Title: Van Meter v. Darien Park Dist.

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 90541-Agenda 31-May 2001.
WILLIAM VAN METER et al., Appellants, v. THE DARIEN PARK
							DISTRICT et al., Appellees.
Opinion filed October 17, 2003.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	The plaintiffs, William and Patricia Van Meter, filed a complaint
against the Darien Park District, the City of Darien, the Village of
Downers Grove, the County of Du Page, and five private defendants,
alleging that surface water flooded their home upon completion of an
adjacent municipal recreation area called Westwood Park (the park).
The municipal defendants filed motions to dismiss, pursuant to section
2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9)
(West 1994)), alleging that they were entitled to discretionary
immunity under section 2-201 of the Local Governmental and
Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (the Act) (745 ILCS
10/2-201 (West 1994)). The Du Page County circuit court granted
the municipal defendants' motions to dismiss, and the appellate court
affirmed. No. 2-99-0009 (unpublished order under Supreme Court
Rule 23). We granted the plaintiffs' petition for leave to appeal (177
Ill. 2d R. 315) and now reverse.
I. BACKGROUND
	The plaintiffs' 20-count complaint alleged negligence, res ipsa
loquitur, and trespass and unlawful taking claims against the municipal
defendants. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that they own a
single-family residence in Darien. According to the plaintiffs, the
defendants started designing and planning the park on property
between Darien and Downers Grove in March 1992. Together with
engineers and architects, the defendants produced a "Landscape
Development Plan,"depicting drainage of surface and subsurface
water, as well as changes in the elevation of the property affecting the
natural flow of water. The Darien Park District approved the plan in
conjunction with requirements imposed by the City of Darien, the
Village of Downers Grove and Du Page County. Pursuant to the plan,
the defendants, through their contractors, constructed a storm water
drainage and detention system to restrict water from the environs of
the park development and to prevent water from flowing in its natural
course.
	The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants owed "a duty to the
Plaintiffs to provide adequate drainage for the passage of water from
and/or around Plaintiffs' property and not to alter the natural flow of
water so as to cause water to back-up and flood Plaintiffs' real estate
and residence." The plaintiffs further alleged that the defendants knew
or should have known, when they approved the park plans, that the
alterations in the natural flow of water would cause flooding problems
for neighboring residents. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants
breached this duty by failing to design, plan, supervise, observe, or
manage properly the construction of Westwood Park. The plaintiffs
specified several defects in the park construction, including an
insufficient storm water drainage system that (1) alters the
groundwater elevation; (2) restricts the natural flow of water; and (3)
diverts water from adjoining property onto the plaintiffs' property.
	The plaintiffs charged that the defendants negligently caused
flooding on the plaintiffs' property and that the defendants negligently
failed to correct the defects in the park design and construction "after
being placed on notice that the use of those public improvements have
[sic] created conditions that are not reasonably safe." The plaintiffs
asserted that, before 1996, the year the project was completed, they
suffered no flooding. In their trespass/unlawful taking counts, the
plaintiffs alleged that the park construction has caused and still causes
flooding on their property. This "continuing trespass," a purported
"constant diversion" of water, has robbed them of the "peaceable
enjoyment, occupation, possession, and use of their residence" and
lowered the value of their property.
	The defendants each filed motions to dismiss, pursuant to section
2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9)
(West 1994)), asserting that plaintiffs' claims were barred by
defendants' affirmative defense of immunity under section 2-201 of
the Act (745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 1994)). On September 17, 1998,
the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims against the Darien Park
District, Darien, and Downers Grove under section 2-201 of the Act,
providing governmental entities with immunity from liability for acts
or omissions arising from a determination of policy and an exercise of
discretion. 745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 1994); Harinek v. 161 North
Clark Street Ltd. Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335, 341 (1998). On
December 3, 1998, the trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion to
reconsider, stating:
			"[W]hat could be more discretionary than trying to decide
how the landscape is going to be reconfigured to
accommodate this park that they wanted to put here? I mean,
that's almost discretionary by definition, isn't it?
			You have to decide how you're going to change the
landscape. You have to decide how you're going to
reconfigure the surface flow of water because the park
doesn't do any good if it's under water.
			And so everybody sits around the table and decides how
are we going to do this and what's our best judgment as to
how we should design this so it does a minimum amount of
damage to the surrounding properties and redirects the
surface flow of the waters, so that we can build this park
here.
			What's more discretionary than that? If I apply the ad hoc
test to these facts, how do I not conclude that the design of
this park was a discretionary function?
* * *
			I think that even taking the facts as alleged in the plaintiff's
[sic] complaint as true and indulging all reasonable inferences
therefrom in favor of the plaintiff, that my conclusion to be
drawn from those facts is that this is a discretionary function
on behalf of the municipalities which, in fact, immunizes them
therefore under 2-201."
Because other counts remained pending against the private
defendants, the trial court found that its dismissal was final as to the
Darien Park District, Darien, and Downers Grove and that there was
no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)). On January 21, 1999, the
court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims against Du Page County under
section 2-201. This order also contained Rule 304(a) language.
	The appellate court affirmed the trial court's dismissals, holding
that the defendants enjoyed immunity under section 2-201. The
appellate court stated in pertinent part as follows:
			"Defendants, through their employees, used their skill,
judgment, and ultimately their discretion to consider the
design of the park, its landscaping, and the type of
construction. Employees of the defendants, in each of their
respective municipal capacities, balanced competing interests
when determining whether and how the flow of water should
be directed and restricted.
			The Act provides for immunity of public entities, such as
defendants, which, through their employees, exercised their
judgment and discretion when they determined how to
design, plan, supervise, observe, or manage the construction
of Westwood Park. Therefore, to the extent any adoption of
a plan or design of the construction of Westwood Park by
defendants caused plaintiffs' damages, the Act precludes
recovery from defendants." No. 2-99-0009 (unpublished
order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
We allowed plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.
Before this court, plaintiffs argue that the trial and appellate courts
misapplied section 2-201 of the Act. For the reasons that follow, we
agree and reverse.
II. ANALYSIS
	In the matter before us, the parties dispute whether the circuit
court properly granted defendants' section 2-619(a)(9) motions to
dismiss plaintiffs' complaint on the basis that section 2-201 of the
Tort Immunity Act completely immunized defendants from liability for
the acts and omissions stated in plaintiffs' complaint. According to
plaintiffs, the circuit court improperly dismissed their complaint
because defendants did not establish that their alleged actions were
"discretionary" within the meaning of section 2-201. Defendants
counter that the circuit court properly dismissed plaintiffs' complaint
under section 2-619(a)(9) because, despite their duty not to alter the
natural flow of water on another's land, they are entitled to absolute
immunity regarding all of their decisions with respect to the planning
and construction of Westwood Park because all decisions involved the
exercise of discretion. Accordingly, defendants argue, their actions fall
squarely within the purview of the immunity provided under section
2-201 of the Act. We disagree. For the reasons discussed below, we
hold that the circuit court improperly dismissed plaintiffs' claims as to
these municipal defendants.
	The purpose of a section 2-619 motion to dismiss is to dispose
of issues of law and easily proved issues of fact at the outset of
litigation. Zedella v. Gibson, 165 Ill. 2d 181, 185 (1995). Specifically,
section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure permits
involuntary dismissal where "the claim asserted against defendant is
barred by other affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or
defeating the claim." 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 1998). An
" 'affirmative matter,' in a section 2-619(a)(9) motion, is something
in the nature of a defense which negates the cause of action
completely ***." Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469,
486 (1994). The moving party thus admits the legal sufficiency of the
complaint, but asserts an affirmative defense or other matter to defeat
the plaintiff's claim. Kedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v.
Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112, 115 (1993). Immunity under the Act is an
affirmative matter properly raised in a section 2-619(a)(9) motion to
dismiss. Bubb v. Springfield School District 186, 167 Ill. 2d 372, 378
(1995). When a court rules on a section 2-619 motion to dismiss, it
"must interpret all pleadings and supporting documents in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party." In re Chicago Flood
Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 189 (1997). Our review of a section 2-619
dismissal is de novo. Epstein v. Chicago Board of Education, 178 Ill. 2d 370, 383 (1997).
	In 1959, this court abolished sovereign immunity from tort claims
for municipalities. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No.
302, 18 Ill. 2d 11 (1959). In 1965, the General Assembly responded
by enacting the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees
Tort Immunity Act. Zimmerman v. Village of Skokie, 183 Ill. 2d 30,
43 (1998). The 1970 Illinois Constitution validated both Molitor and
the Act. Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd. Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335, 344 (1998); see Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, §4 ("Except as the
General Assembly may provide by law, sovereign immunity in this
State is abolished"); see also Comment, Illinois Tort Claims Act: A
New Approach to Municipal Tort Immunity in Illinois, 61 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 265 (1966).
	The Act serves to protect local public entities and public
employees from liability arising from the operation of government.
745 ILCS 10/1-101.1(a) (West 1998); see Epstein, 178 Ill. 2d  at
375.(1) By providing immunity, the General Assembly sought to prevent
the dissipation of public funds on damage awards in tort cases. See
Bubb, 167 Ill. 2d  at 378. The Act does not create new duties; rather,
it " 'merely codifies those duties existing at common law[ ] to which
the subsequently delineated immunities apply.' " Village of
Bloomingdale v. CDG Enterprises, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 484, 490 (2001),
quoting Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 386 (1996).
Since the Act was enacted in derogation of the common law, it must
be strictly construed. Snyder v. Curran Township, 167 Ill. 2d 466, 477
(1995). Unless an immunity provision applies, municipalities are liable
in tort to the same extent as private parties. See Barnett, 171 Ill. 2d 
at 386.
	In the matter at bar, plaintiffs, in their amended complaint, allege
substantially identical conduct on the part of each municipal defendant
relating to the defendants' involvement in the planning and
development of Westwood Park. With respect to each defendant,
plaintiffs assert that the defendants "breached their duty to the
plaintiffs by causing or allowing a change in the natural groundwater
elevation and flow of groundwater to occur resulting in water from
adjoining lands to gather on plaintiffs' property and the flooding of
plaintiffs' real estate and residence." At common law, a landowner
bears a duty not to increase the natural flow of surface water onto the
property of an adjacent landowner. See Templeton v. Huss, 57 Ill. 2d 134, 141 (1974); Daum v. Cooper, 208 Ill. 391, 397-98 (1904); see
generally 36 Ill. L. & Prac. §3, at 53 (1958) ("an upper landowner has
no legal right to collect and discharge on to a servient estate any
surface water which would not naturally flow in the direction of the
servient estate"); 36 Ill. L. & Prac. §6, at 55-56 (1958) (stating that
"[a] landowner may maintain an action to recover the damages
suffered by him where another landowner improperly drains surface
water onto his land. *** An action in chancery will also lie to enjoin
a property owner from improperly draining surface waters onto
another's land to the injury of the latter"). This common law duty
applies equally to private and public landowners. Accordingly, a local
public entity bears a common law duty not to increase the natural flow
of surface water onto the property of an adjacent landowner.
	Our inquiry, however, is not concluded. After determining that
a duty exists, we must next address whether provisions of the Tort
Immunity Act immunize the municipal defendants in the matter at bar
from liability for alleged breaches of this duty. As stated, the Tort
Immunity Act adopted the general principle that " 'local governmental
units are liable in tort but limited this [liability] with an extensive list
of immunities based on specific government functions.' " Zimmerman,
183 Ill. 2d  at 43, quoting Burdinie, 139 Ill. 2d  at 506. Moreover, "the
existence of a duty and the existence of an immunity are separate
issues." Barnett, 171 Ill. 2d  at 388. The question thus becomes
whether the Act insulates the defendants from the plaintiffs' viable
common law tort claims. See Village of Bloomingdale v. CDG
Enterprises, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 484, 490 (2001) ("to determine whether
[an] entity is liable for the breach of a duty, we look to the Tort
Immunity Act, not the common law"). Because the immunities
afforded to governmental entities operate as an affirmative defense,
those entities bear the burden of properly raising and proving their
immunity under the Act. It is only when the governmental entities
have met this burden that a plaintiff's right to recovery is barred.
Zimmerman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 44; Bubb, 167 Ill. 2d  at 378.
	The trial and appellate courts held that defendants here met that
burden, finding that section 2-201 provides immunity in this case.
Section 2-201 extends the most significant protection afforded to
public employees under the Act. D. Baum, Tort Liability of Local
Governments and Their Employees: An Introduction to the Illinois
Immunity Act, 1966 U. Ill. L.F. 981, 994. According to section 2-201:
			"Except as otherwise provided by Statute, a public
employee serving in a position involving the determination of
policy or the exercise of discretion is not liable for an injury
resulting from his act or omission in determining policy when
acting in the exercise of such discretion even though abused."
745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 1998).
	We first extensively discussed the scope of section 2-201
immunity in Snyder v. Curran Township, 167 Ill. 2d 466 (1995). In
Snyder, the plaintiff lost control of her van when she encountered a
sharp turn at the top of a hill on a rural road. The plaintiff sued Curran
Township for its negligent failure to place a warning sign before the
curve in conformity with the Illinois Vehicle Code, and the township
claimed immunity under section 2-201. On appeal from a jury verdict
in favor of the plaintiff, the appellate court held that section 2-201
provided immunity. Snyder v. Curran Township, 267 Ill. App. 3d 174
(1994).
	This court reversed, observing that the appellate court's
erroneous conclusion "rested on an impermissibly expansive definition
of discretionary immunity." Snyder, 167 Ill. 2d  at 472. We rejected the
appellate court's reasoning that, unless a specific rule, statute, or legal
order mandates a certain course of conduct, a government official can
characterize any given action as discretionary and, therefore, immune
from liability in tort. Snyder, 167 Ill. 2d  at 473. We recognized that:
			"the distinction between discretionary and ministerial
functions resists precise formulation, and that the
determination whether acts are discretionary or ministerial
must be made on a case-by-case basis. [Citations.] Indeed,
Prosser notes that this distinction is 'finespun and more or
less unworkable. *** "It would be difficult to conceive of any
official act *** that did not admit of some discretion in the
manner of its performance, even if it involved only the driving
of a nail." ' " Snyder, 167 Ill. 2d  at 474, quoting W. Prosser,
Torts §132, at 988-90 (4th ed. 1971), quoting Ham v.
County of Los Angeles, 46 Cal. App. 148, 162, 189 P. 462,
468 (1920).
	We then defined the terms "discretionary" and "ministerial" as
follows:
		"[D]iscretionary acts are those which are unique to a
particular public office, while ministerial acts are those
which a person performs on a given state of facts in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal
authority, and without reference to the official's discretion as
to the propriety of the act." (Emphases added.) Snyder, 167 Ill. 2d  at 474.
See also Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd. Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335, 343 (1998). We concluded in Snyder that the township's
duties were more properly characterized as ministerial because the
Vehicle Code dictated the placement of warning signs: "Where ***
tailored statutory and regulatory guidelines place certain constraints
on the decisions of officials, a court should be reluctant to label
decisions falling wholly outside the established parameters as
'discretionary.' " Snyder, 167 Ill. 2d  at 474.
	In Harinek, this court addressed a question of first impression
with respect to section 2-201 of the Act: we considered whether
section 2-201 requires that a public entity prove that its act or
omission is both an exercise of discretion and a policy determination
before immunity applies. We answered this question in the affirmative.
The Harinek plaintiff was an office worker who alleged that she was
injured during an office fire drill planned and conducted by the City of
Chicago's fire marshal. According to the plaintiff, during the fire drill
the marshal negligently directed a large group of people, including the
plaintiff, to stand in the vicinity of a heavy, windowless door. As a
result, the plaintiff was hit and injured when someone opened the door
without warning. The plaintiff also alleged that the fire marshal had
acted willfully and wantonly because he had been placed on notice that
the area where he directed the group to stand was unsuitable for that
purpose. Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d  at 338.
	The circuit court granted the City's motion to dismiss the
plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the City was immune from
liability under section 2-201 of the Act. The appellate court reversed,
holding that section 2-201 did not insulate the City from liability
because the fire marshal's conduct in "directing plaintiff to stand
behind a door, though discretionary, is not a policy determination
within the meaning of the Act." Harinek v. City of Chicago, 283 Ill.
App. 3d 491, 496 (1996).
	This court reversed. We held that, under the plain language of
section 2-201, immunity will not attach unless the plaintiff's injury
results from an act performed or omitted by the public entity in
determining policy and exercising discretion. Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d  at
341. Accordingly, this court conducted a dual-prong inquiry with
respect to whether section 2-201 immunity attached. First, we held
that the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint described acts and
omissions of the fire marshal in determining fire department policy.
We noted that this court had previously defined " 'policy decisions
made by a municipality' " as " 'those decisions which require the
municipality to balance competing interests and to make a judgment
call as to what solution will best serve each of those interests.' "
Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d  at 342, quoting West v. Kirkham, 147 Ill. 2d 1, 11
(1992). We held in Harinek that the allegations in the plaintiff's
complaint fell squarely within this definition:
		"The fire marshal is responsible for planning and conducting
fire drills in the City of Chicago. In planning these drills, the
marshall must balance the various interests which may
compete for the time and resources of the department,
including the interests of efficiency and safety. The alleged
acts and omissions outlined in the complaint, such as the
marshal's decisions regarding where to assemble the
participants and whether to provide warning signs and
alternate routing, were all part of his attempts to balance
these interests. Accordingly, these acts and omissions were
undertaken in determining policy within the meaning of the
statute." Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d  at 342-43.
	We then turned to the second question of whether the acts of the
fire marshal were discretionary within the meaning of section 2-201.
We observed that, in Snyder, discretionary acts were defined as
" 'those which are unique to a particular public office.' " Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d  at 343, quoting Snyder, 167 Ill. 2d  at 474. Applying this
definition to the facts in that case, we held that the fire marshal's
conduct as set forth in the plaintiff's complaint constituted an exercise
of discretion:
		"The marshal bears sole and final responsibility for planning
and executing fire drills in buildings throughout Chicago. He
is under no legal mandate to perform these duties in a
prescribed manner; rather, he exercises his discretion in
determining how, when, and where to hold drills such as the
one in which plaintiff was injured." Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d  at
343.
Accordingly, because the acts and omissions of the fire marshal
alleged in the plaintiff's complaint were both a determination of policy
and an exercise of discretion, section 2-201 of the Act immunized the
City from liability.
	This court again addressed discretionary immunity under section
2-201 in In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, (1997).
Chicago Flood involved a dredging company hired by the City of
Chicago to replace bridge piling clusters. Numerous downtown
businesses were flooded when a tunnel wall under the Chicago River
was breached during pile driving. A class of plaintiffs sued the
dredging company and the City. The plaintiffs alleged that the City
failed to supervise the pile driving; failed to maintain, repair, and
protect the tunnel before and after the breach; and failed to warn the
plaintiffs about the flood danger after learning of the breach. The trial
court denied the City's motion to dismiss on immunity grounds and
certified several questions for review, including whether the Act
shielded the City from the plaintiffs' claims. The appellate court held
that the City's supervision of the pile driving was discretionary under
section 2-201.
	We affirmed the appellate court, noting the common law
distinction between discretionary and ministerial acts. Chicago Flood,
176 Ill. 2d  at 193-94. The plaintiffs argued that once the City
approved the pile-driving plan its actions became ministerial and the
City became liable for negligent supervision. Chicago Flood, 176 Ill. 2d  at 194-95. We disagreed, holding that the City's broad supervisory
power over the dredging company's pile driving was a discretionary
act because the City retained broad contractual "discretion to locate
the pilings in any location it thought best." Chicago Flood, 176 Ill. 2d 
at 195.
	In Harrison v. Hardin County Community Unit School District
No. 1, 197 Ill. 2d 466 (2001), the plaintiff was injured when she
collided with a high school student who lost control of his vehicle as
he drove home from school in inclement weather. Plaintiff sued the
school district alleging that its personnel acted willfully and wantonly
in refusing the student's request to leave school early because he
feared getting into an accident due to the heavy snow. The school
district moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on the basis that it
was immunized from liability under section 2-201 of the Act. We
began our analysis by reiterating our holding in Harinek that section
2-201 requires that the alleged acts or omissions committed by a
municipality must be "both a determination of policy and an exercise
of discretion." Harrison, 197 Ill. 2d  at 472, citing Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d 
at 341. The parties in Harrison agreed that the decision by the school
principal to refuse the student's request to leave school early was
"discretionary" in nature, because his actions were " 'those which are
unique to a particular public office.' " Harrison, 197 Ill. 2d  at 472,
quoting Snyder, 167 Ill. 2d  at 474. However, the parties disagreed as
to whether the principal was determining policy when he denied the
student's request.
	In Harrison, we repeated our prior statement that "policy
decisions [are] those that require the governmental entity or employee
to balance competing interests and to make a judgment call as to what
solutions will best serve each of those interests." Harrison, 197 Ill. 2d 
at 472. Under the facts presented, we found that the school principal
had to "balance the competing interests of [the student's] desire to
leave early before the weather worsened with that of the school's
interest in an orderly dismissal, along with the possibility that if one
student was dismissed early then, in the future, every student would
want to leave early. [The principal] then had to make a judgment as
to how best to perform his duties as principal and find a solution that
best served all of these interests." Harrison, 197 Ill. 2d  at 474.
Accordingly, we held that the actions of the school principal
constituted policy determinations within the meaning of section
2-201. Harrison, 197 Ill. 2d  at 474.
	Finally, in Arteman v. Clinton Community Unit School District
No. 15, 198 Ill. 2d 475 (2002), this court held that a school district's
decision not to provide in-line skating safety equipment to students
was a discretionary policy determination immunized under section
2-201. In arriving at this determination, we once again reiterated that
section 2-201 immunity requires that the act or omission be both a
determination of policy and an exercise of discretion, and once again
quoted from Snyder the definition that " 'discretionary acts are those
which are unique to a particular public office.' " Arteman, 198 Ill. 2d 
at 484-85, quoting Snyder, 167 Ill. 2d  at 474.
	With our section 2-201 precedent in mind, we now turn to the
present case. In the matter before us, the legal sufficiency of plaintiffs'
action, including plaintiffs' allegations that defendants acted in concert
to achieve their objective of building Westwood Park, is admitted by
defendants' section 2-619(a)(9) dismissal motions. Nevertheless, in
separate motions to dismiss, defendants asserted that they were
absolutely immune from liability under section 2-201 of the Tort
Immunity Act, because the allegations in plaintiffs' complaint involve
acts or omissions that are discretionary in nature. As stated, section
2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure allows involuntary
dismissal of a plaintiff's claim where the claim is "barred by other
affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim."
735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 1994). Immunity from suit under the
Tort Immunity Act is an "affirmative matter" properly raised under
section 2-619(a)(9). Bubb, 167 Ill. 2d  at 378. It is well settled that the
"affirmative matter" asserted by the defendant must be apparent on the
face of the complaint; otherwise, the motion must be supported by
affidavits or certain other evidentiary materials. Epstein v. Chicago
Board of Education, 178 Ill. 2d 370, 383 (1997); Kedzie & 103rd
Currency Exchange, Inc., 156 Ill. 2d  at 116. Once a defendant
satisfies this initial burden of going forward on the section
2-619(a)(9) dismissal motion, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to
establish that the defense is " 'unfounded or requires the resolution of
an essential element of material fact before it is proven.' " Epstein,
178 Ill. 2d  at 383, quoting Kedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc.,
156 Ill. 2d  at 116. " 'If, after considering the pleadings and affidavits,
the trial judge finds that the plaintiff has failed to carry the shifted
burden of going forward, the motion may be granted and the cause of
action dismissed.' " Epstein, 178 Ill. 2d  at 383, quoting Kedzie &
103rd Currency Exchange, Inc., 156 Ill. 2d  at 116. Because a
dismissal under section 2-619(a)(9) resembles the grant of a motion
for summary judgment, an appeal from a section 2-619(a)(9) dismissal
is the same in nature as an appeal following a grant of summary
judgment, and is likewise afforded de novo review. Epstein, 178 Ill. 2d  at 383; Kedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc., 156 Ill. 2d  at
116. The reviewing court must consider whether " 'the existence of
a genuine issue of material fact should have precluded the dismissal or,
absent such an issue of fact, whether dismissal is proper as a matter of
law.' " Epstein, 178 Ill. 2d  at 383, quoting Kedzie & 103rd Currency
Exchange, Inc., 156 Ill. 2d  at 116.
	As an initial matter, we note that defendant Village of Downers
Grove filed with this court a motion to strike section I of plaintiff's
reply brief, pursuant to our Rule 341(g) (188 Ill. 2d R. 341(g)). Rule
341(g) provides that the reply brief "shall be confined strictly to
arguments presented in the brief of the appellee." According to the
Village, section I of plaintiffs' reply brief presents, for the first time,
the argument that section 2-201 of the Tort Immunity Act should not
apply to defendants because the alleged tortious acts at issue were not
"discretionary" in that they were not "unique" to the particular public
offices of the government entities involved. The Village asserts that
this "unique to a particular public office" argument does not appear in
any brief filed by a defendant in the instant action, and, therefore
section I of plaintiffs' reply is not confined strictly to the arguments
presented in the responsive briefs of appellees. This court entered an
order directing that this motion be taken with the case.
	We now deny the Village's motion to strike section I of plaintiffs'
reply brief. In their respective response briefs, defendants argue that
their actions were "discretionary" within the meaning of section
2-201. This court has repeatedly defined "discretionary" actions for
purposes of section 2-201 immunity as actions " 'unique to a
particular public office.' " Arteman, 198 Ill. 2d  at 484-85, quoting
Snyder, 167 Ill. 2d  at 474; Harrison, 197 Ill. 2d  at 472; Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d  at 343. Furthermore, the record discloses that, in the circuit
court, the plaintiffs and defendants presented specific argument as to
whether the actions were "unique" to the particular public offices of
the defendants. We hold that plaintiffs' discourse in their reply brief
with respect to whether the alleged actions were "unique" to the
defendants' particular public offices was in answer to the arguments
advanced by defendants that their actions were "discretionary" within
the meaning of section 2-201.
	We now turn to the central question of whether defendants
adequately established their affirmative defense that they were entitled
to absolute immunity from plaintiffs' claims under section 2-201 of
the Act. As we have outlined above, our cases have made clear that
there is a distinction between situations involving the making of a
policy choice and the exercise of discretion. Municipal defendants are
required to establish both of these elements in order to invoke
immunity under section 2-201. Arteman, 198 Ill. 2d at 484-85;
Harrison, 197 Ill. 2d  at 472; Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d  at 341; and Snyder,
167 Ill. 2d  at 474. In the case at hand, the municipal defendants have
failed to establish either element.
	Regarding the policy decision element, in general, formulating a
plan for the construction of a park should require the consideration of
site-specific conditions and the balancing of competing interests. As
discussed above, this court has held that decisions requiring a
governmental entity to balance competing interests and to make a
judgment call as to what solution will best serve those interests are
"policy decisions" within the meaning of section 2-201. Arteman, 198 Ill. 2d  at 484; Harrison, 197 Ill. 2d  at 472; Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d  at
342-43. This "affirmative matter" asserted by defendants to defeat
plaintiffs' viable claims, namely, that defendants' actions and
omissions were the result of a policy decision, is not apparent on the
face of the complaint. See Epstein, 178 Ill. 2d  at 383; Kedzie & 103rd
Currency Exchange, Inc., 156 Ill. 2d  at 116. Neither is the assertion
supported by affidavit or other evidentiary materials of record. See
Epstein, 178 Ill. 2d  at 383; Kedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc.,
156 Ill. 2d  at 116.
	The municipal defendants have likewise failed to establish that
their alleged actions or omissions were "discretionary" as
contemplated by section 2-201. As stated, this court has defined
"discretionary" actions to be those " 'unique to a particular public
office.' " Arteman, 198 Ill. 2d  at 484-85, quoting Snyder, 167 Ill. 2d 
at 474; Harrison, 197 Ill. 2d  at 472; Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d  at 343. That
defendants' alleged activities were unique to their particular offices is
neither apparent on the face of the complaint nor supported by
affidavit or other evidentiary material. See Epstein, 178 Ill. 2d  at 383;
Kedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc., 156 Ill. 2d  at 116.
	Because the Tort Immunity Act is in derogation of the common
law, it must be strictly construed against the public entities involved.
Zimmerman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 44, quoting Aikens v. Morris, 145 Ill. 2d 273, 278 (1991). Questions of material fact remain as to whether the
conduct of the municipal defendants in the matter at bar was the result
of a "policy decision" and "discretionary" within the meaning of
section 2-201. We, therefore, hold that, in the matter at bar,
defendants have not met their burden, as set forth in section
2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure, of establishing their
affirmative defense under section 2-201 of the Act.
III. CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial and appellate
courts erred by finding that section 2-201 insulates defendants'
alleged conduct from liability. We hold that the municipal defendants
did not meet their burden under section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of
Civil Procedure to establish that their actions were the result of a
policy decision and discretionary within the meaning of section 2-201
of the Tort Immunity Act. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of
the trial and appellate courts and remand this cause to the circuit court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
	JUSTICE THOMAS took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD, dissenting:
	Though the majority holds that the trial court "improperly
dismissed" the plaintiffs' claims (slip op. at 5), it does not answer the
question presented by this case: namely, whether the municipal
defendants are entitled to immunity under section 2-201 of the Tort
Immunity Act for their park-planning decisions. Instead, without any
invitation from the parties, the majority transforms this case from an
immunity case into a pleading case, stretching to do procedurally what
it could not do substantively-remand to give the plaintiffs another day
in court. While I applaud the majority's conclusion as a noble attempt
to achieve an equitable result for the plaintiffs, this conclusion is both
legally indefensible and unnecessary.
	By filing a motion to dismiss under section 2-619(a)(9) of the
Code of Civil Procedure, the defendants acknowledged that the
plaintiffs have a viable tort claim (see Kedzie & 103rd Currency
Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112, 115 (1993)), but they also
contended that "other affirmative matter" in the form of a defense
under section 2-201 of the Act defeats the claim because their park-planning decisions were discretionary. Because the defendants did not
support their motion with evidentiary materials, the question thus
becomes whether the existence of this defense appears on the face of
the plaintiffs' complaint. See Epstein v. Chicago Board of Education,
178 Ill. 2d 370, 383 (1997).
	The majority concludes that the defendants here failed to meet
"their burden [under section 2-619(a)(9)] of establishing their
affirmative defense" under the Act. Slip op. at 18. Following Harinek
v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd. Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335 (1998),
the majority bifurcates its section 2-201 analysis. First, the majority
states that the face of the plaintiffs' complaint does not indicate the
defendants' park-planning decisions were "policy decisions" requiring
them to balance competing interests before choosing a course of
action. Second, the majority states that the face of the plaintiffs'
complaint does not indicate the defendants' park-planning decisions
were "discretionary" or unique to their particular offices.
	Though the majority does not refer to section 2-619(a)(6) in its
discussion of the section 2-201 case law, the majority in effect raises
the level of pleading specificity required before a court can find an
"other affirmative matter" defense on the face of the complaint. Even
a cursory examination of these cases, however, reveals that we have
never sought such a close connection between the plaintiffs'
allegations and the immunity claimed by the defendants.
	Snyder v. Curran Township, 167 Ill. 2d 466 (1995), involved a
jury trial, and Harrison v. Hardin County Community Unit School
District No. 1, 197 Ill. 2d 466 (2001), involved a summary judgment
motion, not section 2-619(a)(9) motions to dismiss. In In re Chicago
Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179 (1997), which involved motions to
dismiss under both section 2-615 and section 2-619, we stated that
the plaintiffs did not allege there was a prescribed method for
repairing the tunnel or for notifying landowners of its breach. We then
observed: "[T]he City had to make several decisions following its
notice of the tunnel breach. *** All of these decisions were within the
City's discretion, which is afforded immunity against liability."
Chicago Flood, 176 Ill. 2d  at 197. Without dissecting the complaint,
we simply concluded that the City's decisions were discretionary.
	Then came Harinek, where we refined our understanding of
discretionary immunity by holding that a municipal defendant's
activities must be both policy-determining and discretionary. In
Harinek, the plaintiff alleged that the City of Chicago fire department
"planned, controlled, operated, and implemented" a fire drill and that
the City's fire marshall, pursuant to a plan, positioned the plaintiff near
a door that struck her during the drill. Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d  at 342.
After reviewing the plaintiff's allegations, we held that they "describe
acts and omissions of the fire marshal in determining fire department
policy" (Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d at 342) and "the fire marshal's conduct
described in the complaint clearly constituted an exercise of
discretion" (Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d at 343). Again, we did not engage in
a probing examination of the complaint to determine whether its
allegations implicated an immunity defense under section 2-201
before concluding that the City's activities were discretionary. Finally,
in Arteman v. Clinton Community Unit School District No. 15, 198 Ill. 2d 475 (2002), our most recent pronouncement on discretionary
policy immunity, we briefly referred to the allegations of the plaintiffs'
complaint, but only in the background of the opinion, and concluded
the school district's activities were discretionary.
	Further, the majority does not even apply the pleading rule it
creates. The complaint here was certainly no less descriptive than that
in Harinek. As the majority correctly observes, the plaintiffs
			"allege substantially identical conduct on the part of each
municipal defendant relating to the defendants' involvement
in the planning and development of Westwood Park. With
respect to each defendant, plaintiffs assert that the defendants
'breached their duty to the plaintiffs by causing or allowing
a change in the natural groundwater elevation and flow of
groundwater to occur resulting in water from adjoining lands
to gather on plaintiffs' property and the flooding of plaintiffs'
real estate and residence.' " Slip op. at 6-7.
	In fact, the plaintiffs alleged much more. According to their
amended complaint, one or more of the defendants "commenced the
design and planning for construction" of the park project; retained a
civil engineering firm and an architectural firm for the project; "jointly
produced a Schedule of Drawings and specifications" or a plan for the
project depicting water drainage; "caused to be designed and
constructed a storm water drainage and detention system *** [and
other] improvements to real estate"; approved the plan and accepted
the public improvements to the park; and were "otherwise involved in
the design, planning, supervision, observation and/or management of
this construction."
	Certainly, these activities involved balancing competing interests
and making decisions unique to these defendants. It defies reason to
conclude that the defendants planned a park and implemented that
plan without deciding among alternatives and that these decisions
were not unique to these defendants. Who else besides the defendants
here-the Darien Park District, the City of Darien, the Village of
Downers Grove, and the County of Du Page-would make such
decisions regarding a park situated between Darien and Downers
Grove in Du Page County? These allegations on their face clearly
describe a discretionary policy decision, and the defendants were
clearly entitled to immunity. Instead, the majority concludes that this
case should be remanded to the trial court where the municipal
defendants will, in all likelihood without delay, file legally dispositive
affidavits asserting that they balanced competing interests before
choosing a park plan and that this activity was unique to their offices.
The plaintiffs have won this battle, but they will ultimately lose the
war.
	The majority's decision does unnecessary violence to our case
law, in light of the plaintiffs' ability to pursue other avenues of relief.
Though the plaintiffs have not asked for it, injunctive relief, against
which the Act provides no protection, is available in municipal
flooding cases. 745 ILCS 10/2-101 (West 1998); see Romano v.
Village of Glenview, 277 Ill. App. 3d 406, 411 (1995) (a
municipality's decision to dig retaining ponds on a golf course near
the plaintiff homeowners' property, which resulted in flooding, was an
"unreasonable" interference with homeowners' property rights and not
subject to immunity from injunctive relief); Salzman v. Sumner
Township, 162 Ill. App. 3d 92, 95 (1987) (an award of money
damages against a municipality for diverting the natural flow of
surface waters "would be inadequate"); see also Barrington Hills
Country Club v. Village of Barrington, 357 Ill. 11 (1934); Springer
v. City of Chicago, 308 Ill. 356 (1923); Elser v. Village of Gross
Point, 223 Ill. 230 (1906); Young v. Commissioners of Highways, 134 Ill. 569 (1890); Smith v. City of Woodstock, 17 Ill. App. 3d 948
(1974); Larson v. Village of Capron, 3 Ill. App. 3d 764 (1972).
	Additionally, though the plaintiffs have not pleaded them,
constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983 are not barred by the
Act. See Firestone v. Fritz, 119 Ill. App. 3d 685, 689 (1983), citing
Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir. 1973); see
also Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 376, 110 L. Ed. 2d 332, 353, 110 S. Ct. 2430, 2443 (1990). The flooding of private property caused by
a public improvement may effect an unconstitutional taking.
		"A city may elevate or depress its streets, as it thinks proper,
but if, in so doing, it turns a stream of mud and water upon
the grounds and into the cellars of one of its citizens, or
creates in his neighborhood a stagnant pond that brings
disease upon his household, upon what ground of reason can
it be insisted, that the city should be excused from paying for
the injuries it has directly wrought?
			It is said that the city must grade streets and direct the
flow of waters as best as it can for the interests of the public.
Undoubtedly, but if the public interest requires that the lot of
an individual shall be rendered unfit for occupancy, either
wholly or in part, in this process of grading or drainage, why
should not the public pay for it to the extent to which it
deprives the owner of its legitimate use? Why does not the
constitutional provision apply as well to secure the payment
for property partially taken for the use or convenience of a
street, as when wholly taken and converted into a street? ***
To the extent to which the owner is deprived of its legitimate
use and in so far as its value is impaired, to that extent he
should be paid.
			*** In our opinion, the theory that private rights are ever
to be sacrificed to public convenience or necessity, without
full compensation, is fraught with danger, and should find no
lodgment in American jurisprudence. ***
* * *
			*** We are unable to see why the property of an
individual should be sacrificed for the public convenience
without compensation. We do not think it sufficient to call it
damnum absque injuria. We know our Constitution was
designed to prevent these wrongs. We are of opinion, that,
for injuries done to the property of the [business owner], by
turning a stream of mud and water upon his premises, or by
creating in the immediate neighborhood of his dwelling an
offensive and unwholesome pond, if the jury find these things
to have been done, the city *** must respond in damages."
Nevins v. City of Peoria, 41 Ill. 502, 510-11, 515 (1866).
Accord City of Dixon v. Baker, 65 Ill. 518, 520 (1872) ("If municipal
corporations can raise the grade of streets at discretion, and not
provide suitable gutters to carry off the surface water, and thus
overflow the lands abutting upon the streets, with impunity, then the
owners of lots in our towns and cities are entirely at the mercy of the
authorities of the municipality"); see Graham v. Keene, 143 Ill. 425
(1892); Stack v. City of East St. Louis, 85 Ill. 377 (1877); City of
Bloomington v. Brokaw & Gregory, 77 Ill. 194 (1875); City of Aurora
v. Reed, 57 Ill. 29 (1870); City of Aurora v. Gillett, 56 Ill. 132 (1870);
Drainage District #1 v. Village of Green Valley, 69 Ill. App. 3d 330,
335 (1979); Dwyer v. Village of Glen Ellyn, 314 Ill. App. 572 (1942)
(abstract of op.); City of Highland v. Auer, 235 Ill. App. 327 (1925);
see generally G. Ratcliff, Private Rights under Illinois Drainage Law,
1960 U. Ill. L.F. 198, 208 ("A city has no right to change a
watercourse without being liable to an adjoining landowner for any
resulting damage"); K. Roberts, Note, Tort Liability of Municipal
Corporations in Illinois, 1951 U. Ill. L.F. 637, 645 ("The law seems
to be well settled in Illinois that a municipal corporation may not
construct public works and improvements in such a way as to cause
surface water to flow in a different manner or in a substantially
increased quantity upon the land of private owners").(2)
	In short, the majority need not warp our case law under section
2-201 of the Act just to give the plaintiffs' tort claims an illusory
second life. Though section 2-201 bars the plaintiffs' tort claims,
properly pleaded injunctive relief and constitutional claims could
survive under the Act. I dissent.
	JUSTICE GARMAN joins in this dissent.
	JUSTICE GARMAN, also dissenting:
	I join Justice Fitzgerald's dissent. I write separately to explain
why I agree with Justice Fitzgerald that it is clear from the face of the
complaint that the defendants were entitled to immunity.
	The majority holds that it is not apparent on the face of the
complaint that the defendants' actions were (1) the result of a policy
decision (slip op. at 15) and (2) discretionary (slip op. at 15). The
complaint alleges that the defendants planned and built a park that
now causes flooding on plaintiffs' property. The allegation that the
defendants planned and built a park clearly entails that the
defendants's actions were the result of policy decisions and were
discretionary.
	The majority correctly states that "decisions requiring a
governmental entity to balance competing interests and to make a
judgment call as to what solutions will best serve those interests are
'policy decisions' within the meaning of section 2-201." Slip op. at
14-15. The majority also states that planning a park "should require
the consideration of site-specific conditions and the balancing of
competing interests." Slip op. at 14. When the majority concludes that
it is not apparent on the face of the complaint that the park was a
result of policy decisions, it assumes that, although planning a park
should require the balancing of competing interests, it need not.
	This assumption is mistaken. Planning a park (or an airport or any
other substantial project) obviously involves weighing competing
interests and therefore always involves policymaking. The fact that the
park was planned means that someone made a conscious decision.
Making a conscious decision means that some interests were weighed
more heavily than others.
	Because planning means weighing competing interests, it is not
clear what more the defendants must show to establish that they made
policy decisions when they planned the park. Is it enough simply to
file affidavits that assert the obvious fact that when they planned they
weighed competing interests? I am concerned that our decision today
may be misinterpreted by courts to mean that a defendant is not
immune under section 2-201 unless he shows that he duly weighed
the plaintiff's interests. It is important to bear in mind that section
2-201, by its very terms, immunizes all good-faith policy decisions
that involve discretion, even if the discretion is abused. See White v.
Village of Homewood, 285 Ill. App. 3d 496, 502 (1996).
	The majority states that we have "defined 'discretionary' actions
to be those ' "unique to a particular public office." ' " Slip op. at 15,
quoting Arteman, 198 Ill. 2d  at 484-85, quoting Snyder, 167 Ill. 2d  at
474. It then holds that it is not apparent from the face of the complaint
that the defendants' alleged activities were unique to their particular
offices. Slip op. at 15. Although I agree that whether the defendants'
activities were unique to their office is relevant, I do not agree that it
provides the sole test of whether their actions were discretionary.
	We first used the phrase "unique to a particular public office" to
describe discretionary acts under section 2-201 in Snyder v. Curran
Township, 167 Ill. 2d 466 (1995). There, however, we concluded that
Curran Township's failure to place a sign warning of a curve in
conformity with the State Manual was a ministerial act not subject to
immunity due, in part, to the fact that statutory and regulatory
guidelines placed certain constraints on the decisions of officials.
Snyder, 167 Ill. 2d  at 474.
	In addition to Snyder, the majority discusses In re Chicago Flood
Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179 (1997), Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street
Ltd. Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335 (1998), Harrison v. Hardin County
Community Unit School District No. 1, 197 Ill. 2d 466 (2001), and
Arteman v. Clinton Community Unit School District No. 15, 198 Ill. 2d 475 (2002). In Chicago Flood, the City of Chicago (the City) hired
Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Company (Great Lakes) to remove and
replace wood piling clusters at several city bridges. The City noted in
the contract that the pilings were to be located at specified positions
to prevent serious damage to underground structures. Great Lakes,
however, installed the pilings at one bridge in a location other than
originally designated in the contract. This caused a breach in the wall
of an underground freight tunnel, which resulted in the flooding of
numerous downtown businesses.
	In determining whether the City was immune under section
2-201 of the Act, we noted that a municipality exercises discretion
" 'when it selects and adopts a plan in the making of public
improvements, such as constructing sewers or drains; but [it acts
ministerially when] it begins to carry out that plan *** and is bound
to see that the work is done in a reasonably safe and skillful manner.' "
Chicago Flood, 176 Ill. 2d  at 194, quoting City of Chicago v. Seben,
165 Ill. 371, 377-78 (1897). We concluded that the City was immune
under section 2-201 because it retained discretion to determine the
location of the pile drivings and because the plaintiffs failed to allege
a prescribed method for repairing the tunnel and warning the plaintiffs
of the tunnel breach. Chicago Flood, 176 Ill. 2d  at 196-97. In finding
the City's actions to be discretionary and, thus, immune from liability,
we did not discuss whether the acts were unique to the City.
	In Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd. Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335 (1998), we discussed whether the conduct of a City of
Chicago fire marshal involved the exercise of discretion under section
2-201. The complaint alleged that a decision by the fire marshal about
how to conduct a fire drill was negligent. Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d  at 338.
In concluding that the fire marshal exercised his discretion, we stated:
"The marshal bears sole and final responsibility for planning and
executing fire drills in buildings throughout Chicago. He is under no
legal mandate to perform these duties in a prescribed manner; rather,
he exercises his discretion in determining how, when, and where to
hold drills such as the one in which plaintiff was injured." Harinek,
181 Ill. 2d  at 343. Certainly, the point that the fire marshal bears sole
responsibility for fire drills goes to the question of uniqueness. But
uniqueness was not the only basis for our holding. We also observed
that the marshal is not constrained by any legal mandate in deciding
how to hold the drills.
	In Harrison v. Hardin County Community Unit School District
No. 1, 197 Ill. 2d 466 (2001), we were called upon to decide whether
the school district was immune from liability for injuries allegedly
caused by a high school principal's decision not to allow a student to
leave school early to avoid driving home in inclement weather.
Although we quoted the sentence from Snyder that states that
discretionary acts are those which are unique to the office, we also
made clear that the question whether the principal's action was
discretionary was not before us because the parties agreed that it was
discretionary. Harrison, 197 Ill. 2d  at 472.
	Finally, in Arteman v. Clinton Community Unit School District
No. 15, 198 Ill. 2d 475 (2002), we held that a school district's
decision not to provide roller-blade safety equipment was both a
policy decision and discretionary. Again, although we quoted the
language from Snyder, we did not apply it to conclude that the school
district exercised discretion. Rather, we followed several opinions of
the appellate court that held that a school district's decision not to
provide safety equipment was discretionary. Arteman, 198 Ill. 2d  at
485. Arteman was primarily concerned with whether the appellate
court was mistaken when it held that the common law duty of school
districts to provide reasonably necessary safety equipment trumps the
immunity provided by section 2-201 (Arteman, 198 Ill. 2d at 487),
not with whether the defendants were immune.
	Thus, in none of the cases discussed by the majority have we
decided whether an action was discretionary based solely on a
determination of whether it was unique to the actor's office. I would
hold that the proper inquiry is the one we followed in Harinek to hold
that the fire marshal's actions were discretionary. Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d 
at 343. First we should ask: Where does the official whose action is
challenged stand in the relevant hierarchy of decisionmakers? Did he
bear the sole and final responsibility for the decision in question, or
was his decision to act as he did subject to review and approval by
others? The higher the official stood in the relevant chain of command,
the more likely it is that he acted with discretion for the purposes of
section 2-201. This prong of the inquiry captures what "uniqueness"
means as actually applied in Harinek. Second, we should also ask to
what extent the official in question was subject to a legal mandate to
act in a prescribed manner. The less his freedom to act was restricted
by legal mandate, the more likely it is that he acted with discretion for
the purposes of 2-201.
	Applying this inquiry to the facts of this case, I would hold that
it is apparent from the face of the complaint that defendants' actions
were discretionary. Their decisions with respect to the park were not
subject to review or approval by any higher decisionmaker, nor were
they required by legal mandate to adopt any particular plan or kind of
plan.
	For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD joins in this dissent.
1.  The parties do not dispute that the defendants are all local public entities under the Act.
	See 745 ILCS 10/1206 (West 1998).
2.  The State also would be liable for such damage. See,
	e.g., Branding v. State, 31 Ill. Ct. Cl. 455, 457 (1977) ("one who negligently alters the natural flow of water on
	the property of an adjacent landowner, thereby causing damage, is liable to such abutting landowner"); Eckmann v. State, 45
	Ill. Ct. Cl. 282 (1993); Vickroy v. State, 31 Ill. Ct. Cl. 489 (1977); Mount v. State, 31 Ill. Ct. Cl. 299 (1977); Shilling
	v. State, 24 Ill. Ct. Cl. 395 (1963); Doerr v. State, 22 Ill. Ct. Cl. 314 (1956); see also Herget National Bank of Pekin
	v. Kenney, 105 Ill. 2d 405 (1985).