Title: People v. Buycks

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
Filed 7/30/18 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S231765 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/8 B262023 
STEVENSON BUYCKS, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Respondent. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. NA097755 
 
____________________________________) 
 
) 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
)  
S232900 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/1 D066907 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 Imperial County 
LAURA REYNOSO VALENZUELA, 
)  
Super. Ct. No. JCF32712 
 
) 
 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
)  
S238888 
 
 
) 
 
In re JOHN MANUEL GUIOMAR 
)  
Ct.App. 6 H043114 
 
 
) 
 
 
on Habeas Corpus. 
)  
Monterey County 
 
) 
Super. Ct. Nos. 
 
____________________________________) 
 
  SS131590A, SS131650A  
 
At the November 4, 2014 General Election, California voters approved 
Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Proposition 47).  
Proposition 47 reclassified as misdemeanors certain offenses that previously were 
 
2 
 
felonies or “wobblers.”1  It also added Penal Code section 1170.18,2 which 
permits those previously convicted of felony offenses that Proposition 47 reduced 
to misdemeanors to petition to have such felony convictions resentenced or 
redesignated as misdemeanors.  Section 1170.18 allows those currently serving 
sentences for Proposition 47 eligible felony convictions to petition to have their 
sentences recalled and be “resentenced to a misdemeanor.”  (§ 1170.18, subd. (b).)  
It also allows those who have already completed their sentences for Proposition 47 
eligible felony convictions to petition to have their convictions “designated as 
misdemeanors.”  (§ 1170.18, subd. (f).)  Once an offense is resentenced or 
redesignated as a misdemeanor it “shall be considered a misdemeanor for all 
purposes.”  (Pen. Code, § 1170.18, subd. (k).)  
We granted review in three cases to resolve similar issues concerning 
Proposition 47’s effect on felony-based enhancements in resentencing proceedings 
under section 1170.18.  In People v. Buycks (S231765), we address whether 
Proposition 47 requires the dismissal of a two-year sentencing enhancement for 
committing a felony offense while released on bail for an earlier felony offense 
(§ 12022.1, subd. (b)) when that earlier felony offense is reduced to a 
misdemeanor under section 1170.18.  In People v. Valenzuela (S232900), we 
address whether Proposition 47 requires the dismissal of a one-year sentencing 
enhancement for having served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) when the 
felony underlying that prior prison term has been reduced to a misdemeanor under 
                                              
1 
Wobblers are “a special class of crimes involving conduct that varies 
widely in its level of seriousness,” and may therefore be “chargeable or . . . 
punishable as either a felony or a misdemeanor.”  (People v. Park (2013) 56 
Cal.4th 782, 789 (Park); see also People v. Kunkel (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 46, 51, 
fn. 3.) 
2 
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted. 
 
3 
 
section 1170.18.  In the third matter, In re Guiomar (S238888), we consider 
whether Proposition 47 requires the dismissal of a failure to appear for a felony 
charge under section 1320.5 when the underlying felony has subsequently been 
reduced to a misdemeanor under the initiative. 
We conclude that Proposition 47’s mandate that the resentenced or 
redesignated offense “be considered a misdemeanor for all purposes” (§ 1170.18, 
subd. (k)) permits defendants to challenge felony-based section 667.5 and 12022.1 
enhancements when the underlying felonies have been subsequently resentenced 
or redesignated as misdemeanors.  As explained below, under some circumstances 
such challenges may be brought in a resentencing procedure under section 
1170.18; they may also be brought on petition for writ of habeas corpus, in 
reliance on the retroactivity principle of In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 
(Estrada).  In the latter instance, relief is limited to judgments that were not final 
at the time the initiative took effect on November 5, 2014.  We further conclude, 
however, that those convicted under section 1320.5 cannot obtain similar relief. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Defendant Stevenson Buycks 
In November 2013, defendant Stevenson Buycks pleaded guilty to felony 
possession of narcotics in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11350, 
subdivision (a), in case No. BA418285.  The trial court ordered Buycks to enroll 
in a one-year, live-in treatment program in lieu of a prison sentence and released 
him on his own recognizance. 
However, in December 2013, Buycks was caught shoplifting at a Home 
Depot, resisted theft-prevention officers who tried to apprehend him, wielded a 
knife, escaped in a van, and then was chased by police until his van was rammed 
to a stop by a police car.  Buycks had also abandoned his drug treatment program, 
 
4 
 
and, in late December 2013, the trial court sentenced him to three years in state 
prison based on his earlier conviction for felony possession of narcotics in case 
No. BA418285. 
 Regarding his second case involving the Home Depot-related crimes, case 
No. NA097755, Buycks was charged with two counts of second degree robbery in 
violation of section 211, one count of petty theft by a person with three prior 
convictions in violation of section 666, subdivision (a), and one count of evading a 
police officer in violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.2, subdivision (a).  
Because he had committed these new felonies while released on his own 
recognizance on the earlier felony for possession of narcotics, Buycks was also 
charged in this second case with an on-bail (or released on own recognizance) 
enhancement under section 12022.1, subdivision (b).  That subdivision provides: 
“Any person arrested for a secondary [felony] offense that was alleged to have 
been committed while that person was released from custody on a primary 
[felony] offense shall be subject to a penalty enhancement of an additional two 
years, which shall be served consecutive to any other term imposed by the court.”  
(§ 12022.1, subd. (b).)   
On August 28, 2014, Buycks entered a negotiated plea of no contest to a 
single count of petty theft with a prior, a felony, and evading a police officer, also 
a felony.  He admitted he had committed those offenses while released on his own 
recognizance in the first felony case (§ 12022.1), and that he had served two prior 
prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).  He was sentenced that same day to seven years 
eight months, which included two years for the section 12022.1 enhancement. 
That judgment became final 60 days later. 
After the voters approved Proposition 47 in the November 4, 2014 General 
Election, Buycks successfully petitioned for resentencing in case No. BA418285, 
with the court granting his request to resentence his narcotics conviction to a 
 
5 
 
misdemeanor in early January 2015.  He also successfully petitioned under 
Proposition 47 for resentencing in his case No. NA097755, with the court granting 
his request to resentence his petty theft with a prior conviction to a misdemeanor 
in late January 2015.  The resentencing court, however, rejected Buycks’ argument 
that his section 12022.1 enhancement no longer applied because the narcotics 
offense for which he had been released on bail when he committed his Home 
Depot-related crimes was no longer a felony because of the passage of Proposition 
47.  The resentencing court reasoned that, at the time Buycks committed his Home 
Depot-related felonies, his earlier offense was still a felony and that Proposition 47 
did not apply to his section 12022.1 enhancement.  In resentencing defendant, the 
court restructured defendant’s sentence to make his conviction for felony evading 
a police officer as the principal term and imposed a full base term of three years, 
the maximum possible sentence, plus the enhancements for an aggregate sentence 
of 7 years. 
Buycks appealed the resentencing in this second case, contending that his 
section 12022.1 enhancement should not have been reimposed by the resentencing 
court because the narcotics offense for which he had been released on his own 
recognizance had been resentenced as a misdemeanor.  The Court of Appeal 
agreed, concluding that when Buycks’ Proposition 47 petition was granted in his 
second case, he was “subject to a full resentencing” in that case, and the trial court 
“was required to reevaluate the applicability of section 12022.1 at that time.”   
We granted review on our own motion. 
B.  Defendant Laura Reynoso Valenzuela 
In October 2012, defendant Laura Valenzuela was convicted of the felony 
of receiving stolen property under section 496 in case No. JCF28616, and she was 
sentenced to serve a 16-month prison term. 
 
6 
 
In September 2014, a jury in case No. JCF32712 found Valenzuela guilty 
of carjacking in violation of section 215, subdivision (a), reckless evasion of a 
peace officer in violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.2, subdivision (a), and 
possession of methamphetamine in violation of Health and Safety Code section 
11377, subdivision (a).  Because all three offenses involved a “felony for which a 
prison sentence or a sentence of imprisonment in a county jail” (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) 
could be imposed, these new crimes subjected Valenzuela to a prior felony prison 
term enhancement for her prior conviction in case No. JCF28616, requiring the 
court to “impose a one-year term for each prior separate prison term or county jail 
term imposed . . . for any [prior] felony” (ibid.).  
Valenzuela waived her right to a jury trial on her prior felony prison term 
enhancement allegations under section 667.5, subdivision (b), and the trial court 
found true an enhancement based on her 2012 receipt of stolen property conviction 
in case No. JCF28616.  As a result, at her sentencing in October 2014, Valenzuela 
received a one-year consecutive term for the section 667.5, subdivision (b) 
enhancement, with a total term of six years eight months in prison.  She then filed 
a notice of appeal concerning this second matter. 
After the November 2014 general election, and while her appeal was still 
pending, Valenzuela successfully petitioned to have her conviction for receipt of 
stolen property in case No. JCF28616 redesignated as a misdemeanor.  
On appeal, Valenzuela contended that the appellate court should reduce her 
narcotics offense to a misdemeanor.3  She further asserted that Proposition 47 
                                              
3 
Valenzuela also attempted to petition the trial court to have her conviction 
for possession of methamphetamine reduced to a misdemeanor in her second case 
that was then on appeal, but the trial court took the matter off its calendar, 
believing that it lacked jurisdiction pending the outcome of the appeal. 
 
7 
 
required the appellate court to strike her one-year section 667.5, subdivision (b) 
prior felony prison term enhancement because her 2012 receipt of stolen property 
conviction in case No. JCF28616 had been reduced to a misdemeanor.  The Court 
of Appeal refused to reduce her narcotics offense to a misdemeanor, stating that 
she must renew her petition in the trial court, and rejected her argument to strike 
the enhancement.  It noted that at the time Valenzuela was sentenced, her prior 
conviction was still a felony, and that the purpose of section 667.5 is to punish for 
recidivist conduct.  The Court of Appeal also concluded that nothing in 
Proposition 47 indicated an intent to retroactively ameliorate the collateral 
consequences of felonies reduced to misdemeanors. 
We granted Valenzuela’s petition for review. 
C.  Petitioner John Manuel Guiomar 
In March 2014, petitioner John Manuel Guiomar pleaded guilty regarding 
separate incidents in separate case numbers to felony second degree robbery (§ 
211), felony burglary (§ 459), and felony possession of a controlled substance 
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11350) in case No. SS130616A.  Guiomar also pleaded 
guilty to the crime of failure to appear (Pen. Code, § 1320.5) while on bail for the 
felony possession of a controlled substance charge in case No. SS131650A.  
Under section 1320.5, “[e]very person who is charged with or convicted of the 
commission of a felony, who is released from custody on bail, and who in order to 
evade the process of the court willfully fails to appear as required, is guilty of a 
felony.”  Guiomar’s aggregate sentence for all four cases was six years, with the 
trial court imposing an eight-month term for his section 1320.5 failure to appear 
conviction, to run consecutive to the other offenses. 
After passage of Proposition 47, Guiomar successfully petitioned for 
resentencing to reduce both his prior burglary conviction and his prior possession 
 
8 
 
of a controlled substance conviction in case No. SS130616A to misdemeanors.  At 
his May 6, 2015 resentencing hearing, Guiomar was not present but was 
represented by counsel.  Although the resentencing court granted Guiomar’s 
request to reduce both felonies to misdemeanors, it restructured his sentence to 
again reflect an aggregate sentence of six years by imposing a six-year term for the 
robbery.  The resentencing court did not dismiss the section 1320.5 count for the 
failure to appear while on a bail for a felony in case No. SS131650A, and it 
imposed the sentence for that offense as a four-year term concurrent to the term 
for the other offenses.  The clerk’s minutes indicate that the trial court resentenced 
Guiomar “pursuant to stipulation,” although it was unclear whether that referred to 
his original March 2014 plea agreement or a new stipulation entered at the 
Proposition 47 resentencing.  Guiomar unsuccessfully sought reconsideration of 
his sentence by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the resentencing 
court. 
Guiomar then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Court of 
Appeal, raising sentencing issues and alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at 
his resentencing hearing.  That petition was supplemented by his counsel, raising 
additional sentencing issues.  The Court of Appeal issued orders to show cause on 
both petitions. 
The Court of Appeal rejected Guiomar’s claim that the resentencing court 
lacked jurisdiction to resentence him on counts unaffected by Proposition 47.  (In 
re Guiomar (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 265, 273-275.)  The Court of Appeal also 
rejected his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, concluding that Guiomar 
was not prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to object to the restructuring of 
Guiomar’s sentence to impose the same six-year aggregate term because these 
resentencing decisions were within the court’s discretion.  The Court of Appeal 
further held that the reimposition of the section 1320.5 conviction was proper 
 
9 
 
because, at the time of his failure to appear, Guiomar was charged with a felony, 
notwithstanding the fact that the felony was ultimately reduced to a misdemeanor 
conviction under Proposition 47.  (In re Guiomar, at pp. 275-277.) 
We granted Guiomar’s petition for review. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
In addressing Proposition 47’s collateral effect on enhancements and 
offenses attached to convictions reduced to misdemeanors, we proceed as follows.   
First, we will consider the terms of and intent behind the pertinent 
provisions of Proposition 47, including the significance of Proposition 47’s 
mandate that the felonies reduced4 under its provisions “shall be considered a 
misdemeanor for all purposes.”  (Pen. Code, § 1170.18, subd. (k).)  From this, we 
conclude that the “misdemeanor for all purposes” provision operates prospectively 
— by having ameliorative effect on any new collateral consequence imposed after 
a successful Proposition 47 resentencing.  However, because Proposition 47 is a 
measure designed to ameliorate punishment, the “misdemeanor for all purposes” 
language also requires felony-based section 667.5 and 12022.1 enhancements to 
                                              
4 
As previously explained, Proposition 47 enacted two petitioning procedures 
for those already convicted of felonies that the initiative reclassified as 
misdemeanors.  Those currently serving felony sentences for Proposition 47 
eligible offenses may petition to have their sentences recalled and be “resentenced 
to a misdemeanor.”  (§ 1170.18, subd. (b).)  Those who have already completed 
their felony sentences for Proposition 47 eligible offenses may petition to have 
their felony convictions be “designated as misdemeanors.”  (§ 1170.18, subd. (f).)  
Regardless of whether a court has resentenced a crime as a misdemeanor or has 
redesignated a crime as a misdemeanor, we will generally use the term “reduced” 
to refer to both circumstances, unless otherwise noted. 
 
10 
 
be retroactively stricken, but only with regard to judgments that were not final at 
the time the initiative took effect.5 
Second, we will examine the Attorney General’s various arguments 
contending that Proposition 47 cannot upset felony-based enhancements already 
imposed, notwithstanding the fact that the underlying felony offense had been 
reduced to a misdemeanor under the proposition.  This review leads us to conclude 
that Buycks and Valenzuela are entitled to relief under the initiative, but that 
Guiomar is not, because a section 1320.5 offense is not premised on the conviction 
status of the felony for which the defendant failed to appear.   
A.  The Relevant Provisions of Proposition 47  
As previously discussed, at the November 4, 2014 General Election, 
California voters approved Proposition 47.  The measure amended portions of the 
Health and Safety Code and the Penal Code to reclassify certain drug possession 
and theft-related offenses from felonies or wobblers to misdemeanors, with limited 
exceptions for those offenders having certain prior convictions that are not 
relevant in the present matters.  (§ 1170.18, subds. (a), (i).)  The measure also 
added sections to the Government Code that assessed the annual savings generated 
from the act and invested those savings in various crime prevention and treatment 
programs.  (Gov. Code, §§ 7599-7599.2.)  
In addition to its reclassification of certain felonies to misdemeanors, 
Proposition 47 created procedures to ameliorate convictions for those currently 
serving a sentence for a qualifying felony, as well as those who have completed 
their sentences for a qualifying felony, regardless of whether those judgments are 
                                              
5 
A judgment becomes final when the availability of an appeal and the time 
for filing a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court have 
expired.  (People v. Kemp (1974) 10 Cal.3d 611, 614.) 
 
11 
 
final.  (§ 1170.18, subds. (a), (f).)  These provisions are expressly retroactive in 
their effect by permitting persons “who would have been guilty of a misdemeanor 
under” the measure had it “been in effect at the time of the offense” to petition to 
seek relief.  (Ibid.)  For those currently serving a sentence for a qualifying felony, 
Proposition 47 contains a discretionary component under which the resentencing 
court must assess whether “resentencing the petitioner would pose an 
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.”  (§ 1170.18, subd. (b).)  For those 
who have completed their sentences for a qualifying felony, the resentencing 
court, upon receiving an application from a person with a qualifying felony 
conviction, “shall designate the felony offense or offenses as a misdemeanor.”  
(Id., subd. (g).) 
Although no provision enacted by Proposition 47 expressly addresses 
whether the measure has any mitigating effect on felony-based enhancements or a 
felony failure to appear in which the underlying felony is reduced to a 
misdemeanor, section 1170.18, subdivision (k), which was enacted by that 
initiative, is relevant to the issue.  That subdivision states, in relevant part, that a 
“felony conviction that is recalled and resentenced under subdivision (b) or 
designated as a misdemeanor under subdivision (g) shall be considered a 
misdemeanor for all purposes . . . .”6  (§ 1170.18, subd. (k).)   
Finally, uncodified sections of Proposition 47 informed voters that the act 
“shall be broadly construed to accomplish its purposes,” and that its provisions 
“shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.”  (Voter Information 
                                              
6  
This provision contains an exception stating that “resentencing shall not 
permit that person to own, possess, or have in his or her custody or control any 
firearm” nor prevent a conviction under provisions prohibiting certain narcotics 
offenders from possessing firearms.  (§ 1170.18, subd. (k).) 
 
12 
 
Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, §§ 15, 18, p. 74 (Voter 
Information Guide).) 
B.  Proposition 47 Mitigates the Collateral Consequences of Felony 
Convictions Reduced to a Misdemeanor for All Purposes 
Proposition 47 enabled the two defendants and the single petitioner in these 
consolidated matters to petition to have their various narcotics offenses and 
larceny-related convictions to be retroactively reduced to misdemeanors.  As 
described above, all three successfully did so. 
At issue, in all three of these cases, are the collateral consequences of the 
reduction received under Proposition 47 on each subsequent offense at issue.  Our 
courts have characterized “the possibility of increased punishment in the event of a 
subsequent conviction” as “a collateral consequence.”  (People v. Crosby (1992) 3 
Cal.App.4th 1352, 1355, citing Carter v. Municipal Court (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 
184, 190; Hartman v. Municipal Court (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 891, 893.)  In all 
three cases before us now, each criminal litigant received additional punishment 
based on the circumstance that he or she was originally charged with a felony 
crime and sentenced as a convicted felon.  Even though the resentencing courts 
had converted each underlying felony conviction to a misdemeanor under 
Proposition 47, in each matter, the trial court declined to give retroactive relief for 
any collateral consequence attached to that underlying felony conviction for 
purposes of the criminal litigant’s new sentence. 
But in addition to affording persons the ability to retroactively have their 
felony convictions be reduced to misdemeanors, Proposition 47, through section 
1170.18, subdivision (k), mandates that the reduced conviction “shall be 
considered a misdemeanor for all purposes.”  (Italics added.)  Subdivision (k) of 
section 1170.18, therefore, plainly extends the retroactive ameliorative effects of 
Proposition 47 to mitigate any future collateral consequence of a felony conviction 
 
13 
 
that is reduced under the measure.  And yet, subdivision (k) is silent concerning 
whether it also retroactively mitigates the already-imposed collateral consequence 
of a felony conviction that is subsequently reduced under the measure. 
The Attorney General agrees that the phrase “misdemeanor for all 
purposes” in section 1170.18, subdivision (k) means that those who successfully 
obtain resentencing of their felony convictions to misdemeanors under Proposition 
47 may not be subsequently subject to a felony-based enhancement for that 
reduced conviction.7  Instead, the Attorney General argues that voters did not 
intend for Proposition 47 to retroactively reach back to unravel a felony-based 
conviction or a felony-based enhancement that had already been imposed before 
any successful petition for resentencing under section 1170.18, even if that 
judgment was not final.  He contends a resentencing under section 1170.18 has 
only a forward ameliorative effect on any new collateral consequence that is 
imposed after a successful Proposition 47 resentencing. 
We disagree.  As we will explain, based on established presumptions we 
apply to measures designed to ameliorate punishment, a successful Proposition 47 
petitioner may subsequently challenge, under subdivision (k) of section 1170.18, 
any felony-based enhancement that is based on that previously designated felony, 
                                              
7  
Several published Court of Appeal decisions have agreed that the phrase 
“misdemeanor for all purposes” in section 1170.18, subdivision (k) means that those 
who successfully obtain resentencing of their felony convictions to misdemeanors 
under Proposition 47 may not be subsequently subject to a felony-based 
enhancement for that reduced conviction.  (People v. Call (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 
856; People v. Kindall (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1199; People v. Jones (2016) 1 
Cal.App.5th 221, 230, fn. 5; People v. Abdallah (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 736.)  We 
approve of these decisions, including those rejecting the claim that the right to equal 
protection of the laws requires section 1170.18, subdivision (k) to be given full 
retroactive effect, regardless of its effective date.  (See also People v. Floyd (2003) 
31 Cal.4th 179, 191.)  
 
14 
 
now reduced to misdemeanor, so long as the judgment containing the 
enhancement was not final when Proposition 47 took effect.  In addition, finality 
aside, a defendant who successfully petitions for resentencing on a current 
Proposition 47 eligible conviction may, at the time of resentencing, challenge a 
felony-based enhancement contained in the same judgment because the prior 
felony conviction on which it was based has since been reduced to a misdemeanor.   
C.  The Meaning of the Phrase “Misdemeanor for All Purposes” in 
Proposition 47 
1.  Section 1170.18, subdivision (k) cannot be construed as having the 
same retroactive effect of other provisions in Proposition 47  
“In interpreting a voter initiative . . . , we apply the same principles that 
govern statutory construction.”  (People v. Rizo (2000) 22 Cal.4th 681, 685.)  
Where a law is adopted by the voters, “their intent governs.”  (People v. Jones 
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 1142, 1146.)  In determining that intent, “we turn first to the 
language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning.”  (People v. 
Birkett (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226, 231.)  But the statutory language must also be 
construed in the context of the statute as a whole and the overall statutory scheme. 
(Horwich v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 272, 276.)  We apply a 
presumption, as we similarly do with regard to the Legislature, that the voters, in 
adopting an initiative, did so being “aware of existing laws at the time the 
initiative was enacted.”  (Professional Engineers in California Government v. 
Kempton (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1016, 1048.) 
Concerning whether a new law applies both prospectively and retroactively, 
the rules are well established.  No part of the Penal Code “is retroactive, unless 
expressly so declared.”  (§ 3.)  “[T]he language of section 3 erects a strong 
presumption of prospective operation, codifying the principle that, ‘in the absence 
of an express retroactivity provision, a statute will not be applied retroactively 
 
15 
 
unless it is very clear from extrinsic sources that the [lawmakers] . . . must have 
intended a retroactive application.’  [Citations.]  Accordingly, ‘ “a statute that is 
ambiguous with respect to retroactive application is construed . . . to be 
unambiguously prospective.” ’ ”  (People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 324.) 
As discussed above, subdivision (k) of section 1170.18 is silent concerning 
whether reduced convictions under Proposition 47 must be “considered a 
misdemeanor for all purposes” retroactively so as to undo the collateral 
consequences of those convictions that were imposed before the measure took 
effect.  Nevertheless, the fact that the authors of Proposition 47 twice expressly 
made references to the retroactive effect of the measure in some of its provisions 
but did not explicitly do so for subdivision (k) of section 1170.18 is significant.  
“When the Legislature ‘has employed a term or phrase in one place and excluded 
it in another, it should not be implied where excluded.’ ”  (Pasadena Police 
Officers Assn. v. City of Pasadena (1990) 51 Cal.3d 564, 576.)  Therefore, if 
subdivision (k) of section 1170.18 was intended to have the identical broad 
retroactive effects as the provisions permitting both incarcerated and released 
persons to petition to have their qualifying felony convictions reduced to 
misdemeanors, it could have used the same clear retroactive language used in 
subdivisions (a) and (f).  As we will explain, it did not. 
In Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, this court refused 
to read a retroactivity clause into a voter-approved initiative for tort reform where 
the measure was silent as to whether it had any retroactive effect.  We observed 
that because “initiative measures are subject to the ordinary rules and canons of 
statutory construction [citations], informed members of the electorate who 
happened to consider the retroactivity issue would presumably have concluded 
that the measure — like other statutes — would be applied prospectively because 
 
16 
 
no express provision for retroactive application was included in the proposition.”  
(Id. at pp. 1212-1213.) 
This logic applies with even greater force here where subdivisions (a) and 
(f) of section 1170.18 both clearly reflect an intent to have full retroactive 
application, whereas subdivision (k) uses no similar language.  As a result, in the 
absence of any express declaration of retroactive application, the default 
presumption applies to subdivision (k) so that its effect operates only 
prospectively. 
2.  The Estrada rule permits section 1170.18, subdivision (k) to 
retroactively apply to nonfinal judgments 
Although subdivision (k) of section 1170.18, unlike other provisions of 
Proposition 47, contains no provision concerning retroactivity, it also contains no 
provision categorically precluding its capacity to have any constitutionally 
permissible retroactive effect.  Moreover, this provision is directly connected to 
other parts of Proposition 47 that premise eligibility for resentencing by looking 
backward to those persons “who would have been guilty of a misdemeanor under” 
the measure had it “been in effect at the time of the offense” and allow them to 
petition to seek relief.  (§ 1170.18, subds. (a), (f).)  Thus, construing statutory 
language in the context of the measure as a whole, the “for all purposes” phrase of 
section 1170.18, subdivision (k) is rooted in an overall scheme that is undeniably 
intended to have a retroactive effect.  This observation is important because 
Proposition 47 as a whole, including subdivision (k) of section 1170.18, is 
intended to ameliorate criminal punishment.  This invokes a limited rule of 
retroactivity that applies to newly enacted criminal statutes intended to reduce 
punishment for a class of offenders.  
Under such circumstances, we presume that newly enacted legislation 
mitigating criminal punishment reflects a determination that the “former penalty 
 
17 
 
was too severe” and that the ameliorative changes are intended to “apply to every 
case to which it constitutionally could apply,” which would include those “acts 
committed before its passage[,] provided the judgment convicting the defendant of 
the act is not final.”  (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745.)  The Estrada rule rests 
on the presumption that, in the absence of a savings clause providing only 
prospective relief or other clear intention concerning any retroactive effect, “a 
legislative body ordinarily intends for ameliorative changes to the criminal law to 
extend as broadly as possible, distinguishing only as necessary between sentences 
that are final and sentences that are not.”  (People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 
646, 657, citing Estrada, at p. 745.)  “The rule in Estrada has been applied to 
statutes governing penalty enhancements, as well as to statutes governing 
substantive offenses.”  (People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 792; see also 
Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 301; People v. Vinson (2011) 193 
Cal.App.4th 1190, 1198; People v. Figueroa (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 65, 69-71; People 
v. Vasquez (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 763, 767-768.) 
Most recently, we concluded that the Estrada rule did not apply to a narrow 
class of defendants seeking relief under Proposition 47.  Specifically, we held that 
the measure did not entitle defendants who were sentenced before Proposition 47’s 
effective date, but whose judgments were not yet final, to an automatic reduction 
and resentencing of their felony convictions.  These defendants, we held, must 
instead petition for resentencing under the resentencing provision of section 
1170.18, subdivision (a).  (People v. DeHoyos (2018) 4 Cal.5th 594 (DeHoyos).) 
This conclusion, we determined, followed from specific provisions within 
Proposition 47.  The resentencing provision of Proposition 47 is not silent 
concerning the question of retroactivity, but instead expressly provides a 
resentencing procedure for all “who were ‘serving a sentence’ for a covered 
offense as of Proposition 47’s effective date.”  (DeHoyos, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 
 
18 
 
603, quoting § 1170.18, subd. (a).)  We further noted that this language “draws no 
express distinction between persons serving final sentences and those serving 
nonfinal sentences, instead entitling both categories of prisoners to petition courts 
for recall of sentence.”  (Id. at p. 603.)  We also observed that both the 
resentencing provision of Proposition 47 and the measure’s uncodified declared 
purpose made evident the intent to make resentencing of all persons serving a 
sentence for a Proposition 47 eligible offense “dependent on a court’s assessment 
of the likelihood that a defendant’s early release will pose a risk to public safety,” 
regardless of the finality of the judgment.  (DeHoyos, at p. 603.)  Thus, the 
Estrada rule of retroactivity had no application to persons serving a sentence for a 
Proposition 47 eligible offense when the measure took effect because the 
legislation expressly contained its own retroactivity provision for this class of 
persons, and it treated this class in the same manner, regardless of the finality of 
their judgments. 
In contrast, as enacted by Proposition 47, we agree with defendant 
Valenzuela that the “for all purposes” provision in section 1170.18, subdivision 
(k) contains no savings clause indicating that it applies only prospectively, nor 
does it contain any language indicating that it otherwise limits or subsumes the 
ordinary presumption long established under the Estrada rule.  In fact, unlike the 
resentencing provision addressed in DeHoyos, the measure does not delineate any 
particular procedure to govern any relief afforded by section 1170.18, subdivision 
(k). 
Also, in contrast to the provision we addressed in DeHoyos, the application 
of the “for all purposes” provision in section 1170.18, subdivision (k) is not 
restricted by any further judicial evaluation of a defendant’s risk of danger to 
public safety.  Instead, the “for all purposes” provision takes effect after the 
resentencing court, under section 1170.18, subdivision (b), has assessed a 
 
19 
 
defendant’s risk of danger to public safety in reducing the sentence for the 
underlying felony.8  (§ 1170.18, subd. (k) [“A felony conviction that is recalled 
and resentenced under subdivision (b) . . . shall be considered a misdemeanor for 
all purposes”].)  
Thus, there is nothing in subdivision (k) that would have signaled to an 
informed voter that the well-established Estrada rule would not apply.  These 
circumstances confirm that Proposition 47 was intended to broadly mitigate the 
collateral penal consequences of certain narcotics and larceny-related offenses so 
that they could be treated as a misdemeanor for all purposes as to “to every case to 
which it constitutionally could apply.”  (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745.) 
As a result, the reduction of a felony conviction to a misdemeanor 
conviction under Proposition 47 exists as “a misdemeanor for all purposes” 
prospectively, but, under the Estrada rule, it can have retroactive collateral effect 
on judgments that were not final when the initiative took effect on November 5, 
2014.  (See People v. Evans (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 894.)9  This construction 
comports with another provision of section 1170.18, which explicitly states that 
“[r]esentencing pursuant to this section does not diminish or abrogate the finality 
of judgments in any case that does not come within the purview of this section.”  
(§ 1170.18, subd. (n).) 
                                              
8 
In People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, we recently 
affirmed the principle that the Estrada rule of retroactivity still applies even if the 
new legislation merely “ameliorated the possible punishment for a class of 
persons.”  (Id. at p. 308, italics added.)  Consequently, the mere fact that a 
resentencing under section 1170.18, subdivision (b), is not guaranteed because the 
resentencing court has some discretion to deny a Proposition 47 eligible defendant 
relief on the basis of public safety does not preclude the application of the Estrada 
rule to section 1170.18, subdivision (k). 
9  
We approve of the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in this case. 
 
20 
 
D.  Other Contentions Against Any Retroactive Application of Section 
1170.18, Subdivision (k) 
1.  Prior interpretations of the phrase “misdemeanor for all purposes” 
do not preclude relief under the Estrada rule 
Relying on the general rule that “[i]dentical language appearing in separate 
provisions dealing with the same subject matter should be accorded the same 
interpretation” (Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 132), the 
Attorney General contends that our previous interpretation of the phrase 
“misdemeanor for all purposes” in another statute foreclosed any possibility in the 
voters’ minds that subdivision (k) of section 1170.18 could be applied 
retroactively.  We conclude that the statutory comparison is inapt under the 
present circumstances. 
The phrase “misdemeanor for all purposes” is also used in section 17, 
subdivision (b), a provision that describes collateral consequences triggered when 
a wobbler offense10 is ultimately sentenced as a misdemeanor.  (See § 17, subd. 
(b) [when the court designates the wobbler as a misdemeanor, “it is a 
misdemeanor for all purposes”].)   
In Park, supra, 56 Cal.4th 782, we addressed the significance of the phrase 
“misdemeanor for all purposes,” as used in section 17, subdivision (b), on the 
application of a felony-based enhancement where the prior underlying felony, a 
wobbler, had been ultimately sentenced as a misdemeanor.  In Park, the defendant 
had been convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter and assault with a 
firearm but he also had a prior conviction of assault with a deadly weapon.  By the 
time the defendant was sentenced for the offenses involving manslaughter, the 
other court handling the defendant’s prior assault with a deadly weapon matter 
                                              
10 
See, ante, footnote 1. 
 
21 
 
reduced that offense to a misdemeanor under section 17, subdivision (b), and 
dismissed it after the defendant had successfully completed probation.  Under 
these circumstances, we held that the sentencing court in the manslaughter-related 
offenses could not impose a five-year enhancement under section 667, subdivision 
(a), for the defendant having previously been convicted of a serious felony.  (Park, 
at p. 787.) 
In reaching this conclusion, we relied on the phrase “misdemeanor for all 
purposes,” as used in section 17, subdivision (b).  We reviewed several prior cases 
and noted that when a trial court reduces an offense to a misdemeanor under 
section 17, subdivision (b), “the statute generally has been construed in 
accordance with its plain language to mean that the offense is a misdemeanor ‘for 
all purposes.’ ”  (Park, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 793, citing People v. Navarro 
(1972) 7 Cal.3d 248, 271 [rendering defendant eligible for a drug addiction 
rehabilitation program normally foreclosed to convicted felons], People v. Hannon 
(1971) 5 Cal.3d 330, 340 [rendering defendant, who had been committed to the 
California Youth Authority, ineligible to be sentenced to state prison], People v. 
Marshall (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 502, 504-505 [precluding the imposition of a 
five-year section 667, subdivision (a), enhancement for prior serious felony in a 
subsequent criminal proceeding].) 
But in Park, we further commented that a defendant previously convicted 
of a wobbler felony offense “would be subject to the [felony-based] enhancement 
had he committed and been convicted of the present crimes before the court 
reduced the earlier offense to a misdemeanor.”  (Park, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 802, 
italics added.)  The Attorney General emphasizes this, and also cites our decision 
in People v. Feyrer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 426 concerning the effect of a court’s 
decision to sentence a defendant to a misdemeanor under section 17, subdivision 
(b).  There, we stated, “If ultimately a misdemeanor sentence is imposed, the 
 
22 
 
offense is a misdemeanor from that point on, but not retroactively.”  (Feyrer, at p. 
439, italics added; see also People v. Banks (1959) 53 Cal.2d 370, 381-382 
[stating that a wobbler reduced under section 17 is considered a misdemeanor for 
all purposes thereafter, but not retroactively].) 
The Attorney General relies on these cases to conclude that the meaning of 
the phrase “misdemeanor for all purposes” is similarly limited under Proposition 
47 such that the criminal litigants in the present matters cannot benefit any further 
from Proposition 47 because they were all convicted of their subsequent offenses 
and enhancements before having their underlying felonies reduced to 
misdemeanors.  He claims that when the voters approved Proposition 47, the 
electorate was presumably aware of this judicial interpretation, and must have 
intended the same result here. 
But the rule of statutory construction that identical language appearing in 
other statutory provisions should be given the same interpretation applies when the 
provisions “deal[] with the same subject matter.”  (Walker v. Superior Court, 
supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 132.)  Proposition 47, on one hand, and section 17, 
subdivision (b), on the other, do not concern the same subject and serve different 
goals.  (See People v. Cornett (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261, 1269, fn. 6 [declining to 
apply the same meaning used in other Penal Code statutes to the phrase “10 years 
of age or younger” as used in § 288.7 because the other statutes “do not concern 
the same or an analogous subject as section 288.7”].)   
Both Park and Feyrer concerned the “for all purposes” effect of a 
sentencing court’s discretionary decision to sentence an individual defendant to a 
misdemeanor under the existing statutory provision of section 17, subdivision (b).  
We acknowledged in Park that, through section 17, subdivision (b), “the 
Legislature has empowered the courts to decide, in each individual case, whether 
the crime should be classified as a felony or a misdemeanor,” and, in exercising 
 
23 
 
that discretion, “the court considers the facts surrounding the offense and the 
characteristics of the offender.”  (Park, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 801.)  
In contrast, as previously discussed, Proposition 47 and its enactment of 
section 1170.18, subdivision (k), represent a change in law designed to have an 
ameliorative effect on punishment of offenses no longer deemed egregious enough 
to be handled as felonies.  Proposition 47’s resentencing determination is premised 
on a universal reclassification of certain felonies to misdemeanors.  The measure 
further allows a whole class of persons, those previously convicted of those same 
offenses as felons, “who would have been guilty of a misdemeanor under this act 
had this act been in effect at the time of the offense,” to be retroactively 
resentenced as misdemeanants, even if those judgments are final and the persons 
have already completed their felony sentences.  (§ 1170.18, subd. (f).) 
Thus, here the “for all purposes” effect of the reduction of the underlying 
felony conviction to a misdemeanor under Proposition 47 is rooted in legislation 
intended to reform the needs of the criminal law by reducing penalties with respect to 
particular criminal offenses.  This is unlike the circumstances in Park and Feyrer, 
where a section 17 sentencing determination merely serves to mitigate punishment 
for the unique circumstances of a single individual. 
As a result, viewing section 1170.18, subdivision (k) in context of the 
purposes of Proposition 47, we see no reason why our prior interpretation of the 
phrase “misdemeanor for all purposes” in the context of section 17 forecloses the 
application of the Estrada rule. 
2.  Punishment of recidivist offenders does not override the Estrada rule 
The Attorney General further argues that enhancements under sections 
667.5, subdivision (b) and 12022.1, subdivision (b), are rooted in a defendant’s 
status as a recidivist offender, and not in the specific underlying conduct.  He 
 
24 
 
contends that Proposition 47 did not explicitly address and had no impact on any 
prior electorate’s desire to punish recidivist offenders. 
We rejected a similar argument in Park.  There, we observed that “[w]hen 
the court properly exercises its discretion to reduce a wobbler to a misdemeanor, it 
has found that the felony punishment, and its consequences, are not appropriate 
for that particular defendant.”  (Park, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 801, italics added.)  
Indeed, “one of the ‘chief’ reasons for reducing a wobbler to a misdemeanor ‘is 
that under such circumstances the offense is not considered to be serious enough 
to entitle the court to resort to it as a prior conviction of a felony for the purpose of 
increasing the penalty for a subsequent crime.’ ”  (Id. at p. 794, quoting In re 
Rogers (1937) 20 Cal.App.2d 397, 400-401.)  The same logic applies here.  In 
directing that a qualifying conviction be treated as a misdemeanor “for all 
purposes,” Proposition 47 fairly contemplated the consequences of this 
redesignation on associated enhancements like those under sections 667.5 and 
12022.1.  
Moreover, the fact that Proposition 47 did not expressly mention recidivist 
offenders does not mean that voters intended to deny those resentenced under the 
measure any further mitigation of their punishment stemming from the collateral 
consequences of their original felony conviction.  The information given to voters 
stated that the “measure reduces penalties for certain offenders convicted of 
nonserious and nonviolent property and drug crimes” and would allow “certain 
offenders who have been previously convicted of such crimes to apply for reduced 
sentences.”  (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, analysis of Prop. 47 by 
Legis. Analyst, p. 35, italics added.)  More specifically, it states that “the measure 
reduces the penalties for the following crimes” — listing grand theft, shoplifting, 
receiving stolen property, writing bad checks, check forgery, and drug possession.  
(Id. at p. 35, italics added; id. at p. 36.) 
 
25 
 
This emphasis on reduced penalties11 for these narcotics and larceny-
related offenses extends logically to enhancements and subsequent offenses 
connected to those offenses.  From these particular statements in the ballot 
materials for Proposition 47, it follows that a reduced penalty for a crime that had 
previously been classified as a felony would include a penalty that takes the form 
of an enhancement or other recidivist-based punishment that was alleged with that 
same felony. 
In fact, as previously observed (ante, fn. 6), section 1170.18, subdivision 
(k) contains an exception stating that “resentencing shall not permit that person to 
own, possess, or have in his or her custody or control any firearm” or prevent a 
conviction under provisions prohibiting certain narcotics offenders from 
possessing firearms.  This single exception to the collateral effect of Proposition 
47’s resentencing provisions further suggests that the measure’s mandate to reduce 
penalties for a distinct class of narcotics and larceny-related offenses otherwise 
fully extends to enhancements and subsequent offenses alleged with those 
offenses.  (Wildlife Alive v. Chickering (1976) 18 Cal.3d 190, 195 [under the 
canon of statutory construction of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, “where 
exceptions to a general rule are specified by statute, other exceptions are not to be 
implied or presumed,” absent “a discernible and contrary legislative intent”].) 
Additionally, extending the ameliorative effects of felony convictions 
reduced to misdemeanor convictions under Proposition 47 to enhancements and 
subsequent offenses derived from those convictions — at least when the 
judgments involving these felony-based enhancements are not yet final for 
                                              
11 
Webster’s defines a “penalty” as a “punishment”; a “suffering . . . which is 
annexed by law”; a “disadvantage . . . due to some action (as transgression or 
error).”  (Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (2002) p. 1668.)  
 
26 
 
purposes of Estrada — is consistent with the measure’s goal to generate savings to 
be invested into various crime prevention and treatment programs.  (See Gov. 
Code, §§ 7599-7599.2.)  As previously explained, the measure allows those who 
have already completed their sentences for Proposition 47 eligible felony 
convictions to petition to have their convictions “designated as misdemeanors.”  
(§ 1170.18, subd. (f).)  Permitting defendants to ameliorate, under Estrada, their 
nonfinal judgments involving felony-based enhancements and felony-based 
offenses grounded on those reduced offenses would generate cost savings by 
reducing the incarceration terms for those offenders. 
Lastly, Proposition 47’s creation of a procedure to retroactively reduce to a 
misdemeanor any judgment, even those that are otherwise final, is consistent with 
the conclusion that the initiative should also have a limited retroactive impact on 
nonfinal judgments involving enhancements previously derived from those now 
reduced felonies.12 
E.  Proposition 47’s Application to the Enhancements in Sections 667.5 
and 12022.1 and to Section 1320.5 Convictions 
1.  Enhancements under section 667.5, subdivision (b) 
Turning to the specific enhancements and convictions before us, first, as to 
nonfinal judgments containing a section 667.5, subdivision (b) one-year 
enhancement, we conclude that Proposition 47 and the Estrada rule authorize 
striking that enhancement if the underlying felony conviction attached to the 
enhancement has been reduced to a misdemeanor under the measure. 
                                              
12  
Accordingly, we disapprove of the Proposition 47 cases that have held that 
Estrada does not apply to enhancements because they serve to punish recidivism 
or because Estrada applies only to nonfinal judgments of conviction for a 
“particular criminal offense” or a “prohibited act.”  (In re Diaz (2017) 
8 Cal.App.5th 812; People v. Johnson (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 111.) 
 
27 
 
In sentencing a defendant for a new felony offense, a one-year sentence 
enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (b) is applied “for each prior 
separate prison term or county jail term imposed under subdivision (h) of Section 
1170 or when sentence is not suspended for any felony.”  (§ 667.5, subd. (b).)  
However, the enhancement contains a “washout” exception and does not apply 
with regard to “any prison term served prior to a period of five years in which the 
defendant remained free of both prison custody and the commission of an offense 
which results in a felony conviction.”  (Ibid.)  Thus, “if a defendant is free from 
both prison custody and the commission of a new felony for any five-year period 
following discharge from custody or release on parole, the enhancement does not 
apply.”  (People v. Fielder (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1229.) 
On its face, section 667.5, subdivision (b) does not expressly state that a 
prior felony conviction is required.  But the provision’s reference to a prior “prison 
term” necessarily must subsume the existence of a prior felony conviction that 
justified the imposition of that prison term.  Thus, in describing the elements 
required for the imposition of a section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement, we 
have stated it “requires proof that the defendant: (1) was previously convicted of a 
felony; (2) was imprisoned as a result of that conviction; (3) completed that term 
of imprisonment; and (4) did not remain free for five years of both prison custody 
and the commission of a new offense resulting in a felony conviction.”  (People v. 
Tenner (1993) 6 Cal.4th 559, 563.) 
With this understanding, the resentencing of a prior underlying felony 
conviction to a misdemeanor conviction negates an element required to support a 
section 667.5 one-year enhancement.13  A successful Proposition 47 petition or 
                                              
13  
We disapprove People v. Acosta (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1072 to the extent 
that it held that the “misdemeanor for all purposes” language of section 1170.18, 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
28 
 
application can reach back and reduce a defendant’s previous felony conviction to 
a misdemeanor conviction because the defendant “would have been guilty of a 
misdemeanor under” the measure had it “been in effect at the time of the offense.”  
(§ 1170.18, subds. (a), (f).)  Therefore, if the “felony conviction that is recalled 
and resentenced . . . or designated as a misdemeanor” conviction becomes “a 
misdemeanor for all purposes,” then it can no longer be said that the defendant 
“was previously convicted of a felony” (People v. Tenner, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 
563), which is a necessary element for imposing the section 667.5, subdivision (b) 
enhancement.  Instead, “for all purposes,” it can only be said that the defendant 
was previously convicted of a misdemeanor.  
Consequently, section 1170.18, subdivision (k) can negate a previously 
imposed section 667.5, subdivision (b), enhancement when the underlying felony 
attached to that enhancement has been reduced to a misdemeanor under the 
measure. 
2.  Enhancements under section 12022.1 
Concerning nonfinal judgments containing a section 12022.1, subdivision 
(b) two-year enhancement, we conclude that Proposition 47 ameliorates that 
enhancement if one of the underlying felony convictions attached to the 
enhancement has been reduced to a misdemeanor under the measure. 
Section 12022.1 defines the felony for which the defendant had been 
released from custody on bail or on own recognizance as the “primary offense,” 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
subdivision (k) alters only the status of felony convictions, not the fact that the 
defendant has served a qualifying prior felony prison term for purposes of a 
section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement. 
 
29 
 
and the new felony committed while on release as the “secondary offense.”  
(§ 12022.1, subd. (a).)  “Section 12022.1 does not make the defendant’s 
conviction of the primary offense an element of the enhancement for the purpose 
of proving the enhancement,” but there must be “proof of conviction of the 
primary offense before the enhancement can be imposed.”  (People v. Smith 
(2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 923, 935, italics added.)  Thus, a section 12022.1 
enhancement allegation can be found true if the defendant committed a secondary 
offense while released from custody for the primary offense and is convicted of 
the secondary offense.  But the imposition of the section 12022.1 enhancement 
must be stayed until the defendant is also convicted of the primary offense.  
(§ 12022.1, subd. (d).)  Moreover, “[i]f the person is acquitted of the primary 
offense[,] the stay shall be permanent.”  (Ibid.; see also In re Jovan B. (1993) 6 
Cal.4th 801, 809.)  Consequently, section 12022.1 is a unique enhancement that, 
even if found true, cannot be imposed until the defendant is convicted of both the 
prior felony and the new felony committed while released on bail.  (In re Jovan B., 
at p. 809; People v. McClanahan (1992) 3 Cal.4th 860, 869.) 
The effect of these circumstances means that if Proposition 47 can reach 
back and reduce to a misdemeanor the record of conviction for the primary 
offense, and that conviction becomes “a misdemeanor for all purposes,” then the 
attached section 12022.1 enhancement in a nonfinal judgment remains intact but 
its two-year term must be struck and permanently stayed.  In contrast, if 
Proposition 47 can reach back and reduce to a misdemeanor the record of 
conviction for the secondary offense, and that conviction becomes “a 
misdemeanor for all purposes,” then the attached section 12022.1 enhancement in 
a nonfinal judgment must be dismissed entirely. 
In either circumstance, Proposition 47 ameliorates a section 12022.1 
enhancement in a nonfinal judgment if one of the underlying felony convictions 
 
30 
 
attached to the enhancement has been reduced to a misdemeanor conviction under 
the measure. 
3.  Convictions under section 1320.5 
A very different result, however, must govern the effect of Proposition 47 
on convictions for the section 1320.5 offense of failing to appear while released on 
bail.  Under section 1320.5, “[e]very person who is charged with or convicted of 
the commission of a felony, who is released from custody on bail, and who in 
order to evade the process of the court willfully fails to appear as required, is 
guilty of a felony.”  (§ 1320.5, italics added.)  Under a plain reading of the statute, 
a section 1320.5 conviction does not require the bail jumper’s felony charge to 
have resulted in a felony conviction.  This defeats petitioner Guiomar’s claim for 
relief under Proposition 47.  The measure mandates that a “felony conviction that 
is recalled and resentenced . . . or designated as a misdemeanor . . . shall be 
considered a misdemeanor for all purposes . . . .”  (§ 1170.18, subd. (k), italics 
added.)  Proposition 47, therefore, ameliorates the collateral effects of felony 
convictions, not the collateral effects of felony charges. 
Our case law supports this interpretation of section 1320.5.  In People v. 
Walker (2002) 29 Cal.4th 577 (Walker), a majority of this court concluded that a 
failure to appear on a felony charge under section 1320.5 can also be the basis of a 
section 12022.1 enhancement for committing a new felony offense while released 
from custody for the original felony offense.  Although in Walker we were not 
confronted with a scenario in which the underlying felony charge is ultimately 
reduced to a misdemeanor, we discussed the apparent different legislative 
purposes behind sections 1320.5 and 12022.1 and rejected the contention that the 
application of both would constitute improper double punishment.  (Walker, at pp. 
588-589.) 
 
31 
 
In so doing, a majority of this court explained that sections 1320.5 and 
12022.1 serve different purposes.  The majority observed that the primary purpose 
of section 1320.5 is to deter the act of jumping bail and that it requires punishment 
“whether or not the defendant ultimately is convicted of the charge for which he or 
she was out on bail when failing to appear in court as ordered.”  (Walker, supra, 
29 Cal.4th at p. 583.)  This is in contrast to the extended purpose for imposing a 
section 12022.1 enhancement, which not only deters bail jumping, but further 
targets recidivist offenders by requiring convictions for both the primary felony 
offense for which the defendant was released on bail as well as for the secondary 
felony offense the defendant committed while released on bail.  We recognized 
that the recidivist focus of section 12022.1, in requiring convictions for both 
offenses, reflected such offenders “as being particularly deserving of increased 
punishment for their on-bail recidivism” and as being “more blameworthy than 
defendants who willfully fail to appear for felony charges that ultimately are 
dismissed or reduced, or result in acquittal.”  (Walker, at p. 584.) 
In addition to section 1320.5’s purpose of deterring bail jumping, we 
further observed that the statutory language states that the crime applies to any 
person “ ‘charged with or convicted of’ ” commission of a felony while released 
from custody on bail.  (Walker, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 583, quoting § 1320.5.)  We 
also quoted a Senate Bill analysis regarding section 1320.5 stating that the crime 
would apply “ ‘even if the defendant was the victim of misidentification or was 
acquitted on the underlying charge.’ ”  (Walker, at p. 583, quoting Assem. Com. 
on Crim. Law & Pub. Safety, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 395 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.) 
p. 2.) 
Thus, considering that a section 1320.5 conviction does not require the bail 
jumper’s felony charge to have resulted in a felony conviction, or in any 
conviction at all, the fact that Guiomar successfully petitioned to have his 
 
32 
 
narcotics offense reduced to a misdemeanor under Proposition 47 did not have any 
collateral effect on his section 1320.5 conviction.  Under section 1170.18, 
subdivision (k), Guiomar’s “felony conviction” for his narcotics offense became 
“a misdemeanor for all purposes,” but that did not alter the fact that he had been 
charged with a felony when he failed to appear while on bail for that felony 
charge.  Accordingly, under these circumstances, Guiomar’s conviction for section 
1320.5 does not qualify for resentencing under Proposition 47. 
F.  Resentencing Procedures for Proposition 47 Related Enhancements 
As we have previously noted, nothing in Proposition 47 expressly provides 
a mechanism for recalling and resentencing a judgment because a prior underlying 
felony conviction supporting an enhancement in that judgment has been reduced 
to a misdemeanor.  Instead, Proposition 47’s procedures focus on the resentencing 
and redesignation of felony convictions and not the resentencing, redesignation, or 
dismissal of enhancements or other crimes predicated on the existence of a prior 
felony. 
Accordingly, because Proposition 47 does not provide a specific 
mechanism for recalling and resentencing a judgment solely because a felony-
based enhancement has been collaterally affected by the reduction of a conviction 
to a misdemeanor in a separate judgment, we will describe other available 
procedural mechanisms to strike such enhancements.  
1. The full resentencing rule 
We have held that when part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand 
for resentencing “a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial 
court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances.”  
(People v. Navarro (2007) 40 Cal.4th 668, 681, citing People v. Burbine (2003) 
106 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1259 [“upon remand for resentencing after the reversal of 
 
33 
 
one or more subordinate counts of a felony conviction, the trial court has 
jurisdiction to modify every aspect of the defendant’s sentence on the counts that 
were affirmed, including the term imposed as the principal term”].) 
Similarly, in considering not only Proposition 47, but also analogous 
statutes addressing recalled sentences, the Courts of Appeal have concluded that, 
under the recall provisions of section 1170, subdivision (d), the resentencing court 
has jurisdiction to modify every aspect of the sentence, and not just the portion 
subjected to the recall.  (People v. Burbine, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1258; 
People v. Sanchez (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 768, 772; People v. Stevens (1988) 205 
Cal.App.3d 1452, 1457-1458; People v. Hill (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 831, 834.)  In 
this situation, we have recognized that the resentencing court may consider “any 
pertinent circumstances which have arisen since the prior sentence was imposed.”  
(Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, 460.)  This principle, which we shall 
call the “full resentencing rule,” has also been applied to recall and resentencing 
provisions enacted by Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012.  
(People v. Garner (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1118.)  Finally, several Courts of 
Appeal have upheld the modification of every aspect of a defendant’s sentence by 
a resentencing court following a successful petition to recall only part of that 
sentence under Proposition 47.  (In re Guiomar, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th 265, 272-
275; People v. Cortez (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 308, 317; People v. McDowell (2016) 
2 Cal.App.5th 978, 982; People v. Roach (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 178, 183; 
People v. Rouse (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 292, 300; People v. Sellner (2015) 240 
Cal.App.4th 699, 701-702.) 
In People v. Buycks (S231765), the Court of Appeal properly recognized 
this rule, even though defendant’s conviction became final just over a week before 
Proposition 47 took effect.  (See § 1237.5; Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.308(a).)  
When the trial court conducted a full resentencing of defendant in the present 
 
34 
 
matter for his Proposition 47 eligible petty theft with a prior conviction, the Court 
of Appeal explained, “it was required to reevaluate the applicability of section 
12022.1 at that time,” considering the fact that his primary offense conviction had 
become a misdemeanor conviction.14  Thus, notwithstanding the Estrada rule, a 
person may petition for recall of his or her current sentence under section 1170.18, 
subdivision (a), upon which the trial court, when it resentences on the eligible 
felony conviction, must also resentence the defendant generally and must therefore 
reevaluate the continued applicability of any enhancement based on a prior felony 
conviction.   
This application of the full resentencing rule to an otherwise final judgment 
is also consistent with section 1170.18, subdivision (n), which states: 
“Resentencing pursuant to this section does not diminish or abrogate the finality of 
judgments in any case that does not come within the purview of this section.”  
(Italics added.)  This subdivision emphasizes that, when a final judgment in a case 
cannot be opened for resentencing under the procedures created by section 
1170.18, the judgment remains final even if it contains a prison prior enhancement 
or an on-bail enhancement as to which the underlying felony has been reduced to a 
                                              
14  
In supplemental briefing, the Attorney General concedes that the 
resentencing court was required to reconsider the continued applicability of the 
section 12022.1 enhancement, but contends the authority to strike it is not 
mandatory but is subject to section 1385, which gives a court the discretion to 
dismiss “in furtherance of justice.”  (§ 1385, subd. (a).)  We reject this contention 
because, as explained above, the authority to dismiss such an enhancement stems 
from section 1170.18, subdivision (k), which mandates that a reduced felony 
conviction “shall be considered a misdemeanor for all purposes.”  Moreover, a 
nondiscretionary application of section 1170.18, subdivision (k) is consistent with 
Proposition 47’s mandate that the act “shall be broadly construed to accomplish its 
purposes,” and that its provisions “shall be liberally construed to effectuate its 
purposes.”  (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, text of Prop. 47, §§ 15, 
18, p. 74.) 
 
35 
 
misdemeanor.  But section 1170.18’s exception to this rule of finality applies not 
only to individual counts, but to the entire case in which the judgment contains at 
least one felony conviction qualifying for reduction to a misdemeanor under the 
resentencing procedures of Proposition 47. 
Although her judgment was not final when Proposition 47 took effect, in 
People v. Valenzuela (S232900), defendant is also in a similar procedural posture 
in being able to claim, in conjunction with a Proposition 47 resentencing petition 
for her conviction for possession of methamphetamine, that her section 667.5 
enhancement should be dismissed. 
Therefore, at the time of resentencing of a Proposition 47 eligible felony 
conviction, the trial court must reevaluate the applicability of any enhancement 
within the same judgment at that time, so long as that enhancement was predicated 
on a felony conviction now reduced to a misdemeanor.  Such an enhancement 
cannot be imposed because at that point the reduced conviction “shall be 
considered as a misdemeanor for all purposes.”  (§ 1170.18, subd. (k).)  Under 
these limited circumstances, a defendant may also challenge any prison prior 
enhancement in that judgment if the underlying felony has been reduced to a 
misdemeanor under Proposition 47, notwithstanding the finality of that judgment. 
2. Petition for writ of habeas corpus 
We also conclude that the collateral consequences of Proposition 47’s 
mandate to have the redesignated offense “be considered a misdemeanor for all 
purposes” can properly be enforced by means of petition for writ of habeas corpus 
for those judgments that were not final when Proposition 47 took effect. 
The relief we discuss here, under the “misdemeanor for all purposes” 
language of section 1170.18, subdivision (k), is an ameliorative provision distinct 
from the ameliorative provisions of subdivisions (a) and (f) of the same statute 
 
36 
 
which provide express mechanisms for reducing felony convictions to 
misdemeanors.  The effect of section 1170.18, subdivision (k), constitutes an 
ameliorative change to the laws governing the imposition of felony-based 
enhancements and other collateral consequences, as opposed to an ameliorative 
change to the law under which the original felony conviction was had.  A petition 
for habeas corpus seeking to vacate a section 667.5 prior prison term enhancement 
on the ground that it is based on a prior felony theft conviction that has since been 
reduced to a misdemeanor, for example, would be invoking Estrada not to 
establish the initiative’s ameliorative effect on the prior theft conviction, but to 
show that section 1170.18, subdivision (k) has some retroactive effect to the extent 
permitted under Estrada. 
With this understanding, our courts have afforded defendants relief on 
petition for writ of habeas corpus involving collateral attacks on enhancements.  
(See People v. Reyes (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1222, 1227; In re Ditsch (1984) 162 
Cal.App.3d 578, 583-584; In re Pritchett (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1754.)  We have 
also recognized more generally that “habeas corpus proceedings may provide a 
vehicle to obtain relief limited to a new sentencing hearing in the original criminal 
action, which may result in a different sentence.”  (In re Kirchner (2017) 2 Cal.5th 
1040, 1052, fn. 9, citing People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 
497, 530, fn. 13; In re Lewallen (1979) 23 Cal.3d 274, 282; In re Levi (1952) 39 
Cal.2d 41, 47.) 
Finally, we note that nothing in Proposition 47 precludes the availability of 
a petition for writ of habeas corpus as an appropriate avenue to seek relief in such 
cases. 
III.  DISPOSITION 
In People v. Buycks (S231765), the Court of Appeal correctly concluded 
that because the narcotics offense for which Buycks had been released on his own 
 
37 
 
recognizance had been reduced to a misdemeanor it was to “be considered as a 
misdemeanor for all purposes” under section 1170.18, subdivision (k).  When 
Buycks’ Proposition 47 petition was granted in his second case, the trial court was 
obligated to sentence defendant anew in that case and to reevaluate the 
applicability of the section 12022.1 enhancement at that time.  The Court of 
Appeal correctly concluded that the enhancement could not be reimposed and 
should be stricken in light of section 1170.18, subdivision (k).  Accordingly, the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal in People v. Buycks (S231765) is affirmed.15  
In People v. Valenzuela (S232900), the Court of Appeal held that, despite 
defendant’s successful petition to have her underlying felony reduced to a 
misdemeanor under Proposition 47, that measure did not relieve her of the one-
year section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior felony prison term enhancement.  As 
discussed above, however, section 1170.18, subdivision (k), may affect the 
validity of enhancements when the underlying felony has been reduced under 
Proposition 47.  Because Valenzuela’s judgment in case No. JCF32712 was not 
final when Proposition 47 took effect, the Estrada rule applies to strike her section 
667.5, subdivision (b) prior felony prison term enhancement.  Alternatively, 
because it appears that Valenzuela has a Proposition 47 eligible conviction in case 
No. JCF32712, if the resentencing court grants her petition to reduce that 
conviction to a misdemeanor, the court must resentence her anew in that case, and 
it will be required to reevaluate the applicability of the section 667.5 enhancement 
                                              
15  
Because the resentencing court had imposed the maximum possible 
sentence, regardless of whether the two-year on-bail enhancement was stricken, 
there is no need to remand the matter to the trial court to exercise its sentencing 
discretion anew. 
 
38 
 
at that time.  Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed and 
remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
In In re Guiomar (S238888), the Court of Appeal held that, despite 
Guiomar’s successful petition to have his underlying felony reduced to a 
misdemeanor under Proposition 47, that measure did not relieve him of his 
conviction of felony failure to appear under section 1320.5.  As discussed above, 
the Court of Appeal correctly determined that Proposition 47 did not affect his 
status as a person charged with a felony at the time of his failure to appear, and 
that his successful petition in case No. SS131650A to have his felony possession 
of a controlled substance conviction reduced to a misdemeanor did not affect the 
validity of his section 1320.5 conviction.  Accordingly, the judgment of the Court 
of Appeal is affirmed. 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
BRUINIERS, J.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________ 
*         Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division 
Five, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 
California Constitution.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Buycks, People v. Valenzuela and In re Guiomar 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding XXX 
Review Granted XXX 241 Cal.App.4th 519 & 244 Cal.App.4th 692 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S231765, S232900 & S238888 
Date Filed: July 30, 2018 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles, Imperial & Monterey 
Judge: James D. Otto, Christopher J. Plourd, Pamela L. Butler & Lydia M. Villarreal 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant Stevenson 
Buycks. 
 
Stephen P. Lipson, Public Defender (Ventura) and Michael C. McMahon, Chief Deputy Public Defender, 
for California Public Defenders Association and Public Defender of Ventura County as Amici Curiae on 
behalf of Defendant and Appellant Stevenson Buycks. 
 
Steven J. Carroll and Helen Irza, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant 
Laura Reynoso Valenzuela. 
 
William J. Arzbaecher III for California Public Defenders Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Defendant and Appellant Laura Reynoso Valenzuela. 
 
Jonathan Grossman, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner John Manuel Guiomar. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Edward C. DuMont, State Solicitor General, 
Janill L. Richards, Principal Deputy State Solicitor General, Joshua A. Klein, Deputy State Solicitor 
General, Samuel P. Siegel, Associate Deputy State Solicitor General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Mary Sanchez and 
David Zarmi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent in No. S231765. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Steven T. Oetting, Deputy State Solicitor General, 
Charles C. Ragland, Scott C. Taylor, Meredith S. White and Marvin E. Mizell, Deputy Attorneys General, 
for Plaintiff and Respondent in No. S232900. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, Eric D. Share, Seth K. Schalit, Donna M. 
Provenzano and Amit Kurlekar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Petitioner in No. S238888. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Richard L. Fitzer 
6285 East Spring Street, 276N 
Long Beach, CA  90808 
(562) 429-4000 
 
Helen Irza 
Appellate Defenders, Inc. 
555 West Beech Street, Suite 300 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 696-0282 
 
Jonathan Grossman 
Sixth District Appellate Program 
95 South Market Street, Suite 570 
San Jose, CA  95113 
(408) 241-6171 
 
Marvin E. Mizell 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 738-9139