Title: State v. Negrete

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2012 WI 92 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP1702 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Abraham C. Negrete, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
(No Cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 12, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 8, 2012 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit  
 
COUNTY: 
Washington   
 
JUDGE: 
Andrew T. Gonring 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
 
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (Opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent.  
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Jeffrey W. Jensen, Milwaukee, and oral argument by 
Jeffrey W. Jensen. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by Sarah 
Burgundy and the brief was filed by Thomas E. Dietrich, 
assistant attorneys general, with whom on the brief was J.B. Van 
Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
2012 WI 92
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2010AP1702 
(L.C. No. 
1992CF41) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Abraham C. Negrete, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 12, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, which affirmed the 
circuit court's denial of Abraham Negrete's postconviction 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea.1  The plea at issue was entered 
in 1992, and no transcript of the plea hearing is available.  
The sole issue on review is whether Negrete was entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing on his plea withdrawal motion under Wis. 
                                                 
1 The 
Honorable 
Andrew 
T. 
Gonring 
presided 
in 
this 
postconviction proceeding in the Washington County Circuit 
Court; the Honorable Leo F. Schlaefer presided in the underlying 
action in which Negrete entered his plea. 
No. 
2010AP1702   
 
2 
 
Stat. § 971.08(2) (2009-10).2  Resolution of this issue turns on 
the pleading requirements of a motion to withdraw a guilty or no 
contest plea under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2).  Section 971.08(2) 
provides that a defendant has a statutory right to withdraw a 
guilty or no contest plea upon proving that:  (1) the circuit 
court failed to personally advise the defendant of the potential 
deportation consequences of the plea; and (2) the plea is likely 
to result in one of the enumerated immigration consequences. 
¶2 
In support of his motion, Negrete stated in an 
affidavit that he "do[es] not recall" whether the plea-accepting 
court advised him of the potential deportation consequences of 
his plea.3  Negrete's affidavit also states that he is now 
subject to deportation proceedings.  However, Negrete's plea 
questionnaire indicates that he was advised of the immigration 
consequences prior to making his plea.  
¶3 
We 
conclude 
that 
Negrete's 
allegations 
are 
insufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing.  Where a 
defendant seeks to withdraw a guilty plea under Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(2), but there is no transcript of the plea hearing, the 
pleading requirements for such motions are those set forth in 
State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 310, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996).  
Under the applicable Bentley-type standard, Negrete's affidavit 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009–10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 We use the term "plea-accepting court" to refer to the 
circuit court in which Negrete entered his plea in 1992; "the 
circuit court" refers to the court in which the present 
postconviction proceeding was initiated in 2010. 
No. 
2010AP1702   
 
3 
 
has not alleged sufficient facts that, if true, would entitle 
him to withdraw his guilty plea.  Specifically, Negrete has 
failed to sufficiently allege that the plea-accepting court did 
not tell him of the potential immigration consequences of his 
plea.  In addition, his motion fails to allege sufficient facts 
demonstrating a causal nexus between his guilty plea and the 
likelihood 
of 
any 
immigration 
consequences. 
 
Therefore, 
Negrete's motion to withdraw his guilty plea under § 971.08(2) 
was properly denied. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
In April 1992, Abraham Negrete pleaded guilty to one 
count of second-degree sexual assault of a person under the age 
of 16 years, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) (1991–92).  
As a result, Negrete was sentenced to 18 months of probation and 
ordered to pay restitution.  After serving his probation and 
paying restitution, Negrete was discharged in April 1994. 
¶5 
On 
March 10, 
2010, 
nearly 
18 
years 
after 
his 
conviction, Negrete moved to withdraw his guilty plea for the 
1992 sexual assault charge.  The motion was based on Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(2),4 which allows a defendant to withdraw a guilty or no 
                                                 
4 When 
accepting 
a 
defendant's 
plea, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.08(1)(c) directs that: 
Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or no 
contest, 
it shall . . . [a]ddress the defendant 
personally and advise the defendant as follows:  "If 
you are not a citizen of the United States of America, 
you are advised that a plea of guilty or no contest 
for the offense with which you are charged may result 
in deportation, the exclusion from admission to this 
No. 
2010AP1702   
 
4 
 
contest plea where a plea-accepting court fails to personally 
advise the defendant of the potential immigration consequences 
of the plea,5 and that plea is likely to result in an adverse 
immigration consequence listed in § 971.08(2).  Negrete's motion 
alleged that when accepting Negrete's plea, the court "did not 
inform" him of the potential immigration consequences of his 
plea, and that Negrete is now "the subject of deportation 
proceedings." 
¶6 
Whereas Negrete's motion affirmatively stated that the 
court "did not inform Negrete" of the potential immigration 
consequences, his affidavit filed in support of the motion was 
equivocal.  His affidavit stated, "I do not recall the court, or 
my lawyer, ever telling me of [the potential immigration 
consequences] of the plea."  Negrete also averred that he had 
not understood the potential immigration consequences of his 
                                                                                                                                                             
country or the denial of naturalization, under federal 
law." 
Additionally, Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) provides that: 
 
If a court fails to advise a defendant as 
required by sub. (1)(c) and a defendant later shows 
that the plea is likely to result in the defendant's 
deportation, exclusion from admission to this country 
or 
denial 
of 
naturalization, 
the 
court 
on 
the 
defendant's 
motion 
shall 
vacate 
any 
applicable 
judgment 
against 
the 
defendant 
and 
permit 
the 
defendant to withdraw the plea and enter another plea. 
5 Throughout this opinion, we refer to  "immigration 
consequences" as shorthand for the various adverse immigration 
actions referred to under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c) & (2). 
No. 
2010AP1702   
 
5 
 
plea, and that had he known, he would not have entered the 
guilty plea. 
¶7 
At the time of his conviction in 1992, Negrete 
indicated that he did not intend to seek postconviction relief; 
accordingly, no transcript of the plea hearing was created from 
the court reporter's notes.  Moreover, Negrete's attorney for 
the 1992 offense has died, and the presiding judge in that case, 
the Honorable Leo F. Schlaefer, has retired.  Negrete stated in 
his motion to withdraw his plea that, if given the opportunity, 
he would testify that he was not warned on the record at the 
time he entered his plea. 
¶8 
In the circuit court, Negrete's argument for plea 
withdrawal relied largely on this court's decision in State v. 
Douangmala, 2002 WI 62, 253 Wis. 2d 173, 646 N.W.2d 1, which 
rejected the harmless error approach when a defendant seeks to 
withdraw a plea under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2).  Id., ¶46.  Under 
the harmless error approach, a defendant alleging error under 
§ 971.08(2) would not have been allowed to withdraw his plea if 
the State could show that the defendant was otherwise aware of 
the likely immigration consequences of his plea.  See State v. 
Chavez, 175 Wis. 2d 366, 368–71, 498 N.W.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1993). 
¶9 
In response to Negrete's motion, the State emphasized 
that, at the time of Negrete's plea, motions to withdraw under 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) were subject to the harmless error 
approach established in Chavez.  Id.  The State relied on our 
decision in State v. Lagundoye, 2004 WI 4, 268 Wis. 2d 77, 674 
N.W.2d 526, which provided that Douangmala's repudiation of the 
No. 
2010AP1702   
 
6 
 
harmless error approach was not retroactively applicable because 
Douangmala's holding was a new rule of criminal procedure, and 
such rules are not applied to cases that were final before the 
rule's issuance.  Id., ¶2.  Because Negrete's case was final 
long before our decision in Douangmala, the State argued, 
harmless error applied to Negrete's motion. 
¶10 In support of its argument that any error was 
harmless, the State primarily relied on Negrete's "Request to 
Enter Plea and Waiver of Rights" form ("plea questionnaire"), 
which Negrete submitted to the court at the time of his 1992 
plea.  That form includes numerous statements to which a 
pleading defendant must agree before entering a plea.  Most 
statements include an adjacent blank space where a defendant 
must place his initials to indicate his understanding of the 
statement.  The statement relevant to our discussion here, 
paragraph 20 of the plea questionnaire, provides in language 
substantially similar to the statutory warning in Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(1)(c): 
 
If you are not a citizen of the United States of 
America, you are advised that a plea of guilty or no 
contest and a finding of guilty by the Court of the 
offense(s) with which you are charged in the Criminal 
Complaint or Information, may result in deportation, 
exclusion from admission to this Country or a denial 
of naturalization under federal law. 
¶11 In the blank space adjacent to that paragraph, 
Negrete's initials appear.  Also, near the end of the document, 
following the initialed paragraphs, there is a statement that "I 
have read this entire document and I understand its contents."  
No. 
2010AP1702   
 
7 
 
That provision is signed by "Abe Negrete," and dated April 29, 
1992, the same day as the plea hearing.  Finally, the plea 
questionnaire 
is 
signed 
by 
Negrete's 
then-attorney, 
Gary 
McGregor, who acknowledged by his signature that he "discussed 
and 
explained 
the 
contents 
of 
the 
questionnaire 
to 
the 
defendant, that the defendant acknowledged his understanding of 
each item in this questionnaire, including any post-conviction 
relief procedures, and that [the attorney knows] the above 
signature to be the defendant's." 
¶12 In deciding whether to grant Negrete's motion to 
withdraw, the circuit court concluded that, based on Lagundoye, 
the harmless error analysis applied.  In light of the plea 
questionnaire, the circuit court determined that any failure by 
the plea-accepting court to personally advise Negrete of the 
deportation consequences of his plea was harmless because the 
questionnaire demonstrated that Negrete was independently aware 
of those consequences.  Accordingly, the court denied Negrete's 
motion without an evidentiary hearing. 
¶13 The court of appeals affirmed in an unpublished 
decision.  That court assumed that Negrete had not been 
personally advised as required under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c), 
but that, nonetheless, such error was harmless.  Given the 
conflict 
between 
Negrete's 
allegations 
and 
the 
plea 
questionnaire in the record, the court concluded that nothing 
would have been added by an evidentiary hearing at which Negrete 
would have been the sole witness.  Therefore, based on the 
entirety of the record, the court held that there was no 
No. 
2010AP1702   
 
8 
 
question that Negrete was aware of the potential immigration 
consequences of his plea, and that any failure to personally 
advise him, if such a failure occurred, was harmless. 
¶14 Negrete petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted.  We now affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶15 Negrete asserts that under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2), he 
is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea.  This requires us to 
interpret the language of that statute to determine what a 
defendant must plead in his motion to satisfy the statutory 
elements.  Statutory interpretation presents a question of law 
that we review independently of the circuit court and the court 
of appeals, although benefiting from those courts' analyses.  
Rasmussen v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2011 WI 52, ¶14, 335 Wis. 2d 1, 
803 N.W.2d 623.  Where the meaning of the statute is plain from 
the words used, we ordinarily will not examine extrinsic sources 
such as legislative history.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶¶45–46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110. 
¶16 In addition, as relevant here, there are two methods 
by which courts typically review motions to withdraw guilty or 
no contest pleas after judgment and sentence.  The first method 
is based on the general rule that a defendant seeking to 
withdraw a guilty or no contest plea after sentencing must show 
"'manifest injustice by clear and convincing evidence.'"  State 
v. Hampton, 2004 WI 107, ¶60, 274 Wis. 2d 379, 683 N.W.2d 14 
No. 
2010AP1702   
 
9 
 
(quoting Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 311).  This method, often 
referred to as the Bentley standard, see id., ¶51, applies a 
two-step standard of review for motions to withdraw guilty or no 
contest pleas.  Id., ¶55. 
¶17 Under the first step of a Bentley-type review, a 
reviewing 
court 
must 
determine 
whether 
a 
defendant's 
postconviction motion alleges sufficient material facts that, if 
true, would entitle the defendant to relief.  See State v. 
Allen, 2004 WI 106, ¶9, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433 (citing 
Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 309-10).  This presents a question of 
law subject to independent review.  Id.  Where a defendant's 
motion alleges facts that would entitle him to withdraw his 
plea, 
but 
the 
record 
conclusively 
demonstrates 
that 
the 
defendant is not entitled to relief, no evidentiary hearing is 
required.6  Id.  Whether the record conclusively demonstrates 
that the defendant is entitled to no relief is also a question 
of law, subject to independent review.  Id. 
¶18 Under the second step of a Bentley–type review, if the 
defendant's motion does not allege sufficient facts to entitle 
the defendant to relief, an appellate court reviews the circuit 
court's decision to grant or deny an evidentiary hearing under 
an erroneous exercise of discretion standard.  Id.  The circuit 
                                                 
6 Where a defendant alleges sufficient facts and the record 
does not conclusively demonstrate that the defendant is not 
entitled to relief, the circuit court is without discretion, and 
must grant an evidentiary hearing.  State v. Douangmala, 2002 WI 
62, ¶¶23–25, 253 Wis. 2d 173, 646 N.W.2d 1; State v. Hampton, 
2004 WI 107, ¶55, 274 Wis. 2d 379, 683 N.W.2d 14. 
No. 
2010AP1702   
 
10 
 
court's discretionary decision will be sustained if the court 
has examined the relevant facts of record, applied a proper 
legal standard, and reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge 
could reach.  Miller v. Hanover Ins. Co., 2010 WI 75, ¶¶29-30, 
326 Wis. 2d 640, 785 N.W.2d 493. 
¶19 Another method, alleged to be applicable here, is the 
standard of review for a guilty or no contest plea established 
under State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986).  
Under Bangert, we established an approach for plea withdrawals 
whereby a defendant may shift the burden of proof to the State 
when:  (1) the defendant can point to a plea colloquy deficiency 
evident in the plea colloquy transcript, and (2) the defendant 
alleges that he did not know or understand the information that 
should have been provided in the colloquy.  Id. at 274–75; see 
Hampton, 274 Wis. 2d 379, ¶46.  When a defendant is able to make 
such a showing, the burden then shifts to the State to show by 
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's plea was made 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 
at 275.  Additionally, where a defendant makes such a showing, a 
reviewing court considers the sufficiency of the colloquy and 
the necessity of an evidentiary hearing as questions of law, 
subject 
to 
independent 
review, 
but 
benefiting 
from 
the 
discussions of the circuit court and the court of appeals.  See 
State v. Hoppe, 2009 WI 41, ¶17, 317 Wis. 2d 161, 765 N.W.2d 
794. 
¶20 We conclude that the more broadly applicable Bentley-
type plea withdrawal standard of review is appropriate here.  In 
No. 
2010AP1702   
 
11 
 
so concluding, we also hold that Bangert's burden shifting 
procedure is not applicable under these circumstances because 
the Bangert procedure is predicated on a defendant making "a 
pointed showing" of an error in the plea colloquy by reference 
to the plea colloquy transcript.7  See Hampton, 274 Wis. 2d 379, 
¶46.  Because Negrete has made no such showing, Bangert's burden 
shifting procedure is inapplicable.   
¶21 Accordingly, in applying the Bentley-type standard of 
review, we independently review whether Negrete's motion alleges 
sufficient facts that, if true, would entitle him to withdraw 
his plea.  Additionally, because we conclude that Negrete's 
motion did not allege sufficient facts to entitle him to relief, 
we review the circuit court's decision to deny his motion under 
an erroneous exercise of discretion standard. 
B.  Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08(2) 
¶22 To determine what a defendant must allege in a motion 
to withdraw a guilty plea under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2), we 
examine the language of the statute: 
 
If a court fails to advise a defendant as 
required by sub. (1)(c) and a defendant later shows 
that the plea is likely to result in the defendant's 
deportation, exclusion from admission to this country 
or 
denial 
of 
naturalization, 
the 
court 
on 
the 
                                                 
7 We discuss our reasoning for this conclusion in greater 
depth in Section II.C., below, where we address the applicable 
pleading standard for motions to withdraw under Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(2) where the plea hearing transcript is unavailable.  
In that section, we examine the rationale underlying Bangert's 
burden shifting procedure and discuss why such rationale is 
unavailing where a defendant does not point to an error in the 
plea hearing transcript. 
No. 
2010AP1702   
 
12 
 
defendant's 
motion 
shall 
vacate 
any 
applicable 
judgment 
against 
the 
defendant 
and 
permit 
the 
defendant to withdraw the plea and enter another plea. 
¶23 The statutory language is clear.  As we recognized in 
Douangmala, 253 Wis. 2d 173, ¶¶23–25, where a defendant's motion 
establishes that a court failed to properly advise the defendant 
of the potential immigration consequences of his plea, the 
defendant may withdraw his plea and enter a new plea, without 
regard to whether he was otherwise aware of such consequences.  
To employ Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) to withdraw his plea, however, 
the defendant's motion must first allege two facts:  (1) that 
the circuit court "fail[ed] to advise [the] defendant [of the 
deportation consequences of the defendant's plea] as required by 
[§ 971.08(1)(c)]"; and (2) that the defendant's "plea is likely 
to result in the defendant's deportation, exclusion from 
admission to this country[,] or denial of naturalization."  Wis. 
Stat. § 971.08(2); see also Cody Harris, Comment, A Problem of 
Proof: How Routine Destruction of Court Records Routinely 
Destroys a Statutory Remedy, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1791, 1802 (2007) 
(discussing People v. Totari, 50 P.3d 781, 785-86 (Cal. 2002)), 
establishing similar pleading requirements for a motion to 
withdraw a guilty or no contest plea to avoid deportation 
consequences of the plea). 
¶24 First, Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) requires a defendant to 
allege that the plea-accepting court "fail[ed] to advise [the] 
defendant as required by [§ 971.08(1)(c)]."  Therefore, a 
defendant must affirmatively assert that the plea-accepting 
court did not tell the defendant of the potential immigration 
No. 
2010AP1702   
 
13 
 
consequences of his plea.  See § 971.08(2).  A defendant's 
allegation that he does not recall whether the judge told him of 
the potential immigration consequences of his plea, or that it 
is possible that the judge might have failed to do so, does not 
allege facts that, if true, would entitle the defendant to 
relief.  See Hampton, 274 Wis. 2d 379, ¶55. 
¶25 Such inconclusive assertions as "I do not recall" will 
not support plea withdrawal because the truth or falsity of the 
defendant's statement has no bearing on whether the court 
actually advised the defendant of the potential immigration 
consequences of the plea.  Whether the defendant remembers being 
told is not the operative fact upon which the right of 
withdrawal under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) is based; rather, the 
operative fact is whether the judge fulfilled the statutory 
requirement.  Consequently, if the defendant does not allege 
that the court did not tell him of the potential immigration 
consequences of his plea, the defendant has not met the first 
element of § 971.08(2), and his motion to withdraw may be denied 
without an evidentiary hearing.  See Allen, 274 Wis. 2d 568, ¶9. 
¶26 The second allegation that a defendant must make when 
seeking to withdraw a guilty or no contest plea under Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(2) is that the plea "is likely to result in the 
defendant's deportation, exclusion from admission to this 
country[,] or denial of naturalization."  This requires that the 
defendant allege facts demonstrating a causal nexus between the 
entry of the guilty or no contest plea at issue and the federal 
government's likely institution of adverse immigration actions 
No. 
2010AP1702   
 
14 
 
consistent with § 971.08(1)(c).  Bare allegations of possible 
deportation are insufficient. 
¶27 The immigration consequences flowing from a guilty or 
no contest plea are tied to federal law.  See Andrew Moore, 
Criminal Deportation, Post-Conviction Relief and the Lost Cause 
of Uniformity, 22 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 665, 667–77 (2008).  
Accordingly, to satisfy Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2)'s "likelihood" of 
immigration consequences requirement, a defendant may allege 
that:  (1) the defendant pleaded guilty or no contest to a crime 
for which immigration consequences are provided under federal 
law; and (2) because of his plea, the federal government has 
manifested its intent to institute one of the immigration 
consequences listed in § 971.08(2), as to the defendant.8  As 
                                                 
8 More specifically, if a defendant chooses to establish 
that the crime to which the defendant pleaded is one for which 
the defendant would have been subject to potentially adverse 
immigration consequences under controlling federal law, the 
defendant should cite the federal law upon which reliance is 
placed.  For example, under federal law, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2006) 
delineates numerous categories of aliens who are potentially 
deportable.  Relevant to motions under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) is 
the federal statute providing that "[a]ny alien who is convicted 
of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is 
deportable."  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  See State v. 
Baeza, 174 Wis. 2d 118, 127, 496 N.W.2d 233 (Ct. App. 1993). 
In addition, in such a motion, a defendant should allege 
that the federal government has conveyed its intent to impose 
one of the enumerated immigration consequences set out in Wis. 
Stat. § 971.08(2).  This required nexus between the crime to 
which a plea was made and adverse immigration consequences can 
be demonstrated by alleging facts that show that, because of his 
plea, 
the 
defendant 
has 
become 
subject 
to 
deportation 
proceedings, has been excluded from admission to the country, or 
has been denied naturalization. 
No. 
2010AP1702   
 
15 
 
alternatives, a defendant may submit some written notification 
that the defendant has received from a federal agent that 
imports adverse immigration consequences because of the plea 
that 
was 
entered; 
or, 
a 
defendant 
may 
narrate 
verbal 
communications that the defendant has had with a federal agent 
advising that adverse immigration consequences were likely and 
that such consequences were tied to the crime for which the plea 
was entered.   
¶28 To summarize, under the applicable pleading standards 
for motions to withdraw guilty or no contest pleas under Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.08(2) 
where 
the 
plea 
hearing 
transcript 
is 
unavailable, a defendant must allege sufficient facts that, if 
true, would demonstrate satisfaction of the statute's two 
requirements.  A defendant must allege that the court did not 
tell the defendant of the immigration consequences of his plea 
and that entry of the plea is likely to result in one of the 
consequences enumerated in § 971.08(2).  However, if the record 
conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to 
relief, no hearing is required; or, if the defendant does not 
allege sufficient facts that, if true, would entitle the 
defendant to relief, the circuit court is within its discretion 
to deny the defendant's motion without holding an evidentiary 
hearing.  See State v. Balliette, 2011 WI 79, ¶18, 336 Wis. 2d 
358, 805 N.W.2d 334. 
C.  Applicability of Bentley-type Standard 
¶29 Acknowledging that allegations of a defective plea 
colloquy are typically subject to analysis under Bangert, we 
No. 
2010AP1702   
 
16 
 
briefly discuss our rationale for applying a Bentley-type 
pleading requirement to the circumstances of this case.  First, 
the Bentley-type pleading standard embodies the general rule 
that a defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty or no contest plea 
after sentencing must prove manifest injustice by clear and 
convincing evidence.  See Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 283; Hampton, 
274 Wis. 2d 379, ¶60.  Accordingly, the Bentley-type, manifest-
injustice-by-clear-and-convincing-evidence 
standard 
is 
the 
starting point from which we may determine whether any other 
pleading standards apply.  
¶30 As an alternative pleading standard for motions to 
withdraw guilty or no contest pleas, Bangert contemplated a 
shift in the burden of proof from the defendant to the State 
based upon a showing of a deficiency in the plea colloquy 
transcript.  See Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274–75.  As we have 
stated, the necessary showing requires a defendant to point to 
specific deficiencies evident on the face of the plea colloquy 
transcript.  See Hampton, 274 Wis. 2d 379, ¶51 (Bangert analysis 
is "confined to alleged defects in the record of the plea 
colloquy").  In addition, a defendant's motion must allege that 
he did not know or understand the information that should have 
been presented at the plea hearing.  State v. Brown, 2006 WI 
100, ¶36, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906.  Once the defendant 
satisfies Bangert's preliminary requirements, the burden then 
shifts to the State to show by clear and convincing evidence at 
an 
evidentiary 
hearing that, notwithstanding the colloquy 
No. 
2010AP1702   
 
17 
 
deficiencies, 
the 
defendant's plea was entered knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily.  Hampton, 274 Wis. 2d 379, ¶46. 
¶31 Where 
the 
transcript 
of 
the 
plea 
hearing 
is 
unavailable, however, Bangert's burden shifting procedure does 
not apply, because:  (1) the defendant will not be able to make 
the requisite showing from the transcript that the circuit court 
erred in the plea colloquy, and (2) the rationale underlying 
Bangert's burden shifting rule does not support extending that 
rule to situations where a violation is not evident from the 
transcript.  Instead, the policy of finality counsels that a 
party seeking to disrupt a final judgment by withdrawing his 
plea must first allege facts which, if true, demonstrate that 
manifest injustice has occurred and that relief is therefore 
warranted.9  See Balliette, 336 Wis. 2d 358, ¶¶57–58; see also 
State v. Ernst, 2005 WI 107, ¶25, 283 Wis. 2d 300, 699 N.W.2d 92 
("Any claim of a violation on a collateral attack that does not 
detail such facts will fail.").   
¶32 First, 
practically 
speaking, 
where 
there 
is 
no 
transcript of the plea colloquy, the showing required under 
Bangert, relying on evidence in a transcript of defects in the 
plea colloquy, simply cannot be made.  See Balliette, 336 
Wis. 2d 358, ¶57. Second, and more fundamentally, the rationale 
underlying Bangert's low standard for burden shifting——that the 
State can avoid such burden by ensuring that the circuit court 
                                                 
9 Here, the legislature has effectively provided that 
"manifest injustice" is established by satisfying the elements 
of Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2). 
No. 
2010AP1702   
 
18 
 
complies with the colloquy requirements——rings hollow, because 
there is no evidence in the record that the court did not 
comply.  See Hampton, 274 Wis. 2d 379, ¶51.  Without linking the 
shift of the burden of proof to a showing of error evident on 
the face of the transcript, we would ignore the general rule 
that a defendant seeking to withdraw his plea retains the burden 
of proving his claim by clear and convincing evidence.  See id., 
¶¶60, 63–64. 
¶33 Accordingly, where a defendant is unable to point to a 
defect evident on the face of a plea colloquy transcript because 
such transcript is unavailable, the more appropriate review of a 
motion to withdraw a guilty or no contest plea under Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(2) is that set forth in Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 310.10  
Allegations that are "less susceptible to objective confirmation 
in the record" are particularly suited to a Bentley-type 
                                                 
10 Indeed, this standard largely corresponds to the general 
statutory requirement for particularity in motion pleading.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 971.30(2)(c). 
No. 
2010AP1702   
 
19 
 
analysis,11 
because 
the 
defendant 
is 
required 
to 
allege 
particular facts that would entitle the defendant to relief 
before the court is obligated to hold an evidentiary hearing on 
the motion.  See Hampton, 274 Wis. 2d 379, ¶51.  Therefore, a 
defendant 
seeking 
relief 
under 
§ 971.08(2) 
must 
allege 
sufficient facts in his motion that, if true, would demonstrate 
that the plea-accepting court failed to tell the defendant of 
the potential immigration consequences of his plea, and that the 
                                                 
11 The Bentley-type standard has been characterized, by 
reference to Bangert, as applying to errors in the pleading 
process "extrinsic to the plea colloquy," such as ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  See, e.g., State v. Howell, 2007 WI 75, 
¶74, 301 Wis. 2d 350, 734 N.W.2d 48.  Although this distinction 
between matters within the plea colloquy and matters extrinsic 
to 
the 
colloquy 
often 
provides 
sufficient 
guidance, 
the 
distinction departs from Bangert's original holding and is 
therefore not entirely accurate.  Because Bangert provided a 
method by which defendants could shift the burden of proof to 
the State when the defendant could show from the face of the 
transcript that the circuit court had erred in the plea colloquy 
and that he did not understand the information that should have 
been provided, we now reaffirm that where a defendant is not 
able to make such a showing under Bangert, the defendant may 
nonetheless avail himself of the Bentley-type procedure to prove 
that he is entitled to withdraw his guilty or no contest plea.  
No. 
2010AP1702   
 
20 
 
defendant's plea is likely to result in adverse immigration 
consequences.12   
D.  Application 
¶34 Having set forth the applicable pleading requirements 
for motions to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest under 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) where the plea hearing transcript is 
unavailable, we turn to the application of that standard to 
Negrete's motion.  We conclude that under the applicable 
Bentley-type review, Negrete's motion does not set forth 
sufficient, nonconclusory facts that, if true, would entitle him 
to relief.  See Allen, 274 Wis. 2d 568, ¶9.   
¶35 With regard to the first pleading requirement under 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2), that the circuit court did not tell 
Negrete of the immigration consequences of his plea, Negrete 
alleges in his motion that "the court did not inform Negrete, on 
the record, of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea."  
However, Negrete's affidavit, filed simultaneously with his 
                                                 
12 Our decision in this case is not affected by Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).  First, Padilla held that a 
defense attorney's failure to properly inform his client of 
potential immigration consequences may constitute deficient 
performance under the Sixth Amendment.  Id. at 1483–84.  Here, 
Negrete 
does 
not 
allege 
that 
counsel's 
performance 
was 
deficient.  Second, and more to the point, by enacting Wis. 
Stat. § 971.08(1)(c) & (2), Wisconsin codified the protections 
contemplated in Padilla, but placed the duty to warn on the 
circuit court, rather than solely on the attorney.  Accordingly, 
because the right at issue here, § 971.08(1)(c)'s right to be 
informed of the immigration consequences of a guilty or no 
contest plea, is a court-oriented, statutorily protected right, 
our analysis is distinct from that of Padilla. 
No. 
2010AP1702   
 
21 
 
motion, alleges that Negrete "do[es] not recall" whether he 
received the necessary warning.  We have recognized that 
evidentiary facts stated in an affidavit supplant allegations in 
a pleading.  Moutry v. Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 35 Wis. 2d 652, 
659, 151 N.W.2d 630 (1967).  Therefore, Negrete's motion, when 
taken together with his affidavit, fails to satisfy the first 
requirement of § 971.08(2).13 
¶36 The second pleading requirement for motions under Wis. 
Stat. § 971.08(2) is that a defendant must allege that the plea 
at issue "is likely to result" in one of the enumerated 
immigration consequences.  To this end, Negrete's motion states 
the offense for which he entered the plea ("second degree sexual 
assault of a child") and alleges that "Negrete is now the 
subject of deportation proceedings."  These bare allegations are 
insufficient to demonstrate that Negrete's "plea is likely to 
result in [his] deportation."  See Xiong v. INS, 173 F.3d 601, 
604-08 (7th Cir. 1999). 
¶37 To comply with the Bentley-type pleading standard in 
the context of Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2), a defendant may set forth 
the crime of conviction, the applicable federal statutes 
establishing his potential deportability, and those facts 
                                                 
13 By failing to satisfy one of the requirements of Wis. 
Stat. § 971.08(2), Negrete has failed to demonstrate that he is 
entitled to relief as a matter of law.  We nonetheless examine 
Negrete's motion under § 971.08(2)'s second requirement to 
provide guidance for defendants seeking relief in the future 
under that section, and to provide support for our conclusion 
that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in 
denying Negrete's motion. 
No. 
2010AP1702   
 
22 
 
admitted in his plea that bring his crime within the federal 
statutes.  In so doing, a defendant may submit some written 
notification that the defendant has received from a federal 
agent that imports adverse immigration consequences because of 
the plea that was entered; or, a defendant may narrate verbal 
communications that the defendant has had with a federal agent 
advising that adverse immigration consequences were likely and 
that such consequences were tied to the crime for which the plea 
was entered.  A defendant's motion should not require the 
circuit court or a reviewing court to speculate about the 
factual basis for the requisite nexus.   
¶38 Accordingly, we conclude that Negrete's motion fails 
to allege facts sufficient to entitle him to relief because he 
has not satisfied the two necessary requirements of Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(2).  Therefore, under the first step of the Bentley-
type analysis, we conclude that Negrete is not entitled to 
relief as a matter of law. 
¶39 We now turn to the second step of the Bentley-type 
analysis; that is, whether the circuit court properly exercised 
its discretion in denying Negrete's motion.  Here, the circuit 
court examined Negrete's motion as the parties had framed the 
issue, under the harmless error analysis; specifically, the 
court concluded that under Lagundoye, harmless error applied to 
Negrete's 1992 plea.  Consequently, although the circuit court 
applied a proper legal standard, it cannot be said that the 
circuit court exercised its discretion under identical legal 
standards as those set forth herein. 
No. 
2010AP1702   
 
23 
 
¶40 Nothing in our analysis, however, suggests that 
Lagundoye is no longer good law; accordingly, we would be 
mistaken to say that the circuit court applied an erroneous 
legal standard.  Rather, the court examined the relevant facts, 
applied a proper legal standard, and reached a reasonable 
conclusion.  See Miller, 326 Wis. 2d 640, ¶¶29-30.  We conclude, 
therefore, that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise 
its discretion in denying Negrete's motion. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶41 We 
conclude 
that 
Negrete's 
allegations 
are 
insufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing.  Where a 
defendant seeks to withdraw a guilty plea under Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(2), but there is no transcript of the plea hearing, the 
pleading requirements for such motions are those set forth in 
Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 310.  Under the applicable Bentley-type 
standard, Negrete's affidavit has not alleged sufficient facts 
that, if true, would entitle him to withdraw his guilty plea.  
Specifically, Negrete has failed to sufficiently allege that the 
plea-accepting 
court 
did 
not 
tell 
him 
of 
the 
potential 
immigration consequences of his plea.  In addition, his motion 
fails to allege sufficient facts demonstrating a causal nexus 
between his guilty plea and the likelihood of any immigration 
consequences.  Therefore, Negrete's motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea under § 971.08(2) was properly denied. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
 
No.  2010AP1702.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶42 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 971.08(2) provides remedies when a circuit court fails 
to 
give 
a 
defendant 
the 
warnings 
about 
the 
immigration 
consequences resulting from a guilty or no contest plea.1  It 
provides, in relevant part, as follows:  
If a court fails to advise a defendant as required by 
sub. (1)(c) and a defendant later shows that the plea 
is likely to result in the defendant's deportation, 
exclusion from admission to this country or denial of 
naturalization, the court on the defendant's motion 
shall vacate any applicable judgment against the 
defendant and permit the defendant to withdraw the 
plea and enter another plea. (Emphases added.) 
¶43 At one point, the majority recites these legislative 
pleading requirements correctly.  The majority explains that the 
defendant's motion must allege:  "(1) that the circuit court 
'fail[ed] 
to 
advise 
[the] 
defendant 
[of 
the 
deportation 
consequences 
of 
the 
defendant's 
plea] 
as 
required 
by 
[§ 971.08(1)(c)]'; and (2) that the defendant's 'plea is likely 
to result in the defendant's deportation, exclusion from 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08(1)(c) sets forth as follows what 
the circuit court is to state in addressing the defendant about 
immigration consequences: 
971.08(1) Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or 
no contest, it shall do all of the following: 
. . . . 
(c) Address the defendant personally and advise the 
defendant as follows: "If you are not a citizen of the 
United States of America, you are advised that a plea 
of guilty or no contest for the offense with which you 
are charged may result in deportation, the exclusion 
from admission to this country or the denial or 
naturalization, under federal law."    
No.  2010AP1702.ssa 
 
2 
 
admission to this country[,] or denial of naturalization." 
Majority op., ¶23.   
¶44 Thereafter 
the 
majority 
opinion 
transmutes 
the 
statutory pleading requirements without the benefit of briefs or 
argument by the State or Negrete and applies them retroactively 
to Negrete.      
¶45 I dissent because the majority opinion improperly 
applies the first statutory pleading requirement and creates a 
second, brand-new pleading requirement for a motion to withdraw 
a guilty or no contest plea under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) when a 
circuit court fails to give a defendant the warnings. 
¶46 With respect to the first pleading requirement——allege 
that the circuit court failed to advise the defendant of 
immigration consequences——the majority (adopting the State's 
argument) ignores and misconstrues the thrust of Negrete's 
motion and supporting affidavit.   
¶47 With respect to the second pleading requirement——
allege that the plea is likely to result in immigration 
consequences——the majority deviates from the text of the statute 
and sets forth several pleading requirements not in the text of 
the statute.  These new-for-2012-judicially-created pleading 
requirements, not grounded in the text of the statute and not 
briefed or argued by the State or Negrete, are then unfairly 
No.  2010AP1702.ssa 
 
3 
 
applied retroactively to Negrete's motion filed in 2010.  
Majority op., ¶3.2 
¶48 The majority's application of both statutory pleading 
requirements is incredibly unjust to the defendant.  In all 
contexts, courts should strive to remove technical obstacles and 
enable parties to litigate their claims on the merits.  But in 
the context of the present case, with its dramatic consequences 
to Negrete, the court should be particularly concerned with 
ensuring that both Negrete and the State have a fair opportunity 
to make their claims.  As the United States Supreme Court 
recently recognized, "changes to our immigration law have 
dramatically raised the stakes of a noncitizen's criminal 
conviction. . . . [D]eportation is an integral part——indeed, 
sometimes the most important part——of the penalty that may be 
imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified 
crimes."3   
                                                 
2 In the circuit court and court of appeals, the State 
argued that the doctrine of laches prevented the defendant from 
seeking to withdraw his plea.  The State abandoned that argument 
in this court.  The Wisconsin Association of Criminal Defense 
Attorneys nevertheless filed a non-party brief addressing the 
doctrine of laches, arguing that the doctrine can never apply to 
motions under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2). 
In the circuit court and court of appeals, the state also 
argued that any error made by the circuit court in taking the 
defendant's plea was harmless.  Before this court, the state 
primarily focuses on the sufficiency of the defendant's motion, 
not on harmless error.  The circuit court and court of appeals 
decided the present case on harmless error, not on whether the 
allegations of the motion were facially sufficient.  
3 Padilla 
v. 
Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010) 
(footnote omitted). 
No.  2010AP1702.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶49 Instead, the majority has improperly transformed Wis. 
Stat. § 971.08(1)(c) and (2) into a "gotcha" game.  The majority 
is out of step with the "entire tenor of modern law," which "is 
to prevent the avoidance of adjudication on the merits by resort 
to 
dependency 
on 
non-prejudicial 
and 
non-jurisdictional 
technicalities."4  The majority creates one roadblock after 
another, always erring on the side of denying the defendant the 
minimal remedies of an opportunity to have an evidentiary 
hearing5 or to re-plead.    
                                                 
4 Cruz v. DILHR, 81 Wis. 2d 442, 449, 260 N.W.2d 692 (1978). 
Wisconsin courts "'reject the approach that pleading is a 
game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to 
the outcome . . . .'"  Canadian Pac. Ltd. v. Omark-Prentice 
Hydraulics, Inc., 86 Wis. 2d 369, 373, 272 N.W.2d 407 (Ct. App. 
1978) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957)).   
See also Wis. Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Arby Constr., 2012 WI 87, 
¶36, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___. 
5 Such a hearing would not be a pointless exercise, although 
Negrete's lawyer and the court reporter are both deceased.  For 
one thing, the circuit court judge who took the plea (or perhaps 
another judge or court staff person) could testify regarding the 
judge's practice regarding the warnings required by Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(1)(c).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
                                                (continued) 
No.  2010AP1702.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶50 In 
sum, 
the 
majority 
unreasonably 
ignores 
and 
misconstrues the thrust of Negrete's motion and supporting 
affidavit.  In addition, the majority deviates from the 
statutory text and sets forth new pleading requirements not 
found in Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2).  It is extremely unfair for the 
majority to apply these new-for-2012-judicially-created pleading 
requirements retroactively to Negrete's motion, which was filed 
in 2010.  
I 
¶51 With regard to the first pleading requirement, the 
majority concludes that Negrete fails to allege sufficient 
material facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief, 
because "Negrete has failed to sufficiently allege that the 
                                                                                                                                                             
We know that numerous circuit court judges have not 
complied with the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c). 
See, e.g., State v. Lagundoye, 2004 WI 4, ¶44, 268 Wis. 2d 77, 
674 N.W.2d 526 (Judge Diane S. Sykes and Judge Elsa C. Lamelas 
each failed to provide the required warnings); State v. 
Douangmala, 2002 WI 62, 253 Wis. 2d 173, 646 N.W.2d 1 (Judge 
Donald R. Zuidmulder failed to provide the required warnings); 
State v. Vang, 328 Wis. 2d 251, 789 N.W.2d 115 (Ct. App. 2010) 
(Judge Mark A. Warpinski, Jr. failed to provide the required 
warnings); State v. Shampo, No. 03-0162-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2003) (Judge Thomas G. Grover failed to 
provide the required warnings); State v. Garcia, 2000 WI App 81, 
234 Wis. 2d 304, 610 N.W.2d 180 (Judge William H. Carver failed 
to 
provide 
the 
required 
warnings); 
State 
v. 
Lopez, 
196 
Wis. 2d 725, 539 N.W.2d 700 (Ct. App. 1995) (Judge Dennis J. 
Flynn failed to provide required warnings); State v. Issa, 186 
Wis. 2d 199, 519 N.W.2d 741 (Ct. App. 1994) (Judge Victor Manion 
failed to provide the required warnings); State v. Chavez, 175 
Wis. 2d 366, 498 N.W.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1993) (Judge Richard G. 
Greenwood failed to provide the required warnings).  
An evidentiary hearing could also more clearly establish 
the "nexus" to satisfy the stringent new requirements created by 
the majority opinion.  
No.  2010AP1702.ssa 
 
6 
 
plea-accepting 
court 
did 
not 
tell 
him 
of 
the 
potential 
immigration consequences of his plea."  Majority op., ¶3.  
¶52 I disagree with the majority.  Negrete's motion and 
affidavit must be read in their entirety and together, which the 
majority fails to do.  The motion and the affidavit were both 
drafted by Negrete's attorney and filed together.  Together they 
state that Negrete unwittingly entered a plea without being 
informed of and understanding the immigration consequences of 
such a plea.6   
¶53 Negrete's motion explicitly states that "during the 
course of the plea colloquy the court did not inform Negrete, on 
the record, of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea."  
The motion further states that, if given the opportunity, 
Negrete "will testify that he did not know of the immigration 
consequences of his guilty plea; and, further, if he had known 
that he would be subject to deportation as a result of his plea 
he would not have entered the guilty plea."  Both of these 
statements, if true, would entitle Negrete to relief.      
¶54 In Negrete's affidavit filed simultaneously with his 
motion, Negrete avers that he "do[es] not recall the court, or 
[his] lawyer, ever telling [him] of this consequence of the 
plea."  The majority describes this statement as "equivocal" and 
                                                 
6 The legislative history of 1985 Wis. Act 252, which 
created Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2), "indicates that the legislature 
sought to alleviate the hardship and unfairness involved when an 
alien unwittingly pleads guilty or no contest to a charge 
without being informed of the consequences of such a plea."  
Chavez, 175 Wis. 2d at 371. 
No.  2010AP1702.ssa 
 
7 
 
"inconclusive."  Majority op., ¶¶6, 25.7  But the language in the 
affidavit about the failure to recall cannot negate the very 
next sentence in the affidavit, which does not equivocate at 
all:  "Had I known of this consequence, I would not have entered 
the guilty plea."  This sentence in the affidavit is consistent 
with Negrete's allegation in his motion that "the court did not 
inform Negrete, on the record, of the immigration consequences 
of his guilty plea."8   
¶55 The 
majority 
asserts 
that 
"a 
defendant 
must 
affirmatively assert that the plea-accepting court did not tell 
the defendant of the potential immigration consequences of his 
plea."  Majority op., ¶24.  Negrete did just that in his motion 
and affidavit.   
¶56 To reach its contrary conclusion, the majority (and 
the State) pull out of context and place undue weight on a 
single phrase in the affidavit: "I do not recall."  Majority 
                                                 
7 Negrete and the State dispute the meaning to be given this 
"I do not recall" language.  Each gives a reasonable meaning to 
the phrase.  
8 The majority's claim that "evidentiary facts stated in an 
affidavit supplant allegations in a pleading" is an incomplete 
and incorrect statement of the law.  Majority op., ¶35.  The 
rule of law is that in deciding a motion for summary judgment 
and determining whether there is a genuine issue of material 
fact, a court will view the facts stated in an affidavit as 
supplanting or taking precedence over facts stated in a motion 
for summary judgment or in a pleading to the extent that the 
facts stated in the affidavit are inconsistent or contrary to 
those in the motion or pleading.  See Moutry v. Am. Mut. Liab. 
Ins. Co., 35 Wis. 2d 652, 659, 151 N.W.2d 630 (1967).   
Even assuming this summary judgment rule is applicable in 
the present case, the facts stated in Negrete's affidavit are 
not inconsistent with or contrary to those stated in his motion.   
No.  2010AP1702.ssa 
 
8 
 
op., ¶25.  In light of the entirety of Negrete's statements in 
the motion and affidavit, the majority's reading is unreasonable 
and unfair. 
¶57 What could Negrete have alleged that would satisfy the 
majority?  Apparently the majority would prefer that Negrete 
state that, although 18 years have elapsed, he remembers the 
plea colloquy very, very clearly and can state with absolute 
certainty that the circuit court did not give him the warnings 
required by the statute.9  This is an unrealistic request that 
will 
only 
encourage 
"self-serving" 
and 
untrustworthy 
statements.10  
¶58 Everyone agrees that it is unfortunate that there is 
no transcript of Negrete's 1992 plea hearing.  But whose fault 
is that?  If there is "fault," it lies somewhere in the judicial 
system, not with Negrete.  Yet, the majority opinion places the 
burden caused by the missing transcript entirely on Negrete.  
Majority op., ¶¶29-33.  Negrete is asked to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that the warnings were not given despite not 
                                                 
9 It is not unusual for a long time to elapse between the 
crime and the threat of deportation.  See Cody Harris, Comment, 
A Problem of Proof: How Routine Destruction of Court Records 
Routinely Destroys A Statutory Remedy, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1791, 
1805 (2007) ("[I]t often takes more than a decade for the INS 
(now ICE) to initiate deportation proceedings."). 
10 See 
Harris, 
supra 
note 
9, 
at 
1807-09 
(compiling 
California cases that have recognized the problems with such 
statements).  See also id. at 1812 ("[I]t is difficult to 
imagine 
a 
scenario 
in 
which 
a 
defendant 
could 
ever 
prevail . . . without recourse to a plea hearing transcript, 
rending [sic] the remedy provided under the statute illusory for 
a significant number of defendants."). 
No.  2010AP1702.ssa 
 
9 
 
having had the opportunity to put forth any evidence beyond his 
written assertions that the required warnings were not given and 
he did not know the consequences of his plea.  The majority 
places an insurmountable hurdle in front of Negrete.     
¶59 The 
majority 
puts 
heavy 
emphasis 
on 
the 
plea 
questionnaire to decide the present case against Negrete, but 
the fact that Negrete initialed each of the 23 items on the 
four-page questionnaire (in which the attorney filled in any 
required information), including signifying that he was advised 
that a guilty plea "may result" in deportation, does not 
supplant the statutory requirement of a colloquy on the record.11   
¶60 Our cases are clear that if there were a transcript 
showing a defective plea colloquy, the plea questionnaire would 
not suffice to prevent an evidentiary hearing.  The court has 
held that a plea questionnaire cannot substitute for a personal, 
                                                 
11 See State v. Hoppe, 2009 WI 41, ¶¶30-33, 317 Wis. 2d 161, 
765 N.W.2d 794:  
A 
circuit 
court 
may 
use 
the 
completed 
Plea 
Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights Form when discharging 
its plea colloquy duties. . . .  
A circuit court may not, however, rely entirely on the 
Plea 
Questionnaire/Waiver 
of 
Rights 
Form 
as 
a 
substitute 
for 
a 
substantive 
in-court 
plea 
colloquy. . . .  
Although we do not require a circuit court to follow 
inflexible guidelines when conducting a plea hearing, 
the Form cannot substitute for a personal, in-court, 
on-the-record plea colloquy between the circuit court 
and a defendant. 
See also Issa, 186 Wis. 2d at 208-09 (plea questionnaire 
admitting being given immigration warnings does not satisfy the 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c)).    
No.  2010AP1702.ssa 
 
10 
 
in-court, on-the-record colloquy.12  Yet in the instant case the 
majority allows the plea questionnaire to cure an alleged defect 
in a non-existent transcript.  The majority's reasoning and 
result do not comport with our precedent. 
¶61 I conclude that Negrete's motion and affidavit, read 
in their entirety and together, allege sufficient facts to 
support Negrete's claim that his plea colloquy was deficient.  
Negrete's claim, if true, would entitle him to relief.13 
                                                 
12 See Hoppe, 317 Wis. 2d 161, ¶47; Issa, 186 Wis. 2d at 
208-09. 
In California, a state the majority uses as support, 
majority op., ¶24, when there is no transcript or other court 
documentation regarding the plea hearing, a statute provides 
that the defendant is "presumed not to have received the 
required advisement."  The cases conclude that the presumption 
is rebuttable.  The prosecution bears "the burden to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the required advisements were 
given."  People v. Arriaga, 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d 807, 813 (2011) 
(citing People v. Dubon, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 914 (2001)).   
13 The majority opinion uses an inappropriate analytical 
framework.  It erroneously concludes that because Bangert does 
not apply, Bentley automatically does.  See State v. Bangert, 
131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986); State v. Bentley, 201 
Wis. 2d 303, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996). 
The State's brief argues that the defendant's motion fails 
under either the Bangert framework or the Bentley framework.  
The decision of the court of appeals cited only Bangert.  
Contrary to the majority's assertion, however, the instant 
case is neither a Bangert nor a Bentley case. It does not fit 
neatly into either framework.  It is not a Bangert case because 
there is no transcript.  And it is not a Bentley case because 
the defendant does not contend that there was an extrinsic cause 
for the defective plea other than a defective colloquy.   
By applying the Bentley analysis, the majority has forced a 
square peg into a round hole. 
No.  2010AP1702.ssa 
 
11 
 
II 
¶62 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08(2) also requires that the 
defendant show "that the plea is likely to result in the 
defendant's deportation, exclusion from admission to this 
country or denial of naturalization." 
¶63 Negrete's motion stated the offense for which he 
entered the plea (second degree sexual assault) and then 
asserted 
that 
he 
is 
"now 
the 
subject 
of 
deportation 
proceedings."   
¶64 Neither the State nor Negrete argued that the motion 
or affidavit was defective with regard to the requirement that 
the defendant state that the plea is "likely to result in the 
defendant's deportation."  Both the State and Negrete obviously 
read the motion and affidavit as declaring that Negrete's 
conviction for second degree sexual assault was the reason he 
was likely to be subject to deportation proceedings.  The 
State's and Negrete's reading of the motion and affidavit is 
reasonable and should be accepted for purposes of interpreting 
and testing the sufficiency of Negrete's motion. 
¶65 Yet, Negrete's motion does not satisfy the majority.   
¶66 First, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
declares 
that 
a 
defendant's motion must "allege facts demonstrating a causal 
nexus between the entry of the guilty or no contest plea at 
issue and the federal government's likely institution of adverse 
immigration actions consistent with § 971.08(1)(c)."  Majority 
op., ¶26. 
No.  2010AP1702.ssa 
 
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¶67 It is unnecessary for the majority to replace the 
statutory language, which is that the defendant show "that the 
plea is likely to result in the defendant's deportation, 
exclusion 
from 
admission 
to 
this 
country 
or 
denial 
of 
naturalization."  Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c).  Further, it is not 
clear that the majority's replacement language fits all the 
circumstances that come within the statute.  For example, must a 
defendant show "the federal government's likely institution of 
adverse immigration actions" in order to demonstrate that the 
plea 
is 
likely to result in the defendant's denial of 
naturalization?   
¶68 The majority goes on to depart further from the text 
of the statute and sets forth specific ways in which a defendant 
may satisfy the majority's rephrasing of the statutory pleading 
requirement.  See majority op., ¶¶26-27.  
¶69 The majority sums up the newly created requirements as 
follows: 
[A] defendant may set forth the crime of conviction, 
the 
applicable 
federal 
statutes 
establishing 
his 
potential deportability, and those facts admitted in 
his plea that bring his crime within the federal 
statutes.  In so doing, a defendant may submit some 
written notification that the defendant has received 
from a federal agent that imports adverse immigration 
consequences because of the plea that was entered; or, 
a defendant may narrate verbal communications that the 
defendant has had with a federal agent advising that 
adverse immigration consequences were likely and that 
such consequences were tied to the crime for which the 
plea was entered.14 
                                                 
14 Majority op., ¶37. 
No.  2010AP1702.ssa 
 
13 
 
¶70 The majority opinion has, without question, rewritten 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2).   
¶71 The statute says nothing about a defendant setting 
forth the crime for which he was convicted.  The statute says 
nothing about reciting the applicable federal statutes.  The 
statute says nothing about reciting a legal argument that the 
facts admitted in his plea conform to the federal deportation 
statutes.15  The statute says nothing about submitting written 
notifications or narrating verbal communications.  
¶72 Some of these details would seem more fitting as legal 
argument in a memorandum in support of a motion or a pleading, 
as opposed to appearing in the motion or pleading itself. 
¶73 Although 
the 
majority 
uses 
the 
word 
"may" 
in 
describing its new requirements, the result for the defendant in 
the present case makes clear that, in fact, a defendant must 
meet the majority's new requirements.  
                                                 
15 Fortunately the majority opinion does not go on to 
declare, without briefs, the meaning of the phrase "aggravated 
felony" in the federal deportation statutes.  Majority op., ¶27 
n.8.   
For a discussion of the expanding meaning of "aggravated 
felony" over the years to include many garden variety state law 
crimes, see Harris, supra note 9, at 1796-98.  For a discussion 
of recent cases in which second degree sexual assaults have been 
found to be crimes of violence and therefore aggravated felonies 
under the immigration statute, see Elizabeth D. Lauzon, What 
Constitutes "Aggravated Felony" for Which Alien Can be Deported 
or 
Removed 
Under 
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) 
of 
Immigration 
and 
Nationality 
Act 
(8 
U.S.C.A. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii))—Crime 
of 
Violence Under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43)(F), 50 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 
443, §§ 27-28 (2010).       
No.  2010AP1702.ssa 
 
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¶74 The statute requires the defendant to allege merely 
that 
"the 
plea is likely to result in the defendant's 
deportation" (emphasis added).  The majority has transformed the 
statute and now requires the defendant to allege something much 
more than "likely."  The majority reads a more absolute 
requirement into the statute, namely, that the defendant has 
already been notified that he or she will be deported.16   
¶75 There are several ways a defendant may show that the 
plea is "likely to result in the defendant's deportation," at 
the appropriate stage of the proceedings.  The majority's 
extremely detailed pleading requirements do not appear in the 
statute and in all likelihood are not the only ways in which a 
defendant may satisfy the plain language of the statute. 
¶76 No case prior to today has interpreted Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(2) to require a defendant to satisfy any of the 
specific, detailed requirements set forth by the majority 
opinion.  Negrete did not have notice of the new judicially 
created 
"refer-to-and-explain-the-federal-deportation-statutes" 
or 
the 
"submit-written-notification-or-narrate-verbal-
communications" pleading requirements.  
¶77 If I were to agree with the new pleading requirements 
created by the majority, and I do not, I would allow the 
defendant to re-plead.  The majority's retroactive application 
                                                 
16 The only thing short of demonstrating certain deportation 
that might satisfy the majority is detailed briefing, contained 
within a pleading, discussing how the conviction fits within the 
federal deportation statutes.  Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08(2) does 
not require such detail. 
No.  2010AP1702.ssa 
 
15 
 
of its 2012 newly created pleading requirements, which are not 
supported by the statute, offends the most basic sense of fair 
play and due process.  
¶78  Negrete never got notice of these new pleading 
requirements.  Negrete never had a chance to comply with these 
requirements.  If the court adopts new pleading requirements, it 
should, at a minimum, give a defendant notice and an opportunity 
to re-plead under the new requirements.    
¶79 The majority's retroactive application approach also 
conflicts with Wis. Stat. § 802.09, which embodies Wisconsin's 
tradition of liberal amendment of pleadings.17  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 802.09 provides that leave to amend pleadings "shall be freely 
given at any stage of the action when justice so requires."18  
"[Wisconsin Stat. § 802.09] is intended to facilitate the 
disposition of litigation on the merits and to subordinate the 
                                                 
17 See, e.g., Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 2007 WI 
97, ¶¶25-26, 303 Wis. 2d 94, 735 N.W.2d 418. 
It is longstanding uncontroverted law that a court abuses 
its discretion in refusing to allow an amendment of a pleading 
"[w]hen it appears that an omission . . . is material, . . . and 
that such omission or failure is through mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect."  Wiegel v. Sentry Indem. Co., 
94 Wis. 2d 172, 184-85, 287 N.W.2d 796 (1980) (quoting Wipfli v. 
Martin, 34 Wis. 2d 169, 173-74, 148 N.W.2d 674 (1967)).  
18 Although a motion is not a pleading, the Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.09 directive to freely give leave to amend pleadings has 
been applied to motions.  See State v. Sutton, 2012 WI 23, ¶22, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___. 
See also Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1) (providing that with some 
exceptions, "rules of . . . practice in civil actions shall be 
applicable in all criminal proceedings unless the context of a 
section or rule manifestly requires a different construction"). 
No.  2010AP1702.ssa 
 
16 
 
importance of pleadings.  It provides maximum opportunity for 
each claim to be decided on its merits rather than on procedural 
technicalities."19 
¶80 Moreover, the majority opinion violates a basic rule 
of appellate review by bypassing the adversary process and 
raising and deciding a question on its own.20  The majority has 
                                                 
19 3 Jay E. Grenig, Wisconsin Practice Series:  Civil 
Procedure § 209.1 (4th ed. 2010)). 
20 "As various members of this court have said, we should 
not 'reach out and decide issues' that were not presented to the 
court by the parties."  Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., v. 
Doyle, 2006 WI 107, ¶335, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408 
(Roggensack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(quoting Town of Beloit v. Cnty. of Rock, 2003 WI 8, ¶72, 259 
Wis. 2d 37, 657 N.W.2d 344 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting)). 
See also State v. Thompson, 2012 WI 90, ¶¶9, 57, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (declaring that the court should not 
decide issues that are not briefed).  
The United States Supreme Court has often explained the 
fundamental importance of the adversarial presentation of 
issues.  See, e.g., Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988) 
("This system is premised on the well-tested principle that 
truth——as well as fairness——is 'best discovered by powerful 
statements 
on 
both 
sides 
of 
the 
question.'" 
(citations 
omitted)); Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) ("The 
system assumes that adversarial testing will ultimately advance 
the public interest in truth and fairness."); Mackey v. Montrym, 
443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) ("[O]ur legal tradition regards the 
adversary process as the best means of ascertaining truth and 
minimizing the risk of error . . . ."). 
Scholars have made similar observations.  See, e.g., 
Stephan Landsman, Readings on Adversarial Justice: The American 
Approach to Adjudication (1988); Jerold H. Israel, Cornerstones 
of the Judicial Process, Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y, Spring 1993, at 
5; Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology and the Evolution of the 
Adversary System, 64 Ind. L.J. 301, 316-19 (1989).  
 
No.  2010AP1702.ssa 
 
17 
 
gone well beyond the parties' arguments and has concocted 
numerous ways in which Negrete's motion is defective.  While the 
State, like the majority, did fixate on the words "do not 
recall" in Negrete's affidavit in support of his motion, the 
State did not raise the "nexus" issue that the majority treats 
as equally fatal to Negrete's motion.  The "nexus" issue, which 
the majority discusses and analyzes in detail, has not been 
briefed by either the State or Negrete.       
¶81 The motion and affidavit, in my opinion, satisfy the 
requirement in Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) that "the plea is likely 
to result in the defendant's deportation."  If the majority 
insists on rewriting the statute, Negrete should be given a 
chance to amend his 2010 motion to meet the majority's new 
judicially created 2012 pleading requirements. 
* * * * 
¶82 For the reasons set forth, I conclude, based on the 
plain text of Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2), that Negrete's motion in 
the present case was sufficient to earn Negrete an opportunity 
for an evidentiary hearing or for re-pleading. 
¶83 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶84 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
No.  2010AP1702.ssa 
 
1