Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Peck

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Peck, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-2961.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2017-OHIO-2961 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. PECK. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Peck, Slip Opinion No.  
2017-Ohio-2961.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Failure to provide competent representation—Failure to 
act with reasonable diligence—Six-month suspension, fully stayed on 
conditions—Restitution ordered. 
(No. 2016-1490—Submitted February 8, 2017—Decided May 30, 2017.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 
Court, No. 2015-067. 
_______________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Gregory Lawrence Peck, of Oxford, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0040211, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1988. 
{¶ 2} On December 10, 2015, relator, disciplinary counsel, filed a 
complaint with the Board of Professional Conduct, charging Peck with professional 
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misconduct arising from his neglect of a client’s legal matter, which resulted in a 
default judgment and the assessment of treble damages against the client. 
{¶ 3} The parties entered into stipulations of fact, misconduct, and 
aggravating and mitigating factors and jointly recommended that Peck be 
suspended from the practice of law for six months, with the entire suspension 
stayed.  After hearing Peck’s testimony, a panel of the board adopted the parties’ 
stipulations and their recommended sanction.  The board adopted the panel’s 
findings and recommendation.  We adopt the board’s report in its entirety and 
suspend Peck from the practice of law for six months, fully stayed on the condition 
that he engage in no further misconduct. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 4} On January 21, 2009, Ashley Needham filed a complaint in the 
Middletown Municipal Court against We Sell Auto Sales (“We Sell”) alleging 
breach of contract, negligence, fraud, and a violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales 
Practices Act.  Donald Jones, the owner of We Sell, asked Peck to represent him in 
the case. 
{¶ 5} Although Peck generally limited his practice to family law and 
criminal defense, he had previously handled a similar civil matter and agreed to the 
representation.  He entered an appearance as counsel for We Sell, answered the 
complaint out of time, and filed a motion to dismiss. 
{¶ 6} Needham, however, twice amended the complaint—first to add her 
grandfather, Charles Needham, as a plaintiff, and the second time to name Donald 
Jones, d.b.a. We Sell, as a defendant.  The second amended complaint was served 
on Peck by e-mail and on Jones by certified mail, but Peck did not answer it.  
Consequently, the Needhams moved for default judgment against Donald Jones, 
d.b.a. We Sell.  Peck failed to respond.  Although Peck appeared at the hearing on 
the default motion, the court granted the motion, finding that he had not presented 
any evidence of excusable neglect or moved for leave to file an answer out of time.  
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The court issued a judgment in favor of the Needhams for $6,206.89 in 
compensatory damages, trebled to $18,620.67 under the Consumer Sales Practices 
Act, punitive damages of $6,206.89 on their fraud claim, attorney fees of $1,100, 
and interest at the rate of 4 percent per annum.  Peck did not appeal the trial court’s 
decision, and the parties stipulate that the court issued a certificate of judgment for 
$25,927.56. 
{¶ 7} After Peck appeared at a judgment-debtor examination with Jones, the 
Needhams garnished $6,054.26 from Jones’s financial accounts.  Thereafter, Peck 
moved the court to stay the judgment-enforcement proceedings until a Civ.R. 60(B) 
hearing occurred.  But neither Peck nor Jones appeared for the hearing on the 
motion to stay.  And because there was no Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from 
judgment pending, the magistrate denied Peck’s request for a stay.  Peck did not 
file objections to the magistrate’s decision. 
{¶ 8} Nearly a year after the court denied the request for a stay, Peck filed 
a motion for relief from the default judgment under Civ.R. 60(B).  The magistrate 
denied the motion.  The court overruled Peck’s objections to the magistrate’s 
decision and affirmed the original default judgment in the Needhams’ favor. 
{¶ 9} Peck appealed the denial of his Civ.R. 60(B) motion but then 
attempted to challenge the court’s initial grant of the default judgment.  The court 
of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, finding not only that Peck’s 
appeal was untimely because the default judgment had been issued three years 
earlier but that Peck had also waived any error in that judgment by failing to object 
to the magistrate’s decision granting it.  Needham v. Jones, 12th Dist. Butler No. 
CA2012-07-135, 2013-Ohio-2965, ¶ 21-22. 
{¶ 10} In addition to mishandling the representation, Peck failed to provide 
Jones with information regarding his professional-liability-insurance carrier.  At 
the hearing, he testified that he thought he had malpractice insurance but that he 
had missed the deadline to renew his policy and therefore lacked coverage. 
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{¶ 11} The parties stipulated and the board agreed that Peck’s conduct 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 (requiring a lawyer to provide competent representation 
to a client) and 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing a client). 
Sanction 
{¶ 12} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
several relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the 
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions 
imposed in similar cases. 
{¶ 13} The sole stipulated aggravating factor is that Peck caused his client 
significant financial harm: Jones has had a default judgment imposed against him 
for more than $25,000, he has had over $6,000 garnished from his bank accounts, 
he has had a lien issued against his real property, and he has been unable to obtain 
a loan.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(8).  Stipulated mitigating factors include the 
absence of a prior disciplinary record, the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, 
and a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings.  See Gov.Bar R. 
V(13)(C)(1), (2), and (4). 
{¶ 14} In weighing the appropriate sanction for Peck’s misconduct, the 
board considered several cases in which we imposed sanctions ranging from a 
public reprimand to a six-month actual suspension for similar misconduct.  It found 
the facts of Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Nelson, 144 Ohio St.3d 414, 2015-Ohio-4337, 
44 N.E.3d 268, and Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Dawson, 124 Ohio St.3d 22, 
2009-Ohio-5959, 918 N.E.2d 519, to be most instructive. 
{¶ 15} In Nelson, the attorney failed to consult with a client regarding the 
status and management of the client’s personal-injury case.  He filed a complaint 
without the client’s knowledge, failed to conduct discovery on her behalf, and failed 
to respond to the defendant’s discovery requests.  Nelson ultimately dismissed the 
lawsuit without the client’s knowledge or consent, failed to timely refile it, and 
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failed to advise the client that his malpractice insurance had lapsed.  Thus, the client 
lost not only the ability to pursue her personal-injury claim but also a source of 
recovery for a malpractice action.  Aggravating factors included Nelson’s initial 
failure to cooperate in the disciplinary process and the harm to his client.  But we 
found that a public reprimand was the appropriate sanction because Nelson 
accepted responsibility for his misconduct and did not (1) have prior discipline, (2) 
act with a selfish motive, (3) engage in fraud, dishonesty, or self-dealing, (4) engage 
in a pattern of neglect, or (5) profit from his misconduct.  Nelson at ¶ 6-9. 
{¶ 16} In Dawson, the attorney neglected an age-discrimination action filed 
against two of his clients.  Specifically, Dawson failed to respond to the plaintiff’s 
discovery requests and motion for partial summary judgment.  Consequently, the 
court granted a default judgment against Dawson’s clients and awarded the plaintiff 
more than $180,000 in damages.  Dawson did not appeal that judgment, but the 
parties later settled the case for $27,000.  Dawson failed to inform the affected 
clients that he did not carry professional-liability insurance, and after settling their 
legal-malpractice claim for $22,000, he defaulted after paying just $5,500 and 
ultimately discharged the obligation in bankruptcy. 
{¶ 17} The sole aggravating factor in Dawson was a brief attorney-
registration suspension.  Mitigating factors included the absence of a dishonest or 
selfish motive and Dawson’s cooperation throughout the disciplinary proceedings.  
But in light of the substantial default judgment entered against Dawson’s clients as 
a result of his misconduct, and his failure to abide by the terms of the malpractice 
settlement, we suspended Dawson from the practice of law for six months, with no 
stay.  Dawson, 124 Ohio St.3d 22, 2009-Ohio-5959, 918 N.E.2d 519, at ¶ 24-25. 
{¶ 18} In this case, the board determined that Peck’s misconduct was more 
egregious than Nelson’s because the client suffered an actual monetary loss, unlike 
Nelson’s client, who lost the ability to pursue a legal claim that may or may not 
have been successful.  Because Peck did not have a prior suspension and had neither 
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violated the terms of a malpractice settlement nor discharged his financial 
obligation to his client in bankruptcy as Dawson had, the board found that Peck’s 
conduct was less egregious than Dawson’s. 
{¶ 19} Citing the measurable harm to Jones, the board recommends that we 
adopt the parties’ stipulated sanction of a six-month suspension from the practice 
of law, fully stayed. 
{¶ 20} Having thoroughly reviewed the record, we adopt the board’s 
findings of fact, misconduct, and aggravating and mitigating factors.  In addition to 
the cases cited by the board, we note that in Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Drain, 120 
Ohio St.3d 288, 2008-Ohio-6141, 898 N.E.2d 580, ¶ 2, we imposed a six-month 
suspension, fully stayed on conditions, on an attorney who neglected a single client 
matter, intentionally prejudiced the client’s interests by repeatedly missing 
established deadlines, missed the statute of limitations for refiling the client’s case, 
and canceled his professional-liability insurance without warning the client.  
Therefore, we agree that a six-month suspension, fully stayed on the condition that 
Peck engage in no further misconduct, is the appropriate sanction in this case.  We 
note that the parties made no mention of restitution to Jones in their stipulations 
and that the board concluded that no restitution was owed.  However, we find that 
restitution equal to the amount of the judgment entered against Jones, d.b.a. We 
Sell, is necessary and appropriate in this case in light of Peck’s failure to answer 
the second amended complaint, to respond to the motion for default judgment, and 
to either move the court for leave to file an answer out of rule or present evidence 
of excusable neglect during his appearance at the default hearing. 
{¶ 21} Accordingly, Gregory Lawrence Peck is suspended from the practice 
of law in Ohio for six months, with the entire suspension stayed on the conditions 
that he make full restitution of $25,927.56, plus interest at the rate of four percent 
per annum from May 17, 2010, to Donald Jones, d.b.a. We Sell Auto Sales, and 
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commit no further misconduct.  If Peck violates the conditions, the stay will be 
lifted and he will serve the entire suspension.  Costs are taxed to Peck. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, FRENCH, O’NEILL, FISCHER, and 
DEWINE, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., not participating. 
_________________ 
Scott J. Drexel, Disciplinary Counsel, and Michelle R. Bowman, Assistant 
Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Gregory Lawrence Peck, pro se. 
_________________