Title: State ex rel. Nese v. State Teachers Ret. Bd. of Ohio

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Nese v. State Teachers Retirement Bd. of Ohio, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-1777.] 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-1777 
THE STATE EX REL. NESE ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. STATE TEACHERS 
RETIREMENT BOARD OF OHIO, APPELLEE; JEFFERSON COUNTY EDUCATIONAL 
SERVICE CENTER GOVERNING BOARD, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Nese v. State Teachers Retirement Bd. of Ohio,  
Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-1777.] 
State Teachers Retirement System—Eligibility for membership—Virtual learning 
academy—R.C. 3307.01(B)—“Teacher,” defined—Instructors providing 
services to students of virtual learning academy are not ”employed in the 
public schools” but rather are independent contractors—Membership in 
retirement system not available to instructors who have no ongoing 
contract with county, set their own hours, do not receive benefits, do not 
use county facilities, and are paid on a per-pupil or per-course basis. 
(No. 2012-0251—Submitted January 9, 2013—Decided May 2, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
No. 09AP-1161, 2011-Ohio-6764. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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O’CONNOR, C.J. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment denying the request of relators-
appellants John Nese, Donald Williams, and Catherine Miles (“the instructors”) 
for writs of mandamus to compel respondent-appellee State Teachers Retirement 
Board of Ohio (“STRS”) to accept employer and employee contributions to its 
retirement fund and to compel respondent-appellee Jefferson County Educational 
Service Center Governing Board (“Jefferson County ESC”) to make employer 
contributions to the retirement system on their behalf. 
{¶ 2} The salient question in this appeal is not whether the instructors 
were “teachers” as that term is commonly understood.1  Rather, the question 
before us is whether the STRS had some evidence to support its conclusion that 
the instructors were independent contractors, and not employees, of the Jefferson 
County ESC and therefore were not “teachers” within the meaning of R.C. 
3307.01(B)(5). 
{¶ 3} Because the instructors fail to establish that the STRS abused its 
discretion in determining that they were not “teachers” within the meaning of the 
R.C. 3307.01(B)(5),  we must affirm the decision of the court of appeals, which 
similarly held that the instructors had not established that the STRS abused its 
discretion. 
RELEVANT BACKGROUND 
{¶ 4} An “education service center” (“ESC”) is a statutory creation.  As 
part of an educational regional service system, its purpose is to provide support to 
state and local educational initiatives and to improve school effectiveness and 
student achievement.  R.C. 3312.01(A).  An ESC provides services to school 
districts and community schools by contract and by statute.  R.C. 3312.01(A) and 
                                          
 
1 Nese and Williams are teachers in local school districts hired by Jefferson County to provide 
instruction to students in the Virtual Learning Academy (“VLA”).   Miles is a retired teacher hired 
by Jefferson County to provide instruction to the students in the VLA.   
January Term, 2013 
 
3
(C); Hastings, Manoloff, Sharb, Sheeran & Jaffe, Baldwin’s Ohio School Law, 
Section 4.5, 44-45 (2011-2012 Ed.). 
{¶ 5} Jefferson County ESC works with administrators, teachers, and 
students in seven local school districts.  In 2001, school superintendents in some 
of those schools were concerned over the depletion of resources in their districts 
caused by the loss of students recruited to “community schools,” also known as 
“charter schools,” which were authorized by the General Assembly’s enactment 
of R.C. Chapter 3314 in 1997.  147 Ohio Laws, Part I, 909, 1187.  See State ex 
rel. Ohio Congress of Parents & Teachers v. State Bd of Edn., 111 Ohio St.3d 
568, 2006-Ohio-5512, 857 N.E.3d 1148, ¶ 1, 6.  The superintendents believed that 
it was necessary to research “online curriculum options” that could be used to 
compete with charter schools, and Jefferson County ESC began looking at a 
“virtual learning academy” that was being used by another district. 
{¶ 6} A “virtual learning academy” or “VLA” is an “internet-based 
educational delivery system designed for K-12, providing alternative educational 
options for credit deficiencies, alternative programs, home schooling, home bound 
instruction, and 2002 summer school programs.”  A VLA is not a school; it is an 
“educational option,” like “distance learning,” which involves “systematic 
instruction in which the instructor and/or student participate by mail or electronic 
media.” Ohio Adm.Code 3301-35-01(B)(10)(a) (including “distance learning” as 
an “educational option”). 
{¶ 7} After researching the market, Jefferson County ESC determined 
that the best on-line curriculum was available through a California vendor, 
Learning Springs.  Jefferson County ESC passed a resolution to partner with 
Learning Springs and then marketed its own VLA to local school districts and, 
eventually, districts around the state.  But as the program proved more successful 
in enrolling students, concerns arose over the curriculum’s failure to fully align 
with Ohio’s state academic-content standards.  In 2003, Jefferson County ESC 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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hired teachers to rewrite the curriculum so that it would fully align with state 
standards. 
{¶ 8} Although we are not aware of any reported case in the state or 
federal courts that addresses the specific question with which we are confronted, 
we are aware that “cyber schools” and curriculum options like the VLA are 
increasing in America.  A number of states include virtual learning as a form of 
public education.  See generally Browning, Will Residency be Relevant to Public 
Education in the Twenty-First Century?, 8 Pierce L.Rev. 297, 338-339 (2010).  
Indeed, cyber schools are an increasingly popular, and rapidly growing, addition 
to the education community.  There were only 60 “virtual” or “cyber” charter 
schools in America in 2003, but by 2009, more than 100,000 students were 
enrolled in 195 virtual schools in 26 states.  Brady, Umpstead & Eckles, 
Unchartered Territory:  The Current Legal Landscape of Public Cyber Charter 
Schools, 2010 B.Y.U.Educ. & L.Rev. 191. 
{¶ 9} Ohio is at the forefront of this development.  “In 2003, Ohio had 
only six cyber charter schools.  Since 2003, Ohio has officially granted charters 
for the opening of thirty-nine additional cyber charter schools.”  Id. at 196, fn. 19.  
As of April 2008, the VLA served 22,000 students in 180 school districts in 
Ohio.2 
{¶ 10} The instructors in this case were hired to instruct students in the 
VLA.  Each instructor can serve hundreds of students in a given year. 
{¶ 11} If a school district decides to use the VLA as part of its own 
curriculum, that district decides whether to use its own faculty or the VLA staff.  
If the school district decides to use VLA staff, Jefferson County “matches” the 
                                          
 
2 Notably, however, Jefferson County ESC has marketed its VLA curriculum to other states and to 
foreign countries.  Through those successful efforts, the VLA has a presence in all 50 states and in 
over 14 countries.   
 
January Term, 2013 
 
5
students to one of the VLA instructors.  Jefferson County receives a participation 
fee of $175 per student for its role and “passes through” the pay VLA instructors 
receive, which is $105 per student per semester, or $210 per student for a full 
(two-semester) academic year. 
{¶ 12} In order to obtain that pay, VLA instructors submit a stipend form 
to Jefferson County ESC when a student completes a course or the student’s 
license expires.  If the school district withdraws a student from a VLA course, 
Jefferson County ESC pays the instructor on a prorated basis for the number of 
units of the course the student completes. 
{¶ 13} As VLA instructors, Nese, Williams and Miles did not have 
contracts with Jefferson County.  Rather, they signed a form provided by 
Jefferson County that stated that they agreed “to be on board to take on VLA 
students.”  As VLA instructors, they did not receive health insurance or other 
fringe benefits from Jefferson County ESC.  However, most VLA instructors are 
full-time teachers working in classrooms.  Nese and Williams served as teachers 
in local school districts and thus received health insurance and other benefits 
through their traditional teaching jobs.  And Miles retired as a teacher at the end 
of the 2008-2009 school year and likely received those benefits through her 
retirement plan. 
{¶ 14} Nese, Williams, and Miles were entitled to a great deal of latitude 
in their day-to-day work.  For example, VLA instructors were authorized to create 
their own mid-term and final examinations or to use on-line lessons as the 
examinations. 
{¶ 15} They were also free, as were other VLA instructors, to choose 
when and where they did their work.  Jefferson County did not set specific times 
at which they were required to instruct or deadlines by which the work had to be 
completed.  And although Jefferson County offered a place to work for teachers 
and students who do not have access to a computer, the VLA instructors were not 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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required to teach there.  In fact, most of the VLA instructors worked at home or at 
a public library and often did so after typical school hours. 
{¶ 16} Jefferson County ESC initially considered its VLA instructors to 
be independent contractors rather than employees.  Consequently, it did not 
deduct contributions to pay to the retirement system.  Eventually, however, 
Jefferson County ESC decided to treat its VLA instructors as employees and 
withheld contributions accordingly.  Thus, for example, in 2004, Williams 
received a 1099 form from Jefferson County for his work instructing in the VLA, 
but for 2005 through 2009, he received W-2 forms. Other instructors also received 
1099 forms initially and subsequently received W-2s. 
{¶ 17} In November 2008, the STRS determined that the VLA instructors 
were independent contractors instead of employees.  It refunded all contributions 
made by Jefferson County ESC on the VLA instructors’ behalf.  Thereafter, 
Jefferson County ESC adopted a resolution specifying duties for its VLA faculty, 
including the general duties of “logging into the system on a daily basis to grade 
student’s work, answering student’s questions, providing feedback to students, 
providing structure to students, and outlining expectations to students.”  And 
Nese, Williams, and Miles were given performance evaluations after the STRS’s 
decision that they were independent contractors. 
{¶ 18} In December 2009, Nese, Williams, and Miles filed an action in 
the Tenth District Court of Appeals challenging the STRS’s decision.  In their 
amended complaint, Nese, Williams, and Miles sought writs of mandamus to 
compel Jefferson County ESC to make the requisite employer contributions to the 
retirement system for their VLA instruction and to compel the STRS to accept 
employer and employee contributions based on their work for the VLA and to 
include their VLA compensation in calculating their final average salary for 
retirement purposes.  In so doing, the VLA instructors were seeking inclusion of 
their compensation as VLA instructors into the calculation of their final annual 
January Term, 2013 
 
7
salary for retirement purposes.  The amounts are significant:  the instructors allege 
that the compensation from working in the VLA ranged from hundreds to tens of 
thousands of dollars and reached as high as $66,324 for one instructor. 
{¶ 19} On December 29, 2011, the court of appeals denied the writ.  The 
court held that there was some evidence to support the STRS’s finding that the 
VLA instructors were independent contractors.  Nese, Williams, Miles, and 
Jefferson County ESC appealed to this court.  We now affirm. 
ANALYSIS 
Mandamus and the Applicable Standard of Review 
{¶ 20} The instructors seek extraordinary relief, mandamus, to compel the 
STRS to accept retirement-system contributions for their work while instructing 
for Jefferson County ESC.  To be entitled to the requested relief, Nese, Williams, 
and Miles must establish a clear legal right to be recognized as members of the 
retirement system for their VLA work, a corresponding clear legal duty on the 
part of the STRS to treat them as retirement-system members and to accept 
contributions for their VLA work, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Nation Bldg. Technical Academy v. Ohio 
Dept. of Edn., 123 Ohio St.3d 35, 2009-Ohio-4084, 913 N.E.2d 977, ¶ 11. 
{¶ 21} Notably, the instructors must establish their entitlement to the writ 
by clear and convincing evidence.  State ex rel. Wasserman v. Fremont, 131 Ohio 
St.3d 52, 2012-Ohio-27, 960 N.E.2d 449, ¶ 4.  In other words, the instructors 
must present evidence that  
 
is more than a mere “preponderance of the evidence,” but 
not to the extent of such certainty as is required “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” in criminal cases, and [that] will produce in the 
mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts 
sought to be established. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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State ex rel. Husted v. Brunner, 123 Ohio St.3d 288, 2009-Ohio-5327, 915 N.E.2d 
1215, ¶ 18, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), 
paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶ 22} We begin our analysis with the propriety of mandamus relief in 
this case. 
{¶ 23} “The General Assembly established the State Teachers Retirement 
System to pay retirement allowances and other benefits to public school teachers, 
and the State Teachers Retirement Board administers and manages the retirement 
system.”  State ex rel. Morgan v. State Teachers Retirement Bd. of Ohio, 121 
Ohio St.3d 324, 2009-Ohio-591, 904 N.E.2d 506, ¶ 19, citing R.C. 3307.03 and 
3307.04.  The determination of whether any person is a teacher, and thus a 
member of the retirement system, is solely within the province of the retirement 
board.  See R.C. 3307.01(B) (“In all cases of doubt, the state teachers retirement 
board shall determine whether any person is a teacher, and its decision shall be 
final”). 
{¶ 24} Because the retirement board’s final decision of whether a person 
is a teacher and thus a member of the retirement system is not appealable, Nese, 
Williams, and Miles lack an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  
Thus, mandamus is available to the instructors if they show that the STRS abused 
its discretion in making its determination.  See State ex rel. Hulls v. State 
Teachers Retirement Bd. of Ohio, 113 Ohio St.3d 438, 2007-Ohio-2337, 866 
N.E.2d 483, ¶ 27 (applying abuse-of-discretion standard to the retirement board’s 
determination concerning disability-retirement benefits); State ex rel. Schaengold 
v. Ohio Pub. Emps. Retirement Sys., 114 Ohio St.3d 147, 2007-Ohio-3760, 870 
N.E.2d 719, ¶ 8 (applying this standard to a public employees retirement board’s 
denial of service credit). 
January Term, 2013 
 
9
{¶ 25} “An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is unreasonable, 
arbitrary, or unconscionable.”  State ex rel. Stiles v. School Emps. Retirement Sys., 
102 Ohio St.3d 156, 2004-Ohio-2140, 807 N.E.2d 353, ¶ 13.  Thus, “ ‘[a]s long as 
there is sufficient evidence to support [a] retirement-system board’s decisions, we 
will not disturb them.’ ”  State ex rel. Marchiano v. School Emps. Retirement Sys., 
121 Ohio St.3d 139, 2009-Ohio-307, 902 N.E.2d 953, ¶ 21, quoting State ex rel. 
Grein v. Ohio State Highway Patrol Retirement Sys., 116 Ohio St.3d 344, 2007-
Ohio-6667, 879 N.E.2d 195, ¶ 9. 
{¶ 26} The quantum of evidence necessary to support the retirement-
system board’s decision is not a heavy one.  As we stated in Schaengold, 
 
[A] “clear legal right to a writ of mandamus exists when the 
board is found to have abused its discretion by entering an order 
that is not supported by some evidence.” [State ex rel. Schaengold 
v. Ohio Pub. Emps. Retirement Sys., 10th Dist. No. 05AP-1002,] 
2006-Ohio-5093, 2006 WL 2789921, ¶ 33.  See, e.g., Kinsey v. Bd. 
of Trustees of Police & Firemen’s Disability & Pension Fund of 
Ohio (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 224, 225, 551 N.E.2d 989; see, also, 
State ex rel. Peyton v. Schumacher (Nov. 16, 2000), Franklin App. 
No. 00AP-78, 2000 WL 1715901, *1, and Gerchak v. Pub. Emps. 
Retirement Bd. (Sept. 15, 1998), Franklin App. No. 98AP-325, 
1998 WL 635313, *2, applying the same standard to uphold Public 
Employees Retirement Board determinations that claimants were 
independent contractors rather than public employees. 
 
114 Ohio St.3d 147, 2007-Ohio-3760, 870 N.E.2d 719, ¶ 19. 
{¶ 27} A fortiori, if there is some evidence to support the board’s 
determination, mandamus will not lie.  State ex rel. Foley v. Vulcan Mfg. Co., 84 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
Ohio St.3d 59, 60, 701 N.E.2d 993 (because there was “some evidence on which 
the [Industrial Commission] could rely” in denying benefits, the court “cannot 
disturb the commission’s decision”), citing State ex rel. Burley v. Coil Packing, 
Inc., 31 Ohio St.3d 18, 508 N.E.2d 936 (1987). 
{¶ 28} Deference is always due in an abuse-of-discretion case.  But it is 
particularly important when, as here, we are presented with conflicting evidence 
on whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor.  In cases in 
which a worker presents some evidence that he is an employee rather than an 
independent contractor, the question becomes one of fact that should be decided 
by the fact-finder.  Indus. Comm. v. Laird, 126 Ohio St. 617, 186 N.E. 718 
(1933), paragraph three of the syllabus.  See also Bostic v. Connor, 37 Ohio St.3d 
144, 145-146, 524 N.E.2d 881 (1988) (the question whether a worker is an 
employee or independent contractor becomes a jury question when the worker 
presents some evidence that he is an employee).  We are mindful that the STRS is 
the finder of fact in this matter, as well as an adjudicator highly knowledgeable 
about Ohio’s teachers, their work, and their pensions. 
{¶ 29} Having set forth the applicable standards, we proceed with our 
analysis of the dispositive issue in this appeal: whether some evidence supported 
the STRS’s decision that Nese, Williams, and Miles were independent contractors 
of Jefferson County ESC rather than employees of Jefferson County ESC. 
R.C. 3307.01(B):  Definition of “Teacher” 
{¶ 30} Under Ohio law, public-school teachers and their employers must 
make contributions to the retirement fund.  See R.C. 3307.26 and 3307.28.  As 
relevant to this case, R.C. 3307.01(B)3 defines “teacher” for purposes of 
retirement-system membership as 
 
                                          
 
3 Effective January 7, 2013, subsection (B)(4) of R.C. 3307.01 now appears in subsection (B)(5).  
2012 Sub.S.B. No. 342. 
January Term, 2013 
 
11
(1)  Any person paid from public funds and employed in 
the public schools of the state under any type of contract described 
in section 3311.77 or 3319.08 of the Revised Code in a position for 
which the person is required to have a license issued pursuant to 
sections 3319.22 to 3319.31 of the Revised Code;  
* * *  
(5) Any other teacher or faculty member employed in any 
school, college, university, institution, or other agency wholly 
controlled and managed, and supported in whole or in part, by the 
state or any political subdivision thereof, including Central state 
university, Cleveland state university, and the university of Toledo. 
 
{¶ 31} In construing statutory provisions, including R.C. 3307.01(B), our 
paramount concern is the legislative intent.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Grace, 123 Ohio St.3d 471, 2009-Ohio-5934, 918 N.E.2d 135, ¶ 25.  “An axiom 
of statutory construction is that ‘[w]ords * * * that have acquired a technical or 
particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be 
construed accordingly.’ ”  Hoffman v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, 113 Ohio St.3d 
376, 2007-Ohio-2201, 865 N.E.2d 1259, ¶ 26, quoting R.C. 1.42. 
{¶ 32} R.C. 3307.01(B)(1) and (5) require that individuals must be 
employees to be “teachers”—and thus covered by the retirement system’s pension 
plan. But the STRS determined that Nese, Williams, and Miles were not 
“teachers” because they were independent contractors rather than employees 
when they worked as VLA instructors for Jefferson County ESC.  We thus turn to 
the legal tests for distinguishing an employee from an independent contractor. 
Common Law:  Distinguishing Employees from Independent Contractors 
{¶ 33} “The chief test in determining whether one is an employee or an 
independent contractor is the right to control the manner or means of performing 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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the work.”  Bobik v. Indus. Comm., 146 Ohio St. 187, 64 N.E.2d 829 (1946), 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  See also Foran v. Fisher Foods, Inc., 17 Ohio 
St.3d 193, 194, 478 N.E.2d 998 (1985) (holding that “one who exercises day-to-
day control over the employee will be considered as the employer”).  “If such 
right is in the employer, the relationship is that of employer and employee; but if 
the manner or means of performing the work is left to one responsible to the 
employer for the result alone, an independent contractor relationship is created.”  
Pusey v. Bator, 94 Ohio St.3d 275, 279, 762 N.E.2d 968 (2002), citing Bobik at 
paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 34} In so holding, however, we have recognized that as a practical 
matter, every contract for work reserves to the employer a certain degree of 
control to enable him to ensure that the contract is performed according to 
specifications.  Gillum v. Indus. Comm., 141 Ohio St. 373, 382, 48 N.E.2d 234 
(1943).  Thus, we have distinguished on the continuum of control whether a 
worker is an employee or an independent contractor: 
 
“The control of the work reserved in the employer which effects a 
master-servant relationship is control of the means and manner of 
performance of the work, as well as of the result; an independent 
contractor relationship exists where the person doing the work is 
subject to the will of the employer only as to the result, but not as 
to the means or manner of accomplishment. Thus, a person 
employed to perform certain work is not necessarily a mere servant 
because the contract provides that the work shall be subject to the 
approval or satisfaction of the employer. Such a provision is not an 
assumption by the employer of the right to control the person 
employed as to the details or method of doing the work, but is only 
a provision that the employer may see that the contract is carried 
January Term, 2013 
 
13
out according to the plans.”  See also, 21 Ohio Jurisprudence, 626, 
Section 4; Miller v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 134 Ohio St. 289, 
291, 16 N.E.2d 447; Industrial Commission v. McAdow, 126 Ohio 
St. 198, 184 N.E. 759; Klar v. Erie R. Co., 118 Ohio St. 612, 162 
N.E. 793; Hughes v. Cincinnati & S. Railway Co., 39 Ohio St. 461; 
Pickens & Plummer v. Diecker & Bros., [21 Ohio St. 212 (1871)]. 
 
Gillum at 382-383. 
{¶ 35} Our case law makes clear that in determining who has the right to 
control the work, we must look at the individual facts of a case. 
 
The factors to be considered include, but are certainly not limited 
to, such indicia as who controls the details and quality of the work; 
who controls the hours worked; who selects the materials, tools 
and personnel used; who selects the routes travelled; the length of 
employment; the type of business; the method of payment; and any 
pertinent agreements or contracts. 
 
Bostic v. Connor, 37 Ohio St.3d at 146, 524 N.E.2d 881. 
{¶ 36} We now view the evidence in the record through the lens of the 
foregoing law on mandamus and employment. 
The Record 
{¶ 37} The record demonstrates that the instructors did not have an 
employment contract with Jefferson County ESC.  They did not receive fringe 
benefits, including health insurance. 
{¶ 38} They set their own work hours and could create their own 
examinations. They did not use Jefferson County ESC’s facilities to perform their 
work.  They were not required to instruct a specific number of students or courses. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 39} The instructors were paid “stipends,” which were flat fees per 
student. Two of them initially received 1099 forms instead of W-2 forms for tax 
purposes because Jefferson County ESC originally considered them to be 
independent contractors rather than employees. 
{¶ 40} We have relied on comparable factors in upholding a public 
employee retirement board’s determination that persons are independent 
contractors rather than public employees entitled to retirement-system 
membership and benefits.  See, e.g., Schaengold, 114 Ohio St.3d 147, 2007-Ohio-
3760, 870 N.E.2d 719, ¶ 20-21 (factors included that attorney serving as a 
temporary magistrate pursuant to a bilateral contract was paid a flat fee, was not 
eligible for employee fringe benefits, was not controlled or supervised in 
conducting hearings or in issuing decisions, and received a form 1099 for tax 
purposes).  Similarly, the courts of appeals have found, on similar facts, that a 
person was an independent contractor rather than an employee.  See, e.g., State ex 
rel. Curtin v. Ohio Pub. Emps. Retirement Sys., 10th Dist. No. 09AP-801, 2011-
Ohio-2536, ¶ 28 (assistant city income tax administrator was paid a fee for 
services, did not receive fringe benefits, provided many of his own supplies, and 
received form 1099 for tax purposes); State ex rel. Peyton v. Schumacher, 10th 
Dist. No. 00AP-78, 2000 WL 1715901, *2 (person who hauled gravel for two 
townships did not maintain regular hours, did not receive fringe benefits, was paid 
by the amount hauled and not an hourly wage or salary, and provided his own 
truck for hauling). 
{¶ 41} The instructors rely on evidence of a resolution setting forth duties 
for VLA instructors and performance evaluations completed for Nese, Williams, 
and Miles, all of which were drafted after the STRS decided that the instructors 
were independent contractors and not employees entitled to retirement-system 
membership.  The instructors’ argument is not persuasive given that the STRS 
was not presented with this information prior to rendering its decisions.  The 
January Term, 2013 
 
15
STRS could not have abused its discretion based on evidence that was never 
presented to it.  See Marchiano, 121 Ohio St.3d 139, 2009-Ohio-307, 902 N.E.2d 
953, ¶ 25 (applying this general rule to a determination by the School Employees 
Retirement System).  Notably, even the general duties for VLA instructors listed 
in the resolution are directed to the basic rules of the work to be performed (e.g., 
logging onto the system daily to grade students’ work and answering students’ 
questions) rather than to subjective decisions about the quality or substance of the 
work itself (e.g., directing the actual grading and answers provided by the 
instructors). 
{¶ 42} Finally, the instructors rely on a statement in a retirement-system 
employers’ manual that “[i]f the teaching duties performed by an independent 
contractor are the same as those performed by teachers under employment 
contracts, then there is no difference for [retirement-system] purposes.”  But even 
assuming purely arguendo that we are bound to accept that statement as true, the 
instructors submitted no credible evidence, much less clear and convincing 
evidence, to establish that their duties were the same as those performed by other 
teachers working with Jefferson County ESC under employment contracts. 
{¶ 43} On the record before us, we cannot say that the STRS’s 
determination was arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable.  At worst, the 
evidence was equivocal.  Reasonable minds could differ as to whether Nese, 
Williams, and Miles were independent contractors or employees of Jefferson 
County ESC when they acted as VLA instructors.  But our role is not to review de 
novo.  Rather, our duty under the law of Ohio is to review only for an abuse of 
discretion. 
{¶ 44} In discharging that duty, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals because the instructors have failed to present clear and convincing 
evidence establishing that they were employees. The court of appeals properly 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
 
held that the STRS’s decision was supported by some evidence and, therefore, 
that mandamus would not lie. 
{¶ 45} Finally, we recognize that the dissent in the court of appeals 
expressed concern over STRS 
 
 imposing the traditional attributes of a teacher on the less 
than traditional and, in light of technological advances, a likely 
increasingly common approach to teaching.  What constitutes 
control will vary with the circumstances, and the circumstances 
here are considerably different than those of the more traditional 
classroom and make the factors [the STRS] cites not pertinent to 
determining whether relators are employees. 
 
 2011-Ohio-6764, ¶ 16 (Bryant, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  We 
do not disagree that the VLA and cyber schools present a new way of teaching.  
But it is precisely for those reasons that the STRS, with its expertise in this area, 
is entitled to deference.  And, of course, the General Assembly, is entitled to 
change the definition of “teacher” in R.C. 3307.01(B)(5) to encompass VLA 
instructors and other independent contractors who work in cyber schools.  Those 
prerogatives, however, are not judicial ones. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 46} We conclude that Nese, Williams, and Miles did not establish by 
clear and convincing evidence that the STRS abused its discretion by determining 
that they were not “teachers” under R.C. 3307.01(B) for purposes of their work as 
instructors for the VLA operated by Jefferson County ESC.  We therefore affirm 
the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
LANZINGER, KENNEDY, and RINGLAND, JJ., concur. 
January Term, 2013 
 
17
PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, and O’NEILL, JJ., dissent. 
ROBERT P. RINGLAND, J., of the Twelfth Appellate District, sitting for 
FRENCH, J. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 47} Respectfully, I dissent. 
{¶ 48} The issue in this case is whether relators John Nese, Donald 
Williams, and Catherine Miles are teachers entitled to participate in the State 
Teachers Retirement System (“STRS”) in connection with their employment at 
the Jefferson County Educational Service Center providing teaching services 
through the virtual learning academy (“VLA”).  In my view, they are teachers 
because they meet the statutory definition of teachers and the appellate court 
magistrate determined the STRS had abused its discretion in concluding the 
relators were independent contractors. In addition, the appellate court magistrate 
found that the Jefferson County Educational Service Center employed Nese, 
Williams, and Miles to provide teaching services through the VLA. 
{¶ 49} Nese, Williams, and Miles each held a license to teach from the 
state of Ohio, each instructed students not only in public schools but also through 
the VLA of the Jefferson County Educational Service Center, an agency 
supported by the state, and each contributed to STRS for their years of service.  
STRS objected to the legal conclusions of the magistrate.  On its review, the 
appellate court approved and adopted the magistrate’s findings, but then 
disregarded them by concluding that Nese, Williams, and Miles were independent 
contractors. 
{¶ 50} Because Nese, Williams, and Miles qualify statutorily as teachers, 
because the magistrate’s findings are supported by the record, and because the 
appellate court abused its discretion by adopting the findings of the magistrate but 
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then denying the writ, I would reverse the decision of the appellate court and 
grant the writ. 
Factual Background and Procedural History 
{¶ 51} Nese, Williams, and Miles taught school in Jefferson County, and 
they also taught courses through the VLA of the Jefferson County Educational 
Service Center, an internet-based educational system designed for K-12.  
According to the magistrate’s decision, Nese provided teaching services through 
the VLA from the 2005-2006 fiscal year through the 2007-2008 fiscal year, 
Williams and Miles provided services in the program from the 2004-2005 fiscal 
year through the 2007-2008 fiscal year, and contributions were submitted to 
STRS by relators and the Jefferson County Educational Service Center for that 
service.  However, in a December 2008 letter, STRS refunded $14,771.93 in 
contributions, asserting that earnings for the VLA were being returned as 
unauthorized contributions. 
{¶ 52} In December 2009, Nese, Williams, and Miles filed a mandamus 
complaint in the Tenth District Court of Appeals seeking to compel STRS to 
accept their contributions for earnings from the Jefferson County Educational 
Service Center.  The appellate court referred the matter to a magistrate, who 
found that the Jefferson County Educational Service Center employed Nese, 
Williams, and Miles to provide teaching services through the VLA, further found 
that relators had received W-2 and 1099 forms from the Jefferson County 
Educational Service Center, and concluded that relators’ receipt of these “does not 
indicate independent contractor status.”  The magistrate also noted that the 
Jefferson County Educational Service Center exercises control over relators and 
concluded that their status was that of employees, not independent contractors.  
The magistrate also referenced a STRS employer fact sheet, which suggested that 
even hiring independent contractors does not necessarily relieve the employer of 
the obligation to forward contributions on earnings.  The magistrate thus 
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concluded that Nese, Williams, and Miles fit within the statutory definition of 
teacher and recommended that the writ be allowed to permit them to participate in 
STRS. 
{¶ 53} The 
appellate 
court, 
after 
reviewing 
the 
magistrate’s 
recommendation and adopting its findings, rejected the magistrate’s legal 
conclusions and instead concluded that STRS did not abuse its discretion in 
concluding that relators are independent contractors. 
{¶ 54} Relators and the Jefferson County Educational Service Center 
appealed that denial to this court. 
Standard of Review 
{¶ 55} This court applies a standard of abuse of discretion when 
reviewing an appellate court decision on a complaint seeking a writ of mandamus.  
State ex rel. Hillyer v. Tuscarawas Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 70 Ohio St.3d 94, 97, 
637 N.E.2d 311 (1994) (applying abuse-of-discretion standard to appellate court’s 
decision in a mandamus case).  “The term ‘abuse of discretion’ means an 
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable decision.”  State ex rel. Pipoly v. State 
Teachers Retirement Sys., 95 Ohio St.3d 327, 2002-Ohio-2219, 767 N.E.2d 719, 
¶ 14. 
Relators are Teachers 
{¶ 56} R.C. 3307.01(B)(5) defines the term “teacher” to include “[a]ny 
other teacher or faculty member employed in any * * * other agency wholly 
controlled and managed, and supported in whole or in part, by the state or any 
political subdivision thereof.”  Because the Jefferson County Educational Service 
Center is a successor to a county school district, it receives funding from the state.  
R.C. 3311.05(A); R.C. 3301.07(C).  In Cline v. Martin, 94 Ohio St. 420, 426, 115 
N.E. 37 (1916), we characterized boards of education of county school districts as 
“agencies of the state for the organization, administration, and control of the 
public school system of the state, separate and apart from * * * other subdivisions 
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of the state.”  Thus, in conformity with this statute, educational service centers are 
agencies supported in whole or in part by the state.  See generally R.C. 3317.11. 
{¶ 57} In addition, R.C. 3307.01(B)(5) emphasizes the capacity in which 
employment occurs, in order to distinguish those employed as teachers from those 
employed in other capacities, such as cooks or custodians or administrators, etc.  
This statute therefore defines teachers as those employed in the capacity of 
teachers or faculty members employed in an agency supported by the state.  Here, 
each relator is a member of the teaching profession, has a license to teach issued 
by the state of Ohio, and  provided teaching services through the VLA by virtue 
of employment at the Jefferson County Educational Service Center, an agency 
that is supported by the state. 
{¶ 58} Notably, the General Assembly does not use the term “employee” 
in R.C. 3307.01(B)(5), nor does it require employment status as it has done in 
other statutes relating to retirement systems.  Compare R.C. 145.01(A)(3) 
(“public employee” means “[a]ny person who is an employee of a public 
employer, notwithstanding that the person’s compensation for that employment is 
derived from funds of a person or entity other than the employer”) (emphasis 
added); R.C. 5505.02 (membership in the Ohio State Highway Patrol Retirement 
System “includes all state highway patrol employees, as defined in [R.C. 
5505.01], and such membership is mandatory for such employees”) (emphasis 
added).  Although the General Assembly could have required a teacher to be an 
employee in the definition of “teacher” in R.C. 3307.01(B)(5), it did not do so. 
{¶ 59} Thus, in my view, relators were employed as teachers in the 
Jefferson County Educational Service Center within the meaning of R.C. 
3307.01(B)(5). 
Employee vs. Independent Contractor 
{¶ 60} STRS urges that R.C. 3307.01 permits only those employed as 
teachers to participate in the retirement system, claiming that some evidence 
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supports its determination that Nese, Williams, and Miles were independent 
contractors, not employees, and ineligible to participate in STRS. 
{¶ 61} Contrary to this position, the magistrate found that the Jefferson 
County Educational Service Center employed them as teachers and that finding is 
supported by competent, credible evidence: W-2 forms issued to relators for at 
least some of their years of service and the control of the mode and manner of 
instruction by the Educational Service Center.  Notably, in Gillum v. Indus. 
Comm., 141 Ohio St. 373, 48 N.E.2d 234 (1943), we explained that an individual 
is an employee, rather than an independent contractor, when the employer has the 
right to control the manner in which the individual works.  Id. at paragraph two of 
the syllabus. 
{¶ 62} And the magistrate also noted that an STRS employer fact sheet 
instructs that STRS may still require contributions from those hired as 
independent contractors: 
 
Hiring an individual to fill an STRS Ohio-covered position 
through an independent contract or a temporary agency does not 
necessarily relieve an employer’s obligation to make contributions 
on earnings to STRS Ohio.  If the individual’s duties are the same 
as those performed by teachers or administrators under 
employment contracts, STRS Ohio considers the individual to be 
an employee and requires contributions to be remitted to STRS 
Ohio. 
Please note that an agreement to be an independent 
contractor is not the sole indicator of a true independent contract 
relationship.  Primary criterion cited in Attorney General Opinions 
and IRS Guidelines for distinguishing between an independent 
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contractor and an employee is the right of the employer to control 
the “mode and manner” of the work performed. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 63} The magistrate’s recommendation concluded as follows: “Given 
the record, the fact that relators fit within the definition of R.C. 3307.01(B)(4), 
and STRS policy regarding independent contractors, the evidence fails to support 
STRB’s finding that relators are not members of STRS for the employment with 
JCESC and teaching at the VLA.”  2011-Ohio-6764, ¶ 51. 
{¶ 64} The difficulty for me with the court of appeals’s opinion is that it 
adopted the factual findings of the magistrate, ¶ 13, but then disregarded those 
findings in its analysis when it concluded that the STRS did not abuse its 
discretion in concluding that the relators were independent contractors.  The 
appellate court’s conclusions contradict the findings it adopted and, because 
relators did prove their entitlement to participate in STRS for at least some of 
their years of service, the court of appeals abused its discretion in denying the 
writ. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 65} Nese, Williams, and Miles satisfy the definition of teacher set forth 
in R.C. 3307.01(B)(5).  The Jefferson County Educational Service Center, an 
agency supported by the state, employed them as teachers, they served in that 
capacity for several years, made STRS contributions during that time, and relied 
on their status as teachers for their retirement.  The sudden and unexpected refund 
of those contributions by STRS on its assertion that contributions for earnings 
from the VLA are unauthorized is wholly unwarranted. 
{¶ 66} Accordingly, I would conclude that the court of appeals abused its 
discretion in adopting the findings of its magistrate but then concluding, contrary 
to those findings, that STRS did not abuse its discretion in returning what it called 
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“unauthorized” contributions.  I would therefore reverse the judgment of the court 
of appeals and grant the requested writ. 
PFEIFER and O’NEILL, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Green, Haines, Sgambati Co., L.P.A., Ira J. Mirkin, Stanley J. Okusewsky 
III, and Charles W. Oldfield, for appellants John Nese, Donald Williams, and 
Catherine Miles. 
 
Pepple & Waggoner, Ltd., R. Brent Minney, and Mark J. Jackson, for 
appellant Jefferson County Educational Service Center Governing Board. 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Allan K. Showalter and John E. 
Patterson, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee. 
______________________