Title: Matter of Millsap

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matter of Millsap1987 WY 16732 P.2d 1065Case Number: 86-145Decided: 02/19/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
INJURY TO WILLIAM GLEN MILLSAP, AN EMPLOYEE OF R.L. MANNING COMPANY. WILLIAM 
GLEN MILLSAP, APPELLANT (EMPLOYEE-CLAIMANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
R.L. MANNING COMPANY, 
APPELLEE (EMPLOYER-RESPONDENT).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, UintaCounty, Robert B. Ranck, 
J.

 
 
Daniel E. White of Vines, 
Rideout, Gusea & White, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellant.

 
 
Thomas F. Reese of Brown, 
Drew, Apostolos, Massey & Sullivan, Casper, for appellee.

 
 
Before BROWN, C.J., THOMAS, URBIGKIT, and MACY, 
JJ., and GUTHRIE, Ret. J.

 
 

GUTHRIE, Retired 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This appeal involves 
the action of the trial court in dismissing an application for modification of a 
previous award of worker's compensation benefits which was filed on October 7, 
1985, on behalf of the injured workman, appellant William Millsap, and the 
further denial of a motion requesting appointment of an impartial physician to 
examine and evaluate appellant's condition.

 
 

[¶2.]     The worker's 
compensation division does not pursue its right to appeal or to participate in 
any manner in this proceeding. Although this case previously has been before 
this Court, R.L. Manning Company v. Millsap, Wyo., 687 P.2d 252 (1984), we are 
now faced with a different set of facts which are pertinent to our consideration 
of this appeal and its disposal and which are quite 
simple.

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellant was injured 
on August 5, 1977, while employed by appellee R.L. Manning Company. He received 
benefits for temporary, total disability for some time and, on March 19, 1979, 
received an award, which was paid in a lump sum, for 15% permanent partial 
disability. Appellant had additional surgery on January 7, 1981, and claims 
arising from this surgery were paid. A payment for mileage and expense incurred 
by appellant in pursuit of such medical treatment was made on March 17, 1982. In 
addition thereto, there was a fee bill from Dr. William Mott in the sum of 
$47.50 which was ordered paid on April 6, 1982. The award for permanent, partial 
disability of 15% was made in March 1979, more than five years prior to 
appellant's motion herein. However, the physician's fee bill which was ordered 
paid as late as April 6, 1982, was within the four-year period prior to the 
filing of the motion.

 
 

[¶4.]     After a hearing on this 
matter, appellee moved for a dismissal of the proceedings on the basis of the 
limitation contained in § 27-12-606, W.S. 1977, contending that no petition had 
been filed within the four-year period after the 1979 award. In its decision, 
the court denied the motion for appointment of an impartial physician and 
granted the motion to dismiss the application for modification. This, then, 
poses the question directly and immediately: Was this application timely filed? 
It is necessary first to make disposal of this question.

 
 

[¶5.]     In urging this appeal, 
appellant asserts that, by virtue of the ruling in the case of Wyoming State 
Treasurer v. Barnes, Wyo., 587 P.2d 214 (1978), the court had continuing 
jurisdiction of this matter. Alternatively, appellant asserts that the claim was 
filed in time by virtue of the allowance and payment of Dr. Mott's bill, which 
was within the period of limitations contemplated by § 27-12-606, and that such 
payment was an award as contemplated by the statute. In answer to this 
contention, appellee asserts that the statute, § 27-12-606, applies and refers 
to an award of compensation as a type of award and a specific award. Therefore, 
the March 1979 award is the point at which the time would begin to 
run.

 
 

[¶6.]     We cannot rely upon 
authority from other jurisdictions, because our statute is unique. Conn v. Ed Wederski Construction Company, Wyo., 668 P.2d 649 
(1983). Further, it must be kept in mind that our construction of this statute 
must be made in honor of our rule of liberal construction in worker's 
compensation cases. Id.

 
 

[¶7.]     The statute under which 
this reopening is sought, § 27-12-606, is as follows, to 
wit:

 
 
"Where an award of compensation has been made 
in favor of or on behalf of an employee for any benefits under this act [§§ 
27-12-101 through 27-12-804], an application may be made to the clerk of 
district court by any party within four (4) years from the date of the last 
award, or at any time during which monthly payments under an award are being 
made, for additional benefits of any type or nature or for a modification of the 
amount of the award on the ground of increase or decrease of incapacity due 
solely to the injury, or upon grounds of mistake or fraud." (Emphasis 
added.)

 
 

[¶8.]     However, since this 
question hinges upon an interpretation and construction of the preceding 
section, it is necessary that we also consider as part and parcel thereof § 
27-12-607, W.S. 1977, which is as follows, to wit:

 
 
"Every award within the 
meaning of this act [§§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-804] is a judicial determination 
of the rights of the employer, the employee and the disposition of money within 
the various accounts provided under this act as to all matters involved. Except 
as otherwise provided, the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern in 
matters before the courts of this state in reference to this act. No award of 
compensation or allowance of any expense claim chargeable against the account of 
any employer contributing under this act shall be made without notice to the 
employer and opportunity for hearing, unless the employer files written consent 
to the claim in the court having jurisdiction. If no written objection to the 
payment of the claim is filed within ten (10) days from the date of verified 
receipt of the notice to the employer or his qualified agent, it is conclusively 
presumed that the employer consents to the claim and the claim shall be 
submitted to the clerk of district court for approval. If after a diligent 
effort has been made the notice cannot be served upon an employer, the clerk of 
district court may allow or disallow the claim."

 
 

[¶9.]     This section contains a 
definition which makes it directly applicable in arriving at a proper definition 
of "award" here and controlling. Appellee concludes correctly this statutory 
definition of "award" is significant. It is our view that when the legislature 
did set out "for any benefits" and, later in such section, mentioned "from the 
date of the last award," it definitely was not using this term in the manner 
outlined and as appellee contends.

 
 

[¶10.]  We are not cited to any section or any 
authority by the parties herein which we consider applicable, nor have we been 
able to find any authority which might be applicable to sustain appellee's view. 
Because the statute is so totally dissimilar to all the statutes which we have 
encountered, it will apparently be necessary to make this interpretation within 
the parameters of our worker's compensation law and our decisions arising 
thereunder.

 
 

[¶11.]  Inference may be drawn therefrom that 
there is no intent to limit this statute to any particular award by use of these 
above words. Appellee goes so far in its argument as to contend that the word 
"award" means "payment for a permanent disability and possibly payment of 
temporary total disability." We can find no basis for such contention within 
these sections. We have heretofore recognized that the reopening may be "for 
`additional benefits of any type or nature.'" Conn v. Ed Wederski Construction Company, 
supra at 652 (emphasis in original). In that case, this Court 
said:

 
 
"[Section] 27-12-606, 
W.S. 1977, represents an attempt by the legislature to balance the concept of 
finality as applied to worker's compensation awards with the need to assure that 
injured workmen receive the full amount of any benefits to which they are 
entitled under the law." Id. at 653 (emphasis 
added).

 
 

[¶12.]  In our view, the statute does not lend 
itself to the view of a definition of award with a strict limitation for which 
appellee contends when it mentions "made in favor of or on behalf of an employee 
for any benefits." (Emphasis added.) 
It may be observed that the payment for the doctor was certainly for services 
performed on behalf of appellant for his benefit, as the services would be for 
any injured workman, and was paid from an account set up by the Worker's 
Compensation Act. This strangely tortured and sharply limited definition 
contended for by appellee can certainly not live under the bright light of the 
rule of liberal consideration.

 
 

[¶13.]  In this case, the bill of the doctor was 
paid by virtue of an instrument entitled "ORDER OF AWARD" executed by the clerk 
of court after notice had been given to appellee and a card had been returned 
indicating receipt of notice of said claim. The card which was returned and 
remains in the file was signed by an agent of appellee with a check mark in a 
square marked "approved." This factual situation certainly brings it under the 
purview of § 27-12-607. It is our view that the order approving the payment and 
the payment of said doctor were and are, by virtue of the statute and case law, 
a judicial determination upon which an award was based. This Court has 
heretofore recognized that an approval of a claim by procedure of this character 
is a judicial determination:

 
 
"Whether a claim is 
adjudicated under the formal-dispute procedures, or informally by the clerk of 
the district court - where there is no employer objection - the character of the 
award as a judicial determination is not changed. See, Midwest Refining Co. v. 
George, 41 Wyo. 55, 281 P. 1005, 1007 [1929]; and Wyoming State Treasurer ex 
rel. Workmen's Compensation Department v. Niezwaag, Wyo., 452 P.2d 214, 217 
[1969]." WyomingState Treasurer ex rel. Worker's Compensation Division 
v. Svoboda, Wyo., 573 P.2d 417, 419-20 
(1978).

 
 

[¶14.]  It being the view of this Court that the 
petition was filed timely, the case must be remanded for proper hearing and 
determination as to whether the employee can meet his burden of proof and the 
conditions as set out in § 27-12-606.

 
 

[¶15.]  It was not error, however, for the trial 
court, believing as it did that this petition for reopening was not timely, to 
deny the motion for the employment of an impartial physician to examine and 
evaluate appellant. Were this motion untimely, the examination and evaluation 
would have been an exercise in complete futility and would only submit the 
worker's compensation fund - a fund, by the way, which under the present 
circumstances should be zealously protected - to a useless charge. The factual 
situation developed during the rehearing will be the basis upon which that court 
should consider the motion for appointment of a physician.

 
 

[¶16.]  Reversed and 
remanded.