Title: Delgado v. Souders

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed: May 16, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

JOY DELGADO,
	Respondent on Review,
    and
STATE OF OREGON,	
	Respondent on Review,
	v.
ROBERT HUNTER SOUDERS,
	Petitioner on Review.
(95-10330; CA A92188; SC S44163)

	Argued and submitted September 8, 1999.
	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Chris W. Dunfield, Corvallis, argued the cause and filed the
brief and additional authorities for petitioner on review.
	Richard L. Wehmeyer, Corvallis, argued the cause for
respondent on review Delgado.
	Robert M. Atkinson, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause for respondent on review State of Oregon.  With
him on the briefs and additional authorities were Hardy Myers,
Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
and Riggs, Justices.**
	CARSON, C. J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals and the order of the
circuit court are affirmed.
    *Appeal from Benton County Circuit Court, Frank D. Knight, Judge. 146 Or App 580, 934 P2d 1132 (1997).	
   **Van Hoomissen, J., retired December 31, 2000, and did not
participate in the decision of this case.  Kulongoski, J.,
resigned June 14, 2001, and did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.  De Muniz and Balmer,
JJ., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this
case.	
  		CARSON, C.J.
		This case involves ORS 30.866, set out post, the civil
anti-stalking statute.  The trial court entered a stalking
protective order (SPO) under that statute, prohibiting defendant
from knowingly following plaintiff, knowingly being in
plaintiff's presence or within 100 feet of her residence, and
from entering certain property.  Defendant appealed, raising
various constitutional challenges to ORS 30.866 and further
arguing that there was not sufficient evidence to support entry
of the SPO in his case.  The Court of Appeals affirmed.  Delgado
v. Souders, 146 Or App 580, 934 P2d 1132 (1997).  We affirm the
Court of Appeals' decision and the trial court's order.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

		The facts are as follows.  In 1995, plaintiff was a
student at Oregon State University (OSU) in Corvallis, working
toward a doctoral degree in education administration.  In the
summer of 1995, plaintiff lived in an apartment about four blocks
from the OSU campus and seven blocks from her office at the
School of Education building, and she regularly walked to and
from campus.  During that summer, plaintiff noticed defendant
several times a week, sometimes more than twice a day, either
walking around plaintiff's apartment building or walking nearby
as plaintiff walked to and from campus.  She also noticed
defendant a number of times in the OSU library when she was
studying there.  Initially, defendant's presence caused plaintiff
no alarm or concern, although she began to notice defendant with
increasing frequency and, on one occasion, noticed that defendant
appeared to be looking in her direction.
		One morning in late September 1995, when plaintiff was
walking to campus, she heard leaves crunching behind her, turned,
and saw defendant right behind her.  Defendant passed by
plaintiff within one or two feet and, in the course of passing
by, crossed the street diagonally away from her.  Plaintiff was
startled and thought it strange that defendant had not said
anything when he passed by her so suddenly, particularly because
the area otherwise was deserted.
		After that encounter, between September and November
1995, plaintiff noticed defendant on at least three occasions
seated at tables near her study carrel in the basement of the OSU
library.  She ultimately stopped going to her study carrel,
because defendant's presence made her uncomfortable.  During the
same time frame, plaintiff also noticed on a few occasions that
defendant would appear on different floors of the library when
she was working on those floors.  On one or two of those
occasions, she and defendant made "very, very brief" eye contact. 
By mid-November, plaintiff began to feel as if defendant were
stalking her and became concerned for her personal safety.
		In late November 1995, plaintiff was unloading her
vehicle in the afternoon after returning home from a Thanksgiving
trip.  At that time, the street was quiet and deserted.  When
plaintiff locked and closed her vehicle door and turned around,
she saw defendant about two or three feet away from her; he
walked past her and, in the course of passing by, crossed the
street diagonally away from her.  Plaintiff began to feel more
uncomfortable about defendant's conduct and became afraid and
concerned for her personal safety.  Consequently, she began
documenting her encounters with defendant.  One of plaintiff's
concerns was the manner in which defendant "silently and swiftly"
walked up behind her, without announcing -- or without her
otherwise noticing -- his presence.  Plaintiff also was concerned
by the physically close nature of defendant's appearances, at
times when no other people were nearby and when defendant was
walking in a large, unobstructed area.
		On December 1, 1995, during the late afternoon,
plaintiff noticed defendant, from a distance, walking toward the
School of Education building.  At one point, defendant walked on
the same side of the street as plaintiff; however, he turned and
walked up a pathway near the building, and did not come into
contact with plaintiff or otherwise give any indication that he
was aware of her presence.  Plaintiff again became concerned and
afraid as a result of seeing defendant so frequently,
particularly because, to plaintiff's knowledge, defendant neither
worked nor attended classes at the School of Education building.
		Shortly after noon the next day, plaintiff was walking
between the School of Education building and the OSU computer
center, at a time when the campus seemed deserted, when she
sensed something behind her.  Although she did not hear anything,
she started to turn, and defendant was "right there," about one
foot away.  As plaintiff described it, defendant again had come
up behind her swiftly, without any sound, and then passed by her. 
When defendant was about three feet ahead of plaintiff, plaintiff
said "what the hell" to him, but he did not respond and kept
walking forward.  Later that day, plaintiff called the police,
and, on December 7, 1995, plaintiff filed a civil stalking
complaint (1) against defendant under ORS 30.866(1).
		Later on December 7, 1995, an Oregon State Police (OSP)
officer located defendant, handcuffed him, and transported him to
the Public Safety Building on the OSU campus.  An OSU public
safety officer then issued defendant a notice, which is not at
issue in this proceeding, declaring that he no longer was
permitted on the OSU campus.  On December 12, 1995, a trial court
held an initial hearing on plaintiff's complaint and, after
considering plaintiff's allegations, entered a temporary SPO
against defendant under ORS 30.866(2).  Soon thereafter,
defendant moved to dismiss the complaint upon various
constitutional grounds; the trial court denied that motion.
		In February 1996, the trial court held an evidentiary
hearing, pursuant to ORS 30.866(3)(a).  Plaintiff testified about
the encounters described above, adding that, throughout those
encounters, defendant had not spoken to her, although he had made
"side glances" in her direction when crossing the street and, on
one or two occasions at the library, had made "very, very brief"
eye contact.  Plaintiff also presented evidence that she had
suffered depression, anxiety, and "psychosocial stress" related
to those encounters.  Finally, plaintiff presented evidence that,
in 1993, another female OSU student had obtained an SPO against
defendant.
		At the close of plaintiff's evidence, defendant moved
to dismiss, based upon insufficient evidence.  The trial court
denied that motion, and defendant then presented his case.  For
his part, defendant testified that, like plaintiff, he lived
within walking distance of the OSU campus and frequently used the
OSU library as a resource for his work.  Defendant noted that he
used materials on different floors of the library and that he
often read the newspapers in the basement.
		Defendant further testified that he walked everywhere,
that he would pass the School of Education building when walking
from his apartment to the OSU library, and that he would pass
plaintiff's apartment building when walking from his apartment to
downtown Corvallis.  Defendant testified that it was not unusual
for him to walk by plaintiff's apartment building between four to
eight times in one day.  Defendant also described his manner of
walking as "fairly fast" and stated that he regularly overtook
other pedestrians on the sidewalk, giving no warning of his
approach.  Defendant further testified that he never remembered
seeing plaintiff during the time period in question and that he
did not know that plaintiff had complained about his conduct
until he was transported to the Public Safety Building.  Finally,
other witnesses testified, in defendant's behalf, that defendant
was a peaceful and truthful person, and that he walked quickly
and "with a purpose," using long strides. 
		At the close of all the evidence, defendant renewed his
pretrial motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, based upon
various constitutional grounds.  The trial court adhered to its
earlier ruling and also concluded that plaintiff had established
all the elements required to obtain an SPO under ORS
30.866(3)(a).  The court then entered an order that prohibited
defendant from knowingly following plaintiff or knowingly being
in her presence; telephoning plaintiff; knowingly being in
plaintiff's presence in the OSU library; knowingly being within
100 feet of plaintiff's residence; and entering the School of
Education building or the OSU computer center.
		As noted, defendant appealed.  On appeal, the state
intervened as a party.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's order.  Delgado, 146 Or App 580.  We allowed defendant's
petition for review, which challenges ORS 30.866 upon various
constitutional grounds and also raises issues related to the
sufficiency of the evidence.  
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

		We first address defendant's evidentiary challenge. 
See State v. Montez, 324 Or 343, 346, 927 P2d 64 (1996)
(addressing subconstitutional issues before constitutional
issues).  As explained below, we conclude that plaintiff
presented sufficient evidence to establish all the elements
required to obtain an SPO under ORS 30.866(3)(a).
		We begin by setting out the civil anti-stalking
statute.  ORS 30.866 provides, in part:
	"(1) A person may bring a civil action in a
circuit court for a court's stalking protective order
or for damages, or both, against a person if:
	"(a) The person intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly engages in repeated and unwanted contact
with the other person or a member of that person's
immediate family or household thereby alarming or
coercing the other person;
	"(b) It is objectively reasonable for a person in
the victim's situation to have been alarmed or coerced
by the contact; and
	"(c) The repeated and unwanted contact causes the
victim reasonable apprehension regarding the personal
safety of the victim or a member of the victim's
immediate family or household.
	"(2) At the time the petition is filed, the court,
upon a finding of probable cause based on the
allegations in the petition, shall enter a temporary
court's stalking protective order that may include, but
is not limited to, all contact listed in ORS 163.730. 
The petition and the temporary order shall be served
upon the respondent with an order requiring the
respondent to personally appear before the court to
show cause why the temporary order should not be
continued for an indefinite period.
	"(3)(a) At the hearing, whether or not the
respondent appears, the court may * * * proceed to
enter a court's stalking protective order * * *.
	"(b) If respondent fails to appear after being
served as required by subsection (2) of this section,
the court may issue a warrant of arrest * * * in order
to ensure the appearance of the respondent in court.
	"(4) The plaintiff may recover:
	"(a) Both special and general damages, including
damages for emotional distress;
	"(b) Punitive damages; and
	"(c) Reasonable attorney fees and costs.
	"* * * * *
	"(7) Proof of the claim shall be by a
preponderance of the evidence."
ORS 163.730 sets out a number of definitions that apply to    
ORS 30.866.  That statute provides, in part:
	"(1) 'Alarm' means to cause apprehension or fear
resulting from the perception of danger.
	"(2) 'Coerce' means to restrain, compel or
dominate by force or threat.
	"(3) 'Contact' includes but is not limited to:
	"(a) Coming into the visual or physical presence
of the other person;
	"(b) Following the other person;
	"(c) Waiting outside the home, property, place of
work or school of the other person or of a member of
that person's family or household;
	"(d) Sending or making written or electronic[ (2)]
communications in any form to the other person;
	"(e) Speaking with the other person by any means;
	"(f) Communicating with the other person through a
third person;
	"(g) Committing a crime against the other person;
	"(h) Communicating with a third person who has
some relationship to the other person with the intent
of affecting the third person's relationship with the
other person;
	"(i) Communicating with business entities with the
intent of affecting some right or interest of the other
person;
	"(j) Damaging the other person's home, property,
place of work or school; or
	"(k) Delivering directly or through a third person
any object to the home, property, place of work or
school of the other person.
	"* * * * *
	"(7) 'Repeated' means two or more times."
		As noted above, defendant contends that plaintiff
presented insufficient evidence to establish that defendant had
engaged in stalking under ORS 30.866(1).  Specifically, defendant
complains that his conduct was too innocuous to establish, as a
matter of law, that he had stalked plaintiff.  Defendant further
argues that plaintiff's sense of alarm was not objectively
reasonable, as ORS 30.866(1)(b) requires. 
		We begin with defendant's contention that, regardless
of the reasonableness of plaintiff's sense of alarm, plaintiff
presented insufficient evidence as a matter of law to establish
that his conduct constituted stalking.  For purposes of our
analysis, we focus upon the elements set out in ORS 30.866(1)(a):
	"(1) A person may bring a civil action * * * for a
court's stalking protective order * * * against a
person if:
	"(a) The person intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly engages in repeated and unwanted contact
with the other person or a member of that person's
immediate family or household thereby alarming or
coercing the other person[.]"
(Emphasis added.)  Among other things, ORS 163.730(3) defines
"contact" as:
	"(a) Coming into the visual or physical presence
of the other person; [or]
	"(b) Following the other person[.]"
Defendant does not dispute that plaintiff sufficiently
proved that, under the foregoing definition of "contact," he
"engage[d] in repeated and unwanted contact," ORS 30.866(1)(a),
with plaintiff.  The gravamen of defendant's argument, rather,
concerns the mental-state requirement set out in ORS
30.866(1)(a), that is, whether plaintiff proved that defendant
acted with a necessary mental state respecting his contacts with
her.  That question, in turn, involves determining the extent to
which the requisite mental states set out in ORS 30.866(1)(a)
apply to the remaining parts of that statute. (3)
		We begin by examining the text and context of ORS
30.866(1), to ascertain the legislature's intent.  See PGE v.
Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143
(1993) (explaining methodology).  As noted, ORS 30.866(1)(a)
requires that a person accused of stalking in a civil proceeding
"intentionally, knowingly or recklessly engage[] in repeated and
unwanted contact with the other person * * * thereby alarming or
coercing the other person."  At the outset, we observe that the
word "thereby," which denotes causation, precedes the words
"alarming" and "coercing."  Consequently, the text of ORS
30.866(1)(a) demonstrates that the legislature did not intend to
require any culpability on a defendant's part respecting any
alarm or coercion that the recipient of the contact experiences;
rather, the terms "alarming" and "coercing" speak to the actual,
subjective effect that a defendant's conduct has upon the
recipient.  Compare ORS 163.732(1) (crime of stalking requires
that person "knowingly alarm[] or coerce[]" another person or
member of that person's family or household).
		The legislature did, however, impose a mental-state
requirement in ORS 30.866(1)(a) respecting a defendant's conduct
in contacting another person, by requiring that a defendant
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly "engage[] in repeated and
unwanted contact with the other person."  The placement of the
adverbs "intentionally," "knowingly," and "recklessly"
immediately before the verb "engage[]" demonstrates that those
words modify the verb "engage[]."  Thus, the requisite mental
states attach to the act of "engag[ing]" in the contact in
question with the other person, such as coming into the visual or
physical presence of that person, or following that person.  See
ORS 163.730(3)(a) and (b) (setting out those definitions of
"contact," among others; referring to contact with "the other
person"). 
		We further observe that the adjectives "repeated" and
"unwanted" modify the object "contact."  Because those adjectives
serve to describe the type of contact in which a defendant
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly must engage, we conclude
from the text that a defendant must act intentionally, knowingly,
or recklessly respecting the repeated and unwanted nature of the
contacts in question.
The context of ORS 30.866(1)(a), which includes other
related statutes, PGE, 317 Or at 611, helps to clarify the nature
of the requisite mental states identified in that statute and how
they apply to the described conduct.  ORS 161.085 sets out the
following definitions for purposes of the Oregon Criminal Code: (4)


	"(7) 'Intentionally' or 'with intent,' when used
with respect to a result or to conduct described by a
statute defining an offense, means that a person acts
with a conscious objective to cause the result or to
engage in the conduct so described.
	"(8) 'Knowingly' or 'with knowledge,' when used
with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described
by a statute defining an offense, means that a person
acts with an awareness that the conduct of the person
is of a nature so described or that a circumstance so
described exists.
	"(9) 'Recklessly,' when used with respect to a
result or to a circumstance described by a statute
defining an offense, means that a person is aware of
and consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that
the circumstance exists.  The risk must be of such
nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a
gross deviation from the standard of care that a
reasonable person would observe in the situation."
		Applying those definitions to ORS 30.866(1)(a), we
conclude that ORS 161.085(7) requires that a defendant act with a
conscious objective to engage in repeated and unwanted contact
with the other person; ORS 161.085(8) requires that a defendant
act with an awareness that he or she is engaging in repeated and
unwanted contact with that person; and ORS 161.085(9) requires
that a defendant be aware of and then consciously disregard a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that he or she is engaging in
repeated and unwanted contact with that person, and the risk must
be of such a degree that a reasonable person would not have
disregarded it.  Stated differently, at a minimum (that is, in
the case of "recklessly"), a defendant subjectively must be aware
of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the contacts in
question are repeated and unwanted by the recipient, and then
consciously and unreasonably disregard that risk.  
		That, in turn, demonstrates that ORS 30.866(1)(a)
speaks to a defendant's mental state and actions with regard to a
particular person -- in other words, a defendant at least
recklessly must direct his or her repeated and unwanted contacts
toward a targeted, particular person.  By contrast, a defendant
who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly places himself or
herself in a particular location without any awareness of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the contacts in question
are repeated and unwanted by a particular person cannot be said
to have acted with the minimal requisite mental state in respect
of "contact[ing]" that person.
		To summarize (particularly as applicable to this case): 
Under ORS 30.866(1)(a), plaintiff must have proved that, in at
least two instances of coming into her visual or physical
presence, defendant had been aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that she did not want defendant in her
presence, and then consciously had disregarded that risk when a
reasonable person would not have done so.
		With that construction of ORS 30.866(1)(a) in mind, we
turn to the facts of this case.  We begin by making several
observations regarding our standard of review.  At the outset, we
note that ORS 30.866 sets out a unique proceeding, in which a
plaintiff files a civil action to obtain an SPO, the entry of
which depends upon some standards common to the criminal law. 
See ORS 30.866(1) (identifying proceeding as "civil action"); ORS
30.866(1)(a) (setting out mental states of intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly); ORS 30.866(2) (setting out probable-cause standard for entering temporary civil SPO).  Regardless of
whether this case can be characterized as "civil" or "criminal,"
however, our standard of review respecting the challenged ruling
on the evidentiary issue -- specifically, the trial court's
denial of defendant's motion to dismiss, at the close of
plaintiff's case, based upon insufficient evidence -- is the
same, as the citations below demonstrate.
		We first note that we must view the evidence in the
record, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in
favor of plaintiff, the nonmoving party.  See State v.
Krummacher, 269 Or 125, 137, 523 P2d 1009 (1974) (in deciding
whether trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for
judgment of acquittal, conflicts in evidence must be viewed in
state's favor); Anderson v. Sturm, 209 Or 190, 191, 303 P2d 509
(1956) (in reviewing sufficiency of evidence on defendant's
motion for nonsuit, court views evidence, and every reasonable
inference to be drawn therefrom, in plaintiff's favor).  Further,
it is a question of law whether the evidence presented was
sufficient to support the elements required to obtain an SPO. 
See State v. Belt, 325 Or 6, 11, 932 P2d 1177 (1997) (question of
law whether evidence sufficient to support requisite element of
criminal statute at issue); State Farm v. Century Home, 275 Or
97, 105, 550 P2d 1185 (1976) (same, regarding civil action).  In
evaluating plaintiff's evidence, we must determine whether she
presented enough evidence, as a matter of law, to permit
reasonable persons to conclude that the evidence established each
element by the requisite burden of proof (here, preponderance of
the evidence).  See State v. Herrera, 286 Or 349, 360, 594 P2d
823 (1979) (so stating, in context of submission of defense to
jury in criminal case); Pattle v. Wildish Construction Co., 270
Or 792, 798, 529 P2d 924 (1974) (so stating, in context of motion
for nonsuit in civil case at close of plaintiff's evidence).
		In reviewing the record, we also must be mindful that a
party may establish an element of a criminal offense or a civil
action by circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences
arising from such evidence.  See State v. Carson, 292 Or 451,
461, 640 P2d 586 (1982) (jury entitled to review chain of
circumstances to infer criminal defendant's mental state); Lemons
et al v. Holland et al, 205 Or 163, 188, 284 P2d 1041 (1955)
(element of civil action may be established by circumstantial
evidence and reasonable inferences arising therefrom).  However,
as noted above, it is a legal question whether the evidence
presented is sufficient to support a particular inference.  Belt,
325 Or at 12.  
		Finally, in assessing such an inference, the question
for this court is whether the evidence presented gives rise to a
reasonable inference respecting an element in question or,
depending upon the circumstances, whether a conflicting
reasonable inference also can be drawn.  Id.; see also Lemons,
205 Or at 188 (facts so established must be such that reasonable
inference may be drawn regarding element in question). 
		As will be seen, this case turns upon the existence of
evidence, including any reasonable inference to be drawn
therefrom, tending to establish defendant's mental state vis-á-vis his contacts with plaintiff.  We now turn to the record and
apply the foregoing principles in that regard.
As discussed at the outset of this opinion, plaintiff
presented evidence of three occasions in which defendant passed
by her suddenly, silently, and swiftly, when no other people were
nearby -- once while plaintiff was walking to the OSU campus,
once on the street in front of plaintiff's apartment building,
and once on the OSU campus.  On two of those occasions, upon
reaching plaintiff and passing by her, defendant crossed the
street diagonally away from her and made "side glances" in her
direction.  In addition, the record shows that, on at least three
occasions during the time period in question, defendant appeared
in different parts of the OSU library when plaintiff was present. 
Finally, on one occasion, plaintiff noticed defendant, from a
distance, walking toward the School of Education building.  Those
occurrences, taken together, took place over a three-month
period, between late September and mid-December 1995. (5) 
		At the close of plaintiff's evidence, the trial court,
without comment, denied defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's
complaint.  The question before us is whether plaintiff presented
sufficient evidence, as a matter of law, to establish each
element required to obtain an SPO under ORS 30.866(1).
		For purposes of our analysis, we first note that, as to
the contacts in the OSU library and the first occasion (in
September 1995) when defendant passed by plaintiff closely while
walking to campus, plaintiff did not present evidence that, at
the time that they occurred, those contacts had caused her alarm
or any reasonable apprehension for her personal safety.  Rather,
plaintiff testified that those contacts, which had occurred over
about a two-month period, had caused her concern, in that she had
begun noticing defendant more and more frequently in unexpected
locations.  Although those contacts -- regardless of defendant's
mental state at the time -- cannot be said to satisfy all the
elements of ORS 30.866(1), they do provide important contextual
background respecting defendant's mental state during the
contacts that occurred in November and December 1995, in which
defendant again passed by plaintiff in a physically close manner.
		Turning, then, to those two contacts, the record
demonstrates that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to
establish both that those contacts subjectively had caused her
alarm, ORS 30.866(1)(a), and that they had caused her to have
reasonable apprehension regarding her personal safety, ORS
30.866(1)(c).  We further conclude that, contrary to one of
defendant's arguments on review, plaintiff's alarm was
objectively reasonable under the circumstances.  ORS
30.866(1)(b).
		The remaining question is whether the evidence was
sufficient as a matter of law to prove that defendant had acted
with a requisite mental state regarding the two contacts in
question.  As explained earlier, ORS 30.866(1)(a) requires
plaintiff to have proved that defendant at least recklessly had
engaged in repeated and unwanted contact with her, by coming into
her visual or physical presence.  In other words, plaintiff must
have proved that, in those two instances of coming into her
presence, defendant subjectively had been aware of a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that she did not want defendant in her
presence and then consciously had disregarded that risk when a
reasonable person would not have done so. 
Because defendant never said anything to plaintiff or
otherwise communicated with her in any way, and because plaintiff
also did not vocalize to defendant in any way (until after he had
passed by her a final time in December 1995) that his repeated
presence was unwanted, we must infer his mental state in
contacting plaintiff exclusively from his physical conduct.  The
following facts in that regard are significant:  (1) defendant's
close physical proximity to plaintiff (between one and three
feet) when no other people were nearby and, on the occasion in
November, when a large, unobstructed area was available to
defendant; (2) on the occasion in November, defendant's crossing
the street diagonally away from plaintiff immediately upon
passing her and then making "side glances" in her direction; and
(3) the fact that defendant had appeared in plaintiff's presence
on numerous occasions in the preceding months, on one occasion
passing by plaintiff in the same physically close manner and
crossing the street diagonally away upon passing her, while
glancing in her direction.  In light of our standard of review --
which requires that we draw all reasonable inferences in
plaintiff's favor -- we conclude that those facts support the
reasonable inference that defendant was aware of and then
consciously and unreasonably disregarded a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that, on two occasions, he had come into
plaintiff's presence when she did not want the contacts.  Stated
differently, it reasonably can be inferred from defendant's
conduct -- namely, his passing by plaintiff swiftly and closely
in deserted environments, and quickly crossing away upon reaching
her and glancing in her direction -- that he had targeted his
contacts (albeit recklessly) toward this particular plaintiff. (6) 
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's
motion to dismiss, at the close of plaintiff's case, based upon
insufficient evidence.
		Having rejected defendant's subconstitutional
challenge, we turn to his constitutional challenges.
APPLICABILITY OF CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED
SAFEGUARDS FOR CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
		Defendant contends that, although ORS 30.866 creates a
civil action for entry of an SPO, that statute in fact is
criminal in nature, giving rise to various state and federal
constitutional safeguards, including the right to a jury trial. 
In particular, defendant cites Article I, section 11, of the
Oregon Constitution, which provides, in part:
	"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have the right to public trial by an impartial jury in
the county in which the offense shall have been
committed; to be heard by himself and counsel; to
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, and to have a copy thereof; to meet the witnesses
face to face, and to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor * * *."
(Emphasis added.) (7)
		The state responds that ORS 30.866 is civil in nature
and that, in any event, the procedure for entering an SPO under
that statute is not the type of proceeding to which Article I,
section 11, was intended to apply.  For the reasons that follow,
we agree with the state's latter contention.
At the outset, we note that the parties' disagreement
about whether ORS 30.866 is a "civil" or "criminal" statute is
based upon their respective applications of the criteria that
this court identified in Brown v. Multnomah County Dist. Ct, 280
Or 95, 570 P2d 52 (1977). (8)  However, this court's case law
demonstrates that, even if an ostensibly civil proceeding can be
characterized as a criminal prosecution under Brown, an
applicable historical exception to Article I, section 11, can
exempt such a proceeding from the safeguards set out in that
provision.  For example, in State ex rel Dwyer v. Dwyer, 299 Or
108, 698 P2d 957 (1985), this court addressed the question
whether a criminal contempt proceeding for violation of a child-support order implicated Article I, section 11.  After
determining that, under Brown, such a proceeding might be
characterized as a criminal prosecution, the court reviewed the
history of criminal contempt proceedings and concluded that, when
the Oregon Constitution was adopted, it already was well
established that such proceedings took place without jury trials. 
Id. at 112-14.  The court, therefore, concluded that a
statutorily required court finding on a criminal contempt charge 
"is wholly confined within an historical exception that
was well-established when the Oregon constitutional
guarantee of a jury trial in all criminal prosecutions
was adopted, and the jury trial guarantee in Article I,
section 11, demonstrably was not intended to reach
punishment for indirect criminal contempt for violation
of court orders to pay child support."
Id. at 114-15.
		Similarly, in State ex rel Hathaway v. Hart, 300 Or
231, 708 P2d 1137 (1985), this court concluded that criminal
contempt proceedings for restraining order violations under the
Abuse Prevention Act fell within a historical exception to
Article I, section 11.  In so concluding, the court acknowledged
that the framers of the Oregon Constitution could not have been
aware of restraining orders under the Act, which was enacted in
1977.  Id. at 240.  However, the court determined that it could
review the historical record "for analogies to restraining orders
under the Act."  Id.  Based upon a historical exception for
injunctions preventing spousal harassment, as well as the
exception for criminal contempt proceedings discussed in Dwyer,
the court in Hathaway concluded that the framers would have
viewed restraining order proceedings under the Act as an
exception to Article I, section 11, and, consequently, that no
right to a jury trial applied.  Id. at 241-42.
		Consistent with Dwyer and Hathaway, we shall review the
historical record to determine whether an SPO entered under    
ORS 30.866 falls within a historical exception to Article I,
section 11.  As in Hathaway, the framers of the Oregon
Constitution cannot be said to have contemplated specifically the
entry of an SPO, as the legislature did not enact the anti-stalking statutes as a whole until 1993.  Here, however, the
purpose of our inquiry is not to try to match historical facts;
rather, our goal is to identify relevant principles that
illuminate the matter at hand.  See generally State v. Delgado,
298 Or 395, 692 P2d 610 (1984) (examining historical record to
determine scope of framers' intent respecting types of weapons
encompassed within constitutional right to bear arms).
To that end, we think it significant that, before
statehood, the Statutes of Oregon provided for proceedings to
prevent the commission of crimes.  Under those statutes, upon
receipt of a complaint of a threat to commit an offense against
another person or another person's property, a magistrate could
examine both the complainant and the accused person, as well as
any potential witnesses.  The accused person, in turn, had a
statutory right to be assisted by counsel.  Statutes of Oregon,
Act to Define Crimes and Misdemeanors, and Regulate Criminal
Proceedings, ch XVI, §§ 2, 4, 5 (1855).  The magistrate further
could compel the appearance of the accused person, id.  at § 3,
and, upon a finding of "just cause to fear that any such offence
will be committed" by the accused person, could require the
accused person to enter into recognizance (9) with sufficient
sureties, id. at § 6.  However, the magistrate had no authority
to order the accused person to appear before the district court,
unless that person was charged with an offense within that
court's jurisdiction.  Id.
		The statutory procedure set out in ORS 30.866 for
entering an SPO mirrors the historical procedure for preventing
the commission of a crime:  A plaintiff files a petition in
circuit court; the court compels the appearance of the defendant
(and may issue a warrant if the defendant fails to appear); the
court hears testimony from both sides; and, upon a finding of
probable cause (for a temporary SPO) or preponderance of the
evidence (for a more permanent SPO), the court may enter an SPO
against the defendant and also may award damages to the
plaintiff.  Further, as with the prevention of commission of a
crime, ORS 30.866 as a whole sets out a preventive procedure,
that is, the entry of an SPO ostensibly would serve to prevent
the defendant from harming the plaintiff in some way.  In sum, it
is significant to our analysis here that the right to a jury
trial did not attach to the procedures in place in 1855 for
preventing the commission of a crime.
		In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the
procedures set out in ORS 30.866 for obtaining an SPO fall within
a historical exception to Article I, section 11, and, therefore,
cannot be characterized as a "criminal prosecution[]" within the
meaning of that provision.  Accordingly, defendant was not
entitled to the constitutional safeguards set out in that
provision, such as the right to a jury trial.
		Defendant also contends that, "as applied" to him, the
procedures set out in ORS 30.866 amounted to a criminal
prosecution under Article I, section 11.  Defendant specifically
contends that, on the date that plaintiff filed her complaint, an
OSP officer subjected him to a "full custody" arrest, including
being frisked and handcuffed.  In defendant's view, "[h]e was
treated in the same fashion as a person arrested for a crime."
		The evidence reflects, as defendant contends, that a
police officer frisked and handcuffed him, and transported him by
police vehicle, on the date that plaintiff filed her complaint. 
However, ORS 30.866 does not contemplate such police action. 
Rather, the statute itself provides for issuance of an arrest
warrant only if a defendant fails to appear upon being served
with the petition and temporary SPO.  ORS 30.866(3)(b).  Stated
differently, the police actions that defendant cites as
demonstrating that ORS 30.866 is "criminal" in nature "as
applied" to his case are not part of the statute that he
challenges.  We therefore reject defendant's "as applied"
argument.
OVERBREADTH

Before the trial court and the Court of Appeals, and in
his petition for review, defendant contended that ORS 30.866(1)
was unconstitutionally overbroad, in violation of Article I,
section 8, of the Oregon Constitution, and the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (10)  At
oral argument, however, defendant conceded that this court's
decision in 
State v. Rangel, 328 Or 294, 977 P2d 379 (1999),
which upheld ORS 163.732, the criminal anti-stalking statute,
against a similar challenge, disposed of his overbreadth claim
here.  We therefore do not address it further. (11)
VAGUENESS

		Defendant next contends that ORS 30.866(1) is
unconstitutionally vague, in violation of Article I, sections 20
and 21, of the Oregon Constitution, and the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, all
set out post.  Specifically, defendant complains that certain
terms in ORS 30.866(1) and, by incorporation, ORS 163.730, fail
to provide "fair notice" of the speech and conduct that ORS
30.866(1) prohibits.  The state responds that defendant cannot
challenge a civil statute such as ORS 30.866(1) upon vagueness
grounds under the Oregon Constitution and, alternatively, that
the statute is not unconstitutionally vague.
		We begin with the state's contention that defendant
cannot bring a vagueness challenge to a civil statute under the
Oregon Constitution.  As will be seen, in addressing the state's
response to defendant's "fair notice" argument, it is necessary
to examine the nature of a vagueness challenge under both Article
I, section 20, and Article I, section 21.
		We begin with Article I, section 21, which provides, in
part:
	"No ex-post facto law * * * shall ever be passed 
* * *."
As pertinent to a vagueness challenge, that constitutional
provision prevents those charged with enforcing and applying
criminal laws "to make the law after the event."  State v.
Robertson, 293 Or 402, 408, 649 P2d 569 (1982); see also State v.
Cornell/Pinnell, 304 Or 27, 32-33, 741 P2d 501 (1987) (Article I,
section 21, prohibits granting "unbridled discretion" to judge
and jury in respect of applying criminal statute in question);
Megdal v. Board of Dental Examiners, 288 Or 293, 298, 303, 605
P2d 273 (1980) (vague criminal laws allow court or jury to define
crime after the fact, in violation of Article I, section 21). (12) 
A "criminal" law, in the ex post facto context, is one that
carries a sanction that is criminal, as opposed to civil, in
nature.  See Davidson v. Oregon Government Ethics Comm., 300 Or
415, 425, 712 P2d 87 (1985) (court distinguished civil forfeiture
penalty from penal sanctions in criminal cases).  Because Article
I, section 21, concerns criminal laws, this court has stated that
it does not apply to a vagueness challenge to a civil law.  See
Megdal, 288 Or at 298, 303 (emphasizing that Article I, section
21, applies to criminal laws; rejecting vagueness challenge to
professional licensing statute under Article I, section 21). (13)
		Here, defendant challenges the civil anti-stalking
statute, ORS 30.866.  Particularly, defendant challenges the
statutory prerequisites to entry of an SPO, not the procedures
and penalties (which, as noted earlier, undoubtedly are criminal
in nature) that result if a defendant violates an SPO.  The only
"penalty," for our purposes here, that results from ORS 30.866 is
the entry of an SPO that restricts a defendant from contacting
the plaintiff. (14)  Such an order, by itself, cannot be considered
a punishment that is criminal in nature for purposes of Article
I, section 21.  Consequently, we conclude that defendant's
vagueness challenge under Article I, section 21, is without
foundation.
		As noted, defendant also cites Article I, section 20,
in his vagueness challenge to ORS 30.866(1).  That section
provides:
	"No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or
class of citizens privileges, or immunities, which,
upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all
citizens."
Among other things, Article I, section 20, requires that a
governmental decision to offer or deny some advantage to a person
"be made by permissible criteria and consistently applied."  City
of Salem v. Bruner, 299 Or 262, 268-69, 702 P2d 70 (1985)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Freeland,
295 Or 367, 374, 667 P2d 509 (1983) (Article I, section 20,
prohibits "[h]aphazard" (internal quotation marks omitted) or
"standardless" administration of laws).  Unlike section 21 of
Article I, section 20 applies to both civil and criminal laws. 
See, e.g., Libertarian Party of Oregon v. Roberts, 305 Or 238,
248-51, 750 P2d 1147 (1988) (applying Article I, section 20, to
civil law); State v. Graves, 299 Or 189, 195-97, 700 P2d 244
(1985) (applying Article I, section 20, to criminal law).
In the context of a vagueness challenge to a criminal
law under Article I, section 20, the inquiry is whether the
enactment at issue "creat[es] a serious danger of unequal
application" of the enactment.  Cornell/Pinnell, 304 Or at 32;
see also Graves, 299 Or at 195 (Article I, section 20, is
implicated "when vague laws give unbridled discretion to judges
and jurors to decide what is prohibited in a given case, for this
results in the unequal application of criminal laws").  This
court has not articulated the extent -- if any -- to which the
standard for analyzing an arguably vague civil law for haphazard
and standardless administration, such as ORS 30.866(1), might be
different from the standard applicable to criminal laws. (15) 
		In this case, however, we need not determine the
appropriate standard for reviewing a civil law for vagueness
under Article I, section 20.  That is so, because defendant has
not cast his argument in terms of unequal application of the
laws.  Rather, defendant argues that ORS 30.866(1) does not
provide "fair notice" of the conduct that it prohibits.  In
short, although defendant cites Article I, section 20, his
vagueness challenge is not grounded in the protection that that
constitutional provision affords.  See generally State v. Wyatt,
331 Or 335, 343, 15 P3d 22 (2000) (to preserve claim of error on
appeal, party must provide trial court with explanation
sufficient enough to ensure that court can identify alleged error
with enough clarity to consider and correct error immediately, if
warranted).  Accordingly, we agree with the state that
defendant's particular vagueness challenge cannot rest upon the
Oregon Constitution.  
		We turn to defendant's challenge to ORS 30.866(1) under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
provides:
"No State shall * * * deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law       
* * *."
In respect of a vagueness challenge under the Due Process Clause,
the United States Supreme Court has stated:
	"'Vague laws offend several important values. 
First, because we assume that man is free to steer
between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that
laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so
that he may act accordingly.  Vague laws may trap the
innocent by not providing fair warning.  Second, if
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be
prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for
those who apply them.  A vague law impermissibly
delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges,
and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective
basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and
discriminatory applications[.]'"
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 US 489, 498,
102 S Ct 1186, 71 L Ed 2d 362 (1982) (quoting Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 US 104, 108-09, 92 S Ct 2294, 33 L Ed 2d 22
(1972)).  The protection against vague laws that the Due Process
Clause affords applies to both criminal and civil laws.  See
Chicago v. Morales, 527 US 41, 119 S Ct 1849, 144 L Ed 2d 67
(1999) (invalidating ordinance that imposed criminal sanctions as
unconstitutionally vague); Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 US
728, 90 S Ct 1484, 25 L Ed 2d 736 (1970) (upholding civil statute
against vagueness challenge).   
		As noted, defendant's challenge to ORS 30.866(1)
focuses upon the "fair notice" component of the federal vagueness
doctrine.  A threshold inquiry, however, concerns the appropriate
standard for evaluating defendant's challenge.  
		According to the Supreme Court, "[t]he degree of
vagueness that the Constitution tolerates -- as well as the
relative importance of fair notice and fair enforcement --
depends in part on the nature of the enactment."  Hoffman
Estates, 455 US at 498.  For example, enactments with civil,
rather than criminal, penalties, are subject to greater
tolerance, "because the consequences of imprecision are
qualitatively less severe."  Id.  Compare Morales, 527 US at 56
(in invalidating ordinance preventing loitering and imposing
criminal penalties, question was whether ordinance was "so vague
and standardless" that it left public uncertain as to prohibited
conduct); with Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 US 609, 629,
104 S Ct 3244, 82 L Ed 2d 462 (1984) (in upholding anti-discrimination statute, court focused upon whether statutory
terms articulated with "reasonable degree of clarity"). 
Additionally, laws that threaten to inhibit the exercise of
constitutionally affected rights, such as the right to free
speech, demand a higher level of clarity.  Hoffman Estates, 455
US at 499; see also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 US 589,
603, 87 S Ct 675, 17 L Ed 2d 629 (1967) ("precision of regulation
must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most
precious freedoms," such as freedom of speech (internal quotation
marks and brackets omitted)).
	It arguably might be appropriate in this case to apply
a more tolerant vagueness standard under the Due Process Clause
to ORS 30.866(1), because that statute, in providing for entry of
an SPO, does not impose a penalty that could be considered
criminal in nature for purposes of a federal vagueness analysis. 
However, in Hoffman Estates, the Supreme Court applied a
"relatively strict test" to an ordinance that imposed civil
penalties for selling certain drug paraphernalia without a
license, reasoning that the ordinance was "quasi-criminal" in
light of its "prohibitory and stigmatizing effect."  455 US at
499.  The court ultimately upheld the ordinance, reasoning, among
other things, that "[a] business person of ordinary intelligence"
would understand its disputed terms.  Id. at 489.  Because the
"prohibitory and stigmatizing effect" of entry of an SPO under
ORS 30.866(3)(a) is sufficiently analogous to the ordinance at
issue in Hoffman Estates, we shall apply a similar standard --
whether a person of ordinary intelligence would understand its
terms -- in our analysis of ORS 30.866(1) for purposes of the Due
Process Clause. (16)
We note one additional matter before turning to the
specifics of defendant's challenge.  Here, defendant challenges
the terms "contact," "alarm[]," and "personal safety" set out in
ORS 30.866(1), and, by incorporation, ORS 163.730(1) and (3). (17) 
Defendant makes no argument that any aspect of ORS 30.866(1) is
vague as applied to his particular case; rather, he contends that
"the entire statute leaves a person charged with its violation
uncertain as to what is forbidden and what is not."  Accordingly,
defendant raises only a facial challenge to ORS 30.866(1).  See
Hoffman Estates, 455 US at 494 n 5 (facial vagueness challenge
under Due Process Clause "means a claim that the law is invalid
in toto -- and therefore incapable of any valid application"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  We therefore must determine
whether, in light of his specific contentions, that statute "is
impermissibly vague in all of its applications."  Id. at 495. 
		As noted, defendant first challenges the term "contact"
in ORS 30.866(1).  Specifically, defendant complains that the
statutory definition for "contact" set out in ORS 163.730(3) is
unconstitutionally vague because it states that "contact"
"includes[,] but is not limited to," certain, delineated forms of
conduct.  (Emphasis added.)  See __ Or at ___ (slip op at 8-9)
(setting out ORS 163.730(3) in its entirety).  In defendant's
view, in light of that emphasized wording, there effectively is
no limitation upon what may be considered a "contact."  It
follows, defendant argues, that the statute provides no fair
warning of the type of "contact" that it prohibits.
		In the context of a facial vagueness challenge,
defendant's argument fails, because he focuses upon only part of
the statutory definition.  Specifically, defendant does not
contend that the specific, identifiable forms of contact
delineated in ORS 163.730(3) are unconstitutionally vague;
rather, he contends that other undelineated, unknown forms of
contact fail to satisfy the fair notice requirement of the Due
Process Clause.  In short, defendant's complaint that ORS
163.730(3) does not limit the types of contact that ORS 30.866(1)
prohibits fails to establish that the use of that term renders
ORS 30.866(1) unconstitutionally vague "in all of its
applications."  Hoffman Estates, 455 US at 495 (emphasis added). 
We therefore reject his challenge to the term "contact."
		Defendant next challenges the term "alarm," which ORS
163.730(1) defines as "to cause apprehension or fear resulting
from the perception of danger."  (Emphasis added.)  In
defendant's view, if the term "danger," which is not statutorily
defined, is not limited to physical danger, "then there are no
confines to the term." 
We first note that, in Rangel, this court interpreted
the term "alarm" in ORS 163.730(1), in the context of a contact
involving communication in the form of speech or writing, to
require a fear of "imminent and serious personal violence." 
Rangel, 328 Or at 303 (citing State v. Moyle, 299 Or 691, 703-05,
705 P2d 740 (1985)). (18)  Thus, in the context of communicative
contacts, (19) the term "alarm" in ORS 30.866(1) and ORS 163.730(1)
refers to causing apprehension or fear of personal violence.  
		That case law disposes, in part, of defendant's
complaint about the term "danger" in ORS 163.730(1), because, in
cases involving communicative contacts, that term speaks to an
identifiable effect, that is, fear of personal violence or
physical harm.  As to noncommunicative contacts, we note that the
dictionary defines "danger," in part, as "HARM, INJURY, DAMAGE  
* * * the state of being exposed to harm : liability to injury,
pain, or loss * * *."  Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary, 573
(unabridged ed 1993).  Even if the foregoing definition applies
beyond the concept of "physical" danger in some way (as defendant
contends), its application to physical danger is obvious.  Stated
differently, defendant's argument fails for the same reason as
his "contact" argument, because it fails to demonstrate that the
term "alarm" is vague in all its applications.
		Defendant also challenges the term "personal safety" in
ORS 30.866(1)(c), arguing that, because that term is not defined
by statute, "it is * * * not clear what the legislature meant." 
Defendant's premise that the lack of a statutory definition for a
particular term, in itself, renders the term unconstitutionally
vague is incorrect.  Rather, the inquiry here is whether the term
at issue identifies the prohibited conduct for a person of
ordinary intelligence.  See State v. Farrar, 309 Or 132, 183, 786
P2d 161 (1990), cert den 498 US 879 (1990) (no separate statutory
definition required when statutory phrase at issue identifies
prohibited conduct); see also Hoffman Estates, 455 US at 498
(setting out "person of ordinary intelligence" standard).  
		Here, the term "personal safety" has an identifiable
meaning.  The word "personal," among other things, means:
"1 : of or relating to a particular person * * * 3 :
relating to the person or body : BODILY < appearance>
< liberty> * * *."
Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary at 1686.  The word "safety,"
among other things, means:
"1 : the condition of being safe : freedom of exposure
to danger : exemption from hurt, injury, or loss * * *
 * * *."
Id. at 1998.  Thus, the term "personal safety" refers to the
state of a particular individual being free from danger or harm,
see id. at 573 (defining "danger," in part, as "HARM, INJURY,
DAMAGE" and "the state of being exposed to harm"), or from other
hurt or loss.  In short, despite its lack of a statutory
definition, the term "personal safety" in this context carries an
identifiable meaning that is understandable to a person of
ordinary intelligence and, therefore, is not unconstitutionally
vague.
		Finally, defendant contends that,
	"[i]n analyzing the stalking statute, all of the
terms which are vague must be considered together. 
When the statute is read as a whole, the vagueness of
each term compounds the vagueness of the others. 
Because so many of the terms used in the statute are
vague, the citizens of Oregon cannot be sure if their
conduct is prohibited under the statute, and
consequently, the statute is unconstitutional."
As can be seen from the foregoing, we disagree with defendant's
premise.  The terms that he challenges are not vague by failing
to identify the prohibited conduct for a person of ordinary
intelligence; consequently, his argument that the statute itself
is vague as a whole is without foundation.  We reject defendant's
argument that ORS 30.866(1) fails to provide fair notice under
the Due Process Clause.
RIGHT TO TRAVEL

Defendant finally contends that, by allowing entry of
an SPO, ORS 30.866(3)(a) violates his constitutional right to
travel freely from place to place.  As support, defendant
generally cites Article I, sections 8 and 33, of the Oregon
Constitution, (20) and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution, contending that he has a "penumbral
constitutional right to walk freely about public sidewalks and
walkways." 
		As to the Oregon Constitution and the First Amendment,
defendant cites cases that involved the right to use public areas
for free expression, free association, and petitioning purposes. 
Defendant otherwise does not articulate with any clarity his
rationale that ORS 30.866(3)(a) violates the constitutional
provisions that he cites, respecting violation of a
constitutional right to travel; we also have found no case law
supporting that proposition.  Further, defendant made no
"penumbral" argument under Article I, section 33, to the trial
court or to the Court of Appeals.  Consequently, we reject
defendant's arguments under the state constitution and the First
Amendment without further discussion.
		As to the Fourteenth Amendment, defendant primarily
relies upon Morales, 527 US 41, which the United States Supreme
Court decided after the Court of Appeals issued its decision in
this case.  In Morales, the Supreme Court invalidated a city
"gang-congregation" ordinance upon vagueness grounds, holding
that the prohibition in the ordinance against "loitering" by
certain persons, defined as "remain[ing] in any one place with no
apparent purpose," id. at 47, specified no standard of conduct
and, therefore, violated the Due Process Clause.  Id. at 60. 
Before engaging in its vagueness analysis, the Court stated:
	"* * * [T]he freedom to loiter for innocent
purposes is part of the 'liberty' protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  We have
expressly identified this right to move from one place
to another according to inclination as an attribute of
personal liberty protected by the Constitution. * * *
Indeed, it is apparent that an individual's decision to
remain in a public place of his choice is as much a
part of his liberty as the freedom of movement inside
frontiers that is a part of our heritage * * * or the
right to move to whatsoever place one's own inclination
may direct * * *."
Id. at 53-54 (internal quotation marks, citations, and footnotes
omitted).  See also Kent v. Dulles, 357 US 116, 126, 78 S Ct
1113, 2 L Ed 2d 1204 (1958) ("Freedom of movement is basic in our
scheme of values.").  Thus, the Court in Morales declared that
the right to move about freely in a public place indeed is
protected by the Due Process Clause; however, it did not have
occasion to analyze the limitations of the ordinance at issue
upon that right.
		The Supreme Court, however, has explored the
constitutionality of limitations upon the right to travel in
other contexts.  In Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 US 500,
84 S Ct 1659, 12 L Ed 2d 992 (1964), in analyzing the
constitutionality of certain restrictions upon the ability of
United States citizens to travel abroad, the Court applied the
following "well-established principle[]" for testing "whether the
restrictions * * * imposed are consistent with the liberty
guaranteed" by constitutional due process protections:  
"It is a familiar and basic principle, recently
reaffirmed in NAACP v. Alabama, 377 US 288, 307[, 84 S
Ct 1302, 12 L Ed 2d 325 (1964)], that 'a governmental
purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.' * * *
In applying this principle the Court in NAACP v.
Alabama, supra, referred to the criteria enunciated in
Shelton v. Tucker, [364 US 479,] 488[, 81 S Ct 247, 5 L
Ed 2d 231 (1960)]: 
"'[E]ven though the governmental purpose be
legitimate and substantial, that purpose
cannot be pursued by means that broadly
stifle fundamental personal liberties when
the end can be more narrowly achieved.  The
breadth of legislative abridgement must be
viewed in the light of less drastic means for
achieving the same basic purpose.'"
Id. at 508 (final brackets in original; citations omitted).  The
Court then examined the congressional purpose supporting the
statute at issue, id. at 509, and concluded that the statute
swept too broadly and, therefore, was unconstitutional on its
face, id. at 514.  See also Zemel v. Rusk, 381 US 1, 85 S Ct
1271, 14 L Ed 179 (1965) (affirming restrictions upon travel to
Cuba, in light of national security justifications).
		Here, the legislative purpose behind ORS 30.866 is
apparent from the text of that statute:  The legislature was
concerned with preventing the commission of certain crimes
against particular persons and their immediate families or
household members.  To prevent the commission of such crimes,
which is a legitimate legislative purpose, the legislature
created a mechanism in ORS 30.866 whereby a potential criminal
defendant could be prevented from "contact[ing]" a potential
crime victim:
	"(2) At the time the petition [for a civil SPO] is
filed, the court, upon a finding of probable cause
based on the allegations in the petition, shall enter a
temporary court's stalking protective order that may
include, but is not limited to, all contact listed in
ORS 163.730.  The petition and the temporary order
shall be served upon the respondent with an order
requiring the respondent to personally appear before
the court to show cause why the temporary order should
not be continued for an indefinite period.
	"(3)(a) At the [subsequent] hearing, * * * the
court * * * may proceed to enter a court's stalking
protective order * * *."
See also ORS 163.730(3) (delineating 11 forms of prohibited
contact).  The types of contact specified in ORS 163.730(3) are
limited to particular interactions or communications between the
defendant and the plaintiff, a member of the plaintiff's
immediate family or household, or some other third party
connected to the plaintiff.  Further, although a temporary SPO
entered under ORS 30.866(2) (and, ultimately, a more permanent
SPO entered under ORS 30.866(3)(a)) may prohibit contact that is
not delineated under ORS 163.730(3), the context of the statutes
as a whole demonstrates that such a prohibition must relate to
the type of contact that gave rise to the entry of an SPO in the
first instance.  See ORS 30.866(1) (setting out conduct providing
basis for filing petition); ORS 30.866(2) (court may enter
temporary SPO upon finding of probable cause based upon
allegations in petition).  We conclude that the means of
achieving the legislative purpose of preventing the commission of
certain crimes set out in ORS 30.866(2) and (3)(a) and ORS
163.730(3)(a) are sufficiently narrowly drawn, so as to satisfy
the Due Process Clause.  See generally Zemel, 381 US at 14 ("the
fact that a liberty cannot be inhibited without due process of
law does not mean that it can under no circumstances be
inhibited").
Defendant also cites as problematic the "unlimited
duration" of an SPO entered under ORS 30.866(2) and (3)(a). 
Although it is true that ORS 30.866(2) contemplates the future
entry of an SPO for an "indefinite period," even assuming that
such a provision implicates any constitutional right to travel,
we think it significant that nothing in ORS 30.866 prevents a
defendant from seeking a modification, including a change in
duration. (21)  Defendant does not otherwise articulate how the lack
of a provision for termination or any time limitation in ORS
30.866 gives rise to a constitutional violation of his right to
travel under the Due Process Clause.  Without further elaboration
from defendant, we decline to address that aspect of his argument
further. (22)
CONCLUSION

		In sum, we conclude that:  (1) the trial court did not
err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss, based upon
insufficient evidence; (2) ORS 30.866 falls within a historical
exception to Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution,
and, therefore, does not require the protections for "criminal
prosecutions" set out in that provision; (3) ORS 30.866(1) is not
unconstitutionally overbroad, as contended by defendant, in
violation of Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution;
(4) defendant cannot bring a vagueness challenge to ORS 30.866(1)
under Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution; (5)
defendant's "fair notice" vagueness challenge to ORS 30.866(1) is
not grounded in Article I, section 20, of the Oregon
Constitution; (6) ORS 30.866(1) and, by incorporation, ORS
163.730(1) and (3), are not unconstitutionally vague, in the
respects asserted by defendant, under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and
(7) ORS 30.866 does not violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment respecting any right of defendant to travel
freely from place to place.  
		The decision of the Court of Appeals and the order of
the circuit court are affirmed.



1. 	Although ORS 30.866(2) refers to a "petition,"
plaintiff here filed a document entitled "Oregon Uniform Stalking
Complaint."  (Emphasis added.)

2. 	The 2001 Legislature added the words "or electronic" to
ORS 163.730(3)(d).  Or Laws 2001, ch 870, § 1.  Other than that
amendment, the current version of ORS 163.730 is the same as it
was at the time in 1995 when the contacts in question occurred.

3. 	The state contends that defendant neither preserved
that particular issue at trial nor raised it on appeal, and,
accordingly, that this court should not address it.  However,
defendant thoroughly argued to the trial court and raised on
appeal the issue whether plaintiff had presented sufficient
evidence respecting the elements required to obtain an SPO under
ORS 30.866(1), including evidence of his mental state vis-á-vis
his conduct toward plaintiff.  That issue necessarily raises the
statutory construction question that we have identified. 

4. 	Although ORS 30.866 is not part of the Oregon Criminal
Code, it has a criminal counterpart, ORS 163.738, which, together
with ORS 163.744, provides for issuance of a criminal citation
that ultimately could result in entry of an SPO by a court.  ORS
163.738(2)(a)(B), which the legislature enacted as part of the
same legislative package as ORS 30.866, see Or Laws 1993, ch 626,
§§ 4, 9 (setting out legislation), sets out requirements for
obtaining an SPO, following issuance of a criminal citation, that
are identical to those set out in ORS 30.866(1), including the
requirement that the defendant "intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly engage[] in repeated and unwanted contact with the
other person * * *."  ORS 163.738(2)(a)(B)(i).  In light of that
criminal counterpart to ORS 30.866(1)(a), we conclude that, in
enacting the civil statute in the same legislative package, the
legislature intended the definitions set out in ORS 161.085(7) to
(9) to apply to ORS 30.866(1)(a).
5. 	As noted earlier, plaintiff also had noticed defendant
outside her apartment building and inside the OSU library on a
number of occasions earlier in the summer of 1995.  However,
according to plaintiff's testimony, nothing about defendant's
behavior at that time led her to think that those contacts were
anything other than coincidental.

6. 	We note that, as to the remaining contact that occurred
on December 1, 1995, when plaintiff noticed defendant walking
toward the School of Education building from a distance, nothing
about defendant's conduct on that occasion suggests that he was
aware of any risk that he had come into plaintiff's visual
presence.

7. 	Defendant also contends that entry of an SPO under  
ORS 30.866(3)(a) implicates the criminal protections set out in
the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.  However, his arguments concerning whether      
ORS 30.866 is civil or criminal in nature are confined to Article
I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution.  Accordingly, we
decline to consider his federal constitutional arguments on that
issue.

8. 	In Brown, this court concluded that the following
factors are relevant to the determination whether an "ostensibly
civil penalty proceeding," 280 Or at 102, can be characterized as
a "criminal prosecution[]" under Article I, section 11:  (1) the
type of offense at issue; (2) the prescribed penalty for the
offense; (3) the collateral consequences that flow from the
offense; (4) the punitive significance of the offense; and (5)
the applicability to the offense of pretrial practices ordinarily
used in the enforcement of criminal laws.  Id. at 102-09. 
Applying those factors, the court in Brown concluded that the
offense of driving under the influence of intoxicants gave rise
to a "criminal prosecution[]" within the meaning of Article I,
section 11.  Id. at 109. 

9. 	A "recognizance" was defined at the time as "[a]n
obligation of record, entered into before a court or officer duly
authorized for that purpose, with a condition to do some act
required by law, which is therein specified."  II Bouvier's Law
Dictionary, 423 (14th ed 1874).  A recognizance served to secure
the presence of the defendant.  Id.

10. 	Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides:
	"No law shall be passed restraining the free
expression of opinion, or restricting the right to
speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever;
but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of
this right."
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides,
in part:  
	"Congress shall make no law * * * abridging the
freedom of speech * * *."
The First Amendment is made applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment.  New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US
254, 264 n 4, 84 S Ct 710, 11 L Ed 2d 686 (1964).

11. 	ORS 163.732 provides, in part:
	"(1) A person commits the crime of stalking if:
	"(a) The person knowingly alarms or coerces
another person or a member of that person's immediate
family or household by engaging in repeated and
unwanted contact with the other person;
	"(b) It is objectively reasonable for a person in
the victim's situation to have been alarmed or coerced
by the contact; and
	"(c) The repeated and unwanted contact causes the
victim reasonable apprehension regarding the personal
safety of the victim or a member of the victim's
immediate family or household."
As with ORS 30.866, ORS 163.730 sets out a number of definitions
for terms used in ORS 163.732.
		In Rangel, this court construed ORS 163.732(1),
together with the definitions of "alarm" and "coerce" set out in
ORS 163.730(1) and (2), to require that a contact based upon
communication "consist of a threat that convincingly expresses to
the addressee the intention that it will be carried out, and that
the actor has the ability to do so."  Rangel, 328 Or at 306
(emphasis omitted).  In light of that construction, the court
concluded that the statute was not unconstitutionally overbroad
under either the state or federal constitutions.
		As can be seen, the elements set out in ORS
163.732(1)(a) are different from those set out in ORS
30.866(1)(a) in a number of ways.  However, the court's narrowing
construction in Rangel -- which saved the criminal statute from
an overbreadth challenge -- concerned elements in ORS 163.732(1)
(together with ORS 163.730(1) and (2)) that are identical to the
elements in ORS 30.866(1) that are at issue here.  In light of
that conclusion, as well as the lack of any new arguments on
defendant's part here, we adopt the reasoning set out in Rangel
without further elaboration.
		We further note that defendant raises a separate
challenge to ORS 30.866(1) based upon the free expression and
freedom of speech provisions of the state and federal
constitutions.  However, his argument in that regard incorporates
his entire overbreadth argument by reference.  Under Rangel, we
therefore reject it.

12. 	As noted, a vagueness challenge under Article I,
section 21, concerns the argument that the particulars of a
criminal law are determined after the fact.  We note, however,
that this court's case law could be read to suggest that a
vagueness challenge under Article I, section 21, can encompass a
"fair notice" element -- that is, that Article I, section 21,
prohibits the enactment of a law that fails to inform those who
are subject to it, in a sufficiently explicit manner, "'what
conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.'" 
State v. Plowman, 314 Or 157, 160, 838 P2d 558 (1992), cert den
508 US 974 (1993) (citing State v. Graves, 299 Or 189, 195, 700
P2d 244 (1985)); see also State v. Chakerian, 325 Or 370, 382,
938 P2d 756 (1997) (in case involving vagueness challenge under
Oregon Constitution, court explained that vagueness doctrine
serves functions of providing reasonable notice of prohibited
conduct and of preventing judge, jury, and enforcement officials
from exercising uncontrolled discretion in punishing defendants). 

		Upon closer examination of the case law, however, it is
apparent that such suggestions concern the nature of the
vagueness doctrine generally, rather than articulating any "fair
notice" requirement under Article I, section 21.  See Graves, 299
Or at 195 (in discussing fair notice requirement, court cited
State v. Hodges, 254 Or 21, 27, 457 P2d 491 (1969), which set out
fair notice requirement under Due Process Clause); see also
Chakerian, 325 Or at 382 (citing Graves for "fair notice"
proposition); Plowman, 314 Or at 160 (same); Cornell/Pinnell, 304
Or at 29-30 (same).

13. 	We note that, in Davidson, 300 Or 415, this court
suggested that a civil statute that imposed a forfeiture penalty
was more likely to implicate vagueness protections under the
state and federal constitutions than a civil statute that
governed professional conduct.  See id. at 425 (so suggesting). 
However, the court then characterized the vagueness issue as one
involving due process under the federal constitution and
ultimately concluded that the statute at issue was not vague in
any event.  Id.
		Notwithstanding the discussion in Davidson, this
court's general pronouncements under Article I, section 21, as
well as the court's statement in Megdal, 288 Or at 298, that
Article I, section 21, applies to vagueness challenges to only
criminal laws, clarify that a vagueness challenge to a civil law
-- that is, for ex post facto purposes, a law that does not
impose a "criminal" penalty -- cannot stand under Article I,
section 21.

14. 	As noted earlier, ORS 30.866(4) also provides for the
potential award of damages to the plaintiff, as well as the
imposition of reasonable attorney fees and costs.

15. 	In Anderson v. Peden, 284 Or 313, 326, 587 P2d 59
(1978), this court stated that a vagueness challenge to a civil
law under Article I, section 20, "must show that in fact a policy
unlawfully discriminating in favor of some persons against others
either has been adopted or has been followed in practice." 
However, that case involved a different type of complaint under
Article I, section 20, namely, that discretionary administration
of governmental policy resulted in discrimination against a group
or class of persons.
		We also note that this court has invalidated a civil
law upon the ground that a disputed term was "too vague to convey
a definite meaning capable of serving as a standard or guide in
carrying that portion of the [statute] into effect," resulting in
the determination of compliance being left "to the unguided
judgment" of those applying the statute.  Vinton v. Hoskins, 174
Or 106, 116, 147 P2d 892 (1944).  In that case, however, the
court cited neither Article I, section 20, nor any other state or
federal constitutional provision, as a basis for its decision.

16. 	The fact that certain types of "contact" delineated in
ORS 163.730(3) involve communication also weighs in favor of
applying a stricter vagueness standard.  See Hoffman Estates, 455
US at 499 (laws that threaten to inhibit exercise of right to
free speech demand higher level of clarity).

17. 	Defendant also challenges the terms "coerc[e]" and
"following" in ORS 30.866(1) and, by incorporation, ORS
163.730(2) and (3)(b); however, because he makes no particular
argument supporting his contention that those terms are
unconstitutionally vague, we do not address those challenges.

18. 	The state relies, in part, upon the interpretation in
Moyle, 299 Or at 706, of the term "alarm" in a different statute
-- ORS 166.065(1)(d) (1995) (prohibiting telephonic harassment) -- that is, "fear or terror resulting from a sudden sense of
danger."  (Emphasis added.)  We do not apply that definition
broadly to the term "alarm" as set out in ORS 30.866(1) in all
respects, however, because ORS 163.730(1) sets out a different
definition applicable to that statute, namely, "to cause
apprehension or fear resulting from the perception of danger." 
(Emphasis added.)

19. 	Because Rangel involved an overbreadth challenge under
Article I, section 8, it concerned only contacts that, like those
at issue in Moyle, implicated speech or expression.

20. 	Article I, section 33, provides:  "This enumeration of
rights, and privileges shall not be construed to impair or deny
others retained by the people."

21. 	Indeed, in this case, the trial court's order required
plaintiff to notify the court if she moved more than 50 miles
from Corvallis and, if so, that defendant may request dismissal;
the order otherwise provided that defendant may request dismissal
two years after the date of the order. 

22. 	Defendant also contends in his petition for review that
ORS 30.866, "as applied here, purports to forbid an Oregon
citizen from walking on public sidewalks to conduct his or her
business in a peaceable manner," (emphasis added) and, therefore,
"is an illegal restraint on constitutionally protected activity." 
However, before the trial court and the Court of Appeals,
defendant challenged only the facial validity of ORS 30.866 in
respect of his constitutional right to travel.  We therefore do
not address his "as-applied" argument.