Title: Horne v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
KHALID HORNE, 
 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 520, 2004 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID 0107022453 
§   
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: June 17, 2005 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: August 5, 2005 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court.  REMANDED 
with jurisdiction retained. 
 
 
 
Khalid Horne, pro se, appellant. 
 
 
Loren C. Meyers, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, for the appellee, 
State of Delaware. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
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The appellant, Khalid Horne, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s denial of his first motion for postconviction relief.  Horne’s opening 
brief on appeal raises several claims challenging the effectiveness of his trial 
counsel.  Because we find the record insufficient to review the substance of 
Horne’s claims, we remand this matter to the Superior Court for expansion 
of the record and reconsideration of Horne’s claims in light of the expanded 
record.  Jurisdiction will be retained. 
Trial 
The record reflects that Horne was arrested in July 2001 on charges of 
trafficking cocaine and several related offenses.  At his trial in February 
2002, a State chemist testified that the weight of the crack cocaine seized 
from Horne was 5.01 grams. On cross-examination, the State chemist 
admitted that there was a five percent margin of error in the reported weight 
of the drugs.  Based on this testimony, defense counsel moved for a 
judgment of acquittal on the trafficking charge, arguing that the State had 
not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the cocaine weighed five grams 
or more.  The Superior Court denied defense counsel’s motion.   
The jury convicted Horne of five drug offenses, including trafficking, 
and resisting arrest. The Superior Court sentenced Horne to fourteen years in 
prison followed by probation, which included a three-year minimum 
 
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mandatory sentence for trafficking cocaine.1  This Court affirmed Horne’s 
convictions and sentence on appeal.2   
Horne’s Postconviction Motion 
In May 2004, Horne filed his first motion for postconviction relief.  
The motion asserted nine claims, including eight claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel and one claim challenging the legality of the search 
warrant. Horne also filed motions seeking the appointment of counsel and an 
evidentiary hearing.  The Superior Court summarily dismissed the search 
warrant claim as previously adjudicated.3  Without requesting a response 
from either trial counsel or the State, the Superior Court denied the eight 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on their merits.  Because the 
Superior Court found no merit to Horne’s postconviction motion, it 
concluded that neither an evidentiary hearing nor the appointment of counsel 
was appropriate.  This appeal followed. 
Horne’s Appellate Claims 
In his opening brief on appeal, Horne asserts that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to properly investigate and present an expert to 
                                                 
1 At the time of Horne’s conviction, the sentence for trafficking cocaine weighing more 
than five grams but less than fifty grams was three years minimum mandatory.  See Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 16, § 4753A(a)(2)a (1995). 
2 Horne v. State, 817 A.2d 804 (Table) (Del. 2003). 
3 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4). 
 
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challenge the State’s evidence regarding the scale used to weigh the drugs 
seized by police during the execution of the search warrant.  In response, the 
State cites to a conversation on the record between defense counsel and the 
trial judge.  The State contends that the inference to be drawn from the 
conversation is that defense counsel did consult with an expert and made a 
strategic decision not to challenge the calibration of the scale.  In light of this 
inference, the State contends, Horne could not overcome the presumption 
that his counsel’s performance was professionally reasonable.4 
Ineffectiveness Claims 
First Postconviction Motion 
 
This Court consistently has held that it will not consider a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in a direct criminal appeal if the issue has 
not been decided on the merits in the trial court.5  The rationale for this rule 
arises from “the reviewing Court’s need to have before it a complete record 
on the question of counsel’s alleged incompetency . . . .”6  As a practical 
matter, therefore, a defendant’s first and best opportunity to raise an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is in a timely motion for 
postconviction relief filed pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. 
                                                 
4 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990). 
5 Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 829 (Del. 1994). 
6 Duross v. State, 494 A.2d 1265, 1267 (Del. 1985). 
 
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Once a motion for postconviction relief is filed, the Superior Court, in 
its discretion, may proceed in a number of different ways.  If it “plainly 
appears from the motion” and record that the defendant is not entitled to 
relief, the Superior Court may summarily dismiss the petition.7  If the 
defendant is indigent and the motion presents a “substantial ground for 
relief,” the Superior Court may appoint counsel to represent the defendant in 
the postconviction proceedings.8  If the motion is not summarily dismissed, 
the Superior Court “shall order the attorney general to file a response.”9  The 
Superior Court also may direct that the record be expanded to include, 
without limitation, documents, transcripts or exhibits from appellate or 
habeas corpus proceedings.10  If the motion contains allegations of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, “the judge may direct the lawyer who 
represented the movant to respond to the allegations”11 and thereafter may 
hold an evidentiary hearing.12 
Although Rule 61 does not require the Superior Court to obtain trial 
counsel’s affidavit in response to the defendant’s allegations of ineffective 
                                                 
7 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(4). 
8 Id. 61(e). 
9 Id. 61(f). 
10 Id. 61(g)(2). 
11 Id. (emphasis added). 
12 Id. 61(h). 
 
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assistance of counsel, we find that to be the preferable practice in a case like 
this involving a first postconviction motion containing ineffectiveness 
claims.  Without either an affidavit from trial counsel or an evidentiary 
hearing on the allegations, “trial counsel would have neither an opportunity 
to be heard, nor the chance to defend himself against such charge of 
incompetency.”13  More importantly, without counsel’s affidavit or sworn 
testimony, the record upon which this Court must base its appellate review 
of the reasonableness of counsel’s representation is incomplete and 
inadequate. 
Conclusion 
Accordingly, we conclude that this matter must be remanded to the 
Superior Court for expansion of the record to include trial counsel’s affidavit 
in response to Horne’s allegations.  In its discretion, the Superior Court may 
direct the parties to respond to the affidavit and hold an evidentiary hearing, 
if necessary.  The Superior Court is directed to issue supplemental findings 
and conclusions on Horne’s postconviction motion based upon the expanded 
record.  Jurisdiction is retained.14 
                                                 
13 Duross v. State, 494 A.2d at 1267. 
14 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 19(c).