Title: State v. Tony Nollie

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2002 WI 4 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-0744-CR 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Tony Nollie,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 23, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 4, 2001   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Maxine A. White   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BABLITCH, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by Erich C. 
Straub and Kachelski, Atta & Straub, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Erich C. Straub. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Lara 
M. Herman, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2002 WI 4 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound 
volume 
of 
the 
official 
reports.   
No.  00-0744-CR  
(L.C. No. 99 CM 3121) 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Tony Nollie,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 23, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee 
County, Maxine A. White, Judge.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   In this case, we are asked to 
review a judgment of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Maxine 
A. White, Circuit Court Judge, which prevented a defendant from 
asserting the privilege of self-defense to the crime of carrying 
a concealed weapon.  We hold that the circuit court was correct 
in disallowing the defense under the facts of this case and, for 
that reason, we need not answer the question of when, if ever, 
the privilege of self-defense may be asserted for the crime of 
carrying a concealed weapon. 
No. 
00-0744-CR   
 
2 
 
 
¶2 
The defendant, Tony Nollie, was charged with carrying 
a concealed weapon in violation of Wis. Stat. § 941.23 (1999-
2000).1  Before trial, the State moved to exclude Nollie's 
statement to police that he carried a gun because he had 
previously been the victim of a robbery.  Nollie made an offer 
of proof that he would rely on this statement and other facts in 
asserting 
the 
privilege 
of 
self-defense 
under 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.45(2).  The circuit court granted the State's motion, and 
Nollie was convicted at a jury trial.  Nollie appealed from his 
conviction and the court of appeals certified the case to this 
court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61.  We affirm the 
judgment of the circuit court. 
I 
¶3 
At 1:30 a.m. on April 1, 1999, Milwaukee Police 
Officers Glenn Podlesnik and Stephen Pederson were on patrol 
when they saw what appeared to be an abandoned car in the 
parking lot of a McDonald's restaurant on the corner of 27th 
Street and Capitol Drive in Milwaukee.  The officers noticed 
that the car was up on a jack, the trunk was open and there were 
some toolboxes and other items outside of the vehicle.  When 
they approached the car, they found Nollie in the driver's seat. 
¶4 
There is a dispute over what Nollie was doing when the 
police discovered him.  The police testified that Nollie had 
been asleep in the front seat, and that they had to wake him up 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
00-0744-CR   
 
3 
 
 
before they could ask him to exit the vehicle.  Nollie claims 
that he injured his back while changing his tire, and that he 
merely sat down to rest. 
¶5 
The police asked Nollie to exit the vehicle.  As 
Nollie got out of the vehicle, the officers noticed the handle 
of a pistol protruding from Nollie's waistband.  The police 
questioned Nollie about the weapon.  Nollie admitted that the 
pistol was his and stated that he carried a gun because he had 
been robbed before.  Nollie was cooperative with the officers at 
all times during the encounter. 
¶6 
Nollie was arrested and charged with carrying a 
concealed weapon in violation of Wis. Stat. § 941.23.  Before 
trial, the State moved to suppress Nollie's statement about his 
previous victimization on the grounds that the statement was 
irrelevant and prejudicial.  Nollie argued that State v. Dundon, 
226 Wis. 2d 654, 594 N.W.2d 780 (1999), allows a defendant to 
assert the privilege of self-defense to the crime of carrying a 
concealed weapon and that his statement was relevant to that 
defense. 
¶7 
Nollie then made the following offer of proof.  
Shortly before 1:30 a.m., Nollie had pulled into the McDonald's 
parking lot to change a flat tire.  While he was changing the 
tire, Nollie noticed four young men standing at the corner bus 
stop about 30 feet away.  Nollie claimed that he felt threatened 
No. 
00-0744-CR   
 
4 
 
 
because he was in a high crime neighborhood,2 it was late at 
night, and these young men were very loud and profane.  Nollie 
also claimed that he was frightened because he previously had 
been the victim of crime several times in the same neighborhood, 
including an armed robbery in which he had been physically 
assaulted. 
¶8 
Nollie kept a lawfully-owned pistol in the trunk of 
his car, where it was unloaded and stored in a toolbox.  The 
ammunition was stored in a separate toolbox in the trunk.  
Worried that the men on the corner might try to rob him, Nollie 
went to his trunk, loaded his pistol, placed it in his 
waistband, and went back to changing his tire.  Nollie claims 
that he injured his back while removing the tire and sat down in 
the car to rest.  At some time after this point, the officers 
made contact with him. 
¶9 
Neither Nollie nor the State presented evidence that 
the young men on the corner had been aware of Nollie's presence, 
or that the men had reacted to Nollie in any way.  There was 
also no evidence that the four men had seen Nollie arm himself, 
or that the men had reacted when Nollie actually armed himself.  
The officers testified that at the time they made contact with 
Nollie, there was no one standing on the corner by the bus stop.  
Nollie does not dispute this fact. 
                                                 
2 Based on the testimony of the officers, the State agreed 
that this neighborhood had a high crime rate, particularly at 
night. 
No. 
00-0744-CR   
 
5 
 
 
¶10 After reviewing Dundon, the circuit court granted the 
State's motion to exclude Nollie's statement and did not allow 
Nollie to present a claim of self-defense.  The circuit court 
noted that Dundon only allowed a claim of self-defense to 
carrying a concealed weapon in extremely narrow circumstances, 
and the facts of Nollie's case did not meet the requirements. 
¶11 Nollie went to trial and was convicted by the jury of 
carrying a concealed weapon.  The jury was not instructed on the 
self-defense privilege.  On appeal, Nollie challenged the 
circuit court's ruling that he could not present a claim of 
self-defense.  Recognizing the significance and impact of this 
case, the court of appeals certified the case to this court.  We 
now affirm the holding of the circuit court. 
II 
¶12 The 
Wisconsin 
Statutes 
explicitly 
recognize 
the 
defense of privilege.  See Wis. Stat. § 939.45.  An actor's 
conduct, although otherwise criminal, is legally justified when 
it occurs under one of several circumstances recognized by 
statute.  Id.  If the actor's conduct occurs under circumstances 
of 
coercion 
or 
necessity, 
the 
conduct 
is 
privileged.  
Wis. Stat. §§ 939.45(1), 939.46, 939.47.  Likewise, an act is 
privileged if it is done in defense of persons or property.  
Wis. Stat. §§ 939.45(2), 
939.48, 
939.49. 
 
Wisconsin 
also 
recognizes privileges for the good faith performance of the 
duties of a public office, Wis. Stat. § 939.45(3); for the 
reasonable 
effectuation 
of 
a 
lawful 
arrest, 
No. 
00-0744-CR   
 
6 
 
 
Wis. Stat. § 939.45(4); and for the reasonable discipline of a 
child 
by 
a 
person 
responsible 
for 
the 
child's 
welfare, 
Wis. Stat. § 939.45(5).  Finally, the privilege statute contains 
a "catch-all" provision, which incorporates any other privilege 
recognized by statutory or common law.  Wis. Stat. § 939.45(6).  
Each of these privileges may be raised as a defense to a 
criminal charge. 
¶13 The statute's language also indicates that the defense 
of privilege is available for "any crime" when the privileged 
activity 
is 
the 
basis 
for 
the 
criminal 
conduct.  
Wis. Stat. § 939.45.  Although the defense of privilege is 
commonly used by defendants charged with crimes that require a 
mental state such as homicide, see, e.g., Cleghorn v. State, 55 
Wis. 2d 466, 468-69, 198 N.W.2d 577 (1972); or other assaultive 
offenses, see, e.g., State v. Paulson, 106 Wis. 2d 96, 97-99, 
315 N.W.2d 350 (1982), this court has noted that the concept of 
privilege does not necessarily conflict with a strict liability 
offense.3  State v. Brown, 107 Wis. 2d 44, 53, 318 N.W.2d 370 
(1982).  For instance, this court has recognized a common law 
privilege under § 939.45(6) as a defense to the crime of felon 
in possession of a firearm, Wis. Stat. § 941.29.  State v. 
                                                 
3 On the face of the statute, carrying a concealed weapon is 
a strict liability offense.  See Wis. Stat. § 941.23.  However, 
this court has recognized that there is a limited mental state 
required——that the defendant is aware of the weapon's presence.  
State v. Asfoor, 75 Wis. 2d 411, 415, 249 N.W.2d 529 (1977).  
Here, there is no question that Nollie was aware of the weapon's 
presence. 
No. 
00-0744-CR   
 
7 
 
 
Coleman, 206 Wis. 2d 199, 210, 556 N.W.2d 701 (1996).  Still, 
this court has also recognized that not all crimes are amenable 
to all privilege defenses.  Whether a crime is amenable to the 
privilege of self-defense is a question of law, which we review 
de novo.  Dundon, 226 Wis.2d at 662. 
¶14 In Dundon, this court refused to extend the common law 
privilege found in Coleman to the crime of carrying a concealed 
weapon.  Dundon, 226 Wis. 2d at 665.  In Dundon, the defendant 
worked at a gas station, where his duties included collecting 
and depositing bank receipts.  Id. at 657.  The gas station's 
safe had filled up because the armored car had not come for four 
days and Dundon was forced to take the money——which included 
about $17,000 cash——to the bank himself.  Dundon had brought a 
handgun from home, which he took with him on his trip to the 
bank.  When Dundon got to the bank, he tucked the gun in his 
waistband and went inside.  A security guard saw the weapon and 
immediately contacted the police.  No disturbance occurred while 
Dundon was in the bank, but when the police arrived, they patted 
Dundon down, found the gun, and arrested him for carrying a 
concealed weapon. 
¶15 At trial, Dundon argued that he was privileged to 
carry the gun out of necessity.  The trial court denied this 
defense and prevented Dundon from putting forth any testimony 
about the prevalence of crime in the area or about Dundon's 
previous experience as a robbery victim. 
No. 
00-0744-CR   
 
8 
 
 
¶16 On appeal, this court upheld the trial court's 
decision on narrow grounds.  This court first dismissed the 
privileges listed in Wis. Stat. § 939.45(1)-(5) as inapplicable 
based on the facts of the case.  Most notably, this court did 
not allow Dundon to argue self-defense under § 939.45(2) because 
Dundon's concerns were "not specific and imminent; they were 
only general and potential."  Dundon, 226 Wis. 2d at 667-68.  
The court then turned to subsection (6), the "catch-all" 
section, to determine if any common law privilege applied. 
¶17 Dundon argued that the common law privilege found by 
this court in Coleman, 206 Wis. 2d 199, should also apply in his 
case, but this court refused to apply the Coleman privilege.  
This court noted that in 1878, the legislature had explicitly 
revoked the exact privilege sought by Dundon, and the court 
would be exceeding its authority if it reinstated it.  Dundon, 
226 Wis. 2d at 672-73.  This court warned that opening up the 
prohibition 
on 
carrying 
a 
concealed 
weapon 
to 
broad 
justification 
defenses 
"would 
create 
mischief, 
destroy 
uniformity, and impose a heavy burden on prosecutors" and that 
any privilege "must be applied restrictively so as not to 
undermine the objective of the statute."  Id. at 665.4 
                                                 
4 As in Dundon, we note that the privilege afforded in the 
pre-1878 statute might also have applied in this case: 
If any person shall go armed with a concealed 
[weapon] . . . he shall, on conviction thereof, be 
adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor . . . provided, that 
so going armed shall not be deemed a violation of this 
act whenever it shall be made to appear that such 
No. 
00-0744-CR   
 
9 
 
 
¶18 Here, Nollie agrees that application of the Coleman 
privilege to his case has been foreclosed by this court's 
holding in Dundon.  He notes, however, that this court left open 
the question of whether carrying a concealed weapon can be 
privileged under the self-defense section, § 939.45(2), and 
argues that his circumstances fit this privilege.  We disagree, 
and 
hold 
that 
Nollie's 
circumstances 
do 
not 
present 
an 
appropriate case to assert the privilege of self-defense. 
¶19 To sustain a claim of self-defense the defendant must 
show that (1) the defendant had an actual and reasonable belief 
that there was an actual or imminent unlawful interference with 
the defendant's person; (2) the defendant had the actual and 
reasonable belief that the threat or use of force was necessary; 
and (3) that the defendant only used such threat or force as he 
actually 
and 
reasonably 
believed 
was 
necessary.  
Wis. Stat. § 939.48(1). 
                                                                                                                                                             
person had reasonable cause to fear assault or other 
injury or violence to his person . . . 
Dundon, 226 Wis. 2d 654, 671-72, 594 N.W.2d 780 (1999) (quoting 
§ 1, ch.7, Laws of 1872)(emphasis added).  In Dundon, we 
recognized that the legislature had explicitly repealed the 
privilege sought by the defendant, and we were careful not to 
intrude upon the realm of the legislative branch by reinstating 
the privilege as one found under common law.  However, unlike 
Dundon where the court was dealing with the common law Coleman 
privilege, the concern about overstepping our bounds does not 
arise here because we are deciding the applicability of an 
explicit statutory privilege that has been enacted by the 
legislature. 
No. 
00-0744-CR   
 
10 
 
 
¶20 In determining whether a defendant is entitled to 
assert the privilege of self-defense, we must view the facts in 
the light most favorable to the defendant.  State v. Mendoza, 80 
Wis. 2d 122, 153, 258 N.W.2d 260 (1977).  The general rule is 
that the circuit court must hear an offer of proof from the 
defendant to determine whether the evidence would support the 
proffered defense.  Dundon, 226 Wis. 2d at 674.  However, a 
defendant is not entitled to have the jury consider a theory of 
self-defense when there is no evidence to support it.  Id. at 
674-75; State v. Olsen, 99 Wis. 2d 572, 578-79, 299 N.W.2d 632 
(Ct. App. 1980).  It is not an error for a circuit court to 
exclude evidence of self-defense where it is clear that an offer 
of proof does not show that self-defense was applicable.  
Dundon, 226 Wis. 2d at 674.  Here, we find that Nollie did not 
make a showing in his offer of proof that would have supported 
his presenting a claim of self-defense. 
¶21 As we stated in Dundon, "the defense of privilege 
applies by statute to 'any crime' but the defense may be limited 
for some crimes to extraordinary facts."  Id. at 663.  Any 
privilege that would justify carrying a concealed weapon must be 
extremely narrow and must not undermine the purpose of the 
statute.  Id. at 665.  Like the crime of felon in possession of 
a firearm, the nature of carrying a concealed weapon only makes 
a privilege available on the "rarest of occasions."  Coleman, 
206 Wis. 2d at 210-12.  It will be difficult for a defendant to 
show that there was not a reasonable alternative to violating 
No. 
00-0744-CR   
 
11 
 
 
the law, and that the firearm was not possessed for longer than 
reasonably necessary.  Id. at 212 (citing United States v. 
Perez, 86 F.3d 735, 737 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Perrin, 45 F.3d 869, 874 (4th Cir. 1995)). 
¶22 Nollie argues that the facts of his case are specific 
and extraordinary enough to allow the privilege of self-defense 
to be applied to the crime of carrying a concealed weapon, 
unlike in Dundon where this court found the threat too "general 
and potential."  Dundon, 226 Wis. 2d at 668.  Although both 
Nollie and Dundon cited the "high crime" nature of the 
neighborhood and previous victimization as factors in their 
claims of self-defense, Nollie asserts that his case is 
distinguishable from Dundon.  First, Nollie's situation took 
place late at night, whereas Dundon had been transporting the 
money during the day.  Additionally, while changing his tire, 
Nollie was in a much more vulnerable position than Dundon, who 
had been driving in a car.  Nollie argues that he was 
essentially stranded with very limited means of escape if 
trouble were to start. 
¶23 Most importantly, though, Nollie argues that he was 
faced with a specific threat: the four young men who were 
nearby, being loud and profane.  Nollie asserts that he only 
armed himself in response to this particular scenario, and that 
the situation was specific enough to overcome the restriction on 
"general and potential" threats imposed by this court in Dundon.  
Although we agree that Nollie's situation involved a more 
No. 
00-0744-CR   
 
12 
 
 
specific threat than Dundon's, we still find that Nollie did not 
make a sufficient showing to present a claim of self-defense. 
¶24 To argue self-defense, Nollie's offer of proof must 
indicate that he had an actual and reasonable belief of actual 
or imminent unlawful interference.  In this case, there was no 
actual or imminent unlawful interference to speak of.  As we 
stated in Dundon, a general and potential threat of interference 
is not enough to invoke the self-defense privilege; the threat 
must be imminent and specific.  Dundon, 226 Wis. 2d at 667-68.  
Nollie asserts that the four men on the street corner presented 
a specific threat.  Although we agree that they may have 
presented a more specific threat than the ones perceived by 
Dundon, the threats perceived by Nollie were not imminent and 
were still too general to invoke the privilege.  Even when 
viewed in the light most favorable to Nollie, there was no 
indication that the men threatened, accosted, communicated, or 
even noticed Nollie at any time.  This situation does not 
present a threat imminent and specific enough for Nollie to 
invoke the privilege of self-defense.  Affording a person the 
privilege of carrying a concealed weapon for self-defense under 
such 
circumstances 
clearly 
does 
not 
comport 
with 
the 
legislature's intent in criminalizing carrying a concealed 
weapon. 
¶25 Furthermore, when the police officers arrived, Nollie 
was still armed, he was sitting in his car, and the four young 
men were nowhere to be seen.  Nollie does not contest this.  At 
No. 
00-0744-CR   
 
13 
 
 
that point in time, the specific threat alleged by Nollie was 
gone.  The only threat that Nollie could point to then was the 
high incidence of crime in the neighborhood——clearly not a 
specific and imminent threat. 
¶26 In Coleman, we noted that it is difficult for a 
defendant claiming the defense of privilege to the crime of 
felon in possession of a firearm to show that the firearm was 
not possessed for longer than reasonably necessary.  Coleman, 
206 Wis. 2d at 211-12 (citing Perez, 86 F.3d  at 737; Perrin, 
45 F.3d at 874).  The same holds true for the crime of carrying 
a concealed weapon.  Here, even in the light most favorable to 
the defendant——that Nollie was not asleep but merely resting 
from an injury——any potential opportunity for him to assert a 
self-defense privilege had passed.  To allow an individual to 
claim self-defense under such circumstances would essentially 
allow anyone walking in a "high crime neighborhood" to conceal a 
weapon——a 
situation 
that, 
again, 
would 
eviscerate 
the 
legislature's intent in making carrying a concealed weapon a 
crime. 
III 
¶27 Even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to 
the defendant, we hold that Nollie could not have sustained a 
claim of self-defense and the circuit court was correct when it 
refused to allow Nollie to argue self-defense at trial.  For 
this reason, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court and 
sustain Nollie's conviction. 
No. 
00-0744-CR   
 
14 
 
 
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  00-0744-CR.wab 
 
 
 
1
¶28 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   (dissenting).  Although the 
majority correctly states the test to apply in this case, see 
majority op. at ¶19, I conclude that the majority errs in its 
conclusion that Nollie failed to present sufficient evidence in 
this case to sustain a claim of self-defense.  For this reason, 
I would reverse Nollie's judgment of conviction and remand for a 
new trial, permitting the defendant to assert a privilege of 
self-defense.   
¶29 Evidence is sufficient to support a theory of defense 
if "a reasonable construction of the evidence will support the 
defendant's theory 'viewed in the most favorable light it will 
"reasonably admit from the standpoint of the accused."'"  State 
v. Mendoza, 80 Wis. 2d 122, 153, 258 N.W.2d 260 (1977) (citation 
omitted).  A reasonable construction of the evidence in this 
case leads to the conclusion that Nollie had an actual and 
reasonable 
belief 
that 
there 
was 
an 
imminent 
unlawful 
interference with his person.  Nollie argued that he was forced 
to pull his car over while driving home at 1:30 a.m. on a 
Thursday morning because of a flat tire.  When he got out of his 
car, several men were being loud and profane approximately 
thirty feet from his car.  Having been the victim of several 
crimes in the same area, including a physical assault and armed 
robbery, Nollie removed and loaded a firearm from his trunk and 
placed it in the waistband of his pants.   
¶30 Indeed, the test is not whether the evidence showed 
that there was an actual or imminent unlawful interference with 
the defendant's person.  Instead, it is based on whether the 
No.  00-0744-CR.wab 
 
 
 
2
defendant had an actual and reasonable belief that there was an 
actual or imminent unlawful interference.  In this case, in 
light of the defendant's past history with being a victim of a 
crime, of evidence showing his proximity to several individuals 
in a high crime area late at night, and of evidence of his 
vulnerability to becoming a victim of another crime, I would 
conclude that the defendant's belief that he may be victimized 
again was reasonable.  Therefore, his claim of self-defense 
should have been permitted in this case.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent.   
 
No.  00-0744-CR.wab 
 
 
 
1