Title: Parker v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC08-1385 
____________ 
 
J. B. PARKER,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[December 1, 2011] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
J. B. Parker was convicted and sentenced to death for the 1982 murder of 
Frances Slater.  This Court affirmed Parker‟s convictions and sentence of death on 
direct appeal.  Parker v. State (Parker I), 476 So. 2d 134, 140 (Fla. 1985).  In 1998, 
Parker was granted a new penalty phase due to the State‟s suppression of 
exculpatory evidence that suggested a codefendant, and not Parker, shot the victim.  
State v. Parker (Parker V), 721 So. 2d 1147, 1147, 1149-50 (Fla. 1998).  After the 
new penalty-phase proceeding, Parker was again sentenced to death, and this Court 
affirmed his sentence on direct appeal.  Parker v. State (Parker VI), 873 So. 2d 
270, 275 (Fla. 2004).  In the current proceeding, Parker filed a motion for 
 
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postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, raising 
issues concerning the new penalty phase.  The postconviction court denied 
Parker‟s motion, and Parker has appealed that denial to this Court.  Because the 
order concerns postconviction relief from a sentence of death, this Court has 
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
 
Parker raises claims that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance in the 
penalty phase, that the State withheld favorable information, that the State made a 
false statement during trial, and that the postconviction court erred during the 
evidentiary hearing on his postconviction motion.  We conclude that Parker‟s 
counsel was deficient for stipulating to the admissibility of a statement Parker 
made to law enforcement on May 7, 1982.  We also conclude that the State 
withheld favorable information, specifically the complete terms of a cooperation 
agreement with codefendant Terry Johnson.  However, because Parker has failed to 
demonstrate prejudice on these claims and his remaining claims are without merit, 
we affirm the postconviction court‟s denial of relief. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
J. B. Parker is one of four defendants convicted of the murder of eighteen-
year-old Francis Slater and is one of the three defendants sentenced to death for the 
murder.  Parker‟s case has had a long procedural history.  A brief summary of the 
 
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facts as presented at Parker‟s first trial are set forth in Parker V, 721 So. 2d at 
1148, as follows: 
Parker was convicted of kidnaping, robbery with a firearm, and 
first-degree murder.  Briefly, the testimony at trial reflected the 
following.  In 1982, Parker and three other defendants, John Earl 
Bush, Alphonso Cave, and Terry Wayne Johnson, robbed a 
convenience store.  Money was taken from the store and the female 
store clerk (the victim) was also taken from the store and placed in 
Bush‟s car.  The victim was later found dead; she had been shot and 
stabbed.  Death was caused by a gunshot wound to the back of the 
head.  Bush‟s girlfriend [Georgeann Williams] testified that Parker 
had admitted to her that he shot the victim and that Bush had stabbed 
her.  The girlfriend‟s mother and sister testified that she told them of 
Parker‟s confession.  Parker‟s pre-trial statements to police regarding 
the crime were also introduced and Parker also testified at trial.  In 
those statements, he implicated himself in the crimes but denied being 
the shooter. 
After the trial, Parker was sentenced to death, following an eight-to-four jury 
recommendation of death.  Parker I, 476 So. 2d at 136.  This Court affirmed 
Parker‟s convictions and sentence on direct appeal.  Id. at 140. 
 
Two of Parker‟s codefendants, John Bush and Alphonso Cave, were 
convicted of first-degree murder in separate trials and sentenced to death.  Bush v. 
State, 461 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 1984); Cave v. State, 727 So. 2d 227, 228 (Fla. 1998).  
The other participant, Terry Johnson, was convicted of kidnapping and felony 
murder and sentenced to life in prison.  Johnson v. State, 484 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 1986).  Bush was executed in 1996.  Cave remains on death row. 
 
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Parker‟s first motion for postconviction relief was denied, and the denial was 
affirmed by this Court.  Parker v. State (Parker II), 542 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 1989).  
This Court also denied Parker‟s habeas corpus petition.  Parker v. Dugger (Parker 
III), 550 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1989).  Parker‟s federal habeas corpus petition was also 
denied.  Parker v. Singletary (Parker IV), 974 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1992). 
The Newly Discovered Evidence Leading to a New Penalty-Phase Proceeding 
After discovering evidence that had been withheld by the State, Parker filed 
a successive motion for postconviction relief on the basis of newly discovered 
evidence and a Brady1 violation.  Parker V, 721 So. 2d at 1149.  The circuit court 
found that the State had withheld evidence favorable to Parker, which indicated 
that codefendant Bush stabbed the victim and that codefendant Cave shot her. 
This favorable information stemmed from a resentencing proceeding 
involving codefendant Cave.  In that proceeding, the State introduced testimony 
from Michael Bryant, who testified that he shared a cell with Cave and overheard a 
conversation between Bush and Cave suggesting that Bush stabbed the victim and 
that Cave shot her.  Id. at 1149.  Later, Cave told Bryant that if he told anyone, he 
would see that Bryant was “taken care of.”  Cave also beat Bryant, sending him to 
the hospital.  Id.  Bryant reported the assault to Lieutenant Art Jackson and told 
him of the conversation that he had overheard.  Jackson also testified at Cave‟s 
                                         
 
1.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 
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resentencing and corroborated Bryant‟s testimony.  See id.  None of this 
information had been disclosed to Parker.  Id. at 1149. 
After an evidentiary hearing in Parker‟s case, the trial court determined that 
a new penalty-phase proceeding was warranted but that a new guilt-phase 
proceeding was not.  Id.  This Court agreed.  Id. at 1147.  In upholding the trial 
court‟s grant of a new penalty phase, this Court reasoned: 
This evidence would have assisted in impeaching the testimony of 
Bush‟s girlfriend, which was the sole evidence to show that Parker 
was the shooter.  Further, Parker would have been able to use this 
evidence to show that the State introduced this evidence in Cave‟s 
resentencing to prove that Cave, rather than Parker, was the shooter.  
Under these circumstances, we must agree with the trial judge‟s 
conclusion that confidence in the jury‟s recommendation of death has 
been undermined, especially given that the jury recommendation for 
death in Parker‟s case was eight-to-four and that codefendant Johnson, 
who was not identified as the shooter by the State, received a life 
sentence even though he participated in the crime. 
Id. at 1151 (emphasis added). 
The New Penalty-Phase Proceeding 
At Parker‟s new penalty-phase proceeding, the following evidence was 
introduced by the State, which relied primarily on the testimony of codefendant 
Johnson and a statement made by Parker to Detective David Powers on May 7, 
1982: 
[T]he State presented witnesses to establish the facts of the original 
crime and Parker‟s culpability, including codefendant Johnson, who 
recounted the events leading to Slater‟s murder. 
 
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Johnson testified that the first time the defendants went to the 
convenience store, all four went in to buy potato chips and that when 
they returned to the store later that evening, Parker went into the store 
with Cave and Bush to commit the robbery.  Johnson also testified 
that when they arrived at the location where Slater was killed, Parker 
took the gun from Cave.  Johnson stated that he heard a shot but did 
not know who shot Slater, that after the murder Parker told Bush to 
get rid of the knife, and that the four later split the money taken from 
the store. 
The State also introduced a statement made by Parker on May 
7, 1982, when he went with Detective David Powers to the area where 
the victim was killed.  During this time, Parker stated that Bush both 
stabbed and shot the victim, indicated where Bush had thrown the 
knife after the murder, and recounted that the four defendants 
discussed killing a sheriff‟s deputy, Timothy Bargo, who stopped the 
car in which they were riding on the night of the murder. 
Parker VI, 873 So. 2d at 275.  The State also presented testimony from Georgeann 
Williams, who testified that she was dating codefendant Bush at the time of the 
crime and visited him when he was in jail after being arrested.  After she spoke 
with Bush about what happened during the crime, she also visited Parker, whose 
cell was nearby.  Parker told Williams that Bush stabbed the victim and that Parker 
shot her.  Parker told Williams that it would be her word against his if she repeated 
what he told her.  He also told Williams that Bush had a record and that it would be 
blamed on Bush. 
 
Parker presented the following evidence, including testimony from Richard 
Barlow, the prosecutor during Cave‟s resentencing: 
Parker presented several witnesses in mitigation.  Of 
significance for the purposes of Parker‟s appeal is the testimony of 
Richard Barlow, who was the prosecutor during Cave‟s 1993 penalty 
 
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phase.  Barlow stated that he relied on the testimony of Michael 
Bryant, who was in the same cell as Cave at the Martin County [J]ail, 
to establish that Cave was a principal in Slater‟s murder.  Barlow 
testified that Bryant went to Arthur Jackson, who was running the jail 
at the time, and told Jackson that he overheard a conversation between 
Cave and Bush, in which Cave admitted that he “popped a cap” in the 
back of Slater‟s head. 
In addition, portions of Michael Bryant‟s testimony given 
during Cave‟s 1993 penalty phase were read into the record.  Bryant 
testified about the conversation he overheard between Cave and Bush: 
 
Well what I overheard, Bush was a couple of cells down 
and what it was, you know, they started talking about it 
and Bush told Cave, says, we wouldn‟t never be in here if 
you didn‟t try to burn her with a cigarette butt.  He says, 
well, you stabbed her in the stomach and Bush told Cave, 
he says, well, you popped a cap in the back of her head. 
Id. at 276.   
 
The jury returned a verdict recommending a sentence of death by a vote of 
eleven to one.  Id. at 276.  The trial court found five aggravating factors,2 one 
statutory mitigator (age of nineteen years old at the time of the crime), which was 
given very little weight, and thirteen nonstatutory mitigators.3  Among the 
                                         
 
2.  The trial court found: (1) the capital felony was committed while the 
defendant was engaged in the commission of a kidnapping; (2) the capital felony 
was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest; (3) the 
capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain; (4) the crime was especially 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and (5) the crime was committed in a cold, 
calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal 
justification (CCP). 
 
3.  The trial court found the following nonstatutory mitigators: (1) the 
defendant cooperated with law enforcement (moderate weight); (2) the defendant 
had an abused or deprived childhood, experienced childhood hunger, was raised in 
 
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nonstatutory mitigators, the court assigned moderate weight to Parker‟s 
cooperation with law enforcement and the fact that Parker left school to help his 
family.  The remaining nonstatutory mitigation was given little or very little 
weight.  Id.  The trial court sentenced Parker to death.  Id. at 277. 
On appeal, Parker raised numerous claims,4 including that the trial court 
erred in denying the motion to suppress his May 7, 1982, statement.  During the 
                                                                                                                                   
poverty, was raised without a father figure, and was left unsupervised at home 
(little weight); (3) the defendant is psychologically classified as a follower (very 
little weight); (4) the defendant‟s behavior in prison has been good for the most 
part (very little weight); (5) the defendant does well in a structured environment 
such as prison (very little weight); (6) the defendant exhibited appropriate behavior 
during his trials (very little weight); (7) the defendant developed a relationship 
with Audrey Rivers, a woman who visited him somewhat regularly (very little 
weight); (8) the defendant was under the influence of alcohol on the night of the 
crime (very little weight); (9) the defendant performed well as a public school 
athlete (little weight); (10) the defendant is a slow learner and was teased as a child 
(little weight); (11) the defendant left school to help his family, was not a violent 
or cruel child, was a kind and helpful child, and protected his family (moderate 
weight); (12) the defendant treated his teachers with respect and was not an 
aggressive child (little weight); and (13) the lapse of time between the defendant‟s 
first trial and the current penalty phase was caused by the State‟s discovery 
violation (very little weight). 
 
4.  Parker raised the following claims: (1) the trial court erred in denying the 
motion to suppress his May 7, 1982, statement; (2) the trial court erroneously 
excluded certain defense evidence; (3) the trial court erred in failing to grant a 
motion for mistrial based on the prosecutor‟s improper comment during closing 
argument; (4) the trial court‟s misstatement to the venire panel denied Parker the 
right to a fair trial; (5) the trial court erred in finding HAC; (6) the trial court erred 
in finding CCP; (7) the trial court erred in finding the avoid arrest aggravator; (8) 
the trial court erred in finding the pecuniary gain aggravator; (9) the trial court 
failed to assign the proper weight to the mitigating factors established, and Parker‟s 
death sentence was disproportionate; (10) the murder in the course of a felony 
 
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pendency of the direct appeal, this Court relinquished jurisdiction to the trial court 
to conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding the motion to suppress Parker‟s May 7 
statement.  Id. at 278.  The trial court found that the May 7 statement was properly 
admitted.  Id. at 279.  This Court agreed and affirmed Parker‟s sentence of death.  
Id. 
The Present Rule 3.851 Motion for Postconviction Relief 
Parker raised numerous claims in the instant motion for postconviction 
relief.  The postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing on several of the 
claims.5  At the evidentiary hearing, the following witnesses testified:  Investigator 
                                                                                                                                   
aggravator was unconstitutional; (11) the trial court erred in allowing the State to 
rehabilitate a witness with statements of an unidentified person; (12) the State‟s 
use of inconsistent “triggerman” theories was a violation of Parker‟s due process 
rights; (13) the trial judge lacked the authority to preside over the penalty-phase 
proceeding; (14) Florida‟s death penalty statute was unconstitutional under 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 
(2002); (15) the delay between Parker‟s indictment and the new penalty phase 
violated the Eighth Amendment; and (16) the trial court erred in denying Parker‟s 
request for a special jury instruction on circumstantial evidence.  Parker VI, 873 
So. 2d at 277 n.4. 
 
5.  An evidentiary hearing was held on the following claims: (1) trial counsel 
was ineffective for (a) failing to procure Bryant as a witness; (b) failing to prepare 
to cross-examine and impeach Johnson; (c) failing to properly investigate and 
procure mitigation witnesses, attack Parker‟s prior convictions, and retain a mental 
health expert; (d) failing to move for a continuance to produce Bryant; (e) failing 
to prevent the introduction into the resentencing trial the information that Parker 
had been sentenced to death and had spent time on death row; (f) failing to 
properly impeach Williams; (g) failing to object to Parker being shackled during 
trial; (h) improperly waiving Parker‟s right to testify; and (2) the State violated 
Brady by failing to disclose the terms of Johnson‟s witness agreement and violated 
 
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Sue Gent; Richard Barlow (the prosecutor in codefendant Cave‟s 1993 
resentencing proceeding); David Lamos (Parker‟s defense counsel during his 
resentencing proceeding); Terry Wayne Johnson (a codefendant who testified in 
Parker‟s resentencing proceeding); and attorney expert Kevin Anderson (who was 
called to testify as to trial counsel‟s conduct during the resentencing proceeding). 
 
Parker raises seven claims for this Court‟s review: (1) trial counsel was 
ineffective for stipulating to the use of inadmissible evidence at the hearing on the 
motion to suppress Parker‟s May 7, 1982, statement; (2) trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to properly impeach Georgeann Williams; (3) trial counsel 
was ineffective for failing to present testimony from Richard Barlow that he 
                                                                                                                                   
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), by allowing Johnson to falsely deny 
his signature on his “recantation” affidavit. 
 
The following claims were summarily denied without an evidentiary 
hearing: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for (a) improperly stipulating to the use of 
inadmissible evidence at the hearing on the motion to suppress Parker‟s May 7, 
1982, statement, and failing to argue that this second statement to the police was 
involuntary; (b) failing to preserve Parker‟s speedy trial rights; (c) failing to depose 
and investigate the State‟s expert witness; (d) failing to apply and argue the 
applicable law concerning the admission of mitigation witness affidavits; (e) 
failing to question Richard Barlow, the former prosecutor on Cave‟s case, on 
redirect regarding Barlow‟s professional considerations in evaluating Bryant‟s 
statements; (f) failing to properly prepare for cross-examination and impeachment 
of Art Jackson, a Martin County Jail officer, concerning the cell locations of the 
codefendants; (g) failing to preserve Parker‟s speedy trial rights for appeal; (h) 
failing to preserve for appeal the issue of the sentencing order being adopted 
completely from the State‟s sentencing memorandum; (i) failing to determine 
whether Parker is mentally retarded; (j) failing to argue that Parker‟s May 7, 1982, 
confession was coerced; (2) Parker‟s death sentence is unconstitutional; and (3) the 
trial court and prosecutor misled the jury by minimizing the jury‟s role in 
sentencing. 
 
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believed the testimony of Michael Bryant; (4) trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to impeach Terry Wayne Johnson based upon the agreement he struck with 
the State to testify consistent with his grand jury testimony; (5) counsel‟s 
deficiencies, when viewed cumulatively, deprived Parker of a fair resentencing 
proceeding; (6) the postconviction court erred in not granting a new penalty phase 
based upon a Brady violation (the prosecution‟s failure to disclose the complete 
terms of the cooperation agreement, misrepresentation of the terms of that 
agreement, or both); and (7) the postconviction court erred in sustaining the State‟s 
objection to Parker‟s attempt to present expert testimony of attorney 
ineffectiveness. 
ANALYSIS 
 
In analyzing Parker‟s claim, we first address his claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  Then, we discuss his claims concerning the cooperation 
agreement with codefendant Johnson.  Finally, we discuss Parker‟s claim that the 
postconviction court erred during the evidentiary hearing. 
I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims 
Following the United States Supreme Court‟s decision in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), this Court has held that for ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two requirements must be satisfied:  
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 
lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
 
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competent performance under prevailing professional standards.  
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.  A court 
considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel need not make a 
specific ruling on the performance component of the test when it is 
clear that the prejudice component is not satisfied. 
Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So. 3d 535, 546 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Maxwell v. 
Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986)). 
 “Penalty phase prejudice under the Strickland standard is measured by 
whether the error of trial counsel undermines this Court‟s confidence in the 
sentence of death when viewed in the context of the penalty phase evidence and 
the mitigators and aggravators found by the trial court.”  Hurst v. State, 18 So. 3d 
975, 1013 (Fla. 2009).  That standard does not “require a defendant to show „that 
counsel‟s deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome‟ of his 
penalty proceeding, but rather that he establish „a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in [that] outcome.‟ ”  Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 
455-56 (2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94). 
Summary Denial Standard 
 
Rule 3.851 provides certain pleading requirements for initial and successive 
postconviction motions.  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(e)(1)-(2).  For example, the motion 
must state the nature of the relief sought, Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(e)(1)(C), and must 
include “a detailed allegation of the factual basis for any claim for which an 
 
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evidentiary hearing is sought.”  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(e)(1)(D).  An evidentiary 
hearing should be held “whenever the movant makes a facially sufficient claim that 
requires a factual determination.”  Gore v. State, 24 So. 3d 1, 11 (Fla. 2009) 
(quoting Owen v. State, 986 So. 2d 534, 543 (Fla. 2008)).  However, 
“[p]ostconviction claims may be summarily denied when they are legally 
insufficient, should have been brought on direct appeal, or are positively refuted by 
the record.”  Id. (quoting Owen, 986 So. 2d at 543). 
Standard of Review When Evidentiary Hearing Is Granted 
Both prongs of the Strickland test present mixed questions of law and fact.  
Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 771 (Fla. 2004).  “In reviewing a trial court‟s 
ruling after an evidentiary hearing on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
this Court defers to the factual findings of the trial court to the extent that they are 
supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviews de novo the application 
of the law to those facts.”  Mungin v. State, 932 So. 2d 986, 998 (Fla. 2006). 
A.  Stipulating to Evidence for the Motion to Suppress  
Parker’s May 7, 1982, Statement 
In this claim, Parker contends that trial counsel was ineffective for 
stipulating to the evidence used to decide whether his May 7, 1982, statement was 
admissible.  Parker‟s May 7 statement was admitted during the resentencing 
proceeding through the testimony of Detective Powers.  Because Parker had 
invoked his right to counsel prior to making the May 7 statement, the admissibility 
 
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of that statement under United States Supreme Court precedent turns on whether 
Parker initiated the May 7 contact with law enforcement.  See Edwards v. Arizona, 
451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) (holding that under the Fifth Amendment, once an 
accused person in custody has expressed his or her desire “to deal with the police 
only through counsel, [that person] is not subject to further interrogation by the 
authorities until counsel has been made available . . . unless the accused himself 
initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police”). 
The stipulated evidence included hearsay statements made by Detective 
Powers, stating that he was told Parker had contacted the police department and 
wished to cooperate.  By stipulating to this evidence, Parker asserts, trial counsel 
failed to preserve his right to object to the admissibility of the evidence and to 
appeal an adverse ruling on it.  Parker contends that because the only evidence that 
he initiated the May 7 contact with law enforcement would have been inadmissible 
absent trial counsel‟s stipulation, this statement would have been suppressed.  
In analyzing this claim, we begin by setting forth the relevant facts and 
procedural history.  After being arrested, Parker made two statements to the police, 
the second of which is at issue in this claim.  The first statement was on May 5, 
1982, when Parker was apprehended by the police and brought to the station for 
questioning—that statement is not the subject of this claim.  On appeal from the 
denial of Parker‟s federal habeas petition, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that 
 
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Parker‟s May 5 statement was taken in violation of Parker‟s Fifth Amendment 
right to counsel.  Parker IV, 974 F.2d at 1574.  The State did not challenge the 
Eleventh Circuit‟s ruling and did not seek to introduce the May 5 statement during 
the new penalty phase.  Parker VI, 873 So. 2d at 277-78. 
The second statement, which is the focus of this claim, took place on May 7, 
1982, when Parker accompanied Detective Powers on a tour of the crime scene, 
starting at the convenience store.  Prior to the resentencing proceeding, Parker filed 
a motion to suppress that focused primarily on the May 7 statement.  The State 
filed a motion to quash, arguing that Parker was barred by the law of the case from 
attempting to raise the issue.  The trial court granted the State‟s motion to quash.  
At resentencing, Detective Powers testified as to the events of May 7. 
On direct appeal, Parker argued that the trial court should have granted an 
evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress.  After oral argument, this Court 
relinquished jurisdiction to the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing.  Parker 
v. State, No. SC01-172, order at 1 (Fla. Sup. Ct. Oct. 17, 2002).  The attorney who 
represented Parker during the resentencing proceeding also represented him on 
appeal to this Court and in the relinquishment proceeding. 
Upon relinquishment, the parties filed a stipulation to establish the 
evidentiary record for the motion to suppress.  In lieu of an evidentiary hearing, the 
parties agreed that eighteen exhibits would “constitute the evidentiary record for 
 
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purposes of disposing of the Defendant‟s Motion to Suppress filed October 1, 
1999, and in lieu of further testimony.”  The stipulation further provided that the 
exhibits would “be admissible in evidence for purposes of [the] court‟s 
determination of that motion.” 
Among other things, the stipulated record included Detective Powers‟ 1982 
suppression hearing testimony, 1982 deposition, and 2002 affidavit.  Detective 
Powers stated during his 1982 deposition: “I don‟t recall who it was that had told 
me that Parker had contacted someone at the Sheriff‟s Department and indicated 
that he wished to cooperate in the investigation.”  However, in the 1982 
suppression hearing after his deposition, Powers testified: “I had been directed 
down to the jail by Captain Crowder, my supervisor, who had advised that Mr. 
Parker had wished to speak with investigators from our department and that he 
wished to cooperate with us.”  Then, in a 2002 affidavit, Powers stated differently: 
I do not recall who it was that had told me that Parker had contacted 
someone at the Sheriff‟s department and indicated that he wished to 
cooperate in the investigation. . . .  I previously testified at the 1982 
motion to suppress I thought that Captain Crowder was that person.  
However, Captain Robert Crowder . . . has advised me that he was not 
that person. . . .   
. . .  Because I now know that Captain Crowder did not give me 
that command, I now believe that Sheriff Holt did. 
 
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However, Sheriff Holt denied having any further contact with Parker after May 5.6  
Powers testified that Parker was “totally cooperative” during the May 7 interview 
and that Parker signed a waiver of rights form indicating that he wished to show 
Powers where the knife was located. 
 
The stipulated record also contained Parker‟s specific denials of initiating 
the May 7 contact.  Additionally, there was evidence that Parker refused to take 
police to find the knife between the May 5 and May 7 interviews. 
After considering the stipulated record, the trial court entered an order 
denying the motion to suppress, finding among other things that Parker initiated 
contact with law enforcement on May 7.  In support of this finding, the trial court 
stated: “On May 7, 1982, Detective Lieutenant David Powers, also of the Martin 
County Sheriff‟s Department, received a call from Sheriff Holt who advised him 
that Parker had now contacted someone at the Sheriff‟s Department and indicated 
that he wished to speak with the detectives and cooperate with the investigation.”  
State v. Parker, No. 82-912CF, order at 4-5 (Fla. 5th Cir. Ct. Feb. 12, 2003). 
After the case returned to this Court, counsel asserted that the trial court‟s 
denial of Parker‟s motion to suppress was in error.  This Court recognized that “the 
admissibility of Parker‟s [May 7] statements to Powers . . . turns on whether Parker 
                                         
 
6.  Sheriff Holt is now deceased. 
 
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initiated the communication with Powers and, if so, whether Parker‟s waiver of 
rights was valid.”  Parker VI, 873 So. 2d at 280.  The Court noted:  
The stipulated record before the trial court contained conflicting 
evidence on whether Parker initiated the May 7 interview with 
Detective Powers.  Parker stated through an affidavit that he did not 
initiate contact with the sheriff‟s office.  Detective Powers stated, to 
the contrary, that he was directed by the sheriff‟s office to speak to 
Parker pursuant to Parker‟s request. 
Id.   
After reviewing the stipulated record, this Court held that competent, 
substantial evidence supported the trial court‟s finding that Parker initiated the 
May 7 contact.  Id. at 279.  This Court rejected the argument by Parker‟s counsel 
that Detective Powers‟ testimony in the stipulated record could not be considered 
competent to establish that Parker initiated the May 7 interview because it was 
hearsay.  Id. at 280-81.  The Court rejected this argument because Parker had 
previously stipulated to the admissibility of the evidence: 
Parker stipulated to the admissibility of this evidence and cannot now 
assert that the trial court was precluded from considering Powers‟ 
testimony in addressing the motion to suppress.  See Laws v. State, 
356 So. 2d 7, 8-9 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (“[T]he general rule is that 
otherwise inadmissible evidence, received without objection, may 
properly be considered in determining the facts in issue.”). 
Id. at 281.  The Court also noted other facts evidencing that Parker was generally 
eager to communicate with the police regarding the murder.  See id.  The Court 
further concluded that under the totality of the circumstances, Parker‟s waiver of 
 
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rights was knowing and intelligent.  Id.  Thus, the Court affirmed the trial court‟s 
order denying Parker‟s motion to suppress. 
We now turn to the consideration of Parker‟s ineffectiveness claim based on 
the stipulation to the admissibility of Detective Powers‟ statements, a claim that the 
postconviction court summarily denied.7  The State asserts that this claim is 
procedurally barred, contending that Parker cannot revisit an issue already covered 
on direct appeal by arguing ineffectiveness of counsel.  We disagree.  This Court 
has explained the distinction between claims that are cognizable on direct appeal 
and claims that are cognizable in postconviction: 
Whereas the main question on direct appeal is whether the trial court 
erred, the main question in a Strickland claim is whether trial counsel 
was ineffective.  Both claims may arise from the same underlying 
facts, but the claims themselves are distinct and—of necessity—have 
different remedies: A claim of trial court error generally can be raised 
on direct appeal but not in a rule 3.850 motion, and a claim of 
ineffectiveness generally can be raised in a rule 3.850 motion but not 
on direct appeal. 
Bruno v. State, 807 So. 2d 55, 63 (Fla. 2001) (footnotes omitted).  In this case, the 
claim raised on direct appeal was that competent, substantial evidence did not 
support a finding that Parker initiated contact because the evidence supporting such 
a finding was hearsay.  Parker VI, 873 So. 2d at 280-81.  This is distinct from the 
                                         
 
7.  Although the postconviction court summarily denied this claim, Parker 
does not argue on appeal that the postconviction court should have granted an 
evidentiary hearing.  Rather, Parker focuses on the merits of the claim. 
 
- 20 - 
claim raised here—that counsel was ineffective for stipulating to the admissibility 
of the evidence.  That stipulation was the basis for this Court rejecting the claim 
raised on direct appeal.  We conclude that Parker is not attempting to relitigate the 
claim raised on direct appeal and, thus, the instant claim is not procedurally barred. 
Turning to the merits of Parker‟s ineffectiveness claim, we first address 
whether Detective Powers‟ statements in the stipulated record would have been 
admissible in a suppression hearing absent the stipulation.  If the evidence would 
have been admissible, counsel cannot be deficient for stipulating to it.  Further, 
Parker would be unable to demonstrate prejudice. 
Detective Powers‟ statements in the stipulated record regarding whether 
Parker initiated contact are hearsay.  See § 90.801(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2010) 
(“ „Hearsay‟ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at 
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”).  
These statements were admitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted—that 
Parker initiated the May 7 interview.  Further, these statements were made by 
someone other than the declarant, Powers.  Moreover, in the most recent affidavit, 
Powers stated that he did not recall who it was that had told him that Parker had 
contacted the Sheriff‟s office.  None of the statements made by Powers falls under 
a statutory exception to hearsay, and the language of the evidence code regarding 
 
- 21 - 
hearsay encompasses hearings as well as trials.  The State contends, however, that 
hearsay is admissible in suppression hearings. 
We reject the adoption of a broad rule that hearsay is always admissible in 
suppression hearings.  The State cites Lara v. State, 464 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1985), 
and State v. Cortez, 705 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), in support of its 
contention that hearsay is admissible in pretrial hearings, including suppression 
hearings.  We disagree with the State‟s broad interpretation of Lara. 
In Lara, this Court did not hold that hearsay evidence is always admissible at 
suppression hearings.  The issue in Lara concerned whether consent to a 
warrantless search could be established by the admission of hearsay evidence in a 
suppression hearing.  464 So. 2d at 1175, 1177.  In rejecting the defendant‟s claim 
that the motion to suppress should have been granted, the Court noted that hearsay 
can provide the basis for issuance of a search warrant as well as the basis for an 
officer to act without a warrant.  Thus, the Court reasoned, hearsay is admissible to 
establish consent to a warrantless search: 
[W]e find that the hearsay evidence establishing Rizo‟s consent was 
properly admitted at the suppression hearing, even though Rizo was 
unavailable for cross-examination.  This Court has previously held 
that an affidavit for a search warrant may be based on hearsay 
information.  State v. Wolff, 310 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1975) (citing Jones 
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), overruled on other grounds, 
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980)).  See also Blair v. 
State, 406 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1981).  In addition, we note that the 
United States Supreme Court in Jones found that “an officer may act 
upon probable cause without a warrant when the only incriminating 
 
- 22 - 
evidence in his possession is hearsay . . . .”  362 U.S. at 270.  We find 
no error in the admission of the hearsay evidence in this cause. 
Lara, 464 So. 2d at 1177; see also State v. Cortez, 705 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 3d DCA 
1998) (holding that hearsay is admissible in an evidentiary hearing on a motion to 
suppress evidence (citing Lara)). 
The hearsay at issue in the instant case is different because it does not 
involve evidence supporting a search or probable cause.  Rather, the evidence 
concerns whether Parker, after having invoked his right to counsel on May 5, 
initiated contact with law enforcement on May 7.  We conclude that the hearsay at 
issue in this case, absent the stipulation, would not have been admissible. 
We note that the failure to establish that Parker reinitiated contact with law 
enforcement on May 7 after having invoked his right to counsel on May 5 would 
not be a mere technical omission.  Approaching Parker after he had asserted his 
right to counsel in the May 5 interview, absent Parker having been provided 
counsel or having initiated the May 7 contact, would be in violation of Parker‟s 
constitutional right against self-incrimination and right to counsel.  After an 
individual has clearly asserted his right to counsel, all interrogation is required to 
cease until he has been provided counsel.  Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485.  As stated by 
the United States Supreme Court, “it is inconsistent with Miranda[8] and its 
                                         
 
8.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
- 23 - 
progeny for the authorities, at their instance, to reinterrogate an accused in custody 
if he has clearly asserted his right to counsel.”  Id.  The requirement that the 
defendant must have reinitiated contact is to protect against the inherently 
compelling pressures of custodial interrogation.  The United States Supreme Court 
has explained: 
[T]he prophylactic protections that the Miranda warnings provide to 
counteract the “inherently compelling pressures” of custodial 
interrogation and to “permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege 
against self-incrimination,” 384 U.S., at 467, are implemented by the 
application of the Edwards corollary that if a suspect believes that he 
is not capable of undergoing such questioning without advice of 
counsel, then it is presumed that any subsequent waiver that has come 
at the authorities‟ behest, and not at the suspect‟s own instigation, is 
itself the product of the  “inherently compelling pressures” and not the 
purely voluntary choice of the suspect. 
Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 (1988). 
 
  We conclude that trial counsel was deficient for stipulating to the 
admissibility of Detective Powers‟ hearsay statements.  In stipulating to the 
admissibility of these statements, counsel appears to have assumed that the trial 
court could not rely on hearsay to support a finding that Parker initiated the May 7 
contact, even though the stipulation provided that the evidence “shall be admissible 
in evidence for purposes of [the] court‟s determination of that motion.”  Notably, 
no one argues that Parker‟s counsel had a strategic reason for stipulating to the 
admissibility of Detective Powers‟ hearsay statements.  We conclude that 
stipulating to otherwise inadmissible evidence and waiving Parker‟s ability to 
 
- 24 - 
object to the same constituted deficient performance in this case, especially since 
the hearsay evidence was the only direct evidence regarding whether Parker 
initiated the May 7 interview.  Because any analysis of prejudice must be done on 
a cumulative basis, we will discuss prejudice after our analysis of the remaining 
claims.  
B.  Impeaching and Cross-Examining Georgeann Williams 
In this claim, Parker asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to competently cross-examine and impeach Williams as to her criminal history.  
After holding an evidentiary hearing on this claim, the postconviction court denied 
the claim, finding that Parker had failed to demonstrate deficient performance or 
prejudice.  The postconviction court‟s conclusion is supported by competent, 
substantial evidence. 
Parker contends that trial counsel was unprepared to confront Williams with 
records documenting her prior convictions.  Parker asserts that counsel did not 
have those records ready to use at the resentencing proceeding because of an 
inadequate investigation.  However, attorney Kevin Anderson testified at the 
evidentiary hearing that he found multiple certified copies of convictions in 
counsel‟s files involving false statements or dishonesty, which were ready to be 
used for impeachment.  Further, a review of the files introduced into evidence at 
the evidentiary hearing reveals that counsel had certified copies of many of 
 
- 25 - 
Williams‟s convictions.  Although the files, as introduced into evidence, did not 
contain copies of some of the convictions Parker asserts should have been 
obtained, trial counsel testified at the hearing that two or three boxes of files were 
destroyed in a hurricane. 
In addition to certified copies of convictions, the files revealed that trial 
counsel had hired an investigator to conduct a background investigation of 
Williams, which the investigator had conducted and provided to counsel.  Counsel 
had copies of numerous arrest affidavits, traffic citations, and affidavits of 
violations of probation.  He also had a copy of the Florida Department of Law 
Enforcement arrest report for Williams.  In sum, the evidence demonstrates that 
counsel had prepared to cross-examine and impeach Williams and had performed 
an adequate investigation. 
Parker next asserts that counsel was ineffective in cross-examining and 
impeaching Williams as to her criminal history.  However, counsel questioned 
Williams at length on this subject.  On direct, the State elicited that Williams had 
been convicted of petit theft “about four” times and had been convicted for driving 
with a suspended license.  On cross-examination, trial counsel then questioned 
Williams concerning an arrest for a 1982 petit theft for which she was placed on 
probation.  He also elicited that Williams had lied to the police and gave them her 
sister‟s name in 1982 when she was arrested for driving with a suspended license.  
 
- 26 - 
Further, at the time of the resentencing proceeding, she was on felony probation for 
driving while her license was suspended.  The charge was a felony because she had 
been convicted of at least three offenses for driving with a suspended license.  She 
was originally sentenced to thirty days in jail, but her sentence was reduced to 
probation.  She was also arrested in 1999 for another felony offense of driving with 
a suspended license.  Trial counsel also questioned Williams concerning letters she 
had written in 1996 stating that she did not know who was the shooter.  During 
cross-examination, Williams stated that she had lied in the letters and had written 
the letters “just to be left alone.” 
 
Parker asserts that trial counsel could have impeached Williams with other 
convictions and could have entered certified copies of convictions into evidence.  
However, this additional impeachment would be largely cumulative.  The judge 
and jury already knew that Williams had been convicted of petit theft at least four 
times, that she was currently on probation for a felony conviction for driving with a 
suspended license, and that she apparently had an additional felony conviction for 
driving with a suspended license.  “[F]ailing to present cumulative impeachment 
evidence does not necessarily constitute ineffective assistance.”  State v. 
Riechmann, 777 So. 2d 342, 356 (Fla. 2000).  In sum, we conclude that counsel 
adequately prepared for impeaching Williams.  Further, he impeached her at length 
concerning her criminal history and elicited from Williams that she had told lies, 
 
- 27 - 
had lied to the police by giving them her sister‟s name, and had lied in letters in 
1996.  Trial counsel also introduced the 1996 letters into evidence, in which 
Williams wrote that she did not know who was the shooter.  In light of this, we 
conclude that failing to introduce additional, cumulative evidence of her criminal 
history and failing to introduce certified criminal convictions into evidence did not 
constitute deficient performance. 
C.  Failing to Elicit Testimony from Richard Barlow that He  
Believed the Testimony of Michael Bryant 
In this claim, Parker asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to question Richard Barlow on redirect as to his professional considerations in 
evaluating Michael Bryant‟s credibility, after the State opened the door to such 
questioning on cross-examination.  Although this claim was summarily denied by 
the postconviction court, Parker does not argue on appeal that he should have been 
granted an evidentiary hearing on this claim.  Rather, he argues the merits of the 
claim.  We conclude that this claim is without merit. 
The facts underlying this claim are as follows.  In 1998, this Court granted 
Parker a new penalty-phase proceeding because the State had withheld the 
exculpatory evidence of the testimony of Michael Bryant—testimony that was 
presented in codefendant Cave‟s 1993 resentencing proceeding, in which Bryant 
testified that he overheard a conversation indicating that Cave was the shooter, not 
 
- 28 - 
Parker.  Parker V, 721 So. 2d at 1149.9  During Parker‟s resentencing, Richard 
Barlow, the prosecutor during Cave‟s 1993 resentencing proceeding, testified. 
During direct examination, Barlow testified that he assessed Bryant‟s 
credibility by evaluating whether Bryant would have any motives to come forward 
and testify and that he determined that Bryant did not have a motive to make 
money and that there was no potential intimidation by Cave.  After speaking with 
Bryant, Barlow also considered codefendant Johnson‟s statements.  Trial counsel 
then asked Barlow how he had evaluated Johnson‟s testimony and Bryant‟s 
statements.  The State objected on relevancy grounds, and the judge sustained the 
objection.  Barlow further testified that he had also considered medical examiner 
evidence in assessing Bryant‟s credibility.  However, when counsel attempted to 
ask what Barlow‟s considerations were as to the medical examiner evidence, the 
trial court precluded this line of questioning because it pertained to Barlow‟s 
professional thought process in assessing Bryant‟s credibility.  Counsel then 
elicited from Barlow his opinion that Bryant‟s testimony was credible and that 
                                         
9.  Cave‟s initial sentence of death was vacated by the federal district court 
because of ineffective assistance of counsel, and Cave was granted a new 
sentencing proceeding.  Cave v. Singletary, 971 F.2d 1513, 1514 (11th Cir. 1992).  
After a second sentencing proceeding in 1993, he was again sentenced to death—it 
was during that proceeding that the State presented testimony that Cave was the 
shooter.  That death sentence was vacated in 1995 due to a procedural error.  Cave, 
727 So. 2d at 228.  Cave was given a third resentencing proceeding, during which 
the State did not argue that Cave was the triggerman, but rather that Cave had a 
leadership role during the entire criminal episode.  Id. at 230-31. 
 
- 29 - 
during Cave‟s trial, Barlow had taken the position that the State had proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt that Cave was the shooter. 
On cross-examination, the State inquired as to Barlow‟s thought processes in 
assessing Bryant‟s credibility.  In doing so, the State acknowledged that it had 
opened the door to Barlow‟s thought processes in evaluating Bryant‟s credibility.  
However, on redirect, trial counsel did not reopen the objected-to line of 
questioning about Barlow‟s mental processes in evaluating Bryant‟s credibility 
with respect to the medical examiner evidence.  Rather, counsel focused on the 
evidence brought out by the State on cross-examination, such as Bryant‟s motives 
to testify against Cave. 
On direct appeal, trial counsel argued to this Court that the trial court 
reversibly erred by precluding Barlow from testifying as to professional 
considerations in evaluating Bryant‟s statement in conjunction with the medical 
examiner evidence.  Parker VI, 873 So. 2d at 283.  This Court rejected that claim: 
Lastly, Parker contends that the trial court erred by limiting the 
testimony of former assistant state attorney Richard Barlow, who 
presented the testimony of Michael Bryant during Cave‟s 1993 
penalty phase to establish that Cave was the shooter.  Specifically, 
Parker argues that the trial court erred in precluding Barlow from 
testifying . . . as to Barlow‟s professional considerations in evaluating 
Bryant‟s statement in conjunction with the medical examiner‟s 
evidence. . . .  
 
 
. . . . 
With respect to the exclusion of Barlow‟s professional 
considerations in evaluating the credibility of Bryant‟s statements, the 
trial court sustained the State‟s objection to this line of questioning, 
 
- 30 - 
ruling that the prosecutor‟s “actual professional thought process” in 
evaluating a witness was not relevant.  However, the trial court 
subsequently recognized during cross-examination that the State had 
opened the door to Barlow‟s mental processes and that on redirect 
Parker would be allowed to question Barlow on this issue.  It was 
Parker‟s responsibility to reopen this line of questioning, which he 
failed to do.  We therefore conclude that the trial court did not commit 
reversible error in sustaining the objection to testimony about the 
prosecutor‟s evaluation of Bryant as a witness. 
 
Id. 
Parker now asserts that his counsel was ineffective for failing to reopen the 
objected-to line of questioning on redirect and points to this Court‟s opinion on 
direct appeal in support of this claim.10  We note that on redirect, trial counsel did 
not pursue the particular lines of questioning as to the medical examiner evidence 
or Johnson‟s testimony.  However, the record shows that on redirect, counsel did 
question Barlow regarding his reasons for believing Bryant‟s testimony.  Counsel 
asked whether Barlow had considered whether or not Bryant‟s testimony was 
fabricated in order to escape Cave‟s cell.  Barlow testified that he had considered 
it, but that at the time of Cave‟s 1993 resentencing proceeding, Bryant was not in 
                                         
 
10.  Parker appears to frame the issue in his postconviction motion more 
broadly than the issue addressed by this Court in its direct appeal opinion.  Parker 
contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to elicit testimony on redirect 
examination regarding Barlow‟s professional considerations in reviewing Bryant‟s 
credibility.  However, a review of this Court‟s opinion on direct appeal reveals that 
the Court‟s statements about failing to reopen the line of questioning pertained to 
Barlow‟s considerations in evaluating Bryant‟s testimony in conjunction with the 
medical examiner‟s evidence.  See Parker VI, 873 So. 2d at 283. 
 
- 31 - 
jail and had no pending charges and, thus, in 1993 “it wasn‟t a consideration that 
he wanted to be moved out of a cell to testify.”  Barlow also testified that Bryant 
had no pending charges against him in 1993, nor did he have a civil case against 
the prison.  On redirect, counsel appeared to focus on the evidence brought out by 
the State on cross-examination and elicited Barlow‟s reasons for believing that 
Bryant did not fabricate his testimony in order to escape from Cave‟s abuse. 
Thus, although trial counsel could have reopened the specific line of 
questioning concerning Barlow‟s evaluation of the medical examiner evidence or 
Johnson‟s testimony, the record shows that the failure to do so does not rise to the 
level of deficient performance.  Further, although counsel could have pressed 
Barlow for his reasons why he believed Bryant in more detail, this also does not 
rise to the level of deficient performance.  Parker has not demonstrated how failing 
to pursue a particular line of questioning or how failing to question Barlow for the 
reasons why he believed Bryant in further detail falls “outside the broad range of 
reasonably competent performance under prevailing professional standards.”  
Schoenwetter, 46 So. 3d at 546 (quoting Maxwell, 490 So. 2d at 932).  Although 
trial counsel could arguably have elicited more of Barlow‟s considerations in 
evaluating Bryant‟s credibility, “[t]he standard is not how present counsel would 
have proceeded, in hindsight.”  Brown v. State, 846 So. 2d 1114, 1121 (Fla. 2003) 
(quoting Cherry v. State, 659 So. 2d 1069, 1073 (Fla. 1995)).  Accordingly, we 
 
- 32 - 
conclude counsel‟s performance was not deficient as to this claim.  Thus, the 
postconviction court did not err in denying this claim. 
II. Claims Regarding the Cooperation Agreement  
with Codefendant Terry Johnson 
We next review Parker‟s claims concerning the cooperation agreement 
between Johnson and the State, the terms of which differed from the disclosure 
notice filed by the State and provided to counsel.  Parker asserts that counsel was 
ineffective either because he had a copy of the agreement and failed to impeach 
Johnson with it or because he failed to obtain a copy of the agreement.  
Alternatively, Parker asserts that the State committed a Brady violation by not 
disclosing the complete terms of the agreement.  Parker additionally asserts that the 
prosecutor‟s statement during trial (that the gist of the disclosure notice and the 
agreement were the same) was a violation of Giglio. 
The terms of the agreement were that Johnson agreed to “testify truthfully in 
accord with the sworn testimony that [he] gave to both law enforcement officers 
and the Grand Jury of Martin County in the year 1982” in exchange for the parole 
board being notified of his cooperation.  However, the State‟s disclosure notice 
that was provided to trial counsel reflected only that Johnson was to “truthfully 
testify” in exchange for the parole board being notified and made no mention that 
Johnson was to testify in accord with specific prior testimony. 
 
- 33 - 
During the cross-examination of Johnson at the resentencing proceeding, 
counsel introduced the State‟s disclosure notice into evidence, which stated that 
Johnson had agreed to testify “truthfully.”  Then the following took place: 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Mr. Johnson, is that the disclosure agreement 
that the State of Florida made to you that it would advise the Parole 
Commission of the fact that you did not testify, that it—if you did not 
testify it would make the Parole Commission aware of that fact? 
JOHNSON:  I have never talked to Mr. Colton.  [Mr. Colton was the 
State Attorney whose name was on the disclosure notice.] 
STATE [MR. MIRMAN]:  That‟s not the document that he received, 
that‟s a document I sent to you.  The gist of it is the same.  See what I 
mean?  That‟s the disclosure to the Defense, not to the witness. 
. . . . 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: So, my question—my question is, you were 
made aware by Mr. Mirman that if you testified before this Jury, that 
the Parole Commission would be made aware of that fact? 
JOHNSON:  That I—that I did cooperate by testifying truthfully. 
As to Parker‟s claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach 
Johnson with the complete terms of the agreement, this claim fails because Parker 
has not established that his counsel had a copy of the agreement or was notified of 
the complete terms of the agreement as of the time of Parker‟s resentencing.  All of 
the evidence suggests that counsel did not in fact have a copy of the agreement, nor 
was he otherwise notified of its complete terms, as of the time of the resentencing 
proceeding and, as discussed later, we conclude that the terms were improperly 
withheld by the State.  Trial counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to impeach 
 
- 34 - 
Johnson with the terms of a document that was withheld from him.  Riechmann, 
777 So. 2d at 357; see also Roberts v. State, 568 So. 2d 1255, 1259 (Fla. 1990) 
(“Counsel cannot be considered deficient in performance for failing to present 
evidence which allegedly has been improperly withheld by the State.”). 
Parker also asserts that even if his counsel did not have a copy of the 
agreement, he was ineffective for failing to investigate the matter of the disclosure 
notice in order to obtain a copy of the agreement.  However, nothing in the 
disclosure notice suggested that the terms of the agreement might differ or that a 
copy of the agreement should have been attached.  We conclude that in this case, 
counsel was not deficient in failing to obtain from the State a copy of the 
agreement when the disclosure notice appeared to have disclosed all of the terms of 
the agreement. 
We now consider Parker‟s Giglio claim.  To establish a Giglio violation, it 
must be shown that “(1) the testimony given was false; (2) the prosecutor knew the 
testimony was false; and (3) the statement was material.”  Guzman v. State, 868 
So. 2d 498, 505 (Fla. 2003).  “[T]he false evidence is material „if there is any 
reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of 
the jury.‟ ”  Id. at 506.  “The State, as the beneficiary of the Giglio violation, bears 
the burden to prove that the presentation of false testimony at trial was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id.  Giglio claims present mixed questions of law and 
 
- 35 - 
fact.  Accordingly, this Court defers to those factual findings supported by 
competent, substantial evidence, but reviews de novo the application of the law to 
the facts.  Green v. State, 975 So. 2d 1090, 1106 (Fla. 2008). 
We reject Parker‟s summarily presented claim that the prosecutor‟s 
statement during resentencing—that the gist of the notice and the agreement were 
the same—was “tantamount to a Brady violation,” as well as a violation of Giglio.  
This claim was not presented to the postconviction court.  Thus, it is procedurally 
barred.  See id. at 1104 (holding that claim “is procedurally barred because it was 
neither raised in Green‟s 3.851 motion nor addressed by the trial court”). 
We now consider Parker‟s Brady claim.  To meet the requirements of Brady, 
Parker must show that (1) favorable evidence—either exculpatory or impeaching, 
(2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State, and (3) because the 
evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced.  See Strickler v. Greene, 527 
U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999); see also Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903, 910 (Fla. 2000).  
To meet the materiality prong, the defendant must demonstrate “a reasonable 
probability that the jury verdict would have been different had the suppressed 
information been used at trial.”  Smith v. State, 931 So. 2d 790, 796 (Fla. 2006) 
(citing Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289, 296).  A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.  See Way, 760 So. 2d at 913; 
see also Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290. 
 
- 36 - 
In reviewing a Brady claim, “this Court defers to the factual findings made 
by the trial court to the extent they are supported by competent, substantial 
evidence, but reviews de novo the application of those facts to the law.”  
Lightbourne v. State, 841 So. 2d 431, 437 (Fla. 2003).  However, the 
postconviction court in this case did not make factual findings on the merits of this 
claim.  Instead the postconviction court found that this claim was procedurally 
barred because it found that Parker could have raised it on direct appeal.  We 
disagree. 
Turning to the merits of Parker‟s Brady claim that the State suppressed 
favorable information by failing to disclose the complete terms of the agreement, 
we conclude that the first prong of Brady is satisfied in this case because the 
complete terms of the cooperation agreement constituted favorable impeaching 
evidence.  Trial counsel could have used the complete terms of the cooperation 
agreement—that Johnson was required to testify in accordance with his 1982 grand 
jury testimony and statements made to the police—to impeach Johnson as to the 
reasons he was testifying consistent with these prior statements at resentencing and 
disavowing a 1989 affidavit.11  Instead, counsel was only able to impeach Johnson 
                                         
 
11.  The affidavit, which was purported to be signed by Johnson, stated, 
among other things, that Bush was the one who confessed to Williams, that Bush 
was a liar and a violent person, that Johnson did not remember how Bush “got the 
gun [from Cave], but [he] heard a holler, then [he] heard a shot,” and that Parker 
was not a violent person and was not capable of murder. 
 
- 37 - 
as to the fact that he had agreed to testify truthfully in exchange for the parole 
board being notified of his cooperation.  The complete terms of the cooperation 
agreement should have been disclosed to defense counsel. 
 
The second prong of Brady is also satisfied—the complete terms of the 
cooperation agreement were willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State.  
The complete terms of the agreement were in the prosecutor‟s possession; the 
agreement was between the State and Johnson, and Johnson testified at 
resentencing that the prosecutor had provided him with a copy of the agreement as 
well as his grand jury testimony to ensure that he remembered it.  The State filed a 
Disclosure of Witness Agreement with the trial court and provided a copy of the 
disclosure to Parker‟s trial counsel.  However, rather than disclosing the complete 
terms of the agreement, the disclosure only specified that Johnson had agreed to 
“truthfully testify.”  Thus, by not including the full terms of the agreement in the 
disclosure, the State withheld favorable impeaching evidence.  Further, the 
prosecutor‟s comment during trial counsel‟s cross-examination of Johnson strongly 
suggests that only the disclosure notice was provided to trial counsel, not a copy of 
the cooperation agreement or notice of the complete terms of that agreement.  
Additionally, the only indication at the evidentiary hearing that counsel had been 
notified of the complete terms of the agreement was a letter found in counsel‟s 
files that was dated about a year after Parker‟s resentencing proceeding. 
 
- 38 - 
In evaluating the third prong of Brady—whether Parker was prejudiced by 
the failure to disclose the complete terms of the agreement—we address this on a 
cumulative basis along with the ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding 
Parker‟s May 7 statement.  See Hurst v. State, 18 So. 3d 975, 1015 (Fla. 2009) 
(stating that this Court “considers the cumulative effect of evidentiary errors and 
ineffective assistance claims together” (quoting Suggs v. State, 923 So. 2d 419, 
441 (Fla. 2005))); see also State v. Gunsby, 670 So. 2d 920, 924 (Fla. 1996) 
(granting a new trial on the basis of the combined effect of newly discovered 
evidence, the erroneous withholding of evidence, and ineffective assistance of 
counsel); cf. Mordenti v. State, 894 So. 2d 161, 174 (Fla. 2004) (reversing for a 
new trial after conducting cumulative prejudice analysis of withheld favorable 
information implicating Brady and asserted misrepresentations involving Giglio). 
III. Cumulative Prejudice Analysis  
 
 Because we conclude that trial counsel was deficient concerning the May 7 
statement and that the State improperly withheld favorable impeaching information 
(the complete terms of the cooperation agreement), we consider the impact of these 
errors cumulatively to determine whether Parker has established prejudice.  After a 
thorough analysis of the claims, we conclude that Parker is not entitled to relief.   
First, we determine the effect of counsel‟s deficiency in stipulating to the 
admissibility of the hearsay statements made by Detective Powers in the stipulated 
 
- 39 - 
record.  Without these statements, the stipulated record does not contain evidence 
that Parker initiated the May 7 contact.  Although the stipulated record contains an 
abundance of evidence indicating that Parker was generally eager to speak to 
police and very willing to cooperate with Powers on May 7, the record is devoid of 
any indication that Parker initiated the contact.  Further, there is evidence that 
Parker refused to take police to find the knife between the May 5 and May 7 
interviews, but no evidence in the stipulated record as to whether or why Parker 
would have changed his mind and initiated contact with police on May 7. 
Although the record reflected that Parker was “totally cooperative” during 
the May 7 interview and signed a waiver of rights form indicating that he wished to 
show Detective Powers where the knife was located, this does not address the issue 
of who initiated the interview.  See Hunter v. State, 973 So. 2d 1174, 1176 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 2007) (“In this case, the State never rebutted Appellant‟s testimony that he 
decided to speak to Officer Orr after being contacted by a correctional officer.  
Moreover, Officer Orr merely testified that he confirmed that it was Appellant‟s 
decision to speak to him.  This testimony does not address the issue of who 
initiated the contact that led Appellant to decide to speak to the officer.  Thus, the 
trial court erred in denying Appellant‟s motion to suppress.”).  We conclude that 
there would not have been competent, substantial evidence to support the trial 
 
- 40 - 
court‟s finding that Parker initiated the May 7 interview, absent the stipulated-to 
hearsay statements. 
Next, we evaluate the nature and impact of Parker‟s May 7 statement as 
admitted at resentencing.  Parker‟s May 7 statement was relayed by Detective 
Powers‟ relatively brief testimony at trial.  Detective Powers testified that Parker 
accompanied him on a tour of the crime scene, starting at the convenience store.  
Parker showed Detective Powers where the victim was “let . . . out” of the car.  He 
stated that Bush had both stabbed and shot the victim, and Parker showed 
Detective Powers where the knife used to stab the victim was discarded.  Parker 
told Powers that they were pulled over by a deputy and discussed killing the 
deputy, but decided against it because the deputy had already run their license 
plate.  Parker also showed Powers the route that the four codefendants took until 
they divided up the money from the robbery and disbanded. 
 
In short, the content of Parker‟s May 7 statement that would have been 
suppressed included Parker‟s admissions that he was involved in the robbery and 
that he was at the scene of the murder.  Parker‟s May 7 statement largely 
corroborated Johnson‟s testimony at the resentencing proceeding.  Johnson 
testified in a similar manner, except that according to Johnson, moments before the 
victim was shot, Parker was handed the gun.  Thus, Detective Powers‟ testimony 
about Parker‟s May 7 statement lent credibility to Johnson‟s testimony because 
 
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Parker himself admitted to being involved in the robbery and being at the scene of 
the murder—details testified to by Johnson.  Further, if the May 7 statement had 
been suppressed, the jury would not have heard that the codefendants discussed 
killing a deputy after the murder. 
However, even without Detective Power‟s testimony as to Parker‟s May 7 
statement, Johnson‟s detailed testimony concerning Parker‟s actions during the 
crime remains, along with Georgeann Williams‟ testimony that Parker admitted to 
being the shooter.  Further, in his May 7 statement, Parker denied killing the 
victim, whereas Johnson‟s testimony places the gun in Parker‟s hand shortly before 
the victim was shot.  Although without the admission of the May 7 statement, the 
jury would not have heard Parker‟s admissions that he was at the scene of the 
crime and would not have heard that the participants had discussed killing the 
deputy, there would remain significant evidence of Parker‟s role in the murder and 
sufficient evidence supporting the aggravators.  On the other hand, the suppression 
of Parker‟s May 7 statement removes the evidence supporting the trial court‟s 
finding of the nonstatutory mitigator that Parker cooperated with police, which was 
given moderate weight. 
We now discuss the value and effect of the additional impeachment 
concerning Johnson.  “[T]he impeachment value of the undisclosed evidence must 
be analyzed in determining whether prejudice ensued.”  Hunter v. State, 29 So. 3d 
 
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256, 271 (Fla. 2008).  Although the full terms of the cooperation agreement would 
have constituted stronger impeachment material than the terms revealed in the 
disclosure notice, we conclude that this additional impeachment would not have 
destroyed Johnson‟s credibility.  The judge and jury were already aware of the fact 
that Johnson had an agreement with the State to testify in exchange for the parole 
board being notified of his cooperation and presumably weighed his credibility 
accordingly.  Thus, they were already aware of an agreement and Johnson‟s motive 
to please the State and to testify in exchange for compensation.  Further, the 
complete terms of the cooperation agreement required Johnson to “testify 
truthfully in accord with the sworn testimony that [he] gave to both law 
enforcement officers and the Grand Jury of Martin County in the year 1982.”  
(Emphasis added.)  In short, even though the complete terms of the cooperation 
agreement would have given the judge and jury additional impeachment material 
on which to conclude that Johnson had a motive to testify, the cooperation 
agreement does not reveal any deal was made with Johnson other than that he 
should testify truthfully based on his prior sworn testimony.  Thus, we conclude 
that the impeachment value of the undisclosed evidence was not significant. 
Parker asserts that if trial counsel had adequately impeached Georgeann 
Williams (with her prior convictions) and impeached Johnson (with the complete 
terms of the cooperation agreement), this would have shown that both Williams 
 
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and Johnson were “utterly unworthy of belief” and would have left but one piece 
of incriminating evidence suggesting that Parker was anything more than a 
passenger in the vehicle used to kidnap the victim—Parker‟s May 7 statement, 
which would have been suppressed.  However, we have concluded that counsel 
was not deficient in impeaching Williams.  Further, as discussed above, had 
counsel been able to impeach Johnson with the complete terms of the cooperation 
agreement, the impact of this impeachment evidence would not have destroyed 
Johnson‟s credibility as Parker assumes. 
Parker also contends that without Parker‟s May 7 statement and with 
codefendant Johnson‟s motive to lie exposed, there would have been insufficient 
remaining evidence to meet the heightened mens rea requirement for the 
imposition of the death penalty, citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), 
and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987).  The holdings of the United States 
Supreme Court in Enmund and Tison were summarized by this Court in Stephens 
v. State, 787 So. 2d 747, 759 (Fla. 2001): 
The United States Supreme Court and this Court have 
consistently held that a sentence of death must be proportional to the 
defendant‟s culpability.  Thus, in Enmund the Court indicated that in 
the felony murder context a sentence of death was not permissible if 
the defendant only aids and abets a felony during the course of which 
a murder is committed by another and defendant himself did not kill, 
attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force be 
used.  Later, in Tison the Court said a sentence of death in the felony 
murder context can be proportional if the defendant is a major 
 
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participant in the felony and the defendant‟s state of mind amounts to 
a reckless indifference to human life. 
Even without Parker‟s May 7 statement and with the additional impeachment of 
Johnson, significant evidence remains that Parker was guilty of more than just 
felony murder.  Even if Parker was not the shooter, he was “a major participant in 
the felony and [his] state of mind amount[ed] to a reckless indifference to human 
life.”  Id.  Johnson testified that Parker went in the store and participated in robbing 
and kidnapping the victim.  Johnson also testified that shortly before the victim 
was killed, Parker asked Cave for the gun and exited the vehicle.  Johnson then 
heard a shot, but did not see who shot the victim.  In sum, the remaining evidence 
meets the requirements of Enmund and Tison. 
We conclude that the cumulative effect of the May 7 statement and the 
withheld terms of the cooperation agreement does not undermine our confidence in 
Parker‟s sentence of death “when viewed in the context of the penalty phase 
evidence and the mitigators and aggravators found by the trial court.”  Stewart v. 
State, 37 So. 3d 243, 253 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Hurst v. State, 18 So. 3d 975, 1013 
(Fla. 2009)).  Accordingly, we conclude that Parker has not demonstrated prejudice 
and is not entitled to relief. 
IV. Whether the Postconviction Court Erred in Precluding  
Certain Expert Attorney Testimony 
 
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In his final claim, Parker asserts that the postconviction court erred in 
limiting Parker‟s attempt to present expert testimony of an attorney, Anderson, 
who would have testified concerning trial counsel‟s performance.  Parker contends 
that the postconviction court erred because it was bound by an earlier 1989 
decision of this Court and because the postconviction court misapplied Casey v. 
State, 969 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).  We conclude that Parker‟s first claim 
is without merit and that any error in applying Casey was harmless.12 
 
A trial judge‟s decision to exclude expert testimony is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.  Lynch v. State, 2 So. 3d 47, 80 (Fla. 2008) (“The decision of a 
postconviction court to exclude the testimony of an expert is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.”).  This standard is satisfied when “the judicial action is arbitrary, 
fanciful, or unreasonable, which is another way of saying that discretion is abused 
only where no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court.”  Id. 
(quoting Huff v. State, 569 So. 2d 1247, 1249 (Fla. 1990)). 
At the outset, Parker asserts that this issue was already put to rest in a prior 
proceeding in this case.  In Parker II, 542 So. 2d at 357, this Court stated: “[W]e 
find no merit in Parker‟s fourth claim that the trial court improperly admitted 
                                         
 
12.  Neither party argues that Casey was wrongly decided, and therefore we 
do not comment on the correctness of that decision. 
 
- 46 - 
expert testimony concerning the effectiveness of his trial counsel.”  The Court did 
not elaborate further. 
We conclude that this Court‟s holding in the 1989 case was not applicable 
here.  This Court did not address whether expert testimony as to attorney 
effectiveness would always be appropriate or admissible on Strickland issues, nor 
did it discuss its reasons for its holding.  Rather, this Court simply held that the 
trial court did not err in admitting expert testimony concerning trial counsel 
effectiveness in that specific circumstance.  The ruling at issue here involved a 
different witness and different evidence. 
Parker further contends that the postconviction court misapplied Casey, 
which involved an evidentiary hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  
In Casey, during the hearing, the postconviction court precluded expert testimony 
as to the reasonableness of the defense counsel‟s strategic decisions.  Casey, 969 
So. 2d at 1059-60.  The Fourth District held that the postconviction court did not 
abuse its discretion in precluding the testimony, noting that the reasonableness of 
an attorney‟s strategic decision is a matter of law to be determined by the judge 
and thus the judge could exclude the testimony as irrelevant or infringing on the 
province of the court.  Id. 
The postconviction court in this case, on the basis of Casey, ruled that 
Anderson could not testify as to whether trial counsel rendered ineffective 
 
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assistance and could not comment on the reasonableness of any strategic decisions.  
We deny this claim because even assuming that the postconviction court in this 
case did misapply Casey with respect to this ruling and thus arguably abused its 
discretion, any error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Anderson testified as 
to whether trial counsel‟s investigation was reasonable as to a number of claims on 
which an evidentiary hearing was granted.  He also testified to other aspects of 
Parker‟s ineffectiveness claims, such as his opinion that trial counsel was 
unsuccessful in impeaching Williams.  The postconviction court also had before it 
the direct appeal record as well as the evidence submitted by Parker during the 
evidentiary hearing.  Anderson‟s testimony would not have altered this record or 
evidence upon which the court relied.  We conclude that failing to hear Anderson‟s 
opinion on whether counsel was ineffective did not contribute to the postconviction 
court‟s denial of Parker‟s ineffective assistance of counsel claims on which an 
evidentiary hearing was granted.  Accordingly, we hold that any error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the postconviction court‟s denial of 
Parker‟s motion for postconviction relief. 
 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
LEWIS, J., specially concurs, with an opinion. 
 
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CANADY, C.J. and POLSTON, J., concur in result. 
QUINCE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
LEWIS, J., specially concurring. 
 
 
I agree with the majority that the hearsay testimony at issue in this case with 
regard to whether Parker reinitiated contact with law enforcement after invoking 
the right to counsel, absent the stipulation by counsel, would not have been 
admissible.  I also agree with the cumulative prejudice analysis and the decision to 
affirm the denial of Parker‟s motion for postconviction relief. 
 
QUINCE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
 
This is a troubling case because there appear to be multiple errors made 
during the course of this retrial.  These errors would not in and of themselves 
require a reversal, and certainly not reversal of the guilt phase of the proceedings.  
However, because of these errors my confidence in the outcome of the penalty 
phase of this case has been undermined such that I do not believe that this is a case 
where the death penalty should be imposed.  Therefore, the defendant‟s sentence 
should be reduced to life, or at the very least the defendant should be given a new 
penalty phase proceeding.   
 
- 49 - 
 
I agree with the majority that counsel was deficient in stipulating to the fact 
that the defendant initiated contact with law enforcement on May 7 and that the 
State committed a Brady violation in regard to the agreement it had with the 
codefendant Johnson.  In addition, I do not believe that the defendant‟s attorney 
adequately impeached Georgeann Williams, codefendant Bush‟s girlfriend.  
Therefore, when viewed with the other evidence in this case, which calls into 
question whether the defendant was the shooter, I cannot agree that the errors were 
not harmful. 
 
The defendant in this case was nineteen years old at the time of the murder.  
He admittedly was involved in the robbery and was admittedly at the scene of the 
murder.  The real issue is whether he was the shooter.  The defendant has 
maintained that codefendant Cave shot the victim.  There was testimony presented 
from Michael Bryant, who shared a cell with Cave, that he overheard a 
conversation between codefendants Bush and Cave in which Bush acknowledged 
that he stabbed the victim and Cave acknowledged that he shot the victim.  The 
prosecutor in Cave‟s case also testified that he relied on the testimony of Bryant to 
show that Cave was the shooter. 
 
The only evidence that points to Parker as the shooter comes from 
Georgeann Williams, who at one point said she did not know who the shooter was.  
The testimony of the third codefendant, Johnson, was to the effect that Parker had 
 
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a gun shortly before the shooting, but he did not actually see the victim being shot.  
Moreover, the evidence from the May 7 statement should not have been admitted.  
Even though some of the evidence from that statement was not necessarily 
incriminating, even the fact that the defendant knew the location of certain items of 
evidence could have made a difference in the jury‟s evaluation of the case.    
Any evidence which would tend to further impeach the credibility of 
Williams and Johnson should have been presented to the jury in this case to 
evaluate the relative culpability of Parker. 
I would therefore give Parker a new sentencing proceeding where this 
evidence could be presented. 
 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Martin County,  
Gary L. Sweet, Judge - Case No. 82-352-CF-C 
 
Baya Harrison, III, Monticello, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Lisa-Marie Lerner, 
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee