Title: Marvin Coleman v. Gary R. McCaughtry

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2006 WI 49 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP548-W 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Marvin Coleman, 
          Petitioner-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Gary R. McCaughtry, Warden, Waupun Correctional  
Institution and Matthew J. Frank, Secretary, 
Department of Corrections, 
          Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(no cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 18, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 12, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Rock-Janesville   
 
JUDGE: 
Edwin C. Dahlberg 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BUTLER, JR., J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., and BRADLEY, J., join the 
concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner there were briefs by Brian Kinstler and 
Kohler & Hart, LLP, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Brian 
Kinstler. 
 
For the respondents the cause was argued by William L. 
Gansner, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2006 WI 49
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP548-W  
(L.C. No. 
1985CF2721 & 1985CF2722) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Marvin Coleman, 
 
          Petitioner-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Gary R. McCaughtry, Warden, Waupun Correctional  
Institution and Matthew J. Frank, Secretary, 
Department of Corrections, 
 
          Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 18, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the court of appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   This case requires us 
to review the denial of Marvin Coleman's petition for writ of 
habeas corpus, which alleged ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel.  The State asserted that his claim was barred by laches 
and the court of appeals agreed, dismissing Coleman's petition.   
¶2 
The State has the burden of proof in regard to all the 
elements of its laches defense.  With that in mind and based on 
the record before us, we affirm the conclusion of the court of 
appeals that the State proved that Coleman unreasonably delayed 
No. 
2004AP548-W   
 
2 
 
in filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus as a matter of 
law.  However, the factual record is insufficient for a 
reviewing court to decide whether the State suffered prejudice.1  
Therefore, we reverse and remand to the court of appeals for 
fact-finding to determine whether the State has been prejudiced 
by Coleman's unreasonable delay.  The court of appeals shall 
select a method appropriate for fact-finding, either through the 
use of a special master or by remand to the circuit court.2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
On February 19, 2004, Coleman filed a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus in the court of appeals under State v. 
Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992), asserting that 
his appointed appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective 
because he failed to pursue an appeal from Coleman's 1986 Rock 
County convictions. 
¶4 
The criminal case that underlies Coleman's petition 
for habeas can be outlined as follows:  in 1986, Coleman was 
charged with nine criminal counts.  He moved to suppress 
evidence found in a search of Vanessa Henning's residence on 
Sunshine Street that supported the charged offenses.  Henning 
                                                 
1 The State claims that the only information it had about 
Coleman's appeal came from his petition that attached three 
letters between Coleman and appellate counsel.  Coleman has not 
argued that the State had knowledge that he would assert an 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, so we 
conclude that element of laches is not at issue in this review. 
2 The court of appeals is without jurisdiction to make 
factual findings.  Wurtz v. Fleischman, 97 Wis. 2d 100, 107 n.3, 
293 N.W.2d 155 (1980). 
No. 
2004AP548-W   
 
3 
 
testified at the suppression hearing that she consented to the 
search because she believed she had no choice after officers 
told her they would arrest her if she did not allow them to 
search her home.  Henning's grandmother, present at the time of 
the search, testified to the same effect.  Two Beloit police 
detectives testified that Henning had not been threatened with 
arrest.  They also testified that on the day after the search of 
Henning's house, she contacted police to report that she had 
found additional clothing and a box containing bullets that 
belonged to Coleman.  She asked that an officer come and get 
them.  One of the officers also said that Coleman said he 
resided on Nelson Avenue with his aunt and uncle, and that he 
did not refer to Henning's house as his residence.   
¶5 
Coleman also testified.  He said that he had been 
living at the Sunshine Street house; that he had been Henning's 
partner for six years; that he lived with her in her previous 
residence; and that he was the father of her children.  The 
State emphasized that Coleman had not stayed at Henning's house 
continuously; that Coleman and Henning had broken up; that 
Henning had ordered Coleman out of the house; and that Coleman's 
belongings were in the basement in plastic bags at the time of 
the search.   
¶6 
The circuit court found that there was "clear and 
positive evidence" that Coleman was not a resident of Henning's 
house on the date of the search.  Without reaching the issue of 
whether Henning's consent to search was voluntary, the circuit 
court concluded that Coleman did not have standing to challenge 
No. 
2004AP548-W   
 
4 
 
the search and denied his motion to suppress.  Coleman then pled 
guilty to all counts, which included sexual assault, armed 
robbery, theft, and battery.  He was sentenced to eighty years 
imprisonment.   
¶7 
Coleman was appointed postconviction and appellate 
counsel after his plea, and he filed an unsuccessful motion for 
sentence modification in January of 1987.  According to Coleman, 
his appellate counsel advised him that there was no chance of 
obtaining relief on appeal; therefore, he took no direct appeal. 
¶8 
The 
record 
before 
us 
includes 
three 
written 
communications between appellate counsel and Coleman over the 
course of almost a year that relate to the decision not to 
appeal.  They provide a less than complete picture of what 
happened regarding this decision.  For example, on June 1, 1987, 
appellate counsel wrote to Coleman at the Columbia Correctional 
Institution.  He said: 
I write simply to confirm the agreement we 
reached on May 29, 1987.   
I told you that I thought you had no chance of 
obtaining any relief on appeal.  You accepted my view 
and indicated that you did not want to pursue an 
appeal. 
¶9 
On May 17, 1988, Coleman wrote back to appellate 
counsel:  
I'm writing requesting my transcripts so that I 
may do the necessary research, that you fail [sic] to 
do for an appeal or post-conviction.  Please do not 
close my appeal, if [a] deadline has not accured 
[sic]. 
No. 
2004AP548-W   
 
5 
 
By me gathering greater knowledge of law and ect. 
[sic] I come to know that you were not out to do your 
job, in helping me do the research for my appeal or 
post-conviction relief. 
I know why you didn't do the best of your 
ability, its [sic] because your [sic] not the one who 
has to sit behind these bars each and everyday.  No!, 
its [sic] me that will remain here for the rest of my 
life if nothing is done about it. 
¶10 Appellate counsel wrote back to Coleman on May 23, 
1988, and enclosed copies of police reports and transcripts.  He 
stated: 
In your letter you say that I failed to do the 
necessary research for an appeal or post-conviction 
relief in your case.  I have to disagree with that.  I 
did substantial research in an effort to find a way to 
obtain a reversal of the trial court's ruling on your 
suppression motion or to find a way to permit you to 
withdraw the guilty pleas you entered before Judge 
Dahlberg on May 28, 1986.  You and I discussed 
different possible avenues of relief on January 16, 
1987 and again on May 29, 1987.  At that time you 
agreed with me that there was no hope for an appeal 
and told me not to pursue one.  We had tried to have 
Judge Dahlberg modify your sentence.  He denied that 
motion. 
¶11 Coleman argues that he was denied effective assistance 
of appellate counsel because his attorney failed to appeal the 
Fourth Amendment issue regarding whether Henning consented to 
the search.  He argues that, pursuant to State v. Johnson, 153 
Wis. 2d. 121, 129, 449 N.W.2d 845 (1990) (citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)), he is entitled to relief from 
his 
counsel's 
deficient 
performance 
because 
a 
reasonable 
attorney would have pursued the issue of consent, and that there 
No. 
2004AP548-W   
 
6 
 
is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's deficient 
performance, he would have prevailed on appeal.     
¶12 Coleman also claims 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
precedent has established that one need not be a resident of the 
premises to have standing to challenge a search, so long as the 
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
premises searched, which he claims to have had.  
¶13 While noting that Coleman does not assert that he 
instructed postconviction counsel to pursue an appeal, the State 
focuses, not on the merits of the ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, but rather, on the merits of its laches defense 
to the petition for habeas.  The State acknowledges that the 
available information about the decision not to pursue an appeal 
does not reveal with particularity the process by which 
appellate counsel reached the conclusion that the Fourth 
Amendment issue was without merit.  It also does not address the 
conversations counsel had with Coleman prior to Coleman's 
reaching the final decision not to appeal. 
¶14 The State emphasizes that the record shows Coleman 
failed to take any action between 1987 and 2004 and that his 
failure not only supports part of the laches defense, but also 
reinforces the State's position that Coleman agreed not to 
pursue an appeal.  Coleman does not assert that he requested 
counsel to appeal and counsel ignored his request.  Counsel did 
file a motion for postconviction relief in regard to sentencing, 
but that was unsuccessful.  
No. 
2004AP548-W   
 
7 
 
¶15 The State notes that it suggested to the court of 
appeals that the court consider directing appellate counsel to 
respond to the petition for habeas in regard to his ability to 
recall 
or 
reconstruct 
the 
circumstances 
surrounding 
his 
representation of Coleman.  The court of appeals chose not to do 
so.  Instead, it concluded that Coleman's delay in petitioning 
for habeas was unreasonable and that the State was prejudiced by 
the delay.  From those conclusions, the court determined that 
the State had proved its laches defense. This precluded an 
evidentiary hearing on the merits of Coleman's habeas petition.  
It is the court of appeals' decision on laches that we now 
review.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶16 A 
convicted 
criminal 
defendant 
has 
a 
right 
to 
postconviction relief that includes both a postconviction motion 
under Wis. Stat. § 974.02 (2003-04),3 and a direct appeal, 
pursuant to the Wisconsin Constitution, Article I, § 21(1) and 
Wis. Stat. § 809.30.  Once the time for direct appeal has 
passed, a defendant in a criminal case may collaterally attack 
his conviction pursuant to a Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion, 
Peterson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 370, 381, 195 N.W.2d 837 (1972), 
or via a petition for writ of habeas corpus.  Knight, 168 
Wis. 2d at 522.  Coleman has properly chosen the last form under 
which to seek relief from his convictions because his claim is 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2004AP548-W   
 
8 
 
based on an allegation of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel.  Id. 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶17 We must determine whether the court of appeals erred 
when it concluded the delay was unreasonable and presumed that 
the State had proven the prejudice element of its laches 
defense.  We independently review the "legal issues arising in 
the context of a petition for habeas corpus."  State ex rel. 
Marberry v. Macht, 2003 WI 79, ¶8, 262 Wis. 2d 720, 665 N.W.2d 
155; see also State ex rel. Hager v. Marten, 226 Wis. 2d 687, 
694, 594 N.W.2d 791 (1999).  The question of whether laches 
applied to Coleman's petition requires a determination of the 
reasonableness of the delay in bringing the issue before the 
court; a determination that the State did not have knowledge 
that Coleman would be bringing this claim; and a determination 
of whether the State suffered prejudice due to the delay.  State 
v. Prihoda, 2000 WI 123, ¶37, 239 Wis. 2d 244, 618 N.W.2d 857.  
Reasonableness is a question of law based upon factual findings.  
See Lohr v. Viney, 174 Wis. 2d 468, 477-78, 497 N.W.2d 730 (Ct. 
App. 1993).  When the facts are known, we independently review 
reasonableness as a question of law.  State ex rel. McMillian v. 
Dickey, 132 Wis. 2d 266, 277, 392 N.W.2d 453 (Ct. App. 1986).  
Prejudice is also a legal conclusion based on the facts 
surrounding the issues underlying the petition.  See Lohr, 174 
Wis. 2d at 477.  If the defense of laches is proved, whether to 
apply laches and dismiss the habeas petition is left to the 
discretion of the court of appeals.  See id. at 478.  
No. 
2004AP548-W   
 
9 
 
B. 
Laches 
1. 
General principles 
¶18 A petition for writ of habeas corpus commences a civil 
proceeding wherein the petitioner claims an illegal denial of 
his or her liberty.  State ex rel. Zdanczewicz v. Snyder, 131 
Wis. 2d 147, 151, 388 N.W.2d 612 (1986).  A habeas petition must 
contain a statement of the legal issues and a sufficient 
statement of facts that bear on those legal issues, which if 
found to be true, would entitle the petitioner to relief.  Wis. 
Stat. § 809.51(1); State ex rel. Smalley v. Morgan, 211 Wis. 2d 
795, 802, 565 N.W.2d 805 (Ct. App. 1997).  Habeas corpus relief 
is available only when the petitioner is being held in violation 
of a constitutional right 
or by 
a 
tribunal 
that 
lacks 
jurisdiction, and in either case, only when no other remedy at 
law is adequate to provide relief.  Marberry, 262 Wis. 2d 720, 
¶2.  Habeas is an equitable remedy, United States ex rel. Smith 
v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953), for which there is no 
constitutional right to counsel, State v. Evans, 2004 WI 84, 
¶32, 273 Wis. 2d 192, 682 N.W.2d 784.  
2. 
Laches tests 
¶19 Wisconsin courts have used various tests for laches 
without explaining their differences or why they have used the 
tests that were chosen.  The most commonly used test has three 
elements, but the elements are not always consistently stated.  
For example, in Lohr they are stated as:  (1) unreasonable 
delay, (2) lack of knowledge of and acquiescence in the course 
of events by the party asserting laches and (3) prejudice to the 
No. 
2004AP548-W   
 
10 
 
proponent of the defense.  Lohr, 174 Wis. 2d at 477.  The first 
element in Lohr is attributed to the inaction of the claimant 
and the second and third elements are applied to the person 
asserting laches as a defense.  Id.  
¶20 In Schafer v. Wegner, 78 Wis. 2d 127, 254 N.W.2d 193 
(1977), we stated the same three elements as, "(1) unreasonable 
delay, (2) lack of knowledge on the part of the party asserting 
the defense that the other party would assert the right on which 
he bases his suit, and (3) prejudice to the party asserting the 
defense in the event the action is maintained."  Id. at 132 
(citing Schneider Fuel & Supply Co. v. West Allis State Bank, 70 
Wis. 2d 1041, 1053, 236 N.W.2d 266 (1975)).  More recently we 
applied this same three-element analysis in Sawyer v. Midelfort, 
227 Wis. 2d 124, 159, 595 N.W.2d 423 (1999).  In each case, the 
first element is attributed to inaction of the claimant and the 
second and third elements to the party who raised a laches 
defense.  
¶21 Wisconsin courts have also used a four-element test 
that requires:  "an unreasonable delay must occur, the plaintiff 
must know the facts and take no action, the defendant must not 
know the plaintiff would assert the right on which the suit is 
based, and prejudice to the defendant must occur."  Riegleman v. 
Krieg, 2004 WI App 85, ¶22, 271 Wis. 2d 798, 679 N.W.2d 857 
(citing Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund of Milwaukee v. City 
of Milwaukee, 2001 WI App 144, ¶20, 246 Wis. 2d 196, 630 N.W.2d 
236).  In Riegleman, the court applied the four-element test to 
determine whether a chiropractor's action to collect for 
No. 
2004AP548-W   
 
11 
 
services was precluded.  The second element set out in 
Riegleman, whether the claimant knew the facts that gave rise to 
his claim and yet took no action, has been subsumed into the 
analysis of whether the delay in bringing the claim was 
"unreasonable."  Sawyer, 227 Wis. 2d at 160 (concluding that a 
delay cannot be "unreasonable" until the claimant had, or should 
have had, knowledge that a defendant's acts were a cause of 
claimant's injuries).   
¶22 Another frequently used laches test has only two 
elements:  (1) unreasonable delay by the claimant and (2) 
prejudice to the party raising the laches defense.4  Evans, 273 
Wis. 2d 192, ¶49. 
¶23 In 1984, in Neylan v. Vorwald, 121 Wis. 2d 481, 360 
N.W.2d 537 (Ct. App. 1984), the court of appeals introduced the 
concept of "actual prejudice" in regard to the second element of 
a two-element laches test.  Neylan involved a motion to set 
aside the dismissal of Neylan's claim, which dismissal had been 
entered one year earlier without notice.  Id. at 485.  Laches 
was raised by Vorwald.  In introducing the concept of "actual 
prejudice," the court of appeals tied "actual prejudice" to 
short delays in bringing claims.  Id. at 491.  "Prejudice to 
                                                 
4 There have been occasions when this two-element test has a 
preface to the first element, that the claimant has a cause of 
action against the defendant.  See Mut. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n 
v. Wis. Wire Works, 58 Wis. 2d 99, 111, 205 N.W.2d 762 (1973) 
(citing McDonald v. McDonald, 53 Wis. 2d 371, 192 N.W.2d 903 
(1972)).  We no longer list a "cause of action against the 
defendant" as an element because a cause of action must be 
present, as it is to that cause of action that laches is raised.   
No. 
2004AP548-W   
 
12 
 
defendants resulting from unreasonable delay may be presumed 
. . . but in cases where delay is more moderate or excusable, 
the need to show actual prejudice is proportionally greater 
. . . ."  Id. at 491 n.5 (citing Lyell Theatre Corp. v. Loews 
Corp., 682 F.2d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 1982)).  
¶24 The next time the concept of actual prejudice appears 
is in the two-element test used in McMillian v. Dickey, where 
laches was raised to a petition for habeas corpus.  Citing 
Baxter v. Estelle, 614 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1980), the court of 
appeals said, "[T]he state must demonstrate that it must suffer 
actual prejudice from the delay in its ability to respond to the 
grounds upon which habeas is sought."  McMillian, 132 Wis. 2d at 
281 n.14 (citing Baxter, 614 F.2d at 1032-33 & n.2).  However, 
Baxter 
involved 
federal 
habeas 
that 
differs 
from 
the 
circumstances in which state habeas will lie,5 and Baxter does 
not use the term "actual prejudice," although it does conclude 
that prejudice was shown.  Baxter, 614 F.2d at 1032-33.   
¶25 In Smalley, again in the context of a habeas petition, 
the court of appeals employed a two-element test that requires 
that "actual prejudice" be shown by the state when it raises 
laches to a habeas petition.  Smalley, 211 Wis. 2d at 800 
(citing McMillian, 132 Wis. 2d at 281 n.14).  While Smalley 
                                                 
5 We note that Wisconsin's rules on when a state habeas may 
be filed are more liberal than those applicable to federal 
habeas because since 1996, federal habeas corpus is available to 
a state prisoner for only one year after the state conviction 
becomes final, if the time is not tolled by collateral 
proceedings in state court.  28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) and (2) 
(2000). 
No. 
2004AP548-W   
 
13 
 
refers to laches and uses laches terminology, it appears to have 
conflated its analysis of the habeas petition's timeliness6 with 
the unreasonable delay element of laches.  Both laches and 
habeas petitions seek equitable relief, and they have some 
similar principles.  For example, equitable remedies are not 
available to one whose own inaction results in the harm.  See 
State Bank of Drummond v. Christophersen, 93 Wis. 2d 148, 160, 
286 N.W.2d 547 (1980) (reviewing an appeal of a foreclosure 
judgment modification).  While the analysis of Smalley's delay 
was prefaced with an explanation of laches principles,7 the 
Smalley decision actually rests on the application of habeas 
principles.8  For example, Smalley concluded by explaining that 
                                                 
6 The State has not argued that Coleman's habeas petition 
was untimely under the principles that we have set for 
evaluating habeas petitions.  Therefore, we do not address 
whether Coleman has met his burden of proof in that regard. 
7 The court explained:  
As an equitable doctrine, habeas corpus is subject to 
the doctrine of laches.  Where the delay on the 
petitioner's part was unreasonable and the State 
suffers actual prejudice from the delay in its ability 
to respond to the petition, dismissal on the grounds 
of laches may be warranted.   
State ex rel. Smalley v. Morgan, 211 Wis. 2d 795, 800, 565 
N.W.2d 805 (Ct. App. 1997) (citations omitted).   
8 The court then went on to review Smalley's petition: 
The purpose of habeas corpus "is to provide a 
prompt and effective judicial remedy to those who are 
illegally 
restrained 
of 
their 
personal 
liberty."  
Smalley's petition does not allege facts demonstrating 
that he sought prompt and speedy relief.  Such a 
showing is required. 
No. 
2004AP548-W   
 
14 
 
Smalley's claim was precluded by the insufficiency of the habeas 
petition itself.9  The foundation for the decision in Smalley 
becomes readily apparent when the decision places the burden of 
proof for timeliness of the petition on Smalley, which is in 
accord 
with 
reviewing 
timeliness 
in 
regard 
to 
a 
habeas 
petition.10  Smalley, 211 Wis. 2d at 802 n.7.   
¶26  In 
Evans, 
where 
laches 
was 
not 
raised 
as 
an 
affirmative defense, but where a Knight petition11 remained a 
possibility, we discussed a two-element test for laches and 
appeared to adopt the court of appeals statement that the state 
must show "actual prejudice" when it raises laches as an 
                                                                                                                                                             
Id. at 802 (citations omitted).  
9 The relevant language includes the following: 
We have considered whether our rejection of 
Smalley's petition as untimely runs afoul of Flores 
. . . .  We conclude that it does not because 
Smalley's request for habeas relief must be evaluated 
under the standards applicable to such relief. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
10 By contrast, the burden of proof for all of the elements 
of a laches affirmative defense rests on the party asserting the 
defense.  See Sawyer v. Midelfort, 227 Wis. 2d 124, 159, 595 
N.W.2d 423 (1999).  However, if Smalley were read as an 
application of laches to a habeas petition, it could be 
misunderstood as holding that a party against whom laches is 
asserted 
has 
the 
burden 
of 
proving 
that 
the 
delay was 
reasonable.   
11 The proper procedural vehicle to bring an ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel claim is a habeas petition 
pursuant to State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 522, 484 N.W.2d 
540 (1992). 
No. 
2004AP548-W   
 
15 
 
affirmative defense to a habeas petition.  Evans, 273 Wis. 2d 
192, ¶49.   
¶27 However, in Prihoda, which addressed Prihoda's motion 
to vacate a clerical correction in sentencing, Prihoda raised 
laches to the clerical correction.  Prihoda, 239 Wis. 2d 244, 
¶35.  There, we employed a three-element analysis that did not 
require Prihoda to show "actual prejudice."  Instead, we said 
that Prihoda must prove:  (1) unreasonable delay by the state; 
(2) his lack of knowledge that the state would make a clerical 
correction in his sentence; and that (3) he suffered prejudice 
due to the delay.  Id., ¶37.   
¶28 Prihoda, Sawyer, Lohr and Schafer all employ a three-
element test where the first element is unreasonable delay in 
bringing the claim and the other two elements apply to the party 
asserting laches:  lack of knowledge (that the claim would be 
brought) and effect (prejudice).  In Neylan, McMillian, Smalley 
and Evans, the first element is the same, unreasonable delay, 
but the second element of the two-element analysis is set out as 
"actual prejudice."  When the delay is not extensive, the 
movant's lack of knowledge that the claim would be brought is 
important in assessing prejudice.  Neylan, 121 Wis. 2d at 491 
n.5.  Stated otherwise, actual prejudice includes the concept 
that the party raising laches did not have knowledge that the 
claim would be brought and that he suffered prejudice because of 
the delay in bringing the claim. 
¶29 Because it may be difficult to quantify "actual 
prejudice," we conclude that the three-element analysis of 
No. 
2004AP548-W   
 
16 
 
Sawyer and Prihoda provides the better analytic framework for 
assessing a laches defense than does the two-element analysis 
set out in McMillian, Smalley and Evans.  Carefully applied to 
the facts, assessing whether a party raising laches did not have 
knowledge that the claim would be brought will permit the 
circuit court to more fully apprise the effect of a claim that 
has been unreasonably delayed.  For example, if the State had 
knowledge that Coleman would bring his claim of ineffective 
appellate counsel, but destroyed all the records that it 
possessed that were relevant to that claim, the State might be 
prejudiced in defending against the claim, but it would 
nevertheless fail on its laches defense. 
3. 
Application of laches defense    
¶30 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
concluded 
that 
Coleman 
unreasonably delayed in bringing his claim before the court 
because the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel occurred 
in 1987 and Coleman did not seek relief until 2004, 17 years 
later.  The court of appeals pointed out that:  
Correspondence 
between 
Coleman 
and 
postconviction 
counsel in May 1988 shows that Coleman was aware of a 
potential suppression issue, was dissatisfied with 
counsel's decision not to appeal, intended to do his 
own research into the matter, and possessed the 
necessary transcripts and records to conduct that 
research.  After that exchange of letters, however, 
Coleman apparently did nothing.  There is no record of 
any 
request 
for 
court-appointed 
counsel, 
nor 
allegation that Coleman sought pro bono counsel or 
free legal assistance elsewhere.  Nor does Coleman 
explain why he made no attempt to pursue relief 
without counsel, although 
he is 
literate, 
[and] 
presumably had access to his prison's law library 
. . . . 
No. 
2004AP548-W   
 
17 
 
State 
ex 
rel. 
Coleman 
v. 
McCaughtry, 
No. 
2004AP548-W, 
unpublished order at 2 (Wis. Ct. App. December 13, 2004).   
¶31 The State asserts that the petition was filed more 
than 17 years after Coleman's conviction; the three letters 
between Coleman and appellate counsel suggest that appellate 
counsel assessed the merits of possible appellate issues, found 
them wanting and discussed his findings with Coleman.  The 
letters also show that appellate counsel advised Coleman not to 
appeal and that Coleman accepted this decision.  Furthermore, 
Coleman does not assert that he asked counsel to appeal and that 
counsel ignored his request.   
¶32 The State also asserts that the lack of any record 
that Coleman tried to do anything relative to an appeal from 
1988, when he was given the transcripts, until 2004 when he 
filed his habeas petition supports the court of appeals' 
conclusion that the delay was unreasonable.  We agree that 
Coleman has made no showing of why he failed to attempt to bring 
his concerns before a court on a pro se basis, as so many 
incarcerated persons have.   
¶33 Coleman does not dispute any of the facts argued by 
the State.  Instead, he asserts he did not bring his claim 
before the court sooner because he was without legal knowledge 
or financial means to hire another attorney for a second opinion 
on the issue of an appeal until he married a woman with 
financial resources.  We are unpersuaded.  While his marriage 
may have provided the catalyst to bring a habeas petition, that 
fact does not explain away the uncontroverted fact that Coleman 
No. 
2004AP548-W   
 
18 
 
knew of his claim for more than 16 years but he did nothing, 
year after year.  Accordingly, we agree with the court of 
appeals 
that 
the 
State 
has 
proved 
Coleman's 
delay 
was 
unreasonable as a matter of law.12   
¶34 However, the State must also prove that it was 
prejudiced because of Coleman's delay in bringing his claim.  
Here, the court of appeals assumed that because more than 16 
years had passed since appellate counsel and Coleman discussed 
an appeal, counsel would have little or no recall of why he 
decided to recommend that an appeal not be filed or what he and 
Coleman discussed before he concluded that Coleman had agreed to 
counsel's closing the file.   
¶35 The court interpreted Coleman's relinquishment of the 
right to appeal and the delay as follows:   
He initially accepted counsel's conclusion that he 
could 
not 
meritoriously 
appeal 
his 
convictions.  
Subsequently, Coleman had no access to appointed 
counsel, and no means to retain private counsel.  It 
was only after his recent marriage that he could 
afford to retain the attorney who now represents him 
before this court. 
Id. at 1-2.  It concluded that Coleman's delay was unreasonable, 
and then assumed the delay prejudiced the State. 
Furthermore, the delay of seventeen years greatly 
prejudices the State, under any reasonable view.  As a 
practical matter, the State cannot obtain counsel's 
testimony about his decision not to appeal, because 
                                                 
12 This conclusion should not be interpreted to mean that 
there are no conceivable circumstances under which a 16-year 
delay in filing a Knight petition would be reasonable.  However, 
such circumstances are not presented by this appeal. 
No. 
2004AP548-W   
 
19 
 
counsel undoubtedly has little or no memory of the 
circumstances of that decision.  If Coleman's appeal 
rights were reinstated, and he prevailed in the 
ensuing appeal, the delay would certainly preclude a 
remand for further proceedings on the suppression 
issue, although that would be the logical remedy.  
Additionally, 
if 
the 
evidence 
were 
ultimately 
suppressed, the State would have no practical means of 
retrying Coleman on the remaining evidence.   
Id. at 2-3 (footnote omitted). 
¶36 While the court of appeals' assumption may prove true, 
it is not the only possible outcome that could result from an 
inquiry of postconviction counsel.  Therefore, it cannot be 
decided as a matter of law.  To the contrary, appellate counsel 
may be able to recall or to reconstruct what happened during his 
communications with Coleman; what Coleman's response was; and 
how they reached the ultimate decision not to appeal.  If he 
cannot, then the court of appeals is correct that the State 
suffered prejudice in being able to meet Coleman's claim of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  But if counsel 
proves 
the 
assumption 
of 
the 
court 
incorrect, 
further 
proceedings on Coleman's claim of ineffective assistance will be 
required. 
¶37 Accordingly, we agree with Coleman that based on the 
record before us, the court of appeals erred when it assumed the 
State was prejudiced by Coleman's unreasonable delay, instead of 
requiring the State to prove a factual basis for prejudice.  
Therefore, we reverse the court of appeals decision that laches 
precludes Coleman's petition for writ of habeas corpus, and we 
No. 
2004AP548-W   
 
20 
 
remand the matter to the court of appeals to decide how to 
develop a sufficient factual record. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶38 The State has the burden of proof in regard to all the 
elements of its laches defense.  With that in mind and based on 
the record before us, we affirm the conclusion of the court of 
appeals that the State proved that Coleman unreasonably delayed 
in filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus as a matter of 
law.  However, the factual record is insufficient for a 
reviewing court to decide whether the State suffered prejudice.  
Therefore, we reverse and remand to the court of appeals for 
fact-finding to determine whether the State has been prejudiced 
by Coleman's unreasonable delay.  The court of appeals shall 
select a method appropriate for fact-finding, either through the 
use of a special master or by remand to the circuit court.13 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded. 
 
                                                 
13 Laches may be raised again in any further proceedings, 
e.g., on the merits of the suppression issue or on retrial of 
the crimes of which Coleman stands convicted. 
No.  2004AP548-W.lbb 
 
1 
 
¶39 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J. (concurring).   Laches is an 
equitable defense based upon the petitioner's unreasonable delay 
in bringing an action under circumstances in which such delay is 
prejudicial to the defendant.  Sawyer v. Midelfort, 227 
Wis. 2d 124, 159, ¶74, 595 N.W.2d 423 (1999) (citation omitted).  
It is an affirmative defense, where the burden is on the defense 
to show that the plaintiffs unreasonably delayed in bringing the 
lawsuit.  Id., ¶75; Becker v. Becker, 56 Wis. 2d 369, 374-75, 
202 N.W.2d 688 (1972).  In the absence of any fact-finding 
proceedings that relate to Marvin Coleman's (Coleman's) habeas 
corpus petition, I fail to see how the majority can conclude 
that (1) the State proved that Coleman unreasonably delayed in 
filing his petition; or (2) the element of laches that the State 
had 
knowledge 
that 
Coleman 
would 
assert 
an 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim is not an issue in this review.  
Majority 
op., 
¶2, 
including 
n.1. 
 
The effect 
of 
these 
conclusions is to shift the burden of proof to the petitioner, 
Coleman, and to render the court of appeals and this court into 
fact-finding bodies in excess of our respective jurisdictions.1  
¶40 With respect to laches, what exactly is before this 
court, having been considered by the court of appeals?  We have 
before us Coleman's February 19, 2004, habeas petition with 
attachments, and the State's response to the habeas petition.  
The petition alleges that in 1986, then 20-year-old Coleman pled 
guilty to nine felonies in Rock County Circuit Court.  The 
                                                 
1 See majority op., ¶2 n.2, citing Wurtz v. Fleischman, 97 
Wis. 2d 100, 107 n.3, 293 N.W.2d 155 (1980). 
No.  2004AP548-W.lbb 
 
2 
 
petition alleges that Coleman applied for and received appellate 
counsel to represent him in any postconviction and appellate 
matters.  The petition alleges that appellate counsel advised 
Coleman that "he had no chance of obtaining any relief on 
appeal," and that Coleman accepted that advice and pursued no 
appeal.  The petition alleges that Coleman has since retained 
current counsel, and current counsel has concluded that Coleman 
had a meritorious and ultimately determinative challenge to the 
circuit court's denial of his suppression motion.  The petition 
alleges that as a result, Coleman was deprived of effective 
assistance of appellate counsel.  As to the reasons for delay in 
filing his petition, the petition alleges that Coleman initially 
accepted appointed counsel's advice, having no reason to 
question it, and it was not until he married years later that he 
acquired the monetary resources to retain counsel to review 
prior counsel's performance.  The petition further alleges that 
Coleman was not entitled to appointed counsel. 
¶41 The attachments refer to three written communications 
between appellate counsel and Coleman, between May 1987 and May 
1988, that relate to the original decision not to appeal.  
Majority op., ¶¶8-10.  Of course, because these communications 
occurred approximately 16 to 17 years prior to Coleman's 
February 19, 2004, habeas petition, none of those attached 
communications refer to the delay or the reasons for the delay.  
The only communication from Coleman asked appellate counsel to 
No.  2004AP548-W.lbb 
 
3 
 
"[p]lease do not close my appeal if the deadline has not accured 
[sic]".2 
¶42 What was the State's response to Coleman's February 
2004 habeas petition?  "Respondents LACK SUFFICIENT INFORMATION 
to specifically address the allegation of deficient performance 
contained in Coleman's petition. . . ." (Emphasis in original.)  
The response asserted that the petition be deemed barred by 
laches.  The response alleges that "[i]t appears that between 
1988 and 2004, Coleman took absolutely no action to challenge 
the performance of his appellate counsel, although the legal 
means to do so was available to him."  "[T]here is no indication 
Coleman was under any disability that precluded him from . . . 
seeking pro se a review of appellate counsel's performance 
before 2004."  "Coleman has not demonstrated that he sought 
prompt, speedy relief as required by Wis. Rule § 809.51(1)."  
"This very substantial delay in pursuing his challenge to 
appellate counsel's performance is manifestly unreasonable."  
(Emphases added.)   
¶43 No hearing was held to discern the facts behind the 
allegations in either the habeas petition or the State's 
response.  Yet, this is not a situation where the facts are 
undisputed and there is only one reasonable inference.  See 
Sawyer, 227 Wis. 2d at 159 ("Where the facts are undisputed and 
there is only one reasonable inference, the court may conclude 
as a matter of law that the elements are met.") (citation 
omitted).   
                                                 
2 It appears that by then the deadline had passed. 
No.  2004AP548-W.lbb 
 
4 
 
¶44 The State's response asserts that "it appears" that 
Coleman took no action between 1988 and 2004, but there is no 
way to know that absent a hearing.  The State alleges that 
"there is no indication" that Coleman was under a disability 
that precluded pro se review of counsel's performance, yet not 
only was there no hearing on this point, but Coleman asserted 
that he relied on counsel's advice that his case lacked merit.  
This then presents a factual dispute as to why no pro se action 
was sought.  The State finally maintains that "Coleman has not 
demonstrated" that he sought prompt, speedy relief as required 
by the habeas statute.  Yet, not only does Coleman assert that 
he 
initially 
asked 
for 
an 
appeal, 
but 
his 
subsequent 
communication with appellate counsel a year later indicated that 
he still wanted an appeal.  In addition to creating a factual 
dispute on this point, the State's argument clearly shifts the 
burden to the petitioner that laches should not apply, instead 
of leaving the burden on the party asserting the defense of 
laches, the State.3  Given these factual disputes, it is clearly 
inappropriate for either the court of appeals or this court to 
decide this petition without further fact-finding.  Id. 
¶45 This case is not unlike State ex rel. McMillian v. 
Dickey, 132 Wis. 2d 266, 282, 392 N.W.2d 453 (Ct. App. 1986).  
In that action, the petitioner sought judicial review of his 
                                                 
3 The State's argument on the first two points would also 
relieve the State of its burden with respect to the affirmative 
defense of laches, as its position does not clearly establish 
who has to prove what, so that the inference is that the 
petitioner did not present enough here. 
No.  2004AP548-W.lbb 
 
5 
 
probation revocation from 1974.  Id. at 272.  McMillian's case 
then languished in the circuit court in excess of eight years, 
with no transcript of the proceedings having ever been filed.  
Id. at 274.  In denying his petition, the circuit court and the 
department faulted McMillian for "failing to 'pursue' his 
certiorari action in not making further demands or inquiries 
concerning the status of his case."  Id. at 282.  The court of 
appeals "reject[ed] this attempt to shift the blame for delay in 
the proceedings from those who have failed to act in the manner 
required by law to one who has complied with all legal 
requirements."  Id. 
¶46 Similarly, in this matter Coleman sought and received 
appellate counsel to represent him in postconviction and 
appellate matters.  After initially being informed that his case 
lacked merit, his last known communication to appellate counsel 
asked counsel to keep Coleman's appeal open.  In other words, 
Coleman took the steps he was legally required to take to pursue 
postconviction relief.  Given the factual disputes that exist 
for the reasons for his delaying subsequent actions, and given 
the fact that the burden of proving laches falls on the party 
asserting that affirmative defense, this court should not be 
making factual findings based on Coleman's failure to establish 
or prove anything.  See Sawyer, 227 Wis. 2d at 159.    
¶47 I fully agree with the majority's observation that the 
court of appeals, in State ex rel. Smalley v. Morgan, 211 
Wis. 2d 795, 565 N.W.2d 805 (Ct. App. 1997), "appears to have 
conflated its analysis of the habeas petition's timeliness with 
No.  2004AP548-W.lbb 
 
6 
 
the unreasonable delay element of laches."  Majority op., ¶25.  
The majority accurately observes that "[w]hile the analysis of 
Smalley's delay was prefaced with an explanation of laches 
principles, 
the 
Smalley 
decision 
actually 
rests 
on 
the 
application of habeas principles."  Majority op., ¶25.  The 
majority correctly concludes that "[t]he foundation for the 
decision in Smalley becomes readily apparent when the decision 
places the burden of proof for timeliness of the petition on 
Smalley, which is in accord with reviewing timeliness in regard 
to a habeas petition."  Majority op., ¶25 (emphasis added) 
(citation and footnote omitted). 
¶48 Unfortunately, the majority conflates in exactly the 
same manner as the Smalley court its analysis of the habeas 
petitioner's timeliness with the unreasonable delay element of 
laches.  In applying the laches affirmative defense to the facts 
of this case, the majority points out that "Coleman does not 
assert that he asked counsel to appeal and that counsel ignored 
his request."4  Majority op., ¶31.  This places the burden on 
Coleman as opposed to the State.  The majority then agrees that 
"Coleman has made no showing of why he failed to attempt to 
bring his concerns before a court on a pro se basis, as so many 
incarcerated persons have."5  Majority op., ¶32.  The majority 
                                                 
4 As noted earlier, this "fact" is subject to dispute, as 
Coleman's last instructions of record to appellate counsel were 
to keep his appeal, not close his appeal.  There was no hearing 
to resolve this factual dispute.   
5 As noted earlier, this "fact" is also subject to dispute, 
as Coleman alleged that he relied on appellate counsel's advice 
and lacked the means to hire another lawyer.  Once again, there 
was no hearing to resolve this factual dispute. 
No.  2004AP548-W.lbb 
 
7 
 
once again places the burden on Coleman.  The majority then 
concludes that Coleman knew of his claim for more than 16 years, 
but that he did nothing.6  Majority op., ¶33.  Again, the burden 
is placed on Coleman.  In the absence of any hearing to 
determine the facts that exist in this matter, it is clear that 
the majority, instead of analyzing the laches defense offered by 
the State, has applied the timeliness factor under habeas 
principles in the same manner as the court of appeals in 
Smalley.7   
¶49 On the basis of this record, in the absence of any 
hearing or fact-finding process, I conclude that the State has 
failed to meet its burden of proving that Coleman unreasonably 
delayed in bringing this claim, or that the State lacked any 
knowledge that Coleman would assert the right on which his 
habeas petition is based.  As the majority has already 
determined that a remand is necessary to ascertain whether the 
State has been prejudiced by the delay, I would remand this 
matter to the court of appeals for a determination of all three 
elements of laches.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur.  
                                                 
6 As noted earlier, this "fact" is also subject to dispute, 
as Coleman clearly asserts that he was not aware of the merits 
of his claim, having relied upon appellate counsel's advice, and 
lacked the means to hire counsel to review the merits of his 
claim until he married years later.  Once again, there was no 
hearing to resolve this factual dispute. 
7 The opinion also raises a clear inference that the passage 
of time alone is enough to meet the unreasonable delay element 
of the laches defense.  With this, I heartily disagree.   
No.  2004AP548-W.lbb 
 
8 
 
¶50  I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY 
S. ABRAHAMSON and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this concurring 
opinion.   
 
 
 
No.  2004AP548-W.lbb 
 
1