Title: DAUGHERTY v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DAUGHERTY v. STATE2002 WY 5244 P.3d 28Case Number: 01-13, 01-14Decided: 04/10/2002

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

                                                                                                                                

 

 

TY 
CHARLES DAUGHERTY, 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

TY 
CHARLES DAUGHERTY, 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

            
G. Mark Garrison of Garrison & Bronnenberg, P.C., Cody, 
Wyoming.

Representing 
Appellee: 

            
Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Georgia L. 
Tibbetts, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

  

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

  

            
VOIGT, Justice. 

[¶1]      Ty Charles 
Daugherty (appellant) was convicted of two burglaries.  He was given a split sentence on the 
first burglary and sentencing was continued on the second burglary.  After his probation was revoked, he was 
given a four-to-five year sentence on each crime, with the sentences to run 
concurrently.  In these appeals, the 
appellant attacks the first sentence as violating the split sentencing statute 
and he attacks the second sentence as violating his right to speedy 
sentencing.

 

[¶2]      We affirm the 
sentence for the first burglary, but vacate the sentence for the second 
burglary.  We 
further hold that, in the future, district courts utilizing the split sentencing 
statute must first impose a minimum and maximum sentence as required by statute 
and court rule, and we overrule previous holdings to the 
contrary.

 

ISSUES

 

1.         
Whether the sentence imposed by the district court in Case No. [01-13] 
was illegal?

 

2.         
Whether the district court violated [the appellant's] constitutional 
right to speedy sentencing [in Case No. 01-14]?

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      On June 3, 1996, 
a felony information was filed charging the appellant with burglary.  This case, to which we will refer as the 
"first burglary," is the basis of Case No. 01-13.  On November 22, 1996, a felony 
information was filed charging the appellant with another burglary.  This case, to which we will refer as the 
"second burglary," is the basis of Case No. 01-14.  On February 12, 1997, a combined hearing 
was held in the two cases, at which hearing the appellant entered guilty pleas 
to both burglaries.  He was 
adjudicated guilty of both crimes and a presentence investigation was 
ordered.

 

[¶4]      A sentencing 
hearing was held on June 20, 1997.  
The district court heard the testimony of witnesses and the arguments of 
counsel.  The presentence 
investigation report and its recommendations were reviewed.  Sentencing options, including 
incarceration and probation, were discussed.  At the end of the hearing, the district 
court indicated that it had not yet reached a decision and that the matter would 
be continued.  The hearing was then 
continued until June 26, 1997.

 

[¶5]      At the continued 
hearing, the district court went to considerable length to detail its intentions 
as to sentencing on both burglaries and to explain to the appellant what those 
intentions were.  Because the 
district court's intentions included delaying sentencing on the second burglary, 
the district court explained to the appellant his right to speedy 
sentencing:

 

            
THE COURT:  Okay.  Mr. Daugherty, the Court is proposing to 
defer a portion of the sentencing [on the second burglary]; specifically, the 
portion that would pertain to any prison sentence and fine in that case.  You have a right, legally, to a speedy 
sentencing, and I cannot defer that portion of the sentence unless you are 
willing to give up that right.

 

            
So my question to you and [defense counsel] at this time is whether you 
are willing now, on the record in open court, and yet today to sign a written 
waiver of speedy sentencing.  
[Defense counsel]?

 

            
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Your Honor, 
I did speak with my client about that matter earlier, and I explained to him 
that he does have a right to proceed to sentencing immediately if he wishes to 
do so.  However, after having that 
explained to him, it is his wish to waive a speedy sentencing, insofar as the 
term of incarceration and fine go, indefinitely until the Court resets the 
matter.  And he will do that in 
writing.

 

            
THE COURT:  And, Mr. 
Daugherty, do you concur with what [defense counsel] said?

 

            
MR. DAUGHERTY:  Yes, 
sir.

 

            
THE COURT:  Okay.  Then you may remain standing.  And I am going to go ahead and impose 
the [judgment] and sentence of the Court, except for that portion which is being 
deferred.

 

            
First let me say for the record that the Court has given full and 
extensive consideration to the sentence being proposed in this case.  The Court has considered and rejected 
the possibility of a straight probation order at this time and  well, for many 
reasons has rejected that possibility.

 

            
The Court will, at this time, [on the first burglary] . . . impose a 
split sentence pursuant to the Wyoming statute authorizing split 
sentencing.

 

            
And it is specifically the intention of the Court to use a probationary 
split sentence, as has been recognized by the Wyoming Supreme Court in recent 
case law.  
Accordingly, the Court is requiring that you serve one year in the Park 
County Jail with credit for time served which is a total of 218 days.

 

            
And upon the completion of your term of one year in the Park County Jail, 
you will then be on probation for a period of five years.  There will be a 
number of conditions with respect to that probation, and I will give those to 
you in a moment.

 

            
* * *

 

            
And I will find that the total amount of your joint and several liability 
for restitution is $11,559.33.[1]  The Court will 
further order that you are to pay the sum of $1,000 to the Wyoming Crime 
Victims' Compensation Fund.  That amount may be paid in monthly payments 
when you're released to be on probation, at the rate of $50 per month, beginning 
with the second full month after your release.

 

            
* * *

 

            
The Court will not impose a fine [for the first burglary], but certainly 
reserves the authority to do that [for the second burglary].

 

[¶6]      The district court's 
intention as to sentencing was further clarified in the written Sentence & 
Probation Order:

 

            
THE COURT HEREBY defers sentencing [for the second burglary] with respect 
only to any potential fine and period of incarceration, as the Defendant agreed 
on the record to waive any rights he may have with regard to a speedy 
disposition in [that case].

 

            
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in Case [No. 01-13] and Case [No. 01-14], the 
Defendant shall pay a surcharge to the Crime Victims Compensation Fund in the 
total amount of $1,000.00.

 

            
* * *

 

            
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that [for the first burglary] the Defendant shall 
be incarcerated in the Park County Detention Center for a period of one (1) 
year, pursuant to the probationary split sentence statute under Wyoming Statute 
§7-13-107(c), with credit for 218 days served.  The Defendant shall be granted a furlough to 
Youth Services International, Inc. at the Defendant's expense upon the following 
furlough conditions:

 

            
* * *

 

            
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that upon the Defendant's successful completion of 
the one year program at the Youth Services International, Inc. treatment program 
[for the first burglary] the Defendant shall, at that time be placed on five (5) 
years supervised probation under the direction of the Wyoming Department of 
Corrections, Probation and Parole, upon the following terms and conditions with 
which the Defendant shall comply[.]

 

[¶7]      After the sentencing 
hearing, the appellant was returned to the Park County Jail to continue serving 
his one-year sentence while awaiting transportation to the Youth Services 
International facility in Tarkio, Missouri (YSI).  His sentence was modified on August 21, 1997, 
to allow his parents to transport him to that facility.  The appellant 
successfully completed the YSI program and his sentence was modified again on 
August 6, 1998, this time to allow him to be released from that facility upon 
graduation, even though he had been there a few weeks short of a full year.  His release was 
conditioned upon the probationary terms and conditions contained in the earlier 
Sentence & Probation Order.

 

[¶8]      The next significant 
document in the record is the State's Petition to Revoke Probation, filed 
September 1, 2000.  
The appellant was arrested pursuant to a bench warrant and brought back 
before the district court.  He denied the allegations of the petition.2  His attorney also filed a Motion to Dismiss 
Probation Revocation in Part; Motion to Dismiss [the Second Burglary] in Whole 
and Objections to Imposition of Prison Sentencing in Either [Case].  The motion raised 
two issues:  (1) 
whether the district court, having failed at the outset to impose a prison 
sentence on the first burglary, could do so now; and (2) whether, despite the 
appellant's waiver of speedy sentencing for the second burglary, imposing 
sentence more than three years later violated the appellant's constitutional 
right to due process.

 

[¶9]      A hearing on the 
appellant's motion was held on September 25, 2000.  The transcript of 
that hearing details the confusion shared by all involved as to the exact nature 
of the original sentences in the two cases and the appellant's probationary 
status, particularly in regard to the second burglary.  The appellant took 
the position that, for the first burglary, he could not now receive a prison 
sentence, or that, at most, he could only be sentenced to a maximum of five 
yearsthe length of his probationwith credit for time served.  His second argument 
was that his right to speedy sentencing now prohibited sentencing for the second 
burglary.  To 
the contrary, the State took the position that the appellant could be sentenced 
to any amount of time up to the full statutory ten years for each crime.

 

[¶10]   The district court ruled that, since the 
appellant had never been sentenced or placed on probation for the second 
burglary, the petition to revoke probation should be dismissed as to that 
crime.  On the 
other hand, the district court held that sentencing on the second burglary was 
delayed as an accommodation to the appellant, that the appellant had voluntarily 
waived his right to speedy sentencing, and that "the matter is still open for 
sentencing . . .."  
In regard to the first burglary, the district court denied the motion to 
dismiss, holding that the appellant could be sentenced to up to a maximum of 
five years.

 

[¶11]   A separate evidentiary hearing was then 
set to determine whether probation should be revoked on the first burglary and 
what sentence should be imposed on the second burglary.  That hearing was 
held on October 2, 2000.  At the outset of the hearing, the appellant 
admitted six of the seven allegations of the revocation petition.3  After hearing the testimony of the appellant 
and his probation officer, the district court revoked probation on the first 
burglary, and then imposed sentences of incarceration for not less than four 
years and not more than five years on each burglary, to be served 
concurrently.  
The appellant was given credit for time served of twenty-five months for 
the first burglary and 218 days for the second burglary.  The written Order 
Revoking Probation and Reimposing Sentence, filed November 2, 2000, indicated 
that the appellant had reserved his right to appeal the issues now before this 
Court.

 

SENTENCING LAW

 

[¶12]   Sentencing decisions are within the 
broad discretion of the sentencing court.  Smith v. State, 941 P.2d 749, 750 (Wyo. 1997).  
This Court will not disturb a sentence on the ground of sentencing 
procedures absent a showing by the defendant of an abuse of discretion, 
procedural conduct prejudicial to him, circumstances that manifest inherent 
unfairness and injustice, or conduct that offends the public sense of fair play. 
 Brower v. State, 1 P.3d 1210, 1216 (Wyo. 
2000).  
In that regard, the trial judge abuses his discretion if he premises a 
sentence on a mistaken reading of the law.  Cook v. State, 710 P.2d 824, 825 (Wyo. 1985).

 

[¶13]   The discretion of the trial court is 
also limited by the fact that a sentencing court may only impose those sentences 
that have been authorized by the legislature.  Williams v. State, 
949 P.2d 878, 880 (Wyo. 1997); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-104 (LexisNexis 2001) ("[w]ithin 
the limits prescribed by law" the court is "to determine and fix" 
punishment).  As 
part of that limitation, courts have no inherent right to grant probation.  Hicklin v. State, 535 P.2d 743, 752 (Wyo. 
1975).  
Probation is a form of sentencing that must be authorized by the 
legislature.  Garton v. State, 910 P.2d 1348, 1354 (Wyo. 
1996).

 

[¶14]   Wyoming's statutes governing sentencing 
are found mainly in Chapter 10 of Title 6 and Chapter 13 of Title 7.  Several individual 
statutes are relevant to the present inquiry.4  Every sentence for a felony must meet the 
dictates of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-201 (LexisNexis 2001), which requires 
imposition of a minimum and maximum term.  A felony is any crime that may be punished by 
death or by imprisonment for more than one year.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-101 (LexisNexis 
2001).  The 
minimum term of imprisonment in a state penal institution, as opposed to a 
county jail, is not less than one year.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-107 (LexisNexis 
2001).  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-13-302 (LexisNexis 2001) provides the procedures whereby a 
convicted person may be placed on probation.  The specific, detailed provisions guiding 
probation and parole are found in Articles 4 and 5 of Chapter 13 in Title 7 of 
the Wyoming Statutes.

 

[¶15]   The source of the legislature's power to 
limit judicial authority as to sentencing is found in the constitutional 
separation of powers.  
The legislative branch has the exclusive power to define crimes and to 
prescribe punishments for those crimes.  Billis v. State, 
800 P.2d 401, 412-15 (Wyo. 1990).  
Consequently, a court may only impose a sentence of incarceration that 
falls within the minimum and maximum punishment prescribed by statute.  Williams v. State, 692 P.2d 233, 235 (Wyo. 
1984).  
Where there are multiple charges, the court should impose a separate 
sentence on each count, rather than a consolidated sentence.  Elliott v. State, 626 P.2d 1044, 1046 n.3 (Wyo. 
1981); Stambaugh v. State, 613 P.2d 1237, 1243 (Wyo. 1980).

 

SPLIT SENTENCING

 

[¶16]   The clear intent of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
6-10-101 and 6-10-107, when read together, is that felons be imprisoned in state 
penal institutions, while misdemeanants be imprisoned in county jails.  This intent is 
further reflected in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-103 (Lexis 1999), which mentions 
imprisoning misdemeanants in county jails, and in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-109 
(LexisNexis 2001), which is captioned "Sentences for felonies," and which 
defines "state penal institution."  Finally, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-108 (Michie 
1995) directs the sentencing court specifically how to sentence felons to 
incarceration:

 

            
Unless otherwise specifically provided by statute, any person convicted 
of a felony and sentenced to a term of imprisonment shall be sentenced to the 
custody and control of the department of corrections to be incarcerated in a 
state penal institution designated by the department.

 

[¶17]   The mandate that felons be incarcerated 
in state penal institutions while misdemeanants be incarcerated in county jails 
has a concomitant fiscal impact on the state and the individual counties.  The state, through 
the Department of Corrections, funds and maintains the state penal 
institutions.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 25-1-104 (Michie 1997).  The counties, through their sheriffs, fund and 
maintain the county jails.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 18-2-103, 18-3-603, 
18-6-302 (LexisNexis 2001).

 

[¶18]   In 1984, the Wyoming State Legislature 
created a method whereby certain felons could be housed in county jails, but at 
state expense.  
Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 57 (1984).  The current incarnation of that law, Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-13-107 (LexisNexis 2001), generally referred to as the "split 
sentencing statute," reads as follows:

 

            
(a)       Following a 
defendant's conviction of, or his plea of guilty to any felony, other than a 
felony punishable by death or life imprisonment, the court may impose any 
sentence of imprisonment authorized by law and except as provided in subsection 
(g) of this section, may in addition provide:

 

            
(i)         That 
the defendant be confined in the county jail for a period of not more than one 
(1) year; and

 

            
(ii)        That the 
execution of the remainder of the sentence be suspended and the defendant placed 
on probation.

 

            
(b)       In placing the 
defendant on probation under subsection (a) of this section, the court may 
also:

 

            
(i)         
Impose any fine provided by the statute violated;

 

            
(ii)        Apply the 
provisions of W.S. 7-13-501 through 7-13-503.

 

            
(c)        Except as 
provided in subsection (a) of this section, the court may impose a split 
sentence of incarceration followed by probation in any felony case including 
those in which the statute violated specifically provides for a sentence of 
imprisonment in the state penitentiary.

 

            
(d)       The court may 
impose a split sentence as provided by this section at the time a defendant is 
originally sentenced or at any hearing at which the court modifies or revokes a 
defendant's probation and at which the defendant is personally present.

 

            
(e)       The cost of 
housing convicted felons in the county jail shall be paid by the department of 
corrections by contract arrangement with the county sheriff.  * * *

 

            
* * *

 

            
(h)        A 
defendant sentenced under this section is not eligible for parole and is not 
subject to good time allowances authorized under W.S. 7-13-420.  The sentencing court 
shall continue to have jurisdiction over the defendant during the entire time he 
is confined in county jail and thereafter while the defendant is serving his 
term of probation.

 

            
(j)         If 
consecutive terms of confinement in the county jail are ordered pursuant to this 
section they shall not exceed a period of one (1) year.

 

[¶19]   Proper application of the split 
sentencing statute is the first issue before this Court.  The district court 
applied the statute as it believed it had been interpreted by this Court.  In that regard, 
there are two particular cases of interest.  In 1992, we decided Wlodarczyk v. State, 836 P.2d 279 (Wyo. 
1992).  
Raymond Wlodarczyk had been convicted of aggravated assault.  The district court 
imposed a split sentence of nine months in the county jail, to be followed by 
three years of supervised probation.  After he had served the jail term and most of 
the probationary period, Wlodarczyk's probation was revoked.  The district court 
then sentenced him to prison for a period of five to six years.  Id. at 284.

 

[¶20]   In reversing Wlodarczyk's sentence, this 
Court identified two types of split sentences that could be imposed under Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-13-107:  
(1) split sentencing involving incarceration in the county jail for a 
period not to exceed one year with a probationary sentence to follow county jail 
confinement involving probation granted for the balance of the established 
sentence (classical split sentence); and (2) split sentencing involving incarceration in 
the county jail for a period not to exceed one year with a probationary sentence 
to follow county jail confinement with probation granted for a stated period 
following jail confinement with sentencing postponed subject to entry if 
probation is revoked (probationary split sentence).  Wlodarczyk, 836 P.2d  at 287-88.  
We then applied the rule of lenity, concluding that Wlodarcyzk's sentence 
was a classical split sentence because it did not reflect an intent to allow 
complete re-sentencing in the event of probation revocation.  Id. at 288.  We held that, when probation is revoked in a 
classical split sentence situation, "only the period remaining upon revocation 
can be enforced by confinement."  Id.

 

[¶21]   The second case in which this Court 
interpreted the split sentencing statute was Kidd v. 
State, 937 P.2d 1334 (Wyo. 1997).  
Kidd's original sentence for aggravated assault was four years of 
supervised probation, one condition thereof being that he serve ninety days in 
the county jail.  
When Kidd's probation was later revoked, the district court sentenced him 
to serve thirty to eighty-four months in prison.  Id. at 1335.  Kidd's appeal was 
resolved just as Wlodarczyk's had been.  We concluded that, since the original sentence 
had not indicated an intent to reserve full sentencing in the event of probation 
revocation, the rule of lenity required that we find the sentence to be a 
classical split sentence.  The most that Kidd could be sentenced to was 
the balance of time remaining on his four-year probationary term.  Id. at 1336.5

 

[¶22]   Unlike the trial judges in Wlodarczyk and Kidd, the 
district judge in the instant case specifically mentioned his intention that the 
sentence be a "probationary split sentence, as has been recognized by the 
Wyoming Supreme Court in recent case law."  The written Sentence & Probation Order was 
even more precise:

 

            
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that [for the first 
burglary] the Defendant shall be incarcerated in the Park County Detention 
Center for a period of one (1) year, pursuant to the probationary split sentence 
statute under Wyoming Statute §7-13-107(c), with credit for 218 days 
served.  The 
Defendant shall be granted a furlough to Youth Services International, Inc. at 
the Defendant's expense upon the following conditions:

 

            
* * *

 

            
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that upon the 
Defendant's successful completion of the one year program at the Youth Services 
International, Inc. treatment program, [for the first burglary] the Defendant 
shall, at that time be placed on five (5) years supervised probation . . 
.[.]

 

[¶23]   The appellant's sentence for the first 
burglary clearly and unambiguously was intended to be a probationary split 
sentence under this Court's then-existing interpretation of the split sentencing 
statute.  Therefore, we have no occasion to interpret 
the district court's intent and the rule of lenity has no application here.  The district court 
having retained its sentencing authority as to the first burglary, we will 
affirm the sentence of incarceration for not less than four years and not more 
than five years imposed upon revocation of the appellant's probation.

 

[¶24]   The district court correctly applied Wlodarczyk and Kidd.  The sentence imposed 
for the first burglary fell within the statutory limits and there is no 
indication that the length of the sentence was determined by anything that 
occurred after the original sentencing date.  For these reasons, we have affirmed the 
sentence.  
Nevertheless, this case has once again brought to our attention several 
problems that continue to arise out of the Wlodarczyk 
and Kidd holdings.  We said the 
following in Wlodarczyk:

 

The differences in character between the two types of split 
sentences define the residual sentencing discretion retained by the district 
court upon revocation.  
In the case of the classical split sentence, only the period remaining upon revocation can be 
enforced by confinement.  The probationary split sentence permits the 
sentencing judge to resentence to any sentence which might have originally been 
imposed.

 

Wlodarczyk, 836 P.2d at 288 (emphasis added).  We reiterated this 
proposition in Kidd, 937 P.2d  at 1336.  
Wlodarczyk's original sentence was nine months in jail and three years of 
probation.  No 
prison sentence initially was imposed.  Kidd's original sentence was four years of 
probation, with ninety days in jail.  No prison sentence initially was imposed.  We interpreted both 
sentences, under the statutory language emphasized above, as limiting 
incarceration upon probation revocation to the probationary period, less time 
served.  Kidd, 937 P.2d  at 1336; Wlodarczyk, 836 P.2d  at 
292.  
The effect of such an interpretation was to declare that the district 
court intended the period of probation to equal the period of incarceration.6

 

[¶25]   While the clear imposition of a 
probationary split sentence for the first burglary 
has obviated the need for similar interpretation in the instant case, we are 
still left with the fact that the split sentence was imposed without the 
district court first imposing a lawful minimum and maximum sentence.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-13-201 requires minimum and maximum terms:

 

Except where a term of life is required by law, or as 
otherwise provided by W.S. 7-13-101, when a person is sentenced for the 
commission of a felony, the court imposing the sentence shall not fix a definite 
term of imprisonment, but shall establish a maximum and minimum term within the 
limits authorized for the statute violated.  The maximum term shall not be greater than the 
maximum provided by law for the statute violated, and the minimum term shall not 
be less than the minimum provided by law for the statute violated, nor greater 
than ninety percent (90%) of the maximum term imposed.

 
W.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(2)(B) contains a similar requirement.  In the same vein, 
the split sentencing statute, itself, provides that the district court may 
impose a split sentence after imposing any sentence authorized by law.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-13-107(a).

 
[¶26]   Several split sentencing cases with 
underlying minimum and maximum term sentences have come before this Court.7  In none of those cases were we called upon to 
re-assess the Wlodarczyk and Kidd holdings that, where no underlying sentence is 
imposed and there is no clear intent to defer sentencing entirely, we will 
interpret the probationary period of a split sentence to be the maximum 
allowable term of confinement.  We speak to that point now because the instant 
case brings the matter once again directly before this Court, and because we are 
now convinced that Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-13-107 and 7-13-201 and W.R.Cr.P. 
32(c)(2)(B) require the imposition of a minimum and maximum term sentence before 
split sentencing may be utilized.  The holdings of Wlodarczyk and Kidd to the 
contrary are prospectively overruled, and the distinction between a classical 
split sentence and a probationary split sentence is hereby abrogated.

 

[¶27]   When imposing a split sentence after the 
date this opinion is published in the advance sheets of West's Pacific Reporter, 
the sentencing court must first impose a lawful sentence with a minimum and 
maximum term.  
Sentencing courts may not simply impose a jail sentence followed by 
probation.  
Neither may they postpone sentencing altogether when imposing a split 
sentence.8  We now conclude that, rather than authorizing 
the latter practice, the intent of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-107(c) is simply to 
clarify that split sentencing is available for all felonies except those 
punishable by death or life imprisonment, even if the statute violated 
specifically provides for imprisonment in the penitentiary.9

 
[¶28]   While these conclusions are based 
primarily on this Court's view of legislative intent, they will also help solve 
several difficulties left extant by the holdings of Wlodarczyk and Kidd.  This Court will no 
longer have to interpret the wording of split sentences in an attempt to 
determine the sentencing court's intent.  Further, if the imposition of an underlying 
sentence cannot be postponed indefinitely, issues of speedy sentencing and 
vindictive sentencing will be less likely to arise.

 

SPEEDY SENTENCING

 

[¶29]   We review speedy sentencing claims under 
an abuse of discretion standard.  Reagan v. State, 14 P.3d 925, 927 (Wyo. 2000).

 

"Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among 
which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment 
exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing 
so arbitrarily or capriciously.  Byerly v. Madsen, 
41 Wash. App. 495, 704 P.2d 1236 (1985)."

 

Reagan, 14 P.3d at 927 (quoting Vaughn v. 
State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998)).  
The specific question now before this Court is whether it was an abuse of 
discretion for the district court to delay sentencing on the second burglary for 
three years under the particular circumstances of this case.

 

[¶30]   The felony information charging the 
appellant with the second burglary was filed on November 22, 1996.  On January 21, 1997, 
the appellant filed a Waiver of Speedy Preliminary Hearing Within Ten- or 
Twenty-Day Time Requirement and Request for Continuance of Preliminary 
Hearing.  On the 
same date, he waived his right to a preliminary hearing and the case was 
transferred to the district court.  Arraignment in the district court occurred on 
February 12, 1997.10  The appellant pled 
guilty to both the first and second burglary, he was adjudicated guilty of both, 
and a presentence investigation was ordered.

 

[¶31]   The evidentiary hearing for sentencing 
purposes took place on June 20, 1997.  Sentence was imposed at a final hearing on 
June 26, 1997.  
It was at this latter hearing that the colloquy about speedy sentencing 
quoted previously herein occurred among the district court, defense counsel, and 
the appellant.  
In announcing his desire to defer imposing a prison sentence or fine for 
the second burglary, the district court informed the appellant specifically that 
"[y]ou have a right, legally, to a speedy sentencing, and I cannot defer that 
portion of the sentence unless you are willing to give up that right."  Defense counsel than 
informed the district court that he had previously discussed with the appellant 
his right to speedy sentencing, and that it was the appellant's "wish to waive a 
speedy sentencing, insofar as the term of incarceration and fine go, 
indefinitely until the Court resets the matter."  The appellant indicated that he agreed with 
what his attorney had said.  The record further reflects that it was the 
district court's intent to have the appellant submit a written waiver of speedy 
sentencing.  No 
written waiver was ever filed.

 

[¶32]   The appellant served his split sentence 
and was placed on supervised probation.  On September 1, 2000, the State filed a 
petition to revoke probation.  After a hearing on the appellant's Motion to 
Dismiss Probation Revocation in Part; Motion to Dismiss [the Second Burglary] in 
Whole and Objections to Imposition of Prison Sentencing in Either [Case], the 
district court ruled that, since the appellant had never been on probation for 
the second burglary, the petition should be dismissed in that regard.  The district court 
further ruled, however, that the appellant had voluntarily waived speedy 
sentencing, that sentencing had been deferred as an accommodation to the 
appellant so he could attend the YSI program, and that the appellant could still 
be sentenced for the second burglary.  On October 2, 2000, the appellant was 
sentenced to a term of not less than four years and not more than five years, 
with credit for 218 days served.

 

[¶33]   The appellant's current argument that 
this series of events violated his right to speedy sentencing is 
two-pronged.  
First, citing Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208 (3rd Cir. 1987) and Perez v. 
Sullivan, 793 F.2d 249 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 
479 U.S. 936 (1986), he contends that any "unreasonable sentencing delay" 
violates a defendant's right to due process of law.  His primary argument 
is based upon the following language from Yates v. 
State, 792 P.2d 187, 191 (Wyo. 1990):

 

We elect to hold that a delay in sentencing in excess of one 
calendar year from the date guilt is established, either by trial, whether to a 
jury or to the court, or upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, is 
presumptively unreasonable.  A court may not pronounce sentence on a 
defendant after the expiration of such time, unless the record clearly 
establishes those facts and circumstances that excuse the delay, thus making 
later imposition of the sentence reasonable.  The State must bear the burden of establishing 
those facts and circumstances.  Our rule with respect to the one-year period 
is derived in consonance with Rule 36(b), W.R.Cr.P. [now W.R.Cr.P. 35(b)], which 
permits a trial court to reduce a sentence within one year of its 
imposition.  We 
recognize that one year is an appropriate period of time within which a district 
court may reconsider the sentence that it has imposed, and it follows that one 
year also is a reasonable period of time to require the imposition of 
sentence.  While 
we hold that the delay in excess of one year is presumptively unreasonable, we 
do not hold that the delay serves to deprive the district court of 
jurisdiction.  
Rather, we hold that the delay exceeds the bounds of reason if its occurs 
beyond that date and, in the interest of fairness, due process of law, and 
expeditious handling of court matters, a court should be foreclosed from 
imposing sentence after the one year period of time.

 

[¶34]   The State responds by arguing that the 
record does, indeed, reveal "those facts and circumstances that excuse the 
delay."  The 
State points to the transcript of the June 20, 1997, hearing, where the 
appellant, his attorney, his parents, and the probation agent aggressively 
prevailed upon the district court to allow the appellant to attend the YSI 
program in Missouri, rather than go to prison.  The State then concludes that it was the 
district court's desire to accommodate this request that led the district court 
to defer sentencing on the second burglary.

 

[¶35]   A close reading of the transcripts from 
both the June 20, 1997, and the June 26, 1997, hearings, however, reveals no 
specific statement where the district court indicated that the decision to defer 
sentencing for the second burglary was based on any desire to accommodate the 
appellant.  Read 
together, the transcripts of both hearings do suggest that the decision to 
impose a split sentence and to allow a furlough for the YSI program was made to 
accommodate that request.  But the transcripts of the sentencing hearings 
do not make clear why the appellant could not have been sentenced on the second 
burglary, with supervised probation to include participation in the YSI 
program.

 

[¶36]   Three years later, at the hearing on the 
appellant's Motion to Dismiss Probation Revocation in Part; Motion to Dismiss 
[the Second Burglary] in Whole and Objections to Imposition of Prison Sentencing 
in Either [Case], the district court did indicate that its decision to defer 
sentencing was made as an accommodation to the appellant:

 

            
Regarding Case Number [01-14], the Court will further rule that that 
matter is still open for sentencing, in view of the fact that there was, in open 
court, on the record, a waiver of speedy sentencing, and Mr. Daugherty was here, 
he was represented by counsel, he was prevailing on the Court to do that very 
thing, and it was an accommodation to him so that he could go to the program he 
was proposing to go to.  And the only way the Court was willing to do 
that was if he waived his right to speedy sentencing, which he did.  It's all in the 
record.

 

[¶37]   One inference that might be made from 
this record is that, for some reason, the appellant could not participate in the 
YSI program if he was under a sentence, even a probationary sentence, for the 
second burglary.  
But another inference is that the district court wanted to see whether 
the appellant succeeded in that program before imposing the second 
sentence.  The 
existence of that inference leads to the second prong of the appellant's speedy 
sentencing attack, which is his contention that, while he did waive his right to 
speedy sentencing, he did not do so voluntarily and knowingly.  His argument is 
encapsulated in the following sentences from his appellate brief:

 

            
The District Court accepted Daugherty's purported waiver without advising 
him of the implications or consequences of such waiver.  The lack of 
notification violated Daugherty's constitutional rights and the violation was 
especially prejudicial in light of the subsequent developments in this 
case.  Daugherty 
was ultimately sentenced after the State filed a petition to revoke his 
probation in Case No. [01-13].  Consequently, the effect of the delay in 
sentencing was to place Daugherty on probation without advising him of the 
conditions of that probation or the consequences of failing to comply with the 
implied conditions.  
Under these circumstances, there is simply no question that Daugherty was 
not aware of the nature of the right he was waiving or the consequences of the 
waiver.

 

[¶38]   For a waiver to be valid, there must be 
"an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,'" 
and the waiver must be knowingly and intelligently made.  Nelson v. State, 934 P.2d 1238, 1241 (Wyo. 
1997) (quoting Van Riper v. 
State, 882 P.2d 230, 234 (Wyo. 1994)).  
A defendant need not, however, know and understand every possible 
consequence of this waiver for it to be valid.  Solis v. State, 851 P.2d 1296, 1299 (Wyo. 1993).  
Whether a waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently 
depends upon the surrounding facts and circumstances.  Id.; Mapp v. State, 953 P.2d 140, 144 (Wyo. 1998).  
The state bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence 
that a waiver was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.  Solis, 851 P.2d  at 1299.

 

[¶39]   In the instant case, the district court 
explained to the appellant that:  (1) he had a legal right to speedy sentencing; 
(2) sentencing could not be deferred unless he waived that right; and (3) the 
part of sentencing that would be deferred would be any prison sentence or 
fine.  In 
addition, defense counsel informed the district court, in the presence of the 
appellant, that:  
(1) counsel previously had spoken with the appellant about his speedy 
sentencing rights; (2) the appellant wished to waive speedy sentencing as to any 
prison sentence or fine; and (3) sentencing would be deferred "indefinitely 
until the Court resets the matter."  In response to a question from the district 
court, the appellant indicated his agreement with what his counsel had said.

 

[¶40]   Despite all this information as to the 
existence of the speedy sentencing right, there is a glaring absence in the 
record of anything to indicate the appellant was advised what it was that could 
bring about sentencing on the second burglary.  The district court indicated in open court 
only that it wished to defer sentencing, and did not say for how long or for 
what reasons.  
Defense counsel said that the appellant agreed to postpone sentencing 
"indefinitely until the Court resets the matter."  The written Sentence & Probation Order 
merely defers sentencing based upon the appellant's waiver of speedy 
sentencing.  
Nowhere in the record is there any indication that imposition of 
sentencing for the second burglary would occur as a result of a probation 
violation under the sentence being served for the first burglary.  Yet, the appellant 
argues, that is exactly what happened in this case.  Either that, or he 
was effectively placed on probation for the second burglary, with the 
probationary condition being that he not violate his probation for the first 
burglary.  We 
agree with the appellant that his waiver was not made "knowingly, voluntarily, 
and intelligently."

 

[¶41]   This Court is not willing to countenance 
an open-ended deferral of sentencing under the circumstances of this case.  In Yates, we adopted a one-year standard of presumptive 
reasonableness for speedy sentencing, with the state bearing the burden of 
establishing such facts and circumstances as might excuse a delay beyond one 
year.  Yates, 792 P.2d  at 191.  
Here, sentencing occurred three years after guilt was established.  There is nothing in 
the record to indicate why sentencing did not occur in the interim period.  For instance, why 
was sentence not imposed for the second burglary when the appellant had 
successfully completed the one-year period of his split sentence for the first 
burglary?  
Beyond that, if the imposition of a sentence for the second burglary was 
meant to be a penalty for violation of probation on the first burglary, or, 
stated differently, if successful probation on the first burglary was a 
condition to the continued deferral of sentencing on the second burglary, the 
appellant was never so informed.  Such a lapse implicates the appellant's right 
to the due process of law in that he had no notice of such consequences.  See Solis, 851 P.2d  at 1299.

 

[¶42]   Of equal concern where there has been an 
unreasonable sentencing delay is the possibility that, when sentencing finally 
occurs, the sentencing court will consider matters that occurred after sentence 
should have been imposed, thereby exposing the defendant to a greater 
punishment.  Yates, 792 P.2d  at 192.  
In particular, there is a danger that punishment will be increased 
because of the conduct that serves as the basis for a later probation 
revocation.  Id.; Reagan, 14 P.3d  at 
927-28.  
There is at least an argument that this occurred in the present case, 
where the appellant was sentenced to a lengthier sentence than had been 
requested by the State at the original sentencing hearing.11

 

[¶43]   In Wlodarczyk, 836 P.2d  at 286-87, we identified the seven types of sentences available under 
the Wyoming statutes:  
(1) an indeterminate sentence under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-201; (2) 
deferred prosecution under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-301; (3) straight probation 
under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-302; (4) probation with suspended imposition of 
sentence under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-302; (5) probation with suspended sentence 
under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-302; (6) classical split sentencing under Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-13-107(a); and (7) probationary split sentencing under Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-13-107(c).  
None of these alternatives contemplates the lack of sentencing that 
occurred with respect to the second burglary in the instant case.  The closest would be 
option (7)probationary split sentencingbut even that option requires a 
specific probationary period and a stated condition that sentence be imposed 
upon probation violation.

 

[¶44]   W.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(1) contains clear 
guidance for trial courts wishing to overcome the presumption that a delay in 
sentencing for over a year is unreasonable:  "Sentence shall be imposed without unnecessary 
delay, the court may, when there is a factor important to the sentencing 
determination that is not then capable of being resolved, postpone the 
imposition of sentence for a reasonable time until the factor is capable of 
being resolved."  
If sentence is not to be imposed at the time guilt is established or soon 
thereafter, the trial court must ensure that the record clearly indicates the 
reason for the delay and the circumstances under which the matter will be reset 
for sentencing.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶45]   For the first burglary, Case No. 01-13, 
the appellant was sentenced under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-107(c) to a 
probationary split sentence.  Under this Court's then-existing construction 
of that statute, the district court retained its jurisdiction over the appellant 
and its full authority to sentence him upon revocation of his probation.  The sentence 
imposed, four to five years, was within the sentencing discretion of the 
district court, and it is affirmed.  We hold, however, that district courts 
imposing a split sentence in the future must first impose a lawful sentence with 
minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment.  The holdings to the contrary contained in Wlodarczyk, 836 P.2d 279, and Kidd, 937 P.2d 1334, are hereby prospectively 
overruled.

 

[¶46]   For the second burglary, Case No. 01-14, 
sentencing was simply deferred indefinitely, and eventually occurred more than 
three years after guilt was established.  The State has not met its burden of showing 
that this delay was reasonable or that the appellant's waiver of his right to 
speedy sentencing was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.  The sentence 
imposed, four to five years, is vacated, but the judgment of conviction 
remains.

 

 

FOOTNOTES

  1The presentence investigation report and the written 
Sentence & Probation Order filed on July 10, 1997, made it clear that the 
restitution amount, $11,559.33, was the total amount owed under both cases and 
for certain uncharged forgeries.

  2The 
allegations were:  
(1) failure to pay the Crime Victims' Compensation Fund surcharge; (2) a 
breach of peace conviction; (3) an interference with a peace officer conviction; 
(4) use of cocaine; (5) a marijuana possession conviction; (6) entry into a 
liquor store and purchase of alcohol; and (7) use of methamphetamine.

  3The 
appellant denied using cocaine.

  4Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-13-107 (LexisNexis 2001), the "split sentencing" statute, will be 
discussed later herein, as will Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-108 (Michie 1995).

  5Central 
to this Court's reasoning in Kidd was our 
determination that the county jail time could not be a probationary condition 
because Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-401(a)(x) (1995) defined "probation" as being "a 
sentence not involving confinement."  Kidd, 937 P.2d  at 
1336.

  6Justice Thomas identified this interpretive process 
as a problem nearly a decade ago in his special concurrence in Wlodarczyk, 836 P.2d  at 296-97 (Thomas, J., concurring 
specially).

  7See Buckles v. State, 998 P.2d 927, 929 (Wyo. 
2000) (eighteen to sixty months, with split sentence 
of sixty days followed by probation); Pearl v. State, 
996 P.2d 688, 688 (Wyo. 2000) (one to four years, with split sentence of 120 
days in the county jail followed by four years of probation); Henderson v. State, 976 P.2d 203, 206 (Wyo. 
1999) (four to six years, 
with split sentence of sixteen days in county jail followed by six years of 
probation); Snyder v. State, 912 P.2d 1127, 1129 
(Wyo. 1996) (suspended prison 
sentence, with split sentence of thirty days in the county jail followed by five 
years of probation); Roberts v. State, 912 P.2d 1110, 
1111 (Wyo. 1996) (four to six years, with split sentence of one 
year in the county jail followed by six years of probation); and Smith v. State, 902 P.2d 1271, 1275 (Wyo. 
1995) (twenty-four to 
forty-eight months, with all but sixty days suspended, those sixty days to be 
served in the county jail, followed by four years of probation).  An additional case, 
Paugh v. State, 9 P.3d 973, 975 (Wyo. 
2000), apparently 
involved a split sentence similar to that in Wlodarczyk and Kiddthat is, 
ninety days in the county jail followed by sixty months of probation, with no 
specific minimum or maximum prison termbut no issue as to the sentence was 
raised on appeal.

  8To the contrary, suspending the imposition of 
sentencing under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-302(a)(i) does not violate the principle 
of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-201 because, unlike the split sentencing situation, no 
sentence is being imposed.

  9While most of Wyoming's felony statutes provide only 
that violations are "punishable by imprisonment," others specify that 
imprisonment shall be "in the penitentiary."  For example, compare 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-3-402(c)(i) and 6-4-402(b) (LexisNexis 2001) with Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-105(b) and 6-2-106(b) (LexisNexis 2001).

  10No issue 
has been raised as to any pre-arraignment delays.

  11The State 
argued for a sentence of two to four years.