Title: State v. Simon

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Simon, 87 Ohio St.3d 531, 2000-Ohio-474.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. SIMON, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Simon (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 531.] 
Criminal law — Postconviction remedies — Under R.C. 2953.36, a defendant who 
is ineligible for probation pursuant to R.C. 2951.02 is ineligible to have his 
record sealed — When considering whether applicant is ineligible to have 
conviction record sealed under R.C. 2953.36, trial judge must examine 
entire record to determine whether applicant was armed with a firearm or 
dangerous ordnance. 
1. 
Under the plain language of R.C. 2953.36, a defendant who is ineligible for 
probation pursuant to R.C. 2951.02 is ineligible to have his or her record 
sealed. 
2. 
When considering whether an applicant is ineligible to have a conviction 
record sealed under R.C. 2953.36 because the applicant may have been 
“armed with a firearm or dangerous ordnance” (R.C. 2951.02) at the time of 
the offense, a trial judge must examine the entire record to determine 
whether the applicant was so armed. 
(No. 99-269 – Submitted October 19, 1999 – Decided January 19, 2000.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 74248. 
 
Defendant-appellant, Brian L. Simon, was indicted in 1992 on one count of 
felonious assault and one count of kidnapping.  Both counts contained firearm 
specifications to the effect that “the offender had a firearm on or about his person 
or under his control while committing the offense charged.” 
 
On February 11, 1993, after plea bargaining, defendant pled guilty in 
Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court to an amended charge of assault in count 
one.  Count two was nolled and the firearm specifications were dropped.  
Defendant was sentenced to a suspended six-month jail term and placed on three 
 
2 
years’ probation.  There is no indication that any appeal was ever taken from the 
court’s imposition of sentence.  Probation was terminated on December 14, 1993. 
 
On November 24, 1997, defendant applied to the trial court pursuant to R.C. 
2953.32 to seal his record of conviction.  The trial court first granted the motion to 
seal without a hearing, and then, after the state moved to vacate the order, the trial 
court held a hearing.  Following the hearing, the court overruled the motion to 
vacate and upheld its earlier order of expungement. 
 
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County reversed the 
judgment of the trial court.  The court of appeals held that defendant was not 
eligible for expungement and therefore found that the trial court erred in ordering 
that the record of defendant’s conviction be sealed. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary 
appeal. 
__________________ 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and L. 
Christopher Frey, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
John J. Ricotta and Charles W. Kinkopf, for appellant. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.  The issue presented is whether the indisputable 
fact that defendant was armed during the commission of the offense he was 
convicted of makes defendant ineligible, as a matter of law, to have his record 
sealed.  Defendant asserts that because he pled guilty to an amended charge that 
did not include a firearm specification and did not mention a firearm, he should not 
be precluded as a matter of law from eligibility to have his record sealed.  For the 
following reasons, defendant’s argument is unavailing.  We agree with the court of 
appeals that defendant is ineligible to have his record sealed, and so affirm the 
judgment of that court. 
 
3 
 
“[E]xpungement is an act of grace created by the state,” and so is a privilege, 
not a right.  State v. Hamilton (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 636, 639, 665 N.E.2d 669, 
672.  Expungement should be granted only when all requirements for eligibility are 
met.  Id. at 640, 665 N.E.2d at 672.  An expungement proceeding is not an 
adversarial one; the primary purpose of an expungement hearing is to gather 
information.  Id.  Because expungement proceedings are not adversarial, the Rules 
of Evidence do not apply.  See Evid.R. 101(C)(7). 
 
Specific statutory provisions govern the sealing of a record of conviction.  
See R.C. 2953.31 through 2953.36.  In particular, R.C. 2953.36 provides that the 
conviction records of some offenders cannot be sealed.  As relevant to this case, 
R.C. 2953.36 provides, inter alia, that “[s]ections 2953.31 to 2953.35 of the 
Revised Code do not apply to convictions when the offender is subject to a 
mandatory prison term * * *.” 
 
An offender is subject to a mandatory prison term when that offender is not 
eligible for probation.  Thus, if an offender is ineligible for probation, that offender 
cannot have his record of conviction sealed.  In this way, R.C. 2953.36 requires us 
to refer to statutory provisions on probation to determine eligibility for 
expungement. 
 
The probation restrictions found in former R.C. 2951.02(F) apply to this 
case.  See R.C. 2951.011.  Former R.C. 2951.02 provided: 
 
“(F) An offender shall not be placed on probation, and shall not otherwise 
have his sentence of imprisonment suspended pursuant to division (D)(2) or (4) of 
section 2929.51 of the Revised Code when any of the following applies: 
 
“ * * * 
 
“(3) The offense involved was not a violation of section 2923.12 [carrying a 
concealed weapon] of the Revised Code and was committed while the offender 
was armed with a firearm or dangerous ordnance.”  143 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1470. 
 
4 
 
Applying the above clear provisions, it is evident that, under the plain 
language of R.C. 2953.36, a defendant who is ineligible for probation pursuant to 
R.C. 2951.02 is ineligible to have his or her record sealed. 
 
Defendant argues that since he was, in fact, placed on probation, he must of 
necessity be eligible to have his record sealed.  However, defendant’s argument 
attempts to shift the focus away from where it belongs.  Even though he may have 
avoided the firearm specifications by the plea bargain in this case, and even though 
he was placed on probation pursuant to the plea bargain when he was not eligible 
for it, the record clearly reveals that defendant was “armed with a firearm” when 
he committed the offense.  That fact alone, regardless of supposed mitigating 
factors, and regardless of whether defendant received probation for a 
nonprobationable offense, is dispositive of this case.  See State v. Leers (1992), 84 
Ohio App.3d 579, 581, 617 N.E.2d 754, 755 (that defendant actually received 
probation does not overcome R.C. 2953.36 prohibition against sealing the record 
for a nonprobationable offense).  See, also, State v. Mitchell (May 1, 1997), 
Cuyahoga App. No. 71155, unreported, 1997 WL 218417 (in deciding eligibility 
for expungement, court should not turn a blind eye to firearm use simply because it 
was dropped in plea bargaining). 
 
In State v. Bistarkey (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 7, 661 N.E.2d 167, this court 
considered whether a defendant who had agreed to plead guilty to felonious assault 
in exchange for dismissal of a firearm specification was eligible for shock 
probation.  Pursuant to statute, an offender’s eligibility for shock probation is 
dependent on the offender’s eligibility for probation.  This court found that, since 
there was “no dispute” that the defendant committed his crime with a firearm, he 
was not eligible for probation, and correspondingly was not eligible for shock 
probation.  Id. at 9, 661 N.E.2d at 168. 
 
5 
 
In State v. Koss (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 213, 219-220, 551 N.E.2d 970, 976, 
this court determined that a trial court should look at all available evidence when 
considering whether an offense was committed while the offender possessed a 
firearm for purposes of former R.C. 2951.02(F)(3), even if the jury acquitted the 
offender of the firearm specification.  The court in Koss cited with approval State 
v. Fisher (1985), 26 Ohio App.3d 197, 198, 26 OBR 418, 419, 499 N.E.2d 344, 
346, which found that an offender was not eligible for probation where the 
presentence investigation revealed that the offense was committed with a firearm.  
There is no indication in Fisher that the record contained any evidence of a firearm 
beyond the offender’s admission, nor is there any indication that the offender had 
been charged with a firearm specification.  The fact that the presentence 
investigation revealed that a firearm was used was sufficient to make the offender 
ineligible for probation. 
 
In Koss, as in Bistarkey, this court established that the question whether a 
crime is nonprobationable because it was committed with a firearm must be 
answered by considering the entire record of the case.  If the record reveals that the 
offender was armed with a firearm during the offense, the offender is not eligible 
for probation.  In turn, as relevant to this case, if the offender was not eligible for 
probation, then the offender is not eligible to have the record of the conviction 
sealed. 
 
Consequently, we hold that, when considering whether an applicant is 
ineligible to have a conviction record sealed under R.C. 2953.36 because the 
applicant may have been “armed with a firearm or dangerous ordnance” (R.C. 
2951.02) at the time of the offense, a trial judge must examine the entire record to 
determine whether the applicant was so armed.  In some cases, it may not be 
apparent from the record whether the defendant was armed, and further inquiries 
outside the record may be necessary.  The case sub judice is not such a case. 
 
6 
 
Since the record in this case clearly reveals that defendant committed his 
crime with a firearm, defendant is not eligible to have his record of conviction 
sealed.  Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur.