Title: Commonwealth v. Boyd

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11998 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MICHAEL S. BOYD. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     January 11, 2016. - April 8, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Firearms.  Practice, Criminal, Sentence, Nolle prosequi. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 28, 2008. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Sandra L. Hamlin, J., and a 
motion to correct sentence, filed on May 4, 2014, was heard by 
her. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
James M. Fox for the defendant. 
 
KerryAnne Kilcoyne, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Chauncey B. Wood & Timothy St. Lawrence, for Massachusetts 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
CORDY, J.  The defendant, Michael Boyd, was convicted on 
counts of an indictment charging two sentencing enhancements, 
2 
 
one as a second-time offender, see G. L. c. 269, § 10 (d), and 
one under the Massachusetts armed career criminal (ACC) statute,1 
see G. L. c. 269, § 10G (c), both premised on an underlying 
conviction of unlawful possession of a sawed-off shotgun, in 
violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (c).  The Commonwealth moved for 
sentencing consistent with the fifteen- to twenty-year term of 
imprisonment required by the ACC statute, while the defendant 
recommended a lesser punishment, also within the range afforded 
by the ACC statute.2  See G. L. c. 269, § 10G (c).  The defendant 
was sentenced to a term of from fifteen to seventeen years in 
State prison on the ACC enhancement and was not sentenced on the 
second offender enhancement. 
 
The defendant appealed from the ACC conviction, arguing 
that the Commonwealth's evidence was insufficient to support a 
sentence enhancement under that provision.  In an unpublished 
memorandum and order pursuant to its rule 1:28, the Appeals 
Court agreed, reversing the conviction and remanding the case 
for resentencing.  See Commonwealth v. Boyd, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 
1106 (2014).  The Appeals Court's decision ostensibly left the 
defendant with convictions of unlawful possession of a sawed-off 
                                                          
 
 
1 The armed career criminal indictment charged that the 
defendant had been previously convicted of three violent crimes, 
subjecting him to an enhanced sentence. 
 
 
2 The Commonwealth moved for a sentence of from eighteen to 
twenty years, and the defendant recommended a term of from 
fifteen years to fifteen years and one day. 
3 
 
shotgun, which carries a sentencing range of from eighteen 
months to life, see G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), (c); and the second 
offender enhancement conviction for the same offense, which 
carries a mandatory term of imprisonment in State prison of 
between five and seven years, see G. L. c. 269, § 10 (d). 
 
On remand, the case presented a unique circumstance:  a 
statute that affords greater potential punishment for an 
underlying crime than for a subsequent offense.  Consequently, 
at the resentencing hearing, the defendant argued that he should 
be sentenced under the enhancement statute, while the 
Commonwealth sought the imposition of a longer sentence on the 
underlying crime.  The Commonwealth, over defense objection, 
entered a nolle prosequi of the second offender enhancement 
charge,3 and the judge sentenced the defendant to a term of from 
twelve to fifteen years on the underlying conviction of unlawful 
possession of a sawed-off shotgun. 
 
In his present appeal, the defendant argues that it was 
error for the resentencing judge to allow the Commonwealth to 
avail itself of the nolle prosequi procedure after the initial 
sentencing had already occurred, particularly where such a 
decision exposed him to a greater potential punishment. 
                                                          
 
 
3 The defendant argued that allowing the Commonwealth to 
enter a nolle prosequi on a conviction after both verdict and 
sentence had been entered would subject him to double jeopardy. 
4 
 
 
In Commonwealth v. Richardson, 469 Mass. 248, 249 (2014), 
decided one month after the resentencing in the present case, we 
established that, absent legislative intent to the contrary, "a 
defendant may be sentenced under only one sentencing enhancement 
statute," even if he or she was convicted pursuant to multiple 
such provisions.  The Commonwealth, however, is free to charge a 
defendant under multiple sentencing enhancement statutes, and if 
it secures multiple convictions, it may, prior to sentencing, 
"exercise its prosecutorial prerogative to decide which 
enhancement provision will apply . . . by entering a nolle 
prosequi of all but one sentencing enhancement count."  Id. at 
254.  Because in Richardson the Commonwealth had not exercised 
its nolle prosequi authority prior to sentencing, and because 
the judge sentenced the defendant under two sentencing 
enhancement provisions, we remanded the case for resentencing, 
concluding that, "[w]here . . . the Commonwealth did not 
exercise its authority to enter a nolle prosequi of one of the 
enhancement counts before sentencing, the decision regarding 
which sentence will survive on remand rests with the sentencing 
judge."  Id. at 249, 251-252, 254-255. 
 
Consistent with our holding in Richardson, we conclude that 
the judge's original sentencing on one of two possible 
enhancement convictions (ACC enhancement) effectively acted as a 
dismissal of the other (second offender enhancement).  Thus, the 
5 
 
Commonwealth's attempt to enter a nolle prosequi with respect to 
the second offender enhancement conviction, after the remand, is 
moot as duplicative.  The underlying conviction of possession of 
a sawed-off shotgun, however, remained viable, and where the 
judge on resentencing sentenced the defendant on that 
conviction, we affirm the sentence as imposed.4,5 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Underlying crimes.  The circumstances 
underlying the defendant's conviction are not in dispute, and 
they also are not at issue in his appeal.  To give context, we 
present a brief recitation of the facts precipitating the 
defendant's arrest and his subsequent convictions. 
 
On September 24, 2008, the Framingham police responded to a 
report of a domestic dispute involving the defendant and his 
pregnant girl friend.  The officers discovered that the 
defendant had taken custody of the couple's two children, so 
they proceeded to the defendant's apartment to remove the 
children and to arrest the defendant.  The defendant refused to 
come outside, and the officers heard children screaming.  When 
the police sought to enter the home by force, the defendant 
                                                          
 
 
4 See Commonwealth v. Woodward, 427 Mass. 659, 683 (1998), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Coleman, 390 Mass. 797, 804 (1984) ("it 
is not within [our] power . . . to review an otherwise lawful 
sentence"). 
 
 
5 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
6 
 
fired a shotgun through the window.  The police returned fire, 
wounding the defendant.  They subsequently arrested him. 
 
b.  Procedural history.  The defendant was named in 
indictments setting forth a total of ten different offenses.  In 
addition to the conviction of unlawful possession of a sawed-off 
shotgun, in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (c), the jury 
returned guilty verdicts on indictments charging unlawful 
possession of ammunition without a firearm identification card, 
in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h); two counts of reckless 
endangerment of a child, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13L; 
unlawful possession of a loaded sawed-off shotgun, in violation 
of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n); and unlawful discharge of a firearm, 
in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 12E.6 
 
After evidence was presented at a separate jury-waived 
portion of the bifurcated trial that established the defendant's 
prior criminal history, the defendant was convicted of two 
separate sentencing enhancements (as a subsequent offender and 
as an armed career criminal) for both the shotgun possession 
conviction and the ammunition possession conviction.  The 
                                                          
 
 
6 The defendant was found not guilty on one indictment 
charging assault and battery of a pregnant person and two 
indictments charging assault by means of a dangerous weapon.  
The jury were unable to reach a unanimous verdict on the charge 
of armed assault with intent to murder, in violation of G. L. 
c. 265, § 18 (b).  The judge declared a mistrial with regard to 
that indictment, and the Commonwealth subsequently entered a 
nolle prosequi, dismissing the charge. 
7 
 
defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of from fifteen to 
seventeen years on those convictions, consistent with the 
provisions of the ACC statute, and to a subsequent ten years of 
probation for each of the remaining charges, to run concurrently 
with each other and from and after the prison sentence.  No 
sentence was imposed on the second offender enhancement 
convictions. 
 
At the resentencing hearing on July 10, 2014, after the 
defendant had successfully challenged his armed career criminal 
status, see Boyd, 85 Mass. App. Ct. at 1106, the parties 
mutually agreed to dismiss the possession of ammunition charge 
as duplicative.  The Commonwealth also sought to enter a nolle 
prosequi of the subsequent offender enhancement portion of the 
indictment charging possession of a sawed-off shotgun.  The 
defendant objected, but the resentencing judge allowed the nolle 
prosequi and sentenced the defendant to a term of from twelve to 
fifteen years in State prison for the underlying crime.7  The 
defendant appealed.8  We transferred the case from the Appeals 
Court on our own motion. 
                                                          
 
 
7 The ten-year probation sentences imposed on other 
convictions, to run from and after the prison sentence, were not 
addressed at resentencing. 
 
 
8 The defendant subsequently filed a motion to revise and 
revoke the sentence, again arguing that it was improper to enter 
a nolle prosequi after the imposition of a sentence.  
Specifically, the defendant argued that the new sentence 
8 
 
 
The defendant argues that it was error for the resentencing 
judge to allow the Commonwealth to exercise its nolle prosequi 
authority at the resentencing hearing for two reasons, and the 
resentencing judge was therefore required to sentence the 
defendant under the subsequent offender enhancement provision on 
the charge of possession of a sawed-off shotgun:  first, that 
the nolle prosequi was time barred because sentencing had 
already occurred; and, second, that the Commonwealth's nolle 
prosequi circumvented legislative intent in establishing the 
penalty structure for the underlying charge and the enhancement 
of which the defendant was convicted. 
 
2.  Discussion.  Generally speaking, the Commonwealth has 
"absolute" authority "to enter a nolle prosequi" at any point 
"before sentencing," see Mass. R. Crim. P. 16 (a), 378 Mass. 885 
(1979) ("prosecuting attorney may enter a nolle prosequi on 
pending charges at any time prior to the pronouncement of 
sentence"), "either as to an entire indictment or . . . count 
thereof, or any distinct and substantive part of it."  
Commonwealth v. Massod, 350 Mass. 745, 748 (1966).9  Where the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
"diverges from legislative intent and the interests of justice."  
The motion judge (who was different from the trial judge, who 
had retired in the interim period) denied the motion.  The 
defendant did not file a notice of appeal with regard to the 
motion. 
 
 
9 The defendant argues that the Commonwealth, if it were to 
enter a nolle prosequi on any portion of the conviction against 
9 
 
Commonwealth does not exercise its authority to enter a nolle 
prosequi prior to sentencing, the judge "must exercise 
discretion to craft the most appropriate individualized sentence 
within the bounds of the applicable criminal statutes" 
(quotations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Rivas, 466 Mass. 184, 
190-191 (2013). 
 
In the context of multiple convictions under sentencing 
enhancement statutes, the Commonwealth's prosecutorial 
prerogative over which enhancement is available for sentencing 
ends when the defendant appears before the judge for sentencing.  
See Richardson, 469 Mass. at 254.  At that point, in the absence 
of a nolle prosequi, the sentencing judge has the discretion to 
select one enhancement conviction before levying a punishment.  
Id. at 254-255.  The judge's decision has the effect of 
determining which sentence enhancement "survive[s]" for purposes 
of appeal and any potential remand.  See id. at 255.  The 
adverse effect is that the sentencing enhancement not selected 
by the judge is dismissed, similar to when a nolle prosequi is 
entered prior to sentencing. 
 
The result in the present case is that the defendant was no 
longer subject to the second offender sentence enhancement after 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the defendant, was required to dismiss it in its entirety.  This 
argument is rendered moot by our holding, see note 11, infra, 
but we note that the Commonwealth is entitled to enter a nolle 
prosequi as to discrete portions of charges. 
10 
 
the case was remanded.  See Boyd, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 1106.10  That 
is, the judge's initial sentencing of the defendant under the 
ACC statute effectively dismissed the second offender portion of 
the indictment.  Therefore, after the ACC charge had been 
reversed, the resentencing judge was left to craft a sentence 
based on the only remaining charge associated with G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10:  the underlying crime.  As a result, the Commonwealth need 
not have -- and indeed could not have -- exercised its nolle 
prosequi authority to dismiss the second offender enhancement in 
order to subject the defendant to punishment under the 
underlying crime.11 
                                                          
 
 
10 The same is not true of the underlying charge, under 
which the judge was still permitted to sentence the defendant.  
See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 447 Mass. 1018, 1019 (2006) 
(sentencing enhancement statutes "do not create independent 
crimes").  The underlying crime and the sentencing enhancement 
statute were not duplicative, so dismissal of one was not 
required, compare Commonwealth v. Rivas, 466 Mass. 184, 185 
(2013), nor was it incumbent on the sentencing judge to select 
which of the convictions would "survive," see Commonwealth v. 
Richardson, 469 Mass. 248, 255 (2014). 
 
 
11 Our conclusion renders moot the defendant's concerns 
related to elective dismissal at resentencing.  The defendant 
argues that the Commonwealth's ability to nol pros was time 
barred after resentencing, and also asserts that allowing the 
Commonwealth to nol pros the subsequent offender enhancement 
provision on remand offends the notion of double jeopardy.  
Because we conclude that there was no subsequent offender 
enhancement available for the Commonwealth on which to enter a 
nolle prosequi at the resentencing hearing, and it was therefore 
error for the sentencing judge to accept entry of that nolle 
prosequi, we need not reach these issues. 
11 
 
 
This case presents the circumstance in which our holding 
will inure to the benefit of the Commonwealth.  Due to the 
peculiarity of the sawed-off shotgun possession statute, G. L. 
c. 269, § 10, which affords a greater potential punishment for 
first-time offenders than does the second offender charge for 
the same offense, the Commonwealth was able to secure a more 
severe penalty after the second offender charge had been vacated 
than it would have been able to had the charge remained.  In a 
more common scenario, the dismissal on appeal of the sentencing 
enhancement provision under which a defendant has been sentenced 
would protect the defendant from an enhanced punishment on 
remand, based on the same underlying offense. 
 
The defendant argues that, even if it was appropriate to 
sentence him for the underlying crime, his sentence under that 
statute was excessive.  The defendant contends that a closer 
reading of the tiered penalty structure for possession of a 
sawed-off shotgun under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (c), reveals that the 
Legislature intended a first-time offender to have a sentence of 
less than five years.  The argument implies that, because the 
subsequent offender provisions for the underlying crime each 
subject an offender to a progressively serious potential 
penalty, based on the number of offenses, the Legislature must 
have intended a first-time offender to be subject to less 
punishment than any subsequent offender. 
12 
 
 
We conclude that the defendant's statutory interpretation 
argument is inapt; the statute is not ambiguous, nor was the 
judge's interpretation of that statute in handing down a 
sentence in excess of seven years inappropriate.  While the 
statute is no doubt unusual, there can be no misconstruing the 
language of the Legislature:  first-time offenders in the 
possession of sawed-off shotguns are subject to "imprisonment in 
the state prison for life, or any term of years," with a minimum 
sentence of eighteen months.  G. L. c. 269, § 10 (c).  The 
weapons listed in § 10 (c) (machine gun and sawed-off shotgun) 
are the only "dangerous weapons" listed in § 10, the possession 
of which subjects the possessor to a term of up to life 
imprisonment.  The following section, § 10 (d), is an omnibus 
clause of the statute, allowing for subsequent offender sentence 
enhancements for violations not only of § 10 (c) but also of 
§ 10 (a) (possession of other types of firearms) and § 10 (b) 
(encompassing a wide variety of handheld, nonfirearm weapons, 
including knives, chains, and nunchaku).  A single violation of 
neither § 10 (a) nor § 10 (b) subjects an offender to life 
imprisonment.  This clear differentiation by the Legislature 
indicates that offenses under § 10 (c) are more grievous than 
those under § 10 (a) or (b).  The inconsistent penalty system by 
which second offenders may (at least with respect to offenses 
under § 10 [c]) receive a lesser punishment than first-time 
13 
 
offenders may seem illogical, but it is not ambiguous.  We 
therefore conclude, contrary to the defendant's recitation of 
the rule of lenity, that there is nothing ambiguous about the 
statute in question. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The Commonwealth was unable to exercise 
its nolle prosequi authority as to the second offender 
enhancement because that conviction was no longer available.  
Given that the judge had initially sentenced the defendant under 
the ACC enhancement provision, the second offender enhancement 
was effectively dismissed.  Our conclusion that the defendant 
was no longer subject to the second offender enhancement 
conviction, however, leaves the resentencing judge in the same 
position in which she had been on the initial remand:  able to 
craft a sentence, pursuant to G. L. c. 269, § 10 (c), based on 
the underlying crime, with a potential term of from eighteen 
months to life.  We therefore affirm as imposed the defendant's 
sentence of from twelve to fifteen years in State prison. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.