Title: J.E. Dunn Nw. v. Corus Constr. Venture

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

427 Nev,, Advance Opinion 5
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

J.E. DUNN NORTHWEST, INC., | No. 54332

Appellant, FIL ED

vs.
CORUS CONSTRUCTION VENTURE,
LLC, | MAR 03.2011

_— eee

Appeal from a district court order granting summary

   
  
     
   
  
 
 
   
  

judgment in a mechanic's lien priority action. Eighth Judicial District
Court, Clark County; Mark R. Denton, Judge.
Affirmed.

Gibbs, Giden, Locher, Turner & Senet, LLP, and Ronald S. Sofen, Las
Vegas,
for Appellant.

Meier & Fine, LLC, and Glenn F. Meier and Kathryn J. Quinn, Las Vegas,
for Respondent.

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.
OPINION
By the Court, HARDESTY, J.:
Appellant J.E. Dunn Northwest, Ine. (Dunn), performed

various preconstruction services for the One Las Vegas condominium
project in Las Vegas, Nevada, and recorded a mechanic’s lien for this

MU: 06536

 
work. Respondent Corus Construction Venture, LLC (Corus Bank),!
provided construction financing for the project and recorded a deed of trust
to secure its loan. In this appeal, we address four issues concerning the

visibility requirement for a mechanic's lien to obtain priority over a deed of

 

trust: (1) whether the visibility requirement contained in the definition of
“commencement of construction” in NRS 108.2112 applies to both work
performed and materials and equipment furnished to the construction
site; (2) whether, in the 2003 amendments to NRS Chapter 108, the
Jexpansion of the definition of “work” to make preconstruction services
lienable excuses the visibility requirement found in NRS 108.2212; (8)
whether a lender with priority waives its superior position if it has actual
knowledge of lienable preconstruction work; and (4) whether the
placement of signs and removal of power lines constitutes visible work,
We conclude that NRS 108.2112 plainly requires visibility of work
performed, including preconstruction services, to establish priority. We
also conclude that the 2003 amendments to NRS Chapter 108 did not
affect the long-standing requirement that work must be visible on the
property for a mechanic's lien to take priority over a deed of trust recorded
before commencement of construction, and the statutory visibility
requirement may not be waived by a lender who has actual knowledge of
off-site preconstruction services. Finally, we conclude that the

+Corus Bank, N.A., was the original party on appeal. However, on
October 16, 2009, Corus Construction Venture, LLC, became Corus Bank's
successor in interest, so the parties stipulated to the substitution of Corus
Construction Venture, LLC, as the respondent. Because Corus Bank was
the actual entity with whom Dunn's dispute arose, we refer to respondent
‘as Corus Bank.

 

 
preparatory placement of signs and removal of power lines does not
constitute visible work. In light of these conclusions, we affirm the district
court's order granting Corus Bank's motion for summary judgment.
FACTS
In August 2005, Midbar Condo Development hired Dunn to

 

perform a project feasibility assessment for One Las Vega

 

multimillion-dollar condominium project consisting of two 20-story towers
on Las Vegas Boulevard. Dunn reviewed design considerations

 

coordinated contract documents, developed a construction schedule, and
completed various other administrative tasks in preparation for
construction.

In December 2005, Midbar hired Dunn to serve as
construction manager and contractor for the One Las Vegas project. From
December 2005 to March 2006, Dunn performed over $1 million in
preconstruction services that included preparing project schedules,
coordinating meetings with subcontractors, reviewing subcontractors’ and
architects’ drawings, and other planning-related services.

‘Midbar obtained a loan from Corus Bank to finance the
construction of the project, and Corus Bank recorded its deed of trust on
March 17, 2006, Before recording the deed of trust, Nevada Title
Company hired a third party to perform an inspection of the property.
‘The inspector reported that power lines had been removed from the
subject property and provided photographs that depicted several signs on
an adjacent property. ‘The signs were imprinted with the name of an
architectural firm, Kobi Karp, which was performing design services for
the One Las Vegas project in conjunction with Dunn. The signs were not
located on the specific parcel inspected by the third party, and the

inspector's report ultimately concluded that no construction activity had

 

 
loceurred on the property as of the date Corus Bank recorded its deed of
trust.
of

jany funds, Corus Bank performed a due diligence review, after which it

During loan negotiations and before approving the relea

 

Japproved Dunn as the contractor. Corus Bank negotiated a separate
Jagreement with Dunn, which acknowledged that Dunn had provided, and
would continue to provide, construction services, An early version of this
Jagreement contained a subordination provision requiring Dunn to “waive
its lien rights and to subordinate its mechanic(’s} lien to the Corus Bank
deed of trust.” Dunn did not agree to this provision and Corus Bank
ultimately removed it from the final version of the agreement.

Midbar issued a notice to proceed to Dunn on March 20, 2006,
and Dunn commenced construction, ‘Two years later, in April and June
2008, Clark County issued temporary certificates of occupancy for both
condominium towers. In August 2008, Dunn served a notice of intent to
lien and, on September 8, recorded a mechanics lien for its unpaid
services. A few weeks later, Midbar defaulted on the loan, and a dispute
arose between Corus Bank and Dunn regarding the priority of the deed of
trust and the mechanic's lien.

Dunn filed a complaint in district court in October 2008,
seeking a declaratory judgment that its mechanic's lien had priority over
Corus Bank’s deed of trust. Dunn then filed a motion for summary
judgment, and Corus Bank filed an opposition to Dunn's motion and a
countermotion for summary judgment. The district court denied Dunn's
motion, finding that pursuant to NRS 108.225 and NRS 108.2212,

Dunn's work must have been visible from a reasonable inspection of the
property prior to the date that Corus Bank recorded its deed of trust, and

 

 
Dunn failed to make that showing.* The district court also denied Corus
Bank's countermotion for summary judgment.

In March 2009, Corus Bank renewed its motion for summary
judgment, arguing that under NRS 108.225, a mechanic's lien takes
priority over encumbrances that attach after construction commences,
Accordingly, Corus Bank contended that, because “no visible work had
been performed on the property and no visible equipment or materials had
been furnished to the property” as of the date it recorded its deed of trust,
construction had not commenced. ‘Therefore, its deed of trust had priority.
Dunn argued in opposition that a genuine issue of material fact existed
with regard to whether its work was visible from a reasonable inspection
of the property. Alternatively, Dunn claimed that Corus Bank waived the
requirement that the work must be visible because, prior to recording its
deed of trust, Corus Bank had knowledge that Dunn performed

 

preconstruction services, Dunn also asked for more time for discovery to

 

investigate Corus Bank's knowledge of Dunn's preconstruction work,

‘The district court granted Corus Bank’s renewed motion for
summary judgment. The court concluded that “{tJhere are no genuine
factual issues indicating [that] Dunn provided any visible construction
work on the property at the time Corus’ deed of trust was recorded.” The
court further found that, under NRS 108.225, Dunn's waiver argument

lacked merit because, even if Corus Bank was aware of Dunn's

2NRS 108.225 and NRS 108.2112 do not require the specific lien
claimant requesting priority to perform work prior to the recordation of
the deed of trust in order for its mechanic's lien to have priority. Instead,
all mechanics’ liens relate back to the date overall construction
commenced.

 

 
own

preconstruction services, “such knowledge would not... preclude Corus
from relying on the law relative to priority, requiring that a lien claimant,
for priority purposes, show visible work of improvement at the time of
recordation of an intervening deed of trust.” Dunn appeals.
DISCUSSION

A mechanic's lien has priority over a deed of trust recorded
after the commencement of construction, The priority statute, NRS
108.225, states, in pertinent part:

1, The liens provided for in NRS 108.221 to
108.246, inclusive, are preferred to”

(@) Any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance
which may have attached to the property after the
commencement of construction of a work of
improvement.

2. Every mortgage or encumbrance imposed
upon, or conveyance made of, property affected by
the liens provided for in NRS 108.221 to 108.246,
inclusive, after the commencement of construction
of a work of improvement are subordinate and
subject to the liens provided for in NRS 108.221 to
108.246, inclusive, regardless of the date of
recording the notices of liens,

Since 1977, we have recognized that visible, on-site
construction is required for mechanics’ liens to take a priority position
over a subsequently recorded deed of trust. Aladdin Heating v, Trustees,
Cont, States, 93 Nev. 257, 260, 563 P.2d 82, 84 (1977). In this appeal, we
examine the effect of the Legislature's 2003 amendments to NRS Chapter
108 on the visibility requirement for preconstruction services to take

priority over a deed of trust. Dunn proffers three arguments that the

visibility requirement does not apply to its preconstruction services. First,
Dunn contends that NRS 108.2212, which defines “commencement of

 

 
one

construction,” is ambiguous because that statute makes it unclear whether
work performed, and specifically preconstruction services, must be visible.
Second, Dunn argues that NRS 108.2184, which defines “work” for
Chapter 108 purposes, expanded the scope of lienable work to include
preconstruction services, excusing the visibility requirement for
such application would create a “right

 

preconstruction services becau
without a remedy.” Finally, Dunn argues that work did not have to be
visible in this case because Corus Bank had actual knowledge of Dunn's
preconstruction services, resulting in a waiver of the visibility
requirement, Dunn alternatively argues that the placement of signs and
removal of power lines on the site constitutes visible work, We conclude
that these arguments are without merit.
Standard of review

“This court reviews a district court's grant of summary
judgment de novo.” George L, Brown Ins. v. Star Ins, Co,, 126 Nev. _,
__. 287 P.3d 92, 96 (2010) (quoting Wood v, Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724,
729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005). “Summary judgment is appropriate
when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and
there is no genuine dispute of any material fact.” Dictor v. Creative
Management Services, 126 Nev. __, __, 223 P.3d 932, 334 (2010). We
review the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
George L. Brown Ins., 126 Nev. at _, 287 P.3d at 96.

.e term “commencement of construction” plainly requires visibility for
both work performed and materials or equipment furnished for a work of
improvement

NRS 108.225, the lien priority statute, provides that priority
attaches after “commencement of construction.” NRS 108.2112 defines

“commencement of construction” as the date on which:

 

 
1, Work performed; or

2. Materials or equipment furnished in
connection with a work of improvement,

“is visible from a reasonable inspection of the
site.

Dunn maintains that the visibility requirement is ambiguous because the
arrow symbol indicating a flush line and the comma at the end of
subsection 2 make it unclear whether work performed must be visible for a
mechanic's lien to take priority over a deed of trust. We disagree.

When the language of a statute is clear on its face, “this court
will not go beyond [the] statute's plain language.” Great Basin Water
Network v. State Engr, 126 Nev. _, __, 284 P.3d 912, 918 (2010),
However, if a statute is ambiguous, we examine legislative history and
interpret the statute “in light of the policy and the spirit of the law, and
the interpretation should avoid absurd results.” Westpark Owners’ Ass'n
v. Dist. Ct,, 123 Nev. 349, 357, 167 P.8d 421, 427 (2007) (quoting Hunt v.
Warden, 111 Nev. 1284, 1285, 903 P.2d 826, 827 (1995). “Statutory
language
interpretation.” In xe Candelaria, 126 Nev. _, _, 245 P.3d 518, 520
(2010).

 

 

ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable

NRS 0.025(2), which explains that the arrow symbol, like the
one in NRS 108.2112, is simply a symbol to indicate a flush line, states:

Except as otherwise required by the context, text

of a statute that:

(a) Follows subsections, paragraphs,
subparagraphs or sub-subparagraphs that are
introduced by a colon;

(@)Is_ not designated as a separate
subsection, paragraph, subparagraph or sub-
subparagraph; and

 
0s a

 

(©) Begins flush to the left margin rather
than immediately following the material at the
end of the final subsection, paragraph,
subparagraph or sub-subparagraph,
“applies to the section as a whole, in the case of
subsections, or to the subdivision preceding the
colon as a whole rather than solely to the
subdivision that the text follows, The symbol “~”
in bills and in Nevada Revised Statutes indicates
the beginning of such text.
Dunn maintains that this drafting convention does not apply to NRS
108.2112 because the proposed version of the bill that added NRS

108.22112 did not contain the arrow, and the context of the statute

 

requires an exception. However, the discrepancy between the proposed
and final versions is explained by the fact that the arrow symbol was first
adopted by the Legislature during the same session in which NRS
108.22112 was enacted, See 2003 Nev. Stat., ch. 367, § 20, at 2094,
Regarding the context of the statute, Dunn argues that if we apply the

phrase that appears after the arrow symbol to both subsections 1 and 2,

 

the result will be that lienable, preconstruction work under NRS
108,22184 will not have a priority position because it is not visible.
However, determining whether work is entitled to a lien is not the same a
determining the priority of any such lien. As discussed below, visibility
alone determines priority. Therefore, NRS 108.2112 is not an exception
to the normal application of the provisions included after the arrow

symbol, and the visibility requirement applies to both work performed,

 
including preconstruction services, and materials and equipment
furnished to the site.?

Dunn also asks us to utilize the “last antecedent rule” of
statutory construction to conclude that the language after the arrow
symbol applies only to subsection 2 of NRS 108,22112. The last
antecedent rule, also known as the doctrine of the last antecedent, dictates
that “qualifying words and phrases,...where no contrary intention
appears, refer solely to the last antecedent.” ‘Thompsen v. Hancock, 49
Nev. 336, 341, 246 P. 941, 942 (1926). Using this rule, Dunn argues that
the phrase “is visible from a reasonable inspection of the site” that appears
after the comma at the end of subsection 2 and after the arrow symbol
applies only to the immediately preceding subsection 2 regarding
materials furnished. However, “the presence of a comma before the
qualifying phrase is evidence the qualifier is intended to apply to all
antecedents instead of only the immediately preceding one.” In re Sehome
Park Care Center, Inc., 903 P.2d 443, 447 (Wash. 1995). Therefore, even if
we apply the last antecedent rule as Dunn suggests, its argument would
fail because NRS 108.22112's qualifying phrase “is visible from a
reasonable inspection of the site” would still apply to both subsections 1
and 2.

Additionally, adopting Dunn’s proposed statutory construction
of NRS 108.22112 and applying the qualifying phrase after the arrow

‘Even without the arrow, the visibility provision would still apply to
the section as a whole because the provision in NRS 0.025(2) regarding the
effect of flush lines has been in effect since 1991. See 1991 Nev. Stat., ch.
309, § 1, at 809. In 2003, the Legislature simply added the arrow symbol
to clearly indicate such lines, 2003 Nev. Stat., ch. 367, § 20, at 2094.

 

 
 

ome a

symbol only to subsection 2 would also lead to an absurd reading of the
statute. This court secks to avoid interpretations that yield
“unreasonable or absurd result(s.” Great Basin, 126 Nev. at __. 234
P.3d at 918 (quoting Allstate Insurance Co, v. Fackett, 125 Nev. __, _,
206 P.3d 572, 576 (2009). If we were to interpret the phrase appearing

 

after the arrow symbol as not applying to subsection 1, that provision
would read: “Commencement of construction’ means the date on which
[wlork performed.” ‘This
and there is no support for reading the statute in this manner. See
Heydenfoldt v. Daney G. & S.M. Co,, 10 Nev. 290, 313 (1875) {W]e are
not to construe statutes by equity, but to collect the sense of the

‘atutory construction is grammatically incorrect

   

 

legislature by a sound interpretation of its language, according to reason
and grammatical correctness.”). Thus, Dunn appears to be resorting to
“ingenuity to create ambiguity” that does not exist, see Secretary of State
x. Burk, 124 Nev. 579, 592, 188 P.8d 1112, 1121 (2008) (quoting
Rothschild v. United States, 179 U.S. 463, 465 (1900), and we conclude
that the meaning of NRS 108.2212 is plain and requires visibility for
work performed, including preconstruction services, in order for a

mechanic’s lien to take a priority position over a deed of trust.

‘The legislative expansion_of NRS_108.22184, which defines lienable
“work,” did not. i

Dunn further argues that the visibility requirement in NRS
108.2212 does not apply to preconstruction services because that statute
is incompatible with NRS 108.22184, which defines the type of work

u

 

 
entitled to a lien. Specifically, it argues that we must harmonize NRS
108.2212 with 108.22184 and conclude that the visibility requirement in
NRS 108.2112 does not apply to preconstruction services. Dunn's
rationale is that because preconstruction services have lien rights, those
services must also be entitled to a priority position regardless of the
express visibility requirement in NRS 108.2112. However, under the
current statutory scheme, whether work is entitled to a lien pursuant to
NRS 108.22184 and whether it is entitled to priority over other

encumbrances pursuant to NRS 108,225 are two entirely separate is:

 

es.
Dunn

 

ks us to ignore the visibility requirement as applied to
preconstruction services. We decline to do so,

We first addressed lien priority among third-party claimants
in Aladdin Heating v, Trustees, Central States. 93 Nev. at 260, 563 P.2d
at 84, There, we held that “actual on-site” construction was required for a
lien to have priority over a deed of trust.® Id, The Legislature codified

 

‘NRS 108.2184 defines “work” as “the planning, design,
geotechnical and environmental investigations, surveying, labor and
services provided by a lien claimant for the construction, alteration or
repair of any improvement, property or work of improvement whether the
work is completed or partially completed.”

“The statute at issue in Aladdin, former NRS 108.225, stated in
pertinent part:

 

1, The liens provided for in NRS 108.221 to
108.2395, inclusive, are preferred to:

(@) Any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance
which may have attached subsequent to the time
when the building, improvement or structure was
commenced, work done, or materials were
commenced to be furnished.

continued on next page...

 

12
om i
_Bznensascen me nsarn maaRTn  tnganeanieactoesmacneenn dm
this visibility requirement in 1998 by clarifying in NRS 108.225 that
“work done’ does not include any work commenced before on-site
construction has started.” 1993 Nev. Stat., ch. 502, § 4, at 2056.

In 2003, the Legislature again revisited NRS Chapter 108 and
added NRS 108.2112, which defines “commencement of construction.”
2003 Nev. Stat., ch, 427, § 4, at 2587. This definition simply moved the
visibility requirement previously set forth in Aladdin and the 1993 version
of NRS 108.225 to a new section, NRS 108.2112, The Legislature also
added NRS 108.2184, which defines “work” and sets forth the services for
which a lien may be claimed. 2003 Nev. Stat., ch, 427, § 23, at 2589-90.
‘The list of such services now includes planning, design, and other related

 

At no point during the development of Nevada's current lien
priority statutes did the Legislature dispense with the visibility
requirement. Thus, visibility is the linchpin of priority, and nothing in the
legislative history suggests that the Logislature intended to change that
requirement for any services, including preconstruetion work.

Other jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions and have
required the distinction between lienable work and priority among lien
claimants. In Ketchum, Konkel, et al, v. Heritage Mountain, the court

noted that “[tJhe distinction between the rights of mechanics against the

continued

Aladdin, 93 Nev. at 260 n.1, 563 P.2d at 84 n.1; see also 1965 Nev. Stat.,
ch. 434, § 7, at 1160.

®Corus Bank does not dispute that Dunn performed lienable work.

 

 
owner of the property where no priority issue exists and the adjustment of
relative priorities of third parties in the property is crucial.” 784 P.2d
1217, 1221 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Also, in Williams & Works, Ine, v.
Springfield Corp., the Supreme Court of Michigan considered an argument
similar to Dunn's regarding whether, in expanding the scope of lienable
work, the legislature also intended that such work was entitled to priority.
293 N.W. 2d 304, 310 (Mich. 1980). ‘The court concluded that “it is)
unreasonable to believe the [Michigan] Legislature intended to indirectly
change . . . the traditional and well-established rule requiring a visible, on-
site commencement of construction in order to establish priority, by the
n of the lienable services outlined in [the statute].” Id, at

 

Public policy also supports maintaining the visibility
requirement independently of the statutory scope of lienable work. For
example, in Aladdin we noted that if we were to “permit mechanics’ liens
to... relate back to a time long before” any construction on the property
was visible, “no prudent businessman would be willing to lend
construction money.” Aladdin, 93 Nev. at 260, 563 P.2d at 84. This is
because the purpose of the visibility requirement is “to inform prospective
lenders inspecting the premises that liens had attached.” Id, Maintaining
the visibility requirement, absent contrary legislative intent, preserves
this certainty in construction financing. ‘Thus, we conclude that the
visibility requirement of NRS 108.22112 applies to preconstruction
services, regardless of the 2003 amendments to NRS 108.2184.

The vi juirement abl
Dunn also argues that a party waives NRS 108.22112's
visibility requirement if it has actual knowledge of lienable

 

 
preconstruction services, Dunn claims that Corus Bank knew of Dunn's
lienable work, thus it waived its priority claim. Whether the visibility
requirement is waivable is an issue of first impression in Nevada, Based
on the plain language of Nevada's priority statutes and the policy reasons
for them, we conclude that this requirement is not waivable.

Dunn relies on Kirkwold Construction v. M,G.A. Construction,
513 N.W.2d 241 (Minn, 1994), for the proposition that a party with actual
knowledge of lienable preconstruction work waives the visibility
requirement, However, that case involved Minnesota's lien priority
statute, Minn. Stat. § 614.05(1), which gives a bona fide purchaser or
mortgagee priority over mechanics’ liens only if they did not have “actual
notice” of prior lienable work, ‘Therefore, Kirkwold interpreted a statute
specifically addressing notice. Conversely, Nevada’s mechanic's lien
statutes do not mention notice or provide for priority based on notice, See
In re L, Bruce Nybo, Inc,, 247 B.R. 294, 300 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2000). If the
Legislature intended for notice to affect priority, it could have drafted the
statute to reflect such intent. See id, Without such a provision, NRS
108.225 expressly requires commencement of construction alone for
priority and “actual, constructive or recorded notice” cannot be substituted
for notice through commencement of construction. Id.

This conclusion is congruent with the recognized policy

interest in maintaining certainty and predictability in construction
financing. In Aladdin, we noted that lenders would be less likely to
assume the risk of a construction loan if priority relates back to the date of
nonvisible, preconstruction work, 93 Nev. at 260, 563 P.2d at 84: see also
‘Tracy Price Associates v. Hebard, 72 Cal. Rptr. 600, 606 (Ct. App. 1968)

("To hold that such knowledge constitutes waiver or estoppel would expose

 

 
lenders to 20 many unpredictable hazards that construction financing
would become extremely difficult.”). ‘Thus, it is irrelevant whether Corus
Bank knew of Dunn’s preconstruction work, or whether Dunn agreed to
subordinate its mechanic's lien because Corus Bank's knowledge did not

affect its priority position.”

"Dunn also argues that the district court erred when it refused to
allow Dunn additional time to conduct discovery before granting Corus
Bank's motion for summary judgment. Specifically, Dunn sought further
discovery in order to demonstrate:

() the nature of Corus Bank’s understanding of
the preconstruction services performed by J.E.
Dunn; (2) the nature of the review performed by
Corus Bank on the construction documents; (3) the
reason for which Corus Bank demanded that J.B.
Dunn subordinate its lien to the construction loan;
(4) the reasons for which Corus Bank removed the
subordination clause from the Consent and
Agreement; (6) the nature of any review performed
by Corus Bank . . . under Nevada law on the issue
of lien priority; (6) the nature of the due diligence
performed by Corus Bank on the construction
documents ...; (7) the reasons for which Corus
Bank failed to request a lien release from J.B.
Dunn for the preconstruction services which J.E.
Dunn had performed; and, (8) the nature of any
representations made by Corus Bank to J.B, Dunn
regarding payment.

The district court declined to provide Dunn with more time to
conduct discovery, determining that the issues identified by Dunn “do not
pertain to the question of whether there was actually visible evidence of
construction work on the property but, instead, address what
understanding Corus would reasonably be expected to have had as to
preconstruction services and documents,” According to the district court,
wed on next page ..

 

 

 
Dunn's work was not visible
Dunn alternatively argues that the work it performed was

visible because an architect's

 

sign had been placed at the project site,
albeit on an adjacent property, and power lines were removed. These
facts, Dunn contends, placed Corus Bank on notice that it should have
inquired further as to potential lienable work performed on the site. We
disagree

In Aladdin, we noted that commencement of construction
requires “actual on-site construction” and does not include merely
“architectural, soil testing, and survey work.” 93 Nev. at 260, 563 P.2d at
84, Those activities may involve some physical presence on the site,
including stakes, monuments, and the like, but this presence is
insufficient to provide lenders notice of lienable work entitled to priority.
See In_re_L. Bruce Nybo, Inc, 247 B.R. at 298 (work related to
preconstruction activities, such as staking parcel boundaries, does not

satisfy the visibility requirement). Other courts have more generally held,
continued

whether such services performed by Dunn constituted lienable work “does
not involve the issue of priority as between Dunn and Corus.”

Pursuant to NRCP 56(f), the district court may “grant a continuance
when a party opposing a motion for summary judgment is unable to
marshal facts in support of its opposition.” Aviation Ventures v, Joan
Morris, Inc., 121 Nev. 113, 117-18, 110 P.3d 59, 62 (2005). The party must
“express[ ] how further discovery will lead to the creation of a genuine

sue of material fact.” Id, at 118, 110 P.3d at 62. We review a district
court's refusal to grant additional time for an abuse of discretion. Id.
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion because, even if Corus
Bank had knowledge of Dunn’s preconstruction work, there would be no
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Dunn's mechanic's lien had
priority over the deed of trust because visibility is the threshold inquiry.

 

 
90 Be

and we agree, that preparatory work on a site, such as clearing or grading,
does not constitute commencement of construction. See, et, Clark v.
General Electric Co., 420 S.W.2d 830, 833-34 (Ark. 1967). Thus, we

conclude that installing business signs and removing power lines do not

 

constitute “actual on-site construction” because such activities are
preparatory and are not part of the visible construction project itself.
Therefore, Dunn's work was not visible, 60 its mechanic's lien is junior to
Corus Bank's deed of trust
CONCLUSION

RS 108.225 expressly provides that “commencement of
construction” is required for lien priority. Because we conclude that
“commencement of construction” plainly requires visibility of on-site work
in order for a mechanic's lien to take a priority position over a deed of
trust and that Dunn's preconstruction services were not visible, its
mechanic's lien is junior to Corus Bank's deed of trust. We further
conclude that the visibility requirement is not waivable, and, therefore, it
is irrelevant whether Corus Bank knew of Dunn's preconstruction work or
whether Dunn agreed to subordinate its mechanic's lien because Corus
Bank's knowledge did not affect its priority position. Therefore, summary
judgment in favor of Corus Bank was appropriate because no genuine
issue of material fact existed as to whether construction had commenced
prior to the recordation of Corus Bank's deed of trust.

18

 

 
  
   

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's summary judgment.

Hardesty

Cu.

 

Pickering

  

Parraguirre