Title: In re Chapman

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12537 
 
IN THE MATTER OF WAYNE CHAPMAN. 
 
 
May 16, 2019. 
 
 
Sex Offender.  Practice, Civil, Sex offender, Civil commitment, 
Standing.  Notice, Timeliness.  Supreme Judicial Court, 
Superintendence of inferior courts. 
 
 
 
This is the second of two cases we decide today involving 
Wayne Chapman.  The petitioners in this case are individuals who 
are enrolled in the victim notification registry for Chapman. 
See 803 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 9.00 (2017).  They are appealing 
from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying their 
petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, in which they 
sought, among other things, to enjoin Chapman's release from the 
Massachusetts Treatment Center (treatment center) after two 
qualified examiners opined that he was no longer sexually 
dangerous.  We affirm. 
 
 
Background.  The facts concerning Chapman's history of 
criminal conduct, incarceration, and commitment to the treatment 
center are set forth in Chapman, petitioner, 482 Mass.     
(2019).  In short, Chapman was civilly committed to the 
treatment center for an indeterminate period of from one day to 
life under G. L. c. 123A, after he completed his criminal 
sentences for rape of a child and other sexual offenses in 2004.  
In 2016, he filed a petition in the Superior Court for release 
pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 9, claiming that he was no longer 
sexually dangerous.  As required by § 9, he was examined by two 
qualified examiners, both of whom, in May of 2018, rendered the 
opinion that he was no longer sexually dangerous. 
 
2 
 
 
 
Concerned that the opinions of the qualified examiners 
would result in Chapman's imminent release from custody, see 
Johnstone, petitioner, 453 Mass. 544, 553 (2009) ("in order for 
the Commonwealth to proceed to trial in a discharge proceeding 
under G. L. c. 123A, § 9, at least one of the two qualified 
examiners must opine that the [individual] remains sexually 
dangerous"), the petitioners applied for emergency relief in the 
county court, pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, seeking to enjoin 
Chapman's release.  They raised a variety of claims concerning 
the propriety of the G. L. c. 123A, § 9, proceeding in the 
Superior Court.  They claimed, for example, that Chapman's 
petition for discharge had not been properly served on the 
district attorney and the Attorney General, as the statute 
requires; that the petitioners were not notified of the filing 
of Chapman's petition, as they had been in the past with respect 
to his earlier petitions; that they did not receive fourteen 
days' advance notice of Chapman's imminent release after the two 
qualified examiners found him to be not sexually dangerous, 
which they claimed was required by G. L. c. 258B, § 3 (t); and 
that the qualified examiners had not been properly appointed.  
In a supporting memorandum of law, the petitioners argued that 
they had properly invoked this court's extraordinary power of 
general superintendence to remedy the alleged deficiencies 
because Chapman "has a long history of being adjudicated too 
dangerous to be released into society"; because "the proceedings 
that led to his imminent release were not conducted in 
accordance with the law"; and because their statutory right to 
notice under G. L. c. 258B, § 3 (t), had been violated.  They 
stated in their memorandum that they were seeking relief both on 
their own behalf and on behalf of the general public.1 
                                                 
 
1 Thereafter, in a second memorandum filed in response to 
Wayne Chapman's opposition to their petition, they asserted 
additional claims:  that the qualified examiners' reports were 
insufficient to justify Chapman's release because they were not 
subject to judicial review; and that this court's opinion in 
Johnstone, petitioner, 453 Mass. 544 (2009), did not in fact 
preclude the Commonwealth from proceeding to trial in these 
circumstances.  They also claimed that the process was flawed 
because one of the two qualified examiners in this case had 
opined that Chapman remained sexually dangerous when Chapman 
filed a discharge petition in 2012.  The jury that considered 
that petition found that Chapman remained sexually dangerous, 
but a retrial was ordered because the jury instructions in that 
case did not conform with our holding in Green, petitioner, 475 
Mass. 64 (2016), and that petition was consolidated with the 
3 
 
 
 
 
The single justice denied the petition in June of 2018.  
With respect to the claim that the petitioners had not received 
proper advance notice of Chapman's imminent release, the single 
justice recognized that crime victims and other individuals who 
subscribe to the victim notification registry, see 803 Code 
Mass. Regs. §§ 9.00, as the petitioners in this case did, "are 
entitled to scrupulous compliance with the notice requirements 
provided by statute and regulation," but he concluded that the 
petitioners had received the requisite notice because Chapman 
had not yet been released, and more than fourteen days had 
elapsed since they had received notice.  Second, with respect to 
the petitioners' objection to the process by which the qualified 
examiners had been appointed, the single justice noted that the 
petitioners had "failed to provide any legal authority granting 
them standing or a private cause of action," and he ruled that 
"[r]egardless, the qualification and appointment of the 
qualified examiners followed statutory requirements."  And 
finally, as to the petitioners' objection to the fact that 
opinions of qualified examiners do not receive judicial review, 
the single justice stated that "such review would require a 
legislative change." 
 
 
Discussion.  1.  Commitment and discharge process.  General 
Laws c. 123A carefully defines when and how an individual can 
become subject to a commitment petition; who may bring such a 
petition; the procedure for a commitment hearing; and the 
process by which an individual, once committed, can seek to be 
released from commitment.  See G. L. c. 123A, §§ 9, 12-14.  The 
commitment is a civil commitment, not a criminal incarceration.  
See Commonwealth v. Bruno, 432 Mass. 489, 502 (2000).  It is not 
intended as further punishment for the crime or crimes the 
individual has committed; rather, the intent is preventative -- 
to protect society from individuals who, despite having 
completed their criminal punishment, cannot control their sexual 
impulses as a result of mental illness, mental abnormality, or 
                                                 
petition in this case.  In their second memorandum, the 
petitioners again purported to assert their claims both on their 
own behalf and on behalf of the general public. 
 
 
We need not, and do not, address any additional issues or 
arguments that the petitioners did not raise before the single 
justice and have raised for the first time before the full 
court.  See Ewing v. Davenport-Mello, 478 Mass. 1016, 1016 
(2017). 
4 
 
 
personality disorder and thus are likely to reoffend sexually if 
not confined to a secure facility.  See Dutil, petitioner, 437 
Mass. 9, 14-15, 19-20 (2002). 
 
 
Although the commitment is civil, not criminal, and the 
objective is preventative, not punitive, the consequence of an 
adjudication of sexual dangerousness is a severe deprivation of 
liberty.  See Bruno, 432 Mass. at 502.  An individual so 
adjudicated is committed to the treatment center for an 
indeterminate term of from one day to life, and can remain 
committed long after his or her criminal sentence has concluded.  
See G. L. c. 123A, § 14 (d).  The individual is eligible for 
release only if and when he or she is found to be no longer 
sexually dangerous.  See G. L. c. 123A, §§ 9, 14 (d). 
 
 
Because of the potentially lengthy deprivation of liberty 
that ensues upon a finding of sexual dangerousness, one who is 
alleged to be sexually dangerous is entitled to an array of 
statutory and constitutional protections akin to those afforded 
to criminal defendants.  He or she is entitled to the assistance 
of counsel both at the initial commitment trial and at 
subsequent discharge trials, and to trial by jury; he or she 
cannot be committed unless sexual dangerousness –- as defined by 
the statute –- is proved by the strictest of legal standards, 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt; and, once committed, when the 
individual petitions for discharge, he or she bears no burden to 
prove that he or she is no longer sexually dangerous.  See G. L. 
c. 123A, §§ 9, 14 (b), (d).  Rather, the Commonwealth must prove 
present sexual dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt.  See 
Dutil, 437 Mass. at 11. 
 
 
2.  Standing.  Just as in criminal cases, where it is the 
Commonwealth, and the Commonwealth alone, that has the 
prerogative and the responsibility to prosecute defendants for 
criminal offenses, it is the Commonwealth, and the Commonwealth 
alone, that has the prerogative and the responsibility to file 
and prosecute the initial petition for civil commitment as a 
sexually dangerous person, G. L. c. 123A, § 12, and to defend 
every petition for discharge, G. L. c. 123A, § 9.  Private 
individuals, including the victims of the crimes being 
prosecuted, have no standing in our system of justice to 
prosecute criminal cases and no authority to compel district 
attorneys or the Attorney General to do so.  See Victory 
Distribs., Inc. v. Ayer Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't, 435 Mass. 
136, 142 (2001) ("the right to pursue a criminal prosecution 
belongs not to a private party but to the Commonwealth"); Taylor 
5 
 
 
v. Newton Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't, 416 Mass. 1006, 1006 
(1993) ("it is settled beyond cavil that a private citizen has 
no judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution of 
another").  Likewise, private individuals, including victims of 
sexual offenders, have no standing to prosecute commitment 
petitions under G. L. c. 123A, § 12, or to defend discharge 
petitions under G. L. c. 123A, § 9, and no authority to compel 
the Commonwealth to do so. 
 
 
That said, crime victims have rights.  In 1983, the 
Legislature enacted the so-called victims' bill of rights, 
G. L. c. 258B, which is applicable in criminal cases and, to 
some extent, in sexually dangerous person proceedings.  Among 
the many rights granted to crime victims under this legislation 
is the right to be notified when an offender is released from 
custody.  General Laws c. 258B, § 3 (t), states that crime 
victims have the right "to be informed in advance by the 
appropriate custodial authority whenever the defendant receives 
a temporary, provisional or final release from custody."  
Victims who wish to receive such notice must enroll in the 
victim notification registry, created by 803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§§ 9.00.  The petitioners represent that each of them is 
enrolled in the registry.  The statute governing sexually 
dangerous person discharge petitions, G. L. c. 123A, § 9, 
similarly states that when a person is discharged from the 
treatment center, "notice shall be given to . . . any victim of 
the sexual offense from which the commitment originated; 
provided, however, that said victim has requested notification 
pursuant to [G. L. c. 258B, § 3]."  We discuss infra the 
petitioners' claim that they were not properly notified of 
Chapman's imminent discharge, but we first discuss briefly the 
effect of the victims' bill of rights, i.e., what it does and, 
more importantly, what it does not do. 
 
 
The rights granted to victims of crime under G. L. c. 258B 
do not alter the fundamental rule that it is the Commonwealth, 
and the Commonwealth alone, that prosecutes criminal cases and 
commitment petitions and defends discharge petitions.  By 
enacting the victims' bill of rights, the Legislature gave 
victims the right to be kept informed about and to participate 
in a limited way in these cases, but it did not give them a 
judicially cognizable role in their prosecution.  Simply put, 
the statute confers on them certain rights as victims, but it 
does not confer on them the status of a party or grant them the 
rights that belong to parties.  See Hagen v. Commonwealth, 437 
Mass. 374, 380-381 (2002) (G. L. c. 258B does not alter "long-
6 
 
 
standing," "well-entrenched" rule that victims have no 
judicially cognizable interest in prosecution of others).  See 
also H.T. v. Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 1011, 1012 (2013); Carroll, 
petitioner, 453 Mass. 1006, 1006 (2009). 
 
 
Standing is not a mere legal technicality.  The principles 
governing standing in criminal cases and, as here, sexually 
dangerous person cases arise from the recognition that a 
criminal conviction and a civil commitment as a sexually 
dangerous person can result in a substantial deprivation of 
liberty.  Our jurisprudence simply does not give private 
persons, even where they are victims, the authority to exercise 
the discretion involved in determining whose liberty will be 
placed at risk.  See Victory Distribs., Inc., 435 Mass. at 142; 
Taylor, 416 Mass. at 1006.  Cf. Berger v. United States, 295 
U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (prosecutor is "the representative not of an 
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose 
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its 
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a 
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that 
justice shall be done").  And significantly, legal standing is a 
jurisdictional matter; if parties do not have standing, a court 
has no jurisdiction to adjudicate their claims.  See Phone 
Recovery Servs., LLC v. Verizon of New England, Inc., 480 Mass. 
224, 227 (2018), and cases cited. 
 
 
The petitioners do not have standing to assert the bulk of 
the claims they have made.  Most of their claims concern alleged 
deficiencies in the processing of Chapman's discharge petition 
(e.g., Chapman's alleged failure to serve his petition on the 
district attorney and the Attorney General; the allegedly 
improper appointment of the qualified examiners; the absence of 
an avenue for judicial review of the qualified examiners' 
reports; the validity and applicability of our holding in 
Johnstone; and the appearance of impropriety that allegedly 
resulted from the fact that the same qualified examiner came to 
a conclusion on the 2016 discharge petition that was different 
from the one he had reached on the consolidated 2012 discharge 
petition).  Those claims do not concern the petitioners' 
specific rights under the victims' bill of rights, but instead 
assert rights that "are not private but in fact are lodged in 
the Commonwealth."  Hagen, 437 Mass. at 380, quoting with 
approval Taylor, 416 Mass. at 1006.2 
                                                 
 
2 Shortly after their appeal was entered in this court, the 
petitioners filed a motion asking the full court to enjoin 
7 
 
 
 
 
We reject the petitioners' contention that, despite their 
lack of standing in the underlying G. L. c. 123A proceeding, 
they are nevertheless entitled as a matter of right to invoke 
this court's extraordinary power of general superintendence to 
obtain a resolution of those claims or to enjoin Chapman's 
release based on those claims.  They have no right to employ 
G. L. c. 211, § 3, as private attorneys general.  Nothing we 
said in Brantley v. Hampden Div. of the Probate & Family Court 
Dep't, 457 Mass. 172 (2010), or in Bradford v. Knights, 427 
Mass. 748 (1998), is to the contrary. 
 
 
3.  Advance notice of discharge.  The only claim we can 
discern in the record before us for which the petitioners might 
have standing is their claim that they were not given proper 
advance notice of Chapman's imminent discharge.  We need not 
reach the question whether the petitioners could properly assert 
such a claim by means of a G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition, however, 
because even if the claim were properly brought, it would not 
entitle the petitioners to the relief they seek -- an order 
enjoining Chapman's release -- for at least three reasons. 
 
 
First, the claim fails on the facts.  Chapman has not yet 
been released from custody, yet the petitioners were notified of 
his impending release on May 21, 2018, the day the qualified 
examiners' reports were filed.  This means that the petitioners 
have received far more than the fourteen days' notice to which 
they claim they are entitled. 
 
 
Second, the claim fails on the law.  General Laws c. 123A, 
§ 9, states that an individual must be discharged from the 
treatment center if the fact finder determines that he or she is 
no longer sexually dangerous, and that notice must be given to 
the victim or victims "[u]pon such discharge."  Relying instead 
                                                 
Chapman's release pending the appeal.  We denied that motion in 
a lengthy memorandum and order that set forth many of the same 
principles that are set forth in this opinion.  We noted in the 
order that nothing precluded the Commonwealth from asserting 
these claims in the Superior Court if it deemed it appropriate 
to do so.  The Commonwealth thereafter pursued such relief in 
the Superior Court, unsuccessfully, which gave rise to the 
appeal in Chapman, petitioner, 482 Mass.     (2019). 
 
8 
 
 
on G. L. c. 258B, § 3 (t),3 and 803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 9.09(2)(a),4 the petitioners claim that they were entitled to 
fourteen days' advance notice of Chapman's discharge.  Their 
claim is based on a misreading of this statute and this 
regulation.  Both pertain to situations where an offender has a 
predetermined release date, such as when a defendant's criminal 
sentence is about to expire.  Where the release date is known, 
fourteen days' advance notice is feasible.  But when a fact 
finder finds that an individual committed under G. L. c. 123A is 
no longer sexually dangerous, the individual is entitled (in the 
absence of a stay of the judgment) to immediate release.  The 
release date in this situation is neither scheduled nor known in 
advance, so fourteen days' advance notice is not possible.  
Instead, such situations are controlled by 803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 9.09(4)(b), which provides that "[t]he custodial or 
supervising agency shall provide emergency notification by both 
telephone and mail, whenever an offender . . . receives a court-
ordered release from custody."5  In this case, the record 
contains an affidavit of a Department of Correction employee who 
avers that she and a fellow employee immediately gave notice of 
the possibility of Chapman's release to each of the petitioners 
on the day the two qualified examiners' reports were filed in 
the court.  This action satisfied the notice requirements under 
803 Code Mass. Regs. § 9.09(4)(b). 
 
 
Third, even if the petitioners' right to notice under 
G. L. c. 258B, § 3 (t), had been violated, a lack of notice 
would not justify their requested remedy of enjoining Chapman's 
release from custody.  Nothing in G. L. c. 258B suggests that 
the remedy for a failure to provide any of the various types of 
                                                 
 
3 General Laws c. 258B, § 3 (t), gives victims the right "to 
be informed in advance by the appropriate custodial authority 
whenever the defendant receives a temporary, provisional or 
final release from custody." 
 
 
4 Title 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 9.09(2)(a) (2017) provides 
that "[e]ach custodial or supervisory agency shall provide no 
less than [fourteen] days advance notification for the 
offender's . . . temporary, provisional, and final release from 
custody." 
 
 
5 Along the same lines, see 803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 9.09(4)(d) (2017), which calls for "emergency notification" 
when an offender "receives a short sentence that prohibits 
[fourteen] days advance notice." 
9 
 
 
notice called for by the statute is to keep an individual in 
custody who is otherwise entitled to release. 
 
 
Conclusion.  The judgment of the single justice denying the 
petition filed pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
Wendy J. Murphy for the petitioners. 
 
Joseph N. Schneiderman (Eric Tennen also present) for Wayne 
Chapman. 
 
Mary P. Murray for Department of Correction. 
 
Maura Healey, Attorney General, & Eric A. Haskell, 
Assistant Attorney General, for the Attorney General, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Jonathan W. Blodgett, District Attorney for the Eastern 
District, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.