Title: Moore v. Executive Office of the Trial Court

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12966 
 
DAPHNE MOORE  vs.  EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 7, 2020. - July 8, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Wendlandt, JJ. 
 
 
Trial Court.  Court Administrator.  Public Employment, 
Suspension.  Due Process of Law, Employment.  
Constitutional Law, Equal protection of laws. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on May 7, 2020. 
 
 
The case was heard by Kafker, J. 
 
 
 
John M. Thompson (Linda J. Thompson also present) for the 
plaintiff. 
 
Denise Tsai, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the 
defendant. 
 
 
 
BUDD, C.J.  The plaintiff, Daphne Moore, was suspended 
without pay from her position as an assistant clerk-magistrate 
in the Superior Court in Hampden County following her indictment 
on felony charges.  Moore sought relief from a single justice of 
this court arguing that the Executive Office of the Trial Court 
2 
 
(Trial Court) exceeded its statutory authority by acting 
pursuant to a provision of its personnel manual that mandated 
suspension without pay of employees charged with felonies; she 
was deprived of due process; and application of the Trial 
Court's suspension policy violated her right to equal protection 
of the laws.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the denial 
of Moore's petition for relief. 
 
Background.  Moore is an assistant clerk-magistrate in the 
Superior Court.  On December 20, 2018, a Federal grand jury 
indicted her on charges of conspiracy to possess and distribute 
narcotics, narcotics possession and distribution, money 
laundering conspiracy and money laundering, and making false 
statements to Federal officers.  See United States vs. Moore-
Bush, U.S Dist. Ct., No. 3:18-cr-30001-WGY-6 (D. Mass. Dec. 20, 
2018).  She was arrested the next day, and thereafter arraigned 
and released on her own recognizance pending further proceedings 
in the Federal court. 
Shortly thereafter, Moore was suspended without pay 
pursuant to § 16.600(B) of the Trial Court Personnel Policies 
and Procedures Manual (Manual), which provides in relevant part 
that a Trial Court employee who is the subject of a criminal 
complaint or indictment for a felony, including a felony not 
involving misconduct in office, "shall be suspended without pay 
until the conclusion of the criminal proceedings." 
3 
 
Moore requested and received a hearing, at which she was 
represented by counsel, before the clerk of the Superior Court 
in Hampden County and the Trial Court's deputy labor counsel.  
See Manual, §§ 16.401(B)(2) & 16.600(B).  Following the hearing, 
Moore submitted material relating to the underlying merits of 
and delays in the Federal criminal case against her.  The Trial 
Court affirmed Moore's suspension without pay pursuant to 
§ 16.600(B) of the Manual, concluding that she had offered no 
evidence to rebut the determination that she had been indicted 
for a felony not involving misconduct in office. 
Moore sought reconsideration of the decision, citing this 
court's order suspending a District Court judge with pay 
following the judge's indictment on Federal charges of 
obstruction of justice, the suspension of a Superior Court judge 
with pay following her arrest on charges of domestic violence, 
and the delays in Moore's own criminal trial as reasons favoring 
her reinstatement with pay.  The Trial Court again affirmed her 
suspension without pay.  Moore thereafter filed a petition for 
relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, in the county court.  A 
single justice denied relief without a hearing, and Moore 
appealed to the full court. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Statutory authority to promulgate 
suspension rule.  Moore contends that her suspension without pay 
was unauthorized because the bright-line rule in the Manual 
4 
 
mandating this outcome1 improperly strips the Court Administrator 
of the Trial Court (Court Administrator) of his or her 
discretionary decision-making authority conferred by statute.  
We disagree. 
As the "administrative head of the trial court," the Court 
Administrator is "responsible for the management of court 
personnel, facilities, administration, security, and court 
business."  G. L. c. 211B, § 9A, second & third pars.  Among 
other things, the Court Administrator is responsible for 
"establish[ing] and promulgat[ing] standards for the 
appointment, performance, promotion, continuing education and 
removal of all personnel within the trial court, except judges, 
clerks and registers of probate."2  G. L. c. 211B, § 8.  See 
 
1 Section 16.600(B) of the Trial Court Personnel Policies 
and Procedure Manual (Manual) provides in pertinent part: 
 
"An employee who is indicted for misconduct in office 
(G. L. c. 30, [§] 59) or who is the subject of a criminal 
complaint or indictment for a felony not involving 
misconduct in office, shall be suspended without pay until 
the conclusion of the criminal proceedings. . . .  The 
appointing authority must notify an employee who is 
suspended under this provision that the employee may ask to 
be heard on whether or not suspension is warranted, but 
such request shall not delay the imposition of the 
suspension.  Following disposition of the criminal case, an 
employee may be subject to disciplinary action consistent 
with this section." 
 
2 The exemption for "clerks" does not include assistant 
clerk-magistrates, such as Moore.  See Perullo v. Advisory Comm. 
on Personnel Standards, 476 Mass. 829, 835 (2017) ("it is clear 
 
5 
 
G. L. c. 211B, § 9A (iii) (Court Administrator shall "provide 
personnel management, including . . . establishment of system 
wide personnel policies").  In addition, the Court Administrator 
is authorized, "when necessary to ensure the proper 
administration of justice, . . . [to] impose discipline on such 
officers and employees, including dismissal and suspension with 
or without pay."  G. L. c. 211B, § 9A (xii). 
Read together,3 these statutory provisions confer upon the 
Court Administrator the power to establish standards for 
employee discipline, including standards for removal and 
suspension,4 as well as the power to implement and apply those 
 
to us that, in [G. L. c. 211B,] § 8, the Legislature has 
purposefully distinguished between 'clerks' and 'assistant 
clerks'"). 
 
3 Moore argues that the introductory clause of G. L. 
c. 211B, § 9A (xii), which states, "notwithstanding any general 
or special law to the contrary," precludes reliance on G. L. 
c. 211B, § 8, as a source of authority to issue standards 
governing discipline.  In our view, § 8 is consistent with, 
rather than contrary to, § 9A (xii). 
 
4 Moore argues that § 8 establishes the Court 
Administrator's authority to promulgate standards only for 
employee appointment, performance, promotion, continuing 
education, and removal, but not for employee suspension.  It 
would make little sense if the Court Administrator were 
empowered to define standards of employee conduct and 
performance, but not to establish standards of discipline short 
of removal for violation of those standards.  See, e.g., Tobin 
v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 377 Mass. 212, 214 (1979) 
(authority to remove court officer includes authority to 
suspend).  Cf. Fragopoulos v. Rent Control Bd. of Cambridge, 408 
Mass. 302, 304 (1990) (authority to deny application completely 
includes power to grant application subject to conditions). 
6 
 
standards to Trial Court employees, including assistant clerk-
magistrates like Moore.  See Malloch v. Hanover, 472 Mass. 783, 
791 (2015) ("We interpret separate sections of statutes as a 
whole, to produce internal consistency and to give a rational 
and workable effect" [quotations and citations omitted]). 
Moore argues that the suspension mandate found in 
§ 16.600(B) of the Manual is invalid because the inclusion in 
G. L. c. 211B, § 9A (xii), of the phrases "when necessary to 
ensure the proper administration of justice" and "with or 
without pay" limits the Court Administrator's rulemaking 
authority and requires an individualized, case-by-case 
assessment before an employee may be suspended without pay.  
However, nothing in the plain language of G. L. c. 211B, § 8 or 
§ 9A (xii), prohibits the Court Administrator from making a 
categorical judgment, as he implicitly did here, that the proper 
administration of justice requires the suspension of Trial Court 
employees without pay when they have been indicted for a felony, 
both felonies involving and those not involving misconduct in 
office.  See, e.g., American Hosp. Ass'n v. National Labor 
Relations Bd., 499 U.S. 606, 612 (1991) ("even if a statutory 
scheme requires individualized determinations, the decisionmaker 
has the authority to rely on rulemaking to resolve certain 
issues of general applicability unless [the Legislature] clearly 
expresses an intent to withhold that authority"); Massachusetts 
7 
 
Fine Wines & Spirits, LLC v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 
482 Mass. 683, 692 (2019) ("agency has discretion to design 
rules that can be broadly applied, sacrificing some measure of 
'fit' for administrability" [citation omitted]).  Cf. Borden, 
Inc. v. Commissioner of Pub. Health, 388 Mass. 707, 716, cert. 
denied sub nom. Formaldehyde Inst., Inc. v. Frechette, 464 U.S. 
936 (1983) (administrative agency has discretion to act by 
rulemaking or individual adjudication). 
The adoption of a mandatory policy requiring suspension 
without pay in the case of any felony indictment thus does not 
reflect an abdication, but rather the exercise, of the 
discretion granted to the Court Administrator by G. L. c. 211B, 
§ 9A (xii), to suspend a Trial Court employee without pay "when 
necessary to ensure the proper administration of justice."5  This 
is a reasonable rule of general applicability that is consistent 
with the statutory scheme and that ensures predictability and 
consistency in the imposition of Trial Court discipline when an 
 
5 That § 16.600(B) of the Manual reflects the Court 
Administrator's exercise of discretion to discipline Trial Court 
employees is further evidenced by the fact that that section 
distinguishes between criminal complaints involving felonies and 
those involving misdemeanors and establishes different 
procedures for the imposition of discipline.  While an employee 
charged with a felony must be suspended without pay, an employee 
"who is the subject of a criminal complaint involving a 
misdemeanor may be suspended without pay depending on the 
circumstances of the criminal complaint" (emphasis added).  
Manual, § 16.600(B). 
8 
 
employee faces serious charges of misconduct.  See Massachusetts 
Fine Wines & Spirits, LLC, 482 Mass. at 692 ("uniform, bright-
line rule" guiding agency enforcement of regulation avoids 
uncertainties).  See also Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 115 
(1977) ("When a governmental official is given the power to make 
discretionary decisions under a broad statutory standard, case-
by-case decisionmaking may not be the best way to assure 
fairness. . . .  The decision to use objective rules . . . 
provides [employees] with more precise notice of what conduct 
will be sanctioned and promotes equality of treatment among 
similarly situated [employees]").  Promulgation of § 16.600(B) 
of the Manual constitutes a permissible exercise of the Court 
Administrator's authority under G. L. c. 211B, §§ 8 and 
9A (xii), and Moore's suspension without pay upon the issuance 
of a Federal felony indictment was consistent with and mandated 
by its terms.  See Citizens for Responsible Envtl. Mgt. v. 
Attleboro Mall, Inc., 400 Mass. 658, 669 (1987) (actions taken 
pursuant to broad authority to effectuate statutory purposes 
command judicial deference).  See also Massachusetts Fed'n of 
Teachers, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Board of Educ., 436 Mass. 763, 776-777 
(2002) ("Where statutory language clearly authorizes actions 
taken by an agency, the actions are wholly lawful, and we need 
not look behind them to determine the agency's motives"). 
9 
 
2.  Due process claim.  Moore also argues that the 
mandatory suspension-without-pay provision of § 16.600(B) of the 
Manual is invalid because it violates her constitutional right 
to due process.  She asserts that, as a Trial Court employee, 
she has a property interest in her employment that prohibits her 
suspension absent an individualized determination that it is 
necessary to ensure the proper administration of justice.  In 
her view, the bright-line rule set forth by § 16.600(B) 
supplanted the constitutionally-required standard for 
suspensions from Trial Court employment and thereby "nullified" 
her procedural due process right to appropriate notice and 
opportunity to be heard.  We conclude that the single justice 
did not abuse his discretion or commit an error of law in 
finding that Moore was afforded constitutionally adequate 
procedures. 
The "threshold issue" in considering Moore's procedural due 
process claim is whether there is "a constitutionally protected 
property interest at stake."  Perullo v. Advisory Comm. on 
Personnel Standards, 476 Mass. 829, 840 (2017), quoting Mard v. 
Amherst, 350 F.3d 184, 188 (1st Cir. 2003).  Assuming, without 
deciding, that Moore has a property interest in continued 
employment free from suspension without pay, and that she is 
entitled to an appropriate level of due process protection 
10 
 
before that interest may be disrupted,6 we conclude that the 
Trial Court's procedures satisfied due process. 
"The fundamental requisite of due process is an opportunity 
to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."  
Matter of Kenney, 399 Mass. 431, 435 (1987).  But due process 
"is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the 
particular situation demands" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).  See Haverhill 
Manor, Inc. v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 368 Mass. 15, 24, 
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975) ("Due process is a protean 
concept which imports different procedures in different 
situations or circumstances").  To determine what process is 
due,7 we balance three factors:  "First, the private interest 
that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk 
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedure used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's 
interest [in the process it employs], including the function 
 
6 See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 
240 (1988) (bank president had property interest in continued 
employment free from arbitrary interference by regulating 
authority); Perullo, 476 Mass. at 840-841. 
 
7 Historically, we have "treated the procedural due process 
protections of the Massachusetts and United States Constitutions 
identically."  Matter of Powers, 465 Mass. 63, 80 n.18 (2013), 
quoting Hoffer v. Board of Registration in Med., 461 Mass. 451, 
454 n.5 (2012). 
11 
 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail."  
Gillespie v. Northampton, 460 Mass. 148, 156 (2011), citing 
Mathews, supra at 335. 
To begin, Moore has a significant interest in continued 
employment, and suspension without pay pending the resolution of 
a criminal matter may impose a substantial financial burden.  
See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543 
(1985).  Although suspension is less permanent than termination, 
the delays that often occur in criminal matters may render a 
suspension pursuant to § 16.600(B) of the Manual more like a 
termination than a suspension.  See Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 
924, 932 (1997) ("account must be taken of the length and 
finality of the deprivation" [quotation and citation omitted]).  
Indeed, Moore now has been suspended without pay for over two 
years while the Federal felony charges remain pending.  
Additionally, because § 16.600(B) of the Manual does not provide 
expressly for back pay upon a favorable disposition, Moore may 
not be made entirely whole even if the felony charges are later 
dismissed or otherwise resolved entirely in her favor.8 
 
8 On this point, we note the Trial Court represents in its 
brief that an employee would be entitled to seek back pay upon a 
favorable resolution of his or her case, which could be 
authorized in the Court Administrator's discretion. 
12 
 
Although we do not discount the difficulties Trial Court 
employees like Moore may face due to the loss of income pending 
resolution of criminal proceedings, there is limited risk of 
erroneous suspension without pay under § 16.600(B) of the 
Manual.  Moore's suspension was triggered by the issuance of a 
Federal felony indictment.  As we have explained, supra, the 
promulgation of § 16.600(B) of the Manual reflects the Court 
Administrator's reasonable determination that the fact of a 
felony indictment alone endangers the proper administration of 
justice and supports suspension without pay.  The return of an 
indictment itself "is an objective fact," which is independently 
verifiable and therefore less susceptible to error.  Federal 
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 244 (1988).  The 
return of a felony indictment also "establishes that an 
independent body has determined that there is probable cause" to 
believe that a serious crime has been committed, which 
"demonstrates that the suspension is not arbitrary."  Id. 
For these same reasons, we also conclude that additional 
procedures would be unlikely to afford Trial Court employees 
like Moore with greater protection than already provided in 
accordance with § 16.600(B) of the Manual.  See Dixon, 431 U.S. 
at 113-114 (low risk of erroneous deprivation of driver's 
license in absence of hearing where suspension and revocation of 
license is "largely automatic" under applicable regulations; 
13 
 
additional procedures "would not serve to protect any 
substantive rights").  Through the publication of the Manual, 
Moore was on notice of the consequences of a felony indictment.9  
She received notice that she was being suspended without pay as 
a result of the issuance of a felony indictment for misconduct 
not in office.  And she was given an opportunity to be heard and 
to correct any misunderstanding or mistake regarding the 
triggering fact of the felony indictment.10 
However, Moore argues that the Court Administrator must 
additionally consider the individual facts and circumstances in 
each case prior to determining that suspension without pay is 
necessary to guard the proper administration of justice.  This 
likely would require the Court Administrator to delve into the 
merits of the underlying felony indictment and make an 
independent assessment of the pending charges and the evidence, 
 
9 As relevant here, Trial Court employees also are notified 
that they can be subject to discipline for, among other things, 
"unauthorized use, sale, or possession of controlled substances, 
narcotics, or other drugs at any time," "violation of or failure 
to comply with Federal or State Constitution, statutes, or court 
rules and regulations," and "conduct, whether in the course of 
one's employment or otherwise, that tends to bring the court 
into disrepute or lessens public confidence in the 
administration of justice."  Manual, § 16.100(B) (6), (7) & (23) 
(examples of conduct warranting disciplinary action). 
 
10 For example, the mandatory suspension provision of 
§ 16.600(B) would not apply if evidence had been presented 
showing that the indictment was for a misdemeanor or that Moore 
was not herself the subject of the felony indictment. 
14 
 
which may not be available.  Due process does not require 
engaging in procedures that could create a significant risk of 
interference with a pending criminal matter and unduly and 
unnecessarily burden the Court Administrator.  Henderson v. 
Department of Veteran Affairs, 878 F.3d 1044, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 
2017) (where suspension was based on fact of indictment, 
government agency was not required to investigate employee's 
alleged criminal activity, which could "force a premature 
airing" of defenses [citations omitted]); Brown v. Department of 
Justice, 715 F.2d 662, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("mini-trial" not 
required and may interfere with ongoing criminal proceedings 
where suspension of employee based on fact of indictment). 
Finally, the Trial Court's interest in ensuring the 
integrity of its employees is of paramount importance.  The 
Trial Court has a substantial interest in maintaining public 
confidence in the judiciary, which is eroded when employees of 
the Trial Court are themselves indicted on felony charges, 
whether for conduct in or out of office.  See Gilbert, 520 U.S. 
at 932 ("State has a significant interest in immediately 
suspending, when felony charges are filed against them, 
employees who occupy positions of great public trust and high 
public visibility"). 
More generally, courts have long recognized "the 
government's legitimate purpose in promot[ing] efficiency and 
15 
 
integrity in the discharge of official duties, and [in] 
maintain[ing] proper discipline in the public service" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 
138, 150-151 (1983).  "To this end, the Government, as an 
employer, must have wide discretion and control over the 
management of its personnel and internal affairs.  This includes 
the prerogative to remove employees whose conduct hinders 
efficient operation and to do so with dispatch."  (Citation 
omitted.)  Id. at 151.  See Bessette v. Commissioner of Pub. 
Works, 348 Mass. 605, 608 (1965) ("It is the ascertainable and 
indisputable fact of the indictment, quite apart from guilt, 
that makes continuance in office unsuitable").  Additionally, 
while recognizing the financial burden that suspension without 
pay imposes upon Moore, "the government does not have to give an 
employee charged with a felony a paid leave at taxpayer 
expense."  Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 932. 
By mandating suspension without pay, § 16.600(B) of the 
Manual serves the Trial Court's important interest by remedying 
the "untenable situation" and damage to the public confidence 
that would arise if a Trial Court employee who has been indicted 
for felony misconduct continued to perform public duties at the 
taxpayer's expense.  See Benoit v. Boston, 477 Mass. 117, 122 
(2017) (discussing purpose of G. L. c. 268A, § 25, which 
mandates suspension without pay of any county, municipal, or 
16 
 
district officer or employee under indictment for misconduct in 
office).  See also Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. v. 
Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. Retirement Bd., 397 Mass. 734, 
739 (1986) (discussing purpose of G. L. c. 30, § 59, which 
mandates suspension without pay of any Commonwealth officer or 
employee under indictment for misconduct in office). 
 
Upon balancing these factors, we conclude that the single 
justice did not err in finding that the Trial Court's procedures 
satisfied due process. 
3.  Equal protection claims.  Finally, Moore asserts that 
she has been denied equal protection of the laws on two separate 
grounds.  She contends that similarly situated employees of the 
Supreme Judicial Court receive different consideration if 
indicted for alleged criminal conduct, and that she was treated 
differently from a District Court judge who was suspended with 
pay following her indictment on felony charges last summer. 
The "equal protection mandate is essentially a direction 
that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike" 
(quotation omitted).  Doe v. Acton-Boxborough Regional Sch. 
Dist., 468 Mass. 64, 75 (2014), citing Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).  See Opinion of the 
Justices, 332 Mass. 769, 779-780 (1955) ("Equal protection of 
the laws requires of course that all persons in the same 
17 
 
category and in the same circumstances be treated alike").11  It 
acts as a "shield against arbitrary classifications."  Enquist 
v. Oregon Dep't of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 598 (2008).  "An equal 
protection claim can only succeed if a plaintiff establishes 
that government action discriminates against similarly situated 
persons."  DuPont v. Commissioner of Correction, 448 Mass. 389, 
399 (2007).  We discern no equal protection violation under 
either of Moore's claims.12 
a.  Trial Court and Supreme Judicial Court employees.  
Section 10.6 of the Supreme Judicial Court Personnel Manual 
permits, but does not require, the suspension of employees 
without pay pending resolution of criminal charges against them, 
and this nonmandatory suspension provision applies whether the 
criminal charge is for a felony or a misdemeanor.  Moore argues 
that Supreme Judicial Court and Trial Court employees are 
situated similarly because both categories are court employees, 
 
11 We evaluate claims for equal protection under the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights consistently with claims 
under the Federal Constitution.  Brackett v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 
447 Mass. 233, 243 (2006). 
 
12 Although it is not entirely clear, Moore's reply brief 
contains an argument that may assert a separate equal protection 
claim based on race.  If that is her claim, it is one that has 
not been previously raised, and it therefore comes too late.  
See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy 
Facilities Siting Bd., 457 Mass. 663, 688 (2010).  In any event, 
such a claim would lack merit, because § 16.600(B) of the Manual 
creates no distinction on the basis of an employee's race or 
other protected status, either on its face or as applied. 
18 
 
and that the different, and more favorable, treatment of Supreme 
Judicial Court employees who have been charged with a criminal 
offense constitutes differential treatment that violates her 
right to equal protection.  This argument fails. 
The Supreme Judicial Court and the Trial Court are 
independent, separate legal entities, each operating under 
different statutory schemes, and each vested with distinct 
authority over the management of their own employees.13  That 
these two public employers have adopted different policies 
concerning employee management does not demonstrate that the 
Trial Court itself treats similarly situated employees 
differently.  Cf. Matthews v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 426 
Mass. 122, 130, 131 (1997) (employees not "similarly situated" 
for purposes of proving discrimination where not subject to the 
same disciplinary policies). 
Indeed, in exercising his discretion to promulgate 
employment policies by defining a standard for suspending 
without pay employees indicted for felony conduct unrelated to 
 
13 As the Trial Court notes and as we previously have 
recognized, the Court Administrator is the administrative head 
of a court system consisting of seven different departments 
operating in approximately one hundred court locations 
throughout the Commonwealth and employing about 6,000 people.  
See Anzalone v. Administrative Office of the Trial Court, 457 
Mass. 647, 659 (2010) (judicial notice taken of breadth of Trial 
Court); Annual Report on the State of the Massachusetts Court 
System Fiscal Year 2020 at 40 (number of Trial Court employees). 
19 
 
their office, the Court Administrator has ensured consistent 
treatment among Trial Court employees.  See Lopez v. Davis, 531 
U.S. 230, 244 (2001) ("case-by-case decisionmaking . . . could 
invite favoritism, disunity, and inconsistency"); Dixon, 431 
U.S. at 115 (exercise of discretion to use objective rules 
"promotes equality of treatment among similarly situated" people 
subject to rule). 
b.  Trial Court staff and Trial Court judges.  Separately, 
Moore compares her situation to that of District Court Associate 
Justice Shelley Joseph, who was suspended with pay following a 
Federal felony indictment.  Moore argues that, although both she 
and Judge Joseph face Federal felony indictments, only Judge 
Joseph received the benefit of an individualized assessment of 
whether she should be suspended with or without pay pursuant to 
this court's exercise of its superintendence authority.  See 
Matter of Joseph, Supreme Judicial Ct., No. OE-140 (Aug. 13, 
2019).  Moore argues that she too is entitled to an 
individualized assessment of the circumstances surrounding her 
case prior to a determination that suspension without pay is 
necessary.  Such a result is not compelled by equal protection 
principles. 
Despite the important role they play in the delivery of 
justice within our court system, assistant clerk-magistrates are 
not situated similarly to judges for the purposes of an equal 
20 
 
protection analysis.  Not only are judges bound by a different 
set of rules and responsibilities and subject to a different 
disciplinary scheme than are assistant clerk-magistrates, but 
the role of a judge in making judicial decisions is also "unique 
and singular."  Matter of Joseph, slip op. at 12 (Gants, C.J., 
concurring).  "The dissimilar treatment of dissimilarly situated 
persons does not violate equal protection" (quotation and 
citation omitted).  DuPont, 448 Mass. at 400, 402 (male and 
female inmates not similarly situated in relevant respects for 
purposes of equal protection claim). 
 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the 
single justice is affirmed. 
So ordered.