Title: Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce v. Evers

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2022 WI 38 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce,  
Muskego Area Chamber of Commerce and  
New Berlin Chamber of Commerce and Visitors 
Bureau, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Tony Evers, in his official capacity as Governor 
of Wisconsin, Karen Timberlake, in her official 
capacity as Interim Secretary of the Wisconsin 
Department of Health Services and Joel Brennan, 
in his official capacity as Secretary of the  
Wisconsin Department of Administration, 
          Defendants, 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 
          Intervenor-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
Reported at 398 Wis. 2d 164,960 N.W.2d 442 
PDC No:2021 WI App 35 - Published  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 7, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 14, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
Lloyd V. Carter   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY JJ., joined. 
ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROGGENSACK, 
and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-respondents-petitioners 
there 
were 
briefs filed by Ryan J. Walsh, Amy C. Miller, Scott E. Rosenow 
 
 
2 
and Eimer Stahl LLP, Madison and WMC Litigation Center, Madison. 
There was an oral argument by Scott E. Rosenow.  
 
For the intervenor-appellant there was a brief by Thomas C. 
Kamenick and the Wisconsin Transparency Project, Port Washington 
and Kamenick Law Office, LLC, Port Washington. There was an oral 
argument by Thomas C. Kamenick. 
 
For the defendants there was a brief filed by Clayton P. 
Kawski and Anthony D. Russomanno, assistant attorneys general, 
with whom on the brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. 
There was an oral argument by Clayton P. Kawski, assistant 
attorney general.  
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 38 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC 
(L.C. No. 
2020CV1389) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce, Muskego 
Area Chamber of Commerce and New Berlin Chamber 
of Commerce and Visitors Bureau, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Tony Evers, in his official capacity as 
Governor of Wisconsin, Karen Timberlake, in her 
official capacity as Interim Secretary of the 
Wisconsin Department of Health Services and 
Joel Brennan, in his official capacity as 
Secretary of the Wisconsin Department of 
Administration, 
 
          Defendants, 
 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 
 
          Intervenor-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
JUN 7, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  
ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROGGENSACK, 
and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
No. 
2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC   
 
1 
 
¶1 
REBECCA 
FRANK 
DALLET, 
J.   The 
Milwaukee 
Journal 
Sentinel made public records requests to the Department of 
Health Services (DHS) for certain documents related to the 
COVID-19 pandemic.  After learning that DHS planned to respond 
by releasing a list of "all Wisconsin businesses with over 25 
employees that have had at least two employees test positive for 
COVID-19 or that have had close case contacts that were 
investigated by contact tracers" and the number of such tests or 
contacts at each business, Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce 
and two other trade associations (WMC)1 brought an action seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief to stop the release.  The 
issue is whether the public records law's general prohibition on 
pre-release judicial review of decisions to provide access to 
public records bars WMC's claims.2  See Wis. Stat. § 19.356(1) 
(2019-20).3  We conclude that it does, and therefore affirm the 
court of appeals' decision.   
                                                 
1 The associations are the Muskego Area Chamber of Commerce 
and the New Berlin Chamber of Commerce and Visitors Bureau.  For 
ease of reference, we refer to all three groups collectively as 
"WMC." 
2 The parties' briefs also focused on the question of 
whether WMC has standing to assert its claims.  Although 
standing is relevant to whether a party may assert a declaratory 
judgment claim, see Fabick v. Evers, 2021 WI 28, ¶11, 396 
Wis. 2d 231, 956 N.W.2d 856, we resolve this case on other 
grounds and therefore assume without deciding that WMC has 
standing.  See Voters with Facts v. City of Eau Claire, 2018 WI 
63, ¶26, 382 Wis. 2d 1, 913 N.W.2d 131 (assuming plaintiffs had 
standing to assert their declaratory judgment claims while 
concluding that the complaint failed to state a claim).   
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version. 
No. 
2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC   
 
2 
 
I 
¶2 
As part of its response to the COVID-19 pandemic, DHS 
collected data and compiled a list of Wisconsin businesses with 
more than 25 employees that had two or more employees test 
positive for COVID-19 or that had close contacts investigated by 
contact tracers.4  The list includes the number of positive tests 
or contacts at those businesses.  Before releasing the list in 
response to the Journal Sentinel's public-records requests, DHS 
notified WMC of its plans.  This was a courtesy, as the parties 
agree that DHS was not statutorily required to notify WMC before 
releasing the records.   
¶3 
The day before the planned release, WMC filed suit in 
circuit court,5 naming DHS and a number of state officials as 
                                                 
4 The information contained in these records was apparently 
compiled based on data DHS obtained to investigate and report on 
public-health issues pursuant to its duties under Wis. Stat. 
chs. 250 and 252.  Those duties include "establish[ing] and 
maintain[ing] surveillance activities sufficient to detect any 
occurrence 
of 
acute, 
communicable 
or 
chronic 
diseases," 
"analyz[ing] occurrences, trends and patterns of" disease, and 
"distribut[ing] information based on the analyses."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 250.04(3)(a), (b)1.  DHS may obtain data in a number of 
different ways, including from local health officers or health 
care providers.  See Wis. Stat. § 252.05(1); Wis. Admin. Code 
DHS § 145.04(1)(a) (June 2018).  Laboratories are also required 
to report "specimen results that indicate that an individual 
providing 
the 
specimen 
has 
a 
communicable 
disease." 
 
§ 
252.05(2).  WMC does not challenge DHS's data-collection 
methods.   
5 The Honorable Lloyd V. Carter of the Waukesha County 
Circuit Court presided. 
No. 
2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC   
 
3 
 
defendants.6  WMC alleged that releasing the list would violate 
the patient health care records statutes, Wis. Stat. §§ 146.81 
and 
146.82, 
in 
two 
ways:  (1) 
it 
would 
allow 
for 
the 
identification of its member businesses' employees; and (2) the 
list is derived "from diagnostic test results and the records of 
contact tracers investigating COVID-19" and therefore must be 
kept 
confidential 
as 
a 
patient 
health 
care 
record.  
Additionally, WMC asserted that the public records law's common-
law balancing test weighs against disclosure, because releasing 
the list will injure the reputations of its member businesses 
and violate employees' privacy rights.  Nevertheless, WMC did 
not bring its case directly under either the patient health care 
records statutes or the public records law.  Instead, it brought 
its claims pursuant to the Declaratory Judgments Act, Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.04, requesting a declaration that DHS's planned release 
would be unlawful under either the patient health care records 
statutes or the public records law.  See Wis. Stat. § 806.04(2) 
(authorizing a party to "obtain a declaration of rights, status 
or other legal relations" under a statute).  WMC also sought an 
injunction barring the records' release.   
                                                 
6 Specifically, the complaint named Governor Evers, Andrea 
Palm (then the Secretary-Designee of DHS), and Joel Brennan (the 
Secretary of the Department of Administration).  While this case 
was on appeal, Karen Timberlake replaced Palm as the Secretary-
Designee of DHS, and, as a result, was substituted for Palm as a 
party.  We refer to these defendants collectively (along with 
DHS) as the State.    
No. 
2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC   
 
4 
 
¶4 
The circuit court granted a temporary restraining 
order halting the planned release of the list.  The State then 
moved to dismiss, as did the Journal Sentinel (which the circuit 
court had allowed to intervene).  They argued that WMC lacked 
standing and that its action was barred by 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.356(1), which generally prohibits pre-release judicial 
review of a decision to provide a requester with access to 
public records unless "otherwise provided by statute."  The 
circuit court denied the motions, concluding that § 19.356(1) 
did not apply to WMC's claims.  The circuit court also held that 
WMC had standing to challenge the release of the records under 
the Declaratory Judgments Act because it fell within the "zone 
of interests" protected by the patient health care records 
statutes.  Additionally, the circuit court granted WMC's motion 
for a temporary injunction preventing DHS from releasing the 
records.   
¶5 
The court of appeals granted the State's and the 
Journal Sentinel's petitions for leave to appeal the order 
denying their motions to dismiss7 and reversed the circuit 
court's decision.  Wis. Mfrs. & Com. v. Evers, 2021 WI App 35, 
                                                 
7 Shortly after the circuit court denied the State and 
Journal Sentinel's motions to dismiss, WMC filed a motion for 
leave to file an amended complaint.  Before the circuit court 
ruled on that motion, the State and Journal Sentinel filed their 
petitions for leave to file an interlocutory appeal.  The court 
of appeals granted those petitions, and WMC has not challenged 
that decision.  WMC's motion to amend remains pending in the 
circuit court and, on remand, that court must address whether to 
grant the motion.     
No. 
2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC   
 
5 
 
398 Wis. 2d 164, 960 N.W.2d 442.  The court of appeals held that 
WMC failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted 
because "the statutes on which [WMC] rel[ies] to support [its] 
declaratory judgment action 'do not give legal recognition to 
the interest' [it] assert[s]."  Id., ¶8 (alteration omitted) 
(quoting Moustakis v. DOJ, 2016 WI 42, ¶3 n.2, 368 Wis. 2d 677, 
880 N.W.2d 142).  Relatedly, the court of appeals rejected the 
argument that WMC had such a legally protected interest under 
various standing doctrines.  See id., ¶27.  The court of appeals 
also analyzed the patient health records statutes, noting WMC's 
concession that Wis. Stat. § 146.84(1)(c) provides a cause of 
action only to "an individual," not to WMC or its member 
businesses.  Id., ¶¶18-19.   
¶6 
WMC petitioned for review, challenging the merits of 
the court of appeals' decision.  It did not seek review of the 
court of appeals' decision granting the State's and Journal 
Sentinel's petitions for leave to file an interlocutory appeal.  
We granted WMC's petition.   
II 
¶7 
We review de novo a lower court's decision to grant or 
deny a motion to dismiss.  State ex rel. City of Waukesha v. 
City of Waukesha Bd. of Rev., 2021 WI 89, ¶11, 399 Wis. 2d 696, 
967 N.W.2d 460.  In doing so, we take as true all well-pleaded 
factual allegations, but do not accept legal conclusions as 
true.  Data Key Partners v. Permira Advisers LLC, 2014 WI 86, 
¶19, 356 Wis. 2d 665, 849 N.W.2d 693.  Our analysis also 
No. 
2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC   
 
6 
 
requires us to interpret statutes.  Statutory interpretation is 
a question of law we review de novo.  City of Waukesha, 399 
Wis. 2d 696, ¶12.    
III 
A 
¶8 
We begin with some background principles about the 
public records law.  The public records law provides a requester 
with the right "to inspect any record," "[e]xcept as otherwise 
provided by law."  Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a).  Public records are 
thus 
presumptively 
open 
for 
inspection 
unless 
there 
are 
statutory or common law exceptions to disclosure, and public 
access may be withheld "only in an exceptional case."  Wis. 
Stat. § 19.31; Linzmeyer v. Forcey, 2002 WI 84, ¶¶10-11, 254 
Wis. 2d 306, 646 N.W.2d 811.  Once a request is made, it must be 
responded to or denied "as soon as practicable and without 
delay."  § 19.35(4)(a).  The decision of whether to permit 
public access to a record in response to a request lies with the 
custodian of the record, not its subject.  See State ex rel. 
Bilder v. Township of Delevan, 112 Wis. 2d 539, 558, 334 
N.W.2d 252 (1983).    
¶9 
Related to that premise is the general rule under Wis. 
Stat. § 19.356(1) that "no person is entitled to judicial review 
of the decision of an authority to provide a requester with 
access to a record."  See Wis. Stat. § 19.356(1); see also 
Moustakis, 368 Wis. 2d 677, ¶24.  That rule was adopted by the 
legislature in response to our decisions in Woznicki v. 
No. 
2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC   
 
7 
 
Erickson, 202 Wis. 2d 178, 549 N.W.2d 699 (1996), and Milwaukee 
Teachers' Education Association v. Milwaukee Board of School 
Directors, 227 Wis. 2d 779, 596 N.W.2d 403 (1999), which held 
that public employees had a common-law right to notice and pre-
release judicial review before records concerning them could be 
released.  See Moustakis, 368 Wis. 2d 677, ¶27.    
¶10 Although § 19.356(1) generally prohibits pre-release 
notice or judicial review of a response to a public records 
request, there are exceptions.  Three are enumerated in 
§ 19.356(2)(a)1.-3., and apply to certain categories of records 
regarding public employees or records "obtained by the authority 
through a subpoena or search warrant."  § 19.356(2)(a)2.  These 
exceptions were enacted to "limit the rights afforded by 
[Woznicki and Milwaukee Teachers] 'only to a defined set of 
records 
pertaining 
to 
employees 
residing 
in 
Wisconsin.'"  
Moustakis, 368 Wis. 2d 677, ¶27 (quoting 2003 Wis. Act. 47, 
Joint Legis. Council Prefatory Note).  In addition to the 
specific exceptions, Wis. Stat. § 19.356(1) also contains a 
catchall 
exception, 
providing 
that 
notice 
or 
pre-release 
judicial review may also be available when "otherwise provided 
by statute."  Id. 
B 
¶11 Turning to this case, WMC offers two reasons why the 
general prohibition on pre-release judicial review of a response 
to a public records request does not apply to its claims at all. 
First, it argues that pre-release judicial review is almost 
No. 
2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC   
 
8 
 
always available under the Declaratory Judgments Act.  Second, 
it claims that § 19.356(1) did not eliminate the common-law 
right to pre-release judicial review. 
1 
¶12 WMC argues that the general prohibition against pre-
release 
judicial 
review 
in 
§ 19.356 
does 
not 
apply 
to 
declaratory judgment claims because, if it does, WMC has no 
statutory remedy for improper disclosures of public records.  
Typically, a declaratory judgment claim is available when a 
statute does not provide for an equally "speedy, effective, and 
adequate" remedy.  See Lister v. Bd. of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 
307–08, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976); see also Lamar Cent. Outdoor, LLC 
v. DOT, 2008 WI App 187, ¶19, 315 Wis. 2d 190, 762 N.W.2d 745.  
Conversely, a party may not bring a declaratory judgment claim 
when the remedy provided by statute is "at least as well-suited 
to the plaintiff's needs as declaratory relief."  See Lister, 72 
Wis. 2d at 307–08.  In WMC's view, § 19.356 provides an adequate 
remedy only to the "three narrow categories" of individuals 
specified in § 19.356(2)(a)1.-3., since they are expressly 
entitled to pre-release judicial review.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.356(2)(a)1.-3. 
(providing 
for 
pre-release 
notice 
and 
judicial review when certain employment records or records 
obtained via subpoena or search warrant are about to be 
released).  WMC asserts that, by contrast, § 19.356 provides 
nothing for anyone——including WMC——who falls outside those three 
No. 
2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC   
 
9 
 
narrow categories.8  Thus, relying on Lister and Lamar Central, 
WMC argues that a declaratory judgment claim must be available 
to everyone who falls outside of § 19.356(2)(a).  Otherwise they 
would have no remedy, let alone an adequate one.   
¶13 Neither 
Lister 
nor 
Lamar 
Central 
support 
WMC's 
position, however.  In both of those cases, the plaintiffs 
attempted to enforce an underlying right through a declaratory 
judgment action even though a statute provided an exclusive 
procedure for enforcing that right.  See Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 
307-09 (right to collect debts from state agencies); Lamar Cent. 
Outdoor, 315 Wis. 2d 190, ¶24 (right to challenge a DOT order to 
remove roadside signs).  The question in both cases was thus 
whether the statute's exclusive enforcement procedure barred 
declaratory judgment claims premised on that underlying right.  
See Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 307-09; Lamar Cent. Outdoor, 315 
Wis. 2d 190, ¶¶32–33.  Section 19.356(1) is different.  It 
states a general rule that no one has the right to a particular 
remedy——pre-release 
judicial 
review——and 
then 
enumerates 
exceptions to that rule.  See Wis. Stat. § 19.356(1), (2)(a)1.-
3.  Thus, § 19.356 makes clear that no one has a right to block 
the release of a public record unless otherwise specified.  
                                                 
8 There appears to be tension between this argument and 
WMC's alternative argument that the Declaratory Judgments Act is 
a statute that "otherwise provide[s]" for pre-release judicial 
review under § 19.356, and thus (if WMC is correct) provides 
them with a remedy.   
No. 
2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC   
 
10 
 
Because there is no underlying right to pre-release judicial 
review, the analysis in Lister and Lamar Central is inapposite.9  
2 
¶14 WMC's second argument, that § 19.356(1) did not 
clearly abrogate the common law rules for pre-release notice and 
judicial review, also fails.  This argument took several forms 
throughout this case, but we understand WMC to be arguing that 
§ 19.356 did not eliminate the common law rights to pre-release 
notice and judicial review that we recognized in Woznicki and 
Milwaukee Teachers.  See Moustakis, 368 Wis. 2d 677, ¶27 
(explaining that Woznicki and Milwaukee Teachers "held that 
public employees were entitled to notice and to seek pre-release 
judicial review of the response to records requests pertaining 
to them").  WMC contends that § 19.356 applies only to the kinds 
of employment records that were at issue in those cases.  
                                                 
9 This is also why we reject WMC's related argument that 
reading § 19.356(1) to bar its claims would mean that § 19.356 
"implicitly repeal[ed]" the Declaratory Judgments Act.  See 
Heaton v. Larsen, 97 Wis. 2d 379, 392-93, 294 N.W.2d 15 (1980) 
("Repeals by implication are not favored in the law." (quoting 
another 
source)). 
 
This 
argument 
is 
underdeveloped 
and 
confusing, but so far as we can tell, WMC argues that any time a 
statute precludes declaratory relief, that is the same as 
partially "repealing" the Declaratory Judgments Act.  WMC cites 
no authority for this novel claim.  And, in any event, § 19.356 
did not partially repeal the Declaratory Judgments Act——
implicitly or otherwise.  As explained above, by adopting 
§ 19.356, the legislature expressly limited the right to pre-
release judicial review.  In doing so, it did not alter the 
Declaratory Judgments Act in any way. 
No. 
2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC   
 
11 
 
Because WMC's claims do not involve those kinds of records, it 
concludes that § 19.356 does not apply.    
¶15 Section 19.356(1), however, clearly and unambiguously 
abrogated the common law rights created in Woznicki and 
Milwaukee Teachers.  See United Am., LLC v. DOT, 2021 WI 44, 
¶15, 397 Wis. 2d 42, 959 N.W.2d 317.  The statute provides in no 
uncertain terms that "[e]xcept as authorized in this section or 
as otherwise provided by statute . . . no person is entitled to 
judicial review of the decision of an authority to provide a 
requester with access to a record."  Section 19.356 does not 
distinguish between different categories of individuals or 
records; it states a general rule that applies to all claims for 
pre-release 
judicial 
review 
and 
provides 
two 
types 
of 
exceptions.  The first are those contained in § 19.356(2)-(9), 
and allow for pre-release notice and judicial review when the 
types of records at issue in Woznicki and Milwaukee Teachers are 
involved, subject to heightened rules and expedited procedures.  
The second exception is for all other instances in which a 
statute 
"otherwise 
provide[s]" 
for 
pre-release 
notice 
or 
judicial review.  This statutory language——a general prohibition 
subject to statutorily enumerated exceptions——cannot coexist 
with a common-law entitlement to pre-release notice or judicial 
review.  Therefore, we hold that § 19.356(1) clearly and 
unambiguously eliminated the common-law rights on which WMC 
relies.   
No. 
2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC   
 
12 
 
C 
¶16 Anticipating our conclusion that § 19.356(1) applies 
to the claims it asserts in this case, WMC argues that the 
Declaratory Judgments Act, Wis. Stat. § 806.04, falls within the 
exception to § 19.356(1) for statutes that "otherwise provide[]" 
for pre-release judicial review of records responses.  We reject 
this claim because it is contrary to the text of both the Act 
itself and § 19.356.   
¶17 To begin with, the text of the Declaratory Judgments 
Act is broadly applicable and looks nothing like the other 
statutes where the legislature has specifically authorized 
actions to block an impending release of records.  The 
Declaratory 
Judgments 
Act 
states 
generally 
that 
"[a]ny 
person . . . whose rights, status or other legal relations are 
affected by a statute . . . may have determined any question of 
construction 
or 
validity 
arising 
under 
the . . . statute . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, 
status, or other legal relations thereunder."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.04(2).  It provides a means "to settle and to afford 
relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, 
status and other legal relations."  Wis. Stat. § 806.04(12).  In 
contrast, 
the 
legislature 
has 
adopted 
several 
statutes 
specifically creating a right to block the release of certain 
types of records.  For example, the parties agree that Wis. 
Stat. § 146.84(1)(c) authorizes a patient to obtain pre-release 
judicial review when their confidential health records are in 
danger of being released.  See Wis. Stat. § 146.84(1)(c) ("An 
No. 
2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC   
 
13 
 
individual may bring an action to enjoin any violation" of 
certain confidentiality provisions).10  Similarly, Wis. Stat. 
§§ 51.30(9)(c), 46.90(9)(c), 55.043(9m)(c), and 196.135 also 
explicitly provide for injunctive relief barring the release of 
records.  E.g., § 51.30(9)(c) (providing that "[a]n individual 
may bring an action to enjoin any violation of this section," 
which generally prohibits the disclosure of certain types of 
medical treatment records).  Section 196.135 is even more 
direct, expressly referencing § 19.356 and authorizing both pre-
release notice and an opportunity for judicial review of a 
planned records response.  See § 196.135(4)(b).   
¶18 Unlike these statutes, the Declaratory Judgments Act 
does not explicitly authorize an action to enjoin the release of 
a record.  Indeed, it says nothing at all about records.  As 
explained above, however, other statutes address the issue, 
strongly suggesting that the Act is not a statute that 
"otherwise provide[s]" for pre-release judicial review.  See 
Rudolph v. Indian Hills Estates, Inc., 68 Wis. 2d 768, 775, 229 
N.W.2d 671 (1975) (concluding that the Declaratory Judgments Act 
did not provide a claim for the dissolution of a corporation 
                                                 
10 Although WMC alleges that DHS's planned release of its 
list of employers would violate the patient health care records 
statutes, it concedes that it cannot rely on those statutes to 
obtain pre-release judicial review here because it is not an 
"individual" authorized to seek injunctive relief under § 
146.84(1)(c).  See § 146.84(1)(c) (referring to violations of §§ 
142.82 and 142.83, both of which protect "patients"; in turn, 
"patient" is defined in § 146.81(3) as "a person who receives 
health care services from a health care provider"). 
No. 
2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC   
 
14 
 
where such actions were already expressly provided for in other 
statutes).   
¶19 Moreover, concluding that the Declaratory Judgments 
Act "otherwise provide[s]" for pre-release judicial review of a 
public records response would effectively repeal § 19.356(1).  
As discussed previously, the legislature enacted § 19.356 to 
limit the rights to pre-release notice and judicial review that 
this court created in Woznicki and Milwaukee Teachers.11  See 
Moustakis, 368 Wis. 2d 677, ¶27.  Although those rights may have 
been enforceable via a declaratory judgment action while they 
existed, 
the 
legislature 
abrogated 
them 
when 
it 
adopted 
§ 19.356.  WMC cannot use the Act to circumvent either § 19.356 
or the other statutorily authorized routes for obtaining that 
review.     
¶20 Additionally, WMC's interpretation gives no effect to 
other statutes, such as those cited above, that allow for 
injunctive relief against records releases.  See State ex rel. 
Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 ("Statutory language is read where 
possible to give reasonable effect to every word, in order to 
avoid surplusage.").  That is, if the Declaratory Judgments Act 
                                                 
11 The Joint Legislative Council's prefatory note to 2003 
Wis. Act 47 confirms this conclusion, explaining that § 19.356 
"applies the rights afforded by Woznicki and Milwaukee Teachers' 
only to a defined set of records pertaining to employees 
residing in Wisconsin."  See also Moustakis, 368 Wis. 2d 677, 
¶27 n.17 ("Legislative history may be consulted to confirm a 
plain meaning interpretation.").   
No. 
2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC   
 
15 
 
generally provides for pre-release judicial review, then there 
would be no reason for the legislature to have also specifically 
authorized such review in narrower contexts elsewhere in the 
statutes.  Indeed, WMC's position would undo the legislature's 
choice 
to 
preclude 
pre-release 
judicial 
review 
in 
most 
circumstances.   
¶21 Accordingly, we hold that the Declaratory Judgments 
Act does not "otherwise provide[]" for pre-release judicial 
review of records responses.  See § 19.356(1).   
IV 
¶22 In conclusion, we affirm the court of appeals' 
decision and hold that WMC's complaint fails to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted because its claim is barred by 
§ 19.356(1).   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
Nos.  2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC.akz 
 
1 
 
¶23 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   (dissenting).  I 
dissent because the majority errs in affirming the court of 
appeals' decision dismissing this case.  The court of appeals 
also erred in accepting the interlocutory appeal.  In so doing, 
the court of appeals perpetuated the premature dismissal of this 
case.  The court of appeals, and now this court, fails to 
consider the fact that a motion to amend the pleadings was 
pending before the circuit court.  The majority errs by 
affirming the dismissal of this case and does so with little 
analysis of the serious implications of its decision.  The State 
is prepared to release individuals' personal medical information 
to the public.  The law allows for such a release to be 
challenged.  The majority instead engages in a monocular view of 
one statute and makes no mention of the perhaps unintended 
consequences of its action.  It closes the courthouse doors to 
anyone who may wish to challenge the release of personal medical 
information.  This is egregious error. 
¶24 The majority, like the court of appeals, fails to 
properly 
consider 
the 
procedural 
posture 
of 
this 
case.  
Unfortunately, 
this 
error 
has 
great 
significance 
to 
the 
individuals whose personal and confidential medical information 
will be released.  As a result of the majority's error, the 
names of businesses that have had employees who tested positive 
for COVID-19, and the number of employees who tested positive 
will be published.  Significantly, private patient files that 
are confidential by law, may become public records subject to 
the public records law, and if the government has gathered 
Nos.  2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC.akz 
 
2 
 
personal medical information, the confidential status of that 
information is gone and cannot be challenged.  The damage that 
will be done by public disclosure of private information is 
irreparable.  
¶25 This case was merely at the pleadings stage in the 
circuit court, with a motion to amend the pleadings pending, 
when the court of appeals took the unusual step of granting 
interlocutory 
appeal 
over 
these 
non-final 
pleadings 
and 
determining essentially that these private confidential patient 
files are indeed public records and their release cannot be 
challenged by anyone.  The court of appeals' decision should be 
reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court so that the 
circuit court can consider whether to allow the pleadings to be 
amended.  To dismiss this case at this juncture is error and 
interlocutory intervention was error. 
¶26 The majority's exceedingly short analysis in this case 
makes little to no reference to the procedural posture of the 
case and the pending motion to amend the pleadings below.  The 
majority claims that it resolves the case on grounds other than 
standing 
and 
therefore 
assumes 
without 
deciding 
that 
petitioners, Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce, Muskego Area 
Chamber of Commerce, and New Berlin Chamber of Commerce and 
Visitors 
Bureau 
(collectively, 
"the 
Associations") 
have 
standing.  See majority op., ¶1 n.2.  The majority focuses on 
one public records statute in its analysis.  The majority claims 
that the general prohibition against pre-release judicial review 
found in Wis. Stat. § 19.356 does not apply to declaratory 
Nos.  2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC.akz 
 
3 
 
judgment claims because the Associations have no statutory 
remedy for violations of the public records law.  The majority 
concludes that § 19.356's language is clear that no one has a 
right to block the release of a public record unless otherwise 
specified.  The majority makes no mention of the individuals' 
confidential medical information that is at stake.  The majority 
does 
not 
consider 
the 
amended 
pleadings 
below 
wherein 
individuals 
make 
this 
claim. 
 
The 
majority 
gives 
no 
consideration to the fact that a class action of those 
individuals could make a claim if allowed by amended pleading.   
¶27 To be clear, the implications of the majority's 
conclusions are sweeping.  Shortly after the outbreak of  
COVID-19, on July 1, 2020, media outlets reported that Governor 
Evers and his then-Secretary of Health Palm planned to publish 
names of all Wisconsin businesses that had recorded at least two 
COVID-19 cases.  M.D. Kittle, "Breaking:  Evers' DHS Outing 
Businesses with COVID Cases," Empower Wisconsin (July 1, 2020), 
https://empowerwisconsin.org/breaking-evers-dhs-outing-
businesses-with-covid-cases/.  A number of businesses and the 
Associations sent a letter to the State explaining that 
releasing such information, even in response to a public records 
request, would violate statutory and constitutional provisions.  
The State then determined it would not publish the information.   
¶28 Later that month the State changed its position and 
decided to release the names of over 1,000 employers across 
Wisconsin who had at least two employees test positive for 
COVID-19 or close contacts investigated by contact tracers.  On 
Nos.  2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC.akz 
 
4 
 
the heels of that announcement, the Associations filed an 
initial complaint with the circuit court and moved for a 
temporary restraining order and temporary injunction.  The 
circuit court issued the temporary restraining order and set a 
motion hearing.  At the hearing, the Journal Sentinel was 
granted status to intervene.  Both the State and the Journal 
Sentinel moved to dismiss the complaint.  On October 23, 2020, 
the Associations filed a first amended complaint and a combined 
brief opposing dismissal and supporting temporary injunction. 
¶29 In the first amended complaint the Associations 
alleged that the State planned the release of this sensitive 
information and the business names and the number of known or 
suspected COVID-19 cases.  The allegations were that there were 
more than 1,000 employers that met the State's criteria.  The 
Associations alleged that the information the State planned to 
release was derived from diagnostic test results and the records 
of contract tracers investigating COVID-19.  The Associations 
alleged that the information about whether an employee of a 
facility had tested positive for COVID-19 could come only from 
that individuals' medical records and that the State sought 
release of medical diagnostic tests conducted on numerous 
individuals.  In addition, the Associations alleged that 
releasing 
a 
patient's 
employer's 
name 
would 
permit 
identification of the patient because the employer's name is 
patient identifiable data.  The Associations alleged that given 
the relatively small number of employees in any facility, it 
would not be difficult for coworkers or community members to 
Nos.  2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC.akz 
 
5 
 
discern the identity of the employee or employees who tested 
positive for COVID-19.  The allegations were that the State 
originally obtained the medical records for the purpose of 
communicable disease surveillance and that responding to a 
public records request is not communicable disease surveillance.  
The Associations alleged that the release of confidential 
medical information of these employees would violate their right 
to privacy and unfairly harm the reputation of the Associations' 
members.  The first amended complaint alleged irreparable harm.  
The Associations further alleged that its members are Wisconsin 
taxpayers, and that the plan to collect, review, and release 
this confidential medical information is an unlawful expenditure 
of public funds thus exposing the State to liability to be paid 
out of the public fisc. 
¶30 On December 4, 2020, the circuit court entered orders 
denying the pending motions to dismiss and granting the 
Associations' motion for a temporary injunction.  Thus, the 
Associations succeeded at the circuit court level.  The case 
proceeded under the course of normal litigation.   
¶31 Importantly, on December 12, 2020, the Associations 
filed the motion for leave to file a second amended complaint 
along with the proposed second amended complaint.  The second 
amended complaint added claims from two anonymous individuals 
who tested positive for COVID-19 at the relevant time and who 
are and have been employees of a public-facing Wisconsin 
business with over 25 employees, which business had at least two 
individuals who tested positive for COVID-19.  The individual 
Nos.  2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC.akz 
 
6 
 
plaintiffs sought an injunction under Wis. Stat. § 146.84(1)(c).  
Section 146.84(1)(c) allows "individual[s]" to "enjoin any 
violation of s. 146.82 or 146.83 [regulating confidentiality of 
healthcare records] or to compel compliance with s. 146.82 or 
146.83 . . . ."  As the majority correctly identifies, this 
language allows individuals to obtain injunctive relief prior to 
disclosure of health care information, notwithstanding any 
limitations in Wis. Stat. § 19.356 on pre-disclosure relief.  
See majority op., ¶¶16-17.  If the individuals' claims were 
permitted to proceed at the circuit court, they could have 
represented all individuals affected statewide in a class 
action. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 803.08(1) 
(describing 
the 
prerequisites for obtaining class certification); Mussallem v. 
Diners' Club, Inc., 69 Wis. 2d 437, 445, 230 N.W.2d 717 (1975) 
("[I]t [is] in the public interest as declared by the 
legislature to permit class actions in those cases which meet 
the [statutory] criteria . . . .").   
¶32 There is no indication that the Associations' motion 
to amend was improper, untimely, or in any way outside the 
normal course of behavior in civil cases.  It was filed at the 
very beginning of litigation, before the parties had engaged in 
any discovery and the defendants had developed any reliance on 
the nature of the complaint.  The most significant amendment was 
adding new parties; the facts and the legal claim did not 
change.  At the time the motion to amend was filed, the 
Associations were facing no court order mandating dismissal, nor 
a pending motion to dismiss.  There are no signs of gamesmanship 
Nos.  2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC.akz 
 
7 
 
on the part of the Associations and no indication of unfairness 
to the defendants.   
¶33 Under Wis. Stat. § 802.09, it is the established 
policy of this state that leave to amend pleadings must be 
"freely given at any stage of the action when justice so 
requires."  § 802.09(1).  Like most American courts, we rejected 
long ago highly formalistic and technical pleading procedures.  
We abandoned a prior system that punished unknowing plaintiffs 
for minor procedural errors with outright dismissal on the 
merits.  Korkow v. General Cas. Co. of Wis., 117 Wis. 2d 187, 
193, 344 N.W.2d 108 (1984).  Now, pleadings are intended to 
provide the defendant "reasonable notice . . . [of] the nature 
of the claim," not as a means to set legal minefields and 
dismiss valid lawsuits.  CED Properties, LLC v. City of Oshkosh, 
2014 WI 10, ¶21, 352 Wis. 2d 613, 843 N.W.2d 382.  The first and 
foremost goal of the pleading stage is to encourage resolution 
of the case on the merits.  Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181-82 
(1962) ("It is too late in the day and entirely contrary to the 
spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [on which 
Wisconsin rules of civil procedure are modeled] for decisions on 
the 
merits 
to 
be 
avoided 
on 
the 
basis 
of 
such 
mere 
technicalities.").  There is a strong preference for permitting 
amendments to a complaint, and § 802.09 is "liberally construed 
to permit the amendment of the pleadings so as to present the 
entire controversy."  Tri-State Home Improvement Co., Inc. v. 
Mansavage, 77 Wis. 2d 648, 658, 253 N.W.2d 474 (1977).  
Nos.  2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC.akz 
 
8 
 
¶34 After the Associations had successfully defeated the 
motions to dismiss and had filed a valid motion to amend, the 
Journal Sentinel filed a petition for leave to appeal the 
circuit court's order denying its motion to dismiss.  The State 
also filed a petition for leave to appeal the circuit court's 
orders denying its motion to dismiss and granting the temporary 
injunction.  The Associations opposed the petitions for leave 
noting that given the pending motion to amend the complaint, an 
interlocutory appeal would not serve to dispose of the case.  
Given our liberal pleading standards, the Associations knew they 
had a right to have their claims heard on the merits; they 
complied with standard civil practice, and the defendants were 
not in any way prejudiced or deprived of adequate notice.   Tri-
State Home Improvement, 77 Wis. 2d at 658; Hess v. Fernandez, 
2005 WI 19, ¶23, 278 Wis. 2d 283, 692 N.W.2d 655 (explaining 
that a defendant can overcome the preference for amendments by 
demonstrating "undue delay, [dilatory] motive, and prejudice" 
(citing Foman, 371 U.S. at 182)).   
¶35 While decisions to grant or deny temporary injunctions 
are frequently reviewed on interlocutory appeal, e.g., Werner v. 
A.L. Grootemaat & Sons, Inc., 80 Wis. 2d 513, 259 N.W.2d 310 
(1977), interlocutory appeal of denials of motions to dismiss, 
routine motions that proliferate common civil practice, are 
highly restricted.  The court has recognized that granting 
interlocutory appeal for non-orders are permitted only in 
"special circumstances," given that they carry "considerable 
disadvantages."  Heaton v. Larsen, 97 Wis. 2d 379, 395-96, 294 
Nos.  2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC.akz 
 
9 
 
N.W.2d 15 (1980); State v. Jendusa, 2021 WI 24, ¶20, 396 
Wis. 2d 34, 955 N.W.2d 777.  Interlocutory appeals are "inimical 
to the effective and fair administration [of the judicial 
system]" and encourage "piecemeal litigation."  State v. Jenich, 
94 Wis. 2d 74, 80, 288 N.W.2d 114 (1980); see also Firestone 
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981) 
(explaining that requiring a final judgment prior to appeal 
"emphasizes the deference that appellate courts owe to the trial 
judge as the individual initially called upon to decide the many 
questions of law and fact that occur in the course of a trial," 
prevents 
"piecemeal 
appeals 
[which] 
would 
undermine 
the 
independence of the district judge," and avoids "the obstruction 
to just claims that would come from permitting the harassment 
and cost of a succession of separate appeals from the various 
rulings to which a litigation may give rise, from its initiation 
to entry of judgment").   
¶36 Despite the Associations having a well-established 
right to have their motion to amend reviewed, and favorably 
considered, the court of appeals granted the petitions for leave 
to appeal, consolidated the appeals, and set the case for 
accelerated briefing.  Thus, the court of appeals chose to opine 
on the sufficiency of a complaint that, in all likelihood, had 
no remaining importance in the dispute.  Once a complaint is 
amended, the allegations and claims in the original complaint 
have no legal effect.  See Holman v. Family Health Plan, 227 
Wis. 2d 478, 487, 596 N.W.2d 358 (1999) ("An amended complaint 
supplants the original complaint when the amended complaint 
Nos.  2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC.akz 
 
10 
 
makes no reference to the original complaint and incorporates by 
reference no part of the original complaint."); see also 
Crawford v. Tilley, 15 F.4th 752, 759 (6th Cir. 2021) ("The 
general rule is that filing an amended complaint moots pending 
motions to dismiss." (collecting cases)).  And there was no 
convincing reason to deny the motion to amend.    
¶37 On April 5, 2021, the court of appeals issued its 
decision reversing the circuit court's orders denying the 
motions to dismiss and ordering the circuit court on remand to 
dismiss the complaint with prejudice and vacate the temporary 
injunction. 
 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
recognized 
that 
the 
Associations had moved to amend their complaint before the 
defendants filed an interlocutory appeal, but it chose not to 
address the merits of that motion.  The court of appeals 
speculated, without citation or legal analysis, that the circuit 
court could "consider . . . the propriety of such a second 
amended complaint" after the case had been dismissed.  Wis. 
Mfrs. & Com. v. Evers, 2021 WI App 35, ¶46 n.11, 398 
Wis. 2d 164, 960 N.W.2d 442.   
¶38 The court of appeals' mandate left the future of the 
case in serious uncertainty.   Nonetheless, what is clear is the 
court of appeals dissolved the circuit court's injunctive order 
that prevented disclosure of sensitive health care information.  
Even if the motion to amend before the circuit court is valid, 
and even if the second amended complaint would justify immediate 
injunctive relief, the orders directed at the State would be 
vacated by the court of appeals' decision.  In a matter of 
Nos.  2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC.akz 
 
11 
 
hours, the medical information of thousands of Wisconsites could 
be released.  If a circuit court showed as much disregard for a 
motion to amend and the liberal pleading system as the court of 
appeals did in this case, there would be a very strong case for 
reversible error.  See, e.g., Tri-State Home Improvement, 77 
Wis. 2d at 658-61 (concluding that a circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion when it denied a motion to amend the 
pleadings filed after trial in the case began, because newly 
added claims would not have surprised the defendants, the new 
claims could have been successful, and the amendments would not 
materially prejudice the defendants).  When the court of appeals 
speaks in the future of Wisconsin's favorable posture toward 
motions to amend, it will certainly have less ground to stand 
on.   
¶39 Interlocutory appeal is an extraordinary action and 
ought not be granted lightly by the court of appeals.  The court 
of appeals erred in failing to consider the status of the case 
below, with a pending motion to file a second amended complaint 
to include two individual plaintiffs.  The court of appeals 
never should have granted interlocutory appeal.  To conclude 
dismissal was appropriate, it undertook extraordinary measures 
to close judicial relief to individuals who have the right to 
contest the release of this medical information.  It short-
circuited the standard judicial process and deprived the 
Associations the ability to present their full case on the 
merits.   
Nos.  2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC.akz 
 
12 
 
¶40 While the majority, like the court of appeals, gives a 
minor gesture to the pending motion to amend, it leaves the 
remaining litigation in substantial uncertainty.  Majority op., 
¶5 n.7.  Should the motion to amend be considered as it would 
have been if the court of appeals had not seized jurisdiction?  
The Associations did nothing wrong here; they filed a motion to 
amend prior to any adverse court order.  Or, given that this 
court is mandating dismissal with prejudice of the case, must 
the Associations meet the higher burden of amending the 
complaint after entry of a dismissal order?  Tietsworth v. 
Harley-Davidson, Inc., 2007 WI 97, ¶26, 303 Wis. 2d 94, 735 
N.W.2d 418 ("The presumption in favor of amendment . . . applies 
logically only before judgment has been entered in the case." 
(citing Mach v. Allison, 2003 WI App 11, ¶27, 259 Wis. 2d 686, 
656 N.W.2d 766)).  Do the Associations, the named plaintiffs in 
this case, have standing to request the addition of third 
parties when the Associations themselves have no claim?   
¶41 These problems would not have come about if the court 
of appeals had reserved judgment and allowed the circuit court 
to do its job.  Instead, it impatiently removed this case from 
the circuit court before a pending and facially valid motion to 
amend was resolved.  The court of appeals' actions in this case 
are extraordinary and clearly erroneous.  The individuals 
included in the second amended complaint can simply file another 
lawsuit after dismissal of this case.  Thus, despite the 
hundreds of pages of briefing, hours of oral argument time, and 
months of attorney fees for the litigants and taxpayers, this 
Nos.  2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC.akz 
 
13 
 
appellate process as a whole may not advance lower court 
proceedings in material way.  Likely, the only significant 
result of this appeal is that, during the forthcoming period of 
uncertainty, 
between 
issuance 
of 
this 
decision 
and 
the 
resolution of the motion to amend (or the filing of a new 
lawsuit), the State has the green light to release massive 
amounts of healthcare information.  For that period of time, 
irreparable and illegal harm can be done.   
¶42 The decisions of the court of appeals and today, the 
majority, focus solely on whether the Associations are the 
proper parties to challenge the State's release of information 
on positive COVID-19 tests.  This entire appeal could have been 
avoided if the pending motion to amend were granted.  While some 
may dislike the Associations or their claims, every jurist 
should be concerned by appellate courts engaging in divide-and-
conquer procedural tactics, carving up complaints and dismissing 
claims before a full merits review.  Here, the Associations' 
claims are dismissed on largely procedural grounds, but no 
guidance is given to the litigants or the public as to whether 
the State's proposed disclosures are actually legal.  The 
decisions by the court of appeals and majority in this case 
endorse substantial procedural barriers for the named plaintiffs 
and a reduced body of caselaw to guide decision making in 
Wisconsin.  
¶43 The majority refuses to address the pending motion to 
amend, but the analysis the majority does provide is equally 
concerning.  In Wisconsin, standing is a low bar.  McConkey v. 
Nos.  2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC.akz 
 
14 
 
Van Hollen, 2010 WI 57, ¶15, 326 Wis. 2d 1, 783 N.W.2d 855.  
Standing is to be construed broadly in favor of those seeking 
access to the courts.  Contrary to this court's precedent, the 
court of appeals concluded that a legally protectable interest 
for purposes of a Declaratory Judgments Act lawsuit and 
establishing standing are different things.  Wis. Mfrs. & Com., 
398 Wis. 2d 164, ¶¶27-29.  The court of appeals erred.  There 
need not be a statutory or constitutional provision at issue in 
a Declaratory Judgments Act case.  Of course, declaratory 
judgments can be brought under common law rights, such as those 
established in contract law.  See, e.g., F. Rosenberg Elevator 
Co. v. Goll, 18 Wis. 2d 355, 118 N.W.2d 858 (1963).  In fact, if 
establishing a legally protectable interest for purposes of the 
declaratory judgment is not the same as standing, then the 
Declaratory Judgments Act four-factor test would not require any 
showing of standing.  See Foley-Ciccantelli v. Bishop's Grove 
Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 2011 WI 36, ¶47, 333 Wis. 2d 402, 797 
N.W.2d 789 ("[T]he concepts of standing and justiciability (a 
legally protectable interest) have been viewed as overlapping 
concepts in declaratory judgment cases.").   
¶44 Here, 
the 
Associations 
have 
adequately 
alleged 
standing.  Moreover, the second amended complaint, if allowed, 
states more, not less, in terms of standing.  The second amended 
complaint alleges a violation of a medical records statute.  The 
second 
amended 
complaint 
alleges 
that 
the 
release 
of 
confidential medical information would violate Wis. Stat. 
§ 146.82 and its confidentiality requirement.  The allegations 
Nos.  2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC.akz 
 
15 
 
of the second amended complaint are that the planned release of 
these confidential documents does not fall under any exception 
in § 146.82.  More needs to be known and the merits must be 
reviewed before this lawsuit can be dismissed.  The public 
records statute alone does not dictate the answer.  The majority 
does nothing to reconcile the conflict the public records 
statute has with the medical records provisions. 
¶45 When 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
concluded 
that 
the 
Associations lacked taxpayer standing, its reasoning erred with 
respect to the implausibility standard.  The majority must 
recognize that at this stage of the proceedings, alleged facts 
must be accepted as true, and the pleadings must be construed 
liberally such that any reasonable inferences arising from those 
facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party.  Data Key 
Partners v. Permira Advisers LLC, 2014 WI 86, ¶21 n.9, 356 
Wis. 2d 665, 849 N.W.2d 693 ("Factual assertions are evidenced 
by statements that describe: who, what, where, when, why, and 
how." (quotations omitted)). 
¶46 In addition, for this procedural error regarding the 
proper standard to apply, this court errs:  without analyzing or 
considering any developed facts or legal analysis, this court 
affirms the court of appeals' decision which held, for the first 
time in Wisconsin, as a matter of law, information within 
patient health care records is somehow not confidential so long 
as the government obtains the information.  The court of appeals 
reasoned that Wisconsin's healthcare privacy statutes do not 
protect "information that is merely derived from a record."  
Nos.  2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC.akz 
 
16 
 
Wis. 
Mfrs. 
& 
Com., 
398 
Wis. 2d 164, 
¶24 
n.9. 
 
Absent 
extraordinary circumstances where the information appears in a 
"functional[ly] equivalent" manner as the original record, under 
the court of appeals' reasoning, the State can publicly disclose 
private healthcare records if the information therein is simply 
restated in a government record.  Id.  Notably, the court of 
appeals concluded the private COVID-19 testing information at 
issue 
in 
this 
case 
was 
not 
subject 
to 
confidentiality 
protections.  Id.  Under the plain text of Wis. Stat. § 146.82, 
"[a]ll patient health care records shall remain confidential."  
There is no exception for healthcare records that have been 
restated in government records.  Absent informed consent of the 
patient or person authorized by the patient, healthcare records 
are indeed confidential.  § 146.82(1); Johnson v. Rogers Mem'l 
Hosp., Inc., 2005 WI 114, ¶33, 283 Wis. 2d 384, 700 N.W.2d 27.  
The majority makes no effort to explain how this provision can 
be reconciled with the public records law or the court of 
appeals' decision. 
¶47 Uncorrected, as the majority has now done, the court 
of appeals' interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 146.82 can have 
devastating 
statewide 
consequences 
for 
medical 
privacy.  
Consider whether this request were for patients with certain 
other diseases or private conditions.  It could be someone who 
suffers a miscarriage, or has cancer.  It could be a person who 
has a sexually transmitted disease, a sex crime victim, or an 
individual 
who 
suffers 
from 
mental 
illness. 
 
Under 
the 
majority's interpretation, all may have intimate healthcare 
Nos.  2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC.akz 
 
17 
 
information disclosed to the public.  All that would be required 
is that the government somehow garners the information, and 
there can be no objection to the release of that information.  
The second amended complaint specifically lists individuals who 
would be harmed by the release of this information, but the 
majority precludes them from potentially seeking any relief.  If 
the medical information is released when the Associations are 
dismissed and the injunction in this case is lifted, the 
individuals will have no means to obtain meaningful relief.  
Once their information is made public, the individuals cannot 
later make the information private.   
¶48 In short, the majority affirms the court of appeals' 
decision, which is riddled with error.  The majority opinion 
today goes further to profoundly impact the confidentiality of 
individual patient records.  Pleadings are to be liberally 
construed and here, the majority does not even address the fact 
that any action by the court of appeals was premature because 
the pleadings below were not fully complete.  At this stage in 
the proceedings, it is error to dismiss this case and close the 
courthouse 
doors 
to 
those 
seeking 
to 
protect 
private 
confidential information.  To determine that the only actual 
records protected are the medical records themselves, and not 
the information contained therein, has the potential for 
sweeping negative consequences.  Before today's decision by this 
court, 
the 
information 
contained 
in 
medical 
records 
was 
obviously confidential, as well as the record itself.  An 
individual could object to release of confidential information.   
Nos.  2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC.akz 
 
18 
 
¶49 However, by affirming the court of appeals, the 
majority has determined that because the government has gathered 
information 
from 
individuals' 
confidential 
records, 
that 
information loses confidentiality.  The individual who is the 
subject of that information has no right to review or object to 
its release.  This court has permitted the weaponization of 
private health information, so long as the government has 
gathered 
that 
information. 
 
It 
has 
also 
incentivized 
gamesmanship by dismissing a lawsuit on procedural grounds 
before the plaintiffs have had a full and complete opportunity 
to amend their complaint and provide arguments on the merits.  
This is a dangerous course for the citizens of the state of 
Wisconsin.  It is also contrary to the law.  At a minimum, this 
lawsuit should not be dismissed.  Interlocutory relief was 
incorrectly granted by the court of appeals, and the circuit 
court below should be permitted to proceed with the case and 
determine whether the complaint should be amended. 
¶50 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.  
¶51 I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY join this dissent. 
 
 
Nos.  2020AP2081-AC & 2020AP2103-AC.akz 
 
 
 
1