Title: FREDRICK CHARLES WILKENING V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

FREDRICK CHARLES WILKENING V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 127120 P.3d 680Case Number: 04-120Decided: 09/30/2005
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
FREDRICK 
CHARLES WILKENING,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofSweetwaterCounty

The 
Honorable Nena James, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Ken 
Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel. 

 
 
 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; James Michael Causey, Assistant 
Attorney General.              
            

                        

            
            

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Fredrick C. 
Wilkening appeals from his conviction for felony interference with a peace 
officer.  Mr. Wilkening contends 
that the district court erred by denying his motion requesting an independent 
mental examination and his motion to change his plea to not guilty by reason of 
mental deficiency or illness.  Mr. 
Wilkening also claims the district court erred by allowing the State to amend 
the information on the day of trial.  
We affirm.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Wilkening 
phrases the issues on appeal as:

 
 
1.         
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied [his] 
motion for an independent mental examination and his motion to enter a not 
guilty by reason of mental illness plea.

 
 
2.         
Whether the district court erred when it allowed the State to amend the 
information on the first day of trial preventing [him] from presenting his 
defense.

 
 
The 
State substantially agrees with these issues.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On November 22, 
2002, Deputy David Thompson (Deputy I) was conducting a follow-up investigation 
of an alleged violation of a protection order by Mr. Wilkening.  Upon arriving at the residence 
identified in the protective order, Deputy I noticed Mr. Wilkening exit a motor 
home that was parked behind the residence and get into a car.  Deputy I notified dispatch.  Deputy Jeremy Thompson (Deputy II) was 
assigned to assist. 

 
 
[¶4]      Prior to Deputy 
II's arrival, Mr. Wilkening attempted to leave the property.  Deputy I ordered Mr. Wilkening to stop 
his vehicle.  Mr. Wilkening complied 
with the request and exited the vehicle, but left it running.  Deputy I inquired about Mr. Wilkening's 
presence on the property.  In 
response, Mr. Wilkening stated he was there to retrieve a ticket he received 
from a Rock Springs Police Officer.  
He also informed Deputy I that he "was not going to 
jail."

 
 
[¶5]      After Deputy II 
had arrived on the scene, Mr. Wilkening asked if he could turn off his 
vehicle.  Mr. Wilkening reentered 
his vehicle and attempted to drive away.  
The deputies blocked his escape and approached the vehicle.  Deputy I reached inside the driver's 
window, turned off the ignition, and retrieved the 
keys.

 
 
[¶6]      Mr. Wilkening 
became angry.  He started yelling, 
swearing, and hitting his hands and head on the steering wheel.  He reiterated that he was not going to 
jail and told the deputies that they would have to shoot him.  Deputy I advised Mr. Wilkening that he 
was under arrest and ordered him to exit the vehicle.  Mr. Wilkening refused.  He reached behind the front seat with 
his right hand and kept it there.  
Mr. Wilkening said, "I've got a gun and I'm going to shoot you."  Deputy II broke out the passenger window 
with his baton.  The deputies pulled 
out their duty weapons and pointed them at Mr. Wilkening.  Mr. Wilkening said "I warned you," and 
pulled his hands up quickly.  After 
observing that Mr. Wilkening was holding a screwdriver, not a gun, the deputies 
holstered their weapons and sprayed him with pepper 
spray.

 
 
[¶7]      Deputy I 
attempted to remove Mr. Wilkening from the vehicle.  A struggle ensued.  Mr. Wilkening attempted to stab Deputy I 
with the screwdriver.  Deputy I 
incurred multiple cuts across his knuckles and fingers on his left hand and a 
puncture wound to his right thumb.  
After striking Deputy I with the screwdriver, Mr. Wilkening attempted to 
dive head first through the passenger window.  Deputy II grabbed him and pushed him to 
the ground.  Deputy I struggled to 
handcuff Mr. Wilkening.  While 
trying to get him under control, Mr. Wilkening repeatedly screamed "shoot 
me."  He reached for Deputy II's 
weapon and succeeded in pulling it halfway out of the holster.  When Deputy II removed Mr. Wilkening's 
hand from his weapon, Mr. Wilkening reached for Deputy I's weapon.  Mr. Wilkening continued to scream, 
"shoot me, shoot me, shoot me."  
Eventually, Mr. Wilkening was handcuffed and 
hobbled.

 
 
[¶8]      Mr. Wilkening was 
charged with felony interference with a peace officer in violation of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-5-204(b) (LexisNexis 2001).  
He was arraigned on January 2, 2003.  He pled not guilty.  Trial was initially scheduled for March 
4, 2003.  It was continued several 
times thereafter.  All of the 
continuances were requested by Mr. Wilkening.  

 
 
[¶9]      On June 2, 2003, 
one of the scheduled trial dates, Mr. Wilkening filed a Motion for Mental 
Evaluation.  The motion was 
predicated upon Mr. Wilkening's contention that he had made suicidal statements 
in the course of his altercation with the deputies.  The motion was granted and trial was 
postponed.  The evaluation concluded 
that Mr. Wilkening was competent to stand trial and determined that Mr. 
Wilkening had substantial capacity to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law at the time of the 
incident.

[¶10]   On September 24, 2003, Mr. 
Wilkening's counsel filed a motion to withdraw.  The motion was granted after hearing and 
substitute counsel was appointed on October 9, 2003.  Trial was scheduled for November 4, 
2003.

 
 
[¶11]   On October 30, 2003, the State filed a 
motion to amend the information.  
The motion sought to eliminate the "or attempt to cause" language of the 
original information.  The motion 
was heard on the morning of trial.  
The district court granted the motion despite Mr. Wilkening's 
objection.

 
 
[¶12]   During this same hearing, Mr. 
Wilkening made an oral motion seeking a second mental evaluation.  He also sought to change his plea from 
not guilty to not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency.  Both motions were denied.  Trial was held.  Mr. Wilkening was convicted and judgment 
was entered.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Mental 
Competency

 
 
[¶13]   Mr. Wilkening raises several issues 
relating to his mental competency.  
He contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for a 
second mental evaluation which he orally made on the morning of trial.  He asserts that pursuant to our holding 
in deShazer v. State, 2003 WY 98, ¶ 
32, 74 P.3d 1240, 1253 (Wyo. 2003) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303 (LexisNexis 
2001), the trial court was required to conduct a competency hearing and erred in 
failing to do so.  Additionally, Mr. 
Wilkening asserts that the district court erred in refusing to allow him to 
change his plea from not guilty, to not guilty by reason of mental illness or 
deficiency.  We find no merit in any 
of Mr. Wilkening's contentions.  

 
 
[¶14]   On June 2, 2003, Mr. Wilkening 
filed a motion for mental examination pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-301, et seq.  In support of his motion, Mr. Wilkening 
stated:

 
 
2.         
The sworn testimony of peace officers in this matter alleges that 
Defendant was claiming to have a firearm and demanding that the peace officers 
kill him, or that he would kill them.  
It has been further sworn to by said peace officers that no gun was ever 
found, indicating that the Defendant had a desire to die at that time.  This occurred almost simultaneously with 
the alleged offense.

In 
response to the motion, the district court entered an Order for Mental 
Evaluation.  The mental evaluation 
was conducted and a report was filed with the court on August 7, 2003.  The report indicated that Mr. Wilkening 
was competent at the time of the incident and was competent to stand trial.  

 
 
[¶15]   On the morning of trial, November 
4, 2003, Mr. Wilkening made an oral request for a second mental evaluation.  Defense counsel alleged that the motion 
was premised upon his belief that Mr. Wilkening suffered from a "methamphetamine 
psychosis" at the time of the incident.  
However, in the course of his argument, defense counsel also made 
reference to Mr. Wilkening's fitness to proceed and our decision in deShazer.  The district court initially denied the 
motion.  However, after a brief 
recess, the district court advised counsel that it was prepared to reconsider 
the motion.  The court also informed 
counsel that it had reviewed deShazer 
and invited counsel to restate their positions.  In doing so, defense counsel clearly and 
unambiguously indicated that the motion was directed toward evaluation of Mr. 
Wilkening's competency at the time of the incident.  Defense counsel 
stated:

 

. . . 
What I'm asking to do is to be able to have my client change his plea from not 
guilty to not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency, pursuant to Rule 
11 and Rule 12.2 of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.

 
 
            
I'm doing this because during the course of my representation of Mr. 
Wilkening in the last three weeks, it's become apparent to me that his mental competence at the time of the 
offense is, in fact, an issue.  
There was an independent  or rather, just a mental evaluation done of 
Mr. Wilkening by the state hospital by order of this Court, dated, I believe, 
June 2nd of 2003.  And it was after that that the state 
hospital came back with their evaluation, essentially saying that not only was 
Mr. Wilkening competent to stand trial, but also that he was competent and sane at 
the time of the offense.

 
 
            
I take issue with that.  I believe that Mr. Wilkening should have 
been given an opportunity, at the very least, to obtain an independent mental 
evaluator that could be able to contest that finding of the state 
hospital.  And it doesn't appear 
to me that anything in the record or any other information that I can find 
indicates anything other than that.  
He was not told that he had a right to enter a plea of not guilty by 
reason of mental illness or deficiency.  
And there wasn't any  he had no ability to change his plea later 
on.

 
 
            
I'd really like for him to be 
able to have that right because I think by not being able to use mental illness 
or deficiency at the time of the act, that he's being deprived of a substantial 
right and a substantial defense that I believe he's entitled to.  And again, I don't think that he was 
ever informed that he had a right to contest what the state hospital said, not 
only about his competence to stand trial, but his competence and sanity at the 
time of the alleged occurrence of the offense.

            

            
And I believe that 7-11-303 
provides for us to contest the state hospital with regard to whether the  
mental evaluators, with regard to that determination.  Although I would concede that that 
statute deals only with competence and fitness to proceed with regard to the 
trial.

 
 
The 
court responded:

 

Okay.  The motion of Defendant is denied.  I would be probably taking a different 
approach to this if we were dealing with an issue of fitness to proceed, 
especially in view of the deShazer case and the specific language of 
7-11-303(f), which mandates that the Court shall hold a hearing if the opinion 
relative to fitness to proceed is contested.  However, it's not contested.  That is not what is being contested 
here, so I don't think I'm mandated to afford him the opportunity for a hearing 
regarding that evaluation.

 
 
            
I am also concerned about the Defendant's possible manipulation of the 
system, the timeliness of this.  But 
that's not the primary consideration in my mind.  I'm referring back to Rule 11(a)(1)(B), 
which allows the Defendant to enter a not guilty by reason of mental illness or 
deficiency plea at the time of the arraignment or at such later time as the 
Court may for good cause permit.  I 
have not found that good cause to allow that change of plea has been established 
this morning.  And that is the basis 
for the denial of the motion.  I 
refer specifically to paragraph  to page 3 of the transcript of the arraignment 
held on January 2nd.  It is clear 
that I advised him at the arraignment of his right to enter that 
plea.

 
 
            
It is also clear from the record that he has been continuously 
represented by counsel, experienced counsel, in the sense that these attorneys 
have worked for the Public Defender's office and they handle cases of this 
nature.  And also, the fact that 
even though [defense counsel] came into the case only three weeks ago, this is 
an issue that could have been brought to the attention of the Court 
earlier.  He did, in fact, raise 
other issues.

 
 
            
And aside from that, the bottom line is good cause has not been 
shown.  And that's the basis of the 
denial of the motion.

 
 
(emphasis 
added).  

 
 
[¶16]   Contrary to defense contentions on 
appeal, we find that the record demonstrates that Mr. Wilkening never requested 
a competency hearing to determine his fitness for trial.  However, even if the defendant did not 
request a competency hearing, we have recognized that a district court has a 
duty to suspend proceedings and conduct a competency hearing if reasonable cause 
exists to believe the accused is unfit to proceed because of mental illness or 
deficiency.  deShazer, ¶ 
28.

 
 
[¶17]   A defendant's competency to stand 
trial is an aspect of substantive due process.  deShazer, ¶ 12.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-302 (LexisNexis 
2001) mandates that: 

     

(a)               
 No person shall be tried, sentenced or 
punished for the commission of an offense while, as a result of mental illness 
or deficiency, he lacks the capacity to:

 
 
(i)                 
Comprehend 
his position;

 
 
(ii)               
Understand 
the nature and object of the proceedings against him; 

 
 
(iii)             
Conduct 
his defense in a rational manner; and

 
 
(iv)              
Cooperate 
with his counsel to the end that any available defense may be 
interposed.

 
 
To guard 
against an incompetent person standing trial, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303(a) 
provides that:  "[i]f it appears at 
any stage of a criminal proceeding, by motion or upon the court's own motion, 
that there is reasonable cause to believe that the accused has a mental illness 
or deficiency making him unfit to proceed, all further proceedings shall be 
suspended."  In deShazer, we held that the court erred 
in failing to conduct a competency hearing in light of undisputed evidence that 
deShazer was unfit to proceed.  deShazer, ¶ 32.  No such evidence exists in this 
case.

 
 
[¶18]   Mr. Wilkening received a court 
ordered mental evaluation.  The 
evaluation concluded that he was competent to stand trial.  The only evidence before the trial court 
regarding Mr. Wilkening's lack of fitness to proceed was the unsubstantiated 
statement of Mr. Wilkening's counsel alleging that he believed his client was 
suffering from "methamphetamine psychosis."  "There must be more than a lawyer's 
assertions to justify an inference that appellant was not competent to stand 
trial."  Krucheck v. State, 671 P.2d 1222, 1229 
(Wyo. 1983) 
(Raper, J., Retired, dissenting, with whom Rooney, C.J., joins) (decided on 
other grounds).  See also, State v. Williams, 593 P.2d 896, 904 
(Ariz. 1979) 
(finding that "there was no evidence other than his lawyer's assertions of 
peculiar behavior to justify an inference that appellant was not competent to 
stand trial").

 
 

[¶19]   Mr. Wilkening also claims the 
district court abused its discretion by denying his oral motions for a second 
mental examination and a change of plea.  
Requests for a second mental evaluation to determine competency at the 
time of the incident must be in writing and filed within five days of receipt of 
the initial evaluation.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-11-304 (LexisNexis 2001). If Mr. Wilkening's request for a second evaluation 
was made pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-304, it is untimely and not in 
compliance with the statute.  Mr. 
Wilkening contends, however, that his oral motion requested a second mental 
examination pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303(d) which provides, "[a]fter 
receiving a copy of the report, both the accused and the state may, upon written 
request and for good cause shown, obtain an order granting them an examination 
of the accused by a designated examiner of their own choosing."  Even if this statutory section applies 
to a request to establish competency at the time of the incident, Mr. Wilkening 
must establish good cause for the granting of the motion.1  A motion to change a plea from not 
guilty to not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency also requires a 
showing of good cause.  W.R.Cr.P. 
11(a)(1)(B) and 12.2(a).2  

 
 
[¶20]   "Good cause" is defined as a 
"[s]ubstantial reason, one that affords a legal excuse."  Black's Law Dictionary 623 (5th ed. 
1979).  Whether "good cause" exists 
depends upon the circumstances of each individual case and is within the 
discretion of the district court.  
Id.  In the context of a change of 
plea:

 
 
 "[G]ood cause is shown when it is 
demonstrated that fairness and justice are best subserved by permitting the 
additional plea."  The standard is 
satisfied upon petitioner's showing that, at the time of arraignment, the plea 
was entered due to "mistake, ignorance, or inadvertence."  Ultimately, however, the question of 
good cause is one addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and, 
absent a clear abuse of discretion, the trial judge's ruling will not be 
disturbed on appeal.

 
 

Garza v. 
People of Colorado, 612 P.2d 85, 86-87 (Colo. 1980) (internal citations removed).  See also, Hubbell v. State, 41 
Wyo. 275, 279; 285 P. 153, 155 (Wyo. 1930) (stating that 
the exercise of discretion in matters involving a change of plea is reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard on appeal).

 
 
[¶21]   Mr. Wilkening's claim of good cause 
rests primarily upon his counsel's claim that he suffered from "methamphetamine 
psychosis" at the time of the incident.  
Such an unsupported assertion, in the face of the court ordered 
evaluation finding him competent to stand trial and competent at the time of the 
incident, does not constitute such good cause that would warrant us finding an 
abuse of discretion.  On appeal, Mr. 
Wilkening adds a claim of a "second suicide by cop" incident, which he contends 
occurred ten days prior to trial.  
The incident was not properly brought to the attention of the district 
court and we will not consider it on appeal.  Duke v. State, 2004 WY 120, ¶ 107, 99 P.3d 928, 959 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
[¶22]   Based upon the foregoing, we find 
no error in the district court's denial of Mr. Wilkening's motions.  The court did not abuse its discretion 
in determining that Mr. Wilkening failed to establish good cause for the second 
mental evaluation or to change his plea.  
Mr. Wilkening did not request a competency hearing regarding his fitness 
to proceed with trial pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303 and the record does 
not support a finding that the district court should have initiated a competency 
hearing sua sponte pursuant to Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303 and our holding in deShazer.

 
 

Amendment 
of the Information  

 
 
[¶23]   In his final claim of error, Mr. 
Wilkening contends that he was prejudiced by the amendment of the information on 
the morning of trial because it prevented him from presenting an intoxication 
defense to negate the specific intent requirement of "attempt."    Rule 3(e) of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal 
Procedure sets forth the procedure for 
amending an information:  

 
 
(e)       Amendment of information or 
citation.--Without leave of the court, the attorney for the state may amend 
an information or citation until five days before a preliminary examination in a 
case required to be tried in district court or until five days before trial for 
a case not required to be tried in district court.  The court may permit an information or 
citation to be amended:

 
 
(1) 
      With the 
defendant's consent, at any time before sentencing.

 
 
            
(2)       
Whether or not the defendant consents:

 
 
(A) 
At any time before trial if substantial rights of the defendant are not 
prejudiced.

 
 
(B) 
At any time before verdict or finding if no additional or different offense is 
charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not 
prejudiced.

 
 
We 
have stated that:

 
 
Wyoming 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3(e) grants discretion to a trial judge in deciding 
whether or not a motion brought by the State to amend the information just prior 
to trial should be granted.  
Consequently, we review the trial court's decision by applying our abuse 
of discretion standard.  In deciding 
whether or not the trial court abused its discretion, this court must "determine 
whether the trial court could reasonably conclude as it did and whether any 
facet of its ruling was arbitrary or capricious."

 
 

Burton 
v. State, 2002 
WY 71, ¶ 44, 46 P.3d 309, 320 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Cook v. State, 7 P.3d 53, 58-59 (Wyo. 
2000) (internal citations omitted)).  
An information may not be amended if it prejudices the defendant.  Meek v. State, 2002 WY 1, ¶ 16, 37 P.3d 1279, 1284 (Wyo. 2002).   

 
 
[¶24]   In Meek, on the morning of trial, the State 
requested permission to amend the information to change the controlled substance 
at issue from methamphetamine to cocaine.  
Id., ¶ 19.  Despite having concerns regarding the 
late filing of the motion, we found no error in permitting the amendment because 
there was no prejudice to Mr. Meek.  
Id.  In this case, despite the late filing, 
we also find that Mr. Wilkening was not 
prejudiced by the amendment of the information.  

 
 
[¶25]   Mr. Wilkening was initially charged 
with a single count of interference with a peace officer based upon, 1) 
"intentionally and knowingly" causing bodily injury to a peace officer while 
that officer was engaged in the lawful performance of his official duties; and 
2) "attempting" to cause bodily injury to a peace officer while such officer was 
engaged in the lawful performance of his official duties.  During the hearing on the motion, 
counsel for the State advised the court that the motion was brought pursuant to 
our holding in King v. State, 2002 WY 
27, 40 P.3d 700 (Wyo. 2002).  In King, we 
stated:

 
 
At this 
point, we believe it important, in our supervisory role, to point out what 
appears to be a recurring problem in prosecutions for felony interference.  Just as in Mueller v. State, 2001 WY 134, ¶ 12, fn. 
7, 36 P.3d 1151, ¶ 12, fn. 7 (Wyo. 2001), King was charged using the entire 
language of § 6-5-204(b), without differentiating between the two versions of 
the offense.  Moreover, the 
information was never amended to clarify which version of the offense was being 
pursued.   

 
 

Id., 
¶ 
24.  The amended information 
eliminated the "attempt" alternative of the charge against Mr. Wilkening, and 
clarified the version of the offense which the State would pursue at trial.  Mr. Wilkening has not established that 
he was prejudiced by the amendment.  
Accordingly, we do not find any abuse of discretion by the district court 
in permitting the State to amend the information.

 
 
[¶26]   
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-11-303 pertains to the examination of the accused to determine fitness 
to proceed and provides in part:

 
 
§ 
7-11-303.  Examination of accused to determine fitness 
to proceed; reports; commitment; defenses and 
objections.

 
 
            
(a)  If it appears at any 
stage of a criminal proceeding, by motion or upon the court's own motion, that 
there is reasonable cause to believe that the accused has a mental illness or 
deficiency making him unfit to proceed, all further proceedings shall be 
suspended.

 
 
The 
remainder of section 303 discusses the procedures for an examination, findings 
the examination report shall contain, and the procedures to be followed after an 
examination has taken place.  The 
plain language of the statute does not indicate that it applies to a second 
request for an examination to determine competency at the time of the 
incident.  However, we need not 
decide today whether this statutory section encompasses examinations of the 
accused to determine competency at the time of the incident because, as is 
discussed in detail below, Mr. Wilkening failed to establish the requisite good 
cause.  We note also that the 
request was not in writing as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-11-303(d).

 
 

2W.R.Cr.P. 
11(a)(1)(B) provides:

(a) 
Alternatives. -

 
 
(1) 
In General. - A defendant may plead not guilty, not guilty by reason of mental 
illness or deficiency, guilty, or nolo contendere.  If a defendant refuses to plead or if a 
defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not 
guilty.

 
 

                        
. 
. . 

 
 
(B) 
Mental Illness or Deficiency. - A plea of "not guilty by reason of mental 
illness or deficiency" may be pleaded orally or in writing by the defendant or 
the defendant's counsel at the time of the defendant's arraignment or at such 
later time as the court may for good cause permit.  Such a plea does not deprive the 
defendant of other defenses and may be coupled with a plea of not 
guilty.

 
 
(emphasis 
added).

            

W.R.Cr.P. 
12.2(a) states:

 
 

(a) 
Plea. - If a defendant intends to rely upon the defense of mental illness or 
deficiency at the time of the alleged offense, the defendant shall enter a plea 
of not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency at arraignment.  For 
good cause the court may permit the plea to be entered at a later 
time.

 
 
(emphasis 
added).