Title: Elba Exploration, LLC, William Richard Rollo, Gloria Rollo, Tom Fouts, and Michael Management, Inc. v. Joel R. Pate and Strago Petroleum Corporation (Appeal from Conecuh Circuit Court: CV-20-900055).

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: October 27, 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2022-1069 
_________________________ 
 
Elba Exploration, LLC, William Richard Rollo, Gloria Rollo, 
Tom Fouts, and Michael Management, Inc. 
 
v. 
 
Joel R. Pate and Strago Petroleum Corporation 
 
Appeal from Conecuh Circuit Court 
(CV-20-900055) 
 
PARKER, Chief Justice. 
 
AFFIRMED. NO OPINION. 
 
Shaw, Sellers, Mendheim, Stewart, and Cook, JJ., concur.  
Bryan, J., dissents.  
SC-2022-1069 
2 
 
Mitchell, J., dissents, with opinion, which Wise, J., joins. 
 
 
SC-2022-1069 
3 
 
MITCHELL, Justice (dissenting). 
Following a nonjury trial, the Conecuh Circuit Court entered a 
judgment concluding that Joel R. Pate owned a parcel of property in rural 
Conecuh County, which he had purchased from Evie Phelps.  The circuit 
court found that Phelps in turn had acquired title to the property by 
adverse possession after Phelps's aunt Lucille Jones -- who held a life 
estate in the property -- died.  Other parties claiming a right to the 
property have appealed that judgment, arguing that the evidence 
produced at trial did not support a finding of adverse possession.  I agree 
and therefore dissent from this Court's decision to affirm the circuit 
court's judgment.  
Adverse possession requires that a claimant demonstrate "actual, 
exclusive, open, notorious and hostile possession."  Kerlin v. Tensaw 
Land & Timber Co., 390 So. 2d 616, 618 (Ala. 1980).  Accordingly, for us 
to affirm the circuit court's judgment, there must be substantial evidence 
from which the circuit court could have concluded that Phelps actually 
possessed the property after Jones died.  See Robinson v. Hamilton, 496 
So. 2d 8, 10 (Ala. 1986) (noting that, when a circuit court has heard ore 
tenus evidence, its judgment "is presumed correct and will be reversed 
SC-2022-1069 
4 
 
only if, after consideration of the evidence and all reasonable inferences 
to be drawn therefrom, the judgment is found to be plainly and palpably 
wrong"). 
But I do not see any evidence in the record indicating that Phelps 
did so.  At most, there is evidence indicating that Phelps visited the 
property once a year.  And it is not even clear that he continued to make 
those visits after Jones died.  Thus, Pate failed to show that Phelps had 
actually occupied the property after Jones's death.  For this reason, the 
chain of title ran through the heirs of Jones's deceased husband Clifford 
and favors the appellants, who acquired their interests in the property 
through those heirs.  See Powell v. Hopkins, 288 Ala. 466, 471, 262 So. 
2d 289, 293 (1972) ("[N]o one having been in actual possession thereof, 
the possession is regarded as constructive and follows the chain of title.").  
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment below. 
Wise, J., concurs.