Title: Morgan v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
LAFONTE MORGAN,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
           Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 432, 2011 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0707015408 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
                                         Submitted: December 1, 2011 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: December 19, 2011 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 19th day of December 2011, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Lafonte Morgan, filed an appeal from 
the Superior Court’s July 27, 2011 order adopting the February 17, 2011 
report of the Superior Court Commissioner,1 which recommended that 
Morgan’s first motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court 
                                                 
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §512(b); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62. 
 
2
Criminal Rule 61 be denied.2  The plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, 
has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is 
manifest on the face of the opening brief that the appeal is without merit.3  
We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record before us reflects that, in April 2008, Morgan was 
found guilty by a Superior Court jury of a total of 12 drug and drug-related 
offenses.  He was sentenced to a total of 58 years of Level V incarceration, 
to be suspended after 13 and ½ years for probation.  This Court affirmed 
Morgan’s convictions on direct appeal.4 
 
(3) 
In his appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of his first 
postconviction motion, Morgan claims that a) the State failed to prove that 
he had any illegal drugs in his possession; b) the police did not have 
probable cause either to stop the car in which he was riding on the night of 
his arrest or to search his home; and c) his trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by failing to properly cross-examine the Medical Examiner, 
failing to introduce the statement of his co-defendant into evidence, and 
                                                 
2 Because this was Morgan’s first postconviction motion, the Commissioner requested 
that Morgan’s attorney provide an affidavit in response to Morgan’s claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(g) (2); Horne v. State, 887 A.2d 973, 975 
(Del. 2005). 
3 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
4 Morgan v. State, 962 A.2d 248 (Del. 2008). 
 
3
failing to request a jury instruction on the credibility of accomplice 
testimony.  
 
(4) 
On a motion for postconviction relief, Delaware law requires 
the Superior Court to first determine whether the procedural requirements of 
Rule 61 have been met before considering the substantive merits of the 
motion.5  Because Morgan’s first two claims were previously raised, and 
decided against him, in the proceedings leading to the judgment of 
conviction as well as his direct appeal, they are procedurally barred in this 
proceeding pursuant to Rule 61(i) (4).  Moreover, Morgan has presented no 
justification for this Court’s reconsideration of his claims under Rule 61(i) 
(4) or (5). 
 
(5) 
Morgan’s third claim is that his trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance.  In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that his counsel’s representation 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for his 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the 
outcome of the proceedings would have been different.6  Although not 
                                                 
5 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
6 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
 
4
insurmountable, the Strickland standard is highly demanding and leads to a 
strong presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable.7 
 
(6) 
Morgan specifically claims that his trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to properly cross-examine the Medical Examiner concerning the 
identity and weight of the seized drugs, failing to introduce into evidence his 
co-defendant’s statement that the drugs belonged to her, and failing to 
request a jury instruction on the credibility of accomplice testimony.  The 
record does not support Morgan’s claims.  Morgan’s defense at trial was that 
the illegal drugs did not belong to him.  Consistent with that defense, he 
stipulated at trial that illegal drugs had been seized, obviating any need to 
cross-examine the Medical Examiner on that issue.  The record further 
reflects that both the statement and the testimony of Morgan’s co-defendant 
were the same---that the illegal drugs belonged jointly to her and Morgan, 
not that they belonged to her alone.   
 
(7) 
As for Morgan’s third argument concerning a jury instruction 
on the credibility of accomplice testimony, the record reflects that, while 
Morgan’s co-defendant offered testimony concerning ownership of the drugs 
that incriminated Morgan, there also was physical evidence presented at trial 
that corroborated her testimony.  As such, this Court’s ruling in Bland v. 
                                                 
7 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990). 
 
5
State, 263 A.2d 286, 288 (Del. 1970), which requires the Superior Court to 
instruct the jury that the credibility of uncorroborated accomplice testimony 
merits special consideration, is inapplicable to this case.  For all of the above 
reasons, we conclude that all of Morgan’s ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims are without merit.     
 
(8) 
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by 
settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice