Title: BEAULIEU v. FLORQUIST AND THE CITY OF RAWLINS

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BEAULIEU v. FLORQUIST AND THE CITY OF RAWLINS2001 WY 3320 P.3d 521Case Number: 00-11Decided: 03/30/1991
 October Term, A.D. 2000

March 
30, 2001 

               
WILLIAM N. BEAULIEU, and APRIL                   

D. 
BEAULIEU, and WILLIAM N.

BEAULIEU 
and APRIL D. BEAULIEU,

as 
parents and natural guardians of minor

children 
CHEYENNE ROCHELLE

BEAULIEU 
and SKILAR JONEA BEAULIEU,)

Appellants

(Plaintiffs),

 

v.

BRUCE 
A. FLORQUIST, and the

CITY 
OF RAWLINS,

Appellees

(Defendants).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Carbon County:

The 
Honorable Kenneth E. Stebner, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellants:

Walter 
Urbigkit of Frontier Law Center, Cheyenne, WY.

 Representing 
Appellees:

Loyd 
E. Smith of Murane & Bostwick, LLC, Cheyenne, WY.

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN and HILL, JJ., and O'BRIEN, 
D.J.

 *This 
case was originally assigned to Justice Thomas on July 6, 2000, for the 
rendering of a proffered majority opinion.  
This case was reassigned to Chief Justice Lehman on February 5, 
2001.

  

LEHMAN, 
Chief Justice.

 [¶1]      The automobile in 
which appellant Beaulieu and his family were riding was struck by appellee 
Florquist, an employee of the City of Rawlins.  In the months following the accident, 
two notice of claims on behalf of Beaulieu were submitted to the City of Rawlins 
pursuant to the requirements of the Governmental Claims Act, and suit was 
ultimately filed.  The City of 
Rawlins eventually interposed the statute of limitations, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-39-114, which would bar this action unless it was commenced within one year of 
the date the claim was filed.  While 
the complaint was filed within one year from the filing of the second claim, it 
was filed beyond one year from the first claim.

 

[¶2]      Summary judgment 
was entered by the district court because suit by Beaulieu was not filed against 
the City of Rawlins within one year of the filing of the first notice of 
claim.  That determination was 
predicated upon the finding that the first notice of claim filed with the City 
of Rawlins by the appellant satisfied the requirements of  Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7.  We disagree, reverse the summary 
judgment, and remand.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      This statement of 
the issues is found in the Brief of Appellants:

 

(1)       Legal 
sufficiency of the affidavit filed by Movant Defendants/Appellee within the 
criteria of Wyo. R. Civ. Pro. 56(e) as admissible evidence to create a prima 
facie case for entry of summary judgment pursuant to Wyo. R. Civ. Pro. 
56(c)?

 

(2)       Whether the 
Court committed error in granting summary judgment where the record provided for 
review by the Court demonstrated genuine issues of contested material 
fact?

 

(3)       
Insufficiency of claimed notice document or its filing procedure to start 
the statute of limitations period provided by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-114 (LEXIS 
1999) for all parties and all issues included in Appellants' Complaint involving 
as:

 

(a)       Not filed 
with the required governmental office for claim 
sufficiency;

 

(b)       Not provide 
detailed itemization or amount claimed except for a non-involved car repair 
payment;

 

(c)        Not 
signed;

 

(d)       Not 
include, as named claimants, more than the one party who made no claim for 
himself except a car repair as a paid claim;

 

(e)       Not include 
a designation of the party against whom the claim is made;

 

(f)         
Not rejected by the governmental body, if a claim was made, so that the 
time limitation never started pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-114 Ann. (LEXIS 
1999);

 

(g)       Further, on 
the record presented, the only intended use of the form * * * was to report the 
course of damage events to get car repair reimbursement for Allstate, 
Appellants' insurance company which actually then paid the collision 
damage.

 

(4)       Whether as 
a general standard of law there are two rules for deficiency or sufficiency of a 
governmental claim under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113 (LEXIS 1999) and Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-39-114 (LEXIS 1999).  One 
standard would be applied to the governmental claim to support recovery and a 
different less demanding standard would apply to the statute of limitations for 
filing suit within the one year prescribed time of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-114 
(LEXIS 1999), creating an alternative presumption against the injured claimant 
in either case.

 

This 
Statement of Issues is found in the Brief of Appellees:

 

1.         
Whether the District Court correctly determined that there were no 
genuine issues of material fact and that Defendants were entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law?

 

a.         
Whether Defendants satisfied their initial burden as moving party to 
demonstrate the lack of any genuine issue of material fact and their right to 
summary judgment as a matter of law?

 

b.         
Whether Plaintiffs came forth with evidence demonstrating a genuine issue 
of material fact which would preclude summary judgment?

 

c.         
Whether the trial court correctly determined that Plaintiffs' December 
1996 "Notice of Claim" started the clock running on the statute of limitations 
contained in the Governmental Claims Act, W.S. § 1-39-114?

 

2.         
Whether Plaintiffs are barred from raising issues on appeal not presented 
to the trial court?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      On December 19, 
1996, Bruce Florquist, in the course of his employment by the City of Rawlins 
(Rawlins), was driving a pick-up truck owned by Rawlins which was equipped with 
a snowplow.  Florquist struck the 
Beaulieu vehicle when that vehicle was properly pausing at a stop sign on a city 
street.  William N. Beaulieu, April 
D. Beaulieu, his wife, and Cheyenne Rochelle Beaulieu were in the Beaulieu 
vehicle.  Within seven days of the 
collision, a "Notice of Claim," was discovered in the office of the Rawlins city 
attorney.  The document asserted 
property damage to the Beaulieu vehicle in the amount of $2,839.44 and medical 
damages for his wife, his unborn son, and his daughter in unspecified amounts. 

 

[¶5]      The record does 
not inform us as to when, by whom, or to whom the "Notice of Claim" form was 
presented.  Rawlins and Florquist 
profess no knowledge of these events, but they rely upon the "Notice of Claim" 
in asserting the statutory one-year limitation for filing suit.  All the record can support is that the 
"Notice of Claim" appeared on the desk of a secretary in the city attorney's 
office who forwarded it to the local government self-insurance pool on December 
26, 1996.  The "Notice of Claim" was 
neither signed nor verified by Mr. Beaulieu, who declared by his affidavit that 
he did not prepare it nor did he or any member of his family furnish it to 
Rawlins.  Instead, he speculated 
that it was provided by his insurance carrier to be reimbursed for its payment 
to him of the damages to his vehicle.

 

[¶6]      Late in April of 
1997, an adjuster employed by the local government self-insurance pool forwarded 
an offer of settlement to William Beaulieu in the total amount of $11,300.00, 
which was intended to resolve the property damage and medical claims.  William Beaulieu then retained counsel 
who filed a second claim on behalf of the Beaulieus with the City Clerk of 
Rawlins on June 29, 1998.  There was 
no response by Rawlins to the second claim, and the Beaulieus filed their action 
against Florquist and Rawlins on June 14, 1999. 

 

[¶7]      Florquist and 
Rawlins filed answers to the complaint, and Rawlins then filed a motion for 
summary judgment, supported by memorandum and an affidavit, by which it asserted 
that the "Notice of Claim" that materialized in December of 1996 was a valid and 
proper claim, and the action was filed more than two years after the claim.  Rawlins asserted that, since the 
complaint was filed more than two years after that claim was presented, the 
action was barred by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-114 (LEXIS 1999).  The district court then granted a 
summary judgment in favor of Florquist and Rawlins, ruling that the action was 
time barred.  The Beaulieus' appeal 
is from the Order Granting Summary Judgment.

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶8]      An accurate 
summary of our jurisprudential function in reviewing summary judgments is found 
in Unicorn Drilling, Inc. v. Heart Mountain Irrigation Dist., 3 P.3d 857, 
860 (Wyo. 2000):

 

 Recently, we summarized our review 
function in cases involving summary judgments in this way:

 

Summary 
judgment is proper only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and 
the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Mountain Cement Co. v. Johnson, 
884 P.2d 30, 32 (Wyo. 1994); W.R.C.P. 56(c).  We review a summary judgment in the same 
light as the district court, using the same materials and following the same 
standards.  "We examine the record 
from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we 
give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be 
drawn from the record."  Four 
Nines Gold, Inc. v. 71 Constr., Inc., 809 P.2d 236, 238 (Wyo. 1991).  Summary judgment serves the purpose of 
eliminating formal trials where only questions of law are involved.  Blagrove v. JB Mechanical, Inc., 
934 P.2d 1273, 1275 (Wyo. 1997);  
England v. Simmons, 728 P.2d 1137, 1141 (Wyo. 1986).  We review a grant of summary judgment by 
deciding a question of law de novo and afford no deference to the district 
court's ruling on that question.  
Sammons v. American Auto. Ass'n, 912 P.2d 1103, 1105 (Wyo. 1996); 
Blagrove, 934 P.2d  at 1275.  

 

Gray v. 
Norwest Bank Wyoming, N.A., 984 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Wyo. 1999).  A 
material fact is any fact that, if proved, would have the effect of establishing 
or refuting an essential element of a claim or defense asserted by a party.  Century Ready-Mix Co. v. Campbell 
County School Dist., 816 P.2d 795, 799 (Wyo. 1991).

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶9]      In addressing the 
appeal from the Order Granting Summary Judgment, we first must consider an 
anomaly in the record.  The decision 
letter of the district court is dated October 13, 1999, and the Order Granting 
Summary Judgment was entered on October 25, 1999.    On November 3, 1999, the Beaulieus filed discovery materials in 
accordance with W.R.C.P. 5(d).  
Nothing in the record indicates that these materials were presented to or 
considered by the district court in connection with the Motion for Summary 
Judgment.  The Beaulieus, however, 
have referred to those materials in their Brief of Appellant in this court.  

 

[¶10]   We have said:

 

When we 
review a grant of summary judgment, we examine the case in the same manner as 
the trial court did, and we treat the motion as if it were originally before us, 
using the identical materials and information that were presented to the trial 
court.  Pekas v. Thompson, 
903 P.2d 532, 535 (Wyo. 1995).  The 
rule is that a party on appeal "may only refer to the record as it existed at 
the time the trial court ruled, outline the arguments made at that time, and 
explain why the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.'"  Id.  (quoting Rayner Covering Systems, 
Inc. v. Danvers Farmers Elevator Co., 226 Ill.App.3d 507, 168 Ill.Dec. 634, 
589 N.E.2d 1034, 1036 (1992).

 

Richardson 
v. Hardin, 5 P.3d 793, 798 (Wyo. 2000).  In resolving 
this case, we are foreclosed from considering the materials that were filed 
after the decision by the district court.

 

[¶11]   The invocation of those materials 
is not particularly troublesome in this case because they are referred to for 
background information and are not material to this court's decision.  That might not be true in every 
instance, however, and for the edification of the bench and the bar, we adopt a 
bright line rule.  When discovery 
materials are filed after the date of a hearing or ruling on any subject, we 
will not consider them as part of "the record as it existed at the time the 
trial court ruled" unless the transcript, the decision letter, or the order 
specifically refers to the discovery materials that are included in the 
transmitted record.  If such a 
reference is missing, it will be presumed that they were not before the trial 
court for purposes of the hearing or ruling, and their use will not be permitted 
in this court.

 

[¶12]   We turn to the issues raised by the 
briefs and arguments.  While not 
emphasized in the Beaulieus' statement 
of the issues, argument is presented that the "Notice of Claim" to trigger the 
one-year statute of limitations for filing suit is insufficient because it does 
not satisfy the requirements of Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7.  We are not confronted by the waiver for 
failure to raise the argument in the district court, which we held to be 
dispositive of the issue in Martinez v. City of Cheyenne, 791 P.2d 949, 
958 (Wyo. 1990).  We said in that 
case:

 

This 
particular contention by the State is raised for the first time in this 
appeal.  The point was never argued 
to the district court.  The State 
agrees that this is true, but it contends that an omission of the correct 
certification results in a failure of subject matter jurisdiction, and the issue 
can be raised at any time in the proceeding.  We do not agree with this 
contention.  The failure to verify 
or certify as the constitution now reads is nothing more than a defect or an 
irregularity that is not jurisdictional.  
In re Bear River Irrigation District, 51 Wyo. 343, 65 P.2d 686 
(1937).  The effect of that decision 
is that this alleged defect is not jurisdictional and, for that reason, the 
defense cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.  Matter of Estate of McCue, 776 P.2d 742 (Wyo. 1989); Ricci v. New Hampshire Insurance Company, 721 P.2d 1081 (Wyo. 1986); Dennis v. Dennis, 675 P.2d 265 (Wyo. 1984); 
Nickelson v. People, 607 P.2d 904 (Wyo. 1980); Scherling v. Kilgore, 599 P.2d 1352 (Wyo. 
1979).  We apply our 
well-established rule concerning those issues raised for the first time on 
appeal, and we reject this contention by the State.

 

[¶13]   It never has been questioned that a 
claim against the State must comply with the requirements of Wyo. Const. art. 
16, § 7.  Awe v. University of 
Wyoming 534 P.2d 97, 100 (Wyo. 1975) (overruled on other grounds by 
Dye v. Fremont County Sch. Dist. No. 24, 820 P.2d 982 (Wyo. 1991)).  See Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. 
Catchpole, 6 P.3d 1275, 1281 (Wyo. 2000); State Highway Dep't v. 
Napolitano, 578 P.2d 1342, 1345 (Wyo. 1978); Price v. State Highway 
Comm'n, 62 Wyo. 385, 396, 167 P.2d 309, 312 (Wyo. 1946); Utah Constr. Co. 
v. State Highway Comm'n, 45 Wyo. 403, 422-25, 19 P.2d 951, 954-55 (Wyo. 
1933).  The necessity for the filing 
of a claim appears to have been the assumption of the court in Town Council 
of Town of Hudson v. Ladd, 37 Wyo. 419, 427-31, 263 P. 703, 706-07 (Wyo. 
1928).

 

[¶14]   While the court has ruled that the 
execution requirements of art. 16, § 7 can be waived by failing to assert the 
issue in the trial court, it has not held that the requirement of filing or 
presenting the claim is subject to waiver.  
Instead, we have treated the allegation of the filing of a claim as 
jurisdictional.  Garnett v. 
Brock, 2 P.3d 558, 561 (Wyo. 2000); Board of Trustees of University of 
Wyoming v. Bell, 662 P.2d 410, 414 (Wyo. 1983).  Further, the court has required that the 
date of the claim be alleged with specificity in order that the district court 
may be satisfied that the requirement of the governmental claims statute have 
been satisfied, both with respect to the timely filing of the claim (Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-39-113 (LEXIS 1999)) and the timely filing of the action (Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-39-114 (LEXIS 1999)).  
Routh v. State, ex rel. Workers' Compensation Div., 952 P.2d 1108, 1117 (Wyo. 1998); Amrein v. Wyoming Livestock Bd., 851 P.2d 769, 771 
(Wyo. 1993).

 

[¶15]   In this case, there having been no 
waiver of the question by failing to present it to the trial court, we must 
address any necessity to comply with the requirements of the Constitution of the 
State of Wyoming.  The constitution 
demands:

 

            
No money shall be paid out of the state treasury except upon 
appropriation by law and on warrant drawn by the proper officer, and no bills, 
claims, accounts or demands against the state, or any county or political 
subdivision, shall be audited, allowed or paid until a full itemized statement 
in writing, certified to under penalty of perjury, shall be filed with the 
officer or officers whose duty it may be to audit the 
same.

 

Wyo. 
Const. art. 16, § 7.  The 
requirement is clear that an itemized statement in writing is to be filed, which 
is certified under penalty of perjury.  
Such a statement must be signed by the claimant or the charge of perjury 
could not lie.  In addition, it is 
to be filed with the officer or officers charged with the duty to audit the 
claim.

 

[¶16]   It is well established that a 
municipality is included in the term "political subdivision."  In Witzenburger v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Community Dev. Authority 575 P.2d 1100, 1113 (Wyo. 1978), this court 
dealt with the question of whether the Wyoming Community Development Authority 
is a "political subdivision," and said:

 

            
The constitutional examples of counties, towns and school districts are 
ones that have the distinctive badges of a political subdivision.  Each has a geographic area smaller than 
the state, each is organized with officers elected by its inhabitants to carry 
on a governmental function, having a local purpose and provision is made for the 
levy and assessment of taxes to finance those purposes. 

 

[¶17]   We hold that the City of Rawlins is 
a political subdivision to which the requirements of art. 16, § 7 are 
applicable.  A valid claim against 
such a municipality must be in writing and certified under penalty of perjury, 
which means it must be signed.  
Further, it must be presented to the officer or officers charged with the 
duty of auditing it.  Such claims 
are subject to the same rules that have been established with respect to claims 
against the State.  In any action 
against the municipality, it is necessary to allege with specificity that the 
claim was filed and the date it was filed.  
Obviously the document upon which the City of Rawlins relies in this case 
fails to satisfy those criteria.

 

[¶18]   We emphasize that, because of the 
jurisdictional impact of establishing for purposes of pleading the date of the 
claim and its appropriate certification, such matters should never be treated 
casually or haphazardly.  Not only 
does it behoove a claimant to be sure that the submission of the claim will 
permit an appropriate allegation in a civil complaint, but, by the same token, 
the governmental entity should insure that any forms adopted for the purpose of 
submitting claims should be adequate to satisfy these requirements and that the 
date any claim is received should be clearly established.  Furthermore, the appointment of the 
person charged with the auditing function should be memorialized in some 
official action of the governmental entity.  At a minimum, such established 
procedures and criteria will satisfy the requirements of the 
constitution.

 

[¶19]   The Order Granting Summary Judgment 
is reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court for further 
proceedings in accordance with this opinion.