Title: Melody v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
SCOTT MELODY, 
 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 661, 2002  
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr.A. No. IN96-02-0894 
§  Cr. ID. 9601012687 
§   
§ 
 
Submitted:  April 25, 2003 
Decided:  June 9, 2003 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and STEELE, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 9th day of June 2003, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the 
record below, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Scott Melody, filed this appeal from an 
order of the Superior Court, dated November 15, 2002, which approved the 
Department of Correction’s determination that Melody should complete a twelve 
to eighteen-month drug treatment program.  Melody’s opening brief raises two 
discernible claims:  (i) Melody’s violation of probation sentence was illegal 
because the Superior Court’s sentencing order failed to assign a beginning and 
ending date for Melody’s drug treatment; and (ii) the Superior Court violated 
double jeopardy principles and Melody’s due process rights when it approved the 
 
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Department’s decision without holding a hearing.  We find no merit to Melody’s 
contentions.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
(2) 
The record reflects that Melody pled guilty in 1996 to one count of 
first degree robbery.  The Superior Court sentenced him on that charge to ten years 
at Level V incarceration, to be suspended after serving four years for six years at 
decreasing levels of supervision. In June 2002, the Superior Court found Melody in 
violation of the terms of several probationary sentences, including the probationary 
sentence on his first degree robbery conviction.  With respect to the first degree 
robbery sentence, the Superior Court found Melody in violation of probation and 
sentenced him, effective May 23, 2002, to five years at Level V incarceration, to 
be suspended upon successful completion of the Key or Greentree treatment 
programs for three years at Level IV Crest Program, to be suspended upon 
successful completion of Crest for two years at Level III probation. 
(3) 
Melody appealed his VOP adjudication and sentence.  We affirmed 
the Superior Court’s judgment.1  Melody later appealed two Superior Court orders 
denying motions to modify his VOP sentence.  We affirmed the Superior Court’s 
judgments on appeal.2   
                                                 
1 Melody v. State, Del. Supr., No. 373, 2002, Holland, J. (Oct. 16, 2002). 
2 Melody v. State, Del. Supr., Nos. 559, 2002 and 629, 2002, Holland, J (Mar. 31, 2002). 
 
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(4) 
In his present appeal, Melody again challenges the Superior Court’s 
VOP sentence.  Melody appears to assert that the VOP sentence is illegal because 
it did not establish a beginning and ending date for the completion of Melody’s 
drug treatment.  This Court has reviewed Melody’s VOP sentence on two prior 
occasions and has found his sentence to be authorized by law and within the 
Superior Court’s broad discretion. We will not revisit this issue simply because 
Melody has refined his claim.3   
(5) 
To the extent Melody challenges the Superior Court’s approval of the 
Department of Correction’s determination that Melody should complete a twelve 
to eighteen-month drug treatment program, we find no merit to Melody’s 
contentions.  The Superior Court sentenced Melody to five years in prison, 
effective May 23, 2002, to be suspended upon successful completion of drug 
treatment at Key or Greentree for three years of decreasing supervision.  It was 
well within the Superior Court’s authority to impose drug treatment as a condition 
of Melody’s sentence.4  It is the Department of Correction’s responsibility, 
however, to determine Melody’s particular treatment needs and to evaluate his 
successful completion of treatment.5  The Department of Correction thus was not 
required in this case to seek the Superior Court’s approval in order to place Melody 
                                                 
3 See Riley v. State, 585 A.2d 719, 721 (Del. 1990). 
4 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4204(c)(8) (2001). 
5 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 6504, 6531 (2001).  
 
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in a treatment program for longer than six months.6  Accordingly, contrary to 
Melody’s contention, the Superior Court did not err in failing to hold a hearing 
before approving the Department of Correction’s discretionary, administrative 
decision.  
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                                 
6 See Winward v. Taylor, Del. Supr., No. 454, 2001, Holland, J. (Dec. 12, 2001) (holding 
that an “inmate’s participation in a particular drug treatment program rests within the discretion 
of the Department of Correction. . .”)