Title: People v. Ware

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
VICTOR WARE et al., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
 
S263923 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division One 
D072515 
 
San Diego County Superior Court 
SCD255884 
 
 
December 1, 2022 
 
Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, 
Groban, Jenkins, and Guerrero concurred.  
 
1 
PEOPLE v. WARE 
S263923 
 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
Defendant Nicholas Hoskins was charged with and 
convicted of conspiracy to commit murder, for which he was 
sentenced to 25 years to life.  The charged conspiracy consisted 
of a two-year-long agreement among at least 20 gang members 
to kill members of rival gangs, without agreement as to any 
specific times, persons, or places where killing would take place.  
There was no evidence that Hoskins had committed or 
participated in any act of violence.  The prosecution instead 
sought to tie Hoskins to the charged conspiracy primarily 
through evidence of his gang membership, access to weapons, 
and social media posts celebrating violence against rival gangs.  
Hoskins argues this evidence is insufficient to support a 
conviction for conspiracy to commit murder.  Reviewing the 
entire record in light of established principles of conspiracy law, 
we agree.  We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and 
remand for further proceedings. 
I. 
A. 
 
In the early 2010’s, a violent conflict broke out among 
criminal street gangs in the San Diego area.  The conflict was 
sparked by the April 2011 killing of Dereck Peppers, who was a 
member of the 5/9 Brim criminal street gang, a set of the Bloods 
gang.  In response to the killing, the Brim gang declared war on 
PEOPLE v. WARE 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
2 
rival Crips gangs, leading to a spike in gang-related shootings 
that resulted in multiple injuries and deaths.   
 
Hoskins was a member of the 5/9 Brim gang.  The 
prosecution charged him, along with fellow gang members 
Dionte Simpson and Victor Ware, with multiple offenses 
stemming from the events of the early 2010’s.  Among other 
things, the prosecution alleged that all three were participants 
in a conspiracy spanning a roughly two-year period between 
January 1, 2012, and April 23, 2014, and involving at least 20 
Brim members in total.  The prosecution alleged the object of 
this conspiracy was the murder of rival gang members. 
 
At trial, the prosecution presented evidence that both 
Simpson and Ware had either committed or aided and abetted 
shootings aimed at rival gang members.  By contrast, the 
prosecution presented no evidence that Hoskins either 
committed or aided and abetted any act of violence.  Nor did the 
prosecution present direct evidence that Hoskins agreed with 
others to commit violent acts.  To establish Hoskins’s 
participation in the charged conspiracy, the prosecution instead 
relied on four categories of circumstantial evidence:  (1) evidence 
of Hoskins’s gang membership; (2) evidence that Hoskins had 
access to a gun on at least one occasion during the conspiracy; 
(3) evidence of Hoskins’s involvement in the events surrounding 
the August 27, 2013, shooting of Byreese Taylor; and 
(4) evidence of Hoskins’s social media posts celebrating violence 
against rival gangs.  Because this case concerns a challenge to 
the sufficiency of the evidence against Hoskins, we will describe 
each category of evidence in some detail. 
1. Evidence of gang membership.  The prosecution 
presented 
extensive 
evidence 
establishing 
Hoskins’s 
PEOPLE v. WARE 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
3 
membership in both the 5/9 Brim and a subset of the gang 
known as the “Hit Squad.”  This evidence included a photograph 
showing a large “B” tattooed on Hoskins’s chest, as well as 
photographs from Hoskins’s phone and social media accounts in 
which he or other gang members made Brim or “Crip killing” 
gang signs and wore red clothing associated with the gang.  In 
addition, Hoskins was a member of the Southside Brim Gang 
Facebook group.  In his social media posts, he used unusual 
spelling and terminology common among Brim members, 
replacing the letter “C” with either a “K” or “Ck” (for “Crip killer” 
or “Crip killing”) or “B” (for “Blood”), and occasionally signing off 
his posts with “5/9” (for the 5/9 Brim).  One of his nicknames was 
“Bick Nick.”  The prosecution also introduced a photograph 
showing another one of Hoskins’s nicknames written on the wall 
of a house belonging to an alleged coconspirator, alongside the 
nicknames of other Brim and Hit Squad members.  Finally, a 
witness familiar with the defendants testified that Hoskins was 
part of the Hit Squad, also known at various times as the “Young 
Hit Squad” and the “Tiny Hit Squad.”  According to the witness, 
this subset of the Brims had more “shooters” and “K’s,” meaning 
“kills,” than another subset, the “Hound Unit.” 
2.  Access to firearms.  The prosecution presented evidence 
that in February 2012, Hoskins was riding in a car that was 
pulled over for a faulty license plate light.  Hoskins and the two 
other people in the car — both alleged 5/9 Brim members — 
were eventually searched, and Hoskins was found with a loaded 
firearm concealed in a sock tucked into his pants.  Hoskins was 
arrested with a fellow Brim member.  While the two were in the 
patrol car, Hoskins told the other Brim member that he would 
take responsibility for the gun and other contraband found in 
PEOPLE v. WARE 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
4 
the car.  There was no evidence linking the gun to any prior 
shootings.   
The prosecution also presented evidence that in August 
2012, Hoskins and an unidentified male were questioned by 
police officers based on a suspected curfew violation.  (In fact, 
Hoskins was 19 years old at the time, so the curfew did not 
apply.)  Hoskins was questioned in front of the driveway of a 
house on Florence Street and initially gave the police a false 
name.  At some point, the unidentified male who was with 
Hoskins walked to the backyard of that house.  Officers later 
recovered a loaded revolver from the backyard.  They had not 
seen Hoskins enter the backyard, nor was there any evidence 
that Hoskins knew about the gun. 
3.  Shooting of Byreese Taylor.  On August 27, 2013, Taylor 
was walking in West Coast Crips (WCC) territory when he was 
shot by a passenger riding in the front seat of a car.  The 
passenger, who was wearing a red cloth over his face, was not 
identified; the driver of the car was Timothy Hurst, a 5/9 Brim 
member.  According to the prosecution’s gang expert, the 
shooting appeared to be a mistake:  Taylor was not a rival gang 
member, but a member of a gang allied with the Brims.  Hurst 
was later arrested for and convicted of the shooting. 
The evidence showed Hoskins was a longtime friend of 
Hurst’s.  Their grandmothers were neighbors, and the two men 
had grown up together and remained close friends.  After Hurst 
was arrested, officers searched his car and found a mixture of 
DNA on the passenger side of the vehicle from at least four 
individuals, including Hoskins’s as “a possible major contributor 
to that mixture.”  The prosecution expert could not, however, 
determine when the DNA had entered the van or whether it had 
PEOPLE v. WARE 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
5 
arrived through direct contact or was transferred from another 
object. 
To link Hoskins to the Taylor shooting, the prosecution 
introduced several photographs of Hoskins and his alleged 
coconspirators that were taken in the vicinity of the shooting.  
This included a photograph, uploaded to Hoskins’s Facebook 
account on February 21, 2013 — about six months before the 
Taylor shooting — showing Hurst “tossing up 5/9 Brim and Crip 
killer” signs.  The prosecution noted that the photograph was 
taken at a known WCC hangout about a mile from where Taylor 
was shot and argued that the photograph demonstrated the two 
were “laying the groundwork” for the Taylor shooting.  The 
prosecution also introduced two photographs — posted on 
Instagram by another Brim member, Edward Paris, on the 
morning of August 27, 2013 — showing Hoskins and Paris 
standing in the same park, throwing up gang signs, and 
appearing to give the middle finger to WCC.  The photographs 
were taken about seven hours before Taylor was shot and one 
mile away from the location of the shooting.   
The prosecution also introduced Facebook messages that 
Hoskins sent after the shooting to Taylor and Hurst’s girlfriend, 
in which Hoskins discussed the case against Hurst and tried to 
dissuade Taylor from testifying so that Hurst could “beat his 
[c]ase.”  Hoskins threatened to reveal that Taylor was 
“snitching” to the police, but ultimately did not carry out this 
threat.  
About six months after the shooting, Hoskins posted on 
Facebook:  “I switch up on bitcKh [n-words] fast I Love my Bros 
But I’m truer to the Kode sHit  I’d turn on TB if he did some gay 
PEOPLE v. WARE 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
6 
sHit and vise versa nuttin personal  #onBrims.”1  “TB” referred 
to Hurst, who was also known as “Tim Brim.”  According to the 
prosecution’s gang expert, Hoskins meant that he “love[d] his 
gang,” but was “truer to the code, the code being no snitching.”  
The expert suggested Hoskins meant to call out Hurst for 
talking to the police about the circumstances of the shooting.  
4.  Social media posts.  Hoskins was active on social media, 
and the prosecution introduced extensive evidence of his social 
media posts and photographs, as well as photographs of Hoskins 
uploaded to other 5/9 Brim members’ accounts, to demonstrate 
Hoskins’s awareness and approval of the violent rivalry against 
Crips.  The prosecution argued that Hoskins’s social media 
activity provided a “window” into his mind:  his posts were “his 
words,” gave the jury “an idea of the mindsight of Mr. Hoskins,” 
and reflected a desire to “tell[] the world on Facebook” that he 
was serious about his “Crip killing.”  The prosecution also 
argued that Hoskins used social media to disrespect rival gang 
members.  He was Facebook “friends” with at least two rival 
gang members, one of whom was a victim in a shooting allegedly 
committed by a Brim member, indicating that at least some 
rival gang members could view his Facebook posts.  Though 
some of Hoskins’s status updates could be seen and commented 
on by nonfriends, it was otherwise unclear which of his posts 
were publicly accessible and which were visible only to his 
Facebook friends. 
 
1 
Throughout 
this 
opinion, 
we 
quote 
the 
relevant 
communications as they appeared in Hoskins’s original social 
media posts, including his spelling and capitalization.  But 
consistent with the approach taken in the Court of Appeal and 
by the parties, we use the term “n-word” rather than the original 
that appeared in the posts. 
PEOPLE v. WARE 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
7 
Some of the posts were close in time or location to gang-
related shootings, which the prosecution offered as proof that 
Hoskins was “encouraging, promoting, and furthering the 
violence.”  For example, in April 2012, several days after a rival 
Crips gang member was shot, Hoskins posted on Facebook that 
“cKrossys” — referring to the Crips — “got Hit, all I need is some 
Dro and my day is set.”2  Two 5/9 Brim members were later 
prosecuted for the shooting and convicted.  In February 2013, 
Hoskins posted a photograph of Hurst standing at a 
recognizable street intersection, near the site of a January 2012 
shooting in WCC gang territory that was linked to the Brims.  
The prosecution suggested Hoskins posted the photograph to 
“brag about” the 2012 shooting.   
Other posts seemingly taunted rivals.  In February 2013, 
Hoskins posted a photograph of himself in a well-known WCC 
park with the caption, “cKome Out nd play!  We out Here!  Earth 
is my turf & dats #OnMyTurf!”  In his opening statement, the 
prosecutor emphasized that “[i]n the world of gangs, respect is 
paramount,” and that going into rival gang territory and 
“post[ing] it for everyone to see” is “incredibly disrespectful.”  In 
March 2014, WCC member Paris Hill was murdered.  The 5/9 
Brims were not suspected to be involved in Hill’s death.  A few 
days later, Hoskins posted on Facebook:  “That’s some gay sHit 
not Gansta yall getBacK taggin in the set?  That’s all yo 
DeadHomie worth?  That’s why I kall yall cKraBs.”  The 
prosecution argued that Hoskins knew some WCC members 
would see his message and was mocking them for their response 
 
2  
The full Facebook post read:  “Son was Born healthy.  
cKrossys got Hit, all I need is some Dro and my day is set lol 
#Happy Easter!” 
PEOPLE v. WARE 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
8 
to Hill’s death, calling them a derogatory term for Crips 
members, “crabs.”  Hoskins also posted that message hours after 
WCC gang member Carlton Blue had been shot; the Brims were 
suspected to be involved in Blue’s shooting.  The prosecution 
also introduced various online exchanges, including messages 
between Hoskins and a rival WCC member taunting each other 
about a brief encounter on the street. 
Finally, the prosecution introduced a number of Hoskins’s 
Facebook posts in which he celebrated violence against rival 
gangs and described his life as a gang member.  In one post, 
Hoskins wrote that he was “tired of grindin, fighting, runnin, 
jail, death, stress, betrayal and everything else this game has to 
offer but it’s what we signed up for right?”  On other occasions, 
he wrote, “Never BacK Down is the MuthafucKin motto!” and 
“Violence may Be the easy thing to do But I like easy, it makes 
sense! #9s!,” with “#9s” referring to the 5/9 Brims.  In a separate 
post, Hoskins wrote in part, “Bl59ds kill rips & rips kill Bl59ds 
[n-words] . . . these are all things we already know so why do we 
trip?  Started with a cKhoicKe,” which the prosecution’s gang 
expert translated in part to, “Bloods kill Crips.  Crips kill 
Bloods.”  Hoskins also explained what it meant to be an “OG or 
older homie/general,” writing that gaining such an elevated 
status “isn’t established by age or how long you been around I 
mean it Kount But u need the stripes and reputation to matcKh.  
Bighomie lol.”  According to the prosecution’s gang expert, this 
meant that building one’s status and reputation within the gang 
required putting in the “work,” which could involve “some type 
of mission,” such as a burglary, robbery, or shooting.  To prove 
that Hoskins had acquired an elevated status, the prosecution 
introduced Facebook evidence of Hoskins identifying himself as 
“Big Bick Nick” and of a fellow Brim member identifying himself 
PEOPLE v. WARE 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
9 
as “Little Bick Nick”; according to the prosecution’s expert, it 
was a sign of respect for a younger member to take an older 
member’s name, and this usually indicated that the older 
member was “working towards OG status.” 
 
The prosecution also called attention to several of 
Hoskins’s Facebook posts, including:  (1) a February 2013 
photograph of Hoskins making the Crip killer hand sign with 
the caption, “Spell it BicK NicK tell he really Bout his cK’s,” with 
“cK’s” meaning “Crip killing,” (2) a May 2014 photograph of 
Hoskins wearing a red bandana around his face, with the 
caption, “Rags around our facKe to Beat the Kase inKase a [n-
word] look 5/9 BrimGang,” accompanied by several terms 
related to the rival WCC and Neighborhood Crips (NC) gangs, 
and (3) a May 2014 status update, “Ganstas don’t flicK it with 
gigs they use em,” which the prosecution gang expert translated 
as, “Real gangsters don’t take pictures with their guns.  They 
use them.”  The prosecution also introduced a March 2014 post 
from Hoskins:  “My okkupation Steal,Kill,&Deal everything 
gotta prise even your life.”  The prosecution’s gang expert 
explained this meant that Hoskins saw his job as to “steal, kill, 
and deal,” and that, as part of his work, he would “put a value 
on anything,” “even your life.”  The prosecution’s gang expert 
also acknowledged, however, that not every 5/9 Brim member 
who displayed “Ck” on social media killed Crips; that some 
members might “do it strictly on social media,” meaning only 
post about Crip killing without actually doing so; and that not 
all Brim members commit crimes.  
B. 
The jury found Hoskins and his codefendants guilty of 
conspiracy to commit murder, in addition to other offenses.  
PEOPLE v. WARE 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
10 
Hoskins was also convicted of participation in a criminal street 
gang conspiracy, in violation of Penal Code section 182.5, while 
his two codefendants were convicted of various offenses 
including attempted murder.  As to all three defendants, the 
jury found the conspiracy was for the benefit of a criminal street 
gang.  (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)(1).)  Hoskins was 
sentenced to 25 years to life in prison.  (Id., §§ 182, subd. (a) 
[conspiracy], 187, subd. (a) [murder].) 
On appeal, Hoskins challenged the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting his convictions.  The Court of Appeal 
reversed the gang conspiracy conviction for lack of evidence 
establishing a particular element of that offense.3  But the court 
rejected Hoskins’s challenge to his murder conspiracy 
conviction, finding sufficient evidence that Hoskins and his 
alleged coconspirators “came to a mutual understanding to 
murder rival NC and WCC gang members and that [Hoskins] 
participated in the conspiracy.”  (Ware, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 939.)  Though the court acknowledged that “the prosecution 
failed to prove that [Hoskins] was a direct participant or aider 
and abettor in any of the shootings,” it found sufficient evidence 
from which a jury could conclude Hoskins knew about the 
conspiracy and had the requisite intent to join it and facilitate 
the object offense.  (Id. at p. 941.) 
The Court of Appeal identified several pieces of evidence 
in support of its conclusion.  First, the court pointed to Hoskins’s 
 
3 
Specifically, the court concluded there was no evidence 
Hoskins had promoted, furthered, assisted, or benefited from 
“ ‘any felonious criminal conduct’ ” by 5/9 Brim members, as 
opposed to conduct not constituting a felony.  (People v. Ware 
(2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 919, 951 (Ware).)  The court’s ruling on 
Hoskins’s gang conspiracy conviction is not before us. 
PEOPLE v. WARE 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
11 
social media posts about “Crip killing,” including photographs of 
Hoskins “tossing the gang sign for Tiny Hit Squad” and “ ‘CK’ ”; 
his nickname of “ ‘Bick Nick’ ”; and his Facebook posts that he 
was “really about his Crip killing” and his “ ‘occupation’ ” was to 
“ ‘steal, kill, and deal.’ ”  (Ware, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at 
pp. 941–942.) 
The court next pointed to evidence concerning Hoskins’s 
proximity to firearms, including his prior arrest with a 
concealed gun and one-time proximity to a loaded revolver,4 as 
well as his Facebook post that, according to an expert, meant 
“gangsters do not take photographs with guns, they use them.”  
(Ware, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 942.)  From this evidence, the 
court concluded, a jury could infer “Hoskins carried firearms and 
had the intent to use them.”  (Ibid.) 
The Court of Appeal also pointed to certain Facebook posts 
that seemed to celebrate violence against Crips members and 
were made close in time to two shootings allegedly part of the 
conspiracy.  The court held a jury could reasonably infer that 
Hoskins’s April 2012 post about a Crips member getting shot — 
“cKrossys got Hit” — was about the shooting of a rival gang 
member just days earlier.  (Ware, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 942.)  A jury could also reasonably infer that Hoskins knew 
about the August 27, 2013, Taylor shooting in advance because 
of the photograph, taken hours before the shooting, showing 
 
4  
The Court of Appeal stated that the loaded revolver was 
recovered “in an area after chasing Hoskins.”  (Ware, supra, 52 
Cal.App.5th at p. 942.)  This appears to be an error; the record 
does not show Hoskins was chased, and the loaded revolver was 
found in the backyard of a house of which Hoskins was standing 
in front.  The apparent misstatement of the evidence does not, 
however, affect our analysis of the issue presented. 
PEOPLE v. WARE 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
12 
Hoskins and a fellow 5/9 Brim member “ ‘flipping off’ ” a rival 
gang about one mile away from where Taylor was later shot.5  
(Ibid.) 
Finally, the Court of Appeal concluded that because of 
“Hoskins’s relationship to the coconspirators,” a reasonable jury 
could combine evidence of Hoskins’s social media activity and 
proximity to firearms with his alleged coconspirators’ conduct to 
infer that Hoskins “knew of the conspiracy and had the 
deliberate, knowing, and specific intent to join” it.  (Ware, supra, 
52 Cal.App.5th at p. 942.)  According to the court, this 
conclusion was bolstered by the jury’s finding of gang 
enhancements against all defendants, which “necessarily” 
meant the jury “found the evidence of interdependence among 
the participants in the crimes to be persuasive.”  (Ibid.)  
The Court of Appeal’s opinion was initially unpublished.  
After 
filing, 
the 
Attorney 
General 
requested 
partial 
publication.6  The Attorney General argued that the conspiracy 
portion of the opinion merited publication because it “applies an 
existing rule of law to a set of facts significantly different from 
those stated in published opinions.”  Specifically, the opinion 
“upholds the conspiracy to commit murder convictions . . . based 
 
5  
The Court of Appeal wrote that Hoskins and Paris were 
“ ‘flipping off’ NC,” but the evidence suggests they were trying 
to insult WCC, a different rival Crips gang, instead.  (Ware, 
supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 942.)  Again, the apparent 
misstatement is not material to our analysis of the issue 
presented. 
6  
In a separate letter, the San Diego District Attorney’s 
Office sought, and the Court of Appeal granted, publication of 
the portion of the opinion discussing the withdrawal of 
Hoskins’s attorney. 
PEOPLE v. WARE 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
13 
on the broad context of forming an agreement amongst the gang 
members to kill rival gang members, without any agreement as 
to specific time, person or place that any killing would take 
place.”  (Citing Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c)(2), (3).)7  
Because there were no published opinions upholding a 
conspiracy like the one charged here, publication would “assist 
prosecutors in prosecuting gang members for conspiracy to 
commit murder based on forming a tacit general agreement to 
kill rival gang members.”  The Court of Appeal granted the 
partial publication request. 
We granted Hoskins’s petition for review to address the 
nature of the evidence necessary to establish participation in the 
charged murder conspiracy. 
II. 
Conspiracy “ ‘is an inchoate offense, the essence of which 
is an agreement to commit an unlawful act.’ ”  (People v. Johnson 
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 250, 258 (Johnson).)  This crime has four 
elements:  (1) the existence of an agreement between at least 
two persons; (2) the specific intent to agree to commit an offense; 
(3) the specific intent to commit the offense that is the object of 
the agreement; and (4) an overt act in furtherance of the 
conspiracy, which may be committed by any conspirator.  (Pen. 
Code, § 182, subd. (a)(1); see, e.g., People v. Morante (1999) 20 
Cal.4th 403, 416.)  
The first element, concerning the existence of an 
agreement, “is the crux of criminal conspiracy.”  (People v. 
 
7  
The Attorney General also sought, and the Court of Appeal 
granted, publication of the opinion section discussing First 
Amendment challenges to the use of social media evidence at 
trial. 
PEOPLE v. WARE 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
14 
Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 870.)  As the Attorney General 
acknowledged in his publication request, this case is unusual in 
that the alleged object of the conspiracy is nonspecific:  The 
charged conspiracy instead arises in “the broad context of 
forming an agreement amongst the gang members to kill rival 
gang members, without any agreement as to specific time, 
person or place that any killing would take place.” 
In this appeal, Hoskins does not dispute that the 
prosecution has adequately proved the first element of 
conspiracy, the existence of an agreement.  Nor does he 
challenge the adequacy of the prosecution’s showing as to the 
final element, an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.  To 
satisfy this particular element, a jury need only find that any 
member of the conspiracy committed a single overt act, whether 
criminal or not.  (People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1135; 
accord, People v. Smith (2014) 60 Cal.4th 603, 616.)  Here, one 
of Hoskins’s codefendants was convicted at trial of an attempted 
murder in furtherance of the conspiracy.  Even if the prosecution 
had presented no evidence of any other overt act, the attempted 
murder conviction of an alleged coconspirator in furtherance of 
the conspiracy is sufficient to show the overt act element has 
been satisfied.  
Hoskins’s challenge instead focuses on the nature of the 
evidence necessary to connect any individual gang member to a 
nonspecific, long-running conspiracy of the sort alleged here.  
More specifically, he contests the prosecution’s showing 
regarding the two mental elements of conspiracy, which are the 
elements that establish an alleged conspirator’s participation in, 
and liability for, the charged unlawful agreement. 
 
 
PEOPLE v. WARE 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
15 
A. 
The mental state elements of conspiracy require the 
prosecution to demonstrate the defendant had the specific intent 
both to agree to the conspiracy and to commit the object offense.  
(People v. Horn (1974) 12 Cal.3d 290, 296; People v. Jurado 
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 123.)  The two elements are distinct, but 
closely related.  In some cases, it may be useful to distinguish 
between the two elements, especially when evidence of one is 
direct and the other is circumstantial.  (See, e.g., People v. Marsh 
(1962) 58 Cal.2d 732, 742–744 [focusing on intent to commit a 
crime where there was clear evidence of intent to agree]; People 
v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 629 [focusing on intent 
to agree where there was clear evidence of intent to commit a 
crime].)  But in many cases, proof of the two specific intent 
elements will overlap.  (See, e.g., Harno, Intent in Criminal 
Conspiracy (1941) 89 U.Pa. L.Rev. 624, 631 [“[The two types of 
intent necessary for conspiracy] always shade into each other 
and often there is no practical purpose served in distinguishing 
them”].)  Together, these two specific intent elements play a 
critical role in a conspiracy prosecution:  Proof of these elements 
is what separates a coconspirator from a mere bystander to the 
crime. 
Here, where we consider these elements in the context of 
a charged conspiracy stemming from a gang rivalry, the proof 
necessary to differentiate a coconspirator from a bystander 
takes on particular significance.  Decades ago, in Scales v. 
United States (1961) 367 U.S. 203, the United States Supreme 
Court held that the First Amendment forbids punishing a 
person merely for associating with others — even as part of a 
group premised on a violent aim.  Because the law will not 
recognize a rule of guilt by association, we insist on proof of a 
PEOPLE v. WARE 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
16 
defendant’s knowledge of, and specific intent to further, the 
group’s unlawful ends.  (Scales, at p. 229; see, e.g., Elfbrandt v. 
Russell (1966) 384 U.S. 11, 19 [“A law which applies to 
membership without the ‘specific intent’ to further the illegal 
aims of the organization . . . rests on the doctrine of ‘guilt by 
association[,]’ 
which 
has 
no 
place 
here”]; 
Holder 
v. 
Humanitarian Law Project (2010) 561 U.S. 1, 18 [noting that 
“mere membership” in, or association with, an organization that 
advocates terrorism cannot itself be criminalized].) 
This basic principle is reflected in California’s extensive 
statutory regime targeting gang activity, as well as in judicial 
decisions interpreting and applying that law.  (Pen. Code, 
§ 186.20 et seq.; see, e.g., People v. Renteria (2022) 13 Cal.5th 
951 (Renteria).)  California statutes impose substantial criminal 
penalties — ranging from additional terms of years to 
indeterminate life terms of imprisonment — on gang members 
who commit crimes in concert with other members, or for the 
benefit of the gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, 
or assist criminal activity.  (Pen. Code, § 182.5 [offense of gang 
conspiracy]; id., § 186.22, subds. (a) [offense of active gang 
participation], (b)(1) [sentence enhancements for gang-related 
felonies], (b)(4) [alternative penalties for certain gang-related 
felonies].)  In enacting the law, the Legislature deliberately 
“sought to avoid punishing mere gang membership.”  (People v. 
Rodriguez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1125, 1134 (Rodriguez).)  Thus, 
under the gang statutes, “[m]ere active and knowing 
participation in a criminal street gang is not a crime.”  (Id. at 
p. 1130; see People v. Mesa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 191, 196; People v. 
Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 57–58; People v. Castenada (2000) 
23 Cal.4th 743, 747–752; People v. Loeun (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1, 
11.)  For all the same reasons, in a traditional conspiracy 
PEOPLE v. WARE 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
17 
prosecution broadly targeting gang rivalry, our review of the 
evidence must take care to distinguish between mere evidence 
of gang membership, on the one hand, and participation in the 
charged conspiracy, on the other.   
Caution is likewise warranted because of the unusual 
nature of the charged conspiracy in this case.  The type and 
volume of evidence necessary to establish the existence of a 
broad, nonspecific gang-related conspiracy of the sort alleged 
here poses challenges to a factfinder attempting to distinguish 
the guilt of one defendant from that of another.  In any 
conspiracy prosecution, “the accused often is confronted with a 
hodgepodge of acts and statements by others which he may 
never have authorized or intended or even known about, but 
which help to persuade the jury of [the] existence of the 
conspiracy itself.”  (Krulewitch v. United States (1949) 336 U.S. 
440, 453 (conc. opn. of Jackson, J.).)  This feature of conspiracy 
prosecutions raises particular concerns in the context of a 
prosecution involving a “single massive conspiracy . . . .  [¶]  . . .  
The risk is that a jury will be so overwhelmed with evidence of 
wrongdoing . . . that it will fail to differentiate among particular 
defendants.”  (U.S. v. Evans (10th Cir. 1992) 970 F.2d 663, 674.)  
The risk of confusion makes it particularly critical for courts to 
carefully distinguish between evidence of mere membership in 
a gang embroiled in a violent rivalry and evidence sufficient to 
support a conviction for conspiracy to commit murder.  
Several well-established principles of conspiracy law 
guide us in this task.  To establish the requisite specific intent 
connecting an individual defendant to the charged conspiracy, 
the prosecution must show that the defendant intended to play 
some part in achieving the conspirator’s unlawful ends.  Put 
differently, “[t]here must be something more than ‘[m]ere 
PEOPLE v. WARE 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
18 
knowledge, approval of or acquiescence in the object or the 
purpose of the conspiracy.’ ”  (U.S. v. Cianchetti (2d Cir. 1963) 
315 F.2d 584, 588, quoting Cleaver v. U.S. (10th Cir. 1956) 238 
F.2d 766, 771; see Michael R. v. Jeffrey B. (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 
1059, 1069; see also Direct Sales Co. v. U.S. (1943) 319 U.S. 703, 
711 [knowledge of a conspiracy is necessary, but not sufficient, 
to show that a person “intends to further, promote and cooperate 
in it”].)  A cheerleader, no matter how enthusiastic, is not a 
coconspirator unless the prosecution can prove the cheering was 
intended to play some role in achieving the object offense.  
Likewise, a member of a group may receive some benefit from 
others’ misdeeds, but without more, a mere beneficiary is not a 
coconspirator.  Unlike a Penal Code section 182.5 gang 
conspiracy charge, in which knowingly benefiting from the 
conspiracy is a basis for liability, a Penal Code section 182 
traditional conspiracy requires the prosecution to demonstrate 
that the individual defendant intended to play a role in the 
object offense, not merely profit from it after the fact.  (See 
Johnson, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 262.)   
While it may be useful to show the precise role the 
defendant intended to play in achieving the object of the 
conspiracy, the prosecution is not required to establish precisely 
how the defendant intended to achieve the ends of the 
conspiracy or that the defendant’s chosen means were effective 
in achieving those ends.  Nor, certainly, must the prosecution 
establish the intent to participate in every act necessary to 
complete the object offense.  (See Salinas v. United States (1997) 
522 U.S. 52, 63 [“A conspiracy may exist even if a conspirator 
does not agree to commit or facilitate each and every part of the 
substantive offense”].)  But ultimately, to connect any individual 
to the charged conspiracy, the prosecution must at least 
PEOPLE v. WARE 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
19 
establish that the individual specifically intended to agree to 
commit the criminal offense and to play at least some role in 
achieving it.  (See id. at pp. 63–64.)  
B. 
With these settled principles in mind, we turn to Hoskins’s 
evidentiary challenge for his murder conspiracy conviction.  
Although murder liability is divided into different degrees and 
can rest on different theories (see Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189), 
conspiracy to commit murder can only take a single form:  It 
“requires a finding of unlawful intent to kill, i.e., express malice” 
(People v. Cortez (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1223, 1228) and “is 
necessarily conspiracy to commit premeditated and deliberated 
first degree murder” (id. at p. 1237).  The question before us, 
then, is whether sufficient evidence supports the finding that 
Hoskins had the specific intent to agree to kill and the specific 
intent to commit killings, whether personally or by playing a 
role in killings carried out by others. 
To answer the question, we must “ ‘review the entire 
record in the light most favorable to the judgment,’ ” and then 
determine whether it contains “ ‘evidence that is reasonable, 
credible, and of solid value’ ” such that a reasonable jury could 
have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  
(Renteria, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 970; see Jackson v. Virginia 
(1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 
557, 578.)  As we have recently explained, “sufficiency 
determinations necessarily take account of the ‘standard of 
proof that applied before the trial court.’ ”  (Renteria, at p. 970, 
quoting Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1008.)  
“[T]hat is why in criminal cases we must ensure the record 
PEOPLE v. WARE 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
20 
demonstrates substantial evidence to establish guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  (Renteria, at p. 970.) 
We must “ ‘presume in support of the judgment the 
existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced 
from the evidence . . . “for it is the exclusive province of the trial 
judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the 
truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination 
depends.” ’ ”  (People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87, 
quoting People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357, citation 
omitted.)  But we cannot, however, venture beyond the evidence 
presented at trial, and may consider only those inferences that 
are reasonably supported by the record.  “ ‘[A] reasonable 
inference . . . “may not be based on suspicion alone, or on 
imagination, speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or 
guess work.” ’ ”  (People v. Davis (2013) 57 Cal.4th 353, 360, 
quoting People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 21.)  It “must 
logically flow from other facts established in the action,” and it 
cannot be “based entirely on the suspicions of the officers 
involved in the case and the conjecture of the prosecution.”  
(People v. Austin (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1604.)  
Here, the evidence showed that Hoskins (1) was an active 
member of the 5/9 Brim gang; (2) had access to guns at some 
point during the charged conspiracy; (3) tried to help Hurst after 
Hurst’s arrest for the August 27, 2013, Byreese Taylor shooting; 
and (4) knew of and voiced his support on social media for 
violence against rival gang members.  Considering the evidence 
as a whole, we conclude that no reasonable jury could have 
found beyond a reasonable doubt that Hoskins had the requisite 
intent to participate in a conspiracy to commit murder.  Though 
we discuss each category of evidence in turn, we stress that our 
PEOPLE v. WARE 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
21 
conclusion is based on our assessment of the evidence in its 
entirety. 
We begin with the evidence of Hoskins’s ties to the 5/9 
Brim gang and alleged participants in the charged conspiracy.  
The evidence showed that Hoskins was a member of the 
Southside Brim Gang Facebook group, friends on Facebook with 
Brim gang members, and regularly communicated with Brim 
members and affiliates.  Hoskins consistently affirmed his 
affiliation with the 5/9 Brim gang and professed his support for 
the gang online, and the jury saw numerous photos of Hoskins 
displaying Brim gang signs and associating with fellow Brim 
members, including alleged coconspirators, as well as posts 
describing his life in a gang.  The evidence amply supports the 
allegation that Hoskins was an active Brim member during the 
alleged conspiracy, and Hoskins does not dispute this allegation.  
It is, however, a separate question whether Hoskins was a 
member of the charged conspiracy. 
“[C]ommon 
gang 
membership 
may 
be 
part 
of 
circumstantial 
evidence 
supporting 
the 
inference 
of 
a 
conspiracy.”  (People v. Superior Court (Quinteros) (1993) 13 
Cal.App.4th 12, 20; see People v. Frausto (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 
129, 140–141 [describing instances where proof of gang 
membership tended to demonstrate motive for a crime or 
participation in a conspiracy]; U.S. v. Garcia (9th Cir. 1998) 151 
F.3d 1243, 1247 [“[W]hen evidence establishes that a particular 
gang has a specific illegal objective . . . evidence of gang 
membership may help to link gang members to that objective”].)  
But proof of common membership alone is not sufficient to 
establish participation in a criminal conspiracy.  (See Rodriguez, 
supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1134.)  The effect of such a rule would be 
to criminalize mere association with gang members, which the 
PEOPLE v. WARE 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
22 
law forbids.  (See ibid.; Quinteros, at p. 20 [“[M]ere association 
does not prove a criminal conspiracy”]; cf. U.S. v. Herrera-
Gonzalez (9th Cir. 2001) 263 F.3d 1092, 1095 [stating that it is 
“not a crime to be acquainted with criminals”].)   
The Attorney General contends that Hoskins was “not just 
a gang member — he was a part of the gang’s subset responsible 
for killing rival and perceived rival gang members,” the Hit 
Squad.  The Attorney General suggests that a reasonable jury 
could have inferred that such membership reflects an intent to 
join the conspiracy and to commit murder.  We are not 
persuaded.  First, contrary to the Attorney General’s 
characterization, the record does not show that the Hit Squad 
was a “kill squad” whose “mission was to kill Crips.”  The 
Attorney General points to trial evidence that many Hit Squad 
members committed crimes and that Tiny Hit Squad had more 
shooters and “k’s” than Hound Unit.  But just because one group 
has more shooters and “kills” than another does not establish 
that only shooters and killers were allowed in the first group, or 
that its very purpose was to kill.  One police officer, called to 
testify about his investigation into a shooting undertaken by 5/9 
Brim members not on trial, did refer in passing to Tiny Hit 
Squad as “essentially [an] assassination crew within the 5/9 
Brim gang.”  But the officer offered no evidentiary support for 
that assertion, the Attorney General does not discuss this 
evidence on appeal, and the record supplies no support on its 
own.  Without more evidence about the internal workings of the 
Hit Squad or its requirements for membership, evidence that 
Hoskins was part of the Hit Squad — like evidence that he was 
part of the 5/9 Brim gang in general — shows only that Hoskins 
associated with people involved in various violent criminal 
PEOPLE v. WARE 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
23 
activities, and not that he held any specific intent to join them 
in those activities.   
Second, and relatedly, the Attorney General identifies no 
evidence that Hit Squad members needed to follow any specific 
set of rules or norms, or have any special qualifications or 
undergo any particular initiation rite (such as committing a 
particular crime), as a condition of membership.  Though 
evidence of rules and norms can be relevant in assessing an 
individual’s participation in a charged conspiracy (see U.S. v. 
Bingham (9th Cir. 2011) 653 F.3d 983, 998 [describing strict 
gang rules enforced via formalized hierarchy]; People v. Kopp 
(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, 75 [describing gang’s rules about 
cooperating with law enforcement]), there was no evidence of 
that sort here.  The limited evidence on this subject at trial 
instead showed that many members of the Hit Squad were 
relatives, and suggested that the Hit Squad “subset” was, at 
least in part, a generational grouping within the gang.  Nor was 
there evidence tending to show that the choice to become a 5/9 
Brim gang member in general was necessarily also a choice to 
participate in a long-running, nonspecific conspiracy to commit 
murder.  It is undisputed that the 5/9 Brim gang had an active 
and violent rivalry with the WCC and NC gangs during the 
period of the alleged conspiracy.  It is also undisputed that Brim 
members, like gang members generally, were expected to 
support the goals of the gang, including by backing each other 
up in fights.  But a “general agreement, implicit or explicit, to 
support one another in gang fights does not provide substantial 
proof of the specific agreement required for a conviction of 
conspiracy to commit assault,” much less conspiracy to commit 
murder.  (U.S. v. Garcia, supra, 151 F.3d at p. 1244.)  Again, 
without more specific evidence about the requirements of Hit 
PEOPLE v. WARE 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
24 
Squad or Brim membership, we conclude that no reasonable 
jury could have inferred that membership entailed an 
agreement by all of its members, including Hoskins, to kill 
rivals.  
 
The Attorney General repeatedly describes Hoskins as not 
merely a member of the gang, but an “active leader.”  Again, the 
record does not support this characterization.  The only 
indication Hoskins had achieved some elevated rank was 
evidence that another 5/9 Brim member had adopted Hoskins’s 
gang moniker as his own; that member went by “Little Bick 
Nick,” a reference to Hoskins’s nickname, “Bick Nick.”  This 
evidence, however, does not reasonably support an inference of 
Hoskins’s leadership or “high-level” status within the Brims.  
Indeed, the prosecution’s gang expert testified only that this 
indicated Hoskins was “working towards” a more senior position 
in the gang — not that he had necessarily achieved it.  And even 
setting aside the minimal evidence regarding Hoskins’s 
purportedly elevated status, it is unclear what significance the 
jury reasonably could ascribe to such status.  The prosecution’s 
gang expert testified that gang members must carry out 
“missions” to gain respect — and presumably to advance in the 
group — but the testimony appeared to be based on an 
impression of gangs generally, rather than the specific practice 
of the 5/9 Brims.  In any event, the evidence did not show what 
sort of mission would be necessary to achieve whatever status 
Hoskins might have obtained within the gang.  To the extent the 
prosecution might have sought to rely on an inference that a 
leader or person with elevated status must have been involved 
in gang decisionmaking, including the critical decision to 
murder unspecified members of rival gangs over an extended 
period of time, that inference is likewise unsupported by the 
PEOPLE v. WARE 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
25 
evidence.  The prosecution’s gang expert testified that the 5/9 
Brims did not have a fixed internal hierarchy, but rather only a 
“loose” structure.  Even if Hoskins were considered a “high-
level” member of the gang or enjoyed some type of elevated 
status, the record shed little light on what decisionmaking 
responsibilities might accompany that status — much less on 
the critical question of whether a “high-level” member was 
expected to join in any tacit agreement to kill rivals. 
The next category of evidence relates to Hoskins’s access 
and proximity to guns during the period of the alleged 
conspiracy.  The Attorney General highlights two pieces of 
evidence:  Hoskins’s February 2012 arrest with a gun concealed 
in a sock tucked into his pants, and his August 2012 encounter 
with police when a loaded revolver was found nearby.  As 
Hoskins points out, neither gun was ever linked to any shooting.  
Nor was there any indication that Hoskins intended to use 
either weapon at the time he was arrested — let alone that he 
even knew about the revolver found after his August 2012 
encounter with police.  Nonetheless, the Attorney General 
argues that this evidence indicates Hoskins was “ready and able 
to kill”:  that he “either was, or could easily be armed, if the 
opportunity to shoot rival Crip gang members arose.”  The 
evidence does not reasonably support such an inference.  
Though it may be reasonable to infer that Hoskins “could easily 
be armed” if the opportunity arose, it is not reasonable to infer 
that Hoskins therefore intended to commit first degree murder.  
Individuals — gang members included — frequently possess 
guns without harboring any intent to use the guns to commit 
premeditated, deliberate killings.  Again, nothing in the record 
links Hoskins’s possession or proximity to the guns described 
above to any shootings or any broader criminal design to murder 
PEOPLE v. WARE 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
26 
rivals.  Without more, no reasonable jury could find that such 
evidence proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Hoskins 
intended to agree to participate in a conspiracy to murder rival 
gang members.  
We turn, then, to the evidence concerning the August 27, 
2013, shooting of Byreese Taylor.  The Attorney General argues 
this evidence offers a concrete demonstration of Hoskins’s intent 
to play a part in the shooting of perceived rivals.  But here again, 
the record does not support this conclusion:  The prosecution 
presented no substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury 
could find that Hoskins intended to play any part in the shooting 
of Byreese Taylor.   
There was no substantial evidence that Hoskins was a 
direct participant in the shooting.  The evidence showed only 
that Hoskins and Hurst — who was arrested for and convicted 
of the Taylor shooting — were longtime friends, and that 
Hoskins had been in the passenger seat of Hurst’s vehicle at 
some unspecified point in the past.  The Court of Appeal in this 
case reasoned, and the Attorney General now argues, that a jury 
could have reasonably inferred Hoskins’s specific intent based 
on a photograph, taken on the morning of the shooting and 
posted later that day, showing Hoskins and another 5/9 Brim 
member standing in WCC territory and making gang signs.  
(Ware, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 942.)  The Court of Appeal 
considered it reasonable to infer from the photograph that 
Hoskins “knew of the shooting set to occur that evening.”  (Ibid.)  
The Attorney General, for his part, argues the photograph is 
probative of Hoskins’s intent because it was meant to lure 
victims for the upcoming shooting.  As the Attorney General 
interprets 
the 
photograph, 
Hoskins 
and 
his 
alleged 
coconspirator were trying to show that they were “not afraid to 
PEOPLE v. WARE 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
27 
go into their rival gang members’ territory” and “call[] out to 
rival Crips to come defend their territory and give the Hit Squad 
members an opportunity to shoot them.”  
The photograph in question could not reasonably have 
supported such an inference.  It was taken seven hours before 
the shooting and in a location more than a mile away.  Nothing 
about the photograph tends to establish that Hoskins or his 
alleged coconspirator was aware of the shooting in advance.  
And the Attorney General’s argument about the probative value 
of the photograph is highly speculative, requiring a number of 
inferential 
leaps — 
starting 
from 
the 
gang 
expert’s 
acknowledgement that “disrespect often require[s] retaliation” 
to an alleged plot to lure rivals, using social media, to a place 
where they would be murdered — to reach the conclusion that 
the photograph was part of a conspiracy to murder rivals by 
leading them into an ambush.  The prosecution’s gang expert 
did not testify, based on his experience and expertise, that a 
photograph of this sort might play the role of bait.  As a result, 
the jury would have had no substantial basis to conclude the 
photograph was intended to lure rival gang members to a 
location where they would be killed. 
Even if the prosecution had shown that posting the 
photograph constituted more than mere posturing, and was 
instead calculated to provoke a prompt in-person response, the 
prosecution also failed to introduce evidence sufficient to 
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the photograph 
was intended to lead to a deadly ambush, as opposed to any 
other form of confrontation.  Nor does the theory seem plausible 
in light of the evidence of how the Taylor shooting in fact 
occurred.  The evidence shows that on August 27, 2013, 5/9 Brim 
members were not waiting to ambush rival gang members after 
PEOPLE v. WARE 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
28 
luring them to a location where they would be murdered.  
Instead, Hurst and others drove into a different part of rival 
territory searching for someone to shoot, and when no one 
clearly announced themselves as a rival (let alone sought to 
defend their territory), they accidentally shot a nonrival.  The 
fact that no rival gang member was actually lured into a fight to 
defend the gang’s territory on August 27 tends to undermine the 
Attorney General’s argument that any such inference could 
reasonably be drawn from the photograph.  And indeed, despite 
the considerable volume of evidence introduced at trial about 
the activities of Brim members over the two-year period of the 
charged conspiracy, the prosecution identifies no other instance 
where Brims employed such a strategy.   
The evidence of Hoskins’s role after the August 27 
shooting does not alter this conclusion.  While Hoskins engaged 
in extensive online conversations with others about the shooting 
and Hurst’s arrest, none of those conversations indicated 
Hoskins knew of the shooting before it happened or played any 
role in the actual event.  To be sure, the evidence showed that 
Hoskins collaborated with Hurst’s girlfriend to pressure Taylor 
not to testify against Hurst, and his messages to Taylor were 
full of implicit threats.  But as a whole, the conversation 
demonstrates only that Hoskins was worried about his 
childhood friend and was planning to share paperwork 
suggesting that Taylor was “snitching.”  The prosecution never 
presented evidence that Hoskins or Hurst’s girlfriend entered 
into an agreement to kill Taylor.  The Attorney General suggests 
that the alleged witness intimidation is relevant because it 
“showed that Hoskins was trying to get his coconspirator Hurst 
out of custody and back on the streets where he could continue 
his role in the ongoing conspiracy.”  It would be reasonable for 
PEOPLE v. WARE 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
29 
the jury to infer the truth of the first part of that sentence:  that 
Hoskins was trying to help his childhood friend leave custody.  
But the inference that Hoskins’s efforts were in furtherance of a 
conspiracy to commit murder rests on mere speculation.  There 
is no evidence that Hoskins so much as discussed his efforts with 
other gang members.  And certainly nothing in Hoskins’s 
conversations concerning the shooting suggested the goal was to 
return Hurst to the streets specifically so he could murder rival 
gang members. 
We now turn to the final category of evidence presented 
against Hoskins:  his social media posts.  The posts offer ample 
evidence that Hoskins knew and approved of the alleged 
conspiracy’s goals.  For example, in February 2013, Hoskins 
posted a photograph of himself making the “Crip killer” hand 
sign with the caption:  “Spell it BicK NicK tell he really Bout his 
cK’s.”  In January 2014, he posted:  “Never BacK Down is the 
MuthafucKin motto!”  And in May 2014, he posted:  “Ganstas 
don’t flicK it with gigs they use em.”  There was also evidence 
that Hoskins knew of and celebrated some shootings soon after 
they happened.  For example, in April 2012, Hoskins posted:  
“Son was Born healthy. cKrossys got Hit, all I need is some Dro 
and my day is set lol #HappyEaster!”  At trial, the prosecution’s 
gang expert reasonably suggested that this post referred to a 
shooting, committed by 5/9 Brim members, of a rival Crips 
member — the “cKrossy[]” — several days earlier.  In another 
instance, Hoskins taunted a rival gang after one of their own 
was shot, writing in March 2014:  “That’s some gay sHit not 
Gansta yall getBacK taggin in the set?  That’s all yo DeadHomie 
worth?  That’s why I kall yall cKraBs.”  
The Attorney General argues that Hoskins intended to 
encourage the war by “glorifying and endorsing” the violence on 
PEOPLE v. WARE 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
30 
social media.  The posts do demonstrate that Hoskins approved 
of the violence, and perhaps even perceived some reputational 
benefit to himself from the gang’s success in its ongoing conflict 
with rivals.  But as we have noted, absent proof of intent to play 
some role in achieving the conspiracy’s unlawful goals, neither 
being a cheerleader nor passively accepting the benefits of 
others’ unlawful activities constitutes participation in a 
conspiracy.  And the Attorney General fails to point to evidence 
showing that Hoskins intended the posts to facilitate murder.  
There is no evidence in any of Hoskins’s posts of a plan to 
participate in any of the shootings that constituted the object of 
the conspiracy, nor is there evidence that such posts were 
directed to any alleged coconspirators (or that, as a whole, his 
Facebook posts were consistently viewable by those outside of 
his Facebook friend network). 
The prosecution had asserted at trial that Hoskins’s social 
media posts were particularly probative of his intent to 
participate 
in 
the 
conspiracy 
because 
Hoskins’s 
posts 
celebrating gang violence provided a revealing “window” into his 
mind.  As we consider the evidence on appeal, however, some 
caution is in order.  Social media is not a bedside diary; it is a 
platform for expression aimed at a particular audience.  (See, 
e.g., Packingham v. North Carolina (2017) 582 U.S. __ [137 S.Ct. 
1730, 1737] [“Social media allows users to gain access to 
information and communicate with one another about it on any 
subject that might come to mind”].)  Like any other form of 
public expression, social media posting may include an element 
of performance.  (Ibid. [analogizing social media websites to the 
“modern public square,” capable of “allow[ing] a person with an 
Internet connection to ‘become a town crier with a voice that 
resonates farther than it could from any soapbox’ ”].)  At the 
PEOPLE v. WARE 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
31 
same time, social media statements, like any other statement, 
may reflect the speaker’s state of mind, depending on their 
content and context.  Whether a statement actually reflects the 
speaker’s views or simply involves an element of performance or 
bravado are, of course, questions of fact for a jury to decide. 
Here, in any event, the question is not simply whether 
Hoskins approved of the violence of others, but whether his 
statements, taken with the other evidence as a whole, were 
sufficient to show he intended to conspire with others to commit 
murder.  On this score, the evidence falls short.  Indeed, as the 
prosecution’s own gang expert acknowledged, there could be 5/9 
Brim members who “strictly” display “Ck” or post about “Crip 
killing” on social media without ever actually killing Crips.  
Hoskins’s general celebration of gang violence on social media — 
with no evidence that he ever intended to play a role in 
committing any act of violence — is not enough to establish his 
participation in a conspiracy to commit murder.   
In sum, after considering the record in its entirety, we 
conclude that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to 
show that Hoskins had the requisite intent to participate in a 
conspiracy to kill rival gang members.  The evidence showed 
that Hoskins was an active member of a gang whose other 
members committed acts of violence, that he celebrated those 
acts of violence, and that he had access to weapons that he could 
use in furtherance of those acts, if he so chose.  The evidence 
unquestionably establishes Hoskins’s membership in a group 
with violent aims and his association with individuals who 
commit violent crimes.  But it is not sufficient to support a 
finding that Hoskins specifically intended to enter an agreement 
to commit murder, or that he specifically intended to commit 
murder, either personally or through others. 
PEOPLE v. WARE 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
32 
In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeal 
relied in the last instance on the fact that “the jury necessarily 
found the evidence of interdependence among the participants 
in the crimes to be persuasive, having found true all of the gang 
enhancements against all appellants.”  (Ware, supra, 52 
Cal.App.5th at p. 942.)  We draw a different lesson.  If anything, 
the likelihood the jury relied on evidence of interdependence 
between members of the 5/9 Brim gang underscores the risks of 
confusing gang membership with participation in a conspiracy 
to commit murder in a long-running, large-scale, nonspecific 
conspiracy like the one charged here.  If the prosecution had 
charged Hoskins with conspiracy to commit murder in 
connection with any particular incident allegedly part of this 
conspiracy, no reasonable jury could have found Hoskins guilty 
based on the evidence presented at trial.  At most, the 
prosecution would be able to rely on his membership in the gang, 
association with violent members, general glorification of 
violence on social media, and isolated behavior that had a 
speculative link to any particular incident.  But because the 
prosecution had alleged that Hoskins was part of a much 
broader conspiracy, it was permitted to introduce evidence 
connecting a number of disparate events across multiple years 
and tying Hoskins to two alleged coconspirators, both of whom 
were much more strongly implicated in particular acts of 
violence linked to the conspiracy.  (See id. at pp. 940–941.)  The 
risk of jury confusion makes it all the more vital for courts to 
carefully distinguish between evidence of mere membership in 
a gang embroiled in a violent rivalry, on the one hand, and 
evidence sufficient to support a conviction for conspiracy to 
commit murder, on the other.  
 
 
PEOPLE v. WARE 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
33 
III. 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     KRUGER, J. 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
GUERRERO, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Ware 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 52 Cal.App.5th 919 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S263923 
Date Filed:  December 1, 2022 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  San Diego 
Judge:  Leo Valentine, Jr. 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Nancy Olsen, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant 
and Appellant Nicholas Hoskins. 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler 
and Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Julie L. 
Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina, Steve 
Oetting and Christine L. Bergman, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Nancy Olsen 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 231153 
Encinitas, CA 92023-1153 
(760) 753-5206 
 
Christine L. Bergman 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 738-9159