Title: Timothy J. Kopke v. A. Hartrodt S.R.L.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2001 WI 99 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-3144 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Timothy J. Kopke,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, a 
foreign insurance corporation and Leicht 
Transfer and Storage Co., a Wisconsin 
corporation,  
 
Subrogated-Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
v. 
A. Hartrodt S.R.L., a foreign corporation,  
 
Defendant, 
Cartiere Binda in Liquidazoine S.p.A., a foreign 
corporation,  
 
Defendant-Third-Party Plaintiff-Respondent, 
Societa' Cooperativa L'Arciere, a foreign 
corporation,  
 
Defendant-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Riunione Adriatica Di Sicurta S.p.A., a foreign 
corporation,  
 
Third-Party Defendant-Respondent.  
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 10, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
April 30, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Brown 
 
JUDGE: 
William M. Atkinson 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
CROOKS, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
WILCOX and SYKES, J.J., join dissent. 
 
 
SYKES, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
WILCOX and CROOKS, J.J., join dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
2 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by 
W.H. Levit Jr., Winston A. Ostrow, Michael B. Apfeld and Godfrey 
& Kahn, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Michael B. Apfeld. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief 
(in the court of appeals) by Lee J. Geronime, David A. Krutz, 
Leslie C. Mastey and Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, Milwaukee, and 
oral argument by Chris J. Trebatoski. 
 
 
For the defendant-third-party plaintiff-
respondent there was a brief (in the court of appeals) by Trevor 
J. Will, Eric J. Massen and Foley & Lardner, Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by R. George Burnett. 
 
 
For the third party-defendant-respondent there 
was a brief by Frank J. Daily, Daniel J. La Fave and Quarles & 
Brady LLP, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Daniel J. LaFave. 
 
2001 WI 99 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-3144 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Timothy J. Kopke,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty  
Company, a foreign insurance corporation  
and Leicht Transfer and Storage Co., a  
Wisconsin corporation,  
 
          Subrogated-Plaintiffs- 
          Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
A. Hartrodt S.R.L., a foreign  
corporation,  
 
          Defendant, 
 
Cartiere Binda in Liquidazoine S.p.A., a  
foreign corporation,  
 
          Defendant-Third-Party Plaintiff- 
          Respondent, 
 
Societa' Cooperativa L'Arciere, a foreign  
corporation,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Riunione Adriatica Di Sicurta S.p.A., a  
foreign corporation,  
 
          Third-Party Defendant- 
          Respondent. 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 10, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 99-3144 
 
 
2 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Brown County, 
William M. Atkinson, Circuit Court Judge.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
WILLIAM 
A. 
BABLITCH, 
J.   Societa' 
Cooperativa 
L'Arciere (L'Arciere), an Italian cooperative, challenges the 
exercise of in personam jurisdiction over it.  This challenge 
presents two inquiries:  (1) Whether the facts presented satisfy 
Wisconsin's long-arm statute, Wis. Stat. § 801.05(4) (1997-98)1; 
and (2) Whether L'Arciere has "minimum contacts" with this State 
such that the court's exercise of jurisdiction would be fair and 
in accordance with the Fourteenth Amendment's due process 
requirements.  We conclude that the requisite tests to establish 
personal 
jurisdiction 
over 
L'Arciere 
are 
satisfied.  
Accordingly, we affirm the ruling of the circuit court. 
FACTS 
¶2 
In May of 1997 Timothy J. Kopke (Kopke), a truck 
driver, was seriously injured when he opened a cargo container 
in Neenah, Wisconsin.  The injury occurred when a pallet loaded 
with paper fell out of the cargo container and onto Kopke.  The 
paper had been shipped to Neenah from Crusinello, Italy, by its 
manufacturer, Cartiere Binda in Liquidazione, S.p.A. (Binda). 
The paper had been purchased from the Binda's Crusinello mill by 
CTI Paper USA, Inc. (CTI).  CTI had been purchasing paper 
product from the Crusinello mill since 1991.   
                     
1 All subsequent statutory references are to the 1997-98 
volume, unless otherwise indicated.  
No. 99-3144 
 
 
3 
¶3 
CTI is not a party to this action, although it 
supplied damage reports on cargo containers received from Binda. 
 Forty-four damage reports were issued between August 1996 and 
September 1997.  
¶4 
In 1995 Binda entered into a contract with L'Arciere, 
an employee-owned Italian cooperative, to provide workers to 
load product into cargo containers.  L'Arciere workers and Binda 
employees each played a role in the loading of product into 
cargo containers.   
¶5 
Binda employees would place the paper to be shipped on 
pallets and cover it with shrink-wrap.  Binda's setup department 
prepared loading plans for the containers. Binda produced 
loading plans for five of the shipments occurring between 
November 1996 and May 1997.  At the top of these plans is 
written either "Cont. X CTI Appleton," "Contenitore X CTI" or 
Contenitore X Neenah."  Kopke explains that "Contenitore," or 
"cont." as it is abbreviated, is an Italian word meaning 
"container" and "X" is an abbreviation for "per," meaning "to." 
 "Contenitore X CTI Appleton" identifies a container as being 
loaded for shipment to CTI in Appleton. 
¶6 
In conformity with the loading plan, L'Arciere workers 
moved the pallets into the cargo container.  The L'Arciere 
workers placed the pallets into the cargo container and secured 
it using boards, bracing beams, and inflated air bags to fill 
side spaces.  Binda supplied these packing materials.  
¶7 
After Kopke sustained his injury he brought a claim 
for damages against Binda, L'Arciere, and others.  L'Arciere 
No. 99-3144 
 
 
4 
moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Brown 
County Circuit Court Judge William M. Atkinson denied this 
motion. 
Judge 
Atkinson 
ruled 
that 
L'Arciere's 
acts 
of 
stabilizing the products being shipped by surrounding the 
product with air bags, and installing bracing beams and boards 
into the cargo container, were acts that were part of a 
processing of a product.  The circuit court judge was also 
satisfied that the minimum contacts requirement for due process 
purposes was met.2  L'Arciere appealed.  The court of appeals 
accepted 
L'Arciere's 
appeal, 
and 
subsequently 
the 
court 
certified the appeal to this court pursuant to Wis. Stat. (Rule) 
§ 809.61. 
ANALYSIS 
¶8 
One issue is presented: Did the circuit court err by 
denying a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction 
over L'Arciere?  Every personal jurisdiction issue requires a 
two-step inquiry.  In re Liquidation of All-Star Ins. Corp., 110 
Wis. 2d 72, 76, 327 N.W.2d 648 (1983) (discussing personal 
jurisdiction pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 645.04(5)(a)); Lincoln v. 
Seawright, 104 Wis. 2d 4, 10-11, 310 N.W.2d 596 (1981).  It must 
first 
be 
determined 
whether 
defendants 
are 
subject 
to 
jurisdiction under Wisconsin's long-arm statute.  See Lincoln, 
104 Wis. 2d at 10.  If the statutory requirements are satisfied, 
then 
the 
court 
must 
consider 
whether 
the 
exercise 
of 
                     
2 Judge Atkinson also denied L'Arciere's motion for summary 
judgment.  This decision on summary judgment is not presented 
for review here. 
No. 99-3144 
 
 
5 
jurisdiction comports with due process requirements.  Id.  
"[P]laintiff has the minimal burden of establishing a prima 
facie threshold showing 
that constitutional 
and 
statutory 
requirements for the assumption of personal jurisdiction are 
satisfied."  Ammon v. Kaplow, 468 F. Supp. 1304, 1309 (D. Kan. 
1979).  In this review, we may consider documentary evidence and 
weigh affidavits in reaching a determination as to whether this 
burden has been met.  Id.  "Factual doubts are to be resolved in 
favor of the plaintiff."  Id.  We begin our analysis with 
consideration of Wisconsin's long-arm statute.  
¶9 
Wisconsin Stat. § 801.05(4) authorizes the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over nonresidents whose act or omission 
committed outside of Wisconsin gives rise to an injury within 
the state.  All the participants to this appeal agree that if 
the courts have personal jurisdiction over L'Arciere, it arises 
under § 801.05(4)(b), set forth below:  
 
 
A court of this state having jurisdiction of the 
subject matter has jurisdiction over a person served 
in an action pursuant to s. 801.11 under any of the 
following circumstances: 
 . . .  
(4) Local injury; foreign act.  In any action 
claiming injury to person or property within this 
state arising out of an act or omission outside this 
state by the defendant, provided in addition that at 
the time of the injury, either: 
 . . .  
(b) Products, materials or things processed, 
serviced or manufactured by the defendant were used or 
consumed within this state in the ordinary course of 
trade. 
No. 99-3144 
 
 
6 
¶10 Application of Wis. Stat. § 801.05(4)(b) to the facts 
of this case presents a question of law, which we review 
independently.  Marsh v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 179 Wis. 2d 
42, 52, 505 N.W.2d 162 (Ct. App. 1993).  Wisconsin's long-arm 
statute is liberally construed in favor of jurisdiction.  Id. 
(citing Lincoln, 104 Wis. 2d at 9).  The plaintiff must carry 
the burden of establishing jurisdiction.  Lincoln, 104 Wis. 2d 
at 9. 
¶11 The dispute here is focused upon whether L'Arciere 
engaged in conduct described in Wis. Stat. § 801.05(4)(b).  
Kopke asserts that L'Arciere engaged in "processing."  In 
support of his position, Kopke relies upon Nelson by Carson v. 
Park Industries, Inc., 717 F.2d 1120 (7th Cir. 1983).  In 
Nelson, 
the 
Seventh 
Circuit 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
examined 
§ 801.05(4)(b) 
(1981-82) 
and 
concluded 
that 
"the 
word 
'processed' should be interpreted to include a distributor's 
purchase and sale of goods in the normal course of the 
distribution of those goods."  Id. at 1124.  The court then 
further defined "to process" as follows: 
 
The verb "to process" certainly may refer to the 
narrower concept of preparing something in the sense 
of manufacturing it.  However, it also has the broader 
definitions of subjecting something to a particular 
system of handling to effect a particular result and 
preparing something for market or other commercial use 
by subjecting it to a process.  See Webster's Third 
New International Dictionary of the English Language 
(1963).  We think these broader definitions include 
the actions of a distributor such as [the defendant], 
i.e., purchasing and selling goods in the ordinary 
course of trade in a distribution system. 
No. 99-3144 
 
 
7 
Id. at 1124 n.5 
¶12 Kopke 
asserts 
that 
the 
activities 
performed 
by 
L'Arciere at the Binda mill with respect to the paper product 
falls directly within the definition of "process" set forth in 
Nelson.  L'Arciere had an exclusive contract with Binda to load 
product at the mill.  Kopke points out that damage reports 
produced by CTI show that L'Arciere loaded at least 45 cargo 
containers for shipment to Wisconsin; 39 of which arrived 
between November 1996 and May 1997.3  He argues that L'Arciere 
processed the product for shipment to Wisconsin when it loaded 
and secured the product in the cargo container.  This loading 
was, in Kopke's view, a necessary function in preparing the 
product for market, for the product would not have arrived in 
Neenah, Wisconsin, without the loading performed by L'Arciere.  
¶13 In rebuttal, L'Arciere asserts that the ordinary 
understanding of the word "process" as it is used in Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.05(4)(b) 
means 
an 
action 
directed 
toward 
the 
transformation of the object being processed.  It contends that 
this meaning is supported by dictionary definitions, the 
placement of the word "process" between "manufactured" and 
"serviced" in the statute, and by examining how the legislature 
used the word "process" elsewhere in the Wisconsin statutes.  
                     
3 These numbers represent only the number of containers 
shipped to Wisconsin in which cargo had been damaged.  A 
receiving damage report was faxed to Binda for each cargo 
container that had damaged goods.  Containers that did not have 
damaged cargo were not reported in CTI's documents.  
No. 99-3144 
 
 
8 
¶14 A narrow interpretation of the word "process" is also 
urged by third-party defendant-respondent Riunione Adriatica di 
Sicurta' S.p.A. (RAS).  RAS, an Italian insurance company, 
issued a policy to Binda.  RAS asserts, however, that even under 
L'Arciere's more narrow interpretation its activities constitute 
processing of materials under Wis. Stat. § 801.05(4)(b).  
¶15 The question presented is, therefore, whether the word 
"process" means to bring about a physical transformation upon 
the products, materials, or things themselves, as urged by 
L'Arciere and RAS, or whether process is a broader term as 
suggested by the Seventh Circuit in Nelson, and by Kopke and 
Binda.  We agree with Kopke and Binda. 
¶16 "The fundamental rule of construction of a statute is 
to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature 
as expressed in the statute." Zarnott v. Timken-Detroit Axle 
Co., 244 Wis. 596, 599-600, 13 N.W.2d 53 (1944).   Wisconsin 
Stat. § 801.05 does not define the word "process."  The 
legislature has set forth as a general rule that "words and 
phrases shall be construed according to common and approved 
usage . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1).  "The common and 
approved usage of words can be established by the definition of 
a recognized dictionary."  Milwaukee County v. Dep't of Indus., 
Labor and Human Relations Comm'n, 80 Wis. 2d 445, 450, 259 
N.W.2d 118 (1977).  L'Arciere cites the definition of "process" 
from Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary 1542 (2d ed. 
1998), defining process as "'—v.t. 10. to treat or prepare by 
some particular process, as in manufacturing.'"  The analysis 
No. 99-3144 
 
 
9 
adopted in Nelson, urged by Kopke, relied upon Webster's Third 
New International Dictionary of the English Language (1963) for 
its determination that "to process" may refer to "the broader 
definitions of subjecting something to a particular system of 
handling to effect a particular result and preparing something 
for market or other commercial use by subjecting it to a 
process."  Nelson, 717 F.2d at 1124 n.5.   The dictionary, 
therefore, does not resolve the question of whether a broad or 
narrow meaning should be applied to the word "process."  
¶17 When reasonable minds could differ as to the meaning 
of a statute, the court examines the scope, history, context, 
subject matter and purpose of the statute in question.  Brauneis 
v. LIRC, 2000 WI 69, ¶21, 236 Wis. 2d 27, 612 N.W.2d 635.  
Wisconsin's long-arm statute was designed to satisfy the 
requirements of due process.  Schmitz v. Hunter Mach. Co., 89 
Wis. 2d 388, 403, 279 N.W.2d 172 (1979).  The 1959 revision 
notes state that the statute incorporates grounds that expand 
the 
exercise 
of 
personal 
jurisdiction 
in 
cases 
having 
substantial contacts with this state. Revision Notes——1959 by 
G.W. Foster, Jr. for St. 1959, § 262.05, Wis. Stat. Ann. 
§ 801.05 (West 1977).4  Because the objective of the statute was 
to expand personal jurisdiction we conclude that the broad 
definition of "process" suggested by Nelson, 717 F.2d at 1124 
n.5, properly reflects the legislative intent in adopting this 
                     
4 The Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure were renumbered by 
Supreme Court Order, 67 Wis. 2d 595, 592-96 (1975) (eff. January 
1, 1976). 
No. 99-3144 
 
 
10
statute.  Further, this definition is in keeping with this 
court's consistent statement that "statutes regulating long-arm 
jurisdiction are . . . to be given a liberal construction in 
favor of the exercise of jurisdiction."  Schroeder v. Raich, 89 
Wis. 2d 588, 593, 278 N.W.2d 871 (1979).  Accordingly, we adopt 
that broad definition here.  As a result, we agree with Kopke 
that L'Arciere engaged in processing pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.05(4) and affirm this conclusion by the circuit court.  
¶18 L'Arciere 
presents 
several 
additional 
arguments 
against this conclusion, which we find unpersuasive.  L'Arciere 
points out that the word "processed" appears in numerous other 
statutes, ranging from processing dead animals Wis. Stat. 
§ 95.72(1)(c)3 to processing controlled substances Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.571(1)(a).  L'Arciere does not argue that these statutes 
are in any way cross-referenced or linked together with Wis. 
Stat. § 801.05, other than that in its view these statutes use 
"process" as a concept distinct from packing, packaging, or 
related concepts.  There are limits as to how much and what kind 
of statutory context is relevant to the analysis of a particular 
word in an individual statutory section.  "The risk of 
misunderstanding as a result of allowing irrelevant portions of 
a text to influence the meaning attributed to the segment of 
text being construed is probably just as risky as taking any 
statement out of context."  2A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and 
Statutory Construction § 47:02, at 211 (6th ed. 2000).  We 
conclude that this attempt to determine the meaning of "process" 
in subsection (4)(b) by examining the word as it appears in 
No. 99-3144 
 
 
11
other sections throughout the statutory code distorts, rather 
than 
clarifies, 
legislative 
intent 
in 
creating 
§ 801.05.  
Without something more, such as one statute being incorporated 
into another, or two statutes addressing closely related 
subjects that consideration of one would logically bring the 
other to mind, "[e]very statute is an independent communication, 
for which either the intended or the understood meaning may be 
different."  2A id. § 45.14, at 110.   Accordingly, we do not 
concur with this statutory analysis argument. 
¶19 Further, although L'Arciere correctly points out that 
"process" appears between "manufactured" and "serviced" it does 
not necessarily follow that "process" is to be interpreted as 
meaning "a transformation as occurs in manufacturing."  "'It is 
an elementary rule for the construction of statutes that effect 
must be given, if possible, to every word, clause, and sentence 
thereof.'"  Greenebaum v. Dep't of Taxation, 1 Wis. 2d 234, 238, 
83 N.W.2d 682 (1957) (quoting State v. Columbian Nat. Life Ins. 
Co., 141 Wis. 557, 566, 124 N.W. 502 (1910)).  Were we to 
conclude 
that 
"process" 
is 
merely 
a 
restatement 
of 
"manufacturing," 
we 
would 
render 
"process" 
a 
redundancy.  
However, by adopting the broader meaning of the word, it is 
properly given effect in the statute.   
¶20 Finally, L'Arciere cites to a decision by the Fifth 
Circuit interpreting Florida's long-arm statute which apparently 
contains language similar to Wis. Stat. § 801.05(4).  In Mallard 
v. Aluminum Co. of Canada, 634 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1981), a 
longshoreman was severely injured in Florida while unloading 
No. 99-3144 
 
 
12
cargo from a vessel.  The vessel was owned by a Finnish 
corporation and time-chartered to Bathurst, Ltd., a Canadian 
corporation.  Bathurst hired the Aluminum Company of Canada, 
Ltd. (ALCAN) as stevedore for the loading operations in Canada. 
 The injured longshoreman brought a claim of negligence against 
ALCAN and other defendants.  ALCAN brought a motion to dismiss 
for lack of personal jurisdiction, which the district court 
granted.  The Fifth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the 
Florida long-arm statute could not reach ALCAN.  The court wrote 
that the relevant Florida statute "exerts jurisdiction over any 
nonresident who causes injury to persons or property in Florida 
by act or omission in another state, if products that the 
nonresident processed, serviced or manufactured cause injury 
during use or consumption in Florida."  Id. at 241.   
¶21 Despite the apparently similar language in the Florida 
statute and Wis. Stat. § 801.05(4), the jurisdictions differ on 
two critical rules of statutory interpretation that formed the 
basis of the decision in Mallard.  First, Florida's long-arm 
statute is strictly construed.  Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century 
Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 627 (11th Cir. 1996).  In contrast, 
Wisconsin's long-arm statute is liberally construed in favor of 
the exercise of jurisdiction.  Second, Florida courts have held 
that "the statute requires more activities or contacts to 
sustain 
personal 
jurisdiction 
than 
demanded 
by 
the 
Constitution."  Mallard, 634 F.2d at 241.  In contrast, this 
court has stated that § 801.05 was designed to satisfy the 
requirements of due process. Therefore, we do not find the 
No. 99-3144 
 
 
13
analysis in Mallard persuasive for the purposes of interpreting 
Wisconsin's long-arm statute.  We conclude, therefore, L'Arciere 
falls within the grasp of Wis. Stat. § 801.05(4).5 
¶22 Having concluded that L'Arciere falls within reach of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 801.05(4), 
we 
turn 
now 
to 
consider 
the 
constitutional inquiry.   The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment limits the exercise of jurisdiction by a 
state over a nonconsenting nonresident.  Section 801.05(4) has 
been interpreted as a codification of federal due process 
requirements.6  Compliance with the statute presumes that due 
process is met, subject to the objecting defendant's opportunity 
to rebut.  Lincoln, 104 Wis. 2d at 10.  Thus, when jurisdiction 
is found pursuant to the statutory analysis, the defendant may 
dispute 
the 
presumption 
of 
compliance 
with 
due 
process 
requirements articulated by the Supreme Court.  See Hasley v. 
Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc., 70 Wis. 2d 562, 577, 235 N.W.2d 
446 (1975) ("The burden is not on the defendant to prove lack of 
contact with this state . . . even though the motion to dismiss 
is produced by the defense; the defendant may dispute the 
contacts alleged or attack the demonstrated statutory compliance 
                     
5 Kopke and Binda also argue that L'Arciere "serviced" the 
paper within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 801.05(4)(b).  Having 
resolved this issue on the basis of the statute's use of the 
word "processed," we need not address this argument.  
6  Lincoln v. Seawright, 104 Wis. 2d 4, 10, 310 N.W.2d 596 
(1981). 
No. 99-3144 
 
 
14
on due process grounds.").7  The limits of due process are, of 
course, established by the rules set forth in the decisions of 
the United States Supreme Court.  Zerbel v. H.L. Federman & Co., 
48 Wis. 2d 54, 60, 179 N.W.2d 872 (1970). 
¶23  Due process analysis presents two inquiries.  The 
first inquiry is whether the defendant "purposefully established 
minimum contacts in the forum State."  Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985).  On this question, the 
plaintiff carries the burden.  Id.  If this inquiry is answered 
affirmatively, then the defendant's forum-state contacts "may be 
considered in light of other factors to determine whether the 
assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with 'fair play 
and substantial justice.'"  Id. at 476 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. 
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)).  The defendant carries 
the burden on this question.8  Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 
("[W]here 
a 
defendant 
who 
purposefully 
has 
directed 
his 
activities at forum residents seeks to defeat jurisdiction, he 
                     
7  We disagree with the statement in Marsh v. Farm Bureau 
Mutual Insurance Co., 179 Wis. 2d 42, 53, 505 N.W.2d 162 (Ct. 
App. 1993) that the burden switches to the defendant to show 
that jurisdiction fails to comport with due process requirements 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.     
8 Although in the United States Supreme Court's most recent 
decision involving personal jurisdiction a majority of the 
Justices agreed upon only the "fair play and substantial 
justice" standard, the opinion did employ the two-part inquiry 
articulated in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 
(1985).  See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 
480 U.S. 102 (1987).    
No. 99-3144 
 
 
15
must present a compelling case that the presence of some other 
considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable."). 9 
¶24 We turn then to apply the first inquiry of our due 
process analysis to the facts of this case.  Under the Due 
Process 
Clause, 
personal 
jurisdiction 
over 
a 
nonresident 
defendant is proper when the defendant has "certain minimum 
contacts with [the State] such that the maintenance of the suit 
does 
not 
offend 
'traditional 
notions 
of 
fair 
play 
and 
substantial justice.'"  Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting 
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). Minimum contacts 
requires that "'the defendant's conduct and connection with the 
forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being 
haled into court there."'  Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474 (quoting 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 
(1980)).  Essential to each case is "'that there be some act by 
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege 
of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking 
the benefits and protections of its laws."  Id. at 475 (quoting 
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).  The "purposeful 
                     
9 In Zerbel v. H.L. Federman & Co., 48 Wis. 2d 54, 64-65, 
179 N.W.2d 872 (1970), this court adopted a five-factor test for 
due process.  These factors are:  "the quantity of contacts with 
the state, the nature and quality of the contacts, the source of 
the cause of action, the interest of Wisconsin in the action, 
and convenience."  Lincoln, 104 Wis. 2d at 11.  We conclude that 
these factors are encompassed within the framework set forth by 
the United States Supreme Court in personal jurisdiction cases 
decided subsequent to our decision in Zerbel.  Accordingly, we 
set aside the Zerbel factors and apply Supreme Court precedent 
here. 
No. 99-3144 
 
 
16
availment" requirement has become the "baseline," the primary 
focus, of the minimum contacts analysis.  Clune v. Alimak AB, 
233 F.3d 538, 542 (8th Cir. 2000).  "This 'purposeful availment' 
requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a 
jurisdiction solely as a result of 'random,' 'fortuitous,' or 
'attenuated' contacts, or of the 'unilateral activity of another 
party or a third person.'"  Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 
(citations omitted).  A defendant's contact with the forum state 
must be such that it "should reasonably anticipate being haled 
into court there."  World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 287. 
¶25 As an additional component of analysis, the litigants 
in this case assert that the stream of commerce theory of 
personal jurisdiction articulated in World-Wide Volkswagen and 
in subsequent Supreme Court cases applies here.  In World-Wide 
Volkswagen and Burger King the Court explained:  
 
"[I]f the sale of a product of a manufacturer or 
distributor . . . is 
not 
simply 
an 
isolated 
occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the 
manufacturer or distributor to serve directly or 
indirectly, the market for its product in other 
States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit 
in one of those States if its allegedly defective 
merchandise has there been the source of injury to its 
owner or to others.  The forum State does not exceed 
its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts 
personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers 
its products into the stream of commerce with the 
expectation that they will be purchased by consumers 
in the forum State."  Cf. Gray v. American Radiator & 
Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 
761 (1961). 
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98; see also Burger King, 
471 U.S. 473.  Kopke asserts that personal jurisdiction is 
No. 99-3144 
 
 
17
established under the stream of commerce theory because (1) 
L'Arciere routinely loaded cargo containers for shipment to 
Wisconsin; (2) this destination was indicated on the plans used 
by L'Arciere in loading pallets of paper into the containers; 
and, (3) that these facts establish conduct and connection with 
this forum such that L'Arciere could reasonably anticipate being 
brought into court here when Kopke unloaded the container in 
Wisconsin and a pallet fell out and caused injury. 
¶26 The relevance of the stream of commerce test in 
personal jurisdiction analysis is related to the issue of 
forseeability.  In World-Wide Volkswagen the Supreme Court found 
the concept of forseeability insufficient to serve as a basis 
for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.  Asahi 
Metal Indus. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 109 
(1987).  Yet, as noted by Justice O'Connor in Asahi, in World-
Wide Volkswagen "[t]he Court disclaimed . . . the idea that 
'forseeability 
is 
wholly 
irrelevant' 
to 
personal 
jurisdiction . . . ," and 
determined 
that the 
exercise of 
personal jurisdiction does not offend the Due Process Clause 
when a product is introduced into the stream of commerce with 
the expectation that it will be purchased in the forum State.  
Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98).  
¶27 In Asahi, the Supreme Court divided over the correct 
application of the stream of commerce theory.  Asahi concerned 
an indemnity action by a Taiwanese manufacturer, Cheng Shin, 
against Asahi, a Japanese business.  Cheng Shin manufactured 
tire tube and Asahi manufactured the tube's valve assembly.   
No. 99-3144 
 
 
18
These products were incorporated into motorcycle tires.  While 
the motorcycle was operated in California, the tire exploded, 
severely injuring the driver and killing the passenger.  A 
product liability suit was filed in that state, and Cheng Shin 
was named as a defendant.  The underlying tort action was 
settled and dismissed.  Asahi sought to quash the indemnity 
action, arguing that exercise of personal jurisdiction violated 
due process. 
¶28 The 
California 
Supreme Court held 
that personal 
jurisdiction did not offend due process because of Asahi's 
placement of its product in the stream of commerce by delivering 
them to Cheng Shin in Taiwan, combined with Asahi's awareness 
that some of Cheng Shin's tires would reach California.  The 
United States Supreme Court reversed.     
¶29 In analyzing Asahi, four members of the Court, Justice 
O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Powell and 
Justice Scalia, concluded that "[t]he placement of a product 
into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the 
defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State."  Under 
this view, the "'stream-of-commerce-plus' theory,"10 there must 
be "additional conduct" by the defendant to meet the burden of 
establishing personal jurisdiction.  Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.  
However, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall, 
                     
10 Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc., v. Donaldson Co., 9 F.3d 415, 
420 (5th Cir. 1993).    
No. 99-3144 
 
 
19
and Blackmun, stated that this showing of "additional conduct" 
was not needed.11  According to Justice Brennan: 
 
The stream of commerce refers not to unpredictable 
currents or eddies, but to the regular and anticipated 
flow of products from manufacturer to distribution to 
retail sale.  As long as a participant in this process 
is aware that the final product is being marketed in 
the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit there 
cannot come as a surprise. Nor will the litigation 
present a burden for which there is no corresponding 
benefit. A defendant who has placed goods in the 
stream of commerce benefits economically from the 
retail sale of the final product in the forum State, 
and indirectly benefits from the State's laws that 
regulate and facilitate commercial activity. These 
benefits accrue regardless of whether that participant 
directly conducts business in the forum State, or 
engages in additional conduct directed toward that 
State. Accordingly, most courts and commentators have 
found that jurisdiction premised on the placement of a 
product into the stream of commerce is consistent with 
the Due Process Clause, and have not required a 
showing of additional conduct.   
Id. at 117 (Brennan, J. concurring).  Ultimately, a majority in 
Asahi concluded that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would 
not be reasonable or fair and accordingly violated due process. 
 In total, "Asahi stands for no more than that it is 
unreasonable to adjudicate third-party litigation between two 
foreign 
companies 
in 
this 
county 
absent 
consent 
by 
the 
nonresident defendant."  Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display 
Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 610, 614 (8th Cir. 1994). 
                     
11 Justice Stevens concluded that an examination of minimum 
contacts was unnecessary.  In his view exercise of jurisdiction 
over Asahi would be "unreasonable and unfair" even if the 
defendant had engaged in purposeful activities in the forum 
State.  Asahi, 480 U.S. at 121. 
No. 99-3144 
 
 
20
¶30 We believe the stream of commerce theory as set forth 
by Justice Brennan is the correct analysis to apply to the case 
at hand.  First, as the Seventh Circuit has noted, a majority of 
the Court has not rejected the stream of commerce analysis of 
Burger King and World-Wide Volkswagen, and it is thus binding 
upon the lower courts.  Dehmlow v. Austin Fireworks, 963 F.2d 
941, 947 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Ham v. La Cienega Music Co., 
4 F.3d 413, 416 n.11 (5th Cir. 1993) ("Absent rejection by a 
majority on the Supreme Court, we have continued to apply the 
stream of commerce analysis found in our pre-Asahi cases.").  
¶31 Second, although Kopke is not asserting a strict 
product liability claim, but is instead alleging negligence, we 
nevertheless conclude that the stream of commerce analysis 
should be applied here.12  Kopke's injuries arose out of 
commercial activities and the distribution of goods in the 
stream of commerce.  Specifically, Kopke was injured in Neenah, 
Wisconsin, when he opened an ocean-going cargo container and a 
pallet loaded with paper fell out; Kopke asserts that L'Arciere 
workers in Italy negligently loaded the pallet into the 
container that was shipped to this forum.  Further, the facts of 
this case present a "regular course of dealing that results in 
deliveries" of multiple units of the product into this forum 
over a period of years.  See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 122 (Stevens, J. 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).    
                     
12 A discussion of the distinction between a claim grounded 
upon strict product liability and a claim grounded upon 
negligence is set forth in Fuchsgruber v. Custom Assessories, 
Inc., 2001 WI 81, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ____.  
No. 99-3144 
 
 
21
¶32 Applying that test to the present case, we conclude 
based upon the nature of the contractual relationship between 
L'Arciere and Binda, the identification in the loading plans of 
the cargo's destination as "Appleton" and "CTI Neenah," as well 
as the 
damage reports from 
CTI 
which illustrate 
a not 
insignificant volume of business between CTI and Binda, the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction complies with the limits of 
due process because the cargo was introduced into the stream of 
commerce with the expectation that it would arrive in this 
forum. 
¶33 First, we note L'Arciere had a contract with Binda to 
supply workers for the purpose of loading cargo containers.  
L'Arciere 
employees 
worked 
together 
in 
Italy 
with 
Binda 
employees to load the cargo containers.  This is not a case like 
Asahi where a manufacturer operating in one international forum 
shipped 
parts 
to 
a 
second 
manufacturer 
in 
a 
different 
international forum, who incorporated these parts into a product 
that is shipped to yet a third international forum.  In the 
present case, Kopke asserts that L'Arciere was negligent in the 
manner in which it loaded the cargo container in Italy, and that 
this negligence caused or contributed to causing his injuries 
when the cargo container was opened here in Wisconsin.   
¶34 Second, the loading instructions prepared by Binda and 
used by L'Arciere identified the container's destination as 
"Neenah" or "CTI Appleton."  In other words, these products did 
not randomly or fortuitously appear in Wisconsin; they were 
specifically intended to arrive in this forum.  The injury that 
No. 99-3144 
 
 
22
Kopke suffered occurred in the forum to which the cargo 
containers were directed to arrive.   
¶35 Third, the damage reports prepared by CTI on cargo 
containers received from Binda between November 8, 1996, and May 
20, 1997, demonstrate that at least 40 containers were loaded by 
L'Arciere workers for delivery in this forum.  
¶36 We also note that L'Arciere, by virtue of its business 
relationship with Binda, benefited from the distribution of 
Binda products to this forum.  "A defendant who has placed goods 
in the stream of commerce benefits economically from the retail 
sale of the final product in the forum State, and indirectly 
benefits from the State's laws that regulate and facilitate 
commercial activity."  Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J. 
concurring).   We recognize that this economic benefit arose 
because L'Arciere contracted with Binda to perform a service, 
the loading of cargo containers.  In providing this service 
L'Arciere interacted with Binda employees and handled the final 
product that was being shipped to this forum. L'Arciere's 
handling of the final product is the alleged act of negligence 
that may have caused Kopke's injuries.  The product was shipped 
here as a result of the sale agreement between Binda and CTI.  
As a result of this sales agreement, the cargo container arrived 
in Wisconsin and Kopke was subsequently injured here.  These 
business 
relationships 
benefited 
L'Arciere, 
and 
L'Arciere 
literally "played a hand" in the product arriving in this state. 
 Under these circumstances, we think it reasonable to conclude 
that the purposeful availment requirement is met and that 
No. 99-3144 
 
 
23
L'Arciere has sufficient minimum contacts with this forum to be 
held accountable here if any negligence on its part in loading 
the cargo containers has resulted in damages.   
¶37 In attacking this conclusion L'Arciere's principal 
argument is that the defendant must be aware that the product 
will end up in the forum state.  In its view, actual knowledge 
of a product's destination is essential for the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction and that L'Arciere did not know where 
Neenah or Appleton are located.  For his part, Kopke asserts 
that L'Arciere had actual or at least constructive knowledge of 
the products' destination, which is sufficient for the purposes 
of minimum contacts.   
¶38 Other court's have considered an analogous argument in 
personal jurisdiction cases where an argument is presented 
distinguishing between "know" and "should have known:"  
 
"The 
traditional 
equivalence 
between 
"know" 
and 
"should have known" in our jurisprudence suggests 
that, for purposes relevant to this case, it is a 
distinction that makes no difference.  The ultimate 
test of in personam jurisdiction is "reasonableness" 
and "fairness" and "traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice [International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 
L.Ed. 95 (1945)].  In applying such a test, it is a 
matter of common sense that there should be no 
distinction between "know" and "should have known."  
We cannot say that a potential defendant who actually 
knows his products will ultimately reach the forum 
state any more "purposefully avails itself of the 
privilege of conducting activities [there]," Hanson v. 
Denckla, 357 U.S. [235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1240, 2 
L.Wed. 2d 1283 (1958)], than a potential defendant who 
merely should have known." 
No. 99-3144 
 
 
24
Barone, 25 F.3d at 613 n.4 (quoting Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 
F.2d 191, 200 (5th Cir. 1980)).  We find this reasoning 
applicable to L'Arciere's argument concerning the distinction 
between "knowledge" and "actual knowledge" in this case; its 
argument raises a distinction that makes no difference. 
¶39 Having concluded that Kopke has met his burden to 
establish 
minimum 
contacts 
for 
the 
exercise 
of 
personal 
jurisdiction over L'Arciere, we turn next to a consideration of 
the second inquiry for personal jurisdiction, application of the 
standard of fair play and substantial justice.  The Supreme 
Court has identified the following factors as relevant to the 
analysis of whether personal jurisdiction is reasonable:  (1) 
the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute; (2) the 
plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective 
relief; (3) the burden on the defendant; (4) the interstate 
judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient 
resolution of controversies; and, (5) the shared interest of the 
several States in furthering fundamental substantive social 
policies.  Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113; World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 
U.S. at 477.  The first three factors are relevant to our 
analysis of this case.   
¶40 As to the first factor, the State of Wisconsin has an 
unquestionable interest in providing its citizenry with a forum 
to adjudicate claims arising here.   
¶41 As to the second factor, Kopke, who suffered a spinal 
cord injury causing permanent quadriplegia, has an undeniable 
interest in obtaining convenient relief.  We also believe Kopke 
No. 99-3144 
 
 
25
has a right to effective relief.  This point brings us to 
consideration of an argument presented by RAS, who asserts that 
basic consideration of fairness weigh in favor of dismissing 
L'Arciere.  According to RAS, the sole reason Kopke wants 
L'Arciere to remain in this action is not because he believes it 
has any liability, but because of his concern that Binda will 
attempt to use L'Arciere's "empty chair" to deflect blame at 
trial.  We are not persuaded.  A strategic decision on the part 
of plaintiff's or defense counsel does not weigh in as a factor 
in our due process analysis. 
¶42 The third factor which we will consider is the burden 
on the defendant.  L'Arciere contends that it would be unfair 
and unjust to exercise personal jurisdiction over a party that 
merely packs or loads goods onto a truck or vessel.  In its 
view, subjecting L'Arciere to jurisdiction in this forum would 
subject all packing and portage companies, stevedores, and 
longshoremen to nationwide, even worldwide, jurisdiction.  In 
support of this position, L'Arciere cites three cases in which a 
court determined that the minimum contact requirement of 
personal jurisdiction analysis was not satisfied, American 
President Lines, Ltd. v. Metropolitan Stevedore Services, 567 
F.Supp. 169 (W.D. Wash. 1983); Real Properties, Inc. v. Mission 
Insurance 
Co., 
427 
N.W.2d 
665 
(Minn. 
1988); 
and 
Global 
Servicios, S.A. v. Toplis & Harding, Inc., 561 So.2d 674 (Fla. 
Ct. App. 1990).  Because in each of these cases the minimum 
contacts inquiry was not satisfied we do not have the benefit of 
the 
court's 
consideration 
of 
the 
exercise 
of 
personal 
No. 99-3144 
 
 
26
jurisdiction under the "fair play and substantial justice" 
prong, and, therefore, these cases provide little assistance to 
our analysis.  Nonetheless, we will briefly examine each of the 
three cases cited by L'Arciere.        
¶43 In American President Lines the defendant stevedore 
loaded and stowed cargo onto a vessel in California.  The 
vessel, enroute to its destination of Bhavnagar, India, arrived 
in Seattle.  While in Seattle a negligent stow required a 
lengthy layover for clean-up and restowage.  The federal 
district 
court 
determined 
that 
the 
exercise 
of 
personal 
jurisdiction in Washington State would be impermissible.  First, 
it determined that the loading of cargo in California  "not of 
such a nature that it can be said to put defendant on notice 
that it might be called to defend such actions at any port at 
which the vessel may call."  Id. at 170-71.  Second, the court 
found that "[t]he circumstance that the vessel's owner elected 
to dock in Seattle is insufficient to support the assertion of 
jurisdiction 
over 
defendant 
under 
Washington's 
long-arm 
statute."  Id. at 171.  Third, the court rejected application of 
the stream of commerce theory because the stevedore "did not 
utilize the owner of the vessel it loaded as a distributor of 
its 'products' and thus did not take advantage of an indirect 
marketing scheme and received no economic benefit, either direct 
or indirect, from the residents of Washington."  Id.   
¶44 In Real Properties the Minnesota Supreme Court found 
no personal jurisdiction over a New Jersey company.  The New 
Jersey company had been hired by a Minnesota firm, Barrett 
No. 99-3144 
 
 
27
Moving & Storage (Barrett), to package Chinese art pieces for 
shipment.  The Barrett drivers loaded the crates onto Barrett 
trucks and Barrett hauled the goods from New Jersey to 
Minneapolis, Minnesota.  Upon arrival in Minneapolis it was 
discovered that many of the art pieces were broken.  In the 
ensuing court action, the plaintiff argued that the New Jersey 
firm's negligence in packing caused the breakage.  The question 
decided by the Minnesota Supreme Court was whether or not the 
New Jersey company had sufficient contacts with the forum state 
to 
permit 
it 
to 
exercise 
personal 
jurisdiction. 
 
Real 
Properties, 427 N.W.2d at 667.  The court did not find the 
minimum contacts inquiry satisfied and did not analyze the "fair 
play and substantial justice issue."   
¶45 Finally, in Global Servicios a Columbian corporation, 
working in Columbia, packed household goods and forwarded for 
shipment.  "The goods were packed in Columbia by Global, flown 
to Miami by Lineas Aereas del Caribe (LAC), stored in Miami by 
Inter-American, and trucked to New Jersey by Pride Movers, Inc." 
 Id. at 674.   The goods were damaged at some point in this 
process.  The federal district court concluded that Global did 
not have sufficient minimum contacts with Florida to subject it 
to jurisdiction in that state.  The court noted that Miami is 
the port of entry for air cargo from Columbia.  It concluded 
that Global's contact with Florida was "merely fortuitous and 
was made yet more tenuous by LAC's air transport of the goods 
from Bogota to Miami and by Inter-American's storage of the 
goods once they reached Miami."  Id. at 675.   
No. 99-3144 
 
 
28
¶46 In the case at hand, the cargo container’s arrival in 
Wisconsin was not "merely fortuitous" as was the passage of 
goods through Miami in Global Servicios or, arguably, the 
docking of a vessel in Seattle in American President Lines.  The 
goods were purchased by CTI and intended for delivery in this 
forum; the goods did not fortuitously, randomly, or even 
erringly appear here.  In contrast to the events in Real 
Properties, this was not a one-time transaction.  CTI had been 
purchasing Binda's products since 1991; L'Arciere was loading 
cargo containers under contract with Binda from 1996 through May 
of 1998.  During this period, numerous cargo containers were 
packed by L'Arciere, destined for Wisconsin.  Thus, we conclude 
that L'Arciere was not an anonymous entity packing goods for 
shipment somewhere in the global marketplace.  As a result, we 
conclude that the mere fact that the activity L'Arciere engaged 
in was packing cargo containers does not automatically make the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction unfair.  The larger question, 
and what we believe L'Arciere is attempting to argue, is whether 
a nonresident, unconsenting business entity engaged in loading 
or stowing goods will always avoid personal jurisdiction because 
it is unfair or unreasonable.  We decline to adopt the "per se" 
analysis offered by L'Arciere. 
¶47 In considering the burden on the defendant, we of 
course recognize that like the defendant in Asahi, the defendant 
here is located beyond our national boundaries and will have to 
defend itself in a foreign nation's judicial system.  L'Arciere 
also contends that, as in Asahi, the real dispute is between two 
No. 99-3144 
 
 
29
nonresidents, Binda and L'Arciere.  The contract between Binda 
and L'Arciere contains a choice of forum provision and L'Arciere 
contends that determination of this dispute in this forum would 
violate that agreement.  We find, however, that the feature that 
distinguishes Asahi from the case at hand is that in Asahi, the 
injured plaintiff, a California resident, was no longer a part 
of 
the 
action, 
having 
reached 
a 
settlement 
agreement.  
Therefore, we do not view this case as merely one between two 
nonresident parties.  Kopke is still a party, and very 
interested.  Further, the facts of Asahi are substantially 
different from the present case.  The Supreme Court found it 
unfair to exercise personal jurisdiction over a Japanese 
manufacturer of parts, who sold its product to a Taiwanese 
manufacture, who subsequently incorporated those parts into a 
product that was sold in California.  The present case does not 
present an analogous sale of goods scenario.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the unfairness found by the Court in Asahi is not 
present here. 
¶48 In sum, the defendant must make a "compelling case" 
that other consideration make the exercise of jurisdiction 
unreasonable.  Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.  We conclude that 
L'Arciere has not met this burden.  As a result, we affirm the 
circuit court and conclude that personal jurisdiction over 
L'Arciere is permissible under both the Wisconsin long-arm 
statute and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 The case is remanded to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
No. 99-3144 
 
 
30
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  99-3144.npc 
 
1 
¶49 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. (dissenting).  I join the 
dissent of Justice DIANE S. SYKES, however, I write separately 
as 
to 
the 
majority's 
conclusion 
that 
the 
evidence 
here 
establishes minimum contacts.  If what the majority concludes 
qualifies as minimum contacts is indeed sufficient, then there 
is, in effect, nothing left of the doctrine of minimum contacts, 
which would limit the reach of a state court's jurisdiction.  
According to the majority, a foreign company or organization 
need only provide a service to establish minimum contacts, even 
though the evidence presented fails to establish that that 
foreign company or organization had any knowledge that it was 
processing a product for arrival in a particular forum.  See 
majority op. at ¶37.  The potential implication of the 
majority's decision today on foreign trade is significant and 
cannot be ignored.  Indeed, the United States Supreme Court may 
need to settle finally the scope of the stream of commerce test. 
 The majority has woven a justification for finding that 
L'Arciere 
is 
subject 
to 
this 
state's 
jurisdiction, 
notwithstanding the limits of due process.  There is very 
little, if anything, to tie L'Arciere to Wisconsin, certainly 
nothing that it "should reasonably anticipate being haled into 
court" here.  World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 
286, 297 (1980).13   
                     
13 In Zerbel v. H. L. Federman & Co., 48 Wis. 2d 54, 60, 179 
N.W.2d 872 (1970), this Court recognized that, "[a]s to the 
limits imposed by due-process standards, federal decisions are 
controlling."  I agree with the majority's conclusion that the 
five-factor test set forth in Zerbel has been subsumed into due 
No.  99-3144.npc 
 
2 
¶50 I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion 
that Kopke met his burden of establishing the requisite minimum 
contacts between Wisconsin and L'Arciere.  Id. at 291.  I take 
issue, particularly, with the majority's transformation of what 
is, at best, a prima facie case into a presumption.  The 
majority states that "[c]ompliance with the statute presumes 
that due process is met."  Majority op. at ¶22 (citing Lincoln 
v. Seawright, 104 Wis. 2d 4, 10, 310 N.W.2d 596 (1981)).  Even 
if the defendant can rebut that presumption, it is a presumption 
nonetheless, according to the majority.  Lincoln stated that 
compliance 
with 
Wisconsin's 
long-arm 
statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 801.05, 
constitutes 
prima 
facie 
compliance 
with 
the 
requirements of due process.  104 Wis. 2d at 10.  Lincoln, 
however, made an unsupported conclusion that the prima facie 
case somehow constituted a presumption.  See id.  This is a 
grievous error that should not be continued. 
¶51 More importantly, if compliance with the Wisconsin's 
long-arm statute presumably established due process, such a 
presumption, in and of itself, would offend due process.   
 
The 
Due 
Process Clause 
protects 
an individual's 
liberty interest in not being subject to the binding 
judgments of a forum with which he has established no 
meaningful "contacts, ties, or relations."  Although 
this protection operates to restrict state power, it 
"must be seen as ultimately a function of the 
individual liberty interest preserved by the Due 
Process 
Clause" 
rather 
than 
as 
a 
function 
"of 
federalism concerns." 
                                                                  
process standards adopted by the United States Supreme Court.  
See majority op. at ¶23 n.9.   
No.  99-3144.npc 
 
3 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 & n.13 
(1985) (internal citations omitted).  Due process limits a 
state's power to reach beyond its borders and take jurisdiction 
of those from outside of its borders.  Taking the majority's 
presumption to its logical end, the legislature could enact a 
long-arm statute with no limits and then, presumptively, 
abrogate due process.  This cannot be. 
¶52 Even if the majority’s conclusion that Wisconsin’s 
long-arm 
statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
801.05(4)(b), 
applies 
to 
L'Arciere's activity is correct, due process indeed limits the 
reach of personal jurisdiction.  The limit of that reach is 
premised 
upon 
one 
of 
the 
most 
basic 
of 
due 
process 
rightsnotice.  Not notice of the impending suit, but notice 
that one could even be subject to a suit in the forum state. 
 
When a corporation "purposefully avails itself of the 
privilege of conducting activities within the forum 
State," it has clear notice that it is subject to suit 
there, and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome 
litigation 
by 
procuring 
insurance, 
passing 
the 
expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks are 
too great, severing its connection with the State. 
Id. at 297 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 
(1958)).  Potential defendants must have "fair warning that a 
particular activity may subject [them] to the jurisdiction of a 
foreign sovereign."  Burger King, 471 U.S. at  472 (quoting 
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., 
concurring)).  The fair warning requirement is met where the 
defendant "purposefully directs" its activities towards forum 
residents.  Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472, 473.     
No.  99-3144.npc 
 
4 
¶53 As the majority acknowledges, "purposeful availment" 
is the main cord of the minimum contacts analysis.  See majority 
op. at ¶24.  "Purposeful availment" is comprised of a number of 
interwoven components, one of which is whether the defendant has 
"purposefully directed" its activities at the forum.  It is on 
this component that a majority of the United States Supreme 
Court could not agree in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior 
Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).14  In short, Justice 
O'Connor, speaking for a plurality of four justices, advocated a 
more restrictive test, by requiring specific acts by which a 
defendant purposefully directed its activities toward the forum 
state, in addition to the defendant's awareness and placement of 
a product into the stream of commerce.  Id. at 112.  Justice 
Brennan, speaking for a plurality of four other justices, 
disagreed.  As the majority of this court noted (at ¶29), 
Justice Brennan concluded that so long as there is "regular and 
anticipated flow of products from manufacturer to distribution 
to retail sale," and the defendant "is aware that the final 
product is being marketed in the forum State," the defendant 
benefits "from the State's laws that regulate and facilitate 
commercial activity," including the sale of the product, "the 
possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise."  
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring).  The majority 
                     
14 The United States Supreme Court has not extensively 
analyzed the "purposefully directed" component of the due 
process minimum contacts test since Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. 
Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).  
No.  99-3144.npc 
 
5 
here adopts Justice Brennan's approach, relying upon Dehmlow v. 
Austin Fireworks, 963 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1992), even though 
Dehmlow also examined whether the jurisdictional facts satisfied 
Justice O'Connor's test "in recognition of the recent split of 
Supreme 
Court 
authority 
on 
this 
issue." 
 
Id. 
at 
947.  
Nonetheless, 
assuming, 
arguendo, 
that 
Justice 
Brennan's 
approach, which pertains to the sales and distribution of goods, 
rather than providing a service (see Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 
(Brennan, J., concurring)), applies here,15 the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction in this case would violate due process. 
¶54 Here, there is nothing that suggests that L'Arciere 
purposefully directed any activity toward Wisconsin which would 
establish minimum contacts.  It is undisputed that L'Arciere has 
not, and does not, do business in Wisconsin.  It has no office, 
employees, or property in Wisconsin.  It does not advertise or 
otherwise solicit business in Wisconsin.  It did not create or 
control Binda's distribution system that brought the paper to 
Wisconsin.  Nor is there evidence that L'Arciere processed the 
paper for its sale in Wisconsin.  Binda paid L'Arciere for labor 
regardless of when, where, or even if the paper was delivered. 
                     
15 The 
majority 
glosses 
over 
this 
point, 
summarily 
concluding that the due process analysis from cases which 
involve strict products liability claims applies here because 
"Kopke's injuries arose out of commercial activities."  Majority 
op. at ¶31.  I am not persuaded.  Even under the majority's 
test, which presumably is the one most favorable to its 
conclusion, exercising personal jurisdiction over L'Arciere runs 
afoul of due process.  
No.  99-3144.npc 
 
6 
¶55 The majority relies upon three factors that it 
concludes 
establishes 
L'Arciere's 
minimum 
contacts 
with 
Wisconsin and each fails to establish such. The first is 
L'Arciere's contract with Binda.  See majority op. at ¶33.16  The 
United States Supreme Court stated clearly in Burger King that a 
contract alone does not establish minimum contacts.  471 U.S. at 
478.  Moreover, the contract was between two Italian companies. 
There is no evidence that L'Arciere, at any time, contracted 
with a Wisconsin company.  The fact that L'Arciere employees 
worked with Binda employees does not establish the requisite 
awareness that L'Arciere was purposefully making contact with 
this forum.  See majority op. at ¶33.  There certainly does not 
appear to be any "purposeful availment." 
¶56 Second, 
the 
majority 
relies 
upon 
the 
loading 
instructions which "identified the container's destination."  
Majority op. at ¶34.  According to the majority, these 
instructions show that the paper products L'Arciere packed for 
Binda "were specifically intended to arrive in this forum."  Id. 
 The loading instructions prove no such thing.  These one-page, 
handwritten instructions detail the calculations of the weight 
of the containers and sketch the placement of the containers.  
                     
16 Also, the majority contends (id. ¶33), this case is not 
like Asahi.  I agree.  We do not have before us a manufacturer 
as the defendant, which shipped the allegedly defective part to 
another international forum, which, in turn, was incorporated 
into the product that was shipped into the forum state.  Asahi, 
480 U.S. at 105-107.  This distinction, however, is immaterial 
to L'Arciere's contract with Binda, which hardly establishes a 
contact with this state.  
No.  99-3144.npc 
 
7 
They also state, "x [to] CTI," "x [to] Appleton," and "x [to] 
Neenah."  Nowhere is there any indication that CTI, Appleton, or 
Neenah are located in the United States, let alone in Wisconsin. 
¶57 Third, the majority relies upon evidence that at least 
40 
containers 
were 
loaded 
by 
L'Arciere 
for 
delivery 
to 
Wisconsin.  Majority op. at ¶35.  This evidence comes from 
damage reports CTI completed when it received the shipments from 
Binda.  Id. at ¶35.  These reports record damage that apparently 
occurred 
in 
shipment, 
noting 
where 
the 
containers 
were 
"scraped," or "dirty," or "corner gouged."  However, these 
reports do not, and could not, establish, ex post facto, that 
L'Arciere was aware that those containers were headed for 
Wisconsin.  It is this thread, L'Arciere's supposed awareness, 
which, when pulled, unravels the majority's conclusion. 
¶58 Under either Justice O'Connor's or Justice Brennan's 
test for whether a defendant has purposefully directed its acts 
towards the forum state, the defendant must be aware, at a 
minimum, that its product could reach the forum state.  See 
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105; see also id. at 117 (Brennan, J., 
concurring).  This relates back to the due process requirement 
that the defendant must have "'clear notice that it is subject 
to suit' in the forum," and that it is thus afforded an 
"opportunity to 'alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation.'" 
 Burger 
King, 
471 
U.S. 
at 
476 
n.17 
(quoting 
World-Wide 
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297).  Awareness exists, for example, 
where the defendant "delivers its products into the stream of 
commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by 
No.  99-3144.npc 
 
8 
consumers in the forum State."  World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 
at 298 (emphasis added).  
¶59 Based on the information presented, it is reasonable 
to conclude that L'Arciere had neither the awareness nor the 
expectation that the paper products it packed would be shipped 
to Wisconsin.  There is no indication that L'Arciere knew 
specifically that some were destined for Wisconsin.  None of the 
loading plans produced by Binda contained the words "Wisconsin" 
or "U.S.".  Other plans refer only to "Neenah," "Appleton," or 
only to "CTI."  As L'Arciere pointed out in its brief before 
this court: 
 
There are no less than three Neenahs in the United 
States 
(one 
apiece 
in 
Alabama, 
Virginia, 
and 
Wisconsin); two dozen Appletons within and without the 
United States; and literally hundreds of locations 
around the world where one may find corporations in 
whose name the letters "CTI" play a prominent part. 
Br. of Def.-Appellant at 27.  These references to "Neenah," 
"Appleton," and "CTI" cannot establish minimum contacts.  Also, 
presumably, had L'Arciere been aware that its packing of paper 
might "create a 'substantial connection' with" Wisconsin (Burger 
King, 471 U.S. at 475 (citation omitted)), L'Arciere might have 
procured insurance to alleviate the risk of litigation.  World-
Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.  However, it is undisputed 
that 
L'Arciere’s 
liability 
insurance 
coverage 
specifically 
excluded the United States and Canada.  L'Arciere, since it 
appears to have been unaware of the risk, could not assess that 
risk. 
No.  99-3144.npc 
 
9 
¶60 To find the requisite awareness, the majority adopts 
Kopke's argument that L'Arciere had "constructive knowledge" 
that the paper was being shipped to Wisconsin.  We should be 
wary of an attempt to reach beyond the limits of due process 
based upon such a contention.  First, Kopke points to no 
evidence which would establish that L'Arciere should have known 
the containers were headed here.  Second, and more importantly, 
the purportedly "analogous" cases are wholly inapposite.  See 
majority op. at ¶38.  Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display 
Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 610 (8th Cir. 1994) and Oswalt v. 
Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1980) both involve 
distribution 
contracts 
under 
which 
the 
defendants 
were 
reasonably aware, or even expected, that their product would 
reach the forum state.  In Barone, the Eighth Circuit found that 
Nebraska 
could exercise 
personal 
jurisdiction 
over 
Hosoya 
Fireworks Co. of Tokyo, Japan, consistent with due process.  25 
F.3d at 610-611.  This was due to the distribution agreement 
Hosoya had with Rich Bros.  "Hosoya certainly benefited from the 
distribution efforts of Rich Bros., and although Hosoya claims 
to have had no actual knowledge that Rich Bros. distributed 
fireworks into Nebraska, such ignorance defies reason and could 
aptly be labeled 'willful'"  Id. at 613 (footnote quoted by the 
majority at ¶38 omitted).17   Similarly, in Oswalt, the Fifth 
                     
17 It is noteworthy that Barone referred to Giotis v. Apollo 
of the Ozarks, Inc., 800 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1986), "that appears 
to be on all fours with the case before" the Barone court.  
Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 
610, 612 (8th Cir. 1994).  Giotis determined that a Wisconsin 
court would have jurisdiction over Missouri defendants in their 
No.  99-3144.npc 
 
10
Circuit found that the defendant should have known that its 
products would be marketed and sold in the forum state, Texas, 
based upon the defendant's exclusive distribution arrangement.  
616 F.2d at 199-200.  "[T]he record shows that [the defendant] 
had every reason to believe its product would be sold to a 
nation-wide market, that is, in any or all states."  Id. at 200. 
 To the contrary here, there is nothing in the record which 
would have given L'Arciere reason to believe that, due to a 
distribution agreement it had with a distributor in the United 
States, the paper it packed would end up in Wisconsin.  The 
cases wherein constructive knowledge established awareness, 
                                                                  
role as heads of a distribution network.  800 F.2d at 662, 667-
668. Giotis explained the economic context of a distribution 
network, which would give rise to finding that a manufacturer, 
or seller, should be aware that its product might reach, and 
thus establish a contact with, any number of states. 
[T]he seller-defendant, particularly if at the head of 
a distribution network, realizes the much greater 
economic benefit of multiple sales in distant forums, 
of which the purchase by the particular buyer who has 
brought suit is merely one example.  A seller, since 
it realizes this greater economic benefit, may more 
easily satisfy the purposeful availment test and be 
sued by a buyer in the buyer's forum than a buyer may 
be sued by the seller in the seller's forum.  This is 
especially true where the seller is at the head of a 
distribution network and thus even more clearly has 
"purposefully availed" itself of the economic benefits 
of selling to buyers in distant forums. 
 
Id. at 667 (footnote and citations omitted).  Clearly, we do not 
have this same economic framework here, making the "should have 
known" test for awareness inapplicable.  L'Arciere is not a 
seller-defendant, and certainly is not at the head of a 
distribution network. 
No.  99-3144.npc 
 
11
sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction, rest upon an 
entirely different relationship between the defendant and the 
forum state, than the one we have here.18  That distribution link 
between L'Arciere and Wisconsin does not exist here.  In fact, 
no meaningful link exists between the two.  
¶61 The majority attempts to create a link, however, a 
link through Binda's contacts with Wisconsin.  According to the 
majority,  
 
L'Arciere, by virtue of its business relationship with 
Binda, benefited from 
the distribution 
of 
Binda 
products to this forum.  "A defendant who has placed 
goods in the stream of commerce benefits economically 
from the retail sale of the final product in the forum 
State, and indirectly benefits from the State's laws 
that regulate and facilitate commercial activity."  
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring).  
Majority op. at ¶36.  However, L'Arciere did not benefit 
economically from the fact that the paper it packed was 
delivered to Wisconsin. Binda did.  L'Arciere economically 
benefited from packing the paper.  L'Arciere did not, in any 
way, depend upon Wisconsin for any economic benefit.  It would 
have been paid to pack the paper, whether that paper was sent to 
Wisconsin or to Paris, France, or Paris, Texas.  Such is evident 
from L'Arciere's contract with Binda, which did not specify that 
its work, or payment, was dependent upon the destination of the 
                     
18 Visibly missing from the cases relied upon by the 
majority is a truly analogous case where personal jurisdiction 
has been exercised over a non-resident defendant, based solely 
upon that defendant's preparation of goods to be shipped by 
another to the forum State. 
No.  99-3144.npc 
 
12
cargo.  Indeed, L'Arciere failed to "'purposefully derive [any] 
benefit'" from Wisconsin.  Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473.    
¶62 "[I]t is essential in each case that there be some act 
by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the 
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus 
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."  Id. at 475 
(quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (emphasis 
added)).  Another strand in the cord of "purposeful availment," 
in addition to the defendant's awareness, is the defendant's 
conduct that indicates that the defendant is availing itself of 
the benefit of the forum state, so that it would reasonably 
anticipate litigation there.  Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474.  
Here, however, there is admittedly no such conduct by L'Arciere, 
and the majority refers only to the contract between Binda and 
L'Arciere, the loading instructions, and the damage reports.  
See majority op. at ¶¶33-35.  
¶63 That the majority is creating a minimum contacts test 
based upon foreseeability is evident from its reliance upon 
Kopke's allegation that L'Arciere negligently loaded the pallet 
containing the paper, which injured Kopke when he opened it.  
Majority op. at ¶31, 33.  The premise for the majority's 
reliance 
upon 
Kopke's 
allegation 
is 
that 
if 
L'Arciere 
negligently packed the paper, it was foreseeable that he would 
be injured in Wisconsin.  This approach was plainly rejected by 
the United States Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen.  
There, the Court held that jurisdiction in Oklahoma cannot be 
based upon "the fortuitous circumstance that a single Audi 
No.  99-3144.npc 
 
13
automobile, sold in New York to New York residents, happened to 
suffer an accident while passing through Oklahoma," even though 
it had been argued that the injury in Oklahoma was foreseeable 
because the Audi was mobile.  World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 
295.  "If foreseeability were the criterion  . . . a Wisconsin 
seller of a defective automobile jack could be haled before a 
distant court for damage caused in New Jersey . . . ." Id. at 
296 (citation omitted).  Indeed, World-Wide Volkswagen stands 
for 
the 
proposition 
that 
neither 
injury 
nor 
causation 
establishes personal jurisdiction.  An allegation regarding 
causation is not a jurisdictional fact, and I note that the 
majority fails to rely upon any cases in seeming to so hold that 
it is. 
¶64 What remains as the contact between L’Arciere and 
Wisconsin 
is 
only 
the 
link 
created 
by 
Binda 
and 
CTI, 
specifically that "not insignificant volume of business between 
CTI and Binda."  Majority op. at ¶32.  The amount of business 
between two third-parties has never been the basis of a court's 
exercise of personal jurisdiction.  Again, the majority is 
relying upon a foreseeability minimum contacts test, in order to 
assert Wisconsin's jurisdiction over L'Arciere, and such an 
approach is dependent upon L’Arciere foreseeing, or, in the 
words of the majority, "expect[ing]" that the paper it packed 
"arrive" in Wisconsin.  Majority op. at ¶32 (emphasis added).  
However, "'foreseeability' alone has never been a sufficient 
benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process 
Clause."  World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295.   
No.  99-3144.npc 
 
14
 
[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process 
analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product 
will find its way into the forum State.  Rather, it is 
that the defendant's conduct and connection with the 
forum State are such that he should reasonably 
anticipate being haled into court there.  The Due 
Process 
Clause, 
by 
ensuring 
the 
"orderly 
administration of the laws," gives a degree of 
predictability 
to 
the 
legal 
system 
that 
allows 
potential 
defendants 
to 
structure 
their 
primary 
conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that 
conduct will and will not render them liable to suit. 
Id. 
at 
297 
(citations 
omitted). 
 
Here, 
the 
requisite 
foreseeability, inextricably linked to the notice element of due 
process, is ostensibly missing.  There is very little, if 
anything, that would put L’Arciere on notice that it was 
handling a product that was intended for Wisconsin.  There was 
nothing that would have led to the prediction that their packing 
of containers headed for a "Neenah" or an "Appleton" would 
result in defending an action in Wisconsin, or even in the 
United States.  L'Arciere would have had to have known that 
Appleton and Neenah were located in Wisconsin.  The contact, 
established only through Binda, "is far too attenuated a contact 
to justify [this] State's exercise of in personam jurisdiction 
over" L’Arciere.  Id. at 299.  
¶65 Even under Justice Brennan's less restrictive stream 
of commerce test in Asahi, the necessary minimum contacts are 
not found here.  The majority, in finding to the contrary, rents 
the fabric of due process.  If, as the majority concludes, the 
jurisdictional facts in this case establish minimum contacts, 
little predictability remains for potential plaintiffs and 
No.  99-3144.npc 
 
15
defendants in the present world economy.  Perhaps, it is time 
for the United States Supreme Court again to provide guidance as 
to the scope of due process as related to minimum contacts.  For 
the reasons stated herein, I respectfully dissent. 
¶66 I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX 
and Justice DIANE S. SYKES join this dissent. 
 
 
 
 
No.  99-3144.dss 
 
1 
¶67 DIANE S. SYKES, J. (dissenting).  I join Justice 
Crooks' dissent.  I agree that Wisconsin's long-arm statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 801.05(4)(b), has been satisfied, but that due 
process precludes the assertion of personal jurisdiction over 
L'Arciere.  I write separately because I disagree with the 
majority's adoption of the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of 
the statute in Nelson v. Park Industries, Inc., 717 F.2d 1120 
(7th Cir. 1983). 
¶68 In Nelson, the Seventh Circuit held that the statute's 
reference to "products . . . processed . . . by the defendant 
[and] used or consumed within this state" included the actions 
of a foreign distributor who did nothing more than buy and 
resell goods.  Id. at 1124.  I am not fully convinced that the 
transactional act of buying and reselling a product in the 
ordinary course of trade constitutes "processing" for purposes 
of our long-arm statute.  But that issue need not be decided 
here, and so I would not adopt Nelson's interpretation of the 
statute.  
¶69 Instead, I would conclude that the particularized 
packaging 
procedure 
carried 
out 
by 
L'Arciere 
employees 
constituted "processing" as that term is commonly and ordinarily 
understood.  "To process" is "to treat or prepare by a special 
method."  Funk & Wagnalls New International Dictionary of the 
English Language 1005 (Comprehensive Millennium Ed. 2000). 
¶70 L'Arciere employees packaged and secured the paper 
pallets for shipment in cargo containers according to a detailed 
method——complete with bracing beams, boards, and inflated air 
No.  99-3144.dss 
 
2 
bags——prescribed by Binda's loading plans.  This is a form of 
"processing."  As such, the long-arm statute has been satisfied, 
although the requirements of due process have not, for the 
reasons stated by Justice Crooks.  Accordingly, I join his 
opinion, and respectfully dissent. 
¶71 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX 
and N. PATRICK CROOKS join this dissenting opinion.