Title: Frank v. State By and Through Wyoming Bd. of Dental Examiners,

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Frank v. State By and Through Wyoming Bd. of Dental Examiners,1998 WY 123965 P.2d 674Case Number: 97-133Decided: 09/25/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

Timothy M. FRANK, D.D.S., Appellant 
(Petitioner/Plaintiff),

v.

STATE of Wyoming, acting By and Through the WYOMING 
BOARD OF DENTAL EXAMINERS, Appellee 
(Respondent/Defendant).

 

Appeal from the District Court, Laramie County, 
Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J.

 

Paul K. Knight of Mullikin, 
Larson & Swift, LLC, Jackson, for Appellant 
(Petitioner/Plaintiff).

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; and John S. Burbridge, 
Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, for Appellee 
(Respondent/Defendant).

 

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and TAYLOR,* JJ.

 * Chief Justice at time expedited 
conference.

 

TAYLOR, Justice.

 [¶1] Appellant questions the Wyoming Board of Dental 
Examiners' denial of his request for a license to practice dentistry. Appellant 
claims the Board of Dental Examiners violated both statute and his 
constitutional rights by refusing to grant reciprocity and by accepting only one 
regional clinical examination for licensure in Wyoming. Appellant now challenges 
the district court's opinion affirming the Board of Dental Examiners' decision 
and the district court's refusal to allow appellant to supplement the record on 
appeal. Finding no error, we affirm.

 

                                             
I. ISSUES

 

[¶2] Appellant, Dr. Timothy 
M. Frank (Dr. Frank), presents the following issues for 
review:

 

I. 
Whether the Board's action in denying Dr. Frank's application to practice 
dentistry was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion and unsupported 
by substantial evidence since Dr. Frank met the statutory requirements to 
practice dentistry in Wyoming and since the Board members failed to follow the 
legislative directives provided to them in the Wyoming Dental Practices 
Act?

 

II. Whether the Board's action in denying a license 
to Dr. Frank violated his constitutional rights to equal protection, due process 
and privilege and immunities under the federal and Wyoming 
Constitutions?

 

III. Whether the district court erred in denying Dr. 
Frank's application for presentation of additional evidence since it had the 
authority to direct the Board to review additional evidence where such evidence 
is material and there is good cause for failing to have presented at the 
administrative hearing.

 

[¶3] Appellee, the Wyoming 
Board of Dental Examiners (Board), responds with these 
issues:

 

I. 
Whether the Board's decision to deny Frank's application for licensure by 
reciprocity is supported by substantial evidence of 
record.

 

          
II. Is the Board's decision arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion 
or otherwise contrary to the law.

 

III. Whether the Board violated Frank's 
constitutional right to due process of law, equal protection or privileges and 
immunities under the Commerce Clause.

 

IV. Did the district court err in not allowing Frank 
to present additional evidence after the filing of the Board's reply 
brief.

 

                                             
II. FACTS

 

[¶4] The parties agree to 
the relevant facts of this case. On March 31, 1995, Dr. Frank submitted an 
application requesting licensure by reciprocity to practice dentistry in 
Wyoming. Dr. Frank later requested licensure based upon his current 
qualifications. From 1985 to the time of his request for licensure in Wyoming, 
Dr. Frank held a dental license, in good standing, in the state of Washington 
and previously in the state of Tennessee. At no time during his career had Dr. 
Frank been the subject of any disciplinary action or malpractice claims. Dr. 
Frank had successfully passed the Southern Regional Testing Agency Dental 
Examination, the Washington State Dental 
Licensing Examination, and Parts I and II of the National Board of Dental 
Examinations.

 

[¶5] On June 12, 1995, the 
Board denied Dr. Frank's application because he had not taken the Central 
Regional Dental Testing Service Examination (CRDTS), the professional clinical 
examination required for licensure in Wyoming. On August 30, 1995, the Board 
wrote Dr. Frank explaining why it would not grant reciprocity and informing him 
the CRDTS is the only test the Board accepts.  Dr. Frank requested a hearing on the 
matter, which was held on January 19, 1996. The Board issued its decision on 
March 6, 1996, denying Dr. Frank's 
request for licensure because he had not completed an accepted examination and 
no reciprocity agreement existed between Washington and 
Wyoming.

 

[¶6] Dr. Frank petitioned 
the district court to review the Board's decision, claiming the decision was 
contrary to Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-114(c)(i) and (ii) (1997) and the denial of a 
license to practice his profession violated his constitutional rights. On March 
3, 1997, Dr. Frank filed an application for presentation of additional evidence, 
seeking supplementation of the record with an "Overview of the CRDTS Dental 
Examination," his results from the Southern Regional Testing Agency, and an 
Information Packet from the Washington State Dental Licensing Board for 1986. On 
March 14, 1997, the district court issued its decision affirming the Board's 
actions and denying Dr. Frank's application to present additional evidence. This 
timely appeal followed.

 

                                      
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

[¶7] Our standard of review 
of agency decisions has been set forth as follows:

 

Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure 12 provides for 
judicial review of agency actions. Rule 12.09(a) limits the extent of review to 
determination of matters specified in W.S. 16-3-114(c). That statute requires 
reviewing courts to hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and 
conclusions found to be:

 

                    
"(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with law; [or]

 

           
         * 
* * * * *

 

(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case 
reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by 
statute."

 

W.S. 16-3-114(c)(ii). We review the agency decision 
de novo, according no deference to the district court's decision. * * 
*

 

"Our task is to examine the entire record to 
determine if substantial evidence exists to support the hearing examiner's 
findings.  We will not substitute 
our judgment for that of the hearing examiner if his decision is supported by 
substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a 
reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions."

 

Romero v. Davy McKee Corp., 854 P.2d 59, 61 (Wyo. 
1993). In reviewing questions of law, however, we do not defer to the agency's 
decision. If the conclusion of law is in accordance with law, we affirm it; if 
it is not, we correct it.

 

Heiss v. City of Casper Planning and Zoning Com'n, 
941 P.2d 27, 29 (Wyo. 1997). The actions of the agency are presumed to be 
correct, and it is the appellant's burden to show that the agency did not comply 
with the law. Butts v. Wyoming State Bd. Of Architects, 911 P.2d 1062, 1065 
(Wyo. 1996).

 

                                          
IV. DISCUSSION

 

A. STATUTORY 
CLAIMS

 

[¶8] Dr. Frank contends that 
the Board's refusal to accept regional examinations other than the CRDTS is 
arbitrary and capricious.  Wyo. 
Stat. § 33-15-108(a) (1997) contains the qualifications for licensure in 
Wyoming:

 

(a) Any person of good moral character, who has been 
graduated and admitted to the degree of doctor of dental surgery, doctor of 
dental medicine from a college or university accredited by the American Dental 
Association, or other equivalent degree by any accredited university or college 
authorized to grant the degree by the laws of the United States or by the laws 
of any state of the United States or Dominion of Canada, upon deposit of the 
examination fee set by the board, may make application in writing to the board 
to be examined by it with reference to his qualifications to practice dentistry. 
The applicant shall pass a written and practical examination in a manner 
satisfactory to the board.

 

(Emphasis added.) The Board 
found that Dr. Frank had completed the written requirement by passing Parts I 
and II of the National Board of Dental Examinations, but his failure to complete 
the CRDTS as a practical examination precluded licensure. Dr. Frank argues that 
because the statute does not require the Board to designate one regional 
examination over another, the Board's designation of the CRDTS arbitrarily 
discriminates against substantially similar examinations.

 

[¶9] At the hearing, 
testimony established that the Board chose the CRDTS examination because it most 
thoroughly tests competence in dentistry. Dr. Frank presented no contradictory 
evidence. Neither did he present evidence that the tests he had taken were 
equivalent to the CRDTS. Given the Board's broad discretion afforded by the 
legislature to determine the proper written and practical examinations for 
licensure in Wyoming, we find no abuse of that discretion in requiring an 
applicant to pass an examination, which in the Board's estimate, best tests the 
qualifications of the applicant.

 

[¶10] Dr. Frank next 
challenges the Board's refusal to grant a license on the basis of reciprocity. 
Reciprocity is governed by Wyo. Stat. § 33-15-122 (1997), which 
provides:

 

The board may accept by reciprocity, upon payment of 
a registration fee determined by the board, the license of a dentist who was 
licensed in another state or territory of the United States if the license 
requirements of that state or territory were as great or greater than those of 
Wyoming when that license was granted. Reciprocity may only be granted to 
dentists from those states which grant reciprocity to dentists licensed in 
Wyoming.

 

          
(Emphasis added.)

 

[¶11] Dr. Frank argues that 
the Board categorically denies reciprocity, despite the statutory grant of such 
authority, and therefore its actions are an abuse of discretion and an ultra 
vires limitation of statutory power. Whether the Board denies reciprocity to 
other candidates is of no event in this case because Dr. Frank did not qualify 
for reciprocity. It is undisputed that Washington does not grant reciprocity 
solely on the basis of a Wyoming license. Washington grants reciprocity to 
Wyoming dentists only if they have completed the Western Regional Dental Testing 
Service Examination or the CRDTS prior to 1995. Dr. Frank has not completed 
either of these examinations. 
Consequently, no abuse of discretion occurred when the Board denied reciprocity 
pursuant to the clear language of the statute.

 

B. CONSTITUTIONAL 
CLAIMS

 

[¶12] Dr. Frank's 
constitutional claims are equally without merit. Equal protection " 'mandates 
that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike, both in the 
privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed.' " Allhusen v. State By and 
Through Wyoming Mental Health Professions Licensing Bd., 898 P.2d 878, 884 (Wyo. 
1995) (quoting Small v. State, 689 P.2d 420, 425 (Wyo. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1224, 105 S. Ct. 1215, 84 L. Ed. 2d 356 (1985)).

 

Licensure acts * * * "are passed for the express 
purpose of affording the public protection * * *." Mapes v. Foster, 38 Wyo. 244, 
266 P. 109, 116 (1928). The legislature can, in the exercise of the police 
power, regulate and require licensure of professionals as it sees fit but any 
law in futherance of the police power "must be reasonable and not arbitrary." 
State v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 84 P.2d 767, 771 (1938).

 

Allhusen, 898 P.2d  at 885. 
Equal protection claims are reviewed under one of two levels of scrutiny. Id. If 
the claim involves a member of a "suspect class" or a "fundamental right," we 
employ a strict scrutiny test " 'which requires a showing [by the Board] that 
the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.' " Id. 
(quoting Kautza v. City of Cody, 812 P.2d 143, 147 (Wyo. 1991)). Otherwise, the 
burden of persuasion is assigned to the challengers to demonstrate that the 
challenged action bears no rational relationship to a state interest. Under this 
test, the claimant must show that the classification is unconstitutional beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Allhusen, 898 P.2d  at 885.

 

[¶13] Dr. Frank does not 
contend that he is a member of a suspect class, and "numerous cases have 
recognized that there is no fundamental interest involved in the practice of 
medicine * * * or any other profession." Gumbhir v. Kansas State Bd. of 
Pharmacy, 231 Kan. 507, 646 P.2d 1078, 1090 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1103, 
103 S. Ct. 724, 74 L. Ed. 2d 950 (1983) (and cases cited therein); see also 
Anderson v. Wagner, 61 Ill. App.3d 822, 19 Ill.Dec. 190, 378 N.E.2d 805, 809 
(1978), aff'd, 79 Ill. 2d 295, 37 Ill.Dec. 558, 402 N.E.2d 560 (1979) and State ex rel. 
Schneider v. Liggett, 223 Kan. 610, 576 P.2d 221, 227, dismissed, 439 U.S. 808, 
99 S. Ct. 66, 58 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1978) (and cases cited therein). We, therefore, 
apply a rational relationship test to Dr. Frank's claim. See Allhusen, 898 P.2d  
at 885 (applying a rational relationship test to legislation regarding the 
practice of mental health professionals) and Chalfy v. Turoff, 804 F.2d 20, 23 
(2nd Cir. 1986) ("licensing authority need only show that the challenged 
requirement is rationally related to applicant's fitness for the 
occupation.").

 

[¶14] Dr. Frank does not 
challenge the constitutionality of the statutes governing licensure and 
reciprocity, but claims that the Board's application of those statutes creates 
an arbitrary classification of persons who are qualified to practice dentistry 
but who have not taken the CRDTS. He asserts the Board has created an 
unconstitutional "irrebuttable presumption" that applicants who have not taken 
this test are not qualified. While this may be a creative approach, it does not 
identify any class which is subjected to unequal treatment. Every dentist 
applying for licensure must take the same examination or be licensed in a state 
which has a reciprocity agreement with 
Wyoming.

 

[¶15] Moreover, states have 
a compelling interest in the practice of professions within their boundaries, 
and as part of their power to protect the public health, safety and other valid 
interests, they have broad power to establish standards for licensing 
practitioners and regulating the practice of professions. Gade v. National Solid 
Wastes Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 108, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2388, 120 L. Ed. 2d 73 
(1992) (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792, 95 S. Ct. 2004, 2016, 44 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1975)). The Board determined that the CRDTS best identifies 
qualified individuals to practice dentistry. Dr. Frank failed to present any 
evidence that this determination does not have a rational relationship to the 
state's interests. As we noted above, no evidence was presented that 
contradicted the Board's assessment of the CRDTS.

 

[¶16] Similarly, there is no 
violation of the privileges and immunities afforded to Dr. Frank. The privileges 
and immunities clause "was designed to insure to a citizen of State A who 
ventures into State B the same privileges which the citizens of State B enjoy." 
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395, 68 S. Ct. 1156, 1162, 92 L. Ed. 1460 (1948); 
Powell v. Daily, 712 P.2d 356, 358 (Wyo. 1986). Dr. Frank fails to identify how 
he was treated differently than Wyoming practitioners who are required to take 
the same test.

 

[¶17] Dr. Frank's due 
process claims are also insufficient. Dr. Frank alleges that he was denied 
substantive due process when the Board denied his right to practice. Dr. Frank's 
right to practice, however, is subject to reasonable limitations set by the 
State of Wyoming as discussed above. The Board's alleged categorical denial of 
reciprocity does not affect Dr. Frank because he clearly did not qualify for 
reciprocity under Wyo. Stat. § 33-15-122, which specifically limits the 
discretion of the Board.

 

[¶18] Procedural due process 
requires the applicant be given reasonable notice and a meaningful opportunity 
to be heard by the body which rules on his application before government action 
may substantially affect a significant property interest. Tate v. Wyoming 
Livestock Bd., 932 P.2d 746, 748 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting Pfeil v. Amax Coal West, 
Inc., 908 P.2d 956, 961 (Wyo. 1995)). Dr. Frank believes he was denied this 
right because the Board did not provide a fair investigation and consideration 
of his credentials. It is uncontested, however, that subsequent to Dr. Frank's 
application, the Board investigated the reciprocity between Washington and 
Wyoming, afforded Dr. Frank a hearing 
after notice of the intent to deny his license, allowed Dr. Frank to appear at 
the hearing with his attorney, and allowed him to present evidence and 
cross-examine witnesses. There was no violation of procedural due 
process.

 

C. DENIAL OF APPLICATION TO 
PRESENT ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE

 

[¶19] Dr. Frank asserts the 
district court's denial of his application to present additional evidence prior 
to the hearing on appeal constitutes reversible error. W.R.A.P. 12.08 provides, 
in relevant part:

 

If, before the date set for hearing, application is 
made to the reviewing court for leave to present additional evidence, and it is 
shown to the satisfaction of the court the additional evidence is material, 
and good cause for failure to present it in the proceeding before the agency 
existed, the reviewing court, in contested cases, shall order the additional 
evidence to be taken before the agency upon those conditions determined by the 
reviewing court.

 

(Emphasis added.) While the 
statute mandates court action if two criteria are present, the district court is 
given broad discretion in determining whether there is good cause for the 
failure to present the evidence before the agency. Louisiana Land and 
Exploration Co. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Com'n, 809 P.2d 775, 781 
(Wyo. 1991). Dr. Frank failed to show good cause why he did not submit this 
material in the initial proceeding. His assertion that the "Board had never 
requested production of written requirements of other regional or state 
examinations from Dr. Frank until at the time of the hearing" is insufficient. 
Dr. Frank requested a healing and carried the burden of demonstrating that the 
Board's denial of his license was contrary to statute. An essential element of his claim was the equivalency of 
the examinations he completed to the test required in Wyoming. He does not 
contend that this material was not available at the time he presented his case 
to the Board. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing supplementation of the record.

 

                                          
V. CONCLUSION

 

[¶20] Substantial evidence 
supported the Board's denial of Dr. Frank's application for licensure. The 
Board's determination to accept a certain examination for the clinical portion 
of licensure qualifications is supported by the evidence and rationally related 
to a substantial government interest. Similarly, the Board did not abuse its 
discretion in denying licensure on the basis of reciprocity when Dr. Frank did 
not so qualify under the statutory requirements. The district court's order 
affirming the determination of the Board is affirmed in all 
respects.