Title: In the Matter of Diviacchi

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-13241 
 
IN THE MATTER OF VALERIANO DIVIACCHI. 
 
 
December 5, 2022. 
 
 
Attorney at Law, Suspension, Reinstatement.  Board of Bar 
Overseers. 
 
 
 
The petitioner, Valeriano Diviacchi, appeals from an order 
of a single justice of this court denying his second petition 
for reinstatement to the practice of law, as recommended by the 
Board of Bar Overseers (board).  We affirm. 
 
 
Background.  Diviacchi was suspended from the practice of 
law for a period of twenty-seven months, effective January 2, 
2016, after he was found to have violated several of the 
Massachusetts rules of professional conduct.  See Matter of 
Diviacchi, 475 Mass. 1013, 1021 (2016) (Diviacchi I).  A hearing 
committee of the board concluded, and the board agreed, that 
Diviacchi, in connection with his representation of a client in 
a Federal action filed against her by a lender, 
 
"(1) violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (f)[, as appearing in 
459 Mass. 1301 (2011),] by entering into a contingent fee 
agreement that included provisions not contained in Form A 
or B without explaining these provisions to the client and 
without obtaining her informed consent, confirmed in 
writing; 
 
"(2) violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, [426 Mass. 1308 
(1998);] 1.2 (a), [426 Mass. 1310 (1998);] and 1.3[, 426 
Mass. 1313 (1998),] by refusing to further the client's 
lawful objective of attempting to halt the foreclosure, a 
goal that he knew was important to the client, because 
doing so would risk harm to the predatory lending 
2 
 
 
 
counterclaim which he hoped would be the source of his fee, 
by refusing to meet and talk with the client despite her 
begging, by refusing to participate in settlement 
discussions, and by unilaterally limiting his 
representation despite describing himself as 'counsel of 
record for all purposes' in his Federal court appearance; 
 
"(3) violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 (a) (1)[, 426 Mass. 
1383 (1998),] and 8.4 (c)[, 426 Mass. 1429 (1998),] by 
knowingly making false statements of material fact to both 
the Federal court and the [Boston Municipal Court (BMC)][1] 
. . . ; and 
 
"(4) violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (a)[, as appearing in 
459 Mass. 1301 (2011),] by claiming in the Federal court 
and the BMC that the client owed him approximately $96,000 
in attorney's fees, where no contingency on which to ground 
such recovery had occurred and where the attorney-client 
relationship had effectively ended well before the sale of 
the house, a transaction in which Diviacchi did not 
participate in any event."2 
 
Diviacchi I, 475 Mass. at 1018.  We affirmed the order of a 
single justice of this court imposing a term suspension.  Id. at 
1021. 
 
 
In 2018, Diviacchi filed his first petition for 
reinstatement, which was transmitted to the board.  See Matter 
of Diviacchi, 480 Mass. 1016 (2018) (Diviacchi II).  In 
connection therewith, he filed a motion in the county court 
requesting that the board be compelled to hold a hearing despite 
his objections to providing certain information required by the 
reinstatement questionnaire.3  Id. at 1016.  A second single 
 
1 Those false statements included a baseless allegation, 
made without reasonably diligent inquiry, that the client had a 
pattern of hiring attorneys, refusing to pay their bills, and 
reporting them to the board, and that she had repeated this 
pattern with at least fifteen attorneys.  Matter of Diviacchi, 
475 Mass. 1013, 1017, 1020 (2016). 
 
2 The facts underlying these conclusions are more fully set 
forth in Diviacchi I, 475 Mass. at 1014-1017. 
 
3 Diviacchi continues to object to this aspect of the 
reinstatement questionnaire, arguing that requiring him to 
produce certain financial information constitutes an unlawful 
3 
 
 
 
justice denied the motion to compel and declined to review 
Diviacchi's objections.  Id.  Diviacchi's appeal from that 
interlocutory ruling was dismissed.  Id.  Thereafter, a hearing 
committee of the board held a hearing on the petition and 
recommended that reinstatement be denied on the ground that 
Diviacchi had not carried his "burden of demonstrating that he 
. . . ha[d] the moral qualifications, competency and learning in 
the law required for admission to practice law in this 
Commonwealth, and that his . . resumption of the practice of law 
[would] not be detrimental to the integrity of the bar, the 
administration of justice or the public interest."  See S.J.C. 
Rule 4:01, § 18 (5), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2019).  The 
board adopted that recommendation, and a single justice of this 
court denied reinstatement.  Diviacchi did not appeal from the 
single justice's judgment. 
 
 
Diviacchi thereafter filed his second petition for 
reinstatement, which also was transmitted to the board.  A 
hearing committee held a hearing and issued a report 
recommending that reinstatement be denied, in part because the 
committee was "not persuaded that anything of consequence ha[d] 
changed since the petitioner's suspension and since the denial 
of his first petition for reinstatement."  The board adopted the 
hearing committee's findings and recommendation and filed an 
information in the county court, recommending that the second 
petition be denied.  The second single justice of this court 
concluded that the hearing committee's findings were supported 
by substantial evidence and denied reinstatement. 
 
 
Discussion.  The case is now before us on Diviacchi's 
preliminary memorandum, pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:23 (b), 471 
Mass. 1303 (2015).  That rule requires 
 
"the appellant to demonstrate . . . that there has been an 
error of law or abuse of discretion by the single justice; 
that the decision is not supported by substantial evidence; 
that the sanction is markedly disparate from the sanctions 
imposed in other cases involving similar circumstances; or 
 
search and seizure.  Ultimately, he elected to provide the 
information, and it was admitted subject to a protective order.  
See Matter of Diviacchi, 480 Mass. 1016, 1016 (2018) ("He may 
choose to provide the information requested on the reinstatement 
questionnaire, or he may maintain his objections to doing so").  
In any event, the issue appears not to have factored in the 
board's decision.  In the circumstances, we need not consider it 
further. 
4 
 
 
 
that for other reasons the decision will result in a 
substantial injustice." 
 
Diviacchi has not carried his burden under the rule. 
 
 
"A petitioner for reinstatement must demonstrate that he or 
she 'has the moral qualifications, competency and learning in 
law required for admission to practice law in this Commonwealth, 
and that his or her resumption of the practice of law will not 
be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar, the 
administration of justice, or to the public interest.'"  Matter 
of Leo, 484 Mass. 1050, 1051 (2020), quoting Matter of Weiss, 
474 Mass. 1001, 1002 (2016).  See S.J.C. Rule 4.01, § 18 (5).  
The hearing committee found that Diviacchi had demonstrated none 
of these requirements.  The single justice agreed, and so do we. 
 
 
1.  Moral qualifications.  The conduct giving rise to 
Diviacchi's term suspension is "conclusive evidence that he was, 
at the time, morally unfit to practice law, and it continued to 
be evidence of his lack of moral character . . . when he 
petitioned for reinstatement."  Matter of Leo, 484 Mass. at 
1051, quoting Matter of Dawkins, 432 Mass. 1009, 1010 (2000).  
See Matter of Fletcher, 466 Mass. 1018, 1020 (2013).  We 
emphasize that this is not a proceeding to review the validity 
of the underlying discipline.  See Matter of Leo, supra at 1051 
n.4.  See also Matter of Hiss, 368 Mass. 447, 450 (1975).  Both 
the facts of Diviacchi's misconduct and the professional 
consequences thereof were established in those proceedings, and 
Diviacchi had ample opportunity at that time to be heard by the 
board, the single justice, and this court.  See Diviacchi I, 475 
Mass. at 1018-1020.  Although Diviacchi continues to insist that 
the findings underlying his suspension are factually false and 
he disputes them at length, we consider them to be conclusively 
established.  We will not permit him to relitigate those 
findings. 
 
 
Having been disciplined for conduct evincing unfitness to 
practice, Diviacchi "therefore bears the burden of demonstrating 
that, during the period of suspension, he has 'redeemed himself 
and become "a person proper to be held out by the court to the 
public as trustworthy."'"  Matter of Leo, 484 Mass. at 1051, 
quoting Matter of Dawkins, 432 Mass. at 1010-1011.  That said, 
we do not require a petitioner for reinstatement to admit his or 
her wrongdoing and to repent of it in order to be reinstated.  
We recognized in Matter of Hiss, 368 Mass. at 457-458, that 
"[t]he continued assertion of innocence in the face of prior 
5 
 
 
 
conviction[4] does not, as might be argued, constitute conclusive 
proof of lack of the necessary moral character to merit 
reinstatement. . . . [A] convicted person may on sincere 
reasoning believe himself to be innocent.  We also take 
cognizance . . . that miscarriages of justice are possible."  
Accordingly, we do not "disqualify a petitioner for 
reinstatement solely because he continues to protest his 
innocence . . . .  Repentance or lack of repentance is evidence, 
like any other, to be considered in the evaluation of a 
petitioner's character and of the likely repercussions of his 
requested reinstatement."  Id. at 459.  In this case, despite 
his argument to the contrary, Diviacchi's refusal to acknowledge 
the "nature, effects, or implications of [his] misconduct" 
properly was considered by the hearing committee.  Matter of 
Zankowski, 487 Mass. 140, 153 (2021). 
 
 
In the end, Diviacchi failed to carry his heavy burden to 
establish that "he has redeemed himself and become 'a person 
proper to be held out by the court to the public as 
trustworthy.'"  Matter of Leo, 484 Mass. at 1051, quoting Matter 
of Dawkins, 432 Mass. at 1010-1011.  We need not belabor the 
evidence before the hearing committee.  Suffice it to say that 
after considering the misconduct underlying the suspension, 
Diviacchi's own testimony, character references, and other 
evidence of Diviacchi's activities since his suspension, the 
hearing committee found that nothing of consequence had changed 
since Diviacchi's suspension or since the denial of his first 
petition for reinstatement.  Before this court, Diviacchi makes 
virtually no effort to show that the single justice erred in 
determining that the hearing committee's findings were supported 
by substantial evidence, or that the hearing committee's 
conclusion, adopted by the board, and accepted by the single 
justice, that he is currently fit to practice law was error.  
Bare assertion is no substitute for evidence.5 
 
 
4 Diviacchi's suspension was not based on any criminal 
conviction, but on other wrongdoing established before the 
board.  The distinction is of no moment for present purposes. 
 
5 For example, Diviacchi does not challenge the hearing 
committee's decision, for reasons it fully explained, to give 
the letters he submitted as character references little or no 
weight; and he points to no evidence that the hearing committee 
erred in finding that his nonprofit charitable corporation 
serves as a platform for his own views rather than providing 
material help to other people. 
6 
 
 
 
 
Rather than focusing on the substantial evidence supporting 
the hearing committee's findings, Diviacchi complains about 
being made to prove his moral qualifications to a hearing 
committee that, in his view, is unqualified to decide this 
matter.  He made a similar claim in the underlying disciplinary 
proceedings.  See Diviacchi I, 475 Mass. at 1020 (noting 
"intemperate remarks disparaging the hearing committee's 
qualifications").  Nothing in Diviacchi's memorandum, however, 
demonstrates that either the hearing committee, the board or the 
single justice erred in finding him morally unqualified, nor 
does the evidence persuade us that he has led "a sufficiently 
exemplary life to inspire public confidence once again, in spite 
of his previous actions," notwithstanding their decisions.  
Matter of Prager, 422 Mass. 86, 92 (1996), quoting Matter of 
Hiss, 368 Mass. at 452. 
 
 
Diviacchi's remaining legal arguments are unavailing.  He 
argues that, although he was suspended for a fixed term, he is 
improperly being held to the same standard for reinstatement as 
an attorney who was disbarred or indefinitely suspended.  Both 
our rules and our case law, however, plainly apply the same 
standard to those who are disbarred, indefinitely suspended, or 
suspended for a term of longer than one year, for purposes or 
reinstatement, while treating those suspended for shorter terms 
differently.  S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (5).  See, e.g., Matter of 
Wong, 442 Mass. 1016, 1017 (2004) (applying same standard to 
attorney disciplined by term suspension); Matter of Waitz, 416 
Mass. 298, 304 (1993); Matter of Allen, 400 Mass. 417, 422 n.9 
(1987) (noting issue, but assuming same on petitioner who has 
been indefinitely suspended or disbarred).  We are unpersuaded 
that the rule is unjust merely because it draws a line at a one-
year suspension, as Diviacchi suggests. 
 
 
Diviacchi also argues that he unfairly is being denied 
reinstatement due to his protected speech critical of the legal 
system and of the bar discipline process.  Like any human 
institution, these systems are by no means perfect, and 
Diviacchi has the right to express his views, so long as he has 
a reasonable factual basis for his criticism.  See Matter of 
Cobb, 445 Mass. 452, 467-475 (2005).  The vituperative and 
hyperbolic manner in which he does so, however, need not be 
ignored.  "[A]ttorneys are under an implied 'obligation . . . to 
maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and 
judicial officers.  This obligation . . . includes abstaining 
out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct 
toward judges personally for their judicial acts."  Id. at 468, 
quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 355 (1871).  
7 
 
 
 
The hearing committee properly considered Diviacchi's open 
contempt for the legal system and the disciplinary system, and 
particulary his baseless accusation, made publicly and 
maintained on the Internet, that his suspension was based on 
"bigotry," merely because a committee member was absent for part 
of the proceedings.6  Indeed, that contempt remains evident in 
his memorandum before this court. 
 
 
In sum, the hearing committee's determination that 
Diviacchi lacks the moral qualifications required to practice 
law was well supported, and there has been no error of law or 
abuse of discretion in so determining. 
 
 
2.  Competency and learning in the law.  A petitioner 
seeking reinstatement also must demonstrate that he or she has 
the "competency and learning in law . . . required for admission 
to practice law in this Commonwealth."  Matter of Waitz, 416 
Mass. at 306, quoting S.J.C. Rule 4.01, § 18 (5).  The board 
determined that, although Diviacchi has the "raw intellectual 
firepower to maintain his learning in the law," he had not done 
so.  We agree.  By the time of the hearing, Diviacchi had 
completed a course in practicing with professionalism, but he 
had undertaken no formal continuing legal education in any 
substantive legal subject.7  It appears that he did engage in 
some informal efforts to learn about recent developments in the 
law, such as reviewing Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly and 
summarizing recent cases reported therein.  As the hearing 
committee found, however, these efforts at most evinced a 
"superficial familiarity" with some recent decisions.  
Diviacchi's efforts were on a par with those deemed insufficient 
in Matter of Dawkins, 432 Mass. 1009, 1011 (2000), and less than 
those deemed insufficient in Matter of Waitz, 416 Mass. at 306.  
We agree that Diviacchi did not establish the learning in the 
law required for admission to practice.8 
 
6 As the hearing committee noted, the board's rules permit 
an absent hearing officer to participate in deliberations as 
long as he or she has a copy of the transcript.  See § 3.7(c) of 
the Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers. 
 
7 Indeed, Diviacchi expressed disdain for continuing legal 
education, apparently regarding such courses as "schmooze 
sessions" rather than a valuable way to keep abreast of 
developments in the law. 
 
8 After his appeal was entered in this court, Diviacchi 
moved for leave to take the July 2022 bar examination to 
8 
 
 
 
 
 
3.  Effect of resumption of practice.  Finally, we agree 
with the hearing committee, the board, and the single justice 
that Diviacchi has not shown that his "resumption of the 
practice of law will not be detrimental to the integrity and 
standing of the bar, the administration of justice, or to the 
public interest."  S.J.C. Rule 4.01, § 18 (5).  "The act of 
reinstating an attorney involves what amounts to a certification 
to the public that the attorney is a person worthy of trust."  
Matter of Daniels, 442 Mass. 1037, 1038 (2004), citing 
Centracchio, petitioner, 345 Mass. 342, 348 (1963).  "[T]he 
primary factor for the court's consideration 'is the effect 
upon, and perception of, the public and the bar.'"  Matter of 
Daniels, supra, quoting Matter of Alter, 389 Mass. 153, 156 
(1983).  After hearing all the evidence, including Diviacchi's 
own testimony, and applying the correct legal standard, the 
hearing committee concluded that it could not recommend that he 
be reinstated.  That recommendation, adopted by the board, is 
entitled to substantial deference.  See Matter of Daniels, 
supra.  The hearing committee's reasoning bears repeating: 
 
"The public's respect for the attorney discipline system 
would be seriously eroded by reinstating an attorney who 
came before a reinstatement panel wholly unrepentant about 
the fact that he had ignored and then turned on a client by 
lying to a court in an effort to obtain from that client a 
fee that was not contemplated in the fee agreement.  It 
would find wholly unpersuasive the certification, implicit 
 
establish his competency, arguing that because he was previously 
admitted to the bar and has been suspended, he is ineligible to 
do so without a waiver of applicable rules.  A single justice of 
this court denied the motion, and Diviacchi did not appeal from 
that ruling.  This does not preclude Diviacchi from applying to 
our rules committee for leave to take a bar examination in 
support of a future petition for reinstatement.  See Matter of 
Swanson, 483 Mass. 1022, 1023 (2019) (rules committee has 
inherent power to waive rules where justice and equity require).  
Moreover, as we have concluded that Diviacchi lacks the moral 
qualifications to be reinstated at this time, we decline his 
invitation to reinstate him conditioned on passing the bar 
examination. 
 
Diviacchi has also filed a motion to expand the record to 
include evidence that he recently passed the bar examination in 
another State.  Such evidence was not before the hearing 
committee, and we do not consider it. 
9 
 
 
 
in the reinstatement process, that a reinstated attorney is 
worthy of being held out to the public as 
trustworthy. . . . 
 
"Likewise, the bar could hardly take the process of 
discipline and reinstatement seriously if we recommended 
reinstatement on this record.  The petitioner's vengeful 
and unrepentant attitude towards his client, his refusal to 
acknowledge wrongdoing, his insincere 'acceptance' of 
responsibility by saying that his only mistake was to 
accept engagement by a client who was not worthy of him, 
and his superior and dismissive attitude toward continuing 
legal education are the antithesis of the model for 
reinstatement. 
 
"Finally, the petitioner's reinstatement would run counter 
to the established precedent discussed above and would run 
counter to the fair and even-handed administration of 
justice.  In this regard, we bear in mind that nothing of 
substance has changed since the petitioner's first 
reinstatement petition was denied; a recommendation to the 
contrary here would be inconsistent and indefensible." 
 
The board's recommendation that Diviacchi not be reinstated, and 
the single justice's decision denying reinstatement, are amply 
supported by the record.  Giving due deference to the board's 
recommendation, we conclude that the single justice did not err 
or abuse his discretion in denying reinstatement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
The case was submitted on the record, accompanied by a 
memorandum of law. 
 
Valeriano Diviacchi, pro se.