Title: Johnson v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and 
Kinser, JJ., and Stephenson, Senior Justice 
 
SHERMAINE A. JOHNSON 
 
 
v.  Record Nos. 992525 and 992526  
OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
                           April 21, 2000 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PETERSBURG 
James F. D'Alton, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In these appeals, we review the capital murder conviction 
and death sentence imposed on Shermaine A. Johnson, along with 
his conviction for rape. 
I. PROCEEDINGS 
 
On January 6, 1997, petitions were issued in the Juvenile 
and Domestic Relations District Court of the City of Petersburg 
(juvenile court) against Johnson, charging him with the July 11, 
1994 rape and capital murder of Hope Denise Hall.  Johnson was 
16 years old at the time these offenses were committed.  Notice 
of the juvenile court proceedings was provided to Johnson's 
guardian and grandmother, Virginia Dancy.  After a hearing, the 
juvenile court found probable cause to believe that Johnson had 
committed the crimes alleged and entered an order certifying the 
charges to the grand jury. 
 
On April 17, 1997, the grand jury of the Circuit Court of 
the City of Petersburg (the circuit court) indicted Johnson on 
charges of capital murder in the commission of rape or attempted 
rape in violation of Code § 18.2-31(5), and rape in violation of 
Code § 18.2-61.  Johnson filed numerous pretrial motions and 
requests for continuances during the ensuing 14 months.  On June 
17, 1998, Johnson filed a motion to dismiss the indictments, 
arguing that the circuit court had not complied with the 
requirements of former Code § 16.1-296(B).  This statute 
required the circuit court, within a "reasonable time" after 
receiving the case from the juvenile court, to review the 
records and enter an order either remanding the case to the 
juvenile court or advising the Commonwealth's Attorney that he 
may seek indictments. 
 
The circuit court entered an order dated June 29, 1998, 
stating that it had reviewed Johnson's records from the juvenile 
court and, upon that review, authorized the Commonwealth's 
Attorney to seek indictments.  The grand jury returned new 
indictments on July 2, 1998, and the circuit court later granted 
the Commonwealth's motion to enter a nolle prosequi on the 
original indictments.  The circuit court also entered an order 
stating that "[a]ll papers, documents, orders, motions, 
responses, letters, and arguments" contained in the court files 
of the original indictments were "transferred and incorporated" 
in the files of the new indictments. 
 
2
 
In the first stage of a bifurcated jury trial conducted 
under Code § 19.2-264.3, the jury convicted Johnson of the 
offenses charged in the new indictments.  In the penalty phase 
of the trial, the jury fixed his punishment for capital murder 
at death, based on findings of both "future dangerousness" and 
"vileness." 
 
In a post-trial motion, Johnson sought dismissal of the 
indictments on the ground that the Commonwealth had failed to 
provide notice of the transfer proceedings in juvenile court to 
Johnson's father, in violation of former Code §§ 16.1-263 and -
264.  The trial court denied the motion, finding that "proper 
notice as contemplated by the statute" had been given.  After 
considering the pre-sentence report and victim impact 
statements, the trial court sentenced Johnson to life 
imprisonment on the rape charge and, in accordance with the jury 
verdict, to death on the capital murder charge. 
 
We consolidated the automatic review of Johnson's death 
sentence with his appeal of the capital murder conviction.  Code 
§ 17.1-313(F).  We also certified Johnson's appeal of his rape 
conviction from the Court of Appeals and consolidated that 
appeal with his capital murder appeal.  Code § 17.1-409. 
II.  THE EVIDENCE 
 
We will state the evidence presented at trial in the light 
most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party below.  
 
3
Walker v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 54, 60, 515 S.E.2d 565, 568 
(1999), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 955 (2000); 
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 625, 632, 499 S.E.2d 538, 543 
(1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1067 (1999); Roach v. 
Commonwealth, 251 Va. 324, 329, 468 S.E.2d 98, 101, cert. 
denied, 519 U.S. 951, (1996).  On July 11, 1994, the nude body 
of 22-year-old Hope Denise Hall was found on the bedroom floor 
of her apartment in Petersburg.  She had been stabbed 15 times, 
including fatal stab wounds to her back, chest, and neck. 
 
Hall's body had abrasions on the nose and left cheek.  The 
body also had a broken, ragged fingernail that Dr. Deborah Kay, 
an assistant chief medical examiner for the Commonwealth, 
testified was a "defense-type" injury.  Dr. Kay also testified 
that death "is not generally immediate" with wounds such as 
those suffered by Hall, and that she initially would have 
remained conscious after the wounds were inflicted. 
 
The police found blood on two "steak" knives, which were 
lying on a counter in Hall's kitchen.  Blood was also found on a 
piece of a broken drinking glass located on the kitchen counter, 
and there was additional blood on the kitchen counter and floor.  
The police recovered from the kitchen floor an earring, five 
strands of hair, and a partial shoe print containing some blood.  
The matching earring was found in Hall's bedroom. 
 
4
 
The outside door to Hall's apartment was locked, and the 
police found a partial fingerprint and smears of blood on the 
inside panel of that door, which was located near the kitchen.  
The police recovered two additional "steak" knives, one on 
Hall's bed and one in her bathroom.  The telephone wires in her 
bedroom had been pulled out of the wall. 
 
A smear of blood and blood splatters were located on the 
bedroom wall near the victim's body.  The police found 
additional blood on the bedroom floor, dresser, sheets, and 
bedspread.  There was no sign of forced entry into the 
apartment. 
DNA Evidence 
 
Jean M. Hamilton, a forensic scientist employed by the 
Virginia Division of Forensic Science, testified that she 
performed DNA testing using the "polymerase chain reaction," or 
PCR, technique on evidence recovered from the crime scene and a 
blood sample and vaginal swabs collected from Hall's body during 
an autopsy.  Hamilton concluded that the DNA from the blood 
found on the knife on the bed, the knives in the kitchen, the 
kitchen countertop, and the front door all matched the DNA from 
Hall's blood sample. 
 
Hamilton determined that the DNA from Hall's blood did not 
match the DNA from the blood on the handle of the knife found in 
the bathroom.  However, the blood from the broken glass in the 
 
5
kitchen and one bloodstain on the bedspread contained a mixture 
of Hall's DNA and DNA from the same person whose blood was on 
the handle of the knife found in the bathroom. 
 
Hamilton testified that DNA from sperm detected in two 
semen stains on the sheets and DNA from another stain on the 
bedspread came from the same person as the DNA from the blood on 
the bathroom knife.  However, the DNA from the sperm detected in 
the vaginal swab taken from Hall's body came from more than one 
person. 
 
Early in the investigation, an acquaintance of Hall, Leroy 
Quick, III, who had been observed knocking on the door of Hall's 
apartment on the night of the murder, was suspected of 
committing these crimes.  Hamilton analyzed the DNA from a 
sample of Quick's blood.  Based on her analysis, Hamilton 
eliminated Quick as a possible source of the DNA found on all 
the evidence she had analyzed. 
 
Hamilton then performed a more discriminating type of DNA 
analysis, known as "restriction fragment length polymorphism" or 
RFLP testing, on the DNA from two semen stains found on the 
sheet and the bedspread.  After obtaining the DNA profile from 
those two stains, Hamilton searched the DNA data bank maintained 
by the Division of Forensic Science to determine if the DNA 
profile obtained from the crime scene evidence matched any DNA 
profile on record in the DNA data bank.  Hamilton did not find a 
 
6
matching DNA profile at the time of her initial search in March 
1996, at which time there were about 5,000 samples in the DNA 
data bank. 
 
In August 1996, Hamilton performed a second search of the 
DNA data bank after about 2,500 more samples had been added to 
the bank.  Hamilton's second search revealed that one DNA 
profile contained in the data bank was consistent with the DNA 
profile that she had obtained from the crime scene evidence.  
This matching DNA profile belonged to the defendant, Shermaine 
A. Johnson, who was incarcerated in the Southampton Correctional 
Institute. 
 
Hamilton performed DNA testing, using the PCR technique, on 
another sample of Johnson's blood that was in the custody of the 
City of Franklin Police Department.  Hamilton concluded that the 
DNA profile of Johnson, who is an African-American, matched the 
DNA found on the handle of the knife retrieved from the 
bathroom, some of the semen stains on the sheets, the semen 
stain on the bedspread, and some of the sperm in the vaginal 
swab.  Based on the results of this PCR test, Hamilton estimated 
that this particular DNA profile would occur in about one out of 
980 people in the Black population, or about one-tenth of 1% of 
that population. 
 
Sergeant Thomas Patrick of the Petersburg Bureau of Police 
obtained a search warrant, which he executed on Johnson at the 
 
7
Southampton Correctional Institute.  Pursuant to the search 
warrant, Patrick obtained another blood sample from Johnson, as 
well as head and pubic hair samples.  George Li, a supervising 
forensic scientist with the Virginia Division of Forensic 
Science, conducted RFLP testing on DNA from the blood sample 
obtained from Johnson and compared it to the DNA found at the 
crime scene.  Li concluded that Johnson's DNA matched the DNA 
from semen stains on the sheet and bedspread.  Li estimated that 
the probability of randomly selecting an individual other than 
Johnson with the same DNA profile as that found in the evidence 
taken from the crime scene was about one in one million in the 
Black population. 
 
Li also conducted PCR testing on the DNA from the blood 
sample obtained from Johnson, and compared the results with the 
DNA on the knife found in the bathroom and semen stains found on 
the sheets and bedspread.  Based on the less discriminating PCR 
technique, Li estimated that the probability of a person other 
than Johnson having a DNA profile matching the DNA from the 
crime scene evidence was one in 980 in the Black population. 
Johnson's Statements to Police 
 
After Hamilton made the initial match of the DNA taken from 
the crime scene with Johnson's DNA profile obtained from the 
data bank, three police officers from the Petersburg Police 
Bureau interviewed Johnson at the Southampton Correctional 
 
8
Institute in August 1996.  Upon signing a written waiver of his 
Miranda rights, Johnson told the police officers that he had 
been in Petersburg "quite a bit" during the summer of 1994 and 
had spent "a lot" of time at the apartment complex where Hall 
lived.  His cousin and another acquaintance lived in other 
buildings in the same complex.  Johnson stated that on the night 
Hall was murdered, he encountered her in a hallway and that they 
went inside her apartment and began kissing on her living room 
couch.  Johnson stated that an African-American man with a light 
complexion who had a "fade" haircut knocked on Hall's door, 
entered the apartment, and began arguing with Johnson.  
According to Johnson, this man threatened him with a knife and 
pushed him out of the apartment. 
 
Johnson denied being present in any room in Hall's 
apartment other than the living room and denied being cut or 
injured in any way while in the apartment.  On further 
questioning, Johnson stated that he had not met Hall in the 
outside hallway, but had knocked on her door. 
Other Crimes Evidence 
 
Prior to trial, the Commonwealth gave Johnson notice that 
it intended to present evidence during the guilt phase of the 
trial that Johnson had raped 21-year-old Lavonda Scott on July 
2, 1994, and 15-year-old Janel Chambliss on August 31, 1994.  
Over Johnson's objection, the trial court permitted both Scott 
 
9
and Chambliss to testify about these crimes, after finding that 
there were "numerous" similarities between the crimes committed 
against Scott and Chambliss and the pending charges against 
Johnson. 
 
The trial court cited the following factors in its decision 
to permit the testimony of Scott and Chambliss.  All three 
victims were young African-American women.  Scott and Chambliss 
both knew Johnson and allowed him to enter their homes.  There 
was no sign of forced entry into Hall's apartment.  Johnson 
assaulted both Scott and Chambliss after requesting a glass of 
water.  He then seized knives from their kitchens.  There was a 
broken drinking glass in Hall's kitchen, and the knives used to 
kill Hall came from her kitchen. 
 
Johnson forced both Scott and Chambliss to remove all their 
clothing before raping them.  Hall's body was totally nude and 
her clothes were found near her body.  Johnson threatened both 
Scott and Chambliss, stating that he would kill them if they did 
not follow his directions.  When Chambliss resisted and 
struggled with Johnson, he stabbed her.  There was evidence of a 
struggle in Hall's apartment and Hall was fatally stabbed.  All 
three crimes occurred within a 90-day period in 1994.1
Aggravating Factors 
 
10
 
During the penalty phase of the trial, the Commonwealth 
presented evidence that in addition to the rapes of Scott, 
Chambliss, and Hall, Johnson committed two other rapes in 1994.  
The two victims of these other crimes testified at the penalty 
phase.  The evidence showed that in January 1994, Johnson raped 
a 13-year-old girl as she was walking down a flight of stairs 
inside her apartment building in New Jersey.  Johnson grabbed 
her from behind, held a "steak" knife to her throat, demanded 
that she remove her clothes, and raped her.  In June 1994, 
Johnson raped a 15-year-old girl in a friend's apartment in New 
York City.  Johnson stopped the girl on the street and lured her 
to his friend's apartment, where he threatened her with a knife, 
forced her to remove her clothing, and raped her. 
III. ISSUES PREVIOUSLY DECIDED 
 
On appeal, Johnson raises certain arguments that we have 
resolved in previous decisions.  Since we find no reason to 
modify our previously expressed views, we reaffirm our earlier 
holdings and reject the following arguments: 
 
A.  Imposition of the death penalty constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment in violation of the United States 
Constitution and the Constitution of Virginia.  Rejected in 
Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 347, 360 n.2, 519 S.E.2d 602, 
                                                                  
 
1While the trial court found that all three crimes occurred 
within a 90-day period, the record reflects that they occurred 
 
11
607 n.2 (1999); Jackson, 255 Va. at 635, 499 S.E.2d at 545; 
Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 453, 470 S.E.2d 114, 122, 
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 887 (1996). 
 
B.  Virginia's death penalty statutes fail to provide 
meaningful guidance to the jury.  Rejected in Yarbrough, 258 Va. 
at 360 n.2, 519 S.E.2d at 607 n.2; Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 257 
Va. 292, 299, 513 S.E.2d 642, 647, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 
120 S.Ct. 177 (1999); Roach, 251 Va. at 336, 468 S.E.2d at 105; 
Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 74, 445 S.E.2d 670, 674-75, 
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 971 (1994). 
 
C.  The "vileness" factor is unconstitutionally vague and 
overbroad.  Rejected in Walker, 258 Va. at 61, 515 S.E.2d at 
569; Cherrix, 257 Va. at 299, 513 S.E.2d at 647; Beck v. 
Commonwealth, 253 Va. 373, 387, 484 S.E.2d 898, 907, cert. 
denied, 522 U.S. 1018 (1997). 
 
D.  The "future dangerousness" factor is unconstitutionally 
vague and unconstitutionally permits the consideration of 
unadjudicated conduct.  Rejected in Walker, 258 Va. at 61, 515 
S.E.2d at 569; Cherrix, 257 Va. at 299, 513 S.E.2d at 647; 
Clagett v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79, 86, 472 S.E.2d 263, 267 
(1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1122 (1997). 
 
E.  Virginia's penalty phase instructions do not adequately 
instruct the jury concerning mitigation.  Rejected in Yarbrough, 
                                                                  
within a 60-day period in July and August, 1994. 
 
12
258 Va. at 360 n.2, 519 S.E.2d at 607 n.2; Cherrix, 257 Va. at 
299, 513 S.E.2d at 647; Swann v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 222, 228, 
441 S.E.2d 195, 200, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 889 (1994). 
 
F.  The post-verdict review of the death sentence by the 
trial court does not satisfy constitutional standards because 
the trial court may consider hearsay evidence contained in a 
pre-sentence report and is not required to set aside the death 
sentence upon a showing of good cause.  Rejected in Walker, 258 
Va. at 61, 515 S.E.2d at 569; Cherrix, 257 Va. at 299, 513 
S.E.2d at 647; Breard, 248 Va. at 76, 445 S.E.2d at 675. 
IV.  PRETRIAL MATTERS 
Juvenile Transfer Issues 
 
Johnson argues that the circuit court erred in denying his 
motions to dismiss both sets of indictments.  He first asserts 
that the original indictments were void because the circuit 
court failed to review the transfer record from the juvenile 
court under former Code § 16.1-296(B) before the original 
indictments were obtained.  He also argues that the original 
indictments were void under Commonwealth v. Baker, 258 Va. 1, 
516 S.E.2d 219 (1999)(per curiam), because the Commonwealth had 
failed to notify Johnson's father of the transfer hearing in the 
juvenile court.  We disagree with Johnson's arguments. 
 
The requirement of former Code § 16.1-296(B), that the 
circuit court review the transfer documents from the juvenile 
 
13
court before allowing the Commonwealth to seek indictments, was 
inapplicable to Johnson's case.  This review was not required 
because Johnson previously had been tried and convicted as an 
adult in the Circuit Court of Southampton County for the rape of 
Lavonda Scott.  Code § 16.1-271 provides in relevant part: 
 
Any juvenile who is tried and convicted in a circuit 
court under the provisions of this article shall be 
considered and treated as an adult in any criminal 
proceeding resulting from any future alleged criminal acts. 
. . .  
 
All procedures and dispositions applicable to adults 
charged with such a criminal offense shall apply in such 
cases. . . . The provisions of this article regarding a 
transfer hearing shall not be applicable to such juveniles. 
 
 
The rape of Lavonda Scott occurred on July 2 or 3, 1994, 
and the present offenses took place days later on July 11, 1994.  
Thus, the rape and capital murder of Hope Hall were "future 
alleged criminal acts" within the meaning of Code § 16.1-271, 
and Johnson was not entitled to the protection that the transfer 
statutes afford a juvenile offender who has not previously been 
tried and convicted as an adult in a circuit court.  
Accordingly, since Johnson's prior conviction as an adult 
eliminated the requirement of former Code § 16.1-296(B) that the 
circuit court review the transfer proceedings, his claim that 
the review was not performed in a timely manner has no merit. 
 
The provisions of Code § 16.1-271 also invalidate Johnson's 
claim that the indictments were void because his father was not 
provided notice of the transfer proceedings in the juvenile 
 
14
court.  Under the plain language of Code § 16.1-271, a juvenile 
who has been convicted as an adult in a circuit court is not 
entitled to a transfer hearing in the juvenile court.  Since 
Johnson had no right to a transfer hearing, the notice 
requirements pertaining to such a hearing are inapplicable and 
do not provide a basis for challenging either set of indictments 
returned in this case. 
 
Johnson next contends that the Commonwealth's failure to 
try the charges against him within five months of his 
preliminary hearing violated his right to a speedy trial under 
Code § 19.2-243.  He asserts that the 16-month interval between 
the preliminary hearing and trial is attributable solely to the 
Commonwealth's failure to seek a timely review of the transfer 
documents from the juvenile court. 
 
The record demonstrates that there is no merit to Johnson's 
claim.  Johnson's preliminary hearing and resulting probable 
cause determination occurred in the juvenile court on March 20, 
1997.  Johnson either requested or agreed to every continuance 
granted by the circuit court under the original indictments, and 
Johnson conceded this fact in argument before the circuit court.  
When the time attributable to those continuances is subtracted 
from the total time this case was pending in the circuit court 
before trial, the record shows that Johnson was tried within the 
 
15
time restrictions imposed by Code § 19.2-243.2  See Townes v. 
Commonwealth, 234 Va. 307, 323, 362 S.E.2d 650, 659 (1987) cert. 
denied, 485 U.S. 971 (1988); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. 
App. 148, 155-56, 502 S.E.2d 704, 708 (1998); Watkins v. 
Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 335, 347-48, 494 S.E.2d 859, 865 
(1998). 
 
Johnson also argues that the trial court erred in 
incorporating in the present case, which was tried under the new 
indictments, all pleadings filed and rulings made under the 
original indictments.  He contends that the circuit court lacked 
jurisdiction to take this action after the original indictments 
had been terminated by nolle prosequi, asserting that a new 
preliminary hearing in the juvenile court was required.  Johnson 
also contends that because the original indictments were 
terminated by nolle prosequi, all pretrial proceedings conducted 
under the original indictments were effectively nullified.  
Thus, he argues that there were no rulings or pleadings before 
the trial court that could have been incorporated in the 
prosecution on the new indictments.  We disagree. 
 
As discussed above, since Johnson previously had been tried 
and convicted as an adult for rape, the Commonwealth was not 
required to institute new proceedings in the juvenile court.  
                     
 
2Although Johnson contended in the circuit court that his 
constitutional right to a speedy trial also was violated, he has 
 
16
Code § 16.1-271.  Instead, the Commonwealth was entitled to 
consider and treat Johnson as an adult and obtain new 
indictments in the circuit court.  See Code § 19.2-217; Payne v. 
Warden of Powhatan Correctional Center, 223 Va. 180, 183, 285 
S.E.2d 886, 887-88 (1982). 
 
The new indictments were identical to the old indictments 
and, thus, presented exactly the same issues that Johnson raised 
before the circuit court in the original indictments.  The nolle 
prosequi of the original indictments did not invalidate the 
trial court's rulings in that case, but simply terminated the 
original prosecution and discharged Johnson from liability on 
those indictments.  See Miller v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 929, 
935, 234 S.E.2d 269, 273 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1016 
(1978).  The circuit court was not required to rehear the same 
matters and reissue the same rulings simply because the 
Commonwealth mistakenly had concluded that the original 
indictments may have been invalid.  Thus, we hold that the 
circuit court's decision to incorporate the prior rulings in the 
present case was a proper exercise of the court's discretion.3
                                                                  
not asserted this argument on appeal. 
 
 
3At oral argument in these appeals, Johnson argued for the 
first time that if Code § 16.1-271 required that he be treated 
as an adult, then the original indictments, and all pretrial 
proceedings conducted pursuant to those indictments, were void 
because the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to initiate any 
proceedings against Johnson.  We find no merit in this argument, 
 
17
Motions to Suppress Fruits of Search Warrant 
 
Johnson argues that the 32-day interval between the time 
Hamilton first matched DNA from the crime scene with Johnson's 
DNA profile in the DNA data bank, and the time the search 
warrant was executed, constituted an "unreasonable delay."  He 
contends that the evidence obtained as a result of the search 
warrant, namely, the blood sample, hair samples, and his 
statement to the police, should have been suppressed based on 
this "unreasonable delay."  We disagree. 
 
There is no fixed standard or formula establishing a 
maximum allowable interval between the date of events recited in 
an affidavit and the date of a search warrant.  United States v. 
McCall, 740 F.2d 1331, 1336 (4th Cir. 1984); Huff v. 
Commonwealth, 213 Va. 710, 715, 194 S.E.2d 690, 695 (1973); 
Perez v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 137, 142-43, 486 S.E.2d 578, 
581 (1997).  Instead, a warrant will be tested for "staleness" 
by considering whether the facts alleged in the warrant provided 
probable cause to believe, at the time the search actually was 
conducted, that the search conducted pursuant to the warrant 
would lead to the discovery of evidence of criminal activity.  
                                                                  
because the original indictments were obtained pursuant to the 
circuit court's jurisdiction over Johnson, which existed 
independently of the proceedings in juvenile court.  See Code 
§ 19.2-217.  We also note that Johnson agreed at oral argument 
that the new indictments, under which he was tried and 
convicted, were valid. 
 
18
McCall, 740 F.2d at 1336; Perez, 25 Va. App. at 142, 486 S.E.2d 
at 581; see United States v. Akram, 165 F.3d 452, 456 (6th Cir. 
1999); Huff, 213 Va. at 715-16, 194 S.E.2d at 695. 
 
Here, Johnson's contention of "staleness" fails because the 
DNA from the crime scene evidence and his DNA profile from the 
DNA data bank, which were "matched" by Hamilton and formed the 
basis for issuance of the warrant, were not subject to change 
over the 32-day period at issue.  The blood and hair samples 
taken from Johnson pursuant to the search warrant also were not 
subject to change over this time period.  See State v. Baker, 
956 S.W.2d 8, 13 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997)(holding that samples of 
person's blood, saliva, and hair cannot become "stale.")  Thus, 
we hold that the search warrant was valid and the trial court 
did not err in refusing to suppress the evidence at issue.  
Since the search warrant was valid, we also conclude that there 
is no merit in Johnson's allegation that the statement he made 
to the police should have been suppressed as a fruit of the 
search conducted pursuant to that warrant. 
Constitutionality of Virginia's DNA Data Bank 
 
Johnson argues that the statutes providing for the 
Commonwealth's DNA data bank, Code §§ 19.2-310.2 through -310.7 
(DNA statutes), which include a requirement that all convicted 
felons submit blood samples for DNA testing, violate various 
constitutional rights.  He contends that these statutes violate 
 
19
the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, the Fifth Amendment protection against self-
incrimination, and the Eighth Amendment guarantee against cruel 
and unusual punishment.  He further contends that the DNA 
statutes violate his constitutional right of due process.  
Johnson also relies on the parallel provisions of the 
Constitution of Virginia that articulate these constitutional 
rights.  Finally, Johnson contends that these statutes are 
arbitrary and unreliable, fail to establish meaningful 
restrictions on the seizure and dissemination of DNA material, 
and constitute an "undue delegation of [legislative] powers."  
We disagree with Johnson's arguments. 
 
The DNA statutes do not deny a criminal defendant any 
constitutional rights.  Although we have not considered 
previously the issues Johnson raises, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has addressed the 
constitutionality of Virginia's DNA statutes in two cases.  In 
Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 506 U.S. 
977 (1992), the Court concluded that the procurement of a blood 
sample for DNA analysis from a convicted felon under Code 
§ 19.2-310.2 does not violate the Fourth Amendment guarantee 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.  The Court held that 
"in the case of convicted felons who are in the custody of the 
Commonwealth, we find that the minor intrusion caused by the 
 
20
taking of a blood sample is outweighed by Virginia's interest 
. . . in determining inmates' 'identification characteristics 
specific to the person' for improved law enforcement."  Id. at 
307 (quoting Code § 19.2-310.2); see also Ewell v. Murray, 11 
F.3d 482, 484 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1111 
(1994).  We agree with this conclusion and hold that it is 
equally applicable to the guarantee against unreasonable 
searches and seizures set forth in Article I, Section 10 of the 
Constitution of Virginia. 
 
We also conclude that the Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination, and the parallel right afforded by Article 
I, Section 8 of the Constitution of Virginia, are not violated 
by the DNA statutes.  The taking of a blood sample does not 
implicate any rights against self-incrimination, because such an 
act is not testimonial or communicative in nature.  Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966); Shumate v. Commonwealth, 
207 Va. 877, 880, 153 S.E.2d 243, 245 (1967); Lawrence v. 
Bluford-Brown, 1 Va. App. 202, 204, 336 S.E.2d 899, 900-01 
(1985).  Thus, the withdrawal of blood from a convicted felon to 
provide a DNA sample for inclusion in the DNA data bank in 
accordance with Code § 19.2-310.2 does not violate the felon's 
constitutional protection against self-incrimination. 
 
Next, we conclude that the DNA statutes do not violate the 
Eighth Amendment guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment, 
 
21
and the parallel right secured by Article 1, Section 9 of the 
Constitution of Virginia.  The DNA statutes are not penal in 
nature.  Ewell, 11 F.3d at 485; Jones, 962 F.2d at 309.  
Therefore, there is no merit to Johnson's contention that the 
above rights are "subverted" by the requirement that a DNA blood 
sample be taken from persons convicted of a felony. 
 
We also disagree with Johnson's argument that the DNA 
statutes violate federal constitutional rights of due process 
and the due process provisions of Article I, Section 11 of the 
Constitution of Virginia.  In support of his argument, Johnson 
states merely that the DNA statutes do not "require that notice 
be given to individuals whose DNA is seized."  This argument has 
no merit because the enactment of the statutes themselves in 
1990 provided notice that all persons convicted of a felony will 
be required to give a blood sample for DNA analysis. 
 
We also reject Johnson's arguments that the DNA statutes 
are arbitrary and unreliable, fail to establish meaningful 
restrictions on the seizure and dissemination of DNA material, 
and constitute an "undue delegation of [legislative] powers."  
The statutes apply uniformly to every convicted felon, and the 
use of the information collected from each felon is restricted 
to law enforcement purposes.  Code §§ 19.2-310.2, -310.5, and -
310.6.  Further, since Johnson does not explain why the statutes 
 
22
are an "undue delegation" of powers, we do not address this 
argument because we are unable to discern its substance. 
Batson Challenge 
 
During jury selection, the prosecutor used all five of her 
peremptory strikes to remove African-Americans from the venire.  
Johnson asserted a challenge to the panel under Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).  After noting that the jury panel, 
which included two alternate jurors, was comprised of ten 
African-Americans, one Hispanic, and three Caucasians, the trial 
court ruled that Johnson had failed to establish a prima facie 
case of racial exclusion under Batson.  The trial court stated:  
"It's clear the jury is predominantly black . . . . There was no 
questioning in the voir dire or anything to suggest any racial 
inferences.  So I do not find that a prima facie case has been 
made." 
 
Johnson argues on appeal that the trial court violated the 
holding in Batson in failing to require the prosecutor to state 
race-neutral reasons for each of her peremptory strikes.  In 
response, the Commonwealth contends that the trial court did not 
err under Batson because the circumstances surrounding the 
prosecutor's use of her peremptory strikes did not raise an 
inference that these strikes were made to exclude potential 
jurors based on their race.  We agree with the Commonwealth. 
 
23
 
In Batson, the Supreme Court stated the requirements for 
establishing a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in 
the selection of a petit jury.  The Court held that to establish 
such a prima facie case, 
the defendant first must show that he is a member of a 
cognizable racial group . . . and that the prosecutor 
has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the 
venire members of the defendant's race.  Second, the 
defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which 
there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges 
constitute a jury selection practice that permits 
"those to discriminate who are of a mind to 
discriminate." . . . Finally, the defendant must show 
that these facts and any other relevant circumstances 
raise an inference that the prosecutor used that 
practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury 
on account of their race. 
 
Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.  The trial court's determination 
whether discrimination has occurred in the selection of a 
jury is entitled to great deference.  Id. at 98 n.21. 
 
The defendant has the burden of producing a record 
that supports a prima facie case of purposeful 
discrimination.  United States v. Escobar-De Jesus, 187 
F.3d 148, 164 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, ___U.S.___, 68 
U.S.L.W. 3534 (U.S. Feb.22, 2000)(No. 99-7685); Atkins v. 
Commonwealth, 257 Va. 160, 174, 510 S.E.2d 445, 454 (1999); 
Kasi v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 407, 421, 508 S.E.2d 57, 65 
(1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 2399 (1999); 
see Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97.  The fact that the 
prosecution has excluded African-Americans by using 
 
24
peremptory strikes does not itself establish such a prima 
facie case under Batson.  See 476 U.S. at 96-97; United 
States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F. 2d 1501, 1521 (6th Cir. 
1988).  A defendant also must identify facts and 
circumstances that raise an inference that potential jurors 
were excluded based on their race.  Batson, 476 U.S. at 96; 
Escobar-De Jesus, 187 F.3d at 164. 
 
The composition of the jury that ultimately is sworn 
is a relevant consideration in reviewing a Batson 
challenge.  Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d at 1521-22; see 
Escobar-DeJesus, 187 F.3d at 165.  The jury selected in 
this case was comprised overwhelmingly of African-
Americans.  We also observe that none of the prosecutor's 
questions or statements to the venire indicated that the 
prosecutor was of a mind to discriminate in her exercise of 
peremptory strikes. 
 
In addition, no other facts or circumstances in the 
present record support an inference of purposeful 
discrimination by the prosecutor in the jury selection 
process.  Therefore, we conclude that the record supports 
the trial court's ruling that Johnson failed to make a 
prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination under 
Batson.  Since Johnson failed to establish such a prima 
facie case, the prosecutor was not required to provide a 
 
25
racially neutral explanation for her exercise of peremptory 
strikes. 
Appointment of Co-Counsel 
 
Johnson next argues that the trial court erred in denying 
his request for the appointment of co-counsel with specialized 
knowledge relating to DNA evidence to assist his court-appointed 
attorney in addressing issues presented by the Commonwealth's 
use of such evidence.  Johnson contends that he was denied 
effective assistance of counsel because his court-appointed 
attorney, by his own admission, did not have the expertise 
necessary to evaluate the DNA evidence linking Johnson to these 
crimes. 
 
We find no merit in these arguments.  Johnson withdrew his 
request for appointment of co-counsel prior to trial and instead 
asked the trial court to appoint a DNA expert, which request was 
granted.4  Therefore, by withdrawing his request for co-counsel 
in the trial court, Johnson has waived his claim that the trial 
court erred in denying his request for co-counsel with 
specialized knowledge relating to the use of DNA evidence.  
Further, to the extent that Johnson has raised a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in this argument, we do not 
consider that contention in this appeal.  See Roach, 251 Va. at 
                     
 
4Johnson elected not to call his appointed DNA expert as a 
witness. 
 
26
335 n.4, 468 S.E.2d at 105 n.4; Hall v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. 
App. 74, 82, 515 S.E.2d 343, 347 (1999); 1990 Va. Acts of 
Assembly, ch. 74 (repealing Code § 19.2-317.1, which provided 
for direct appeal of certain ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims); see also Walker v. Mitchell, 224 Va. 568, 570, 299 
S.E.2d 698, 699 (1983). 
Photographs of Victim 
 
On this subject, Johnson has assigned error on the 
following basis:  "The trial court erred in denying 
[d]efendant's motion to exclude certain photographs of the 
victim."  However, Johnson has not addressed this assignment of 
error in his brief, except with regard to "buttons" displaying a 
photograph of the victim worn by certain members of the public 
while in the courtroom.  Therefore, our consideration of this 
assignment of error will be limited to the buttons worn in the 
courtroom, and we will not consider the trial court's admission 
of photographs of the victim into evidence during trial.  See 
Rules 5:27, 5:17(c)(4). 
 
Johnson contends that Hall's family and friends were 
allowed to wear "campaign-size" buttons displaying Hall's 
photograph in the courtroom.  Johnson asserts that although the 
jurors were not seated close enough to the audience to identify 
Hall's image on the buttons, they could tell that the buttons 
 
27
"ha[d] something to do with" Hall and, thus, the jurors were 
improperly influenced. 
 
We find no merit in this argument.  There is nothing in the 
record to support Johnson's contention that any of the jurors 
saw buttons displaying Hall's photograph.  When Johnson raised 
his objection to the buttons at the beginning of trial, the 
court ruled that the spectators would not be permitted to 
display the buttons in any manner that would allow the jurors to 
see them.  The court also ruled that anyone wearing a button was 
required to refrain from any contact with any of the jurors.  
After the trial court stated these rulings, Johnson did not 
object to the adequacy of the trial court's response or later 
argue that any spectator had violated the trial court's 
instructions.  Thus, Johnson has waived any objection to the 
trial court's rulings in response to his request that the 
buttons "not be displayed."  Rule 5:25. 
V. GUILT PHASE ISSUES 
Other Crimes Evidence 
 
Johnson argues that the trial court erred in admitting the 
testimony of Lavonda Scott and Janel Chambliss during the guilt 
phase of his trial.  He asserts that the facts in the cases of 
Scott, Chambliss, and Hall contain no common aspects that are so 
distinctive or idiosyncratic that they would permit an inference 
that the same person committed all three crimes.  We disagree. 
 
28
 
The standard governing the admission of evidence of other 
crimes in the guilt phase of a criminal trial is well 
established.  Generally, evidence that shows or tends to show 
that a defendant has committed a prior crime is inadmissible to 
prove the crime charged.  Guill v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 134, 
138, 495 S.E.2d 489, 491 (1998); Woodfin v. Commonwealth, 236 
Va. 89, 95, 372 S.E.2d 377, 380 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 
1009 (1989); Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 269, 272, 176 
S.E.2d 802, 805 (1970). 
 
There are several exceptions to the general rule excluding 
this type of evidence.  Among other exceptions, evidence of 
other crimes is admissible when relevant to show a perpetrator's 
identity, if certain requirements are met.  We discussed those 
requirements in Chichester v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 311, 326-27, 
448 S.E.2d 638, 649 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1166 (1995): 
[O]ne of the issues upon which "other crimes" evidence may 
be admitted is that of the perpetrator's identity, or 
criminal agency, where that has been disputed.  Proof of 
modus operandi is competent evidence where there is a 
disputed issue of identity. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
[E]vidence of other crimes, to qualify for admission 
as proof of modus operandi, need not bear such an exact 
resemblance to the crime on trial as to constitute a 
"signature."  Rather, it is sufficient if the other crimes 
bear a "singular strong resemblance to the pattern of the 
offense charged."  That test is met where the other 
incidents are "sufficiently idiosyncratic to permit an 
inference of pattern for purposes of proof," thus tending 
to establish the probability of a common perpetrator. 
 
29
 
. . . . 
 
 
If the evidence of other crimes bears sufficient marks 
of similarity to the crime charged to establish that the 
defendant is probably the common perpetrator, that evidence 
is relevant and admissible if its probative value outweighs 
its prejudicial effect . . .  The trial court, in the 
exercise of its sound discretion, must decide which of 
these competing considerations outweighs the other.  Unless 
that discretion has been clearly abused, we will affirm the 
trial court's decision on this issue. 
 
Id. (quoting Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 89-90, 393 
S.E.2d 609, 616-17, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908 (1990)(citations 
omitted)); see also Turner v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. ___, ___, 
___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (2000) decided today; Guill, 255 Va. at 138-
39, 495 S.E.2d at 491-92. 
 
Applying the Spencer standard, we conclude that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of 
Scott and Chambliss in the guilt phase of the trial.  The three 
crimes bear a singular strong resemblance to one another, based 
on common incidents that are sufficiently idiosyncratic to 
establish the probability of a common perpetrator.  In addition, 
the record supports a finding that the probative value of this 
evidence of other crimes outweighed its potential prejudicial 
effect. 
 
The crimes committed against Scott, Chambliss, and Hall 
occurred within a 60-day period.  The victims were all young 
African-American women.  Each victim knew Johnson, and there 
 
30
were no signs of forced entry into the dwellings in which the 
crimes occurred.  In each case, the attacker used a "steak" 
knife that he obtained in the victim's dwelling.  Each victim 
was raped, and the attacker stabbed the victims who resisted 
him. 
 
The attacker asked Scott and Chambliss for a drink of water 
before he attacked them, and a bloodstained broken drinking 
glass was found in the kitchen of Hall's apartment.  Hamilton 
estimated that the DNA from the blood found on the broken glass, 
which matched Johnson's DNA, would occur once in 980 times in 
the Black population.  Finally, the attacker ordered both Scott 
and Chambliss to disrobe completely, and Hall's clothes were 
found intact on the floor of her apartment near her nude body. 
Chain of Custody of Blood Sample 
 
Johnson argues that the trial court erred in admitting into 
evidence the analysis of the blood sample taken from him for 
inclusion in the DNA data bank while he was incarcerated at 
Southampton Correctional Institute in September 1995.  He 
asserts that the Commonwealth did not establish the chain of 
custody of the blood sample, and he contends that the 
Commonwealth had "insufficient controls . . . to conclusively 
track a sample once it reaches the lab to insure that one 
specimen is not mixed with another."  We find no merit in this 
argument. 
 
31
 
A chain of custody is properly established when the 
Commonwealth's evidence provides reasonable assurance that the 
sample to be admitted at trial is the same sample, and in the 
same condition, as when it was first obtained.  Vinson v. 
Commonwealth, 258 Va. 459, 469, 522 S.E.2d 170, 177, (1999); 
Pope v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 114, 121, 360 S.E.2d 352, 357 
(1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1015 (1988).  Thus, under this 
standard, the Commonwealth is not required to eliminate every 
conceivable possibility of substitution, alteration, or 
tampering.  Pope, 234 Va. at 121, 360 S.E.2d at 357; Alvarez v. 
Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 768, 776, 485 S.E.2d 646, 650 (1997). 
 
In the present case, the Commonwealth proved that Ann 
Chavis drew Johnson's blood, and that she taped and initialed 
the vial containing the sample before delivering it to Deborah 
Harrell.  Harrell kept the sample in her custody until 
delivering it to Diane Hamilton at the Division of Forensic 
Science DNA laboratory.  The sample remained in the custody and 
control of the DNA laboratory until it was analyzed. 
 
We also note that under Code § 19.2-187.01, an attested 
report of analysis from the Division of Forensic Science is 
prima facie evidence of custody from the time a sample is 
received by the laboratory until it is released after testing.  
Johnson presented no evidence to overcome the Commonwealth's 
introduction of this prima facie evidence, or the direct 
 
32
evidence of actual custody of the blood sample.  Therefore, the 
Commonwealth met its burden of demonstrating a reasonable 
assurance that Johnson's blood sample was the same sample, and 
in the same condition, as when it first was obtained. 
Testimony of DNA Expert Witnesses 
 
Johnson contends that Jean Hamilton and George Li lacked 
sufficient expertise to testify concerning "population and 
statistical genetics."  Thus, he disputes the admission of their 
testimony regarding the statistical probability that someone 
other than Johnson would have the same DNA profile as the donor 
of the DNA found on evidence collected from Hall's apartment.  
We disagree with Johnson's argument. 
 
The issue whether a witness is qualified to testify as an 
expert on a given subject is a matter submitted to the trial 
court's discretion, and the trial court's ruling in this regard 
will not be disturbed on appeal unless it plainly appears that 
the witness was not qualified.  Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 
295, 305, 384 S.E.2d 785, 792 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 
1093 (1990); Lane v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 713, 718, 292 S.E.2d 
358, 361 (1982); Wileman v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 642, 647, 
484 S.E.2d 621, 624 (1997). 
 
Li testified that he was the supervisor of forensic biology 
examiners at the Division of Forensic Science laboratory in 
Richmond, and that he also conducted forensic biology 
 
33
examinations as part of his duties.  Li holds a Master of 
Science degree in forensic science.  He received training in DNA 
analysis, including statistical issues involved in such 
analysis, from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  Li had 
trained both investigators and technicians on the theory and 
technique of DNA typing, and was an instructor in the graduate 
program in forensic science at Virginia Commonwealth University.  
He had performed DNA analyses on thousands of samples and 
previously had qualified as an expert witness in the field of 
forensic science.  He explained that forensic DNA analysis 
involves a determination whether a person can be eliminated as a 
source of DNA found at a crime scene, as well as a determination 
regarding how frequently a particular DNA profile appears in the 
general population. 
 
Hamilton testified that she holds a Master of Science 
degree in forensic science, and has been employed by the 
Commonwealth Division of Forensic Science for 12 years as a 
forensic scientist.  She also completed undergraduate and 
graduate level courses in statistics.  Hamilton explained that 
part of her work in DNA analysis involves an assessment of the 
approximate frequency that a particular DNA profile appears in 
the general population.  She also stated that she previously has 
testified as an expert witness regarding such probabilities.  
Based on this foundation testimony, we conclude that the trial 
 
34
court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Li and Hamilton 
to testify concerning the statistical probabilities at issue in 
this case. 
Evidence of Third Party Guilt 
 
Johnson argues that the trial court erred in refusing to 
allow him to present testimony that would have proved that Leroy 
Quick, III, was the person who raped and murdered Hope Hall.  
Johnson proffered the testimony of Natalie Williams, Hall's co-
worker, who would have testified that Hall received flowers from 
Quick shortly before she was murdered, and that Hall told 
Williams that Hall did not "want to have anything to do with" 
Quick because he was "crazy."  Johnson also proffered the 
testimony of three women who worked in the rental office of 
Hall's apartment complex who would have testified that within 30 
days before the murder, Hall expressed "concern and 
apprehension" about a person she used to date.5  One of these 
rental office workers, Dolores Reid, also would have testified 
that about one month before the murder, she saw Leroy Quick grab 
Hall in an attempt to "get her to go from one room to another." 
                     
 
5Johnson also argues on appeal that the trial court erred in 
refusing to admit testimony from two of Hall's neighbors who saw 
Quick approach Hall's apartment the night she was murdered.  
However, the record reveals that the defense presented the 
testimony of these two neighbors.  The defense also called 
Officer Carter Burnette of the Petersburg Bureau of Police who 
testified concerning the neighbors' statements and their 
identification of Quick from photographic lineups. 
 
35
 
We find no merit in Johnson's argument that the trial court 
abused its discretion in refusing to admit this evidence. 
Proffered evidence "that merely suggests a third party may have 
committed the crime charged is inadmissible; only when the 
proffered evidence tends clearly to point to some other person 
as the guilty party will such proof be admitted."  Soering v. 
Deeds, 255 Va. 457, 464, 499 S.E.2d 514, 518 (1998).  We have 
stated that "a large discretion must and should remain vested in 
the trial court as to the admission of this class of testimony."  
Karnes v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 758, 766, 99 S.E. 562, 565 
(1919); see also Oliva v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 523, 527, 
452 S.E.2d 877, 880 (1995); Weller v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 
886, 890, 434 S.E.2d 330, 333 (1993). 
 
In Karnes, we reversed a defendant's conviction because the 
trial court refused to admit evidence of death threats that a 
third party had made to the victim shortly before she was 
murdered.  125 Va. at 766-67, 99 S.E. at 565.  In Oliva, the 
Court of Appeals reversed a defendant's conviction because the 
trial court excluded testimony from a witness who had observed 
someone other than the defendant, but who resembled him, running 
from the scene of the crime.  19 Va. App. at 528-29, 452 S.E.2d 
at 881. 
 
In contrast to the evidence at issue in Karnes and Oliva, 
the proffered testimony at issue here bore no direct relation to 
 
36
the crimes charged.  Instead, the proffered testimony tended to 
prove only that Hall had a poor relationship with Quick, and 
such evidence would have invited the jury to speculate that 
these difficulties caused Quick to rape and murder Hall.  
Moreover, Hamilton testified that she had eliminated Quick as a 
possible source of the DNA found on the crime scene evidence.  
Thus, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in excluding the proffered evidence. 
Sufficiency of Evidence of Rape 
 
Johnson argues that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion to strike the rape charge and the reference to rape or 
attempted rape in the capital murder charge.  He contends that 
the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of rape 
because there was no evidence of trauma to Hall's vaginal area, 
no evidence of penetration, and only one injury, a ragged 
fingernail, that could be considered a defensive injury.  We 
disagree with Johnson's argument. 
 
"Rape is defined as 'sexual intercourse against the 
victim's will by force, threat, or intimidation.'"  Wilson v. 
Commonwealth, 249 Va. 95, 100, 452 S.E.2d 669, 673, cert. 
denied, 516 U.S. 841 (1995)(quoting Hoke v. Commonwealth, 237 
Va. 303, 310, 377 S.E.2d 595, 599, cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910 
(1989)); see Code § 18.2-61.  "Penetration by a penis of a 
vagina is an essential element of the crime of rape; proof of 
 
37
penetration, however slight the entry may be, is sufficient."  
Moore v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 184, 186, 491 S.E.2d 739, 740 
(1997)(quoting Elam v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 133, 115, 326 
S.E.2d 685, 686 (1985)). 
 
Hamilton testified that the DNA from the sperm taken from 
Hall's vagina matched Johnson's DNA sample.  The presence of 
Johnson's sperm in Hall's vagina alone is sufficient to support 
the finding that penetration occurred.  Spencer, 238 Va. at 284, 
384 S.E.2d at 780.  The evidence also was overwhelming that Hall 
did not consent to having sexual intercourse with Johnson.  Hall 
sustained 15 stab wounds in her struggle with her attacker.  She 
also sustained facial abrasions, and she had a broken fingernail 
that Dr. Deborah Kay characterized as a "defense-type" injury.  
Thus, the trial court did not err in refusing to strike the rape 
charge and the reference to rape and attempted rape in the 
capital murder charge. 
VI.  SENTENCE REVIEW 
Passion and Prejudice 
 
Under Code § 17.1-313(C), we review the death sentence 
imposed on Johnson to determine whether it (1) was imposed under 
the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary 
factor; or (2) is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty 
imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the 
defendant.  Johnson contends that the jury imposed the death 
 
38
sentence based on passion after the Commonwealth presented 
emotional testimony from Hall's mother and the father of Hall's 
young son, as well as the testimony of the two victims of the 
rapes Johnson committed in New Jersey and New York.  We find no 
merit in this argument. 
 
The victim impact evidence received in this case addressed 
the substantial impact that Hall's murder had on the lives of 
her mother and her son.  This testimony plainly was admissible 
for the jury's consideration in the sentencing process.  See 
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991); Kasi, 256 Va. at 
422, 508 S.E.2d at 65; Beck, 253 Va. at 381, 484 S.E.2d at 903.  
In addition, the evidence of other rapes committed by Johnson 
was admissible since it was relevant to the jury's determination 
of future dangerousness.  See Orbe v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 390, 
401, 519 S.E.2d 808, 814 (1999); Walker, 258 Va. at 64, 515 
S.E.2d at 571.  Based on our independent review of the entire 
record as required by Code § 17.1-313(C)(1), we conclude that 
there is no evidence that the death sentence was "imposed under 
the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary 
factor."6
                     
 
6At oral argument in this appeal, Johnson argued for the 
first time that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the 
jury that he was ineligible for parole, pursuant to Simmons v. 
South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 168-69 (1994).  We do not consider 
this argument on appeal because Johnson failed to raise it in 
the trial court or in his brief filed with this court.  See 
 
39
Excessiveness and Proportionality 
 
Johnson contends that the death sentence imposed in this 
case is disproportionate and excessive when compared to the 
penalties imposed on other 16-year-old males who committed like 
offenses.  In support of his argument, he cites the dissenting 
opinion in Jackson, 255 Va. at 652-56, 499 S.E.2d at 555-57.  We 
disagree with Johnson's argument. 
 
In conducting our proportionality review, we must determine 
whether "other sentencing bodies in this jurisdiction generally 
impose the supreme penalty for comparable or similar crimes, 
considering both the crime and the defendant."  Jenkins v. 
Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 461, 423 S.E.2d 360, 371 (1992), 
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1036 (1993); see also Hedrick v. 
Commonwealth, 257 Va. 328, 342, 513 S.E.2d 634, 642 cert. 
denied, ___  U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 376 (1999).  We compare the 
record in this case with the records of other capital murder 
cases, including those cases in which a life sentence has been 
imposed.  We have examined the records of all capital cases 
reviewed by this Court pursuant to Code § 17.1-313(E).  Since 
the jury imposed the death sentence based on both the future 
dangerousness and vileness predicates, we give particular 
                                                                  
Rules 5:25 and 5:17(c).  We also observe that when the jury 
inquired whether a life sentence would allow the possibility of 
parole, and the trial court instructed the jury to follow the 
 
40
consideration to other capital murder cases in which the death 
penalty was obtained under both predicates. 
 
Johnson's age at the time he committed the offenses is only 
one factor to consider in determining whether other juries 
generally impose the death sentence for similar crimes.  The 
record also shows that he committed five rapes within a seven-
month period.  Johnson beat and stabbed one rape victim, in 
addition to inflicting multiple stab wounds in his murder of 
Hall.  The stab wounds inflicted on Hall that resulted in her 
murder reflect an aggravated battery of the victim and an 
escalating pattern of violence in Johnson's commission of the 
five rapes cited above. 
 
Juries in this Commonwealth generally, with some 
exceptions, have imposed the death sentence for convictions of 
capital murder based on findings of future dangerousness and 
vileness in which the underlying predicate crimes involved 
violent sexual offenses and the defendant had committed violent 
offenses on other occasions.  See, e.g., Vinson, 258 Va. 459, 
522 S.E.2d 170; Cherrix, 257 Va. 292, 513 S.E.2d 642; Hedrick, 
257 Va. 328, 513 S.E.2d 634; Barnabei v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 
161, 477 S.E.2d 270 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1224 (1997); 
Wilson, 249 Va. at 105, 452 S.E.2d at 676; Williams v. 
                                                                  
instructions given and not concern itself with "what happens 
after sentence," Johnson did not raise an objection. 
 
41
Commonwealth, 248 Va. 528, 450 S.E.2d 365 (1994), cert. denied, 
515 U.S. 1161 (1995); Breard, 248 Va. at 89, 445 S.E.2d at 682; 
Mueller v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 386, 422 S.E.2d 380 (1992) 
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1043 (1993); Spencer, 238 Va. 295, 384 
S.E.2d 785; Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 307 S.E.2d 864 
(1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1109 (1984).  Based on this 
review, we hold that Johnson's death sentence is neither 
excessive nor disproportionate to penalties imposed by other 
sentencing bodies in the Commonwealth for comparable crimes, 
considering both the crime and the defendant. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
We find no reversible error in the judgments of the trial 
court.  Having reviewed Johnson's death sentence pursuant to 
Code § 17.1-313, we decline to commute the sentence of death.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the trial court's judgments. 
 
Record No. 992525 — Affirmed.
Record No. 992526 — Affirmed.
 
42