Title: Commonwealth v. St. Hilaire

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11566 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DAVID ST. HILAIRE. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     September 4, 2014. - January 2, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Larceny.  Consent.  Mental Impairment.  Intent.  Evidence, 
Intent. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on January 18, 2011. 
 
 
The case was heard by Mitchell H. Kaplan, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Steven J. Rappaport for the defendant. 
 
Melissa Weisgold Johnsen, Assistant District Attorney 
(David Solet, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  Following a jury-waived trial, a Superior Court 
judge found the defendant guilty of larceny from a person sixty 
2 
 
years of age or older in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 30 (5).1  
The charges arose from a real estate transaction in which Erika 
Magill, the victim, sold her property to the defendant.  At the 
time of the transaction, the victim was an eighty-six year old 
widowed nursing home resident.  The defendant's appeal claiming 
error in the judge's denial of his motion for a required finding 
of not guilty was entered in the Appeals Court, and we 
transferred the case to this court on our own motion to consider 
whether, as the judge ruled, the crime of larceny may be proved 
by evidence that (1) the victim lacked the mental capacity to 
understand the transaction she entered into with the defendant; 
and (2) the defendant knew or should have known that she lacked 
such capacity.  We conclude that the "unlawful taking" element 
of the crime of larceny by theft may be proved by evidence that 
the victim lacked the mental capacity to consent to a taking of 
her property, but that the "specific intent to steal" element 
requires proof that the defendant knew that the victim lacked 
capacity to give such consent.  Because the judge may have 
applied an erroneous legal standard for proof of the specific 
                     
 
1 The judge found the defendant not guilty of obtaining a 
signature under false pretenses in violation of G. L. c. 266, 
§ 31. 
3 
 
intent to steal, we vacate the conviction and remand for a new 
trial.2 
 
Background.  Taken in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 
(1979), the judge could have found the following facts.  The 
victim lived alone in her home in Lowell.  She and her late 
husband owned the home, and she lived there for more than fifty 
years.  The home was her only asset.  The defendant, a building 
inspector in Lowell, was one of the victim's neighbors.  Shortly 
after moving in, the defendant and the victim's husband 
developed a tense relationship due to disputes over the 
boundaries of their respective properties.  After the victim's 
husband died, the defendant inquired about buying the victim's 
home.  She refused to sell to him and told several people, 
including her attorney, that she did not want to sell her 
property to the defendant.  She expressed her resolve not to 
sell to the defendant in colorful language.  She told one 
person, "That son of a bitch wants my house, and he's not 
getting it."  She said to another that there was "no way in 
                     
 
2 Due to the length of time that has elapsed since the trial 
in this case, the judge was unable to respond to an order of 
this court seeking clarification whether the guilty finding was 
based on the defendant's knowledge of the victim's lack of 
mental capacity to consent. 
4 
 
hell" she would sell to the defendant and that her late husband 
would "flip over in his grave" if she did. 
In July, 2001, the victim's attorney prepared the victim's 
will naming her best friend as the sole beneficiary of her 
property, including her home.  The victim had no family.  When 
the friend's health began to deteriorate in 2007, the friend's 
daughter, Lisa Miele, began to visit with and provide help to 
the victim.  In 2007, the victim substituted Miele as her health 
care proxy, a duty previously undertaken by Miele's mother, who 
died in 2009. 
 
On July 13, 2010, the victim broke her hip and was taken to 
a hospital where she was scheduled to undergo surgery the 
following day.  The victim was anxious about the surgery and 
summoned her attorney the afternoon before the surgery to 
discuss her will.  In the conversation with her attorney, the 
victim explained that her best friend had died and that she 
wanted the friend's daughter to receive whatever her friend 
would have received under the prior will.  The attorney attended 
to the matter that day and returned to the hospital later that 
night, before the surgery, with the revised will.  As instructed 
by the victim, the attorney revised the will to bequeath the 
victim's house and property to Miele.  The victim reviewed the 
revised will and signed it in the presence of two witnesses and 
a notary brought to the hospital by the attorney. 
5 
 
 
The next day the victim underwent surgery, and on July 17, 
2010, she was transferred to a nursing home for rehabilitation.  
On admission to the nursing home, a medical staff member 
administered a "mini mental status exam" that showed mild 
cognitive deficits and concluded that the victim was not 
competent to sign any further paperwork.  A supervisor informed 
Miele that as the victim's health care proxy, she would have to 
sign documents on the victim's behalf. 
 
After a few days at the nursing home, the victim's 
condition deteriorated.  She suffered an infection that caused a 
great deal of pain and discomfort.  The medical staff 
administered antibiotics, antidepressants, and oxycodone, which, 
according to one of the treating nurses, could cause confusion 
and sedation.  After receiving the medication, the victim was at 
times incoherent and incapable of expressing herself.  The 
victim's condition was apparent to Miele, who visited the victim 
every day after the surgery.  The defendant also visited the 
victim, and during one visit when both Miele and the defendant 
were present, the defendant questioned Miele about her constant 
attention to the victim. 
 
During the victim's stay at the nursing home, the staff 
became aware that the defendant had asked the victim to sign 
documents, the nature and contents of which were unknown to the 
victim.  On July 21, 2010, Miele relayed this information to the 
6 
 
victim's attorney.  The victim's roommate also was aware of the 
defendant's efforts to get the victim to sign unspecified 
documents.  The victim's roommate promised to telephone Miele if 
the defendant returned with documents for the victim to sign. 
 
On July 26, 2010, Miele visited the victim as usual but the 
victim was barely aware of Miele's presence.  Miele left with a 
promise to return after dinner.  Shortly thereafter, the 
defendant arrived at the victim's bedside with a notary public 
and one other person.  The victim's roommate, who was present 
when the defendant arrived, saw the defendant hand a document to 
the victim.  Without explaining the contents, the defendant 
asked the victim to sign the document.  The victim's roommate 
yelled to the victim not to sign it, but she did.  The victim's 
roommate immediately telephoned Miele.  When Miele arrived to 
investigate what had happened, the victim told Miele that she 
did not know what she had signed.  The defendant did not provide 
a copy of the document to the victim. 
 
A few days later, the victim was taken to the hospital, 
where she fell into a coma.  She died on August 12, 2010.  After 
the victim's death, Miele learned that the victim had signed a 
quitclaim deed conveying her property to the defendant. 
 
Subsequently, Detective Thomas Hultgren of the Lowell 
police department contacted the defendant and requested an 
interview regarding the circumstances of the transfer of the 
7 
 
victim's property to the defendant.  The defendant agreed to an 
interview and met with Detective Hultgren.  During that 
interview, the defendant claimed that, prior to the victim's 
hospitalization for her hip injury, the victim and he had 
reached an oral agreement for the sale of her property.  The 
terms of the alleged agreement were that the defendant would pay 
the victim $100,000, pay off the municipal liens, and grant the 
victim a life estate in the property.  The victim would take 
back two mortgages in the amount of $50,000 and $42,000.  These 
mortgages would be discharged after fifteen years or on the 
victim's death, whichever occurred first.  The defendant showed 
Detective Hultgren a copy of the notarized quitclaim deed the 
victim signed on July 26, copies of two notarized mortgages that 
the victim did not sign, and a document entitled "Life Estate," 
which the victim also did not sign.  Even though the defendant 
was aware that the victim was represented by an attorney and 
that Miele was her caretaker, he never told either of them about 
the agreement for the sale of the victim's property.  The 
defendant did not seek the assistance of an attorney, opting to 
prepare all of the documents himself.  As to the victim's 
condition on the date of the transaction, the defendant claimed 
that she "looked good" and "knew what was going on" when he 
asked her to sign the deed.  He also told Detective Hultgren 
8 
 
that the victim "looked better on July 26 than [she had] in 
months." 
 
The defendant recorded only the $50,000 mortgage, claiming 
that he did so as a protective measure so that the nursing home 
would be unable to get a lien on the victim's house in the event 
that she could not pay her bills.  He paid no money to the 
victim.  Notwithstanding the asserted agreement to grant the 
victim a life estate in the property, the defendant immediately 
changed the locks on the property, denying access to Miele and 
the victim's attorney. 
 
Discussion.  At the close of the Commonwealth's evidence 
and again at the close of all the evidence, the defendant filed 
motions for required findings of not guilty.  The motions were 
denied, and after the close of all the evidence, the judge found 
the defendant guilty of larceny from a person sixty years of age 
or older and not guilty of obtaining a signature by false 
pretenses.  On appeal, the defendant argues that the judge erred 
in denying the motion for a required finding of not guilty of 
larceny, claiming error in the judge's ruling that the unlawful 
taking element of larceny may be proved by evidence that the 
victim lacked the mental capacity to consent to the transaction.  
He contends that without this evidence, the Commonwealth's case 
was otherwise insufficient to prove larceny.  The defendant also 
claims, for the first time on appeal, that because the 
9 
 
transaction granted the victim a life estate in the property, 
the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
intent to deprive the victim of her property "permanently." 
1.  Standard of review.  We review a claim of insufficiency 
of the evidence under the oft-repeated standard articulated in 
Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677.  The test is whether "after viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt" (emphasis in original).  
Id., quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 (1979). 
 
2.  The elements of larceny.  General Laws c. 266, § 30 
(5), inserted by St. 1995, c. 297, § 9,3 provides in relevant 
part as follows:  "Whoever steals or with intent to defraud 
obtains by a false pretense, or whoever unlawfully, and with 
intent to steal or embezzle, converts, or secretes with intent 
to convert, the property of another, sixty years of age or older 
. . . shall be guilty of larceny . . . ."  This provision of the 
statute is identical to G. L. c. 266, § 30 (1),4 except for the 
                     
 
3 In 1995, in "An Act relative to the assault, abuse, 
neglect and financial exploitation of an elderly or disabled 
person," the Legislature amended G. L. c. 266, § 30, to add the 
new paragraph (5), which specified the enhanced punishment for 
larceny of property of persons sixty years of age or older.  See 
St. 1995, c. 297, § 9.  The amendment did not change the 
elements of larceny. 
 
4 The larceny statute, G. L. c. 266, § 30, merged the three 
formerly separate common-law crimes of larceny by theft, larceny 
 
10 
 
specification of an enhanced penalty for larceny of the property 
of persons sixty years of age or older.5  A conviction of larceny 
under G. L. c. 266, § 30 (1), requires the Commonwealth to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt an unlawful taking and carrying away 
of the property6 of another with the specific intent to deprive 
the person of the property permanently.  See Commonwealth v. 
Mills, 436 Mass. 387, 394 (2002).  In this appeal, only the 
unlawful taking and intent elements are at issue.  We consider 
each in turn. 
 
3.  Unlawful taking.  The Commonwealth prosecuted the 
defendant on the theory that the purported sale of the victim's 
                                                                  
by embezzlement, and larceny by false pretense into one crime:  
larceny.  Commonwealth v. Labadie, 467 Mass. 81, 87, cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 257 (2014), citing Commonwealth v. Mills, 436 
Mass. 387, 391–392 (2002).  An indictment pursuant to G. L. 
c. 266, § 30, need not specify the particular type of larceny 
charged against the defendant.  The crime may be established by 
evidence sufficient to warrant a conviction on any one of the 
three formerly separate charges.  Mills, supra at 392, citing 
Commonwealth v. King, 202 Mass. 379, 388 (1909). 
 
 
5 The enhanced penalty provision in G. L. c. 266, § 30 (5), 
for larceny over $250 increases the maximum punishment to 
"imprisonment in the [S]tate prison for not more than ten years 
or in the house of correction for not more than two and one-half 
years, or by a fine of not more than [$50,000] or by both such 
fine and imprisonment."  Under G. L. c. 266, § 30 (1), a person 
convicted of larceny is subject to a maximum punishment of not 
more than five years' imprisonment in the State prison or 
payment of a $25,000 fine and not more than two years in a house 
of correction. 
 
6 The statutory definition of property includes "a deed or 
writing containing a conveyance of land."  G. L. c. 266, 
§ 30 (2). 
11 
 
property to the defendant was in fact a larcenous taking.  The 
argument was that the victim's apparent consent to the 
transaction was vitiated by her mental incapacity at the time 
she executed the deed transferring her property to the 
defendant.  Although the Commonwealth cited no Massachusetts 
case7 expressly allowing evidence of the victim's mental state to 
prove larceny, the judge accepted this premise and instructed 
himself as follows: 
"[T]he court . . . may find that the defendant unlawfully 
took property owned by [the victim] if the Commonwealth has 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, one, that on July 26, 
2010, when the defendant presented [the victim] with a 
quitclaim deed conveying [the property] to himself . . .  
[that the victim] was so mentally impaired that she could 
not understand the transaction that the defendant was 
asking her to enter into, including that she was selling 
her home to the defendant . . . [a]nd, two, that at that 
time the defendant knew or reasonably should have known 
that [the victim] was that incapable of understanding the 
transaction that the defendant was asking her to enter 
into." 
 
                     
 
7 Our cases have not held explicitly that a property owner's 
mental state is probative of the unlawful taking element of the 
crime of larceny by theft.  Explicit references to consent as 
affected by the owner's mental state are less common because in 
the typical larceny prosecution, the lack of consent will be so 
obvious from the circumstances that it is unnecessary to prove 
this fact by direct evidence.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Donovan, 395 Mass. 20, 26 (1985) (placing phony night deposit 
box at bank and taking cash deposits placed in box); 
Commonwealth v. Luckis, 99 Mass. 431, 432 (1868) (grasping 
object in another's pocket); Commonwealth v. Vickers, 60 Mass. 
App. Ct. 24, 26 (2003) (concealing items from retail shop in 
beach-style bag without paying for them); Commonwealth v. Lent, 
46 Mass. App. Ct. 705, 708 (1999) (taking and carrying away 
backpack of victim of attempted kidnapping). 
12 
 
In settling on this principle as a correct interpretation of 
Massachusetts law, the trial judge relied on cases from other 
jurisdictions, State v. Calonico, 256 Conn. 135 (2001); and 
People v. Camiola, 225 A.D.2d 380 (N.Y. 1996).8  The defendant 
seizes on the judge's reliance on these cases to bolster his 
argument that, under Massachusetts law, the victim's mental 
incapacity has no bearing on the crime of larceny and that, 
without legislative action, such evidence may not be considered 
in the unlawful taking calculus.9  We disagree. 
                     
 
8 The court in State v. Calonico, 256 Conn. 135 (2001), 
interpreted a statute closely analogous to G. L. c. 266, § 30 
(1), to permit consideration of the victim's mental state on the 
issue of consent.  The Connecticut statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. 
§ 53a-119 (2013), defines larceny as follows:  "A person commits 
larceny when, with intent to deprive another of property or to 
appropriate the same to himself or a third person, he wrongfully 
takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner."  The 
Calonico court noted that, "[a]lthough [the statute does not] 
specifically enumerate[] lack of consent as an element of 
larceny . . . , we agree with New York's interpretation of N.Y. 
Penal Law 155.05(1), a larceny statute containing language 
similar to that of [Conn. Gen. Stat.] § 53a-119, that '[a] 
donative victim's inability to consent to [a] taking [is a 
factor] . . . properly considered in the context of a 
traditional understanding of the larceny statute.'"  Calonico, 
supra at 154, quoting People v. Camiola, 225 A.D.2d 380, 380-381 
(N.Y. 1996). 
 
 
9 The defendant's argument mirrors the dissent in 
Commonwealth v. Reske, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 522, 532-533 (1997) 
(Gillerman, J., dissenting), which posited that because a 
victim's mental incapacity is not an element of the offense of 
larceny, it may not be offered as proof of the crime except by 
legislative intervention.  As did the majority in Reske, we 
reject that limitation on the nature of evidence probative of 
the defendant's guilt. 
 
13 
 
 
Our review of the common-law underpinnings of the crime of 
larceny persuades us that, although lack of consent is not an 
element of the offense, it is the sine qua non of the crime of 
larceny.  In Commonwealth v. James, 1 Pick. 375, 383 (1823), 
this court affirmed a larceny conviction with the observation 
that the jury's guilty verdict is "well warranted, if, at the 
time the defendant took [the owner's property, it was] not 
lawfully in [the defendant's] possession with the consent of the 
owner" (emphasis added).  Similarly, in Commonwealth v. White, 
123 Mass. 430, 434-435 (1877), the court held that larceny is 
proved if the evidence establishes that the defendant 
"wrongfully and fraudulently [took] and carried away the goods 
of another, with the felonious intent to convert them to his own 
use and make them his own property without the consent of the 
owner"10 (emphasis added).  These early cases, applying a 
definition of larceny essentially unchanged since that time, 
validate our view that the judge properly allowed evidence of 
the victim's mental incapacity to establish the unlawful nature 
of the taking of her property.  In circumstances such as this, 
where larceny is committed through what appears to be a 
                                                                  
 
 
10 The lack of consent is an implicit factor in other 
contexts as well.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Green, 399 Mass. 
565, 567 (1987) (lack of consent implicit in legal definition of 
both assault and battery and indecent assault and battery). 
14 
 
consensual transaction, evidence probative of whether the victim 
actually consented may be admitted during the Commonwealth's 
case-in-chief or in rebuttal to the defense of consent.11 
 
Further, the Commonwealth may introduce evidence of the 
victim's mental capacity as probative of whether the victim 
actually consented to a transaction.  The notion that consent 
may be vitiated by mental incapacity is recognized in our 
criminal jurisprudence.  In Commonwealth v. Blache, 450 Mass. 
583, 590 (2008), this court reaffirmed the long-standing rule, 
first articulated in Commonwealth v. Burke, 105 Mass. 376, 380-
381 (1870), that the lack of consent element in a rape 
prosecution may be proved by evidence that the victim lacked the 
                     
 
11 Our view that larceny may be proved by evidence that the 
property owner lacked the mental capacity to consent is in 
harmony with most of the cases from other jurisdictions where 
the courts have interpreted similar statutes that do not include 
lack of consent as an element of the crime.  See Gainer v. 
State, 553 So. 2d 673, 679 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) ("even without 
an express statutory provision . . . mental deficiency on the 
part of the victim, which is known or should be known to the 
defendant, can render ineffective the apparent consent by that 
victim in a prosecution for theft"); Calonico, 256 Conn. at 153 
(holding that mental capacity may be considered on issue of 
victim's intent); People v. Cain, 238 Mich. App. 95, 128-129 
(1999) (affirming larceny conviction because victim lacked 
mental capacity to consent to taking); Camiola, 225 A.D.2d at 
380-381 (holding that jury may consider victim's mental capacity 
in determining whether defendant acted with victim's knowledge 
and consent).  Cf. State v. Maxon, 32 Kan. App. 2d 67, 79-80 
(2003) (concluding that capacity of mentally handicapped victim 
could not be considered under felony theft statute because 
defendant's actions already covered under specific offense of 
mistreatment of dependent adult). 
15 
 
capacity to consent.  See Commonwealth v. Urban, 450 Mass. 608, 
614 (2008).  In Blache, supra, the victim's lack of capacity to 
consent was directly relevant to an element of the crime and, 
therefore, unquestionably relevant in establishing the 
defendant's guilt. 
 
Our case law, however, has not limited evidence of capacity 
to consent to only those cases where consent is an element of 
the offense.  In Commonwealth v. Reske, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 522, 
524, 526 (1997), a case involving a prosecution for larceny by 
false pretenses12 brought under G. L. c. 266, § 30 (1), the 
Appeals Court weighed the victim's mental capacity to appreciate 
the exploitative nature of the transaction promoted by the 
defendant.  The defendant, a car salesman, was convicted on 
evidence that he sold six different vehicles at inflated prices 
to a mentally disabled customer.  Id. at 527.  In challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence, the defendant asserted a variation 
of "caveat emptor" as a defense.13  The court rejected the 
                     
 
12 Larceny by false pretenses requires proof of the 
following elements:  (1) a false statement of fact was made; (2) 
the defendant knew or believed that the statement was false when 
he made it; (3) the defendant intended that the person to whom 
he made the false statement would rely on it; and (4) the person 
to whom the false statement was made did rely on it and 
consequently parted with property.  Mills, 436 Mass. at 396-397. 
 
 
13 The court characterized the defense as, "[I]t is not a 
crime to gull a willing dupe."  Reske, 43 Mass. App. Ct. at 524. 
 
16 
 
argument, reasoning that the owner's mental incapacity was 
highly probative of the defendant's intent to induce the victim 
to rely on a false statement14 and thereby part with his 
property.  The fact that the victim's mental state was not an 
element of the offense did not preclude consideration of that 
evidence because it was otherwise relevant to an issue in the 
case.  Likewise, it is appropriate here to allow such evidence 
of the victim's mental incapacity insofar as it may be probative 
of the unlawful taking element of the offense. 
 
Consent is a live issue in this case because the 
Commonwealth's prosecution rested on the theory that the victim 
did not consent to the transaction presented by the defendant.  
In such a case, the Commonwealth is entitled, and indeed 
required, to prove the lack of consent beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  See Commonwealth v. O'Connell, 438 Mass. 658, 664 (2003) 
(obligating Commonwealth to prove beyond reasonable doubt 
absence of authority where defendant claims "authority" for 
taking).  In so doing, the Commonwealth may meet its burden to 
prove the lack of consent by evidence showing that it was 
                     
 
14 The defendant claimed in that case that the statements 
asserting an inflated value for the vehicles were not false, 
apparently because a vehicle was worth whatever a customer would 
pay for it.  The court declined to credit this argument, noting 
that the statements were indeed false because the values would 
be so obviously wrong to any person of normal intelligence.  
Reske, 43 Mass. App. Ct. at 524, 526. 
17 
 
neither voluntarily nor knowingly given.  See Commonwealth v. 
Jackson, 432 Mass. 82, 85-86 (2000) (applying test to analogous 
circumstances of waiver of rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 [1966]).  Both of these factors entail a consideration 
of the totality of circumstances surrounding consent, including 
the mental state of the person whose consent is at issue.  See 
Commonwealth v. Edwards, 420 Mass. 666, 673 (1995) (examining 
"rational intellect" and "free will" to determine 
voluntariness).  Therefore, the victim's mental capacity was 
properly considered in the totality of the circumstances 
determinative of whether the victim actually consented to the 
transaction. 
 
Except for the argument that the law precludes 
consideration of the victim's mental state, the defendant does 
not suggest that the evidence is otherwise insufficient to prove 
that the victim lacked the mental capacity to consent to the 
transaction. Therefore, we need not address the factual 
sufficiency of the evidence of an unlawful taking. 
 
4.  Specific intent to steal.  On the intent element of 
larceny, the judge instructed himself that the requisite intent 
may be proved by evidence that the defendant either knew or 
should have known that the victim lacked the mental capacity to 
18 
 
consent to the transaction.15  This was error.  Larceny is a 
specific intent crime that requires the Commonwealth to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to steal 
or deprive the owner permanently of the use of the property.  
G. L. c. 277, § 39.  A defendant's mistaken but honest belief 
that he has a right to the property negates the intent to steal.  
See Commonwealth v. Liebenow, ante 151, 157 (2014); Commonwealth 
v. Vives, 447 Mass. 537, 542 (2006); Commonwealth v. Stebbins, 8 
Gray 492, 495-496 (1857).16  The defendant's claim at trial that 
he honestly believed the victim voluntarily and intelligently 
executed the quitclaim deed transferring her property to him 
implicates this principle.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Newhook, 34 
Mass. App. Ct. 960, 961 (1993) ("defense of honest . . . belief 
may negate the element of a specific and felonious intent to 
steal"). 
 
Where, as here, a defendant asserts a claim of right 
defense that allows for an honest, but mistaken, belief in the 
                     
 
15 Because the defendant neither raised this issue before 
the judge nor objected to the judge's instructions on these 
grounds, we review this aspect of the charge to determine 
whether it resulted in a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice.  Commonwealth v. Bolling, 462 Mass. 440, 452 (2012). 
 
 
16 Although some prior cases concerning the claim of right 
defense suggested a two-part test, whether the belief was honest 
and whether it was reasonable, we recently clarified in 
Commonwealth v. Liebenow, ante 151, 160 (2014), that an honest 
belief need not be objectively reasonable. 
19 
 
defendant's legal right to take property, we hold that it is not 
enough that the Commonwealth prove that the defendant should 
have known of the victim's incapacity.  Instead, if the 
defendant meets his or her burden of production, the 
Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant knew that the victim lacked the mental capacity to 
consent to the transaction.  Liebenow, supra at 161 n.15, citing 
Vives, 447 Mass. at 541.  The burden of production is met "if 
any view of the evidence" would support a factual finding that 
the defendant honestly believed he or she had a legal right to 
take property.  Liebenow, supra at 156, quoting Vives, supra.  
The defendant's production of the quitclaim deed signed by the 
victim would likely meet the defendant's burden in this regard 
and, thereby, shift the burden to the Commonwealth to disprove 
the defendant's claim of right.  See Commonwealth v. Gouse, 461 
Mass. 787, 806 (2012) (producing license to carry firearm would 
meet defendant's burden of production in asserting affirmative 
defense of license to unlawful possession of firearm charge). 
 
If a defendant meets this burden of production, he or she 
is entitled to an instruction directing a not guilty finding if 
the Commonwealth fails to establish by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant did not honestly believe that the 
victim voluntarily and intelligently entered into the 
transaction.  See Commonwealth v. White, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 483, 
20 
 
488 (1977) ("defendant was entitled to an instruction to the 
effect that he should be acquitted [of larceny] if the jury 
should find that the defendant honestly . . . believed that the 
money he took from [the victim] represented a debt actually due 
from [the victim] to the defendant").  The judge's instruction 
fell short of the mark in that it presented the option of a 
guilty finding based on either actual knowledge that the victim 
lacked the mental capacity to consent to the transaction or a 
finding that the defendant should have known that she lacked 
such capacity. 
 
In determining whether the error created a substantial risk 
of a miscarriage of justice, "[w]e consider the strength of the 
Commonwealth's case, the nature of the error, the significance 
of the error in the context of the trial, and the possibility 
that the absence of an objection was the result of a reasonable 
tactical decision."  Commonwealth v. Bolling, 462 Mass. 440, 452 
(2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 687 (2002).  
S.C., 444 Mass. 72 (2005).  Because of the possibility that the 
guilty verdict was based only on proof that the defendant 
"should have known" of the victim's mental incapacity, we 
conclude that the error did result in a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice. 
 
The defendant's other intent argument is unavailing.  The 
defendant claims that the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden 
21 
 
to prove the intent to deprive the victim permanently of the 
"use of her property" because the transaction granted her a life 
estate.  G. L. c. 277, § 39.17  This argument fails. 
 
The elements of larceny do not comprehend a permanent 
deprivation of an owner's "use" of her property.  See Mills, 436 
Mass. at 391-392.  Rather, G. L. c. 277, § 39, was enacted only 
to clarify that the crime of larceny encompasses the formerly 
separate common-law crimes:  larceny by theft, larceny by 
embezzlement, and larceny by false pretenses.  The statute did 
not limit the permanent deprivation to the "use" of one's 
property.  In any event, the judge could have discredited the 
defendant's claim that the victim was granted a life estate.  
The document purporting to create the life estate was not signed 
by the victim and was not recorded with the deed conveying the 
property to the defendant.  The judge also could have considered 
that the defendant secured the property in a manner that would 
have precluded the victim from entering it should she have 
chosen to do so.  Absent a determination that the defendant had 
an honest, albeit mistaken, belief that the victim had the 
capacity to consent to the transaction, the evidence was 
                     
 
17 The defendant relies on the definition of larceny as the 
"criminal taking, obtaining or converting of personal property, 
with intent to defraud or deprive the owner permanently of the 
use of it; including all forms of larceny, criminal embezzlement 
and obtaining by criminal false pretences" (emphasis added).  
G. L. c. 277, § 39. 
22 
 
otherwise sufficient to prove an intent to deprive the victim of 
the property permanently. 
 
5.  Fair notice of liability.  The defendant argues for the 
first time on appeal that even if the transaction with the 
victim was unfair, it may not be punished as a criminal act 
because our law has not previously permitted consideration of a 
victim's mental incapacity as evidence of an unlawful taking in 
a prosecution for larceny. 
 
We are mindful, as the defendant suggests, that the law 
must provide a "fair warning . . . of what the law intends to do 
if a certain line is passed" and that a clear line is needed to 
make the warning fair.  McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 
27 (1931).  We recognize also that "[i]t is not the policy of 
the law to punish criminally private wrongs."  Commonwealth v. 
Drew, 19 Pick. 179, 185 (1837).  Nonetheless, we do not view our 
interpretation of the law of larceny as compromising this 
bedrock principle of the criminal law.  As we have said, the 
notion of consent to a taking of one's property has deep roots 
in our jurisprudence relating to the crime of larceny.  See 
Liebenow, supra at 157, citing Commonwealth v. Brisbois, 281 
Mass. 125, 128-129 (1932); Commonwealth v. McDuffy, 126 Mass. 
467, 469 (1879); and Stebbins, 8 Gray at 495.  Nor do we narrow 
the parameters of consent such that conduct previously deemed 
permissible under our law is now prohibited.  Thus, we discern 
23 
 
no undue risk of prosecution of persons who enter into 
transactions with an honest but mistaken belief that the other 
party voluntarily and intelligently agrees to be a participant 
in a transaction.  See Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249, 
254 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978). 
 
Conclusion.  Because the judge may have applied an 
erroneous legal standard for the element of specific intent in 
reaching his guilty finding, the conviction must be vacated.  
Therefore, we remand the case for a new trial on the larceny 
indictment where the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt a specific intent to steal by evidence that the victim 
lacked the mental capacity to consent to the transaction and 
that the defendant knew that she lacked the mental capacity to 
consent to the transaction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.