Title: Conor Velazquez, an infant by his mother and natural guardian,, Charmaine Velazquez,et als. v. Teresa Jiminez, M.D., et als.

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

In this appeal, the Court considers an issue of first impression in which it must decide whether New Jersey s Good Samaritan Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-1, can be invoked to immunize a hospital physician who assists a patient at the hospital during a medical emergency. Charmaine Velazquez was a patient at St. Peter s Medical Center (the Medical Center) for the purpose of delivering a baby. Dr. Teresa Jiminez was her attending physician. Complications occurred during the course of the delivery because Mrs. Velazquez s baby was suffering from bilateral shoulder dystocia (both of his shoulders were lodged against his mother s public bone). After delivering the baby s head, Dr. Jiminez was unable to deliver the rest of the baby s body. She then called for assistance, and Dr. Angela Ranzini responded. Dr. Ranzini had no prior relationship with or connection to Mrs. Velazquez. Dr. Ranzini was an Assistant Professor of Clinical Obstetrics and Gynecology at the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey (UMDNJ), assigned to the Maternal Fetal Care Unit (MFCU) at the Medical Center. She specializes in maternal fetal medicine and was responsible both for attending to high-risk patients in the MFCU and for supervising resident physicians who cared for their own UMDNJ clinical patients at the Medical Center. Mrs. Velazquez was neither an MFCU nor a clinical patient. Rather, she was the patient of Dr. Jininez, an attending physician with staff privileges at the Medical Center. After unsuccessfully attempting to complete the delivery vaginally, Dr. Ranzini assisted in preparing Mrs. Velazquez and the baby (who was, by virtue of his position, at risk of suffering from a loss of oxygen) for an emergency Caesarean section. The baby, Conor, ultimately was born severely brain damaged, spent his life in a dependent state and died of pneumonia before reaching the age of three. In July 1994, Mr. and Mrs. Velazquez filed suit against the Medical Center and its staff members, and against Dr. Jiminez, Dr. Ranzini, and others for their negligence during Conor s delivery. Before trial, Dr. Jiminez, the Medical Center, and other defendants settled with Mr. and Mrs. Velazquez, leaving only Dr. Ranzini as a defendant. Dr. Ranzini then moved for summary judgment claiming immunity under the Good Samaritan Act. The trial court denied the motion as a matter of law, holding that the Act does not immunize physicians responding to emergencies within a hospital. Dr. Ranzini alone went to trial. At trial, Mr. and Mrs. Velazquez s experts testified that Dr. Ranzini deviated from the standard of care. Dr. Ranzini s experts testified that her conduct conformed to all applicable medical standards and that Conor s condition resulted from the negligence of Dr. Jiminez. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Velazquez and assigned three percent liability to Dr. Ranzini. The trial court, on its own, entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict (j.n.o.v.) in favor of Dr. Ranzini, holding that her liability could not be regarded as a substantial factor in the harm that resulted to Conor. In so ruling, the trial court reiterated that the Good Samaritan Act did not operate to insulate Dr. Ranzini from suit. Mr. and Mrs. Velazquez appealed, challenging the j.n.o.v., among other trial errors. Dr. Ranzini cross-appealed from the trial court s ruling that the Good Samaritan Act did not immunize her from suit. In her appeal, Dr. Ranzini maintained that the location of the emergency is of no consequence. Rather, she maintained that a physician is immunized under the Act so long as he or she acts in the absence of a duty to do so. She further contended that the weight of out-of-state authority supported her interpretation, which she claimed would encourage physicians to assist in a hospital emergency. Mr. and Mrs. Velazquez maintained that Dr. Ranzini s construction of the Act was inconsistent with its plain meaning and with the legislative purpose. In a reported opinion, the Appellate Division reversed the j.n.o.v. and rejected Dr. Ranzini s cross-appeal on the ground that, as a matter of law, the Good Samaritan Act does not apply to physicians working within a hospital. The Supreme Court granted Dr. Ranzini s petition for certification regarding the applicability of the Good Samaritan Act to emergencies involving a patient occurring within a hospital. HELD : New Jersey s Good Samaritan Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-1, encompasses only those situations in which a physician or other volunteer comes, by chance, upon a victim who requires immediate emergency medical care, at a location compromised by lack of adequate facilities, equipment, expertise, sanitation and staff, and does not provide immunity to a hospital physician who assists a patient at the hospital during a medical emergency. 1. Under the common law, a bystander had no duty to provide affirmative aid to an injured person, even if he or she had the ability to do so. However, once a bystander endeavored to help, the common law recognized a duty to do so reasonably, and the volunteer could be held liable for injuries caused by his or her negligent assistance. (pp. 7-9) 2. The goal of Good Samaritan legislation is to encourage the rendering of medical care to those who need it but otherwise might not receive it, by persons who come upon such victims by chance, without the accoutrements provided in a medical facility, including expertise, assistance, sanitation, or equipment. (pp. 9-12) 3. Although all fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted some form of Good Samaritan legislation, the legislation of no two states are alike due, in part, to disparate policies behind their enactment. The country s Good Samaritan statutes fall into three categories: those that expressly exclude hospital care; those that expressly include hospital care; and those, like New Jersey s, that contain no explicit provision one way or the other. (pp. 12-19) 4. The few judicial decisions interpreting the category of statutes that neither expressly excludes nor expressly includes in-hospital emergency medical care are in equipoise, the outcome based, in great measure, on whether the statutes were broadly or narrowly interpreted. (pp. 19-20) 5. If the language of a legislative enactment is clear, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms. When a statute is subject to more than one plausible reading, the role of the courts is to effectuate the legislative intent in light of the language used and the objectives sought to be achieved. (pp. 21-22) 6. A statute enacted in derogation of the common law must be construed narrowly and any doubt about its meaning should resolved in favor of the effect that makes the least rather than the most change in the common law. Coincident with that interpretative canon is New Jersey s tradition of giving narrow range to statutes granting immunity from tort liability because they leave unredressed injury and loss resulting from wrongful conduct. (pp. 22-23) 7. In its present form, New Jersey s Good Samaritan statute immunizes any Good Samaritan who renders emergency care at the scene of an accident or emergency to the victim, or while transporting the victim to a hospital or other facility where treatment or care is to be rendered. (pp. 23-24) 8. Had the Legislature intended the immunity of the Act to be locationally unlimited as urged by Dr. Ranzini, it simply could have said so, and the Legislature s use of the limiting language, at the scene of an emergency, evidences an intent to limit the immunity provided by the Good Samaritan statute. Thus, the scene of an accident or emergency reasonably should be understood to incorporate only those locations at which the provision of adequate and necessary medical care is compromised by the existing conditions. This narrow interpretation does the least violence to the common law right to institute tort actions against those whose negligence injures them. (pp. 24-28) 9. Good Samaritan immunity under N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-1 encompasses only those situations in which a physician (or other volunteer) comes, by chance, upon a victim who requires immediate emergency medical care, at a location compromised by lack of adequate facilities, equipment, expertise, sanitation and staff. A hospital or medical center does not qualify under the terms of the Good Samaritan Act in its present form. (pp. 29-30) 10. The narrow holding in this case does not affect those common law principles that govern the conduct of professionals in a hospital setting, but rather merely carries out the Legislature s intent to carve out, from the ordinary rules of tort liability, a class of volunteers that ministers to victims suffering through the first critical moments after an unexpected events, such as a roadside accident, in a location at which facilities, staff, equipment, sanitation or expertise are limited. (pp. 30-32) 11. Because Dr. Ranzini rendered aid to Mrs. Velazquez in a fully equipped and staffed hospital to which Mrs. Velazquez had been admitted for the purpose of receiving medical care, the Good Samaritan Act did not immunize her from suit. Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. JUSTICE VERNIERO has filed a separate dissenting opinion in which JUSTICE COLEMAN joins. Justice Verniero believes that under that statute as written, a health-care professional in a hospital who does not otherwise have a duty to act is entitled to the same Good Samaritan protections as any other person. In his view, the proper disposition would have been to remand the matter to the Law Division to evaluate whether any physician agreements, hospital protocols, or regulations require a broad imposition of a duty in these circumstances. Absent such a remand, Justice Verniero would interpret the Good Samaritan Act consistent with what he discerns as the legislative purpose to ensure that as many persons as possible respond to a patient s emergent needs. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, LaVECCHIA, and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE LONG s opinion. JUSTICE VERNIERO has filed a separate dissenting opinion in which JUSTICE COLEMAN joins. CONOR VELAZQUEZ, an infant by his mother and natural guardian, CHARMAINE VELAZQUEZ, CHARMAINE VELAZQUEZ, individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of CONOR VELAZQUEZ, and JOSE VELAZQUEZ, individually and as Administrator of the Estate of CONOR VELAZQUEZ, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. TERESA JIMINEZ, M.D., ST. PETER S MEDICAL CENTER, ELLEN MAAK, R.N., JEANINE HEALY, R.N., and JOHN DOES, M.D., Defendants, and ANGELA C. RANZINI, M.D., Defendant-Appellant. Argued January 2, 2002 Decided May 29, 2002 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 336 N.J. Super. 10 (2000). Donald P. Jacobs argued the cause for appellant (Budd Larner Gross Rosenbaum Greenberg & Sade, attorneys; Cynthia A. Walters, of counsel; Mr. Jacobs and Scott E. Reynolds, on the briefs). James M. Andrews argued the cause for respondents (Blank Rome Comisky & McCauley, attorneys; Mr. Andrews, Michelle F. McGovern and James Llewellyn Matthews, on the brief). The opinion of the Court was delivered by LONG, J. New Jersey s Good Samaritan Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-1, provides: Any individual, including a person licensed to practice any method of treatment of human ailments, disease, pain, injury, deformity, mental or physical condition, or licensed to render services ancillary thereto, or any person who is a volunteer member of a duly incorporated first aid and emergency or volunteer ambulance or rescue squad association, who in good faith renders emergency care at the scene of an accident or emergency to the victim or victims thereof, or while transporting the victim or victims thereof to a hospital or other facility where treatment or care is to be rendered, shall not be liable for any civil damages as a result of any acts or omissions by such person in rendering the emergency care. The issue of first impression presented here is whether that statute can be invoked to immunize a hospital physician who assists a patient at the hospital during a medical emergency. We hold that it cannot. [42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 8331(a) (West 1998) (emphasis added).] To qualify for immunity under Pennsylvania s statute, the Good Samaritan must hold a reasonable opinion that the immediacy of the situation is such that the rendering of care should not be postponed until the patient is hospitalized. Id. 8331(b) (emphasis added). One statute explicitly extends coverage to emergency care given wherever required. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 76, 5(a)(1) (West 2002). Others simply immunize emergency medical or professional assistance to a person in need thereof, Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-557b(a) (West Supp. 2002); emergency care without fee provided in good faith, 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 49/25 (West Supp. 2002); emergency care or assistance in an emergency, Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.500(1) (2001); or aid or assistance necessary or helpful in the circumstances to other persons who have been injured or are ill as the result of an accident or illness, or . . . trauma, N.D. Cent. Code 32-03.1-01 (1996), without mentioning any geographic limitations. See footnote 5 Of the twenty-nine states with general statutes like New Jersey s, five have enacted additional specific immunity provisions applicable to emergency obstetrical care. Those statutes include Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 32-1473 (West Supp. 2001) (applying enhanced clear and convincing burden of proof in malpractice actions against health care facility and physicians providing emergency treatment during labor and delivery who have not previously treated patient); Mont. Code Ann. 27-1-734 (2001) (immunizing hospital, nurse or physician rendering emergency obstetrical care to a patient of a direct-entry midwife in an emergency situation ); Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.505(3) (2001) (immunizing medical facility and physician who has not previously treated patient and who in good faith renders emergency obstetrical care or assistance to a pregnant woman during labor or the delivery of the child where injuries are primarily caused by lack of prenatal care); N.D. Cent. Code 32-03.1-02.1 (1996) (immunizing physician who renders emergency obstetrical care or assistance to a pregnant female in active labor who has not previously been cared for in connection with the pregnancy by the physician ); Va. Code Ann. 8.01-225(A)(2) (Michie 2000) (immunizing any person who renders emergency obstetrical care or assistance to a female in active labor who has not previously been cared for in connection with the pregnancy by such person ). None of those statutes expressly excludes obstetrical care provided within a hospital; in fact, most assume that such care is provided within a medical facility. Finally, some general-language jurisdictions (including New Jersey) provide express immunity for medical care rendered while transporting an injured person from the scene to a hospital. See, e.g., Iowa Code 613.17 (West 1999) ( at the place of an emergency or accident or while the person is in transit to or from the emergency or accident ); N.D. Cent. Code 39-08-04.1 (1997) ( en route [from the scene of an accident, disaster, or other emergency] to a treatment facility ); Va. Code Ann. 8.01-225(A)(1) ( en route therefrom [from the scene of an accident, fire or any life-threatening emergency] to any hospital, medical clinic or doctor s office ); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 4.24.300 (West 1988) ( in transporting, not for compensation, therefrom [from the scene of an emergency] an injured person or persons for emergency medical treatment ). In 1996 and 1998, our Legislature added two new Good Samaritan provisions specifically protecting law enforcement officers and firefighters, respectively. N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-1.1 and -1.2. Each of those sections immunizes good faith emergency care given at the scene of an accident or emergency to any victim thereof, or in transporting any such victim to a hospital or other facility where treatment is to be rendered[.] Ibid. (emphasis added). The few judicial decisions interpreting the category of statutes that neither expressly excludes nor expressly includes in-hospital emergency medical care are in equipoise. On the one hand, cases from Arizona, Indiana and Oklahoma support the proposition that Good Samaritan statutes do not immunize emergency care provided in a hospital to a patient. Guerrero v. Copper Queen Hosp., 537 P.2d 1329, 1331 (Ariz. 1975); Steffey v. King, 614 N.E.2d 615, 617 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993); Jackson v. Mercy Health Ctr., Inc., 864 P.2d 839, 844 (Okla. 1993). On the other, courts in Georgia, Illinois, and Utah have interpreted their state s Good Samaritan statutes as protecting physicians who render emergency medical care in a hospital setting. Clayton v. Kelly, 357 S.E.2d 865, 868 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987); Johnson v. Matviuw, 531 N.E.2d 970, 972, 975-76 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988), appeal denied, 537 N.E.2d 810 (Ill. 1989); Hirpa v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 948 P.2d 785, 788 (Utah 1997). The difference in outcome between the cases is based, in great measure, on whether the statutes were broadly or narrowly interpreted. In any event, it would be fair to say that there is no universal interpretation of general statutory language among our sister jurisdictions, no roadmap to follow. Thus, to the extent that the parties in this case rely on the weight of out-of-state authority in support of their positions, they have vastly overstated the case. [Ibid. (quoting 3 Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction 61.01, at 77 (4th ed. 1986) (footnote omitted) (quoting Shaw v. Railroad Co., 101 U.S. 557, 565, 25 L. Ed. 892, 894 (1880))).] Coincident with that interpretive canon is our tradition of giving narrow range to statutes granting immunity from tort liability because they leave unredressed injury and loss resulting from wrongful conduct. Harrison v. Middlesex Water Co., 80 N.J. 391, 401 (1979) (construing strictly landowner s immunity statute). See also Renz v. Penn Cent. Corp., 87 N.J. 437, 457-58 (1981) (holding that railroad immunity act should be strictly construed); Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 487-88 (1970) (construing strictly marital immunity statute); cf. Hallacker v. National Bank & Trust Co., 806 F.2d 488, 490-93 (3d Cir. 1986) (construing strictly New Jersey Landowner s Liability Act). With those general principles in mind, we look now to our Good Samaritan statute, enacted in 1963, following California s lead. Originally, the statute included only health care practitioners; it was amended in 1968 to extend immunity to any individual, including a person licensed to practice any method of treatment of human ailments, disease, pain, injury, deformity, mental or physical condition, or licensed to render services ancillary thereto, who in good faith renders emergency care at the scene of an accident or emergency to the victim or victims thereof . . . . [N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-1.] Thus, in derogation of the basic common law principle that one who volunteers to render assistance must do so reasonably, anyone who rendered care at the scene of an accident or emergency was immunized from civil liability. Although the statute in its original form was silent regarding whether the scene of an accident or emergency is limited in any way, it was most recently amended to clarify that volunteer members of a first aid or ambulance squad are granted the same immunity as all other individuals. Assembly Law, Public Safety, Defense & Corrections Committee Statement accompanying Bill No. 2467--L. 1987, c. 296 (emphasis added). In its present form, the statute immunizes any Good Samaritan who renders emergency care at the scene of an accident or emergency to the victim or victims thereof, or while transporting the victim or victims thereof to a hospital or other facility where treatment or care is to be rendered. N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-1. The Appellate Division read that new language as revelatory of a legislative understanding that the scene of an accident or emergency is somewhere other than a hospital or treatment facility, which is staffed and equipped to render medical care. Velazquez, supra, 336 N.J. Super. at 48. That is certainly one fair interpretation of the statute, which scholars have approved. By distinguishing between these two types of places, the legislature operationally defined scene of an emergency as a place other than a hospital . . . . Roger L. Tuttle, Hospital Emergency Rooms--Application of Good Samaritan Laws, 31 Med. Trial Tech. Q. 145, 157 (Fred Lane ed., 1985) (discussing Miss. Code Ann. 73-25-37). More fundamental to us is the notion that if the Legislature had intended the locationally unlimited immunity urged by Dr. Ranzini, it simply could have said so. See, e.g., Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 76, 5(a)(1) (immunizing medical practitioner who voluntarily and without compensation, renders or attempts to render emergency care to an injured person or any person who is in need of immediate medical aid, wherever required ) (emphasis added). There would have been no reason for it to include, at the Act s inception, the limiting language at the scene of an accident or emergency. There likewise would have been no subsequent need to extend immunity explicitly to persons rendering emergency care while transporting a victim to a medical facility. All of those circumstances would have been encompassed by a statute that immunized anyone rendering emergency medical care. The Legislature apparently intended a circumscription of Good Samaritan immunity as evidenced by the limiting language it chose. That narrowly tailored interpretation does the least violence to our citizens common-law right to institute tort actions against those whose negligence injures them. It thus conforms to our rules regarding the interpretation of statutes in derogation of the common law and statutes granting immunity. Moreover, it gives full throat to the goals underlying the legislation: to encourage the rendering of medical care to those who would not otherwise receive it, by physicians who come upon such patients by chance, without the benefit of the expertise, assistance, equipment or sanitation that is available in a hospital or medical setting. Colby v. Schwartz, supra, 78 Cal. App. 3d at 892, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 628; Reuter, supra, 20 J. Legal Med. at 189; Groninger, supra, 26 Pepp. L. Rev. at 364; Burke, supra, 1 Annals Health L. at 140; Dyke, supra, 15 How. L.J. at 676; Note, supra, 64 Colum. L. Rev. at 1307. Obviously, in enacting our Good Samaritan law, the Legislature was aware that a hospital patient is present in that venue for the very purpose of receiving medical care and is not a person who ordinarily would lack care in the absence of Good Samaritan immunity. Further, physicians in a hospital ordinarily do not come upon a hospital patient by chance as would be the case if an accident or emergency occurred on a roadway. Most importantly, our Legislature knew that the fundamental problem facing a Good Samaritan on the street (the ability to do little more than render first aid under less than optimal circumstances) is not present in a fully staffed and equipped facility like a hospital, whose very purpose is to make available[] the human skill and physical materiel of medical science to the end that the patient s health be restored. Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 123 N.E.2d 792, 794 (N.Y. 1954). As Stewart R. Reuter has observed in Physicians as Good Samaritans, 20 J. Legal Med. 157, 189 (1999): [P]hysicians who care for patients in hospitals are not volunteers in the sense of the person who by chance comes upon the scene of an accident. Moreover, physicians who provide emergency care in hospitals have at their disposal all the modern diagnostic and therapeutic equipment. Granted, they may not be familiar with the patient's medical history or disease and are at somewhat of a disadvantage when compared with the patient's personal physician. However, this disadvantage does not rise to the level of the difficulty that confronts the physician who stops at the site of a roadside accident, who can provide little more than first-aid until the EMS team arrives. In many cases, the physician or surgeon whose expertise is being requested in a hospital emergency will work with a physician or with hospital personnel who have excellent knowledge of the patient's condition and problems. Even if no other physician is already involved in the emergency, the duration of care provided generally is short--until the hospital's trained Code Blue team arrives. See also Theodore Flowers & William J. Kennedy, Note, Good Samaritan Legislation: An Analysis and a Proposal, 38 Temp. L. Q. 418, 425 (1965) (suggesting that Good Samaritan immunity be limited to places other than hospital or physician s office to confine protection to those situations where it is needed most; where neither proper equipment nor adequate facilities are available ). In other words, the scene of an accident or emergency reasonably should be understood to incorporate only those locations at which the provision of adequate and necessary medical care is compromised by the existing conditions. Dr. Ranzini s suggestion that she qualifies as a Good Samaritan because she had no prior duty to Mrs. Velazquez misconceives the Good Samaritan Act entirely. Although the absence of a pre-existing duty is one element that volunteers must establish to qualify for Good Samaritan immunity, Praet v. Borough of Sayreville, 218 N.J. Super. 218, 223 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 108 N.J. 681 (1987), standing alone it does not satisfy the statute. It is the reduced circumstances in which the volunteer finds himself or herself that the Legislature recognized, and it is the rendering of care in the face of those restrictions that it desired to immunize from suit. Had the Legislature intended to insulate anyone rendering emergency care under any circumstances where no pre-existing duty to render aid exists, it could have done so simply and directly. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-557b(a) (West Supp. 2002) (immunizing medical practitioner who, voluntarily and gratuitously and other than in the ordinary course of such person s employment or practice, renders emergency medical or professional assistance to a person in need thereof ); Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.500(1) (2001) (immunizing any person in this state who renders emergency care or assistance in an emergency, gratuitously and in good faith ). We think it is important as well that five out of the seven state statutes that now expressly immunize emergency care in a hospital setting contained, at their inception, general language like ours. Supra at __ n.3 (Slip op. at 14, n.3). Likewise, the legislatures in states that have immunized obstetrical care rendered in a hospital have done so with a specific enactment, altering or supplementing a general statute like our own. Supra at __-__ (Slip op. at 17-18). Presumably, the legislatures of those states recognized that in-hospital emergency care is not within the contemplation of a general language Good Samaritan act. Karen H. Rothenberg, Who Cares?: The Evolution of the Legal Duty to Provide Emergency Care, 26 Hous. L. Rev. 21, 72 (1989) (noting that Virginia emergency obstetrical care provision, adopted after general statute, was enacted in response to obstetricians threats to boycott on-call emergency room services). Dr. Ranzini s contention that by not extending Good Samaritan immunity to a hospital we will encourage physicians to simply stand by and allow patients to suffer or die is equally unpersuasive. First, we will not impute such conduct to the highly respected medical profession. Moreover, we note that scholars suggest that physicians contracts, hospital protocols, ethical rules, regulatory standards and physicians personal relationships operate to make that potential extremely unrealistic relative to a hospital patient. Reuter, supra, 20 J. Leg. Med. at 187, 189. To be sure, the Legislature is free to immunize all persons who render emergency medical treatment without a prior duty to do so, including those who volunteer to act within the walls of a hospital. We tilt neither against nor in favor of such an extension of immunity. We simply are persuaded that the choice is one for the Legislature, and we are unconvinced that the current statute reflects a legislative choice in favor of such immunity. In sum, Good Samaritan immunity under N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-1 encompasses only those situations in which a physician (or other volunteer) comes, by chance, upon a victim who requires immediate emergency medical care, at a location compromised by lack of adequate facilities, equipment, expertise, sanitation and staff. A hospital or medical center does not qualify under the terms of the Good Samaritan Act in its present form. CONOR VELAZQUEZ, an infant by his mother and natural guardian, CHARMAINE VELAZQUEZ, CHARMAINE VELAZQUEZ, individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of CONOR VELAZQUEZ, and JOSE VELAZQUEZ, individually and as Administrator of the Estate of CONOR VELAZQUEZ, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. TERESA JIMINEZ, M.D., ST. PETERS S MEDICAL CENTER, ELLEN MAAK, R.N., JEANINE HEALY, R.N., and JOHN DOES, M.D., Defendants, and ANGELA C. RANZINI, M.D., Defendant-Appellant. VERNIERO, J., dissenting. The Court concludes that the Good Samaritan Act cannot be invoked to immunize a physician who responds in a hospital setting to an emergent call by another physician to assist the latter physician s patient in crisis. Unlike the majority, I believe that under the statute as written a health-care professional in a hospital who does not otherwise have a duty to act is entitled to the same Good Samaritan protections as any other person. In my view, the proper disposition is to remand this matter to the Law Division to evaluate whether any physician agreements, hospital protocols, or regulations require a broad imposition of a duty in these circumstances. I accept the majority s impressive historical analysis of Good Samaritan legislation throughout the country. For me, however, that history does not demonstrate convincingly that our Legislature intended the Act to stop at the hospital door. In that respect, I find only two limitations on the reach of the Act, namely, that the aid giving rise to liability must be rendered at the scene of an accident or emergency or while transporting the victim . . . to a hospital or other facility[.] N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-1. I would not impose an additional restriction when the Legislature itself has declined to do so. See Higgins v. Pascack Valley Hosp., 158 N.J. 404, 419 (1999) (urging courts not to imply certain terms to statute when excluded by Legislature). I do not agree with the majority s conclusion that the Act s hospital or other facility language is intended to exclude from the Act s protections any Good Samaritan who has rendered emergency care in that setting. Ante at ___ (Slip. op. at 24). The 1987 language regarding the transport of victims from an accident scene to a hospital or other facility[,] L. 1987, c. 296, was enacted specifically to ensure that the Act protected members of volunteer first aid, rescue and ambulance squads. Assembly Law, Public Safety, Defense and Corrections Committee, Statement [to] Assembly [Bill] No. 2467, reprinted in N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-1. The Legislature s purpose was merely to describe in sufficient detail the category of non-physicians who may be called on to render emergency aid while transporting a victim to a different location. I might agree with the Court s ultimate disposition following a remand. Absent a remand, however, I would interpret the Act consistent with what I discern as its underlying purpose, namely, to ensure that as many persons as possible respond to a patient s emergent needs. Stated differently, I would not dismiss the possibility that the Legislature would rather have the hospital physician or registered nurse in a remote location respond unhesitatingly to an emergency elsewhere on the premises, than have those same professionals be slow to act, or not act at all, out of fear of litigation. I do not advocate the wholesale immunization of physicians and other professionals in hospitals. Rather, I would continue to tether the Good Samaritan statute to its original moorings, meaning I would apply its protections unless the person who administered the emergency aid had a pre-existing duty to act. See Praet v. Borough of Sayreville, 218 N.J. Super. 218, 224 (App. Div.) (observing that threshold question in determining the applicability of the Good Samaritan Act is whether the person claiming its immunity had a preexisting duty ), certif. denied, 108 N.J. 681 (1987). After a remand, we might well conclude that Dr. Ranzini had such a duty and that she, and indeed most of her medical colleagues, would fall outside the purview of the Act. I am unwilling to reach that conclusion as a matter of law. Nor would I restrict the Act to all emergent situations except those found in a hospital unless the statute explicitly contained that restriction, which it does not. I respectfully dissent. Justice Coleman joins in this opinion. NO. A-105 SEPTEMBER TERM 2000 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court CONOR VELAZQUEZ, etc., et al., Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. TERESA JIMINEZ, M.D., et al., Defendants And ANGELA C. RANZINI, M.D., Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED May 29, 2002 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Long CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Verniero