Title: STATE v CAMITSCH

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

N o . 79-84 I N THE S U P R E M E COURT O F T H E STATE O F MONTANA 1981 STATE O F MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, VS . WAYNE A. CAMITSCH, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of S i l v e r Bow. Honorable Arnold Olsen, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Joseph C. Engel 111, argued, Butte, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Chris Tweeten argued, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, Helena, Montana John G. Winston, County Attorney, Butte, Montana Michael Wheat argued, Deputy County Attorney, Butte, Montana Submitted: February 19, 1981 Decided : Wdfl- (2. & & A t & . / Clerk M r . Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. H a s w e l l , s i t t i n g i n p l a c e of M r . J u s t i c e Frank B. Morrison, d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Defendant a p p e a l s from a c o n v i c t i o n of t h r e e c o u n t s of s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t and one c o u n t of s e x u a l a s s a u l t , f o l l o w i n g a j u r y t r i a l i n S i l v e r Bow County. W e a f f i r m h i s c o n v i c t i o n , b u t remand t h e cause to D i s t r i c t Court f o r f i n - d i n g s to s u p p o r t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e s i g n a t i o n of d e f e n d a n t as a dangerous of f e n d e r . Based on a s t a t e m e n t g i v e n t o p o l i c e by a j u v e n i l e boy t h a t he and t w o j u v e n i l e g i r l s had been g i v e n wine and m a r i j u a n a by t h e d e f e n d a n t and a c e r t a i n "Doc West," and t h a t t h e two men t h e n "molested" t h e g i r l s , B u t t e p o l i c e O f f i c e r Graham and D e t e c t i v e Johnson went t o d e f e n d a n t ' s a u t o r e p a i r g a r a g e on A p r i l 2 , 1979. They t o l d t h e accused t h a t t h e y were i n v e s t i g a t i n g a crime and t h a t t h e y wanted d e f e n d a n t to accompany them t o p o l i c e h e a d q u a r t e r s . Though t h e o f f i c e r s d i d n o t t h e n s p e c i f y t h e crime, t h e d e f e n d a n t v o l u n t a r i l y accompanied them to p o l i c e h e a d q u a r t e r s . Upon a r r i v a l , D e t e c t i v e Johnson informed d e f e n d a n t o f h i s r i g h t s and informed him of t h e a l l e g a t i o n s t h a t he had engaged i n s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h j u v e n i l e g i r l s . According to t h e o f f i c e r s , t h e d e f e n d a n t i n d i c a t e d t h a t he understood h i s r i g h t s , r e a d t h e Miranda c a r d p r e s e n t e d to him, and waived h i s r i g h t s by s i g n i n g it. The o f f i c e r s t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t appeared s o b e r and i n c o n t r o l of h i s f a c u l t i e s ; t h e d e f e n d a n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had been p a i n t i n g a car b e f o r e t h e arrest, and t h a t h i s f a c u l t i e s were impaired from t h e p a i n t fumes. While a t t h e s t a t i o n , d e f e n d a n t gave a n a r r a t i v e s t a t e m e n t i n h i s own h a n d w r i t i n g , a d m i t t i n g an act of s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h A.R.B., a j u v e n i l e . Defendant w a s t h e n placed under arrest. H e t h e n gave a taped s t a t e m e n t similar to h i s w r i t t e n c o n f e s s i o n , which was later t r a n s c r i b e d . The lower c o u r t suppressed t h e t r a n s c r i b e d s t a t e m e n t , f i n d i n g t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t had been induced t o s i g n blank pages o n t o which t h e taped s t a t e m e n t was l a t e r typed. On May 3, 1979, t h e S t a t e charged t h e d e f e n d a n t and a c o d e f e n d a n t by i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h m u l t i p l e c o u n t s of s e x u a l a s s a u l t and s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t . The d e f e n d a n t moved to s e v e r h i s t r i a l from t h a t of h i s c o d e f e n d a n t . On J u n e 19, 1979, t h e c o u r t g r a n t e d t h e motion to s e v e r and t h e S t a t e f i l e d a s e p a r a t e i n f o r m a t i o n a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t . On June 25, 1979, t h e d e f e n d a n t moved to s u b s t i t u t e a n o t h e r judge f o r Judge Arnold O l s e n , c o n t e n d i n g t h a t under t h e r u l e on s u b s t i t u t i o n , a c a s e is n o t a s s i g n e d u n t i l t h e i n f o r m a t i o n is f i l e d and t h a t t h e r e f o r e t h e motion was t i m e l y . The c o u r t d i s a g r e e d and denied t h e motion. P r i o r to t r i a l , d e f e n d a n t f i l e d a motion i n D i s t r i c t C o u r t , a s k i n g t h a t he be g r a n t e d t h e r i g h t to i n s p e c t t h e Youth C o u r t r e c o r d s of t h e p r o s e c u t i n g w i t n e s s e s , a l l of whom were j u v e n i l e s , on t h e grounds t h a t t h e r e c o r d s might have a b e a r i n g o n t h e competency and v e r a c i t y of t h o s e w i t n e s s e s . The d i s t r i c t judge denied t h e motion, r e l y i n g on t h e con£ i d e n t i a l i t y p r o v i - s i o n s of t h e Youth Court A c t , s e c t i o n s 41-5-601, 41-5-602, MCA, and Rule 609, Mont.R.Evid. Defendant was c o n v i c t e d of t h r e e c o u n t s of s e x u a l i n t e r - c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t and one c o u n t of s e x u a l a s s a u l t . The d i s t r i c t judge sentenced d e f e n d a n t to 40 y e a r s i n p r i s o n on each c o u n t of s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e , and 1 0 y e a r s on t h e c o u n t of s e x u a l a s s a u l t , a l l t o r u n c o n c u r r e n t l y . The c o u r t d e s i g n a t e d t h e d e f e n d a n t a dangerous o f f e n d e r . Judgment w a s e n t e r e d on August 6, 1979. Defendant a p p e a l s from t h e c o n v i c t i o n s on a l l c o u n t s , t h e d e n i a l of h i s motion f o r a new t r i a l , and t h e c o u r t ' s d e s i g n a t i o n o f d e f e n d a n t as a dangerous o f f e n d e r . H e raises s i x i s s u e s : 1. Did t h e d e f e n d a n t v o l u n t a r i l y and knowingly waive h i s Miranda r i g h t s ? 2. Was t h e d e f e n s e motion to s u b s t i t u t e t i m e l y , when f i l e d 52 d a y s a f t e r d e f e n s e c o u n s e l r e c e i v e d n o t i c e of t h e j u d g e ' s assumption of j u r i s d i c t i o n , b u t w i t h i n t e n days of t h e S t a t e ' s f i l i n g of a s e p a r a t e i n f o r m a t i o n a g a i n s t t h e d e f n d a n t ? 3. Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s r e f u s a l to d i s c l o s e t h e Youth C o u r t r e c o r d s of c e r t a i n p r o s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s e s f o r use on cross-examination v i o l a t e d e f e n d a n t ' s S i x t h Amendment r i g h t to con£ r o n t h i s w i t n e s s e s ? 4. Did t h e c o u r t improperly e x c l u d e t e s t i m o n y r e g a r d i n g c o e r c i o n of a p r o s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s ? 5. Did t h e District Court c o m m i t r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r i n r e j e c t i n g c e r t a i n of d e f e n d a n t 1 s proposed j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s ? 6. Did t h e c o u r t err i n d e s i g n a t i n g d e f e n d a n t a dangerous of f e n d e r ? Defendant c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e c o n f e s s i o n he made a t t h e p o l i c e s t a t i o n was n o t v o l u n t a r y because he w a s i n c a p a b l e of waiving h i s r i g h t s , and because t h e police used c o e r c i v e tactics i n i n t e r r o g a t i n g him. T h e r e f o r e , he a r g u e s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n a l l o w i n g h i s s t a t e m e n t to be used as e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t him. I n d e t e r m i n i n g whether a c o n f e s s i o n should be s u p p r e s s e d , t h e t r i a l judge must d e c i d e whether or n o t it was v o l u n t a r y . S t a t e v. Lenon ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 174 Mont. 264, 271, 570 P.2d 901, 906. The d e t e r m i n a t i o n of v o l u n t a r i n e s s depends on t h e " t o t a l i t y of t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , " w i t h t h e burden of proof on t h e S t a t e to p r o v e v o l u n t a r i n e s s by a preponderance of t h e e v i d e n c e . S t a t e v. A l l i e s ( 1980 ) , Mont . , 621 P.2d 1080, 1086-1087, 37 St.Rep. 2089, 2097. Based on t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a t t h e s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g , t h e t r i a l judge determined t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n f e s s i o n was v o l u n t a r y . V o l u n t a r i n e s s is a f a c t u a l q u e s t i o n addressed to t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e c o u r t , and t h a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n w i l l n o t be o v e r t u r n e d i f it is s u p p o r t e d by s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e e v i d e n c e . S t a t e v. A l l i e s , s u p r a , Mont. a t , 6 2 1 P.2d a t 1087, 37 St.Rep. a t 2097-2098. The d e f e n d a n t t e s t i f i e d a t t h e h e a r i n g t h a t he had been under t h e i n f l u e n c e of p a i n t fumes when he made t h e i n c r i m i n a t i n g s t a t e m e n t , and t h a t he was advised of h i s r i g h t s o n l y a f t e r t h e s t a t e m e n t had been g i v e n . H e f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t p o l i c e o f f i c e r s had t o l d him t h a t h i s s t a t e m e n t would not be used a g a i n s t him, b u t would o n l y be used a s an a i d i n a r r e s t i n g "Doc West", a s u s p e c t e d c h i l d m o l e s t e r . The d e f e n d a n t f u r t h e r test- i f i e d t h a t O f f i c e r Johnson t o l d him to s i g n s e v e r a l documents. Johnson a l l e g e d l y r e p r e s e n t e d one of t h e documents to be a " r e l e a s e " t h a t , when s i g n e d , would a l l o w d e f e n d a n t to l e a v e t h e i n t e r r o g a t i o n room; i n r e a l i t y it was a waiver of d e f e n d a n t ' s Miranda r i g h t s . P o l i c e o f f i c e r s t e s t i f i e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t was a d v i s e d of h i s r i g h t s f o u r times b e f o r e d e f e n d a n t made h i s s t a t e m e n t . I n e a c h i n s t a n c e , t h e accused i n d i c a t e d t h a t he understood h i s r i g h t s . T h e i r t e s t i m o n y was c o r r o b o r a t e d by d e f e n d a n t ' s w r i t t e n s t a t e m e n t , which was recorded on a " v o l u n t a r y s t a t e m e n t " document and t h e Miranda waiver card signed by d e f e n d a n t . The o f f i c e r s d e n i e d t e l l i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t t h a t t h e y wanted t h e s t a t e m e n t o n l y as a t o o l i n g e t t i n g "Doc West': Both o f f i c e r s were e x p e r i e n c e d i n d e a l i n g w i t h s u s p e c t s under t h e in£ l u e n c e of i n t o x i c a n t s ; t h e y t e s t i f i e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t appeared s o b e r and c o h e r e n t . Defendant t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e words " s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e " were w r i t t e n on t h e " v o l u n t a r y s t a t e m e n t " document by D e t e c t i v e Johnson. The p o l i c e o f f i c e r s test i f ied t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t wrote t h e words a f t e r t h e y i n q u i r e d what t h e d e f e n d a n t meant by t h e s t a t e m e n t , "I d i d it to a d e g r e e w i t h [A.R.B.] ." (one of t h e j u v e n i l e g i r l s . ) The d e t e r m i n a t i o n of v o l u n t a r i n e s s turned s o l e l y on t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e w i t n e s s e s . Two i n c o n s i s t e n t v e r s i o n s of t h e e v e n t s surrounding t h e c o n f e s s i o n were p r e s e n t e d t o t h e judge, and h i s d e n i a l of t h e motion n e c e s s a r i l y i n c l u d e s a f i n d i n g t h a t h e chose to b e l i e v e t h e o f f i c e r s 1 t e s t i m o n y . S t a t e v. Robuck ( 1 9 5 2 ) , 126 Mont. 302, 309, 248 P.2d 817, 820. W e must d e f e r to t h e d i s t r i c t judge who is i n a s u p e r i o r p o s i t i o n to judge t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e w i t n e s s e s . S t a t e v. Lucero ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5 1 Mont. 531, 543, 445 P.2d 731, 737. W e f i n d t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t j u d g e ' s f i n d i n g of v o l u n t a r i n e s s is supported by s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e e v i d e n c e . W e w i l l n o t s u b s t i t u t e o u r judgment f o r h i s when t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l e v i - dence to s u p p o r t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n . S t a t e v. A l l i e s , s u p r a , Mont. a t , 621 P.2d a t 1087, 37 St.Rep. a t 2097-2098. The d i s t r i c t judge c o r r e c t l y denied t h e motion to s u p p r e s s . A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t judge should have e n t e r e d f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of l a w on t h e q u e s t i o n o f v o l u n t a r i n e s s , because t h e r e was c o n f l i c t i n g e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d . While w e a g r e e t h a t it would be a b e t t e r p r a c t i c e to d o t h i s , we have n e v e r h e l d t h a t a j u d g e ' s f a i l u r e to e n t e r f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s i n a s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g would r e s u l t i n a r e v e r s a l . Here, t h e b a s i s of t h e j u d g e ' s d e c i s i o n is o b v i o u s : h e r e s o l v e d c o n f l i c t i n g t e s t i m o n y i n f a v o r of t h e S t a t e . W e f i n d no error i n h i s f a i l u r e t o e n t e r s p e c i f i c f i n d i n g s , par- t i c u l a r l y where d e f e n d a n t n e v e r asked t h a t f i n d i n g s and conclu- s i o n s be e n t e r e d . A p p e l l a n t n e x t claims e r r o r i n t h e d i s t r i c t j u d g e ' s r e f u s a l t o g r a n t h i s motion f o r s u b s t i t u t i o n of judge. W e h o l d t h a t t h e judge r u l e d c o r r e c t l y i n f i n d i n g t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s motion was untimely. On May 3, 1979, t h e d e f e n d a n t and a codefendant, Randolph S c o t t , were charged by i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h m u l t i p l e c o u n t s of s e x u a l a s s a u l t and s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t . On t h a t d a t e t h e S t a t e f i l e d a t i m e l y motion to s u b s t i t u t e a judge f o r t h e pre- s i d i n g judge. O n t h e same day, Judge Arnold Olsen assumed j u r i s d i c t i o n . The f o l l o w i n g day d e f e n s e c o u n s e l acknowledged r e c e i p t of n o t i c e t h a t Judge Olsen had assumed j u r i s d i c t i o n . The d e f e n d a n t t h e n moved to s e v e r h i s t r i a l from t h a t of h i s codefen- d a n t S c o t t . The c o u r t g r a n t e d t h e motion to s e v e r on J u n e 19, 1979. On J u n e 25, 1979, t h e d e f e n d a n t moved t o s u b s t i t u t e a n o t h e r judge f o r Judge Olsen. The motion was denied as n o t t i m e l y . The d e f e n s e motion, f i l e d 52 d a y s a f t e r d e f e n s e c o u n s e l was informed t h a t Judge Olsen had been a s s i g n e d to t h e case, w a s c l e a r l y untimely. Defense c o u n s e l cites no a u t h o r i t y , and we f i n d none, h o l d i n g t h a t t h e f i l i n g of a s e p a r a t e i n f o r m a t i o n a f t e r s e v e r a n c e of a c r i m i n a l t r i a l somehow r e v i v e s t h e r i g h t to p e r e m p t o r i l y d i s q u a l i f y t h e judge. The u s u a l r u l e , under p r i o r law, is t h a t a r i g h t of d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n , o n c e l o s t , c a n n o t be r e v i v e d . Town Pump, Inc. v. District Court ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont. , 590 P.2d 1126, 1129, 36 St.Rep. 282, 286; S t a t e ex r e l . L e a v i t t v . District Court ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 172 Mont. 12, 18, 560 P.2d 517, 521. N o r does d e f e n d a n t c i t e any a u t h o r i t y h o l d i n g t h a t t h e f i l i n g o f a s e p a r a t e i n f o r m a t i o n a f t e r s e v e r a n c e of a c r i m i n a l a c t i o n i n i t i a t e s a new c a u s e o r proceeding which would g i v e rise to a new r i g h t of s u b s t i t u t i o n . Defendant m i s t a k e n l y cites F a r r v. S u p e r i o r Court of Maricopa County ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 114 A r i z . 485, 562 P.2d 365, f o r t h e pro- p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e r i g h t of a p a r t y to d i s q u a l i f y a judge "cannot b e a b r i d g e d by an o r d e r s e p a r a t i n g t h e case ." I n F a r r , d e f e n d a n t w a s i n i t i a l l y charged w i t h r a p e . Defense c o u n s e l moved to change judges. The motion was g r a n t e d and t h e case w a s t r a n s f e r r e d to t h e r e s p o n d e n t judge. T h e r e a f t e r , t h e county a t t o r n e y f i l e d a second i n f o r m a t i o n , c h a r g i n g t h e accused w i t h kidnapping. T h i s second case was a l s o a s s i g n e d t o t h e r e s p o n d e n t judge. Defense c o u n s e l moved t o change judges i n t h i s second cause. A f e w d a y s l a t e r t h e S t a t e moved to c o n s o l i d a t e t h e t w o c a u s e s , r a p e and kidnapping. Noting t h a t t h e kidnapping case b o r e a s e p a r a t e f i l i n g d a t e , a s e p a r a t e case number, and r e q u i r e d a s e p a r a t e a r r a i g n m e n t from t h e rape p r o s e c u t i o n , t h e Arizona Supreme Court h e l d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was s t a t u t o r i l y e n t i t l e d t o have h i s motion t o s u b s t i t u t e judges i n t h e second case g r a n t e d r e g a r d less o f t h e f a c t t h a t t h e two c a u s e s f i l e d a g a i n s t him were c o n s o l i d a t e d . F a r r , s u p r a , 562 P.2d a t 3 6 6 . The c o u r t noted t h a t t h e county a t t o r n e y could have charged b o t h o f f e n s e s i n one i n f o r m a t i o n , b u t chose n o t t o do so. The c o u r t a l s o i n t i m a t e d t h a t i f t h e motion to c o n s o l i d a t e had been g r a n t e d b e f o r e t h e motion to change judges had been made i n t h e second c a u s e , t h e d e f e n d a n t could have been deemed to have waived h i s r i g h t t o a peremptory change of judge. F a r r d e a l s o n l y w i t h t h e e f f e c t of a motion t o c o n s o l i d a t e c l e a r l y s e p a r a t e p r o c e e d i n g s on a peremptory r i g h t of d i s q u a l - i f i c a t i o n - - n o t - w i t h t h e e f f e c t of a motion t o s e v e r on t h e r i g h t o f s u b s t i t u t i o n . The d e f e n d a n t ' s argument h a s no merit. He was on n o t i c e t h a t Judge Olsen would p r e s i d e o v e r t h e p r o c e e d i n g s b o t h b e f o r e and a f t e r s e v e r a n c e . The d i s t r i c t judge p r o p e r l y denied t h e motion f o r d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n . On June 29, 1979, s h o r t l y b e f o r e d e f e n d a n t went t o t r i a l , t h e d e f e n d a n t f i l e d a motion a s k i n g t h e c o u r t to allow c o u n s e l f o r d e f e n d a n t t o i n s p e c t t h e Youth Court r e c o r d s of any complaining w i t n e s s e s on t h e grounds t h a t t h e r e c o r d s might have a b e a r i n g on t h e competency and v e r a c i t y of t h o s e w i t n e s s e s . The S t a t e countered w i t h a motion i n l i m i n e t o exclude r e f e r e n c e t o s u c h r e c o r d s , r e l y i n g on t h e con£ i d e n t i a l i t y p r o v i s i o n s of t h e Youth Court A c t , s e c t i o n s 41-5-601 and 41-5-602, MCA, and Rule 609, Mont .R. Evid. In denying d e f e n d a n t ' s motion, Judge Olsen s t a t e d t h a t he would p e r s o n a l l y examine t h e w i t n e s s e s ' r e c o r d s t o d e t e r m i n e whether any of t h e g i r l s should be examined by a p s y c h i a t r i s t b e f o r e t e s t i f y i n g . D e f e n d a n t ' s motion to i n s p e c t t h e p r o s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s e s ' y o u t h r e c o r d s was e x p r e s s l y based on a d e s i r e to examine them f o r i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t t h e d e f e n s e could use to c h a l l e n g e t h e witness- es' t e s t i m o n i a l competency and t o impeach t h e i r c r e d i b i l i t y . H e asserts t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s r e f u s a l to allow such an examina- t i o n v i o l a t e d t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s S i x t h Amendment r i g h t t o c o n f r o n t t h e a d v e r s e w i t n e s s e s a g a i n s t him, r e l y i n g on Davis v. Alaska ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347. The S i x t h Amendment g u a r a n t e e s t h e r i g h t of an accused t o "be c o n f r o n t e d w i t h t h e w i t n e s s e s a g a i n s t him," and t h i s r i g h t is g u a r a n t e e d t o d e f e n d a n t s i n s t a t e p r o c e e d i n g s as w e l l as i n f e d e r a l p r o c e e d i n g s . P o i n t e r v. Texas ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 380 U.S. 400, 8 5 The United S t a t e s Supreme Court h a s c a u t i o n e d t h a t c o n f r o n t a t i o n must i n c l u d e more t h a n d e f e n d a n t ' s being allowed t o c o n f r o n t t h e w i t n e s s p h y s i c a l l y . A p r i m a r y i n t e r e s t secured by t h e con£ r o n t a t i o n c l a u s e is t h a t of cross-examination, Davis v. A l a s k a , s u p r a , 415 U.S. a t 315, 94 S.Ct. a t 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d a t 353: "Cross-examination is t h e p r i n c i p a l means by which t h e b e l i e v a b i l i t y of a w i t n e s s and t h e t r u t h of h i s t e s t i m o n y are t e s t e d . . . [Tlhe cross-examiner is n o t o n l y p e r m i t t e d to d e l v e i n t o t h e w i t n e s s ' s t o r y t o test t h e w i t n e s s t p e r c e p t i o n s and memory, b u t t h e cross-examiner h a s t r a d i t i o n a l l y been allowed to impeach, i .e., d i s c r e d i t , t h e w i t n e s s . . . A more p a r t i c u l a r a t t a c k on t h e w i t n e s s ' c r e d i b i l i t y is e f f e c t e d b y means of cross-examination d i r e c t e d toward r e v e a l i n g p o s s i b l e b i a s e s , p r e j u d i c e s , or u l t e r i o r motives of t h e w i t n e s s as t h e y may relate d i r e c t l y to i s s u e s or p e r s o n a l i t i e s i n t h e case a t hand. The p a r t i a l i t y of a w i t n e s s is s u b j e c t to e x p l o r a t i o n a t t r i a l , and is 'always r e l e v a n t as d i s c r e d i t i n g t h e w i t n e s s and a f f e c t i n g t h e weight of h i s t e s t i m o n y . ' 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence 5 940, p. 775 (Chadbourn r e v . 1 9 7 0 ) . W e have recognized t h a t t h e exposure of a w i t n e s s ' m o t i v a t i o n i n t e s t i f y i n g is a p r o p e r and i m p o r t a n t f u n c t i o n of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y p r o t e c t e d r i g h t of cross-examination. Greene v. McElroy ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 360 U.S. 474, 496, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377, 79 S.Ct. 1400 (1959)." I n Davis, d e f e n s e c o u n s e l argued t o t h e Court t h a t t h e p r i n c i p a l w i t n e s s f o r t h e S t a t e , a j u v e n i l e on p r o b a t i o n , had r e a s o n to be b i a s e d and to color h i s t e s t i m o n y i n f a v o r of t h e S t a t e . However, based on t h e Alaska s t a t u t e p r o v i d i n g f o r t h e con£ i d e n t i a l i t y of j u v e n i l e r e c o r d s , t h e t r i a l judge r e f used t o l e t c o u n s e l i n q u i r e i n t o t h e w i t n e s s t j u v e n i l e record and h i s p o s s i b l e m o t i v a t i o n s t o a l t e r h i s testimony. The United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t determined t h i s t o be e r r o r , f i n d i n g t h a t d e f e n d a n t was denied h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t of c o n f r o n t a t i o n . The Supreme Court recognized t h e competing i n t e r e s t i n m a i n t a i n i n g t h e c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y of a j u v e n i l e 's r e c o r d s . But t h e Court concluded : " I n t h i s s e t t i n g . . . t h e r i g h t of confron- t a t i o n is paramount t o t h e S t a t e ' s p o l i c y of p r o t e c t i n g a j u v e n i l e of f e n d e r . Whatever t e m - p o r a r y embarrassment might r e s u l t t o [ t h e j u v e n i l e ] or h i s f a m i l y by d i s c l o s u r e of h i s j u v e n i l e record--if t h e p r o s e c u t i o n i n s i s t e d on u s i n g him t o make its case--is outweighed by [ d e f e n d a n t ' s ] r i g h t to probe i n t o t h e i n f l u e n c e o f p o s s i b l e b i a s i n t h e testimony of a c r u c i a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t n e s s .I1 Davis, s u p r a , 415 U.S. a t 319, 94 S.Ct. a t 1112, 39 L.Ed.2d a t 355. W e f i n d t h a t t h e j u d g e ' s r u l i n g h e r e denying d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o i n s p e c t denied him h i s r i g h t t o c o n f r o n t t h e w i t n e s s e s a g a i n s t him. But o u r subsequent review of t h o s e j u v e n i l e r e c o r d s c o n v i n c e s us t h a t t h e e r r o r i n t h i s case is harmless. See S a l a z v . S t a t e ( 1 9 7 7 ) , Wyo . , 561 P.2d 238, 241; S t a t e v. Myers ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 115 R. I. 1583, 350 A. 2d 611, 614-615. W e d e c l i n e to adopt a r u l e a s broad as t h a t which h a s been adopted i n many states, which a l l o w s e v i d e n c e of p r i o r j u v e n i l e c o n v i c t i o n s t o be used as e v i d e n c e t o a t t a c k t h e g e n e r a l c r e d i b i - l i t y of a w i t n e s s . See S t a t e v. Deffenbaugh ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 217 Kan. 469, 536 P.2d 1030. Montana, u n l i k e many states, d o e s n o t r e c o g n i z e t h e use of p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n s t o impeach t h e g e n e r a l c r e d i b i l i t y of a w i t n e s s . Rule 609, Mont .R. Evid. T h e r e f o r e , w e con£ i n e t h e p e r m i s s i b l e use of t h e s e j u v e n i l e r e c o r d s t o d e m o n s t r a t i n g , by cross-examination, a w i t n e s s ' b i a s , p r e j u d i c e , o r motive. See S t a t e v. Brown ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 3 2 N . J . Super. 584, 334 I n t h i s case, d e f e n d a n t attempted t o a t t a c k b o t h com- p e t e n c y and c r e d i b i l i t y . The t r i a l judge examined t h e j u v e n i l e r e c o r d s of t h e j u v e n i l e w i t n e s s e s i n o r d e r t o d e t e r m i n e whether t h e j u v e n i l e s were competent under Rule 601, Mont.R.Evid. H e excluded t e s t i m o n y from L. B., f i n d i n g t h a t based on r e p o r t s from W a r m S p r i n g s , she was s e r i o u s l y m e n t a l l y ill and should n o t t e s t i f y . H i s examination of t h e o t h e r j u v e n i l e r e c o r d s r e v e a l e d t h a t a l l of t h e o t h e r w i t n e s s e s were competent. The t r i a l judge s p e c i f i c a l l y v o i r d i r e d J.S.E., t h e w i t n e s s whose competency w a s i n q u e s t i o n , and found h e r t o be competent. W e f i n d no e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d i n d i c a t i n g t h a t J.S.E. w a s i n c a p a b l e of t r u t h - f u l n e s s o r i n any way incompetent to t e s t i f y . It is w i t h i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l judge to d e t e r m i n e competency and h i s f i n d i n g s w i l l n o t be o v e r t u r n e d a b s e n t an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . S t a t e v. Shambo ( 1 9 5 8 ) , 1 3 3 Mont. 305, 309, 322 P.2d 657, 659. Here t h e Court d i d n o t err i n a l l o w i n g t h e j u v e n i l e w i t n e s s e s to t e s t i f y . W e f u r t h e r conclude t h a t t h e j u v e n i l e r e c o r d s provided no b a s i s f o r impeaching t h e w i t n e s s e s by showing b i a s or p r e j u d i c e . Two of t h e j u v e n i l e w i t n e s s e s had no j u v e n i l e r e c o r d s u n t i l t h e t r i a l was completed; one w i t n e s s (L.B.) was d i s q u a l i f i e d from t e s t i f y i n g by t h e judge; one w i t n e s s had been on p r o b a t i o n f o r one month, b u t t h e p r o b a t i o n had been completed b e f o r e d e f e n d a n t was a r r e s t e d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h i s crime; t h e o t h e r w i t n e s s (J.S.E.) was i n f a c t involved w i t h t h e j u v e n i l e c o u r t system a t t h e time of t r i a l . But d e f e n d a n t w a s g i v e n p l e n t y of o p p o r t u n i t y t o cross-examine J.S.E. a s t o h e r motives f o r t e s t i f y i n g , and h e r c r e d i b i l i t y was a t t a c k e d many times w h i l e s h e was on t h e w i t n e s s s t a n d . She admitted l y i n g when s h e was i n i t i a l l y q u e s t i o n e d by t h e p o l i c e . She t e s t i f i e d t h a t she o r i g i n a l l y d i d n o t want to t a l k t o t h e p o l i c e , b u t changed h e r mind i n o r d e r to t e a c h t h e c o d e f e n d a n t i n t h i s case a l e s s o n . Defense counsel e l i c i t e d t h e i n f o r m a t i o n from J.S.E. t h a t she was p r e s e n t l y a r e s i d e n t of t h e Mountain V i e w Home, and asked h e r whether she had been promised a n y f a v o r s f o r t e s t i f y i n g , a l l of which i n d i c a t e d to t h e j u r y t h a t she was involved w i t h t h e j u v e n i l e a u t h o r i t i e s . I n sum, we f i n d t h a t d e f e n d a n t should have been p e r m i t t e d t o i n s p e c t t h e j u v e n i l e r e c o r d s , i n camera, i n o r d e r to d e t e r m i n e - whether t h e r e were f a c t o r s p r e s e n t which would g i v e t h e w i t n e s s e s a motive to t e s t i f y i n t h e S t a t e ' s f a v o r , o r r e n d e r them somehow b i a s e d or p r e j u d i c e d . But having made t h i s i n s p e c t i o n s i n c e t h e t i m e of t r i a l , we have determined t h a t i n t h i s c a s e , t h e d e n i a l o f t h e motion t o i n s p e c t was h a r m l e s s e r r o r . Because d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t s were n o t p r e j u d i c e d i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n , w e f i n d no r e a s o n t o g r a n t d e f e n d a n t a new t r i a l . A t t r i a l , d e f e n d a n t o f f e r e d t e s t i m o n y from B i l l Murray, a B u t t e a t t o r n e y , who was c a l l e d to t h e p o l i c e s t a t i o n on A p r i l 5, 1979 b y Debbie F o s t e r , t h e sister of codefendant, Randolph S c o t t . The d e f e n d a n t made a formal o f f e r of proof s t a t i n g t h a t Murray would t e s t i f y t h a t F o s t e r had t o l d him t h a t J.S.E., a pro- s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s and one of t h e v i c t i m s , w a s being q u e s t i o n e d i n v i o l a t i o n of h e r r i g h t to c o u n s e l and h e r r i g h t to remain s i l e n t . The c o u r t r e j e c t e d t h e o f f e r as hearsay. The d e f e n d a n t also o f f e r e d E x h i b i t "J" , a p o l i c e i n v e s t i g a t i v e r e p o r t , r e l a t i n g a s t a t e m e n t t a k e n from J.S.E. i n which she a l l e g e d l y r e p u d i a t e d h e r p r i o r i n c r i m i n a t o r y s t a t e m e n t s r e g a r d i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t . The c o u r t excluded t h e r e p o r t . Defendant p r e d i c a t e s error on t h e s e r u l i n g s of t h e t r i a l judge, a r g u i n g t h a t t h e c o u r t should have allowed t h e " j u r y to l e a r n t h a t one of t h e complaining w i t n e s s e s was t e s t i f y i n g a f t e r having been denied h e r r i g h t s to remain s i l e n t and be r e p r e s e n t e d by c o u n s e l and had s u b s e q u e n t l y r e p u d i a t e d t h e i n c r i m i n a t i n g sta- tement she had made a g a i n s t t h e Defendant ." The d i s t r i c t j u d g e ' s r u l i n g a s to Murray's t e s t i m o n y w a s c o r r e c t . Murray intended to t e s t i f y as to what Debbie F o s t e r had t o l d him, and F o s t e r ' s t e s t i m o n y was being o f f e r e d f o r its t r u t h . Rule 801, Mont.R.Evid. T h i s t e s t i m o n y was c l e a r l y h e a r s a y and was i n a d m i s s i b l e . Rule 802, Mont .R. Evid . F u r t h e r , d e f e n d a n t was n o t denied h i s r i g h t to g e t t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n b e f o r e t h e j u r y ; h e c o u l d have c a l l e d Debbie F o s t e r to t e s t i f y about h e r o b s e r v a t i o n s . Defendant concedes t h a t e x h i b i t "J" may have been h e a r s a y , b u t he a r g u e s t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e which it c o n t a i n e d should have been p r e s e n t e d t o t h e j u r y n o n e t h e l e s s . W e a g r e e t h a t it w a s i n a d m i s s i b l e h e a r s a y . Rules 803 ( 8 ) , 802, Mont .R. Evid. W e d o n o t e t h a t d e f e n d a n t was f r e e t o q u e s t i o n t h e p o l i c e as to t h e p r i o r i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e m e n t s made by J.S. E. c o n t a i n e d i n t h a t r e p o r t , Rule 8 0 1 ( d ) , Mont.R.Evid, and he was f r e e to q u e s t i o n J.S.E. a b o u t t h o s e s t a t e m e n t s . The c o u r t r u l e d c o r r e c t l y i n denying t h i s e x h i b i t s admission i n t o e v i d e n c e . A p p e l l a n t n e x t a l l e g e s e r r o r i n t h e d i s t r i c t j u d g e ' s r e f u - s a l t o g i v e s e v e r a l of h i s o f f e r e d j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s . D e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n No. 4 would have t o l d t h e j u r y t h a t : "A c h a r g e such as t h a t made a g a i n s t t h e Defendant i n t h i s c a s e is one which is e a s i l y made, and, once made, d i f f i c u l t to defend a g a i n s t , even i f t h e per- s o n accused is i n n o c e n t . " T h e r e f o r e , t h e l a w r e q u i r e s t h a t you examine t h e t e s t i m o n y of t h e female p e r s o n s named i n t h e i n f o r - m a t i o n w i t h c a u t i o n . " W e approved a similar i n s t r u c t i o n i n S t a t e v. Smith (1980 1 Mont. , 609 P.2d 696, 37 St.Rep. 583, and d e t e r - mined t h a t it should be g i v e n i n t h o s e cases i n which t h e e v i - d e n c e a t t r i a l shows (1) p e r s o n a l enmity between t h e v i c t i m and t h e d e f e n d a n t , - and ( 2 ) no c o r r o b o r a t i n g e v i d e n c e to s u p p o r t t h e victirrls a c c o u n t of t h e r a p e . S t a t e v. Pecora ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mon t . , 619 P.2d 173, 37 St.Rep. 1742. See also S t a t e v. Higley (1980 t Mont. , 621 P.2d 1043, 37 St.Rep. 1942. Here, t h e D i s t r i c t Court p r o p e r l y r e f u s e d to g i v e t h e Smith i n s t r u c t i o n . A s t o Counts I1 and 111, c h a r g i n g d e f e n d a n t w i t h s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t a g a i n s t A. R. B. and L.A.W., t h e r e was no b a s i s i n t h e e v i d e n c e f o r o f f e r i n g t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n . No e v i d e n c e was adduced showing any p e r s o n a l enmity between t h e d e f e n d a n t and A.R.B. or L.A.W. In a d d i t i o n , t h e r e was c o r r o b o r a t i n g t e s t i m o n y from A.R.B. I s b r o t h e r and from M r . Nicholson, b o t h of whom had witnessed t h e acts of d e f e n d a n t a g a i n s t A.R.B. The judge c o r r e c t l y determined t h a t t h e j u r y s h o u l d n o t be i n s t r u c t e d to view t h e t e s t i m o n y of t h e s e two w i t - n e s s e s any d i f f e r e n t l y from t h a t of any o t h e r w i t n e s s . The e v i d e n c e a t t r i a l d i d show p e r s o n a l enmity between t h e d e f e n d a n t and J.S.E. She t e s t i f i e d t h a t she wanted to t e a c h C a m i t s c h ' s c o d e f e n d a n t a l e s s o n , and t h e codefendant t e s t i f i e d t h a t J.S.E. had t h r e a t e n e d t h a t she would g e t even w i t h d e f e n d a n t f o r keeping h e r from s e e i n g t h e c o d e f e n d a n t . A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e o n l y e v i d e n c e of t h e crime w a s t h a t g i v e n by J.S.E. h e r s e l f , and s h e admitted to changing h e r s t o r y i n s e v e r a l p a r t i c u l a r s . I n sum, t h e r e w a s a s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s i n t h e e v i d e n c e f o r t h i s type o f i n s t r u c t i o n , under Smith, b u t t h e d e f e n d a n t f a i l e d to l i m i t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n to a d v i s i n g t h e j u r y to look w i t h c a u t i o n a t t h e t e s t i m o n y o f o n l y J.S.E. The i n s t r u c t i o n as o f f e r e d was e r r o n e o u s and i n c o r r e c t w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e t e s t i m o n y of t h e o t h e r complaining w i t n e s s e s , A.R.B. and L.A.W. Accordingly, it was c o r r e c t y r e f u s e d i n its o f f e r e d form. W e f i n d no error i n t h e j u d g e ' s r e f u s a l t o g i v e t h e i n s t r u c t i o n under t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . S t a t e v. Pecora, s u p r a , Mont. a t , 619 P.2d a t 175, 37 St.Rep. a t 1745. Defendant also p r e d i c a t e s error on t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s f a i l u r e t o g i v e t w o i n s t r u c t i o n s r e l a t i n g to impeachment. Proposed I n s t r u c t i o n N o . 5 c o n t a i n e d a d e f i n i t i o n of "impeachment" and an e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t t h e l a w allows a w i t n e s s to b e impeached by p r i o r i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e m e n t s . Proposed I n s t r u c - t i o n N o . 6 o u t l i n e d f o r t h e j u r y c e r t a i n t y p e s of e v i d e n c e which c o u l d s e r v e to impeach a w i t n e s s ' t e s t i m o n y . Defendant agreed a t t r i a l t h a t t h e e x p l a n a t i o n i n proposed I n s t r u c t i o n No. 5 a b o u t p r i o r i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e m e n t s w a s ade- q u a t e l y covered by t h e c o u r t ' s I n s t r u c t i o n N o . 3 . T h e r e f o r e we need o n l y c o n s i d e r whether a d e f i n i t i o n of "impeach" should have been g i v e n to t h e jury. Although t e c h n i c a l words and e x p r e s s i o n s used i n j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s must be d e f i n e d f o r t h e j u r y , words of common u n d e r s t a n d i n g need n o t be so e x p l a i n e d . McGuinn v. S t a t e ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 177 Mont. 215, 225, 581 P.2d 417, 423; S t a t e v. ~ u m p h r i e s ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 2 1 Wash.App. 405, 586 P.2d 130, 135. None of t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s g i v e n to t h e j u r y c o n t a i n e d t h e term "impeach ," b u t t h e j u r y w a s t o l d by t h e judge i n I n s t r u c t i o n No. 3 t o c o n s i d e r c e r t a i n f a c t o r s i n a s s e s s i n g t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e w i t n e s s e s . I n s t r u c t i o n N o . 3 t o l d t h e j u r y how t o a n a l y z e t h e t e s t i m o n y w i t h o u t e v e r t e l l i n g them t h a t t h e y were t o c o n s i d e r c e r t a i n e v i - d e n c e a s "impeaching" e v i d e n c e . A d e f i n i t i o n of impeach was n o t n e c e s s a r y i n t h a t t h e j u r y was f u l l y i n s t r u c t e d on t h i s a s p e c t of t h e l a w and d e f e n s e c o u n s e l was n o t precluded from a r g u i n g h i s t h e o r y of t h e c a s e . See S t a t e v. K i r k a l d i e ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Mont. , 587 P.2d 1298, 1304-1305, 35 St.Rep. 1532, 1538-1539; S t a t e v. Lee ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 221 Kan. 109, 558 P.2d 1096, 1099. D e f e n d a n t ' s proposed I n s t r u c t i o n N o . 6 was a d e q u a t e l y covered by t h e c o u r t ' s I n s t r u c t i o n N o . 3. N o . 6 c o n t a i n e d a n o n e x h a u s t i v e list of e v i d e n c e t h a t a j u r o r could c o n s i d e r i n a s s e s s i n g t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of a w i t n e s s , as set f o r t h i n t h e com- ments t o Rule 607, Mont.R.Evid. Although it would n o t have been error to g i v e such a s p e c i f i c i n s t r u c t i o n , it was u n n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e c o u r t t o d o so. The i n s t r u c t i o n g i v e n c o n t a i n e d t h e s u b s t a n c e of d e f e n d a n t 1 s i n s t r u c t i o n : "You a r e t h e sole judges of t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of a l l t h e w i t n e s s e s who have t e s t i f i e d i n t h i s case, and of t h e weight t o be g i v e n t h e i r t e s t i m o n y . You w i l l judge t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of a w i t n e s s by t h e manner i n which he t e s t i f i e s , b y t h e n a t u r e of h i s testimony, or by e v i d e n c e a f f e c t i n g h i s c h a r a c t e r f o r t r u t h , honesty o r i n t e g r i t y , or h i s motives, o r by c o n t r a d i c t o r y e v i d e n c e ; and i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e weight t o be g i v e n t o t h e t e s t i m o n y of any w i t n e s s , you have a r i g h t to c o n s i d e r t h e appearance of each w i t - n e s s on t h e s t a n d , h i s manner of t e s t i f y i n g , h i s a p p a r e n t candor o r l a c k of candor, h i s a p p a r e n t f a i r n e s s o r l a c k of f a i r n e s s , h i s a p p a r e n t i n t e l l i g e n c e o r l a c k of i n t e l l i g e n c e , h i s knowledge and means of knowledge on t h e s u b j e c t upon which he t e s t i f i e s , t o g e t h e r w i t h a l l t h e o t h e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s a p p e a r i n g i n e v i d e n c e on t h e t r i a l . " I f you b e l i e v e t h a t any w i t n e s s who h a s t e s t i f i e d i n t h i s case h a s w i l f u l l y t e s t i f i e d f a l s e l y a s to any material m a t t e r i n t h e c a s e , you must reject such of h i s t e s t i m o n y as you b e l i e v e t o have been f a l s e and you have t h e r i g h t t o view t h e rest of h i s t e s t i m o n y w i t h d i s t r u s t and i n your d i s c r e t i o n d i s r e g a r d it, u n l e s s , a f t e r examination of a l l t h e e v i d e n c e , you f i n d such t e s t i m o n y worthy of b e l i e f ." C o u r t ' s I n s t r u c t i o n N o . 3. I t was c l e a r l y unnecessary f o r t h e c o u r t t o g i v e d e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n . The s u b s t a n c e of it was con- t a i n e d i n t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s g i v e n , and we w i l l look to t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s a s a whole i n d e t e r m i n i n g whether they are a d e q u a t e . S t a t e v. C a r y l ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 168 Mont. 414, 430, 543 P.2d 389, 398. The l a s t s p e c i f i c a t i o n of error i n v o l v e s t h e d i s t r i c t j u d g e ' s d e s i g n a t i o n of d e f e n d a n t a "dangerous o f f e n d e r " f o r p a r o l e p u r p o s e s . Defendant a r g u e s t h a t t h e r e was no e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h i s d e s i g n a t i o n and t h a t t h i s d e s i g n a t i o n was as conclu- s o r y as t h e d e s i g n a t i o n which t h i s Court s t r u c k down i n Matter of McFadden (1980 ) , Mont . , 605 P.2d 599, 37 St.Rep. 55. S e c t i o n 46-18-404, MCA, a l l o w s t h e d i s t r i c t judge, i n h i s d i s c r e t i o n , to d e s i g n a t e a c r i m i n a l as dangerous f o r p u r p o s e s of p a r o l e . I n McFadden , s u p r a , Mont. a t , 605 P.2d a t 600, 37 St.Rep. a t 56, w e h e l d t h a t a c o u r t must a r t i c u l a t e its r e a s o n s f o r t h e d e s i g n a t i o n , and t h a t mere r e c i t a t i o n of t h e s t a - t u t o r y language was i n s u f f i c i e n t . The r e a s o n a r t i c u l a t e d h e r e by Judge Olsen was t h a t " [ d e f e n d a n t ] r e p r e s e n t s a s u b s t a n t i a l d a n g e r t o o t h e r p e r s o n s i n s o c i e t y i n t h e o p i n i o n of t h i s C o u r t ." W e f i n d t h i s to be a mere r e c i t a t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e , and v i o l a t i v e of McFadden. But because t h e record i n t h i s case r e v e a l s s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e which could have l e d t h e d i s t r i c t judge to d e s i g n a t e d e f e n d a n t "dangerous," we remand t h e cause to t h e d i s t r i c t judge f o r f i n d i n g s t o s u p p o r t h i s c o n c l u s i o n . U n l i k e t h e d i s t r i c t judge i n McFadden, Judge Olsen made a f i n d i n g t h a t d e f e n d a n t w a s dangerous. However, w i t h o u t having t h e r e a s o n s a r t i c u l a t e d i n t h e judgment, we cannot de t e n n i n e whether t h e r e was an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n by t h e judge. W e a£ f i r m t h e c o n v i c t i o n s i n t h i s cause , and remand it to t h e District Court f o r f i n d i n g s t o s u p p o r t t h e d e s i g n a t i o n of d e f e n d a n t as "dangerous. " M r . Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. H a s w e l l s i t t i n g i n p l a c e of M r . J u s t i c e Frank B. Morrison. M r . ~usf%&red J. Weber s i t t i n g i n p l a c e of M r . J u s t i c e D a n i e l J. Shea.