Title: Strauss v. Strauss

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

STRAUSS_V_STRAUSS.91-334; 160 Vt. 335; 628 A.2d 552


 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                    No. 91-334


 Michael J. Strauss                           Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Chittenden Family Court

 Roberta J. Strauss                           November Term, 1992


 Matthew I. Katz, J.

 Charles R. Tetzlaff of Latham, Eastman, Schweyer & Tetzlaff, P.C., for
   plaintiff-appellee

 Karen Rush Shingler, Burlington, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      DOOLEY, J.   The sole issue in this appeal from a final divorce order
 of the Chittenden Family Court is whether defendant Roberta Strauss is
 entitled to permanent maintenance, rather than time-limited rehabilitative
 maintenance, from her husband Michael Strauss.  We hold that she is so
 entitled and reverse and remand.
      At the time of the divorce in 1991, defendant was forty-eight years old
 and plaintiff was fifty-one years old.  They were married in 1963, and
 shortly thereafter plaintiff earned a Ph.D. in chemistry.  Following a short
 post-doctoral program in Scotland, they settled in Burlington when plaintiff
 obtained a job at the University of Vermont, where he has since become a
 tenured professor of chemistry.
      The parties raised two children, both of whom are now adults.
 Defendant attended the University of Vermont and in 1976 was awarded a
 degree in psychology, earning phi beta kappa honors.  In 1990, she obtained
 a fifth-year certificate in order to teach school and has become licensed as
 a teacher.  She has worked outside the home only infrequently, as a retail
 sales clerk and as an editor for a local magazine.  At the time of the
 divorce hearing, she was working on a bicentennial project as a volunteer.
      Plaintiff's income is about $58,000 per year, of which about $5000
 comes from a government grant that will expire soon.  He is expected to
 have a stable income until he retires at age sixty-five.
      The major assets of the parties were a house and a camp, with equity
 values respectively of $106,000 and $40,000, and plaintiff's pension, with a
 present value of $211,000.  The family court awarded the house to defendant
 and the camp to plaintiff and split the pension between them.  Defendant
 requested a maintenance award, and the court agreed she was entitled to
 maintenance, but concluded:
         The wife here is being awarded the marital home with a
         relatively small mortgage and low monthly payments.  She
         is capable of working, although she is not likely to
         quickly locate a permanent job which will meet her
         reasonable needs.  We decline to conclude that she will
         never be able to find such a job.  This is a clear case
         for rehabilitative alimony.  We have here a woman who is
         healthy, intelligent and not tied down to the care of
         children.  To conclude that she should be awarded
         permanent alimony would be to conclude that she is some
         sort of social misfit who will never be able to support
         herself.  The evidence nowhere supports such a
         conclusion.  This is a case for rehabilitative
         maintenance. . . .  One of its purposes is to put
         pressure on the recipient to find employment or to
         undertake education or training which will lead to
         employment.

 The court awarded maintenance of $1500 per month until the end of 1993,
 $1000 per month until the end of 1995, and $500 per month until the end of
 1997.  It added an award of up to $100 per month during the maintenance
 period to cover uninsured "counselling or therapy as is reasonably likely to
 enhance the wife's employability."
      The court's conclusion was based in part on evidence of an employment
 counselor who testified that defendant's prospects of finding a teaching job
 were poor because of her age, her lack of experience, and the recession's
 effect on the labor market.  He felt that defendant might be able to obtain
 work in the service sector, but even there, jobs were limited and the work
 would be low-paying and possibly only part-time.  The employment counselor
 noted that defendant has certain idiosyncracies that gave employers a
 negative impression at job interviews.  The court's findings reflect most of
 this evidence, and the award for counseling was intended in part to overcome
 the idiosyncracies.
      The relevant statute, 15 V.S.A. { 752(a), authorizes an award of
 maintenance, either rehabilitative or permanent, when the recipient spouse
 lacks sufficient income or property "to provide for his or her reasonable
 needs" and "is unable to support himself or herself through appropriate
 employment at the standard of living established during the marriage."  The
 reference to reasonable needs should not be looked at in relation to
 subsistence.  Downs v. Downs, 154 Vt. 161, 166, 574 A.2d 156, 159 (1990).
 The critical comparison is to the standard of living established during the
 marriage.  See Johnson v. Johnson, 155 Vt. 36, 40-41, 580 A.2d 503, 506
 (1990).  Thus, spousal maintenance is intended to correct the vast
 inequality of income resulting from the divorce, Russell v. Russell, 157 Vt.
 295, 299, 597 A.2d 798, 800 (1991), and to equalize the standard of living
 of the parties for an appropriate period of time.  Downs v. Downs, ___ Vt.
 ___, ___, 621 A.2d 229, 230 (1993).
      In a long-term marriage, maintenance also serves to compensate a
 homemaker for contributions to family well-being not otherwise recognized in
 the property distribution.  See Klein v. Klein, 150 Vt. 466, 474,