Title: SOTERO LEPE NEGRETTE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

SOTERO LEPE NEGRETTE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 88158 P.3d 679Case Number: 06-39Decided: 05/23/2007
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
SOTERO 
LEPE NEGRETTE,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCrookCounty

The 
Honorable Dan R. Price, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Ken 
Koski, State Public Defender, PDP; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Ryan R. 
Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel; Kate McKay, Student Intern.  Argument by Ms. 
McKay.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Eric A. Johnson, Director PAP; 
Geoffrey L. Gunnerson, Student Director PAP; Jennifer Reece, Student Intern, 
PAP. Argument by Ms. Reece.   

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1] 
Sotero Lepe Negrete1 pled guilty to one count of 
possession of a controlled substance conditioned upon his right to appeal the 
denial of his motion to suppress evidence.  
He claims the district court erred by denying his motion because his 
detention by law enforcement was unreasonable under all the circumstances in 
violation of Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.  He also claims the detention violated 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution because the circumstances 
did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion by law enforcement that he was 
involved in criminal activity.  We 
hold the district court did not err in denying the suppression motion and 
affirm.  

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]  The sole issue for this Court's 
determination is whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Negrete's 
motion to suppress because his detention was unconstitutional under both the 
federal and state constitutions.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]  On April 14, 2005, at approximately 2:45 
p.m., Deputy Jeff Hodge of the Crook County Sheriff's Office was patrolling2 westbound on Interstate 90 near 
Moorcroft, Wyoming with his certified drug detection dog in the back seat when 
he observed a pickup truck with tinted windows traveling in the opposite 
direction at approximately fifty-five miles per hour in a seventy-five mile per 
hour zone.  The vehicle's speed 
aroused Deputy Hodge's concerns and he turned his patrol car around and followed 
the pickup.  He called dispatch, 
provided the dispatcher with the pickup's Illinois license plate number and asked for a 
license check.  The dispatcher 
advised him the license plate "was not on file."3  Deputy Hodge activated his emergency 
lights and the driver of the pickup responded by pulling over to the side of the 
highway.

 
 
[¶4]   Deputy Hodge approached the 
driver's side of the pickup.  Inside 
were the driver, later identified as Maria Guadalupe Lombera-Perez, and a 
passenger, Mr. Negrete.  Deputy 
Hodge advised them that he had stopped them because the license plate number was 
not on file.  Mr. Negrete handed the 
deputy a vehicle registration and proof of insurance card.  Deputy Hodge asked Mr. Negrete if he 
owned the vehicle and he responded that it belonged to a friend but was insured 
under his name.  Deputy Hodge 
informed the occupants that he was going to have dispatch run a check on the 
vehicle identification number (VIN) to verify that it was properly registered 
and licensed.  He asked the driver 
to accompany him to the patrol car while he contacted dispatch.  The driver and Mr. Negrete spoke to each 
other in Spanish and Mr. Negrete advised the deputy that the driver did not 
speak English.  Because Ms. 
Lombera-Perez did not speak English and Mr. Negrete seemed more closely 
connected with the vehicle, Deputy Hodge asked Mr. Negrete to accompany him to 
the patrol car while he checked the registration and license plates.  Deputy Hodge obtained Ms. 
Lombera-Perez's driver's license and he and Mr. Negrete went to his patrol 
car.  

 
 
[¶5]  Mr. Negrete sat in the front passenger 
seat of the patrol car while Deputy Hodge contacted dispatch.  As he waited for dispatch to respond, 
Deputy Hodge asked Mr. Negrete where he and Ms. Lombera-Perez were traveling 
from.  Mr. Negrete stated they were 
headed back to Illinois from Oregon where they had 
visited her family for one or two days.  
Deputy Hodge noticed the registration appeared to have been altered and 
the insurance card was for temporary liability insurance effective from April 10 
through May 10, 2005.  The card 
showed the named insured as Gilberto Maldonado and Mr. Negrete as an insured 
driver.  Ms. Lombera-Perez was not 
listed on the card.  

 
 
[¶6]  The dispatcher advised that the VIN was 
a duplicate, meaning more than one vehicle had the same number.  Deputy Hodge went back to the pickup, 
obtained the VIN from the vehicle, and determined that it matched the VIN on the 
registration.  

 
 
 [¶7] Back in the patrol car, Deputy Hodge 
asked Mr. Negrete the name of the pickup's owner.  Mr. Negrete said that Gilbert Mendoza 
owned the pickup and he had let him borrow it.  Deputy Hodge concluded "that there was 
some type of criminal activity afoot" and decided to run a criminal history 
check on Mr. Negrete.  While he 
waited for the results, Deputy Hodge asked Mr. Negrete the names of Ms. 
Lombera-Perez's brother and sister whom they had just visited in Oregon.  Mr. Negrete said that he did not know 
their names; they went by nicknames.  
Deputy Hodge asked what their nicknames were.  Mr. Negrete stated he did not know, 
laughed nervously and tried to explain.  
Deputy Hodge "became increasingly more suspicious" because Mr. Negrete 
did not know the names of the people he had just visited in Oregon.  Deputy Hodge also thought that driving 
from Illinois to Oregon seemed like a long 
way to go for a one or two day visit. 

 
 
[¶8]  By this time, Deputy Hodge had verified 
the pickup was not stolen but had not verified the license plates on the pickup 
belonged on it.  Based on the 
totality of the circumstances, he decided to have his dog sniff the pickup.  He advised Mr. Negrete of his intent and 
Mr. Negrete responded, "[A]ll right.  
No problem."  The dog alerted 
to the rear of the vehicle.  A 
subsequent search revealed thirty-nine packages containing 21.83 pounds of 
marijuana in a compartment concealed by a false panel underneath the pickup bed. 

 
 
[¶9] Mr. 
Negrete was charged with one count of possession of marijuana with intent to 
deliver in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a) (LexisNexis 2005).  Prior to trial, he filed a motion to 
suppress the evidence seized in the vehicle search, claiming that Deputy Hodge 
lacked a reasonable basis to detain him and the detention violated the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.  After a hearing, the 
district court denied the motion, holding that the deputy had a reasonable 
suspicion of illegal activity that justified expanding the scope of the traffic 
stop; use of the drug dog was not a search; and once the dog alerted the deputy 
had probable cause to search.    

 
 
[¶10]  As a consequence of the district court's 
ruling, Mr. Negrete and the State entered into a plea agreement in which the 
State agreed to amend the information to charge Mr. Negrete with possession of 
marijuana in violation of 35-7-1031(c), rather than possession with intent to 
deliver as originally charged.4 In exchange, Mr. Negrete agreed to 
plead guilty to the amended charge conditioned on his right to appeal the denial 
of his suppression motion.  The 
district court accepted the plea agreement and Mr. Negrete's plea of guilty to 
possession.  The district court 
sentenced him to imprisonment for twenty-four to sixty months with credit for 
the time he served between his arrest and his sentencing.        

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶11]  The following standards govern our 
review of alleged error in the denial of a motion to suppress: 

 
 
            
Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are within the sound discretion 
of the trial court. We will not disturb such rulings absent a clear abuse of 
discretion.  An abuse of discretion 
occurs when it is shown the trial court reasonably could not have concluded as 
it did. Factual findings made by a trial court considering a motion to suppress 
will not be disturbed unless the findings are clearly erroneous.  Because the trial court has the 
opportunity to hear the evidence, assess witness credibility, and draw the 
necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions, we view the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the trial court's determination. Whether an unreasonable 
search or seizure occurred in violation of constitutional rights presents a 
question of law and is reviewed de novo.  

 
 

Dettloff 
v. State, 2007 
WY 29, ¶ 11, 52 P.3d 376, 381 (Wyo. 2007) (citations 
omitted).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶12]  Mr. Negrete claims on appeal that once 
he determined the pickup truck was not stolen, Deputy Hodge had no authority 
under the federal or state constitution to detain him and expand the stop into a 
drug investigation.5  The State responds that the detention 
was permissible under both constitutions because Deputy Hodge had a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity based on the circumstances, including that the 
vehicle license plate number was not on file, the vehicle registration appeared 
to have been altered, and the VIN was a duplicate.

 
 
State 
Constitutional Analysis 

 
 
[¶13]  Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution requires searches and seizures to be reasonable under all of the 
circumstances.  O'Boyle v. State, 2005 WY 83, ¶ 26, 117 P.3d 401, 409-10 (Wyo. 2005).  
Whether a search or seizure is reasonable is a question of law to be 
decided from all the circumstances.  
Id., ¶ 25, 117 P.3d  at 409.  Thus, the 
determinative question in Mr. Negrete's case is the reasonableness of the 
detention under all the circumstances.

 
 
[¶14]  The district court concluded the 
detention was reasonable because the circumstances raised questions about the 
vehicle registration and the license plates.  From our review of the record, we 
conclude the evidence supports the district court's conclusion.  We look to the totality of the 
circumstances to determine whether law enforcement had reasonable suspicion to 
justify the detention.  

 
 
[¶15]  The totality of the circumstances 
showed:  the license plate on the 
pickup was not on file; the registration had been altered; the license plate 
number did not match the registration; the occupants of the pickup had traveled 
from Illinois to Oregon for a two day visit; Mr. Negrete did not know the names 
of the people he had just visited in Oregon; Mr. Negrete said he had borrowed 
the pickup from a friend named Gilbert Mendoza but the proof of insurance card 
showed the owner as Gilberto Maldonado; the VIN was a duplicate; Mr. Negrete 
seemed to change the subject whenever Deputy Hodge brought up a subject that 
made him uncomfortable; Mr. Negrete appeared nervous when he could not remember 
the names of the people he had just visited; and Deputy Hodge was unable to 
verify that the license plates belonged on the pickup.  

 
 
[¶16] As 
these events unfolded, Deputy Hodge became increasingly suspicious that Mr. 
Negrete was involved in illegal activity.  
Although any of these circumstances alone may not have justified the 
detention, the totality of the circumstances were sufficient to support the 
conclusion that Deputy Hodge had reasonable suspicion to believe Mr. Negrete had 
committed or might be committing a crime and to detain him.  The detention was reasonable under all 
of the circumstances and did not violate the Wyoming Constitution.     

 
 
[¶17]  In reaching this result, we note that 
the facts presented in Mr. Negrete's case are significantly different from those 
presented in O'Boyle, the case Mr. 
Negrete primarily relies upon to support his argument that his detention was 
unreasonable.  In O'Boyle, a driver was stopped for going 
four miles per hour over the speed limit and then was questioned extensively 
about subjects having nothing to do with the reason for the stop or his travel 
plans, including what courses his son was taking in college, whether he lived on 
campus and the name of the college mascot.  
The obtrusive questioning in O'Boyle occurred despite the trooper's 
admission that he did not have a reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity 
beyond the speeding violation.  

 
 
[¶18]  O'Boyle is immediately distinguishable 
from Mr. Negrete's case both by the extensiveness of the questioning and the 
absence of a reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity.  In contrast to what occurred in O'Boyle, the questions Deputy Hodge 
asked were limited both in number and subject matter.  As compared to the sixty-some questions 
asked in O'Boyle, Deputy Hodge may 
have asked twelve, and those questions were limited in scope to queries about 
who owned the pickup truck, where Mr. Negrete and Ms. Lombera-Perez were 
traveling to and from, how long they had been in Oregon, and who they had 
visited there.  The nature and scope 
of Deputy Hodge's questioning was also directly attributable to his growing 
suspicion of other criminal activity, based in part on the altered registration, 
the discrepancy between the name of the vehicle owner on the proof of insurance 
card and the name Mr. Negrete gave, the questions surrounding the license plate 
number and the VIN, and Mr. Negrete's inability to name the people he had just 
visited.  O'Boyle was factually so different that 
it simply does not support Mr. Negrete's argument.   

        

Federal 
Constitutional Analysis

 
 
[¶19]  We have described our Fourth Amendment 
analysis as follows:

 
 
 
 
            
In determining whether a traffic stop detention was reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment, we apply the two-part inquiry established in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.  at 19-20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, that is:  1) was the 
initial stop justified, and 2) were the officer's actions during the detention 
"reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the 
interference in the first instance[?]"  
In making this inquiry, the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected bright-line 
rules and focused instead on a fact-specific reasonableness inquiry.  Under the Fourth Amendment, the 
government has the burden of demonstrating that a seizure was sufficiently 
limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative 
seizure.  

 
 

O'Boyle, ¶ 46, 
117 P.3d  at 414 (citations omitted).

 
 
[¶20] 
Mr. Negrete does not challenge the appropriateness of the initial stop.  Therefore, our inquiry focuses on the 
second prong of the Terry 
inquiry:  whether the deputy's 
actions during the detention were reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances justifying the interference in the first place.  We have summarized the standards 
applicable under this second prong as follows:  

 
 
An 
officer's actions during a traffic stop must be reasonably related to the 
purpose of the stop.   Absent 
valid consent, a reasonable suspicion of other unlawful activity or reasonable 
suspicion that a detainee is armed, an officer may not expand an investigative 
detention beyond the scope of the stop, ask questions unrelated to the stop or 
"embark on a fishing expedition in the hope that something will turn up."  The relevant question is whether the 
scope of the stop was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances, and 
the burden of proving reasonableness lies with the 
government.

 
 

O'Boyle, ¶ 49, 
117 P.3d  at 415 (citations omitted).

 
 
[¶21] 
Upon being stopped by Deputy Hodge because the pickup license plate was not on 
file, Mr. Negrete was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  We must decide under the totality of the 
circumstances whether Deputy Hodge's actions during the detention were 
reasonably related in scope to the stop.  
In making this determination, we are guided by the following 
principles:  1) a detention must be 
carefully tailored to the reason for the stop;  2) an officer may request the detainee's 
driver's license, proof of insurance, and vehicle registration or rental papers, 
run a computer check and issue a citation or warning;  3) an officer may make reasonable 
inquiry into travel plans to the extent necessary to put the traffic violation 
in context;  4) absent reasonable 
suspicion of other illegal activity or that a detainee is armed, the officer may 
not ask questions unrelated to the stop;  
and 5) an officer may expand the scope of the detention only with valid 
consent or a reasonable suspicion of other illegal activity or that the detainee 
is armed.  Id., ¶ 48, 117 P.3d  at 416.  

 
 
[¶22] 
Applying these standards to the facts presented, we conclude the scope of the 
detention initially was appropriately tailored to the reason for the stop.  By the time Deputy Hodge asked Mr. 
Negrete where they were traveling from, he knew the license plate number on the 
pickup was not on file.  Given this 
information, his single question to Mr. Negrete about where they were traveling 
from was not unreasonable.  Although 
the question did not directly concern the reason for the stop, we do not find it 
unreasonable given its limited nature and duration and in light of the report 
that the license plate was not on file.

 
 
[¶23]  As he waited for information from 
dispatch concerning the pickup occupants' driver's licenses, Deputy Hodge asked 
Mr. Negrete why they had been in Oregon and for how long.   Again, from the limited nature and 
duration of the question as they sat in the patrol car waiting to hear from 
dispatch, we do not find it unreasonable.  
Deputy Hodge then noticed that the registration appeared to have been 
altered by someone whiting out and writing over the original information.  Also, dispatch advised that the VIN was 
a duplicate.  Deputy Hodge asked Mr. 
Negrete the name of his friend who owned the truck and Mr. Negrete responded, 
"Gilbert Mendoza," which did not match the name of Gilberto Maldonado on the 
proof of insurance card.  This 
question was reasonable under the circumstances and all of the circumstances 
together gave rise to increasing suspicion that criminal activity was 
afoot.  Mr. Negrete's nervousness 
and inability to relay the names of the people he just visited, combined with 
all of the other circumstances, gave rise to a reasonable suspicion of other 
illegal activity which justified Deputy Hodge's decision to expand the scope of 
the stop.  For these reasons, we 
hold the detention did not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 

 
 
[¶24]  We affirm the district court's order 
denying the motion to suppress.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The notice 
of appeal is captioned Negrette v. State, an incorrect spelling of Mr. Negrete's 
surname.  We use the correct 
spelling, Negrete, in this opinion.

 
 

2Deputy Hodge 
testified that he was doing "normal patrol work", meaning "traffic citations, 
criminal activity, criminal interdiction.  Beings I have a canine unit, I do 
criminal interdiction."

  

3Deputy Hodge 
testified the information that the license plate was not on file meant that the 
license plate number did not match the pickup, indicating either a forged 
license plate or a stolen vehicle. 

4Possession 
of marijuana with intent to deliver is a felony punishable by imprisonment for 
not more than ten years.  Section 
35-7-1031(a)(ii).  Possession of 
marijuana in the quantity with which Mr. Negrete was charged is also a felony 
but is punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years.  Section § 
35-7-1031(c)(iii).

 
 

5Mr. Negrete 
asserts that the detention and questioning were unreasonable and violated the 
state and federal constitutions.  
 He does not contend the 
canine sniff in and of itself was unconstitutional.  The only argument he makes with respect 
to the canine sniff is that the evidence discovered as a result was fruit of the 
poisonous tree because it followed an unconstitutional detention.  Because Mr. Negrete does not directly 
challenge the canine sniff, we do not address 
it.