Title: Commonwealth v. Valdez

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12040 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  FRANK VALDEZ.1 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     April 4, 2016. - August 17, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ.2 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Plea, Presumptions and burden of 
proof.  Alien. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 20, 1988. 
 
 
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea, filed on November 4, 
2013, was considered by Kathe M. Tuttman, J., and a motion for 
reconsideration was also considered by her. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Scott W. Kramer for the defendant. 
 
Jamie Michael Charles, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
1 Also known as Franklin Falcon and Franklin Falcone. 
 
 
2 Justice Cordy participated in the deliberation on this 
case and authored the concurring opinion prior to his 
retirement.  Justices Spina and Duffly participated in the 
deliberation on this case prior to their retirements. 
                                                          
 
2 
 
 
Jennifer Klein & Wendy S. Wayne, Committee for Public 
Counsel Services, for Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  Under G. L. c. 278, § 29D, where a judge fails 
to advise a defendant during the plea colloquy that conviction 
may have the consequence of exclusion from admission to the 
United States, the conviction must be vacated upon motion of the 
defendant if the defendant shows that his or her conviction "may 
have" that consequence.  The issue on appeal is what the 
defendant must show to establish that his conviction "may have" 
the consequence of exclusion from admission to the United 
States.  We conclude that a defendant satisfies this burden by 
showing (1) that he has a bona fide desire to leave the country 
and reenter, and (2) that, if the defendant were to do so, there 
would be a substantial risk that he or she would be excluded 
from admission under Federal immigration law because of his or 
her conviction.  Because we conclude that the defendant has met 
this burden, we vacate the defendant's conviction and remand the 
case for a new trial.3 
 
Background.  The defendant was born in the Dominican 
Republic and is a citizen of that country.  In 1985, he was 
admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the 
Immigration Impact Unit of the Committee for Public Counsel 
Services. 
                                                          
 
3 
 
alien.  In January, 1989, he pleaded guilty in the Superior 
Court to an indictment alleging larceny of a motor vehicle, in 
violation of G. L. c. 266, § 28, and was sentenced to a prison 
term of five years at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution 
at Concord.   
 
The defendant is now a resident of Connecticut and owns his 
own business selling automobiles.  Since 1997, he has been in a 
relationship with a citizen of the United States, with whom he 
has three children.  No immigration proceedings have been 
commenced against the defendant by Federal authorities. 
 
At some time before September 27, 2013, the defendant 
retained an immigration attorney, Nareg Kandilian, to advise him 
regarding his desire to become a United States citizen and to 
travel outside the United States.  He told Kandilian that he 
wished to see friends and family in the Dominican Republic that 
he had not seen in many years, but feared that, if he were to 
leave the United States, he would be deemed inadmissible and 
placed into removal proceedings upon his attempt to reenter.  
Kandilian reviewed the docket information in this case and the 
defendant's board of probation record.  The attorney concluded 
that, because larceny of a motor vehicle is a "crime involving 
moral turpitude" punishable by imprisonment for more than one 
year, if the defendant were to travel outside the United States 
and attempt to reenter, he would be found inadmissible under 8 
4 
 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2012), and removal proceedings 
would be initiated against him.4  The attorney also concluded 
that the defendant was convicted of an "aggravated felony" under 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (2012) and is deportable under 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012).  The attorney further 
concluded that the defendant is deportable under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), because the defendant's offense is a crime 
involving moral turpitude that was committed within five years 
of his admission to the United States. 
 
To avoid these consequences, the defendant, through 
counsel, moved to withdraw the guilty plea and vacate the 
conviction, claiming that the judge accepted his plea without 
advising that his conviction "may have consequences of 
deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or 
denial of naturalization, pursuant to the laws of the United 
States," as required by G. L. c. 278, § 29D.  In support of his 
motion, the defendant filed affidavits from Kandilian and 
himself, and a memorandum dated March 2, 2011, from John Morton, 
Director of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE), to all ICE employees ("Morton memorandum").  In the 
 
4 The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 unified exclusion and deportation 
proceedings under a single system of "removal proceedings."  See 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996); 12 U.S.C. § 1229a 
(2012).  The term "exclusion" is no longer used by immigration 
authorities but is instead referred to as "inadmissibility." 
                                                          
 
5 
 
memorandum, Morton declared that ICE "only has resources to 
remove approximately 400,000 aliens per year, less than [four] 
percent of the estimated illegal alien population in the United 
States," and therefore "must prioritize the use of its 
enforcement personnel, detention space, and removal resources to 
ensure that the removals the agency does conduct promote the 
agency's highest enforcement priorities, namely national 
security, public safety, and border security."  He identified 
"aliens convicted of crimes, with a particular emphasis on 
violent criminals, felons, and repeat offenders," among those 
given the highest priority for removal.  "For purposes of 
prioritizing the removal of aliens convicted of crimes," he 
directed ICE personnel to refer to offense levels, "with Level 1 
and Level 2 offenders receiving principal attention."  Level 1 
offenders include "aliens convicted of 'aggravated felonies,' as 
defined in [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)]."  Morton also emphasized 
the need "for ICE employees to exercise sound judgment and 
discretion consistent with these priorities," and noted that 
"[p]articular care should be given when dealing with lawful 
permanent residents, juveniles, and the immediate family members 
of [United States] citizens." 
 
In support of its opposition to the motion, the 
Commonwealth filed an affidavit from the then retired plea 
judge, who stated that he "invariably" informed a defendant that 
6 
 
"the guilty plea might lead to his or her deportation or prevent 
him or her from becoming a naturalized citizen," and that he 
would have given the defendant these warnings in accordance with 
his invariable practice.  He also stated, "At some point after 
1988, I added a warning that the guilty plea might also prevent 
reentry into the United States, but I cannot recall precisely 
when I did so."  He noted that he reviewed the plea colloquy he 
conducted on November 16, 1988, in a different case involving a 
different defendant, and that colloquy included the deportation 
and naturalization warnings, but not the warning regarding 
reentry. 
 
The motion judge, based on the affidavits alone, found that 
the Commonwealth had met its burden of showing that the 
defendant had been properly advised at the plea hearing that his 
guilty plea could subject him to deportation or denial of 
naturalization, but had not met its burden of showing that he 
had been advised that his plea could subject him to exclusion 
from admission to the United States should he leave the country 
and attempt to reenter.  The judge nonetheless denied the motion 
because, citing Commonwealth v. Grannum, 457 Mass. 128 (2010), 
she found that the defendant "has not established that he would 
be subject to an express written policy of exclusion should he 
choose to leave the United States and desire to re-enter," and 
therefore "has shown no more than a hypothetical risk" of 
7 
 
exclusion.  The defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, 
which the judge also denied; the defendant then timely appealed 
from both orders. 
 
The Appeals Court affirmed in a published opinion, but 
rested its decision on a different ground.  Commonwealth 
v. Valdez, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 332 (2015).  The court agreed with 
the motion judge that the Commonwealth had failed to prove that 
the defendant received the required warning regarding exclusion 
from admission to the United States.  Id. at 332.  It recognized 
that the defendant had been convicted of a crime involving moral 
turpitude and "very likely would be excluded from reentry if he 
travels outside the United States."  Id. at 336.  It also 
recognized that, because he had been convicted of an aggravated 
felony, he is deportable under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  Id.  But the court concluded that the 
defendant had failed to meet his burden of showing that "he 
faces the consequence of exclusion," id. at 335, because he "has 
not been excluded from the United States," id. at 332; "there is 
no pending proceeding to exclude him from the United 
States," id. at 338; and there is no "pending deportation 
proceeding . . . that would increase the likelihood that he 
would be excluded."  Id.  We granted the defendant's application 
for further appellate review. 
8 
 
 
Discussion.  When the Legislature enacted St. 1978, c. 383, 
in 1978, inserting § 29D into chapter 278 of the General Laws, 
it took great pains to ensure that defendants were informed that 
their plea of guilty, admission to sufficient facts, or plea of 
nolo contendere may have adverse immigration consequences.  
See Commonwealth v. Villalobos, 437 Mass. 797, 805 (2002) 
(entire purpose of statute is to ensure that defendants entering 
pleas are made aware of potential for adverse immigration 
consequences).5  The Legislature set forth in the statute the 
 
5  The full text of G. L. c. 278, § 29D, as inserted by St. 
1978, c. 383, is as follows: 
 
 
"The [c]ourt shall not accept a plea of guilty or 
nolo contendere from any defendant in any criminal 
proceeding unless the [c]ourt advises him of the 
following:  'If you are not a citizen of the United 
States, you are hereby advised that conviction of the 
offense for which you have been charged may have the 
consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission 
to the United States, or denial of naturalization, 
pursuant to the laws of the United States.'  The 
defendant shall not be required at the time of the 
plea to disclose his or her legal status in the United 
States to the court. 
 
 
"If the [c]ourt fails so to advise the defendant, 
and he later at any time shows that his plea and 
conviction may have one of the enumerated 
consequences, the [c]ourt, on the defendant's motion, 
shall vacate the judgment, and permit the defendant to 
withdraw the plea of guilty or nolo contendere, and 
enter a plea of 'not guilty.'  Absent a record that 
the [c]ourt provided the advisement required by this 
section, the defendant shall be presumed not to have 
received the required advisement." 
 
                                                          
 
9 
 
precise language of the warning that the judge was to give a 
defendant before accepting a plea:  "If you are not a citizen of 
the United States, you are hereby advised that conviction of the 
offense for which you have been charged may have the 
consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission to the 
United States, or denial of naturalization, pursuant to the laws 
of the United States."  G. L. c. 278, § 29D.  See Commonwealth 
v. Soto, 431 Mass. 340, 342 (2000) ("The Legislature has put the 
three required warnings in quotation marks, and each of them is 
required to be given so that a person pleading guilty knows 
exactly what immigration consequences his or her guilty plea may 
have").  Section 29D provided that, should the judge fail 
adequately to give this warning, and should the defendant 
subsequently move to vacate the plea, the judge "shall vacate 
the judgment," provided that the defendant "at any time shows 
that his plea and conviction may have one of the enumerated 
consequences."  Id.  By including the words, "at any time," the 
Legislature made clear that there was no limitation in time to 
bringing a motion to vacate the plea, even though the passage of 
time might mean that the tape recording, transcript, and other 
records of the plea colloquy are no longer available through no 
The statute was subsequently amended in 1996 and 2004, after the 
guilty plea in this case, so we refer only to the original 
language of the statute, but our holding in this case would be 
the same under the current language.  See St. 1996, c. 450, 
§ 254; St. 2004, c. 225, § 1. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
10 
 
fault of the Commonwealth, and that no one may recall what was 
said.  See Grannum, 457 Mass. at 132-133 ("Records may be 
unavailable because they have been disposed of pursuant to court 
rules authorizing the destruction of old records, see S.J.C. 
Rule 1:12, as appearing in 382 Mass. 717 [1981], and 
reconstruction may be impossible because of the death, 
retirement, unavailability, or lack of recollection of the 
participants in the plea hearing").  The Legislature made 
equally clear that the presumption of regularity that we apply 
in motions to vacate a guilty plea under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 
(b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), see Commonwealth 
v. Lopez, 426 Mass. 657, 662 (1998), does not apply where a 
defendant moves to vacate a plea under § 29D, because the 
statute provided that "the defendant shall be presumed not to 
have received the required advisement" where there is no record 
that the judge did so.  See Grannum, supra at 134 ("the 
presumption of regularity that warnings were given cannot apply 
in the face of the specific language of G. L. c. 278, § 29D"). 
 
Where, as here, the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden 
of showing that the defendant was advised that his guilty plea 
may have the consequence of "exclusion from admission to the 
United States," § 29D mandates that the defendant be permitted 
to withdraw his plea, provided the defendant shows that his plea 
"may have" that consequence.  "We construe this requirement to 
11 
 
mean that a defendant must demonstrate more than a hypothetical 
risk of such a consequence, but that he actually faces the 
prospect of its occurring."  Commonwealth v. Berthold, 441 Mass. 
183, 185 (2004).  Where the immigration consequence at issue is 
deportation rather than exclusion from admission, we have said 
that, to satisfy this burden, the defendant must show more than 
that, "if the Federal government were to initiate deportation 
proceedings, the defendant almost inevitably would be 
deported."  Grannum, 457 Mass. at 136.  See Commonwealth 
v. Rzepphiewski, 431 Mass. 48, 50 n.6 (2000).  Rather, "[w]here 
the defendant claims that he faces a risk of deportation, we 
construe the statute to require that relief be available only 
where the defendant shows either that the Federal government has 
taken some step toward deporting him or that its express written 
policy calls for the initiation of deportation proceedings 
against him."  Grannum, supra. 
 
This standard is appropriate where the immigration 
consequence is deportation because, as the Morton memorandum 
makes clear, far more noncitizens are deportable than ICE has 
the resources to deport, so the risk of deportation is  
hypothetical even for a noncitizen who is deportable until there 
is evidence that ICE has decided or will decide to initiate 
deportation proceedings.  But this standard is not appropriate 
where the immigration consequence is exclusion from admission to 
12 
 
the United States because, where a defendant's conviction would 
render him or her inadmissible under Federal immigration law,  
exclusion from admission is far more than a hypothetical risk if 
the defendant were to leave the United States. 
 
Every noncitizen who has left the United States and seeks 
admission at a United States port of entry "must present 
whatever documents are required and must establish to the 
satisfaction of the inspecting officer that the alien is not 
subject to removal under the immigration laws . . . and is 
entitled, under all of the applicable provisions of the 
immigration laws . . . , to enter the United States."  8 C.F.R. 
§ 235.1(f) (2013).  As stated, under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), subject to certain exceptions, "any alien 
convicted of . . . a crime involving moral turpitude . . . is 
inadmissible," and therefore ineligible to be admitted to the 
United States. 
 
To ensure that all noncitizens who are not eligible for 
admission because of prior criminal convictions are identified 
at the time of inspection, United States Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) obtains identifying information for all 
individuals arriving by sea or air from outside the United 
States prior to arrival, see 8 U.S.C. § 1221(a) (2012), and 
screens that information against a variety of law enforcement 
databases, including the National Crime Information Center.  See 
13 
 
8 U.S.C. § 1226(d) (2012) (United States Attorney General shall 
"maintain a current record of aliens who have been convicted of 
an aggravated felony," which shall be made available to 
inspectors at ports of entry); United States Department of 
Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment for the TECS 
System:  CBP Primary and Secondary Processing (Dec. 22, 2010).  
At the time of inspection, if the examining officer determines 
that the noncitizen seeking admission "is not clearly and beyond 
a doubt entitled to be admitted, [he or she] shall be detained 
for [removal proceedings]."  8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (2012).6  
See also 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A) (2012) (individual deemed 
inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182[a][2] "shall" be detained); 
8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(5)(ii) (2013) (where noncitizen with lawful 
permanent resident status seeks admission but "appears to be 
inadmissible, the immigration officer may initiate removal 
proceedings against [him or her]"). 
 
An immigration judge will preside over the removal 
proceedings, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2012), at which the 
noncitizen has the burden of establishing that he or she "is 
clearly and beyond doubt entitled to be admitted and is not 
inadmissible under [8 U.S.C. § 1182]".  8 U.S.C. 
 
6 A noncitizen returning to the United States who is 
lawfully admitted for permanent residence is regarded as seeking 
admission if he or she has committed an offense identified in 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (2012), which includes crimes involving 
moral turpitude.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) (2012). 
                                                          
 
14 
 
§ 1229a(c)(2)(A) (2012).  Under these circumstances, it is 
virtually inevitable that an individual who is ineligible for 
admission based on a criminal conviction under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(2) will be deemed inadmissible to the United States 
upon arrival, and ordered removed by an immigration judge 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. 
 
The Commonwealth argues, as the Appeals Court held, that a 
defendant can only satisfy his or her burden of demonstrating 
"more than a hypothetical risk" of exclusion by showing that 
there is a pending proceeding to exclude him from admission to 
the United States.  In practice, this would mean that the 
defendant must leave the country and be denied readmission, as 
there can be no pending proceeding to exclude an applicant from 
admission to the United States unless the applicant has filed 
the required documents with Federal authorities upon attempting 
to enter the country.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1181(a) (2012) ("no 
immigrant shall be admitted into the United States unless at the 
time of application for admission" he or she presents valid 
documents [emphasis added]).  We see two problems with such an 
interpretation of G. L. c. 278, § 29D. 
 
First, it would be contrary to the language of § 29D, which 
at the time of the defendant's plea provided that a defendant's 
conviction shall be vacated upon a showing by the defendant 
"that his plea and conviction may have one of the enumerated 
15 
 
consequences" (emphasis added).  We interpreted this original 
version of the statute to mean that a defendant could attack his 
or her conviction only before the defendant suffered the 
immigration consequence, and therefore held that the remedy was 
not available to a defendant who had already been deported.  
See Commonwealth v. Pryce, 429 Mass. 556, 559 (1999).7  Under our 
interpretation of § 29D in Pryce, a defendant could not attack 
his or her conviction if he or she had already been excluded 
from admission to the United States, but under the 
Commonwealth's interpretation, a defendant could not attack his 
or her conviction until he or she had been excluded from 
admission to the United States.8  The Commonwealth's 
interpretation would transform the words "may have" into "have 
had," which this court declined to do in Pryce, supra ("The 
concept of attacking the conviction after deportation has taken 
 
7 In 2004, the Legislature amended G. L. c. 278, § 29D, to 
make clear that the remedy of vacatur of the conviction is 
available to defendant who "may have or has had one of the 
enumerated consequences, even if the defendant has already been 
deported from the United States."  St. 2004, c. 225, § 1. 
 
 
8 In Commonwealth v. Soto, 431 Mass. 340, 341-342 (2000), we 
ordered that a defendant's guilty plea be vacated because the 
judge had not advised the defendant that his conviction could 
result in his exclusion from admission to the United States 
where the Immigration and Naturalization Service "initiated 
proceedings to remove the defendant from the United States -- he 
was in Puerto Rico at the time -- because of his prior narcotics 
conviction."  We do not opine whether this holding would have 
been different under Commonwealth v. Pryce, 429 Mass. 556, 559 
(1999), had he not been in a territory of the United States when 
he was denied admission. 
                                                          
 
16 
 
place is missing from the statute.  We perceive this to be more 
than a semantic lapse"). 
 
Second, such an interpretation would be contrary to the 
legislative spirit of § 29D, because it would effectively deny a 
defendant a remedy where he or she was convicted without being 
warned of the immigration consequence of exclusion from 
admission to the United States.  Few, if any, defendants whose 
conviction would render them inadmissible upon reentry would 
dare to leave the country, so they could show no pending 
proceeding, and therefore could not show that their conviction 
"may have" the consequence of exclusion from admission.  For 
those foolish or brave enough to leave the country in these 
circumstances, it would be extremely difficult for them to 
challenge their prior conviction after being found inadmissible.  
Where a noncitizen is deemed inadmissible because of conviction 
of a crime of moral turpitude and for that reason placed in 
removal proceedings, he or she is subject to mandatory 
detention.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(a).  Because immigration 
proceedings against those who are detained move quickly, the 
defendant is likely to be removed before a postconviction motion 
can be adjudicated.9  The Commonwealth points to no statute or 
 
9 The average length of detention for those removed is 
twenty-seven days.  See Transactional Records Access 
Clearinghouse, Legal Noncitizens Receive Longest ICE Detention 
                                                          
 
17 
 
precedent that requires the suspension of Federal removal 
proceedings while a postconviction motion is pending.  Thus, 
requiring a noncitizen defendant to wait until he or she is 
found inadmissible before filing a motion under § 29D would 
greatly diminish the practical availability of the remedy 
provided by § 29D for those at risk of exclusion from admission 
to the United States. 
 
We hold that, where a defendant has not received the 
required exclusion from admission warning under § 29D, he or she 
satisfies the burden of showing that his or her conviction "may 
have" the consequence of exclusion from admission to the United 
States by showing (1) that he has a bona fide desire to leave 
the country and reenter, and (2) that, if the defendant were to 
do so, there would be a substantial risk that he or she would be 
excluded from admission under Federal immigration law because of 
his or her conviction.  Here, where the motion judge was not the 
plea judge and did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, we are in 
the same position as the motion judge to make findings.  
See Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 469 Mass. 340, 351 (2014).  We 
conclude from the record that the defendant has satisfied both 
requirements for relief. 
(June 3, 2013), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/321/ 
[https://perma.cc/S33G-CPF3]. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
18 
 
 
First, the defendant has met his burden of showing a bona 
fide desire to travel outside the United States where he told 
his immigration attorney that he wished to "travel outside of 
the United States and to his home country, the Dominican 
Republic, to visit with friends and family who he has not seen 
in many years."  We deem this a modest burden, because we 
recognize that it is natural for an immigrant who has left 
family and friends behind to wish to see them again.  We also 
infer the sincerity of his desire to see family and friends 
because he spoke of it to his immigration attorney before the 
motion was filed, and therefore could not have known that the 
judge would later find that he had been warned of all the 
immigration risks except exclusion from admission to the United 
States, which is the risk relevant to his desire to leave the 
United States.10 
 
Second, there is a substantial risk that, if the defendant  
were to leave the country, he would be excluded from admission 
to the United States under Federal immigration law and placed in 
removal proceedings as a result of his 1989 conviction.  The 
Federal statute governing the inadmissibility of noncitizens, 8 
 
10 Although the affidavit offered by the defendant's 
immigration attorney here provided support for the defendant's 
showing of a bona fide desire to travel outside the United 
States, we do not suggest that an affidavit from an immigration 
attorney is necessary to enable a defendant to make the required 
showing. 
                                                          
 
19 
 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2), does not identify the crimes that qualify 
as "involving moral turpitude."  To determine whether a crime 
involves moral turpitude, courts look to the "inherent nature of 
the crime of conviction, as defined in the criminal 
statute." Mejia v. Holder, 756 F.3d 64, 68 (1st Cir. 2014), 
quoting Idy v. Holder, 674 F.3d 111, 118 (1st Cir. 2012).  We 
are not aware of any case that has specifically declared whether 
larceny of a motor vehicle, in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 28, 
is a crime involving moral turpitude, but it is likely that the 
immigration authorities would conclude that it is. 
 
Under Massachusetts law, to convict a defendant of this 
crime, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant took a 
motor vehicle owned by another with "an intent permanently to 
deprive the rightful owner of the possession of the motor 
vehicle."  Commonwealth v. Giannino, 371 Mass. 700, 703 (1977).  
See Commonwealth v. Moore, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 455, 457 (1994).  
Because the crime of larceny of a motor vehicle has a required 
element that the defendant intends permanently to deprive the 
rightful owner of possession, the immigration authorities are 
likely to find that the crime involves moral turpitude.  
See Almanza-Arenas v. Holder, 771 F.3d 1184, 1190 (9th Cir. 
2014)  (permanent taking of motor vehicle, but not temporary 
taking, is crime involving moral turpitude); Mejia, supra 
(same); Hashish v. Gonzalez, 442 F.3d 572, 576 (7th Cir.), cert. 
20 
 
denied, 549 U.S. 995 (2006) ("'theft' is a crime of moral 
turpitude").  Once found to have committed a crime involving 
moral turpitude, the defendant would be ineligible for admission 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).11 
 
In addition, the defendant's conviction would be deemed an 
aggravated felony because it is a "theft offense" for which he 
was imprisoned for more than one year.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(G).  His conviction of an aggravated felony 
renders him ineligible for certain forms of relief in removal 
proceedings in immigration court.  See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b(a) (2012) (cancellation of removal not available if 
noncitizen has been convicted of aggravated felony). 
 
Conclusion.  Because the defendant has met his burden of 
showing that his conviction "may have" the consequence of 
exclusion from admission to the United States, and he was not 
warned of this consequence during his plea colloquy, we conclude 
that his conviction must be vacated in accordance with § 29D.  
We therefore reverse the order of the judge denying the 
defendant's motion to vacate judgment and remand the case for a 
new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
11 The exceptions to the general rule that "any alien 
convicted of . . . a crime involving moral turpitude" is 
inadmissible do not apply here based on the information 
available in the record.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I); 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii). 
                                                          
 
21 
 
 
 
 
CORDY, J. (concurring).  I agree that the wording of G. L. 
c. 278, § 29D, dictates the outcome reached by the court.  I 
concur only to point out the anomalous result created by 
phrasing of the statute.  Here, more than twenty-five years 
after his plea of guilty, and long after the records of 
precisely what occurred at the plea hearing had been duly 
destroyed pursuant to court rule, the defendant is able to undo 
his conviction because he wishes to make a trip to visit old 
friends and family in his native country, and might well be 
denied reentry to the United States, in light of the conviction 
-- all because, not surprisingly, the Commonwealth cannot 
clearly prove that when he pleaded guilty in 1989 he was advised 
that such a denial of reentry might someday occur as a result. 
 
If, on the other hand, deportation proceedings had been 
commenced against the defendant at some point over the last 
twenty-five years based on the same conviction, such a wiping 
clean of the criminal record would not have been available to 
him, given that the Commonwealth was able to obtain an affidavit 
regarding the distant memory of a still living retired judge 
that he was certain he would have advised the defendant in 1989 
that deportation (as well as the denial of naturalization) might 
be a consequence of the conviction.  Of course, once the 
conviction is vacated due to the travel reentry concern, neither 
 
2 
 
a deportation nor a denial of naturalization could occur as a 
result of it. 
 
The present case involved only the crime of larceny of a 
motor vehicle, but the statute applies to all crimes against 
persons and property to which a person might have pleaded guilty 
any time after 1978, when the statute was enacted.  As is 
evident in this case, there is no time limit as to when a 
challenge can be brought -- and a plea of guilty vacated -- even 
though the plea may have been voluntary and fully supported by 
the facts.  Further, contrary to the ordinary presumption of 
regularity in court proceedings that is applied in all other 
motions to vacate guilty pleas where, because of the passage of 
time, the record of the proceeding is not fully available, the 
statute creates the opposite presumption when immigration 
warnings are at issue. 
 
If this is indeed what the Legislature intends, so be it.