Title: DHW v. Jane Doe

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 47190 
 
In the Matter of:  John Doe I,  
A Child Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age. 
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STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND WELFARE, 
 
     Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
JANE DOE (2019-18), 
 
     Respondent-Appellant. 
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Boise, November 2019 Term 
 
Opinion Filed: December 23, 2019 
 
Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk 
 
 
Appeal from the Magistrate Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, Twin Falls County. Thomas H. Borresen, Magistrate Judge and Calvin H. 
Campbell, Magistrate Judge. 
 
Decree terminating parental rights is affirmed. 
Marilyn Paul, Twin Falls Public Defender, Twin Falls, for appellant. 
Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Twin Falls, for respondent. 
_____________________ 
 
BRODY, Justice. 
Jane Doe (“Mother”) appeals from the magistrate court’s judgment granting the Idaho 
Department of Health and Welfare’s (“the Department”) petition to terminate her parental rights 
to her son, A.V. The magistrate court concluded that the Department proved by clear and 
convincing evidence that Mother and John Doe (“Father”) neglected A.V. and that termination 
was in A.V.’s best interests. Father’s termination is the subject of a separate appeal (Dkt. No. 
47200). Mother’s main argument on appeal is that the magistrate court erred in terminating her 
parental rights because her disabilities prevented her from completing her case plan. We affirm 
the magistrate court’s decree terminating Mother’s parental rights. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A.V., the child at issue in this case, went into foster care in November 2017, when he was 
approximately two-and-a-half years old. Mother acknowledged that A.V. went into care after she 
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had left him alone in an apartment. One Department social worker testified that he met with 
Mother a few days later and talked with her about the fact that A.V. was malnourished. He 
testified that Mother indicated A.V. previously had a hiatal hernia and that he was always going 
to have a problem gaining weight. However, after a Department investigation, and having A.V. 
examined by doctors, that did not turn out to be the case.  
A.V. had been in shelter care once before from the time he was ten months old until he 
was about eighteen-months old. While in care, A.V. received physical therapy from a board-
certified pediatric physical therapist. She worked with A.V. from July 2016, until he was 
returned to his parents in October of 2016. She testified that when she first began working with 
A.V., he was approximately four to six months developmentally delayed. Additionally, she 
learned from the nurse who had worked with A.V. that he was very malnourished when he first 
went into care. However, she saw significant improvement in A.V. during the time that she 
worked with him. In October of 2016, when he returned to his parents’ care, A.V. was slightly 
delayed but, adjusting for his age and prematurity, “he looked really good.” She did not think 
that further skilled therapy was needed. At that time, A.V. weighed eighteen pounds. 
 
In November of 2017, when A.V. went into care for the second time, he weighed only 
sixteen pounds—two pounds less than he weighed when he left foster care a year before. He was 
placed with the physical therapist who had worked with him in 2016, and she became his foster 
mother. The foster mother testified that when she became his foster mother, A.V. was more than 
a year delayed, as he was at the level of a ten-month-old. She believed that, even given that A.V. 
was born prematurely, he should have weighed between twenty and twenty-five pounds. A.V. 
had very little muscle mass, was not walking, and was babbling and making sounds but not 
talking. Likewise, another Department social worker testified that when she first saw A.V. in 
November of 2017, he appeared to be the size and weight of a twelve-month-old, his overall 
development was that of an eleven or twelve-month-old, and he was not walking. She agreed that 
most children take their first step around one year old. 
In response to a question about why she thought A.V. was losing weight in the time 
period before he was placed into care in November of 2017, Mother testified that she was 
dealing with a very big loss—the death of her mother by suicide—and unfortunately she let it get 
in the way of her life and the lives of her children. She did not ask for help because she did not 
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want people feeling sorry for her. However, after A.V. was placed in foster care, she realized that 
all of this could have been avoided if she had just reached out for help.  
A Department social worker developed a case plan for Mother and Father. Both parents 
were present at the case plan meeting in which the case plans were designed. One task on each 
parent’s case plan was to attend as many of A.V.’s physical therapy, speech, and occupational 
therapy sessions as possible. The social worker testified that each parent attended only eleven out 
of forty scheduled speech and occupational therapy visits. 
Another task on each parent’s case plan was to complete a parenting class. The 
Department social worker testified that neither parent completed this task. The leader of the 
parenting class, which was known as Nurturing Parents, testified that neither parent turned in 
their homework, and neither showed for the final in-home session. She explained that the 
homework is a required part of the class because it helps parents apply what they have learned to 
their own households. She testified that throughout the class, she reminds parents that if they turn 
in the homework and attend all of the sessions, they pass, but if they do not, they fail.  
The parenting class teacher further testified that she repeatedly had to ask Mother to put 
her phone away during the class. She was not aware of Mother’s ADHD. However, all parents 
do a self-evaluation at the end of every class to tell her how well they understand the curriculum, 
and Mother repeatedly remarked that she understood the curriculum very well. Furthermore, the 
parents had eighteen weeks to complete their homework; they were not required to turn it in each 
week. The Department social worker testified that she did not know that Mother had ADHD or 
other learning problems because Mother did not make her aware of them. She also testified that 
Mother is now attending Parents as Teachers, another parenting class, and that Mother told her 
that it took her a while to get into the class because she had to be on a waiting list. She testified 
that Parents as Teachers is a one-on-one program, and agreed that it might be more effective for 
Mother.  
Mother testified that as a child, she was diagnosed with dyslexia and was often distracted 
in school. She was in special education and did not graduate from high school. She was 
distracted most of the time during the parenting class, and distracted when she tried to complete 
the homework. She testified that Nurturing Parents was not the most effective way for her to 
learn, but the Parents as Teachers class, which she began in January and was still ongoing, had 
been much more effective. Mother explained that Parents as Teachers is very hands-on and 
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involves working with everyone in the home. Mother testified that she believed that what she 
was learning in this class would be helpful in her parenting of A.V., and that she had asked 
Parents as Teachers for advice on how to parent A.V. during his visits with her. She agreed that 
she did not do that well in Nurturing Parents, but was doing things to make up for it now. She 
testified that she could have started Parents as Teachers earlier if she had known about the 
program, but she did not find out about this class until November or December. She knew she 
needed a parenting class but did not know exactly where to look for it, and she had asked her 
social worker about this. 
One of Mother’s tasks required her to complete a psychiatric evaluation and follow all 
recommendations. The Department social worker testified that Mother completed the evaluation 
but did not follow up on the recommendation for counseling, having only attended one or two 
counseling sessions. Mother acknowledged that she had not followed up with counseling, but 
testified that she had set up an appointment to discuss starting therapy sessions again. 
Mother testified she felt that it would be in A.V.’s best interests to be returned to her; she 
acknowledged that she had made serious mistakes, but argued that she had improved. She 
testified that she clearly understands A.V.’s needs, such as going to the doctor and having a good 
diet, and she is now receiving help and wants to receive help. The Department social worker 
testified, regarding the parents’ progress, “I think that the parents are making progress in regards 
to the other two children in their home and they are showing they can provide for their needs, but 
I don’t feel that they have made enough progress, given the amount of time and the amount of 
services that were provided to them, to show that they will continue to meet [A.V.]’s needs.” 
Regarding A.V.’s relationship with his parents and two sisters, the Department employee 
who supervised Mother’s visits with A.V. testified that A.V. loves seeing his sisters, and that his 
sisters are very happy to see him. Similarly, the Department social worker testified that A.V. is 
close with his sisters; he engages with them and plays with them very well. She agreed that it is 
important to promote sibling relationships and that it would be in A.V.’s best interests to 
maintain a relationship with his sisters. Additionally, she had spoken at length about that with the 
foster mother, who was selected as a permanency plan placement, and the foster mother 
indicated that she would continue to encourage A.V.’s relationships with his parents and sisters. 
She further testified that A.V. loves his parents and goes to them and gets hugs from them, but in 
her opinion, his bond with them is more that of a child with an aunt or an uncle. 
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The magistrate court issued a memorandum decision and order, determining by clear and 
convincing evidence, that the Department had established statutory grounds for termination 
under Idaho Code section 16-2002(3)(b), neglect through failure to complete a case plan, and 
under section 16-1602(31), neglect through conduct or omission of the parents. The magistrate 
court also determined that termination was in A.V.’s best interests. A final judgment and a 
decree were entered, terminating both Mother’s and Father’s parental relationship with A.V. 
Mother filed a timely notice of appeal.   
II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
A. Whether the magistrate court erred in determining that Mother neglected A.V. 
B. Whether the magistrate court erred in determining that termination of Mother’s parental 
rights was in A.V.’s best interests.  
III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Pursuant to Idaho Code section 16-2005(1), a court may terminate parental rights 
if it finds that doing so is in the best interests of the child and that at least one of 
five grounds for termination is satisfied. The trial court must find that grounds for 
terminating parental rights have been proved by clear and convincing evidence. 
The clear and convincing evidentiary standard is met when there is evidence 
indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain.  
On appeal, the appellate court does not reweigh the evidence to determine if it 
was clear and convincing. This Court will not disturb the magistrate court’s 
decision to terminate parental rights if there is substantial, competent evidence in 
the record to support the decision. Substantial, competent evidence is such 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 
This Court will indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the trial court’s 
judgment.  
Matter of Doe II, 165 Idaho 199, 202, 443 P.3d 213, 216 (2019) (citations and quotation marks 
omitted). 
IV. 
ANALYSIS 
A. The magistrate court did not err in determining that Mother neglected A.V. 
One of the five grounds for termination of parental rights in Idaho Code section 16-
2005(1) is neglect. I.C. § 16-2005(1)(b). The Idaho Code “defines several bases for neglect.” 
Matter of Doe, 165 Idaho 46, 50, 437 P.3d 922, 926 (2019). One basis for neglect arises when: 
The parent(s) has failed to comply with the court’s orders or the case plan in a 
child protective act case and: 
(i) The department has had temporary or legal custody of the child for fifteen (15) 
of the most recent twenty-two (22) months; and 
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(ii) Reunification has not been accomplished by the last day of the fifteenth month 
in which the child has been in the temporary or legal custody of the department. 
Id.; Idaho Code § 16-2002(3)(b). Another basis for neglect occurs when a child “is without 
proper parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or other care or control necessary for 
his well-being because of the conduct or omission of his parents, guardian or other custodian or 
their neglect or refusal to provide them . . . .” Idaho Code §§ 16-2002(3)(a), 16-1602(31)(a); 
Matter of Doe, 165 Idaho at 50, 437 P.3d at 926. The satisfaction of either basis for neglect is 
sufficient to support termination of parental rights. See Matter of Doe I, 164 Idaho 849, 853, 436 
P.3d 670, 674 (2019) (stating that “only one definition of neglect needs to be satisfied”). 
In this case, the magistrate court concluded that Mother had neglected A.V. under both of 
these bases. On appeal, Mother makes several statements regarding her disabilities and argues 
that the magistrate court erred in concluding that she had neglected A.V. However, Mother does 
not make clear exactly how her disabilities relate to any alleged error by the magistrate court. 
At best, a few sentences in Mother’s opening brief seem to challenge the magistrate 
court’s finding of neglect based on her “conduct or omission” under Idaho Code section 16-
1602(31). Mother states: 
In this case Mother has acknowledged that she left the child unattended and that she 
should not have done this. She did so at least in part because of her mental disabilities. 
She testified that she had been overwhelmed because she was suffering from anxiety and 
depression which was made worse by her mother’s suicide. 
First, the magistrate court did not find neglect based on Mother’s decision to leave A.V. 
alone in the apartment. Instead, it found neglect “based upon the delays shown in A.V. and his 
malnourishment” that occurred between his first and second placements in foster care. Second, 
Mother presents no authority or argument in support of the proposition that a parent’s “mental 
disabilities” provide a defense against this basis for neglect, and she does not dispute that her 
conduct or omission in this case constituted neglect. See In Interest of Doe Children, 163 Idaho 
367, 372, 413 P.3d 767, 772 (2018) (“Even in an appeal from the termination of parental rights, 
[the Court] will not consider an issue which was not supported by cogent argument and 
authority.”) (citing In re Doe, 156 Idaho 103, 109, 320 P.3d 1262, 1268 (2014)). Mother makes 
the broad statement that “[t]he child welfare system must comply with [the] ADA as well as 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act as long as it receives federal funding. Agencies may not 
discriminate on the basis of disability and must provide reasonable accommodations to 
appropriately serve parents with disabilities.” Mother fails to articulate any basis explaining how 
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the magistrate court’s decision in this case runs afoul of those requirements, and simply citing 
authority without linking it to the case at hand is not enough. It is not the Court’s job to construct 
Mother’s arguments for her. Our standard of review requires that a cogent argument be 
presented. Therefore, Mother’s argument regarding this basis for neglect is unavailing.  
 
Additionally, substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s 
conclusion that the basis for neglect had been established “based upon the delays shown in A.V. 
and his malnourishment.” A.V. lost two pounds between October of 2016, when he was returned 
to Mother and Father after his first placement in foster care, and November of 2017, when he 
was placed into foster care for the second time. The foster mother testified that when he went 
into care the second time, A.V. was more than a year delayed, had very little muscle mass, and 
was not walking or talking. Similarly, a Department social worker testified that A.V. appeared to 
be the size and weight of a twelve-month-old and his overall development was that of an eleven 
or twelve-month-old, at a time when A.V. was approximately two-and-a-half years old. Another 
Department social worker testified that after investigation, it was determined that A.V.’s 
previous hernia was not the cause of his malnourishment in November of 2017. Therefore, 
substantial evidence supports the magistrate court’s determination that A.V. had been neglected 
by his parents through their “conduct or omission” under section 16-1602(31). 
 
Finally, Mother seems to argue that her disabilities should excuse her failure to comply 
with her case plan—a basis for neglect under Idaho Code section 16-2002(3)(b). However, as 
explained above, this basis for neglect is independent of the basis for neglect through a parent’s 
“conduct or omission” under section 16-1602(31). Because the magistrate court’s conclusion 
regarding neglect under section 16-1602(31) is supported by substantial and competent evidence, 
we do not reach the merits of Mother’s argument.  
B. The magistrate court did not err in determining that termination was in A.V.’s best 
interests. 
Many factors are to be considered when determining whether termination is in the best 
interests of the child. Matter of Doe II, 165 Idaho at 204, 443 P.3d at 218. In this case, the 
magistrate court weighed the factors identified by this Court in Matter of Doe, 165 Idaho at 52, 
437 P.3d at 928, as well as several other factors that it determined to be relevant.  
On appeal, Mother argues that it was not in A.V.’s best interests to terminate her parental 
rights because A.V. “has a positive relationship with both of his parents and his two sisters,” 
noting that “[e]ven the foster mother acknowledges that it is in AV’s best interest to maintain 
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contact with both his siblings and his parents.” Mother states that “Idaho Code [section] 32-
717[1](c) includes ‘the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parent or 
parents, and his or her siblings;’ as factors to be considered in determining the best interest of a 
child.” However, this statute concerns child custody in divorce proceedings, not termination of 
parental rights proceedings. See I.C. § 32-717. Nevertheless, a child’s relationship with his 
parents and siblings is certainly a factor that the magistrate court may consider when determining 
the best interests of a child in a termination proceeding. See Matter of Doe, 164 Idaho 511, 516, 
432 P.3d 60, 65 (2018) (“The best interests analysis is an expansive analysis with ‘no set list of 
factors a court must consider’ . . . .”).   Additionally, it is undisputed that A.V. loves his sisters 
and that they enjoy spending time together. For example, the Department employee who 
supervised Mother’s visits with A.V. testified that A.V. loves seeing his sisters and they are 
really happy to see him. Likewise, a Department social worker agreed that it is important to 
promote sibling relationships and stated that A.V. is close with his sisters and engages with them 
very well. The record also shows a bond between A.V. and his parents. For example, the 
Department social worker testified that A.V. loves his parents and gets hugs from them, though 
in her opinion his relationship with them is more that of a child with an aunt or uncle. 
However, a child’s relationship with his parents and siblings is only one factor in a multi-
factor test, and Mother does not argue that it is or should be determinative or given greater 
weight. Cf., e.g., id. (stating that a parent’s ability to change his or her conduct to assume 
parental responsibilities “is only one of many [factors] that goes into the best-interests analysis”). 
Here, the magistrate court clearly considered A.V.’s bond with his sisters in its best interests 
analysis. For example, it stated that “[i]t has long been recognized that maintaining sibling 
relationship[s] is typically in the best interest of the children” and noted that, although a 
Department social worker indicated that the foster mother expressed a desire to foster A.V.’s 
relationship with his siblings, “the termination action against the parents leaves no legal way for 
them to require that such relationship be maintained.” Though the magistrate court did not 
consider A.V.’s bond with Mother and Father as an independent factor in its best interests 
analysis, it did note a Department social worker’s testimony that A.V. goes to his parents for 
hugs but she views his relationship between him and his parents as similar to a relationship with 
an aunt or uncle. After balancing this consideration and all factors that it found to be relevant, the 
magistrate court determined, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination was in A.V.’s 
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best interests. Therefore, without argument or authority showing that the magistrate court gave 
insufficient weight to A.V.’s relationship with his parents or siblings, this Court will not re-
weigh the magistrate court’s balancing of the best interests analysis factors. See In Interest of 
Doe Children, 163 Idaho at 372, 413 P.3d at 772 (“Even in an appeal from the termination of 
parental rights, [the Court] will not consider an issue which was not supported by cogent 
argument and authority.”); see also id. at 377, 413 P.3d at 777 (holding that a mother’s claim that 
terminating her parental rights would be “devastating” to the child because of the child’s strong 
bond with her “[did] not override facts demonstrating termination was in the best interests of the 
child”).  
Mother also argues that her parenting skills and relationship with A.V. will improve 
given that she is now in parenting programs that better accommodate her learning disabilities, 
and that she did not find out about these programs until December of 2018. Again, however, 
Mother provides no argument or authority showing why this consideration should have 
outweighed others in the magistrate court’s best interests analysis. See Matter of Doe, 164 Idaho 
at 516, 432 P.3d at 65 (“This Court has held on prior occasions that the lower court did not err by 
finding that a parent’s recent improvement is outweighed by the other factors of the best interests 
analysis.”). Additionally, the magistrate court recognized that Mother had made progress in her 
parenting skills in the few months before trial, but also expressed its concern that Mother did not 
recognize A.V.’s malnutrition and developmental delays during the twelve-month period 
between his first and second placements in foster care. It concluded that the evidence clearly 
established that she and Father “were simply unable to recognize the dangers” and obtain the 
care needed to alleviate those dangers. Its concern, it added, was supported by the testimony of 
Mother and Father themselves. Conversely, the magistrate court noted that A.V. made significant 
progress in foster care. For example, his weight increased to a normal level and he showed 
substantial improvement in his gross motor skills. Therefore, the magistrate court did not err in 
concluding that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in A.V.’s best interests.  
V. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, the decree of the magistrate court is affirmed. 
 
Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices BEVAN, STEGNER, and MOELLER CONCUR.