Title: Bowen v. Sheldon

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Bowen v. Sheldon, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-921.] 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-921 
BOWEN v. SHELDON, WARDEN. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Bowen v. Sheldon, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-921.] 
Petition for writ of habeas corpus — Cause dismissed. 
(No. 2010-0077 — Submitted February 16, 2010 — Decided March 16, 2010.) 
IN HABEAS CORPUS 
__________________ 
{¶ 1} This cause is before the court upon a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus of Dusten I. Bowen.  Sua sponte, the cause is dismissed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., 
concur. 
 
O’CONNOR, J., concurs separately. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents and would grant the writ. 
 
LANZINGER, J., dissents and would order a return on the writ. 
__________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, J., concurring. 
{¶ 2} Because Dusten Bowen has an adequate remedy at law, I concur in 
the decision to dismiss his habeas corpus petition.  I am compelled to write 
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separately, however, to explain my disagreement with Justice Lanzinger’s 
conclusion. 
{¶ 3} Bowen pled guilty to unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, a 
fourth degree felony.  The trial court’s August 20, 2003 sentencing entry states 
that: 
{¶ 4} “Defendant is notified that after prison release the Parole Board 
may impose a period of post release control and any violation of post release 
control conditions may result in the Adult Parole Authority of Parole Board 
imposing a more restrictive or longer control sanction, or return Defendant to 
prison for up to nine (9) months for each violation, up to a maximum of [one-half] 
of the stated prison term.  If the violation is a new felony, Defendant may receive 
a prison term of the greater of one year of the time remaining of post release 
control, in addition to any other prison term imposed for the new offense.” 
{¶ 5} Neither Bowen nor the state appealed from Bowen’s sentence.  
Bowen completed his sentence on March 23, 2005 and was then placed on 
postrelease control by the Adult Parole Authority. 
{¶ 6} While he was on postrelease control, Bowen was indicted for 
trafficking in cocaine and pled guilty to the offense on February 23, 2006.  On 
March 22, 2006, he was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment for trafficking in 
cocaine and ordered to serve an additional two-year prison term for the 
postrelease control violation.  The sentences were ordered to be served 
consecutively. 
{¶ 7} I agree with Justice Lanzinger that Bowen was never properly 
placed on postrelease control for his conviction for unlawful sexual conduct with 
a minor.  Because postrelease control was never properly imposed, I also agree 
with Justice Lanzinger that it follows that Bowen’s sentence for violating 
postrelease control is contrary to law and void.  However, it does not follow, as 
Justice Lanzinger concludes, that a return on the writ sought by Bowen is proper. 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
{¶ 8} Justice Lanzinger’s conclusion discounts our long-standing 
precedent that a writ of habeas corpus is only warranted in certain extraordinary 
circumstances where there is an unlawful restraint of a person’s liberty and there 
is no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  In re Complaint for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus for Goeller, 103 Ohio St.3d 427, 2004-Ohio-5579, 816 N.E.2d 
594, ¶ 6; Johnson v. Timmerman-Cooper (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 614, 616, 757 
N.E.2d 1153. 
{¶ 9} As we noted in State ex rel. Jaffal v. Calabrese, 105 Ohio St.3d 
440, 2005-Ohio-2591, 828 N.E.2d 107, ¶ 5:  
{¶ 10} “Sentencing errors by a court that had proper jurisdiction cannot be 
remedied by extraordinary writ.  See, generally, Majoros v. Collins (1992), 64 
Ohio St.3d 442, 443, 596 N.E.2d 1038 (habeas corpus); Smith v. Warren (2000), 
89 Ohio St.3d 467, 468, 732 N.E.2d 992 (prohibition); State ex rel. Corrigan v. 
Lawther (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 157, 158, 529 N.E.2d 1377 (mandamus).  
[Petitioner] has or had adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law, e.g., 
appeal and postconviction relief, for review of any alleged sentencing error.  See 
Smith v. Walker (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 431, 432, 700 N.E.2d  592; Childers v. 
Wingard (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 427, 428, 700 N.E.2d 588.” 
{¶ 11} Bowen had, and continues to have, an adequate remedy to correct 
the improper imposition of postrelease control.  Initially, Bowen could have filed 
a direct appeal or sought postconviction relief from the August 20, 2003 
sentencing entry while he was imprisoned.  He did not. 
{¶ 12} After he was released from prison and the Adult Parole Authority 
imposed postrelease control, Bowen could have sought relief from the imposition 
of postrelease control.  Again, he did not. 
{¶ 13} After he committed a new offense and was sentenced for violating 
postrelease control, Bowen could have filed a direct appeal from the March 22, 
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2006 sentencing entry imposing a two-year term of imprisonment for violating 
postrelease control.  Once again, he did not. 
{¶ 14} Rather than availing himself of any of these remedies, Bowen 
waited until after he completed his sentence for trafficking in cocaine and after he 
completed nearly half of his sentence for violating postrelease control before he 
made his first attempt to correct the void sentence.  He chose to do so through a 
petition to this court for a writ of habeas corpus. 
{¶ 15} Despite all of Bowen’s missed attempts to challenge the 
notification of postrelease control, he still has an adequate remedy at law.  A trial 
court’s jurisdiction over a criminal case is limited after it renders judgment, but it 
retains jurisdiction to correct a void sentence and is authorized to do so.  State ex 
rel. Cruzado v. Zaleski, 111 Ohio St.3d 353, 2006-Ohio-5795, 856 N.E.2d 263, ¶ 
19; State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, ¶ 23.  
Indeed, the trial court has an obligation to do so when its error is apparent.  State 
v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, ¶ 23.  There 
is no dispute that a void sentence was imposed. 
{¶ 16} Because Bowen is still imprisoned on the sentence imposed 
pursuant to the March 22, 2006 entry and that sentence is contrary to law, the trial 
court still has jurisdiction to correct the sentencing error.  Therefore, Bowen had, 
and still has, an adequate remedy at law.  Accordingly, his complaint for a writ of 
habeas corpus should be dismissed. 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 17} Because this court’s decisions have indicated that petitioner was 
never properly placed on postrelease control, I respectfully dissent from the 
majority’s decision to dismiss the habeas corpus petition and would instead order 
a return on the writ. 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
{¶ 18} The record indicates that Bowen never received notification that he 
would be subject to mandatory postrelease control upon his release from prison.  
In the 2003 judgment entry sentencing Bowen to five years of community control, 
Bowen was merely notified that “after prison release the Parole Board may 
impose a period of postrelease control.” (Emphasis added.)  The trial court failed 
to notify Bowen that, because his offense was a felony sex offense, he was subject 
to five years of mandatory postrelease control according to R.C. 2967.28.  A 
subsequent 2004 judgment entry revoking community control ordered imposition 
of the previously reserved 15-month prison sentence but failed to include any 
mention of mandatory postrelease control. 
{¶ 19} Upon completion of his 15-month sentence, Bowen was released 
from prison.  Afterwards, in February 2006, Bowen pleaded guilty to trafficking 
in cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A).  The court sentenced him to three 
years in prison for the drug offense, plus an additional two years in prison for 
violation of postrelease control. 
{¶ 20} This case highlights the problems with characterizing as void 
sentences that fail to include notification of mandatory postrelease control.  
Bowen was never properly notified of postrelease control; therefore, according to 
this court’s decisions, his 2004 sentence was void.  See State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio 
St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 961, ¶ 16 (“When a defendant is convicted 
of or pleads guilty to one or more offenses and postrelease control is not properly 
included in a sentence for a particular offense, the sentence for that offense is 
void.  The offender is entitled to a new sentencing hearing for that particular 
offense.”) 
{¶ 21} However, when Bowen completed his original prison term, the 
court’s decisions indicate that his completed sentence was no longer void and 
instead was fully satisfied.  In Bezak, the majority concluded that, because the 
defendant had already served his prison term, he could not be subject to 
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resentencing in order to correct the trial court’s failure to impose postrelease 
control.  Id. at ¶ 18.  This conclusion was also reached in State v. Simpkins, 117 
Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, ¶ 6 (“[I]n cases in which a 
defendant is convicted of, or pleads guilty to, an offense for which postrelease 
control is required but not properly included in the sentence, the sentence is void, 
and the state is entitled to a new sentencing hearing to have postrelease control 
imposed on the defendant unless the defendant has completed his sentence”). 
{¶ 22} Under this line of reasoning, the trial court’s failure to impose 
postrelease control on Bowen was an error in his favor, as he could not properly 
be placed on postrelease control after his release.  It follows that when the trial 
court sentenced Bowen in 2006, it never had the authority to include an additional 
two-year term of imprisonment based on a postrelease control violation, because 
Bowen was never properly placed on postrelease control.  Bowen is now in the 
midst of serving the two-year sentence for violation of his nonexistent postrelease 
control.  He is thus unlawfully restrained from his liberty, and a return on the writ 
is proper. 
{¶ 23} I do not agree with Justice O’Connor’s conclusion that Bowen has 
an adequate remedy at law.  I believe that it is important to recognize the 
distinction between sentences that are void, which are issued by a court that lacks 
jurisdiction, and sentences that are merely voidable, which are nonjurisdictional 
and can be corrected upon direct appeal.  This court has held that “[s]entencing 
errors by a court that had proper jurisdiction cannot be remedied by extraordinary 
writ.”  State ex rel. Jaffal v. Calabrese, 105 Ohio St.3d 440, 2005-Ohio-2591, 828 
N.E.2d 107, ¶ 5.  Thus, when a trial court acts with proper jurisdiction but errs, 
that error is correctable on direct appeal. 
{¶ 24} This court’s decision to label these judgments “void” opens the 
door to the habeas remedy.  To call a judgment void is to state that it is a legal 
nullity, issued by a court lacking jurisdiction.  A void judgment is not a final 
January Term, 2010 
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appealable order.  “A judgment declared void is susceptible to collateral attack at 
any time, and a defendant has a right to a writ of habeas corpus when a judgment 
is void due to lack of jurisdiction despite the availability of alternative remedies 
such as appeal.  Pegan v. Crawmer (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 97, 99-100, 666 N.E.2d 
1091.”  State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, 
¶ 47 (Lanzinger, J., dissenting).  When the trial court sentenced Bowen in 2006 to 
two years’ imprisonment because of a violation of nonexistent postrelease control, 
it lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence, and, consequently, the sentence is 
void.  Bowen is unable to appeal from the trial court’s 2006 entry, and he is left 
without any adequate remedy at law.  Based on this understanding, habeas relief 
is proper in this situation. 
{¶ 25} I have maintained my position that sentences that fail to properly 
include postrelease control should be treated as voidable, rather than void.  State 
v. Bloomer, 122 Ohio St.3d 200, 2009-Ohio-2462, 909 N.E.2d 1254, ¶ 74 
(Lanzinger, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  The majority of this 
court has nevertheless continued to call void sentences that fail to properly impose 
postrelease control.  The confusion resulting from the majority’s stance continues 
to manifest itself in cases like petitioner’s.  Given the extraordinary circumstances 
of this case and this court’s decisions declaring that sentences failing to properly 
impose postrelease control are valid upon completion of the prison term, I 
respectfully dissent and would order a return on the writ. 
__________________ 
 
Dusten I. Bowen, pro se. 
______________________