Title: Van Riper v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Van Riper v. State1994 WY 90882 P.2d 230Case Number: 93-187Decided: 09/30/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Courtney 
James VAN RIPER,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The 
STATE of Wyoming,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, 
J.

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Courtney 
J. Van Riper, pro se.

Representing 
Appellee:

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., and D. Michael 
Pauling, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen.

 

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., THOMAS, MACY and TAYLOR, JJ., and CARDINE, J. 
(Retired).

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant 
Courtney James Van Riper appeals from his conviction for felony larceny by 
bailee.

[¶2]      We affirm as 
modified.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant 
presents eight issues:

I. 
Whether defendant was denied the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of 
counsel at trial and sentencing after initially asserting the right to self 
representation but on the same day, and well in advance of trial, advised the 
trial court of an unambiguous desire for counsel and an inability to proceed at 
trial without counsel?

II. 
Whether defendant made a voluntary waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to jury 
trial by executing a written waiver which stated that without counsel he could 
not proceed with selection of a jury?

III. 
Whether defendant was denied the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right to 
impeach the State's primary witness when the district court denied pretrial 
defense motions for the taking of handwriting exemplars from the witness prior 
to trial, and at the time of cross-examination?

IV. 
Whether the trial court erred in denying motions to suppress oral statements 
obtained by arresting police officers prior to formal arrest but after physical 
seizure which was based on less than probable cause?

V. 
Whether a district court has jurisdiction to order - or may the State obtain any 
process - seizing, attaching, or levying against a defendant's funds or bank 
account in satisfaction of prosecution costs or restitution when those funds are 
exempt under Title 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a)? 

VI. 
Whether the Wyoming Constitution permits imposition of institutional jury costs 
on a criminal defendant?

VII. 
Whether a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation Clause rights are violated when the oral pronouncement 
of sentence is altered by the written judgment and sentence 
mittimus?

VIII. 
Whether a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights are violated when 
sentence is imposed based in part upon materially false information provided by 
the prosecutor?

FACTS

[¶4]      On November 30, 
1992, Appellant told a salesman at Tyrrell Chevrolet in Cheyenne, Wyoming, that 
he would like to look at an economy car. The salesman showed him a 1985 Chrysler 
New Yorker and allowed him to test drive the car. Appellant failed to return 
with the car. The salesman notified his supervisor, and later that afternoon 
they advised the Cheyenne Police Department that the car had been stolen. A 
police officer entered the car's vehicle identification number into the NCIC 
computer system.

[¶5]      In January 1993, 
Tyrrell Chevrolet received an unsigned, handwritten letter which 
stated:

Dear 
T[y]rrell Chevrolet,

I 
would just like to thank you for the Chrysler New Yorker, especially [the 
salesman]. I only have one question[.] [D]oes the car have any warranty left, 
otherwise the car runs great, it gets 35 miles to the gallon. Once again thank 
you.

Sincerely, 
?

ps. 
It's also great for off road use.

[¶6]      On February 2, 
1993, deputies of the Hillsborough County sheriff's office in Tampa, Florida, 
questioned Appellant while they were investigating an unrelated offense. 
According to the deputies, that afternoon they went to a lounge which was 
located in Tampa, and they asked the manager to send Appellant outside to the 
parking lot. When Appellant came out, one of the deputies asked him for 
identification, and Appellant gave him an altered pilot's license. The deputy 
advised Appellant of his Miranda rights and asked him how he had gotten to the 
lounge and where he was staying. Appellant said that he had come by cab and that 
he did not know the name of his motel.

[¶7]      The second deputy 
observed a Chrysler New Yorker, with pilot's wings on its front license plate, 
which was backed into the bushes at the edge of the parking lot. Appellant was 
wearing a pilot's jacket and pilot's wings on his belt buckle. The deputy 
conducted an NCIC search for the rear license plate number, and the search 
revealed that the plate had been issued to a vehicle which was listed as being 
stolen and whose description did not match that of the Chrysler New Yorker. The 
first deputy asked Appellant if he could pat him down for weapons, and Appellant 
said: "[T]hat would be fine." Appellant, telling the deputy that it contained 
keys, reached into his right front pocket. He removed the keys, and a set of car 
keys with the Chrysler logo was among them. The second deputy asked Appellant 
whether the car was his, and Appellant admitted that he had stolen the Chrysler 
New Yorker from a car dealership in Cheyenne, Wyoming. The first deputy advised 
Appellant a second time of his Miranda rights and placed him under 
arrest.

[¶8]      Appellant waived 
his right to have an extradition hearing, and he was returned to Wyoming. 
Appellant was charged on February 5, 1993, with felony larceny by bailee in 
violation of WYO. STAT. § 6-3-402(b) and (c)(i) (1988). He requested that an 
attorney be appointed, and the Laramie County Court appointed the Public 
Defender to represent him. Appellant subsequently replaced the Public Defender 
with private counsel.

[¶9]      On April 5, 1993, 
Appellant filed a "Defendant's Notice of Self-Representation" which 
stated:

NOTICE 
is hereby given that COURTNEY J. VAN RIPER, defendant named in the above styled 
criminal matter, hereby invokes his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation 
under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 [95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562] 
(1975); and W.Dist.Ct.R. 101(a). Defendant shows, in furtherance of W.S. § 
7-6-107, that: (1) he is fo[]rty-five years of age; (2) is college educated and 
has completed an accredited course in paralegal science; and (3) has extensive 
and successful experience in criminal law at the state through federal district 
to Supreme Court levels.

At 
that time, Appellant informed the district court: "[D]efendant has been unable 
to access his savings account at Norwest Bank in order to pay the agreed upon 
retainer to [private counsel]. Accordingly, [private counsel] will not be 
further involved in this matter."

[¶10]   On April 16, 1993, the district 
court granted Appellant's request to represent himself and postponed the trial 
date from May 3, 1993, until June 7, 1993. Appellant filed a "Termination of 
Counsel" on that date which stated:

I, 
hereby terminate [private counsel] as my attorney in the above-entitled matter 
and direct that he immediately cease all efforts in my 
behalf.

I 
realize that I have future Hearings in this matter and that it is my 
responsibility to get new counsel.

Later 
on that same day, Appellant informed the district court that he wanted to hire 
another attorney before trial. The district court provided Appellant with a list 
of attorneys' names and addresses.

[¶11]   On April 30, 1993, the district 
court held a motions hearing, and the following exchange 
occurred:

THE 
COURT: Now, is there anything else that you want to bring up, Mr. Van 
Riper?

MR. 
VAN RIPER: Other than a little bit of follow up. I received from the court, a 
little bit dated, but it was a list of attorneys. I'm presently in contact with 
[an attorney], and he is - I guess he's going to have somebody come 
over.

THE 
COURT: Oh good. So you might be able to get a lawyer within the next week or 
so?

MR. 
VAN RIPER: Well, if possible.

THE 
COURT: Great.

MR. 
VAN RIPER: Thank you.

The 
district court released Appellant's $5,000 cash bond on May 5, 1993, in order to 
permit Appellant to pay to retain an attorney.

[¶12]   On June 2, 1993, Appellant filed a 
"Motion for Order Rescheduling Trial." He requested an additional thirty-day 
postponement because, in part, "defendant has been unable to engage competent 
counsel for trial." The next day, the district court held a hearing on 
Appellant's motion, and the following colloquy occurred:

MR. 
VAN RIPER: Well, now, if I can go back a little bit. Since we had our row, I've 
been trying to hire counsel. I've got some letters [from attorneys] right here. 
. . . They're busy, they can't take any more cases. Not that I haven't been 
trying to get an attorney.

THE 
COURT: Well, I could get you one right now. You have $5,000, don't 
you?

MR. 
VAN RIPER: I do. I've got more than that.

THE 
COURT: How much are you willing to pay?

MR. 
VAN RIPER: Well, I don't know.

THE 
COURT: Well, I could call some people right now, if you are willing to come up 
with five or $10,000.

MR. 
VAN RIPER: Well, Your Honor, that would leave me pretty 
destitute.

THE 
COURT: So you don't want to pay for an attorney?

MR. 
VAN RIPER: No, no, that's not it. That's not it at all. I'm just leery of 
attorneys.

THE 
COURT: You have an absolute right to proceed on your own, and you made that 
decision.

Your 
motion before the court is to delay the trial date. Now the grounds that you 
allege are that you need more information. It seems to me that we've taken care 
of that.

. 
. . .

I'm 
inclined to go forward.

I'm 
impressed with your ability. You seem to know what you're doing. I'm not too 
concerned about you being prejudiced by going to trial next week. You have a 
pretty good handle on what is going on.

[¶13]   On the date of the trial, 
Appellant, having failed to retain counsel, filed a "Waiver of Trial by Jury." 
He was found guilty after a bench trial of one count of felony larceny by 
bailee. The district court sentenced him to serve a term in the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary of not less than six years nor more than nine years and ordered him 
to pay $2,491 in witness expenses, $2,760 in restitution, $50 to the crime 
victims' compensation account, and $360 in jury fees.

RIGHT 
TO BE REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL

[¶14]   Appellant claims that he was 
deprived of his right to have counsel. The State argues that Appellant knowingly 
and voluntarily waived his right to have counsel, asserted his right to 
represent himself, never waived his right to represent himself, and never 
reasserted his right to be represented by counsel.

A 
defendant has a constitutional right to waive his right to counsel and to 
represent himself at criminal trial. However, to be valid, the trial judge must 
ensure that the waiver of counsel is "an intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege." United States v. McConnell, 
749 F.2d 1441, 1450-51 (10th Cir. 1984) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938)). Ideally, the trial 
judge should conduct a thorough and comprehensive formal inquiry of the 
defendant on the record to demonstrate that the defendant is aware of the nature 
of the charges, the range of allowable punishments and possible defenses, and is 
fully informed of the risks of proceeding pro se.

United 
States v. Willie, 
941 F.2d 1384, 1388 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 1200, 117 L. Ed. 2d 440 (1992) (some citations omitted). The district 
court's failure to conduct a complete inquiry on the record into the defendant's 
understanding does not require reversal when "the surrounding facts and 
circumstances, including [the defendant's] background and conduct, demonstrate 
that [the defendant] actually understood his right to counsel and the 
difficulties of pro se representation and knowingly and intelligently waived his 
right to counsel." 941 F.2d  at 1389. "[A] defendant need not himself have the 
skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to 
choose self-representation." Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2541, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975).

[¶15]   When Appellant asserted his right 
to represent himself, the district court did not formally make the findings 
described in WYO. STAT. § 7-6-107 (1987).1 The district court asked Appellant 
about his prior trial experience; asked him what he knew about the rules of 
evidence, including hearsay evidence and using evidence to impeach witnesses; 
and asked him how he planned to investigate his case while he was in jail 
without having the assistance of counsel. The colloquy continued with the 
following exchange:

THE 
COURT: How do you expect to defend yourself effectively, by playing it by 
ear?

MR. 
VAN RIPER: The court will have to go ahead and convict me, and I'll address it 
on appeal. It's just that simple.

THE 
COURT: Very well. I'm going to let you defend yourself in this case. I don't 
think - I think you are a fool, but if you insist and persist to defend 
yourself, I have no choice but to let you do that.

[¶16]   Although Appellant had never 
conducted a trial before, he had pleaded guilty in at least one other case 
without having the assistance of counsel, and he had been convicted of at least 
three other offenses which were related to vehicle thefts. He filed twenty-six 
motions and other documents on his own before trial which included a formal 
notice that he would represent himself. In the notice, he stated that he was 
forty-five years old, and he claimed that he was college educated and that he 
had completed a course in paralegal science. Under these circumstances, 
Appellant's initial decision to waive his right to be represented by counsel was 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Willie, 941 F.2d  at 1389. Cf. 
United States v. Treff, 924 F.2d 975, 980 n. 7 (10th Cir. 1991) (defendant 
"was not so much interested in defending against the crimes charged as he was in 
trying to inject trial error into the proceedings which could result in reversal 
on appeal").

[¶17]   Once he had asserted his right to 
represent himself, Appellant never requested to have appointed counsel, although 
he was experienced at requesting counsel since at his initial appearance he had 
requested and received appointed counsel. See WYO. STAT. § 7-6-104(d) 
(Supp. 1993). Appellant declined the district court's offer to obtain counsel 
for him. After Appellant asserted his right to represent himself, the court had 
no duty to appoint counsel in the absence of a timely and affirmative request 
for counsel. Such a duty would require the district court to read the 
defendant's mind and would enable a defendant to play a "cat and mouse" game 
with the district court. See Treff, 924 F.2d  at 
979.

[¶18]   Appellant suggests that the 
district court had a duty to appoint standby counsel. To force an attorney on a 
defendant who has asserted his right to represent himself constitutes reversible 
error. Ash v. State, 555 P.2d 221, 224 (Wyo. 1976), cert. denied, 
434 U.S. 842, 98 S. Ct. 139, 54 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1977). See McKaskle v. 
Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n. 8, 104 S. Ct. 944, 950 n. 8, 79 L. Ed. 2d 122 
(1984).

Of 
course, a State may - even over objection by the accused - appoint a "standby 
counsel" to aid the accused if and when the accused requests help, and to be 
available to represent the accused in the event that termination of the 
defendant's self-representation is necessary.

Faretta, 
422 U.S.  at 835 n. 46, 95 S. Ct.  at 2541 n. 46. See, e.g., Roose v. State, 
753 P.2d 574 (Wyo. 1988). The appointment of standby counsel is not mandatory. 
See Sanchez v. Mondragon, 858 F.2d 1462, 1463 n. 3 (10th Cir. 1988), 
overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Allen, 895 F.2d 1577 (10th Cir. 1990).

[¶19]   Appellant expressly assumed the 
responsibility for obtaining another attorney. The district court warned him 
before trial about the consequences which could result if he failed to obtain 
counsel. While the district court had the discretion to appoint standby counsel, 
its failure to do so in this case did not constitute an abuse of that 
discretion.

[¶20]   Appellant asserts that the district 
court erred by failing to question why he discharged his attorneys. When a 
defendant discharges his attorney and elects to proceed on his own, the district 
court has a duty to ensure that the defendant is not proceeding on his own 
merely because his attorney was unprepared or incompetent. United States v. 
Silkwood, 893 F.2d 245, 248-49 (10th Cir. 1989). An inquiry about the 
defendant's reasons for being dissatisfied with his counsel is not required when 
the defendant otherwise states his reasons on the record. Willie, 941 F.2d  at 1391.

[¶21]   Appellant replaced the Public 
Defender with private counsel; therefore, the district court did not have a duty 
to inquire about Appellant's reasons for being dissatisfied with the Public 
Defender. Appellant did not complain about his private counsel's performance in 
his notice that he would represent himself. At that time, his only stated reason 
for discharging his attorney was that he was "unable to access his savings 
account . . . in order to pay the agreed upon retainer [fee]." The district 
court did not have any reason to believe that Appellant had decided to proceed 
on his own because his attorney was incompetent or unprepared.2 Silkwood, 893 F.2d  at 
248-49. The district court, therefore, did not have a duty to question Appellant 
about his motives for wanting to represent himself.

RIGHT 
TO HAVE A JURY TRIAL

[¶22]   Appellant claims that he 
involuntarily waived his right to have a jury trial.

The 
requisite inquiry on the adequacy of jury waiver is of a dual nature: (1) was 
the waiver express and (2) was it knowing, intelligent and 
voluntary.

. 
. . If a defendant is competent to stand trial, he is bound by his express 
waiver. . . .

. 
. . [T]he determination as to whether a jury waiver to be effective is 
expressly, intelligently, competently, and voluntarily made must be made in 
light of the unique circumstances of each case.

Robbins 
v. State, 
635 P.2d 781, 784 (Wyo. 1981).

[¶23]   On the day of the trial, Appellant 
filed a "Waiver of Trial by Jury" which stated:

The 
Defendant, Courtney J. Van Riper, hereby waive[s] trial by jury under W.R.Cr.P. 
24(a). Defendant shows that he is unfamiliar with and has no knowledge of the 
procedure and rules for jury examination, peremptory challenges, alternates, 
selection, etc., and is unable to go forward.

The 
district judge held a hearing in chambers. He offered to assist Appellant with 
jury selection and explained the process of exercising peremptory challenges and 
challenging jurors for cause. This exchange followed:

THE 
COURT: Are you willing to waive it knowing all that, knowing that the court will 
help you in asking questions?

MR. 
VAN RIPER: I do waive my right to a jury. My waiver is in writing; you granted 
it.

THE 
COURT: Well, I just want to make sure that you understand that I'm allowing you 
to reinstate a jury, even though I allowed you to waive 
it.

The 
state is here to try to get a jury that's unbiased. I would assure you that I 
would assist you in that regard. But to be fair to you, I cannot help you with 
peremptory challenges.

Knowing 
that, what do you wish to do?

MR. 
VAN RIPER: Let's proceed with this thing.

THE 
COURT: Without a jury?

MR. 
VAN RIPER: With all dispatch.

The 
prosecutor did not object to a bench trial, and the district court granted 
Appellant's request to proceed. W.R.Cr.P. 23(a).

[¶24]   Appellant does not claim that he 
was incompetent to stand trial; he claims that he was not capable of conducting 
his trial. Appellant had prior experience in the criminal justice system, and he 
had pleaded guilty on his own in federal court in at least one other case. Under 
the circumstances of this case, Appellant was bound by his express waiver. 
Robbins, 635 P.2d  at 784.

RIGHT 
TO CONFRONT WITNESSES

[¶25]   At trial Appellant, suggesting that 
the salesman had written the letter to protect his job, cross-examined the 
salesman about the handwritten letter which was addressed to Tyrrell Chevrolet. 
The salesman denied that he had written the letter. In trying to impeach the 
salesman, Appellant attempted to elicit a handwriting exemplar from him. The 
prosecutor objected to Appellant's request, and the district court sustained the 
objection. Appellant asserts that the district court deprived him of his Sixth 
Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him when the district court 
denied his request to cross-examine the salesman by obtaining a handwriting 
exemplar from him.

[¶26]   "[T]he extent and manner of 
cross-examination are matters which are vested within the discretion of the 
trial court, and its ruling on such evidence will not be overturned in the 
absence of a clear abuse of discretion." Grable v. State, 649 P.2d 663, 
673 (Wyo. 1982) (citing Nimmo v. State, 603 P.2d 386 (Wyo. 1979)). See 
also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986) ("trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the 
Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on . . . 
cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that 
is repetitive or only marginally relevant").

[¶27]   The district court's refusal to 
permit Appellant to elicit a handwriting exemplar from the salesman did not 
constitute an abuse of discretion. The district court admitted the handwritten 
statement which the salesman had given to the police when he reported that the 
car had been stolen. Even if the district court erred in making its ruling, the 
error was harmless because the district court had admitted the salesman's 
handwritten statement. Restrictions on the right to confront witnesses are 
subject to the harmless error analysis. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-07, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1262-63, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302 
(1991).

MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS

[¶28]   Appellant claimed that, when he 
exited the Tampa lounge prior to his arrest, he was immediately encircled by 
five officers, two of whom held drawn weapons. He also claimed that, within 
moments after the initial contact had been made with the deputies, he had 
requested to have consultation with counsel and that the deputies questioned him 
without advising him of his Miranda rights. Appellant contends that the district 
court erred when it failed to grant his motion to suppress the confession which 
he had made to the police because he had been physically seized without probable 
cause before he made the statement.

Findings 
on factual issues made by the district court considering a motion to suppress 
are not disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. Since the 
district court conducts the hearing on the motion to suppress and has the 
opportunity to: assess the credibility of the witnesses; the weight given the 
evidence; and make the necessary inferences, deductions and conclusions, 
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the district court's 
determination. The issue of law, whether an unreasonable search or seizure 
occurred in violation of constitutional rights, is reviewed de 
novo.

Wilson 
v. State, 
874 P.2d 215, 218 (Wyo. 1994) (citations omitted).

[¶29]   "[S]tatements given during a period 
of illegal detention are inadmissible even though voluntarily given if they are 
the product of the illegal detention and not the result of an independent act of 
free will." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1326, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983). "`[A] person has been "seized" within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the 
incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to 
leave.'" Wilson, 874 P.2d  at 220 (quoting United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980)). 
"Certain constraints on personal liberty that constitute `seizures' for purposes 
of the Fourth Amendment may nonetheless be justified even though there is no 
showing of `probable cause.'" Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5, 105 S. Ct. 308, 310, 83 L. Ed. 2d 165 (1984) (per curiam). "[An] investigatory stop . . 
. requires only the presence of specific and articulable facts and rational 
inferences which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed 
or may be committing a crime." Wilson, 874 P.2d  at 
220.

[¶30]   At the conclusion of the 
suppression hearing, the district court found:

THE 
COURT: . . . .

Now, 
with respect to the motion to suppress, first of all I find that - I have to 
make a decision as to the question of veracity. Who do I believe, the two 
officers or do I believe Mr. Van Riper? That's why I wanted to know about your 
background. It seems to me that the court will - as to the question of veracity, 
will accept the testimony of the two officers.

And 
based upon that, the court finds that you were given a proper Miranda warning in 
a timely fashion before any admissions were taken from you. And the arrest in 
this case was based on probable cause. And any further statements you might have 
made at the police station, which I understand that the state might bring out in 
rebuttal, those statements were also taken in such a manner as to not violate 
any constitutional rights in this case.

So, 
therefore, the motion to suppress is denied.

[¶31]   Appellant's initial encounter with 
the police was consensual. See Wilson, 874 P.2d  at 220. The manager of 
the lounge asked Appellant to go outside and meet with the police, and Appellant 
complied with the manager's request. Outside, one of the deputies asked to see 
Appellant's identification, and Appellant showed the deputy an altered pilot's 
license. The deputy informed Appellant of his Miranda 
rights.

[¶32]   It is not necessary for us to 
determine whether Appellant was subject to a Fourth Amendment "seizure" when he 
made his statement to the deputies. Whether Appellant was "seized" when he made 
his statement to the deputies is immaterial because the deputies had reason to 
suspect that Appellant had committed a crime. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 469 U.S.  at 6, 105 S. Ct.  at 311. Appellant had given the deputies an altered 
identification and suspicious information about where he was staying and what he 
was driving; the pilot's wings on Appellant's belt buckle matched the pilot's 
wings on the front license plate of the car; and the car's rear license plate 
belonged on a stolen vehicle. Because the deputies had reason to suspect that 
Appellant had stolen the car, Appellant was not subject to an illegal seizure 
when he made his statement to the deputies. Viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the trial court's ruling, we hold that the district court did 
not err by admitting Appellant's statement.3

FROZEN 
BANK ACCOUNT

[¶33]   After trial, the district court 
issued an order which froze Appellant's savings account. Appellant alleges that 
the order violated 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a) (1991). Before the sentencing hearing, 
the district court issued an order which released the freeze. "We have many 
times held that we will dismiss a case when, pending appeal, an event occurs 
which renders a cause moot and makes a determination of the issues unnecessary." 
Davidson v. Sherman, 848 P.2d 1341, 1348 (Wyo. 1993). Appellant's claim 
is moot, and we will not consider it.

JURY 
COSTS

[¶34]   Appellant asserts that the district 
court improperly ordered him to pay jury costs. The State acknowledges that the 
district court erred. We agree and, therefore, set aside that portion of 
Appellant's sentence which ordered him to pay $360 in jury costs. See King v. 
State, 780 P.2d 943, 958 (Wyo. 1989); Johnson v. State, 532 P.2d 598, 
601 (Wyo. 1975); WYO. STAT. § 7-11-505 (Supp. 1993).

ORAL 
SENTENCE VERSUS WRITTEN SENTENCE

[¶35]   Appellant claims that his rights to 
have due process and to confront the witnesses against him pursuant to the Sixth 
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution were 
violated because the written sentence altered the sentence which the district 
court had pronounced at the sentencing hearing.

[¶36]   "We have said that the record of 
judgment is not dispositive when it conflicts with the actual sentence imposed 
orally by the trial judge in open court." Schuler v. State, 668 P.2d 1333, 1341 (Wyo. 1983) (citing Lane v. State, 663 P.2d 175 (Wyo. 
1983)).

[¶37]   At the sentencing hearing, the 
district court stated:

THE 
COURT: Okay. I'm going to make the following findings. I find that the amount of 
restitution owed is $1,000 to Tyrrell[] Chevrolet, plus $1,760 owed to the 
insurance company involved in this case. 

The 
costs for the witnesses, Court will impose those at $2,491; $360 for jurors. And 
there was another increment of costs. . . . I can't recall what that was 
now.

[THE 
PROSECUTOR]: Just the victim's comp fund, Your Honor.

THE 
COURT: Oh, that's right. $50 to the victim's comp fund.

. 
. . .

THE 
COURT: The Judgment of this Court will be, you are sentenced to a period of not 
less than six, nor more than nine years in the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary.

[¶38]   The district court's written 
sentence stated:

IT 
IS HEREBY ORDERED 
that COURTNEY VAN RIPER is guilty of the crime charged in the Information filed 
herein and that he be imprisoned and confined in the Wyoming Department of 
Corrections located at or near the city of Rawlins, Wyoming for a period of not 
less than six (6) years nor more than nine (9) years . . .

. 
. . . .

IT 
IS FURTHER ORDERED 
that COURTNEY VAN RIPER shall make complete restitution to Tyrrell's Chev[]rolet 
in the amount of $1,000.00, Universal Underwriters in the amount of $1,760.00, 
Laramie County District Court Clerk's Office in the amount of $360.00, and State 
of Wyoming District Attorney's Office in the amount of $2,491.00 for the total 
sum of $5,611.00 for any items not returned or damage done as a result of this 
offense;

IT 
IS FURTHER ORDERED 
that COURTNEY VAN RIPER shall pay to the Victim's Compensation Fund . . . the 
sum of $50.00 . . .

The 
terms of the pronounced sentence and the written sentence do not conflict with 
each other; they are identical. See, e.g., Schuler, 668 P.2d  at 1341. 
Appellant's claim, therefore, has no merit.

PROSECUTOR'S 
COMMENT

[¶39]   Appellant alleges that, because the 
prosecutor had used the term "career criminal" during the sentencing hearing, 
the district court relied upon materially false information when it imposed his 
sentence. "[A] sentence must be set aside if the trial court relied at least in 
part on `misinformation of constitutional magnitude.'" Zant v. Stephens, 
462 U.S. 862, 887 n. 23, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2748 n. 23, 77 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1983) 
(quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447, 92 S. Ct. 589, 592, 
30 L. Ed. 2d 592 (1972)). "`[T]he defendant [has] the burden to "establish that 
the sentencing judge in fact rested the sentence on false or improper 
premises."'" Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1115 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting 
Johnson v. State, 790 P.2d 231, 232 (Wyo. 1990)).

[¶40]   At the sentencing hearing, 
Appellant was given an opportunity to comment on the probation officer's report 
of Appellant's prior offense history, and Appellant suggested several 
corrections. W.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(1). At the hearing, the prosecutor stated: "I think 
by the nature of [Appellant's] prior criminal record, if we were in the federal 
system he would be a career criminal." Appellant did not object to the 
prosecutor's use of the term "career criminal." Appellant has failed to 
demonstrate that the sentencing court relied upon the prosecutor's use of the 
term "career criminal." The prosecutor's comment was at most "a poor choice of 
words." Pote v. State, 695 P.2d 617, 630 (Wyo. 
1985).

CONCLUSION

[¶41]   We set aside that portion of 
Appellant's sentence which ordered him to pay jury costs. We have found no other 
error in the proceedings below.

[¶42]   Affirmed as 
modified.

Footnotes

1 Section 7-6-107 provides:

A person who has been advised of his rights under W.S. 7-6-105 may waive 
any right provided by [the Public Defender Act] if at the time of or after 
waiver, the court finds that the person has acted with full awareness of his 
rights and of the consequences of a waiver and if the waiver is otherwise made 
according to law. Before making its findings, the court shall consider such 
factors as the person's age, education, familiarity with the English language 
and the complexity of the crime involved.

Appellant does not challenge the adequacy of the advisement of rights 
which he received at his initial appearance pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 7-6-105(b) 
(1987).

2 After the district court granted his request to represent himself, 
Appellant criticized his attorney's performance. His criticisms are 
unsubstantiated. The attorney filed a timely motion to suppress which was 
accompanied by a motion to reduce bond so that Appellant would be able to pay 
the retainer fee. Appellant discharged the attorney, and the district court did 
not rule on the motion to reduce bond.

3 Although in his brief Appellant cites Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S. Ct. 515, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1986) (coerced confession) and Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966) (involuntary 
custodial statements), he does not make a persuasive argument on the basis of 
either case that his confession should have been suppressed.