Title: Blackmon v. Powell

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 06/07/2013
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013
____________________
1120442
____________________
Timmy Blackmon and Stephanie Blackmon
v.
Eddie Powell d/b/a Powell Plumbing Company
Appeal from Pike Circuit Court
(CV-11-0021)
STUART, Justice.
Timmy Blackmon and Stephanie Blackmon sued Eddie Powell
d/b/a Powell Plumbing Company in the Pike Circuit Court,
asserting 
negligence, 
wantonness, 
breach 
of 
implied
warranties, and breach of contract after a water-supply line
1120442
that Powell had installed in their house ruptured, causing
extensive flooding and water damage.  The trial court entered
a summary judgment in favor of Powell; the Blackmons appeal. 
We affirm.
I.
In approximately April 2008, Timmy, a general contractor
and homebuilder, approached Powell to do the plumbing for a
new house the Blackmons were building as their personal
residence.  Powell had previously done work for Timmy on other
construction projects, and Timmy states that he selected
Powell to do the plumbing in his personal house because Powell
was "reliable" and he and Powell had "a good relationship." 
Timmy and Powell thereafter reached an oral agreement for
Powell to do the plumbing in the house; Timmy later described
the terms of that agreement as follows in his deposition:
"And we had a verbal agreement –– [Powell] came
out and looked at it, and we had a verbal agreement
for him to plumb my house.  We were supposed to
supply the faucets and sinks.  He was supposed to
supply everything from the faucets, sinks –– from
the faucets and sinks down, including the supply
line, drain lines, waterlines, plumbing lines, sewer
lines to complete –– to do a complete project on my
house."
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1120442
Powell does not dispute these basic elements of their
agreement, agreeing that the Blackmons were to supply the
fixtures and, in return for an agreed-upon sum based upon the
number of connections made, he was to install the fixtures and
supply whatever else was needed to connect them to the main
water and sewer lines and to make them functional.
In approximately September 2008, Powell went to the
Blackmons' house to install a vessel sink and waterfall faucet
in an upstairs half-bathroom.  Stephanie had purchased the
sink and faucet on the Internet from separate sources, and,
when Powell arrived, the Blackmons had placed the boxes
containing those items in the half-bathroom where they were to
be installed, as was the Blackmons' custom for plumbing
fixtures they had purchased.   Upon opening the box containing
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the faucet, Powell discovered that two water-supply 
lines 
were
included, and he accordingly used those supply lines during
the installation to connect the hot and cold water to the
faucet.  After the installation was complete, Powell turned
The Blackmons state that they no longer have any records
1
from which they might identify the Internet sources from which
they purchased the sink and the faucet.
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1120442
the water on to check for leaks and found none.  Timmy also
visually inspected the work and saw nothing wrong.
The next 18 months were apparently uneventful with regard
to Powell's plumbing installation, and the Blackmons and 
their
guests used the sink and faucet in the upstairs half-bathroom
without incident and without any signs of a problem or
leakage.  However, at some time on March 18, 2010, the cold-
water-supply line running to the faucet broke at the point
where the coupling threaded onto the base of the faucet,
causing water to flood the bathroom and eventually other parts
of the house.  Timmy returned to the house at approximately
9:00 p.m. and, upon discovering the flooding, turned off the
water-supply valve; however, at that point there was standing
water throughout the house.  He then telephoned Powell, who
agreed to come over the next day.
Upon arriving at the house the next day, Powell tested
the water pressure in the house and found it to be in the low
to normal range and thus unlikely to have caused the water-
supply line to rupture.  Both Timmy and Powell agree that they
have never seen a similar rupture in a water-supply line in
all 
their 
years 
working 
as 
contractor 
and 
plumber,
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1120442
respectively, and, for all that appears, the rupture was
apparently caused by some latent defect in the water-supply
line that was not readily detectable.  Notably, there is no
evidence indicating that the rupture was attributable to any
action or error committed by Powell during the installation.
On February 2, 2011, the Blackmons sued Powell, alleging
that he was ultimately responsible for the damage to their
house.  Their complaint, as later amended, asserted claims of 
negligence, wantonness, breach of implied warranties, and
breach of contract.  The Blackmons subsequently moved the
trial court to enter a summary judgment in their favor on all
claims; Powell responded by also filing a motion for a summary
judgment.  Following an August 6, 2012, hearing on those
motions, the trial court granted Powell's motion, denied the
Blackmons' motion, and entered a judgment accordingly.  The
Blackmons' subsequent motion to alter, amend, or vacate that
judgment was denied by the trial court on November 26, 2012,
and, on January 7, 2013, the Blackmons filed their notice of
appeal to this Court.
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1120442
II.
We review a summary judgment pursuant to the following
standard:  
"This Court's review of a summary judgment is de
novo.  Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
886 So. 2d 72, 74 (Ala. 2003).  We apply the same
standard of review as the trial court applied.
Specifically, we must determine whether the movant
has made a prima facie showing that no genuine issue
of material fact exists and that the movant is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule
56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So. 2d 949, 952-53 (Ala.
2004).  In making such a determination, we must
review the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmovant.  Wilson v. Brown, 496 So. 2d 756, 758
(Ala. 1986).  Once the movant makes a prima facie
showing that there is no genuine issue of material
fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to
produce 'substantial evidence' as to the existence
of a genuine issue of material fact.  Bass v.
SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794,
797-98 (Ala. 1989); Ala. Code 1975, § 12-21-12."
Dow v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So. 2d 1035, 1038-39
(Ala. 2004).
III.
The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of
Powell on all four counts alleged by the Blackmons ––
negligence, wantonness, breach of implied warranties, and
breach of contract.  With regard to the negligence and
wantonness claims, the Blackmons argue that Powell acted
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1120442
negligently 
or 
wantonly 
in 
installing 
a 
defective 
water-supply
line in the upstairs half-bathroom.  They do not argue that
Powell committed any error during the actual installation
process that caused the subsequent rupture; rather, his only
error, they argue, was choosing to use the apparently
defective supply line that came with the faucet.  See the
Blackmons' brief, p. 14 (stating that "the claims of the
Blackmons are not that Mr. Powell was deficient in his
workmanship, it is that the product that he agreed to install
and provide and was paid for as part of the contract, namely
the supply line, which he consciously and voluntarily chose to
use, failed").
In completing the work the Blackmons contracted him to
do, Powell had a duty to exercise due care.  See Armstrong
Bus. Servs., Inc. v. AmSouth Bank, 817 So. 2d 665, 679 (Ala.
2001) ("At common law, a duty of due care can accompany a
contractual obligation 
...."), and Waters v. American 
Cas. Co.
of Reading, Pa., 261 Ala. 252, 258, 73 So. 2d 524, 529 (1953)
("When the contract does not in terms require reasonable care
in doing the act stipulated to be done, the law imposes a duty
–– but does not imply a contract –– to exercise due care in
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1120442
doing the act ....").  The evidence in the record indicates
that Powell installed the water-supply line in question and
then tested it to verify that it was watertight, which it was. 
Timmy also reviewed the installation and apparently saw no
problems, and the water-supply line thereafter worked as
expected until the date of the rupture some 18 months later. 
As the party alleging negligence, the Blackmons bore the
burden of putting forth evidence indicating that Powell had
breached his duty to exercise due care; however, there is no
evidence in the record that would indicate such a breach.  
With regard to the Blackmons' wantonness claim, there is
no evidence indicating that Powell recklessly committed an 
act
–– or recklessly failed to commit a necessary act –– that led
to the ruptured water-supply line.  See Armstrong Business
Services, 817 So. 2d at 679-80 (setting forth the elements of
negligence and wantonness).  Certainly, the mere fact that
Powell used the new water-supply lines that were packaged with
the faucet –– which by all accounts appeared to be functional
and which operated as intended for 18 months after the initial
installation –– is insufficient, without more, to create a
genuine issue of material fact as to the negligence and
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1120442
wantonness claims.  The summary judgment entered on the
negligence and wantonness counts was accordingly proper.
The analysis of the Blackmons' breach-of-contract and
breach-of-implied-warranty-of-workmanship claims is related. 
As this Court explained in Turner v. Westhampton Court,
L.L.C., 903 So. 2d 82, 93 (Ala. 2004), a breach-of-contract
claim in a case like this is effectively the same as a breach-
of-the-implied-warranty-of-workmanship claim:
"The 
[plaintiffs'] 
third 
allegation 
is 
that 
[the
defendant homebuilder] breached the contract of sale
by tendering a poorly built house.  Specifically,
the 
[plaintiffs] 
argue 
that 
[the 
defendant]
contracted to build the house in accordance with the
skill and abilities of a homebuilder and that [the
defendant] failed to perform this contractual duty.
While the [plaintiffs] characterize this as a cause
of action for breach of contract, the cause of
action is more accurately classified as one for the
breach of the implied warranty of workmanship.
"The law implies a duty upon all contracting
parties to use reasonable skill in fulfilling their
contractual obligations.  Sherrill v. Alabama
Appliance Co., 240 Ala. 46, 50, 197 So. 1, 4 (1940);
Mobile Life Ins. Co. v. Randall, 74 Ala. 170, 176-77
(1883).  In the context of the sale of a new house,
a builder-vendor such as [the defendant] is
obligated to construct a house that it will offer
for sale in a workmanlike manner.  Stephens v.
Creel, 429 So. 2d 278, 280 (Ala. 1983).  This
obligation manifests itself in the implied warranty
of 
workmanship. 
While 
improper 
or 
faulty
construction constitutes a technical performance of
the 
contract 
and 
may 
survive 
a 
pure
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1120442
breach-of-contract action, an action alleging the
breach of an implied warranty, such as the implied
warranty 
of 
workmanship, 
can 
overcome 
this
obstacle."
Thus, in this case, Powell technically fulfilled his
obligations under his contract with the Blackmons by
completing the tasks he was hired to do, regardless of the
quality of the plumbing services he provided.  However, the
Blackmons may nevertheless 
recover 
for any poor workmanship by
way of a breach-of-the-implied-warranty-of-workmanship claim
if there is evidence indicating that Powell failed "to use
reasonable 
skill 
in 
fulfilling 
[his] 
contractual 
obligations." 
903 So. 2d at 93.  See also C.P. Robbins & Assocs. v. Stevens,
53 Ala. App. 432, 436, 301 So. 2d 196, 199 (Ala. Civ. App.
1974) ("It is a general rule in contracts for work or services
that there is implied a duty to perform with that degree of
skill or workmanship which is possessed by those of ordinary
skill in the particular trade for which one is employed."). 
We have discussed supra the evidence indicating that Powell
exercised due care in the course of completing his plumbing
work for the Blackmons and concluded that the Blackmons failed
to put forth evidence refuting that evidence.  Similarly, we
hold that the Blackmons failed to put forth any evidence
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1120442
indicating that Powell did not perform his work with
reasonable or ordinary skill.  The trial court therefore
properly entered a summary judgment in favor of Powell on the
breach-of-contract 
and 
breach-of-implied-warranty-of-
workmanship claims.
Finally, we note that count three of the Blackmons'
complaint asserts a general breach-of-implied-warranties
claim.  We have already discussed a breach-of-the-implied-
warranty-of-workmanship claim; however, this count arguably
alleges a breach-of-the-implied-warranty-of-merchantability
claim as well.  This Court explained implied warranties of
merchantability 
as 
follows 
in 
DaimlerChrysler 
Corp. 
v. 
Morrow,
895 So. 2d 861, 864 (Ala. 2004):
"The implied warranty of merchantability is
found in Ala. Code 1975, § 7-2-314.  '[A] warranty
that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in
a contract for their sale if the seller is a
merchant with respect to goods of that kind.'  §
7-2-314(1).  'Goods to be merchantable must be at
least such as ... [a]re fit for the ordinary
purposes for which such goods are used.'  §
7-3-314(2)(c).  '[T]he term [merchantability] means
that a good sold carries with it an inherent
soundness which makes that good suitable for the
purpose for which it was designed.'  Agri-Business
Supply Co. v. Hodge, 447 So. 2d 769, 773 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1984)."
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As we have emphasized, however, "implied warranties [of
merchantability] are applicable only to sellers."  Ex parte
General Motors Corp., 769 So. 2d 903, 910 (Ala. 1999)
(emphasis added).  In this case, the water-supply line that
ruptured was included with the faucet purchased by the
Blackmons and supplied to Powell; it was not provided or sold
by Powell.  The linchpin of a breach-of-the-implied-warranty-
of-merchantability 
claim 
is 
privity; 
accordingly, 
Powell 
would
be unable to pursue any claim against the seller and/or
presumed manufacturer of the defective water-supply line. 
 
See
Wellcraft Marine v. Zarzour, 577 So. 2d 414, 419 (Ala. 1990)
("There is no right of action on an implied warranty theory
against a manufacturer for property damage without privity of
contract." (emphasis omitted)).  Thus, a breach-of-the-
implied-warranty-of-merchantability claim might properly be
asserted by the Blackmons against the Internet seller of the
defective water-supply line, but such a claim would be
inappropriate between the Blackmons and Powell.  Under these
facts, Powell cannot be considered to be a seller of the
water-supply line that ruptured, and the breach-of-the-
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implied-warranty-of-merchantability 
claim 
asserted 
against 
him
must fail.
IV.
The 
Blackmons 
sued 
Powell, 
asserting 
negligence,
wantonness, breach of implied warranties, and breach of
contract after a water-supply line Powell had installed in
their house ruptured, resulting in water damage 
throughout 
the
house.  Both parties moved for a summary judgment in their
favor, and the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor
of Powell.  That judgment is supported by the evidence in the
record and is hereby affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Moore, C.J., and Parker and Wise, JJ., concur.
Shaw, J., concurs in the result.
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