Title: Urich v. Fox

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Urich v. Fox1984 WY 98687 P.2d 893Case Number: 84-30Decided: 09/14/1984MARK URICH, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

ABRAHAM H. FOX, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Supreme Court of Wyoming
MARK URICH, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT), 

v. 

ABRAHAM H. FOX, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Paul T. Liamos, Jr., 
J.

 
 
Sheila J. Barton 
and Martin J. McClain, (argued), Cheyenne, for appellant.

George A. Zunker 
and Carole Shotwell (argued) of Urbigkit, Whitehead, Zunker & Davidson, 
P.C., Cheyenne, 
for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN, and CARDINE, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This case, a suit upon 
three promissory notes, was set for trial upon five days notice. A request for 
continuance was denied. The trial was held as scheduled with neither appellant 
nor his counsel being present. This appeal is from the judgment entered 
following the trial.

[¶2.]     Appellant states the 
issues as:

"1. Whether the trial 
judge abused his discretion by denying Appellant's motion for a continuance when 
the Appellant had only five days notice of the trial setting and his expert 
witness was unavailable to testify because he had been subpoenaed in another 
case set for trial on the same date in Denver, Colorado.

"2. Whether a district 
court can conduct a trial and render a final decision on the merits in the 
absence of the defendant and/or his attorney."

Appellee raises 
an additional issue:

"Was Appellant, acting 
pro se, entitled to special considerations, such as longer periods for notice, 
merely because of his pro se status?"

[¶3.]     Appellee commenced this 
action in August 1983 by filing his complaint. Appellant answered pro se and 
thereafter answered interrogatories and responded to a request for admissions. 
By order, dated December 5, 1983, the case was assigned to the Honorable P.T. 
Liamos, Jr. and set for nonjury trial on Tuesday, December 20, 1983. Appellant 
was notified of his trial date on Thursday, December 15, 1983, five days before 
the trial was to begin. Prior to receiving notice of the trial setting, he had 
contacted a Wyoming attorney who agreed to review the case 
in anticipation of representing him. However, upon learning of the trial date, 
this attorney informed appellant that he would be unable to represent him 
because of the time constraints. Appellant's handwriting expert was under 
subpoena to testify in another case in Denver, Colorado on December 20 and was, therefore, 
unavailable to testify at appellant's trial.

[¶4.]     A second Wyoming attorney made an 
appearance prior to the commencement of appellant's trial asking for a 
continuance of the case until the January docket schedule. This motion was 
denied. Appellant's attorney asked to be excused since he was not prepared to 
try the case. The judge then heard the case without appellant or appellant's 
attorney, rendering a judgment in appellee's favor.

[¶5.]     Rule 7, Uniform Rules 
for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming, states:

"Cases shall not be 
continued upon stipulation of counsel alone, but such continuances may be 
allowed by order of court. No such continuance shall be allowed except for good 
cause shown."

[¶6.]     The trial court has the 
discretion to grant or deny a continuance. Craver v. Craver, Wyo., 601 P.2d 999 
(1979). Matters which are left to the sound discretion of the trial court will 
not be disturbed on appeal without a demonstrated abuse of discretion. Bacon v. Carey Co., Wyo., 669 P.2d 533 
(1983).

"To find an abuse of 
discretion, the refusal must be so arbitrary as to deny appellant due process, 
and the burden rests upon appellant to prove actual prejudice and a violation of 
his rights." Cates v. Eddy, 
Wyo., 669 P.2d 912, 916 
(1983).

On review we 
look at the peculiar circumstances of each case and the reasons which were 
presented to the trial judge at the time of the request. Cates v. Eddy, 
supra.

"`A court does not abuse 
its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law 
committed by the court under the circumstances.'" Randolph v. Hays, Wyo., 665 P.2d 500, 504 (1983) (quoting Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 
(1980)).

We have stated 
that

"* * * the trial court 
may deny a continuance if the problem which gives rise to the request for a 
continuance is the fault of the party moving for the continuance." Craver v. Craver, supra, 601 P.2d  at 
1000. See, Holly Sugar Corp. v. 
Perez, Wyo., 
508 P.2d 595 (1973).

In Bacon v. Carey, supra, the appellant had 
either fired his attorney or made it impossible for him to work on the case. The 
judge stated he would allow the withdrawal but that he would not grant a 
continuance. The denial of a continuance was held not an abuse of discretion 
because the situation was the fault of the party and resulted from difficulties 
he had with his attorney.

[¶7.]     In Cates v. Eddy, supra, appellant agreed 
to the withdrawal of his attorney, then sought a continuance. The pretrial 
conference had been held on April 30, 1982; the case was then set for trial 
October 4, 1982. The motion for continuance was denied. We stated that we would 
not interfere absent a clear abuse of judicial discretion.

[¶8.]     In Sapp v. Wong, 62 Haw. 34, 609 P.2d 137 
(1980), a continuance was requested because an indispensable witness was not 
available to testify. The court stated, first, that the circumstances did not 
suggest that the movants for the continuance merely sought a general delay and, 
second, that the continuance would not have been prejudicial to or inconvenience 
the appellees. Therefore, the trial court's failure to grant the continuance was 
prejudicial to appellants since they did not have a reasonable opportunity to 
try the case on the merits. In State v. 
Jones, 226 Kan. 503, 601 P.2d 1135 (1979), a witness 
failed to appear for trial. The court stated that appellant had made a showing 
of due diligence to procure the witness and therefore, the court's action in not 
granting a continuance was an abuse of discretion and prejudicial error under 
the circumstances. Winkelman v. 
Allen, 214 Kan. 22, 519 P.2d 1377 (1974), involved an 
expert witness who could not be present because adverse weather conditions had 
made travel impossible. The court stated that a denial of a continuance was an 
abuse of discretion under the circumstances. In Yates v. Superior Court In and For Pima 
County, 120 Ariz. 436, 586 P.2d 997 (1978), a trial court 
denied a continuance which was requested because the expert witness was 
unavailable. The inconvenience which was caused by the delay was held to be 
overshadowed by the fact that the petitioner would be foreclosed from having his 
claim considered on the merits. It was held that the trial court acted 
arbitrarily in refusing a continuance when a witness was seriously ill and 
unable to testify. Schwarz v. Ulmer, 
149 Colo. 
601, 370 P.2d 889 (1962). First Nat'l 
Bank and Trust Co. of El Dorado v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 231 Kan. 431, 646 P.2d 1057 (1982), held that the trial court abused its discretion in requiring 
trial fifteen days after the issues were joined and before discovery was 
completed. In those circumstances, the refusal to grant a continuance was 
reversible error.

[¶9.]     In the present case 
appellant was notified of the trial setting five days before the trial date. 
This period encompassed a weekend and was during the holiday season. Appellant's 
expert witness was unavailable for trial because of a previous trial commitment. 
In response to the motion for a continuance made by appellant's counsel, the 
court stated:

"Well, the court notes 
that the matter was filed on August 23 of this year and that personal service 
was obtained on the defendant on the 24th day of August, serving him in Laramie 
County, and that by an answer signed by the defendant, as pro se, the defendant 
has admitted paragraph one and specifically denied the rest of the paragraphs, 
and affirmatively stated that there was no consideration for the notes, those 
notes are not genuine, not obligations of the defendant, and the notes were 
usurious and void. Also enclosed and attached to the file is a letter from the 
office of Michael A. Littman. It was signed by Julie Hunter, secretary for 
Michael Littman, wherein the signed answer was enclosed. There is the additional 
sentence, `If there are any questions, please feel free to call us' - so I 
assume by that that the defendant was represented by Colorado counsel who 
actually prepared the answer for him.

"And I would assume that 
that counsel and the defendant in the request for admissions received copies of 
the notes sued upon, that the defendant, probably with the aid of counsel, 
responded to requests for admissions, admitted apparently one note and denied 
the other two, and also answered the interrogatories, showing to the court that 
the defendant knows what he's being sued for and knows what his defense 
is.

"I noted that the 
certificate of mailing of the answer to interrogatories was signed by Julie 
Hunter, the person who signed the letter as the secretary to Mr. Littman, but no 
appearance in this matter was made by any attorney authorized to practice law in 
Wyoming.

"This has all the 
earmarks of a stall to the court, and I'm not going to allow 
it.

"I'm going to deny the 
motion for a continuance.

"The defendant has had 
ample time to get a Wyoming attorney to make an appearance for 
him. He's had ample time to do any discovery he wanted to 
do."

It would seem 
that the court denied a continuance because the appellant, while appearing pro 
se, may have sought the advice of an attorney before contacting a Wyoming attorney to 
appear in court. But that was not a cause of his being unable to defend or 
proceed with the trial. It was undisputed that appellant's expert was unable to 
be present at the trial through no fault of appellant.

[¶10.]  Rule 5, Uniform Rules for the District 
Courts of the State of Wyoming, states:

"All contested civil 
nonjury cases shall be set for trial on the merits upon reasonable notice to counsel of 
record, at times to be designated by the court or by agreement of counsel at any 
convenient time." (Emphasis added.)

Rule 6(d), 
W.R.C.P.1, requires five days notice for 
hearing motions and an additional three days if the motion is served by mail per 
Rule 6(e), W.R.C.P.2

[¶11.]  Rule 3, Uniform Rules for the District 
Courts of the State of Wyoming,3 defines reasonable notice for the 
taking of depositions as five days, subject to an order either enlarging or 
shortening the time. Rule 56(c), W.R.C.P.4, mandates that a motion for summary 
judgment shall be served at least ten days before the time fixed for the 
hearing. Preparation for trial is far more complex and difficult than 
preparation for a summary judgment hearing or the taking of a deposition. Final 
preparation for trial requires putting the entire case together which includes, 
among other things, assembling and establishing an order for introduction of 
exhibits, interviewing and arranging for attendance of witnesses, time for their 
appearance and order of testifying. It involves opening statement, preparation 
of law to support or oppose objections, foundation for exhibits and final 
argument. The conclusion is inescapable that if five days notice is required for 
hearing motions or taking depositions and ten days notice for a summary 
judgment, some larger period of notice is appropriate for trial. We hold, 
therefore, that, under these circumstances, five days notice of trial is 
presumptively not reasonable notice. This is not to say that a trial setting 
upon five days notice will never be sufficient. In some circumstances, when both 
parties are prepared, their witnesses are available, and the short time to trial 
will not work a hardship in presentation or result in injustice, five days 
notice may be adequate. However, in situations, such as this, where the short 
period of time prevented appellant from having the testimony of his expert 
witness and presenting his case on the merits, we find that five days notice was 
per se unreasonable, and it was an abuse of discretion to refuse a continuance 
when it was requested.

[¶12.]  Appellee contends that appellant was not 
entitled to greater notice because of his pro se status.

"We recognize that a 
party should not benefit from his failure to employ counsel, and it is not the 
function of the court to supervise laymen in the practice of law. However, the 
layman should not be penalized for appearing pro se." Suchta v. O.K. Rubber Welders, Inc., 
Wyo., 386 P.2d 931, 933 (1963).

We have not 
determined this case on the basis of appellant's pro se status. Whether or not 
appellant had the advice of an attorney and whether or not he had retained an 
attorney or was acting pro se are not material to the issue involved. He was 
given just five days notice of the trial setting. His expert witness was unable, 
because of a prior trial commitment, to appear on that date. The witness was, 
thus, unable to testify; and appellant was, therefore, prejudiced, and, through 
no fault of his own, prevented from trying the case on its merits. It is 
immaterial that he acted pro se. While we do not grant pro se litigants special 
status, neither do we punish them for acting without an 
attorney.

[¶13.]  Our disposition on this issue makes it 
unnecessary to decide whether or not the trial court properly proceeded to 
determine the merits of the case without the presence of appellant or his 
attorney.

[¶14.]  The judgment entered, therefore, is 
vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

1 Rule 6(d), W.R.C.P., 
provides:

"A written motion, other 
than one which may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereof shall be 
served not later than 5 days before the time specified for the hearing, unless a 
different period is fixed by these rules or by order of the court. Such an order 
may for cause shown be made on ex parte application. When a motion is supported 
by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion; and, except as 
otherwise provided in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not later 
than 1 day before the hearing, unless the court permits them to be served at 
some other time."

2 Rule 6(e), W.R.C.P., 
provides:

"Whenever a party has the 
right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed 
period after the service of a notice or other paper upon him, and the notice or 
paper is served upon him by mail or by delivery to the clerk, 3 days shall be 
added to the prescribed period, provided however, this rule shall not apply to 
service of process by registered mail under Rule 4(1)(2)."

3 Rule 3, Uniform Rules 
for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming, provides in pertinent 
part:

"`Reasonable notice' for 
the taking of depositions shall be five (5) days, subject, however, to an order 
of the court entered for cause shown enlarging or shortening the time. Rule 6 of 
the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern the computation of 
time."

4 Rule 56(c), W.R.C.P., 
provides:

"The motion shall be 
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party 
prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone 
although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of 
damages."