Title: Commonwealth v. McDonagh

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12363 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  WILLIAM McDONAGH. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 5, 2018. - July 26, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Rape.  Indecent Assault and Battery.  Obscenity, Child 
pornography.  Evidence, Prior misconduct, Obscenity, State 
of mind.  Practice, Criminal, Argument by prosecutor, State 
of mind, Objection. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 30, 2014. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Christine M. Roach, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Patrick Levin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the defendant. 
 
John P. Zanini, Assistant District Attorney (Claudia Arno & 
Sarah McEvoy, Assistant District Attorneys, also present) for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  In 2014, William McDonagh was convicted on two 
indictments charging aggravated statutory rape, in violation of 
2 
 
 
G. L. c. 265, § 23A, and three indictments charging indecent 
assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen, in 
violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13B, arising out of instances of 
sexual abuse the defendant committed against his minor son. 
 
At issue in this appeal is whether the prosecutor, with 
permission from the trial judge, made improper remarks in her 
closing argument.  The comment at issue concerned the purposes 
for which the jury could consider other bad act evidence that 
had been properly admitted through a stipulation of the parties 
-- specifically, that the defendant had been arrested for, and 
admitted to, possession of child pornography.  Despite this 
evidence having been admitted for certain limited purposes, 
including to corroborate the son's testimony that the defendant 
showed him child pornography while committing the acts of abuse 
at issue, the judge allowed the Commonwealth to argue to the 
jury that they could consider the evidence to demonstrate the 
defendant's "state of mind," that he was sexually attracted to 
children.  The defendant argues that this evidence did not show 
his state of mind and that, instead, the prosecutor's closing 
argument invited the jury to infer that he was sexually 
attracted to children and therefore more likely to have 
committed the crimes charged.  Given that the defendant's state 
of mind was not at issue because he denied that the abuse 
occurred, the judge erred in allowing the prosecutor to make 
3 
 
 
that argument in closing.  See Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 
Mass. 228, 249 & n.27 (2014).  However, in light of the 
prosecutor's entire closing argument, the evidence presented at 
trial, and the judge's limiting instructions, the defendant was 
not prejudiced.  Accordingly, we affirm the defendant's 
convictions. 
 
1.  Background.  In September, 2014, the defendant was 
charged with the five offenses discussed above, as well as on 
two indictments of dissemination of obscene matter, in violation 
of G. L. c. 272, § 29.  Six of the seven charges stemmed from 
the defendant's abuse of his minor son, Colin.1  The defendant's 
other minor son, Nathan, was the putative victim of one of the 
dissemination charges. 
 
The jury heard the following evidence at trial.  The 
defendant and his three children moved to Massachusetts in 2006.  
When the defendant and his children arrived in Massachusetts, 
they lived with the defendant's brother in the Hyde Park section 
of Boston.  In 2009, the defendant and his children moved to 
Cambridge, then relocated to the Dorchester section of Boston, 
and eventually settled in Hull. 
 
Colin testified that the defendant began sexually abusing 
him when the family moved to Cambridge in 2009.  The charged 
instances of sexual abuse occurred between 2009 and 2010, while 
                     
 
1 Pseudonyms are used for the defendant's children. 
4 
 
 
the defendant and his children were living in Dorchester.  Colin 
testified that on multiple occasions the defendant touched his 
buttocks and penis with his hand and forced him to engage in 
oral sex.  The defendant, while sexually abusing Colin, showed 
him photographs of naked children and adults on nude beaches, as 
well as video recordings of adults and children engaging in 
sexual activity.  Samples of photographs of nude beaches that 
were found on the defendant's computer were admitted in 
evidence.  Colin explained that these images and video 
recordings depicted people "having sex," which he described as 
"porn."  The defendant threatened to knock Colin's teeth out if 
he told anyone about the abuse. 
 
Other evidence of the defendant's uncharged conduct toward 
his children was also admitted at trial.  This evidence 
indicated that the defendant had sexually assaulted Colin in two 
other counties; showed Colin and Nathan adult and child 
pornography; and showed Colin, Nathan, and their sister 
photographs of people on nude beaches, telling the children that 
he would take them to a nude beach someday. 
 
In October, 2010, the defendant was arrested for possession 
of child pornography; he eventually pleaded guilty and was 
incarcerated.  As discussed in greater detail infra, this 
evidence was introduced through a stipulation of the parties and 
admitted in evidence by the judge for certain limited purposes.  
5 
 
 
In September, 2012, while the defendant was incarcerated and the 
defendant's children were living with his brother, a forensic 
interviewer for the Suffolk County district attorney's office 
interviewed Colin.  During that interview, Colin recounted how 
the defendant abused him.2,3  This was the first time Colin 
reported that the defendant had sexually abused him.4 
 
The jury returned guilty verdicts on all charges except for 
the second indictment charging dissemination of obscene matter, 
which was based on the defendant showing nude beach photographs 
to Nathan.  The defendant appealed to the Appeals Court, which, 
in an unpublished memorandum and order pursuant to its rule 
1:28, affirmed the convictions of aggravated statutory rape and 
indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen.  See 
Commonwealth v. McDonagh, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 1109 (2017).5  This 
                     
 
2 The interview was videotaped, and a redacted version of 
the tape was shown to the jury at trial.  The interviewer also 
testified at trial as the first complaint witness. 
 
3 There was some discrepancy as to where the abuse began, 
but any such discrepancy is immaterial to the defendant's 
appeal. 
 
 
4 The Department of Children and Families (DCF) had 
conducted an investigation following the defendant's arrest for 
possession of child pornography in 2010.  At that time, Colin 
was interviewed by an investigator from DCF.  Colin denied 
having seen anything inappropriate on his father's computer or 
having been touched inappropriately. 
 
 
5 The Commonwealth conceded in the Appeals Court that the 
evidence was insufficient to support the conviction of 
dissemination of obscene matter to Colin, and the Appeals Court 
6 
 
 
court granted the defendant's application for further appellate 
review. 
 
2.  Discussion.  It is undisputed that the defendant's 
arrest for, and admission to, possession of child pornography 
were properly admitted in evidence.  However, the defendant 
contends that the judge erroneously allowed the Commonwealth to 
comment in its closing argument that the jury could consider the 
evidence for purposes of demonstrating the defendant's "state of 
mind," that he was sexually attracted to children.  The 
defendant claims that this was an improper propensity argument 
because it invited the jury to infer that he was sexually 
attracted to children and, therefore, more likely to have 
committed the charged crimes.  The Commonwealth asserts that the 
argument was proper and that, even if it was not, the defendant 
failed to preserve the claim for appellate review.  Accordingly, 
we begin by addressing the threshold issue:  whether the 
defendant's objection to the Commonwealth's closing argument was 
sufficiently precise to preserve the claimed error. 
 
a.  The objection.  Whether and how certain other bad act 
evidence would be admitted in evidence was a prominent and 
recurring issue throughout the defendant's trial --  
particularly, the defendant's 2010 arrest for, admission to, and 
                                                                  
reversed the conviction and dismissed the indictment for that 
count.  Commonwealth v. McDonagh, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 1109 (2017). 
7 
 
 
conviction of possession of child pornography.  Prior to trial, 
the Commonwealth moved in limine to admit this evidence.  The 
defendant had initially moved to exclude it, arguing that the 
evidence "would be highly prejudicial" and "show only his 
propensity to commit the crime[s] charged."  Eventually, the 
defendant conceded that the evidence was relevant to corroborate 
Colin's testimony that the defendant had shown him child 
pornography during the charged incidents of sexual assault.  
This evidence was also admissible to show the defendant's 
efforts to "groom" Colin.6  From the defendant's perspective, 
                     
6 The term "grooming" has been used to "refer[] to 
deliberate actions taken by a defendant to expose a child to 
sexual material; the ultimate goal of grooming is the formation 
of an emotional connection with the child and a reduction of the 
child's inhibitions in order to prepare the child for sexual 
activity."  Commonwealth v. Christie, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 665, 673 
n.10 (2016), quoting United States v. Chambers, 642 F.3d 588, 
593 (7th Cir. 2011).  Where relevant, evidence of grooming may 
be introduced for the nonpropensity purposes of demonstrating 
the defendant's intent, preparation, plan, or design.  See State 
v. Castine, 141 N.H. 300, 302-304 (1996) (evidence of grooming 
properly admitted to show defendant's plan and preparation to 
commit charged acts of sexual assault against child); State v. 
Sena, 144 N.M. 821, 826 (2008) (grooming evidence properly 
admitted to show defendant's intent and to refute claim that 
defendant touched victim for medical purposes); State v. 
Williams, 134 Ohio St. 3d 521, 526-527 (2012) (testimony 
concerning grooming properly admitted to demonstrate "motive, 
preparation, and plan of the accused to target teenage males who 
had no father figure and to gain their trust and confidence for 
the purpose of grooming them for sexual activity with the intent 
to be sexually gratified"); State v. DeVincentis, 150 Wash. 2d 
11, 17-19, 23-24 (2003) (evidence of grooming properly admitted 
to show defendant's plan or design).  See also United States v. 
Johnson, 132 F.3d 1279, 1282-1284 (9th Cir. 1997) (for charge of 
transportation of minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual 
8 
 
 
evidence of the date of his arrest provided an important 
timeline of events and explained the defendant's absence from 
the home while he was incarcerated.  The parties discussed 
introducing the evidence through a stipulation to the jury but 
did not reach an agreement prior to trial.  The judge took the 
issue under advisement. 
 
The parties entered into a stipulation concerning the 
defendant's arrest for and admission to possession of child 
pornography on the final day of trial.  The following 
stipulation was submitted to the jury: 
"On October 25, 2010, William McDonagh was arrested 
for possession of child pornography in Hull, 
Massachusetts.  His home was searched that day and his 
computers, digital camera, and other digital evidence 
were seized.  The defendant admitted to possessing 
child pornography.  He denied ever having any sexual 
contact with his child or any child." 
 
Soon after the stipulation was presented to the court, the 
Commonwealth requested that the judge instruct the jury that 
they could consider the defendant's arrest for possession of 
child pornography to demonstrate his "state of mind," that he 
was sexually attracted to children.  Defense counsel objected, 
arguing that such an instruction would invite the jury to 
consider the other act evidence for impermissible propensity 
purposes and that the defendant had a "criminal character for 
                                                                  
activity, grooming evidence admissible to show defendant's 
intent to engage in unlawful sexual activity with minor). 
9 
 
 
sexual thoughts."  The defendant also noted that a state of mind 
instruction would contradict the judge's other instructions to 
the jury that they not consider the evidence to show the 
defendant has a propensity to commit this type of crime.  
Clearly recognizing the need for specific instructions 
concerning the purposes for which the jury could consider the 
other act evidence, the judge requested that the parties 
identify the precise language for her instruction to the jury:  
"What I need you to focus on is what these words should say 
based on your view of what the permissible use of this evidence 
is."  The judge then ruled that she would not instruct the jury 
on "state of mind" as it related to the defendant's arrest for 
child pornography. 
 
The Commonwealth then requested that it be permitted to 
argue in closing that the jury could consider the defendant's 
admission to possessing child pornography for purposes of 
demonstrating his "state of mind," that he was sexually 
attracted to children.  Differentiating between the defendant's 
arrest for possession of child pornography and his admission to 
possessing child pornography, the judge concluded that the 
Commonwealth's proposed argument was proper.  Defense counsel 
objected.  She began to explain that the Commonwealth's argument 
sought to "show[] that [the defendant] has a criminal character 
10 
 
 
or . . . show[] that he's sexually --."  The judge interjected, 
stating, 
"She's not going to use the words criminal character.  
She's going to say that his admission to possessing 
child pornography is evidence that he was attracted to 
children.  I don't know how you can argue with that.  
So I appreciate your advocacy, but I think that it is 
what it is." 
 
Defense counsel did not assert a further objection. 
 
The Commonwealth's closing argument contained the following 
statement:  "The defendant possessed child pornography.  He was 
sexually attracted to children.  [Colin] told you about the 
abuse he suffered at the hands of his father.  The defendant's 
inclination, or interest sexually in children corroborates 
[Colin's] testimony that his father sexually assaulted him."  
The judge then instructed the jury that evidence of the 
defendant's arrest for possession of child pornography could not 
be considered as evidence that the defendant had a bad character 
or a propensity to commit the crimes charged in this case.  The 
jury were instructed that they could only consider that the 
defendant's 2010 arrest for child pornography was for "the 
limited issue of the defendant's opportunity and the 
relationship between the defendant and the alleged victims for 
purposes of the crimes charged here.  You may not consider this 
evidence for any other purpose." 
11 
 
 
 
Because the judge specifically permitted the Commonwealth 
to make the argument at issue in this appeal, we review the 
judge's evidentiary ruling allowing that argument.  The 
Commonwealth contends that defense counsel failed to lodge an 
adequate objection to the judge's ruling on the Commonwealth's 
closing argument.  Only a timely and precise objection to the 
admission of evidence, or a judge's ruling, will preserve a 
claimed error for appellate review.  See Commonwealth v. Bonds, 
445 Mass. 821, 828 (2006) ("We have consistently interpreted 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 22, 378 Mass. 892 [1979], to preserve 
appellate rights only when an objection is made in a form or 
context that reveals the objection's basis").  See also Mass. 
G. Evid. § 103(a) (2018).  A timely and precise objection not 
only preserves the aggrieved party's appellate rights, but more 
importantly, "afford[s] the trial judge an opportunity to act 
promptly to remove from the jury's consideration evidence [or 
the effect of an initially improper ruling] which has no place 
in the trial."  Abraham v. Woburn, 383 Mass. 724, 726 n.1 
(1981).  See Commonwealth v. DePina, 476 Mass. 614, 624 n.9 
(2017) (importance of objection is to notify judge of impending 
error).7  Accordingly, to ensure that the trial judge is aware of 
                     
 
7 At least as important as protecting the record, a timely 
and precise objection provides the judge with an opportunity to 
consider the argument presented in order to make a reasoned 
decision.  The same principle applies where the judge's ruling 
12 
 
 
the basis for an objection when it is not apparent from the 
context, "counsel should state the specific [evidentiary] ground 
of the objection" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Marshall, 
434 Mass. 358, 365 (2001).  See Commonwealth v. Fowler, 431 
Mass. 30, 41 n.19 (2000) (issue not properly preserved because 
defendant objected on grounds other than those argued on 
appeal). 
 
Where the adequacy of an objection is contested, the 
"objection is to be considered 'in the context of the trial as a 
whole.'"  Commonwealth v. Jones, 464 Mass. 16, 19 n.4 (2012), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Koney, 421 Mass. 295, 299 (1995).  See 
Commonwealth v. Biancardi, 421 Mass. 251, 254 (1995) (objection 
preserved claim where, "[s]urely, the point was brought to the 
judge's attention, and she rejected it").  Perfection is not the 
standard by which we measure the adequacy of an objection.  See 
Commonwealth v. Hollie, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 538, 541 n.3 (1999). 
An objection adequately preserves the claimed error so long as 
"counsel 'makes known to the court the action which he desires 
                                                                  
excludes evidence and the party offering the evidence informs 
the court concerning the admissibility of the proposed evidence 
by an offer of proof.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 103(a)(2) (2018).  
Judges should not hesitate to reconsider their preliminary 
ruling in response to counsel's argument.  Indeed, an informed 
evidentiary argument from counsel may allow the judge to augment 
the record, whether the judge changes his or her ruling or not.  
See Mass. G. Evid. 103(c) (2018) ("court may make any statement 
about the character or form of the evidence, the objection made, 
and the ruling"). 
13 
 
 
the court to take or his objection to the action of the court.'"  
Fowler, 431 Mass. at 41 n.19, quoting Mass. R. Crim. P. 22.  
Accordingly, vague general objections often fall short of 
preserving an error that is later fully articulated on appeal.  
See Commonwealth v. Cancel, 394 Mass. 567, 570-571 (1985).  For 
example, where counsel only stated that the admission of 
proposed testimony was "terribly prejudicial" and not relevant 
to the case, the defendant's subsequent claim on appeal that the 
testimony was impermissible bad act evidence was not preserved 
because "the defendant did not object with the precision 
required to preserve the error on appeal, as she failed to 
delineate any specific evidentiary basis for the objection."  
Commonwealth v. Proia, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 824, 827 (2018).  See 
Bonds, 445 Mass. at 828 ("Rather than an objection to the 
testimony as impermissible evidence of character or propensity, 
the defendant's standing objection was based on relevancy 
alone"). 
 
The admission of other bad act evidence, particularly the 
defendant's arrest for, and admission to, possession of child 
pornography, was an issue that permeated the trial.  Moreover, 
it is clear from the record that the judge was acutely aware of 
the delicate balance required when dealing with other bad act 
evidence and the importance of limiting the jury's consideration 
of that evidence.  Both in requesting jury instructions and 
14 
 
 
seeking permission to make comments in its closing argument, the 
Commonwealth endeavored to allow the jury to consider the 
evidence contained in the stipulation for purposes of 
demonstrating the defendant's "state of mind," that he was 
sexually attracted to children.  The defendant objected in both 
instances, claiming that the Commonwealth was inviting the jury 
to make an impermissible propensity inference that because the 
defendant had been arrested for, and admitted to, possession of 
child pornography, he was sexually attracted to children and 
therefore more likely to have committed the crimes charged.  
Similarly, the Commonwealth was seeking to demonstrate the 
defendant's "criminal character," for purposes of proving that 
the defendant acted in accordance with that bad character. 
 
Although defense counsel articulated an evidentiary basis 
for her objection that was neither perfect nor comprehensive, 
perhaps because the judge interrupted counsel in the midst of 
the objection, counsel's objection adequately preserved the 
issue on appeal.  In the context of the entire case, counsel 
sufficiently articulated that the Commonwealth was seeking to 
invite the jury to use other bad act evidence for purposes other 
than that for which it had been properly admitted.  
Specifically, the defendant stated as grounds for his objection 
that the Commonwealth sought to invite an impermissible 
propensity inference based on the defendant's "criminal 
15 
 
 
character."  See Commonwealth v. Facella, 478 Mass. 393, 403 
(2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 128 (2006) 
("evidence of prior bad acts 'is not admissible to show a 
defendant's bad character or propensity to commit the charged 
crime" [emphasis supplied]).8  To the extent that counsel could 
have provided a more thorough and precise explanation for her 
objection, we cannot hold that against her, as the judge 
interrupted counsel's explanation and essentially exclaimed that 
the Commonwealth's position was inarguably permissible -- "I 
don't know how you can argue with that."  Accordingly, we review 
the defendant's claim under the prejudicial error standard.9 
                     
 
8 Defense counsel should have requested the opportunity to 
augment the grounds for her objection.  It may be that the 
judge, in making her ruling, had in mind that she was not 
allowing evidence in to show the defendant's "criminal 
character," and that she, therefore, did not recognize that 
defense counsel's objection was focused on precluding the 
prosecutor from arguing that the jury could consider the other 
act evidence for impermissible propensity purposes.  Perhaps, 
the judge would have rethought her ruling had defense counsel 
argued that the Commonwealth was seeking to make an improper 
propensity argument; an error that was exacerbated by the fact 
that even if the defendant's "state of mind" was relevant for a 
nonpropensity purpose, any probative value would be outweighed 
by the danger that the jury would use the evidence as 
impermissible character evidence.  While we recognize that the 
judge did state, "I don't know how you can argue with that," in 
response to defense counsel's argument, the judge did not 
foreclose further discussion of the issue. 
 
 
9 We recognize that, generally, counsel's "[f]ailure to 
object to the closing and to ask for a curative instruction 
waives the right to claim error on appeal."  Commonwealth v. 
Marquetty, 416 Mass. 445, 450 (1993).  The defendant correctly 
observes, however, that the judge had sanctioned the 
16 
 
 
 
b.  Claimed error.  As discussed supra, the defendant 
contends that the judge erred in permitting the prosecutor to 
assert in her closing argument that the defendant's admission to 
possessing child pornography demonstrated the defendant's "state 
of mind," that he was sexually attracted to children.  Because 
this invited an impermissible propensity inference, and the 
defendant's state of mind was not at issue in this case, we 
agree.10 
 
"We review questions of admissibility, probative value, and 
unfair prejudice for abuse of discretion . . . and do not 
disturb a trial judge's decision absent a clear error of 
judgment in weighing the relevant factors."  Commonwealth v. 
Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 820 (2017).  "The standard for evaluating 
the admissibility of 'other bad acts' evidence is well 
                                                                  
prosecutor's argument, and so the prosecutor was entitled to 
make it.  See Commonwealth v. Lamrini, 392 Mass. 427, 432-433 
(1984).  The defendant properly challenges the judge's ruling, 
rather than the closing argument itself.  A party need not 
continue to voice an objection once it is clear that doing so 
would be futile.  Commonwealth v. Connolly, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 
424, 426 n.2 (2000) ("after defendant has presented argument and 
the judge has rejected it, he need not subsequently make 
patently futile objections to preserve the point for review"). 
 
 
10 We observe that, on appeal, the defendant claims that his 
admission to possessing child pornography was not probative as 
to his state of mind because possession of child pornography 
does not necessarily evince sexual attraction to children.  We 
do not address this argument, because, as explained infra, the 
defendant's admission to possessing child pornography was not 
admissible as to his state of mind because his state of mind was 
not at issue. 
17 
 
 
established."  Crayton, 470 Mass. at 249.  The Commonwealth may 
not introduce evidence of the defendant's other bad acts in 
order to demonstrate bad character, or a propensity to commit 
the crimes charged.  Commonwealth v. Anestal, 463 Mass. 655, 665 
(2012).  However, this evidence may be admissible to prove a 
material issue separate and distinct from the defendant's 
character or propensity to commit the crime charged.  See 
Commonwealth v. Trapp, 396 Mass. 202, 206 (1985), S.C., 423 
Mass. 356, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1045 (1996).  In the 
appropriate circumstances, other bad act evidence can be used 
for a variety of purposes including, but not limited to, 
establishing a defendant's "motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, . . . pattern of 
operation," absence of mistake, or lack of accident.  Crayton, 
supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Walker, 460 Mass. 590, 613 
(2011).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b)(2) (2018).  Even where the 
other act evidence is relevant for a nonpropensity purpose, the 
evidence may not be admitted if its probative value is 
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant.  
Crayton, supra at 249 & n.27.  See Commonwealth v. Jaundoo, 64 
Mass. App. Ct. 56, 60 (2005) ("A defendant's possession of 
pornography is admissible in sexual assault cases if relevant to 
an issue in the case and if its prejudicial effect does not 
outweigh its probative value"). 
18 
 
 
 
Our resolution of the claimed error is controlled by 
Crayton, 470 Mass. at 248-252.  In that case, the defendant was 
charged with possession of child pornography based on Internet 
searches he allegedly conducted on a computer at a public 
library.  Id. at 229-232.  At trial, the Commonwealth sought to 
show the defendant's state of mind and intent by introducing 
evidence of sexual drawings of young girls that were found in 
his jail cell.  Id. at 248.  The issue at trial, however, was 
the identity of the person who had conducted the illicit 
Internet searches, not that person's intent or state of mind.  
Id. at 250.  We concluded that the other act evidence was 
inadmissible, because "the risk was enormous that the jury would 
use the drawings for the forbidden purpose of identifying the 
defendant as the person who viewed the child pornography on 
[the] computer . . . based on his bad character and propensity 
to possess child pornography."  Id. at 251. 
 
Similarly, the defendant's guilt here did not turn on his 
state of mind during the commission of the charged acts; rather, 
it depended on whether the defendant actually committed the acts 
at all.  See United States v. Colon, 880 F.2d 650, 659 (2d Cir. 
1989) (evidence of prior bad acts not admissible to show intent, 
where intent was not in dispute because defendant denied 
committing charged actions).  Contrast Facella, 478 Mass. at 404 
("Because the rebuttal evidence [of prior bad acts] tended to 
19 
 
 
disprove the defendant's theory . . . , it was relevant and 
admissible for that purpose").11  Accordingly, the risk that the 
jury would conclude that the defendant committed the charged 
crimes based on his criminal character and propensity, as 
demonstrated by his arrest for and admission to possession of 
child pornography, was significant.  This is particularly true 
given that, in closing, the prosecutor commented on the 
defendant's "inclination, or interest sexually in children," 
which was only relevant if he acted in accordance with that 
inclination or bad character in abusing his son.12  Indeed, the 
prosecutor stated in closing that the defendant's alleged sexual 
attraction to children "corroborates [Colin's] testimony that 
his father sexually assaulted him."  This argument clearly 
                     
 
11 The Commonwealth's reliance on United States v. Brand, 
467 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 926 (2007) 
and United States v. Byrd, 31 F.3d 1329, 1335 (5th Cir. 1994), 
cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1052 (1995), is misplaced.  In those 
cases, the defendants claimed the affirmative defense of 
entrapment, which the government can defeat by showing a 
defendant's predisposition to commit the alleged offense.  See 
Brand, supra at 189, 196; Byrd, supra at 1336-1337 & n.9. 
 
 
12 Additionally, "[t]his is not a case in which the disputed 
evidence had [a] direct connection with the crime charged."  
Commonwealth v. LaSota, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 15, 26 (1990).  
Contrast Commonwealth v. Coates, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 728, 739-740 
(2016) (evidence that defendant had viewed pornography was 
admissible where "[m]any of the titles of the pornographic files 
and the description of the video content evince[d] a connection 
to [victim's] allegations of anal intercourse" and "explicitly 
parallel[ed]" victim's description of abuse). 
20 
 
 
invited the jury to make an impermissible propensity inference, 
and as such, should not have been permitted. 
 
c.  Prejudicial error analysis.  "We review 
nonconstitutional errors, preserved through objection at trial, 
to determine whether they created prejudicial error."  
Commonwealth v. Nardi, 452 Mass. 379, 396 (2008), citing 
Commonwealth v. Vinnie, 428 Mass. 161, 163, cert. denied, 525 
U.S. 1007 (1998).  In analyzing a defendant's claim of improper 
argument, albeit an argument specifically permitted by the 
judge, we analyze the remarks "in the context of the entire 
argument, and in light of the judge's instructions to the jury 
and the evidence at trial."  Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 443 Mass. 
245, 273 (2005), quoting Commonwealth v. Viriyahiranpaiboon, 412 
Mass. 224, 231 (1992). 
 
Although the judge erred in allowing the prosecutor to make 
this particular argument, the bulk of the prosecutor's closing 
argument focused on the Commonwealth's substantive evidence 
against the defendant.  Her improper propensity argument "was 
isolated, and 'it was not a principal focus of what otherwise 
was a proper closing argument.'"  Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 478 
Mass. 189, 201-202 (2017), quoting Gaynor, 443 Mass. at 274.  
See Commonwealth v. Lugo, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 229, 234 (2016). 
 
The Commonwealth presented a strong case against the 
defendant, which was anchored in Colin's testimony concerning 
21 
 
 
the instances of sexual abuse; the jury heard Colin testify that 
the defendant had committed the charged acts.  His testimony was 
corroborated by the first complaint witness, as well as a 
videotape recording of his initial disclosure to the first 
complaint witness.  Colin's claim, that the defendant had shown 
him photographs of a nude beach and told him that they would go 
there one day, was also supported by his siblings' testimony 
that the defendant had shown them the same images and made 
similar comments, as well as nude beach photographs submitted to 
the jury that were found on the defendant's computer.  
Importantly, the defendant's 2010 arrest for, and admission to, 
possession of child pornography corroborated Colin's claim that 
the defendant showed him sexual images of children on the 
defendant's computer. 
 
The Commonwealth also introduced evidence of the 
defendant's out-of-county sexual assaults against Colin to show 
his pattern of conduct towards Colin.  See Commonwealth v. King, 
387 Mass. 464, 470 (1982) ("when a defendant is charged with any 
form of illicit sexual intercourse, evidence of the commission 
of similar crimes by the same parties though committed in 
another place, if not too remote in time, is competent to prove 
an inclination to commit the [acts] charged" [citation 
omitted]).  When this evidence was admitted, the judge provided 
a contemporaneous limiting instruction to the jury that they 
22 
 
 
could consider these uncharged assaults on Colin for several 
specific purposes, including as evidence of the defendant's 
opportunity, intent, and state of mind and the relationship 
between the defendant and Colin.13  See Commonwealth v. Daley, 
439 Mass. 558, 568 (2003) (prosecutor's characterization of 
defendant as thief was "innocuous" in light of more 
incriminating evidence that jury had heard about him).  In light 
of Colin's direct testimony, corroborated by the pornography 
found on the defendant's computer, the prosecutor's improper 
remarks concerning the defendant's admission to possessing child 
pornography could not have swayed the jury, particularly since 
that very evidence was properly admitted for a limited purpose. 
 
We are further convinced that the prosecutor's improper 
comment did not prejudice the defendant because the judge 
emphatically instructed the jury that they could not consider 
the other act evidence for propensity purposes or to otherwise 
demonstrate that the defendant had a bad character.  The judge's 
instructions, considered in their entirety, were sufficient to 
ensure that the prosecutor's impermissible argument did not 
influence the jury's deliberations.  Commonwealth v. White, 475 
Mass. 724, 733 (2016).  Although a limited portion of the 
judge's instruction concerning other bad act evidence may have 
                     
 
13 The defendant did not object to this instruction and does 
not argue on appeal that it was improper. 
23 
 
 
been somewhat unclear, the judge admonished the jury not to 
consider evidence related to the defendant's 2010 arrest as 
evidence that he possessed a propensity to commit the crimes 
charged.14  She also made sure that the jury understood the 
meaning of this instruction, explaining that evidence related to 
the defendant's 2010 arrest could not serve as direct proof of 
his guilt, and that the jury could not infer that if he was 
arrested for possessing child pornography, he must also have 
committed the crimes charged.15 
                     
 
14 We note that there was some conflict between the purposes 
for which the defendant's arrest for, and admission to, 
possessing child pornography were admitted, the prosecutor's 
closing argument, and the judge's instruction during the jury 
charge.  Although the defendant's arrest for and admission to 
possessing child pornography were admitted by stipulation to 
corroborate Colin's testimony that his father had shown him 
pornography in the course of the sexual assaults, the judge 
instructed the jury that they could consider that evidence 
"solely as it may bear on the limited issue of the defendant's 
opportunity and the relationship between the defendant and the 
alleged victims for purposes of the crimes charged here.  You 
may not consider this evidence for any other purpose."  To the 
extent that this instruction was unclear because it conflicted 
with the purposes for which the evidence was admitted and the 
Commonwealth's closing argument, the judge emphatically 
instructed the jury that they could not consider such evidence 
as demonstrating that the defendant had a propensity to commit 
the offenses charged. 
 
 
15 Additionally, the jury's questions regarding the 
definition of obscenity, and their verdict of not guilty on one 
indictment charging dissemination of obscene material, evince 
the jury's disciplined deliberations.  See Commonwealth v. 
Daley, 439 Mass. 558, 568 (2003) ("These questions suggest that 
the jury engaged in a careful and thorough examination of the 
evidence . . ."). 
24 
 
 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The convictions on the two indictments 
charging aggravated statutory rape and the three indictments 
charging indecent assault and battery on a child under the age 
of fourteen are affirmed.  In light of the Commonwealth's 
concession that the evidence is legally insufficient to support 
a conviction of dissemination of obscene material, the 
conviction on that indictment is reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.