Title: Renfro v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Renfro v. State1990 WY 2785 P.2d 491Case Number: 89-105Decided: 01/10/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
WILLIAM 
HENRY RENFRO, A/K/A MACO RENFRO, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal 
from the District Court, Teton County, Robert B. Ranck, 
J.

Leonard 
D. Munker, State Public Defender, PDP, Steven E. Weerts, Sr. Asst. Public 
Defender, PDP, and Donald K. Slaughter, Student Intern, PDP, for 
appellant.

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen Byrne, Sr. 
Asst. Atty. Gen., and H. Frank Gibbard, Student Intern, for 
appellee.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

[¶1]      This case again 
presents the quintessential dispute within Wyoming criminal appeals to consider 
whether credit for incarceration upon pre-trial failure to post bond should be 
granted against either or both the minimum and maximum sentence entered under 
the Wyoming indeterminate sentencing statutes. A second issue presented is the 
recurring question of restitution computation.

[¶2]      Appellant William 
Henry Renfro (Renfro), age twenty, after involvement in a serious course of 
crime in Teton County, was arrested and charged with five offenses. He copped a 
plea to the most serious, aggravated robbery, in consideration of dismissal of 
the other four charges.

[¶3]      The sentence 
entered included penitentiary imprisonment for a period of not less than seven 
years and not more than fourteen years, a fine in the amount of $10,000 and 
"[t]hat the defendant pay restitution to the Clerk of the District Court on 
behalf of Farmer Jacks [the grocery store business victim] in the amount of 
$11,581.00."

[¶4]      The trial court 
did not state and the sentence did not reflect any decision about credit on the 
138 days spent by Renfro in jail prior to sentencing.1 Issues presented on appeal include 
indigency incarceration status of presentence jail time2 and requirements to properly 
establish restitution amounts.3

[¶5]      In first 
addressing restitution, we find the State to agree with Renfro that the 
restitution amount was improperly established to provide compliance with the 
applicable statute, W.S. 7-9-103, since no special finding was made and no 
documentary support provided for determination of the 
amount.

     (a) If the court 
requires restitution of a defendant, then at the time of sentencing it shall fix 
a reasonable amount as restitution owed to each victim for actual pecuniary 
damage resulting from the defendant's criminal activity, and shall include its 
determination of the pecuniary damage as a special finding in the judgment of 
conviction.

     (b) To satisfy the 
order the clerk upon request of the victim or the district attorney, may issue 
execution against the defendant for any assets including wages subject to 
attachment in the same manner as in a civil action.

     (c) The court's 
determination of the amount of restitution owed under this section is not 
admissible as evidence in any civil action.[4]

W.S. 
7-9-103.

[¶6]      Reversal or 
remand of the restitution award is not an issue, but only whether reversal or 
remand for recomputation by adequate proof should be ordered.5 We will follow our current decision 
on attorney's fees and proof of damages in general to determine that restitution 
should, in accord with the statute, be established in amount by some credible 
evidence, Petty-Ray Geophysical, Div. of Geosource, Inc. v. Ludvik, 718 P.2d 9 
(Wyo. 1986), and then delineated within the special finding requirement of W.S. 
7-9-103. Proof of the offense from which restitution may be required is an 
intrinsic element of the proof of the crime and consequently requires the 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" character of evidence. Proof of the restitution 
amount as a question of sentence need only be proved by credible evidence, by a 
preponderance, or burden of the evidence. Com. v. Nawn, 394 Mass. 1, 474 N.E.2d 545 (1985).

[¶7]      We are required 
to address the specific issue presented of whether remand for a second chance to 
prove should be granted or, failing to provide sufficient evidence to prove the 
amount, whether the decision is reversed on the basis of inadequate evidence to 
sustain the decision. In order to provide a uniform approach with the present 
posture now developed for attorney's fees and generally for proof of damages and 
in order to also simplify the number of appeals with which this court is 
presented, we will follow the principle that where the initial computation of 
the amount of restitution was the result of a failure of proof, we will not 
normally remand for a recomputation unless we are remanding for other sentencing 
changes as well. See Kaess v. State, 748 P.2d 698 (Wyo. 1987). Accord Albrecht 
v. Zwaanshoek Holding En Financiering, B.V., 762 P.2d 1174 (Wyo. 1988) and Miles 
v. CEC Homes, Inc., 753 P.2d 1021 (Wyo. 1988). See also UNC Teton Exploration 
Drilling, Inc. v. Peyton, 774 P.2d 584 n. 6 (Wyo. 1989). Restitution in the 
criminal case joins other elements of the offense for proper proof by 
prosecution. Sanchez v. State, 567 P.2d 270 (Wyo. 1977). See also Keller v. 
State, 771 P.2d 379 (Wyo. 1989).

[¶8]      The general 
principle that proper proof is required to validate an ordered restitution and 
that remand does not necessarily occur unless other reasons for reversal may 
exist is a well-supported status within this developing category of criminal 
appeals. The principle of proof of amount for restitution was finitely addressed 
in Kaess, 748 P.2d 698. See also Holtzheimer v. State, 766 P.2d 1177 (Alaska 
App. 1989) and State v. Vinyard, 50 Wn. App. 888, 751 P.2d 339 (1988), where the 
items were deleted which were not properly proved. See likewise People v. 
Cheatum, 148 A.D.2d 986, 539 N.Y.S.2d 222, 222 (N.Y.A.D. 1989), which stated 
that "[b]ecause the court ordered restitution without holding a hearing and 
relied solely upon the probation report, we modify the sentence by deleting the 
provision for restitution." Cheatum cites the same insufficiency of proof rule 
from presentence investigation report, United States v. Watchman, 749 F.2d 616 
(10th Cir. 1984).

[¶9]      A case similar in 
other requirements was State v. Blanchard, 409 A.2d 229, 237 (Me. 1979), where 
initially the restitution claim was not properly proven in accord with statute. 
The court then struck the restitution as unrealistic when followed by a long 
period of incarceration. See likewise State v. Fleming, 125 N.H. 238, 480 A.2d 107 (1984); State v. Madril, 105 N.M. 396, 733 P.2d 365 (1987); Matter of 
Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. J-96304, 147 Ariz. 153, 708 P.2d 1344 
(1985); and Rodriguez v. State, 710 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. App. 1986), where unproven 
amounts were deleted.

[¶10]   An example of proper proof for 
malicious mischief damage to a building is provided by Lee v. State, 166 Ga. 
App. 485, 304 S.E.2d 446, 448 (1983):

There 
was extensive evidence as to the nature of the property damage fully documented 
by pictures and estimates. This was uncontested except for certain speculation 
as to who might have been responsible for the damage other than that to which 
the appellants explicitly admitted. It is apparent, therefore, that the trial 
court had competent evidence as to the damage, the amount of the damage, and the 
complicity of the three appellants in the causing of that damage. * * 
*

* 
* * The trial court had the authority to believe the appellants were not solely 
involved or that they were being untruthful in their limited admissions of 
damage. The credibility of witnesses is a matter of resolution by the trier of 
fact, in this case the trial court. * * * We must conclude on the basis of the 
evidence developed that the trial court was warranted fully in its conclusion 
that the appellants alone caused the $34,600 in damages and we are satisfied 
that any reasonable trier of fact could have found so beyond a reasonable 
doubt.

Cf. 
State v. Halsen, 111 Wn.2d 121, 757 P.2d 531 (1988), where the amount was 
computed by the appellate court from an admission of the parties in documentary 
record. Specifically, we do not adopt the notion presented in Note, Victim 
Restitution in the Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97 Harv.L.Rev. 931, 
944 (1984) that restitution, as a punitive sanction, is not limited by the 
amount of harm the offender inflicted on the victim or that the amount of 
restitution ordered, like the magnitude of any other sanction, bears only upon 
the degree of deprivation that the offender will suffer. This rule of adequacy 
of proof of amount required for restitution was directly addressed by our 
decision in Kaess, 748 P.2d  at 699 as the approach which we now 
continue.

[¶11]   The reason for this requirement of 
damage proof is highlighted here. If the amount stated in the sentence were to 
be approved and the millennium subsequently arrives so that all of it was to be 
"repaid," Farmer Jacks would receive money which, by reasoned computation within 
this record, never was taken or ultimately lost.6 The record provides no evidence of 
the total loss. Comments of the prosecuting attorney, unless identifying trial 
evidence or directing attention to file documentation or other credible 
evidence, cannot be substituted for proof.

[¶12]   The second issue presented of 
frequent concern to this court is credit upon the sentence for presentence 
incarceration. This court is convinced that rules should now be finitely 
established that end opportunity or obligation for further appeals on this 
subject.

[¶13]   From Jones v. State, 602 P.2d 378 
(Wyo. 1979) (Jones I) to Jones v. State, 771 P.2d 368 (Wyo. 1989) (Jones II), 
there were eight cases, and this is ninth where this court has addressed 
presentence incarceration credit against sentences. In review of these nine 
cases, we seek to establish rules which should bring this course of continued 
appeals to an end for this category of litigation by finite criteria for a 
determinable result.

[¶14]   In Jones I, 602 P.2d  at 381 the 
holding as limited was stated:

     The law in 
jurisdictions which lack a statute governing credit for pre-sentence detention 
appears to be predominantly that the trial judge has discretion to award or deny 
credit for time spent in pre-sentence detention. * * * However, there is some 
authority that this discretion exists only in cases in which the sum of the 
pre-sentence detention plus the sentence given does not exceed the maximum 
allowable sentence.

[¶15]   Next followed Pote v. State, 695 P.2d 617, 628 (Wyo. 1985), where it was reflected on this 
issue:

     The seventh issue 
raised by appellant is governed by our holding in Jones v. State, Wyo., 602 P.2d 378, 381 (1979):

"* 
* * We hold that a trial judge has discretion to deny or grant credit for time 
served in pre-sentence custody where: (1) the pre-sentence custody is not due to 
the defendant's indigency, and (2) the sum of the time spent in pre-sentence 
custody plus the sentence does not exceed the maximum allowable 
sentence."

     We will not be 
concerned with whether appellant was indigent prior to sentencing. The trial 
court found specifically that he was not, yet he was represented at trial and on 
appeal by the office of the public defender. Our concern is whether the sum of 
the time spent in pre-sentence custody plus the sentence exceeds the maximum 
allowable sentence.

[¶16]   Since the trial court had imposed a 
single maximum sentence in remand, the trial court was directed to give 
appellant credit for the presentence incarceration on the maximum sentence 
time.

[¶17]   In Hedge v. State, 696 P.2d 51 
(Wyo. 1985), an "unlawful sentence" was originally imposed and then corrected by 
the trial court to give credit against the maximum. In recognizing the decision 
of Jones I, the court held that with credit against the maximum, the sentence 
was within state limits and credit against the minimum was not required without 
regard for appellant's indigency. Hedge was rapidly followed by Munden v. State, 
698 P.2d 621, 627 (Wyo. 1985), where again the court required credit against the 
maximum in stating:

     As to the credit for 
presentence detention, we have recently set out the applicable test. In Hedge v. 
State, Wyo., 696 P.2d 51 (1985), we stated that it is within the trial court's 
discretion to grant or deny credit for time served in presentence detention if 
(1) the detention is not due to the defendant's indigency, and (2) the sum of 
the time spent in presentence detention plus the sentence given upon conviction 
does not exceed the maximum allowable sentence. See Jones v. State, Wyo., 602 P.2d 378 (1979).

     The State acknowledges 
that appellant was indigent and his presentence confinement was due to his 
indigency, and then wisely concedes that appellant must be given credit against 
his maximum sentences for his presentence detention. The record reflects 
appellant was arrested on January 17, 1984, and his judgment and sentence was 
filed on June 7, 1984. Accordingly, he should receive credit of 142 days against 
his maximum sentence.

[¶18]   A year later, the issue again 
reappeared where appellant was indigent and was in presentence confinement for 
sixty days with a sentence given for the maximum without credit. Again, this 
court reversed to require credit against the maximum but not against the 
minimum. In Heier v. State, 727 P.2d 707, 709-10 (Wyo. 1986), this court 
stated:

     As an indigent, 
appellant is entitled to credit for sixty days off the maximum sentence. Pote v. 
State, supra. Otherwise, the time spent in presentence confinement plus the ten 
year sentence would exceed the statutory maximum of ten 
years.

* 
* * * * *

A 
minimum sentence need not be reduced by the time spent in presentence detention. 
This is within the discretion of the judge and we will reverse only when there 
is an abuse of discretion.

[¶19]   In Harley v. State, 737 P.2d 750, 756 (Wyo. 1987), we were again required to address the subject and change the 
sentence:

It 
is clear from Heier v. State, supra, and Hedge v. State, supra, that the credit 
must be applied to the maximum sentence imposed. If the maximum sentence plus 
the pre-sentence confinement time exceeds the statutory maximum sentence, it is 
illegal, Heier v. State, supra, and it is simply discretionary with the trial 
court whether it also wishes to credit presentence confinement on the minimum 
sentence.

[¶20]   Lightly v. State, 739 P.2d 1232 
(Wyo. 1987) followed where the defendant was specifically denied credit against 
the maximum with another argument presented that the presentence confinement 
need not be considered because if he had posted bond, he might have been 
retained in jail as a federal prisoner. Concluding on the record that he was a 
state prisoner, this court again remanded for failure to give credit against the 
maximum sentence of eighty-five days presentence confinement. This court in 
Lightly, 739 P.2d  at 1233-34 stated:

     Recently, in Harley v. 
State, Wyo., 737 P.2d 750 (1987), we held that Harley was entitled to credit for 
pre-sentence confinement against his maximum sentence and relied upon the rule 
expressed in Jones v. State, Wyo., 602 P.2d 378, 381 (1979), 
that:

"* 
* * [A] trial judge has discretion to deny or grant credit for time served in 
pre-sentence custody where: (1) the presentence custody is not due to the 
defendant's indigency, and (2) the sum of the time spent in pre-sentence custody 
plus the sentence does not exceed the maximum allowable 
sentence."[1]

If 
Lightly was in custody because of his indigency or if the sum of his time in 
pre-sentence confinement plus the sentence exceeds the maximum allowable term, 
he is entitled to relief. On this record, both of those things 
occurred.

[1] 
Prior applications of this test have treated it as conjunctive. E.g., Harley v. 
State, Wyo., 737 P.2d 750 (1987); Heier v. State, 727 P.2d 707 (1986). Further 
reflection on Jones v. State, Wyo., 602 P.2d 378 (1979), has convinced us that 
the test should be perceived as disjunctive. Different concerns are raised by 
each prong of the test. Indigency invokes the constitutional requirements of 
equal protection; imprisonment in excess of the term set by statute raises 
jurisdictional concerns.

[¶21]   The eighth case which followed was 
Jones II, 771 P.2d 368. Actually, the issue was more complex since the ninety 
percent Duffy rule was implicated which arose by statutory changes after Duffy 
v. State, 730 P.2d 754 (Wyo. 1986), requiring that the minimum cannot be more 
than ninety percent of the maximum. Jones II also presented the issue about the 
effect if the trial court did not state whether credit was considered and 
granted or denied.

[¶22]   This court 
stated:

     When an indigent is 
incarcerated for a period, including the presentence time, which exceeds the 
maximum penalty for his offense, it is unquestionable that he has been punished 
more severely than one who could afford to obtain presentence release. The 
sentencing court in such an instance, by violating a defendant's right to equal 
protection, has clearly abused its discretion. Matthews v. Dees, 579 F.2d 929, 
931 (5th Cir. 1978). However, when a sentence is within the statutory range, it 
is difficult to say which factors formed the basis for the sentencing court's 
decision to determine whether credit was actually given for time 
served.

     There is division 
among the appellate courts that have encountered this difficulty as to whether 
they should presume that sentencing courts adhered to their constitutional 
duties and granted such credit. Godbold v. Wilson, 518 F. Supp. 1265, 1267 n. 5 
(D.Colo. 1981). Appellant urges us to follow the lead of those courts who refuse 
to grant that presumption on review. We find no mandated advantage in selection 
of this application. For example, the court in Godbold, pursuant to a federal 
habeas corpus petition, declared that sentencing courts would be required to 
explicitly credit defendants with presentence time served when that 
incarceration occurred solely because of indigence. Absent an express reference 
to the credit in the sentencing orders, that court indicated it would find such 
sentences unconstitutional. That court freely admitted, however, that the 
sentencing court could, through the legitimate exercise of its discretionary 
power, merely increase sentences so as to avoid the intended effect of the 
decision. Id. at 1269.

     We anticipate that trial 
courts adhere to constitutionally limiting criteria and apply the presumption of 
compliance on an appeal challenging length of sentence. In constitutional 
perspective, the sentencing court was required separately to credit presentence 
time served to the minimum term of appellant's sentence. This is the 
mandatory, not discretional issue of confinement credit 
application.

Jones 
II, 771 P.2d  at 371 (footnote omitted).

[¶23]   Jones II was published March 21, 
1989, and now in this case, Renfro appeared for sentencing on April 12, 1989, 
with a written judgment and sentence entered on April 18, 1989. Obviously, the 
sentencing judge chose not to state what consideration, if any, he gave to the 
requested credit except, in effect, to deny its application. In the face of the 
specific request that credit be given and the direct result that it was not 
done, we are not justified in applying the presumption of constitutional 
compliance addressed in Jones II for disposition of this case.7

[¶24]   We will approach this task on a 
basis of rules which should be sufficient to resolve the effects of presentence 
confinement on sentences previously entered and a prospective rule to apply for 
sentences which will be hereafter rendered.

[¶25]   Rules for existing sentences 
are:

1. 
Granting or denying presentence confinement credit against either or both 
minimum or maximum sentences rests in the sentencing discretion of the trial 
court unless the maximum actually entered plus presentence confinement time 
exceeds the statutory maximum. 

2. 
Additionally, the minimum with whatever credit is given should not be over 
ninety percent of the maximum with whatever credit is given to it if the 
sentence was entered after May 22, 1987. Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 157 
(1987).

3. 
If the defendant is indigent, the trial court is not vested with discretion to 
deny credit for presentence confinement and, in such instances, the credit 
automatically will be afforded against both the minimum and maximum 
sentence.

4. 
If the trial court did not elect to clarify on sentencing record or in the final 
sentence as entered whether the credit will be given presentence incarceration, 
credit will automatically be applied in favor of both the minimum and maximum 
sentence. The documentary record of presentence confinement time shall be used 
by the warden of the penitentiary and the parole board to determine length of 
sentence and appropriateness of release dates if nothing is provided in the 
judgment and sentence as to the grant or denial of presentence confinement 
incarceration.8

[¶26]   The prospective rule for sentences 
entered following the publication date of this opinion is:

[¶27]   Credit will be automatically 
granted for presentence incarceration time on all sentences. We will presume 
that in imposing the stated sentence, the trial court, in its exercise of 
discretion, considered presentence confinement. Consequently, without regard for 
what is or is not stated in the sentence, credit for presentence confinement 
will be applied to reduce the length of remaining incarceration under the 
sentence. As long as the maximum and minimum terms remain within statutory 
limits, discretion of the trial court continues to establish the periods which 
obviously include recognition of presentence confinement.9

[¶28]   We adopt the goal of the American 
Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice for "the purpose * * * to end * * 
* technical distinctions by granting a comprehensive credit that treats all 
periods of confinement attributable to the underlying criminal transaction as 
equivalent, no matter what label is attached to such incarceration. To this end, 
[we would] require[] the credit to be offset against both the minimum and 
maximum terms imposed, * * *." III ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 18.310 (2d 
ed. 1980).10

[¶29]   This resolution provides certainty 
of result, clarity of rules, and preservation of equal protection of 
constitutional interests. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S. Ct. 2018, 26 L. Ed. 2d 586 (1970). See Berger, Equal Protection and Criminal Sentencing: Legal 
and Policy Considerations, 71 Nw.U.L.Rev. 29 (1976); Schornhorst, Presentence 
Confinement and the Constitution: The Burial of Dead Time, 23 Hastings L.J. 1041 
(1972); Stacy, Constitutional Right to Sentence Credit for Pre-Trial 
Incarceration, 41 U.Cin.L.Rev. 823 (1972); Comment, Prisoners' Rights and Equal 
Protection, 20 Am.U.L.Rev. 482 (1970-71); Note, Sentence Crediting for the State 
Criminal Defendant - A Constitutional Requirement, 34 Ohio St.L.J. 586, 593 n. 
35 (1973); and Note, Constitutional Law - Sentencing - Withholding Good Time 
Credit From Prisoners Awaiting Appeal. Pruett v. Texas, 468 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 
1972), aff'd en banc, 470 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1973), 51 Tex.L.Rev. 348 
(1973).

[¶30]   Reversal of the restitution order 
by virtue of this decision does not determine that cash or any other assets 
properly claimable by the victims should not be returned to the rightful owner. 
This decision, as a consideration of criminal responsibility, does not determine 
civil liabilities. Fleming, 480 A.2d 107.

[¶31]   Reversed and remanded for an entry 
of a judgment in conformity herewith.

FOOTNOTES

1 At sentencing, in advance of the trial court's announcement, counsel for 
Renfro asked that credit be given for presentence time served "which is about 4 
and a half months." The oral pronouncement of the trial court that followed did 
not address either granting or denying that credit nor was any opportunity for 
subsequent colloquy given since court was recessed immediately after the 
sentence was orally given.

2 Differing from many states, Wyoming has no statutory provision relating 
to presentence confinement credit.

3 Since Renfro has no assets, has, at best, minimal employability, and has 
been in effect a public charge for at least the three prior years, future 
payment of either restitution or a fine is ephemeral if not totally 
problematical except to the extent that the fruits of the criminal offenses were 
recovered at arrest. However, the amount of the fine and the ability to pay the 
fine now or seven years from now were not raised and will not be further 
considered.

4 Actually, for determination of the restitution amount, the record 
reflects the trial court, in the sentencing session and after detailing 
confinement sentence, then asked: "What is restitution in this case?" The county 
attorney responded: "15 thousand 1 hundred - well, for this defendant it's going 
to be a little different. It would be $11,581.00, Your Honor." Without further 
discussion, the trial court stated, as the judgment and sentence subsequently 
reflected, that restitution would be in the amount stated of $11,581. Efforts at 
compilation indicate that the amount as related to the co-conspirator could not 
have included losses sustained in the one offense - armed robbery of the grocery 
store messenger - and may include losses in all crimes in the course of the 
Teton County activities. The restitution, however, by its order, was payable 
only to Farmer Jacks and not to the victims of the other 
crimes.

5 The requirement to properly prove the loss for the purpose of ordered 
restitution is the subject of extended case review. It is apparent that the 
application of restitution is a fairly recent general development in American 
law with expanded application. "Proof of loss for imposing restitution requires 
evidence sufficient to afford a reasonable basis for estimating the loss, a 
standard similar to that required to prove damages in a tort action." State v. 
Raleigh, 50 Wn. App. 248, 748 P.2d 267, 269 (1988). In White v. State, 773 P.2d 211, 217 (Alaska App. 1989), the court observed that, in accord with the 
argument made by appellant, there had been findings regarding the victim's 
actual amount of damages and then stated that "[w]e agree that the record does 
not reflect any such findings by the trial court. Thus, the restitution order 
must be vacated." See Com. v. Nawn, 394 Mass. 1, 474 N.E.2d 545, 550 (1985), 
where the court provided that "the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence the amount of the victim's losses." See also 
United States v. Watchman, 749 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1984) (delineated that 
hearsay information in presentence investigation report did not suffice as 
proof); People v. Frey, 209 Cal. App. 3d 139, 256 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1989); State v. 
Johnson, 68 Haw. 292, 711 P.2d 1295 (1985); and State v. Lefthandbull, 306 Or. 
330, 758 P.2d 343 (1988). See likewise Cartwright v. State, 605 S.W.2d 287 
(Tex.Cr.App. 1980). In People v. Chacon, 125 Ill. App.3d 649, 80 Ill.Dec. 922, 
466 N.E.2d 374 (1984), the court recognized that a speculative complaint for 
ordering restitution did not suffice in deletion of $15,000 from the sentence 
provision. See also People v. Allen, 119 Ill. App.3d 186, 74 Ill.Dec. 834, 456 N.E.2d 336 (1983).

6 The record reflects that about $4,000 in cash and around $20,000 in 
checks was taken in the messenger robbery. Cash funds recovered from the two 
robbers totalled approximately $2,350, leaving a cash deficiency of $1,650 if 
the $4,000 was accurate. Some of the checks (there is no proof how many) were 
burned and nothing is indicated as to how much of the approximated $20,000 in 
check amounts actually constituted a business loss. No one from the business 
provided written documentation or testified about the amount of loss. If the 
other participant, Gregory R. Litzelman, was charged with about $15,000 and 
Renfro was obligated for $11,581, the restitution is greater than the amount 
taken, even if no cash had been recovered and all of the checks did constitute a 
total loss. As an issue not now directly considered, it is apparent that two 
different rules exist whether only the crime of conviction can be involved in 
required restitution unless a plea bargain agreement is otherwise made. Nelson 
v. State, 628 P.2d 884 (Alaska 1981); State v. Monick, 125 Ariz. 593, 611 P.2d 946 (1980); People v. Quinonez, 735 P.2d 159 (Colo. 1987); State v. Beaudoin, 
503 A.2d 1289 (Me. 1986); State v. Berman, 50 Wn. App. 125, 747 P.2d 492 (1987). 
Within the case discussion in the absence of statutory provisions which expands 
application, the case law confines restitution to the offense of conviction 
unless a different plea bargain is made. The converse principles seem primarily 
to be found in Oregon cases. State v. Davis, 57 Or. App. 322, 644 P.2d 623 
(1982).

7 Additionally, like the comment in UNC Teton Exploration Drilling, Inc., 
774 P.2d 584, the time has come to seek to resolve this proliferating issue in 
Wyoming criminal law of a documented or determined decision. There, attorney's 
fees and computational proof - here, presentence confinement and determined 
credit.

8 Presentence confinement incarceration is defined as incarceration for 
inability and failure to post bond on the offense for which the sentence is 
entered and does not include revoked probation or other confinement that would 
continue to exist without regard for bond posting capabilities in this 
particular proceeding. Obviously, clarity and clarification in the judgment and 
sentence is highly preferred to any presumed credit as an assumed intent of the 
sentencing trial judge. See Lightly, 739 P.2d 1232 and Bayless v. Estelle, 583 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1978).

9 In order to avoid a further course of appellate inquiries, it should be 
recognized that presentence confinement credit has no effect on rules adopted 
for good time or special good time under W.S. 7-13-420 where application of the 
provisions of the statute and adopted rules are confined to events in 
confinement occurring after actual rendition of the sentence for persons then 
incarcerated at the state penitentiary or women's center. See Duffy, 730 P.2d  at 
774, appendix A, Urbigkit, J., dissenting.

10 In result, we would follow generally the standard developed by III ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice, supra, at 
18.307-08:

Standard 18-4.7. Credit for pretrial 
confinement

(a) Credit against the maximum term and any minimum term should be given 
to a defendant for all time spent in custody as a result of the criminal charge 
for which a prison sentence is imposed or as a result of the conduct on which 
such a charge is based. This should specifically include credit for time spent 
in custody prior to trial, during trial, pending sentence, pending the 
resolution of an appeal, and prior to arrival at the institution to which the 
defendant has been committed.

(b) Credit against the maximum term and any minimum term should be given 
to a defendant for all time spent in custody under a prior sentence if the 
defendant is later reprosecuted and resentenced for the same offense or for 
another offense based on the same conduct. In the case of such a reprosecution, 
this should include credit in accordance with paragraph (a) for all time spent 
in custody as a result of both the original charge and any subsequent charge for 
the same offense or for another offense based on the same 
conduct.

(c) If a defendant is serving multiple sentences, and if one of the 
sentences is set aside as the result of direct or collateral attack, credit 
against the maximum term and any minimum term of the remaining sentences should 
be given for all time served since the commission of the offenses on which the 
sentences were based.

(d) If the defendant is arrested on one charge and later prosecuted on 
another charge growing out of conduct which occurred prior to arrest, credit 
against the maximum term and any minimum term of any sentence resulting from 
such prosecution should be given for all time spent in custody under the former 
charge which has not been credited against another 
sentence.

(e) To avoid ambiguities, the award of credit for pretrial incarceration 
should be automatic and mechanical, and affirmative action by the sentencing 
court should be unnecessary. A procedure consistent with this principle is 
specified in standard 18-6.8.

(f) The policies of sentencing authorities and those of other agencies 
empowered to determine the date of actual release should be carefully 
coordinated in the area of sentencing credit to achieve consistency of 
application and the abolition of any distinction between pretrial and posttrial 
confinement. In particular, where the agency administering early release employs 
guidelines to determine the presumptive date of such release, credit for 
pretrial confinement should also be given against such presumptive term. To the 
extent that full integration of policies respecting sentencing credit is not 
achieved, the sentencing court should make corresponding adjustments in the 
sentence it imposes to ensure that the defendant who is confined before trial 
receives full credit therefor.

(g) These standards do not address the question of whether credit should 
be given against the maximum term for good conduct within the correctional 
institution or for compliance with institutional 
rules.

Standard 18-6.8 provides:

Procedure for awarding credit

The credit required by standard 18-4.7 should be awarded in the following 
manner:

(a) The parties should communicate to the court at the time of sentencing 
the facts upon which credit for time served prior to sentencing will be 
based;

(b) The court should inform the defendant at the time of sentencing of 
the defendant's status on the issue of credit for time previously 
served;

(c) The court should assure that the record accurately reflects the facts 
upon which credit for time served prior to sentencing will be computed, but, to 
avoid possible ambiguities, the court should not itself award such credit or 
otherwise reduce the sentence for time served;

(d) The custodian should communicate to the prison authorities at the 
time the defendant is delivered for commitment the amount of time spent in 
custody since the imposition of sentence;

(e) The credit to be awarded against the sentence should be computed by 
the prison authorities as soon as practicable and automatically 
awarded;

(f) The prison authorities should inform the defendant of his or her 
status as soon as practicable; and

(g) The defendant should be afforded an avenue of postconviction review 
for the prompt disposition of questions which may arise as to the amount of 
credit which should have been awarded.

Id. at 18.491-92.