Title: Brault v. Flynn

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Brault v. Flynn  (95-533); 166 Vt. 585; 690 A.2d 1365

[Filed 17-Oct-1996]

                               ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 95-533

                              MAY TERM, 1996

Deborah L. Brault                    }     APPEALED FROM:
                                     }
                                     }
     v.                              }     Orleans Superior Court
                                     }
Hugh L. Flynn and                    }
Agway, Inc.                          }     DOCKET NO. S119-4091 OsC

       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Following a jury trial, plaintiff accepted a remitted verdict.  The
  trial court permitted plaintiff to condition acceptance on the right to
  appeal the remittitur.  On appeal, plaintiff maintains that the court
  abused its discretion in granting remittitur.  As we conclude that
  plaintiff may not simultaneously accept remittitur and appeal the court's
  decision to grant it, we do not review the remittitur decision on the
  merits.  Instead, we reverse and remand the case for reconsideration, in
  light of this decision, of the motion for remittitur.

       Plaintiff, who suffered permanent injuries when her car was rear-ended
  by defendant's truck, filed suit against defendants, the driver of the
  vehicle and the vehicle's owner, for negligence.  At the close of
  plaintiff's case, defendants conceded liability and the case went to the
  jury to decide damages.  The jury awarded plaintiff $750,000.  Arguing that
  the verdict was excessive, defendants moved for remittitur or alternatively
  for a new trial.  The court agreed that the verdict was "grossly excessive"
  and granted the motion on two grounds: first, that during his closing
  argument plaintiff's counsel had encouraged the jury to use the verdict to
  punish defendants, and second, that plaintiff's counsel had suggested, also
  during his closing argument, that the jury use a per diem amount to
  calculate plaintiff's pain and suffering.  In its written opinion, the
  court acknowledged our decision in Debus v. Grand Union Stores, 159 Vt.
  537, 540, 621 A.2d 1288, 1290 (1993), where we held that "there is nothing
  inherently improper or prejudicial about per diem arguments."  Nonetheless,
  the court rejected the majority opinion, reasoning that the Chief Justice's
  dissenting opinion in Debus "present[ed] the `better answer'" on this
  issue, and granting remittitur on that basis.

       As required by V.R.C.P. 59(a), the court presented plaintiff with the
  option to remit $325,000 in lieu of granting defendants a new trial.  The
  court also made clear that if remittitur was accepted, plaintiff could
  still appeal the order granting remittitur.  Plaintiff conditionally
  accepted remittitur based on this understanding, and the court entered
  judgment for $425,000. This appeal followed.

                                     I.

       Defendants maintain that both the trial court and plaintiff are
  mistaken as to the law of remittitur.  Specifically, defendants argue that
  plaintiff cannot both accept remittitur and appeal the court's decision to
  grant remittitur.  The issue, then, is whether a plaintiff can accept
  remittitur "conditionally" or "under protest," thus preserving the right to
  appeal, or whether accepting remittitur forecloses the possibility of
  appeal on that issue.

 

       Although the majority of courts have held otherwise, see Deans v.
  Eastern Me. Medical Ctr., 454 A.2d 835, 837 (Me. 1983), plaintiff urges
  this Court to allow an appeal of an accepted remittitur.  Plaintiff
  mistakenly claims that the court's decision to grant remittitur is subject
  to de novo review by this Court.  According to plaintiff, the court made a
  decision as a matter of law that her case is worth only a specified amount;
  that determination would not be affected by the outcome of a new trial, and
  this Court should treat it as an appealable final judgment. Plaintiff has,
  however, mischaracterized both the nature of the court's decision and the
  standard of review.  Where, as here, a court deems a portion of the damages
  awarded by the jury to be excessive, "[t]he decision to grant a remittitur
  and the amount thereof are left to the trial court's discretion; unless
  there is an abuse of discretion on the part of the court, its decision must
  stand."  Addison Cty. Automotive, Inc. v. Church, 144 Vt. 553, 560,