Title: Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Hanni

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Hanni, 127 Ohio St.3d 367, 2010-Ohio-5771.] 
 
 
MAHONING COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION v. HANNI. 
[Cite as Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Hanni,  
127 Ohio St.3d 367, 2010-Ohio-5771.] 
Attorneys —  Misconduct — Failure to act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing client — Engaging in conduct prejudicial to 
the administration of justice — Six-month suspension, all stayed. 
(No. 2010-1144 — Submitted September 15, 2010 — Decided  
December 2, 2010.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 09-056. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Heidi A. Hanni, last known business address in Poland, 
Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0074801, was admitted to the practice of law in 
Ohio in 2002.  Relator, Mahoning County Bar Association, filed a multiple-count 
complaint against respondent in August 2009.  The complaint alleged that 
respondent had, among other things, failed to provide prompt and diligent 
representation of a client and failed to report professional misconduct. 
{¶ 2} A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline heard testimony from respondent and four other witnesses and 
considered the matter on the stipulations submitted by relator and respondent.  
The panel recommended that respondent’s license to practice law be suspended 
for six months and that the six-month suspension be stayed.  The board accepted 
the recommendation, and neither party objected to the board’s report.  For the 
reasons that follow, we accept the board’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
and recommended sanction. 
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Misconduct 
{¶ 3} The parties stipulated to the following: 
The Plea Withdrawal 
{¶ 4} In July 2004, a motorist struck and killed a pedestrian.  The motorist 
left the scene of the fatal accident and was subsequently charged with aggravated 
vehicular homicide, a felony of the second degree. 
{¶ 5} In February 2007, the motorist-defendant executed a written plea of 
guilty pursuant to Crim.R. 11(F).  In the plea agreement, the defendant stated that 
he intended to withdraw his former plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to 
vehicular homicide, a felony in the third degree.  The plea agreement stipulated 
that a term in prison was not mandatory and that a prison term was not presumed 
to be necessary.  However, the defendant recognized that sentencing is a matter 
within the discretion of the court and that any agreement between counsel for the 
state and his attorney was merely a recommendation.  This plea agreement was 
filed with the court on March 6, 2007.  At this time, the defendant was 
represented by counsel other than respondent. 
{¶ 6} Thereafter, the defendant appeared with his original counsel and the 
assistant prosecuting attorney before the trial judge.  The judge accepted the 
defendant’s plea of guilty to the amended charge and ordered that a presentence 
investigation be prepared.  The sentencing hearing was scheduled for April 26, 
2007. 
{¶ 7} In the interim, the defendant changed his retained counsel.  He 
entered into a written fee agreement with respondent on March 23, 2007.  In the 
fee agreement, the defendant agreed “to pay a retainer fee of $5,000.00 which will 
be received by [respondent] prior to services being rendered.”  By its terms, the 
fee agreement did not include legal services for postjudgment matters, perfecting 
an appeal, or representing the defendant if an appeal was perfected by an adverse 
party. 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
{¶ 8} The defendant paid respondent $2,500 towards the $5,000 fee.  After 
reviewing the procedural posture of the matter, respondent advised the defendant 
that it would be “next to impossible” to vacate his plea this late in the proceeding.  
As a result, respondent agreed to accept only $2,500, with the remainder of the 
fee due only if the court allowed the defendant to withdraw his plea. 
{¶ 9} Prior to the sentencing hearing, respondent orally advised the judge 
that the defendant wanted to withdraw his plea of guilty.  The judge stated that the 
plea agreement reached between the state and the defendant was fair and equitable 
and that the defendant’s prior counsel had worked hard to reach the agreement.  
The judge indicated that he would not grant the request to withdraw the plea. 
{¶ 10} Apparently relying upon this discussion with the judge, respondent 
never filed a written motion to withdraw the plea.  Nor did respondent request to 
withdraw the plea at the sentencing hearing.  Proceeding with sentencing, the 
judge found that a prison term was required and sentenced the defendant to four 
years.  Respondent did not file any postsentencing motions on behalf of the 
defendant. 
{¶ 11} The parties stipulated that under Ohio law, a motion to withdraw a 
plea prior to sentencing should be freely and liberally granted by the trial court 
and that if such a motion is filed, the judge is required to conduct a hearing to 
determine whether there are reasonable and legitimate grounds for the motion.  
Consequently, respondent’s failure to request the transcript of the defendant’s 
change-of-plea hearing following the plea agreement may have hindered  her 
ability to determine whether the plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. 
{¶ 12} Thereafter, the defendant, acting pro se, filed several motions with 
the trial court.  In these motions, he generally requested to withdraw or change his 
plea and vacate his sentence.  He also asserted that he had retained respondent to 
withdraw the plea agreement because he had been confused when he entered the 
negotiated plea and did not understand the agreement because he was mentally ill.  
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All of these motions were overruled by the trial court.  An appeal from these 
judgments was dismissed. 
{¶ 13} The investigation by relator’s certified grievance committee 
determined that the $2,500 respondent charged for withdrawing a plea was not in 
violation of the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct.  Respondent’s attorney is 
holding in escrow the $2,500 paid by the defendant to respondent, and respondent 
has agreed to distribute the money to the defendant as repayment. 
The Radio Show 
{¶ 14} In January 2008, respondent appeared on a local radio program in 
the Youngstown area.  At the time, respondent was a declared candidate in the 
Democratic primary election for the office of Mahoning County Prosecutor. 
{¶ 15} During the show, respondent accused the incumbent Mahoning 
County Prosecutor of misconduct and alleged that the prosecutor and a defense 
attorney were acting unethically in a vehicular-homicide case pending before the 
Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas.  In that particular case, the defendant 
was the driver of a car that had hit a tree, resulting in the death of the passenger in 
the car.  Both the driver and the passenger were intoxicated and had cocaine in 
their blood. 
{¶ 16} The Mahoning County Grand Jury declined to return an indictment 
on the charge of aggravated vehicular homicide against the driver.  On the radio 
show, respondent implied that this result was caused by racism and case fixing.  
Unknown to respondent, the defendant-driver had testified before the Mahoning 
County Grand Jury and had also twice submitted to a polygraph examination and 
passed both times.  Further, relator was unable to discover any evidence for either 
of respondent’s allegations. 
{¶ 17} Respondent also claimed that the Mahoning County Prosecutor had 
suppressed exculpatory evidence in a different case before the Mahoning County 
Court of Common Pleas.  Respondent claimed that because the prosecutor 
January Term, 2010 
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suppressed exculpatory evidence, the defendant was wrongly imprisoned for one 
and a half years.  As a result of this allegation, the trial judge conducted an 
investigation and determined that there was no exculpatory evidence and, 
consequently, no exculpatory evidence to suppress.  Relator investigated the same 
allegations and concluded that there was no probative or reasonable evidence to 
support them. 
{¶ 18} Respondent admitted that her conduct in the plea-withdrawal case 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, which provides, “A lawyer shall act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Respondent 
also admitted that her conduct on the radio show violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d), 
which provides:  
{¶ 19} “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to do any of the 
following: 
{¶ 20} “ * * *  
{¶ 21} “ (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice.” 
{¶ 22} We accept the foregoing stipulations and find that respondent 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 and 8.4(d). 
Sanction 
{¶ 23} In determining the appropriate sanction for an attorney’s 
misconduct, we consider the aggravating and mitigating factors listed under 
Section 10(B) of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints 
and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
(“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn v. Poole, 120 Ohio St.3d 361, 
2008-Ohio-6203, 899 N.E.2d 950, ¶ 9.  “Because each disciplinary case is unique, 
we are not limited to the factors specified in the rule but may take into account 
‘all relevant factors’ in determining what sanction to impose.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 
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10(B).”  Dayton Bar Assn. v. Schram, 122 Ohio St.3d 8, 2009-Ohio-1931, 907 
N.E.2d 311, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 24} The parties stipulated to the aggravating factor that respondent has 
multiple offenses.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(d).  The parties also stipulated to 
several mitigating factors: (1) the absence of a prior disciplinary record, (2) a 
good-faith effort to make restitution or rectify consequences of misconduct, (3) 
full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board and a cooperative effort toward 
the proceedings, and (4) good character or reputation, as shown by respondent in 
letters and testimony.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (c), (d), and (e).  The parties 
stipulated to a recommended sanction of a public reprimand. 
{¶ 25} In considering the appropriate sanction, the panel noted, with 
respect to the plea-withdrawal case, that respondent acknowledged that she should 
have filed a written motion to withdraw the defendant’s guilty plea or made an 
oral motion at sentencing and that she did neither.  The panel also observed that as 
of the date of the disciplinary hearing, respondent had not yet made the restitution 
promised to the defendant. 
{¶ 26} In connection with the radio show misconduct, respondent admitted 
that she had made the alleged statements.  Respondent acknowledged that her 
remarks on the show were made "during the course of a rather heated political 
campaign” and that she had “apologized [to the defense attorney] privately and 
[was] willing to do so publicly in the event that [she was] requested to do so."  
The panel noted that respondent has apologized to both the prosecutor and 
defense attorney.  The prosecutor testified that he had no recollection of 
respondent’s apologizing to him, but he accepted the apology respondent offered 
at the hearing.  The panel also remarked that respondent could offer no evidence 
to support her claims of improper conduct, racism, or suppressed exculpatory 
evidence. 
January Term, 2010 
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{¶ 27} The panel accepted the stipulated disciplinary violations as well as 
the aggravating and mitigating factors.  However, the panel also found that the 
serious nature of the unfounded accusations made on the radio show warranted a 
more serious sanction than a public reprimand.  Because respondent allowed her 
desire for political office to override her obligation to her chosen profession, the 
panel recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for six 
months with the entire suspension stayed.  The board adopted the panel’s findings 
of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended sanction. 
{¶ 28} Based on the foregoing, we accept the board’s recommended 
sanction and suspend respondent from the practice of law for a period of six 
months with the entire six months stayed on the condition that respondent commit 
no further misconduct.  If respondent fails to comply with the condition of the 
stay, the stay will be lifted, and respondent will serve the entire six-month 
suspension.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
BROWN, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Comstock, Springer & Wilson Co., L.P.A., and David C. Comstock Jr.; 
and Green, Haines, Sgambati Co., L.P.A., and Ronald E. Slipski, for relator. 
 
Law Offices of Matthew C. Giannini, Matthew C. Giannini, and Mary 
Ann Fabrizi, for respondent. 
______________________