Title: Mosley v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Lawrence Mosley v. State of Maryland, No. 16, September Term 2003. 
[Criminal Law & Procedure – Ineffective Assistance of Counsel;  Held:  The Court of
Special Appeals should not have heard defendant’s ineffective assistance claim based on
counsel’s failure to support a motion for judgment of acquittal with particularity  because the
record was not sufficiently developed and the critical facts were in dispute.] 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 16
September Term, 2003
__________________________________
LAWRENCE MOSLEY
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
__________________________________
Bell, C.J.
         *Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Wilner, J., concurs
Filed: November 26, 2003
*Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an active
member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant
to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also
participated in the decision and adoption of this
opinion.
2
Lawrence Mosley asks this Court to review a decision rendered by the Court of
Special Appeals that he was not denied effective assistance of counsel when his counsel did
not articulate insufficiency of the evidence as a specific basis for a motion for judgment of
acquittal.  For the reasons stated below, we conclude that the Court of Special Appeals
should not have reviewed Mosley’s claim on direct appeal.  
I.  Background
A.  Facts
On January 13, 2001, at 12:45 a.m., Yvonne Bellamy and Angela Fields left a Chinese
restaurant located in Baltimore.  A man, later identified by the victims as Lawrence Mosley,
approached them from behind and grabbed Ms.  Fields while holding a weapon that appeared
to be a gun to her back,  threatening to kill both women if they did not cooperate with him.
Mosley then took a purse, a back-pack, and their Chinese food and ordered them to walk
away through a parking lot.  As they began walking away, he told them to stop.  He again
approached the women, waving the weapon in the air, and began walking with them.  He did
so after two other people approached them through the parking lot.   The two people turned
out to be plainclothes police officers, Agent Kevin Allis and Officer Donna Jackson, working
in the area, who had witnessed the events of the robbery and had called for backup. 
When the backup subsequently arrived, Mosley released the women and  began to run
with the weapon in his hand toward Agent Allis, who then pulled his badge and gun out.
3
Mosley dropped the weapon, which was admitted as State’s Exhibit 1-A at trial.  Agent Allis
and Officer Jackson both identified State’s Exhibit 1-A  as the weapon used by Mosley,
which they characterized as an “air gun.”  Agent Allis testified that he realized the weapon
was plastic when Mosley dropped it.  Exhibit 1-A  was available to the jurors during their
deliberations.   
On March 7, 2002, Lawrence Mosley was convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City of two counts of second degree assault, two counts of robbery, two counts of wearing
or carrying a dangerous weapon, and two counts of robbery with a dangerous or deadly
weapon.  He was sentenced to two thirteen-year terms of imprisonment, which were to be
served concurrently. 
B.  Appellate Procedural History
Mosley appealed to the Court of Special Appeals on March 11, 2002, raising a single
issue for review.  He argued that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel because
his counsel had failed to state with particularity the grounds for the motion for judgment of
acquittal made at the close of all the evidence.  The evidence regarding the air gun, Mosley
maintained, was insufficient to support his convictions for robbery with a dangerous or
deadly weapon and wearing or carrying a dangerous weapon, and he argued that his counsel
had failed to raise this point specifically, with the result that the issue of the insufficiency of
the evidence relating to the dangerousness of the air gun was not preserved for appellate
review.  The State opposed Mosley’s appeal, arguing that the issue of ineffective counsel
1
These two determinations were, however, inconsistent.  As we have pointed out, the
ineffective assistance of counsel argument was predicated entirely upon trial counsel’s failure
to argue the insufficiency of the evidence relating to the dangerousness of the air gun.  If the
evidence was sufficient, then counsel’s performance was not constitutionally ineffective in
this regard.  Moreover, the Court of Special Appeals’s inconsistent holdings present
problems under Maryland’s Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act, discussed infra, which
requires that, in order for a defendant to have an issue considered in a post-conviction
proceeding, “the alleged error [must not have been] previously and finally litigated or waived
in the proceeding resulting in the conviction or in any other proceeding that the person has
taken to secure relief from the person's conviction.” See Maryland Code, § 102(b)(2) of the
Criminal Procedure Article (2001).  Here, the alleged error was “finally litigated” when the
4
should be resolved in a post-conviction proceeding.  
When the record was transmitted to the Court of Special Appeals on May 10, 2002,
however, the air gun was not included.  Mosley filed a motion to correct the record, which
the Court of Special Appeals granted.  It appeared that the air gun, which was to be
transmitted to the Court of Special Appeals, had been stolen from the trunk of Agent Allis’s
car.  With the gun now lost, in support of his appeal, Mosley secured and filed affidavits of
the Assistant State’s Attorney, Mosley’s trial counsel, and the trial judge as to their
recollections of the gun’s physical characteristics.  Only the Assistant State’s Attorney
remembered the gun, stating in his affidavit that it was a “plastic air gun,” “heavy,” “weighed
approximately ten pounds,” and was “between seven and nine inches in length.”
The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, held that “the evidence was
sufficient to sustain [Mosley’s] convictions for robbery with a deadly weapon and wearing
and carrying a concealed dangerous weapon” as well as concluded that Mosley’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim “must be decided in a post-conviction proceeding.”1 
Court of Special Appeals held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Mosley, because
Mosley’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was based on his assertion that his counsel
should have moved for a judgment for acquittal with particularity based on the insufficiency
of the evidence. 
5
We granted Mosley’s petition for writ of certiorari, presenting the following questions
for our review:
1.  Did the Court of Special Appeals have the authority on direct appeal to
decide whether Petitioner’s trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of
counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights when he failed to argue
with particularity the motion for judgment of acquittal after the State offered
no evidence that the toy gun used in the robbery qualified as a dangerous or
deadly weapon?
2.  Given the conflicting statements contained in the Court of Special
Appeals’s opinion, did the Court actually address Petitioner’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, and, if the Court did address the merits of his
claim, is its decision incorrect in light of the fact that the State lost the toy gun
before it was transmitted to the Court and the Court subsequently failed to
draw inferences about the gun in favor of Petitioner and instead based its
decision solely on an affidavit by the Assistant State’s Attorney which gave an
implausible description of the gun? 
Although the State opposed direct review of Mosley’s claim in the Court of Special
Appeals, the State argues before us that the Court of Special Appeals correctly found that
Mosley was not denied effective assistance of counsel.  The State also maintains that the
Court of Special Appeals properly based its decision on the affidavit of the Assistant State’s
Attorney.
III.  Discussion
A.  The Strickland Analysis  
2
The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”
3
Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides in pertinent part:  “That in
all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right . . . to be allowed counsel . . . .”
6
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution,2 applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights3
guarantee criminal defendants the right to the assistance of counsel at critical stages of the
proceedings.  United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2047, 80 L. Ed.
2d 657, 668 (1984); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063,
80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 691 (1984); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343, 83 S. Ct. 792, 796,
9 L. Ed. 2d 799, 805 (1963); Glasser v. United States, 315  U.S. 60, 69-70, 62 S.Ct. 457,
464-65, 86 L. Ed. 680, 699 (1942); Lettley v. State, 358 Md. 26, 33, 746 A.2d 392, 396
(2000); State v. Wischhusen, 342 Md. 530, 537, 677 A.2d 595, 598 (1996)(discussing the
constitutional right to counsel at "critical stages" of the criminal case); Austin v. State, 327
Md. 375, 381, 609 A.2d 728, 730-31 (1992); Harris v. State, 303 Md. 685, 695 n.3, 496 A.2d
1074, 1079 n.3 (1985)(stating “[t]his Court has not distinguished between the right to counsel
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and the right provided by Art. 21 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights”)(hereinafter “Harris III”).  Integral to this right is the right
to effective assistance of counsel.  See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 377, 106 S.Ct.
2574, 2584, 91 L.Ed. 2d 305, 321 (1986); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. at 2063, 80
L.Ed.2d at 692; In re Parris W., 363 Md. 717, 724, 770 A.2d 202, 206 (2001);  State v.
7
Tichnell, 306 Md. 428, 440, 509 A.2d 1179, 1185 (1986).  
The Supreme Court established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 104
S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693, that a defendant must prove that counsel’s competence
failed to meet an objective standard of reasonableness and that counsel’s performance
prejudiced the defense in order to be successful in an ineffectiveness of counsel claim.   See
also In re Parris W., 363 Md. at 725, 770 A.2d at 206.  This two-pronged test serves to
correct the adversarial process when it has failed to render a reliable trial result.   Strickland,
466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693 (stating that “[u]nless a defendant
makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from
a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable”).  When a defendant
is denied effective assistance of counsel, it is the integrity of the adversarial process that is
compromised.  Id. at 686, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 692-93 (stating that “[t]he
benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied
on as having produced a just result”). 
With respect to the first prong, the Strickland court explained that “the proper standard
for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance.” Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at
2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693.  “Prevailing professional norms” define what constitutes reasonably
effective assistance, and all of the circumstances surrounding counsel’s performance must
be considered.   Id. at  688, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694.  Because it is “tempting”
8
for both a defendant and a court to second-guess a counsel’s conduct after conviction, courts
must be “highly deferential” when they scrutinize counsel’s performance.  Id. at  689, 104
S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694.  Reviewing courts must thus assume, until proven
otherwise, that counsel's conduct fell within a broad range of reasonable professional
judgment, and that counsel’s conduct derived not from error but from trial strategy.  Harris
III, 303 Md. at 698, 496 A.2d at 1081.   
With respect to the second prong of the test, prejudice, the Strickland court explained
that “[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting
aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.”
Strickland,  466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 696.  Because the ultimate goal
of the adversarial process is to produce reliable trial results, the defendant must also be
prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance in order to succeed under an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.  Id. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067, 80 L.Ed.2d at 696.  A “limited”
exception to the requirement of prejudice arises in claims involving conflict of interest.  Id.
 (explaining that, although the conflict of interest rule is not “per se,” there is “a fairly rigid
rule of presumed prejudice for conflicts of interest”). 
B.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
1) Maryland’s Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act
We have explained on numerous occasions that a post-conviction proceeding pursuant
to the Maryland Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act, Maryland Code, § 7-102 of the
4
Section 7-102 states:
(a) In general. -- Subject to subsection (b) of this section, §§ 7-103 and 7-104
of this subtitle and Subtitle 2 of this title, a convicted person may begin a
proceeding under this title in the circuit court for the county in which the
conviction took place at any time if the person claims that: 
(1) the sentence or judgment was imposed in violation of the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of
the State; 
  
(2) the court lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence; 
   
(3) the sentence exceeds the maximum allowed by law; or 
   
(4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack on a
ground of alleged error that would otherwise be available under
a writ of habeas corpus, writ of coram nobis, or other common
law or statutory remedy. 
(b) Requirements to begin proceeding. -- A person may begin a proceeding
under this title if: 
  
(1) the person seeks to set aside or correct the judgment or
sentence; and 
   
(2) the alleged error has not been previously and finally litigated
or waived in the proceeding resulting in the conviction or in any
other proceeding that the person has taken to secure relief from
the person's conviction. 
9
Criminal Procedure Article (2001),4 is the most appropriate way to raise the claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.  In re Parris W., 363 Md. at 726, 770 A.2d at 207; Ware
v. State, 360 Md. 650, 706, 759 A.2d 764, 793 (2000); Perry v. State, 344 Md. 204, 227, 686
A.2d 274, 285 (1996); Walker v. State, 338 Md. 253, 262, 658 A.2d 239, 243, cert. denied,
516 U.S. 898, 116 S.Ct. 254, 133 L.Ed.2d 179 (1995); Stewart v. State, 319 Md. 81, 92, 570
A.2d 1229, 1234 (1990); Johnson v. State, 292 Md. 405, 434, 439 A.2d 542, 559 (1982);
State v. Zimmerman, 261 Md. 11, 24-25, 273 A.2d 156, 163 (1971).  The Act allows the
convicted person to attack the judgment collaterally by challenging the legality of the
5
As we explained in Ruby v. State, the Maryland Uniform Post Conviction Procedure
Act “was enacted in 1958 ‘to create a simple statutory procedure, in place of the common law
habeas corpus and coram nobis remedies, for collateral attacks upon criminal convictions and
sentences.’” 353 Md. 100, 106 n.4, 724 A.2d 673, 676 n.4 (1999) (quoting, Gluckstern v.
Sutton, 319 Md. 634, 658, 574 A.2d 898, 909 cert. denied, 498 U.S. 950, 111 S.Ct. 369, 112
L.Ed.2d 331 (1990)).  The Act, however, does not abolish the common law remedies of
habeas corpus and coram nobis.  Id.  These remedies may be suitable when a defendant is not
incarcerated, subject to parole, or subject to probation because the Act does not provide a
post-conviction proceeding remedy for claims in these circumstances.  Id.
10
conviction and incarceration in a separate evidentiary proceeding.5  See Perry v. State, 357
Md. 37, 72, 741 A.2d 1162, 1181 (1999); Davis v. State, 285 Md. 19, 22, 400 A.2d 406, 407
(1979).  A post-conviction proceeding,  often called a “collateral proceeding,” brought under
the Act is not an appeal of the judgment; rather, it is a collateral attack designed to address
alleged constitutional, jurisdictional, or other fundamental violations that occurred at trial.
See Code, §7-102 of the Criminal Procedure Article;  Maryland State Bar Ass’n v. Kerr, 272
Md. 687, 689-90, 326 A.2d 180, 181 (1974)(explaining that a post-conviction proceeding in
Maryland “does not constitute a part of the original criminal cause, but is an independent and
collateral civil inquiry into the validity of the conviction and sentence”).  Ineffective
assistance of counsel is one of the claims cognizable under the Act, and it is the one most
commonly raised.   Perry, 357 Md. at 72-73 & 74 n.10, 741 A.2d at 1181 & 1182 n.10
(finding that the claim of evidentiary error fell within the Act’s purview and noting also that
other claims allowed under the Act include, among others, whether counsel rendered
ineffective assistance, whether the prosecution suppressed exculpatory evidence, whether the
government violated terms of a plea agreement, whether there was a failure to place on the
6
In fact, the Maryland Uniform Post Conviction Act has been described as more
generous than many states because it allows for a full evidentiary hearing as opposed to a
more limited one.  See Edward A. Tomlinson, Post-Conviction in Maryland: Past, Present
and Future, 45 MD. L. REV. 927, 959 (1986). 
11
trial record the factual basis of a guilty plea, whether there was use of perjured police
testimony, whether the evidence was pursuant to an unlawful arrest, and whether a
confession was erroneously admitted).  
When a defendant attacks a criminal judgment on the basis of denial of effective
assistance of counsel, the Act thus provides the defendant with the possibility of an
evidentiary hearing, reflecting a recognition that “adequate procedures exist at the trial level,
as distinguished from the appellate level, for taking testimony, receiving evidence, and
making factual findings thereon concerning the allegations of error.”  Wilson v. State, 284
Md. 664, 675, 399 A.2d 256, 262 (1979).  Post-conviction proceedings are preferred with
respect to ineffective assistance of counsel claims because the trial record rarely reveals why
counsel acted or omitted to act, and such proceedings allow for fact-finding and the
introduction of testimony and evidence directly related to allegations of the counsel’s
ineffectiveness.6  Walker, 338 Md. at 262, 658 A.2d at 243; Johnson, 292 Md. at 434-35, 439
A.2d at 559; see, e.g., Redman v. State, 363 Md. 298, 302, 768 A.2d 656, 658
(2001)(agreeing that the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel where counsel
failed to seek a change of venue and noting that, at the post-conviction hearing, the
defendant’s counsel “admitted that he was unaware that a capital defendant has the right of
12
automatic removal of the case to another county”); Oken v. State, 343 Md. 256, 286-87, 681
A.2d 30, 41 (1996)(agreeing with the post-conviction court’s findings that there was no
ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel did not introduce evidence related to the
defendant’s alcohol and drug abuse and noting specifically counsel’s explanation in the post-
conviction hearing and his tactical reasons for not including such evidence).  
As we shall explore, the trial record clearly must  illuminate why counsel’s actions
were ineffective  because, otherwise, the Maryland appellate courts would be entangled  in
“the perilous process of second-guessing” without the benefit of potentially essential
information.  Johnson, 292 Md. at 435, 439 A.2d at 559 (quoting People v. Miller, 7 Cal. 3d
562, 102 Cal. Rptr. 841, 848, 498 P.2d 1089 (1972)).  As the Supreme Court recently
explained, such second-guessing on the appellate court’s part may compromise the Strickland
analysis:
When an ineffective-assistance claim is brought on direct
appeal, appellate counsel and the court must proceed on a trial
record not developed precisely for the object of litigating or
preserving the claim and thus often incomplete or inadequate for
this purpose . . . .  The evidence introduced at trial . . . will be
devoted to issues of guilt or innocence, and the resulting record
in many cases will not disclose the facts necessary to decide
either prong of the Strickland analysis.  If the alleged error is
one of commission, the record may reflect the action taken by
counsel but not the reasons for it . . . .  And evidence of alleged
conflicts of interest might be found only in attorney-client
correspondence or other documents that, in the typical criminal
trial, are not introduced.  Without additional factual
development, moreover, an appellate court may not be able to
ascertain whether the alleged error was prejudicial.
7
Maryland Rule 8-301 provides, in pertinent part, the way to obtain  appellate review
by this Court:
(a) Generally. Appellate review by the Court of Appeals may be obtained
only:
(1) by direct appeal or application for leave to appeal, where
allowed by law;
(2) pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions
of Law Act; or
(3) by writ of certiorari in all other cases.
Maryland Rule 8-201 provides, in pertinent part, the way to obtain appellate review
by the Court of Special Appeals:
a) By notice of appeal.  Except as provided in Rule 8-204, the only method of
securing review by the Court of Special Appeals is by the filing of a notice of
appeal within the time prescribed in Rule 8-202. 
8
Another possible way of raising ineffective assistance of counsel claims is in a motion
for a new trial.  The Court of Special Appeals has had occasion to address this possibility
in Ruth v. Maryland, 133 Md. App. 358, 757 A.2d 152 (2000).  In that case, the defendant
appealed after the denial of his motion for a new trial in which he claimed that he was denied
13
Massaro v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S. Ct. 1690, 1694, 155 L. Ed. 2d 714, 720-21
(2003) (internal citations omitted).  Therefore, the adversarial process found in a post-
conviction proceeding generally is the preferable method in order to evaluate counsel’s
performance, as it reveals facts, evidence, and testimony that may be unavailable to an
appellate court using only the original trial record.  Walker, 338 Md. at  262, 658 A.2d at 243.
2) Direct Appeals
Although we prefer post-conviction proceedings to address denial of effective
assistance of counsel claims, we have recognized, nevertheless, that there may be exceptional
cases where the trial record reveals counsel’s ineffectiveness to be “so blatant and egregious”
that review on appeal is appropriate.7, 8  Johnson, 292 Md. at 435 n.15, 439 A.2d at 559 n.15.
effective assistance of counsel and that there was juror misconduct.  Id. at 365, 757 A.2d at
156.  After analyzing the merits of both of these claims, the Court of Special Appeals
affirmed the judgment of the trial court.  Id. at 366, 757 A.2d at 156-57.  Noting, however,
that “appellate review of a trial attorney’s conduct is best done in a post-conviction
proceeding, rather than on direct appeal, where a trial-like setting will ‘provide[] the
opportunity to develop a full record concerning relevant factual issues,’” the Court of Special
Appeals, nevertheless, decided to review the issue because, at the defendant’s motion for a
new trial hearing, “the court heard testimony and accepted evidence regarding [the
defendant’s] ineffective assistance of counsel claim.”  Id. at 367, 757 A.2d at 157.  Although
we have not considered this possibility directly and decline to do so here, we note that the
denial of a new trial motion and the subsequent affirmance of the conviction on appeal may
result in a determination that the substance of the allegation of ineffective assistance of
counsel has been finally litigated under Maryland Code, § 7-106 of the Criminal Procedure
Article (2001)(providing that an allegation of error is “finally litigated” when an appellate
court of the State decides the merits of the allegation or “a court of original jurisdiction, after
a full and fair hearing, decides on the merits of the allegation in a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus or a writ of error coram nobis, unless the decision on the merits of the petition is
clearly erroneous”). 
Another potential way of raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is by
including the claim within a motion to withdraw a guilty plea pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-
242(g).  In Harris v. State, we explained that, although we preferred post-conviction
proceedings for ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the trial court could consider the
merits of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.
299 Md. 511, 517, 474 A.2d 890, 892-93 (1984)(hereinafter “Harris II”).  Such a view, we
noted, is consistent with our preference for post-conviction proceedings because, in such an
instance, the trial court is able to entertain evidence and testimony related to the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, thus creating a record sufficient to evaluate the claim.  Id.
9
We emphasize, however, that, as we shall explain infra, whether the appellate court
should hear the ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal is a different
question, and it depends on whether the test we established in In re Parris W. is met, namely,
that “the critical facts are not in dispute and the record is sufficiently developed to permit a
14
Review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims may occur on direct appeal in a number
of circumstances.  For example, when a defendant alleges his counsel’s effectiveness was
compromised by prejudicial conflicts of interest, we have addressed the issue on direct
appeal.9  See  Austin, 327 Md. at 393, 609 A.2d at 737 (concluding that the trial record
fair evaluation of the claim.”  In re Parris W., 363 Md. at 726, 770 A.2d at 207.
10
Maryland Code, § 2-401(a)(1) of the Criminal Law Article provides, in pertinent part:
“After a death sentence is imposed and the judgment becomes final, the Court of Appeals
shall review the sentence on the record.”
15
sufficiently demonstrated that counsel’s conflicts of interest adversely affected his
performance); see also Harris II, 299 Md. at 518, 474 A.2d. at 893 (acknowledging that an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim may be heard on direct appeal when facts related to
the claim were heard by the trial court as part of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea).  In
addition, this Court has reviewed ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal
when reviewing death penalty cases, as required by statute.  See Maryland Code, § 2-401 of
the Criminal Law Article (2002).10   See Harris II, 299 Md. at 518, 474 A.2d at 893.
A convicted person, in limited circumstances, thus may raise the claim that he or she
was denied effective assistance of counsel on direct review without the benefit of a post-
conviction proceeding.  See In re Parris W., 363 Md. at 727, 770 A.2d at 207; Austin, 327
Md. at 394, 609 A.2d at 737; Harris II, 299 Md. at 518, 474 A.2d. at 893.  The Supreme
Court has evaluated ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct review in the rare
instance where the critical facts are undisputed, the record is sufficiently developed, and/or
the legal representation is so egregiously ineffective that it is obvious from the trial record
that a defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  See Massaro,  ___ U.S.
____, 123 S. Ct. at 1694, 155 L. Ed. 2d at 720-21 (explaining that post-conviction review is
preferable to direct appeal for deciding claims of ineffective assistance and also holding that
16
failure to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal does not bar the
claim from being brought in a post-conviction proceeding).  Numerous other federal courts
also have so opined.  See, e.g., United States v. Khedr, 343 F.3d 96, 99-100 (2nd Cir.
2003)(declining to hear the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim and, without
describing the grounds for the claim, noting a "baseline aversion to resolving ineffectiveness
claims on direct review" but allowing direct appeal in such cases when their "resolution is
'beyond any doubt'”); United States v. Hughes, 330 F.3d 1068, 1069 (8th Cir.
2003)(explaining, in a case where defense counsel went to trial to assert and preserve issues
that did not relate to the defendant’s factual guilt and did not object to the presentence report
recommending that the defendant’s offense level be reduced by two levels for acceptance of
responsibility under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines,  that collateral proceedings are more
appropriate than direct review because ineffective counsel claims usually involve facts
outside the original record); United States v. King, 119 F.3d 290, 295 (4th Cir.
1997)(observing, in a case where the defendant claimed his counsel was constitutionally
ineffective for failing to move to dismiss the indictment based upon a violation of his right
to a speedy trial and for failing to file timely objections to the presentence report, that it is
“well settled” that ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be reviewed at the district
court level rather than on direct appeal).  Various of our sister state courts in states in which
the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act is in effect also have so held.  In State v.
Zernechel, 304 N.W.2d 365, 367 (Minn. 1981), the Supreme Court of Minnesota stated that,
17
without indicating with specificity the defendant’s claims regarding that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel, direct appeals are disfavored because “we do not have the
benefit of all the facts concerning why defense counsel did or did not do certain things.”  In
State v. Miller, 459 S.E.2d 114, 125-26 (W. Va. 1995), the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia, in a case where the defendant claimed that her trial counsel lacked an
effective trial strategy by failing to offer instructions on her affirmative defense of
self-defense, concluded that review of the case on direct appeal was inappropriate because
the record did not, and often could not, adequately reveal the counsel’s trial strategy,
explaining that “[t]he mission of the appellate judiciary is neither to mull theoretical
abstractions nor to practice clairvoyance" and that “[t]he very nature of an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim demonstrates the inappropriateness of review on direct appeal.”
 See also State v. Kelley, 658 N.W.2d 279, 290 (Neb. 2003)(finding the record to be
insufficient regarding counsel’s trial strategy to determine on direct appeal whether counsel's
performance was deficient in his cross-examination of certain witnesses, his failure to object
to certain fruits of the purportedly illegal search, and his failure to object to certain evidence
that the defendant claimed was irrelevant); State v. Cyran, 586 A.2d 1238,1240 (Me.
1991)(declining to hear on direct review defendant’s “numerous” claims of  ineffective
assistance of counsel claims and, without elucidating those claims, explaining that they
refuse to review  ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal, “except in cases
where the appeal record shows beyond the possibility of a rational disagreement that the
18
defendant was inadequately represented, leaving defendant to seek relief through
post-conviction proceedings"). 
The rare instances in which we have permitted direct review are instructive, because
they indicate our willingness to entertain such claims on direct review only when the facts
in the trial record sufficiently  illuminate the basis for the claim of ineffectiveness of counsel.
As we explained in In re Parris W., direct review is an exception that applies only when “the
critical facts are not in dispute and the record is sufficiently developed to permit a fair
evaluation of the claim.”  363 Md. at 726, 770 A.2d at 207.  In that case, the defense counsel,
after issuing subpoenas for five witnesses corroborating the defendant’s alibi for the wrong
date,  conceded he made the scheduling error.  Id. at 720, 727, 770 A.2d at 203, 208.
Because these facts were “undisputed” and the trial record was “developed sufficiently,” we
concluded that it was appropriate for us to determine on direct review that counsel rendered
ineffective assistance under the Strickland analysis.  Id. at 727, 770 A.2d at 207.  
Similarly, we determined in two cases that direct review was appropriate because
defense counsel had apparent conflicts of interest.  In Austin, where two law partners
continued to represent two criminal codefendants even after one defendant decided to testify
against the other, we concluded that the trial record sufficiently demonstrated that defense
counsel’s conflict of interest adversely affected his performance.  327 Md. at 387, 609 A.2d
at 729.  We also had occasion to address another conflict of interest issue in Lettley, in which
defense counsel represented another client who had not been charged with the crime at issue
11
Notably, conflict of interest issues in ineffective counsel cases often do not require
a showing of prejudice.  See Lettley, 358 Md. at 35, 746 A.2d at 397.  For this reason, it
appears we have been more likely to evaluate counsel’s performance on direct review when
conflict of interest is clearly at issue.  See Austin, 327 Md. at 394, 609 A.2d at 737.  We note,
however, that, even though conflict of interest issues may be revealed in the criminal trial
record and thus capable of evaluation on direct review, post-conviction proceedings may
nevertheless be more appropriate in cases where the trial record does not conclusively reflect
how the conflict of interest adversely affected counsel’s performance.  See, e.g., Massaro,
___ U.S. ___, 123 S. Ct. at 1694, 155 L. Ed. 2d at 720-21 (stating that “evidence of alleged
conflicts of interest might be found only in attorney-client correspondence or other
documents that, in the typical criminal trial, are not introduced”); Walker, 338 Md. at 262,
658 A.2d at 243 (concluding that whether defense counsel’s representation of two co-
defendants constituted a conflict of interest adversely affecting counsel’s performance was
best determined in a post-conviction proceeding rather than on direct review).  
19
but had confessed to committing the crime to him.  358 Md. at 29, 746 A.2d at 394.  We
concluded that, although ineffective assistance of counsel claims were best reviewed in a
post-conviction proceeding, “[w]here the claim is based on conflict of interest, and the record
is clear,” direct review is appropriate.11  Id. at 32, 746 A.2d at 396. 
We have been willing, thus, to consider these claims on direct review only when the
facts found in the trial record are sufficiently developed to clearly reveal ineffective
assistance of counsel and that counsel’s performance adversely prejudiced the defendant.
See In re Parris W., 363 Md. at 726, 770 A.2d at 207.  We utilize the same rationale when
we have declined to review claims on direct appeal.  In Johnson, for example, we
emphasized that, if the trial record does not reveal why counsel made certain decisions and
only suggests he may have provided ineffective assistance, we prefer post-conviction
proceedings because they provide counsel with the opportunity to explain his actions.  292
12
Maryland Code, § 6-104 of the Criminal Procedure Article enables a defendant to
make a motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State’s case and at the close of
all  evidence.  It provides, in pertinent part:
20
Md. at 435, 439 A.2d at 559.  In that case, we declined to consider the defendant’s
ineffective assistance claim that his counsel failed “to develop a coherent defense theory”
because the record did not reveal why counsel acted as he did, even though the defendant’s
new counsel cited “many alleged errors by counsel appearing on the face of the record.”  Id.
at 434-35, 439 A.2d at 558-59.  Similarly, in Stewart, a case where the defendant’s counsel
declined to tell a new trial judge that the previous trial judge had recused herself from the
case only if the defendant would waive his right to a jury trial and never asked the new judge
to allow the defendant to elect a jury trial, we determined that the facts in the record were not
sufficiently developed to evaluate whether the defendant voluntarily waived his right to a
jury trial or whether his election was premised on counsel’s ineffective representation.  319
Md. at 91-92, 570 A.2d at 1234.  Moreover, in Walker, we declined to evaluate counsel’s
performance on direct review even though counsel remained silent throughout the trial
because we believed a “full record concerning relevant factual issues” needed to be
developed in a post-conviction proceeding.  338 Md. at 261-62, 658 A.2d at 243.
3) Mosley’s Claim 
According to Mosley, his counsel was ineffective because he did not articulate as one
of the bases for the motion for judgment of acquittal that the State did not prove that the air
gun was a dangerous or deadly weapon.12  In so doing, Mosley asks us to accept two
a) Motion after State's evidence. -- 
(1) At the close of the evidence for the State, a defendant may
move for judgment of acquittal on one or more counts or on one
or more degrees of a crime, on the ground that the evidence is
insufficient in law to sustain a conviction as to the count or
degree. 
(2) Subject to paragraph (3) of this subsection, if the court
denies the motion for judgment of acquittal, the defendant may
offer evidence on the defendant's behalf without having reserved
the right to do so. 
(3) If the defendant offers evidence after making a motion for
judgment of acquittal, the motion is deemed withdrawn. 
(b) Motion after all evidence. -- 
(1) The defendant may move for judgment of acquittal at the
close of all the evidence whether or not a motion for judgment
of acquittal was made at the close of the evidence for the State.
(2) If the court denies the motion for judgment of acquittal, the
defendant may have review of the ruling on appeal. 
Maryland Rule 4-324(a) establishes the procedure for making a motion for judgment
of acquittal:
A defendant may move for judgment of acquittal on one or more
counts, or on one or more degrees of an offense which by law is
divided into degrees, at the close of the evidence offered by the
State and, in a jury trial, at the close of all the evidence. The
defendant shall state with particularity all reasons why the
motion should be granted. No objection to the motion for
judgment of acquittal shall be necessary. A defendant does not
waive the right to make the motion by introducing evidence
during the presentation of the State's case. 
21
premises:  first, that the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions of robbery
with a dangerous or deadly weapon and wearing a dangerous or deadly weapon; and, second,
that his counsel was ineffective per se as a result of his failure to articulate specific bases for
the motion for judgment for acquittal.  As we demonstrate below, we conclude that we
13
Mosley also suggests that, because there is little testimony in the record about the air
gun’s “weight” and “density,” the State failed to prove it was a dangerous or deadly weapon.
This argument, however, ignores the fact that there may have been no need to include such
detail at trial because the air gun was not lost until after the trial was completed and that the
jurors were able to see, touch, and evaluate the air gun during their deliberations.  
22
cannot determine whether the evidence was sufficient and so, applying the test we elucidated
in In re Parris W., we cannot evaluate on direct appeal whether or not his counsel provided
ineffective assistance because critical facts are in dispute. 
In contrast to In re Parris W., the critical facts here are, without a doubt, in dispute.
First, the weapon itself is now missing from the record.  Second, after requesting affidavits
to supplement the record at the Court of Special Appeals, Mosley now disputes the contents
of one of those affidavits, disagreeing with the Assistant State’s Attorney’s description of the
lost air gun’s characteristics.13  Yet, in spite of these problems with the critical facts, Mosley
also argues that the face of the record is sufficient enough to support his assertion that the
air gun was not a dangerous or deadly weapon – even as he attempted to suggest in his brief
and at oral argument that the Assistant State Attorney’s characterization of the air gun was
incorrect.  The following excerpt from oral argument more than indicates that the
characteristics of the air gun were, and are, still at issue:   
Mosley:
But I think on the face of this record it’s very plain that the State
didn’t prove that this plastic toy gun could have been used as a
bludgeon. There’s no testimony about it’s weight, about its
heaviness, about its density.  The fact that it’s plastic in and of
itself suggests that it was lightweight –
The Court:
Well, plastic comes in kinds of varieties, there really are toy
23
guns that can’t hurt anybody but you can get plastic that can do
a lot of damage.
* * *
That was before the trial court also, wasn’t it?
Mosley:
There’s no indication that the Judge picked it up.  Obviously he
saw it, and the gun itself did go back into the jury room during
deliberations.
The Court:
So it was in evidence?
Mosley:
It was in evidence.  But plastic in and of itself, even if it’s a
heavier plastic than a water pistol, you know, a plastic water
pistol, is still inherently a lightweight object that –
The Court:
This wasn’t a water pistol, this was an air gun.
Mosley:
An air gun, and in doing research on the various types of air
guns, the heaviest plastic air gun I could find weighed just under
500 grams, which is about 1 pound.  There are certainly metal
air guns that weigh a little bit more, not much more but a little
bit more, but —
The Court:
It shoots a projectile, does it not?  Whether it’s plastic or metal?  Air
forces something out of the gun.
Mosley:
Correct.  And it’s my understanding that, maybe with the plastic gun,
the projectile it shoots is plastic.
The Court:
Is what?
What kind of air gun was it?  Was it a lightweight or heavy plastic?  These questions and
more remain unresolved.  
We have no ability to evaluate whether there was sufficient evidence to support
Mosley’s conviction as to robbery with a dangerous or deadly weapon and wearing a
14
We note that the jury was told that the air gun was not a “real” gun, heard testimony
about Mosley holding the gun, which was described by the victims as “black” and “hard,”
to the back of the victims while simultaneously threatening to kill them if they did not
cooperate, and had the opportunity to review the air gun for themselves in the jury room
while they deliberated.  
24
dangerous or deadly weapon.  Therefore, we simply cannot conclude with confidence, as
Mosley urges, that the air gun was nothing more than a “plastic toy gun,” and, thus, cannot
be a dangerous or deadly weapon per se.14  See Brooks v. State, 314 Md. 585, 600-01, 552
A.2d 872, 880 (1989)(concluding that a plastic toy gun was not a dangerous or deadly
weapon and explaining the test for determining whether an object qualifies as a dangerous
or deadly weapon, listing as one of the elements for dangerousness whether the weapon could
be used as a “bludgeon”). 
Because we cannot conclude that the evidence was insufficient to sustain Mosley’s
conviction, we cannot take the next step urged by Mosley and determine that his counsel
provided ineffective assistance by not making a motion for judgment for acquittal with
particularity.  As long as the sufficiency of the evidence is at issue, the possibility remains
that Mosley’s counsel lacked grounds to make the motion in the first place.  See State v.
Scalise, 660 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Iowa 2003)(concluding that defendant’s counsel was not
ineffective because, even if his motion for judgment of acquittal was made without
specificity, the jury had substantial evidence to find the defendant guilty).  Given this
possibility, under Strickland’s two-pronged analysis, Mosley’s counsel’s failure to support
the motion with particularity either may not have been ineffective assistance of counsel or
25
may not have been prejudicial to the defendant.  Therefore, we conclude that the issues
presented are more appropriate for elucidation in a post-conviction proceeding. 
As a result, although there may be instances where failure to make a motion for
judgment for acquittal with particularity might be determined to be ineffective counsel based
on the trial record alone, we are unwilling to make such a failure per se ineffective assistance
of counsel.  As we explained in In re Parris W. and iterate here, direct review is only
appropriate if the record is sufficiently developed and the critical facts are not in dispute.
363 Md. at 726, 770 A.2d at 207.   
Mosley’s case is distinguishable from the cases he cites in support of his position
because, in those cases, the critical facts regarding counsel’s performance were undisputed
and specific, and the record was more than sufficient to allow the appellate court to evaluate
the case.  See United States v. Bass, 310 F.3d 321, 330 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Jimenez Recio, 258 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 537 U.S. 270,
123 S.Ct. 819, 154 L.Ed. 2d 744 (2003); United States v. Rosalex-Orozco, 8 F.3d 198, 199
(5th Cir. 1993); People v. West, 719 N.E.2d 664, 680 (Ill. 1999); State v. Westeen, 591
N.W.2d 203, 207 (Iowa 1999); In re Parris W., 363 Md. at 726-27, 770 A.2d at 207;
Holland v. State, 656 So. 2d 1192, 1197-98 (Miss. 1995); State v. Denis, 678 N.E. 2d 996,
998 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).  In Mosley’s case, however, the critical facts relating both to the
sufficiency of the evidence and to his counsel’s failure to move for judgment for acquittal
with particularity are neither clear nor undisputed.  We, thus, conclude that a post-conviction
15
Because we are vacating the Court of Special Appeals’s decision and preserving
Mosley’s ability to pursue his claims in a post-conviction proceeding, we decline to address
his claim that the Court of Special Appeals should not have supplemented the trial record
with an affidavit describing the lost air gun.  We note, however, that it is well-established
that an appellate court is not a trier of fact.  Harris III, 303 Md. at 698, 496 A.2d at 1080.
Mosley’s claim that he was rendered ineffective assistance of counsel is directly related to
the disputed factual attributes of the gun. 
Our comments here in no way limit the appellate court from allowing the record to be
corrected on appeal when necessary pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-414 (providing the
appellate court with the authority to “order that an error or omission in the record be
corrected” and that a “motion that is based on facts not contained in the record or papers on
file in the appellate court and not admitted by all the other parties shall be supported by
affidavit”).  Given the situation in this case, however, where the parties dispute the
characteristics of lost evidence, we believe that the trial court in a post-conviction proceeding
is better able to evaluate whatever evidence and testimony may be introduced regarding the
weapon and whether it could be characterized as dangerous or deadly. 
26
proceeding is the appropriate venue to evaluate Mosley’s ineffective assistance of counsel
claim. 
III.  Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons we adhere to our long-standing view that ineffective
assistance of counsel claims are best tested in post-conviction proceedings and that review
of such claims on direct appeal is limited to the rare exception where the record is
sufficiently developed and the critical facts are not in dispute.  We, therefore, vacate the
order of  the Court of Special Appeals and remand with directions to the Court of Special
Appeals to dismiss the appeal.  The vacating of the order shall not prejudice Mosley’s right
to assert his claims in a post-conviction proceeding, should he desire to do so.15 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS 
VACATED 
AND 
CASE
27
REMANDED TO THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS 
WITH 
DIRECTIONS 
TO
DISMISS THE APPEAL WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.  COSTS IN THIS COURT AND
IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO
BE PAID BY PETITIONER. 
Circuit Court For Baltimore City
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 16
September Term, 2003
______________________________________
LAWRENCE MOSLEY
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
         *Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Concurring Opinion by Wilner, J.
______________________________________
Filed:   November 26, 2003
*Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and
conference of this case while an active member of this
Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution,
Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision
and adoption of this case.
I concur in the judgment because I agree that the record before us, being the same
record that was before the Court of Special Appeals, is inadequate to permit a determination
of whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support the conviction.  I offer the
following comment, however.
Maryland Rule 4-324(a) permits a defendant, at the close of the evidence offered by
the State and, in a jury trial, at the close of all of the evidence, to move for judgment of
acquittal on one or more counts or on one or more degrees of an offense that is divided into
degrees.  The Rule requires, however, that the defendant “shall state with particularity all
reasons why the motion should be granted.”  This Court has held that, if such a motion is not
made, an appellate court will not review the case to determine the sufficiency of the
evidence.  The issue – perhaps the most important one in the case – is regarded as waived,
unpreserved. Wersten v. State, 228 Md. 226, 179 A.2d 364 (1962).  We have also held that,
even if such a motion is made, the failure of the defendant to particularize his/her complaint
– to point out how and why the evidence is legally insufficient – also withdraws the issue
from appellate review.  See State v. Lyles, 308 Md. 129, 517 A.2d 761 (1986); Muir v. State,
308 Md. 208, 517 A.2d 1105 (1986); and cf. Warfield v. State, 315 Md. 474, 554 A.2d 1238
(1989).
A lawyer is not required to make a motion for judgment of acquittal unless there is a
reasonable basis for the motion, and, indeed, it likely would be a violation of Rule 3.1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for the lawyer to make such a motion frivolously –
16
 Rule 3.1 states that “[a] lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which
includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.
A lawyer may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the
moving party’s case be established.”  
-2-
without a reasonable basis in the record.16  Nonetheless, it has become routine in criminal
cases for counsel to file such a motion, regardless of the state of the record.  There are two
reasons, both pragmatic.  Nothing is lost by filing the motion, but everything may be lost if
one is not filed.  In the heat of the battle, one may never know for certain whether the
presiding judge might entertain some doubt about the legal sufficiency of the evidence and
be inclined to grant the motion, in whole or in part.  Whether any group of appellate judges
would find the evidence insufficient would, in that situation, be irrelevant, for if the trial
judge grants a judgment of acquittal, that ends the matter, at least to the extent of the
acquittal.  On the other hand, if the motion is not made, the issue is lost, both at the trial and
appellate levels.  The trial judge is not given the opportunity to rule and the appellate court
is not given the opportunity to find the evidence insufficient, even if the trial judge would
have found otherwise.  From the point of view of a Strickland analysis, the issue, as to both
prongs – deficient performance and prejudice – will, in most cases, depend entirely on
whether a reviewing court, in post conviction proceedings, concludes that there was a proper
basis for such a motion.
If a motion is made but not particularized, the situation may be worse.  There is
always the chance that, even if not particularized, the motion may be granted by the trial
-3-
judge, who might well conclude on his or her own analysis that the evidence is insufficient.
If that happens, of course, the issue will disappear and will never surface in either an appeal
or a post conviction proceeding.  The concern we face is when such a motion is not granted.
If an unparticularized motion is not granted, the defendant has lost the right of appellate
review, just as if the motion had never been made at all, but that loss may be made worse by
the assumption that, in making even the generalized motion, the lawyer believed that there
was some basis for it.  The deficiency withdraws from appellate review an issue that the
lawyer presumably believed existed. 
The end result will be the same – post conviction relief will be unavailable, because
of the prejudice prong of Strickland, unless the reviewing court finds that the evidence as to
at least one conviction was legally insufficient.  I would find it difficult, however, to justify
a conclusion that there was not deficient performance.  If the lawyer believed that there was
enough of a basis for the motion to make it, how could it not be deficient performance to fail
to make it in such a way as to make it effective?  This is one instance in which simply
making a motion “for the record” has no effect (unless, fortuitously, it is granted).
This is an area in which trial judges can, and should, provide some meaningful
assistance.  A motion for judgment of acquittal asks the judge to end the case, or at least part
of the case.  The judge is entitled to know every possible basis for the motion, and should not
permit counsel to rest on an unparticularized motion, unless, as sometimes happens, the judge
intends to grant the motion based on his or her own analysis.  It is a simple matter to ask
-4-
counsel, “on what ground,” or to ask counsel to explain what necessary element is missing.
I do not suggest that the judge has any legal duty or responsibility to make that inquiry, and,
even when made, it will not necessarily result in all proper grounds being stated, but (1) it
might help in some cases, and (2) it will not leave the record showing only a legally useless
motion.