Title: Ryan P. St. Louis v. Town of North Elba

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 45  
Ryan P. St. Louis,
            Respondent,
        v.
Town of North Elba, et al.,
            Appellants.
Matthew J. Kelly, for appellants. 
Sarah I. Goldman, for respondent.
LIPPMAN, Chief Judge:
Plaintiff Ryan St. Louis was injured while employed as
a maintenance worker at the McKenzie-Intervale Olympic Jumping
Complex in Lake Placid.  At the time of his injury, St. Louis was
assisting a work crew that was constructing a drainage pipeline
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No. 45
by welding together and laying twenty-foot sections of snow-
making pipe.  The crew utilized a hydraulic-operated clamshell
bucket attached to the bucket arm of a front-end loader to lift
sections of the pipe approximately four feet above the ground and
then hold the pipe in place in the jaws of the clamshell. 
Suspending one end of the pipe section in the air during the
welding enabled the crew to reach the underside of the jointed
sections.  
After a crew member finished welding two pipe sections,
St. Louis began hitting the welded seam with a hammer to remove
excess metal, when suddenly the jaws of the clamshell bucket
opened and released the pipe.  The pipe pinned St. Louis to the
ground, causing serious injury to his legs and feet.  Although
the members of the work crew later testified that they ordinarily
used chains to secure loads in the clamshell bucket, at the time
of the injury, there was no chain, rope or any other safety
device to prevent the pipe from falling in the event of machine
malfunction.  
St. Louis commenced this action for damages, alleging,
among other things, that defendant Town of North Elba, the owner
of the Olympic Complex, had violated Labor Law § 241 (6), which
"requires owners and contractors to provide reasonable and
adequate protection and safety for workers and to comply with the
specific safety rules and regulations promulgated by the
Commissioner of the Department of Labor" (Ross v Curtis-Palmer
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No. 45
Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 501-502 [1993] [internal quotation
marks omitted]).  Since § 241 (6) imposes a non-delegable duty on
property owners, plaintiff need not show that defendants
exercised supervision or control over the worksite in order to
establish a right of recovery under § 241 (6) (see Allen v
Cloutier Constr. Corp, 44 NY2d 290, 300 [1978]).  Nonetheless,
comparative negligence remains a cognizable affirmative defense
to a § 241 (6) cause of action (see Long v Forest-Fehlhaber, 55
NY2d 154, 160-161 [1982]). 
In order to state a claim under § 241 (6), a plaintiff
must allege that the property owners violated a regulation that
sets forth a specific standard of conduct and not simply a
recitation of common-law safety principles (see e.g. Ross, 81
NY2d at 501-502).  Here, plaintiff rests his § 241 (6) claim on a
violation of 12 NYCRR § 23-9.4 (e).  
Section 23-9.4 falls within Subpart 23-9 of the Code,
which is entitled "Power Operated Equipment."  Section 23-9.1
("Application of this Subpart") specifies that "[t]he provisions
of [subpart 23-9] shall apply to the power-operated heavy
equipment or machinery used in construction, demolition and
excavation operations."  Following this statement of
applicability are nine sections covering specific kinds of power-
operated heavy equipment or machinery, which do not mention
"loaders" or "front-end loaders."  Section 23-9.4 itself
provides:
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"Where power shovels and backhoes are used for material
handling, such equipment and the use thereof shall be
in accordance with the following provisions:
[. . .]
(e) Attachment of load.
 
(1) Any load handled by such equipment shall
be suspended from the bucket or bucket arm by means of
wire rope having a safety factor of four.
(2) Such wire rope shall be connected by
means of either a closed shackle or a safety hook
capable of holding at least four times the intended
load."
In its motion papers, defendants challenged the use of
§ 23-9.4 as a predicate for a § 241 (6) claim, arguing, among
other things, that § 23-9.4 only mentions "power shovels and
backhoes" and therefore cannot be extended to include "front-end
loaders."      
 Supreme Court denied defendant's motion for summary
judgment, concluding that the provisions of § 23-9.4 (e) cover
front-end loaders when used in the manner and circumstances
presented.  The court relied on Copp v City of Elmira (31 AD3d
899 [3d Dept 2006]), which held that § 23-9.4 applies to a
"payloader" used to elevate construction material:
"The regulation clearly addresses situations in which
construction equipment is used to lift materials and
sets forth pertinent safety standards.  The term power
shovel is not separately defined and where, as here,
construction equipment is used to attempt to accomplish
the same task as a power shovel, it would be
inconsistent with the purpose of the regulation and
cause an objectionable result to find the safety
precautions regarding lifting materials inapplicable
(see Matter of ATM ONE v Landaverde, 2 NY3d 472, 476-
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No. 45
477)" (Copp, 31 AD3d at 900) (emphasis added).
The Appellate Division affirmed, rejecting defendant's
argument that Section 23-9.4 cannot apply to a front-end loader.
The court found "the manner in which the equipment is used rather
than its name or label" to be the touchstone in assessing the
applicability of a particular Code section (see 70 AD3d 1250, 
1251 [2010]) (citing Copp, 31 AD3d at 900; Borowicz v
International Paper Co., 245 AD2d 682, 684 [3d Dept 1997]; Smith
v Hovnanian Co., 218 AD2d 68, 71 [3d Dept 1995]). 
The Appellate Division subsequently granted permission
to appeal to the Court of Appeals upon the certified question of
whether the court had erred in affirming the motion court.
We now answer the certified question in the negative
and affirm the Appellate Division order upholding the denial of
summary judgment. 
As an initial matter, we agree that Subpart 23-9 of the
Code, which applies to "power-operated heavy equipment or
machinery used in construction" extends to a front-end loader
being used to construct a drainage pipeline.  A front-end loader
is undeniably "power-operated heavy equipment."  Moreover, the
Code's definition of "construction work" expressly includes "pipe
and conduit laying" (12 NYCRR § 23-1.4 [b] [13]).  
Further, we agree that the safety requirements of this
section appropriately extend to the case of a front-end loader
that is enlisted to do the material handling that is otherwise
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No. 45
performed by power shovels and backhoes.  Although the Code does
not enumerate each piece of heavy equipment that can be operated
to suspend materials from its bucket or bucket arm, § 23-9.4 (e)
was clearly drafted to reduce the threat posed by heavy materials
falling from buckets by requiring loads to be fastened with
sturdy wire, proportionate to the weight of the load.  The same
danger that exists for a worker using a power shovel or backhoe
with an unsecured load exists for a worker using a front-end
loader with an unsecured load.  We furthermore note the record
indicates testimony that the workers normally secured materials
in the bucket by use of metal chain, and the accident report
stated that the injury could have been prevented by "us[ing]
chain on pipe."  Thus, it is apparent that material hoisting with
a front-end loader is associated in the trade with the same known
risks as other power-operated machinery used in this manner.
The Industrial Code should be sensibly interpreted and
applied to effectuate its purpose of protecting construction
laborers against hazards in the workplace (see e.g. Allen v
Cloutier Constr. Corp., 44 NY2d at 300 ["Doubtless this duty
(imposed by Labor Law § 241)is onerous; yet, it is one the
Legislature quite reasonably deemed necessary by reason of the
exceptional dangers inherent in connection with 'constructing or
demolishing buildings or doing any excavating in connection
therewith'"] [internal citations omitted]).  Accordingly, the
preferred rule both as a matter of statutory interpretation and
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as a reinforcement of the objectives of the Industrial Code is to
take into consideration the function of a piece of equipment, and
not merely the name, when determining the applicability of a
regulation.  This approach accounts for those circumstances where
a slightly different machine is utilized for the same risky
objective that is perhaps more frequently or more efficiently
achieved by the machine designated by name in the Code. 
We therefore hold that the Appellate Division did not
err in its conclusion that a front-end loader used to suspend
dangerous construction materials from its bucket arm should
demand the same safety precautions as required for other power-
operated heavy equipment performing the same function.  It now
remains for a jury to determine the remaining factual issues,
including proximate cause and comparative negligence.
Accordingly, the order should be affirmed, with costs,
and the certified question answered in the negative. 
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Ryan P. St. Louis v Town of North Elba, et al.
No. 45
SMITH, J. (dissenting):
The majority's decision can only confuse what until now
has been our consistent, if rather complicated, approach to
actions brought under Labor Law § 241 (6).  That statute says:
"All areas in which construction, excavation
or demolition work is being performed shall
be so constructed, shored, equipped, guarded,
arranged, operated and conducted as to
provide reasonable and adequate protection
and safety to the persons employed therein or
lawfully frequenting such places.  The
commissioner [of the Department of Labor] may
make rules to carry into effect the
provisions of this subdivision, and the
owners and contractors and their agents for
such work, except owners of one and two-
family dwellings who contract for but do not
direct or control the work, shall comply
therewith."
I call our approach to interpreting the statute
complicated because, as we explained in Ross v Curtis-Palmer
Hydro-Elec. Co. (81 NY2d 494, 501-505 [1993]), we have in essence
subdivided section 241 (6).  Ross says:
"Labor Law § 241 (6) is, in a sense, a
hybrid, since it reiterates the general
common-law standard of care and then
contemplates the establishment of specific
detailed rules through the Labor
Commissioner's rule-making authority"
(id. at 503).
Responding to the dual nature of the statute, we have
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No. 45
separated the first sentence from the second, holding that the
second sentence, but not the first, may "create duties that are
nondelegable" in the sense that liability for breach of those
duties may be imposed even on owners and contractors who exercise
no supervision or control over the activity in question (id.). 
In other words, a worker injured through a breach of the
generalized standard of care stated in the first sentence does
not have a cause of action against entities that do not supervise
or control the work, but if the injury results from a violation
of the "specific detailed rules" contemplated by the second
sentence, no barrier to such a suit exists.
To complicate matters further, a cause of action will
exist only where the Commissioner has indeed promulgated
"specific detailed rules" -- not where she has merely broadly
restated a duty of care, using such words as "reasonable and
adequate protection and safety" (id. [internal quotations marks
and citations omitted]).  The bottom line is that a plaintiff may
sue a non-supervising owner or contractor under Labor Law § 241
(6) only where the Commissioner's regulation "sets forth a
specific requirement or standard of conduct" (id.) or mandates
"compliance with concrete specifications" (id. at 505).
Of course, deciding whether the requirements of a
particular regulation are "specific" or "concrete" enough can be
tricky (see e.g., Misicki v Caradonna, 12 NY3d 511 [2009]).  But
until today, we at least knew the starting point for the inquiry:
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No. 45
the words of the regulation.  Now the majority holds that we may
disregard the words if doing so will effectuate the regulation's
"purpose of protecting construction laborers against hazards in
the workplace" (majority op at 6).  It is therefore unimportant
that the regulation in issue here is, by its plain language,
applicable only to "power shovels and backhoes"; it can also be
applied to a different kind of equipment, a front-end loader,
because the majority does not think the difference between the
kinds of equipment justifies different treatment.
Whatever the merits of this kind of "purpose-based"
interpretation generally, it makes no sense at all in the context
of a statute whose whole point, as we have interpreted it, is to
give a remedy only for violations of a regulation's specific
commands.  The virtue of this approach is that it assures that
all have clear notice of what the law requires; but how could the
defendants in this case possibly have known, from reading 12
NYCRR § 23-9.4 (e), that its requirements applied to front-end
loaders?  If courts can freely rewrite the regulations to give
whatever protection a court thinks should be given, why not
forget about the general-specific distinction explained in Ross
and allow plaintiffs to sue owners and contractors under Labor
Law § 241 (6) for any violation of the common-law standard of
care?
For these reasons, I would dissent from the majority's
legal conclusion even if I agreed with its factual premise --
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No. 45
that there is no difference between a power shovel or backhoe and
a front-end loader that warrants different treatment.  For me, it
is enough that the regulation does treat them differently.  But I
am also skeptical of the majority's premise.  The Commissioner
may well have good reasons for believing that power shovels and
backhoes -- which have, at least sometimes, longer arms than
front-end loaders, and thus may lift their loads to a greater
height -- present more danger and should be regulated more
strictly.  Neither the record in this case nor our expertise as
judges equips us to decide that question, and we should not usurp
the Commissioner's authority by doing so.   
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order affirmed, with costs, and certified question answered in
the negative. Opinion by Chief Judge Lippman. Judges Ciparick,
Pigott and Jones concur. Judge Smith dissents and votes to
reverse in an opinion in which Judges Graffeo and Read concur.
Decided March 31, 2011
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