Title: In Re: Estate of Sauers (concurring/dissenting)

State: pennsylvania

Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Document:

[J-31-2010][M.O. - Baer, J.] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MIDDLE DISTRICT IN RE: ESTATE OF PAUL J. SAUERS, III, DECEASED APPEAL OF: JODIE L. SAUERS : : : : : : : : : : : No. 78 MAP 2009 Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court entered on 4/17/09 at No. 1060 MDA 2007 affirming the order of York County Court of Common Pleas entered on 5/16/07 at No. 67-06-01327 ARGUED: May 11, 2010 CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION MR. JUSTICE EAKIN DECIDED: November 23, 2011 I join the majority’s holding that ERISA preempts § 6111.2 of the Probate Code. In light of this conclusion, however, I would dismiss as moot the issue regarding an estate administrator’s capacity to sue. According to the majority, the latter argument concerns the administrator’s “authority” to sue on behalf of the contingent beneficiary.1 See Majority Slip Op., at 9. 1 I agree with Justice Saylor that the parties and the courts below failed to distinguish capacity and standing. See Concurring Slip Op., at 2 n.1 (Saylor, J., concurring). Indeed, Appellant conflates the concepts of standing and capacity in her brief, using the terms interchangeably. Likewise, the majority opinion does not clarify the issue but contends legal capacity is “extremely amorphous” and the “blurry distinction between capacity to sue and standing [i]s a ‘somewhat metaphysical question.’” Majority Slip Op., at 9. The majority merely characterizes Appellant’s capacity argument as a question of authority, which does not make the distinction less blurry – as such, I believe it is best put aside, particularly as it is made irrelevant by resolution of the preemption issue. [J-31-2010] - 2 The majority accepts the Administrator’s argument that a life insurance policy is the decedent’s personal property and concludes the Administrator, as the decedent’s personal representative, had the authority to challenge the disbursement of an ERISA plan’s life insurance proceeds in orphan’s court. However, the majority’s conclusion that an estate administrator has such authority appears inconsistent with the holding that ERISA preempts the statute, and I cannot join that holding. The majority, citing Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001), properly determines ERISA preempts § 6111.2 in part because plan administrators applying the state statute would face “a never-ending possibility of lawsuits,” which would frustrate the goals of ERISA. See Majority Slip Op., at 17-18; cf. Egelhoff. One of ERISA’s goals is to “establish a uniform administrative scheme, which provides a set of standard procedures to guide processing of claims and disbursement of benefits.” Egelhoff, at 148 (quoting Fort Halifax Packing Co. Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9 (1987)). An ERISA plan must be administered “in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D). While plan administrators may be subject to civil liability in federal court for contravening their fiduciary duties, probate challenges under state law are inapplicable where, as in the instant case, ERISA preempts the Probate Code. In the end, the majority concludes the ERISA plan document controls the disbursement of the life insurance proceeds. Accordingly, the issue of whether an estate administrator has the capacity to sue on behalf of a life insurance contingent beneficiary in orphan’s court is not relevant to the disposition of the instant case.