Title: Drummond v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ALVIN L.  DRUMMOND, 
 
§ 
§ 
No.  532, 2002 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
Appellant, 
 
 
 
§ 
Court Below–Superior Court  
§ 
of the State of Delaware, in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
and for Sussex County in 
§ 
IS01-11-0461 - 0464; IS01- 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
11-0468 - 0471; IS01-11- 
§ 
0473 - 0476; IS01-12-0768,  
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
0769; IS01-12-0773 - 0779; 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
IS-01-12-0707 - 0718. 
§ 
§ 
Def.  ID No.  0111006853  
 
Submitted: 
June 4, 2003 
Decided: 
October 2, 2003 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and STEELE, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 2nd day of October 2003, upon consideration of the appellant’s brief 
filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney’s motion to withdraw, 
and the State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
On July 1, 2002, after a five-day trial, Alvin L. Drummond was 
convicted by a Sussex County Superior Court jury of one count of Attempted 
Murder in the First Degree, eights counts of Robbery in the First Degree, one 
count of Burglary in the First Degree, three counts of Kidnapping in the Second 
Degree, four counts of Aggravated Menacing, one count of Conspiracy in the 
Second Degree, one count of Wearing a Disguise During the Commission of a 
 
 
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Felony, one count of Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited, and thirteen 
counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony.  
Drummond was sentenced on August 23, 2002, to life imprisonment plus ninety-
six years.  This is Drummond’s direct appeal. 
(2) 
Drummond’s counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw 
pursuant to Rule 26(c).  The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 
26(c) is twofold.  First, the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made 
a conscientious examination of the record and the law for claims that could 
arguably support the appeal.  Second, the Court must conduct its own review of 
the record and determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least 
arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without an adversary 
presentation.1 
                                                 
1Penson v.  Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v.  Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 
486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v.  California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).  
(3) 
Drummond’s counsel asserts that, based upon a careful and complete 
examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  By letter, 
Drummond’s counsel informed Drummond of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and 
provided him with a copy of the motion to withdraw, the accompanying brief and 
 
 
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the complete trial transcript.  Drummond was also informed of his right to 
supplement his attorney’s presentation.  Drummond responded with a brief that 
raises three issues for this Court’s consideration.  The State has responded to the 
position taken by Drummond’s counsel as well as to the issues raised by 
Drummond and has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 
(4) 
The evidence at trial established that on Friday, November 9, 2001, 
at approximately 11:00 p.m., Valerie Harmon’s home in Frankford, Delaware was 
invaded by a masked man who robbed at gunpoint Harmon and her family2 and a 
visiting neighbor, Conswella Ayres.  At the same time that the masked man was 
robbing the occupants inside of Valerie Harmon’s house, two other unmasked 
men, who were also armed with guns, were robbing other Harmon family 
members and friends who were playing cards and socializing in Harmon’s garage.  
After robbing Harmon and the others inside of the house, the masked man forced 
everyone from the house and into the garage where they joined the other robbery 
victims who had been forced by the two unmasked robbers to lie face down on the 
garage floor.  
(5) 
Soon after the masked man forced the occupants of the house to join 
those in the garage, a vehicle drove into the Harmon driveway.  A passenger, 
                                                 
2Family members in the house included Valerie Harmon’s seventeen year-old son,  eleven- 
year old daughter, and seven year-old granddaughter.  
 
 
4 
Thomassena White, who lived at the Harmon residence and who was returning 
home from work, got out of the car intending to go into the house.  As she 
approached the house, however, Ms. White was accosted from behind by the 
masked man, who forced her to go to the garage.  The masked man then 
approached the vehicle that was still parked in the Harmon driveway.  The masked 
man opened the driver’s door and, after a brief exchange of words with the driver, 
shot several times at point blank range, hitting the driver, Travis White, in the leg.  
A third person in the car, Tyrone Brackett, jumped from the car and ran.   
(6) 
Upon hearing the gunshots, the two unmasked robbers fled the 
garage, and the area, on foot, disposing of their guns in the woods.  They were 
apprehended by police ninety minutes later.  Drummond was arrested two days 
later on November 11, 2001. 
(7) 
Numerous witnesses testified at Drummond’s trial as to the events of 
November 9, 2001.  One of the witnesses was nineteen year-old Brandon Gibbs, 
who was one of the two unmasked men who had robbed the occupants of Valerie 
Harmon’s garage.  Gibbs testified that Drummond was the masked man who 
robbed the occupants of Harmon’s house.   
(8) 
Gibbs testified that Drummond, who was driving, and another man, 
Mark Tingle, picked him up in Seaford at around 9:00 p.m. on November 9, 2001. 
 Gibbs had a handgun in his possession.  According to Gibbs, Drummond, Gibbs, 
 
 
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and Tingle, went to Conswella Ayres’ house,3 that was located down the street 
from Valerie Harmon’s house, where Drummond used the telephone.  Drummond 
then drove Gibbs and Tingle to the Harmon residence and parked alongside the 
road in a wooded area a short distance from the house.  Gibbs testified that 
Drummond gave Tingle a handgun and instructed Gibbs and Tingle to go to 
Harmon’s garage and rob everybody there while Drummond went to the house.  
Then, according to Gibbs, Drummond removed a mask from the trunk of his car, 
put the mask on, and all three men walked toward the house and the garage. 
                                                 
3Conswella Ayres is the mother of two of Drummond’s children. 
 
 
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(9) 
As instructed by Drummond, Gibbs and Tingle went inside the 
garage.  Once there, they threatened the occupants with handguns and removed 
from them money, cell phones and, in one case, a buck knife.  Approximately 
twenty minutes later, after hearing gunshots, Gibbs and Tingle ran from the garage 
and looked for Drummond’s car, but the car was gone.  Gibbs and Tingle then 
began walking, throwing their guns away in the woods.  Ninety minutes later, they 
were picked up by the police and questioned about the robberies.4    
(10) On appeal, Drummond has raised three issues for this Court’s 
consideration.  Drummond claims that (i) he was prejudiced by misstatements 
made by the prosecutor during the State’s closing and rebuttal arguments, (ii) the 
trial court abused its discretion when it admitted Conswella Ayres’ out-of-court 
                                                 
4Gibbs and Tingle were charged with numerous offenses stemming from the incident on 
November 9, 2001.  Gibbs pled guilty on June 10, 2002, to one count of Robbery in the Second 
Degree and one count of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony.  State v. 
Gibbs, Del. Super.  Ct., No.  0111006859, Graves, J.  (June 10, 2002).  As part of his plea 
agreement, Gibbs agreed to testify at Drummond’s trial.  At the time of Drummond’s trial, Gibbs 
was awaiting sentencing.  Tingle, who refused to testify at Drummond’s trial, was found guilty of 
eleven charges stemming from the robberies and was sentenced.  His conviction and sentence were 
affirmed on direct appeal. Tingle v.  State, 2003 WL 141269 (Del.  Supr.). 
 
 
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taped statement, and (iii) he was denied effective the assistance of counsel.  
Drummond’s claims are without merit.   
(11) Drummond cites to several excerpts from the prosecutor’s closing 
and rebuttal arguments that, according to Drummond, misstate the testimony at 
trial.  Specifically, Drummond complains that the prosecutor (i) misstated the time 
of the robbery, (ii) misstated a witness’ testimony about the time of the robbery, 
(iii) mischaracterized a witness’ testimony about the position in which the get-away 
car was parked, and (iv) misstated that one of the robbers wore gloves.  None of 
the prosecutor’s statements were objected to at trial.   
(12) We review the prosecutor’s uncontested misstatements for plain 
error.5  In this case, to constitute plain error, the prosecutor’s misstatements, either 
individually or cumulatively, must have been so clearly prejudicial to substantial 
rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of Drummond’s trial. 6  Indeed, the 
prosecutor’s misstatements “must be so clear and defense counsel’s failure to 
                                                 
5Derose v.  State, ___A.2d___, 2003 WL 21998576 (Del.  Supr.); Warren v.  State, 
774 A.2d 246, 255 (Del.  2001); Del.  Supr.  Ct.  R.  8. 
6Derose v.  State, ___A.2d___, 2003 WL 21998576 (Del.  Supr.). 
 
 
8 
object so inexcusable that a trial judge, in the interest of fundamental fairness, has 
no reasonable alternative than to intervene sua sponte and declare a mistrial or 
issue a curative instruction.”7   
 
                                                 
7Id.  (quoting Trump v.  State, 753 A.2d 963, 964 (Del 2000)).  
 
 
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(13) Drummond claims that the prosecutor misstated or misrepresented 
the time of the robberies when he stated, first, in his opening statement, that the 
robberies took place at “approximately 11:00, 11:30 at night,”8 and later, in his 
closing statement, that the masked individual entered the Harmon residence “at 
10:30 -- approximately 10:00.”9  Contrary to Drummond’s contentions, however, 
these contrasting statements did not misstate or misrepresent the evidence.  There 
were numerous witnesses to the robberies on November 9, 2001.  The witnesses’ 
estimates of the time that the robberies took place were imprecise, but they were 
mostly in the 10:00 to 11:00 p.m. range. 
(14) Second, Drummond complains that the prosecutor misquoted 
Brandon Gibbs’ testimony with respect to how the get-away car was parked.  It is 
true that in his closing argument, the prosecutor mistakenly stated that Gibbs had 
testified that the get-away car was parked head out.10 The misstatement was not, 
however, so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and 
integrity of the trial.  Whether the get-away car was parked head in, head out, or 
                                                 
8Tr., Vol.  E, at 5 (July 1, 2002). 
9Id.  at 17. 
10Gibbs had actually testified that the car was parked alongside the road.  When the 
prosecutor asked Gibbs whether the car was “backed in so the headlights were facing the road or 
was front in,” Gibbs testified that he could not recall.  See Tr., Vol.  C., at 135 (June 26, 2002).    
 
 
10 
alongside the road, the thrust of Gibbs’ testimony about the car was that it was 
gone when he went to look for it after he fled Valerie Harmon’s garage. 
(15) Similarly, Drummond complains that the prosecutor in rebuttal 
argument stated that the masked individual wore gloves when the record did not 
support such a statement.  Drummond is correct that the record does not support 
the prosecutor’s statement that the masked individual wore gloves; however, the 
prosecutor’s misstatement was not so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to 
jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial.  The presence or absence of gloves 
worn by the masked robber was of no apparent consequence to the case. 
(16) Finally,  Drummond complains that the prosecutor misrepresented a 
witness’ testimony as to the time of the robbery.  In his rebuttal argument, the 
prosecutor stated that Sol Feliciano, a defense alibi witness, “testified repeatedly” 
as to the time of day, i.e., “11:00 [p.m.],” that Drummond was at her home in 
Georgetown.11  Although Feliciano did testify that Drummond arrived at her 
apartment in Georgetown “a little after 11:00,”12 the transcript reveals that 
Feliciano testified repeatedly as to the date, i.e., “November 11,” of Drummond’s 
visit, and not the time, as stated by the prosecutor.13   
 
                                                 
11Tr., Vol.  E, at 53 (July 1, 2002). 
12Tr., Vol.  D, at 35 (June 27, 2002). 
13The transcript reveals that Drummond’s defense counsel initially misstated the date when 
 
 
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he questioned Feliciano on direct examination.  See Tr., Vol.  D, at 34 (June 27, 2002).  
Eventually, however, Drummond’s defense counsel was able to elicit from Feliciano that she had 
seen Drummond on a Friday; and on cross-examination, Feliciano testified that she had been wrong 
when she testified earlier that the date was November 11.  See Tr., Vol.  E, at 8-9 (July 1, 2002). 
 
 
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(17) The prosecutor’s confusion regarding Feliciano’s testimony as to the 
time and/or date of Drummond’s visit, as well as the other prosecutorial 
misstatements alleged by Drummond, did not constitute plain error.  There is no 
indication in this record that the prosecutor intentionally misstated the evidence or 
misled the jury.14  Viewed individually or collectively, the misstatements were not 
so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity 
of Drummond’s trial. 
(18) Next, Drummond complains that the trial court abused its discretion 
when admitting Conswella Ayres’ taped out-of-court statement to the police.  
According to Drummond, Ayres’ statement implicating Drummond had been 
coerced by the police and contained falsehoods and hearsay and “falls under fruits 
of the poison tree.”  
                                                 
14See Morris v.  State, 795 A.2d 653, 659 n. 12 (Del.  2002) (citing to Hughes v.  State, 
437 A.2d 559, 567 (Del.  1981)). 
 
 
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(19) The record reflects that Ayres was called as a prosecution witness.  
Ayres had been present when the masked individual entered Valerie Harmon’s 
home, and she may have been aware of Drummond’s plans.15  Ayres’ trial 
testimony, however, favored Drummond.  Consequently, the State sought, 
pursuant to title 11 section 3507 of the Delaware Code, to introduce into evidence 
Ayres’ out-of-court taped statement to the police in which she implicated 
Drummond in the robberies.  Drummond’s defense counsel, who had previously 
reviewed Ayres’ taped statement, did not object to its admission nor did he accept 
the trial court’s explicit offer for voir dire of the police officer on the issue of 
voluntariness.    
(20) After the tape was admitted into evidence and played for the jury, 
Ayres testified on cross-examination that she had lied in her statement, and that 
Drummond was not the person who had committed the robberies on November 9, 
2001.  According to Ayres, when the detective threatened to charge her with 
                                                 
15Ayres was compelled to testify under a grant of immunity.  See Del.  Code Ann.  tit.11, § 
3506 (2001). 
 
 
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robbery, she told the detective “what he wanted to hear,”16 i.e., that Drummond 
had committed the robberies. 
                                                 
16Tr., Vol.  C., at 109 (June 26, 2002). 
 
 
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(21) On appeal, Drummond challenges the admissibility of Ayres’ taped 
out-of-court statement by questioning the voluntariness of the statement.17  
Drummond, however, did not properly challenge the voluntariness of Ayres’ 
statement prior to its admission into evidence.  Consequently, we  review the claim 
under the plain error standard,18 i.e., for error that is so clearly prejudicial to 
substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.19 
                                                 
17Title 11, section 3507 of the Delaware Code provides, in pertinent part, that “[i]n a 
criminal prosecution, the voluntary out-of-court prior statement of a witness who is present and 
subject to cross-examination may be used as affirmative evidence with substantive independent 
testimonial value” (emphasis added). 
18Hubbard v.  State, 2001 WL 1089664 (Del.  Supr). 
19Id. 
 
 
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(22) There was no plain error in the admission of Ayres’ out-of-court 
statement.  At the time the statement was admitted, the issue of voluntariness was 
not in dispute.  Drummond’s counsel agreed with the Superior Court, and the 
record supports, that the State laid a proper foundation for the admission of the 
statement pursuant to Section 3507.20  Moreover, Drummond declined the 
Superior Court’s explicit offer for voir dire of the police officer on the issue of 
voluntariness, and he did not object to the admission of the tape.  Under these 
circumstances, Ayres’ statement was properly admitted under Section 3507.  From 
that point on, the issue of voluntariness, and the weight of Ayres’ conflicting of 
accounts of November 9, were matters properly for the jury’s consideration.21  It 
was the jury’s role as the trier of fact to resolve any issues concerning Ayres’ 
credibility and to consider any claim of involuntariness as it affected the weight of 
the evidence.22  
(23) Finally, Drummond generally accuses defense counsel of ineffective 
assistance.  It is settled law, however, that this Court will not consider a claim of 
                                                 
20A two-part foundation must be established before a witness’ out-of-court statement may 
be offered into evidence pursuant Section 3507: (i) the witness must testify as to the truthfulness of 
the statement; and (ii) the witness must testify as to the events perceived or heard.  Feleke v.  
State, 620 A.2d 222, 226-67 (Del.  1993). 
21Hatcher v.  State, 337 A.2d 30, 32 (Del.  1975). 
22Tyre v.  State, 412 A.2d 326, 330 (Del. 1980); Riley v.  State, 1998 WL 780354 (Del. 
 Supr.). 
 
 
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ineffective assistance of counsel for the first time on direct appeal. 23   Accordingly, 
we will not review Drummond’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim in this 
appeal. 
(24) The Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that 
Drummond’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable 
issue.  We are also satisfied that Drummond’s counsel has made a conscientious 
effort to examine the record and has properly determined that Drummond could 
not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
                                                 
23Desmond v.  State, 654 A.2d 821, 829 (Del.  1994) 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm is 
GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  The motion to 
withdraw is moot. 
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ E. Norman Veasey 
Chief Justice