Title: Fink v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
KENNETH E. FINK, 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   No. 578, 2005 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§  
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§   Court Below – Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ Cr.A. Nos. IN00-05-1260 thru 1285 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§                    IN00-05-1752 thru 1755 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§  
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
    Submitted:  March 1, 2006 
 
 
 
 
      Decided:  March 14, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 14th day of March 2006, it appears to the Court that: 
1) 
Kenneth E. Fink, the defendant-below, appeals from the denial 
of his Rule 61 motion for post-conviction relief.  On March 18, 2004, Fink 
filed a Rule 61 motion for post-conviction relief, which the Superior Court 
Commissioner recommended be denied in a report dated April 29, 2005.  
The Superior Court rejected Fink’s objections and adopted the 
Commissioner’s Report, denying his motion on October 28, 2005.  Fink now 
appeals to this Court from the denial of his Rule 61 motion.   
 
2) 
Fink claims that his defense counsel failed to raise a 
meritorious argument on appeal, and that that failure constituted ineffective 
 
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assistance of counsel.  We review the denial of a motion for post-conviction 
relief based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to determine 
whether competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact and 
whether its conclusions of law are free from legal error.1   
 
3) 
In March 2000, the Office of Attorney General began 
investigating Fink, an attorney and member of the Delaware Bar, for misuse 
and for conversion of client funds for personal use.2  To assist its 
investigation, the State obtained a search warrant for Fink’s car and 
residence to look for client records, financial information and legal 
documents.  The State executed the search warrant on March 21, 2000, 
seizing two desktop computers, two hard drives, forty-two zip disks, two 
CD-ROMs and three floppy disks.   
4) 
A second search warrant, granted the following day, permitted a 
search of the seized computer equipment.  While searching a seized CD, a 
police officer opened a file named “pre-teen.jpg” and discovered that it was 
child pornography.  The State then obtained a third search warrant to search 
the same computer equipment for additional evidence of child pornography.  
                                          
 
1 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996); Shockley v. State, 565 A.2d 1373, 
1377 (Del. 1989). 
2 On June 3, 2003, Fink was disbarred.  See In re Fink, 2003 WL 21295919 (Del. Supr.). 
 
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Execution of that third warrant revealed more than 190 images of child 
pornography.   
5) 
Fink filed a pre-trial motion to suppress all of the child 
pornography seized during the execution of the second and third warrants.  
Fink argued that:  (i) the discovery of the pornography resulted from a 
search that was beyond the scope of the second warrant, (ii) the second 
warrant’s execution did not adhere to the guidelines outlined in its 
supporting affidavit, and (iii) the second warrant lacked sufficient 
particularity and was overbroad.  Fink also claimed that the third warrant, 
and all evidence seized during its execution, was the tainted fruit of the 
overbroad execution of the second warrant.  The Superior Court denied 
Fink’s suppression motion.  
6) 
On March 8, 2002, a jury convicted Fink of fifteen counts of 
Unlawfully Dealing in Child Pornography and fifteen counts of Possession 
of Child Pornography.  Fink was sentenced to ninety-eight years at Level V, 
suspended after serving eight years, for thirty-five years probation.3  Fink 
raised seven claims of error on direct appeal, including an argument that the 
first warrant was vague and overbroad.  He did not, however, challenge the 
                                          
 
3 On March 24, 2004, the Superior Court reduced the Level V time from eight years to 
six years.   
 
 
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propriety of the issuance or execution of the second and third warrants.  We 
affirmed Fink’s judgments of conviction and sentence on appeal.4   
 
7) 
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Fink 
must demonstrate that: (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness, and (2) the deficiencies in counsel’s 
representation caused him actual prejudice.5  Counsel’s efforts benefit from 
a strong presumption of reasonableness in that analysis.6   
8) 
To satisfy the first prong, in the context of a failure to raise a 
particular claim on appeal, Fink must show that counsel was objectively 
unreasonable because the not-raised, nonfrivolous issue was clearly stronger 
than the issues that counsel did present.7  If Fink succeeds in such a 
                                          
 
4 Fink v. State, 817 A.2d 781 (Del. 2003).   
5 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984); Gattis v. State, 697 A.2d 
1174, 1178 (Del. 1997); Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d at 1196.   
6 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d at 1196 (citing Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753-54 (Del. 
1990)).   
7 Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 288 (2000).  To analyze the first prong of Strickland, 
Fink urges this Court to adopt the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation, which considers 
whether:  (i) the omitted issue was significant and obvious; (ii) counsel ignored an issue 
that was clearly stronger than the issues actually presented; and (iii) the failure to raise 
the issue may have been a strategic decision by counsel.  Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 
646 (7th Cir. 1986).  The United States Supreme Court cited Gray v. Greer with approval 
as to only the second factor:  namely, whether the overlooked issue was stronger than 
those presented.  Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. at 288.  Because Fink cannot demonstrate 
even that single consideration, it is unnecessary to reach the merits of adopting the entire 
Greer analysis. 
 
 
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showing, he must then establish a reasonable probability that, but for his 
counsel’s failure to raise the issue, he would have prevailed on his appeal.8 
 
9) 
Fink claims that a challenge to the issuance and execution of 
the second warrant (permitting a search of the computer equipment) was the 
stronger issue to raise on appeal, and that his counsel’s failure to do so 
amounted to constitutionally ineffective assistance.  Fink contends that:  (i) 
the police seized the computer equipment without any assurance that there 
was financial information contained in its files; (ii) even if counsel had 
successfully challenged the first warrant on appeal, the second and third 
warrants would have remained valid, because the Superior Court’s denial of 
the motion to suppress concerning those warrants was the law of the case; 
(iii) nothing in counsel’s affidavit showed that a strategic decision was made 
not to appeal; (iv) the police officer executing the warrant did not use proper 
limiting searches and tools that were available to particularize electronic 
searches; and (v) that officer had no expertise in conducting that type of 
electronic search.    
10) 
Upon review of the record and the contentions of the parties, we 
conclude that Fink has not established that his counsel’s decision was 
objectively unreasonable.  The Commissioner’s Report, as adopted by the 
                                          
 
8 Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. at 285. 
 
6
Superior Court in denying Fink’s Rule 61 motion, correctly performed the 
Strickland analysis and concluded that counsel’s decision not to appeal the 
denial of Fink’s motion to suppress (based on warrants two and three) was a 
strategic decision and not at all unreasonable under the circumstances.   
11) 
The record supports the Commissioner’s conclusions.  Fink’s 
counsel advanced seven thorough and careful arguments on appeal, 
including several arguments challenging the search warrant for Fink’s home 
and car.  Contrary to Fink’s assertion, had counsel prevailed on the appeal of 
the first search warrant, it may have resulted in a suppression of the 
computer images, because without a warrant to search the home, there would 
be no seizure of any computer equipment—let alone later warrants 
authorizing a search of that seized equipment.9  Fink’s counsel stated in his 
affidavit that before deciding not to appeal the second and third warrant 
issue, he reviewed the warrants, the motion, the hearing transcript, and the 
Superior Court’s decision.  He ultimately concluded that the trial court acted 
within its discretion in denying the underlying motion.   
12) 
In its denial of Fink’s motion to suppress, the Commissioner 
carefully considered the scope of the warrant to search the computer 
equipment, and the conduct of the officer executing the warrant, and 
                                          
 
9 It is now established that Fink’s appeal challenging that first warrant also lacked merit.  
Fink v. State, 817 A.2d 781 (Del. 2003).    
 
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concluded that Fink’s challenges were meritless.  Because Fink has not 
shown that his counsel’s failure to appeal the denial of Fink’s initial motion 
to suppress was an objectively unreasonable decision, we do not reach the 
second prong of Strickland, which is whether that decision actually 
prejudiced Fink.   
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment 
of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice