Title: State v. Garrett

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

228 Or. 1 (1961)
363 P.2d 762
STATE
v.
GARRETT

Supreme Court of Oregon.
Motion to dismiss appeal July 5, 1961.
Allowed July 19, 1961.
*2 Bernard, Bernard, Edwards & Hurley, Portland, for the motion.
Charles E. Raymond, District Attorney for Multnomah County, and Oscar D. Howlett, Deputy District Attorney, contra.
MOTION TO DISMISS ALLOWED.
PERRY, J.
The defendant was charged by the grand jury of Multnomah County with murder in the first degree, it being alleged in the indictment that the defendant committed arson in a dwelling which resulted in the death of her daughter.
To this indictment the defendant, pursuant to ORS 135.830, plead a former acquittal of the same crime charged. Her plea was sustained by the trial court and the State filed its notice of appeal.
The defendant has moved for the dismissal of the appeal upon the grounds, first, that there was no proper service of the notice of appeal, and, second, that the sustaining of a plea of former jeopardy is not a judgment from which the State may appeal.
The motion to dismiss must be granted upon both of these grounds.
1. The record discloses that the statutory Notice of Appeal was served upon the attorneys for the defendant at a time when the defendant was residing in Multnomah County. ORS 138.110 provides:
This same set of circumstances, under practically the same statute, occurred in State of Oregon v. Brown, 5 Or 119, 120, and we said:
2. In order for this court to obtain jurisdiction of a matter on appeal, it is necessary that the statutory requirements of service of the notice of appeal be strictly followed in accordance with the legislative mandate. McCain v. State Tax Commission, 227 Or 486, 360 P2d 778; State v. Archerd, 144 Or 309, 24 P2d 5.
3. On the right of the State to appeal, ORS 138.060 provides:
And ORS 138.020 specifically provides there shall not be a right of appeal by the State otherwise. This court has so held in Portland v. Erickson, 39 Or 1, 62 P 753; State v. Minnick, 33 Or 158, 54 P 223, and State v. Ellis, 3 Or 497.
The State contends, however, the action of the trial court in dismissing the indictment was, in legal effect, the same as the sustaining of a demurrer to the indictment and, therefore, became an appealable order.
The judgment of the trial court quite properly provides that the order of dismissal shall constitute a bar to any further prosecution of the defendant for the crime charged in the indictment. A plea of former jeopardy is not a plea to the merits (Potter v. State, 91 Fla 938, 109 So 91; State v. Ellsworth, 131 NC 773, 42 SE 699, 92 Am S R 790; State v. Simmons, 9 Terry 166, 99 A2d 401), nor is it an attack upon the sufficiency of the indictment. Such a plea is a claim by a defendant to his constitutional right to be tried but once for the same offense. "It is not an inquiry as to anything that accused has or has not done, and therefore is not of a criminal nature." 22 CJS 1245, Criminal Law § 441. Therefore, such a plea does not admit as true the facts set forth in the indictment, but points out that if those facts are true the defendant will establish that he has been formerly tried for the same crime as alleged and lawfully acquitted or convicted. The sustaining of his plea, which is a plea in bar, disposes of the entire cause as fully and effectively as would a verdict of acquittal on the merits.
The appeal by the State must, therefore, be dismissed, and it is so ordered.