Title: Commonwealth v. Parker

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-10988 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  HAROLD PARKER. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 12, 2018. - December 7, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Kidnapping.  Search and Seizure, Clothing, Exigent 
circumstances.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Motion to 
suppress, New trial, Discovery, Argument by prosecutor, 
Assistance of counsel.  Evidence, Chain of custody. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 20, 2001. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Patrick 
F. Brady, J., and the cases were tried before him; and motions 
for a new trial and for posttrial discovery, filed on September 
1, 2016, were considered by Christine M. Roach, J. 
 
 
 
Richard J. Fallon for the defendant. 
 
Helle Sachse, Assistant District Attorney (Patrick M. 
Haggan, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
BUDD, J.  On the morning of November 4, 2001, the body of 
the victim, a twenty-one year old woman, was discovered in the 
Charles River near the Boston side of the Boston University 
2 
 
footbridge.  The defendant, Harold Parker, was convicted as a 
joint venturer of kidnapping and murder in the first degree in 
connection with the death.1 
We consolidated his direct appeal with his appeal of the 
denial of his motions for a new trial and for posttrial 
discovery, and now affirm.  Further, we decline to grant 
extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
Background.  We summarize the facts the jury could have 
found, reserving certain details for discussion of specific 
issues.  In the fall of 2001, an area adjacent to the main 
entrance to a public transit station in the Harvard Square area 
of Cambridge, known as "the Pit," was a gathering place for an 
assortment of young people, a number of them homeless.  The 
victim and her boyfriend, Gene Bamford, were among those who 
congregated there. 
In late October, 2001, the defendant and Ismael Vasquez,2 
who held themselves out as senior members of the "Crips" gang, 
                     
 
1 Of the three codefendants, brothers Ismael Vasquez and 
Luis Vasquez were similarly charged and convicted, with Luis 
additionally being charged with and convicted of aggravated rape 
of the victim, and Scott Davenport was charged and convicted of 
murder in the first degree.  Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 462 Mass. 
827, 828 n.3 (2012). 
 
 
2 As Ismael Vasquez and his codefendant brother Luis Vasquez 
share a last name, hereafter we use their first names. 
3 
 
recruited prospective members at the Pit, including the victim, 
Bamford, Ana White, and Lauren Alleyne. 
After an initiation ceremony, which took place in a nearby 
cemetery on Halloween night, Ismael, the defendant, and Bamford 
explained to the assembled group that they would be sent on 
"missions" to rob people.  If a member failed to complete the 
mission, or otherwise failed to obey the leaders, that member 
would be given a "violation," that is, a beating.  A third 
violation would result in that member's death.  If the offending 
member could not be found, the gang would kill someone close to 
that member. 
Beginning that night, members were sent on missions.  When 
enough cash and credit cards had been collected, the group 
retired to a motel.  There, "marriage" ceremonies were conducted 
in which Bamford was "married" to the victim, the defendant was 
"married" to Alleyne, and Ismael was "married" to White. 
The next day, at a second meeting in the cemetery, Luis was 
introduced to the members as one of the leaders of the group.  
That day and the next, members again were sent out on missions.  
On November 2, members were to report to the motel where Ismael, 
Luis, and the defendant were waiting.  The victim also remained 
at the motel because she was considered to be "child-like" and 
would be a burden to those on missions. 
4 
 
While in Harvard Square, members, including Bamford and 
Alleyne, learned that Ismael, Luis, and the defendant were not 
Crips.  Instead, Ismael and Luis were purportedly members of the 
"Latin Kings" gang, and had been sent to organize a false "set" 
of Crips.  Upon hearing this news, the group renounced their 
memberships; Bamford devised a plan to obtain a gun and rescue 
the victim, whom Bamford feared would be in danger once Ismael, 
Luis, and the defendant learned that members of the group had 
turned against them. 
The next day, November 3, Alleyne returned to the motel to 
warn Ismael, Luis, and the defendant of Bamford's plan.  Ismael 
arranged for Scott Davenport to provide transportation for the 
three men, the victim, Alleyne, and White (who had since 
rejoined the group) in exchange for heroin.  The victim related 
to Alleyne and White a dream she had that she interpreted to 
mean that Bamford was going to betray Ismael, Luis, and the 
defendant.  In turn, White told the men that the victim knew all 
along that Bamford was going to turn against them. 
The group traveled to Cambridge, where the defendant told 
Alleyne and White that they were going to "get" the victim.  The 
defendant instructed Alleyne and White that when they heard the 
phrase "green light" they were to pull the victim to the ground 
and hold her down as Davenport stabbed her.  The defendant 
5 
 
further instructed Alleyne to wrap a bandanna around her hand in 
case the victim tried to bite. 
As the women walked along the tracks of a railroad bridge 
that spanned the Charles River, Ismael shouted "green light."  
As planned, Alleyne and White pulled the victim to the ground; 
Davenport approached and stabbed the victim repeatedly, and then 
Luis ran to them and struck the victim in the head several times 
with a pair of "nunchucks."  Luis and Davenport then threw the 
victim's body into the Charles River. 
The defendant and others were arrested hours later for 
kidnapping another individual whom they believed had turned 
against them.  While in custody, the defendant was questioned 
about the victim's death.  Among other things, the defendant 
told investigators that he knew that the victim would be killed 
and was against it, but that other members threatened to kill 
him and stripped him of his rank in the gang.  He also stated 
that he was approximately twenty feet away from where the victim 
was killed.  Later in the interview, when asked if he killed the 
victim, he responded, "You don't understand that someone at my 
level doesn't have to do any dirt work," and "[W]hen it comes to 
trial your witnesses won't make it." 
Discussion.  In the direct appeal from his murder 
conviction, the defendant asserts error in the denial of his 
pretrial motion to suppress his clothing and in the prosecutor's 
6 
 
closing argument at trial.  In the appeal from the denial of his 
motion for a new trial, the defendant alleges ineffective 
assistance of his trial counsel for failing to highlight 
irregularities in the handling of the defendant's clothing and 
asserts that had the jury been aware of the discrepancies, such 
knowledge may have made a difference in their verdicts.3  We 
address the issues from each appeal. 
1.  Motion to suppress.  The defendant claims that his 
motion to suppress evidence obtained from his clothing was 
improperly denied because there were no exigent circumstances 
justifying the warrantless seizure.  We find no error. 
We summarize the facts found by the judge who heard the 
motion to suppress, who was also the trial judge.  See 
Commonwealth v. Stephens, 451 Mass. 370, 381 (2008).  The 
defendant, the Vasquez brothers, and Davenport were arrested for 
kidnapping on Saturday, November 3, 2001, and held pending 
arraignment.  The victim's body was discovered the next morning.  
On Monday morning, investigators received an anonymous tip that 
three individuals who had been arrested for kidnapping were 
involved in the victim's death.  Based on the tip and other 
                     
3 The defendant also moved for posttrial discovery.  The 
judge who considered that motion did not err in denying it. 
 
7 
 
corroborating evidence,4 a State police investigator had the 
defendant disrobe and seized his clothing while he was in 
custody awaiting arraignment.  The investigator subsequently 
returned the clothing to a court officer after a District Court 
judge instructed the investigator to discontinue the warrantless 
seizure.  The defendant's clothing was held with his other 
property, and later taken by the State police pursuant to a 
search warrant issued the following day. 
"A reasonable belief as to the potential loss or 
destruction of evidence may create exigent circumstances 
permitting a warrantless . . . seizure of [that] evidence."  
Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 439 Mass. 616, 620 (2003).  See 
Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 468 Mass. 204, 213 (2014); 
Commonwealth v. Gentile, 437 Mass. 569, 573 (2002).  The 
defendant argues that exigent circumstances did not exist at the 
time his clothing was seized because he was in police custody at 
the time of the seizure and whether he would be released had not 
been determined.  We find this argument unpersuasive. 
At the time of the initial seizure, the defendant was in 
custody awaiting arraignment on kidnapping charges and wearing 
the clothing in which he had been arrested.  Given that the 
                     
4 The defendant does not challenge the judge's finding of 
probable cause; although we do not here recite all of the 
evidence available to the investigators at the time of the 
seizure, we agree that probable cause existed. 
8 
 
defendant's arrest occurred near the time of the murder, it was 
objectively reasonable to believe that there was a significant 
risk that the defendant might attempt to hide or destroy 
evidence of the crime that existed on his clothing while in 
custody, e.g., exchanging his clothes with another detainee or 
washing his clothes in a jail cell sink or toilet.  See 
Figueroa, 468 Mass. at 213 (exigent circumstances exist when 
"police have reasonable grounds to believe that obtaining a 
warrant would be impracticable under the circumstances because 
the delay in doing so would pose a significant risk that . . . 
evidence may be destroyed").  Further, it was unclear whether 
the defendant would be released from police custody, freeing him 
to hide or destroy any evidence on his clothing.  See id. at 
214; Commonwealth v. Taylor, 426 Mass. 189, 195 (1997).  Thus, 
there was no error in denying the defendant's motion to 
suppress.5 
2.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant claims 
that during the prosecutor's closing argument he made 
misstatements concerning blood evidence connecting the defendant 
                     
 
5 The defendant also argues that the judge erred in 
determining that the seizure was of no consequence because the 
clothing was returned to the court officer and no observations 
of the evidence were included in the affidavit of the search 
warrant.  As we conclude that the motion to suppress was 
properly denied on the basis of exigent circumstances, we need 
not address whether the doctrine of inevitable discovery 
applies. 
9 
 
to the crime, creating a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage 
of justice.  See G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We disagree. 
The jury heard from experts regarding three bloodstains on 
the defendant's sweatshirt.  Two of the stains were found to be 
human blood and were consistent with spatter stains.  The 
remaining bloodstain, too small to analyze further, was 
consistent with being either a spatter or a transfer stain.  An 
analysis of the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) in one of the two 
larger stains revealed a DNA mixture from at least two people, 
and that a major profile found in the mixture matched that of 
the victim.  In his closing, the prosecutor argued that all 
three stains were from the nunchucks used to hit the victim, 
stating, "[Y]ou also heard about the three spots of spatter on 
[the defendant's] shirt. . . .  [T]hat's probably how those 
three drops of the victim's blood get there." 
The defendant claims that the prosecutor's suggestion that 
all three stains were spatter and that all three were consistent 
with the victim's blood were misstatements of the evidence 
warranting reversal of his convictions.  Because the defendant 
failed to object to the prosecutor's closing argument at trial, 
our review is limited to determining whether any error produced 
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
Commonwealth v. Mendez, 476 Mass. 512, 521 (2017), citing 
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 455 Mass. 372, 377 (2009). 
10 
 
"In closing argument, '[p]rosecutors are entitled to 
marshal the evidence and suggest inferences that the jury may 
draw from it.'"  Commonwealth v. Roy, 464 Mass. 818, 829 (2013), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Drayton, 386 Mass. 39, 52 (1982).  Such 
inferences need only be reasonable and possible based on the 
evidence before the jury.  Roy, supra.  Taylor, 455 Mass. at 
383.  "Prosecutors may not 'misstate the evidence or refer to 
facts not in evidence,'" however.  Commonwealth v. Martinez, 476 
Mass. 186, 200 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 
514, 516-517 (1987). 
Here, expert testimony established that two of the three 
stains were consistent with spatter, and the third was 
consistent with either spatter or transfer.  This testimony, 
coupled with the third stain's proximity to the first and 
second, provided a solid basis for the inference that all three 
stains were spatter.  See Commonwealth v. Cole, 473 Mass. 317, 
333 (2015); Roy, 464 Mass. at 829.  Similarly, the suggestion 
that all three stains contained the victim's blood was also a 
fair inference to draw based on the evidence and the 
Commonwealth's theory of the case.  See Commonwealth v. 
Valentin, 474 Mass. 301, 308-309 (2016); Commonwealth v. 
Blaikie, 375 Mass. 601, 612 (1978) ("counsel may argue 
inferences from the evidence which are most favorable to his or 
11 
 
her theory of the case, as long as the inferences drawn are 
reasonable"). 
Also unavailing is the defendant's argument that the 
prosecutor should have mentioned the DNA mixture in the lone 
bloodstain that was tested.  The defendant's theory was that he 
was present for the victim's murder but that he was not a 
participant.  The prosecution's theory was that the defendant 
ordered the killing but did not physically carry it out.  Given 
this basic agreement on the facts, we are not persuaded that 
mention of the DNA mixture would have had any meaningful 
exculpatory effect.  Whether or not the prosecutor misstated the 
evidence by omitting this particular fact, the omission was not 
likely to have influenced the jury's decision, and thus there 
was not a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
See Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 681 (1992), S.C., 469 
Mass. 447 (2014). 
3.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  In his motion for a 
new trial, the defendant claims that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to highlight irregularities in the way 
investigators handled evidence in order to cast doubt on the 
chain of custody and, ultimately, on the fact that on the night 
of the murder the defendant was wearing a blue fleece pullover, 
which was later found to have human bloodstains. 
12 
 
Because the defendant was convicted of murder in the first 
degree, rather than reviewing the claim under the traditional 
Saferian standard,6 we ask whether there was error resulting in a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice pursuant to 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Wright, 411 Mass. at 681-682.  In essence, 
"[t]he burden is on the defendant to demonstrate that something 
inappropriate was likely to have unfairly influenced the jury's 
verdict."  Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 477 Mass. 658, 674 (2017), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Painten, 429 Mass. 536, 550 (1999). 
The defendant raises two points based on appellate 
counsel's inspection of the evidence posttrial.  First, the 
cardboard box that contained Luis's clothing was labeled with 
his name on both the top flap and the side of the box, but also 
had the defendant's name on the box with a line through it.  
Second, according to the investigator's testimony, the 
defendants' clothing was placed into five separately labeled 
plastic bags at the police station prior to being put into 
evidence boxes.  However, appellate counsel found two additional 
unlabeled plastic bags with the trial evidence that were not 
referenced during the trial. 
                     
6 Under Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974), 
the traditional standard for ineffective assistance of counsel 
is whether an attorney's performance fell measurably below that 
which might be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer and, if 
so, whether such ineffectiveness has likely deprived the 
defendant of an otherwise available substantial defense. 
13 
 
The defendant asserts that trial counsel's failure to 
direct the jury's attention to these discrepancies may have made 
a difference in the jury's verdicts.  We disagree.  Counsel for 
both Ismael and the defendant vigorously challenged the chain of 
custody of the clothing generally.  The defendant's trial 
counsel focused on the fleece pullover in particular, pointing 
out that there was no record of what the defendant wore when he 
was arrested, and that the defendant's booking photograph 
depicted him in a white T-shirt.  Finally, defense counsel 
established during cross-examination that the clothing seized 
from the defendant by an investigator was given to a court 
officer in unlabeled evidence bags when the investigator was 
ordered to stop the seizure. 
The defendant has made no showing that the discrete issues 
he raised in support of his motion for a new trial would have 
made a difference in the jury's verdicts, especially because he 
has made no connection between the discrepancies and the fleece 
pullover.  More importantly, although the blood evidence on the 
fleece pullover was part of the Commonwealth's case, the 
defendant was alleged to have ordered the killing, and not to 
have committed the murder himself.  Thus, the blood evidence was 
merely additional circumstantial evidence showing that the 
defendant was present during the murder. 
14 
 
4.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  In addition to a 
review of the prosecutor's closing argument, we have reviewed 
the entire record and discern no reason to reduce the degree of 
guilt or grant a new trial pursuant to our powers under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E. 
Conclusion.  We affirm the defendant's convictions and the 
order denying the defendant's motions for a new trial and for 
posttrial discovery. 
So ordered.