Title: Commonwealth v. Teixeira

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11279 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOAO TEIXEIRA. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     September 14, 2020. - January 20, 2021. 
 
Present:  Lenk, Gaziano, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Self-defense, Prior misconduct.  Self-
Defense.  Practice, Criminal, Request for jury 
instructions, Argument by prosecutor, Assistance of 
counsel, Capital case.  Constitutional Law, Assistance of 
counsel. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 3, 2009. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Richard J. Chin, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on August 13, 2014, was heard by 
him. 
 
 
 
Andrew S. Crouch for the defendant. 
 
Mary H. Nguyen, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
                     
 
1 Justice Lenk participated in the deliberation on this case 
and authored this opinion prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
LENK, J.  The defendant was convicted of murder in the 
first degree by deliberate premeditation and of unlawful 
possession of a firearm in the shooting death of Keith Leverone.  
The victim was shot in the parking lot of a convenience store in 
Brockton on February 7, 2009.  The defendant appeals from his 
convictions and from the denial of his motion for a new trial, 
which we consolidated with his direct appeal. 
 
The defendant argues that a new trial is required in light 
of a number of errors at trial and in the denial of his motion 
for a new trial.  In particular, he contends that the trial 
judge erred by declining to give a requested instruction on 
self-defense, and by allowing the prosecutor to introduce prior 
bad act evidence.  The defendant asserts as well that certain of 
the prosecutor's remarks in her opening statement and closing 
argument were improper.  The defendant also argues that he 
received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel, and that 
newly discovered evidence casts real doubt on the justice of the 
convictions.  Finally, the defendant asks this court to exercise 
its authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the verdict 
of murder in the first degree. 
 
We conclude that there was no error, and accordingly affirm 
the convictions.  We also discern no reason to use our 
extraordinary authority to reduce the murder verdict to a lesser 
degree of guilt or to order a new trial. 
3 
 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  We recite the facts as the 
jury could have found them, reserving some details for later 
discussion. 
 
The shooting death of the nineteen year old victim occurred 
in the early morning of February 7, 2009, in a convenience store 
parking lot in Brockton.  The fatal shot took place shortly 
after a fight between the defendant, the victim's brother, 
Olivio Leverone,2 and several others.  Olivio was the 
Commonwealth's key witness at trial, and the only witness who 
saw the defendant holding a gun. 
 
Olivio testified that at about 9 P.M. on February 6, 2009, 
he was driving around Brockton in his black Acura, with the 
victim and Olivio's friend Steven Andrade.  While at an 
intersection, the defendant and Curtis Busby, both of whom were 
former friends of Olivio, approached in a maroon vehicle.  From 
the front passenger's seat, the defendant fired two shots at 
Olivio.  Olivio "took off," and neither the vehicle nor its 
occupants were hit.  No one reported the incident to police, and 
another witness denied that the incident took place. 
 
Later that night or in the early morning hours of 
February 7, 2009, Olivio, Andrade, and the victim drove to a 
gasoline station that was a popular hangout spot at that hour, 
                     
 
2 Because the victim and his brother Olivio Leverone share a 
last name, we refer to Olivio Leverone by his first name. 
4 
 
after the bars closed.  The defendant and Busby also were 
present.  Olivio's friend, Camilo Pina, pinned the defendant 
against a vehicle, and Olivio ran up and stabbed the defendant 
twice in the leg with a pocket knife.  A police officer who had 
been inside the building heard an argument and came outside.  
The officer testified that several arguments were occurring, 
there were many vehicles and people, and the situation was "just 
getting out of hand."  It is unclear whether the arguments were 
related to the stabbing; the officer did not see a stabbing, nor 
did anyone report one.  When the officer told the crowd to 
disperse, Olivio and his group complied.  The victim remained in 
Olivio's Acura throughout the time the group was at the gasoline 
station. 
 
Olivio, Pina, Andrade, and the victim then drove to a 
nearby convenience store that was also a popular place to 
gather.  The parking lot was "packed," and about thirty people 
were present.  The victim again stayed in the Acura.  Olivio 
chatted with two women in a parked vehicle and then noticed that 
the defendant and Busby had arrived.  Both Busby and the 
defendant were wearing gloves. 
 
The defendant walked towards an open parking spot near 
Olivio and announced that he was ready to fight "whoever."  He 
lifted his T-shirt, which Olivio understood to indicate that the 
defendant was not carrying a gun. 
5 
 
 
Olivio and one to three others "swung on" the defendant.3  
They punched him, pulled his T-shirt over his head so he was 
unable to see, and kicked him.  The "pummeling" lasted about 
five minutes, and ended when Olivio and the others had "pounded" 
the defendant to the ground. 
 
Olivio walked away and headed towards his vehicle.  Olivio 
noticed the victim seated in the rear seat, where he had 
remained "the whole time."  While walking, Olivio turned around 
and saw the defendant getting up and approaching Busby, who was 
standing near a Dumpster.  Olivio heard the defendant tell 
Busby, "Give me the gun," and saw Busby hand the defendant a 
gun; Olivio began to run past his Acura towards the street.  
When he was in the middle of the street, he heard a single 
gunshot, and turned around again to see the defendant driving 
away in the Acura.4  Olivio ran back to the parking spot and 
found the victim lying on the ground near a silver vehicle, not 
breathing. 
 
Officers were dispatched to the scene; the first arrived 
within a few minutes, checked the victim, and did not find a 
                     
 
3 One witness testified that the victim, whom she did not 
know, participated in the fight, while other witnesses said that 
the victim was not a participant, and described the fight as 
being two to three on one. 
 
 
4 A witness at the grand jury testified that the shooter had 
been standing in the middle of the road, and left on foot.  This 
witness was summonsed, but did not appear to testify at trial. 
6 
 
pulse.  The medical examiner later determined that the victim 
suffered a single gunshot wound to the top of his head.  Olivio 
approached the officer and said that the person on the ground 
was his brother.  Police initially questioned Olivio inside the 
store, and then asked him to come to the police station for 
further questioning. 
 
Sometime that afternoon, the defendant's friend Anthony 
Bass was driving on Belmont Street when he saw the defendant 
walking and stopped to offer him a ride.  The defendant was 
carrying a white plastic bag.  Bass "popped" the trunk, and the 
defendant got into the vehicle without the bag.  A few hundred 
feet further along Belmont Street, police stopped the vehicle 
and arrested both occupants.  The vehicle was towed to a police 
garage, where it was searched.  Police seized a white plastic 
bag from the trunk that contained a pair of jeans and a T-shirt, 
both stained with blood later determined to be the defendant's, 
and a pair of black gloves that subsequently tested positive for 
gunshot residue and the defendant's deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA).5 
 
b.  Prior proceedings.  Before trial, the defendant moved 
to suppress evidence seized from his person and the vehicle in 
which he had been a passenger when he was arrested.  The motion 
                     
 
5 One of the gloves contained a mixed DNA profile, with the 
defendant being one of multiple possible contributors.  A match 
of the DNA in the second glove was inconclusive when compared 
with the defendant's DNA profile. 
7 
 
was denied.  In a pretrial motion in limine, the Commonwealth 
sought to introduce evidence of prior bad acts, specifically, 
the shooting at Olivio's vehicle, and an alleged arson of 
Olivio's vehicle after the victim's death.  The defendant 
opposed both motions.  The judge excluded the arson evidence, 
but allowed the prosecutor to introduce evidence of the 
defendant's shooting at Olivio's vehicle, and the name of the 
city where the vehicle was found. 
 
At trial, the prosecutor proceeded on theories of 
deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty.  
Olivio, the Commonwealth's key witness, testified pursuant to a 
cooperation agreement.  At the close of the prosecutor's case, 
the defendant moved for a required finding of not guilty, which 
was denied.  At a sidebar before the final charge, the defendant 
requested that the judge provide an instruction on self-defense; 
the judge declined to do so.  The judge instructed the jury on 
murder in the first degree based on the theories of deliberate 
premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty; murder in the 
second degree; voluntary manslaughter; and the mitigating 
circumstances of reasonable provocation or sudden combat. 
 
The jury convicted the defendant of murder in the first 
degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation.  The defendant 
then moved to set aside the verdict and to order the entry of a 
8 
 
finding of guilty of so much of the indictment as alleged 
manslaughter.  The motion was denied. 
 
The defendant's direct appeal subsequently was stayed 
pending resolution of his motion for a new trial, and his 
supplemental motion for a new trial.  The motion judge, who was 
also the trial judge, denied the motion, and we consolidated the 
appeal from that denial with the defendant's direct appeal. 
 
2.  Discussion.6  a.  Instruction on self-defense.  The 
defendant argues that the judge erred in denying his request for 
                     
 
6 The defendant also filed a Moffett brief, in which he 
argues that the stop of the vehicle in which he was a passenger 
later on the day of the shooting was unlawful, and that the 
judge erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence 
seized from the vehicle.  See Commonwealth v. Moffett, 383 Mass. 
201, 208-209 (1981). 
 
 
The defendant argues that the officer who conducted the 
stop did not have the knowledge to which he testified at trial 
as his reason for the stop (i.e., that the officer recognized 
the defendant and also was aware that there was an outstanding 
warrant for his arrest).  The defendant argues that the 
officer's testimony was not credible, in part, because the 
officer did not mention in his radio transmissions that he had 
seen the defendant, whom police were seeking in conjunction with 
the shooting.  The defendant also suggests that police should 
have obtained a warrant before they searched the rented vehicle, 
and that it was improper for police to have obtained permission 
to search the vehicle from its lawful owner, a nationwide 
automobile rental company, rather than from one of the other 
occupants of the vehicle. 
 
 
The claims that there was no reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause to stop the distinctive vehicle, or to order the 
defendant from the vehicle, are unavailing.  Police had 
testimony from eyewitnesses reporting a man entering a vehicle 
the description of which matched that of the vehicle the 
9 
 
an instruction on self-defense, and maintains that the absence 
of such an instruction had a substantial effect on the jury's 
consideration of the case, resulting in prejudicial error. 
 
An instruction on self-defense must be given if any view of 
the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
defendant, "is sufficient to raise the issue."  See Commonwealth 
v. Harrington, 379 Mass. 446, 450 (1980).  Here, according to 
the defendant, the evidence introduced at trial raised a 
reasonable doubt as to whether he shot the victim in self-
defense, and, accordingly, the judge was required to instruct 
the jury on the use of deadly force in self-defense.  The 
defendant also maintains that the judge's reliance on 
Commonwealth v. Barber, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 460, 463–464 (1984), 
S.C., 394 Mass. 1013 (1985), was misplaced, and the fact that 
the defendant instigated the confrontation did not make self-
defense unavailable.  See id. (while self-defense instruction 
generally is not warranted in case of mutual combat, where 
deceased escalated use of force, instruction on self-defense 
should be given). 
 
Because the objection was preserved, we review for 
prejudicial error.  Commonwealth v. Sosa, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 106, 
                     
witnesses had described as leaving the scene.  The question 
whether the officer's testimony was not credible was for the 
jury to determine. 
10 
 
115 (2011), citing Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 
(1994).  When reviewing the denial of an instruction on the use 
of deadly force in self-defense, a reviewing court asks whether, 
in the light most favorable to the defendant, the evidence 
raised at least a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
(a) believed he or she was in imminent danger of death or 
serious bodily harm from which the defendant could save him- or 
herself only by using deadly force, and (b) used all reasonable 
means available to retreat from the conflict.  See Commonwealth 
v. Pike, 428 Mass. 393, 396, 398 (1998); Barber, 394 Mass. 
at 1013. 
 
i.  Reasonable belief in danger of death or serious bodily 
harm.  As the defendant notes, there was some evidence that, 
during the altercation prior to the shooting, he reasonably 
believed that he was in danger of death or serious bodily harm.  
The shooting occurred after the victim's brother joined with two 
or three others in "pummeling" the defendant for about five to 
ten minutes until he fell to the ground, bleeding.  The 
defendant then stood up, obtained a weapon from his friend, a 
shot rang out, and the victim was seen lying on the ground.  
Whether it was reasonable for the defendant to fear death or 
serious bodily injury depends, in part, on the length of time 
that passed and the actions between the fight and the shooting. 
11 
 
 
The longer the time span between the events, the clearer 
the termination of any threat to the defendant, and thus the 
less likely it would be reasonable to fear imminent death or 
bodily injury.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Epsom, 399 Mass. 254, 
258 (1987) (defendant was not entitled to instruction on self-
defense where, after fight, defendant followed victim outside 
bar, given that there was no evidence that assaults or threats 
continued, but defendant shot victim).  Acting "out of a feeling 
of anger or revenge resulting from the first stage of [an] 
altercation" does not support a contention that a defendant 
"acted out of fear of imminent danger of death or serious bodily 
harm" (quotation and citation omitted).  Pike, 428 Mass. at 397-
398.  See Commonwealth v. Britt, 465 Mass. 87, 95-96 (2013).  
Here, Olivio testified that roughly thirty seconds passed 
between the end of the fight and the gunshot.  Another witness 
testified that it was "not even three minutes."  Were the time 
span so short that it was unclear the fight was over at the 
moment the defendant pulled the trigger, it would be reasonable 
that he had a fear of imminent harm. 
 
Beyond the timing, the actions of those involved may 
indicate whether it was reasonable for the defendant to fear 
imminent harm.  Before the defendant obtained the gun and pulled 
the trigger, Olivio and his companions had ceased hitting and 
kicking the defendant, and had walked away.  The group was 
12 
 
heading back toward their vehicle and were at least several feet 
away.  See Pike, 428 Mass. at 398 (self-defense instruction was 
not warranted where there was no evidence that victim had means 
of injuring defendant from distance of several feet).  The 
clearest testimony as to the victim's whereabouts immediately 
before the shooting was from Olivio, who said that the victim 
remained in the vehicle, which was about two parking spaces from 
the location of the fight.  Given the history of violence 
between the defendant's group and the victim's group -- the 
earlier shooting by the defendant at Olivio and his group, and 
the subsequent stabbing of the defendant by Olivio -- and the 
intensity of the beating, the defendant might have feared that 
his assailants had knives or other weapons they were planning to 
obtain from their vehicle.  It is clear, however, that Olivio 
and his group, let alone the victim, were no longer right beside 
or on top of the defendant when he headed to his companion to 
obtain a weapon.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Grassie, 476 Mass. 
202, 212 (2017), S.C., 482 Mass. 1017 (2019). 
Fear of imminent harm is subjective, Commonwealth v. 
Iacoviello, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 231, 240 (2016), and certainly 
there was some reason here for the defendant to have been 
concerned for his safety in the moments before the shooting.  
The accounting of the events during that brief period was vague 
and incomplete.  There is agreement, however, that the beating 
13 
 
was serious.  One witness testified that she stopped watching 
because she "didn't think it was fair at all."  The 
Commonwealth's counterintuitive assertion at argument before us 
that this severe attack was desired by the defendant in order to 
set the stage for a planned shooting was unsupported in the 
record, and downplays the severity of the attack and the fear 
the defendant may have felt.  Nonetheless, even if the defendant 
reasonably had believed that he was at risk of death or serious 
bodily harm, in order to be entitled to an instruction on self-
defense, he was required to have retreated from the situation if 
he could have done do so safely. 
 
ii.  Use of all reasonable means to retreat.  The 
requirement that a defendant have availed him- or herself of all 
reasonable means of retreating from the conflict before 
resorting to the use of deadly force does not impose the duty to 
place oneself in danger.  Pike, 428 Mass. at 398.  "[An 
individual] must, however, use every reasonable avenue of escape 
available to him [or her]" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Lopez, 474 Mass. 690, 697 (2016). 
 
The events in this case speak to two separate incidents of 
violence, first the fight, and then reengagement by the 
defendant in firing the shot.  See Commonwealth v. Espada, 450 
Mass. 687, 693 (2008) (self-defense instruction was not 
warranted where defendant shot victim in separate incident one 
14 
 
and one-half hours after victim beat him).  Where events are 
separate, as here, a self-defense instruction often is not 
merited because in the intervening moments a defendant has the 
opportunity to retreat.  See, e.g., Pike, 428 Mass. at 398-399 
(defendant was not entitled to instruction on use of deadly 
force in self-defense where defendant used deadly force against 
victim after victim had retreated by reapproaching victim, who 
thereafter came towards defendant, and throwing radio at 
victim's head); Epsom, 399 Mass. at 258 (defendant was not 
entitled to instruction on use of deadly force in self-defense 
where, after fight, defendant followed victim outside bar, and 
then shot him). 
In the case at hand, the jury heard evidence that the 
defendant had reasonable avenues of retreat after the fight, 
that he was aware of at least one avenue, and that he chose not 
to use it.  Prior to the shooting, the defendant had retreated 
back toward his friend, Busby, who was standing near a Dumpster 
watching the fight.  Rather than leave the parking lot, the 
defendant obtained a firearm from Busby and turned and began 
pursing Olivio and his companions, who were in the process of 
walking back to their vehicle.  See Commonwealth v. Mercado, 456 
Mass. 198, 209-210 (2010) (no instruction on self-defense was 
warranted where defendant was free to leave but returned with 
firearm).  Similarly, we have held that an instruction on the 
15 
 
use of deadly force in self-defense was not warranted where a 
defendant who had access to a vehicle in which he could have 
fled chose instead to reach inside that vehicle, retrieve a 
firearm, and shoot the victim.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Diaz, 
453 Mass. 266, 280 (2009), overruled on other grounds by 
Commonwealth v. Womack, 457 Mass. 268 (2010).  See also Espada, 
450 Mass. at 694 (no self-defense instruction was warranted 
where defendant, "instead of remaining safely behind the 
[D]umpster," ran up to departing victim, saw "flash," then shot 
at victim's vehicle four times, "firing even as they tried to 
leave"); Commonwealth v. Leoner-Aguirre, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 581, 
585 (2018) (defendant "got more than he was entitled to receive" 
when judge instructed jury on self-defense, where defendant did 
not avail himself of all reasonable means to retreat before 
using deadly force on public street). 
Here, nothing stopped the defendant from fleeing the scene 
after the individuals who had been beating him moved away.  The 
encounter took place in the open parking lot of a lighted 
convenience store.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Avila, 454 Mass. 
744, 769 (2009) (defendant reasonably could have retreated from 
altercation on public street); Espada, 450 Mass. at 692-693 
(location in small alley did not eliminate means to avoid combat 
where sidewalk was nearby and thus defendant had available 
reasonable avenues that would have allowed retreat).  There was 
16 
 
also no threat of force from a weapon preventing the defendant 
from fleeing.  While Olivio had been carrying and using a knife 
the previous day, there was no direct evidence that, at the time 
of the shooting, Olivio or his companions were armed.  Moreover, 
the defendant does not point to any particular threat, let alone 
from the victim, at the time of the shooting.  Cf. Espada, supra 
at 693-694 (defendant who shot at victim's vehicle as it was 
driven away down alley was not entitled to instruction on self-
defense, even where defendant thought he saw "flash" from 
victim's vehicle); Pike, 428 Mass. at 398 (defendant who threw 
radio at victim as victim came towards him was not entitled to 
self-defense instruction).  Contrast Commonwealth v. Ortega, 480 
Mass. 603, 611–612 (2018) (victim's possession and use of 
firearm may make retreat unreasonable). 
 
Because the defendant in this case did not meet the 
requirement that he use all reasonable means to retreat before 
resorting to deadly force, the judge did not abuse his 
discretion in declining to provide an instruction on the use of 
force or excessive force in self-defense. 
 
b.  Prior bad acts.  The defendant argues that the judge's 
decision to allow the introduction of prior bad act evidence 
concerning a purported shooting the day before the victim's 
death in the early morning hours of the following day was an 
abuse of discretion. 
17 
 
 
"It is well settled that the prosecution may not introduce 
evidence that a defendant previously has misbehaved, indictably 
or not, for the purposes of showing his [or her] bad character 
or propensity to commit the crime charged . . . ."  Commonwealth 
v. Helfant, 398 Mass. 214, 224 (1986).  See Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 404(b)(1) (2020).  Such evidence may be admissible, however, 
if relevant for another purpose, such as to prove "motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
absence of mistake, or lack of accident."  See Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 404(b)(2).  Even where relevant, prior bad act evidence "will 
not be admitted if its probative value is outweighed by the risk 
of unfair prejudice to the defendant."  See Commonwealth v. 
Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249 (2014).  "To be sufficiently 
probative the evidence must be connected with the facts of the 
case [and] not be too remote in time" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Butler, 445 Mass. 568, 574 (2005). 
 
Before evidence of a prior bad act may be introduced 
against a defendant, "the Commonwealth must satisfy the judge 
that the 'jury . . . reasonably [could] conclude that the act 
occurred and that the defendant was the actor'" (citation 
omitted).  See Commonwealth v. Leonard, 428 Mass. 782, 785 
(1999); Mass. G. Evid. § 104(b).  "The Commonwealth need only 
show these facts by a preponderance of the evidence."  See 
Leonard, supra.  "If the judge finds this standard has been met, 
18 
 
it is thereafter for the jury to evaluate the evidence for 'its 
weight and credit.'"  See id. at 786, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Robinson, 146 Mass. 571, 582 (1888). 
 
Where the error is properly preserved, as here, we review a 
judge's decision to allow the introduction of prior bad act 
evidence for abuse of discretion.  See Commonwealth v. Facella, 
478 Mass. 393, 407 (2017).  On appeal, the decision will stand 
absent "a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors 
relevant to the decision, such that the decision falls outside 
the range of reasonable alternatives."  See id., citing L.L. v. 
Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). 
 
Prior to trial, the prosecutor moved to admit evidence that 
the defendant shot at Olivio's vehicle four or five hours before 
the victim was shot.  Olivio had been driving with the victim 
and Andrade when the defendant and Busby drove past in a maroon 
vehicle, and, as they passed, the defendant, from the 
passenger's seat, fired two shots towards Olivio's vehicle.  The 
prosecutor argued that this evidence was admissible to establish 
a possible motive, to show the defendant's state of mind, and to 
help establish a pattern of conduct towards the victim, thereby 
providing a complete picture of the events surrounding the 
victim's death.  In opposition, the defendant argued that 
Olivio's assertions were "demonstrably false," because Andrade, 
a passenger in Olivio's black Acura, later told police that the 
19 
 
shooting did not happen.  The defendant also maintained that the 
evidence was more prejudicial than probative and requested that, 
at a minimum, a voir dire of the purported witnesses be 
conducted. 
 
On the first day of trial, the parties revisited the issue 
at a sidebar conference, and counsel reiterated his request that 
the judge conduct a voir dire of Olivio and Andrade.  Counsel 
again pointed out that Andrade's statement to police 
contradicted Olivio's, and argued that Olivio's assertion was 
part of a larger pattern of false statements.  The judge queried 
what purpose a voir dire would serve: 
"I mean the voir dire would be for me to make a 
determination as to credibility.  I don't think that's my 
function.  I think, you know, I think what we're ignoring 
here is the fact that there's been a lot of bad blood 
between these two groups and that . . . there are reasons 
why they're not candid with the police, there's reason why 
when confronted they recant.  So I don't think this is a 
situation where I should be making determinations of 
credibility.  He made this statement.  It goes to motive.  
It's an alleged incident that took place prior to the 
alleged shooting, and I'm going to allow it." 
 
 
Olivio subsequently testified that the defendant fired 
approximately two shots at his vehicle while hanging out of the 
front passenger's side window.  Olivio explained that neither 
the vehicle nor its passengers were struck, and that he did not 
report the incident to police because nobody was shot and he was 
not a snitch. 
20 
 
 
The judge did not abuse his discretion in concluding that 
the evidence was relevant to a possible motive, including prior 
animus between the defendant and the victim and his brother, and 
therefore in allowing it to be introduced.  The incident shed 
light on the hostile relationship between the defendant and 
Olivio, as well as the victim, which is relevant to establishing 
a possible motive for the subsequent fatal shooting.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Watt, 484 Mass. 742, 748 (2020) (evidence of 
prior shooting was "relevant to show a motive for a shooting 
that otherwise appeared senseless"); Commonwealth v. Gil, 393 
Mass. 204, 215-216 (1984) (evidence of hostile relationship was 
relevant to motive).  In addition, the fact that the defendant's 
shooting at Olivio's vehicle was alleged to have occurred 
approximately five hours before the fatal shooting means that 
the prior bad act evidence is both connected with the facts of 
the case and temporally linked.  See Butler, 445 Mass. at 574.  
Compare Watt, supra (evidence of shooting eleven days prior to 
fatal shooting of victim was relevant to motive). 
 
The defendant argued during trial, as he does before us, 
that any probative value of the evidence was outweighed by 
unfair prejudice because the evidence was "demonstrably untrue."  
The basis for this assertion is Andrade's statement to police 
that the defendant had not fired at Olivio's vehicle earlier in 
the evening, as well as the lack of any evidence beyond Olivio's 
21 
 
statement to support his allegations.  A lack of other support, 
however, does not make the evidence demonstrably untrue.  While 
the defendant can dispute the allegation, he has not proved it 
to be untrue.  Moreover, that prior bad act evidence may be 
disputed does not render it inadmissible; rather, the question 
is whether the jury reasonably could conclude that the defendant 
did, in fact, commit the act.  See Leonard, 428 Mass. at 785.  
Here, the jury reasonably could have concluded, on the basis of 
Olivio's testimony, that the act of the defendant shooting at 
his vehicle did occur.7  As such, there was no abuse of 
discretion in the judge's decision to leave the credibility 
determination to the jury. 
The defendant also asserts error in the judge's decision 
not to conduct a voir dire hearing prior to allowing the 
introduction of Olivio's testimony, for the same reasons that he 
                     
7 The defendant also argues that the error was not mitigated 
because the judge did not instruct on the proper uses of prior 
bad act evidence.  While such an instruction is often 
preferable, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bryant, 482 Mass. 731, 
737 (2019) (noting that best practice would be to give limiting 
instruction at time evidence of defendant's drug dealing history 
was admitted), a trial judge, is not required, sua sponte, to 
provide one, see Commonwealth v. Peno, 485 Mass. 378, 395 
(2020), citing Commonwealth v. Leonardi, 413 Mass. 757, 764 
(1992) ("To be sure, we have not said that a judge is required 
to give contemporaneous limiting instructions if a defendant 
does not request them"); Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 
244, 270 (1982), citing Commonwealth v. Monsen, 377 Mass. 245, 
252 (1979).  It was not necessary for the judge, without any 
request from either party, specifically to instruct on the 
limited permissible uses of the prior bad act evidence. 
22 
 
objected to the evidence writ large, i.e., that the only 
evidence of the incident was from Olivio's testimony, and that 
another witness testified that the incident did not happen.  
"The decision to conduct a voir dire examination of a witness 
rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge . . . ."  
Commonwealth v. Pina, 481 Mass. 413, 431 (2019).  In this case, 
the judge did not abuse his discretion in concluding that a voir 
dire was unnecessary because it was for the jury, and not the 
judge, to decide whether Olivio's testimony was credible, or 
whether they found Andrade's testimony credible.  So long as the 
prosecutor put forward sufficient evidence such that the jury 
reasonably could conclude that the defendant committed the prior 
bad act, questions of weight and credibility are for the jury.  
See Leonard, 428 Mass. at 786. 
c.  Prosecutor's opening statement and closing argument.  
The defendant contends that numerous statements in the 
prosecutor's opening and closing were improper.  He asserts 
that, in the context of the statements as a whole, and in the 
absence of any specific curative instructions, these statements 
were so egregious that he was deprived of a fair trial and that 
a new trial is required on that basis alone.  In particular, the 
defendant argues that the prosecutor misstated the evidence 
concerning the defendant's intent to kill the victim, argued 
inferences with no basis in the record, suggested that the 
23 
 
prosecutor had knowledge of facts not in evidence, and attempted 
to excite the jury's passion and sympathy with testimony as to 
the manner in which the victim was killed.  The defendant 
contends also that the prosecutor deliberately and in bad faith 
made arguments as to motive without evidentiary support. 
 
"While prosecutors are entitled to argue 'forcefully for 
the defendant's conviction,' closing arguments must be limited 
to facts in evidence and the fair inferences that may be drawn 
from those facts."  Commonwealth v. Rutherford, 476 Mass. 639, 
643 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Wilson, 427 Mass. 336, 350 
(1998).  "[A] prosecutor should not refer to the defendant's 
failure to testify, misstate the evidence or refer to facts not 
in evidence, interject personal belief in the defendant's guilt, 
play on racial, ethnic, or religious prejudice or on the jury's 
sympathy or emotions, or comment on the consequences of a 
verdict" (footnotes omitted).  Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 
514, 516-517 (1987), and cases cited.  "A prosecutor may not use 
closing argument to argue or suggest facts not previously 
introduced in evidence" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Beaudry, 445 Mass. 577, 580 (2005). 
 
Because the defendant did not object to the prosecutor's 
remarks at trial, we review for a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Niemic, 472 Mass. 
665, 673 (2015) (Niemic I). 
24 
 
 
i.  Motive for shooting the victim.  The defendant 
maintains that there was no evidence to support the prosecutor's 
repeated statements concerning the reason why the victim was 
shot:  either in mistake for Olivio, or intentionally because 
the victim was Olivio's brother and Olivio had fled. 
During her opening statement, the prosecutor remarked, 
"And although the evidence may show that the defendant 
mistook [the victim] for his brother, Olivio, the evidence 
will show this killing was the product of deliberate 
premeditation and that it was done with extreme atrocity 
and cruelty." 
 
In her closing, the prosecutor stated, 
"Now, one question you may be asking is if [the victim] had 
absolutely nothing to do with this fight, nothing to do 
with this defendant, then why is it that he is the one that 
ends up dead?  I suggest to you, ladies and gentlemen, the 
defendant chased after Olivio Leverone that night in the 
parking lot and he couldn't get to him.  So he figured he'd 
get to him another way.  He'd get to him vicariously by 
killing his brother in cold blood." 
 
The prosecutor continued this line of argument by ending her 
closing with, "This coward who gunned down [the victim] and 
killed him for absolutely no reason except for the fact that he 
was Olivio Leverone's brother." 
 
The evidence showed that the defendant had a long-standing 
dispute with Olivio, his former friend, and that the groups had 
been engaged in ongoing hostilities towards each other.  
Olivio's brother, the victim, remained in a vehicle near the 
scene of the recent assaults against the defendant, able to 
25 
 
observe and by some accounts not participating.  At the time of 
the fatal shooting, the defendant was chasing after Olivio and 
his two friends, who had just beaten the defendant so severely 
that he fell down, bleeding, while Olivio ran past the Acura in 
which his brother was seated. 
 
The prosecutor's suggestions that the victim was shot 
because the defendant could not get to his brother, Olivio, 
mistook the victim for Olivio, or wanted to cause Olivio severe 
distress were all reasonable inferences that the jury could have 
drawn from the evidence.  Moreover, the prosecutor was not 
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the motive for the 
shooting.  See Commonwealth v. Moseley, 483 Mass. 295, 302 n.9 
(2019), citing Commonwealth v. Borodine, 371 Mass. 1, 8 (1976), 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1049 (1977).  Therefore, the challenged 
remarks about the victim being shot because he was Olivio's 
brother were not improper. 
 
ii.  Statements that the victim was "cowering."  The 
defendant also argues that the prosecutor engaged in 
impermissible speculation when she described the victim as 
"cowering," and stated that he "knew what was coming," at the 
time he was shot.  The prosecutor argued: 
"[The medical examiner] described for you the bullet wound 
to his head in the top of his head and went straight down 
his spine about seventeen inches, which would indicate, I 
suggest to you, that [the victim] was in a ninety degree 
angle at the time he was executed, which is consistent, I 
26 
 
suggest to you, with him either getting out of the car or 
being dragged out of the car at the time he was executed." 
 
The prosecutor later expanded upon this argument: 
"Again, consider the position that the victim would have to 
have been in at the time he was killed.  I suggest to you 
he was in a cowering position, which would suggest that he 
knew what was coming." 
 
 
The medical examiner testified as to the placement of the 
bullet at the top rear of the victim's head, and the seventeen 
and one-half inches it traveled directly down through the 
victim's body, lodging in the central portion of the back 
("straight down through the body without deviating significantly 
at all)."  In response to the prosecutor's repeated inquiries, 
the medical examiner stated that she could not tell from the 
injuries how close the weapon had been to the victim, the angle 
of the weapon when the shot was fired, how the shot had 
occurred, or the victim's position at the time of the shooting.  
The judge sustained the defendant's objections to the 
prosecutor's insistent questioning.  At a sidebar hearing, the 
judge explained that asking the expert to form an opinion on the 
position of the victim was "going to rise to speculation as to 
what happened." 
 
While the prosecutor presented her arguments as 
"suggest[ions]" rather than as established facts, and her two 
suggestions of what had occurred actually differed 
substantially, neither of them were based on evidence before the 
27 
 
jury.  The medical examiner explicitly described the path of the 
bullet as "down" the victim's body.  A reasonable inference 
might have been that the victim was kneeling or sitting, whereas 
"dragged" implies that the defendant was horizontal.  The 
medical examiner also testified to finding a bruise on the 
victim's head, but did not note any injuries from having been 
"dragged."  Although the evidence did not preclude an inference 
that the victim was out of the vehicle at the time of his death, 
it also did not support the prosecutor's suggestions of the 
victim's position at death.  The expert clearly stated that she 
could not opine as to the distance between the gun and the 
victim when the shot was fired, or the victim's position or 
location when shot, and in sustaining the defendant's objection, 
the judge explained that any further efforts to have her do so 
would have required her to speculate.8 
                     
 
8 Prosecutor:  "With your training and experience, would you 
be able to form an opinion as to the proximity of the 
weapon that was fired to the gunshot to the head?" 
 
 
Witness:  "No.  This type of injury pattern is best 
described as an indeterminate range injury pattern. . . ." 
 
 
. . . 
 
 
Prosecutor:  "Would you be able to form an opinion in your 
training and experience as to the position of [the victim] 
in regards to the downward trajectory that you observed in 
the bullet that you found?" 
 
 
Defense counsel:  "Objection, Your Honor." 
28 
 
 
The suggestion that the victim was "cowering" also was 
merely speculative, and prone to inflame the jury.  
Prosecutorial "appeals to sympathy . . . obscure the clarity 
with which the jury would look at the evidence and encourage the 
jury to find guilt even if the evidence does not reach the level 
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt."  Commonwealth v. Niemic, 
483 Mass. 571, 591 (2019) (Niemic II), citing Commonwealth v. 
Bois, 476 Mass. 15, 34 (2016).  "Cowering," unlike a term such 
as "kneeling" or "crouching," encompasses an emotional element 
of fear or apprehension.  Beyond describing a physical position, 
see, e.g., Rutherford, 476 Mass. at 647 (evidence of bloodstains 
supported prosecutor's statement that victim was "crawling" as 
opposed to "standing"), the use of the word "cowering" 
communicates a mental state, and one for which the jury could 
                     
 
 
After the defendant objected, the judge limited the expert 
to testifying to where the bullet lodged as sufficient evidence 
of the trajectory.  On cross-examination, defense counsel 
followed up on this line of questioning: 
 
 
Defense counsel:  "[Y]ou cannot give any opinion as to 
distance from which the shot was fired?" 
 
 
Witness:  "No." 
 
 
. . . 
 
 
Defense counsel:  "So you can't give an idea where someone 
was when the gunshot was discharged?" 
 
 
Witness:  "[I]n terms of distance I cannot." 
29 
 
have great sympathy.  In asserting that such a position meant 
the victim "knew what was coming," the prosecutor also 
improperly invited juror sympathy by emphasizing the purported 
emotions of the victim immediately prior to his death, where 
there was no evidence as to what the victim was feeling. 
 
Indeed, given the victim's position inside the vehicle, as 
described by witnesses, there was no evidence the victim knew 
what was coming, or even saw the gun pointed at him in the very 
brief period between the fight ending, the victim's friends 
starting to return to their vehicle, and the shooting.  See 
Commonwealth v. Smith, 387 Mass. 900, 909-910 (1983) 
(prosecutor's "speculative argument" was improper, as "[a] 
verdict must be based only on facts established by evidence 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  It is the evidence, not the 
sympathy, that must be the foundation of the jury's decision").  
Compare Rutherford, 476 Mass. at 645 ("argument that the victim 
was 'crawling away to die,' leaving bloody hand and knee prints 
on the floor, after giving up any hope of survival" was 
impermissible and speculative play to juror sympathy, inviting 
them to speculate as to victim's final thoughts [emphasis 
added]).  "The jury should not be asked to put themselves 'in 
the shoes' of the victim, or otherwise be asked to identify with 
the victim."  Rutherford, supra at 646, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Bizanowicz, 459 Mass. 400, 420 (2011).  Whether or not, as the 
30 
 
prosecutor "suggested," the victim "knew what was coming," the 
prosecutor's statements not only played to the emotions of the 
jury in inviting them to imagine the victim's last moments, but 
also were unsupported by the evidence. 
 
While a prosecutor may urge the jury to draw reasonable 
inferences from the facts, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Burgess, 
450 Mass. 422, 437 (2008), here there simply was no evidence as 
to the victim's emotional state or thoughts, be it "cowering" or 
an awareness that his death was imminent, see Niemic II, 483 
Mass. at 593 (prosecutor's statement that victim was at crime 
scene to seek refuge from defendant was improper where there was 
"absolutely no evidence" to support that assertion); Beaudry, 
445 Mass. at 580-584 (prosecutor's suggestion that complainant's 
testimony was true because it reflected knowledge of type of 
acts alleged was improper, where no facts at trial demonstrated 
child had knowledge beyond that ordinary for children her age).  
Compare Commonwealth v. Matos, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 343, 354 (2019) 
(where victim identified perpetrator as "red-hatted man," and 
defendant's mother identified red-hatted man as defendant, 
prosecutor's connection of evidentiary dots to argue defendant 
attacked victim was not improper).  In sum, the prosecutor 
crossed the line, and her remarks as to the victim's position 
and state of mind shortly before his death were improper.  See 
Smith, 387 Mass. at 909-910. 
31 
 
 
"If a defendant establishes that the prosecutor's closing 
argument was improper, we are guided by the following factors 
when deciding whether a new trial is required:  'whether 
'defense counsel seasonably objected to the arguments at 
trial . . . whether the judge's instructions mitigated the 
error . . . whether the errors in the arguments went to the 
heart of the issues at trial or concerned collateral 
matters . . . whether the jury would be able to sort out the 
excessive claims made by the prosecutor . . . and whether the 
Commonwealth's case was so overwhelming that the errors did not 
prejudice the defendant.'"  Niemic I, 472 Mass. at 673-674, 
citing Commonwealth v. Maynard, 436 Mass. 558, 570 (2002). 
 
Here, defense counsel did not object to any of the 
prosecutor's statements at trial.  While the statements "went to 
the heart" of the matter with respect to the theory of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty, the jury reached their verdict on the 
theory of deliberate premeditation, making these comments 
collateral.  See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 424 Mass. 207, 212-213 
(1997) ("The prosecutor's effort to explicate the theory of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty for the jury was partly incorrect, 
but could have had no effect on the jury's conviction of the 
defendant of murder in the first degree on the theory of 
deliberate premeditation"). 
32 
 
 
Additionally, the jury were able to sort out the excessive 
claims.  The jury heard testimony by the medical examiner that 
the gunshot wound entered the top of the victim's skull and 
traveled into his neck and upper back.  They heard the medical 
examiner say that she could not answer how proximate the weapon 
was to the victim when fired.  When the prosecutor questioned 
whether the medical examiner could opine as to the trajectory of 
the bullet, the judge sustained an objection, stating, "I don't 
think she -- it's going to rise to speculation as to what 
happened."  The jury observed this exchange, and were able to 
note the lack of a determination as to the position of the 
victim.  Thus, they were able to distinguish these excessive 
claims.  Finally, apart from these brief remarks, the majority 
of the prosecutor's arguments were without error.  Contrast 
Niemic II, 483 Mass. at 598-599 (new trial was required due to 
improper prosecutorial statements in opening and closing); 
Niemic I, 472 Mass. at 675, 679 (prosecutor's "highly improper, 
emotionally charged discussion covering three pages of 
transcript" combined with additional error of failure to request 
instruction on reasonable provocation necessitated new trial). 
 
In making a determination as to the effect of improper 
remarks, "the cumulative effect of all the errors must be 
'considered in the context of the arguments and the case as a 
whole.'"  Niemic I, 472 Mass. at 673, quoting Maynard, 436 Mass. 
33 
 
at 570.  The single shot to the top of the victim's head 
suggested, if anything, a premeditated killing.  The victim had 
been sitting in his vehicle, not participating in any of the 
earlier altercations.  The evidence of a cold and calculated 
killing would have outweighed any prejudice from the brief 
improper remarks.  In the context of the trial and the arguments 
as a whole, the improper suggestions would have had little 
impact on the jury's thinking, let alone have created a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
iii.  Bad faith.  The defendant challenges one of the 
remarks in the prosecutor's opening statement as misstating the 
evidence, unsupported by any evidence, and being so egregious 
that this represents the "rare case" where a prosecutor's 
opening was made in bad faith.  The defendant points to the 
statement that, "although the evidence may show that the 
defendant mistook [the victim] for his brother, Olivio, the 
evidence will show this killing was the product of deliberate 
premeditation and that it was done with extreme atrocity and 
cruelty" (emphasis added).  This, the defendant argues, 
constituted bad faith and prejudiced the defendant in implying 
motive that otherwise would be absent.  As stated, the defendant 
did not challenge any portion of these remarks at trial. 
 
"The proper function of an opening is to outline in a 
general way the nature of the case which the counsel expects to 
34 
 
be able to prove or support by evidence."  Commonwealth v. 
Croken, 432 Mass. 266, 268 (2000), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Fazio, 375 Mass. 451, 454 (1978).  "This expectation must, of 
course, have been reasonable and grounded in good faith." 
Croken, supra, quoting Fazio, supra at 456. 
 
For similar reasons as with the prosecutor's statements 
about the defendant's motives, the defendant has not shown that 
the challenged statement was not something the prosecutor 
expected to be able to prove.  The defendant was chasing Olivio, 
who had just beaten him, as Olivio headed for the vehicle in 
which the victim was sitting, at 3 A.M.  The prosecutor may have 
expected to put forth sufficient evidence for the jury to 
conclude that the defendant mistook the victim for his brother.  
Thus, the defendant has not established that the prosecutor's 
suggestion about what the evidence "may" show about the reason 
for the killing was made in bad faith. 
 
d.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  The defendant 
argues that the judge erred in denying his motion for a new 
trial on grounds of constitutionally ineffective assistance by 
trial counsel, and newly discovered evidence that "cast[s] real 
doubt on the justice of his convictions." 
 
"In evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
in a case of murder in the first degree, we begin by determining 
whether there was a serious failure by trial counsel.  If so, 
35 
 
then we determine whether the failure resulted in a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice."  Commonwealth v. 
LaCava, 438 Mass. 708, 712–713 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Harbin, 435 Mass. 654, 656 (2002), and citing Commonwealth v. 
Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 681–682 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 
(2014). 
i.  Failure to call alibi witness.  The defendant contends 
that his counsel was infective for failing to call an alibi 
witness.  The defendant argues that his counsel should have 
sought a capias or a delay in the trial in order to locate and 
bring before the court this witness, whose grand jury testimony 
contradicted Olivio's account of the shooting. 
The determination whether to call a witness is a strategic 
decision.  Commonwealth v. Montez, 450 Mass. 736, 754 (2008), 
citing Commonwealth v. Adams, 374 Mass. 722, 728-729 (1978).  "A 
strategic decision amounts to ineffective assistance 'only if it 
was manifestly unreasonable when made.'"  Montez, supra, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Martin, 427 Mass. 816, 822 (1998). 
The witness testified before the grand jury that he was 
driving past the parking lot where the shooting and preceding 
fight took place.  He saw some type of altercation and then saw 
Olivio leaving the scene in a black vehicle before another 
individual fired a shot towards the victim's vehicle.  The 
witness also testified that he was shown a photographic array by 
36 
 
police and selected two photographs from it as appearing like 
the shooter, one of which was of the defendant. 
This witness had been summonsed to appear at the 
defendant's trial on the day before his anticipated testimony, 
and, according to the defendant's investigator, declined to be 
served in hand, so the investigator had left the summons at the 
witness's address.  When the witness did not appear, counsel did 
not seek a continuance or to have him arrested and brought to 
court, but, rather, carried on with the trial.  In an affidavit 
filed with the defendant's motion for a new trial, trial counsel 
averred that he had decided not to take these steps because, 
while he initially had believed that the witness's testimony 
would be helpful for the defense, he by then no longer was sure 
what the testimony would be.  While some of the witness's 
testimony before the grand jury was highly exculpatory, the 
witness also had identified a photograph of the defendant as 
looking like the shooter.  Since the witness's testimony at best 
would have been a double-edged sword, defense counsel decided it 
would be better to forgo the testimony. 
Such a decision by counsel not to call a witness whose 
testimony counsel felt might not be credible, and which might in 
counsel's view harm his client's case, is not manifestly 
unreasonable.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Morales, 453 Mass. 40, 
45 (2009).  Contrast Commonwealth v. Hill, 432 Mass. 704, 718 
37 
 
(2000) (failure to call disinterested witness who would have 
contradicted entirely Commonwealth's theory of case was 
manifestly unreasonable, given absence of any explanation or 
reasoning by defense counsel).  Here, the witness deliberately 
did not appear in court when he knew he was being asked to 
testify.  His versions of events differed from those of the 
other witnesses, calling into question the witness's 
credibility, or at least how it would be perceived by the jury.  
As such, it was not manifestly unreasonable for trial counsel to 
make a determination not to undertake to locate the witness and 
have him returned to the court to testify. 
ii.  Failure to cross-examine witness.  The defendant also 
maintains that he received constitutionally ineffective 
assistance because counsel failed to cross-examine the 
defendant's friend Bass about his purported ownership of the 
black gloves found in a plastic bag in the trunk of Bass's 
vehicle. 
The trial judge is the "final arbitrator on matters of 
credibility" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 
Mass. 336, 344 (2014), and cases cited.  Our review is limited 
to whether the judge committed "a significant error of law or 
other abuse of discretion."  See id., citing Commonwealth v. 
Sherman, 451 Mass. 332, 334 (2008).  See, e.g., Martin, 427 
Mass. at 817. 
38 
 
The evidence showed that the gloves were found inside a 
plastic bag containing a T-shirt and a pair of jeans, both 
stained with blood that matched the defendant's DNA.  The gloves 
themselves tested positive for gunshot residue, and one of them 
contained a mixed DNA profile, part of which was consistent with 
the defendant's DNA.  At trial, defense counsel elicited 
testimony from Bass to the effect that the trunk contained many 
items of clothing belonging to Bass, and his mother and sister, 
as well as to Busby.  Counsel did not specifically ask Bass if 
the gloves belonged to him.9  There was testimony that Bass, as 
well as the defendant, had been seen wearing gloves on the night 
of the shooting. 
In support of the defendant's motion for a new trial, Bass 
submitted a postconviction affidavit stating that the gloves 
were his, that he had worn them earlier on the day of the 
shooting, and that he had placed them in the trunk at some point 
before the defendant got into the vehicle.  The defendant argues 
that, "[w]ithout this testimony, counsel deprived [the 
defendant] of a substantial ground of defense by failing to 
fully undermine the connection between him and the gloves."  The 
decision not to examine Bass about his ownership of the gloves, 
                     
 
9 Counsel averred in an affidavit, "At the time of trial, I 
was unaware that Mr. Bass would testify that the black gloves 
found in his car trunk belonged to him.  I, therefore, did not 
question him about the gloves." 
39 
 
in the defendant's view, was not a strategic decision because it 
was based on a lack of knowledge. 
The motion judge, who was also the trial judge, rejected 
Bass's affidavit as implausible or outright not credible for 
several reasons.  See Scott, 467 Mass. at 344, citing 
Commonwealth v. Leavitt, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 84, 85 (1985) 
("Particular deference is to be paid to the rulings of a motion 
judge who served as the trial judge in the same case").  First, 
the judge noted that trial counsel was unaware of any claim that 
the gloves belonged to Bass.  Such information, the judge 
stated, was something that the defendant would have mentioned to 
his attorney before, and therefore the assertion of ownership 
was implausible and the claim of evidence was "newly contrived."  
Second, the judge also commented that Bass's claim that he owned 
the gloves was "suspect given that the gloves were found inside 
a plastic bag containing pants stained with [the defendant's] 
blood."  A motion judge has discretion to credit evidence or to 
make a determination concerning its reliability.  Commonwealth 
v. Bonnet, 482 Mass. 838, 848 (2019), citing Commonwealth v. 
Sullivan, 469 Mass. 340, 351 (2014).  Here, the judge found the 
claims not to be credible, and thus concluded that there could 
be no error in trial counsel having failed to cross-examine a 
witness on evidence that was "implausible" and seemingly "newly 
contrived" in support of the motion for a new trial. 
40 
 
 
e.  Newly discovered evidence.  The defendant also asserts 
that "newly discovered" evidence involving jailhouse calls by 
Olivio, and Olivio's criminal convictions after the defendant's 
trial, require a new trial. 
Where a defendant moves for a new trial on the ground of 
newly discovered evidence, the defendant must show that the 
evidence "is in fact newly discovered"; the newly discovered 
evidence is "credible and material"; and the newly discovered 
evidence "casts real doubt on the justice of the conviction."  
See Pina, 481 Mass. at 435, and cases cited.  "Evidence is newly 
discovered if it 'was unknown to the defendant or trial counsel 
at the time of trial' or at an earlier motion for a new trial."  
Commonwealth v. Ellis, 475 Mass. 459, 472 (2016), citing 
Commonwealth v. Cowels, 470 Mass. 607, 616 (2015). 
The defendant argues that recordings of jailhouse calls 
between Olivio and several individuals are "newly discovered," 
and would have "substantially weaken[ed] the Commonwealth's 
case," casting doubt on the justice of the convictions.  Three 
of the calls were made while Olivio was being held on $250,000 
bail before the defendant's trial, and the others were made 
after the defendant had been convicted.  The calls, which do not 
use individuals' names, could tend to suggest that Olivio was 
seeking another plea arrangement in connection with his pending 
charges, notwithstanding his assertions to the contrary at the 
41 
 
defendant's trial.  Similarly, the defendant claims that 
evidence of Olivio's later convictions would have been material 
and relevant to impeach Olivio. 
The defendant's trial counsel was aware of Olivio's pending 
charges and that he was being held on bail.  There is no showing 
that reasonable due diligence would not have uncovered calls 
from Olivio that took place before trial.  Pina, 481 Mass. 
at 435 (defendant must show that reasonable diligence on part of 
defendant or defense counsel would not have uncovered evidence 
by time of trial or first motion for new trial).  The defendant 
argues that if trial counsel had tried to obtain the call 
records, he would have failed because of either the short time 
span or the refusal of jail staff to provide them, and that such 
an inability to obtain the evidence renders it "newly 
discovered."  We can only speculate as to what would have 
happened if counsel had sought to obtain the records of the 
calls, but he did not, and thus the calls made pretrial are not 
"newly discovered," because with due diligence they could have 
been discovered at that time. 
Even if the evidence indeed had been newly discovered, 
however, it merely would have been cumulative of significant 
other evidence challenging Olivio's credibility.  Counsel cast 
doubt on Olivio's credibility repeatedly, from counsel's opening 
statement through the end of his closing argument.  For 
42 
 
instance, Olivio admitted that he did not cooperate before the 
grand jury because he "didn't want to snitch" and he "wanted to 
take things in [his] hands."  Olivio denied lying, but when 
asked, "Well, you didn't tell the truth, correct?" he replied, 
"Correct."  Olivio admitted to lying before the grand jury, the 
jury heard evidence of a very beneficial cooperation agreement, 
and he was impeached by multiple other convictions.  Additional 
evidence that Olivio had lied with respect to a plea agreement 
concerning the pending charges would have had little impact on 
the jury's evaluation of Olivio's credibility. 
Because the purported newly discovered evidence is merely 
cumulative, this is not one of those "rare cases" where a new 
trial is warranted because "the Commonwealth's case 
depends . . . heavily on the testimony of a witness and where 
the newly discovered evidence seriously undermines the 
credibility of that witness" (quotations and citation omitted).  
See Cowels, 470 Mass. at 621.  Moreover, much of this asserted 
newly discovered evidence, such as the bulk of the jailhouse 
calls, concerns events that took place after the defendant's 
convictions, and that would not have been admissible to show any 
person's state of mind at the time of the defendant's trial. 
 
f.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant urges 
this court to use its authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to 
reduce the verdict of murder in the first degree to manslaughter 
43 
 
or to murder in the second degree.  He argues that we should 
consider the spontaneity of the fight and whether the killing 
was the product of reasonable provocation or sudden combat, 
rather than malice. 
 
Under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, "[t]his court may overturn a 
conviction and remand the case to the Superior Court for a new 
trial or reduce a conviction of murder in the first degree to a 
conviction on a lesser charge, for any reason that justice may 
require."  Commonwealth v. Billingslea, 484 Mass. 606, 618 
(2020).  A reduction in guilt may be appropriate even where the 
evidence is sufficient to support the verdict.  See Commonwealth 
v. Rolon, 438 Mass. 808, 821 (2003).  This court, however, 
"grants relief under § 33E extremely rarely and only in the most 
extraordinary circumstances."  Billingslea, supra. 
Considering the particulars of the fight that led to the 
victim's death, we do not discern the spontaneity or reasonable 
provocation that sometimes may persuade us to reduce a verdict.  
The record does show that Olivio injured the defendant twice, in 
the period immediately preceding the fatal shooting, and in both 
instances the injuries were far from minor.  None of the 
incidents before the fatal shooting, however, appeared to 
surprise the individuals involved, and, indeed, they appeared to 
have sought each other out at public locations that were known 
to them as places to gather and socialize.  In particular, 
44 
 
during what was described as an "unfair" beating of three 
individuals on one, which the defendant invited, his friend 
stood by, carrying a gun, and not coming to his defense. 
 
Importantly, as discussed, the defendant took the 
opportunity after the blows had ended, and while his assailants 
were walking away, to obtain a weapon from his friend, rather 
than to escape or otherwise to avoid further combat.  This 
suggests a deliberateness and choice of escalation that could 
have been avoided.  The intent to kill was not formed in the 
"heat of sudden affray or combat," Commonwealth v. Baker, 346 
Mass. 107, 119 (1963), but, rather, after the conflict had 
ended, even if mere moments before the shot was fired.  Compare 
Niemic I, 472 Mass. at 679 (ordering new trial or reduction in 
verdict where there was no self-defense instruction and there 
was evidence that supported self-defense, in conjunction with 
erroneous statements by prosecutor in closing). 
 
Here, the jury were instructed on the defenses of 
reasonable provocation or sudden combat, but did not find that 
the defendant merited the resultant reduction in the degree of 
guilt to manslaughter or to murder in the second degree.  Absent 
evidence in our plenary review to indicate that the result 
should be contrary, we will not replace the jury in their 
assessment of a record that depended heavily on credibility 
assessments of the witnesses. 
45 
 
 
Having conducted the plenary review required by G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, we conclude that a reduction in the verdict would 
not be more consonant with the interest of justice in this case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order denying motion for  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  a new trial affirmed. 
 
 
CYPHER, J. (concurring, with whom Kafker, J., joins).  
Although I agree with the outcome, I write separately to the 
address the prosecutor's closing argument.  Specifically, the 
defendant contends, and the court agrees, that the prosecutor 
engaged in impermissible speculation when she described the 
victim as "cowering" and stated that the victim "knew what was 
coming" at the time he was shot.  A prosecutor may "argu[e] 
forcefully for a conviction based on the evidence and on 
inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence."  
Commonwealth v. Walters, 485 Mass. 271, 289 (2020), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 516 (1987).  I disagree 
with the court that the prosecutor went beyond the bounds of a 
reasonable inference in making this argument. 
 
The medical examiner testified that the bullet entered the 
top rear of the victim's head and traveled seventeen and one-
half inches directly down through the victim's body.  Based on 
this evidence, the jury could have inferred that the victim was 
not in the car at the time he was shot, as it would have been 
difficult for the defendant to shoot him in the top of the head 
if he had been sitting in the car.  The prosecutor's suggestion 
that the evidence was consistent with the victim "either getting 
out of the car or being dragged out of the car" was a reasonable 
inference.  The medical examiner's testimony that she could not 
tell how close the gun was to the victim when it was fired, or 
2 
 
the angle of the weapon when it was fired, does not negate the 
inference that the victim was no longer in the car when he was 
shot. 
 
I also disagree with the court's conclusion that the 
prosecutor's use of the word "cowering" was mere speculation 
rather than reasonable inference based on the evidence.  "Expert 
testimony is required where an inference is 'beyond [the] common 
knowledge and experience of the ordinary lay[person]'" 
(quotation omitted).  Walters, 485 Mass. at 291, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Scott, 464 Mass. 355, 363 (2013).  Although the 
medical examiner testified that she could not say what the 
victim's position was at the time of the shooting, her testimony 
that the bullet entered the top of the victim's head and 
traveled directly down permits the inference that the defendant 
was standing above the victim.  The court states that a 
"reasonable inference might have been that the victim was 
kneeling or sitting."  See ante at    .  To "cower" is defined 
as (1) "to crouch down:  squat" or (2) "to shrink away or cringe 
[usually] in abject fear of something menacing or domineering 
and sometimes from cold."  Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 526 (1993).  There is little difference between 
kneeling or sitting on the ground and crouching down.  Further, 
it is a reasonable inference that when a gun was pointed at the 
victim, he shrunk away.  See Commonwealth v. Parker, 481 Mass. 
3 
 
69, 74 (2018) ("In closing argument, prosecutors are entitled to 
marshal the evidence and suggest inferences that the jury may 
draw from it" [quotation, citation, and alteration omitted]). 
 
Finally, I disagree that the prosecutor's statement that 
the victim "knew what was coming" improperly invited juror 
sympathy by emphasizing purported emotions of the victim before 
his death that were unsupported in evidence.  Rather, I conclude 
that the statement was a reasonable inference that an ordinary 
layperson could make based on the evidence presented that the 
defendant pointed a gun at the victim and then shot him in the 
top of the head.  See Scott, 464 Mass. at 362-363.  See also 
Commonwealth v. Reyes, 483 Mass. 65, 75-76 (2019) (prosecutor's 
statement that defendant obtaining knife on night before killing 
evidenced premeditation based on reasonable inference even where 
defendant testified that he obtained knife for self-defense and 
did not use it during killing); Commonwealth v. Diaz, 478 Mass. 
481, 490 (2017) (prosecutor's statement that victim "didn't die 
from the first blow" was reasonable inference where medical 
examiner's testimony supported theory but left open possibility 
that victim could have suffered immediate death); Commonwealth 
v. Burgess, 450 Mass. 422, 437 (2008) (prosecutor's statement 
that defendant pursued victim into bathroom was reasonable 
inference from evidence that knife with defendant's fingerprints 
on it was found in bathroom sink); Commonwealth v. Colon, 449 
4 
 
Mass. 207, 223-224, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1079 (2007), S.C., 
479 Mass. 1032 (2018) (prosecutor's statement that defendant was 
"ruthless drug dealer who would kill to obtain his own 'corner'" 
was fair inference where defendant testified to financial 
dispute with victim over drug-dealing operation); Commonwealth 
v. Corriveau, 396 Mass. 319, 337 (1985) (prosecutor's statement 
that sexual activity played part in killing was reasonable 
inference given evidence that defendant and victim were observed 
dancing, kissing, and holding hands earlier that night). 
 
By contrast, in Commonwealth v. Rutherford, 476 Mass. 639, 
646 (2017), we concluded that the prosecutor's statement that 
the victim was "crawling away to die" unfairly asked jurors to 
imagine the victim's final thoughts and invited jurors to decide 
the case based on sympathy for the victim.  There, although the 
evidence supported the inference that the victim was crawling on 
his hands and knees, there was no evidence to warrant the 
inference that he was crawling away to die.  See id. at 646-647.  
The prosecutor's contention that the victim was crawling away 
from a telephone that could be used to call 911 did not permit 
the inference that the victim was instead crawling to his death.  
See id. at 646.  See also Commonwealth v. Valentin, 474 Mass. 
301, 307 (2016) ("piling of inference upon inference is 
improper" [quotation and citation omitted]). 
5 
 
 
Unlike in Rutherford, the prosecutor's statements here did 
not require the jurors to imagine the defendant's final 
thoughts, nor did the statements invite the jurors to decide the 
case on sympathy for the victim.  Instead, the prosecutor's 
statements were commonsense inferences to be drawn from the 
testimony of the medical examiner and the evidence presented 
that the defendant pointed a gun at the victim's head and shot 
him. 
 
I am not suggesting that we lighten the duty of prosecutors 
to confine their arguments to those supported by the evidence or 
to avoid unfair emotional appeals.  I suggest only that we 
recognize a reasonable inference.