Title: Commonwealth v. Resende

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-11997 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JAIME RESENDE. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     September 7, 2016. - January 3, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & 
Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Armed Home Invasion.  Armed Assault with Intent to Rob.  
Practice, Criminal, Duplicative convictions, Double 
jeopardy, Verdict, Confrontation of witnesses, Argument by 
prosecutor.  Evidence, Statement of codefendant, Immunized 
witness, Corroborative evidence.  Constitutional Law, 
Confrontation of witnesses, Double jeopardy. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 21, 2007. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Richard J. Chin, J., and a 
motion for a new trial was heard by him; certain of the cases 
were retried before Charles J. Hely, J.; and motions to 
reinstate a conviction and for release from unlawful restraint 
were heard by Richard J. Chin, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Jonathan Shapiro (Molly Gayle Campbell with him) for the 
defendant. 
 
Mary E. Lee, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
2 
 
 
David Lewis, Anthony Mirenda, & Richard G. Baldwin, for 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  In 2010, a Superior Court jury convicted the 
defendant of murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-
murder for his role in the shooting death of Nelson Pina.  The 
jury also convicted him of armed home invasion and armed assault 
with intent to rob.  The defendant filed a motion for a new 
trial, arguing, among other things, that the judge should have 
provided the jury with a felony-murder merger instruction.  The 
trial judge, who heard the motion, determined that a new trial 
was necessary on the felony-murder conviction, but did not 
disturb the convictions of armed home invasion and armed assault 
with intent to rob.  At his 2015 retrial, this time on the 
single charge of felony-murder, a second jury found the 
defendant not guilty. 
 
In this appeal, the defendant challenges the convictions  
at his first trial of armed home invasion and armed assault with 
intent to rob.  He argues, on double jeopardy grounds, that he 
cannot be guilty of those charges because the second jury 
acquitted him of felony-murder, predicated upon the same 
underlying felonies.  He also argues that the felony convictions 
should not stand because the admission of an incriminating 
statement from a nontestifying codefendant violated his 
3 
 
constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him; the 
jury were permitted to convict based solely on the 
uncorroborated testimony of an immunized witness; and the 
prosecutor's closing argument contained statements that were 
unsupported by the record.  For the reasons that follow, we 
affirm the defendant's convictions. 
 
1.  Facts.  We recite the facts that the jury could have 
found at the first trial.  In November, 2006, the defendant 
devised a plan to go to Nelson Pina's Brockton residence and rob 
him of cash and drugs.  The defendant recruited Vernon Newbury, 
a person he knew from the sale of illegal drugs, to assist with 
the robbery.  The defendant also asked Newbury to find others to 
assist in the commission of the robbery.  Newbury, in turn, 
contacted Kenston Scott, his cousin, who agreed to help rob 
Pina.1 
 
On the night of November 16, 2006, the defendant, Scott, 
Newbury, Eric Davis, and the defendant's brother all met at the 
house of another of Newbury's cousins in Brockton.  They smoked 
marijuana and discussed the robbery.  After ten to fifteen 
minutes, the group drove toward the victim's house in three 
vehicles.  The defendant drove his own automobile with his 
brother, Scott drove in another vehicle with Davis, and Newbury 
                                                 
1 At trial, Newbury testified under a grant of immunity and 
was a key witness against the defendant. 
4 
 
drove alone in a third vehicle, but stopped before he reached 
the victim's house. 
 
When they arrived at the victim's house, Scott raised the 
hood of his vehicle, turned on its emergency flashing lights, 
and went to the victim's front door.  Julia Codling, the 
victim's girl friend, went to the door with the victim.  Through 
the closed door, Scott told them that his automobile had broken 
down and asked to borrow a telephone to call for help.  Codling 
did not recognize Scott, describing him only as a "black male 
with a hat with designs."  The victim got his dog from the 
basement, then opened the front door and gave Scott a cordless 
telephone.  Scott began walking back to his vehicle carrying the 
telephone.  As Scott approached his vehicle, another man got out 
and Scott said, "He's here."  Scott walked back toward the 
house.  Coddling heard a struggle at the front door, followed by 
an exchange of four gunshots.  She telephoned 911 to report that 
shots had been fired, and police arrived shortly thereafter. 
 
The defendant drove from the scene, passing Newbury on the 
way.  Scott was wounded, but he left the scene, leaving his 
vehicle behind.  Newbury met the defendant after the incident.  
The defendant initially told Newbury, "Things got fucked up and 
shots rang out."  Newbury drove past the victim's house and saw 
Scott's vehicle with its hood up and lights flashing.  After 
that, Newbury drove to the defendant's brother's house in 
5 
 
Quincy, where he reconvened with the defendant, the defendant's 
brother, and Scott, who was bleeding. 
 
When police arrived, they found the victim lying on the 
floor near the entrance, dead.  The front door was damaged, and 
there were spent projectiles, fired from two different guns, 
near the doorway.  In the basement, police found $48,000 in cash 
and two containers with small amounts of marijuana, as well as a 
handwritten ledger they believed was a record of drug 
transactions. 
 
During the course of the investigation, police obtained 
records showing a call between cellular telephones associated 
with Scott and the defendant.  The police also obtained 
telephone records showing calls between the telephones belonging 
to the defendant and Newbury, in the hours immediately before 
and after the shooting.  They also determined that a baseball 
hat found at the scene and a bloody sweatshirt found nearby each 
contained Scott's deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA).  Police spoke 
with a witness in the neighborhood who said that there were two 
individuals outside the victim's house at the time of the 
shooting.  Several months later, police spoke with Scott, who 
told them that he had been at the victim's house to purchase 
drugs on the night of the shooting, but that someone else had 
done the shooting. 
6 
 
 
2.  Prior proceedings.  A grand jury returned indictments 
charging the defendant with murder in the first degree, armed 
home invasion, and armed assault with intent to rob.  At the 
defendant's first trial (a joint trial with codefendant Scott), 
the Commonwealth proceeded on theories of murder in the first 
degree by deliberate premeditation, and felony-murder with armed 
home invasion and armed robbery or attempted armed robbery as 
the predicate felonies.  The jury found the defendant guilty of 
felony-murder with the predicate felony of armed home invasion; 
armed home invasion; and armed assault with intent to rob.2  At 
sentencing, the judge dismissed the conviction of armed home 
invasion as duplicative.  See Commonwealth v. Alcequiecz, 465 
Mass. 557, 558 (2013). 
 
The defendant appealed from his convictions and filed a 
motion for a new trial.  His direct appeal was stayed pending 
                                                 
2 Kenston Scott, the codefendant, was convicted at the first 
trial of murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-
murder, with the predicate felony of armed home invasion, and 
possession of a firearm without a firearms identification card.  
See Commonwealth v. Scott, 472 Mass. 815, 816 (2015).  His 
motion for a new trial was allowed with respect to the felony-
murder conviction, on the ground of improper jury instructions 
on felony-murder.  Scott pursued an interlocutory appeal to 
challenge the judge's ruling that the evidence was sufficient to 
support a finding of two separate and distinct assaults.  Id. at 
815.  He maintained that he was entitled acquittal on the 
felony-murder charge on the ground of insufficient evidence.  
Id. at 817-818.  We determined that the evidence was sufficient 
for a jury to conclude that there were two independent assaults, 
and we affirmed the judge's order denying the motion for a 
finding of not guilty on the charge of felony-murder with armed 
home invasion as the predicate felony.  See id. at 823, 826. 
7 
 
resolution of the motion for a new trial.  The trial judge 
concluded that the jury instructions on felony-murder were 
improper because they did not contain a required merger 
instruction pursuant to Commonwealth v. Bell, 460 Mass. 294, 
302-303 (2011), S.C., 473 Mass. 131 (2015), cert. denied, 136 S. 
Ct. 2467 (2016), and Commonwealth v. Kilburn, 438 Mass. 356, 361 
(2003), and allowed the defendant's motion for a new trial on 
that ground.  He denied the other claims.  The defendant 
appealed from the denial of the other claims, but later withdrew 
that appeal.  He then filed a motion to dismiss in the Superior 
Court, asserting that a new trial would violate the protections 
against double jeopardy.  A different Superior Court judge 
denied that motion. 
 
At the defendant's second trial, the Commonwealth proceeded 
on theories of murder by means of deliberate premeditation, 
felony-murder predicated on the felony of armed home invasion, 
attempted armed robbery, and unlawful possession of a firearm.  
At the close of the evidence, the judge declined to instruct the 
jury on deliberate premeditation, felony-murder predicated on 
armed home invasion, and felony-murder in the second degree 
predicated on unlawful possession of a firearm.  The judge 
instructed on felony-murder in the first degree with the 
predicate offenses of attempted armed robbery and attempted 
8 
 
unarmed robbery.  The jury found the defendant not guilty on the 
indictment charging murder in the first degree. 
 
The defendant filed a motion for release from unlawful 
restraint, arguing that the felony convictions from his first 
trial should be overturned because the second jury had acquitted 
him of felony-murder.  That motion was denied.  The Commonwealth 
moved to reinstate the vacated conviction of armed home 
invasion, on the ground that it was no longer duplicative.  That 
motion ultimately was allowed.  The defendant appealed from the 
denial of his motion for release from unlawful restraint, the 
allowance of the Commonwealth's motion to reinstate the 
conviction of armed home invasion, and the initial convictions 
of armed home invasion and armed assault with intent to rob.  
The appeals were consolidated and we allowed the defendant's 
motion for direct appellate review. 
 
3.  Double jeopardy and inconsistent verdicts.  The 
defendant contends that the convictions of armed home invasion 
and armed assault with intent to rob must be vacated because 
they violate the protection against double jeopardy.  In the 
defendant's view, the Commonwealth had two options after the 
first trial judge allowed the motion for a new trial on the 
murder charge.  First, the Commonwealth could have declined to 
prosecute the defendant for murder, thereby preserving the 
convictions of armed home invasion and armed assault with intent 
9 
 
to rob.  In the alternative, the Commonwealth could have elected 
to retry him on all of the charges from the first trial.  The 
defendant argues that, as a result of the acquittal on the 
felony-murder charge, he has been deemed innocent of all of the 
felony charges, because they involved the same acts that 
underlay the murder indictment. 
 
The defendant's appeal raises issues of double jeopardy and 
inconsistent verdicts.  The prohibition against double jeopardy, 
provided by the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, as well as by the common and statutory law of the 
Commonwealth, protects a defendant against multiple prosecutions 
for the same offense.  See Commonwealth v. Vanetzian, 350 Mass. 
491, 493-494 (1966).  "[C]ourts may not impose more than one 
punishment for the same offense and prosecutors ordinarily may 
not attempt to secure that punishment in more than one trial."  
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977).  See Commonwealth v. 
Clemmons, 370 Mass. 288, 294-295 (1976). 
 
Continuing jeopardy, on the other hand, exists where a 
verdict is vacated, either through a direct appeal or by the 
allowance of a motion for a new trial, and the defendant is 
retried on that charge.  Commonwealth v. Burke, 342 Mass. 144, 
149 (1961).  See Marshall v. Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 529, 538 
(2012) ("the prohibition against double jeopardy . . . does not, 
10 
 
however, necessarily bar a retrial where a conviction has been 
set aside on appeal" [citations omitted). 
 
In the circumstances here, the judge properly determined 
that double jeopardy did not prohibit retrial on the felony-
murder charge.  The allowance of the defendant's motion for a 
new trial placed him under continuing jeopardy during the 
pendency of the prosecution, rather than placing him at risk of 
double jeopardy, and the Commonwealth was entitled to a retrial.  
Where some, but not all, of a defendant's convictions are 
overturned on appeal, double jeopardy principles do not require 
the Commonwealth to choose between a retrial on all of the 
charges, including the verdicts that stand after appeal, or no 
retrial at all.  See Bell, 460 Mass. at 309-310; Commonwealth v. 
Plunkett, 422 Mass. 634, 641 (1996).  Here, the defendant's 
felony-murder conviction was vacated and set aside, and his 
independent conviction of armed assault with intent to rob was 
not.  Retrial on the felony-murder charge therefore did not 
violate double jeopardy protections. 
 
The defendant also argues that the felony convictions from 
the first trial should be vacated as inconsistent with the 
verdict of not guilty of felony-murder.  In cases involving 
verdicts returned by the same jury, "the rule is well 
established in criminal cases that mere inconsistencies in 
verdicts, one of which is an acquittal, will not render the 
11 
 
verdict of guilty erroneous even though such inconsistency may 
have indicated the possibility of compromise on the part of the 
jury."  Commonwealth v. Scott, 355 Mass. 471, 475 (1969).  While 
legally inconsistent verdicts may not stand, factually 
inconsistent verdicts may.  Commonwealth v. Medeiros, 456 Mass. 
52, 57-58 (2010). 
 
"In limited circumstances," where the verdicts are legally 
inconsistent, they must be set aside.  Id. at 58.  For instance, 
verdicts of guilt involving mutually exclusive crimes, where it 
is impossible for the Commonwealth to prove the elements of both 
offenses with respect to a particular defendant, must be vacated 
and set aside.  See id. (conviction of one purported 
coconspirator could not stand, where all other coconspirators 
were acquitted at same trial); Commonwealth v. Carson, 349 Mass. 
430, 434-436 (1965) (convictions of larceny of shares of stock 
and larceny of proceeds from sale of same shares could not 
stand). 
 
On the other hand, factual inconsistencies in verdicts "do 
not afford a ground for setting aside a conviction as long as 
the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction on the count 
on which the guilty verdict was reached."  Commonwealth v. 
Pease, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 539, 542 (2000).  Verdicts are 
factually inconsistent when, "considered together, [the 
verdicts] suggest inconsistent interpretations of the evidence 
12 
 
presented at trial."  Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 452 Mass. 142, 
151 n.8 (2008).  See Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 411 Mass. 313, 
323-324 (1991) (guilty verdict of armed robbery by means of 
shotgun could stand, where same jury found defendant not guilty 
of carrying dangerous weapon [same shotgun]). 
 
Here, the defendant's conviction of armed home invasion is 
neither legally nor factually inconsistent with the acquittal of 
felony-murder.  We do not agree with the defendant's position 
that he was found "innocent" of this offense at his second 
trial.  The charge of armed home invasion, by itself, was not 
before the jury at this trial.  As for the charge of felony-
murder, the judge declined to instruct the jury on armed home 
invasion as a predicate felony, because he concluded that the 
armed home invasion had merged with the act of violence that led 
to the victim's death, and that there was no separate assault 
apart from that act.  He observed that, "[M]y concern is that 
under the case law, and in particular Commonwealth v. Bell, they 
use the language that there must be a separate and distinct 
assault. . . .  I'm not going to submit armed home invasion to 
the jury as a basis for a felony-murder verdict. . . .  I do not 
believe that it should be submitted to the jury under the 
principles discussed in Commonwealth v. Bell." 
 
As a result of the judge's ruling, the jury were not 
instructed on the elements of armed home invasion, as a 
13 
 
predicate crime of felony-murder, and accordingly did not return 
a verdict on this offense.  The defendant's acquittal of felony-
murder was not, therefore, an implicit finding of not guilty of 
armed home invasion. 
Nor is the previous conviction of armed assault with intent 
to rob legally or factually inconsistent with the acquittal on 
the felony-murder indictment.  "[T]here are circumstances in 
which a jury may properly convict on the underlying felony and 
yet acquit on felony-murder."  Commonwealth v. Blackwell, 422 
Mass. 294, 300 (1996).  See Scott, 355 Mass. at 475 (robbery 
conviction not legally inconsistent with felony-murder acquittal 
even where victim died as result of injuries she suffered during 
robbery). 
At the defendant's second trial, the jury considered the 
underlying felony of attempted robbery.  The jury did not 
consider the felony of armed assault with intent to rob.  There 
can be no "acquittal" of a charge never presented to a jury. 
The defendant also argues that the verdicts are 
inconsistent, and cannot stand, because two different juries 
returned different verdicts based upon the same evidence.  We do 
not agree.  As the Maryland Court of Appeals has commented, "the 
rule of consistency loses much of its force in the case of 
separate trials because different verdicts may well . . . [be] 
due solely to the different composition of the two juries, . . . 
14 
 
[or] a variety of other circumstances, including a difference in 
the proof offered at trial" (quotations omitted).  State v. 
Johnson, 367 Md. 418, 425-426 (2002), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Byrd, 490 Pa. 544, 552 (1980).  In Johnson, supra at 430, the 
Maryland court affirmed verdicts returned by two different 
juries, where, at a trial separate from his asserted 
coconspirators, the defendant was found guilty of conspiracy, 
even though all the purported coconspirators had been found not 
guilty at their joint trial.  In our view, this rationale is 
compelling. 
There are many reasons why the second jury could have found 
the defendant not guilty of felony-murder other than because 
they concluded that the Commonwealth failed to prove that the 
defendant committed the predicate felony.  See, e.g., Gonzalez, 
452 Mass. at 151; Blackwell, 422 Mass. at 303-304 (Liacos, C.J., 
dissenting); Commonwealth v. Sherry, 386 Mass. 682, 699 (1982), 
overruled on another ground by Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. 
217 (2005).  We reject the defendant's argument that fundamental 
fairness requires this court to vacate the convictions of armed 
home invasion and armed assault with intent to rob.  The 
defendant was found guilty of both offenses by a fair and 
impartial jury in the first trial, and we would be speculating 
as to what another jury found in a separate trial.  The second 
trial resulted in a felony-murder acquittal, and the defendant 
15 
 
was spared a sentence of life imprisonment.  The second trial, 
however, cannot spare the defendant from the consequences of 
convictions properly decided by a different jury. 
 
4.  Remaining arguments.3  Having determined that the 
defendant's felony convictions were not invalidated by the 
subsequent felony-murder acquittal, we address the defendant's 
claims of error in the first trial. 
 
a.  Bruton issue.  The codefendant, Scott, did not testify, 
but his statement to police was played for the jury.  In that 
statement, Scott said that, at the time of the shooting, he had 
been present at the victim's house to purchase drugs.  Scott 
told police that, shortly after he arrived at the victim's 
house, "some guys" ran around a corner and "shots were fired."  
He said that he had had no involvement in a robbery and did not 
kill anyone, but that he had been at "the wrong place, at the 
wrong time."  When pressed about his whereabouts immediately 
prior to the shooting, Scott said that he went to his cousin's 
house in Brockton, where he encountered two men he did not know.  
The group sat around and smoked marijuana for approximately 
                                                 
3 The Commonwealth contends that the defendant waived his 
appellate rights with respect to his other claims.  According to 
the Commonwealth, the waiver occurred when the defendant 
withdrew his appeal from the denial, in part, of his motion for 
a new trial.  After carefully reviewing the docket entries, and 
the status reports the defendant filed with the court, we 
conclude that the record does not support the conclusion that 
the defendant waived his appellate rights. 
16 
 
fifteen to thirty minutes.  Scott then drove alone, in his own 
vehicle, to the victim's house to purchase drugs.  The men who 
had been at his cousin's house left in a different vehicle. 
 
The defendant contends that the introduction of Scott's 
statement violated his rights, under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution, to confront and 
cross-examine the witnesses against him.  See Bruton v. United 
States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968).  The United States Supreme 
Court held in that case that the admission of a nontestifying 
codefendant's statement, naming the defendant as a participant 
in the crime, violated the defendant's right to confrontation 
under the Sixth Amendment.  Id. at 123-124, 126.  The Court 
observed that testimony that expressly inculpates a defendant is 
so "powerfully incriminating" that it cannot be cured by a 
limiting instruction to the effect that the jury may only 
consider the statement as evidence against the codefendant.  Id. 
at 135-136.  See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 464 Mass. 56, 69, cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 2828 (2013) ("[o]ur considerations of the 
Bruton rule mirror the Federal standard"). 
 
The United States Supreme Court subsequently has extended 
its holding in the Bruton case to prohibit the introduction of a 
nontestifying codefendant's statement that directly inculpates a 
defendant even where the defendant's name is not mentioned.  
Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 192 (1998).  See Commonwealth v. 
17 
 
Bacigalupo, 455 Mass. 485, 492 (2009) (introduction of 
nontestifying codefendant's statement that his "friend" was 
present at shooting was sufficiently direct reference to 
defendant to violate his right to confrontation, notwithstanding 
limiting instruction). 
 
Where a nontestifying codefendant's statement does not 
inculpate a defendant directly, but does inculpate the defendant 
when combined with other evidence, a limiting instruction may be 
sufficient to cure the prejudice.  Rivera, 464 Mass. at 70 (" The 
law is clear, however, that inferential incrimination can be 
properly cured by a limiting instruction").  In that case, we 
concluded that, where the judge had given an appropriate 
limiting instruction, there was no error in the admission of a 
nontestifying codefendant's redacted statement that did not 
directly reference the defendant, but incriminated him "only to 
the extent that the jury accepted other evidence against him 
that places him at the scene [of the crime]."  Id. at 70-71.  
Similarly, a nontestifying codefendant's statement that "other 
members" of the codefendant's gang had been involved with a 
killing, accompanied by a limiting instruction, did not violate 
the defendant's right to confrontation because the statement did 
not refer directly to him.  Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 462 Mass. 
827, 843-844 (2009). 
18 
 
 
In this case, as in Rivera, 446 Mass. at 70-71, Scott's 
statement was not so powerfully incriminating as to require its 
exclusion from the joint trial.  The statement was probative and 
significant to the Commonwealth's case because it corroborated 
Newbury's testimony that the defendant, Scott, and others met in 
Brockton prior to the robbery; that Scott did not know the other 
individuals; that they all smoked marijuana; and that the "two 
other guys" left the house and drove off in different vehicles.  
Scott's statement did not directly implicate the defendant or 
name him, expressly or by implication, as one of the "guys" who 
ran around the corner and started shooting the victim.  Scott 
did not tell police, at any later point in his interview, that 
the unknown men gathered at his cousin's house were the same 
individuals who "came around the corner and started shooting."  
In sum, the statement tended to inculpate the defendant only 
when considered with other, properly introduced evidence.  See 
Vasquez, 462 Mass. at 843-844. 
 
The defendant objected to the use of Scott's statement as 
corroboration of Newbury's testimony.  Defense counsel argued 
that "later . . . the district attorney [would argue] that . . . 
Scott['s statement] is corroborating the testimony of Newbury 
and putting these other guys who would be [the defendant] and 
his brother at a meeting with . . . Scott prior to this 
incident."  The judge commented that it would be impermissible 
19 
 
for the jury to consider the statement for such a purpose, and 
the prosecutor agreed that he would not make use of the 
statement to corroborate Newbury's testimony.  Counsel replied, 
"Thank you."  He did not later object when the Commonwealth 
introduced the statement, and he did not request a limiting 
instruction.  In his closing argument, the prosecutor did not 
refer to Scott's statement as corroborative evidence. 
 
Although the prosecutor and defense counsel agreed at that 
sidebar hearing that Scott's statement could not be used against 
the defendant, the judge did not provide the jury with any 
limiting instruction on its use.  This was error.  The judge 
should have instructed the jury that they could not consider 
Scott's statement as evidence against the defendant.  See 
Rivera, 464 Mass. at 68, 71; Vasquez, 462 Mass. at 841, 844.  
Because the defendant did not object at trial and did not 
request a limiting instruction, we review for a substantial risk 
of a miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. Freeman, 352 Mass. 
556, 563-564 (1967). 
 
We conclude that the improper admission of Scott's 
statement resulted in no such risk.  The statement was 
cumulative of other, properly admitted evidence.  See 
Commonwealth v. MacKenzie, 413 Mass. 498, 510 (1992).  There was 
other testimony that multiple individuals had been at the 
victim's house when the shooting occurred.  Additional, properly 
20 
 
admitted evidence, including Newbury's testimony and cellular 
telephone records, also suggested that the defendant had been at 
the scene of the shooting. 
 
b.  Testimony of immunized witness.  The defendant argues 
further that his conviction must be overturned because the 
Commonwealth did not introduce evidence to corroborate the 
testimony of its immunized witness, Newbury.  Pursuant to G. L. 
c. 233, § 20I, "No defendant in any criminal proceeding shall be 
convicted solely on the testimony of, or the evidence produced 
by, a person granted immunity."  See Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 
425 Mass. 357, 360 (1997), quoting Commonwealth v. Scanlon, 373 
Mass. 11, 19 (1977) ("We have said that to provide the requisite 
credibility, 'there must be some evidence in support of the 
testimony of an immunized witness on at least one element of 
proof essential to convict the defendant'").  The corroborating 
evidence need not connect the defendant to the crime, but must 
support at least one element of the crime.  See Fernandes, supra 
at 359; Commonwealth v. DeBrosky, 363 Mass. 718, 730 (1973). 
 
Contrary to the defendant's assertions, the jury heard 
sufficient evidence to corroborate Newbury's testimony about the 
events of the night of the shooting.  The victim was found dead, 
immediately inside his front doorway, with a gun on the floor 
between his legs.  Police found spent bullets, fired from two 
different guns, near the door.  This evidence could support an 
21 
 
inference that the defendant's accomplice, Scott, was armed with 
a firearm and assaulted the victim by shooting him with it, 
satisfying two elements of the offenses of armed home invasion 
and armed assault with intent to rob.  See G. L. c. 265, §§ 17, 
18C.  Investigators also noted damage to the front door of the 
victim's house, suggesting that an intruder struggled to push 
his way into the house, satisfying one element of armed home 
invasion.  See G. L. c. 265, § 18C. 
 
The defendant argues that the judge erred by not 
instructing the jury that they could not rely on the testimony 
of the immunized witness unless they first found that other 
evidence supported at least one element of the crime.  The 
defendant did not request such an instruction, and did not 
object to its absence following the judge's charge.  Therefore, 
we review for a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  
Freeman, 352 Mass. at 563-564. 
 
A judge is not required to instruct the jury that they 
cannot convict a defendant solely on the testimony of a 
particular immunized witness.  See Commonwealth v. Brousseau, 
421 Mass. 647, 655 (1996).  "Rather we consider whether 'the 
charge, as a whole, adequately covers the issue.'"  Commonwealth 
v. Dyous, 436 Mass. 719, 727 (2002), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Anderson, 396 Mass. 306, 316 (1985).  In formulating an 
immunized witness instruction, a judge may instruct pursuant to 
22 
 
G. L. c. 233, § 20I, without naming a particular witness, that 
immunized witness testimony cannot serve as the sole basis for 
conviction.  Dyous, supra.  See Commonwealth v. Vacher, 469 
Mass. 425, 440-441 (2014).4 
 
In this case, the failure to provide an instruction that 
immunized witness testimony cannot serve as the sole basis for 
conviction did not constitute a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice.  The Commonwealth produced other 
evidence to corroborate Newbury's testimony concerning the 
defendant's participation in the botched robbery.  Defense 
counsel cross-examined Newbury regarding the grant of immunity, 
and argued that the government handed this "shadowy figure" a 
"get-out-of-jail card" in exchange for "hang[ing] this on a 21-
year-old kid [his client]."  See Brousseau, 421 Mass. at 654 
("defense counsel vigorously cross-examined [the witness] and 
vigorously argued to [the] jury her lack of credibility" 
[citation omitted]).  The judge's charge included general 
instructions regarding witness credibility, witness bias, and a 
                                                 
4 In contrast, G. L. c. 277, § 63, requires that an 
indictment or complaint filed more than twenty-seven years after 
the commission of a rape of child offense "be supported by 
independent evidence that corroborates the victim's 
allegations."  The corroboration must relate to the specific 
criminal act of which the defendant stands accused.  
Commonwealth v. White, 475 Mass. 724, 738 (2016).  In a case 
brought under G. L. c. 277, § 63, a judge is required to 
instruct the jury "regarding the Commonwealth's obligation to 
provide independent evidence that related to the specific 
criminal acts at issue . . . ."  White, supra at 742. 
23 
 
specific instruction that the jury could consider a grant of 
immunity in assessing witness credibility.  Accordingly, the 
jury heard sufficient evidence to corroborate Newbury, and were 
instructed properly that the witness's testimony should be 
scrutinized in light of his grant of immunity. 
 
c.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant maintains 
also that his convictions must be overturned because, in 
closing, the prosecutor made arguments that were not supported 
by the evidence.  The defendant challenges, in particular, the 
prosecutor's statements that the defendant knew that the victim 
had drugs and money at his house because the victim entertained 
guests there, and that the defendant had had to recruit Scott to 
help with the robbery because he needed someone that the victim 
would not recognize, and the victim would have recognized the 
defendant.  The defendant did not object to either of these 
statements at trial, so we review for a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 Mass. 8, 13 
(1999). 
 
The prosecutor's reference to the defendant knowing that 
the victim had large amounts of cash and drugs at his house 
because the victim frequently hosted guests was a permissible 
inference from the evidence.  The victim's girl friend testified 
that there was a large amount of money in the house, and that 
the victim frequently entertained friends in the basement.  
24 
 
Newbury's testimony that the defendant called Newbury to tell 
him about the plan to rob the victim of money and drugs supports 
an inference that the defendant knew the victim had money and 
drugs in his house. 
 
The prosecutor also told the jury, "See, [the defendant] is 
a Brockton guy . . . .  They're going to rob a Brockton guy, a 
Cape Verde guy.  He needs someone to do the job because . . . he 
was concerned that he might be recognized."  This statement was 
not supported by any evidence at trial and should not have been 
made.  See Commonwealth v. Colon, 449 Mass. 207, 224, cert. 
denied, 552 U.S. 1079 (2007).  While there was testimony that 
both men lived in Brockton, there was no testimony concerning 
any prior relationship or a shared ethnic heritage.5  
Nonetheless, the judge properly instructed the jury that closing 
arguments are not "a substitute for the evidence," and that the 
jury had a duty to decide the case based on the testimony and 
exhibits entered in evidence.  Commonwealth v. Benjamin, 399 
Mass. 220, 223-224 & n.1 (1987), overruled on another ground by 
Commonwealth v. Paulding, 438 Mass. 1 (2002). 
 
The defendant argues that the prosecutor's statement that 
the defendant chose Scott to assist in the robbery was 
particularly troubling because it provided a motive for the 
                                                 
5 The record is silent as to the ethnicity of both the 
defendant and the victim. 
25 
 
defendant to have involved Scott, and supported the 
Commonwealth's argument that the defendant was the mastermind.  
Although the prosecutor's remark was improper, it did not create 
a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  Motive is a 
collateral issue, and an impermissible inference with respect to 
motive does not necessarily amount to reversible error.  See 
Commonwealth v. Perez, 444 Mass. 143, 152 (2005).  Although the 
tenor of the remark was particularly unfortunate, and the remark 
should not have been made, it was a single statement made in the 
context of an otherwise proper closing argument. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.