Title: Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC v. Bickford

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2017 ME 140 
Docket: 
Han-16-414 
Argued: 
April 12, 2017 
Decided: 
June 29, 2017 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC 
 
v. 
 
MAX A. BICKFORD 
 
 
JABAR, J. 
[¶1]  Max A. Bickford appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court 
(Hancock County, R. Murray, J.) affirming a District Court (Ellsworth, 
Mallonee, J.) judgment in a small claims proceeding in favor of Portfolio 
Recovery Associates, LLC (PRA), finding Bickford liable on debt that PRA had 
purchased from a prior creditor.  Bickford raises two issues on appeal.  He 
contends that the District Court erred by finding that PRA had met its burden 
of proof and by admitting PRA’s exhibits into evidence.  We disagree and 
affirm.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  PRA filed two small claims complaints against Bickford: one on 
April 23, 2015, and the second on May 11, 2015.  The first claim alleged that 
 
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Bickford had been indebted to Capital One Bank (USA), N.A. in the amount of 
$1,102.20 and that PRA had purchased the debt.  The second alleged that 
Bickford had been indebted to HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A. in the amount of 
$885.08 and that PRA had purchased the debt.  In each complaint, PRA 
requested a judgment against Bickford for the amount of the alleged debt plus 
costs.   
[¶3]  The District Court (Mallonee, J.) heard the cases together on 
October 5, 2015.  For each claim, PRA offered in evidence an affidavit 
suggesting that PRA had received proper assignment of Bickford’s debt and 
that the purported amount of the debt was an accurate statement of the 
amount of money owed.  PRA also offered in evidence for each claim bills of 
sale purportedly proving the sale of Bickford’s two accounts from the prior 
creditors to PRA.  Additionally, as to its first claim, PRA offered in evidence 
several credit card statements and a 2012 Maine tax lien certificate offered to 
show that the address where the statements were mailed was Bickford’s 
residence.  As to its second claim, in addition to the affidavit and bill of sale, 
PRA offered in evidence a single credit card statement.   
[¶4]  Bickford objected to the admission of the affidavits in each claim 
on the basis that there was no witness to verify their relevance, accuracy, or 
 
3 
credibility, and that they did not comply with the requirements for actions 
brought on itemized annexed accounts pursuant to 16 M.R.S. § 355 (2016).  
Bickford also argued that all of PRA’s exhibits should be excluded pursuant to 
M.R.S.C.P. 6(b) and 15, and M.R. Civ. P. 43(a).  Further, he argued at the 
hearing that PRA had offered no evidence of a contract and therefore could 
not prove its claims for breach of contract.   
[¶5]  The court reserved ruling on the evidentiary offerings in both 
claims and provided additional time for each party to submit written 
arguments.  After review of the written submissions, in two decisions—
without making factual findings or explicitly ruling on the admissibility of the 
evidence—the court found that 16 M.R.S. § 355 did not apply and concluded 
that PRA had met its burden of proof as to both claims.1  Bickford appealed 
both decisions to the Superior Court pursuant to M.R.S.C.P. 11(d), and the 
Superior Court (Hancock County, R. Murray, J.) affirmed the District Court’s 
decisions.  Bickford timely appeals that judgment.  See M.R. App. P. 2(b)(3). 
                                         
1  At the hearing, PRA asserted that its complaints recited claims only for breach of contract.  In 
written filings to the District Court following the hearing, PRA asserted causes of action for breach 
of contract and unjust enrichment, and a claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, see 
15 U.S.C.S. §§ 1692-1692p (LEXIS through PL 115-9).  On appeal here, PRA does not specify the 
legal theory under which it is entitled to relief, but contends that its evidence supports the court’s 
finding that PRA owns Bickford’s debt, the debt is in the amounts alleged, Bickford defaulted, and 
PRA’s two affidavits meet the statutory requirements of 16 M.R.S. § 355 (2016), which sets out 
requirements of affidavits for accounts annexed complaints.  Because at the hearing PRA explicitly 
disclaimed section 355 as a basis for Bickford’s liability, we do not consider arguments related to 
that cause of action. 
 
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II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶6]  Bickford raises two issues on appeal.  First, he claims that the 
District Court erred by finding that PRA had met its burden of proof to 
establish its ownership of his debt.  Second, he asserts that the court erred by 
admitting PRA’s affidavits into evidence because the affidavits do not meet the 
requirements of 16 M.R.S. § 355 and PRA presented no live witnesses to 
support its case.  
A. 
Standard of Review 
[¶7]  Small claims proceedings in the District Court are creatures of 
statute with procedures and rules different from those in the District and 
Superior Courts.  See 14 M.R.S. §§ 7481-7487 (2016).  Initially, the small 
claims rules limited any appeal by either party to issues of law.  See Ela v. 
Pelletier, 495 A.2d 1225, 1227-28 (Me. 1985).  In Ela v. Pelletier, however, we 
held that limiting appeals by the defendant to issues of law violated the Maine 
Constitution because it denied the defendant the right to a jury trial.  Id. at 
1228-29.  Because the plaintiff had the option of bringing the claim in 
Superior Court where a jury trial would be available, there was no 
constitutional requirement that the plaintiff be given the same right as the 
 
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defendant to appeal a small claims judgment and demand a jury trial.  Id. at 
1229.  
 
[¶8]  The Rules of Small Claims Procedure were subsequently amended 
to reflect the defendant’s options on appeal.  See M.R.S.C.P. 11.  Rule 11(d)(2) 
states that upon appeal by the defendant, he or she is entitled to a jury trial de 
novo on an issue triable by right.  If the defendant decides to appeal any 
factual issues, he or she is required to file affidavits “‘setting forth specific 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact’” entitling the 
appealing defendant to a trial by jury.  H & H Oil Co. v. Dineen, 557 A.2d 604, 
605 (Me. 1989) (quoting M.R. Civ. P. 56(e)); see also M.R.S.C.P. 11(d)(2); M.R. 
Civ. P. 80L.  Failure to make a demand for a jury trial with accompanying 
affidavits constitutes a waiver of his right to jury trial.  In that event, the 
appeal is limited to questions of law.  See M.R.S.C.P. 11(d)(1)-(2). 
 
[¶9]  Here, Bickford did not demand a jury trial on any issues, and 
therefore we only address any legal issues, which we review de novo.  See 
Gray v. TD Bank, N.A., 2012 ME 83, ¶ 10, 45 A.3d 735.  Legal issues do not 
include questions of weight to be given to evidence.  See Vibert v. Dimoulas, 
2017 ME 62, ¶ 16, --- A.3d ---.  Thus, to the extent that Bickford argues that the 
court erred in its assessment of evidence properly admitted, that argument 
 
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cannot entitle Bickford to relief on appeal.  To the extent that Bickford argues 
that, as a matter of law, PRA did not present evidence on which the court 
could have determined that Bickford was liable, that argument is cognizable 
on appeal.  See NDC Commc’ns, LLC v. Carle, 2016 ME 156, ¶ 7, 149 A.3d 1151. 
 
[¶10]  PRA’s evidence was limited to the information contained in and 
accompanying the affidavits.  If the court did not err in admitting the affidavits 
in evidence, then the court had evidence sufficient to support its 
determinations that Bickford is liable to PRA.  Alternatively, if the affidavits 
were not admissible, then there would be no evidence on which the court 
could find Bickford liable.  We therefore turn to Bickford’s argument 
pertaining to the admissibility of PRA’s documents admitted in evidence. 
B. 
Admissibility of the Evidence 
 
[¶11]  Bickford argues that the court erred by admitting in evidence the 
various exhibits that PRA offered in both its claims, because PRA’s reliance 
upon affidavits rather than live witnesses denied Bickford a fair opportunity 
to present a defense.  PRA, on the other hand, contends that its exhibits were 
properly admitted and that there was no requirement for it to present a live 
witness.    
 
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[¶12]  The purpose of small claims proceedings is to provide “a simple, 
speedy and informal court procedure for the resolution of small claims.”  
14 M.R.S. § 7481.  Small claims are defined as any claim for “debt or 
damage[s]” no greater than $6,000.  14 M.R.S. § 7482.  The Small Claims Act 
provides that the Supreme Judicial Court shall adopt procedural rules for 
small claims actions.  14 M.R.S. § 7484-A.  Under M.R.S.C.P. 6(b), the Maine 
Rules of Evidence, other than those with respect to privilege, do not apply in 
small claims proceedings.  Without setting evidentiary standards, M.R.S.C.P. 
6(b) states that “[t]he court may receive any oral or documentary evidence, 
not privileged, but may exclude any irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly 
repetitious evidence.”  (Emphasis added). 
 
[¶13]  In this case, the exhibits submitted by PRA included documents 
that were not “irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious.”  In support of its 
claim on the Capital One debt, PRA offered in evidence photocopies of five 
credit card bills setting out Bickford’s name, an account number, the dates of 
the statements, and the outstanding balance.  In support of its claim on the 
HSBC debt, PRA offered in evidence one credit card bill also setting out 
Bickford’s name, an account number, a date, and an outstanding balance.  
PRA’s affidavits suggested that PRA was the assignee of Bickford’s previous 
 
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creditors and listed the final four digits of the Capital One and HSBC accounts.  
In addition, PRA offered two bills of sale, one for each claim, both stating that 
“[a]ccounts identified in the Sale File” had been sold by prior creditors to PRA.  
The court was entitled to admit in evidence and then consider these 
documents because they fell within the general grant of admissibility created 
in Rule 6(b) and because none of that Rule’s grounds for exclusion applied 
here.  There was no error in the court’s decision to admit these documents in 
evidence.2 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
2  We are not persuaded by Bickford’s assertion that in this type of proceeding, he had a “right” 
to cross-examine the affiants, and we note that nothing in the record indicates that Bickford 
requested any process by which one or both affiants would be made available, telephonically or 
otherwise, for testimonial purposes.  
 
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Erica Veazey, Esq. (orally), Pine Tree Legal Assistance, Bangor, for appellant 
Max A. Bickford 
 
Katherine Audet, Esq., Law Offices Howard Lee Schiff, PC, Portland, and David 
P. Florio, Esq. (orally), Law Offices Howard Lee Schiff, PC, Auburn, 
Massachusetts, for appellee Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC. 
 
Linda Conti, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for 
amicus curiae Attorney General Janet T. Mills 
 
Thomas A. Cox, Esq., National Consumer Law Center, Portland, and Jeffrey 
Gentes, Esq., Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization, New Haven, 
Connecticut, for amici curiae The National Consumer Law Center and The 
Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization 
 
 
Hancock County Superior Court docket numbers AP-2015-10 and AP-2015-11 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY