Title: Williams v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
DANA WILLIAMS,
Defendant Below-
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
Plaintiff Below-
Appellee.
§
§
§  No. 562, 2001
§
§
§  Court Below—Superior Court
§  of the State of Delaware,
§  in and for New Castle County
§  Cr.A. Nos. IN98-02-0214 
§                   IN98-02-0215
§
Submitted: March 15, 2002
  Decided:   April 17, 2002
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and HOLLAND, Justices
O R D E R
This 17th  day of April 2002, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal
and the record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1)
The defendant-appellant, Dana Williams, filed this appeal from
the October 25, 2001 order of the Superior Court denying his motion for
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  We find
no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
(2)
In his appeal, Williams claims that: a) his trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance; and b) the Superior Court abused its discretion in
failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his postconviction motion. 
1Williams v. State, 756 A.2d 349 (Del. 2000).
2Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).
3Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990).
-2-
(3)
In January 1999, Williams was convicted by a Superior Court
jury of Stalking and Non-Compliance with Conditions of Bond.  He was
sentenced to a total of 8 years imprisonment at Level V, to be suspended after
7 years for decreasing levels of probation.  This Court affirmed Williams’
convictions and sentences on direct appeal.1  
(4)
In order to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, Williams must show that his counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings
would have been different.2  While not insurmountable, the Strickland
standard is highly demanding and leads to a “strong presumption that the
representation was professionally reasonable.”3  
(5)
Williams’ claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail
because he has not demonstrated that any alleged errors on the part of his
counsel resulted in prejudice to him.  Moreover, given that Williams’ claim
4SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(d) (4).
-3-
fails on its face to satisfy the Strickland standard, the Superior Court was
within its discretion to summarily dismiss it.4  
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the
Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
   s/Joseph T. Walsh
Justice