Title: Mayo v. Mayo

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Mayo v. Mayo (99-432); 173 Vt. 459; 786 A.2d 401

[Filed 26-Sep-2001]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 1999-432

                             NOVEMBER TERM, 2000

Jodi Mayo	                       }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
     v.	                               }	Lamoille Family Court
                                       }	
                                       }
Michael Mayo	                       }	DOCKET NO. 173-12-97 Ledm

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Defendant Michael Mayo appeals the Lamoille Family Court's finding of
  contempt of court  and order for sanctions which resulted in the
  modification of his and plaintiff Jodi Mayo's stipulated  final divorce
  order.  Defendant claims (1) plaintiff's motion to amend the stipulated
  final divorce  order was untimely as beyond the one year time limit for
  modification of court orders under V.R.C.P.  60(b) when the grounds for
  modification are based upon subsection (3) of that rule; (2) plaintiff 
  failed to allege a real, substantial and unanticipated change in
  circumstances when she sought  modification of the spousal maintenance
  agreement contained within the stipulated final divorce  order; (3) the
  court lacked jurisdiction to modify the stipulated final divorce order in a
  contempt  proceeding; (4) the court's contempt sanction modifying the
  property settlement portion of the  stipulated final divorce order was
  reversible error; and (5) the court's opinion on contempt is not  supported
  by adequate findings of fact, and the findings relied upon are clearly
  erroneous.  We agree  that the court's finding of contempt was erroneous,
  and that the sanctions imposed resulted in an  impermissible modification
  of the stipulated final divorce order, and accordingly reverse.   
  
       On July 31, 1998, plaintiff and defendant filed a stipulated final
  divorce order which the  family court accepted and entered that same day. 
  The order provides in part that the parties list the  marital home for
  sale, and upon its sale distribute 55% of the sale proceeds to plaintiff
  and 45% to  defendant.  Defendant was awarded possession of the home until
  it sold.  The order also provides  that defendant pay plaintiff spousal
  maintenance for five years, commencing on August 1, 1998 in  the amount of
  $1,000 per month for one year, then decreasing to $750 per month for the
  next two  years, and to $500 per month for the final two years. 

       On January 22, 1999, the family court heard defendant's motion to
  modify the final divorce  order, as well as plaintiff's objection to the
  motion and her request to enforce the final order.  At the  hearing, the
  judge recognized that both parties were at fault for the confusion and
  conflict that had  arisen between them in this contentious divorce, and
  that they had been antagonizing each other to  the detriment of their
  children.  The judge noted that the defendant had been intentionally late
  in  paying spousal maintenance to plaintiff, and that, to rectify the
  situation, "the first thing [defendant]  ought to do is he ought to pay the
  alimony on time each and every month, together with the child  support." 
  At the end of this discussion, the judge addressed defendant's counsel and
  stated "I don't 
                                      
 

  think you need an order."    

       On February 17, plaintiff signed and then filed a motion to hold
  defendant in contempt,  claiming that defendant was in violation of the
  court's January 22 "order" (FN1) that he pay the  monthly maintenance and
  child support on time.  Plaintiff alleged that at that time, defendant was
  in  arrears $850 in maintenance and $31.64 in child support payments.  In
  her motion plaintiff sought  punitive damages of $5,000 payable at the time
  of the sale of the home, if not sooner, attorney's fees,  and interest on
  the late maintenance and support payment amounts.  

       A hearing was held on this motion on April 2, and on June 22 the court
  filed its order finding  defendant in contempt.  At the hearing, the court
  stated to the parties that "the contempt process is  not one for reworking
  the original [divorce] order."  In its order on the contempt charge, the
  court  stated that defendant had not kept up on his monthly payments since
  the final divorce order had been  issued and that defendant had testified
  to this failure, so there was no question whether he had  violated the
  court's order.  The court identified the issue before it as whether
  defendant had shown  that he does not have the ability to make the required
  payments.  It found that he did not have  sufficient income to make the
  required support payments when the stipulation was presented to the  court,
  and noted that defendant had testified at the April 2 hearing that, after
  the stipulated final  divorce order was entered, his income did not change
  from its previous level.  Therefore, the court  concluded, defendant did
  not act in good faith when he signed the stipulation, and that in failing
  to  make his required payments to plaintiff he acted in willful violation
  of the stipulated final divorce  order.  A hearing was scheduled for August
  6 to determine "the appropriate means of ensuring  compliance with the
  court's order." 

       On August 5, defendant filed a "memorandum regarding sanctions
  hearing" wherein he  notified the court that he was then current on his
  child support and maintenance obligations, and  suggested the creation of
  an escrow account to guard against future arrearages.  On August 11, 
  plaintiff submitted a "memorandum regarding sanctions" which requested
  different sanctions than  the punitive damages and interest originally
  sought in her motion.  Rather, while she still sought  attorney's fees, she
  asked the court to revise the property and maintenance settlements,
  absolving  defendant from all future maintenance payments and awarding her
  possession and full ownership 

 

  of the marital home.  On September 3, the court issued its order
  sanctioning defendant for his  contempt.  The court granted plaintiff's
  request and ordered defendant to vacate the home and convey  his interest
  to plaintiff.  Defendant was to be released from owing plaintiff any future
  maintenance  payments from August 1, 1999 forward.  Plaintiff was also
  awarded $2,500 in attorney's fees.  This  order was followed by an amended
  final order wherein the court used its "equitable powers" to set  aside the
  parties' stipulated final order of divorce.  This appeal followed.

       Defendant begins his challenge to the proceedings below by assailing
  the timeliness of the  motion to modify the property settlement, claiming
  that plaintiff's motion to amend the final order  was untimely because it
  was made more than one year after the entry of the final divorce order. 
  See  V.R.C.P. 60(b)(3) (motion for relief from judgment or order, if based
  on fraud, must be made not  more than one year after the judgment or order
  was entered).  In plaintiff's August 11 "memorandum  regarding sanctions,"
  she argued that Rule 60(b)(3) could provide a means by which the property 
  settlement could be revised, based upon "fraud, misrepresentation or
  misconduct."  Plaintiff offered  that "[c]onsidering all of these factors,
  plaintiff requests that the court revise the property settlement  in such a
  way that defendant may be absolved from all future maintenance payments to
  plaintiff, and  plaintiff may move back into the homestead residence with
  the children, and be awarded full  possession and ownership of the
  residence."  This constituted the first time plaintiff sought to modify 
  the final order or raised any claim of fraud.

       The procedure for modifying a property settlement arising from a
  divorce proceeding is well  settled.  "[T]he [family] court cannot modify
  the property disposition aspects of a divorce decree  absent circumstances,
  such as fraud or coercion, that would warrant relief from a judgment 
  generally." Boisselle v. Boisselle, 162 Vt. 240, 242,