Title: Marusa v. Erie Ins. Co.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Marusa v. Erie Ins. Co., Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-1957.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-1957 
MARUSA ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. ERIE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may 
be cited as Marusa v. Erie Ins. Co., Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-1957.] 
Insurance—Motor 
vehicles—Uninsured-motorists 
coverage—Policy 
defining 
“uninsured motor vehicle” as motor vehicle whose operator “has immunity 
under the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Law” provides coverage 
for damages caused by tortfeasor who is immune under that law—Specific 
definitional language prevails over general language in policy that insurer 
will pay damages that insured is “legally entitled to recover.” 
(No. 2012-0058—Submitted January 8, 2013—Decided May 21, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 96556, 
2011-Ohio-6276. 
______________________ 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} Based on the insurance policy that Maria Marusa has with Erie 
Insurance Company, we conclude that summary judgment against her and her 
daughter was improperly granted and that their claim for uninsured-motorist 
coverage is not precluded. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} In November 2009, appellant Maria Marusa was driving her car when 
it was struck by a police cruiser driven by Officer Michael Canda.  Marusa and her 
daughter Melanie, also an appellant, were both injured in the accident.  The parties 
stipulated that the Marusas’ injuries were proximately caused by Officer Canda’s 
negligent operation of his police cruiser and that the Marusas “were not negligent 
and were not at fault for causing the collision.” 
{¶ 3} The Marusas filed suit against appellee, Erie Insurance Company, 
seeking damages to compensate for, among other claims, medical expenses and pain 
and suffering.  The parties have stipulated that “Officer Canda and his employer are 
immune from suit under the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act” and that 
“Officer Canda qualifies as an ‘uninsured motorist’ under the terms” of the insurance 
policy that Maria Marusa has with Erie Insurance.  In its answer, Erie Insurance 
claimed that it was not obligated to pay damages because even though the policy 
includes uninsured-motorist coverage and Officer Canda is an uninsured motorist, 
the Marusas were not “legally entitled to recover,” citing Snyder v. Am. Fam. Ins. 
Co., 114 Ohio St.3d 239, 2007-Ohio-4004, 871 N.E.2d 574. 
{¶ 4} Erie Insurance moved for summary judgment.  The trial court granted 
the motion, stating that the Marusas are “precluded from recovery under the terms of 
the Policy.”  The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Snyder controls.  Marusa 
v. Erie Ins. Co., 8th Dist. No. 96556, 2011-Ohio-6276. 
{¶ 5} We granted the Marusas’ discretionary appeal.  131 Ohio St.3d 1552, 
2012-Ohio-2263, 967 N.E.2d 764. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
{¶ 6} The issue in this case is whether the trial court properly granted 
summary judgment for Erie Insurance and against Marusa. 
A.  Standard of Review 
{¶ 7} Our review of cases involving a grant of summary judgment is de 
novo.  Bonacorsi v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co., 95 Ohio St.3d 314, 2002-Ohio-
January Term, 2013 
3 
 
2220, 767 N.E.2d 707, ¶ 24.  Summary judgment may be granted only when (1) 
there is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law, and (3) viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the 
nonmoving party, reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that 
conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party.  M.H. v. Cuyahoga Falls, 134 Ohio 
St.3d 65, 2012-Ohio-5336, 979 N.E.2d 1261, at ¶ 12. 
B.  Interpreting Insurance Contracts 
{¶ 8} “The meaning of a contract is to be gathered from a consideration of 
all its parts, and no provision is to be wholly disregarded as inconsistent with other 
provisions unless no other reasonable construction is possible.”  German Fire Ins. 
Co. v. Roost, 55 Ohio St. 581, 45 N.E. 1092 (1897), paragraph one of the syllabus.  
The intent of the parties is presumed to be reflected in the language used in the 
policy.  Kelly v. Med. Life Ins. Co., 31 Ohio St.3d 130, 509 N.E.2d 411 (1987), 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  Because the cause before us involves the 
interpretation of an insurance contract, any ambiguities will be construed strictly 
against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured.  Dominish v. Nationwide Ins. 
Co., 129 Ohio St.3d 466, 2011-Ohio-4102, 953 N.E.2d 820, at ¶ 7.  See Buckeye 
Union Ins. Co. v. Price, 39 Ohio St.2d 95, 99, 313 N.E.2d 844 (1974). 
{¶ 9} Fortunately, the long and tortured history of this court’s jurisprudence 
regarding uninsured/underinsured-motorist (“UM”) insurance coverage need not be 
retold for us to resolve the case before us.  This case is novel, based on the language 
contained in Erie Insurance’s contract, and recourse to precedent other than Snyder is 
unnecessary. 
C.  Snyder and This Insurance Contract 
{¶ 10} In Snyder, this court stated that “a policy provision limiting the 
insured’s recovery of uninsured- or underinsured-motorist benefits to amounts which 
the insured is ‘legally entitled to recover’ is enforceable, and its effect will be to 
preclude recovery when the tortfeasor is immune under R.C. Chapter 2744.”  114 
Ohio St.3d 239, 2007-Ohio-4004, 871 N.E.2d 574, at ¶ 29.  The court also stated that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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“[o]ur ruling here, of course, does not prevent insurers from responding to consumer 
demand by offering uninsured-motorist coverage without precluding recovery 
because of a tortfeasor’s immunity.”  Id. at ¶ 33.  The UM endorsement in this case 
does just that. 
{¶ 11} The UM endorsement provides that “Uninsured motor vehicle” 
includes a motor vehicle whose owner or operator “has immunity under the Ohio 
Political Subdivision Tort Liability Law [OPSTLL].”  But Erie Insurance claims that 
language elsewhere in the endorsement that Erie will pay damages that the insured is 
“legally entitled to recover” makes Snyder dispositive, as that phrase mirrors the 
language relied upon in Snyder to preclude coverage.  We do not agree.  We 
conclude that the language of the definitional provision controls, and it plainly and 
unambiguously provides UM coverage when an insured is injured by an owner or 
operator who is immune under the OPSTLL. 
{¶ 12} The critical distinction between Snyder and this case is that in Snyder, 
the plaintiff relied on a statutory definition of “uninsured motor vehicle.”  Here, 
Marusa is not constrained by a statutory definition.  This court’s decision, therefore, 
is not controlled by Snyder.  Twice at oral argument, Erie Insurance stated that it 
included the definitional provision because consumers would otherwise not know 
what an uninsured motorist is.  It is interesting that Erie Insurance did not consider it 
necessary or advisable to similarly define “legally entitled to recover” to ensure that 
consumers would be aware of the potential impact of the Snyder decision. 
{¶ 13} Given our conclusion concerning the definition of “uninsured motor 
vehicle” contained in this insurance contract, we cannot conclude, as the Snyder 
court did when confronted with language from outside the insurance contract, that 
the phrase “legally entitled to recover” precludes uninsured-motorist coverage when 
the owner or operator is immune under the OPSTLL.  Two courts of appeals have 
recently reached the same conclusion.  See Thom v. Perkins Twp., 6th Dist. No. E-
10-069, 2012-Ohio-1568, 2012 WL 1154578; Payton v. Peskins, 12th Dist. No. 
CA2010-10-022, 2011-Ohio-3905, 2011 WL 3433027.  To give effect to the policy 
January Term, 2013 
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definition of an “uninsured motor vehicle,” it is necessary to consider it an exception 
to the limiting phrase “legally entitled to recover,” which the Snyder court foresaw as 
a possibility.  114 Ohio St.3d 239, 2007-Ohio-4004, 871 N.E.2d 574, at ¶ 33. 
{¶ 14} Furthermore, the definitional provision is specific and the “legally 
entitled to recover” provision is general.  When faced with provisions that are 
arguably in conflict, we apply the more specific provision.  Troyer v. Janis, 132 Ohio 
St.3d 229, 2012-Ohio-2406, 971 N.E.2d 862, ¶ 15.  See Mut. Life Ins. Co. of New 
York v. Hill, 193 U.S. 551, 558, 24 S.Ct. 538, 48 L.Ed. 788 (1904). 
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 15} The trial court granted Erie’s motion for summary judgment.  We 
conclude that the motion was improperly granted.  The definitional provision at issue 
operates to expand UM coverage, not to limit or preclude it.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that summary judgment should have been denied to Erie Insurance. 
{¶ 16} Marusa also moved for summary judgment on the issue whether the 
policy provides UM coverage, which the trial court denied.  Having concluded that 
neither Snyder nor the insurance contract precludes UM coverage, we remand the 
cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’NEILL, J., concurs. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER, J., concur in judgment and concur 
separately. 
O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, and FRENCH, JJ., dissent and would hold that Snyder 
v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 114 Ohio St.3d 239, 2007-Ohio-4004, 871 N.E.2d 574, 
controls. 
____________________ 
LANZINGER, J., concurring. 
{¶ 17} I concur in judgment only for reasons expressed in my dissent in 
Snyder v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 114 Ohio St.3d 239, 2007-Ohio-4004, 871 N.E.2d 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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574.  As Judge Stewart remarked in her dissent to the application of Snyder in this 
case,  
 
The broader principle at issue here, and the one that apparently 
troubles the majority, too, is the prospect that an insured who 
specifically pays for UM coverage could be denied that coverage 
simply because the tortfeasor happened to be immune from liability, 
despite being fully at fault as is the case here. UM coverage is 
designed just for these types of situations, yet court decisions have 
effectively denied a significant number of people insurance coverage 
that they pay for, and think that they have, but do not. This is an 
intolerable state of the law and one I hope is quickly rectified. 
 
Marusa v. Erie Ins. Co., 8th Dist. No. 96556, 2011-Ohio-6276, ¶ 25 (Stewart, P.J., 
dissenting). 
{¶ 18} Erie’s policy provides that “[u]ninsured motor vehicle” means a 
motor vehicle “for which the owner or operator of the ‘motor vehicle’ has immunity 
under the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Law or a diplomatic immunity.” 
{¶ 19} And it also provides: 
 
OUR PROMISE 
“We” will pay damages for bodily injury that “anyone we 
protect” or the legal representative of “anyone we protect” are legally 
entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an “uninsured motor 
vehicle” or “underinsured motor vehicle.” 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 20} The majority opinion holds that Erie’s specific definition of 
“uninsured motor vehicle” trumps the broader “legally entitled to recover” language. 
January Term, 2013 
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This is one way to hold Erie to its coverage promise.  But in Snyder this court held 
that use of the language “legally entitled to recover” excludes recovery of uninsured-
motorists benefits when the tortfeasor is immune under R.C. Chapter 2744.  Id. at 
¶ 24 and 29.  I would forthrightly overrule Snyder rather than simply distinguish it as 
a case premised on the statutory definition of “uninsured motor vehicle” rather than 
the policy definition. 
{¶ 21} By amending R.C. 3937.18(A) in 2001 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 97, the 
General Assembly made clear that insurers were no longer obligated to offer 
uninsured- and underinsured-motorist coverage as part of a motor-vehicle liability 
policy.  149 Ohio Laws, Part I, 779, 779-780.  In addition, insurers who now choose 
to offer UM/UIM coverage within a policy are granted the freedom to limit or 
exclude UM/UIM coverage under “specified circumstances.” R.C. 3937.18(I).  That 
section, however, says nothing about modifying statutory definitions. By considering 
the term “legally entitled to recover” as a “specified circumstance” under R.C. 
3937.18(I), Snyder allowed an insurance contract containing this language to 
invalidate R.C. 3937.18(B)(5)’s definition of “uninsured motorist.” 
{¶ 22} Although R.C. 3937.18 no longer contains the term “legally entitled 
to recover,” the idea remains that a plaintiff injured by an uninsured motorist must 
still prove the elements of the claim: 
 
With respect to the uninsured motorist coverage, underinsured 
motorist coverage, or both uninsured and underinsured motorist 
coverages included in a policy of insurance, an insured shall be 
required to prove all elements of the insured’s claim that are 
necessary to recover from the owner or operator of the uninsured or 
underinsured motor vehicle. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  R.C. 3937.18(D); compare 1997 amendment to R.C. 3937.18(A), 
1997 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 261, 147 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2372, 2373 (“legally entitled to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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recover” means that the insured is able to prove the elements of the claim for 
damages from the tortfeasor). 
{¶ 23} I would hold that a policy that defines an uninsured motor vehicle as a 
vehicle owned or operated by one with political-subdivision immunity does not 
exclude the promise of UM/UIM insurance coverage by using the term “legally 
entitled to recover”  in the insuring clause.  I do not believe that we can continue to 
hold that these words effectively demolish the UM/UIM protection that the insured 
expects to receive in such a policy. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
____________________ 
Caravona & Berg, L.L.C., Donald E. Caravona, and Aaron P. Berg, for 
appellants. 
Hanna, Campbell & Powell, L.L.P., Robert L. Tucker, John R. Chlysta, and 
Emily R. Yoder, for appellee. 
________________________