Title: Connie Ray Israel v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC05-1739 
____________ 
 
CONNIE RAY ISRAEL,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC06-653 
____________ 
 
CONNIE RAY ISRAEL,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
WALTER A. MCNEIL, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[March 20, 2008] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Connie Ray Israel appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion to 
vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death filed under 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  He also petitions this Court for a writ 
of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For 
the reasons expressed below, we affirm the order denying postconviction relief and 
deny the petition for habeas corpus. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Connie Ray Israel was convicted of burglary of a dwelling with a battery, 
kidnapping, sexual battery with great force, and first-degree murder arising out of 
the December 27, 1991, murder of 77-year-old Esther Hagans in her home in 
Putnam County.  See Israel v. State, 837 So. 2d 381, 384 (Fla. 2002).  Hagans’ 
body was discovered in the bedroom of her house by the police after they were 
summoned by a neighbor when Hagans did not respond to a telephone call.  
Hagans had been sexually assaulted and struck on the head, which caused major 
brain hemorrhaging.  The medical examiner testified that Hagans had a weak heart 
and it gave out due to the stress and shock of the beating and sexual assault.  Id.  
Semen stains from the scene were ultimately identified as Israel’s through DNA 
testing.  Id. at 385. 
Evidence and testimony at trial showed that Israel stayed at several Palatka 
hotels after Hagans’ murder and paid for the rooms in cash.  Israel bought cocaine 
from his dealer three or four times on the day after the murder and also paid in 
cash.  Israel told a number of individuals that he had “hit the lottery.”  A prisoner 
housed in the same cell with Israel testified that Israel stated he was charged with 
 
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first-degree murder, that he “tried to knock that bitch’s head off,” that he sexually 
assaulted Hagans, and that he went into her house to steal some church money.  Id. 
at 384-85. 
Israel was the only defense witness at trial.  He denied having any 
involvement in Hagans’ murder or confessing to his cellmate.  Israel testified that 
the law enforcement officers took Hagans’ money and made the scene look like a 
murder.  Israel insisted that his semen was not found at the scene and that the 
officers had planted his blood at the scene.  Id. at 385. 
The jury returned a guilty verdict on all four counts in the indictment.  After 
the penalty phase, the jury returned an advisory sentence of death by a vote of 
eleven to one.  The trial court followed the jury’s recommendation and sentenced 
Israel to death on the first-degree murder conviction.  The court found four 
aggravating circumstances:  (1) the defendant was previously convicted of violent 
felony; (2) the crime was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel (HAC); (3) the 
crime was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a 
sexual battery, burglary, and kidnaping; and (4) the capital felony was committed 
for pecuniary gain.  The court found two statutory mitigating circumstances:  (1) 
the defendant was under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance at the time the crime occurred; and (2) the defendant’s capacity to 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
 
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requirements of the law was substantially impaired.  The court gave some weight 
to these mitigating circumstances.  Id. 
On direct appeal to this Court, Israel raised seven issues.1  However, this 
Court found no merit to the claims and affirmed Israel’s convictions and the death 
sentence.  Id. at 394. 
Israel filed a motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.851, raising sixteen claims.  An evidentiary hearing was conducted by 
the trial court on January 20, 2005.  The witnesses at the hearing included Israel’s 
trial attorney Clyde Wolf, defense mental health experts Dr. Brad Fisher (a 
forensic psychologist) and Dr. Jonathan Lipman (a neuropharmacologist), and 
State mental health expert Dr. Harry McClaren (a forensic psychologist). 
Dr. Fisher testified that he had interviewed Israel on several occasions and 
had reviewed previous psychological evaluations and various records, including 
family interviews, court records, school records, and medical records.  However, 
Dr. Fisher was unable to conduct any meaningful testing because Israel refused to 
cooperate.  Based on the interviews and the materials that he reviewed, Dr. Fisher 
                                          
 
 
1.  Israel claimed the trial court erred in (1) conducting portions of the trial 
when he was involuntarily excluded; (2) denying his motion for continuance of 
trial; (3) denying his motion for a mistrial; (4) requiring him to be held in visible 
restraints before the jury; (5) ignoring nonstatutory mitigating evidence of drug 
abuse, brain damage, and low intellectual functioning presented during the penalty 
phase; and (6) allowing the jury’s death sentence recommendation to stand even 
though it was grounded on a split jury vote.  Israel also claimed that his death 
sentence was disproportionate.   
 
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opined that Israel has a paranoid personality, suffered some level of neurological 
impairment at age five, has borderline intelligence with an IQ of 81, and has 
polysubstance abuse that started at an early age.  Dr. Fisher testified that his 
findings were very similar to and consistent with those of the mental health expert 
who testified at Israel’s trial, psychologist Dr. Harry Krop. 
Dr. Lipman testified that he had reviewed the reports of the previous and 
current mental health experts, Israel’s criminal records, this Court’s opinion on 
direct appeal, the transcripts of the trial testimony by Israel and Dr. Krop, the 
transcript of the sentencing proceeding, the sentencing order, and the interviews of 
Israel’s family members.  Dr. Lipman also interviewed Israel on two separate days 
and discussed the case with Dr. Fisher.  Dr. Lipman testified that Israel had an 
extensive record of drug use, principally crack cocaine.  He explained that cocaine 
usage would tremendously exacerbate Israel’s underlying psychological disorders 
that had been diagnosed by the other mental health experts.  Dr. Lipman stated that 
these effects could include delusions, hallucinations, and irrational fears.  
However, because Israel had not cooperated with him, Dr. Lipman could not offer 
a more specific evaluation. 
The State’s expert, Dr. McClaren, testified that he was able to interview 
Israel for about two hours.  Israel refused to cooperate after this initial interview.  
Dr. McClaren reviewed the same documents as Drs. Fisher and Lipman, but also 
 
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reviewed Israel’s files from the Department of Corrections.  Dr. McClaren testified 
that Israel meets the criteria for paranoid personality disorder and antisocial 
personality disorder and is suffering from polysubstance dependence.  Dr. 
McClaren also could not rule out that Israel suffers from some degree of brain 
dysfunction, a delusional disorder relating to his bodily functions, depression, 
paraphilia (aberrant sexual arousal) with a nonconsenting partner, and sexual 
sadism.  However, Dr. McLaren was also unable to make definitive diagnoses 
because of Israel’s refusal to cooperate. 
Trial counsel Wolfe testified that he was appointed as Israel’s attorney and 
that he was the fourth attorney to represent Israel in his case.  Wolfe was originally 
appointed as stand-by counsel while Israel represented himself.  As soon as Wolfe 
was appointed as full counsel, he filed a motion for the appointment of an 
investigator.  Because Israel denied any involvement in Hagan’s homicide, Wolfe 
concentrated on a reasonable doubt defense.  Wolfe requested Dr. Krop be 
appointed as a mental health expert to evaluate Israel’s status.  However, Israel did 
not cooperate with Dr. Krop’s evaluation.  Investigator John O’Malley contacted 
Israel’s family members and sought Israel’s school records.  Israel’s family was 
not helpful in this investigation. 
 
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The trial court issued an order denying all relief on August 9, 2005.  Israel 
has appealed that denial to this Court.  He has also petitioned this Court for a writ 
of habeas corpus. 
APPEAL OF RULE 3.851 POSTCONVICTION MOTION 
 
Israel appeals the denial of his postconviction motion to this Court, raising 
five issues.  Israel asserts that:  (1) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance 
during closing argument of the penalty phase; (2) trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance in failing to file a sentencing memorandum for the Spencer2 hearing; (3) 
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to present mitigating 
evidence and to prepare an expert witness prior to his penalty phase testimony; (4) 
procedural and substantive errors deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial; and 
(5) Florida’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  We 
address each claim in turn below. 
 
In order to succeed on his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, 
Israel must satisfy both prongs of the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668 (1984).  As explained by this Court,  
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 
lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
                                          
 
 
2.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688, 690-91 (Fla. 1993) (explaining the 
procedure to be used in sentencing phase proceedings, including a hearing at which 
both sides can present argument and additional evidence). 
 
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competent performance under prevailing professional standards. 
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.  A court 
considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel need not make a 
specific ruling on the performance component of the test when it is 
clear that the prejudice component is not satisfied. 
Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986) (citations omitted).  
Because both prongs of the Strickland test present mixed questions of law and fact, 
this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the trial court’s factual 
findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviewing the 
court’s legal conclusions de novo.  See Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 771-72 
(Fla. 2004). 
Penalty Phase Closing Argument 
 
Israel argues that his trial counsel did not present a proper closing argument 
in which he reviewed all of the possible mitigating factors.  Israel cites both the 
brevity of the argument, which only consists of three pages in the record, and its 
lack of intensity.  He also contends that trial counsel should have either objected to 
statements made by the State made during its closing argument or responded to the 
statements during the defense closing argument. 
 
In the State’s closing argument, the prosecutor recited the evidence in 
support of the aggravating factors, including that Israel had three prior convictions 
for violent crimes (the burglary of a structure with an assault; battery, kidnapping, 
 
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robbery, and sexual battery; and battery on a law enforcement officer), that he 
killed Hagans during the course of a sexual battery, kidnapping and burglary, that 
the murder was HAC, and that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain.  The 
State concluded its closing argument by summarizing the testimony of the defense 
mental health expert as follows: 
So, what are we left with?  All of this evidence that cries out for 
the death penalty and a doctor who comes in and tells you what, he 
couldn’t help it, he was born that way.  This man was born evil, born 
bad, he’s going to be that way for now on and there’s nothing I can do 
except identify it for you.  I can give him some tests, I wish I could 
give him some more, but I can tell you that is what’s wrong with him, 
he’s got diffuse brain damage and he goes around raping women and 
beating them up.  That’s what’s wrong with him. 
 
Well, Ladies and Gentlemen, you decide how much mitigation 
that deserves.  How much weight do you give to he just does it 
because he does it? 
 
I submit to you that although the decision is difficult in thinking 
of the outcome, that is, someone’s going to die here, the 
overwhelming evidence is easy. 
 
Israel’s trial counsel did not object to this argument by the State.  
Additionally, counsel’s only response to these statements during defense closing 
argument was that “no one has testified Mr. Israel does these things just because he 
does these things.”  Trial counsel argued that Israel would be incarcerated for the 
rest of his life, in light of the circumstances of the case and the fact that he was 
already serving a sentence for a prior offense.  Counsel also argued that the 
uncontroverted testimony of the mental health expert showed that Israel was under 
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance and that his capacity to 
 
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conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired.  
Counsel also noted that Israel’s long-term cocaine use and longstanding mental and 
psychological problems impaired his ability to control his behavior and urged the 
jury to consider these in the its sentencing recommendation.  Finally, counsel told 
the jurors that they should recommend a life sentence, in light of all of these 
matters. 
 
In the sentencing order, the trial court found no nonstatutory mitigating 
circumstances applicable to Israel’s case because “[h]is record is bad, his character 
worse, and the offense itself is horrible.”  Accordingly, the trial court assigned no 
weight to nonstatutory mitigation.  On direct appeal, Israel claimed that the trial 
court erred when it failed to find nonstatutory mitigating evidence of drug abuse, 
brain damage, and low intellectual functioning.  Israel, 837 So. 2d at 392.  This 
Court found no error because “Israel failed to identify the areas of drug abuse, 
brain damage, and low intellectual functioning as specific nonstatutory mitigation 
for the trial court to consider.”  Id.  This Court explained that, unlike statutory 
mitigation that has been clearly defined by the Legislature, the parameters of 
nonstatutory mitigation are “largely undefined” and can include “any factor that 
could reasonably bear on the sentence.”  Id. at 391-92 (quoting Nelson v. State, 
748 So. 2d 237, 243 (Fla. 1999)).  Thus, the defendant has a burden to identify the 
nonstatutory mitigation relied upon.  Id. at 392.  Israel asserts that had counsel 
 
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specifically identified these nonstatutory mitigating factors during closing 
argument of the penalty phase, he could have persuaded the jury that a life 
sentence was warranted. 
The lower court denied relief on this postconviction claim, stating that a 
review of counsel’s closing argument did not reveal either deficient performance or 
prejudice.  The court noted that counsel addressed Israel’s impaired ability due to 
drug use and his longstanding mental and psychological problems, told the jury 
that Israel would die in jail if given a life sentence, and told the jury that Israel’s 
life was in their hands. 
 
There is no question that Wolfe’s closing argument was very brief and that 
he did not elaborate on the nonstatutory mitigation that would support a sentence 
of life.  Based on the testimony and evidence presented by the mental health expert 
at the penalty phase,3 counsel could have argued that the nonstatutory mitigating 
                                          
 
 
3.  Dr. Krop testified that Israel had been responsive to neuropsychological 
testing and that he had administered six separate tests.  The tests revealed an IQ of 
81, deficits across the board and “deficiencies in almost all tests,” and brain 
impairment indicative of lifelong organic or neurological impairment rather than a 
head injury.  Dr. Krop also testified that Israel had a history of substance abuse, 
probably cocaine, had a personality disorder with antisocial, paranoid, and 
hypochondriac features, and suffered from “some other personality deficits.”  
Israel’s school records indicated problem behavior, low academic performance, 
that “his mind seems to wander as if he’s in a daze”, and that he appeared 
“emotionally disturbed for hours at a time.”  Dr. Krop opined that Israel was under 
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the murder.  
He also explained that cocaine use would create further problems in terms of 
 
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factors of brain damage, low intellectual functioning, and drug abuse were 
applicable and that the factors were compounded by each other.  See, e.g., Hildwin 
v. State, 951 So. 2d 784, 785 n.1 (Fla. 2006) (noting that the nonstatutory 
mitigation found by the trial court included a history of drug abuse and organic 
brain damage); Crook v. State, 813 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 2002) (reversing the trial 
court’s rejection of defendant’s brain damage as a mitigating circumstance and 
noting that this damage was exacerbated by his use of alcohol and drugs at the time 
of the murder); DeAngelo v. State, 616 So. 2d 440, 443 (Fla. 1993) (describing 
defendant’s brain damage and resulting personality and mood disorders as 
mitigating factors).  Thus, in light of the sentencing order that found no 
nonstatutory mitigation and this Court’s resolution of that issue on direct appeal, 
we conclude that trial counsel’s closing argument could have been more detailed 
and could have elaborated on the nonstatutory mitigating factors.  The real issue, 
however, is whether Israel was prejudiced by counsel’s failure in this regard.  We 
conclude that he was not. 
The trial court found the statutory mental mitigators established based on the 
uncontroverted penalty phase testimony of Dr. Krop, which included testimony 
that Israel has brain damage, low intellectual functioning, and a history of cocaine 
abuse and suffers from a personality disorder with antisocial, paranoid, and 
                                                                                                                                        
impaired judgment, poor impulse control, and inability to consider the 
consequences of his actions. 
 
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hypochondriacal features.  Dr. Krop testified that he met with Israel seven times 
and administered six neuropsychological tests.  However, because Israel generally 
refused to participate in the traditional psychological testing, Dr. Krop had to rely 
in part on earlier psychological reports and information from Israel’s family in 
forming his psychological diagnosis.  Dr. Krop also had a long history with Israel 
dating back to 1993. 
At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, trial counsel Wolfe explained his 
strategy for presenting mitigating evidence and making closing argument.  Counsel 
considered Dr. Krop to be the most favorable witness to present mitigating 
evidence and the two statutory mental mitigators to be the best mitigating factors to 
focus on with the jury.  The jury heard evidence of the nonstatutory mitigating 
factors of brain damage, low intelligence, and substance abuse through Dr. Krop’s 
testimony.  Counsel made a strategic decision not to focus on Israel’s substance 
abuse or to present possibly damaging testimony from family members.  Trial 
counsel told the jury that a life sentence would guarantee that Israel would be 
“incarcerated for the rest of his life” and thus they need not recommend a sentence 
of death.  Trial counsel also reminded the jury of the uncontroverted mitigating 
evidence presented through Dr. Krop’s testimony just a few moments before 
closing argument, including that Israel was under the influence of extreme mental 
or emotional disturbance, had substantially impaired ability to control his conduct, 
 
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had longstanding psychological problems, and cocaine use further impaired his 
ability to control his conduct.  Thus, Israel was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure 
to argue these circumstances with more specificity or detail during closing 
argument. 
Failure to File a Sentencing Memorandum 
Israel asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a sentencing 
memorandum with the trial court.  The record indicates that the State submitted a 
sentencing memorandum arguing for the death penalty a month before the Spencer 
hearing.  At the Spencer hearing, the court requested defense counsel to provide a 
sentencing memorandum analyzing the aggravating and mitigating factors.  
Despite this request, counsel never filed a sentencing memorandum.  Further, at the 
subsequent sentencing hearing, counsel’s only argument was an objection to the 
sentencing recommendations contained in the presentencing investigation report.  
In response to the court’s questioning, counsel stated that there was nothing else he 
wanted to bring to the court’s attention. 
At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, counsel stated that he did not file 
a written sentencing memo because he felt he could articulate the arguments for a 
life sentence better verbally.  Counsel could not explain why he did not make a 
verbal argument for a life sentence or why he did not submit a sentencing memo.  
However, Israel did not present any new mitigating evidence at the postconviction 
 
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hearing, and the testimony and diagnoses of the postconviction experts mirrored 
those of Dr. Krop during the penalty phase of trial. 
 
As discussed above, while counsel’s failure in this regard may have been 
deficient, we do not find that Israel was prejudiced by counsel’s conduct.  The 
sentencing order indicates that the court considered all of the evidence presented 
during the various proceedings.  Further, the postconviction order notes that the 
court “heard and considered testimony presented at various stages of the 
proceedings going to non-statutory mitigators, including Mr. Israel’s drug abuse, 
brain damage, low intellectual functioning as well as Mr. Israel’s character, 
background, record and other circumstances surrounding the offense,” but “[chose] 
to assign no weight to non-statutory mitigating circumstances.”  The court 
“independently identif[ied] and weigh[ed] the mitigating and aggravating factors in 
determining whether to impose the death penalty.”  Thus, counsel’s failure to file a 
sentencing memorandum did not result in prejudice to Israel. 
Mitigating Evidence and Expert Witness Testimony 
Israel contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to 
conduct a reasonable investigation of Israel’s background for possible nonstatutory 
mitigating factors, by failing to present adequate mitigating evidence at trial, and 
by failing to properly prepare the sole defense mitigation witness, psychologist Dr. 
Krop, for his testimony at trial. 
 
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The lower court concluded that counsel’s trial performance was not 
ineffective because counsel was able to establish the two statutory mental 
mitigators.  The court rejected the failure to prepare the witness part of this claim 
as conclusory and insufficient.  The order denying relief on this claim detailed the 
testimony from the trial and the evidentiary hearing that refuted Israel’s claim, 
including the evidentiary hearing testimony of trial counsel Wolfe and 
postconviction mental health experts Dr. Fisher and Dr. Lipman. 
At the evidentiary hearing, Wolfe testified about his trial strategy relating to 
mitigation.  Wolfe testified that he hired an experienced investigator who contacted 
Israel’s two sisters and his mother, but that their testimony would have been 
harmful to the case.  Israel’s mother told the investigator that if her son committed 
this crime, he deserved whatever sentence was imposed.  Wolfe also explained that 
Dr. Krop, who was appointed as a mental health expert to evaluate Israel, had been 
involved with Israel since 1993.  During the penalty phase of trial, Dr. Krop had 
testified about Israel’s substance abuse, low intellectual functioning, and possible 
brain damage.  Wolfe had offered this evidence in support of the statutory mental 
mitigators, which he believed the jury would find more compelling than 
nonstatutory mitigation.  Wolfe also made a tactical decision not to focus on 
Israel’s drug history because he believed the jury would not be sympathetic to a 
drug user who committed violent crimes to get drug money. 
 
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Dr. Fisher testified that he agreed with the diagnosis presented by Dr. Krop 
at trial, i.e., that Israel has low intellectual functioning, suffers from organic brain 
damage, has a personality disorder and other deficits, and has a long history of 
substance abuse.  Dr. Lipman also agreed with Dr. Krop’s trial testimony that 
Israel’s psychological disorders would be exacerbated by his cocaine use.  Even 
the State’s expert witness, Dr. McClaren, agreed with Dr. Krop’s trial diagnosis to 
a great extent.  All three postconviction experts testified that Israel had been 
uncooperative with them, which is also what Dr. Krop reported at trial.  In fact, it 
appears that Dr. Krop was able to conduct a more comprehensive evaluation than 
the postconviction experts were.  Dr. Krop successfully administered seven 
psychological tests and was able to offer fairly comprehensive evidence and 
testimony at trial regarding Israel’s psychological impairments.  Based on Dr. 
Krop’s testimony, the trial court found the two statutory mental health mitigators to 
be applicable. 
Based on the postconviction record, we conclude that Israel did not produce 
any mitigating evidence that was not presented at trial.  Additionally, Dr. Krop did 
testify at trial about Israel’s borderline intellectual functioning, organic brain 
damage, and drug use.  At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel offered strategic 
reasons for not presenting family testimony (it would be more harmful than 
helpful) and for not emphasizing Israel’s drug problems (the jury would not be 
 
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sympathetic to a drug abuser who committed violent crimes to get drug money).  
Based on all of the above, the postconviction court was correct in finding that trial 
counsel was not deficient in his presentation of mitigating evidence. 
Israel also argues that counsel was ineffective in preparing Dr. Krop to 
testify at the penalty phase.  Israel complains that Dr. Krop based his trial 
diagnosis in part on psychological reports filed by other mental health experts who 
had evaluated Israel for competency to stand trial.  He also asserts that Dr. Krop 
should not have testified about Israel’s failure to cooperate in these evaluations or 
about the conclusions reached by the other evaluators, including one psychiatrist 
who found no evidence of psychiatric illness. 
Dr. Krop testified at trial that he had reviewed three previous evaluations by 
mental health professionals, that he would always review prior evaluations in 
making an evaluation of an individual, and that Israel had not been cooperative 
during these previous evaluations.  While Dr. Krop testified that one of the experts 
had detected no psychiatric illness, he also testified that the other two doctors had 
diagnosed drug abuse, serious depression, paranoid personality disorder, and 
antisocial personality disorder, which were consistent with Dr. Krop’s diagnosis.  
Even Israel’s own postconviction defense experts had to rely on previous reports 
and information in making their evaluations because Israel refused to cooperate 
with them.  As noted by all of the experts, Israel limited their evaluations by his 
 
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lack of cooperation.  Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective because his client 
refused to fully cooperate in psychological evaluations.  Thus, we agree with the 
trial court’s ruling that Israel is not entitled to postconviction relief on this claim. 
Apprendi and Ring Claims 
Israel claims that Florida’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional under 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 
(2002), because it does not require the aggravating circumstances to be specified in 
the indictment, does not require the jury to be unanimous as to the existence of 
specific aggravating circumstances, and permits death sentence recommendations 
to be based on a simple majority vote of the jury.  We conclude that these claims 
are procedurally barred in these postconviction proceedings.4 
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 
U.S. 348 (2004), held that the decision in Ring is not retroactive.  A majority of 
this Court has also concluded that Ring does not apply retroactively in Florida to 
cases that are final, under the test of Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980).  See 
Johnson v. State, 904 So. 2d 400, 412 (Fla. 2005).  This Court has similarly 
concluded that Apprendi is not retroactive in application.  See Hughes v. State, 901 
So. 2d 837, 848 (Fla. 2005).  Thus, Israel is not entitled to relief on these claims. 
Cumulative Error 
                                          
 
 
4.  In addition, all of these claims have been denied by this Court on the 
merits. 
 
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Israel also claims that he was denied a fundamentally fair trial based on 
cumulative errors that occurred.  “However, where the individual claims of error 
alleged are either procedurally barred or without merit, the claim of cumulative 
error also necessarily fails.”  Parker v. State, 904 So. 2d 370, 380 (Fla. 2005); see 
also Griffin v. State, 866 So. 2d 1, 22 (Fla. 2003).  As discussed in the analysis of 
the individual issues above, the alleged errors are either meritless, procedurally 
barred, or do not meet the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Because the alleged individual errors are without merit, the contention of 
cumulative error is similarly without merit.  Thus, Israel is not entitled to relief on 
this claim.  
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
 
Israel has also petitioned this Court for a writ of habeas corpus, raising four 
claims.  He asserts that:  (1) several of the standard jury instructions given in 
Florida capital cases are unconstitutional and appellate counsel was ineffective for 
failing to litigate these issues on appeal; (2) he may be incompetent to be executed; 
(3) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the rules prohibiting 
juror interviews violate various constitutional guarantees; and (4) execution by 
lethal injection is cruel and unusual punishment.  We address each claim in turn 
below. 
Jury Instructions 
 
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Israel raises a number of claims of instructional error relating to Florida’s 
death penalty.  He claims that:  (1) the instruction on the “committed while 
engaged in the commission of a felony” aggravating factor results in an 
unconstitutional automatic aggravator; (2) the jury instructions on the weighing of 
aggravating and mitigating factors shifted the burden to him to prove that death 
was not the appropriate sentence and improperly led the jury to believe that it need 
not consider mitigating factors unless they outweighed the aggravating factors; and 
(3) the jury instructions diminished the jury’s sense of responsibility for sentencing 
in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), as applied in Ring.  
Finally, he asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective for not litigating these 
claims of instructional error on direct appeal. 
Claims regarding the adequacy or constitutionality of jury instructions 
should be raised on direct appeal.  See Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 665 
(Fla. 2000) (stating that substantive challenges to jury instructions are procedurally 
barred in postconviction challenges because the claims can and therefore should be 
raised on direct appeal).  Moreover, this Court will not consider such procedurally 
barred claims under the guise of ineffective assistance of counsel.  See Rodriguez 
v. State, 919 So. 2d 1252, 1280 (Fla. 2005) (stating that claims that could have 
been raised on direct appeal cannot be relitigated under the guise of ineffective 
assistance of counsel). 
 
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Finally, to the extent that Israel asserts ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel for not litigating these claims of instructional error on direct appeal, he has 
not met his burden.  See Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 2000) 
(explaining that the standard of review applicable to claims of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel raised in a habeas petition mirrors the Strickland 
standard for trial counsel ineffectiveness, i.e., deficient performance and prejudice 
from the deficiency).  Jury instructions “are subject to the contemporaneous 
objection rule, and, absent an objection at trial, can be raised on appeal only if 
fundamental error occurred.”  State v. Delva, 575 So. 2d 643, 644 (Fla. 1991).  
Israel has not asserted that trial counsel objected to any of these instructions.  Nor 
has Israel shown that the alleged instructional error was fundamental error that 
could be raised on appeal even though not preserved at trial.  Thus, appellate 
counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for not raising an unpreserved claim on 
appeal.  See Rodriguez, 919 So. 2d at 1281; Medina v. Dugger, 586 So. 2d 317, 
318 (Fla. 1991). 
Additionally, even assuming that these claims had been properly preserved 
for appellate review, appellate counsel could not be deemed ineffective for failing 
to raise issues that this Court has consistently found to be without merit.  See, e.g., 
Miller v. State, 926 So. 2d 1243, 1257 (Fla. 2006) (rejecting claim that instruction 
diluted the jury's responsibility by labeling their penalty phase verdict as advisory 
 
- 22 -
and not binding); Perez v. State, 919 So. 2d 347, 368 (Fla. 2005) (same), cert. 
denied, 126 S. Ct. 2359 (2006); Griffin v. State, 866 So. 2d 1, 14 (Fla. 2003) 
(same); Rodriguez, 919 So. 2d at 1280 (rejecting claim that the standard jury 
instruction impermissibly shifts the burden to the defense to prove that death is not 
the appropriate sentence); San Martin v. State, 705 So. 2d 1337, 1350 & n. 5 (Fla. 
1997) (concluding that weighing provisions in Florida's death penalty statute 
requiring the jury to determine “[w]hether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist 
which outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist” and the standard 
jury instruction thereon did not unconstitutionally shift the burden to the defendant 
to prove why he should not be given a death sentence); Blanco v. State, 706 So. 2d 
7, 11 (Fla. 1997) (finding instruction on aggravating circumstance of murder in the 
course of a felony does not constitute an automatic aggravator).  Appellate counsel 
cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to pursue meritless issues on direct appeal.  
Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1070-71 (Fla. 2000).  Thus, Israel is not 
entitled to habeas relief on this claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 
Incompetent to be Executed 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.811(a) provides that “[a] person under 
sentence of death shall not be executed while insane to be executed.”  Subsection 
(c) of the same rule provides that “[n]o motion for a stay of execution pending 
hearing, based on grounds of the prisoner's insanity to be executed, shall be 
 
- 23 -
entertained by any court until such time as the Governor of Florida shall have held 
appropriate proceedings for determining the issue pursuant to the appropriate 
Florida Statutes.” 
Israel concedes that this claim is not ripe for review as he has not yet been 
found incompetent and a death warrant has not yet been signed.  He contends that 
he is only raising this issue for preservation purposes.  This Court has repeatedly 
found that no relief is warranted on similar claims.  See State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 
120, 137 n.19 (Fla. 2003) (rejecting Coney’s claim that he is insane to be executed 
where he acknowledged that claim was not yet ripe and was being raised only for 
preservation purposes); Jones v. State, 845 So. 2d 55, 74 (Fla. 2003) (finding claim 
that defendant may be insane to be executed “not ripe for review” where defendant 
was not yet found incompetent and death warrant had not yet been signed; noting 
that defendant made claim “simply to preserve it for review in the federal court 
system”); Hall v. Moore, 792 So. 2d 447, 450 (Fla. 2001) (stating that it is 
premature for a death-sentenced individual to present a claim of incompetency or 
insanity with regard to his execution if a death warrant has not been signed).  Thus, 
Israel is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 
Juror Interview Rules 
Israel argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
challenge the constitutionality of Florida’s restrictions on post-trial jury interviews 
 
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by attorneys.  He claims that rule 4-3.5(d)(4) of the Rules Regulating the Florida 
Bar and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.575 violate his constitutional rights 
of due process and equal protection. 
Rule 4-3.5(d)(4) prohibits a lawyer from initiating communication with any 
juror regarding a trial with which the lawyer is connected, except to determine 
whether the verdict may be subject to legal challenge.  The rule provides that the 
lawyer “may not interview the jurors for this purpose unless the lawyer has reason 
to believe that grounds for such challenge may exist.”  R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-
3.5(d)(4).  Before conducting such an interview, the lawyer must file a notice of 
intent to interview, setting forth the name of the juror to be interviewed.  The 
lawyer must also deliver copies of the notice to the trial judge and opposing 
counsel a reasonable time before the interview. 
Rule 3.575, which became effective in January 2005, establishes the 
procedure for seeking juror interviews where a party has reason to believe that the 
verdict may be subject to legal challenge.  This rule requires the party to file a 
motion to interview with the court and to set forth the names of the jurors to be 
interviewed and the reasons the party believes the verdict may be subject to legal 
challenge.  If the judge makes a finding that the verdict may be subject to 
challenge, he or she enters an order permitting the interview, which is conducted in 
 
- 25 -
the presence of the court and the parties.  If the court does not find a reason to 
challenge the verdict, the court denies permission to interview. 
 
We conclude that Israel is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim for a 
number of reasons.  First, Israel could have and should have brought this claim on 
direct appeal.  Thus, it is procedurally barred in this postconviction proceeding.  
See Suggs v. State, 923 So. 2d 419, 440 (Fla. 2005) (finding that postconviction 
court was correct to find juror interview claim procedurally barred because not 
raised on direct appeal).  Second, even though Israel couches this claim as 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for not raising the claim on direct 
appeal, he makes no assertion that trial counsel actually filed a motion to interview 
jurors that was denied, nor has he alleged any specific juror misconduct that would 
warrant a juror interview.  Id. at 440.  Thus, he has not shown the two prongs 
required to prove ineffective assistance of appellate counsel that would warrant 
habeas relief.  See Rutherford, 774 So. 2d at 643.  Third, this Court has 
consistently rejected constitutional challenges to rule 4-3.5(d)(4).  See, e.g., 
Barnhill v. State, 971 So. 2d 106, 117 (Fla. 2007); Power v. State, 886 So. 2d 952, 
957 (Fla. 2004); Johnson v. State, 804 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 2001).5 
                                          
 
 
5.  The procedure outlined in rule 3.575 is consistent with rule 4-3.5(d)(4).  
Rule 3.575 was adopted because the Rules of Criminal Procedure did not provide a 
procedure for attorneys to interview jurors following a criminal trial.  See 
Amendments to Fla. Rules of Crim. Pro., 886 So. 2d 197, 198-99 (Fla. 2004).  Rule 
3.575 did not abrogate rule 4-3.5(d)(4).  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.575 court comm.  
 
- 26 -
Moreover, both rules provide a mechanism for defendants to interview jurors 
when there are good faith grounds for a challenge.  Even before rule 3.575 was 
adopted, an attorney was required to make sworn allegations that, if true, would 
require a new trial before being allowed to interview any member of the jury.  
Johnson, 804 So. 2d at 1225.  Under rule 3.575, the party who wants to conduct 
juror interviews must file a motion stating the name of the juror to be interviewed 
and the reasons the party believes the verdict is subject to challenge.  As noted 
above, Israel has not alleged that he filed a motion requesting permission to 
interview jurors, nor has he alleged any specific juror misconduct.  As in many 
other cases, Israel’s claim appears to be nothing more than a request to investigate 
possible grounds for finding juror misconduct.  Suggs, 923 So. 2d at 440; Arbelaez 
v. State, 775 So. 2d 909, 920 (Fla. 2000) (finding that a defendant does not have a 
right to conduct “fishing expedition” interviews with the jurors after a guilty 
verdict is returned). 
Lethal Injection 
 
Finally, Israel claims that execution by lethal injection is cruel and unusual 
punishment because, if not properly carried out, there is a risk of unnecessary pain.  
Israel does not assert that lethal injection is inherently cruel and inhumane and, in 
fact, we have specifically held that it is not.  See, e.g., Provenzano v. State, 761 So. 
2d 1097, 1099 (Fla. 2000). 
 
- 27 -
 
When complications occurred in the administration of chemicals during the 
execution of Angel Diaz in December 2006, the Governor issued an executive 
order creating a Commission on the Administration of Lethal Injection.  The 
Commission held four days of hearings on the lethal injection procedures and 
issued a report to the Governor in March 2007.  See Lightbourne v. McCollum, 
969 So. 2d 326, 329-30 (Fla. 2007).  After the Commission issued its report, a 
circuit court held a thirteen-day evidentiary hearing in Lightbourne on the issue of 
lethal injection and the procedures used by the Department of Corrections (DOC) 
in carrying out executions.  In the wake of the Commission report, questions raised 
by the circuit court during its hearing, and DOC’s own internal review, the 
execution procedures were revised.  Id. at 346.  In September 2007, the circuit 
court entered a final order, finding that the August 2007 revised procedures were 
not unconstitutional.  Id. at 331.  On appeal, we concluded that Florida's current 
lethal injection procedures, as actually administered through the DOC, do not 
violate the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.  Id. at 
353. 
 
Israel makes no new argument to support his habeas claim in this case.  In 
light of the extensive evidence presented during the Lightbourne and Commission 
hearings and the revised procedures that have been implemented by DOC, we 
conclude that Israel is not entitled to habeas relief on this issue. 
 
- 28 -
 
- 29 -
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of 
postconviction relief and we deny Israel’s petition for habeas relief. 
 
It is so ordered. 
WELLS, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. 
LEWIS, C.J., and ANSTEAD, J., concur in result only. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Putnam County,  
Kim C. Hammond, Judge – Case No. CR93-1684 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Bill Jennings, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Robert T. Strain and David 
Robert Gemmer, Assistant CCRC, Middle Region, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Kenneth S. Nunnelley, 
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent