Title: In re C.I.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Notice:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.

                                No. 88-409


In re C.I., Juvenile                         Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
                                             District Court of Vermont,
                                             Unit No. 2, Franklin Circuit

                                             January Term, 1990

Joseph J. Wolchik, J.

Howard E. Van Benthuysen, Franklin County State's Attorney, and Jo-Ann
   Gross, Deputy State's Attorney, St. Albans, for appellee State of Vermont

Steve Dunham, Public Defender, St. Albans, for appellant C.I.


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson and Dooley, JJ.


     GIBSON, J.   This is an appeal by C.I., a juvenile, from an order of
the Franklin Superior Court declaring him to be a child in need of super-
vision (CHINS) pursuant to 33 V.S.A. { 632(12)(C).  We affirm.
     The CHINS petition was filed on January 13, 1988, and a preliminary
hearing was held on January 21, 1988, at which time father, mother and C.I.
all entered denials to the petition; the court ordered that temporary
placement of the child remain with the mother.  A merits hearing was
convened on February 5, 1988, but was continued at the request of the mother
prior to the taking of any evidence.  Further hearings were held on March 9,
March 16, April 5 and April 13, 1988.  On April 15, 1988, the court found
that C.I. was CHINS because he was beyond the control of his mother.  In its
disposition order, the court awarded legal custody of C.I. to his mother,
with protective supervision by the Department of Social and Rehabilitation
Services (SRS).  C.I. thereafter filed the present appeal.
     C.I. argues first that the trial court lost jurisdiction when it failed
to commence a "hearing on the merits" within fifteen days of the filing of
the petition.  33 V.S.A. { 647(a) states in pertinent part:
            At the time of the filing of the petition, . . . the
          court shall fix a time for a hearing thereon, which, if
          the child is in detention or shelter care, shall not be
          later than fifteen days after the filing thereof . . . .

     The time schedules presented in the statute are directory, not
jurisdictional; thus, a failure to comply with the time requirements does
not automatically divest the trial court of jurisdiction or result in the
voiding of the CHINS adjudication or the disposition order.  In re M.C.P,
___ Vt. ___, ___, 571 A.2d 627, 637 (1989); In re J.R., ___ Vt. ___, ___,
570 A.2d 154, 157 (1989).  In any event, the facts do not support C.I.'s
theory that the hearing was untimely.  When the CHINS petition was filed on
January 13, 1988, C.I. was living at home, and he continued to live at home
until January 28, 1988, when he was placed in a foster home.  It was then
that C.I. first came under "detention or shelter care," within the meaning
of { 647(a).  The merits hearing was convened February 5, 1988, well within
the time prescribed by the statute.  On February 20, 1988, C.I. was
returned to his mother's home, where he remained until shortly before the
April 13 hearing.
     Appellant argues that there was no "significant" hearing until March 9,
1988, and that the period in consideration under { 647(a) should be the
period between January 28, 1988 and March 9, 1988.  We disagree.  Although
no evidence on the merits was presented until April 5, 1988, the merits
hearing was duly convened on February 5, 1988, at which time certain
preliminary matters, including the mother's request for a continuance, were
discussed with the court.  Since fewer than fifteen days had elapsed from
January 28, 1988, the statute was therefore met. See In re R.S., 143 Vt.
565, 569-70,