Title: Masters v. Industrial Garments Mfg. Co.

State: tennessee

Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court

Document:

595 S.W.2d 811 (1980) Jessie Lee MASTERS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. INDUSTRIAL GARMENTS MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellant. Supreme Court of Tennessee. March 17, 1980. *812 Charles T. Herndon, IV, Johnson City, for defendant-appellant; Herndon, Coleman, Brading & McKee, Johnson City, of counsel. Howard R. Dunbar, Johnson City, for plaintiff-appellee; Dunbar & Dunbar, Johnson City, of counsel. BROCK, Chief Justice. The defendant employer appeals from the decree of the Chancery Court awarding to the plaintiff employee workmen's compensation benefits for 50% permanent partial disability of the body as a whole. The defendant complains that the evidence is insufficient to support the finding of the trial court that (1) she sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of her employment as a seamstress on April 27, 1977, and (2) that the notice provisions of the workmen's compensation laws were satisfied. Other errors are alleged but we do not deem it necessary to consider them. The plaintiff contends that she suffered an injury to her back while lifting bundles of pants on the job on April 27, 1977, which resulted in pain that caused her to leave the job at about 2:00 p.m. on that date. She testified to that effect and further that early in the morning hours of May 2, 1977, her back pain became so severe that she sought relief at an emergency room of a hospital in Johnson City. She was treated in the emergency room for a kidney infection and after being off from work for several days returned to her job where she continued to work for several months. She sought medical attention from several physicians: Dr. Webb, a general practitioner, Dr. Phil Roe, a gynecologist, Dr. Sam Huddleston, an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Horace Cupp, a neurosurgeon, Dr. William Kennedy, an orthopedic surgeon and Dr. Ronald Rosenthal, an orthopedic surgeon. Two witnesses, Shelia Hughes, the plaintiff's union president, and Thelma Banner, the plaintiff's supervisor, testified that on April 27, 1977, the plaintiff complained that lifting the bundles of garments upon which she was working caused pain in her back and that for this reason she needed a "bundle boy" to move the bundles for her. However, neither witness testified that upon this occasion the plaintiff complained of having received an injury of any kind. It is well settled that except in an obvious case, such as an amputation of a limb or a portion thereof, the employee must establish by expert medical evidence that the injury and disability of which he or she complains was caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. Mazanec v. Aetna Insurance Company, Tenn., 491 S.W.2d 616 (1973). It is also well settled that this Court does not weigh the testimony of various witnesses but is limited to ascertaining whether the record contains any credible evidence from which causation may be found. In the case at bar the plaintiff relies upon the testimony of Dr. Rosenthal for proof of both causation and permanency of her alleged injury. Accordingly, we have carefully examined Dr. Rosenthal's testimony. Dr. Rosenthal examined the plaintiff on one occasion as a consultant at the request of Dr. Roe of Johnson City. Based upon the history given him by the plaintiff and upon x-rays taken of her back and upon his physical examination of the plaintiff, Dr. Rosenthal testified that: The above quoted excerpts from the testimony of Dr. Rosenthal are, in our opinion, adequate to support findings by the trial court that the plaintiff strained her back while lifting bundles of pants on the job and that this strain combined with preexisting degenerative arthritis of her spine resulting in a pain causing condition which probably will be permanent. Thus, there is medical evidence to support the trial court's *814 findings of causation and permanency of the injury. The defendant also contends that the plaintiff employee failed to give notice of injury as required by T.C.A., § 50-1001, which provides as follows: The plaintiff makes no claim that written notice was given, so that, the real inquiry is whether the employer had "actual knowledge of the accident" and injury. The plaintiff contends that material evidence of actual knowledge on the part of the employer is shown by her testimony as follows: Shelia Hughes testified, in pertinent part, as follows: The witness, Thelma Banner, testified, in pertinent part, as follows: It is shown elsewhere in the record that the plaintiff had sustained an injury on the job in 1976 and had made a proper report thereof to the employer at that time. It, therefore, cannot be doubted that she was aware of the proper procedure to follow in the event she wished to make a claim or give notice of an alleged on the job injury. In our opinion an employee who relies upon alleged actual knowledge of the employer must prove that the employer had actual knowledge of the time, place, nature and cause of the injury. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Company v. Blackwood, Okl., 456 P.2d 507 (1969); 82 Am.Jur.2d Workmen's Compensation § 453 (1976). As Mr. Special Justice Oliver pointed out in Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Long, Tenn., 569 S.W.2d 444, 449 (1978): It is our conclusion that the fair import of the above quoted testimony in behalf of the plaintiff upon the issue of *816 actual knowledge is that she was calling upon her labor union representative and superior for the assistance of a "bundle boy" because the work of lifting the bundles was too strenuous for her and that this testimony did not convey any idea that she was giving notice of, or making a claim of, an injury or an accident. She did not seek first aid treatment or ask to be permitted to visit a physician or a medical facility; she merely asked for the help of a "bundle boy." In order for a communication to constitute either written notice or actual knowledge on the part of the employer it must be calculated to reasonably convey the idea to the employer that the employee claims to have suffered an injury arising out of and in the course of her employment. The present record contains no material evidence of such a communication at any time before the actual filing of a suit in court many months after the alleged accident occurred. We, therefore, conclude that the plaintiff has failed to satisfy the notice requirements of the statute above set out and that the judgment in her favor must be reversed and her suit dismissed. Costs are taxed against the plaintiff. COOPER, HENRY HARBISON, JJ., and McLEMORE, Special Judge, concur.