Title: REYNOLDS v BURLINGTON NORTHERN I

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 14792 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA KEITH REYNOLDS, Plaintiff and Appellant, BURLINGTON NORTHERN, INC., a corporation, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, In and For the County of Lincoln, Honorable Robert Holter, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Murphy, Robinson, Heckathorn and Phillips, Kalispell, Montana I. James Heckathorn argued, Kalispell, Montana For Respondents: Kroschel, Peterson and Koolen, Billings, Montana K. Kent Koolen argued, Billings, Montana Submitted: March 27, 1980 Decided: DEC 9 - '@@ Mr. J u s t i c e Daniel J. Shea d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. P l a i n t i f f , K e i t h Reynolds, w h i l e employed by Ksanka Lumber Company, was s e v e r e l y i n j u r e d when a s t r i n g of Bur l i n g t o n Northern r a i l r o a d c a r s suddenly moved down a s i d i n g and s t r u c k a c a b l e over which he was s t r a d d l e d . H e sued B u r l i n g t o n Northern f o r damages, and a p p e a l s from an o r d e r of t h e L i n c o l n County D i s t r i c t Court d i r e c t i n g a v e r d i c t i n favor of t h e r a i l r o a d . The p l e a d i n g s a r e i m p r e c i s e and c o n f u s i n g , b u t it a p p e a r s t h a t p l a i n t i f f sued t h e r a i l r o a d on two t h e o r i e s : F i r s t , t h a t he was a b u s i n e s s i n v i t e e i n h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e r a i l r o a d and t h a t a s such, t h e r a i l r o a d owed him t h e d u t y t o p r o v i d e a s a f e p l a c e t o work. Second, t h a t t h e r a i l r o a d v i o l a t e d t h e F e d e r a l S a f e t y Appliance A c t , and t h a t he was a member of t h e p r o t e c t e d c l a s s under t h e Act. I t is n o t e n t i r e l y c l e a r what t h e r a i l r o a d ' s d e f e n s e s were. I t appears, however, t h a t t h e r a i l r o a d conceded t h a t p l a i n t i f f was a b u s i n e s s i n v i t e e , b u t denied t h a t t h e r a i l r o a d owed him a s such, t h e d u t y t o p r o v i d e him w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o work. I t a p p e a r s t h a t t h e r a i l r o a d had a two- pronged d e f e n s e i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e S a f e t y Appliance Act. F i r s t , t h e r a i l r o a d contended t h a t because p l a i n t i f f was n o t on t h e main l i n e of t h e r a i l r o a d and because t h e f a c i l i t i e s were l e a s e d t o t h e Ksanka Lumber Company, p l a i n t i f f was n o t e n t i t l e d t o p r o t e c t i o n under t h e Act. Second, assuming a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e Act t o t h i s c a s e , t h e r a i l r o a d a l l e g e d t h a t it was e n t i t l e d t o a s s e r t t h e d e f e n s e s of assumption of r i s k and c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e , and pleaded both d e f e n s e s a s a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e s . W e f i r s t set f o r t h t h e f a c t s of t h e a c c i d e n t b e f o r e a g a i n v e n t u r i n g i n t o t h e p r o c e d u r a l entanglement a t t h e end of t r i a l which l e d t o t h i s appeal. P l a i n t i f f , a t t h e time of h i s i n j u r i e s , was a 45-year o l d employee of Ksanka Lumber Company, who worked a t a w o o d c h i p - l o a d i n g f a c i l i t y a t F o r t i n e , Montana, on l a n d l e a s e d by Ksanka Lumber Company from t h e defendant r a i l r o a d . ( W e n o t e , p a r e n t h e t i c a l l y , and w i l l have more t o s a y of t h i s l a t e r , t h a t Ksanka Lumber Company is a wholly-owned s u b s i d i a r y of Plum C r e e k Lumber Company, and t h a t Plum Creek Lumber Company is i n t u r n , a wholly-owned s u b s i d i a r y of t h e d e f e n d a n t r a i l r o a d . ) On October 3 , 1974, a t approximately 8:00 a.m., r a i l r o a d employees p l a c e d a s t r i n g of f i v e empty c a r s a g a i n s t a s i x t h c a r a l r e a d y p l a c e d on a s i d e t r a c k a d j a c e n t t o Ksanka's woodchip-loading f a c i l i t y . None of t h e b r a k e s on t h e f i v e c a r s were s e t . When p l a i n t i f f came t o work a t 4:00 p.m., t h e f i r s t of t h e s i x c a r s had a l r e a d y been s p o t t e d a t t h e l o a d i n g c h u t e . T h i s c a r was approximately 150 f e e t from t h e remaining empty r a i l r o a d c a r s . P l a i n t i f f f i n i s h e d f i l l i n g t h e p a r t i a l l y - loaded c a r w i t h c h i p s about 8:30 p.m. and rode it down t h e i n c l i n e t o a s p o t where it would be r e r o u t e d by t h e r a i l r o a d . He t h e n walked up t h e i n c l i n e t o t h e remaining s t r i n g of empty c a r s . He t e s t i f i e d t h a t he climbed t h e l a d d e r on t h e second c a r i n t h e s t r i n g and t i g h t e n e d and s e c u r e d its brakes b e f o r e uncoupling t h e l e a d c a r . Upon uncoupling t h e l e a d c a r , he rode it down t o t h e l o a d i n g a r e a t o load it w i t h woodchips. To f a c i l i t a t e even l o a d i n g of woodchips, an e l e c t r i c c a r p u l l e r is provided f o r t h e l o a d i n g o p e r a t i o n . T h i s p u l l e r moves a c a r up and down t h e t r a c k t o a l l o w woodchips l e a v i n g t h e c h u t e t o f i l l t h e c a r evenly. A f t e r s t o p p i n g t h e l e a d c a r a t t h e c h i p l o a d e r , t h e p l a i n t i f f a t t a c h e d t h e c a r p u l l e r c a b l e t o t h e end of t h e c a r . While doing s o , he s t r a d d l e d t h e c a r p u l l e r c a b l e and t u r n e d h i s back t o t h e s t r i n g of c a r s which were f u r t h e r down t h e t r a c k . The s t r i n g of empty c a r s suddenly began r o l l i n g and s t r u c k t h e c a b l e over which he was s t r a d d l e d . The c o l l i s i o n p r o p e l l e d p l a i n t i f f i n t o t h e a i r and h i s l e g was badly broken. P l a i n t i f f ' s l e g remained i n a c a s t f o r two and a h a l f y e a r s and d u r i n g t h i s t i m e , s u r g e r y was performed s e v e r a l times. He r e t u r n e d t o work i n A p r i l 1977, b u t immediately experienced a d d i t i o n a l problems w i t h t h e f o o t on h i s i n j u r e d l e g . H i s p h y s i c a l . p r o b l e m s prevented him from c o n t i n u i n g t o work a t h i s o l d job and from performing any d u t i e s which r e q u i r e d movement of h i s l e g o r f o o t . P l a i n t i f f sued t h e r a i l r o a d i n December 1975. The p r o c e d u r a l problems i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e s u b s t a n t i v e b a s i s f o r recovery, had t h e i r beginning i n t h e p l e a d i n g s and c a r r i e d over i n t o t h e p r e t r i a l o r d e r . I n h i s c o m p l a i n t , a s a s e p a r a t e a l l e g a t i o n of n e g l i g e n c e , p l a i n t i f f a l l e g e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t owed him t h e d u t y of p r o v i d i n g him w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o work. H e a l s o enumerated s e v e r a l s p e c i f i c a t i o n s of n e g l i g e n c e whereby t h e r a i l r o a d had caused h i s i n j u r i e s . The complaint c o n t a i n e d no a l l e g a t i o n t h a t p l a i n t i f f was a b u s i n e s s i n v i t e e o f t h e d e f e n d a n t r a i l r o a d . W i t h o u t s p e c i f y i n g how t h e S a f e t y Appliance Act a p p l i e d t o him, p l a i n t i f f a l s o a l l e g e d t h a t t h e r a i l r o a d had v i o l a t e d t h e Act and was t h u s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r h i s i n j u r i e s . W e cannot t e l l from t h e D i s t r i c t Court f i l e whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t held a p r e t r i a l c o n f e r e n c e , although t h e r e is a p r e t r i a l o r d e r s i g n e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t and approved by c o u n s e l f o r both s i d e s . The i m p r e c i s e p l e a d i n g s were c a r r i e d over i n t o t h e p r e t r i a l o r d e r . The o r d e r , s i g n e d s o a s t o supplement t h e p l e a d i n g s (see Rule 1 6 , M.R.Civ.P.) set f o r t h t h e i s s u e s of f a c t and law a s f o l l o w s : 1. Was t h e d e f e n d a n t n e g l i g e n t i n which n e g l i g e n c e was t h e proximate c a u s e of p l a i n t i f f ' s i n j u r y ? 2. Was t h e p l a i n t i f f c o n t r i b u t o r i l y n e g l i g e n t ? 3 . Did p l a i n t i f f assume t h e r i s k of i n j u r y ? 4. Did defendant v i o l a t e t h e S a f e t y Appliance Act? 5. The e x t e n t and amount of p l a i n t i f f ' s i n j u r y and damage. N e i t h e r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f i l e n o r t h e t r i a l t r a n s c r i p t , r e v e a l s any s i g n i f i c a n t r u l i n g s o r d i s c u s s i o n s on q u e s t i o n s of law. R a t h e r , it a p p e a r s t h a t no r u l i n g s were made u n t i l t h e end of t h e t r i a l when t h e c o u r t and counsel were s e t t l i n g j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s . P l a i n t i f f o f f e r e d s e v e r a l i n s t r u c t i o n s r e l a t i n g t o h i s n e g l i g e n c e t h e o r y of l i a b i l i t y . S e v e r a l c o n t a i n e d language t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f was a b u s i n e s s i n v i t e e of t h e d e f e n d a n t r a i l r o a d and t h a t a s such t h e r a i l r o a d owed p l a i n t i f f a d u t y t o p r o v i d e him w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o work. The r a i l r o a d ' s p o s i t i o n on t h e b u s i n e s s i n v i t e e s t a t u s of p l a i n t i f f is n o t e n t i r e l y c l e a r , b u t t h e r e is no doubt t h a t t h e r a i l r o a d a s s e r t e d t h a t it d i d n o t owe a d u t y t o p r o v i d e him w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o work. The r a i l r o a d a r g u e s t h a t such d u t y a p p l i e s o n l y t o an employer-who must p r o v i d e its employees w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o work--and t h a t p l a i n t i f f was n o t an employee of t h e r a i l r o a d . A l l of p l a i n t i f f ' s o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n s were l a c e d w i t h language s t a t i n g t h a t t h e r a i l r o a d owed him a d u t y t o p r o v i d e a s a f e p l a c e t o work. W e cannot d e t e r m i n e t h e p r e c i s e r u l i n g s of t h e t r i a l c o u r t on t h e q u e s t i o n s of law p r e s e n t e d by t h e s e o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n s . For example, t h e r e c o r d does n o t d i s c l o s e whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t r u l e d o n l y t h a t t h e r a i l r o a d d i d n o t owe p l a i n t i f f a d u t y t o p r o v i d e him w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o work, o r whether it a l s o r u l e d t h a t p l a i n t i f f was n o t a b u s i n e s s i n v i t e e . N e i t h e r p l a i n t i f f ' s c o u n s e l nor d e f e n s e c o u n s e l made any e f f o r t t o o b t a i n a d e f i n i t i v e r u l i n g . The consequence is t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t r e f u s e d almost a l l of t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n s on h i s n e g l i g e n c e t h e o r y of l i a b i l i t y . Because he was e f f e c t i v e l y l e f t w i t h o u t any i n s t r u c t i o n s s u p p o r t i n g h i s n e g l i g e n c e t h e o r y of l i a b i l i t y , p l a i n t i f f ' s c o u n s e l t o l d t h e t r i a l c o u r t t h a t it might a s w e l l d i r e c t a v e r d i c t i n f a v o r of t h e r a i l r o a d . The d e f e n d a n t r a i l r o a d a l s o renewed i t s m o t i o n f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t . The t r i a l c o u r t , a c c o r d i n g l y , d i r e c t e d a v e r d i c t a g a i n s t p l a i n t i f f on t h e n e g l i g e n c e t h e o r y . S i m i l a r problems cropped up w i t h r e l a t i o n t o p l a i n t i f f ' s t h e o r y of recovery under t h e S a f e t y Appliance A c t . The r e c o r d is e q u a l l y clouded. The p a r t i e s d i d n o t r e q u e s t t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o e n t e r any p r e l i m i n a r y r u l i n g s a s t o whether t h e Act a p p l i e d i n t h i s c a s e , and i f a p p l i c a b l e , t h e n a t u r e and e x t e n t of its a p p l i c a t i o n . Thus, t h e problems f i r s t a r o s e d u r i n g s e t t l e m e n t of j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s r e l a t i n g t o t h e A c t . P l a i n t i f f o f f e r e d s e v e r a l i n s t r u c t i o n s r e l a t i n g t o h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e Act a s a p p l i e d t o t h i s c a s e , and t h e t r i a l c o u r t r e f u s e d most of them. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h e r e c o r d does n o t t e l l u s t h e p a r t i c u l a r s of why t h e t r i a l c o u r t c o n s i d e r e d t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s t o be i n e r r o r o r i n a p p l i c a b l e . P l a i n t i f f o f f e r e d a n i n s t r u c t i o n d e f i n i n g c a u s a t i o n under t h e A c t , b u t which used t h e language c o n t a i n e d i n t h e F e d e r a l E m p l o y e r s ' L i a b i l i t y A c t ( 5 5 1 t h r u 6 0 ; i n p a r t i c u l a r , s e e 5 5 1 . ) Another paragraph of t h e same i n s t r u c t i o n s t a t e d t h a t c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e was n o t a d e f e n s e t o an a c t i o n u n d e r t h e S a f e t y A p p l i a n c e A c t . Although t h e t r i a l c o u r t r e f u s e d t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n , w e c a n n o t determine whether he r u l e d t h a t both paragraphs were i n e r r o r , o r whether t h e c a u s a t i o n language o r c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e s t a t e m e n t was i n e r r o r . The p l a i n t i f f made no e f f o r t t o o b t a i n a c l a r i f y i n g r u l i n g t o determine p r e c i s e l y what was wrong w i t h h i s o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n . The r e c o r d is f u r t h e r confused by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t r a i l r o a d o f f e r e d an i n s t r u c t i o n under t h e A c t c o n t a i n i n g language t h a t c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e was a d e f e n s e , and p l a i n t i f f ' s counsel d i d n o t o b j e c t . I t makes l i t t l e s e n s e f o r p l a i n t i f f t o o f f e r an i n s t r u c t i o n s t a t i n g t h a t c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e is n o t a d e f e n s e and t h e n t o f a i l t o o b j e c t t o t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n s t a t i n g t h a t c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e is a d e f e n s e , t o an a c t i o n under t h e A c t . (We n o t e h e r e t h a t t h e r a i l r o a d a s s e r t s t h a t it d i d n o t o f f e r an i n s t r u c t i o n c o n t a i n i n g assumption o r r i s k a s a d e f e n s e because it was s a t i s f i e d t h a t t h e evidence rendered t h i s d e f e n s e i n a p p l i c a b l e . ) Because t h e t r i a l c o u r t r e f u s e d most of p l a i n t i f f ' s o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n s d e f i n i n g and a p p l y i n g t h e S a f e t y Appliance A c t , p l a i n t i f f a s s e r t e d t h a t he could n o t argue a v i o l a t i o n of t h e A c t t o t h e j u r y , and t h e r e f o r e r e q u e s t e d t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t a l s o e n t e r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t on t h i s t h e o r y of l i a b i l i t y . Defense counsel a g r e e d , and a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t was a c c o r d i n g l y e n t e r e d . P l a i n t i f f ' s counsel l a t e r moved f o r a new t r i a l and a l l e g e d on s e v e r a l g r o u n d s , t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t had i m p r o p e r l y c o n s t r u e d and a p p l i e d t h e law. W e c a n n o t determine i f b r i e f s were s u p p l i e d t h e c o u r t i n s u p p o r t of t h i s motion. I n any e v e n t , it a p p e a r s t h a t t h e motion was o r a l l y argued, and t h a t w i t h i n a few d a y s t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i r e c t e d t h e c l e r k t o e n t e r a minute e n t r y s t a t i n g t h a t t h e motion f o r a new t r i a l was denied. Reasons f o r d e n i a l were n o t s t a t e d . P l a i n t i f f ' s a p p e a l followed. P l a i n t i f f s t a t e s t h e i s s u e s a s f o l l o w s : (1) Was R e y n o l d s a b u s i n e s s i n v i t e e on p r e m i s e s o f B u r l i n g t o n Northern? ( 2 ) Did B u r l i n g t o n Northern owe Reynolds a d u t y of p r o v i d i n g him w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o work? ( 3 ) Does t h e F e d e r a l S a f e t y Appliance A c t a p p l y t o Reynolds? ( 4 ) Is c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e a d e f e n s e under t h e Act? ( 5 ) Did t h e Court e r r i n d i r e c t i n g its v e r d i c t a g a i n s t Reynolds? The r a i l r o a d , on t h e o t h e r hand, s t a t e s t h e i s s u e s i n t h e f o l l o w i n g language: ( 1) Was t h e p l a i n t i f f improperly precluded from s u b m i t t i n g t h e i s s u e of "premises l i a b i l i t y " t o t h e j u r y ? ( 2 ) Was t h e p l a i n t i f f improperly precluded from s u b m i t t i n g t h e i s s u e of S a f e t y Appliance A c t l i a b i l i t y t o t h e j u r y ? ( 3 ) Did t h e Court commit r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r by d i r e c t i n g a v e r d i c t a g a i n s t t h e p l a i n t i f f ? I t is c l e a r t h a t t h e p a r t i e s cannot a g r e e on t h e i s s u e s and t h a t t h e t r i a l r e c o r d d o e s n o t d e m o n s t r a t e a well-prepared and well-presented c a s e by counsel f o r e i t h e r s i d e . Although we cannot s a y t h a t t h i s c a s e would n o t u l t i m a t e l y have been appealed had it gone t o t h e j u r y , w e h a v e no d o u b t t h a t it would b e h e r e i n a d i f f e r e n t p r o c e d u r a l c o n t e x t i f c o u n s e l f o r both s i d e s had p a i d c l o s e r a t t e n t i o n t o t h e law and t o d r a f t i n g t h e i r proposed j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s . W e n o t e a l s o t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t should n o t be f a u l t e d by t h e p l a i n t i f f f o r d i r e c t i n g a v e r d i c t when it was t h e p l a i n t i f f who r e q u e s t e d t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o do so. On t h e o t h e r hand, had t h e t r i a l c o u r t been more c a r e f u l i n i t s r u l i n g s w i t h r e l a t i o n t o t h e proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s , and had t h e p a r t i e s i n s i s t e d on c a r e f u l r u l i n g s , we would be i n a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n t o handle t h e s u b s t a n t i v e i s s u e s w i t h o u t f i r s t s o r t i n g o u t t h e p r o c e d u r a l problems which l e d t o t h e r e s u l t s a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t l e v e l . B e c a u s e o f t h e n a t u r e o f t h e r u l i n g s a f f e c t i n g p l a i n t i f f ' s o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n s a s t o h i s n e g l i g e n c e t h e o r y of l i a b i l i t y , w e cannot t e l l why t h e t r i a l c o u r t e f f e c t i v e l y took t h e n e g l i g e n c e t h e o r y away from t h e j u r y . Nor can w e determine t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g s i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n and s c o p e o f t h e S a f e t y A p p l i a n c e A c t . Nonetheless, w e d e t e r m i n e t h a t w e must d e c i d e whether, under t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e , t h e d e f e n d a n t r a i l r o a d had t h e d u t y t o p r o v i d e p l a i n t i f f w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o work. Although it a p p e a r s t h a t t h e r a i l r o a d c o n c e d e s t h e r i g h t o f t h e p l a i n t i f f t o s u e under t h e S a f e t y Appliance A c t , w e must a l s o determine whether t h e r a i l r o a d h a s a v a i l a b l e t o it t h e d e f e n s e s of assumption of r i s k and c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e . W e d i s c u s s f i r s t t h e a p p l i c a t i o n and scope of t h e S a f e t y Appliance A c t . APPLICATION O F THE FEDERAL SAFETY APPLIANCE ACT: P r o c e d u r a l Backqround I n t h a t p o r t i o n of t h e p r e t r i a l o r d e r s e t t i n g f o r t h p l a i n t i f f ' s c o n t e n t i o n s , p l a i n t i f f s i m p l y a l l e g e d t h a t "defendant v i o l a t e d t h e S a f e t y Appliance A c t ( 4 5 U.S.C. S 1- 1 6 ) i n p r o v i d i n g a c a r w i t h a d e f e c t i v e h a n d b r a k e . " Defendant, on t h e o t h e r hand, had s e v e r a l c o n t e n t i o n s i n t h e p r e t r i a l o r d e r p e r t a i n i n g t o its d e f e n s e of t h e c a s e . I t a l l e g e d f i r s t t h a t t h e c a r s were n o t i n use on d e f e n d a n t ' s l i n e a t t h e t i m e of t h e a c c i d e n t . Second, it a l l e g e d t h a t p l a i n t i f f ' s i n j u r i e s w e r e n o t c a u s e d by a d e f e c t i v e handbrake o r , by a f a i l u r e of a handbrake t o perform p r o p e r l y and e f f i c i e n t l y on t h e o c c a s i o n i n q u e s t i o n when used i n a normal, o r d i n a r y and proper o p e r a t i o n . T h i r d , it a r g u e d t h a t p l a i n t i f f ' s i n j u r i e s w e r e c a u s e d by h i s n e g l i g e n c e i n f a i l i n g t o p r o p e r l y set a handbrake o r by improperly s e t t i n g t h e handbrakes on t h e remaining c a r s . F o u r t h , it a l l e g e d t h a t p l a i n t i f f had assumed t h e r i s k of h i s i n j u r i e s ( a l t h o u g h t h i s c o n t e n t i o n was withdrawn a t t h e t i m e j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s were s e t t l e d . ) F i f t h , t h e r a i l r o a d a s s e r t e d t h a t t h e r e is no e v i d e n c e t h a t a n y o f t h e handbrakes on any of t h e c a r s were d e f e c t i v e . I n i t i a l l y , we n o t e t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t d i d n o t a s s e r t d u r i n g s e t t l e m e n t of j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s , nor does it a s s e r t h e r e , t h a t t h e S a f e t y Appliance Act is i n a p p l i c a b l e because t h e r a i l r o a d c a r s were n o t i n use on d e f e n d a n t ' s l i n e a t t h e t i m e p l a i n t i f f s u s t a i n e d h i s i n j u r i e s . W e a s s u m e , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t d e f e n d a n t h a s abandoned t h i s c o n t e n t i o n . Furthermore, i n J e n k i n s v. Chicago & S o u t h e a s t e r n I l l i n o i s R a i l r o a d ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 5 Ill.App.3d 954, 284 N.E.2d 392, a c a s e remarkably s i m i l a r t o t h e f a c t s h e r e , t h e Court r u l e d t h a t t h e c a r s , although on a s i d i n g , t h a t was l e a s e d t o t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s e m p l o y e r , were i n o p e r a t i o n on d e f e n d a n t ' s r a i l r o a d l i n e . W e hold a l s o , t h a t d e f e n d a n t cannot d e f e a t a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e A c t because t h e c a r s were on a s i d i n g , even though t h e c a r l o a d i n g o p e r a t i o n s on t h e s i d i n g were handled by Ksanka Lumber Company. THE FEDERAL SAFETY APPLIANCE ACT: S u b s t a n t i v e A p p l i c a t i o n P l a i n t i f f ' s o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n s a p p l y i n g t h e S a f e t y Appliance Act, s t a t e d t h a t proof of a v i o l a t i o n of t h e Act, t o g e t h e r w i t h a c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e v i o l a t i o n and t h e i n j u r i e s s u s t a i n e d , is s u f f i c i e n t t o impose l i a b i l i t y on t h e r a i l r o a d . They f u r t h e r provided t h a t t h e d e f e n s e s of c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e and assumption o f r i s k were n o t a v a i l a b l e t o t h e r a i l r o a d . The d e f i n i t i o n of c a u s a t i o n was t h a t which is provided f o r i n t h e F e d e r a l Employers' L i a b i l i t y Act--and we s h a l l have more t o s a y of t h i s l a t e r . The r a i l r o a d a l s o o f f e r e d s e v e r a l i n s t r u c t i o n s d e f i n i n g t h e A c t , b u t provided t h a t c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e is a d e f e n s e even i f a v i o l a t i o n of t h e A c t is proved. ( A s we p r e v i o u s l y s t a t e d , t h e r a i l r o a d e l i m i n a t e d its assumption of r i s k d e f e n s e from its o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n s because it b e l i e v e d t h a t a s a m a t t e r of e v i d e n c e , t h e d e f e n s e was i n a p p l i c a b l e . ) The t r i a l c o u r t r e f u s e d p l a i n t i f f ' s o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n s and approved t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s . C o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e was t h u s a d e f e n s e under t h e Act. Only two o t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s had d i r e c t a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h e Act. The f i r s t (and a proper i n s t r u c t i o n ) d e f i n e d i n e f f i c i e n t brake and d e f e c t i v e brake; and t h e second (which a l s o was p r o p e r ) d e f i n e d t h e terms i n e f f i c i e n t and i n e f f e c t i v e , b u t f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t t h e terms were n o t synonymous. The t r i a l c o u r t approved s e v e r a l more of d e f e n d a n t ' s o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t apply t o p l a i n t i f f ' s t h e o r i e s of recovery; but t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s do n o t s p e c i f y t h a t t h e y a r e i n t e n d e d t o a p p l y e i t h e r t o t h e n e g l i g e n c e t h e o r y o f recovery, o r t o t h e S a f e t y Appliance A c t t h e o r y of r e c o v e r y , o r t o both. The danger, of c o u r s e , is t h a t t h e j u r y , w i t h o u t being p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t e d , could improperly a p p l y t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s w i t h o u t t h e n e c e s s a r y d e s i g n a t i o n . One of t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s d e f i n e d r e a s o n a b l e c a r e , which c o u l d a p p l y o n l y t o p l a i n t i f f ' s common l a w n e g l i g e n c e a c t i o n . A second d e f i n e d t h e term n e g l i g e n c e , which a g a i n could o n l y be a p p l i e d t o p l a i n t i f f ' s n e g l i g e n c e t h e o r y . A t h i r d i n s t r u c t i o n d e f i n e d t h e term c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e , b u t d i d n o t a t t e m p t t o s t a t e whether it a p p l i e d t o e i t h e r o r b o t h of p l a i n t i f f ' s t h e o r i e s o f r e c o v e r y . A f o u r t h i n s t r u c t i o n a l s o d e f i n e d c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e , and is s i m i l a r l y d e f e c t i v e f o r a f a i l u r e t o d e s i g n a t e which t h e o r y it a p p l i e d t o . A f i f t h i n s t r u c t i o n d e f i n e d t h e term proximate c a u s e , and a l t h o u g h p r o p e r l y a p p l i c a b l e t o both t h e o r i e s of recovery, f a i l e d t o c o n t a i n language t e l l i n g t h e j u r y t h a t t h e d e f i n i t i o n d i d a p p l y t o b o t h t h e o r i e s . W e a r e t h u s l e f t w i t h a s e r i e s o f i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t a r e w o e f u l l y i n a d e q u a t e , even assuming t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t had p r o p e r l y r u l e d on t h e a p p l i c a t i o n and scope of t h e S a f e t y Appliance A c t . I f t h e c a s e had gone t o t h e j u r y , and t h e p l a i n t i f f r e c e i v e d an a d v e r s e j u r y v e r d i c t , w e would be compelled t o r e v e r s e f o r t h e r e a s o n t h a t t h e j u r y was i m p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t e d . W e n e x t proceed t o a d i s c u s s i o n of t h e s u b s t a n t i v e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e F e d e r a l S a f e t y Appliance Act a s t h e y a p p l y t o t h i s c a s e . W e have no doubt t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f is a member of t h e c l a s s which can invoke t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e F e d e r a l S a f e t y Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C. 55 1 t h r u 46. S e c t i o n 1 1 p r o v i d e s i n p a r t : " I t s h a l l be unlawful f o r any common c a r r i e r . . . t o h a u l , o r p e r m i t t o be hauled o r used on its l i n e , any c a r . . . n o t equipped w i t h . . . e f f i c i e n t hand b r a k e s . . ." S e c t i o n 1 3 o f t h e Act p r o v i d e s f o r c r i m i n a l p e n a l t i e s f o r any v i o l a t i o n . Although t h e A c t i t s e l f d o e s n o t c r e a t e a c a u s e o f a c t i o n i n favor of anyone, it h a s been g i v e n e f f e c t through c i v i l s u i t s under t h e F e d e r a l Employers' L i a b i l i t y A c t ( 4 5 U.S.C. 5s 5 1 t h r u 60) i n t h e c a s e o f r a i l r o a d employees, and by s u i t s i n s t a t e c o u r t s invoking s t a t e law f o r n o n r a i l r o a d employees. I n Coray v. Southern Pac. Co. ( 1 9 4 9 ) , 335 U.S. 520, 522-523, 69 S.Ct. 275, 276, 93 L.Ed.2d 208, 210, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t long ago s t a t e d : ". . . t h i s Act, f a i r l y i n t e r p r e t e d , must be h e l d t o p r o t e c t a l l who need p r o t e c t i o n from d a n g e r o u s r e s u l t s d u e t o m a i n t e n a n c e o r o p e r a t i o n o f c o n g r e s s i o n a l l y p r o h i b i t e d d e f e c t i v e a p p l i a n c e s . " I n Boyer v. A t c h i s o n , Topeka and S a n t a Fe Railway Co. ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 38 111.2d 31, 230 N.E.2d 173, t h e I l l i n o i s Supreme Court held t h a t a r a i l r o a d passenger could invoke t h e p r o t e c t i o n of t h e A c t , and f u r t h e r m o r e , t h a t t h e d e f e n s e of assumption of r i s k was n o t a v a i l a b l e t o t h e r a i l r o a d . I n J e n k i n s , s u p r a , f o l l o w i n g t h e l e a d set f o r t h i n Boyer, t h e I l l i n o i s A p p e l l a t e Court d e c l a r e d t h a t a n o n r a i l r o a d employee working on t h e r a i l r o a d ' s s i d i n g , could invoke t h e p r o t e c t i o n of t h e A c t , and f u r t h e r m o r e , t h a t t h e d e f e n s e of c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e was n o t a v a i l a b l e t o t h e r a i l r o a d . I t is t h u s c l e a r t o us t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f h e r e can invoke t h e p r o t e c t i o n of t h e A c t ; and it is e q u a l l y c l e a r t h a t t h e r a i l r o a d cannot a s s e r t t h e d e f e n s e s of assumption of r i s k and c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e . Because it is a f e d e r a l A c t , f e d e r a l c o u r t d e c i s i o n s n e c e s s a r i l y d e f i n e t h e s u b s t a n t i v e p r o v i s i o n s . The U.S. Supreme Court h a s d e c l a r e d t h a t t h e Act imposes a b s o l u t e l i a b i l i t y t h a t is n o t i n any way dependent on t h e law of n e g l i g e n c e . I n O'Donnell v. E l g i n J. & E. Ry. Co. ( 1 9 4 9 ) , 338 U.S. 384, 390, 70 S.Ct. 200, 204, 94 L.Ed. 187, t h e Court s t a t e d : ". . . t h i s Court e a r l y swept a l l i s s u e s of n e g l i g e n c e o u t o f c a s e s u n d e r t h e S a f e t y Appliance A c t . For r e a s o n s s e t f o r t h a t l e n g t h i n our books, t h e Court h e l d t h a t a f a i l u r e of equipment t o perform a s 0 r e q u i r e d by t h e S a f e t y Appliance A c t is i n i t s e l f an a c t i o n a b l e wrong, i n no way dependent upon n e g l i g e n c e and f o r t h e proximate r e s u l t s of which t h e r e is l i a b i l i t y - - a l i a b i l i t y t h a t c a n n o t be e s c a p e d by p r o o f o f c a r e o r d i l i g e n c e . ( C i t i n g c a s e s . ) " For r e a s o n s t h a t a r e n o t e n t i r e l y c l e a r , however, t h e U.S. Supreme Court h a s a l s o d e c l a r e d t h a t whether t h e r a i l r o a d can a s s e r t c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e o r assumption of r i s k a s d e f e n s e s i n a c a s e i n v o l v i n g a n o n r a i l r o a d employee, depends e n t i r e l y on s t a t e law r a t h e r t h a n f e d e r a l law. The most r e c e n t c a s e a d h e r i n g t o t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is Crane v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa Railway Co. ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 395 U.S. 164, 89 S.Ct. 1706, 23 L.Ed.2d 176. I n Crane, t h e Court upheld an Iowa Supreme Court d e c i s i o n holding t h a t one who b r i n g s s u i t under t h e S a f e t y Appliance Act must prove (under Iowa law) t h a t he was f r e e from c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence. I n d e c l a r i n g , however, t h a t a nonemployee could n o t invoke t h e same p r o t e c t i o n s under t h e F e d e r a l Employers' L i a b i l i t y A c t t o which a r a i l r o a d employee is e n t i t l e d , t h e m a j o r i t y s t a t e d : "We r e c o g n i z e t h e i n j u s t i c e o f d e n y i n g recovery t o a nonemployee which would n o t be denied t o an employee performing t h e same t a s k i n t h e same manner a s d i d p e t i t i o n e r . But it i s f o r C o n g r e s s t o amend t h e s t a t u t e t o p r e v e n t such i n j u s t i c e . I t is n o t p e r m i t t e d t h e Court t o r e w r i t e t h e s t a t u t e . " 395 U.S. a t 167. J u s t i c e Black, joined by Chief J u s t i c e Warren and J u s t i c e Douglas, d i s s e n t e d , a r g u i n g t h a t a nonemployee under t h e S a f e t y Appliance Act should have t h e same p r o t e c t i o n s a s t h o s e g i v e n a r a i l r o a d employee who invokes t h e Act as a b a s i s of p r e d i c a t i n g c i v i l l i a b i l i t y . B e c a u s e t h e S a f e t y A p p l i a n c e A c t c r e a t e s a b s o l u t e l i a b i l i t y n o t dependent upon t h e law of n e g l i g e n c e , w e must d e c i d e t h i s i s s u e on t h e b a s i s of whether we p e r m i t t h e d e f e n s e s of assumption of r i s k and c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e where s u i t is brought under a s t a t e s t a t u t e t h a t imposes a b s o l u t e l i a b i l i t y . I n P o l l a r d v. Todd ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 148 Mont. 1 7 1 , 418 P.2d 8 6 9 , a c a s e b r o u g h t u n d e r t h e Montana S c a f f o l d i n g Act, we r u l e d t h a t l i a b i l i t y is e s t a b l i s h e d where it is proved t h a t a s t a t u t e h a s been v i o l a t e d and t h e r e is a proximate c a u s e c o n n e c t i o n between t h e v i o l a t i o n and t h e r e s u l t i n g i n j u r i e s . W e r u l e d , f u r t h e r m o r e , t h a t i n s u c h a c a s e , t h e d e f e n s e s of a s s u m p t i o n o f r i s k and c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e a r e n o t a v a i l a b l e t o one who h a s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y under t h e S c a f f o l d i n g A c t . W e would be i n c o n s i s t e n t i n i n t e r p r e t i n g a b s o l u t e l i a b i l i t y s t a t u t e s i f w e were t o permit t h e r a i l r o a d t o invoke t h e d e f e n s e s of assumption of r i s k and c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e under t h e S a f e t y Appliance Act b u t t o d i s a l l o w t h e d e f e n s e s under t h e Montana S c a f f o l d i n g A c t . I n e i t h e r c a s e , t h e p r i n c i p l e is t h e same, and t h e p r i n c i p l e should be c o n s i s t e n t l y a p p l i e d . W e a r e n o t a l o n e i n holding t h a t t h e d e f e n s e s of assumption of r i s k and c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e a r e n o t a v a i l a b l e t o t h e r a i l r o a d where sued by a p l a i n t i f f who invokes t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e S a f e t y Appliance A c t . I n Boyer, s u p r a , t h e I l l i n o i s Supreme Court determined t h a t t h e a c t i o n a b l e wrong under t h e Act is t h e f a i l u r e of t h e equipment t o perform a s r e q u i r e d under t h e Act, and t h a t once t h e v i o l a t i o n is proved, t h e p l a i n t i f f need o n l y prove t h e c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e v i o l a t i o n and t h e i n j u r i e s s u s t a i n e d . I n r u l i n g t h a t t h e d e f e n s e o f assumption of r i s k was n o t a v a i l a b l e under I l l i n o i s law, t h e c o u r t s t a t e d : "Under such a p o l i c y which imposes an a b s o l u t e d u t y t o p r o v i d e f o r p u b l i c s a f e t y it would be i n c o n g r u o u s t o a l l o w t h e d o c t r i n e o f assumption of r i s k t o be employed by t h e d e f e n d a n t t o avoid t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o one f o r whose b e n e f i t t h e s t a t u t e was enacted." 230 N.E.2d a t 178. Not t o be d e n i e d , two y e a r s l a t e r , a d e f e n d a n t r a i l r o a d a s s e r t e d t h e d e f e n s e of c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e i n a s u i t brought by a n o n r a i l r o a d employee p u r s u a n t t o t h e S a f e t y Appliance Act. The I l l i n o i s A p p e l l a t e C o u r t , f o l l o w i n g t h e l e a d i n Boyer, h e l d t h a t c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e is n o t a d e f e n s e t o a s u i t brought p u r s u a n t t o t h e Act. J e n k i n s , s u p r a . The Court s t a t e d : "Because t h e a c t i o n is one t o e n f o r c e an a b s o l u t e l i a b i l i t y , t h e a p p l i c a b l e s t a t e law is t h a t which d e a l s w i t h t h o s e t y p e s o f a c t i o n s . I t is elementary t h a t c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e , a c o n c e p t o f t h e l a w o f n e g l i g e n c e , i s n o t a n a p p l i c a b l e d e f e n s e a g a i n s t one s e e k i n g t o e n f o r c e an a b s o l u t e l i a b i l i t y . " 284 N.E.2d a t 400. The c o u r t i n J e n k i n s a l s o l a i d t o r e s t any assumption t h a t t h e d e f e n s e s would be a v a i l a b l e t o t h e r a i l r o a d where sued by a n o n r a i l r o a d employee: " I m p l i c i t i n t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s argument is t h e c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e f a c t t h a t p l a i n t i f f is a nonemployee of t h e d e f e n d a n t r a i l r o a d changes h i s s t a t u s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e a v a i l a b l e d e f e n s e s . D e f e n d a n t h a s n o t s u g g e s t e d , however, t h a t p l a i n t i f f is n o t w i t h i n t h e c l a s s of t h o s e i n t e n d e d t o be p r o t e c t e d by t h e s t a t u t e . W e can s e e no c o g e n t r e a s o n s t o a p p l y t h e remedy t h e s t a t u t e p r o v i d e s i n c o n s i s t e n t l y w i t h r e s p e c t t o e m p l o y e e s v e r s u s nonemployees. P l a i n t i f f is w i t h i n t h e p r o t e c t e d c l a s s and t h e r e f o r e he should be a f f o r d e d a l l t h e i n c i d e n t s o f t h e remedy, i n c l u d i n g t h e u n a v a i l a b i l i t y o f c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e a s a d e f e n s e . " 284 N.E.2d a t 400- 401. Nor can we s e e any c o g e n t r e a s o n s why t h e d e f e n s e s o f assumption of r i s k and c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e s h o u l d be i n a p p l i c a b l e i n a s u i t brought by a r a i l r o a d employee b u t a p p l i c a b l e i n a s u i t brought by a n o n r a i l r o a d employee. The S a f e t y Appliance A c t d o e s n o t r e q u i r e us t o r e a c h t h i s u n j u s t r e s u l t . Crane, s u p r a . Furthermore, o u r own c a s e of P o l l a r d , s u p r a , c l e a r l y sets f o r t h our p o s i t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t t o a s t a t u t e imposing a b s o l u t e l i a b i l i t y - - t h e d e f e n s e s of assumption of r i s k and c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e a r e n o t a v a i l a b l e . There is, however, one a r e a where a r a i l r o a d employee is e n t i t l e d t o a more l i b e r a l s t a n d a r d imposing l i a b i l i t y t h a n is a n o n r a i l r o a d employee--and t h a t is w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e q u e s t i o n of c a u s a t i o n . I n t h i s c a s e , t h e p l a i n t i f f o f f e r e d an i n s t r u c t i o n which d e f i n e d c a u s a t i o n by t h e s t a n d a r d s of t h e F e d e r a l Employers' L i a b i l i t y A c t . T h a t p o r t i o n o f t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s t a t e d : ". . . Under t h e F e d e r a l S a f e t y Appliance Act, i f a r a i l r o a d , such a s t h e Defendant i n t h i s a c t i o n , v i o l a t e s any such a c t , and i f t h e v i o l a t i o n c o n t r i b u t e s i n any way o r manner t o t h e i n j u r y of a p e r s o n such a s t h e P l a i n t i f f i n t h i s c a s e , such r a i l r o a d s h a l l be l i a b l e i n damages t o t h a t p e r s o n f o r h i s i n j u r i e s . " (Emphasis added. ) T h i s i n s t r u c t i o n d e f i n e d c a u s a t i o n according t o t h e d e f i n i t i o n c o n t a i n e d i n t h e F e d e r a l Employers' L i a b i l i t y Act ( 4 5 U.S.C. S 51) and c o u r t d e c i s i o n s f u r t h e r s o l i d i f y i n g t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n . See G a l l i c k v . B a l t i m o r e and Ohio R a i l r o a d Co. ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 372 U.S. 108, 83 S.Ct. 659, 9 L.Ed.2d 618; Rogers v. M i s s o u r i P a c i f i c R a i l r o a d Co. ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 352 U.S. 500, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493. The U.S. Supreme Court h e l d i n Crane, t h a t one who is n o t a r a i l r o a d employee c a n n o t i n v o k e t h e b e n e f i t s o f t h e F e d e r a l E m p l o y e r s ' L i a b i l i t y A c t i n a s u i t a g a i n s t a r a i l r o a d . (Crane, s u p r a , 395 U.S. a t 166.) Because t h e r e is no d e f i n i t i o n o f c a u s a t i o n i n t h e S a f e t y Appliance Act, w e conclude t h a t t h e i s s u e of proximate c a u s e must be d e c i d e d on t h e b a s i s o f t h e d e f i n i t i o n which p r e v a i l s under state law. S e e , McNair v. Berger ( 1 9 3 2 ) , 92 Mont. 441, 1 5 P.2d 834; Montana J u r y I n s t r u c t i o n G u i d e , No. 1 5 . 0 0 , and c a s e s c i t e d i n t h e commentary t o t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n . W e have n o t f a s h i o n e d a s p e c i a l d e f i n i t i o n t o a p p l y t o s t a t u t e s imposing a b s o l u t e l i a b i l i t y . P o l l a r d , s u p r a . SAFE PLACE TO WORK W e n e x t d i s c u s s t h e i s s u e o f whether t h e r a i l r o a d owed p l a i n t i f f t h e d u t y t o p r o v i d e him w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o work even though he was a n o n r a i l r o a d employee. The l e g a l b a s i s upon which t h e p l a i n t i f f would impose t h i s d u t y upon t h e r a i l r o a d was never c l e a r l y s e t f o r t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t l e v e l , nor is it c l e a r l y set f o r t h i n t h i s appeal. P l a i n t i f f a l l e g e d i n h i s c o m p l a i n t , and t h e a l l e g a t i o n is c a r r i e d over i n t o t h e p r e t r i a l o r d e r - - t h a t t h e r a i l r o a d breached its d u t y t o p r o v i d e him w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o work. I n t h e complaint, t h i s was simply an a l l e g a t i o n made w i t h o u t any s p e c i f i c a t i o n of how o r why t h e r a i l r o a d d i d n o t p r o v i d e him w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o work. H e d i d , however, have s e v e r a l s e p a r a t e s p e c i f i c a t i o n s of n e g l i g e n c e i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e s a f e p l a c e t o work a l l e g a t i o n . I n t h e p r e t r i a l o r d e r , he has a g e n e r a l a l l e g a t i o n t h a t t h e r a i l r o a d f a i l e d t o p r o v i d e him w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o work, and t h e n s e v e r a l s p e c i f i c a t i o n s o f n e g l i g e n c e , a l l a p p a r e n t l y aimed a t s p e c i f y i n g how o r why t h e r a i l r o a d breached its d u t y t o p r o v i d e him w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o work. Nowhere i n t h e complaint o r i n t h e p r e t r i a l o r d e r is t h e r e an i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f claimed h i s s t a t u s a s a b u s i n e s s s - i n v i t e e t r i g g e r e d t h e r a i l r o a d ' s d u t y t o p r o v i d e him w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o work. T h i s a l l e g a t i o n f i r s t a p p e a r e d i n p l a i n t i f f ' s o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n s , a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e t r i a l . W e can g e t an a p p r e c i a t i o n of what happened o n l y by r e a d i n g t h e t r a n s c r i p t w i t h r e l a t i o n t o t h e s e t t l e m e n t of j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s . P l a i n t i f f ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s s t a t e d f i r s t t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f was a b u s i n e s s i n v i t e e of t h e r a i l r o a d , and second, t h a t a s a b u s i n e s s i n v i t e e , t h e r a i l r o a d owed him a d u t y t o p r o v i d e him w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o work. I t d o e s n o t a p p e a r t h a t t h e r a i l r o a d r e f u t e d p l a i n t i f f ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t he was a b u s i n e s s i n v i t e e - - f o r , on t h a t q u e s t i o n a t l e a s t , t h e law is c l e a r . However, t h e r a i l r o a d d i d o b j e c t t o any c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e d u t y t o p r o v i d e p l a i n t i f f w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o work a r o s e from p l a i n t i f f ' s s t a t u s a s a b u s i n e s s - i n v i t e e . N e i t h e r t h e r a i l r o a d nor t h e p l a i n t i f f d i s a g r e e t h a t a s t o a n i n v i t e e , t h e r a i l r o a d had a d u t y t o e x e r c i s e r e a s o n a b l e c a r e t o a v o i d i n j u r i n g a n i n v i t e e o n t h e premises. But p l a i n t i f f went a s t e p f u r t h e r and p e r s i s t e d i n h i s c l a i m t h a t t h e r a i l r o a d had t h e d u t y , based on p l a i n t i f f ' s i n v i t e e s t a t u s , t o p r o v i d e him w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o work. He based h i s argument on t h e F e d e r a l Employers' L i a b i l i t y A c t , w h i c h , j u d i c i a l l y i n t e r p r e t e d , r e q u i r e s r a i l r o a d employers t o p r o v i d e a s a f e p l a c e t o work f o r t h e i r employees. P l a i n t i f f a t no time o f f e r e d an e x p l a n a t i o n a s t o how o r why, a s a n o n r a i l r o a d employee, he was e n t i t l e d t o t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e E m p l o y e r s ' L i a b i l i t y A c t . The r a i l r o a d , on t h e o t h e r hand, c i t e d Crane, s u p r a , f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t a n o n r a i l r o a d employee c a n n o t a v a i l h i m s e l f of t h e p r o t e c t i o n provided by t h e Employers' L i a b i l i t y Act. Although t h e t r i a l c o u r t r e j e c t e d p l a i n t i f f ' s o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n s , t h e r e is no c l e a r r e a s o n why it d i d so. Was it because t h e t r i a l c o u r t concluded t h a t p l a i n t i f f was n o t a b u s i n e s s i n v i t e e , o r was it because t h e t r i a l c o u r t concluded t h a t t h e r a i l r o a d d i d n o t owe p l a i n t i f f t h e d u t y t o p r o v i d e him w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o work? O r was it both? P a r t of t h e problem h e r e is t h a t t h e language a s t o b u s i n e s s - i n v i t e e s t a t u s and t h a t a s t o a s a f e p l a c e t o work, was c o n t a i n e d i n t h e same i n s t r u c t i o n s . Thus, w i t h o u t a c l e a r r u l i n g from t h e t r i a l c o u r t a s t o why it r e j e c t e d t h e i n s t r u c t i o n , w e a r e l e f t t o g u e s s . The p r o b l e m is compounded because p l a i n t i f f ' s c o u n s e l made no e f f o r t t o o b t a i n a c l e a r r u l i n g from t h e t r i a l c o u r t a s t o why t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s were r e j e c t e d . He should have done s o . W e a r e l e f t w i t h t h i s s i t u a t i o n a t t h a t p o i n t where t h e t r i a l c o u r t r e f u s e d p l a i n t i f f ' s o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n s : t h e p l a i n t i f f o f f e r e d no s u b s t i t u t e s ; t h e d e f e n d a n t o f f e r e d n o i n s t r u c t i o n s on t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t i n g between p l a i n t i f f and t h e r a i l r o a d ( t h e r a i l r o a d contended p l a i n t i f f was an i n v i t e e ) ; and t h e t r i a l c o u r t proposed none of its own. The r e s u l t is t h a t t h e r e c o r d is barreh o f i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t would have i n any way s e t f o r t h p l a i n t i f f ' s t h e o r y of t h e c a s e on t h e n e g l i g e n c e c o u n t had t h e c a s e been s u b m i t t e d t o t h e j u r y . T h i s is an anomolous s i t u a t i o n , t o s a y t h e l e a s t . A s we have i n d i c a t e d , p l a i n t i f f i n t h i s a p p e a l , now sets f o r t h t h e i s s u e s a s t o b u s i n e s s - i n v i t e e s t a t u s and s a f e p l a c e t o work, a s s e p a r a t e i s s u e s . T h a t is n o t t h e way t h e y were p r e s e n t e d t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t . P l a i n t i f f i n h i s b r i e f s t o t h i s C o u r t sets f o r t h c i t a t i o n a f t e r c i t a t i o n o f e n c y c l o p e d i a law t h a t p l a i n t i f f was a b u s i n e s s invitee--and w i t h t h i s t h e r a i l r o a d agrees--as do we. There is no q u e s t i o n , and a p p a r e n t l y never was one t h a t p l a i n t i f f a t l e a s t had t h e s t a t u s of a b u s i n e s s - i n v i t e e . W e do n o t need t o b e l a b o r t h i s p o i n t h e r e . I n h i s b r i e f s , t h e p l a i n t i f f c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e r a i l r o a d owed him a s a f e p l a c e t o work, h i s c o u n s e l p r o v i d e s u s w i t h a b s o l u t e l y no a u t h o r i t y , nor even good argument, t h a t t h e r a i l r o a d had a d u t y t o p r o v i d e him w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o work. A l l of h i s c i t a t i o n s m i s s t h e i s s u e he r a i s e s . N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e r e a r e i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r s i n t h i s c a s e , n o t brought t o our a t t e n t i o n by e i t h e r p a r t y , t h a t compel u s t o hold t h a t under t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e , t h e r a i l r o a d d i d owe p l a i n t i f f t h e d u t y t o p r o v i d e him w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o work. I t is an elementary p r i n c i p l e t h a t an employer must p r o v i d e its employees w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o work. Shannon v. Howard S. Wright Const. Co. ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont . , 593 P.2d 438; P o l l a r d , 418 P.2d a t 872; A l l e n v. Bear Creek Coal Co. ( 1 9 1 1 ) , 43 Mont. 269, 115 P. 673, 677; Anderson v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. ( 1 9 0 6 ) , 34 Mont. 181, 85 P.2d 884, 890. S e e a l s o 56 C.J.S. M a s t e r & S e r v a n t S 204; 53 Am.Jur.2d Master & S e r v a n t S 195. The r a i l r o a d , o f c o u r s e , acknowledges t h i s p r i n c i p l e , b u t a r g u e s t h a t t h i s p r i n c i p l e c a n n o t a p p l y h e r e f o r t h e simple r e a s o n t h a t p l a i n t i f f was n o t its employee. A s f a r a s it g o e s , it is a good argument. But w e cannot i g n o r e t h e r e a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e B u r l i n g t o n Northern and Ksanka Lumber Company. A t t h e beginning of t r i a l , c o u n s e l f o r t h e r a i l r o a d f i l e d a motion i n l i m i n e w i t h t h e t r i a l c o u r t , based on t h e f o l l o w i n g r e v e l a t i o n s : Ksanka Lumber Company is a wholly- owned s u b s i d i a r y of Plum Creek Lumber Company; and Plum Creek Lumber Company is i n t u r n , a wholly-owned s u b s i d i a r y of B u r l i n g t o n Northern. The r a i l r o a d a s s e r t e d t h a t it would be h i g h l y p r e j u d i c i a l f o r t h e j u r y t o l e a r n of its ownership of Ksanka Lumber Company, t h r o u g h t h e Plum Creek Lumber Company. I t a p p e a r s t h a t t h i s motion was g r a n t e d , f o r t h e j u r y d i d n o t , a t l e a s t d i r e c t l y , have t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n . It may w e l l be t r u e t h a t t h e i n f o r m a t i o n would be h i g h l y p r e j u d i c i a l t o t h e d e f e n d a n t r a i l r o a d h e r e , b u t w e c a n n o t i g n o r e t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e d u t i e s owed by t h e r a i l r o a d t o t h e p l a i n t i f f h e r e . The p l a i n t i f f was performing work more d i r e c t l y connected t o t h e o p e r a t i o n s o f a r a i l r o a d t h a n t o t h e o p e r a t i o n s o f a lumber company. P l a i n t i f f worked a t a r a i l r o a d s i d i n g , f i l l i n g r a i l r o a d c a r s w i t h woodchips. H i s work r e q u i r e d him t o n o t o n l y be on r a i l r o a d t r a c k s , b u t a l s o t o climb on and o f f r a i l r o a d c a r s t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e i r movement t o t h e p l a c e of l o a d i n g . H e a l s o had t o s h u t t l e t h e r a i l r o a d c a r s away from t h e l o a d i n g a r e a t o make room f o r t h e n e x t r a i l r o a d c a r t o be loaded. That t h e r a i l r o a d l e a s e d t h e p r e m i s e s t o Plum Creek Lumber Company, which i n t u r n l e a s e d t h e premises t o Ksanka Lumber Company--both being t h e a l t e r ego o f t h e r a i l r o a d company--makes l i t t l e d i f f e r e n c e . The p l a i n t i f f was working d i r e c t l y i n t h e o p e r a t i o n s o f t h e r a i l r o a d i n e v e r y s e n s e o f t h e word. W e d o n o t q u e s t i o n h e r e t h e r i g h t o f a r a i l r o a d c o r p o r a t i o n t o c r e a t e wholly-owned s u b s i d i a r y c o r p o r a t i o n s t o conduct some of its b u s i n e s s . W e do, however, q u e s t i o n t h e r i g h t of a r a i l r o a d by s o d o i n g , t o a b s o l v e i t s e l f o f t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o p r o v i d e a s a f e p l a c e t o work f o r employees who a r e t e c h n i c a l l y employed by a s u b s i d i a r y c o r p o r a t i o n , b u t whose employment is d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o t h e o p e r a t i o n s of a r a i l r o a d . W e t h u s hold t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t r a i l r o a d h e r e , owed t h e p l a i n t i f f t h e d u t y t o p r o v i d e him w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o work. Where one c o r p o r a t i o n is t h e wholly-owned s u b s i d i a r y o f t h e p a r e n t company, and where t h e employee is engaged i n d u t i e s t h a t a r e a s c l o s e l y connected t o t h e b u s i n e s s of t h e p a r e n t company a s t h e y a r e t o t h e s u b s i d i a r y c o r p o r a t i o n , a s t h e y a r e h e r e , j u s t i c e r e q u i r e s us t o hold t h a t b o t h c o r p o r a t i o n s owed t h e d u t y t o p r o v i d e p l a i n t i f f w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o work. I t is s a f e t o assume t h a t p l a i n t i f f c o l l e c t e d Workers' Compensation b e n e f i t s from Ksanka Lumber Company, and t h u s t h a t Ksanka's d u t y t o p r o v i d e a s a f e p l a c e t o work was d i s c h a r g e d b y t h e W o r k e r ' s C o m p e n s a t i o n b e n e f i t s . On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e r i g h t of t h e worker t o s u e t h e p a r e n t company under t h e f a c t s h e r e is n o t doubted. Had t h e employee been a b l e t o s u e a s an employee of t h e r a i l r o a d under t h e F e d e r a l Employers' L i a b i l i t y A c t , s u p r a , and invoked t h e S a f e t y Appliance A c t a s h i s c a u s e o f a c t i o n , t h e r e is no doubt t h a t h i s chances o f r e c o v e r y a g a i n s t t h e r a i l r o a d would h a v e b e e n c o n s i d e r a b l y e n h a n c e d . F o r example, p l a i n t i f f would have been e n t i t l e d t o a more l i b e r a l d e f i n i t i o n of c a u s a t i o n t h a n t h a t t o which he is e n t i t l e d i n t h i s c a s e . Thus, t h e r a i l r o a d is e n t i t l e d t o a s t r i c t e r d e f i n i t i o n of c a u s a t i o n t o be a p p l i e d i n t h i s c a s e . The o r d e r o f t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i r e c t i n g a v e r d i c t on b o t h c o u n t s is r e v e r s e d . T h i s c a u s e is remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r a new t r i a l . W e Concur: C h i e f J u s t i c e v / J u s t i c e s