Title: Linhart v. Lawson

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
FRANCIS LINHART, JR. 
 
v.  Record No. 000291     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
January 12, 2001 
THOMAS LAWSON, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
Junius P. Fulton, III, Judge 
 
Francis Linhart, Jr., was injured when the vehicle he was 
driving was struck by a school bus driven by Thomas Lawson, an 
employee of the School Board of the City of Norfolk (School 
Board).  Linhart filed a motion for judgment against Lawson 
and the School Board alleging that Lawson's negligence 
resulted in Linhart's injuries.  Lawson and the School Board 
filed special pleas in bar asserting the defense of sovereign 
immunity.  The trial court granted those pleas and dismissed 
Linhart's motion for judgment, holding that Lawson was 
entitled to sovereign immunity for acts of simple negligence 
under the standard set out in Messina v. Burden, 228 Va. 301, 
321 S.E.2d 657 (1984), and that, because the School Board's 
liability "is entirely dependent upon, and derived from" 
Lawson's negligence, the motion for judgment failed because it 
did not allege gross negligence against both the School Board 
and Lawson. 
 
Linhart appeals the judgment of the trial court, 
asserting (1) that the School Board's immunity was abrogated 
by Code § 22.1-194 under the circumstances of this case and 
(2) that Lawson was not entitled to immunity because Code 
§ 22.1-194 also abrogated Lawson's immunity, or, 
alternatively, Lawson was not entitled to immunity under the 
holding in Messina v. Burden.  For the reasons that follow, we 
conclude that the trial court erred in sustaining the School 
Board's plea of sovereign immunity but correctly held that 
Lawson was entitled to immunity for acts of simple negligence. 
I.  Immunity of the School Board 
Linhart first argues that pursuant to Code § 22.1-194, 
the School Board is not entitled to the defense of sovereign 
immunity under the circumstances of this case.  That section 
provides, in pertinent part, that if a school board 
is the owner, or operator through medium of a 
driver, of, or otherwise is the insured under the 
policy upon, a vehicle involved in an accident, the 
. . . school board shall be subject to action up to, 
but not beyond, the limits of valid and collectible 
insurance in force to cover the injury complained of 
or, [if self-insured under] § 22.1-190, up to but 
not beyond the amounts of insurance required under 
subsection A of § 22.1-190 and the defense of 
governmental immunity shall not be a bar to action 
or recovery. . . . The . . . school board may be 
sued alone or jointly with the driver, provided that 
in no case shall any member of a school board be 
liable personally in the capacity of a school board 
member solely. 
 
We have held that this statute abrogates the immunity of a 
school board for acts of simple negligence "to a limited 
degree" and when the conditions of the statute are met, the 
 
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defense of sovereign immunity will "not bar an action . . . 
for recovery of damages in an amount up to the limits of the 
insurance policy."  Wagoner v. Benson, 256 Va. 260, 262-64, 
505 S.E.2d 188, 188-90 (1998).  At the time of the accident in 
this case, the School Board was self-insured in the amount of 
at least $50,000 for injury to one person pursuant to Code 
§ 22.1-190.  Therefore, the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
does not bar this action against the School Board to the 
extent of the limits of the School Board's self-insurance. 
 
The School Board argues, however, that the trial court 
nevertheless was correct in dismissing the motion for judgment 
against the School Board.  Any liability it may have is solely 
vicarious liability, the School Board argues, and, under 
common law principles, the standard of liability applied to 
Lawson and the School Board must be the same.  Because Lawson 
can only be liable for acts of gross negligence, the School 
Board argues that it too can only be liable for gross 
negligence.  Therefore, the School Board concludes, the trial 
court correctly dismissed the motion for judgment because the 
motion did not allege gross negligence against the School 
Board or Lawson.  We disagree. 
The common law principle that the liabilities of 
principals and agents are coterminous is not applicable when 
altered by the General Assembly.  Schwartz v. Brownlee, 253 
 
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Va. 159, 166, 482 S.E.2d 827, 831 (1997).  In Schwartz, we 
considered Code § 8.01-581.15, which imposes a cap on medical 
malpractice recovery but limits the cap to health care 
providers.  Therefore, even though the employer's liability 
was predicated on the acts of its employee, a health care 
provider, the non-health care employer was not entitled to the 
limitation of the cap.  Code § 8.01-581 abrogated the common 
law principle that the liabilities of agent and principal are 
coterminous.  Id. at 166-67, 482 S.E.2d at 831-32. 
In this case, as we have said, Code § 22.1-194 subjects 
the School Board to limited liability for injuries incurred 
through the acts of its employee school bus drivers.  The 
statute does not require that the school board and its 
employee be sued jointly and in fact allows a plaintiff to 
proceed solely against a school board.  As in Schwartz, we 
conclude that, in enacting Code § 22.1-194, the General 
Assembly created an exception to the common law principle 
recited above and imposed liability on a school board for 
simple negligence, even if its employee is liable only for 
acts of gross negligence.  Therefore, the trial court erred in 
dismissing Linhart's motion for judgment against the School 
Board for failure to plead gross negligence. 
II.  Immunity of Bus Driver 
 
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Linhart argues that Lawson was not immune from liability 
for acts of simple negligence because, in addition to 
abrogating the immunity of the School Board, Code § 22.1-194 
also abrogated the immunity of Lawson, the School Board's 
employee.*  Linhart bases his position on the statutory 
language which provides that the school board may be sued 
alone "or jointly with the driver" and on the fact that the 
only exception to personal liability set out in the statute 
relates to that of a school board member in his official 
capacity.  We disagree with Linhart. 
Abrogation of the common law requires that the General 
Assembly plainly manifest an intent to do so.  Schwartz, 253 
Va. at 166, 482 S.E.2d at 831.  Nothing in Code § 22.1-194 
clearly and unambiguously removes the common law protection of 
sovereign immunity from bus drivers employed by school boards.  
Governmental employees have always been subject to suit for 
                     
* Relying on Wynn v. Gandy, 170 Va. 590, 197 S.E. 527 
(1938), Linhart also argues that school board employees, 
specifically school bus drivers, had no common law immunity at 
the time the predecessor to Code § 22.1-194 was enacted in 
1944 and therefore the enactment of that section had no effect 
on the immunity of school bus drivers.  Regardless of a school 
bus driver's status in 1944, the common law immunity of school 
board employees, which includes bus drivers, has been 
recognized.  See Stanfield v. Peregoy, 245 Va. 339, 345, 429 
S.E.2d 11, 14 (1993)(distinguishing "simple operation" of a 
school bus in Wynn from the "governmental duty of transporting 
children"); see also Lentz v. Morris, 236 Va. 78, 372 S.E.2d 
608 (1988)(high school teacher); Banks v. Sellers, 224 Va. 
 
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gross negligence and thus the language in the statute 
authorizing a suit against employee and school board jointly 
does no more than recognize that such an employee is amenable 
to suit.  Without more, the language of the statute is 
insufficient to convey a plainly manifest intent to abrogate a 
governmental employee's immunity for acts of simple 
negligence. 
We are cognizant of the fact that in enacting the 
Virginia Tort Claims Act, Code §§ 8.01-195.1 to -195.9, the 
General Assembly included language specifically preserving the 
immunity of governmental employees.  Code § 8.01-195.3.  We do 
not believe that the failure to use similar language in Code 
§ 22.1-194 requires the conclusion that the immunity of the 
school bus driver was not preserved.  An affirmative statement 
of immunity reinforces a legislative intent not to abrogate 
such immunity.  However, such language does not impose an 
additional condition that immunity is abrogated in the absence 
of an affirmative statement preserving such immunity.  
In light of this holding, the question next arises 
whether the legislation effectively precludes school bus 
drivers from claiming the protection of sovereign immunity 
when the school board employer is not entitled to claim 
                                                                
168, 294 S.E.2d 862 (1982)(school superintendent and 
principal).  
 
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governmental immunity under the specific circumstances 
detailed in the statute.  As Linhart notes, in both Messina v. 
Burden and James v. Jane, 221 Va. 43, 282 S.E.2d 864 (1980), 
we stated that, an individual claiming sovereign immunity must 
be employed by an immune governmental entity.  Messina, 228 
Va. at 312, 321 S.E.2d at 663; James v. Jane, 221 Va. at 51, 
282 S.E.2d at 868.  However, we conclude that neither our 
prior decisions nor the enactment of Code § 22.1-194 requires 
the result advocated by Linhart. 
 As a general matter, school boards are immune 
governmental entities.  Kellam v. Sch. Bd. of the City of 
Norfolk, 202 Va. 252, 256, 117 S.E.2d 96, 98-99 (1960).  The 
limited abrogation of this immunity in the specific 
circumstances described in Code § 22.1-194 does not affect the 
general status of a school board as a governmental entity 
entitled to the immunity of the sovereign.  Applying the tests 
enunciated in Messina v. Burden and James v. Jane to preclude 
Lawson's immunity because the School Board is not an "immune 
governmental entity" under Code § 22.1-194 would be 
inconsistent with our determination that Code § 22.1-194 does 
not abrogate an employee bus driver's immunity.  Furthermore, 
such a conclusion would effectively abrogate the employee's 
immunity by implication, a result that we have rejected.  See 
Schwartz, 253 Va. at 166, 482 S.E.2d at 831. 
 
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Finally, Linhart argues that the trial court erred in its 
application of the four-part test set out for employee 
immunity recited in Messina v. Burden.  Again we disagree.  As 
the trial court observed, the transportation of children in a 
school bus is a governmental function in which the government 
has a substantial interest and over which the government 
exercises significant control as reflected in the regulations 
issued regarding the qualifications for and requirements of 
the job.  Furthermore, the act complained of, transporting 
school children, involved discretion and judgment.  Cf. 
Stanfield v. Peregoy, 245 Va. 339, 344-45, 429 S.E.2d 11, 14 
(1993).  Accordingly, we reject Linhart's challenge to the 
trial court's determination that Lawson was entitled to 
immunity for acts of simple negligence under the standards set 
out in Messina v. Burden.   
III.  Conclusion 
In summary, we conclude that the trial court erred in 
sustaining the School Board's plea of sovereign immunity 
because Code § 22.1-194 subjects a school board to suit for 
acts of simple negligence under the limited circumstances 
outlined by that statute.  The trial court correctly concluded 
that Lawson's immunity from liability for his acts of simple 
negligence was not abrogated by Code § 22.1-194.  Finally, the 
trial court did not err in concluding that under the standards 
 
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set out in Messina v. Burden and James v. Jane, Lawson was 
entitled to immunity for his acts of simple negligence.  
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial court 
sustaining the School Board's plea of sovereign immunity and 
remand the case for further proceedings against the School 
Board.  We will affirm the judgment of the trial court 
sustaining Lawson's plea of sovereign immunity. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
      and remanded.
 
 
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