Title: Onderko v. Sierra Lobo, Inc.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Onderko v. Sierra Lobo, Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-5027.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-5027 
ONDERKO, APPELLEE, v. SIERRA LOBO, INC., APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Onderko v. Sierra Lobo, Inc., Slip Opinion No.  
2016-Ohio-5027.] 
Workers’ compensation―R.C. 4123.90―Action for retaliatory discharge―Prima 
facie case for retaliatory discharge does not include proof that plaintiff 
suffered workplace injury. 
(Nos. 2014-1881 and 2014-1962—Submitted October 28, 2015—Decided July 
21, 2016.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Erie County,  
No. E-14-009, 2014-Ohio-4115. 
____________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
The necessary elements of a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge under R.C. 
4123.90 do not include proof that the plaintiff suffered a workplace injury. 
____________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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O’NEILL, J. 
{¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal and certified-conflict case, we will 
determine whether establishing a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge under 
R.C. 4123.90 requires a showing that the plaintiff suffered a workplace injury.  
Based on the plain language of R.C. 4123.90, we hold that it does not.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the judgment of the Sixth District Court of Appeals. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 2} Appellee, Michael P. Onderko, was hired as a full-time engineering 
tech with appellant, Sierra Lobo, Inc., in November 15, 2010.  On August 9, 2012, 
Onderko was moving office furniture with two other employees when his right knee 
started to hurt.  As a result of this pain, Onderko left work early.  On his way home, 
Onderko stopped at a gas station, and his knee gave out as he stepped off a curb.  
Onderko drove home, and his wife took him to the emergency room.  Onderko did 
not tell the emergency-room doctor that his knee had started hurting at work.  He 
told the doctor only about the curb incident at the gas station. He did not mention 
the pain at work because he knew that Sierra Lobo was very concerned about its 
safety record and he was afraid of losing his job. 
{¶ 3} The emergency-room doctor referred Onderko to an orthopedic 
specialist.  As a result, Onderko visited Dr. Jeffrey A. Biro on August 10, 2012.  
The history section of Dr. Biro’s Clinic Note indicates that Onderko had injured his 
knee six weeks before and that he had self-treated, resolving the injury over several 
weeks’ time with ice, rest, and the use of crutches.  Dr. Biro’s note then states that 
Onderko went on with the activities of daily living until his knee “completely let 
go” as he was climbing a curb. 
{¶ 4} Onderko asserts that the information in Dr. Biro’s clinic note is 
incorrect.  He asserts that he told Dr. Biro that his previous knee injury was to his 
other knee.  There was no previous injury to his right knee, the knee at issue in this 
case.  He further asserts that he attempted to get Dr. Biro to change the note, but 
January Term, 2016 
 
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Dr. Biro refused to speak with him once he discovered that Onderko was pursuing 
a workers’ compensation claim. 
{¶ 5} On Friday, August 10, 2012, the same day as his visit with Dr. Biro, 
Onderko called Sierra Lobo to request light-duty work due to his knee injury. A 
human-resources generalist for Sierra Lobo avers that when she asked Onderko 
whether his injury had occurred at work, Onderko told her it had not, that he had 
been having problems with it for a while. Onderko disputes this statement.  He 
asserts that he never told her that his injury did not occur at work. 
{¶ 6} On Monday, August 13, 2012, Onderko again inquired whether he 
could return to work on light-duty status, mentioning that he had taken some 
prescription pain medication. David Hamrick, the Corporate Director of Human 
Resources, told Onderko that he could not return to work because of the medication.  
On that same day, Onderko filed a First Report of Injury (“FROI”) with the Ohio 
Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (“BWC”) alleging that his right knee had been 
injured while lifting and pushing equipment.  Onderko avers that he filed the FROI 
because Dave Hamrick told him he did not believe that the injury was a work injury, 
and Onderko wanted to be sure the injury was documented as work-related. The 
record includes “Incident/Close Call Witness Statements” from three Sierra Lobo 
employees that, taken together, corroborate that Onderko tried to secure light-duty 
work following the August 9, 2012 injury, that he had mentioned a prior knee 
injury, and that Dave Hamrick did not believe that Onderko’s injury was work-
related. 
{¶ 7} On September 6, 2012, at the request of the BWC, Dr. Nicholas Ahn, 
an orthopedic surgeon, reviewed Onderko’s medical file.  Dr. Ahn’s clinical 
summary states that the sprain/strain to the right knee was directly related to the 
injury that occurred on August 9, 2012.  The doctor further opined that the August 
9 injury was separate from the injury Onderko had suffered six weeks before, and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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there was no evidence that any earlier injury was aggravated by the August 9 
incident. 
{¶ 8} On September 10, 2012, the BWC denied Onderko’s claim for 
benefits.  The order states that Onderko failed to meet his burden of proof based on 
the notes from Dr. Biro and the notes from the emergency-room visit.  The BWC 
order notes that Dr. Biro was to send a corrected statement that was never received, 
and the physician review, apparently Dr. Ahn’s, had also not been received. 
{¶ 9} One day later, on September 11, 2012, the BWC vacated its 
September 10 order and allowed Onderko’s claim based on the physician review of 
Dr. Ahn.  On September 21, 2012, BWC issued an order granting Onderko 
temporary-total-disability payments from August 10, 2012, through August 28, 
2012.  The order notes that Onderko was released to return to work on August 29, 
2012.  On October 4, 2012, Sierra Lobo appealed BWC’s September 21 order to 
the Industrial Commission. 
{¶ 10} Following a hearing on October 31, 2012, a district hearing officer 
vacated the September 21 order and denied Onderko’s claim in its entirety, finding 
that Onderko did not sustain an injury in the course of his employment as alleged.  
According to the order dated November 6, 2012, the denial was based on the 
records from Dr. Biro as well as the records from the emergency room, Onderko’s 
testimony at the hearing denying any right-knee problems prior to the August 9 
injury, which the hearing officer found to be implausible, and various witness 
statements.  Onderko did not appeal this decision.  Onderko states that he did not 
appeal because by the time he received the order he was already back at work, he 
wanted the ordeal to be over, and he needed his job. 
{¶ 11} Onderko was terminated from Sierra Lobo on December 12, 2012, 
for his “deceptive” attempt to obtain workers’ compensation benefits for a non-
work-related injury.  Onderko avers that he had no idea that Sierra Lobo was 
considering firing him, that during his time as an employee for Sierra Lobo he 
January Term, 2016 
 
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received performance bonuses and had no discipline or unexcused absences, and 
that he was never investigated for or charged with workers’ compensation fraud. 
{¶ 12} On March 8, 2013, Onderko filed a complaint in the Erie County 
Court of Common Pleas asserting that Sierra Lobo violated R.C. 4123.90 when it 
terminated his employment for pursuing his workers’ compensation claim. The 
complaint alleged that on August 9, 2012, Onderko sustained a work-related injury 
while employed by Sierra Lobo, that as a result of that injury Onderko filed a 
workers’ compensation claim, and that because Onderko filed the claim, Sierra 
Lobo retaliated against Onderko by terminating his employment. 
{¶ 13} In its motion for summary judgment Sierra Lobo argued that to 
establish a prima facie case of retaliation under R.C. 4123.90 and under this court’s 
decision in Wilson v. Riverside Hosp., 18 Ohio St.3d 8, 479 N.E.2d 275 (1985), the 
plaintiff must demonstrate that the underlying claim for benefits involved a work-
related injury.  The employer further asserted that because a district hearing officer 
of the Ohio Industrial Commission determined that Onderko’s injury was not work-
related, res judicata prevents Onderko from relitigating whether his injury was 
work-related. Thus, according to the employer’s position, Onderko’s retaliation 
claim must fail as a matter of law. 
{¶ 14} In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Onderko argued 
that it is the filing of the workers’ compensation claim, not the allowance of the 
claim, that triggers the statutory protection from discharge, and Sierra Lobo 
misstated the law in asserting that a plaintiff must actually prevail in his or her 
workers’ compensation claim in order to establish retaliation under R.C. 4123.90 
and Wilson. 
{¶ 15} The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of employer 
Sierra Lobo. 
{¶ 16} Onderko appealed, and the Sixth District Court of Appeals reversed. 
The appellate court cited this court’s determination that the basic purpose of the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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retaliation statute is “ ‘ “to enable employees to freely exercise their rights without 
fear of retribution from their employers.” ’ ”  2014-Ohio-4115, 20 N.E.3d 322,  
¶ 27, quoting Sutton v. Tomco Machining, Inc., 129 Ohio St.3d 153, 2011-Ohio-
2723, 950 N.E.2d 938, ¶ 22, quoting Coolidge v. Riverdale Local School Dist., 100 
Ohio St.3d 141, 2003-Ohio-5357, 797 N.E.2d 61, ¶ 43. 
{¶ 17} In sustaining Onderko’s assignments of error, the court reasoned:  
 
Requiring an employee to successfully prove that the injury 
occurred at work for purposes of a retaliatory-discharge claim would 
have a chilling effect on the exercise of his or her rights because the 
employee would be forced to choose between a continuation of 
employment and the submission of a workers’ compensation claim.  
This choice must be made by the employee knowing that if he or she 
fails to prove that the cause of the injury was work related, not only 
will his or her claim be denied, but the employer would then be free 
to terminate the employment simply because the claim was filed. 
 
Id. at ¶ 28.  That holding implicitly recognizes that the entire workers’ 
compensation system is designed to provide a no-fault process for the resolution of 
claims of injury.  Were employers permitted to discharge employees for utilizing 
the system, its very purpose would be defeated. 
{¶ 18} Thus, the appellate court held that under R.C. 4123.90, a plaintiff is 
not required to prove that the injury occurred at the workplace and arose out of the 
scope of employment. The court also held that Onderko was not collaterally 
estopped or barred by res judicata from establishing the workplace injury element 
of his claim.  The court concluded that because of its determination that a workplace 
injury is not a required element of a retaliatory-discharge claim under R.C. 4123.90, 
January Term, 2016 
 
7
and because Sierra Lobo offered no other grounds to justify Onderko’s termination, 
summary judgment against Onderko was inappropriate. 
{¶ 19} On January 28, 2015, this court accepted Sierra Lobo’s discretionary 
appeal (case No. 2014-1881).  141 Ohio St.3d 1454, 2015-Ohio-239, 23 N.E.3d 
1196.  In that appeal, Sierra Lobo presents the following two propositions of law:   
 
Proposition of Law No. 1: As an element of establishing a 
prima facie claim for retaliatory discharge under R.C. 4123.90, a 
plaintiff must prove that he or she suffered a workplace injury. 
Proposition of Law No. 2: As a matter of law, an employee 
who fails to appeal a decision of the Industrial Commission that his 
or her injury was not work-related cannot bring [an] R.C. 4123.90 
retaliation claim based upon that claimed injury. 
 
{¶ 20} In case No. 2014-1962, this court recognized that a conflict exists 
between the Sixth District’s decision in Onderko’s case and the Fifth District’s 
decision in Kilbarger v. Anchor Hocking Glass Co., 120 Ohio App.3d 332, 697 
N.E.2d 1080 (5th Dist.1997).  We certified the following question for review: 
{¶ 21} “Whether, as an element of establishing a prima facie claim for 
retaliatory discharge under R.C. 4123.90, plaintiff must prove that he or she 
suffered a workplace injury.”  141 Ohio St.3d 1451, 2015-Ohio-239, 23 N.E.3d 
1194.  The two cases were consolidated for decision.  Id. 
{¶ 22} The Kilbarger case involved an injured worker’s appeal from a 
bench trial that resulted in a finding in favor of the employer on a claim for 
retaliatory discharge under R.C. 4123.90.  In his appeal, Kilbarger argued that the 
trial court had erred by requiring him to prove that he was injured on the job.  A 
two-to-one majority disagreed and overruled Kilbarger’s assignment of error. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 23} Although the appellate court found that Kilbarger had sufficiently 
alleged the three elements of a prima facie case of retaliation in his complaint filed 
under R.C. 4123.90 and this court’s decision in Wilson, 18 Ohio St.3d 8, 479 N.E.2d 
275, syllabus, the court nonetheless concluded that Kilbarger could not prevail 
under R.C. 4123.90 because he had failed to prove one of those elements at trial, 
i.e., he failed to prove that he was injured at work. 120 Ohio App.3d at 337-339, 
697 N.E.2d 1080. 
{¶ 24} We disagree.  Accordingly, we answer the certified-conflict question 
and proposition of law No. 1 in the negative and hold that pursuant to the plain 
language of R.C. 4123.90, the elements of a prima facie case of retaliatory 
discharge under the statute do not require the plaintiff to prove that the injury 
occurred on the job.  We also reject appellant’s second proposition of law.  Because 
proof of a work-related injury is not an element of a prima facie case of retaliatory 
discharge, failure to appeal the denial of a workers’ compensation claim does not 
foreclose a claim for retaliatory discharge under R.C. 4123.90.  Our decision rests 
on the language and basic purpose of the statute. 
Analysis 
{¶ 25} Ohio’s statutory workers’ compensation system is the result of a 
constitutional provision authorized by Ohioans, namely, Article II, Section 35.  
Ohio’s statutory scheme supplanted the prior common-law system.  Sutton, 129 
Ohio St.3d 153, 2011-Ohio-2723, 950 N.E.2d 938, ¶ 33.  The system is founded on 
a recognition that unintentional injury is a reality in the workplace and is designed 
to balance the interests of employers and employees when unintentional injury 
occurs.  See Bunger v. Lawson, 82 Ohio St.3d 463, 465, 696 N.E.2d 1029 (1998).  
The employers’ part of the bargain is that participation in the state insurance fund 
is compulsory.  The employees’ part of the bargain is that they are precluded from 
suing their employers for unintentional injuries that happen at work.  The idea here 
is that when unintentional workplace injuries happen, nothing is gained when 
January Term, 2016 
 
9
employees and employers are in an adversarial position in the courtroom.  Instead 
Ohio has a statutory system designed to return the employee to work and to protect 
the economic viability of the employer.  Consequently we look directly to the 
statute to determine whether proof of workplace injury is an element of a prima 
facie case of retaliatory discharge under R.C. 4123.90. 
{¶ 26} When applying a statute, the court must give effect to all of the 
statute’s words.  Stolz v. J & B Steel Erectors, Inc., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2016-Ohio-
1567, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 9.  Likewise, “a court must give effect to the natural and 
most obvious import of a statute’s language, avoiding any subtle or forced 
constructions.” Id., citing Ohio Neighborhood Fin., Inc. v. Scott, 139 Ohio St.3d 
536, 2014-Ohio-2440, 13 N.E.3d 1115, ¶ 22. 
The Statute at Issue 
{¶ 27} R.C. 4123.90 provides: 
 
No employer shall discharge, demote, reassign, or take any 
punitive action against any employee because the employee filed a 
claim or instituted, pursued or testified in any proceedings under the 
workers’ compensation act for an injury or occupational disease 
which occurred in the course of and arising out of his employment 
with that employer. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Sierra Lobo points to the italicized phrase and argues that the 
plain language of R.C. 4123.90 explicitly requires a showing that the plaintiff 
suffered a workplace injury.  It argues that this showing is essential, especially in 
cases such as Onderko’s, where an employee pursues a retaliation claim after the 
Industrial Commission has adjudicated that the employee did not suffer a work-
related injury.  Sierra Lobo further argues that the Ohio General Assembly placed 
the requirement in the statute to differentiate between false and valid claims under 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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the Workers’ Compensation Act and to prevent precisely the situation presented in 
this case―where an employee whose injury was fully and finally adjudicated not 
to have occurred in the workplace is nevertheless permitted to force his employer 
to defend a suit claiming retaliatory discharge. 
{¶ 28} Onderko argues that requiring an employee to prove that the injury 
occurred at work for purposes of a retaliatory-discharge claim would have a chilling 
effect on the exercise of the employee’s rights because the employee would be 
forced to choose between a continuation of employment and the submission of a 
workers’ compensation claim.  Onderko also asserts that it is the filing of a workers’ 
compensation claim, not the allowance of the claim, that triggers the statutory 
protection from discharge.  We agree with Onderko. 
{¶ 29} In Wilson v. Riverside Hosp., 18 Ohio St.3d 8, 479 N.E.2d 275, this 
court established the requirements for the sufficiency of a complaint for retaliatory 
discharge under R.C. 4123.90 in the context of a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss. 
{¶ 30} Sonya Wilson was injured in a fall while she was on the job.  Her 
workers’ compensation claim was allowed, and she was unable to work for 11 
months, during which time she received compensation for temporary total 
disability.  When Wilson’s doctor released her for work, Wilson notified her 
employer of her intention to return to work.  Wilson’s employer sent her a letter 
stating that she had been terminated because its leave-of-absence policy guaranteed 
a position for only ten weeks, and since Wilson was on leave for over 11 months, 
her position had been filled.  The letter further stated that her termination was 
pursuant to the leave-of-absence policy and that the termination did not violate any 
law.  Wilson filed a complaint for an alleged violation of R.C. 4123.90. 
{¶ 31} Wilson’s employer filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim because Wilson’s complaint did not specifically allege that the discharge was 
in retaliation for her workers’ compensation claim.  The employer argued that the 
termination letter demonstrated that there was no retaliatory motive in its refusal to 
January Term, 2016 
 
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rehire Wilson. The trial court granted the employer’s motion to dismiss.  The court 
of appeals affirmed the judgment.  This court reversed. 
{¶ 32} There was no dispute in Wilson’s case regarding whether her injury 
was work-related.  Rather, the dispute in Wilson was whether her complaint 
sufficiently alleged that her employer had retaliated against her.  This court 
concluded that by referring to R.C. 4123.90 in the complaint, Wilson sufficiently 
complied with the notice-pleading requirements of Civ.R. 8(A). 
{¶ 33} Accordingly, this court held that “[a] complaint filed by an employee 
against an employer states a claim for relief for retaliatory discharge when it alleges 
that the employee was injured on the job, filed a claim for workers’ compensation, 
and was discharged by that employer in contravention of R.C. 4123.90.”  18 Ohio 
St.3d 8, 479 N.E.2d 275, syllabus.  Our holding in Wilson addressed whether a 
reference in the complaint to the retaliatory-discharge statute was sufficient to 
satisfy the notice-pleading requirements of Civ.R. 8(A) when the complaint does 
not specifically allege that the plaintiff was discharged in retaliation for pursuing a 
workers’ compensation claim.  We did not hold that a plaintiff must prove that his 
or her injury was work-related as an element of a prima facie case of employer 
retaliation under R.C. 4123.90. 
{¶ 34} This court has also considered and ruled on the basic purpose and 
import of R.C. 4123.90.  In Coolidge, 100 St.3d 141, 2003-Ohio-5357, 797 N.E.2d 
61, a teacher was assaulted and seriously injured by one of her students.  She had 
an allowed workers’ compensation claim and was receiving temporary-total-
disability benefits.  Initially the school granted her leave requests but then denied 
her request for a further extension of her leave time.  The teacher was then 
discharged for being absent without leave.  She filed actions for wrongful 
termination and retaliatory discharge, asserting that terminating her for violation of 
the district’s leave-of-absence policy while she was receiving temporary-total-
disability compensation violated public policy.  This court agreed. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 35} We observed: 
 
The basic purpose of any antiretaliation statute is to enable 
employees to freely exercise their rights without fear of retribution 
from their employers.  The recognition of a public-policy exception 
for wrongful discharge in retaliation for filing a workers’ 
compensation claim, whether derived from statutory or common 
law, is built on the premise that “[i]nability to challenge retaliatory 
discharges would undermine the purpose of the workers’ 
compensation statute by forcing the employee to choose between 
applying for the benefits to which he is entitled and losing his job.” 
82 American Jurisprudence 2d (2003) 682-683, Wrongful 
Discharge, Section 93. 
 
Id. at ¶ 43.  Accord Sutton, 129 Ohio St.3d 153, 2011-Ohio-2723, 950 N.E.2d 938, 
¶ 22 (recognizing a common-law action for wrongful discharge in violation of 
public policy based on R.C. 4123.90’s expression of “a clear public policy 
prohibiting retaliatory employment action against injured employees”). 
{¶ 36} In this case it is undisputed that Onderko filed a claim for workers’ 
compensation benefits.  It is also undisputed that Onderko’s claim was denied, then 
allowed, then denied.  Then Onderko was fired.  It is undisputed that Onderko was 
fired for pursuing workers’ compensation benefits.  However, Sierra Lobo asserts 
that Onderko’s retaliation claim must fail as a matter of law because Onderko’s 
workers’ compensation claim was not allowed.  The Fifth District has held that 
proof of injury at work is an element of a retaliation case brought pursuant to R.C. 
4123.90.  Kilbarger, 120 Ohio App.3d at 338-339, 697 N.E.2d 1080.  That is not 
the law of Ohio.  Just as this court’s holding in Wilson did not require the plaintiff 
to prove that the injury was work-related in order to prevail under R.C. 4123.90, 
January Term, 2016 
 
13 
we today affirm that principle.  Proof of injury at work is not an element of a prima 
facie case of retaliatory discharge under R.C. 4123.90. 
{¶ 37} Sierra Lobo’s proposition that in order to have a successful 
retaliation claim under the statute, the workers’ compensation claim must be 
successful ignores the language of the statute as well as its import.  The plain 
language of the statute prohibits “any punitive action against any employee because 
the employee filed a claim or instituted, pursued or testified in any proceedings 
under the workers’ compensation act for an injury or an occupational disease which 
occurred in the course of and arising out of his employment with that employer.”  
R.C. 4123.90.  The language of the statute hinges on the employer’s response to the 
plaintiff’s pursuit of benefits, not the award of benefits.  Hinging recovery under 
the statute on proof of “an injury or an occupational disease which occurred in the 
course of and arising out of” the plaintiff’s employment would have the effect of 
reading the phrase “filed a claim or instituted, pursued or testified in a proceeding” 
completely out of the statute.  The compensability of the injury is not a required 
element in a retaliatory-discharge case.  R.C. 4123.90 does not authorize courts to 
review the compensability of a workers’ compensation claim.  The only relevant 
question for the trial court is whether a claim was pursued and whether the 
employee was fired or otherwise punished for doing so. 
{¶ 38} Interpreting the statute to prohibit retaliation against only those 
workers whose claims have been allowed misses the point of the statute, which is 
to enable employees to freely exercise their rights without fear of retribution from 
their employers.  Sutton, 129 Ohio St.3d 153, 2011-Ohio-2723, 950 N.E.2d 938,  
¶ 22. 
{¶ 39} Our holding in this case by no means suggests that a fraudulent or 
false claim for workers’ compensation may be pursued without penalty and is not 
grounds for termination.  Filing a false claim or making misleading statements in 
order to secure workers’ compensation is a crime in Ohio.  R.C. 2913.48.  Any 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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person undertaking such conduct is subject to significant criminal penalties. There 
is no indication here that Onderko was investigated or charged with workers’ 
compensation fraud.  In fact, the record is clear that this employee was discouraged 
by his employer from even applying for benefits in the first place, with the 
dismissive statement by his supervisor that the claim was probably not allowable.  
We resist interpreting the antiretaliation statute in such a way that would vest 
employers with the discretion to label any unsuccessful claim as deceptive and then 
terminate the employee. 
{¶ 40} We therefore hold that a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge 
under R.C. 4123.90 requires a plaintiff to prove only that the employer discharged, 
demoted, reassigned, or took any other punitive action against the plaintiff in 
retaliation for the plaintiff’s filing a workers’ compensation claim or instituting, 
pursuing, or testifying in any proceedings under the Workers’ Compensation Act. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 41} For the foregoing reasons, we answer the certified question and 
Proposition of Law No. 1 in the negative and hold that pursuant to the plain 
language of R.C. 4123.90, the necessary elements of a prima facie case of 
retaliatory discharge under R.C. 4123.90 do not include proof that the plaintiff 
suffered a workplace injury.  Thus, the plaintiff is not required to prove that he or 
she was injured on the job.  We also hold that because proof of a work-related injury 
is not an element of a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge, failure to appeal the 
denial of a workers’ compensation claim does not foreclose a suit for retaliatory 
discharge under R.C. 4123.90.  The judgment of the Sixth District is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, and FRENCH, JJ., 
concur. 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents in an opinion. 
_________________ 
January Term, 2016 
 
15 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 42} I respectfully dissent. 
{¶ 43} R.C. 4123.90 provides that “[n]o employer shall discharge * * * any 
employee because the employee filed a claim * * * for an injury or occupational 
disease which occurred in the course of and arising out of his employment with that 
employer.”  (Emphasis added.)  Thus, the statute supports the view that a retaliation 
claim can proceed only if a workplace injury in fact occurred.  A court should not 
construe the statute in a manner to encourage fraudulent claims for workers’ 
compensation benefits, and here, the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation 
determined that there was no workplace injury.  The evidence therefore supports 
the trial court finding that Sierra Lobo, Inc., fired Onderko for filing a fraudulent 
claim. 
{¶ 44} The syllabus prepared by today’s majority contradicts the statute and 
is another example of the court failing to adhere to the rule of law and to recognize 
that the General Assembly is the policy-making body in our government and 
substituting its own judgment for that of the legislature. 
{¶ 45} Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Sixth District 
Court of Appeals. 
_________________ 
 
Walter Haverfield, L.L.P, and Margaret A. O’Bryon, for appellee. 
 
Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P., Mark J. Valponi, Brian E. Ambrosia, 
and Jennifer B. Orr, for appellant. 
  
 
The Gittes Law Group, Frederick M. Gittes, and Jeffrey P. Vardaro, urging 
affirmance for amici curiae Ohio Employment Lawyers Association. 
 
Law Office of Thomas Tootle Co., L.P.A., and Thomas Tootle, urging 
affirmance for amici curiae Ohio Association for Justice. 
 
Portman & Foley, L.L.P., and Frederic A. Portman, urging affirmance for 
amicus curiae Fraternal Order of Police Capital City Lodge No. 9. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Paul L. Cox, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Fraternal Order of Police 
of Ohio, Inc. 
_________________