Title: Commonwealth v. McCalop

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12845 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  KHAMAL McCALOP. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 9, 2020.  -  September 24, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ.1 
 
 
Firearms.  Jury and Jurors.  Practice, Criminal, Jury and 
jurors, Deliberation of jury, Sentence, Plea, 
Postconviction relief, New trial. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 6, 2015. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Linda E. Giles, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on February 4, 2019, was 
considered by her. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Kathryn Karczewska Ohren for the defendant. 
 
Erin D. Knight, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
1 Chief Justice Gants participated in the deliberation on 
this case and authored this opinion prior to his death. 
2 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  It is a fundamental tenet of our system of 
justice that a conviction cannot stand if the defendant proves 
that the jury's deliberations were infected by racial or ethnic 
bias.  See Commonwealth v. Laguer, 410 Mass. 89, 97-98 (1991).  
This case concerns the obligation of a judge promptly to address 
an allegation of racial bias when it is presented.  Here, 
immediately after the entry of a guilty verdict in the 
defendant's case, defense counsel was approached by a 
deliberating juror who stated that she was surprised to see the 
amount of racism vocalized during the deliberations by several 
of the jurors who voted to find the defendant guilty.  Defense 
counsel promptly filed a motion to obtain juror names and 
contact information to investigate the juror's claims prior to 
the scheduled jury-waived trial on two sentencing enhancements.  
We conclude that the judge erred by not promptly allowing this 
motion. 
 
After the judge criticized defense counsel for having 
brought the motion and disparaged its merits, the judge asked 
the prosecutor if a plea offer that had earlier been discussed 
would "still be on the table" if the defendant were to withdraw 
his motion.  Under that offer, the prosecutor would agree to nol 
pros the sentencing enhancement with the longer minimum 
mandatory sentence in return for the defendant's guilty plea to 
the sentencing enhancement with a lesser minimum mandatory and a 
3 
 
 
joint recommendation regarding the imposition of sentence.  The 
prosecutor conferred with his supervisor and obtained approval 
of the plea offer.  The defendant then withdrew the motion, 
pleaded guilty to one of the sentencing enhancements, and, in 
response to the judge's inquiry, agreed to waive his right to 
raise the issue presented in the motion. 
 
The defendant later moved, unsuccessfully, to vacate his 
guilty plea to the sentencing enhancement, claiming that it was 
involuntary because he was coerced into pleading guilty by the 
judge and unfairly deprived of his opportunity to explore the 
possibility of racial bias in the verdict.  We conclude that the 
judge's error in not promptly allowing the motion for jurors' 
names and contact information, and in disparaging its merits, 
compounded by the judge's inducement of the defendant to waive 
his right ever to raise the issue of racial bias among the 
jurors, so tainted the guilty plea that it cannot stand.  A 
guilty verdict arising from racial or ethnic bias not only poses 
a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice but also, "if 
left unaddressed, would risk systemic injury to the 
administration of justice."  Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 
S. Ct. 855, 868 (2017).  Therefore, where a defendant makes a 
good faith claim that a deliberating juror reported that racial 
bias infected the jury's deliberations, a judge may not 
4 
 
 
condition acceptance of a guilty plea to a sentencing 
enhancement upon a waiver of that claim. 
 
Background.  1.  Facts.  We summarize the relevant evidence 
at trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.  At 
approximately 9:45 A.M. on May 13, 2015, Boston police officers 
were driving in an unmarked police vehicle when they received a 
radio call requesting they look for a "white Mercedes [sport 
utility vehicle (SUV)]" with a particular license plate number 
in the Blue Hill Avenue area.  The officers spotted the vehicle 
as it turned onto Blue Hill Avenue, but before they could 
activate their lights and sirens to conduct a traffic stop, the 
vehicle increased its speed and cut in and out of traffic.  
Believing that the driver was attempting to flee, the officers 
activated their lights and sirens and initiated what became a 
high-speed chase. 
 
The defendant, who was the driver of the SUV, struck 
several other vehicles while attempting to evade the officers.  
After the SUV turned the wrong way down a one-way street, it 
crashed into another vehicle parked at an intersection.  The 
defendant then got out of the SUV and took off running, holding 
a black firearm in his hand.  The officers followed the 
defendant on foot.  The defendant ran around the back side of a 
house, where the officers temporarily lost sight of him, but he 
was eventually apprehended behind the house. 
5 
 
 
 
The officers conducted a search of the defendant but did 
not find a firearm.2  After a search of the surrounding area, an 
officer spotted a black firearm "on the corner of the ledge" of 
the roof of the house near where the defendant had been 
apprehended.  One of the officers identified the firearm as the 
one he had seen the defendant holding when the defendant fled 
from his vehicle.  The firearm contained eight rounds of 
ammunition in its magazine.  No latent fingerprint of the 
defendant was found on the firearm. 
2.  Jury trials.  A Suffolk County grand jury returned four 
indictments against the defendant:  possession of a firearm, in 
violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); possession of ammunition, 
in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h); possession of a loaded 
firearm, in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n); and negligent 
operation of a motor vehicle, in violation of G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (2) (a). 
 
At the defendant's first jury trial in the Superior Court, 
he was convicted only of negligent operation of a motor vehicle.  
The jury were unable to reach a unanimous verdict regarding the 
remaining three indictments, and the judge declared a mistrial 
as to those charges.  The judge deferred sentencing on the 
                                                          
 
2 Through a more thorough search of the defendant at the 
police station, the police seized a black cellular telephone 
from him. 
6 
 
 
negligent operation charge until all the charges were resolved.  
A different Superior Court judge presided over the defendant's 
retrial on the remaining three indictments.  After a two-day 
trial, the jury found the defendant guilty on each of the 
indictments on February 2, 2017. 
Defense counsel later attested that, after he left the 
court house following the verdict, two jurors waited for him in 
the courtyard and asked to speak with him to express their 
concerns about the trial.  One was a deliberating juror; the 
other was an alternate juror.  Both jurors were visibly upset, 
and the deliberating juror was crying.  The deliberating juror 
stated that the deliberations began with an even six-to-six 
split, but the jurors slowly changed their votes to guilty due 
to comments made by other jurors, until she was the last person 
at the end of the day "holding on" to a not guilty vote.  When 
she told her fellow jurors that she wished to return the next 
day to continue deliberations, they started yelling at her and 
"forced her" to change her vote to guilty.  She also told 
defense counsel that she was surprised to see the amount of 
racism expressed and vocalized during the deliberations by 
several of the jurors who were voting to find the defendant 
7 
 
 
guilty, and that she believed racism changed some of the jurors' 
votes to guilty.3 
3. Sentencing enhancements.  After the guilty verdicts, the 
defendant was arraigned on two sentencing enhancement charges 
related to his conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm:  
an enhancement as a second and subsequent offender under G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (d), based on his conviction in 2000 of unlawful 
possession of a firearm; and an enhancement as an offender with 
a prior conviction of a serious drug offense under G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10G (a), based on his conviction in 2003 in Federal court of 
distribution of a class B substance.4  The defendant pleaded not 
guilty to both sentencing enhancements and waived his right to a 
jury trial on these charges.  The judge ordered the defendant 
held without bail and scheduled the jury-waived trial on the 
sentencing enhancement charges for February 7, 2017, at 2 P.M.  
The judge directed the prosecutor to have the relevant police 
                                                          
 
3 The mother of the defendant's children, who was with 
defense counsel after the verdict, also submitted an affidavit 
attesting to the same information, although the copy in the 
record does not have a signature. 
 
4 "We characterize a person who is subject to sentencing 
under [G. L. c. 269, § 10G,] after being convicted of the 
unlawful carrying of a firearm as an 'armed career criminal' 
only where the defendant has three prior convictions of a 
violent crime or serious drug offense."  Commonwealth v. 
Richardson, 469 Mass. 248, 252 n.8 (2014), citing Commonwealth 
v. Anderson, 461 Mass. 616, 626 n.10, cert. denied, 568 U.S. 946 
(2012). 
8 
 
 
officer present for the trial unless the parties "work[ed] out 
some resolution." 
 
On February 7, prior to the scheduled sentencing 
enhancement trial, the defendant filed a motion for a mistrial 
and a motion for disclosure of the jurors' names and "contact 
information."5  The defendant supported these motions with the 
affidavit of defense counsel, which described defense counsel's 
encounter with the jurors after trial. 
 
When the 2 P.M. sentencing enhancement trial was scheduled 
to begin, the prosecutor informed the judge that the police 
officer witness was not available that day because he had been 
called in to service for the "duck boat" parade, which 
celebrated the New England Patriots victory in the Super Bowl.  
Defense counsel objected to a continuance, noting that the 
parade had ended well before 1 P.M., and there was no reason the 
officer could not be available for the hearing.  The judge 
allowed the continuance and gave defense counsel the option of 
rescheduling to Wednesday or Thursday of that week.  Defense 
counsel requested that the trial be delayed until the following 
week because he had "literally no availability" for the 
                                                          
 
5 Because the guilty verdicts had already been entered, the 
motion for a mistrial should have been fashioned as a motion for 
a new trial.  See Commonwealth v. Fredette, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 
253, 257 n.8 (2002). 
9 
 
 
remainder of the week.6  The judge denied the request, stating 
that the trial "has to be this week," because she had to conduct 
a full-week evidentiary hearing the next week. 
 
Defense counsel then asked the judge to consider sentencing 
the defendant right then, at the hearing.  The judge replied 
that she could not sentence the defendant then because he was 
facing the sentencing enhancement charges on which he had 
earlier been arraigned.  Defense counsel then suggested that the 
Commonwealth might not choose to move forward on the sentencing 
enhancement charges if the parties could come to a plea 
agreement. 
 
In the discussion that followed, it emerged that the 
prosecutor had received permission from his supervisors to nol 
pros the § 10 (d) sentencing enhancement in exchange for the 
defendant's plea to the § 10G enhancement and a joint 
recommendation regarding the defendant's sentence.  However, 
after the prosecutor told his supervisors of the newly filed 
motions, they withdrew their permission, saying that they were 
"concerned" and wanted to look over the motions before moving 
                                                          
 
6 Following the verdict, when a trial date for the 
sentencing enhancements was being scheduled, defense counsel had 
told the judge that he had "a terrible schedule next week, both 
with morning appearances and 2:00 P.M. appearances out of the 
county." 
10 
 
 
forward.  Upon learning this, the judge told defense counsel, 
"Good going . . . .  You just upset this applecart." 
The judge also expressed doubts that she could entertain 
the defendant's motion for juror names and contact information 
for two reasons:  first, because defense counsel was not 
permitted to talk to a juror about the jury's deliberative 
process; and second, because "[t]his is inherently the kind of 
subject that a court should never inquire about -- the internal 
decision-making process of a jury."  Despite defense counsel's 
protestation that he did not make such an inquiry of the juror, 
the judge told defense counsel, "So, if you expected relief in 
this regard, I'm going to tell you right now . . . I'll hear 
argument on it, but I have grave doubts that you're entitled to 
any kind of relief given what you said to me in this motion."7 
 
Returning to the issue of a possible plea agreement, the 
judge, through discussion with the prosecutor, confirmed that 
the § 10 (d) sentencing enhancement required a minimum mandatory 
sentence of five years,8 and that the § 10G sentencing 
                                                          
 
7 Defense counsel later told the judge that he neither 
approached the jurors nor asked them a single question.  
Instead, he said, they approached him and he listened to what 
they said.  The judge responded, "I'm not saying that you 
violated any rules here . . . but . . . what that juror told you 
may not be something that I could even inquire about." 
 
8 Under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (d), a defendant convicted of the 
illegal possession of a firearm who has a prior conviction for a 
11 
 
 
enhancement carried a minimum mandatory sentence of three years 
and a maximum sentence of fifteen years.  The judge also 
confirmed with the prosecutor that, until the defendant's 
motions had been filed, the prosecutor had had permission to nol 
pros the § 10 (d) sentencing enhancement in exchange for an 
agreed-upon sentence "along the lines of four to five" years in 
State prison on the unlawful possession of a firearm conviction 
with the § 10G sentencing enhancement.  The judge also confirmed 
with defense counsel that the defendant would be agreeable to 
such a plea agreement.9 
 
The judge next asked the prosecutor whether, if the 
defendant were to withdraw his motions, the four- to five-year 
sentence offer would "still be on the table."  The prosecutor 
agreed to ask his supervisors for permission to enter into such 
a plea agreement.  The judge then asked defense counsel whether 
the defendant would be withdrawing his motions if the prosecutor 
                                                          
 
like offense "shall be punished by imprisonment in the state 
prison for not less than five years nor more than seven years."  
The sentence may not be suspended, and the defendant may not 
receive any deduction from his sentence for good conduct.  Id. 
 
9 In discussing the resurrection of the plea agreement, 
defense counsel interjected that he "felt a duty" both to his 
client and to the court to bring the allegations to the court's 
attention, and that he had not approached the jurors on his own.  
The judge responded that she was not faulting defense counsel 
for bringing the motions, but "was just suggesting that it may 
amount to a hill of beans." 
12 
 
 
were to obtain that permission.  Defense counsel said that he 
"would absolutely suggest" that to his client. 
 
The contours of the plea agreement were then more precisely 
articulated:  if the defendant were to withdraw his motions and 
plead guilty to the § 10G sentencing enhancement on the unlawful 
possession of a firearm conviction, the prosecutor would enter a 
nolle prosequi on the § 10 (d) sentencing enhancement, move to 
dismiss the conviction of unlawful possession of ammunition as 
duplicative of carrying a loaded firearm, and recommend a 
sentence of no less than four and no more than five years in 
State prison on the § 10G conviction, and a sentence of 
probation for two years on and after this custodial sentence on 
the conviction of unlawful carrying of a loaded firearm.  The 
defendant would join the prosecutor in making this 
recommendation.10 
 
After a brief recess, the prosecutor confirmed that he had 
permission for this recommendation, and the defendant confirmed 
that he would withdraw his motions.  The judge asked the 
defendant if he understood that, by withdrawing the motions, he 
                                                          
 
10 The judge later stated, ultimately without objection, 
that she intended to sentence the defendant to a probationary 
term of two years on his conviction of negligent operation of a 
motor vehicle, to be served concurrently with the other 
probationary term. 
13 
 
 
could not "raise this issue any longer."  The defendant said 
that he did. 
 
The defendant then pleaded guilty to the § 10G sentencing 
enhancement, and the judge conducted a plea colloquy with the 
defendant.  The judge again informed the defendant that by 
pleading guilty to the § 10G sentencing enhancement, he was 
waiving his right to pursue the motions he filed that day.  When 
the judge asked whether anyone had "forced, threatened or 
pressured" him in any way to plead guilty to this offense, the 
defendant answered, "no."  The defendant agreed that he was 
pleading guilty to this indictment "willingly and voluntarily," 
and defense counsel agreed that his client's guilty plea was 
made "knowingly, willingly, and voluntarily" after he had 
discussed with his client "all aspects of his case." 
 
Defense counsel informed the judge that he would leave the 
notice of appeal in the file "for the protection of the 
defendant's rights."  The judge agreed that he could do so, 
noting that "arguably [the defendant] has the right to appeal 
his conviction for the loaded firearm."  After the judge 
sentenced the defendant in accordance with the terms of the plea 
agreement, the defendant filed a notice of appeal. 
 
5.  Motion for a new trial.  On February 4, 2019, the 
defendant, now represented by appellate counsel, filed a motion 
for a new trial in which he asked the judge to vacate his guilty 
14 
 
 
plea, his withdrawal of the motions for a mistrial and for 
disclosure of jurors' names and contact information, and his 
relinquishment of appellate rights.  In his motion, supported by 
affidavits from the defendant and his trial counsel, the 
defendant asserted that each of these decisions were made 
involuntarily because the defendant and defense counsel 
"panicked" when the judge rebuked defense counsel for speaking 
with a juror and were "unnerved" by the judge's frustration that 
the postverdict motions had caused the plea offer to be 
withdrawn, by the judge's attempt to resurrect the plea 
agreement, and by the judge's declared intent to schedule the 
§ 10G trial for a date when defense counsel was unavailable.  
The defendant claimed that, but for his panic at sentencing and 
the judge's interference, he would never have withdrawn his 
motions or pleaded guilty to the § 10G sentencing enhancement. 
 
The judge denied the defendant's motion without an 
evidentiary hearing.  The judge explained that her statement, 
"Good going, [defense counsel].  You just upset this applecart," 
was "blunt," but it was "borne out of [her] concern that 
[defense counsel's] precipitous motions were drawing the ire of 
[the prosecutor] and his superiors and, in turn, leading to the 
possible derailment of a charge concession by the Commonwealth."  
She noted that some of her comments, such as, "I don't want 
anyone to feel pressured," and her urging of the parties to 
15 
 
 
"approach this dispassionately," "paint the picture of me as a 
peacemaker, not a bully."  She declared that her "efforts to 
resurrect the Commonwealth's previous offer of four to five 
years, at which offer [defense counsel] and his client leapt," 
and her suggestion that the defendant be placed on probation for 
the other two convictions "do not suggest a judge who was out 
to, in [appellate counsel's] words, 'thwart judgment.'" 
 
The judge also declared that her "skepticism over the 
propriety" of the defendant's motions "was well-founded."  She 
found that defense counsel intended "in major part" to 
investigate the jury's deliberative process, an inquiry which 
she said was prohibited.  The judge recognized that "juror bias 
is a legitimate subject for post-verdict inquiry," citing 
Commonwealth v. McCowen, 458 Mass. 461, 497 (2010), and Laguer, 
410 Mass. at 97, but she noted that the defendant had yet to 
furnish an affidavit from the deliberating juror "attesting to 
her alleged claim of racism permeating the deliberations" and 
therefore the defendant "cannot meet even his initial burden of 
proving that the jury were exposed to racially charged language 
or stereotypes." 
 
Finally, the judge noted that she conducted a full colloquy 
with the defendant regarding his change of plea to the § 10G 
sentencing enhancement, and that, as part of the colloquy, both 
the defendant and his counsel affirmed that the defendant 
16 
 
 
changed his plea knowingly, willingly, and voluntarily.  The 
judge found that these affirmations "mitigate against their 
claims that the defendant's withdrawal of his motions and entry 
into a guilty plea were rendered involuntary by [her] words."  
The defendant timely appealed the judge's denial of the motion 
for new trial, and we transferred the case to this court on our 
own initiative. 
Discussion.  1.  Allegations that the jury deliberations 
were tainted by racism.  Because the judge's response to the 
defendant's motions for a mistrial and for juror names and 
contact information is intertwined with the defendant's claim 
that his plea was involuntary, we begin there.  "A criminal 
defendant is entitled to a trial by an impartial jury pursuant 
to the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights."  
Commonwealth v. Heywood, 484 Mass. 43, 44 (2020), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Williams, 481 Mass. 443, 447 (2019).  "The 
presence of even one juror who is not impartial violates a 
defendant's right to trial by an impartial jury."  McCowen, 458 
Mass. at 494, quoting Commonwealth v. Vann Long, 419 Mass. 798, 
802 (1995).  Racial bias in the jury system is "a familiar and 
recurring evil that, if left unaddressed, would risk systemic 
injury to the administration of justice."  Pena-Rodriguez, 137 
S. Ct. at 868.  While "[a]ll forms of improper bias pose 
17 
 
 
challenges to the trial process," id. at 869, racial and ethnic 
bias "implicate[] unique historical, constitutional, and 
institutional concerns," id. at 868.  To "prevent a systemic 
loss of confidence in jury verdicts," id. at 869, where a 
defendant submits a motion raising the possibility that he "did 
not receive a trial by an impartial jury, which was his 
fundamental right, [it] cannot be ignored," Laguer, 410 Mass. at 
97.  See Pena-Rodriguez, supra ("A constitutional rule that 
racial bias in the justice system must be addressed -- 
including, in some instances, after the verdict has been entered 
-- is necessary to prevent a systemic loss of confidence in jury 
verdicts").  In fact, to ignore concerns about the influence of 
racial bias in the jury room "might well offend fundamental 
fairness" (quotation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 
Mass. 140, 155 n.25, cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1137 (1982). 
Therefore, when defense counsel, in good faith, attests 
that a deliberating juror told counsel after the verdict that 
racist statements were made by one or more jurors during the 
course of deliberations, the judge must give the defendant a 
fair opportunity to obtain an affidavit from that juror setting 
forth with some specificity who among the jurors made statements 
reflecting racial bias and, to the best of his or her memory, 
the statements that were made.  See McCowen, 458 Mass. at 494; 
Laguer, 410 Mass. at 97.  Here, the defendant moved for juror 
18 
 
 
names and contact information so that his attorney could "follow 
up" with the deliberating juror with whom he spoke and 
investigate that juror's claim that racism infected the jury's 
deliberations and influenced their verdict.  The judge in this 
case erred in not promptly allowing that motion and in 
disparaging its merits. 
 
Once a motion permitting investigation into the allegation 
is allowed, the process proceeds as we described in McCowen, 458 
Mass. at 494-497.  If the defendant submits an affidavit from a 
juror "alleging that a juror (or more than one juror) made a 
statement to another juror that reasonably demonstrates racial 
or ethnic bias, and the credibility of the affidavit is in 
issue, the trial judge should conduct a hearing to determine the 
truth or falsity of the affidavit's allegations."  Id. at 494.  
"In evaluating claims of juror bias, a judge . . . must first 
determine whether the defendant has satisfied his burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged 
statements that possibly reflect racial or ethnic bias were 
actually made by the juror."  Id. at 494-495.  "Where juror 
testimony is needed to ascertain whether the racist statement 
was made, a judge may inquire of the jurors whether the 
statement was made but may not inquire into their subjective 
thought process, such as their reasons for concluding that the 
defendant was guilty, the content of their deliberations, or the 
19 
 
 
effect of the statement at issue on their thought process."  Id. 
at 494 n.35. 
 
If "one or more of the challenged statements are shown to 
have been made," then the judge must "determine whether the 
defendant has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
juror who made the statements was actually biased because of the 
race or ethnicity of a defendant, victim, defense attorney, or 
witness." McCowen, 458 Mass. at 495.  Generally, this requires 
the judge to determine the "precise content and context of the 
statement to determine whether it reflects the juror's actual 
racial or ethnic bias, or whether it was said in jest or 
otherwise bore a meaning that would fail to establish racial 
bias."  Id. at 496.  But "[i]n some instances, the statement 
made by the juror may establish so strong an inference of a 
juror's actual bias that proof of the statement alone may 
suffice."  Id., quoting Laguer, 410 Mass. at 94, 98-99 ("if 
alleged statement -- '[T]he goddamned spic is guilty just 
sitting there; look at him.  Why bother having the trial' -- 
were made by juror, judge must find actual ethnic bias").  If 
the judge finds that the juror's statements reflected actual 
bias, then the defendant is "entitled to a new trial without 
needing to show that the juror's bias affected the jury's 
verdict."  McCowen, supra. 
20 
 
 
Where the defendant has proved that the challenged 
statements were made, but failed to prove that the statements 
reflected actual bias, "the judge still must determine whether 
the statements so infected the deliberative process with 
racially or ethnically charged language or stereotypes that it 
prejudiced the defendant's right" to an impartial jury.  Id. at 
496-497.  The defendant "bears the initial burden of proving, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, that the jury were exposed to 
statements that infected the deliberative process with racially 
or ethnically charged language or stereotypes."  Id. at 497.  
"If the defendant meets this burden, the burden then shifts to 
the Commonwealth to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant was not prejudiced by the jury's exposure to these 
statements."  Id. 
In this case, the judge did not allow the defendant's 
motion for juror names and contact information so that defense 
counsel could locate the deliberating juror with whom he spoke 
and investigate her allegations.11  Instead, the judge unfairly 
rebuked defense counsel for initiating a postverdict discussion 
                                                          
 
11 In rare cases, the jury list may need to be or has 
already been impounded for safety reasons.  See Commonwealth v. 
Silva, 448 Mass. 701, 709 (2007).  In such cases, the defendant 
may still gain access to the requested information, but a judge 
may choose to consider what restrictions, if any, to place on 
the dissemination of juror information to protect the jurors' 
personal safety and security.  Here, there is nothing in the 
record to indicate that the jury list was impounded. 
21 
 
 
with the juror, claiming that counsel's conduct violated the 
guidelines for juror contact that this court established in 
Commonwealth v. Moore, 474 Mass. 541, 551-553 (2016).  Those 
guidelines, which require an attorney who wishes to "initiate 
postverdict contact with jurors" to give written notice to 
opposing counsel five business days "before contacting any 
juror," do not apply where a juror initiates postverdict contact 
with the attorney, as the defense attorney attested happened 
here.  Id. at 551.  See Commonwealth v. Solis, 407 Mass. 398, 
404 (1990) ("Alleged improprieties may, of course, be disclosed 
by a concerned juror"). 
The judge was correct that some of the information provided 
by the deliberating juror, specifically the juror's claim that 
the other jurors gave her a "hard time" when she said she wanted 
to return the next day to continue deliberations and that they 
"forced her" to change her vote to guilty, would not be 
appropriate areas of inquiry and, even if true, would not be 
admissible in considering a motion for a new trial.  See Moore, 
474 Mass. at 552 (affidavit from juror must not focus on "the 
substance of the jury's deliberations or the individual or 
collective thought processes of the juror or the jury as a 
whole"); Commonwealth v. Fidler, 377 Mass. 192, 198 (1979) (even 
when investigating allegations of extraneous influences on jury, 
our rule "does not permit evidence concerning the subjective 
22 
 
 
mental processes of jurors, such as the reasons for their 
decisions"). 
But that would not justify discouraging defense counsel 
from exploring a ground that might require a new trial, 
specifically the claim that the jury deliberations were tainted 
by racial bias.12  Nor was it fair for the judge, in denying the 
defendant's motion for a new trial on the sentencing 
enhancements, to find support for that denial from the 
defendant's failure to provide an affidavit from the 
deliberating juror, when the judge did not provide defense 
counsel with the juror's contact information that would have 
enabled the defendant to obtain such an affidavit. 
 
If the defendant wishes to explore whether he has grounds 
to move for a new trial on the underlying firearms conviction 
based on the allegation that racial bias tainted the jury's 
deliberations, the defendant may again file a motion for juror 
names and contact information, and this time, the judge should 
allow the motion.  Defense counsel then, following the protocol 
                                                          
 
12 A defendant's good faith claim that a jury's verdict 
might be tainted by racial bias also would not justify a 
prosecutor's withdrawal of a plea offer because the 
Commonwealth, too, has a substantial interest in ensuring that 
jury verdicts are free from bias.  We note that the prosecutor 
in this case did not declare that his authority to make the plea 
offer had been withdrawn because of the newly-filed postverdict 
motions; he simply declared that his supervisors wanted to 
review the motions before moving forward. 
23 
 
 
for contacting jurors as set out in Moore, 474 Mass. at 551-553, 
may investigate the allegations of racial bias made by the 
deliberating juror and seek affidavits from that juror and any 
others who may shed light on the allegations. 
2.  Voluntariness of the guilty plea.  A motion to withdraw 
a guilty plea is properly treated as a motion for a new trial 
pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 
1501 (2001).  Commonwealth v. Lavrinenko, 473 Mass. 42, 47 
(2015), quoting Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 468 Mass. 174, 178 
(2014).  We review a motion judge's conclusion to deny a motion 
for new trial "only to determine whether there has been a 
significant error of law or other abuse of discretion."  
Lavrinenko, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 
307 (1986).  The defendant argues that his motion for a new 
trial should have been granted and his guilty plea to the § 10G 
sentencing enhancement vacated because the plea and his 
withdrawal of his postverdict motions were involuntary.13  The 
                                                          
 
13 At oral argument, the Commonwealth declared that the 
judge did not abuse her discretion in finding the defendant's 
plea to the sentencing enhancement to be voluntary, but it did 
not object to the defendant pursuing his claim that the verdict 
in the second jury trial was tainted by racism by filing a 
motion for a new trial.  Indeed, the Commonwealth stated that it 
would "welcome" such a motion for a new trial because the 
Commonwealth, too, has a substantial interest in ensuring that 
jury verdicts are free from bias.  The Commonwealth's 
concession, although welcome, does not affect our analysis of 
the defendant's motion to vacate his guilty plea, which must 
24 
 
 
defendant states that his plea was involuntary because he 
"panicked" based on the judge's critical response to his 
postverdict motions and her reproach of defense counsel for 
"upset[ting] this applecart."  We conclude that the judge abused 
her discretion in determining that the defendant's plea was 
voluntary and denying his motion for a new trial as to the § 10G 
enhancement. 
We understand why the defendant chose to plead guilty to 
the § 10G enhancement.  The record reflects that, before the 
hearing, the defendant explored with the prosecutor the 
possibility of a plea that would both spare him from the five-
year minimum mandatory sentence he would receive if he were 
found guilty of the sentencing enhancement under § 10 (d) and 
protect him from the risk of an even longer sentence.  The 
defendant then decided to file the postverdict motions that, if 
granted, would cause his firearm convictions to be vacated.14  It 
is fair to say that the judge's response to those motions would 
lead a reasonable defense attorney to believe that there was no 
significant chance that the judge would order a new trial on 
those grounds.  Because there is nothing in the record to 
                                                          
 
focus on what happened at the time of the plea, not on a 
concession made by the Commonwealth on appeal at oral argument. 
 
14 These motions could not affect his conviction of 
negligent operation of a motor vehicle, because that verdict 
arose from his first trial. 
25 
 
 
suggest that the defendant had a credible defense to the 
sentencing enhancements, it was a reasonable defense strategy, 
given the judge's response to those motions, to attempt to 
resurrect the plea agreement that defense counsel had earlier 
explored. 
We also understand why the judge believed that she had not 
coerced the plea.  The impetus for the judge's entry into the 
plea conversation came from defense counsel; it was not 
initially raised or suggested by the judge.  The judge, 
believing that the defendant's motions were "leading to the 
possible derailment of a charge concession by the Commonwealth," 
proceeded to try and "resurrect the Commonwealth's previous 
offer of four to five years" by urging the defendant to withdraw 
his postverdict motions.  Defense counsel told the judge that he 
would "absolutely" suggest the deal to his client, and the 
defendant agreed to withdraw these motions in order to obtain 
the benefit of the plea bargain he had sought previously. 
 
The judge never threatened the defendant with a harsher 
sentence if he were to pursue his motions.  In fact, the judge's 
words reflect that she was hoping to spare the defendant from a 
longer minimum mandatory sentence rather than threatening him 
with a longer sentence.  Contrast Letters v. Commonwealth, 346 
Mass. 403, 404-406 (1963) (guilty plea coerced where trial judge 
threatened defendant with consecutive life sentences unless he 
26 
 
 
pleaded guilty).  The judge knew the Commonwealth's burden to 
prove the sentencing enhancement charges was "not onerous" and 
did not want the Commonwealth to withdraw a plea offer and 
proceed to trial on the sentencing enhancements because of 
motions that might amount to a "hill of beans."  The judge's 
vocal skepticism regarding the defendant's postverdict motions 
was improper, as discussed supra, but that supports her 
assertion that she was seeking to prevent the defendant from 
serving extra time in prison, rather than seeking to deny him 
due process. 
However, even though the defense counsel acted reasonably 
under the circumstances and the judge believed that she was 
helping rather than hurting the defendant, the fact remains that 
the guilty plea was tainted by the judge's error in not granting 
the defendant's motion for juror names and contact information, 
and in disparaging its merits.  We might have permitted the plea 
to stand if the defendant, after pleading guilty, was free to 
pursue his claim that the jury's deliberations had been infected 
with racial bias through a motion for a new trial.  But the 
judge expressly elicited from the defendant during the plea 
colloquy a commitment not only to withdraw the postverdict 
motions but also to never pursue those motions again.  In 
effect, the judge conditioned the plea on the defendant's 
promise forever to waive his claim that he was denied his 
27 
 
 
fundamental right to an unbiased jury because the jury 
deliberations were infected with racial bias. 
A justice system that is committed to equal justice for 
persons of all races and ethnicities, and to the protection of a 
defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial, cannot permit a 
plea to be conditioned on the waiver of such a claim, even if 
the waiver is part of a plea bargain.  A defendant may waive the 
right to a trial by jury but, once the right is invoked, a 
defendant may not waive his or her right to a verdict that is 
untainted by racial or ethnic bias.  See Heywood, 484 Mass. at 
44, quoting Commonwealth v. Susi, 394 Mass. 784, 786 (1985) 
("The failure to grant a defendant a fair hearing before an 
impartial jury violates even minimal standards of due process").  
Contrast Commonwealth v. Hardin, 476 Mass. 1011, 1012 (2016) 
(defendant's "argument that the complaint fails to state a crime 
raises an issue of subject matter jurisdiction, which may be 
raised at any time, . . . and which cannot be waived" through 
guilty plea [citation omitted]).  We therefore vacate the 
defendant's guilty plea and order a new trial as to the 
sentencing enhancements. 
We recognize that vacating the defendant's guilty plea and 
allowing a new trial on the sentencing enhancements also unwinds 
the plea agreement and releases the Commonwealth from its 
obligation to nol pros the § 10 (d) enhancement, with its five-
28 
 
 
year minimum mandatory sentence.  Under our holding in 
Commonwealth v. Richardson, 469 Mass. 248, 254 (2014), the 
defendant may be sentenced only on one of the charged 
enhancement statutes.  So, should the defendant choose not to 
pursue a motion for a new trial on the underlying firearms 
conviction, or should that motion be denied, the Commonwealth 
may choose to leave its nolle prosequi intact and proceed to 
trial only on the § 10G enhancement.  Where the current district 
attorney "welcomes" the defendant having a fair opportunity to 
explore whether racial bias, in fact, did infect the jury's 
deliberations, we trust that she will not seek to penalize the 
defendant for attempting to preserve that opportunity.  We 
therefore need not address whether it would be permissible for a 
district attorney in these circumstances to prosecute the 
sentencing enhancement that was previously nol prossed. 
 
3.  Sufficiency of evidence of conviction of unlawful 
possession of a loaded firearm.  The defendant also argues that 
his conviction of unlawful possession of a loaded firearm should 
be reversed because no reasonable trier of fact could conclude 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that the 
firearm was loaded.  In order to convict a defendant of unlawful 
possession of a loaded firearm under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n), the 
Commonwealth is required to prove that the defendant knew that 
the firearm he possessed was loaded with ammunition.  
29 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 479 Mass. 600, 608 (2018).  The 
Commonwealth concedes that the evidence at trial, even when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, fell 
short of such proof.  Where there was insufficient evidence as 
to an essential element of the crime charged, the defendant's 
conviction under § 10 (n) must be reversed and vacated. 
 
Conclusion.  The defendant's guilty plea to the § 10G 
sentencing enhancement for his conviction of unlawful possession 
of a firearm is vacated, and a new trial is ordered as to that 
sentencing enhancement.  The defendant's conviction of unlawful 
possession of a loaded firearm under § 10 (n) is vacated, and 
the case is remanded to the Superior Court for entry of a 
judgment of not guilty as to that indictment.  The defendant may 
renew his motion in the Superior Court for juror names and 
contact information, which shall now be granted.  If the 
evidence so warrants, the defendant may bring a motion for a new 
trial as to his underlying firearm conviction, alleging that the 
jury's deliberations were tainted by racial bias.15 
                                                          
 
15 If a motion for a new trial is brought, it shall be heard 
by a judge other than the trial judge.  Although we are 
confident that the trial judge would resolve the motion fairly 
and in accordance with law, in view of her statements concerning 
the postverdict motions when they were first filed, we believe 
that assigning the motion to a different judge would "serve the 
interests of promoting the appearance that justice will be 
administered impartially."  Commonwealth v. Coleman, 390 Mass. 
797, 810 n.15 (1984).  See Commonwealth v. Henriquez, 440 Mass. 
30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                          
 
1015, 1016 (2003); Commonwealth v. Lebron, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 
970, 972 (1987).  That assigned judge should also preside over 
any resulting new trial on the sentencing enhancement and impose 
an appropriate sentence on the defendant.