Title: Todd W. Brauneis v. State

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2000 WI 69 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-2212 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Todd W. Brauneis, Gregory C. Decleene, Eugene M. 
Kapitanski, Joel Brunton, Thomas Doege, Thomas 
Geboy, Peter J. Holmes, Robert Koleta, James 
McLaughlin, Jr., Rudy Ramos, John E. Schaller, 
Craig F. Ford, Ronald J. Mielke, Paul J. 
O'Leary, James S. Rehfeldt, Robert D. Sumter, 
Jerome P. Pytlik, Russell P. Fahn, Donald J. 
Hesse, Dale Kopacz, Alan M. Kuhn, John J. 
Bosmans, James A. Krznarich, Ronald F. Mamayek, 
William H. Neider, John L. O'Leary, Carl W. 
Pennewell, Charles R. Novak, Jason A. Nimmer, 
James D. Pfeifer and Jeffrey T. Vogt,  
 
Petitioners-Respondents, 
 
v. 
State of Wisconsin, Labor and Industry Review 
Commission,  
 
Respondent-Appellant, 
The Illingworth Corporation,  
 
Respondent-Co-Appellant.  
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 27, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
May 25, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit Court 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Jacqueline D. Schellinger 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs 
 
2 
(in the court of appeals) and oral argument by William W. Cassel, 
Labor and Industry Review Commission. 
 
 
For the respondent-co-appellant there were briefs 
(in the court of appeals) by Jere W. Wiedenman and Buchanan & 
Barry, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Jere W. Wiedenman. 
 
 
For the petitioners-respondents there was a brief 
by Matthew R. Robbins, Jill M. Hartley and Previant, Goldberg, 
Uelmen, Gratz, Miller & Brueggeman, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Matthew R. Robbins. 
 
2000 WI 69 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-2212 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Todd W. Brauneis, Gregory C. Decleene,  
Eugene M. Kapitanski, Joel Brunton,  
Thomas Doege, Thomas Geboy, Peter J.  
Holmes, Robert Koleta, James McLaughlin,  
Jr., Rudy Ramos, John E. Schaller, Craig  
F. Ford, Ronald J. Mielke, Paul J.  
O'Leary, James S. Rehfeldt, Robert D.  
Sumter, Jerome P. Pytlik, Russell P.  
Fahn, Donald J. Hesse, Dale Kopacz, Alan  
M. Kuhn, John J. Bosmans, James A.  
Krznarich, Ronald F. Mamayek, William H.  
Neider, John L. O'Leary, Carl W.  
Pennewell, Charles R. Novak, Jason A.  
Nimmer, James D. Pfeifer and Jeffrey T.  
Vogt,  
 
          Petitioners-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin, Labor and Industry  
Review Commission,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant, 
 
The Illingworth Corporation,  
 
          Respondent-Co-Appellant. 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee 
County, Honorable Jacqueline D. Schellinger, Circuit Court 
Judge.  Affirmed. 
FILED 
 
JUN 27, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-2212 
 
 
2 
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This appeal is before this 
court on certification from the court of appeals pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.61.1  The State of Wisconsin Labor and 
Industry 
Review 
Commission 
(LIRC) 
and 
The 
Illingworth 
Corporation (Illingworth) appeal an order of the circuit court 
for Milwaukee County, Honorable Jacqueline D. Schellinger, 
Judge, reversing LIRC's unemployment compensation decision.  The 
circuit court determined that Illingworth's act of barring 
employees from work constituted a lockout pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 108.04(10)(d).2  We agree that Illingworth's conduct was a 
                     
1 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 provides in relevant part: 
The supreme court may take jurisdiction of an appeal 
or other proceeding in the court of appeals upon 
certification by the court of appeals or upon the 
supreme court's own motion.  
 
All future references are to the 1998-99 Statutes unless 
otherwise indicated. 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 108.04(10) provides in relevant part: 
(a) An employe who has left or partially or totally 
lost his or her work with an employing unit because of 
a strike or other bona fide labor dispute, other than 
a lockout, is not eligible to receive benefits based 
on wages paid for employment prior to commencement of 
the dispute for any week in which the dispute is in 
active progress in the establishment in which the 
employe is or was employed . . . . 
(d) In this subsection, "lockout" means the barring of 
one or more employes from their employment in an 
establishment by an employer as a part of a labor 
dispute, which is not directly subsequent to a strike 
or other job action of a labor union or group of 
employes of the employer . . . .  
No. 
98-2212 
 
 
3 
statutory lockout and, accordingly, Petitioners-Respondents are 
entitled to unemployment compensation.  We therefore affirm the 
circuit court's decision.  
I. 
¶2 
The Petitioners-Respondents, Todd W. Brauneis and co-
workers, were Illingworth employees.3  They worked as sheet metal 
workers for Illingworth at its Milwaukee facility.  They are 
members of Local 18 of the Sheet Metal Workers' International 
Association (Local 18 or the union) which represents them in 
collective bargaining.   
¶3 
 Illingworth is a member of the Sheet Metal and Air 
Conditioning 
Contractors' 
Association 
(Association) 
which 
bargains collectively on behalf of Illingworth and other 
Association members.  The Association members agree to be bound 
by the Association's actions concerning negotiations with the 
union, including instructions and directives regarding concerted 
action.  
¶4 
During the relevant time period, there was a 1993-1996 
collective bargaining agreement between the Association and 
Local 18 that had expired.  At issue during the negotiations was 
compensation for "addendum workers" or those workers covered by 
an 
addendum 
to 
the 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement.  
Construction Supply & Erection  (CS&E), also an Association 
                     
3 They are collectively referred to herein as "Petitioners-
Respondents." 
No. 
98-2212 
 
 
4 
member, employed the largest number of Local 18 addendum workers 
in the Milwaukee area.  
¶5 
On Friday, June 7, 1996, Local 18 went on strike 
against CS&E.  Local 18 chose CS&E as the strike target because 
of the large numbers of addendum workers it employed. On 
Tuesday, June 11, 1996, the Association directed its members to 
inform Local 18 employees that they were locked out.  Some 
Association members did not participate in the lockout. 
¶6 
Illingworth participated in the lockout.  During week 
24 of 1996, Illingworth locked out Petitioners-Respondents.  
However, Local 18 did not go on strike against Illingworth.  The 
union did not go on strike against any other Association member. 
¶7 
On June 14, 1996, the Association notified its members 
that a tentative agreement had been reached with the union.  The 
strike against CS&E and the Association-directed lockout ended 
on Monday, June 17, week 25 of 1996.  
     
¶8 
Although Illingworth and CS&E both employ members from 
the Local 18 union and some members may work at both companies, 
the companies are entirely separate businesses.  Illingworth's 
business involves sheet metal fabrication, installation and 
maintenance.  CS&E specializes in steel fabrication, decking and 
siding.  Illingworth and CS&E have separate ownership and 
management and operate out of separate facilities. 
¶9 
Petitioners-Respondents 
applied 
for 
unemployment 
compensation benefits for the time that they were locked out of 
Illingworth during week 24 of 1996.  The Department of Industry, 
Labor 
and 
Human 
Relations 
determined 
that 
Petitioners-
No. 
98-2212 
 
 
5 
Respondents were entitled to unemployment compensation for the 
time they had been locked out, since they had not lost their 
employment due to a strike or bona fide labor dispute at their 
own facility.4  
¶10 Illingworth appealed this initial determination to the 
Appeal Tribunal, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for the 
Division 
of 
Unemployment 
Insurance 
of 
the 
Department 
of 
Workforce 
Development. 
The 
ALJ 
affirmed, 
finding 
that 
Illingworth and CS&E were separate legal entities, and therefore 
separate establishments within the meaning of Wis. Stat. 
§ 108.04(10).  The ALJ also found that Petitioners-Respondents 
did not leave or lose their employment because of a strike or 
other bona fide labor dispute in active progress with the 
establishment in which they were employed and granted them the 
unemployment compensation benefits they sought.  
¶11 Illingworth petitioned 
LIRC 
to review 
the 
ALJ's 
decision.  LIRC reversed the ALJ's ruling and held that the 
employees 
were 
not 
entitled 
to 
unemployment 
compensation 
benefits. In addition to relying upon the findings of fact 
related above, LIRC found that the purpose of the union's strike 
                     
4 The Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations is 
now known as the Department of Workforce Development.  The 
legislature renamed the Department of Industry, Labor and Human 
Relations the Department of Industry, Labor and Job Development, 
effective July 1, 1996.  However, the Department was given the 
option to use the name Department of Workforce Development which 
it did.  The legislature recognized the name change in 1997. 
Wisconsin Blue Book 1999 – 2000 493 (Wisconsin Legislative 
Reference Bureau ed., 1999).   
No. 
98-2212 
 
 
6 
was to exert pressure on all the Association members to 
acquiesce to the union's bargaining position. Unemployment 
Compensation Decision, Hearing No. 96606892MWG (Aug. 20, 1997) 
(R. at 19:13).  LIRC termed the strike a "selective strike."  
Id.  LIRC concluded that Illingworth's action was not a lockout 
under Wis. Stat. § 108.04(10)(d) because it "was a direct 
reaction to the selective strike."  Id.  LIRC also concluded 
that there was an active labor dispute at the establishment 
where Petitioners-Respondents worked, Illingworth's lockout.5  
¶12 Petitioners-Respondents appealed LIRC's decision to 
the circuit court.  The circuit court reversed, finding that 
there was no strike against the Association or Illingworth based 
upon the statutory definitions of employee, employment and 
strike.  The circuit court also found the phrase "subsequent to 
a strike or other job action of a labor union or group of 
employes6 
of 
the 
employer" 
in Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 108.04(10)(d) 
ambiguous.  According to the court, a reasonable interpretation 
that would effect the statutory purpose that an employer not 
finance a strike against it is that the "or" distinguishes 
                     
5 We do not address LIRC's additional inquiry whether the 
Department of Workforce Development had waived recovery of 
overpaid benefits to employees since our decision is that the 
employees are entitled to the benefits and none were thus 
overpaid.  The issue was not raised by Petitioners-Respondents, 
 or 
Respondent-Appellant 
LIRC, 
or 
Respondent-Co-Appellant 
Illingworth.  
6 The 
legislature 
uses 
the 
alternative 
spelling 
of 
"employee."  We use the more generally accepted version. See THE 
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 450 (2d College ed. 1985).  
No. 
98-2212 
 
 
7 
between union members and non-union employees who may strike.  
Correspondingly, the court held that Illingworth's action was a 
statutory lockout because it was not subsequent to a strike 
against itself.  
¶13 LIRC and Illingworth appealed the circuit court's 
decision.  The court of appeals certified this appeal and we 
accepted the certification.  
II. 
¶14 Here, we review the decision of LIRC, not the circuit 
court's decision.  Bunker v. LIRC, 197 Wis. 2d 606, 611, 541 
N.W.2d 168 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing DILHR v. LIRC, 155 Wis. 2d 
256, 262, 456 N.W.2d 162 (Ct. App. 1990)).  LIRC's findings of 
fact are upheld if they are supported by substantial and 
credible evidence.  Hagen v. LIRC, 210 Wis. 2d 12, 23, 563 
N.W.2d 454 (1997).  Here, we uphold most of LIRC's findings.  
However, there is no evidentiary support for its finding that 
the purpose of Local 18's strike was to pressure all Association 
members into acquiescing to its bargaining position.  The only 
evidence of intent is that the union targeted CS&E because it 
employed the largest number of addendum workers, and the 
addendum 
workers 
were 
an 
issue 
during 
the 
negotiations. 
Unemployment Compensation Decision, Hearing No. 96606892MWG 
(Aug. 20, 1997) (R. at 19:10).  According to LIRC's findings, 
Local 18 did not suggest to the Association that other 
contractors would be targeted, even though the union did not 
assure 
the 
Association 
that 
it 
would 
not 
strike 
other 
contractors.  (R. at 19:12).  However, Local 18 did not strike 
No. 
98-2212 
 
 
8 
any other Association member.  Given that LIRC's finding 
regarding the intent of the union's strike is not supported by 
substantial evidence, we will disregard that finding.  
¶15 LIRC's statutory construction and application of that 
construction to the facts, is, as any legal conclusion, a 
question of law subject to judicial review.   Trinwith v. LIRC, 
149 Wis. 2d 634, 640, 439 N.W.2d 581 (Ct. App. 1989); Bunker v. 
LIRC, 197 Wis. 2d at 611.  Even though we are not bound by 
LIRC's 
statutory 
interpretation, 
we 
consider 
whether 
the 
circumstances 
of 
the 
case 
warrant 
deference 
to 
its 
interpretation.  "This court has identified three distinct 
levels of deference granted to agency decisions: great weight 
deference, due weight deference and de novo review."  UFE, Inc. 
v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 284, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996) (citation 
omitted).  
¶16 LIRC contends that we should grant great weight 
deference to its interpretation of Wis. Stat. 108.04(10).7  We 
disagree.   
 
Great weight deference is appropriate once a court has 
concluded that: (1) the agency was charged by the 
legislature 
with 
the 
duty 
of 
administering 
the 
statute; (2) that the interpretation of the agency is 
one of long-standing; (3) that the agency employed its 
expertise or specialized knowledge in forming the 
interpretation; 
and 
(4) 
that 
the 
agency's 
interpretation will provide uniformity and consistency 
in the application of the statute.  Harnischfeger 
Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 650, 660, 539 N.W.2d 98 
(1995).  
                     
7 Illingworth joins LIRC's contention that great weight 
deference should be accorded to LIRC's decision.  
No. 
98-2212 
 
 
9 
¶17 LIRC's interpretation here of Wis. Stat. § 108.04(10) 
is not one of long-standing.  LIRC has long interpreted and 
applied Wis. Stat. § 108.04(10).  Trinwith, 149 Wis. 2d at 640; 
Hemstock Concrete Prod., Inc. v. LIRC, 127 Wis. 2d 437, 380 
N.W.2d 387 (Ct. App. 1985); Jenks v. DILHR, 107 Wis. 2d 714, 321 
N.W.2d 347 (Ct. App. 1982).  However, there is no indication 
that LIRC has previously addressed whether employees are 
eligible for unemployment compensation where an employer locks 
out those employees who are members of a union because the union 
is striking another employer with which the employee's employer 
is associated.  Also, as shown herein, LIRC's interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 108.04(10) does not promote uniform or consistent 
application.  Consequently, the circumstances here do not 
warrant great weight deference.  
¶18 Petitioners-Respondents contend that LIRC's decision 
should be accorded no weight, at the other end of the review 
spectrum.  We disagree with this posture also.  De novo review 
applies where "there is no evidence that the agency has any 
special expertise or experience interpreting the statute."  
DILHR v. LIRC, 161 Wis. 2d 231, 246, 467 N.W.2d 545 (1991).  De 
novo review also applies "when the issue before the agency is 
clearly one of first impression, or when the agency's position 
on an issue has been so inconsistent so as to provide no real 
guidance." UFE, Inc., 201 Wis. 2d at 285 (citations omitted).  
Even though the circumstances here may be novel, LIRC has both 
special expertise and experience in interpreting Wis. Stat. 
§ 108.04(10).  De novo would thus be inappropriate.  
No. 
98-2212 
 
 
10
¶19 This is precisely the situation that warrants due 
weight deference:  LIRC has had some experience interpreting 
Wis. Stat. § 108.04(10), yet has not faced the particular 
circumstances we have here.  "Even though an agency never 
interpreted 
a 
particular 
statute 
against 
facts 
of 
first 
impression, 
because 
the 
agency 
has 
prior 
experience 
in 
interpreting the statute, the agency's decision will be accorded 
due weight or great bearing." Bunker, 197 Wis. 2d at 612-13 
(quoting William Wrigley, Jr., Co. v. DOR, 160 Wis. 2d 53, 70-
71, 465 N.W.2d 800 (1991), rev'd on other grounds, DOR v. 
William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214 (1992)).  Indeed, where, 
as here, an agency "has some experience in an area, but has not 
developed the expertise which necessarily places it in a better 
position to make judgments regarding the interpretation of the 
statute 
than 
a 
court," 
due 
weight 
is 
the 
"appropriate" 
deference.  UFE, Inc., 201 Wis. 2d at 286.  
¶20 Pursuant 
to 
due 
weight 
deference, 
an 
agency's 
statutory interpretation is accorded some weight, but is not 
conclusive. 
 
So 
long 
as 
the 
agency's 
interpretation 
is 
reasonable and complies with the statute's purpose, a court will 
not overturn it.  UFE, Inc., 201 Wis. 2d at 286-87.  "[H]owever, 
the fact that the agency's interpretation is reasonable does not 
mean that its interpretation will necessarily be upheld.  If a 
court finds an alternative interpretation more reasonable, it 
need not adopt the agency's interpretation." Id. at 287.  Here, 
this court finds an alternative interpretation, one more 
No. 
98-2212 
 
 
11
reasonable than LIRC's.  Also, unlike LIRC's interpretation, our 
interpretation fulfills the intent of the statute.  
III. 
¶21 The lodestar of statutory interpretation is discerning 
the intent of the legislature.  Milwaukee County v. DILHR, 80 
Wis. 2d 445, 451, 259 N.W.2d 118 (1977).  In looking for 
legislative intent, we start with the language of the statute.  
UFE, Inc., 201 Wis. 2d at 281; Kelley Co. v. Marquardt, 172 Wis. 
2d 234, 247, 493 N.W.2d 68 (1992).  "While it is true that 
statutory interpretation begins with the language of the 
statute, it is also well established that courts must not look 
at a single, isolated sentence or portion of a sentence, but at 
the role of the relevant language in the entire statute."  
Alberte v. Anew Health Care Serv., Inc., 2000 WI 7, ¶ 10, 232 
Wis. 2d 587, 605 N.W.2d 515 (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. 
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987)).  If the plain meaning of the 
statute is self-evident, we look no further.  UFE, Inc., 201 
Wis. 2d at 281.  Where a statute is ambiguous, i.e., "reasonable 
minds could differ as to its meaning" (Harnischfeger Corp., 196 
Wis. 2d at 662), the court examines further the scope, history, 
context, subject matter and purpose of the statute in question. 
 UFE, Inc., 201 Wis. 2d at 282.   
¶22 "A 
benefit 
claimant 
is 
presumed 
eligible 
for 
[unemployment compensation] benefits and the party (the employer 
here) resisting payment of benefits has the burden of proving 
that the case comes within the disqualifying provision of the 
law . . . ."  Kansas City Star Co. v. DILHR, 60 Wis. 2d 591, 
No. 
98-2212 
 
 
12
602, 211 N.W.2d 488 (1973).  The pertinent disqualifying 
provision is Wis. Stat. § 108.04(10). 
 According to Wis. Stat. 
§ 108.04(10)(a), an employee who has partially lost his or her 
work due to a strike or other bona fide labor disputeother than 
a lockoutis not eligible to receive unemployment compensation 
benefits.  A lockout is defined by Wis. Stat. § 108.04(10)(d).  
¶23 LIRC contends that the definition of lockout does not 
include what it terms a defensive lockout, or a lockout in 
response to a selective strike or whipsaw strike that begins 
with one employer to pressure associated employers into acceding 
to the union.8  Section 108.04(10)(d) indicates that a lockout 
does not include barring employees from employment in the 
employer's establishment that is "directly subsequent to a 
strike or other job action of a labor union or group of 
employees of the employer."  It is not clear from the plain 
language whether the term employer in the lockout definition 
encompasses a multi-employer bargaining unit.  Both LIRC and 
Illingworth maintain that it does.   
                     
8  Whipsaw strike refers to "whipsawing" which is a tactic 
used by unions to strike "one at a time" employers of a multi-
employer bargaining unit.  NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 
449, 353 U.S. 87, 90 n.7 (1957); see also A.J. Sweet v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 16 Wis. 2d 98, 110a, 114 N.W.2d 853 (1962). 
In its decision, LIRC uses, but does not define, the term 
selective strike.  However, its decision indicates that the 
strike's purpose was the same as that of a whipsaw strike, i.e., 
to pressure all Association members to acquiesce to the union.  
Id.; Unemployment Compensation Decision, Hearing No. 96606892MWG 
(Aug. 20, 1997) (R. at 19:13).  On appeal, LIRC refers to Local 
18's strike as a "whipsaw action" or "whipsaw strike," as well 
as "selective strike." 
No. 
98-2212 
 
 
13
¶24 Reasonable minds could differ as to whether the term 
employer in the statute is limited to a single employer or 
extends to an association of employers.  LIRC argues that the 
Association should be considered the employer.9  However, 
employees are defined as those performing services (Wis. Stat. 
§ 108.02(12)); employment means service by an individual for pay 
(Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)).  There is no evidence that the 
Association is an employer insofar as it employs Petitioners-
Respondents or CS&E's employees.  Consequently, we do not find 
the definition of employer helpful in determining whether Wis. 
Stat. § 108.04(10)(d) includes a multi-employer bargaining unit. 
¶25 Reasonable minds could find that the term employer  
means either a single or multiple employer.  Since reasonable 
minds 
could 
differ, 
we 
find 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 108.04(10)(d) 
ambiguous.  See Harnischfeger Corp., 196 Wis. 2d at 662.  But 
see Trinwith v. LIRC, 149 Wis. 2d at 642.10  Given that the 
subsection is ambiguous, we turn to "extrinsic aids" to 
                     
9 Section 108.02(13)(a) provides in pertinent part that 
"'Employer' 
means 
every 
government 
unit 
and 
any 
person, 
association . . . . "  
10 In 
Trinwith, 
the 
court 
concluded 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 108.04(10)(c), now subsection (d), was not ambiguous insofar 
as the term "barring" does not include a constructive lockout.  
Trinwith v. LIRC, 149 Wis. 2d 634, 643-644, 439 N.W.2d 581 (Ct. 
App. 1989).  "We conclude that the legislature clearly intended 
that an employer lock an employee out of the establishment as a 
result of a dispute."  Id. at 643. 
No. 
98-2212 
 
 
14
interpret the statute, starting with the legislative history. 11 
  Milwaukee County, 80 Wis. 2d at 452.  In 1983, the legislature 
amended Wis. Stat. § 108.04(10) to add the lockout exemption.   
1983 Wis. Act 468, § 2.  Prior to this amendment, this court 
commented that "sec. 108.04(10), as a disqualifying statute, 
does not contain an exemption for workers who lose their jobs 
because of a lockout, as do the statutes of many states."  De 
Leeuw v. DILHR, 71 Wis. 2d 446, 452, 238 N.W.2d 706 (1976); see 
also A.J. Sweet v. Industrial Comm'n, 16 Wis. 2d 98, 104, 114 
N.W.2d 853 (1962).  On January 27, 1983, a group of Assembly 
Representatives introduced 1983 Assembly Bill 58.  This bill was 
to renumber and amend Wis. Stat. § 108.04(10) and create 
§ 108.04(10)(c), now subsection (d).  1983 A.B. 58.    
¶26 The Senate proposed amendments to the bill.  Senate 
Amendment 1 to 1983 Assembly Bill 58.  Drafts of the Senate's 
proposed amendments indicate that the Senate considered adding 
to the phrase "of the employer," the phrase "or an allied 
employer."  [Draft] Senate Amendment to 1983 A.B. 58.  Had the 
legislature adopted 
the 
Senate's 
proposed 
amendments, the 
definition of lockout would have read:   
 
                     
11 The legislative history for the 1983 amendment to Wis. 
Stat. § 108.04(10) is sparse.  It contains drafting documents, 
the proposed bill and the final act.  There is also a letter to 
the Wisconsin State AFL-CIO from an attorney that refers to the 
1983 amendment, however, we do not consider it since it is 
neither from or to a member of the legislature.  Nor is there 
any evidence that a member adopted the views expressed therein.  
  
No. 
98-2212 
 
 
15
"[L]ockout" means the barring of one or more employes 
from their employment in an establishment by an 
employer as a part of a labor dispute, which is not 
directly subsequent to a strike or other job action of 
a labor union or group of employes of the employer or 
allied employer. 
The proposed Senate amendment defined "allied employer" as "an 
employer which is jointly participating in collective bargaining 
with one or more other employers."  Id.  However, both of these 
proposed 
amendments 
were 
deleted 
from 
the 
final 
Senate 
Amendment.  Senate Amendment 1 to 1983 A.B. 58.  The final 
Senate Amendment was adopted, and the changes therein included 
in the final bill.  1983 Wis. Act 468; 1983 A.B. 58.   
¶27 The 
draft 
Senate 
Amendment 
indicates 
that 
the 
legislature considered adopting the definition of employer that 
LIRC 
adopted, 
one 
that 
includes 
an 
employer 
jointly 
participating in collective bargaining with one or more other 
employers.  However, the Senate rejected that definition.  We 
cannot ignore this legislative history.  We, too, reject an 
interpretation of the definition of employer that includes an 
allied employer.  We should not read into the statute language 
that the legislature did not put in.  In the Interest of G. & 
L.P., 119 Wis. 2d 349, 354, 349 N.W.2d 743 (1984).   
¶28 From the legislative history we glean that the 
legislature intended that the phrase "of the employer" in Wis. 
Stat. § 108.04(10)(d) does not include an employer joined or 
associated 
with 
another 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
collective 
bargaining.  Applying the intended meaning of "employer" here, 
we find that Illingworth's conduct constituted a statutory 
No. 
98-2212 
 
 
16
lockout.  It is not disputed that Illingworth barred one or more 
employees from their employment as part of a labor dispute.  
Wis. Stat. § 108.04(10)(d).  There is also no dispute that 
Illingworth's "barring  . . . of employes" took place at the 
employer's establishment, Illingworth's Milwaukee facility.  Id. 
 Illingworth's conduct, however, was not directly subsequent to 
a strike or other job action by Local 18 directed at Illingworth 
as an employer.  Id.  The employees did not strike Illingworth 
or take any other job action.  The initial and only job action 
between 
Illingworth 
and 
the 
Petitioners-Respondents 
was 
Illingworth's lockout.  Illingworth's lockout thus entitles 
employees to unemployment compensation benefits.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 108.04(10)(a). 
¶29 Both LIRC and Illingworth repeatedly contend that Wis. 
Stat. § 108.04(10) excludes, to use their term, "defensive 
lockouts."12  Their definition of a "defensive lockout" is 
inextricable from their characterization of Local 18's strike as 
a whipsaw strike, i.e., the strike at CS&E was something that 
Illingworth had to defend against because it was going to be the 
next target of a strike.  However, Wis. Stat. § 108.04(10)(d) 
makes no such distinction, but excludes those lockouts that are 
"directly subsequent to a strike or other job action" by the 
                     
12  LIRC justifies its interpretation by contending that 
Illingworth acted legally and appropriately because its lockout 
was in response to a whipsaw strike.  Whether or not Illingworth 
acted legally or appropriately under federal labor law is not 
the issue here.  The issue is instead Petitioners-Respondents' 
eligibility for benefits under Wis. Stat. § 108.04(10). 
No. 
98-2212 
 
 
17
employer's labor union.  The key is that for the lockout to be 
excluded, it must be in response to a strike or job action 
against the employer; a strike against multi-employer bargaining 
unit does not qualify for the exclusion.  
¶30 Illingworth relies upon A.J. Sweet, 16 Wis. 2d 98, to 
contend that associated employers that engage in a lockout 
should be considered a single employer. Two important facts 
distinguish A.J. Sweet.  One, it was "conceded that a labor 
dispute was in progress between the union and the five plaintiff 
employers."  Id. at 105.  Here, Petitioners-Respondents have 
repeatedly contended that there was no labor dispute between 
Illingworth and them.  Two, A.J. Sweet was decided more than 20 
years before the legislature amended Wis. Stat. § 108.04(10) to 
exempt lockouts from labor disputes that would otherwise 
disqualify employees from obtaining unemployment benefits. 
¶31 The only case we have found instructive is Kentucky 
Unemployment Insurance Commission v. Louisville Builders, 351 
S.W.2d 157 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961) (Louisville Builders).  In 
Louisville Builders, the situation was strikingly similar: 
employers associated for the purpose of collective bargaining 
locked out employees when the employees' union struck one of the 
employers.  Id. at 159-160. The locked-out employees applied for 
unemployment compensation and were awarded it according to a 
Kentucky statute that exempts lockouts from the strike/bona fide 
labor dispute disqualification of unemployment benefits.  Id. at 
159.  Kentucky's statute is substantially similar to Wis. Stat. 
No. 
98-2212 
 
 
18
§ 108.04(10).13  Id.  The employers argued there, as Illingworth 
argues here, that the strike against one was a strike against 
all.  Id. at 160.  The court found that while the lockout "grew 
out of the labor dispute [that] was initiated by the strike," 
the employees there that were locked out had not gone out on 
strike.  Id. at 161.  The court also found that the legislature 
intended to limit the lockout statute and it did not extend to 
employers associated for collective bargaining and thus upheld 
the award of benefits to the employees.  Id. at 161, 162.  
Similarly, we conclude that the legislature has so limited the 
                     
13 The Wisconsin legislature has not so limited the lockout 
option for employers.  Unlike Kentucky, Wisconsin excludes from 
the definition of a lockout an employer's lockout of employees 
that is "directly subsequent to a strike or other job action." 
Wis. Stat. § 108.04(10)(d).  
No. 
98-2212 
 
 
19
lockout provision and that the Petitioners-Respondents are 
entitled to benefits.14 
¶32 "Courts should also resolve statutory ambiguities so 
as to advance the legislature's basic purpose in enacting the 
legislation."  UFE, Inc., 201 Wis. 2d at 288.  LIRC argues that 
its construction of lockout to include multi-employer bargaining 
units furthers the purpose of the statute because such lockouts 
are necessary to defend against whipsaw actions.  We disagree 
and find that our interpretation furthers the legislative 
purpose underlying Wis. Stat. § 108.04(10).  
¶33 The statutory purpose of Wis. Stat. § 108.04(10) is 
four-fold:  (1) provide income support to unemployed workers (De 
Leeuw, 71 Wis. 2d at 450); (2) protect employers from financing 
a strike against themselves; (3) preserve the status quo during 
                     
14 Since we have determined that Illingworth's lockout was a 
statutory lockout under Wis. Stat. § 108.04(10), we need not 
address Petitioners-Respondents' argument that they are also 
entitled to benefits because there was no "dispute  . . . in 
active progress in the establishment in which the employe is or 
was employed."  Wis. Stat. § 108.04(10)(a).  For that reason, we 
do not address the "establishment" analysis in Liberty Trucking 
Co. v. DILHR, 57 Wis. 2d 331, 204 N.W.2d 457 (1973).  Moreover, 
Liberty Trucking did not involve multiple employers claiming to 
be associated and therefore should be considered a single 
employer.  Instead, that case involved single employers that had 
multiple work sites and whose cases had been joined to argue 
together on appeal.  Id. at 333.  Here, the contention would be 
that Illingworth and CS&E are to be considered a single employer 
even though, as LIRC found, they have separate ownership and 
management, 
they 
operate 
out 
of 
separate 
facilities 
and 
specialize in different products.  In short, they are "totally 
separate 
businesses." 
Unemployment 
Compensation 
Decision, 
Hearing 
No. 
96606892MWG 
(Aug. 
20, 
1997) 
(R. 
at 
19:10). 
Consequently, Liberty Trucking would be inapposite to any 
establishment analysis. 
No. 
98-2212 
 
 
20
a labor dispute (Marathon Elec. Mfg. Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 
269 Wis. 394, 408, 69 N.W. 573 (1955); and (4) maintain 
neutrality during labor disputes (Jenks, 107 Wis. 2d at 725).  
¶34 LIRC's interpretation would allow employers to lockout 
employees who are not striking against them.  These employees 
would have no income support even though they are not involved 
in a labor dispute with their employer.  In contrast, our 
interpretation provides income support to employees locked out 
by an employer against whom they have not struck or targeted 
with a job action.  Our interpretation maintains the status quo 
and neutrality during a labor dispute because benefits are not 
paid if the employer locks out the employees in response to a 
strike or other job action against the employer.  It does not 
pull employees into other labor disputes.  
¶35 "In recognizing that a purpose of the disqualifying 
section 108.04(10), was to prevent an employer from financing a 
strike against himself . . . decisions have at least implied 
that the employee or the employer must be directly involved in 
the dispute."  Kenneth F. Sullivan Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 25 
Wis. 2d  84, 88, 130 N.W.2d 194 (1964).  LIRC's interpretation 
would have the employer escape paying unemployment benefits even 
though the employer locked out employees with whom there is not 
a direct dispute. 
¶36 LIRC's 
interpretation 
did 
not 
promote 
either 
consistency or uniformity in the application of Wis. Stat. 
§ 108.04(10).  Its interpretation turned on whether a lockout 
was a defensive lockout in response to a whipsaw strike.  It 
No. 
98-2212 
 
 
21
involved imputing intent to a strike where there is no evidence 
of such.  Unemployment Compensation Decision, Hearing No. 
96606892MWG (Aug. 20, 1997) (R. at 19:10).  Our interpretation 
looks to the conduct between the employer and employee and does 
not involve divining the intent of a strike against another 
employer. 
¶37 In summary, we conclude that, giving due weight 
deference to LIRC, our interpretation of the lockout provision 
of Wis. Stat. § 108.04(10) is more reasonable than LIRC's.  It 
reflects the intent of the legislature, evident from the 
legislative history and the statutory purpose.  Given our 
construction 
of 
the 
lockout 
provision 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 108.04(10), we also conclude that Illingworth has not, and 
cannot, meet its burden of proving that Petitioners-Respondents 
are disqualified from unemployment compensation benefits for the 
time Illingworth locked them out.  Illingworth's lockout was a 
statutory lockout.  Thus, we affirm the decision and order of 
the circuit court that reviewed and reversed LIRC's Unemployment 
Compensation Decision in favor of Illingworth.  
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-2212 
 
 
22
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-2212 
 
 
1