Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Donald J. Harman

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2019 WI 108 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP1263-D 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Donald J. Harman, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Donald J. Harman, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HARMAN 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 18, 2019   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Donald J. Harman, La Crosse, WI.  
 
For the complainant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Matthew F. Anich and Dallenbach Anich & Wickman SC, Ashland.  
 
 
 
2019 WI 108
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2018AP1263-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Donald J. Harman, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Donald J. Harman, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
DEC 18, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney Donald J. Harman has appealed a 
report and recommendation filed by Referee Allan E. Beatty, 
concluding that Attorney Harman committed three counts of 
professional misconduct and recommending that his license to 
practice law in Wisconsin be suspended for six months.  Rather 
than challenging the referee's findings of fact or conclusions of 
law, Attorney Harman argues on appeal that the referee should have 
recused himself.  Attorney Harman did not request a substitution 
of the referee pursuant to SCR 22.13(4).  When he subsequently 
No. 
2018AP1263-D   
 
2 
 
raised the issue of the referee's participation, he refused to 
participate in a scheduled telephone conference at which the 
recusal issue would have been addressed.  Based on these facts, we 
find that Attorney Harman waived his objection to the referee's 
participation in this matter. 
¶2 
Upon careful review of this matter, we uphold the 
referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law, and we agree 
that a six-month suspension of Attorney Harman's Wisconsin law 
license is an appropriate sanction for the misconduct at issue.    
We further agree with the referee that, as a condition of the 
reinstatement of his license, Attorney Harmon should be required 
to satisfy a judgment entered against him.  We also find it 
appropriate to follow our usual custom of imposing the full costs 
of this proceeding, which are $7,662.28 as of May 13, 2019, on 
Attorney Harman.   
¶3 
Attorney Harman was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1960.  He has been disciplined on four prior 
occasions.  In 1987 he was publicly reprimanded for having charged 
one client an excessive fee and for failing to turn over another 
client's files upon termination of representation, notwithstanding 
a court order to do so.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Harman, 137 Wis. 2d 148, 403 N.W.2d 459 (1987).  In 1989 he 
received a consensual public reprimand for having acted in the 
presence of a conflict of interest, failing to maintain complete 
trust account records and render proper accounting of funds held 
in trust, and failing to cooperate.  Public Reprimand of Donald J. 
Harman, April 26, 1989.  In 1998 he received another public 
No. 
2018AP1263-D   
 
3 
 
reprimand for failing to act promptly in his client's matter and 
failing to notify the client of a significant procedural 
development.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Harman, 221 
Wis. 2d 238, 584 N.W.2d 537 (1998).  In 2001, Attorney Harman's 
license was suspended for six months for eight counts of misconduct 
that included trust account violations, dishonesty, presence of a 
conflict of interest without obtaining written consent, failing to 
keep client confidences, knowingly disobeying the rules of a 
tribunal, and on two separate occasions using information obtained 
during the representation of a former client to that former 
client's disadvantage.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Harman, 2001 WI 71, 244 Wis. 2d 438, 628 N.W.2d 351 (2001). 
¶4 
On July 6, 2018, the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) 
filed a complaint alleging three counts of misconduct with respect 
to Attorney Harman's representation of W.Z. in a divorce proceeding 
in LaCrosse County.  Attorney Harman represented W.Z. from February 
11, 2016 until April 3, 2017.  He did not charge W.Z. for his 
representation.  The petitioner in the divorce action, R.Z., was 
represented by Attorney Rochelle Jones of Legal Action of 
Wisconsin, Inc. 
¶5 
On September 11, 2015, a domestic abuse injunction was 
entered against W.Z.  On February 11, 2016, LaCrosse County Family 
Court Commissioner (FCC) Elizabeth A. Wright issued a temporary 
order in the divorce requiring the parties to file joint federal 
and state income tax returns with the tax refunds to be equally 
divided after being processed through Attorney Jones' trust 
account.   
No. 
2018AP1263-D   
 
4 
 
¶6 
On April 20, 2016, with no motion or order to show cause 
pending, Attorney Harman sent an unsolicited letter to FCC Wright 
asking her to "dismiss the injunction sua sponte and vacate the 
order awarding custody of the two children to [R.Z.]."  The letter 
informed the family court commissioner that Attorney Harman and 
his client "are also asking that the police investigate [R.Z.'s] 
lies" and said if police were satisfied that R.Z. did lie, she 
should be charged with obstruction. 
¶7 
Attorney Harman's April 20, 2016 letter to FCC Wright 
enclosed a "claim of [W.Z.'s]," apparently provided in an attempt 
to satisfy the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 893.80.  The "claim" 
alleged that W.Z. had been damaged through the negligence of an 
officer of the LaCrosse Police Department, the office of the 
LaCrosse County District Attorney, the office of the Wisconsin 
State Public Defender, and Legal Action of Wisconsin, Inc., acting 
through Attorney Jones.  The claim sought damages of $550,000.   
¶8 
On April 25, 2016, Attorney Harman sent an additional 
unsolicited letter to FCC Wright, with various enclosures, 
including medical records of W.Z. and purported "transcripts" of 
conversations between W.Z. and his wife.  Attorney Harman's letter 
stated: 
I challenge [R.Z.] or [the assistant district attorney] 
or [an attorney with the Office of the State Public 
Defender] to show me where in the medical records of 
[W.Z.] any opinion of any doctor that [W.Z.] has a mental 
illness and/or that a doctor prescribed medication for 
his mental illness. 
¶9 
On April 25, 2016, Attorney Jones sent Attorney Harman 
a letter enclosing the Z.'s state income tax refund check in the 
No. 
2018AP1263-D   
 
5 
 
amount of $871, as well as the Z.'s federal income tax refund check 
in the amount of $8,803, with a request that Attorney Harman have 
his client endorse both checks and return them to Attorney Jones' 
office so she could deposit them in her client trust account and 
distribute the funds, pursuant to the February 11, 2016 temporary 
order in the divorce. 
¶10 On May 2, 2016, Attorney Harman sent another unsolicited 
letter to FCC Wright to "present information to you about [R.Z.'s] 
untruthfulness."  Among other things, the letter said, "[R.Z.] 
should have her child visits supervised so as to try and insulate 
her children from a mother who has no moral compass and whose life 
is driven by sex, greed and a desire to dominate others."  None of 
Attorney Harman's letters to FCC Wright constituted motions for 
relief and the letters failed to conform to basic requirements of 
Wisconsin civil procedure rules. 
¶11 On May 16, 2016, Attorney Harman filed a motion on W.Z.'s 
behalf in the divorce action seeking dismissal of the domestic 
abuse injunction which had been entered in a separate case.  On 
June 17, 2016, Attorney Harman sent yet another letter to FCC 
Wright along with a purported "transcript" of a conversation 
between W.Z. and his daughter with an employee of "The Parenting 
Place."  The June 17, 2016 letter concluded, "I have reported three 
instances of [R.Z.'s] inappropriate behavior.  As a result I am 
asking the Family Court Commissioner what corrective action she 
would recommend be taken with respect to [R.Z.]." 
¶12 On June 27, 2016, Attorney Jones filed a notice of motion 
and motion for remedial contempt and a supporting affidavit in the 
No. 
2018AP1263-D   
 
6 
 
divorce action relating to W.Z.'s failure to endorse and return 
the tax refund checks as required under the terms of the February 
11, 2016 temporary order.  At the same time, Attorney Jones filed 
a response opposing Attorney Harman's motion, request for 
dismissal of motion and request for costs.  Attorney Jones 
requested sanctions against Attorney Harman as well as costs 
associated with defending the action. 
¶13 On July 6, 2016, Attorney Harman filed a counterclaim 
for annulment on W.Z.'s behalf in the Z. divorce.  The grounds 
asserted for an annulment in the counterclaim were frivolous. 
¶14 On August 9, 2016, Attorney Harman sent another letter 
to FCC Wright, this time including letters to a clinical therapist, 
a nurse practitioner, a generalized response from the therapist, 
and a printout defining mental illness. 
¶15 On August 18, 2016, FCC Wright issued an order denying 
W.Z.'s motion seeking relief from the domestic abuse injunction, 
finding the motion unwarranted under the law and frivolous.  The 
order also denied W.Z.'s motion to dismiss the temporary order 
that had been entered on February 11, 2016.  The order stated the 
family court commissioner did not have authority to enter a 
judgment of annulment, and the FCC declined to enter a ruling 
regarding W.Z.'s counterclaim for an annulment that had been filed 
on July 6, 2016.  The order denied W.Z.'s motion requesting the 
imposition of sanctions against Attorney Jones, finding the motion 
not in accordance with the law and frivolous.  The order also found 
W.Z. and Attorney Harman in contempt of the February 11, 2016 
temporary order relating to the parties' income tax refunds and 
No. 
2018AP1263-D   
 
7 
 
found that W.Z. had willfully withheld the refund checks.  The FCC 
deferred a ruling as to the amount of R.Z.'s award of fees, costs, 
and sanctions pending her attorney filing a petition for fees with 
a supporting affidavit.  
¶16 Attorney Harman sent a letter dated August 9, 2016 to 
FCC Wright saying, "please consider the following factual material 
in making your decision about dismissing the Domestic Abuse 
Injunction now in force against [W.Z.] that allows one half hour 
of visitation with his children one week, and two visits every 
other week." 
¶17 On August 10, 2016, W.Z. purged the contempt by endorsing 
the federal and state income tax refund checks and providing them 
to Attorney Jones. 
¶18 On August 19, 2016, Attorney Harman filed requests for 
de novo hearings in the Z. divorce along with a request for 
substitution of LaCrosse County Circuit Court Judge Levine.  The 
substitution request was untimely and was denied. 
¶19 On August 24, 2016, Judge Levine issued an order 
dismissing W.Z.'s motions for de novo hearings due to his failure 
to appear.  The order noted that W.Z.'s de novo motion regarding 
the domestic abuse injunction case was untimely.  The order also 
stated that upon receipt of affidavits in support of an award for 
fees, costs, and sanctions, W.Z. would have 10 days to object to 
the amount of fees requested by R.Z.'s attorney.  Attorney Jones 
and her supervisor from Legal Action of Wisconsin filed affidavits 
that same day. 
No. 
2018AP1263-D   
 
8 
 
¶20 After sending FCC Wright the April 20, 2016, April 25, 
2016, May 2, 2016, June 17, 2016, and August 9, 2016 letters with 
voluminous enclosures, Attorney Harman sent Judge Levine a 
September 2, 2016 letter alleging that FCC Wright was "precluded 
from hearing the Motion to Rescind the Domestic Abuse Injunction 
because she was to avoid an impropriety as per SCR 60.3 [sic] when 
she knew that respondent had filed a claim against her prior to 
the motion hearing." 
¶21 In the September 2, 2016 letter, Attorney Harman also 
responded to the court's order finding W.Z. and himself in 
contempt.  The letter stated that Attorney Harman had held the tax 
refund checks until FCC Wright denied his motion and that his 
client had not participated in making the decision to hold the tax 
refund check.  Attorney Harman further stated he was never given 
written notice of the change of hearing date for the de novo 
hearing before Judge Levine.  
¶22 After alleging in the September 2, 2016 letter to Judge 
Levine that FCC Wright was precluded from acting in the Z. divorce, 
on September 7, 2016, Attorney Harman sent FCC Wright a letter 
suggesting that W.Z. meet with the child support agency without 
R.Z. being present, saying "what can we do to facilitate such a 
meeting?" 
¶23 On September 6, 2016, Attorney Harman sent a letter with 
enclosures, including various pictures and text messages, to 
Attorney Jones and FCC Wright claiming that R.Z. was falsely 
advertising herself as divorced.   
No. 
2018AP1263-D   
 
9 
 
¶24 A hearing was held before FCC Wright on September 12, 
2016 with respect to W.Z.'s request for dismissal of the domestic 
abuse injunction; his request to dismiss the temporary order; his 
request for a judgment of annulment; and R.Z.'s request for 
attorney's fees for having to respond to Attorney Harman's 
submissions. 
¶25 On September 13, 2016, Judge Levine entered a $4,400 
judgment in favor of Legal Action of Wisconsin for having to 
respond to Attorney Harman's various motions in the Z. divorce. 
¶26 Attorney Harman sent a letter dated September 14, 2016 
to FCC Wright commenting on the award of attorney's fees to 
Attorney Jones and noting his continued objection to FCC Wright 
participating in the proceedings. 
¶27 On October 12, 2016, Nunc Pro Tunc September 12, 2016, 
FCC Wright issued an order stemming from the September 12, 2016 
hearing.  The order stated:  
The respondent's request for dismissal of the domestic 
abuse injunction is frivolous, on grounds that the court 
has no authority in the divorce action to dismiss an 
injunction issued in a separate matter; the respondent's 
request to dismiss the temporary order is frivolous, 
because the available remedies were to either file a 
request for a de novo hearing or a motion to amend the 
temporary order; the respondent's request to the family 
court for a judgment of annulment is frivolous because 
the family court commissioner has no authority to enter 
such a judgment; the respondent's request for sanctions 
against the petitioner's attorney is frivolous because 
petitioner's 
pleadings 
complied 
with 
statutory 
requirements and the respondent failed to state with any 
specificity any impropriety with those pleadings; the 
petitioner's attorney had to respond to a 618-page 
submission of the respondent containing duplicative 
documents, Chinese text, improper transcripts, and 
No. 
2018AP1263-D   
 
10 
 
personal information about the parties irrelevant to the 
matter; Attorney Jones correctly filed a motion for 
contempt for respondent's failure, until the September 
12, 2016 hearing, to comply with the 2015 tax refund 
provisions of the February 11, 2016 temporary order 
(attributing this to Harman having failed to obtain his 
client's endorsement on the refund checks and then 
return them to Attorney Jones); [W.Z.] is not personally 
responsible for any of the aforesaid actions; and the 
petitioner's request for attorneys fees in the amount of 
$4,400 is reasonable. 
¶28 Attorney Harman was ordered to pay the $4,400 within 60 
days.  To date, the judgment remains unpaid. 
¶29 In May 2017, Attorney Harman sent a letter to Attorney 
Jones and included two satisfactions of judgments relating to the 
obligations owed by Attorney Harman and W.Z.  Attorney Jones 
responded that since Attorney Harman was no longer the attorney of 
record for W.Z., she could not discuss any issues that pertained 
to him.  Attorney Jones also informed Attorney Harman that a 
satisfaction of judgment as to Attorney Harman's obligation was 
not possible since he had not paid anything on the judgment, nor 
had he made any arrangements to do so.  
¶30 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of 
misconduct with respect to Attorney Harman's representation of 
W.Z.: 
Count One:  By seeking relief from and providing evidence 
to 
the 
family 
court 
commissioner 
in 
a 
manner 
inconsistent with proper civil procedures and deemed 
frivolous by the family court commissioner, Attorney 
Harman violated SCR 20:1.1.1 
                                                 
1 SCR 20:1.1 provides:  "A lawyer shall provide competent 
representation to a client.  Competent representation requires the 
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably 
necessary for the representation." 
No. 
2018AP1263-D   
 
11 
 
Count Two:  By failing until at least the August 10, 
2016 hearing2 to comply with the tax refund provisions 
of the February 11, 2016 temporary order, Attorney 
Harman violated SCR 20:3.4(c).3 
Count Three:  By failing to comply with the court's order 
that he personally pay the $4,400 judgment to Legal 
Action of Wisconsin for attorney fees in LaCrosse County 
Case 2016FA22, Attorney Harman violated SCR 20:3.4(c). 
¶31 The referee was appointed on July 24, 2018.  On August 
27, 2018, Attorney Harman filed a motion to dismiss the OLR's 
complaint along with a supporting affidavit.  He filed an answer 
and an affirmative defense on August 31, 2018.  The answer denied 
the three paragraphs of the OLR's complaint stating the counts of 
misconduct.  The answer did not deny, or even mention, any of the 
paragraphs in the complaint setting forth the facts of Attorney 
Harman's representation of W.Z.  The answer accused FCC Wright of 
"impropriety" and alleged that she ignored the civil rights claim 
filed against her by W.Z.  Attached to the answer was a copy of a 
June 5, 2018 letter from the Executive Director of the State of 
Wisconsin Judicial Commission to Attorney Harman acknowledging 
receipt of Attorney Harman's correspondence to the Judicial 
Commission accusing FCC Wright and Judge Levine of misconduct.   
                                                 
2 There is an October 12, 2016 order (Nunc Pro Tunc September 
12, 2016) that refers to finding Attorney Harman in contempt until 
a September 12, 2016 hearing.  However, there is also an August 
18, 2016 order indicating that W.Z. purged the contempt by 
endorsing and giving the checks to Attorney Jones during an August 
10, 2016 hearing. 
3 SCR 20:3.4(c) provides:  "A lawyer shall not knowingly 
disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except for an 
open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation 
exists." 
No. 
2018AP1263-D   
 
12 
 
¶32 Since Attorney Harman's answer did not deny any of the 
factual allegations contained in the complaint, the OLR filed a 
motion for summary judgment on September 21, 2018.  The referee 
sent an email to the OLR's counsel and Attorney Harman on September 
26, 2018 to set a date for a telephonic scheduling conference.   
¶33 On September 26, 2018, although he had not requested a 
substitution of the referee within ten days of the referee's 
appointment, as required by SCR 22.13(4), Attorney Harman sent the 
referee and the OLR's counsel an email saying,  
I will ask that you recuse yor self [sic] on the grounds 
that OLR primary witness the FCC Wright was a former co-
employee, or a relationship where you were in charge of 
the office and the FCC was working for you.  The Judicial 
Code requires that you abstain from further proceedings. 
¶34 The referee sent an email to Attorney Harman and the 
OLR's counsel on September 26, 2018, stating that a telephone 
scheduling conference would be held at 9:00 a.m. on October 3, 
2018.  The email stated that the recusal issue would be addressed 
during the scheduling conference. 
¶35 On October 2, 2018, Attorney Harman sent an email to the 
referee and the OLR's counsel saying he would not participate in 
the telephone scheduling conference and that, "I think that Ref 
Beatty wants to get me to a phine [sic] call sohe [sic] can say I 
waived my right to object to his effort to act as Referee." 
¶36 The referee responded by sending an October 2, 2018 email 
to Attorney Harman and the OLR's counsel saying:  
You are required to participate in phone conferences 
relating to your disciplinary matter.  If you choose not 
to participate, then decisions may be made with you in 
No. 
2018AP1263-D   
 
13 
 
default.  As I have indicated in previous emails, we 
will discuss in tomorrow's phone conference how to 
address the issues you have raised.  If you do not 
participate, those issues may be considered waived.  
Further, email is not the proper forum for addressing 
the merits of issues in this case.  I urge you to 
participate in tomorrow's phone conference. 
¶37 On October 3, 2018, at 9:00 a.m., as instructed by the 
referee, the OLR's counsel initiated a telephone conference call 
by first calling Attorney Harman's office.  There was no answer at 
Attorney Harman's office, so the OLR's counsel left a telephone 
message for Attorney Harman.  The OLR's counsel then called the 
referee to complete the scheduled telephone conference and 
reported that he had called Attorney Harman's office but no one 
had answered the phone. 
¶38 Following Attorney Harman's refusal to participate in 
the October 3, 2018 telephone scheduling conference, the referee 
signed an order finding that Attorney Harman's choice not to 
participate in the telephone scheduling conference represented 
egregious conduct on Attorney Harman's part.  The referee denied 
Attorney Harman's motion to dismiss and granted the OLR's motion 
for summary judgment.  The referee stated that he would decide the 
appropriate sanction based on written submissions from the 
parties, to be simultaneously filed by November 1, 2018.  The 
referee stated if Attorney Harman filed a written request for a 
hearing on the issue of sanction within 15 days of the date of the 
order, the referee would schedule such a hearing.  The referee 
stated he did not want to schedule a hearing if Attorney Harman 
was not going to show up. 
No. 
2018AP1263-D   
 
14 
 
¶39 On October 4, 2018, Attorney Harman sent an email to the 
referee and the OLR's counsel.  The subject of the email was "Void 
order."  The email stated, "a provision of the Judicial Code 
prohibits Judges from appearing in cases involving former 
employees' naughty naughty Al baby [sic]."  
¶40 Attorney Harman did not request a hearing on the issue 
of sanction, so no hearing was scheduled.  Both sides submitted 
written briefs regarding the sanction recommendation.   
¶41 The referee issued his report and recommendation on 
November 28, 2018.  The referee found that the OLR had proved by 
clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that Attorney Harman 
committed each of the violations alleged in the OLR's complaint.  
The referee found that a six-month suspension of Attorney Harman's 
Wisconsin law license was an appropriate sanction for his 
misconduct. 
¶42 The referee noted there were multiple aggravating 
factors in this case, including the fact that Attorney Harman has 
four prior disciplinary proceedings, the most recent one resulting 
in a six-month license suspension.  The referee noted that some of 
the same problems evident in the previous disciplinary proceedings 
were also present in this one.  For example, the referee noted 
that in its 2001 decision this court agreed with the referee's 
observation 
that 
Attorney 
Harman's 
pattern 
of 
misconduct 
demonstrated a disregard of the legal system and showed his 
willingness 
to 
ignore 
established 
procedures 
for 
dispute 
resolution in favor of his perceived personal expediency.   
No. 
2018AP1263-D   
 
15 
 
¶43 The referee said Attorney Harman has continued to 
demonstrate a disregard for and a lack of understanding of the 
rules of civil procedure and the rules of disciplinary proceedings.  
The referee said Attorney Harman persists in engaging in 
"litigation by correspondence" and rather than filing motions and 
briefs and making arguments, he instead sends letters.  The referee 
noted that in the Z. divorce, Attorney Harman sent FCC Wright eight 
letters between April 20, 2016 and September 14, 2016.  The referee 
said the correspondence demonstrates Attorney Harman's inability 
to accept the finality of judicial officers' decisions as he kept 
trying to reargue what had previously been decided.  The referee 
noted that Attorney Harman's one motion seeking to obtain a de 
novo review was dismissed due to his non-appearance, and the 
referee also noted the judge further found that the motion was 
untimely. 
¶44 The referee said despite the filings in the Z. case being 
in the form of correspondence rather than motions, FCC Wright 
addressed them as motions and found four of them to be frivolous.  
The referee said the one motion Attorney Harman did file, to 
dismiss the domestic abuse injunction, was incorrectly filed in 
the divorce action rather than in the separate injunction case. 
¶45 The referee said Attorney Harman showed the same pattern 
of litigation by correspondence in this disciplinary proceeding, 
litigating by email rather than by motion.  The referee commented 
that having been the respondent in four prior disciplinary 
proceedings, Attorney Harman should be especially knowledgeable 
about the rules.   
No. 
2018AP1263-D   
 
16 
 
¶46 The referee found another aggravating factor in the case 
to be the potential harm to W.Z. when Attorney Harman withheld the 
income tax refund checks from W.Z., exposing his client to the 
possibility of a finding of contempt.  Further, the referee found 
it particularly troubling that when Attorney Harman does not like 
a judicial officer's decisions, or fears what the decisions could 
be, he attacks the judicial officer.  The referee noted that in 
the 2001 disciplinary proceeding Attorney Harman alleged that the 
referee had a conflict of interest and asked her to recuse herself.  
The referee said in the Z. case, Attorney Harman tried to get the 
family court commissioner removed, and in this disciplinary 
proceeding, Attorney Harman asked the referee to recuse himself 
and then refused to participate in a scheduling conference when 
the recusal did not automatically occur.   
¶47 The referee said Attorney Harman has not demonstrated 
acceptance of responsibility, nor has he demonstrated an 
understanding of the issues.  The referee said Attorney Harman's 
responses in the disciplinary proceeding have primarily been 
attempts to re-litigate the issues in the Z. divorce.  The referee 
said it does not appear that Attorney Harman is able to move on 
from court decisions with which he disagrees.  The referee also 
said it is clear that Attorney Harman failed to provide W.Z. with 
competent representation.  The referee said Attorney Harman failed 
to demonstrate the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and 
preparation reasonably necessary for that representation, and he 
also demonstrated an inability or unwillingness, or both, to follow 
required procedures and to focus on the relevant issues. 
No. 
2018AP1263-D   
 
17 
 
¶48 The referee concluded that a six-month suspension of 
Attorney Harman's license to practice law in Wisconsin was an 
appropriate sanction.  The referee also recommended that, as a 
condition to the reinstatement of Attorney Harman's law license, 
that he be ordered to satisfy the $4,400 judgment entered against 
him in the divorce case, and he be ordered to obtain a neuro-
psychological examination addressing his ability to understand and 
conform his conduct to the Rules of Professional Conduct for 
Attorneys. 
¶49 In his appeal, Attorney Harman argues that the OLR 
falsely claimed, in its summary judgment motion, that Attorney 
Harman did not deny facts in his answer and affirmative defense, 
which then allowed the OLR to take a default judgment against him.  
Attorney Harman devotes the bulk of his argument to reiterating 
his claim that the referee should have recused himself due to the 
fact that for five years both the referee and FCC Wright were 
employed at the state public defender's LaCrosse office.  Attorney 
Harman also continues to argue that FCC Wright should have recused 
herself from the Z. divorce proceeding, because he and his client 
had accused her of violating W.Z.'s civil rights.  He says, "it 
appears that FCC Wright has imposed her revenge against both 
Harman's client and Harman by not recusing herself and not setting 
aside the domestic abuse injunction against Harman's client and at 
the same time imposing a judgment of $4,400 for attorney's fees 
upon Harman."  Attorney Harman accuses the OLR of failing to 
disclose exculpatory facts, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 83 (1963), which requires a prosecutor to disclose any 
No. 
2018AP1263-D   
 
18 
 
evidence 
favorable 
to 
the 
accused 
that 
goes 
toward 
the 
creditability of a witness. 
¶50 Attorney Harman concludes his brief by saying that, 
"OLR's 
participation 
in 
this 
disciplinary 
proceeding 
is 
oderiferous [sic]."  He says, "if disciplined . . . because of the 
antics of the OLR prosecution team, Respondent shall imagine 
himself to be like a member of a den of thieves whose members 
ousted a fallen member for being honest." 
¶51 The OLR responds that Attorney Harman's brief should be 
stricken because it fails to comply with the requirements of Wis. 
Stat. § 809.19(1).  The OLR goes on to argue that Attorney Harman 
never moved the referee to recuse himself, nor did he ever move to 
disqualify the referee.  In addition, the OLR points out that 
Attorney Harman refused to participate in the October 3, 2018 
telephone scheduling conference at which the referee indicated he 
would address the recusal issue.  For these reasons, the OLR 
asserts that Attorney Harman either waived or forfeited his right 
to appeal the recusal issue since this court has held that failure 
to preserve issues means they are waived.  See, e.g., In re Ambac 
Assurance Corp., 2012 WI 22, ¶36, 339 Wis. 2d 48, 810 N.W.2d 450. 
¶52 Turning to the merits of Attorney Harman's claim that 
the referee should have recused himself, the OLR notes that the 
referee disclosed on the record the information he believed the 
parties might consider relevant to the question of his recusal, 
and the referee noted that he and FCC Wright were both attorneys 
in the LaCrosse Office of the State Public Defender before Attorney 
Wright became the LaCrosse County Family Court Commissioner and 
No. 
2018AP1263-D   
 
19 
 
before the referee retired from the state public defender's office 
in 2015.  The OLR notes the referee stated he never held a 
supervisory position in the public defender's office and was never 
FCC Wright's supervisor. 
¶53 The OLR says even if Attorney Harman had participated in 
the October 3, 2018 telephone scheduling conference and had filed 
or made a motion asking the referee to recuse himself, the referee 
was not required to do so since the fact that the referee once 
worked in the same office with FCC Wright, who was apparently the 
person who filed the grievance against Attorney Harman with the 
OLR, is not a fact or circumstance where the referee's own interest 
may be perceived to impair his impartiality.  In addition, the OLR 
says a basic premise of Attorney Harman's contention is apparently 
that FCC Wright was the OLR's primary witness.  The OLR says in 
fact it had no need to call FCC Wright, or anyone else, as a 
witness given that Attorney Harman had already admitted all of the 
factual allegations in the complaint.   
¶54 The OLR says while Attorney Harman argues that he was 
denied a due process hearing, the only reason no hearing was held 
in this case was that Attorney Harman unilaterally and voluntarily 
decided to refuse to participate.  The OLR argues there is no 
denial of due process when someone who has had timely notice of a 
proceeding fails to appear and present evidence.  The OLR says 
even after Attorney Harman refused to participate in the telephone 
scheduling conference, the referee still gave him an opportunity 
to request a hearing on the issue of appropriate sanction, but 
Attorney Harman declined that opportunity. 
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2018AP1263-D   
 
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¶55 Turning to the question of the appropriate level of 
discipline, the OLR reiterates that this is Attorney Harman's fifth 
disciplinary proceeding, and it notes that the referee identified 
a pattern of misconduct which would warrant a six-month suspension.   
¶56 A referee's findings of fact are affirmed unless clearly 
erroneous.  Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 
Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  The court may impose whatever sanction 
it sees fit, regardless of the referee's recommendation.  See In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 
Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶57 We conclude there has been no showing that any of the 
referee's findings of fact are clearly erroneous.  Accordingly, we 
adopt them.  We further agree with the referee's conclusions of 
law that Attorney Harman violated the supreme court rules set forth 
above.   
¶58 Attorney Harman does not challenge the referee's 
findings of fact or his conclusions of law.  Instead, he argues 
that the proceeding was unfair, and even violative of due process, 
because the referee refused to recuse himself.  As the OLR points 
out, SCR 22.13(4) provides that within ten days after notice of 
appointment of the referee, either the OLR or the respondent may 
file a motion for substitution of the referee, which shall be 
granted as a matter of right.  Additional motions shall be granted 
for good cause.  Attorney Harman never invoked his right for 
substitution of the referee under SCR 22.13.  Instead, he raised 
the issue in an email.  When the referee informed the parties that 
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2018AP1263-D   
 
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the recusal issue would be addressed in the course of a telephone 
scheduling conference, Attorney Harman announced he would not 
participate in the conference.  Under the circumstances, we find, 
as we did in Attorney Harman's 2001 disciplinary proceeding, that 
Attorney 
Harman 
waived 
any 
objection 
to 
the 
referee's 
participation in this matter.   
¶59 In addition, we reject Attorney Harman's claim that he 
was denied due process in the course of this proceeding.  He was 
given notice of the telephone scheduling conference and refused to 
participate in it.  The consequences of his refusal are his alone. 
¶60 As to the appropriate level of discipline, we agree with 
the referee that a six-month suspension of Attorney Harman's law 
license is appropriate.  This is Attorney Harman's fifth 
disciplinary proceeding.  In the 2001 proceeding, which also 
resulted in a six-month license suspension, we noted that Attorney 
Harman's pattern of conduct demonstrated a disregard of the legal 
system.  The same holds true here.  Attorney Harman's course of 
conduct in his representation of W.Z. resulted in Legal Action of 
Wisconsin having to incur the time and expense of responding to a 
series of frivolous filings.  Although Attorney Harman was ordered 
to pay $4,400 to Legal Action of Wisconsin within 60 days of 
September 12, 2016, that amount remains unpaid.  Attorney Harman's 
conduct in representing W.Z. was unprofessional, and his continued 
attacks on the family court commissioner, the judge, and the 
referee in this disciplinary proceeding are also troubling and 
demonstrate a lack of respect for the legal system and the judicial 
process. 
No. 
2018AP1263-D   
 
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¶61 Although no two disciplinary proceedings are identical, 
we find that In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mauch, 2010 WI 
2, 322 Wis. 2d 79, 777 N.W.2d 637 is somewhat analogous.  In Mauch, 
as here, the attorney had been disciplined on four separate 
occasions.  In imposing a six-month suspension, this court agreed 
with the referee that in light of Attorney Mauch's apparent 
indifference to the seriousness of the proceedings, a suspension 
that would require the attorney to petition for reinstatement will 
provide assurance that he can be safely recommended to the 
profession, the courts, and the public as a person who is fit and 
capable to practice law in this state.  Mauch, 322 Wis. 2d at 90.  
The same rationale applies here, and we agree with the referee 
that a six-month license suspension is appropriate.  As is our 
usual custom, we find it appropriate to assess the full costs of 
this proceeding against Attorney Harman. 
¶62 Finally, we agree with the referee's recommendation 
that, as a condition to the reinstatement of his license to 
practice law in Wisconsin, Attorney Harman should be ordered to 
satisfy the $4,400 judgment entered against him in the Z. divorce 
case.  We do not agree with the referee that the reinstatement of 
Attorney Harman's license to practice law should be conditioned 
upon his obtaining a neuro-psychological examination. 
¶63 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Donald J. Harman to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of six months, 
effective January 29, 2020. 
¶64 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, as a condition of the 
reinstatement of his license to practice law in Wisconsin, Donald 
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2018AP1263-D   
 
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J. Harman shall satisfy the $4,400 judgment entered against him in 
the Z. divorce case in LaCrosse County. 
¶65 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Donald J. Harman shall comply 
with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a person 
whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been suspended. 
¶66 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date of 
this order, Donald J. Harman shall pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the cost of this proceeding, which are $7,662.28 as of 
May 13, 2019. 
¶67 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions with this order is required for reinstatement.  See 
SCR 22.29(4). 
 
 
No. 
2018AP1263-D   
 
 
 
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