Title: Ex parte Alabama Department of Finance. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: GTSI Corp. v. Alabama Department of Finance)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 04/11/08
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
____________________
1061639
____________________
Ex parte Alabama Department of Finance
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: GTSI Corp.
v.
Alabama Department of Finance)
(Madison Circuit Court, CV-06-2530)
MURDOCK, Justice.
The Alabama Department of Finance ("the Department")
petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus instructing the
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Madison Circuit Court to grant its motion to dismiss or, in
the alternative, for a summary judgment, or, failing that, to
grant its motion to transfer the case to the Montgomery
Circuit Court.  For the reasons stated herein, we grant the
petition and instruct the trial court to dismiss the
Department from the case.
I.  Factual and Procedural Background
On July 22, 2005, the Department issued an invitation to
bid for the purchase of an "Enterprise Storage Solution" and
related equipment, software, 
and 
services. 
 
Following
submission of bids, the contract was awarded to GTSI Corp.
("GTSI") on August 31, 2005.
GTSI shipped the purchased equipment to the Department in
Montgomery.  GTSI then arranged for one of the items delivered
to the Department, the StorEdge 9985, to be shipped from
Montgomery 
to 
the 
Alabama 
Supercomputer 
Authority 
in
Huntsville.  At some point, either during shipment to or
unloading at Huntsville, the StorEdge 9985 was damaged to such
an extent that it was rendered unusable.  Because of this
damage, the Department refused to pay for the StorEdge 9985.
In response, GTSI filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in
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the Madison Circuit Court, seeking an order from that court
requiring the Department to pay for the StorEdge 9985.
On February 1, 2007, the Department filed in the Madison
Circuit Court a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for
a summary judgment, arguing that the Department was entitled
to sovereign immunity.  On February 2, 2007, the Department
filed a motion to transfer the case to the Montgomery Circuit
Court, arguing that actions against State agencies must be
filed in Montgomery County.  On July 6, 2007, the trial court
entered an order, stating, in part:
"This cause came before the Court on the 7th day
of June, 2007, for a hearing on all pending motions.
Having considered the pleadings, the responses and
briefs 
thereto, 
and 
the 
arguments 
and
representations of counsel, and after careful review
of all relevant and applicable law, it is ORDERED,
ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows:
"1.
The defendant's Motion to Transfer Venue is
denied.
"....
"3.
Within sixty (60) days, the parties shall
concur and submit a joint scheduling order
for entry by this Court.
"4.
This matter is hereby set for trial on the
5th day of May, 2008, at 9:30 a.m. in
Courtroom 
#6 
of 
the 
Madison 
County
Courthouse."
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4
Although the trial court's order did not explicitly reference
the motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for a summary
judgment, we will treat that motion as having been denied,
given that the trial court's order indicated that the motion
was considered, that it was not granted, that the parties were
ordered to submit a scheduling order, and that the case was
set for trial.
On July 24, 2007, GTSI amended its mandamus petition by
adding as a respondent James Allen Main in his capacity as the
State Finance Director and director of the Department.  On
August 17, 2007, the Department filed the presently pending
petition for a writ of mandamus with this Court.  The relief
sought therein relates to the Department only; Main did not
join the petition, and no relief is sought on his behalf.
II.  Standard of Review
In Ex parte Branch, [Ms. 1051783, September 7, 2007] __
So. 2d __ (Ala. 2007), this Court stated:
"The denial of a motion for a summary judgment
or of a motion to dismiss grounded on immunity is
reviewable by a petition for a writ of mandamus.  Ex
parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 912 (Ala. 2000).  Ex
parte Haralson, 853 So. 2d 928, 931 n.2 (Ala. 2003)
('The denial of a motion to dismiss or a motion for
a summary judgment generally is not reviewable by a
petition for writ of mandamus, subject to certain
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narrow exceptions, such as the issue of immunity.
Ex parte Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 825 So. 2d
758, 761-62 (Ala. 2002).').  This Court has stated:
"'A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary
remedy available only when there is: "(1)
a clear legal right to the order sought;
(2) an imperative duty upon the respondent
to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do
so; (3) the lack of another adequate
remedy; and (4) the properly invoked
jurisdiction of the court."  Ex parte BOC
Group, Inc., 823 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Ala.
2001).'
"Ex parte Nall, 879 So. 2d 541, 543 (Ala. 2003)."
__ So. 2d at __.
III.  Analysis
The Department contends that it is entitled to the
sovereign 
immunity 
conferred 
on 
the 
State 
by 
§ 
14,
Constitution of Alabama 1901, and, as a result, that the trial
court should have granted its motion to dismiss or, in the
alternative, for a summary judgment.  We agree.
Section 14 provides "[t]hat the State of Alabama shall
never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity."
"Under § 14, the State and its agencies are absolutely immune
from suit."  Lyons v. River Road Constr., Inc., 858 So. 2d
257, 261 (Ala. 2003).  The Department is an agency of the
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State, see Ala. Code 1975, § 41-4-1 et seq., and, therefore,
it is entitled to sovereign immunity.
GTSI argues that, notwithstanding sovereign immunity, an
agency of the State is subject to suit for the payment of
goods and services it has accepted under a contract.  GTSI
argues that, under the circumstances present in this case, it
"may properly pursue its claims through a Petition for the
Writ of Mandamus against the Department of Finance," and that
"the doctrine of sovereign immunity is not a defense to the
Petition brought by GTSI."
GTSI is correct when it argues that certain actions are
not barred by § 14.  There are six general categories of
actions that do not come within the prohibition of § 14: (1)
actions brought to compel State officials to perform their
legal duties; (2) actions brought to enjoin State officials
from enforcing an unconstitutional law; (3) actions to compel
State officials to perform ministerial acts; (4) actions
brought against State officials 
under 
the 
Declaratory
Judgments Act, Ala. Code 1975, § 6-6-220 et seq., seeking
construction of a statute and its application in a given
situation; (5) valid inverse condemnation actions brought
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against State officials in their representative capacity; and
(6) actions for injunction or damages brought against State
officials in their representative capacity and individually
where it was alleged that they had acted fraudulently, in bad
faith, beyond their authority, or in a mistaken interpretation
of law.  See Drummond Co. v. Alabama Dep't of Transp., 937 So.
2d 56, 58 (Ala. 2006) (quoting Ex parte Carter, 395 So. 2d 65,
68 (Ala. 1980)); Alabama Dep't of Transp. v. Harbert Int'l,
Inc., [Ms. 1050271, Mar. 7, 2008] __ So. 2d __ (Ala. 2008)
(holding that the exception for declaratory-judgment actions
applies only to actions against State officials).  As we
confirmed in Harbert, these "exceptions" to sovereign immunity
apply only to actions brought against State officials; they do
not apply to actions against the State or against State
agencies.  See Alabama Dep't of Transp., __ So. 2d at __.
Actions against the State or against State agencies are
absolutely barred by § 14.  As a result, the Department is
entitled to the relief it seeks from this Court in the form of
an order directing the trial court to dismiss it from this
action.
IV.  Conclusion
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Based on the foregoing, we grant the Department's
petition.  The trial court is instructed to dismiss the
Department from the action.  The alternative relief sought by
the Department -- to have the action transferred to the
Montgomery Circuit Court -- is rendered moot by our decision
on the sovereign-immunity issue.  In addition, GTSI filed a
motion to strike certain portions of the Department's mandamus
petition.  In response, the Department candidly agreed that
the portions of its petition to which GTSI objected were due
to be stricken.  Thus, we grant GTSI's motion. 
MOTION TO STRIKE GRANTED; PETITION GRANTED;  WRIT ISSUED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Stuart, and Bolin, JJ., concur.