Title: MEHDIPOUR v. STATE ex rel. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

MEHDIPOUR v. STATE ex rel. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS  MEHDIPOUR v. STATE ex rel. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS 2004 OK 19 90 P.3d 546 Case Number: 99301 Decided: 03/30/2004 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA FARAMARZ MEHDIPOUR, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. STATE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants/Appellees. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION III Honorable Doug Gabbard II, Trial Judge ¶0 The appellant, Faramarz Mehdipour (Mehdipour), an inmate incarcerated in the custody of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections filed a lawsuit against the appellees, various prison officials and employees of the Department (collectively, prison officials). Mehdipour alleged that actions taken by the prison officials violated his civil rights. He filed a pauper's affidavit, rather than pay the filing fee. The prison officials filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that because Mehdipour had, on at least three prior occasions, filed lawsuits that had been dismissed as either frivolous or for failure to state a claim, the cause must be dismissed without the payment of a filing fee. The trial court, Honorable Doug Gabbard II, granted the prison officials' motion for summary judgment. Mehdipour appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. We granted certiorari to determine whether inmates who might ordinarily proceed as indigents or paupers, but who are required to prepay filing fees pursuant to CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED. Faramarz Mehdipour, Stringtown, Oklahoma Pro se, J. Kevin Behrens, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for Defendants/Appellees. KAUGER, J: ¶1 We granted certiorari to address the issue of whether inmates who seek to proceed as indigents or paupers, but who are required to prepay filing fees pursuant to "A. A prisoner who has, on three or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, or while on probation or parole, brought an action or appeal in a court of this state or a court of the United States that has been dismissed on the grounds that the case was frivolous, or malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, may not proceed in a matter arising out of a civil case, or upon an original action or on appeal without prepayment of all fees required by law, unless the prisoner is under immediate danger of serious physical injury. . . ." We hold that the statute does not deprive inmates of the due process right to access to courts. FACTS ¶2 On January 2, 2003, the appellant, Faramarz Mehdipour (Mehdipour), an inmate at the Mack Alford Correctional Facility in Stringtown, Oklahoma, filed a lawsuit in the district court of Atoka County, Oklahoma, against the appellants, the warden, and various employees of the prison and the Department of Corrections (collectively, prison officials). Mehdipour complained of violations of his civil rights, alleging that the prison officials: 1) improperly placed him in a segregation unit; 2) seized his legal materials and personal property; 3) forced him to live with a smoker in the same cell; 4) failed to properly train prison employees; and 5) forced him to work against his will. He did not allege that he was under any immediate danger of serious physical injury. Rather than pay the filing fee in the district court, Mehdipour filed a pauper's affidavit. ¶3 The prison officials filed a motion for summary judgment on March 24, 2003. They argued that, pursuant to ¶4 On April 28, 2003, the trial court entered an order granting the prison officials' motion for summary judgment. It found that Mehdipour was incarcerated, he had not paid the filing fee, and he had, on at least three prior occasions, filed actions which had been dismissed as frivolous or for failure to state a claim. Mehdipour appealed, insisting that he had never filed a frivolous civil action. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court. It determined that TITLE 57 O.S. 2001 §566.2 DOES NOT DEPRIVE INMATES OF THE DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO ACCESS TO COURTS. ¶5 Mehdipour argues that a literal construction of ¶6 There are two sources of the right to access the courts and due process. Oklahoma's Constitution, art 2, §6 specifically guarantees citizens' access to courts. ¶7 The United States Supreme Court has issued orders denying petitioners from proceeding in forma pauperis when seeking extraordinary relief for filing excessive, frivolous and/or abusive petitions in the Court. ¶8 This Court has previously determined that §6 of the Oklahoma Constitution ¶9 Wise involved the issue of whether inmates were statutorily deprived of the capacity to file any civil action against a third party which does not involve the asserted violation of constitutional rights. ¶10 If this cause were about the abolition of the right to seek redress for every type of injury or complaint of any civil case that required a filing fee, we would agree that Mehdipour v. Wise, ¶11 Title 28 U.S.C.A. §1915(g)(1996) of the Federal Prison Litigation Reform Act (the Act) has a provision which is similar to Oklahoma's "In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the Untied States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury." Under the Act, federal courts may also exempt non-prisoner indigents from prepaying filing fees. ¶12 The United States Supreme Court has not addressed the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C.A. §1915(g)(1996) as it relates to access to the courts or due process. Our research does not reveal any persuasive authority for holding the statute unconstitutional. However, the federal circuit courts have addressed the constitutionality of the statute and agree that it is constitutional and does not deny access to courts, due process, or violate the equal protection clause. ¶13 The courts which have determined that the "three strikes" rule does not block a prisoner's access to courts do so because, by its terms, it does not prevent prisoners from filing civil actions, it merely prohibits them from enjoying in forma pauperis status. ¶14 These courts also recognize that the United States Supreme Court has never required an unlimited rule that indigents, at all times, in all cases, have the right to relief without payment of fees or that Congress is compelled to provide unlimited access to courts. ¶15 The courts which have determined that the statute does not violate due process or equal protection recognize that unless a classification involved is a fundamental right or is drawn upon an inherently suspect distinction such as race, religion, or alienage, the constitutionality of statutory discrimination is presumed and requires only that the classification challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. ¶16 In upholding the constitutionality of the statute, the courts reason that: 1) proceeding in forma pauperis is a privilege, not a right -- fundamental or otherwise; 2) rather than prohibiting the filing of civil actions, it merely prohibits the privilege of proceeding in forma paueris; and 3) its function is not to place burdens on prisoners, but to put them in the same position as other litigants who have to weigh their resources and determine whether a lawsuit or an appeal is worth the expense. Ultimately, application of the statute is entirely within an inmate's control if meritless lawsuits are not filed. ¶17 In Higgins v. Carpenter, "It is true that some indigent inmates - who, like Higgins and Early, have no prison jobs or other income sources and cannot save the full filing fee-- may be effectively prevented from pursuing valid constitutional claims after receiving three strikes. Yet, a 'constitutional requirement to waive court fees in civil cases is the exception, not the general rule.' . . . The Supreme Court has recognized only a few civil matters in which fee waivers are required. . .(termination of parental rights). . . (divorce proceedings). If fee waivers are not constitutionally required in prisoner §1983 cases, it follows that inmates do not have a constitutional right to pay court fees for civil cases by the installment method. . . .To be sure, proceeding IFP in a civil case is a privilege, not a right -- fundamental or otherwise." (Citations omitted.) ¶18 While pronouncement of a federal law question by an inferior federal court is not binding on this Court, it is persuasive, ¶19 Under the current statutory scheme, Oklahoma courts may exempt non-prisoner indigents from prepaying filing fees. ¶20 The Okla. Const. art. 2, §6, ¶21 Because prisoners are not a suspect class, and the provisions of CONCLUSION ¶22 A legislative act is presumed to be constitutional and will be upheld until the contrary is shown. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED. WATT, C.J., HODGES, LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, KAUGER, BOUDREAU, WINCHESTER, EDMONDSON, J.J., concur. OPALA, V.C.J., concurs in result. FOOT