Title: Vandenberg  v. Aramark Educational Services, Inc.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 09/30/2011
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2011
____________________
1100557
____________________
David Vandenberg and Elizabeth Beene, individually and for a
class of similarly situated persons
v.
Aramark Educational Services, Inc., et al.
____________________
1100560
____________________
Chloe Compton, Morgan Peppers, and Leigh Ellen Black,
individually and for a class of similarly situated persons
v.
Compass Group, USA, Inc., d/b/a/ Chartwells, et al.
2
____________________
1100561
____________________
John Lane and Natalie Smith, individually and for a class of
similarly situated persons
v.
Sodexo, Inc., et al.
Appeals from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-10-902889; CV-10-902891; and CV-10-902894)
STUART, Justice.
On August 11, 2010, students and former students
(hereinafter referred to as "the students") of the University
of Alabama ("UA"), Auburn University ("Auburn"), and the
University of Alabama at Birmingham ("UAB") (hereinafter
referred to collectively as "the universities") filed three
separate class-action lawsuits in the Jefferson Circuit Court
challenging 
the 
legality 
of 
so-called 
"dining-dollars"
programs implemented by the universities and pursuant to which
all undergraduate students are required to pay a mandatory
dining fee each semester, which is then credited back to the
students in the form of "dining dollars" that could be spent
only at on-campus dining outlets controlled exclusively by the
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
3
food-service 
vendors 
for 
the 
universities 
–– 
Aramark
Educational Services, Inc., at UA; Compass Group, USA, Inc.,
d/b/a/ Chartwells at Auburn; and Sodexo, Inc., at UAB
(hereinafter referred to collectively as "the food-service
vendors").  On December 29, 2010, the trial court dismissed
the three actions, and the students now appeal.  We have
consolidated the three appeals for the purpose of writing one
opinion.  We affirm.
I.
In 1992, UA hired the Cornyn Fasano Group ("CFG"), a
food-service-management consulting firm, to study the dining
services available at UA and to make recommendations on how to
better administer those services.  CFG submitted its final
report to UA in July 1995, and among the recommendations made
in that report were the recommendations that UA implement a
mandatory dining fee for all full-time undergraduate students
and that UA contract with a third-party company to administer
all food services on the UA Tuscaloosa campus. 
Approximately a month after receiving the CFG report, UA
issued a notice requesting proposals from vendors interested
in operating its on-campus food services.  Aramark submitted
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
The fee was later raised to $300 per semester.
1
The dining-dollars program at UA was eventually modified
2
to 
allow 
students 
to 
spend 
their 
dining 
dollars 
at
approximately four off-campus dining establishments.
4
a proposal in October 1995 and, in June 1996, entered into a
contract with UA to operate all food services on the UA
Tuscaloosa campus, including vending machines, traditional
dining halls for students living on campus, and other
restaurant and café outlets.  Pursuant to the terms of the
contract, Aramark made an initial payment to UA to help
finance the renovation of campus dining facilities and also
agreed to pay UA an annual commission on all on-campus food
sales with a minimum annual guaranteed return.  In turn, UA
agreed to provide Aramark use of all on-campus dining
facilities and to complete renovations of certain facilities.
UA also agreed to impose a mandatory dining fee upon all full-
time undergraduate students in the amount of $200 per
semester, which would be credited back to the students as
dining dollars.   Students could then access the dining
1
dollars in their accounts by swiping their student ID cards as
payment at the Aramark outlets on campus.   At the conclusion
2
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
It appears that Auburn, unlike UA and UAB, may not
3
officially use the term "dining dollars" in association with
its mandatory dining fee; however, for convenience, and
because of the similarities between the dining programs
administered by the universities, that term is used in this
opinion to refer to Auburn's dining program as well.
5
of the academic year, students with unspent dining dollars
could request a refund of those remaining funds. 
In subsequent years, UAB and Auburn each decided to
revamp their on-campus food services in a similar fashion.  In
June 2005, UAB entered into a contract with Sodexo that was
substantially similar to the contract UA had entered into with
Aramark –– Sodexo provided funds for the renovation and/or
construction of on-campus dining facilities and agreed to pay
UAB a commission on all food sold by Sodexo while UAB granted
Sodexo exclusive control of all food services at UAB. UAB also
implemented a dining-dollars program pursuant to which each
full-time undergraduate student was charged a mandatory dining
fee of $225 each semester, then credited back an equal amount
of dining dollars to be used exclusively at Sodexo outlets on
campus. 
Auburn thereafter implemented its own dining-dollars
program beginning with the freshman class entering in the fall
semester of 2008.   In July 2007, Auburn entered into a
3
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
Students enrolled in classes prior to the fall 2008
4
semester are exempt from paying the mandatory dining fee.
6
contract with Chartwells, pursuant to which Chartwells was
made the exclusive provider of food services at Auburn in
return for paying Auburn a commission on all food-service
sales and helping to fund capital improvements to on-campus
dining facilities.  Auburn agreed to begin imposing a
mandatory dining fee of $995 per semester upon all students
living on campus and $300 per semester upon those students
living off campus.   An amount equal to that fee was then
4
placed in a dining-dollars account linked to each student's ID
card, and the student could then spend those funds at
Chartwells food outlets on campus.  Unlike students at UA,
students at Auburn and UAB cannot apply for a refund of the
unused dining dollars in their accounts at the end of the
academic year, and the programs at Auburn and UAB have not
been expanded to include any off-campus dining establishments.
On August 11, 2010, groups of students and former
students at UA, UAB, and Auburn who had paid the mandatory
dining fee at their respective universities filed three
separate actions in the Jefferson Circuit Court.  The students
named as defendants in those actions the boards of trustees
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
The universities are controlled by two boards of
5
trustees.  The board of trustees for the University of Alabama
system controls both UA and UAB; Auburn has a separate board
of trustees.  The university administrators named as
defendants by the students, all sued solely in their official
capacities, were: (1)  C. Ray Hayes, vice chancellor for
financial affairs for the University of Alabama system; (2)
Sarah B. Newton, then president pro tempore of the Auburn
board of trustees; and (3)  Dr. Donald L. Large, executive
vice president and chief financial officer at Auburn. 
7
governing 
the 
universities 
and 
certain 
university
administrators, 
as 
well 
as 
the 
food-service 
vendors
(hereinafter referred to collectively as "the defendants").5
The students specifically alleged that the universities'
exclusive 
contracts 
with 
their 
respective 
food-service 
vendors
violated § 6-5-60, Ala. Code 1975, inasmuch as those contracts
created "an unlawful trust, combine, or monopoly" and that
those contracts were unconstitutional in that they violated
the prohibition in Ala. Const. 1901, Art. IV, § 93, against
the State's "be[ing] interested in any private or corporate
enterprise."  The students suing UA and Auburn –- but not the
students suing UAB –– also alleged that UA and Auburn had
violated § 16-1-32(d), Ala. Code 1975, because the student ID
cards at those universities were effectively acting as
university-issued debit cards and the transaction fees
associated with their use were accordingly prohibited by law
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
The students sought money damages only from the food-
6
services vendors, presumably because this Court has held that
"to the extent that [an] action seeks money damages from the
State, it is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity."
Ex parte Murphy, [Ms. 1090699, May 13, 2011] ___ So. 3d ___,
___ (Ala. 2011).
8
from exceeding five percent, yet, when the commissions due
under the food-services contracts were included, those fees
were more than three times that statutory limit.  Finally, the
students also alleged that the universities and food-service
vendors had unlawfully converted their funds and transformed
them from lawful currency into dining dollars.  The students
sought class certification for their claims, a judgment
declaring the universities' contracts with the food-service
vendors to be illegal, and both injunctive relief and money
damages.6
Along with the complaints, the students also served
interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for
admissions upon the defendants.  The defendants thereafter
moved to stay discovery and for an extension of time in which
to file motions to dismiss, and, on September 24, 2010, the
trial court granted those motions, ordering that all motions
to dismiss be filed by October 1, 2010.  On that date, the
defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaints for failure
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
9
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., and, on December 29, 2010,
after conducting a consolidated hearing, the trial court
granted the defendants' motions and dismissed all pending
claims with prejudice.  On February 9, 2011, the students
filed these appeals.
II.
We explained the standard of review applicable to an
appeal of a trial court's judgment dismissing a case pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6) as follows in Crosslin v. Health Care
Authority of Huntsville, 5 So. 3d 1193, 1195 (Ala. 2008):
"In 
considering 
whether 
a 
complaint 
is
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., a court 'must accept
the allegations of the complaint as true.'  Creola
Land Dev., Inc. v. Bentbrooke Housing, L.L.C., 828
So. 2d 285, 288 (Ala. 2002) (emphasis omitted).
'"The appropriate standard of review under Rule
12(b)(6)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] is whether, when the
allegations of the complaint are viewed most
strongly in the pleader's favor, it appears that the
pleader could prove any set of circumstances that
would entitle [it] to relief."'  Smith v. National
Sec. Ins. Co., 860 So. 2d 343, 345 (Ala. 2003)
(quoting Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299
(Ala. 1993)).  In determining whether this is true,
a court considers only whether the plaintiff may
possibly prevail, not whether the plaintiff will
ultimately prevail.  Id.  Put another way, '"a Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only when it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
10
facts in support of the claim that would entitle the
plaintiff to relief."'  Id. (emphasis added)." 
III.
The students argue that the trial court erred in
dismissing: (1) their antitrust claims; (2) their § 93
unlawful-state-interest-in-a-private-enterprise 
constitutional
claims; (3) their § 16-1-32(d) excessive-transaction-fee
claims; and (4) their conversion claims.  We will consider
each group of claims in that order; however, inasmuch as the
students have named certain public entities and officials ––
the boards of trustees and administrators of the universities
–– as defendants, we first must consider the applicability of
Ala. Const. 1901, Art. I, § 14, which provides generally that
"the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any
court of law or equity."  
This Court has held that the immunity afforded the State
by § 14 applies to instrumentalities of the State and State
officers sued in their official capacities when such an action
is effectively an action against the State.  Lyons v. River
Road Constr., Inc., 858 So. 2d 257, 261 (Ala. 2003).  We have
specifically "extended the restriction on suits against the
State found in § 14 'to the state's institutions of higher
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
11
learning' and ha[ve] held those institutions absolutely immune
from suit as agencies of the State."  Ex parte Troy Univ., 961
So. 2d 105, 109 (Ala. 2006) (quoting Taylor v. Troy State
Univ., 437 So. 2d 472, 474 (Ala. 1983)).  This § 14 bar also
prohibits "actions against officers, trustees, and employees
of state universities in their official capacities."  Alabama
Agric. & Mech. Univ. v. Jones, 895 So. 2d 867, 873 (Ala.
2004).  We have, however, stated that certain causes of action
are not barred by § 14:
"'"There are four general categories
of actions which in Aland v. Graham, 287
Ala. 226, 250 So. 2d 677 (1971), we stated
do not come within the prohibition of § 14:
(1) 
actions 
brought 
to 
compel 
State
officials to perform their legal duties;
(2) 
actions 
brought 
to 
enjoin 
State
o f f i c i a l s  
f r o m  
e n f o r c i n g  
a n
unconstitutional law; (3) actions to compel
State officials to perform ministerial
acts; and (4) actions brought under the
Declaratory Judgments Act ... seeking
construction 
of 
a 
statute 
and 
its
application in a given situation.  287 Ala.
at 229-230, 250 So.2d 677.  Other actions
which are not prohibited by § 14 are:  (5)
valid inverse condemnation actions brought
against 
State 
officials 
in 
their
representative capacity; and (6) actions
for injunction or damages brought against
State officials in their representative
capacity and individually where it was
alleged that they had acted fraudulently,
in bad faith, beyond their authority or in
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
12
a mistaken interpretation of law.  Wallace
v. Board of Education of Montgomery County,
... 280 Ala. [635] at 639, 197 So. 2d 428
[(1967)]; Unzicker v. State, 346 So. 2d
931, 
933 
(Ala. 
1977); 
Engelhardt 
v.
Jenkins, 273 Ala. 352, 141 So. 2d 193
(1962)."'
"Drummond Co. v. Alabama Dep't of Transp., 937 So.
2d 56, 58 (Ala. 2006) (quoting [Ex parte] Carter,
395 
So.2d 
[65,] 
68 
[(Ala. 
1980)]) 
(emphasis
omitted).  These actions are sometimes referred to
as 'exceptions' to § 14; however, in actuality these
actions are simply not considered to be actions
'"against the State" for § 14 purposes.'  Patterson
v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So. 2d 137, 142 (Ala. 2002).
This Court has qualified those 'exceptions,' noting
that '"[a]n action is one against the [S]tate when
a favorable result for the plaintiff would directly
affect a contract or property right of the State, or
would result in the plaintiff's recovery of money
from the [S]tate."'  Alabama Agric. & Mech. Univ. v.
Jones, 895 So. 2d 867, 873 (Ala. 2004) (quoting
Shoals Cmty. Coll. v. Colagross, 674 So. 2d 1311,
1314 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995)) (emphasis added in
Jones)." 
Alabama Dep't of Transp. v. Harbert Int'l, Inc., 990 So. 2d
831, 840 (Ala. 2008).  As clarified in Harbert, these
"exceptions," including the exception for actions seeking a
declaratory judgment under the Declaratory Judgments Act,
apply only to actions against State officials, not actions
against State agencies.  Id. at 841.  The defendant boards of
trustees are corporate bodies governing the universities, and
there is no exception to the immunity afforded the State by §
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
However, although the students may seek injunctive and
7
declaratory relief against the university administrators, § 14
still immunizes those State officials from any claim for money
damages.  Harbert, 990 So. 2d at 839-41.
13
14 that would permit the trial court to entertain an action
against them, regardless of whether monetary, injunctive, or
declaratory relief is being sought.  Accordingly, the boards
of trustees are due to be dismissed as parties with regard to
all the claims alleged by the students, and we need only
consider those claims as they relate to the university
administrators and the food-service vendors.7
The students' first claim is that the dining-dollars
programs violate § 6-5-60, which states, in relevant part:
"(a) Any person, firm, or corporation injured or
damaged by an unlawful trust, combine or monopoly,
or its effect, direct or indirect, may, in each
instance of such injury or damage, recover the sum
of $500 and all actual damages from any person,
firm, or corporation creating, operating, aiding, or
abetting such trust, combine, or monopoly and may
commence the action therefor against any one or more
of the parties to the trust, combine, or monopoly,
or their attorneys, officers, or agents, who aid or
abet such trust, combine, or monopoly."
The trial court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss the
students' § 6-5-60 antitrust claims on the basis of the state-
action-immunity doctrine, a tenet of antitrust law that holds
states and their instrumentalities immune from antitrust
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
14
violations if their alleged anticompetitive behavior was in
accordance with a clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed policy of the State.  Mobile Cnty. Water, Sewer &
Fire Prot. Auth., Inc. v. Mobile Water & Sewer Sys., Inc., 567
F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1349 (S.D. Ala. 2008).  On appeal, the
students argue (1) that the state-action-immunity doctrine is
not applicable to their antitrust claims because those claims
are made under state, not federal, law, and (2) that the
application 
of 
the 
state-action-immunity 
doctrine 
is
inappropriate in this case even if it does apply to state
antitrust claims.  For the reasons that follow, we reject both
arguments.
It is well settled that "[t]he federal law relating to
monopolization governs Alabama antitrust actions."  McCluney
v. Zap Prof'l Photography, Inc., 663 So. 2d 922, 926 (Ala.
1995) (citing Ex parte Rice, 259 Ala. 570, 67 So. 2d 825
(1953)).  The state-action-immunity doctrine has been a part
of that federal antitrust law since 1943 when it was first
articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).  The United States
Supreme Court summarized Parker and the origin of the state-
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
15
action-immunity 
doctrine 
as 
follows 
in 
Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 48-49
(1982):
"[Parker] addressed the question whether the
federal antitrust laws prohibited a State, in the
exercise of its sovereign powers, from imposing
certain anticompetitive restraints.  These took the
form of a 'marketing program' adopted by the State
of California for the 1940 raisin crop; that program
prevented appellee from freely marketing his crop in
interstate commerce.  Parker noted that California's
program 
'derived 
its 
authority 
... 
from 
the
legislative command of the state,' id., at 350, and
went on to hold that the program was therefore
exempt, 
by 
virtue 
of 
the 
Sherman 
Act's 
own
limitations, from antitrust attack:
"'We find nothing in the language of the
Sherman Act or in its history which
suggests that its purpose was to restrain
a state or its officers or agents from
activities directed by its legislature.  In
a dual system of government in which, under
the Constitution, the states are sovereign,
save only as Congress may constitutionally
subtract 
from 
their 
authority, 
an
unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's
control over its officers and agents is not
lightly to be attributed to Congress.'
Id., at 350–351."
Notwithstanding the fact that this Court has previously cited
Parker and applied state-action-immunity principles to a state
antitrust claim in Twine v. Liberty National Life Insurance
Co., 294 Ala. 43, 47, 311 So. 2d 299, 302 (1975), the students
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
16
argue that the state-action-immunity doctrine should not apply
to state antitrust claims because, they say, the doctrine was
formulated 
to 
address 
federalism 
and 
state-sovereignty
concerns, and there can be no such concerns when it is alleged
that only state, as opposed to federal, antitrust laws have
been violated.  Applying the state-action-immunity doctrine in
such 
cases, 
the 
students 
argue, 
would 
be 
illogical,
effectively "giving a state agency 'state immunity' from
limitations directed specifically to the state."  (Students'
brief in case no. 1100557, p. 38.)  
However, this argument fails to recognize that the
limitations implicit in § 6-5-60 are not directed specifically
to the State; rather, they are directed to "any person, firm,
or corporation creating, operating, aiding, or abetting such
[a] trust, combine, or monopoly."  (Emphasis added.)  Indeed,
while federalism and state-sovereignty principles may have
been the primary impetus behind the formulation of the state-
action-immunity doctrine, they are not the only basis for the
doctrine.  It is also evident from Parker that the doctrine
was derived from the plain language of the Sherman Act:
"The Sherman Act makes no mention of the state
as such, and gives no hint that it was intended to
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
17
restrain state action or official action directed by
a state.  The Act is applicable to 'persons'
including corporations, § 7, 15 U.S.C.A., and it
authorizes 
suits 
under 
it 
by 
persons 
and
corporations.  § 15.  A state may maintain a suit
for damages under it, State of Georgia v. Evans, 316
U.S. 159 [(1942)], but the United States may not,
United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 [(1941)]
–– conclusions derived not from the literal meaning
of the words 'person' and 'corporation' but from the
purpose, the subject matter, the context and the
legislative history of the statute.
"There is no suggestion of a purpose to restrain
state action in the Act's legislative history.  The
sponsor of the bill which was ultimately enacted as
the Sherman Act declared that it prevented only
'business combinations'.  21 Cong. Rec. 2562, 2457;
see also at 2459, 2461.  That its purpose was to
suppress combinations to restrain competition and
attempts 
to 
monopolize 
by 
individuals 
and
corporations, 
abundantly 
appears 
from 
its
legislative history.  See Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 492, 493 and note 15 [(1940)];
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 6 Cir.,
85 F. 271 [(1898)], affirmed 175 U.S. 211 [(1899)];
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 54-58
[(1911)]."
317 U.S. at 351.  Like the Sherman Act, there is nothing in
the text of § 6-5-60 that would indicate that the Alabama
Legislature intended to restrain state actors by way of § 6-5-
60.  Nor have the students identified anything in the relevant
legislative history that would indicate as much.  In fact, if
anything, the language in § 6-5-60 allowing for recovery only
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
18
from a "person, firm, or corporation" would seem to indicate
the contrary.  
The state-action-immunity doctrine also has a logical
basis that is as relevant to state antitrust claims as it is
to federal antitrust claims.  The United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana summarized the logical
basis for granting states and their instrumentalities immunity
from liability for violating state antitrust laws as follows
in Airline Car Rental, Inc. v. Shreveport Airport Authority,
667 F. Supp. 303, 308 (W.D. La. 1987):
"The 
principles 
of 
federalism 
and 
state
sovereignty on which the Supreme Court relied in
Parker [v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943),] have no
bearing on the question whether state antitrust laws
should apply to municipalities acting pursuant to a
clearly 
expressed 
state 
policy 
permitting
anticompetitive 
conduct; however, it would be
illogical to hold that a state legislature which had
clearly articulated such a policy nevertheless
intended that a municipality acting pursuant to that
policy should be subject to liability under state
antitrust laws.  For this reason, the court will
dismiss both [the appellant's] federal and state
antitrust claims."
For all these reasons, we now reaffirm Twine, which applied
the 
state-action-immunity 
doctrine 
without 
clearly
denominating it as such and explicitly hold that the state-
action-immunity doctrine may be raised as a defense to claims
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
19
that state antitrust laws have been violated.  The university
administrators are accordingly entitled to immunity with
regard to the students' § 6-5-60 antitrust claims.  We further
note that this is consistent with our long-standing caselaw
applying federal antitrust principles to state-law antitrust
claims.  See Ex parte Rice, 259 Ala. 570, 575, 67 So. 2d 825,
829 (1953) (noting that "[w]e do not seem to have in Alabama
a statute which defines an unlawful monopoly" and accordingly
holding that the federal statutes "prescribe the terms of
unlawful monopolies and restraints of trade as they should
also be administered in Alabama"), and Parker, 317 U.S. at
350-51 ("We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or
in its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain
a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by
its legislature." (emphasis added)).  However, further inquiry
is necessary to determine if the food-service vendors may also
claim the protections of the state-action-immunity doctrine.
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) ("Midcal"), the
Supreme Court of the United States unanimously held that a
private party acting in conjunction with the state might be
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
20
entitled to state-action-immunity protection if the private
party is acting pursuant to a clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed state policy.  In discussing whether
the defendants acted pursuant to a clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed state policy, the trial court, in its
orders dismissing the cases challenging the dining-dollars
programs at UA and UAB, stated:
"Applying such law here, the court begins with
the legal basis for [UA's and UAB's] operations.
Section 264 of the Alabama constitution declares
that the University of Alabama system 'shall be
under the management and control of a board of
trustees.' 
[Section 16-47-2, Ala. Code 1975,]
provides that the board of trustees 'shall have all
the rights, powers and franchises necessary to or
promotive of the end of its creation and shall be
charged 
with 
all 
the 
corresponding 
duties,
liabilities and responsibilities.'  Further, from [§
16-47-34, Ala. Code 1975], comes the additional
power 'to organize the university by appointing a
corps of instructors, who shall be styled the
faculty of the university, and such other officers
as the interest of the university may require; to
remove such instructors or officers, and to fix
their salaries or compensation, and increase or
reduce the same at their discretion; to institute,
regulate, alter or modify the government of the
university, as it may deem advisable; to prescribe
courses of instruction, rates of tuition and price
of board and regulate the necessary expenses of
students; and to confer such degrees as are usually
conferred by similar institutions.'  (Emphasis
added.)
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
21
"The board of trustees for the University of
Alabama system has been given, both from the
constitution and from the Alabama legislature, broad
authority to operate and manage [its universities']
operations.  It is foreseeable that, in the exercise
of such authority, the board would contract food
services 
to 
third-party 
entities 
possessing
expertise in that area.  That such is foreseeable is
evidenced by [§ 41-16-27(g), Ala. Code 1975], which
generally exempts from the mandatory bid process
'contractual services and purchases of personal
property regarding the athletic department, food
services, and transit services negotiated on behalf
of two-year and four-year colleges and universities
....'
"The court agrees with the defendants that the
prerequisite of a clearly articulated policy does
not mean that the alleged anti-competitive agreement
must be specifically blessed by the legislature for
the state-action immunity to apply.  The U.S.
Supreme Court has before made clear that a clear
articulation does not require the state to declare
explicitly that it expects anticompetitive conduct
to result from legislation; instead, a clear
articulation merely requires that anticompetitive
conduct 
is 
the 
foreseeable 
result 
of 
the
legislation.  See Town of Hallie [v. City of Eau
Claire], 471 U.S. [34,] 41-43, 105 S.Ct. [1713,]
1718 (1985); see also F.T.C. v. Hospital Board of
Directors of Lee County, 38 F.3d 1184, 1189-91 (11th
Cir. 1994).
"It is certainly foreseeable that a university
would require some form of a mandated meal plan for
its students, and it is foreseeable that an
exclusive management contract would govern the
provision of meal service on campus.  Given the
broad authority of [the board of trustees for the
University of Alabama system] to govern all aspects
of campus life, including the terms, conditions and
fees for board provided to students, the clear
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
The order entered in the case dismissing the complaint
8
challenging Auburn's dining-dollars program was virtually
identical; however, the paragraph describing the legal basis
for Auburn's operations read as follows:
"Applying such law here, the court begins with
the legal basis for Auburn's operations.  Section
266 of the Alabama constitution declares that
'Auburn University shall be under the management and
control of a board of trustees.'  [Section 16-48-2,
Ala. Code 1975,] provides that the Auburn board of
trustees 'shall have all the rights, privileges and
franchises necessary to a promotion of the end of
its 
creation 
and 
shall 
be 
charged 
with 
all
corresponding 
duties, 
liabilities 
and
responsibilities.'  Further, from [§ 16-48-4, Ala.
Code 1975,] comes the additional power 'to organize
the institute by appointing a corps of instructors,
who shall be styled the faculty of the university
and such other instructors and officers as the
interest of the university may require; and to
remove any such instructors or other officers, and
to fix their salaries or compensation, and increase
or reduce the same at its discretion, to regulate,
alter, or modify the government of the university,
as it may deem advisable; to prescribe courses of
instruction, rates of tuition and fees; to confer
such academic and honorary degrees as are usually
conferred by institutions of similar character; and
to do whatever else it may deem best for promoting
the interest of the university.'  (Emphasis added.)"
22
articulation requirement for state-action immunity
is met." 8
The students challenge the trial court's conclusion that
the requirement that there be a clear articulation of a state
policy was met, arguing that it is too great a leap to
conclude that it was foreseeable that the boards of trustees
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
23
of the universities would enter into the exclusive contractual
relationships with the food-service vendors merely because
they were granted broad authority to operate and to manage the
operations of the universities.  We disagree.  As detailed in
trial court's order, the legislature has granted to the boards
of trustees broad authority to manage the operations of their
universities, and that authority certainly encompasses the
authority to enter into contracts.  That the statutes do not
explicitly state that the boards may enter into "exclusive"
contracts is irrelevant –- as one court has noted, "an
exclusive contract is merely a subset of the power to
contract."  Active Disposal, Inc. v. City of Darien, 635 F.3d
883, 886 (7th Cir. 2011).  Moreover, the legislature has also
specifically empowered the boards of trustees governing UA,
UAB, and Auburn to control the "expenses" and "fees" payable
by students at those universities, §§ 16-47-34 and 16-48-4,
Ala. Code 1975.  Accordingly, we agree with the trial court's
determination that it is "foreseeable that a university would
require some form of a mandated meal plan for its students,
and it is foreseeable that an exclusive management contract
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
We also note that the CFG report submitted to UA in 1995
9
indicates that "mandatory board plans" were required at
earlier periods in UA's history and that on-campus dining
services had been contractor-operated since 1965.
The students object to the trial court's use of § 41-16-
10
27(g), Ala. Code 1975 –– which exempts certain contracts,
including those for food services, negotiated on behalf of
universities from the State's mandatory-bid requirements –– to
bolster its finding of foreseeability because that statute was
not enacted until 2000, 6 years after the implementation of
the first dining-dollars program at UA and around 100 years
after the enactment of the first incarnation of § 6-5-60.
However, § 41-16-27(g) does not grant universities the
authority to execute contracts for food services; rather, by
exempting those specific contracts from the mandatory-bid
process, it implicitly recognizes that that authority exists.
24
would govern the provision of meal service on campus."   We
9
also hold that all other elements of the dining-dollars
programs 
implemented 
by 
the 
universities 
are 
equally
foreseeable in light of the broad authority granted the boards
of trustees in these areas.10
The students also argue that it was inappropriate for the
trial court to decide issues of foreseeability and immunity at
this stage of the proceedings.  Citing Thetford v. City of
Clanton, 605 So. 2d 835, 841 (Ala. 1992) ("Foreseeability is
an issue for the jury to resolve."), and Doe v. McRae's of
Alabama, 703 So. 2d 348, 350 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996)
("Ordinarily, foreseeability is a question of fact for the
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
We also note that this Court overruled McRae's in Ex
11
parte McRae's of Alabama, Inc., 703 So. 2d 351, 352 (Ala.
1997), 
effectively 
agreeing 
with 
the 
trial 
court's
determination that the criminal acts of the third party were
25
jury.), the students argue that foreseeability 
is an
intrinsically factual issue that a jury, not a trial court
considering a motion to dismiss, should resolve.  The
defendants, however, argue that other courts applying the
state-action-immunity 
doctrine 
routinely 
resolve
foreseeability concerns on motions to dismiss.  See, e.g.,
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 38 (1985);
Active Disposal, 635 F.3d at 889; Rectrix Aerodome Ctrs. v.
Barnstable Mun. Airport Comm'n, 610 F.3d 8, 16 (1st Cir.
2010); and Pennsylvania v. Susquehanna Area Reg'l Airport
Auth., 423 F. Supp. 2d 472, 484 (M.D. Pa. 2006). 
We agree with the defendants that the trial court
properly decided this issue.  Unlike both Thetford and
McRae's, where the issue was whether a business should be held
liable for the allegedly foreseeable criminal acts of a third
party, the issue here is whether the universities' actions in
implementing the dining-dollars programs were foreseeable
based on the power vested in the boards of trustees by the
Alabama constitution and Alabama statutes.
  By necessity,
11
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
not foreseeable as a matter of law, stating:  "[s]uffice it to
say that there had never been a similar assault on the
defendant's store premises, or any violent crimes of any
nature on those premises." 
26
this inquiry focused on the review and interpretation of the
relevant constitutional provisions and statutes, a task
traditionally reserved for the court.  Federal courts applying
the state-action-immunity doctrine typically resolve these
issues without resort to a jury, and we find no error in the
trial court's doing the same in this case.
The students also argue that the trial court erred by
deciding the immunity issue at this time, quoting Patton v.
Black, 646 So. 2d 8, 10 (Ala. 1994):  "[I]t is a rare case
involving the defense of immunity that would be properly
disposed of by dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)"  (as
quoted in the students' brief in case no. 1100557, p. 49).
However, this quotation omits the word "discretionary" from
the language of the Patton Court's actual opinion, which reads
"[t]hus, it is the rare case involving the defense of
discretionary immunity that would be properly disposed of by
a dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)."  (Emphasis added.)
The Court elsewhere in Patton discussed the difficulties
associated with the application of the discretionary-immunity
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
"Since Cranman, we analyze immunity issues in terms of
12
'State-agent' immunity, rather than 'under the dichotomy of
ministerial versus discretionary functions.'  Ex parte Hudson,
866 So. 2d 1115, 1117 (Ala. 2003)" Howard v. City of Atmore,
887 So. 2d 201, 203 (Ala. 2003).  The analysis in Cranman, a
plurality opinion, was adopted by this Court in Ex parte
Butts, 775 So. 2d 173 (Ala. 2000).
27
defense, 
stating 
that 
"[t]he 
distinction 
between 
discretionary
functions and ministerial functions is often cloudy and
difficult to discern."  646 So. 2d at 10.  That difficulty
eventually led this Court to restate the principle of
discretionary immunity in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392
(Ala. 2000).
  Discretionary immunity is not an issue in this
12
case, and, because the defendants have properly raised and
argued the state-action-immunity defense in their motions to
dismiss, the trial court's consideration of that defense was
consistent with the judicial policy that immunity issues
should be decided as early as possible once raised.  See,
e.g., Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991) ("One of the
purposes of immunity, absolute or qualified, is to spare a
defendant not only unwarranted liability, but unwarranted
demands customarily imposed upon those defending a long drawn
out lawsuit.").
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
28
The students' final argument with regard to whether the
dining-dollars programs are the foreseeable result of a
clearly articulated state policy is that they cannot be, if
only because there is a more clearly articulated state policy
that, they argue, forbids such programs.  That policy, the
students argue, is set forth in § 93 of the Alabama
Constitution of 1901, which states in relevant part that
"[t]he state shall not ... be interested in any private or
corporate enterprise."  The students argue that the dining-
dollars programs violate § 93 inasmuch as the contracts
between the universities and the food-service vendors provide
that the universities receive a percentage of each transaction
in which dining dollars are used.  Thus, the students argue,
the universities are effectively business partners with the
food-service vendors, in violation of the prohibition of such
arrangements in § 93.  See Knight v. West Alabama Envtl.
Improvement Auth., 287 Ala. 15, 20, 246 So. 2d 903, 906 (1971)
("The restraints of said Section 93 concerning being
interested in any private or corporate enterprise have been
construed to mean, with certain exceptions not here relevant,
that the State may not engage, alone or in concert with
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
29
others, in the business of any type generally characterized as
private enterprise.").
The trial court rejected this argument on the basis of
caselaw clearly indicating that § 93 does not apply to public
corporations.  See, e.g., Thomas v. Alabama Mun. Elec. Auth.,
432 So. 2d 470, 481 (Ala. 1983) ("A public corporation is a
separate entity from the State and from any local political
subdivision thereof. The prohibitions of Sections 93 and 94
are directed to the State and not to public corporations.");
and Knight, 287 Ala. at 19, 246 So. 2d at 905 ("It is well
established by the decisions of this Court that a public
corporation is a separate entity from the State and from any
local political subdivision thereof, including a city or
county, and that the prohibitions of Section 93 are directed
to the State and not to public corporations.").  The board of
trustees governing UA and UAB was organized as a public
corporation by § 16-47-1, Ala. Code 1975, and the board of
trustees governing Auburn was similarly organized as a public
corporation by § 16-48-1, Ala. Code 1975; thus, Thomas and
Knight would seem applicable.  However, the students argue
that it is inconsistent to consider the boards of trustees as
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
30
the State for immunity purposes and then in the same case
declare that they are not the State for § 93 purposes; if the
boards are the "State" for one purpose, the students argue,
they must be the "State" for other purposes.  However, while
it may seem inconsistent, the trial court correctly decided
these issues, because that is the result our caselaw dictates.
As referenced above, our caselaw is unanimous in its
treatment of § 93 and public corporations –– § 93 does not
apply to them.  See, e.g., Thomas and Knight, supra.  The
immunity that comes from § 14 and that is associated with
being part of the State, however, does not automatically
attach to all public corporations; some public corporations
are entitled to it while others are not.  In Armory Commission
of Alabama v. Staudt, 388 So. 2d 991, 993 (Ala. 1980), we
explained what more is required before a public corporation
may claim that immunity, stating:
"Whether a lawsuit against a body created by
legislative enactment is a suit against the state
depends on the character of power delegated to the
body, the relation of the body to the state, and the
nature of the function performed by the body.  All
factors in the relationship must be examined to
determine whether the suit is against an arm of the
state or merely against a franchisee licensed for
some beneficial purpose."
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
31
We have previously considered whether state universities, as
public corporations, should be entitled to that state immunity
and answered that inquiry in the affirmative.  See, e.g.,
Rigby v. Auburn Univ., 448 So. 2d 345, 347 (Ala. 1984) ("[W]e
conclude that because of the character of the power delegated
to it by the state, its relation to the state as an
institution of higher learning, and the nature of the function
it performs as an institution of higher learning, Auburn
University is an instrumentality of the state and therefore
immune to suit by the terms of Section 14 of our state
constitution.").  For those same reasons, we conclude that the
boards of trustees may be considered the State for purposes of
§ 14 state immunity, while nevertheless maintaining a status
distinct from the State for § 93 purposes because they are
organized as public corporations.  The trial court correctly
held that the dining-dollars programs are the foreseeable
result of a clearly articulated state policy.
However, although the clear-articulation-of-a-state-
policy test has been met, the Midcal test applied by courts
when determining whether to extend state-action immunity to
nonstate parties also typically requires a showing that the
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
32
alleged anticompetitive conduct is actively supervised by the
state.  445 U.S. at 105.  However, beginning with Town of
Hallie, this requirement has been relaxed when the particular
circumstances of the case make it unnecessary.  471 U.S. at
46-47 (holding that municipalities need not satisfy the second
prong of the Midcal test).  Relying on the rationale of
Zimomra v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 111 F.3d 1495 (10th Cir.
1997), the trial court found that these were such cases
because the universities had the exclusive authority both to
mandate the mandatory dining fees and to set the amount of
those fees, and the food-service vendors merely acted to
fullfil the terms of their contracts.  See Zimomra, 111 F.3d
at 1499-1500 (holding that active supervision by the state
need not be shown in a case challenging the legality of
mandatory fees attached to car rentals because the city and
the county –– not a private party –– had the ultimate
responsibility of setting those mandatory fees).  The students
argue that the rationale of Zimomra should not apply because
the food-service vendors played an active part in the
negotiations that led to the implementation of the mandatory
dining fees and the dining-dollars programs, and because the
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
33
food-service vendors exercise substantial autonomy in the
manner in which they provide food services under the
contracts.  We ultimately decline to address this issue,
however, because, by any standard, it is clear that the
universities 
actively 
supervised 
the 
challenged 
dining-dollars
programs on their respective campuses.  
Each of the universities' contracts with the respective
food-service 
vendor 
contains 
detailed 
provisions 
setting 
forth
guidelines governing nearly every facet of the food-service
vendor's on-campus operation, including menu selection and
food preparation.  The universities also retain ultimate
authority over food prices and the operating hours of the on-
campus dining outlets.  The contracts are sufficiently
comprehensive that there can be no question that the
universities are actively involved in and supervising the
food-service operations on their campuses.  Moreover, lest
there be any doubt that the contracts merely allow for the
possibility of supervision as opposed to actual supervision,
see FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 638 (1992)
("The mere potential for state supervision is not an adequate
substitute for a decision by the State."), we also note that
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
34
the contracts require the food-service vendors to file regular
reports with the universities detailing their operations.  For
example, UA's contract with Aramark requires Aramark to
"[s]ubmit quarterly reports to the university addressing
issues that affect the efficiency of the operations, security,
services, food, sanitation, and any other relevant topics, and
including back-up data and recommendations for improving the
situation."  UA's decision to raise the mandatory dining fee
from its original $200 per semester to $300 per semester is
further evidence that it is actively involved in and
supervising its dining-dollars program, as opposed to merely
deciding to implement such a program and then leaving the
details of operation to Aramark.
The defendants have established that the food-service
vendors were acting according to a clearly articulated state
policy and that their actions were actively supervised by the
universities; accordingly, they are protected by the state-
action-immunity doctrine with 
regard 
to the 
students'
antitrust claims, and the trial court did not err by
dismissing those claims.  As explained supra, the students' §
93 claims are also without merit because § 93 does not apply
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
35
to public corporations like the boards of trustees; the trial
court therefore correctly dismissed those claims as well.  We
thus turn to the UA and Auburn students' argument that the
trial court erred by dismissing their claims alleging a
violation of § 16-1-32(d).
Section 16-1-32 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
"(a) The board of trustees or any other
governing body of a public institution of higher
education as defined in Section 16-5-1 may establish
a program which provides students enrolled at the
institution 
with 
debit 
cards 
issued 
by 
the
institution.  This specific authority shall exist in
addition to any pre-existing authority to establish
such 
a 
program 
conferred 
elsewhere 
by 
the
Constitution of Alabama of 1901, or statute.
"(b) A student issued a debit card under the
program may use the card to purchase merchandise or
services available through the institution or at the
institution through a person authorized to sell
merchandise or services at the institution, or at
any other location or through any other person as
determined by the board of trustees or the governing
body.
"(c) Without limiting the generality of the
foregoing subsection, the debit card program shall
at a minimum allow a person who operates an
off-campus college bookstore which sells merchandise
or services of the same kind as the merchandise or
services that a student may purchase at a bookstore
operated on the campus of the institution under
subsection (b), to participate in the program under
the same or equivalent terms applicable to a person
authorized to sell merchandise or services under
subsection (b), and to accept a debit card payment
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
36
from a student to whom a debit card has been issued
under the program for purchase of that merchandise
or service.
"(d) A per transaction fee, not to exceed 3.25
percent of the total purchase price may be charged
the 
off-campus 
bookstore 
by 
the 
institution
administering 
the 
debit 
card 
program. 
Other
merchants may participate in the program under the
terms and conditions established by the institution.
The transaction fee for all other merchants or
vendors, irrespective of type of business, shall not
exceed five percent of the total purchase price."
In their complaints, the UA and Auburn students argue that UA
and Auburn have been charging transaction fees in excess of
the five-percent cap in subsection (d) because the commission
charged on every dining-dollars transaction exceeds five
percent even before other debit-card fees are considered.  The
defendants argue that there has been no violation of § 16-1-32
because 
the 
commission 
is 
not 
properly 
considered 
a
"transaction fee" for purposes of the statute.  The trial
court ultimately declined to reach that issue, stating:
"Finally, while 
the 
plaintiffs 
attempt 
to 
assert
a claim under [§ 16-1-32], there is no indication
that the Alabama legislature intended to create a
private cause of action for any violation of that
statute.  A private right of action cannot be
presumed; rather, '[o]ne claiming a private right of
action within a statutory scheme must show clear
evidence of a legislative intent to impose civil
liability 
for 
a 
violation 
of 
the 
statute.'
Blockbuster, Inc. v. White, 819 So. 2d 43, 44 (Ala.
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
37
2001); American Auto. Ins. Co. v. McDonald, 812 So.
2d 309, 311 (Ala. 2001).  Accordingly, no claim can
be based on [§ 16-1-32]."
Citing Corpus Juris Secundum, the students argue that the
trial court erred because, they argue, the general rule is
that when a statute imposes a duty for the benefit or
protection 
of 
particular 
individuals 
or 
classes 
of
individuals, a violation of that duty gives a right of action
to any person for whose benefit or protection the statute was
enacted.  1A C.J.S. Actions § 57.  However, by its very terms,
this rule would grant a right of action only to those
individuals for whose benefit the statute was enacted.  The
plain language of § 16-1-32 indicates that it was enacted to
open the market for university-issued debit cards to off-
campus merchants and to prevent such merchants from being
charged excessive transaction fees.  Thus, § 16-1-32 was
enacted for the benefit of merchants, not students.  Although
it is possible that excessive transaction fees, if allowed,
would be passed on from merchants to students (and the public
in general) in the form of higher across-the-board prices,
there is no indication that the legislature intended to
address that indirect possibility in § 16-1-32.  Because § 16-
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
38
1-32 was not enacted for the direct benefit of students, we
will not read into it the creation of a cause of action
available to the students at UA and Auburn.  The trial court's
dismissal of the § 16-1-32 claims is accordingly affirmed.
The students' final argument is that the trial court
erred by dismissing their conversion claims.  The trial court
does not specifically discuss these claims in its orders;
however, they were implicitly included in the final paragraph
of the orders, which stated:  "[h]aving considered the
defendants' 
contentions, 
and 
the 
plaintiffs' 
responses
thereto, the court concludes that the plaintiffs may not
maintain any of the causes of action asserted in their
complaint."  (Emphasis added.)  The defendants argue that the
reason the trial court did not address the students'
conversion claims is because, the defendants argue, the
students are asserting them for the first time on appeal.
Upon review, however, each of the complaints filed by the
students at the different universities does contain a broad
allegation of conversion.  See, e.g., brief of the students in
case no. 1100557 ("This scheme also constitutes a conversion
of the plaintiffs' funds by requiring the payment into the
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
39
dining dollars account, then transforming lawful currency into
'dining 
dollars' 
over 
which [the food-service vendor]
exercises exclusive dominion and control.").  Nevertheless,
the trial court's dismissal of the students' conversions
claims is due to be affirmed because,  even when the
allegations of the students' complaints are viewed most
strongly in their favor, it is apparent that they cannot
prevail on these claims.
"To establish conversion, one must present proof of a
wrongful taking, an illegal assumption of ownership, an
illegal use or misuse of another's property, or a wrongful
detention or interference with another's property."  Crown
Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 657 So. 2d 821, 823 (Ala. 1994).  The
complaints do not support a finding that any party took or
otherwise illegally assumed ownership of the students' funds.
There is no allegation that any party wrongfully accessed
deposit accounts belonging to the students and withdrew the
money or that any party otherwise took the funds from the
students without the students' consent.  Nor is there an
allegation that the funds were obtained through fraud,
artifice, stealth, or trickery.  See Brown v. Campbell, 536
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
40
So. 2d 920, 921 (Ala. 1988) (holding that possession obtained
through fraud, artifice, stealth, or trickery without the
consent of the owner is wrongful and will support an action
for conversion).  Rather, the only conclusion that can be
gleaned from the complaints is that the students were
presented with a lawful mandatory charge associated with
attendance 
at 
their 
chosen 
university 
and 
that 
they
subsequently consented to pay that charge as a condition of
attendance.  Undoubtedly, some of the students did not like
paying the mandatory dining fee and would have preferred to
attend their respective university without paying it; however,
the same is no doubt as true of any tuition payments.  Such
dissatisfaction, however, is not tantamount to a lack of
consent.  Because the students clearly consented to pay the
mandatory dining fee, their conversion claims fail.  See also
Jones v. DCH Health Care Auth., 621 So. 2d 1322, 1324 (Ala.
1993) ("'In order to constitute conversion, nonconsent to the
possession and the disposition of the property by defendant is
indispensable.'" (quoting 89 C.J.S. Trover & Conversion § 5,
p. 535 (1955))).
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
41
IV.
The students sued the boards of trustees governing the
universities, the administrators of the universities, and the
food-service 
vendors, 
alleging 
that 
the 
dining-dollars
programs operated by the universities violated:  (1) state
antitrust laws; (2) § 93 of the Alabama Constitution inasmuch
as it forbids the State from having an interest in a private
enterprise; (3) the rule in § 16-1-32(d) barring universities
from charging excessive transaction fees to merchants that
accept university-issued debit cards; and (4) the common-law
prohibition on conversion.  However, because the boards of
trustees are entitled to state immunity pursuant to § 14 of
the Alabama Constitution, all claims against them were
properly dismissed.  The university administrators and food-
service vendors are entitled to immunity on the asserted
antitrust claims as well, albeit state-action immunity as
opposed to state immunity; thus, the trial court's dismissal
of the antitrust claims was also proper.  Moreover, because
the universities are public corporations not subject to § 93,
because the students lack standing to pursue a cause of action
for a violation of § 16-1-32(d), and because the students have
1100557, 1100560, 1100561
42
not and cannot allege the necessary elements of a conversion
claim, the trial court also properly dismissed the students'
other claims.  Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court
are hereby affirmed.
1100557 –– AFFIRMED.
1100560 –– AFFIRMED.
1100561 –– AFFIRMED.
Woodall, Bolin, Parker, Main, and Wise, JJ., concur.
Shaw, J., concurs in the result.
Malone, C.J., recuses himself.