Title: Israel v. DeSantis

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC19-552 
____________ 
 
SCOTT J. ISRAEL, SHERIFF, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
RON DESANTIS, GOVERNOR, 
Appellee. 
 
April 23, 2019 
 
LAGOA, J. 
 
Scott J. Israel (“Israel”), the Sheriff of Broward County, Florida, appeals the 
circuit court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of quo warranto, challenging 
Governor Ron DeSantis’s authority to suspend him from office in Executive Order 
19-14.  Israel appealed the circuit court’s order to the Fourth District Court of 
Appeal, which certified the appeal to this Court as one of great public importance 
requiring immediate resolution by this Court.  We have jurisdiction, see art. V, § 
3(b)(5), Fla. Const., and affirm the circuit court’s order dismissing Israel’s petition.  
 
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BACKGROUND 
In 2016, Israel was reelected as the Sheriff of Broward County, Florida, for a 
four-year term.  Following Israel’s reelection, two mass shootings occurred during 
Israel’s term of office: the January 6, 2017, shooting at the Fort Lauderdale-
Hollywood Airport in Broward County and the February 14, 2018, school shooting 
at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida. 
On January 2, 2019, the Marjory Stoneman Douglas Public Safety 
Commission Report was released.  Thereafter, on January 11, 2019, Governor Ron 
DeSantis issued Executive Order 19-14, suspending Israel from office.  Executive 
Order 19-14 alleged that certain actions by Israel “constitute[d] neglect of duty and 
incompetence.”  In support of these grounds for Israel’s suspension, Executive 
Order 19-14 asserts various factual allegations, based in part on the Marjory 
Stoneman Douglas Public Safety Commission Report and an internal investigation 
into the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood Airport shooting.  Executive Order 19-14 
details how Israel allegedly “egregiously failed in his duties as Sheriff for Broward 
County,” stating that two separate reports “specifically found that Sheriff Israel has 
not and does not provide frequent training for his deputies resulting in the deaths of 
twenty-two individuals and a response that is inadequate for the future safety of 
Broward County residents” and “specifically found that Sheriff Israel has not 
implemented proper protocols to provide guaranteed access to emergency services, 
 
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nor proper protocols to have timely, unified command centers set up to control a 
crime scene leading to confusion, a lack of recognized chain-of-command, and 
ultimately a failure to contain the dangerous situation.” 
On March 7, 2019, Israel filed a petition for writ of quo warranto in the 
Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, alleging that Governor DeSantis 
exceeded his constitutional authority when suspending Israel.1  On April 4, 2019, 
the circuit court issued a written order dismissing Israel’s petition.  In its order, the 
circuit court found that “the allegations set forth in Executive Order 19-14 [were] 
sufficient to support the specified grounds of neglect of duty and incompetence, 
and therefore, [met] the jurisdictional requirements for suspension.”  The circuit 
court further found that Executive Order 19-14 “alleges facts that support and bear 
a reasonable relation to the stated grounds” of neglect of duty and incompetence.   
On April 5, 2019, Israel appealed the circuit court’s order to the Fourth 
District Court of Appeal.  On April 9, 2019, the Fourth District certified the case 
for pass-through jurisdiction, finding that the appeal involved a question of great 
public importance that required immediate resolution by this Court.  
                                          
 
1.  On January 29, 2019, Israel sought formal review on the merits of his 
suspension from the Florida Senate, as provided for under article IV, section 7(b) 
of the Florida Constitution.  The Senate scheduled a hearing on Israel’s suspension 
for the week of April 8, 2019, but abated its review pending resolution of Israel’s 
petition.  
 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“Since the nature of an extraordinary writ is not of absolute right, the 
granting of such writ lies within the discretion of the court.”  Topps v. State, 865 
So. 2d 1253, 1257 (Fla. 2004).  Accordingly, we generally review a circuit court’s 
decision on a petition for writ of quo warranto for an abuse of discretion.  See 
Detzner v. Anstead, 256 So. 3d 820, 822 n.4 (Fla. 2018).  However, because 
Israel’s petition also concerns matters of constitutional interpretation, our review of 
the circuit court’s constitutional interpretation is de novo.  See Zingale v. Powell, 
885 So. 2d 277, 280 (Fla. 2004). 
ANALYSIS 
Article V, section 3(b)(8) of the Florida Constitution authorizes the judiciary 
to issue writs of quo warranto “to state officers and state agencies.”  “Quo warranto 
is used ‘to determine whether a state officer or agency has improperly exercised a 
power or right derived from the State.’ ”  League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Scott, 
232 So. 3d 264, 265 (Fla. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Fla. House of 
Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 607 (Fla. 2008)).  The Governor is a state 
officer.  See Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702, 707 (Fla. 2011). 
Israel contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition for writ of 
quo warranto, arguing that Governor DeSantis lacks the authority to suspend Israel 
from office because Executive Order 19-14 does not provide an “objective factual 
 
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predicate” to conclude Israel neglected or incompetently performed a specific 
“duty for which he was bound by law to perform.” 
 
We begin our analysis with the plain language of article IV, section 7(a) of 
the Constitution.  Zingale, 885 So. 2d at 282.  Where the language of the 
Constitution “is clear, unambiguous, and addresses the matter in issue, then it must 
be enforced as written,” as the “constitutional language must be allowed to ‘speak 
for itself.’ ”  Fla. Soc’y of Ophthalmology v. Fla. Optometric Ass’n, 489 So. 2d 
1118, 1119 (Fla. 1986); accord Pleus v. Crist, 14 So. 3d 941, 944 (Fla. 2009) (“If 
that language is clear, unambiguous, and addresses the matter in issue, then it must 
be enforced as written.” (quoting Lawnwood Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Seeger, 990 So. 2d 
503, 511 (Fla. 2008))). 
Article IV, section 7(a) of the Constitution provides that the Governor “may 
suspend from office . . . any county officer, for malfeasance, misfeasance, neglect 
of duty, drunkenness, incompetence, permanent inability to perform official duties, 
or commission of a felony.”  Once the Governor suspends a public official, the 
Florida Senate has the exclusive role of determining whether to remove or reinstate 
that suspended official.  Art. IV, § 7(b), Fla. Const.   
As we recently stated, the judiciary has a “limited role in reviewing the 
exercise of the suspension power, which the Constitution commits to the governor 
and which inherently involves ‘judgment and discretion.’ ”  Jackson v. DeSantis, 
 
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No. SC19-329, slip op. at 3 (Fla. Apr. 16, 2019) (quoting State ex rel. Hardie v. 
Coleman, 155 So. 129, 133 (Fla. 1934)).  Where an executive order of suspension 
“names one or more of the grounds embraced in the Constitution and clothes or 
supports it with alleged facts sufficient to constitute the grounds or cause of 
suspension, it is sufficient.”  Hardie, 155 So. at 133.  Similarly, the Senate’s 
judgment of removal or reinstatement “is final, and will not be reviewed by the 
courts,” as under the constitutional process for suspension and removal, the 
“Senate is nothing less than a court provided to examine into and determine 
whether or not the Governor exercises the power of suspension in keeping with the 
constitutional mandate.”  Id. at 134.  Assuming that the office of the suspended 
officer falls under one of the constitutionally enumerated categories and the 
Governor has filed the executive order of suspension with the custodian of records, 
the plain language of the Constitution excludes the judiciary from involving itself 
in the suspension and removal process save for a limited exception.  
Turning to that exception, the Constitution requires the Governor to issue an 
executive order of suspension “stating the grounds” of the officer’s suspension.  
While a suspended officer may seek judicial review of an executive order of 
suspension to ensure that the order satisfies that constitutional requirement, the 
judiciary’s role is limited to determining whether the executive order, on its face, 
sets forth allegations of fact relating to one of the constitutionally enumerated 
 
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grounds of suspension.  Id. at 133.  Thus, “[a] mere arbitrary or blank order of 
suspension without supporting allegations of fact, even though it named one or 
more of the constitutional grounds of suspension, would not meet the requirements 
of the Constitution.”  Id.  However, where the executive order of suspension 
contains factual allegations relating to an enumerated ground for suspension, the 
Constitution prohibits the courts from examining or determining the sufficiency of 
the evidence supporting those facts, as the “matter of reviewing the charges and the 
evidence to support them is solely in the discretion of the Senate.”  Id. at 134; see 
also State ex rel. Kelly v. Sullivan, 52 So. 2d 422, 425 (Fla. 1951) (“It is the 
function of the Senate, and never that of the Courts, to review the evidence upon 
which the Governor suspends an officer in the event the Governor recommends his 
removal from office.”).  Therefore, the factual allegations in an executive order of 
suspension must satisfy only a low threshold under the judiciary’s limited, facial 
review, and “if, on the whole, [the executive order] contains allegations that bear 
some reasonable relation to the charge made against the officer, it will be adjudged 
as sufficient.”  Hardie, 155 So. at 133.    
 
Under this standard, Executive Order 19-14 satisfies our limited review.  
Executive Order 19-14 states that at the time of his suspension, Israel was serving 
as the Sheriff of Broward County, which is a “county officer” under article VIII, 
section 1(d) of the Florida Constitution.  Executive Order 19-14 names the grounds 
 
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for Israel’s suspension—neglect of duty and incompetence—and provides various 
factual allegations that reasonably relate to those grounds of suspension.   
 
Israel argues, however, that article IV, section 7(a) of the Constitution limits 
the grounds for suspension to a statutory duty prescribed to his office, which he 
claims Executive Order 19-14 fails to identify.  “[I]n construing a constitutional 
provision, we are not at liberty to add words that were not placed there originally 
or to ignore words that were expressly placed there at the time of adoption of the 
provision.”  Pleus, 14 So. 3d at 945.  There is nothing in the plain language of 
article IV, section 7(a) stating that the grounds for suspending a public official are 
solely limited to his or her statutory duties.  
Moreover, the plain and ordinary meaning of the word “duty” found in 
article IV, section 7(a) of the Constitution offers no support for Israel’s argument.  
“[U]nless the text of a constitution suggests that a technical meaning is intended, 
words used in the constitution should be given their usual and ordinary 
meaning . . . .  To this effect, ‘a dictionary may provide the popular and common-
sense meaning of terms . . . .’”  Lawnwood, 990 So. 2d at 512 (quoting Advisory 
Opinion to Governor—1996 Amendment 5 (Everglades), 706 So. 2d 278, 282 (Fla. 
1997)).  According to Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 259 (1967), 
“duty” is defined in part as “the action required by one’s position or occupation.”  
See also American Heritage Dictionary 573 (3d ed. 1992) (defining “duty” as “[a]n 
 
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act or a course of action that is required of one by position, social custom, law, or 
religion”). 
Furthermore, in Hardie, this Court explained that with regard to the 
Governor’s constitutional suspension power,  
Neglect of duty has reference to the neglect or failure on the 
part of a public officer to do and perform some duty or duties laid on 
him as such by virtue of his office or which is required of him by law.  
It is not material whether the neglect be willful, through malice, 
ignorance, or oversight.  When such neglect is grave and the 
frequency of it is such as to endanger or threaten the public welfare it 
is gross. 
 
155 So. at 132.  “Incompetency . . . has reference to any physical, moral, or 
intellectual quality, the lack of which incapacitates one to perform the duties of his 
office” and “may arise from gross ignorance of official duties or gross carelessness 
in the discharge of them . . . [or] from lack of judgment and discretion.”  Id. at 133.  
A review of Executive Order 19-14 shows that it articulates factual allegations that 
bear a reasonable relation to the grounds of neglect of duty and incompetence as 
those terms are understood in their usual and ordinary meaning.     
CONCLUSION 
The Constitution establishes a clear and unambiguous process for suspension 
and removal.  The Governor may suspend for one or more of the grounds 
enumerated in article IV, section 7(a), and the Senate may remove or reinstate the 
officer pursuant to article IV, section 7(b).  The Constitution reserves to the Senate 
 
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the sole responsibility for reviewing the evidence supporting the Governor’s 
executive order of suspension, and it is the constitutional role of the Senate to 
consider whether the suspended officer merits removal or reinstatement.  Where 
the suspended officer falls within one of the constitutionally enumerated categories 
and the Governor has filed the executive order of suspension with the state 
custodian of records, the judiciary’s sole role in this process is limited to a facial 
review of the executive order of suspension to determine whether it contains 
allegations that bear some reasonable relation to the charge made against the 
officer.  This is “due entirely to the fact that the Constitution itself has set up its 
own special court to try the matter, namely the state Senate.”  Hardie, 155 So. at 
136 (Davis, C.J., concurring).   
Accordingly, we find that the Governor has satisfied the constitutional 
requirements set forth in article IV, section 7(a) of the Constitution and has the 
authority to suspend Israel from the office of Sheriff of Broward County.  We 
therefore affirm the circuit court’s order denying Israel’s petition for writ of quo 
warranto. 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LAWSON, LUCK, and MUÑIZ, JJ., concur. 
MUÑIZ, J., concurs with an opinion, in which CANADY, C.J., and LAWSON and 
LUCK, JJ., concur. 
LABARGA, J., concurs in result only with an opinion. 
 
 
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ANY MOTION FOR REHEARING OR CLARIFICATION MUST BE FILED 
WITHIN THREE DAYS. A RESPONSE TO THE MOTION FOR 
REHEARING/CLARIFICATION MAY BE FILED WITHIN TWO DAYS 
AFTER THE FILING OF THE MOTION FOR REHEARING/CLARIFICATION. 
NOT FINAL UNTIL THIS TIME PERIOD EXPIRES TO FILE A 
REHEARING/CLARIFICATION MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
MUÑIZ, J., concurring. 
 
I concur in the majority opinion but write briefly to address the claim at the 
heart of Sheriff Israel’s petition, i.e., the assertion that the factual allegations 
underlying the suspension order are disconnected from Israel’s statutory duties.  
Israel’s view of those duties is far too narrow.  Section 30.15(e), Florida Statutes 
(2018), makes sheriffs “in person or by deputy” the “conservators of the peace” in 
their respective counties.  Relatedly, section 30.07, Florida Statutes (2018), 
authorizes sheriffs to appoint deputies and makes sheriffs responsible for the 
deputies’ neglect in office.  A sheriff’s myriad day-to-day functions and 
responsibilities—including the development of policies and the training and 
supervision of employees—are the essential means of carrying out these 
overarching statutory obligations.  And it requires no imagination to see the 
connection between these obligations and the significant performance deficiencies 
alleged in Executive Order 19-14.  Of course, Israel is free to dispute the merits of 
the suspension order’s factual allegations and to argue about the proper role of a 
governor in supervising local officials.  But the appropriate forum for those debates 
is the Senate.  It is not this Court’s role to weigh the sufficiency of the evidence or 
 
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to second-guess the governor’s exercise of a discretionary function under the 
Constitution. 
CANADY, C.J., and LAWSON and LUCK, JJ., concur. 
 
LABARGA, J., concurring in result only. 
 
As the circuit court correctly noted in its order, this case presents the narrow 
question of whether the executive order suspending Sheriff Israel alleges facts 
sufficient to support the suspension on the stated grounds.  While I agree that 
Executive Order 19-14 fulfills this requirement, I write to emphasize that our 
review of these matters is not pro forma.  Indeed, executive orders suspending 
officials pursuant to article IV, section 7(a), of the Florida Constitution must allege 
specific, detailed facts which support and allow for meaningful review by the 
Senate.  This requirement, in my view, is of paramount importance when the 
official in question was duly elected by the voters.2  Furthermore, the suspension 
order must provide the official in question with sufficient notice of the allegations 
to allow the official to mount a meaningful defense. 
                                          
 
 
2.  Article IV, section 7(a) authorizes the governor to suspend from office 
“any state officer not subject to impeachment, any officer of the militia not in the 
active service of the United States, or any county officer.”  Accordingly, the 
suspension power may be applied to suspend public officials who are elected by 
the citizens of Florida.  The office of sheriff is not subject to impeachment, and 
therefore a governor has the authority to suspend a sheriff pursuant to this 
provision, as occurred in this case. 
 
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This Court noted in State ex rel. Hardee v. Allen, 172 So. 222, 224 (Fla. 
1937), that “[i]t is not necessary that the allegation[s] of fact be as specific as the 
allegations of an indictment or information in a criminal prosecution.”  The 
allegations must, however, identify the specific instances of alleged misconduct 
with sufficient detail to facilitate meaningful review by the Senate, by this Court 
when applicable, and to allow the official to mount a defense.  An executive order 
which presents only general or conclusory allegations will not suffice.  This is not 
a demanding standard, but it is nonetheless a substantive requirement imposed by 
the Florida Constitution, and this Court is obligated to vacate any suspension 
which does not satisfy it. 
Certified Judgments of Trial Courts in and for Broward County – David Alan 
Haimes, Judge - Case No. 062019CA005019AXXXCE – An Appeal from the 
District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Case No. 4D19-970 
 
Benedict P. Kuehne, Michael T. Davis, and Susan Dmitrovsky of Kuehne Davis 
Law, P.A., Miami, Florida; and Stuart N. Kaplan of Kaplan & Parker, LLP, Palm 
Beach Gardens, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Joe Jacquot, General Counsel, Nicholas A. Primrose, John MacIver, Colleen Ernst, 
and James Uthmeier, Deputy General Counsel, Executive Office of the Governor, 
Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee