Title: Cuffee v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MICAH O. CUFFEE, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 19, 2018 
§ 
§  Court Below:  Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  Cr. ID No. 1209013919 (K) 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted:   March 15, 2019 
 
 
 
 
Decided:   May 6, 2019 
 
Before VALIHURA, SEITZ, and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
 
 
ORDER 
 
 
Upon consideration of the briefs of the parties and the record in this case, it 
appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The defendant below-appellant, Micah O. Cuffee, has appealed the 
Superior Court’s denial of his first motion for postconviction relief under Superior 
Court Criminal Rule 61.  After careful consideration of the parties’ briefs and the 
record, we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment.    
(2) 
On August 7, 2013, a Superior Court jury found Cuffee guilty of 
Attempted Theft, Conspiracy in the Second Degree, and Criminal Mischief.  After 
granting the State’s petition to declare Cuffee a habitual offender, the Superior Court 
sentenced Cuffee to eight years of Level V incarceration for Attempted Theft, two 
2 
 
years of Level V incarceration, suspended for one year of Level III probation, for 
Conspiracy in the Second Degree, and a fine of $250 for Criminal Mischief.   
(3) 
This Court affirmed Cuffee’s convictions on direct appeal.1  The Court 
described the events leading to Cuffee’s convictions as follows:       
On the night of September 19, 2012, a resident of a development located 
near Walker Road in Dover heard a vehicle, a screeching, metallic noise 
like something was being dragged, and voices outside the back of her 
townhouse.  Office buildings, which were closed for the day, were 
located behind the caller’s townhouse.  The resident called 911 to report 
the noises at approximately 10:30 p.m.  Corporal Gregory Hopkins and 
other members of the Dover police responded to the 911 call. 
 
Initially, Hopkins and the other police officers checked businesses and 
communities along Walker Road for the source of the reported noises. 
Hopkins checked 1155 Walker Road and did not see anything there. 
Hopkins then went to the 911 caller’s townhouse and spoke to her about 
what she had heard in order to pinpoint the location of the noises.  Based 
on that conversation, Hopkins drove back to 1155 Walker Road, which 
was located behind the townhouse. 
 
Hopkins walked around the building located at 1155 Walker Road and 
saw four, disconnected air conditioning units behind the building and 
near a shed.  The air conditioners had been cut from the building located 
at 1155 Walker Road.  Hopkins reported his findings and it was decided 
that he would stay in the area to conduct surveillance in case someone 
returned to pick up the disconnected air conditioners.  Other officers set 
up a perimeter near Walker Road. 
 
Shortly after Hopkins concealed himself under some trees to monitor the 
area where the air conditioners were located, he observed a maroon 
minivan, with no headlights on, driving in from Walker Road.  After 
driving into the parking lot that was closest to the disconnected air 
                                                 
1 Cuffee v. State, 2014 WL 5254614, at *3-8 (Del. Oct. 14, 2014). 
3 
 
conditioners, the minivan began backing up over a bed of rocks near the 
air conditioners and became stuck. 
 
Hopkins watched the minivan occupants attempt to remove the minivan 
from the rocks.  They were unsuccessful and called somebody for 
assistance.  Although Hopkins could see the occupants of the minivan 
walk around it, he could not see them at all times.  Hopkins observed a 
white pick-up truck drive in from Walker Road and tow the minivan off 
of the rocks.  Cuffee’s cousin, Walter Cuffee, testified that Cuffee called 
him the night of September 19, 2012 for assistance.  Walter Cuffee drove 
his white pick-up truck to Walker Road, where he testified that he picked 
up Cuffee and Mark McDonald, and then helped Cuffee and McDonald 
tow the minivan from the rocks.  After Hopkins watched the white pick-
up truck and maroon minivan leave the parking lot, he saw that the 
disconnected air conditioners were no longer where he had previously 
seen them.  Hopkins radioed police units on Walker Road to report that 
the air conditioners had been taken and that both the white pick-up truck 
and maroon minivan should be stopped.  Hopkins then walked around 
the area and saw that the air conditioners had been moved to the other 
side of the shed. 
 
Police stopped the white pick-up truck and maroon minivan.  Cuffee was 
driving the minivan and McDonald was the passenger. Both men were 
arrested.  In a search of the minivan, the police found a pair of bolt 
cutters, Channellock pliers, a flashlight, and two pairs of work gloves. 
All of the seats, except for the driver seat and front passenger seat, had 
been removed from the minivan.  Cuffee’s daughter testified that she 
owned the minivan and that the equipment in the minivan belonged to 
her husband.2 
 
(4) 
On August 11, 2015, Cuffee filed a timely motion for postconviction 
relief.  The motion was assigned to a Superior Court Commissioner.  On October 
28, 2015, Cuffee filed a motion to compel in which he sought to listen again to a CD 
                                                 
2 Id. at *1-2. 
4 
 
of the 911 calls and police officers’ radio communications from the night of his 
arrest.  The State opposed the motion, arguing that Cuffee had already listened to the 
recordings during his direct appeal and had not established a basis to listen to the 
recordings again.  The Commissioner denied Cuffee’s motion. 
(5) 
After Cuffee supplemented and amended his motion for postconviction 
relief, his former counsel filed affidavits in response, and the State responded to the 
motion, the Commissioner issued a report and recommendation on August 7, 2017.  
The Commissioner found that Cuffee failed to overcome the Rule 61 procedural bars 
and recommended denial of his motion for postconviction relief.  Cuffee objected to 
the Commissioner’s report and recommendation.  On November 13, 2017, after de 
novo review of the record, the Superior Court accepted the Commissioner’s report 
and recommendation and denied the motion for postconviction relief.3  This appeal 
followed.                       
(6) 
We review the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for 
abuse of discretion, although we review questions of law de novo.4  Both the 
Superior Court and this Court on appeal first must consider the procedural 
requirements of Rule 61 before considering the merits of any underlying 
postconviction claims.5  The procedural bars of Rule 61 do not bar a timely claim of 
                                                 
3 State v. Cuffee, 2017 WL 5606703 (Del. Nov. 13, 2017). 
4 Claudio v. State, 958 A.2d 846, 850 (Del. 2008). 
5 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
5 
 
ineffective assistance of counsel.6  Cuffee argues, as he did below, that the Superior 
Court erred: (i) in denying his motion to compel; (ii) in finding his claims of 
improper amendment of the indictment, prosecutorial misconduct, erroneous 
admission of photographs showing copper tubing, improper withholding of the 
recordings, and violation of his right to represent himself procedurally barred; and 
(iii) in finding that his counsel was not ineffective.  Cuffee has waived appellate 
review of the other claims he raised below but he did not argue in his opening brief.7   
(7) 
Cuffee argues that the Superior Court Commissioner should have 
granted the motion to compel because the recordings contain Brady v. Maryland8  
material (references to a vehicle near the crime scene with air conditioners and a 
man in a hoodie) relevant to his postconviction motion, it was more than two years 
since he last heard the recordings, and it would not be unduly burdensome for the 
State to arrange for him to listen to the recordings again.  Cuffee raised the 
recordings on direct appeal, arguing that the State’s failure to produce recordings of 
911 calls and police officers’ radio communications the night of September 19, 2012 
was a violation of the State’s discovery obligations and Brady.  The Court granted, 
                                                 
6 Bradley v. State, 135 A.3d 748, 759 (Del. 2016). 
7 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1997); Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 
1993).  These claims included a police officer providing false information, ineffective assistance 
based on his counsel not filing a motion for a new trial within seven days, and the State withholding 
a traffic ticket issued to Cuffee and a police officer’s notes. 
8 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
6 
 
over Cuffee’s objections, the State’s motion to expand the record to include a CD of 
the recordings, and the State arranged for Cuffee to hear the recordings.   
(8) 
The Court addressed and rejected Cuffee’s claims concerning the 
recordings on direct appeal.  As to the alleged discovery violation, the Court assumed 
without deciding that Cuffee’s discovery requests encompassed the recordings, but 
found that the failure to produce the recordings was not central to the case and 
Cuffee’s substantial rights were not prejudicially affected.9  The Court also found 
that Cuffee’s Brady violation claim lacked merit.10  In addressing references on the 
recordings to other vehicles less than two miles from the crime scene that could or 
were carrying air conditioners, we held: 
As far as the police officers’ observation of a truck with a tarp on Route 
8 while Hopkins was watching the maroon minivan become stuck on 
rocks near the disconnected air conditioners or the possible sighting of 
a vehicle with an air conditioner while Cuffee was being arrested (and 
while the air conditioners at issue were still at 1155 Walker Road), this 
information essentially amounts to the existence of other vehicles that 
could transport or were transporting air conditioners.  Unlike the 
maroon minivan driven by Cuffee, these vehicles were not observed 
near the disconnected air conditioners at 1155 Walker Road after a 
nearby resident heard voices and dragging noises.  The existence of 
these other vehicles adds little to Cuffee’s defense.11 
 
                                                 
9 Cuffee, 2014 WL 5254614, at *6-7.   
10 Id. at *7 (finding that the recordings were not exculpatory or impeaching of the police witnesses’ 
testimony and that the suppression of the recordings did not undermine confidence in the outcome 
of the trial). 
11 Id.  The man in the hoodie was with the truck on Route 8, not walking near the disconnected air 
conditioners as Cuffee suggests.   
7 
 
Cuffee seeks to listen to the recordings again so he can raise claims that this Court 
has already rejected.  Rule 61(i)(4) bars any claim that was formerly adjudicated.  
Under these circumstances, the Superior Court did not err in denying Cuffee’s 
motion to compel.   
(9) 
The Superior Court also did not err in finding that Cuffee’s claims 
concerning the amendment of the indictment, the prosecutor’s statements about 
when Cuffee was at 1155 Walker Road and the theft of air conditioners, the violation 
of his right to represent himself, and the withholding of the audio recordings, were 
barred by Rule 61(i)(4).  This Court addressed, and rejected, all of these claims on 
direct appeal.12  Rule 61(i)(4) does not apply to a claim that the Superior Court lacked 
jurisdiction or that satisfies Rule 61(d)(i) (new evidence that creates a strong 
inference of actual innocence) or 61(d)(ii) (a new rule of constitutional law renders 
the conviction invalid),13 but Cuffee has failed to show that any of these exceptions 
apply here.   
(10) As recognized by the Superior Court, many of Cuffee’s remaining 
claims are barred by Rule 61(i)(3).  Rule 61(i)(3) bars any claim that was not asserted 
                                                 
12 Id. at *2-8 (affirming the amendment of the indictment, finding no prosecutorial misconduct 
based on statements regarding when Cuffee was at the crime scene and the harvesting of air 
conditioners, holding Cuffee was not entitled to reversal of his convictions assuming there was a 
discovery violation, deciding that the Brady claims were without merit, and concluding that Cuffee 
waived his right to represent himself). 
13 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5). 
8 
 
in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction unless the movant shows 
cause for relief from the procedural default and prejudice from a violation of the 
movant's rights.  Cuffee’s counsel objected to the introduction of photographs 
showing copper tubing in the minivan at trial, but Cuffee failed to raise this issue on 
direct appeal.  He has not shown cause for the procedural default.   
(11) Cuffee also makes several prosecutorial misconduct claims that he did 
not raise at trial or on appeal.  These claims include: (i) the prosecutor introduced 
Channellocks into evidence that were not found in the minivan as a police officer 
testified; (ii) the prosecutor stated that the bolt cutters found in the minivan were 
functional, but failed to show their functionality;14 (iii) three pairs of gloves were 
found in the minivan, but the prosecutor only introduced two pairs into evidence; 
and (iv) the prosecutor failed to introduce a notebook found in the minivan into 
evidence.  Cuffee makes no effort to show cause for the failure to raise the claims 
concerning the functionality of the bolt cutters.  That claim is therefore barred by 
Rule 61(i)(3).  Cuffee asserts ineffective assistance of counsel to overcome the Rule 
61(i)(3) procedural bar for the claims concerning the Channellocks, gloves, and 
notebook, which we address along with his other ineffective assistance counsel 
                                                 
14 The prosecutor invited the jurors to look at and handle the bolt cutters during their deliberations. 
9 
 
claims below.  Attorney error short of ineffective assistance of counsel does not 
constitute cause for procedural default.15   
(12) To prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Cuffee must 
establish that: (i) his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness; and (ii) but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable 
probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.16  
Although not insurmountable, the Strickland standard is highly demanding and 
subject to a “strong presumption that the representation was professionally 
reasonable.”17  The defendant must also set forth and substantiate concrete 
allegations of actual prejudice.18   
(13) Cuffee argues that his counsel was ineffective because he: (i) failed to 
investigate or object to the prosecutor’s mishandling of evidence as discussed above; 
(ii) failed to request a continuance to review the audio recordings and use those 
recordings at trial; (iii) failed to move for a mistrial based on the cumulative effect 
of the missing gloves and notebook, the introduction of Channellocks that were not 
found in the minivan, and the withholding of the recordings; and (iv) failed to request 
                                                 
15 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990). 
16 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). 
17 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990). 
18 Younger, 580 A.2d at 556. 
10 
 
the removal of a juror that the prosecutor recognized.  The Superior Court did not 
err in finding Cuffee failed to show his counsel was ineffective. 
(14) First, the record does not support Cuffee’s claim that the prosecutor 
introduced Channellocks into evidence that were not found in the minivan as a police 
officer testified.  This claim is based on Cuffee’s contention that the Channellocks 
do not appear in the police reports, the intake form referenced in the State’s 
discovery responses under Rule 16, or photographs of the van interior.  But the 
State’s discovery responses stated that the intake form might not list all physical 
evidence (which was also available for inspection), and the Channellocks do appear 
in one of the van interior photographs (State Exhibit 21).  Cuffee has not shown there 
was any prosecutorial misconduct for his attorney to investigate or note an objection.  
Nor has Cuffee shown that his counsel had any basis to object to the State not 
introducing the notebook into evidence at trial.   
(15) As to the gloves, Cuffee’s trial counsel stated in his affidavit that he did 
not challenge the number of gloves introduced at trial versus the number of gloves 
found in the minivan because he was concerned that the jury might view that as 
reaching for straws and it made more sense to rely on the location of the gloves 
(under the bolt cutters instead of on top of the bolt cutters as one would expect).  
Cuffee claims that the third pair of gloves would have supported his claim that the 
minivan belonged to his son-in-law.  But another pair of gloves would simply have 
11 
 
been cumulative of his daughter’s testimony that the minivan, tools, and gloves in 
the minivan belonged to her husband who used the minivan for his masonry work. 
Cuffee has not shown a reasonable probability that introduction of another pair of 
gloves into evidence would have resulted in a different outcome. 
(16) As to the recordings, Cuffee’s counsel explained in his affidavit that he 
did not learn of the recorded communications among the police officers until his 
cross-examination of one of the officers at trial.  He felt that the evidence presented 
so far was circumstantial at best and that asking for a continuance to review the 
recordings might prejudice the jury against Cuffee.  After trial he reviewed the 
recordings and concluded that there was nothing of value for the defense.   
(17) This Court reached a similar conclusion on direct appeal.  We 
concluded that the recordings were consistent with the police officers’ testimony at 
trial, and that even if there was information “marginally favorable” to the defense 
(the existence of other vehicles that could transport or were transporting air 
conditioners), confidence in the outcome of the trial was not undermined.19  It was 
the maroon minivan that Cuffee was driving, not the other vehicles, that was seen 
near the disconnected air conditioners at 1155 Walker Road.  Cuffee has not shown 
a reasonable probability of a different result if the recordings had been introduced at 
                                                 
19 Cuffee, 2014 WL 5254616, at *7. 
12 
 
trial.   In light of our rulings regarding the Channellocks, the third pair of gloves, the 
notebook, and the recordings, Cuffee has not shown that his trial counsel had any 
basis to move for a mistrial for cumulative error.   
(18) Finally, Cuffee argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to request the removal of a juror recognized by the prosecutor.  On the second day 
of trial, the prosecutor informed the Superior Court that he recognized one of the 
jurors from a gym he belonged to in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  The prosecutor 
stated that they would speak at the gym.  At the request of Cuffee’s counsel, the 
Superior Court asked the juror separately if he recognized the prosecutor or defense 
counsel from anywhere other than the trial.  The juror responded that he did not.  
Cuffee’s counsel agreed with the Superior Court that there was nothing further to 
pursue.   
(19) In his affidavit, Cuffee’s counsel states that the juror did not recognize 
the prosecutor and would have been replaced by an alternate who worked for law 
enforcement, which Cuffee disputes.  Cuffee also argues that his counsel should have 
sought the juror’s removal because that is what Cuffee wanted.  Given the amount 
of time since the prosecutor had apparently last interacted with the juror and the fact 
that the juror did not recognize the prosecutor, counsel’s decision not to seek 
removal of the juror fell within the range of reasonable professional assistance.  
13 
 
Cuffee did not have the right to dictate trial strategy.20  Having carefully considered 
the parties’ positions, we conclude that the Superior Court did not err in denying 
Cuffee’s motion for postconviction relief.    
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
                                                 
20 Gunter v. State, 2016 WL 2765360, at *3 (Del. May 9, 2016) (recognizing that criminal 
defendant does not have a right to dictate trial strategy); Zimmerman v. State, 2010 WL 546971, 
at *2 (Del. Feb. 16, 2010) (recognizing that criminal defendant has a right to counsel, but not a 
right to counsel who will not disagree on trial strategy and that counsel is not obligated to obtain 
the defendant’s consent to every tactical decision).