Title: FRAME v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

FRAME v. STATE2001 WY 7229 P.3d 86Case Number: 00-188Decided: 08/13/2001

 

APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                            

 

RICKY 
LYNN FRAME,

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Fremont County

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Sylvia 
Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel.

 Representing 
Appellee:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Wyoming Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General; and Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General.

 

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ.

  
            
HILL, Justice.

 [¶1]      Appellant, Ricky 
Lynn Frame, seeks review of the judgment and sentence entered against him upon 
his plea of guilty to the crime of larceny as defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-3-402(a) and (c)(i) (LexisNexis 2001).  
Frame's sole contention is that the district court abused its discretion 
in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which was filed before 
sentencing.

 

[¶2]      We will 
affirm.

 

[¶3]      The parties 
articulate the single issue to be resolved in virtually identical terms.  The clearest statement of the issue 
is:  Did the district court abuse 
its discretion in denying Frame's presentence motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea?

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      On July 24, 1999, 
Frame was caught by police while in the act of stealing money from vending 
machines at the K-Mart Store in Riverton, Wyoming.  He was arrested at the site of the 
crime.  The vehicle he was in was 
searched at the time of his arrest.  
That vehicle was then impounded and was more thoroughly searched at a 
later time pursuant to a search warrant.  
In the searches, the police recovered over $700 in coins and dollar 
bills, as well as keys that unlocked the vending machines.  Eyewitnesses averred that an accomplice 
was helping Frame, but that accomplice fled the scene, and, so far as this 
record shows, the accomplice has never been caught.  On July 26, 1999, Frame was charged with 
one count of larceny and one count of conspiracy to commit larceny.  A trial was scheduled for November 2, 
1999.  On September 17, 1999, 
Frame's attorneys1 filed a motion in limine, supported 
by a brief, as well as a motion to dismiss (or in the alternative to suppress 
evidence) which was also supported by a brief.  The purpose of both motions was to seek 
rulings from the district court to suppress evidence obtained in 
unconstitutional searches, to prevent witnesses from testifying as to the 
amounts of money which were typically found in the vending machines, and to 
prevent the admission of evidence relating to other crimes, wrongs, or acts 
under W.R.E. 404(b).  On September 
30, 1999, Frame's attorneys filed a detailed witness and exhibit list as 
required by the trial scheduling order.  
On October 1, 1999, Frame's attorney filed proposed jury instructions in 
preparation for the November 2, 1999, trial date.  Before the date set for trial and before 
any of the pretrial motions were heard, Frame appeared before the district court 
on October 5, 1999, to change his plea from not guilty to guilty in accordance 
with a plea bargain.  Frame agreed 
that the terms of the plea bargain were:  
In exchange for a plea of guilty to larceny, the conspiracy count would 
be dismissed, the State's recommendation for sentencing was to be for a term not 
to exceed four to six years, and the district court was not bound by the terms 
of the agreement.  It is also clear 
from the record that Frame, not his attorneys, made the decision to plead 
guilty, and that the decision to plead guilty was made voluntarily and 
intelligently with due regard to the alternative courses of action available to 
him.  One other feature of the 
bargain was that the prosecution gave a summary of the factual basis for the 
plea and, thus, Frame made no statements incriminating himself or, consequently, 
his accomplice.  At the conclusion 
of the presentation of the factual basis, Frame simply agreed that it was 
correct.  The district court 
accepted the guilty plea and ordered a presentence investigation.  The presentence investigation was filed 
in the district court on January 7, 2000, and it contained a recommendation: 
". . . due to lack of cooperation that the Defendant be sentenced to a 
lengthy term at the Wyoming State Penitentiary."  Frame had initially refused to cooperate 
in completing the questionnaire portion of the presentence investigation, but on 
January 20, 2000, he finally did submit a completed 
questionnaire.

 

[¶5]      Meantime, on 
January 11, 2000, Frame filed a pro se motion to dismiss his attorneys, as well 
as one to withdraw his guilty plea.  
On January 18, 2000, Frame's attorney filed a motion to withdraw as 
counsel.  By order entered on 
January 26, 2000, the district court granted the attorney's motion to withdraw 
and appointed a very experienced public defender to assume responsibility for 
the case.  The initial hearing on 
Frame's motion to withdraw his plea was held on January 31, 2000, but that time 
was used only to reschedule the hearing to March 6, 2000, as requested by 
Frame.  Substitute counsel stated 
that was plenty of time to prepare.  
At that hearing, Frame based his motion to withdraw his guilty plea on 
problems that he had with his attorney, which are well summarized in this 
quotation from the hearing transcript:

 

            
He refused to talk with me. He refused to come down and discuss my case, 
to prepare for motions.  I had to 
constantly call him and argue with him to get him to even file a motion.  Like the two motions he did file for me, 
everytime  what few times he would come down to the jail to talk with me was 
very brief, and then the subject only concerned a plea bargain.  He never wanted to discuss going to 
trial.

            
He never  he gave me the impression that he was not going to represent 
me at a trial.  In fact, basically 
refused to take me to trial.

 

[¶6]      Frame also 
asserted that his attorney led him to believe that he would be sentenced to 
probation.  However, Frame was also 
forced to admit on cross examination that he had not called any of his concerns 
about his attorney's performance to the attention of the district court at the 
time he entered his guilty plea, even though he was fully aware of all the 
alleged concerns he had about his attorney at that time.2  The motion to withdraw the plea of 
guilty was denied by order entered on March 16, 2000.  A sentencing hearing was held on May 10, 
2000, and sentence was entered on June 5, 2000, imposing upon Frame a prison 
term of three to six years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary with credit for 
time served in the amount of 138 days.

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶7]      A motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea, such as that filed here, is governed by W.R.Cr.P. 32(d) 
which provides that if a motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea is made before 
sentence is imposed, the court may permit withdrawal upon a showing by the 
defendant of any fair and just reason.  
A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a plea of guilty before 
sentence is imposed, and where the strictures of W.R.Cr.P. 11 have been met, and 
the defendant intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily entered into his plea of 
guilty, the district court's decision to deny such a motion is within its sound 
discretion.  Burdine v. 
State, 974 P.2d 927, 929-30 (Wyo. 1999); 3 Charles Alan Wright, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 538 (1982 and Supp. 2001).  Seven factors have been suggested as 
pertinent to the exercise of the court's discretion:  (1) Whether the defendant has asserted 
his innocence; (2) whether the government would suffer prejudice; (3) whether 
the defendant has delayed in filing his motion; (4) whether withdrawal would 
substantially inconvenience the court; (5) whether close assistance of counsel 
was present; (6) whether the original plea was knowing and voluntary; and (7) 
whether the withdrawal would waste judicial resources.  3 Wright, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Criminal 2d § 538 (Supp. 2001); United States v. Black, 201 F.3d 1296, 1299-1300 (10th Cir. 2000).

 

[¶8]      Frame does not 
contend that the district court failed to comply with W.R.Cr.P. 11.  In the trial court, he did contend that 
he was forced to plead guilty by his attorney, and that argument has been 
restructured here as an effective assistance of counsel issue.  Ineffective assistance of counsel may 
constitute a fair and just reason to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea.  Brock v. State, 981 P.2d 465, 469-70 (Wyo. 1999); Dichard v. State, 844 P.2d 484, 487 (Wyo. 
1992).  At the hearing on the 
motion, Frame's substitute counsel characterized the issue as one which involved 
incompetence in the relationship between attorney and client  i.e., a 
lack of zealous representation of Frame and an unwillingness to attempt to prove 
that Frame was not guilty  rather than that counsel was inept or 
unskilled.  In Mehring v. 
State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1111 (Wyo. 1993), we suggested that coercion from 
defense counsel, such as threatening to withdraw if defendant does not accept 
the plea, or forcing the plea because counsel is not prepared for trial, may 
create an involuntary plea.  
However, there is nothing in this record to suggest that Frame was 
threatened in any way.  Even viewing 
his self-serving allegations made in support of the motion to withdraw in a 
light most favorable to him, they are insufficient to amount to coercion.  Moreover, the record belies Frame's 
direct allegations:  (1) His 
attorneys filed motions to suppress all of the evidence which would have served 
as the basis for a conviction, (2) the pretrial filings by the attorneys 
demonstrate that they were prepared to go to trial, (3) Frame did not pose any 
of these matters to the district court at the time his plea was entered and he 
specifically denied that his plea was other than voluntary, and (4) Frame was 
specifically told that the district court was not bound by the four- to six-year 
sentencing recommendation (meaning it could have been more severe than that); 
thus, Frame's decision could not have been rendered involuntary by a belief that 
he would get probation (in fact, he received only a three- to six-year 
sentence).  Moreover, the 
circumstances of this case suggest that Frame's attorney acted prudently.  Frame was caught in the act of taking 
money from the vending machines.  It 
was unlikely that the evidence against him was going to be suppressed.  Frame had an extensive criminal history, 
and some of that history may have been admissible as W.R.E. 404(b) evidence to 
prove the instant crime.  Much of 
his criminal history would have been admissible had Frame chosen to testify in 
an attempt to exonerate himself.  
Finally, we note that Frame's testimony lacked credibility.  All of his allegations were self-serving 
and, perhaps, served the best interests of his accomplice, as well.  Frame has not cited pertinent authority 
that is directly in point with his argument that his attorney's performance was 
ineffective or inadequate.  Our own 
survey of pertinent authority reveals a great reservoir of case law that rebuts 
such an argument.  See 
generally, Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Adequacy of Defense Counsel's 
Representation of Criminal Client Regarding Guilty Pleas, 10 A.L.R.4th 8, esp. §§ 22-31 (1981 and Supp. 
2000).

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶9]      We hold that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw 
the guilty plea.  The judgment and 
sentence of the district court are affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1Initially, two attorneys represented 
Frame, but his assertions of ineffective assistance are only directed at one of 
those attorneys.

 

  
2Frame's attorney 
was not subpoenaed or otherwise made available on the date of the hearing, and 
the district court opted not to continue the hearing to avail itself of the 
attorney's response to Frame's assertions.  
Although testimony from that attorney would have gone a long way in 
defusing this issue, we agree that it is not essential to disposition of the 
issue under the circumstances presented here.