Title: State of Idaho and Casa v. John Doe Termination of parental rights

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 32732 
 
IN THE INTEREST OF: JANE DOE, A 
CHILD UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF 
AGE.                      
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STATE OF IDAHO, and CASA,                   
                                            
          Petitioners-Respondents,          
                                            
v.                                          
                                            
JOHN DOE,                                   
                                            
          Respondent-Appellant. 
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Boise, May 2007 Term 
 
2007 Opinion No. 96  
 
Filed:  July 2, 2007 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Bonner County.  Honorable Steven C. Verby, District Judge.  Honorable Barbara 
A. Buchanan, Magistrate Judge. 
 
The decision of the district court is vacated and remanded. 
 
Valerie Parr Thornton, Sandpoint, for appellant. 
 
Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Cheri L. Bush, Deputy 
Attorney General, Boise, for respondents. 
 
 
 
SCHROEDER, Chief Justice. 
 
 This is an appeal following the termination of the parental rights of John Doe.   
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
John Doe (“Doe”) and the mother of Baby Doe were roommates with separate friends 
and activities.  The mother discovered she was pregnant in her third trimester.  She insisted that 
John Doe was not the father.  When she had the baby in April 2003, the mother admitted to 
doing methamphetamines and marijuana.  Child Protective Services let her take the child home, 
but two weeks later tests came back positive for marijuana and methamphetamine in the baby’s 
system and the state put the child in foster care.  The mother worked at being drug free for 
several months.  She married John Doe and they were attempting to gain custody of the child 
with Doe as the putative father.  From the notes at this stage, it appears that all efforts were 
focused on reuniting the child with the mother.      
The mother eventually grew weary of being drug free.  She left Doe and gave up her 
parental rights to Baby Doe in January 2004.  At that point the court ordered DNA testing to 
determine whether Doe was the father.  After his paternity was established in February 2004, 
Doe attempted to gain custody on his own.  A case plan was enacted, almost identical to the case 
plan that Doe and the mother had signed, that required Doe to: (1) attend some of the baby’s 
medical appointments; (2) remain drug free and submit to testing two times a week; (3) obtain 
substance abuse evaluation and complete recommended treatment; (4) attend a parenting class 
and counseling; (5) find a job to demonstrate that he could support the child; and (6) find 
adequate housing.  Doe worked toward completing these requirements.  
The court held a termination hearing in September of 2004.  The court terminated Doe’s 
parental rights holding that Doe had abused and neglected his child.  Doe appealed the magistrate 
court’s decision to the district court.  The district court affirmed the magistrate court’s decision 
terminating Doe’s parental rights.  Doe appeals to this Court.  There are a number of issues 
raised.  However, there is one dispositive issue. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing a decision rendered by the district court sitting in its appellate capacity, 
this Court considers the record before the magistrate court independently of the district court’s 
determination, giving due regard to the district court’s analysis.  CASI Found., Inc. v. Doe, 142 
Idaho 397, 399, 128 P.3d 934, 936 (2006).  In an action to terminate parental rights where a trial 
court has noted explicitly and applied a clear and convincing standard, an appellate court will not 
disturb the trial court’s findings unless they are not supported by substantial and competent 
evidence.  Id.  Substantial competent evidence is “evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion.”  State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 343, 345-46, 144 P.3d 597, 599-600 
(2006) (quoting Folks v. Moscow Sch. Dist. No. 281, 129 Idaho 833, 836, 933 P.2d 642, 645 
(1997)).  
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III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT APPLY THE CORRECT LEGAL STANDARD 
 
Generally the Court will not consider on appeal any issues that are not raised by the 
parties.  State, Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Housel, 140 Idaho 96, 100, 90 P.3d 321, 325 (2004).  
At times the Court has made exceptions for certain issues in certain types of cases.  See Roe 
Family Servs. v. Doe, 139 Idaho 930, 934-35, 88 P.3d 749, 753-54 (2004) (a magistrate judge 
failed to apply the correct law to the facts in a termination case); Housel, 140 Idaho at 100, 90 
P.3d at 325 (where magistrate’s modification of a support order raised two issues not addressed 
by the Department the Court gave notice of its concerns and afforded the parties an opportunity 
to respond); Crane Creek Country Club v. City of Boise, 121 Idaho 485, 487, 826 P.2d 446, 448 
(1990) (Bakes, C.J., specially concurring) (an issue not raised in the trial court or on appeal may 
be addressed when plain or fundamental error exists).  Fundamental error, as defined in criminal 
cases, is error which “so profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice and 
deprives the accused of his constitutional right to due process.”  State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 
281, 77 P.3d 956, 970 (2003).  While this is not a criminal case, the magistrate court’s error in 
applying the incorrect standard affects Doe’s fundamental right to raise his own child and 
violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
According to the magistrate court, Idaho Code § 16-1623(i) (redesignated in 2005 as 16-
1629(9)), creates a rebuttable presumption that termination of the parent-child relationship is in a 
child’s best interest where the child has been in the Department’s custody and placed out of the 
home for more than fifteen of the past twenty-two months.  However, that is not an accurate 
characterization of the law.  That statute states:  
There shall be a rebuttable presumption that if a child is placed in the custody of 
the department and was also placed in out of the home care for a period not less 
than fifteen (15) out of the last twenty-two (22) months from the date the child 
entered shelter care, the department shall initiate a petition for termination of 
parental rights.  This presumption may be rebutted by a finding of the court that 
the filing of a petition for termination of parental rights would not be in the best 
interests of the child or reasonable efforts have not been provided to reunite the 
child with his family, or the child is placed permanently with a relative.   
 
I.C. § 16-1629(9).  This merely creates a presumption in favor of the department initiating a 
termination petition when a child has been in the state’s custody and not in the parent’s care for 
fifteen out of twenty-two months.  It does not create a presumption that it is in the best interests 
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of the child to terminate parental rights.  The statute should have had no bearing on the court’s 
decision in this case, but the magistrate court used its interpretation of this section in making its 
findings: “[t]he [magistrate] court begins its analysis with the presumption that termination of 
[Doe]’s parental rights is in [the child]’s best interest.”   
The presumption applied by the magistrate court does not follow the United States 
Supreme Court ruling in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1391-92 
(1982), which held that “[b]efore a State may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of 
parents in their natural child, due process requires that the State support its allegations by at least 
clear and convincing evidence.”  Instead of requiring the Department to prove its case, the 
magistrate’s interpretation of I.C. § 16-1629(9) required that Doe rebut a presumption that 
termination was in the child’s best interest with evidence that termination was not in the best 
interests of the child and reasonable efforts to reunite them had not been made by the 
Department.  According to Santosky, this is a violation of Doe’s due process rights because the 
Department did not have to support its allegations by clear and convincing evidence; instead, the 
magistrate placed the burden on Doe to prove that the allegations were not true.   
The magistrate’s misinterpretation of I.C. § 16-1629(9) also does not follow Idaho’s 
longstanding presumption that a natural parent should have custody of his children.  Roe Family 
Servs. v. Doe, 139 Idaho at 937, 88 P.3d at 756.  The magistrate court’s construction of the 
statute reverses that presumption.  It looked at the facts with the presumption that termination 
was in the child’s best interest.  Rather than having a presumption that raising his child was in 
the child’s best interests, Doe was required to rebut the opposite presumption.  Doe had to prove 
that termination was not in the child’s best interests and that reasonable efforts had not been 
made rather than the state having the burden to prove that the reverse was true.   
 
Application of the incorrect burden infected the trial and does not constitute harmless 
error.  A remand for proceedings applying the correct legal standard is necessary. 
IV.  
CONCLUSION 
 
 The order terminating parental rights is vacated and the case remanded for further 
proceedings. 
   
Justices TROUT, EISMANN, BURDICK and JONES CONCUR. 
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