Title: STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, as Subrogee V. KYLE A. KUNZ and PAUL DUFKA

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, as Subrogee V. KYLE A. KUNZ and PAUL DUFKA2008 WY 71186 P.3d 378Case Number: S-07-0177Decided: 06/23/2008
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
STATE FARM MUTUAL 
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, as Subrogee,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
KYLE A. KUNZ and 
PAUL DUFKA,

 
 
Appellees

(Defendants).

 
 
Certified Question from theDistrictCourtofGoshenCounty

The 
Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
Billie Ruth Edwards, Edwards & 
Johnson, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

 
 
No 
appearance.

 
 
Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, 
HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]           
This 
matter comes before us as a certified question from the district court for 
 
           
        Wyoming 's 
Eighth Judicial District.  The question arises from an apparent conflict in 
statutory language contained in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-9-128(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2007) governing 
subject matter jurisdiction of circuit courts, and statutory language  
contained in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-6-301(c) relating to service of process on 
non-resident motorists.  Appellant, 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, contends that the district court 
has subject matter jurisdiction to determine civil actions, regardless of the 
amount in controversy, if service of process is accomplished pursuant to Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-6-301(c).  

 
 

[¶2]           
The 
specific question presented by the district court is this:

 
 
Does the 
Circuit Court or the District Court have jurisdiction over a civil suit brought 
against a non-resident, where the prayer for recovery requests less than 
$7,000.00?

 
 

[¶3]           
We 
answer the certified question as follows:  The circuit court has subject 
matter jurisdiction over a civil suit brought against a non-resident, where the 
prayer for recovery requests less than $7,000.00.  Circuit courts' subject 
matter jurisdiction over civil matters is governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 5-9-128 and is not impacted by the method of service of process.  
The portion of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-6-301(c) relied upon by State Farm 
addresses venue and does not confer subject matter jurisdiction on a district 
court in a civil action where the amount in controversy does not exceed 
$7,000.00.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶4]           
The 
facts are undisputed.  State Farm 
filed separate civil actions against the defendants in the district 
court for the Eighth Judicial District seeking compensatory damages arising 
from the alleged negligent operation of a motor vehicle.1  In each case, State Farm 
sought less than $7,000.00 in compensatory damages.  Neither defendant was a Wyoming resident.  Both were served with process by service 
on the Secretary of State pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-6-301.  The defendants failed to respond to the 
complaints, and State Farm sought a default judgment against each defendant. 

 
 

[¶5]           
The 
district court did not enter the judgments.  Instead, acting sua sponte, the court questioned whether 
it had subject matter jurisdiction over the actions.  The court recognized that, pursuant to 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-9-128(a), circuit courts have exclusive original civil 
jurisdiction over actions "where the prayer for recovery is an amount not 
exceeding seven thousand dollars ($7,000.00)."  Because service of process had been 
accomplished pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-6-301, however, State Farm 
contended that the issue of subject matter jurisdiction was controlled by the 
specific language contained in that statute:  "The district court of the county in 
which the cause of action arose or the district court of the county in which the 
plaintiff resides shall have jurisdiction over the action."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-6-301(c).  Faced with this apparent statutory 
conflict, the 
district court certified the question to this Court for 
resolution.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶6]           
The 
certified question involves subject matter jurisdiction.  To place it in context, we note that the 
state constitution establishes district courts as   Wyoming 
's courts of 
general 
jurisdiction: 

 
 
The 
district court shall have original jurisdiction of all causes both at law and in 
equity and in all criminal cases, of all matters of probate and insolvency and 
of such special cases and proceedings as are not otherwise provided for.  The district court shall also have 
original jurisdiction in all cases and of all proceedings in which jurisdiction 
shall not have been by law vested exclusively in some other 
court.

 
 

Wyo. 
Const. art. 5, § 10.  As 
contemplated in this constitutional provision, the legislature established 
circuit courts as "other court[s]" with limited subject matter jurisdiction over 
specified matters.  See 
generally Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 5-9-101 through -107, 5-9-127 through 
-131.  Subject 
matter jurisdiction refers to the power of a court to hear and determine cases 
of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.  Granite Springs Retreat Ass'n, Inc. v. 
Manning, 2006 WY 60, ¶ 5, 133 P.3d 1005, 1009 (Wyo. 2006).  Subject matter jurisdiction is essential 
to the exercise of judicial power.  
Id. at 
1009-10.  If a court does not have 
subject matter jurisdiction, "it lacks any authority to proceed, and any 
decision, judgment, or other order is, as a matter of law, utterly void and of 
no effect for any purpose."  
Id. at 
1010.  Subject matter jurisdiction 
is not a subject of judicial discretion.  
It cannot be waived and can be raised at any time and on the court's own 
motion.  Id. at 
1009-10.  A court must be satisfied 
that it has the required jurisdiction before proceeding to disposition on the 
merits.  Id. at 
1010.  There is no question that the 
district court acted appropriately in raising the issue of subject matter 
jurisdiction prior to entering the requested default 
judgments.

 
 

[¶7]           
In 
interpreting the two statutes at issue, our primary goal "is to determine the 
legislature's intent."  GDK v. State, 2004 WY 78, ¶ 8, 92 P.3d 834, 836 (Wyo. 2004).  We first 
try to determine that intent by considering "the ordinary and obvious meaning of 
the words employed by the legislature."  
Parodi v.    Wyoming Dept. of Transportation, 947 P.2d 1294, 1295 
(Wyo. 
1997).  When a statute is clear and 
unambiguous, we give effect to the plain language of the statute.  Gunderson v. State, 925 P.2d 1300, 1304 
(Wyo. 
1996).  If a statute is ambiguous, 
we try to discern its meaning using other aids, of which legislative history is 
one.  Olheiser v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 866 P.2d 768, 770 (Wyo. 1994).  A statute is ambiguous if it is vague or 
uncertain and subject to varying interpretations.  Allied-Signal, Inc. v.  
  Wyoming 
  State 
Board of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 219-220 (Wyo. 1991).  

 
 

[¶8]           
The 
statute dealing with circuit court jurisdiction provides as 
follows:

 
 

(a)   Each circuit court has exclusive 
original civil jurisdiction within the boundaries of the state 
for:

 
 
(i) An action where the prayer for 
recovery is an amount not exceeding seven thousand dollars 
($7,000.00).

 
 

Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 5-9-128.  The language of this statute is 
clear and unambiguous, and State Farm does not contend otherwise.  This statute was enacted as part of the 
legislature's reformation of Wyoming's former county courts into the 
present system of circuit courts.  
See 2000 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 
24.  The language plainly expresses 
the legislature's intent to provide circuit courts with subject matter 
jurisdiction over the specified civil matters.

  

[¶9]           
State 
Farm, however, relies on the language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-6-301, which 
provides as follows: 

 
 
(a)  The use and operation of a motor vehicle 
on any street or highway within Wyoming by any person upon whom service of 
process cannot be made within Wyoming either personally or by service upon a 
duly appointed resident agent is deemed an appointment of the secretary of state 
of Wyoming as the operator's lawful attorney upon whom may be served all legal 
processes in any proceeding against him . . . .

 
 
(c)  . . . The 
district court of the county in which the cause of action arose or the district 
court of the county in which the plaintiff resides shall have jurisdiction over 
the action.

 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Although the language seems 
straightforward on initial reading, a comparison of this statute with other 
Wyoming 
statutes reveals an ambiguity.

 
 

[¶10]       
The 
statute uses the word 
jurisdiction.  However, its 
reference to the "district court of the county in which the cause of 
action arose or the district court of the county in which the plaintiff 
resides" (emphasis added) is very similar to language found in other Wyoming statutes 
addressing venue.  For example, Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-5-107 provides that actions against non-residents and 
foreign corporations "may be brought in any county where the cause of action 
arose or where the plaintiff resides."  
See generally Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 1-5-101 through -109.  In 
contrast, other Wyoming statutory and constitutional 
provisions addressing jurisdiction do not refer to the county or locality in 
which the court is located, but rather to the type of court that has 
jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Wyo. 
Const. art. 5, § 10 ("The 
district court shall have original jurisdiction of all causes both at law and in 
equity."); Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 5-9-129 ("Circuit courts have original jurisdiction in all 
misdemeanor criminal cases.").  See also Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-9-128.  Because the language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1-6-301(c) suggests venue while using the word jurisdiction, it is ambiguous 
and subject to varying interpretations.  
This ambiguity requires us to dig deeper to determine the legislature's 
intent.  

 
 

[¶11]       
The 
legislative history indicates that most of the provisions of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1-6-301 were enacted in 1935.  
1935 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 43, § 1.  The recognized general purpose of the 
statute was to provide "substituted service of process to afford redress to 
persons injured within the state as a result of the operation of a motor vehicle 
therein by a non-resident."  Zacharias v. Ippen, 337 F.2d 445, 446 
(10th Cir. 1964).  The particular sentence at issue ("The 
district court of the county in which the cause of action arose or the district 
court of the county in which the plaintiff resides shall have jurisdiction over 
the action.") was added to the statute by an amendment enacted in 1945.  1945      Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 11, § 1.

 
 

[¶12]       
It is not 
immediately obvious what the legislature intended this amendment to 
accomplish.  As noted above, 
district courts are courts of general jurisdiction, and would have subject 
matter jurisdiction over the specified actions with or without the addition of 
this sentence.  Thus, it 
was unnecessary for the legislature to amend the statute if its intent was to 
confer subject matter jurisdiction on the district courts.  We presume 
that "the legislature did not intend futile things."  City of   Torrington v. Cottier, 2006 WY 145, 
¶ 15, 145 P.3d 1274, 1280 (Wyo. 2006).  We must therefore reject the conclusion 
that the legislature intended the amendment to establish subject matter 
jurisdiction in the district courts.

 
 

[¶13]       
The 
legislature itself provided an indication of a different intent.  The preamble to the 1945 amendment 
stated that it was "An Act to amend and re-enact [the statute] related to 
actions growing out of motor vehicle operations, fixing the venue of such actions and 
providing for service of process therein, upon the Secretary of State as 
attorney of non-residents."  1945 
Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 11 (emphasis added).  
One commentator referred to the amendment simply as the "venue 
provision," and explained it to mean that "the district court of the county in 
which the cause of action arose or where the plaintiff resides may hear the 
action."  Kim McDonald, Wyoming Nonresident Motorist Statute, 18 
   
 Wyo. L.J. 231, 
234 (1964).

 
 

[¶14]       
As we 
have explained previously, venue "as a modern legal concept refers to the 
county, district, or other geographical location in which, for the sake of 
fairness, convenience, or other commanding policy considerations, a cause is to 
be tried.'"  Sundance Mt. Resort v. Union Tel. Co., 
2007 WY 11, ¶ 9, 150 P.3d 191, 195 (Wyo. 2007) (quoting 77 Am. Jur. 2d Venue § 1 (2006)).

 
 
The 
distinction between "jurisdiction" and "venue" has been plainly established and 
has frequently been recognized. Jurisdiction connotes the power to decide a case 
on the merits, while venue denotes locality, the place where the suit should be 
heard.

 
 

Wiglesworth 
v. Wyrick, 531 S.W.2d 713, 721 (Mo. 1976) (quoting 21 C.J.S. Courts § 15(c)).  Because the statute in question 
indicates the locality where the suit should be heard, we must conclude that the 
legislature intended it to establish venue rather than 
jurisdiction.

 
 

[¶15]       
This is 
not the first time that the legislature used the word "jurisdiction" in a 
statute intended to establish venue.  
In Myuskovich v. State ex rel. 
Osborn, 59 Wyo. 406, 413, 141 P.2d 540, 542 (1943), we 
considered statutory language that read as follows:

 
 
Jurisdiction over proceedings to 
compel support is vested in the district court of the county in which the 
alleged father is permanently or temporarily resident, or in which the mother or 
the child resides or is found.

 
 
In the Court's opinion, Justice 
Blume wrote that the "jurisdiction above mentioned . . . is not, we think, 
jurisdiction of the subject matter.  
It relates to the venue of the action."  Id. 
at 416, 141 P.2d  at 543.  We 
similarly conclude that, in the statute now at issue, the legislature used the 
word "jurisdiction," but meant to establish venue.

 
 

[¶16]       
State 
Farm contends that when two statutes directly conflict, the more specific 
governs over the 
more general.  See, e.g., Cooper v. Town of Pinedale, 1 P.3d 1197, 
1200 (Wyo. 2000); L.U. Sheep Co. v. Board of County 
Comm'rs, 790 P.2d 663, 674 (Wyo. 
1990).  State Farm asserts that the 
statute concerning non-resident motorists, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-6-301, is 
more specific, and should control.  
It therefore urges us to hold that jurisdiction over the two cases at 
issue should lie in the district court.

  

[¶17]       
We need 
not resort to this canon of construction, however, because our reading of the 
two statutes resolves the apparent conflict.  When faced with statutes that appear 
to conflict, we first attempt "to harmonize them so as to give full effect to 
each."  Jessen v. Burry, 13 P.3d 1118, 1121 
(Wyo. 2000); Cooper, 1 P.3d  at 
1200.  Our conclusions that Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 5-9-128(a) establishes subject matter jurisdiction, while Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-6-301 was intended to establish venue, resolves the apparent 
conflict, and gives full effect to each statute.  Harmonizing the two statutes leads to 
this answer to the certified question:  
Circuit courts have subject matter jurisdiction over a civil suit brought 
against a non-resident, when the prayer for recovery does not exceed 
$7,000.00.

 
 

[¶18]       
We remand 
this case to the district court for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The complaint against Mr. Kunz was 
filed in GoshenCounty.  Suit was brought against Mr. Dufka in 
NiobraraCounty.