Title: Matter of Fountain

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
In the Matter of a Member 
 
§    
of the Bar of the Supreme Court 
§  
of the State of Delaware,  
 
§   No. 198, 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
DARRYL K. FOUNTAIN, 
 
§   Board Case Nos. 5, 18, 29, 30 and 
 
 
 
 
 
§       41, 2004 
 
 
Respondent.  
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
  Submitted:  June 6, 2005 
 
 
 
 
     Decided:  July 11, 2005 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices, and 
STOKES, Judge,1 constituting the Court en Banc.   
 
 
Disciplinary Proceeding Upon Final Report of the Board on 
Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court.  Suspension Ordered. 
 
James E. Liguori, Esquire, Dover, Delaware, for Respondent. 
 
Mary Susan Much, Esquire, Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 
Wilmington, Delaware. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Per Curiam: 
                                          
 
1 Sitting by designation pursuant to Del. Const. art. IV, § 12 and Supr. Ct. R. 2 and 4. 
 
2
This matter is before the Court for disciplinary action upon review of 
the April 2005 Final Report and Recommendation (“Final Report”) of the 
Board on Professional Responsibility (“Board”).  The Respondent, Darryl K. 
Fountain (“Fountain”), has been a member of the Bar of this Court since 
1984.  The Board has recommended a one-year suspension with the 
possibility of applying for reinstatement after six months, if certain 
conditions are met.  The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) argues that 
a one-year suspension is inappropriate and also objects to the Board’s 
recommendation that Fountain be allowed, subject to conditions, to petition 
for reinstatement six months from the date of the suspension.   
The ODC suggests that the appropriate sanction for undisputed ethical 
violations is a three-year suspension and that Fountain’s ability to apply for 
reinstatement should vest only upon the conclusion of a three-year 
suspension.  The ODC argues that the Board’s recommendation is not 
consistent with prior disciplinary cases.  The ODC also requests 
authorization to petition the Chancery Court for a Receiver of Fountain’s 
law practice.   
After careful consideration, we have decided that a three-year 
suspension is an appropriate sanction, subject to the right to apply for 
reinstatement after two years if certain conditions are met and Fountain 
 
3
otherwise demonstrates his rehabilitation.  We also direct the ODC to 
petition the Court of Chancery for a Receiver of Fountain’s law practice.   
Facts2 
 
Fountain was admitted to the Bar of the Supreme Court of Delaware 
in 1984.  At all times relevant to the Petition, Fountain was engaged in the 
private practice of law with an office in Wilmington. 
 
Case No. 18, 2004 
 
On April 2, 2004, Martin Zukoff, CPA, the auditor for the Lawyers’ 
Fund for Client Protection conducted a compliance audit of Fountain’s law 
office financial books and records.  Mr. Zukoff issued a written audit report 
on April 8, 2004 (“Audit Report”).  The Audit Report stated that Fountain 
had failed properly to maintain his financial books and records for his law 
practice from at least 1995 through the date of the audit.  Specifically, the 
Audit Report indicated that Fountain (1) failed to maintain a cash 
receipts/cash disbursements journal for each bank account; (2) failed to 
reconcile his operating account and his escrow account; and (3) failed to 
maintain a client subsidiary ledger for his attorney escrow account.  
Accordingly, Mr. Zukoff was unable to determine, among other things, if 
negative client balances existed or whether earned fees were timely 
                                          
 
2 The facts are taken almost verbatim from the Board’s Report. 
 
4
transferred to the operating account.  Further, Mr. Zukoff noted that 
Fountain had failed to file his 2002 federal and state personal income tax 
returns and his Wilmington Net Profit tax returns. 
 
Mr. Zukoff also noted that Fountain had failed accurately to report the 
status of his books and records on his Certificates of Compliance filed in the 
period from 1996 through 2004.  Mr. Zukoff also found that Fountain was 
co-mingling his own funds with client funds in his escrow account and that 
for the period of April 2003 through February 2004, Fountain’s escrow 
account had 26 overdraft balances.  Because Fountain’s escrow account was 
not designated as a Professional Conduct Rule 1.15A account, the ODC had 
not received notices of these overdrafts.  Fountain’s operating account had 
20 overdraft balances for the same period. 
 
The Audit Report noted that one week before the scheduled audit, 
Fountain had engaged a CPA firm to bring his books and records into 
compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct.  As of the date of the 
audit, however, the CPA firm was only able to enter deposits and cancel 
check transactions for the operating and escrow accounts from January 2003 
through February 2004.  No reconciliations had been performed nor client 
lists or ledgers created for the escrow account. 
 
5
 
A follow up audit was performed on September 1, 2004.  Mr. Zukoff 
reported that Fountain had opened a “new” escrow account and had entered 
check and deposit transactions in the computer system from April 13, 2004 
through June 24, 2004. He reported, among other things that:  no monthly 
reconciliations had been performed; no client balance listings had been 
performed; no monthly summary listings had been prepared; it was still not 
possible to determine whether any negative client balances existed or 
whether there were any unidentified client funds; overdraft balances were 
noted for each month from June through August 2004; and Fountain had not 
yet filed his 2002 federal or state income tax returns or his Wilmington net 
profit tax return.  Finally, Mr. Zukoff noted that he was unable to locate 
retainer deposits from three clients (discussed below) who had filed 
complaints against Fountain.   
 
Case No. 29, 2004 
 
On April 1, 2004, one of Fountain’s clients, Christina Paoli, filed a 
disciplinary complaint alleging that despite numerous requests, Fountain had 
failed to provide her with an accounting of her retainer funds. By letter dated 
April 6, 2004, the ODC asked Fountain to respond to the allegations in Ms. 
Paoli’s complaint and to provide a copy of his retainer letter and an 
accounting of the funds.  Fountain filed a response on April 21, 2004 stating 
 
6
that Ms. Paoli had paid him a $1,000 retainer in or about September 2003 
and three subsequent $200 payments but that he had failed to document his 
use of these funds.  Fountain’s retainer letter failed to advise Ms. Paoli how 
the retainer was to be earned and drawn down from his escrow account.  By 
letter dated April 22, 2004, ODC again requested Fountain to provide a 
statement of the client’s account and a time line of his representation.  
Fountain failed to provide this information. 
 
Case No. 30, 2004 
 
On April 13, 2004, Joseph Rychalsky, Jr. paid Fountain a $3,000 cash 
retainer for legal representation in connection with a criminal matter in the 
Superior Court.  Fountain gave Mr. Rychalsky a retainer letter confirming 
receipt of the $3,000 and indicating that it would be used for “1) entering 
[his] appearance, 2) facts investigation, 3) legal research, and 4) penalty 
calculation.”  The letter did not set forth Fountain’s hourly rate.  On April 
20, 2004, Fountain appeared in Superior Court over one hour late for the 
client’s trial and without the client’s file.  Following repeated attempts to 
reach Fountain in late April, Mr. Rychalsky determined that he wished to 
terminate Fountain’s representation.  On May 22, 2004, Mr. Rychalsky 
received a $1,537.50 refund check from Fountain as well as an account 
statement of the use of his retainer.  The account statement shows that 
 
7
Fountain charged Mr. Rychalsky for legal services at the rate of $250 per 
hour.  The refund check was post dated to May 26, 2004.  By letter dated 
June 28, 2004, the ODC directed Fountain to respond to Mr. Rychalsky’s 
complaint by July 12, 2004.  Fountain failed to respond. 
 
Case No. 41, 2004 
 
In or about February 2000, Stephen Bunting retained Fountain to 
represent him in a defamation lawsuit.  Mr. Bunting paid Fountain a $7,500 
retainer.  Fountain advised Mr. Bunting that the suit would be filed by April 
2004, but it was not.  Therefore, Mr. Bunting sought periodic status updates 
from Fountain. 
 
On May 27, 2004, Fountain confirmed in writing the receipt of Mr. 
Bunting’s retainer but he did not indicate how that retainer would be earned.  
On or around August 24, 2004, Mr. Bunting terminated Fountain’s 
representation and requested the return of all documents as well as his 
retainer.  In response, Fountain sent Mr. Bunting a “draft” pleading but he 
did not immediately return any documents.  Fountain did not return the 
retainer or any portion thereof.  At the September 1, 2004 follow up audit 
discussed above, Mr. Zukoff was unable to locate or track the receipt and 
use of Mr. Bunting’s retainer. 
 
8
 
At the hearing, Fountain testified that he deposited Mr. Bunting’s 
check into his operating account in February 2004 and that he drew down on 
it immediately.  Fountain also testified that he prepared an accounting of his 
use of the funds and that the accounting should have been included in the 
materials that he sent to Mr. Bunting following the termination.  Mr. Bunting 
denied receiving any accounting.  Mr. Bunting also testified that Fountain 
had told him that Fountain would have to figure out what portion of the 
retainer would be returned. 
 
Case No. 5, 2004 
 
In January 2003, Fountain filed his Affidavit of Compliance with the 
Commission on Continuing Legal Education (“Commission”) verifying that 
he had completed 1.4 credit hours towards his required 24 credit hours.  
Fountain included with his submission a proposed make-up plan to bring his 
CLE deficiency into compliance with the Supreme Court Continuing Legal 
Education Rules (“CLE Rules”).  The Commission accepted Fountain’s 
proposed make-up plan and advised him that it had to be completed by April 
30, 2003, with notice to the Commission no later than May 15, 2003, in 
order to comply with the CLE Rules. 
 
On March 28, 2003, Fountain submitted a revised make-up plan 
verifying that he had completed 12 credits, including 5.5 credits of enhanced 
 
9
ethics and stating that he would complete the remaining required credits by 
May 19, 2003.  On April 5, 2003, the Commission advised Fountain that it 
could not approve the revised plan, as the completion of the credits would 
fall outside the allowable time period of April 30, 2003.  Fountain was 
further advised that the course work he had completed would be applied 
towards his December 31, 2002 reporting requirements but that he would be 
subject to late fees.    
 
On July 8, 2003, the Commission issued a Notice of Non-Compliance 
advising Fountain that late fees were accruing and that his failure to comply 
with the CLE Rules would be forwarded to the ODC if he failed to respond 
on or before July 28, 2003.  Fountain failed to respond to the July 8, 2003 
Notice.  On October 9, 2003, the Commission issued a statement of non-
compliance to the ODC.  In response to a request from the ODC, Fountain 
admitted his non-compliance with the CLE Rules and outlined a plan to take 
CLE courses through the Internet.  Various attempts by the ODC to contact 
Fountain by phone and mail in the period from December 2003 through 
March 2004 were fruitless.  Fountain failed to respond to these inquiries.   
 
At the time of the February 23, 2005 Board hearing, Fountain 
remained non-compliant with his CLE reporting requirements.  As of 
December 31, 2002, his late fees were over $1,000.  Fountain testified that 
 
10
he had submitted a proposal to sponsor a consumer law program to the 
Delaware State Bar Association (“DSBA”) which, if accepted, would 
provide him an unspecified number of CLE credits.   
Ethical Violations Admitted 
 
As set forth in the Petition for Discipline filed by the ODC and 
admitted in the Answer, Fountain has violated several of the Delaware 
Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (the “Rules”). 
 
Case No. 18 involves violations of Rules 1.15(a) (lawyer shall hold 
client property separate from lawyer’s property and maintain complete 
record of escrow account funds), 1.15(d) (detailing specific requirements for 
maintenance of attorneys’ books and records), 1.15A (requiring designation 
of accounts into which escrow funds deposited as a 1.15A account), and 
8.4(d) (professional misconduct to engage in conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice). 
 
Case Nos. 29, 30 and 41 involve, in the aggregate, additional 
violations of Rules 1.15(a), 1.15(d) and 8.1(b), as well as violations of Rules 
1.15(b) (lawyer shall promptly deliver to client funds to which client is 
entitled), 1.5(f) (lawyer must provide written statement of basis on which 
retainer will be earned and statement of fees earned at the time fees drawn 
from trust account), and 1.16(d) (upon termination, lawyer must surrender 
 
11
papers and property to which client is entitled including unearned retainer 
funds). 
 
In Board Case No. 5, Fountain violated Rules 3.4(c) (lawyer shall not 
knowingly disobey obligation under rules of tribunal) and 8.1(b) (lawyer 
shall not “knowingly fail to respond to lawful demand for information from  
. . . a disciplinary authority”). 
Aggravating Factors 
 
The Board found that the following aggravating factors exist in this 
disciplinary matter: 
 
1) 
Fountain has engaged in a pattern of misconduct involving 
seventeen separate counts, including (a) filing numerous false Certificates of 
Compliance with the Supreme Court; and (b) failing to satisfy basic financial 
obligations relating to the proper maintenance of law practice books and 
records [ABA Standard for Imposing Lawyer Discipline (“ABA Standard”) § 
9.22(c)]; 
 
2) 
Fountain’s misconduct consists of multiple offenses [ABA 
Standard § 9.22(d)]; 
 
3) 
Fountain’s failure to file federal and state income tax returns in 
2002 constitutes illegal conduct  [ABA Standard § 9.22(k)]; and 
 
12
 
4) 
Fountain has substantial experience in the practice of law, 
having been admitted to the Delaware Bar in 1984 [ABA Standard § 9.22(i)]. 
Mitigating Factors 
 
The Board found that the following mitigating factors exist in this 
disciplinary matter: 
 
1) 
Fountain has no prior disciplinary record [ABA Standard            
§ 9.32(a)]; 
 
2) 
Fountain has exhibited remorse and has recognized the 
wrongfulness of his conduct, as evidenced by (a) his admissions to most of 
the allegations made and the violations charged in the Petition and (b) his 
testimony [ABA Standard § 9.32(l)];   
 
3) 
Fountain has cooperated, at least in part, with the ODC, [ABA 
Standard § 9.32(e)].  The Board notes, however, that on several occasions, 
Fountain did not respond to the ODC’s inquiries.  Indeed, these failures form 
the basis for two of the Counts in the Petition.  Accordingly, this factor is not 
given as much weight as it would have received if there had been full 
cooperation; 
 
4) 
Fountain is of good character [ABA Standard § 9.32(g)] and has 
a history of serving clients who might not otherwise have legal 
representation. 
 
13
Board’s Recommended Discipline 
 
 
The 
Board 
on 
Professional 
Responsibility 
(“Board”) 
has 
recommended a one-year suspension, with the ability to apply for 
reinstatement at any time after six months from the date of the suspension, 
based on “a demonstration that he has made arrangements to resume the 
practice of law in association with one or more attorneys or in a law firm, 
but in no case shall [“Fountain”] have responsibility for the financial 
recordkeeping requirements imposed by Rule 1.15, and shall have no 
authority to issue checks from operating or escrow accounts.”  As grounds 
for this recommendation, the Board primarily relied upon its findings that 
Fountain’s case was distinguishable from In re Landis,3 In re Bailey,4 and In 
re Garrett,5 in that Fountain did not have a lengthy period of nonpayment of 
personal taxes.  The Board also found Fountain’s case distinguishable from 
In re Brodoway,6 and In re Froelich,7 in that Fountain had not taken “swift 
remedial efforts” to rectify his misconduct and . . . offered only “vague 
assurances that he will correct the situation in the future.”  In distinguishing 
                                          
 
3 In re Landis, 850 A.2d 291 (Del. 2004). 
4 In re Bailey, 821 A.2d 851 (Del. 2003). 
5 In re Garrett, 835 A.2d 514 (Del. 2003). 
6 In re Brodoway, 854 A.2d 1158 (Table) (Del. 2004). 
7 In re Froelich, 838 A.2d 1117 (Del. 2003). 
 
14
the latter two cases, the Board also found that Fountain’s conduct was 
knowing and involved a “systemic failure” and caused injury to clients. 
ODC’s Objections 
 
The ODC submits that this Court’s recent decision in In re Shamers is 
the most analogous Delaware disciplinary precedent.8  The ODC argues that 
a three-year suspension is appropriate in this matter, based upon:  Fountain’s 
ten-year failure to maintain his books and records; his continuing and 
present failure to maintain his firm’s books and records in accordance with 
the Rules; his continuing and present failure to complete his continuing legal 
education requirements for 2002 and 2004; his continuing and present 
failure to safeguard client/third party funds; his continuing and present 
failure to pay his federal and state income taxes in violation of the Rules; 
and his longstanding failure to accurately report the status of his books and 
records to this Court on his Certificates of Compliance for 1996, 1997, 1998, 
1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004.   
Standard of Review 
 
 
This Court “has an obligation to review the record” in a disciplinary 
proceeding “independently and determine whether there is substantial 
                                          
 
8 In re Shamers, 873 A.2d 1089 (Del. 2005). 
 
15
evidence to support the Board’s factual findings.”9  This Court reviews the 
Board’s conclusions of law de novo.10  As to the Board’s recommendation of 
an appropriate sanction, this Court has the exclusive authority for 
disciplining members of the Delaware Bar.  Therefore, we have stated that 
“while the Board’s recommendations on the appropriate sanction to be 
imposed are helpful, they are not binding on this Court.”11  This Court “has 
wide latitude in determining the form of discipline, and . . . will review the 
recommended sanction to ensure that it is appropriate, fair and consistent 
with . . . prior disciplinary decisions.”12   
Lawyer Sanction Standards 
 
 
Lawyer disciplinary sanctions “are not designed to be either punitive 
or penal.”13  “The objectives of the lawyer disciplinary system [in Delaware] 
are to protect the public, to protect the administration of justice, to preserve 
confidence in the legal profession, and to deter other lawyers from similar 
misconduct.”14  The focus of the lawyer disciplinary system in Delaware is 
not on the lawyer, but rather on the danger to the public that is ascertainable 
                                          
 
9 In re Bailey, 821 A.2d 851, 862 (Del. 2003) (citing In re Reardon, 759 A.2d 568, 575 
(Del. 2000)). 
10 Id.  
11 Id. at 866. 
12 Id. 
13 In re Garrett, 835 A.2d 514, 515 (Del. 2003). 
14 In re Bailey, 821 A.2d 851, 866 (Del. 2003). 
 
16
from the lawyer’s record of professional misconduct.15  To further these 
objectives and “to promote consistency and predictability in the imposition 
of disciplinary sanctions,” this Court looks for guidance to the four-factor 
test established by the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions:  the 
ethical duties violated by the lawyer; the lawyer’s mental state; the extent of 
the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct; and the 
existence of aggravating and mitigating factors.16 
Prior Delaware Disciplinary Cases 
 
The inherent and exclusive authority for disciplining members of our 
Bar is vested in this Court.17  The Court has wide latitude in determining the 
form of discipline to be imposed.18  In imposing sanctions, the Court is 
guided by its precedents.19 
                                          
 
15 In re Hull, 767 A.2d 197, 201 (Del. 2001). 
16 ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 8 (1992), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/regulation/standards_sanctions.pdf.  See also In re Bailey, 821 
A.2d at 866.   
17 See In re Green, 464 A.2d 881, 885 (Del. 1983). 
18 See Matter of a Member of the Bar, 226 A.2d 705, 707 (Del. 1967).   
19 In re Ryan, 498 A.2d 515 (Del. 1985) (suspended for two years for altering a letter 
from state securities agency that rejected registration of securities offered for sale by 
employer, with the intent to make employer believe that securities had been accepted for 
registration); In re Tos, II, 576 A.2d 607 (Del. 1990) (suspended for one year for failing 
to provide competent representation, failing to comply with requests of the Supreme 
Court and Family Court Clerk, and failing to comply with Supreme Court directions); In 
re McCann, 669 A.2d 49 (Del. 1995) (suspended for one year for missing filing 
deadlines, failing to respond to court orders, neglecting to inform client that appeal had 
been dismissed, identifying self as “nephew” in clients will, submitting falsified evidence 
to tribunal); In re Mekler, 669 A.2d 655 (Del. 1995) (suspended for one year for failing to 
review clients file until five months after petition for review of child support order, 
 
17
 
Where there is a finding of continuous failure to file and pay income 
taxes and failure to maintain law office books and records, the Court has 
generally found that a suspension of the lawyer is appropriate and usually 
that sanction is for three years.20  In reviewing books and records cases, this 
Court considers whether the conduct was an isolated incident or continued 
without correction for several years and whether the violations could be 
readily repeated.21  We recently conducted an extensive review of this 
Court’s prior precedents involving similar ethical violations.22 
Suspension Appropriate Sanction 
In Garrett, we held that a lawyer’s record of “knowing misconduct     
. . . over a period of several years” involving lawyer books and records, 
unfiled tax returns, and false Certificates of Compliance warrants suspension 
from the practice of law, and concluded that based upon the Board’s finding 
of fact and violations of the Rules, a three-year suspension was “consistent 
                                                                                                                             
 
submitting falsified documents to court, incorrectly informing clients that continuance 
was obtained, failing to appear at review, failing to communicate with court); In re 
Lassen, 672 A.2d 988 (Del. 1996) (three year suspension for making personal restaurant 
charges to clients’ accounts, disguising charges, making misrepresentations to bankruptcy 
court, and charging fictitious billable hours to clients); In re Faraone, 722 A.2d 1 (Del. 
1998) (six month suspension and eighteen month probation for misrepresenting material 
information and failing to correct certain misunderstandings concerning real estate 
transactions).  See In re Christie, 574 A.2d 845, 853 (Del. 1990).   
20 In re Landis, 850 A.2d 291, 293 (Del. 2004), citing In re Garrett, 835 A.2d 514 (Del. 
2003). 
21 See In re Benson, 774 A.2d 258 (Del. 2001); In re Landis, 850 A.2d at 293. 
22 In re Shamers, 873 A.2d 1089 (Del. 2005). 
 
18
with this Court’s prior holdings in similar cases.”23  Our decisions in Landis 
and Bailey resulted in shorter suspensions, but reflect ameliorating 
circumstances that are not present in Fountain’s case.24  We have concluded 
that Shamers is the most analogous precedent. 
 
The record in Fountain’s case demonstrates a multi-year failure to 
maintain proper books and records and safeguard client funds; a failure to 
timely file and pay personal state and federal income taxes; and a ten-year 
failure to accurately report the status of his books and records on his 
Certificates of Compliance.  The complete disarray of Fountain’s financial 
records is graphically illustrated by numerous overdraft notices to his 
operating account and to his escrow account.  Several of Fountain’s clients 
have been harmed by the co-mingling of funds when Fountain deposited 
unearned retainer fees directly into his operating account.  While the Board 
believes that Fountain sincerely wants to rectify the situation, it questions 
Fountain’s ability to take the appropriate steps to bring his books and 
records into compliance.  At the time of the hearing, Fountain remained non-
compliant.  Even the witnesses who testified on Fountain’s behalf, including 
two former judges, acknowledge that Fountain has not demonstrated the 
                                          
 
23 In re Garrett, 835 A.2d 514, 515 & 515 n.4 (Del. 2003) (collecting cases). 
24 In re Landis, 850 A.2d 291 (Del. 2004); In re Bailey, 821 A.2d 851 (Del. 2003). 
 
19
capacity to properly administer a private law practice in accordance with the 
applicable ethical rules.   
 
We have concluded a three-year period of suspension is the 
appropriate sanction for Fountain, subject to his ability to apply for 
reinstatement after two years if certain conditions are satisfied.  We have 
also concluded that Fountain’s inability to correct his accounting 
deficiencies raises significant concerns that he will not effectively discharge 
his obligations under Rules 21 and 23 of the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of 
Disciplinary Procedure upon his suspension from the practice of law.  
Therefore, we have concluded that Fountain poses an ongoing risk of harm 
to clients and former clients unless a Receiver is appointed for the purpose 
of protecting the interests of those persons.  Accordingly, it is hereby 
ORDERED that Fountain be disciplined as follows:  
 
1) 
that he be suspended from engaging in the practice of law as a 
member of the Delaware Bar for a period of three years, commencing on the 
date of this decision, subject to his ability to apply for reinstatement after 
two years if the conditions in paragraph 7 are satisfied and Fountain has 
otherwise demonstrated his rehabilitation; 
 
2) 
that Fountain be reprimanded publicly; 
 
20
 
3)  
that Fountain discharge his obligations under Rules 21 and 23 
of the Delaware Lawyers Rules of Disciplinary Procedure; 
 
4) 
that during his suspension, Fountain shall not share in any legal 
fees arising from clients or cases referred by Fountain during the period of 
suspension to any other attorney or share in any legal fees earned for 
services by others during such period of suspension; 
5) 
that during his suspension, Fountain shall pay all of the ODC’s 
costs in this proceeding; pay the costs of the LFCP audits; and pay all past 
and current federal and state income taxes, as well as any taxes owed to the 
City of Wilmington; and repay to his clients all unearned fees; 
 
6) 
that Fountain must fully cooperate with the ODC in its efforts 
to monitor his compliance with the suspension order 
 
7) 
that if Fountain has complied with all of the other terms and 
conditions of this opinion, he may petition for reinstatement after two years, 
based upon a demonstration that he has made arrangements to resume the 
practice of law in a public capacity or in a private law firm, but not as a solo 
practitioner and not in any office-sharing arrangement that would amount in 
substance to a solo practice, and in no case shall Fountain have 
responsibility for the financial recordkeeping requirements imposed by Rule 
1.15, nor shall he have authority to issue checks from operating or escrow 
 
21
accounts, which responsibility shall be assumed by one or more of the other 
members in good standing of the Delaware Bar with whom Fountain has 
arranged to engage in the private practice of law; 
 
8) 
that the ODC’s application for leave to petition the Court of 
Chancery for a Receiver of Fountain’s law practice is hereby granted; 
 
9) 
that this Opinion and Order be disseminated by Disciplinary 
Counsel in accordance with the Rules of the Board of Professional 
Responsibility.