Title: State v. William T. Evers

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). By all appearances, Evers was a model of middle-class decorum and success. He had been happily married for thirty years, lived in the same Nutley home for twenty-five years, and reared a daughter, adopted at birth, for eleven years. But there was another side to Evers that he kept hidden from public view an obsession with surfing the Internet for adult and child pornography. In 1997, Evers purchased his first personal computer. His wife opened an America Online (AOL) account with the charges billed to her credit card at their home in Nutley. Evers assumed two AOL screen names, one reserved exclusively for interactions with adult and child pornography Internet sites, BTE324, and the other for interacting with friends, family, and some other adult pornography sites. Evers initially visited adult pornography websites and chat rooms on his computer every morning, downloading photographs onto the hard drive of his computer. A year later, Evers began exploring special interest child pornography chat rooms and exchanging child pornography with other users. Over a period of approximately six weeks, Evers collected several hundred pornographic pictures of children through the Internet. In April 1999, he suffered an attack of conscience and became concerned he might be caught by law enforcement, his wife, or his daughter, so he ceased his excursions to the child pornography chat rooms. However, he maintained on his computer hard drive scores of pornographic images of nude ten- to fifteen-year-old girls engaged in sexual activities. In February 1999, Deputy Sheriff Michael A. DiMatteo of the San Bernardino County Sheriff s Department in California was investigating the use of child pornography on the Internet. He logged onto AOL, entering a chat room bearing a title strongly suggestive of sexual activity involving children. He submitted his screen name and e-mail address to permit other AOL subscribers interested in the subject matter to communicate with him. On February 15, 1999, DiMatteo received over ninety-eight responses. One response, containing images of a nude female child, was from the user of a screen name BTE324. DiMatteo applied to the Superior Court of San Bernardino County for a search warrant to learn the identities of the users of the ninety-eight screen names trading in child pornography. He received the warrant and mailed it to AOL s corporate headquarters in Virginia. AOL provided DiMatteo with the information demanded in the warrant, including the name of the account holder and the billing address of the screen name BTE324. DiMatteo forwarded the results of his investigation to the Nutley Police Department. Nutley Police Detective Sergeant Daniel Meehan applied for a warrant to search Evers residence for computers and computer related equipment. A Superior Court judge issued the warrant. On May 25, 1999, Nutley police searched Evers residence, seizing the hard drive of the family computer. Evers, who was home at the time, was arrested and made a full confession concerning his use of the computer to acquire and trade in child pornography. Evers initially was indicted on one count of second-degree endangering the welfare of a child by distributing a photograph through the Internet that depicted a child engaged in a prohibited sexual act, and one count of fourth-degree endangering for knowingly possessing and/or viewing the photograph. After Evers refused a plea offer, investigators cracked the hard drive of his computer and retrieved over forty images depicting naked girls under the age of sixteen engaged in various sexual acts. The State obtained a superceding indictment charging the same single count of second-degree distribution and forty-three counts of fourth-degree possession of child pornography. Evers pled not guilty and sought admission into the Essex County Pretrial Intervention Program. The trial court affirmed the denial of the PTI request by the Essex County Prosecutor and denied Evers motion to suppress his confession and the evidence seized pursuant to the New Jersey search warrant. Evers entered into a conditional plea to one count of distribution of child pornography and to forty counts of possession of child pornography. The court agreed to consider downgrading the distribution charge by one degree for purposes of sentencing and imposing concurrent sentences. At sentencing, the court downgraded the second-degree distribution offense to the third-degree sentencing range. It also concluded that imprisonment would constitute a serious injustice, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1d, and sentenced Evers to five years probation condition on 364 days of incarceration in the Essex County jail. The court suspended the county jail term pending its six-month review of Evers probation; ordered that Evers receive counseling and treatment at the Avenel Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center; and ordered Evers to comply with the registration requirements of Megan s Law. The State appealed the probationary sentence imposed on the second-degree charge, and Evers appealed, among other things, the denial of the motion to suppress evidence seized in the search. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions and sentences in an unpublished opinion. In a dissent limited to the sentencing issue, Judge Steinberg concluded that the presumption of imprisonment on the charge of second-degree distribution of child pornography had not been overcome and that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a term of probation. The State s appeal as of right, based on the dissent below, is limited to the propriety of Evers probationary sentence. The Supreme Court granted Evers petition for certification, limited to the issues arising out of his claim that the evidence seized pursuant to the New Jersey search warrant should be suppressed. HELD: The evidence of child pornography seized pursuant to the search warrant was admissible at trial. The presumption of imprisonment for this second-degree offense was not overcome and the findings in support of a probationary sentence were in part based on irrelevant and inappropriate factors, and were otherwise not adequately supported by the record. 1. Evers claims that the affidavit in support of the New Jersey warrant contained information acquired by law enforcement in California in violation of his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures and its counterpart in the New Jersey Constitution. To invoke the protections of the Fourth Amendment and the New Jersey Constitution, Evers must show that government authorities trammeled a reasonable or legitimate expectation of privacy. A person ordinarily surrenders an expectation of privacy to information revealed to a third-party. Thus, Evers had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of e-mail he forwarded to fifty-one intended recipients, one of whom happened to be an undercover police officer. Evers also claims that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy to the subscriber information stored at AOL headquarters in Virginia. Deputy Sheriff DiMatteo of the San Bernardino Sheriff Department had no way of knowing that the holder of the screen name BTE324 was a New Jersey resident, and New Jersey authorities did not assist DiMatteo in any way in procuring the warrant from a California magistrate. The New Jersey Constitution protects the rights of people within the State from unreasonable searches and seizures by State officials, not California officials. Nor does Evers have a protected privacy interest in the subscriber information under the Fourth Amendment. Even though the Federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) establishes the means by which a government may acquire subscriber information from an Internet service provider, the federal courts have held that this does not constitute a legislative determination of a reasonable expectation of privacy. (pp. 9-18) 2. Another question is whether a violation of a federal statute or sister-state law, if proved, is a sufficient ground for New Jersey to apply its exclusionary rule. Evers argues that the California warrant was unenforceable in Virginia, and delivery of the subscriber information to DiMatteo was in violation of the ECPA and California law, meaning the evidence would not have been admissible in a California court. The Supreme Court is unconvinced that there was any violation of the ECPA or California law. Nevertheless, even if there were a violation, the Court would not invoke the exclusionary rule of New Jersey. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct. Ordinarily, the rule will not bar otherwise reliable and relevant evidence gathered by law enforcement authorities in another jurisdiction over which this State has no control or authority, as long as those authorities were not acting in concert with New Jersey authorities. To apply the exclusionary rule here would advance none of its purposes deterrence, judicial integrity, and imposing a cost on illicit behavior and would prevent the introduction of reliable and relevant evidence in a criminal prosecution. (pp. 18-26) 3. Evers also claims that Detective Meehan s affidavit did not provide probable cause to justify a warrant to search his home. More particularly, he argues that the AOL billing address for the screen name BTE324 did not answer the question whether BTE324 actually used the computer for illicit purposes at the same location, and therefore there was not a well-grounded suspicion that a search would yield evidence of child pornography. The Court disagrees. Under the circumstances, the billing address of the Internet screen name that e-mailed photographs of child pornography was a logical place to search for evidence of the identity of the holder of the screen name and evidence of the crime. The probable cause standard for the issuance of a search warrant was met in this case. (pp. 27-35) 4. The Court also must determine the propriety of Evers probationary sentence for the second-degree crime of child endangerment. Under the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, a second-degree crime has a sentencing range of between five and ten years, with a presumptive sentence of seven years. The Code also provides that for second-degree crimes, the sentencing court shall impose a sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to the character and condition of the defendant, it is of the opinion that his imprisonment would be a serious injustice which overrides the need to deter such conduct by others. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1d. The standard for overcoming the presumption of imprisonment is distinct from that for downgrading an offense, and the reasons offered to dispel the presumption must be more compelling than those that might warrant downgrading an offense. In deciding whether the presumption of imprisonment is overcome, a trial court should determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence that there are relevant mitigating factors present to an extraordinary degree and, if so, whether cumulatively, they so greatly exceed any aggravating factors that imprisonment would constitute a serious injustice overriding the need for deterrence. The trial court also must look at the gravity of the offense with respect to the peculiar facts of a case to determine the role deterrence should play. Demands for deterrence are strengthened in direct proportion to the gravity and harmfulness of the offense and the deliberateness of the offender. (pp. 35-50) 5. The Court concludes that the factors relied on by the trial court to meet the serious injustice standard are not credibly supported by the record and are not so extraordinary as to dispel the presumption of imprisonment. Also, the trial judge s estimation that the offense of child pornography distribution has been improperly graded by the Legislature has no bearing on the appropriate punishment for Evers crime. The Legislature determines the punishment for crimes. Although the Court recognizes that Evers previously blameless life evokes compassion, it cannot agree that the circumstances are so rare and extraordinary that the human cost of his imprisonment exceeds society s imperative need to deter others from disseminating child pornography. (pp. 50-59) Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED with respect to Evers appeal, and REVERSED with respect to the State s appeal, and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for resentencing. JUSTICE COLEMAN has filed a separate, concurring opinion, expressing the view that some of the Fourth Amendment discussion in the Court s opinion is not essential to the disposition of the appeal. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES LONG, VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA, and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE ALBIN s opinion. JUSTICE COLEMAN has filed a separate, concurring opinion. Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Respondent, v. WILLIAM T. EVERS, Defendant-Respondent and Cross-Appellant. Argued September 24, 2002 Decided February 13, 2003 On appeal from and certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Wendy Alice Way, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant and cross-respondent (David Samson, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). Paul J. Jackson argued the cause for respondent and cross-appellant. The opinion of the Court was delivered by ALBIN, J. Defendant William T. Evers challenges the validity of a search of his home authorized by a warrant that uncovered evidence of his possession and transmission of child pornography on the Internet and led to his conviction of multiple violations of the child endangerment statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4. The State challenges defendant s sentence to a probationary term for second-degree child endangerment, an offense that carries a presumption of imprisonment, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1d. We now resolve these claims. [Id. at 507.] The defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the subscriber information. The district court decided the issue as though MindSpring had disclosed the information to the government without requiring a subpoena. In that circumstance, the defendant could sue MindSpring for the unwarranted disclosure, but not insist on suppression of the evidence in a criminal prosecution. Id. at 509. See also Kennedy, supra, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 1110 (holding that defendant had not demonstrated an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his subscriber information despite his reliance on ECPA). Accordingly, we hold that defendant had no Fourth Amendment or Article I, Paragraph 7 protected privacy right in the subscriber information provided to AOL. [Id. at 736 (citations omitted).] See also Burge v. Estelle, 496 F.2d 1177, 1178 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that Texas as the forum state may choose its own standards for determining the admissibility of evidence [gathered in Oklahoma] so long as minimum federal constitutional standards are honored, and that Texas is not bound by Oklahoma s choice of a deterrent ). In conclusion, no New Jersey official engaged or participated in any unlawful conduct in the acquisition of the Evers subscriber information in Virginia. To apply the exclusionary rule would advance none of its purposes deterrence, judicial integrity, and imposing a cost on illicit behavior and would disserve the process of doing justice in this state by preventing the introduction of reliable and relevant evidence in a criminal prosecution. Use of that evidence in this state will not offend the integrity of our judicial process. There may be circumstances in which the procuring of evidence by the agents of another jurisdiction, although in compliance with the Federal Constitution, would so offend the judicial conscience and our state s basic notions of fairness and justice that our courts would not countenance the admission of such evidence in a trial. But this is not such a case. We therefore hold that the subscriber information obtained by AOL was properly used by Nutley Detective Meehan in securing a warrant for the search of defendant s home. [See also United States v. Cox, 190 F. Supp. 2d 330, 333-34 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting Lamb).] Unlike State v. Kline, 42 N.J. 135, 138 (1964), a case in which a search pursuant to a warrant was held invalid because [n]o facts or circumstances were set forth in the affidavit which afforded reasonable grounds to believe that bookmaking was being carried on in the home, in the present case, the reasonable and natural inferences were that evidence of the crime would be found in the home. Before applying for the search warrant in this case, Detective Meehan ascertained that the billing address was, in fact, a residence. The privacy interests of the home are entitled to the highest degree of respect and protection in the framework of our constitutional system, and in securing a warrant for the search of a home, law enforcement authorities should present reliable and accessible information to establish probable cause. There is nothing in the present record to indicate whether or not it was possible to determine the precise point of transmission of the e-mail sent to Deputy Sheriff DiMatteo. At oral argument, the State admitted that it did not know whether such information was obtainable. We note with approval that in several other cases, law enforcement officials took additional steps to verify that the computers from which offending images were sent were located in the defendants residences. See, e.g., United States v. Bender, 290 F.3d 1279, 1281 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that search warrant was based on information subpoenaed from AOL and BellSouth that revealed that the person sending the e-mails [containing child pornography] used a computer located at [defendant s address] ), cert. denied, U.S. , 123 S. Ct. 571, L. Ed.2d (2002); Cox, supra, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 334 (denying motion to suppress where affidavit used to secure search warrant detailed the daily AOL account activity, most notably between 6 p.m. and 2 a.m. ); Lamb, supra, 945 F. Supp. at 446, 460 (denying motion to suppress and noting that after AOL subscriber information was released pursuant to federal grand jury subpoena, [f]urther investigation confirmed that a computer equipped with a modem was located in defendant s home and that it was used to access AOL ). Although there is nothing in the record to suggest that such additional information was available in this case, law enforcement officers should, when possible, turn to available sources of information which may give greater accuracy to the probable cause determination. The Fourth Amendment and Article I, Paragraph 7 do not render ignorance bliss. We do not suggest that if it were possible to obtain the precise point of transmission in this case, the failure to do so would have invalidated the warrant. However, technological advances, if they do not already, may soon permit law enforcement officers to determine easily through Internet service providers the exact point of transmission of personal computer e-mail. A single billing account for an Internet service provider, such as AOL, may cover the charges for a number of computers used by different members of a family. Given the mobility of our society, even that of the nuclear family, some computers may be at home and others in more distant locations. For example, parents may pay the account for computers used by their children in college. A laptop computer can be used at any number of locations other than the billing address. For this reason, a judge reviewing an application for the search of a home should make certain that reliable information, which is accessible in a timely manner, is utilized in making the probable cause determination of the locale of a computer used for criminal purposes. In other words, our courts must consider the new realities of our ever-expanding technological world. Nonetheless, the proofs in support of a search warrant will continue to be examined in a common-sense and not a hypertechnical manner. See Ventresca, supra, 380 U.S. at 109, 85 S. Ct. at 746, 13 L. Ed. 2d at 689. We are satisfied that the probable cause standard for the issuance of a search warrant was met in this case. [Ibid. (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)).] The guiding purpose of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice (Code) is clear punishment, rather than rehabilitation, for wrongful acts. Jabbour, supra, 118 N.J. at 6; Roth, supra, 95 N.J. at 353-56. To achieve that purpose, as well as uniformity in sentencing, the Code channel[s] the discretion of trial courts by focusing on the gravity of the offense rather than the offender s blameworthiness or capacity for rehabilitation. Jabbour, supra, 118 N.J. at 6 (citing State v. Hodge, 95 N.J. 369, 375 (1984); Roth, supra, 95 N.J. at 355). The Code guides the discretion of judges through a system of grading crimes into four degrees and presumptive sentencing. See N.J.S.A. 2C:1-4; N.J.S.A. 2C:43-1; Roth, supra, 95 N.J. at 356. A crime of the first-degree, the most serious on the scale, ordinarily has a range of sentence of between ten and twenty years of imprisonment, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6a(1), with a presumptive sentence of fifteen years, which may increase or decrease depending on the weighing of the mitigating and aggravating factors, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1f(1)(b). If the mitigating and aggravating factors are in equipoise, the presumptive term applies. Ibid. A second-degree crime has a sentencing range of between five and ten years, N.J.S.A. 2C;43-6a(2), with a presumptive sentence of seven years, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1f(1)(c). To further channel the discretion of the judge, the Code applies a presumption of imprisonment to a person convicted of a first- or second-degree crime, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1d, and applies a presumption of non-imprisonment to a person convicted of a third- or fourth-degree crime who is a first time offender, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1e. [W]here the court is clearly convinced that the mitigating factors substantially outweigh the aggravating factors and where the interest of justice demands, the court may sentence a person convicted of a crime of the first- or second-degree within the sentencing ranges of crimes one degree lower. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1f(2). The presumption of imprisonment for first- and second-degree crimes, however, comes into play regardless whether a defendant has led a crime-free or blameless life. Defendant seeks to overcome the presumption of imprisonment that applies to his conviction of a second-degree crime, so we look to the relevant statute and case law to determine whether he has met his burden. The Code provides that a sentencing court shall deal with a person who has been convicted of a crime of the first or second degree by imposing a sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to the character and condition of the defendant, it is of the opinion that his imprisonment would be a serious injustice which overrides the need to deter such conduct by others. [N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1d (emphasis added).] Absent a proper finding of serious injustice that outweighs the need for general deterrence, a trial court must impose a custodial sentence, Roth, supra, 95 N.J. at 358-59, unless the defendant has been found eligible for an alternative sentence specifically authorized by the Code, State v. Soricelli, 156 N.J. 525, 537-38 (1999). The presumption of imprisonment is not dispelled merely because the trial court is clearly convinced that the mitigating factors substantially outweigh the aggravating factors and the interests of justice justify downgrading a first- or second-degree offense pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1f(2). Jabbour, supra, 118 N.J. at 7. In that event, the trial court must nevertheless impose a term of imprisonment within the downgraded sentencing range because the presumption of imprisonment is determined not by the sentence imposed[,] but by the offense for which a defendant is convicted, State v. O Connor, 105 N.J. 399, 404-05 (1987). The downgrading of an offense is not a prerequisite to finding that the presumption of imprisonment for a first- or second-degree conviction has been overcome. Jarbath, supra, 114 N.J. at 413. The standard for overcoming the presumption of imprisonment is distinct from that for downgrading an offense. Moreover, the reasons offered to dispel the presumption of imprisonment must be even more compelling than those that might warrant downgrading an offense. State v. Megargel, 143 N.J. 484, 498-502 (1996). In permitting consideration of the character and condition of the defendant in determining whether imprisonment would be a serious injustice, the Code left a residuum of power in the sentencing court not to imprison in those few cases where it would be entirely inappropriate to do so. Roth, supra, 95 N.J. at 358 (internal quotation marks omitted). One of the central purposes of the Code was to avoid the imposition of disproportionate sentences. See Jarbath, supra, 114 N.J. at 408. We have consistently held that this residuum of power may be legitimately exercised in those truly extraordinary and unanticipated cases where the human cost of punishing a particular defendant to deter others from committing his offense would be too great. State v. Rivera, 124 N.J. 122, 125 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted); Roth, supra, 95 N.J. at 358 (internal quotation marks omitted). In only one case to date, State v. Jarbath, supra, 114 N.J. 394, has this Court had occasion to hold that the serious injustice standard was satisfied, overcoming the presumption of imprisonment. In Jarbath, we observed, [f]or example, that one group within the class of cases where the standard might be met includes those instances where the character and condition of the defendant are so idiosyncratic that incarceration or extended imprisonment for the purposes of general deterrence is not warranted. Id. at 408. Jarbath was a psychotic, mentally retarded woman, who caused the death of her nineteen-day-old son after she twice accidentally dropped him on a coffee table. Id. at 398. She was charged with the murder of her son and pled guilty to the lesser offense of reckless manslaughter. Ibid. While in prison, Jarbath was abused almost daily by other inmates and attempted to commit suicide. Ibid. We observed that the imprisonment of an emotionally impaired mother involved in the accidental killing of a baby, a defendant who could not sufficiently comprehend the wrongfulness of her conduct, would not further any recognized goal of general deterrence. Id. at 405-06. We also noted that Jarbath, due to her impaired condition, could not endure life in prison without unusual suffering and privation that greatly exceeded what a relatively normal person could bear under similar circumstances. Id. at 409. In such a case, we found that general deterrence unrelated to specific deterrence has relatively insignificant penal value. Id. at 405. We also found that it was highly unlikely that the imprisonment of Jarbath would be the type of example needed to deter others from neglecting their parental or child-care responsibilities. Id. at 405-06. The sum of her condition and character and the level of her culpability on the continuum of reckless manslaughter led us to conclude that the defendant s imprisonment constituted a serious injustice outweighing the needs of general deterrence. Id. at 408-09. See also State v. E.R., 273 N.J. Super. 262, 265, 269, 273-74 (App. Div. 1994) (affirming resentencing of defendant with full-blown AIDS who pled guilty to second-degree possession of pipe bombs from seven-year-custodial to five-year-probationary term, where imprisonment would entail excessive hardship to defendant because specific deterrence was no longer consideration in light of his undisputed physical incapacity and imminent death within six months). In all other Code cases, this Court rejected the defendants claims that the sum of their circumstances was so rare and extraordinary that the human cost of their punishment exceeded the need to deter others from committing like offenses. See Jabbour, supra, 118 N.J. at 3-4, 8-9 (vacating five-year probationary sentence of youthful, first-time offender who pled guilty to second-degree sexual assault of four-year-old, despite his promising rehabilitation prospects given intense psychiatric counseling); Johnson, supra, 118 N.J. at 14-20 (vacating five-year probationary sentence of first-time offender who pled guilty to two counts of first-degree aggravated sexual assault of young stepdaughter, despite his deafness and drug dependent condition and his status as sole economic support for his primarily deaf family); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 188, 219-20 (1984) (holding that five-year custodial sentence imposed on battered woman convicted of reckless manslaughter of abusive spouse did not constitute serious injustice, despite children s need to have their mother at home ); Roth, supra, 95 N.J. at 340-41, 366-69 (vacating five-year probationary sentence of first-time offender who pled guilty to first-degree aggravated sexual assault by forcing young mother strolling with infant to perform sexual act on defendant at knifepoint, despite severe substance abuse problems, abject remorse for his conduct, broad range of community support, and cooperation with law enforcement authorities). See also Soricelli, supra, 156 N.J. at 526, 528-32, 537-40 (vacating three-and-one-half-year probationary sentence of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree possession of PCP with intent to distribute, despite rehabilitation, responsible employment in his own restaurant, and assumption of child-support and visitation obligations ); Rivera, supra, 124 N.J. at 123-27 (vacating illegal two-year suspension of imposition of sentence of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree robbery, despite link between defendant s addiction and offense); O Connor, supra, 105 N.J. at 402, 405-08, 410-11 (vacating three-year probationary sentence of first-time offender who pled guilty to second-degree aggravated arson, in absence of any finding that presumption of imprisonment had been overcome); Hodge, supra, 95 N.J. at 371-72, 378-80 (vacating five-year probationary sentence conditioned on sixty-three days imprisonment of first-time offender who pled guilty to first-degree aggravated sexual assault of thirteen-year-old step-daughter, despite his support of his family and good rehabilitation prospects). A review of these cases suggests the heavy burden borne by a defendant who seeks to overcome the presumption of imprisonment. The common thread running through each is the focus on the gravity of the offense, which implicates the need for specific and general deterrence. In none of these cases was the defendant able to show that his character and condition were so unique or extraordinary, when compared to the class of defendants facing similar terms of incarceration, that he was entitled to relief from the presumption of imprisonment. Our case law has amply described those instances that do not meet the serious injustice standard. Our jurisprudence, however, has not given the trial courts guideposts for determining the extraordinary or extremely unusual case where the human cost of imprisoning a defendant for the sake of deterrence constitutes a serious injustice. The standard must be more than I know it when I see it. The Code, as well as our previous case law, provides the analytical framework in which to set standards for defining when the character and condition of a defendant is so unusual or unique that imprisonment would be a serious injustice overriding the State s paramount concern for deterrence. We need only look to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b to find factors to be considered in determining whether the character and condition of a defendant is so highly unusual or unique as to meet the serious injustice standard. The Code provides for the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors in calculating the specific term of imprisonment within a sentencing range. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6a; N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a, -1b, -1f(1). In those circumstances where the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating factors, a judge is authorized to impose a sentence below the presumptive term. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1f(1). In those cases where the trial court is clearly convinced that the mitigating factors substantially outweigh the aggravating factors and where the interest of justice demands, the court may sentence a person convicted of a crime of the first- or second-degree within the sentencing range of a crime one degree lower. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1f(2). In Megargel, supra, 143 N.J. at 498-501, we recognized that the serious injustice standard which determines whether a defendant is in or out of prison must necessarily be higher than the standard for downgrading an offense under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1f(2). N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b sets forth the mitigating factors to be considered by the trial court generally in imposing sentence: (1) The defendant s conduct neither caused nor threatened serious harm; (2) The defendant did not contemplate that his conduct would cause or threaten serious harm; (3) The defendant acted under a strong provocation; (4) There were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the defendant s conduct, though failing to establish a defense; (5) The victim of the defendant s conduct induced or facilitated its commission; (6) The defendant has compensated or will compensate the victim of his conduct for the damage or injury that he sustained, or will participate in a program of community service; (7) The defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the present offense; (8) The defendant s conduct was a result of circumstances unlikely to recur; (9) The character and attitude of the defendant indicate that he is unlikely to commit another offense; (10) The defendant is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment; (11) The imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive hardship to himself or his dependents; (12) The willingness of the defendant to cooperate with law enforcement authorities; (13) The conduct of a youthful defendant was substantially influenced by another person more mature than the defendant. [N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b.] In deciding whether the character and condition of a defendant meets the serious injustice standard, a trial court should determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence that there are relevant mitigating factors present to an extraordinary degree and, if so, whether cumulatively, they so greatly exceed any aggravating factors that imprisonment would constitute a serious injustice overriding the need for deterrence. We do not suggest that every mitigating factor will bear the same relevance and weight in assessing the character and condition of the defendant; it is the quality of the factor or factors and their uniqueness in the particular setting that matters. In determining the role that deterrence should play in the serious injustice standard, we begin by restating that there is a presumption of imprisonment for those convicted of first- and second-degree crimes. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1d. However, a violation of a criminal statute may be more or less egregious depending on the particular facts. In evaluating the severity of the crime, the trial court must consider the nature of and the relevant circumstances pertaining to the offense. Every offense arises in different factual circumstances. Megargel, supra, 143 N.J. at 500. For example, in Jarbath, supra, the Court in assessing the defendant s culpability for manslaughter, referred to the criminal act as accidental, and focused on the severe mental retardation of the defendant. 114 N.J. at 405-06. We have noted that [c]ourts should consider a defendant s role in the incident to determine the need to deter him from further crimes and the corresponding need to protect the public from him. Megarel, supra, 143 N.J. at 501. [D]emands for deterrence are strengthened in direct proportion to the gravity and harm[ful]ness of the offense and the deliberateness of the offender. Id. at 501 (second alteration added) (quoting State in the Interest of C.A.H. & B.A.R., 89 N.J. 326, 337 (1982)). Accordingly, trial courts should look to the statutory sentencing mitigating factors and determine whether those factors are present to such an extraordinary degree and so greatly exceed the aggravating factors that a particular defendant is distinguished from the heartland of cases for the particular offense. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 5K2.0 cmt. (2001) (discussing grounds for departure from sentencing range established by applicable guidelines). It is the quality of the extraordinary mitigating factors taken together that must be weighed in deciding whether the serious injustice standard has been met. The trial court also must look at the gravity of the offense with respect to the peculiar facts of a case to determine how paramount deterrence will be in the equation. Generally, for first- and second-degree crimes there will be an overwhelming presumption that deterrence will be of value. The standard we articulate today has been intuitively applied in such cases as Jarbath and is consistent with this Court s jurisprudence on the serious injustice standard. Defendant engaged in the activity in question without any appreciation that it was criminalized. Without diminishing his conduct in any way and the fact that it perpetuated the growing market for what is called cyber-porn, it is the court s view that the participation of others in this evil network will not be deterred by sending this bit player to prison. He should be viewed differently than someone who originates or manufactures the offending material. The deterrence of defendant himself is being accomplished by the embarrassment and anxiety of this pending case and the prospect of imprisonment. The appropriate penal objectives can be satisfied by long-term supervision, coupled with specific treatment, and the life-time requirements of Megan s Law. That is what the defendant s journey into the dark side of the [I]nternet has brought down upon himself and his family. Looking at the total picture presented of this individual standing before this court, I find that justice will not be served by sending him to prison, and the interests of society do not require it. Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Respondent, v. WILLIAM T. EVERS, Defendant-Respondent and Cross-Appellant. _____________________________ Coleman, J., concurring in the Court s judgment. I write separately to express the view that, although some of the Fourth Amendment discussion in the Court s opinion is not essential to the disposition of this appeal, I nonetheless concur in the Court s judgment. NO. A-81/82 SEPTEMBER TERM 2001 ON APPEAL FROM Appellate Division, Superior Court STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant And Cross-Respondent, v. WILLIAM T. EVERS, Defendant-Respondent And Cross-Appellant. DECIDED February 13, 2003 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Albin CONCURRING OPINION BY Justice Coleman DISSENTING OPINION BY The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. [ U.S. Const. amend. IV.] The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue except upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the papers or things to be seized. [ N.J. Const. art. I, 7.] (c) Records concerning electronic communication service or remote computing service. (1) A governmental entity may require a provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service to disclose a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents of communications) only when the governmental entity (A) obtains a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court with jurisdiction over the offense under investigation or equivalent State warrant; (B) obtains a court order for such disclosure under subsection (d) of this section; (C) has the consent of the subscriber or customer to such disclosure; or . . . . (E) seeks information under paragraph (2). (2) A provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service shall disclose to a governmental entity the (A) name; (B) address; (C) local and long distance telephone connection records, or records of session times and durations; (D) length of service (including start date) and types of service utilized; (E) telephone or instrument number or other subscriber number or identity, including any temporarily assigned network address; and (F) means and source of payment for such service (including any credit card or bank account number), of a subscriber to or customer of such service when the governmental entity uses an administrative subpoena authorized by a Federal or State statute or a Federal or State grand jury or trial subpoena or any means available under paragraph (1). [ 18 U.S.C.A. 2703(c)(1)(A) (C), (c)(1)(E), (c)(2)(A)-(F) (emphasis added).]