Title: State ex rel. James v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. James v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-1426.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2017-OHIO-1426 
THE STATE EX REL. JAMES, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT, v. WAL-MART 
STORES, INC., ET AL., APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. James v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Slip Opinion No. 
2017-Ohio-1426.] 
Workers’ compensation—Temporary-total-disability compensation—Evidence 
supported Industrial Commission’s decision to deny temporary-total-
disability compensation—Claimant was not working when the alleged 
period of disability began—Judgment of the court of appeals reversed and 
writ denied. 
(No. 2014-1157—Submitted February 7, 2017—Decided April 20, 2017.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 13AP-3,  
2014-Ohio-2279. 
_______________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellants/cross-appellees, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., and the Industrial 
Commission, appeal from the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals that 
granted a limited writ of mandamus ordering the commission to vacate its order 
denying temporary-total-disability benefits to appellee/cross-appellant, Norman 
James Jr., and to further address his termination from employment and his 
eligibility for temporary-total-disability compensation. 
{¶ 2} Because the evidence supported the commission’s decision to deny 
temporary-total-disability compensation, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and deny the writ. 
I.  Facts and Procedural History 
A.  Accident and Employment 
{¶ 3} James was injured on November 30, 2004, while employed by Wal-
Mart.  The injury fractured a surgical screw in his neck from a previous operation 
not related to his employment.  His workers’ compensation claim was allowed for 
neck spasm and mechanical complication of internal orthopedic device and was 
later amended to allow the additional condition of aggravation of preexisting 
cervical canal stenosis. 
{¶ 4} James returned to work at Wal-Mart in September 2005, after being 
released by his doctor with no restrictions.  He quit his job at Wal-Mart on April 
20, 2007.  He briefly worked for Petco and later got a job with a company that is 
referred to in the record as Casper Transport, Inc., and as Casper Service 
Automotive (“Casper”).  Casper fired him on November 16, 2007, for excessive 
absenteeism, and he has not worked since that time.  On June 1, 2007, James was 
involved in an auto accident unrelated to his employment. 
B.  First Request for Temporary-Total-Disability Compensation 
{¶ 5} In January 2009, James filed a motion requesting temporary-total-
disability benefits beginning November 17, 2007, the day after he was fired from 
January Term, 2017 
 
3
Casper.  Following a hearing, the commission denied benefits for the period from 
November 17, 2007, through September 29, 2009, the date of the commission 
hearing.  The commission concluded that the medical evidence in the record was 
inconsistent and equivocal and that it raised questions about the intervening auto 
accident in June 2007.  The commission declined to address Wal-Mart’s argument 
that James had voluntarily abandoned his job when he was fired by Casper because, 
regardless of his employment status after leaving Casper, the record contained no 
medical evidence to support a finding of temporary total disability. 
C.  Second Request for Temporary Total Disability Compensation 
{¶ 6} In October 2009, James again filed for temporary-total-disability 
benefits.  A staff hearing officer heard the request on April 15, 2010.  The hearing 
officer concluded that based on the commission’s previous order, the request for 
benefits from April 1, 2009, through September 29, 2009, was barred by res 
judicata. 
{¶ 7} The hearing officer also denied benefits for the period from 
September 30, 2009, through April 15, 2010, on the basis that James voluntarily 
abandoned his former position with Casper and was not employed when the 
disability recurred, citing State ex rel. Baker v. Indus. Comm., 89 Ohio St.3d 376, 
732 N.E.2d 355 (2000), State ex rel. McCoy v. Dedicated Transport, Inc., 97 Ohio 
St.3d 25, 2002-Ohio-5305, 776 N.E.2d 51, and State ex rel. Eckerly v. Indus. 
Comm., 105 Ohio St.3d 428, 2005-Ohio-2587, 838 N.E.2d 97. 
{¶ 8} The commission refused further appeal. 
D.  Original Action in Mandamus 
{¶ 9} James filed an original action in mandamus in the court of appeals 
alleging that the commission abused its discretion when it determined that he had 
voluntarily abandoned his position with Wal-Mart and was ineligible for 
temporary-total-disability compensation from September 30, 2009, through April 
15, 2010. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4
{¶ 10} A magistrate appointed to hear the case issued a decision 
recommending that the court deny the writ.  The magistrate concluded that the 
evidence supported the commission’s finding that James voluntarily quit his job 
with Wal-Mart and further concluded that there was no evidence in the record that 
James left his job with Casper due to the allowed conditions in his claim.  The 
magistrate also concluded that the commission did not abuse its discretion when it 
denied benefits on the basis that James was not working at the time he became 
disabled.  The magistrate rejected James’s argument that State ex rel. Estes Express 
Lines v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-569, 2009-Ohio-2148, a case 
in which the claimant was laid off, applied to the facts of this case. 
{¶ 11} James filed objections to the magistrate’s report.  In a split decision, 
the court of appeals determined that the commission did not abuse its discretion in 
finding that James had voluntarily abandoned his employment with Wal-Mart, but 
the appellate court sustained, in part, James’s objection to the magistrate’s 
conclusion that Estes Express did not apply.  The court granted a limited writ 
vacating the denial of temporary-total-disability benefits and returning the case to 
the commission to further address the end of James’s employment at Casper. 
{¶ 12} The dissenting judge agreed with the affirmance of the commission’s 
finding that James had voluntarily abandoned his employment with Wal-Mart, but 
she also stated that there was no evidence that James’s departure from Casper was 
due to the allowed conditions in his claim and that she would deny the writ of 
mandamus. 
{¶ 13} This matter is before the court on the direct appeals filed by Wal-
Mart and the commission and the cross-appeal of James.1   
 
 
                                                 
1 The court referred this case to mediation and stayed briefing.  After mediation was unsuccessful, 
the case was returned to the regular docket and briefing commenced.    
January Term, 2017 
 
5
II.  Legal Analysis 
A.  Standard of Review in Mandamus Cases 
{¶ 14} Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy granted when a relator 
establishes a clear legal right to the relief requested and a clear legal duty on the 
part of the commission to provide such relief.  State ex rel. Rouch v. Eagle Tool & 
Machine Co., 26 Ohio St.3d 197, 198, 498 N.E.2d 464 (1986).  This requires the 
relator to demonstrate that the commission abused its discretion by entering an 
order that was not supported by any evidence in the record.  State ex rel. Avalon 
Precision Casting Co. v. Indus. Comm., 109 Ohio St.3d 237, 2006-Ohio-2287, 846 
N.E.2d 1245, ¶ 9. 
B.  Eligibility for Temporary-Total-Disability Benefits 
{¶ 15} To be eligible for temporary-total-disability benefits, an injured 
worker must demonstrate (1) that he or she is medically unable to return to the 
duties of the former position and (2) that the industrial injury is the reason for the 
loss of earnings.  State ex rel. McCoy v. Dedicated Transport, Inc., 97 Ohio St.3d 
25, 2002-Ohio-5305, 776 N.E.2d 51, ¶ 35.  The burden is on the claimant to prove 
these elements with affirmative evidence.  State ex rel. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. 
Indus. Comm., 81 Ohio St.3d 56, 57, 689 N.E.2d 30 (1998). 
{¶ 16} If an injured worker does not return to his or her former position of 
employment as a result of the worker’s own actions rather than the industrial injury, 
the worker is considered to have voluntarily abandoned his or her employment and 
is no longer eligible for temporary-total-disability compensation.  Baker, 89 Ohio 
St.3d at 380-381, 732 N.E.2d 355.  However, a claimant who voluntarily abandoned 
employment but reenters the workforce will be eligible to receive temporary-total-
disability compensation if, due to the original industrial injury, the claimant 
becomes temporarily and totally disabled while working at the new job.  McCoy at 
syllabus. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6
{¶ 17} In light of these legal principles, we must determine whether there 
was some evidence in the record supporting the commission’s finding that James 
voluntarily abandoned his job with Wal-Mart and its decision denying James’s 
request for temporary-total-disability compensation for the period from September 
30, 2009, through April 15, 2010. 
C.  Status of James’s Departure from Wal-Mart 
{¶ 18} There is no dispute that James quit his job at Wal-Mart in April 2007.  
In his brief, he concedes that he did so in order to seek other employment.  James 
did not submit to the commission any affirmative evidence demonstrating that the 
allowed conditions of his claim contributed to his decision to leave Wal-Mart.  
Thus, he failed to meet his burden of proving that his industrial injury was the cause 
of his lost earnings.  See Yellow Freight Sys., 81 Ohio St.3d at 57, 689 N.E.2d 30.  
Consequently, the commission did not abuse its discretion when it characterized 
James’s departure from Wal-Mart as voluntary. 
D.  Evidence Supporting the Denial of Temporary-Total-Disability Benefits 
{¶ 19} Wal-Mart maintains that the hearing officer properly applied 
Eckerly, 105 Ohio St.3d 428, 2005-Ohio-2587, 838 N.E.2d 97, as authority to deny 
benefits, and that Estes Express, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-569, 2009-Ohio-
2148, is distinguishable.  According to Wal-Mart, James failed to meet his burden 
under McCoy, 97 Ohio St.3d 25, 2002-Ohio-5305, 776 N.E.2d 51, because he was 
not working when the alleged period of disability began and he did not produce 
evidence that he lost his job with Casper for reasons related to the allowed 
conditions in his claim.  We agree. 
{¶ 20} Eckerly involved a claimant who was fired from his job for 
unexcused absenteeism three months after his workplace injury occurred.  The 
commission denied his claim for temporary-total-disability compensation because 
there was no evidence in the record that he was employed.  We affirmed, reasoning 
that a key tenet in temporary-total-disability cases is that “the industrial injury must 
January Term, 2017 
 
7
remove the claimant from his or her job.  This requirement obviously cannot be 
satisfied if [the] claimant had no job at the time of the alleged disability.”  
(Emphasis sic.)  Eckerly at ¶ 9. 
{¶ 21} Estes Express involved an injured worker who was laid off by his 
employer.  At the same time, the worker underwent a medical procedure related to 
his industrial injury.  The court of appeals concluded that although no longer 
employed, the injured worker remained eligible for temporary-total-disability 
compensation because his departure was initiated by his employer and because the 
worker had submitted medical evidence substantiating that his disability existed at 
the time of his layoff.  Estes Express at ¶ 14-16, 19-21. 
{¶ 22} Here, the court of appeals concluded that Estes Express “could apply 
to this situation, but requires a factual development of the reasons [the claimant’s] 
employment with Casper Automotive ended.”  2014-Ohio-2279, at ¶ 9.  We do not 
agree.  The record here demonstrates that like the claimant in Eckerly, James was 
terminated from Casper for excessive absenteeism.  He offered no evidence that his 
workplace injury caused the absences for which Casper terminated him, and there 
is no evidence that he was working when he later claimed to be disabled.  
Consequently, the commission did not abuse its discretion when it applied Eckerly 
and denied temporary-total-disability compensation.  There is no need to further 
consider the facts surrounding James’s termination of employment from Casper. 
{¶ 23} Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals to the 
extent that the court issued a limited writ of mandamus vacating the denial of 
temporary-total-disability compensation, and we affirm the remainder of the 
appellate court’s judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part,  
and writ denied. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, O’NEILL, FISCHER, and DEWINE, JJ., 
concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., not participating. 
_________________ 
Gallon, Takacs, Boissoneault & Schaffer Co., L.P.A., and Theodore A. 
Bowman, for appellee/cross-appellant. 
Roetzel & Andress, Douglas E. Spiker, and Timothy J. Webster, for 
appellant/cross-appellee Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Patsy A. Thomas, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellant/cross-appellee Industrial Commission. 
_________________