Title: Walker v. McAnnany

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Walker v. McAnnany1990 WY 143802 P.2d 876Case Number: 90-60Decided: 12/13/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
Telford A. WALKER, 

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

Betty J. Franzen 
McANNANY, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Teton County, D. Terry Rogers, J.

Kenneth S. 
Cohen, Jackson, for appellant.

Peter F. Moyer, 
Jackson, for appellee.

Before 
THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., and RAPER, J. Retired.

RAPER, Justice, 
Retired.

[¶1]      This case 
involves a claim for deficiency judgment following foreclosure of a mortgage by 
notice and sale. The trial court granted a deficiency judgment for the 
difference between the unpaid mortgage debt at the time of foreclosure and the 
foreclosure sale price. The difference, including unpaid taxes, attorneys fees 
and publication costs, came to $51,098.97. Added to that amount are accrued 
interest, further attorneys fees and costs.

[¶2]      The appellant 
states the issues to be:

1. Was the written notice 
provided by appellee in its letter dated February 12, 1987 to Nauman-Walker, a 
California general partnership, c/o Telford A. Walker, the requisite written 
notice required by Section 34-4-103(a)(iv), W.S. 1977, to be sent to the record 
owner of the real property, so as to entitle appellee to foreclose by 
advertisement and sale the interest of appellant Telford A. Walker, one of the 
two individual record owners of the subject real property?

2. Was the arbitration 
process conducted in accordance with the stipulation of the parties and, if not, 
was it reversible error for the district court to have ordered the parties to 
trial rather than compelling them to arbitrate in accordance with the 
stipulation?

[¶3]      The appellee sets 
out the issues to be:

1. Did the trial court 
commit reversible error in granting a deficiency judgment against appellant 
following foreclosure by appellee by notice and sale, in light of appellant's 
objection to the notice of intent to foreclose?

2. Did the trial court 
commit reversible error in granting a judgment at trial, following efforts by 
the parties to arbitrate under a settlement stipulation?

[¶4]      We will affirm 
the district court's judgment.

[¶5]      The court made 
findings of fact and conclusions of law which we will summarize as accurately 
reflecting what the record shows. Peter Nauman and Telford A. Walker, on May 26, 
1981, executed and delivered to appellee and her husband, since deceased, a 
promissory note in the amount of $215,000, secured by a real estate mortgage on 
a motel located in the Town of Jackson, Teton County, Wyoming. The note and 
mortgage were executed in the name of Nauman-Walker, a California general 
partnership consisting of Peter Nauman and Telford Walker, who executed such 
note and mortgage in their individual capacities as well. The mortgage was 
recorded in the Teton County clerk's office.

[¶6]      In June 1981, 
with appellee's approval, Nauman-Walker, the partnership, quitclaimed its 
interest in the property to Nauman and Walker individually as tenants in common. 
The note and mortgage remained in the partnership name. Nauman-Walker, the 
partnership, was frequently in default under the payment terms, so the payment 
schedule was restructured by the parties in 1985. Nauman and Walker continued to 
be in default so appellee decided to foreclose the mortgage by advertisement and 
sale, as provided by terms of the mortgage.

[¶7]      In February 1987, 
a default in a condition of the mortgage by non-payment of the note occurred by 
which the power of the sale became operative. No suit or proceeding had been 
instituted at law to recover the debt remaining secured by the mortgage and no 
assignment of this mortgage had been made.1

[¶8]      On February 12, 
1987, appellee, through her attorney, sent written notice of intent to foreclose 
the mortgage by advertisement and sale to the partnership as record owner and 
upon the person in possession, an individual different than the record owners, 
Peter Nauman and Telford Walker. The notice of intent was sent to the 
Nauman-Walker partnership and to Peter Nauman and Telford Walker, by certified 
mail, return receipt requested, to the last known address of the record owner. 
The notices were mailed on February 12, 1987. The person in possession was 
personally served on such date. The notice was mailed at least ten days before 
commencement of publication of notice of sale. See note 1, section (iv). Notice 
of the mortgage foreclosure sale was published for four consecutive weeks 
beginning March 4, 1987.

[¶9]      Appellant 
furnished the address of 820 Emerald Bay, Laguna Beach, California 92661, and 
never caused a change of address to be made. The same address was used when the 
partnership transferred the property to the individual members of the 
partnership. Appellant never provided appellee with any different address. The 
certified letter was returned to sender with a notation that appellant had moved 
and left no forwarding address.

[¶10]   The appellant made an appearance 
after a default judgment had been taken and claimed that notice of service by 
publication had been sent to the wrong address in California since he had been 
divorced in 1985, moved to a different address in California and had noted the 
new address on a motel guest register when he checked into the motel in 
September 1987. The appellee agreed to vacate the default judgment so the case 
could be heard on the merits. We note that in the Agreement of Purchase and 
Sale, signed by appellant, is a provision that:

Any notice required or 
needed to be given under this agreement shall be delivered or sent by certified 
mail to the other party addressed as follows:

* * * * * 
* 

Telford 
Walker

820 Emerald 
Bay

Laguna Beach, California 
92661

Reference to the 
note and mortgage to be executed appeared in such agreement. We are satisfied 
that the agreement in this case setting out appellant's address as the official 
address is the one which governs in the disposition in this case. Appellant had 
never advised appellee of any different address. Even the quitclaim deed by the 
partnership to the individual partners showed appellant's address as the one to 
which the notice of intent to foreclose was sent. Additionally, the record 
discloses that Nauman sent a copy of the notice he had received to Walker with a 
note attached inquiring whether Walker had "seen this." Appellant thus had 
actual notice from his partner.

[¶11]   We are unconvinced that appellee is 
bound by any address appearing on a hotel registration as claimed by appellant. 
Appellee was owner of another motel where appellant stayed when he was in 
Jackson on a few occasions. On at least one occasion he showed on his 
registration card a different address than that appearing on the mortgage and a 
subsequent document altering the payment terms which also showed the mortgagors 
as a partnership. The one registration card in evidence is dated after 
the date of the notice of intent to foreclose. The lack of probative value of 
such evidence is apparent. The appellant simply failed to prove that appellee 
was aware of any new address for purposes of mortgage foreclosure by notice and 
sale. Appellee was never notified of any different address for appellant than 
that appearing in the mortgage.

[¶12]   There is no provision in W.S. 
34-4-103(a)(iv), supra, that prohibits actual notice of intent to 
foreclose other than by mailing to the last known address of the record owner. 
We find in Globe Mining Co. v. Anderson, 78 Wyo. 17, 47, 318 P.2d 373, 385 
(1957) where it was said that "[d]efendants, having knowledge of * * * claims, 
will not be heard to raise an imperfect recordation of certificates of location 
as a defect of which they can take advantage." The court went on to say that 
where there is an attempt in good faith "to comply with the law, courts are 
inclined to be liberal in construing his acts so as not to defeat his claim by 
technical criticism." See also Western Standard Uranium Company v. Thurston, 355 P.2d 377, 387 (Wyo. 1960) (quoting In re Roberts' Estate, 58 Wyo. 438, 133 P.2d 492, 499 (1943)) where a general rule of statutory construction is discussed 
wherein it was said that in construing statutes, "`[a] result which is fair and 
reasonable is sought.'" It was noted that there was no penalty for failure to 
abide by the statute.

[¶13]   As we visualize it, the purpose of 
such notice is to afford mortgagee an opportunity to bring the indebtedness 
current or take other appropriate action to avoid foreclosure. Even if appellee 
had a burden of making an extensive search for a different address for 
appellant, which we do not believe she had, appellant has not shown prejudice by 
his having actual notice rather than receiving a notice by certified mail. In 
the case before us, there was no prohibition against appellant having actual 
notice from his partner of appellee's intent to foreclose her mortgage and there 
appears no question about the good faith of appellee. Appellant had actual 
notice. It has been broadly said by the Wyoming Supreme Court that "[t]he law is 
almost elementary that whatever puts a party on inquiry amounts to `notice.'" 
Rodin v. State ex rel. City of Cheyenne, 417 P.2d 180, 195 (Wyo. 
1966).

[¶14]   We are not inclined to follow 
appellant's view of what he considers the law, which would require appellee to 
make an extensive search for a new address when the certified letter was 
returned. This is an unnecessary burden to place on the mortgagor who has parted 
with her property. Since the parties went to the effort of setting out specific 
addresses in the security instruments, appellee should be entitled to rely upon 
such information in the absence of specific notice of a change of address. It 
was not up to appellee to conduct an elaborate or even any lesser search for 
appellant's whereabouts after his divorce.

[¶15]   We are aware of and have considered 
Ulery-Williams, Inc. v. First Wyoming Bank, N.A.-Laramie, 748 P.2d 740 (Wyo. 
1988) wherein this court held that notice to individual corporate officers at 
their home address did not satisfy statutory requirement of notice of 
foreclosure of the corporation's real estate mortgage by advertisement pursuant 
to power of sale. We are convinced that such case can be readily distinguished 
because of the facts and circumstances appearing here.

[¶16]   We consider it of singular 
significance that repeatedly in all documents pertaining to the mortgage 
appellant held himself out as a partner, even after a deed dated June 17, 1981 
by the partners conveying the motel by the partnership to the members as equal 
tenants in common as partners. The transfer was made by consent of the mortgagee 
but subject to "the understanding that you both remain jointly and severally 
liable under the Promissory Note, Mortgage, Agreement for Purchase and Sale and 
related documents." In 1985, the parties shown as "Nauman-Walker, a California 
general partnership composed of Peter B. Nauman and Telford A. Walker and Betty 
McAnnany a/k/a Betty J. Franzen," amended the promissory note to modify the 
payment terms. Nauman-Walker reported income to the IRS on partnership forms. We 
consider it compelling that the partnership was never dissolved in accordance 
with the terms of the agreement of partnership in evidence. Furthermore, the 
partnership agreement showed the motel titled as "a tenancy in common." It was 
part of the partnership plan that the tenancy in common be created from the very 
beginning. The subsequent execution of the quitclaim deed by appellee made no 
change in the partnership note and mortgage setting out appellant's mailing 
address. These facts, coupled with the lack of any notification of any different 
address for the appellant other than that appearing in the mortgage, and the 
actual notice to the appellant, all combine to distinguish this case from 
Ulery-Williams, Inc., 748 P.2d 740. While the appellant does much complaining 
about being deprived of the right of redemption, nowhere do we see a tender of 
redemption money.

[¶17]   As to the issue of arbitration, it 
appears, during trial, the parties agreed to arbitration of the issue of value 
of the mortgaged property because of appellant's claim that the amount bid by 
mortgagee was not fair and was not made in good faith. The appraisal of the 
arbitrators fixed the value at $180,000, the amount bid by appellee, but 
appellant objected to the decision, claiming that the appraisers had an informal 
meeting with appellee and her husband. After giving counsel for both parties an 
opportunity to agree on three different appraisers, and neither having responded 
that they had so agreed, the trial court set the matter for trial. Neither party 
thereafter raised any question about going ahead with arbitration, nor was any 
objection to trial made. The appellant made a request for change of trial date. 
Pretrial documents were filed by appellant but no objection to trial was made. 
No objection was ever made after notice of trial setting to the matter being 
tried by the court. Notice of appeal from the court's judgment, which made no 
mention of arbitration, was filed by appellant.

[¶18]   It is our view that appellant 
consented to the matter being tried by the trial judge and that, no objection 
having been made, appellant has waived any right to raise any issue of 
arbitration on appeal. The appellant failed to preserve for consideration by 
this court by making objection to proceeding by trial rather than arbitration. 
He should have immediately, after the case was set for trial, objected and given 
the trial judge an opportunity to rule on such objection. As this court has so 
often said, it will not consider issues not first presented to the trial court. 
Song Lee v. Ferguson, 795 P.2d 1220 (Wyo. 1990) and cases cited.2

[¶19]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 W.S. 34-4-103 provides 
that:

(a) To entitle any party 
to give a notice as hereinafter prescribed and to make such foreclosure, it is 
requisite:

(i) That some default in 
a condition of such mortgage has occurred by which the power to sell became 
operative;

(ii) That no suit or 
proceeding has been instituted at law to recover the debt then remaining secured 
by such mortgage, or any part thereof, or if any suit or proceeding has been 
instituted, that the same has been discontinued, or that an execution upon the 
judgment rendered therein has been returned unsatisfied in whole or in part; 
and

(iii) That the mortgage 
containing the power of sale has been duly recorded; and if it has been 
assigned, that all assignments have been recorded; and

(iv) That written notice 
of intent to foreclose the mortgage by advertisement and sale has been served 
upon the record owner, and the person in possession of the mortgaged premises if 
different than the record owner, by certified mail with return receipt, mailed 
to the last known address of the record owner and the person in possession at 
least ten (10) days before commencement of publication of notice of sale. Proof 
of compliance with this subsection shall be by affidavit.

2 See also Palm v. Palm, 
784 P.2d 1365 (Wyo. 1989), an interesting divorce case involving appointment by 
a district court of a master to divide the personal property. The husband did 
not object until he received the master's bill for services. Too late, said this 
court. If objection to the appointment is to be taken by a litigant, it must be 
made timely by filed objection, and, if possible, before performance by the 
master. A failure to make timely objection constitutes a waiver of error. We see 
much similarity here. A party cannot appeal from a judgment or order to which he 
has, to all intents and purposes, consented.