Title: Thompson v. Delaware

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
AARON THOMPSON, 
 
Defendant Below,  
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below,  
Appellee. 
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No.  454, 2017 
 
Court Below:  Superior Court of 
the State of Delaware 
 
I.D. No. 1602016732 (N) 
 
 
Submitted:  December 12, 2018 
Decided:  February 21, 2019 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and VAUGHN, Justices. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
Elise K. Wolpert, Esquire (Argued), and Eugene J. Maurer, Jr., Esquire, Eugene J. 
Maurer, Jr., P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant, Aaron Thompson. 
 
Maria T. Knoll, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Wilmington, Delaware, for 
Appellee, State of Delaware. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VAUGHN, Justice: 
 
 
1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Appellant, Aaron Thompson, appeals from a Superior Court jury verdict 
finding him guilty of two counts of Murder in the First Degree, two counts of 
Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, and Conspiracy in the 
First Degree.  The charges arose from the double homicide of Joseph and Olga 
Connell, who were shot to death on September 22, 2013.  The State’s theory of the 
case at trial was that Mr. Connell’s business partner, Chris Rivers, paid to have the 
Connells killed so he could collect on an insurance policy listing Mr. Connell as the 
insured and Rivers as the beneficiary.  The theory was that Rivers paid Joshua Bey, 
who in turn hired Dominique Benson and Thompson to carry out the murders.  The 
success of the State’s theory at Thompson’s trial largely depended on the testimony 
and credibility of Bey.  Thompson contended throughout the trial that Bey was 
lying and made up the connection with Thompson to get himself a favorable plea 
deal. 
Thompson makes two claims on appeal.  First, he contends that two 
statements by the State during its rebuttal argument constituted prosecutorial 
misconduct that undermined the fairness of the trial.  According to Thompson, the 
first statement in question was one in which the State argued facts that were not 
supported by record.  The second statement, he argues, was one that improperly 
appealed to the jury’s emotion.  Second, he contends that the trial court abused its 
 
 
2 
discretion in allowing Bey’s recorded statement to the police to be played for the 
jury following his testimony, arguing that this was inadmissible hearsay not subject 
to an exception. 
We find that the Superior Court should be affirmed on both claims.  First, we 
conclude that the two statements made by the State during its rebuttal do not rise to 
the level of prosecutorial misconduct.  Second, we conclude that Bey’s recorded 
statement to the police was admissible under Delaware Rule of Evidence 106, the 
rule of completeness. 
II.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Rivers and Mr. Connell were joint owners of C&S Automotive Repair.  In 
October 2012, Rivers and Mr. Connell secured a nearly one million–dollar mortgage 
in connection with their business.  As part of that transaction, they were both 
required to purchase life insurance in the amount of $977,500, with the other partner 
named as the beneficiary, so that the surviving partner could pay off the mortgage if 
one of them were to die. 
At approximately 1:30 a.m., on September 22, 2013, New Castle County 
police officers responded to a reported shooting at the Connells’ residence in 
Wilmington.  The officers discovered that the Connells had been shot and killed.  
After an extensive investigation, the police arrested Rivers and charged him with 
their murders. 
 
 
3 
Early on in the investigation, on October 4, 2013, Bey was questioned by 
Detective James Leonard because Rivers’s phone records revealed that, around the 
time of the murders, he had deleted certain communications with a phone number 
associated with Bey’s girlfriend.  Initially, Bey declined knowing anyone by the 
name of Chris Rivers, but after the detective confronted him with Rivers’s phone 
records, Bey admitted that Rivers was his mechanic.  During the questioning, it 
became apparent that Bey was not telling the entire truth with regard to his contact 
with Rivers around the time of the murders.  As for his location on the night of the 
murders, Bey stated that he worked an overnight shift at a department store (from 
approximately 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.).  His timesheet and video surveillance of 
the parking lot corroborated Bey’s statement that he was at work at the time of the 
murders. 
Detective Leonard questioned Bey again on October 24, 2013, and this time 
Bey admitted he was Rivers’s drug dealer.  The next day, Bey was arrested for 
providing a false statement to the police.  This arrest violated the terms of a 
probationary term he was serving and led to a violation of probation proceeding 
against him. 
After almost ten months of incarceration, while awaiting trial on the charge of 
providing a false statement to the police, and moments before trial was to start, Bey 
agreed to provide information about the murders in exchange for a deal from the 
 
 
4 
State.  On August 14, 2014, Bey gave a proffer that implicated not only himself, 
but also Rivers and Benson (the “August 14 proffer”).  At that time, however, Bey 
declined to enter into an agreement with the State. 
Bey was arrested for the Connells’ murders the following month.  He then 
agreed to cooperate.  In exchange for his cooperation, the State made a plea offer 
involving a plea of guilty to Conspiracy in the First Degree and a finding that he had 
violated his probation.  On September 5, 2014, after becoming a cooperating 
witness, Bey provided his fourth and final statement to the police (the “September 5 
statement”). 
At Thompson’s trial, Bey testified for the State, and his testimony provided 
the main narrative of the Connells’ murders.  He explained that shortly after 
meeting Rivers in 2012, he started selling him prescription pills and cocaine and that 
in 2013, Rivers asked him to hire someone to kill the Connells.  Bey and Rivers 
negotiated over the price, eventually settling on $60,000.  Rivers agreed and 
arranged to pay half up front and the other half in installments.  Bey told Rivers 
that he needed $5,000 immediately, which Rivers paid in cash. 
Bey testified that he hoped to make money from this transaction by hiring 
someone else to do the murders for less.  Bey asked Benson to do it and brought 
him to C&S to see the shop and meet Rivers.  After learning from Rivers that Bey 
had lied to him about how much Rivers was willing to spend (so that he could keep 
 
 
5 
the extra for himself), Benson nonetheless agreed to find someone else to do it for 
them.  As the planning progressed, Bey was under the impression that Benson 
would commit the murders, but at some point, Benson told Bey that he would ask 
Thompson to assist him. 
Bey further testified that Benson’s cousin, Willis Rollins, was also asked to 
carry out their plan.  Benson arranged for Bey and Rollins to meet at a restaurant 
near the Connells’ residence so that Bey could show Rollins where the Connells 
lived.  Bey testified that Thompson arrived at the restaurant and handed Rollins a 
gun with a silencer.  After showing Rollins the path to take to get to the Connells’ 
residence, Bey went back to his car and waited for Rivers to provide updates as to 
their location.  The next day, Bey called Benson to ask what happened.  Benson 
stated that Rollins “froze up” and did not go through with the plan.1 
Bey then testified about a second attempt to kill the Connells.  Benson told 
Bey, who in turn told Rivers, that they were having trouble finding a car to use.  
Rivers offered to let them drive his truck, a Chevrolet Tahoe, so Bey picked it up at 
C&S and then met Benson and Thompson in a parking lot behind his mother’s house.  
Bey testified that Benson and Thompson got into the car and drove off.  But the 
Connells were not killed this time either.  Bey explained that because Rivers’s car 
was equipped with On Star, Thompson was concerned about driving it. 
                                                 
1 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A170. 
 
 
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On September 22, 2013, the night of the murders, shortly before beginning his 
overnight shift at the department store, Bey learned from Rivers that the Connells 
would be returning home from dinner in about thirty minutes.  Bey relayed this 
information to Benson.  Bey did not speak to Benson again until after his shift 
ended the next morning.  When Bey first called Benson the next morning to ask 
what happened, Benson said he needed to call Thompson to find out.  A few hours 
later, Bey received a call from Benson saying that it was official and to “go collect.”2 
Apart from the initial $5,000 payment, Bey did not receive any other money 
prior to the murders.  After the murders, Rivers eventually paid another $5,000 to 
Bey on September 26.  Bey testified that after he received the money from Rivers, 
he “called up Dom [Benson]” and then met with Benson, who was accompanied by 
Rollins, at a park near Benson’s house to give Benson this $5,000 payment. 3  
According to Bey, Benson refused the payment.  Later that day, Bey received a 
phone call from Benson instructing him to meet with Thompson.  Bey went to 
Thompson’s house and gave him the $5,000 and explained that Rivers would be 
receiving more money from an insurance payout. 
On cross-examination, Thompson confronted Bey with several statements 
from his prior statements to the police that were inconsistent with his testimony at 
                                                 
2 Id. at A174. 
3 Id. at A175, A175-76. 
 
 
7 
trial.  A substantial portion of Bey’s cross-examination involved Thompson’s 
counsel confronting Bey with several statements he made in the August 14 proffer 
that were inconsistent with his trial testimony.  He also questioned Bey about two 
discrete points in the September 5 statement that were inconsistent with his trial 
testimony. 
Before beginning its redirect, the State announced that it intended to play 
Bey’s September 5 statement for the jury as a prior consistent statement under 
Delaware Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) to rehabilitate his credibility.4  Thompson 
objected, arguing that this exception did not apply because Bey’s motive to lie 
existed prior to the September 5 statement.  The trial court heard arguments about 
this issue following Bey’s cross-examination.  The State explained that it intended 
to play the September 5 statement, and not the August 14 proffer, because it had 
higher quality audio.  Thompson admitted that the August 14 proffer and the 
September 5 statement were largely consistent with each other, but he maintained 
that both were made after Thompson’s motive to lie arose.  And although the trial 
court asked whether the September 5 statement was independently admissible under 
                                                 
4 At the time of trial, Rule 801(d)(1)(B) provided that a statement is not hearsay if the declarant 
testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination about the statement and the statement is 
“consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of 
recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.”  This rule was amended, effective January 1, 
2018, such that this exception applies only in civil cases.  See D.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B).  The rule now 
provides that for criminal cases, the admissibility of prior consistent statements is governed by 11 
Del. C. § 3507.  See id. 801(d)(1)(C). 
 
 
8 
either 11 Del. C. § 3507 or Delaware Rule of Evidence 106, the parties focused their 
arguments on Rule 801(d)(1)(B). 
The morning after the hearing, the trial court ruled from the bench that the 
September 5 statement was admissible under both Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and 11 Del. C. 
§ 3507.  The trial court explained that Thompson attacked Bey’s credibility by 
showing that his motives were improper—“they were to get a deal, to save himself, 
and to curry whatever favor he had in order to minimize his own legal difficulties”—
and, therefore, found that Bey’s prior consistent statement, offered to rehabilitate his 
credibility, “fit squarely within Rule 801(d)(1)(B).” 5  As to § 3507, the court 
explained that because Thompson cross-examined Bey about the statement, the prior 
statement was admissible under that statute.  In light of this ruling, Thompson 
agreed to allow the State to introduce the September 5 statement through Detective 
Leonard.  After Detective Leonard set the foundation for the statement, it was 
played in its entirety for the jury. 
In addition to Bey’s (and other witnesses’) testimony, the State presented 
phone records and cellular location information that generally was consistent with, 
and circumstantially corroborated, Bey’s testimony.  The State presented phone 
records of all persons involved in the murders.  Some of this evidence, at least on 
its face, contradicted certain portions of Bey’s testimony.  Of particular concern 
                                                 
5 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A207-08. 
 
 
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was Bey’s testimony as to whom he called a few days after the murders.  Bey 
testified that on September 26, he called Benson and then met with Benson, who was 
accompanied by Rollins, at a park near Benson’s house.  The phone records, 
however, showed that there were multiple phone calls between Rollins’s phone and 
Bey’s phone that day, but none between Bey’s and Benson’s.  The State presented 
evidence that Benson and his girlfriend shared a phone and that during the day she 
typically took that phone with her to work, meaning Benson ordinarily did not have 
access to the phone during the daytime. 
Ultimately, the jury found Thompson guilty of all charges.  He was 
sentenced to two natural life sentences plus forty-five years at Level V incarceration.  
This is Thompson’s direct appeal. 
III.  DISCUSSION 
Thompson’s first claim is that two separate incidents of prosecutorial 
misconduct occurred during the State’s rebuttal argument and that this misconduct 
prejudiced him and compromised the integrity of the trial. 
The standard of review for claims of prosecutorial misconduct depends on 
whether the issue was fairly presented below.6  “If defense counsel raised a timely 
and pertinent objection to prosecutorial misconduct at trial, or if the trial judge 
intervened and considered the issue sua sponte, we essentially review for harmless 
                                                 
6 Baker v. State, 906 A.2d 139, 148 (Del. 2006) (en banc). 
 
 
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error.”7  If, on the other hand, defense counsel failed to object and the trial judge 
did not intervene sua sponte, “we review only for plain error.”8  Regardless of the 
standard of review, however, we must first conduct a de novo review to determine 
whether misconduct actually occurred. 9  If no misconduct occurred, then the 
analysis ends under either standard.10 
In Thompson’s closing argument, he argued that Bey’s testimony was false 
and that Bey had made up his entire story.  In its rebuttal, the State argued, among 
other things, that, based on Bey’s testimony and the evidence indicating that Benson 
did not have access to his phone during the daytime, Benson must have been 
communicating with Bey using Rollins’s phone.  Thompson objected to this as 
beyond the scope of the closing argument his counsel had made.  The Superior 
Court overruled the objection.  On appeal, Thompson contends that the State 
improperly argued facts that were not supported by the evidence when it “suggested 
that Bey was actually speaking to Benson when he called Rollins on September 26, 
2013—the day on which Bey attempted to give Benson a partial $5,000 payment.”11  
We find that the State’s argument concerning Bey’s phone calls was supported 
by the record and, therefore, no misconduct occurred.  The State argued that Bey’s 
                                                 
7 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
8 Id.  
9 Id. at 148, 150. 
10 Id. 
11 Appellant’s Opening Br. at 20. 
 
 
11 
testimony, that he called Benson on September 26, 2013, was consistent with the 
phone records even though the records indicated that Bey actually called Rollins’s 
phone on that day.  Bey testified at trial that on September 26, he “called up Dom 
[Benson]” and that he met with Benson, who was accompanied by Rollins, at a park 
near Benson’s house. 12  That testimony alone supports the State’s argument.  
However, there was also testimony at trial that established that Benson’s girlfriend 
worked during the day and that when she worked she took their phone (that is, 
Benson’s phone for the purposes of the phone records) to work with her.  Thus, 
record evidence supported the reasonable inference that Benson likely did not have 
access to his phone at this time (because it would have been with his girlfriend) and 
that, as a substitute, Benson would use Rollins’s phone to contact Bey because he 
was with Rollins at that time.  Because the State’s argument was a reasonable 
inference supported by the record, it cannot and did not constitute misconduct. 
In his closing argument, Thompson’s counsel also tried to impugn Bey’s 
motive for testifying against Thompson by suggesting that Bey was getting a 
sweetheart deal in exchange for his testimony.  The second statement that 
Thompson complained of arose in that context.  During the State’s rebuttal 
argument, the prosecutor said: “He [Bey] is a flipped co-defendant.  He is a snitch.  
He is a rat.  All of those things.  He will serve eight-and-a-half years in prison, 
                                                 
12 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A175, A175-76. 
 
 
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and then he will get out.  And what will happen to him then?” 13  Thompson 
objected and said he would address the objection later.  The court responded, 
saying “[l]et her finish her point.”14  The prosecutor then moved on to another 
topic.  After the State completed is rebuttal, Thompson’s counsel renewed the 
objection and asked for a mistrial, arguing that the prosecutor’s statement created a 
clear and prejudicial inference that Bey would be at risk of personal danger upon his 
release from prison.  The State argued that Bey would experience other adverse 
circumstances upon his release from prison and that to “the extent it causes a 
problem,” the court should give a curative instruction informing the jury to disregard 
the statement. 15  The court denied the request for a mistrial and Thompson’s 
counsel declined a curative instruction.  We find that the trial court’s denial of 
Thompson’s request for a mistrial was not error.  We agree with the State that the 
statement was ambiguous and did not rise to the level of prosecutorial misconduct.  
Rather than being an attempt to evoke sympathy, the more plausible explanation was 
that the State was trying to rebut the defense’s continual attacks on Bey’s credibility 
and suggestion that he was getting a good deal in exchange for his testimony.  In 
essence, the State was pointing out that Bey’s decision to testify was a double-edged 
sword:  Although he got a shorter prison sentence, he also risked being labeled a 
                                                 
13 Id. at A306. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at A308. 
 
 
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snitch.  And even if the statement is viewed as improper, it did not cause prejudice 
to Thompson sufficient to justify the granting of a mistrial. 
Thompson’s second claim on appeal involves an issue of admissibility of 
evidence, which we review under the abuse of discretion standard.16  “An abuse of 
discretion occurs when a court has exceeded the bounds of reason in light of the 
circumstances, or so ignored recognized rules of law or practice so as to produce 
injustice.”17  The Superior Court found that Bey’s September 5 statement, played 
to the jury following Bey’s testimony, was admissible under both Delaware Rule of 
Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) and 11 Del. C. § 3507.  Although the court asked the parties 
about the applicability of Rule 106, it did not expressly base its ultimate decision on 
that rule.  For the following reasons, we find that the entirety of Bey’s September 
5 statement was admissible under Rule 106 to put into context the various 
inconsistent statements brought out by Thompson on cross-examination. 
Rule 106 codifies the common-law rule of completeness, and its purpose is 
“to prevent misleading impressions which often result from taking matters out of 
context.”18  In certain circumstances, Rule 106 can render otherwise inadmissible 
evidence, such as hearsay, admissible.19  It states, “If a party introduces all or part 
                                                 
16 McNair v. State, 990 A.2d 398, 401 (Del. 2010). 
17 Id. 
18 Flamer v. State, 953 A.2d 130, 135 (Del. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
19 United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1986).  Although in Banther v. State, 
823 A.2d 467, 487 (Del. 2003) (en banc), we stated that “D.R.E. 106 does not make otherwise 
 
 
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of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at 
that time, of any other part—or any other writing or recorded statement—that in 
fairness ought to be considered at the same time.”20  Importantly, Rule 106 “applies 
to an oral quotation from a part of a document,” and “the offer of the document itself, 
in whole or in part, is unnecessary to the application of the Rule.”21  Therefore, 
when Thompson questioned Bey about specific parts of the September 5 statement 
by quoting portions of his statement, Thompson “introduce[d]” part of the 
September 5 statement for purposes of Rule 106.22 
“Once a party introduces a portion of a recording or writing, the burden shifts 
to the other party to require the admission of all or part of the remainder of the 
recording or writing which ought in fairness be considered contemporaneously with 
                                                 
inadmissible evidence admissible,” that was in the context of evidence being inadmissible under 
Rule 403, which trumps all other evidence rules.  The rule against hearsay, Rule 802, says, 
“Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these Rules.”  Thus, Rule 106, as part 
of “these Rules,” can authorize the admission of hearsay in certain circumstances.  See Sutton, 
801 F.2d at 1368 (interpreting the analogous federal rule and explaining that “every major rule of 
exclusion in the Federal Rules of Evidence contains the proviso, ‘except as otherwise provided by 
these rules,’ which indicates ‘that the draftsmen knew of the need to provide for relationships 
between rules and were familiar with a technique for doing this,’” and “[t]here is no such proviso 
in Rule 106, which indicates that Rule 106 should not be so restrictively construed” (footnote 
omitted) (first quoting Fed. R. Evid. 402, 501, 602, 613(b), 704, 802, 806, 901(b)(1), 1002; and 
then quoting C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5078, at 376 
(1977 & 1986 Supp.))).  Moreover, for a prior case illustrating the law covered by the Delaware 
rule, the Editors’ Notes for Rule 106 cite to Lowber v. State, 100 A. 322, 324 (Del. 1917), where 
this Court held that what would have been hearsay under the modern rules should have been 
admitted at trial so that the whole statement could have been considered. 
20 D.R.E. 106. 
21 Burke v. State, 484 A.2d 490, 497 (Del. 1984). 
22 See id. 
 
 
15 
it.”23  Rule 106 is further circumscribed by two qualifications: “The portions sought 
to be admitted (1) must be relevant to the issues and (2) only those parts which 
qualify or explain the subject matter of the portion offered by the opponent need be 
admitted.”24 
Where, as here, the cross-examiner’s goal is to impeach the credibility of the 
testifying witness by arguing that the witness’s whole story is made up and does this 
by bringing up isolated examples of inconsistencies with a prior statement that are 
insignificant to the whole story, it is appropriate under Rule 106 for the jury to hear 
the entire prior statement to properly assess the witness’s credibility.  Thompson’s 
line of attack was that since Bey could not keep his story straight (or consistent), he 
must have made the whole thing up.  The recorded statement, however, was largely 
consistent with Bey’s trial testimony.  Therefore, playing the entire statement  
countered Thompson’s argument that Bey was making everything up. 
For these reasons, and because the State sought to play only one of 
Thompson’s recorded statements, we do not think that there was any impermissible 
bolstering of the witness or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.  
Although Rule 106 does not always require the admission of an entire recorded 
                                                 
23 Flamer, 953 A.2d at 135 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
24 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
 
16 
statement, the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the entirety of 
the September 5 statement. 
Since we find that Bey’s September 5 statement was admissible under Rule 
106, we need not consider its admissibility under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) or § 3507. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Superior Court is affirmed.