Title: Okemo Mountain v. Town of Ludlow Zoning Board

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

OKEMO_MTN_V_TOWN_OF_LUDLOW_ZONING_BD.94-331; 164 Vt 447; 671 A.2d 1263

[Filed 15-Dec-1995]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 94-331


Okemo Mountain, Inc. and Vermont                  Supreme Court
Department of Forests, Parks and
Recreation
                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            Windsor Superior Court

Town of Ludlow Zoning Board of
Adjustment, John Lysobey, et al.                  June Term, 1995



John P. Meaker, J.

       Richard H. Coutant of Salmon & Nostrand, Bellows Falls, for
  plaintiff-appellee Okemo Mountain, Inc.

       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Conrad W. Smith, Assistant
  Attorney General, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee Department of Forests,
  Parks & Recreation

       John Lysobey, pro se, Ludlow, intervenor-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Morse and Johnson,(FN1) JJ.



       GIBSON, J.     Landowners John and Christine Lysobey and Wayne and
  Beverly Lysobey appeal from a superior court summary judgment, which held
  in favor of plaintiff Okemo Mountain, Inc. (Okemo) that the Lysobeys do not
  have public road frontage or access by easement to a public road, as
  required under zoning regulations of the Town of Ludlow in order to develop
  land.  The Lysobeys maintain that the court erred in concluding that (1)
  any easement the Lysobeys or their predecessors-in-interest may have had
  over Okemo Mountain Road has been extinguished by adverse possession, and
  (2) Okemo Mountain Road is not a public road under the Town's zoning
  regulation § 610.3 and 24 V.S.A. § 4406(2).(FN2)  We reverse.

 

       In 1986, the Lysobeys purchased thirty-four acres on Okemo Mountain in
  Ludlow, Vermont, adjacent to Okemo State Forest.  Access to the property is
  via Okemo Mountain Road, which begins at Route 103 and proceeds up Okemo
  Mountain passing through land owned by Okemo and then through Okemo State
  Forest.  The Lysobeys' land was once owned by Herbert E. Walker, who
  acquired the property by quitclaim deed dated August 1, 1922.

       During the summer of 1935, the State of Vermont acquired rights-of-way
  across privately owned land to construct Okemo Mountain Road.  Walker was
  one of the landowners who conveyed a right-of-way to the State.  By
  quitclaim deed dated September 23, 1935, Walker conveyed to the State
  "exclusive use and control of a strip of land four (4) rods wide" across
  his land, conforming to the proposed Okemo Mountain Road surveyed and
  marked on the land. Walker reserved rights to all wood cut on the strip and
  "the right to pass and repass over said strip of land above described and
  any other like strips of land" lower down on the mountain and "the road to
  be constructed thereon."  The State subsequently constructed Okemo Mountain
  Road.

       In 1940, Walker quitclaimed to the State of Vermont a 1.75-acre parcel
  of land, which included almost all the land Walker owned over which the
  road passed.  Two small sections of the road, less than one-quarter the
  width of the road, were not conveyed.  The 1940 quitclaim deed states:  "I,
  Herbert E. Walker . . . have REMISED, RELEASED, AND FOREVER QUIT-CLAIMED
  unto the said State of Vermont, all right and title which I, the said
  Herbert E. Walker or my heirs have in, and to a certain piece of land in
  Ludlow . . . ."  It further states that "Herbert E. Walker will have anc
  [sic] claim no right in or to the said quit-claimed premises."

       In 1956, Okemo began operating a ski area on Okemo Mountain.  Access
  to the base lodge at the ski area is via Okemo Mountain Road.  The road
  above the lodge has not been maintained for vehicular traffic during the
  winter, but has been used as a ski trail.  This upper

 

  section of the road is on land owned by the State of Vermont, except for
  the small sections noted above that were not conveyed to the State in 1940. 
  The road is regulated by the Department of Forests, Parks and Recreation
  (Department), which currently classifies the road as a State Forest
  Highway, "Class B," a paved or unpaved State Forest Highway that is
  generally open to the public, but may be closed at certain times of the
  year, restricting public access.  The Department does not consider Okemo
  Mountain Road a public highway, although it is open for public use from
  mid-May through the end of October.

       In 1963, the Department leased to Okemo part of Okemo State Forest to
  develop and operate a ski area.  The lease purported to give Okemo
  authority to restrict adjoining landowners from use of the roads and other
  leased premises.  The Department and Okemo entered into a new lease for ski
  area development on Okemo Mountain in 1975.  The parties  dispute whether
  the lease agreement has been continuous since 1963.

       In October 1988, the Lysobeys applied for a permit to build a
  residential home on their land adjacent to Okemo State Forest and accessed
  via the section of Okemo Mountain Road above the base lodge.  The zoning
  administrator approved the permit application, and Okemo filed a notice of
  appeal with the Ludlow Zoning Board of Adjustment, challenging the
  Lysobeys' right to pass over Okemo Mountain Road to their property.  Under
  Ludlow's zoning regulations, "No land development may be permitted on lots
  which do not either have frontage on a public road or public waters or,
  with the approval of the Planning Commission, access to such a road or
  waters by a permanent easement or right-of-way (at least 20 feet in
  width)."  Town of Ludlow, Vermont, Zoning and Flood Hazard Regulations §
  610.3 (Mar. 6, 1990).  Following hearings, the Board affirmed the decision
  of the zoning administrator, concluding that the Lysobeys have a
  right-of-way over Okemo Mountain Road above the base lodge and that it
  provides access to a public road.

       Okemo and the Department appealed the decision of the Zoning Board to
  the superior court.  Subsequently, the zoning administrator granted the
  Lysobeys a second permit to construct decks and a generator house on the
  land; this permit was also affirmed by the Zoning Board and

 

  appealed to superior court.  The Lysobeys intervened in the two appeals and
  filed a cross-complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, requesting
  (1) a declaration of the rights of the parties to use of Okemo Mountain
  Road, and (2) an injunction preventing Okemo and the Department from
  interfering with the Lysobeys' right to use the road.

       Addressing cross-motions for summary judgment, the superior court
  reversed the decision of the Zoning Board of Adjustment.  The court
  concluded that any year-round right-of-way that may have existed
  appurtenant to the Lysobeys' land was extinguished by adverse possession in
  1978, fifteen years after the Department first leased to Okemo the right to
  control access to upper Okemo Mountain Road.  The court further concluded
  that Okemo Mountain Road was not a public road under the Town zoning
  regulation § 610.3.  Accordingly, it held that the Lysobeys' land does not
  have frontage on a public road or access to a public road by a permanent
  easement.  The Lysobeys appeal.

                                     I.

       In reviewing an appeal from a summary judgment, we apply the same
  standard as the superior court.  "To prevail on a motion for summary
  judgment, the moving party must show that there are no genuine issues of
  material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
  of law."  Palmer v. Bennington Sch. Dist., 159 Vt. 31, 35, 615 A.2d 498,
  500 (1992).

       We begin by examining the nature of the right reserved by Walker in
  1935, an issue the trial court did not reach.  A reservation is a clause in
  a deed by which the grantor retains one or more rights in the estate
  granted.  See Lincoln Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. State,