Title: State ex rel. Lane v. Pickerington

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Lane v. Pickerington, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-5454.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-5454 
[THE STATE EX REL.] LANE, APPELLANT, v. CITY OF  
PICKERINGTON ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Lane v. Pickerington,  
Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-5454.] 
Public employees—Mandamus sought to compel municipal personnel appeals 
board to conduct hearing—Letter from city law director insufficient to 
constitute appealable order of board—Remand to court of appeals. 
(No. 2011-0922—Submitted October 18, 2011—Decided October 27, 2011.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Fairfield County, 
No. 10-CA-14, 2011-Ohio-1908. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the court of appeals 
denying a writ of mandamus to compel a city and its personnel appeals board to 
conduct a hearing and make a determination on the merits of a municipal 
employee’s appeal of his removal from employment.  Because the court of 
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appeals erred in holding that the employee had an adequate remedy by appeal to 
the common pleas court to raise his claims when there was no evidence that the 
board had issued any decision, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals 
and remand the cause to the court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
Facts 
{¶ 2} Appellant, Paul Lane, was employed by the city of Pickerington, 
Ohio, from August 30, 1999, until November 2, 2009.  Lane worked for the city 
as a construction inspection supervisor until November 2005 and then as an 
inspections administrator up to November 2, 2009.  According to Lane, he was in 
the classified civil service during his employment with Pickerington. 
{¶ 3} Effective November 2, 2009, following a hearing, the interim city 
manager terminated Lane’s employment for disciplinary reasons.  By letter dated 
November 5, 2009, the interim city manager issued a notice that was hand-
delivered to Lane by the city’s personnel director notifying him of his termination 
from employment for violating Section 7.14 of the city’s Personnel Policy and 
Procedures Manual, Use of Technology, Section 2. 
{¶ 4} On November 17, 2009, Lane submitted to the city’s personnel 
director a request for a hearing before appellee Pickerington Personnel Appeals 
Board regarding his termination from employment.  Section 9.03 of the 
Pickerington City Charter specifies, “The Personnel Appeals Board shall be 
established to hear appeals whenever any official or employee in the competitive 
service feels aggrieved by any action of the City Manager or is suspended, 
reduced, or removed and requests such hearing.” 
{¶ 5} By letter dated December 1, 2009, Pickerington Law Director 
Phillip K. Hartmann responded to Lane’s request for a hearing before the 
personnel appeals board by rejecting the request: 
January Term, 2011 
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{¶ 6} “This letter is in response to your November 17, 2009 request for a 
hearing before the Personnel Appeals Board ‘PAB.’  Pursuant to Charter Sections 
9.02 and 9.03, the PAB rules and the Codified Ordinances of the City, the position 
you previously held as the Director of the Building Department is an exempt 
position and therefore considered ‘unclassified.’  The PAB does not have 
jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an unclassified employee regarding dismissal. 
{¶ 7} “Therefore, the City respectfully declines your request for a 
hearing before the PAB.  If you should have any questions or concerns, please do 
not hesitate to contact me.” 
{¶ 8} Several months later, in March 2010, Lane filed a complaint in the 
Court of Appeals for Fairfield County for a writ of mandamus to compel 
appellees, Pickerington and its personnel appeals board, to conduct a hearing and 
issue a determination on the merits of his appeal, reinstate him to the position of 
inspections administrator, and award back pay and corresponding employment 
benefits.  After the parties submitted motions for summary judgment, on April 13, 
2011, the court of appeals granted appellees’ motion and denied the writ. 
{¶ 9} This cause is now before the court on Lane’s appeal as of right. 
Legal Analysis 
{¶ 10} Lane requested a writ of mandamus to compel Pickerington and 
the Pickerington Personnel Appeals Board to, inter alia, conduct a hearing on his 
appeal from his discharge from employment and to issue a determination on the 
merits.  To be entitled to the writ, Lane must establish a clear legal right to the 
requested relief, a corresponding clear legal duty on the part of appellees to 
provide it, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  
State ex rel. Am. Subcontractors Assn., Inc. v. Ohio State Univ., 129 Ohio St.3d 
111, 2011-Ohio-2881, 950 N.E.2d 535, ¶ 20. 
{¶ 11} The court of appeals denied the writ because it determined that 
Lane had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by administrative 
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appeal to the common pleas court from the personnel appeals board’s decision.  
“Mandamus will not issue when the relators have an adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of law.”  State ex rel. Voleck v. Powhatan Point, 127 Ohio St.3d 
299, 2010-Ohio-5679, 939 N.E.2d 819, ¶ 7; R.C. 2731.05.  “An administrative 
appeal generally constitutes an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that 
precludes a writ of mandamus.”  State ex rel. Natl. Employers Network Alliance, 
Inc. v. Ryan, 125 Ohio St.3d 11, 2010-Ohio-578, 925 N.E.2d 947, ¶ 1. 
{¶ 12} Pursuant to R.C. 124.34, “an employee who is being removed may 
appeal to the appropriate civil service commission and, if not satisfied, may then 
appeal to the Court of Common Pleas * * * in accordance with R.C. Chapter 
119.”  State ex rel. Henderson v. Maple Hts. Civ. Serv. Comm. (1980), 63 Ohio 
St.2d 39, 41, 17 O.O.3d 24, 406 N.E.2d 1105; see R.C. 124.34(B) (“In cases of 
removal or reduction in pay for disciplinary reasons, either the appointing 
authority or the officer or employee may appeal from the decision of the state 
personnel board of review or the [municipal civil service] commission, and any 
such appeal shall be to the court of common pleas of the county in which the 
appointing authority is located, or to the court of common pleas of Franklin 
county, as provided by section 119.12 of the Revised Code”). 
{¶ 13} The court of appeals relied on our decision in Henderson to deny 
Lane’s request for extraordinary relief in mandamus.  In Henderson, a nonresident 
employee of the city of Maple Heights appealed to the city’s civil service 
commission from the city’s termination of his employment for his failure to 
comply with the city charter’s residency requirement.  The civil service 
commission, through its legal counsel, denied the employee’s request for a 
hearing because his appeal did not fall within the commission’s jurisdiction.  The 
employee then sought a writ of mandamus to compel the civil service commission 
to conduct a hearing to allow him to contest his termination from employment and 
January Term, 2011 
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to direct the mayor and transit director to reinstate him to his former position with 
back pay. 
{¶ 14} The court of appeals dismissed the mandamus action because the 
employee had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and we affirmed 
the dismissal on that basis: 
{¶ 15} “A denial by the respondent civil service commission of 
jurisdiction of this controversy represented a final appealable order.  When the 
commission refused relator’s request for a hearing, relator should have appealed 
to the Court of Common Pleas.  Having failed to do so, and, thereby having failed 
to pursue his appellate remedies in the ordinary course of law, he cannot now 
collaterally attack this jurisdictional determination.”  Id. at 41. 
{¶ 16} In Henderson, however, there was no question that the civil service 
commission itself refused to hear the discharged employee’s appeal and that the 
commission’s legal counsel merely communicated the commission’s own 
decision to the employee. 
{¶ 17} By contrast, there is no evidence here that the Pickerington 
Personnel Appeals Board issued a final, appealable order that the board lacked 
jurisdiction over Lane’s request for a hearing on his termination from 
employment with the city.  The letter from the law director to Lane did not even 
state that it was being issued on behalf of the board—instead, the law director 
represented that “the City” was denying his request, and not the board. 
{¶ 18} Nor is there any authority cited by appellees that would authorize 
the law director to issue a decision on behalf of the personnel appeals board.  See 
Pickerington City Charter, Section 5.04 (“The Law Director shall be the legal 
adviser of and attorney and counsel for the City and for all officials, boards, 
commissions, and departments thereof in all matters relating to their official 
duties; and shall, when requested, give legal opinions in writing”); see also FOE 
Aerie 2177 Greenville v. Ohio State Liquor Control Comm., Franklin App. No. 
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01AP-1330, 2002-Ohio-4441, ¶ 23 (no evidence that the Liquor Control 
Commission had granted authority to the county prosecuting attorney to act on its 
behalf with respect to its statutory responsibilities); Fairview Park Fire Fighters 
Assn. v. Fairview Park (July 22, 1982), Cuyahoga App. No. 44662, 1982 WL 
2489 (the city law director had no duty to enter into a consent agreement on 
behalf of the city that fixed wages, which was a power vested in the city council). 
{¶ 19} Therefore, in the absence of a final, appealable order by the 
Pickerington Personnel Appeals Board on Lane’s request for a hearing, he did not 
have an adequate remedy by way of administrative appeal to raise his claims.  
Consequently, the court of appeals erred in denying the writ on this basis. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 20} Based on the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals denying the writ of mandamus, and we remand the cause for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  On remand, the court of appeals will 
determine whether Lane can establish his entitlement to a writ of mandamus to 
compel the city and its personnel appeals board to conduct a hearing and make a 
determination on the merits of an appeal. 
Judgment reversed  
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, CUPP, and MCGEE 
BROWN, JJ., concur. 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents. 
LANZINGER, J., dissents and would affirm on the basis of State ex rel. 
Henderson v. Maple Hts. Civ. Serv. Comm. (1980), 63 Ohio St.2d 39, 41, 17 
O.O.3d 24, 406 N.E.2d 1105. 
__________________ 
 
Moses Law Offices, L.L.C., and Michael A. Moses, for appellant. 
January Term, 2011 
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Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn Co., L.P.A., Phillip K. Hartmann, Paul L. 
Bittner, and Aaron L. Granger, for appellees. 
______________________