Title: Myers v. Meyers

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Myers v. Meyers, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-1915.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-1915 
THE STATE EX REL. MYERS v. MEYERS ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Myers v. Meyers, Slip Opinion No.  
2022-Ohio-1915.] 
Mandamus—Public Records Act—The time at which a law-enforcement officer 
creates a record or the police department’s method for maintaining such a 
record determines whether the exemption to disclosure under R.C. 
149.43(A)(2)(c) applies—Partial writ of mandamus granted. 
(Nos. 2020-1469 and 2021-0211—Submitted October 5, 2021—Decided June 9, 
2022.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
____________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} In these two consolidated original actions, we address the issue 
whether an offense-and-incident report, which initiates a police investigation and 
is a public record under Ohio’s Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, is limited to the 
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form that police officers fill out in order to report the incident or whether it also 
includes contemporaneous reports created by the investigating officers that 
document the officers’ observations and the statements of witnesses at the scene.  
Relator, Derek J. Myers, seeks a writ of mandamus requiring respondents, the city 
of Chillicothe; its police chief, Ron Meyers (“police chief”); and the police 
department’s records clerk, Mica Kinzer (collectively, “Chillicothe” or “the city”), 
to disclose the “supplement narratives” that the city withheld when Myers had 
requested the public-record incident reports.  The city asserts that it properly 
withheld the supplement narratives on the ground that such a narrative constitutes 
a confidential law-enforcement investigatory record (“CLEIR”)—specifically, 
“investigatory work product” under R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(c).  In addition to the writ 
of mandamus, Myers also requests awards of statutory damages, attorney fees, and 
court costs. 
{¶ 2} We grant the writ with respect to a limited number of supplement 
narratives but deny it as to the majority of the supplement narratives.  We also grant 
Myers an award of statutory damages for the city’s delayed production of certain 
incident-report forms, but we deny in part Myers’s claim for statutory damages on 
the ground that we do not “stack” statutory damages.  Finally, we award court costs 
to Myers, but we deny his request for an award of attorney fees. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Chillicothe police department’s public-records policy 
{¶ 3} The city presented the affidavit of the police chief to explain its 
public-records policy.  That affidavit provides the best starting point for 
understanding the status of the public-records requests at issue in these cases. 
{¶ 4} According to the police chief, the department “generates investigatory 
records after it receives a complaint from the public that pertains to potential 
violations of criminal laws.”  After receiving a complaint, “an officer is then 
dispatched to the location of the incident to investigate.”  But because the officer 
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“begin[s] the investigation immediately after being dispatched, the officer often 
does not create the offense-and-incident report until after [he or she] leave[s] the 
scene of the incident.”  Based on the filled-in incident-report forms generated by 
the investigating officers, Kinzer prepares a daily media report and distributes it to 
various media recipients. 
{¶ 5} In his affidavit, the police chief states that there are “three sources of 
information” that make up what he refers to as an “investigatory record”: (1) the 
“standard, fill-in-the-blank information that identifies the investigation status, 
investigating officer, date, location, and offense information, all of which the 
investigating officer enters,” (2) the “initial narrative section that the investigating 
officer generates,” which “identifies the offense alleged, the location of the 
incident, and whether the investigation is ongoing,” and (3) “supplement 
narratives,” which “contain the personal notes of the investigating officer regarding 
the incident, summarizing witness and victim interviews, and evaluating the alleged 
offense.”  The supplement narratives also contain “specific details of the crime 
alleged, the identities of the victim, witnesses, and alleged perpetrator, and other 
related information.” 
{¶ 6} In responding to a public-records request for an “investigatory 
record,” the department “generally does not disclose the supplement narratives for 
the record, so long as the related investigation remains ongoing.”  The department 
views supplement narratives as “confidential law enforcement investigatory 
records, since they are the investigating officer’s work product.”  But the 
department does disclose upon request the incident-report form plus the “initial 
narrative,” which is authored by the investigating officer. 
{¶ 7} The police chief’s affidavit further explains that once an investigation 
is closed, the department “disclose[s] the entire investigatory record, consisting of 
both the offense-and-incident reports and the supplement narratives.”  The purpose 
of that policy is to “prevent the public disclosure of detailed information of an 
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investigation while it is ongoing,” a practice that “protects witnesses, victims, and 
suspects from potential harassment.” 
{¶ 8} In discussing the status of the records requests, we adopt the following 
terminology for purposes of this opinion.  What the police chief refers to as “the 
standard, fill-in-the-blank information,” we will call “the incident-report form.”  As 
for the two types of narratives, we will follow the police chief’s terminology and 
call them the “initial narrative” and the “supplement narratives.”  Finally, we will 
use the phrase “public-record incident report” to refer to those documents that must 
be disclosed under the Public Records Act. 
{¶ 9} This terminology permits us to state succinctly the nature of the 
parties’ disagreement.  Myers argues that the public-record incident report includes 
the supplement narratives, while the city maintains that the public-record incident 
report is limited to the incident-report form and the initial narrative. 
B.  Case No. 2020-1469 
{¶ 10} Myers is the editor and proprietor of the publication the Scioto Valley 
Guardian.  As part of his work, Myers regularly submits public-records requests 
seeking the disclosure of public-record incident reports.  Kinzer sends a daily media 
report through an email-distribution service to media recipients like Myers.  For 
each new investigation, Kinzer’s media report contains the case number, the offense 
charged, any relevant names, the date and time, and the address of the incident. 
{¶ 11} On November 20, 2020, Myers sent an email reply to Kinzer’s media 
report that stated: “Hello, please send P2015185,” which he intended as a request 
for the public-record incident report relating to the investigation with that number.  
Approximately two hours after sending his first email, Myers sent Kinzer a second 
email stating, “Please let me know whether you will be sending this report today.  
If you deny the request, please cite your reasoning and law.”  Around the time that 
Myers sent his first email to Kinzer, he also emailed the police chief and stated that 
“we must address the persisting issue of your records department denying public 
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records requests for police reports, citing open investigations.”  That day, the police 
chief gave the following response: “When investigations are completed and able to 
be released, they are,” but that when a matter “is under investigation, until 
reviewed, it stays as a work in progress.”  On November 23, Kinzer informed Myers 
that she “was told that [the report he had requested] is not to be released at this time 
because it is still being investigated.”  Notably, Kinzer did not fulfill the 
department’s policy that was described by the police chief in his affidavit: Kinzer 
did not disclose the incident-report form with the initial narrative when Myers made 
his request. 
{¶ 12} On December 4, 2020, Myers filed a complaint for a writ of 
mandamus in this court (case No. 2020-1469) to obtain the public-record incident 
report for investigation No. P2015185.  On December 11, the police chief formally 
denied Myers’s request, citing the CLEIR exception in R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(c).  The 
police chief reiterated that the record would be released after the investigation was 
complete. 
{¶ 13} The city belatedly disclosed the incident-report form on January 8, 
2021, along with the initial narrative but withheld the supplement narratives.  Myers 
filed an amended complaint on March 18, 2021, stating that the city’s disclosure on 
January 8 consisted of only a “truncated version of P2015185.” 
C.  Case No. 2021-0211 
{¶ 14} After making the records request at issue in case No. 2020-1469, 
Myers requested eight additional public-record incident reports.  Those additional 
public-records requests followed the basic pattern of the request in case No. 2020-
1469.  As she had with Myers’s earlier request, in five of Myers’s later requests, 
Kinzer initially relied on the media report she had already sent and did not promptly 
disclose the incident-report forms.  For three of the public-record incident reports 
that Myers requested in case No. 2021-211, the city promptly disclosed the 
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incident-report form along with the initial narratives but withheld the supplement 
narratives. 
{¶ 15} On February 16, 2021, Myers filed the complaint for a writ of 
mandamus in case No. 2021-0211 to obtain all eight of what he claims are the 
public-record incident reports that he requested (which include, according to his 
argument, the supplement narratives).  Two business days after Myers filed that 
complaint, the city disclosed five incident-report forms along with the initial 
narratives and also disclosed the supplement narratives in four cases in which the 
city deemed the investigation to be complete. 
{¶ 16} We consolidated case Nos. 2020-1469 and 2021-0211 and granted 
an alternative writ.  162 Ohio St.3d 1441, 2021-Ohio-1398, 166 N.E.3d 1269.  In 
response to the alternative writ, the city submitted the supplement narratives that it 
had withheld for in camera review by this court. 
D.  The status of Myers’s public-records requests 
{¶ 17} For the sake of clarity, we outline the status of Myers’s nine records 
requests at issue. 
{¶ 18} Request No. 1 (case No. 2020-1469): investigation No. P2015185.  
Myers emailed this public-records request on November 20, 2020.  The city initially 
denied this request.  The city provided Myers the incident-report form and the initial 
narrative on January 8, 2021, but withheld the supplement narratives. 
{¶ 19} Request No. 2 (case No. 2021-0211): investigation No. 18-019929.  
Myers emailed this request on December 6, 2020.  The city initially denied this 
request.  The city provided Myers the incident-report form and the initial narrative 
on February 18, 2021, but withheld the supplement narratives.  This request is at 
issue in case No. 2021-0211, as are all the subsequent requests in this list. 
{¶ 20} Request No. 3: investigation No. P2015431.  Myers emailed this 
request on December 8, 2020.  The city initially denied this request.  The city 
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provided Myers the incident-report form and the initial narrative on February 18, 
2021, but withheld the supplement narratives. 
{¶ 21} Request No. 4: investigation No. 2015437.  Myers emailed this 
request on December 8, 2020.  The city initially denied this request.  The city 
provided Myers the incident-report form and the initial narrative on February 18, 
2021.  The city also disclosed the supplement narratives on that date because the 
investigation was closed. 
{¶ 22} Request No. 5: investigation No. 2015499.  Myers emailed this 
request on December 10, 2020.  The city initially denied this request.  The city 
provided Myers the incident-report form and the initial narrative on February 18, 
2021, but withheld the supplement narratives. 
{¶ 23} Request No. 6: investigation No. P2015606.  Myers emailed this 
request on December 15, 2020.  The city initially denied this request.  The city 
provided Myers the incident-report form and the initial narrative on February 18, 
2021.  The city also disclosed the supplement narratives on that date because the 
investigation was closed. 
{¶ 24} Request No. 7:  investigation No. P2100231.  Myers emailed this 
request on January 18, 2021.  The city provided Myers the incident-report form and 
the initial narrative on January 19, 2021, but initially withheld the supplement 
narratives.  On February 18, 2021, the city disclosed the supplement narratives 
because the investigation was closed. 
{¶ 25} Request No. 8: investigation No. P2100318.  Myers emailed this 
request on January 22, 2021.  The city provided Myers the incident-report form and 
the initial narrative on the same day but withheld the supplement narratives.  On 
February 18, 2021, the city disclosed the supplement narratives because the 
investigation was closed. 
{¶ 26} Request No. 9: investigation No. P2100352.  Myers emailed this 
request on January 26, 2021.  The city provided Myers the incident-report form and 
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the initial narrative on the same day but withheld the supplement narratives.  The 
city subsequently provided Myers the incident-report form and the initial narrative 
but withheld the supplement narratives. 
{¶ 27} The following chart summarizes the foregoing information: 
Request No. 
Investigation 
No. 
Public-Records 
Request (date) 
Incident-
Report 
Form 
and 
Initial 
Narrative (date 
disclosed) 
Supplement 
Narratives 
(date 
disclosed) 
1 
P2015185 
11/20/20 
1/8/21 
 
2 
18-019929 
12/6/20 
2/18/21 
 
3 
P2015431 
12/8/20 
2/18/21 
 
4 
P2015437 
12/8/20 
2/18/21 
2/18/21 
5 
P2015499 
12/10/20 
2/18/21 
 
6 
P2015606 
12/15/20 
2/18/21 
2/18/21 
7 
P2100231 
1/18/21 
1/19/21 
2/18/21 
8 
P2100318 
1/22/21 
1/22/21 
2/18/21 
9 
P2100352 
1/26/21 
1/26/21 
 
 
{¶ 28} In sum, with respect to request Nos. 4, 6, 7, and 8, the city has made 
full disclosure of the records because those investigations are complete.  Thus, 
Myers’s writ claim is moot with respect to request Nos. 4, 6, 7, and 8.  As for request 
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, and 9, the city has disclosed the incident-report forms and the initial 
narratives but withheld the supplement narratives.  And finally, in request Nos. 1 
through 6, the city failed to promptly disclose the incident-report forms. 
 
 
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II.  LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A.  Burden of proof 
{¶ 29} A person who is denied access to a public record may seek to compel 
its production through a mandamus action.  R.C. 149.43(C)(1)(b).  In such a case, 
the requester must prove a clear legal right to the requested records and a 
corresponding clear legal duty on the part of the custodian to provide them, State 
ex rel. Penland v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 158 Ohio St.3d 15, 2019-Ohio-
4130, 139 N.E.3d 862, ¶ 9, by clear and convincing evidence, State ex rel. 
McCaffrey v. Mahoning Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 133 Ohio St.3d 139, 2012-Ohio-
4246, 976 N.E.2d 877, ¶ 16. 
{¶ 30} Because the city invokes the CLEIR exception to disclosure here, it 
bears the burden of production “to plead and prove facts clearly establishing the 
applicability of the [exception].”  Welsh-Huggins v. Jefferson Cty. Prosecutor’s 
Office, 163 Ohio St.3d 337, 2020-Ohio-5371, 170 N.E.3d 768, ¶ 27.  And because 
“[e]xceptions to disclosure under * * * R.C. 149.43 are strictly construed against 
the public-records custodian,” the custodian does not satisfy its burden “if it has not 
proven that the requested records fall squarely within the exception.”  State ex rel. 
Cincinnati Enquirer v. Jones-Kelley, 118 Ohio St.3d 81, 2008-Ohio-1770, 886 
N.E.2d 206, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
B.  Public-record incident reports must be distinguished from “specific 
investigatory work product” 
{¶ 31} R.C. 149.43(A)(1) defines a public record as a “record[] kept by any 
public office, including but not limited to, state, county, city, village, [and] 
township.”  R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(h) excepts CLEIRs from the public-records 
definition.  R.C. 149.43(A)(2) defines a CLEIR as “any record that pertains to a 
law enforcement matter of a criminal, quasi-criminal, civil, or administrative 
nature, but only to the extent that the release of the record would create a high 
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probability of disclosure of” one of four categories listed in R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(a) 
through (d). 
{¶ 32} At issue here is the city’s claim of confidentiality under R.C. 
149.43(A)(2)(c), one provision of which excepts from disclosure “specific 
investigatory work product.”  Notably, unlike other categories of a CLEIR, the 
exception for “specific investigatory work product” expires at the end of a criminal 
trial, State ex rel. Caster v. Columbus, 151 Ohio St.3d 425, 2016-Ohio-8394, 89 
N.E.3d 598, ¶ 47, or when an investigation has been closed, State ex rel. Cincinnati 
Enquirer v. Ohio Dept. of Pub. Safety, 148 Ohio St.3d 433, 2016-Ohio-7987, 71 
N.E.3d 258, ¶ 41-42.  See also State ex rel. Police Officers for Equal Rights v. 
Lashutka, 72 Ohio St.3d 185, 188, 648 N.E.2d 808 (1995) (the investigatory-work-
product exception “applies to actual pending or highly probable criminal 
prosecutions” [emphasis deleted]). 
{¶ 33} We have consistently held that routine “offense-and-incident 
reports” do not fall under the exception for “specific investigatory work product,” 
and are therefore public records.  See State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson, 70 Ohio 
St.3d 420, 639 N.E.2d 83 (1994), paragraph five of the syllabus (investigatory-
work-product exception “does not include ongoing routine offense and incident 
reports,” which “are subject to immediate release upon request”),1 overruled on 
other grounds by Caster; see also State ex rel. Lanham v. Smith, 112 Ohio St.3d 
527, 2007-Ohio-609, 861 N.E.2d 530, ¶ 13 (routine offense-and-incident reports, 
which are “form reports in which the law enforcement officer completing the form 
enters information in the spaces provided,” are “not exempt work product and are 
normally subject to immediate release upon request”). 
 
1. Myers argues that we should narrow the definition of police-officer work product to include only 
“opinion work product” rather than adhere to the broader Steckman standard, which encompasses 
“fact work product.”  See Caster at ¶ 63-65 (O’Connor, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part).  We decline to do so.  In Caster, this court adhered to the broader standard, id. at ¶ 19, and we 
see no compelling reason to revisit that issue in this case. 
January Term, 2022 
 
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C.  Analysis of Myers’s writ claim 
{¶ 34} As discussed, the gravamen of Myers’s claim for a writ of mandamus 
lies in his argument that the supplement narratives constitute part of the public-
record incident report.  The city’s defense is that the supplement narratives 
constitute “specific investigatory work product” under R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(c); in the 
city’s view, the public-record incident report encompasses the incident-report form 
and the initial narrative but does not extend to the supplement narratives. 
{¶ 35} In support of his writ claim, Myers advances an argument that has a 
broader version and a narrower version.  Under the broader version, all the 
supplement narratives are part of the public-record incident report.  Under the 
narrower version, only some of the supplement narratives are part of the public-
record incident report. 
1.  Whether all the supplement narratives are public records 
{¶ 36} Myers first argues that all the supplement narratives are part of the 
public-record incident reports because they are “included in the very same 
document” as the incident-report form.  As factual support, Myers refers to the 
police chief’s affidavit, which characterizes the incident-report form, initial 
narrative, and supplement narratives as parts of an overarching “investigatory 
record.” 
{¶ 37} In support of his position, Myers cites our decision in State ex rel. 
Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Maurer, 91 Ohio St.3d 54, 741 N.E.2d 511 
(2001).  Maurer addressed a media representative’s request for an unredacted copy 
of an Ohio Uniform Incident Report: 
 
In the space apparently to be used to describe the events, the deputy 
wrote “taped narrative” and attached to the incident report four 
typed transcripts of taped statements by law enforcement officers.  
These typed narrative statements were titled “Wayne County 
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Sheriff’s Office Narrative/Supplementary Report.”  Written 
statements by other witnesses were also attached to the report.  The 
incident report form total[ed] two pages in length; the typed 
narrative statements and witnesses’ statements total[ed] thirty-five 
pages. 
 
Id. at 54.  This court held that the incident report and the narratives had to be 
disclosed because the officer who had completed the report “incorporated the typed 
narrative statements by reference in the incident report”; as a result, he 
“incorporated them in a public record.”  Id. at 57.  “ ‘Once clothed with the public 
records cloak, the records cannot be defrocked of their [public-record] status.’ ”  
Id., quoting State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hamilton Cty., 75 Ohio St.3d 374, 
378, 662 N.E.2d 334 (1996). 
{¶ 38} Myers reasons that if “documents merely ‘referenced’ ” in the 
incident-report form are “by virtue of that reference, incorporated into that Report, 
then a fortiori narratives that are themselves part of the very same document are 
part of the Report as well.” 
{¶ 39} We reject Myers’s contention that all supplement narratives are part 
of the public-record incident report.  Contrary to Myers’s argument, the police 
chief’s affidavit does not answer the question before us, it merely poses it.  The 
police chief regards certain documents as the public-record incident report but not 
the supplement narratives. Whether the supplement narratives are public records 
does not, however, depend on the police chief’s viewing them as part of a larger 
investigatory record that includes the incident-report forms.  Instead, the public-
record status of the supplement narratives depends on the standards we have 
developed in the case law. 
{¶ 40} Our case law provides two bases for determining whether documents 
qualify as part of the public-record incident report.  The first is whether the 
January Term, 2022 
 
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document constitutes a regular incident-report form on which officers have filled 
in blanks with information.  See Lanham, 112 Ohio St.3d 527, 2007-Ohio-609, 861 
N.E.2d 530, ¶ 13.  The second is whether the information provided initiates the 
investigation, Maurer, 91 Ohio St.3d at 56-57, 741 N.E.2d 511, as opposed to 
constituting work product generated after the investigation is under way. 
{¶ 41} To demonstrate the application of these criteria, consider Myers’s 
request No. 4, investigation No. P2015437, in which the city has disclosed the 
supplement narratives because the investigation is complete.  In investigation No. 
P2015437, the incident-report form was generated on December 5, 2020, at 8:03 
p.m., and the first supplement narrative was authored at 10:29 p.m.  Six supplement 
narratives followed, three of which were created on December 7, one on December 
9, one on December 13, and the final supplement narrative is dated January 25, 
2021.  Those later supplement narratives, which were generated days after the date 
and time of the incident-report form, are not part of the public-record incident report 
because they neither contain information included in the incident-report form nor 
do they supply information that initiated the investigation.  As a result, because the 
later supplement narratives are not part of the public-record incident report, they 
may qualify as work product of the investigation that was initiated by the public-
record incident report. 2  We therefore reject the broad version of Myers’ argument. 
2.  Some supplement narratives are public records 
{¶ 42} Alternatively, Myers advances a narrower version of his argument 
by asserting that some, but not all, of the supplement narratives are public records.  
He contends that some of the supplement narratives that have already been 
 
2. Myers also argues that because some of the incident-report forms “directly reference their 
corresponding Supplement Narratives,” the content from those supplement narratives are 
incorporated into the public-record incident report by reference.  While there is a place for “names 
mentioned in narratives” in the incident-report form and the word “supplement” appears next to the 
names of certain witnesses, the references to “supplement” in the incident-report forms merely serve 
to identify the names that are mentioned in the supplement narratives; they do not incorporate 
witness statements into the incident-report forms. 
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produced “contain narrative derived directly from the party reporting the facts of 
the at-issue offense or incident to the Department.”  Myers surmises that the same 
may be true of the documents that the city has submitted for in camera review. 
{¶ 43} We conclude that this narrower version of Myers’s argument is 
correct.  In addressing this point, it is useful to consider an example. In request No. 
4, investigation No. P2015437, the city disclosed the supplement narratives because 
the investigation was completed.  The date of the incident was December 5, 2020, 
and time of the incident was 8:03 p.m.  The time on the initial narrative was 9:58 
p.m. on the same date.  The first supplement narrative was created at 10:29 p.m. on 
that date, approximately 30 minutes after the initial narrative.  That first supplement 
narrative contains the responding officer’s observations and witness statements.  
There are six supplement narratives on later dates, with the last one concluding the 
investigation on January 25, 2021. 
{¶ 44} A review of the supplement narratives in investigation No. 
P2015437 establishes that the first supplement narrative is contemporaneous with 
the police response to the incident and contains information that the responding 
officer obtained at the scene.  Because the timing and nature of the content shows 
that the information initiates the investigation, the first supplement narrative 
consists of what we will call “incident information” that properly constitutes part 
of the public-record incident report, even though the officer elected to label that 
information as a “supplement” narrative rather than an “initial” narrative. 
{¶ 45} We hold that when a police department maintains both incident-
report forms and investigatory work product as part of the same overall 
investigatory record, officers’ reports that contain their observations at the time that 
they are responding to an incident, along with initial witness statements taken at the 
time of the incident or immediately thereafter, are incident-report information that 
is a public record and may not be withheld from disclosure as “specific 
investigatory work product” under R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(c).  To use the terminology 
January Term, 2022 
 
15 
of this opinion, supplement narratives that contain incident information are part of 
the public-record incident report, even though officers have neither included that 
information on the incident-report form nor incorporated it into the “initial 
narrative.” 
{¶ 46} We emphasize, however, that our analysis in this case does not 
foreclose redacting information that is part of the public-record incident report if 
that information qualifies for nondisclosure under a public-records exception other 
than “specific investigatory work product,” including a different CLEIR provision.  
Even the information that is included in an incident-report form may, in a proper 
case, be redacted under a public-records exception other than the specific-
investigatory-work-product exception in R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(c).  See State ex rel. 
Shaughnessy v. Cleveland, 149 Ohio St.3d 612, 2016-Ohio-8447, 76 N.E.3d 1171, 
¶ 12 (“we have stated that police incident reports are subject to redactions to prevent 
the disclosure of exempt information”), citing State ex rel. Beacon Journal 
Publishing Co. v. Akron, 104 Ohio St.3d 399, 2004-Ohio-6557, 819 N.E.2d 1087, 
¶ 55 (“although police offense-and-incident reports are generally subject to 
disclosure, documents containing information that is exempt under state or federal 
law may be redacted”), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State 
ex rel. DiFranco v. S. Euclid, 138 Ohio St.3d 367, 2014-Ohio-538, 7 N.E.3d 1136.  
In the cases before us, however, the city does not advance any exception from 
public-records disclosure of the supplement narratives other than the specific-
investigatory-work-product exception.  Under our holding, to the extent that 
supplement narratives contain incident information, they do not constitute specific 
investigatory work product and must be disclosed if no other public-records 
exception justifies withholding them. 
 
 
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3.  Determining which supplement narratives are part of the public-record 
incident report 
{¶ 47} The next issue that must be resolved is a factual matter: which 
supplement narratives contain incident information and are therefore public 
records.  Here, the most important factor is timing—the initial observations by 
officers and the initial witness statements taken at the physical location close to the 
time that the incident occurred constitute incident information that may not be 
regarded as specific investigatory work product, even when the information has not 
been incorporated into the incident-report form. 
{¶ 48} We now review each of the investigations in which the city has 
submitted records for in camera review in order to identify which supplement 
narratives contain incident information that makes them subject to disclosure as 
part of the public-record incident report. 
a.  Case No. 2020-1469 
{¶ 49} Request No. 1: investigation No. P2015185.  Myers requested this 
record on November 20, 2020.  The date and time on this incident report are 
November 19, 2020, at 9:31 a.m.  The initial narrative is dated November 19, 2020, 
at 10:23 a.m. and states, “Detective opened an investigation into a possible sexual 
assault.  Investigation continues.”  The first supplement narrative, dated November 
19 at 10:25 a.m., contains an account of the officer’s interview of the victim.  There 
are additional supplement narratives on later dates.  The city shall disclose the first 
supplement narrative that is dated November 19, 2020, because it contains incident 
information.  The remaining supplement narratives are not subject to the writ. 
b.  Case No. 2021-211 
{¶ 50} Request No. 2: investigation No. 18-019929.  Myers requested this 
record on December 6, 2020.  The date and time on this incident report are August 
28, 2018, at 9:15 a.m.  The initial narrative, dated August 28, 2018, at 9:35 a.m., 
states, “Detective opened an investigation into a reported sexual assault.  
January Term, 2022 
 
17 
Investigation ongoing.”  The first supplement narrative, dated April 18, 2020, at 
5:31 p.m., recites the background of the investigation and investigative activity.  
There are additional supplement narratives on later dates.  None of these 
supplement narratives need be disclosed because they do not contain incident 
information. 
{¶ 51} Request No. 3: investigation No. P2015431.  Myers requested this 
record on December 8, 2020.  The date and time on this incident report are 
December 5, 2020, at 10:41 a.m. The initial narrative, dated December 5, 2020, at 
2:22 p.m., states, “Dispatched on a possible deceased female.”  The first supplement 
narrative, dated December 5, 2020, at 2:24 p.m., describes the officer’s impressions 
at the scene and initial witness statements.  There is an additional supplement 
narrative on a later date.  The city shall disclose the December 5 supplement 
narrative because it contains incident information. 
{¶ 52} Request No. 5: investigation No. P2015499.  Myers requested this 
record on December 10, 2020.  The date and time on this incident report are 
December 9, 2020, at 6:33 a.m.  The initial narrative, dated December 9, 2020, at 
7:36 a.m., states, “Investigation.”  The first supplement narrative, dated December 
9 at 8:10 a.m., describes the officer’s response to the incident, the officer’s 
impressions of the crime scene, and initial witness statements.  A second 
supplement narrative is dated December 9 at 8:11 a.m.  It is written by a different 
officer and describes how that officer assisted at the scene of the incident.  There 
are additional supplement narratives on later dates.  The city shall disclose the first 
and second supplement narratives, dated December 9, because they contain incident 
information.  The remaining supplement narratives are not subject to the writ. 
{¶ 53} Request No. 9: investigation No. P2100352.  Myers requested this 
record on January 26, 2021.  The date and time on this incident report are January 
23, 2021, at 8:35 p.m.  The initial narrative, dated January 23, 2021, at 11:51 p.m., 
states, “Report taken.”  The first supplement narrative, dated January 23, 2021, at 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
11:51 p.m., describes the officer’s impressions at the scene, presents initial witness 
statements, and specifies further actions by the officer.  There are additional 
supplement narratives on later dates.  The city shall disclose the January 23 
supplement narrative because it contains incident information.  The remaining 
supplement narratives are not subject to the writ. 
{¶ 54} In light of the foregoing discussion of the records submitted for in 
camera review, we issue a writ of mandamus requiring the city to disclose those 
supplement narratives that we have identified as containing incident information. 
D.  Statutory damages 
{¶ 55} Under R.C. 149.43(C)(2), a “requester shall be entitled to recover” 
statutory damages when (1) he submits a written public-records request “by hand 
delivery, electronic submission, or certified mail,” (2) the request “fairly describes 
the public record or class of public records to the public office or person responsible 
for the requested public records,” and (3) “a court determines that the public office 
or the person responsible for public records failed to comply with an obligation” 
imposed by R.C. 149.43(B).  Statutory damages accrue at $100 “for each business 
day during which the public office or person responsible for the requested public 
records failed to comply” with R.C. 149.43(B), “beginning with the day on which 
the requester files a mandamus action to recover statutory damages, up to a 
maximum of one thousand dollars.”  Id. 
{¶ 56} Myers submitted his public-records requests by email, which 
triggers R.C. 149.43(C)(2).  Myers advances four types of statutory-damage claims: 
1. 
Damages for the city’s failure to promptly disclose incident-report forms; 
2. 
Damages for the city’s failure to promptly disclose supplement narratives 
that are public records because they contain incident information (i.e., the 
supplement narratives that are subject to the writ in these cases); 
January Term, 2022 
 
19 
3. 
Damages for the city’s failure to promptly disclose supplement narratives 
that were originally investigatory work product in those investigations that 
have been completed; and 
4. 
Damages for the city’s failure to promptly provide a reasoned denial of 
Myers’ requests including citation to legal authority. 
{¶ 57} In connection with considering each specific claim, three general 
questions arise: (1) whether Myers’s request for nine incident reports should be 
treated as distinct records requests for purposes of assessing statutory damages, 
(2) whether we should assess separate damage awards for the city’s violations of 
R.C. 149.43(B) if those violations relate to one records request, and (3) whether 
damages that would otherwise accrue should be abated on the ground that the city 
acted reasonably (though unlawfully) in withholding certain records. 
1.  Precedent prohibits “stacking” damages but permits multiple awards of 
damages with respect to distinct records requests 
{¶ 58} This court has held that R.C. 149.43(C)(2) “ ‘does not permit 
stacking of multiple damage awards based on what is essentially the same records 
request.’ ”  State ex rel. Ware v. Akron, 164 Ohio St.3d 557, 2021-Ohio-624, 174 
N.E.3d 724, ¶ 22, quoting State ex rel. Dehler v. Kelly, 127 Ohio St.3d 309, 2010-
Ohio-5724, 939 N.E.2d 828, ¶ 4.  A requester who has made one public-records 
request may typically recover only $100 for each business day that a public office 
fails to comply with its obligation, even when the requester identifies multiple 
violations of R.C. 149.43(B) for a particular business day.  See State ex rel. 
DiFranco v. S. Euclid, 144 Ohio St.3d 565, 2015-Ohio-4914, 45 N.E.3d 981,  
¶ 28-29.  And R.C. 149.43(C)(2) imposes a $1,000 cap on the damages that a 
requester may recover for a records request. 
{¶ 59} Since the requester is entitled to one damage award for each public-
records request, we must determine what constitutes a single request.  The city 
argues in its merit brief that “all nine of Relator’s requests” amount to “essentially 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
the same records request.”  We disagree.  Each of Myers’s requests relates to a 
separate public-record incident report, and—with one exception that is noted 
below—each request was made in a separate email on a different date.  Compare 
Ware at ¶ 22 (two letters that were included in one certified-mailed envelope, both 
of which requested police-department personnel information, were treated as a 
single records request for purposes of calculating statutory damages). The 
antistacking principle does not prohibit multiple statutory-damage awards when 
violations occur in connection with different records requests. 
2.  Myers is entitled to statutory damages for the city’s failure to promptly 
disclose incident-report forms 
{¶ 60} As already discussed above, with respect to six of Myers’s nine 
records requests, the city failed to make the incident-report forms available 
promptly, as required by R.C. 149.43(B)(1).  Instead of producing the incident-
report forms themselves, the city initially relied on Kinzer’s daily media report to 
provide Myers with the information that was contained in the incident reports.  But 
a records request is a request not for information but for an existing record.  See 
State ex rel. Morgan v. New Lexington, 112 Ohio St.3d 33, 2006-Ohio-6365, 857 
N.E.2d 1208, ¶ 30.  Once the record has been requested, R.C. 149.43(B) requires 
that the public office “promptly” make it available to the requester. 
{¶ 61} Although these violations trigger R.C. 149.43(C)(2), the statutory-
damage provision, it is appropriate to consider whether to abate damages under 
R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(a) and (b).  Those provisions authorize us to reduce or not to 
award statutory damages if we find (1) that “a well-informed public office * * * 
reasonably would believe that the conduct * * * that allegedly constitutes a failure 
to comply with an obligation” imposed by R.C. 149.43(B) did not constitute such 
a failure “based on the ordinary application of statutory law and case law as it 
existed at the time of the conduct,” R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(a), and (2) that “a well-
informed public office * * * reasonably would believe that [its] conduct * * * 
January Term, 2022 
 
21 
would serve the public policy that underlies the authority that is asserted as 
permitting that conduct,” R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(b). 
{¶ 62} The city’s failure to promptly disclose incident-report forms does not 
satisfy either of these criteria.  In Steckman, 70 Ohio St.3d 420, 639 N.E.2d 83, and 
in later cases, we stated that incident reports constitute public records and do not 
constitute confidential work product.  Here, the city did not misunderstand Myers’s 
request; instead, it misunderstood its clearly established duties under R.C. 149.43.  
Accordingly, the city violated its statutory obligation under R.C. 149.43(B)(1) to 
promptly provide the incident-report forms to Myers, and Myers is entitled to 
statutory damages. 
{¶ 63} We must now compute the amount of statutory damages to which 
Myers is entitled.  In case No. 2020-1469, the incident-report form was not 
disclosed until more than ten days after Myers filed the complaint for a writ of 
mandamus—the complaint was filed in this court on December 4, 2020, and the 
incident report was not produced until January 8, 2021.  Accordingly, Myers is 
entitled to an award of $1,000 in statutory damages for the city’s violation of its 
prompt-disclosure requirement in case No. 2020-1469. 
{¶ 64} In case No. 2021-0211, with respect to five of the eight incident-
report forms that Myers requested, the city did not disclose the incident-report 
forms until two days after Myers filed the complaint for a writ of mandamus—the 
complaint was filed in this court on February 16, 2021, and the incident-report 
forms were provided on February 18, 2021, two business days later.  Importantly, 
however, two of the public-record incident reports were sought in the same email.3  
 
3. The award of statutory damages for the untimely disclosure of the incident-report forms in case 
No. 2021-0211 pertains to request Nos. 2 through 6 (investigation Nos. 18-019929, P2015431, 
P2015437, P2015499, and P2015606).  Request Nos. 3 and 4 (investigation Nos. P2015431 and 
P2015437) were included in the same email that Myers sent on December 8, 2020.  We will treat 
that email as a single records request for purposes of statutory damages. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
Because of the antistacking principle, Myers is limited to one award of statutory 
damages for that single email request. 
{¶ 65} To compute the amount of damages, we assess $100 “for each 
business day” of the city’s noncompliance “beginning with the day on which 
[Myers] file[ed] [the] mandamus action.”  See R.C. 149.43(C)(2).  Myers is entitled 
to $200 for two days—the day on which he filed the complaint in case No. 2021-
0211 and the following day—multiplied by the four separate requests in which 
incident-report forms were not promptly produced—a total of $800 damages.  We 
therefore award Myers $800 for the city’s failure to promptly disclose a total of five 
incident report-forms for four separate public-records requests.  Adding this 
amount to the $1,000 we awarded Myers in case No. 2020-1469, we arrive at a total 
damages award of $1,800. 
3.  Statutory damages relating to the city’s delayed disclosure of those supplement 
narratives that contain the incident information will be abated 
{¶ 66} Myers also seeks statutory damages for the city’s delay in disclosing 
the supplement narratives that contain incident information that makes them part of 
the public-record incident report—in other words, the supplement narratives that 
are required to be disclosed by the writ that we are issuing.  By extension, this claim 
could encompass the delay in disclosing supplement narratives that contain incident 
information with respect to the four investigations in which the city has already 
disclosed all the supplement narratives.4     
{¶ 67} If we determine that we should abate the claim for statutory damages 
under R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(a) and (b), however, the amount of the damages is moot.  
In the context of the city’s failure to disclose the supplement narratives that are 
subject to the writ, we find that the city behaved reasonably under R.C. 
149.43(C)(2)(a) and (b).  First, under R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(a), the city could 
 
4. This aspect of Myers’s argument involves request Nos. 4, 6, 7, and 8 (investigation Nos. 
P2015437, P2015606, P2100231, and P2100318).  
January Term, 2022 
 
23 
reasonably have believed that it was proper to withhold the supplement narratives 
to protect the fruits of its investigation from disclosure, and the reasonableness of 
this position receives support from our decision to deny the writ with respect to 
most of the supplement narratives.  Second, under R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(b), the city 
could also have reasonably believed that withholding the information that is 
contained in the supplement narratives served the public policy of keeping the city’s 
investigatory work product confidential.  Accordingly, we will abate the statutory 
damages that are associated with the city’s failure to disclose the supplement 
narratives that contain incident information. 
4.  Myers has not shown that he is entitled to statutory damages for the city’s 
delayed disclosure of the investigatory work product in the completed 
investigations 
{¶ 68} The next claim for statutory damages concerns request Nos. 4, 6, 7, 
and 8 (investigation Nos. P2015437, P2015606, P2100231, and P2100318), in 
which the city has disclosed all the supplement narratives on the ground that the 
investigations have been completed and closed—in other words, the disclosure 
includes those supplement narratives that qualified as investigatory work product 
while the investigations were still ongoing.  Here, Myers contends that the city did 
not promptly disclose the public-record investigatory reports.  Because two 
business days elapsed, beginning with the date on which Myers filed the complaint 
in case No. 2021-0211 before full disclosure, Myers seeks $800 in statutory 
damages. 
{¶ 69} We have already determined that in case No. 2021-0211, Myers is 
entitled to $200 in statutory damages for the city’s failure to promptly disclose the 
incident-report forms, and that determination includes two requests we are now 
considering:  request Nos. 4 and 6 (investigation Nos. P2015437 and P2015606).  
The antistacking principle would bar any further award of statutory damages for 
those requests.  That leaves request Nos. 7 and 8 (investigation Nos. P2100231 and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
P2100318).  Myers’s claim for statutory damages in this context would amount to 
an additional $400 ($100 for the day on which Myers filed the complaint and the 
day thereafter, multiplied by two). 
{¶ 70} Because the status of these particular supplement narratives depends 
on whether and when the investigations were complete, Myers has the burden to 
show that disclosure was not made promptly after completion of the investigation.  
We conclude that Myers has not met that burden.  With respect to investigation No. 
P2100231, the final supplement narrative is dated January 15, 2021, and it ends by 
stating: “Investigation continues.”  By contrast, in investigation No. P2100318, the 
final supplement narrative is dated February 10, 2021, and states: “Case closed.”  
Myers filed the complaint in case No. 2021-0211 on February 16, and the 
investigatory record in each of those two matters was produced two days later. 
{¶ 71} This evidence does not show that the city unreasonably delayed the 
disclosure of the supplement narratives.  In P2100231, at the time Myers made his 
request on January 18, 2021, the final supplement narrative stated the investigation 
was continuing; as a result, the city needed to make a subsequent determination as 
to whether the investigation had been completed.  The city both determined that the 
investigation was complete and produced the full record within the month after 
Myers made the request.  In P2100318, the delay in producing the full record after 
the case had been closed was a week and a day.  Myers has not shown the delay to 
be unreasonable in either situation. 
5.  Myers is not entitled to damages relating to the city’s failure to promptly cite 
authority in support of its denial of Myers’s request for supplement narratives 
{¶ 72} Myers also claims damages because of the city’s delay in providing 
the statutory basis for withholding the requested supplement narratives.  R.C. 
149.43(B)(3) requires that a written denial to a written public-records request 
“provide the requester with an explanation, including legal authority, setting forth 
why the request was denied.”  In case No. 2020-1469, the city provided a denial 
January Term, 2022 
 
25 
with a citation to a statute on December 11, 2020, seven days after Myers filed the 
complaint.  However, the city did not provide a denial with a statutory citation with 
respect to any of the other requests until after the mandamus action was filed.  
Myers seeks statutory damages for the city’s delay in providing a denial that is 
compliant with R.C. 149.43(B)(3). 
{¶ 73} We deny this portion of Myers’s damages claim for two reasons.  
First, R.C. 149.43(B)(3)—unlike R.C. 149.43(B)(1)—does not contain a 
requirement that the denial be “prompt.”  See State ex rel. Ware v. Giavasis, 160 
Ohio St.3d 383, 2020-Ohio-3700, 157 N.E.3d 710, ¶ 12.  As a result, the city’s 
delay in providing Myers with an explanation for its denial does not by itself entitle 
Myers to an award of statutory damages.  Second, although the city did not provide 
a formal explanation with respect to each of his records requests, the email 
exchanges between Myers and the police chief in case No. 2020-1469 furnished 
Myers with a general explanation of the city’s position.  Accordingly, we deny 
statutory damages based on the city’s delay in explaining its denial of Myers’s 
requests for the supplement narratives. 
E.  Attorney fees 
{¶ 74} We may award attorney fees when we order a public office to 
comply with R.C. 149.43(B).  R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(b) “outlines four different 
triggering events that grant a court discretion to order reasonable attorney fees in a 
public-records case.”  State ex rel. Rogers v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 155 Ohio 
St.3d 545, 2018-Ohio-5111, 122 N.E.3d 1208, ¶ 32.  Myers seeks attorney fees 
under R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(b). 
{¶ 75} However, R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(c) states that attorney fees should not 
be awarded when a court determines that the public office “reasonably would 
believe that the conduct or threatened conduct of the public office or person 
responsible for the requested public records did not constitute a failure to comply 
with an obligation in accordance with” R.C. 149.43(B) and that the public office 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26 
“reasonably would believe that the conduct or threatened conduct of the public 
office or person responsible for the requested public records would serve the public 
policy that underlies the authority that is asserted as permitting that conduct or 
threatened conduct.” 
{¶ 76} We have already made a similar determination in connection with 
abating statutory damages associated with the city’s failure to disclose supplement 
narratives that contain incident information.  Using that same logic, we conclude 
that awarding attorney fees is inappropriate here because the city could have 
reasonably believed that it could withhold the supplement narratives and that doing 
so would fulfill the public policy behind the investigatory-work-product exception.  
Indeed, Myers does not cite any legal authority in which supplementary parts of an 
investigatory record have been held to be public records.  See State ex rel. Summers 
v. Fox, 164 Ohio St.3d 583, 2021-Ohio-2061, 174 N.E.3d 747, ¶ 14.  We deny 
Myers’s request for an award of attorney fees. 
F.  Costs 
{¶ 77} Myers also requests an award of court costs.  R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(a)(i) 
states: “If the court orders the public office or the person responsible for the public 
record to comply with [R.C. 149.43(B)], the court shall determine and award to the 
relator all court costs.”  Because we are granting a partial writ of mandamus, we 
award court costs to Myers. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 78} For the foregoing reasons, we grant Myers a partial writ of 
mandamus requiring the city to disclose some, but not all, of the supplement 
narratives at issue.  Stated generally, the city must disclose those supplement 
narratives that we have previously found to contain incident information—but the 
city need not disclose any other supplement narratives.  More specifically, the city 
must disclose: (1) the first supplement narrative for investigation No. P2015185, 
dated November 19, 2020, at 10:25 a.m., (2) the first supplement narrative for 
January Term, 2022 
 
27 
investigation No. P2015431, dated December 5, 2020, at 2:24 p.m., (3) the first and 
second supplement narratives for investigation No. P2015499, dated December 9, 
2020, at 8:10 a.m. and 8:11 a.m., and (4) the first supplement narrative for 
investigation No. P2100352, dated January 23, 2021, at 11:51 p.m.  We are not 
ordering the city to disclose any of the supplement narratives for investigation No. 
18-019929.  We also award Myers statutory damages in the amount of $1,800.  We 
award costs to Myers, but we deny his request for an award of attorney fees. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and DONNELLY, STEWART, and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion joined by 
DEWINE, J. 
FISCHER, J., concurs in the court’s judgment granting a partial writ but 
dissents from the court’s judgment as to the award of damages and costs. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 79} Today, the majority modifies the definition of what “specific 
investigatory work product” is under R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(c).  By doing so, it 
needlessly complicates a standard that was settled almost 30 years ago in State ex 
rel. Steckman v. Jackson, 70 Ohio St.3d 420, 639 N.E.2d 83 (1994).  In Steckman, 
this court held that “information assembled by law enforcement officials in 
connection with a probable or pending criminal proceeding” is “specific 
investigatory work product” and is therefore exempt from disclosure.  Id. at 
paragraph five of the syllabus, overruled on other grounds by State ex rel. Caster 
v. Columbus, 151 Ohio St.3d 425, 2016-Ohio-8394, 89 N.E.3d 598.  The majority’s 
change to Steckman’s definition to include when a report is created and how a police 
department maintains the record will certainly cause confusion and spur litigation 
for years to come. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
28 
{¶ 80} I agree with the majority’s decision to grant an award of $1,800 in 
statutory damages to relator, Derek J. Myers, because respondents, the city of 
Chillicothe; its police chief, Ron Meyers (“police chief”); and the police 
department’s records clerk, Mica Kinzer (collectively, “the city”), failed to timely 
produce routine incident-report forms.  Although I also agree with the majority’s 
decision to deny Myers statutory damages for the city’s failure to produce various 
supplement reports, I disagree with the majority’s reasoning. 
{¶ 81} I also disagree with the majority’s holding that the time at which a 
law-enforcement officer creates a record or that a police department’s method for 
maintaining such records determines whether the confidential-law-enforcement-
investigatory-record exemption (“specific investigatory work product”), R.C. 
149.43(A)(2)(c), applies. 
{¶ 82} Because the records that the city withheld from disclosure meet the 
Steckman definition of “specific investigatory work product,” I would deny Myers 
a writ of mandamus.  Because the majority does otherwise, I dissent. 
{¶ 83} Therefore, I concur in part and dissent in part. 
Mandamus and R.C. 149.43, Ohio’s Public Records Act 
{¶ 84} Mandamus is an appropriate remedy by which to compel a public 
office’s compliance with the Public Records Act.  R.C. 149.43(C)(1)(b); see State 
ex rel. Physicians Commt. for Responsible Medicine v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of 
Trustees, 108 Ohio St.3d 288, 2006-Ohio-903, 843 N.E.2d 174, ¶ 6.  The requester 
must establish by clear and convincing evidence a clear legal right to the requested 
records and a corresponding clear legal duty on the part of the public office to 
provide them.  State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Sage, 142 Ohio St.3d 392, 2015-
Ohio-974, 31 N.E.3d 616, ¶ 10. 
{¶ 85} “Exceptions to disclosure under the Public Records Act are strictly 
construed against the public-records custodian, and the custodian has the burden to 
establish the applicability of an exception.”  State ex rel. Miller v. Ohio State Hwy. 
January Term, 2022 
 
29 
Patrol, 136 Ohio St. 3d 350, 2013-Ohio-3720, 995 N.E.2d 1175, ¶ 23.  To meet this 
burden, the records custodian must prove that the requested records “fall squarely 
within the exception.”  State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Jones-Kelley, 118 Ohio 
St.3d 81, 2008-Ohio-1770, 886 N.E.2d 206, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
“Specific investigatory work product” exception 
to the Public Records Act 
{¶ 86} A public record is any record kept by a public office.  R.C. 
149.43(A)(1).  Despite that overarching definition of a public record, the legislature 
has exempted certain records from disclosure. 
{¶ 87} A confidential law-enforcement investigatory record is exempt from 
disclosure when the record “pertains to a law enforcement matter of a criminal, 
quasi-criminal, civil, or administrative nature, but only to the extent the release of 
the record would create a high probability of disclosure” of one of four categories 
of records.  R.C. 149.43(A)(2).  In this case, the city argues that the requested 
records are exempt as specific investigatory work product under R.C. 
149.43(A)(2)(c). 
{¶ 88} In Steckman, 70 Ohio St.3d 420, 639 N.E.2d 83, this court stepped 
back from its earlier decisions in State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. 
Univ. of Akron, 64 Ohio St.2d 392, 415 N.E.2d 310 (1980), and State ex rel. Natl. 
Broadcasting Co. v. Cleveland, 38 Ohio St.3d 79, 526 N.E.2d 786 (1988), regarding 
what material could be classified as specific investigatory work product and 
therefore exempt under R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(c).  In Steckman, this court concluded 
that it had not addressed what the phrase “specific investigatory work product” 
meant in Beacon Journal Publishing Co.  Steckman at 433.  In Beacon Journal 
Publishing Co., this court held that the R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(c) exemption did not 
apply because the reports at issue were “routine factual reports.”  (Emphasis 
added).  Id. at 397. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
30 
{¶ 89} In Steckman, this court also cast doubt on the reliability of the 
holding in Natl. Broadcasting Co.  This court explained in Steckman that the 
definition of specific investigatory work product in Natl. Broadcasting Co. as “ ‘an 
investigator’s deliberative and subjective analysis, his interpretation of the facts, 
and his theory of the case, and investigative plans,’ ” Steckman at 434, quoting Natl. 
Broadcasting Co. at paragraph three of the syllabus, was based on a “nonexistent 
foundation,” Steckman at 433. 
{¶ 90} In Steckman, this court concluded that it had not yet addressed what 
constituted “work product” for purposes of the specific-investigatory-work-product 
exemption under R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(c).  Recognizing this court’s failure to define 
that phrase in past decisions, this court focused on the text of R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(c).  
This court considered the United States Supreme Court’s definition of “work 
product” in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947), 
and the definition of the “work product rule” in Black’s Law Dictionary 1606 (6th 
Ed.Rev.1990).  Steckman at 434.  This court held that “information assembled by 
law enforcement officials in connection with a probable or pending criminal 
proceeding is, by the work product exception found in R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(c), 
excepted from required release.”  Id. at paragraph five of the syllabus.  This court 
also held that “[r]outine offense and incident reports are subject to immediate 
release upon request.”  Id. 
{¶ 91} After Steckman, we reiterated that its holding applies “to actual 
pending or highly probable criminal prosecutions and defines, in that context, the 
very narrow exceptions to R.C. 149.43.”  (Emphasis sic.)  State ex rel. Police 
Officers for Equal Rights v. Lashutka, 72 Ohio St.3d 185, 188, 648 N.E.2d 808 
(1995). 
{¶ 92} In holding that the specific-investigatory-work-product exemption 
applied in State ex rel. Leonard v. White, 75 Ohio St.3d 516, 518, 664 N.E.2d 527 
(1996), this court explained that “[o]nce it is evident that a crime has occurred, 
January Term, 2022 
 
31 
investigative materials developed are necessarily compiled in anticipation of 
litigation and so fall squarely within the Steckman definition of [specific 
investigatory] work product.”  (Emphasis added). 
The supplement narratives are specific investigatory work product 
and are therefore exempt from disclosure 
{¶ 93} Myers made nine public-records requests seeking incident-report 
forms and supplement narratives.  The incident-report forms are not in dispute.  The 
dispute before us centers on the supplement narratives.  The city provided 
supplement narratives for request Nos. 4, 6, 7 and 8 after the investigations 
associated with those requests were closed.  So, the issue here is whether the 
specific-investigatory-work-product exemption applies to the supplement 
narratives connected to Myers’s request Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, and 9.  In the requests at 
issue, the term “supplement narrative” refers to the additional narratives that are 
prepared by police officers as part of an investigatory record.  For purposes of 
consistency, this opinion adopts the same terminology as the majority: 
 
“[T]he standard, fill-in-the-blank information,” we will call 
“the incident-report form.”  As for the two types of narratives, we 
will follow the police chief’s terminology and call them the “initial 
narrative” and the “supplement narratives.”  Finally, we will use the 
phrase “public-record incident report” to refer to those documents 
that must be disclosed under the Public Records Act. 
 
Majority opinion, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 94} As explained in the police chief’s affidavit, supplement narratives 
“contain the personal notes of the investigating officer regarding the incident, 
summarizing witness and victim interviews, and evaluating the alleged offense,” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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along with “specific details of the crime alleged, the identities of the victim, 
witnesses, and alleged perpetrator, and other related information.” 
{¶ 95} The majority holds that various supplement narratives do not fall 
under the specific-investigatory-work-product exemption.  I disagree.  Because the 
records sought in request Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, and 9 fall squarely within the Steckman 
definition of specific investigatory work product, Myers is not entitled to a writ of 
mandamus. 
{¶ 96} Request No. 1 asks for the public-record incident report from 
investigation No. P2015185.  The incident-report form states that the rape of a child 
was reported on November 19, 2020, at 9:31 a.m.  A detective met with the victim 
at 10:23 a.m.  The initial narrative, which is dated November 19, 2020, at 10:23 
a.m., states: “Detective opened an investigation into a possible sexual assault.  
Investigation continues.”  The first supplement narrative was completed just two 
minutes after the initial narrative.  It states that the detective met with the victim 
who wanted to discuss incidents that had occurred in 2007.  The victim described 
the sex acts that the accused had reportedly forced on the victim. 
{¶ 97} Request No. 2 asks for the public-record incident report for 
investigation No. 18-019929.  The majority grants Myers an award of statutory 
damages only for the city’s failure to disclose the incident-report form.  I agree with 
that determination. The allegation in the incident-report form is gross sexual 
imposition.  The initial narrative is dated August 28, 2018.  It states: “Detective 
opened an investigation into a reported sexual assault.  Investigation ongoing.”  
There is no supplement narrative until April 18, 2020, and the investigation was 
ongoing. 
{¶ 98} Request No. 3 asks for the public-record incident report for 
investigation No. P2015431.  The incident-report form lists a suspicious death of a 
27-year-old woman, reported on December 5, 2020, at 10:41 a.m.  The investigating 
officer reported being at the scene at approximately 10:45 a.m.  The initial narrative 
January Term, 2022 
 
33 
is dated December 5, 2020, at 2:22 p.m., and states: “Dispatched on a possible 
deceased female.”  The first supplement narrative, which was written by that same 
officer, was created two minutes later and contained his observations.  It states that 
the investigating officer arrived at the same time as the medics and that he had 
spoken to the decedent’s parents.  The officer waited for the coroner to arrive and 
then turned the investigation over to a detective. 
{¶ 99} Request No. 5 asks for the public-record incident report for 
investigation No. P2015499.  The incident-report form lists the possible crime as a 
shooting and states that an aggravated assault and an aggravated burglary may have 
occurred.  The initial narrative is dated September 9, 2020, at 7:36 a.m., and states: 
“Investigation.”  The first supplement narrative is dated that same day at 8:10 a.m.  
The responding officer wrote that there was a victim who had been shot in a home.  
The officer found the victim, who was in an upstairs bedroom.  The reporting 
witness described a break-in and the shooting. 
{¶ 100} Request No. 9 asks for the public-record incident report for 
investigation No. P2100352.  The incident-report form identifies the crime as gross 
sexual imposition.  The initial narrative is dated January 23, 2021, at 11:51 p.m., 
and states: “Report taken.”  The first supplement narrative was reported at the same 
time.  It states that the responding officer was dispatched to investigate a possible 
rape.  The officer spoke to the victim’s mother, who reported that her child had 
been raped.  The name of the child victim and additional details are given in the 
first supplement narrative. 
{¶ 101} An in camera review of the first supplement narratives in request 
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, and 9 reveals that those records were created after it was evident to 
the responding officers that a crime had been committed, Leonard, 75 Ohio St.3d 
at 518, 664 N.E.2d 527, and the officers and detectives began assembling the 
information “in connection with a probable or pending criminal proceeding,” 
Steckman, 70 Ohio St.3d at 435, 639 N.E.2d 83.  Therefore, the city properly relied 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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on the specific-investigatory-work-product exemption under R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(c) 
as its reason for not disclosing the supplement narratives. 
{¶ 102} The majority reaches a contrary decision because it focuses on 
matters that are unrelated to the content of the supplement narratives.  As a result, 
the majority needlessly redefines what constitutes a “specific investigatory work 
product” for purposes of what qualifies as an exemption under R.C. 
149.43(A)(2)(c). 
The majority needlessly redefines the Steckman definition of 
“specific investigatory work product” 
{¶ 103} This court has been applying the Steckman definition of “specific 
investigatory work product” to cases involving public-records requests since 1994.  
Law-enforcement agencies across Ohio have also relied on the Steckman definition 
to determine whether a records request falls within the exemption.  Records 
custodians know that routine offense and incident reports are subject to immediate 
release upon request.  But, according to Steckman, other records regarding a 
criminal investigation are not.  The question that the records custodian must answer 
is: Does the content of the information in the record that is being requested pertain 
to a probable or pending criminal proceeding?   
{¶ 104} But today, on a nonexistent foundation, the majority redefines the 
R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(c) exemption.  Now, there are additional metrics—i.e., when a 
police officer or detective creates a record and how a police department maintains 
its records—that must be considered in determining whether a particular record 
falls squarely within the specific-investigatory-work-product exemption.  These 
additional considerations will only foster confusion and spur litigation.  The 
definition set forth in Steckman, 70 Ohio St.3d at 435, 639 N.E.2d 83, is readily 
understandable and needs no modernization to apply it to this case.  “[I]nformation 
assembled by law enforcement officials in connection with a probable or pending 
criminal proceeding is, by the work product exception found in R.C. 149.43, 
January Term, 2022 
 
35 
excepted from required release.”  Steckman at 435.  We should not fix what is not 
broken. 
{¶ 105} The majority, however, states: 
 
[W]hen a police department maintains both incident-report forms 
and investigatory work product as part of the same overall 
investigatory record, officers’ reports that contain their observations 
at the time that they are responding to an incident, along with the 
initial witness statements taken at the time of the incident or 
immediately thereafter, are incident-report information that is a 
public record and may not be withheld from disclosure as “specific 
investigatory work product” under R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(c). 
 
Majority opinion at ¶ 45. 
{¶ 106} The majority creates an additional temporal part to the definition of 
“specific investigatory work product.”  While Steckman, 70 Ohio St.3d 420, 639 
N.E.2d 83, incorporated a temporal consideration—i.e., specific investigatory work 
product is created once it is evident that a crime has occurred—the majority now 
creates an additional temporal element—i.e., specific investigatory work product is 
created when the police officer or detective generates the record sometime after his 
or her initial investigation.  After today, the definition of specific investigatory 
work product will turn on (1) at what point it is evident that a crime has occurred 
and (2) when in time law enforcement assembles the material and generates the 
record.  So, what is that timing?  How long after an initial report is created must 
law-enforcement officers wait before assembling information that will be protected 
under the specific-investigatory-work-product exemption?  Obviously, here, a few 
minutes is not enough.  So, is it hours, days, or weeks?  The majority never tells us.  
Regardless of when it is, the majority’s new temporal element is not realistic in 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
36 
modern-day policing.  When law-enforcement officers respond to the scene of a 
crime, time is of the essence; and gathering evidence—whether physical or 
testimonial—to support a potential prosecution must begin immediately.  Once it 
is evident that a crime has occurred, the compilation of investigative materials 
begins in anticipation of litigation, and the related records are exempt under R.C. 
149.43(A)(2)(c).  And this is exactly what the city was doing in every investigatory 
case at issue here. 
{¶ 107} The majority also includes a consideration about how a public 
office maintains its records.  But that is irrelevant.  The Public Records Act—and 
the exemptions to it—are about the content of the information in the record.  Public-
records custodians routinely redact information that is exempt from disclosure.  
R.C. 149.43(B)(1).  So, if a law-enforcement agency maintains routine factual 
information and specific investigatory work product in the same overall record, 
then the records custodian may disclose the incident-report form while redacting 
any information that is considered to be specific investigatory work product.  See 
R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(c). 
{¶ 108} Police officers completed the incident-report forms with the 
understanding that under Steckman, those reports were immediately subject to 
release.  Police officers and detectives then used the supplement narratives to begin 
assembling the information that would be needed for future prosecutions.  
Regardless of when that information was collected—at the same time that the 
incident had been reported or hours, days, or weeks later— that information is 
properly exempt from disclosure under the specific-investigatory-work-product 
exemption of R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(c) if the material is collected in anticipation of 
litigation. 
Statutory damages 
{¶ 109} Before addressing Myers’s specific requests for statutory damages, 
I address two determinations in the majority opinion with which I disagree.  First, 
January Term, 2022 
 
37 
the majority opinion states that R.C. 149.43(B)(3) (“If a request is ultimately 
denied, in part or in whole, the public office or the person responsible for the 
requested public record shall provide the requester with an explanation, including 
legal authority, setting forth why the request was denied”) does not contain a 
requirement that a denial of a public-records request be prompt.  And second, the 
majority opinion states that a denial of one public-records request serves as a 
blanket denial for all public-records requests.  Majority opinion at ¶ 72. 
{¶ 110} “The primary duty of a public office when it has received a public-
records request is to promptly provide any responsive records within a reasonable 
amount of time and when a records request is denied, to inform the requester of that 
denial and provide the reasons for that denial.”  (Emphasis added.)  State ex rel. 
Cordell v. Paden, 156 Ohio St.3d 394, 2019-Ohio-1216, 128 N.E.3d 179, ¶ 11, 
citing R.C. 149.43(B)(1) and (3).  A statutory requirement that need never be 
completed is not a requirement at all.  See Ware v. Kurt, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-
Ohio-1627, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 70 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
{¶ 111} Moreover, the Public Records Act requires a records custodian to 
“provide the requester with an explanation, including legal authority, setting forth 
why the request was denied.”  R.C. 149.43(B)(3).  Therefore, the legislature 
requires that when a records custodian denies a public-records request, she provide 
the requester with the legal authority for why the request is being denied.  The city 
understood its obligation to respond to each public-records request because it 
responded to each of Myers’s public-records requests. 
{¶ 112} Turning to Myers’s request for statutory damages, there are two 
types of records at issue here: incident-report forms and supplement narratives. 
Incident-report forms 
{¶ 113} Myers argues that he is entitled to statutory damages because the 
city failed to timely provide incident-report forms for request Nos. 1 through 6.  I 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
38 
agree with the majority that Myers is entitled to an award of $1,800 in statutory 
damages for those requests.  Myers requested the public records by email and the 
factors set forth in R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(a) and (b) allowing for a reduction of such an 
award are not met here.  I also agree with the majority that request Nos. 7, 8, and 9 
are not at issue because they were produced for Myers within a reasonable time. 
Supplement narratives 
{¶ 114} Myers makes three arguments for statutory damages that pertain to 
the supplement narratives.  First, he argues that if this court grants him a writ of 
mandamus for the supplement narratives for request Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, and 9, then this 
court should grant him an award of statutory damages for each of those requests 
because those supplement narratives were—and continue to be—wrongfully 
withheld.  He asks for $1,000 in statutory damages for each of those five requests.  
Second, he argues that he is entitled to an award of statutory damages for request 
Nos. 1 through 9 because the city failed to promptly cite any legal authority in 
support of its denial of Myers’s requests for those supplement narratives.  Lastly, 
he argues that he is entitled to statutory damages because the city delayed disclosing 
the supplement narratives from the completed investigations in request Nos. 4, 6, 
7, and 8. 
Supplement narratives: Request Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, and 9 
{¶ 115} For reasons that differ from the majority, I agree that Myers is not 
entitled to statutory damages for the city’s denial of the supplement narratives in 
request Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, and 9.  As set forth above, I would deny his request for a 
writ of mandamus because these supplement-narrative requests are exempt under 
the specific-investigatory-work-product exemption under R.C 149.43(A)(2)(c).  
The majority determines that Myers should not receive an award of statutory 
damages pertaining to these supplement-narrative requests because any amount of 
possible damages should be abated under R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(a) and (b). 
January Term, 2022 
 
39 
{¶ 116} Myers argues that even if this court does not grant him a writ of 
mandamus for request Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, and 9, he would still be entitled to statutory 
damages because the city failed to promptly cite legal authority in support of its 
denial for Myers’s requests for supplement narratives in contravention of R.C. 
149.43(B)(3).  The majority states that R.C. 149.43(B)(3) does not contain a 
requirement that the denial be “prompt.”  As set forth above, I disagree.  The 
majority also suggests that when a records custodian provides a denial with legal 
reasoning as to one public-records request, that denial is sufficient for any 
subsequent denials of public-records requests.  Again, as set forth above, I disagree. 
{¶ 117} Additionally, I would not award Myers statutory damages for 
request Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 9, because the city did provide a prompt explanation with 
legal authority.  Almost every response to Myers’s requests was a variation on the 
same theme—that the city was not required to release the supplement narratives 
while an investigation was ongoing.  For instance, in response to request No. 3, 
Kinzer responded, “Please see the response from Det. Wallace, who is the 
investigating detective on this case (P2015431).  I have already provided the initial 
to everyone.  Once he completes his investigation, I am more than happy to send 
out the full report.”  Included with Kinzer’s response was a forwarded email from 
the detective that read: “[The case] is still pending and he can only have initial.”  
As to Myers’s argument that this response was insufficient because it failed to 
provide a specific legal response, R.C. 149.43(B)(3) does not require the records 
custodian to cite to a specific statutory section or case.  Using lay terms to explain 
the legal authority for denying a public-records request is sufficient. 
Supplement narratives: Request Nos. 4, 6, 7, and 8 
{¶ 118} Lastly, Myers argues that although the public-record incident 
reports in investigation Nos. P2015437, P2015606, P2100231, and P2100318 had 
been disclosed once those investigations were closed, the city unreasonably delayed 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
40 
its disclosure of those supplement narratives.  I agree with the majority that the 
evidence does not support this argument. 
{¶ 119} Myers also argues that he is entitled to statutory damages because 
the city failed to promptly cite legal authority in support of its denial of Myers’s 
request for supplement narratives for these requests.  As stated above, the city 
provided responses with legal reasoning for every records request.  Most responses 
were like the one that Kinzer had provided for request No. 7: “[I]t’s still an open 
investigation.” 
{¶ 120} The response to request No. 6, however, was different. Kinzer 
responded: “This is all I am able to release on the case from Det. Fyffe at this time—
P2015606.”  Below that response was the following information: “Detective was 
notified via ICAC of possible pornography involving a juvenile.  Suspect in case 
has not been identified at this time, still awaiting information on case.”  (Italics 
sic.)  This response indicates that investigation No. P2015606 was still ongoing. 
{¶ 121} While Kinzer’s response did not directly state that investigation 
No. P2015606 was still an active case, the detective’s response did.  The detective 
wrote that the case involved allegations of pornography involving a juvenile and 
that the suspect had not been identified.  Plainly, it was still an open investigation 
because a suspect had not been identified and caught. 
{¶ 122} Therefore, just as Myers is not entitled to statutory damages for the 
city’s denial of the supplement narratives in request Nos. 1, 3, 5, and 9, Myers is 
not entitled to statutory damages for the city’s denial of the supplement narratives 
in request Nos. 4, 6, 7, and 8. 
Court costs and attorney fees 
{¶ 123} I dissent from the majority’s judgment awarding Myers court costs.  
Court costs are awarded after a court orders a records custodian to comply with 
R.C. 149.43(B).  R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(a)(i).  Because I would not grant Myers a writ 
of mandamus, I would not award him court costs. 
January Term, 2022 
 
41 
{¶ 124} Likewise, a court may order the payment of attorney fees when it 
orders a public office to comply with R.C. 149.43(B).  R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(b).  
Again, because I would not grant Myers a writ of mandamus, I would not award 
attorney fees. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 125} I agree with the majority’s judgment awarding Myers $1,800 in 
statutory damages because the city failed to timely produce incident-report forms.  
I also agree with the majority’s judgment denying Myers an award of statutory 
damages for his public-records requests for the supplement narratives.  However, I 
disagree with the majority’s reasoning. 
{¶ 126} I dissent from the majority’s judgment granting Myers a partial writ 
of mandamus.  Specific investigatory work product is “information assembled by 
law enforcement officials in connection with a probable or pending criminal 
proceeding,” Steckman, 70 Ohio St.3d 420, 639 N.E.2d 83, at paragraph five of the 
syllabus, and that information is exempt from disclosure pursuant to R.C. 
149.43(A)(2)(c).  Because the supplement narratives fall squarely within the 
Steckman definition of specific investigatory work product, the records are not 
subject to disclosure and the writ of mandamus should be denied.  Because the 
majority decides otherwise, I concur in part and dissent in part. 
DEWINE, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
 
Robinson Law Firm, L.L.C., and Emmett E. Robinson, for relator. 
 
Reminger Co., L.P.A., Patrick Kasson, and Kent Hushion, for respondents. 
_________________