Title: Gardner v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
MICHAEL ARMIN GARDNER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 131166 
         JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  June 5, 2014 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals 
erred in affirming the circuit court’s exclusion of evidence 
of good character sought by the defendant. 
Procedural and Factual Background1 
In the Circuit Court of Arlington County, Michael Armin 
Gardner (Gardner) was charged with three counts of aggravated 
sexual battery in violation of Code § 18.2-67.3 and one count 
of object sexual penetration in violation of Code § 18.2-67.2.  
The charges arise from events alleged to have taken place 
during sleepovers at his home on June 16 and June 18, 2011, 
and involve pre-teen girls who were friends of his daughter.  
After a jury trial, Gardner was found guilty of two counts of 
aggravated sexual battery and one count of object sexual 
penetration.2 
                     
1 We will address only those facts and procedures 
relevant to the dispositive issue. 
 
2 The circuit court declared a mistrial on one count of 
aggravated sexual battery after the jury was unable to reach a 
unanimous verdict on that charge.  That charge is not 
presently at issue in this appeal. 
 
 
2 
Gardner appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals, 
which denied his petition for appeal.  Gardner v. 
Commonwealth, Record No. 1831-12-4 (June 21, 2013).  This 
Court granted Gardner’s petition for appeal.  The dispositive 
issue for purposes of this appeal is whether the Court of 
Appeals erred in affirming the judgment of conviction despite 
the circuit court’s refusal to permit Gardner to elicit 
evidence of his good character through two witnesses.3 
While presenting its case at trial, the defense called 
six character witnesses.  In addition to presenting evidence 
of Gardner’s character for truth and veracity, Gardner also 
attempted to question two of those character witnesses, Laurie 
Ombrembt (Ombrembt) and Katherine Allan (Allan), about his 
reputation in the community for being a good caretaker of 
children and for not being sexually assaultive or abusive 
toward them. 
Specifically, Gardner’s counsel asked Ombrembt, “Do you 
know if Mr. — what Mr. Gardner’s reputation is, among those 
who know him as well, for being someone who would be a good 
caretaker of children as opposed to someone who would harm or 
abuse or be neglectful of them?”  The Commonwealth objected 
                     
3 Although Gardner asserts additional assignments of 
error, we need not address them because this assignment of 
error is dispositive.  See, e.g., Board of Supervisors v. 
Davenport & Co., 285 Va. 580, 591-92, 742 S.E.2d 59, 64 
(2013). 
 
3 
and argued that Gardner was limited to presenting character 
evidence relating to “a reputation for truthfulness and 
veracity or for peacefulness.”  In response, Gardner argued to 
the circuit court that he was entitled to present evidence 
regarding his reputation for possessing traits related to the 
crimes charged and that reputation evidence could be in the 
form of negative testimony regarding his not having a 
reputation for possessing a certain trait. 
The Commonwealth then argued that 
it is the defendant’s reputation at the time of the 
incident which is at issue here, so if the neighbors 
had a discussion that he’s never known to be a 
pedophile, that would be one thing if they had a 
discussion in the neighborhood about that, but I 
doubt that they did until after the incident and I 
don’t think he can prove that up through this 
witness or any other. 
 
Immediately thereafter, the circuit court stated, “I 
agree,” and sustained the Commonwealth’s objection to the 
character evidence sought by Gardner. 
Gardner then proffered the following: 
Your Honor, we would proffer, then, that Ms. 
Ombrembt . . . would testify that - beyond what 
she’s already testified to - that there is no 
evidence of a negative sort that Mr. Gardner has 
been involved in any sort of abusive, physical, 
sexual, neglectful behavior with children. 
 
That that is current and that that is including 
the time period of mid-June of 2011 and the time 
frame leading up to that; that she has knowledge of 
that, of people’s involvement with Mr. Gardner; that 
they have expressed that they allow and would allow 
 
4 
[their] kids to be with him, to be supervised with 
him; and that they have no evidence, no indication, 
of any sort of bad conduct, sexual conduct, with 
minor children during that time. . . .  And she’s 
never heard any of that. 
Gardner called Allan as his next witness.  After 
establishing her knowledge of Gardner’s reputation in the 
community and questioning Allan about Gardner’s reputation for 
truth and veracity, Gardner, without objection, asked the 
circuit court to incorporate his earlier questions to Ombrembt 
and proffer as part of Allan’s testimony. 
In its order denying Gardner’s appeal and affirming the 
circuit court’s ruling regarding the Commonwealth’s objection 
to Gardner’s character evidence inquiry, the Court of Appeals 
stated that there was no evidence that the witnesses had 
discussed the characteristic of being a good caretaker of 
children and not being abusive or assaultive toward them prior 
to Gardner’s being charged with the offenses.  The court noted 
that the proffered testimony of the reputation witnesses 
focused on the suggestion that Gardner had not been involved 
previously in any sort of abusive, physical, sexual or 
neglectful behavior with children and that these witnesses 
knew individuals who would allow Gardner to supervise their 
children.  The Court of Appeals then concluded that the 
circuit court did not preclude testimony as to the general 
reputation evidence that existed regarding Gardner prior to 
 
5 
his being charged with the offenses and affirmed the judgment 
of the circuit court.  Considering the Commonwealth’s 
objections and Gardner’s proffer in the context in which they 
were presented at trial, we conclude that this ruling of the 
Court of Appeals was erroneous. 
Analysis 
Gardner claims that the circuit court misapplied the law 
by ruling that truth and veracity were the only admissible 
traits or, alternatively, that the reputational evidence 
sought was not within a relevant time period.  Gardner claims 
the Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the convictions 
and by ruling that the circuit court did not preclude 
testimony as to Gardner’s general reputation prior to his 
being charged with the offenses. 
By asking Ombrembt and Allan to testify about their 
personal knowledge of his “reputation in the community for a 
character trait at issue in the case,” Gardner maintains he 
laid the proper foundation for admission of the additional 
character testimony he sought from them.  He claims his 
proffer addressed the Commonwealth’s claim that the character 
testimony he sought did not relate to his reputation prior to 
being charged with the offenses.  Gardner proffered that the 
reputation evidence he sought from the witnesses included “the 
time period of mid-June of 2011 and the time frame leading up 
 
6 
to it.”  According to Gardner, the proffer also provided 
additional foundational information to support the 
reputational evidence he wanted admitted. 
The Commonwealth acknowledges Gardner’s proffer 
“reference[d] the relevant time period.”  However, it argues 
that “though [Gardner] asserted Ombrembt and Allan were aware 
of the assessment of Gardner by particular individuals as it 
related to their children, [he] failed to place this proffer 
into the larger context of community opinion.”  The 
Commonwealth disagrees that Gardner’s proffer was merely 
laying a foundation.  According to the Commonwealth, Gardner’s 
proffer focused on Ombrembt’s and Allan’s own personal 
knowledge, which is impermissible as character evidence. 
A trial court exercises its sound discretion when it 
decides whether to admit character evidence in the form of 
witness testimony in a criminal trial.  See Zirkle v. 
Commonwealth, 189 Va. 862, 872, 55 S.E.2d 24, 30 (1949).  
However, although a trial court exercises its discretion in 
admitting or excluding evidence, the court may not exercise 
its discretion to exclude admissible evidence.  See Gray v. 
Rhoads, 268 Va. 81, 86, 597 S.E.2d 93, 96 (2004).  This is 
because admissibility of evidence is determined by legal 
principles.  Id. 
 
7 
At trial, the Commonwealth objected, on two grounds, to 
Gardner’s question that sought the disputed character 
evidence.  It first objected to the question because the 
Commonwealth believed Gardner was limited to character 
evidence concerning reputation for truthfulness, veracity or 
peacefulness.  Secondly, the Commonwealth claimed that the 
question sought inadmissible reputation evidence because the 
evidence did not exclusively concern Gardner’s reputation 
before the incident.  As a matter of law, neither ground was a 
proper basis for sustaining the Commonwealth’s objection to 
Gardner’s question that sought the proposed character 
evidence. 
We have repeatedly stated that a defendant is not limited 
solely to reputation evidence regarding truthfulness, but may 
offer evidence to prove good character for any trait relevant 
in the case.  See Barlow v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 338, 340, 
297 S.E.2d 645, 646 (1982); Zirkle, 189 Va. at 871, 55 S.E.2d 
at 29; see also Va. R. Evid. 2:404(a)(1) (permitting character 
evidence in the form of “[e]vidence of a pertinent character 
trait of the accused offered by the accused”).  Character is 
used as a synonym for reputation.  Zirkle, 189 Va. at 871, 55 
S.E.2d at 29.  “A person on trial for a criminal offense has 
the right to introduce evidence of his good character, on the 
theory that it is improbable that a person who bears a good 
 
8 
reputation would be likely to commit the crime charged against 
him.”  Id.  For this reason, the circuit court erred as a 
matter of law to the extent it sustained the Commonwealth’s 
objection and excluded Gardner’s character evidence based upon 
the Commonwealth’s stated objection that character evidence is 
limited to a defendant’s character for truth and veracity or 
for peacefulness. 
Likewise, case law does not support the Commonwealth’s 
argument at trial, accepted by the circuit court and affirmed 
by the Court of Appeals, that Gardner’s character evidence was 
restricted to his reputation before being criminally charged.  
The Commonwealth cites no Virginia case that supports 
excluding evidence offered to bolster a defendant’s character 
on that basis.  Prior decisions of this Court and of the Court 
of Appeals demonstrate that reference to post-offense conduct 
or conversations in cross-examining a defense character 
witness may be restricted in the discretion of the trial 
court, but none of these cases asks the impossible:  that a 
defense character witness not testify to the defendant’s 
reputation at the time of trial but reconstruct what that 
reputation was prior to the offense.  See Ginger v. 
Commonwealth, 137 Va. 811, 814-15, 120 S.E. 151, 152 (1923) 
(prosecution rebuttal character witness could not testify 
without knowledge of the general reputation of the defendant 
 
9 
before or after the offense); Mohler v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 
713, 735-36, 111 S.E. 454, 461-62 (1922) (in rebutting defense 
character evidence, prosecution cannot offer proof of a 
reputation adversely affected by the pendency of the present 
prosecution); Carter v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 169, 
169-70 (1819) (witness without knowledge of the defendant’s 
character could not recount conversation with third party held 
after the pending charges were brought); Gravely v. 
Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 560, 564, 414 S.E.2d 190, 192 (1992) 
(on cross-examination of defense character witness 
Commonwealth may not question about unrelated offenses 
occurring after the date of the events giving rise to the 
pending charges). 
Generally, “in a criminal prosecution [if the prosecution 
is allowed to offer evidence of the defendant’s bad character 
for a particular trait] the evidence must be limited to [the 
defendant’s] general reputation ante litem motam,” i.e., 
before the defendant was accused of the crime or the trial 
began.  Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Vickers, 121 Va. 
311, 314, 93 S.E. 577, 578 (1917).  The purpose of this 
evidence rule is to prevent admission of untrustworthy adverse 
reputation character evidence engendered by the very fact of 
the pending charges from unfairly influencing the jury’s 
 
10 
verdict.4  See Ginger, 137 Va. at 815, 120 S.E. at 152 
(“[U]nfounded suspicions engendered by the accusation may 
serve to color the reputation and render it untrustworthy”) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).5 
The rationale for the restriction on adverse character 
proof does not apply when a defendant offers evidence of his 
good reputation.  Any character witness who is prepared to 
testify as to the defendant’s good reputation after the 
defendant has been accused of a crime has certainly not formed 
“unfounded suspicions engendered by the accusation.”  Id. 
Additionally, the Commonwealth argues that the Court of 
Appeals did not err in affirming the convictions because the 
circuit court correctly ruled that Gardner had to provide 
evidence that the witnesses had discussed the relevant 
characteristics prior to Gardner’s being charged for their 
testimony to be admissible.  However, the Court of Appeals has 
previously ruled otherwise.  In Byrdsong v. Commonwealth, 
                     
4 See generally 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1618, at 492-93 (3d 
ed. 1940) (collecting cases). 
 
5 See generally Christopher Mueller & Laird Kirkpatrick, 
Evidence § 419 (3d ed. 2003) (citing case law for the 
proposition that a defendant’s “reputation in the community 
after the charge became publicized might not be a trustworthy 
index to his actual character”); Roger Park, et al., Evidence 
Law § 5.07 & n.80 (3d ed. 2011) (citing cases where the 
prosecution’s attempt to rebut defendant’s character proof 
with reputation affected by the existence of the pending 
charges was disallowed). 
 
11 
2 Va. App. 400, 407, 345 S.E.2d 528, 532 (1986), the character 
witness frankly admitted that “[the defendant’s reputation] 
came up after this case came up, but I can’t pinpoint anybody 
ever having the need to discuss [whether] he was telling the 
truth before this came up.”6  (Emphasis in original.)  The 
Court of Appeals correctly held in Byrdsong that the trial 
court should have allowed the jury to hear the witness’s 
testimony.  Id. at 406, 345 S.E.2d at 532.  To the extent the 
circuit court sustained the Commonwealth’s objection because 
Gardner failed to show his character witnesses had discussed 
his reputation prior to the incident, or because their 
testimony might have included evidence of Gardner’s reputation 
as of the day of trial, the circuit court erred. 
Although the circuit court erred in sustaining the 
objection to Gardner’s character evidence questions, we must 
                     
6 Our law permits character evidence based on what the 
witness has heard about the defendant and what the witness has 
“not heard in the community,” which makes any requirement of 
prior discussion by the witness obviously inapplicable.  See 
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 423, 440, 587 S.E.2d 532, 544 
(2003); Zirkle, 189 Va. at 871-72, 55 S.E.2d at 29-30; 
Byrdsong, 2 Va. App. at 406, 345 S.E.2d at 531.  Generally, 
there is no requirement that the defense character witness 
have engaged in prior discussions of defendant's character for 
the traits at issue. See also Michelson v. United States, 335 
U.S. 469, 478 (1948) (approving testimony that the witness had 
heard nothing ill of the defendant).  See generally, e.g., 
Kenneth Broun, et al., McCormick on Evidence, § 43 (6th ed. 
2006) (describing requirements for a character witness's 
knowledge of the defendant's reputation with no mention of a 
prior discussion requirement). 
 
12 
consider the proffer to determine whether the circuit court’s 
error prejudiced Gardner.  See Commonwealth Transp. Comm’r v. 
Target Corp., 274 Va. 341, 348, 650 S.E.2d 92, 96 (2007) 
(holding that without a proper proffer, this Court was unable 
to determine whether the trial court’s ruling on admissibility 
of the evidence prejudiced the appellant).  “Error may . . . 
be predicated upon . . . exclusion of evidence [if] the 
substance of the evidence was made known to the court by 
proffer.”  Va. R. Evid. 2:103(a)(2).  Counsel is required to 
proffer the substance of the anticipated testimony.  Whittaker 
v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 966, 968-69, 234 S.E.2d 79, 81 
(1977); Scott v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 73, 78-79, 60 S.E.2d 
14, 16 (1950); Owens v. Commonwealth, 147 Va. 624, 630-31, 136 
S.E. 765, 767 (1927); Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Pollard, 
94 Va. 146, 156-57, 26 S.E. 421, 423-24 (1896).   
A criminal defendant may prove his good reputation for a 
particular character trait by presenting “[n]egative evidence 
of good character.”  Zirkle, 189 Va. at 871, 55 S.E.2d at 29.  
“Negative evidence of good character is based on the theory 
that a person has a good reputation if that reputation has not 
been questioned.”  Jackson v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 423, 439, 
587 S.E.2d 532, 544 (2003).  “A witness may testify that he or 
she has never heard that the accused has the reputation of 
possessing a certain trait.”  Chiles v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. 
 
13 
App. 698, 700, 406 S.E.2d 413, 415 (1991).  We conclude that 
Gardner’s proffer was sufficient to demonstrate the substance 
of the evidence of Gardner’s character that would have been 
provided, if the circuit court had not erroneously sustained 
an objection to Gardner’s inquiry concerning his character, 
and it would have been favorable to Gardner. 
A jury may consider character evidence in determining a 
criminal defendant’s guilt and punishment.  Zirkle, 189 Va. at 
871, 55 S.E.2d at 29.  Considering the evidence presented at 
trial and the fact that the jury could not reach a unanimous 
verdict on one count of aggravated sexual battery, we cannot 
say with fair assurance that the circuit court’s exclusion of 
Ombrembt’s and Allan’s character testimony did not 
“substantially sway[]” the jury’s determination of Gardner’s 
guilt.  See Clay v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 253, 260, 546 S.E.2d 
728, 731-32 (2001) (“[I]f one cannot say, with fair assurance, 
after pondering all that happened without stripping the 
erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not 
substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to 
conclude that substantial rights were not affected. . . .  
If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot 
stand.”) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 
764-65 (1946)).  Thus, we cannot say that the circuit court’s 
sustaining of the Commonwealth’s objection resulting in the 
 
14 
exclusion of Gardner’s character evidence was harmless error.  
See Barlow, 224 Va. at 342, 297 S.E.2d at 647 (holding that 
the exclusion of defendant’s character evidence of nonviolence 
was not harmless error, despite defendant’s opportunity to 
present evidence of his reputation for being “honest and hard-
working”); see also Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 
476 (1948) (recognizing “[the] privilege [of presenting 
character evidence] is sometimes valuable to a defendant 
[because] such testimony alone, in some circumstances, may be 
enough to raise a reasonable doubt of guilt”). 
Conclusion 
We hold that the Court of Appeals erred in denying 
Gardner’s appeal, because the circuit court erred by 
sustaining the Commonwealth’s objection to Gardner’s question 
that sought admissible character evidence.  Furthermore, we 
cannot say that such error was harmless.  Therefore, we will 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacate the 
convictions, and remand this case to the Court of Appeals 
directing that it remand the case to the circuit court for 
further proceedings if the Commonwealth be so inclined. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
 
 
 
15 
JUSTICE LEMONS, concurring. 
 
I join the majority opinion in its entirety and write 
this concurrence to emphasize one additional matter which will 
be relevant upon remand – the joinder of the separate offenses 
under Rule 3A:10(c). 
 
Gardner assigns error to the Court of Appeals' judgment 
affirming the trial court's joinder of charges against him 
arising from allegations of criminal conduct occurring on June 
16 and June 18, 2011.  Because this case will be reversed and 
remanded and Gardner's convictions will be vacated, it is 
unnecessary for this Court to address whether the trial court 
erred by joining the separate offenses for trial.  However, if 
the Commonwealth proceeds with prosecution following remand, 
it will have the burden of moving for joinder again and the 
defendant will have the opportunity to oppose the motion. 
As a general rule, evidence of propensity to commit a 
crime is inadmissible.  Va. R. Evid. 2:404(b) ("Evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is generally not admissible to 
prove the character trait of a person in order to show that 
the person acted in conformity therewith.").  However, under 
Rule 3A:10(c), a trial court may order the defendant to be 
tried in a single trial for more than one offense if "justice 
does not require separate trials and (i) the offenses meet the 
requirements of Rule 3A:6(b) or (ii) the accused and the 
 
16 
Commonwealth's attorney consent thereto."  Scott v. 
Commonwealth, 274 Va. 636, 644, 651 S.E.2d 630, 634 (2007).  
See also Commonwealth v. Smith, 263 Va. 13, 16, 557 S.E.2d 
223, 225 (2002); Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 229, 
421 S.E.2d 821, 827 (1992); Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 
33, 393 S.E.2d 599, 603 (1990).  Under Rule 3A:6(b), two or 
more offenses may be joined "if the offenses are based on the 
same act or transaction, or on two or more acts or 
transactions that are connected or constitute parts of a 
common scheme or plan." 
Upon remand, if the Commonwealth seeks joinder again, the 
trial court must carefully reconsider the standards we have 
articulated for joinder of separate offenses. 
 
JUSTICE McCLANAHAN, dissenting. 
 
I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the circuit 
court abused its discretion in excluding Gardner's proffered 
character testimony of Laurie Ombrembt and Katherine Allan.  
Furthermore, for the reasons stated by the Court of Appeals in 
denying Gardner's petition for appeal, I do not believe the 
circuit court abused its discretion in reaching its other 
rulings challenged in this appeal.  I would thus affirm the 
judgment of the circuit court. 
 
17 
 
Following Ombrembt's testimony regarding Gardner's 
reputation for truthfulness, his counsel asked Ombrembt about 
Gardner's reputation for being "a good caretaker of children."  
The circuit court sustained the Commonwealth's objection to the 
question on the ground that no foundation had been established 
for whether such reputation was for the period before or after 
Gardner's alleged crimes, as the latter would be inadmissible.  
Gardner's counsel then proffered Ombrembt's testimony in 
response to this question regarding Gardner's reputation for 
being a good caretaker of children, which clarified that the 
response would cover the period leading up to Gardner's alleged 
crimes.  Gardner's counsel subsequently offered this proffer as 
Allan's answer to the same question regarding Gardner's 
reputation for child care. 
By proffering this testimony, Gardner preserved the right 
to challenge its exclusion on appeal, and the proffer is now 
before us for review.  See Va. R. Evid. 2:103(a)(2); Holles v. 
Sunrise Terrace, Inc., 257 Va. 131, 135, 509 S.E.2d 494, 497 
(1999); Owens v. Commonwealth, 147 Va. 624, 630, 136 S.E. 765, 
767 (1927).  The proffered testimony contained no statement that 
either Ombrembt or Allan was aware of Gardner's reputation in 
the community for a trait regarding child care, which was a 
threshold requirement for its admission under well-settled 
principles.  I would, therefore, hold that the proffer was 
 
18 
legally deficient for reputation evidence – despite the 
clarification regarding the timing issue. 
 
A character witness in a criminal case "must be aware of 
the [accused's] reputation in the community before [she] may 
testify [regarding the accused's] reputation for a particular 
characteristic."  Jackson v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 423, 440, 587 
S.E.2d 532, 544 (2003).  As a corollary, the testimony is 
confined to "the opinion that the people of the community have 
of [the accused]."  Zirkle v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 862, 871, 55 
S.E.2d 24, 29 (1949).  The long-established rationale for this 
common law rule of evidence, which presents a significant 
exception to the hearsay rule, is as follows: "reputation is the 
aggregate voice of a community, offered to prove its corporate 
or collective opinion, as the basis for inferences that the 
person is a particular sort of person, hence that he probably 
behaved a certain way.  It is the very fact that the witness 
reports the voice of the community that is thought to be the 
great strength of such proof."  Christopher B. Mueller & Laird 
C. Kirkpatrick, 2 Federal Evidence § 4:42 (4th ed. 2013) (citing 
Badger v. Badger, 88 N.Y. 546, 552 (N.Y. 1882)and Michelson v. 
United States, 335 U.S. 469, 477 (1948)). 
 
"Reputation," in short, "is not what a few persons say or 
may think about the accused, it is what the community generally 
believes."  Moore v. United States, 123 F.2d 207, 210 (5th Cir. 
 
19 
1941) (citations omitted).  In laying a foundation for the 
admission of reputation evidence, the proponent must therefore 
"establish[] that the community from which the reputation 
testimony is drawn is sufficiently broad to provide the witness 
with adequate knowledge to give a reliable assessment."  
Morrison v. State, 818 So.2d 432, 449 (Fla. 2002) (citation 
omitted); see State v. Denny, 240 S.E.2d 437, 439 (N.C. 1978) 
("[D]efendant's character is proved by testimony concerning his 
general reputation, held by an appreciable group of people who 
have had adequate basis upon which to form their opinion." 
(emphasis in original) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Commonwealth v. La Pierre, 408 N.E.2d 883, 883-84 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (explaining that "the trial judge has 
discretion to exclude [reputation] evidence if he determines 
that it is based on the opinions of too limited a group," 
because "[i]t is only where the sources are sufficiently 
numerous and general that they are viewed as trustworthy" 
(citation omitted)).  Thus, for example, in State v. Tucker, 968 
A.2d 543, 548-49 (Me. 2009), the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine 
held that reputation testimony was properly excluded because it 
was based on reports from only eight people in a single 
apartment community. 
 
Here, the proffered testimony contained an ambiguous 
reference to Ombrembt's "knowledge of . . . people's involvement 
 
20 
with Mr. Gardner," followed by the statement that "they have 
expressed that they allow and [she] would allow her kids to be 
with him, [and] be supervised with him."  (Emphasis added.)  
Ombrembt would then purportedly state that "they have no 
evidence, no indication, of any sort of bad conduct, sexual 
conduct, with minor children."  (Id.)  Ombrembt's reference to 
"people" involved with Gardner, who purportedly expressed an 
opinion about him, could have been any number of individuals 
(even as few as two) having any number of disparate connections 
to him.  There was simply no proffer that Ombrembt knew of 
Gardner's reputation for child care from the collective judgment 
of any particular community of appreciable size and definition 
such as to make the community judgment probative, as required 
for the admission of reputation evidence.1 
 
Even if we assume by the reference to "people" that 
Ombrembt was referring to the same individuals upon whom she 
                     
1 The proffer, of course, cannot reasonably be read in the 
alternative as presenting Ombrembt's knowledge of Gardner's 
reputation among everyone with whom he was involved in all of 
his various social, commercial and professional activities and 
associations, which would be incredible on its face.  See 
Nobrega v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 508, 518, 628 S.E.2d 922, 927 
(2006) (the trial court may reject, as a matter of law, 
testimony determined to be "'inherently incredible'" (quoting 
Walker v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 54, 70-71, 515 S.E.2d 565, 575 
(1999)); Barker v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 370, 374, 337 S.E.2d 
729, 732 (1985) ("'[W]e are not required to believe that which 
we know to be inherently incredible or contrary to human 
experience.'" (quoting Willis v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 560, 564, 
238 S.E.2d 811, 813 (1977)). 
 
21 
based her testimony regarding Gardner's reputation for 
truthfulness, the proffer would still be deficient.  There, 
Ombrembt simply identified two certain couples who lived nearby, 
and then made reference to "the neighbors around that [she] 
know[s] well" - whoever that might have been in addition to the 
two named couples, if she was in fact referring to anyone else.  
The opinion of a character witness's select group of individuals 
with whom she is best acquainted does not represent the 
collective judgment of a cognizable community for purposes of 
presenting reputation evidence.2  See Ginger v. Commonwealth, 137 
Va. 811, 814, 816, 120 S.E. 151, 152, 153 (1923) (reputation 
testimony about a person's dangerousness was "clearly 
inadmissible" when based on conversation with two law 
enforcement officers rather than "general reputation" (emphasis 
in original)). 
 
After hearing the proffered testimony and the argument of 
counsel about whether it constituted admissible reputation 
evidence, the circuit court did not change its ruling to exclude 
it.  For the reasons stated above, I would hold that the circuit 
court did not abuse its discretion in finding an insufficient 
basis for the admission of the purported reputation evidence, as 
it was deficient as a matter of law in failing to identify a 
                     
 
2 Allen also testified about Gardner's purported reputation 
for truthfulness, but, like Ombrembt, Allen failed to identify a 
cognizable community from which to report that particular trait. 
 
22 
cognizable community.  Therefore, I would affirm Gardner's 
convictions.