Title: TWP OF BINGHAM V RLTD RAILROAD CORPORATION

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED APRIL 18, 2001  
THE TOWNSHIP OF BINGHAM,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v  
No. 115602  
RLTD RAILROAD CORPORATION and  
LEELANAU TRAILS ASSOCIATION, 
INC.,  
Defendants-Appellees.  
PER CURIAM  
This is a dispute between a township and proponents of a  
“rails 
to 
trails” 
recreational pathway that passes through the  
township.
 The Court of Appeals has twice found that the  
township’s zoning ordinance is preempted by laws that govern  
such pathways.  We reverse the judgment of the Court of  
Appeals and remand this case to circuit court for further  
proceedings.  
I  
This case concerns a former rail line that, roughly  
speaking, extends from Traverse City to Suttons Bay.  The  
right of way in Leelanau County is about one hundred feet wide  
and about fifteen miles long.1  Until the late 1970s, the  
Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad provided freight service along  
this corridor.2  
“Abandonment” of a rail line is a term that has a  
specific meaning under federal and state transportation law.3  
In common parlance, however, one may say that this rail line  
has been abandoned since the early 1990s, when a tourist  
railroad ceased operation.4  
At the time this litigation arose, the owner of the  
corridor was RLTD Railroad Corporation, which was in the  
process of selling the property (on land contract) to the  
Leelanau Trails Association, Inc.  The association’s intent  
was to construct and maintain a “rails to trails” recreational  
pathway for hikers, runners, bicyclists, and others.  
From the materials at hand, it appears that the sale has  
been completed.  The record is less clear regarding the  
present status of the pathway, but we gather that it has been  
1 At oral argument, counsel for the township explained 
that the pathway is slated to be joined with a similar tract 
in Grand Traverse County, creating a renamed trail of greater 
length.  
2 We are told that passenger service ended in 1948.  
3 See RLTD R Corp v Surface Transportation Bd, 166 F3d 
808, 810-811 (CA 6, 1999).  
4 For several years in the early 1990s, the tourist line 
carried sightseers back and forth.  
2  
 
at least partially open to the public for several years.  
The project had opponents. 
Some lived in Bingham  
Township, through which the rail line passed.  Backers of the  
project apparently had indicated that as many as sixty or  
seventy thousand persons might use the pathway each year, and  
opponents were concerned about the potential effect of such  
traffic.  
In September 1995, RLTD filed a petition with the Surface  
Transportation Board,5 seeking to formally abandon this  
stretch of track.  The association filed on the same day a  
statement of its willingness to assume control of the line.6  
However, the eventual result of those proceedings was a  
determination that the federal board lacked jurisdiction.  
RLTD R Corp v Surface Transportation Bd, 166 F3d 808 (CA 6,  
1999).  
While the federal matter was under way, Bingham Township  
filed a February 1996 complaint against RLTD and the  
association.  The township alleged a dispute regarding the  
extent of its zoning authority over the project, and asked for  
a declaration of rights and a preliminary injunction against  
the project.  
Jointly represented, the defendants moved for summary  
5 
 Actually, the petition was filed with the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, which no longer exists. The matter was  
transferred to the Surface Transportation Board.  See RLTD, 
n 3 supra at 810 and 811, n 2.  
6 
 
In 
February 
1995, 
the 
Michigan 
Department of  
Transportation and the Michigan Department of Natural  
Resources had declined to purchase the former rail corridor.  
3  
 
disposition.  MCR 2.116(C)(8), (10). 
In their motion, the  
defendants stated that the township’s zoning ordinance is  
preempted by federal law. The defendants’ supporting brief  
also mentions state law, but the focus of the brief is  
likewise on federal law.  
The circuit court denied the request for preliminary  
injunction and granted the defendants’ motion for summary  
disposition.7
 The court found that the township’s zoning  
ordinance was preempted, though the court noted “certain  
important caveats”-
--matters pertaining to public health and  
safety are subject to the authority of local government.  
In its ruling, the circuit court noted the Michigan  
trailways act, which is Part 721 of the Natural Resources and  
Environmental Protection Act.8  MCL 324.72101 et seq.; MSA  
13A.72101 et seq. However, the court’s opinion reflected the  
assumption 
that 
the 
proceedings 
before 
the 
Surface  
Transportation Board would lead to federal oversight of the  
project.  
Several days later, the township filed a motion to  
clarify.
 In response, the circuit court entered a final  
judgment declaring that “the Defendants’ proposed trail  
construction and operation is not subject to Plaintiff’s  
7 
 The court discussed the differing standards for 
granting motions under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10), but did 
not explicitly state the paragraph under which the motion was 
being granted.  
8 MCL 324.101 et seq.; MSA 13A.101 et seq.  
4  
 
zoning code or master plan . . . .”9  
After the township filed its claim of appeal in the Court  
of Appeals, the Surface Transportation Board ruled that it was  
without jurisdiction.  This decision was later upheld on  
appeal. RLTD, supra.10  
In February 1998, the Court of Appeals affirmed the  
judgment of the circuit court.  228 Mich App 154, 155; 576  
NW2d 731 (1998).  The Court of Appeals explained its decision  
by noting the Legislature’s strong interest in this sort of  
recreational project:  
The Legislature has repeatedly exercised its 
authority over the development of rail-trails.  For  
example, in the State Transportation Preservation 
Act of 1976, the Legislature expressly stated that 
“[t]he preservation of abandoned railroad rights of 
way for future rail use and their interim use as 
public trails is declared to be a public purpose.” 
MCL 474.51(3); MSA 22.180(21)(3). The Legislature 
later adopted the Michigan trailways act, MCL 
324.72102; MSA 13A.72102, in which it again stated 
that the acquisition, development, and maintenance 
of Michigan trailways is in the best interest of 
the state and is declared to be a public purpose.3  
Recently, the Legislature passed an appropriations 
bill for the Michigan Department of Transportation 
identifying certain rail lines, including the one 
at issue here, as “essential corridors” to the 
state’s transportation infrastructure.  1995 PA  
9 Consistent with its earlier ruling, the court added 
that “the Defendants’ proposed trail is subject to other 
reasonable 
regulation in the interest of public health, safety 
and welfare.”  
10 Perhaps believing that the federal decision undercut 
the basis of circuit court’s ruling, the township amended its 
zoning ordinance in early 1997.  RLTD and the association say 
in this Court that setback requirements and other features of 
the amended ordinance would have the effect of destroying the 
corridor by carving it into small segments.  The township says 
that its ordinance has been amended again, and would create no 
such problem.  
5  
 
 
 
___________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________ 
133, § 708.  
In light of the state’s repeated expression of 
intent to establish and maintain such trailways, we 
find that giving local authorities the power to 
impose their individual zoning schemes over these 
interjurisdictional transportation corridors would 
frustrate the Legislature’s intent to preserve 
essential rail corridors and to allow for rail­
trail transformations. Indeed, if every governing 
body along a transportation corridor had the right 
to exercise its individual zoning authority on the 
rail-trail, construction and maintenance of such 
transportation 
corridors 
would 
be 
virtually 
impossible.  In this conflict between state law and  
plaintiff’s 
effort 
to 
zone 
the 
property 
in  
question, 
we 
hold 
that 
plaintiff’s 
zoning 
ordinances are preempted. [228 Mich App 158-159.]  
3 MCL 324.72102; MSA 13A.72102 provides:  
The legislature finds and declares that a 
statewide system of trailways will provide for 
public enjoyment, health, and fitness;  encourage 
constructive leisure-time activities;  protect open 
space, cultural and historical resources, and  
habitat for wildlife and plants; enhance the local  
and state economies; link communities, parks, and 
natural resources;  create opportunities for rural­
urban exchange, agricultural education, and the 
marketing of farm products;  and preserve corridors 
for possible future use for other public purposes. 
Therefore, the planning, acquisition, development, 
operation, and maintenance of Michigan trailways is 
in the best interest of the state and is declared  
to be a public purpose.  
In a footnote, the Court of Appeals agreed with Judge Rodgers  
that the township does retain some authority with regard to  
issues of health and safety.11  
11  
We 
agree 
with 
the 
circuit 
court 
that  
defendants and users of the trailway are subject to 
reasonable local regulation which is in the  
interest of public health, safety, and welfare. 
See MCL 324.72103(1)(b); MSA 13A.72103(1)(b) (To 
qualify as a Michigan trailway, “[t]he design and  
6  
 
 
 
 
When the township applied to this Court for leave to  
appeal, we remanded the case to the Court of Appeals “to  
determine whether and how the regulatory provisions of the  
Michigan trailways act, MCL 324.72101 et seq.; MSA 13A.72101  
et seq., . . . apply to the land corridor in question.”12  460  
Mich 868 (1999).  
On remand, the Court of Appeals again affirmed.  237 Mich  
App 538; 603 NW2d 795 (1999).  It found that the Michigan  
trailways act does apply.  237 Mich App 543-546.  From there,  
the Court explained that the trailways act preempts local  
zoning control of a “Michigan trailway.”  237 Mich App 546­
552. In that fashion, the Court reached this conclusion:  
The MTA anticipates a process in which a 
trailway becomes a designated “Michigan trailway.”  
maintenance of the trailway and its related  
facilities [must] meet generally accepted standards 
of public safety”).  These regulations may, for 
example, provide for the enforcement of criminal 
and civil laws, construction and maintenance of 
fencing, and limitation of noise. We further note  
that 
the 
Michigan 
Trailways 
Act 
repeatedly 
emphasizes the Legislature’s desire that the public 
purpose in a statewide system of trailways be  
balanced 
with 
the 
interests 
of 
surrounding 
landowners 
and 
residents. 
See, 
e.g., 
MCL  
324.72103(1)(j); 
MSA 
13A.72103(1)(j), 
MCL  
324.72103(3); MSA 13A.72103(3). 
We strongly 
encourage the parties to work together to meet 
these common goals. [228 Mich App 159, n 4.]  
12 Our order also directed the Court of Appeals “to 
determine whether and how the regulatory provisions of the 
. . . State Transportation Preservation Act, MCL 474.51 et  
seq.; MSA 22.180(21) et seq., apply to the land corridor in 
question.”  On remand, the Court of Appeals found that the 
STPA did not apply because the land is not owned by the 
Department of Transportation.  237 Mich App 542-543. Neither  
side 
has 
appealed 
that determination, and so the applicability 
of this act is no longer at issue.  
7  
 
  
  
During this process, local zoning cannot be  
permitted to frustrate the Legislature’s clearly 
expressed intent to encourage the development of 
such interjurisdictional trailways.  Accordingly, 
we conclude, as we did in our original opinion, 
that “[i]n this conflict between state law and 
plaintiff’s effort to zone the property in question 
. . . plaintiff’s zoning ordinances are preempted.” 
Bingham Twp, supra [228 Mich App] 159. [237 Mich 
App 552-553.]  
For a second time, the township applied to this Court,  
and we granted leave to appeal.  462 Mich 902 (2000). In our  
order, we invited briefing on “the issue of whether and how  
the Michigan trailways act, MCL 324.72101 et seq.; MSA  
13A.72101 et seq., or local zoning ordinances apply to  
abandoned railroad corridors.”  
II  
As indicated, the circuit court did not state whether it  
granted the defendants’ motion for summary disposition under  
MCR 2.116(C)(8) or (10).  However, “summary disposition under  
either MCR 2.116(C)(8) or (10) will always present an issue of  
law for our determination . . . .” and thus “[w]e review a  
trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition de  
novo.” 
Straus v Governor, 459 Mich 526, 533; 592 NW2d 53  
(1999).  
This case also presents a question of statutory  
interpretation, which we likewise decide de novo. 
Kent Co  
Deputy Sheriffs Ass’n v Kent Co Sheriff, 463 Mich 353, 357,  
n 8; 617 NW2d 533 (2000); Howell Twp v Rooto Corp, 463 Mich  
347, 352, n 10; 617 NW2d 533 (2000).  
8  
 
 
III  
As stated above, the holding of the Court of Appeals that  
the township’s zoning authority is preempted is grounded in  
its determination that the Michigan trailways act applies to  
the disputed trail.  
In turn, that determination was reached after reference  
to the statutory definitions of a “trailway”:  
“Trailway” means a land corridor that features 
a broad trail capable of accommodating a variety of 
public recreation uses.  [MCL 324.72101(f); MSA 
13A.72101(f).]  
and “Michigan trailway”:  
“Michigan 
trailway” 
means 
a 
trailway 
designated by the commission[13] pursuant to section 
72103. [MCL 324.72101(e); MSA 13A.72101(e).]  
The 
Legislature 
has, 
in 
this 
definition, 
clearly 
provided  
that a Michigan trailway is a trailway designated by the  
Commission of Natural Resources under MCL 324.72103; MSA  
13A.72103.  That provision outlines both a process that  
includes a public hearing14 and a wide variety of substantive  
requirements for a proposed trailway.15  237 Mich App 543-545.  
13 “[T]he commission” is the Commission of Natural 
Resources. MCL 324.301(a); MSA 13A.301(a).  
14 MCL 324.72103(2); MSA 13A.72103(2).  
15  
Upon petition by any person or on its own 
motion, the commission may designate a trailway in 
this state as a “Michigan trailway.” The petition 
or motion shall propose permitted uses of the 
trailway.  The commission shall not designate a 
trailway as a Michigan trailway unless it meets, or 
will meet when completed, all of the following  
requirements:  
9  
(a) The land on which the trailway is located 
is owned by the state or a governmental agency, or 
otherwise is under the long-term control of the 
state or a governmental agency through a lease, 
easement, or other arrangement.  If the land is  
owned by a governmental agency, the commission 
shall obtain the consent of the governmental agency 
before designating the land as part of a Michigan 
trailway.  
(b) The design and maintenance of the trailway 
and its related facilities meet generally accepted 
standards of public safety.  
(c) The trailway meets appropriate standards 
for its designated recreation uses.  
(d) The trailway is available for designated 
recreation uses on a nondiscriminatory basis.  
(e) The trailway is a multiuse trail suitable  
for 
use 
by 
pedestrians, 
by 
people 
with  
disabilities, and by other users, as appropriate.  
(f) The trailway is, or has potential to be, a 
segment of a statewide network of trailways, or it 
attracts a substantial share of its users from  
beyond the local area.  
(g) The trailway is marked with an official 
Michigan trailway sign and logo at major access 
points.  
(h) The trailway is not directly attached to a 
roadway, except at roadway crossings.  
(i) Where feasible, the trailway offers  
adequate 
support 
facilities 
for 
the 
public, 
including 
parking, 
sanitary 
facilities, 
and  
emergency telephones, that are accessible to people 
with disabilities and are at reasonable frequency 
along the trailway.  
(j) Potential negative impacts of trailway 
development on owners or residents of adjacent 
property 
are 
minimized 
through 
all 
of 
the  
following:  
(i) Adequate enforcement of trailway rules and 
regulations.  
10  
 
 
 
As counsel for RLTD and the association conceded at oral  
argument, the former rail line has never been designated a  
“Michigan trailway.” Indeed, no such petition has ever been  
filed.16  
Notwithstanding the lack of designation, the Court of  
Appeals found the statute applicable on the ground that the  
statutory 
language 
reveals 
that 
“the 
Legislature has  
contemplated an ongoing process by which trailways are  
developed and eventually obtain ‘Michigan trailway’ status.”  
237 Mich App 545.  The Court noted that the Legislature  
permitted a “Michigan trailway” designation to be applied if  
the trailway “meets or will meet when completed” the 
requirements set forth in MCL 324.72103(1)(a)-(k); MSA 
13A.72103(1)(a)-(k). 
The Court of Appeals is correct that the Legislature has  
anticipated that the requirements for designation as a  
(ii) Continuation of access for trailway 
crossings for agricultural and other purposes.  
(iii) Construction and maintenance of fencing, 
where necessary, by the owner or operator of the 
trailway.  
(iv) Other means as considered appropriate by 
the commission.  
(k) Other conditions by the commission. [MCL 
324.72103(1); MSA 13A.72103(1).]  
16 Counsel explained, from his clients’ perspective, the  
reasons for not filing. 
They related to perceived 
difficulties in gaining the support of other townships for the 
formation of a “Michigan trailway management council,” MCL 
324.72106; MSA 13A.72106, and the prospects for achieving 
governmental control of the pathway, as required by MCL 
324.72103(1)(a); MSA 13A.72103(1)(a).  
11  
“Michigan trailway” might not be met all at once, and that  
they need not have been met at time of the petition or even at  
the time of designation. 
However, that sort of flexible  
approach-
--a legislative recognition that fulfillment of the  
requirements can be a long process-
--does not mean that the  
Legislature made the statute applicable to pathways that lack  
the designation. 
Indeed, the legislation anticipates the  
opposite.
 By permitting designation before the statutory  
requirements are met and before the trailway is completed, the  
Legislature removed any need to offer special protection to  
undesignated trailways.  
The Court of Appeals said that, though the corridor had  
not yet received the “Michigan trailway” designation, “it is  
making progress toward this goal, and thus it is appropriate  
to apply the regulatory provisions contained in the [statute]  
to the trailway.” 237 Mich App 546. That is not what the  
legislation provides. The Legislature has made the “Michigan  
trailway” designation broadly available-
--even to incomplete  
trailways that will later meet statutory requirements-
--and we  
find in the language of the statute no basis for applying the  
statute to a trailway that has not received the designation.17  
17 
In 
summary, 
the association has neither applied for nor 
achieved trailway designation; no government entity has yet 
accepted or indicated a willingness to accept the property 
proposed for the trailway, a precondition upon which  
designation depends; there is no apparent support among the 
relevant jurisdictions for the formation of the necessary 
“trailway management council”; 
there have been no public 
hearings to determine the extent to which the proposed 
trailway can satisfy such statutory requirements as those 
relating to public safety, designated recreation uses, and  
12  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Because the statute is not applicable, there is no need  
to determine whether it preempts the zoning authority of the  
township.  Neither must we address alternative theories  
advanced by the parties and the amici curiae in support of  
their respective views of local zoning authority over this  
former rail corridor.  
For these reasons, we reverse the judgments of the Court  
of Appeals and the circuit court, and we remand this case to  
the 
circuit 
court 
for further proceedings consistent with this  
opinion. MCR 7.302(F)(1).  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, WEAVER, 
KELLY, TAYLOR, 
YOUNG, 
and  
MARKMAN, JJ., concurred.  
adequate support facilities; there have been no public 
hearings to determine how the proposed trailway can best 
minimize 
any 
adverse 
impact upon adjoining property owners and 
agriculture; and the Commission of Natural Resources has had 
no opportunity to determine whether there are any “other 
conditions” that ought to be satisfied in the course of 
designating the trailway.  
13