Title: State v. Steffes

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2013 WI 53 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP691-CR   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Matthew R. Steffes, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 340 Wis. 2d 576, 812 N.W.2d 529 
(Ct. App. 2012-Published) 
PDC No: 2012 WI App 47     
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 20, 2013   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 12, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Thomas P. Donegan   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY, J., dissent. (Opinion 
filed.)    
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Jeffrey W. Jensen, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Jeffrey W. 
Jensen.   
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Daniel J. O’Brien, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general, with assistance 
from Jason Gorn, legal extern. 
  
 
 
2013 WI 53
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP691 
 
(L.C. No. 
2004CF2138) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Matthew R. Steffes, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 20, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeal.  Affirmed.     
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   We review a published 
decision of the court of appeals affirming Matthew R. Steffes's 
conviction of two counts of conspiracy to commit theft of 
property by fraud.  See State v. Steffes, 2012 WI App 47, 340 
Wis. 2d 576, 812 N.W.2d 529.  While in prison, Steffes was part 
of a conspiracy that defrauded AT&T out of more than $28,000 of 
phone services through a scheme that involved furnishing the 
company with fraudulent information.  Specifically, Steffes and 
his cellmate——with the help of friends and family members 
No. 
11AP691 
   
 
2 
 
outside of prison——submitted fictitious business names and 
stolen personal identifying information to AT&T to set up phone 
numbers.  Steffes would then make collect calls to these numbers 
with the knowledge they would never be paid for.  The plan would 
work for short bursts of time; once it was clear that the phone 
bill was not going to be paid, AT&T would shut down the number.  
Steffes and the other members of the conspiracy would then move 
on and set up a new telephone number.  Over the course of the 
eighteen-month life of this plan, Steffes made 322 phone calls, 
free of charge.   
¶2 
Steffes was subsequently charged and convicted of two 
counts of conspiracy to commit theft by fraud of property in 
excess of $10,000.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 939.31, 943.20(1)(d), and 
943.20(3)(c) (2011-12).1   
¶3 
Two issues are presented in this case.  The first is 
whether submitting fictitious business names and stolen personal 
identifying information is a "false representation" under Wis. 
Stat. § 943.20(1)(d).  Steffes alleges that such conduct is not 
a false representation because the statute requires that the 
actor make an express promise to pay.  The second issue is 
whether the applied electricity that AT&T uses to power its 
network is included within the definition of "property" found in 
§ 943.20(2)(b).  Steffes argues that his conviction cannot be 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated.  Nothing has 
changed in any applicable statute since the relevant conduct 
occurred. 
No. 
11AP691 
   
 
3 
 
sustained because the evidence at trial showed that he stole 
telephone services and not property.   
¶4 
On the first issue we hold that Steffes made "false 
representations" to AT&T.  The theft-by-fraud statute says that 
"'[f]alse representation' includes a promise made with intent 
not to perform if it is part of a false and fraudulent scheme."  
Wis. Stat. § 943.20(1)(d) (emphasis added).  Because the word 
"includes" is not restrictive, the statute clearly anticipates 
that other conduct aside from an express promise falls under the 
umbrella of a "false representation."  The scope and history of 
the theft-by-fraud statute make plain that providing fictitious 
business names and stolen personal identifying information to a 
phone company as a way of avoiding payment falls within the 
meaning of "false representation."  
¶5 
As to the second issue, "property" under the theft-by-
fraud statute is defined as "all forms of tangible property, 
whether 
real 
or 
personal, 
without 
limitation 
including 
electricity, gas and documents which represent or embody a chose 
in 
action 
or 
other 
intangible 
rights." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 943.20(2)(b) (emphasis added).  Relying on the plain language 
of the statute in conjunction with commonly used dictionaries, 
we conclude that Steffes stole electricity from AT&T.  AT&T 
purchases and stores electricity to power its network.  When 
consumers make phone calls, AT&T must buy more electricity.  The 
conspiracy perpetrated against AT&T therefore deprived the 
company of its property.  We affirm the court of appeals.                   
No. 
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4 
 
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶6 
While Matthew Steffes and Joshua Howard were cellmates 
at the Waupun Correctional Institution, Howard devised an 
illicit scheme that would allow the two of them to make free 
collect calls from prison.  The conspiracy worked as follows.  
Friends and family members outside the prison walls would set up 
a phone number by giving false information to the phone company—
—in this case AT&T.2  Once the dummy number was set up, Howard 
and Steffes could make unlimited collect calls to the number.  
The benefit to the people setting up the fraudulent numbers was 
that they would receive free phone service for a short period of 
time.  After the phone company would shut the number down 
because of unpaid bills, the process would start over again.   
¶7 
The plan was elaborate and long-lasting, involving 
Steffes's father, his sister (who also has a child with Howard), 
his cousin, several friends, and another woman who has a child 
with Howard.  In sum, 60 fraudulent phone numbers were created 
between May 2002 and May 2003. Part of the operation entailed 
giving fictitious business names to AT&T, while other numbers 
were set up using stolen personal identifying information 
obtained through a health care clinic where Steffes's sister's 
roommate worked.  Over an 18-month period in 2002 and 2003, 
Steffes made 322 calls totaling 6,562 minutes.  The loss to AT&T 
                                                 
2 SBC was the phone company that suffered the losses, but at 
the time of trial it had been renamed AT&T.  See Shawn Young, 
SBC Completes AT&T Purchase, Takes New Name, Wall St. J., Nov. 
19, 2005, at A8.  To avoid confusion, we will exclusively 
designate the phone company as "AT&T" throughout this opinion.   
No. 
11AP691 
   
 
5 
 
from setting up the fraudulent phone numbers and the unpaid 
calls was $28,061.41.   
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶8 
Steffes was charged with two counts of conspiracy to 
commit theft by fraud of property in excess of $10,000 pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 939.31, 
943.20(1)(d), 
and 
943.20(3)(c).3  
Section 939.31 is the conspiracy statute and it provides that 
"whoever, with intent that a crime be committed, agrees or 
combines with another for the purpose of committing that crime 
may, if one or more of the parties to the conspiracy does an act 
to effect its object, be fined or imprisoned or both."  The 
theft-by-fraud statute, § 943.20(1)(d), makes it a crime to 
obtain "title to property of another person by intentionally 
deceiving the person with a false representation which is known 
to be false, made with intent to defraud, and which does defraud 
the person to whom it is made."  "Property" is defined as "all 
forms of tangible property, whether real or personal, without 
limitation 
including electricity, gas and documents which 
represent or embody a chose in action or other intangible 
                                                 
3 The State brought two charges because Steffes helped set 
up one group of phone numbers under the fictitious business name 
"Nick's Heating & Cooling" and another under "Douyette Typing 
Service" or "Douyette Advertising Service."  The loss to AT&T 
from the former was $13,541.63 and the latter $14,519.78.   
Steffes was also charged with but acquitted of one count of 
conspiracy to commit identity theft. 
No. 
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6 
 
rights."  § 943.20(2)(b).  Steffes pled not guilty and the case 
proceeded to a jury trial.4     
¶9 
Robert Lindsley, an engineer for AT&T, testified at 
trial that someone making a phone call is using "an applied form 
of electricity," and that all telephone companies need a "power 
network" to connect electricity to the telephone network.  The 
key to understanding this concept, Lindsley explained, rests in 
the difference between AC and DC power.  AC power is the 
electricity that runs through outlets in a wall.  Conversely, DC 
power is stored in batteries.  In Lindsley's words, "the 
telephone company actually buys AC power from the commercial 
utility[,]  [turns] AC power into a DC form, [and] stores that 
energy in batteries so that if we lose commercial power to our 
central office, your phone continues to work."  
¶10 According to Lindsley, AT&T customers are given a 
"subscriber pair."  This is a wire that connects the registered 
phone line to the switch at AT&T's central office.  The switch 
is what directs a phone call to the dialed number and connects 
the circuit, so when a customer makes a phone call he is not 
only using the subscriber pair, but also power from the switch.  
As Lindsley explicated, "We digitize the signal, so it uses 
equipment that can transmit that telephone call either through 
                                                 
4 Steffes was originally charged in 2004 but did not stand 
trial until five years later.  Because the procedural history 
leading up to the trial is not germane to the issues at hand, we 
will not recount it.   
No. 
11AP691 
   
 
7 
 
fiberoptic cables, over cable systems, or even through radio 
links using radio towers."    
¶11 Steffes was convicted of two counts of conspiracy to 
commit theft by fraud.  The court sentenced him to two years in 
prison followed by thirty months of extended supervision on each 
count, to be served concurrently.  He and the other members of 
the conspiracy were also ordered to jointly and severally pay 
the full $28,061.41 loss in restitution to AT&T.   Steffes 
appealed his conviction to the court of appeals and argued: (1) 
the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because 
no "false promise" was made during the commission of the 
conspiracy; (2) the applied form of electricity used by AT&T is 
more akin to a service and thus is not property for purposes of 
the theft-by-fraud statute.5    
¶12 In a published opinion, the court of appeals affirmed 
his conviction.  Steffes, 340 Wis. 2d 576.  On the issue of 
whether a "false promise" was made during the conspiracy, 
Steffes argued that because no member of the conspiracy actually 
told the telephone company that he would pay for the services, 
no "false promise" was made.  The court of appeals held that the 
theft-by-fraud statute does not require evidence of an express 
false promise; the statute requires only that "the offender 
'intentionally 
deceiv[e]' 
the 
victim 
'with 
a 
false 
                                                 
5 Steffes also alleged that he was entitled to resentencing 
and that the circuit court issued erroneous jury instructions.  
Steffes does not raise his sentencing claim before this court.  
As for the jury instruction issue, we address that in footnote 
7, infra, of this opinion.   
No. 
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8 
 
representation . . . known to be false, made with intent to 
defraud.'"  Id., ¶17 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 943.20(1)(d)).  Here, 
all the false identifying information that the conspirators gave 
to AT&T amounted to false representations.  Steffes, 340 Wis. 2d 
576, ¶17.    
¶13 As to the second question——whether applied electricity 
is property under the theft-by-fraud statute——the court of 
appeals held that the presence of the term "electricity" in Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 943.20(2)(b) 
is 
"broad 
enough 
to 
encompass 
the 
transmission of electricity over telephone lines."  Steffes, 340 
Wis. 2d 576, ¶23.  Because the statute does not specifically 
distinguish between different types of electricity, the court of 
appeals 
reasoned 
that 
the 
legislature 
intended 
the 
term 
"electricity" to be applied broadly and to encompass electricity 
transmitted over telephone lines.  Id.   
¶14 We granted Steffes's petition for review and now 
affirm the court of appeals.   
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶15 There are two issues presented for our review.  The 
first is whether submitting fictitious business names and stolen 
personal identifying information is a "false representation" 
under Wis. Stat. § 943.20(1)(d).  The second is whether the 
applied electricity that AT&T uses to power its network is 
included 
within 
the 
definition 
of 
"property" 
found 
in 
§ 943.20(2)(b).  These are questions of statutory interpretation 
which we review de novo.  Crown Castle USA, Inc. v. Orion 
No. 
11AP691 
   
 
9 
 
Constr. Group, LLC, 2012 WI 29, ¶12, 339 Wis. 2d 252, 811 N.W.2d 
332.   
 
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
¶16 We first hold that submitting fictitious business 
names and stolen personal identifying information as a means of 
setting up phone numbers constitutes a "false representation" 
for purposes of the theft-by-fraud statute.  On the second 
question we hold that because AT&T must purchase and store 
electricity to power its network, it was defrauded out of its 
property by Steffes and his fellow conspirators.  For these 
reasons, Steffes was appropriately prosecuted for conspiracy to 
commit theft by fraud and the evidence presented at trial 
satisfied all the elements of that crime.    
A. 
Submitting Fictitious Business Names and Stolen 
Personal Identifying Information Constitutes a "False 
Representation" 
1. 
History of Theft of Property by Fraud   
¶17 The crime of theft by fraud traces its roots to a 1757 
Act of the Parliament of Great Britain, which provided that  
All persons who knowingly and designedly, by 
false pretense or pretenses, shall obtain from any 
person 
or 
persons, 
money, 
goods, 
wares 
or 
merchandizes, with intent to cheat or defraud any 
person 
or 
persons 
of 
the 
same . . . shall 
be . . . fined and imprisoned, or . . . be put to 
pillory, 
or 
publicly 
whipped 
or . . . transported . . . for 
the 
term 
of 
seven 
years . . . . 
James E. Simon, A Survey of Worthless Check Offenses, 14 Mil. L. 
Rev. 29, 30 (1961) (quoting 30 Geo. 2, c.24, § 1).  Prior to the 
No. 
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10 
 
passage of this statute, English common law did not recognize 
the "crime of obtaining property by false pretenses," as it was 
then known.  State v. Semrau, 199 A.2d 580, 582 (Conn. App. Ct. 
1963).  Instead, the remedy for someone who was defrauded out of 
property was in civil court:  "[W]e are not to indict one man 
for making a fool of another: let him bring his action."  Reg. 
v. Jones, (1703) 91 Eng. Rep. 330 (Q.B.).   
¶18 The law passed by Parliament served as a template for 
false pretense statutes in most American states.  Simon, A 
Survey of Worthless Check Offenses, 14 Mil. L. Rev. at 30.  
Indeed, Wisconsin's very first compilation of statutes contained 
similar language.  See Wis. Stat. ch. 134, § 33 (1849).6  As this 
court stated in 1859, one of the goals of the false pretense 
statute was to "protect the weak and credulous from the wiles 
and stratagems of the artful and cunning."  State v. Green, 7 
Wis. 571 [*676], 580 [*685] (1859) (quoting the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts's interpretation of an identical statute 
in Commonwealth v. Drew, 36 Mass. 179, 184 (1837)).  Or as the 
                                                 
6 That statute read: 
If any person shall designedly, by any false pretence 
or by any privy or false token, and with intent to 
defraud, obtain from any other person any money or 
goods, wares, merchandize or other property, or shall 
obtain with such intent the signature of any person to 
any written instrument, the false making whereof would 
be punishable as forgery, he shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the state prison not more than five 
years nor less than one year, or by fine not exceeding 
five hundred dollars nor less than fifty dollars. 
Wis. Stat. ch. 134, § 33 (1849).   
No. 
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11 
 
court of appeals more recently described it:  "The purpose in 
creating the statute was to protect unsuspecting citizens from 
swindlers who, realizing that the crimes of larceny and 
embezzlement required that property be taken without the owner's 
consent, obtained the property of others with their consent by 
means of willful misrepresentation and deliberate lying."  State 
v. O'Neil, 141 Wis. 2d 535, 539, 416 N.W.2d 77 (Ct. App. 1987).          
        
¶19 In the ensuing decades, a plethora of fraud and 
larceny statutes were added to Wisconsin's "offenses against 
property" statutory chapter.  See generally Wis. Stat. Ch. 343 
(1953). The current theft-by-fraud statute was enacted in 1955 
as a way of condensing these crimes into one law.  See § 1, ch. 
696, Laws of 1955; State v. Meado, 163 Wis. 2d 789, 797, 472 
N.W.2d 567 (Ct. App. 1991) ("One of the objectives of the 1955 
revision was to simplify the language and to state fully the 
prohibition in fewer words than the previous statutes.").  It is 
with this background in mind that we apply the contemporary 
statute to Steffes's argument that his conviction must be 
reversed because no member of the conspiracy promised to pay 
AT&T for the phone services and thus no "false representation" 
was made.   
2. 
Steffes's Conduct as a Conspirator Falls Under Wis. 
Stat. § 943.20(1)(d) 
¶20 The theft-by-fraud statute makes it illegal to: 
Obtain[] title to property of another person by 
intentionally 
deceiving the person with a false 
No. 
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12 
 
representation which is known to be false, made with 
intent to defraud, and which does defraud the person 
to whom it is made.  "False representation" includes a 
promise made with intent not to perform if it is a 
part of a false and fraudulent scheme. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 943.20(1)(d).  Because Steffes was charged 
with conspiracy to commit theft by fraud, the State was required 
to prove that only one member of the conspiracy made a "false 
representation."  See Wis. Stat. § 939.31.  We hold that 
providing 
fictitious 
business 
names 
and 
stolen 
personal 
identifying information to a phone company with the intent of 
setting 
up 
temporary 
phone 
numbers 
constitutes 
a 
"false 
representation."         
¶21 The key to understanding why Steffes's argument lacks 
merit is the second sentence of the statute.  It says that a 
false representation "includes a promise made with intent not to 
perform."  Wis. Stat. § 943.20(1)(d) (emphasis added).  If 
"includes" were replaced with "means" or "is," Steffes's 
position would be on stronger footing.  The word "includes," 
though, is not restrictive.  See 2A Norman J. Singer & J.D. 
Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 47:7 (7th 
ed. West 2012) ("[T]he word 'includes' is usually a term of 
enlargement, and not of limitation . . . . It, therefore, 
conveys the conclusion that there are other items includable, 
though 
not 
specifically 
enumerated . . . .") 
(citations 
omitted).  "Including" is another way of saying "is not limited 
to."  See State v. Popenhagen, 2008 WI 55, ¶41 n.20, 309 Wis. 2d 
601, 749 N.W.2d 611.  To reach the result desired by Steffes, we 
would have to either rewrite or ignore the plain language of the 
No. 
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13 
 
statute.  This we may not do.  See City of Menasha v. WERC, 2011 
WI App 108, ¶18, 335 Wis. 2d 250, 802 N.W.2d 531 (noting that a 
court "may not substitute [its] judgment for that of the 
legislature; [it] may not rewrite the statute.").     
¶22 A court may read the word "includes" in a restrictive 
manner only if "there is some textual evidence that the 
legislature intended the word 'includes' to be interpreted as a 
term of limitation or enumeration."  Popenhagen, 309 Wis. 2d 
601, ¶43.  There is nothing in the two sentences of Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.20(1)(d) to indicate that the legislature limited "false 
representation" to situations where an individual makes an 
express promise to pay for items he has no intention of paying 
for.  In fact, the statute quite clearly says just the opposite.  
Accordingly, we reject Steffes's reading of the statute.7   
                                                 
7 For similar reasons, we dismiss Steffes's argument that 
the circuit court gave improper jury instructions.  The standard 
jury 
instructions 
for 
theft 
by 
fraud 
define 
"false 
representation" as "one of past or existing fact.  It does not 
include expressions of opinions or representations of law."  
Wis. JI——Criminal 1453A.  The circuit court used this language 
but also added that "[a] representation may be expressed, or it 
may be implied from all of the circumstances surrounding the 
transaction."  Steffes alleges that this addition rendered the 
court's instructions legally incorrect.   
As a general matter, we first note that a circuit court has 
wide latitude to give instructions based on the facts of a case.  
State v. McCoy, 143 Wis. 2d 274, 289, 421 N.W.2d 107 (1988).  
The court may exercise its discretion regarding both the 
language and emphasis of the instruction.  Id.  "Only if the 
jury instructions, as a whole, misled the jury or communicated 
an incorrect statement of the law will we reverse and order a 
new trial."  State v. Laxton, 2002 WI 82, ¶29, 254 Wis. 2d 185, 
647 N.W.2d 784.   
No. 
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14 
 
¶23 Having rejected Steffes's view that the State was 
required to show that a member of the conspiracy promised to pay 
for the phone services, we hold that there was ample evidence 
that a "false representation" was made.  Telephone companies 
require new customers to provide contact information for a 
reason: if the customer does not pay, the information enables 
the company to shut off service, demand payment, and if 
necessary, begin collection proceedings.  A phone company's 
contractual rights are therefore violated when individuals give 
false information in order to evade payment.  If Steffes were 
correct, telephone providers would be required to undertake 
exhaustive background checks on each potential customer to 
ensure that the information provided was accurate.  The theft-
by-fraud statute does not require the State to show that a 
consumer made an express promise to retailers that he would pay 
the full amount owed.  The evidence in this case more than 
supports the jury's finding that false representations were 
made.  See State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 507, 451 N.W.2d 
752 (1990) (this court will uphold a conviction if any 
reasonable inferences support it).        
                                                                                                                                                             
As we explain in this opinion, making an express promise to 
pay is one way, but not the only way, to make a "false 
representation."  Given the facts in this case, it was not only 
entirely appropriate for the circuit court to instruct the jury 
as it did, but it would have been legally incorrect for the 
court to say that a false representation required an express 
promise to pay, as Steffes believes.  The circuit court was well 
within its discretion to choose the words that it did.    
No. 
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15 
 
B. 
The Applied Form of Electricity Used by AT&T is 
"Property" Under Wis. Stat. § 943.20(2)(b) 
¶24 Steffes next alleges that his conviction should be 
reversed because what he and his co-conspirators stole was not 
property, but rather telephone services.8  According to Steffes, 
                                                 
8 Steffes also presented a narrower version of this argument 
before the court of appeals.  There, he asserted that the 
evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to prove that he 
stole more than $2,500 worth of electricity, and thus his 
convictions should be reduced from a felony to a misdemeanor.  
See Wis. Stat. § 943.20(3)(a) (making it a Class A misdemeanor 
if the property stolen does not exceed $2,500).  Steffes does 
not make this argument before our court, and in any event, we 
reject this contention.  At trial, when Robert Lindsley (an AT&T 
engineer) was asked how much electricity is used in a typical 
phone call, he replied that he could not "quantify" the amount 
"because every circuit is different" depending on the distance 
of the call.  Steffes presented no evidence that the amount of 
electricity stolen was less than $2,500.  The State, meanwhile, 
made its case that Steffes stole $13,541.63 of property in count 
one and $14,519.78 in count two.  On both counts, the jury was 
asked the following on the verdict form: 
Was the value of the property stolen more than 
$10,000? 
Yes___ No ___ 
If you answer the preceding question NO, then answer 
this question: 
Was the value of the property stolen more than $5,000? 
Yes___ No ___ 
If you answer the preceding question NO, then answer 
this question: 
Was the value of the property stolen more than $2,500? 
Yes___ No ___ 
No. 
11AP691 
   
 
16 
 
the applied electricity used by AT&T to power its network does 
not fall within the ambit of the statute.  The State responds 
that because AT&T owns the electricity that powers the telephone 
lines, the conspiracy carried out by Steffes and the others 
clearly amounted to theft of AT&T's property via fraud.   
¶25 To 
restate, 
"property" 
under 
the 
theft-by-fraud 
statute is defined as "all forms of tangible property, whether 
real or personal, without limitation including electricity, gas 
and documents which represent or embody a chose in action or 
other intangible rights."  Wis. Stat. § 943.20(2)(b) (emphasis 
added).  "Electricity" is not given a specific definition in the 
statute.  "When a word of common usage is not defined in a 
statute, we may turn to a dictionary to ascertain its meaning."  
Burbank Grease Servs., LLC v. Sokolowski, 2006 WI 103, ¶14, 294 
Wis. 2d 274, 717 N.W.2d 781.  In searching for the appropriate 
dictionary definition of "electricity" we are mindful of the 
"ordinary-meaning canon," which provides that "[w]ords are to be 
understood in their ordinary, everyday meaning——unless the 
context indicates that they bear a technical sense."  Antonin 
Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of 
                                                                                                                                                             
The jury answered that the property stolen from AT&T was 
worth more than $10,000 on both counts.  Given the evidence 
presented at trial by the State, we will not disturb the jury's 
conclusion that Steffes stole more than $10,000 of applied 
electricity from AT&T.  See Morden v. Cont'l AG, 2000 WI 51, 
¶39, 235 Wis. 2d 325, 611 N.W.2d 659 ("[A]ppellate courts search 
the record for credible evidence that sustains the jury's 
verdict, not for evidence to support a verdict that the jury 
could have reached but did not.").   
No. 
11AP691 
   
 
17 
 
Legal Texts 69 (2012).  A court "should assume the contextually 
appropriate ordinary meaning unless there is reason to think 
otherwise."  Id. at 70.  As nothing in § 943.20(2)(b) indicates 
that "electricity" was intended to have a technical meaning, we 
will look at the common understanding of the word.  One 
dictionary defines "electricity" as an "[e]lectric current used 
or regarded as a source of power."  The American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language 575 (5th ed. 2011).  Another 
defines it similarly:  "A supply of electric current laid on in 
a building or room."  Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 807 (6th 
ed. 2007).  And a dictionary published around the time the 
current theft-by-fraud statute was enacted defined "electricity" 
as an "electric current" with examples of its use as "to install 
electricity; a machine run by electricity."  The Random House 
Dictionary of the English Language 459 (1966).  Coursing through 
these definitions is the notion that the word "electricity," as 
it is used in its everyday parlance, means something that 
provides power. 
¶26 A straightforward reading of this statute combined 
with the use of dictionaries unequivocally supports the State's 
view that Steffes stole electricity from AT&T.  To surmount this 
textual and lexicographical hurdle, Steffes describes a parade 
of horribles that will supposedly be unleashed if we uphold his 
conviction under Wis. Stat. § 943.20(1)(d).  For example, 
Steffes claims that the failure to pay a dental or barber bill 
could result in prosecution for theft by fraud because dentists 
No. 
11AP691 
   
 
18 
 
and barbers use electricity when cleaning teeth and cutting 
hair.  The difference, however, between not paying a dentist's 
or barber's bill and defrauding a phone company is that the 
dentist and barber do not own the electricity they use to 
provide services to customers, but rather pay a utility company 
to heat and light their offices.  AT&T, by contrast, must buy AC 
power, turn it into DC power, and store it in batteries at one 
of its networks.  The electricity used by AT&T is thus its 
"property" for purposes of the theft-by-fraud statute.  Given 
this 
fundamental 
difference, 
we 
do 
not 
share 
Steffes's 
prosecutorial slippery slope concerns.  Cf. Robert H. Bork, The 
Tempting of America 169 (1990) ("Judges and lawyers live on the 
slippery slope of analogies; they are not supposed to ski it to 
the bottom.").   
¶27 What is more, this court does not issue advisory 
opinions on how a statute could be interpreted to different 
factual 
scenarios 
in 
future 
cases. 
 
See 
Grotenrath 
v. 
Grotenrath, 215 Wis. 381, 384, 254 N.W. 631 (1934) ("[C]ourts 
will not ordinarily render advisory opinions where the questions 
propounded have not arisen and may never arise.").  Rather, it 
is our job to adjudicate the dispute in front of us.  It is thus 
not necessary for us to resolve the hypotheticals laid out by 
Steffes.  See Gortmaker v. Seaton, 450 P.2d 547, 548 (Or. 1969) 
(en banc) ("It is fundamental to appellate jurisprudence that 
courts do not sit 'to decide abstract, hypothetical, or 
contingent questions . . . .'") (citation omitted).     
No. 
11AP691 
   
 
19 
 
¶28 An issue raised at oral argument——but not briefed by 
Steffes——is that Steffes's conduct fell under the "theft of 
telecommunications 
service" 
statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 943.45.  
Because the parties did not address this question, we will not 
answer whether Steffes could be charged under any of the 
provisions in § 943.45(1).  See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 
627, 646, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (noting that an 
appellate court may decline to address issues that are not 
briefed); see also State v. Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d 121, 124, 449 
N.W.2d 845 (1990) (declining to address an issue not briefed).    
We do, however, pause to note that whether Steffes could have 
been charged with a different crime for the same conduct is not 
determinative of whether Steffes's conviction for theft by fraud 
was valid.  
¶29 That a prosecutor has discretion in deciding what 
charges to bring is codified in this state's law:  "[I]f an act 
forms the basis for a crime punishable under more than one 
statutory provision, prosecution may proceed under any or all 
such provisions."  Wis. Stat. § 939.65.  As we have said, "This 
section gives a green light to multiple charges, which may 
result in 
multiple 
convictions, under different statutory 
provisions."  State v. Davison, 2003 WI 89, ¶51, 263 Wis. 2d 
145, 
666 
N.W.2d 1 (emphasis removed).  It is entirely 
permissible for a prosecutor to base a charging decision upon 
the penalty scheme set by the legislature for each potential 
crime.  Cf. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 
No. 
11AP691 
   
 
20 
 
(1979) ("The prosecutor may be influenced by the penalties 
available upon conviction, but this fact, standing alone, does 
not give rise to a violation of the Equal Protection or Due 
Process Clause.").  As long as a charging decision is not based 
on an arbitrary or discriminatory classification such as race or 
religion, prosecutors have broad discretion in deciding what 
charges to bring.  State v. Ploeckelman, 2007 WI App 31, ¶13, 
299 Wis. 2d 251, 729 N.W.2d 784.  The ultimate question is 
whether the state can prove all the elements of the alleged 
offense.   
¶30 The elements of theft by fraud are: (1) the victim was 
the 
owner 
of 
property; (2) the defendant made a false 
representation to the owner; (3) the defendant knew the 
representation 
was 
false; 
(4) 
the 
defendant 
made 
the 
representation with intent to deceive and to defraud the owner; 
(5) the defendant obtained title to the property by the false 
representation; (6) the owner was deceived or misled by the 
representation; (7) the owner parted with title to the property 
in reliance on the false representation and was thus defrauded.  
Wis JI——Criminal 1453A.  AT&T purchased AC power from a utility 
company and turned it into DC power by storing it in batteries.  
It was thus the owner of the electricity, satisfying element 
number one.  As for the next three elements, we explained in the 
previous section that members of the conspiracy knowingly made 
false representations to AT&T with the intent of deceiving and 
defrauding the company.  The fifth element is satisfied by the 
No. 
11AP691 
   
 
21 
 
fact that Steffes made hundreds of phone calls over AT&T's phone 
lines.9  Finally, on the last two elements, AT&T was deceived 
into parting with its property in that it relied on the 
fictitious 
business 
names and stolen personal identifying 
information that Steffes and his co-conspirators provided as a 
means of fraudulently setting up phone numbers.  As all the 
                                                 
9 The phrase "[o]btains title to property" found in Wis. 
Stat. § 943.20(1)(d) seems to indicate that a defendant must 
acquire actual legal title to an item to be convicted of theft 
by fraud.  The court of appeals addressed this issue in State v. 
Meado, 163 Wis. 2d 789, 793, 472 N.W.2d 567 (Ct. App. 1991), 
when it was presented with the question of whether a defendant 
who fraudulently obtained a lease——but not full title——to a van 
could be prosecuted under the statute.  The answer was yes, 
because if the court "adopted [Meado's] argument that actual 
title is required to pass, an actor would have to obtain the 
legal document that is evidence of the title before the actor 
could be charged with violating" § 943.20(1)(d).  Meado, 163 
Wis. 2d at 798 (emphasis in original).  This reading of the 
statute "would reward the industrious and designing thief who, 
having 
perpetrated 
the 
proper 
fraud 
by 
making 
false 
representations, could escape criminal liability as long as the 
official title remained with the owner as security."  Id.  The 
Wisconsin Criminal Jury Instructions Committee agrees with this 
view as well.  Wis JI——Criminal 1453A, Comment 5.   
We concur with the Meado court's interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 943.20(1)(d).  Very few pieces of property actually have 
a legal title with a name on it.  If the state had to show that 
a defendant was a title holder of the property he stole, theft 
by fraud would be impossible to prosecute for a wide swath of 
cases.  Furthermore, it would be absurd if fraudulently 
obtaining title to a home or vehicle were criminalized but the 
exact same conduct were legal so long as the perpetrator were 
only leasing.  Cf. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 
WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (observing that 
statutes are interpreted to avoid absurd or unreasonable 
results).  For these reasons, we hold that 943.20(1)(d) only 
requires the prosecution to show that the defendant obtained the 
property.              
No. 
11AP691 
   
 
22 
 
elements of theft by fraud were met in this case, it is 
irrelevant whether Steffes could have been prosecuted under a 
different statute.  
V. 
CONCLUSION 
¶31 Two issues are presented in this case.  The first is 
whether submitting fictitious business names and stolen personal 
identifying information is a "false representation" under Wis. 
Stat. § 943.20(1)(d).  Steffes alleges that such conduct is not 
a false representation because the statute requires that the 
actor make an express promise to pay.  The second issue is 
whether the applied electricity that AT&T uses to power its 
network is included within the definition of "property" found in 
§ 943.20(2)(b).  Steffes argues that his conviction cannot be 
sustained because the evidence at trial showed that he stole 
telephone services and not property.   
¶32 On the first issue we hold that Steffes made "false 
representations" to AT&T.  The theft-by-fraud statute says that 
"'[f]alse representation' includes a promise made with intent 
not to perform if it is part of a false and fraudulent scheme."  
Wis. Stat. § 943.20(1)(d) (emphasis added).  Because the word 
"includes" is not restrictive, the statute clearly anticipates 
that other conduct aside from an express promise falls under the 
umbrella of a "false representation."  The scope and history of 
the theft-by-fraud statute make plain that providing fictitious 
business names and stolen personal identifying information to a 
No. 
11AP691 
   
 
23 
 
phone company as a way of avoiding payment falls within the 
meaning of "false representation."     
¶33 As to the second issue, "property" under the theft-by-
fraud statute is defined as "all forms of tangible property, 
whether 
real 
or 
personal, 
without 
limitation 
including 
electricity, gas and documents which represent or embody a chose 
in 
action 
or 
other 
intangible 
rights." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 943.20(2)(b) (emphasis added).  Relying on the plain language 
of the statute in conjunction with commonly used dictionaries, 
we conclude that Steffes stole electricity from AT&T.  AT&T 
purchases and stores electricity to power its network.  When 
consumers make phone calls, AT&T must buy more electricity.  The 
conspiracy perpetrated against AT&T therefore deprived the 
company of its property.  We affirm the court of appeals.      
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
                  
  
 
 
No.  2011AP691-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶34 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  In common 
parlance, 
Matthew 
Steffes, 
the 
defendant, 
and 
his 
co-
conspirators set up a complicated scheme to steal from the 
telephone company.  They intended to, and did, bilk the 
telephone company of what the telephone company sells——telephone 
services.   
¶35 The defendant is not, however, guilty of a crime 
unless the State can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he 
violated the terms of a specific statute.  Why?  Because there 
are no common law crimes in Wisconsin.1  All crimes are 
statutorily defined.  
¶36 The defendant in the present case was charged with, 
and found guilty of, violating Wis. Stat. §§ 943.20(1)(d)2 and 
943.20(3)(c),3 a class G felony.  These statutes criminalize 
                                                 
1 Wis. Stat. § 939.10.  See also State v. Genova, 77 
Wis. 2d 141, 145-46, 252 N.W.2d 380 (1977). 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 943.20(1)(d) reads: 
(1) Acts. Whoever does any of the following may be 
penalized as provided in sub. (3): 
. . . .  
(d) Obtains title to property of another person by 
intentionally 
deceiving the person with a false 
representation which is known to be false, made with 
intent to defraud, and which does defraud the person 
to whom it is made.  "False representation" includes a 
promise made with intent not to perform it if it is a 
part of a false and fraudulent scheme.  
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 943.20(3)(c) provides:  
(3) Penalties. Whoever violates sub. (1): 
No.  2011AP691-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
fraudulently obtaining the property of another with a value in 
excess of $10,000.   
¶37 The question of law presented in the instant case is, 
as the majority opinion states at ¶15:  "[W]hether the applied 
electricity that AT&T uses to power its network is included in 
the definition of 'property' found in § 943.20(2)(bparlan)."  As 
the majority opinion explains at ¶¶9-10, the telephone company 
uses electricity to power the transmission of telephone calls.4   
¶38 Electricity is specifically enumerated as "property" 
subject to the statute.5  Wisconsin Stat. § 943.20(2)(b) defines 
the word "property" for purposes of the statute as follows:  
"'Property' means all forms of tangible property, whether real 
or personal, without limitation including electricity, gas and 
documents which represent or embody a chose in action or other 
intangible rights."6   
¶39 Services, 
including 
telephone 
services, 
are 
not 
included within the statutory definition of property.7       
                                                                                                                                                             
. . . .  
(c) If the value of the property exceeds $10,000, is 
guilty of a Class G felony.  
4 I agree with the majority opinion that the defendant 
engaged in false representation to defraud the telephone 
company. 
5 The jury was instructed that under Wisconsin law the term 
"property" includes electricity. 
6 Wis. Stat. § 943.20(2)(b). 
7 Theft of services cannot be prosecuted under Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.20 of the Criminal Code.  See William A. Platz, The 
Criminal Code, 1956 Wis. L. Rev. 350.   
No.  2011AP691-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶40 I write on two issues of law presented:  (1) whether 
stealing 
telephone 
services 
from 
the 
telephone 
company 
constitutes stealing electricity under the statute at issue; and 
(2) if so, whether the value of the telephone services equals 
the value of the electricity stolen under the statute at issue.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Early drafts of the statute in 1950 (Bill No. 784, S.) and 
1953 (Bill No. 100, A.,), included explicit language listing 
services as property subject to theft under § 943.20.  See 
Drafting Records for 1950 Bill No. 784, S. and 1953 Bill No. 
100, A., on file at Wis. Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, 
Wis.  
The 
legislature later removed all language regarding 
services and intangible property from the statute it eventually 
enacted in 1955.  Ch. 696, Laws of 1955, § 943.20(2)(a) (eff. 
July 1, 1956).  
In 1960, Gordon B. Baldwin, Professor of Law and assistant 
dean at the University of Wisconsin Law School, summarized the 
comprehensive 
changes 
to 
the 
Criminal 
Code 
regarding 
misappropriation.  He explained that the definition of property 
in § 943.20 "does not reach the deceiver who takes labor and 
services 
from 
another 
without 
any 
intention 
of 
paying."  
Professor Baldwin advised that "[i]f criminal sanctions are 
needed to protect [service providers] specific statutes must be 
enacted."   
Professor Baldwin wrote: 
The 
comprehensive definition of property in the 
Criminal Code does not, however, reach all persons who 
intend a misappropriation.  It does not reach the 
deceiver who takes labor and services from another 
without 
any 
intention 
of 
paying. 
 
The 
doctor, 
architect, 
engineer 
and 
garagemen 
[sic] 
may 
be 
victimized and deserves protection, but the property 
definitions are not comprehensive enough to cover 
these misappropriations of services and time.  If 
criminal sanctions are needed to protect them specific 
statutes must be enacted (emphasis in original). 
Gordon B. Baldwin, Criminal Misappropriation in Wisconsin – Part 
I, 44 Marq. L. Rev. 253, 262 (Winter 1960-61). 
No.  2011AP691-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶41 The State chose, as is its prerogative, to charge the 
defendant with violation of the felony statute.8  I do not agree 
with the State or the majority opinion that stealing telephone 
services that apply electricity is stealing electricity within 
the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 943.20.  Even if stealing the 
telephone services can be shoehorned into the statutory concept 
of stealing electricity, I do not agree with the majority that, 
as a matter of law or fact, the value of electricity stolen is 
the same as the market value or replacement value of the 
telephone services stolen.  I therefore dissent.   
I 
¶42 I conclude as a matter of statutory interpretation 
that the defendant did not steal electricity from the telephone 
company under the statute at issue.   
¶43 Electricity powers our 21st Century world.  We all 
purchase electricity or use electricity purchased by others to 
power our lives.  The telephone company purchases electricity 
and provides services that are powered by electricity.   
¶44 The majority opinion defines electricity: "[I]n its 
everyday parlance [electricity] means something that provides 
power" and that "[a] straightforward reading of this statute 
combined with the use of dictionaries unequivocally supports the 
                                                 
8 The State might have charged and proved a violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 943.45, entitled "Theft of Telecommunications 
Service."  The penalty is, at most, a Class B misdemeanor.   
The State in future similar cases might use Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.50, creating a felony for the theft of services valued at 
more than $500.  This statute was enacted in 2011, after the 
defendant's conduct and the trial in the present case occurred. 
No.  2011AP691-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
State's 
view 
that 
Steffes 
stole 
electricity 
from 
AT&T."  
Majority op., ¶¶25-26.       
¶45 The majority opinion seems to rely on two theories to 
support its interpretation of the statutory word "electricity."  
First, it asserts that "applied electricity" is included within 
the statutory word "electricity."  Second, it asserts that the 
telephone company differs from the typical user of electricity 
or service provider that powers its services with electricity.  
Why?  Because the telephone company, unlike other users of 
electricity 
or 
service 
providers, 
owns 
the 
electricity.  
Majority op., ¶¶26, 30.  
¶46 The majority opinion, the State, and the court of 
appeals interpret the word "electricity" in the statute to 
include "applied electricity." 
¶47 The majority opinion defines the word "electricity," 
as we stated above, but does not define the phrase "applied 
electricity."  The phrase "applied electricity" does not appear 
in dictionaries or in glossaries discussing electricity.9  So 
what is the meaning of the phrase?   
¶48 At trial, the State presented testimony that telephone 
services are included in the definition of "property" because 
telephone service uses an "applied form of electricity."  Robert 
Lindsley, an electrical engineer and manager for the telephone 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., 8 Cyclopedia of Applied Electricity 483 (1921) 
(glossary of electrical terms); see also Clair A. Bayne, Applied 
Electricity & Electronics 656-70 (2000) (glossary of important 
terms).   
No.  2011AP691-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
company offered his expert opinion that "when you, you know, use 
your phone, you are using an applied form of electricity."10 
¶49 In its brief to the court of appeals, the State argued 
that "[t]he 'property' obtained by the installation and use of 
the fraud [sic] telephone lines by false representation were 
[sic] valuable telephone services which involve an 'applied 
form' of electricity and, as such, is 'property' within the 
scope of the statute. . . . Those calls simply could not be 
completed without electricity (unless the co-conspirators used 
tin cans and miles of string to transmit voice impulses).  
Electricity 
is 
an 
essential 
component 
of 
telephone 
service . . . ."11   
¶50 Interpreting 
the 
statutory 
word 
"electricity" 
appearing in Wis. Stat. § 943.20(2)(b), the court of appeals 
concluded as a matter of law that "electricity" as used in the 
statute includes "applied electricity," that is, that the 
                                                 
10 Testimony of Robert Lindsley, in part: 
When the telephone company bills a telecommunications 
network, it also bills a power network to support that 
telecommunications 
network. 
 
That 
power 
network 
splices electricity to the telephone network, and 
without that electricity, the telephone network would 
not be able to——to cause communications to occur over 
that network.  Basically, when you, you know, use your 
phone, you are using an applied form of electricity. 
When Robert Lindsley was asked whether he knew the 
telephone company's cost to power the phone system, he testified 
that he did not. 
11 State's court of appeals brief at 16. 
No.  2011AP691-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
statute includes electricity used to transmit the human voice 
via telephone lines.12   
¶51 In its brief before this court, the State argues that 
"property" under Wis. Stat. § 943.20(2)(b) includes electricity 
in its applied form; that "[t]he electricity and the telephone 
system to which it was applied were inextricably linked," and 
that "[e]lectricity is an essential component of telephone 
service . . . ."13  
¶52 Thus, the phrase "applied electricity" simply refers 
to the application of electricity in some manner.  The phrase is 
used to mean how and when electricity is used to power a 
particular 
product 
or 
service. 
 
The 
phrase 
"applied 
electricity," as used in the majority opinion, means the 
telephone company applies electricity in the delivery of 
telephone services.  More broadly, "applied electricity" means 
any application of electricity. 
¶53 This use of the phrase "applied electricity" is the 
ordinary use of the phrase.  Accordingly, the Cyclopedia of 
Applied 
Electricity 
describes 
itself 
as 
"a 
complete 
and 
practical working treatise on the generation and application of 
electric 
power."14 
 
According 
to 
the 
Cyclopedia: 
 
"The 
                                                 
12 State 
v. 
Steffes, 
2012 
WI 
App 
47, 
¶¶23-24, 
340 
Wis. 2d 576, 812 N.W.2d 529. 
13 State's Brief at 28. 
14 1 Cyclopedia of Applied Electricity 7 (1921).  Still, the 
term "applied electricity" is not found in the Table of Contents 
or the Index.   
No.  2011AP691-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
applications of the electric current are numberless and are to 
be found in every home. . . . Think again of the telephone, the 
wire and wireless telegraphs, and the thousands of other 
application of the electric spark, and electric energy which 
contribute to our daily comfort."15    
¶54 Thus, stealing "applied electricity" means in the 
present case, according to the majority opinion, stealing the 
electricity used to power the telephone services.  Majority op., 
¶5. 
¶55 If the criminal statute at issue includes electricity 
used to power telephone services as property, then the majority 
opinion has, in effect, rewritten the statute to include 
numerous services that are powered by electricity.   
¶56 The 
State 
attempts 
to 
avoid 
this 
result 
by 
distinguishing telephone services from other "services [that] 
                                                                                                                                                             
The phrase "applied electricity" is most often used as a 
textbook title, in a similar manner to the phrase "Applied 
Mathematics."  
See also Principles of Electricity Applied to Telephone and 
Telegraph Work (1961) (The title page describes the text as "[a] 
Training Course Text Prepared for Employees of the Long Lines 
Department, American Telephone and Telegraph Company."  The 
Preface explains that this edition of the text "has required the 
introduction of certain basic concepts and principles not dealt 
with in earlier editions, as well as numerous examples to 
illustrate their applications in practice."); Clair A. Bayne, 
Applied Electricity and Electronics (2000) (The phrase "applied 
electricity" is in the title of the text, but is not found in 
the Table of Contents, the Index, or the Glossary of Important 
Terms.). 
15 1 Cyclopedia of Applied Electricity 8 (1921).  For a 
discussion of electricity applied to the telephone, see 8 
Cyclopedia of Applied Electricity 11-90 (1921).  
No.  2011AP691-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
involve the use of electricity (i.e., legal advice over a 
telephone or the barber's use of electric hair clippers)."  From 
the State's vantage point, electricity is incidental to numerous 
services 
but, 
in 
contrast, 
integral 
to 
the 
telephone.  
Employees, skills, time, machinery, and labor are incidental to 
telephone services but, in contrast, according to the State, 
integral to other services that use electricity.  The State's 
brief explains the differences among service providers that use 
applied electricity as follows:   
The obvious difference is that the telephone lines 
cannot 
function, 
and 
so 
the 
service 
cannot 
be 
provided, 
without 
an 
enabling 
electrical 
system: 
electricity is essential to the service.  A telephone 
system cannot exist without it.  The customer who 
purchases access to a phone line purchases the 
electricity that powers it.  Legal services and a 
haircut can, theoretically, be provided without using 
electricity (a face-to-face meeting with a lawyer; a 
barber's scissors or straight razor).  The electricity 
used in connection with those services is only 
incidental to the service itself.  It is the value of 
the lawyer's skill and time, and the barber's skill 
and labor, that is lost when those services are 
fraudulently obtained by the lawyer's client or the 
barber's customer.  The telephone company loses the 
value of the applied form of electricity when its 
services are fraudulently obtained; the value of the 
telephone company's spent employee skills, time and 
labor are only incidental to that service.16    
¶57 This 
argument is unpersuasive, and the majority 
opinion rightfully refuses to adopt it.   
¶58 Service providers other than the telephone company 
require electricity to operate.  For example, the dentist uses 
electricity to power the lights, the dental chair, the drill, 
                                                 
16 State's Brief at 32 n.15 (emphasis in original). 
No.  2011AP691-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
the electric toothbrush, the suction apparatus, the ultrasonic 
sterilizer, the sealant gun, the x-ray machine, the security 
system, and computers.  Even the old-school barber, with only 
her scissors and straight razor, needs lights to see what she is 
doing.  As I recently discovered, when the electricity is shut 
off for a few hours, the barber closes up shop. 
¶59 Without electricity, neither the telephone company nor 
the dentist nor the barber can operate.  Electricity is 
essential and integral to telephone and dental and barbering 
services and telephone and dental and barbering services all 
also require human skills, time, labor, and equipment.   
¶60 In lieu of the State's argument that "electricity is 
integral 
to 
telephone 
services," 
the 
majority 
opinion 
distinguishes telephone services using "applied electricity" 
from other services using "applied electricity" based on the 
notion that the telephone company owns the electricity that 
powers the telephone services.  Robert Lindsley explained that 
the telephone company purchases AC power from the commercial 
utility, converts the electricity into DC power, and stores that 
energy in batteries so that in the event of a power outage, the 
telephone company can use the energy from the batteries to power 
the telephone system.17 
                                                 
17 Testimony from AT&T expert Robert Lindsley: 
There are two different forms of power.  There is AC 
power, which is what you would get out of your AC 
outlet at your home, and you are getting that from the 
commercial utility.  And then there is DC power.  The 
difference between AC and DC power is DC power, which 
is direct current power, can be stored in batteries.  
AC power cannot be stored in batteries.   
No.  2011AP691-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
¶61 The 
majority 
opinion 
promotes 
the 
"ownership" 
distinction as follows:  
The 
difference, 
however, 
between 
not 
paying 
a 
dentist's or barber's bill and defrauding a phone 
company is that the dentist or barber do not own the 
electricity they use to provide services to customers, 
but rather pay a utility company to heat and light 
their offices.  AT&T, by contrast, must buy AC power, 
turn it into DC power, and store it in batteries at 
one of its networks.  The electricity used by AT&T is 
thus its "property" for purposes of the theft-by-fraud 
statute.18 
¶62 The majority opinion's theory of the distinctiveness 
of electricity that powers telephone service based on the 
telephone company's ownership of electricity is not supported by 
fact or law.     
¶63 First, it seems to me that the majority opinion may be  
misreading the record regarding the concept of and importance of 
the telephone company's storage and "ownership" of electricity.  
Very little testimony discusses this issue.  No one focused on 
this topic at trial.  Yet a plain reading of Robert Lindsley's 
testimony seems to indicate that the telephone company only 
converts and stores electricity for use during a power outage 
and may simply transmit the electricity it normally receives. 
                                                                                                                                                             
So the telephone company actually buys AC power from 
the commercial utility, rectifies that DC——or excuse 
me.  The AC power into a DC form, stores that energy 
in batteries so that if we lose commercial power to 
our central office, your phone continues to work. 
18 Majority op., ¶26 (emphasis in original). 
No.  2011AP691-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
¶64 Furthermore, other service providers may also store 
(and thus "own") electricity for later use.19  A dentist 
purchases electricity to charge the laptop, cell phone, cordless 
phone, portable x-ray machine, and other portable electronic 
devices.  The dentist stores the electricity in the devices' 
batteries and then uses the electricity later to perform a 
service.20     
                                                 
19 The 
majority 
opinion 
attempts 
to 
distinguish 
the 
telephone company from other service providers and yet asserts 
at the same time that comparing service providers creates a 
slippery slope and unnecessary hypotheticals.  Majority op., 
¶¶26-27. 
Looking at how other service providers use electricity and 
at whether theft of their services can be prosecuted under the 
majority opinion's interpretation of the statute at issue is 
helpful to ensure that the statute is being interpreted 
correctly and that it will be applied consistently in the future 
to similar cases.  Were a person to fraudulently acquire cable 
television or internet service or a ticket on an electric train, 
could that person be successfully prosecuted for stealing 
electricity under the majority opinion's interpretation of the 
statute at issue in the present case? 
20 See John Bird, Electrical and Electronic Principles and 
Technology 28-29 (3d ed. 2007): 
The battery is now over 200 years old and batteries 
are found almost everywhere in consumer and industrial 
products.  Some practical examples where batteries are 
used include: 
In laptops, in cameras, in mobile phones, in cars, in 
watches 
and 
clocks, 
for 
security 
equipment, 
in 
electronic meters, for smoke alarms, for meters used 
to read gas, water and electricity consumption at 
home, to power a camera for an endoscope looking 
internally at the body, and for transponders used for 
toll collection on highways throughout the world. 
No.  2011AP691-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
¶65 Second, as a matter of law, the majority opinion's 
reliance on the telephone company's "ownership of electricity" 
as the determinative factor under the statute at issue is 
erroneous.  This ownership distinction is contrary to law and 
the purpose of the theft statute.21   
¶66 The purpose of the theft statutes is to prevent the 
taking of property without the consent of the owner or the 
person who has constructive or actual possession.22     
¶67 Property may be stolen from anyone who has the right 
to possess and use a thing to the exclusion of others.23 
Possession and control over the use of property is all that is 
required in order for it to be stolen.  Electricity may be 
diverted (stolen) from one that takes and stores electricity or 
one that simply pays to possess and use electricity.    
                                                 
21 Mitchell v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 325, 339, 267 N.W.2d 349 
(1978) (the offenses involving personal property contained in 
Chapter 943 consistently make possession of the property, not 
ownership, the key factor).  
See also Wis. Stat. § 943.32(3) (for purposes of the 
robbery statute, "owner" means a person in possession of 
property whether the person's possession is lawful or unlawful).  
See also Wis. Stat. § 971.33, Possession of property (in 
the prosecution of a crime committed by stealing, damaging, or 
fraudulently receiving or concealing personal property, it is 
sufficient if it is proved that at the time the crime was 
committed either the actual or constructive possession or the 
general or special property in any part of such property was in 
the person alleged to be the owner thereof).  
22 See generally 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law 
§ 19.2(a) (2d ed. 2003).  
23 See 
Mitchell 
v. 
State, 
84 
Wis. 2d 325, 
339, 
267 
N.W.2d 349 (1978).  
No.  2011AP691-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
¶68 The two dead giveaways for me that the State was 
prosecuting the defendant for theft of telephone services, not 
for the theft of electricity, were the charging documents and 
the State's argument that the value of the telephone services 
stolen equals the value of the electricity stolen.24 
¶69 The criminal complaint and information do not mention 
electricity.  These documents simply allege that the defendant 
stole both services and property. 
¶70 The only reference in the complaint to the stolen 
property and its value is in Section 1 of the complaint, 
entitled Summary of Allegations, which explains, "All tolled 
[sic], SBC representatives calculate that this fraud group 
bilked the Phone Company out of about $40,000 in phone service 
fees." 
¶71 The 
First 
Amended 
Information 
alleges 
that 
the 
defendant conspired to "obtain[] title to the property of [the 
telephone company], having a value exceeding $10,000 . . . [by 
making] 
a 
false 
promise 
to 
pay 
for 
telephone 
service 
                                                 
24 According to testimony at trial, telephone service fees 
paid by telephone customers not only pay for the electricity 
used to power the system, but also pay for the transmission 
wires, cables, offices, employees, and other machines and 
equipment. 
No.  2011AP691-CR.ssa 
 
15 
 
accounts . . . ."  The information does not specify the property 
that was the object of the conspiracy.25  
                                                 
25 The defendant was initially charged in 2004, pled no 
contest, was sentenced, and then was permitted to withdraw his 
no-contest plea in 2009.  After the plea was withdrawn, a Third 
Amended Information was filed, which restated charges filed 
years earlier in the First Amended Information.  The Third 
Amended Information is not in the record, but the First Amended 
Information is in the record, and represents the charges brought 
at trial. 
First Amended Information: 
COUNT 
01: 
CONSPIRACY 
TO 
MISAPPROPRIATE 
PERSONAL 
IDENTIFYING INFORMATION, HABITUAL CRIMINALITY (As to 
Defendants Matthew Steffes and Joshua Howard) 
Between about July 1, 2002 and December 1, 2002, at 
various locations within the County of Milwaukee, with 
intent that a crime be committed, did combine with 
another for the purpose of committing a crime, viz: 
The crime of Identity Theft . . .   
COUNT 02: CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT THEFT BY FRAUD (VALUE > 
$10,000), 
HABITUAL 
CRIMINALITY 
(As 
to 
Defendants 
Matthew Steffes and Joshua Howard) 
Between about July 1, 2002 and July 1, 2003, at 
various locations within the County of Milwaukee, with 
intent that a crime be committed, did combine with 
another for the purpose of committing a crime, viz.: 
The crime of Theft by Fraud, whereby the conspirators 
did combine for the purpose of obtaining title to the 
property of SBC, having a value exceeding $10,000, by 
intentionally 
deceiving 
SBC 
with 
a 
false 
representation known by the conspirators to be false, 
viz. a false promise to pay for telephone service 
accounts created in the name of Nick Steffes, which 
representation made with intent to defraud and which 
did defraud SBC, and furthermore one or more co-
conspirators did an act to effect the conspiracy's 
object 
contrary 
to 
Wisconsin 
Statutes 
section 
943.20(1)(d) & (3)(c) and 939.31 and 939.62 (emphasis 
added). 
No.  2011AP691-CR.ssa 
 
16 
 
¶72 The State not only made no effort to explain in the 
charging documents that the defendant stole electricity, but 
also made no effort at trial to quantify or qualify the amount 
or type of electricity stolen, or its value at the time it was 
stolen.   
¶73 The State has the burden to prove what property was 
stolen——how much property, what kind of property, and the value 
of the property. 
¶74 The State did not proffer any information at trial to 
quantify, qualify, or value the electricity that was allegedly 
stolen——how much electricity, what kind of electricity, or the 
value of the electricity stolen.  Rather, the State proved the 
number of telephone minutes used and the value of the telephone 
services.  
                                                                                                                                                             
COUNT 03: CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT THEFT BY FRAUD (VALUE > 
$10,000), 
HABITUAL 
CRIMINALITY 
(As 
to 
Defendants 
Matthew Steffes and Joshua Howard) 
Between about July 1, 2002 and July 1, 2003, at 
various locations within the County of Milwaukee, with 
intent that a crime be committed, did combine with 
another for the purpose of committing a crime, viz.: 
The crime of Theft by Fraud, whereby the conspirators 
did combine for the purpose of obtaining title to the 
property of SBC, having a value exceeding $10,000, by 
intentionally 
deceiving 
SBC 
with 
a 
false 
representation known by the conspirators to be false, 
viz. a false promise to pay for telephone service 
accounts created in the name of Jamie Douyette, which 
representation was made with intent to defraud and 
which did defraud SBC, and furthermore one or more co-
conspirators did an act to effect the conspiracy's 
object 
contrary 
to 
Wisconsin 
Statutes 
section 
943.20(1)(d) & (3)(c) and 939.31 and 939.62 (emphasis 
added). 
No.  2011AP691-CR.ssa 
 
17 
 
¶75 The best the majority opinion can put forth (and it is 
not good enough to convince me) is to explain that "AT&T 
purchases and stores electricity to power its network.  When 
consumers make phone calls, AT&T must buy more electricity.  The 
conspiracy perpetrated against AT&T therefore deprived the 
company of its property."  Majority op., ¶5.    
¶76 For the reasons set forth, I conclude that the 
defendant's bilking the telephone company was theft of telephone 
services, not theft of electricity under the statute.  As 
Assistant Attorney General William Platz and Professor Gordon 
Baldwin both explained more than a half century ago, theft of 
services is not covered by Wis. Stat. § 943.20.  The simple fact 
that electricity is used to power telephone service does not 
morph a theft of these services into a theft of electricity.   
II 
¶77 Even if stealing telephone services would constitute 
stealing electricity under the statute at issue, and it does 
not, the value of the electricity stolen is not, as a matter of 
law or fact, equal to the value of the telephone services.  The 
State and the majority opinion can add whatever adjectives they 
like before the term "electricity," but to convict an individual 
for a Class G felony under § 943.20, the State must prove that 
the individual in fact stole a quantifiable and valuable amount 
of electricity in excess of $10,000. 
¶78 The value of the electricity stolen is an important 
factor because the penalty for theft ranges from a misdemeanor 
No.  2011AP691-CR.ssa 
 
18 
 
through a Class G felony depending on the value of the property 
stolen.26 
¶79 Value is statutorily defined as "the market value at 
the time of the theft or the cost to the victim of replacing the 
property within a reasonable time after the theft, whichever is 
less."27 
¶80 Although the fair market value (or replacement value) 
of the stolen property is not an element of theft, when a 
criminal statute prescribes a penalty based on the value of the 
property, the fact finder (here the jury) determines the value 
of the property stolen and the jury's determination must be 
supported by the evidence.  The sentence for a theft felony 
cannot stand when there is no factual basis for the value of the 
stolen property.28 
¶81 The burden is on the State to prove the value of the 
stolen electricity.  The majority erroneously flips the burden 
                                                 
26 In Sartin v. State, this court explained: 
While . . . the value of the property stolen is not an 
element of the crime of theft, nevertheless value is 
of the utmost importance in determining the applicable 
penalty upon conviction.   
Sartin v. State, 44 Wis. 2d 138, 148, 170 N.W.2d 727 (1969).  
See also White v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 485, 490, 492-93, 271 
N.W.2d 97 (1978). 
27 Wis. Stat. § 943.20(2)(d). 
28 White 
v. 
State, 
85 
Wis. 2d 485, 
490, 
492-93, 
271 
N.W.2d 97 (1978) (a factual basis must be established for value; 
"Value must be determined before an appropriate penalty can be 
imposed . . . ."); Sartin v. State, 44 Wis. 2d 138, 151, 170 
N.W.2d 727 (1969). 
No.  2011AP691-CR.ssa 
 
19 
 
to the defendant to prove the quantity and value of electricity 
used to make each call.  Majority op., ¶24 n.8. 
¶82 The State proved only the "fair market value" of the 
telephone calls, not the "fair market value" of the electricity 
stolen and not the "replacement cost" of the electricity stolen.  
The State was content with not offering the quantity and value 
of the stolen electricity even though at trial AT&T's engineer, 
Robert Lindsley, testified that it would be possible to 
determine how much electricity was used to power each of the 
defendant's phone calls, but "it would be a very labor intensive 
process."   
¶83 Moreover, according to the testimony, the cost of the 
electricity used to provide telephone service does not equal the 
amount the telephone company charges for telephone service.  
Additional costs beyond the cost of electricity factor into the 
fees the telephone company charges for telephone service.  
Testimony at trial was that the telephone service fees paid by 
consumers not only pay for the electricity used to power the 
system, but also pay for the transmission wires, cables, 
offices, employees, and other machines and equipment. 
¶84 Thus, the fair market value of the stolen telephone 
service that the State offered at trial is not equal to the fair 
market value of the electricity stolen.  Accordingly, as a 
matter of law or fact, the State did not prove the value of the 
electricity stolen.   
¶85 The majority opinion follows the lead of the court of 
appeals, equating "applied electricity" to the entire telephone 
No.  2011AP691-CR.ssa 
 
20 
 
service as follows:  "[T]he market value to the telephone 
company of the services [fraudulently obtained] is the correct 
measure 
of 
the 
value 
of 
the 
stolen 
property 
in 
this 
case. . . . The undisputed evidence is that the phone company 
lost 
over 
$26,000 
in 
billable 
services——i.e. 
applied 
electricity . . . ."29   
¶86 The State did not prove the value of the electricity 
stolen.  Even if the statute is interpreted to mean the applied 
electricity in the present case, and I do not so interpret the 
statute, the State did not prove that the value of the stolen 
property exceeds $2,500.30  Under these circumstances the felony 
conviction 
must be 
vacated, a conviction of a Class A 
misdemeanor must be entered, and the cause must be remanded for 
resentencing.31 
¶87 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶88 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
                                                 
29 State 
v. 
Steffes, 
2012 
WI 
App 
47, 
¶¶23-24, 
340 
Wis. 2d 576, 812 N.W.2d 529. 
30 The minimum value of property stolen required for theft 
to 
be 
classified 
as 
a 
felony 
is 
$2,500. 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 943.20(3)(a) If the value of the property does not exceed 
$2,500, [whoever violates sub. 1] is guilty of a Class A 
misdemeanor.  
31 White v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 485, 493, 271 N.W.2d 97 
(1978). 
No.  2011AP691-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
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