Title: State v. Jeffrey A. House

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2007 WI 79 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP2202 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Jeffrey Allen House, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  296 Wis. 2d 419, 722 N.W.2d 400 
(Ct. App. 2006-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 27, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 24, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Charles F. Kahn, Jr.   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
CROOKS, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
WILCOX and ROGGENSACK, JJ., join concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there was a brief by 
Michael J. Steinle and Terschan, Steinle & Ness, Milwaukee, and 
oral argument by Michael J. Steinle. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Juan 
B. Colas, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
2007 WI 79
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP2202-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2004CF2744) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,   
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent   
 
 
v. 
 
Jeffrey Allen House,   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner   
FILED 
 
JUN 27, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Jeffrey House, 
seeks review of an unpublished court of appeals decision 
affirming a judgment convicting him of conspiracy to deliver 
cocaine.1 House contends that the court of appeals erred in 
letting stand the circuit court's denial of his motion to 
suppress telephonic evidence on the ground that the evidence was 
obtained pursuant to an invalid wiretap order. He argues that 
because 
the 
wiretap 
order 
authorized 
interceptions 
of 
                                                 
1 See State v. House, No. 2005AP2202-CR, unpublished slip 
opinion (Wis. Ct. App. August 3, 2006)(affirming a judgment of 
the circuit court for Milwaukee County, Charles F. Kahn, Jr., 
Judge). 
No. 
2005AP2202-CR   
 
2 
 
communications 
for 
crimes 
not 
specifically 
enumerated 
in 
Wisconsin's wiretapping statutes, the order was unlawful and 
evidence from the wiretap should be suppressed. 
¶2 
We 
determine 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
erred 
in 
authorizing 
a 
wiretap 
for 
offenses 
not 
enumerated 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 968.28.2 
However, 
we 
also 
determine 
that 
the 
authorization of a wiretap for non-enumerated offenses does not 
warrant suppression of the evidence obtained from the wiretap in 
this case. The order included both enumerated and non-enumerated 
offenses, and it contained sufficient probable cause for the 
enumerated offenses. Further, the evidence obtained by wiretap 
was for enumerated offenses, and charges were brought only for 
enumerated offenses. Thus, the failure does not conflict with 
the statutory objectives of protecting privacy and limiting 
wiretapping to situations clearly calling for the use of such an 
extraordinary device. Accordingly, we affirm the court of 
appeals. 
I 
¶3 
This case stems from an extended investigation of a 
drug-trafficking operation which focused on Samuel Caraballo and 
Felix Rivera. In March 2004, a detective in the Milwaukee Police 
Department applied to the circuit court of Milwaukee County for 
an order authorizing interception of communications from a cell 
phone associated with Caraballo. The application was based on an 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-
06 version unless otherwise noted.  
No. 
2005AP2202-CR   
 
3 
 
investigation by Milwaukee's High Intensity Drug Trafficking 
Area Drug Gang Task Force (HIDTA). 
¶4 
The affidavit supporting the application describes a 
drug-trafficking 
enterprise 
involving 
at 
least 
a 
dozen 
individuals and multiple businesses. It describes HIDTA's use of 
a variety of investigative techniques to gain information about 
the operation, including confidential informants, controlled 
purchases, physical surveillance, a John Doe investigation, 
garbage searches, and traces on telephone numbers associated 
with Caraballo.  It also explains why those procedures and other 
possible investigative tools had failed, appeared unlikely to 
succeed if attempted, or were too dangerous to use.  
¶5 
The application for the wiretap asserts that the 
evidence produced by the HIDTA investigation was sufficient to 
show probable cause that the subjects had committed, were 
committing, and would continue to commit violations of a number 
of 
state 
drug 
trafficking 
statutes.3 
These 
include 
                                                 
3 The affidavit in the application reads as follows:  
[Subjects] and others, as yet unknown, have committed, 
are committing and will continue to commit state 
violations 
of 
Wisconsin 
Statutes 
§ 961.41[(1)] 
(Manufacture, Distribution or Delivery), § 961.41(1m) 
(Possession With Intent to Manufacture, Distribute or 
Deliver) and § 961.42 (Keeping a Place for Using, 
Manufacturing, Keeping or Delivering) for controlled 
substances 
including, 
but 
not 
limited 
to 
§ 961.16(2)(b) 
(cocaine), 
§ 961.14(4)(am) 
(. . . 
"Ecstasy" 
or 
MDMA) 
and 
§ 961.14(3)(k)(heroin); 
§§ 939.31 and 961.41(1x)(Conspiracy), and §§ 946.83 
and 
946.85 
(Racketeering 
and 
Continuing 
Criminal 
Enterprises) as well as federal violations of Title 
21, United States Code, §§ 841(a)(1)(Possession with 
No. 
2005AP2202-CR   
 
4 
 
§ 961.41(1)(manufacture, distribution or delivery), § 961.41(1m) 
(possession with intent to manufacture, distribute or deliver) 
and § 961.42 (keeping a place for using, manufacturing, keeping 
or delivering) for controlled substances, including cocaine, 
ecstasy, and heroin. The application also stated that the 
defendants 
had 
violated state conspiracy and racketeering 
statutes, 
including 
Wis. Stat. §§ 939.31 
and 
961.41(1x) 
(conspiracy), 
and 
§§ 946.83 
and 
946.85 
(racketeering 
and 
continuing criminal enterprises).  
¶6 
In addition to the violations of state law, the 
application asserted violations of federal statutes, including 
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1)(possession with the intent to distribute 
and distribution of controlled substances), 846 (conspiracy), 
and 843(b)(use of a communication facility to facilitate 
controlled substance felonies). Further, it averred probable 
cause 
for 
violations 
of 
federal 
racketeering 
and 
money 
laundering laws, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952 (interstate and foreign 
travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises), 
and 1956 and 1957 (money laundering). The application for the 
                                                                                                                                                             
the 
Intent 
to 
Distribute 
and 
Distribution 
of 
Controlled Substances, including but not limited to 
cocaine, Ecstasy (MDMA) and heroin), 846 (conspiracy) 
and 
843(b)(Use 
of 
a 
Communication 
Facility 
to 
Facilitate 
Controlled 
Substance 
Felonies), 
and 
violations of Title 18, United States Code, §§ 1952 
(Interstate and Foreign Travel of Transportation in 
Aid of Racketeering Enterprises), and 1956 and 1957 
(Money Laundering). 
No. 
2005AP2202-CR   
 
5 
 
wiretap was approved by the district attorney for Milwaukee 
County and the state attorney general. 
¶7 
The circuit court approved the wiretap for a 30-day 
period. The order authorizing the wiretap incorporates the 
language of the application and approves wiretapping for all of 
the crimes set forth in the application.4 The State requested and 
received two extensions of the wiretap.  
                                                 
4 The order authorizing the wiretap provides in relevant 
part: 
It is hereby ordered: 
That law enforcement officers of the High Intensity 
Drug 
Trafficking 
Area 
Drug 
Gang 
Task 
Force 
(HIDTA) . . . be and they are hereby authorized . . . 
to intercept the wire (cellular phone) communications 
of 
[subjects] 
and 
others, 
yet 
unknown . . . such 
communication 
concerning 
or 
related 
to 
 
state 
violations 
of 
Wisconsin 
Statutes 
§ 
961.41[(1)] 
(Manufacture, Distribution or Delivery), § 961.41(1m) 
(Possession With Intent to Manufacture, Distribute or 
Deliver) and § 961.42 (Keeping a Place for Using, 
Manufacturing, Keeping or Delivering) for controlled 
substances 
including, 
but 
not 
limited 
to, 
§ 
961.16(2)(b) 
(cocaine), 
§ 
961.14(4)(am) 
(3,4-
methylenedioxymethampetamine:  "Ecstasy" or MDMA) and 
§ 961.14(3)(k) (heroin); §§ 939.31 and 961.41(1x) 
(Conspiracy), and §§ 946.83 and 946.85 (Racketeering 
and 
Continuing 
Criminal Enterprises) as well as 
federal violations of Title 21, United States Code, §§ 
841(a)(1) (Possession with the Intent to Distribute 
and Distribution of Controlled Substances, including 
but not limited to cocaine, Ecstasy (MDMA) and 
heroin), 846 (Conspiracy), and 843(b) (Use of a 
Communication 
Facility 
to 
Facilitate 
Controlled 
Substance Felonies), and violations of Title 18, 
United States Code, §§ 1952 (Interstate and Foreign 
Travel or 
Transportation in Aid of Racketeering 
Enterprises), 
and 
1956 
and 
1957 
(Money 
Laundering) . . . . 
No. 
2005AP2202-CR   
 
6 
 
¶8 
In May 2004, the State filed a complaint naming over 
30 people as defendants. The 15 counts in the complaint all 
pertain to drug trafficking and conspiracy to traffic drugs. The 
complaint 
did 
not 
include 
charges 
for 
money 
laundering, 
racketeering, or continuing criminal enterprise. House was 
charged with two counts of conspiracy to deliver cocaine. The 
complaint describes five calls that House made to Caraballo's 
phone in which House requests cocaine or arranges to receive 
cocaine from Caraballo. 
¶9 
House moved to suppress evidence obtained from the 
wiretap on two grounds. First, he asserted that the order for 
the wiretaps was unlawful because it authorized wiretaps for 
crimes not enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 968.28. Second, he argued 
that the extensions for the wiretap were unlawful because they 
failed to conform to the requirement under Wis. Stat. §§ 968.30 
and 968.28 that applications for extensions receive approval 
from the district attorney and the attorney general. The circuit 
court denied the motion with regard to the first ground. 
However, it granted House's motion to exclude the evidence 
obtained from the wiretap during its extension.5 
¶10 House subsequently entered a guilty plea to one count 
of conspiracy to deliver cocaine. He was sentenced to two years, 
six months initial confinement and three years, six months 
extended supervision. He appealed the denial of his suppression 
                                                 
5 The State does not challenge the circuit court's order 
excluding the evidence obtained during the wiretap extension. 
No. 
2005AP2202-CR   
 
7 
 
motion, 
arguing 
that 
money 
laundering, 
racketeering, 
and 
continuing criminal enterprise were outside the scope of 
Wisconsin's 
wiretapping 
statutes. 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
questioned the validity of the State's claim that such crimes 
are encompassed in "dealing in controlled substances," which is 
within the scope of the statutes. Nonetheless, it affirmed 
House's judgment of conviction. It determined that including 
offenses not enumerated in Wisconsin's wiretap statutes in the 
wiretap order did not render the order unlawful. 
II 
¶11 In this case we must determine whether a circuit court 
erred in authorizing a wiretap for offenses not enumerated in 
Wisconsin's wiretap statutes, and if so, whether suppression of 
evidence obtained by the wiretap is warranted. In resolving 
these questions we interpret statutes and apply those statutes 
to the particular facts of this case. Questions of statutory 
interpretation and application present questions of law which we 
review independently of the determinations rendered by the 
circuit court and the court of appeals.  Kierstyn v. Racine 
Unified School Dist., 228 Wis. 2d 81, 88, 596 N.W.2d 417 (1999). 
III 
¶12 House 
contends 
that 
because 
money 
laundering, 
racketeering, 
and 
continuing 
criminal 
enterprise 
are 
not 
specifically enumerated crimes for which wiretaps are authorized 
under the Wisconsin wiretap statutes, the order authorizing the 
wiretap in this case was unlawful. We begin our analysis by 
examining 
the 
words 
of 
Wisconsin's 
wiretap 
statute, 
No. 
2005AP2202-CR   
 
8 
 
Wis. Stat. § 968.28. It states in relevant part that a circuit 
court may authorize wiretaps only where the wiretap may provide, 
or has provided, evidence of certain enumerated crimes: 
The 
authorization [of an interception] shall be 
permitted only if the interception may provide or has 
provided evidence of the commission of the offense of 
homicide, 
felony 
murder, 
kidnapping, 
commercial 
gambling, bribery, extortion, dealing in controlled 
substances or controlled substance analogs, a computer 
crime that is a felony under s. 943.70, or any 
conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing offenses. 
¶13 A plain reading of the statute reflects that the 
crimes of money laundering, racketeering and continuing criminal 
enterprise 
are 
not 
specifically 
enumerated 
crimes.  
Nevertheless, the State argues that a circuit court may 
authorize wiretaps for those crimes insofar as they constitute 
"dealing in controlled substances," which is an enumerated 
offense under § 968.28. We disagree. Not only is such an 
interpretation inconsistent with the plain words of the statute, 
it also contradicts the legislative intent that § 968.28 be a 
restrictive statute.  By authorizing a wiretap for money 
laundering, racketeering, and continuing criminal enterprise, 
the circuit court expanded the scope of a wiretap beyond the 
statutory limit.  It therefore erred in providing such an 
authorization. 
¶14 The 
interception 
of 
wire, 
oral, 
and 
electronic 
communications is governed by Title III of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which is codified at 18 
U.S.C. Part I, Ch. 119, § 2510, et sub. (2006). Wisconsin's 
No. 
2005AP2202-CR   
 
9 
 
electronic surveillance statutes are patterned after Title III. 
Our interpretation of the state statutes therefore benefits from 
the legislative history and intent of Title III and from federal 
decisions 
considering 
Title 
III. 
State 
v. 
Gilmore, 
201 
Wis. 2d 820, 825, 549 N.W.2d 401 (1996).  
¶15 Congress intended that Title III be construed strictly 
because it knew that it was creating an investigative mechanism 
which 
potentially 
threatened 
the 
constitutional 
right 
to 
privacy.  "[I]t carefully wrote into the law the protective 
procedures for the issuance of warrants which the Supreme Court 
had declared in Katz v. United States [389 U.S. 347 (1967)] and 
Berger v. New York [388 U.S. 41 (1967)] were constitutional 
precondition[s] 
of . . . electronic 
surveillance." 
 
United 
States v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267, 277 (2d Cir. 1974)(internal 
quotations omitted). 
¶16 Congress 
also 
intended 
to 
limit 
wiretapping 
to 
investigations of certain major offenses. S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 
2186. Title III circumscribes the authority of both federal and 
state agencies. The authority of federal agencies is set forth 
in subsection (1) of 18 U.S.C. § 2516 and the authority of the 
state agencies is set forth in subsection (2).   
¶17 Each of the offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) 
was chosen by Congress "either because it is intrinsically 
serious or because it is characteristic of the operations of 
organized crime." S. Rep. No. 1097 at 2186. In enacting 18 
U.S.C. § 2516(2), Congress intended that any state statute 
No. 
2005AP2202-CR   
 
10 
 
permitting wiretaps "must meet the minimum standards reflected 
as a whole in the proposed chapter," and that states "would be 
free to adopt more restrictive legislation, or no legislation at 
all, but not less restrictive legislation." S. Rep. No. 1097 at 
2187.  
¶18 Thus, 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) is intended to provide two 
things. It assures that states would allow wiretapping only for 
crimes that are at least as "intrinsically serious" or as 
"characteristic of organized crime" as those crimes enumerated 
in § 2516(1). It also allows, if the legislatures so choose, 
that state statutes may place greater restrictions on wiretaps 
than do the federal statutes.  However, states may not enact 
legislation broader than that which is authorized for the states 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2). 
¶19 Title III outlines the requirements that federal 
agencies must meet in order to receive authorization for 
interceptions and designates by statute number the offenses for 
which wiretaps may be authorized. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1). The 
enumerated offenses are set forth in subparagraphs (a) through 
(f). For instance, subparagraph (a) includes those offenses that 
fall within the national security category, including offenses 
involving espionage, sabotage, and treason. Subparagraph (b) 
includes the offenses of murder, kidnapping, robbery and 
extortion. Subparagraphs (c), (d), and (e)  enumerate scores of 
federal 
offenses, 
including 
the 
manufacture, 
importation, 
receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in 
narcotic 
drugs, 
marijuana, 
or 
other 
dangerous 
drugs, 
No. 
2005AP2202-CR   
 
11 
 
racketeering, and money laundering. Finally, subparagraph (f) 
includes any conspiracy to commit the specifically enumerated 
federal offenses. 
¶20 Subparagraph (2) of 18 U.S.C. § 2516 authorizes states 
to enact laws governing state law enforcement agents' use of 
wiretaps and sets forth the following requirements:  
The principal prosecuting attorney of any State, or 
the principal prosecuting attorney of any political 
subdivision thereof, if such attorney is authorized by 
a statute of that State to make application to a State 
court judge of competent jurisdiction for an order 
authorizing or approving the interception of wire, 
oral, or electronic communications, may apply to such 
judge for, and such judge may grant in conformity with 
section 2518 of this chapter and with the applicable 
State statute an order authorizing, or approving the 
interception 
of 
wire, 
oral 
or 
electronic 
communications by investigative or law enforcement 
officers having responsibility for the investigation 
of the offense as to which the application is made, 
when such interception may provide or has provided 
evidence of the commission of the offense of murder, 
kidnapping, gambling, robbery, bribery, extortion, or 
dealing 
in 
narcotic 
drugs, 
marihuana 
or 
other 
dangerous drugs, or other crime dangerous to life, 
limb, or property, and punishable by imprisonment for 
more than one year, designated in any applicable State 
statute 
authorizing 
such 
interception, 
or 
any 
conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing offenses. 
18 U.S.C. § 2516(2)(emphasis added).  
No. 
2005AP2202-CR   
 
12 
 
¶21 Wisconsin's 
wiretapping 
statutes 
reflect 
the 
provisions 
set 
forth 
in 
18 
U.S.C. 
§ 2516(2).6 
Under 
Wis. Stat. § 968.30(3)(a) a court may not enter an order for a 
wiretap unless "[t]here is probable cause for belief that an 
individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a 
particular offense enumerated in s. 968.28." In turn, § 968.28 
provides that interceptions of communications may be authorized 
for only a limited group of offenses: 
homicide, 
felony 
murder, 
kidnapping, 
commercial 
gambling, bribery, extortion, dealing in controlled 
substances or controlled substance analogs, a computer 
crime that is a felony under s. 943.70, or any 
conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing offenses. 
¶22 It is clear that the legislature intended that the 
offenses enumerated in § 968.28 be patterned after those in 18 
U.S.C. § 2516(2). Thus, § 968.28 sets forth mostly the same 
crimes, in the same order, and in largely the same language as 
the crimes listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2). However, unlike its 
federal counterpart, the state wiretap statute does not include 
the offense of robbery.  
                                                 
6 The 
Senate 
Report 
accompanying 
Title 
III 
describes 
§ 2516(2) as providing the template for state laws providing for 
wiretaps. S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), 
reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2187. In an analysis of 
1969 
Assembly 
Bill 
860, 
which 
established 
Wisconsin's 
wiretapping statutes, then Attorney General Robert W. Warren 
echoed 
this 
view, 
stating 
that 
under 
the 
Wisconsin 
law 
"[a]uthorization can be permitted only in certain crimes which 
have been set out in the federal statute authorizing the states 
to 
adopt 
these regulations." Legislative Reference Bureau 
drafting file for ch. 427, Laws of 1969. 
No. 
2005AP2202-CR   
 
13 
 
¶23 As noted, Title III permits states "to adopt more 
restrictive legislation, or no legislation at all, but not less 
restrictive legislation." United States v. Capra, 501 F.2d at 
276 (quoting S. Rep. No. 1097, supra, 2187). Wisconsin's 
legislature allowed that most of those crimes explicitly 
designated by 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) could be the basis for a 
wiretap. However, the legislature did not permit circuit courts 
to authorize wiretaps for the purpose of providing evidence for 
robbery, even though robbery is an offense for which states may 
allow wiretapping under 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2).  
¶24 In addition, § 2516(2) of the federal statute provides 
that states may authorize wiretaps for "other crime[s] dangerous 
to life, limb, or property, and punishable by imprisonment for 
more than one year, designated in any applicable State statute 
authorizing such interception." 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2). Consistent 
with those requirements, in 1983 the Wisconsin legislature 
amended § 968.28 to include "a computer crime that is a felony 
under s. 943.70." 1983 Wis. Act 438. Computer crimes are 
dangerous to life, limb, or property,7 felony computer crimes are 
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year,8 and the state 
statute authorizing wiretaps designates computer crimes as 
subject to wiretapping. 
                                                 
7 See Wis. Stat. §§ 943.70(2)(b)2.-4.  
8 See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 943.70(2)(b)2.-4., 
§ 939.50 
(classification of felonies). 
No. 
2005AP2202-CR   
 
14 
 
¶25 The 
legislative 
history 
of 
the 
computer 
crimes 
provision demonstrates the intent that Wisconsin's wiretapping 
statutes be restrictive in accordance with Title III. The 
drafting instructions for 1983 Wis. Act 438 reflected the 
federal 
requirement 
that 
offenses 
must 
be 
specifically 
enumerated in the statute in order to obtain authorization for a 
wiretap: 
To: Bruce 
From: Dick White 
Drafting Instructions:  
 . . . . 
Authorize use of wiretaps in computer crime cases 
where there is a significant risk of causing great 
bodily harm because of the crime. (Cannot currently 
get a wiretap in these cases——it's not a specifically 
authorized 
crime 
for 
which 
wiretapping 
can 
be 
authorized . . . .) 
Legislative Reference Bureau drafting file for 1983 Wis. Act 
438. 
¶26 A "Note to File" also recognizes that the federal 
legislation limits the state's ability to authorize wiretapping 
by the enumeration of only certain offenses. "18 U.S.C. 2516——
limits state regulation of wiretapping to certain offense[s]." A 
subsequent drafter's note reflects that the original draft of 
the amendment needed to be modified in keeping with the 
"restrictive" approach of the legislation: 
DRAFTER'S NOTE: When you review this draft, please 
note the following: (1) The wiretap revision is more 
restrictive than you requested. The federal law (18 
U.S.C. 2516) limits the states to covering offenses 
No. 
2005AP2202-CR   
 
15 
 
which are punishable by imprisonment for more than one 
year. I limited the change accordingly . . . . 
Legislative Reference Bureau drafting file for 1983 Wis. Act 
438. 
¶27 Thus, the legislature carefully demarcated the crimes 
for which wiretaps may be authorized under § 968.28. It followed 
the provisions in Title III, but deliberately did not include 
every crime contemplated in 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2). Further, where 
§ 968.28 allows that a wiretap can be authorized for a crime not 
explicitly set forth in the federal statute, it carefully 
complies with the requirements of § 2516(2) providing for such 
additions. 
¶28 The State's view that the circuit court may authorize 
wiretaps for racketeering, continuing criminal enterprise, and 
money laundering because those crimes constitute "dealing in 
controlled substances" conflicts with the narrowly circumscribed 
scope of § 968.28. By authorizing a wiretap for racketeering, 
continuing 
criminal 
enterprise, and money laundering, the 
circuit court expanded the scope of the wiretap beyond the limit 
authorized by law. 
¶29  The 
State 
correctly 
asserts 
that 
dealing 
in 
controlled substances may provide a foundation for racketeering 
or continuing criminal enterprise charges and that money 
laundering may be an aspect of a drug dealing operation. 
However, those offenses may also be based on crimes not 
enumerated in § 968.28. Thus, including them in an order 
authorizing a wiretap in effect authorizes a wiretap for other 
No. 
2005AP2202-CR   
 
16 
 
crimes that would support a racketeering, continuing criminal 
enterprise, or money laundering charge. 
¶30 As an example, by including racketeering in the 
authorization, the circuit court potentially incorporated more 
than one hundred additional criminal offenses.  Section 946.82 
defines expansively "racketeering activity." Among the statutes 
listed as potentially constituting racketeering are §§ 943.32 
(Robbery), 943.38 (Forgery), 943.76 (Infecting animals with a 
contagious disease), 944.34 (Keeping place of prostitution), and 
946.49 (Bail jumping). An order that authorizes the interception 
of 
communications 
"concerning or related to" racketeering 
violations, therefore, has the effect of authorizing the 
interception of communications concerning or related to robbery, 
forgery, infecting animals with a contagious disease, keeping a 
place of prostitution, and bail jumping. These offenses are 
clearly not among those for which the legislature has authorized 
wiretapping. 
Moreover, 
as 
noted 
above, 
the 
legislature 
conspicuously declined to include robbery in the list of crimes 
for which wiretapping may be authorized, despite the fact that 
Title III expressly provides that state wiretapping statutes may 
include robbery. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2).  
¶31 The wiretap order also authorized interceptions of 
communications concerning continuing criminal enterprise and 
violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957, two federal money 
laundering statutes. Similar to the effect of authorizing 
interceptions for racketeering, authorizing the interception of 
communications for continuing criminal enterprise and money 
No. 
2005AP2202-CR   
 
17 
 
laundering in effect authorizes interceptions for crimes not 
enumerated in § 968.28. Further, while "dealing in controlled 
substances" may provide a foundation for the crimes of money 
laundering, racketeering, and continuing criminal enterprise, 
those crimes encompass a great deal more than dealing in 
controlled 
substances. 
Interpreting 
"dealing 
in 
controlled 
substances" 
as 
including 
racketeering, 
continuing 
criminal 
enterprise, and money laundering therefore conflicts with the 
restrictive nature of the Wisconsin statutes. 
¶32 The State also argues that, even if "dealing in 
controlled substances" does not include the offenses of money 
laundering, racketeering, and continuing criminal enterprise as 
a general matter, in this case it is clear that those crimes are 
all part of a drug trafficking operation. With this view, only 
those money laundering, racketeering, and continuing criminal 
enterprise activities related to drug trafficking would be open 
to interception here. This argument is unpersuasive. It is 
contrary to the language of the order, which does not limit 
interceptions of communications regarding money laundering, 
racketeering, and continuing criminal enterprise to instances 
where those crimes are related to drug trafficking.9 
                                                 
9 Limiting a wiretap order to enumerated offenses need not 
have the effect of limiting the use of evidence gathered 
pursuant to a lawful wiretap order to those crimes specifically 
set out in the order. Wis. Stat. § 968.29(5) provides that when 
an agent intercepts: 
communications relating to offenses other than those 
specified in the order . . . . The contents and any 
evidence derived therefrom may be used under sub. (3) 
No. 
2005AP2202-CR   
 
18 
 
¶33 In 
sum, 
we 
conclude 
that 
money 
laundering, 
racketeering, 
and 
continuing 
criminal 
enterprise 
are 
not 
specifically enumerated offenses in § 928.28 and that those 
offenses 
are 
not 
included 
within 
"dealing 
in 
controlled 
substances," 
which 
is 
an 
enumerated 
offense. 
 
Such 
a 
construction would 
contradict the legislative intent that 
§ 968.28 be a restrictive statute and would result in expanding 
the scope of a wiretap authorization beyond the statutorily 
imposed limitations.  Accordingly we determine that the circuit 
court erred in authorizing a wiretap for offenses not enumerated 
in Wis. Stat. § 968.28. 
IV 
¶34 Having determined that the circuit court erred in 
authorizing a wiretap for crimes not enumerated in § 968.28, we 
turn to the question of whether suppression is required. House 
asserts that the suppression of any evidence resulting from the 
wiretap is required under § 968.30(9)(a). Our interpretation of 
the statutes and case law leads us to conclude that suppression 
is not warranted in this case. 
                                                                                                                                                             
[pertaining to use of interceptions in court] when 
authorized or approved by the judge who acted on the 
original 
application 
where 
the 
judge 
finds 
on 
subsequent application, made as soon as practicable 
but no later than 48 hours, that the contents were 
otherwise intercepted in accordance with [Wisconsin's 
wiretapping statutes or Title III]. 
We do not address, however, what the result would be in 
situations other than presented in this case.  
No. 
2005AP2202-CR   
 
19 
 
¶35 We make this determination because the non-enumerated 
crimes in the order are surplusage. The wiretap order includes 
both enumerated and non-enumerated offenses. It is undisputed 
that there was probable cause for the enumerated offenses. There 
is no indication that communications regarding non-enumerated 
offenses were intercepted, and no non-enumerated offenses were 
charged. Thus, the statutory objectives of protecting privacy 
and restricting wiretaps to situations clearly calling for their 
use have been fulfilled despite the violation of § 968.28.  
¶36 In addressing this issue, we look first to the 
statutory 
provision 
for 
suppression. 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 968.30(9)(a) sets forth the conditions under which information 
gathered 
by 
wiretap 
may 
be 
suppressed. 
It 
provides 
for 
suppression 
"on 
the 
grounds 
that 
the 
communication 
was 
unlawfully intercepted; the order of authorization or approval 
under which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or 
the interception was not made in conformity with the order of 
authorization or approval. . . ."10 It is undisputed that the 
                                                 
10 This language mirrors the suppression provision in 18 
U.S.C. 2518(10)(a). That section provides: 
Any aggrieved person . . . may move to suppress the 
contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted 
pursuant 
to 
this 
chapter, 
or 
evidence 
derived 
therefrom, on the grounds that—— 
(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted; 
(ii) the order of authorization or approval under 
which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; 
or 
No. 
2005AP2202-CR   
 
20 
 
wiretaps in this case were made in conformity with the 
authorization order. 
¶37 Further, the order authorizing the wiretap was not 
insufficient on its face. Section 968.30(4) lists the things 
that must be specified in an order authorizing a wiretap. It 
requires, for example, that an order specify the person to be 
wiretapped, the organization authorized to perform the wiretap, 
and the person authorizing the application for the wiretap. 
Wis. Stat. §§ 968.30(4)(a) and (d). Relevant to this case is the 
requirement that the order specify the "the particular offense 
to which [the wiretap] relates." Wis. Stat. § 968.30(4)(c). In 
this case, the order did specify the offenses to which the 
wiretap related. The error was not that the order was 
"insufficient on its face," which is a potential ground for 
exclusion under § 968.30(9)(a). Rather, the error was that by 
referencing non-enumerated offenses, the order included too 
much. 
¶38 Because the evidence here cannot be excluded on the 
grounds that the interception did not conform with the order or 
that the order was insufficient on its face, exclusion would 
have to be on the ground that "the communication was unlawfully 
intercepted." Although the circuit court erred in authorizing a 
                                                                                                                                                             
(iii) the interception was not made in conformity with 
the order of authorization or approval. 
 . . . If the motion is granted, the contents of the 
intercepted wire or oral communication, or evidence 
derived therefrom, shall be treated as having been 
obtained in violation of this chapter. . . .  
No. 
2005AP2202-CR   
 
21 
 
wiretap for offenses not enumerated in § 968.28, not every 
failure to follow wiretapping statutes makes an interception 
unlawful such that suppression is required. United States v. 
Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 574-75 (1974). Rather, whether a violation 
of the wiretapping statutes requires suppression depends upon 
whether the statutory purpose has been achieved despite the 
violation. United State v. Cunningham, 113 F.3d 289, 293-94 (1st 
Cir. 1997)(quoting United States v. Johnson, 696 F.2d 115, 121 
(D.C. Cir. 1982). 
¶39 In United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974), an 
application for a wiretap stated that an Assistant Attorney 
General specially designated by the Attorney General had 
authorized the application, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1).11 
416 U.S. at 508-09. In fact, the application had been reviewed 
and authorized by the Executive Assistant to the Attorney 
General, who did not have statutory authority to authorize 
wiretap applications. Id. at 509-10. The Court determined that 
the interceptions were unlawful and suppression was warranted 
because the order failed to satisfy a statutory requirement 
"that directly and substantially implement[s] the congressional 
                                                 
11 Under 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1), applications for wiretaps may 
be authorized by: 
The 
Attorney 
General, 
Deputy 
Attorney 
General, 
Associate Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney 
General, any acting Assistant Attorney General, or any 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General or acting Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division or 
National Security Division specially designated by the 
Attorney General . . . . 
No. 
2005AP2202-CR   
 
22 
 
intention to limit the use of intercept procedures to those 
situations 
clearly 
calling 
for 
the 
employment 
of 
this 
extraordinary investigative device." Id. at 527.  
¶40 In contrast, Chavez involved an application for a 
wiretap that indicated a designated Assistant Attorney General 
had approved the application, when in fact the Attorney General 
had approved the application. 416 U.S. at 565-66. The Court 
determined that where it is clear that the Attorney General 
authorized the application for a wiretap, the misidentification 
of the approving official on the application does not undermine 
the purpose of statute. Thus, the Court concluded that the 
misidentification did not render interceptions unlawful and that 
suppression of evidence from the wiretap would be error. Id. at 
579-80. 
¶41 United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413 (1976), 
involved an application for a wiretap in which the Government 
failed to comply with 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(iv), which requires 
that the Government include in any wiretap application "the 
identity of the person, if known, committing the offense and 
whose communications are to be intercepted." Id. at 416. The 
Court determined that so long as the authorizing court fulfills 
the 
statutory 
requirements 
to 
determine 
that 
normal 
investigative techniques are unsuccessful and to find probable 
cause,12 the failure to identify a person under § 2518(1)(b)(iv) 
does not render a wiretap unlawful. Id. at 436. As in Chavez, 
                                                 
12 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(3)(a)-(d).   
No. 
2005AP2202-CR   
 
23 
 
the failure to comply with the statute did not render the 
interceptions unlawful, and did not require suppression. Id. at 
439. 
¶42 Federal courts analyzing the Title III suppression 
provisions in light of Giordano, Chavez, and Donovan have 
determined that "violations of even . . . central requirements 
do not mandate suppression if the Government demonstrates to the 
court's satisfaction that the statutory purpose has been 
achieved despite the violation." Cunningham, 113 F.3d at 293-94; 
United States v. Lopez, 300 F.3d 46, 56 (1st Cir. 2002); see 
also United States v. Chun, 503 F.2d 533, 542 (9th Cir. 1974).  
¶43 The few federal courts that have addressed the 
question of whether including non-enumerated offenses in a 
wiretap 
order 
requires 
suppression 
have 
come 
to 
varying 
conclusions. House cites to two federal cases for the view that 
interceptions made pursuant to an order that references non-
enumerated offenses are subject to suppression, United States v. 
Millstone, 684 F. Supp. 867 (W.D.Pa. 1988)(reversed on other 
grounds), and United States v. Ward, 808 F. Supp. 803 (S.D.Ga. 
1992).  
¶44 In Millstone, a Pennsylvania court authorized a 
wiretap based on a finding of probable cause that the subject of 
the 
wiretap 
was 
committing 
three 
crimes: 
prostitution, 
racketeering, 
and 
conspiracy 
to 
commit 
prostitution 
and 
racketeering. 684 F. Supp. at 869.  The court determined that 
the wiretap was illegal because prostitution and racketeering 
are not enumerated offenses within the scope of 18 U.S.C. 
No. 
2005AP2202-CR   
 
24 
 
§ 2516(2), and that any evidence from such a wiretap was 
inadmissible. Id. at 870.  Millstone, however, is inapt. In that 
case, the wiretap order referenced only non-enumerated offenses. 
This contrasts with the present case, where the non-enumerated 
offenses are surplus to an enumerated offense.  
¶45 In Ward, the court authorized wiretaps based on 
applications asserting, among other offenses, violations of 18 
U.S.C. § 1953 (interstate transportation of wagering material) 
and 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (tax evasion), neither of which are 
enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1). Citing to Giordano, the court 
determined 
that 
Congress 
intended 
to 
restrict 
wiretap 
authorizations 
to 
specific 
offenses, 
and 
that 
an 
order 
authorizing interceptions for non-enumerated offenses warrants 
suppression.  808 F. Supp. at 806. 
¶46 The most recent district court to address the question 
is the Eastern District of Wisconsin, which reached a different 
conclusion than the Ward court. In United States v. O'Neill, 27 
F. Supp. 2d 1121 (E.D. Wis. 1998), an order authorized a wiretap 
for numerous offenses set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1). In 
addition, the order listed 18 U.S.C. § 842(h) (concerning stolen 
explosives), which is not enumerated in the statute. Id. at 
1127. The court denied the defendant's motion to suppress, 
rejecting the view that "reference to a non-listed offense in 
the surveillance authorizations completely invalidates those 
authorizations." Id. 
¶47 The Tenth Circuit has addressed a related issue. In 
United States v. Smart, 278 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2002), federal 
No. 
2005AP2202-CR   
 
25 
 
investigators submitted an application for a court order 
authorizing a wiretap to investigate several offenses, including 
violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (fraud relating to federal 
health care programs). Id. at 1170. That offense is not 
enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1). The order authorizing the 
wiretap, however, did not reference the non-enumerated offense. 
The Tenth Circuit concluded that the order was not unlawful and 
that suppression was unwarranted. Id. at 1174. However, the 
court specifically declined to address the question of whether 
an 
order 
referencing 
non-enumerated 
offenses 
would 
merit 
suppression. "The question of whether an order authorizing 
wiretapping in investigation of both enumerated and non-
enumerated offenses would survive review is saved for another 
day." Id. 
¶48 With scant and equivocal law on the effect of 
including non-enumerated offenses in a wiretapping order, we 
must decide whether the purposes of the wiretapping statutes 
have been fulfilled despite the violation of § 968.28 by 
including surplus, non-enumerated offenses in the wiretap order. 
We determine that under the circumstances here, the purposes 
have been fulfilled.  
¶49 The court in United States v. Escobar-de Jesus 
discussed the purposes that Title III seeks to achieve:  "the 
statutory 
objectives 
of 
protecting 
privacy 
interests 
and 
ensuring that intercept procedures are used only in 'those 
situations 
clearly 
calling 
for 
the 
employment 
of 
this 
extraordinary investigative device.'" 187 F.3d 148, 171 (1st 
No. 
2005AP2202-CR   
 
26 
 
Cir. 1999)(quoting Giordano, 416 U.S. at 527); see Lopez, 300 
F.3d at 56.  
¶50 Here the order contains both enumerated and non-
enumerated offenses. There is no question that the foundation of 
the wiretap application and order in this case is dealing in 
controlled substances. The application for the wiretap detailed 
an extensive drug trafficking operation and an elaborate law 
enforcement investigation of that operation. The focus of the 
application and the order was distribution and possession with 
intent to distribute cocaine, heroin, and ecstasy, as well as 
conspiracy to commit those crimes.  
¶51 Those crimes are all squarely within the scope of 
§ 968.28. Because the focus of this case was on enumerated 
crimes, the intercept procedures were used in a situation 
"calling for the employment of this extraordinary investigative 
device." Giordano, 416 U.S. at 527. The addition of the non-
enumerated crimes does not undermine this purpose.  
¶52 Likewise, inclusion of the non-enumerated offenses 
here does not undermine the purpose of protecting privacy 
interests.  As the court in Escobar-de Jesus noted: 
To the extent that Title III is designed to protect 
privacy interests similar to those reflected in the 
Fourth 
Amendment . . . that 
statutory 
purpose 
was 
served by the district court's finding of probable 
cause to intercept and by the order's inclusion of 
other items of particularity, including the identity 
of 
the 
person 
whose 
communications 
were 
to 
be 
intercepted, the nature and location of the telephone 
line to be intercepted, a particular description of 
the type of communication sought to be intercepted, 
No. 
2005AP2202-CR   
 
27 
 
and a statement of the particular offense to which the 
communications relate . . . . 
187 F.3d at 171 (internal citations omitted). 
¶53 In order to authorize a wiretap, § 968.30(3) requires 
that the circuit court find probable cause to believe that (a) a 
person is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a 
crime, 
(b) 
communications 
regarding 
the 
crime 
will 
be 
intercepted, (c) other investigative techniques have failed or 
are unlikely to succeed, and (d) the wiretapped facilities are 
used or will be used in connection with the crimes. Here, there 
is no question that there was probable cause for each of these 
with respect to the enumerated drug offenses. The error in this 
case is one of referencing surplus offenses alongside the 
enumerated offenses for which there was ample probable cause.  
¶54 Moreover, there is no contention that including the 
offenses led to additional interceptions in this case. House 
makes no claim, and there is nothing in the record before us to 
suggest, that the wiretap intercepted communications beyond 
those pertaining to dealing in controlled substances. The 
evidence obtained by the wiretap addressed only the properly 
enumerated offenses.  
¶55 Additionally, House has been charged only with crimes 
enumerated in § 968.28. House was charged with conspiracy to 
deliver cocaine. He was not charged with money laundering, 
racketeering, or continuing criminal enterprise.  The error of 
including non-enumerated crimes in the authorization for the 
No. 
2005AP2202-CR   
 
28 
 
wiretap appears to have no consequence as to either the evidence 
obtained or to the charges that were brought. 
¶56 Thus, the addition of the non-enumerated offenses does 
not undermine the statutory purpose of privacy protection in 
this case. The probable cause requirements under § 968.30(3), 
which serve to protect privacy, were met. Further, with respect 
to House, the communications intercepted and the crimes charged 
were within the scope of § 968.28.  
¶57 We find support for this view in cases involving 
misrepresentations 
in 
wiretap 
applications. 
In 
Franks 
v. 
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), the Supreme Court addressed the 
circumstances in which it is appropriate to suppress evidence 
derived from a warrant issued on the basis of an affidavit that 
contained false statements concerning probable cause. Id. at 
155-56. The Court determined that even where a defendant makes a 
sufficient allegation that an affidavit is based on a deliberate 
misrepresentation, a hearing may not be required. Rather, when 
information "that is the subject of the alleged falsity or 
reckless disregard is set to one side, [and] there remains 
sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to support a finding 
of probable case, no hearing is required." Id. at 171-72. 
¶58 The Franks test applies to wiretap applications. 
United States v. Small, 423 F.3d 1164, 1172 (10th Cir. 2005), 
United States v. Southard, 700 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1983). Thus, 
a deliberately or recklessly false statement made in an 
affidavit to obtain a wiretap order "does not in and of itself 
invalidate that . . . order, or compel suppression of evidence 
No. 
2005AP2202-CR   
 
29 
 
obtained upon its execution." United States v. Ippolito, 774 
F.2d 1482, 1485 (9th Cir. 1985). Rather, false statements that 
are material to a finding of probable cause will invalidate the 
order. Id. 
¶59 We acknowledge that the Franks test applies to false 
statements rather than to the inclusion of non-enumerated 
offenses. Nonetheless, its methodology is relevant here. Under 
Franks 
the 
presence 
of 
willful 
false 
statements 
in 
an 
application will not render a wiretap order invalid if there 
remains probable cause even when the false statements are 
removed. Here, we determine that the purposes of Wisconsin's 
wiretapping statutes were fulfilled despite the inclusion of 
non-enumerated offenses in the order.  
¶60 In the present case, the purposes of the wiretap 
statutes have been fulfilled and the error appears to be of no 
material consequence. The enumerated crimes that served as the 
basis for the wiretap order were crimes of sufficient magnitude 
to warrant a wiretap. Further, the privacy protections of the 
probable cause requirements under § 968.30(3) were met. There is 
no contention that the police intercepted any of House's 
communications that were unrelated to the enumerated offenses in 
the order, and House was charged with only enumerated offenses. 
Accordingly, even though we have concluded that the circuit 
court erred in listing the non-enumerated offenses, we determine 
the error does not constitute an unlawful interception such that 
suppression is warranted. 
V 
No. 
2005AP2202-CR   
 
30 
 
¶61 In sum, we determine that the circuit court erred in 
authorizing 
a 
wiretap 
for 
offenses 
not 
enumerated 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 968.28. 
However, 
we 
also 
determine 
that 
the 
authorization of a wiretap for non-enumerated offenses does not 
warrant suppression of the evidence obtained from the wiretap in 
this case. The order included both enumerated and non-enumerated 
offenses, and it contained sufficient probable cause for the 
enumerated offenses. Further, the evidence obtained by wiretap 
was for enumerated offenses, and charges were brought only for 
enumerated offenses. Thus, the failure does not conflict with 
the statutory objectives of protecting privacy and limiting 
wiretapping to situations clearly calling for the use of such an 
extraordinary device. Accordingly, we affirm the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
No.  2005AP2202-CR.NPC 
 
1 
 
 
¶62 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (concurring).  While I join  
the majority's conclusion that suppression of the evidence 
obtained from the wiretap in this case is not warranted, I 
disagree with the majority's determination that the circuit 
court erred in authorizing a wiretap for offenses not enumerated 
in Wis. Stat. § 968.28.  I write separately because I read 
"dealing in controlled substances" under § 968.28 to be broad 
enough to encompass the allegations of money laundering, 
racketeering, and continuing criminal enterprise in this case.   
¶63 Here, the offenses of money laundering, racketeering, 
and continuing criminal enterprise were all part of a drug 
trafficking operation.  This conclusion is supported by the 
affidavit of Detective Stanaszak, which stated, "I believe that 
SAMUEL CARABALLO is operating a drug trafficking organization 
involving numerous family members and other individuals that 
distributes cocaine, Ecstasy (MDMA) and heroin in and around the 
Milwaukee area from sources located outside Wisconsin, utilizing 
commercial properties to facilitate these activities and likely 
launder the proceeds." 
¶64 The application for a wiretap on the phone of Samuel 
Caraballo listed the offenses under investigation as violations 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1)(a) 
(manufacture, 
distribution 
or 
delivery 
of 
controlled 
substances), 
Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1m) 
(possession of controlled substances with intent to manufacture, 
distribute or deliver), and Wis. Stat. § 961.42 (keeping a place 
for using, manufacturing, keeping or delivering controlled 
No.  2005AP2202-CR.NPC 
 
2 
 
substances). 
 
The 
application 
also 
listed 
violations 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 941.41(1x) (conspiracy to commit violations of 
section 
961.41), 
and 
Wis. Stat. §§ 946.83 
and 946.85 
(racketeering 
and 
continuing 
criminal 
enterprises). 
 
The 
application further listed violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) 
(distribution of and possession with intent to distribute 
controlled 
substances), 
21 
U.S.C. 
§ 843(b) 
(use 
of 
a 
communication 
facility 
to 
facilitate 
controlled 
substance 
felonies), 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (interstate or foreign travel or 
transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises), and 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957 (money laundering).  Although the 
wiretap application listed offenses not explicitly enumerated in 
Wis. Stat. § 968.28, it was not invalid, because it established, 
along with the affidavit of Detective Stanaszak in support of 
the application, probable cause that there was a nexus between 
the offenses of money laundering, racketeering, and continuing 
criminal enterprise, and the offense of "dealing in controlled 
substances" in this case.  Wis. Stat. § 968.28.   
¶65 The majority opinion states that the legislature 
intended that the offenses enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 968.28 be 
patterned after those set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2).  
Majority op., ¶22.  The majority opinion quotes former Wisconsin 
Attorney General Robert W. Warren in support of its position 
that authorization of wiretapping is permissible only in certain 
crimes which have been listed in the federal statute.  Majority 
op., ¶21 n.6 (citing Legislative Reference Bureau drafting file 
for ch. 427, Laws of 1969).   
No.  2005AP2202-CR.NPC 
 
3 
 
¶66 Under 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2), the principal prosecuting 
attorney of any state is authorized to apply to a judge for an 
order authorizing interception of wire, oral, or electronic 
communications, where such interception may provide evidence of 
certain types of offenses, including "dealing in narcotic drugs, 
marihuana or other dangerous drugs, or other crime dangerous to 
life, limb, or property, and punishable by imprisonment for more 
than one year. . . ."  The inclusion of the language "or other 
crime dangerous to life, limb, or property, and punishable by 
imprisonment for more than one year . . ." suggests that 
Congress intended that a state, in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2516(2), could authorize wiretapping for a broad range of 
dangerous offenses, not limited to the offenses explicitly 
enumerated in the statute. 
¶67 Additionally, a closer look at then Attorney General 
Robert W. Warren's Analysis of Assembly Bill 8601 evidences an 
intent that Wisconsin's wiretapping statute be used to fight 
organized crime.  Attorney General Warren stated, "Today's law 
enforcement officers need the legal authorization to record the 
conversations of criminals and others who are reasonably 
suspected of serious crimes, and particularly organized crimes."  
Legislative Reference Bureau drafting file for ch. 427, Laws of 
1969.  The offenses of money laundering, racketeering, and 
continuing criminal enterprise in this case are "organized 
crimes" of the type contemplated by Attorney General Warren.  
                                                 
1 1969 Assembly Bill 860 established Wisconsin's wiretapping 
statutes. 
No.  2005AP2202-CR.NPC 
 
4 
 
The legislative history of Wisconsin's wiretapping statute, as 
well as the broad, inclusive language of 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2), 
support a conclusion that the circuit court did not err in 
authorizing 
a 
wiretap 
for 
offenses 
not 
enumerated 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 968.28. 
¶68 For the above stated reasons, I respectfully concur.   
¶69 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX 
and PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join this concurrence. 
 
 
No.  2005AP2202-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶70 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
majority opinion concludes that error was committed when the 
order authorized a wiretap for offenses not enumerated in Wis. 
Stat. § 968.28.  Majority op., ¶2.  The State specifically 
applied 
for 
and 
the 
order 
specifically 
authorized 
the 
interception 
of 
communications 
related 
to 
non-enumerated 
offenses.  I agree with the majority opinion that the order 
violated the statutory requirements. 
¶71 The majority opinion nonetheless refuses to suppress 
the evidence obtained as a result of this invalid order.  The 
legislature carefully restricted the State's powers under the 
wiretapping statute and enacted suppression as an enforcement 
mechanism.  Suppression is appropriate in the instant case to 
ensure proper compliance with statutory requirements.  For the 
following reasons, I dissent. 
No.  2005AP2202-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
I 
¶72 The Wisconsin legislature intended,1 like Congress,2 to 
circumscribe significantly the power to authorize wiretapping.  
                                                 
1 The memorandum submitted by Robert W. Warren, then-
Attorney General of the State of Wisconsin, to the legislature 
considering the wiretap bill explained that although wiretapping 
is 
an 
extremely 
useful 
"tool," 
there 
must 
be 
"strict 
limitations" to the electronic surveillance authority granted to 
local law enforcement.  Warren further explained that "I do not 
advocate, and indeed, this bill opposes the indiscriminate or 
uncontrolled or unsupervised use of electronic surveillance by 
law enforcement officers or agencies. . . . [L]aw enforcement 
usage 
should 
be 
allowed 
only 
upon 
court 
approval 
and 
supervision."  Analysis of Assembly Bill 860 by Robert W. 
Warren, Attorney General, at 2, in Bill Drafting File on Laws of 
1969, ch. 427 (available at Wis. Legislative Reference Bureau, 1 
East Main St., Madison, Wis.).    
One of the express goals of the statute was "to protect 
effectively the privacy of wire and oral communications," and 
accordingly 
the 
wiretapping 
statute 
"prohibit[s] 
any 
unauthorized interception of such communications."  See Assembly 
Bill 860 in Bill Drafting File on Laws of 1969, ch. 427 
(available at Wis. Legislative Reference Bureau, 1 East Main 
St., Madison, Wis.). 
2 "Congress legislated in considerable detail in providing 
for applications and orders authorizing wiretapping and evinced 
the clear intent to make doubly sure that the statutory 
authority 
be 
used 
with 
restraint 
and 
only 
where 
the 
circumstances warrant the surreptitious interception of wire and 
oral communications."  United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 
515 (1974).  
This court has expounded on the careful balance Congress 
sought to achieve between permitting law enforcement officials 
to use wiretapping and protecting individual rights in State v. 
Gilmore, 201 Wis. 2d 820, 830-31, 549 N.W.2d 401 (1996), in 
which the court explained that "[i]n enacting Title III Congress 
displayed 
an 
overriding concern with protecting privacy."  
Gilmore, 201 Wis. 2d at 830.  See also majority op., ¶15 
("Congress intended that Title III be construed strictly because 
it knew that it was creating an investigative mechanism which 
potentially threatened the constitutional right to privacy.").   
No.  2005AP2202-CR.ssa 
 
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Recognizing that it was granting an extraordinary power to law 
enforcement officials and explicitly recognizing the privacy 
interests at stake, the Wisconsin legislature, like Congress, 
carefully crafted the statute to contain precise requirements 
and subjected statutory violations to suppression.3   
¶73 Contrary to the concurring opinion, the statutory 
language "dealing in controlled substances" must be narrowly 
interpreted 
so 
as 
not 
to 
"conflict[] 
with 
the 
narrowly 
circumscribed scope of § 968.28."  Majority op., ¶28.  When the 
legislature goes to great lengths to emphasize the rigor with 
which the law should be applied, the court ought to follow the 
legislature's lead.  The majority opinion properly recognizes 
the precision with which the legislature "demarcated the crimes 
for which wiretaps may be authorized under [Wis. Stat.] 
§ 968.28."  Majority op., ¶27.  The crimes of money laundering, 
racketeering, 
and 
continuing criminal enterprise are non-
enumerated offenses and are not within the scope of the statute.  
Majority op., ¶13.  
                                                 
3 Attorney General Warren explained the provisions allowing 
for suppression as follows: "These built in safe-guards provide 
a dual purpose——that of discouraging law enforcement and 
prosecutive officers as well as judges from seeking and granting 
electronic 
surveillance 
warrants 
except 
in 
selective 
investigative situations, and, obviously, the safeguards protect 
the citizen from unjustified surveillance."  Analysis of 
Assembly Bill 860 by Robert W. Warren, Attorney General, at 6, 
in Bill Drafting File on Laws of 1969, ch. 427 (available at 
Wis. Legislative Reference Bureau, 1 East Main St., Madison, 
Wis.).    
No.  2005AP2202-CR.ssa 
 
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¶74 I agree with the majority opinion that the order that 
authorized surveillance for both enumerated and non-enumerated 
offenses was invalid; it violated the statutory requirements. 
II 
¶75 Despite recognizing that the order violated the 
statutory 
requirements, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
nonetheless 
concludes that "the authorization of a wiretap for non-
enumerated offenses does not warrant suppression of the evidence 
obtained from the wiretap in this case."  Majority op., ¶2.  The 
majority 
opinion 
provides 
no 
sanction 
for 
the 
statutory 
violation, thus trivializing the statutory enumeration of the 
crimes for which wiretap authorization is allowed.  At this 
point, I depart from the majority opinion. 
¶76 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.30(9)(a) expressly provides for 
suppression of evidence for violations of the relevant statutory 
provisions.  It states in full: 
Any 
aggrieved 
person 
in 
any 
trial, 
hearing 
or 
proceeding 
in 
or 
before 
any 
court, 
department, 
officer, agency, regulatory body or other authority of 
this state, or a political subdivision thereof, may 
move before the trial court or the court granting the 
original warrant to suppress the contents of any 
intercepted wire, electronic or oral communication, or 
evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that the 
communication was unlawfully intercepted; the order of 
authorization 
or 
approval 
under 
which 
it 
was 
intercepted is insufficient on its face; or the 
interception was not made in conformity with the order 
of authorization or approval.  The motion shall be 
made before the trial, hearing or proceeding unless 
there was no opportunity to make the motion or the 
person was not aware of the grounds of the motion.  If 
the motion is granted, the contents of the intercepted 
wire, electronic or oral communication, or evidence 
derived therefrom, shall be treated as having been 
No.  2005AP2202-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
obtained in violation of ss. 968.28 to 968.37.  The 
judge may, upon the filing of the motion by the 
aggrieved person, make available to the aggrieved 
person or his or her counsel for inspection such 
portions of the intercepted communication or evidence 
derived therefrom as the judge determines to be in the 
interest of justice.4 
¶77 Suppression 
is 
appropriate 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 968.30(9)(a) when "the order of authorization under which [the 
communication] was intercepted is insufficient on its face."  
"Insufficient 
on 
its 
face" 
means, 
in 
ordinary 
parlance, 
inadequate on its face to meet the statutory requirements.  The 
order here was plainly insufficient on its face. 
¶78 The majority opinion interprets the phrase "an order 
insufficient on its face" to mean an order that has too little 
in it, that is, an order that is missing some important 
information.  The majority opinion reasons that the order in the 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.30(9)(a) mirrors the suppression 
provision located in the federal wiretapping statute, 18 U.S.C. 
2518(10)(a), which provides in pertinent part: 
Any aggrieved person . . . may move to suppress the 
contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted 
pursuant 
to 
this 
chapter, 
or 
evidence 
derived 
therefrom, on the grounds that—— 
(i) 
the communication was unlawfully intercepted; 
(ii) 
the order of authorization or approval under 
which it was intercepted is insufficient on its 
face; or 
(iii) 
the interception was not made in conformity 
with the order of authorization or approval. 
 . . . If the motion is granted, the contents of the 
intercepted wire or oral communication, or evidence 
derived therefrom, shall be treated as having been 
obtained in violation of this chapter. 
No.  2005AP2202-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
instant case does not have "too little" but instead has "too 
much" in it.  Majority op., ¶37.  The majority opinion concludes 
that the order, which references illegally enumerated crimes, 
merely contains "surplusage."  I call an order with too much or 
too little inadequate on its face to meet the requirements of 
Wis. Stat. § 968.28. 
¶79 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.30(9)(a) also expressly permits 
suppression when communications are "unlawfully intercepted." 
The majority opinion adopts the following standard to evaluate 
when 
a 
communication 
is 
"unlawfully 
intercepted" 
and 
a 
suppression motion should be granted: "[W]hether a violation of 
the wiretapping statutes requires suppression depends upon 
whether the statutory purpose has been achieved despite the 
violation."  Majority op., ¶38.   
¶80 The purpose of federal Title III and its wiretapping 
provisions (upon which the state legislation is based) is, 
according to the United States Supreme Court, to prohibit all 
interceptions of oral and wire communications except those 
specifically provided for in the Act.  "[Although] [t]he Act is 
not as clear in some respects as it might be, . . . it is at 
once 
apparent 
that 
it . . . limits 
the 
crimes 
for 
which 
intercept authority may be obtained . . . ."5  Because of the 
violation, the statutory purpose of Wis. Stat. § 968.28 has not 
been achieved in the present case.  The order does not 
sufficiently limit the crimes for which intercept authority may 
                                                 
5 United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 515 (1974). 
No.  2005AP2202-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
be obtained, and therefore the information garnered in violation 
of Wis. Stat. § 968.28 should be suppressed. 
¶81 A somewhat differently worded test to determine 
whether evidence should be suppressed under federal Title III 
and its wiretapping provisions has been articulated by the 
United States Supreme Court: "[S]uppression is required only for 
a 'failure to satisfy any of those statutory requirements that 
directly and substantially implement the congressional intention 
to limit the use of intercept procedures to those situations 
clearly calling for the employment of this extraordinary 
investigative device.'"  United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 
433-34 (1977) (quoting United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 
527 (1974)).  The majority opinion recognizes this test.  
Majority op., ¶42.   
¶82 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.28, with a more limited list of 
offenses for which surveillance is permissible than the federal 
law, is a clear statutory requirement that plays a central and 
functional role in achieving the legislative purpose of guarding 
against unwarranted use of electronic surveillance, and it 
directly and substantially implements the legislative intent to 
limit the use of intercept procedures to only a few expressly 
enumerated offenses.  
¶83 Applying the text of § 968.30(9)(a) and United States 
Supreme Court case law, I would hold that suppression is 
appropriate in the circumstances of the instant case.  I remain 
unpersuaded by what the majority opinion in essence treats as a 
"no harm, no foul" situation.   
No.  2005AP2202-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶84 In 
the 
instant 
case 
the 
application 
and 
order 
contained no clerical error.  There was no inadvertent mistake.  
The error is one that goes to, and directly undermines, a 
fundamental tenet of the wiretapping statute, namely the 
explicit limitation on the crimes for which wiretapping is 
permissible.  Compliance with § 968.28 is no mere technicality.  
By authorizing surveillance for crimes not enumerated in the 
statute, the order in the instant case clearly violates the 
standard for suppression set forth by the United State Supreme 
Court in Donovan and Giordano. 
¶85 The majority opinion is correct that there is limited 
authority on the issue presented.  Indeed, the only case 
directly analyzing and deciding the issue presented in the 
instant case is United States v. Ward, 808 F. Supp. 803 (S.D. 
Ga. 1992), which the Ward court described as a case of first 
impression.6   
¶86 In Ward, the order for wiretaps allowed surveillance 
for two offenses not enumerated in the federal wiretapping 
statute.  The Ward court reasoned that permitting the government 
to proceed without sanctions for the over-inclusive applications 
and intercept orders provides no incentive to the government to 
fulfill its responsibilities to comply with the statute.  
Suppression, on the other hand, serves the deterrent purpose of 
the statute and places the burden on the government to comply 
with the statute, according to the Ward court. 
                                                 
6 United States v. Ward, 808 F. Supp. 803, 805 (S.D. Ga. 
1992). 
No.  2005AP2202-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
¶87 The Ward court decided to suppress the evidence 
collected 
pursuant 
to 
the 
overbroad 
and 
invalid 
order, 
emphasizing that the government, as well as the people, must 
obey the laws.  The Ward court quoted Justice Brandeis' famous 
words on the rule of law: 
In a government of laws, existence of the government 
will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law 
scrupulously.  Our government is the potent, the 
omnipresent teacher.  For good or for ill, it teaches 
the whole people by its example. . . . To declare that 
in the administration of the criminal law the end 
justifies 
the 
means . . . would 
bring 
terrible 
retribution.  Against that pernicious doctrine this 
Court should resolutely set its face.7   
¶88 I would follow Ward in the instant case.  For the 
reasons set forth, I dissent. 
                                                 
7 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
No.  2005AP2202-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
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