Title: In Re: Timothy C.

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

In Re: Timothy C.,
No. 133, September Term, 2000
HEADNOTE:
JUVENILE CAUSES; COMPLAINT; PETITION
A juvenile that is the subject of a delinquency petition need not be served by the State,
unless a juvenile petition has been filed.  Thus, pursuant to Md. Rule 1-204, the State may
move to extend the time for filing the delinquency petition without notifying the juvenile of
its intent to do so.
Circuit Court for Montgomery County
Sitting as a Juvenile Court
No. J982282A
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 133
September Term, 2000
IN RE: TIMOTHY C.
          Bell, C. J.
          Eldridge
          Raker
          Wilner
          Cathell
          Harrell
          Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Bell, C. J.
         Filed:    August 7, 2003
1By Acts of 2001, Ch. 414, juvenile jurisdiction was transferred from the District
Court of Maryland to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.
2Effective July 1, 2003, the name of the Agency was changed to “the Department
of Juvenile Services.”  See Ch. 53, Acts of 2003.
The questions presented by this case are three, namely, whether: where the deadline
for filing a delinquency petition against a juvenile has expired, but the time for doing so has
been  extended without a finding of good cause, a juvenile court may make that good cause
finding via a nunc pro tunc hearing; a 10-month delay in holding an adjudicatory hearing in
a delinquency case constitutes a delay of constitutional proportions, sufficient to trigger the
constitutional speedy trial analysis; and the 10-month delay, when coupled with prosecutorial
misconduct in the form of ex parte communications with the court, is sufficiently egregious
to warrant dismissal of the charges in this case.    The Court of Special Appeals, in an
unpublished opinion answered the first question in the affirmative and the remaining two
questions in the negative, thus affirming the judgment of the District Court of Maryland,
sitting in Montgomery County as a Juvenile Court.1   We shall affirm, but not for the same
reasons as the intermediate appellate court. 
I.
A complaint was filed with the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ),2 alleging that
Timothy C., the petitioner, a student at Rock Terrace, a school for children with learning
disabilities, committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute a sexual
offense.  According to four of the petitioner’s classmates, the petitioner forced one of the
boys to perform fellatio, first on him, and then on a third boy, who also was an unwilling
3 Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, § 464A provides, as relevant:
“(a) Elements of offense. -- A person is guilty of a sexual offense in the
second degree if the person engages in a sexual act with another person: 
“(1) By force or threat of force against the will and without
the consent of the other person.”
This section is now codified at Md. Code (2002) § 3-306 of the Criminal Law Article. See
Acts of 2002, Ch. 26, § 2.
4The intake officer commented in this regard:
“The worker spoke to the father of the victim and he said this was not a
court matter but, a mental health issue.   Both the respondent and the victim
are mentally challenged.”
2
participant, while the petitioner watched.  These acts, if committed by an adult, would have
constituted a sexual offense in the second degree, pursuant to Md. Code (1957, 1996  Repl.
Vol.) Art. 27, § 464A.. 3  
The petitioner was arrested on July 8, 1998 and DJJ received the complaint against
the petitioner in August, 1998.  Within 30 days of receiving the complaint, it  conducted an
investigation.   Because the intake officer recommended informal adjustment, in the “Best
Interest of Youth/Community”4 and the offense would have been a felony if committed by an
adult, DJJ referred the matter to the State’s Attorney, who received the referral on September 23,
1998.  Within 30 days of his receipt of the referral, or on October 21, 1998, the State’s Attorney filed
a Motion For Appropriate Relief (To Extend Time For Filing Petition), in which he  requested the
juvenile court to extend the deadline for filing charges for an additional 60 days.   The certificate of
service attached to the motion indicated that only DJJ had been mailed a copy of the motion.   Three
reasons were given for why the extension of time was needed:
5 This allegation was later disproved.  There was no prior assault charge involving
the same victim.
6 The authorization/referral received from the Department of Juvenile Justice on
September 23, 1998 indicated that the victim did not want to pursue the matter in court. 
The counselor for the Department testified that she checked the “No” box next to the
preprinted question, “Does Victim Want Court?” because the victim’s father told her that
“he did not necessarily want to go to court, but that he did not want this to happen again. 
He feels that it is a mental health issue and not a delinquency issue.”  The counselor also
testified that her original recommendation was for informal supervision.
3
“1.  That Respondent is charged with a sex offense.
“2.  That Respondent has a prior assault charged involving the same victim.[5]
“3.  That according to the Department of Juvenile Justice Authorization the
victim’s father has reservations about pursuing this matter.”[6]
On the same day the motion was filed, the juvenile court, apparently without a
hearing, granted it, thus giving the State an additional 60 days in which to file a delinquency
petition.   Thereafter, within the 60 day period, the State filed a delinquency petition against
the petitioner. 
The petitioner moved to strike the delinquency petition as untimely filed.   He also
moved to dismiss the petition on constitutional speedy trial grounds.    Finally, the petitioner
sought dismissal of the petition as a result of the delay in setting the adjudicatory hearing.
At a hearing on Petitioner’s Motion to Strike the Extension of Time, he argued that
notice is required to be given to an opposing party and that, because no such notice was
provided, the granting of the State’s motion violated due process and the Maryland Rules.
The  juvenile court agreed with the petitioner that the order granting the State’s motion to
4
extend the time for filing the delinquency petition was flawed, and that the failure to serve
the petitioner resulted in a violation of Maryland Rule 1-351.   Rather than strike the order
as the petitioner urged, however, the court held a hearing on the motion for extension of time
nunc pro tunc.   At the conclusion of that hearing, the court ruled that there was good cause
for the extension of time.    Consequently, it denied the petitioner’s motion to strike.
 Noting that the time elapsed from arrest to the adjudicatory hearing was just over
fourteen (14) months and that none of that delay was attributed to him, the petitioner, on the
morning of the adjudicatory hearing, argued that the petition should be dismissed for
violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial.   Having conducted the analysis of the
factors, as required by Berryman v. State, 94 Md. App. 414, 420, 617 A.2d 1120, 1123, cert.
denied, 331 Md. 86, 626 A.2d 370 (1993), the court denied the motion.
The petitioner’s motion to dismiss for the untimeliness of the adjudicatory hearing was
premised on there being a delay of more than ten (10) months between his being charged and
the petition being adjudicated, while the applicable rule, Md. Rule 11-114 prescribes that the
adjudicatory hearing be set within sixty (60) days.   Acknowledging that dismissal is not
lightly to be ordered, the petitioner argued that the circumstances surrounding the delay, i.e.
the length of delay from charging to adjudication and the ex parte communications that
occurred between the prosecutor and the court during a postponement hearing, were so
egregious as to make dismissal the only appropriate disposition.    The court was not
convinced and, so, denied that motion, as well.   
7Md. Code (1974,1998 Repl. Vol., 1999 Cum. Supp.) § 3-810 (q) of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article provides:
“The court may dismiss a petition for failure to comply with this section
only if the respondent has demonstrated actual prejudice.”
Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory citations herein are to Md. Code (1974,
1998 Repl. Vol, 1999 Cum. Supp.) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
5
The petitioner noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, challenging each of
the aforementioned rulings of the juvenile court.    The intermediate appellate court affirmed
the judgment of the juvenile court, finding merit in none of the issues the petitioner raised.
As to the motion to dismiss the petition as untimely filed, the court endorsed the nunc pro
tunc hearing procedure the juvenile court followed in resolving what the Court of Special
Appeals described as a  “technical violation of the Rules.”   It opined:
“Rather than dismissing the petition based on such a violation, however, the
trial court conducted a hearing nunc pro tunc to determine whether or not good
cause for the extension existed at the time it was granted.   After hearing
testimony from both the State and the [petitioner] regarding the circumstances
surrounding the extension, the trial court found that good cause for the
extension had, in fact, existed.   As a result, the trial court denied the
[petitioner] any additional relief.   We see no error in that determination.”
The court also was of the view that the petitioner failed to demonstrate actual prejudice, as
he was required, by Md. Code (1974,1998 Repl. Vol., 1999 Cum. Supp.) § 3-810 (q) of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article,7 to do.
Assuming that the right to speedy trial applied to juvenile proceedings, the
intermediate appellate court concluded that there was, in this case, no speedy trial violation.
6
Purporting to count from the date of arrest to date of adjudication, but in fact counting only
from the date the delinquency petition was filed, the court determined that only ten (10)
months elapsed.  That length of delay, the court held, “is not an inordinate delay within
constitutional contemplation.”  For that reason, the Court of Special Appeals did not conduct
the analysis of the speedy trial factors enumerated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530,
92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L. ED.2d 101, 115 (1972), ending its analysis with this threshold
determination.                  
Finally, the Court of Special Appeals rejected the petitioner’s argument that dismissal
of the petition was required because it had not been adjudicated within the sixty (60) days
required by Rule 11-114.   Specifically, the court was unconvinced that the circumstances
surrounding the delay in the case were so extraordinary or egregious as to require dismissal
under  In Re Keith W., 310 Md. 99, 109, 527 A.2d 35, 40 (1987).
The petitioner filed in this Court  a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted.
In re Timothy C., 362 Md. 623, 766 A.2d 147 (2001).    As indicated, we shall affirm the
judgment of the intermediate appellate court, although not on the same grounds.
II.
The  petitioner argues that the “Maryland Rules, the text of the Juvenile Causes Act,
and the case law under the act all compel the conclusion that when the State litigates a
motion to extend the deadline for charging, the State must serve notice on the child.”  
Pointing out that § 3-812 (c) requires that “the procedures to be followed by the court, shall
8Maryland. Rule 1-204, in pertinent part, provides:
“(b) Ex parte order.  The court may enter ex parte an order as provided in
subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this Rule only if the motion sets forth (1)
facts which satisfy the court that the moving party attempted but was unable
to reach agreement with the opposing party and that the moving party
notified or attempted to notify the opposing party of the time and place the
moving party intends to confer with the court; or (2) facts which satisfy the
court that the moving party would be prejudiced if required to comply with
the requirements of subsection (b)(1) of this Rule.
“(c) Service of Order.   An order which shortens the time for responding to
original process may be served in the same manner as the original process. 
Other orders entered under this rule shall be served in the manner provided
by Rule 1-321.”
9Maryland  Rule 1-351 provides:
“Order upon ex parte application prohibited – Exceptions.  No court shall
sign any order or grant relief in an action upon an ex parte application
unless:
“(a) an ex parte application is expressly provided for or
necessarily implied by these rules or other law, or
“(b) the moving party has certified in writing that all parties
who will be affected have been given notice of the time and
place of presentation of the application to the court or that
specified efforts commensurate with the circumstances have
been made to give notice.”
7
be as specified in the Maryland Rules, he submits that failure to serve notice on the child is
a violation of both Maryland Rule 1-204 (Motion to shorten or extend time requirements)8
and 1-351 (Order upon ex parte application prohibited - Exceptions),9 both of which prohibit,
except under limited circumstances not here implicated, ex parte orders.   Therefore, relying
on In re: Anthony R., 362 Md. 51, 66, 763 A. 2d 136, 145 (2000) (holding that the thirty (30)
day time limit for charging is mandatory and dismissal is the sanction), the petitioner
8
concludes: 
“Since the filing of the State’s motion to extend the deadline was flawed in
such a fundamental way, it was a nullity.  Since the motion was a nullity, it
cannot be said to have been filed within the relevant 30-day period.  Since the
request for the extension of the deadline was not filed before the 30-day period
expired, it was not timely, and the order granting it was fundamentally flawed.
Without a valid extension, the State is required to charge within 30 days.
Since the charge was not filed within 30 days, the petition must be dismissed.”
Relying on  In re Stephen B., 84 Md. App. 1, 9-10, 578 A.2d 223, 227-28, cert.
denied, 321 Md. 385, 582 A.2d 1256 (1990), State v. Patrick A., 312 Md. 482, 492-93, 540
A.2d 810, 814-815 (1988), and Calhoun v. State, 299 Md. 1, 9, 472 A.2d 436, 440 (1984),
the petitioner adds, “ a  nunc pro tunc,  after-the-fact determination does not comply with the
requirements of timing statutes.”
The petitioner acknowledges, as he must, that when the extension of time for filing
the delinquency petition was sought, self-evidently, he had not yet been charged, the
delinquency court proceedings had not yet commenced.    No matter, he maintains, arguing
that “[a] juvenile delinquency case, unlike an adult criminal case, does not begin with
charging.”   For that proposition, he cites § 3-810 (a) - (k) and, in particular, § 3-810 (e). 
The petitioner also proffers that “[t]he case between DJJ (a department of the State) and
Timothy was already joined, shortly after DJJ became involved,” offering as proof the fact
that the petitioner had been attending counseling arranged by DJJ since the locker room
incident became the subject of complaint.    In addition, he points to the court’s involvement
in the extension of time process.    In that regard, he asserts:
9
“The fact that the legislature involved the court in the process of extending the
deadline strongly suggests that the adversarial system is implicated.    In our
system of justice, the court acts as referee between two competing parties; in
Maryland, the court does not exist to “rubber stamp” the State.    If the
legislature intended that the State hold all the cards and make all the decisions
in regard to extending the time limit for charging, there would be no need to
go to the court for an extension; the legislature could have simply allowed the
State to grant its own extension, if the State believed there was good cause.”
The State counters that service on the petitioner was not required because, when the
extension of time was sought, the delinquency petition had not yet been filed; thus, “Timothy
C. was not yet a party.”    Moreover, the State argues, “ the ‘opposing party’ in this context
was not Timothy C., but rather the Department of Juvenile Justice , which had recommended
informal adjustment [and which] was, in fact, appropriately served with the State’s motion.”
 If service were required to be made on the petitioner, the State nevertheless continues of the
belief that dismissal of the petition was not compelled.    In its view a nunc pro tunc, after
the fact determination of the existence of good cause for the extension of time, “under the
circumstances of this case ... was entirely proper.”    The State reasons:
“...[I]n its recent decision of In re Anthony R., this Court concluded that
dismissal with prejudice is required when the State ‘fails to file a delinquency
petition within thirty days of receiving a referral from an intake officer unless,
within the thirty-day period, the State’s Attorney receives an extension for
good cause shown from a court.’ 362 Md. at 66[, 736 A.2d at 145].  
However, in In re Anthony R., this Court was addressing a situation in which
no effort was made to obtain an extension within the original thirty day period.
See id. at 54-54[, 736 A.2d at 138-39].    Here, by contrast, the motion was
both timely filed and timely granted within the thirty days.    Thus, even
assuming arguendo that the order was rendered invalid by a lack of service,
dismissal is not mandated.”
 Underlying the petitioner’s argument, and, indeed, the juvenile court’s ruling and
10
handling of the issue of the timeliness of the filing of the delinquency petition, is the
accuracy of the court’s determination that the motion to extend the time required that the
petitioner be a party to that proceeding and, therefore, needed to be served with the motion
before the court legally could consider the matter.   It was that ruling that made the nunc pro
tunc hearing necessary and, ultimately, this Court’s determination to review that issue.   As
a threshold matter, therefore, we consider the propriety of that ruling.
           To do so, we must review the statutory scheme governing the filing of delinquency
petitions.   That scheme consists of pertinent sections of § 3-810 and § 3-812.   Section 3-810
(a) designates the DJJ intake officer as the person to receive “complaints from a person or
an agency having knowledge of facts which may cause a person to be subject to the
jurisdiction of the [juvenile] court.”    Having received such a complaint, § 3-810 (c) (1)
provides that the intake officer has twenty-five (25) days to inquire into the court’s
jurisdiction over the complaint and “whether judicial action is in the best interests of the
public or the child.”   Having conducted the inquiry, the intake officer, within the twenty-five
(25) day period, “may ...:
“(i) Authorize the filing of a petition;
“(ii) Propose an informal adjustment of the matter; or 
“(iii) Refuse authorization to file a petition.”
If a complaint alleges the commission of a delinquent act which would be a felony if
committed by an adult, and if the intake officer denies authorization to file a petition or
11
proposes informal adjustment, then the intake officer “shall immediately” forward the
complaint and the “entire intake case file” to the State’s Attorney.  § 3-810 (c) (4) (i).
Section 3-810 (c) (4) (ii) gives the State’s Attorney thirty (30) days after receipt of the
complaint, “unless the court extends the time,” to “make a preliminary review as to whether
the court has jurisdiction and whether judicial action is in the best interests of the public or
the child,” and decide which of three options  -  file a petition, refer the complaint to DJJ for
informal disposition or dismiss the complaint - to take.   See also § 3-812 (b), which
provides, as relevant:
“Petitions alleging delinquency or violation of §3-831 shall be prepared and
filed by the State’s Attorney.   A petition alleging delinquency shall be filed
within 30 days after receipt of a referral from the intake officer, unless that
time is extended by the court for good cause shown. . . .”
 As indicated, when the State sought the extension of time, a delinquency petition, an
“original pleading,” see Maryland Rule 1-202 (q) (“the first pleading filed in an action
against a defendant”), had not been filed.   Indeed, the purpose of the application to the court
was to delay just such a filing.   The filing of the delinquency petition signals the initiation
of judicial action.  Section 3-810 (c) (1) requires the intake officer to determine the court’s
jurisdiction and ‘whether judicial action is in the best interest of the public or the child.”
Section 3-810 (c) (3), on the other hand, permits the intake officer to recommend, inter alia,
the filing of a petition or an informal adjustment.    See also § 3-810 (e), which permits the
intake officer to propose informal adjustment upon concluding from the complaint and
inquiry “that an informal adjustment, rather than judicial action, is in the best interests of the
12
public and the child.”   In this case, the intake officer had recommended informal adjustment,
a disposition different from and, in fact, an alternative to judicial action.
Maryland Rule 1-321 (a) addresses the service of pleadings and papers other than
original pleadings.    It provides:
“(a)  Generally. Except as otherwise provided in these rules or by order of
court, every pleading and other paper filed after the original pleading shall be
served upon each of the parties. If service is required or permitted to be made
upon a party represented by an attorney, service shall be made upon the
attorney unless service upon the party is ordered by the court. Service upon the
attorney or upon a party shall be made by delivery of a copy or by mailing it
to the address most recently stated in a pleading or paper filed by the attorney
or party, or if not stated, to the last known address. Delivery of a copy within
this Rule means: handing it to the attorney or to the party; or leaving it at  the
office of the person to be served with an individual in charge; or, if there is no
one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place in the office; or, if the office
is closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at the dwelling
house or usual place of abode of that person with some individual of suitable
age and discretion who is residing there. Service by mail is complete upon
mailing.”
A “party,”as defined by § 3-801(r), includes “a child who is the subject of a petition or a
peace order request, the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian, the petitioner and an adult
who is charged under § 3-831 of this subtitle.”  Until the petition was filed, there was no
judicial proceeding to which the petitioner was, or could be, a party.   And until the petition
was filed, there being no obligation to serve the petitioner because he was not a party at that
time, there could be no ex parte order in the circumstance in which the State seeks to extend
the time for filing the very pleading that would initiate judicial action.    Indeed, it may be
argued that, by virtue of the posture of the proceedings, at the very least, ex parte action was
13
contemplated, or necessarily implied, by Rule 1-351.
The petitioner also argues that the State’s obtaining of the time extension without
serving him violated Maryland Rule 1-204, as well.   That Rule permits the court to extend
or shorten the time for doing an act required by “these rules or an order of court,” if the
motion to do so is filed within the period prescribed for doing the act, Rule 1-204 (a).  It
proscribes the entry of ex parte orders for those purposes, however, except upon a showing
of an attempt to reach agreement, notice, or attempted notice, of the time and place where
the court will be consulted and of facts that the moving party would be prejudiced in the
absence of an ex parte order.  As the State points out, “[Rule 1-204], by its plain language
is ... applicable only ‘[w]hen these rules or an order of court require or allow an act to be
done at or within a specified time ...,” a requirement lacking in this case since the time
requirement at issue in this case “is imposed by statute; specifically, by Sections 3-810 (c)
(4) (ii) and 3-812 (b) ....”   It is additionally pertinent that, as already indicated, when the
extension of time was sought, no court action had been initiated and, therefore, there simply
was no “opposing party,” unless it were DJJ, on whom service was made, with whom to
consult in an attempt to reach agreement or to whom notice needed to be given.   
Nor are we persuaded that the involvement of the court in the process of extending
the time for filing a delinquency petition necessarily suggests the implication of the
adversarial system.    The statute, § 3-812 (b), requires the State’s Attorney to show good
cause to obtain extension of time to file a petition.    It does not require that there be, and the
10Nonetheless, we think it important to recall the meaning of the phrase, “nunc pro
tunc, ” and the office of the “nunc pro tunc order.”    According to Black's Law
Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) at page 964, the phrase means:
“Lat. Now for then. A phrase applied to acts allowed to be done after the
time they should be done, with a retroactive effect, i.e., with the same effect
as if regularly done. Nunc pro tunc entry is an entry made now of something
actually previously done to have effect of former date; office being not to
supply omitted action, but to supply omission in record of action really had
but omitted through inadvertence or mistake. 
“Nunc pro tunc merely describes inherent power of court to make its
records speak the truth, i. e., to record that which is actually but is not
14
court’s ability to determine whether there has been the requisite showing does not depend
upon there being, an adversarial hearing.   In this case, the State’s Attorney offered a reason
for requesting the extension of time - the need for further investigation.  The justification for
that reason, contained in the motion to extend time and the DJJ referral - the nature of the
offense, the disposition recommended by the intake officer, and the fact that the father of the
victim had expressed reservations about judicial  action - could have been, and obviously
was, found to be good cause.    To be sure, had the petitioner been a party, required to be
served, his exclusion and the fact that he might have been able to persuade the court that an
extension was not required, that the reasons offered were not sufficient cause, are matters
that we would, and should, consider.    That, however, is not the situation we have here.  
We hold that, because the State was not required to serve the petition on Timothy C.
when it filed its motion to extend the time for filing a delinquency petition, the juvenile court
did not err in denying the petitioner’s motion to strike the delinquency petition.    Therefore,
we need not, and do not, address the propriety of the nunc pro tunc, after the fact hearing.10
recorded. ...   Nunc pro tunc signifies now for then, or, in other words, a
thing is done now, which shall have the same legal force and effect as if
done at time when ought to have been done. ...”    
Maryland law is in accord.   In Maryland, Delaware & Virginia R. Co. v. Johnson, 129
Md. 412, 416-17, 99 A. 600, 601 (1916), although never using the phrase, nunc pro tunc,
the Court observed:
“To make the record speak the truth and conform to the facts is a common
law power, and is incident to all courts of record, and essential to their
efficient existence.   This power may be exercised at any time, even if the
Record has been transmitted on appeal to a superior court and the appeal is
there pending....   But in the exercise of such power the Court is authorized
to make only such corrections as will make the record conform to the actual
facts occurring in the progress of the cause, or, in other words, make the
Record speak the truth.   It cannot so change the Record as to make it
inconsistent with the facts, or make it state what is not true.” (Citations
omitted)
See Greff v. Fickey, 30 Md. 75, 77 (1869) (“If (the judge) [is] satisfied either from his
own knowledge of what had actually occurred in the progress of the cause, or from
evidence adduced, that the docket entries made by the clerk were erroneous and
incomplete, it was within his power, and his plain duty, to have them corrected, so that a
full, true and perfect transcript of the whole proceedings as they actually occurred in the
progress of the cause might be sent up in obedience to the writ”).
The Court of Special Appeals, consistent with the view of our sister States, see
McPherson v. State, 63 S.W.2d 282 (Ark. 1933); Careaga v. Careaga, 393 P.2d 415, 417
(Ca. 1964);  In the Interest of H.L.W., 535 S.E.2d 834, 835-36 (Ga. App. 2000); Pirtle v.
Cook, 956 S.W.2d 235, 240-42 (Mo.1997); Interstate Printing Company v. Department of
Revenue, 459 N.W.2d 519, 522-23 (Neb. 1990); Finley v. Finley, 189 P.2d 334, 336
(Nev. 1948); Helle v. Public Utilities Commission, 161 N.E. 282, 283-84 (Ohio 1928); 
Andrews v. Koch, 702 S.W.2d 584, 585 (Tex. 1986); Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298, 299
(Utah 1984); Council v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 288, 292, 94 S.E.2d 245, 248 (1956); 
Bostwick v. Van Vleck, 82 N.W. 302, 303 (Wis 1900), has said that “the purpose of a
nunc pro tunc entry is to correct a clerical error or omission as opposed to a judicial error
or omission.”   Prince George's Co. v. Commonwealth Land Title, 47 Md. App. 380, 386,
423 A.2d 270, 274 (1980).   See  Forward v. McNeilly, 148 Md. App. 290, 312, 811 A.2d
855, 868 (2002).    In Helle, 161 N. E. at 284 (quoting Cleveland Leader Printing Co. v.
Green, 40 N. E. 201, (Ohio 1895), the Ohio Supreme Court pointed out:
“The province of a nunc pro tunc entry is to correct the record of the court
in a cause so as to make it set forth an act of the court, which though
15
actually done at a former term thereof, was not entered upon the journal;
and it cannot lawfully be employed to amend the record so as to make it
show that some act was done at a former term, which might or should have
been, but was not, then performed.”
Bostwick 82 N.W. at 303, enunciated a test to be applied:
“The test to be applied in determining whether an error in a judgment is of a
judicial character, or a mere clerical mistake which may be corrected in the
court where it was made at any time, saving intervening rights of third
parties and with due regard to equitable considerations, is whether the error
relates to something that the trial court erroneously omitted to pass upon or
considered and passed upon erroneously, or a mere omission to preserve of
record, correctly in all respects, the actual decision of the court, which in
itself was free from error. If the difficulty is found to be of the latter
character, it may be remedied as a mere clerical mistake,  which will not
have the effect to change the judgment pronounced in the slightest degree,
but merely to correct the record evidence of such judgment.”
16
III. 
In In re: Thomas J., 372 Md. 50, 70, 811 A.2d 310, 322 (2002), this Court held that,
“as a matter of fundamental fairness ..., the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights require that juveniles be
afforded a speedy trial.”  As we have done in criminal prosecutions and, consistent with our
sister jurisdictions that have expanded the speedy trial right to juveniles, we adopted the four
part test enunciated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 530-32, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192-93, 33
L. Ed.2d 101, 115-117 (1972), to determine whether the juvenile in that case had been denied
his constitutional right to a speedy trial.  Id. at 72, 811 A. 2d at 323.    “The factors identified
to be considered  are: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the assertion
of the right to a speedy trial by the accused; and (4) the prejudice to the accused resulting
11The petitioner makes the argument that less delay is required in the juvenile
context than in the adult context.   He points to, and contrasts the difference in the statutes
and rules prescribing when an adult criminal trial and a juvenile proceeding must be
commenced, 180 days in the case of the former, see Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.
Vol. Article 27, § 591 (now Maryland Code (2002) § 6-103 of the Criminal Procedure
Article) and Maryland Rule 4-271, and 60 days in the case of the latter, see Maryland
Rule 11-114.   There is a suggestion to that effect in  In re Thomas J., 372 Md. 50, 75-76,
811 A.2d 310, 325 (2002).  We need not decide this issue since the length of the delay in
this case is of constitutional magnitude, even for an adult criminal trial.   See Divver v.
State, 356 Md. 379, 389-90, 739 A. 2d 71, 76-77 (1999). 
17
from the delay.”  Thomas J., 372 Md. at 72, 811 A.2d at 323, citing Barker v. Wingo, 407
U. S. at 530-32, 92 S. Ct. at 2192-93, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 117-18; Divver v. State, 356 Md. 379,
388, 739 A.2d 71, 76 (1999).    Therefore, this aspect of the speedy trial question the
petitioner presented has been answered favorably to him.   This leaves to be resolved whether
the delay from arrest to adjudication was of constitutional magnitude, as the petitioner also
maintains.
Addressing that question, we note, preliminarily, that, although the juvenile court
conducted a Barker v. Wingo weighing analysis, the Court of Special Appeals did not, having
declined to do so.  It determined, instead, that the relevant delay, which it calculated,
erroneously, to be ten (10) months, rather than the fourteen and a half (14½) months it
actually was, did not reach the constitutional threshold – that it was not sufficiently
inordinate.   The intermediate appellate court was wrong on both points.11  Our cases teach
that a delay of fourteen (14) months and fifteen (15) days is of constitutional proportion. 
See Divver v. State, 356 Md. at, 389-90, 739 A.2d at 76-77, surveying our speedy trial cases
18
to determine the threshold at which the Barker v. Wingo weighing is triggered.   Noting that
delays between arrest and trial of less than a year had been determined to be sufficiently
inordinate to trigger the Barker v. Wingo analysis, we held, albeit in an adult context, that
a delay of twelve (12) months and sixteen (16) days in the trial of a relatively uncomplicated
District Court case was of constitutional proportion, i.e. it was sufficiently “presumptively
prejudicial” as to make necessary an inquiry into the other factors that go into the Barker v.
Wingo balance.   Henson v. State, 335 Md. 326, 333, 643 A.2d 432, 435 (1994).   It follows
that the Court of Special Appeals was required to, and should have, weighed the Barker v.
Wingo factors.
Ordinarily, we would remand the case to the intermediate appellate court to conduct
the weighing.   Under the circumstances of this case, as was the case in Divver, 356 Md. at
394, 739 A.2d at 79, that is unnecessary.   The juvenile court, unlike in Divver, where neither
the District Court nor the Circuit Court did the weighing, weighed the Barker v. Wingo
factors.   Moreover, the essential facts are largely undisputed.    Therefore, we are able to
perform our independent constitutional review on the record we have.
 As we have seen, the length of the delay was sufficiently presumptively prejudicial
to trigger the weighing.    Closely related to the length of the delay is the reason for the delay.
Different reasons will generate different weights.    As we explained in State v. Bailey, 319
Md. 392, 412, 572 A.2d 544, 553 (1990), 
“‘[A] continuum exists whereby a deliberate attempt to hamper the defense
would be weighed most heavily against the State, a prolongation due to
19
negligence of the State would be weighed less heavily against it, a delay
caused by a missing witness might be a neutral reason chargeable to neither
party, and a delay attributable solely to the defendant himself would not be
used to support the conclusion that he was denied a speedy trial.”
(quoting Jones v. State, 279 Md. 1, 6-7, 367 A.2d 1, 5-6 (1976).   
 In this case, the trial court determined that the reason for each delay, and the delay
as a whole, was neutral, attributable to neither the State nor the petitioner.    It  reasoned:
“Reasons for the delay, I believe [sic] have already been made a matter of
record, there was ... a lot of concern in DJJ regarding whether or not this was
a case in which the victim and his family would cooperate with the, with a
prosecution of the case and then, further investigation along the same lines, in
the State’s Attorney’s office, once the matter was, was petitioned and that it
did get petitioned within ninety days or so of the case being referred to DJJ. 
And I find that there was no ... that those reasons, to the point of filing the
petition, were, were legitimate ones, and, perfectly suitable, given the sensitive
nature of the case.
“We’ve already gone over the situation involving the time from the filing of
the petition, until the May 27 trial date, .... I find that those reasons, having to
do with calendaring of cases, were satisfactory, and basically from May 27 on,
we’ve been, we in the sense of the Court and the State’s Attorney’s Office
certainly have been trying to get this case to trial.   We still haven’t succeeded
in it yet.”
As we have seen, the petitioner asserted his right to a speedy trial on February 24,
1999.    The juvenile court, accordingly, weighed this factor in the petitioner’s favor.
With respect to the last factor, the prejudice to the petitioner, three interests have been
identified as bearing on this factor: “(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to
minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense
will be impaired.” Thomas J., 372 Md. at 77, 811 A.2d at 326, citing Barker v. Wingo, 407
20
U.S. at 532, 92 S. Ct. 2193, 33 L. Ed2d at 118.  The first interest, the juvenile court
concluded, was not implicated in this case, while the second favored the petitioner.   With
respect to the third interest, it did not believe that it had been shown, reasoning that “the mere
assertion that children who may be emotionally disturbed or have other problems, have
specific memory impairments, any greater than the rest of the general population. ... [I]t’s
been proffered by [defense counsel], but without anything on earth to support it.”  The
juvenile court struck the balance in favor of the State and denied the petitioner’s speedy trial
motion.
We do not believe that the reasons for the delay factor should be weighed, overall,
as neutral.  Clearly, the delay attributable to the inquiry preliminary to filing the delinquency
petition is properly weighed as neutral; however, the delay following the filing of the petition
is attributable to, and weighed against, the State, although not heavily so.    That said, we
hold that the juvenile court, under the circumstances, struck the proper balance.   There was
no error in the denial of the motion to dismiss for denial of a speedy trial.
IV.
Maryland Rule 11-114 requires that an adjudicatory hearing be held within sixty (60)
days of service on the respondent of a juvenile petition.   We have held, however, that “only
the most extraordinary and egregious circumstances should be allowed to dictate dismissal
as the sanction for this violation of a procedural rule.”   In re Keith W., 310 Md. 99, 109, 527
A.2d 35, 40 (1987).  See In re Keith G., 325 Md. 538, 548, 601 A.2d 1107, 1112 (1992). 
12The petitioner argues that the overriding purpose of the Juvenile Causes Act has
changed since the decision in In re Keith W., 310 Md. 99, 527 A. 2d 35 (1987), from
rehabilitation to a “greater focus on public safety and accountability, i. e., the purposes
have become more punitive, and now resemble the criminal law more closely.”   
21
This so, we said, because the overriding purpose of the juvenile statute “will ordinarily not
be served by dismissal of the juvenile proceeding.”   In re Keith W., 310 Md. at 109, 527 A.
2d at 40.12    
Aware of this position, the petitioner argues that this case is characterized by
egregious circumstances sufficient to justify dismissal, namely the delay between the filing
of the petition and the adjudication hearing, just over ten (10) months, and ex parte
communications between prosecutor and the court.  With regard to the latter, the petitioner
relies on the petition by the State to extend time for filing the petition as one such ex parte
hearing.   The second, it proffers, occurred when a prosecutor communicated with the court
during a postponement hearing, when the petitioner’s counsel was not present, which resulted
in the rescheduling of the hearing for an adjudication with no witnesses.    We are not
persuaded.
We have already determined that the petition to extend time was not a prohibited ex
parte communication, that such communication was contemplated and the petition to extend
time did not require notice to the petitioner. Consequently, that circumstance does not
demonstrate egregiousness.    As to the ex parte communication during the postponement
hearing, addressing its egregiousness, the juvenile court said:
22
“[I]n an absolutely, positively perfect world maybe [some things] could have
been done differently, but I don’t think that ... with all the parties acting in
good faith, which I do find that they were.   Again, there’s not a hint of
anything that [the State] said to the Court on January 20th ... that said he was
acting with the voice of [petitioner’s counsel].   I mean, he couldn’t have been
clearer that he wasn’t.   The Court essentially made an honest ... assumption
that may not have ... that in fact was not correct.   But again was that
egregious?    I don’t find in any way, shape or form that it was egregious.”
Moreover, the continuances that were granted were supported by good cause.   To be sure,
the circumstances of this case are somewhat peculiar.   They are not so extraordinary or
egregious as to justify dismissal of the delinquency petition, however.  
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.