Title: Bryan v. Hudson

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

The City of Bryan, Appellee, v. Hudson, Appellant. 
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[Cite as Bryan v. Hudson (1997),  
 Ohio St.3d   
 .] 
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Motor vehicles -- Driving while intoxicated -- Establishing valid consent 
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or refusal to take breath-alcohol-concentration test in context of 
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administrative license suspension -- Notice requirement of R.C. 
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4511.191(C) is satisfied by reading to arrestee the language of 
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R.C. 4511.191(C)(2)(b) as set forth on the top portion of BMV 
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Form 2255. 
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- - -  
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For purposes of establishing a valid consent or refusal to take a breath-alcohol- 
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concentration test in the context of an administrative license suspension 
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pursuant to R.C. 4511.191, the notice requirement of R.C. 4511.191(C) is 
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satisfied by reading to the arrestee the language of R.C. 4511.191(C)(2)(b) 
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as set forth on the top portion of BMV Form 2255. 
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- - -  
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(No. 95-1513 -- Submitted October 9, 1996 -- Decided February 4, 1997.) 
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CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Williams County, No. WM- 94 - 
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014. 
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On August 23, 1994, appellant, Robert S. Hudson, was arrested by Officer 
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Jeremy Jones of the Bryan Police Department for speeding, operating a 
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motorcycle without a helmet, and operating a motor vehicle while under the 
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influence of alcohol.  Officer Jones transported appellant to the Bryan police 
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station, where he read the top portion of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles (“BMV”) 
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Form 2255 to appellant, advised him of his Miranda rights, asked him to submit 
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to a breath- alcohol- concentration (“BAC”) test, and advised him of his right to 
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obtain an alternate chemical test at his own expense.  After the appellant refused 
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to submit to the BAC test, Officer Jones suspended appellant’s driver’s license 
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pursuant to the administrative license suspension (“ALS”) provisions of R.C. 
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4511.191. 
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On August 25, 1994, appellant filed an ALS appeal and a request for 
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occupational driving privileges in the Bryan Municipal Court, in which he 
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asserted that his license suspension should be terminated because the arresting 
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officer failed to inform him of the consequences of refusing to be tested or of 
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submitting to the requested test.  At the September 2, 1994 ALS hearing, Officer 
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Jones testified that when he and the appellant arrived at the police station, he 
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read appellant the “top portion” of BMV Form 2255 verbatim in front of a 
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witness and that appellant said he understood what was read to him.  The trial 
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court rejected appellant’s assertion that he had not been properly advised of the 
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consequences of a refusal to take the BAC test.  Accordingly, the trial court 
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denied appellant’s appeal of his ALS for refusing to submit to the BAC test.   
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The court of appeals affirmed the appellant’s conviction, holding that “(1) 
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the advice prescribed by R.C. 4511.191(C)(2)(b) and as set forth on BMV form 
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2255, if read verbatim to an arrested person by the arresting officer, is sufficient 
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to satisfy the statutory requirement that he be advised of the consequences of 
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taking or not taking the chemical test and that the arresting officer need not 
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specify the duration of the suspension for an individual arrestee in order to 
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comply with the notice provisions of R.C. 4511.191(C);  [and] (2) the trial court 
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did not err in finding that appellant had been adequately advised of his statutory 
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rights before he refused to take the BAC test * * *.”   
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The court of appeals also certified that its decision was in conflict with the 
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decisions of the Court of Appeals for Franklin County in Columbus v. Ocker 
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(1994), 97 Ohio App.3d 596, 647 N.E.2d 205, and the Court of Appeals for 
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Portage County in State v. Given (Dec. 23, 1994), Portage App. No. 94-P-0012, 
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unreported, on the following question:  “whether, for purposes of establishing a 
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valid consent or refusal to take a blood [sic] alcohol concentration test in the 
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context of  reviewing an administrative license suspension pursuant to R.C. 
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4511.191, the statutory notice provision contained in R.C. 4511.191(C) is 
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satisfied by a showing that the officer read to the arrested person the language of 
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R.C. 4511.191(C)(2)(b) as set forth on the top portion of BMV Form 2255.”  
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This cause is now before the court upon determination that a conflict 
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exists. 
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- - -  
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Arthur, O’Neil, Mertz & Bates Co., L.P.A., and E. Charles Bates, for 
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appellant. 
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Ronald J. O’Brien, Columbus City Attorney, David M. Buchman, City 
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Prosecutor, and Brenda J. Keltner, Assistant City Prosecutor, urging affirmance 
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for amicus curiae, city of Columbus. 
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- - -  
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LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. The issue certified to this court is whether, for 
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purposes of establishing a valid consent or refusal to take a breath-alcohol-
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concentration test in the context of reviewing an administrative license 
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suspension pursuant to R.C. 4511.191, the statutory notice provision contained 
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in R.C. 4511.191(C) is satisfied by a showing that the officer read to the arrestee 
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the language of R.C. 4511.191(C)(2)(b) as set forth on the top portion of BMV 
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Form 2255.  We hold that it is.  Therefore, we affirm the court of appeals and 
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hold that for purposes of establishing a valid consent or refusal to take a breath-
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alcohol- concentration test in the context of an administrative license suspension 
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pursuant to R.C. 4511.191, the notice requirement of R.C. 4511.191(C) is 
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satisfied by reading to the arrestee the language of R.C. 4511.191(C)(2)(b) as set 
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forth on the top portion of BMV Form 2255. 
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Under R.C. 4511.191(C)(1), any person arrested “for operating a vehicle 
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while under the influence of alcohol” shall be advised, pursuant to R.C. 
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4511.191(E) and (F), of the consequences of his refusal to submit upon request 
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to a chemical test and of the consequences of his submission to the test “if he is 
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found to have a prohibited concentration of alcohol in the blood, breath, or 
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urine.”   
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R.C. 4511.191(C) states further: 
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“(2)(a) The advice given pursuant to division (C)(1) of this section shall 
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be in a written form containing the information described in division (C)(2)(b) of 
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this section and shall be read to the person. * * *  
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“(b)  The form required by division (C)(2)(a) of this section shall read as 
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follows: 
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“‘You now are under arrest for operating a vehicle while under the 
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influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or both alcohol and a drug of abuse and 
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will be requested by a police officer to submit to a chemical test to determine the 
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concentration of alcohol, drugs of abuse, or alcohol and drugs of abuse in your 
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blood, breath, or urine.   
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“‘If you refuse to submit to the requested test or if you submit to the 
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requested test and are found to have a prohibited concentration of alcohol in 
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your blood, breath, or urine, your driver’s or commercial driver’s license or 
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permit or nonresident operating privilege immediately will be suspended for the 
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period of time specified by law by the officer, on behalf of the registrar of motor 
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vehicles. * * *’”  (Emphasis added.) 
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The appellant urged both the lower courts and this court to conclude that 
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the arresting officer must specify the exact period of a potential suspension that 
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applies individually to each arrestee  and not merely read to the arrestee the 
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language of R.C. 4511.191(C)(2)(b) as set forth on the top portion of BMV 
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Form 2255 before a valid consent or refusal to take the chemical test is 
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established.  Both courts rejected this contention.  However, in Columbus v. 
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Ocker (1994), 97 Ohio App.3d 596, 647 N.E.2d 205, the Franklin County Court 
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of Appeals interpreted the phrase “by the officer” to modify the preceding phrase 
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“as specified by law,” thereby requiring the arresting officer to make an 
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individualized determination of the prospective penalties pursuant to R.C. 
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4511.191(E) and (F) and accordingly advise the arrestee “as to the consequences 
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of refusing to submit to the chemical test designated and the consequences of 
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taking the test revealing a prohibited concentration of alcohol.”  Id. at 600, 647 
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N.E.2d at 207. 
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Further, in State v. Given (Dec. 23, 1994), Portage App. No. 94-P-0012, 
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unreported, the Portage County Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion 
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as the Franklin County Court of Appeals.  The court concluded that the 
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provisions of R.C. 4511.191(C), construed together, require the arresting officer 
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“to read and advise the offender as to the potential lengths of suspension relating 
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to his refusal to take a chemical test or if the offender submits to a chemical test 
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which reports a prohibited alcohol concentration level.”  The Given court held 
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that “[t]he plain language of R.C. 4511.191(C)(1) indicates that the term 
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‘consequences’ requires more than a warning that the offender’s license may be 
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suspended.  It also requires information specified in R.C. 4511.191(E) and (F), 
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which relate to the potential lengths of suspension.” 
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The court of appeals observed that to allow such an interpretation as 
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proposed by the Ocker and Given courts would be “to impose a requirement 
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upon police officers that is so wholly impractical that it could not reasonably 
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have been intended by the legislature in its drafting of the statute.”  We agree, 
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and in analyzing the construction of R.C. 4511.191, we believe that the 
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interpretation urged by the appellant is not what the legislature intended. 
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There are so many factors to be considered by a police officer that it 
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would be difficult even to begin to try to make an assessment-- factors such as 
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accurate prior arrest or conviction history, prior refusals or consents, lack of a 
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driver’s license, municipal violations, etc.  See  R.C. 4511.191(E) and (F).  
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These convoluted, detailed requirements are almost impossible to assess 
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accurately in the arrest setting and, we believe, were intended by the legislature 
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to be determinations made by a court at the time of the ALS hearing.   
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A court must give effect to all words of the statute.  State v. Moaning 
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(1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 126, 128, 666 N.E.2d 1115, 1116, citing Shover v. Cordis 
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Corp. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 213, 218, 574 N.E.2d 457, 461.  Further, unless 
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there is ambiguity, legislative intent must be determined from the language of 
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the statute itself.  R.C. 1.49;  Stewart v. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Elections (1973), 
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34 Ohio St.2d 129, 63 O.O.2d 227, 296 N.E.2d 676;  State v. Singer (1977), 50 
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Ohio St.2d 103, 108, 4 O.O.3d 237, 240, 362 N.E.2d 1216, 1220.  In following 
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these well-established principles, this court finds that the language of R.C. 
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4511.191(C)(2)(b) contains a misplaced modifier.  Modifiers should be placed as 
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close as possible to the words they modify.  “If several expressions modify the 
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same word, they should be so arranged that no wrong relation is suggested.”  
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Strunk & White, The Elements of Style (3 Ed. 1979) 30.  The phrase “will be 
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suspended for the period of time specified by law by the officer, on behalf of the 
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registrar of motor vehicles,” R.C. 4511.191(C)(2)(b), contains two similar 
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modifiers:  the prepositional phrases “by law” and “by the officer.”  We believe 
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that the phrase “by the officer” modifies both the phrase “will be suspended,” 
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and the phrase “on behalf of the registrar of motor vehicles.”  In other words, the 
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officer suspends the license on behalf of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles.  The 
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phrase “by law” modifies the word “specified” in the phrase “for the period of 
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time specified.”  In other words, the period of time is specified by law. 
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Informing an arrestee of the consequences of his actions in the ALS 
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process is not only a requirement of R.C. 4511.191(C), but is essential to 
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fairness and due process.  However, requiring law enforcement to be able to 
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make an on-the- spot determination of the exact period of a license suspension is 
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inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute. 
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Therefore, we hold that the advice which must be given to an arrestee 
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under R.C. 4511.191(C)(2)(b) does not include the obligation to specify the 
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exact period of potential suspension.  Instead, the requirement of R.C. 
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4511.191(C)(2)(b) is met when the top portion of BMV Form 2255 is read 
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verbatim to the arrestee.   
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Judgment affirmed. 
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MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, BAIRD, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., 
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CONCUR. 
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WILLIAM R. BAIRD, J., of the Ninth Appellate District, sitting for RESNICK, 
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J. 
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