Title: Wilkinson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Wilkinson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div.1999 WY 159991 P.2d 1228Case Number: 98-251, 99-44Decided: 12/07/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF:

DAVID WILKINSON, 
Appellant (Claimant/Petitioner),

v.

STATE OF WYOMING ex rel. 
WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellee 
(Respondent)

IN THE MATTER OF THE 
WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: DAVID WILKINSON, Appellant 
(Claimant/Petitioner),

v.

STATE OF WYOMING ex rel. 
WYOMING WORKERS' COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellant 
(Respondent).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Natrona County, The Honorable Dan Spangler, 
Judge.

Appeal from the District 
Court of Laramie County, The Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge,

Keith R. 
Nachbar, Casper, Wyoming representing Appellant.

Gay Woodhouse, 
Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Bernard P. Haggerty, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General, representing Appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN & HILL, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant David 
Wilkinson appeals from the Natrona County district court's order affirming the 
hearing examiner's dismissal with prejudice of his application for extended 
permanent total disability benefits and from the Laramie County district court's 
order dismissing his petition for review.

[¶2]      We affirm the 
district courts' decisions.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Wilkinson 
presents two issues for our review:

1. Is the 
Worker's Compensation Division required to comply with a final order of the 
Medical Commission awarding extended benefits to the 
Claimant?

2. Was the 
hearing examiner's dismissal of Wilkinson's alternate application with prejudice 
an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law?

FACTS

[¶4]      It is necessary 
for us to recite, in some detail, the unusual and complicated procedural history 
of the cases before us in order to explain our decision. On December 30, 1983, 
Wilkinson was severely injured in a work-related accident. In 1988, the Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Division (the division) determined that Wilkinson was 
permanently totally disabled. Wilkinson was awarded permanent total disability 
benefits, and the division finished paying those benefits in April 1992. 
Wilkinson subsequently applied for and was granted extended permanent total 
disability benefits through August 1993.

[¶5]      In 1996, 
Wilkinson again applied for extended permanent total disability benefits. The 
division denied his application, and Wilkinson objected. The matter was referred 
to the Medical Commission for a contested case hearing. The commission 
determined that the law which was in effect when Wilkinson suffered his initial 
injury in 1983 applied to his application. It ruled that Wilkinson remained 
permanently totally disabled and that he was entitled to extended benefits. The 
division paid one year's worth of extended benefits to 
Wilkinson.

[¶6]      On July 15, 1997, 
Wilkinson applied for additional extended permanent total disability benefits. 
The division denied his application, and the matter was referred to the Office 
of Administrative Hearings for a contested case hearing. The division sought a 
ruling on what law applied to Wilkinson's application. Wilkinson moved for a 
summary judgment, maintaining that the Medical Commission's order, which relied 
upon Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-12-405(d) (Michie 1983) (repealed 1986),1 required the division to continue 
to pay him extended permanent total disability benefits. He claimed, therefore, 
that the hearing examiner should not reconsider issues which had been decided by 
the Medical Commission and that she should apply the Medical Commission's 
decision to his July 15, 1997, application.

[¶7]      The hearing 
examiner held a hearing on November 3, 1997, to consider the parties' motions. 
She denied Wilkinson's motion for a summary judgment and ruled that the law in 
effect in 1988, when it was determined that Wilkinson was permanently totally 
disabled, was the law that should be applied to his application for extended 
benefits. Wilkinson moved for a continuance of the contested case hearing which 
was scheduled for November 6, 1997. The hearing examiner denied Wilkinson's 
motion.

[¶8]      On November 5, 
1997, Wilkinson withdrew his application for benefits and moved for a dismissal 
of the pending action without prejudice. The division filed a traverse to 
Wilkinson's motion for a dismissal without prejudice. The hearing examiner heard 
the parties' arguments on Wilkinson's motion on November 6, 1997. She denied his 
motion to dismiss without prejudice and gave him the choice of proceeding with 
the contested case hearing on his application or having a dismissal with 
prejudice entered against him. Wilkinson refused to proceed and did not offer 
any evidence. Consequently, the hearing examiner ruled that Wilkinson had not 
satisfied his burden of proof and dismissed the case with 
prejudice.

[¶9]      Wilkinson filed a 
petition for review of the hearing examiner's decision in the Natrona County 
district court (Case No. 98-251). The district court concluded that the hearing 
examiner's decision was in accordance with law and affirmed. Wilkinson 
subsequently appealed from the district court's decision to the Wyoming Supreme 
Court.

[¶10]   Wilkinson also filed a petition for 
review in the Laramie County district court (Case No. 99-44), seeking review of 
the division's refusal to abide by the Medical Commission's order. The state 
filed an objection to the petition for review, arguing that the petition was 
untimely and was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The district 
court dismissed Wilkinson's petition for review on the ground that the issue he 
raised in his petition was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 
Wilkinson appealed to the Wyoming Supreme Court, and this Court consolidated 
Case No. 98-251 and Case No. 99-44 for appellate review.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶11]   When this Court reviews an 
administrative agency's decision, we do not accord special deference to the 
district court's determination. Wyoming Department of Employment, Unemployment 
Insurance Commission v. SF Phosphates, Ltd., 976 P.2d 199, 201 (Wyo. 1999). 
Instead, we review the case as if it had come directly to the Wyoming Supreme 
Court from the agency. Shaffer v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Division, 960 P.2d 504, 506 (Wyo. 1998). Judicial review of 
administrative decisions is limited to a determination of the matters set out in 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LEXIS 1999). W.R.A.P. 12.09(a); Everheart v. S 
& L Industrial, 957 P.2d 847, 851 (Wyo. 1998).

[¶12]   This Court will not disturb an 
agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly contrary to the overwhelming 
weight of the evidence. Nelson v. Sheridan Manor, 939 P.2d 252, 255 (Wyo. 1997). 
We do not, however, grant the same deference to an agency's conclusions of law. 
Id. We affirm an agency's conclusions of law when they are in accordance with 
law. Corman v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 909 P.2d 966, 970 (Wyo. 1996). When an agency has not invoked and properly applied the 
correct rule of law, we remedy the agency's errors. Gneiting v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 897 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Wyo. 
1995).

DISCUSSION

Case No. 
98-251

[¶13]   It is somewhat difficult to discern 
from Wilkinson's brief what errors he claims the hearing examiner made in Case 
No. 98-251 because he confuses the issues in that case with the issues in Case 
No. 99-44. We have, however, distilled his argument concerning Case No. 98-251 
down to two primary claims of error: (1) The hearing examiner's dismissal of 
Wilkinson's case with prejudice was an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with law; and (2) the hearing examiner erred when she did not apply 
the Medical Commission's decision, which ruled that Wilkinson was entitled to 
extended permanent total disability benefits, to his July 15, 1997, 
application.

A. Dismissal of 
Case with Prejudice

[¶14]   This Court has recognized a hearing 
examiner's authority to dismiss a worker's compensation case. See, e.g., Bila v. 
Accurate Telecom, 964 P.2d 1270 (Wyo. 1998); Walsh v. Holly Sugar Corporation, 
931 P.2d 241 (Wyo. 1997). The hearing examiner in this case did not indicate 
what procedural rule she relied upon in dismissing Wilkinson's action. 
Nevertheless, the parties seem to agree that W.R.C.P. 41 was applicable to this 
situation. That rule states in pertinent part:

(a) Voluntary 
Dismissal; Effect Thereof.

. . . 
.

(2) By Order of 
Court. Except as provided in paragraph (1), an action shall not be dismissed at 
the plaintiff's instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and 
conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a 
defendant prior to the service upon the defendant of the plaintiff's motion to 
dismiss, the counterclaim shall remain pending for independent adjudication by 
the court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this 
paragraph is without prejudice.

(b) Involuntary 
Dismissal; Effect Thereof.

(1) By 
Defendant. For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these 
rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or 
of any claim against the defendant. Unless the court in its order for dismissal 
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not 
provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for 
improper venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19, operates as an 
adjudication upon the merits.

(2) By the 
Court. Upon its own motion the court may dismiss without prejudice any action 
not prosecuted or brought to trial with due diligence.

W.R.C.P. 
41.

[¶15]   Wilkinson moved, presumably under 
W.R.C.P. 41(a)(2), for a voluntary dismissal of the action without prejudice. He 
sought the dismissal because he was not prepared for the contested case hearing 
and because he had filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Natrona 
County district court to compel the division to comply with the Medical 
Commission's order.2 The division objected to 
Wilkinson's motion to dismiss without prejudice and requested that a dismissal 
with prejudice be entered against him. The hearing examiner denied Wilkinson's 
motion to dismiss without prejudice and told him that he must present evidence 
in support of his application or a dismissal with prejudice would be entered 
against him. Wilkinson refused to proceed with the contested case hearing, and 
the hearing examiner dismissed the action with prejudice.

[¶16]   When a W.R.C.P. 41(a)(2) motion to 
dismiss is denied, the case continues, and the order is not appealable. 9 
Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2376 
(1971). We will not, therefore, review the hearing examiner's denial of 
Wilkinson's motion to dismiss without prejudice.

[¶17]   The division's request for a 
dismissal with prejudice was presumably brought under W.R.C.P. 41(b)(1). A 
dismissal under that rule generally amounts to an adjudication on the merits. 
W.R.C.P. 41(b)(1); Wright & Miller, supra, at § 2369. There seem to be two 
underlying bases for the hearing examiner's decision to dismiss Wilkinson's 
application with prejudice: (1) Wilkinson refused, in contravention of her prior 
orders, to proceed with his case; and (2) he failed to meet his burden of proof. 
We agree with the hearing examiner on both fronts.

[¶18]   Wilkinson admitted that part of the 
reason he requested the motion to dismiss without prejudice was to delay the 
contested case hearing because he was not prepared for it. The hearing examiner 
had previously denied Wilkinson's motion for a continuance of the hearing, and 
we cannot fault her for refusing to allow him to circumvent her earlier ruling. 
Furthermore, Wilkinson failed to meet his burden to prove that he was entitled 
to receive extended permanent total disability benefits when he declined to 
present evidence in support of his application. The hearing examiner correctly 
dismissed Wilkinson's July 15, 1997, application with prejudice. See Turnbough 
v. Campbell County Memorial Hospital, 499 P.2d 595, 598 (Wyo. 1972) (McIntyre, 
C.J., concurring).

B. Finality of 
the Medical Commission's Decision

[¶19]   We turn now to Wilkinson's claim 
that the hearing examiner erred by failing to apply the Medical Commission's 
decision to his July 15, 1997, application for extended permanent total 
disability benefits. Wilkinson did not include an argument on that issue in the 
brief he submitted to the district court. We generally do not consider issues 
which were not presented to the lower tribunal and do not pertain to fundamental 
matters. Zielinske v. Johnson County School District No. 1, 959 P.2d 706, 710 
(Wyo. 1998). We will not, therefore, consider Wilkinson's argument concerning 
the preclusive effect of the Medical Commission's decision because he did not 
present it to the district court.3

Case No. 
99-44

[¶20]   Wilkinson claims that the Laramie 
County district court erred when it dismissed his petition for review in Case 
No. 99-44. The state argues that the dismissal was appropriate because 
Wilkinson's claims in that case were barred by the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel. We agree with the state.

[¶21]   Collateral estoppel, which is also 
known as issue preclusion, applies to administrative decisions. University of 
Wyoming v. Gressley, 978 P.2d 1146, 1153 (Wyo. 1999); Kahrs v. Board of Trustees 
for Platte County School District No. 1, 901 P.2d 404, 406 (Wyo. 1995). The 
collateral estoppel doctrine prohibits relitigation of issues which were 
actually and necessarily involved in a prior action between the same parties. 
Id. Courts consider four factors in determining whether the collateral estoppel 
doctrine applies: 

(1) whether the 
issue decided in the prior adjudication was identical with the issue presented 
in the present action; (2) whether the prior adjudication resulted in a judgment 
on the merits; (3) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is 
asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and 
(4) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior 
proceeding.

Slavens v. Board 
of County Commissioners for Uinta County, 854 P.2d 683, 686 (Wyo. 
1993).

[¶22]   The issue presented to the Laramie 
County district court, which concerned whether or not the Medical Commission's 
decision applied to the July 15, 1997, application, was identical to one of the 
issues determined in the administrative proceeding. Wilkinson was a party to the 
administrative proceeding, and the hearing examiner issued a ruling on the 
merits of the issue. Wilkinson was afforded a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate the issue before the hearing examiner. Although he failed to take 
advantage of his right to have the hearing examiner's decision reviewed by the 
Natrona County district court, Wilkinson had the opportunity for full judicial 
consideration of the issue. A full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue is 
all that is required for the collateral estoppel doctrine to apply. CLS v. CLJ, 
693 P.2d 774, 776-77 (Wyo. 1985). All the factors of the collateral estoppel 
doctrine were present in this case, and the Laramie County district court 
properly dismissed Wilkinson's petition for review. See Davis v. State, 910 P.2d 555, 558 (Wyo. 1996).

[¶23]   Affirmed.

Footnotes

1 Before its 
repeal in 1986, § 27-12-405(d) provided in pertinent 
part:

(d) 
Upon the expiration of the period of time in which the amount awarded to the 
employee for permanent total disability would be paid in its entirety at the 
monthly rates fixed by law, the district court may award additional compensation 
to the injured employee for any continuing impairment of his earning power 
resulting from the original injury, subject to the 
following:

(i) 
A claim for compensation must be filed by the employee, or by someone on his 
behalf, and a hearing held;

(ii) The employee shall establish that his earning power has been and 
continues to be impaired by reason of the injury for which compensation was 
awarded;

. . 
. .

(v) 
The additional compensation shall be payable only so long as the employee's 
earning power is impaired, and his right to receive compensation terminates upon 
his death;

(vi) The award may be increased within the limit set above or decreased 
upon proper showing to the court that there has been a substantial change in the 
employee's earning power, except that no modification of a prior award is 
effective less than six (6) months after the effective date of the prior 
award.

2 The 
documents concerning Wilkinson's mandamus action are not included in the record 
on appeal. The parties represent in their briefs that the action was voluntarily 
dismissed on June 8, 1998.

3 Wilkinson 
asserts in his reply brief that he could not present his argument to the 
district court because a denial of a motion for a summary judgment is not a 
final appealable order. It is interesting to note that he did present the issue 
to this Court. In any event, Wilkinson is correct when he states that a denial 
of a motion for a summary judgment generally is not appealable. Wolter v. 
Equitable Resources Company, Western Region, 979 P.2d 948, 953 (Wyo. 1999). 
Nevertheless, when a case has been fully decided and a party desires appellate 
review of a lower tribunal's determination of law in the context of a denial of 
a summary judgment motion, the issue must be included as part of the appeal of 
the entire case. See LVW v. J (Adoption of MSVW), 965 P.2d 1158, 1161-62 (Wyo. 
1998). If this were not true, the lower tribunal's decision would never be 
subject to appellate review. § See id.

LEHMAN, Chief Justice, 
dissenting, with whom GOLDEN, Justice, joins.

[¶24]   Because I believe the majority 
decision incorrectly declines to review the Division's deliberate refusal to 
recognize the final order of the Medical Commission, issued after the Division 
was given a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in a contested case 
hearing, I must respectfully dissent.

1. The 
Law

[¶25]   The essence of the underlying 
dispute between Wilkinson and the Division was which law applied to Wilkinson's 
eligibility for extended permanent total disability benefits in 1997. After a 
contested case hearing directly addressing this issue, as it related to his 
request for benefits in 1996, the Medical Commission ruled that "the law 
governing Employee/Claimant's claim for extended benefits shall be the law in 
effect at the time of Employee/Claimant's injury, W.S. § 27-12-405(d)(i) through 
(vii) (1983)." This provision stated in relevant part:

§ 27-12-405. 
Permanent total disability; defined; benefits; additional benefits upon 
expiration of initial award.

(a) Permanent 
total disability means the loss of both legs or both arms, total loss of 
eyesight, paralysis or other conditions permanently incapacitating the employee 
from performing any work at any gainful occupation for which he is reasonably 
suited by experience or training.

. . 
.

(d) Upon the 
expiration of the period of time in which the amount awarded to the employee for 
permanent total disability would be paid in its entirety at the monthly rates 
fixed by law, the district court may award additional compensation to the 
injured employee for any continuing impairment of his earning power resulting 
from the original injury, subject to the following:

(i) A claim for 
compensation must be filed by the employee, or by someone in his behalf, and a 
hearing held;

(ii) The 
employee shall establish that his earning power has been and continues to be 
impaired by reason of the injury for which compensation was 
awarded;

(iii) In 
determining whether there has been an impairment in the employee's earning 
power, the district court shall consider the amount which the employee is 
currently capable of earning in comparison with his earnings at the time of his 
injury;

. . . 

(v) The 
additional compensation shall be payable only so long as the employee's earning 
power is impaired, and his right to receive compensation terminates upon his 
death;

(vi) The award 
may be increased within the limit set above or decreased upon proper showing to 
the court that there has been a substantial change in the employee's earning 
power, except that no modification of a prior award is effective less than six 
(6) months after the effective date of the prior award. . . 
.

(vii) The award 
shall be decreased to an amount necessary to qualify the employee for maximum 
benefits for any other state or federal government pension plans of any type to 
which the employee is otherwise eligible.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 27-12-405 (Michie June 1983 Rpl.). Approximately six months after the Medical 
Commission issued its ruling, the hearing examiner ruled that Wilkinson's 
extended permanent total disability benefits for 1997 were governed by the 
amended law in effect in 1988, the year the Division first awarded Wilkinson 
permanent total disability benefits. That law provided:

§ 27-14-403. 
Awards generally; method of payment.

(g) Following 
payment in full of any award . . . to an employee for permanent total disability 
. . ., an additional award may be granted:

(i) In the case 
of an employee subject to the following requirements and limitations which shall 
be met:

(A) A claim for 
compensation is filed by the employee or someone on his behalf and a hearing is 
held following notice to the employer and division;

(B) The employee 
establishes a reasonable effort on his behalf has been made to return to part 
time or full time employment including retraining and educational 
programs;

(C) The hearing 
examiner in determining entitlement under this paragraph shall consider income 
of the employee from all sources including active or passive income, household 
income and any monthly amount from any other governmental 
agency;

. . 
.

(F) The hearing 
examiner may decrease an award to qualify an employee eligible for maximum 
benefits under any other state or federal pension plan;

(G) Any award 
granted under this subsection shall not exceed twelve (12) months but may be 
renewed following additional hearings unless the hearing examiner, the director 
and the employer mutually determine a hearing is not 
necessary.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 27-14-403 (Michie June 1987 Rpl.). The import of which law is applied directly 
affects Wilkinson's burden of proof to establish his eligibility for benefits. 
As the Hearing Examiner recognized, "there are certain requirements under 403 
[Michie June 1987 Rpl.] as opposed to 405 [Michie June 1983 Rpl.], and the 
burden of proof is heightened on the Claimant under that statute in 403 as 
opposed to 405." Because the hearing examiner's dismissal of Wilkinson's claim 
was based solely on his failure to meet the burden of proof under the law in 
effect in 1988, the main issue on appeal is whether collateral estoppel 
precluded the hearing examiner from applying that law.

2. The 
Facts

[¶26]   In 1983, Wilkinson fell from a 
truck while at work and suffered three compression fractures of his vertebrae, a 
dislocated collar bone, and a smashed right leg. He received permanent total 
disability benefits in 1988, which expired in 1992. In 1993, Wilkinson requested 
extended benefits. At a contested case hearing before a hearing examiner, the 
parties stipulated that the 1988 law applied. The hearing examiner denied the 
benefits requested in 1993.

[¶27]   The current dispute began when 
Wilkinson again filed for extended permanent total disability benefits on 
January 28, 1996. Upon the Division's denial of that claim, and Wilkinson's 
objections to the Division's determinations, the case was referred for a full 
hearing to the Medical Commission to be held on April 10, 1997. In the meantime, 
in December 1996, Wilkinson submitted another request for extended benefits for 
1997 through January 1998.

[¶28]   On March 20, 1997, the Division 
filed a Motion for Instruction on Applicable Law, arguing that the parties' 
stipulation applying the 1988 law at the 1993 hearing was binding on the current 
claim. A hearing was held on the Division's motion on April 1, 1997. Relying on 
L.U. Sheep Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs of County of Hot Springs, 790 P.2d 663, 674 (Wyo. 1990), the Medical Commission made an oral determination that it 
was not bound by the parties' stipulation of law in an earlier proceeding, and 
concluded that the law governing Wilkinson's claim for extended benefits was the 
law in effect at the time of his injury, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-12-405(d)(i) 
through (vii) (Michie June 1983 Rpl). The contested case hearing on the merits 
of Wilkinson's claim was held on April 10, 1997, at which both parties presented 
numerous witnesses and exhibits. On May 14, 1997, the Medical Commission issued 
a written order regarding its determination of applicable law, and holding that 
Wilkinson had proven "his earning power has been and continues to be impaired by 
reason of the injury for which compensation was awarded" and that his current 
earning capacity was zero. The Division did not appeal the Medical Commission's 
decision.

[¶29]   The Division paid Wilkinson 
extended benefits from January 28, 1996 through January 27, 1997, but refused to 
make further payment on the basis that Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-403(g)(i)(G) 
restricted the Medical Commission's award to twelve months of benefits. Although 
Wilkinson believed he had filed a claim for 1997 benefits in December 1996, 
before the Medical Commission issued its decision, the Division informed 
Wilkinson that it had no record of that claim. Relying on the Division's 
representation, Wilkinson filed another claim for benefits for the period of 
January 27, 1997 through January 26, 1998. The Division received that claim on 
July 15, 1997.

[¶30]   The next day, July 16, 1997, the 
Division issued a Final Determination denying benefits for 1997, which stated in 
relevant part:

The Division 
determines the claimant is not entitled to permanent total extended benefits 
pursuant to Wyoming Statute 27-14-403(g)(C). The Division determines claimant's 
income . . . active or passive income, household income and any monthly income 
from any other governmental agency . . . to be adequate and meets the need for 
subsistence. Your income from social security of $12,000.00 exceeds the U S 
Department of Labor level of $10,860.00. Your adjusted annual award from the 
Division is $0.00.

This language 
reiterates the 1988 limitations on benefits, but there is no reference to the 
1983 law found by the Medical Commission to be controlling in Wilkinson's case 
only two months earlier.

[¶31]   Wilkinson then filed an objection, 
maintaining that he continued to be permanently disabled, the claim was 
previously determined in his favor by the Medical Commission, and the 1983 
statute does not contemplate consideration of the Department of Labor 
subsistence levels. The matter was referred to the Office of Administrative 
Hearings, which set a hearing date for November 6, 1997. This was the beginning 
of case no. 98-251.

[¶32]   On October 9, 1997, the Division 
filed a Motion for Instruction on Applicable Law, arguing precisely the same 
issues which had been argued to the Medical Commission in the earlier 
proceeding. This motion did not refer to its argument to the Medical Commission 
or the Medical Commission's recent holding on the matter. As Exhibit B to its 
motion, the Division included the affidavit of Marcia Price, the claims 
specialist responsible for Wilkinson's file, which stated that Wilkinson had 
filed for extended benefits for the year 1997 on or about December 1, 
1996.

[¶33]   On October 20, 1997, Division filed 
its disclosure statement in which it phrased its contentions as 
follows:

The Respondent 
contends that the Employee - Claimant's entitlement to extended permanent total 
disability benefits should be considered under the law in effect in 1988. Under 
that law, the Employee - Claimant would be subject to the provisions of Wyo. 
Stat. § 27-14-403(g) (1988). Respondent would request that the Office of 
Administrative Hearings hold the Employee-Claimant to his strict burden of proof 
under this statute.

In the event the 
Office of Administrative Hearings should determine that the applicable law is 
Wyo. Stat. § 27-12-405(d), the law in effect at the date of the accident, then 
the Respondent would contend that any extended permanent total disability 
benefits payable to the Employee-Claimant should be reduced to an amount 
necessary to qualify him for maximum state or federal governmental 
benefits.

[¶34]   Two days later, on October 22, 
Wilkinson filed a Motion for Summary Judgment claiming entitlement to the 1997 
benefits as a matter of law. He argued the Medical Commission's determination 
collaterally estopped the Division's arguments on the applicable law, and the 
Medical Commission's Order required payment "for any and all claims by David 
Wilkinson for extended benefits." As exhibits to his brief, Wilkinson submitted 
the copy of the statute in effect in 1983, the Marcia Price affidavit used in 
the Division's motion, copies of past claims and correspondence from doctors, 
the deposition testimony of Dr. Law, and Wilkinson's affidavit stating that his 
circumstances had not changed since the hearing before the Medical Commission. 
The Division did not submit a written response to the Motion for Summary 
Judgment.

[¶35]   The Division's Motion for 
Instruction on Applicable Law, and Wilkinson's Motion for Summary Judgment were 
heard on November 3, 1997. The Division's motion was heard first. The Division 
argued that the 1988 law applied, while Wilkinson maintained the Division's 
position was precluded by collateral estoppel. The hearing transcript reveals 
that there was significant confusion as to whether the December application for 
1997 benefits was pending before the Medical Commission at the time it made its 
decision. Nonetheless, the hearing examiner determined that the claim before her 
was filed in July 1997 and, therefore, was a new claim. On that basis, she 
determined that the Medical Commission's Order did not preclude her finding that 
the 1988 law applied to this claim.

[¶36]   Turning to the motion for summary 
judgment, the Division argued that the motion was insufficient given the hearing 
examiner's decision on the applicable law. The Division noted that under the 
1988 provision, Wilkinson "has a burden of proof to show retraining, 
reeducation, household income, etc." Because none of these issues were addressed 
in Wilkinson's motion, the hearing examiner denied the motion for summary 
judgment.

[¶37]   At this juncture, Wilkinson's 
counsel requested a continuance of the hearing scheduled in three days. Counsel 
for Wilkinson explained:

We are not going 
to be able to go to hearing on Thursday. This has totally turned upside down the 
case, as far as I'm concerned. There is also a Petition for Writ of Mandamus,1 and we intend to pursue that in the 
District Court. So I'll have to move for a continuance because it appears that 
what we are going to do is re-litigate what has been litigated in May that took 
a year and a half to get it to hearing.

The Division 
refused to agree with a continuance, stating:

What the 
Employee/Claimant has to do at the hearing on Thursday is establish reasonable 
effort has been made to return to part-time or full-time employment, including 
retraining and educational programs, and also provide sources of active or 
passive income, household income, any other amount from a governmental entity. 
We are set to go and we will ask that you hold the Employee/Claimant to a strict 
burden of proof.

(Emphasis 
added.) However, the Division's counsel then stated that, we are not contesting 
the issue of permanent total disability. 

[¶38]   Wilkinson's counsel attempted to 
clarify the issues which would be heard at the imminent 
proceeding:

I guess what I 
need to find out is the issue of retraining is something that was certainly 
exhausted in the Medical Commission hearing. So if the Division will stipulate 
to everything but the issue of other sources of income, then we could proceed on 
Thursday. If we're going to go back and re-litigate all the issues that were 
litigated before the Medical Commission, we're talking about several months of 
preparation. We did depositions of I think I spelled it out in my memo. We did a 
vocational evaluation, they did a vocational evaluation; we did a deposition of 
the treating physician and three other doctors; we had five other witnesses. If 
those things are in issue again here within six months of the last decision, we 
are going to need some time to put everything together.

. . 
.

. . . [I]f the 
Office is ruling that we have a different burden of proof from what the Medical 
Commission ruled and is opening up the issue of Mr. Wilkinson's continued 
entitlement to extended benefits on the issue that [Division's counsel] raised, 
which is the issue of whether he has undergone retraining efforts, quite 
frankly, the Medical Commission's decision precludes any dispute over those 
things because the Medical Commission and that was exactly their argument 
before, was that he hadn't undergone retraining. We had vocational people 
testify, and the Medical Commission ruled that he has done what he could 
do.

Now, if the 
Division is going to stipulate to the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
that were entered into by the Medical Commission regarding his ability to 
undergo retraining, and so on, then maybe the financial issues are all we have 
to deal with. If that's not the case, then yes, we have to change our witnesses 
and we are going to have to go through the same hearing that we did before, so 
we are going to add probably eight other witnesses and have to do depositions 
and everything we did before.

(Emphasis 
added.) Pressing its advantage, the Division refused to stipulate to the 
findings of the Medical Commission. After the hearing examiner noted Wilkinson's 
objection, she ruled that the hearing would proceed.

[¶39]   The next day, Wilkinson filed a 
motion to withdraw his application and to dismiss the pending action without 
prejudice. On November 5, the Division filed a Traverse to the Motion and asked 
that if the matter is dismissed, it be dismissed with prejudice. Arguments on 
this motion were heard as a preliminary matter on November 6, 1997. At that 
time, counsel for Wilkinson explained that there were two reasons for the motion 
to dismiss.

[¶40]   The first was that counsel for the 
parties had discussed, prior to the November 3 hearing, that the only probable 
issue at the November 6 hearing would be whether other sources of income were to 
be considered under the 1983 statute and, if so, what they were. Both counsel 
had agreed that the number of witnesses would be limited, and Wilkinson would 
not be required to show whether or not he had earning ability, whether he 
continued to be disabled, or whether he had made efforts at retraining or 
employment. Given the understanding of counsel, and the ruling on Monday 
morning, there was insufficient time to prepare for the hearing. Wilkinson's 
counsel argued that proceeding to hearing on the date set would essentially deny 
Wilkinson a fair opportunity to be heard. Secondly, Wilkinson maintained that 
the July 1997 application was unnecessary under the law in effect in 1983 and, 
therefore, if the Medical Commission's decision was applied on Wilkinson's 
petition for writ of mandamus, Wilkinson's present claim for 1997 benefits would 
be moot.

[¶41]   Although the Division's counsel 
recalled the conversation referred to by Wilkinson's counsel, he explained, 
"obviously, I was looking at the case from a different viewpoint." He 
continued:

My view is that 
what we were talking about is extended benefits. If the 1983 was applicable, we 
would be arguing about whether or not the social security that he received 
should be considered. And if so, to what extent. If the 1988 law was applicable, 
we would have been arguing that he had not undertaken sufficient retraining, 
re-education. We want this office to consider all of his active and passive 
income. We are ready to proceed today. We have got our evidence and we are ready 
to hold [Wilkinson] to his strict burden of proof today.

At this point, 
Wilkinson's counsel attempted once more to convince the hearing examiner that 
the issues raised by the Division were decided before the Medical Commission. 
Pointing to the Medical Commission's order, counsel 
stated:

Look at finding 
number 10 on . Look at finding number 11 on . Look at finding number 13 on of 
the Medical Commission's order. Look at findings 16, 17, 18. All of those 
findings have to do with whether or not - in addition finding numbers 21 and 20. 
All of those findings have to do with Mr. Wilkinson's efforts at retraining, 
re-education and re-employment. Those are precisely the issues that were fought 
so diligently by both sides before the Medical Commission.

The hearing 
examiner then asked if Wilkinson had any plans to refile the case. Counsel 
responded that he did not expect that would be necessary, since he believed that 
the matter pending before the district court would resolve the issues. In 
response, the hearing examiner concluded:

In looking at 
the reasons that have been enumerated by the attorney on behalf of the claimant 
today, . . . - and if the contention by the claimant is that the time period 
that's before the office of a hearing is covered by the Medical Commission order 
and that this matter would be to be decided for the second time, clearly there 
would be no problem with this matter being dismissed with prejudice because that 
matter would be disposed of by that prior order.

On this basis, 
the hearing examiner stated she would either grant a dismissal with prejudice or 
proceed to hearing. When counsel for Wilkinson stated he could not proceed 
further, the case was dismissed with prejudice due to the hearing examiner's 
belief that the dismissal would not interfere with the matter pending before the 
district court.

[¶42]   Wilkinson appealed the dismissal of 
his claim to the district court in Natrona County. While this appeal was 
pending, he withdrew his petition for writ of mandamus. On June 18, 1998, the 
district court issued a decision letter stating in relevant 
part:

The Court finds 
that the decision of the administrative judge was in accordance with the law and 
should otherwise be affirmed.

The case was 
dismissed with prejudice because the Petitioner's case did not meet its burden 
of proof. Given the failure of evidence to support the claim, dismissal with 
prejudice is appropriate.

The court's 
order was issued on July 13, 1998. This appeal followed and was docketed as case 
no. 98-251.

[¶43]   On July 22, 1998, Wilkinson filed a 
petition for review in the district court of Laramie County seeking to enforce 
the Medical Commission's order. The district court dismissed the petition on 
November 12, 1998, finding his claim that the 1983 law applied was barred by the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel. Wilkinson appealed this decision, and the case 
was docketed as case no. 99-44. The two cases were consolidated for appellate 
review before this court.

3. 
Analysis

[¶44]   The majority affirms the hearing 
examiner's dismissal of the case with prejudice and declines to review the real 
issue in this case - the finality and effect of the Medical Commission's 
decision. Applying W.R.C.P. 41(b)(1), the majority states that "there seem to be 
two underlying bases for the hearing examiner's decision to dismiss Wilkinson's 
application with prejudice: (1) Wilkinson refused, in contravention of her prior 
orders, to proceed with his case; and (2) he failed to meet his burden of 
proof." Maj. op. at 5. While the parties argued the propriety of the hearing 
examiner's decision under Rule 41, the order did not state that the hearing 
examiner was dismissing the case with prejudice because of a failure to comply 
with an earlier order in the proceedings. The only reason given by the hearing 
examiner for its decision was Wilkinson's failure to meet his burden of proof. 
Thus, the correct rule to be applied to the hearing examiner's decision, as a 
matter of law, is W.R.C.P. 52(c)5, not Rule 41(b).3

[¶45]   Because a ruling under 52(c) is an 
adjudication on the merits of the case, it is not a discretionary finding. The 
standard of review applied in a case dismissed with prejudice under Rule 52(c) 
is essentially a directed verdict analysis, taking the plaintiff's evidence as 
true and affording it all favorable and reasonable inferences. Mountain 
View/Evergreen Improvement & Serv. Dist. v. Casper Concrete Co., 912 P.2d 529, 531 (Wyo. 1996); Kaiser v. Farnsworth Drilling Co., Inc., 851 P.2d 1292, 
1295 (Wyo. 1993). However, when the ruling is based on conclusions of law argued 
before the tribunal, the issues are "freely reviewable." 9A Wright & Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d, § 2588 at 601 (1995).4

[¶46]   While it is true that Wilkinson did 
not identify collateral estoppel as a separate issue in his brief to the 
district court, it is equally apparent that he expressly and clearly laid forth 
his position regarding the collateral estoppel effect of the Medical 
Commission's decision. Further, the district court's decision letter affirms the 
hearing examiner's determinations of law. Thus, I would find that the issue of 
collateral estoppel was not waived, was considered by the district court, and is 
appropriately before us on appeal.

[¶47]   We repeatedly have held that the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to a final determination by an 
administrative agency. University of Wyoming ex rel. Kail v. Gressley, 978 P.2d 1146, 1153 (Wyo. 1999); Slavens v. Board of County Comm'rs for Uinta County, 854 P.2d 683, 685 (Wyo. 1993).

[A]lthough many 
cases speak of res judicata in the administrative context, they actually apply 
collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel is the appropriate doctrine since 
collateral estoppel bars relitigation of previously litigated issues. . . . Res 
judicata on the other hand bars relitigation of previously litigated claims or 
causes of action.

Ottema v. State 
ex rel. Worker's Compensation Div., 968 P.2d 41, 45 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting Tenorio 
v. State ex rel. Workers' Compensation Div., 931 P.2d 234, 238 (Wyo. 1997) 
(citations omitted)). As the majority ironically points out on behalf of the 
Division, collateral estoppel forecloses relitigation when the issue presented 
is identical to one determined in a prior proceeding; when the prior proceeding 
produced a decision on the merits of the issue; when the party against whom 
issue preclusion is asserted was a party, or in privity with the party, in the 
prior proceeding; and when the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted 
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. 
Kahrs v. Board of Trustees for Platte County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 901 P.2d 404, 406 
(Wyo. 1995); Slavens, 854 P.2d  at 686.

[¶48]   There is no question here that the 
Division specifically sought a ruling on the same issue which had reached a 
final determination on its merits in the 1996 proceeding before the Medical 
Commission. In the hearing before the Medical Commission, the Division argued 
that Wilkinson was not deemed permanently totally disabled until 1998. However, 
under our holding in Rodgers v. State ex rel. Workers' Compensation Div., 939 P.2d 246, 249 (Wyo. 1997), published before the Medical Commission's 
determination, "the particular facts of each case must be considered to 
determine the applicable statute, and . . . the claimant's injury is deemed to 
have occurred when the treating physician determined that the claimant was 
totally disabled." This is a determination particularly suited to the Medical 
Commission, and the determination that the 1983 law applied to Wilkinson's 1996 
claim for extended benefits necessarily includes the finding that he was 
permanently totally disable before the 1987 amendments. The proceeding before 
the Medical Commission involved the same parties, and the final determination on 
the merits was rendered only after these parties fully and fairly litigated the 
issue. The Division was free to appeal that decision to the district court, but 
it did not do so. Thus, all the requirements for the application of the 
collateral estoppel doctrine were satisfied in this case.

[¶49]   However, the Division erroneously 
convinced the hearing examiner that because this was a new claim filed after the 
hearing before the Medical Commission, and the Medical Commission has no 
authority to rule on prospective claims, its decision did not apply in any way 
to the current dispute. Putting aside the issue of whether the claim for 1997 
benefits was before the Commission at the time of the hearing, a new claim does 
not negate the application of collateral estoppel to the same issues which were 
previously litigated and decided.

[¶50]   Under our holdings in Tenorio and 
Ottema, an uncontested determination of benefits will not act as a bar to later 
claims or defenses. Ottema, 968 P.2d  at 45; Tenorio, 931 P.2d  at 239. However, 
in this case, several issues relating to the 1997 benefits were decided by the 
Medical Commission after a full hearing. First, it cannot be questioned that the 
law to be applied to extended permanent total disability benefits stemming from 
Wilkinson's 1983 injury was an issue before the Medical Commission, the issue 
was litigated on its merits, and decided. Therefore, unless the Division 
contested the current claim because it was not causally related to the 1983 
injury, any issues as to the applicable law were barred by the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel. The Division conceded that Wilkinson remained totally 
permanently disabled from his 1983 injury. Thus, the hearing examiner erred in 
failing to apply the law in effect in 1983.

[¶51]   Were we to approve the Division's 
position that each new claim is totally untouched by previous rulings, we would 
be holding that a claimant will never have a final determination on any aspect 
of his claim extending beyond one year. The onerous burden on the claimant and 
the taxpayers of such a decision is clear. Each year, the claimant, represented 
by an attorney often paid by the taxpayers, would be required to litigate each 
and every element of his claim, even in the absence of an allegation that 
something had changed. At the same time, the costs of the Division's legal 
representation would also be borne by the citizens of Wyoming. Thus, every year 
the parties would reargue the same issues, presenting the same witnesses and the 
same evidence, all at the expense of the Wyoming taxpayer. According to the 
position taken by the Division, Wilkinson could apply for permanent total 
disability benefits for 1998, and the law to be applied would again be 
relitigated. This certainly cannot be the intent of the 
legislature.

[¶52]   Finding that the 1983 law applies 
to Wilkinson's 1997 benefits pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel, we 
turn to the procedural requirements and Wilkinson's burden of proof under that 
law. These issues have not been determined by this court in the past, and 
therefore we must consider the statutory provisions according to our well 
established rules of construction. Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. Game & 
Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042-45 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶53]   The Division argued that the 
Medical Commission's ruling was limited to a one year period pursuant to § 
27-14-403(i)(G), and that Wilkinson was required to file a new claim each year 
before he was entitled to extended benefits. The plain language of subsection § 
27-14-403(g)(i)(G), however, limits its application to "[a]ny award granted 
under this subsection." The award granted by the Medical Commission was pursuant 
to § 27-12-405 (1983). Therefore, § 27-14-403(g)(i)(G), by its own language, 
does not apply here. Instead, we must look to the 1983 provision to determine 
whether Wilkinson was required to file a separate claim for 1997 
benefits.

[¶54]   The provisions relating to the 
continuation of extended benefits, once awarded under § 27-12-405(d) state, "The 
additional compensation shall be payable only so long as the employee's earning 
power is impaired, and his right to receive compensation terminates upon his 
death;" that "the award may be . . . decreased upon proper showing to the court 
that there has been a substantial change in the employee's earning power, except 
that no modification of a prior award is effective less than six (6) months 
after the effective date of the prior award;" and,"[t]he award shall be 
decreased to an amount necessary to qualify the employee for maximum benefits 
for any other state or federal government pension plans of any type to which the 
employee is otherwise eligible." § 27-12-405(d)(v), (vi) & (vii). The 
statute is silent as to whether the claimant must refile a claim for extended 
benefits after the initial claim is granted.

[¶55]   In Wright v. State ex rel. Workers' 
Safety & Compensation Div., 952 P.2d 209, 210-14 (Wyo. 1998), we recognized 
that the rule of liberal construction of the statute in favor of the claimant is 
applied when the statute at issue is silent as to the issue presented and 
precedes the legislature's 1994 amendment to the preamble of the worker's 
compensation statutes. Therefore, our construction in this case "should be 
accomplished to afford coverage wherever that end may be achieved without 
unreasonably extending the clear language of the statute." Id., at 211(and cases 
cited therein). Applying this rule, there is nothing in the statute which 
requires Wilkinson to continue to file annual claims for extended benefits. 
Rather, the language of the 1983 provisions places the burden on the Division to 
initiate an action to decrease or terminate Wilkinson's extended benefits once 
awarded by the Medical Commission.

[¶56]   The Division did not initiate any 
action in this case. It failed to present any evidence that Wilkinson's earning 
power had substantially changed, or that the benefits he received precluded a 
maximum award of any state or federal benefits. Therefore, the Division failed 
to establish a prima facie case that the benefits should be decreased. Under 
these circumstances, Wilkinson carried no burden of proof, and the hearing 
examiner erred in dismissing the case for his failure to shoulder a non-existent 
burden.

[¶57]   I would, therefore, reverse. Should 
the Division believe that Wilkinson's current benefits are in contravention of 
Wyo. Stat. § 27-12-405(d)(vii), it is free to initiate action on that issue. 
Given that I would find the hearing examiner's dismissal with prejudice in 
error, the second judgment in case no. 99-41 must also be 
reversed.

Footnotes

1 On October 
31, 1997, Wilkinson filed a petition for Writ of Mandamus in the district court 
seeking to compel the Division's payment of 1997 extended benefits pursuant to 
the order of the Medical Commission.

2 W.R.C.P. 
52(c) states, in pertinent part:

If 
during a trial without a jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and the 
court finds against the party on that issue, the court may enter judgment as a 
matter of law against that party with respect to a claim . . . that cannot under 
the controlling law be maintained[.]

3 Even were 
Rule 41 applied to this case, the language of Rule 41 is expressed as permissive 
rather than mandatory. Gaudina v. Haberman, 644 P.2d 159, 169 (Wyo. 1982). The 
discretionary determination as to whether to grant or deny an involuntary 
dismissal, and under what conditions, "requires a weighing of circumstances and 
judicial policies." Id. at 170. I believe consideration of the circumstances and 
judicial policies in this case would reveal an abuse of discretion on the part 
of the hearing examiner. See 9 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Civil 2d, § 2369 at 335-40, and § 2376 at 423 (1995) (courts view 
with disfavor the use of the ultimate sanction of dismissal with prejudice 
except in extreme cases).

4 Relying on 
Zielinske v. Johnson County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 959 P.2d 706 (Wyo. 1998), the 
majority declines to consider the finality of the Medical Commission's decision 
(collateral estoppel) because it was not presented in the opening appellate 
brief to the district court. The majority's reliance on Zielinske is misplaced, 
as that case was certified to us by the district court and, therefore, our 
refusal to consider the issue raised for the first time in the appellants reply 
brief in Zielinske was based on the failure to raise the issue at the 
administrative level. That is not the case here.

Our 
general rule, as correctly stated by the majority in its standard of review, is 
that we review a decision in worker's compensation cases as if it came directly 
from the Division, according no deference to the district court's findings. If 
the agency's conclusions of law are correct, the decision will be affirmed. If 
not, we will correct the agency's decision. Walsh v. Holly Sugar Corp., 931 P.2d 241, 242 (Wyo. 1997); Clark v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety & Compensation 
Div., 968 P.2d 436, 437 (1998). I have found no Wyoming case which holds that 
issues in a worker's compensation appeal are waived if not directly raised in 
the initial brief to a district court, even though extensively argued below. 
However, we need not decide that question here.