Title: Davis v. Immediate Med. Serv., Inc.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

DAVIS, ADMR., APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT, v. IMMEDIATE MEDICAL 
SERVICES, INC. ET AL., CROSS-APPELLEES; EM CARE OF ALLIANCE, INC. ET AL., 
APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as Davis v. Immediate Med. Serv., Inc. (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 10.] 
Civil procedure — Determining whether default judgment can be entered against 
a defendant who was ultimately found not negligent at trial — Applicability 
of Civ.R. 6(B)(2) with respect to the propriety of a default judgment — 
Admissibility of evidence of bias stemming from commonality of insurance 
between the witness and a malpractice defendant. 
1. 
A plaintiff has the right to have a motion for default judgment heard and 
decided before trial. 
2. 
In an action for medical malpractice, an expert witness having the same 
malpractice insurer as another defendant is subject to inquiry concerning 
bias if the witness testifies favorably for that defendant.  (Ede v. Atrium S. 
OB-GYN, Inc. [1994], 71 Ohio St.3d 124, 642 N.E.2d 365, construed and 
followed.) 
3. 
Where an expert has a financial incentive to be biased, the jury may 
determine whether that bias exists and how that bias affects all defendants 
who are contesting similar issues and who benefit from the expert’s 
testimony, regardless of commonality of insurance.  (Ede v. Atrium S. OB-
GYN, Inc. [1994], 71 Ohio St.3d 124, 642 N.E.2d 365, construed and 
followed.) 
(No. 96-203 — Submitted May 7, 1997 — Decided October 8, 1997.) 
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Stark County, No. 
94CA0253. 
2 
 
This case involves medical malpractice and wrongful death claims brought 
by Evelyn Davis, the plaintiff-appellee and cross-appellant, as administrator of the 
estate of her husband, Albert Davis.  Mr. Davis died on April 25, 1991 due to an 
infection resulting from a ruptured appendix.  In the days prior to his death, Mr. 
Davis and his wife visited several health care providers for treatment.  Her 
complaint alleged that their negligence culminated in the death of her husband. 
 
Mr. Davis began experiencing pain in his right lower abdomen on April 7, 
1991.  Concerned about her husband, Mrs. Davis consulted a medical book at 
home.  After reading the book, Mrs. Davis felt that her husband’s symptoms were 
indicative of appendicitis.  Because of their suspicions and Mr. Davis’s pain, the 
couple went to Immediate Medical Services, Inc. (“IMS”), defendant and cross-
appellee.  At this emergency care facility, Mr. Davis was examined by Dr. Barbara 
Guarnieri, defendant and cross-appellee, who took a history and performed a 
number of tests.  Dr. Guarnieri was employed by Alliance Immediate Care, Inc. 
(“AIC”), defendant-appellant, which apparently had a contractual relationship with 
IMS. 
 
The Davises told Dr. Guarnieri of their suspicion of appendicitis.  After 
examining Mr. Davis and concluding that the tests did not indicate appendicitis, 
Dr. Guarnieri diagnosed a urinary tract infection, a condition that Mr. Davis had 
said he had suffered from a few years earlier.  Dr. Guarnieri prescribed antibiotics 
and told Mr. Davis that he should consult his own physician if he did not feel 
better in a couple of days. 
 
Although he took the medication prescribed by Dr. Guarnieri, Mr. Davis’s 
illness continued after his initial visit.  Two days later, Mr. and Mrs. Davis went to 
the emergency room at defendant Alliance Community Hospital.  While there, Mr. 
Davis was treated by Dr. Geno Serri.  Dr. Serri was employed by EM Care of 
3 
Alliance, Inc. (“EM Care”), appellant, which had a contractual relationship with 
the hospital.  Mr. Davis told Dr. Serri that he was experiencing lower abdominal 
pain which had not subsided, and again expressed his concern that it was 
appendicitis.  Dr. Serri examined Mr. Davis and ordered additional tests, 
eventually diagnosing abdominal pain with an uncertain cause.  He told Mr. Davis 
to complete the course of antibiotics, and also gave him a prescription for pain 
medication.  Dr. Serri also contacted Mr. Davis’s family physician, Dr. William 
Eichner, and told the couple to schedule a follow-up appointment with him. 
 
On April 15, 1991, Mr. and Mrs. Davis visited defendant Dr. William 
Eichner, Mr. Davis’s family doctor, at a scheduled appointment.  Mr. Davis told 
the doctor that he felt better that day but had experienced some cramping over the 
weekend.  Dr. Eichner eventually concluded that Mr. Davis had a urinary tract 
infection with resolved symptoms of gastroenteritis.  Dr. Eichner prescribed 
medication for stomach discomfort and scheduled Mr. Davis for a follow-up visit 
for April 30, 1991. 
 
Eight days later, on April 23, 1991, Mr. Davis returned to the emergency 
room at Alliance Community Hospital with severe pain and breathing difficulties.  
Dr. Serri again examined Mr. Davis; however, Mrs. Davis requested that Dr. Serri 
contact Dr. Duane C. Kuentz, her physician. 
 
Dr. Kuentz arrived at the hospital at approximately 3:30 p.m. and 
determined that Mr. Davis was suffering from multiple abdominal abscesses, 
which may have resulted from a ruptured appendix.  At 5:00 p.m., Dr. Kuentz 
contacted a general surgeon, Dr. William Fiegenschuh, to consult about possible 
surgery.  Dr. Fiegenschuh arrived at the hospital around 9:00 p.m. that evening but 
determined that Mr. Davis needed to be stabilized before surgery could occur on 
the following day. 
4 
 
Dr. Fiegenschuh eventually performed an exploratory laparotomy around 
1:00 p.m. the following day.  Dr. Fiegenschuh discovered and drained the 
abscesses.  He also removed the appendix, which had ruptured.  Despite surviving 
the surgery, Mr. Davis could not withstand the infection that had resulted from the 
burst appendix, and died the next day, April 25, 1991. 
 
A complaint was filed on October 9, 1992 against IMS, Dr. Barbara 
Guarnieri, EM Care, Dr. Eichner, and Alliance Community Hospital, alleging 
negligent medical care.1  An amended complaint was filed on April 23, 1993, 
adding AIC (Dr. Guarnieri’s employer) and Dr. Fiegenschuh as parties.2 
 
The jury eventually returned verdicts in favor of all the above defendants 
except for Dr. Eichner, who was found liable in the amount of $643,000. 
 
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment in part and reversed it in part.  A 
new trial was ordered against defendant EM Care on the basis that the trial court 
should have allowed plaintiff to cross-examine an expert witness on the issue of 
possible bias.  The appellate court also held that it was error to deny plaintiff’s 
pretrial default motion against AIC.  The remainder of the judgment was affirmed. 
 
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal and cross-appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos, Lee E. Plakas and Christopher M. Huryn, for 
appellee and cross-appellant, Evelyn Davis. 
 
Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs, Gary A. Banas, Marlene C. Gebauer 
and Christopher S. Humphrey, for appellant Alliance Immediate Care, Inc., and 
cross-appellee, Barbara Guarnieri, M.D. 
 
Jacobsen, Maynard, Tuschman & Kalur, Janis L. Small, R. Mark Jones and 
William A. Davis, for appellant EM Care of Alliance, Inc. 
5 
 
Jacobsen, Maynard, Tuschman & Kalur, John A. Simon and John S. Polito, 
for cross-appellee Immediate Medical Services, Inc. 
__________________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.  In this case, we are asked to determine 
whether a default judgment can be entered against a defendant who was ultimately 
found not negligent at trial.  We also look at the applicability of Civ.R. 6(B)(2) 
with respect to the propriety of default judgment.  In addition, we examine the 
admissibility of evidence of bias stemming from commonality of insurance 
between the witness and a malpractice defendant.  For the following reasons, we 
affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.  Specifically, we affirm the court of 
appeals’ judgment ordering the entry of a default judgment against AIC and a new 
trial against EM Care.  We reverse the court of appeals’ judgment to the extent 
that it denied a new trial against Dr. Guarnieri and IMS. 
I 
Appeal of AIC of Default Judgment 
 
Three days before trial, Mrs. Davis filed a motion for default judgment 
against AIC, due to AIC’s failure to answer her amended complaint.  On the 
morning of trial, Gary Banas, the attorney representing AIC and Dr. Guarnieri, 
argued against the motion.  Banas claimed surprise that AIC was a party, since he 
had not known of the amended complaint and had not received a copy until two 
days before trial, although the amended complaint had been properly served upon 
AIC’s statutory agent thirteen months before.  At trial, Banas argued excusable 
neglect under Civ.R. 60(B), the rule for relief from judgment.  Despite this 
irregularity, the judge denied the motion for default and permitted Banas to file an 
answer instanter. 
6 
 
The answer filed by Banas was miscaptioned “Answer of Defendant 
Immediate Medical Care, Inc.,” a corporation which had never been a party to the 
lawsuit.  The plaintiff brought the error to the court’s attention at the close of the 
defendants’ evidence.  Banas responded that he had been confused from the 
beginning of the case about the names of the litigants in this action and asked that 
he be allowed to correct the mistake.  The trial court stated that it would look at 
the pleadings and make a ruling.  The court never directly ruled on the issue.  
However, the court denied plaintiff’s motion for default judgment, in effect, when 
it submitted verdict forms to the jury naming AIC as a defendant.  On appeal, the 
plaintiff argued that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant default 
judgment against AIC.  The court of appeals agreed, and we concur with this 
finding. 
 
Default judgment may be awarded when a defendant fails to make an 
appearance by filing an answer or otherwise defending an action.  Civ.R. 55(A).  
Civ.R. 6(B)(2) allows for an extension of time to file a late pleading within the 
trial court’s discretion “upon motion made after the expiration of the specified 
period * * * where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect.”  A ruling 
by the trial court on such a motion will be upheld absent an abuse of discretion.  
Marion Prod. Credit Assn. v. Cochran (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 265, 271, 533 N.E.2d 
325, 331. 
 
In determining whether neglect is excusable or inexcusable, all the 
surrounding facts and circumstances must be taken into consideration.  Griffey v. 
Rajan (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 75, 514 N.E.2d 1122, syllabus.  Neglect under Civ.R. 
6(B)(2) has been described as conduct that falls substantially below what is 
reasonable under the circumstances.  State ex rel. Weiss v. Indus. Comm. (1992), 
65 Ohio St.3d 470, 473, 605 N.E.2d 37, 39, citing GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. 
7 
ARC Industries, Inc. (1976), 47 Ohio St.2d 146, 152, 1 O.O.3d 86, 89, 351 N.E.2d 
113, 117. 
 
Based upon this court’s decision in Miller v. Lint (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 209, 
16 O.O.3d 244, 404 N.E.2d 752, the court of appeals found that AIC failed to 
substantially comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure when it did not file an 
answer and then filed a deficient answer when given permission by the trial court.  
We agree. 
 
In Lint, we held that although Civ.R. 6(B) grants broad discretion to the trial 
court concerning procedural matters, such discretion is not unlimited. Id. at 214, 
16 O.O.3d at 247, 404 N.E.2d at 755.  Lint involved a defendant who did not file 
an answer in the specified time period and made no showing of excusable neglect.  
In ruling against the defendant we stated that “the failure of the defendant to 
comply, even substantially, with the procedures outlined in the Civil Rules 
subjected her to the motion for a default judgment, and the plaintiffs, having 
complied with the Civil Rules, had a right to have their motion heard and decided 
before the cause proceeded to trial on its merits.” Id. at 214, 16 O.O.3d at 247, 404 
N.E.2d at 755. 
 
The trial court, based only on the statement of AIC’s counsel that he had 
received a copy of the amended complaint only two days before, found excusable 
neglect and permitted AIC’s attorney to file an answer instanter.  We disagree 
with this determination.  When viewed in its entirety, the conduct of AIC and of 
AIC’s counsel was unreasonable and did not constitute excusable neglect. 
 
There was incontrovertible evidence that an amended complaint had been 
filed and that AIC should have been aware of its existence.  To begin with, it is 
uncontradicted that the amended complaint had been served on AIC’s statutory 
agent by certified mail thirteen months before trial.  Not only was AIC’s statutory 
8 
agent properly served, but the certificate of service attached to the amended 
complaint states that AIC’s counsel was sent the amended complaint by ordinary 
mail.  Under these specific circumstances, this conduct is not excusable neglect.  
Therefore, the trial court should not have allowed counsel to file a late pleading. 
 
AIC alleges that the subsequent jury verdict in favor of AIC should preclude 
a default judgment against it, since AIC had been exonerated on the merits.  We 
reject this argument.  The verdict rendered by the jury in AIC’s favor is irrelevant.  
A plaintiff has the right to have a motion for default judgment heard and decided 
before trial.  Lint, 62 Ohio St.2d at 214, 16 O.O.3d at 247, 404 N.E.2d at 755.  A 
defendant’s right to force a plaintiff to prove his or her claim depends upon the 
defendant’s compliance with the Civil Rules and the timely filing of an answer to 
the complaint.  Otherwise, the sanctions for noncompliance would lose their 
deterrent effect.  Even though we recognize that it is preferable to hear a case upon 
its merits, the rules of procedure must be applied consistently, and AIC’s 
noncompliance cannot be overlooked.  As we stated in Lint, “However hurried a 
court may be in its efforts to reach the merits of a controversy, the integrity of 
procedural rules is dependent upon consistent enforcement because the only fair 
and reasonable alternative thereto is complete abandonment.”  Id. at 215, 16 
O.O.3d at 247, 404 N.E.2d at 755.  Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the court 
of appeals regarding AIC. 
II 
Cross-Examination of Expert Witness 
 
During trial, Dr. Guarnieri, the initial treating doctor, presented the expert 
testimony of Dr. Bruce D. Janiak.  Dr. Janiak revealed during voir dire, outside the 
presence of the jury, that he was insured by Physician’s Insurance Exchange 
Company (“P.I.E.”).  The parties do not dispute that although Dr. Guarnieri was 
9 
not insured by P.I.E., other defendants in the case were, specifically EM Care.  
The plaintiff wanted to question Dr. Janiak concerning his insurance coverage to 
show bias.  However, the trial court ruled that the insurance link could not be 
introduced as evidence of bias, as Dr. Janiak’s testimony was concerned solely 
with Dr. Guarnieri. 
 
Plaintiff appealed, alleging that she should have been allowed to cross-
examine Dr. Janiak to show bias based on similar insurance coverage.  The court 
of appeals agreed in part and ordered a new trial against EM Care.  Judge 
Hoffman, in his concurrence, however, stated his belief that a new trial was also 
warranted against Dr. Guarnieri and IMS, since Dr. Janiak’s testimony benefited 
them as well, and since the lack of opportunity to show bias prejudiced the 
plaintiff. 
 
The issue then, is whether the trial court improperly denied plaintiff the 
opportunity to cross-examine a medical expert concerning commonality of 
insurance.  We examine this issue pursuant to an abuse-of-discretion standard.  
Calderon v. Sharkey (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 218, 24 O.O.3d 322, 436 N.E.2d 1008, 
syllabus. 
 
In Ede v. Atrium S. OB-GYN, Inc. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 124, 642 N.E.2d 
365, syllabus, we stated that in a medical malpractice action, “evidence of a 
commonality of insurance interests between a defendant and an expert witness is 
sufficiently probative of the expert’s bias as to clearly outweigh any potential 
prejudice evidence of insurance might cause.”  In that case, the defendant 
physician and the physician testifying as an expert witness on his behalf were 
insured by the same malpractice insurer.  Our decision in Ede was necessitated by 
the Pavlovian response that many judges have in assuming that prejudice will 
result from disclosure of insurance coverage.  In discouraging such rote behavior, 
10 
we stated that “[t]he legal charade protecting juries from information they already 
know keeps hidden from them relevant information that could assist them in 
making their determinations.”  Id. at 127, 642 N.E.2d at 368.  This reasoning is 
supported by Evid.R. 102, which states:  “The purpose of these rules is to provide 
procedures for the adjudication of causes to the end that the truth may be 
ascertained and proceedings justly determined.”  Ede is further supported by 
Evid.R. 411, which states that evidence of liability insurance is admissible when 
offered for the purpose of proving bias or prejudice of a witness.  The Evidence 
Rules favor inclusion of relevant evidence at trial, Evid.R. 402, limiting its 
admissibility only in specific circumstances, such as where prejudice outweighs 
probativeness.  Evid.R. 403(A).  We held in Ede that evidence of bias based on 
commonality of insurance between a malpractice defendant and an expert 
testifying in his or her favor was sufficiently probative to outweigh any possible 
prejudice. 
A.  Appeal of EM Care 
 
Dr. Guarnieri called Dr. Bruce D. Janiak, a physician insured by P.I.E., as a 
medical expert to testify on her behalf.  Although Dr. Guarnieri was not insured by 
P.I.E, the fact that her co-defendant EM Care had the same insurance company as 
the expert witness is sufficient for our decision in Ede to apply.  Our holding in 
Ede was not limited to evidence of commonality of insurance between a defendant 
and the expert called by that defendant.  In an action for medical malpractice, an 
expert witness having the same malpractice insurer as another defendant is subject 
to inquiry concerning bias if the witness testifies favorably for that defendant. 
 
Even though Dr. Janiak stated that he had no opinion concerning the 
standard of care of any other defendant, his testimony for Dr. Guarnieri benefited 
the other emergency care doctors at trial, and the plaintiff should have been 
11 
allowed to elicit evidence of any potential bias based on commonality of 
insurance.  Specifically, Dr. Janiak testified as to the role of the emergency 
physician in evaluating and deciding what further medical treatment is 
appropriate.  Furthermore, Dr. Janiak stated that appendicitis is “one of the hardest 
diagnoses in medicine to make” and “about the best that the emergency physician 
can do [in cases of abdominal pain] is make a judgment as to whether we think the 
patient ought to have a surgical evaluation.”  Dr. Janiak expressed that his 
testimony was meant to apply only to the initial evaluation made by Dr. Guarnieri.  
Nevertheless, such testimony has a spillover effect in bolstering the defenses of 
other emergency care providers in this case, and the jury could easily consider his 
testimony to be in favor of all such providers.  Thus, there was sufficient 
foundation to impeach Dr. Janiak on the question of bias.  We believe that the trial 
court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the plaintiff to cross-examine the 
expert witness on this issue.  We recognize that Ede had not been decided at the 
time of this trial.  However, under Ede, the trial court acted unreasonably in not 
allowing probative evidence concerning bias, which prejudiced plaintiff’s ability 
to thoroughly cross-examine defendant’s medical expert.  As in Ede, it is for the 
jury to weigh the credibility of evidence concerning bias, and the trial court should 
have allowed plaintiff to elicit such testimony.  Therefore, the appellate court’s 
judgment ordering a new trial against EM Care is affirmed. 
B.  Cross-Appeal of Evelyn Davis 
 
The court of appeals found that a new trial was warranted only against EM 
Care based on Ede.  However, we believe that since Dr. Janiak’s testimony 
concerning the standard of care of emergency room physicians flowed to all other 
emergency care providers in this case, the court of appeals should have also 
granted a new trial against Dr. Guarnieri and IMS. 
12 
 
In his separate opinion below, Judge Hoffman stated that Dr. Janiak’s expert 
opinion may have been colored, since other defendants at trial were also insured 
by the same company.  Specifically, he elaborated that “[o]nce it is recognized that 
Dr. Janiak’s opinion may be colored by his potential pecuniary bias, such opinion 
is necessarily colored as to all medical providers in the same lawsuit who share the 
same duty of care, including non-P.I.E. insured medical providers.” 
 
Judge Hoffman concluded that while this was an extension of our holding in 
Ede, it was consistent with the rationale behind Ede of allowing the jury to 
consider whether Dr. Janiak’s opinion was biased as a result of his status as a 
P.I.E. insured and, if so, whether that bias affected the weight to be given to his 
opinion as it relates to the non-P.I.E. defendants on whose behalf it was offered 
(Dr. Guarnieri and IMS) and to the P.I.E.-insured emergency care provider (EM 
Care). 
 
Since Dr. Janiak testified as to the standard of care for emergency room 
physicians, the jury should have been able to determine whether any possible bias 
existed which may have affected Dr. Janiak’s conclusions as to all emergency care 
providers similarly situated, irrespective of whether they were commonly insured.  
As plaintiff points out, it is a favorite tactic of medical malpractice co-defendants 
to have each other’s experts lend testimonial support to other defendants in the 
case.  Where an expert has a financial incentive to be biased, the jury may 
determine whether that bias exists and how that bias affects all defendants who are 
contesting similar issues and who benefit from the expert’s testimony, regardless 
of commonality of insurance. 
III 
 
Therefore, the judgment of the court of appeals ordering a new trial against 
EM Care is affirmed.  The court of appeals’ judgment denying a new trial against 
13 
Dr. Guarnieri and IMS is reversed.  We affirm the appellate court’s judgment 
ordering the entry of a default judgment against AIC.  The cause is remanded to 
the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment affirmed in part, 
 reversed in part  
and cause remanded. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. 
The complaint also named Drs. Geno Serri, Andres Lao, and Edward 
Mitchell as defendants.  However, all of these parties were dismissed with 
prejudice and are not part of this appeal. 
2. 
The trial court granted the motion of Dr. Fiegenschuh and William H. 
Fiegenschuh, M.D., Inc. to order plaintiff’s claims of negligent credentialing tried 
separately.  Thus, they are not part of this appeal. 
 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.  
Although I agree that AIC’s failure to properly answer the amended complaint 
entitled Davis to a default judgment, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that 
the later jury verdict exonerating Dr. Guarnieri and AIC is “irrelevant.”  Rather, 
the verdict renders the trial court’s failure to grant a default judgment against AIC 
nonprejudicial.  Additionally, I dissent from the extension of the holding in Ede v. 
Atrium S. OB-GYN, Inc. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 124, 642 N.E.2d 365. 
I.  DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
 
The majority frames the issue in the present case as whether a default 
judgment can be entered against a defendant who was ultimately found not 
14 
negligent at trial.  Yet, in its discussion of the issue, the majority neglects the 
leading case on the subject, Frow v. De La Vega (1872), 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 552, 
21 L.Ed. 60.  In that case, the Supreme Court held that when multiple defendants 
are alleged to be jointly liable and fewer than all defendants default, a court may 
not render a liability determination as to the defaulting parties unless and until the 
remaining defendants are found liable on the merits.  Justice Bradley wrote,  “If 
the court in such a case as this can lawfully make a final decree against one 
defendant separately, on the merits, while the cause was proceeding undetermined 
against the others, then this absurdity might follow:  there might be one decree of 
the court sustaining the charge of joint fraud committed by the defendants; and 
another decree disaffirming the said charge, and declaring it to be entirely 
unfounded, and dismissing the complainant's bill.  And such an incongruity, it 
seems, did actually occur in this case.  Such a state of things is unseemly and 
absurd, as well as unauthorized by law. 
 
“[I]f the suit should be decided against the complainant on the merits, the 
bill will be dismissed as to all the defendants alike — the defaulter as well as the 
others.  If it be decided in the complainant's favor, he will then be entitled to a 
final decree against all.”  Id. at 554, 21 L.Ed. at 61. 
 
The Frow doctrine has been widely accepted by treatises, see 10 Moore’s 
Federal Practice (3 Ed.1997), Section 55.25;  10 Wright, Miller & Kane,  Federal 
Practice and Procedure (2 Ed.1983), Section 2690; 21 Federal Procedure, Lawyers 
Edition (1997), Section 51:64, and by the federal circuits.  See Farzetta v. Turner 
& Newall, Ltd. (C.A.3, 1986), 797 F.2d 151, 154 (stating that Frow stands for the 
proposition that “if at trial facts are proved that exonerate certain defendants and 
that as a matter of logic preclude the liability of another defendant, the plaintiff 
should be collaterally estopped from obtaining a judgment against the latter 
15 
defendant, even though it failed to participate in the proceeding in which the 
exculpatory facts were proved”); In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation (C.A.7, 1980), 
617 F.2d 1248, 1256-1258  (distinguishing Frow on grounds that, because liability 
in the case at bar was joint and several, nonliability of some defendants would not 
logically preclude liability of other defendants).  In Internatl. Controls Corp. v. 
Vesco (C.A.2, 1976), 535 F.2d 742, 746, fn. 4, the court questioned the continued 
validity of Frow in light of the passage of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
but ultimately concluded that “[i]n any event, at most, Frow controls in situations 
where the liability of one defendant necessarily depends upon the liability of the 
others.” 
 
In the present case, Davis alleged that these defendants were jointly and 
severally liable and specifically that AIC was responsible for the medical 
malpractice of its agent, Dr. Guarnieri, by way of the doctrine of respondeat 
superior.  As this court stated in Strock v. Pressnell (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 
217, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1244, “It is axiomatic that for the doctrine of respondeat 
superior to apply, an employee must be liable for a tort committed in the scope of 
his employment.”  Had AIC properly answered, as a matter of logic and law, it 
would be impossible to maintain an action against AIC after the jury exonerated 
Dr. Guarnieri of liability. 
 
The Frow doctrine was meant to apply precisely in this situation, to prevent 
the absurdity that results in granting a judgment based on respondeat superior 
against the employer when the employee has committed no wrongdoing.  Under 
Frow, the trial court could not enter a liability determination against AIC, the 
defaulting defendant, unless and until the remaining defendant, Dr. Guarnieri, was 
found liable on the merits.  Because Dr. Guarnieri was not found liable on the 
merits, the trial court’s failure to grant the default judgment was not prejudicial. 
16 
 
The Maryland Court of Appeals, that state’s highest court, reached the same 
conclusion in the context of respondeat superior in a medical malpractice case.  
Curry v. Hillcrest Clinic, Inc. (1995), 337 Md. 412, 653 A.2d 934.  In that case, 
the plaintiff alleged that the defendant hospital was liable under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior for the medical malpractice of its doctor.  The hospital failed 
to answer and default judgment was entered against it.  The hospital was permitted 
to participate in the scheduled arbitration hearing on the issue of damages only.  
The arbitration panel, however, found that to the extent that the doctor was 
negligent, that negligence was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.  
The arbitration panel then entered a final judgment of no liability for the hospital.  
On appeal from the arbitration, the trial court vacated the final entry and permitted 
the hospital to defend on the merits.  After a jury trial, a verdict was entered in 
favor of both the doctor and hospital on all counts.  On appeal, the intermediate 
appellate court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to a default judgment against 
the hospital. 
 
The Maryland Court of Appeals agreed, holding that Frow “certainly 
operates where the conduct of a defendant who appeared and successfully 
defended on the merits is the sole basis for liability of a defaulting defendant 
under the principle of respondeat superior.”  337 Md. at 430, 653 A.2d at 943.  
Specifically, the court held that “in a negligence case, a finding that an appearing 
agent or servant has not committed actionable negligence inures to the benefit of a 
defaulting principal whose liability rests solely on respondeat superior.”  Id. at 
434, 653 A.2d at 945. 
 
Even a more relaxed view of the Frow rule dictates a finding that the trial 
court’s failure to grant Davis’s motion for default judgment was not prejudicial.  
In Hunt v. Inter-Globe Energy, Inc. (C.A.10, 1985), 770 F.2d 145, 148, the court 
17 
held that a default judgment entered against one of several defendants, each of 
whom is jointly and severally liable for plaintiff’s damages, establishes only 
liability and not the defaulting defendant’s relative share of fault.  Accord Dundee 
Cement Co. v. Howard Pipe & Concrete Products, Inc. (C.A.7, 1983), 722 F.2d 
1319, 1324; Montcalm Publishing Corp. v. Ryan (S.D.N.Y.1992), 807 F.Supp. 
975, 977-978.  Under this view of Frow, any default judgment against AIC could 
establish only its liability.  AIC’s responsibility for Davis’s damages, however, is 
still dependent upon Dr. Guarnieri’s liability.  Because Dr. Guarnieri was 
exonerated, AIC’s relative share of the damages is zero and Davis has suffered no 
harm from the trial court’s failure to grant the default judgment. 
II.  COMMONALITY OF INSURANCE 
 
I additionally disagree with the majority’s extension of Ede v. Atrium S. OB-
GYN, Inc. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 124, 642 N.E.2d 365, and join Justice Lundberg 
Stratton’s reasoning as stated in Part II of her dissent. 
 
For these reasons, I would reverse the court of appeals’ judgment ordering 
entry of a default judgment against AIC.  I would also reverse the court of appeals’ 
judgment ordering a new trial against EM Care and would affirm the court of 
appeals’ judgment denying a new trial against Dr. Guarnieri and IMS. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concur in the foregoing 
dissenting opinion. 
 
LUNDBERG  STRATTON, J., dissenting.  The discretion of a trial court is one 
of the keystone principles of our judicial system.  Because today’s decision erodes 
that vital principle, I respectfully dissent.  I believe that the decision of the trial 
court was soundly within its discretion and fell far short of being unreasonable, 
arbitrary, or unconscionable so as to constitute an abuse of discretion.  State v. 
Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 16 O.O.3d 169, 173, 404 N.E.2d 144, 149; 
18 
Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 5 OBR 481, 482, 450 
N.E.2d 1140, 1142. 
 
In State ex rel. Shafer v. Ohio Turnpike Comm. (1953), 159 Ohio St. 581, 
590-591, 50 O.O. 465, 469-470, 113 N.E.2d 14, 19, this court stated: 
 
“‘Abuse of discretion, and especially gross and palpable abuse of discretion, 
which are the terms ordinarily employed to justify an interference with the 
exercise of discretionary power, implies not merely error of judgment, but 
perversity of will, passion, prejudice, partiality, or moral delinquency.’  
 
“* * * 
 
“‘[I]t must be kept in mind that “abuse of discretion” means more than an 
error of law or error of judgment * * *.  It means “a discretion exercised to an end 
or purpose not justified by, and clearly against reason and evidence” * * *.  Where 
the court does not exercise a discretion in the sense of being discreet, circumspect, 
[and] prudent and exercising cautious judgment, there is an abuse of discretion. * 
* * The term has been defined as “a view or action that no conscientious judge, 
acting intelligently, could have honestly taken.”’”  (Citations omitted.) 
 
Where a court exercises its discretion, as it did in this case, this court should 
not overturn the trial court’s decision absent a finding of an abuse of discretion.  
Martin v. Martin (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 292, 294-295, 18 OBR 342, 344, 480 
N.E.2d 1112, 1114. 
I.  DEFAULT MOTION 
 
The majority’s paragraph one of the syllabus implies that the trial court did 
not decide the plaintiff’s motion for default before trial.  However, the trial court 
held a record hearing, evaluated both the evidence and the credibility of defendant 
AIC’s position, stated its findings, and denied the motion for default.  Therefore, 
the trial court did just what the syllabus mandates (unless the syllabus means 
19 
“decided in the moving party’s favor,” which would remove all discretion from a 
trial court). 
 
By concluding that the trial court denied the default motion “based only on 
the statement of AIC’s counsel,” the majority’s opinion also implies that the 
defendant failed to present evidence in its defense.  Yet, AIC’s counsel, Mr. 
Banas, clearly was prepared and offered to testify as to the reasons for the failure 
to answer.  Plaintiff’s counsel stated that this would not be necessary, and 
therefore waived the formal presentation of evidence, allowing the court to rely on 
counsel’s representations.  Plaintiff cannot now complain of such lack of 
“evidence.”  The court stated that it would treat Mr. Banas’s representation “[a]s if 
[made] under oath” and then found that it  believed Mr. Banas.  The fact that a 
certificate of service to Mr. Banas was attached to the amended complaint created 
only a rebuttable presumption of service.  Mr. Banas represented that AIC had 
never forwarded the complaint and he had never received separate service.  The 
court stated that it believed that the complaint had been sent but never received.  
The presumption was rebutted.  We have no basis on which to substitute our 
judgment of credibility for that of the trial court. 
 
The trial court had the full scope of the case before it and was in the best 
position to weigh all the competing considerations.  In addition to Alliance 
Immediate Care, other parties were Immediate Medical Services, Inc., Alliance 
Community Hospital, and EM Care of Alliance.  Even the plaintiff in the body of 
her amended complaint used “Alliance Immediate Corporation.”  The trial court 
also used “Alliance Immediate Medical Services” in its ruling. 
 
When AIC’s counsel mislabeled the defendant in the answer he prepared, it 
took plaintiff’s counsel nearly three weeks (until June 10, at the close of 
defendants’ evidence) to bring the error to the court’s attention.  Yet all parties and 
20 
the court clearly knew that AIC, Dr. Guarnieri’s employer, was the defendant, and 
the jury was properly instructed on the same.  No different claims, discovery, trial 
tactics, or evidence would have been presented.  No prejudice attached. 
 
I do not condone the failures of AIC or its counsel to follow the procedural 
rules.  AIC counsel’s follow-up, once he discovered the amended complaint, was 
sloppy lawyering indeed.  But a judge has discretion to deny a motion for a default 
judgment after looking at all the equities involved in a particular situation.  
Martin, 18 Ohio St.3d 292, 18 OBR 342, 480 N.E.2d 1112. 
 
The majority stresses the need to adhere to procedural rules. However, the 
trial court ordered all dispositive motions to be filed by April 1, 1994.  Yet 
thirteen months after service of the amended complaint, on May 20, 1994, four 
days before trial, the plaintiff, without leave of court, filed for default.  But the 
majority attaches no penalty to plaintiff’s failure to follow a court order on 
procedure.  If we are going to strictly adhere to technical points of procedure, then 
fairness dictates that we should also address plaintiff’s failure to follow the rules. 
 
The second oral motion for default could not possibly have been ruled on 
before trial as it was not made until the close of defendant’s evidence.  At that 
point, AIC’s counsel stated that he had not realized the error in names until that 
moment.  AIC’s counsel asked, also by oral motion, albeit inartfully, to substitute 
names.  After the verdict, the trial court granted the substitution and sub silentio 
overruled the second motion for default.  Therefore, since substitution was 
granted, the answer could now be considered properly filed, contrary to plaintiff’s 
claim that no answer has yet been filed.  Although this was never done in writing, 
it was done orally and on the record.  The trial court was well within its discretion 
to deny the second motion for default, considering that AIC had now fully 
participated and defended in the trial. 
21 
 
Default judgment should be reserved for cases where court procedures are 
ignored and the process flouted, as in Miller v. Lint (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 209, 16 
O.O.3d 244, 404 N.E.2d 752.  This fact pattern is a far cry from Miller and, I 
believe, clearly fits within that area of discretion reserved to a trial court. 
 
In addition, I join in Justice Cook’s well-reasoned dissent as to why the 
issue of default is harmless error, if error at all, because the jury cleared Dr. 
Guarnieri, the employee, of all liability, thereby also exonerating her employer, 
AIC.  Or conversely, AIC should now be permitted to file its proper Civ.R. 60(B) 
motion to set aside the default judgment.  In addition, this court fails to order any 
hearing on damages.  Civ. R. 55, concerning default, states: 
 
“(A) * * * If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into 
effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or 
to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of 
any other matter, the court may conduct  such hearings * * * as it deems necessary 
and proper  * * *.” 
 
Defendant AIC should at least now be permitted a hearing on damages to 
present the results of the jury trial establishing no liability on the part of its 
employee, Dr. Guarnieri. 
 
The law favors trying cases on the merits, not technicalities.  Perotti v. 
Ferguson (1983), 7 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 7 OBR 256, 257, 454 N.E.2d 951, 952.  This 
court has stated: 
 
“Where no reply * * * is filed, there is authority for granting defendant 
judgment on the pleadings.  However, the cases awarding judgment to a defendant 
for the inadvertence of an attorney to file a reply are, generally, old precedents 
occurring at a time when a lawsuit ofttimes developed into a test of an attorney’s 
astuteness rather than a determination of the merit of a client’s contention.  To 
22 
decide a lawsuit on the failure of an attorney to file a reply rather than on the 
merits of a claim would seem an anachronism in our present-day system of 
jurisprudence.”  (Citation omitted.)  McDonald v. Haught (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 
43, 46, 39 O.O.2d 39, 41, 225 N.E.2d 235, 237-238. 
 
The Rules of Civil Procedure expressly favor seeking substantial justice.  
Civ.R. 61 states: 
 
“No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error 
or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by 
any of the parties is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or 
for vacating, modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal 
to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.  The 
court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the 
proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” 
 
But the real crux of this case is whether the court, in light of all these 
procedural issues, abused its discretion.  I believe that the trial court did not, and I 
therefore dissent. 
II.  COMMONALITY OF INSURANCE 
 
The second issue also involves the further erosion of a trial court’s 
discretion when ruling on evidentiary issues.  The expansion of Ede v. Atrium S. 
OB-GYN, Inc. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 124, 642 N.E.2d 365, to such remote and 
speculative connections as exist in this case further undermines a trial court’s 
discretion. 
 
The majority relies on Ede to expand the “commonality of insurance 
interests” theory to new, per se horizons.  The expert, Dr. Janiak, and the 
defendant for whom he testified, Dr. Guarnieri, did not have the same insurer (as 
in Ede); only EM Care of Alliance, Inc. shared an insurer with Dr. Janiak.  
23 
Immediate Medical Services, Inc. also did not share the same insurer , but Dr. 
Janiak gave no testimony in its favor. 
 
The majority finds Dr. Janiak’s broad, generalized background statements as 
to the duties of an emergency room physician to be sufficient to somehow qualify 
as expert testimony on the standard of care on behalf of the other emergency care 
defendants.  Such background testimony was necessary to establish the foundation 
for his expert opinion on Dr. Guarnieri’s care.  Yet Dr. Janiak testified that he had 
no opinion whether the other defendants’ conduct met the standard of care.  
Indeed, the plaintiff and each defendant had their own separate experts.  And, in 
fact, each defendant physician saw the decedent at different times, with different 
symptoms, so the specific standards of care at each visit would differ. 
 
In addition, on voir dire, Dr. Janiak testified that he was unaware that his 
premiums might be affected by this case since he testified he was also unaware of 
other defendants being insured by his insurer.  He reaffirmed that he had no 
opinion as to the other physicians’ failure to meet any standard of care. 
 
Against this backdrop, the trial court weighed the probative value versus the 
prejudicial effect of admitting the evidence and properly determined that cross-
examination should not be permitted under Evid.R. 401(A) and 403.  This was 
within the province of a trial court’s discretion:  to limit the scope of the cross-
examination of a medical expert on issues of bias and pecuniary interest.  
Calderon v. Sharkey (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 218, 24 O.O.3d 322, 436 N.E.2d 1008, 
syllabus.  Absent abuse of that discretion, the trial court’s decision should be 
affirmed.  Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d at 157, 16 O.O.3d at 173, 404 N.E.2d at 149;  
State v. Apanovitch (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 19, 22, 514 N.E.2d 394, 398. 
 
Yet the majority now extends the holding of Ede to this case.  The mere 
background testimony on the common issue, emergency room care by one party’s 
24 
expert somehow assumes center stage and opens the door to unduly prejudicial 
cross-examination.  The discretion is removed from a trial court; under such a 
tenuous connection, a trial court must now allow cross-examination as a matter of 
law.  Does this court really believe that the malpractice insurance industry is so 
devious that an expert for a non-insured can be persuaded to shade his testimony 
to benefit other defendants so as to keep his own premiums low?  “Bias” means 
that a witness has altered or colored his or her testimony for personal reasons or 
self-interest.  There is not a shred of evidence that this happened.  In fact, the only 
evidence on record establishes the opposite. 
 
It is even more difficult to see how Dr. Guarnieri’s verdict would be 
affected by such cross-examination.  Dr. Janiak was Dr. Guarnieri’s expert.  Dr. 
Janiak was already prepared to testify in Dr. Guarnieri’s favor; that is why he was 
retained.  He was extensively cross-examined as to bias — his relationship with 
both the defense law firms, his hourly fees, his proclivity to testify only for 
physicians.  The judge allowed all that, and fairly so.  I fail to see how someone 
else’s insurance relationship would affect Dr. Janiak’s own testimony for the 
defendant who retained him, and with whom he did not share a common insurer. 
To allow questioning of Dr. Janiak on his insurance relationship to other 
defendants could clearly prejudice Dr. Guarnieri’s case by confusing the issues 
and implying that a verdict against Dr. Guarnieri would somehow affect Dr. 
Janiak’s premiums from a different company. 
 
This was a lengthy trial with many experts.  The jury verdicts in favor of Dr. 
Guarnieri , AIC, and IMS were unanimous.  The judge listened to the voir dire of 
the witness, balanced the issues of relevance and prejudice, and properly excluded 
the evidence.  Only if the exclusion of evidence amounts to a prejudicial abuse of 
discretion should the trial court’s decision be overturned.  Calderon, 70 Ohio 
25 
St.2d at 222, 24 O.O.3d at 325, 436 N.E.2d at 1012.  Such prejudice must affect a 
substantial right of a party.  State ex. rel. Avellone v. Lake Cty. Bd. of Commrs. 
(1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 58, 62, 543 N.E.2d 478, 482.  Yet the majority reverses all 
the above verdicts without any evidence that such cross-examination, if allowed, 
would have made any difference.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.