Title: Covil v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Lemons and 
Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
DEMETRIUS COVIL 
            OPINION BY 
 
 
 
SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 
 
v.  Record No. 040036          November 5, 2004 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
This appeal involves the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the grand larceny conviction of a person found in 
possession of recently stolen property who was known not to be 
the original thief. Pursuant to familiar principles, the 
evidence will be summarized in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial. 
 
On April 8, 2002, Tanya M. Bray rented a red Oldsmobile 
Alero from a car rental company in Virginia Beach. On the 14th 
of that month, she left her workplace in Portsmouth at 
approximately 7:30 a.m., entered the rental car and started 
the engine. A man unknown to her approached the car and took 
it from her at gunpoint. 
 
Two days later, at 6:10 p.m., Detective T. McAndrew of 
the Portsmouth police was on routine patrol when he saw 
Demetrius Covil, whom he knew from previous encounters, 
driving a red Alero eastbound on Duke Street. Knowing that 
Covil’s driver’s permit was suspended, McAndrew followed him. 
Covil made a right turn and then stopped voluntarily. Learning 
 
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that the Alero had been reported stolen, McAndrew arrested 
Covil and charged him with grand larceny of the vehicle.  
Covil was subsequently indicted for that offense under Code 
§ 18.2-95, tried at a bench trial, and was convicted. 
 
Tanya Bray was unable to identify the original thief from 
a photo lineup that included Covil’s picture and testified at 
trial that Covil “doesn’t look like him”. She stated on cross-
examination that she had never seen Covil before. In oral 
argument at the bar of this Court, the Attorney General 
conceded that Covil was not the person who took the Alero from 
Tanya Bray on April 14th.  
 
Covil, a convicted felon, testified at trial that he had 
asked a friend of his mother to find him a rental car in which 
he and his girlfriend could drive to King’s Dominion “on 
Saturday.” As a result of this contact, he testified, two men 
unknown to him came up to him and gave him the keys to the 
Alero in exchange for $50.00. He further testified that he did 
not know the way to King’s Dominion, but was relying on 
another friend, named “Twin,” who was “locked up” at the time 
of trial, to drive him there. Covil did not give the date of 
this transaction, but April 16, 2002, the date on which he was 
arrested in possession of the stolen car, fell on a Tuesday. 
 
At the conclusion of the bench trial, the court found 
Covil’s testimony incredible, stating, “I just don’t believe 
 
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his story. I think it’s got too many holes in it”. Covil was 
convicted of grand larceny and sentenced to one year and seven 
months incarceration. The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished 
opinion, affirmed the conviction. 
 
For well over a century, Virginia law has made the crime 
of receiving stolen goods a species of larceny. Code § 18.2-
108, like its statutory predecessors, provides: 
If any person buy or receive from another person, or aid 
in concealing, any stolen goods or other thing, knowing 
the same to have been stolen, he shall be deemed guilty 
of larceny thereof, and may be proceeded against, 
although the principal offender be not convicted. 
 
 
 
We have therefore long held that a person indicted for 
simple larceny may be tried, convicted and punished for that 
offense merely upon proof that property was stolen by some 
other person and received by the accused, knowing it to have 
been stolen. Stapleton v. Commonwealth, 140 Va. 475, 488, 124 
S.E. 237, 241 (1924); Price v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 
Gratt.) 846, 853 (1872).* In the present case, it is undisputed 
that the property was stolen by another person, that its value 
was sufficient to meet the requirements of grand larceny under 
Code § 18.2-95, and that Covil received the property and had 
                     
* Formerly, Code § 18.2-111 contained a provision 
permitting the accused to demand from the Commonwealth a 
written statement specifying the particular statute upon which 
the prosecution would rely in seeking a conviction of larceny.  
That provision was deleted by 1994 Acts, Ch. 555. 
 
 
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it in his exclusive possession on the second day after the 
theft.  Thus, the dispositive question is whether the 
Commonwealth’s evidence was sufficient to support a finding of 
guilty knowledge on Covil’s part. Stated differently, if the 
case were tried to a jury, would the evidence have been 
sufficient to submit to the jury the factual issue whether 
Covil knew the car was stolen property? 
 
 
In Roberts v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 264, 270, 337 S.E.2d 
255, 259 (1985), we said: 
 
It is true, of course, that an essential element of the 
offense of receiving stolen property is guilty knowledge. 
It is also true that no witness testified directly that 
the defendant knew the property in question was stolen. 
But the element of guilty knowledge may be supplied by 
circumstantial evidence, including the circumstance that 
the accused was in possession of recently stolen 
property. 
 
(Citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 
 
Another circumstance proper for consideration by the 
trier of fact is the explanation, or lack of it, given by the 
accused. Because proof of possession of recently stolen goods 
establishes a prima facie case that the defendant received 
them with guilty knowledge, the burden is cast upon him to go 
forward with evidence in explanation. Roberts, 230 Va. at 271, 
337 S.E.2d at 260. 
 
Covil was not, of course, required to testify but he 
voluntarily did so and gave an account that the trier of fact 
 
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rejected as inherently incredible.  The inference of guilty 
knowledge arising from an accused’s possession of recently 
stolen property may be repelled by a credible explanation, but 
the trier of fact is under no obligation to accept an account 
it finds unworthy of belief. In cases of this kind, when a 
defendant’s “hypothesis of innocence” is rejected as 
unreasonable, evidence of his possession of recently stolen 
goods is sufficient to support a conviction.  Roberts, 230 Va. 
at 272, 337 S.E.2d at 260; Westcott v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 
123, 127, 216 S.E.2d 60, 64 (1975).  Further, a fact-finder, 
having rejected a defendant’s attempted explanation as untrue, 
may draw the reasonable inference that his explanation was 
made falsely in an effort to conceal his guilt.  Emmett v. 
Commonwealth, 264 Va. 364, 372, 569 S.E.2d 39, 45 (2002), 
cert. denied, 538 U.S. 929 (2003); Carter v. Commonwealth, 223 
Va. 528, 532, 290 S.E.2d 865, 867 (1982); Toler v. 
Commonwealth, 188 Va. 774, 782, 51 S.E.2d 210, 214 (1949). A 
false or evasive account is a circumstance, similar to flight 
from a crime scene, that a fact-finder may properly consider 
as evidence of guilty knowledge. 
 
Because these circumstances were properly considered by 
the trial court and were sufficient to support the conviction, 
we will affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed.