Title: Stricker v. Frauendienst

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Stricker v. Frauendienst1983 WY 92669 P.2d 520Case Number: 83-64Case Number: 83-64Decided: 09/12/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
CLAYTON L. STRICKER AND 
JACQUELINE A. STRICKER, HUSBAND AND WIFE, APPELLANTS 
(DEFENDANTS),

v.

MARLIN FRAUENDIENST, AN 
INDIVIDUAL, D/B/A CHEYENNE LANDSCAPING, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Alan B. Johnson, 
J.

Sue Davidson of 
Urbigkit & Whitehead, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellants.

Mitchell E. 
Osborn of Grant & Grant, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and 
CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The single question in 
this case is whether an attorney is authorized to sign a lien statement for his 
client. Appellee's attorney signed and filed a lien statement with the county 
clerk. The county court granted judgment for the amount demanded in the 
complaint, foreclosed appellants' lien and directed that the property subject to 
the lien be sold. The district court affirmed the judgment and order of the 
county court.

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Appellee built a fence 
on appellants' property pursuant to an agreement between the parties.1 Appellants denied that the fence 
was built in conformance with the parties' agreement, and maintained that it was 
not built with the quality of materials agreed upon nor was the workmanship 
according to the agreement.2 Appellee's attorney furnished 
appellants with notice of intent to file a lien, and signed and filed a lien 
statement for $1,759.44. Appellants contend that the lien statement did not 
conform with the requirements of §§ 29-1-201 through 29-1-309, W.S. 1977 (June 
1981 replacement), because it was not signed by a person authorized by 
law.

[¶4.]     Section 29-1-301(a), 
supra, provides, "In order to have a perfected lien pursuant to this title, a 
lien claimant shall file with the county clerk a lien statement * * *." Section 
29-1-201(a)(iv), supra, defines a lien claimant as "any person who claims a lien 
under this title pursuant to a contract for improvement of property entered into 
by an owner of the property."

[¶5.]     Section 29-1-201, 
supra, provides:

"(b) Only the following 
agency relationships are presumed in this title:

"(i) If any spouse enters 
into a contract for the performance of any work or the furnishing of any 
materials for the benefit of the property of the other spouse for which a lien 
is provided by this title, the spouse contracting for the work shall be presumed 
to be the agent of the spouse owning the property;

"(ii) Between joint 
tenants;

"(iii) Among tenants in 
common; and

"(iv) An employee is an 
agent of his employer."

[¶6.]     Appellants urge that we 
construe § 29-1-201(b), supra, to exclude attorneys as agents of the lien 
claimant for the purpose of filing a lien. However, § 29-1-201(b), does not 
address the signing of a lien statement. It does not indicate for what purpose 
agency relationships are presumed except that a presumed agent may bind a 
principal by contracting for work or materials. We cannot read into this statute 
the concept that only the presumed agent listed may file a lien statement. The 
statute does not abrogate the general law of agency for purposes of making lien 
statements.

[¶7.]     Even if the persons 
listed in § 29-1-201(b), supra, are the only presumed agents, that does not 
preclude proof of a different agency relationship. In this latter event, the 
agency would have to be proved, whereas the agency of the persons listed by the 
statute is presumed. An attorney acting on behalf of his client has 
traditionally been regarded as an agent of his client. Evidence establishing an 
attorney-client relationship proves agency. Appellants do not contend that 
appellee's attorney was not employed to make a lien statement. 

[¶8.]     The applicable lien 
law, §§ 29-1-201 through 29-2-109, supra, is different in some respects from its 
forerunner. The former statutes, § 29-11, W.S. 1957, and § 29-2-109, W.S. 1977, 
provided:

"* * * Every original 
contractor * * * every subcontractor shall * * * file * * * a just and true 
account * * * if known to the person filing the lien, which in all cases shall 
be verified by the oath of the person filing the lien, or by some reliable person for him * * 
*." (Emphasis added.)

[¶9.]     The lien law governing 
this case does not contain the provision that the lien statement shall be 
verified by "some reliable person." Appellants conclude from that omission that 
only the persons who are presumed agents can verify a lien statement, and since 
attorneys are not listed as presumed agents, they cannot verify such statements. 
It seems more logical to suppose that the legislature omitted the term, "some 
reliable person," because it was ambiguous and had the potential for 
problems.

[¶10.]  It is generally held that a lien 
statement may be made by an attorney or other agent of the claimant. 53 
Am.Jur.2d, Mechanics Liens, § 222, p. 743 (1970); 57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 
166, p. 709 (1948).

"`Whenever * * * a 
regularly admitted attorney appears for a party in a cause, the presumption is 
that such appearance is authorized.'" Heyer v. Hines, 36 Wyo. 53, 252 P. 1028, 1029 (1927).

"The attorney's knowledge 
is deemed to be the client's knowledge, when the attorney acts on his behalf * * 
* [O]nce a party has designated an attorney to represent him in regard to a 
particular matter, the court and the other parties to an action are entitled to 
rely upon that authority until the client's decision to terminate it has been 
brought to their attention * * *." Haller 
v. Wallis, 89 Wn.2d 539, 573 P.2d 1302, 1307 (1978).

[¶11.]  It is fundamental that an attorney at law 
is an agent of his client and it is immaterial whether he is employed for a 
single transaction or a series of transactions. Attorneys are agents even though 
in some respects they are independent contractors. Restatement (Second), Agency 
2d, § 1, Comment on subsection (3), p. 11 (1958).

[¶12.]  Appellants concede that "an attorney as 
an agent can be `a representative of his principal * * * in contractual 
relations with third' persons. * * *" C.M. & W. Drilling Company Inc. v. 
Schieck, 74 Wyo. 64, 284 P.2d 390, 397 (1955). Appellants 
contend, however, that "the agency relations must be one which is statutorily 
recognized."

[¶13.]  The relationship between a client and his 
attorney is one of the oldest recognizable principal-agent affiliations. 
Ordinarily, an attorney acts for his client in legal matters and many quasi 
legal causes. If the legislature intended that the traditional agency 
relationship between a client and his attorney be inapplicable with respect to 
making a lien statement, we fail to see that intent manifest in the present lien 
law.

[¶14.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Appellants perfunctorily 
denied the contract's existence in one paragraph of their answer, but admitted 
it in two other paragraphs. The county court concluded that there was a contract 
and appellants have not appealed that determination.

2 The county court found 
against appellants on the workmanship and quality of materials issue and this 
issue was not appealed.