Title: State v. Simoneau

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Simoneau  (2001-007); 176 Vt. 15; 833 A.2d 1280

2003 VT 83

[Filed 29-Aug-2003]
[Motion to Alter or Amend Denied 6-Oct-2003]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter  of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 2003 VT 83

                                No. 2001-007

  State of Vermont                           Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
       v.                                    District Court of Vermont,
                                             Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

  Patrick Simoneau                           September Term, 2002

  Michael S. Kupersmith, J.

       Lauren Bowerman, Chittenden County State's Attorney, and Pamela Hall
  Johnson, Deputy State's Attorney, Burlington, for Plaintiff-Appellee State
  of Vermont.

       William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and John Treadwell, Assistant
  Attorney General, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee Vermont Criminal
  Justice Training Council.

       Mark E. Furlan of Abatiell Associates, P.C., Rutland, for
  Defendant-Appellant.

       Kevin J. Coyle and Joseph A. Farnham of McNeil, Leddy & Sheahan,
  Burlington, for  Intervenor-Appellee Burlington Police Department.

       Aileen L. Lachs of Mickenberg, Dunn, Kochman, Lachs & Smith,
  Burlington, for Intervenor-Appellee Burlington Police Officers'
  Association.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse (FN1), Johnson and Skoglund

  
       ¶   1.   DOOLEY, J.   In this consolidated appeal, defendant Patrick
  Simoneau  challenges the civil suspension of his motor vehicle license and
  the judgment entered on his  conditional guilty plea to driving under the
  influence, fourth offense.  The parties reserved the  following issues for
  appeal: (1) did the trial court err in denying the initial defense motion
  to suppress  and dismiss for lack of probable cause; (2) did the trial
  court err in denying defendant's motion to  reopen his motion to suppress
  and dismiss based upon newly discovered evidence; and (3) did the trial 
  court err in denying the defense access to training records of the charging
  officer as part of discovery.(FN2)  We affirm.

       ¶  2.   On September 10, 2000, defendant was arrested for suspicion
  of driving under  the influence.  He was charged with driving under the
  influence, fourth offense, and the State also  initiated civil suspension
  proceedings against him.  After being arraigned, defendant moved to
  suppress  the evidence against him and to dismiss the civil suspension
  proceedings, arguing that the officers  lacked probable cause to arrest
  him.  The trial court held a combined criminal and civil hearing on these 
  motions on December 6, 2000. 

       ¶  3.   At the hearing, Burlington Police Officer Daniel Merchand
  testified that on  September 10, 2000, he and Officer Timothy Ahonen were
  sent to investigate an altercation at a  Burlington residence.  Upon
  arriving, the officers spoke with Allen Bouchard who had a cut lip and was 
  intoxicated.  Mr. Bouchard told Officer Merchand that he had been hanging
  out and drinking with  friends and had gotten into a scuffle with
  "Patrick."  While talking with Mr. Bouchard, Officer  Merchand observed a
  man wearing plaid shorts and a light colored shirt exit through the back
  door of  the residence.  The officers were unable to locate "Patrick" and,
  finding Mr. Bouchard uncooperative,  they departed.

       ¶   4.   While walking to their patrol cars, the officers observed a
  vehicle without its headlights on, backing into a parking space.  Officer
  Merchand saw the driver, who was wearing a light  colored shirt and plaid
  shorts, exit the vehicle and begin to walk unsteadily towards the residence
  where  the altercation had taken place.  Officer Merchand yelled "Patrick,"
  and the individual looked toward  him.  When defendant was less than
  twenty-five feet from the back door of the apartment, Officer  Ahonen
  attempted to stop him from reentering the building.  When defendant
  resisted Officer Ahonen's  actions, he was placed in handcuffs to allow the
  officers to "figure out what was going on . . . ."

       ¶   5.   While defendant was detained, Officer Merchand observed his
  watery, bloodshot  eyes and detected a moderate odor of alcohol on his
  breath.  Officer Merchand then advised defendant  that he was under arrest
  for suspicion of driving under the influence.  

       ¶  6.   Defense witness Kim Jarvis also testified at the hearing. 
  She stated that she  lived at the residence where the altercation occurred
  and had been present when the officers arrived.   She observed the officers
  handcuffing defendant and stated that she had seen defendant driving
  shortly  before his arrest.

       ¶  7.   At the close of the hearing, the court granted judgment for
  the State in the civil  proceeding and denied defendant's motion to
  suppress.  The court found that Officer Merchand had  reasonable grounds to
  believe that defendant was operating a motor vehicle under the influence of 
  intoxicating liquor and that his arrest was supported by probable cause. 
  The court based its conclusions  on Officer Merchand's testimony and found
  Ms. Jarvis's testimony consistent with Officer Merchand's  observations. 
  The court made the following factual findings: (1) Mr. Bouchard indicated
  to Officer  Merchand that he had been drinking with defendant that night;
  (2) Officer Merchand observed defendant  back his vehicle into the parking
  space; (3) Officer Merchand noticed defendant's "unsteady gait;" and  (4)
  Officer Merchand yelled at defendant and got a response, which helped
  confirm his suspicion that  this was indeed Patrick.

       ¶   8.   In January 2001, defendant filed notice that he was
  appealing the civil  suspension decision.  He then retained new counsel. 
  In May 2001, defendant filed a "Renewed Motion  to Suppress and Dismiss" in
  the criminal proceeding, and asked the court to reconvene a hearing based 
  on new evidence.  The new evidence consisted of testimony of Lisa Page, who
  was present the night of  the incident but did not testify at the original
  suppression hearing; Allen Bouchard, who also did not  testify at the
  suppression hearing; Kim Jarvis; and Guy Paradee, Private Investigator. 
  The main thrust of  the proffered testimony was that the officers could not
  have seen defendant operate a vehicle.   Defendant moved to reopen the
  civil suspension proceeding on the same basis.

       ¶   9.   In May 2001, defendant served a subpoena on the Record
  Keeper at the Vermont  Criminal Justice Training Council (Council).  The
  Council runs the State Police Academy that Officer  Merchand attended for
  training at the start of his service as a police officer.  The subpoena
  requested  that the Record Keeper attend a deposition and produce all
  records regarding Officer Merchand,  including reports related to his
  training.  The Council moved to quash the subpoena.  In response, 
  defendant asserted that the records would show that Officer Merchand had
  been dismissed from the  Police Academy for lying and violation of the
  rules, and defendant wanted to use this information to  impeach Officer
  Merchand when he testified.

       ¶   10.   In June 2001, after a hearing and in camera inspection of
  the pertinent Council  records, the court granted the Council's motion to
  quash.  The court rejected the State's assertion that  the Vermont Access
  to Public Records statute barred disclosure of the records, but concluded
  that  there was "no legitimate manner" in which defendant could use the
  records at a hearing or at trial. The  court noted that defendant was
  seeking the Council's records for potential impeachment purposes,  rather
  than exculpatory use.  The court concluded that the documents contained
  information that was  "collateral at best," and even assuming that the
  court would allow such an inquiry at trial, defendant  could not use the
  records to impeach Officer Merchand under Rule 608(b) of the Vermont Rules
  of  Evidence.  At the hearing, the court also received Officer Ahonen's
  deposition testimony into evidence,  without objection, and indicated that
  it would consider this testimony as evidence when considering  defendant's
  motion to renew. 

       ¶   11.   In July 2001, the court denied defendant's renewed motion
  to suppress and  dismiss and his motion to reopen the civil proceeding. 
  The court considered the deposition testimony  of Officer Ahonen in
  reaching its conclusion and used its order to explain in greater detail the
  reasons  supporting its initial denial of defendant's motion, including
  setting out findings of fact. 

       ¶   12.   In August 2001, defendant entered a conditional guilty
  plea to driving under the  influence, fourth offense, reserving four issues
  for appeal.  We granted his motion to consolidate his  civil and criminal
  appeals, and this appeal followed.

       ¶   13.   We first address defendant's claim that the trial court
  erred in denying his initial  motion to suppress.  Defendant argues that
  the court's essential findings of fact are not supported by  the record and
  therefore its conclusion that the officers were warranted in conducting an
  investigatory  stop is erroneous.  Additionally, defendant maintains that
  the officers' use of physical force  transformed the investigatory stop
  into an arrest for which the officers lacked probable cause.

       ¶   14.   Resolution of a motion to suppress involves a mixed
  question of fact and law.   We must accept the trial court's findings of
  fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  See State v.  Lawrence, 2003 VT
  68, ¶¶ 8-9, 14 Vt. L. Wk. 221 (mem.).  The question of whether the facts as
  found  met the proper standard to justify a stop is one of law.  Id.  A
  police officer is authorized to make an  investigatory stop based on a
  reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity.  See Terry v. 
  Ohio,