Title: Rhymes v. State

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

356 So. 2d 1165 (1978) J.Q. RHYMES v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 50327. Supreme Court of Mississippi. March 22, 1978. Houghton F. Elias, Jr., Cleveland, for appellant. *1166 A.F. Summer, Atty. Gen., by Robert D. Findley, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. Before SMITH, ROBERTSON and LEE, JJ. LEE, Justice, for the Court: J.Q. Rhymes was convicted in the Circuit Court of Bolivar County for rape of his seven-year-old daughter and was sentenced to life imprisonment, from which conviction and sentence he appeals. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in that the indictment was fatally defective and omitted an essential element of the crime charged against him. The indictment charged the following: Appellant argues that the indictment charges he violated Section 97-3-65(1), Mississippi Code Annotated (1972), without adding the words "as amended." Further, that Section 97-3-65 was the pertinent section of Mississippi Code Annotated (1972), and that Section 97-3-65(1), which was in effect at the time of the alleged crime, was an amendment to Mississippi Code Annotated (1972) by the 1974 Supplement. Section 97-3-65 provided punishment for rape of a female child under the age of twelve (12) years at death, unless the jury fixed the punishment at imprisonment in the penitentiary for life. Section 97-3-65(1) fixes the punishment at death with no provision for life imprisonment. Section 99-17-20, Mississippi Code Annotated (1972), as amended by the 1976 Supplement, provides that where a crime is punishable by death, the offense shall be specifically cited in the indictment by setting forth the section and subsection number of the Code defining the offense alleged to have been committed by the accused and that any conviction for such offense shall not be valid unless the offense shall have been set forth in the indictment by section and subsection. In Bell v. State, 353 So. 2d 1141 (Miss. 1977), the trial court permitted amendment of the indictment in order to include the section and subsection of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-19(2)(e) (Supp. 1977), as amended, to comply with Section 99-17-20, and said: The purpose of referring to the section and subsection is to inform the defendant specifically of the charge against him. Appellant admits that the indictment would have been sufficient, if the two words "as amended" had been added following the reference to "Mississippi Code Annotated (1972)." However, when appellant turned to Section 97-3-65, Mississippi Code Annotated (1972), he immediately was put on notice that the section had been amended and that he should turn to the supplement for the amendment. In Westmoreland v. State, 246 So. 2d 487 (Miss. 1971), the Court cited with approval the following statement from 41 Am.Jur.2d Indictments and Informations § 88 (1968): The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the question in Jackson v. United States, 325 F.2d 477 (8th Cir.1963), and said: Appellant made no objection to the sufficiency of the indictment nor did he challenge its validity in the trial court by demurrer or otherwise. We are of the opinion that a citation to an existing Code section includes all amendments thereto then in force, that the indictment was amendable and that, if defective at all, it was only a formal defect, which, if properly brought to the attention of the court, would have been amended. We note that in Jackson v. State, 337 So. 2d 1242 (Miss. 1976), this Court considered the effect of Section 99-17-20 insofar as it pertained to granting instructions in a capital case and stated: We hold that appellant was adequately informed of the charge against him, that Section 99-17-20 was substantially complied with, and that no prejudice resulted to appellant by failure to include the words "as amended" after reference to the section and subsection of the Mississippi Code of 1972. Appellant contends that the indictment was also defective for the reason that it did not charge appellant's age to be above eighteen (18) years. The statute provides a lesser sentence for an accused whose age is between thirteen (13) and eighteen (18) *1168 years. The amended Section 97-3-65(1) simply modified the punishment prescribed for a person within such age limits. The proof was undisputed that appellant was thirty-two (32) years of age at the time of the crime and the reduction of punishment as to persons within the 13 to 18 age group could not be prejudicial to appellant. Moreover, the trial court declined to submit the case to the jury on the death penalty. We are of the opinion that the indictment was sufficient and valid and that there is no merit to assigned error No. I. Appellant contends that the court erred in failing to examine the prosecutrix to determine her competency as a witness. The child was seven (7) years old at the time of the crime and eight (8) years old at the time of trial. Appellant did not request the court to examine this witness in the absence of the jury to determine whether she understood the significance of an oath or whether she was otherwise qualified. The record does not indicate that she was not qualified to testify on account of her age. Appellant urges us to declare a new procedure through this Court's inherent rule-making power whereby trial court judges would be required to personally examine child witnesses before allowing them to testify. We note through experience that usually trial judges do satisfy themselves children of tender age are competent and qualified before admitting their testimony. Additionally, there is a duty upon the party against whom such witnesses are introduced to request an examination of them in the absence of the jury for the purpose of determining competency. In Wilson v. State, 221 So. 2d 100 (Miss. 1969), the Court stated the rule pertaining to competency of children as follows: See Perkins v. State, 290 So. 2d 597 (Miss. 1974). After preliminary questions, the district attorney asked the prosecutrix the following questions: On cross-examination, appellant's attorney asked the prosecutrix the following questions: Q. Are you sure about this, Skippy? A. Uh huh." *1169 The above examination indicates that the child knew the meaning of telling the truth. The cross-examination by appellant waived his challenge to the competency of such witness. Jackson v. State, 158 Miss. 524, 130 So. 729 (1930). Appellant contends that the evidence does not support the verdict and that his motion for a directed verdict at the close of the State's case should have been granted. Appellant chiefly argues that the State failed to prove penetration of the victim's privates. Without detailing the evidence, the record indicates overwhelmingly that there was such penetration. She bled, was hurt, torn and lacerated and ran from appellant to the bathroom where she hid. Although appellant testified that he was intoxicated and that he did not commit the act, when his wife arrived at home after the child had been attacked, appellant stated to her that he was sorry and that he tried to stop. A Dr. Green examined the child shortly after the assault and found extensive tissue damage or tearing in the lower part of the child's vagina and in the adjacent tissues, which required sutures. There was profuse bleeding and the child remained in the hospital four (4) days. The child said, "He stuck his thing in my booty." The doctor's examination did not indicate any penetration or damage in her anus. The fact of penetration need not be proved where it is shown that the private parts of the female (under the age of twelve years) have been lacerated or torn in the attempt to have carnal knowledge of her. Section 97-3-65(1), Mississippi Code Annotated (1972), as amended. We are of the opinion that the verdict was amply supported by the evidence and that there is no merit in the third assignment of error. Gandy v. State, 355 So. 2d 1096 (Miss. 1978); Warn v. State, 349 So. 2d 1055 (Miss. 1977); Cochran v. State, 278 So. 2d 451 (Miss. 1973). For the reasons stated, the judgment and sentence of the trial court are affirmed. AFFIRMED. PATTERSON, C.J., SMITH, P.J., and ROBERTSON, SUGG, WALKER, BROOM, BOWLING and COFER, JJ., concur.