Title: Sheppard v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC19-1512 
____________ 
 
BILLY JIM SHEPPARD, JR., 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC20-422 
____________ 
 
BILLY JIM SHEPPARD, JR., 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
RICKY D. DIXON, etc., 
Respondent. 
 
March 10, 2022 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Billy Jim Sheppard, Jr., appeals an order of the circuit court 
denying his motion to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder 
and sentence of death filed under Florida Rule of Criminal 
 
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Procedure 3.851 and petitions this Court for a writ of habeas 
corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. 
In the proceedings below, the circuit court granted a new 
penalty phase and the State has not challenged that ruling.  
Therefore, only postconviction claims relevant to the guilt phase 
issues are presented on appeal.  Sheppard’s petition for writ of 
habeas corpus raises two claims of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel.  For the reasons explained below, we affirm the 
circuit court’s order and deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
BACKGROUND 
Sheppard was convicted of the first-degree murders of 
Monquell Wimberly and Patrick Stafford.  See Sheppard v. State, 
151 So. 3d 1154, 1157 (Fla. 2014).  The jury recommended the 
death penalty for the murder of Wimberly by a vote of eight to four 
and life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the 
murder of Stafford.  Id. at 1164.  The trial court followed the jury’s 
recommendations.  Id.  We affirmed both convictions and the 
sentence of death on direct appeal, id. at 1157, and summarized the 
relevant facts as follows: 
 
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Dtalya Barrett, a security guard at the Hollybrook 
Apartments on King Street in Jacksonville, testified that 
on the morning of July 20, 2008, she was working at the 
apartment’s entrance gate.  When she heard gunshots 
shortly after 10 a.m., she ran to the end of the sidewalk 
where she saw a person holding a gun out of the 
passenger side window of a passing car driving toward 
her.  The person holding the gun shot a teenage boy, 
later identified as sixteen-year-old Monquell Wimberly, 
who was riding a bicycle.  Barrett ran to call police and 
when she returned, she saw the shooter leaning out of 
the car window and looking back toward the boy on the 
ground.  She could not see the driver but could see the 
passenger quite well from about ten to twelve feet away, 
and she said the shooter was a black male with “dreads.”  
When the police arrived, she was placed in the police car 
to wait but “ran off” because, as she explained, the police 
put her where everyone could see her and “they didn’t 
think about whether he can come kill us or whatever . . . 
. I wanted to get out and get my kids and leave.” . . . 
 
Barrett did meet with detectives the next day and 
was shown a series of photographs on the computer.  She 
initially picked out one person as “looking like” the 
shooter, and although police investigated that person, he 
was not arrested.  When Barrett met again with 
detectives and was shown more photographs she picked 
out Sheppard’s photograph, and she identified Sheppard 
in court as the man she saw shoot Wimberly.  She also 
identified Dorsette James’s stolen car as matching the 
vehicle in which the shooter was riding. 
 
Khalilah Mejors, a resident at the Hollybrook 
Apartments, was standing on the third-floor balcony on 
the morning of July 20, 2008, and saw the young man 
riding the bicycle.  She testified that as a dark gray Ford 
Crown Victoria or Mercury vehicle approached the boy 
and slowed down, the boy put his hands in the air and 
was immediately shot, and he was shot several more 
 
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times while on the ground.  She could not see the 
shooter’s face or that of the driver but did see the lower 
part of an arm sticking out of the passenger side window 
holding the gun.  She ran to the victim and found him 
still alive but not speaking. 
 
Kieva Sherrod was also a resident at the Hollybrook 
Apartments on July 20, 2008, where she lived on the 
third floor facing King Street.  She was standing on the 
balcony with her cousin Khalilah Mejors that morning 
and also saw Wimberly ride by on a bicycle toward the 
entrance to the apartment complex.  She saw the vehicle, 
which looked like a gray Ford Crown Victoria, drive up to 
the person on the bicycle and slow down, and the boy on 
the bicycle stopped.  She testified that she sat down, but 
heard a gunshot and when she looked again, the boy on 
the bicycle had his hands up in the air.  She saw a gun 
pointed out of the window of the car, but she could not 
see who was holding the gun, although she could see 
that there were two people in the car.  Sherrod testified 
that the boy was shot several more times and fell off the 
bicycle.  She ran inside to get her phone to call the police 
and then ran down to the boy to see if he was still alive.  
She said he was still alive but she did not hear him say 
anything.  She identified a photograph of the car, which 
witnesses later identified as one stolen from Dorsette 
James at the Prime Stop convenience store, as the car 
she saw that morning. 
 
Approximately one and a half hours before 
Wimberly was shot, a car matching the description of the 
Wimberly shooter’s car was stolen at gunpoint from 
Dorsette James at the Prime Stop Food Store.  Willie Lee 
Carter, Jr., testified that he was at the store with James, 
who was since deceased.  Carter, who was outside but 
not in the vehicle, heard James exit the store and say, 
“Man, don’t do it like that.”  When Carter looked, he saw 
two men getting into James’s car, a gray Crown Victoria.  
One man, described as shorter and with light brown skin 
 
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and dreadlocks, got into the driver’s side of the car.  The 
other person, a tall man with darker skin, got in the 
passenger side and the car drove away.  When Carter 
asked James why he let them take his car, Carter 
testified that James told him one of the men had a gun.  
James later picked Sheppard’s photograph out of a 
photographic array as the driver and a photograph of 
Rashard Evans as the person who got into the passenger 
side of the car.  Photographs taken from inside the Prime 
Stop store showed both Evans and Sheppard at the store 
that morning. 
 
The stolen car was recovered that evening near 
where the shooting occurred, but no DNA was found for 
comparison purposes.  Latent fingerprints and palm 
prints taken from the stolen car were submitted for 
examination and comparison.  Fingerprint examiner 
Richard Kocik of the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office testified 
that some of the fingerprints taken from the stolen car 
were of no value and were not compared to anyone.  The 
only prints of value taken from the vehicle, palm prints 
and some fingerprints, matched Rashard Evans. 
 
. . . .  
 
Before Detective [Bobby] Bowers[, Sr.] arrived to 
investigate the Wimberly shooting scene on King Street 
on July 20, 2008, he had been investigating the shooting 
of Patrick Stafford, which occurred at 6 a.m. that same 
morning on Academy Street in Jacksonville.  Shamika 
Worthey lived on Academy Street and, in the early 
morning hours of July 20, 2008, went out to her car to 
retrieve some diapers and saw Patrick Stafford asleep in 
her brother’s car.  She returned to the house and went 
back to sleep but was awakened by the sound of 
gunshots at about 5:30 or 5:45 a.m.  She could not see 
anything from the window and woke her uncle and 
brother and asked if Stafford had a gun and was told he 
did not.  She looked again and could then see that 
 
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Stafford was lying by a tree in the yard.  He appeared to 
have blood on his shirt. 
 
Leporyon Worthey . . . testified that he and Patrick 
Stafford, his cousin, arrived at the house on Academy 
Street after midnight and that he went to bed around 3 
a.m., leaving Stafford sitting on the hood of Leporyon’s 
car waiting for a ride.  When his sister woke him around 
6 a.m., Leporyon found Stafford on the ground, with the 
car door open and no one else present.  Leporyon said 
Stafford tried to speak but could not do so.  Crime scene 
detective Howard Mac Smith was dispatched to the 
Academy Street scene and found a Ford LTD parked in 
the yard with the door open and the passenger side 
window shattered.  Stafford’s body was near the car and 
shell casings found around the area were collected for 
forensic examination. 
 
Id. at 1158-60 (footnote omitted). 
 
Sheppard was taken into custody and after being read and 
waiving his Miranda1 rights, he was interviewed by Detective 
Bowers and Detective Glen Warkentien.2  Id. at 1161.  Sheppard 
initially denied carjacking James’s car, but he later admitted that 
he and Evans took the car for a “joyride.”  Id.  Sheppard maintained 
that he got into the driver’s side and that he later got out of the car 
 
1.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
2.  A redacted form of the video of the interview was played for 
the jury; Sheppard’s trial counsel did not object to its admission at 
trial.  Sheppard, 151 So. 3d at 1161. 
 
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while Evans kept it.  Id.  Sheppard denied taking the car by force 
and denied any involvement with the Wimberly or Stafford murders.  
Id. 
Sheppard’s cellmate, Michael Roberts, gave the following 
testimony: 
Roberts testified that at one point during their 
incarceration, Sheppard asked him how much weight an 
eyewitness’s testimony would be given if that witness 
identified Sheppard as the shooter, but there was no 
other evidence.  Roberts testified that he told Sheppard 
the testimony would be crucial.  Roberts testified that 
Sheppard also asked how much weight it would carry if a 
codefendant related facts of a crime to a third party when 
the other codefendant was not present.  Roberts said he 
asked about it and Sheppard told him Evans, his 
codefendant, was housed on the other side of the jail and 
was bragging about a carjacking, saying “the guy bucked 
and that they shot him,” referring to the Stafford murder.  
Roberts said that when Sheppard was explaining why he 
was charged with murder, Sheppard said his codefendant 
Evans had talked and it got back to the police, who then 
matched the ballistics from the two shootings. 
 
Roberts testified, “Actually he said that—he said 
that they were going hard [apparently a reference to 
doing drugs] and they were trying to find a car and that 
they went to rob a guy for his car and he bucked.  They 
were trying to take a car from him and he bucked,” which 
meant he was not giving up the car.  “So he said that him 
and Rashard shot him . . . .  He said they both put fire on 
him,” which meant shooting him.  Roberts also testified 
that he overheard Sheppard telling some other inmates 
that, later on the day of the carjacking attempt, they 
“shot that [expletive] from West Jax that was on his bike” 
 
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and with whom Sheppard said he had argued.  Roberts 
explained that Sheppard said he had been in a big 
argument a few days before with “some boys from West 
Jax because [Sheppard] and [his associate] Dirt, they’re 
from Paxon and PYC,” which are gang references. 
 
Roberts testified that Sheppard later told him 
directly about shooting the boy on the bicycle after he 
and Evans had shot the man who “bucked” in the 
attempted carjacking earlier that morning.  Roberts 
testified, “And he said that he pulled up to him and he 
was on a bicycle.  And they slowed down and he hung his 
arm out the window and started shooting.  And he said 
the dude looked at him and was, like—(demonstrating)—
and shot.  And he said he went ahead and shot him.  He 
didn’t say how many times.”  Roberts testified that 
Sheppard then described the woman who could identify 
him: 
 
And then he said whenever they—he shot 
the guy.  He looked up when they were pulling 
away, and there was a lady looking right in his 
face.  And he said it was just—and I was like: 
Well, why didn’t you—you know, why didn’t 
you shoot her?  Basically I said that.  And he 
was like: Oh, I wish I would have killed her.  
He said because it was—I guess the way he 
put it was when they were pulling—when he 
looked up—after he shot the guy, he looked up 
and she was looking at him but Rashard was 
already pulling away. 
 
Roberts testified that Sheppard told him Evans 
would not testify against him, but Sheppard was worried 
about the woman who could identify him. 
 
Roberts also testified that at the point when his own 
charges were about to be dropped, Sheppard asked him 
for a favor.  When Roberts asked what the favor was, 
 
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Sheppard said, “Man, you know, if she don’t come and 
testify on me, they ain’t got no case.  You told me yourself 
. . . [y]ou said, man, if she don’t come testify, they ain’t 
got no case on me at all, other than what my codefendant 
told that other guy.”  Roberts said Sheppard told him he 
would get all the information to Roberts through 
Sheppard’s sister and could pay him with his income tax 
return.  Roberts said he did not want to look weak so he 
said he would think about it, but never gave Sheppard an 
answer.  Roberts said Sheppard asked him several times 
after that what he was going to do, and then Sheppard 
was moved out of the jail dorm.  Roberts testified, “He 
wanted me to kill her.”  Roberts further testified that he 
never told law enforcement about this information while 
his own charges were still pending in Duval County and 
that he was not promised anything for his testimony, 
although he later divulged the information in hopes of a 
reduced sentence on subsequent charges in Nassau 
County.  He testified that he pled guilty to those charges 
and, at the time of trial, was facing a possible sentence of 
thirty years in prison. 
 
Id. at 1161-62. 
The medical examiner who performed the autopsies on 
Stafford and Wimberly opined at trial that the cause of death for 
both victims was multiple gunshot wounds.  Id. at 1160.  Though 
no firearms were recovered, David Warniment, a firearms examiner 
for the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, examined and 
compared bullets and shell casings from both the Stafford and 
Wimberly shootings.  Id. at 1160-61.  Warniment testified that two 
firearms were used to shoot Stafford and that one was used to 
 
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shoot Wimberly; he testified that “two bullets recovered from 
Stafford’s body were fired from the same Smith and Wesson 9mm 
caliber pistol that fired three bullets recovered from Wimberly’s 
body.”  Id. at 1161. 
 
On direct appeal, Sheppard challenged his convictions for both 
murders and his sentence of death for Wimberly’s murder, raising 
five issues: (1) the admission of Sheppard’s videotaped confession 
was fundamental error; (2) the trial court erred in admitting the 
out-of-court statement by Evans to Evans’s girlfriend, which elicited 
a response from Sheppard that implicated him; (3) the admission of 
Barrett’s testimony about her fear of the shooter “constituted 
fundamental error in that it inflamed the minds of the jurors, 
violated the prohibition against a ‘Golden Rule’ argument, and was 
an improper attack on Sheppard’s character by suggesting a 
propensity for violence”; (4) the trial court’s handling of juror 
misconduct or premature deliberation amounted to fundamental 
error; and (5) Sheppard’s sentence of death was not proportionate.  
Id. at 1165-75. 
 
We rejected each claim and concluded that there was 
sufficient evidence to sustain Sheppard’s convictions.  Id. at 1165-
 
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76.  Accordingly, we affirmed Sheppard’s convictions for both 
murders and his sentence of death for Wimberly’s murder.  Id. at 
1175-76. 
In April 2016, Sheppard timely filed the initial rule 3.851 
motion at issue in this postconviction appeal.  He raised the 
following claims: (I) his death sentence violates Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304 (2002), and Florida’s constitutional prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment because he is intellectually 
disabled; (II) ineffective assistance of counsel during jury selection 
for (a) failing to question prospective jurors about aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, (b) failing to conduct a meaningful death 
qualification, (c) failing to inquire about racial bias, (d) failing to 
ensure the jury was properly instructed of its role during the 
penalty phase, and (e) failing to object to a Batson3 violation; (III) 
ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase for (a) failing 
to present an insanity defense, (b) failing to present a competent 
misidentification defense, (c) failing to effectively cross-examine 
Barrett, (d) failing to hire a crime scene reconstructionist, (e) failing 
 
 
3.  Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 
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to make proper objections, (f) failing to file a motion in limine to 
exclude the videotaped interrogation of Sheppard, (g) failing to 
challenge the State’s ballistics evidence, and (h) failing to 
investigate jury misconduct; (IV) newly discovered evidence of 
Roberts’s recantation of his trial testimony; (V) Brady and Giglio4 
violations for withholding information of deals that the State made 
in exchange for Roberts’s and Willie Carter’s trial testimony; (VI) 
prosecutorial misconduct for presenting evidence of gang affiliation 
despite disclosing to trial counsel that the State did not intend to 
argue Sheppard’s gang affiliation as an aggravating circumstance; 
(VII) ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase for (a) 
failing to conduct a competent mitigation investigation and failing to 
present mitigation, (b) failing to ensure a competent mental health 
evaluation, (c) failing to establish and argue statutory mitigators, (d) 
stipulating to an aggravating circumstance, (e) failing to object to 
improper jury instructions, and (f) failing to object to the State’s 
improper closing argument; (VIII) trial counsel failed to retain a 
qualified mental health expert in violation of Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 
 
4.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Giglio v. United 
States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
 
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U.S. 68 (1985); (IX) due process violations because (a) trial counsel 
was overextended and failed to provide adequate representation and 
(b) trial counsel lost or destroyed Sheppard’s trial records, thereby 
prohibiting postconviction counsel from adequately investigating 
and pleading claims; (X) cumulative error; (XI) Florida’s capital 
sentencing procedure violates Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016), 
and the Sixth and Eighth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution; and (XII) the death penalty is cruel and unusual 
because (a) Florida cannot maintain a sufficient supply of drugs to 
administer lethal injection and (b) Florida’s use of midazolam as the 
first drug in its three-drug protocol is unconstitutional.  Sheppard 
later filed a motion to amend and add three claims; the trial court 
allowed him to include the following two claims: (XIV) newly 
discovered evidence that Mejors was smoking marijuana and not 
wearing her glasses when she witnessed Wimberly’s murder; and 
(XV) the State committed Brady and Giglio violations by failing to 
disclose that Mejors was not wearing her glasses when she 
witnessed Wimberly’s murder. 
The State conceded that Sheppard is entitled to a new penalty 
phase under Hurst v. Florida and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 
 
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2016), overruled in part by State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 
2020), and the circuit court granted a new penalty phase and 
dismissed the remaining penalty phase claims as moot, and 
Sheppard withdrew several claims.  The circuit court conducted an 
evidentiary hearing for the remaining claims that involved a factual 
dispute, at which several individuals were called to testify, including 
Sheppard’s trial counsel, W. Charles Fletcher, and the assistant 
state attorney who represented the State at trial, Mark Caliel.  After 
the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court entered an order denying 
Sheppard’s motion for postconviction relief on August 5, 2019. 
This appeal follows.  On appeal, Sheppard argues that the 
circuit court erred by denying: (A) varied claims of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel; (B) two newly discovered evidence 
claims; (C) several Brady and Giglio claims; and (D) a claim of 
cumulative error.  We address Sheppard’s postconviction appeal 
first, followed by his petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which 
Sheppard alleges that his appellate counsel was ineffective on direct 
appeal in two respects. 
 
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ANALYSIS 
I. POSTCONVICTION APPEAL 
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims 
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant 
must show the following: 
First, counsel’s performance must be shown to be 
deficient.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984).  Deficient performance in this context means that 
counsel’s performance fell below the standard guaranteed 
by the Sixth Amendment.  Id.  When examining counsel’s 
performance, an objective standard of reasonableness 
applies, id. at 688, and great deference is given to 
counsel’s performance.  Id. at 689.  The defendant bears 
the burden to “overcome the presumption that, under the 
circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be 
considered sound trial strategy.’ ”  Id. (quoting Michel v. 
Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).  This Court has 
made clear that “[s]trategic decisions do not constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel.”  See Occhicone v. State, 
768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000).  There is a strong 
presumption that trial counsel’s performance was not 
ineffective.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 669. 
 
Second, the deficient performance must have 
prejudiced the defendant, ultimately depriving the 
defendant of a fair trial with a reliable result.  Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 689.  A defendant must do more than 
speculate that an error affected the outcome.  Id. at 693.  
Prejudice is met only if there is a reasonable probability 
that “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.”  Id. at 694.  Both deficient 
performance and prejudice must be shown.  Id.  Because 
 
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both prongs of the Strickland test present mixed 
questions of law and fact, this Court employs a mixed 
standard of review, deferring to the circuit court’s factual 
findings that are supported by competent, substantial 
evidence, but reviewing the circuit court’s legal 
conclusions de novo. 
 
Bradley v. State, 33 So. 3d 664, 671-72 (Fla. 2010).  Because 
Strickland requires a defendant to establish both prongs, if one 
prong is not met, the Court need not reach the other.  Stewart v. 
State, 801 So. 2d 59, 65 (Fla. 2001).  However, “[w]here trial 
counsel is deficient in more than one area . . . we must ‘consider 
the impact of these errors cumulatively to determine whether [the 
defendant] has established prejudice.’ ”  Sparre v. State, 289 So. 3d 
839, 847 (Fla. 2019) (quoting Parker v. State, 89 So. 3d 844, 867 
(Fla. 2011)). 
(1) Failure to Effectively Present a Misidentification Defense 
Sheppard first challenges the circuit court’s denial of his claim 
that his trial counsel was ineffective in presenting a 
misidentification defense because counsel (a) failed to retain a 
witness identification expert to opine on the credibility of eyewitness 
identification; (b) failed to investigate and present to the jury 
eyewitness accounts of the shooting that differed from Barrett’s 
 
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account; and (c) failed to effectively challenge the photo lineup that 
the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office (Sheriff’s Office) presented to 
eyewitnesses.  We affirm the circuit court’s finding that trial counsel 
was not deficient in the presentation of a misidentification defense. 
(a) Witness Identification Expert 
Barrett was the only witness who identified Sheppard as the 
shooter in the Wimberly murder.  She observed the shooter for four 
or five seconds and made “clear and strong eye contact” with him as 
he was leaning out of the passenger side window of a moving vehicle 
while holding a gun.  She selected his photograph out of a 
photospread shortly after the shooting and she identified him at 
trial.  At trial, Barrett and several other witnesses testified that she 
was extremely stressed during the shooting, in part because she 
initially believed that the victim was her nephew.  Sheppard argues 
that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the 
proceedings would have been different if trial counsel had retained 
an eyewitness identification expert to educate himself or the jury 
about the factors that may affect eyewitness identification. 
Sheppard’s trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing 
that, though the main theory of defense at trial was 
 
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misidentification, he believed the inconsistencies in Barrett’s 
identification of Sheppard as the shooter were not significant and 
that any testimony that a witness identification expert could give 
would be “common sense” and would ultimately be of little use 
because it could not be used to identify anyone other than 
Sheppard as the shooter.  Moreover, trial counsel testified that 
Sheppard confessed to him that he was the shooter and trial 
counsel was concerned an eyewitness expert would bolster Barrett’s 
identification.5 
 
We agree with the circuit court’s conclusion that trial 
counsel’s strategic decision not to retain an identification expert 
was not deficient performance.  See Pietri v. State, 935 So. 2d 85, 85 
(Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (concluding that a trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for 
failing to retain an eyewitness expert because the expert’s testimony 
related to common sense problems with eyewitness identification).  
As noted, Sheppard confessed to trial counsel that he was the 
shooter, and trial counsel was understandably concerned that 
 
5.  Trial counsel testified that Sheppard told him that “there’s 
no way that bitch [meaning Barrett] could have seen me.” 
 
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additional testimony about issues with Barrett’s identification—
issues that the jurors could have relied on their common sense to 
resolve—could potentially produce information damaging to his 
client. 
Moreover, though the circuit court did not address prejudice 
with respect to this subclaim, in light of the other evidence of guilt 
in the case—including ballistic evidence matching a firearm from 
both shootings; witness testimony that Sheppard and Evans stole 
Jones’s car, which matched the description of the car used during 
the Wimberly shooting; and Sheppard’s video confession to stealing 
Jones’s vehicle—there is no reasonable probability that but for trial 
counsel’s failure to retain an identification expert the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
Therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief. 
(b) Eyewitness Accounts 
There were several discrepancies in eyewitness descriptions of 
the car that was used during the shooting.  Barrett vacillated on the 
position of a sticker on the back window of the car and ultimately 
identified James’s car, which did not have a sticker on the back 
window, as the one used during the shooting.  Sheppard argues 
 
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that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and 
call witnesses to bring out inconsistencies in Barrett’s testimony 
that would have rebutted Barrett’s identification of Sheppard as the 
shooter. 
At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Sheppard presented 
several witnesses whose descriptions of the car used during the 
shooting varied as to the color of the car and type of license plate.  
At the hearing, trial counsel conceded that there were slight 
variations in eyewitness descriptions of the car used during the 
shooting and that it may have been important to bring out Barrett’s 
prior inconsistent statements, but he maintained they were 
insignificant and did not overcome the overall consistencies in 
eyewitness descriptions of the car and Barrett’s identification of 
Sheppard at trial. 
We agree with the circuit court’s conclusion that trial 
counsel’s failure to challenge Barrett’s description of the car and to 
investigate and call certain witnesses at trial to rebut Barrett’s 
testimony did not fall below the standard guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment.  As trial counsel explained, attempting to challenge 
slight inconsistencies among witness descriptions of the car would 
 
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have highlighted the overall consistency in their identification of 
Sheppard.  Moreover, the circuit court cited competent, substantial 
evidence in support of its determinations that the eyewitness 
testimony offered at the postconviction evidentiary hearing, 
including by Avery Evans, Asia Ramsey Iszard, and Ava Webb, 
either failed to contradict Barrett’s account of the murder, 
corroborated Barrett’s account, or was not credible.  Credibility 
determinations are the province of the trial court and will not be 
disturbed so long as they are supported by competent, substantial 
evidence, as they are in this case.  See Foster v. State, 929 So. 2d 
524, 537 (Fla. 2006) (explaining that the trial court is in a better 
position to judge the credibility of witnesses). 
Therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief. 
(c) Photospreads 
Sheppard argues that the Sheriff’s Office did not follow its own 
procedures in administering the photospread to Barrett.  Namely, 
the officer failed to show the photos to Barrett one at a time and 
failed to document her witness statement verbatim.  Sheppard 
argues that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to challenge 
Barrett’s identification during the photo lineup. 
 
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Because nothing in the record shows that the Sheriff’s Office 
breached its own procedure, the circuit court correctly concluded 
that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient when he decided 
to refrain from questioning Barrett on this point.  Postconviction 
counsel argued below and on appeal that trial counsel was deficient 
for not challenging the failure of the Sheriff’s Office to document 
Barrett’s statement verbatim, but counsel does not explain how that 
failure would have affected the credibility of Barrett’s identification.  
Therefore, this claim is speculative and cannot succeed.  See 
Bradley, 33 So. 3d at 672. 
 
Even if this claim was not speculative, trial counsel’s 
performance was not deficient.  Sheppard argues that trial counsel 
was deficient when he failed to challenge Barrett’s identification 
during the photo lineup.  This argument ignores the fact trial 
counsel actually did challenge the validity of Barrett’s identification 
when he suggested that she may have remembered Sheppard’s face 
from the “mugbook” that she was shown earlier.  Trial counsel 
cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to challenge Barrett’s 
identification because he actually did so during trial.  See Bates v. 
 
- 23 - 
State, 3 So. 3d 1091, 1106 n.20 (Fla. 2009) (“[C]ounsel cannot be 
held ineffective for what counsel actually did . . . .”). 
Therefore, this claim was properly denied. 
(2) Failure to Effectively Cross-Examine Barrett 
Sheppard next challenges the circuit court’s denial of his claim 
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine Barrett 
on four alleged inconsistencies between her trial testimony and her 
previous statements, namely (a) her evolving description of the 
shooter; (b) her evolving description of the vehicle used during the 
shooting; (c) whether she had seen the shooter and the vehicle in 
the apartment complex prior to the shooting; and (d) whether she 
knew the victim.  We affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief with 
respect to each of these claims. 
(a) Evolving Description of the Shooter 
Sheppard argues that Barrett’s description of him was 
inconsistent with his appearance at the time of the shooting and 
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge Barrett 
regarding discrepancies in her description of the shooter’s hairstyle. 
When Barrett initially spoke to the police, shortly after the 
shooting, she described the shooter as having a short haircut.  
 
- 24 - 
Later, at her deposition, she described the shooter as having long 
plaits, although she stated that she could not really tell how long 
his hair was.  Then finally at trial, Barrett testified that the shooter 
had dreads that did not go past his shoulders. 
At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that he would 
bring to the jury’s attention changes in a witness’s description of 
the shooter if the changes were significant.  Trial counsel further 
testified that he was concerned that pressing Barrett as to certain 
aspects of her identification of Sheppard as the shooter would only 
provide her with an opportunity to reiterate her certainty that 
Sheppard was the shooter. 
The circuit court found that “Barrett’s description to the police 
of the shooter as having short hair is consistent with the picture of 
[Sheppard] with a short haircut and tight dreadlocks” that Barrett 
picked out of the photospread in identifying Sheppard as the 
shooter, and further ruled that trial counsel’s “strategy was 
reasonable in light of the insignificance of the different descriptions 
of [Sheppard’s] hairstyle.”  Even if Barrett’s prior descriptions of the 
shooter’s hairstyle had been admissible as prior inconsistent 
statements, see Wilcox v. State, 143 So. 3d 359, 383 (Fla. 2014) 
 
- 25 - 
(holding that a prior statement is inconsistent only if it directly 
contradicts or materially differs from the trial testimony) (citing 
State v. Smith, 573 So. 2d 306, 313 (Fla. 1990)), we agree with the 
circuit court’s conclusion that trial counsel’s decision to refrain 
from challenging Barrett on her prior descriptions of the shooter’s 
hairstyle was reasonable.  The record shows that trial counsel’s 
strategy was not to challenge insignificant changes to Barrett’s 
description of the shooter that would give Barrett the opportunity to 
reiterate to the jury her identification of Sheppard as the shooter. 
Because reasonable strategy decisions do not constitute 
deficient performance, we affirm the denial of relief. 
 
(b) Evolving Description of the Vehicle 
Sheppard next argues that trial counsel was ineffective in 
cross-examining Barrett regarding her inconsistent descriptions of 
the vehicle used in the shooting, which he contends would have 
shown that the vehicle Barrett described did not match the vehicle 
stolen by Sheppard.  Barrett testified at trial that she could not 
provide specific details relating to the vehicle’s tag, but that she 
could describe what the back of the vehicle looked like.  Barrett also 
 
- 26 - 
stated that a white decal appeared on the back rearview window of 
the vehicle used in the shooting. 
The circuit court concluded that Barrett’s inability to provide 
specific details relating to the vehicle’s tag did not amount to an 
inconsistent statement, and that it was simply a gap in knowledge.  
As for the differing statements regarding the decal, the circuit court 
concluded that the decal was a minor detail and that it did not 
undermine Barrett’s trial testimony; therefore, trial counsel was not 
deficient for failing to question her on this point. 
The record shows that trial counsel made reasonable strategic 
decisions not to challenge Barrett’s descriptions because he did not 
want to potentially introduce more damaging evidence against 
Sheppard, who had confessed to the shooting, or highlight the 
consistencies between the descriptions of the car provided by 
Barrett and other witnesses. 
Accordingly, because Sheppard failed to establish deficient 
performance, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief. 
 
- 27 - 
(c) Previous Sightings of Shooter at Hollybrook 
Apartments 
 
At the evidentiary hearing, Sheppard argued that trial counsel 
was deficient for failing to impeach Barrett with her prior 
inconsistent statements regarding her having previously seen 
Sheppard at Hollybrook Apartments. 
Barrett had initially told police that she knew the shooter and 
had seen his car around the complex before the shooting.  She 
suggested that they check the security logs to try to identify the car.  
However, she later recanted and told police that she had fabricated 
that statement because she was afraid of retribution.  Sheppard 
contends that his trial counsel should have used Barrett’s initial 
statement to impeach her. 
We agree with the circuit court’s conclusion that trial 
counsel’s strategic decision not to impeach Barrett with her prior 
statement was reasonable and therefore not deficient.  Cross-
examining Barrett regarding these statements would have provided 
her an opportunity to reiterate her certainty that Sheppard was the 
shooter and potentially to articulate before the jury facts supporting 
a reasonable fear of retribution from him.  Trial counsel made a 
 
- 28 - 
permissible determination that the risk of allowing Barrett to 
bolster or supplement her testimony outweighed any potential 
benefit to Sheppard’s defense. 
Therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief. 
(d) Barrett’s Relation to the Victim 
 
Sheppard next argues that stress affected Barrett’s ability to 
correctly identify the victim and that trial counsel was ineffective in 
cross-examining her on this point.  However, the circuit court 
correctly concluded that Barrett could not be impeached regarding 
her initial fear that the victim was her nephew because she made 
no prior inconsistent statements.  Barrett first told the police that 
she thought her nephew was injured during the shooting.  She later 
told the police that she initially feared that her nephew was the 
victim of the shooting, but that she later realized that he was not 
the victim.  At trial, Barrett testified that she was initially concerned 
that the victim of the shooting was her nephew; however, she 
ultimately did not know the victim, but that she “knew of him.”  
Trial counsel could not have used Barrett’s statements regarding 
her initial fear to impeach Barrett’s trial testimony because they 
were not inconsistent statements.  See Lowe v. State, 259 So. 3d 
 
- 29 - 
23, 43-44 (Fla. 2018); see also Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 383.  
Therefore, because “[t]rial counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to 
pursue meritless arguments,” Deparvine v. State, 146 So. 3d 1071, 
1093 (Fla. 2014) (citing Owen v. State, 986 So. 2d 534, 543 (Fla. 
2008)), we affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief. 
(3) Failure to Hire a Crime Scene Reconstructionist 
Sheppard next challenges the circuit court’s denial of his claim 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to retain a crime 
scene reconstructionist to refute Barrett’s account of the crime.  We 
affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief. 
At the evidentiary hearing, Sheppard presented Dr. Michael 
Knox, an expert crime scene reconstructionist, to challenge 
Barrett’s account of the shooting with measurements of the scene.  
In his testimony, Dr. Knox could pinpoint neither the exact location 
of the shooting nor Barrett’s location when the shooting began.  
Later at the hearing, trial counsel testified that he did not hire a 
crime scene reconstructionist because he had knowledge of 
Sheppard’s involvement in the shooting; and he feared that an 
accurate reconstruction of the crime scene would only prove 
Sheppard’s guilt. 
 
- 30 - 
We agree with the circuit court’s conclusion that Sheppard 
failed to show that trial counsel was deficient for failing to hire a 
crime scene reconstructionist.  The circuit court found that Dr. 
Knox’s reconstruction lacked specificity and did not undermine 
Barrett’s trial testimony.  Furthermore, the circuit court ruled that 
trial counsel’s decision not to retain a crime scene reconstructionist 
was reasonable because the use of such an expert would have been 
fraught with risk considering Sheppard’s confession to trial counsel.  
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief. 
(4) Failure to Object to Inflammatory Statements 
Sheppard also argues that the circuit court erred in denying 
his claim that trial counsel failed to object to unduly prejudicial 
statements made by Barrett and Detective Bowers at trial regarding 
Barrett’s description of the victim and Barrett’s agitated state.  We 
affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief with respect to this claim. 
 
During Barrett’s trial testimony, she referred to Wimberly as a 
“baby” or “little boy” three times.  Trial counsel testified at the 
evidentiary hearing that these references were not objectionable, 
particularly when the jury saw photos of the victim, who was 
sixteen years old.  We agree with the circuit court’s conclusion that 
 
- 31 - 
trial counsel’s strategy was reasonable and, therefore, not deficient.  
Furthermore, Sheppard cannot show prejudice.  We agree with the 
circuit court’s assessment that, given the brief nature of Barrett’s 
description of the victim, and the State’s theory of the case that 
Wimberly was a rival gang member who was murdered as a result of 
a gang dispute, there is no reasonable probability that but for trial 
counsel’s failure to object to these statements the outcome of the 
trial would have been different. 
 
Barrett’s other statements at issue were expressions of fear 
that the shooter might return and harm her because she witnessed 
the crime.  This Court considered these statements on direct appeal 
in the context of a fundamental error argument.  We found no 
fundamental error because “Barrett did not know the identity of the 
shooter at the time she expressed fear of the shooter’s possible 
return.”  Sheppard, 151 So. 3d at 1170.  We have now considered 
these statements under Strickland and find no reasonable 
probability that the outcome at trial would have been different had 
trial counsel objected to these statements—nor do we find any error 
in the circuit court’s conclusion that trial counsel did not perform 
 
- 32 - 
deficiently in letting these comments pass without objection.  See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
Regarding deficiency, when assessing a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, we must make every effort “to eliminate the 
distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of 
counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 
counsel’s perspective at the time.”  See id. at 689.  Considering 
Barrett’s comments in the context of the entire record, we cannot 
say that trial counsel’s decision not to object falls below the 
standard guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.  The record shows 
that Barrett, who had since identified Sheppard as the shooter, 
stated her fear to provide an explanation for her failure to return to 
the police to give her statement immediately after the shooting.  On 
the point of prejudice, Sheppard cannot show that, but for trial 
counsel’s failure to object to Barrett’s expression of fear, there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have 
been different. 
 
With respect to Detective Bowers’s testimony, the initial brief 
vaguely states that Bowers’s testimony was “full of objectionable 
statements” which “unduly prejudiced” Sheppard.  However, the 
 
- 33 - 
brief does nothing more than recite in cursory fashion a portion of 
the testimony to which the argument applies and does not 
demonstrate error with respect to the circuit court’s ruling as to any 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim related to the testimony 
summarily recited.  We have found similar allegations in a brief 
“without any supportive argument or authority with regard to the 
manner in which trial counsel’s conduct was deficient or the 
prejudice he sustained” insufficient to warrant relief, Hannon v. 
State, 941 So. 2d 1109, 1139 (Fla. 2006), and find Sheppard’s 
argument regarding Detective Bowers’s testimony similarly lacking. 
Consequently, we affirm as to this issue without further 
analysis. 
(5) Failure to Challenge the Admission of the Video Recording 
of Sheppard’s Interrogation 
 
Sheppard further argues that his videotaped interrogation, 
which was played for the jury at trial, contained numerous 
prejudicial statements by Detective Bowers and that the circuit 
court erred in denying his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to challenge the admission of the video.  This Court 
considered the admission of the video on direct appeal and 
 
- 34 - 
concluded that it did not amount to fundamental error.  Sheppard, 
151 So. 3d at 1166.  Applying Strickland, we now hold that the 
circuit court properly denied relief on Sheppard’s claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel because Sheppard failed to establish 
deficiency and, moreover, failed to establish prejudice.  See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
Regarding deficiency, the record shows that trial counsel made 
a strategic decision not to challenge the admission of the video 
because he had already viewed it and redacted the portions of the 
video he believed most damaging to Sheppard’s defense.  Mere 
dissatisfaction with trial counsel’s strategy is not enough to satisfy 
Strickland’s deficiency prong where, as here, the strategy was 
reasonable.  Johnston v. State, 63 So. 3d 730, 737 (Fla. 2011) 
(“There is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s performance 
was not deficient.” (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690)). 
In any event, Sheppard failed to make the showing of prejudice 
required by Strickland.  In the video, when Bowers offered theories 
on how Sheppard committed the murder, Sheppard denied his 
involvement in the shooting.  In light of the evidence adduced at 
trial that pointed to Sheppard’s guilt, including the eyewitness 
 
- 35 - 
accounts and the identification of Sheppard as the shooter, there is 
no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have 
been different had trial counsel been able to successfully preclude 
the jury from hearing the portions of the video he now argues 
should have been redacted.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
Therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief. 
(6) Failure to Challenge the State’s Ballistic Evidence 
Sheppard also challenges the circuit court’s denial of his claim 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present an expert 
to challenge the State’s ballistics expert.  In rejecting this claim, the 
circuit court explained: 
At the evidentiary hearing, the defense called 
William Tobin, a forensic metallurgist material scientist 
to testify about toolmark examinations for firearms.  
(E.H. at 25-27.)  Tobin testified specifically that the 
science of toolmark examinations, which Warniment 
performed, is not a real science and has no foundational 
validity.  (E.H. at 50, 57, 67, 76.)  Tobin also testified, 
however, that the examination Warniment did in this 
case is still commonly accepted practice in the forensic 
community.  (E.H. at 99.) 
Julie Schlax, Fletcher’s co-counsel at Defendant’s 
trial, testified at the evidentiary hearing that she cross-
examined Warniment at trial.  (E.H. at 160-61.)  
According to Schlax, she did not want to make an issue 
of the science behind Warniment’s testimony.  (E.H. at 
169.)  “[I]f you try to make too large of a deal of the 
 
- 36 - 
science on the cross-examination technique when it is so 
widely accepted, you run the risk that—it’s almost why 
are they protesting so much if they claim it wasn’t him.”  
(E.H. at 169.)  She testified that based upon her 
experience with Warniment, it would not have been 
effective to attack his credibility and expertise.  (E.H. at 
169.)  She also testified the defense theory was 
“regardless of whether or not the gun was at either scene, 
Mr. Sheppard wasn’t the person pulling the trigger at 
either scene.”  (E.H. at 168.) 
Similarly, Fletcher testified he has handled 
“hundreds if not thousands of cases [that] involve 
ballistic testimony.”  (E.H. at 242.)  According to Fletcher, 
ballistics testimony, “specifically the identification of shell 
casings at one location to shell casings at another 
location is commonly accepted not only in law 
enforcement but in the courts and in the general 
public[.]”  (E.H. at 242.)  He stated it would not be an 
effective strategy to try to discredit ballistics testimony 
that is so commonly accepted.  (E.H. at 242-43.)  Fletcher 
further testified that Warniment was an excellent State 
witness whose testimony is “credible and believable.”  
(E.H. at 242.)  Like Schlax, Fletcher explained the 
defense was primarily that Defendant did not shoot either 
Stafford or Wimberly.  (E.H. at 243.)  “It was not the fact 
that those two cases were unrelated, it was the 
identification of the person behind the barrel of the 
gun[.]”  (E.H. at 243.) 
Counsels’ strategy not to challenge the science 
behind Warniment’s ballistics examinations was 
reasonable given the defense’s theory that Defendant was 
not the shooter regardless of whether the murders were 
related.  Moreover, Fletcher and Schlax reasonably 
believed that challenging Warniment’s conclusions would 
hurt them in front of the jury.  Counsel was not 
ineffective.  See Reynolds, 99 So. 3d at 472 (concluding 
counsel not deficient when reasonably believed strategy 
 
- 37 - 
was correct); see also Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 
111(2011) (“Strickland does not enact Newton’s third law 
for the presentation of evidence, requiring for every 
prosecution expert an equal and opposite expert from the 
defense.”). 
The circuit court’s findings are supported by competent, 
substantial evidence, and we agree with the circuit court’s legal 
analysis.  Accordingly, because Sheppard failed to establish 
deficient performance with respect to this claim, we affirm the 
denial of relief. 
B. Newly Discovered Evidence Claims 
 
Sheppard next argues that the circuit court erred in denying 
two claims in which he sought relief based on newly discovered 
evidence.  For the reasons below, we affirm the denial of relief as to 
both claims. 
(1) Roberts’s Recantation 
 
Sheppard’s first newly discovered evidence claim centers on an 
affidavit in which Sheppard’s former cellmate, Michael Roberts, 
recanted his trial testimony regarding Sheppard’s inculpatory 
statements to Roberts.  At the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court 
sustained the State’s hearsay objection and properly allowed a 
proffer of the affidavit and testimony from members of the defense 
 
- 38 - 
team who had witnessed the recantation.  The State was also 
allowed to proffer rebuttal testimony—witnesses who testified that 
Roberts had affirmed his trial testimony after the recantation and 
had explained that he only recanted to get Sheppard’s 
postconviction counsel to leave him alone.  Roberts died prior to the 
evidentiary hearing and Sheppard argues on appeal, as he did 
below, that the recantation evidence should have been admitted 
under the hearsay exception for statements against interest found 
in section 90.804(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2020).  This statute states: 
(2) Hearsay exceptions.—The following are not 
excluded under s. 90.802, provided that the declarant is 
unavailable as a witness: 
 
. . . . 
 
(c) Statement against interest.—A statement which, 
at the time of its making, was so far contrary to the 
declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest or tended to 
subject the declarant to liability or to render invalid a 
claim by the declarant against another, so that a person 
in the declarant’s position would not have made the 
statement unless he or she believed it to be true.  A 
statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal 
liability and offered to exculpate the accused is 
inadmissible, unless corroborating circumstances show 
the trustworthiness of the statement. 
 
Id. 
 
- 39 - 
 
The circuit court concluded, without analysis, that Roberts’s 
statement did not fall within this exception and therefore denied 
relief with respect to Sheppard’s claim of newly discovered evidence.  
We agree with Sheppard that Roberts’s statement would have been 
against his penal interests because his recantation could have 
resulted in his prosecution for perjury based upon his testimony at 
Sheppard’s 2012 trial.  See § 775.15(6), Fla. Stat. (2020) (“A 
prosecution for perjury in an official proceeding that relates to the 
prosecution of a capital felony may be commenced at any time.”).6  
Accordingly, the circuit court should have next conducted the 
“trustworthiness” inquiry required by section 90.804(2)(c) to 
determine whether Roberts’s statement fell within the hearsay 
 
6.  In Lightbourne v. State, 644 So. 2d 54, 57 (Fla. 1994), this 
Court reasoned that no reasonable person “would believe they were 
subject to a perjury penalty eight years after providing testimony at 
a trial.”  The Court in Lightbourne relied on section 775.15(2)(b), 
Florida Statutes (1991), which, at the time, set the statute of 
limitations at three years for perjury committed in a capital case.  
However, in 1997, the Florida Legislature amended section 775.15 
to say, “A prosecution for perjury in an official proceeding that 
relates to the prosecution of a capital felony may be commenced at 
any time.”  Ch. 97-90, § 1, at 514, Laws of Fla. (amending  
§ 775.15(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1996)).  The statute has since been 
renumbered, but the language remains the same.  See § 775.15(6), 
Fla. Stat. (2020). 
 
- 40 - 
exception.  It did not.  It is also true, however, that even assuming 
the admissibility of Roberts’s newly discovered statement at retrial, 
Sheppard is not entitled to a retrial under the test we apply to 
newly discovered evidence. 
To succeed on a claim of newly discovered evidence, the 
defendant must establish two prongs.  See Jones v. State, 709 So. 
2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998).  First, the defendant must show that the 
evidence was not known by the trial court, the party, or counsel at 
the time of trial and it could not have been discovered through due 
diligence at the time of trial.  Id. at 521.  After establishing this 
prong, the defendant must show that the newly discovered evidence 
is of such a nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on 
retrial.  Id.; Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1991).  When 
analyzing the second prong, “ ‘the trial court is required to “consider 
all newly discovered evidence which would be admissible” at trial 
and then evaluate the “weight of both the newly discovered evidence 
and the evidence which was introduced at the trial” ’ . . . . This 
cumulative analysis must be conducted so that the trial court has a 
‘total picture’ of the case.”  Lightbourne v. State, 742 So. 2d 238, 
247 (Fla. 1999) (quoting Jones, 709 So. 2d at 521-22).  “Newly 
 
- 41 - 
discovered evidence satisfies the second prong . . . if it ‘weakens the 
case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt 
as to his culpability.’ ”  Marek v. State, 14 So. 3d 985, 990 (Fla. 
2009) (quoting Jones, 709 So. 2d at 526). 
This Court applies a mixed standard of review to a lower 
court’s rulings on newly discovered evidence claims after an 
evidentiary hearing.  It reviews findings of fact and credibility 
determinations for competent, substantial evidence and it reviews 
the application of law to the facts de novo.  See Marek, 14 So. 3d at 
990. 
In Sheppard’s case, even assuming, without deciding, that 
Roberts’s statement is admissible7 and that it constitutes newly 
discovered evidence, when considered in the total picture of the 
case, the statement is not of such a nature that it would probably 
produce an acquittal on retrial as required by the second prong of 
 
 
7.  Because recantations are rarely credible, see Armstrong v. 
State, 642 So. 2d 730, 735 (Fla. 1994), and given the testimony that 
Roberts disavowed the recantation affidavit after signing it, it 
appears unlikely that the circuit court would have resolved the 
admissibility issue in Sheppard’s favor.  However, because 
resolution of this issue involves credibility determinations that the 
circuit court was in the best position to make, we assume 
admissibility for purposes of our analysis. 
 
- 42 - 
Jones.  The evidence of Sheppard’s guilt is overwhelming and 
includes that Barrett witnessed Wimberly’s murder and identified 
Sheppard as the shooter, Sheppard, 151 So. 3d at 1158-59; that 
ballistic evidence connected the Wimberly and Stafford murders by 
“show[ing] that the gun that fired two of the three projectiles 
recovered from Stafford’s body was the same gun that killed 
Wimberly,” id. at 1157; and that witnesses identified the car used 
during Wimberly’s murder as the car that Sheppard and his 
codefendant were seen stealing, id. at 1159, which Sheppard later 
confessed to taking for a “joyride,” id. at 1161.  Considering 
Roberts’s statement alongside additional evidence favorable to 
Sheppard developed on postconviction such as that relating to 
Mejors, which we address below, and comparing it to the 
overwhelming evidence of Sheppard’s guilt from multiple sources 
that corroborate each other, Roberts’s statement, although certainly 
not without impact, does not create reasonable doubt.  See Marek, 
14 So. 3d at 990.  Therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s denial. 
(2) Khalilah Mejors’s Eyesight and State of Mind 
Sheppard next argues that the circuit court erred in denying 
relief based on his claim of newly discovered evidence that Mejors 
 
- 43 - 
was smoking marijuana and not wearing her prescription glasses 
when she witnessed the Wimberly shooting.  He also argues that 
the circuit court erred in denying his motion to continue the 
postconviction hearing in order to present Mejors’s live testimony.  
We affirm the circuit court’s denial on the merits for the reasons 
explained below, and because the circuit court addressed this claim 
on the merits based upon its acceptance of Sheppard’s proffer of 
Mejors’s expected testimony by affidavit, we find no abuse of 
discretion in the circuit court’s denial of the continuance.  See Diaz 
v. State, 132 So. 3d 93, 118 (Fla. 2013) (explaining that a trial 
court’s ruling on a motion for continuance is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion and that “[a]n abuse of discretion is generally not found 
unless the court’s ruling on a continuance results in undue 
prejudice to the defendant” (quoting Randolph v. State, 853 So. 2d 
1051, 1062 (Fla. 2003))). 
Turning to the merits, Mejors described the car used during 
the shooting as a “dark gray . . . Ford Crown Vic or Mercury.”  She 
also testified that the gun came out of the front passenger window 
and it was held by an African-American male; she could not see the 
shooter’s face.  According to Mejors, the gun was black and may 
 
- 44 - 
have been a Glock.  She identified James’s car as the car in which 
the shooter appeared.  At the time of the shooting, Mejors was on a 
third-floor balcony smoking a “cigar.” 
 
Postconviction counsel discovered that Mejors was smoking 
marijuana at the time of the shooting and was not wearing her 
prescription glasses.  The circuit court considered this proffered 
testimony and concluded that, though Mejors’s new testimony 
constituted newly discovered evidence, Sheppard would not be 
entitled to relief because Mejors’s testimony at trial was cumulative 
of the testimony of Sherrod, Carter, and Barrett. 
We agree with the circuit court that this potential 
impeachment evidence would not entitle Sheppard to a new trial 
because it is not of such a nature that it would probably produce an 
acquittal on retrial.  See Jones, 709 So. 2d at 521.  Mejors’s 
description of the car was cumulative of other evidence and 
consistent with the descriptions provided by other witnesses.  Her 
testimony that the shooter was African-American was similarly 
cumulative.  Impeachment of her testimony that the shooter was 
holding what appeared to be a Glock, though not cumulative, would 
not probably produce an acquittal on retrial given that Mejors did 
 
- 45 - 
not see more than one weapon being fired from the car during the 
shooting and that the State presented expert testimony that the 
shooter used a Smith and Wesson; and finally, because Sheppard’s 
defense was misidentification and none of Mejors’s trial testimony 
identified Sheppard as the shooter, any limited impeachment value 
of the newly discovered evidence does not weaken the case against 
Sheppard so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his 
culpability.  Marek, 14 So. 3d at 990. 
Therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of this claim. 
C. Giglio and Brady Violations 
Sheppard next argues that the circuit court erred in finding 
that Brady and Giglio violations did not occur at his trial with 
respect to (1) Michael Roberts, (2) Willie Carter, and (3) Khalilah 
Cook Mejors.  We affirm the circuit court’s denial with respect to 
these claims. 
“To establish a Brady violation, the defendant has the burden 
to show that: (1) the evidence was either exculpatory or impeaching; 
(2) the evidence was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the 
State; and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was 
prejudiced.”  Duckett v. State, 231 So. 3d 393, 400 (Fla. 2017) 
 
- 46 - 
(quoting Davis v. State, 136 So. 3d 1169, 1184 (Fla. 2014)).  To 
establish materiality or prejudice under Brady, the defendant “must 
demonstrate . . . a reasonable probability that the jury verdict 
would have been different had the suppressed information been 
used at trial.”  Smith v. State, 931 So. 2d 790, 796 (Fla. 2006) 
(citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 289 (1999)). 
“To establish a Giglio violation, it must be shown that: (1) the 
testimony given was false; (2) the prosecutor knew the testimony 
was false; and (3) the statement was material.”  Duckett, 231 So. 3d 
at 400 (quoting Guzman v. State, 868 So. 2d 498, 505 (Fla. 2003)).  
Unlike a Brady claim for which the defendant bears the burden of 
proof as to the materiality prong, “[u]nder Giglio, once a defendant 
has established that the prosecutor knowingly presented false 
testimony at trial, the state bears the burden to show that the false 
evidence was not material.”  Guzman, 868 So. 2d at 507.  “This 
requires the State to prove that the presentation of false testimony 
was ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,’ id. at 506, or in other 
words, that ‘there is no reasonable possibility that the error 
contributed to the conviction.’ ”  Ponticelli v. State, 941 So. 2d 1073, 
 
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1088 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Guzman, 868 So. 2d at 506, and then 
State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1138 (Fla. 1986)). 
This Court applies a mixed standard of review to the lower 
court’s determination of Brady and Giglio claims.  It reviews the 
factual findings for competent, substantial evidence and reviews the 
legal conclusions de novo.  Duckett, 231 So. 3d at 400. 
(1) Roberts 
The facts supporting Sheppard’s Brady and Giglio claims for 
Roberts’s testimony are the same as the facts supporting the newly 
discovered evidence claim concerning Roberts’s recantation.  As 
noted above, Sheppard produced an affidavit and two witnesses to 
testify about Roberts’s recantation.  At the evidentiary hearing, the 
State presented Roberts’s defense attorney, who testified that 
Roberts was not promised a deal on his pending charges in 
exchange for his testimony.  The assistant state attorney who 
represented the State at Sheppard’s trial, Caliel, also testified at the 
evidentiary hearing that he told Roberts that he could not make him 
any specific promises regarding his pending criminal charges.  In 
support of his argument that the State had a deal with Roberts, 
Sheppard notes that Roberts’s pending criminal charges were 
 
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resolved favorably, but he does not present evidence that this was 
due to any undisclosed deal that Roberts made with the State in 
exchange for his testimony. 
Consistent with Caliel’s postconviction testimony, the trial 
record also suggests that Roberts did not have an undisclosed deal 
with the State.  Roberts testified at trial that his Duval County 
charge was dropped before Sheppard’s trial began.  Roberts also 
candidly testified that he was seeking reduced sentences in 
exchange for his trial testimony; the fact that he later received 
favorable sentences, without more, does not establish Sheppard’s 
claim that Roberts entered into a specific deal with the State in 
exchange for his testimony.  Moreover, Roberts’s affidavit recanting 
his testimony is not inconsistent with his testimony at trial that he 
entered an open plea in the hope that the State would inform the 
court of his substantial assistance in Sheppard’s case. 
Though the circuit court denied the Brady and Giglio claims 
based on its ruling that Roberts’s affidavit was not admissible 
evidence, we uphold denial of these claims on an alternative basis, 
namely that Sheppard did not show that the State willfully or 
inadvertently suppressed favorable evidence as necessary to prevail 
 
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under Brady or that the State presented testimony that it knew was 
false as required to prevail under Giglio.  See Robertson v. State, 829 
So. 2d 901, 906 (Fla. 2002) (explaining that an appellate court may 
affirm when the trial court reaches the right result for the wrong 
reason so long as there is a basis in the record to support the trial 
court’s ruling). 
(2) Willie Carter 
At trial, Carter testified that he witnessed Sheppard and Evans 
steal James’s car.  He identified Sheppard as the person who 
entered the driver’s side of James’s car.  Carter was incarcerated 
during his testimony, but he testified that he did not have charges 
pending at the time of his testimony.  On redirect, he clarified that 
he was serving a twelve-year sentence on a cocaine charge that was 
unrelated to his testimony.  Sheppard argues that the State had a 
deal with Carter to recommend a sentence reduction in exchange 
for favorable testimony in Sheppard’s case.  To support this 
argument, Sheppard notes that the State filed a substantial 
assistance motion for Carter after he testified in Sheppard’s trial 
and Carter received a reduced sentence.  During the hearing on the 
 
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motion for reduction of sentence, the State mentioned that Carter 
had recently testified in Sheppard’s case. 
At Sheppard’s postconviction hearing, Caliel testified that 
Carter was convicted and sentenced for his charges before his 
testimony in Sheppard’s case and the motion for sentence reduction 
was for a separate matter.  Caliel further explained that he became 
aware of the sentence reduction after the motion was filed and he 
did not provide testimony or attend the hearing.  Moreover, Carter’s 
trial testimony was consistent with his deposition testimony, which 
he gave before he was arrested on the charges that resulted in the 
twelve-year sentence. 
Carter could not have been offered a deal for his testimony 
because he was not facing criminal charges when, during his 
deposition, he identified Sheppard as one of the people who stole 
James’s car.  Moreover, Caliel testified that he was unaware of any 
sentence reduction motion until after it had been filed by another 
state attorney.  Therefore, we agree with the circuit court’s legal 
conclusion that the facts are insufficient to show that the State 
violated Brady or Giglio. 
 
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(3) Khalilah Cook Mejors 
The facts of this claim are substantially similar to the facts of 
the newly discovered evidence claim related to Mejors.  The only 
additional fact is that shortly after the shooting, Mejors told police 
that she was not wearing her prescription glasses when she 
witnessed the shooting.  However, this information did not appear 
in any police reports, and the State only inquired about her vantage 
point, not her vision, during trial.  Sheppard argues that the State 
knowingly concealed information of Mejors’s nearsightedness 
because police knowledge is imputed to the prosecutor. 
 
We agree with the circuit court that, even if Sheppard could 
show that the State withheld favorable evidence about Mejors’s 
nearsightedness so as to violate Brady and that the State knowingly 
presented testimony that was false under Giglio, Sheppard would 
still not be entitled to relief.  Mejors’s testimony was cumulative, 
and her nearsightedness would not discredit her overall testimony, 
which was consistent with the testimony of other witnesses.  Even 
presuming that Mejors’s testimony about her vantage point was 
false within the meaning of Giglio for omitting that she was not 
wearing her prescription glasses, the error was harmless beyond a 
 
- 52 - 
reasonable doubt, as there is no reasonable possibility it 
contributed to the conviction.  See Ponticelli, 941 So. 2d at 1088.  
Also, even assuming the State’s suppression of favorable evidence, 
having failed under the more “defense friendly” materiality prong of 
Giglio, Sheppard cannot meet his burden to show “a reasonable 
probability that the jury verdict would have been different had the 
suppressed information been used at trial” as required to establish 
materiality under Brady.  Smith, 931 So. 2d at 796.  Therefore, we 
affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief. 
D. Cumulative Error 
In the final issue of his appeal, Sheppard challenges the 
circuit court’s denial of his cumulative error claim, in which he 
argued that “when considered as a whole,” the “sheer number of 
types of errors in [his] guilt and penalty phases” deprived him of the 
fundamentally fair trial to which he was entitled under the Sixth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution.  We affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief. 
As explained above, trial counsel was not deficient in any 
respect; therefore, there is no cumulative prejudice to analyze with 
respect to Sheppard’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  See 
 
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Sparre, 289 So. 3d at 847 (explaining that where trial counsel is 
deficient in more than one area that the Court must “consider the 
impact of these errors cumulatively” (quoting Parker, 89 So. 3d at 
867)). 
Although we assumed violations of both Brady and Giglio with 
respect to Mejors, we conducted the required materiality analysis 
for both claims, and there are no additional Brady or Giglio 
violations to address.  See Smith v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 572 F.3d 
1327, 1334 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Considering the undisclosed evidence 
cumulatively means adding up the force of it all and weighing it 
against the totality of the evidence that was introduced at trial.  
That is the way a court decides if its confidence in the guilty verdict 
is undermined where a suppressed-evidence type of Brady claim is 
involved, or if [a violation of Giglio] was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt . . . .”). 
In affirming the circuit court’s denial of the newly discovered 
evidence claim related to Mejors, we affirmed the circuit court’s 
legal conclusion that the newly discovered evidence is not of such a 
nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial, which 
required a cumulative consideration of the newly discovered 
 
- 54 - 
evidence in light of a total picture of the case.  See Lightbourne, 742 
So. 2d at 247.  We conducted the same cumulative consideration in 
affirming the denial of the newly discovered evidence claim related 
to Roberts on the basis that, even if admissible, and even if newly 
discovered, Roberts’s statement is not of such a nature that it 
would probably produce an acquittal on retrial. 
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of Sheppard’s 
cumulative error claim. 
II. HABEAS PETITION 
Sheppard presents two claims of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel in his petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims are properly 
raised in a habeas petition and are governed by the Strickland 
standard of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  See Frances v. 
State, 143 So. 3d 340, 358 (Fla. 2014) (“[T]his Court’s ability to 
grant habeas relief on the basis of appellate counsel’s 
ineffectiveness is determined by the defendant’s ability to meet both 
the deficiency and prejudice prongs of Strickland.”).  “It is the 
defendant’s burden to allege a specific, serious omission or overt act 
upon which the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be 
 
- 55 - 
based.”  Id. at 357 (citing Brown v. State, 846 So. 2d 1114, 1127 
(Fla. 2003)). 
A. Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Sheppard argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for 
failing to argue on direct appeal that prosecutorial misconduct 
amounted to fundamental error.  The alleged misconduct is that the 
State made multiple references to Sheppard’s gang affiliation during 
the guilt phase after promising trial counsel that it would not 
pursue gang affiliation as an aggravator during the penalty phase. 
Appellate counsel may be ineffective for failing to raise claims 
of fundamental error.  See Spencer v. State, 842 So. 2d 52, 73 (Fla. 
2003) (explaining that “an exception” to the rule that “appellate 
counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to raise issues not 
preserved for appeal” exists “where appellate counsel fails to raise a 
claim which, although not preserved at trial, presents a 
fundamental error”).  Moreover, prosecutorial misconduct can 
constitute fundamental error.  See Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 
765 (1987) (“[P]rosecutorial misconduct may ‘so infec[t] the trial 
with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 
 
- 56 - 
process.’ ” (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 
(1974))). 
 
However, the prosecutor in Sheppard’s case did not engage in 
misconduct by presenting evidence of Sheppard’s alleged gang 
affiliation to the jury during the guilt phase.  Sheppard does not 
identify instances where the prosecution engaged in impermissible 
opening or closing argument or introduced inadmissible evidence 
during his trial.  Sheppard references the video of his interrogation 
that was introduced at trial, which contains suggestions by the 
police officer that Sheppard was in a gang, but this Court 
considered the admission of that video on direct appeal and 
concluded that it did not amount to fundamental error.  Sheppard, 
151 So. 3d at 1165-68.  Therefore, because this Court has already 
ruled that admission of the video was not fundamental error, 
Sheppard cannot establish that appellate counsel was ineffective.  
See Breedlove v. Singletary, 595 So. 2d 8, 11 (Fla. 1992) 
(“[A]ppellate counsel is not ineffective for not raising nonmeritorious 
issues.”); cf. Spencer, 842 So. 2d at 74 (“[A]ppellate counsel raised 
this very issue on appeal and cannot be deemed ineffective for 
failing to prevail on a claim raised and rejected on appeal.”). 
 
- 57 - 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the claim is denied. 
B. Roper v. Simmons8 
Sheppard next claims that his appellate counsel was 
ineffective for failing to argue that Roper should be extended to 
preclude twenty-one-year-olds, Sheppard’s age at the time of the 
murders, from receiving the death penalty.  However, he 
acknowledges that a Roper extension claim cannot succeed on the 
merits under the law.  See Barwick v. State, 88 So. 3d 85, 106 (Fla. 
2011) (“[T]he Court has expressly rejected the argument that Roper 
extends beyond the [United States] Supreme Court’s 
pronouncement that the execution of an individual who was 
younger than eighteen at the time of the murder violates the eighth 
amendment.” (citing England v. State, 940 So. 2d 389, 406-07 (Fla. 
2006))).  Therefore, his claim must fail because appellate counsel 
cannot be ineffective for failing to bring a meritless claim.  See 
Breedlove, 595 So. 2d at 11. 
 
8.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the circuit court’s 
order denying postconviction relief for all guilt phase claims and 
deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, 
COURIEL, and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County, 
Linda F. McCallum, Judge 
Case No. 162008CF011059BXXXMA 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Robert S. Friedman, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Dawn B. 
Macready, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, North 
Region, Tallahassee, Florida, and Stacy R. Biggart, Special Assistant 
Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Gainesville, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Michael T. Kennett, Assistant 
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent