Title: Burch v. Hechinger Company

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
LOUISE V. BURCH 
 
v. Record No. 991490  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 JUNE 7, 2002 
HECHINGER COMPANY 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
J. Howe Brown, Judge 
 
 
In this personal injury action, the question on appeal 
is whether the plaintiff-appellant was a statutory employee 
of the defendant-appellee when she was injured.  Because we 
answer that question affirmatively, we will affirm the 
circuit court’s judgment sustaining the defendant’s plea in 
bar based on the exclusivity provision of the Virginia 
Workers’ Compensation Act, Code § 65.2-307(A). 
FACTS AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS 
 
Louise V. Burch was employed as a sales representative 
by Greenhost, Inc. (Greenhost).  Greenhost grew plants and 
flowers and sold them on a wholesale basis to various 
retailers, including Hechinger Company (Hechinger). 
 
In the spring of 1997, Burch negotiated an order for 
Greenhost flowers to be sold at a Hechinger store in 
Springfield during a “truckload sale” advertised to take 
place over a Friday, Saturday and Sunday in May.  Burch 
agreed to be present during part of the truckload sale to 
assist in displaying the flowers and to answer 
horticultural questions for Hechinger retail customers. 
 
A problem arose when one of the trailers of flowers 
arrived at the Springfield Hechinger store a day earlier 
than anticipated and Hechinger did not have staff available 
to unload the flowers and arrange the display that day.  If 
the plants remained inside the trailer all day, the heat 
would cause them to wilt and die and Burch “would have to 
go up there and write a return.”  Therefore, at the request 
of her supervisor, Burch went to the Hechinger store the 
day before the sale was scheduled to begin and assisted in 
arranging the display of flowers as they were unloaded from 
the trailer. 
 
Hechinger’s garden clerk and acting manager on duty 
that day, Richard Lawrence Scherer, was responsible for 
unloading the trailer.  The flowers had been stored for 
transport inside the trailer on carts, each of which held 
approximately 42 flats with about 36 flowering plants in 
each flat.  While Scherer used a hydraulic lift to remove 
the carts of flowers from the trailer, Burch and at least 
one other Hechinger employee began rearranging Hechinger’s 
existing stock to make room for the new delivery of 
flowers. 
 
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Burch was engaged in this task when two women 
approached her and asked for assistance in locating red 
impatiens, a particular color and type of flower.  Aware 
that no red impatiens were on display, Burch invited the 
customers to accompany her to the trailer to ascertain 
whether any were in the delivery being unloaded. 
 
Only three or four carts had been unloaded from the 
trailer at that time, and Scherer attempted to look for the 
red impatiens among the carts remaining on the trailer.  
However, he was unable to maneuver the carts to view the 
contents of each, so he returned to unloading carts from 
the trailer while the customers waited.  At this point, one 
of the carts filled with potted flowers rolled off of the 
trailer’s tailgate, falling onto Burch and injuring her. 
 
Burch subsequently filed suit alleging that the 
accident resulted from the negligence of Hechinger’s 
employee and that Hechinger was vicariously liable for his 
negligent acts.  In its defense, Hechinger filed a plea in 
bar alleging that at the time of her injury, Burch was a 
statutory employee of Hechinger and that her negligence 
action was therefore barred by the exclusivity provision of 
the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act, Code § 65.2-307. 
 
The circuit court found that Burch’s injury occurred 
while she was consolidating and rearranging flowers, a task 
 
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ordinarily performed by Hechinger employees.  Thus, the 
court ruled that Burch was a statutory employee of 
Hechinger and that her exclusive remedy was a claim for 
workers’ compensation benefits.  The court sustained 
Hechinger’s plea in bar and dismissed Burch’s negligence 
action.  Burch appeals that dismissal, contending that the 
court erred in ruling that she was a statutory employee of 
Hechinger.1
ANALYSIS 
 
The rights and remedies provided in the Virginia 
Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act) are exclusive of all 
other rights and remedies for employees who fall within the 
scope of the Act.  Code § 65.2-307(A).  See Feitig v. 
Chalkley, 185 Va. 96, 98, 38 S.E.2d 73, 73-74 (1946) 
(discussing rationale of workers’ compensation system and 
the exchange of the right to a jury trial for a faster and 
guaranteed recovery).  Therefore, the sole issue in this 
appeal is whether the trial court was correct in 
designating Burch as a statutory employee of Hechinger at 
                     
1 Burch also asserts that the circuit court erred in 
failing to consider that the contractual relationship 
between Greenhost and Hechinger was that of vendor-vendee 
and thus outside the scope of Code § 65.2-302(A).  However, 
because Burch failed to raise that issue in the proceedings 
below, we will not consider that assignment of error.  See 
Rule 5:25. 
 
 
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the time of her injury.  If so, then her negligence action 
seeking damages from Hechinger is barred by Code § 65.2-
307(A). 
 
With regard to when an individual may be properly 
considered a statutory employee, the Act provides: 
When any person (referred to in this section as 
“owner”) undertakes to perform or execute any 
work which is a part of his trade, business or 
occupation and contracts with any other person 
(referred to in this section as “subcontractor”) 
for the execution or performance by or under such 
subcontractor of the whole or any part of the 
work undertaken by such owner, the owner shall be 
liable to pay to any worker employed in the work 
any compensation under this title which he would 
have been liable to pay if the worker had been 
immediately employed by him. 
 
Code § 65.2-302(A)(emphasis added). 
 
“The issue whether a particular person or entity is 
the statutory employer of an injured employee is a 
jurisdictional matter presenting a mixed question of law 
and fact that must be determined under the facts of each 
case.”  Bosley v. Shepherd, 262 Va. 641, 648, 554 S.E.2d 
77, 81 (2001).  If the facts establish that an individual 
performs activities that are normally performed by a 
person’s employees rather than by independent contractors, 
then that individual is properly considered that person’s 
statutory employee for purposes of the Act.  Shell Oil Co. 
v. Leftwich, 212 Va. 715, 722, 187 S.E.2d 162, 167 (1972).  
 
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See also Carmody v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 234 Va. 198, 205-
06, 361 S.E.2d 128, 132-33 (1987) (licensee portrait 
photography business inside Woolworth store was engaged in 
work that Woolworth normally conducted through its 
employees; thus, licensee’s employee was Woolworth’s 
statutory employee). 
 
In the instant case, Burch was arranging displays of 
flowers and, more immediately at the time of her injury, 
she was assisting Hechinger retail customers.  The 
uncontroverted testimony at the hearing on Hechinger’s plea 
in bar established that both of these activities were 
normally performed by Hechinger employees.  Burch 
acknowledged that at least one other Hechinger employee was 
engaging in the same work as that being performed by her 
when she was injured.  In fact, Burch stated on brief that 
“[t]he consolidation and arranging of flowers at the 
Hechinger store . . . was normally performed by Hechinger’s 
employees.”  However, Burch had agreed to be involved in 
these tasks after delivery of the flowers because that was 
part of the deal she negotiated with Hechinger for the 
truckload sale.  Both Scherer and Burch testified that 
Hechinger employees were responsible for unloading the 
trailer of flowers at the Springfield Hechinger store and 
that Burch was not involved in that activity in any way. 
 
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Burch contends, however, that she was not furthering 
Hechinger’s business when her injury occurred, but rather, 
that she was completing the delivery of Greenhost’s 
product.  We have previously considered the point at which 
an individual delivering products has completed the task of 
delivery, and beyond which point, engaging in further 
activities constitutes performing the work of another 
entity’s trade, business or occupation.  In Bosley, we held 
that using a crane to deliver sheetrock to specific 
locations on a jobsite was part of the delivery.  262 Va. 
at 649-50, 554 S.E.2d at 82.  The employee so engaged was 
not a statutory employee of the general contractor because 
he did not perform any other task to further the work of 
the general contractor.  Id.; see also Burroughs v. 
Walmont, Inc., 210 Va. 98, 100, 168 S.E.2d 107, 108 (1969) 
(the stacking of sheetrock in several rooms constituted the 
final act of delivery, not the act of construction).  In 
contrast, we held that an individual who delivered sand to 
a construction site and then participated in spreading the 
sand to a six-inch base as required by building 
specifications was a statutory employee of the general 
contractor because he had proceeded beyond the task of 
delivery and engaged in the contractor’s work of 
 
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construction.  Bosher v. Jamerson, 207 Va. 539, 542-43, 151 
S.E.2d 375, 377 (1966). 
 
We think that the instant case is more like Bosher.  
Although Burch contends that she was engaged in the final 
act of delivery, the testimony clearly reflects that Burch 
herself did not participate in the delivery of the flowers.  
Rather, Greenhost’s wholesale delivery was complete when 
the trailer arrived at the Springfield Hechinger store, 
because it was then the responsibility of Hechinger 
employees to unload the flowers and continue the retail 
merchandising process from that point forward. 
 
Burch was involved in discrete activities both prior 
to and after the delivery.  Before the delivery, she 
represented Greenhost in negotiating the sale to Hechinger.  
Once the trailer of flowers arrived at the Hechinger store, 
Hechinger employees were then responsible for unloading the 
flowers from the trailer, as well as arranging the flowers 
on display and assisting Hechinger retail customers. 
 
Thus, when Burch’s involvement resumed, after the 
delivery, her activities – that is, arranging the display 
of flowers and answering the questions of Hechinger retail 
customers – were, as previously noted, tasks that were 
normally performed by Hechinger employees.  That she was 
motivated to perform such tasks by the prospect of 
 
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increased future sales does not change the fact that both 
activities further the retail business of Hechinger and are 
normally performed by Hechinger employees. 
CONCLUSION 
 
The evidence at the hearing on Hechinger’s plea in bar 
was sufficient to support the circuit court’s finding that, 
by virtue of engaging in work normally performed by 
Hechinger employees, Burch was a statutory employee of 
Hechinger at the time of the accident.  Thus, her sole 
remedy lies in workers’ compensation and her negligence 
action against Hechinger is barred by the exclusivity 
provision of the Act.  For this reason, we find no error 
and will affirm the judgment of the circuit court 
dismissing this action. 
Affirmed. 
 
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