Title: Douglas County v. Briggs

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

593 P.2d 1115 (1979)
286 Or. 151
DOUGLAS COUNTY, a Body Politic and Corporate of the State of Oregon, Petitioner,
v.
R.A. BRIGGS and Gertrude Briggs, Husband and Wife, and Gertrude Briggs, Individually, Respondents.
No. 76 2052; CA 9099; SC 25859.

Supreme Court of Oregon.
Argued and Submitted February 7, 1979.
Decided April 24, 1979.
Paul Nolte, County Counsel, Roseburg, argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.
Gordon G. Carlson, Roseburg, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondents.
Before HOLMAN, P.J., and TONGUE, HOWELL, BRYSON,[*] LENT and LINDE, JJ.
HOLMAN, Justice.
Douglas County brought a declaratory judgment proceeding to determine whether it was required to compensate defendants for loss of access from defendants' property to an established abutting county road which had been converted by the county into a throughway. The trial court concluded that severing defendants' rights of access constituted a compensable taking and entered judgment for defendants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment upon the basis that an easement of ingress and egress is a property right which government may not extinguish without just compensation and that ORS 374.420(1) was merely a recognition of that pre-existing right. 34 Or. App. 409, 578 P.2d 1261 (1978). This court granted review.
*1116 The action by the county establishing the county road as a throughway was taken pursuant to ORS 374.420 which provides, in part, as follows:
The statute does not specifically provide that counties must compensate property owners whose rights of access to adjacent county roads are terminated. However, it provides limited means by which counties may extinguish easements of access upon establishment of a throughway. The specified means of acquisition indicate that the property owner must agree to the termination of his rights of access unless the county acquires the right by condemnation. This, in turn, suggests that the rights of access cannot be terminated except by payment unless they are donated to the county by the property owner. In the event of an ambiguous statute, such as we have here, it is proper to look at the legislative history in an endeavor to clarify that which the legislature intended.
A perusal of the legislative history shows clearly that the legislature intended that property owners be compensated for the termination of their rights of access upon the conversion of an ordinary county road into a throughway. ORS 374.420 was enacted in 1965.[1] The original version was incorporated in House Bill 1067 and was entirely different from the statute which was ultimately enacted. The original bill provided
This version of the bill was defeated on the House floor after Rep. Skelton made the following observation:
The bill was referred to the House Committee on Local Government which substituted the language which is now subsection (1) of ORS 374.420. When the amended bill came up in the House of Representatives for floor debate, the following discussion occurred:
When the amended bill came to the Senate, we find the following before the Senate Committee on Local Government:
No tapes were made of Senate floor debates during the 1965 session.
There can be no doubt about the legislative intent in view of the above comments. We hold that ORS 374.420 requires the county to pay property owners for the loss of their rights of access when an established county road adjacent thereto is made into a throughway. Constitutional issues should not be decided when there is an adequate statutory basis for decision. Therefore, we take no position one way or the other whether Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution[2] mandates payment for loss of rights of access in a situation like the present. Despite defendants' common law right of access, we believe the matter to be one of considerable doubt in situations in which the access is terminated for purposes which have to do with the use of the county road as a public road.
The property of defendants lies between two county roads, one of which was established as a throughway and the other which was not. Defendants had access to and from their property on the latter. The county contends that the Court of Appeals erred "in holding the determination of whether adequate or reasonable access to a public highway remains for an abutting landlord when access has been restricted is a question of fact as determined by the highest and best use." The county claims *1118 this is a problem of constitutional magnitude under Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution. But for the statute previously discussed, the question of whether loss of adequate and reasonable access would be compensable is one of constitutional magnitude. However, the questions of the highest and best use of particular property and whether its access to a public road for such use is adequate and reasonable or has been impaired are not questions of constitutional magnitude or of law but are questions of fact that relate to the question of value.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
[*]  Bryson, J., did not participate in the decision of this case.
[1]  Oregon Laws 1965, ch. 364, § 1.
[2]  "Private property shall not be taken for public use, * * * without just compensation; * * *."