Title: Skipper v. ALA. FARM BUREAU MUT. CAS. INS.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

460 So. 2d 1270 (1984)
Marion L. SKIPPER & Liz Skipper
v.
ALABAMA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL CASUALTY INS. CO.
83-321.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
November 30, 1984.
*1271 John L. Lawler, Mobile, for appellants.
Bert S. Nettles and Reggie Copeland, Jr. of Nettles, Barker & Janecky, Mobile, for appellee.
BEATTY, Justice.
Marion and Liz Skipper's home was destroyed by fire. Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Insurance Company (Farm Bureau), which insured the home, paid the mortgagee listed on the policy for the loss. Subsequently, Farm Bureau filed a declaratory judgment action against the Skippers, claiming that under the concealment or fraud provision of the insurance policy, the policy was void because of misrepresentations made by the Skippers in their application for insurance concerning whether or not the Skippers had ever been sued. The pertinent provisions follow:
Farm Bureau also claimed that pursuant to the subrogation provision of the policy, the Skippers should reimburse Farm Bureau for the amount paid to the mortgagee.
The Skippers counterclaimed against Farm Bureau, alleging breach of contract and bad faith refusal to settle the claim. Farm Bureau later amended its complaint to allege that the Skippers' statements denying that they had removed furniture from their home prior to the fire were false.
The case proceeded to trial on all claims. In defense of the bad faith claim, Farm Bureau sought to introduce the hearsay testimony of witnesses who claimed to *1272 have known about or seen the Skippers moving furniture from their home just prior to the fire. This testimony was offered to show what information Farm Bureau had in its files at the time it filed the declaratory judgment action. One objection to this evidence was sustained and one was withdrawn, at which time no limiting instruction was requested. At the close of Farm Bureau's case in chief, the trial court entered a directed verdict in favor of Farm Bureau on the Skippers' bad faith claim.
Well into the Skippers' case in chief (five witnesses had been examined), the trial judge, ex mero motu, interrupted the direct examination of Marion Skipper to instruct the jury as follows:
The Skippers did not object to this instruction nor did they request any other jury instructions with respect to the bad faith claim and the evidence presented in defense thereof.
After all the evidence was presented, the trial court denied the Skippers' motion for directed verdict on Farm Bureau's claim that the Skippers misrepresented that they did not remove furniture from their home just prior to the fire. The misrepresentation/subrogation claim and the Skippers' breach of contract claim were submitted to the jury. The jury returned a verdict of $40,000 in favor of Farm Bureau, and the trial court entered judgment on the verdict. No pre-judgment or post-judgment motions were filed by the Skippers.
The Skippers present basically two issues on appeal: (1) Did the trial court err in failing to direct a verdict for the Skippers on Farm Bureau's claim of misrepresentation? (2) Did the trial court err in failing to instruct the jury to disregard the evidence presented in defense of the bad faith claim, specifically the hearsay testimony admitted, which, if taken for the truth of the matter asserted, supported Farm Bureau's claim of misrepresentation by the Skippers? We conclude that neither of these issues is reviewable because they were not properly preserved under Rules 50 and 51, A.R.Civ.P.
First, by challenging the trial court's denial of their motion for directed verdict, the Skippers are asking this Court to review the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial. Because the Skippers failed to move for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, they have waived any right to attack the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Sealy, 374 So. 2d 877, 881-882 (Ala.1979), this Court said:
Second, Rule 51, A.R.Civ.P., set forth in pertinent part below, states what is required in order to challenge on appeal the jury instructions that were or were not given at trial:
Moreover, "the law of this state requires that an objection to the failure to charge on a particular subject ... must be by way of a requested written charge." City of Birmingham v. Wright, 379 So. 2d 1264, 1266 (Ala.1980). As we have already pointed out, the Skippers neither orally objected to the instruction given by the trial judge nor submitted a requested written instruction to be given on the subject of the hearsay evidence allowed in on the bad faith issue. Therefore, the alleged error was in no way properly preserved for our review.
Accordingly, the judgment below is due to be, and it is hereby, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and ALMON, SHORES and EMBRY, JJ., concur.