Title: FAS, LLC v. Town of Bass Lake

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2007 WI 73 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP1689 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
FAS, LLC, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Town of Bass Lake, 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
Sawyer County Zoning Committee, Sawyer County 
Board of Appeals and Sawyer County Zoning 
Administrator, 
          Respondents-Respondents, 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Intervening-Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 294 Wis. 2d 697, 717 N.W.2d 853 
Ct. App. 2006—Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 19, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 4, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Sawyer   
 
JUDGE: 
John P. Anderson 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
by 
Thomas 
W. 
Harnisch 
and 
Thomas 
Harnisch 
Law 
Office, 
Neillsville, and oral argument by Thomas Harnisch. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent there were briefs and oral 
argument by Clifford E. Stoner, Hayward. 
 
For the intervening-respondent-respondent the cause was 
argued by Diane L. Milligan, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Paul G. Kent, Abigail 
C.S. Potts, and Anderson & Kent, S.C., Madison, on behalf of the 
Wisconsin Builders Association, and there was oral argument by 
Paul G. Kent. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Thomas D. Larson, and 
Debra P. Conrad, Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin REALTORS 
Association. 
 
 
 
2007 WI 73
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No. 2005AP1689    
(L.C. No. 
2004CV132) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
FAS, LLC, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Town of Bass Lake, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
Sawyer County Zoning Committee, Sawyer County 
Board of Appeals and Sawyer County Zoning 
Administrator, 
 
          Respondents-Respondents, 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Intervening-Respondent-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUNE 19, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a per curiam decision of the Court of Appeals.  
Affirmed.   
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished per curiam decision of the court of appeals1 that 
                                                 
1 FAS, LLC v. Town of Bass Lake, No. 2005AP1689, unpublished 
slip op., ¶2 (Wis. Ct. App. May 31, 2006). 
No. 
2005AP1689 
 
2 
 
affirmed the circuit court's order2 concluding that the Sawyer 
County Board of Appeals (board of appeals) proceeded on an 
incorrect theory of law when it concluded that a navigable 
stream meandering through a parcel divides the parcel into two 
lots and, based on that conclusion, that neither of the lots 
formed by the stream's division of the parcel had the minimum 
lakeshore frontage of 100 feet.  The circuit court reversed and 
the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court, reasoning that 
since a riparian owner holds title to the center of a navigable 
stream, a landowner who owns both shores of a navigable stream 
owns the entire streambed.  FAS, LLC v. Town of Bass Lake, No. 
2005AP1689, unpublished slip op., ¶10 (Wis. Ct. App. May 31, 
2006).  As a result, the court of appeals concluded that the 
parcel was not divided by Johnson Creek.  Id. 
¶2 
A riparian owner holds qualified title to the center 
of a navigable stream.  Therefore, when the same riparian owner 
holds qualified title to the property on both shores of the 
stream, his ownership is continuous throughout the streambed.  
Accordingly, a navigable stream meandering over a parcel does 
not divide the parcel into two parcels when the same riparian 
owner holds qualified title to the property on both shores of 
the stream.  We also conclude that under the Sawyer County 
Zoning Ordinances then in effect, the entire parcel, including 
the streambed, is used to calculate the width of the lakeshore 
frontage.  Therefore, because the board of appeals proceeded on 
                                                 
2 Sawyer County Judge John P. Anderson presided. 
No. 
2005AP1689 
 
3 
 
an incorrect theory of law in regard to whether the navigable 
stream divided the parcel, it inaccurately calculated the width 
of the parcel at issue under the then effective zoning 
ordinance.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
FAS, LLC (FAS) owned a parcel of real estate on Lac 
Courte Oreilles in the Town of Bass Lake, Sawyer County, 
Wisconsin, known as Government Lot 4.  On July 12, 2002, FAS 
recorded a Certified Survey Map (CSM) creating from a portion of 
Government Lot 4 two CSM lots, each with approximately 104 feet 
of lake frontage on the shores of Lac Courte Oreilles.  The 
portion of Government Lot 4 that remained after creation of CSM 
Lots 1 and 2 is the parcel at issue in this review.  On 
September 5, 2002, FAS recorded this parcel as the Bayshore 
Pines Condominium (hereinafter the condominium parcel).  The 
condominium parcel has approximately 103 feet of lakeshore 
frontage.  This frontage includes approximately seven feet of 
the mouth of Johnson Creek, a navigable stream that flows 
through the parcel and terminates at the shoreline of Lac Courte 
Oreilles.   
¶4 
FAS's original map of the condominium parcel did not 
make any reference to Johnson Creek.  Subsequently, the Town 
notified 
the 
Sawyer 
County 
Zoning 
Administrator 
(zoning 
administrator) that it believed the condominium parcel contained 
a navigable stream that divided the parcel into two lots; and 
therefore, the minimum lakeshore frontage requirement for a 
buildable lot was not satisfied.  However, contrary to the 
No. 
2005AP1689 
 
4 
 
zoning administrator's determination and the Town's contention, 
the zoning committee decided that the condominium parcel was not 
divided into two lots by Johnson Creek and that the mouth of 
Johnson Creek should be included in the calculation of lakeshore 
frontage under Sawyer County's zoning ordinance.  The zoning 
committee stated that "the lake classification is based on 
density and the lot meets that density requirement." 
¶5 
The Town appealed the zoning committee's decision to 
the board of appeals, and the board of appeals overturned the 
zoning committee's decision.  It did so because it determined 
that Johnson Creek divided the condominium parcel into two 
unequally sized lots, neither of which met the minimum lakeshore 
frontage requirement of 100 feet.  The board of appeals 
concluded that the zoning committee erred as a matter of law by 
not following an attorney general opinion, 66 Op. Att'y Gen. 2 
(1977).  The board of appeals quoted the following portion of 
the 1977 attorney general opinion as the basis for its decision:  
A body of navigable water separates a parcel of land 
as effectively as does a public highway.  Land owners 
abutting on navigable streams hold a qualified title 
to the center of the stream bed. . . . Therefore, 
parcels separated by navigable waters are no more 
susceptible to functional integration than parcels 
separated by public highways.   
66 Op. Att'y Gen. at 8. 
¶6 
FAS appealed the board of appeals' decision to the 
Sawyer County Circuit Court by statutory certiorari pursuant to 
No. 
2005AP1689 
 
5 
 
Wis. Stat. § 59.694(10) (2003-04).3  The circuit court reversed 
the decision, concluding that a landowner holds title to the 
center of a navigable streambed, and therefore, when a landowner 
owns both shores of the stream, the stream does not divide the 
parcel into two parcels or lots.  Thereafter, the circuit court 
reviewed the zoning ordinance and concluded that the condominium 
parcel satisfied the minimum lakeshore frontage requirement for 
a "lot."  The circuit court stated that attorney general 
opinions are only of persuasive value and are not precedent.  
Since the circuit court concluded the 1977 opinion contained an 
erroneous statement of law, the court also concluded that the 
board of appeals proceeded on an incorrect theory. 
¶7 
The Town appealed the circuit court's decision and in 
a per curiam opinion, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit 
court's conclusion that a navigable stream does not legally 
divide a parcel when the same owner owns the land on both sides 
of the stream.  FAS, No. 2005AP1689, unpublished slip op., ¶2.4  
The court of appeals also recognized that attorney general 
opinions are not binding authority.  Id., ¶9.  The court of 
appeals reasoned that since abutting landowners hold title to 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated. 
4 The Town also argued to the court of appeals that the case 
should be remanded to the board of appeals for a de novo hearing 
because the board of appeals erroneously concluded as a matter 
of law that it had no authority to conduct such a hearing.  FAS, 
No. 2005AP1689, unpublished slip op., ¶2.  The court of appeals 
concluded there was no basis for remand.  Id. 
No. 
2005AP1689 
 
6 
 
the center of the creek, "where a single landowner owns both 
banks, the landowner 'owns' the entire creek."  Id., ¶10.  The 
court also noted that the Town cited "no state law or county 
ordinance supporting its contention that a parcel bisected by a 
creek is not treated as a single lot or that a creek mouth 
bisecting a lot cannot be included for purposes of determining 
lakeshore frontage."  Id.  The Town petitioned for review, which 
we granted. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶8 
This case is before us on certiorari review, pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 59.694(10).5  "On appeal from an order or 
judgment entered on certiorari, a reviewing court reviews the 
record of the agency, not the findings or judgment of the 
circuit court."  Wood v. City of Madison, 2003 WI 24, ¶12, 260 
Wis. 2d 71, 659 N.W.2d 31.  In statutory certiorari, when 
additional evidence is not taken, review is confined to the 
record before the board of appeals and is limited to an 
examination of:  
(1) whether the board kept within its jurisdiction; 
(2) whether it proceeded on a correct theory of law; 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 59.694(10) states, in part:   
A person aggrieved by any decision of . . . any 
. . . board . . . of the municipality, may, within 30 
days after the filing of the decision in the office of 
the board, commence an action seeking the remedy 
available by certiorari.  . . .  The court may reverse 
or affirm, wholly or partly, or may modify, the 
decision brought up for review. 
No. 
2005AP1689 
 
7 
 
(3) whether its action was arbitrary, oppressive, or 
unreasonable and represented its will and not its 
judgment; and (4) whether the board might reasonably 
make the order or determination in question based on 
the evidence.   
State ex rel. Ziervogel v. Wash. County Bd. of Adjustment, 2004 
WI 23, ¶14, 269 Wis. 2d 549, 676 N.W.2d 401.  The second of 
these issues is the only issue implicated in our review of the 
board of appeals' decision.  Whether an agency has proceeded on 
a correct theory of law is subject to independent appellate 
review.  Id.     
¶9 
In reviewing the board of appeals' decision, we 
interpret provisions in the Sawyer County Zoning Ordinances and 
in the Wisconsin Statutes.  The interpretation of an ordinance 
is a question of law that we review independently.  Bruno v. 
Milwaukee County, 2003 WI 28, ¶6, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 
656.  The interpretation of a statute is also a question of law 
that we review independently, "but benefiting from the analyses 
of the court of appeals and the circuit court."  Marder v. Bd. 
of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 2005 WI 159, ¶19, 286 
Wis. 2d 252, 706 N.W.2d 110. 
B. 
Condominium Parcel's Lakeshore Width 
¶10 As we begin our discussion, it is important to focus 
on the question that this review is to address:  Whether the 
seven feet of lake frontage that is occupied by the mouth of 
Johnson Creek should be counted in determining the lakeshore 
width of the condominium parcel under the applicable zoning 
ordinance.  If it can be counted, then the condominium parcel 
has sufficient shoreline, at least 100 feet, to constitute a 
No. 
2005AP1689 
 
8 
 
buildable 
parcel 
or 
lot 
under 
the 
Sawyer 
County 
Zoning 
Ordinances 
then in 
effect.  See Wis. Admin. Code § NR 
115.05(3)(a)2.;6 Sawyer County Zoning Ordinance § 18.3 (last 
amended January 18, 2007).7  It is the Town's position that 
Johnson Creek divides the condominium parcel into two lots, 
neither of which has 100 feet of shoreline width.   
1. 
Wisconsin common law 
¶11 There is no statute that answers the question of 
whether a navigable stream that runs through a parcel divides 
the parcel into two lots or parcels.  However, common law in 
Wisconsin provides that a riparian owner holds qualified title 
to the geographical center of a navigable stream.  State v. 
Trudeau, 139 Wis. 2d 91, 101, 408 N.W.2d 337 (1987) (citing 
Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 501-02, 53 N.W.2d 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Admin. Code § NR 115.05(3)(a)2. states:  "Lots 
not served by public sanitary sewer shall have a minimum average 
width of 100 feet and a minimum area of 20,000 square feet." 
7 Sawyer County Zoning Ordinance § 18.3 provides that 
unsewered lots in the R-1 zoning district must have a minimum 
lot width of 100 feet.  Apparently, the condominium parcel is 
unsewered and is zoned Residential/Recreational. 
No. 
2005AP1689 
 
9 
 
514, 55 N.W.2d 40 (1952)).8  It follows that since a riparian 
owner holds qualified title to the center of the stream, where a 
riparian owner holds qualified title to both shores of the 
stream, the riparian owner has qualified title to the entire bed 
of the stream as well.  It seems logical to conclude that if one 
owns both banks of a stream, as well as the entire bed of a 
stream that runs through a parcel, there is no legal division of 
the parcel into two lots or parcels, unless a division has been 
made by some other means.  For example, one could own two tracts 
of land where the stream has been recorded as the divisor of the 
two tracts, with one tract on each side of the stream.  However, 
those are not the facts with which we are presented.   
¶12 The board of appeals relied on an attorney general 
opinion, 66 Op. Att'y Gen. 2, to conclude that Johnson Creek 
divided the condominium parcel into two lots.  The 1977 opinion 
                                                 
8 The test for navigability is whether the body of water is 
"'capable of floating any boat, skiff, or canoe, of the 
shallowest draft used for recreational purposes.'"  State v. 
Kelley, 2001 WI 84, ¶30, 244 Wis. 2d 777, 629 N.W.2d 601 
(quoting Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 506, 53 
N.W.2d 514, 55 N.W.2d 40 (1952)).  The test "does not depend on 
whether [the body of water] is always navigable, or whether its 
navigability is due to natural conditions."  Id.  "[T]he test is 
whether the navigability is regularly recurring or of a 
sufficient duration to make it conducive to recreational uses."  
Id. (citing DeGayner & Co. v. DNR, 70 Wis. 2d 936, 946, 236 
N.W.2d 217 (1975)).  All parties agree that Johnson Creek is 
navigable.  We have characterized the landowner's title as a 
"qualified title" because "the state holds the beds underlying 
navigable waters in trust for all of its citizens, subject only 
to the qualification that a riparian owner on the bank of a 
navigable stream has a qualified title in the stream bed to the 
center thereof."  Muench, 261 Wis. at 501-02. 
No. 
2005AP1689 
 
10 
 
discussed the proper calculation of land area for purposes of 
applying what was at that time Wis. Stat. § 236.02(8) (1977-78), 
renumbered as § 236.02(12).   
¶13 As an initial matter, and as will be discussed in more 
detail infra, Wis. Stat. § 236.02(12) is not applicable to our 
analysis for at least two reasons.  First, a declaration of 
condominium is not a subdivision of land as defined in ch. 236.  
Wis. Stat. § 703.37.  Second, even if ch. 236 were used by 
analogy,9 the determination of lot sizes under § 236.02(12) 
refers to lot area and not lot width or lakeshore frontage, 
which is the issue this case presents. 
¶14 The Town contends that the 1977 attorney general 
opinion regarding the division of parcels by navigable streams 
requires 
us 
to 
conclude 
that 
Johnson 
Creek 
divides 
the 
condominium parcel into two lots, and therefore, the minimum 
lakeshore frontage requirement is not met by either lot.  We 
disagree with the Town's contention.  As we explain below, the 
cases on which the attorney general opinion relied are based on 
other ordinances, and their reasoning is not applicable here.  
                                                 
9 It is not necessary to address the State's argument that 
the zoning issues should have been resolved through county 
subdivision review pursuant to Wis. Admin. Code § NR 115.05(4) 
and Sawyer County Subdivision Control Ordinance § 3.3.  Although 
the State of Wisconsin, on behalf of the Department of Natural 
Resources, 
was 
permitted 
to 
intervene 
as 
an 
additional 
respondent, we note that the July 7, 2002, approval of the two-
lot certified survey division was unsuccessfully challenged by 
the Town in a separate action.  Accordingly, land division 
issues relating to the CSM are not before us in this review.  
No. 
2005AP1689 
 
11 
 
¶15 The attorney general opinion concluded that a parcel 
is separated into two parcels by a navigable stream because the 
two sides of the stream are not functionally integrated, 
stating:   
A body of navigable water separates a parcel of land 
as effectively as does a public highway.  Land owners 
abutting on navigable streams hold a qualified title 
to the center of the stream bed. . . . Therefore, 
parcels separated by navigable waters are no more 
susceptible to functional integration than parcels 
separated by public highways.   
66 Op. Att'y Gen. at 8.  The opinion relied on a case from New 
Jersey for the proposition that all the land in a parcel must 
have "functional integration"; that is, all the land in a parcel 
must be able to be put to the use of the owner.  Id. at 4-5 
(citing Loveladies Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Barnegat City Serv. 
Co., 159 A.2d 417 (1960)).  The attorney general opinion 
concluded that because a navigable stream has public rights of 
use, it separates the function of the property chosen by the 
owner from the function accorded to the public.  Id. at 8.  It 
was this separation of functions by a navigable stream that the 
attorney general opinion saw as the factor that causes a 
navigable stream to divide the parcel over which the stream 
meanders.  Id.  The attorney general opinion described this 
separation as a lack of "functional integration."  Id.  
¶16 However, 
in 
Loveladies, 
a 
local 
ordinance 
was 
interpreted in light of a subdivision plat that used easements 
to create private streets in order to provide a dense housing 
pattern that would not have been possible with public streets 
No. 
2005AP1689 
 
12 
 
whose width is greater than that used for the private streets.  
Loveladies, 159 A.2d at 421.  In addition, in New Jersey, public 
streets are not included in the calculation of the size of a 
lot.  Id. at 422.  As one of the rationales for its holding, the 
New Jersey court explained that the function of a lot is to 
provide a defined space upon which to build, while the function 
of a street is for public passage.  Id.  The court went on to 
explain that these distinct functions are necessary to the 
overall concept of a subdivision that requires both functions.  
Id.  The court also explained that the ordinance contemplates 
"mutual exclusion between lot areas and street areas" due to the 
way it defines "corner lot" as "fronting on two streets at their 
intersection."  This description would not make sense if a lot 
both "fronted" on a street and "included" the street.  Id. at 
424.  Nowhere in Loveladies is the term "functional integration" 
used.  That term appears to have been coined by the attorney 
general opinion. 
¶17 The attorney general opinion also cited Weisbrod v. 
Daenicke, 36 Wis. 73 (1874), as consistent with its functional 
integration theory. 66 Op. Atty Gen. at 5.  In Weisbrod, we 
interpreted a statute that exempted a homestead from claims of 
creditors if the parcel of land did not exceed one-quarter acre 
and was occupied by the landowner.  Weisbrod, 36 Wis. at 75-76.  
The court recognized that an owner has fee ownership to the 
center of an adjoining street, subject to the public easement.  
Id. at 76.  However, the court determined that the area of the 
homestead parcel should be calculated without inclusion of the 
No. 
2005AP1689 
 
13 
 
land on which the street was placed, reasoning that the object 
of the statute was to secure the debtor a home upon which he and 
his family could live.  Id.  Because the debtor "has no right to 
occupy the street for such a purpose, to build upon it, to 
cultivate it, or to appropriate it to any domestic use," 
counting the land under the street would frustrate the purpose 
of the statute.  Id.  However, the purpose behind the statute 
interpreted in Weisbrod has no relevance here.  Whether we count 
the streambed as part of the width of the condominium parcel has 
nothing to do with whether the owner of the condominium parcel 
will have sufficient land on which to support himself and his 
family, as was the concern in Weisbrod.     
¶18 While attorney general opinions may be considered 
persuasive authority, they are not precedent for any court. 
State v. Chvala, 2003 WI App 257, ¶25 n.7, 268 Wis. 2d 451, 673 
N.W.2d 401; Ahlgren v. Pierce County, 198 Wis. 2d 576, 583, 543 
N.W.2d 812 (Ct. App. 1995).  We conclude that this attorney 
general opinion is neither precedent nor persuasive for the 
issue we address here:  Whether the seven feet of lake frontage 
that is occupied by the mouth of Johnson Creek should be counted 
in determining the lakeshore width of the condominium parcel 
under the applicable zoning ordinance.  
¶19 Furthermore, as we explained above, in Wisconsin a 
riparian owner holds qualified title to the geographical center 
of the bed of a navigable stream.  Trudeau, 139 Wis. 2d at 101.  
Since a riparian owner holds qualified title to the center of a 
navigable streambed, where a riparian owner holds qualified 
No. 
2005AP1689 
 
14 
 
title to both shores of the stream, the physical divide caused 
by the stream does not interfere with the unified ownership of 
the parcel.  Were we to agree with the board of appeals, we 
would be creating new parcels in Wisconsin wherever there is a 
meandering navigable stream running over land that has in the 
past been treated as one parcel.  
¶20 Wisconsin law regarding municipal annexation supports 
our conclusion that a navigable stream should not affect unified 
ownership of land.  For example, the Town of Campbell challenged 
the validity of its annexation by the City of La Crosse on the 
basis that the annexed property was not contiguous with the City 
of La Crosse as required by statute because the Black River, 
which was approximately 800 feet wide in the area, separated the 
properties.  Town of Campbell v. City of La Crosse, 2001 WI App 
201, ¶¶1-2, 247 Wis. 2d 946, 634 N.W.2d 840.  The court of 
appeals recognized that a riparian owner holds title to the 
center of the stream and stated:   
We find no authority for the proposition that a 
river running over the point of contact renders 
properties non-contiguous . . . .  Therefore, we find 
that the property of the City [of La Crosse] meets the 
annexed properties at the center of the riverbed of 
the Black River.  It follows that the annexed 
properties are "contiguous" . . . . 
No. 
2005AP1689 
 
15 
 
Id., ¶19.10  Because we have concluded that the condominium 
parcel is one parcel, not two lots, we turn to the Sawyer County 
Zoning Ordinance to determine whether the condominium parcel has 
sufficient lakeshore frontage to build upon, according to the 
applicable zoning ordinances. 
2. 
Zoning ordinances 
¶21 We interpret ordinances in the same manner as we 
interpret statutes because "'[t]he rules for the construction of 
statutes and municipal ordinances are the same.'"  Bruno, 260 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶6 (citation omitted).  The additional purpose of 
area zoning is to regulate "density, setbacks, frontage, height, 
and other dimensional attributes, in order to promote uniformity 
of development, lot size, and building configuration and size."  
Ziervogel, 269 Wis. 2d 549, ¶22.  The additional purpose of 
                                                 
10 The court of appeals distinguished its decision from Town 
of Delavan v. City of Delavan, 176 Wis. 2d 516, 500 N.W.2d 268 
(1993), where we concluded that the properties were not 
contiguous because they were separated by a lake on the basis 
that unlike riverbeds, lakebeds are owned by the state.  Town of 
Campbell v. City of La Crosse, 2001 WI App 201, ¶¶17-18, 247 
Wis. 2d 946, 634 N.W.2d 840.  Nonetheless, the court in Town of 
Delavan declined to void annexation based on the principle of de 
minimis.  Town of Delavan, 176 Wis. 2d at 530.   
FAS argues that the doctrine of de minimis renders the 
existence of Johnson Creek insufficient to divide the lot or 
disrupt a continuous lakeshore frontage measurement.  See, e.g., 
Town of Delavan, 176 Wis. 2d at 530-31 (concluding that for 
purposes of municipal annexation, the lake disrupted contiguity 
of property; however, the land was such a tiny fraction of 
property that the principle of de minimis rendered the lack of 
contiguity insufficient to void annexation).  Since we conclude 
that the property is not divided by Johnson Creek, it is 
unnecessary for us to address this argument. 
No. 
2005AP1689 
 
16 
 
shoreland zoning is to protect the public's interest in 
navigable waters, including promoting healthful water conditions 
conducive to protecting aquatic life and fish.  Id.  We 
interpret zoning ordinances in light of their purposes.  Id. 
¶22 To resolve the question this review poses, we begin 
with Sawyer County Zoning Ordinance § 2.1 as it appeared when 
the board of appeals made its decision because the board of 
appeals decision rested on its conclusion that Johnson Creek 
divided the condominium parcel into two "lots."  The ordinance 
defined "lot" as follows: 
(36) LOT: A parcel of land occupied or capable of 
being occupied by one building and the accessory 
buildings 
or 
uses customarily incidental to it, 
including such open spaces as are required by this 
ordinance. 
The ordinance also defines lot characteristics, e.g., "lot, area 
of"; "lot, front"; "lot, depth of"; "lot, width of"; and "lot 
lines."  The Town argues that the definition of "lot, front" is 
relevant to our decision.  That definition is as follows: 
(38) LOT, FRONT:  On shoreland lots, the front 
shall be the area from the shoreline landward.  On 
nonshoreland lots, the front shall be the area from 
the road or road easement away from the road. 
¶23 The Town first argues that paragraph 38 of the zoning 
ordinance that defines "lot, front" actually defines a "front 
lot."  After reversing the words of the ordinance, the Town then 
asserts that its interpretation of paragraph 38 shows that 
Johnson Creek created two "front lots" out of the condominium 
parcel.  The Town's interpretation of paragraph 38 of the zoning 
No. 
2005AP1689 
 
17 
 
ordinance is certainly novel, but unpersuasive.  Paragraph 38, 
quoted above, is a directional definition that explains which 
side of a lot is the "front."  This is done to facilitate an 
understanding of the part of the property on which certain areas 
of open space and other setback restrictions are required.  See 
Sawyer County Zoning § 4.  
¶24 The Town then argues that because no buildings or 
structures can be placed on any public use area, such as a 
navigable stream or public road, a "lot" cannot include any 
public use area because the zoning ordinance's definition of 
"lot" requires the capability of being occupied by a building.  
This argument may have validity were Johnson Creek 90 feet wide 
as it meandered through the condominium parcel because then 
there would be no land area for a building, which would preclude 
the land owned by FAS on either side of Johnson Creek from 
satisfying the definition of "lot" in the zoning ordinance.  
Here, the argument proves too much because the ordinance's 
definition of "lot" is a functional one, i.e., a "lot" must be 
"occupied or capable of being occupied by one building."  Sawyer 
County Zoning § 2.1(36).  However, the land to the south of 
Johnson Creek is only a few feet wide and is not capable of 
being occupied by a building.  Therefore, that land could not be 
a 
"lot" 
under 
the 
ordinance's 
definition 
because 
it 
is 
functionally insufficient.  Furthermore, in shoreland zoning, no 
structure can be constructed within 75 feet of the ordinary 
highwater mark.  Sawyer County Ordinance § 4.49.  However, 
though no structure can be built in this area, it does not 
No. 
2005AP1689 
 
18 
 
follow that it is not part of the lot.  The same can be said for 
front, rear and side yard setbacks.  
¶25 We conclude that the zoning committee's interpretation 
of the ordinances is in keeping with the ordinance's purpose.  
The 
zoning 
committee 
concluded 
that 
the 
shoreland 
width 
regulation for the property has as its purpose the control of 
density, and that the condominium parcel satisfies that purpose 
as the frontage is at least 100 feet.  Furthermore, including 
the width of the streambed as part of the width of the lakeshore 
frontage does not undermine the other shoreland zoning purposes 
because both the Department of Natural Resources' and Sawyer 
County's 
regulations requiring setbacks from the ordinary 
highwater marks and prohibiting land disturbing activities 
promote the public's interest in Lac Courte Oreilles and Johnson 
Creek regardless of how the shoreline width of the condominium 
parcel is calculated.  See Wis. Admin. Code NR § 115.05(3)(b) 
and (c); Sawyer County Zoning § 4.49.  
¶26 In its brief, the Town correctly recognized that the 
definition of "lot" in the ordinance does not mention a 
navigable stream.  In addition, the public has a right to use 
navigable streams, and therefore, a riparian owner cannot place 
a structure on the bed of a navigable stream without approval or 
exemption from regulation.  See Wis. Stat. § 30.12; Town of 
Campbell, 247 Wis. 2d 946, ¶16; DeGayner & Co. v. DNR, 70 
Wis. 2d 936, 945, 236 N.W.2d 217 (1975) (stating that a riparian 
landowner has "qualified title" to the bed of a navigable 
stream, 
which 
is 
subject 
to 
the 
public's 
easement 
of 
No. 
2005AP1689 
 
19 
 
navigation). 
 
However, 
that 
premise 
does 
not 
assist 
in 
interpreting the definition of "lot" in the Sawyer County Zoning 
Ordinances.  As we explained above, the definition of "lot" in 
paragraph 36 of the zoning ordinance is a functional one, i.e., 
the land must be "occupied or capable of being occupied" by a 
building.  Sawyer County Zoning § 2.1(36).  That definition may 
prevent a parcel with a very wide meandering stream from meeting 
the zoning ordinance's definition of a "lot," but those facts 
are not present here.   
¶27 Furthermore, even though we are addressing the proper 
calculation of the width of lakeshore frontage or lot width and 
not lot area, it is instructive to note that the definition of 
"lot, area" in Sawyer County Zoning Ordinance § 2.1(37), 
provides:  "LOT, AREA OF:  The contiguous, not separated by 
public roadway, of a lot between its front, rear, and side lot 
lines."  Under the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius, "the express mention of one matter excludes other 
similar matters [that are] not mentioned."  Perra v. Menomonee 
Mut. Ins. Co., 2000 WI App 215, ¶12, 239 Wis. 2d 26, 619 N.W.2d 
123.  Since the definition of "lot, area" excludes public 
roadways, but makes no mention of navigable streams, it follows 
that the definition of "lot, area" does not exclude the bed of a 
navigable stream.  While this definition is not directly 
applicable to determining whether a "lot" as defined in the 
zoning ordinance includes a navigable stream, it can be argued 
that if the streambed is not included in the calculation of the 
area of a lot, the bed of a navigable stream also should not be 
No. 
2005AP1689 
 
20 
 
included in the calculation of the width of lakeshore frontage 
of a lot under the same municipality's zoning ordinances.11 
¶28 Accordingly, we conclude that the board of appeals 
applied an incorrect theory of law in its determination that the 
condominium parcel is two lots, neither of which meet the 100 
foot frontage requirement.  We also conclude that the record 
shows the condominium parcel has a lakeshore width of greater 
than 100 feet. 
3. 
Wisconsin statutes 
¶29 The 
statutes 
by 
which 
the 
remaining 
parcel 
of 
Government Lot 4 became a condominium are contained in Wis. 
Stat. ch. 703.  It provides that a condominium form of ownership 
is created by recording a declaration of condominium and a map 
or plat for the property with the register of deeds for the 
county where the property is located.  Wis. Stat. § 703.07.  
Zoning or other land use ordinances must apply in the same way 
                                                 
11 During oral argument it was brought to our attention that 
Sawyer 
County 
amended 
its 
Subdivision 
Control/Condominium 
Ordinances subsequent to the board of appeals decision in this 
case, and that it excluded navigable waterways along with public 
roadways from the definition of "lot, area."  In addition, 
§ 4.0, Classifications of Land Division, now provides, "[a]ny 
contiguous parcel or tract of land which is owned, controlled or 
managed as a single entity shall be treated as a single parcel 
or tract of land for the purpose of this ordinance unless it is 
divided . . . by navigable water."  Because these ordinances 
were not in effect at the time the board of appeals made its 
decision, we have not addressed them, except to note them for 
the reader.   
No. 
2005AP1689 
 
21 
 
to condominiums as to other forms of ownership.12  Wis. Stat. 
§ 703.27.  "[A] condominium is a form of ownership [and] not a 
form of land use, [nor] is [it] a subdivision as defined in ch. 
236."  Wis. Stat. § 703.37. 
¶30 The State argues that Wis. Stat. ch. 236, which 
regulates subdivisions of land, must be applied in deciding this 
case because the original CSM began a problem that is continued 
by the condominium parcel.  We do not address any perceived 
problems with the CSM because those issues have been proceeded 
on in a separate lawsuit and are not before us.  As we explained 
when we began our analysis of the issue presented, the question 
we decide is whether the width of the condominium parcel, 
properly calculated, is 100 feet or greater.  
¶31 We note that in order to be a subdivision within the 
scope of ch. 236, two things must occur:  First, there must be a 
land division, and second, the land division must create five or 
more parcels or building sites.  Wis. Stat. § 236.02(12).13  We 
                                                 
12 We note that the map of the condominium parcel shows four 
buildings.  This opinion does not address whether the zoning 
permits 
the 
construction 
of 
four 
dwelling 
units 
on 
the 
condominium parcel.  That question is not before us. 
13 Wisconsin Stat. § 236.02(12) defines "subdivision" as: 
a division of a lot, parcel or tract of land by the 
owner thereof or the owner's agent for the purpose of 
sale or of building development, where: 
(a) The act of division creates 5 or more parcels 
or building sites of 1 1/2 acres each or less in area; 
or 
No. 
2005AP1689 
 
22 
 
also note that under Wis. Admin. Code § 115.05(4), "all land 
divisions in shoreland areas which create 3 or more parcels or 
building sites of 5 acres each or less within a 5-year period" 
must be reviewed by the county pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 236.45.  
And in addition, the Sawyer County Zoning Committee Subdivision 
Control Ordinance § 2.4 (adopted March 26, 1971 and last amended 
March 20, 2003) in effect at the time the board of appeals 
decided this matter states:  "Every division of land within the 
unincorporated areas of Sawyer County shall be subject to the 
provisions of this ordinance and Chapter 236 of the Wisconsin 
Statutes."  However, we have found no authority for the 
proposition that the recording of a declaration of condominium 
is a division of land, rather than simply a change in the form 
of ownership of the parcel.  Wis. Stat. § 703.37; see Herman v. 
County of Walworth, 2005 WI App 185, ¶13, 286 Wis. 2d 449, 703 
N.W.2d 720 (concluding that an application for conditional use 
permits to construct condominiums is not a division of land).   
¶32 Notwithstanding the need to show that a land division 
has occurred in order to fall within the parameters of ch. 236, 
neither the State nor any other party attempts to persuade us 
that what occurred with the recording of the condominium 
declaration and map is land division.  Perhaps that is because 
each party has noted that Wis. Stat. § 703.37 provides that a 
condominium is a form of ownership, not a form of land use or a 
                                                                                                                                                             
(b) Five or more parcels or building sites of 1 
1/2 acres each or less in area are created by 
successive divisions within a period of 5 years. 
No. 
2005AP1689 
 
23 
 
subdivision under ch. 236.  However, whatever the reason, we are 
not willing to parse the foundational requirements necessary for 
the application of the provisions of ch. 236.  We simply note 
their absence and conclude that we have not been shown that any 
action taken relative to the creation of the condominium form of 
ownership brings the condominium parcel within the scope of ch. 
236. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶33  We conclude that a navigable stream meandering over a 
parcel does not divide the parcel into two parcels when the same 
riparian owner holds qualified title to the property on both 
shores of the stream.  We also conclude that under the Sawyer 
County Zoning Ordinances then in effect, the entire parcel, 
including the streambed, is used to calculate the width of the 
lakeshore frontage.  Therefore, because the board of appeals 
proceeded on an incorrect theory of law in regard to whether the 
navigable stream divided the parcel, it inaccurately calculated 
the width of the parcel at issue under the then effective zoning 
ordinance.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2005AP1689.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶34 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I agree 
with the majority opinion on the first issue presented for 
review: whether the navigable waterway in the instant case 
legally divides the subject parcel into two or more parcels.  
The answer is "no."   
¶35 I cannot, however, join the majority opinion for two 
reasons:   
(1) I do not understand why the majority opinion concludes 
that the bed of a navigable stream is included in the definition 
of "lot" and in the calculation of lot area and why a 
calculation of lot area depends on how wide the navigable stream 
is.  A navigable waterway should not be used to calculate lot 
area or lakeshore frontage.   
(2) The case should be remanded to the circuit court to 
decide issues not addressed by the majority opinion.  I would 
remand the cause to the circuit court to determine whether the 
condominium parcel should have been reviewed according to local 
land division rules (including deciding whether this matter is 
barred by claim preclusion) and to determine what effect, if 
any, the amended Sawyer County ordinances have on the instant 
case.   
I 
¶36 I cannot follow the majority opinion's discussion of 
the definition of "lot" in the zoning ordinance.  See majority 
op., ¶¶21-24.  The majority opinion appears to hold that the 
definition of "lot" and the calculation of lot area for a parcel 
include the bed of the navigable stream "owned" by the riparian 
No.  2005AP1689.ssa 
 
2 
 
owner, and then concludes that the width of this stream bed must 
also be included in lakeshore frontage.  Majority op., ¶¶26-27.   
¶37 The majority opinion, however, also concludes that the 
definition of "lot" is a "functional one."  Majority op., ¶26.  
Then why isn't it more logical to hold that because public 
highways are not included in the definition of "lot" or in the 
calculation of lot area because no building is permitted on the 
highway, other public thoroughfares that the "owner" cannot 
build on or freely use (that is, similarly non-functional 
spaces), like navigable waterways, ought not count in the 
definition or "lot," or in the calculation of lot area, or in 
the calculation of lakeshore frontage?  Thus, regardless of 
whether the parcel at issue is one lot or whether the navigable 
water divides the parcel into two lots, the width of the 
navigable water should not count in the calculation of lakeshore 
frontage.   
¶38 Because it focuses on a "functional" definition of 
"lot," the majority opinion concludes that "[t]hat definition 
may prevent a parcel with a very wide meandering stream from 
meeting the zoning ordinance's definition of a 'lot' . . . ."  
Majority op., ¶26.  Why would the width of the navigable stream 
change the definition of "lot" or calculation of lot area under 
the zoning ordinance?  How wide does the navigable stream have 
to be to be too wide under ¶24 of the majority opinion?  
¶39 I also do not understand how, on the one hand, the 
majority opinion can conclude that the "functional" definition 
of "lot" and lot area is useful in determining the effect of a 
No.  2005AP1689.ssa 
 
3 
 
navigable waterway in determining lot area and, on the other 
hand, declare unpersuasive the 1977 attorney general opinion 
that took a functional approach to calculating lot size.  Both 
the majority opinion and the 1977 attorney general opinion 
examine whether navigable waterways can be used in determining 
"lot" measurements, like lot area.  Both recognize that the 
question of what constitutes a "lot" is a matter of the function 
of the ordinance in question.  Yet, the majority opinion, 
without recognizing the irony and inconsistency of its position, 
scoffs at the reasoning and conclusion of the 1977 attorney 
general opinion.   
II 
¶40 Even though I agree with the majority opinion's 
holding that a navigable stream meandering over a parcel does 
not divide the parcel into two parcels when the same riparian 
owner holds title to the property on both shores of the stream, 
majority op., ¶2, I would remand the cause to the circuit court 
to address two issues that are not sufficiently addressed by the 
majority opinion. 
¶41 First, more consideration than the majority opinion's 
two paragraphs (¶¶31-32) should be given to the State's well-
developed argument that the condominium parcel resulted from a 
subdivision of land that was subject to (but did not get) 
subdivision review pursuant to Wis. Admin. Code § NR 115.05(4) 
and the Sawyer County Subdivision Control Ordinance § 2.4.  FAS 
had one parcel of land (Government Lot 4) from which it 
allegedly carved off two parcels of land.  The "remaining 
No.  2005AP1689.ssa 
 
4 
 
portion" of Government Lot 4 was later recorded as a condominium 
parcel.  Wasn't this "remaining portion" of the original lot, in 
effect, the third piece of land created by the subdivision?  
Sounds to me like a good argument worthy of a court's full 
consideration.  FAS argues that this argument was waived, or in 
the alternative, is barred by claim preclusion.1  A decision on 
this subdivision issue may be determinative of all issues 
presented in the instant case.  I would remand to the circuit 
court to decide this issue. 
¶42 Second, the County amended the ordinances governing 
lot area and land division after the Board decided the present 
matter. 
 
Navigable 
waterways 
are 
now 
excluded 
from 
the 
definition of "lot, area" and navigable waterways now divide a 
contiguous parcel of land.  The majority opinion acknowledges 
this change in a footnote but fails to analyze the effect, if 
any, of the amendments.  Majority op., ¶27 n.11.  The circuit 
court should determine whether the amended ordinances affect the 
calculation of lakeshore frontage in the present case. 
¶43 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
¶44 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
                                                 
1 In Sawyer County Circuit Court Case No. 2004CV139, Appeal 
No. 2005AP1691, the Town and County challenged whether the other 
two parcels complied with certain zoning regulations.  That 
case, however, did not involve the remaining portion of the land 
(what is now the condominium parcel) nor was the State a party. 
No.  2005AP1689.ssa 
 
5 
 
 
 
No.  2005AP1689.ssa 
 
 
 
1