensive 
fact-finding. 
See 
MCL 
552.513(2) 
and 
600.5080(1). 
Our requirement under such circumstances is 
that the court satisfy itself concerning the best interests 
of the children. 
When the court signs the order, it 
indicates that it has done so. A judge signs an order only 
8  
 
 
after profound deliberation and in the exercise of the 
judge’s traditional broad discretion. See Greene v Greene, 
357 Mich 196, 202; 98 NW2d 519 (1959). 
However, 
the 
deference 
due 
parties’ 
negotiated 
agreements does not diminish the court’s obligation to 
examine the best interest factors and make the child’s best 
interests paramount. 
MCL 722.25(1). 
Nothing in the Child 
Custody Act gives parents or any other party the power to 
exclude the legislatively mandated “best interests” factors 
from the court’s deliberations once a custody dispute 
reaches the court. 
Furthermore, neither the Friend of the Court Act nor 
the domestic relations arbitration act relieves the circuit 
court of its duty to review a custody arrangement once the 
issue of a child’s custody reaches the bench. 
The Friend 
of the Court Act states that the circuit court “shall” hold 
a hearing de novo to review a friend of the court 
recommendation 
if 
either 
party 
objects 
to 
that 
recommendation in writing within twenty-one days. 
MCL 
552.507(5). 
Likewise, MCL 600.5080 authorizes a circuit court to 
modify or vacate an arbitration award that is not in the 
best interests of the child. It requires the circuit court 
to review the arbitration award in accordance with the 
9  
 
 
 
 
requirements of other relevant statutes, including the 
Child Custody Act. 
The court retains authority over 
custody until the child reaches the age of majority. 
MCL 
722.27(1)(c). 
Thus, even when parties initially elect to submit a 
custody dispute to an arbitrator or to the friend of the 
court, they cannot waive the authority that the Child 
Custody Act confers on the circuit court. 
As the Court of 
Appeals has previously explained, parties “cannot by 
agreement usurp the court’s authority to determine suitable 
provisions for the child’s best interests.” 
Lombardo v 
Lombardo, 202 Mich App 151, 160; 507 NW2d 788 (1993). 
See 
also Napora v Napora, 159 Mich App 241, 246; 406 NW2d 197 
(1986). 
Permitting the parties, by stipulation, to limit 
the 
trial 
court’s 
authority 
to 
review 
custody 
determinations would nullify the protections of the Child 
Custody 
Act 
and 
relieve 
the 
circuit 
court 
of 
its 
statutorily imposed responsibilities. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that parties cannot 
stipulate to circumvent the authority of the circuit court 
in determining the custody of children. 
In making its 
determination, the court must consider the best interests 
10  
 
 
 
 
  
 
of 
the 
children. 
Child 
custody 
determinations 
or 
agreements are not binding until entered by court order. 
The Court of Appeals judgment in favor of plaintiff, 
remanding this case to the Family Division of the Oakland 
Circuit Court for a hearing de novo is affirmed, but for a 
reason different from that stated by that Court. 
MCR 
7.302(G)(1). 
Maura D. Corrigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
11