Title: Baker v. Town of Goshen

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Baker v. Town of Goshen  (97-038); 169 Vt. 145; 730 A.2d 592

[Filed 19-Mar-1999]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as  formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify  the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont  05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to  press.

                                 No. 97-038

J. Lee and Susan Baker and	            Supreme Court
Welland and Esther Horn
                                            On Appeal from
     v.		                            Environmental Court

Town of Goshen	                            May Term, 1998

Merideth Wright, J.

       John R. Barrera, Middlebury, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

       F. Rendol Barlow of Langrock Sperry & Wool, Middlebury, for
  Defendant-Appellee.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       DOOLEY, J.   This appeal is from a decision of the Vermont
  Environmental Court  granting a permit to relocate and modify a
  non-complying structure, but also ruling that two  parcels of land had
  merged for purposes of zoning regulation.  Appellants Welland and Esther 
  Horn are the former owners of all of the land in issue.  Also appealing the
  decision are J. Lee  and Susan Baker, the current owners of the smaller,
  one-acre parcel.  The larger, fourteen-acre  parcel is now owned only by J.
  Lee Baker, although both he and his wife Susan reside on that  parcel. 
  Appellants appeal only from the merger decision.  We dismiss the appeal
  because it  seeks an advisory opinion.

       In 1969, the Horns divided the land in question into a one-acre parcel
  and a fourteen-acre parcel, selling the one-acre parcel, with a cabin, to
  a third party.  The one-acre parcel is  bordered on the east (rear) and
  south by the fourteen-acre parcel.  The one-acre parcel was  conveyed back
  to the Horns in 1971.  In 1993, the Horns conveyed the fourteen-acre parcel
  to J. Lee Baker, who 

 

  built a house on it.  In 1996, the Horns conveyed the one-acre parcel to
  the  Bakers, as tenants by the entireties, retaining a life estate for
  Welland Horn.

       In 1971, the Town of Goshen adopted a zoning ordinance which requires
  that residential  lots be a minimum of ten acres in area in the district
  where the land lies.

       In 1996, the Bakers applied for a permit to build a new foundation on
  the one-acre lot  and to relocate the preexisting cabin on this new
  foundation.  The Town zoning ordinance  requires a front yard setback of 85
  feet and side-yard and rear-yard setbacks of 200 feet.  At its  original
  location, and considering only the one-acre parcel, the cabin complies with
  only the  front-yard setback requirement.  The relocation would move the
  cabin back and turn it  approximately 45 degrees, leaving it less
  conforming with respect to the rear-yard setback  requirement, but slightly
  more conforming with respect to the side-yard setback requirements.   The
  new location, like the original location, fully complies with only the
  front-yard setback  requirement.  If the two parcels were considered as
  one, the cabin would meet setback  requirements except with respect to the
  north side of the property.  Such consideration, however,  creates a new
  nonconformity because the zoning ordinance prohibits "more than one
  residential  building on a lot."

       The Town apparently treated the permit application as a request for a
  variance.  On May  21, 1996, the Town granted the variance, with
  conditions.  Although appellants received the  requested permit, they
  appealed to the environmental court in order to challenge two conditions: 
  (1) that the two parcels must be conveyed as a single fifteen-acre parcel
  "if and when a sale  occurs in the future;" and (2) the cabin can be used
  on a seasonal basis or as a guest house, but  not as a year-round
  residence.

       The environmental court agreed that appellants should receive a permit
  to move the  cabin, but the court struck the two conditions.  It did so,
  however, on the basis that appellants  did not need a variance because the
  lots had merged and that the only remaining nonconformity  was the
  inadequate setback with respect to the north side line.  Because the
  relocation of the  cabin reduced that nonconformity, the court issued the
  permit without granting a variance.

 

       Appellants now appeal to this Court.  Although the environmental court
  decision gives  them the permit they requested, without the conditions to
  which they object, they ask us to  reverse the rationale of the
  environmental court decision and rule that there has been no merger  of the
  lots for purpose of the Town zoning ordinance.  The Town has not appealed
  from the  decision to strike the permit conditions and, in its brief, asks
  us to affirm the rationale of the  environmental court decision. 

       We begin with a preliminary issue.  The Town contends that we cannot
  consider the  appeal because it was filed too late.  (FN1) On December 13,
  1996, the environmental court  issued oral findings and conclusions
  granting the application as proposed without the conditions  to which
  appellants had originally objected.  On that date, the clerk of the
  environmental court  made the following docket entry: "permit granted;
  ruling on the record.  CASE CLOSED."  On  January 13, 1997, a Monday,
  appellants filed a notice of appeal in the environmental court by 
  facsimile transmission.  On January 14th, they filed with the court the
  original of the notice  together with the filing fee.  On the next day,
  they moved the environmental court for a written  decision.  The court
  granted the motion and issued the written decision on April 17, 1997.

       The Town argues that entry of judgment occurred when the clerk made
  the docket entry  memorializing the oral decision.  Because the notice of
  appeal was due to be filed within thirty  days of the date of entry of
  judgment, see V.R.A.P. 4, the Town argues that the notice was due  on
  January 12, 1997, extended to January 13th because no filing could be made
  on Sunday, see  V.R.C.P. 6(a) (excluding last day of filing period if
  occurring on Saturday, Sunday or holiday).  The Town then argues that
  appellants failed to file the requisite notice by that date because the 
  facsimile transmission does not qualify as a notice of appeal under the
  rule.

       Although the parties have briefed whether a notice of appeal can be
  filed through a 

 

  facsimile copy, we conclude that we can resolve the timeliness issue
  without determining the  effectiveness of the facsimile.  The appeal period
  runs from the date of "entry of judgment."   See id.  The process of
  creation and entry of judgment is governed by V.R.C.P. 58:
		
     [U]pon a decision by the court granting or denying relief, the 
     clerk, unless the Presiding Judge otherwise orders, shall forthwith 
     prepare the judgment without awaiting any direction by the court.  
     The Presiding Judge shall promptly approve and sign the 
     judgment, and the clerk shall thereupon enter it.   A judgment is 
     effective only when entered as provided in Rule 79(a).

  V.R.C.P. 58.  Civil Rule 79(a) requires the clerk to keep a civil docket
  and to enter in it  judgments, showing the date of entry and its "nature
  and subject matter."  V.R.C.P. 79(a).  The  clerk is also required to
  record final judgments, and certain other orders, in a book for that 
  purpose as soon as possible after the rendition of the judgment or order. 
  See id. at (b). 

       The federal rule is "substantially similar" to Vermont Civil Rule 58,
  although the federal  rule explicitly requires a separate judgment
  document.  See Reporter's Notes, V.R.C.P. 58.   Federal Rule 58 is
  interpreted to require two steps: the preparation and approval of the
  separate  judgment, and entry of the judgment on the docket.  See 11 C.
  Wright, A. Miller & D. Kane,  Federal Practice and Procedure § 2785, at 23
  (2d ed. 1995).  Both steps are mandatory.  See id.  § 2785, at 25.

       We conclude that Vermont Civil Rule 58 also requires a two-step
  process.  The presiding  judge must "approve and sign the judgment,"
  although the judgment need not be one wholly  separate document, see
  Morissette v. Morissette, 143 Vt. 52, 58,