Title: Womack v. State

State: georgia

Issuer: Georgia Supreme Court

Document:

260 Ga. 21 (1990) 389 S.E.2d 240 WOMACK v. THE STATE. S90G0187. Supreme Court of Georgia. Decided March 13, 1990. The Garland Firm, Donald F. Samuel, for appellant. Frank C. Winn, District Attorney, for appellee. Michael R. Hauptman, amicus curiae. WELTNER, Justice. Womack was convicted of sodomy in two separate cases, each based upon an accusation identifying different individuals as victims. He waived indictment and a jury, and proceeded to the trial of both cases on a stipulation of facts. His sole defense was that prosecution of the second case was barred by the statute of limitation. The trial judge denied Womack's motion for directed verdict of acquittal as to the second case, found him guilty in both cases, and imposed a sentence on each conviction. This appeal involved the second case only, and is limited to the denial of the motion that was based on the statute of limitation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, and we granted certiorari. Womack v. State, 193 Ga. App. 186 (387 SE2d 336) (1989). 1. OCGA § 17-3-1 (c) provides: 2. Exceptions to this statute are set out in OCGA § 17-3-2, as follows: The period within which a prosecution must be commenced 3. In Sears v. State, 182 Ga. App. 480 (356 SE2d 72) (1987), the state contended that the statute of limitation was tolled, under the exception of OCGA § 17-3-2 (2), in a case of sexual crimes against a child of tender years; and that the defendant's acts must be considered as "unknown" crimes within the contemplation of OCGA § 17-3-2(2) because of the victim's age, lack of awareness of the criminality of the alleged conduct, or a purported fear of the defendant. That claim was rejected. 4. In Sears, supra, the Court of Appeals went on to state: 5. We believe that Sears states the better rule, and that it, rather than the implications of Kiles, should be followed. Under the latter, for example, a prosecution for certain misdemeanors committed during early youth might be initiated fifty years after the fact. Surely, that is not the purport of the exemption. 6. There being no evidence that the crimes were "unknown" to the state, the motion for directed verdict should have been granted. Womack remains under sentence by virtue of his conviction and sentence in the first case, which is not the subject of appeal. Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur. [1] The victim in this case was more than 14 years of age. [2] Kiles dealt with a prosecution for adultery and fornication. The Court of Appeals, in rejecting the defendant's claim that prosecution was barred by the statute of limitation, held that the complaining witness' testimony "was not inadmissible upon the theory that the woman's knowledge that the crime had been committed was imputable to the state." Id. at 675 (2).