Title: Carver v. Sheriff of La Salle County

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 91108-Agenda 26-November 2001.
MARGARET M. CARVER et al., Appellants, v. THE SHERIFF 
 								OF La SALLE COUNTY, Appellee.
Opinion filed February 6, 2003.
	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the
court:
	This case is before us on a question of Illinois law certified by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 145 Ill.
2d R. 20. The certified question is:
		"Whether, and if so when, Illinois law requires counties
to pay judgments entered against a sheriff's office in an
official capacity. If [the Supreme Court of Illinois]
believes that the answer depends on whether the case was
settled as opposed to litigated, we would welcome
treatment of that distinction as well."
For the reasons that follow, we hold that under Illinois law a
sheriff, in his or her official capacity, has the authority to settle and
compromise claims brought against the sheriff's office. Because
the office of the sheriff is funded by the county, the county is
therefore required to pay a judgment entered against a sheriff's
office in an official capacity. We further hold that this conclusion
is not affected by whether the case was settled or litigated.
BACKGROUND
	On April 14, 1994, plaintiffs Margaret M. Carver and Randall
S. Carmean, former employees of the La Salle County sheriff's
department, filed a complaint in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois against La Salle County, the
La Salle County sheriff's department, and Anthony M. Condie,
sheriff of La Salle County. The complaint alleged that the sheriff
of La Salle County, Anthony Condie, engaged in sexual
harassment, sex discrimination, deprivations of equal protection,
and retaliation, in violation of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (42 U.S.C. §2000(e) (1994)) and section 1983 of title 42 (42
U.S.C. §1983 (1994)).
	In June 1994, defendants La Salle County and the La Salle
County sheriff's department filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs'
complaint. La Salle County contended that because the sheriff
holds an independent office created by article VII, section 4(c), of
the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, §4(c)),
the county had no control over the conduct or policies of the
sheriff's office and, therefore, the county could not be held
vicariously liable for the alleged discriminatory conduct of
Condie. In addition, the La Salle County sheriff's department
argued that because it was created within the office of the La Salle
County sheriff, and because its powers and duties are exercised
under the direction of the sheriff, it did not have a separate legal
existence apart from the sheriff of La Salle County and was,
therefore, "not a sueable entity under Illinois law."
	On June 17, 1994, the district court granted the motion to
dismiss filed by La Salle County and the La Salle County sheriff's
department. The district court, however, also granted plaintiffs
leave to file an amended complaint. On August 2, 1994, plaintiffs
filed an amended complaint, and named, as the sole defendant,
"Anthony M. Condie, Sheriff," in his official capacity. The
allegations and relief requested in the amended complaint were the
same as in plaintiffs' original complaint.
	The parties proceeded with discovery, and the case was set for
trial. On July 17, 1996, the district court summoned a prospective
jury panel, and the parties appeared for trial. The court gave the
parties a final break within which to discuss a settlement. The
parties thereafter informed the court that they had reached a
tentative settlement of the case and requested that the court enter
a consent decree to reflect their agreement. The consent decree
stated that "Defendant Anthony M. Condie, Sheriff of LaSalle
County has agreed to the entry of judgment against him" in the
amount of $500,000 in compensatory damages for violations of
title VII and section 1983. The parties informed the court that the
sheriff was entering the decree in his official capacity and that the
judgment was regarded as an obligation of the office of the sheriff
of La Salle County. Pursuant to the provisions contained within
the consent decree, the court clerk terminated the case, with the
exception of issues arising out of the enforcement of the decree.
	On August 30, 1996, the plaintiffs filed with the district court,
and served upon La Salle County, a third-party citation to discover
assets to determine whether the county was holding assets for, or
on behalf of, the La Salle County sheriff.(1) In response, La Salle
County provided plaintiffs with the sheriff's budget and a list of all
funds appropriated to the office of the La Salle County sheriff by
the county board. Plaintiffs thereafter determined that La Salle
County held funds duly appropriated and authorized by law for the
use and benefit of the La Salle County sheriff and that these funds
were available for the payment of the judgment. On September 6,
1996, plaintiffs filed a motion with the district court requesting
that La Salle County turn over to plaintiffs all funds appropriated
to the office of the La Salle County sheriff through the end of the
budget year of 1996, and that the court impose a judicial lien on all
assets held by La Salle County that belonged to the office of the
La Salle County sheriff. On September 27, 1996, over two years
after it requested that it be dismissed from this case, La Salle
County attempted to intervene in this matter by filing a motion to
quash the citation and a motion to set aside the consent decree as
void. La Salle County argued that because it was not a party to the
consent decree, it was not bound by its terms. The county further
argued that, in any event, the consent decree was void because
Sheriff Condie possessed no authority to enter into the decree and
to determine how county monies would be expended. The county
concluded by alleging that "the consent decree was but a ploy
between the plaintiffs and Sheriff Anthony M. Condie to place the
entire burden of paying the judgment on the County of La Salle, a
non-party."
	On December 11, 1996, the district court entered an opinion
and order denying La Salle County's motion to declare the consent
decree void. The court noted that La Salle County filed the motion
to set aside the consent decree as an intervenor, yet the county
neither presented the court with the proper motion to intervene nor
requested leave of court to file an intervention motion.
Accordingly, because La Salle County was not a party to the
action, the court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain
the motion. Nevertheless, the court commented that it would have
been disinclined to allow La Salle County to intervene, as the
county did not show that the consent decree placed a legal
obligation upon the county or affected its rights and interests. The
district court, however, did quash the plaintiffs' citation to
discover assets. The court noted that, in their pleadings, plaintiffs
had failed to address La Salle County's motion to quash, and,
therefore, the county's argument stood unrefuted. The court agreed
with the county that there was no evidence in the record that the
county possessed any of the sheriff's assets that could apply to the
judgment.
	Thereafter, La Salle County, arguing that it had always
remained a party to the underlying litigation, filed in the district
court a motion requesting the court to "alter or amend" its
judgment order of December 9, 1996, or in the alternative, for
leave to intervene, instanter. On June 10, 1997, the court denied
both motions. The court noted that La Salle County voluntarily
absented itself from this case, and "when La Salle County chose
not to protect its interests thereafter, it found itself in an oubliette
from which its untimely motion offers no escape." The district
court concluded that a grant of intervention at this late stage of
litigation would prejudice the parties.
	La Salle County appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. In Carver v. Condie, 169 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 1999) (Carver I), the Seventh Circuit reversed and
remanded this matter for further proceedings before the district
court. The Seventh Circuit concluded that "the district court acted
too hastily in finding that the county could not contest its liability
under the consent decree" (Carver I, 169 F.3d at 470) and that
La Salle County "has raised serious questions about its duty to
satisfy the consent decree the sheriff signed" (Carver I, 169 F.3d
at 473). Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit remanded this cause for
the district court to determine "[w]hether or not the county has
standing to attack the underlying consent decree, or if it may only
defend against its legal liability to pay." Carver I, 169 F.3d  at 474.
	On remand, plaintiffs filed in the district court a motion to
direct La Salle County to pay the consent decree. In response, the
county again filed a motion to vacate the consent decree or, in the
alternative, for declaratory relief. On February 10, 2000, the
district court denied the motions of both plaintiffs and La Salle
County, finding that La Salle County is not liable to plaintiffs for
paying the consent decree. The district court, however, also
recommended that the question of who pays the consent decree
judgment be certified to this court.
	Plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit. Because Condie is
no longer the sheriff of La Salle County, and because the consent
decree was entered against Condie in his official capacity, the
court recaptioned the case as Carver v. Sheriff of La Salle County,
243 F.3d 379 (7th Cir. 2001) (Carver II). The court noted that the
instant cause "is just one instance of a recurring question: Who
pays official-capacity judgments in Illinois when the wrongdoer is
an independently-elected officer?" Carver II, 243 F.3d  at 381. The
Seventh Circuit explained the dilemma posed by cases such as that
at bar:
		"Sheriffs, treasurers, clerks of court, and several other
officers within Illinois counties are elected directly by the
people and establish their own policies, but they lack
authority to levy taxes or establish their own budgets. This
leads the independently-elected officers to contend that
the counties must pay; but the counties, which are unable
to control the conduct of the officers, insist that they
cannot be held liable because an official-capacity
judgment runs against the office and not against an
'employee' of the county. The law of Illinois does not
provide a clean solution to this conflict, in which each
insists that the other must pay." (Emphasis in original.)
Carver II, 243 F.3d  at 381.
	In attempting to resolve the question of who pays official-capacity judgments in Illinois when the wrongdoer is an
independently elected officer, the Seventh Circuit looked to
section 9-102 of the Local Governmental and Governmental
Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS
10/9-102 (West 2000)) and concluded that because the cause at
bar involves an official-capacity suit against the sheriff's office,
"the sheriff's office itself seems to be [a] 'local public entity' "
within the meaning of this statutory section, which empowers a
local public entity to settle and pay tort claims for which the entity
is liable. Carver II, 243 F.3d  at 383. The Seventh Circuit,
however, observed that although it appears that the sheriff
possesses the statutory authority to settle the claim and to pay the
judgment, the statutory scheme does not make funds available to
the sheriff to do so. The Seventh Circuit questioned the argument
advanced by La Salle County that when an independently elected
county officer settles official-capacity litigation, that officer may
only recommend to the county board that funds be appropriated to
satisfy the judgment. The court observed that under such a system,
"the plaintiffs' entitlement would be, not immediate payment, but
an order compelling the incumbent sheriff to get a move on
finding the necessary funds (or, at plaintiffs' option, to an order
vacating the settlement and placing the case back on the docket for
decision on the merits)." Carver II, 243 F.3d  at 385. The Seventh
Circuit then took La Salle County's argument one step further:
			"Suppose that an order requiring a sheriff to seek
funding from a county is the only possible enforcement
tool after a sheriff settles official-capacity litigation. That
has an unsettling implication for cases that are not settled,
for it implies that no money judgment against a sheriff's
office is enforceable in Illinois. The alternative to
settlement is a decision by the court, and LaSalle
County's argument that it has plenary power not to
appropriate funds to pay judgments implies that it could
refuse to pay-and deny plaintiffs any means of
collecting-even if this case had been litigated to the hilt
rather than settled. That would put Illinois out of
compliance with federal law ***. A state may not evade
compliance by modeling its internal organization after a
huckster's shell game, so that no matter which entity the
plaintiff sues, the state (or its subdivisions) always may
reply that someone else is responsible-and that power has
been divided in such a fashion that the responsible person
can't pay, and the entity that can pay isn't responsible for
doing so. We are confident that the State of Illinois would
not do such a thing, and that its statutes and other
institutional arrangements leave some means of producing
an enforceable judgment. But LaSalle County says
otherwise, that it is never obliged to pay an official-capacity judgment growing out of a sheriff's wrongdoing,
and our tour through state law has not produced a clear
answer to the County's argument." (Emphasis omitted.)
Carver II, 243 F.3d  at 385-86.
	Perceiving that there was a need for this court to
authoritatively decide the issue of who is liable for payment of a
judgment entered against a sheriff's office in an official capacity,
the Seventh Circuit certified this question pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 20 (145 Ill. 2d R. 20).(2) We agreed to answer the
question certified to us by the Seventh Circuit. We granted leave
to the County of Du Page and the County of Cook to file an
amicus curiae brief in support of La Salle County.

ANALYSIS
	We are asked by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit to answer the following question: "Whether, and
if so when, Illinois law requires counties to pay judgments entered
against a sheriff's office in an official capacity. If [the Supreme
Court of Illinois] believes that the answer depends on whether the
case was settled as opposed to litigated, we would welcome
treatment of that distinction as well." The resolution of this
question involves the interpretation of statutes found within the
Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq. (West 2000)) and
the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/1-1001 et seq. (West 2000)).
Because the construction of a statute is a question of law, our
review is de novo (Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of
Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503 (2000)), and our inquiry is conducted
within a familiar analytical framework.
	It is well settled that the primary objective of this court in
construing the meaning of a statute is to ascertain and give effect
to the intention of the legislature. Harinek v. 161 North Clark
Street Ltd. Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335, 340 (1998); Boaden v.
Department of Law Enforcement, 171 Ill. 2d 230, 237 (1996). All
other rules of statutory construction are subordinate to this cardinal
principle. Sylvester v. Industrial Comm'n, 197 Ill. 2d 225, 232
(2001); Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 387
(1998). We determine legislative intent by examining the language
of the statute, which is "the most reliable indicator of the
legislature's objectives in enacting a particular law." Michigan
Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d  at 504; see also Yang v. City of
Chicago, 195 Ill. 2d 96, 103 (2001); Nottage v. Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 392 (1996). The statutory language must be given its plain,
ordinary and popularly understood meaning (In re Detention of
Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300, 308 (2002); Bubb v. Springfield
School District 186, 167 Ill. 2d 372, 381 (1995)), and we are to
afford the statutory language the fullest, rather than the narrowest,
possible meaning to which it is susceptible (Lake County Board of
Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 119 Ill. 2d 419, 423
(1988)). This court will not depart from the plain language of a
statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations or conditions that
conflict with the express legislative intent. Petersen v. Wallach,
198 Ill. 2d 439, 446 (2002); Yang, 195 Ill. 2d  at 103; Kraft, Inc. v.
Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990).
	Because all provisions of a statutory enactment are viewed as
a whole (Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d  at 504;
Bubb, 167 Ill. 2d at 382), words and phrases should not be
construed in isolation, but must be interpreted in light of other
relevant portions of the statute. Sylvester, 197 Ill. 2d  at 232;
Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d  at 504. In construing
a statute, we presume that the General Assembly, in its enactment
of legislation, did not intend absurdity, inconvenience or injustice.
Burger v. Lutheran General Hospital, 198 Ill. 2d 21, 40 (2001);
Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d  at 504.
	At the outset, we note that section 5-1002 of the Counties
Code (55 ILCS 5/5-1002 (West 2000)) provides that a county
must indemnify a sheriff or deputy for "any judgment recovered
against him or her as the result of [an injury to the person or
property of another caused by the sheriff or deputy in the
performance of his or her duties], except where the injury results
from the wilful misconduct of the sheriff or deputy," up to
$500,000. Although it may initially appear that this statute is
applicable to the instant cause, we agree with the Seventh Circuit
in Carver II that a close examination of section 5-1002 reveals
that, under the specific facts presented at bar, section 5-1002
"does not provide a silver bullet here." Carver II, 243 F.3d  at 384.
	First, as the Seventh Circuit correctly noted, the plain
language of the indemnity provisions contained within section
5-1002 establishes that indemnification is available only where a
judgment is entered against a sheriff or deputy in a personal
capacity: "the county shall indemnify the sheriff or deputy, as the
case may be, for any judgment recovered against him or her."
(Emphases added.) 55 ILCS 5/5-1002 (West 2000). The plain
language of section 5-1002 does not indicate that it applies to
official-capacity actions in which the office of the sheriff is held
responsible. Accordingly, where, as here, a judgment is entered
against a sheriff in his official capacity and is regarded as an
obligation of the sheriff's office, section 5-1002 does not apply.
	Moreover, even if we were to assume that section 5-1002
indemnifies sheriffs or deputies for judgments entered in an
official capacity, a further difficulty arises. Section 5-1002
explicitly excludes from indemnification any judgment entered as
a result of "wilful misconduct." 55 ILCS 5/5-1002 (West 2000).
As stated, in the matter at bar plaintiffs filed federal claims
pursuant to both section 1983 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. A Title VII claim is, by necessity, an official-capacity
action because only  an "employer" may be held liable for
discrimination which violates Title VII's provisions. 42 U.S.C.
§2000e(b) (1994); Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir.
1995). Accordingly, plaintiffs at bar filed their Title VII lawsuit as
an official-capacity action in which the sheriff's office (the
"employer" of Condie for purposes of Title VII) was the
defendant. If section 5-1002 were construed to apply to an
official-capacity action such as that at bar, the section's explicit
exclusion of "wilful misconduct" from indemnification would lead
to an absurd result: the county government could insulate itself
from liability imposed under a federal statute, and thereby
preclude a meritorious plaintiff from recovering on the claim. As
the Seventh Circuit correctly observed in Carver II, such a result
would "put Illinois out of compliance with federal law ***
[which] holds that Title VII is binding on the states, and may be
enforced in federal court, by virtue of national power under §5 of
the fourteenth amendment." Carver II, 243 F.3d  at 385-86. Thus,
we agree with the Seventh Circuit that section 5-1002 "is a poor
match" for Title VII claims, such as those at bar, as "all violations
of Title VII require discriminatory intent, a form of wilful
misconduct." Carver II, 243 F.3d  at 384. In light of the limitations
imposed by our General Assembly upon the indemnification
provisions contained within section 5-1002, it is not surprising
that the parties in the matter before us do not strenuously argue the
application of section 5-1002 to the instant cause.
	Rather, the dispute between the parties at bar revolves
primarily around their differing interpretations of section 9-102 of
the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/9-102 (West 2000)). This
statutory provision falls under article IX of the Tort Immunity Act,
which is entitled "Payment of Claims and Judgment." 745 ILCS
10/9-101 et seq. (West 2000). Section 9-102 sets forth the
parameters within which a local public entity may compromise
and settle claims filed against it, and empowers that entity to pay
any tort judgment or settlement for compensatory damages for
which the entity, or an employee of the entity acting within the
scope of employment, is liable. Section 9-102 provides:
			"A local public entity is empowered and directed to pay
any tort judgment or settlement for compensatory
damages for which it or an employee while acting within
the scope of his employment is liable in the manner
provided in this Article. *** A local public entity may
make payments to settle or compromise a claim or action
which has been or might be filed or instituted against it
when the governing body or person vested by law or
ordinance with authority to make over-all policy decisions
for such entity considers it advisable to enter into such a
settlement or compromise." 745 ILCS 10/9-102 (West
2000).
	In its submission to this court, La Salle County contends that,
under the plain language of section 9-102, only a county board
may settle or compromise a claim and appropriate funds for
payment of a judgment. La Salle County asserts that the phrase
"local public entity" contained in section 9-102 refers to the
county. Accordingly, La Salle County argues, by the very terms of
section 9-102 only the county board is "vested by law or
ordinance to make over-all policy decisions" for the county, only
the county board can enter into a settlement or compromise of
claims, and, therefore, only the county board is empowered to pay
any tort judgment or settlement for which it or an employee of the
county acting within the scope of employment is liable. Under the
facts presented at bar, La Salle County contends that Sheriff
Condie did not possess the authority to enter into the settlement
agreement and consent decree absent the express authorization of
the La Salle County board. Accordingly, under the county's
interpretation of section 9-102, it is not liable for the judgment.
	Plaintiffs advance a different interpretation of section 9-102.
Plaintiffs contend that Sheriff Condie, in his official capacity as
the sheriff of La Salle County, possessed the statutory authority,
pursuant to section 9-102, to enter into the settlement agreement
and consent decree. Plaintiffs, echoing the position taken by the
Seventh Circuit in Carver II, contend that a county sheriff is a
"local public entity." Therefore, plaintiffs assert, the sheriff, as the
"person vested by law *** with authority to make over-all policy
decisions" for the office of county sheriff, is expressly vested by
section 9-102 with the power to enter into a settlement of claims
filed against that office and to authorize payment to satisfy such
claims. We agree with plaintiffs' interpretation of section 9-102.
	We begin our analysis with a review of article I of the Tort
Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/1-201 et seq. (West 2000)), which
contains definitions of several words and terms used throughout
the Act. The term "local public entity" is defined in section 1-206:
			" 'Local public entity' includes a county, township,
municipality, municipal corporation, school district,
school board, educational service region, regional board
of school trustees, community college district, community
college board, forest preserve district, park district, fire
protection district, sanitary district, museum district,
emergency telephone system board, and all other local
governmental bodies. 'Local public entity' also includes
library systems and any other intergovernmental agency
or similar entity formed pursuant to the Constitution of
the State of Illinois or the Intergovernmental Cooperation
Act as well as any not-for-profit corporation organized for
the purpose of conducting public business. It does not
include the State or any office, officer, department,
division, bureau, board, commission, university, or
similar agency of the State." (Emphasis added.) 745 ILCS
10/1-206 (West 2000).
We have previously observed that the term "local public entity,"
as used in the Tort Immunity Act, is "broadly defined." Boyles v.
Greater Peoria Mass Transit District, 113 Ill. 2d 545, 553 (1986).
Although the office of sheriff is not specifically listed as a "local
public entity" in section 1-206, "Illinois courts have long
recognized that various public entities, although not expressly
identified in the statute, are within the definition of 'local public
entity.' " Luciano v. Waubonsee Community College, 245 Ill. App.
3d 1077, 1083 (1993) (collecting cases). For the reasons that
follow, we conclude that because a county sheriff falls within the
term "other local governmental bodies" contained in section
1-206, the sheriff is therefore a "local public entity" for purposes
of the Tort Immunity Act.
	The office of sheriff is created by article VII, section 4, of the
Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, §4(c)). The
parties at bar do not dispute that, under Illinois law, a sheriff is an
independently elected county officer and is not an employee of the
county in which the sheriff serves. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, §4(c);
Moy v. County of Cook, 159 Ill. 2d 519 (1994); see also Franklin
v. Zaruba, 150 F.3d 682, 686 n.4 (7th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that
while "sheriffs are agents of the county, rather than the state ***
the sheriff is a particular kind of county agent-i.e., an officer
rather than an employee"). Accordingly, sheriffs answer to the
electorate of the county from which they are elected, and not to the
county board. See Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1092
(7th Cir. 1995); Thompson v. Duke, 882 F.2d 1180, 1187 (7th Cir.
1989). Our constitution sets the sheriff's term of elected office for
four years (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, §4(c)), and the duties of the
sheriff are continuous, without regard to the particular person who
holds the office. Moy, 159 Ill. 2d  at 530. Our constitution further
provides that a sheriff "shall have those duties, powers and
functions provided by law and those provided by county
ordinance," as well as "the duties, powers or functions derived
from common law or historical precedent unless altered by law or
county ordinance." Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, §4(d).
	Several sections of the Counties Code set forth the powers
and the duties of the sheriff. See generally 55 ILCS 5/3-6001 et
seq. (West 2000). For example, the sheriff has the authority to
appoint and hire deputies (55 ILCS 5/3-6008 (West 2000)) and to
act as the custodian of the county courthouse and the jail (55 ILCS
5/3-6017 (West 2000); see also Moy, 159 Ill. 2d  at 526 (discussing
the specific duties imposed upon the sheriff by law with respect to
the operation of the county jail)). The sheriff has the statutory duty
to protect the peace within his or her county and, to this end, is
authorized to "prevent crime and maintain the safety and order of
the citizens of that county; and may arrest offenders on view, and
cause them to be brought before the proper court for trial or
examination." 55 ILCS 5/3-6021 (West 2000). The sheriff is also
vested with the authority to act as the county's supervisor of safety
(55 ILCS 5/3-6035 (West 2000)), with the power to "enforce all
the laws of this State and, within the municipalities *** relating to
the regulation of motor vehicle traffic and the promotion of safety
on public highways." 55 ILCS 5/3-6036 (West 2000).
	The sheriff's office is financed by public funds appropriated
to that office by the county. For example, section 4-6003 of the
Counties Code provides that in counties of less than 2 million the
county board "shall fix the compensation of sheriffs, with the
amount of their necessary clerk hire, stationery, fuel and other
expenses." 55 ILCS 5/4-6003 (West 2000). The county board is
also obligated by statute to "provide proper rooms and offices for
the accommodation" of the sheriff, as well as "reasonable and
necessary expenses for the use of the *** sheriff." 55 ILCS
5/5-1106 (West 2000). Although the sheriff is statutorily
authorized to collect certain fees for services (55 ILCS 5/4-5001
(West 2000)), the sheriff is required to transfer these fees to the
county treasurer (55 ILCS 5/3-13001 (West 2000)), and may not
use them for compensation or payment of the expenses of the
sheriff's office. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, §9(a).
	La Salle County observes that absent from the statutory
powers vested in the sheriff is the power to tax and to appropriate
monies. The county asserts that the inability of the county sheriff
to levy taxes is fatal to the argument that the sheriff is a "local
public entity" within the meaning of the Tort Immunity Act. We
disagree. The Tort Immunity Act contains no requirement that, in
order for a governmental unit to be classified as a "local public
entity," it must possess the power to tax. See McQueen v. Shelby
County, 730 F. Supp. 1449, 1454 (C.D. Ill. 1990). Indeed, if the
General Assembly intended to restrict the definition of a "local
public entity" to only those entities authorized to levy taxes, it
could have defined a "local public entity" as an entity possessing
the authority to tax. No such restriction appears in section 1-206.
As stated, this court will not depart from a statute's plain language
by reading into it exceptions, limitations or conditions the
legislature did not express. Petersen, 198 Ill. 2d  at 446; Yang, 195 Ill. 2d  at 103.
 	In sum, a county sheriff is an independently elected county
official, who performs functions that are essential to the operation
of government, and whose office is funded by public funds. In
light of these factors, we conclude that the county sheriff is a
"local governmental body" as that term is used in section 1-206 of
the Tort Immunity Act. Accordingly, the sheriff is a "local public
entity" within the meaning of the Act.
	Having found that the office of sheriff is a "local public
entity," we return to an examination of section 9-102 of the Tort
Immunity Act, the statutory provision which is at the crux of the
dispute between the parties. In the matter at bar, the sole defendant
named in the action filed by plaintiffs was Sheriff Condie in his
official capacity as the sheriff of La Salle County. Thus, the entity
sued by plaintiffs was the office of the sheriff of La Salle County,
and, accordingly, it is this local public entity which would be
liable for any judgment on plaintiffs' claims. As stated, section
9-102 provides that a local public entity may make payments to
settle a claim filed against that public entity when the "person
vested by law or ordinance with authority to make over-all policy
decisions for such entity considers it advisable to enter into such
a settlement or compromise." (Emphasis added.) 745 ILCS
10/9-102 (West 2000). We conclude that this statutory provision
gives the power to settle an action to the person who makes overall
policy decisions for the local public entity which is being sued.
Under the facts presented, this person is the county sheriff. In
addition, section 9-102 empowers and directs a local public entity
to pay "any tort judgment or settlement for compensatory damages
for which it *** is liable." (Emphases added.) 745 ILCS 10/9-102
(West 2000). Reading this portion of section 9-102 in the factual
context of the matter at bar, we conclude that this provision
authorizes the sheriff (as the local public entity) to pay any
judgment or settlement for compensatory damages for which the
office of the sheriff is liable.
	Accordingly, pursuant to section 9-102 of the Tort Immunity
Act, a county sheriff, in his or her official capacity, is vested by the
General Assembly with the authority to settle litigation filed
against the sheriff's office and to direct the office to pay that
settlement. However, the dilemma noted by the Seventh Circuit in
its opinion in Carver II remains: although the sheriff has authority
to settle claims filed against the sheriff's office pursuant to section
9-102, the statute is silent with respect to the specific mechanism
for funding the judgment.
	As stated, although the office of sheriff is constitutionally
created (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, §4(c)), and the sheriff is an
independently elected county officer, the county sheriff lacks the
authority to levy taxes or establish a budget. Instead, the General
Assembly has determined that the sheriff's office is to be financed
by public funds appropriated to it by the county board. See 55
ILCS 5/4-6003 (West 2000); 55 ILCS 5/5-1106 (West 2000). We
conclude that, under this statutory scheme, the county is obligated
to provide funds to the county sheriff to pay official capacity
judgments entered against the sheriff's office.
	As stated, in construing the meaning of statutes, the primary
objective of this court is to ascertain and give effect to the
legislature's intent. Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d 
at 503-04. Our holding today effectuates the intent of the General
Assembly, as evinced in section 9-102 of the Tort Immunity Act,
to authorize a county sheriff to settle official-capacity claims
against his or her office. Indeed, a contrary result would thwart the
intent of the legislature in vesting settlement authority in the
sheriff pursuant to section 9-102: the sheriff would have the
authority to settle a claim, but would have no means to satisfy the
resulting judgment. A settling meritorious plaintiff, therefore,
would be left with a completely hollow victory. Indeed, in the
words of the Seventh Circuit in Carver II, such a result would
resemble a "huckster's shell game, so that no matter which entity
the plaintiff sues, the state (or its subdivisions) always may reply
that someone else is responsible-and that power has been divided
in such a fashion that the responsible person can't pay, and the
entity that can pay isn't responsible for doing so." Carver II, 243 F.3d  at 386. We are additionally mindful that such a result could
raise the possibility of collusion between independently elected
officials and counties to frustrate meritorious actions brought by
plaintiffs and to prevent them from ever having enforceable
judgments. In construing statutes, we presume that the General
Assembly, in enacting the legislation, did not intend absurdity or
injustice. Burger, 198 Ill. 2d  at 40; Michigan Avenue National
Bank, 191 Ill. 2d  at 504. Certainly, the General Assembly could
not have intended such an absurd and unjust result.
	In its written and oral submissions to this court, La Salle
County apparently concedes that if the matter before us had been
litigated to a verdict and judgment in the district court, the county
would be potentially liable for any judgment entered against the
sheriff in his official capacity, even if the sheriff failed to present
any type of defense against the charges. La Salle County
vigorously argues, however, that there is a palpable distinction
between a judgment entered after trial and a judgment entered
pursuant to a settlement agreement. According to the county,
settlements carry the risk of collusion between the plaintiffs and
independently elected county officials. Therefore, the county
steadfastly maintains that where the sheriff settles an official-capacity claim, the settlement must be approved by the county.
Absent such approval, the county contends that it is never
obligated to pay such a settlement. We reject the county's
assertions.
	The plain language of section 9-102 clearly expresses the
legislature's intent that this statutory provision is to apply equally
to judgments or settlements. That section provides that a local
public entity is vested with authority to "settle or compromise a
claim" where that entity determines that it is advisable to "enter
into such a settlement or compromise" and, accordingly, empowers
the entity to pay "any tort judgment or settlement." (Emphases
added.) 745 ILCS 10/9-102 (West 2000). Thus, contrary to the
argument advanced by La Salle County, the legislature did not
include any language in section 9-102 restricting that statute's
application to judgments entered after trial, or requiring that the
county board approve a settlement made by the county sheriff with
respect to claims against his or her office. To treat a settlement
differently than a judgment rendered after trial would be to render
the "settlement and compromise" provisions of section 9-102
meaningless. As stated, in construing a statute, we will not depart
from the statute's plain language by reading into it exceptions,
limitations or conditions that conflict with the express legislative
intent. Yang, 195 Ill. 2d  at 103; Kraft, 138 Ill. 2d  at 189. The plain
language of section 9-102, which places settlements on an equal
footing with judgments entered after trial, is in accord with Illinois
public policy, which favors the settlement of claims. Rakowski v.
Lucente, 104 Ill. 2d 317, 325 (1984); see also Security Pacific
Financial Services v. Jefferson, 259 Ill. App. 3d 914, 919 (1994)
("there exists a strong policy in favor of settlement and the
resulting avoidance of costly and time-consuming litigation"). We
further note that the county's argument may also lead to absurd
results. Because section 9-102 specifically allows for settlements,
it would be absurd to read this provision as imposing the duty
upon a defendant to go to trial on a hopeless case in an effort to
trigger 9-102's provisions. As stated, in construing a statute, we
presume that the General Assembly did not intend an absurd
result. Burger, 198 Ill. 2d  at 40; Michigan Avenue National Bank,
191 Ill. 2d  at 504.
	Although the plain language of section 9-102 belies the
county's assertion that settlements are to be treated differently than
judgments which are entered after trial, we briefly address La Salle
County's argument that settlements are suspect because there is a
risk of collusion between the settling parties. As an example,
La Salle County points to the consent decree entered in the case at
bar, and alleges that plaintiffs and Sheriff Condie entered into the
consent decree as a "ploy" to obtain money from La Salle County.
Whatever merit La Salle County's argument may have, we
determine that this argument is not germane to the factual context
at bar. The record reflects that La Salle County requested to be
dismissed from these proceedings at the outset of the case, thereby
indicating that it did not want to be involved in this matter. Indeed,
by having itself dismissed from the case, the county was unaware
of the options facing the sheriff on the eve of trial, including
whether the agreement to a settlement offer would be
advantageous in light of the evidence which was to be presented
by plaintiffs at trial. We further note that the county did not
request to intervene in the proceedings upon the entry of the
consent decree. Indeed, it was only after plaintiffs instituted
collection proceedings that the county requested to intervene in an
attempt to overturn the decree. By voluntarily absenting itself from
the proceedings, the county failed to protect its own interests and
those of its taxpaying constituents from the obligations imposed
by section 9-102. We note that we express no opinion with respect
to the validity of a settlement agreement stemming from a lawsuit
of which a county had no notice.
	As its final argument, La Salle County asserts that the matter
at bar is factually analogous to the situation present in our decision
in Pucinski v. County of Cook, 192 Ill. 2d 540 (2000). In Pucinski,
the clerk of the circuit court of Cook County brought an original
action for mandamus in this court to compel Cook County and its
treasurer to pay for a mainframe computer and software she had
purchased for the circuit clerk's office. The purchase, however,
was not made in accordance with the provisions of the Counties
Code and Cook County ordinances. Specifically, the contract
signed by Pucinski did not have the prior approval of the Cook
County board of commissioners and was not signed by the
president of the board, the county purchasing agent, and the
comptroller (55 ILCS 5/5-36001 (West 1998); Cook County
Ordinances §10-17) and it was not the subject of competitive
bidding (55 ILCS 5/5-36006 (West 1998); Cook County
Ordinances §10-18). In her mandamus petition, Pucinski stated
that she had requested approval for the purchase from the Cook
County board, but that the president of the board declined to place
her request on the board's agenda. Pucinski thereafter entered into
the contract herself in her official capacity as the circuit court
clerk, on the grounds that the purchase was necessary for her
office to perform its statutory and constitutional obligations, and
that she had the ultimate authority with respect to how her office
should be run. Subsequently, the Cook County board refused to
pay the contract because it had not been authorized or subject to
competitive bidding.
	This court denied Pucinski's mandamus petition. We
observed that "[b]ecause operations of the circuit clerks' offices
are paid for by the counties, any payments made from the county
treasuries on behalf of the clerks' offices must comport with the
requirements of the Counties Code *** [and] the applicable Cook
County ordinances." Pucinski, 192 Ill. 2d  at 545. We held that
Pucinski did not comply with the applicable statutes, which
expressly required that the purchase contract was to be submitted
to the county board for prior approval and that the purchase be the
subject of competitive bidding. Pucinski, 192 Ill. 2d  at 545-46.
	In its submission to this court, La Salle County contends that
"[j]ust as the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County could not
compel the county board to pay for new office equipment which
she purchased without following statutory procedures and without
approval from the Cook County Board of Commissioners, Sheriff
Condie, in this case, had no power (no statutory grant of settlement
authority) to enter into a settlement agreement and consent decree
which would require LaSalle County to pay the sum of $500,000."
We disagree. Pucinski is factually distinguishable from the matter
at bar and is therefore inapposite. Our decision in Pucinski was
animated by the fact that in purchasing the computer equipment,
Pucinski failed to comply with explicit requirements contained in
statutory provisions and county ordinances governing purchases,
including the preapproval of purchasing contracts by the county
board. In contrast, Sheriff Condie comported with the statutory
provisions contained in section 9-102 governing the settlement of
official-capacity claims. Unlike in Pucinski, no statutory
provisions were transgressed in the matter at bar.
	As a final matter, we note that the amicus curiae brief filed by
Du Page and Cook Counties raises two additional issues: (1) the
propriety of Sheriff Condie's retention of private counsel to defend
against plaintiffs' action; and (2) whether a federal section 1983
claim is cognizable against a county sheriff. Both of these issues
are beyond the scope of the question certified to this court by the
Seventh Circuit. "This court is not a court of review for federal
court decisions. Therefore, we are restricted to the question
certified to us." Yang, 195 Ill. 2d  at 102. Accordingly, we decline
to address the arguments of amici.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we answer the question certified to
us by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
as follows: we hold that under Illinois law a sheriff, in his or her
official capacity, has the authority to settle and compromise claims
brought against the sheriff's office. Because the office of the
sheriff is funded by the county, the county is therefore required to
pay a judgment entered against a sheriff's office in an official
capacity. We further hold that this conclusion is not affected by
whether the case was settled or litigated.
Certified question answered.
	JUSTICE RARICK took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
	I respectfully dissent. Section 5-1002 of the Illinois Counties
Code (Code) (55 ILCS 5/5-1002 (West 2000)) requires counties
to indemnify sheriffs for any personal injury or property damage
judgment within specific limits and subject to certain conditions.
The majority holds that this provision is inapplicable to the case
at hand because it only applies to individual-capacity judgments.
This interpretation is belied by the plain language of the section
that clearly states the provision applies to "any judgment."
(Emphasis added.) 55 ILCS 5/5-1002 (West 2000). If the
legislature meant for the section to apply only to individual-capacity judgments, I believe it would have done so expressly.
	Instead of relying on a statutory section plainly on point, the
majority concludes that a county is obligated to provide funds to
a county sheriff to pay official-capacity judgments, relying
primarily on two general provisions of the Code, sections 4-6003
and 5-1106 (55 ILCS 5/4-6003, 5-1106 (West 2000)). Slip op. at
14. The majority reasons that because these sections provide that
the sheriff's office is to be financed by public funds appropriated
to it by a county board, a "statutory scheme" exists requiring the
county to pay official-capacity judgments entered against the
sheriff's office. I disagree with the majority for three reasons.
	First, the majority's opinion runs counter to the familiar
doctrine of ejusdem generis. That principle of statutory
construction provides that when a statute lists several classes of
persons or things but provides that the list is not exhaustive, the
class of unarticulated persons or things will be interpreted as those
"others such like" the named persons or things. City of East St.
Louis v. East St. Louis Financial Advisory Authority, 188 Ill. 2d 474, 484 (1999). Section 4-6003 is a general provision fixing the
amount of compensation, together with necessary expenses, of
sheriffs in counties with populations of less than 2 million. The
necessary expenses are defined to include the hiring of clerks,
stationery, fuel, and other expenses. Notably absent from this list
is any reference to the payment of judgments. The payment of
judgments is not an expense "such like" clerk personnel,
stationery, or fuel. Thus, an obligation of a county to pay a
judgment entered against a sheriff cannot reasonably be inferred
from the language of section 4-6003.
	Second, section 5-1106 requires county boards to provide,
among other things, "reasonable and necessary expenses for the
use of the county board, county clerk, county treasurer, recorder,
sheriff, coroner, State's attorney, superintendent of schools, judges
and clerks of courts, and supervisor of assessment." 55 ILCS
5/5-1106 (West 2000). Although this provision does not give
examples of the kinds of expenses within the reasonable and
necessary category, the statute is concerned generally with
provisions for county office buildings and for equipment and
repairs (55 ILCS 5/5-1106 (West 2000)). An obligation to pay
judgments simply does not arise from the plain language of this
section.
	Lastly, the majority's opinion does not recognize specific
safeguards designed by the legislature to protect counties from
unrestricted and unlimited liability for judgments rendered against
county sheriffs. Those safeguards, found solely in section 5-1002,
are: (1) a cap of $500,000 in liability for the county; (2) specific
notice requirements to the county; (3) an exemption for the county
if the injury was caused by the sheriff's willful misconduct; and
(4) authority for the county to intervene and to appear and defend
the action (55 ILCS 5/5-1002 (West 2000)). The wisdom of the
majority's decision to sanction a sheriff's authority to settle a
lawsuit that a county is ultimately responsible for paying is
questionable in the first place. Since the Code gives counties the
exclusive authority to levy taxes to pay judgments (see 55 ILCS
5/1-6004 (West 2000)), it is axiomatic that the counties should
have the ultimate authority to settle the underlying lawsuits. 
Beyond this fundamental concern, if the comprehensive indemnity
scheme set out in section 5-1002 is wholly ignored, then a county
could be held responsible for satisfying a judgment in any amount
by reason of a settlement it had no opportunity to approve or even
review stemming from a lawsuit it had no notice of whatsoever.
That concern would be completely alleviated by section 5-1002's
notice requirement and the language allowing counties to
intervene and to appear and defend the action. Under the
majority's opinion, contrary to the legislature's express language,
there is no limitation on the amount of recovery, no notice
requirement, and no authorization for the county to intervene.
	The majority states that it expresses "no opinion with respect
to the validity of a settlement agreement stemming from a lawsuit
of which a county had no notice." Slip op. at 18. I question how
the majority can qualify its opinion in such a way when there is
absolutely no authority, under the majority's opinion, that requires
a county sheriff or deputy to provide the county with notice of the
underlying suit. Having overlooked section 5-1002's safeguards,
the majority was simply left with no other choice but to begin to
graft the section 5-1002 protections onto the general statutory
section.
	Consider for a moment that a sheriff in a case such as the one
at bar decides to settle a lawsuit for $5 million or $50 million or
$5 billion. There being, under the majority's decision, no
limitation on the amount of recovery, no notice requirement, and
no authorization for the county to intervene, there would be
absolutely nothing a county could do to avoid being bound by such
a judgment. How can this result be countenanced?
	The majority attempts to reconcile its position by reasoning
that, under section 5-1002, counties are not required to indemnify
sheriffs for injuries resulting from "wilful misconduct." 55 ILCS
5/5-1002 (West 2000). According to the majority, the county
government could thus "insulate itself from liability" because
" 'all violations of Title VII require discriminatory intent, a form
of wilful misconduct.' "  Slip op. at 10, quoting Carver v. Sheriff
of La Salle County, 243 F.3d 379, 384 (7th Cir. 2001). I
respectfully submit the majority is incorrect. First of all, the scope
of the willful misconduct limitation should be defined in light of
the kinds of remedies available to the victim of the misconduct.
Surely, a county should not be required to indemnify a sheriff for
a murder, a felony, or other egregious behavior. But, the victim of
an official policy decision, resulting in discrimination or a
depravation of constitutionally protected rights could recover a
judgment, even if the policy were the result of a deliberate
decision.  Second, if the county was complicit in the misconduct,
then the plaintiff could sue the county directly.
	Section 5-1002, entitled "Indemnity of sheriff or deputy,"
requires a county to indemnify a sheriff for any judgment
recovered against him for injuries caused while engaged in the
performance of his duties. Given that this statute applies to any
personal injury or property judgment, it applies to the official-capacity judgment at issue in this case. Thus, the "when" portion
of the certified question should depend on a finding of at least
substantial compliance with the terms of that statute. Since I
cannot agree that any other basis exists requiring the county to pay
a judgment entered against a sheriff in his official capacity, I
respectfully dissent.
 



1.      1Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a) allows a judgment creditor to
obtain discovery from "any person," using the procedures provided by
the law of the state where the district court sits. In Illinois, the
governing rule is Illinois Supreme Court Rule 277(a), which authorizes
a judgment creditor to commence a supplementary proceeding "with
respect to a judgment which is subject to enforcement *** against the
judgment debtor or any third party the judgment creditor believes has
property of or is indebted to the judgment debtor." 134 Ill. 2d R. 277(a).
The citation filed by plaintiffs sought to compel La Salle County to
disclose its bank accounts, any appropriations, approvals, consents and
authorizations of monies to be disbursed to the sheriff's office;
documents evidencing any wages due or about to become due to the
sheriff and his employees; and a list of assets owned by the La Salle
County sheriff.

2.      2Our Rule 20 permits the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit to certify a question of Illinois law to this court, where
the question "may be determinative of the said cause, and there are no
controlling precedents in the decisions of this court." 145 Ill. 2d R.
20(a).