Title: Commonwealth v. Wallace

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
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SJC-11705 
SJC-11707 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  NICKOYAN WALLACE 
(and a companion case1). 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 4, 2015. - June 30, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, & Lenk, 
JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Speedy trial, Delay in 
commencement of prosecution.  Due Process of Law, Delay in 
commencement of prosecution.  Practice, Criminal, Speedy 
trial, Delay in commencement of prosecution, Capital case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on May 22, 2002. 
 
 
Motions to dismiss, filed on June 18 and 28, 2010, were 
heard by Charles J. Hely, J. 
 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal in the companion case was allowed by Gants, J., in the 
Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk, and the 
appeals were consolidated and reported by him to the Appeals 
Court.  After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Norman S. Zalkind (Ruth O'Meara-Costello with him) for Timi 
Wallace. 
                     
 
1 Commonwealth vs. Timi Wallace. 
2 
 
 
Matthew A. Kamholtz for Nickoyan Wallace. 
 
Sarah Montgomery Lewis, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
J. Anthony Downs, Samuel Sherry, Catherine Curley, Matthew 
R. Segal, Jessie Rossman, & Chauncey B. Wood for American Civil 
Liberties Union Foundation of Massachusetts & another, amici 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
SPINA, J.  In this consolidated interlocutory appeal, we 
consider whether the Commonwealth's delay in obtaining custody 
of the defendants Nickoyan Wallace (Nickoyan) and Timi Wallace 
(Timi),2 brothers, from Federal prison authorities impermissibly 
affected their right to a speedy trial.  In considering this 
question in motions to dismiss due to delays totaling more than 
nine years,3 a judge of the Superior Court found that Timi's 
right to a speedy trial had not been violated but that of 
Nickoyan had.  A single justice of this court allowed the 
interlocutory appeals of Timi and the Commonwealth, consolidated 
the cases, and reported them to the Appeals Court.  The Appeals 
Court held that the Commonwealth had not violated the speedy 
trial right of either brother, affirming the denial of Timi's 
motion and reversing the allowance of Nickoyan's.  Commonwealth 
v. Wallace, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 123 (2014).  This court granted 
                     
 
2 The victim and defendants are brothers and share the same 
surname.  Accordingly, we refer to them by their first names 
where possible to avoid confusion. 
 
 
3 The total delays in these cases are over nine years.  To 
avoid confusion, at various points in this opinion we focus our 
analysis on smaller portions of the total delays.  The total 
delays for both cases remain the same. 
3 
 
the brothers' applications for further appellate review.  We 
affirm the decision of the trial court to deny Timi's motion and 
to allow Nickoyan's motion.4 
 
1.  Background.  The essential facts are not in dispute, 
and we recite them as the motion judge found, reserving further 
details for discussion of the specific issues raised.  On 
March 26, 2000, the victim, Tasfa Wallace, was shot to death 
through the door of his apartment.  Moments before the shooting, 
the victim's girl friend had answered knocking at the door and 
had seen Timi and Nickoyan, the victim's brothers, through the 
door's peephole.  Other witnesses saw Timi and Nickoyan entering 
and leaving the building at the time of the shooting.  The next 
day, March 27, criminal complaints accusing Nickoyan and Timi of 
murder in the first degree issued from the Dorchester Division 
of the Boston Municipal Court Department.  Boston police 
officers searching for Timi and Nickoyan could not find them and 
subsequently learned that both brothers had fled the 
Commonwealth. 
 
In April, 2000, the United States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts issued Federal fugitive warrants 
naming the defendants and accusing them of the Federal charge of 
unlawful interstate flight to avoid prosecution.  As a result of 
                     
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus brief filed by the American 
Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Massachusetts and the 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
4 
 
the entry of Federal officials into the search, the focus 
quickly narrowed on the possibility that the defendants were in 
Providence, Rhode Island.  On September 25, the defendants 
committed an armed robbery of a gun store in Providence.  Days 
later, on October 5, law enforcement officials arrested Nickoyan 
at an apartment in Providence.  As police surrounded the 
apartment to arrest him, Nickoyan was able to telephone Timi.  
Timi fled and was not arrested until July 20, 2004.  Both 
defendants were indicted for armed robbery and related charges 
by a Federal grand jury on October 18, 2000. 
 
Nickoyan was arraigned on the Federal armed robbery charges 
on October 26, 2000, and placed in pretrial custody.  Nickoyan's 
trial ended in a conviction on November 8, 2001, and his 
sentence of seventeen years began on March 19, 2002.  Nickoyan 
immediately appealed from his convictions.  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed his conviction 
in August, 2003.  United States v. Wallace, 71 Fed. Appx. 868 
(1st Cir. 2003). 
 
Timi's arrest, arraignment, and trial in Federal court came 
soon thereafter.  Timi was convicted and began his sentence of 
twenty-five years on January 21, 2005.  He also immediately 
appealed from his conviction.  The First Circuit affirmed his 
convictions in August, 2006.  United States v. Wallace, 461 F.3d 
15 (1st Cir. 2006).  Both defendants also pursued appeals 
5 
 
collaterally attacking the propriety of their sentences.  See 
United States v. Wallace, 573 F.3d 82 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 
558 U.S. 1036 (2009); United States vs. Wallace, No. 06-2606 
(1st Cir. May 23, 2008). 
 
Following Nickoyan's Federal trial, a Massachusetts grand 
jury issued indictments against Nickoyan and Timi accusing them 
of the murder of Tasfa.  Electronic mail messages obtained from 
the district attorney's office demonstrate that prosecutors were 
aware that both Nickoyan and Timi were in Federal custody.  The 
case was assigned to several assistant district attorneys over 
the period from 2000 until 2007.  Not until 2009 did prosecutors 
initiate the necessary steps to gain custody of Nickoyan and 
Timi from Federal prison authorities under the Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers (IAD).  St. 1965, c. 892, § 1.  Detainers 
against both Nickoyan and Timi were issued on July 16, 2009.  
Nickoyan was arraigned in Superior Court on December 9, 2009, 
and Timi on November 25, 2009. 
 
2.  Interstate Agreement on Detainers.  As we previously 
have explained, the IAD establishes the "procedures by which one 
jurisdiction may obtain temporary custody of a prisoner 
incarcerated in another jurisdiction for the purpose of bringing 
that prisoner to trial."  Commonwealth v. Copson, 444 Mass. 609, 
611 (2005), quoting Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 436 n.1 
(1981).  The IAD only applies to persons who have "entered upon 
6 
 
a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of 
a party state."  St. 1965, c. 892, § 1, art. III (a).  The 
Federal government is a party State.  Id. at § 1, art. II (a).  
 
The necessary first step to applicability of the IAD is the 
filing of a detainer by the jurisdiction seeking custody.  See 
St. 1965, c. 892, § 1, art. I (regulating determination of 
status of any and all detainers).  A detainer is "a legal order 
that requires a State in which an individual is currently 
imprisoned to hold that individual when he has finished serving 
his sentence so that he may be tried by a different State for a 
different crime."  Copson, supra at 611 n.1, quoting Alabama v. 
Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 148 (2001).  Once a detainer is filed, 
the IAD governs the procedures by which either a party State or 
a prisoner may request the disposition of any untried charges.  
Copson, supra at 611.  If a party State requests custody of a 
prisoner to pursue untried charges, trial must commence within 
120 days of arrival of the prisoner in the receiving State.  St. 
1965, c. 892, § 1, art. IV (c).  If a prisoner against whom a 
detainer is filed requests disposition of untried charges, the 
party State filing the detainer must bring the detainer to trial 
within 180 days of the delivery of the prisoner's request to the 
prosecuting officer and the appropriate court.  Id. at § 1, art. 
III (a).  Failure to abide by either of these time limits 
7 
 
requires that the party State filing the detainer dismiss the 
charges with prejudice.  Id. at § 1, art V (c). 
 
3.  Discussion.  The defendants allege that their right to 
a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 11 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights has been violated by the years-long delays between the 
issuance of the criminal complaints accusing them of the murder 
of their brother and their arraignments for that crime.  In 
reviewing a motion to dismiss because of a speedy trial 
violation, we give deference to the findings of the motion 
judge, but we may reach our own conclusions.  See Commonwealth 
v. Martin, 447 Mass. 274, 280 (2006).  "Simply to trigger a 
speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval 
between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing 
ordinary from 'presumptively prejudicial' delay."  Doggett v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-652 (1992), citing Barker v. 
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-531 (1972).  When a defendant has 
demonstrated an unreasonable delay giving rise to the 
possibility of prejudice, we utilize the four-factor balancing 
test first set out in Barker to determine whether the 
defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial has been 
violated by the delay.  Doggett, supra at 651, citing Barker, 
supra at 530.  The presumption of prejudice derived from a delay 
cannot be the sole basis of a speedy trial claim but rather is 
8 
 
"part of the mix of relevant facts."  Doggett, supra at 655-656.  
In determining whether the right to a speedy trial has been 
violated, we must weigh (i) the length of the delay, (ii) the 
reasons for the delay, (iii) the defendants' assertions of their 
right to a speedy trial, and (iv) the prejudice to the 
defendants (through the lens of Doggett).  See Commonwealth v. 
Butler, 464 Mass. 706, 714-715 (2013).  See also Barker, supra 
at 530-533.  While we ultimately decide this case under the 
right to a speedy trial enshrined in art. 11, the analysis is 
analogous to that of the Federal right.  Butler, supra at 709 
n.5. 
 
a.  Length of the delays.  Length of delay "is actually a 
double enquiry."  Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651.  An unreasonable 
delay is the trip wire giving rise to speedy trial analysis.  
Id.  In Massachusetts, we calculate this time beginning from the 
moment of formal accusation -- in this case, from the moment the 
criminal complaints issued from the Boston Municipal Court on 
March 27, 2000.  Butler, 464 Mass. at 713.5  The almost ten-year 
delays certainly are sufficient to trigger a speedy trial 
                     
 
5 Less clear in this instance is whether the clock tolls at 
the filing of the detainer for both defendants in July, 2009, as 
urged by the Commonwealth, or their arraignments in late 2009, 
as the defendants would have it.  The nearly six month 
difference is immaterial in our analysis given the total delays 
of over nine years, and we need not decide this question on 
these facts.  We note that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers 
(IAD) itself does not set a time limit on when a detainer must 
be filed.  See St. 1965, c. 892, § 1. 
9 
 
analysis under Barker.  See Doggett, supra at 652 (delay of 
eight and one-half years); Butler, supra at 715 (ten-year 
delay). 
 
We additionally weigh them independently as a factor.  
Doggett, supra at 651-652.  The delays are weighted according to 
the reasons put forth for their justification under the second 
factor.  Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.  In any instance, these delays 
weigh against the Commonwealth.6 
 
b.  Reasons for the delays.  The reason for the delay is 
the "flag all litigants seek to capture."  United States v. Loud 
Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315 (1986).  Weighing most heavily against 
the government are deliberate attempts at delay.  Barker, 407 
U.S. at 531.  Of equal weight but opposite import to a defendant 
are "delays requested or otherwise orchestrated by the 
defendant, such as evading capture by authorities."  
Commonwealth v. Carr, 464 Mass. 855, 861 (2012).  The more 
neutral reasons "such as negligence or overcrowded courts should 
be weighed less heavily but nevertheless should be considered 
since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must 
                     
 
6 As noted by the defendants, this factor measures the total 
delay from formal accusation.  The assignment of reasons for a 
particular part of the delay remains the second prong of the 
analysis under Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).  See 
Commonwealth v. Carr, 464 Mass. 855, 861 (2013) (measuring 
entirety of delay caused by defendant's flight). 
10 
 
rest with the government rather than with the defendant."  
Barker, supra at 531. 
 
The defendants both urge that the only part of the delays 
that should be attributed to them is the period between the 
issuance of the complaints and their individual arrests.  For 
Nickoyan, this period is about six months, and for Timi, this 
period is just over four years.  The brothers urge that the 
reason for the remaining delays is wholly attributable to the 
Commonwealth. 
 
We do not interpret the delays as the defendants urge.  
While we agree that the delays between issuance of the 
complaints and their arrests are attributable to the defendants 
due to their flight, we do not think their complicity in the 
orchestration of the delays stops there.  Both Timi and Nickoyan 
claim that because they were arrested on fugitive warrants 
issued due to Massachusetts charges but were first subjected to 
trial on the Federal armed robbery indictments, the delays from 
Federal arraignment to Federal sentencing should not count 
against them.  Rather, they argue, the reason for the delays 
rests with the Commonwealth because the Commonwealth failed to 
assert its primacy in prosecuting the brothers. 
 
We will not fault the Commonwealth for not insisting on 
being the first in line to prosecute a fugitive in out-of-State 
Federal custody who has committed additional serious crimes 
11 
 
while in flight.  Instead, we view the defendants' Federal trial 
as an extension of their conscious decision to flee prosecution 
and commit the intervening crime.  Indeed, were we to view the 
situation in the light now urged by the defendants and require 
the Commonwealth to bring its case before the Federal 
prosecution, it is difficult to see how they would not attempt a 
similar claim of a violation of the speedy trial right at the 
Federal level in this scenario because Federal authorities would 
have relinquished in-hand custody of the defendants only to try 
them at a later date after their Massachusetts trial.  
Furthermore, the judge took judicial notice from personal 
experience of the difficulty of obtaining prisoners in Federal 
custody while Federal authorities were actively prosecuting 
those prisoners.  The period between Federal arraignment and 
Federal sentencing must weigh against the defendants.  Cf. 
United States v. Grimmond, 137 F.3d 823, 828 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 525 U.S. 850 (1998) ("Simply waiting for another 
sovereign to finish prosecuting a defendant is without question 
a valid reason for delay").  Cf. also Commonwealth v. Domanski, 
332 Mass. 66, 72 (1954); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 
506, 524 (1858) ("No judicial process, whatever form it may 
assume, can have any lawful authority outside of the limits of 
the jurisdiction of the court or judge by whom it is issued . . 
."). 
12 
 
 
More difficult to weigh is the period after the defendants' 
Federal sentencing when they became subject to the IAD.  The 
motion judge found this period to be characterized by a 
"cumulative lack of attention by the [d]istrict [a]ttorney's 
[o]ffice to the duty to file detainers in this case within a 
reasonable time."  In Nickoyan's case, this cumulative lack of 
attention lasted over seven and one-half years, enough for the 
judge to determine Nickoyan's right to a speedy trial had been 
violated.  Nickoyan, of course, urges that the motion judge was 
correct in this finding.  Timi's delay between sentencing and 
the filing of the detainer was shorter, just over four years.  
The motion judge found that Timi's right to a speedy trial had 
not been violated because the part of the delay caused by Timi's 
deliberate flight was longer than that caused by the 
government's neglect in filing a detainer. 
 
Timi argues that this delay should weigh heavily enough 
against the Commonwealth to warrant reversal.  He points out 
that the years-long failure to gain custody indicates the low 
prosecutorial priority to bring him to trial and that the 
failure of each successive assistant district attorney to act 
should compound the failure of the previous one.  Moreover, he 
disputes the motion judge's calculations of the length of delay 
13 
 
weighing against him and the Commonwealth.7  Finally, he says 
that the Commonwealth's failure even to attempt to procure him 
prior to his Federal sentencing should cause the delay after 
sentencing to weigh even more heavily against the Commonwealth. 
 
While we acknowledge the validity of Timi's arguments with 
the exception of the judge's calculations of the delay, we do 
not grant them the weight he would have us give them.  We have 
already stated that the moment of formal accusation marks the 
beginning of the calculation of delay.  Likewise, we have 
discussed the issue of Federal authorities pursuing a 
prosecution prior to the Commonwealth.  The delay caused by Timi 
from his flight through his Federal sentencing is roughly 
commensurate with the Commonwealth's delay in filing a detainer.  
These comparable delays are not weighed equally, however.  
Timi's deliberate orchestration of the delay weighs more heavily 
than the Commonwealth's mere neglect.  Accordingly, the reason 
for the entirety of the delay -- as set out in Barker -- must 
ultimately lie at Timi's feet due to the greater weight placed 
on his contribution to the delay. 
                     
 
7 Timi argues that the period of about eight months between 
the vacation of his sentence by the Federal Court of Appeals and 
his resentencing should not be weighed against him as the motion 
judge did.  We agree with the motion judge that this time should 
count against him, as it is a consequence of his deliberate 
action while fleeing the Massachusetts charges. 
14 
 
 
The reason for delay in Nickoyan's case does not require 
such fine balancing of weights.  The delay of seven and one-half 
year between Federal sentencing and the detainer seems excessive 
and the motion judge counted the length of time heavily.  The 
Commonwealth argues that the explanation of this delay lies in a 
confluence of individual factors that make the Commonwealth's 
delay less egregious, if not outright excusable.  While we do 
agree with the Commonwealth that the fault is not so indivisible 
and uniform as Nickoyan would have us view it, we look with 
extreme disfavor on a delay of this length. 
 
The Commonwealth puts forth the initial premise that its 
intent throughout the entirety of this case was to try both 
defendants together.  The judge recognized that such a desire 
could permit some delay.  Indeed, from a case management 
perspective, such a desire would seem eminently logical.  The 
brothers are accused of acting in concert at the same place and 
at the same time.  A prosecution of one would involve almost 
entirely the same evidence that could be used against the other.  
The idea that the delay in attempting to coordinate the custody 
of codefendants so that the government might jointly prosecute 
them for substantially the same criminal offense arising from 
the same set of facts has some support in Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  See United States v. Casas, 425 F.3d 23, 34 (1st 
Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1061 (2006) ("the joint 
15 
 
prosecution of defendants involved in the same drug trafficking 
conspiracy is justified as a means of serving the efficient 
administration of justice").  Cf. Parker v. United States, 404 
F.2d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 1968) (substantial public interest in 
joint trials because joinder "expedites the administration of 
justice, reduces the congestion of trial dockets, conserves 
judicial time, lessens the burden upon citizens who must 
sacrifice both time and money to serve upon juries, and avoids 
the necessity of recalling witnesses who would otherwise be 
called upon to testify only once").  We do not go so far as to 
say that the interest in jointly trying codefendants should or 
can rationalize a seven-year delay.  Rather, we recognize that 
some delay may sometimes be justified when seeking to satisfy 
the public interest in this respect.  It is not so justified 
here. 
 
Having accepted the premise that serving the public 
interest through a joint trial was the Commonwealth's 
overarching goal, we can analyze its actions with more nuance.  
The Commonwealth stresses that its major concern with filing a 
detainer was the invocation of the speedy trial provisions of 
the IAD by one of the defendants.  In such a circumstance, the 
Commonwealth understood that it had to commence trial within 120 
days of the receipt of a request by a prisoner to dispose of the 
detainer or risk dismissal of the charges with prejudice.  With 
16 
 
such a drastic scenario of dismissal hanging in the balance of 
the decision of when to file a detainer, the Commonwealth acted 
cautiously in proceeding against the defendants.  A hasty or 
ill-timed move on the part of the prosecution would result in 
the complete inability to pursue the serious charge of murder in 
the first degree.  Barker itself recognized that the underlying 
charge can have an effect on the leeway a reviewing court will 
give the government in analyzing a speedy trial challenge.  
Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 ("To take but one example, the delay 
that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is 
considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy 
charge"). 
 
Yet the important fact remains that the Commonwealth could 
have filed a detainer against Nickoyan at any time 
postsentencing because he was serving a "term of imprisonment" 
under the IAD but did not do so.  St. 1965, c. 892, § 1, art. 
III (a).  Notwithstanding the early applicability of the IAD, 
the Commonwealth operated under a legally mistaken impression 
that a request for the transfer of custody of the defendants 
from the Federal authorities was not a practical option until 
the dust from the posttrial motions and appeals had settled.  If 
the Commonwealth was waiting for a moment when it could be 
reasonably certain it would gain custody of both defendants at 
the same time to try them within the time prescribed by the IAD, 
17 
 
we can certainly entertain that the Commonwealth erred on the 
side of what it viewed as reasonable caution, especially in 
light of, as further urged by the Commonwealth, the more 
immediate and pressing caseload of the assistant district 
attorneys.  While we appreciate Nickoyan's implicit assertion 
that the delay attributed to Timi cannot also weigh against him, 
the fact remains that their cases are essentially the same and 
the degree of fault attributable to the Commonwealth cannot be 
viewed through a lens that does not take into consideration the 
confusion that flowed from the defendants' efforts to avoid 
prosecution. 
 
None of these factors individually or collectively, 
however, can change the fact that the reason for the delay after 
Federal sentencing in Nickoyan's case is ultimately the 
Commonwealth's negligence.  We emphasize this point.  As we have 
explained, determining the ultimate reason for the delay in 
Nickoyan's case requires us to balance a two-year delay 
resulting from deliberate flight and a Federal trial with the 
seven-year long negligence of the Commonwealth to bring charges.  
This balance is not the simple math that seven is greater than 
two.  Nickoyan's deliberate actions weigh far more heavily than 
the Commonwealth's failures, but even accepting the 
Commonwealth's justifications, the seven years of prosecutorial 
inaction are excessive and outweigh that part of the delay 
18 
 
attributable to Nickoyan.  We agree with the trial judge, 
however, that the delay occasioned by the Commonwealth was not 
deliberate, but negligent.  The reason for the delay in 
Nickoyan's case lies at the Commonwealth's feet. 
 
c.  Defendants' assertion of their speedy trial right.  
"[A] defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right . . . is 
entitled to strong evidentiary weight," but "the failure to 
assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove 
that he was denied a speedy trial."  Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-
532.  While it is not necessary that "a defendant must storm the 
courthouse and batter down the doors to preserve his right to a 
speedy trial," we do require some affirmative action.  Butler, 
464 Mass. at 716.  We keep in mind the presumption that inaction 
cannot constitute waiver of a constitutional right.  See Barker, 
supra at 525-526.  The parties do not dispute that neither Timi 
nor Nickoyan asserted a right to a speedy trial prior to the 
motion to dismiss. 
 
The motion judge found that Timi and Nickoyan never took 
any steps consistent with an assertion of a right to a speedy 
trial.  Both defendants were aware that the Boston police were 
looking for them when they fled the Commonwealth in 2000.  
Additionally, Timi was informed on the record at both his 
Federal arraignment and sentencing of the existence of murder 
charges in Massachusetts.  Furthermore, Timi and Nickoyan 
19 
 
refused to sign a form requesting a speedy disposition of the 
charges after the detainer had been filed. 
 
Timi and Nickoyan argue that the failure of each to assert 
his right to a speedy trial should not weigh against him until 
he had formal notice of the indictment against him, a moment 
that occurred much later in the period in question.  Judging the 
defendant's assertion of the right to a speedy trial only after 
formal notice of the indictment creates a standard that elevates 
form over substance.  We decline to adhere to a rule requiring 
receipt of formal notice, nor do we think the defendants' 
position finds support in case law.  The right to a speedy trial 
attaches upon formal accusation, Butler, 464 Mass. at 713, here, 
the issuance of the complaints of which the defendants had 
notice.  From his flight to evade prosecution after the murder 
of his brother as well as the multiple times he was informed of 
the existence of murder charges in Massachusetts during the 
process of his Federal trial, we reasonably can infer that Timi 
had sufficient notice of the charges against him to weigh his 
failure to assert his right to a speedy trial in the 
Commonwealth's favor. 
 
Similarly unavailing is Nickoyan's claim that he lacked 
formal notice of the indictment against him and that the 
Commonwealth deliberately withheld information of the charge 
from him.  We see no evidence in the record before us that the 
20 
 
Commonwealth deliberately hid the fact of the indictment from 
Nickoyan as he argues.  At his arraignment on the Federal armed 
robbery charges in October, 2000, the fact that Nickoyan was 
wanted as a fugitive from a murder charge in Massachusetts was 
part of the government's argument as to why Nickoyan should not 
be released from pretrial custody.  We again reject the argument 
that the lack of formal notice of the indictment relieves a 
defendant of the impact of a failure to assert the right to a 
speedy trial for the length of time at issue here.8 
 
Timi and Nickoyan counter that they still should not be 
faulted because they were unrepresented on the murder charges 
and were unaware of the right to a speedy trial.  In weighing 
the impact of the defendants' failure to assert their right to a 
speedy trial, representation by counsel and awareness of the 
right are factors in the analysis but not prerequisites.  The 
                     
 
8 It is important to understand that in the circumstances 
here, a complaint for murder in the Boston Municipal Court has 
functional significance under the IAD on detainers.  For 
example, if a murder complaint were pending in the Boston 
Municipal Court or a District Court, a defendant would be 
entitled, upon notice under the IAD, to a probable cause hearing 
under Mass. R. Crim. P. 3 (f), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1502 
(2004), within the time provided for trial under the IAD.  If, 
after hearing, no probable cause were found, the defendant would 
have to be returned to the host State.  If after hearing 
probable case were found, the Commonwealth would have to obtain 
an indictment and commence trial thereon conformably with the 
IAD.  Alternatively, in lieu of a probable cause hearing, the 
Commonwealth could satisfy the requirements of the IAD by 
obtaining an indictment and dismissal of the murder complaint, 
and by commencing trial on the indictment within the time 
provided under the IAD. 
21 
 
defendants would have the Commonwealth affirmatively demonstrate 
that they were aware of the right to a speedy trial in order for 
the failure to assert it to weigh against them.  See 
Commonwealth v. Blaney, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 96, 98 (1977) (no 
indication defendant was aware of right to speedy trial). 
 
In this case, we think such an inquiry unnecessary, and 
thus, we decline to accept the defendants' contention.  At his 
Federal arraignment, the judge acknowledged Nickoyan's oral 
request for a speedy trial.  Nickoyan was not unfamiliar with 
the legal process -- he filed a private suit against one of the 
assistant district attorneys in this case.  Nickoyan also 
refused to sign a form requesting prompt disposition of the 
charges after the detainer had been filed.  In these 
circumstances, we think it unlikely that Nickoyan was so naive 
as to the legal process that his lack of counsel on the State 
charges and claimed ignorance of the right to a speedy trial 
should obviate his failure to assert the right. 
 
Similarly, Timi was not unaware of his right to a speedy 
trial.  He chose not to exercise it.  At his Federal 
resentencing following a successful appeal, Timi's counsel 
argued that the pendency of a seven year old murder charge 
should not impact any new sentence imposed.  Counsel 
specifically referenced the IAD and its speedy trial provision.  
When finally confronted with the opportunity to address the 
22 
 
murder charges after a detainer had been filed, Timi refused to 
sign the form.  If we can draw any inference from his actions, 
we cannot conclude that Timi acted with the caution that he 
claims might be expected from an unrepresented defendant but 
that Timi hoped to avoid prosecution for as long as possible. 
 
To emphasize, the failure by the defendants to assert their 
speedy trial right is not a waiver of the right itself but 
simply a factor to be weighed.  "The speedy trial right is not 
one which may be kept in reserve in the event that one's belief 
that the prosecution has overlooked or decided not to pursue his 
case proves to be erroneous."  Commonwealth v. Look, 379 Mass. 
893, 901, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 827 (1980).  Here, we find it 
difficult to accept the defendants' claims of ignorance as the 
source of their failure to assert the right.  Instead, we infer 
an effort to "fly under the radar."  Butler, 464 Mass. at 717.  
Accordingly, this factor weighs against the defendants more than 
the Commonwealth but not heavily so.  We reiterate that weighing 
the failure to assert the right is not akin to wholesale waiver. 
 
d.  Prejudice to the defendants.  This case fundamentally 
turns on the characterization of the Commonwealth's conduct from 
the time of the defendants' Federal sentencing until their 
arraignment in Superior Court and the effect of this delay on 
the basic interests the Sixth Amendment and art. 11 were 
designed to protect.  The motion judge likened the 
23 
 
Commonwealth's failure to file a detainer under the IAD to 
neglect.  This determination is entitled to deference.  See 
Commonwealth v. Martin, 447 Mass. 274, 284 (2006).  The Supreme 
Court has noted that prosecutorial negligence falls in the 
middle ground of the spectrum bookended by prosecutorial 
diligence and bad faith delay.  See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656-
657.  However, official negligence "falls on the wrong side of 
the divide between acceptable and unacceptable reasons for 
delaying a criminal prosecution once it has begun."  Id. at 657.  
"[S]uch is the nature of the prejudice presumed that the weight 
we assign to official negligence compounds over time as the 
presumption of evidentiary prejudice grows."  Id.  Judicial 
tolerance of such negligence "varies inversely with its 
protractedness . . . and its consequent threat to the fairness 
of the accused's trial" (citation omitted).  Id. 
 
Here the only time in question possibly attributable to the 
Commonwealth -- and thus giving rise to the presumption of 
prejudice -- is the time between Federal sentencing and 
arraignment in this case.  For Timi, this period was over four 
years.  For Nickoyan, it was approximately seven years and three 
months.  The motion judge characterized this delay as the 
"result of a cumulative lack of attention by the [d]istrict 
[a]ttorney's [o]ffice to the duty to file detainers in this case 
within a reasonable time." 
24 
 
 
In Doggett, Federal officials attempted to arrest the 
defendant by going to his parents' residence.  505 U.S. at 649.  
Informed that the defendant had left the country a few days 
earlier, the government placed the defendant's name in a 
database designed to alert when he reentered the country.  Id.  
Subsequently, the investigating officers discovered that the 
defendant was serving a sentence in a foreign prison.  Id.  
Despite a promise to expel the defendant to the United States 
upon his release, officials in the foreign jurisdiction allowed 
the defendant instead to go to a different country.  Id.  
Meanwhile, the alerts in the central database had expired.  Id.  
One year later, the defendant returned to the United States, 
earned a college degree, married, lived openly under his own 
name, and stayed within the law.  Id.  Federal officials, 
meanwhile, had learned of his entry into the third country but 
not of his return to the United States.  Id. at 649-650.  It was 
only after officials ran a credit check on persons named in 
outstanding warrants that the defendant was discovered, 
arrested, and arraigned.  Id. at 650. 
 
This discovery, arrest, and arraignment took place eight 
and one-half years after his indictment and six years after his 
return to the United States and subsequent adoption of a law-
abiding lifestyle.  The defendant moved for a dismissal of the 
charges against him based on a violation of his Sixth Amendment 
25 
 
right to a speedy trial.  Id.  The Federal District Court denied 
his motion because, although the defendant was blameless for the 
delay and the government's negligence was entirely to blame, the 
defendant could not show any particular prejudice to his 
defense.  Id. 
 
The Supreme Court disagreed.  Id. at 651.  Although the 
defendant could not show any particularized prejudice, the lapse 
of time had entitled him to the rebuttable presumption of 
prejudice.  Id. at 657-658.  The unreasonable delay between 
formal accusation and trial can produce more than one sort of 
harm, "including oppressive pretrial incarceration, anxiety and 
concern of the accused, and the possibility that the accused's 
defense will be impaired by dimming memories and the loss of 
exculpatory evidence" (quotations and citations omitted).  Id. 
at 654.  Accord Commonwealth v. Hanley, 337 Mass. 384, 387, 
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958) (giving same rationale for 
speedy trial right).  "Of these forms of prejudice, 'the most 
serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant 
adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire 
system.'"  Doggett, supra, quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.  The 
court held that the government had not persuasively rebutted the 
presumption of prejudice.  Doggett, supra at 658 n.4. 
 
The defendant in Doggett had been unaware of the 
indictments against him.  Id. at 653-654.  It was this lack of 
26 
 
awareness coupled with the delay that impacted one of the 
interests protected by the speedy trial right -- the impairment 
of the accused's defense.  In explaining how delay and lack of 
knowledge can impair a defense, Justice Douglas, in a concurring 
opinion discussing the application of the right to a speedy 
trial to delays that occur before formal accusation, quoted the 
following explanation: 
 
"Indeed, a suspect may be at a special disadvantage 
when complaint or indictment, or arrest, is purposefully 
delayed.  With no knowledge that criminal charges are to be 
brought against him, an innocent man has no reason to fix 
in his memory the happenings on the day of the alleged 
crime.  Memory grows dim with the passage of time.  
Witnesses disappear.  With each day, the accused becomes 
less able to make out his defense.  If during the delay, 
the Government's case is already in its hands, the balance 
of advantage shifts more in favor of the Government the 
more the Government lags.  Under our constitutional system 
such a tactic is not available to police and prosecutors." 
 
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 331 n.3 (1971) (Douglas, 
J., concurring in the result), quoting Nickens v. United States, 
323 F.2d 808, 813 (1963) (Wright, J., concurring in the result). 
 
This explanation starkly underscores the conflict the 
presumption of prejudice seeks to overcome.  To maintain the 
relative positions of the parties as if no delay had occurred, 
there exists a presumption of prejudice to balance against a 
recognized but unquantifiable governmental advantage growing 
27 
 
with the passage of time.9  See Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 
54-55 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Because potential 
substantial prejudice inheres in the denial of any of these 
safeguards, prejudice is usually assumed when any of them is 
shown to have been denied").  With this goal in mind, we can 
easily recognize that the contours of the various concerns that 
affect prejudice are dynamic and fact-specific. 
 
The Supreme Court recognized that the presumption of 
prejudice may not always carry the day for a defendant.  The 
prosecution may yet still persuasively rebut the presumption of 
prejudice.  See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 658 ("when the presumption 
of prejudice, albeit unspecified, is neither extenuated, as by 
the defendant's acquiescence . . . nor persuasively rebutted, 
the defendant is entitled to relief" [footnotes omitted]).  We 
defer to the motion judge's determination that the defendants 
did not suffer oppressive pretrial incarceration or anxiety and 
concern due to the delay.  Therefore, the Commonwealth 
persuasively must rebut the presumption that the delay has 
prejudiced the ability to present a meaningful defense. 
                     
 
9 Clearly, a delay also can impair the prosecution's case.  
In a speedy trial analysis, a necessary precondition is that the 
Commonwealth feels its evidence is strong enough to bring the 
case forward.  In considering the existence -- whether actual or 
presumed -- of prejudice, therefore, we need not account for the 
effect of the delay on the Commonwealth's evidence. 
28 
 
 
The Commonwealth argues that it persuasively has rebutted 
the presumption of prejudice because much of the Commonwealth's 
evidence has been preserved.  All of the witnesses but one are 
still available to testify.  However, this assertion is only 
half of the analysis because "the passage of time is a double-
edged sword."  Butler, 464 Mass. at 717-718.  To rebut 
persuasively a presumption of prejudice, the Commonwealth not 
only must demonstrate that its case has not been impacted by the 
passage of time, but also must show that the defendant's case 
has not suffered any prejudice.  See United States v. Molina-
Solorio, 577 F.3d 300, 307 & n.4 (5th Cir. 2009).  This bar is 
difficult to meet.  See Uviller, Barker v. Wingo:  Speedy Trial 
Gets a Fast Shuffle, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 1376, 1394-1395 (1972). 
 
The Commonwealth has failed to -- and likely cannot -- 
demonstrate that the defendants have suffered no prejudice.  
This fact, however, is not dispositive of our analysis of the 
fourth Barker factor.  Instead, the weight of this factor also 
is affected by any circumstances that may extenuate the 
prejudice.  See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 658.  Timi's time in 
flight, nearly half of the total delay and attributable wholly 
to his deliberate action, is a circumstance that extenuates the 
prejudice caused by the entirety of the nine-year delay and 
accordingly lessens the weight of this factor in the final 
summation of the Barker test in his case.  Nickoyan's much 
29 
 
shorter flight and longer postsentencing delay does not 
extenuate the prejudice as much as in Timi's case.  We therefore 
place greater weight on the fourth Barker factor in Nickoyan's 
favor and less in Timi's. 
 
e.  Weighing the Barker factors.  No single factor nor 
specific combination thereof is a "necessary or sufficient 
condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy 
trial."  Barker, 407 U.S. at 533.  The balancing of the factors 
is "difficult and sensitive."  Id.  We discuss the balancing of 
the factors for Nickoyan and Timi in turn. 
 
The total delay of nine years weighs against the 
Commonwealth in Timi's case but is heavily mitigated by the fact 
nearly half of the delay was caused by Timi's flight and Federal 
trial.  Furthermore, Timi took no action consistent with 
asserting his speedy trial right.  Any presumption of prejudice 
weighing in Timi's favor is extenuated by his flight.  In the 
totality of the circumstances, we are confident in saying that 
Timi's right to a speedy trial has not been violated, as the 
motion judge determined. 
 
Nickoyan faced the same total nine-year delay as Timi, and 
thus that factor must weigh in his favor.  As we have stated, 
the reason for the delay post-Federal sentencing is due to the 
negligence of the Commonwealth in bringing Nickoyan to trial.  
That factor must also weigh in Nickoyan's favor.  Although 
30 
 
Nickoyan also took no action consistent with asserting his 
speedy trial right, this factor is offset by the presumption of 
prejudice for which we must account and which is neither 
otherwise extenuated nor persuasively rebutted.  In the final 
weighing, the Barker factors clearly point to a violation of 
Nickoyan's right to a speedy trial as the motion judge also 
determined. 
 
f.  Rule 36 (d) (3).  The defendants argue that the delay 
in filing the detainer by the Commonwealth should result in the 
dismissal of the charges under Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (d) (3), 378 
Mass. 909 (1979).  The IAD does not govern when a detainer 
should be filed against a prisoner.  Rather it deals with the 
proper resolution of detainers once they are filed.  See St. 
1965, c. 892, § 1, art. I.  The duty to file detainers for 
defendants incarcerated outside the Commonwealth is explained in 
rule 36 (d) (3).  The rule requires that a prosecutor diligently 
seek to file a detainer.  Id.  If the prosecutor has delayed 
unreasonably, the defendant must show actual prejudice from the 
failure to file a detainer in order for the charges to be 
dismissed with prejudice.  See Commonwealth v. Roman, 470 Mass. 
85, 95 (2014) (requiring showing of actual prejudice under rule 
36 [c]); Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 67, 69-71 
(1988) (declining to dismiss absent showing of prejudice under 
rule 36 [d]).  The defendants argue that this court should adopt 
31 
 
the constitutional rule of presumptive prejudice in analyzing 
the failure of prosecutors to timely file a detainer.  We 
decline to do so.  The defendants have not demonstrated any 
actual prejudice arising from the delay in filing the detainer.10  
We therefore decline to dismiss the charges pursuant to rule 36. 
 
4.  Conclusion.  For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm 
the denial of Timi's motion to dismiss and the allowance of 
Nickoyan's. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
 
10 Timi additionally argues that this court should consider 
dismissal under Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (c), 378 Mass. 909 (1979).  
Such an analysis also requires a showing of particular 
prejudice.  See Commonwealth v. Roman, 470 Mass. 85, 95 (2014).  
We accordingly decline to dismiss the charges against Timi 
because of a violation of rule 36 (c).