Title: Cundy v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Cundy v. State1995 WY 95897 P.2d 1302Case Number: 94-277Decided: 06/20/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

Cecil A. 
CUNDY,

 Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming,

 Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Crook County, Barton R. Voigt, J.

Cecil A. Cundy, Sundance, appellant pro se.

Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., 
D. Michael Pauling, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Theodore E. Lauer, Director, 
Prosecution Assistance Program, and Dee Morgan, Student Intern, Prosecution 
Assistance Program, for 
appellee.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, TAYLOR, LEHMAN, JJ., 
and GUTHRIE, District Judge.

GUTHRIE, 
District Judge.

[¶1]      The sole issue 
presented in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in refusing to give an 
instruction which embodied the appellant's theory of the case. Reasoning that 
another instruction incorporated appellant's defense theory and that the 
proffered instruction was not relevant, the district court refused the 
instruction.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Cecil A. Cundy 
was convicted of three counts of battery in violation of WYO. STAT. § 6-2-501(b) 
(1988). The basis for his conviction were events that occurred around midnight 
on October 16, 1993, in Crook County. Eleven young people, ranging in age from 
fourteen to eighteen years, were confronted by Cundy, who advised them that they 
were trespassing on property belonging to the Sundance Mountain Resort, Inc., of 
which he was president. Tempers flared; harsh words were exchanged; and Cundy 
"touched" three of the trespassers when he attempted to remove them from the 
property.

[¶4]      Cundy offered two 
instructions. Instruction H was accepted and given as Jury Instruction 
16:

An owner or a person rightfully in possession of 
property has the right to repel or terminate an unlawful intrusion. But he has 
no right to use any more force than is necessary.

[¶5]      The trial judge 
refused offered Instruction K, which contained "a lengthy definition of civil 
trespass": 

Trespass is an unauthorized entry onto the land of 
another.

At common law, every man's land is deemed to be 
enclosed, and every unauthorized, and therefore unlawful entry into the closed, 
or private property, of another is a trespass.

The intention required to make a person a trespasser 
is an intention to enter upon the particular piece of land in question, 
irrespective of whether the actor knows or should know that he is not entitled 
to enter.

The person is liable as a trespasser for an 
intentional entry though he has acted in good faith, and under the mistaken 
belief, however reasonable, that he is committing no 
wrong.

An unauthorized remaining on land in another's 
possession is a continuing trespass for the entire time during which the actor 
wrongfully remains.

A 
trespasser continues to trespass merely by remaining inactive and wrongfully 
failing to remove from the premises after being notified to do 
so.

[¶6]      We agree with the 
trial court that Instruction K was not relevant, was confusing and would have 
added nothing to Cundy's defense.

[¶7]      It is well 
recognized that a criminal defendant has the right to have a "theory of the case 
instruction," if it is fairly supported by the evidence. Stagner v. State, 842 P.2d 520, 522 (Wyo. 1992). Theory of defense instructions are to be derived from 
and address criminal defenses provided for by statute or acknowledged by court 
decision. Bouwkamp v. State, 833 P.2d 486, 490 (Wyo. 
1992).

[¶8]      It is clear that 
Jury Instruction 16 contained the essential elements of Cundy's defense; for 
example, his right to repel the trespassers. However, Cundy's request that 
Instruction K be given was an inappropriate effort to inject the civil tort of 
trespass into a criminal proceeding. As we observed in Prime v. State, 767 P.2d 149, 154 (Wyo. 1989), "[w]e eschew a rule that every instruction offered by a 
defendant must be given if he characterizes it as incorporating his theory of 
the case."

[¶9]      We hold that the 
trial court properly refused to give Instruction K. The judgment and sentence of 
the district court is affirmed.