Title: 3232 Page Ave. Condo. Ass'n v. City of Virginia Beach

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
3232 PAGE AVENUE CONDOMINIUM  
UNIT OWNERS ASSOCIATION 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
 v.  Record No. 112193 
JUSTICE CLEO E. POWELL 
 
 
 
November 1, 2012 
CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
A. Bonwill Shockley, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether a condemnor may, in an 
eminent domain proceeding, alternatively assert ownership rights 
in the condemned property.  We further consider whether the 
evidence in this case was sufficient to support the circuit 
court’s ruling that the City of Virginia Beach (the “City”) 
proved an implied dedication of the disputed property. 
I. Background 
 
The present case concerns the beach along the Chesapeake 
Bay from First Landing State Park to the Lesner Bridge, referred 
to as “Cape Henry Beach.”  Cape Henry Beach is approximately two 
miles long, and has 23 public access easements maintained by the 
City.   
 
In early 2008, Cape Henry Beach was exhibiting signs of 
severe erosion.  The City planned to replenish the beach with 
additional sand to prevent further erosion.  In order to 
accomplish this, the City asked the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
 
2 
to pump sand dredged1 from the Lynnhaven Inlet onto Cape Henry 
Beach.  The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers agreed, provided the 
City obtained a permit from the Virginia Marine Resources 
Commission (“VMRC”) authorizing the pumping of sand onto Cape 
Henry Beach.  The VMRC would not issue such a permit without 
either the consent of all property owners that abut Cape Henry 
Beach or a court order granting the City the right of entry. 
 
On December 9, 2008, the Virginia Beach City Council passed 
an ordinance authorizing: 
the acquisition by purchase or condemnation, 
pursuant to Sections 15.2-1901, et seq., and 
Title 25.1 of the Code of Virginia of 1950, as 
amended, of public beach easements (the 
"Easements") for public recreation and shore 
protection as stated above and for other related 
public purposes for the preservation of the 
safety, health, peace, good order, comfort, 
convenience, and for the welfare of the people in 
the City of Virginia Beach, across the areas of 
the Cape Henry beaches, to the extent that public 
easements or property ownership are not already 
confirmed . . . . 
 
To facilitate the acquisition of the required easements, 
the ordinance specifically authorized the City Manager: 
to make or cause to be made on behalf of the City 
of Virginia Beach . . . a reasonable offer to the 
owners or persons having an interest in the 
property that will be affected by said Easements.  
If refused, the City Attorney is hereby 
authorized to institute proceedings to condemn 
said Easements. 
                     
 
1 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had tentatively planned 
to begin dredging the Lynnhaven Inlet in 2009. 
 
3 
 
The ordinance further included a list of the seven 
properties that the City sought to acquire easements upon, one 
of which was owned by the 3232 Page Avenue Condominium Unit 
Owners Association (the “Condo Association”).  On January 27, 
2009, the City sent a pre-condemnation offer letter to the Condo 
Association, stating: 
The public claims an absolute right to use the 
sandy beaches along the bayfront north of the 
seaward toe of the dune or bulkhead line from 
Lynnhaven Inlet to First Landing Park.  
Nevertheless, it is our understanding that the 
[Condo Association] contests this right.  The 
City of Virginia Beach must clarify the rights of 
the public in order to proceed with the sand 
replenishment project.  The City is prepared to 
file a Petition for Condemnation in order to 
confirm access to the needed areas in time for 
the project. 
 
The City further offered to purchase “a beach easement” for 
$4,000, an amount it described as the easement’s fair market 
value.  The Condo Association rejected the City’s offer. 
 
On February 20, 2009, the City filed a “Petition for 
Condemnation to Confirm Public Easements,” seeking to acquire or 
confirm title to easements on the Condo Association’s property.  
In the petition, the City sought to take or confirm a “perpetual 
recreational easement and a shore protection/construction 
easement” (collectively, the “Easements”). 
 
In its “Answer and Grounds of Defense and Objections to 
Jurisdiction,” the Condo Association argued that, under the 
 
4 
eminent domain statutes, the City could not seek to both quiet 
title and condemn a property in the same action.  In an order 
dated July 24, 2009, the circuit court overruled the Condo 
Association’s objections and ruled that it would rule on the 
issue of ownership of the Easements “at or immediately after the 
hearing to determine just compensation.”  The Condo Association 
responded by filing a motion in limine seeking to preclude the 
City from offering any evidence relating to the ownership issue 
at the just compensation trial.  The circuit court granted the 
motion. 
 
At the conclusion of the just compensation trial, the jury 
valued the Easements at $152,000.  The circuit court then 
required the City deposit $150,033.722 with the clerk, pending 
the outcome of the ownership trial. 
 
During the subsequent ownership trial, the circuit court 
heard evidence that, in 1926, Cape Henry Beach was depicted as 
“Ocean Avenue.”3  In 1954, however, the Board of Supervisors 
abandoned Ocean Avenue and the title to the property passed to 
the adjoining property owners. 
                     
 
2 The $150,033.72 required by the circuit court represented 
the difference between the amount initially deposited with the 
clerk ($4,000) and the awarded amount ($152,000), plus the 
interest that would have accrued ($2,033.72). 
 
3 According to the witness, it was the standard practice at 
the time to depict a beach as a road in plats. 
 
5 
 
The circuit court heard further evidence that, from at 
least 1976, the City’s police force patrolled the entirety of 
Cape Henry Beach around the clock.  Similarly, evidence was 
presented that, from at least 1980, the City maintained Cape 
Henry Beach.  Such maintenance included daily garbage removal 
from trash barrels provided by the City, raking the beach to 
remove litter, grading the beach, annually planting new beach 
grass and removing dead sea life.  The City also presented 
evidence that the general public used the entire beach.  Indeed, 
there was testimony that, there were times when the beach was so 
crowded, maintenance workers could not drive vehicles on the 
beach. 
 
After hearing all of the evidence, the circuit court ruled 
that the City had “provided evidence necessary to show that the 
City has attained an easement through implied dedication and 
acceptance subsequent to the recordation of the plat in 1956.”  
In making its ruling, the circuit court specifically noted that: 
In this case, we have the existence of the public 
access and, going on after 1956, the regulation 
of the area of the whole beach, . . . the 
maintenance of the beach, the patrolling of the 
beach, . . . and all of those things that are 
already in evidence. 
 
The circuit court subsequently entered an order allocating 
the jury award from the just compensation trial to the City. 
 
The Condo Association appeals. 
 
6 
II. Analysis 
 
On appeal, the Condo Association argues that the circuit 
court erred by permitting the City to maintain a condemnation 
action on the Easements while simultaneously claiming ownership 
of the Easements.  The Condo Association also takes issue with 
the circuit court’s determination that the City had acquired the 
Easements through implied dedication and the circuit court’s 
failure to consider the City’s abandonment of Ocean Avenue in 
1954. 
A. Condemnation Proceeding 
 
The Condo Association makes three related arguments.  
First, the Condo Association argues that the trial court erred 
in allowing the City to use the condemnation proceeding as a 
surrogate for a declaratory judgment action to determine 
ownership of the Easements.4  Second, the Condo Association 
contends that, by allowing the City to try title in conjunction 
with a condemnation proceeding, the circuit court effectively 
                     
 
4 On brief and at oral argument, the Condo Association 
attempts to frame the “fundamental issue appealed” as whether a 
condemnor can claim that it already possessed the rights it 
sought to condemn “[a]fter a just-compensation trial has gone 
badly.”  The record, however, establishes that the City claimed 
that it already owned the easements before it initiated the 
condemnation proceedings.  The pre-condemnation offer letter 
clearly demonstrates this belief, as does the petition for 
condemnation, where the City specifically states that it 
“believes that the only persons who are entitled to an interest 
in the compensation to be ascertained by this proceeding are:” 
the Condo Association and the general public. 
 
 
7 
allowed the City to condemn its own property.  Third, the Condo 
Association asserts that, because the City cannot condemn 
property it already owns, the initiation of a condemnation 
proceeding necessarily acts as a judicial admission by the City 
that it did not own the property. 
The statutes confirming the power of eminent 
domain must be strictly construed, and a locality 
must comply fully with the statutory requirements 
when attempting to exercise this right.  We 
consider the language of each statute at issue to 
determine the General Assembly’s intent from the 
plain and natural meaning of the words used.  
When the language of a statute is unambiguous, 
courts are bound by the plain meaning of that 
language. 
Hoffman Family, L.L.C. v. City of Alexandria, 272 Va. 274, 283-
84, 634 S.E.2d 722, 727 (2006) (citations omitted). 
 
Contrary to the argument raised by the Condo Association, 
the City is not attempting to condemn property it already owns, 
nor was the City’s filing a judicial admission that it did not 
own the Easements.  Rather, the City sought to condemn the 
Easements, the ownership of which was in dispute.  An 
examination of the statutes dealing with condemnation 
demonstrates that the General Assembly clearly intended to allow 
a circuit court to determine ownership of the condemned property 
as part of the condemnation proceeding.   
 
8 
 
Code § 25.1-2225 provides that, where a controversy exists 
among the parties regarding the ownership of the property, the 
ownership rights of the respective parties will be determined 
“in the manner hereinafter provided in § 25.1-241.”  Code 
§ 25.1-2416 also uses similarly general terms, specifically: 
“claimants” and “persons.”  Although the term “claimant” is not 
defined, it is noteworthy that the definition of “[p]erson” 
applicable to eminent domain proceedings under Title 25.1 
specifically includes “the Commonwealth” as well as “any city, 
county, town, or other political subdivision.”  Code § 25.1-100. 
                     
 
5 Code § 25.1-222 states: 
 
No delay in the proceeding for the determination 
of just compensation shall be occasioned by the 
claims of the parties with respect to the 
ownership of any land or other property or to the 
interest therein of the respective parties.  In 
such cases the court shall require the retention 
of the deposit of the award for the whole 
property, or the part in dispute, until the 
rights of the respective parties have been 
determined in the manner hereinafter provided in 
§ 25.1-241; provided, however, the court shall 
permit any such claimants to intervene as parties 
to the proceedings as provided in § 25.1-218. 
6 The relevant portion of Code § 25.1-241 states: 
 
A. If it appears to the court that there exists a 
controversy among claimants to the fund and any 
interest accrued thereon, or to the ownership of 
the property subject to the condemnation, the 
court shall enter an order setting a time for 
hearing the case and determining the rights and 
claims of all persons entitled to the fund or to 
any interest or share therein. 
 
9 
 
The General Assembly could have limited Code §§ 25.1-222 
and -241 to apply only to the respondents of a condemnation 
proceeding, but it chose not to.  Indeed, it is worth noting 
that the General Assembly provided just such a limitation within 
other provisions of the condemnation statutes.  Under Code 
§ 25.1-243(A), “a party whose property or interest therein is to 
be taken or damaged” can apply for a withdrawal pendente lite 
“of the amount deposited for his interest in the property to be 
taken or damaged.”  (Emphasis added.)  Clearly, this limitation 
only applies to respondents/condemnees, as a 
petitioner/condemnor, regardless of whether it is seeking to 
confirm or acquire ownership in a property, could never be “a 
party whose property or interest therein is to be taken or 
damaged.” 
 
In the present case, the City and the Condo Association are 
both “parties” to the condemnation proceeding and there can be 
no doubt that ownership of the Easements was in dispute.  
Furthermore, nothing in either Code §§ 25.1-222 or -241 
indicates that the General Assembly intended to exclude the 
petitioner/condemnor from being considered a party, claimant, or 
person as the terms are used within the statutes.  Therefore, 
under Code §§ 25.1-222 and -241, not only did the circuit court 
have the jurisdiction to determine the ownership of the property 
as between the parties, but it was also required to do so.  
 
10 
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in 
permitting the City to claim it already owned the Easements or 
in determining the parties’ ownership rights as part of the 
condemnation proceedings. 
B. Implied Dedication 
 
The Condo Association next argues that the circuit court 
erred in finding that the City had acquired ownership of the 
Easements by implied dedication.  According to the Condo 
Association, there was no implied dedication of the Easements, 
as the City failed to prove that the Condo Association acted in 
a way that unmistakably and decisively showed an affirmative 
intent to dedicate the property.  The Condo Association further 
asserts that there has been no showing that the use by the 
public was adverse to and exclusive of its own use and enjoyment 
of the property.  The Condo Association concedes that the City 
proved that the public used the beach and that the City 
regularly patrolled and maintained the beach.  However, it 
contends that these facts alone do not prove an implied 
dedication of the Easements. 
Dedication is an appropriation of land by its 
owner for the public use.  It may be express or 
implied.  It may be implied from long use by the 
public of the land claimed to have been 
dedicated.  Dedication is not required to be made 
by a deed or other writing, but may be 
effectually and validly done by verbal 
declarations.  The intent is its vital principle, 
and the dedication may be made in every 
 
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conceivable way that such intention may be 
manifested.  It must, however, be manifested by 
some unequivocal act, and is not effectual and 
binding until accepted.  When the intention of 
the owner to make the dedication has been 
unequivocally manifested, and there has been 
acceptance by competent authority, or such long 
use by the public as to render its reclamation 
unjust and improper, the dedication is complete. 
Buntin v. City of Danville, 93 Va. 200, 204, 24 S.E. 830, (1896) 
(citations omitted). 
 
Furthermore,  
the intent to dedicate which may be implied need 
not have actually existed in the mind of the land 
owner.  One is presumed to intend the usual and 
natural consequences of his acts.  Hence, where 
public or private rights have been acquired upon 
the faith of conduct of the landowner under such 
circumstances as to make the doctrine of estoppel 
applicable, the law will imply the intent to 
dedicate even where there is an entire absence 
thereof in the mind of the landowner, and even 
against a contrary intent. 
Keppler v. City of Richmond, 124 Va. 592, 611, 98 S.E. 747, 753 
(1919). 
 
The Condo Association asserts that, in order to prove 
implied dedication, the City must prove that the use by the 
public was “‘adverse to and exclusive of the use and enjoyment 
of the property by the [Condo Association].’”  City of Staunton 
v. Augusta Corp., 169 Va. 424, 433, 193 S.E. 695, 698 (1937) 
(quoting 8 R.C.L., p. 904, sec. 29). 
[W]here . . . the use of the property by the 
public is not exclusive of the owner's rights, 
but is consistent and in common therewith, such 
 
12 
use by the public is no proof of an intention to 
dedicate the property to the public, but is 
permissive only. 
Id. at 436, 193 S.E. at 699.  But cf. Keppler, 124 Va. at 610, 
98 S.E. at 753 (examining whether use “by the public of the 
strip of land in controversy [has] been sufficient to raise the 
implication or presumption of a dedication”); City of Richmond 
v. A. Y. Stokes & Co., 72 Va. (31 Gratt.) 713, 724 (1879) (“the 
use of the property by the public, with the assent of the owner, 
will justify the presumption of dedication if the use has 
continued so long that private rights and the public convenience 
might be materially affected by an interruption of the 
enjoyment.”); Harris v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. (20 Gratt.) 833, 
839 (1871) (“intent [to dedicate] may be presumed from 
circumstances connected with a long and uninterrupted user by 
the public.”); Skeen v. Lynch, 40 Va. (1 Rob.) 186, 193-94 
(1842) (“The use of property by the public with the assent of 
the owner, will, under particular circumstances, justify the 
presumption of a dedication to the public, provided the use has 
continued so long that private rights and the public convenience 
might be materially affected by an interruption of the 
enjoyment.”). 
 
We note, however, that in City of Staunton, public use was 
the only evidence of either dedication or acceptance.  Thus, it 
is clear that the language from City of Staunton cited by the 
 
13 
Condo Association is only applicable where public use is the 
only evidence of dedication.  Where, in addition to long-term 
public use, there has been an acquiescence in the exercise of 
dominion and control over the property, this standard does not 
apply. 
“Where the owner of property abutting upon a city 
street constructs the building upon his property 
3 1/2 feet back from the street line, and paves 
the same in the same manner as the sidewalk is 
paved, and permits the public using such sidewalk 
to also use such paved strip between the front of 
his building and the street line as a sidewalk, 
he will not be held to have thereby dedicated the 
same to the public by implication, unless it be 
further shown that the public authorities, with 
his knowledge, exercise acts of dominion thereon 
indicative of their belief that the same has been 
dedicated to the public.” 
City of Staunton, 169 Va. at 437, 193 S.E. at 700 (quoting 
Morlang v. City of Parkersburg, 84 W.Va. 509, 100 S.E. 394 
(1919)) (emphasis added); see also City of Hampton v. Stieffen, 
202 Va. 777, 785-86, 120 S.E.2d 361, 366 (1961) (holding that 
evidence of public use and maintenance by a public authority 
“shows that there was a dedication and an acceptance”). 
 
In the present case, there is ample evidence that the 
public has used the entirety of Cape Henry Beach since 1926, the 
City has patrolled and maintained the property for over thirty 
years, and the Condo Association never objected to the City’s 
exercise of dominion and control.  Thus, there is sufficient 
evidence proving that there was an implied dedication and 
 
14 
acceptance thereof by the City.7  Accordingly, we cannot say that 
the circuit court erred in finding that the City had acquired 
ownership of the Easements by implied dedication.8 
III. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court did not err by 
allowing the City to condemn property that it also claimed to 
own.  Furthermore, the evidence demonstrates that the City 
acquired the Easements through an implied dedication based on 
the continued public use and the City’s efforts in maintaining 
and patrolling the property.  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
ruling of the circuit court. 
Affirmed. 
 
                     
 
7 Furthermore, although not specifically alleged by the 
City, the doctrine of estoppel would necessarily imply the Condo 
Association’s intent to dedicate the Easements.  In expending 
significant resources to maintain the beach for over 30 years, 
the City clearly relied to its detriment on the Condo 
Association’s acquiescence to the City’s exercise of dominion 
and control over the beach. 
 
8 As the City’s purported abandonment of Ocean Avenue in 
1954 had no bearing on either the circuit court’s decision or on 
this Court’s decision affirming the circuit court, we do not 
consider the Condo Association’s fourth assignment of error. 
 
15 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE MILLETTE and JUSTICE 
MIMS join, dissenting. 
 
In this appeal from a condemnation proceeding, the majority 
concludes that "the General Assembly clearly intended to allow a 
circuit court to determine ownership of the condemned property 
as part of the condemnation proceeding" as between the condemnor 
and the defendants named in the condemnation petition.  Unlike 
the majority, I conclude that neither the phrase "claims of the 
parties with respect to the ownership" in Code § 25.1-222 nor 
the phrase "controversy among claimants . . . to the ownership 
of the property subject to the condemnation" in Code § 25.1-241 
encompasses or contemplates ownership claims asserted by the 
condemnor.  In my view, the circuit court did not have the 
authority in this condemnation proceeding to render a judgment 
holding that the condemnor owned the property it sought to 
condemn.  Thus, I respectfully dissent. 
Article 1, § 11 of the Constitution of Virginia prohibits 
the General Assembly from passing "any law whereby private 
property shall be taken or damaged for public uses, without just 
compensation."  Generally, "[c]ondemnation proceedings are based 
on the constitutional principle that when the condemnor takes 
private land for public purposes, the owner may not be deprived 
of the use and control of his property unless he receives just 
compensation therefor."  Bartz v. Board of Supervisors of 
 
16 
Fairfax Cnty., 237 Va. 669, 672, 379 S.E.2d 356, 357 (1989).  
The taking of private property "is a matter of serious import 
and is not . . . permitted except where the right is plainly 
conferred and the manner of its exercise has been strictly 
followed."  School Bd. of Harrisonburg v. Alexander, 126 Va. 
407, 412, 101 S.E. 349, 351 (1919) (emphasis added). 
Title 25.1 of the Code addresses the subject of eminent 
domain and sets forth specific procedures for condemnation 
proceedings.  When statutes relate to the same subject, they may 
be considered in pari materia.  Lucy v. County of Albemarle, 258 
Va. 118, 129, 516 S.E.2d 480, 485 (1999).  Upon considering the 
entire body of statutes pertaining to condemnation proceedings, 
I cannot conclude, as the majority does, that based on the 
language in two discrete statutes, the General Assembly intended 
to permit condemnation proceedings to be used to try claims of 
ownership between the condemnor and the defendant owners named 
in the condemnation petition. 
The General Assembly defined the terms " '[p]etitioner' " 
and " 'condemnor' " as "any person who possesses the power to 
exercise the right of eminent domain and who seeks to exercise 
such power."  Code § 25.1-100.  The General Assembly also 
defined the term " '[o]wner' " as "any person who owns property, 
provided that the person's ownership of the property is of 
record in the land records of the clerk's office of the circuit 
 
17 
court of the county or city where the property is located."  Id.  
Obviously, in the present case, the City of Virginia Beach (the 
City), which is the condemnor here, was not an "owner" under 
this Title of the Code because its alleged existing ownership of 
the perpetual recreational easement and shore 
protection/construction easement (collectively, the Easements), 
was not of record in the land records of the Circuit Court 
Clerk's Office of the City of Virginia Beach.  So the question 
is whether the General Assembly, having specifically defined 
these terms, nevertheless intended to include a 
petitioner/condemnor when it used the terms "parties" and 
"claimants" in Code §§ 25.1-222 and -241, respectively. 
A condemnation proceeding "shall be initiated by filing a 
petition complying with the requirements of [Code] § 25.1-206" 
in the circuit court of the city or county where the property to 
be condemned is located.  Code § 25.1-205; see also Code § 25.1-
201.  In pertinent part, a petition for condemnation must 
contain:  
1. A caption wherein the person vested by law 
with power to exercise the right of eminent 
domain shall be the petitioner, and the named 
defendants shall be at least one of the owners of 
some part of or an interest in the property to be 
taken or damaged, and the property to be taken 
designated generally by kind, quantity and 
location. 
 
 2. Short and plain statements of the 
following: 
 
18 
 
. . . . 
 
 e. The estate, interest or rights in the 
property to be taken; 
 
. . . . 
 
 g. As to each separate piece of property to 
be taken or damaged, the names and residences, so 
far as known by petitioner, of the defendants who 
are joined as owners of the property, or of some 
interest therein, if their names have been 
ascertained by a reasonably diligent search of 
the records, considering the character and value 
of the property involved and the interests to be 
acquired, or if their names have otherwise been 
learned; and if the names of other persons or 
classes of persons to be joined as owners of the 
property are unknown, such persons may be made 
defendants under the designation of "Unknown 
Owners"; 
 
 h. Compliance with the provisions of [Code] 
§ 25.1-204 and the manner of such compliance; 
 
. . . . 
 
 3. A prayer asking for judgment (i) that the 
property or the estate, interest or rights 
therein be condemned and the title thereto vested 
in the petitioner, (ii) that just compensation be 
ascertained as provided in [Code] § 25.1-230 and 
awarded, and (iii) for such other relief as may 
be lawful and proper.  
 
Code § 25.1-206.  Despite its assertion that it already owned 
the Easements, the City failed to identify its ownership 
"interest or rights in the property to be taken" or identify 
itself as "defendants who are joined as owners of the property 
or some interest therein" in the petition as required by Code 
§§ 25.1-206(2)(e) and (g). 
 
19 
With regard to the provision in Code § 25.1-206(2)(h) 
requiring compliance with Code § 25.1-204, except in situations 
not applicable here, a condemnor cannot "institute proceedings 
to condemn property until a bona fide but ineffectual effort to 
purchase from the owner the property sought to be condemned has 
been made."  Code § 25.1-204(A).  In the City's complaint, which 
it captioned as a "PETITION FOR CONDEMNATION TO CONFIRM PUBLIC 
EASEMENTS," the City alleged that it had made such an offer to 
purchase the Easements.  Having done so, it is illogical to 
allow the City to condemn property but simultaneously claim 
ownership of the Easements in the condemnation proceeding 
itself. 
An owner may file an answer and grounds of defense in 
response to a petition for condemnation.  Code § 25.1-213.  The 
failure of an owner to do so does not "preclude the owner from 
. . . presenting evidence as to valuation and damage, or . . . 
sharing in the award of just compensation according to his 
interest therein or otherwise protecting his rights."  Code 
§ 25.1-214(A).  Furthermore, "[a]ny person not already a party 
to the proceedings whose property . . . is to be taken or 
damaged . . . as a result of the taking and use by the 
petitioner, may be made a party to the proceeding upon filing a 
petition for intervention."  Code § 25.1-218. 
 
20 
After the condemnor files the condemnation petition, the 
proceeding itself consists of two stages.  Williams v. Fairfax 
Cnty. Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 227 Va. 309, 313, 315 S.E.2d 
202, 204 (1984).  In the first stage, a determination about the 
"fair market value of the land taken and the damage, if any, to 
the remaining land" is made.  Id. at 313, 315 S.E.2d at 204; see 
also Code §§ 25.1-227.2 through -236.  Only the condemnor and 
the owner of the land have an interest in this valuation stage.  
Williams, 227 Va. at 313-14, 315 S.E.2d at 204.  To avoid any 
delay in determining just compensation due to "the claims of the 
parties with respect to the ownership of any land . . . or to 
the interest therein of the respective parties," the court is 
required to retain the deposit of the award for the property 
condemned "until the rights of the respective parties have been 
determined in the manner hereinafter provided in [Code] § 25.1-
241."  Code § 25.1-222. 
In the second stage, "[a] determination of a particular 
owner's loss relative to that of others is . . . undertaken 
[and] the condemnation award is allocated among those with 
interests in the property."  Fairfax Cnty. Park Auth. v. 
Virginia Dep't of Transp., 247 Va. 259, 263, 440 S.E.2d 610, 612 
(1994).  The "title to the property and rights condemned shall 
vest in the petitioner" upon paying into court the sum 
ascertained as just compensation.  Code § 25.1-237.  Upon 
 
21 
payment of the just compensation sum into court and confirmation 
of the report of the body making that determination, "the 
interest or estate of the owner or owners in the property taken 
or damaged shall terminate and they shall have such interest or 
estate in the fund and any interest accrued thereon so paid into 
court as they had in the property so taken or damaged."  Code 
§ 25.1-240(A).  In accordance with Code § 25.1-222, it is at 
this point in the condemnation proceeding that the court 
determines "the rights and claims of all persons entitled to the 
fund" when "there exists a controversy among claimants to the 
fund . . . or to the ownership of the property subject to the 
condemnation."  Code § 25.1-241(A). 
In considering these various statutes, it must be 
remembered that "the parties to a condemnation proceeding are 
not in the position of plaintiffs and defendants in traditional 
actions or suits."  Trout v. Commonwealth Transp. Comm'r., 241 
Va. 69, 73, 400 S.E.2d 172, 174 (1991).  Because "[t]he exercise 
of the power of eminent domain, and the implementation of the 
constitutional just-compensation clause . . . grow out of an 
entirely different history, . . . . [t]he petitioner in a 
condemnation case is . . . not a traditional plaintiff."  Id. 
Viewing the entire body of statutes governing condemnation 
proceedings, I cannot conclude that the General Assembly, by 
using the term "parties" in Code § 25.1-222 and the term 
 
22 
"claimants" in Code § 25.1-241, intended for a condemnor, in a 
condemnation proceeding, to have the capacity to condemn private 
property while simultaneously claiming ownership of the 
property.  The terms "claimants" and "parties" are generic and 
are not defined as are the terms " '[p]etitioner,' " 
" 'condemnor,' " and " '[o]wner' ".  Having defined these 
particular terms, the General Assembly used them repeatedly 
throughout Title 25.1 but did not use them in Code §§ 25.1-222 
and -241.  Moreover, it would seem obvious that the City, as the 
condemnor, cannot take and condemn property from itself.  See 
Continental Cas. Co. v. Town of Blacksburg, 846 F.Supp. 486, 487 
(W.D. Va. 1994) ("It is axiomatic that the Commonwealth of 
Virginia cannot take property from itself.  Nor can an entity of 
the state take property already owned by the state."). 
The majority's decision today also renders other procedures 
in condemnation proceedings incongruous.  For instance, when the 
condemnor pays the just compensation sum into court in 
accordance with Code § 25.1-237, title to the property and the 
rights condemned vests in the condemnor.  But, if the condemnor 
then proves in a hearing conducted pursuant to Code § 25.1-241 
that it already owns the property, that initial vesting is 
rendered meaningless.  Furthermore, as happened in this case, 
the defendant, 3232 Page Avenue Condominium Unit Owners 
Association, had to expend resources to present evidence as to 
 
23 
the valuation of the Easements and damage only then to learn 
that the City had already acquired the Easements it sought to 
condemn through implied dedication and acceptance.  Likewise, 
the just compensation trial itself was not a wise use of 
judicial resources if the City already owned the Easements. 
In addition, the prayer for relief in the petition for 
condemnation filed by the City, as the condemnor, is telling. In 
relevant part, the City requested the following relief: 
(i) confirm that the Easement Area is a public 
beach (ii) . . . determine the value of the 
Easements taken and damages, if any, which may 
accrue to the remaining property of the Defendant 
. . . (iv) condemn the Easements and rights 
described and confirm and vest the title in the 
City; (v) ascertain the amount of the just 
compensation to be awarded to the City on behalf 
of the general public due to long public use of 
the Easement Area for recreational purposes and 
maintenance of the Easement Area by the City. 
 
The only property interest requested by the City was to confirm 
that the "Easement Area is a public beach."  Also, I find no 
authority in Title 25.1 that permits the City to request "just 
compensation . . . on behalf of the general public."  
Thus, I conclude that the circuit court erred in holding 
that, in this condemnation proceeding, it could adjudicate the 
City's asserted ownership of the Easements it sought to condemn.  
Under the procedures set forth for condemnation proceedings, the 
court had no authority to rule on the City's claim.  Thus, its 
order finding that the City had acquired the Easements by 
 
24 
implied dedication and acceptance is, at a minimum, voidable, if 
not void ab initio.  See Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390, 402, 
649 S.E.2d 672, 678 (2007) ("An order is void ab initio, rather 
than merely voidable, if the character of the judgment was not 
such as the court had power to render, or because the mode of 
procedure employed by the court was such as it might not 
lawfully adopt.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Singh v. 
Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 52, 541 S.E.2d 549, 551 (2001) ("The lack of 
jurisdiction to enter an order under any of these circumstances 
renders the order a complete nullity [that] may be impeached 
directly or collaterally by all persons, anywhere, at any time, 
or in any manner.") (internal quotation marks omitted). 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would reverse 
the portion of the circuit court's judgment holding that it had 
the authority in this condemnation proceeding to adjudicate the 
City's claim that it owned the Easements it sought to condemn 
and vacate that portion of the circuit court's judgment holding 
that the City acquired ownership of the Easements by implied 
dedication and acceptance. 
 
JUSTICE MIMS, dissenting. 
 
I join the dissenting opinion of CHIEF JUSTICE KINSER.  
However, I also write separately to dissent from the majority’s 
holding that the City proved an implied dedication of the 
 
25 
Easements over the portion of Cape Henry Beach owned by the 
Condo Association. 
 
Private property cannot become public property by 
dedication unless two events occur in the proper sequence.  The 
first event is a landowner’s offer to donate his private 
property to the public.  The second element is an acceptance by 
the government on behalf of the people.  Mulford v. Walnut Hill 
Farm Group, LLC, 282 Va. 98, 106, 712 S.E.2d 468, 473 (2011); 
Bradford v. Nature Conservancy, 224 Va. 181, 198, 294 S.E.2d 
866, 875 (1982).  If there has been no offer to donate, there is 
nothing for the government to accept.  See Keppler v. City of 
Richmond, 124 Va. 592, 602, 98 S.E. 747, 750 (1919) (“[S]ince in 
our view of the case a preponderance of the evidence does not 
establish that there was ever a dedication of the land in 
question for a public use, we shall not enter in this opinion 
upon the question of whether there was a valid acceptance of the 
land for public use on the part of the city or of the public.”). 
 
The landowner’s offer “need not be made by deed or other 
writing, but may be effectually and validly made by acts or 
verbal declarations.  It may be express or implied.  It may be 
implied from long use by the public of the land claimed to be 
dedicated.”  City of Staunton v. Augusta Corp., 169 Va. 424, 
432-33, 193 S.E. 695, 698 (1937).  Nevertheless, the fundamental 
 
26 
prerequisite is the intent of the landowner to transfer his or 
her property to public ownership: 
“To constitute a dedication there must be an 
intention to appropriate the land for the use and 
benefit of the public.  The intention, the animus 
dedicandi, is the vital principle of the doctrine 
of dedication.  The acts and declarations of the 
landowner indicating such intention must be 
unmistakable in their purpose, and decisive in 
their character, to have that effect.” 
 
Id., at 433, 193 S.E. at 698 (quoting Harris v. Commonwealth, 
61. Va. (20 Gratt.) 833, 837 (1871)); see also City of Hampton 
v. Stieffen, 202 Va. 777, 784, 120 S.E.2d 361, 365 (1961) 
(“ ‘The intent is its vital principle” and “must . . . be 
manifested by some unequivocal act . . . .’ ”) (quoting Buntin 
v. City of Danville, 93 Va. 200, 204, 24 S.E.2d 830, 830 (1896) 
(emphasis added)); Keppler, 124 Va. at 610, 98 S.E. at 753 (“The 
intent to dedicate is essential . . . to complete a dedication” 
(emphasis added)). 
 
“[W]e know that individual owners of property are not apt 
to transfer it to the community or subject it to public 
servitude without compensation,” so a party alleging that a 
landowner has intentionally done so bears the burden of proving 
it.∗ City of Staunton, 169 Va. at 433, 193 S.E. at 698; accord 
                     
 
∗ A landowner of course may become estopped from denying 
intent to dedicate property to public use, just as any party may 
become estopped from denying or asserting any relevant fact 
under the familiar principles of estoppel, but only after an 
appropriate analysis to determine whether the landowner is in 
 
27 
Keppler, 124 Va. at 613, 98 S.E. at 754.  It is true that public 
use may be evidence of such intent. 
 
However, public use may also show nothing more than the 
landowner’s willingness to permit transient use by the public 
rather than a transfer or relinquishment of his rights of 
ownership.  Commonwealth v. Kelly, 49 Va. (8. Gratt.) 632, 634-
35 (1851) (“A permission to pass over land may prove an 
intention to dedicate or a mere license revocable at the will of 
the owner; and we think that the mere permission to pass over 
land ought in this state to be regarded as a license.” (emphasis 
added)); see also Station #2, LLC v. Lynch, 280 Va. 166, 176, 
695 S.E.2d 537, 542-43 (2010) (“Permission to enter the real 
property of another does not rise to the level of an easement.  
An easement concerns the continuing use of real property.  
Permission merely to enter the real property of another without 
such continuing use is a license.” (citations omitted)).  
Therefore, merely permitting public use is ambiguous; it is not 
                                                                  
fact so estopped.  See Keppler, 124 Va. at 611, 98 S.E. at 753 
(Where the doctrine of estoppel applies, “the law will imply the 
intent to dedicate . . . even against a contrary intent.  [But 
i]n the case before us we cannot inquire or decide whether the 
doctrine of estoppel aforesaid is applicable” because the proper 
parties are not present.) 
 
It seems unlikely that estoppel would apply in this case 
because the City necessarily would have to allege it relied on 
conduct of the Condo Association to its detriment.  Mulford, 282 
Va. at 111, 712 S.E.2d at 476 (2011); Waynesboro Village, L.L.C. 
v. BMC Props., 255 Va. 75, 82, 496 S.E.2d 64, 68 (1998). 
 
 
 
28 
an “unequivocable act,” City of Hampton, 202 Va. at 784, 120 
S.E.2d at 365, or “unmistakable in [its] purpose.”  City of 
Staunton, 169 Va. at 433, 193 S.E. at 698. 
 
To the contrary, we have held that public use may prove an 
intent to dedicate only if the use is “adverse to and exclusive 
of the use and enjoyment of the property” by the landowner.  Id.  
When the public use is openly hostile to the landowner’s 
continued ownership, his failure to object to protect his 
interest is evidence that he no longer claims it.  However, if 
the public’s use of private land is merely subordinate to “and 
in connection with its use by the owners,” id., there is no such 
evidence.  Rather, in such cases the landowner may be willing to 
share his property with others, so long as they do not interfere 
with his use or interest, without divesting himself of ownership 
and the authority to stop sharing it.  Keppler, 124 Va. at 614, 
98 S.E. at 754. 
 
The majority opinion states that this principle does not 
apply when the government exercises dominion and control over 
the property.  I disagree for two reasons.  First, I am not 
persuaded that principle is correct.  Second, I do not believe 
the evidence establishes that the City exercised dominion and 
control. 
 
On the first point, the majority relies on an excerpt from 
City of Staunton that quotes a headnote of the Supreme Court of 
 
29 
Appeals of West Virginia’s opinion in Morlang v. City of 
Parkersburg, 100 S.E. 394 (W. Va. 1919).  The headnote states 
that public use is insufficient to prove dedication “unless it 
be further shown that the public authorities, with [the 
landowner’s] knowledge, exercise acts of dominion thereon 
indicative of their belief that the same has been dedicated by 
the public.”  City of Staunton, 169 Va. at 437, 193 S.E. at 700.  
However, this is dictum and irrelevant to this case. 
 
The excerpt is introduced with the statement “[n]either do 
we think that the city showed with the necessary clarity of 
proof that it has ever accepted this strip of property and 
exercised jurisdiction and dominion over it as one of its 
streets.”  169 Va. at 436, 193 S.E. at 699.  Therefore, it 
applies not to the offer but to the acceptance phase of a 
dedication.  It is dictum because the Court already had 
concluded that there was no offer, id., and a determination that 
there was no offer obviates an analysis of acceptance.  See 
Keppler, 124 Va. at 602, 98 S.E. at 750.  It is irrelevant 
because the issue in this case is whether the Condo Association 
intended to offer a dedication, not whether the City accepted. 
 
I believe that if the government’s exercise of dominion and 
control is to be relevant as evidence of the landowner’s intent 
to donate, rather than the government’s acceptance, it must 
either be accompanied by evidence of an affirmative act of 
 
30 
consent by the landowner, City of Staunton, 169 Va. at 437, 193 
S.E. at 700 (“Dedication, whether express or implied, rests upon 
the consent of the owner.”), or be sufficiently adverse to or 
exclusive of the landowner’s interest that he knows the 
government exerts a claim of right.  Keppler, 124 Va. at 612, 98 
S.E. at 753 (The government’s action on the disputed land must 
be sufficient “to give notice that a claim to it . . . was 
asserted.”).   
 
City of Hampton, the other case cited by the majority, is 
consistent with this principle because of the landowner’s 
affirmative acts.  In that case, the city claimed an implied 
dedication of an easement over an alley.  The record showed that 
the landowner had, among other things, asked the city to 
construct a curb and to place “no parking” signs on the west 
side of the alley, and thereafter asked police to ticket 
vehicles parked there in violation of the signs.  202 Va. at 
783-84, 120 S.E.2d at 365.  There is no analogous evidence in 
this case that the Condo Association requested any improvements 
or public expenditures on its beach. 
 
Similarly, the City’s undertakings in this case were not 
hostile to the interests of the landowner.  As set forth in its 
brief they include the enactment of public safety ordinances, 
police patrols, maintaining the sand dunes, and removal of 
trash, litter, and debris.  None of these activities adequately 
 
31 
informed the Condo Association that the City intended to divest 
the Condo Association of its interest in the property; none were 
adverse to or exclusive of its interests.  They therefore did 
not adequately inform the Condo Association that it was 
obligated to object or lose its interest. 
 
To the contrary, “[t]he first time, so far as this record 
discloses, that the public authorities ever asserted an interest 
or a right [adverse to the Condo Association] was when” the City 
sent its pre-condemnation offer letter.  Morlang, 100 S.E. at 
399.  “[I]nstead of acquiescing in the [C]ity’s claim at that 
time[, the Condo Association] resisted and contested” it, 
asserting and claiming complete title.  Id. at 399-400.  
Accordingly, it cannot be said that there is evidence the Condo 
Association intended to offer the public any easement over its 
beach. 
 
For these reasons, and those expressed by Chief Justice 
Kinser in her separate opinion which I join, I dissent and would 
reverse the judgment of the circuit court.