Title: CREMER v CREMER RODEO LAND LIVES

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 80-170 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 KATHRYN B . CREMER, a Special Administratrix of the Estate of Cornelius M. Cremer, Deceased, Plaintiff and Respondent, CREMER RODEO LAND AND LIVESTOCK CO., AND LEO J. CREMER, JR., Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, In and for the County of Sweet Grass, The Honorable Joseph Gary, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: William R. Morse, Absarokee, Montana Arnold R. Berger, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Pedersen, Herndon, Harper & Munro, Billings, Montana Submitted on Briefs: January 22, 1931 Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e Court. Cremer Rodeo Land and L i v e s t o c k Company a p p e a l s t h e j u r y v e r d i c t and judgment o f a Sweet G r a s s County D i s t r i c t Court awarding c e r t a i n r e a l p r o p e r t y t o p l a i n t i f f . Kathryn Cremer, t h e widow of C o r n e l i u s Cremer and t h e s p e c i a l a d m i n i s t r a t r i x of h i s e s t a t e , brought t h i s c a u s e o r i g i n a l l y t o impose a c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t and compel t h e Cremer Rodeo Land and L i v e s t o c k Company t o deed c e r t a i n l a n d t o her l a t e husband's e s t a t e . I n Cremer v. Cremer Rodeo Land and L i v e s t o c k Co. ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont. , 592 P.2d 485, 36 St.Rep. 541, t h i s Court h e l d , i n t e r a l i a , t h a t Kathryn Cremer had p r e s e n t e d a s u f f i c i e n t c a s e of a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n t o submit t o t h e j u r y . The c a u s e was r e v e r s e d and remanded f o r a new t r i a l . On remand a Sweet G r a s s County j u r y found i n f a v o r o f Kathryn Cremer on t h e a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n c l a i m , and t h e D i s t r i c t Court awarded her t h e r e a l p r o p e r t y i n i s s u e p u r s u a n t t o t h a t v e r d i c t . The company a p p e a l s . Leo J. Cremer, S r . , and C o r n e l i u s (Corny) M. Cremer enjoyed c l o s e b r o t h e r l y and b u s i n e s s r e l a t i o n s h i p s . T h e i r f a t h e r , John Cremer, who l i v e d i n Wisconsin, d i e d i n 1936. T h e i r mother d i e d f i v e y e a r s l a t e r . A f t e r t h e d e a t h of t h e i r mother, a n o t h e r b r o t h e r , Glynn Cremer, i n f o r m a l l y d i s t r i b u t e d w h a t r e m a i n e d o f t h e i r f a t h e r ' s e s t a t e . P l a i n t i f f , Corny's s u r v i v i n g s p o u s e , c l a i m s t h a t Leo, S r . , r e c e i v e d Corny's s h a r e o f t h e e s t a t e and used it t o p u r c h a s e t h e land s u b j e c t of t h i s a c t i o n which is d e s c r i b e d a s E1/2 o f Sec. 34, Township 5 North, Range 1 5 E a s t , M.P.M. The October 1 4 , 1944, deed from t h e p r e v i o u s owner o f t h e l a n d , J. Arvid C a r l s o n , named t h e "Cremer Rodeo, Land and Livestock Company," a Montana c o r p o r a t i o n owned by Leo Cremer, S r . , a s t h e g r a n t e e . The deed was executed i n Merrick County, Nebraska. P l a i n t i f f c l a i m s t h a t Leo, S r . , intended t o convey t h i s land t o Corny b u t f a i l e d t o do s o p r i o r t o h i s d e a t h i n 1953. She a l s o contends t h a t Leo, S r . ' s , widow, B e r t h a , d e l i v e r e d a deed t o Corny s h o r t l y a f t e r Leo, S r . 's, d e a t h , b u t t h a t it was s u b s e q u e n t l y l o s t i n a l a w y e r ' s o f f i c e i n Helena. Corny, Kathryn, and t h e i r f a m i l y occupied, used and p a i d t a x e s on t h e l a n d from 1947 u n t i l approximately 1974. A t t h a t p o i n t it was d i s c o v e r e d t h a t Leo Cremer, J r . , a c t i n g on behalf of t h e company, had e n t e r e d i n t o an o i l and g a s l e a s e of S e c t i o n 34. Upon t h e d e a t h of Corny i n 1975, p l a i n t i f f demanded a deed t o S e c t i o n 34, and, when no deed was d e l i v e r e d , t h i s a c t i o n ensued. The Cremer Rodeo Land and L i v e s t o c k Company r a i s e s t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s f o r our review: 1. Did t h e c o u r t e r r i n f a i l i n g t o i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y on p e r m i s s i v e use i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n ? 2. Did t h e c o u r t e r r i n f a i l i n g t o i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y on t h e d e f e n s e of l a c h e s ? 3. Did t h e c o u r t e r r i n f a i l i n g t o i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y on t h e d e f e n s e of e s t o p p e l ? 4. Was t h e r e s u f f i c i e n t evidence of damage t o s u p p o r t t h e v e r d i c t o f $10,000? The company m a i n t a i n s t h a t it was r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r f o r t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o r e f u s e its o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n s on p e r m i s s i v e use. W e d i s a g r e e . I n s o f i n d i n g , our a n a l y s i s o f t h e record f i n d s it wanting of any c r e d i b l e evidence t h a t C o r n e l i u s Cremer ever r e c e i v e d e x p r e s s permission t o u s e Section 34. This Court has long held and consistently affirmed the rule that ' I [o] rdinarily a party has the right to instructions adaptable to his theory of the case." Meinecke v. Skaggs (1949), 123 Mont. 308, 313, 213 P.2d 237, 240. Affirmed, Wollan v. Lord (1963), 142 Mont. 498, 385 P.2d 102. The Meinecke rule is not absolute, however, and this Court remains mindful of its limitations. In Gunderson v. Brewster (1970), 154 Mont. 405, 411, 466 P.2d 589, 592, Mr. Chief Justice Harrison wrote that the "right to instructions adaptable to a party's theory of the case if there be credible evidence thereon, belongs to both parties, not just to one. " Emphasis supplied. The facts of this case are not uncommon. Family relationships that proceed through generations on a friendly and amicable basis frequently become adverse, with familial tolerance being cast aside over the prospect of enriching financial position. Although Leo Cremer, Jr . , asserts that Cornelius Cremer occupied Section 34 with the permission of the company, his proof does not reveal that express permission was ever granted. Implied acquiescence is not the same as permission. Weldon v. Heron (1967), 78 N.M. 427, 432 P.2d 392; Ivons-Nispel, Inc. v. Lowe (1964), 347 Mass. 760, 200 N.E.2d 282. On the contrary, possession has been held to be adverse where possession was with forbearance of the title holder who was aware of another's possession and failed to prohibit it. Weldon v. Heron, supra, citing Myran v. Smith (1931), 117 Cal.App. 355, 4 P.2d 219. Therefore, possession may be adverse even though the owner does not interfere with e n t r y and t h e p o s s e s s o r u n d e r s t a n d s t h a t t h e r e w i l l be no f u t u r e i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h h i s p o s s e s s i o n . Hoelmer v . H e i s k e l l ( 1 9 4 9 ) , 359 Mo. 236, 221 S.W.2d 142. I n 1949 t h e Minnesota c o u r t c a p s u l i z e d t h e c r u c i a l d i s t i n c t i o n between "acquiescence" and "permission" a s it e x i s t s w i t h regard t o t h e law of a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n : ". . . I t must be a p p a r e n t , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t ' a c q u i e s c e n c e ' and ' p e r m i s s i o n ' a s used i n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n a r e n o t synonymous. 'Acquiescence, ' r e g a r d l e s s of what it might mean o t h e r w i s e , means, when used i n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n , p a s s i v e conduct on t h e p a r t of t h e owner of t h e s e r v i e n t e s t a t e c o n s i s t i n g o f f a i l u r e on h i s p a r t t o a s s e r t h i s paramount r i g h t s a g a i n s t t h e i n v a s i o n t h e r e o f by t h e a d v e r s e u s e r . ' P e r m i s s i o n ' means more t h a n mere acquiescence; i t d e n o t e s t h e g r a n t o f a p e r m i s s i o n i n f a c t o r a l i c e n s e . Naporra v. Weckwerth, 178 Minn. 203, 226 N.W. 569, 65 A . L . R . 1 2 4 . S e e , D a r t n e l l v . Bidwell, 115 Me. 227, 98 A . 743, 5 A.L.R. 1320; Davis v. Wilkinson, 140 Va. 672, 125 S.E. 700. " I n t h e c a s e of p e r m i s s i v e u s e , t h e user is under t h e owner of t h e s e r v i e n t e s t a t e ; i n a c a s e of a c q u i e s c e n c e , it is a g a i n s t him. See, Z o l l i n g e r v. Frank, 110 Utah 514, 175 P.2d 7 1 4 , 170 A . L . R . 770." D o z i e r v . Krmpotich ( 1 9 4 9 ) , 227 Minn. 503, 507, 35 N.W.2d 696, 699; r e a f f i r m e d , Ehle v. P r o s s e r ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 293 Minn. 183, 197 N.W.2d 458. I n sum we have reviewed t h e evidence produced a t t r i a l and f i n d no evidence of p e r m i s s i v e use. C o r n e l i u s Cremer t r e a t e d t h e land he possessed a s h i s own, p a i d t a x e s on t h e p r o p e r t y , and improved t h e p r o p e r t y . I n t h e absence of any evidence s u p p o r t i n g t h i s p o r t i o n of t h e company's c a s e , w e f i n d t h a t no r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r could have o c c u r r e d a s a r e s u l t of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s r e f u s a l t o g i v e a p e r m i s s i v e use i n s t r u c t i o n . T h i s Court t a k e s n o t e of t h e f a c t t h a t t h e company opposed p l a i n t i f f ' s o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n covering p e r m i s s i v e u s e f o r t h e reason t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n d e f i n i n g a " h o s t i l e " holding covered t h e same s u b j e c t m a t t e r . The company's reasoning is e q u a l l y a p p l i c a b l e t o its proposed i n s t r u c t i o n on p e r m i s s i v e use. The company a l s o a s s e r t s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n f a i l i n g t o i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y on t h e d e f e n s e s of l a c h e s and e s t o p p e l . W e f i n d , however, t h a t t h e s e l e g a l i s s u e s were p r e v i o u s l y decided by t h i s C o u r t , and it was n o t e r r o r f o r t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s t o be r e f u s e d . See F i s c u s v. B e a r t o o t h E l e c t r i c C o o p e r a t i v e , I n c . ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont . , 591 P.2d 196, 36 St.Rep. 333. "The r u l e is w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d and l o n g adhered t o i n t h i s s t a t e t h a t where, upon an a p p e a l , t h e Supreme Court, i n d e c i d i n g a c a s e p r e s e n t e d s t a t e s i n its o p i n i o n a p r i n c i p l e o r r u l e of law n e c e s s a r y t o t h e d e c i s i o n , such pronouncement becomes t h e law of t h e c a s e , and must be adhered t o throughout its subsequent p r o g r e s s , both i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t and upon s u b s e q u e n t a p p e a l ; and t h i s , although upon its subsequent c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e Supreme Court may be c l e a r l y of o p i n i o n t h a t t h e former d e c i s i o n is e r r o n e o u s . . . it i s a f i n a l a d j u d i c a t i o n f r o m t h e consequences of which t h i s Court may n o t d e p a r t , nor t h e p a r t i e s r e l i e v e themselves [ c i t i n g c a s e s ] . " Carlson v. Northern Pac. R. Co. ( 1 9 2 9 ) , 86 Mont. 78, 81, 281 P. 913, 914. Our f i r s t o p i n i o n s t a t e d t h e law of t h e c a s e on t h e s e i s s u e s . I t was b i n d i n g upon t h e t r i a l c o u r t and is now binding upon us. Anderson v. Border ( 1 9 3 0 ) , 87 Mont. 4, 285 P. 174; Apple v. Edwards ( 1 9 4 9 ) , 123 Mont. 135, 211 P.2d Our review of t h e f i r s t Cremer o p i n i o n compels u s t o f i n d t h a t t h e t r i a l of t h i s c a s e d i d n o t change i t s c h a r a c t e r i n such a way a s t o f r e e u s from our o r i g i n a l d e c i s i o n . This C o u r t ' s r u l i n g t h a t " t h i s is n o t a c a s e f o r t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f " t h e e q u i t a b l e p r i n c i p l e s of l a c h e s o r e s t o p p e l c o n t i n u e s t o be v a l i d , and w e a r e n o t a t l i b e r t y t o f i n d e r r o r i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s r e f u s a l t o i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y on t h e s e t h e o r i e s . A p p e l l a n t ' s f i n a l assignment of e r r o r a l l e g e s t h a t t h e r e was i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence of t h e amount of damages t o s u s t a i n t h e $10,000 v e r d i c t a g a i n s t t h e company. Our review of t h e record p e r s u a d e s us t h a t t h e r e was indeed s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o s u p p o r t t h e j u r y ' s f i n d i n g o f damages i n t h e amount of $10,000. The f o l l o w i n g evidence was adduced a t t r i a l : Leo Cremer, J r . , t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had r e c e i v e d $1.00 per a c r e i n d e l a y r e n t a l s f o r a p e r i o d of roughly seven y e a r s . Based on t h a t testimony t h e j u r y determined t h a t Leo Cremer, J r . , a c t i n g on behalf of t h e company, r e c e i v e d $320 per year from t h e d e l a y r e n t a l s i n v o l v i n g S e c t i o n 34, and, t h e r e f o r e , d u r i n g a seven-year p e r i o d t h e company's t o t a l r e c e i p t s from t h i s s o u r c e would be i n t h e neighborhood of $2,300. B i l l Cremer, grandson of Kathryn Cremer and her l e s s e e u n t i l h e r o u s t e r i n 1 9 7 7 , t e s t i f i e d w i t h p a r t i c u l a r i t y about h i s g r o s s income from S e c t i o n 34 and t h e expenses he had i n c u r r e d i n t h e r e a l i z a t i o n of t h a t income. H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y had y i e l d e d an average annual n e t income of $3,862 i n t h e y e a r s he farmed S e c t i o n 34. By reason of t h e o u s t e r , t h e C o r n e l i u s Cremer f a m i l y missed two h a r v e s t s and maintained t h a t t h e damage s u s t a i n e d i n l o s t p r o f i t s was $7,724. When t h e amount of d e l a y r e n t a l r e c e i p t s is added t o t h e amount of l o s t p r o f i t s , t h e $10,000 f i g u r e is a r r i v e d a t . T h i s Court h a s long h e l d t h a t a judgment f o r damages must be supported by substantial evidence that is not the product of mere guess or speculation. See Bjerum v. Wieber (1967), 149 Mont. 375, 427 P.2d 62. We observe that there is no uncertainty as to the existence of substantial damages. Indeed, such damages exist whenever the owner of property is deprived of the use of that property. Recovery of damages will not be denied, even if the mathematical precision of the figure is challenged, provided the evidence is sufficient to afford a reasonable basis for determining the specific amount awarded. Accord, Jacquel ine ' s Washington, Inc. v. Mercantile Stores Co. (1972), 80 Wash.2d 784, 498 P.2d 870. We have reviewed the evidence regarding the amount of damage incurred by respondent and find the evidence sufficient to support the verdict. Accordingly, we affirm. / We concur: