Title: Martin v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
ANDREW JACKSON MARTIN 
 
v.  Record No. 070136 
OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
November 2, 2007 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether a court may require a 
defendant to submit to court-ordered child support as a 
condition of a suspended sentence.  For the reasons stated 
below, the judgment of the Court of Appeals will be affirmed. 
I. 
Facts and Proceedings Below 
On October 23, 2005, at about 7:20 p.m., Officer Huffman 
of the Chesterfield County police observed Andrew Jackson 
Martin (“Martin”) driving with a defective taillight.  The 
Officer followed Martin into a service station and when Martin 
began walking towards the store, asked him to come back.  
Officer Huffman explained to Martin why he was being stopped 
and asked him for his driver’s license and registration.  When 
Martin responded that he did not have a license, Officer 
Huffman initiated a records check and found out that Martin’s 
license was suspended.  Martin had been adjudicated an 
habitual offender in 1997, and notified of this status in 
January of 1998.  Upon presentation to the grand jury, Martin 
was indicted for driving after having been declared an 
 
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habitual offender.  Upon trial by the court without a jury, 
Martin was found guilty.  At sentencing, it was determined 
that Martin had at least six similar offenses.  The court 
stated that this was “not really a driving offense but a 
failure to obey the orders of the Court.”  Martin testified at 
sentencing about his children and indicated that he does “take 
care of [his] kids,” but was not under a court order to do so.  
He was sentenced to five years in prison, but the trial court 
suspended three years and six months of the sentence upon 
condition that the defendant be of good behavior, submit to 
supervised probation, and pay the costs of the proceeding.  
Additionally, the terms of the suspended sentence included a 
requirement that Martin “report to the Division of Child 
Support Enforcement and submit to an order of support for any 
child that is not in the defendant’s custody.” 
 
Martin objected to the condition relating to child 
support, stating that it was unrelated to the charge, and that 
it additionally imposes an obligation on a third party – the 
mother of his child – to cooperate.  He appealed to the Court 
of Appeals, which denied the appeal by order, stating that the 
condition was within the trial court’s discretion and was 
reasonable.  Martin v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1598-06-2 
(December 19, 2006).  We awarded him an appeal upon two 
assignments of error: 
 
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1. 
The trial court erred by ordering as a condition 
of his suspended penitentiary sentence that the 
appellant submit to court ordered child support 
for any children for which he did not have legal 
custody. 
2. 
The Court of Appeals of Virginia erred by finding 
that the order of the trial judge was within his 
discretion. 
 
II.  Analysis 
The determination of sentencing lies within the sound 
discretion of the trial court.  See e.g., Lane v. 
Commonwealth, 223 Va. 713, 719, 292 S.E.2d 358, 362  (1982) 
(citations omitted).  A sentencing decision will not be 
reversed unless the trial court abused its discretion.  See 
id. 
Martin argues that the child support condition of the 
sentencing order is not reasonable and that it is not related 
to the underlying offense.  He claims that child support has 
no connection to the commission of the crime, that there must 
be a nexus between the crime and the conditions placed on a 
suspended sentence, and that this condition was therefore 
unreasonable. 
However, Code § 19.2-305(B) provides in relevant part 
that “[a] defendant placed on probation following conviction 
may . . . be required to provide for the support of his wife 
or others for whose support he may be legally responsible.”  
Therefore, the General Assembly has made it clear that the 
 
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trial court may impose this condition.  At the sentencing 
hearing, Martin stated that he has two children with different 
mothers.  He also explained that he lives with one of the 
children, but not the other and that there was not a child 
support order in place requiring him to support either of 
them.  By requiring Martin to submit to court-ordered child 
support, the trial court simply imposed the requirements 
authorized by Code § 19.2-305(B).  We note that the General 
Assembly has adopted child support guidelines in Code § 20-
108.2 and has empowered the Division of Child Support 
Enforcement to supervise and enforce child support payments.  
Code § 63.2-1901 et. seq.  In light of these Code provisions, 
we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
III.  Conclusion 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals will be 
affirmed. 
Affirmed.