Title: Gattineri v. Wynn MA, LLC

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
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SJC-13416 
 
ANTHONY GATTINERI  vs.  WYNN MA, LLC, & another.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 13, 2023. - November 3, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Gaming.  License.  Contract, Option, Performance and breach.  
Real Property, Option.  Public Policy.  Statute, 
Construction.  Constitutional Law, Taking of property.  
Supreme Judicial Court, Certification of questions of law. 
 
 
 
Certification of questions of law to the Supreme Judicial 
Court by the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit. 
 
 
Kelley A. Jordan-Price (Michael J. Connolly & John A. 
LeBlanc also present) for the plaintiff. 
Emily Kanstroom Musgrave (Samuel M. Starr & Catherine S. 
Lombardo also present) for the defendants. 
Howard M. Cooper, Ian J. Pinta, & Christian G. Kiely, for 
FBT Everett Realty, LLC, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
David S. Mackey, Melissa C. Allison, & Sean M. Grammel, 
Special Assistant Attorneys General, for Massachusetts Gaming 
Commission, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
1 Wynn Resorts, Limited. 
2 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  As part of their bid to win a casino license in 
Massachusetts, defendants Wynn MA, LLC, and Wynn Resorts, 
Limited (collectively, Wynn),2 entered into an option contract 
with FBT Everett Realty, LLC (FBT), to purchase a parcel of land 
in Everett and Boston (FBT parcel) for $75 million.  As Wynn's 
casino license application proceeded, the Massachusetts Gaming 
Commission (commission) discovered the possibility of concealed 
ownership interests in FBT by a convicted felon with connections 
to organized crime.  Extensive investigation by the commission 
of FBT, however, did not resolve those concerns.  In response to 
the commission's lingering concerns, and after further 
negotiations, FBT and Wynn amended their option agreement and 
lowered the purchase price for the FBT parcel to $35 million, a 
figure that reflected the fair market value of the parcel if it 
were not used as a casino.  The amended option agreement was 
submitted to the commission, and as a condition of its approval 
of the amendment, the commission imposed a price cap of $35 
million on the sale of the FBT parcel.  The commission also 
required that the three publicly known members of FBT certify 
that they would be the "exclusive recipients" of the FBT parcel 
sale proceeds. 
 
2 Defendant Wynn MA, LLC, is a wholly owned subsidiary of 
codefendant Wynn Resorts, Limited. 
3 
 
Plaintiff Anthony Gattineri, a minority owner of FBT, 
opposed the price reduction and refused to sign the certificate 
as required by the commission, arguing that he deserved to be 
paid his percentage of the price reduction.  Gattineri alleges 
that at a meeting with Wynn vice-president Robert DeSalvio in 
San Diego, California, the two men agreed that in exchange for 
Gattineri signing the certificate, Wynn would "make Anthony 
Gattineri whole" by paying him an additional nearly $19 million, 
calculated as Gattineri's proportional share of the $40 million 
price reduction on the FBT parcel.  This agreement was neither 
committed to writing nor communicated to the commission.  
Gattineri was also a person of particular interest to the 
commission, as he not only was one of the three principals of 
FBT but had also bought out the convicted felon's ownership 
interest in FBT and still owed him money at the time of the 
investigation. 
Gattineri eventually signed the certificate.  The 
commission then later awarded Wynn a casino license.  However, 
Wynn never paid Gattineri the additional $19 million he alleges 
he was owed, so he sued Wynn in the United States District Court 
for the District of Massachusetts.  Gattineri argues that Wynn 
has committed a breach of the contract (San Diego agreement) 
formed between Gattineri and Wynn that induced Gattineri to sign 
the certificate. 
4 
 
A Federal District Court judge granted summary judgment for 
the defendants on all counts, and Gattineri appealed to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.  The First 
Circuit, reasoning that the enforceability of the San Diego 
agreement under Massachusetts law was potentially dispositive of 
the case, certified the following questions to this court: 
1.  "Is the San Diego Agreement unenforceable because it 
violates [§] 21 of the Gaming Act?"3 
 
2.  "If not, is the San Diego Agreement unenforceable for 
reasons of public policy of ensuring public confidence in 
the integrity of the gaming licensing process and in the 
strict oversight of all gaming establishments through a 
rigorous regulatory scheme?" 
 
Gattineri v. Wynn MA, LLC, 63 F.4th 71, 95 (1st Cir. 2023).  See 
S.J.C. Rule 1:03, as appearing in 382 Mass. 700 (1981) 
(requirements for certification). 
We conclude that the San Diego agreement is unenforceable 
for reasons of public policy.  By its express terms, the 
paramount public policy of the Expanded Gaming Act (gaming act), 
G. L. c. 23K, is to protect the integrity and public confidence 
in the casino gambling licensure process.  This public policy, 
reflecting both the risks presented by large-scale gambling 
operations and the recognized need for their strict regulation, 
has been consistently emphasized in our gambling statutes and 
our case law.  Consequently, an agreement, concealed from the 
 
3 G. L. c. 23K, § 21, inserted by St. 2011, c. 194, § 16. 
5 
 
commission empowered to review and approve casino licenses and 
inconsistent with the terms presented to, and approved by, the 
commission to address its concerns about the possibility of 
involvement of organized crime, is therefore unenforceable as a 
violation of public policy.  Because we hold that the San Diego 
agreement is unenforceable for reasons of public policy, we need 
not reach the question whether it is separately unenforceable 
under § 21 of the gaming act.4 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  We recite the facts as stated 
by the certifying court, supplemented by undisputed facts in the 
parties' appendices.  Because this case was decided on a motion 
for summary judgment, we recite the facts "in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party," here Gattineri. See 
Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miville, 491 Mass. 489, 492 (2023), 
quoting Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co. v. Krusell, 485 Mass. 431, 435 
(2020). 
Gattineri is a 46.69 percent minority nonmanaging member of 
FBT.  The other principals of FBT are Paul Lohnes and Dustin 
DeNunzio.  In 2009, FBT purchased the FBT parcel, located in 
Everett and Boston, where the Encore Boston Harbor resort and 
casino now stands.  In December 2012, Wynn entered into an 
option agreement with FBT to purchase the parcel for $75 
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Massachusetts Gaming Commission and by FBT Everett Realty, LLC. 
6 
 
million.  The option agreement required FBT to remediate some of 
the environmental contamination on the parcel.  FBT also agreed 
that it and its members would "reasonably cooperate with [Wynn] 
with respect to any information it reasonably requires to 
complete the Casino Application and respond to any such 
inquiries throughout the licensing process."  In January 2013, 
Wynn filed an application with the commission for a Region A 
Category 1 gaming license to operate a resort and casino in 
Massachusetts.  As a part of the application process, the 
commission's investigations and enforcement bureau (IEB) began 
investigating Wynn and FBT to determine Wynn's suitability for a 
gaming license. 
During the investigation, the IEB became concerned by the 
possibility that Charles Lightbody, a convicted felon with ties 
to organized crime, had hidden ownership interests in FBT.  The 
basis for these suspicions were telephone calls recorded in 
December of 2012 between Lightbody and an inmate in State prison 
wherein Lightbody referenced ownership or control of the FBT 
parcel and the need to conceal it from the commission.  
Gattineri stated that he obtained Lightbody's 12.05 percent 
membership interest in FBT via a memorandum of transfer and 
promissory note for $1.7 million.  FBT manager Dustin DeNunzio 
admitted to the IEB that he had altered the memorandum of 
transfer and promissory note to create the impression that 
7 
 
Lightbody divested his interest in FBT in August 2012, prior to 
the December 2012 option agreement with Wynn.  Those documents, 
however, were actually executed in July 2013, heightening the 
IEB's concerns. 
The IEB concluded that Lightbody had held an ownership 
interest in FBT for longer than had been disclosed by FBT, and 
thus the IEB was concerned that he continued to be involved 
without the commission's knowledge.  There was also evidence 
that Gattineri had not fully paid the promissory note and 
satisfied the terms of the memorandum of transfer, raising 
questions about whether Lightbody retained some reversionary 
interest.5  When the IEB investigation was near completion, IEB 
director Karen Wells informed Wynn of the IEB's findings and 
concerns regarding the FBT parcel sale.  Wells told Wynn that 
how it proceeded regarding FBT "receiving a financial windfall 
as a result of the gaming facility was something the IEB would 
report on regarding [Wynn's] suitability [to hold a casino 
license]." 
 
 
5 In a July 2013 interview with police, Gattineri stated 
that he owed Lightbody "like, a million," and when asked whether 
Lightbody still had an ownership interest in a portion of FBT, 
he replied, "Well, if I don't pay him, he can take it away from 
me."  In June of 2014, before Gattineri signed the certificate 
as required by the commission, he paid the money owed to 
Lightbody and owned Lightbody's share of FBT outright. 
8 
 
In response to the concerns expressed by the IEB, Wynn 
hired an appraiser to study the FBT parcel and determined that 
the fair market value for the FBT parcel if it were not used for 
a casino was approximately $35 million.  As the IEB 
investigation was ongoing, Wynn and FBT were negotiating 
environmental liabilities associated with the FBT parcel.  
Following these negotiations, Wynn and FBT agreed to the ninth 
amendment to the option agreement (ninth amendment), whereby the 
purchase price for the FBT parcel would be reduced to $35 
million and FBT's environmental liabilities would be capped at 
$10 million.  Gattineri opposed the purchase price reduction, 
but as minority owner of FBT, he was unable to stop the ninth 
amendment's ratification. 
Wynn submitted the ninth amendment to the commission for 
its review and approval, describing the agreement as the 
"proposed resolution to concerns raised by the [IEB] . . . about 
undisclosed interests in FBT."  In testimony before the 
commission, Wynn general counsel Kim Sinatra stated that Wynn 
had fashioned the ninth amendment as a response to "the 
seriousness of the concerns expressed" by the IEB.  Wynn 
represented that $35 million was the fair market value of the 
FBT parcel assuming it would not be used for a casino, thus 
obviating any concern about undisclosed interests in FBT 
obtaining a casino premium from the sale of the FBT parcel.  
9 
 
Sinatra told the commission that the price reduction had been 
negotiated "to take away from the transaction . . . the enhanced 
benefit, economic benefit[,] that casino usage would add to 
[the] valuation of this property." 
The commission credited Wynn's dedication to addressing the 
concerns about FBT brought to them by the IEB, characterizing 
the ninth amendment as a "prompt and aggressive" attempt to 
remedy IEB's concerns.  It further noted that the ninth 
amendment was "a thought[ful], careful exhaustive, appraisal of 
. . . what a fair market value would be for a noncasino use" of 
the FBT parcel.  A commissioner also expressed his belief that 
"none of the appreciation of [the FBT parcel] that came from the 
sale" should "go[] to somebody who's been dishonest" with the 
IEB or the commission. 
The commission then approved Wynn's purchase of the FBT 
parcel after imposing two conditions on the parties.  First, it 
required that Wynn pay no more than $35 million in exchange for 
the FBT parcel, reflecting the value of the parcel without a 
casino premium.  Second, the three members of FBT (Gattineri, 
Lohnes, and DeNunzio) would be required to sign under oath 
certificates stating that they would be the "exclusive 
recipients of the proceeds" of the FBT parcel sale.  The 
commission also directed the IEB to deliver its files to the 
10 
 
United States Attorney, the Attorney General of Massachusetts, 
and the district attorney for the Suffolk district. 
Lohnes and DeNunzio signed the certificates on December 23, 
2013, but Gattineri refused to do so.  For several months, 
Gattineri met with various Wynn representatives but refused to 
sign the certificate, protesting that he would not sign unless 
he was given his share of the $40 million price reduction. 
On June 14, 2014, Gattineri met with Wynn vice-president 
Robert DeSalvio at the Westgate Hotel in San Diego.  Gattineri 
alleges that at this meeting, he and DeSalvio agreed that if 
Gattineri signed the certificate and Wynn subsequently obtained 
a gaming license, Wynn would "make Anthony Gattineri whole."  
According to Gattineri, "making [him] whole" meant paying him 
around $19 million, calculated as his 46.69 percent share of the 
$40 million price reduction on the FBT parcel.  A few hours 
after his June 14 meeting with DeSalvio, Gattineri signed a 
certificate stating that he would be the sole recipient of his 
share of the FBT parcel purchase price.  Neither Wynn nor 
Gattineri alerted the commission to the San Diego agreement.6  
 
6 Gattineri argues that the public, and thus the commission, 
was on notice as to the existence of the San Diego agreement.  
In support of this contention, Gattineri points to a July 13, 
2014, Boston Globe article.  The article's sixteenth paragraph 
mentions that Gattineri signed the certificate to "preserv[e] 
the possibility that he would be paid more than $16 million if 
Wynn gets his casino."  The parties disagree as to whether this 
is a reference to Gattineri's share of the $35 million purchase 
11 
 
Gattineri stated in a deposition that he asked DeSalvio to put 
the San Diego agreement in writing and that DeSalvio refused to 
do so "because of the gaming law."7 
On June 18, 2014, Wynn sent the commission a copy of the 
certificate.  In September 2014, Wynn was granted a gaming 
license by the commission and subsequently bought the FBT parcel 
for $35 million.  Wynn did not pay Gattineri the $19 million 
that he alleges he was due under the San Diego agreement. 
In October 2014, Gattineri was indicted in the Federal 
District Court for alleged fraud in connection with FBT's 
ownership of the FBT parcel and was arraigned in the Superior 
Court on charges of impeding a gaming investigation, conspiracy, 
and tampering with evidence.  In 2016, Gattineri was acquitted 
 
price (which amounted to slightly over $16 million) or a very 
oblique reference to the San Diego agreement (valued at roughly 
$19 million).  In either case, we disagree with Gattineri's 
contention that one oblique line in a newspaper article 
reasonably could support a rationale for finding that the San 
Diego agreement is a public agreement. 
 
7 Because we interpret the facts in the light most favorable 
to Gattineri, we assume for the purposes of this opinion that 
the San Diego agreement took place in the manner Gattineri 
alleges.  We do not determine that Wynn and Gattineri actually 
entered into the San Diego agreement, although we note that the 
commission has the right and even the responsibility to 
determine whether such an agreement was made, and the alleged 
conduct may be subject to further investigation. 
12 
 
of all Federal charges, and the Commonwealth thereafter entered 
nolle prosequis with respect to the State charges.8 
b.  Procedural history.  In June 2018, Gattineri sued Wynn 
in the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts, alleging breach of contract, common-law fraud, 
and unfair or deceptive trade practices in violation of G. L. 
c. 93A, § 11.  Arguing that Wynn had "fail[ed] to make him 
whole," Gattineri sought almost $19 million in damages.  A 
Federal District Court judge granted Wynn's motion for summary 
judgment on all three counts, and Gattineri appealed.  On 
appeal, the First Circuit determined that the ultimate legality 
of the San Diego agreement was potentially dispositive of 
Gattineri's suit.  Gattineri, 63 F.4th at 90.  Reasoning that 
the legality of the San Diego agreement involves "important 
questions of state law and public policy with significant 
implications," the First Circuit certified questions for our 
review.  Id. at 94. 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Public policy and the gaming act.  
"The general rule of our law is freedom of contract . . . ." 
Beacon Hill Civic Ass'n v. Ristorante Toscano, Inc., 422 Mass. 
318, 320 (1996), quoting Smith v. The Ferncliff, 306 U.S. 444, 
 
 
8 Lightbody was also acquitted of the charges related to the 
sale of the FBT parcel.  United States v. DeNunzio, 450 F. Supp. 
3d 86, 88 (D. Mass. 2020). 
13 
 
450 (1939).  However, "it is 'universally accepted' that public 
policy sometimes outweighs the interest in freedom of contract, 
and in such cases the contract will not be enforced."  Feeney v. 
Dell Inc., 454 Mass. 192, 199-200 (2009), citing Beacon Hill 
Civic Ass'n, supra at 321.  "The grounds for a public policy 
exception must be clear in the acts of the Legislature or the 
decisions of this court."  Trustees of the Cambridge Point 
Condominium Trust v. Cambridge Point, LLC, 478 Mass. 697, 705 
(2018), quoting Miller v. Cotter, 448 Mass. 671, 683 (2007).  
"'Public policy' in this context refers to a court's conviction, 
grounded in legislation and precedent, that denying enforcement 
of a contractual term is necessary to protect some aspect of the 
public welfare."  Rawan v. Continental Cas. Co., 483 Mass. 654, 
666 (2019), quoting Beacon Hill Civic Ass'n, supra.  With these 
principles in mind, we consider whether the San Diego agreement 
is unenforceable on public policy grounds. 
This court has long recognized that the legalization and 
regulation of gambling are among the Legislature's core police 
powers, given the risks associated with gambling operations.  
Abdow v. Attorney Gen., 468 Mass. 478, 489-490 (2014).  See 
Selectmen of Topsfield v. State Racing Comm'n, 324 Mass. 309, 
315-316 (1949) (Legislature has authority to impose conditions 
on gambling that it "deem[s] necessary in the public interest").  
See also Commonwealth v. Wolbarst, 319 Mass. 291, 294 (1946) 
14 
 
(explaining that "suppression of gambling lies within the domain 
of the police power of the Commonwealth").  "[B]ecause of the 
nature of the business[, gambling] can be abolished at any time 
that the Legislature may deem proper for the safeguarding and 
protection of the public welfare."  Carney v. Attorney Gen., 451 
Mass. 803, 817 (2008), quoting Selectmen of Topsfield, supra at 
315.  Where gambling has been legalized, the Legislature has 
strictly regulated it, giving administrative agencies broad 
powers to oversee its licensing and operation to protect the 
public interest.  See G. L. c. 23K, § 1 (10) (providing that 
"the power and authority granted to the commission shall be 
construed as broadly as necessary" to implement and administer 
gaming act).  See also Colella v. State Racing Comm'n, 360 Mass. 
152, 159 (1971) (recognizing that because "inherent in any 
[large] gambling operation" are "many perils, pitfalls, 
temptations and traps for the unwary" as well as "occasions for 
corruption for the participants," Legislature gave "very broad 
powers" to State Racing Commission to address these "dangers").  
We have also already recognized these specific concerns and 
powers in this exact context in Revere v. Massachusetts Gaming 
Comm'n, 476 Mass. 591, 597-598 (2017) (explaining broad 
discretion afforded to commission and importance placed on 
public confidence in integrity of gaming licensing process under 
gaming act). 
15 
 
The text of the gaming act reflects this commitment to 
strict regulation to promote the integrity, and reduce the 
risks, of casino gambling.  As the Legislature expressly stated:  
"ensuring public confidence in the integrity of the gaming 
licensing process and in the strict oversight of all gaming 
establishments through a rigorous regulatory scheme is the 
paramount policy objective of [the gaming act]" (emphasis 
added).  G. L. c. 23K, § 1 (1).  Thus, "the power and authority 
granted to the commission shall be construed as broadly as 
necessary for the implementation, administration and enforcement 
of [the gaming act]."  G. L. c. 23K, § 1 (10).  The gaming act 
pursues this objective by, inter alia, requiring comprehensive 
investigation and regulation of gaming industry participants, 
ranging from commission members and employees to casino license 
applicants, licensees, and their business associates.  See G. L. 
c. 23K, §§ 1 (1), 3 (a), (l), 6 (b), 12 (a).9 
 
 
9 The focus on integrity and public confidence begins with 
the selection of the commissioners themselves. "Prior to 
appointment to the commission, a background investigation shall 
be conducted into the financial stability, integrity, and 
responsibility of a candidate, including [his or her] reputation 
for good character, honesty and integrity."  G. L. c. 23K, 
§ 3 (a).  See also G. L. c. 23K, § 3 (l) (requiring background 
checks for all commission employees and stating that employees 
are generally disqualified by past convictions of felonies or 
crimes involving dishonesty).  Although commission members and 
employees are subject to the general code of conduct for public 
employees, the commission is required to "establish a code of 
ethics . . . more restrictive than" that imposed on other 
government employees.  G. L. c. 23K, § 3 (m).  The commission's 
16 
 
The commission is directed to "assure . . . that there 
shall be no material involvement directly or indirectly with 
. . . a gaming operation or the ownership thereof, by 
unqualified, disqualified or unsuitable persons or by persons 
whose operations are conducted in a manner not conforming with" 
the gaming act.  G. L. c. 23K, § 4 (9).  Importantly, the 
commission may "require a person who has a business association 
of any kind with a gaming licensee or applicant to be qualified 
for licensure under [the gaming act]."  G. L. c. 23K, § 4(11).  
Because Gattineri, as one of the owners of the FBT parcel, was 
"a person who ha[d] a business association . . . with a gaming 
licensee or applicant" (that is, Wynn), the commission had, at a 
minimum, the power to review Gattineri's involvement in the 
parcel as part of Wynn's qualifications for licensure.  Id.  As 
explained in more detail infra, Gattineri was also "a business 
association" of particular concern.  He had purchased the 
interest in FBT of a convicted felon with possible connections 
to organized crime, and there were multiple unanswered questions 
related to that purchase.  The gaming act also provides for an 
in-depth investigation of the qualifications and suitability of 
 
code of ethics prohibits "the receipt of gifts by commissioners 
and employees from any gaming licensee, applicant," or his or 
her business associates, and "provid[es] for recusal of a 
commissioner . . . due to a potential conflict of interest."  
Id. 
17 
 
licensees and their associates to ensure their integrity.  The 
gaming act created the IEB, designated as a "law enforcement 
agency" and empowered it with "such law enforcement powers as 
necessary to effectuate the purposes" of the gaming act.  G. L. 
c. 23K, § 6 (b).  Once the commission has received an 
application for a gaming license, the IEB is authorized to 
investigate "without limitation . . . the integrity, honesty, 
good character and reputation of the applicant" (emphasis 
added).  G. L. c. 23K, § 12 (a) (1).  Applicants seeking gaming 
vendor licensure can be required to produce records including 
"a criminal and arrest record; . . . any civil judgments 
obtained against the person pertaining to antitrust or 
security regulation; . . . an independent audit report of 
all financial activities and interests including, but not 
limited to, the disclosure of all contributions, donations, 
loans, or any other financial transaction to or from a 
gaming entity or operator in the past [five] years; and 
. . . clear and convincing evidence of financial stability 
. . . .  The commission may require such other information 
as it considers appropriate including, but not limited to, 
information related to the financial integrity of the 
applicant . . . ."  
 
G. L. c. 23K, § 31 (b).  The commission may further require, "at 
its sole discretion, . . . [investigation of] other persons or 
companies that have a business association of any kind with the 
applicant."  205 Code Mass. Regs. § 116.02(2) (2012). 
The affirmative obligations of those whose qualification 
and suitability are being evaluated are also set out in the 
gaming act.  Such persons "have the continuing duty to provide 
18 
 
any assistance or information required by the commission and to 
cooperate in any inquiry or investigation conducted by the 
commission."  G. L. c. 23K, § 13 (b).  They may not "willfully 
withhold information from, or knowingly give false or misleading 
information to, the commission."  G. L. c. 23K, § 13 (c).  Lack 
of transparency by an applicant, licensee, or other person 
required to be qualified for licensure can result in the denial 
of an application or the revocation of a license already 
granted.  Id. 
All these requirements are designed to develop a thorough 
understanding of the applicants and their associates to ensure 
the integrity of the gambling license and operation.  The 
concealing of information relevant to this inquiry is strictly 
prohibited. 
Given the well-defined public policy concerns set out in 
the gaming act and the case law, we turn to the licensing 
process and the specific contracts at issue. 
b.  Core regulatory concern requiring full investigation 
and disclosure of the details of the FBT parcel sale.  In the 
instant case, the commission was confronted with very troubling 
evidence indicating that Lightbody, a convicted felon with 
possible connections to organized crime, might have an 
undisclosed ownership interest in the parcel of land that would 
be a part of a casino license application.  That interest had 
19 
 
also been purchased by Gattineri pursuant to a promissory note 
and memorandum of understanding.  The details of that purchase 
were also suspicious, as documents had been backdated.  All of 
this made the details of the FBT parcel sale to Wynn, including 
Gattineri's interest in it, a matter of significant regulatory 
concern, requiring full investigation and disclosure. 
Gattineri's interest in the property and the price he would 
receive for it were therefore well within the regulatory powers 
of the commission.  The commission's follow-up investigation 
also made its lingering concerns regarding Lightbody and 
Gattineri clear to all of those involved.  As a result, any 
additional contract involving Gattineri's compensation should 
have been presented to the commission by Wynn or Gattineri 
himself.  Wynn and Gattineri's statutory obligations to fully 
disclose pertinent information and to not mislead the commission 
required such presentation particularly because of the concerns 
that Lightbody might still be involved, and because Gattineri 
was the one who transacted with him.  See G. L. c. 23K, 
§ 13 (b), (c).  Consequently, the enforcement of any contracts 
concealed from the commission and compensating Gattineri for his 
interest in the property would be a violation of public policy. 
c.  A secret contract with terms inconsistent with those 
disclosed to the public.  Not only was the alleged San Diego 
agreement concealed from the commission, but it was also 
20 
 
inconsistent with the publicly disclosed terms and conditions 
upon which the sale of the FBT property had been approved.  This 
provides an additional reason for rendering the San Diego 
agreement unenforceable. 
The commission had approved the sale of the FBT parcel to 
Wynn with two specific conditions designed to address its 
concerns about undisclosed interests with connections to 
organized crime.  First, it sought certificates from FBT members 
that confirmed their ownership stake in FBT and that they would 
be the only recipients of the FBT parcel sale proceeds.  Second, 
it required that "the sale price" of the FBT parcel be "no more 
[than] $35 million" to ensure that the purchase of the parcel 
would not reflect a casino premium.  The commission considered 
the price reduction necessary to promote public confidence in 
the integrity of the deal, as the combination of the IEB's 
investigation, the certificates, the capped price, and the 
turning over of files to the United States Attorney, the 
Attorney General of Massachusetts, and the district attorney for 
the Suffolk district for further investigation demonstrated the 
commission's commitment to preventing any persons with 
connections to organized crime from profiting from the awarding 
of the license. 
In response, Gattineri refused to sign the certificate.  
Instead, he would only do so if he received extra compensation.  
21 
 
That compensation, he claims, was to be provided in the San 
Diego agreement, a contract for an additional $19 million that 
was concealed from the commission. 
Secret deals in violation of the public terms and 
conditions required for gaming licensure are unenforceable 
violations of public policy.  They place in grave doubt the 
integrity of the public process for awarding the license, and 
thereby defeat the public's confidence in that process.  See 
G. L. c. 23K § 1 (1); Abdow, 468 Mass. at 489-490; Colella, 360 
Mass. at 158.  As a result, they are unenforceable. 
As alleged by Gattineri, he and Wynn's representative 
negotiated a secret oral agreement for additional compensation 
beyond the $35 million cap required as a condition for approval 
of the license.  It was also to be paid to Gattineri, the person 
who had purchased an additional interest in FBT from Lightbody, 
the convicted felon with ties to organized crime who was 
recorded claiming to still have an interest in the FBT parcel, 
thereby raising concerns that such additional undisclosed 
compensation might end up in his hands.  It is hard to imagine 
contractual conditions more likely to undermine the public's 
confidence in the licensing process.  According to Gattineri, 
the deal was negotiated in private, done orally and not in 
writing, and deliberately concealed from the commission.  
Enforcement of such a secret agreement, contradicting the public 
22 
 
terms of approval, constitutes a clear violation of public 
policy. 
d.  The unusual nature of the price condition, the 
commission's authority, and the legality of the response to the 
condition.  Finally, we address the regulatory taking issue left 
open by our discussion of the ninth amendment in FBT Everett 
Realty, LLC v. Massachusetts Gaming Comm'n, 489 Mass. 702 
(2022). 
Referencing that decision, Gattineri argues that the San 
Diego agreement does not violate public policy because the 
commission exceeded its authority in requiring a reduction in 
the purchase price of the FBT parcel.  See id. at 716.  In that 
case, we reversed the entry of summary judgment in favor of the 
commission on FBT's regulatory taking claim, on the grounds that 
the motion judge did not apply the correct legal standard for 
regulatory takings and that the $35 million cap constituted a 
"highly unusual" regulatory decision even though the commission 
had "broad discretion in addressing its concerns about potential 
concealed, criminal ownership interests in FBT."  Id. at 714, 
715.  In particular, we questioned whether the cap may have 
compelled the transfer of the value of the property from one 
group of private parties, the FBT principals, to another, Wynn.  
Id. at 717.  We emphasized in that case, as we do here, however, 
23 
 
that these facts remain disputed and were not resolved by this 
court in FBT Everett Realty, LLC.  See id. 
But even if we were to assume that the commission somehow 
exceeded its authority and effectuated a taking against FBT by 
limiting the FBT parcel purchase price to $35 million, the 
proper course of action would have been to seek compensation 
from the commission, as FBT has done in the lawsuit it brought 
against the commission.  See id. at 707-708 (discussing FBT's 
lawsuit).  The solution to administrative overreach is a public 
process challenging such overreach, not secret deals.  As a 
result of FBT's lawsuit, the public will be apprised of the 
commission's actions and whether those actions constituted an 
unlawful taking.  See id. at 717.  By contrast, Gattineri 
attempted to evade the commission's publicly declared 
requirements for a gaming license by enacting a secret side deal 
inconsistent with those requirements.  Such a secret side deal 
is an unenforceable contract in violation of public policy 
regardless of whether the commission itself exceeded its 
authority in conditioning the license on a $35 million cap. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  We answer the second certified question as 
follows.  An agreement, concealed from the commission empowered 
to review and approve casino licenses, and inconsistent with the 
terms presented to, and approved by, the commission to address 
its concerns about the possible involvement of organized crime, 
24 
 
is unenforceable as a violation of public policy.  Because we 
hold that the San Diego agreement is unenforceable for public 
policy reasons, we need not and do not answer the first 
question, regarding whether it also violates § 21 of the gaming 
act. 
The Reporter of Decisions is directed to furnish attested 
copies of this opinion to the clerk of this court.  The clerk in 
turn will transmit one copy, under the seal of the court, to the 
clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit, as the answer to the question certified, and will also 
transmit a copy to each party.