Title: Twine v. Liberty National Life Insurance Co.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

311 So. 2d 299 (1975)
Charles A. TWINE, Jr.
v.
LIBERTY NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE CO.
SC 1022.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
April 10, 1975.
*300 J. Richard Carr, Gadsden, for appellant.
Hubert Burns, Gadsden, Ira L. Burleson, Ralph B. Tate, Birmingham, for appellee.
MERRILL, Justice.
This appeal is from a judgment granting defendant's motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
Plaintiff is engaged in the funeral home business in Cherokee County and alleged that he "has been injured or damaged, directly or indirectly, by an unlawful trust combine or monopoly created and operated by the defendant." The amended complaint contained four claims. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) ARCP. Prior to a hearing on or response to this motion, defendant amended *301 it with supporting affidavits and other documents and asked that the amended motion be treated as one for summary judgment pursuant to the provisions of Rule 12(b) and 56 ARCP. After oral argument on the motion, the trial court determined that defendant's motion should be granted unless the plaintiff, within ten days from the date of the ruling, filed additional pleadings or counteraffidavits to overcome or refute the matters presented in support of the amended motion.
Plaintiff filed his affidavit. The court overruled the motion to dismiss on May 10, 1974. Defendant filed a motion to set aside the May 10th order. On July 25, 1974, the court, after a hearing, rescinded the May 10th order, and granted defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff says that the action was brought under Tit. 7, § 124, Code 1940, which (as stated in brief) "provides that any person, firm or corporation can bring a suit for damages caused by an unlawful trust, combine, or monopoly."
The alleged unlawful activity consisted of restrictions on trade contained in funeral policies and vault policies. Provisions from each type policy are quoted in the complaint, but there is no material difference except as to purpose, and only the contested paragraph in funeral policies is quoted here:
The contention is that the policies should not be restricted to authorized dealers.
This is required by statute. The Alabama Insurance Code, Acts of Alabama 1971, p. 709, and listed in the 1958 Recompilation as Tit. 28A, §§ 1-759, provides in Chapter 17, Burial Insurance Policies, as follows:
And § 398 provides in pertinent part:
The contested paragraph in the policy quoted supra shows that it contains substantially the required provisions. The affidavit of William T. Graves, Vice President of Liberty National, states that policies containing the "restraint of trade" provisions were approved by the Commissioner of Insurance of Alabama. This was not denied or controverted by plaintiff's affidavit. The affidavit of Charles Healey, President of Brown-Service Funeral Homes Company, Inc., stated that the "authorized *302 funeral director" required under the policy were those independent funeral directors throughout the State of Alabama with whom Brown-Service, a whollyowned subsidiary of Liberty National, has contracted to provide the services under such policies. This fact was not denied by plaintiff.
There can be no legal claim for damages to the person or property of any one except as it follows from the breach of a legal duty. Pickett v. Matthews, 238 Ala. 542, 192 So. 261, and whatever damage results from doing that which is lawful does not lay the foundation of an action. Randle v. Payne, 39 Ala.App. 652, 107 So. 2d 907, cert. denied 268 Ala. 697, 107 So. 2d 913.
In Alabama Power Co. v. Alabama Electric Cooperative, 394 F.2d 672 (5th Cir.), cert. den. 393 U.S. 1000, 89 S. Ct. 488, 21 L. Ed. 2d 465, the court stated that "The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that, `where a restraint upon trade or monopolization is the result of valid governmental action, as opposed to private action, no violation of the [Sherman] Act can be made out. United States v. Rock Royal Co-op, 307 U.S. 533, 59 S. Ct. 993, 83 L. Ed. 1446, Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 63 S. Ct. 307, 87 L. Ed. 315.' Eastern R. Conf. v. Noerr Motors, 1961, 365 U.S. 127, 136, 81 S. Ct. 523, 529, 5 L. Ed. 2d 464." "These decisions rest upon the fact that under our form of government the question whether a law of that kind should pass, or if passed be enforced, is the responsibility of the appropriate legislative or executive branch of government so long as the law itself does not violate some provision of the Constitution." Noerr Motors, supra.
Here, defendant did no more than the statute required. There is no merit in Claim One.
The unlawful activity charged in Claim Two was price fixing. Plaintiff charged that the defendant owned Brown-Service, and had contracted with Brown-Service to service its burial insurance policies; that Brown-Service had contracted with plaintiff's competitors in Cherokee and surrounding counties, and a copy of the contract with his competitors was attached as Exhibit A.
Since the only affidavit supporting plaintiff's complaint was his own, we copy the body of the affidavit in which he said:
It is an accepted principle of business law that any seller may determine the price at which he will sell his own product or service and any buyer may determine what he is willing to pay for any product or service.
The distinction between a purchaser and seller agreeing upon the price that they will pay or sell, and the price fixing which is condemned by the antitrust laws, is pointed out in Fagan v. Sunbeam Lighting Co., 303 F. Supp. 356, 360 (D.C.Ill.1969):
The contract attached by plaintiff as an exhibit to sustain this allegation of price fixing is simply the form of an agreement used by Brown-Service to purchase the *304 services of independent funeral directors and sets out the charges which Brown-Service will pay to the funeral director providing such services. This contract does not in any way fix the price which the plaintiff or any other funeral director may charge others for rendering funeral services. It expressly provides that a funeral director may furnish or contract to furnish funeral merchandise and services for any other person, firm or corporation. It expressly provides that the funeral director may establish prices for his funerals and vaults sold to others.
It is clear that the contract by which Brown-Service acquires the services of a funeral director does not fix the price at which the funeral director may sell his services to others, and it does not fix the price at which plaintiff may sell his services. It is simply a contract by which Brown-Service purchases the services of a funeral director and agrees upon the price to be paid therefor. This type of transaction is not condemned by the antitrust laws and is not price fixing within the meaning of the antitrust laws.
It is true that the complaint in Claim Two uses the words price fixing, but the exhibit clearly shows no price fixing. An exhibit made the basis of a cause of action or defense and contradicting the averments of the pleading of which it is a part will control such pleading. Waugaman v. Skyline Country Club, 277 Ala. 495, 172 So. 2d 381; Ivey v. Wiggins, 271 Ala. 610, 126 So. 2d 469.
There was no genuine issue of material fact as to Claim Two.
The pertinent part of the claim follows:
The affidavits show that plaintiff was offered a contract to become an authorized funeral director but he did not enter into the contract and he concedes that he is not an authorized funeral director.
This contention was answered in Hunter v. Brown-Service Funeral Co., 241 Ala. 25, 200 So. 869. There, the policy named two "authorized undertakers." One of them, the plaintiff Hunter, terminated his relationship with Brown-Service and was not an authorized undertaker at the time of insured's death. The family of the policy holder took the policy to Hunter and he provided the services. The insurance company refused to pay him and he sued. The trial court rendered judgment for the company and this court affirmed, stating:
In the instant case, plaintiff refused to become an authorized funeral director and insofar as Liberty National is concerned, he was a stranger to the contract and can take no advantage therefrom or enforce any legal complaint thereon.
The rule is that one not a party to, or in privity with a contract, cannot sue for its breach; and a stranger to a contract can take no advantage of a breach of any condition of the contract. Watson v. Mills, 275 Ala. 176, 153 So. 2d 612.
Claim Three is without merit. The statute required the policy to name an authorized funeral director and no liability attached unless the policy was presented to an authorized funeral director.
The pertinent part of this claim alleges:
This is another instance where the exhibits contradict and control the pleading. One of the "Standards of Acceptability of Contract Funeral Directors," a part of Exhibit A which was attached to plaintiff's Claims Two, Three and Four reads: "9. The funeral director must be of the Negro race." Also, in paragraph 3 of the exhibit, which was the contract which defendant urged plaintiff to accept in order to become an authorized funeral director, the statement appears that the policies are issued "upon the lives of persons of the Negro race under which the benefits are payable in merchandise and service incident to burial."
Charles Healey's affidavit states that Brown-Service has entered into funeral service contracts "with 77 black funeral directors throughout the State of Alabama." Plaintiff's affidavit, which was filed after defendant's affidavits, neither denies this statement nor does his affidavit support the allegation that Brown-Service refused to pay him because he was a black man.
Allegations contained in a complaint do not create an issue against a motion for summary judgment supported by affidavits. Smith v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 505 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir.); First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 88 S. Ct. 1575, 20 L. Ed. 2d 569; Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932 (3rd Cir.), cert. den. 400 U.S. 831, 91 S. Ct. 62, 27 L. Ed. 62.
In his affidavit, plaintiff refers in paragraphs 8, 9 and 13 to $300.00 funerals being worth only $95.00 and $600.00 funerals worth only $150.00. These figures come from paragraph 12 of Exhibit A which was the proferred contract which plaintiff did not accept. Paragraph 12 reads in pertinent part:
*306 This is the schedule of payments to the funeral director for his services. The affidavits make it clear that Brown-Service, "The Homes Company," furnishes the funeral merchandise such as the casket and the funeral clothing. Then it pays the funeral director for the services listed in the policies, such as embalming and preparation of the body, a place where memorial services may be held, assistance in conducting the services and transportation of the remains of the deceased to the place of interment. The schedule listed in paragraph 12, supra, is the amounts paid for services and does not include the merchandise.
We think plaintiff has stated his real complaint in brief when he states that if he should enter into the proferred contract he gets paid according to their schedule "rather than what he would normally charge or would like to charge for his funeral services." (Emphasis supplied.)
In Ex parte Rice, 258 Ala. 132, 61 So. 2d 7, a case involving a charge of monopoly, this court said:
To the same effect are Kinnear Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 214 F.2d 891 (5th Cir.), cert. den. 348 U.S. 912, 75 S. Ct. 292, 99 L. Ed. 715 (an antitrust action); Baim & Blank v. Warren-Connelly Co., D.C., 19 F.R.D. 108, and Alexander v. Texas Company, 149 F. Supp. 37 (D.C., La.).
Plaintiff cites and discusses Battle v. Liberty National Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39. That was a class action and, having been dismissed on motion, the judgment was reversed. There, the complaint and exhibits consumed over 100 pages, and the appellate court held the complaint good as against a motion to dismiss. Here, the matter went to summary judgment based on supporting affidavits and an exhibit to a simple four-claim complaint.
Summary judgment was the proper method of disposing of this case and the entry of such judgment was not reversible error.
Affirmed.
BLOODWORTH, MADDOX, JONES and ALMON, JJ., concur.