Title: Addison v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
WHITNEY ADDISON, 
 
Respondent Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below,  
Appellee. 
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No.  443, 2018 
 
Court Below:  Family Court of 
the State of Delaware 
 
ID. No. 1803002841 (N) 
 
Submitted: February 20, 2019 
  Decided:  April 18, 2019 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and VAUGHN, Justices. 
O R D E R 
On this 18th day of April 2019, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and 
the record on appeal, it appears that: 
(1) 
A Family Court commissioner found the appellant, Whitney Addison,1 
delinquent by having committed Offensive Touching.  A Family Court judge 
affirmed the commissioner’s finding.  Addison appeals, her sole claim being that 
the State violated her right to due process by filing a delinquency petition that was 
defective because it failed to charge an offense and left her vulnerable to possible 
subsequent prosecution.  She makes three arguments in support of this claim.  
                                                 
1 A pseudonym was assigned pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 7(d). 
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First, she contends that the petition was defective because it failed to set forth facts 
that support each element of Offensive Touching.  Second, she contends that the 
defective petition could not have been cured by a bill of particulars.  Finally, she 
contends that the Family Court erred in holding that she waived her right to challenge 
the sufficiency of the petition when she waived a reading of the petition at her 
arraignment.  We find no merit to Addison’s contentions and affirm. 
(2) 
On March 5, 2018, Keishla Montijo was working as a credit coordinator 
at Lowe’s hardware store in New Castle.  At approximately 5:30 p.m., Addison and 
three others approached Montijo from behind.  Addison hit her multiple times and 
pulled her to the floor.  Montijo got up and reported the attack to the store’s 
manager, who called the police.  The store’s security camera system captured the 
attack. 
(3) 
Addison was charged with being delinquent by having committed 
Offensive Touching.  A Family Court commissioner conducted a bench trial.  At 
the close of the State’s case, Addison moved to dismiss the delinquency petition, 
arguing that it failed to charge an offense.  The court denied the motion and held 
that the petition adequately charged Offensive Touching because it gave a definitive 
statement of the charge, the date of the offense, and the identity of the victim.  After 
Addison testified and each side gave closing arguments, the court found Addison 
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delinquent of Offensive Touching.  Addison was sentenced to thirty days at Level 
V, suspended for one year of community supervision. 
(4) 
Addison filed a Request for Review of Commissioner’s Order.  She 
presented three objections: (1) her due process right to notice of the charge was 
violated by the allegedly defective petition, (2) her due process right to be protected 
against double jeopardy was violated by the State’s petition, and (3) the Family 
Court erred in determining that sufficient evidence existed to justify a finding that 
Addison had committed Offensive Touching. 
(5) 
The Family Court judge affirmed the commissioner’s order.  As to 
Addison’s first objection, the court held that the State’s petition provided adequate 
notice by tracking the language of the statute and connecting it to the facts of the 
case.  This holding effectively overruled Addison’s second objection.  The court 
explained, “The language of the charge along with the date of the offense and the 
name of the victim are sufficient to protect [Addison] from double jeopardy.”2  The 
Family Court judge also rejected Addison’s third objection concerning the 
sufficiency of the evidence.3 
(6) 
“We review denial of a motion to dismiss [a petition alleging 
delinquency] for abuse of discretion.”4  Questions of law and alleged constitutional 
                                                 
2 Appellant’s Opening Br. Ex. D, at 2. 
3 Addison has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. 
4 Pierce v. State, 911 A.2d 793, 796 (Del. 2006) (citing State v. Harris, 616 A.2d 288, 291 (Del. 
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violations are reviewed de novo.5  “To the extent the trial judge’s decision is based 
on factual findings, we review for whether the trial judge abused his or her discretion 
in determining whether there was sufficient evidence to support the findings and 
whether those findings were clearly erroneous.”6 
(7) 
Addison contends that the petition was defective because it lacked the 
necessary elements to support a charge of Offensive Touching and that such defect 
has left her vulnerable to subsequent prosecution for the same offense.  She further 
argues that (1) a bill of particulars could not have cured the State’s defective petition 
and (2) her waiver of a reading of the petition at her arraignment was not a waiver 
of her due process right to challenge the sufficiency of the petition. 
(8) 
For a petition to adequately charge an offense, it must include “a plain, 
concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense 
charged.” 7   This requirement serves two purposes: (1) “to put the juvenile 
[respondent] on full notice of what [s]he is called upon to defend” and (2) “to 
effectively preclude subsequent prosecution for the same offense.”8  A petition is 
sufficient if it fulfills these two purposes,9 and a charging document is generally 
                                                 
1992)). 
5 Zebroski v. State, 12 A.3d 1115, 1119 (Del. 2010) (en banc). 
6 Lopez–Vazquez v. State, 956 A.2d 1280, 1285 (Del. 2008). 
7 Fam. Ct. Crim. R. 7(c). 
8 In re Edward R.R., 1993 WL 331877, at *2 (Del. Fam. June 17, 1993); see also Mayo v. State, 
458 A.2d 26, 27 (Del. 1983) (per curiam) (attributing the same purposes to a criminal indictment). 
9 In re Edward R.R., 1993 WL 331877, at *2; see also Holland v. State, 194 A.2d 698, 699-700 
(Del. 1963) (“An information or indictment is sufficient if it fulfills the basic purpose of enabling 
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sufficient if it sets forth the offense in the words of the statute and those words 
themselves set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense. 10  
However, if a petition lacks a plain statement of the elements or essential facts of the 
charged act of delinquency, it is defective and should be dismissed.11 
(9) 
Here, in addition to referring to the Offensive Touching statute by its 
statutory number and providing the street address where the offense occurred, the 
petition contained the following language: 
[Addison], on or about the 5th day of March, 2018, in the 
County of New Castle, State of Delaware, did 
intentionally touch MONTIJO, KEISHLA M, either with 
a member of her body or with any instrument, knowing 
that she was thereby likely to cause offense or alarm to that 
person by knocking her to the ground.12 
The italicized words were crossed out by the prosecutor before presenting the 
petition to Addison and the court for trial.  Under the statute, a person is guilty of 
Offensive Touching when that person “[i]ntentionally touches another person either 
with a member of his or her body or with any instrument, knowing that the person is 
thereby likely to cause offense or alarm to such other person.”13 
                                                 
the defendant to adequately prepare his defense and protect himself against double jeopardy.”). 
10 Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974); State v. Deedon, 189 A.2d 660, 662 (Del. 
1963). 
11 In re Edward R.R., 1993 WL 331877, at *2 (citing Harley v. State, 534 A.2d 255 (Del. 1987)); 
see also Fam. Ct. Crim. R. 12(b)(2). 
12 Appellant’s Opening Br. Ex. A. 
13 11 Del. C. § 601(a)(1); see also Iverson v. State, 913 A.2d 570, 2006 WL 3598175, at *2 (Del. 
Dec. 12, 2006) (Table). 
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(10) Addison argues that the language in the petition does not contain all the 
elements of Offensive Touching.  She argues that the petition does not specify 
whether she touched the victim with a member of her body or an instrument.  She 
takes particular issue with the State crossing out the factual statement, “by knocking 
her to the ground.”  She argues that the petition fails to delineate circumstances 
suggesting that she knew the alleged touching would likely cause offense or alarm 
to the victim.  For these reasons, she claims, the petition is vague and does not 
specify every element of the offense.  Because the petition is vague and does not 
specify every element of the offense, she argues, the petition does not preclude 
subsequent prosecution and creates a “risk of potential double jeopardy.”14 
(11) All of Addison’s arguments fail because the petition tracked the 
statutory language and connected it to Addison’s alleged conduct.  By doing so, it 
satisfied the requirements for a sufficient petition.15  The petition provided her name 
as the alleged perpetrator, the name of the alleged victim, and the date and location 
of the alleged offense.  An exact identification or description of the instrument or 
member of body used is not an essential element of the offense.16  The petition 
served its purpose of providing Addison with adequate notice of the offense charged. 
                                                 
14 Appellant’s Opening Br. at 16, 15-18. 
15 See Allison v. State, 148 A.3d 688, 2016 WL 5462439, at *3 (Del. Sept. 28, 2016) (Table). 
16 See Fam. Ct. Crim. R. 7(c) (“It may be alleged in a single count that . . . the person charged 
committed [the offense] by one or more specified means.”); Iverson, 2006 WL 3598175, at *2 (“A 
conviction of offensive touching requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that ‘the 
person intentionally touches another person either with a member of his or her body or with any 
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(12) For these same reasons, the petition has not left her vulnerable to 
subsequent prosecution in violation of her right not to be subjected to double 
jeopardy.  A petition precludes subsequent prosecution when it contains a plain 
statement of the facts constituting the essential elements of the offense.17  Here, the 
petition precludes subsequent prosecution for the same offense because the petition 
contained the essential elements of the offense: it cited the statute involved and set 
forth its actual language, provided the date and location of the alleged offense, 
named Addison as the alleged perpetrator, and identified the alleged victim.  
Because the petition was sufficient, the Family Court did not err. 
(13) Finally, it is worth noting that although Addison is correct in arguing 
that a bill of particulars cannot cure a defective petition,18 the petition here was not 
defective.  The Family Court’s holding did not rely upon Addison’s failure to 
request a bill of particulars.  The court held that the petition’s language was 
sufficient to provide notice and prevent subsequent prosecution, meaning there was 
                                                 
instrument, knowing that the person is thereby likely to cause offense or alarm to such other 
person.’”  (internal alteration and omissions omitted) (quoting 11 Del. C. § 601(a)(1))); cf. 
Allison, 2016 WL 5462439, at *3 (“[I]t is sufficient if the information covers any one of the three 
harms covered by the [child endangerment] statute.”); Harley, 534 A.2d at 257 (“As to the assault 
charge, the exact nature and description of the instrument used during the altercation is not an 
essential element of the crime.”). 
17 See United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376-78 (1953). 
18 See Deedon, 189 A.2d at 663 (explaining that a bill of particulars “may not be used to supply a 
missing element of the offense in question”). 
 
 
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nothing to be cured by a bill of particulars.  The court referenced Addison’s failure 
to request a bill of particulars, as well as her waiver of a reading of the petition at 
her arraignment, in which she acknowledged that she “understood the nature of the 
accusations made against her,” to further demonstrate that Addison had notice of the 
offense charged.19  Accordingly, Addison’s final two arguments, that (1) a bill of 
particulars would not have cured a defective petition and (2) her waiver of a reading 
of the petition at her arraignment was not a waiver of her due process right to 
challenge the sufficiency of the petition, are unavailing. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
/s/  James T. Vaughn, Jr. 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
19 Appellant’s Opening Br. Ex. D, at 2.