Title: Social Services v. Vann

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Circuit Court for Charles County
Case No. 08-C-00-001783
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 87
September Term, 2003
CHARLES COUNTY DEPARTMENT 
OF SOCIAL SERVICES
v.
CHARLES VANN
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by Raker, J. 
Filed:   July 29, 2004
1All future statutory references to the Family Law Article of the Maryland Code (1999
Repl. Vol., 2003 Cum. Supp.) shall be designated “FL.”
2As it happens, the teacher was not pregnant.
In this case, we must decide whether the Court of Special Appeals, on judicial review
of an administrative agency decision, erred when it held that a parent could not be
responsible for indicated child abuse when, in the course of administering corporal
punishment, the parent inadvertently injured his son because the child attempted to escape
the punishment. The Charles County Department of Social Services found Charles Vann
responsible for “indicated child abuse” pursuant to Maryland Code (1999 Repl. Vol., 2003
Cum. Supp.), § 5-701 of the Family Law Article.1  An administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld
the Department’s finding and Vann filed a petition for judicial review of the agency decision
in the Circuit Court for Charles County.  We shall hold that the ALJ’s decision was supported
by substantial evidence.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment by the Court of Special
Appeals.  
I.
On May 6, 1999, Charles Vann, respondent, and his wife each received a phone call
from the administrators of the daycare center of their six-year-old son.  The daycare providers
had called to advise them that their son had brutally punched and kicked a teacher in the
stomach.  Because the teacher was thought to be pregnant2 and had suffered serious injuries,
the daycare providers sent her to the hospital and demanded that respondent and his wife
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immediately retrieve their son from the daycare center.
That evening, respondent and his wife discussed the situation.  This was not the first
time their son had misbehaved violently at the daycare center.  Prior to this incident, he had
been involved in multiple bouts of fighting with the other students, prompting the providers
to transfer him from his original classroom to a new one and, on occasion, to send him home
early.  Ultimately, the difficulties with the child became so severe that the daycare providers
threatened to, and eventually did, expel him permanently from the center.
Respondent and his wife were consternated by their six-year-old’s repeated and
unrelenting behavioral issues.  Previous attempts to modify the child’s conduct using a
graduated discipline regimen—which included sitting him in a corner for fifteen minutes,
banning him from access to his video games, prohibiting him from going outside to play with
his friends, and restricting his movements to his bedroom—had resulted only in more clashes
with the students and teachers, culminating in the punching incident on May 6.
Both parents agreed that corporal punishment was the appropriate discipline for their
son’s misbehavior that day.  Using his personal belt, respondent, while verbally chastising
his son for the incident at the daycare center, struck at his son.  But the six-year-old
attempted to avoid the blows by running away, hiding under the bed, and grabbing the belt
from his father.  In the course of the tussle and respondent’s attempts to land the blows,
respondent struck him in his lower back with the belt buckle, causing a reddish, moon-shaped
bruise about an inch in length.  In all, respondent struck his son two or three times with the
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belt.
The following day, respondent’s son complained to his teacher of back pain.  The
daycare providers observed the injuries on the child and reported the matter to Child
Protective Services.  Eventually, an investigator employed by the local Department of Social
Services was called to look into the matter.  On May 10, 1999, the investigator interviewed
respondent and his wife.  On January 13, 2000, the local department advised respondent that
he had been charged with indicated child abuse, see FL §§ 5-701(b)(1) and 5-701(m); that
his name would be submitted to a state centralized registry used for the recording of such
findings, see FL § 5-714(e); and that he had a right to contest the charge before an
administrative court, see FL § 5-706.1.  See also Montgomery County v. L.D., 349 Md. 239,
707 A.2d 1331 (1998); C.S. v. P.G. County Social Services, 343 Md. 14, 680 A.2d 470
(1996).
Respondent exercised his right to the hearing before an administrative law judge under
FL § 5-706.1(b), and the hearing took place on July 18, 2000.  On August 30, 2000, the ALJ
issued her decision, stating as follows:
“The evidence establishes that [respondent] loves his son . . .
fiercely and wants to raise well-behaved responsible children,
which is admirable.  The evidence also establishes that
[respondent’s] actions in swinging a belt with a large metal
buckle at a young child who is twisting, hopping, and trying to
run away puts the child in danger of sustaining unintended
serious injuries.  Although [respondent] testified that he was
aiming for [his son’s] buttocks, he missed the mark and hit [the]
lower-mid back area, leaving marks.
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“. . . Wielding a cowhide belt with a 2-3" metal buckle at a six-
year-old child who is frantically trying to get away and out of
reach by twisting, turning, and grabbing at the belt is not
[justified].  [Respondent’s] action injured [the child].  Striking
him and causing a half-moon red/purplish mark on his back . .
. harmed his health and placed him at substantial risk of harm.
The substantial risk and potential for such harm was imminent
in that if the child had ducked to avoid the belt, the buckle could
have struck his eye or teeth, and could have resulted in more
serious, even permanent, injuries.  Once an intended target
becomes a moving one, it cannot be predicted with certainty
where the blows will land.”
Based on these findings, the ALJ affirmed the decision of the local department to charge
respondent with indicated child abuse.
Respondent filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Charles County.
The Circuit Court affirmed the findings of the Department of Social Services.  In an
unreported opinion, a divided panel of the Court of Special Appeals reversed the Circuit
Court’s decision, holding that respondent could not be held responsible for indicated child
abuse when, in the course of administering corporal punishment, he injured his son
inadvertently as the child attempted to escape the punishment.  
The Court of Special Appeals reasoned that, as a matter of law, respondent’s exercise
of corporal punishment could not be “transformed” from lawful corporal punishment into
unlawful indicated child abuse simply by virtue of the child’s disobedience to his parent’s
order to stand still and accept the punishment.  But for the child’s independent decision to
disobey, the court stated, the punishment would have been lawful, and a parent cannot be
held responsible for the injury if the child’s action is the “independent intervening cause” of
3FL § 5-701(b) provides:  
“‘Abuse’ means:
“(1)  the physical or mental injury of a child by
any parent or other person who has permanent or
temporary care or custody or responsibility for
supervision of a child, or by any household or
family member, under circumstances that indicate
that the child's health or welfare is harmed or at
substantial risk of being harmed; or
“(2)  sexual abuse of a child, whether physical
injuries are sustained or not.”
FL § 5-701(m) provides:  
“‘Indicated’ means a finding that there is credible evidence,
which has not been satisfactorily refuted, that abuse, neglect, or
sexual abuse did occur.”
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the injury.  Dissenting, Judge Deborah Eyler argued that the majority’s reasoning was
circular, because it determined the corporal punishment lawful without considering the
objective reasonableness of the punishment under the totality of circumstances, including
factors such as the child’s age, size, ability to understand the punishment, and ability to
comply.  The local Department sought review of the intermediate appellate court’s  holding,
and we granted its petition for writ of certiorari.  378 Md. 613, 837 A.2d 925 (2003).
Petitioner contends that the Court of Special Appeals’s holding was tantamount to an
exception to “indicated child abuse” for parents who unintentionally injure their child in the
course of administering corporal punishment.  Petitioner argues the statutory definition of
indicated child abuse, found in FL §§ 5-701(b) and (m),3 does not contain the exception
carved out by the intermediate appellate court.  The court, suggests petitioner, confused the
definition of indicated child abuse in FL § 5-701 with either that of criminal child abuse, Md.
4All future statutory references to the Criminal Law Article of the Maryland Code
(2002, 2003 Cum. Supp.) shall be designated “CL.”
-6-
Code (2002, 2003 Cum. Supp.), § 3-601 of the Criminal Law Article,4 or that of “protective
order” child abuse (that is, child abuse sufficient to require a legal protective order for the
child, see FL § 4-501(b) (defining abuse for Title 4, Subtitle 5 of the Family Law Article,
including abuse requiring a protective order); see also FL §§ 4-504 to 4-506).  Protective
order child abuse expressly excludes reasonable corporal punishment, FL § 4-501(b)(2), and
criminal child abuse has been held not to encompass reasonable corporal punishment, see
Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 126-27, 389 A.2d 341, 348-49 (1978), whereas child abuse
as defined by FL § 5-701 contains no such disclaimer.  Petitioner sees this distinction as
crucial, evincing an intent by the Legislature to disregard corporal punishment in the context
of FL § 5-701.  The Court of Special Appeals, contends petitioner, applied the wrong
definition of child abuse and erred as a matter of law because it took into account the fact
that respondent was implementing corporal punishment on his recalcitrant son. 
Respondent counters that the definition of abuse in FL § 5-701 does not foreclose the
reasonable use of corporal punishment.  Because reasonable corporal punishment is
permitted and because respondent’s use of force was reasonable, respondent could not be
held responsible for child abuse.  As evidence of legislative intent, respondent also refers to
FL § 4-501, defining child abuse in the context of protective orders, which expressly
precludes reasonable corporal punishment from its purview.  He argues that the definitions
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of child abuse in FL §§ 4-501 and 5-701 must be harmonized.  Citing the legislative bill file,
respondent also argues that the legislative history of FL § 5-701 clearly indicates that parental
intent must be considered a factor in determining whether “indicated child abuse” under the
statute actually occurred.  Finally, respondent asserts the real motive behind petitioner’s
decision to charge respondent was the agency’s desire to keep a record of any parent alleged
to have committed child abuse.  He contends that such motive is at odds with the policy of
the statute the agency is charged with administering.
II.
As a court sitting in judicial review of an administrative agency decision, this Court
reviews the decision in the same posture as that of the courts below.  That is to say, we
reevaluate the decision of the agency under the same statutory standards as would the circuit
court, and we do not employ those standards to reevaluate the decision of the circuit or
intermediate appellate court.  See Division of Labor v. Triangle, 366 Md. 407, 416, 784 A.2d
534, 539 (2001); Dept. of Health v. Campbell, 364 Md. 108, 123, 771 A.2d 1051, 1060
(2001) (noting that it is the final decision at the administrative level, not the decision of the
previously reviewing court, which is the focus of each level of judicial review).
Under our holding in C.S., 343 Md. 14, 680 A.2d 470, a challenge to the entry of
one’s name in a central registry as an “indicated child abuser” pursuant to FL § 5-701 is a
contested case within the meaning of the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act, Md. Code
5All future statutory references to the State Government Article of the Maryland Code
(1984, 1999 Repl. Vol., 2003 Cum. Supp.) shall be designated “SG.”
-8-
(1984, 1999 Repl. Vol., 2003 Cum. Supp.) § 10-202(d)(1) of the State Government Article.5
See Sugarloaf v. Waste Disposal, 323 Md. 641, 594 A.2d 1115 (1991).  As a contested case
in which the agency was acting in its quasi-judicial capacity—as opposed to “quasi-
legislative” agency actions, for which a wholly different set of administrative law principles
apply, see SG § 10-125; Fogle v. H & G Restaurant, Inc., 337 Md. 441, 654 A.2d 449
(1995)—judicial review is governed by SG § 10-222.
SG § 10-222(h) sets forth standards of judicial review over agency decisions in
contested cases and varies those standards depending on the type of agency determination
under scrutiny.  See Spencer v. Board of Pharmacy 380 Md. 515, 846 A.2d 341 (2004).  With
regard to agency factual determinations, the standard of review is whether the finding is
“unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in light of the entire record
as submitted,” also known as substantial evidence review.  SG § 10-222(h)(3)(v).  Under
substantial evidence review of an agency’s factual findings, a court is limited to ascertaining
whether a reasoning mind could have reached the same factual conclusions reached by the
agency on the record before it.  Board of Physician v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 67-68, 729 A.2d
376, 380-81 (1999).
With regard to agency legal conclusions, judicial review is less deferential to the
agency.  When an agency makes “conclusions of law” in a contested case, the APA permits
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the court, on judicial review, to decide the correctness of the agency’s conclusions and to
substitute the court’s judgment for that of the agency’s.  SG § 10-222(h)(3)(i)–(iv); Total AV
v. Dept. of Labor, 360 Md. 387, 394, 758 A.2d 124, 127-28 (2000).  Even with conclusions
of law, however, an agency’s legal interpretation of the statute it administers or of its own
regulations is entitled to some deference from the courts.  See Jordan v. Hebbville, 369 Md.
439, 450, 800 A.2d 768, 775 (2002); MTA v. King 369 Md. 274, 288-89, 799 A.2d 1246,
1254 (2002).
Other agency decisions fall within categories that are neither legal conclusions nor
factual findings, see, e.g., Spencer, 380 Md. 515, 846 A.2d 341 (explaining judicial review
over discretionary functions of the agency), and some fall within both.  These latter sort
commonly are known as “mixed questions of law and fact” or applications of law to facts:
The agency has correctly stated the law and its fact-finding is supported by the record, but
the question is whether it has applied the law to the facts correctly.  When the agency
decision being judicially reviewed is a mixed question of law and fact, the reviewing court
applies the substantial evidence test, that is, the same standard of review it would apply to
an agency factual finding.  Pollock v. Patuxent, 374 Md. 463, 469 n.3, 823 A.2d 626, 630 n.3
(2003); Ramsay, Scarlett & Co. v. Comptroller, 302 Md. 825, 837-38, 490 A.2d 1296,
1302-03 (1985); Kohli v. LOOC, Inc., 103 Md.App. 694, 654 A.2d 922 (1995), rev’d in part
on other grounds and remanded, 347 Md. 258, 701 A.2d 92 (1997); Strother v. Board of
Education, 96 Md.App. 99, 623 A.2d 717 (1993). 
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The agency decision reviewed by the Court of Special Appeals and before this Court
on certiorari is the ALJ’s determination that respondent’s 
“[s]triking [the child] and causing a half-moon red/purplish
mark on his back . . . harmed his health and placed him at
substantial risk of harm.  The substantial risk and potential for
such harm was imminent in that if the child had ducked to avoid
the belt, the buckle could have struck his eye or teeth, and could
have resulted in more serious, even permanent, injuries.  Once
an intended target becomes a moving one, it cannot be predicted
with certainty where the blows will land.”
To determine the proper standard of review, we must first determine whether the
agency decision was a legal conclusion, a factual finding, or a mixed question of law and
fact.  The Court of Special Appeals considered it a conclusion of law, stating that “we are
persuaded that the ALJ erred in concluding as a matter of law that the corporal punishment
imposed by [respondent] placed his son in ‘substantial risk of harm’” (emphasis added).
Because it saw the decision under review as an issue of law, the court applied de novo
review, substituting its view for that of the agency.  
We disagree that the issue is solely a legal one.  Whether a finding of “indicated child
abuse” is permitted by FL § 5-701 when, in the course of administering corporal punishment,
the child disobeys the parent and consequently is injured is patently a mixed question of law
and fact. When the ALJ concluded that a substantial risk was “imminent,” it did so by
applying the law, which requires a substantial risk of harm for a finding of indicated child
abuse, FL § 5-701(b); C.O.M.A.R. 07.02.07.12, to the facts of the case, the possibility of a
6Even in the Court of Special Appeals, the dissenting and majority opinions agreed
on the applicable law, with Judge Eyler stating that “I do not take issue with most of the
majority’s general discussion of the applicable law.  I disagree, however, with the majority’s
application of the law to the facts ” (emphasis added).
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swinging metal buckle causing severe injury to a six-year old child.6
In Ramsay, 302 Md. 825, 490 A.2d 1296, we addressed the standard of review of an
administrative agency decision.  The Court of Special Appeals had held that the taxing
authority’s determination on whether a particular corporation was unitary or binary was a
conclusion of law, subject to de novo judicial review.  Id. at 837-38, 490 A.2d at 1302-03.
We disagreed and held that the question was rather the application of the law to the
“established evidence” in the record.  Finding no disagreement between the court and the
agency regarding the applicable law, we noted the distinction was really about the
“proper application [of the governing law] to the established
evidence of record.  . . .  [W]hether a business is unitary or
separate and distinct for tax purposes . . . is not solely a question
of law; rather, the issue for purposes of appellate review . . . is
governed by whether, in light of substantial evidence appearing
in the record, a reasoning mind could reasonably have reached
the conclusion reached by the Tax Court.”  
Id.  Notably, we applied the same substantial evidence test for mixed questions of law and
fact as we did for purely factual findings by the agency.
Like Ramsay, the agency determination—here, that a substantial risk of harm resulted
from respondent’s swinging of a belt buckle at a six-year old attempting to evade the
blows—was an application of law to a specific set of facts.  The ALJ’s decision was entitled
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to deferential review, that is, substantial evidence review, and the court should have
considered whether the ALJ’s application of law to the facts was fairly debatable or whether
a reasoning mind could have reached the same conclusions reached by the agency on the
record before it.  Pollock, 374 Md. at 469 n.3, 823 A.2d at 630 n.3.  
Deferential review over mixed questions of law and fact is appropriate in order for the
agency to fulfill its mandate and exercise its expertise.  Administering a child abuse statute
is the sort of action for which the expertise of agencies is well suited.  To discover whether
the corporal punishment was lawfully executed, the agency assesses the reasonableness of
the punishment not only in light of the child’s misbehavior and whether it warranted physical
punishment, but also in view of the surrounding circumstances in which the punishment took
place, including the child’s age, size, ability to understand the punishment, as well as, in the
instant case, the minor’s capacity to obey his parent’s order to stand still while being struck
by the belt.  Cf. FL § 4-501(b)(2) (“Nothing in this subtitle shall be construed to prohibit
reasonable punishment, including reasonable corporal punishment, in light of the age and
condition of the child, from being performed by a parent or stepparent of the child”
(emphasis added)).  
Although it may not have been unreasonable for respondent to use corporal
punishment, the surrounding circumstances, including respondent’s swinging of a belt buckle
at a six-year-old frantically trying to get away and out of reach by twisting, turning and
grabbing at the belt, amounted to action that could be reasonably deemed by the agency
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impermissible under the applicable law.  As Judge Deborah Eyler aptly noted in her dissent,
“[T]he problem with [the court’s] reasoning is that it put the cart before the horse.”  In other
words, the court did not consider in its calculus the totality of circumstances surrounding the
physical punishment when it decided the corporal punishment was lawful.  Instead, the
reasonableness of corporal punishment depends not simply on the misbehavior of the child
and the amount of force used in the punishment from the parent’s perspective, but also on
the physical and mental maturity of the child, and the propriety of the decision to use force
in circumstances that may increase the potential for serious injury.
These scenarios cannot be adjudicated without considering the law in view of the
applicable facts.  Because of the fact-dependent nature of such inquiries, it is more desirable
for the agency, using its expertise and scrutinizing the evidence before it, to determine
whether the risk created by the parent satisfied the child abuse statute.  Accordingly, the
agency’s application of the law must be given deference under the substantial evidence test.
Applying the substantial evidence test, this Court must assess whether a reasoning
mind could have reached the conclusion, based upon this record, that respondent’s actions
created a substantial risk of harm toward his son.  The ALJ’s considered judgment was that
the swinging of the buckle end of a belt at a six-year old who was attempting to run away did
create such a risk.  The record substantiates this finding, and it was not unreasonable.
Furthermore, the record establishes that respondent admitted causing the bruise injuries to
his son’s lower back; that respondent’s wife saw the reddish bruise marks herself after the
7Both parties agree that the definition of criminal child abuse is distinct from that of
the definition of child abuse found in the Family Law Article.  We have elsewhere
expounded on the meaning of criminal child abuse.  See, e.g., Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115,
127 (1978); Fisher and Utley v. State, 367 Md. 218, 275, 786 A.2d 706, 740 (2001);
Anderson v. State, 61 Md.App. 436, 487 A.2d 294, cert. denied, 303 Md. 295, 493 A.2d 349
(1985); see also Newby v. U.S., 797 A.2d 1233, 1242 (D.C. 2002).
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corporal punishment; that respondent continued to swing the belt at the child in spite of the
child’s frantically running around the room; and that respondent “missed the mark” of his
son’s buttocks, hitting instead the lower back with a metal buckle swung at a six-year-old
child.  The ALJ found that there existed a danger of the belt striking the eyes and teeth as
well as an unacceptable level of uncertainty in terms of the  potential for the serious injury
that is inherent in the swinging of a belt buckle at a moving target.  These concerns also were
not unreasonable, and the record supports these findings.  Therefore, the ALJ’s application
of the law to these factual findings—that the facts satisfied the requirement of a substantial
risk of harm under § 5-701 and C.O.M.A.R. 07.02.07.12—is affirmed under the substantial
evidence review applied to such agency decisions.
II.
We turn to petitioner’s arguments that FL § 5-701(b) and FL § 4-501(b) create two
separate definitions of child abuse, one for a local department’s finding of “indicated” child
abuse, FL § 5-701(b), and another for a finding of child abuse sufficient to justify the
issuance of a protective order, FL § 4-501(b)(2).7
When interpreting a statute, we look first at the plain language of the statute, with a
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goal to implement the legislative intent.  See Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 387, 835 A.2d
1221, 1226 (2003).  Ordinarily, where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, a
court’s endeavor reaches its end, and the court need only apply the statute as it reads.  Id.  
We begin with the statutory text of the statutes at issue.  FL § 4-501(b) defines abuse
as follows:
“(1) ‘Abuse’ means any of the following acts:
(i)  an act that causes serious bodily harm;
(ii)  an act that places a person eligible for relief
in fear of imminent serious bodily harm;
(iii)  assault in any degree;
(iv)  rape or sexual offense under §§ 3-303
through 3-308 of the Criminal Law Article or
attempted rape or sexual offense in any degree; or
(v)  false imprisonment.
“(2)  If the person for whom relief is sought is a child, ‘abuse’
may also include abuse of a child, as defined in Title 5, Subtitle
7 of this article. Nothing in this subtitle shall be construed to
prohibit reasonable punishment, including reasonable corporal
punishment, in light of the age and condition of the child, from
being performed by a parent or stepparent of the child.
“(3)  If the person for whom relief is sought is a vulnerable
adult, ‘abuse’ may also include abuse of a vulnerable adult, as
defined in Title 14, Subtitle 1 of this article.”
FL § 5-701(b) defines abuse as follows:
“‘Abuse’ means:
“(1) the physical or mental injury of a child by any parent or
other person who has permanent or temporary care or custody or
responsibility for supervision of a child, or by any household or
family member, under circumstances that indicate that the
child's health or welfare is harmed or at substantial risk of being
harmed; or
“(2) sexual abuse of a child, whether physical injuries are
sustained or not.”
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FL § 4-501(b) defines abuse for Title 4, Subtitle 5 of the Family Law Article, dealing with
domestic violence, whereas FL § 5-701(b) defines abuse for Title 5, Subtitle 7 of the same
article, dealing with child abuse.
The two statutes, FL § 4-501(b) and FL § 5-701(b), undoubtedly create two different
definitions of abuse within their respective subtitles.  FL § 4-501(b) reveals a three-part
definition of abuse, divided according the person who is being victimized.  Thus, one part
of that definition applies to victims in general, FL § 4-501(b)(1); another applies to children
victims, FL § 4-501(b)(2); and finally another applies to “vulnerable adults,” FL § 4-
501(b)(3).  On the other hand, FL § 5-701(b) reveals a two-part definition, divided according
to the nature of the abuse (either physical or sexual), for FL § 5-701(b) applies to children
victims alone.  Thus, a plain reading of both definitions indicates that they are two separate
and distinct definitions of abuse.
Petitioner’s argument, however, is not that there are two different definitions of the
word “abuse,” but rather that the definition of “abuse” in FL § 4-501(b)(2), which applies to
children (child abuse), evinces a completely different meaning of child abuse from the one
found in FL § 5-701(b).  We do not agree.
FL § 4-501(b)(2) adopts FL § 5-701(b)’s definition of child abuse when it defines
child abuse by reference to FL § 5-701(b):  “If the person for whom relief is sought is a child,
‘abuse’ may also include abuse of a child, as defined in Title 5, Subtitle 7 of this article [§
5-701(b)].”  Thus, FL § 4-501(b)(2) simply states that when the victim is a child, the term
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“abuse” as used in Title 4, Subtitle 5 is the same as the definition found in FL § 5-701(b).
In fact, FL § 4-501(b)(2) is  meaningless apart from FL § 5-701(b) because FL § 4-501(b)(2)
does not contain a substantive description of child abuse, only a cross reference to FL § 5-
701(b).  
Petitioner would have this Court read FL § 4-501(b)(2) to create a completely new,
substantive definition of child abuse, based principally upon its second sentence:  “Nothing
in this subtitle shall be construed to prohibit reasonable punishment, including reasonable
corporal punishment, in light of the age and condition of the child, from being performed by
a parent or stepparent of the child.”  Because similar language is not found in FL § 5-701(b),
petitioner reasons that FL § 4-501(b)(2) is a definition of child abuse that excepts from its
purview “reasonable corporal punishment,” whereas FL § 5-701(b) does not.  
The central premise of this argument is that one definition of child abuse excuses
reasonable corporal punishment whereas the other does not.  The clear implication is that FL
§ 5-701(b)(2) defines child abuse to include some forms of reasonable corporal punishment.
This is an incorrect understanding of Maryland law and of the term “child abuse.”
Reasonable corporal punishment, by definition, is not child abuse.  Therefore, in light of the
child abuse statute, there can be no definition of child abuse that includes reasonable corporal
punishment.  In short, child abuse and reasonable corporal punishment are mutually
exclusive; if the punishment is one, it cannot be the other.  Petitioner’s principal argument,
that FL § 4-501(b) is distinguishable from FL § 5-701(b) based upon the exclusion of
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reasonable corporal punishment from one and not the other, lacks merit.
Petitioner also argues that the Court of Special Appeals erred because it considered
whether the respondent’s action was reasonable corporal punishment.  To the contrary, not
only did the intermediate appellate court not err by attempting to determine whether the
corporal punishment was reasonable (albeit reaching an erroneous result, see supra, Part II),
the real error would have been to follow the position advocated by petitioner.  When a court
is deciding whether a particular parental discipline is child abuse, whether it be under CL §
3-601 or FL §§ 5-701 or 4-501, the court always determines whether the corporal punishment
was reasonable.  As we have noted, child abuse excludes by definition reasonable corporal
punishment.  In the case sub judice, the agency action was lawful.
Petitioner also argues that “it makes sense” to have two different definitions of child
abuse.  Petitioner reasons that because issuing a child protective order is different from
entering a parent’s name into a central registry, the Legislature created two definitions of
child abuse to correspond to these two distinct remedies available to the local department.
Because the institution of a child protective order (which must be issued by a court, see FL
§ 4-506) is more drastic than entering the parent’s name into a central registry, “it makes
sense” that FL § 4-501(b)(2) would carve out an exception for reasonable corporal
punishment, thereby requiring the local department to provide more justification to a court
in order to issue a more drastic order.  FL § 5-701(b)(1), on the other hand, is easier for the
local Department to fulfill because reasonable corporal punishment is no excuse under that
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definition.  Thus, the local department will have an easier time satisfying § 5-701(b)(1) and
can more easily institute the less drastic measure of entering a parent’s name in a central
registry. 
Although the idea is superficially logical—that a lesser degree of injury on a child is
required for a finding of “indicated” child abuse and a higher degree is required for the
issuing of a protective order—it defies the plain language of the statute and is foreclosed.
In any event, even were we to agree that this understanding is a viable interpretation, which
it is not, and inquire into the legislative history, that inquiry would only confirm that
petitioner is incorrect.  Petitioner contends that the legislative history indicates an intent to
create two different definitions in the Family Law Article.  Petitioner’s understanding of the
legislative history, however, is misguided.
Originally, since at least 1991, FL § 4-501(b) defined child abuse as follows:
“(b) Abuse. — (1) ‘Abuse’ means any of the following acts
committed by a household member against another household
member:
* * *
(iii) abuse of a child, as defined in Title 5, Subtitle
7 of this article; or 
* * * 
“(2) Nothing in this subtitle shall be construed to prohibit
reasonable corporal punishment, in light of the age and
condition of the child, from being performed by a parent or
stepparent of the child.”
Md. Code (1984, 1991 Repl. Vol.) § 4-501(b) of the Family Law Article (superseded).  The
key moment, according to petitioner, occurred in 1994, when the Legislature passed
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amendments to FL § 4-501.  See 1994 Laws of Maryland ch. 469, § 1, at 2250.  The amended
statute reordered these provisions as reflected in FL § 4-501(b)(2), which has remained
unchanged since the 1994 amendments:
“If the person for whom relief is sought is a child, ‘abuse’ may
also include abuse of a child, as defined in Title 5, Subtitle 7 of
this article. Nothing in this subtitle shall be construed to prohibit
reasonable 
punishment, 
including 
reasonable 
corporal
punishment, in light of the age and condition of the child, from
being performed by a parent or stepparent of the child.”
Petitioner compares the 1984 version of FL § 4-501’s definition of child abuse with
the 1994 amended version and interprets those changes as instituting an entirely new
definition of child abuse.  “At the same time [it made these changes to the statute in 1994],
the Legislature made clear that ‘abuse’ as it was now defined by FL § 5-701 would not
necessarily constitute abuse for purposes of FL 4-501(b)(1) [sic].  The amended statute
provided, as it does now, that abuse, as defined in 4-501(b)(1) [sic] ‘may also include abuse
of a child,’ as defined in FL § 5-701.”  Petitioner’s brief at 15-16 (emphasis in original)
(citation omitted).  In other words, Petitioner fashions the legislative intent to create a version
of child abuse in FL § 4-501 different from FL § 5-701 primarily through the use of the word
“may” when, for the last 10 years prior to the amendment, the definitions were the same and
notwithstanding the fact that the definition does not merely repeat but incorporates the
definition found in FL § 5-701. 
Petitioner’s interpretation of the legislative history is incorrect.  The creation of two
separate, distinct definitions of child abuse within the same article—one of which is
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constituted by a reference to the other—would be an extraordinary thing for the Legislature
to do mainly through the addition of an auxiliary verb.  In sum, there is only one definition
of child abuse in the Family Law Article, absent any statutory or legislative indication that
two were intended.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
REVERSED.
CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT
WITH DIRECTIONS TO AFFIRM THE
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR CHARLES COUNTY.  COSTS IN
THIS COURT AND THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY
RESPONDENT.