Title: Brooks v. Town of Bar Harbor

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
 2024 ME 21 
Docket: 
Han-23-159 
Argued: 
December 6, 2023 
Decided: 
 March 26, 2024 
 
Panel: 
 STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ.* 
 
 
ERICA BROOKS et al. 
 
v. 
 
TOWN OF BAR HARBOR 
 
 
CONNORS, J. 
[¶1]  The question presented in this declaratory judgment action is 
whether the Town of Bar Harbor’s adoption of an amendment to its Land Use 
Ordinance regarding vacation rentals was void because it was passed with less 
than a supermajority.  The Superior Court (Hancock County, R. Murray, J.) 
concluded a supermajority was not needed; residents Erica Brooks and Victoria 
Smith brought this action seeking a contrary declaration.  Brooks and Smith 
appeal from the Superior Court’s judgment granting the Town’s motion for 
summary judgment and denying their motion for summary judgment.  We 
affirm, albeit on different grounds than those of the Superior Court. 
 
*  Although Justice Jabar participated in this appeal, he retired before this opinion was certified. 
 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  “The following facts are drawn from the summary judgment record 
and are not disputed by the parties.”  Dussault v. RRE Coach Lantern Holdings, 
LLC, 2014 ME 8, ¶ 2, 86 A.3d 52.  Given the basis of our decision, we may be 
brief as to the material facts. 
 
[¶3]  Brooks and Smith own real property within the Town; Brooks is also 
a real estate broker who sells real estate in the Town.  Brooks was a member of 
the Planning Board at all times relevant to this case until her term expired in 
July 2021.  Smith is a current holder of a short-term rental license on property 
she owns.   
[¶4]  On November 2, 2021, the Town enacted an amendment to the 
provisions in its Land Use Ordinance (LUO) relating to short-term rentals by a 
vote of 1,260 out of 2,100, or 60%.  Brooks and Smith argue that because the 
Planning Board’s vote—held before the November 2021 election—on whether 
to recommend the proposed amendment resulted in a 2-2 tie, under the 
language of the LUO then in place, the amendment needed to be enacted by a 
two-thirds Town vote to become effective.   
[¶5]  Before the Superior Court, the parties concentrated on the issue of 
whether the language of the LUO required passage by a two-thirds 
 
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supermajority.  The Superior Court agreed with the Town that the language did 
not.  On appeal before us, the Maine Municipal Association (MMA) moved and 
was granted permission to file an amicus brief.  In that brief, the MMA argued 
that it was immaterial whether the LUO language called for a supermajority 
vote because under 21-A M.R.S. § 723(4) (2023) and 30-A M.R.S. § 2501 (2023), 
unless the Town’s charter provides otherwise, which it does not, only a simple 
majority vote was required for the amendment to become effective.   
[¶6]  Although the parties continued to concentrate their argument on 
appeal on the language in the LUO and the effect of a tie Planning Board vote, 
the Town also endorsed the MMA’s argument.  In response to the MMA’s 
argument, Brooks and Smith contended that we should not address the 
argument because it came too late, without affording them an opportunity to 
develop the factual record relating to that argument.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
We may affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on alternative 
grounds. 
[¶7]  As a general rule, “[w]e may affirm a summary judgment on 
alternative grounds from the trial court decision when we determine, as a 
matter of law, that there is another valid basis for the judgment.”  Yankee Pride 
Transp. & Logistics, Inc. v. UIG, Inc., 2021 ME 65, ¶ 11, 264 A.3d 1248; see also 
 
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Est. of Smith v. Cumberland Cnty., 2013 ME 13, ¶ 22, 60 A.3d 759 (“Although we 
reach our conclusion for reasons different from those indicated by the Superior 
Court . . . entry of summary judgment may be affirmed when we determine, as 
a matter of law, that there is another valid basis for the judgment.”); Rainey v. 
Langen, 2010 ME 56, ¶ 24, 998 A.2d 342 (“We are, of course, free to affirm a 
summary judgment for reasons different from those upon which the Superior 
Court relied.”). 
[¶8]  Although Brooks and Smith argue that additional facts are needed 
to address the MMA’s argument that the supermajority requirement in the LUO 
is unenforceable, the MMA’s argument is straightforward, is purely legal, and 
depends only on the language of the relevant statutes and the uncontested 
contents of the Town’s charter.  Brooks and Smith had a fair opportunity to 
respond in their reply brief, and they are not prejudiced by our choice to 
address the merits of that legal argument.1 
[¶9]  Given that we can address this appeal on alternative grounds raised 
for affirmance based on the evidentiary record before us, that this will not 
 
1  Ordinarily, we do not entertain a new argument raised in an amicus brief.  See State v. Sloboda, 
2020 ME 103, ¶ 19 n.8, 237 A.3d 848. Here, however, the Town expressly endorsed the MMA’s 
argument, and because the argument presents alternative grounds for affirmance, we could have 
ruled based on those grounds sua sponte.  Cf. id. (addressing a jurisdictional argument raised by amici 
because the issue could be raised at any time). 
 
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prejudice any party, and that ruling based on the alternative grounds will serve 
the interests of judicial economy and provide guidance to the bench and bar, 
we exercise our discretion to address the merits of this appeal on those 
alternative grounds. 
B. 
By statute, only a simple majority was needed to enact the LUO 
amendment. 
[¶10]  The language of the relevant statutes is clear.  Title 21-A, 
section 723(4) provides, “A referendum question is determined by majority 
vote.”  Title 30-A, section 2501 provides, “Except as otherwise provided by this 
Title or by charter, the method of voting and the conduct of a municipal election 
are governed by Title 21-A.”  Because the Town’s supermajority requirement 
was contained only in the LUO, not in its charter, that requirement is 
unenforceable. 
The entry is: 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Erica Johanson, Esq. (orally), and Paige Eggleston, Esq., Jensen Baird, Portland, 
for appellants Erica Brooks and Victoria Smith 
 
Jonathan P. Hunter, Esq. (orally), and Stephen W. Wagner, Esq., Rudman 
Winchell, Bangor, for appellee Town of Bar Harbor 
 
 
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Sarah J. Jancarik, Esq., Maine Municipal Association, Augusta, for amicus curiae 
Maine Municipal Association 
 
 
Hancock County Superior Court docket number AP-2021-10 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY