Title: State v. Johnson

State: iowa

Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court

Document:

222 N.W.2d 453 (1974) STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. David Hugh JOHNSON, Appellant. No. 56930. Supreme Court of Iowa. October 16, 1974. *454 Archerd & Johnson by Robert W. Brinton, Clarion, for appellant. Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Darby Maria Coriden, Asst Atty. Gen., and William A. Long, County Atty., for appellee. Heard before MOORE, C. J., and MASON, RAWLINGS, LeGRAND and REYNOLDSON, JJ. RAWLINGS, Justice. Defendant, David Hugh Johnson, appeals from an ex parte substitute judgment on his previously entered guilty plea. We reverse. October 25, 1973, an information was filed in Wright County charging Johnson had committed robbery with aggravation, The Code 1973, Section 711.2. November 7th defendant pled guilty to the above charge. The same day, with leave granted by trial court upon the county attorney's request, said information was amended to charge robbery without aggravation, Code § 711.3. Defendant then withdrew his prior plea and, in relevant part, this dialogue ensued: November 8th trial court entered this judgment: November 28th, without notice to defendant and in his absence, this judgment was entered: The sole issue presented is whether defendant's absence at time of the aforesaid resentencing vitiates the above quoted November 28th judgment. I. Both defense counsel and county attorney have filed affidavits in this court, separate and apart from the record. These instruments indicate the aforesaid dialogue was preceded by other relevant but unrecorded negotiations or proceedings. See in this regard State v. Reppert, 215 N.W.2d 302, 306-307 (Iowa 1974); State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542, 549-550 (Iowa 1969); *456 Recommendations of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Standard 3.2 (14 Crim.L. 3001, 3003). Among other things the above noted affidavits intimate the presiding judge indulged in plea bargaining during which defendant was advised a three year sentence would be imposed in event he entered a guilty plea. See in this regard ABA Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty, § 3.3 and Commentary at 72-77 (Approved Draft 1968); ABA Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial Judge, § 4.1 and Commentary at 53-60 (Approved Draft 1972); Recommendations of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Standard 3.7 (14 Crim.L. 3001, 3004-3005). In the processing of this appeal, however, no recognition is accorded said affidavits. See In re Adoption of Blanchard, 179 N.W.2d 441, 442 (Iowa 1970); State v. Houston, 261 Iowa 1369, 158 N.W.2d 158, 161 (1968); Code § 793.17; Iowa R.Civ.P. 340(a). II. We turn now to the November 8th judgment, quoted above. Code § 711.3 provides, in essence, a person committing robbery without aggravation shall be imprisoned for not to exceed ten years. And our indeterminate sentence statute, § 789.13, declares: As to that enactment, this court observed in Adams v. Barr, 154 Iowa 83, 86, 134 N.W. 564 (1912): See also Bernklau v. Bennett, 162 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Iowa 1968); State v. Kulish, 260 Iowa 138, 145, 148 N.W.2d 428 (1967). It is thus evident trial court had no right, power or authority to do other than impose imprisonment for not to exceed the maximum term specified in § 711.3, supra. See State v. Wiese, 201 N.W.2d 734, 737-738 (Iowa 1972). See also State v. Kulish, supra. Consequently the November 8th judgment was a nullity. See State v. Shilinsky, 248 Iowa 596, 603, 81 N.W.2d 444 (1957). See also State v. Wiese, 201 N.W.2d at 737; State v. Taylor, 258 Iowa 94, 96, 137 N.W.2d 688, 689 (1965); 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 535; cf. State v. Hopp, 190 N.W.2d 836, 837-838 (Iowa 1971). III. Therefore, as previously noted, the basic question posed is whether the November 28th judgment, entered without prior notice to defendant and in his absence, constitutes a valid adjudication. Noticeably, trial court's inherent authority to resentence defendant is not and could not be effectively disputed. In State v. Wiese, 201 N.W.2d at 736, we said: Moreover, this court further stated in Wiese, supra, at 737: "[A] trial court does not exhaust its jurisdiction until a valid judgment is entered. State v. Shilinsky, 248 Iowa 596, 81 N.W.2d 444 (1957)." See also State v. Deets, 195 N.W.2d 118, 125 (Iowa 1972); State v. Taylor, cited above. But the foregoing does not alone resolve the problem now before us. IV. Further, by way of exclusion, we are not here concerned with the correction of a mere clerical error or omission. In other words, the situation instantly involved would not permit entry of a nunc pro tunc order to make the record show truthfully what judgment was actually intended. See Headley v. Headley, 172 N.W.2d 104, 108 (Iowa 1969); Jersild v. Sarcone, 163 N.W.2d 78, 81 (Iowa 1968); State v. Frey, 206 Iowa 981, 982-984, 221 N.W. 445 (1928); Parenti v. District Court, 198 Iowa 560, 563-564, 199 N.W. 259 (1924). In the same vein, this court is not here concerned with a mere correction regarding place of commitment as in Cummings v. Bennett, 324 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1963). Rather, we are confronted with a totally new and different judgment, i. e., a change of penal substance. See State v. Gregory, 198 Iowa 316, 320-321, 198 N.W. 58 (1924); State v. Davis, 105 Ariz. 498, 467 P.2d 743, 747-748 (1970); cf. Cummings v. Bennett, 324 F.2d at 3. V. At this point Code § 789.3 comes into play. It provides: "When judgment is pronounced, if the conviction be for a felony, the defendant must be personally present; if for a misdemeanor, he need not." The meaning and purpose of this enactment is self-evident as applied to the imposition of an original valid sentence. But we have not had prior occasion to squarely determine whether a felony-charged defendant is entitled to notice and opportunity to be present at time of resentencing where the original judgment was void. Touching on the subject, however, is State v. Kamerling, 259 Iowa 177, 143 N.W.2d 359 (1966). There the accused was sentenced "to pay a fine of $____ together with costs and in default of payment that he be confined in the County jail for a period of 30 days." On appeal this court said, 259 Iowa at 178, 143 N.W.2d at 359: A case closely akin to that now before us is Roberts v. State, 197 Kan. 687, 421 P.2d 48 (1966). There the defendant pled guilty to charges of burglary and grand larceny. He was thereupon sentenced to imprisonment for terms, respectively, in excess of applicable statutory limits. After defendant's resultant incarceration and setting aside of the original sentences, new statutorily proper judgments were entered. Defendant contested such resentencing because he was not then present. This challenge was apparently premised upon K.S.A. 62-1507 which states, in part: "For the purpose of judgment, if the conviction be for an offense punishable by imprisonment, the defendant must be personally present; * * *." Compare Iowa Code § 789.13, quoted above. The Kansas Supreme Court disposed of the issue before it with this apt statement, 421 P.2d at 50-51: Also, in State v. Verdugo, 78 N.M. 372, 431 P.2d 750 (1967) trial court vacated an original judgment of imprisonment, then resentenced defendant in absentia. The new sentence was later contested and the appellate court dispositively declared, 431 P.2d at 751: See also United States v. Behrens, 375 U.S. 162, 164-166, 84 S. Ct. 295, 296-297, 11 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1963); State v. Davis, 467 P.2d at 747-748. VI. In light of the foregoing we conclude and now hold that where an original felony-related judgment is void the defendant must be present with counsel at all proceedings attendant upon imposition of a new and different sentence. This case must therefore be reversed and remanded with instructions that the judgment or judgments previously entered be set aside and for further appropriate proceedings. In this regard see generally North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1969); State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d at 549-550, and citations; Code § 777.15; State v. Bastedo, 253 Iowa 103, 106-107, 111 N.W.2d 255 (1961); People v. Riebe, 40 Ill. 2d 565, 241 N.E.2d 313, 314-315 (1968); Recommendations of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Standard 3.7 (14 Crim.L. 3001, 3004-3005); ABA Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty, § 2.1(a) (Approved Draft 1968). Reversed and remanded with instructions.