Title: Piazza v. Cuyahoga County

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Piazza v. Cuyahoga Cty., Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-2499.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2019-OHIO-2499 
PIAZZA, APPELLEE, v. CUYAHOGA COUNTY, APPELLANT, ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Piazza v. Cuyahoga Cty., Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-2499.] 
Political-subdivision tort liability—R.C. 2744.09(B)’s exception to immunity for 
civil actions by an employee “relative to any matter that arises out of the 
employment relationship between the employee and the political 
subdivision”—R.C. 2744.09(B) does not require that the alleged tortious 
conduct underlying a claim against a political subdivision have occurred 
during the plaintiff’s employment by the political subdivision—Plaintiff’s 
claim for false-light invasion of privacy is relative to a matter that arose out 
of her employment relationship with county—Court of appeals’ judgment 
affirming trial court’s rejection of county’s assertion of immunity affirmed. 
(No. 2017-1649—Submitted March 5, 2019—Decided June 26, 2019.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 104724,  
2017-Ohio-8163. 
_____________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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FRENCH, J. 
{¶ 1} This appeal asks us to clarify the meaning of R.C. 2744.09(B), which 
provides that the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, R.C. Chapter 2744, does 
not apply to “[c]ivil actions by an employee * * * against his political subdivision 
relative to any matter that arises out of the employment relationship between the 
employee and the political subdivision.” 
{¶ 2} Appellee, Marcella King Piazza, sued her former employer, appellant, 
Cuyahoga County, for false-light invasion of privacy based on a statement allegedly 
made by Cuyahoga County Executive Ed FitzGerald regarding the termination of 
Piazza’s employment.  Both the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas and the 
Eighth District Court of Appeals applied R.C. 2744.09(B) to reject the county’s 
assertion of political-subdivision immunity.  We affirm. 
Facts and procedural background 
{¶ 3} In 2003, Piazza began working as an office manager for the Cuyahoga 
County Board of Revision (“BOR”).  She continued to work there until August 
2010, when the county transferred her from the BOR to the Department of Justice 
Affairs.  In June 2010, about two months before Piazza’s transfer, the Plain Dealer 
Publishing Company (“Plain Dealer”) began to publish a series of articles reporting 
on an ongoing investigation into the BOR and its employees and board members.  
In December 2010, the Plain Dealer described its investigation as having 
“unearthed rampant mismanagement, deplorable work habits, questionable tax 
breaks, favors for the connected and violations of state law.” 
{¶ 4} On March 9, 2011, the county terminated Piazza’s employment as 
well as the employment of two other county employees who had previously worked 
at the BOR.  In a press release, County Executive FitzGerald stated, “Today three 
people have been terminated from employment with Cuyahoga County due to the 
reorganization of the Cuyahoga County Board[] of Revision.”  Within 90 minutes 
January Tern, 2019 
 
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of being informed of her termination, Piazza received a telephone call from a Plain 
Dealer reporter seeking comment on her discharge.  Piazza refused to comment. 
{¶ 5} About 30 minutes later, the Plain Dealer published an article on 
www.cleveland.com with the headline, “Cuyahoga County Executive Ed 
FitzGerald fires three employees tied to board[] of revision scandal.”  The article 
began, “Three more Cuyahoga County employees have lost their jobs because of 
the extensive dysfunction and mismanagement uncovered last year at the board[] 
of revision.”  Despite noting that Piazza and the other two terminated employees 
had been reassigned in August 2010 to other county departments “after The Plain 
Dealer reported about poor work habits of board employees,” the article quoted a 
FitzGerald spokesperson as stating that the terminations were “due to our 
reorganization of the board of revision.” 
{¶ 6} Later that day, the Plain Dealer published a second article with the 
headline, “Cuyahoga County Executive Ed FitzGerald says he couldn’t justify 
keeping reassigned board[] of revision workers in new positions.”  The second 
article quoted FitzGerald as stating, “Instead of terminating [Piazza and the other 
two former BOR employees], the previous administration reassigned them.  * * * 
We can’t afford to reshuffle people for their own job security.”  The second article 
included a photograph of Piazza that the county had supplied. 
{¶ 7} Piazza initially filed a complaint for false-light invasion of privacy 
against the county and the Plain Dealer in October 2013 (“Piazza I”), but she later 
voluntarily dismissed that complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(1).  She filed this 
action against the county and the Plain Dealer in August 2015.  Piazza bases her 
false-light claim against the county on the quoted statement from FitzGerald, and 
she alleges that the statement created a false inference that she was involved in the 
BOR corruption scandal.  Piazza alleges that the statement was made with a 
reckless disregard for its truth or falsity.  She also alleges that as a result of conduct 
by the county and the Plain Dealer, she suffered severe emotional distress, public 
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humiliation, and damage to her personal and professional reputation.  Here, we are 
concerned only with Piazza’s claim against the county. 
{¶ 8} The county moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was 
immune from liability pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(A) and that Piazza’s claim was 
time-barred.  The trial court denied the county’s motion for summary judgment in 
a two-sentence journal entry, holding that “[g]enuine issues of material fact exist 
and [Piazza’s] false light claim is not time-barred, nor does political subdivision 
immunity apply to [Piazza’s] claim arising from her employment relationship with” 
the county. 
{¶ 9} The county filed an interlocutory appeal from the denial of its motion 
for summary judgment.  The Eighth District addressed only the question of 
immunity, and in a two-to-one decision, it affirmed the trial court’s rejection of the 
county’s assertion of immunity, holding that Piazza’s claim “arose out of her 
employment relationship with the county, and the county is not immune from 
liability pursuant to the express exception in R.C. 2744.09(B).”  2017-Ohio-8163, 
98 N.E.3d 1263, ¶ 23. 
{¶ 10} This court accepted the county’s discretionary appeal.  152 Ohio 
St.3d 1442, 2018-Ohio-1600, 96 N.E.3d 298.  The county maintains that R.C. 
2744.09(B) is unambiguous, is in derogation of common-law immunity, and must 
be strictly construed in favor of immunity.  The county essentially asks this court 
to hold that R.C. 2744.09(B) does not apply when a former employee of a political 
subdivision brings an intentional-tort claim that accrued when she was no longer 
employed by the political subdivision.  In particular, the county argues that a former 
employee is not an “employee” under R.C. 2744.09(B) and that such a claim does 
not “arise[] out of the employment relationship.” 
Analysis 
{¶ 11} R.C. Chapter 2744, the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, 
establishes a comprehensive statutory scheme for the tort liability of political 
January Tern, 2019 
 
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subdivisions and their employees.  The act initially sets out a broad, general rule 
that a political subdivision is not liable in damages in civil actions for injury, death 
or loss to person or property caused by an act or omission in connection with a 
governmental or proprietary function.  R.C. 2744.02(A)(1).  The act, however, goes 
on to provide several exceptions to immunity, R.C. 2744.02(B), as well as defenses 
to those exceptions, R.C. 2744.03. 
{¶ 12} R.C. 2744.09 identifies certain scenarios in which R.C. Chapter 
2744 does not apply.  As relevant here, R.C. 2744.09(B) provides that Chapter 2744 
“does not apply to, and shall not be construed to apply to * * * [c]ivil actions by an 
employee * * * against his political subdivision relative to any matter that arises 
out of the employment relationship between the employee and the political 
subdivision.”  R.C. 2744.09(B) “is designed to protect employees by allowing them 
to recover against their employers, who would otherwise be entitled to immunity 
under R.C. Chapter 2744.”  Sampson v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., 131 Ohio 
St.3d 418, 2012-Ohio-570, 966 N.E.2d 247, ¶ 13. 
{¶ 13} The county asserted in its motion for summary judgment that it is 
immune from Piazza’s claim pursuant to the general grant of immunity in R.C. 
2744.02(A)(1) because R.C. 2744.02(B) does not provide any exceptions to 
immunity for intentional torts.  In response, Piazza did not dispute that the county 
is a political subdivision nor did she argue that any exception to immunity in R.C. 
2744.02(B) applies here.  Piazza primarily argued that issue preclusion barred the 
county’s immunity argument, but she also quoted Sampson for the proposition that 
“[w]hen an employee of a political subdivision brings a civil action against the 
political subdivision alleging an intentional tort, that civil action may qualify as a 
‘matter that arises out of the employment relationship’ within the meaning of R.C. 
2744.09(B),” id. at paragraph one of the syllabus, quoting R.C. 2744.09(B).  Piazza 
noted that she had previously opposed the county’s motion for judgment on the 
pleadings in Piazza I by arguing that the intentional nature of the tort she alleges 
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does not “erase[]” “the employment relationship between [Piazza] and the County” 
or preclude a finding that the alleged tort arose out of the employment relationship. 
{¶ 14} Both the trial court and the Eighth District applied R.C. 2744.09(B) 
to reject the county’s assertion of immunity.  Because the order on appeal is a denial 
of a motion for summary judgment, we review the matter de novo, governed by the 
standards in Civ.R. 56.  Vacha v. N. Ridgeville, 136 Ohio St.3d 199, 2013-Ohio-
3020, 992 N.E.2d 1126, ¶ 19, citing Comer v. Risko, 106 Ohio St.3d 185, 2005-
Ohio-4559, 833 N.E.2d 712, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 15} This appeal presents a legal question—whether R.C. 2744.09(B) 
requires an ongoing employment relationship between the plaintiff and the 
political-subdivision employer, either at the time the plaintiff’s claim accrued or at 
the time the plaintiff filed her complaint—and a factual question—whether Piazza’s 
false-light claim is relative to a matter that arises out of her employment 
relationship with the county.  We address the legal question first. 
R.C. 2744.09(B) does not require an ongoing employment relationship 
between the plaintiff and the political-subdivision employer 
{¶ 16} A dispute over the meaning of a statute presents a question of law 
that we consider de novo.  Progressive Plastics, Inc. v. Testa, 133 Ohio St.3d 490, 
2012-Ohio-4759, 979 N.E.2d 280, ¶ 15.  Our primary goal in statutory 
interpretation is to give effect to the legislature’s intent.  Christe v. GMS Mgt. Co., 
Inc., 88 Ohio St.3d 376, 377, 726 N.E.2d 497 (2000).  To do so, we look to and 
give effect to the statutory language without deleting or inserting words.  Bailey v. 
Republic Engineered Steels, Inc., 91 Ohio St.3d 38, 39-40, 741 N.E.2d 121 (2001), 
citing Provident Bank v. Wood, 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 105, 304 N.E.2d 378 (1973), 
and Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Cleveland, 37 Ohio St.3d 50, 524 N.E.2d 441 
(1988), paragraph three of the syllabus. 
January Tern, 2019 
 
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{¶ 17} The county argues that for R.C. 2744.09(B) to apply to her claim, 
Piazza needed to be a current county employee, both when her claim accrued and 
when she filed her complaint. 
{¶ 18} The Eighth District rejected the county’s argument that because the 
alleged tortious conduct—the statement by FitzGerald—occurred after the county 
terminated Piazza’s employment, her claim does not arise out of her employment 
relationship with the county.  2017-Ohio-8163, 98 N.E.3d 1263, at ¶ 17-19.  In 
doing so, it relied on Fleming v. Ashtabula Area City School Bd. of Edn., 11th Dist. 
Ashtabula No. 2006-A-0030, 2008-Ohio-1892.  Fleming was a substitute teacher 
employed by a school board of education that chose not to renew his contract.  
Following a school-board meeting at which the board discussed its decision not to 
renew Fleming’s contract, the school-district superintendent made allegedly 
defamatory statements about Fleming during a radio interview.  Fleming thereafter 
filed an action, including a defamation claim, against the school board. 
{¶ 19} The Eleventh District applied R.C. 2744.09(B) and affirmed the trial 
court’s rejection of the school board’s assertion of immunity.  Like the county here, 
the school board in Fleming argued that R.C. 2744.09(B) did not apply, because 
the plaintiff was not an employee at the time the alleged torts occurred.  The 
Eleventh District rejected that argument.  It stated: 
 
The language of the statute expressly connects the terms 
“employee” and “arises out of the employment relationship.”  
Obviously, therefore, the statute only applies to former employees 
if the alleged tortious conduct arises out of the employment 
relationship.  Appellants [the school board and superintendent] are 
requesting an interpretation that affords an exception to the 
immunity only if the conduct occurred while the employee was 
technically employed.  If the legislature intended the statute to be as 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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narrow as appellants suggest, it would have been quite simple to 
limit the application of the statute by stating just that.  However, it 
seems clear that “relative to any matter that arises out of the 
employment relationship” is intended to encompass much more than 
appellants propose. 
 
(Emphasis sic.)  Id. at ¶ 34. 
{¶ 20} When the General Assembly intends to require that conduct or 
injuries have occurred during ongoing employment, it does so expressly.  For 
example, with respect to employer intentional torts, R.C. 2745.01(A) refers to 
claims “for damages resulting from an intentional tort committed by the employer 
during the course of employment.”  (Emphasis added.)  Similarly, R.C. 4113.52(A), 
which requires an employee to report certain violations of law by an employer, 
applies only if the employee became aware of the violation “in the course of the 
employee’s employment.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 21} In the context of workers’ compensation, a compensable injury must 
have occurred “in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s 
employment.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 4123.01(C).  In distinguishing those 
concepts, we have held that “in the course of” relates to “the time, place, and 
circumstances of the injury”—so as to limit “benefits to employees who sustain 
injuries while engaged in a required employment duty or activity consistent with 
their contract for hire and logically related to the employer’s business.”  Friebel v. 
Visiting Nurse Assn. of Mid-Ohio, 142 Ohio St.3d 425, 2014-Ohio-4531, 32 N.E.3d 
413, ¶ 13.  On the other hand, “arising out of” focuses on the causal connection 
between the employment and the injury.  Id. at ¶ 14. 
{¶ 22} The General Assembly did not use “in the course of” or “during the 
course of” language in R.C. 2744.09(B).  Instead, it broadly removed from the 
purview of R.C. Chapter 2744 civil actions “relative to any matter that arises out of 
January Tern, 2019 
 
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the employment relationship.”  Id.  A claim “ ‘arises out of the employment 
relationship’ ” between an employee and a political-subdivision employer “ ‘if there 
is a causal connection or a causal relationship between the claims raised by the 
employee and the employment relationship.’ ”  Vacha, 136 Ohio St.3d 199, 2013-
Ohio-3020, 992 N.E.2d 1126, at ¶ 17, quoting Sampson, 131 Ohio St.3d 418, 2012-
Ohio-570, 966 N.E.2d 247, at paragraph two of the syllabus.  The test under R.C. 
2744.09(B) is one of causal connection, not of timing. 
{¶ 23} The county relies on the General Assembly’s use of the present-tense 
“arises” in R.C. 2744.09(B) to argue that the General Assembly intended to require 
an ongoing employment relationship at the time a claim accrued, but the use of the 
present tense there does not demonstrate that intention.  Rather, because the phrase 
“arises out of” refers to the existence of a causal connection, the phrase, read in the 
context of the entire statute, requires only that there have been a causal connection 
between the claim and the employment relationship, whether or not the 
employment relationship was continuing or had terminated.  We conclude that R.C. 
2744.09(B) does not require that the alleged tortious conduct underlying a claim 
against a political subdivision have occurred during the plaintiff’s employment by 
the political subdivision. 
{¶ 24} The county argues that its contrary reading of R.C. 2744.09(B) and 
its belief that the statute is inapplicable here are consistent with Sampson and 
Vacha, because the torts in those cases occurred while the plaintiffs were still 
employed.  We disagree.  In Sampson, we simply rejected the employer’s attempt 
to import from workers’ compensation law the fiction that an intentional tort, by 
definition, is outside the scope of employment.  Sampson at ¶ 12-14.  We held that 
a civil action against a political subdivision alleging an intentional tort “may qualify 
as a ‘matter that arises out of the employment relationship’ within the meaning of 
R.C. 2744.09(B).”  Id. at ¶ 17.  Vacha followed Sampson and reiterated that whether 
R.C. 2744.09(B) applies depends on whether, based on the particular evidence 
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presented in the case, there is a causal connection between the claim and the 
employment relationship.  Vacha at ¶ 19.  Neither Sampson nor Vacha dictates the 
result in this case. 
{¶ 25} Before turning to the question whether Piazza’s claims, in fact, arose 
out of the employment relationship between Piazza and the county, we briefly 
address—and reject—the county’s argument that the plaintiff must have been an 
employee at the time she filed a lawsuit against a political-subdivision employer in 
order for R.C. 2744.09(B) to apply. 
{¶ 26} The county argues that because R.C. 2744.09 applies to “civil 
actions by an employee,” the statute unambiguously requires that the plaintiff have 
been an “employee” when she filed her complaint.  As used in R.C. Chapter 2744, 
“ ‘[e]mployee’ means an officer, agent, employee, or servant, whether or not 
compensated or full-time or part-time, who is authorized to act and is acting within 
the scope of the officer’s, agent’s, employee’s, or servant’s employment for a 
political subdivision.”  R.C. 2744.01(B).  In light of that definition, the county’s 
reading of R.C. 2744.09(B) is plausible.  But so is Piazza’s reading: that the 
statutory language does not put conditions on when an action was filed, so long as 
the claim arises from the employment relationship.  Reading R.C. 2744.09(B) in its 
entirety, we agree with the Eleventh District that based on the statute’s failure to 
“specifically address at what point the employee must have been employed by the 
political subdivision,” the statute is ambiguous.  Fleming, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 
2006-A-0030, 2008-Ohio-1892, at ¶ 30. 
{¶ 27} We reject the county’s argument that we must interpret any 
ambiguity in R.C. 2744.09(B) in favor of political-subdivision immunity.  The 
county argues that because the exceptions to immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B) are in 
derogation of the general grant of immunity in R.C. 2744.02(A), courts must 
construe the exceptions narrowly to maintain the policy balance the General 
Assembly established.  See, e.g., Doe v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 137 
January Tern, 2019 
 
11 
Ohio App.3d 166, 169, 738 N.E.2d 390 (2d Dist.1999); Harp v. Cleveland Hts., 87 
Ohio St.3d 506, 514-515, 721 N.E.2d 1020 (2000) (Cook, J., dissenting), citing 
Wall v. Cincinnati, 150 Ohio St. 411, 83 N.E.2d 389 (1948).  R.C. 2744.09(B), 
however, differs from R.C. 2744.02(B).  R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) states that political 
subdivisions are immune from liability “[e]xcept as provided in [R.C. 
2744.02](B).”  It does not refer to R.C. 2744.09, which states that R.C. Chapter 
2744—including the general grant of immunity in R.C. 2744.02(A)(1)—shall not 
be construed as applying to the situations listed in R.C. 2744.09.  In those situations, 
therefore, we do not start with an assumption of immunity, and the policy 
justification for construing an exception in favor of immunity is absent. 
{¶ 28} Neither this court nor, as far as we can discern, any Ohio appellate 
court has ever adopted the county’s position that R.C. 2744.09(B) applies only if 
the plaintiff was still an employee of the political subdivision when she filed her 
complaint.  To the contrary, in the nearly 34 years since the enactment of R.C. 
2744.09(B), Ohio courts—including this court—have repeatedly applied the statute 
in cases filed after the plaintiff’s employment by a political subdivision had ended.  
See Vacha v. N. Ridgeville, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 10CA009750, 2011-Ohio-2446,  
¶ 20-24 (although plaintiff was granted permanent-total-disability benefits prior to 
filing complaint, R.C. 2744.09(B) precluded immunity so long as there was a causal 
connection between Vacha’s claims and her employment relationship with the 
city), aff’d, 136 Ohio St.3d 199, 2013-Ohio-3020, 992 N.E.2d 1126; George v. 
Newburgh Hts., 2012-Ohio-2065, 970 N.E.2d 1138 (8th Dist.); Steinbrink v. 
Greenon Local School Dist., 2d Dist. Clark No. 11CA0050, 2012-Ohio-1438; Long 
v. Hanging Rock, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 09CA30, 2011-Ohio-5137; Fleming, 11th 
Dist. Ashtabula No. 2006-A-0030, 2008-Ohio-1892, ¶ 31; Gessner v. Union, 159 
Ohio App.3d 43, 2004-Ohio-5770, 823 N.E.2d 1 (2d Dist.). 
{¶ 29} The General Assembly has instructed courts to presume that in 
enacting R.C. 2744.09(B), it intended a “just and reasonable result.”  R.C. 1.47(C).  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Reading the word “employee” in R.C. 2744.09(B) as requiring an ongoing 
employment relationship at the time a plaintiff files an employment-related claim 
against her political-subdivision employer would give rise to an unreasonable 
result.  As the Eleventh District has astutely noted, such a reading “would 
encourage employers to terminate employees to avoid potential liability when an 
incident has occurred.”  Fleming at ¶ 31.  It is unreasonable to presume that the 
General Assembly intended to incentivize an employer to terminate an employee 
who may have an employment-related claim to preserve its entitlement to political-
subdivision immunity. 
{¶ 30} We reject the dissenting opinion’s assertion that we are interfering 
with the General Assembly’s constitutional authority to make policy for the state.  
Indeed, it is undisputed that it is not this court’s role to second-guess the General 
Assembly’s policy choices.  Ohio Neighborhood Fin., Inc. v. Scott, 139 Ohio St.3d 
536, 2014-Ohio-2440, 13 N.E.3d 1115, ¶ 38, citing Kaminski v. Metal & Wire 
Prods. Co., 125 Ohio St.3d 250, 2010-Ohio-1027, 927 N.E.2d 1066, ¶ 61.  But it is 
our constitutional role “to interpret the law that the General Assembly enacts,” with 
the “primary goal * * * to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.”  
State v. Taylor, 138 Ohio St.3d 194, 2014-Ohio-460, 5 N.E.3d 612, ¶ 14.  And in 
light of the General Assembly’s stated intention to achieve a “just and reasonable” 
result when enacting a statute, R.C. 1.47(C), we have recognized that “ ‘statutes 
will be construed to avoid unreasonable or absurd consequences.’ ”  State v. White, 
142 Ohio St.3d 277, 2015-Ohio-492, 29 N.E.3d 939, ¶ 29, quoting State v. Wells, 
91 Ohio St.3d 32, 34, 740 N.E.2d 1097 (2001). 
{¶ 31} In accord with the prior decisions cited above and to avoid the 
unreasonable results that would arise from a contrary ruling, we hold that R.C. 
2744.09(B) does not require that a plaintiff have been employed by the political-
subdivision employer at the time she filed her lawsuit. 
January Tern, 2019 
 
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Piazza’s false-light claim is “relative to [a] matter that arises out of the 
employment relationship” 
{¶ 32} We now turn from the legal question regarding the meaning of R.C. 
2744.09(B) to the factual question whether Piazza’s false-light claim is “relative to 
any matter that arises out of the employment relationship” between Piazza and the 
county.  In answering that question, we must consider whether there is a causal 
connection between Piazza’s claim and her employment relationship with the 
county.  Sampson, 131 Ohio St.3d 418, 2012-Ohio-570, 966 N.E.2d 247, at 
paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 33} As part of its de novo review of the trial court’s rejection of the 
county’s assertion of immunity, the court of appeals held that Piazza’s claim arose 
out her employment relationship with the county.  2017-Ohio-8163, 98 N.E.3d 
1263, at ¶ 11, 23.  We likewise apply a de novo standard of review.  Sampson at  
¶ 19.  And in doing so, we agree with the Eighth District’s conclusion that there is 
no genuine issue of material fact and that Piazza’s claim is relative to a matter that 
arose out of her employment relationship with the county. 
{¶ 34} As we consider whether there is a causal connection between 
Piazza’s claim and her employment relationship with the county, we are not judging 
the merits of Piazza’s claim; that question is not before us.  We therefore do not 
consider the county’s arguments that Piazza’s claim does not satisfy the required 
elements of a false-light claim or that the defense of truth will bar the county’s 
liability.  Instead, we consider only whether there is a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding a causal connection between Piazza’s claim and her employment 
relationship with the county.  Whether Piazza can succeed on the merits of her claim 
is a question for the trial court. 
{¶ 35} The statement forming the basis of Piazza’s claim against the county 
concerns, and was made at about the same time as, the county’s termination of her 
employment.  According to Piazza, the quoted statement falsely connected her and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14 
her termination with the BOR corruption scandal.  Termination of employment is a 
matter that arises out of the employment relationship.  Gessner, 159 Ohio App.3d 
43, 2004-Ohio-5770, 823 N.E.2d 1, at ¶ 31.  In Schmitt v. Cuyahoga Cty. 
Educational Serv. Ctr., the Eighth District held that because the plaintiff’s claims, 
including claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, “stem 
from the termination of her employment, it is apparent there is a causal connection 
between her claims and her employment relationship” with her former employers.  
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97623, 2012-Ohio-2210, ¶ 14. 
{¶ 36} Unlike the plaintiff in Schmitt, Piazza has not alleged that the 
termination of her employment was itself tortious.  But the statement allegedly 
made by FitzGerald is “relative to” her termination, which is a “matter that arises 
out of the employment relationship.”  R.C. 2744.09(B).  As the Eighth District 
stated in this case, “the only relationship between Piazza and the county executive 
was that of employment.”  2017-Ohio-8163, 98 N.E.3d 1263, at ¶ 22.  The 
statement attributed to FitzGerald was directly related to Piazza’s performance, her 
employment with the county, and the county’s termination of her employment.  
Neither Piazza’s termination nor FitzGerald’s statement explaining why she was 
terminated could have occurred absent an employment relationship between Piazza 
and the county.  Examining the factual basis of Piazza’s claim, we agree with the 
Eighth District that Piazza’s claim is relative to a matter that arises out of her 
employment relationship with the county. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 37} We hold that there is no temporal limitation in R.C. 2744.09(B) that 
requires an ongoing employment relationship, either at the time a plaintiff’s claim 
against a political-subdivision employer accrued or at the time the plaintiff filed the 
claim against her political-subdivision employer.  There must, however, be a causal 
connection between the claim and the plaintiff’s employment relationship, whether 
ongoing or terminated, with the political-subdivision employer.  For these reasons, 
January Tern, 2019 
 
15 
we affirm the Eighth District’s judgment affirming the trial court’s rejection of the 
county’s assertion of immunity. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and DONNELLY and FROELICH, JJ., concur. 
FISCHER, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by KENNEDY and DEWINE, JJ. 
JEFFREY E. FROELICH, J., of the Second Appellate District, sitting for 
STEWART, J. 
_________________ 
FISCHER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 38} The majority determines that R.C. 2744.09(B) is ambiguous and 
holds that the statute does not require a plaintiff to have been employed by the 
political-subdivision employer at the time the plaintiff filed the lawsuit.  Because I 
would conclude that the statute is unambiguous and thus requires a plaintiff to be 
an employee of the political subdivision at the time of filing the lawsuit, I 
respectfully dissent. 
A former employee of a political subdivision is not an “employee” for 
purposes of R.C. 2744.09(B) 
{¶ 39} The propositions of law we accepted for review in this case address 
the meaning of R.C. 2744.09(B), which provides: 
 
This chapter does not apply to, and shall not be construed to 
apply to, the following: 
* * * 
(B) Civil actions by an employee * * * against his political 
subdivision relative to any matter that arises out of the employment 
relationship between the employee and the political subdivision. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
(Emphasis added.)  The issue that we must resolve first is whether appellee, 
Marcella King Piazza, a former employee of Cuyahoga County at the time she filed 
the lawsuit in this case, is an “employee” for purposes of R.C. 2744.09(B). 
{¶ 40} We determine the General Assembly’s intent first by examining the 
language of the statute.  Stewart v. Vivian, 151 Ohio St.3d 574, 2017-Ohio-7526, 
91 N.E.3d 716, ¶ 24.  “When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous 
and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no need for this court to apply 
the rules of statutory interpretation.”  Symmes Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Smyth, 87 
Ohio St.3d 549, 553, 721 N.E.2d 1057 (2000). 
{¶ 41} In reviewing the language of the statute, “we may not restrict, 
constrict, qualify, narrow, enlarge, or abridge the General Assembly’s wording.”  
State ex rel. Carna v. Teays Valley Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 131 Ohio St.3d 
478, 2012-Ohio-1484, 967 N.E.2d 193, ¶ 18.  “Instead, we must accord significance 
and effect to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute, and abstain from 
inserting words where words were not placed by the General Assembly.”  (Citation 
omitted and emphasis added.)  Id.  When the General Assembly has defined the 
terms used within the statute, like “employee” in this case, those definitions control 
when applying the statute.  Terteling Bros. v. Glander, 151 Ohio St. 236, 85 N.E.2d 
379 (1949), paragraph one of the syllabus; Vivian at ¶ 25; Stewart v. Trumbull Cty. 
Bd. of Elections, 34 Ohio St.2d 129, 130-131, 296 N.E.2d 676 (1973). 
{¶ 42} The majority determines that R.C. 2744.09(B) is ambiguous because 
the statute does not specify at what point the plaintiff must have been employed by 
the political subdivision.  Reading R.C. 2744.09(B) in a vacuum may support that 
conclusion, but reviewing the statute in light of the General Assembly’s definition 
of “employee” in R.C. 2744.01(B) compels the opposite conclusion—R.C. 
2744.09(B) is unambiguous and applies only if the plaintiff was an employee of the 
political subdivision at the time the plaintiff filed the lawsuit. 
January Tern, 2019 
 
17 
{¶ 43} The General Assembly has specifically defined the term “employee” 
in R.C. 2744.01(B).  Thus, that definition is implicit in, and controls in the 
application of, R.C. 2744.09(B).  Terteling Bros. at paragraph one of the syllabus.  
As used in Chapter R.C. 2744, “ ‘[e]mployee’ means an officer, agent, employee, 
or servant, whether or not compensated or full-time or part-time, who is authorized 
to act and is acting within the scope of the officer’s, agent’s, employee’s, or 
servant’s employment for a political subdivision.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 
2744.01(B).  The General Assembly has defined “employee” as an individual who 
has existing authority to act and who is acting (present tense) within the scope of 
his or her employment—thus someone who is currently employed by the political 
subdivision.  Therefore, when reading R.C. 2744.09(B) (“Civil actions by an 
employee * * *”) with the applicable definition of “employee,” it is clear that the 
plaintiff must be an employee—i.e., a current employee—of the political 
subdivision when the lawsuit is filed for R.C. 2744.09(B) to apply. 
{¶ 44} The majority, in holding that R.C. 2744.09(B) does not require an 
ongoing employment relationship between the plaintiff and the political 
subdivision, in effect, ignores the General Assembly’s definition of “employee” 
and tacitly inserts language, into either R.C. 2744.01(B) or R.C. 2744.09(B), to 
permit a former employee to proceed with his or her civil action against a political 
subdivision under R.C. 2744.09(B).  Neither the definition of “employee” provided 
in R.C. 2744.01(B) nor the language of R.C. 2744.09(B), however, refers to “past,” 
“former,” “resigned,” or “fired” employees.  If the General Assembly had intended 
to allow political subdivisions to be sued by former employees, the General 
Assembly could have written “by a current or past employee” into R.C. 2744.09(B) 
or provided a broader definition of “employee” in R.C. 2744.01(B).  It did not.  This 
court has repeatedly instructed that statutes passed by the General Assembly, if 
clear in their wording, shall not be construed in a manner contrary to the words used 
and that a court shall not add words to, or delete words from, an unambiguous 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
statute.  See, e.g., Carna, 131 Ohio St.3d 478, 2012-Ohio-1484, 967 N.E.2d 193, at 
¶ 18.  The majority has strayed from those directives. 
{¶ 45} I would hold that R.C. 2744.09(B) is unambiguous and conclude, 
based on the definition of “employee” provided in R.C. 2744.01(B), that a plaintiff 
must be an employee of the political subdivision at the time of filing the lawsuit for 
R.C. 2744.09(B) to apply. 
This court’s decision in Vacha and other appellate courts’ decisions do not 
preclude us from applying the plain language of R.C. 2744.09(B) 
{¶ 46} The majority supports its holding by noting that neither this court 
nor any other Ohio appellate court has adopted the position that R.C. 2744.09(B) 
applies only if the plaintiff is still an employee of the political subdivision at the 
time the plaintiff files the complaint.  The majority notes that courts have 
“repeatedly applied the statute in cases filed after the plaintiff’s employment by a 
political subdivision had ended.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 28. 
{¶ 47} It is true that no appellate court in Ohio has adopted the position that 
R.C. 2744.09(B) applies only if the plaintiff is still an employee of the political 
subdivision at the time the plaintiff files the complaint.  The majority, however, 
fails to acknowledge that in this court and in all but one of the courts of appeals, no 
case has ever squarely presented the issue whether a former employee of the 
political subdivision is an “employee” for purposes of R.C. 2744.09(B). 
{¶ 48} In Vacha v. N. Ridgeville, 136 Ohio St.3d 199, 2013-Ohio-3020, 992 
N.E.2d 1126, this court may have implicitly assumed, for purposes of deciding 
other issues relating to the statute, that R.C. 2744.09(B) applies to lawsuits filed by 
former political-subdivision employees.  But we are not bound by that assumption, 
because the issue whether a former employee is an “employee” for purposes of R.C. 
2744.09(B) was not raised as a proposition of law or argued by the parties in that 
case.  See State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, 
¶ 77-78 (O’Donnell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Thus, this court’s 
January Tern, 2019 
 
19 
decision in Vacha does not preclude us from deciding this case based solely on the 
plain language of the statute. 
{¶ 49} The only appellate court that has ever remotely addressed this 
particular issue is the Eleventh District Court of Appeals in Fleming v. Ashtabula 
Area City School Bd. of Edn., 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2006-A-0030, 2008-Ohio-
1892.  That court did not conduct a statutory analysis of R.C. 2744.09(B), nor did 
it refer to the definition of “employee” provided in R.C. 2744.01(B).  Instead, the 
court simply rejected, on policy grounds, the argument that the plaintiff must be an 
employee of the political subdivision at the time the lawsuit is filed: “To hold 
otherwise would encourage employers to terminate employees to avoid potential 
liability when an incident has occurred.”  Id. at ¶ 31.  Given Fleming’s lack of 
statutory analysis, this court should not rely on that decision. 
A plain-language application of R.C. 2744.09(B) would not lead to 
unreasonable consequences 
{¶ 50} The majority explains, as further justification of its holding and its 
rejection of the clear and unambiguous language of R.C. 2744.01(B) and 
2744.09(B), that “[r]eading the word ‘employee’ in R.C. 2744.09(B) as requiring 
an ongoing employment relationship at the time a plaintiff files an employment-
related claim against her political-subdivision employer would give rise to an 
unreasonable result.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 29.  The majority relies on R.C. 
1.47(C), which provides that “[i]n enacting a statute, it is presumed that * * * [a] 
just and reasonable result is intended.”  The majority claims that “[i]t is 
unreasonable to presume that the General Assembly intended to incentivize an 
employer to terminate an employee who may have an employment-related claim to 
preserve its entitlement to political-subdivision immunity.”  Id. at ¶ 29. 
{¶ 51} Generally, when there is no ambiguity in a statute, this court does 
not apply any of the rules of statutory construction.  Smyth, 87 Ohio St.3d at 553, 
721 N.E.2d 1057; United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95-96, 5 L.Ed. 37 (1820).  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
Because the language of R.C. 2744.09(B) is clear and unambiguous, there is no 
need to apply the rules of statutory construction.  By applying a statutory-
construction analysis to R.C. 2744.09(B), a clear and unambiguous statute, the 
majority invades the role of the legislature to write laws and make policy 
determinations.  See Jacobson v. Kaforey, 149 Ohio St.3d 398, 2016-Ohio-8434, 
75 N.E.3d 203, ¶ 8.  Therefore, I would simply apply the statute as written and hold 
that a plaintiff must be an employee of the political subdivision at the time of filing 
the lawsuit for R.C. 2744.09(B) to apply. 
{¶ 52} But even assuming arguendo that it is appropriate to consider the 
rules of statutory construction, including R.C. 1.47(C), when applying a clear and 
unambiguous statute, the consequences of a plain-language application of R.C. 
2744.09(B) are not unreasonable.  This court determines, on a case-by-case basis, 
whether an interpretation of a statute produces unreasonable consequences.  See, 
e.g., State ex rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Wells, 18 Ohio St.3d 382, 384, 481 
N.E.2d 632 (1985).  Though this court has previously rejected interpretations of 
statutes that would lead to unreasonable consequences, we have not yet defined 
“unreasonable consequence.”  Generally, “unreasonable” means contrary to reason 
or sound judgment or beyond the limits of acceptability or fairness.  See Black’s 
Law Dictionary 1772 (10th Ed.2014).  In another context, we have determined that 
a trial court’s decision is unreasonable when there is no sound reasoning process 
that would support the decision.  AAAA Enterprises, Inc. v. River Place Community 
Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990). 
{¶ 53} Despite the lack of a definition of “unreasonable,” this court has 
determined that an interpretation of a statute would produce unreasonable 
consequences when there would be some type of unintended and serious legal 
consequence.  See, e.g., Dispatch Printing Co. at 634 (rejecting an interpretation of 
the Public Records Act that would allow a provision of a collective-bargaining 
agreement to take precedence over the act’s requirements because that 
January Tern, 2019 
 
21 
interpretation would have empowered private citizens to alter legal relationships 
between a government and the public at large through collective-bargaining 
agreements); State v. Wells, 91 Ohio St.3d 32, 34, 740 N.E.2d 1097 (2001) (the 
statutory term “anal cavity” does not include the victim’s buttocks because that 
interpretation would subject an offender committing only one criminal act to 
prosecution under two different criminal provisions). 
{¶ 54} Although there is no established test for determining whether an 
interpretation of a statute would produce unreasonable consequences, what is clear 
from the above definition of “unreasonable” and from our case law is that an 
unreasonable consequence is something more than an undesirable consequence.  
An unreasonable consequence is one that goes beyond the limits of fairness or that 
is contrary to reason.  And here, the consequence of applying the plain language of 
R.C. 2744.09(B) is that a political subdivision would be entitled to immunity when 
a former employee files a civil action against the political subdivision.  While this 
consequence might be undesirable for Piazza and other former employees of 
political subdivisions, it is not unreasonable, illogical, and/or unfair. 
{¶ 55} I understand the majority’s policy concern that if we applied the 
plain language of the statute, employers could be encouraged to terminate 
employees when an incident has occurred in order to avoid potential liability, see 
majority opinion at ¶ 29, citing Fleming, 2008-Ohio-1892, at ¶ 31.  I do not presume 
to know the policy considerations of the General Assembly, but I am aware that 
while there may be undesirable consequences, those consequences might be 
outweighed by other policy considerations such as limiting the liability of a political 
subdivision, saving local governments from expending valuable resources, and 
encouraging current employees to bring actions swiftly. 
{¶ 56} Here, the General Assembly chose to define the term “employee” in 
R.C. 2744.01(B), and it chose not to include former employees in that definition or 
to provide a separate provision for former employees in R.C. 2744.09.  If the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
General Assembly wishes to change the wording of either statute in order to permit 
a former employee’s lawsuit to be covered by R.C. 2744.09(B), the General 
Assembly may do so.  This court does not have that authority.  Kaminski v. Metal 
& Wire Prods. Co., 125 Ohio St.3d 250, 2010-Ohio-1027, 927 N.E.2d 1066, ¶ 61.  
The General Assembly—not this court—makes policy determinations.  Id.  
Therefore, I would conclude that a plain-language application of R.C. 2744.09(B) 
would not create unreasonable—and certainly would not create absurd—
consequences. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 57} R.C. 2744.09(B) is clear and unambiguous.  As explained above, this 
court has never held that a former employee is an “employee” for purposes of R.C. 
2744.09(B).  Thus, under the particular wording of that statute, a civil action must 
be brought “by an employee,” meaning an employee of the political subdivision at 
the time of the lawsuit’s filing, for R.C. 2744.09(B) to apply.  Because Piazza was 
not an employee of Cuyahoga County at the time she filed the lawsuit, I would 
conclude that R.C. Chapter 2744’s general rule of immunity applies.  Since I would 
hold that Piazza is not an “employee” for purposes of R.C. 2744.09(B), I would not 
reach the factual question whether her false-light claim is “relative to [a] matter that 
arises out of the employment relationship,” id., between Piazza and the county. 
{¶ 58} For the reasons set forth above, I must respectfully dissent. 
 
KENNEDY and DEWINE, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Schuster & Simmons Co., L.P.A., and Nancy C. Schuster, for appellee. 
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Brian 
R. Gutkoski, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney; Robert J. Triozzi, Cuyahoga County 
Law Director, and Awatef Assad and Jonathan M. Scandling, Assistant Law 
Directors, for appellant. 
January Tern, 2019 
 
23 
Gwen E. Callender; and Bolek, Besser, Glesius, L.L.C., and Matthew D. 
Besser, urging affirmance for amici curiae Fraternal Order of Police of Ohio, Inc., 
and Ohio Employment Lawyers Association. 
_________________