Title: Town of Wilson v. City of Sheboygan

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2020 WI 16 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP2162 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Town of Wilson, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
City of Sheboygan, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 14, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 19, 2019   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Sheboygan   
 
JUDGE: 
Daniel J. Borowski   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous Court 
with respect to Parts I., III.C., and III.D., and the majority 
opinion of the Court with respect to Parts II., III.A., III.B., 
and IV., in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ZIEGLER, 
and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a 
concurring opinion, in which KELLY, J., joined. HAGEDORN, J., 
filed a concurring opinion.   
NOT PARTICIPATING:  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there were briefs filed (in the 
court of appeals) by Michael D. Huitink and Sorrentino Burkert 
Risch LLC, Brookfield.  There was an oral argument by Michael D. 
Huitink.  
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed (in the 
court of appeals) by H. Stanley Riffle and Municipal Law & 
Litigation Group, S.C., Waukesha.  There was an oral argument by 
H. Stanley Riffle. 
 
 
2 
 
For amicus Wisconsin Towns Association, a brief was filed by 
Joseph Ruth, Shawano. 
 
For joint amici League of Wisconsin Municipalities and NAIOP 
– Wisconsin there was a brief filed by Julie M. Gay and Law Office 
of Julie M. Gay, Waukesha, Thomas D. Larson, Madison, and Claire 
Silverman, Madison.  
 
 
 
 
2020 WI 16 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2018AP2162 
(L.C. No. 
2017CV490) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Town of Wilson, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Sheboygan, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
FILED 
 
FEB 14, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous Court 
with respect to Parts I., III.C., and III.D., and the majority 
opinion of the Court with respect to Parts II., III.A., III.B., 
and IV., in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ZIEGLER, 
and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a 
concurring opinion, in which KELLY, J., joined. HAGEDORN, J., filed 
a concurring opinion.   
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Sheboygan 
County, Daniel J. Borowski, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.  Kohler Company sought to 
convert 247 acres of land located in the Town of Wilson into a 
world championship golf course.  After determining that the golf 
course development would not come to fruition if the land remained 
within the Town's boundaries, Kohler successfully petitioned for 
annexation to the City of Sheboygan.  In response, the Town filed 
No. 
2018AP2162   
 
2 
 
a declaratory judgment action alleging that the annexation was 
"arbitrary, capricious, non-contiguous, an abuse of discretion, 
and otherwise procedurally and substantively non-compliant with 
[the City's] annexation authority under Chapter 66, Wis. Stats, 
and existing Wisconsin case[]law."  The City moved for partial 
summary judgment regarding the annexation petition's compliance 
with the population certification requirement in Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0217(5)(a) (2017-18), which was granted.1  The circuit court 
ultimately conducted a bench trial and concluded that the 
annexation satisfied the statutory contiguity requirement and the 
"rule of reason."2  The circuit court further concluded that the 
annexation petition fully satisfied the procedural requirements of 
§ 66.0217.  Consequently, the circuit court dismissed the action 
in full. 
¶2 
On bypass3 from the court of appeals, the Town asks us 
to review whether:  (1) the annexation satisfies the statutory 
contiguity requirement; (2) the annexation satisfies the rule of 
reason; (3) the annexation petition strictly complied with the 
signature requirements in Wis. Stat. § 66.0217(3); and (4) the 
annexation petition strictly complied with the population 
certification requirement in § 66.0217(5)(a).  We conclude that 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 Judge Daniel J. Borowski of the Sheboygan County Circuit 
Court presided.   
3 The Town's petition to bypass was filed pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 809.60.   
No. 
2018AP2162   
 
3 
 
the annexation is contiguous and satisfies the rule of reason.  We 
also conclude that the annexation petition strictly complied with 
§§ 66.0217(3) and (5)(a).  Therefore, we affirm the circuit court. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶3 
For nearly 80 years Kohler has owned 247 acres of 
undeveloped land abutting Lake Michigan located within the Town's 
boundaries.  In March 2014, Kohler submitted an application with 
the Town for a conditional use permit to develop the land into a 
world championship golf course.  After Kohler's plan went public, 
there was immediate opposition to the proposed development by the 
Town's citizens.  The opposition centered on environmental 
concerns, deforestation, and perceived impacts to residential 
wells.  By 2015, three of the five members of the Town Board were 
known to oppose the development, decreasing the likelihood that 
Kohler's application would be approved. 
¶4 
Due to unfolding Town Board opposition and concerns 
about the Town's ability to provide adequate water and fire 
services to the proposed development,4 Kohler approached the City 
about the possibility of annexing its property and adjacent lands.  
The City was interested in Kohler's proposal as it "had 
historically targeted the lands within the annexation, including 
the Kohler Land, for future City expansion, development and 
                                                 
4 Kohler was concerned that the Town's inability to provide a 
municipal water source would negatively impact the golf course 
development based on:  (1) insufficient water for the golf course 
operations; (2) exposure to well damage claims from neighboring 
landowners; and (3) a potentially inadequate water source for the 
Town's volunteer fire department in the event of a fire.   
No. 
2018AP2162   
 
4 
 
economic growth as a part of the City's 2011 Comprehensive Plan."  
The City was also facing a substantial need for housing, which was 
stunting economic growth.  Annexation would allow the City to 
immediately address its housing needs by developing the land 
adjacent to Kohler's property.  It was a mutually beneficial 
arrangement for Kohler and the City:  annexation was a means for 
Kohler to achieve its goal of developing its land into a golf 
course and for the City to achieve its goal of economic growth.  
¶5 
Kohler independently designed the boundaries of the 
territory subject to the proposed annexation, without the City's 
assistance.  To increase its size and shape, Kohler included a 
large amount of state land in its proposal.  Kohler also purchased 
several of the properties located within the territory.  Pursuant 
to Kohler's design, the border between the City and the first 
parcel of the territory spans approximately 650 feet in width.  
The territory proceeds in a southeasterly direction and varies in 
size from 1,450 feet wide at certain points to 190 feet wide before 
expanding to the proposed golf course development.  The map of the 
annexation is attached as an appendix to this opinion. 
¶6 
Kohler initiated the annexation process in April 2017 by 
publishing a notice in the Sheboygan Press and sending a "Request 
for Annexation Review" to the Department of Administration 
("DOA").  Kohler then circulated a "Petition for Annexation by 
One-Half Approval" (the "Petition") in accordance with Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0217(3)(a).5  The Petition stated that its purpose was to 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 66.0217(3)(a)1. provides: 
No. 
2018AP2162   
 
5 
 
"make City of Sheboygan services available to the territory and to 
ready the territory for development consistent with the City of 
Sheboygan's 2011 Comprehensive Plan."  According to the Petition, 
the population of the territory subject to the proposed annexation 
included six adults and three children.  Kohler obtained five 
signatures for the Petition from owners representing over one-half 
of the real property in assessed value within the territory, as 
required by § 66.0217(3)(a)1.b.6   
¶7 
DOA issued a nonbinding recommendation in favor of the 
annexation and found it in the "public interest," as defined in 
Wis. Stat. § 66.0217(6)(c).7  DOA determined that the annexation 
                                                 
(a) Direct annexation by one-half approval.  A petition 
for direct annexation may be filed with the city or 
village clerk if it has been signed by either of the 
following: 
1. A number of qualified electors residing in the 
territory subject to the proposed annexation equal to at 
least the majority of votes cast for governor in the 
territory at the last gubernatorial election, and either 
of the following: 
a. The owners of one-half of the land in area within 
the territory. 
b. The owners of one-half of the real property in 
assessed value within the territory. 
6 The parties stipulated that five signatures would be a 
majority of qualified electors.   
7 DOA has a mandatory role to play in annexations "within a 
county having a population of 50,000 or more."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0217(6)(a).  Section 66.0217(6)(c) states that the "public 
interest" is determined after considering:  
1. Whether the governmental services, including zoning, 
to be supplied to the territory could clearly be better 
No. 
2018AP2162   
 
6 
 
was contiguous to the City "via a quarter-quarter sized parcel of 
city-owned territory approximately 650-feet wide." 
¶8 
Shortly thereafter, the City's Common Council adopted 
two ordinances:  one annexing the territory included in the 
Petition and another zoning the land as suburban residential.  
Additionally, the Common Council approved a pre-annexation 
agreement between Kohler and the City.8 
¶9 
The Town filed suit against the City in the circuit court 
and moved for a temporary injunction, which was denied.  The 
parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment regarding the 
validity of the annexation pursuant to Wis. Stat. ch. 66 and the 
rule of reason.  The circuit court denied summary judgment based 
on 
disputed 
issues 
of 
material 
fact 
regarding 
statutory 
                                                 
supplied by the town or by some other village or city 
whose boundaries are contiguous to the territory 
proposed for annexation which files with the circuit 
court a certified copy of a resolution adopted by a two-
thirds vote of the elected members of the governing body 
indicating a willingness to annex the territory upon 
receiving an otherwise valid petition for the annexation 
of the territory. 
2. The shape of the proposed annexation and the 
homogeneity of the territory with the annexing village 
or city and any other contiguous village or city. 
8 As the circuit court noted, the pre-annexation agreement 
reflected the "mutual interest between Kohler and the City in the 
proposed annexation" and was negotiated between City officials and 
Kohler before Kohler filed the Petition.  The agreement established 
mutual obligations of the City and Kohler as it related to the 
proposed annexation.  For example, the City agreed to extend water 
utility to the golf course property, as well as provide police, 
fire, and emergency services to the property.  Kohler agreed to, 
among other things, utilize the City's municipal water service for 
all improvements on the property within three years of development.   
No. 
2018AP2162   
 
7 
 
contiguity, the rule of reason, and the Petition's compliance with 
the procedural requirements set forth in Wis. Stat. § 66.0217.  
The circuit court subsequently granted the City's partial motion 
for summary judgment as to the Petition's compliance with the 
population certification requirement in § 66.0217(5)(a).9  The case 
proceeded to a bench trial.  The trial centered on the Town's claim 
that the annexation was not contiguous and violated the rule of 
reason.   
¶10 In November 2018, the circuit court issued a written 
decision concluding that:  (1) the annexation satisfied the 
statutory contiguity requirement in Wis. Stat. § 66.0217(3); (2) 
the annexation did not violate the rule of reason; and (3) the 
Petition fully complied with the procedural requirements set forth 
in § 66.0217.10  Accordingly, the circuit court dismissed the 
Town's declaratory judgment action in full.  The Town petitioned 
this court to bypass the court of appeals, which we granted.   
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶11 The legislature has conferred broad authority on cities 
and villages to annex unincorporated lands under Chapter 66 of the 
                                                 
9 The City, with the circuit court's permission, filed a 
subsequent motion for partial summary judgment on this issue. 
10 The circuit court "incorporate[d] by reference" its May 
2018 written decision on the City's motion for partial summary 
judgment and noted that the Town did not raise any new issues at 
trial regarding whether the Petition complied with the procedural 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 66.0217.  It concluded that the 
Petition 
"complied 
with 
the 
procedural 
requirements 
of 
§ 66.0217 . . . [and it] was properly noticed and included the 
signatures of five of the six qualified electors and the owners of 
91% of the territory measured by assessed value." 
No. 
2018AP2162   
 
8 
 
Wisconsin Statutes.  See Town of Pleasant Prairie v. City of 
Kenosha, 
75 
Wis. 2d 322, 
326-27, 
249 
N.W.2d 581 
(1977).  
Annexation ordinances have long enjoyed a presumption of validity.  
Id.; see also Town of Lafayette v. City of Chippewa Falls, 70 
Wis. 2d 610, 618, 235 N.W.2d 435 (1975).  A party challenging an 
annexation ordinance bears the burden of overcoming this 
presumption by demonstrating that the circuit court's findings are 
contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the 
evidence.  Town of Waukechon v. City of Shawano, 53 Wis. 2d 593, 
596, 193 N.W.2d 661 (1972).   
¶12 In order to resolve the Town's contention that the 
annexation is not contiguous and that the Petition failed to comply 
with the procedural requirements set forth in Wis. Stat. § 66.0217, 
we engage in statutory interpretation.  Statutory interpretation 
is a question of law that we review de novo.  Horizon Bank, Nat'l 
Ass'n v. Marshalls Point Retreat LLC, 2018 WI 19, ¶28, 380 Wis. 2d 
60, 908 N.W.2d 797.   
¶13 We also review the circuit court's application of the 
rule of reason, a doctrine designed to determine whether the power 
delegated to cities and villages under Chapter 66 has been abused 
under the facts and circumstances of a given case.  See Town of 
Pleasant Prairie, 75 Wis. 2d at 326-27.  To pass muster under the 
rule of reason, an annexation must satisfy three requirements:   
(1) exclusions and irregularities in boundary lines must 
not be the result of arbitrariness; (2) some reasonable 
present or demonstrable future need for the annexed 
property must be shown; and (3) no other factors must 
exist which would constitute an abuse of discretion on 
the part of the municipality. 
No. 
2018AP2162   
 
9 
 
Town of Menasha v. City of Menasha, 170 Wis. 2d 181, 189, 488 
N.W.2d 104 (Ct. App. 1992).  A failure to satisfy any one of the 
prongs renders an annexation arbitrary, capricious, and invalid.  
Town of Lafayette, 70 Wis. 2d at 625.   
¶14 We accept the circuit court's factual determinations 
regarding the rule of reason unless they are clearly erroneous.  
Town of Baraboo v. Village of West Baraboo, 2005 WI App 96, ¶19, 
283 Wis. 2d 479, 699 N.W.2d 610.  "Whether the undisputed facts 
meet the legal standards of the rule of reason presents a question 
of law, which we review de novo . . . ."  Id. 
¶15 Lastly, we review the circuit court's grant of summary 
judgment as to the Petition's compliance with the population 
certification requirement in Wis. Stat. § 66.0217(5)(a) using the 
same methodology as the circuit court.  Green Spring Farms v. 
Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 314-15, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987).  Summary 
judgment shall be granted where the record demonstrates "that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2).    
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶16 We first address the Town's claim that the annexation 
does not meet the statutory contiguity requirement, as set forth 
in Wis. Stat. § 66.0217(3) and interpreted by this court in Mt. 
Pleasant I and its progeny.  Town of Mt. Pleasant, Racine Cty. v. 
City of Racine, Racine Cty., 24 Wis. 2d 41, 127 N.W.2d 757 (1964) 
("Mt. Pleasant I").  We next discuss the rule of reason and 
determine whether it voids the annexation at issue in this case.  
No. 
2018AP2162   
 
10 
 
Finally, we consider the Town's procedural challenges to the 
Petition as they relate to the signature requirement in 
§ 66.0217(3) and the population certification requirement in 
§ 66.0217(5)(a). 
A.  Contiguity 
¶17 The Town asserts that the annexed territory is not 
contiguous to the City and therefore the annexation ordinance 
should be invalidated.  Wisconsin Stat. § 66.0217(3) allows 
property owners to annex territory that is "contiguous to a city 
or village."11  (Emphasis added.)  "Contiguous" should be construed 
according to its "common and approved usage unless a different 
definition has been designated by the statutes."  State v. Curiel, 
227 Wis. 2d 389, 404, 597 N.W.2d 697 (1999); see also Wis. Stat. 
§ 990.01(1).  The term "contiguous" is not defined in Chapter 66 
of the Wisconsin Statutes.   
¶18 To determine the definition of "contiguous" as it 
relates to Wis. Stat. § 66.0217(3), we look to the substantial 
amount of case law that addresses the term's meaning and 
application.  "Although finding a single, precise definition of 
'contiguous' is difficult, one may discern a trend in Wisconsin's 
courts to require at minimum some significant degree of physical 
contact between the properties in question."  Town of Delavan v. 
                                                 
11 Along with the statutory contiguity requirement, Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0217 outlines the procedures related to preparation, notice, 
circulation, and filing of such petitions.  Direct annexation by 
one-half approval, the procedure followed by Kohler, requires 
strict compliance.  § 66.0217(3); see Town of Burke v. City of 
Madison, 225 Wis. 2d 615, 625, 593 N.W.2d 822 (Ct. App. 1999).   
No. 
2018AP2162   
 
11 
 
City of Delavan, 176 Wis. 2d 516, 528, 500 N.W.2d 268 (1993) 
(emphasis added) (citing City of Waukesha v. Salbashian, 128 
Wis. 2d 334, 352 n.5, 382 N.W.2d 52 (1986)) (referencing one 
dictionary definition of contiguous:  "touching along boundaries 
often for considerable distances" but stating that "[f]or the 
purposes of this decision, we define contiguous as touching or 
adjoining."); Town of Waukechon, 53 Wis. 2d at 597 (describing the 
proposed annexation as "contiguous to the city for its entire 575-
foot width").  We recognize that each case is fact-specific, and 
therefore we decline to define contiguity using a numerical 
threshold.  
¶19 We have rejected the adoption of a broader definition of 
contiguous that includes territory near to, but not actually 
touching, a municipality.  See Town of Delavan, 176 Wis. 2d at 
528-29 (declining the City's request to adopt "a broader definition 
of 'contiguous' that includes territory near to, but not actually 
touching, the annexing municipality," as it would "place distant 
lakeshore property owners at risk of being annexed by neighboring 
municipalities").  However, we acknowledge that there can be 
situations where contiguous "does not always mean the land must be 
touching."  Town of Lyons v. City of Lake Geneva, 56 Wis. 2d 331, 
336, 202 N.W.2d 228 (1972).  For example, in Town of Lyons, we 
determined that a 23-foot public road separating the City limits 
from the boundary of the annexed land was "close enough to the 
city limits to be contiguous" because "a public road should not 
destroy the concept of 'contiguous' regardless of ownership."  Id.;  
see also Town of Delavan, 176 Wis. 2d at 530 (recognizing that a 
No. 
2018AP2162   
 
12 
 
1.5-acre parcel of land separated from the land sought to be 
annexed by 400 feet of water was not contiguous, but that the 
"trivial lack of contiguity [was] insufficient to void the 
annexation" given the "unique facts of th[e] particular case"). 
¶20 The Town presents side-by-side maps to support its 
assertion that the annexation in this case is "virtually identical" 
to the annexation invalidated in Mt. Pleasant I, 24 Wis. 2d 41.  
In Mt. Pleasant I, a private party sought to connect its land to 
the Racine city limits by a corridor approximately 1,705 feet long, 
varying in width from approximately 152 to 306 feet.  Id. at 43.  
The land physically touched the Racine city limits only at the 
southwest corner by a 153-foot-wide corridor.  Id. at 43-44.  The 
Mt. Pleasant I court focused its discussion of contiguity on the 
validity of "corridor" or "strip" annexations, intended by 
developers to attach land to a city to obtain services, but which 
"in reality are no more than isolated areas connected by means of 
a technical strip a few feet wide."  Id. at 45-46.   
¶21 Because of the lack of Wisconsin authority regarding the 
validity of these annexations, the Mt. Pleasant I court looked to 
out-of-state authority for guidance.  Id. at 45.  Four of the five 
out-of-state cases cited in Mt. Pleasant I involved voided 
annexations with a border of less than 100 feet between the 
annexing municipality and the annexed territory.  See Potvin v. 
Village of Chubbuck, 284 P.2d 414, 415 (Idaho 1955) (corridor strip 
was five feet wide); Clark v. Holt, 237 S.W.2d 483, 484 (Ark. 1951) 
(border was 50 feet wide); State ex rel. Danielson v. Village of 
Mound, 48 N.W.2d 855, 858-59 (Minn. 1951) ("100-foot wide railroad 
No. 
2018AP2162   
 
13 
 
right of way which extends about five-eighths of a mile"); State 
ex rel. Fatzer v. Kansas City, 222 P.2d 714, 720 (Kan. 1950) (of 
the land annexed, "only 82 feet touches the city limits of Kansas 
City").12     
¶22 Here, unlike in Mt. Pleasant I, the annexed territory 
shares a common boundary with the City of 650 feet, which is more 
than only a "technical strip a few feet wide."13  The degree of 
physical contact between the City and the territory is over four 
times that of the border connecting the City with the annexed 
territory in Mt. Pleasant I and involves a significant degree of 
physical contact between the properties.  See Town of Waukechon, 
53 Wis. 2d at 597 ("The Town of Waukechon attempts to analogize 
[Mt. Pleasant I] with the instant action.  We see no similarity 
between the cases.  The area of proposed annexation herein is 
rectangular and is contiguous to the city for its entire 575-foot 
width."); see also Town of Lyons, 56 Wis. 2d at 336 ("In the Mt. 
Pleasant Case, we held land was not contiguous because only a small 
part of it touched the city.")  Based on the facts of this case, 
                                                 
12 The fifth case, People ex rel. Village of Worth v. Ihde, 
177 N.E.2d 313 (Ill. 1961), involved annexation to a highway which 
also likely involved a border of less than 100 feet. 
13 The City, DOA, and the circuit court all cited Mt. Pleasant 
II in their discussion of contiguity, despite the fact that the 
contiguity of the annexation was not at issue in that case.  Town 
of Mt. Pleasant v. City of Racine, 28 Wis. 2d 519, 524, 137 
N.W.2d 656 (1965) ("Mt. Pleasant II") ("Respondent does not attack 
the ordinance on the ground that the territory lacks sufficient 
contiguity as was done in the first Mt. Pleasant v. Racine Case."). 
No. 
2018AP2162   
 
14 
 
we conclude that the annexation satisfies the statutory contiguity 
requirement in Wis. Stat. § 66.0217(3). 
¶23 We observe that when the Mt. Pleasant I court stated 
that it relied upon "application thereto of the rule of reason" to 
reach its conclusion regarding statutory contiguity, 24 Wis. 2d at 
47, it blurred the statutory contiguity and rule of reason 
analyses.  This has caused confusion and conflation of the 
statutory contiguity requirement with the first prong of the rule 
of reason.  See, e.g., Town of Waukechon, 53 Wis. 2d at 597.  We 
clarify that contiguity is a legislative mandate discrete from the 
first prong of the judicially created rule of reason, which is 
described in detail below. 
B. The Rule of Reason 
¶24 The rule of reason is a "judicially-created doctrine 
courts have applied to assess the validity of annexations," in 
addition to statutory requirements.  Town of Lincoln v. City of 
Whitehall, 2019 WI 37, ¶15 n.10, 386 Wis. 2d 354, 925 N.W.2d 520.  
The rule, also referred to as "the test of reason," has been traced 
back to the 1880s.  See Smith v. Sherry, 50 Wis. 210, 6 N.W. 561, 
564 (1880); see also Town of Fond du Lac v. City of Fond du Lac, 
22 Wis. 2d 533, 541, 126 N.W.2d 201 (1964) (applying the rule of 
reason that was "first announced in Smith v. Sherry").  Wisconsin 
courts have applied the rule of reason in annexation cases for 
over 50 years14 to serve as a check on whether a municipality has 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., Town of Lincoln v. City of Whitehall, 2019 WI 
37, ¶15 n.10, 386 Wis. 2d 354, 925 N.W.2d 520; Town of Delavan v. 
City of Delavan, 176 Wis. 2d 516, 528, 500 N.W.2d 268 (1993); Town 
of Pleasant Prairie v. City of Kenosha, 75 Wis. 2d 322, 327, 249 
No. 
2018AP2162   
 
15 
 
abused its powers of annexation.  Town of Delavan, 176 Wis. 2d at 
538.  The analysis continues to play a role in Wisconsin annexation 
jurisprudence.15 
¶25 An annexation satisfies the rule of reason when three 
requirements are met.  First, exclusions and irregularities in 
boundaries must not be the result of arbitrariness.  Town of 
Pleasant Prairie, 75 Wis. 2d at 327.  Second, some reasonable 
present or demonstrable future need for the annexed property must 
be shown.  Id.  Finally, no other factors must exist which would 
                                                 
N.W.2d 581 (1977); Town of Lafayette v. City of Chippewa Falls, 70 
Wis. 2d 610, 625, 235 N.W.2d 435 (1975); Town of Center v. City of 
Appleton, 70 Wis. 2d 666, 668 n.4, 235 N.W.2d 504 (1975); Town of 
Waukesha v. City of Waukesha, 58 Wis. 2d 525, 532, 206 N.W.2d 585 
(1973).   
15 Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's concurrence would sua 
sponte abolish the rule of reason, despite the parties' request 
that the rule remain intact.  Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's 
concurrence, ¶51.  It is not up to us to make or develop arguments 
on behalf of the parties.  See Industrial Risk Insurers v. American 
Eng'g Testing, Inc., 2009 WI App 62, ¶25, 318 Wis. 2d 148, 769 
N.W.2d 82 ("[W]e will not abandon our neutrality to develop 
arguments."); State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 647, 492 
N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) ("We cannot serve as both advocate and 
judge."); see also Yorgan v. Durkin, 2006 WI 60, ¶13 n.4, 290 
Wis. 2d 671, 715 N.W.2d 160 ("The proper procedure is to have an 
issue raised, briefed, and argued by the parties before deciding 
it.").  
When asked at oral argument about the value of the rule of 
reason, the City's attorney responded, "the rule of reason protects 
against very, very far out circumstances," and "if we do away with 
the rule of reason there is no check" on such circumstances.  The 
City's attorney further commented:  "I've thought through this a 
lot . . . I've done municipal law for forty years and I think it 
would be a bad thing to do away with the rule of reason." 
No. 
2018AP2162   
 
16 
 
constitute an abuse of discretion.  Id.  We analyze each 
requirement in turn.   
1. 
Arbitrariness 
¶26 The first prong of the rule of reason prohibits 
exclusions and irregularities in boundary lines as a result of 
arbitrariness.  Id.  We have long recognized that "[w]here property 
owners initiate direct annexation, we do not think the municipality 
may be charged with arbitrary action in the drawing of the boundary 
lines."  Town of Lyons, 56 Wis. 2d at 338.  The choice of 
boundaries is generally within the discretion of the private party 
petitioners.  See Town of Pleasant Prairie, 75 Wis. 2d at 342.  
¶27 However, there are two exceptions when boundary lines 
drawn by private party petitioners may be considered impermissibly 
arbitrary.  The first is when the municipality is the "'real 
controlling influence'" in selecting the boundaries.  Town of 
Baraboo, 283 Wis. 2d 479, ¶24 (quoted source omitted).  In that 
situation, "the municipality may be charged with any arbitrariness 
in the boundaries even though the property owners are the 
petitioners."  Town of Lincoln, 386 Wis. 2d 354, ¶15 n.11.  
"'Influencing' the proceedings, in this context, means more than 
providing mere technical assistance or recommendations to the 
petition signers . . . rather, it means conduct by which the 
annexing authority dominates the petitioners so as to have 
effectively selected the boundaries."  Town of Menasha, 170 Wis. 
2d at 192.  In other words, a court may determine there is 
arbitrariness when the annexing municipality acts as a "'puppeteer 
and the petitioners [are it's] puppets dancing on a municipal 
No. 
2018AP2162   
 
17 
 
string.'"  Town of Lincoln, 386 Wis. 2d 354, ¶15 n.11 (quoting 
Town of Waukesha v. City of Waukesha, 58 Wis. 2d 525, 530, 206 
N.W.2d 585 (1973)).   
¶28 Boundaries drawn by a private party may also be 
considered impermissibly arbitrary when the territory subject to 
the proposed annexation is an "exceptional" shape.  See, e.g., 
Town of Pleasant Prairie, 75 Wis. 2d at 342 ("Where the boundaries 
of an otherwise unexceptionable direct annexation are fixed by 
petitioners . . . without the exercise of undue influence by the 
annexing city or village, we see no reason why the petitioners may 
not determine those boundaries so as to insure the annexation's 
success.")(emphasis added); see also Town of Medary v. City of La 
Crosse, 88 Wis. 2d 101, 115-16, 277 N.W.2d 310 (Ct. App. 1979) 
("The rule of reason may, however, be applied to invalidate an 
annexation where the annexation may result in 'gerrymandered' or 
'crazy quilt' municipal boundaries, even when the annexation is 
initiated by a private landowner who sets the boundaries."); Town 
of Menasha, 170 Wis. 2d at 191 & n.3 ("There are some circumstances 
in which the shape of an annexed parcel's boundaries are so 
'irregular' 
in 
shape, 
that 
shape 
alone——apart 
from 
any 
consideration of whether the city was acting as a petitioner——can 
serve to invalidate the annexation ordinance.").  Wisconsin courts 
have recognized that "there is authority for the proposition that 
a court may examine the boundaries of an annexation if it has an 
irregular shape even though the boundaries are determined by the 
No. 
2018AP2162   
 
18 
 
property owners."  Town of Campbell v. City of La Crosse, 2003 WI 
App 247, ¶26, 268 Wis. 2d 253, 673 N.W.2d 696.16   
¶29 However, this second exception is limited to the most 
egregious situations, not mere irregularities in shape, or arm-
like extensions.  See Town of Baraboo, 283 Wis. 2d 479, ¶¶22-23 
                                                 
16 In 1977, this court in Town of Pleasant Prairie, 75 Wis. 2d 
at 342, restated the principle from Mt. Pleasant I that boundaries 
drawn by private party petitioners can be scrutinized for 
arbitrariness, but only where the annexed area is an "exceptional 
shape."  Two years later, in Town of Medary v. City of La Crosse, 
88 Wis. 2d 101, 277 N.W.2d 310 (Ct. App. 1979) and subsequently in 
Town of Menasha v. City of Menasha, 170 Wis. 2d 181, 488 N.W.2d 104 
(Ct. App. 1992), the court of appeals repeated this standard.  In 
Town of Campbell, the court of appeals relied upon "the analysis 
in Town of Pleasant Prairie" to conclude that the general shape of 
an annexation was not open to challenge in an owner-initiated 
annexation.  Town of Campbell v. City of La Crosse, 2003 WI App 
247, ¶¶26-27, 268 Wis. 2d 253, 673 N.W.2d 696.  However, as noted 
above, Town of Pleasant Prairie allows for such scrutiny where the 
annexed area is an "exceptional shape." 
In subsequent cases, the court of appeals analyzed the shape 
of the boundaries drawn by a private party, while also continuing 
to call on this court to clarify the exception, see, e.g., Town of 
Baraboo v. Village of West Baraboo, 2005 WI App 96, ¶23 & n.5, 283 
Wis. 2d 479, 699 N.W.2d 610 (calling on the court to clarify this 
issue, yet concluding the shape of the annexation was not "of a 
kind that removes it from the 'general rule' that owner-petitioned 
annexations should not be invalidated under the first component of 
the rule of reason" because "[i]t is not a shoestring or balloon 
on a stick annexation whereby the Village has relied solely on 
highway right-of-way to 'capture' a distant prized parcel . . ."); 
see also Town of Lincoln v. City of Whitehall, 2018 WI App 33, ¶39 
n.7, 382 Wis. 2d 112, 912 N.W.2d 403 (reversed and remanded on 
other grounds) ("[W]e renew our call for the supreme court to 
clarify the law in this area."). 
We now answer the court of appeals' numerous calls for 
clarification 
and 
reiterate 
that 
private 
party 
initiated 
annexations that are an "exceptional" shape may be reviewed by a 
court under the first prong of the rule of reason.  
No. 
2018AP2162   
 
19 
 
(reasoning that "although it produces an arm-like extension of the 
northern municipal boundary . . . [it] does not violate the first 
component of the rule of reason"); see also Town of Medary, 88 
Wis. 2d at 117 ("While the shape of the annexation is somewhat 
irregular, the irregularity is partly necessitated because of the 
irregularity of the La Crosse city limits along the joint boundary 
of the city . . . [this] is not the extreme crazy-quilt or 
shoestring annexation disapproved in Mt. Pleasant.")   
¶30 In this case, as to the first exception, the circuit 
court found that "[t]here is absolutely no evidence in the record 
supporting any claim that the City selected the boundaries for the 
Kohler annexation."  Instead, the record shows that Kohler alone 
selected the territory to be included in the Petition, prepared 
the annexation map, and drew the boundary lines.  The circuit court 
found that "the City had no input or involvement whatsoever in 
determining the boundaries for the annexation."17  The circuit 
court's factual findings regarding the lack of proof are sufficient 
and legally support the conclusion that the City did not act as a 
"controlling influence" that orchestrated the annexation.   
¶31 As to the second exception, this annexation is not an 
exceptional shape.  The boundaries in this case are not the type 
                                                 
17 The Town asserts that the City's involvement in presenting 
Kohler's annexation proposal to the Common Council and in preparing 
a pre-annexation agreement equates to influence or control.  We 
agree with the circuit court that the City merely provided 
technical assistance which does not rise to the level of 
"dominat[ing] the petitioners so as to have effectively selected 
the boundaries."  Town of Menasha, 170 Wis. 2d at 192.  
No. 
2018AP2162   
 
20 
 
of exceptional "gerrymandered" or "crazy quilt" boundaries 
disapproved of in Mt. Pleasant I.  See Town of Baraboo, 283 
Wis. 2d 479, ¶¶22-23 (distinguishing the annexation at issue from 
a "shoestring" or "balloon on a stick" annexation whereby the 
Village sought to "'capture' a distant prized parcel").  The 
territory is 1,450 feet wide at certain points, which is almost 
five times the widest dimension in the Mt. Pleasant I annexation.  
Additionally, the configuration is also far more substantial in 
its dimensions than the isolated rural area that was connected by 
a technical strip in Mt. Pleasant I.  We agree with the circuit 
court that "[t]he overall shape and appearance of the Kohler 
annexation is [] not so arbitrary or unreasonable that it can or 
should be invalidated." 
¶32 Based on the circuit court's findings of fact, which are 
supported by ample evidence, we conclude that the boundary lines 
are not impermissibly arbitrary under the first prong of the rule 
of reason.  
 
 
2. 
Reasonable Present or Future Demonstrable Need 
¶33 Under the second prong of the rule of reason, we assess 
whether there is "some reasonable present or demonstrable future 
need for the annexed territory."  Town of Pleasant Prairie, 75 
Wis. 2d at 334.  "To sustain the validity of an annexation the 
annexing municipality need not have a pressing, imperative need 
for the territory.  A showing of a reasonable need for the 
No. 
2018AP2162   
 
21 
 
annexation will be sufficient to sustain annexation."  Id. at 
335.18   
¶34 This court has considered a number of factors when 
determining the needs of the annexing municipality including:  
"'(1) A substantial increase in population; (2) a need for 
additional area for construction of homes . . . ; (3) a need for 
additional land area to accommodate the present or reasonably 
anticipated future growth of the municipality; . . . (4) the 
extension of police, fire, sanitary protection or other municipal 
services . . . .'"  Town of Sugar Creek v. City of Elkhorn, 231 
Wis. 2d 473, 482, 605 N.W.2d 274 (Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Town of 
Lafayette, 70 Wis. 2d at 626); see also Town of Pleasant Prairie, 
75 Wis. 2d at 335-36.  This list is not exhaustive as there are 
other factors which courts may deem relevant depending upon the 
particular facts of each case.   
¶35 When the petition is initiated by a private party, as in 
the instant case, the court must also consider the petitioner's 
desire to be located in a particular municipality.  Town of Sugar 
Creek, 231 Wis. 2d at 483.  We have consistently given great weight 
to the desire of property owners to seek annexation in pursuit of 
                                                 
18 A court's assessment of whether there is a reasonable need 
for the annexation is not an independent evaluation of the best 
interest of the parties.  Town of Lyons v. City of Lake Geneva, 56 
Wis. 2d 331, 338, 202 N.W.2d 228 (1972); see also Town of Medary, 
88 Wis. 2d at 122-23 (reasoning that a municipality "is in no 
position to negotiate or pick and choose" when a petition is 
presented because the statute "does not make any provision for a 
city to annex only that portion of territory . . . for which it 
has a need.  It must annex all of the territory or none of it.").  
No. 
2018AP2162   
 
22 
 
their own perceived best interests.  See Town of Pleasant Prairie, 
75 Wis. 2d at 329; see also Town of Waukesha, 58 Wis. 2d at 533 
(reasoning that the wishes of a private party petitioning for 
annexation "are relevant as well as the need of the municipality 
to annex"); Town of Campbell, 268 Wis. 2d 253, ¶31 (observing that 
in past decisions we have "consider[ed] the needs of the annexed 
territory along with the needs of the annexing municipality in 
concluding that the need component is met").  When considering a 
property owner's desire to annex property, we incorporate other 
factors like "the applicable zoning ordinances, development goals, 
and available services into its determination of need."  Town of 
Delavan, 176 Wis. 2d at 539.   
¶36 The circuit court made detailed findings in its written 
decision regarding the City's need and Kohler's desire for 
annexation.  In determining whether the City showed a present or 
demonstrable future need for the annexed territory, the circuit 
court observed that "[t]he most obvious example is in the expansion 
of residential housing . . . .  Annexation further provides the 
City with the ability to achieve its long term economic planning 
and goals."  See Town of Lyons, 56 Wis. 2d at 338 (recognizing a 
city's reasonable need for land which could be zoned residential).  
The City had planned for years to develop and expand and Kohler's 
proposal provided the opportunity to do so.  See Town of Waukechon, 
53 Wis. 2d at 599 (recognizing that "the city has a comprehensive 
city plan which calls for residential development to the south of 
the city").  Therefore, the circuit court concluded that the 
"City's desire to effect a reasonable and orderly plan for 
No. 
2018AP2162   
 
23 
 
municipal expansion, development and economic growth satisfy the 
need requirement under the rule of reason."  
¶37 The circuit court also detailed the reasons Kohler wanted 
its property to be annexed to the City:  to overcome the Town 
Board's opposition to the intended golf course development and to 
assure that the golf course would receive a sufficient source of 
water.  The circuit court described Kohler's predicament with the 
Town as follows:  "the Town Board members historically opposed the 
golf course development . . . [and] . . . Kohler reasonably 
believed that [the Town Board] would not take a different approach 
when it came time to . . . vote on Kohler's application for a 
conditional use permit."   
¶38 The circuit court further weighed Kohler's concern that 
the Town is incapable of providing water for the golf course 
development.  Kohler had determined that it would benefit from the 
availability of the City's municipal water source because it 
"ensured that there would be sufficient water available" for all 
of the buildings constructed in conjunction with the golf course.  
The availability of municipal water for the City's full-time fire 
department additionally "provided Kohler with better fire 
protection . . . than the Town's volunteer fire department."  The 
circuit court's factual findings on the City's needs and Kohler's 
desires for the annexation are amply supported by the evidence and 
therefore we conclude that the second prong of the rule of reason 
is satisfied.  
3.  Other Factors That Constitute an Abuse of Discretion 
No. 
2018AP2162   
 
24 
 
¶39 Finally, we consider whether there are other factors 
that would constitute an abuse of discretion under the third prong 
of the rule of reason.  Town of Pleasant Prairie, 75 Wis. 2d at 
327.  Under this prong, we "consider evidence that the municipality 
abused its discretion for reasons other than those considered under 
the first two components."  Town of Campbell, 268 Wis. 2d 253, 
¶37.   
¶40 The Town asserts that the City abused its discretion by 
simply rubber-stamping the annexation and agreeing to support the 
golf course development "simply to get more money."  The circuit 
court found, however, that "none of the facts or reasons given by 
the Town show the City abused its discretion in enacting the 
ordinance.  Initially, many of the alleged 'bad acts' which the 
Town identifies are taken out of context and unsupported by the 
factual record."19  The record includes evidence of lengthy 
                                                 
19 Some of these "facts" considered by the circuit court 
include: 
 Sheboygan's employees began lobbying for this golf 
course development even before it knew what other 
properties would be included in the annexation 
(i.e., support the golf course regardless of any 
other issues or needs); 
 Sheboygan allowed Kohler to write and even dictate 
the advocacy position for the golf course, both to 
its officials and the DOA; 
 Sheboygan knew this plan was "controversial" and 
could not be supported by references to its 
Comprehensive Plan, and asked Kohler to provide 
justifications for it; 
 Sheboygan had no concern about ripping this land 
use conditional use permit decision away from the 
No. 
2018AP2162   
 
25 
 
deliberations by City officials regarding the annexation, which 
supports 
the 
circuit 
court's 
finding 
that 
"City 
officials . . . conducted a thorough analysis of the petition 
before recommending it to the Common Council for adoption."  The 
City's actions were aimed at effectuating the annexation requested 
by Kohler and were consistent with Kohler's expressed desire to 
develop its land into a world championship golf course.  See 
Sanitary Dist. No. 4-Town of Brookfield v. City of Brookfield, 
2009 WI App 47, ¶21, 317 Wis. 2d 532, 767 N.W.2d 316 ("The City's 
actions . . . were always consistent with, and in furtherance of, 
the property owner's expressed desire.  The property owners 
initiated the annexation proceeding and were assisted by the City 
to accomplish that intent.").  The circuit court's findings of 
fact are amply supported by the evidence and therefore we conclude 
that the Town failed to demonstrate any abuse of discretion under 
the third prong of the rule of reason.  We conclude that the 
annexation satisfies all three prongs of the rule of reason.  
 
C.  Signature Requirement 
¶41 The Town asserts that because the territory included a 
large amount of state and city-owned land with no assessed value, 
the 
Petition 
failed 
to 
afford 
property 
owners 
with 
the 
representative power to veto a proposed annexation as intended by 
Wis. Stat. § 66.0217(3)(a)1. 
                                                 
Town and residents that surround the subject 
parcel. 
No. 
2018AP2162   
 
26 
 
¶42 Wisconsin Stat. § 66.0217(3)(a)1. provides, in relevant 
part:  
(a) Direct annexation by one-half approval.  A petition 
for direct annexation may be filed with the city or 
village clerk if it has been signed by either of the 
following: 
1. A number of qualified electors residing in the 
territory subject to the proposed annexation equal 
to at least the majority of votes cast for governor 
in the territory at the last gubernatorial 
election, and either of the following: 
a. The owners of one-half of the land in area 
within the territory. 
b. The owners of one-half of the real property 
in assessed value20 within the territory.   
(Emphasis added.)  
¶43 The Town acknowledges that, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0217(3)(a)1.b., non-assessed state and city-owned parcels of 
land are excluded in calculating the amount of signatures required 
to approve annexation.  The Town concedes that the Petition 
included signatures for over one-half of the owners of real 
property in assessed value within the territory, and thus comports 
with the plain language of § 66.0217(3)(a)1.b.  See State ex rel. 
Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 ("[W]e have repeatedly held that 
statutory interpretation 'begins with the language of the statute.  
                                                 
20 "Assessed value," as defined by Wis. Stat. § 66.0217(1)(a), 
is "the value for general tax purposes as shown on the tax roll 
for the year next preceding the filing of any petition for 
annexation."    
No. 
2018AP2162   
 
27 
 
If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the 
inquiry.'" (quoted source omitted)).  
¶44 The Town asserts, however, that the City circumvented 
the intent of Wis. Stat. § 66.0217(3)(a)1. when it failed to 
include hundreds of acres of non-assessed state and city-owned 
property to determine the signature requirement.  The Town argues 
that where the proposed annexation includes a large amount of non-
assessed land, as in the instant case, the petitioner should be 
forced to calculate the number of signatures needed by units of 
acreage pursuant to § 66.0217(3)(a)1.a.  According to the Town, 
the omission of State-owned parcels from the calculation 
"artificially weighs against the rights of those representing the 
petitioned territory to voice their choice for or against 
initiation of annexation proceeding."  The Town admits that this 
is a "new, novel, issue of law" but argues that the omission of 
the state and city-owned land otherwise defeats the purpose of 
§ 66.0217(3).  
¶45 The Town's argument that a petitioner should be required 
to use one method of calculation over another is a policy argument 
and has no support in the statutory language.  See Flynn v. DOA, 
216 Wis. 2d 521, 529, 576 N.W.2d 245 (1998) ("It is for the 
legislature to make policy choices, ours to judge them based not 
on our preference but on legal principles . . . .").  It is 
undisputed that the Petition included the signatures of the owners 
of 91 percent of the territory measured by assessed value, thus 
complying with the requirements set forth in Wis. Stat. 
No. 
2018AP2162   
 
28 
 
§ 66.0217(3)(a)1.a.  We therefore conclude that the Petition 
complied with § 66.0217(3)(a)1.   
D. 
Population Certification Requirement 
¶46 Finally, the Town asserts that the Petition failed to 
certify the population count in accordance with Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0217(5)(a), which provides: 
The petition shall also specify the population of the 
territory. In this paragraph, "population" means the 
population of the territory as shown by the last federal 
census, by any subsequent population estimate certified 
as acceptable by the department or by an actual count 
certified as acceptable by the department.   
(Emphasis added.)   
¶47 At the circuit court, the Town asserted that DOA failed 
to issue a certification of Kohler's population count, "either by 
written affirmation or otherwise."  The circuit court granted the 
City's partial summary judgment motion on the issue, concluding 
that the "undisputed facts in the present case demonstrate that 
Kohler's petition complied with the population requirement in Wis. 
Stat. § 66.0217(5)(a)."  The circuit court relied in part on two 
affidavits submitted by DOA employee Erich Schmidtke.  Schmidtke 
conducted the review of the Petition and averred that by accepting 
the petition for a public interest review, DOA "certified" or 
confirmed that the Petition satisfied this requirement.   
¶48 Schmidtke explained that when there is no federal census 
information, DOA employs a multi-step process to "certify as 
acceptable" 
the 
population 
estimate 
or 
actual 
population 
incorporated within a petition.  This process includes obtaining 
population information from (1) the annexation petition; (2) the 
No. 
2018AP2162   
 
29 
 
"Request for Annexation Review" form; and (3) an "Annexation Review 
Questionnaire" that the annexing city or village and the annexee 
town file with DOA.  Schmidtke stated that he relied on population 
information in the Request for Annexation Review form and the 
petition document,21 and noted that the City and Town also included 
population information in their Annexation Review Questionnaires.  
After "finding that the population requirement . . . was complied 
with, the Department accepted the petition for its review."  Based 
on Schmidtke's averments, the circuit court found that Schmidtke 
"completed the 'process' in which the DOA engages in order to 
certify as 'acceptable' the population specified in Kohler's 
petition."  
¶49 As determined by the circuit court, the Town failed to 
raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether DOA 
"certified as acceptable" the population in the Petition based on 
its review.  As the circuit court correctly noted, Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0217(5)(a) does not explicitly require DOA to engage in any 
formal, specific process or to audit the population information in 
order to certify a population estimate or actual population count.  
Since it remains undisputed that Schmidtke, on behalf of DOA, 
reviewed the population in the Petition and averred that he 
                                                 
21 In his affidavits, Schmidtke stated that he reviewed the 
Petition for population information; however, it appears that DOA 
never received a copy of the Petition.  The Town is correct that 
DOA received only the Notice of Intention to Circulate an 
Annexation Petition, the Request for Annexation Review, and the 
Annexation Review Questionnaire.   
No. 
2018AP2162   
 
30 
 
certified it as acceptable, we uphold the circuit court's grant of 
partial summary judgment on this issue.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶50  We conclude that the annexation meets the statutory 
contiguity requirement in Wis. Stat. § 66.0217(3) and satisfies 
the rule of reason.  We further conclude that the Petition complied 
with the signature and certification requirements set forth in 
§§ 66.0217(3) and (5)(a).  Therefore, we affirm the circuit court. 
By the Court.—The decision of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
 
No. 
2018AP2162   
 
 
 
1 
No.  2018AP2162.rgb 
1 
 
¶51 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the majority that the annexation of Kohler's land to the City of 
Sheboygan satisfies the contiguity requirement of Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0217(3) (2017-18).1  I also agree the annexation petition 
complied 
with 
the 
signature 
requirement 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 66.0217(3)(a)1 and the Department "certified as acceptable" the 
population specified in the petition as required under Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0217(5)(a) (2017-18).2  I write separately, however, because 
the majority perpetuates the "rule of reason," a judicially created 
doctrine not found in the statutory text.3  I would overturn Town 
of Mt. Pleasant v. City of Racine4 ("Mt. Pleasant I")——the case 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to Wis. Stat. § 66.0217(3) are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 I join parts I, III.C, and III.D of the majority opinion.  
3 See, e.g., Town of Fond du Lac v. City of Fond du Lac, 22 
Wis. 2d 533, 541, 126 N.W.2d 201 (1964) (discussing the origin of 
the principle in cases); Richard W. Cutler, Characteristics of 
Land Required for Incorporation or Expansion of a Municipality, 
1958 Wis. L. Rev. 6, 27–29 (1958) (crediting the rule of reason's 
origin to a 1957 Wisconsin Supreme Court case); Clayton P. 
Gillette, Expropriation and Institutional Design in State and 
Local Government Law, 80 Va. L. Rev. 625, 681 (1994) (discussing 
Mt. Pleasant I and referring to the "judicially created 'rule of 
reason'"); Stephen L. Knowles, Comment, The Rule of Reason in 
Wisconsin Annexations, 1972 Wis. L. Rev. 1125, 1146 (1972) (calling 
the rule of reason a "judicial doctrine"); Walter K. Johnson, The 
Wisconsin Experience with State-Level Review of Municipal 
Incorporations, Consolidations, and Annexations, 1965 Wis. L. Rev. 
462, 474 (1965) (referring to it as the "judicially created 'rule 
of reason'"); Robert D. Zeinemann, Overlooked Linkages Between 
Municipal Incorporation and Annexation Laws:  An In-Depth Look at 
Wisconsin's Experience, 39 Urb. Law. 257, 285 (2007) (describing 
the rule of reason as "made by the courts"); majority op., ¶24 
("The rule of reason is a 'judicially created doctrine[.]'"). 
4 Town of Mt. Pleasant v. City of Racine ("Mt. Pleasant I"), 
24 Wis. 2d 41, 127 N.W.2d 757 (1964). 
No.  2018AP2162.rgb 
2 
 
responsible for grafting the rule of reason onto the statutory 
contiguity requirement for annexation——and abolish the rule of 
reason because the judiciary invaded the exclusive authority of 
the legislature by rewriting the annexation statute to its liking.  
It is "the province and duty of the judicial department to say 
what the law is[,]" and not what we think it should be.  Marbury 
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).  The legislature 
conditioned annexations on contiguity, procedural requirements, 
and nothing more.  This court lacks any authority to modify, tweak 
or supplement the legislature's work.   
I 
¶52 Continuing to apply a judicial doctrine so consistently 
criticized for confusing judges and litigants alike in its meaning 
and application intractably ensconces in our jurisprudence even 
those cases widely recognized to be wrongly decided.  "While 
adhering to precedent is an important doctrine for lending 
stability to the law, not every decision deserves stare decisis 
effect.  After all, the purpose of stare decisis 'is to make us 
say that what is false under proper analysis must nonetheless be 
held to be true, all in the interest of stability.'"  State v. 
Grandberry, 2018 WI 29, ¶86, 380 Wis. 2d 541, 910 N.W.2d 214 
(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) (quoting Antonin Scalia, 
A Matter of Interpretation:  Federal Courts and the Law 138-40 
(1997)).  Besides eternalizing bad law, sustaining judicial 
rewriting of statutes sanctions judicial usurpation of the 
legislative function.  "Reflexively cloaking every judicial 
opinion with the adornment of stare decisis threatens the rule of 
law, 
particularly 
when 
applied 
to 
interpretations 
wholly 
No.  2018AP2162.rgb 
3 
 
unsupported by the statute's text."  Manitowoc Co., Inc. v. 
Lanning, 2018 WI 6, ¶81 n.5, 379 Wis. 2d 189, 906 N.W.2d 130 
(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring).   
¶53 This court has long recognized that multiple factors 
warrant jettisoning wrongly decided precedent:   
(1) Changes or developments in the law have undermined 
the rationale behind a decision; (2) there is a need to 
make a decision correspond to newly ascertained facts; 
(3) there is a showing that the precedent has become 
detrimental to coherence and consistency in the law; (4) 
the prior decision is "unsound in principle;" or (5) the 
prior decision is "unworkable in practice." 
Bartholomew v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund & Compcare Health Ins. 
Corp., 2006 WI 91, ¶33, 293 Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216 (footnote 
omitted).  "The principle of stare decisis does not compel us to 
adhere to erroneous precedents or refuse to correct our own 
mistakes."  State v. Outagamie Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2001 WI 78, 
¶31, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 628 N.W.2d 376.  In determining whether to 
uphold a prior case's statutory interpretation, "[i]t is well to 
keep in mind just how thoroughly [an earlier decision] rewrote the 
statute it purported to construe."  Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 
U.S. 616, 670 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  In adopting the 
rule of reason, Mt. Pleasant I transformed a single word into a 
thorny three-part test requiring judges to inject their subjective 
whim into the analysis rather than applying their objective 
judgment.   
¶54 The first two prongs of the rule ask whether boundaries 
are "arbitrar[y]," or there is a "reasonable" need for the 
property.  See Town of Lafayette v. City of Chippewa Falls, 70 
Wis. 2d 610, 625, 235 N.W.2d 435 (1975).  Drawing the line between 
No.  2018AP2162.rgb 
4 
 
what is rational or arbitrary, and what is reasonable or 
unreasonable, inherently depends on the subjective beliefs of a 
reviewing judge.  It is no wonder why, almost 70 years after the 
creation of the doctrine, nobody knows how it applies or what it 
prohibits.  Regrettably but not surprisingly, the doctrine has 
spawned decades of cases from which no decipherable principle of 
law may be discerned.  See Stephen L. Knowles, Comment, The Rule 
of Reason in Wisconsin Annexations, 1972 Wis. L. Rev. 1125, 1140 
(1972) ("[The rule of reason's] use leads to confusion and invites 
litigation."); Robert D. Zeinemann, Overlooked Linkages Between 
Municipal Incorporation and Annexation Laws:  An In-Depth Look at 
Wisconsin's Experience, 39 Urb. Law. 257, 315-16 (2007) (stating 
that today's rule of reason "is a confusing set of ad hoc and 
oftentimes conflicting opinions" and its jurisprudence is akin to 
"muddy waters").   
¶55 When revisiting a judicial opinion like Mt. Pleasant I, 
which overrode the policy choices of the people's representatives 
in favor of the court's preferences, "courts of last resort are 
duty-bound to correct the prior court's error."  Manitowoc Co., 
Inc., 379 Wis. 2d 189, ¶81 n.5 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., 
concurring); see also Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 
1989 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[W]e should not invoke stare 
decisis to uphold precedents that are demonstrably erroneous.").  
As the court recently recognized, "[w]e do more damage to the rule 
of law by obstinately refusing to admit errors, thereby 
perpetuating 
injustice, 
than 
by 
overturning 
an 
erroneous 
decision."  State v. Roberson, 2019 WI 102, ¶49, 389 Wis. 2d 190, 
935 N.W.2d 813 (quoting Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Emp'rs Ins. of 
No.  2018AP2162.rgb 
5 
 
Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶100, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257).  "If 
the precedent is bad, let it be overruled by all means, or let the 
legislature regulate the matter by statute."  Francis Lieber, On 
Civil Liberty and Self-Government 211 (Theodore D. Woolsey ed., 3d 
ed. 1883).  With respect to annexation, the legislature had 
regulated the matter by statute but that didn't stop the judiciary 
from stepping in to tamper with the legislature's policy choices 
in order to advance its own.  This court should disavow its 
decades-old 
interference 
with 
the 
legislature's 
exclusive 
prerogative to write laws.  
II 
¶56 In Mt. Pleasant I, the court purported to address whether 
the annexation by the City of Racine of property located in the 
Town of Mt. Pleasant "was void because the area proposed to be 
annexed [was] not contiguous to the city of Racine within the 
requirements of sec. 66.021(2)(a)[.]"  Town of Mt. Pleasant v. 
City of Racine, 24 Wis. 2d 41, 45, 127 N.W.2d 757 (1964).  The 
land at issue in Mt. Pleasant I was 145 acres total, including a 
corridor roughly "1,705 feet long, and varying in width from 
approximately 306 feet to 152 feet."  Id. at 43.  At the end of 
this corridor, 153 feet of the annexed area touched the City of 
Racine.  Id. at 44.  On appeal, the court considered whether the 
proposed annexation satisfied the statutory requirement of 
contiguity.  Id. at 45.  At the time of Mt. Pleasant I, Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.021(2)(a) (1961-62)5 contained one substantive requirement 
                                                 
5 All subsequent references to Wis. Stat. § 66.021(2) are to 
the 1961-62 version unless otherwise noted.  
No.  2018AP2162.rgb 
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for annexation:  contiguity.6  The statutory provision at issue 
between the parties in this case retains this sole substantive 
requirement.7   
¶57 The Mt. Pleasant I majority neglected to analyze the 
statutory meaning of "contiguous," a deficit to which the majority 
in this case alludes but nevertheless declines to rectify.  
Majority op., ¶20.  Instead of developing the meaning of 
"contiguous" under the annexation statute, the majority elects to 
distinguish the annexed territory in Mt. Pleasant I from the 
annexed property in this case, based upon the "significant degree 
of physical contact between the properties."  Majority op., ¶22 
(citation omitted).  I agree with the majority's conclusion; giving 
the word its plain meaning, Kohler's property is "contiguous" to 
the City of Sheboygan.  See Contiguous, Black's Law Dictionary 
(11th ed. 2019) ("Touching at a point or along a boundary; 
ADJOINING"). 
                                                 
6 In 1964 the statute provided:   
Methods of annexation.  Territory contiguous to any city 
or village may be annexed thereto in the following ways:   
 (a)Direct Annexation. . . . 
Wis. Stat. § 66.021(2) (emphasis added).  
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 66.0217(3) provides:   
Other 
methods 
of 
annexation. 
 
Subject 
to 
ss. 
66.0301(6)(d) and 66.0307(7), and except as provided in 
sub. (14), territory contiguous to a city or village may 
be annexed to the city or village in the following 
ways:    
(a)Direct annexation by one-half approval. . . . 
(emphasis added). 
No.  2018AP2162.rgb 
7 
 
¶58 In this case, the majority acknowledges "[t]he Mt. 
Pleasant I court focused its discussion of contiguity on the 
validity of 'corridor' or 'strip' annexations," which Mt. Pleasant 
I described as "isolated areas connected by means of a technical 
strip a few feet wide."  Mt. Pleasant I, 24 Wis. 2d at 46; majority 
op., ¶20.  Somewhat ironically, Mt. Pleasant I's concern over 
shoestring or gerrymander annexations was completely untethered to 
the statutory contiguity requirement.  In lieu of ascertaining the 
meaning of "contiguous" under the annexation statute, that court 
supplanted the statutory language altogether in favor of the 
judicially-invented "test of reason."  Mt. Pleasant I, 24 
Wis. 2d at 45–46.  While the legislature imposed but one 
substantive 
requirement——contiguity——the 
judiciary 
fashioned 
three components on which it would condition its approval of an 
annexation:  "(1) Exclusions and irregularities in boundary lines 
must not be the result of arbitrariness; (2) some reasonable 
present or demonstrable future need for the annexed property must 
be shown; and (3) no other factors must exist which would 
constitute an abuse of discretion."  Town of Lafayette, 70 
Wis. 2d at 625 (footnote omitted).  By inquiring whether the 
boundary lines were "reasonable in the sense that they were not 
fixed arbitrarily, capriciously, or in the abuse of discretion[,]" 
the Mt. Pleasant I court abandoned the statutory text altogether, 
instead 
proclaiming 
that 
"[s]hoestring 
or 
gerrymander 
annexation[s]" do not coincide with legislative "intent" as the 
court somehow divined it.  Mt. Pleasant I, 24 Wis. 2d at 46.  
Without any pretense of ascertaining the meaning of "contiguous" 
under the annexation statute, the court held, in conclusory 
No.  2018AP2162.rgb 
8 
 
fashion, that under the extra-textual "rule of reason . . . the 
annexation of the area in question does not meet the statutory 
requirement of contiguity."  Id. at 47. 
¶59 Mt. Pleasant I's determination that the boundary lines 
of the proposed annexation were not "reasonable," i.e., were "fixed 
arbitrarily, capriciously, or in the abuse of discretion[,]" has 
no bearing on whether annexed property is contiguous.  Boundary 
lines could be "fixed arbitrarily" and unreasonable, and 
nevertheless be "contiguous" under the annexation statute.  Rather 
than applying the sole criterion for a lawful annexation——
contiguity——the 
Mt. 
Pleasant 
I 
court 
instead 
introduced 
considerations it found pertinent under its policy predilections, 
but were in fact extraneous to the statutory language.  See Mt. 
Pleasant I, 24 Wis. 2d at 47 (Wilkie, J., dissenting) (citing 
§ 66.021(2)) ("The majority has engrafted onto the statute the 
additional requirement that a proposed annexation is subject to 
review under the 'rule of reason' to determine whether the proposed 
boundary lines are 'reasonable in the sense that they were not 
fixed arbitrarily, capriciously, or in abuse of discretion.'"  
(footnote omitted)).  In doing so, the court crossed the judicial 
boundary of declaring what the law says and intruded on the 
legislature's prerogative to proclaim what the law should be. 
¶60 Grounded in the premise that judges know better than the 
people's representatives, the rule of reason displays judicial 
arrogance at its worst.  See Clayton P. Gillette, Expropriation 
and Institutional Design in State and Local Government Law, 80 Va. 
L. Rev. 625, 681–82 (1994) (noting that implicit in Mt. Pleasant 
I's rationale is "that judicial intervention could provide a more 
No.  2018AP2162.rgb 
9 
 
accurate decision about the propriety of particular annexations"); 
Laurie Reynolds, Rethinking Municipal Annexation Powers, 24 Urb. 
Law. 247, 295 n.185 (1992) ("The . . . rule of reason . . . allows 
wide-ranging judicial inquiry to evaluate the policy decisions 
behind the municipality's annexation."  (citation omitted)).  The 
rule of reason represents a relic of a by-gone era, reflecting the 
long-discredited notion that it was the duty of jurists to "do 
justice."8 
¶61 Mt. Pleasant I also violated a cardinal canon of 
statutory interpretation by adding words (and a lot of them) to 
the statutory text.  "Under the omitted-case canon of statutory 
interpretation, '[n]othing is to be added to what the text states 
or reasonably implies (casus omissus pro omisso habendus est).  
That is, a matter not covered is to be treated as not covered.'"  
Enbridge Energy Co., Inc. v. Dane Cty., 2019 WI 78, ¶23, 387 
Wis. 2d 687, 929 N.W.2d 572 (quoting State ex. rel. Lopez-Quintero 
v. Dittman, 2019 WI 58, ¶18, 387 Wis. 2d 50, 928 N.W.2d 480); see 
also Wisconsin Ass'n of State Prosecutors v. WERC, 2018 WI 17, 
¶45, 380 Wis. 2d 1, 907 N.W.2d 425 ("Nothing is to be added to 
what the text states or reasonably implies[.]"  (quoting Antonin 
Scalia & Brian Garner, Reading Law:  The Interpretation of Legal 
Texts 93 (2012))); Dawson v. Town of Jackson, 2011 WI 77, ¶42, 336 
Wis. 2d 318, 801 N.W.2d 316 ("We decline to read into the statute 
                                                 
8 Reportedly, Judge Learned Hand once implored Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes to "Do Justice!"  As the story goes, Justice Holmes 
responded, "That is not my job.  My job is to play the game 
according to the rules."  See Michael Herz, "Do Justice!":  
Variations of a Thrice-Told Tale, 82 Va. L. Rev. 111, 111 (1996) 
(citing Learned Hand, A Personal Confession, in The Spirit of 
Liberty 302, 306–07 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960)).  
No.  2018AP2162.rgb 
10 
 
words the legislature did not see fit to write."  (citation 
omitted)). 
¶62 The majority in this case does not attempt to dispute 
the existence of statutory contiguity (under its "common, 
ordinary, and accepted meaning")9 in Mt. Pleasant I, nor can it 
identify any language in Wis. Stat. § 66.021(2) even impliedly 
suggesting that the annexation must satisfy the rule of reason, 
nor can it connect the plain meaning of "contiguous" to any element 
of the rule of reason.  See § 66.021(2); majority op., ¶¶20-22 
(discussing  Mt. Pleasant I's 153 foot border, which the Mt. 
Pleasant court held insufficient to meet the statutory contiguity 
requirement, while acknowledging the persuasive authority on which 
it relied set the line at 100 feet).  At least the majority in 
this case acknowledges "that when the Mt. Pleasant I court stated 
that it relied upon 'application thereto of the rule of reason' to 
reach its conclusion regarding statutory contiguity . . . , it 
blurred the statutory contiguity and rule of reason analyses."  
Majority op., ¶23.  The majority also concedes that Mt. Pleasant 
I did not actually interpret the statute but instead added 
additional hurdles proposed annexations must satisfy in order to 
survive judicial scrutiny:  "contiguity is a legislative mandate 
discrete from the first prong of the judicially created rule of 
reason[.]"  Id.   
¶63 Just like its predecessor statute in 1964, Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0217(3) requires only contiguity for annexations.  See 
§ 66.0217(3).  Preventing 
"[s]hoestring 
or 
gerrymander[ed] 
                                                 
9 State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 
58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.   
No.  2018AP2162.rgb 
11 
 
annexations" is a policy matter for the Wisconsin Legislature to 
adopt, not this court.  Mt. Pleasant I blatantly disregarded the 
text of the annexation statute, remade the law to its liking, and 
should be overruled as both "unsound in principle" and "wrongly 
decided."  In this case, I would rely on the plain meaning of the 
annexation statute and consider only whether Kohler's property is 
contiguous to the City of Sheboygan——that is, "[t]ouching at a 
point or along a boundary; ADJOINING"; "neighbouring, in close 
proximity[]"; "touching, in contact; adjoining."  Contiguous, 
Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); Contiguous, Oxford English 
Dictionary (6th ed. 1993).  It is.  The analysis ends there.    
III 
¶64 The "rule of reason" does not enjoy the longevity 
suggested by the majority.  In a passing reference, the majority 
cites Smith v. Sherry, 50 Wis. 210, 6 N.W. 561 (1880), as the 
rule's foundation.  See majority op., ¶24.  Not so.  In Town of 
Fond du Lac v. City of Fond du Lac, 22 Wis. 2d 533, 541, 126 
N.W.2d 201 (1964), the court erroneously declared the rule of 
reason to have been "first announced in Smith v. Sherry[.]"  
Sherry's holding did not create the rule of reason and earlier 
courts twisted its language in order to give the rule a misleading 
lineage.  
¶65 In Sherry, the court considered the validity of the 
Village of Shawano's annexation of non-adjoining property over six 
miles away.  See Sherry, 50 Wis. at 561.  The court held the 
annexation invalid pursuant to Article 11, Section 3 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, which gives the legislature the power to 
organize cities and villages.  Sherry, 50 Wis. at 564.  The 
No.  2018AP2162.rgb 
12 
 
annexation was constitutionally invalid because the property was 
not "adjacent or contiguous" to the Village, not because of 
arbitrary boundary lines or an abuse of discretion.  See Sherry, 
50 Wis. at 564.  The court interpreted cities and villages in 
Article 11, Section 3 to "impl[y] an assemblage of inhabitants 
living in the vicinity of each other and not separated by any other 
intervening civil division of the state."  Id.  Because six miles 
separated the Village from the property in question, Sherry held 
"the territory so admitted to be included . . . is an abuse and 
violation of that provision of section 3, art. 11, of the 
constitution[.]"  Id.  The court concluded by saying that it was 
imposing no constraints on the legislature in fixing boundaries 
for cities or villages, "so long as the territory of which [they 
are] composed is adjacent or contiguous[.]"  Id. at 564-65. 
¶66 Almost fifty years of academic scholarship and cases 
reveal the shaky foundation for the current three-pronged rule of 
reason.  Based solely on improper judicial policy making, the rule 
of reason has no foundation in Sherry or the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  Sherry "has been infrequently cited in the past 
sixty years and misused when it was cited."  Zeinemann, supra ¶54, 
at 277 & n.145 (internal footnote omitted; footnote omitted) 
(explaining courts miscited Sherry for the basis of the current 
rule of reason).  Wisconsin courts have cited Sherry in annexation 
cases only twice since 1975.  For good reason.  "[T]oday's Rule of 
Reason bears little resemblance to the rule from Sherry" and 
"departs from Sherry."  Id. at 278 (footnote omitted); see also 
Knowles, supra ¶54, at 1133 (discussing two weaknesses with the 
rule of reason's purported basis in the constitution).  While the 
No.  2018AP2162.rgb 
13 
 
rule of reason is a limitation on arbitrary actions by 
municipalities, the constitutional provision applied in Sherry is 
a "positive grant of power" allowing municipalities to govern 
themselves.  See Wis. Const. art. 11, § 3 ("Cities and villages 
organized pursuant to state law may determine[.]"); Knowles, supra 
¶54, at 1133 (discussing the same).   
¶67 The expressed purpose for the judicial creation of the 
rule of reason was to effectuate a perceived legislative "intent" 
to prohibit certain annexations.  Mt. Pleasant I, 24 Wis. 2d at 46 
(suggesting that a corridor annexation "does not coincide with 
legislative intent"); see also Richard W. Cutler, Characteristics 
of Land Required for Incorporation or Expansion of a Municipality, 
1958 Wis. L. Rev. 6, 29 (1958) ("Presumably the court interpreted 
the rule of reason as representing legislative intent."  (footnote 
omitted)); Knowles, supra ¶54, at 1139 ("The principal advantage 
of the rule of reason in the contiguity cases is that, at least in 
theory, it may be used to invalidate annexations allowed by the 
statutes but clearly contrary to legislative intent.").  This court 
rightly discarded legislative "intent" as a permissible indicator 
of statutory meaning.  See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court 
for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
("It is the enacted law, not the unenacted intent, that is binding 
on the public."); see also State v. Lopez, 2019 WI 101, ¶39, 389 
Wis. 2d 156, 
936 
N.W.2d 125 
(Rebecca 
Grassl 
Bradley, 
J., 
concurring) ("An interpretation based on what the legislature 
intended a statute to mean is improper."); Winebow, Inc. v. 
Capitol-Husting Co., 2018 WI 60, ¶40, 381 Wis. 2d 732, 914 
N.W.2d 631 
(Rebecca 
Grassl 
Bradley, 
J., 
dissenting) 
No.  2018AP2162.rgb 
14 
 
("[L]egislative intent behind enactment of a law . . . cannot 
govern statutory interpretation.  Rather, our analysis must focus 
on the statutory language itself[.]"); State v. Grandberry, 380 
Wis. 2d 541, ¶55 (Kelly, J., concurring) ("[W]e give effect only 
to what the legislature does, not what it tried to do."  (footnote 
omitted)).   
¶68 Crafting judicial doctrines based on the collective 
intent of a large body relies on the false premise that a 
deliberative body acts with a single purpose.  See John W. 
MacDonald, The Position of Statutory Construction in Present Day 
Law Practice, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 369, 371 (1950) ("[A]nyone who has 
ever dealt with the legislative process knows how conspicuously 
absent is a collective legislative intention."); see also Scalia 
& Garner, Reading Law, supra ¶61, at 391-96 ("[C]ollective intent 
is pure fiction because dozens if not hundreds of legislators have 
their own subjective views on the minutiae of the bills they are 
voting on[.]").  Legislative intent is nothing more than a pretense 
to conceal what the court is actually doing——making law reflecting 
its own biases and policy predilections.  See John F. Manning, 
Without the Pretense of Legislative Intent, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 2397, 
2400, 2406-07 (2017) ("[L]egislative intent is a fiction, 
something judges invoke to elide the fact that they are 
constructing rather than identifying a legislative decision.").  
"It is impossible to find the 'will,' 'design,' 'intent,' or 
'mind' . . . without making some value judgment about what should 
count as that legislature's intended decision and why."  Id. at 
2431 (emphasis in original).  The only foundation upon which the 
No.  2018AP2162.rgb 
15 
 
rule of reason stands, legislative intent, collapsed long ago.10  
There is nothing left upon which the rule can, or should, stand.    
¶69  Mt. Pleasant I was the first case to use the rule of 
reason to invalidate an annexation for lack of contiguity.  
Knowles, supra ¶54, at 1138.  Setting aside the impropriety of the 
court's action, Mt. Pleasant I failed to explain it.  See Walter 
K. Johnson, The Wisconsin Experience with State-Level Review of 
Municipal Incorporations, Consolidations, and Annexations, 1965 
Wis. L. Rev. 462, 479 (1965).  Mt. Pleasant I neglects to explain 
why the annexation was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion, nor does it specify the court-proclaimed "lack of 
reason for the annexation shape."  Id.; see also Mt. Pleasant I, 
24 Wis. 2d at 45–47.  Instead, it substituted its own will for 
that of local officials.  Johnson, supra ¶69, at 479.  
¶70 In this case, the majority elects to continue applying 
the rule of reason, but the rule's incurable flaws prevent the 
majority from contributing any clarity.  With respect to the 
arbitrariness prong of the test, the majority concludes the land 
at issue "is not an exceptional shape[,]" before declaring it is 
not similar to the "boundaries disapproved of in Mt. Pleasant I."  
Majority op., ¶31.  The aerial images provided by the Town of 
Wilson, however, show that the shape of the annexed property is 
almost identical to the annexation's shape in Mt. Pleasant I.  
                                                 
10 Even the great purposivists of their time, Henry Hart and 
Albert Sacks, dismissed the idea of discerning a collective 
legislative intent.  See John F. Manning, Without the Pretense of 
Legislative Intent, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 2397, 2410 (2017) (citing 
Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process 1374 
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., Foundation 
Press 1994) (1958)). 
No.  2018AP2162.rgb 
16 
 
Parties will remain without any guidance in future annexation 
disputes.   
¶71 The other requirements of the rule of reason suffer from 
the same infirmities.  Under the third prong, "no other factors 
must exist which would constitute an abuse of discretion."  Town 
of Pleasant Prairie v. City of Kenosha, 75 Wis. 2d 322, 327, 249 
N.W.2d 581 (1977) (footnote omitted).  What factors rise to the 
level of an abuse of discretion?  Prior decisions shed little light 
on this part of the inquiry.  The majority in this case defines 
the standard as encompassing "reasons other than those considered 
under the first two components."  Majority op., ¶39 (quoted source 
omitted).  Does this mean an annexation reflects an abuse of 
discretion whenever a judge identifies any other reason for 
rejecting the annexation besides arbitrariness or lack of 
reasonable need?  See Manning, supra ¶68, at 2400.  
¶72 The rule of reason does not work because it is not a 
rule of law; it is a mechanism by which the judiciary exercises 
not its judgment but its will.  The majority and Justice Hagedorn's 
concurrence both suggest the court acquiesce to the parties' 
requests to retain the rule of reason.  See majority op., ¶24 n.15. 
(noting the "parties' request that the rule remain intact[]"); 
Justice Hagedorn's concurrence, ¶78 (with respect to "discarding 
the rule of reason . . . . the parties . . . expressly asked us 
not to do so.")  Litigants, of course, advocate for decisions 
benefitting their interests.  Judges, however, have an independent 
duty to say what the law is, regardless of what the parties may 
wish it to be.  See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.  The majority 
mischaracterizes abolishing the rule of reason as "abandon[ing] 
No.  2018AP2162.rgb 
17 
 
our neutrality to develop arguments."  See majority op., ¶24 n.15 
(quoted source omitted).  Overturning a law the court had no 
authority to invent is not abandoning neutrality; it is our 
judicial role and our responsibility to ensure we exercise only 
judicial and not legislative power.  See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
at 177.  If parties ask us to usurp the role of the legislature, 
we must decline.  The City's arguments in favor of retaining the 
rule of reason may be valid, but they are arguments properly made 
before the legislature, not the bench.  It "is the obligation of 
the Judiciary . . . to confine itself to its proper role[.]"  
Koschkee v. Taylor, 2019 WI 76, ¶54, 387 Wis. 2d 552, 929 
N.W.2d 600 (quoting City of Arlington v. F.C.C., 569 U.S. 290, 327 
(2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)).  The proper judicial role 
does not include "reweigh[ing] the policy choices of the 
legislature."  Mayo v. Wisconsin Injured Patients and Families 
Comp. Fund, 2018 WI 78, ¶¶26, 40, 383 Wis. 2d 1, 914 N.W.2d 678.  
Because jurists are not policy makers, this court should apply the 
annexation law as enacted by the legislature and shed the rule of 
reason from the contiguity analysis.    
¶73 The majority proposes the "proper procedure" would be to 
wait for the parties to raise the issue before deciding it.  See 
majority op., ¶24 n.15 (quoted source omitted).  The parties in 
this case did raise the rule of reason, asking us to apply it.  If 
in the course of adjudicating a controversy, we discover we lack 
any authority to apply a law, we are duty-bound to say so.  Cf. 
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (abrogating Korematsu 
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), even though neither party 
sought it, but simply because the dissent's invocation "afford[ed] 
No.  2018AP2162.rgb 
18 
 
th[e] Court the opportunity to make express . . . Korematsu was 
gravely wrong the day it was decided . . . and . . . 'has no place 
in law[.]'"  (quoted source omitted)).  The essence of the judicial 
function is not to fashion law based on our policy preferences, 
but the "duty to correctly 'expound' it."  Gamble v. United States, 
139 S. Ct. 1960, 1982 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting 
Letter from J. Madison to N. Trist (Dec. 1831), in 9 The Writings 
of James Madison 477 (G. Hunt ed. 1910) (Writings of Madison)); 
see also Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 
17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 23, 26 (1994) ("[A] vital part of the 
judicial task is to determine whether a claimed source of 
law . . . may be inapplicable . . . because it conflicts with some 
hierarchically superior legal source.").  Just as the Constitution 
reigns supreme over statutory law, so too does statutory law trump 
judicial policy making.11  With respect to the rule of reason, 
"[w]e should get out of this area, where we have no right to be, 
and where we do neither ourselves nor the [state] any good by 
remaining."  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 1002 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in 
part and dissenting in part).  Because its creation reflects 
improper overreaching by the judiciary, we should abandon the rule 
of reason, regardless of the consequences.12 
                                                 
11 See Justice Hagedorn's concurrence, ¶¶76-77 (acknowledging 
the rule of reason is "judicial policy-making" and the "rule of 
judges" instead of the "rule of law[,]" but nevertheless applying 
it as "a fair statement and application of" the doctrine.   
12 Justice Hagedorn's concurrence recommends a "full hearing 
on the merits of this important issue" in order to "ensure that we 
are not missing anything" and to identify "the consequences of our 
decision" before deciding whether to discard the rule of reason.  
Justice Hagedorn's concurrence, ¶78.  Continuing to tread on the 
No.  2018AP2162.rgb 
19 
 
IV 
¶74 I agree with the majority in concluding that the 
annexation of Kohler's property by the City of Sheboygan satisfied 
the contiguity requirement under Wis. Stat. § 66.0217(3).  I cannot 
join the majority's analysis because its continued adherence to 
the rule of reason perpetuates a non-textual interpretation of our 
annexation statute, gives life to the antiquated notion of 
legislative "intent," and validates judicial policy making.  
Because I would overturn Mt. Pleasant I, abolish the rule of 
reason, and determine contiguity based solely on the text of the 
annexation statute, I respectfully concur.  
¶75 I am authorized to state that Justice DANIEL KELLY joins 
this concurrence. 
 
 
                                                 
exclusive province of the legislature in the interests of prudence 
elevates the consequences of our decision making over the statutory 
text.  "But it is precisely because people differ over what is 
sensible and what is desirable that we elect those who will write 
our laws——and expect courts to observe what has been written."  
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:  The Interpretation 
of Legal Texts 22 (2012).  When this court created the rule of 
reason, it observed what the legislature had written, decided it 
didn't like it, and replaced the statutory text with what the court 
deemed to be a preferable test.  Regardless of the consequences, 
such an invasion of the legislative's prerogative should not stand. 
No.  2018AP2162.bh 
 
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¶76 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (concurring).  The majority opinion 
is a fair statement and application of the analytical framework 
our cases have announced.  That's the good news, and the reason I 
join the majority.  The bad news is that our cases are about as 
straightforward as a Halloween corn maze, and employ interpretive 
principles that should strike terror into everyone committed to 
the rule of law rather than the rule of judges.   
¶77 In a tour de force, Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's 
concurrence lays out the manifold problems with the rule of reason.  
It reminds me of the two rules Justice Neil Gorsuch tells his law 
clerks.  The first rule is, "Don't make stuff up."  The second 
rule is, "When people beg, and say, 'Oh the consequences are so 
important,' and when they say, 'You're a terrible, terrible person 
if you don't,' just refer back to Rule No. 1."1  A casual read-
through of our cases creating, modifying, and applying the rule of 
reason leads to the discomforting notion that the "legal test" the 
judiciary has superimposed onto annexation challenges is nothing 
more than a fancy-sounding façade for the real agenda:  judicial 
policy-making pretending to be law. 
¶78 With that said, I have one bit of pause before officially 
saying so and discarding the rule of reason from our jurisprudence.  
Namely, the parties did not ask us to go there, and in oral 
argument, expressly asked us not to do so.  Eliminating the rule 
of reason would be a significant change in our doctrine.  Before 
taking this step, I believe we would be best served by adversarial 
                                                 
1 https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-high-courts-rocky-
mountain-originalist-11567792378. 
No.  2018AP2162.bh 
 
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briefing and argument.  A full hearing on the merits of this 
important issue would help ensure that we are not missing anything 
and that the consequences of our decision are fully fleshed out 
beforehand.  Therefore, I join the majority, but would welcome an 
opportunity to revisit the rule of reason. 
 
No.  2018AP2162.bh 
 
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