Title: Redd v. Kansas Truck Center

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 101,137 
 
WILLIAM ALVIN REDD, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
KANSAS TRUCK CENTER AND UNIVERSAL UNDERWRITERS INS. CO., 
Appellants. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
Under the savings clause in both K.S.A. 77-621(a)(2) and K.S.A 2009 Supp. 77-
621(a)(2), judicial review of an agency action is subject to the standards in effect at the 
time the agency action was taken. Therefore, the 2009 Kansas Judicial Review Act 
amendments to the standard of review apply only prospectively to agency decisions 
issued on or after July 1, 2009, and in this case we apply the standard of review set forth 
in K.S.A. 77-621(c)(7) prior to those amendments.  
 
2. 
Under the secondary injury rule, when a primary injury under the Workers 
Compensation Act is shown to have arisen out of and in the course of employment, the 
natural consequences directly flowing from the injury, including new and distinct 
injuries, are compensable. 
 
3. 
Whether a second injury is compensable as a natural and probable consequence of 
the primary injury is dependent upon the facts of each case. 
 
2 
4. 
Appellate courts exercise unlimited review on questions of statutory interpretation 
without deference to an administrative agency's or board's interpretation of its authorizing 
statutes. 
 
5. 
K.S.A. 44-510d requires compensation for each scheduled injury when multiple 
injuries occur within a single extremity. 
 
6. 
The $50,000 compensation cap in K.S.A. 44-510f(a)(4) does not apply to a worker 
awarded both temporary total disability benefits and permanent partial disability benefits 
for multiple scheduled injuries under K.S.A. 44-510d.  
 
Appeal from Workers Compensation Board. Opinion filed September 10, 2010. Affirmed. 
 
James L. Mowbray, of Wallace, Saunders, Austin, Brown & Enochs, Chartered, of Wichita, 
argued the cause, and Michael D. Streit, of the same firm, was with him on the briefs for appellants.  
 
Roger A. Riedmiller, of Law Office of Roger A. Riedmiller, of Wichita, argued the cause and was 
on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
BILES, J.:  Kansas Truck Center and its insurance carrier challenge a workers 
compensation award to William Alvin Redd for permanent partial impairments to 
portions of his right and left upper extremities due to work-related injuries. The Workers 
Compensation Board ruled the injured worker's multiple right upper extremity 
impairments developed as a natural consequence of a 2003 crush injury to Redd's left 
hand and subsequent overcompensation use for that left hand injury. We hold there is 
substantial competent evidence supporting the Board's findings. 
3 
 
In making this determination, we address and resolve a conflict among Court of 
Appeals panels regarding the appropriate standard of review to employ when an agency's 
action is attacked as being unsupported by substantial competent evidence. This conflict 
arose following amendments in 2009 to the Kansas Judicial Review Act, see K.S.A. 2009 
Supp. 77-601 et seq.; L. 2009, ch. 109, secs. 23-30, which altered the statutory standard 
of review under K.S.A. 77-621(c). The panels have divided on whether those 
amendments are retroactive. We hold they are not. Both K.S.A. 77-621(a)(2) and K.S.A. 
2009 Supp. 77-621(a)(2) contain a savings clause limiting the revised standard of review 
in K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 77-621(c)(7), (d) to agency decisions issued on or after July 1, 
2009. Accordingly, because the agency finding in this case was made before the 2009 
amendments became effective, we apply the standard of review under K.S.A. 77-
621(c)(7) in effect when the agency issued its order that found Redd's multiple right 
upper extremity impairments developed as a natural consequence of the crush injury to 
his left hand. 
 
Next, we decide the correct methodology to calculate awards when an employee 
suffers multiple scheduled injuries. A majority of the Board held Redd was entitled to 
five separate scheduled injury awards–one for each impairment to a scheduled member of 
his right and left upper extremities. Kansas Truck Center argues Redd's injuries should 
have been combined into a single whole body impairment as contemplated by the 
American Medical Association Guides to Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (Guides) 
(4th ed. 1995). We hold the correct statutory interpretation requires assignment of 
separate awards for each scheduled member suffering disability or impairment that 
appears in the K.S.A. 44-510d schedule and affirm the method used in this case. 
 
In reaching this conclusion, we decline to endorse a competing methodology also 
used by the Board in at least one other claim that combined multiple injuries to the same 
extremity to the highest level of injury on that extremity. Our disagreement with that 
4 
approach is discussed below and in our decision in Mitchell v. Petsmart, Inc., (No. 
99,528, this day decided).  
 
Finally, we reject Kansas Truck Center's claim that the $50,000 compensation cap 
in K.S.A. 44-510f(a)(4) limits Redd's award. We hold the statutory cap does not apply 
when a worker is awarded both temporary total disability benefits and permanent partial 
disability benefits for multiple scheduled injuries under K.S.A. 44-510d. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Redd was a gear technician and diesel truck mechanic for Kansas Truck Center. 
He began working for the company in June 1996. His job required him to rebuild 
transmissions and work on suspensions and clutch assemblies. His left thumb was 
crushed in 2003 while repairing a semi-tractor trailer suspension. Redd immediately 
reported the injury to his supervisor. The company referred him to several doctors, who 
all agreed Redd should be placed on light duty work restrictions. 
 
 Initially, Redd did not miss any work other than for doctor appointments. For 7 
months after the accident, he performed the same job tasks despite his light duty 
restrictions because Kansas Truck Center did not provide any accommodations to comply 
with the doctors' limitations. During this period, Redd tried to avoid using his injured left 
hand and thumb area by finding different ways to perform his job. He testified he would 
balance heavy objects across the forearm of his left hand and use rope placed around his 
neck and tied with a noose to help carry heavy equipment parts. If a coworker was 
around, Redd would ask for help, but most times he performed the tasks himself by 
working with his right hand.   
 
Redd claimed he began experiencing problems with his right upper extremity 
about 1 month after the crush injury to his left thumb. He testified he told his supervisor, 
5 
an insurance company adjuster, and one of his doctors that he had pain in his right hand. 
Kansas Truck Center disputes this testimony, noting the medical records only mention 
treatment for Redd's left extremity and do not reference right hand pain. Redd's doctor 
fitted him with a custom spica split. But when he returned to work after this treatment, he 
was told by Kansas Truck Center that it could not continue to allow him to work because 
of the restrictions his doctor had placed on him. Redd last performed work for Kansas 
Truck Center on December 11, 2003. He underwent surgery to his left thumb in April 
2004. Redd was formally terminated in October 2004.  
 
 Dr. J. Mark Melhorn became Redd's treating physician in 2005. Dr. Melhorn 
performed surgeries on Redd's right wrist and elbow, left wrist and elbow, and left 
thumb. Dr. Melhorn testified the work Redd performed after the crush injury contributed 
to the conditions in his right upper extremity. Also in 2005, Dr. James L. Gluck examined 
Redd at Kansas Truck Center's request. This occurred before Dr. Melhorn performed any 
surgery. Dr. Gluck testified he did not "see a well-defined pathologic process that would 
explain [Redd's] symptomology." Dr. Gluck found the left thumb abnormality was related 
to the crush injury and adopted another doctor's impairment rating for that injury. But Dr. 
Gluck testified the symptoms in Redd's right upper extremity and left upper extremity 
were not work related. Redd filed a claim under the Workers Compensation Act, K.S.A. 
44-501 et seq. 
 
The administrative law judge (ALJ) appointed Dr. Paul Stein to perform an 
independent medical evaluation in the workers compensation proceedings. In his report, 
Dr. Stein concluded Redd's injury to his left thumb was the only left hand damage 
causally related to the crush injury, but he also found within a reasonable degree of 
medical probability that the crush injury could have caused carpal tunnel syndrome. Dr. 
Stein assigned 21 percent total impairment to the left thumb. Following the Guides, Dr. 
Stein converted the 21 percent impairment to the thumb into a 9 percent impairment to 
the hand, an 8 percent impairment to the upper extremity, and a 5 percent impairment to 
6 
the whole person. He then assigned a 10 percent impairment to the left upper extremity 
for carpal tunnel syndrome.  
 
Moving to the next step required by the Guides, Dr. Stein combined the 8 percent 
upper extremity impairment caused by the thumb and the 10 percent upper extremity 
injury caused by carpal tunnel into a 17 percent total left upper extremity impairment. Dr. 
Stein did not provide a combined whole body impairment calculation for these injuries. 
Even though he could not causally relate them to the crush injury, Dr. Stein assigned a 5 
percent impairment to the left upper extremity for an impaired range of motion in Redd's 
left wrist and a 3 percent right upper extremity impairment for lateral elbow pain if the 
ALJ disagreed with his causation findings. 
 
Dr. Pedro Murati also examined Redd. Dr. Murati reported Redd complained of a 
grinding pain in his right thumb, numbness and tingling in the fingers, and a burning 
sensation in his right hand. Redd also told Dr. Murati his hands went numb when he was 
driving and his right shoulder felt out of alignment. Dr. Murati found these conditions 
were caused by overuse following the crush injury. 
  
The ALJ entered an award for temporary total and permanent partial disability. 
Regarding the permanent partial disability, the ALJ determined Redd's testimony, taken 
in conjunction with the medical opinions, established that Redd sustained work-related 
injuries to both his right and left upper extremities. The ALJ found Redd was entitled to 
an award based on the statutorily scheduled injuries to his right and left upper extremities 
as provided in K.S.A. 44-510d. The ALJ assigned a 21 percent impairment to the left 
upper extremity and a 10 percent impairment to Redd's right upper extremity. The ALJ 
approved two scheduled injuries awards, one for each extremity. Redd requested review 
by the Board. 
 
7 
In that review, the Board entered its order finding Redd's right and left upper 
extremity conditions were a natural consequence resulting from the crush injury to his 
left hand and Redd's subsequent overcompensation use for that injury. The Board 
awarded Redd permanent partial and temporary total disability benefits. Regarding the 
permanent partial disability, the Board determined Redd had five scheduled injuries to his 
left hand and right upper extremities, rather than the two the ALJ awarded. The Board 
assigned the following regional impairment ratings: (1) 16 percent impairment to 
claimant's left hand; (2) 10 percent for the left forearm (carpal tunnel syndrome); (3) 10 
percent for the left arm (tunnel/ulnar nerve decompression); (4) 10 percent for the right 
forearm (carpal tunnel syndrome); (5) 15 percent for the right arm (right ulnar cubital 
tunnel decompression and lateral epicondylectomy). 
 
But the Board members disagreed about how to calculate Redd's award. A 
majority determined the statutes required separate awards for each scheduled injury. One 
dissenting Board member argued the multiple injuries should have been combined, based 
upon that member's interpretation of K.S.A. 44-510d(a)(23), which provides "the loss of 
a scheduled member shall be based upon permanent impairment of function as 
determined using the [Guides], if the impairment is contained therein." The dissenter 
went on to predict: "This dispute will arise each time the Board is asked to consider 
extremity injuries when the claimant is not found to be permanently and totally disabled 
and when the claimant has more than one body part injured in one or more extremities."  
 
Kansas Truck Center filed a timely appeal. Redd moved to transfer the case to this 
court, which was granted. Jurisdiction arises from K.S.A. 20-3018(c) (transfer from Court 
of Appeals). 
 
 Kansas Truck Center advances three issues before this court: (1) whether 
substantial competent evidence supported the Board's determination that the left hand 
crush injury caused Redd's right upper extremity impairments; (2) whether the Board 
8 
erred by calculating permanent partial disability awards for each of Redd's five scheduled 
impairments, instead of making one award for a whole body impairment; and (3) whether 
the Board erred by not applying the $50,000 cap specified in K.S.A. 44-510f(a)(4) for 
Redd's temporary total and permanent partial disability benefits award. We address each 
issue in order. 
 
ISSUE ONE: SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE  
 
Kansas Truck Center first challenges the Board's factual findings that the injury to 
Redd's right upper extremity was a natural consequence of the crush injury to his left 
thumb and Redd's overcompensation use for that injury while he continued working for 
the company. Redd defends these determinations. The Board's findings that Redd's left 
upper extremity injuries were related to the left hand crush injury are not at issue. 
  
Standard of Review 
 
Our standard of review for cases under the Workers Compensation Act, K.S.A. 
44-501 et seq., is statutorily controlled by the Act for Judicial Review and Civil 
Enforcement of Agency Actions, K.S.A. 77-601 et seq. See K.S.A 44-556; K.S.A. 2009 
Supp. 44-556. This Act was recently amended and renamed the Kansas Judicial Review 
Act (KJRA). L. 2009, ch. 109, secs. 23-30 (now codified at K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 77-601 et 
seq.). Review of an agency's factual findings is permitted under K.S.A. 77-621(c)(7) and 
K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 77-621(c)(7), depending on the effective date of the agency action. 
Whether substantial competent evidence exists is a question of law. Casco v. Armour 
Swift-Eckrich, 283 Kan. 508, 514, 154 P.3d 494 (2007). 
 
Effective July 1, 2009, the legislature revised the statutory standard of review of 
an agency's factual determination. See K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 77-621(c)(7), (d). Several 
Court of Appeals panels have since disagreed as to whether the new standard should be 
9 
applied retroactively or whether it only applies prospectively to agency decisions issued 
on or after July 1, 2009. As revised, K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 77-621(d) now alters an appellate 
court's analysis in three ways: (1) It requires review of the evidence both supporting and 
contradicting the Board's findings; (2) it requires an examination of the presiding officer's 
credibility determination, if any; and (3) it requires review of the agency's explanation as 
to why the evidence supports its findings. The revised statute now states:   
 
"(d)  For purposes of this section, 'in light of the record as a whole' means that the 
adequacy of the evidence in the record before the court to support a particular finding of 
fact shall be judged in light of all the relevant evidence in the record cited by any party 
that detracts from such finding as well as all of the relevant evidence in the record, 
compiled pursuant to K.S.A. 77-620, and amendments thereto, cited by any party that 
supports such finding, including any determination of veracity by the presiding officer 
who personally observed the demeanor of the witness and the agency's explanation of 
why the relevant evidence in the record supports its material findings of fact.  In 
reviewing the evidence in light of the record as a whole, the court shall not reweigh the 
evidence or engage in de novo review." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 77-621(d).  
 
When confronted with this revised statute, some Court of Appeals panels have 
held the statutory changes were procedural in nature and, therefore, should be applied 
retroactively. See, e.g., Douglas v. Ad Astra Information Systems, 42 Kan. App. 2d 441, 
450-51, 213 P.3d 764 (2009), rev. granted June 23, 2010. But as pointed out recently by 
another Court of Appeals panel, those decisions ignore the savings clause contained in 
the legislation, K.S.A. 77-621(a)(2), now codified at K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 77-621(a)(2). 
Milano's Inc. v. Kansas Dept. of Labor, 43 Kan. App. 2d. 779, 786-87, 231 P.3d 1072 
(2010). Both K.S.A. 77-621(a)(2) and K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 77-621(a)(2) state: "[T]he 
validity of agency action shall be determined in accordance with the standards of judicial 
review provided in this section, as applied to the agency action at the time it was taken." 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
10 
This court previously has held "all rights of action will be enforced under 
[procedural amendments] without regard to whether they accrued before or after such 
change of law and without regard to whether or not the suit has been instituted, unless 
there is a savings clause as to existing legislation. [Citations omitted.]" (Emphasis 
added.) Jones v. Garrett, 192 Kan. 109, 114-15, 386 P.2d 194 (1963). Therefore, the 
savings clause in K.S.A. 77-621(a)(2) provides that the KJRA provisions in effect at the 
time of the agency action are controlling. 
 
At the time at issue in this appeal, K.S.A. 77-621(c)(7) required review of the 
agency's determination for evidence "that is substantial when viewed in light of the 
record as a whole." Case law defined substantial evidence as evidence possessing 
something of substance and relevant consequence to induce the conclusion that the award 
was proper, furnishing a basis to act from which the issue raised could be easily resolved. 
Graham v. Dokter Trucking Group, 284 Kan. 547, 553-54, 161 P.3d 695 (2007). Under 
this holding, the Board's preamendment decision should be upheld if supported by 
substantial evidence, even though there is other evidence in the record supporting 
contrary findings. 284 Kan. at 554.  
 
The decision is supported by substantial competent evidence 
 
The ALJ and the Board both determined that overcompensation use from the crush 
injury to Redd's left hand caused Redd's right upper extremity injuries. The ALJ, the 
Board, and the parties do not articulate this point, but the secondary injury rule authorizes 
the award for the right upper extremity injuries under these facts. The rule provides 
"when a primary injury under the Work[ers] Compensation Act is shown to have arisen 
out of and in the course of employment every natural consequence that flows from the 
injury, including new and distinct injury, is compensable if it is a direct and natural 
result of the primary injury." (Emphasis added.) Jackson v. Stevens Well Service, 208 
Kan. 637, 643, 493 P.2d 264 (1972). This is what Redd claims. Whether a secondary 
11 
injury is compensable as a natural and probable consequence of the primary injury 
depends upon the facts.  
 
In agreeing with Redd, the ALJ relied upon the medical testimony of Drs. 
Melhorn, Gluck, Murati, and Stein to conclude the injury to Redd's right upper extremity 
was caused by its overcompensation use after the left-hand thumb crush injury. In 
rejecting Kansas Truck Center's argument that the award should be limited to Redd's left 
hand and thumb, the ALJ found Redd underwent surgery to his right upper extremity in 
connection with treatment for the crush injury. Dr. Melhorn conducted these surgeries, 
and he testified the insurer approved of, and paid for, all of the procedures.  
 
The Board agreed with the ALJ on this point. In finding causation existed for the 
injuries to both the left and right upper extremities, the Board cited Redd's testimony that 
he returned to full duty work despite his light duty restrictions, but to do so he had to 
compensate for his injured left hand. The Board found this led to symptoms in his right 
hand and right arm within 3 to 4 weeks. The Board also found support in Dr. Melhorn's 
opinion for its conclusion that Redd's subsequent work activities contributed to the right 
upper extremity injuries, which required surgery. 
 
But Kansas Truck Center urges that the Board's causation finding regarding the 
injuries to the upper right extremity should be reversed because Redd's testimony was not 
credible, the doctor's testimony was insufficient, and the weight of the medical testimony 
did not support a causation finding that the left hand crush injury caused problems with 
the right upper extremities. All three arguments fail under our standard of review.   
 
First, Kansas Truck Center attacks the credibility of Redd's testimony supporting 
causation because, the employer argues, Redd did not report the upper right extremity 
problem to his treating physicians while he was still employed by the company. This 
argument is without merit because it involves a credibility determination made by the 
12 
Board. This court will not reassess credibility on appeal. Frick Farm Properties v. 
Kansas Dept. of Agriculture, 289 Kan. 690, 709-10, 216 P.3d 170 (2009). 
 
Redd testified he told his supervisor, an insurance company adjuster, and his 
doctor, while still employed, that he was experiencing pain in his right hand. The ALJ 
found this testimony credible and relied upon it when determining Redd properly notified 
his employer regarding the injuries to both his left and right extremities. The Board's 
findings are consistent with this credibility determination. The Board held Redd notified 
his employer, the insurance carrier, and Redd's doctor that he was having problems with 
his right upper extremity. The ALJ personally observed Redd's demeanor and found his 
testimony credible. We will not disturb this determination.  
 
Second, Kansas Truck Center argues Dr. Melhorn, the doctor the Board relied 
upon, did not specifically state there was causation or that it was within a reasonable 
degree of medical certainty. Kansas Truck Center also challenges Dr. Melhorn's 
causation finding as not credible, claiming the doctor testified Redd's complaints were 
unverifiable and noted Redd did not exhibit optimal effort during the grip tests. 
 
But this misstates Dr. Melhorn's testimony and involves another credibility 
determination. Dr. Melhorn concluded Redd's work activities contributed to his right 
upper extremity injuries. Dr. Melhorn conducted surgery on Redd's upper right extremity 
while acting as the treating physician and assigned an impairment rating for the right arm. 
As to the veracity of Redd's complaints, Dr. Melhorn acknowledged he was unable to 
verify them through objective testing, but he further testified he believed the impairment 
rating was appropriate considering Redd's medical history, the physical exam, and a 
nerve conduction study. Dr. Melhorn also testified he did not have a reason to disbelieve 
Redd's complaints. Accordingly, the record supports the Board's reliance on Dr. 
Melhorn's testimony.   
 
13 
Third, Kansas Truck Center argues the Board's causation finding contradicts the 
weight of the medical testimony. Conceivably, this argument might have greater strength 
under the revised statutory standard of review under the KJRA discussed above, which 
requires examining the evidence both supporting and detracting from the agency's 
findings. K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 77-621(d). But the argument certainly fails under the 
standard of review applicable under K.S.A. 77-621(c)(7) for this appeal because it was 
reasonable for the Board to principally rely upon Redd's treating physician, whose 
testimony supported the Board's finding. 
 
Both Drs. Melhorn and Murati found causation. Their conclusions were buttressed 
by Redd's testimony that symptoms in his right hand began 3 to 4 weeks after he began 
working while favoring it. Ultimately, this was another credibility determination. It was 
reasonable for the Board to accept the treating physician's testimony, which was 
supported by Dr. Murati. We will not disturb this finding. We hold the Board's causation 
decision was supported by substantial competent evidence in light of the record as whole. 
  
ISSUE TWO: PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY AWARD CALCULATION 
 
Next, Kansas Truck Center challenges the Board's method for calculating the 
permanent partial disability award. Various positions are advanced as the correct 
outcome. The Board's majority held Redd was entitled to permanent partial disability 
compensation for five scheduled injuries. It issued separate awards for each of the five 
impairments, resulting in the following awards: (1) left hand totaled $9,650.88 for a 16 
percent loss of use; (2) left forearm totaled $8,190.72 for a 10 percent loss of use; (3) left 
arm totaled $8,622.72 for a 10 percent loss of use; (4) right forearm totaled $8,190.72 for 
a 10 percent loss of use; and (5) right arm totaled $12,934.08 for a 15 percent loss of use. 
This resulted in a total permanent partial disability award of $47,589.12.   
 
14 
Kansas Truck Center counters that the Board should have combined these five 
impairments into one whole body impairment rating, resulting in one award. It argues this 
calculation method is required by K.S.A. 44-510d(a)(23), which adopts the Guides. In its 
brief, Kansas Truck Center argues "[t]he Guides' method was appropriately used by the 
physician experts in this case, converting [Redd's] regional impairments to a whole body 
impairment using the Combined Values Chart."   
 
This is similar to the position taken in the Board's dissenting opinion, which 
argued the Board should "determine the upper extremity impairments for each separate 
part as done by the majority, but, then, combine the upper extremity impairments as 
instructed by the [Guides]." The dissenting board member did not clarify whether he 
believed the Guides required calculating these injuries as a whole body impairment, as 
Kansas Truck Center argued, or combined as separate upper extremity impairments, as 
done by the Mitchell panel.  
 
Standard of Review 
 
Under the KJRA, this court may grant relief if the Board has erroneously 
interpreted or applied the law. K.S.A. 77-621(c)(4). Statutory interpretation is subject to 
unlimited appellate review. Higgins v. Abilene Machine, Inc., 288 Kan. 359, 361, 204 
P.3d 1156 (2009). Redd argues this court should be deferential to the Board's 
interpretation of the Workers Compensation Act when there is a rationale basis for its 
interpretation, citing Casco, 283 Kan. at 521. 
 
But this argument ignores this court's more recent decisions, which have 
recognized little utility for such deference given the long-standing admonition that 
appellate courts are always free to substitute their judgment for that of the administrative 
agency when reviewing a question of law. Ft. Hays St. Univ. v. University Ch., Am. Ass'n 
of Univ. Profs, 290 Kan. 446, 457, 228 P.3d 403 (2010) ("In this matter, an appellate 
15 
court exercises unlimited review on the determinative question of statutory interpretation 
without deference to [the agency's] view as to its own authority."); Higgins, 288 Kan. at 
361 ("No significant deference is due [an administrative law judge's] or the [Workers 
Compensation] Board's interpretation or construction of a statute."). Indeed, when an 
agency applies the same statute in conflicting ways, as the Board has on this question, 
any judicial deference is stymied. Cf. Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 
65-66, 165 L. Ed. 2d 345 , 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006) (Agency views that are shifting or 
insufficiently developed have little or no persuasive value.). 
 
Furthermore, when appellate courts embark upon statutory interpretation and 
construction, "the most fundamental rule . . . is that the legislature's intent governs if [it] 
can be ascertained." Higgins, 288 Kan. at 361. The first step is to ascertain legislative 
intent through the language employed, giving ordinary words their ordinary meaning. 288 
Kan. at 361-62. When a statute is plain and unambiguous, this court must give effect to 
the statute's express language, instead of determining what the law should or should not 
be. Appellate courts will not speculate about legislative intent or read a statute in a 
manner that adds something not readily contained within it. 288 Kan. at 362 (quoting 
Graham, 284 Kan. at 554. 
 
The statutes require separate awards 
 
As noted above, the Board has employed, and the Court of Appeals has affirmed, 
different methods for calculating permanent partial disability awards. The Board uses one 
here–assigning separate awards for each injury to a scheduled member. A Court of 
Appeals panel recently affirmed this method in Conrow v. Globe Engineering Co., No. 
99,718, unpublished opinion filed March 13, 2009. Another method the Board utilized 
combined multiple injuries to the same extremity to the highest level of injury on that 
extremity. A different Court of Appeals panel approved this approach in Mitchell v. 
Petsmart, Inc., 41 Kan. App. 2d 523, 203 P.3d 76 (2009), rev. granted 289 Kan. 1279 
16 
(2009). We announce a decision in that case this same day and reverse the Mitchell 
panel's decision on this point. Mitchell, (No. 99,528, this day decided). In Redd's case, 
the Mitchell court's approach would result in two permanent partial disability awards–one 
for Redd's left upper extremity and one for Redd's right upper extremity. 
 
But neither of these two conflicting methodologies used by the Board involves a 
whole body impairment calculation, which is a third approach and the one advocated by 
Kansas Truck Center in this appeal. Accordingly, we must determine which method is 
correct under K.S.A. 44-510d in this case. A review of the governing statutes, the case 
law interpreting those statutes, the Guides, and the legislative history for K.S.A. 44-
510d(a)(23) is required. We will follow those reviews with an analysis to resolve the 
question. 
 
A. The Statutes 
 
An overview of the Workers Compensation Act places the issue in context. In 
Casco v. Armour-Swift Eckrich, 283 Kan. 508, 522, 154 P.3d 494 (2007), this court 
explained:   
 
"The Workers Compensation Act calculates compensation differently depending 
on the nature of the disability. K.S.A. 44-510c provides compensation for temporary and 
permanent total disabilities. K.S.A. 44-510d and 44-510e provide compensation for 
permanent partial disabilities. K.S.A. 44-510d calculates the award based on a schedule 
of disabilities. If an injury is on the schedule, the amount of compensation in the schedule 
includes compensation for the complete loss of the member or the partial loss of the 
member. K.S.A. 44-510d(a) (21). The compensation for a scheduled disability is based 
on the schedule alone without regard to the claimant's loss in earning power. [Citation 
omitted.] K.S.A. 44-510e, on the other hand, calculates the award for any injury not 
included on the schedule." 
 
17 
Kansas Truck Center's challenge solely pertains to the permanent partial disability 
calculation. Both K.S.A. 44-510d and K.S.A. 44-510e are relevant. The Board's 
scheduled injury calculation was made under K.S.A. 44-510d, but Kansas Truck Center's 
approach would require compensation as if Redd suffered a general disability under 
K.S.A. 44-510e because whole body impairments are not scheduled injuries.   
 
K.S.A. 44-510d(a) provides in part that permanent partial disability compensation 
"is to be paid for not to exceed the number of weeks allowed" in the following schedule: 
"(11)  For the loss of a hand, 150 weeks 
"(12)  For the loss of a forearm, 200 weeks 
"(13)  For the loss of an arm, excluding the shoulder joint, shoulder girdle, 
shoulder girdle, shoulder musculature or any other shoulder structures, 225 weeks 
. . . . 
"(21)  . . . For the permanent partial loss of use of a . . . hand . . . arm . . . shall be 
paid as provided for in K.S.A. 44-510c . . . per week during that proportion of the number 
of weeks in the foregoing schedule provided for the loss of such . . . hand, [arm, or 
shoulder], which partial loss thereof bears to the total loss of a . . . hand, [arm, or 
shoulder] . . . ; but in no event shall the compensation payable hereunder for such partial 
loss exceed the compensation payable under the schedule for the total loss of such . . . 
hand, arm, [or shoulder] . . ., exclusive of the healing period.  
. . . .   
"(23)  Loss of a scheduled member shall be based upon the permanent 
impairment of function to the scheduled member as determined using the fourth edition 
of the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 
if the impairment is contained therein."   
 
K.S.A. 44-510e defines permanent partial general disability as a disability, partial 
in character and permanent in quality, which the K.S.A. 44-510d schedule does not cover. 
It then establishes a unique method for calculating general disabilities that considers 
wage loss. That particular methodology is not relevant to this appeal, but it should be 
noted that general disabilities tend to result in higher awards. Pruter v. Larned State 
18 
Hospital, 271 Kan. 865, 869, 26 P.3d 666 (2001). Kansas Truck Center predicates much 
of its advocacy for a whole body impairment on the language in K.S.A. 44-510(d)(a)(23), 
which requires loss of a scheduled member be based upon the permanent impairment of 
function to the scheduled member "as determined" using the Guides. Accordingly, it is 
appropriate to next consider those Guides in the applicable context for this case. 
 
B. The Guides 
 
This court has not examined the Guides or the meaning of their adoption in K.S.A. 
44-510d(a)(23). According to the foreword, the Guides' stated purpose is "'to bring 
greater objectivity to estimating the degree of long-standing or "permanent" 
impairments.'" Guides, p. v. This is accomplished by performing medical evaluations "in 
accordance with the directions in the Guides." Guides § 1.2, p. 3. 
 
The first step under the Guides is assessment or evaluation. This requires a 
documented medical evaluation and review of a patient's case history. The Guides 
contain chapters on each organ system, and each chapter contains descriptions on ways to 
evaluate the body part, function, or system. Guides § 1.2, p. 3. The Guides' methods for 
evaluating impairments to the upper extremities are outlined in Chapter 3, relating to the 
musculoskeletal system. The hand and upper extremity sections cover the thumb, finger, 
wrist, elbow, and shoulder regions. Guides §§ 3.1a-3.1o, pp. 15-74. 
 
The second step requires combining impairments. The Guides instruct physicians 
to combine impairments to the same member and then convert that impairment to the 
next larger unit. For example, multiple injuries to the same thumb are combined. Then, 
the total thumb impairment is converted to a hand or "regional" impairment. All regional 
impairments, i.e., hand, wrist, and shoulder, are combined to generate a total impairment 
to the upper extremity. Ultimately, this upper extremity calculation is converted into a 
whole body impairment. Guides §§ 3.1e, 3.1n, pp. 24, 65. These calculations are 
19 
performed whether it is a single injury, i.e., impairment to one hand, or multiple injuries, 
i.e., impairment to the hand and shoulder. Guides § 3.1o, pp. 66-74. 
 
Guides § 3.1e, p. 24, entitled "Combining Impairment Values," demonstrates how 
to combine impairments for the same member, i.e., one finger with two impairments, and 
how to combine multiple regional impairments, i.e., the hand, wrist, and shoulder. It 
states:   
 
"When there is more than one impairment of a member, such as abnormal 
motion, sensory loss, and amputation of a finger, the impairments must be combined 
before the conversion to the next larger unit, in this case the hand, is made.   
"The method for combining impairments is based on the idea that a second or a 
succeeding impairment should apply not to the whole, but only to the part that remains 
after the first and other impairments have been applied. . . .  
"The Combined Values Chart on p. 322 may be used to determine the combined 
value of two impairment percents or, in succession, any number of impairment percents. 
 
. . . . 
"Multiple regional impairments, as with those of the hand, wrist, elbow, and 
shoulder, are expressed in terms of impairment of the upper extremity and are combined 
using the Combined Values Chart. The Chart is used also to combine impairments of two 
or more organ systems and express these as a whole-person impairment." 
 
Guides § 3.1n, p. 65, entitled "Combining Regional Impairments to Obtain 
Impairment of the Whole Person," instructs a physician to combine regional impairments, 
i.e., hand, wrist, or shoulder, into a whole body impairment. The first step is to covert 
these impairments into a value for the upper extremity. Then, the Guides § 3.1n, p. 65, 
convert the upper extremity impairment into a whole body impairment, stating: 
 
"1.  Determine the impairments of each region (hand, wrist, elbow, and shoulder joints) 
as described in preceding sections.  
20 
"2.  Use the Combined Values Chart (p. 322) to combine impairments to the upper 
extremity contributed by each region. 
 
. . . . 
"3.  Use Table 3 (p.20) to convert impairment of the upper extremity to impairment of the 
whole person."  
 
 
Guides § 3.1o, pp. 66-74, entitled "Summary of Steps for Evaluating Impairments 
of the Upper Extremity," provides instructions for calculating upper extremity awards 
and combining them into whole body impairments. This summary instructs physicians to 
convert a singular injury into a regional impairment and then a whole body impairment, 
even if there are no other injuries. This is demonstrated by the Guides § 3.1o (I. Hand 
Region), p. 66, pertaining to calculating a hand impairment, which states:   
 
"G.  Total hand impairment: add the hand impairment values related to the involved 
digits. 
"H.  Convert hand impairment to upper extremity impairment. (Table 2, p.19) 
. . . . 
"K.  If no other upper extremity impairment exists, convert the upper extremity 
impairment related to the hand region to a whole-person impairment (Table 3, p. 20)."  
 
These instructions also are included at the bottom of Figure 1, which is titled 
"Upper Extremity Impairment Evaluation Record." Guides § 3.1a, p. 16. 
 
As is easily seen from the above description, Kansas Truck Center is correct that 
the Guides contemplate converting a worker's injury into a whole body impairment. But 
that does not resolve the inquiry. We next consider Kansas Truck Center's claim in light 
of the consideration given to the Guides by the legislature when it included reference to 
them in the statutes. 
 
 
21 
C. Applicable Legislative History 
 
In evaluating Kansas Truck Center's argument, it is necessary to look more closely 
at K.S.A. 44-510d(a)(23), which references the Guides. This provision was added to the 
statute in 1993 and modified in 1996. L. 1993, ch. 286, sec. 33; L. 1996, ch. 79, sec. 23. 
But the only meaningful change in 1996 was adopting the fourth edition of the Guides 
instead of the third edition. L. 1996, ch. 79, sec. 23. 
 
The 1993 amendment was part of a massive workers compensation revision effort. 
This court described the endeavor when it reviewed the changes:   
 
"At the start of the 1993 legislative session, legislators had before them the 
reports of the Governor's Task Force on Workers Compensation, the Insurance 
Commissioner's Workers Compensation Task Force, and the Legislative Post Audit 
Committee, all of which suggested areas of the workers compensation system that the 
various committees determined needed reform. Over the course of the session, the House 
Committee on Labor and Industry and the Senate Committee on Commerce conducted 
hearings and heard from witnesses representing employees, employers, trial lawyers, 
labor organizations, and business associations. S.B. 307, which dealt with safety issues, 
was used as the vehicle for workers compensation reform. The legislation passed 
unanimously in both the House and Senate, and Governor Finney signed the bill into 
law." Injured Workers of Kansas v. Franklin, 262 Kan. 840, 842, 942 P.2d 591 (1997).   
 
Dr. Phillip L. Baker's testimony before a legislative committee provides some 
insight for our present purposes into issues the legislature considered regarding the 
Guides. Dr. Baker was asked to give his opinion on "whether physicians could rate and 
schedule shoulder or girdle problems at that area, as provided in Sec. 23 of SB 215, rather 
than body of the whole." (Emphasis added.) Minutes, Sen. Comm. on Commerce, 
February 10, 1993. Dr. Baker gave this response: 
 
22 
"'[T]he answer is yes, because that is the way we do it anyway. The only reason they are 
converted to whole body is because the system asks us to do that, and it has been that 
way as long as I can remember. In fact, it was hard to learn to do that. . . .' There is now a 
table in the AMA guidelines for impairment that [converts to a whole body impairment]. 
You just look up the percent that you have given to the upper extremity for the shoulder 
and go down the table until you find that number and there is a schedule that does 
that. . . . But it's not a medical issue, it's a book logistic issue that has little relationship to 
the body and how it functions and what this person may be doing." Minutes, Sen. Comm. 
on Commerce, February 10, 1993.   
 
The committee's question at least impliedly suggests it did not mean for this 
provision to adopt the Guides' requirements to convert all injuries into whole body 
impairments. The doctor's answer also shows there is not a medical reason for combining 
the impairments, which means that refusing to adopt Kansas Truck Center's argument 
does not affect the impairment ratings' accuracy. 
 
D. Analysis 
 
As noted above, even though Kansas Truck Center is correct that the Guides 
require combining impairments into whole body injuries, it still fails to address whether 
adopting this approach is consistent with the other provisions in the Workers 
Compensation Act. As Kansas Truck Center conceded at oral argument, if the Guides are 
followed literally, all impairments would be calculated as whole body injuries and 
compensated under K.S.A. 44-510e. This interpretation would render the scheduled 
injury provisions in K.S.A. 44-510d(a)(1)-(22) meaningless because a claimant would 
never be awarded benefits based on a scheduled injury.   
 
This court previously addressed whether certain scheduled injuries can be 
converted into a whole body impairment given the scheduled injury provisions set out in 
the law. In Casco, the injured worker suffered a repetitive use injury to his left shoulder 
23 
and subsequently injured his right shoulder as a natural consequence of the first injury. 
The issue on appeal was whether injuries to parallel limbs should be calculated separately 
as scheduled injuries or combined and calculated as a general body disability under 
K.S.A. 44-510e.  
 
The Casco court emphasized scheduled injuries were the general rule and general 
disabilities the exception, holding the awards at issue must be calculated as scheduled 
injuries in accordance with K.S.A. 44-510d. 283 Kan. at 528. In doing so, this court 
overruled Honn v. Elliott, 132 Kan. 454, 295 Pac. 719 (1931), which had allowed 
multiple scheduled injuries to be combined into whole body impairments. 283 Kan. at 
527 (citing and discussing Pruter, 271 Kan. at 873-76). Admittedly, Casco did not 
address the K.S.A. 44-510d(a)(23) reference to the Guides, but Kansas Truck Center's 
argument that Redd's award should be converted into a whole body impairment would 
require us to overrule Casco. 
 
To avoid this problem, Kansas Truck Center attempts to distinguish Casco by 
arguing its holding only applies to bilateral injuries, not separate injuries to the same 
extremity as Redd suffered. But this ignores the Casco decision's core, which definitively 
held that scheduled injuries are the general rule and that the statutory structure 
comprising the Workers Compensation Act does not permit combining scheduled injuries 
into a whole body impairment. 283 Kan. at 528-29. 
 
In addition, if the plain reading of a statute yields an ambiguity or a lack of clarity, 
the rules of statutory construction are used to resolve the ambiguity. This requires moving 
outside the text of the provision and examining evidence of legislative intent, legislative 
history, or employing the additional canons of statutory construction to determine the 
legislature's meaning. Higgins, 288 Kan. at 362. The legislative history, as discussed 
above, is consistent with Casco's aversion to whole body impairment when there is a 
specific statutory schedule.  
24 
 
Appellate courts also must consider various provisions of an act in pari materia to 
reconcile and bring the provisions into workable harmony if possible. State v. Breedlove, 
285 Kan. 1006, 1015, 179 P.3d 115 (2008). If they cannot be resolved, a fundamental 
rule of statutory construction is "[w]hen there is a conflict between a statute dealing 
generally with a subject and another statute dealing specifically with a certain phase of it, 
the specific statute controls unless it appears that the legislature intended to make the 
general act controlling. [Citations omitted.]" Matjasich v. Kansas Dept. of Human 
Resources, 271 Kan. 246, 251, 21 P.3d 985 (2001). 
 
Applying the rules of statutory interpretation, the provision referencing the Guides 
in K.S.A. 44-510d(a)(23) must be read in a way that does not render the statutory 
schedule in K.S.A. 44-510d extraneous, if possible. See State v. Trautloff, 289 Kan. 793, 
797, 217 P.3d 15 (2009) ("As a general rule, courts should read statutes to avoid 
unreasonable results and should presume that the legislature does not intend to enact 
useless or meaningless legislation."). But if the entire instructions contained in the Guides 
are to be applied to create a whole body impairment for every injury to a worker, as 
Kansas Truck Center argues they should be, the statute's scheduled injury sections in 
K.S.A. 44-510d(a)(1)-(22) become meaningless. Statutory construction rules do not favor 
this result.  
 
As discussed above, the Guides were designed to increase objectivity and 
uniformity when estimating impairments. Dr. Baker's comments suggest the Guides' 
conversions into regional and whole body impairments were added simply to help 
physicians comply with their particular state's workers compensation requirements when 
applicable. But since the Kansas Legislature created its own mechanism to calculate 
permanent partial disability awards in K.S.A. 44-510d and K.S.A. 44-510e, the more 
reasonable interpretation for K.S.A. 44-510d(a)(23) is that the legislature meant to adopt 
the evaluation requirements but not the instructions to combine and convert the injuries 
25 
into whole body impairments. This view maintains the Guides' purpose of bringing 
greater objectivity to the physician's task of estimating the magnitude of permanent 
impairments, while allowing for the scheduled injury calculations specified in the statute.  
 
This interpretation also is consistent with another statutory interpretation rule that 
the more specific statute should govern if the statutes cannot be reconciled. In re Roth, 
269 Kan. 399, 403, 7 P.3d 241 (2000) ("[W]here a conflict between general and specific 
statutes exists, the specific statute will prevail unless it appears that the legislature meant 
to make the general statute controlling." ). The scheduled injury provisions in K.S.A. 44-
510d(a)(1)-(22) deal specifically with how a permanent partial disability award should be 
calculated, while the Guides are a general instruction manual developed to help 
physicians across the nation calculate impairments for claimants without specific 
reference to a particular state's statutory scheme for providing benefits to injured workers. 
K.S.A. 44-510d(a)(23) is the more general provision in the statute. We conclude the 
Guides should not control over the more specific statutory schedule. We hold this 
statutory analysis and our rationale in Casco demonstrate Redd's impairments should not 
be combined into whole body impairments. 
 
But this conclusion does not end our inquiry. As discussed above, the Board used 
a different method of calculation in Mitchell. This variation in Mitchell stopped short of 
combining multiple injuries to single extremities into a whole body impairment. We must 
determine whether that alternative method is proper before ruling how Redd's award 
should be calculated. 
 
The employee in Mitchell also suffered multiple injuries like Redd. The Board 
determined Mitchell suffered repetitive trauma, developing bilateral carpal tunnel 
syndrome, right elbow symptoms, and bilateral shoulder injuries. The Board then 
combined these impairment ratings at the level of each shoulder, resulting in a 24.5 
percent impairment to the right upper extremity and a 8 percent impairment to the left 
26 
upper extremity. Two board members dissented, arguing Mitchell's injuries needed to be 
compensated on the schedule at the level corresponding to that injury. The dissenters 
argued for separate calculations, which was the approach the Board majority used for 
Redd.  
 
The Mitchell panel interpreted K.S.A. 44-510d to allow compensation at the 
highest level of the injury when multiple injuries occur within a single extremity. First, it 
distinguished its calculations from those found improper in Casco by noting the Board 
did not convert Mitchell's injuries into a whole body impairment thereby requiring 
compensation under the general disability statute, K.S.A. 44-510e. Then, it noted the 
statutory structure of the scheduled injuries was progressive, meaning an injured worker 
is entitled to more weeks if the injury occurs at a higher level, i.e., 200 weeks for a 
forearm, but 210 weeks for the loss of an arm. The panel quoted Casco, 283 Kan. at 522, 
stating that "'[i]f an injury is on the schedule, the amount of compensation in the schedule 
includes compensation for the complete loss of the member or the partial loss of the 
member,'" but the panel then stated that where only a partial loss occurs, the number of 
weeks is reduced by the percentage of the loss and, thus, "the principle of compensating 
an extremity at the highest level affected applies regardless of whether the loss is total or 
partial." Mitchell, 41 Kan. App. 2d at 537. 
 
Admittedly, this approach does not render the statutory schedule meaningless, but 
it does read something into provisions of K.S.A. 44-510d(a)(1)-(22) that does not exist. 
The schedule does not contain any language requiring the combination of scheduled 
injuries, and the Mitchell panel did not explain where it found the authority to justify the 
way in which the Board combined Mitchell's injuries. 
 
Using the statutory construction analysis recited above, we hold the best way to 
reconcile K.S.A. 44-510d(a)(23) with the statutory schedule is to use the Guides as a 
mechanism to evaluate impairment at the level of the injury and to not apply its 
27 
provisions that call for combining injuries first into regional, and then whole body, 
impairments. As such, separate awards should be provided at each injury level. The 
Board majority correctly calculated Redd's award. 
 
ISSUE THREE: THE $50,000 CAP IN K.S.A. 44-510f(a)(4) 
 
Finally, Kansas Truck Center argues the $50,000 benefit cap in K.S.A. 44-
510f(a)(4) applies because Redd's permanent partial disability award was for "functional 
impairment only." Redd received $47,589.12 for permanent partial disability and $22,464 
for temporary total disability. This resulted in a total award of $70,053.12. For the 
$50,000 cap to apply under these facts, Kansas Truck Center argues the statute limits 
Redd's total disability award. Redd, of course, argues the $50,000 cap does not apply in 
cases where temporary total disability benefits are awarded, citing Roberts v. Midwest 
Mineral Inc., 41 Kan. App. 2d 603, 204 P.3d 1177 (2009), pet. for rev. filed April 20, 
2009 (pending). Applying the cap as Kansas Truck Center advocates would decrease 
Redd's award by $20,053.12. 
 
Kansas Truck Center's argument also presents a question of statutory interpretation 
subject to unlimited appellate review as did the last issue. And, as noted above, we cannot 
give deference to the Board's interpretation on this question because the Board has 
applied the statute in contradictory ways. See Smothers v. Transervice Logistics, Inc., 
2009 WL 1588632, at *4 (Work. Comp. Bd., No. 1,039,301, filed May 29, 2009) 
(declining to follow Roberts after the Roberts' petition for review was filed); Martinez v. 
Cargill Meat Solutions, 2010 WL 2671463, at *6 (Work. Comp. Bd., No. 1,027,952, filed 
June 25, 2010) (adopting the Roberts approach).   
 
The meaning of K.S.A. 44-510f(a)(4) is an issue of first impression for this court, 
but two Court of Appeals panels have addressed it. Roberts, 41 Kan. App. 2d at 603, and 
Rinke v. Bank of America, No. 93,868, unpublished opinion filed March 30, 2007. The 
28 
panels interpreted the statutory language differently, although both decisions resulted in 
findings that did not apply the $50,000 statutory cap.  
 
First, we review the statute in controversy.  
 
K.S.A. 44-510f(a) sets an employee's maximum compensation benefits. It states:  
 
" (a)  Notwithstanding any provision of the workers compensation act to the 
contrary, the maximum compensation benefits payable by an employer shall not exceed 
the following: 
"(1)  For permanent total disability, including temporary total, temporary partial, 
permanent partial and temporary partial disability payments paid or due, $125,000 for an 
injury or any aggravation thereof; 
"(2) for temporary total disability, including any prior permanent total, 
permanent partial or temporary partial disability payments paid or due, $100,000 for an 
injury or any aggravation thereof; 
"(3)  subject to the provisions of subsection (a)(4), for permanent or temporary 
partial disability, including any prior temporary total, permanent total, temporary partial, 
or permanent partial disability payments paid or due, $100,000 for an injury or any 
aggravation thereof; and 
"(4)  for permanent partial disability, where functional impairment only is 
awarded, $50,000 for an injury or aggravation thereof." (Emphasis added). 
 
Functional impairment is considered only in instances in which an injured worker 
suffers from a partial loss of use of a member, in which case there must be a 
determination of the percentage of loss of use of the scheduled member. The permanent 
partial general disability statute defines functional impairment as  
 
"the extent, expressed as a percentage, of the loss of a portion of the total physiological 
capabilities of the human body as established by competent medical evidence and based 
on the fourth edition of the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of 
Permanent Impairment, if the impairment is contained therein." K.S.A. 44-510e(a). 
29 
 
In 1993, K.S.A. 44-510f was amended to add subsection (a)(4) as part of workers 
compensation reform . L. 1993, ch. 286, sec. 35. Additional language was also added to 
K.S.A. 44-510f(a)(3) that year. Specifically, that the $100,000 cap was "subject to the 
provisions of subsection (a)(4)". L. 1993, ch. 286, sec. 35.  
 
A representative from the Revisor of Statutes testified the workers compensation 
bill "'[p]rovides a cap on "white collar" recoveries where there has been no wage loss at 
one-half the current limit for permanent partial disability.'" Minutes, Sen. Comm. on 
Commerce, February 8, 1993. These minutes do not specifically identify K.S.A. 44-
510f(a)(4). But it is reasonable to assume they refer to this provision because it was the 
only statutory cap included in the 1993 amendments, and it allows one-half of the 
maximum compensation benefits allotted in K.S.A. 44-510f(a)(2)-(3). See L. 1993, ch. 
286, sec. 35. 
 
In Rinke, the claimant was awarded $32,364.71 in temporary total disability and 
$22,411.89 in permanent partial disability. The total for both awards was $54,776.60. The 
appellants argued K.S.A. 44-510f(a)(4) limited recovery in cases with "functional 
impairment only" to $50,000 and that this cap applied to the permanent partial and the 
temporary total disability awards. The Board held the language in K.S.A. 44-510f(a)(4) 
was clear and unambiguous and the $50,000 limit only applied to permanent partial 
disability awards. It also held the temporary total disability compensation was not 
included in this $50,000 cap. The Rinke panel affirmed, holding:  
 
"As the Board noted, the $50,000 limit in K.S.A. 44-510f(a)(4) does not specify 
that it includes 'prior' TTD, PTD, TPD, or PPD as do other subsections of the statute. The 
statute requires only that the $50,000 cap be applied in permanent partial disability cases 
where functional impairment only is awarded. Here, Rinke was awarded permanent 
partial and temporary total disability. Considering the unambiguous language of K.S.A. 
44-510f(a)(4), the Board's interpretation was not erroneous." Slip op. at 8.  
30 
 
In Roberts, the claimant also was awarded temporary total disability and 
permanent partial disability. The specific awards were not included in the opinion, but it 
is clear the total awards exceeded $50,000. The ALJ and Board limited claimant's total 
award to $50,000 under K.S.A. 44-510f(a)(4). The panel reversed, finding the $100,000 
cap in K.S.A. 44-510f(a)(3) applied. 41 Kan. App. 2d at 611. In doing so, the panel must 
have found the statutes providing for caps were ambiguous. 
 
The Roberts panel began by recognizing that appellate courts are required to 
consider provisions of an act in pari materia with the intent to reconcile and harmonize 
the provisions. It then determined K.S.A. 44-510f(a)(4) applies to both scheduled and 
nonscheduled permanent partial disabilities. 41 Kan. App. 2d at 611. Stated another way, 
it recognized there are two categories of permanent partial disability awards, scheduled 
and general disability, and both categories are based upon functional impairment. 
Therefore, the clause "for functional impairment only" was not meant to distinguish types 
of permanent partial disability awards.   
 
The Roberts panel next attempted to reconcile K.S.A. 44-510f(a)(4) with K.S.A. 
44-510f(a)(3), which places a $100,000 cap on "permanent or temporary partial 
disability, including any prior temporary total, permanent total, temporary partial, or 
permanent partial disability payments paid or due." The court asked: "If the $50,000 
compensation cap in K.S.A. 44-510f(a)(4) applies to both scheduled and nonscheduled 
injuries, then what type of claims are subject to the $100,000 cap in K.S.A. 44-
510f(a)(3)?" 41 Kan. App. 2d at 610-11.   
 
The Roberts panel concluded the distinction between these statutes' application 
was whether the claimant received any other award. It stated:  
 
31 
"[T]he only reasonable interpretation of the statute is that K.S.A. 44-510f(a)(4) is limited 
to those few cases in which a claimant does not suffer an injury that causes the claimant 
to lose at least a week's time from work, but rather causes a 'functional impairment only.' 
If there is an injury which prevents the claimant from working for at least a week, then 
the claimant is also entitled to TTD payments under K.S.A. 44-510c(b)(1), in which case 
the $100,000 compensation cap in K.S.A. 44-510f(a)(3) applies." (Emphasis added.) 41 
Kan. App. 2d at 611.  
 
In other words, the Roberts panel determined the term "functional impairment 
only" means K.S.A. 44-510f(a)(4) is effective when the only award is for permanent 
partial disability. If the employee also receives a temporary total disability award, the 
panel concluded, the $50,000 limitation does not apply. 41 Kan. App. 2d at 611.  
 
We find this interpretation consistent with the rules of statutory construction and 
the limited evidence of legislative history. It also makes clear where the Rinke court over 
simplified its analysis. When viewing K.S.A. 44-510f(a)(4) in isolation, it is not 
unreasonable to interpret the phrase "functional impairment only" as meaning that the 
legislature intended to impose a separate cap on permanent partial disability awards. But 
this interpretation cannot be reconciled with the other sections of K.S.A. 44-510f, which 
also apply to permanent partial disability awards. The best interpretation is to construe 
"functional impairment only" to mean the injured worker received only a permanent 
partial disability and nothing else. Since Redd was awarded permanent partial disability 
and temporary total disability, Redd's award is subject to the $100,000 cap in K.S.A. 44-
510f(a)(3), not the $50,000 limitation in K.S.A. 44-510f(a)(4). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We hold substantial competent evidence supported the Board's factual 
determinations that Redd's right upper extremities injuries resulted from the left hand 
crush injury. 
32 
 
 We further hold the Board majority's separate injury calculation for each 
extremity was correct. Kansas Truck Center's argument that the scheduled injuries should 
have been combined into a whole body impairment is rejected as being inconsistent with 
the Workers Compensation Act. We also reject the calculation methodology approved by 
the Court of Appeals panel in Mitchell, as discussed above and in our decision released 
this same date in that case. 
 
Finally, we reject Kansas Truck Center's argument that Redd's award was subject 
to the $50,000 liability cap set out in K.S.A. 44-510f(a)(4); rather, it was subject to the 
$100,000 cap in K.S.A. 44-510f(a)(3). 
 
Affirmed.