Title: State v. Fuller

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Fuller, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-726.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-726 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. FULLER, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Fuller, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-726.] 
Court of appeals’ judgment reversed on the authority of State v. Singleton and 
cause remanded to the trial court. 
(No. 2008-2343 — Submitted January 13, 2010 — Decided March 4, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Madison County, 
No. CA2008-04-008. 
__________________ 
{¶ 1} The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed on the authority of 
State v. Singleton, 124 Ohio St.3d 173, 2009-Ohio-6434, 920 N.E.2d 958, to the 
extent that the court of appeals held that a hearing pursuant to R.C.2929.191 was 
not required to correct appellant’s sentence.  The cause is remanded to the trial 
court for a hearing pursuant to R.C.2929.191. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, and 
CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurs separately. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J., concurring. 
{¶ 2} While I recognize that Justice Pfeifer has raised legitimate 
concerns regarding the use of this court’s decision in State v. Singleton to dispose 
of the present case, I agree that the judgment of the court of appeals should be 
reversed in this case. 
{¶ 3} The proposition of law before us in Singleton stated, “Prior to the 
expiration of an originally imposed prison term, a trial court may correct an 
offender’s felony sentence pursuant to the procedure outlined in R.C. 2929.191 if 
that sentence lacks the sanction of postrelease control.”  In my opinion in 
Singleton, I concluded that “the amendments to R.C. 2929.19 and the enactment 
of R.C. 2929.191 represent an attempt to return logic and order to this area of the 
law and that R.C. 2929.191 should be applied both retroactively and 
prospectively.”  State v. Singleton, 124 Ohio St.3d 173, 2009-Ohio-6434, 920 
N.E.2d 958, ¶ 65 (Lanzinger, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
{¶ 4} For the reasons stated in my opinion in Singleton, I continue to 
maintain that the statute should be applied prospectively and join in the majority’s 
decision to reverse and remand the present case to the trial court for a hearing 
pursuant to R.C. 2929.191. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 5} “[T]he fact of placement of a statement in a syllabus paragraph 
does not transform dictum into a conclusion of law.” DeLozier v. Sommer (1974), 
38 Ohio St.2d 268, 271, 67 O.O.2d 335, 313 N.E.2d 386, fn. 2.  Today this case is 
decided on the authority of paragraph two of the syllabus of State v. Singleton, 
124 Ohio St.3d 173, 2009-Ohio-6434, 920 N.E.2d 958, which is to say it is 
decided on the authority of nothing.  The second syllabus paragraph of Singleton 
January Term, 2010 
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is pure dictum.  “Obiter dictum” has been defined as “ ‘an incidental and 
collateral opinion uttered by a judge, and therefore (as not material to his decision 
or judgment) not binding.’ ”  State ex rel Gordon v. Barthalow (1948), 150 Ohio 
St. 499, 505-506, 38 O.O. 340, 83 N.E.2d 393, quoting Webster’s New 
International Dictionary (2d Ed.).  Black’s Law Dictionary defines it as “a judicial 
comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to 
the decision in the case and therefore not precedential * * *.” Black’s Law 
Dictionary (8th Ed.2004) 1102.  The definition of “obiter dictum” in the next 
edition of Black’s Law Dictionary should read, “See State v. Singleton, paragraph 
two of the syllabus.” 
{¶ 6} In Singleton, the question before us was “whether the de novo 
sentencing procedures detailed in decisions of this court or the remedial 
procedures set forth in R.C. 2929.191 * * *, which became effective July 11, 
2006, should be used by trial courts to properly sentence an offender when 
correcting a failure to properly impose postrelease control.” Singleton at ¶ 1.  The 
first syllabus paragraph answered the question for the defendant in Singleton: 
“For criminal sentences imposed prior to July 11, 2006, in which a trial court 
failed to properly impose postrelease control, trial courts shall conduct a de novo 
sentencing hearing in accordance with decisions of the Supreme Court of Ohio.”  
The second syllabus paragraph of Singleton purports to deal with cases in which 
sentences were imposed after the effective date of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 137, 
Baldwin’s Ohio Legislative Service Annotated (Vol. 4, 2006) L-1911 (“H.B. 
137”).  However, the sentence of the only defendant in Singleton was imposed 
prior to the effective date of H.B. 137.  The second syllabus paragraph in 
Singleton is thus “a judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, 
but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not 
precedential.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 7} Further, the second syllabus paragraph in Singleton is not the 
product of a true majority of this court.  Instead, it is cobbled together by only two 
of the five justices responsible for the judgment of the case, coupled with the two 
dissenters.  There was only one judgment in Singleton: this court affirmed the 
judgment of the court of appeals because R.C. 2929.191 did not apply to the 
defendant.  Justices Lanzinger and Lundberg Stratton dissented from the sole 
judgment in the case – how can they then be a part of any majority decision?  
Singleton did not involve two defendants; there were not two judgments such that 
a justice could be in the majority in one, both, or neither.  A justice was either in 
the majority or not, and thus Justices Lanzinger and Lundberg Stratton as 
dissenters cannot be counted upon as part of the majority decision.  If they are 
considered four votes of a majority but dissented from the judgment, that 
necessarily means that the law with which they agreed, the second syllabus 
paragraph, had no bearing on the judgment of the case.  They concurred in dictum 
only.  Do four judges concurring in dictum constitute a majority opinion?  
Whether they do or not, the dictum they agree to has no precedential value. 
{¶ 8} Also, Singleton states that the curative procedure set forth in R.C. 
2929.191 controls in cases in which sentencing errors were made after the 
effective date of H.B. 137, despite the fact that by the statute’s own terms, it 
applies only to sentences imposed prior to the effective date of H.B. 137, and 
despite the fact that no defendant anywhere has ever argued that R.C. 2929.191 
applies to sentences imposed after the effective date of H.B. 137. 
{¶ 9} This case presents the real issue that H.B. 137 raises regarding 
sentences imposed after the effective date of the act.  The decision of the court of 
appeals in this case is based upon an application of R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)(c), which 
was not addressed in Singleton and which purports to essentially make an 
imposition of postrelease control automatic and thus not reliant on the imposition 
of postrelease control by a trial judge at a sentencing hearing and in the court’s 
January Term, 2010 
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entry.  In State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 
568, this court recognized that the intention of the General Assembly in H.B. 137 
was to make the imposition of postrelease control independent of a court order: 
“[T]he General Assembly amended the Revised Code through 2006 Am.Sub.H.B. 
No. 137, which authorizes the executive branch to impose postrelease control 
without a court order. See Section 5(A), Am.Sub.H.B. No. 137, eff. July 11, 
2006; R.C. 2929.191and 2967.28(B).  The validity of that action has been 
challenged on constitutional and other grounds, and we agreed to review that 
issue [in case No. 2007-1415, State v. Mosmeyer, 115 Ohio St.3d 1472, 2007-
Ohio-5735, 875 N.E.2d 626].” (Emphasis added.) Simpkins, ¶ 17, fn. 1.  For one 
reason or another, that issue has yet to be reviewed by this court.  Simpkins states 
that the issue will be decided in Mosmeyer—a decision that this case was 
originally held for.  But the issue was not decided in Mosmeyer, see State v. 
Mosmeyer, 122 Ohio St.3d 200, 2009-Ohio-2462, 909 N.E.2d 1254,  and this case 
was then held for Singleton, which also does not address the legality of the 
imposition of postrelease control without a valid court order.  The issue should 
finally be resolved here. 
{¶ 10} The court below held that pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(3), a trial 
judge’s sentencing errors do not affect the executive branch’s ability to impose 
postrelease control:  
{¶ 11} “Am.Sub.H.B. No. 137, effective July 11, 2006, amended R.C. 
2929.19(B)(3)(c) and addressed the situation where a court imposing sentence for 
an offense requiring postrelease control fails to notify the offender at the hearing 
that he is subject to postrelease control.  Such a failure, according to the amended 
statute, ‘does not negate, limit, or otherwise effect the mandatory period of 
supervision that is required for the offender under division (B) of section 2967.28 
of the Revised Code.’  This version of the statute applies to appellant's case in 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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view of the fact that appellant's guilty plea and sentencing followed the effective 
date of the amended statute. 
{¶ 12} “Although the trial court in this case failed to notify appellant that 
he was subject to postrelease control at the sentencing hearing, the amended 
version of R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)(c) leaves the required period of his postrelease 
control intact. Thus, appellant's sentence is not void as contrary to law, and the 
doctrine of res judicata operates to bar appellant's argument in this appeal.” State 
v. Fuller (Oct. 22, 2008), Madison App. No. CA2008-04-008, ¶4-5. 
{¶ 13} This court did not discuss the constitutionality of R.C. 
2929.19(B)(3)(c) in Singleton.  Even accepting Singleton’s dictum that R.C. 
2929.191 applies prospectively, the curative portion of that statute is not 
mandatory.  It reads, “On and after the effective date of this section, a court that 
wishes to prepare and issue a correction to a judgment of conviction of a type 
described in division (A)(1) or (B)(1) of this section shall not issue the correction 
until after the court has conducted a hearing in accordance with this division.” 
(Emphasis added.)  R.C. 2929.191(C).  Thus, although the second syllabus 
paragraph of Singleton may reflect the worthwhile intent to resolve all cases 
involving postrelease-control sentencing issues in one fell swoop, it does not 
succeed in its goal.  Since R.C. 2929.191 says that a court may correct a 
sentencing error if it so wishes, a court is not required by statute to do so.  That 
leaves unresolved the question that this case raises – is a properly imposed 
sentence necessary for the imposition by the Adult Parole Authority of postrelease 
control, i.e., can the General Assembly render postrelease-control sentencing 
errors meaningless by statute? 
{¶ 14} Since Simpkins, we have been waiting for the right case to address 
this issue.  This is that case.  Instead, a majority of the court today cites dictum 
from a non-majority of the court in Singleton to avoid the issue. 
__________________ 
January Term, 2010 
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Stephen J. Pronai, Madison County Prosecuting Attorney, and Eamon P. 
Costello, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Shaw & Miller and Mark J. Miller, for appellant. 
______________________