Title: State v. Longo

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: November 9, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff on Review,
v.
CHRISTIAN MICHAEL LONGO,
Defendant on Review.
(CC 016441; SC S50474)
On automatic and direct review of the judgment of conviction
and sentence of death imposed by the Lincoln County Circuit
Court.
Robert J. Huckleberry, Judge.
Argued and submitted September 12, 2006.
Rankin Johnson, IV, Portland, argued the cause for defendant
on review.  With him on the briefs were Peter A. Ozanne,
Executive Director, and Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, Office of
Public Defense Services, Salem.
Rolf C. Moan, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause
for plaintiff on review.  With him on the brief were Hardy Myers,
Attorney General, Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General, and
Christina M. Hutchins, Assistant Attorney General, Salem.
Before De Muniz, Chief Justice, and Carson, Gillette,
Durham, Balmer and Kistler, Justices.*
DE MUNIZ, C. J.
The judgment of conviction and sentence of death are
affirmed.
*Riggs, J., retired September 30, 2006, and did not
participate in the consideration or decision of this case. 
Walters, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision
of this case.
DE MUNIZ, C. J.
This matter is before the court on automatic and direct
review of defendant's sentence of death for seven counts of
aggravated murder.  Defendant pleaded guilty to the aggravated
murder of his wife, Mary Jane Longo, and his two-year-old
daughter Madison.  At trial, a jury convicted him of also
murdering his four-year-old son Zachery and his three-year-old
daughter Sadie. (1)  For the reasons discussed below, we affirm
the judgment of conviction and the sentence of death.
I. FACTS
Because the jury found defendant guilty, we present the
facts in the light most favorable to the state.  See, e.g., State
v. Moore, 324 Or 396, 398, 927 P2d 1073 (1996) (so noting).
The first hints of the events that would unfold in
Oregon came roughly 18 months before the crimes, while defendant
was living with his family in Michigan.  On May 26, 2000, Mary
Jane Longo called her sister; she was very upset.  Mary Jane told
her sister that she had discovered emails from defendant to
another woman; that she had confronted defendant with those
emails; and that defendant had told her that he did not love her
anymore, that she spent too much time and attention on the
children, and that she was no fun since they had had children. 
In early 2001, because of various financial and legal
problems, defendant and the family moved to Ohio and lived for a
time in a warehouse.  After defendant became a suspect in the
murders, police searched that warehouse.  There they discovered
items that had been left behind by the Longos, including Mary
Jane's wedding dress and wedding photos of defendant and Mary
Jane.  There were also two books:  one was a Spanish phrasebook,
and the other was a book entitled The Modern Identity Changer.
Defendant and his family soon left Ohio, arriving on
the Oregon coast in early September 2001.  They settled in the
Newport area.  Defendant was hired as a part-time employee in the
Starbucks coffee outlet located in the local Fred Meyer
department store.  
Defendant and his family moved into the Newport Motor
Inn around the first of November 2001.  Defendant told the
manager that he had been sent down from Portland to help set up
the Starbucks outlet. 
On November 19, 2001, defendant printed off from the
Internet the obituaries for four young adult men from the area. 
Those printed obituaries would later be found in defendant's
locker at work.  Handwritten on three of the printed obituaries
were social security numbers.  When police later captured
defendant, he had in his possession one of the four names.
On November 20, 2001, defendant stole a credit card
receipt for a customer making a purchase at Starbucks.  After the
murders, defendant used that credit card information to buy a
plane ticket to Texas.
About November 30, 2001, defendant and his family moved
into a condominium. Defendant told the condominium manager and
the front desk person that defendant worked as a subcontractor
for Qwest surveying the coast for DSL (a type of high-speed
Internet service).  Defendant claimed to both that he had only
two children, not three.  Defendant also claimed that his family
lived out of town, but he said that they would visit some
weekends. (2) 
Defendant had one vehicle, a maroon minivan with an
out-of-state license plate reading "KID VAN." (3)  On December
9, 2001, defendant and his family looked at a green Dodge Durango
at the Town and Country Dodge dealership in Wilsonville.
On December 15, 2001, a Saturday, defendant did not
work.  That night, Denise Thompson, a coworker of defendant's,
babysat the children so that defendant and Mary Jane could go to
dinner and a movie.  Defendant and his wife returned about
10:30 p.m.  As far as can be determined, that was the last time
anyone other than defendant saw Mary Jane Longo or the children
alive.
It is not clear exactly when defendant committed the
crimes.  At 2:00 a.m. on the morning of Sunday, December 16, a
couple staying in the room directly above the Longos, Mr. and
Mrs. Crabb, were awakened by dragging noises that continued for
five to 15 minutes.  Mrs. Crabb believed that the noises were
coming from downstairs.  Mr. Crabb thought that the noises came
from next door; he called the apartments on either side, but no
one answered.  The next morning, the Crabbs complained at the
front desk.  They were told that no one had been in the rooms on
either side of them.
Defendant's recorded interview with police suggested
that the murders took place in the early morning hours of Monday,
December 17.  Defendant implied that he killed his family after
returning home from work at 11:00 p.m.  He indicated that it was
either Sunday or Monday, but he could not remember which. 
Defendant's work records show that he did not work on Saturday;
he did work until 11:00 p.m. on both Sunday and Monday, December
16 and 17.
In his recorded statement, defendant said that, when he
got home after 11:00 p.m., everyone was asleep.  He had some wine
and cheese, went onto the deck to think about his financial
problems, then came back in and lay down in bed next to Mary
Jane.  Madison, the youngest child, was sleeping on the floor of
the bedroom on a comforter.  Zachery and Sadie slept in the
living room on the couch.  Defendant lay awake for a couple of
hours, worrying about his financial problems.  In his recorded
statements to police, defendant did not further describe the
crime, but he did say that he had "been reliving it [those
events] every night." (4) 
Mary Jane was manually strangled.  Her nude body was
put into a suitcase and dumped off the dock at the Embarcadero
Marina.  Madison, the two-year-old, also was strangled; her body
was put into a different suitcase and dumped off the same dock. 
Zachery and Sadie (ages four and three, respectively) both died
of asphyxiation, but the medical examiner could not be more
specific.  The body of Sadie Longo was tied to a rock and dropped
off a bridge on Highway 34 near Waldport.  The body of Zachery
Longo was found floating near the same bridge.  Near where
Sadie's body was later found, divers located a large rock inside
a child's pillowcase that had been twisted shut. 
At about 4:30 a.m. on Monday morning, December 17, a
construction worker was driving on Highway 34 near Waldport.  He
found a red minivan stopped in the middle of a bridge.  The
worker stopped and asked the driver, a man, whether he needed any
help.  The driver said that he did not; he had pulled over
because his "check engine" light had come on. 
Later the same morning, at about 8:00 a.m., the harbor
master at the Embarcadero Marina noticed a broken pipe under a
ramp at the marina.  Divers later discovered the suitcases
containing the bodies of Mary Jane and Madison in the water just
beneath where the pipe had been broken. 
Defendant worked on Monday, December 17, from 2:00 p.m.
to 11:00 p.m.
Defendant did not work Tuesday, December 18.  That day,
the housekeeping staff at the Newport Motor Inn discovered that
someone had put in their trash dumpster children's clothes, baby
books, and a wallet containing Mary Jane's driver license.  
That afternoon, someone stole a green Dodge Durango 
from the Town and Country Dodge dealership in Wilsonville and
left behind a maroon minivan.  Although the license plate had
been removed from the minivan, the foam underneath showed the
impression of the letters "KID VAN."  Inside the minivan were two
other different license plates.
Late in the afternoon on December 18, defendant spoke
with the manager at the condominium.  Defendant told the manager
that he had taken his wife and children to the airport, and that
he and Mary Jane were having marital problems.
Defendant attended a Christmas party for Starbucks
employees the same night.  He was driving a green Dodge Durango. 
Defendant told Denise Thompson and another coworker that he had
taken his wife and children to the airport.  The party involved a
gift exchange, and defendant gave the recipient of his gift a
bottle of perfume.  The bottle was not new; it had belonged to
Mary Jane. 
On Wednesday, December 19, defendant worked from 5:00
a.m. to 2:00 p.m.  That day, defendant told Thompson and another
coworker that his wife was having an affair, and that she had
left him for the other man. (5)  He named the man supposedly
involved.  Defendant claimed to Thompson that he was not sure
whether Madison was his own child.
In the same conversation, defendant told Thompson that
he had put the minivan in storage in Portland.  Defendant also
told Thompson that he wanted to install a CD player in the
Durango.  Thompson made arrangements for her and her husband to
accompany defendant on Saturday to buy a CD player that
Thompson's husband would install.
That afternoon, defendant rented a movie. 
The same day, December 19, police discovered Zachery's
body. 
On Thursday, December 20, defendant again worked from
5:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.  He later played volleyball with a
coworker. 
Thompson tentatively identified Zachery's body on
December 21.  
On December 21, defendant fled the state and headed for
San Francisco.  After he arrived, he applied for a job at a local
Starbucks.  Then, however, defendant decided to flee to Mexico. 
On December 26, defendant purchased a plane ticket using the
information from the stolen credit card receipt.  He left the
green Dodge Durango in the parking lot at San Francisco
International Airport.  In the Durango, police later found the
license plate "KID VAN," as well as defendant's checkbook,
marriage license, and diploma. 
Police captured defendant on January 13, 2002, less
than one month after the murders.  At the time, defendant was
staying at a campground near Cancun, Mexico.  At the campground,
defendant had told other people he was a writer for the New York
Times.  He had been touring local ruins and other sights.  At the
time of his capture, defendant was sharing a cabana with a woman,
and he admitted that he had been sexually intimate with her.
While defendant was being returned to the United
States, the FBI agent accompanying defendant asked him about the
murders.  Defendant replied, "I sent them to a better place." 
II. ANALYSIS
Defendant makes 26 assignments of error.  We have
reviewed each one.  We discuss a number of them below.  We reject
the remainder, because we conclude that they are unpreserved, or
are controlled by this court's prior decisions, or are meritless. 
A. Guilt Phase
1. Whether Defendant's Rights Under the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations or Other International Law
Prohibit Imposing the Death Penalty
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion requesting
that the trial court prohibit imposition of the death penalty or
a life sentence in defendant's case.  Defendant's argument turns
on his having been captured in Mexico.  In support of his motion,
defendant presented evidence that Mexico generally refuses the
attempted extradition of fugitives who face the death penalty or
life imprisonment, unless the extraditing state agrees to waive
those punishments.  As he did in the trial court, defendant seeks
to get the benefits that he claims he would have had if he had
insisted on being formally extradited.  Accordingly, defendant
argues that the trial court should have either dismissed the
capital murder charges (leaving noncapital aggravated murder
charges) or prohibited the imposition of the death penalty or a
life sentence. 
Defendant bases that argument on the claim that he has
personal and individually enforceable rights under the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 UST 77
(VCCR).  Defendant contends that the FBI agent who explained
defendant's options about returning to the United States was
functioning at the time as a "consular officer" within the
meaning of the VCCR.  Under the VCCR, defendant argues, the agent
had a legally enforceable duty to advise defendant to obtain
local counsel.  Defendant asserts that, had he consulted with
local counsel, that counsel would have told defendant to insist
on formal extradition, ultimately preventing the state from
imposing the death penalty.  Defendant contends that the FBI
agent instead misled and deceived defendant into returning to the
United States voluntarily.
The trial court made the following findings of fact in
a written order denying defendant's motion to prohibit imposition
of the death penalty or a life sentence.  Special Agent Clegg is
an FBI agent assigned to the FBI office in Mexico City.  The
trial court noted that "Mr. Clegg is a 'diplomat,' but as such
has no law enforcement authority in Mexico."  The FBI has no
authority to make arrests in Mexico.  Although the trial court
did not make specific findings on whether Clegg functioned as a
consular officer, Clegg testified that he did not. 
On January 13, 2002, Clegg received information that
defendant was at a campground near Tulum, in the Mexican state of
Quintana Roo.  Clegg flew to Cancun and met with the chief of the
Quintana Roo police.  About one dozen Mexican police officers,
joined by Clegg, then traveled to Tulum to arrest defendant.
Mexican police, not Clegg, arrested defendant.  The
police, Clegg, and defendant then returned to Cancun.  After they
arrived in Cancun, Clegg advised defendant of the three options
available to him:  extradition, deportation, or voluntary return. 
The trial court found that "[t]here is no evidence that Special
Agent Clegg was anything but truthful with the Defendant as to
these options * * * or that the options discussed weren't
properly laid out."  Defendant then emphatically indicated that
he did not want to spend time in a Mexican jail; he wanted to
return to the United States.  Clegg informed the chief of police,
who confirmed defendant's decision. 
The next flight back to the United States left the
following morning at 7:20 a.m.  Defendant stayed at the police
station all night with Special Agent Clegg.  He was not held in a
jail cell or mistreated by Mexican police.  Virtually no
conversation took place at the station. 
Mexican police, accompanied by Clegg, took defendant to
the airport the next morning, where he boarded a plane for the
United States.  
After returning to the United States, defendant signed
a statement in which he acknowledged that he had voluntarily
returned to the United States without any promises or
threats. (6)
Clegg did not notify defendant that he had a right to
contact the United States consulate, and as far as Clegg knew,
the Mexican police officers did not do so, either.  Defendant
offered some evidence that the United States consular official
would have told defendant that he was in serious trouble and
given defendant a list of local attorneys.
In contending that he has individually enforceable
rights under the VCCR, and that those rights were violated,
defendant relies mainly on Article 36 of the VCCR, which
provides, in part:
"1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of
consular functions relating to nationals of the sending
State:
"* * * * *
"(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities
of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the
consular post of the sending State if, within its
consular district, a national of that State is arrested
or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or
is detained in any other manner.  Any communication
addressed to the consular post by the person arrested,
in prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded
by the said authorities without delay.  The said
authorities shall inform the person concerned without
delay of his rights under this subparagraph;
"(c) consular officers shall have the right to
visit a national of the sending State who is in prison,
custody or detention, to converse and correspond with
him and to arrange for his legal representation. * * *
Nevertheless, consular officers shall refrain from
taking action on behalf of a national who is in prison,
custody or detention if he expressly opposes such
actions.
"2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this
Article shall be exercised in conformity with the laws
and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the
proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations
must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for
which the rights accorded under this Article are
intended."
VCCR, Art 36, 21 UST at 100-01.
This court already has concluded that Article 36 of the
VCCR does not create an individually enforceable right.  "[T]he
obligations that Article 36 describes are enforceable only by the
affected signatory states and not by individual detainees." 
State v. Sanchez-Llamas, 338 Or 267, 276, 108 P3d 573 (2005),
aff'd on other grounds sub nom Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, ___ US
___, 126 S Ct 2669, 165 L Ed 2d 557 (2006). (7)
Moreover, defendant confuses permission with duty.  The
VCCR gives a country the opportunity to help its nationals, but
it does not force the country to do so.  Article 36 gives
"consular officers" "the right to visit a national of the sending
State who is in * * * custody or detention, * * * and to arrange
for his legal representation" (emphasis added); the VCCR does not
make it a duty for consular officers to do so.  The stated
purpose of Article 36 is to "facilitat[e] the exercise of
consular functions," not to mandate that consular officials will
perform those functions.  In our view, the VCCR did not put on
the United States any duty to help defendant get local counsel in
Mexico.
Defendant also relies on the extradition treaty between
the United States and Mexico (Extradition Treaty, US - Mex, May
4, 1978, 31 UST 5059).  But that, too, does not help defendant. 
Nothing in that treaty makes formal extradition the sole means by
which fugitives may be returned to the United States.  See United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 US 655, 668-69, 112 S Ct 2188, 119
L Ed 2d 441 (1992) (rejecting argument that Mexican national,
forcibly kidnapped from Mexico and returned to United States,
could not be prosecuted; "to infer from this Treaty and its terms
that it prohibits all means of gaining the presence of an
individual outside of its terms goes beyond established precedent
and practice").
Finally, defendant claims that Clegg had some duty to
defendant under the Department of State's Foreign Affairs Manual. 
But even if the consular officer portions of the Foreign Affairs
Manual somehow applied to Clegg -- an issue that we need not
decide -- the Foreign Affairs Manual is not a source of law.  See
Scales v. I.N.S., 232 F3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir 2000) (stating that
Foreign Affairs Manual had not been arrived at after notice-and-comment rulemaking, and that such "agency manuals" "lack the
force of law" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
In sum, we reject all defendant's arguments based on
the manner of his return from Mexico.
2. Whether the Trial Court Should Have Suppressed
Defendant's Statements to Police
Before trial, defendant argued that the court should 
suppress some of his statements to police, in order to cure
alleged violations of his Miranda rights.  Defendant renews those
arguments on review.
The trial court made extensive findings of fact on the
question and rejected defendant's arguments for suppression. 
Defendant did not make any statements regarding the crime until
after he was in United States custody, and after he had been
given his Miranda warnings at the airport.  Defendant then had
three interviews with police:  the first with Agent Clegg on the
plane back to the United States, the second in Texas with Agent
Clegg and two other officers, and the third in Newport, after
defendant returned to Oregon.  Before all three interviews,
police either gave defendant Miranda warnings or reminded him
that he had been so advised earlier.
In all three interviews, defendant refused to answer
particular questions or to discuss certain subjects.  In several
of those cases, he indicated that he wanted to speak with someone
else or to get some advice before discussing those matters, but
defendant never identified who he meant. 
The trial court found, and defendant does not contest,
that "at no time did the [d]efendant ever say that he wished to
consult counsel, 'consult legal advice[,]' or ask for a lawyer." 
(Emphasis in original.)  The trial court also rejected the claim
that defendant's refusal to discuss some subjects amounted to an
invocation of the right to remain silent.  Defendant "wanted to
talk about his case, that is clear, and in doing so did not
invoke at any time a right to remain silent or his desire to
speak with counsel.  To the contrary, he wanted to keep on
talking."  (Emphasis in original.)  Defendant "wished to continue
discussing his situation with the police, so [he] made the call
[respecting] which areas he would and would not discuss[.]"  The
police officers were "very credible witnesses who gave
[defendant] every opportunity without pressure to say, or not
say, what he wanted or that which was on his mind."  (Emphasis in
original.) 
Under the circumstances, we reject defendant's argument
that the court should have suppressed his statements to
police. (8)  See State v. Kell, 303 Or 89, 99, 734 P2d 334
(1987) (no Miranda violation when defendant unequivocally asked
for lawyer before talking about some subjects, but otherwise
continued speaking to police; "[d]efendant was entitled to pick
and choose what he wished to talk about").
3. Whether the State Unconstitutionally Used Peremptory
Challenges to Exclude Minority Group Members from the
Jury
During voir dire, defendant contended that the state
unconstitutionally used peremptory challenges to eliminate
minority jurors from the jury panel.  Defendant renews those
arguments here.
Voir dire began on Tuesday, February 18, 2003.  Juror
number 1853 was examined that day and the following, February 19. 
The parties passed her for cause.
The next day, February 20, juror number 627, a woman
from South Korea, appeared as a potential juror.  The parties
passed her for cause, but later that day the state struck her
with its fourth peremptory challenge.  Defendant did not object.
Voir dire continued on Friday, February 21, then
skipped the weekend and began again on Tuesday, February 25.  On
Wednesday, February 26, the state used its tenth peremptory
challenge to strike juror 1853.  Defendant then objected, arguing
that the state had violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 US 79, 89,
106 S Ct 1712, 90 L Ed 2d 69 (1986):  Of approximately 50 jurors
that had been examined to that point, only jurors 1853 and 627
were members of a racial or ethnic minority, and the prosecution
had struck both. (9)
It is not clear from the record whether juror 1853 was
actually a member of a racial or ethnic minority.  Defendant's
counsel argued that she was "probably Native American," though he
had first thought she might be Hispanic.  In response, the
prosecution stated that they thought that juror 1853 was
Caucasian.  The court later said:
"* * * I saw the juror myself, and I would not be able
to say that she was of ethnic -- African American,
Native American -- I mean, I -- I couldn't tell what
her racial background is.  Native American is what you
said.  And frankly she looked like -- just like
everybody else we've seen on the jury, with the
exception of [juror 627] who is Asian."
The trial court refused to bring juror 1853 back to question her
about her race.  Instead, the court orally ruled that defendant
had failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 
However, the state also asked for the opportunity to
offer a neutral explanation why they had challenged juror 1853. 
The state did so the next day, explaining that they were
concerned from her answers on voir dire that juror 1853 might not
be able to impose the death penalty.  At the conclusion of that
colloquy, the trial court said that the state's explanation
"makes moot the issue now before the Court." (10)
The same day as that oral ruling, the trial court
signed a written order denying defendant's motion on the ground
that defendant had failed to make a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination.  In the order, the trial court noted
the dispute regarding whether juror 1853 was a minority, adding
that "this court has no reason to believe the juror is of a
racial minority[.]"  The court also indicated that it had
reviewed the recorded questioning of juror 1853, and that nothing
in the questioning "would lead the court to believe the State's
challenge of either juror was racially motivated[.]"  Finally,
the court also noted that the state had disclosed its reason for
challenging juror 1853, "which reason was based upon the State's
belief the juror might not be able to fulfill her duties as
required by law." 
ORCP 57 D(4), made applicable to criminal proceedings
by ORS 136.230(4), prohibits any party from using peremptory
challenges to discriminate, and sets out the procedure for such
challenges.
"D(4)(a) A party may not exercise a peremptory
challenge on the basis of race, ethnicity or sex. 
Courts shall presume that a peremptory challenge does
not violate this paragraph, but the presumption may be
rebutted in the manner provided by this section.
"D(4)(b) If a party believes that the adverse
party is exercising a peremptory challenge on a basis
prohibited under paragraph (a) of this subsection, the
party may object to the exercise of the challenge.  The
objection must be made before the court excuses the
juror.  The objection must be made outside of the
presence of potential jurors.  The party making the
objection has the burden of establishing a prima facie
case that the adverse party challenged the potential
juror on the basis of race, ethnicity or sex.
"D(4)(c) If the court finds that the party making
the objection has established a prima facie case that
the adverse party challenged a prospective juror on the
basis of race, ethnicity or sex, the burden shifts to
the adverse party to show that the peremptory challenge
was not exercised on the basis of race, ethnicity or
sex.  If the adverse party fails to meet the burden of
justification as to the questioned challenge, the
presumption that the challenge does not violate
paragraph (a) of this subsection is rebutted.
"D(4)(d) If the court finds that the adverse party
challenged a prospective juror on the basis of race,
ethnicity or sex, the court shall disallow the
peremptory challenge."
That procedure corresponds with the constitutional
requirements explained by the United States Supreme Court in
Batson and subsequent cases.  See, e.g., Johnson v. California,
545 US 162, 168, 125 S Ct 2410, 162 L Ed 2d 129 (2005)
(summarizing requirements). (11)  
However, we note a recent constitutional development in 
this area of the law.  In Batson, the United States Supreme Court
had said that the party must initially make out a "prima facie
case" of purposeful discrimination.  476 US at 93-94; see ORCP 57
D(4)(b) (requiring same).  In 2005, however, Johnson held that
the initial burden on a defendant is less than the words "prima
facie case" might suggest.  
In Johnson, the California Supreme Court had concluded
that a "prima facie case" of discriminatory challenges meant a
showing that, more likely than not, the challenges were the
product of purposeful discrimination.  545 US at 167 (California
court concluded that prima facie case requires "strong evidence
that makes discriminatory intent more likely than not if the
challenges are not explained" (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted; emphasis in original)). 
The United States Supreme Court, however, held that
that standard was too high.
"We did not intend the first step to be so onerous that
a defendant would have to persuade the judge -- on the
basis of all the facts, some of which are impossible
for the defendant to know with certainty -- that the
challenge was more likely than not the product of
purposeful discrimination.  Instead, a defendant
satisfies the requirements of Batson's first step by
producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge
to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred."
Johnson, 545 US at 170.
Courts should examine "the totality of the relevant
facts" to decide whether they may infer purposeful
discrimination. 
"For example, a 'pattern' of strikes against black
jurors included in the particular venire might give
rise to an inference of discrimination.  Similarly, the
prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire
and in exercising his challenges may support or refute
an inference of discriminatory purpose.  These examples
are merely illustrative.  We have confidence that trial
judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will be
able to decide if the circumstances concerning the
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges creates a
prima facie case of discrimination against black
jurors."
Batson, 476 US at 97.
Here, the trial court found "no reason to believe" that
juror 1853 was a racial minority, and we must defer to that
finding.  See State v. Nefstad, 309 Or 523, 528, 537-38, 789 P2d
1326 (1990) (giving "great weight" to trial court's impressions
of potential juror in reviewing court's decision to exclude juror
for cause); see also Hernandez v. New York, 500 US 352, 364-69,
111 S Ct 1859, 114 L Ed 2d 395 (1991) (concluding that trial
court's findings at third step of Batson were reviewed for clear
error). (12)  We must conclude, then, that juror 1853 appeared
to be Caucasian, regardless of what her actual racial heritage
may have been.  Viewed in that manner, the peremptory challenge
of an apparently Caucasian juror adds nothing to defendant's
prima facie case.
We agree with the trial court, too, that the evidence
fails to make out a prima facie case.  The record does not show a
pattern of questioning by the prosecutor suggestive of racial
discrimination.  See Batson, 476 US at 97 (identifying that form
of evidence).  And the state's peremptory challenge to juror 627
does not show a "pattern" of challenges to minority jurors.  See
id. ("a 'pattern' of strikes against black jurors included in the
particular venire might give rise to an inference of
discrimination").  Without something more, the striking of a
single member of a minority group from a jury is not enough "to
permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination
has occurred."  Johnson, 545 US at 170. (13)  
We reject defendant's arguments that the state violated
Batson v. Kentucky. (14)
4. Whether the State Committed a Discovery Violation in
Its Handling of the Crabb Testimony
Defendant here assigns errors relating to the testimony
by the Crabbs about the noises that they heard in the early
morning hours of December 16, 2001.
The Crabbs were last-minute witnesses.  An investigator
for the state first interviewed the Crabbs on March 12, 2003, two
days after opening statements in the trial.  That same day, the
investigator prepared a brief memorandum that was immediately
submitted to the defense.  Although Mrs. Crabb had told the
investigator that she and her husband had disagreed about where
the noises came from, the report did not mention the
disagreement.  Defendant would not learn about the disagreement
regarding where the noises came from until Mrs. Crabb testified
on March 24, 2003.  
In its written order denying defendant's motion for a
mistrial, the trial court found no evidence to suggest that the
state's investigator acted intentionally in omitting the
information.  Defendant does not challenge that finding.
Defendant nonetheless argues that the state violated
his statutory discovery rights under ORS 135.815 (2001) and his
constitutional rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 US 83, 83 S Ct
1194, 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963).  Defendant contends that the
evidence was exculpatory, and that the state's failure to
disclose it kept defendant from investigating further.  Defendant
argues that the trial court should have either granted a
continuance for defendant to investigate, or struck the
testimony, or declared a mistrial.
We conclude that defendant has not shown any discovery
violation.  The state did not violate statutory discovery
requirements, because it provided the written statement that the
state's investigator had prepared.  See ORS 135.815(1)(a) (2001)
(requiring state to disclose "relevant written or recorded
statements or memoranda of any oral statements" of
witness). (15)  And the state did not violate Brady, because
the jury learned at trial of Mr. Crabb's doubts about the
location of the noises.  See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 US 419, 433-34, 115 S Ct 1555, 131 L Ed 2d 490 (1995) (suppression of
exculpatory evidence is unconstitutional "if there is a
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to
the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted));
Brady, 373 US at 86-87 (suppression of exculpatory evidence
violates due process, because it casts doubt on fairness of
trial). (16)
Furthermore, defendant was not prejudiced in any way. 
In its written order denying defendant's motion for a mistrial,
the trial court correctly concluded that the investigator's March
12 memorandum had put defendant on notice that there was an issue
regarding the source of the sound and the acoustics of the
condominiums.  The trial court also concluded, correctly, that
defendant had had ample time to investigate the source of the
sound; after the state disclosed the investigator's report about
the Crabb's testimony, the trial court had granted defendant a
continuance from March 13 through March 18 to investigate.  Even
so, the trial court offered defendant another short continuance
when the discrepancy in the Crabbs' testimony first came to light
(though defendant apparently did not accept the court's offer). 
We note that defendant apparently took advantage of the first
continuance, because he did offer at trial evidence that the
noise might have come from a different source. 
We conclude that the trial court permissibly refused to
declare a mistrial or to strike the Crabbs' testimony.
5. Whether Hearsay Statements in Sister's Testimony
Qualified as Excited Utterances
Defendant challenges the admission of testimony by Mary
Jane's sister about defendant's statements to Mary Jane after she
discovered e-mails from him to another woman.
Defendant objected to the testimony at trial.  The
state laid a foundation to introduce the testimony, eliciting
from Mary Jane's sister (1) that Mary Jane was very upset and
sobbing during the phone call; (2) that Mary Jane had discovered
the e-mails and spoken with defendant immediately before she
called her sister; (3) that Mary Jane immediately came over to
her sister's house, arriving within 20-30 minutes; and (4) that
Mary Jane was still visibly shaken and upset when she arrived --
so visibly upset, in fact, that a neighbor later asked the sister
what was wrong.  The trial court ruled that the statements made
over the phone were admissible as an excited utterance. 
The statements from Mary Jane to her sister were
hearsay under OEC 801(3).  However, under OEC 803(2), hearsay is
admissible if it is "[a] statement relating to a startling event
or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of
excitement caused by the event or condition." (17)  Defendant
argues that Mary Jane's discovery of defendant's e-mails, and
defendant's statement that he did not love her, were not
"startling" because they did not "'caus[e] a momentary shock,
fright, surprise, or astonishment by a mild or forcible demand
upon the attention.'"  (Quoting Webster's Third New Int'l
Dictionary 2228 (unabridged ed 1993).) 
We do not agree.  The record demonstrates that Mary
Jane suffered surprise, astonishment, and shock, and that the
events were a forcible demand on her attention.  When Mary Jane
spoke on the phone she was crying, and she was so distraught that
she remained visibly upset when she arrived at her sister's house
20-30 minutes later.  The trial court did not err in concluding
that the event was startling.  See State v. Carlson, 311 Or 201,
217, 808 P2d 1002 (1991) (to determine whether event is
startling, "the trial judge should 'look primarily to the effect
[of the event or condition] upon the declarant'" (alteration in
original; citation omitted)); State v. Cunningham, 337 Or 528,
542, 99 P3d 271 (2004), cert den, 544 US 931 (2005) (phone calls
from defendant to victim changing plans for victim to get
children were "a subjectively and objectively startling event";
victim's phone calls to others were excited utterances). 
Defendant also argues that, even though Mary Jane may
have been distraught, "there is no indication that Mary Jane was
'startled' at the time that she made the statement to [her
sister]."  Again, we disagree.  The sister testified that her
conversation with Mary Jane took place immediately after Mary
Jane's conversation with defendant, and Mary Jane was in tears
when she spoke with her sister.  Because Mary Jane's statements
came on the heels of the startling events, and because Mary Jane
showed obvious distress, the trial court did not err when it
concluded that Mary Jane was startled at the time she made the
statements.  See Carlson, 311 Or at 218 (statement "must have
been made while the excitement persisted," and court considers
several criteria, including "lapse of time" (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)); see also Cunningham, 337 Or at 544-45 (little time had elapsed between startling event and victim's
conversations with others; victim was under stress; and victim
had no reason to fabricate statements).
We reject defendant's argument that the trial court
erred in allowing the testimony.
B. Penalty Phase
1. Whether Oregon is Constitutionally Required to Create
Statewide Standards for Imposing a Death Sentence
Defendant contends, based on Bush v. Gore, 531 US 98,
121 S Ct 525, 148 L Ed 2d 388 (2000), that the federal
constitution requires Oregon to establish statewide standards
regarding who is sentenced to death.  Defendant argues that the
trial court should have allowed defendant to conduct discovery
regarding sentencing decisions for all of Oregon, not just
Lincoln County.
This court has rejected the claim that either the state
or federal constitution requires the state to establish statewide
standards to impose the death penalty.  See State v. Cunningham,
320 Or 47, 65-68, 880 P2d 431 (1994), cert den, 514 US 1005
(1995) (rejecting arguments under Article I, section 20, of
Oregon Constitution, and both Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
United States Constitution).  We can find nothing in Bush that
even remotely calls that conclusion into question.  See 531 US at
109 (holding on election questions "limited to the present
circumstances"). 
Defendant also argues that he should have been entitled
to discover evidence relative to that issue so that he could
offer it to the jury.  This court rejected that argument, too, in
Cunningham.  320 Or at 64-69 (so holding in death penalty
context).  We find no error.
2. Whether the Second and Fourth Death Penalty Questions
Must Be Proved Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
In deciding whether to sentence a defendant to death, a
jury must answer four questions.  ORS 163.150(1)(b)
(1999). (18)  Defendant contends that the second and fourth
questions unconstitutionally allow a defendant to be sentenced to
death on proof less than beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 530 US 466, 490, 120 S Ct 2348, 147 L Ed 2d 435
(2000) ("any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum," other than prior conviction,
"must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt").
The second question asks "[w]hether there is a
probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society." 
ORS 163.150(1)(b)(B).  In that statute, "probability" means "more
likely than not," and the trial court correctly instructed the
jury to that effect.  See State v. Wagner, 305 Or 115, 150-52,
752 P2d 1136 (1988), vac'd and rem'd on other grounds, 492 US
914, 109 S Ct 3235, 106 L Ed 2d 583 (1989) (interpreting
"probability" in second question to mean "more likely than not").
The jury must find the probability of future violence beyond a
reasonable doubt.  See ORS 163.150(1)(d) (state must prove first
three questions beyond reasonable doubt). 
As the United States Supreme Court held in Apprendi and
reiterated in Blakely v. Washington, 542 US 296, 124 S Ct 2531,
159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004):  "'Other than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.'"  Blakely, 542 US at
301 (quoting Apprendi, 530 US at 490).  The Apprendi rule applies
generally to aggravating facts that must be found before a
defendant is sentenced to death.  See Ring v. Arizona, 536 US
584, 609, 122 S Ct 2428, 153 L Ed 2d 556 (2002) (Apprendi
requires that jury, not judge, must determine aggravating
circumstances in capital case). 
Because the jury must answer the second question "yes"
before the death penalty may be imposed, defendant contends that
the United States Constitution, as interpreted in
Apprendi/Blakely, requires the state to prove future
dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt.  Defendant contends,
however, that proving the probability of a future event beyond a
reasonable doubt amounts to proving the future event itself by a
lesser standard.  He thus concludes that the federal constitution
requires the state to prove that a defendant, beyond a reasonable
doubt, would commit future acts of criminal violence. 
We disagree.  Defendant misses the important
distinction between the fact being proved and the standard by
which it is proved.  The fact that the state must prove is the
probability of future dangerousness, not any particular future
criminal act.  The standard of proof for that probability is
beyond a reasonable doubt.  One can see the same distinction in
the operation of familiar forms of gambling, such as blackjack. 
One may not be able to say whether the next card turned by the
dealer will be, for example, a face card or a six.  But one can
say, beyond any reasonable doubt, that when enough games are
played, the odds will have favored the house and the house will
have made money.
We turn to the fourth question, which asks "[w]hether
the defendant should receive a death sentence." 
ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D).  The trial court must direct the jury to
answer that question "no" if one or more jurors believes a
defendant should not receive a death sentence "after considering
any aggravating evidence and any mitigating evidence * * *."  ORS
163.150(1)(c)(B). (19)  ORS 163.150(1)(d) does not provide for
a burden of proof on the fourth question, and the trial court
instructed the jury to that effect. 
As noted, Apprendi/Blakely applies only to "facts." 
See Blakely, 542 US at 301 ("'any fact that increases the
penalty'" (emphasis added; quoting Apprendi, 530 US at 490)); see
also Ring, 536 US at 609 (Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury
applies to "the factfinding necessary to put [a defendant] to
death").  But the fourth question does not involve any
determination of fact.  Instead, in answering the fourth
question, the jury weighs aggravating factors against mitigating
factors.  "[T]he fourth question does not carry a burden of
proof, 'because it does not present an issue subject to proof in
the traditional sense[;] rather[,] it frames a discretionary
determination for the jury.'"  Moore, 324 Or at 432 (emphasis and
second alteration in original; quoting State v. Wagner, 309 Or 5,
18, 786 P2d 93, cert den, 498 US 879, 111 S Ct 212, 112 L Ed 2d
171 (1990)).  Because the fourth question does not involve a
determination of fact, Apprendi/Blakely does not require the
state to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. (20)
We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err
in ruling that the state need not prove the fourth death penalty
question beyond a reasonable doubt. 
3. Whether Trial Court Should Have Allowed Defendant to
Introduce Evidence Regarding Mexican Extradition Law as
Mitigating Evidence
Defendant argues that the trial court erred during the
penalty phase, because it prevented him from offering certain
mitigating evidence relating to his capture and return from
Mexico.
At the penalty phase, the jury may consider mitigating
evidence that relates to defendant's background, or to
defendant's character, or to the circumstances of the offense. 
ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (for fourth question, jury may consider "any
mitigating evidence concerning any aspect of the defendant's
character or background, or any circumstances of the offense");
State v. Stevens, 319 Or 573, 580-83, 879 P2d 162 (1994)
(interpreting statute and United States Supreme Court cases); see
Oregon v. Guzek, ___ US ___, 126 S Ct 1226, 1231-32, 163 L Ed 2d
1112 (2006) (although Eighth Amendment requires states to allow
introduction of mitigating evidence regarding "the defendant's
character or record or the circumstances of the offense"
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted), states otherwise
retain "authority to set reasonable limits upon the evidence a
defendant can submit").
Defendant argues that the trial court excluded
mitigating evidence that related to his character.  He asserts:
"That evidence [relating to defendant's arrest and
extradition] tended to prove that defendant did not
resist his arrest by the Mexican authorities, try to
escape, or use or threaten to use violence.  It tended
to prove that he did not lie to the authorities
regarding his crimes in Oregon.  It tended to prove
that defendant had not planned his escape to Mexico; if
he had, he would have been more likely to familiarize
himself with Mexican law as it applied to him. 
Finally, it tended to prove that he voluntarily agreed
to waive extradition from Mexico, submitting to his
trial in Oregon.  The jury could have relied on any of
those facts to determine that positive aspects of
defendant's character justified a sentence less than
death."
Defendant's argument, however, bears little
relationship to what actually happened at trial.  Both defendant
and Agent Clegg testified extensively before the jury about the
circumstances of defendant's arrest in Mexico. (21)  Defendant
specifically identifies only one piece of evidence that the trial
court excluded, and that was evidence that Mexican extradition
law prohibits extraditing a fugitive unless the receiving state
waives the death penalty. (22)  The court did not otherwise
keep defendant from offering evidence about the facts surrounding
his arrest.  Because the evidence that defendant claims should
have been introduced actually was introduced, we see no merit to
that part of defendant's argument.
We turn, then, to the only question presented by this
record:  Whether evidence about Mexican extradition law relates
to defendant's character.  
To answer that question, we must first discuss briefly
what constitutes evidence relating to a defendant's character. 
This court has noted that "character" is "read quite broadly" in
this context.  Stevens, 319 Or at 583.  It is "not
necessarily * * * linked to a defendant's culpability for the
crime for which he or she is being sentenced."  Id.  Character
evidence includes evidence of "'a defendant's disposition to make
a well-behaved and peaceful adjustment to life in prison.'"  Id.
(quoting Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 US 1, 7, 106 S Ct 1669,
90 L Ed 2d 1 (1986)).  In Stevens, this court held that character
evidence also included evidence that defendant's execution would
have harmed defendant's daughter.
"A rational juror could infer from the witness's
testimony that she believed her daughter would be
adversely affected by defendant's execution because of
something positive about his relationship with his
daughter and because of something positive about
defendant's character or background.  Put differently,
a rational juror could infer that there are positive
aspects about defendant's relationship with his
daughter that demonstrate that defendant has the
capacity to be of emotional value to others."
Id. at 584.
The evidence need not relate directly to defendant's
character; it may be circumstantial evidence.  See id. ("While
the witness's testimony may not offer any direct evidence about
defendant's character or background, it does offer circumstantial
evidence.").  
Here, defendant argues that Mexican extradition law
would have "tended to prove that defendant had not planned his
escape to Mexico; if he had, he would have been more likely to
familiarize himself with Mexican law as it applied to him."  That
defendant did not premeditate his crimes, he contends,
illuminates a positive aspect of his character.
As defendant implicitly recognizes, the particularities
of Mexican extradition law do not relate directly to any aspect
of defendant's character.  For Mexican extradition law to be
relevant at all, it must be circumstantial evidence from which a
juror could rationally infer something about defendant's
character.  See Stevens, 319 Or at 584 (concluding that testimony
was circumstantial evidence of character).  Mexican extradition
law, then, must make some aspect of defendant's character "more
probable or less probable."  OEC 401 (relevant evidence is
"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable").
Although defendant does little to elaborate on his
argument, it seems to proceed as follows.  Defendant offered
testimony to suggest that Mexican extradition law prohibits
Mexico from extraditing fugitives who might face the death
penalty.  Mexico would, instead, extradite a fugitive only if the
state agreed to waive the death penalty.  From that evidence,
defendant draws the following chain of inferences:  Mexican
extradition law would have benefitted defendant, so defendant had
an incentive to learn about Mexican law.  Defendant did not take
advantage of Mexican law -- he did not insist on formal
extradition -- so defendant must not have known about Mexican
law.  Because defendant had an incentive to learn about Mexican
law, but he did not do so, the mere existence of the law suggests
that defendant did not plan the murders.
In our view, the last inference does not follow. 
Defendant's failure to research Mexican law before the murders
proves nothing, because defendant failed to research Mexican law
after the murders, either.  He had at least as much incentive to
research it afterwards, and he had nine days to do it in.  But
defendant never researched Mexican law at any point.
In short, evidence about the nature of Mexican law is
not relevant to defendant's character, because it did not make it
less likely that he planned the murders.  See OEC 401 (relevant
evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable"); Trook v. Sagert, 171 Or
680, 690, 138 P2d 900 (1943) ("If a rational relationship does
not exist between the item of evidence offered and the fact which
a party must prove, it would be a waste of time to let the
witness testify.").  The trial court properly rejected it.
III.  CONCLUSION
As previously noted, we have considered defendant's
other assignments of error.  As to those assignments of error, we
conclude that they either are unpreserved, are disposed of by
prior rulings of this court, or are without merit.  In our view,
further discussion of those assignments would not benefit the
bench, bar, or public.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence of death
are affirmed.
1. Defendant was indicted on seven counts of aggravated
murder.  The first four counts involved the murder of Mary Jane,
Zachery, Sadie, and Madison.  Each count alleged aggravated
murder because there had been more than one murder victim in the
criminal episode.  ORS 163.095(1)(d).  The last three counts
alleged the aggravated murder of Zachery, Sadie, and Madison,
because the victims were each under the age of 14.  ORS
163.095(1)(f).  Defendant pleaded guilty to counts 1, 4, and 7
(one count involving Mary Jane's murder, and two counts for
murdering Madison).  Defendant was convicted at trial of the
remaining four counts (two counts each for murdering Zachery and
Sadie).
2. Defendant varied his story about where his family lived. 
He told the manager that they lived in Hillsboro, but he told the
front desk person Tigard.
3. Defendant did not own the minivan; he admitted at trial
that he had stolen the minivan in Ohio, and that he had
registered the license plate "KID VAN" for another car that he
had owned at the time.
4. At trial, defendant admitted that the events of the night
of December 16-17 were as he had told the police.  However,
defendant denied that any murders took place that night.  He
claimed that he had killed only Mary Jane and Madison, sometime
after he returned from work at 11:00 p.m. on Tuesday, December
18. 
Defendant testified that Mary Jane had killed Zachery
and Sadie and (he had believed initially) Madison.  Defendant
said that he strangled Mary Jane when he discovered that. 
Afterward, defendant claimed, he discovered that Madison was
still breathing, but he strangled her because she was
unresponsive.  Defendant implied that Mary Jane had dumped
Zachery and Sadie off the bridge near where their bodies were
later found.
5. A total of five different coworkers testified that
defendant had claimed that his wife had been having an affair and
had left him for the other man.
6. Although the trial court's order fails to note when
defendant signed that statement, the evidence showed that it
happened after defendant had returned to the United States. 
7. If Clegg had functioned as a consular official, as
defendant argues, then Mexican police officers would have had no
need to advise defendant of his right to contact the United
States consulate.  Even setting that aside, defendant did not
offer any evidence of how Mexican law responds to the failure to
inform a person of rights under the VCCR.  See VCCR, Art 36(2)
(rights "shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and
regulations of the receiving State" -- here, Mexico).  And even
assuming that United States law governed, this court's decision
in Sanchez-Llamas holds that the VCCR does not create an
individually enforceable right.
8. Defendant also argues that his statements should have been
suppressed under the VCCR, or because they were involuntarily
given out of a fear of Mexican jails.  As previously noted, this
court has held that a defendant does not have individual right
under the VCCR.  State v. Sanchez-Llamas, 338 Or 267, 276, 108
P3d 573 (2005).  Moreover, in that case the United States Supreme
Court, although assuming without deciding that the VCCR created
individual rights, nevertheless concluded that suppression would
not be an appropriate remedy for any violations.  Sanchez-Llamas
v. Oregon, ___ US ___, 126 S Ct 2669, 2677-78 & 2682, 165 L Ed 2d
557 (2006). 
Because defendant made his first statements about the
crimes only after he was on a plane back to the United States, we
also find meritless defendant's argument that the statements were
made from fear of Mexican jails. 
9. The voir dire record shows that 45 potential jurors had
been individually interviewed when defendant made his Batson
challenge.
10. In Hernandez v. New York, 500 US 352, 111 S Ct 1859, 114 L
Ed 2d 395 (1991), a plurality of the justices concluded that,
after the state offered a race-neutral justification and the
trial court ruled on whether there had been intentional
discrimination, it rendered moot any need to decide whether
defendant had made out a prima facie case of discrimination.  Id.
at 359.
11. In Johnson the Court summarized the procedure as follows:
"First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case
by showing that the totality of the relevant facts
gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. 
Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie
case, the burden shifts to the State to explain
adequately the racial exclusion by offering permissible
race-neutral justifications for the strikes.  Third, if
a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court
must then decide * * * whether the opponent of the
strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination."
545 US at 168 (footnote, internal quotation marks and citations
omitted; alteration in original).
12. Although Hernandez involved a four-justice plurality, two
other justices specifically concurred in the standard of review. 
500 US at 372.
13. Defendant argues that State v. Henderson, 315 Or 1, 843
P2d 859 (1992), held that striking a single minority juror could
qualify as a prima facie case under Batson.  With appropriate
supporting facts, that may be true.  Henderson, however, did not
decide what constituted a prima facie case; for procedural
reasons, this court assumed that defendant had made out a prima
facie case, and proceeded to Batson's second and third steps. 
See id. at 5 n 3 (matter had been decided in earlier appellate
proceedings, and state had not sought review).
14. Defendant also claims a Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section
violation for excluding jurors opposed to the death penalty,
felons, and persons for whom jury service would be a financial
hardship.  However, defendant concedes that the United States
Supreme Court rejected his argument regarding excluding jurors
opposed to the death penalty in Lockhart v. McCree, 476 US 162,
174, 106 S Ct 1758, 90 L Ed 2d 137 (1986).  He also concedes that
this court has rejected his argument regarding excluding ex-felons.  State v. Compton, 333 Or 274, 288-89, 39 P3d 833, cert
den, 537 US 841 (2002).
Defendant's argument regarding excluding jurors for
financial hardship also is meritless.  The fair-cross-section
guarantee only covers the jury venire, not the particular petit
jury.  The Supreme Court has specifically recognized that
excusing individual jurors for financial hardship is permissible,
though systematically excluding an economic class may be
unconstitutional.  See Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 US 217,
224, 66 S Ct 984, 90 L Ed 1181 (1946) ("It is clear that a
federal judge would be justified in excusing a daily wage earner
for whom jury service would entail an undue financial hardship"
(footnote omitted), though automatically excluding all daily wage
earners from the jury venire violated proper jury selection
principles.).  Nothing like that occurred in this case.
15. ORS 135.815 (2001) provided, in part:
"(1) Except as otherwise provided in ORS 135.855
and 135.873, the district attorney shall disclose to a
represented defendant the following material and
information within the possession or control of the
district attorney:
"(a) The names and addresses of persons whom the
district attorney intends to call as witnesses at any
stage of the trial, together with their relevant
written or recorded statements or memoranda of any oral
statements of such persons."
16. Defendant also argues that the state violated Article I,
section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, citing