Title: Blanchard v. Town of Bar Harbor

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2019 ME 168 
Docket: 
BCD-19-12 
Argued: 
October 7, 2019 
Decided: 
December 19, 2019 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
JAMES BLANCHARD et al. 
 
v. 
 
TOWN OF BAR HARBOR 
 
 
MEAD, J. 
[¶1]  James Blanchard and a number of other individuals1 whose 
properties have views overlooking the waters adjacent to the Town of 
Bar Harbor’s Ferry Terminal Property appeal from a judgment of the Business 
and Consumer Docket (Murphy, J.) in favor of the Town on appellants’ 
complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the Town’s Zoning Ordinance 
Amendment is invalid.  Because we conclude that the property owners have 
failed to demonstrate a particularized injury and have commenced this action 
prematurely, we vacate the judgment on standing and ripeness grounds and 
                                         
1  William B. Ruger, Jr., Trustee of the 1999 William B. Ruger, Jr. Revocable Trust; Jonathan Eno 
and Karen Gilfillan; Arnold and Margaret Amstutz; Mark Brady; Douglas Denny-Brown and Andrea 
Denny-Brown; William and Weslie Janeway; Pamela McCullough; James Paterson and Patrice 
McCullough; Lawrence and Susan Stahlberg; William Clendaniel; Harold Clark; Wendy Gamble; 
Oakley and Frances Johnson; and Robert Worrell. 
 
 
2 
remand for dismissal without prejudice.  As such, we do not reach the merits of 
the property owners’ claims that the Amendment is inconsistent with state law 
and that the court erred in deferring to the Department of Environmental 
Protection’s order approving the Amendment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  We draw the following facts from the parties’ stipulated record.  See 
BCN Telecom, Inc. v. State Tax Assessor, 2016 ME 165, ¶ 3, 151 A.3d 497. 
[¶3]  Pursuant to the Bar Harbor Town Charter, the Town Council placed 
a warrant article on a referendum ballot containing the Zoning Amendment 
(Article 12) and a competing measure (Article 13) to be addressed at a Town 
meeting on June 13, 2017.  At that Town meeting, residents voted to pass the 
Zoning Amendment (Article 12) and rejected the competing measure 
(Article 13). 
[¶4]  The Amendment changed the Town’s Land Use Ordinance in three 
ways: (1) it created a new “Shoreland Maritime Activities District” that would 
apply to the Ferry Terminal Property (Tax Map 231, Lot 004), (2) it added 
definitions for “passenger terminal” and “parking deck,” and (3) it amended the 
zoning map by applying the Shoreland Maritime Activities District to the Ferry 
Terminal Property.  See Bar Harbor, Me., Land Use Ordinance §§ 129-49.3, 
 
 
3 
125-109 (June 13, 2017).  The parties agree that the intent underlying the 
Amendment was to allow substantially larger cruise ships to use the 
Ferry Terminal Property. 
 
[¶5]  On July 18, 2017, the Department of Environmental Protection 
(DEP) issued an order approving the Amendment.2  The property owners, who 
own real property in Bar Harbor, Sorrento, and Hancock, subsequently filed a 
complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the Amendment was invalid.  
See 14 M.R.S. § 5954 (2018).  The parties submitted the matter to the Business 
and Consumer Docket on agreed statements of fact.  The BCD entered judgment 
for the Town, concluding that (1) the property owners’ declaratory judgment 
request presented “a genuine controversy ripe for judicial review,” (2) only the 
Bar Harbor property owners had standing to challenge the Amendment, (3) the 
Amendment was in harmony with the Town’s comprehensive plan, (4) the DEP 
order was entitled to “considerable deference,” and (5) the Amendment was 
not inconsistent with DEP regulations. 
 
[¶6]  The property owners raise two arguments on appeal, see 14 M.R.S. 
§ 5959 (2018): (1) the court erred in deferring to the DEP’s order, and (2) the 
                                         
2  Amendments to municipal ordinances are not effective unless they are approved by the DEP.  
See 38 M.R.S. § 438-A(3) (2018). 
 
 
 
4 
Amendment is inconsistent with state statutes and regulations.  We conclude 
that the property owners lack standing to challenge the Town’s amendment of 
its Land Use Ordinance and that their claim is not ripe.  Thus, we do not reach 
their substantive arguments.  We vacate the court’s judgment and remand for 
entry of an order of dismissal without prejudice. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶7]  Our analysis begins by considering the threshold issues of standing 
and ripeness.  Each presents a potential bar to action by us. 
A. 
Standing 
[¶8]  We review standing de novo as a question of law.  JPMorgan Chase 
Bank v. Harp, 2011 ME 5, ¶ 7, 10 A.3d 718.  In the trial court, the Town argued 
that the property owners in towns other than Bar Harbor lacked standing, and 
the court agreed.  The trial court stopped short of denying standing to the 
Bar Harbor landowners, stating that the “Town implicitly concedes that this [is] 
a sufficient injury to confer standing on the four Plaintiffs who own property in 
Bar Harbor under Buck [v. Town of Yarmouth, 402 A.2d 860 (Me. 1979)].”  
Because we may raise the issue of standing sua sponte, Collins v. State, 
2000 ME 85, ¶ 5, 750 A.2d 1257, we are not bound by the court’s conclusion 
 
 
5 
that the Town “implicitly concede[d]” that the Bar Harbor property owners 
have standing. 
[¶9]  Our cases have allowed anticipatory declaratory judgment actions 
brought by “those persons engaged in a business directly affected by a statute.”  
James v. Inhabitants of the Town of W. Bath, 437 A.2d 863, 865 (Me. 1981) 
(emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted); see also Annable v. Bd. of Envtl. 
Prot., 507 A.2d 592, 593, 596 (Me. 1986) (concluding that, although there was 
not yet a “formal invocation of the licensing process . . . [nor] enforcement 
action,” the plaintiff, who had sought and received approval from the Town for 
multiple subdivision plans, was seeking a declaration of his own legal rights to 
build, “which [were] directly affected by [the statute]”). 
[¶10]  Here, the property owners face no similar immediate threat to 
their own property or business interests, nor are their alleged interests 
captured under a different exception allowing anticipatory challenges.  See, e.g., 
James, 437 A.2d at 865 (“[W]hen declaratory relief is available as a procedural 
matter, a person whose activities are regulated with the imposition of criminal 
penalties for failure to comply has standing to challenge such regulation and 
need not undergo a criminal prosecution before being able to seek relief.” 
 
 
6 
(emphasis added) (citing Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 
428 U.S. 52, 62 (1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973))). 
[¶11]  The property owners cite a number of other cases for the 
proposition that we allow challenges to a municipal ordinance even before the 
claimants have suffered harm, but in those cases, plaintiffs alleged a tangible 
and inevitable harm.  In Ace Tire Co. v. Mun. Officers of City of Waterville, the 
plaintiff had paid the challenged annual license fees to the City under protest 
for years.  302 A.2d 90, 94 (Me. 1973).  In Delogu v. City of Portland, the 
property-owning plaintiffs had standing as taxpayers to challenge a municipal 
property tax change.  2004 ME 18, ¶¶ 1, 8, 843 A.2d 33. 
[¶12] 
 
The 
property 
owners 
also 
invoke 
our 
long-held 
preventive-remedial doctrine of standing to argue that their action is 
preventive in nature and thus they do not need to demonstrate a particularized 
injury.3  The preventive-remedial doctrine allows a plaintiff to sue a 
                                         
3  At the outset, we note that standing and ripeness may be inextricably intertwined in this context.  
As we observed in Lehigh v. Pittston Co., tension exists between the preventive-remedial doctrine of 
standing, which encourages anticipatory challenges, and the doctrine of ripeness, “which mandates 
restraint.”  456 A.2d 355, 358 n.11 (Me. 1983).  We have questioned the continuing validity of the 
preventive-remedial doctrine.  See id.  However, we have continued to apply the doctrine in recent 
decisions, see Petrin v. Town of Scarborough, 2016 ME 136, ¶ 20, 147 A.3d 842, and we do not 
reconsider the doctrine’s viability in this opinion; see McCorkle v. Town of Falmouth, 529 A.2d 337, 
338 n.2 (Me. 1987) (“Because we have no difficulty concluding here that the relief sought was 
preventive, we defer to another day acting upon the invitation . . . to reconsider the viability of the 
[doctrine].”). 
 
 
7 
municipality “to seek preventive relief against a threatened public wrong” 
without demonstrating a particularized injury.  Buck, 402 A.2d at 862.  Where 
the relief sought is “remedial” rather than “preventive,” however, the plaintiff 
must demonstrate a particularized injury, in other words, an injury that does 
not affect all members of the town equally.  Id.; see Petrin v. Town of 
Scarborough, 2016 ME 136, ¶¶ 20-21, 147 A.3d 842; Lehigh v. Pittston Co., 
456 A.2d 355, 358 (Me. 1983).  Where a citizen lacks a particularized injury, we 
have concluded that the Attorney General is a proper plaintiff to initiate an 
action against a municipality to remedy a public wrong.  Buck, 402 A.2d at 863 
(“Thus, denial of standing to plaintiffs does not leave the voters of the Town of 
Yarmouth without a remedy for a public wrong suffered by all voters equally, if 
any exists.”). 
[¶13]  Because the property owners are seeking relief for a “wrong” that 
has already occurred, the enactment of the Amendment, we conclude that this 
case fits squarely within the line of cases in which plaintiffs have requested 
remedial relief.  See Lehigh, 456 A.2d at 359 n.12 (collecting case law for actions 
deemed “remedial”); see also Petrin, 2016 ME 136, ¶ 20, 147 A.3d 842 (relief 
from past tax assessments deemed “remedial”).  Because they seek remedial 
relief, the property owners must show that they suffer a particularized injury. 
 
 
8 
[¶14]  The property owners have failed to demonstrate a particularized 
injury.  Based upon the stipulated record, the only potential injury they allege 
is that they “own and use residentially improved properties” in Bar Harbor, 
Hancock, and Sorrento “with direct views over the inner Bar Harbor ocean 
waters adjacent to the Ferry Terminal Property.”  We have applied a “minimal” 
threshold for standing where the challenging party is an abutter.  See Roop v. 
City of Belfast, 2007 ME 32, ¶ 8, 915 A.2d 966.  However, nothing in the 
stipulated record indicates that any of these property owners is an abutter.  
Further, even if the property owners had established themselves as abutters, 
they have not met the minimal standing threshold for abutters upon these facts.  
The stipulated record contains no evidence demonstrating the tangible effect 
on the property owners’ views.  This is perhaps unsurprising because detailing 
a negative effect on a view undoubtedly proves challenging when there is not 
yet a concrete proposal threatening that view.  See infra ¶¶ 19-22. 
[¶15]  In Harrington v. Inhabitants of Town of Kennebunk, we concluded 
that “the potential for obstruction of view is an improper subject for judicial 
notice” as a matter of “evidentiary propriety” because whether a structure will 
obstruct a view “is clearly neither a matter of uncontested common knowledge 
nor capable of certain verification.”  459 A.2d 557, 560 (Me. 1983).  Thus, we 
 
 
9 
indicated that evidence of a blocked view is necessary to demonstrate a 
particularized injury that is based on views.  See id.  Accordingly, because the 
property owners have failed to demonstrate particularized injuries in their 
request for remedial relief, we vacate the judgment issued by the BCD and 
remand for entry of dismissal without prejudice. 
B. 
Ripeness 
 
[¶16]  Although the property owners lack standing to pursue this 
challenge to the changes to the Land Use Ordinance upon this record, we 
address also the issue of ripeness for the benefit of the parties and the court in 
the event that a subsequent challenge to the ordinance is tendered. 
 
[¶17]  We review ripeness de novo as a question of law.  Johnson v. City of 
Augusta, 2006 ME 92, ¶ 7, 902 A.2d 855.  The doctrine of ripeness prevents 
“judicial entanglement in abstract disputes, avoid[s] premature adjudication, 
and protect[s] agencies from judicial interference until a decision with concrete 
effects has been made.”  Id. 
 
[¶18]  The BCD judgment cited Sold, Inc. v. Town of Gorham, which states, 
“The declaratory judgment law does permit anticipatory challenges to a 
regulation or ordinance to resolve a dispute regarding a planned action, before 
the matter actually proceeds and the challenged ordinance is applied to the 
 
 
10 
detriment of the plaintiffs.”  2005 ME 24, ¶ 14, 868 A.2d 172.  The Declaratory 
Judgments Act (DJA) provides,  
Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other 
writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other 
legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, 
contract or franchise may have determined any question of 
construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, 
ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, 
status or other legal relations thereunder. 
 
14 M.R.S. § 5954. 
 
[¶19]  The DJA gives plaintiffs whose rights are affected the right to bring 
declaratory action.  Here, the property owners’ “rights, status or other legal 
relations” are not yet affected.  As we have noted above, although the Land Use 
Ordinance has been modified, and the parties agree that the changes were 
intended to improve the ferry terminal to accommodate cruise ships, there is 
no currently planned action for construction or development in the 
Ferry Terminal Property. 
 
[¶20]  In our case of first impression examining the DJA, we observed that 
the purpose of the DJA is “not to enlarge the jurisdiction of the courts . . . but to 
provide a more adequate and flexible remedy in cases where jurisdiction 
already exists.”  Me. Broad. Co. v. E. Tr. & Banking Co., 142 Me. 220, 223, 
49 A.2d 224 (1946).  Since then, we have maintained that the DJA “may be 
 
 
11 
invoked only where there is a genuine controversy.”  Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Garcia, 1998 ME 38, ¶ 4, 707 A.2d 384.  “A genuine controversy exists if a 
case is ripe for judicial consideration and action.”  Id.  Ripeness is a two-prong 
analysis: (1) the issues must be fit for judicial review, and (2) hardship to the 
parties will result if the court withholds review.  Id.  We conclude that the 
property owners’ claim is not ripe. 
[¶21]  The property owners fail each ripeness prong.  First, in order to be 
fit for review, the controversy must pose a “concrete, certain, or immediate 
legal problem.”  Johnson v. Crane, 2017 ME 113, ¶ 10, 163 A.3d 832 (quotation 
marks omitted).  Here, all that has taken place is the passage of the Amendment.  
The record is devoid of any suggestion that the Town has addressed or 
approved any application for a permit for construction or development at the 
Ferry Terminal Property.  Any challenge that the property owners make at this 
point is necessarily speculative as to the extent of development, improvement, 
or construction that might occur, and thus the sort of injury they might suffer.  
The mere fact that the Amendment allows accessory uses—subject to review 
by the Town permitting authority—in the new Shoreland Maritime Activities 
District, including a bank, farmers’ market, hotel, multifamily dwelling, or 
restaurant, among other possibilities, does not ripen appellants’ challenge 
 
 
12 
against any conjectural future development.  See Bar Harbor, Me., 
Land Use Ordinance § 125-49.3(C)(2). 
 
[¶22]  Second, like the fitness prong, the hardship prong “requires 
adverse effects on the plaintiff, . . . and speculative hardships do not suffice to 
meet [the] requirement.”  Johnson v. City of Augusta, 2006 ME 92, ¶ 8, 
902 A.2d 855 (citations omitted); see Clark v. Hancock Cty. Comm’rs, 
2014 ME 33, ¶ 20, 87 A.3d 712.  Because no building or development permits 
have been sought, the property owners’ injury is purely speculative at this 
point.  In simple terms, the property owners’ situation before and after our 
review would remain the same, thus rendering this challenge to the ordinance 
not ripe for judicial review.4 
The entry is: 
Judgment vacated.  Remanded for the entry of 
judgment of dismissal without prejudice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
4  During oral argument, the Town agreed that the property owners, if they are able to demonstrate 
appropriate standing, would have the ability to challenge the enactment of the Land Use Ordinance 
in later proceedings relating to applications for permits for construction or development on the 
Ferry Terminal Property. 
 
 
13 
William H. Dale, Esq. (orally), Mark A. Bower, Esq., and Benjamin T. McCall, Esq., 
Jensen Baird Gardner & Henry, Portland, for appellants James Blanchard et al.  
 
Edmond J. Bearor, Esq., Joshua A. Randlett, Esq., and Jonathan P. Hunter, Esq. 
(orally), Rudman Winchell, Bangor, for appellee Town of Bar Harbor 
 
 
Business and Consumer Docket docket number CV-2017-52 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY