Title: ANDREWS v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

248 Ind. 525 (1967)
229 N.E.2d 806
ANDREWS ET AL.
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 30,812.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed October 9, 1967.
*526 Trennepohl, Berger & Shoup, of Angola, for appellants.
John J. Dillon, Attorney General, and Donald R. Ewers, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
LEWIS, J.
This is an interlocutory appeal from the Steuben Circuit Court in an action brought by the State of Indiana. The appellee seeks to condemn and appropriate permanent easements and certain lands owned by the appellants under the provisions of the eminent domain statutes relating to the acquisition of land for highway purposes. The appellee filed its complaint for condemnation, setting forth the description of appellants' land which appellee alleged was necessary for the carrying out of a certain highway improvement project identified as State Road No. I-69.
The appellants filed written objections to the proceedings alleging that:
The Steuben Circuit Court overruled appellants' objections and this appeal was prosecuted.
Substantially, it is the appellants' contention that:
*528 Appellants' objection (1) states in substance that appellants' land will not serve a public purpose. The factual situation of the design and improvement of State Road No. I-69 is important. Appellants' land will not become a part of State Road No. I-69, but rather is intended to be used as a frontage road to reach the property of one Baldwin. The parties concede that the proposed frontage road across appellants' property would serve only the Baldwin property which would be completely land-locked if a frontage road is not installed. Appellants contend that since only Baldwin's property will be served, this is not a public use within the meaning of the condemnation statute.
It should be noted that the Legislature did, in 1957, adopt the following statute, Burns' Indiana Statutes, Anno., § 36-2949, [1949 Repl.], (1967 Cum. Pocket Supp.):
The foregoing statute expressly gives the State Highway Commission as the agent for the appellee, the power to take land for additional service and frontage roads.
Since the road in question serves only one individual's land, we are faced with the issue as to whether or not such a road constitutes a public use or a private use.
The appellants cite for their authority, principally, two Indiana cases. First, Fountain Park Company v. Hensler (1927), 199 Ind. 95, 155 N.E. 465. This case questioned the right of the Legislature to give Chautaugua companies the power of eminent domain. The right of the Legislature to *529 delegate the power of eminent domain upon a private corporation to take private property was raised. This Court held the classification to be an arbitrary and capricious one and stated that the operation of the Chautaugua companies did not constitute a "public use." We believe the case is not particularly helpful as an analogy here, especially in view of Burns', § 36-2949, supra. Secondly, Kessler v. City of Indianapolis (1927), 199 Ind. 420, 157 N.E. 547, decided in 1927, involved the Park Department of the City of Indianapolis and a property owner. The Park Department attempted to condemn a right of way from Mrs. Kessler in order that a neighbor of Mrs. Kessler's property might have access to Pleasant Run Boulevard. A close examination of the Kessler case reveals that the facts are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar and this 1927 decision falls far short in being helpful in the determination of this case, particularly in the light of the enabling statute, Burns', § 36-2949, supra, passed subsequently to the decision in that case.
We believe we must look to the over-all plan for State Road No. I-69 and realize that with large interstate highways being designed with only limited access, frontage roads become necessary to relieve land-locked property. In furtherance of this purpose the General Assembly passed the following legislation:
Modern travel called for non-access highways; such highways, in turn, necessitated a completely new method of design and land acquisition. The appellee has afforded us the following case which is helpful, to-wit: Luke v. Massachusetts *531 Turnpike Authority (1958), 149 N.E.2d 225, 337 Mass. 304. The facts are substantially as follows:
Mrs. Luke's land was bounded on the west by that of Powers and on the east by that of Ford. The toll road left Powers without access to any public or private way. At the same time, the Authority purported to take a permanent easement across the land of Luke and Ford to provide access to the remaining Powers land. Mrs. Luke contended that the taking of the private way was beyond the power granted the Authority by the Legislature; and in the alternative, if the Legislature did purport to grant such power, the grant was unconstitutional. The Massachusets court, in sustaining the Turnpike Authority, stated as follows:
Mrs. Luke further contended that the power to condemn her land for the purpose of giving her neighbor access was not spelled out in the act by which the Authority received its power. In answer to this, the court stated as follows:
See also, Department of Public Works v. Farina (1963), 194 N.E.2d 209, 29 Ill. 2d 474, and the following language therein:
Objection (2) filed by appellants is substantially as follows: The State of Indiana may not assume the position that reduction of damages serves a "public use." Appellee argues that if, in truth and fact, the service road would have the effect of reducing the damages to be paid to the Baldwins, this situation would give rise to a "public use." Appellants, however, argue this is not tenable since the law fixes the damages payable to the Baldwins at the time the notice was served upon them by the State that it had commenced a condemnation action. We are unable to agree with the appellants on this contention.
The layout and design of the interstate complex would indicate that the Baldwins were to have access through a service road at the time the condemnation was filed, so the basic premise alluded to by the appellants that the damages to Baldwins is fixed on the date of the taking without giving significance to the service road is in error. The overall design and plans and specifications for State Road No. I-69 and all service roads were known and available at the time of the filing of the complaint and the issuing of notice to the Baldwins.
*533 In truth and in fact, we must conclude that a service road would alleviate a land-locked condition of the Baldwin property and would certainly have the effect of reducing the amount of damages payable to the Baldwins. If the State of Indiana is not in a position to minimize the damages paid to land owners, then the cost of Interstate Highways would soar astronomically and Indiana would be dotted abnormally with land-locked real estate. We believe that in planning and providing for condemnation of service roads, under Burns', § 36-2949, supra, the Legislature properly intended such service roads would constitute a public use whether such road served one property owner or many. We so hold.
The appellee filed an action in 1963 seeking condemnation of the subject real estate and later dismissed that action. Thereafter, in 1965, another condemnation was filed. It is appellants' contention that the fact that two identical actions were filed for the subject real estate constitutes vexatious litigation and supports appellants' contention raised in objection (3).
Appellants rely upon Lake Agricultural Company et al. v. Brown et al. (1917), 186 Ind. 30, 114 N.E. 755, in which certain dicta is announced concerning vexatious litigation. A careful examination of Lake Agricultural Company et al. v. Brown et al., supra, will reveal that this Court was not impressed with the argument concerning vexatious litigation and did not make a judicial determination on that basis. In that case the Court concluded that as to whether or not a cause of action was vexatious was a matter for the sound discretion of a Trial Court and, in the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion, the Trial Court would be affirmed.
We relate the case at bar to State of Indiana v. Flamme, et al. (1940), 217 Ind. 149, 26 N.E.2d 917, in which this Court made the following statement with reference to vexatious litigation:
We must conclude that the objection to condemnation on the basis of vexatious litigation is not tenable in the case at bar.
The Trial Court properly overruled the objections of the appellants and the judgment is affirmed.
Hunter, C.J., Arterburn, Jackson and Mote, JJ., concur.
NOTE.  Reported in 229 N.E.2d 806.