Title: GARNICK v. TETON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

GARNICK v. TETON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 12002 WY 1839 P.3d 1034Case Number: 00-213, 00-214Decided: 02/06/2002

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

                                                                                                
   

JESSICA 
GARNICK, 

Appellant(Plaintiff),

v.

TETON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT

NO. 1, a.k.a. TETON COUNTY

SCHOOL DISTRICT NUMBER ONE, 

Appellee(Defendant).

TETON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT

NO. 1 a.k.a TETON COUNTY

SCHOOL DISTRICT NUMBER ONE, 

Appellant(Defendant),

v.

JESSICA GARNICK, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District Court of Teton 
County

The Honorable John D. Troughton, Judge

Representing Jessica Garnick: 

Robert N. Williams of Meyer and Williams, Jackson, 
Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Williams.

 Representing Teton County School District No. 
1: 

Tracy J. Copenhaver of Copenhaver, Kath & Kitchen, LLC, 
Powell, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Copenhaver.

  

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

HILL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court; LEHMAN, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion.

  

            
HILL, Justice. 

[¶1]      Jessica Garnick 
(Garnick) was injured while maneuvering through an obstacle course as part of a 
personal fitness class at Jackson High School.  Garnick is Appellant in Case No. 00-213, and 
Teton County School District No. 1 (the School) is the Appellee.  Although the jury's 
verdict was generally in her favor, Garnick contends that the district court 
committed several errors during the trial of her negligence claim, against the 
School, that require the matter to be reversed and remanded to the district 
court for a new trial.  
In Case No. 00-214 the School is the Appellant and Garnick the 
Appellee.  The 
School contends that the trial court erred in its award of costs to Garnick, and 
Garnick concedes that the award of costs should be modified in some respects. 
 We will affirm 
in Case No. 00-213, and we will modify, but otherwise affirm, the award of costs 
at issue in Case No. 00-214.

[¶2]      In Case No. 00-213, 
Garnick raises these issues:

            
A.  Was 
reversible error committed when the jury, during an onsite inspection, of the 
site of the injury, conducted an independent investigation of the mishap?

            
B.  Did 
the trial court commit reversible error in permitting evidence of a collateral 
source over plaintiff's objection?

            
C.  Did 
the trial court commit reversible error when it failed to excuse juror Shidner 
for cause, when she admitted a bias in favor of the defendant, thereby forcing 
plaintiff to waste a peremptory challenge?

            
D.  Did 
the jury's expression of confusion at the time of the rendition of the verdict 
demonstrate that it didn't understand the instructions of the Court?

            
E.  Did 
the trial court commit reversible error when the procedures established to 
accept a verdict and permit polling of a jury by W.S. §1-11-212 through W.S. § 
1-11-214 were disregarded?

            
F.  Was 
the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury, as plaintiff requested, 
reversible error, and should the trial court have granted a new trial?

The School rephrases those issues thus:

A.  
Was it reversible error for a juror in the presence of the Court and 
counsel, to take a measurement during an on-site inspection, which measurement 
was not objected to and was subsequently placed on the record with counsel being 
given an opportunity to inquire and without any objection?

B.  
Is it reversible error for the trial court to permit testimony relating 
to the availability of services to an injured party and the cost thereof?

C.  
Did the trial court commit reversible error when it refused to excuse 
juror Shidner for cause when she specifically expressed an ability to be fair 
and impartial?

D.  
Did the Court properly and fairly address the concerns of the jury at the 
time of rendering a verdict by allowing them to return to the jury room for 
further deliberations after a clear explanation of the effect of their verdict 
was given to them?

E.  
Did the trial court commit reversible error when it allowed counsel for 
Appellant to poll the jury after rendering its initial verdict and then, after 
clear explanation was given to the jury, accepting the revised verdict without 
requiring the jury to be re-polled when counsel failed to object or request that 
the jury be re-polled?

F.  
Was the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury, as Appellant 
requested, reversible error and should the trial court have granted a new 
trial?

[¶3]      In case No. 00-214, 
the School raises these issues:

I.          
Whether the district court erred in awarding plaintiff costs for 
plaintiff's expert in excess of those costs allowed by the Uniform Rules for 
District Courts?

II.          
Whether the district court erred in awarding plaintiff costs for 
unnecessary depositions?

III.         
Whether the district court erred in awarding plaintiff costs for 
additional deposition transcript excerpts?

IV.        Whether 
the district court erred in awarding plaintiff costs for witness fees in excess 
of those allowed by the rules?

[¶4]      Garnick does not 
provide a statement of the issues for this portion of the appeal but concedes 
that some of the items awarded as costs should be modified, although the bulk of 
them should be affirmed.

[¶5]      Garnick was injured in 
a physical education class at Jackson High School on October 30, 1997.  At that time, she 
was 17 years old.  
Garnick was an accomplished singer, dancer, and actress,1 and before the accident had completed an 
application to attend the Cincinnati Conservatory of Music.2  While completing her 
final exam for the physical fitness class, Garnick was required to jump from a 
balcony, a distance of 13 feet, to a pole vault mat that was 5' wide, 11' long, 
and 2' thick.3  Garnick missed the mat and landed on the 
gymnasium floor.  
She suffered numerous injuries, which included shattering each of her 
ankles.  Both 
will require fusions, which will take away movement in her ankles.  The injuries have 
required considerable medical attention and expense and will continue to do so 
for some time to come.  
Of perhaps greater importance, as a result of her injuries, Garnick will 
not be able to pursue her intended career to any meaningful extent.4  Although the jury never became aware of it, 
the School had, in effect, waived its governmental immunity to the extent of 
$1,000,000.00 by obtaining liability insurance in that amount.

[¶6]      The applicable 
standard of review is this.  The issue comes to this Court upon appeal of 
the district court's denial of a motion for new trial.  Trial courts have 
broad discretion when ruling on a motion for new trial, and they will not be 
reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.  A party seeking reversal has a heavy burden; 
indeed, the party must show that a different result would have been obtained 
absent the abuse.  
Carlson v. Carlson, 888 P.2d 210, 215 (Wyo. 
1995).

[¶7]      Garnick acknowledges 
that she requested the jury visit to the scene of the accident.  If there were 
objections to the request, the School does not make reference to them.  The good judgment of 
the trial court in granting the motion for a jury view is not called into 
question by the parties and, in that regard, we only suggest that a trial court 
may wish to make a clearer record as to the value of such a view than was done 
in this case.  
See 75 Am.Jur.2d Trial §§ 258-60 and 271(checklist for jury view) 
(1991).5  Again, the record does not reflect these 
facts, but it appears to be accepted as true by both parties that the visit 
included the jury, the parties, counsel for both parties, the trial judge, and 
the court reporter.  
The record does not reflect that the jury or the bailiff(s) were 
instructed about any guidelines or limitations with respect to the accident 
scene visit.6  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-11-206 (LexisNexis 2001) 
provides this bit of guidance for a trial court:

When the court considers it proper for the jurors to view 
the property which is the subject of litigation or the place in which any 
material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body under the 
charge of an officer to the place which shall be shown to them by a person 
appointed by the court for that purpose.  While the jurors are absent no person other 
than the person so appointed shall speak to them on any subject connected with 
the trial.

[¶8]      This brief passage in 
the record sets the stage for the visit:

THE COURT:  . . .

            
And I want the record to reflect that we are going out to the school at 
this time.  It's 
a quarter to 10:00.  
We will embark at about five minutes to 10:00.  Counsel is permitted 
to go.  Jessica 
is permitted to be there.  Mrs. Weaver is permitted to be there as the 
representative of the School that's sitting at counsel table.  But we, meaning the 
Jury, the Bailiff, Patricia and I are not going to wait around for you 
folks.  If you 
are there, you can participate.  But if you're not there, we're just going to 
go ahead and look at the gymnasium.

[¶9]      The transcript shows 
this with respect to the proceedings at the gymnasium:

JUROR [E.]:  Could we see the balance beam, where it 
was?

THE COURT:  Is there a person from the school here?  They want to see the 
balance beam.

            
Oh, there is Mrs. Weaver.  Can you put the balance beam up?

MR. COPENHAVER:  Judge, its going to take some time.  It's out in the 
sporting shed.  
She can show them where it was, but that's about it.

THE COURT:  Come show them where it was, Mrs. Weaver. 
(Mrs. Weaver indicated where the balance beam was placed.)

MRS. WEAVER:  you could craw[l] through the obstacle and the 
balance beam starts right about here and goes to about right about here.

MR. MEYER:  Where does it stop?

MRS. WEAVER:  Right back to here.

THE COURT:  Okay.  Mr. Colter, round them up.  Let's go back.

[¶10]   The record contains a reporter's note 
that several inaudible comments were made by jurors to one another during the 
visit.  We learn 
more about the visit, after the fact, when the trial court was compelled to deal 
with a predictable "glitch" that occurred during the accident scene visit:

THE COURT:  Ladies and Gentlemen, I have to make a record 
of at least one thing out there at the gymnasium.  Some of you produced a tape and measured the 
distance from the top rail of the mezzanine down to the mat.  What was the 
distance that you measured?  I want  it has to be part of the record.

JUROR [O.]:  The tape is twelve feet.

THE COURT:  How much was it?

JUROR [O.]:  The tape was twelve feet7.

THE COURT:  Twelve feet.

JUROR [O.]:  And it was just a little bit more.

MR. MEYER:  Was that from the top of the mat or from the 
floor?

JUROR [O.]:  No, from the floor.

MR. MEYER:  From the floor to the rail?

THE COURT:  Any other measurements that you took?

JUROR [O.]:  Nope.

JUROR [E.]:  That's not true.  We kind of measured 
from the end of the beam to the tape.  We didn't have a tape measure, but the tiles 
are a foot by a foot.

THE COURT:  So what was  so what was the distance?

JUROR [E.]:  Eight feet, from the tape next to the 
wall.

MR. MEYER:  Can I ask, your Honor, how they determined 
where the  where the beam ended though?

THE COURT:  Mrs. Weaver showed us  showed the spot where 
the beam was placed and you Jurors, apparently, made a measurement from that 
point to the middle of the  the tape. Is that how it was Mrs. [E.]?

JUROR [E.]:  To the tape closest to the wall.

MR. MEYER:  Okay.  Was there a measurement made to the first 
tape?

JUROR [E.]:  Well, we knew that it was three feet between 
the tape 

MR. MEYER:  Okay.

JUROR [E.]:  -- is what we surmised from that.

MR. MEYER:  Okay.

THE COURT:  Anything else that the jury did out there that 
needs to be made part of the record?

            
Because, you see, what you're doing is evidence, folks.  You are doing your 
own evidence gathering when you start measuring stuff.  And I need to make 
sure that all the evidence is reflected in the record.  That's why I have to 
talk to you about it.

            
Yes, Mrs. [S.]?

JUROR [S.]:  I didn't measure anything, but I don't know if 
this matters.  I 
did feel the thickness of the orange mat that was affixed to the bleachers.

THE COURT:   I think everyone did that.  (Pause.)

            
All right.  
Call your next witness, counsel, please.

[¶11]   Garnick contends that the trial court 
erred in denying her motion for new trial, which was filed after the relatively 
unfavorable verdict was received by the trial court.  Garnick's counsel 
does not contend that any other remedial request was made at the time, for 
example, for a remedial instruction or for a mistrial.8  Counsel for Garnick 
goes on to recite authority relating to unauthorized accident scene visits or 
unauthorized experiments by the jury.  This, of course, was not an unauthorized9 view, but Garnick does assert that the jury 
engaged in "unauthorized" conduct during an authorized visit.10  As set out above, 
Garnick was aware of what occurred and did not seek either remedial instructions 
or to have a mistrial declared.  As a general rule, that failure constitutes a 
bar to any subsequent assertion of the error.  75B Am.Jur.2d Trial 
§ 1725 (1992); also see 
75B Am.Jur.2d Trial §§ 1548-1555 (1992).  In particular, we 
note the text of § 1554:

            
Where it is disclosed prior to the verdict that jurors have engaged in an 
unauthorized view, a prompt objection is required or the losing party will be 
held to have "speculated" on a verdict in his favor and will be barred from 
complaining.  
The error arising from an unauthorized view by a juror of a scene 
pertinent to the trial of the cause in which the juror is sitting must be 
properly assigned, presented, and preserved for appeal.

Also see, DeWitty v. Decker, 383 P.2d 734, 736 (Wyo. 1963).  Garnick refers to an 
affidavit from a juror to help advance a contention that the jury used the 
measurements taken by individual jurors at the view to devaluate the credibility 
of Garnick's case as well as her expert witnesses whose opinions relied on the 
distance from railing to floor being 13 feet. The district court did not 
consider the affidavit, and we approve of that decision.  Garnick's brief does 
not contain cogent argument or pertinent authority that would convince us that 
the trial court abused its discretion in not giving weight to that 
affidavit.  The 
affidavit is inconclusive as to the effect the measurement had on that 
individual juror's views and is speculation as to all other members of the 
jury.  See 75B Am.Jur.2d Trial § 
1555.

[¶12]   We conclude, given the totality of the 
circumstances of this case, and particularly in light of Garnick's failure to 
suggest or seek timely remedial measures, that the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying the motion for new trial.

[¶13]   The admission of evidence is within the 
sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not disturb evidentiary rulings 
unless the appellant demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion.  Young v. HAC, LLC, 2001 WY 50, ¶ 6, 24 P.3d 1142, ¶ 6 
(Wyo. 2001).  
The core of our inquiry must reach the question of the reasonableness of 
the choice made by the trial court.   Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria.  It means a sound 
judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and 
without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.  We must ask ourselves whether the district 
court could reasonably conclude as it did and whether any facet of its ruling 
was arbitrary or capricious.  Carlton v. Carlton, 
997 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Wyo.2000); Young, ¶ 6.

[¶14]   In the presentation of this issue, 
Garnick relies on the case of Banks v. Crowner, 694 P.2d 101, 105 (Wyo. 1985), wherein we adopted the collateral source rule:

We will now consider whether the hospital bills from the 
Veteran's Administration (V.A.) were properly submitted to the jury for 
consideration.  
It is generally held that one who is injured by the tortious conduct of 
another is entitled to recover the reasonable value of the medical services 
necessary to treat the injury.  This is true even if the medical services are 
rendered gratuitously:

"Payments made to or benefits conferred on the injured party 
from other sources are not credited against the tortfeasor's liability, although 
they cover all or a part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable.  Restatement 
(Second), Torts 2d, § 920(A)(2) (1982).  

Comment (c) of the above section reads, in relevant 
part:

"c. The rule that collateral benefits are not subtracted 
from the plaintiff's recovery applies to the following types of benefits:

* * * * * *

"(3) Gratuities.  This applies to cash gratuities and to the 
rendering of services.  
Thus the fact that the doctor did not charge for his services or the 
plaintiff was treated in a veterans hospital does not prevent his recovery for 
the reasonable value of the services."  

See also, Hudson v. Lazarus, 95 
App.D.C. 16, 217 F.2d 344 (1954), where a veteran was treated in a veteran's 
hospital after he sustained injuries in a car accident, the court allowing the 
recovery of such medical and hospital expenses rendered, even though they were 
received gratuitously.  
It is noted in the present case that appellee agreed to reimburse the 
V.A. for all medical services rendered;  however, that matter is between appellee and 
the V.A. and is immaterial to our decision in this case.

[¶15]   Garnick's objection to the admission of 
evidence based on the collateral source rule arose in this context.  The School's expert 
witness, Patrick Renfro, was testifying as a witness designed to rebut Garnick's 
damages.  Renfro 
is a registered nurse and rehabilitation specialist.  Renfro testified on 
many subjects, but when it came to the subject of rehabilitation counseling, the 
following occurred:

            
Q.  How 
about with regard to rehab counseling?  I mean, just with a rehab specialist?

            
A.  Well, 
again, that's something that I do a great deal of.  And as I discussed 
this with Jessica and her mom during our interview, I would anticipate that 
given the fact that her injury has affected some of her goals and plans for the 
future, she might benefit from being able to consult with a rehabilitation 
professional, vocational professional and that there are a variety of ways that 
she can take advantage of that, one of which we mentioned earlier, the high 
school counselor.  
The college that she attends has  she'll have an academic 
counselor.  
She'll also have a placement counselor.  The schools also have available a disabled 
student's counselor who is available to provide assistance and counseling 
specifically to an individual with a disability.  Each state, also, has a Division of Vocational 
Rehabilitation.

            
MR. MEYER:  
Your Honor, I do have an objection based upon the collateral source 
rule.

            
MR. COPENHAVER:  
I don't think those services fall under that, your honor. (Pause.)

            
THE COURT:  
Mr. Meyer, I'm sitting up here contemplating that because I guess I don't 
know whether or not the Plaintiff is claiming a loss because of -- an expense 
that you and I don't have in our lives for rehabilitation counseling.

            
MR. MEYER:  
We're not saying anything about that.  It's going to be up to the jury to decide that 
based upon what they know of Jessica, but we put no testimony in at all that 
this expense  that there will be an expense for this.

            
MR. COPENHAVER:  
Well, --

            
THE COURT:  
Then I do not understand your collateral source objection.

            
MR. MEYER:  
Well, I think the testimony falls within the collateral source and I have 
a legal responsibility to raise the objection.

            
THE COURT:  
Well, it's overruled then.

            
Q.  Do 
you remember where you were?

            
A.  Yes, 
I just mentioned the Division of Vocation Rehabilitation which is a program an 
individual has to qualify for and which would provide rehabilitation 
counseling.  It 
could provide assistance with even equipment or training expenses, if the person 
needed those services from a financial standpoint.  But those are two 
examples of the types of services from a rehabilitation counseling standpoint 
that are available to Jessica and which would be of assistance to her in making 
decisions, figuring out what kinds of accommodations would be appropriate to 
allow her to be as functional as possible in her chosen vocational pursuits.

            
Q.  And 
are those available at no cost?

            
A.  Yes, 
sir.

[¶16]   The only objection broached by counsel 
for Garnick was the collateral source rule.  However, Garnick had received no gratuitous 
services of the nature discussed in the testimony solicited from Renfro, nor was 
she making any claims for damages in that regard, and, therefore, the district 
court overruled the objection.  For the sake of clarity, it is worth 
mentioning that the testimony appears to have had no relevance whatsoever, and 
it is apparent that some of it may have been quite inaccurate.  Of course, at the 
time of trial, Garnick was no longer in high school, so she could not very well 
have gone back to her high school alma mater to seek services.  There is nothing in 
the record to suggest that Garnick was "disabled," or that she needed vocational 
rehabilitation, or that she could have qualified for those services if she did 
need them.  As a 
matter of fact, there is nothing in the testimony introduced in Garnick's behalf 
that she needed any of the services discussed in the above-quoted portion of 
Renfro's testimony.  
It is, however, clear from the tenor of the testimony that it was 
intended to convey to the jury that it should not award any money to Garnick for 
such services as those enumerated in the above-quoted testimony because she 
could get them for free, or in the event that she might need them in the future 
they would be free.  To that extent, the collateral source rule is 
relevant, and it would have been prudent for the district court to have 
sustained the objection.  The objection was in the "ballpark" but, more 
importantly, it was readily apparent that the testimony was otherwise irrelevant 
and, thus, inadmissible.  However, we do not see this oversight on the 
part of the trial court as constituting reversible error.  It is de minimus 
and, if error at all, harmless.  W.R.C.P. 61.11

Failure of Trial Court to Strike a Juror for Cause

[¶17]   Garnick contends that the district court 
committed reversible error in denying her request to challenge a juror for 
cause.12  The basis for the challenge lay in a potential 
bias of the juror in favor of the School and its chief witnesses.  We apply an abuse of 
discretion standard to a trial court's ruling on a challenge for cause.  Krahn v. Pierce, 485 P.2d 1021, 1024 (Wyo. 1971).  In connection with 
the review standard, Garnick does point out a recent decision of this Court 
wherein we opined, in the form of dicta, that district judges should be wary of 
rehabilitating a prospective juror who has vehemently articulated bias or 
prejudice with respect to a party or issue.  Ormsby v. Dana Kepner 
Company of Wyoming, Inc., 997 P.2d 465, 472 (Wyo. 2000).  While that remains 
sound advice, it does not alter the applicable standard of review or Garnick's 
burden of persuasion with respect to this issue.  More importantly, nothing resembling a 
"vehemently articulated bias or prejudice with respect to a party or issue" can 
be found in this record.

[¶18]   Garnick contends that because this juror 
was a "friend" of Mr. Holzer, who was the gym teacher who designed the obstacle 
course on which Garnick injured herself, the trial court should have granted a 
challenge for cause.  
The record shows that the juror indicated she knew Holzer because he had 
coached her children, both children had done the obstacle course as a part of 
their schooling, and because she had taken some "ropes" courses that Holzer 
taught.  She did 
consider Holzer to be a friend.  Her children knew Garnick, and one of them 
talked to Garnick about the accident wherein Garnick was injured.  After these facts 
were revealed by the juror, she was asked if her relationship with Holzer would 
cause her problems in serving as a juror, to which she answered "No."  When asked if she 
could give Garnick a "fair shake," she answered "Yes."  In several follow-up 
questions, the juror continued to indicate she could be fair.  Garnick includes in 
this challenge the fact that the juror also knew the high school principal, but 
the juror likewise indicated that would create no problems in her jury 
service.  Later 
in the voir dire, it was revealed that one of the juror's sons served as a 
teaching assistant for Mr. Holzer.  Counsel for Garnick again asked if that would 
make it difficult for her to serve as a juror, and she indicated that it "could 
be," and that it might be "awkward" for her.  Based upon those responses, counsel asked that 
the juror be excused.  
The trial court then asked if she could be fair to both sides, and the 
juror responded, "I guess I still feel that I could listen to both sides and 
judge fairly."  
The trial court indicated that that was "fair enough for me," and denied 
the request.  
Counsel then asked another series of questions and concluded that series 
by asking the juror if, "as you sit here on this jury, could you give Jessica 
Garnick the same consideration you would give Mr. Holzer?"  The juror answered, 
"Yes."  On two 
more occasions, counsel for Garnick renewed his objections to the seating of 
this juror and, although the trial court expressed some misgivings about the 
juror, he did not alter his initial ruling.

[¶19]   We are unable to characterize these 
circumstances as an abuse of discretion, and Garnick has cited no pertinent 
authority that would dissuade us from this conclusion.  We note briefly that 
Garnick goes to some length to describe the juror upon whom they would have 
exercised a peremptory challenge had they not found it necessary to use it on 
the juror more fully described above.  We need not further elaborate on that matter 
because we find no error in the trial court's denial of the challenge for 
cause.

[¶20]   The standard of review is that set out 
above with respect to a trial court's ruling on a motion for new trial.  In this regard, we 
also note that the verdict form used by the trial court was that proposed by 
Garnick, and that Garnick made no objections to the use of the verdict form.

[¶21]   It is evident that this jury did have 
some trouble with the rendition of its verdict.  We set out the verdict form exactly as the 
jury filled it in, in order to make clear the genesis of this issue:

VERDICT FORM AND INTERROGATORIES

            
We, the jury, duly impaneled and sworn in this case, do unanimously find 
as follows:

1a.  Do you find, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that defendant TETON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 was negligent?

                                    
Yes     x      

                                    
No   
_____

If your answer above is "yes" move to question 1b.

If your answer above is "no" sign the verdict form and give 
it to the bailiff.

1b.  Do you find, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that such negligence was a cause of the injuries to plaintiff, JESSICA 
GARNICK.

                                    
Yes     x      

                                    
No    
_____

If your answer above is "yes" move to question 2a.

If your answer above is "no" sign the verdict form and give 
it to the bailiff.

2a.  Do you find, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that plaintiff JESSICA GARNICK was negligent?

                                    
Yes     x      

                                    
No   
_____

If your answer above is "yes" move to question 2b.

If your answer above is no" move to question 
4.

2b.  Do you find, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that such negligence was a cause of the injuries to plaintiff, JESSICA 
GARNICK.

                                    
Yes     x      

                                    
No  
_____

If your answer above is "yes" move to question 3.

If your answer above is "no" move to question 4.

3.  
Considering all of the fault at 100%, what percentage of the total fault 
is attributable to each of the following for the negligence claims only?

A.  
Defendant School District  (0% to 100%)     50%  

B.  
Plaintiff Jessica Garnick (0% to 100%)        50%

                        
Total                                        
      100%

            
(the total must equal 100%)

If you find that Jessica Garnick's fault is greater than 
50%, sign the verdict and return it to the baileff [sic].  If you find that Jessica Garnick's fault is 
less than or equal to 50%, Please go on to question 4.

4.  
Without considering the percentage of fault attributed as above, what 
total amount of damages do you find was sustained by Plaintiff Jessica Garnick 
(Note, the Judge will make appropriate deductions for fault attributable to the 
plaintiff, Jessica Garnick, if any)

                                                
     250,000.00

                                                
$   150,000.00

[¶22]   The verdict form was, of course, dated 
and signed by the foreperson of the jury.  The second to the last instruction given to 
the jury (Instruction No. 20) was as follows:

This case must be determined on the basis of comparative 
fault.  In 
deciding the case you will need to know the meaning of the terms "negligence" 
and "fault."

When the word negligence is used in these instructions, it 
means the failure to use ordinary care.  Ordinary care means the degree of care which 
might reasonably be expected of the ordinary careful person under the same or 
similar circumstances.  
The law does not say how such an ordinary careful person would act.  That is for you to 
decide.

A person is at fault when that person is negligent and that 
person's negligence is a cause of the injury or damages for which the claim is 
made.

It will be necessary for you to determine the percentage of 
fault, if any, of each of the persons involved in the occurrence.  It also will be 
necessary for you to determine the amount of damages sustained by any party 
claiming damages.

Your findings as to fault will affect the plaintiff's 
recovery.  It is 
my duty to explain how that may occur.

The defendant's liability for damages is limited by the 
percentage of fault, if any, that you find is attributable to the defendant.

The recovery for the plaintiff is reduced by the percentage 
of fault, if any, that you find attributable to the plaintiff, Jessica 
Garnick.

Should you determine that plaintiff, Jessica Garnick's, 
fault exceeds fifty percent, the plaintiff will not be entitled to recover any 
damages.

In explaining the consequences of your verdict, the court 
has not meant to imply that any person is at fault.  That is for you to 
decide in conformity with these instructions.

[¶23]   The case was submitted to the jury, and 
the jury retired for its deliberations at 2:03 p.m. on November 9, 1999.  The jury deliberated 
until late into the night.  At 11:47 p.m. that same day, the trial court 
called the jury into the courtroom, apparently believing that the jury may have 
been unable to reach a verdict.  The jury indicated that it was not having 
trouble reaching a verdict, and the trial court sent the jury back to the jury 
room to continue its deliberations at 11:53 p.m.  The jury then returned to the courtroom at 
12:12 a.m. on November 10, 1999, with a verdict.  The verdict was read and, as shown above, the 
jury initially awarded Garnick $150,000.00 in damages.  The jury was polled, 
and each juror acknowledged the verdict.  The trial court then asked counsel if the jury 
should be polled further.  Counsel for Garnick asked the trial court to 
ask the jury if its intended verdict was that Garnick receive only $75,000.00 in 
damages.  This 
exchange then occurred in the courtroom:

THE COURT:  The result of your verdict, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, will be that Jessica Garnick recovers $75,000.00.  That's what I will 
do, because you have found her to be 50% at fault.  The amount that she 
will recover is $75,000.00  Is there anyone  how do I ask the question? 
(Pause.)

Is anyone surprised by what I have just told you?

(Several jurors responded by nods.)

            
JUROR [W.][Foreperson]:  Yes.

            
THE COURT:  
Mrs. [W.], do you feel that you can speak for the entire Jury?

           
JUROR [W.]:  
Yes.

            
THE COURT:  
Is there someone that doesn't think Mrs. [W.] can speak for them?  (No response.)

            
You are surprised by the result, Mrs. [W.]?

            
JUROR [W.]:  
Yes.

            
THE COURT:  
What do you want me to do now counsel?

            
MR. WILLIAMS:  
Give the verdict form back to the Jury and let them --  I would like to 
confer with Counsel before we 

MR MEYER:  They may need additional instruction, your 
Honor, to know the effect of the verdict.  (Pause.)

           
THE COURT:  
Sit down, Gentlemen.

            
This is not the first time this has happened to me, folks, okay?

            
Its [sic] instruction No. 20, which provides 
in pertinent part:  
It will be necessary for you to determine the percentage of fault, if 
any, of each of the persons involved in the occurrence.  It also will be 
necessary for you to determine the amount of damages sustained by any party 
claiming damages.  
Your findings as to fault will affect the Plaintiff's recovery.  It is my duty to 
explain how that may occur.  The Defendant's liability for damages is 
limited by the percentage of fault, if any, that you find is attributable to the 
Defendant.  The 
recovery for Plaintiff is reduced by the percentage of fault, if any, that you 
find attributable to the Plaintiff Jessica Garnick.  Should you determine 
that Plaintiff Jessica Garnick's fault exceeds 50%, the Plaintiff will not be 
entitled to recover any damages.  (Pause.)

            
The verdict, please, Mrs. Hawkins.  (Pause.)

            
With respect to damages, the verdict provides in Question 4:  Without considering 
the percentage of fault attributed as above, what total amount of damage  
damages do you find was sustained by Plaintiff Jessica Garnick?  Note, the Judge will 
make appropriate deductions for fault attributable to the Plaintiff Jessica 
Garnick, if any.

            
Now, I do not know for certain what your intent is.  I do not want to 
know what your intent is.  But I  and I want no discussion from 
you.  I want no 
indication from any of you what your intent is, but I will give you my 
interpretation.

            
My interpretation is that you wanted Jessica Garnick to have 
$150,000.00.  I 
have no way of knowing whether I am right or whether I am wrong, but I  that's 
what I think.  
And I believe that I must send you back, after having read these 
instructions and after having told you to consider all of the other instructions 
as well as the ones that I have read to you; and if you believe that your 
verdict needs to be corrected, then you shall correct it.  If you do not 
believe that it should be corrected, you should not correct it.

            
Now, I tell you those things because I recently had a jury in Uinta 
County where the verdict form was not correct.  When I talked to the jury about what they 
meant to do in the jury verdict, they told me.  Both parties knew what the Jury wanted 
done.  There was 
a raging blizzard outside, so I sent the Jury home without sending them back to 
correct the verdict form and guess what?  I'm going through a new trial because I didn't 
send the jury back to correct the verdict.  And when I didn't do that, both sides said "I 
won.  I don't 
care what the Jury told you in open court, Judge.  My side of the case won.  I'm going to 
appeal."  So I 
said, "Well, if that's what you're going to do, we're going to have a new 
trial."  And the 
Supreme Court said, "Judge Troughton, you're right.  Give them a new 
trial."

            
So I think I have to send you back so that you can discuss among 
yourselves whether or not you think the verdict is a correct verdict, whether it 
expresses your intent or whether it doesn't; and to make whatever changes you 
think are necessary to the verdict.

            
Mr. Williams, do you have any objection to that?

            
MR. WILLIAMS:  
No, your Honor.

            
THE COURT:  
Mr. Copenhaver?

            
MR. COPENHAVER:  
No, your Honor.

            
THE COURT:  
Now, with the parties' permission, I will tell the Jury that the simple 
thing for them to do is just to change the number in the last question.  Is that all right 
with you, Mr. Williams?

            
MR. WILLIAMS:  
Yes, sir.

            
THE COURT:  
How about it for you, Mr. Copenhaver?

            
MR. COPENHAVER:  
If that's their intent, that's fine, your Honor.

            
THE COURT:  
Yes, because if that's not what you wanted her to have  if you wanted 
her to have $150,000, then you need to change that figure to $300,000.  That's the simple 
solution.  But 
you do what you believe is the appropriate thing to do.  I am not instructing 
you to do anything because it's your decision; and it's something that you folks 
have to resolve because you're the judges of this, not me.  All I can do is to 
try to make sure you understand things.  I don't want any of you to think that I'm 
telling you what to do because I'm not.  The last thing in the world that I want to do 
in this case is to do that to you folks.  Because if I do that, I'm going to get an 
appeal.  And I 
don't want an appeal in this case.  I want it to be over.

            
All right.  
Mr. Colter, will you take the Instructions and the Jury Verdict and have 
the Jury retire.  
We'll stand by, folks.

[¶24]   The jury then returned to continue its 
deliberations at 12:27 a.m. on November 10, 1999, and returned seven minutes 
later with its revised verdict.  As shown above, the verdict was changed from 
$150,000.00 to $250,000.00.  The Court did ask the jury foreperson if that 
was correct, and the response was "Yes."  The trial court said it would not further poll 
the jury.  It 
then asked counsel for both parties if there was anything further, and both said 
"No."  The jury 
was then excused.  
A few minutes later, with the jury gone and after the trial court 
explained to counsel and Jessica Garnick herself that it would not have found 
Garnick to be 50% at fault and that he would have awarded her more money if it 
was up to him, counsel for Garnick lodged two objections to the verdict.  The first was based 
on a theory that the jury still did not get the amount of damages right, i.e., it appeared to want her to have $150,000, but only 
changed its verdict to award $125,000.  The second was to the effect that the trial 
court should have further polled the jury.  The trial court's position was that both of 
those issues should have been raised before the jury was excused.

[¶25]   Garnick contends that this scenario 
clearly demonstrates profound confusion on the part of the jury, that the jury 
did not take enough time to seriously reflect on its modified verdict, and that 
the trial court should have allowed further polling of the jury.  Taking into account 
all circumstances shown by the record, including the fact that Garnick failed to 
object to the trial court's decision not to further poll the jury or to 
specifically ask for such polling when the trial court gave the opportunity for 
such a request, we will not conclude that the trial court abused its discretion 
in denying the motion for new trial.

[¶26]   Garnick contends that the trial court 
erred in refusing several jury instructions she offered.  The function of jury 
instructions is to give the jury guidance with respect to the applicable 
law.  A trial 
court is not obligated to give an offered instruction, so long as the jury is 
adequately instructed on the law as it pertains to the case at hand.  We do not reverse a 
trial court's rulings on an instruction unless it is demonstrated that the 
instruction was necessary to impart to the jury the proper principles of law 
that are applicable to the case and, further, that the proponent of the refused 
instruction can show prejudice.  Ormsby, 997 P.2d 465 at 471; Reese v. Board of Directors of Memorial 
Hospital of Laramie County, 955 P.2d 425, 427 (Wyo. 1998).

[¶27]   Garnick first contends that the trial 
court erred in refusing to give the following premises liability 
instruction:

            
Teton County School District No. 1 must use ordinary care to keep the 
obstacle course in a reasonably safe condition for the purpose for which it was 
reasonably intended.

            
In connection with that duty, the school district also has the 
affirmative duty to protect students against dangers known to exist by it and 
also to protect against dangers which it should discover by the use of 
reasonable care.

It is contended that the instruction is loosely based on our 
holding in Rhoades v. K-Mart Corporation, 863 P.2d 626, 629 (Wyo. 1993), as well as W.P.J.I.C. 9.03 (1994), which provides:

            
A landlord must use ordinary care to keep the [stairs, hallways, walks, 
and so forth] in a reasonably safe condition for the purpose for which the 
[stairs, hallways, walks and so forth] were reasonably intended.

[¶28]   Without reciting all of the instructions 
given, suffice it to say we are persuaded that the message intended to be 
conveyed to the jury, by that proposed instruction, was adequately conveyed to 
the jury by other instructions.  It is also abundantly clear that Garnick was 
permitted wide latitude in arguing her point to the jury that the School was 
negligent with respect to the set-up and use of the obstacle course.  In addition, this 
case was not really postured as a premises liability case, although an 
instruction like that offered might well have been given without prejudice to 
the School.  
Finally, we do not see that Garnick was prejudiced by the failure of the 
trial court to give the instruction.

[¶29]   Next, Garnick contends that the trial 
court erred in failing to give its "theory of the case" instruction:

            
The plaintiff in this case is Jessica Garnick.  The defendant in 
this case is Teton County School District No.1.  Jessica Garnick claims as follows:

            
The "railing to mat" jump located in the obstacle course was dangerous 
and the school district employees should not have permitted its use.  The railing was too 
high to jump from, the mat was too small to adequately protect obstacle course 
participants and the obstacle course instructions were inadequate.

[¶30]   For this proposition, Garnick relies on 
Bigley v. Craven, 769 P.2d 892, 894-98 (Wyo. 1989) 
(citing Short v. Spring Creek Ranch, Inc., 731 P.2d 1195, 1199-2000 (Wyo. 1987)); also see Langdon v. 
Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corporation, 494 P.2d 537, 541 (Wyo. 1972).  It is true those 
cases require that a trial court give a theory of the case instruction but only 
if it is also a clear declaration of the law.  An instruction that is not consistent with law 
should be refused.  
Short, 731 P.2d  at 1200.  The offered 
instruction is not a statement of the law that would govern the facts in this 
case but a statement of the facts that tend to support Garnick's legal 
theory.  In 
argument to the jury, Garnick was permitted full rein in this regard.  However, the 
authority cited does not require a trial court to give the jury an instruction 
that summarizes a party's factual contentions.  We find no error in the refusal of the offered 
instruction.

[¶31]   Garnick also contends that the trial 
court erred in failing to give a concurrent cause instruction:

            
There may be more than one cause of injury, that is, there may be 
concurrent causes.

            
Concurrent causes do not always occur simultaneously.  One cause may be 
continuous in operation and joined with another cause at a later time.

[¶32]   The offered instruction is an accurate 
recitation of W.P.J.I.C. 3.05 (1994), but we do not consider the instruction to 
have been necessary or appropriate under the circumstances of this case.  Concurrent cause, of 
necessity, requires the actions of at least a third party, or force, (although 
there may be a fourth, a fifth, etc.).  3 Stuart M. Speiser, 
Charles F. Krause, Alfred Gans, The American Law of 
Torts, § 11.5 (1986); Natural Gas Processing Company 
v. Hull, 886 P.2d 1181, 1186-87 (Wyo. 1994).  Here, the proposed instruction does not appear 
to relate to the theories presented to the jury which were that the School was 
negligent (Garnick's theory) and that Garnick was negligent (the School's 
theory).  The 
instruction would have served no purpose under the circumstances of this case, 
and there was no error in the trial court refusing it.

[¶33]   Finally, Garnick contends that the 
errors discussed above, when viewed cumulatively, require a new trial.  As is so often the 
case with cumulative error arguments, they are dependent on this Court agreeing 
that any error existed.  In this instance, the furthest we are able to 
go is that the trial court's asserted error in the admission of evidence 
obtained by the jury during its visit would have at most been harmless 
error.  In all 
other respects, we find no error.  That problems were encountered in this case 
cannot be denied, but all of the problems were capable of resolution short of a 
mistrial or a new trial.  Trials are required to be fair, but they need 
not be perfect.

[¶34]   The School contends that the district 
court erred in its award of costs.  At the conclusion of the trial, the district 
court awarded Garnick a total of $11,442.11 in costs.  The School contends 
that this amount should be reduced to $6,075.14.  Garnick concedes that the award of costs 
should be reduced to $8,425.21.  Thus, our resolution of these issues need only 
deal with the middle ground between those two figures.

[¶35]   Costs are governed by statute and court 
rules.  Synder v. Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079, 1091 (Wyo. 1999); 
Hashimoto v. Marathon Pipe Line Company, 767 P.2d 158, 167-69 (Wyo. 1989); Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361, 1372 (Wyo. 1986): Bi-Rite Package, Inc. v. District 
Court of the Ninth Judicial District of Fremont County, 735 P.2d 709, 712 
(Wyo. 1987).  
Within the confines set out above, the determination of allowable costs 
to be taxed is within the discretion of the trial court.  Hashimoto, 767 P.2d at 168-69; State v. Dieringer, 708 P.2d 1, 11-13 (Wyo. 1985).

[¶36]   An expert witness "shall be allowed 
witness fees of twenty-five dollars ($25.00) per day or such other amount as the 
court allows according to the circumstances of the case."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-14-102(b) (LexisNexis 2001).  For purposes of costs in this case, the 
district court was authorized to "award and tax costs and apportion them between 
the parties on the same or adverse sides as it deems right and equitable."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-14-126(a) (LexisNexis 2001); also see W.R.C.P. 54(d) and U.R.D.C. 501(a).13

[¶37]   We will not analyze the School's 
argument in detail because the School has failed to support its contentions with 
cogent argument or pertinent authority.  Moreover, the School's arguments are not 
written with the applicable standard of review in mind.  In addition, such an 
analysis would not, in any way, further advance our jurisprudence with respect 
to costs in a case such as this.  We accept Garnick's concession that costs 
should be reduced to the amount of $8,425.21 because expert witness fees awarded 
were excessive in that they should not have been paid for out of court 
preparation time.

[¶38]   The judgment of the district court is 
affirmed.  The 
order awarding costs is affirmed as modified above.  The case is remanded 
to the district court for the purpose of entering an order reducing the award of 
costs to $8,425.21.

  

LEHMAN, Chief Justice, dissenting. 

[¶39]   I respectfully dissent.  My apprehension in 
this case evolves from the purported confusion of the jury regarding the amount 
of damages awarded to appellant.  The majority correctly points out that both 
parties agreed to the procedure used by the court and, beyond that, I 
acknowledge that appellee did not raise it as an issue.  It was raised, 
however, in a different context by plaintiff and is of such fundamental import 
that I must give comment.

[¶40]   The jury, after determining the 
comparative fault of the parties, first returned with a verdict of 
$150,000.  Those 
damages were written in by the jury in a blank under the paragraph which 
read:

            
Without considering the percentage of fault attributed as above, what 
total amount of damages do you find was sustained by Plaintiff Jessica 
Garnick  (Note, 
the Judge will make appropriate deductions for fault attributable to the 
plaintiff, Jessica Garnick, if any)

[¶41]   When compared to instructions courts 
provide to jurors involving complex legal theories, that language seems 
relatively straight forward.  The jury asked no questions during its 
deliberations, and, when initially polled, the jurors acknowledged that the 
$150,000 was in fact its verdict.  What followed, however, was further inquiry 
about the jurors' intent, with the ultimate explanation by the court that if the 
jury wanted the plaintiff 
to get $150,000, it would have to award her $300,000.  The only reason this 
issue was presented to the court at all was the jury came back with a $250,000 
verdict rather than the $300,000, and the plaintiff thought that proved 
confusion on the part of the jury.

[¶42]   My problem, of course, is that the jury 
first determined the total amount of damages it felt plaintiff had 
suffered.  That 
is what the law requires; that is what the jurors were instructed to find.  The jurors performed 
their difficult task, and the only remaining duty of the court was to apply the 
law of contributory negligence based upon the percentage of fault determined by 
the jury.  What 
appears to have occurred, however, is that the increased damage amount from 
$150,000 to $250,000 was determined by the jury, not based upon what the actual 
damages it felt occurred to the plaintiff, but what amount the jurors wanted the plaintiff to 
receive.

[¶43]   In fact the colloquy from the court as 
it was reinstructing the jury regarding damages included language about what the 
jury wanted the plaintiff 
to have.  
Quoting from a portion of the discussion:

THE COURT:  Yes, because if that's not what you wanted her 
to haveif you wanted her to have $150,000, then you need to change that figure 
to $300,000.  
That's the simple solution.  But you do what you believe is the appropriate 
thing to do.

[¶44]   The question is not what the jury, the 
court, or counsel want the plaintiff to receive.  The question is not how to avoid application 
of comparative fault statutes.  The question is what damages were incurred by 
the plaintiff.  
The above instruction given by the court is not in accordance with 
law.  The error 
of law committed is, I believe, so fundamental and clearly resulted in a 
different verdict, that it cannot be ignored.  I would reverse for a new trial in which a 
jury would be allowed to determine once again the percentage of fault attributed 
to the parties and, without influence, the total amount of damages it felt was 
actually suffered by plaintiff.

FOOTNOTES

   1Garnick's 
family operated a dude ranch and summer theater in Jackson.  She starred or 
otherwise appeared in many theater productions.  Her life had been built around the theater, 
which she planned to pursue as a career.  There was evidence to the effect that musical 
theater requires three distinct talents: to sing well, dance well, and act 
well.  As a 
result of her injuries, Garnick lost one of the three requirements, and a second 
was seriously impaired, i.e., she could no longer 
dance, and her ability to move gracefully on stage is hampered by a permanent 
limp.

   
2There is evidence in the record that assesses the 
Cincinnati Conservatory as one of the institutions that attracts those looking 
for talent for Broadway musicals.

   
3Thus, the distance from the railing to the floor was 
13', but the distance from the railing to the mat was 11'.  The evidence also 
showed that over a period of 16 years, 10,000 students had done the obstacle 
course, and Garnick was the only person to have missed the mat.

   
4The School presented evidence that the "average" 
musical theater performer earns only about $13,000.00 per year, whereas, as a 
music education teacher, Garnick could earn over $30,000.00 a year.  At the time of 
trial, Garnick was attending college with a goal of obtaining a degree in music 
education.  
There was evidence that Garnick was considerably more than average and 
that she had the talent, charisma, and competitive drive to succeed in musical 
theater.

   
5As a general rule, a trial court would decline to 
allow a jury view where conditions are changed in some material way.  75 Am.Jur.2d Trial § 260 (1991).  In this instance, it is difficult to determine 
whether the changes in the accident scene were "material."  The gymnasium was 
apparently the same, but it became obvious (in hindsight) that it did not look, 
and was not set up, as it was on the date of Garnick's injuries.

   
6Where a view by a jury is had, the jurors should be 
instructed as to the purpose and effect of the visit.  The failure to give 
such instructions may be without prejudice.  "The jury may be instructed that after having 
made an inspection of the premises, it is not bound to accept as true any 
testimony which it believes to be untrue after a personal inspection of the 
matter testified about, or it may be instructed to return a verdict according to 
testimony if it is in conflict with what its personal inspection has 
disclosed."  75B 
Am.Jur.2d Trial § 1234 (1992).  Of particular 
importance will be instructions to the jury with regard to whether the view is 
"evidence."  75 
Am.Jur.2d Trial § 264 (1991).

   
7In context, it seems clear that the juror was using a 
tape measure that was 12' in length, and that the measurement was 12' plus "a 
little bit more."  
Thus, the difference between Garnick's expert's measurements and that of 
the jury is a matter of inches.

   
8The district court's findings in this regard are 
found in its decision letter denying Garnick's motion for a new trial, or for an 
additur:

Third, when parties insist upon the jury visiting the 
accident scene, they accept the risks inherent in such an endeavor.  Among the risks is 
the inability to predict or guard against what 12 strong-willed people might do 
during their site visit.  In this case, the jury decided to feel the 
pole vault mat and to measure the height of the mezzanine.

Because the jury did their own measurements, the 
Court made their activities and findings part of the evidence and record.  The Court gave the 
parties an opportunity to deal with the actions of the jury, as they deemed 
appropriate.

No request for remedial actions were [sic] made by either party and no objections were 
raised.  
Therefore, the objections, if any, to the jury's activities were 
waived.

If either the jury or the Court committed error, 
under the plain error doctrine, the errors are harmless.  The measurements 
made by the jury did not differ significantly from the measurements made by the 
Plaintiffs.

  9An unauthorized view occurs when a juror or jurors 
goes to the scene without benefit of court supervision.  See 75B Am.Jur.2d Trial §§ 1548-55 (1992).

10"Just as it is improper for them to do so at other times, 
the jury may not make experiments, demonstrations, or tests during an authorized 
view.  Where the 
test, experiment, or demonstration relates to matters not in dispute or which 
are immaterial, however, the conduct of the jury, although susceptible of 
criticism, is to be considered not prejudicial."

"A party will be deemed to have waived objection to 
misconduct of this kind by failing to raise proper objection or to otherwise 
bring the matter to the attention of the court at the trial when he or his 
counsel has knowledge of such misconduct and the opportunity to raise objection 
thereto."  75 
Am.Jur.2d Trial § 269 (1991).

   
11W.R.C.P. 61 states:

"No error in either the admission or the exclusion of 
evidence and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or 
omitted by the court or by any of the parties is ground for granting a new trial 
or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying or otherwise 
disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to 
the court inconsistent with substantial justice.  The court at every stage of the proceeding 
must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties."

   12Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-11-203 (LexisNexis 2001) (emphasis added) states:

§ 
1-11-203. Challenges for cause; grounds.

            
(a) Challenges for cause may be taken on one (1) or more of the following 
grounds:

(i) A lack of any of the qualifications prescribed by 
statute which render a person competent as a juror;

            
(ii) Relationship by consanguinity or affinity within the third degree to 
either party;

            
(iii) Standing in the relation of debtor or creditor, guardian or ward, 
master or servant, or principal or agent to either party, or being a partner 
united in business with either party, or being security on any bond or 
obligation for either party;

(iv) Having served as a juror or a witness in a 
previous trial between the same parties for the same cause of action, or being 
then a witness therein;

(v) Interest on the part of the juror in the event or 
question involved in the action, but not an interest of the juror as a member or 
citizen of a municipal corporation;

(vi) Having formed or expressed an unqualified 
opinion or belief as to the merits or the main question of the action.  The reading of 
newspaper accounts of the subject matter before the court shall not disqualify 
the juror either for bias or opinion;

(vii) The existence of a 
state of mind in the juror evincing enmity or bias for either party.

   
13       (a) Civil 
Cases.

            
(1) Filing of Certificate of Costs.  Within 20 days after entry of the final 
judgment allowing costs to the prevailing party, a certificate of costs shall be 
filed and copy served upon opposing counsel.  The certificate shall be itemized.  For witness fees, 
the certificate shall contain:

(A)                
The name of 
the witness;

(B)                
Place of 
residence, or the place where subpoenaed, or the place to which the witness 
voluntarily traveled without a subpoena to attend;

(C)                
The number 
of full days or half days the witness actually testified in court;

(D)                
The number 
of days or half days the witness traveled to and from the place of trial;

(E)                
The exact 
number of miles traveled;

(F)                
The manner 
of travel, air, railroad, bus or private vehicle; and,

(G)               
If common 
carrier transportation is used, the price of an economy fare.

            
(2) Objections to Certificate of Costs.  If no objections are served within 10 days 
after service of the certificate of costs, the costs shall be taxed as set forth 
in the certificate of costs.  If objections are filed, the court shall 
consider the objections and tax costs.  A hearing may be provided at the discretion 
of the court.

            
(3) Allowable Costs.

      (A) Filing Fees, jury 
demand fees, and fees for services of process.  (W.S. § 18-3-608 sets forth sheriff 
fees.)

            
(B) Witness Fees.

(i) Witness fees are allowed at the rate of $30.00 
per day and $15.00 per half day necessarily spent traveling to and from the 
proceeding and in attendance at the proceeding.  Mileage is allowed at the rate of $.23 per 
mile, not to exceed the costs of common carrier transportation rates.

(ii) Expert witness fees shall be allowed at the 
rate of $25.00 per day or such other amount as the court may allow according to 
the circumstances of the case.  If the amount allowed constitutes a higher 
hourly rate than $25.00 per day, this higher amount is allowable only for the 
time that the expert witness actually testified.  Time charged in preparation for providing 
testimony and/or standing by awaiting the call to give testimony is not 
allowable as costs, except at the rate of $25.00 per day.

(C) Reporter Fees.  The $45.00 fee is a taxable cost.  Transcripts of 
proceedings, such as motion hearings, pretrial conferences, etc., prepared at 
the request of a party in anticipation of trial are not taxable as costs unless 
such matters become part of the record on appeal.

            
(D) Costs of Depositions.

(i) Costs of depositions are taxable if reasonably 
necessary for the preparation of the case for trial.  A deposition is 
deemed reasonably necessary if:

I.   
 Read to the jury as 
provided in Rule 32(a)(3), W.R.C.P.;

II.       Used at trial for impeachment 
concerning a material line of testimony (impeachment on a collateral issue does 
not fall within the scope of this rule);

III.      Necessarily, and not merely 
conveniently, used to refresh the recollection of a witness while on the stand; 
or

IV.    
Was taken at 
the request of a non-prevailing party.  The foregoing are meant to provide 
guidelines, and are not exhaustive.  The use of depositions for trial preparation 
alone does not justify the imposition of costs.

(ii) Reporters fees for depositions.  Actual, ordinary 
reporting fees will be allowed.  Extra costs for expediting transcripts or 
daily copy costs will not be allowed, except as authorized by an order entered 
prior to the date such costs are to be incurred.  Reporters' travel, per diem expenses and 
appearance fees will not be taxed as costs.

(iii) Fees and expenses of counsel.  Fees and expenses 
of counsel for traveling to and attending depositions are not taxable as 
costs.

            
(E) Copies of Papers.  Duplicating costs necessarily incurred for 
documents admitted into evidence shall be allowed.  Duplication costs 
for documents for counsel's own use are not allowable.

            
(F) Exhibits Received in Evidence.  The expense of preparing exhibits received in 
evidence, including 8 by 11 photographs (but not enlargements), videotapes, 
models and other demonstrative evidence are allowable as taxable costs at the 
discretion of the court.

            
(4) Other Costs Not Enumerated. -- These rules do not preclude the award 
of other costs not enumerated herein if otherwise allowable under law; nor do 
they require the award of costs as they may be denied altogether if the court, 
through the exercise of its discretion, so determines.  Moreover, to the 
extent that W.S. § 1-14-125 limits costs, that statute is controlling.  However, costs 
associated with the offer of judgment rule, i.e. Rule 68, W.R.C.P., must be 
awarded.

            
(5) Apportionment. -- All costs may be apportioned among some or all of 
the non-prevailing parties as the court may determine.