Title: Saavedra v. Delaware

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ELDER SAAVEDRA, 
§ 
 
§ No. 165, 2019 
 
Defendant Below, 
§  
 
Appellant, 
§ Court Below: Superior Court 
 
§ of the State of Delaware  
 
v. 
§  
 
§ ID No. N1705014681 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
§ 
 
§   
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§  
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted: November 13, 2019 
Decided: 
January 30, 2020 
 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices.  
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Delaware.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
Michael W. Modica, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant Saavedra. 
Brian L. Arban, Esquire Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Appellee 
State of Delaware.  
 
 
2 
 
TRAYNOR, Justice: 
 
A Superior Court jury convicted Elder Saavedra of the first-degree murder of 
Lester Mateo and possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony.  
The court sentenced Saavedra to life in prison for the murder conviction and ten 
years in prison for the weapons charge. 
 
In this direct appeal, Saavedra argues that his convictions should be 
overturned because of the prosecutor’s misconduct and the trial court’s erroneous 
admission of evidence during his trial.  His principal complaint relates to the chief 
investigating officer’s narrative testimony during the prosecution’s display of 
numerous video clips that, it claimed, showed Saavedra exiting a nightclub, getting 
behind the wheel of a large sport utility vehicle, and driving that SUV into Mateo, 
killing him.  He claims that the prosecution used the officer’s narration as a vehicle 
for the admission of improper identification testimony and otherwise inadmissible 
hearsay. 
 
Saavedra also contends that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing 
another officer to offer lay opinion testimony under D.R.E. 701 regarding the 
meaning of a phrase uttered in Spanish by Saavedra at the scene, when, according to 
Saavedra, the opinion was not “rationally based on the witness’s perception.”  And 
finally, Saavedra asserts that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he asked 
3 
 
a question that implied that the witness—despite his denial—had identified Saavedra 
in a video clip during a pretrial interview. 
 
Although Saavedra has raised some legitimate concerns regarding the 
officer’s narrative testimony that accompanied the important video evidence, we 
disagree with his conclusion that the admission of that testimony, much of which 
came in without objection and was the subject of two curative instructions, is 
grounds for reversal.  Nor are we persuaded that the challenged opinion testimony 
and the prosecutor’s question that purportedly implied a fact that was not supported 
by the evidence affected the fairness of Saavedra’s trial.  Therefore, we affirm. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On the evening of March 25, 2017, Lester Mateo, accompanied by several 
friends, drove a Cadillac Escalade belonging to a friend’s sister to a nightclub in 
Bear, Delaware called El Nuevo Rodeo.  As the evening passed into the early 
morning hours of March 26, Elder Saavedra, who was at the club with his brother, 
Carlos, and his cousin, Brian, started a scuffle on the club’s dance floor by shoving 
one of Mateo’s friends, Yosimar DeLeon-Lopez.  The nightclub’s security staff 
quickly moved to separate Saavedra and his friends from DeLeon-Lopez, Mateo, 
and their friends, escorting the latter group out the club’s front door while Saavedra’s 
group was escorted out a side door.  As DeLeon-Lopez was leaving the club through 
its main door, he saw the person who had pushed him on the dance floor and heard 
4 
 
him say:  “Guatemala”—an apparent reference to Mateo’s group—“is going to die.”1  
DeLeon-Lopez later identified Saavedra in a photographic lineup conducted at the 
police station as the man who pushed him and confirmed that identification at trial.  
Two other witnesses—Irwin Ramirez-Recinos and Fernando Castillo de Leon—also 
identified Saavedra as the person who started the scuffle on the dance floor.  
Witnesses described Saavedra’s demeanor variously as “insult[ing],”2 “mad and 
drunk,”3 and itching for a fight. 
 
After the altercation, Mateo, who was his group’s designated driver, walked 
hurriedly and then ran to the Escalade, got in, and drove it to the edge of the parking 
lot near the east end of the building.  For reasons that are unclear, Mateo then got 
out of the vehicle, with the engine running and the front driver’s side door open, and 
began to walk toward the nightclub’s entrance.  But he didn’t get far.  Almost 
immediately, two individuals from Saavedra’s group, Brian Saavedra and Carlos 
Saavedra, began to chase him, belts and buckles in hand.  A doorman came to 
Mateo’s aide by spraying the two pursuers with pepper spray.  But Mateo was not 
out of harm’s way.  Another individual, ultimately identified by Madelyn Aramiz as 
Elder Saavedra, had hopped into the running Escalade and now pointed it in Mateo’s 
direction.  Try as he might to evade the speeding Escalade, Mateo was unable to get 
                                         
1 App. to Opening Br. at A44. 
2 App. to Answering Br. at B31.  
3 Id.  
5 
 
away.  Saavedra caused the Escalade to leap a curb and then accelerated, ramming 
the vehicle violently into the fleeing Mateo resulting in his death from blunt force 
injuries. 
 
The police arrived at the scene within a matter of minutes.  Detective Scott 
Mauchin of the Delaware State Police, who was designated as the chief investigating 
officer, arrived approximately one hour later and began the process of identifying 
and interviewing witnesses and gathering surveillance video evidence, which, as will 
be discussed in detail later, was extensive. 
 
One of the witnesses who came forward was Madelyn Aramiz.  Ms. Aramiz 
had been at El Nuevo Rodeo that evening since it opened at 9:00, but in the ensuing 
four hours she had only “one drink and that was it.”4  Around 1:00 a.m., Aramiz 
“noticed the security guards running to an area,”5 which she interpreted as some sort 
of trouble brewing so, being tired anyway, she decided to leave the club and wait in 
her cousin’s van for her cousin who was dancing.  Shortly after entering the van, she 
heard what she described as a “scuffle” behind it.6  She looked out and noticed a 
person walking “alongside . . . [a] black car.”7  She watched from two parking spaces 
away as that person, who “looked spooked,”8 turned to run.  But, as she put it, “the 
                                         
4 Id. at B39. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at B40. 
7 App. to Opening Br. at A67. 
8 Id. at A68. 
6 
 
truck floored it and ran right in [to him].”9  Her conclusion that “the truck floored it” 
was based on how loud the engine sounded.10 
 
Aramiz immediately looked at the person who was driving the truck.11  She 
watched as the driver opened the door of the truck.12  At trial, she described what 
she saw next: 
 
I saw him jump out.  I saw him jump out of the driver’s side.  
And then he proceeded to run.  But he stood directly in front of the van 
that I was sitting in pretty much.  And he stood there.  He had a belt 
wrapped around his hand with a big buckle.  He stood there for a few 
seconds.  And then he kind of smirked and did a little hippity-hop.  And 
then he said “la migra.”  And then he ran off.13 
 
Aramiz waited for a security guard to arrive before getting out of the van.  She 
told the guard that “there was someone lying there [and] that he was probably 
dead.”14  She then called 911.  She spoke to the police initially at the scene, but it is 
unclear what she told them at the time.  We do know, however, that she met with the 
police later that week and picked a photograph of Elder Saavedra out of a 
photographic lineup, identifying him as the person she saw getting out of the vehicle 
after it struck Lester Mateo. 
                                         
9 Id.. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at A68–69. 
12 Id. at A69. 
13 Id.  A review of the video evidence suggests that Aramiz was mistaken and that Saavedra was 
not wielding his belt as a weapon.  That same evidence, however, shows Saavedra’s two 
companions, Brian and Carlos Saavedra, holding their belts as if they intended to use them 
aggressively. 
14 Id. at A70. 
7 
 
 
Although the police secured these identifications of Elder Saavedra during the 
week following Mateo’s death—by Yosimar DeLeon-Lopez, Irwin Ramirez-
Recinos, and Fernando Castillo de Leon as the instigator of the dance-floor 
altercation and by Madelyn Aramiz as the driver of the Cadillac Escalade that caused 
Mateo’s death— Saavedra was not arrested for several weeks following the crime.  
That is because Saavedra left Delaware ostensibly to evade detection and arrest.  
According to cell-tower location information obtained through a search warrant, 
Saavedra’s cell phone connected to a cell tower in North Carolina approximately 
seven hours after the collision in the dance club parking lot.  A day and a half later, 
according to the cell phone call detail records, Saavedra was in New York City. 
 
Other evidence tended to show that Saavedra was fleeing the consequences of 
his actions at El Nuevo Rodeo.  For instance, having never missed a paycheck in the 
three and one-half years during which he worked for a local commercial office 
furniture company, Saavedra “stopped showing up for work” on March 27 according 
to the company’s owner, leaving two paychecks unclaimed.15 
 
A former girlfriend of Saavedra’s, Mariela Conejo-Cintura, provided 
additional insight into his activities and state of mind in the wake of Mateo’s death.  
Conejo-Cintura was in El Nuevo Rodeo and saw Saavedra “fighting with [the] 
                                         
15 Id. at A107–10. 
8 
 
friends, family of the boy- - the guy,”16 but she didn’t see how the fight started.  She 
had no direct contact with Saavedra until later that morning after El Nuevo Rodeo 
had closed.  As she was driving home after dropping off friends, Saavedra called her 
on her cell phone.  Saavedra told Conejo-Cintura that he needed her help and 
implored her to come to his apartment across the river in Swedesboro, New Jersey.  
She complied, and when she arrived at the apartment, she found Saavedra acting in 
a “strange” manner, “mad” and “nervous.”17  Saavedra left the area of the 
Swedesboro apartment without telling Conejo-Cintura what exactly it was that he 
needed, and she did not ask because, according to her, “when you ask [questions of 
Saavedra], he gets really upset and comes at people.”18 
 
“[D]ays later”19—the record does not say how many—Conejo-Cintura 
returned to Saavedra’s Swedesboro apartment at Saavedra’s request, but he was not 
there—nor was his bed, furniture, or living room table.  The apartment was otherwise 
in disarray with “a lot of stuff . . . and boxes open everywhere.”20  This surprised 
Conejo-Cintura, because she always knew Saavedra to keep a clean, orderly, and 
well-furnished apartment.   
                                         
16 Id. at A91. 
17 App. to Answering Br. at B110. 
18 Id. at B111. 
19 Id. at B112. 
20 Id. at B113. 
9 
 
 
The next time Conejo-Cintura saw Saavedra was at her home in Delaware.  
After asking Conejo-Cintura if she had heard any rumors about what happened that 
night at El Nuevo Rodeo, Saavedra once again asked for help, saying that he needed 
to buy a car so he could leave the country.  Conejo-Cintura, fearful that Saavedra 
would do harm to her—he “threatened [her] with death”21—answered Saavedra’s 
demands by helping find a car and signing for the loan. 
 
Several days later—once again, we are not certain how many—Saavedra 
returned to Conejo-Cintura’s house, this time in the car she had purchased for him.  
And on this occasion, Saavedra told Conejo-Cintura what happened “on the night of 
the rodeo.”  Saavedra confessed: 
 
[t]hat he got possessed by the devil and killed somebody that 
night and he didn’t want to do it, and that he was going to finish the rest 
of the rats, the Guatemalans that he doesn’t like.22 
Saavedra also told Conejo-Cintura that, because she now knew what 
happened, if anything happened to him, she would be guilty too.  Saavedra was 
arrested on May 5, 2017 and charged with murder in the first degree and possession 
of a deadly weapon—the Cadillac Escalade—during the commission of a felony.23 
                                         
21 Id. at B117. 
22 Id. 
23 Sept. 17, 2018 Trial Transcript at 53; Answering Br. at 16. 
10 
 
 
At his trial, the evidence was overwhelming—and Saavedra did not appear to 
contest—that he was the instigator of the dance-floor scuffle.24 And surveillance 
video clips, collected from numerous camera angles, captured—with varying 
degrees of clarity—much of what occurred after the two contending groups were 
expelled from the club.  
 
In the State’s opening statement, the prosecutor played some of the video clips 
for the jury and identified Lester Mateo and Elder Saavedra, among others, from the 
time they left the club to the moment of the fatal collision.  During this display, after 
specifically pointing out Saavedra, the prosecutor invited the jury to “watch . . . and 
track the defendant.”25  Saavedra did not object.  The prosecutor also played a video 
showing Madelyn Aramiz walking to her van shortly before the collision and 
described her identification of Saavedra in the photographic lineup. 
 
For his part, Saavedra’s opening statement was short (covering five transcript 
pages) and relatively benign.  He did, however, remind the jury that, despite the 
prosecutor’s identification of Saavedra in the video clips during opening statements, 
whether that identification was accurate was for the jury to decide.  Saavedra also 
suggested that Madelyn Aramiz’s identification was unreliable. 
                                         
24 In closing argument, Saavedra’s counsel attempted to downplay the significance of the scuffle, 
calling it a “non-fight.”  September 17, 2018 Trial Transcript 101. 
25 Sept. 10, 2018 Trial Transcript. 
11 
 
 
The jury heard the testimony of fourteen witnesses, all of whom were called 
by the State.  Saavedra chose not to present any evidence.  Not surprisingly, one of 
the major thrusts of Saavedra’s closing argument was an attack on Aramiz’s 
credibility.26  But notably—especially in light of Saavedra’s arguments before us—
Saavedra paid scant attention in closing to the video evidence and whether it 
supported the State’s contention that Saavedra was the driver who killed Mateo. 
 
As mentioned, after the jury found Saavedra guilty of murder in the first 
degree and possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony, the 
Superior Court sentenced Saavedra to life plus ten years in prison. 
II.  SAAVEDRA’S CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL 
 
Saavedra makes three arguments on appeal.  First, he claims that the 
prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by impermissibly eliciting the 
narration of the critical surveillance videotapes.  According to Saavedra, the manner 
in which the prosecutor questioned the chief investigating officer during the 
playback of the video for the jury manifested an intent to call forth inadmissible 
hearsay and improper identifications.  Saavedra also appends a claim to this 
argument that the “enhancing” of one of the videos was improper. 
                                         
26 Saavedra’s counsel went so far as to call Aramiz a liar, prompting a curative instruction from 
the trial judge. 
12 
 
 
Second, Saavedra contends that the Superior Court abused its discretion by 
allowing a police witness of Hispanic descent to testify regarding the meaning, 
beyond a literal translation, of the phrase “la migra”—a phrase an important 
eyewitness said she heard Saavedra utter as he fled the scene.  The State offered, and 
the court admitted, the testimony as a lay opinion under Rule 701 of the Delaware 
Rules of Evidence (“D.R.E.”), which Saavedra says was error. 
 
Third, Saavedra argues that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct 
when the prosecutor asked a question of a recalcitrant witness implying that the 
witness had previously identified Saavedra in a video, after the witness had denied 
doing so. 
III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When we consider prosecutorial-misconduct claims, our standard of review 
frequently depends on whether the defendant objected to the alleged misconduct at 
trial.  If the defendant did not object, this Court reviews only for plain error; if he 
did object, then we review for harmless error.27   
Because the scope of Saavedra’s prosecutorial misconduct claims is unclear—
some aspects of it appear to have been raised below while others were not—it is 
appropriate here to describe the difference between harmless-error and plain-error 
review of a prosecutorial misconduct claim.   Under both standards, we first engage 
                                         
27 Baker v. State, 906 A.2d 139, 148 (Del. 2006). 
13 
 
in a de novo review to determine whether the prosecutor’s actions rise to the level of 
misconduct.28  If we decide that no misconduct occurred, the analysis ends; only if 
we find misconduct do we proceed to the plain error and harmless error analysis.29 
If we find misconduct and the claim was not fairly considered below because 
a timely objection was not made and the judge failed to address the conduct sua 
sponte, we engage in a plain error analysis and apply the standard announced in 
Wainwright v. State,30 to determine whether the error complained of is so clearly 
prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial 
process.31  According to Wainwright,  
the doctrine of plain error is limited to material defects which are 
apparent on the face of the record[,] which are basic, serious[,] and 
fundamental in their character, and which clearly deprive an accused of 
a substantial right, or which clearly show manifest injustice.32 
If we find plain error under the Wainwright standard, we reverse. 
 
Where, on the other hand, defense counsel raised a timely objection to the 
prosecutorial misconduct at issue or if the trial judge addressed the issue sua sponte, 
we review for harmless error.  In Baker v. State, then-Chief Justice Steele aptly 
described our harmless-error analysis as applied to prosecutorial misconduct: 
                                         
28 Id. at 149–50. 
29 Id. 
30 504 A.2d 1096 (Del. 1986). 
31 See Baker, 906 A.2d at 150.  
32 Wainwright, 504 A. 2d at 1100.   
14 
 
 
If  . . . we determine that the trial prosecutor did engage in 
misconduct, we move to the second step in the analysis, because not 
every instance of prosecutorial misconduct requires reversal.  Only 
improper comments or conduct that prejudicially affect the defendant’s 
substantial rights warrant a reversal of his conviction.  To determine 
whether prosecutorial misconduct prejudicially affects a defendant’s 
substantial rights, we apply the three factors of the Hughes test, which 
are:  (1) the closeness of the case, (2) the centrality of the issue affected 
by the error, and (3) the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.  
The factors in the Hughes test are not conjunctive and do not have the 
same impact in every case; for example, one factor may outweigh the 
other two.  Moreover, we apply the test itself in a contextual, case-by-
case, and fact sensitive manner.  33 
 
If we conclude that prosecutorial misconduct has occurred but that reversal is 
not warranted because of the failure to meet the Wainwright standard under plain-
error review or the Hughes standard under harmful-error analysis, we proceed to yet 
another analytical step in accordance with our decision in Hunter v. State.34  Under 
Hunter, even where we are unable to conclude that the prosecutor’s misconduct was 
so prejudicial as to compromise the fairness of the trial process, we may yet reverse 
where the misconduct is part of a “persistent pattern of prosecutorial misconduct” 
over different trials such that a failure to reverse would compromise the integrity of 
the judicial process.35  “Under the Hunter test we can reverse, but need not do so,”36 
especially where other ways of dealing with the misconduct such as a referral to the 
                                         
33 Baker, 906 A.2d at 148–149 (citations omitted); see also Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559 (Del. 
1981). 
34 Hunter v. State, 815 A.2d 730 (Del. 2002). 
35 Id. at 737–38.   
36 Baker, 906 A.2d at 149 (emphasis in original). 
15 
 
Attorney General for internal discipline or to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel are 
more appropriate. 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Testimony Relating to Video Presentation—Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
As mentioned, the immediate prelude to the fatal collision and the actual 
collision itself were captured by surveillance video cameras.  Most of the video 
images, especially those showing Saavedra angrily walking away from the nightclub 
and those that captured the Escalade striking Mateo, are remarkably clear.  Others, 
including the portion of one video clip depicting Saavedra getting into the Escalade 
before the collision and fleeing from it afterwards are considerably less clear.  All 
told, the State moved twenty separate video DVDs into evidence and played all of 
them for the jury during its case-in-chief.  Saavedra now raises a multitude of 
arguments relating to the manner in which the prosecution presented this video 
evidence.  He leads with his claim that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by 
asking questions of the chief investigating officer that elicited inadmissible 
testimony during the video presentation and follows with the contention that one of 
the videos was improperly “enhanced.”37 
                                         
37 Opening Br. at 2, 27–2 8. 
16 
 
Saavedra claims that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he 
“impermissibly elicit[ed] [the] improper narration of [the] surveillance videotapes”38 
by Detective Mauchin.  He claims—if we understand his argument correctly—that, 
although the questions asked by the prosecutor were not in themselves improper, the 
prosecutor’s purpose in asking them was to elicit an improper identification of 
Saavedra as well as inadmissible hearsay.  He further contends that, because several 
instances of Detective Mauchin’s purportedly prejudicial and inadmissible 
testimony came after the trial judge directed Detective Mauchin to “refrain from 
making any type of identification of the defendant,”39 the questions that elicited the 
responses were asked in disregard of the trial court’s instructions.  
Although we do not condone the use of narrative testimony during a video 
presentation to a fact finder beyond what is necessary to lay the foundation for the 
video’s admission and to present an uncontroversial explanation of what the video 
depicts, we are satisfied, after a careful review of the prosecutor’s examination of 
Detective Mauchin—especially the uninterrupted examination on the first day of 
trial—that the prosecutor cannot fairly be charged with misconduct.   
 
According to Saavedra, the alleged misconduct and improper identifications 
occurred on the fourth day of trial.  But that was not Detective Mauchin’s first day 
                                         
38 Id.  
39 App. to Opening Br. at A112. 
17 
 
on the witness stand.  In fact, Detective Mauchin had testified and was subject to 
cross-examination on the first trial day, after which eight other witnesses testified, 
including security personnel from El Nuevo Rodeo, Irwin Ramirez-Recinos, 
Yosimar DeLeon-Lopez, Fernando Castillo de Leon, Brian Saavedra, and Madelyn 
Aramiz.  Detective Mauchin was also recalled on the third day of trial for testimony 
relating to his participation in the search of two residences with which Saavedra was 
connected.40  Then, on the fourth day of trial, Detective Mauchin was recalled.  
Saavedra’s prosecutorial-misconduct claim focuses on this third round of the 
detective’s testimony.  But to fairly assess the propriety of the prosecutor’s direct 
examination the third time around, we must first understand the evidence that had 
been presented up to that point—without objection—and especially what Detective 
Mauchin had already told the jury. 
 
During Detective Mauchin’s testimony on the first day of trial, the State 
moved the admission of seventeen video exhibits collected from more than a dozen 
surveillance cameras.   At first, the detective identified the different cameras by 
number and described the areas outside El Nuevo Rodeo captured by each camera, 
                                         
40 At the home of Mariela Conejo-Cintura (Saavedra’s former girlfriend) at which, it was learned, 
Saavedra had stored some of his property, police seized a shirt that the State contended Saavedra 
was wearing on the night of Mateo’s death.  During this testimony, Mauchin compared the shirt to 
a still photo (State’s Ex. No. 24) developed from the video that was admitted as State’s Ex. No. 7. 
18 
 
noting that certain camera angles were more helpful than others “because they 
showed all the parties involved . . . [and] their movements.”41 
 
The prosecution, without objection, then began to play the video clips for the 
jury as Detective Mauchin was questioned.  Here are some representative—and 
particularly relevant—examples of the interplay between the video clips and 
Mauchin’s testimony: 
Q. 
What is significant, why did you pull this camera angle [camera 
two] in this clip? 
A. 
Primarily because you could see the victim, Lester Mateo, from 
this camera angle.42 
* * *  
Q. 
What are we looking at here?  What are we looking at with 
respect to Lester? 
A. 
The Guatemalan group are talking with the security guards out 
front, and they’re explaining to them or trying to at least explain 
to them as to what happened inside the club.43 
* * * 
 
Q. 
What are we looking at here? 
A. 
This is Lester Mateo.  He just walked away from the front door.  
Now he’s running down the alley.  He’s in [sic] route to actually 
get the Escalade.44 
* * * 
 
Q. 
Why was this collected? 
                                         
41 App. to Answering Br. at B6. 
42 Id. at B7 (referring to State’s Ex. No. 2). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at B8 (referring to State’s Ex. No. 3). 
19 
 
A. 
This is the Cadillac Escalade as Lester Mateo is driving it, 
towards that side parking lot.45 
* * * 
 
Q.  
Why was this clip collected? 
A. 
This clip shows the defendant and his friends exiting the club and 
walking towards camera three.46 
* * * 
 
Q. 
What’s the time on this? 
A. 
March 26, 2017, at 1:18 a.m.  And this will also pick up the 
defendant and his group as they walk further down the 
sidewalk.47 
* * * 
Q. 
When you see them enter the picture, can you point them to the 
jury, please. 
A. 
Yes.  This is the defendant right here in the front with his shirt 
open, and he does not have a cowboy hat on. 
Q. 
Can you identify the people portrayed in the surveillance 
throughout the course of your investigation after talking to 
witnesses? 
A. 
Yes.  We were able to identify, out of that group of actually six 
that you’ll see, we identified four of the individuals in that group. 
Q. 
As they come into the picture, you can point them out to the jury 
and identify them. 
A. 
Sure.  This is Brian Saavedra right here with his back to the 
camera now (indicating).  This is Carlos Saavedra right here 
(indicating).  He’s the brother of the defendant.  This is Raul 
Hernandez here (indicating).  And these are the two that we were 
not able to identify.48 
                                         
45 Id. (referring to State’s Ex. No. 6). 
46 Id. (referring to State’s Ex. No. 7) (emphasis added). 
47 Id. (referring to State’s Ex. No. 7) (emphasis added). 
48 Id. (referring to State’s Ex. No. 7) (emphasis added). 
20 
 
* * * 
Q. 
Do you recognize anybody who you’ve met in the course of your 
investigation in this clip? 
A. 
Yes.  This is Madelyn Aramiz right there with her back towards 
the camera (indicating).49 
* * * 
MS. BRENNAN: And now, Your Honor, next is State’s 10. 
THE WITNESS: This captures – this is camera six. It’s on March 26, 
2017, at 1:20 a.m.  This picks up that area that’s been 
referred to as the grassy knoll.  And it also picks up that 
side lot.  And this is the defendant right here (indicating).50 
 
Q. 
What are we watching here? 
A. 
Lester Mateo has just brought the vehicle up.  That’s the Cadillac 
Escalade. 
Q. 
Do you see the time and date? 
A.  
Yes, It’s March 26, 2017, at 1:20 a.m.51 
* * * 
MS. BRENNAN: Next, Your Honor, is State’s 11.  
 
Q. 
What’s the time and date on this camera four view? 
 
A. 
March 26, 2017, at 1:21 a.m. 
Q. 
What’s getting depicted in this clip at this point that it’s stopped 
right here at 1:21 and nineteen seconds? 
A. 
At the very far end of the building, Lester Mateo actually runs up 
into security.  And one of the security guards actually grabs 
Lester, unknown as to what was occurring, and actually threw 
him down to the ground.52 
* * * 
                                         
49 Id. at B9 (referring to State’s Ex. No. 9). 
50 Id. (referring to State’s Ex. No. 10).  
51 Id. (referring to State’s Ex. No. 10). 
52 Id. (referring to State’s Ex. No. 11).  
21 
 
 
Q. 
As the clip plays, can you tell the jury what we are watching? 
A. 
Sure.  Lester gets knocked down.  He gets up and runs out into 
the parking lot, and he’s ultimately struck by Escalade. 
Q. 
Do you see the driver of the Escalade? 
A. 
Yes.  He flees, jumps over Lester’s body, and then runs off down 
towards the side parking lot. 
MS. BRENNAN: And, Your Honor, last this clip is No 12 at 1:21:16 
at March 26, 2017, from camera five.53 
 
Q. 
What are we about to watch, Detective Mauchin? 
A. 
You’re about to watch that same collision between the Cadillac 
Escalade and Lester Mateo just from the different camera angle 
from camera five.54 
* * * 
Q. 
How were you able to – I guess, where did you see the driver of 
the Escalade in this clip? 
A. 
In this clip I saw him – he ran past actually one of the security 
guards. 
Q. 
Was it from combining your views of both camera angles that 
you were able to tell that the person that was running in camera 
five was the driver? 
A. 
Yes.55 
* * * 
Q. 
What are we looking at here? 
A. 
That would be the collision.  And that’s obviously a zoomed-in 
view of it.  That’s the defendant exiting and jumping over the 
victim, running down through the upper lot and then circling 
down to head down to the side lot.56 
                                         
53 Id. (referring to State’s Ex. No. 12). 
54 Id. at B10 (referring to State’s Ex. No. 12).  
55 Id.  (referring to State’s Ex. No. 12)  
56 Id. at B11 (referring to State’s Ex. No. 17) (emphasis added). 
22 
 
Thus, Detective Mauchin, with the aid of the video footage, walked the jury 
through a four-minute sequence of events that began with the two factions leaving 
El Nuevo Rodeo and concluded with the driver of the Escalade—later identified as 
Saavedra—fleeing the scene after running over Lester Mateo.  It is important to 
emphasize here that Saavedra did not voice a single objection to any of the questions 
that prompted Detective Mauchin to describe what—and who, including Saavedra—
the video depicted.  And it is equally worth noting that Saavedra has not identified a 
single question asked by the prosecutor during this examination as an instance of 
misconduct.57  Having reviewed the video clips carefully, we suspect that the 
absence of objections was likely the product of the ostensibly uncontroversial nature 
of Detective Mauchin’s testimony—at least at that point in time. 
Between Detective Mauchin’s testimony on the first day of trial and his third 
round of testimony when he was recalled on the fourth day of trial, Saavedra’s 
strategy apparently changed.  In the interim, the State called twelve other witnesses, 
at least seven of which—including Ramirez-Recinos, DeLeon-Lopez, Castillo de 
                                         
57 Buried in a footnote on page 23 of Saavedra’s opening brief is a contention that the last-quoted 
testimony above “compound[ed] the prosecutor [sic] misconduct and due process violation alleged 
here and reflects an egregious pattern.  Alternatively, it is plain error.”  We fail to see how this 
question and answer, asked and answered several days before the prosecutor is alleged to have 
committed misconduct, made the subsequent conduct worse.  To the contrary, Saavedra’s apparent 
consent to the admission of this testimony on the first day of trial undermines his claim that the 
prosecutor’s conduct on the fourth day of trial was improper.  In any event, to the extent that 
Saavedra attempts to raise a claim of error in this footnote, we find that the claim has been waived.  
See Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993) (“The failure to raise a legal issue in the 
text of the opening brief generally constitutes a waiver of that claim on appeal.”). 
23 
 
Leon, and two members of the El Nuevo Rodeo security team—were in the nightclub 
and its parking lot as the events depicted in the video unfolded.  For some reason, 
however, the prosecutor only displayed the video to one of these intervening 
witnesses—Brian Saavedra—for the purpose of identifying the relevant actors.58  
And Brian Saavedra, to the apparent surprise of the prosecution, was not entirely 
helpful. 
Brian Saavedra acknowledged that he went to El Nuevo Rodeo with his 
cousins, Carlos and Elder Saavedra, on the night in question.  He also admitted that 
he and Elder were involved in a fight, which led to their departure together from the 
club with security.  Several different camera angles show Brian Saavedra interacting 
and walking with several other individuals after they were escorted out of the club; 
two are of particular interest.  Brian Saavedra identified the one wearing a 
“sombrero,”59 as his cousin Carlos.  But it was Brian’s hatless companion, shirt 
unbuttoned, bare chest exposed, and visibly agitated, whose identity was of 
paramount significance.  For starters, this was the person that Detective Mauchin 
had already identified as “the defendant . . . with his shirt open,” also noting that “he 
does not have a cowboy hat on.”60  And this person also appears to be the same 
                                         
58 Notably and as mentioned, however, Ramirez-Recinos was shown a still photo gleaned from a 
key video and identified the person with Brian and Carlos Saavedra as the person who started the 
fight inside the club. 
59 App. to Opening Br. at A55. 
60 See n.41, supra. 
24 
 
person whom another witness—Irwin Ramirez-Recinos—identified in a still photo61 
as the person who started the fight on the dance floor, i.e., Elder Saavedra.  What is 
more, Brian’s bare-headed companion bore more than a striking resemblance to the 
man who, post-collision, alighted from the Escalade and ran away—that is, the 
person responsible for Lester Mateo’s death.62  Yet despite Brian’s admission that 
he left the club with Elder and clear video evidence that he was conversing and 
walking with the hatless person depicted in the video, when asked to identify that 
person, he claimed to be stumped. 
As Detective Mauchin retook the stand for the third time, having identified 
the first time—without objection— Saavedra, Mateo and all the other key players as 
the tragic event unfolded on video, Saavedra’s approach to how the prosecutor was 
employing the video evidence appears to have changed.  While displaying yet 
another video clip, this one showing a number of people running away from the 
scene approximately ten seconds after the fatal collision, the prosecutor asked 
Detective Mauchin:  “In reviewing the surveillance clip [State Exhibit 153] during 
your investigation, what did you notice helpful to your investigation?”63  Saavedra 
did not object to this question at trial, nor does he tell us now how this question can 
be fairly characterized as prosecutorial misconduct.  But Detective Mauchin’s 
                                         
61 App. to Answering Br. at B21–22; see also State’s Ex. No. 29. 
62 Compare State’s Ex. No. 8 with State’s Ex. Nos. 10, 12, and 29. 
63 App. to Opening Br. at A112. 
25 
 
response that “this shows the defendant and his cousin”64 drew a prompt objection 
from Saavedra’s counsel.  After a sidebar, during which the prosecutor offered to 
rephrase his question, the court instructed Detective Mauchin and the jury: 
 
Detective Mauchin, I would ask you to refrain from making any 
type of identification of the defendant. 
 
Ladies and gentlemen, you should disregard Detective 
Mauchin’s testimony stating that it was the defendant and his friends 
running away.65  
 
After the instruction, the prosecutor appropriately followed up by asking the 
witness:  “Detective, without commenting as to who we are seeing in this video, 
what did you notice happening on the screen that was helpful to your 
investigation?”66  Detective Mauchin observed that the operator of one of the 
vehicles depicted in the video appeared to be “fleeing, along with other members of 
his party.”67   
 
This exchange was followed by more testimony from Detective Mauchin 
about some additional video and certain still shots taken from the surveillance video, 
depicting the scene and some of the individuals involved in the incident.  As the 
State played the video admitted as State’s Exhibit No. 18, the following exchange 
between the prosecutor and Detective Mauchin occurred: 
                                         
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
26 
 
Q. 
[W]hat are we looking at here? 
A. 
This is the individual who was identified by many of the 
witnesses as having engaged in the altercation inside the El 
Nuevo Rodeo, and this is him now backpedaling in that grassy 
area on Camera 6. 
Q. 
. . . And in reviewing this during the course of your investigation 
. . . if you can kind of narrate what we’re seeing with regards to 
the tracking of this individual. 
A. 
Sure . . . So now he begins to walk down, and he will slowly start 
to walk towards the left, and he will actually—there’s a vehicle 
there.  It’s like an SUV.  He will actually lean up against that 
vehicle with his back on that vehicle. 
Q. 
. . . Now, out of all of the people that we just saw him walking 
among, is there anything unique that you notice about him in 
conducting your investigation? 
A. 
Well, the individual who witnesses have identified as being Brian 
Saavedra [the defendant’s cousin], he is the individual who is 
directly in front of him squatting down. 
Q. 
And what about the person with the red circle around him 
initially, and still with the red circle around him? 
A. 
That is the individual who was identified as having engaged in 
the altercation inside the club.68 
 
Despite the identifications embedded in this series of questions—
identifications that are likely dependent upon hearsay statements and which clearly 
implicate Saavedra, albeit without calling him by name—the answers came in 
without objection.  Finally, when Detective Mauchin’s next answer once again 
identified a person in a video “signal[ling] to others” as “the individual who was 
                                         
68 App. to Answering Br. at B149. 
27 
 
identified as starting the altercation,”69 Saavedra’s counsel objected.  When the trial 
judge sustained the objection, defense counsel apparently content, told the 
prosecutor that he could “continue to play [the video].”70  But when Detective 
Mauchin’s next answer referred to the individual “who started the trouble inside of 
the El Nuevo [Rodeo],” Saavedra’s counsel made his second objection and requested 
a mistrial, claiming that Detective Mauchin, an experienced detective, was 
disregarding the court’s earlier instruction.71  The trial judge saw it differently: 
 
The request for a mistrial is denied.  I think he is doing something 
different in this testimony and not disregarding my previous instruction.  
So you’re correct that he’s made an improper factual leap here for the 
jury, and I will instruct the jury to disregard that statement.  But he’s 
not doing what I previously instructed him not to do, which was identify 
that person as the defendant.  So the objection is sustained.  I’ll instruct 
the jury that it’s up to them to determine who gets into the vehicle and 
to disregard any testimony about who that person is . . . .72 
The court, once again, instructed the jury: 
 
The objection is sustained.  Ladies and gentlemen, . . . the factual 
issue of who gets into that vehicle, which person it is on the video, is 
up to you to determine in the course of this trial in your deliberations, 
and you should disregard any testimony from Detective Mauchin or any 
                                         
69 Id. at B150. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
28 
 
other witness stating who actually gets into the vehicle.  All right?  
Thank you.73 
 
Though Saavedra did not object to the questions the prosecutor asked and does 
not argue now that the questions themselves were improper, he nevertheless claims 
that they amounted to prosecutorial misconduct.  This contention hinges on 
Saavedra’s assertion that the questions masked a hidden “purpose,” which was “to 
elicit an improper identification of the Defendant by Detective Mauchin.”74  We 
reject Saavedra’s invitation to impute a bad-faith motive to the prosecutor’s 
questions, which, by and large, were so innocuous as to be viewed by Saavedra’s 
trial counsel as unobjectionable. 
 
To be sure, a prosecutorial tactic can amount to misconduct even in the 
absence of a timely objection; for that reason, we have plain-error review.  But, as 
outlined in detail above, on the first day of trial, Saavedra acquiesced in Detective 
Mauchin’s wholesale description of what and whom75 was depicted in the numerous 
video clips that were introduced without objection and played for the jury.  
Saavedra’s decision to allow the prosecution free rein to proceed in this manner 
during the early stages of trial undermines his contention that the prosecution’s 
                                         
73 Id. 
74  Opening Br. at 19. 
75 For example, on the first day of trial, the prosecutor asked Detective Mauchin if he could 
“identify the people portrayed in the surveillance throughout the course of [his] investigation after 
talking to witnesses,” and also instructed him, “[a]s they come into the picture, . . . to point them 
out to the jury and identify them.  B8. 
29 
 
examination of Detective Mauchin on the last day of trial was out of bounds.  In 
sum, in the context of the trial as a whole, we are not prepared to infer an improper 
purpose from the prosecutor’s unobjectionably formulated questions.76  Therefore, 
Saavedra’s first prosecutorial misconduct claim fails. 
 
This is not to say that we have no concerns about the use of lay opinion 
testimony by police officers to identify defendants from photographic or 
videographic images.  Indeed, we reiterate—and urge our trial courts and bar to take 
heed of—the concerns we expressed most recently in Thomas v. State.77  Before a 
law enforcement witness uses a video clip or photograph to identify the defendant, 
due caution should be exercised to ensure that a proper foundation is laid 
establishing, to the trial court’s satisfaction, that the witness has a special familiarity 
with the defendant that would put him in a better position than the jury to make the 
                                         
76 Our conclusion that the prosecutor’s examination of Detective Mauchin did not constitute 
prosecutorial misconduct does not mean that we view the examination as flawless.  Although 
asking a witness to narrate a video is not impermissible per se, see, e.g., United States v. Begay, 
42 F.3d 486, 502–503 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub nom. MacDonald v. United States, 516 
U.S. 826 (1995), it is fraught with evidentiary peril.  In particular, questions that call for a witness 
to provide an unbounded narrative response are likely to elicit responses that contain objectionable 
evidence before opposing counsel can object.  Counsel is then relegated to the unenviable position 
of making a well-founded objection after the jury has heard the inadmissible testimony.  A motion 
to strike, under such circumstances, is not the equivalent of a timely objection.  And here the 
prosecutor at one point explicitly asked Detective Mauchin to narrate as a video was played.  A28.  
(“As [this video—Exhibit No. 13] is played, please feel free to narrate as to what we are 
watching.”).    But Saavedra’s counsel did not object to this question nor does his prosecutorial 
misconduct claim cite it as improper. 
77 207 A.3d 1124 (TABLE), 20189 WL 1380051 (Del. March 26, 2019). 
30 
 
identification.78  And in determining whether the witness occupies such a position, 
the court should also consider whether the images from which the identification is 
to be made “are not either so unmistakably clear or so hopelessly obscure that the 
witness is no better suited than the jury to make the identification.”79 
 
But the claim before us now is not that the trial court erroneously permitted 
Detective Mauchin to identify Saavedra using the video images that were equally 
available to the other witnesses and the jury.  Instead, we have been presented with 
a record that shows an uncontested examination of the chief investigating officer on 
the first day of trial in which the key actors were identified—without objection—in 
the video footage the jury was watching.  The prosecutor and the court could 
reasonably assume, based on the absence of an objection, that the identity of the 
person depicted on the video, separate and apart from whether Saavedra can be seen 
getting in or out of the Cadillac Escalade, was not a contested fact.  But Saavedra 
would now have us hold that the same form of questions asked three days later was 
                                         
78 U.S. v. Jett, 908 F.3d 252, 271–72 (7th Cir. 2018) (“Under [F.R.E.] Rule 701, a witness can 
match a defendant to surveillance footage only if there is a basis for concluding that the witness 
‘is more likely to correctly identify the defendant from the photograph than is the jury.’”) (quoting 
U.S. v. White, 639 F.3d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 2011)); U.S. v. Rodriguez-Adorno, 695 F.3d 32, 40 (1st 
Cir. 2012) (“[W]here the witness is in no better position than the jury to make an identification, 
such testimony does not meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 701 and is 
inadmissible.”); State v. Lazo, 209 N.J. 9, 22–24 (N.J. 2012) (noting that “when there is no change 
in a defendant’s appearance, juries can decide for themselves—without identification testimony 
from law enforcement—whether the person in the photograph is the defendant sitting before 
them”). 
79 U.S. v. Jackman, 48 F.3d 1, 4–5 (1st Cir. 1995).   
31 
 
not merely objectionable, but amounted to prosecutorial misconduct.  That we are 
not prepared to do. 
B.  Enhanced Video 
Saavedra’s opening brief devotes one short paragraph to his contention that 
one of the video clips80 was improperly enhanced by placing a red circle around the 
individual who Detective Mauchin identified as the Defendant so that his 
movements could be tracked.  Saavedra claims that the State employed this 
technique because one of the most important segments of the clip was, because of 
distance and darkness, of “poor quality.”81 
 
It is unclear to us whether Saavedra intends this claim, which he did not raise 
when the video was played at trial, to be a separate misconduct claim or a factor to 
be considered in our assessment of the propriety of Detective Mauchin’s 
identification testimony.  Under either framework, Saavedra’s argument is 
unavailing for one simple reason:  the red circle does not enhance the images on the 
video;82 it merely directs the viewer to the place on the video that was the subject of 
the witness’s testimony, much as a laser pointer would do.  It remained, as the trial 
                                         
80 State’s Ex. No. 18. 
81 Opening Br. at 27 n.92. 
82 We do not mean to suggest—and Saavedra does not appear to argue—that enhancing video 
evidence is, in and of itself, impermissible. 
32 
 
court instructed, for the jury to decide what and whom could be seen within the red 
circle. 
 
Having rejected Saavedra’s claim that the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial 
misconduct, we need not assess whether the alleged misconduct affected the fairness 
of Saavedra’s trial.  Nevertheless, we note that, even had we come down on 
Saavedra’s side and concluded that the prosecutor’s examination of Detective 
Mauchin was improper, we would conclude that the error was harmless. 
 
Taking the Hughes harmless-error factors in turn, the case against Saavedra 
was not particularly close.  It was undisputed that Saavedra instigated the dance-
floor altercation and threatened the lives of Mateo’s group.  Madelyn Aramiz 
identified Saavedra in a photographic lineup as the person who jumped out from 
behind the wheel of the Cadillac Escalade after it struck Mateo.  Saavedra’s actions 
to evade detection and arrest provided evidence of a consciousness of guilt.  But 
most telling was Saavedra’s admission to his former girlfriend that, “on the night of 
the [R]odeo . . . he got possessed by the devil and killed somebody . . . .”83  What is 
more, a careful review of the video unaided by Detective Mauchin’s testimony, 
which this Court has undertaken, the still shots of the driver exiting the Escalade, 
and the testimony of Ramirez-Recino, Castillo de Leon, and De Leon-Lopez, leaves 
little room for doubt that Saavedra drove the Escalade into Mateo.  When that 
                                         
83 App. to Answering Br. at B117. 
33 
 
evidence is considered together with Aramiz’s identification and Saavedra’s flight 
and eventual confession, even that slightest of doubts vanishes.  
 
The second Hughes factor, the centrality of the issue affected by the purported 
error could be seen as favorable to Saavedra’s position only because the identity of 
the driver was really the only issue in the case.  But, as noted, Detective Mauchin 
was not the sole person or evidence that put Saavedra behind the wheel; the other 
witnesses and video evidence would have been sufficient to do so on their own. 
 
And finally, we are satisfied that the trial judge took sufficient steps to 
mitigate any mischief that might have attended Detective Mauchin’s testimony.   In 
the immediate wake of the two instances of misconduct specifically identified by 
Saavedra, the trial judge gave curative instructions.  Following the first instance, the 
court instructed the jury to “disregard Detective Mauchin’s testimony stating that it 
was the defendant and his friends running away.”84  And after the second—this time 
after over-ruling Saavedra’s request for a mistrial—the court instructed the jury to 
disregard the detective’s testimony during a video display, identifying “the 
individual who started the trouble inside El Nuevo” as the person “entering the 
vehicle” that shortly thereafter ran over Mateo.  In her instruction, moreover, the 
trial judge emphasized that it was the sole province of the jury to determine the 
identity of the driver.  In the context of Saavedra’s trial, these instructions were 
                                         
84 App. to Opening Br. at A112. 
34 
 
meaningful and practical steps taken in response to Saavedra’s concerns and 
mitigated any prejudicial effect the detective’s testimony may have caused.85 
 
Saavedra’s claim fares no better under a proper application of the Hunter test.  
His argument under Hunter is not only conclusory—it merely announces that the 
prosecutor’s misconduct casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process without 
explaining how it does so—but it is also based on a misunderstanding of the type of 
repetitive error and “persistent pattern of misconduct”86 that Hunter was meant to 
address.  In Hunter, we identified a persistent pattern of misconduct because the 
prosecutor’s improper comments “cover[ed] several of the specific categories of 
comment that have been prohibited in past decisions.”87  Thus, in applying Hunter 
we are attempting to “provide safeguards against a repetition of the same type of 
specific conduct that ha[s] been held to be error [in prior decisions], albeit harmless 
error.”88  We do not look, as Saavedra’s asks us to, to the repetition of errors within 
a specific trial, but repetition of the same errors over multiple trials, which reflects a 
disregard of our prior admonitions and thus impugns the integrity of the judicial 
                                         
85 See Justice v. State, 947 A.2d 1097, 1102 (Del. 2008) (A trial judge’s prompt curative 
instructions are presumed to cure error and adequately direct the jury to disregard improper 
statements.  A curative instruction is a meaningful or practical alternative to declaring a mistrial, 
and juries are presumed to follow the instruction.) (quotations and footnotes omitted). 
86 Hunter, 815 A.2d at 738. 
87 Id. (emphasis added).  Thus, Hunter is meant to address prosecutorial behavior that we have 
disapproved of in the past, but continues to persist in other trials. 
88 Brokenbrough v. State, 522 A.2d 851, 864 (Del. 1987) (emphasis in original). 
35 
 
process.89  Because Saavedra has not described this type of pattern or repetition, his 
argument under Hunter fails. 
 
Thus, even if the jury should not have heard Detective’s Mauchin’s narrative 
testimony, the fact that it did is harmless.  It follows that, to the extent that Saavedra 
did not object to portions of that testimony, the admissions of those portions was not 
plain error. 
C.  Lay Opinion Testimony 
 
In addition to identifying Saavedra as the person who alighted from the 
Escalade after it struck and killed Mateo, Madelyn Aramiz also testified that, before 
fleeing, Saavedra said “la migra,” which she translated to mean “immigration.”90  
The State then introduced testimony, over Saavedra’s objection, from Trooper Kelly 
Diaz, who assisted Detective Mauchin in the investigation of this case, that “la 
migra” had a special meaning in Hispanic communities.  Trooper Diaz claimed to 
know that meaning because he grew up in a “mostly Hispanic”91 neighborhood.  
According to Diaz, who confirmed that “la migra” means “immigration,” 
[t]hrough [his] experience living in apartment complexes, especially in 
Hispanic populations, any time the police or the feds are coming and 
people yell “La Migra,” they say that so that everybody scatters and 
                                         
89 In so holding, we recognize that we have from time to time and at the urging of the defendant 
reviewed Hunter claims with reference to repetitive errors within a single trial.  We do not see 
those cases as altering the proper focus of our review under Hunter, which is on whether our prior 
judicial admonitions short of reversal are falling on deaf ears. 
90 A69–70. 
91 A84. 
36 
 
they leave as quick [sic] as they can so they’re not picked up by police 
or the feds.92   
Saavedra objected on the grounds of relevance and because the translation with 
commentary was in the nature of expert testimony.93  The State countered that the 
challenged statement was not expert testimony but, rather, was permissible opinion 
testimony from a lay witness permissible under Rule 701 of the Delaware Rules of 
Evidence (“D.R.E.”).  The Superior Court agreed with the State, overruling 
Saavedra’s objection.  We now review this evidentiary ruling for abuse of 
discretion.94 
 
D.R.E. 701, which governs opinion testimony by lay persons, provides that: 
 
If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form 
of an opinion is limited to one that is; 
 
(a)  Rationally based on the witness’s perception; 
 
(b)  Helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or 
to determining a fact in issue; and 
 
(c)  Not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. 
 
Saavedra contends that Trooper Diaz’s testimony was not admissible under 
this rule because it was not based on Diaz’s perception under subsection (a) but, 
instead, relied on the perception of the witness—Madelyn Aramiz—who claimed to 
have heard Saavedra cry “la migra.”  The State counters that Trooper Diaz’s 
                                         
92 A84–85. 
93 Although this is not clear from the trial record, Saavedra has represented in its opening brief that 
the State did not disclose in discovery that Trooper Diaz would testify as an expert. 
94 Seward v. State, 723 A.2d 365, 372 (Del. 1999). 
37 
 
testimony about the meaning of those words was rationally based upon his personal 
experiences growing up in a Hispanic neighborhood and helpful to the jury’s 
understanding of what Aramiz heard.  Therefore, the State argues that the testimony 
was admissible under D.R.E. 701.  In the alternative, the State claims—contrary to 
what it argued in the Superior Court—that Diaz’s testimony was admissible expert 
testimony under D.R.E. 702.  Not surprisingly, Saavedra responds that the State 
waived its right to invoke D.R.E. 702 when it announced to the Superior Court that 
“this is not expert testimony.”95   
Both sides miss the mark, each in their own way.  The State’s attempt to 
shoehorn Trooper Diaz’s testimony into D.R.E. 701’s ambit is based on an 
incomplete reading of the rule that omits subsection (c).  Specifically, though the 
State addresses whether the opinion was rationally based on Diaz’s knowledge and 
helpful to determining a fact in issue, it does not say—other than making the 
alternative argument it eschewed below—how the opinion is “[n]ot based 
on . . . other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.”96 Saavedra’s 
argument that Trooper Diaz’s testimony is not based on his personal knowledge 
under subsection (a) also misses the point, because it conflates his testimony about 
what Aramiz said she heard from Saavedra’s mouth with Trooper Diaz’s 
                                         
95 App. to Opening Br. at A79. 
96 D.R.E. 701(c). 
38 
 
interpretation of those words.  The challenged opinion is the interpretation, which 
was clearly based on Diaz’s experience in the neighborhoods of his youth—a form 
of specialized knowledge—and not Aramiz’s recollection of what Saavedra said 
before he fled. 
We therefore tend to think—without deciding—that the Diaz testimony was 
in fact based on specialized knowledge, violating subsection (c), and should have 
been offered under D.R.E. 702.  But we need not address that distinction nor need 
we surmise how the Superior Court would have ruled had it been so offered in light 
of the State’s apparent failure to disclose Trooper Diaz’s expert status during pretrial 
discovery.  We can avoid those questions because, however debatable the admission 
of Diaz’s testimony under D.R.E. 701 might be, any error was harmless. 
 
First and foremost, it is difficult to discern what prejudice Saavedra suffered 
because the jury heard Trooper Diaz’s opinion that “la migra” is a catch-phrase that 
implores those who hear it to scatter, given that Saavedra himself was in flight.  But 
even if the phrase bore some negative connotation that was separate and distinct 
from Saavedra’s observed conduct, the error would still be harmless.  In this regard, 
we have held that “an error in admitting evidence may be deemed to be ‘harmless’ 
when ‘the evidence exclusive of the improperly admitted evidence is sufficient to 
39 
 
sustain a conviction.’”97  And here, setting aside Trooper Diaz’s testimony, there is 
ample evidence, including the video evidence and eyewitness identifications 
described above and Saavedra’s confession to Mariela Conejo-Centura that “on the 
night of the rodeo . . . he got possessed by the devil and killed somebody . . .,”98 to 
sustain Saavedra’s convictions. 
D.  The Prosecutor’s “Implied Assertion” 
 
Saavedra’s final claim again charges the prosecutor with misconduct that 
undermined the fairness of his trial, this time in connection with the prosecutor’s 
direct examination of Brian Saavedra.  As mentioned earlier, Brian admitted that he 
went to El Nuevo Rodeo with Elder and Carlos Saavedra and that the three were 
escorted out of the club because of the fight in which he and Elder were participants.  
He also acknowledged that one of the surveillance video clips99 showed him, Carlos, 
and a friend, Raul, walking away from the club.  But when asked to identify “the 
person with the shirt unbuttoned”100—a person with whom he was clearly interacting 
and who had been identified from a still photo as the person who started the fight 
inside—Brian said that he did not know who that was. 
 
Brian’s answer prompted the following exchange: 
                                         
97 Cooke v. State, 97 A.3d 513 (Del. 2014) (quoting Nelson v. State, 628 A.2d 69, 77 (Del. 
1993)).   
98 App. to Answering Br. at B121. 
99 State’s Ex. No. 8. 
100 App. to Answering Br. at B35. 
40 
 
Q. 
Do you remember ever speaking with any member of the 
Delaware State Police about this surveillance video? 
A. 
Yes. 
Q. 
And do you remember speaking with both of these officers 
about who was in these surveillance videos? 
 
A. 
Um-hmm. 
Q. 
When you spoke with these officers, did you come in 
voluntarily? 
 
A. 
They came to my house. 
Q. 
Do you remember coming into offices and speaking with 
these officers? 
 
A. 
Yes101 
* * * 
Q. 
And when you spoke with the troopers with Trooper Diaz 
acting as an interpreter, do you recall whether or not you 
were able to say who that person in the surveillance 
without the hat on was? 
 
A. 
No. 
 
Q. 
You don’t remember that? 
 
A. 
Yes.  I remember I said that I didn’t know who it was. 
Q. 
That you did not.  And you don’t remember giving these 
troopers the name of the individual who was seen walking 
without the sombrero on? 
 
A. 
No.102 
 
Saavedra now contends that the last question in this series “was a deliberate 
attempt to create an impression on the jury that Brian Saavedra previously identified 
                                         
101 App. to Opening Br. at A56–57. 
102 Id. at A57–58. 
41 
 
the defendant in a video clip when he met with the police, despite his multiple 
denials.”103  According to Saavedra, the prosecutor’s question contained an implied 
assertion of a prejudicial fact, which the State was not prepared to prove through 
other evidence.  This, he says, “constitutes misconduct and violates due process.”104 
 
Saavedra further contends that the prosecutor made matters worse by 
mischaracterizing Brian’s testimony in closing argument, when he told the jury: 
 
And even Brian Saavedra somehow identified him by not 
identifying him, because Brian Saavedra, the defendant’s cousin, came 
in and testified:  That’s me wearing a hat, and that’s Carlos wearing a 
hat.  And the three of us came together, but we didn’t—we left together, 
but, yet, suddenly wouldn’t say—said he didn’t know who that person 
is, despite witnesses telling you over and over again that that person not 
wearing the hat, the person in a fit of rage, is the defendant, his cousin, 
who he sees every day, his cousin who was pepper sprayed and did tell 
you that the defendant was able to drive home because he was not.105 
 
Because defense counsel did not raise a timely objection to either instance of 
alleged prosecutorial misconduct and the trial judge did not intervene sua sponte, we 
review this claim for plain error.106  Of course, as with the prosecutorial claims 
discussed earlier, if we determine that no misconduct occurred, our analysis ends 
there. 
                                         
103 Opening Br. at 48. 
104 Id. 
105 App. to Opening Br. at A115 (quoted and emphasis added in Opening Br. at 47). 
106 Baker, 906 A.2d at 148.  
42 
 
 
It would have been improper for the State “to ask a question which implie[d] 
the existence of a factual predicate which the [prosecutor] [knew] he [could not] 
support by evidence.”107  This standard has been read to prohibit questions implying 
factual predicates for which the examiner “has no reason to believe that there is a 
foundation of truth.”108  Here, the record reflects that the prosecutor had a sound 
reason to believe that the implied factual predicate of her question—that Brian 
Saavedra had been able to identify the individual on the video in an earlier 
statement—was true.  And she disclosed that reason at a sidebar conference 
immediately following the question, advising the court that Brian had previously 
made the identification in Trooper Diaz’s presence during trial preparation.109  Her 
plan at that point was to call Trooper Diaz to testify under 11 Del. C. § 3507110 to 
the substance of Brian’s earlier statement, but that never happened. 
 
To be sure, testimony from Trooper Diaz concerning Brian’s prior out-of-
court identification would have eliminated any purported prejudice created by the 
                                         
107 ABA Standard Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, The Prosecution Function 
§5.7(d). 
108 United States v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283, 1307 (7th Cir. 1976). 
109 We note that Saavedra, in his opening brief on appeal, claims that his defense counsel disputed 
the existence of the § 3507 statement during the side bar conference.  We read the record 
differently.  Saavedra’s counsel’s side bar protest appears to have been focused solely on the 
absence of notes reflecting Saavedra’s prior statements.  See A61.  (“I understand that goes to the 
weight, . . . not the admissibility. I’m just asking if there are notes.”). 
110 Under 11 Del. C. § 3507, “[i]n a criminal prosecution, the voluntary out-of-court prior statement 
of a witness who is present and subject to cross-examination may be used as affirmative evidence 
with substantive independent testimonial value.” 
43 
 
factual predicate that Saavedra claims was embedded in the prosecutor’s questions.  
But we cannot ignore the fact that Saavedra’s counsel did not object or challenge in 
any meaningful way the factual predicate for the questions.  Had there been a timely 
objection, it would have been within the Superior Court’s discretion to require the 
prosecutor to establish the factual predicate, which, based on the prosecutor’s 
representations at the side bar conference, could have been easily accomplished.  
Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the challenged questions 
amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. 
 
Nor are we persuaded that the prosecutor’s closing argument mischaracterized 
Brian Saavedra’s testimony.  To the contrary, we understand the State’s argument to 
have been that the jury could infer that Brian left the nightclub with Elder and Carlos 
Saavedra and that the man Brian claimed he could not identify was his cousin, 
Elder—from Brian’s testimony, from what the jury themselves saw on the video, 
and from what numerous other witnesses had said.  Arguing from the evidence that 
a witness’s testimony—here, Brian Saavedra’s answer that he could not identify the 
hatless person in the video—lacks credibility is not prosecutorial misconduct. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
The judgments of conviction of the Superior Court are affirmed.