Title: State v. Hatton

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Hatton, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-3991.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-3991 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE v. HATTON, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Hatton, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-3991.] 
Crim.R. 33(B)—R.C. 2953.21 and 2953.23—The trial court and court of appeals 
abused their discretion by applying res judicata to bar defendant’s claims—
Judgment reversed and cause remanded to the trial court. 
(No. 2021-0704—Submitted March 30, 2022—Decided November 10, 2022.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Pickaway County, No. 19CA34,  
2021-Ohio-1416. 
_____________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Martin L. Hatton, is serving an aggregate 39-year prison 
sentence for his 1997 convictions for aggravated burglary, kidnapping, rape, 
felonious assault, and theft—offenses that he has consistently maintained he did 
not commit.  Hatton has unsuccessfully challenged his convictions on direct appeal, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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in a timely petition for postconviction relief, and in numerous other postconviction 
filings. 
{¶ 2} In 2018, more than 20 years after his convictions, Hatton discovered 
through a public-records request a memorandum from Raman Tejwani, the DNA 
expert who testified for the state at Hatton’s trial, to the Pickaway County 
prosecutor dated June 22, 1998.  In the memo, Tejwani acknowledged that the 
mixed samples (i.e., DNA samples that included DNA from more than one 
contributor) about which she had testified at Hatton’s trial contained male DNA 
from someone other than Hatton or Ricky Dunn, whom the state had identified as 
the second of two participants in the offenses and against whom the state had also 
obtained convictions. 
{¶ 3} Based primarily on his discovery of the Tejwani memo, Hatton filed 
a motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial and a successive petition for 
postconviction relief, both of which the Pickaway County Court of Common Pleas 
denied without a hearing.  The Fourth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
court’s judgment. 
{¶ 4} We reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand this matter to 
the trial court for further proceedings. 
Relevant Background 
Trial proceedings 
{¶ 5} Following a jury trial in 1997, Hatton was convicted of aggravated 
burglary, kidnapping, rape, felonious assault, and theft.  The state’s theory of the 
case was that Hatton and Dunn entered the Circleville home of P.C. and S.C., that 
Hatton raped their 17-year-old daughter J.C. at knifepoint in her upstairs bedroom, 
and that Hatton then forced her downstairs to the family room, where Dunn raped 
her.  J.C.’s trial testimony tracked the state’s theory, although she could not identify 
Hatton as the man who had raped her in her bedroom. 
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{¶ 6} During the crimes, J.C.’s father, P.C., walked downstairs to 
investigate sounds he had heard from his bedroom.  From the stairway, P.C. 
observed one person, whom he could not identify, running from the house.  
However, P.C. was able to restrain a second person—later identified as Dunn—
who ran into him after he reached the bottom of the staircase.  P.C. testified that 
while he and Dunn struggled, Dunn screamed out the door, “Marty, Marty, Marty!” 
and stated, “I came with Marty Hatton.”  Meanwhile, J.C. ran upstairs to her 
mother, and they called 9-1-1. 
{¶ 7} Sergeant Wayne Gray, the first police officer to arrive at the scene, 
found P.C. standing over Dunn in the foyer.  Dunn was screaming for “Marty,” and 
he told Sergeant Gray he was there with “Marty Hatton.”  The officers arrested 
Dunn and began searching for the second suspect. 
{¶ 8} A more complete description of the testimony from Hatton’s trial, 
including Dunn’s incriminating testimony and evidence that Dunn and Hatton were 
together on the night of the offenses, may be found in State v. Hatton, 4th Dist. 
Pickaway No. 97 CA 34, 1999 WL 253450 (Apr. 19, 1999) (“Hatton I”).  Here, 
though, we focus on the DNA evidence presented at Hatton’s trial. 
{¶ 9} The state called Tejwani, a criminalist employed by the city of 
Columbus’s crime lab, as an expert witness.  The crime lab had received from the 
Circleville Police Department blood samples from Hatton, Dunn, and J.C.; vaginal 
swabs and underwear collected from J.C.; and a purported semen stain on a piece 
of fabric cut by the police from a sweatshirt that Hatton was allegedly wearing on 
the night of the offenses.  The stain from the sweatshirt did not contain enough cells 
to extract DNA, and no conclusions could be drawn regarding its source.  The lab 
performed a differential extraction of the mixed samples on the vaginal swabs and 
underwear to separate the female and male fractions, and it used a polymerase chain 
reaction to test the DNA. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 10} Tejwani testified that the male fractions from the vaginal swabs and 
underwear “could not give information for the contributor[s]” because they were 
mixed samples and that she could “neither exclude nor include anybody” as a 
contributor to those mixed samples.  With respect to those mixed samples, the table 
of test results included in the lab report signed by Tejwani, provided to Hatton’s 
counsel before trial, and admitted as evidence stated only, “Inconclusive.” 
{¶ 11} During her trial testimony, Tejwani referred to her notes, which the 
state had not produced to Hatton but which Tejwani agreed to provide to Hatton’s 
attorney at the conclusion of her testimony. 
{¶ 12} The next day, Hatton called his own forensic expert, Larry M. 
Dehus, who had reviewed the lab report and the notes that Tejwani had provided to 
defense counsel the previous day.  He testified that “there was information in the 
notes that was not included in the report,” specifically the presence of a faint B 
allele in the mixed-sample male DNA fractions at genetic marker D7S8.  According 
to Dehus, the B allele was significant because it could not have come from Hatton, 
Dunn, or J.C., all of whom had only A alleles at that genetic marker.  He therefore 
opined that someone other than Hatton and Dunn “was [a] contributor to semen in 
those samples.” 
{¶ 13} The state neither offered a rebuttal to Dehus’s testimony that the 
mixed samples contained DNA from a male contributor other than Hatton or Dunn 
nor suggested an alternative source for the additional DNA.  In fact, the prosecutor 
ignored Dehus’s testimony about the significance of the B allele altogether, never 
once mentioning the B allele in his cross-examination of Dehus.  Instead, the 
prosecutor focused almost exclusively on impeaching Dehus’s qualifications.  In 
his closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury that Dehus’s testimony was no 
different from Tejwani’s testimony—that the DNA test results did not conclusively 
include or exclude Hatton.  But the prosecutor then flatly rejected the defense’s 
argument that someone other than Hatton and Dunn was involved: “There was no 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
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third person.  It was Ricky Dunn and Marty Hatton inside that residence * * * 
beyond any reasonable doubt.” 
Hatton’s direct appeal and initial petition for postconviction relief 
{¶ 14} The Fourth District affirmed Hatton’s convictions on direct appeal.  
Hatton I, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 97 CA 34, 1999 WL 253450.  As relevant here, 
the court of appeals rejected Hatton’s argument that the state’s failure to disclose 
the existence of the B allele prior to trial deprived him of a fair trial.  Id. at *20-21.  
It stated that unlike a typical violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 
1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), in which the jury is denied the opportunity to hear 
about the alleged exculpatory evidence, Hatton’s expert witness was able to testify 
at trial about the B allele and its significance.  Hatton I at *21. 
{¶ 15} In 1998, while his direct appeal was pending in the court of appeals, 
Hatton filed a petition for postconviction relief in the trial court.  There, he again 
argued that the state had “failed to disclose relevant, exculpatory evidence”—the 
presence of the B allele—“in time for its effective use at trial.”  In support of his 
petition, Hatton filed an affidavit from molecular biologist Christie T. Davis.  Davis 
agreed with Tejwani’s characterization of the male DNA fractions from the mixed 
samples as “inconclusive,” but she also stated that the B allele must have come 
from someone other than Hatton or Dunn.  After the court of appeals affirmed 
Hatton’s convictions in his direct appeal, the trial court denied Hatton’s petition for 
postconvition relief without holding a hearing, characterizing the arguments in his 
petition as “basically identical” to those he had unsuccessfully raised on appeal.  
The Fourth District affirmed that judgment, stating that Davis’s affidavit was “not 
altogether different from” Dehus’s testimony and did not demonstrate that Tejwani 
had testified falsely.  State v. Hatton, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 00CA10, 2000 WL 
1152236, *5 (Aug. 4, 2000). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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The Tejwani memo 
{¶ 16} In 2018, in response to a public-records request, Hatton received for 
the first time a copy of a memo from Tejwani to the county prosecutor.  The memo 
was dated June 22, 1998, a date on which both Hatton’s direct appeal and his first 
petition for postconviction relief were pending.  The memo, which Tejwani wrote 
following a phone conversation she had with Hatton’s postconviction counsel, 
Keith Yeazel, states: 
 
 
Mr. Yeazel was concerned about the origin of the faint “B” 
type observed at the D7S8 locus in sample 5 (vaginal swabs, male 
fraction) as reported in the Crime Lab log, page 3.  This type was 
not observed in the known blood samples of [J.C.], Martin L. Hatton 
or Ricky D. Dunn.  The male fraction of the vaginal swabs consisted 
of a mixed DNA sample and no information regarding the 
contributor could be obtained from the DNA typing results which 
were reported as “inconclusive” in the Lab Report. 
 
{¶ 17} In the memo, Tejwani implicitly informed the prosecutor that 
Hatton’s attorney was asking about an element of the DNA test results that she had 
not included in the lab report or testified about at trial, and she also acknowledged 
that neither Hatton nor Dunn could have contributed the B allele that was found in 
the mixed samples, because a B allele was “not observed in the known blood 
samples.”  The memo was the first and only acknowledgment in the record by a 
state’s witness that the B allele indicated that someone other than Hatton or Dunn 
had contributed to the male DNA in the mixed samples.  The prosecutor did not 
disclose the Tejwani memo to Hatton’s trial, appellate, or postconviction counsel.  
And Hatton did not learn of its existence for more than 20 years. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
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Hatton’s 2019 motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial and his petition 
for postconviction relief 
{¶ 18} In 2019, based primarily on his discovery of the Tejwani memo,1 
Hatton filed a motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial and a petition for 
postconviction relief.  Hatton made similar arguments in both filings and requested 
an evidentiary hearing and a new trial.  Hatton argued that the memo contradicted 
Tejwani’s trial testimony that the DNA test results were inconclusive and that the 
memo demonstrated that the test results excluded him as a contributor to the mixed 
samples.  He also argued that the state’s failure to disclose that material, 
exculpatory information and its presentation of false testimony from Tejwani 
violated his right to a fair trial.  Finally, he preemptively argued that res judicata 
should not apply, because the Tejwani memo had not been “subject to inclusion or 
review at any level.” 
{¶ 19} The trial court addressed Hatton’s motion and postconviction 
petition together, and it denied both without a hearing.  Without distinguishing 
between the motion and the petition, the court summarily rejected Hatton’s 
arguments that the memo contradicted Tejwani’s trial testimony and that it 
demonstrated that the test results excluded him as a source of the DNA.  It also held 
that res judicata barred Hatton’s arguments because the memo was “not really new” 
evidence and because the “issue [had] been litigated and decided before.”  On 
appeal, the Fourth District agreed that res judicata barred Hatton’s requested relief, 
and it affirmed the trial court’s judgment.  2021-Ohio-1416, ¶ 29, 39, 46. 
 
1. In support of his motion and petition, Hatton also submitted evidence that in 2009, Dunn recanted 
his testimony that implicated Hatton in the offenses, but both the trial court and the court of appeals 
had previously considered the recantation and found it not credible.  See State v. Hatton, 4th Dist. 
Pickaway No. 13CA26, 2014-Ohio-3601.  Hatton also submitted a purportedly newly discovered 
police report in which a detective noted that he and another officer did not believe Dunn’s initial 
statements to them that Dunn had had consensual sex with J.C. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 20} In this discretionary appeal, Hatton presents three propositions of 
law.  He asks this court to hold that (1) the state must always disclose DNA test 
results that exclude a defendant as a contributor to an evidentiary DNA sample, (2) 
the state must disclose DNA test results and analyses if it learns, even after trial, 
that its expert testified contrary to those results, and (3) a trial court errs by denying 
a petition for postconviction relief when the petitioner has established with newly 
discovered evidence that the conviction was based on materially false evidence. 
Analysis 
{¶ 21} We do not reach Hatton’s propositions of law, which concern the 
merits of whether Hatton is entitled to a new trial under Crim.R. 33 or R.C. 2953.21 
and 2953.23, because determinative threshold issues require us to reverse the court 
of appeals’ judgment and remand this matter to the trial court for further 
proceedings. 
Res judicata does not bar Hatton’s motion or his petition 
{¶ 22} Before directly addressing Hatton’s motion for leave to file a motion 
for a new trial and his petition for postconviction relief, we first reject the trial 
court’s and court of appeals’ determinations that res judicata precludes Hatton from 
seeking a new trial and postconviction relief based on the recently discovered 
Tejwani memo.  The doctrine of res judicata precludes a convicted defendant “from 
raising and litigating in any proceeding, except an appeal from that judgment, any 
defense or any claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have been 
raised” at trial or on direct appeal.  State v. Szefcyk, 77 Ohio St.3d 93, 671 N.E.2d 
233 (1996), syllabus.  Res judicata applies to motions for a new trial, see, e.g., State 
v. Rodriguez, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108048, 2019-Ohio-5117, ¶ 23, and petitions 
for postconviction relief, see State v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 679 N.E.2d 1131 
(1997). 
{¶ 23} The trial court here held that res judicata bars Hatton’s claims 
because his purportedly “ ‘new evidence’ is not really new” and because his 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
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arguments have been litigated before.  The court of appeals likewise concluded that 
res judicata bars Hatton’s claims.  It reasoned, “[T]he pertinent information from 
the [Tejwani] memo was known and available to [Hatton] during his trial.”  2021-
Ohio-1416 at ¶ 28.  It also stated that Hatton had challenged, albeit unsuccessfully, 
Tejwani’s credibility in his 1998 petition for postconviction relief.  Id. at ¶ 29.  Both 
courts’ conclusions, however, are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
Tejwani memo and its import. 
{¶ 24} While the existence of the B allele and its omission from the lab 
report and Tejwani’s trial testimony did permeate Hatton’s arguments on direct 
appeal and in his 1998 petition for postconviction relief, the Tejwani memo does 
more than simply restate the existence of the B allele and reiterate Tejwani’s 
testimony that the DNA test results were inconclusive.  The new information in the 
memo is the acknowledgment by Tejwani—the state’s expert witness—that the B 
allele could not have originated from Hatton or Dunn and that, therefore, DNA from 
another male was present in the mixed samples.  That new information creates an 
obvious hole in the state’s narrative that two men entered J.C.’s home, that those 
two men raped J.C. and left their DNA, and that those two men were Hatton and 
Dunn.  If the male DNA in the mixed samples was wholly contributed by two men, 
one of whom was Dunn, then Tejwani’s acknowledgment of the B allele and its 
significance would mean that Hatton could not have been the other contributor.2   
{¶ 25} Tejwani’s acknowledgment in the memo of the significance of the B 
allele, which was glaringly absent from both the lab report and her trial testimony, 
 
2.  This does not mean that the test results necessarily exonerate Hatton, because we do not know 
whether the mixed samples contained DNA from two men or from more than two men.  Davis stated 
that the male fraction indicated “a mixture of DNA from at least two individuals,” and Tejwani 
could say only that there was “more than one donor.”  Dehus stated that someone other than Hatton 
and Dunn must have contributed to the male fraction of the samples.  Davis also acknowledged 
scenarios under which DNA from a male, unconnected to the offenses, could have ended up in the 
mixed samples.  That said, no evidence was introduced at trial to identify any innocent source of 
DNA in the male fraction of the samples. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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is qualitatively different than bare knowledge of the B allele’s presence.  Had he 
been armed with the withheld acknowledgement by the state’s own expert, Hatton 
could have impeached Tejwani’s incomplete testimony and buttressed, if not 
outrightly confirmed, defense expert Dehus’s testimony about the DNA test results, 
the substance of which the prosecutor essentially ignored.  Additionally, had 
Tejwani’s acknowledgement come out at trial, it likely would have compelled the 
state to offer some explanation for the additional or alternative contributor to the 
mixed samples, given the state’s theory that Dunn and Hatton were the only two 
offenders.  Tejwani’s acknowledgment and its potential effect on Hatton’s trial 
have not been, and could not have been, litigated before.  Accordingly, we conclude 
that both the trial court and the court of appeals abused their discretion by applying 
res judicata to preclude Hatton from arguing for a new trial and postconviction 
relief based on newly discovered evidence. 
Motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial 
{¶ 26} We now turn to Hatton’s motion for leave to file a motion for a new 
trial. 
{¶ 27} Crim.R. 33(A) states: “A new trial may be granted on motion of the 
defendant for any of the following causes affecting materially the defendant’s 
substantial rights: * * * (6) When new evidence material to the defense is 
discovered which the defendant could not with reasonable diligence have 
discovered and produced at the trial.”  Generally, a motion for a new trial based on 
newly discovered evidence must be filed within 120 days after the jury verdict was 
rendered or the trial court’s decision was issued if the defendant waived the right 
to a jury trial.  Crim.R. 33(B). 
{¶ 28} An untimely motion for a new trial based on newly discovered 
evidence may be filed only if the defendant first establishes by clear and convincing 
evidence that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence within 
the 120-day period.  Id.  If the trial court determines that the defendant has met that 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
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burden and grants a motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial, then the 
defendant must file that motion within seven days.  Id.  In the motion for a new 
trial, the defendant must show that the newly discovered evidence discloses “ ‘ “a 
strong probability that it will change the result if a new trial is granted” ’ ” and that 
it is not  “ ‘ “merely cumulative to former evidence.” ’ ”  State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio 
St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128, 767 N.E.2d 166, ¶ 85, quoting State v. Hawkins, 66 
Ohio St.3d 339, 350, 612 N.E.2d 1227 (1993), quoting State v. Petro, 148 Ohio St. 
505, 76 N.E.2d 370 (1947), syllabus.  The defendant is entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing when the allegations in the motion demonstrate substantive grounds for 
relief.  State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 289, 714 N.E.2d 905 (1999). 
{¶ 29} Because Hatton seeks a new trial more than 20 years after his 
convictions, he must comply with Crim.R. 33(B)’s two-step process for filing an 
untimely motion.  Appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion for leave 
to file a motion for a new trial is conducted under an abuse-of-discretion standard.  
State v. Townsend, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-371, 2008-Ohio-6518, ¶ 8, citing 
State v. Pinkerman, 88 Ohio App.3d 158, 160, 623 N.E.2d 643 (4th Dist.1993), 
citing State v. Wright, 2d Dist. Greene No. 90 CA 135, 1992 WL 66385 (Mar. 31, 
1992).  An abuse of discretion is more than an error of law or judgment; it implies 
that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.  Blakemore 
v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). 
{¶ 30} When a defendant seeks leave to file a motion for a new trial under 
Crim.R. 33(B), the trial court may not consider the merits of the proposed motion 
for a new trial until after it grants the motion for leave.  State v. Bethel, 167 Ohio 
St.3d 362, 2022-Ohio-783, 192 N.E.3d 470, ¶ 41, citing State v. Brown, 8th Dist. 
Cuyahoga No. 95253, 2011-Ohio-1080, ¶ 14.  The sole question before the trial 
court when considering whether to grant leave is whether the defendant has 
established by clear and convincing proof that he was unavoidably prevented from 
discovering the evidence on which he seeks to base the motion for a new trial. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 31} In support of his motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial, 
Hatton submitted numerous documents, including the Tejwani memo and an 
affidavit in which he detailed his initial receipt of the memo in 2018.  Hatton could 
not have discovered the Tejwani memo within 120 days after the jury’s verdict, 
because Tejwani did not write it until after that time had elapsed.  And then, after 
Tejwani drafted the memo and transmitted it to the prosecutor, the state withheld 
the memo from Hatton, despite its relevance to arguments in Hatton’s then-pending 
direct appeal and petition for postconviction relief.  We have held that “a defendant 
may satisfy the ‘unavoidably prevented’ requirement contained in Crim.R. 33(B) 
by establishing that the prosecution suppressed the evidence on which the defendant 
would rely in seeking a new trial.”  State v. McNeal, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-
2703, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 17, citing Bethel at ¶ 25, 59.  The state does not dispute 
Hatton’s assertion that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the Tejwani 
memo.  Instead, it continues to assert that it had no duty to turn over the memo. 
{¶ 32} The trial court ignored Crim.R. 33(B)’s two-step process and 
sidestepped the preliminary question whether Hatton had demonstrated that he was 
unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence on which he seeks to rely.  
Instead, the court improperly jumped to the merits of Hatton’s claim for a new trial, 
which the court reviewed under the standard stated in Petro, 148 Ohio St. 505, 76 
N.E.2d 370, at syllabus: 
 
To warrant the granting of a motion for a new trial in a 
criminal case, based on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it 
must be shown that the new evidence (1) discloses a strong 
probability that it will change the result if a new trial is granted, (2) 
has been discovered since the trial, (3) is such as could not in the 
exercise of due diligence have been discovered before the trial, (4) 
is material to the issues, (5) is not merely cumulative to former 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
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evidence, and (6) does not merely impeach or contradict the former 
evidence. 
 
The court held that the Tejwani memo was not outcome determinative, because 
“DNA evidence was not essential” to the state’s case and the jury was able to 
convict Hatton based on other evidence.  The court stated that Hatton’s “ ‘new 
evidence’ comes nowhere near meeting the conditions outlined * * * in Petro.” 
{¶ 33} Although the Petro standard will apply in resolving the merits of 
Hatton’s motion for a new trial under Crim.R. 33(A)(6), Hatton was not required 
to satisfy that standard to obtain leave to file a motion for a new trial.  He was 
required to establish only that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the 
evidence on which he seeks to base his motion.  Unless and until a trial court grants 
a defendant leave to file a motion for a new trial, the merits of the new-trial claim 
are not before the court.  See Bethel, 167 Ohio St.3d 362, 2022-Ohio-783, 192 
N.E.3d 470, at ¶ 41 (“The trial court should not have purported to deny Bethel’s 
new-trial motion on its merits, because the court never permitted Bethel to file that 
motion”).  As the Fourth District noted in this case, the state conceded that the trial 
court erred by failing to address the narrow, preliminary question before it.  2021-
Ohio-1416 at ¶ 10-11. 
{¶ 34} Hatton supported his motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial 
with uncontradicted evidence that, on its face, demonstrates that he was 
unavoidably prevented from discovering the Tejwani memo—the primary evidence 
upon which he seeks to base his motion for a new trial—within the time for filing 
a motion for a new trial.  By overlooking Hatton’s satisfaction of that burden and 
denying his motion for leave to file a motion for new trial, the trial court abused its 
discretion. 
{¶ 35} Questions about whether Hatton’s newly discovered evidence 
satisfies the remaining elements of the Petro standard, including whether the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Tejwani memo creates a strong probability that it would change the result if a new 
trial were granted, remain for the trial court to decide when adjudicating the motion 
for a new trial itself.  Thus, we express no opinion on whether Hatton should 
ultimately prevail on the merits of his motion for a new trial. 
{¶ 36} Nevertheless, we do hold that Hatton is entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing on his motion.  The trial court ultimately and improperly decided Hatton’s 
motion for a new trial on the merits, concluding that the Tejwani memo was not 
outcome determinative, and it also employed the wrong analysis to reach that 
conclusion.  Whether suppressed evidence is outcome determinative for purposes 
of a motion for a new trial is not determined by whether sufficient other evidence 
supported the jury’s verdict but by whether the suppressed evidence, when viewed 
in the context of the whole case, is sufficient to undermine confidence in the verdict.  
McNeal, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-2703, __ N.E.3d __, at ¶ 21.  As we stated 
above, the Tejwani memo illuminated a substantial hole in the state’s theory of its 
case against Hatton, and Hatton reasonably alleged, and is entitled to an opportunity 
to prove at an evidentiary hearing, that the new information contained in the memo, 
had it been available to him at trial, would likely have resulted in a different 
outcome.  We conclude that Hatton’s motion alleged sufficient substantive grounds 
for relief to warrant a hearing. 
Petition for postconviction relief 
{¶ 37} Finally, we turn to Hatton’s petition for postconviction relief under 
R.C. 2953.21 and 2953.23.  Pursuant to R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(a), a convicted 
defendant who asserts a denial or infringement of constitutional rights sufficient to 
render his conviction void or voidable may file a petition asking the court that 
imposed sentence to vacate the judgment or sentence or to grant other relief.  A 
petitioner, like Hatton, who files a petition more than 365 days after the trial 
transcript was filed in the court of appeals in his direct appeal or who files a 
successive petition, must satisfy the jurisdictional requirements in R.C. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
15 
2953.23(A)(1) or (2) for an untimely, second, or successive petition for 
postconviction relief.  Bethel, 167 Ohio St.3d 362, 2022-Ohio-783, 192 N.E.3d 470, 
at ¶ 20; R.C. 2953.21(A) and 2953.23(A).  To warrant an evidentiary hearing on a 
petition for postconviction relief, the petitioner bears the burden of producing 
evidence that demonstrates a cognizable claim of constitutional error.  State v. 
Sidibeh, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-498, 2013-Ohio-2309, ¶ 13. 
{¶ 38} We review a decision to grant or deny a petition for postconviction 
relief, including the decision whether to afford the petitioner a hearing, under an 
abuse-of-discretion standard.  State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-
6679, 860 N.E.2d 77, ¶ 51-52, 58.  But whether a trial court has subject-matter 
jurisdiction to entertain an untimely, second, or successive petition for 
postconviction relief is a question of law, which we review de novo.  State v. 
Apanovitch, 155 Ohio St.3d 358, 2018-Ohio-4744, 121 N.E.3d 351, ¶ 24. 
{¶ 39} Hatton invoked R.C. 2953.23(A)(1) as the basis for the trial court’s 
jurisdiction to consider his petition.3  To satisfy R.C. 2953.23(A)(1), Hatton was 
required to show (1) that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts 
on which he must rely to present his claim for relief and (2) that but for 
constitutional error at trial, no reasonable fact-finder would have found him guilty.  
The “unavoidably prevented” requirement in R.C. 2953.23(A)(1) mirrors the 
“unavoidably prevented” requirement in Crim.R. 33(B).  Bethel at ¶ 59, citing State 
v. Barnes, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2017-0092, 2018-Ohio-1585, ¶ 28. 
{¶ 40} Neither the trial court nor the court of appeals directly addressed 
whether Hatton satisfied one of the exceptions in R.C. 2953.23(A) to establish the 
trial court’s jurisdiction to consider an untimely and successive petition for 
 
3. The trial court erroneously stated that Hatton relied on R.C. 2953.23(A)(2), which is inapplicable 
here.  See Apanovitch at ¶ 29 (holding that R.C. 2953.23(A)(2) confers jurisdiction only over a select 
class of offenders who applied for DNA testing under R.C. 2953.71 through 2953.81 or under former 
R.C. 2953.82). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
postconviction relief.  Although the trial court stated that Hatton’s “ ‘new evidence’ 
is not really new,” it did so in the context of applying res judicata, not in the context 
of assessing its jurisdiction under R.C. 2953.23.  Similarly, the court of appeals 
alluded to its finding that the Tejwani memo did not contain facts previously 
unavailable to Hatton, but then, rather than holding that the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction, the court of appeals stated, “Therefore, appellant’s petition herein is 
also barred by res judicata.”  2021-Ohio-1416 at ¶ 38. 
{¶ 41} Having determined that the trial court and the court of appeals 
abused their discretion by applying res judicata to preclude Hatton’s claims, we 
must reverse the court of appeals’ decision affirming the dismissal of Hatton’s 
petition for postconviction relief on that basis.  On remand, the trial court must 
begin by answering the threshold question—whether Hatton satisfied the 
jurisdictional requirements of R.C. 2953.23(A)(1) to file an untimely and 
successive petition for postconviction relief.  In answering that question, the court 
should avoid indulging in the mischaracterizations of the Tejwani memo that 
permeated the lower courts’ prior decisions in this matter and that we have rejected 
in our discussion of res judicata above. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 42} For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Fourth District 
Court of Appeals and remand this matter to the trial court with instructions that it 
grant Hatton’s motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial; afford Hatton an 
evidentiary hearing on his motion for a new trial; and determine whether Hatton 
has satisfied the jurisdictional requirements for an untimely and successive petition 
for postconviction relief under R.C. 2953.23(A)(1), and if so, determine the merits 
of that petition. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
FISCHER, DEWINE, and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
17 
DONNELLY, J., concurs, with an opinion joined by BRUNNER, J. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in judgment only. 
_________________ 
DONNELLY, J., concurring. 
{¶ 43} I fully join the majority opinion.  I write separately to note that a 
sizeable amount of evidence outside the trial-court record has accumulated in this 
case from the many postconviction filings made between 1998 and 2019 by 
appellant, Martin Hatton.  When postconviction petitioners seeking new trials 
provide evidence outside the trial-court record that potentially undermines the 
theory of guilt that was used to convict them, courts should hold hearings on the 
petitions as a regular practice.  But Ohio courts are not doing this.  I also write to 
emphasize the pitfalls of having only one trial judge assess the integrity of a 
conviction throughout the entire life of a criminal case.  And there are pitfalls to 
conducting postconviction review as a continuation of the adversarial process rather 
than as a neutral truth-seeking process.  Justice would be better served by expanding 
the rules that apply to petitions for postconviction relief and motions for a new trial 
that involve claims of actual innocence and relevant evidence that was not proffered 
at the time of trial.  Justice would also be better served by supplementing the 
postconviction process with an independent commission that has the power to 
investigate claims of actual innocence and assess whether a viable claim of 
innocence has been established.  This case highlights the need for such reforms. 
{¶ 44} As is clear from the majority opinion, the identity of the second 
perpetrator was the central issue at Hatton’s 1997 trial.  The rape victim was unable 
to identify the person who, along with Ricky Dunn, broke into her home and raped 
her.  As the state’s DNA expert testified, the DNA evidence was inconclusive.  The 
state’s expert also knew that the DNA samples contained male DNA that could not 
have come from Hatton or Dunn, but the state failed to disclose that fact to the 
defense before or during the expert’s testimony.  The state did not provide Hatton 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
with the expert’s revelatory DNA-analysis notes until after the expert had testified.  
However, Dunn testified that Hatton was the second perpetrator, and other 
witnesses testified that Dunn had identified Hatton as the second perpetrator. 
{¶ 45} In support of his 1998 postconviction petition, Hatton submitted the 
affidavit of a DNA expert averring that the state had used scientifically 
unacceptable procedures in performing its DNA testing and that her review of the 
state’s results indicated that either Hatton was not a contributor to the DNA samples 
or that a third male had also contributed to the DNA samples.  Hatton also provided 
an affidavit from Dunn’s cellmate averring that Dunn had told him that he had 
falsely identified Hatton as the second perpetrator.  The trial court denied the 
petition without a hearing, concluding that the DNA expert’s affidavit submitted by 
Hatton did not contain new evidence outside the trial-court record (other than the 
expert’s opinion of the evidence that had been presented at trial) and that the 
cellmate’s affidavit was hearsay and did not “create a strong probability the result 
in [a new] trial would be different.” 
{¶ 46} In 2005 and 2008, with the help of the Ohio Innocence Project, 
Hatton requested postconviction DNA testing.  The trial court concluded in both 
instances that DNA testing was unwarranted because a “reasonable jury” could still 
find Hatton guilty “based solely upon circumstantial evidence and testimony of the 
other witnesses.”  The court of appeals affirmed both judgments.  State v. Hatton, 
4th Dist. No. 05CA38, 2006-Ohio-5121; State v. Hatton, 4th Dist. No. 09CA4, 
2010-Ohio-1245.  In affirming the second judgment, the Fourth District Court of 
Appeals added that Hatton could have raped the victim without leaving DNA, and 
that the convictions were based on other evidence, including Dunn’s testimony.  
2010-Ohio-1245 at ¶ 23-25.4 
 
4.  I consider the appellate court’s elaboration in this instance to be inappropriate.  It is not the role 
of an appellate court to come up with theories supporting a criminal defendant’s guilt that are not 
reflected in the trial court’s decision. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
19 
{¶ 47} In support of a 2011 motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial, 
Hatton submitted correspondence that Dunn had sent to the Innocence Project in 
2009, recanting his trial testimony and identifying the second perpetrator as “Jeff 
Massey.”  Hatton also submitted a more recent affidavit from Dunn in which he 
averred that he had falsely identified Hatton rather than Massey as the second 
perpetrator.  Although Hatton included an affidavit from an attorney for the 
Innocence Project explaining that the organization had not provided Dunn’s 
correspondence to Hatton until December 2010, the trial court concluded that 
Hatton had failed to justify his delay in filing his motion, and it denied leave.  After 
being instructed by the Fourth District to reach the merits of Hatton’s motion, State 
v. Hatton, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 11CA23, 2013-Ohio-475, the trial court denied 
the motion without a hearing, finding that Dunn’s recantation was not credible and 
that other unspecified evidence supported Hatton’s conviction. 
{¶ 48} Hatton’s 2019 motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial and 
his 2019 petition for postconviction relief included a 1998 memo from the state’s 
DNA expert to the county prosecutor that had not previously been disclosed to 
Hatton.  In the memo, the expert admits that the DNA samples from Hatton’s trial 
included DNA from a male other than Hatton or Dunn.  Hatton’s motion and 
petition also included police reports from January 1997 that were provided to 
Hatton in response to his April 2019 public-records request.  The reports indicate 
that the investigating detectives found Dunn to be completely lacking in credibility 
and that although Dunn had identified Hatton as the second perpetrator, the 
detectives, after consulting with the county prosecutor, determined that the most 
they could do with that information was to have Hatton appear in a live lineup.  The 
reports make clear that the detectives and the county prosecutor did not believe that 
there was adequate evidence at that point to file charges against Hatton.  However, 
one of the reports states that a municipal-court judge had called the police 
department and demanded that charges be filed against Hatton.  One of the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
detectives filed criminal complaints against Hatton in the Circleville Municipal 
Court the same day. 
{¶ 49} The trial court denied Hatton’s 2019 motion and petition without a 
hearing.  The trial court concluded that Hatton’s arguments were barred by res 
judicata, that there was no new evidence in the case, and that the DNA evidence 
was not essential to the conviction, because the jury had convicted him “on a 
plethora of additional evidence.” 
{¶ 50} When presented with each individual claim or bit of evidence to 
support Hatton’s requests for postconviction review, the trial judge did not deem it 
necessary to test the veracity of each in light of all the other evidence.  But looking 
at all of Hatton’s postconviction efforts together, we now have (1) a statement from 
one of Dunn’s cellmates indicating that Dunn had told him that he had perjured 
himself during Hatton’s trial, (2) an affidavit from a DNA expert indicating that the 
state’s DNA testing procedures were scientifically unacceptable, (3) a recantation 
by Dunn—the only person who identified Hatton as the second perpetrator and the 
state’s star witness, (4) police reports showing that charges were filed against 
Hatton only because a judge had insisted that charges be filed and that the detectives 
and prosecutor who had reviewed the evidence had not believed it was sufficient to 
charge him, (5) repeated requests by Hatton for DNA testing, (6) unwavering 
claims of innocence by Hatton, and now (7) a written statement from the state’s 
DNA expert stating that the DNA samples include male DNA that could not have 
come from Hatton or Dunn.  Hatton has not established a right to relief on his 
claims, but he has presented evidence that if true would merit a new trial.  The trial 
court’s refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing on Hatton’s claims at this point is 
unreasonable. 
{¶ 51} We try to get as close as we can to the truth through the many rules, 
the many roles, and the many participants involved in jury trials.  But after a trial 
concludes with a verdict, any subsequent arguments regarding the truth-finding 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
21 
process are made to the trial judge alone.  Judges are not exempt from the normal 
human tendency to interpret new evidence in a way that confirms one’s already 
existing beliefs—known as confirmation bias—and a trial judge who presided over 
a defendant’s trial “cannot help but carry any bias from the original case into the 
consideration of the post-conviction claim,” Frank Tankard, Tough Ain’t Enough: 
Why District Courts Ignore Tough-on-Paper Standards for a Federal Prisoner’s 
Right to a Hearing and How Specialty Courts Would Fix the Problem, 79 UMKC 
L.Rev. 775, 777 (2011).  Confirmation bias is not the same as judicial bias, but it 
poisons judicial decision-making all the same.  For this reason, among others, I 
believe that statewide reforms are in order for postconviction claims of actual 
innocence. 
{¶ 52} In a July 2022 report, the Ohio Task Force on Conviction Integrity 
and Postconviction Review recommended such reforms to Ohio’s postconviction-
review 
process. 
 
Report 
and 
Recommendations, 
available 
at 
https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/docs/Boards/CIPR/Report.pdf (accessed Oct. 
19, 2022) [https://perma.cc/97RM-THBP].  Among other suggested changes, the 
task force recommends the creation of an Independent Innocence Inquiry 
Commission and amendments to the statutes governing postconviction petitions, 
R.C. 2953.21 and 2953.23.  State Representative David Leland recently proposed 
new legislation to the General Assembly that incorporates these reforms.  2022 H.B. 
No. 738 (as introduced), chrome-extension://ieepebpjnkhaiioojkepfniodjmjjihl 
/data/pdf.js/web/viewer.html?file=https%3A%2F%2Fsearch-prod.lis.state.oh.us 
%2Fsolarapi%2Fv1%2Fgeneral_assembly_134%2Fbills%2Fhb738%2FIN%2F00
%2Fhb738_00_IN%3Fformat%3Dpdf (accessed October 31, 2022); see also Rep. 
Leland to introduce bill addressing wrongful convictions (Oct. 11, 2022), 
https://ohiohouse.gov/members/david-leland/news/rep-leland-to-introduce-bill-
addressing-wrongful-convictions-112149 
(accessed 
Oct. 
19, 
2022) 
[https://perma.cc/9W7N-JAQB].  The task force also drafted a proposed criminal 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
rule, Crim.R. 33.1, which I hope will be advanced for review and consideration by 
this court’s Commission on the Rules of Practice and Procedure.  Report and 
Recommendations at 1.  It is my sincere hope that this court and the General 
Assembly give serious consideration to these proposals for reform. 
{¶ 53} Under these reforms, a petitioner claiming innocence would not need 
to struggle through multiple layers of review to finally get four or more justices at 
this court to hold that a nonfrivolous request for postconviction review should 
proceed to an evidentiary hearing.  Instead, a hearing would be required for all 
nonfrivolous claims of innocence that include evidence that was not proffered 
during the original proceedings.  And if the Independent Innocence Inquiry 
Commission comes to fruition, a petitioner’s claims would not remain solely at the 
mercy of the adversarial process and a judge who previously presided over the 
matter.  Instead, petitioners would be able to present their claims to an independent 
truth-seeking body that is not susceptible to confirmation bias and that bears 
allegiance to nothing other than the truth. 
{¶ 54} Amending the statutes governing postconviction petitions and 
adopting Crim.R. 33.1 would ensure for all convicted people claiming innocence 
the same opportunities for evidentiary hearings and substantive review that the 
majority is ensuring through this decision for Hatton.  I fully join the majority 
opinion. 
 
BRUNNER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
 
Judy C. Wolford, Pickaway County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jayme 
Hartley Fountain, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
The Behal Law Group, L.L.C., and John M. Gonzales, for appellant. 
_________________