Title: State v. Jeffrey A. Warbelton

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2009 WI 6 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP105-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Jeffrey A. Warbelton, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2008 WI App 42 
(Reported at: 308 Wis. 2d 459, 747 N.W.2d 717) 
(Ct. App 2008-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 21, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 5, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago   
 
JUDGE: 
Scott C. Woldt   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Paul G. LaZotte, assistant state public defender, Madison, and 
oral argument by Paul G. LaZotte. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Thomas 
J. Balistreri, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 6
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP105-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2004CF227) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Jeffrey A. Warbelton, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 21, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Jeffrey A. 
Warbelton, seeks review of a published court of appeals decision 
affirming his conviction for stalking.1  Under Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.32(2m)(a) (2001-02),2 whoever commits the crime of stalking 
is guilty of a Class H felony if the actor has a previous 
                                                 
1 See State v. Warbelton, 2008 WI App 42, 308 Wis. 2d 459, 
747 N.W.2d 717, affirming a judgment of the circuit court for 
Winnebago County, Scott C. Woldt, Judge.   
2 Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent references to 
the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-02 version, as amended 
effective February 1, 2003, by Wis. Act 109.   
No. 
2007AP105-CR   
 
2 
 
conviction for a violent crime.  Warbelton stipulated that he 
had been convicted of a prior violent crime.  Over his 
objection, the stipulation was admitted into evidence and the 
issue was submitted to the jury for its determination.    
¶2 
Warbelton asserts that because a prior conviction for 
a violent crime is a penalty enhancer and is not an element of 
the crime of stalking, the circuit court erroneously admitted 
evidence of the prior conviction and submitted it to the jury 
for determination.  In the alternative, Warbelton contends that 
even if a prior conviction for a violent crime is an element of 
Class 
H 
felony 
stalking, 
under 
State 
v. 
Alexander3 
the 
stipulation should not have been entered into evidence and the 
element should not have been submitted to the jury.   
¶3 
We conclude that a prior conviction for a violent 
crime under Wis. Stat. § 940.32(2m)(a) is an element of the 
stalking crime, rather than a penalty enhancer.  We further 
determine that Alexander is applicable only to prosecutions for 
driving while under the influence of an intoxicant or with a 
prohibited alcohol concentration.4  Here, the circuit court did 
not err by admitting the stipulation into evidence and by 
submitting the element to the jury for its determination.  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
                                                 
3 214 Wis. 2d 628, 571 N.W.2d 662 (1997). 
4 See Wis. Stat. §§ 346.63(1)(a), 346.63(1)(b).  
No. 
2007AP105-CR   
 
3 
 
 
I. 
¶4 
In April of 2004, Jeffery A. Warbelton was charged 
with seven criminal counts, all related to his conduct toward 
Linda M. Peterson, the complainant and his former wife.  At 
issue here is Count 1: Stalking, in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.32(2m)(a).5  The complaint stated that Warbelton:  
[D]id intentionally engage in a course of conduct 
directed at . . . Linda M Peterson that causes that 
person to fear and that would cause a reasonable 
person to fear bodily injury or death to himself [sic] 
and where the actor knows or reasonably should know 
that the conduct placed the person in reasonable fear 
of bodily injury or death to himself [sic].  The actor 
has a previous conviction for a violent crime as 
defined in s. 939.632(1)(e)1. . . . contrary to sec. 
940.32(2m)(a) . . . a 
Class 
H 
Felony, 
and 
upon 
conviction may be fined not more than Ten Thousand 
Dollars ($10,000), or imprisoned not more than six (6) 
years, or both.  
The violent crime referred to in the complaint was a 1994 
conviction for sexual assault of a child.   
¶5 
The trial began on November 7, 2005, and lasted for 
three days.  Shortly before the jury was convened, the court and 
the parties discussed Warbelton's offer to waive a jury 
determination of his prior conviction for a violent crime.    
¶6 
Warbelton's attorney stated that he believed "the 
nature of that element is more in the nature of a penalty 
                                                 
5  In addition to stalking, the complaint also charged the 
following offenses: telephone harassment contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 947.012(1)(a); three counts of disorderly conduct contrary to 
§ 947.01; criminal trespass contrary to § 943.14; and criminal 
damage to property contrary to § 943.01(1). 
No. 
2007AP105-CR   
 
4 
 
enhancer rather than in what's typically a jury determination.  
We would be willing to stipulate not only to the prior acts but 
it's our position we would waive the jury trial on that 
particular issue."  The judge conducted a colloquy during which 
Warbelton affirmed that he wanted to waive a jury determination 
of his prior conviction and that he made the decision of his own 
free will.  The judge stated, "I'll accept the waiver and will 
not try that issue."   
¶7 
The 
district attorney, however, objected to the 
waiver.  He argued that under Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1), the State 
must consent to a jury waiver, and "at this point in time the 
State's not willing to waive the right to jury trial on that 
issue." 
¶8 
Warbelton's attorney argued that "much like the 
dangerous weapon penalty enhancer and numerous other enhancers 
that the legislature has placed in the statute, either it's to 
be determined by the court after a finding of guilt of the 
underlying offense or . . . the defendant may stipulate to that 
element."  The district attorney countered that "there's a 
difference between a stipulation to the element versus a waiver 
of that issue before the jury," and that according to recent 
United States Supreme Court cases, a fact that increases a 
penalty must be found unanimously by a jury. 
¶9 
The judge determined that although he could limit the 
evidence of the prior conviction to the proposed stipulation, he 
could not compel the State to accept a waiver of a jury trial on 
the element: 
No. 
2007AP105-CR   
 
5 
 
[L]ooking at [Section 972.02(1)], which talks about 
jury trial waiver, it clearly states "with approval of 
the court," which I would approve of, "and consent of 
the State."  Obviously, the State doesn't consent; and 
therefore, I guess we'll have the jury decide that.   
¶10 The parties agreed that the jury would not learn the 
nature of or any details about Warbelton's prior conviction for 
sexual assault of a child.  Although his judgment of conviction 
would be entered into evidence, it would not be published to the 
jury.  The jury would hear only that both parties had stipulated 
that Warbelton had a prior conviction for a violent crime as 
defined under Wis. Stat. § 939.632(1)(e)1.   
¶11 In fact, that is what occurred.  After opening 
statements, the district attorney read the stipulation to the 
jury as follows: 
Exhibit No. 7 is a certified Judgment of Conviction in 
Winnebago 
County 
Case 
95-CF-90. 
 
This 
document 
establishes that the defendant, Jeffrey Warbelton, has 
a previous conviction for a violent crime under 
Wisconsin Statutes 939.632, Sub. 1, Sub. E, (1). 
Exhibit No. 7 was never published to the jury.  The jury then 
heard nearly two days of testimony regarding the alleged acts of 
stalking, as well as the other charges——telephone harassment, 
disorderly conduct, criminal trespass, and criminal damage to 
property.6   
                                                 
6 This case was consolidated with two other criminal cases 
against Warbelton, alleging three counts of bail jumping and two 
violations of a domestic abuse order.  Ultimately, the jury 
returned not guilty verdicts on these five charges.  They are 
not at issue in this review. 
No. 
2007AP105-CR   
 
6 
 
¶12 Warbelton took the stand and testified about his 
recollection of the incidents that formed the basis for the 
criminal complaint.  During direct examination, he admitted that 
he had been convicted of five crimes.  
¶13 The parties' stipulation was not mentioned again until 
the end of trial, when the judge reread the stipulation and gave 
the jury instructions.  The judge instructed the jury on the 
elements of Class H felony stalking as follows: 
If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that 
all four elements of [stalking] have been proved, you 
should find the defendant guilty.  If you are not so 
satisfied, you must find the defendant not guilty.  If 
you find the defendant guilty, you must answer the 
following question: Did the defendant have a previous 
conviction for a violent crime as defined in Section 
939.632, Paren. 1 Paren. E (1), Wisconsin Statutes. 
Before you may answer yes, you must be satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the answer to the 
question is yes.  If you are not so satisfied, you 
must answer the question no. 
Further, the judge stated, "The district attorney and the 
attorney for the defendant have stipulated, or agreed, to the 
existence of certain facts, and you must accept these facts as 
conclusively proved[.]"7  
                                                 
7 In its argument to this court, the State asserted that the 
circuit court gave a limiting instruction in order to minimize 
the possible prejudicial effect of the stipulation.  A review of 
the evidence shows that the following limiting instruction was 
read to the jury: 
Evidence has been received that the defendant, Jeffrey 
A. Warbelton, has been convicted of crimes.  This 
evidence was received solely because it bears upon the 
credibility of the defendant as a witness.  It must 
not be used for any other purpose, and particularly, 
you should bear in mind that a criminal conviction at 
No. 
2007AP105-CR   
 
7 
 
¶14 The jury returned guilty verdicts on the stalking 
charge, the telephone harassment charge, the criminal damage to 
property charge, and the three disorderly conduct charges.  The 
jury returned a not guilty verdict on the criminal trespass 
charge. 
 
The 
judge 
sentenced 
Warbelton 
to 
three 
years 
incarceration and three years extended supervision for stalking.  
He further sentenced Warbelton to two years incarceration on 
each of the remaining five counts, to run concurrently with each 
other and consecutively to the sentence for stalking. 
¶15 Warbelton filed a motion for postconviction relief, 
asking the court to vacate all six convictions.  He argued that 
the court erred by admitting evidence that he had a previous 
conviction for a violent crime, and by asking the jury to 
determine the fact of the prior conviction.  The court denied 
Warbelton's motion. 
¶16 Warbelton appealed the decision.  The court of appeals 
concluded that Warbelton's prior criminal history was not a 
penalty enhancer, but rather was an element of the crime.  The 
court further determined that it was not error for the circuit 
                                                                                                                                                             
some previous point is not proof of guilt of the 
offense now charged. 
This is a standard jury instruction given when evidence of 
a prior conviction is admitted to impeach the testimony of the 
defendant.  See Wis JI——Criminal 327.  Here, however, the 
stipulation was not entered into evidence solely because it 
bears upon the credibility of the defendant's testimony.  It was 
admitted because the jury was required to use the evidence of a 
prior crime to find that Warbelton was guilty of Class H felony 
stalking.   
No. 
2007AP105-CR   
 
8 
 
court to admit the evidence at trial or to instruct the jury to 
make a finding on that matter.  State v. Warbelton, 2008 WI App 
42, ¶1, 308 Wis. 2d 459, 747 N.W.2d 717.  Warbelton petitioned 
for review.  
II. 
¶17 The question of whether to admit evidence is within 
the circuit court's discretion.  State v. Franklin, 2004 WI 38, 
¶6, 270 Wis. 2d 271, 677 N.W.2d 276.  This court will reverse 
such a decision only if the circuit court erroneously exercised 
its discretion.  Id.  A circuit court erroneously exercises its 
discretion when it bases its decision on a misstated fact or an 
incorrect view of the law.  State v. Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d 270, 
280, 588 N.W.2d 1 (1999). 
¶18 In determining whether the legislature intended the 
conviction of the prior violent crime to be a penalty enhancer 
or an element of Wis. Stat. § 940.32(2m), we are presented with 
a question of law.  State v. Smith, 2005 WI 104, ¶13, 283 
Wis. 2d 57, 699 N.W.2d 508.  Similarly, the determination of 
whether this fact should have been submitted to the jury also 
presents a question of law.  State v. LaCount, 2008 WI 59, ¶47, 
310 Wis. 2d 85, 750 N.W.2d 780.  We review questions of law 
independently from the conclusions rendered by the circuit court 
and the court of appeals.  State ex rel. Hipp v. Murray, 2008 WI 
67, ¶20, 310 Wis. 2d 342, 750 N.W.2d 873.   
III. 
¶19 We examine first whether a prior conviction for a 
violent crime is a penalty enhancer, as Warbelton contends, or 
No. 
2007AP105-CR   
 
9 
 
an element of Section 940.32(2m)(a), as advanced by the State.  
This distinction is important because if it is merely a penalty 
enhancer akin to the habitual criminality statute,8 the circuit 
court committed error by admitting evidence of Warbelton's prior 
crime: 
A repeater charge is relevant only to the action of 
the trial judge in imposing sentence after the jury 
has made the finding of guilt in respect to the crime 
tried before it.  It must be withheld from the jury's 
knowledge. 
Mulkovich v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 464, 468, 243 N.W.2d 198 (1976).   
¶20  Two cases from the United States Supreme Court 
provide helpful context to our element versus penalty enhancer 
inquiry.  In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000), 
the court reasoned that a criminal defendant is entitled to "a 
jury determination that he is guilty of every element of the 
crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt."  
Generally, a fact must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt if it increases the potential penalty for a 
crime beyond the penalty which could otherwise be imposed.  Id. 
at 476.  The due process protections guaranteed by a jury trial 
"extend, to some degree, to determinations that go not to a 
defendant's guilt or innocence, but simply to the length of his 
sentence."  Id. at 484 (quotations omitted).  The U.S. Supreme 
Court stated: 
The judge's role in sentencing is constrained at its 
outer limits by the facts alleged in the indictment 
                                                 
8 Wis. Stat. § 939.62(1) (2005-06). 
No. 
2007AP105-CR   
 
10 
 
and found by the jury.  Put simply, facts that expose 
a 
defendant 
to 
a 
punishment 
greater 
than 
that 
otherwise 
legally 
prescribed 
were 
by 
definition 
"elements" of a separate legal offense. 
Id. at 483 n.10. 
¶21 The sole exception to this rule is the fact of a prior 
conviction.  Id. at 487-88 (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United 
States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)).  The legislature has the authority 
to designate a prior conviction as a penalty enhancer rather 
than an element of the offense.  Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 
246.  Although the legislature is permitted to designate a prior 
conviction as a penalty enhancer, it does not follow that the 
legislature is forbidden from designating a prior conviction as 
an element.9  Unless otherwise designated by the legislature, a 
fact relevant to conviction is presumed to be an essential 
element of a crime.10 
¶22 With these principles in mind, we turn to an analysis 
of the text of the statute.  Determining whether a fact is an 
element or a penalty enhancer is an exercise in statutory 
                                                 
9 For another example, see Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2)(a), which 
criminalizes possession of a firearm for individuals previously 
convicted of a felony.  State v. Gibson, 2000 WI App 207, ¶8, 
238 Wis. 2d 547, 618 N.W.2d 248 (concluding that a prior felony 
conviction is an element of § 941.29(2)(a)).  
10 See Massey v. United States, 281 F. 293, 297 (8th Cir. 
1922) ("Statutes providing for greater punishment of second or 
subsequent offenses by the same person have long been in force 
in this country . . . .  It is the established rule, under such 
statutes, unless the statute designates a different mode of 
procedure, . . . the indictment or information must allege the 
fact of the prior conviction, and the allegation of such 
conviction must be proved in the trial to the jury.") (Citation 
omitted).   
No. 
2007AP105-CR   
 
11 
 
interpretation.  The legislature is entrusted to define the 
elements of a crime and to prescribe punishments for each crime.  
State v. Davison, 2003 WI 89, ¶31, 263 Wis. 2d 145, 666 
N.W.2d 1; see also Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 
(1985).   
¶23 The 2001-02 version of Wis. Stat. § 940.32 provides in 
relevant part: 
(2) Whoever meets all of the following criteria is 
guilty of a Class I felony: 
(a) 
The actor intentionally engages in a course of 
conduct directed at a specific person that would 
cause 
a 
reasonable 
person 
under 
the 
same 
circumstances to fear bodily injury to or death 
of himself or herself or a member of his or her 
family or household. 
(b) 
The actor intends that at least one of the acts 
that constitute the course of conduct will place 
the specific person in reasonable fear of bodily 
injury to or death of himself or herself or a 
member of his or her family or household. 
(c) 
The actor's acts induce fear in the specific 
person of bodily injury to or the death of 
himself or herself or a member of his or her 
family or household. 
 . . . . 
(2m) Whoever violates sub. (2) is guilty of a Class H 
felony if any of the following applies: 
No. 
2007AP105-CR   
 
12 
 
(a) 
The actor has a previous conviction for a violent 
crime, as defined in s. 939.632(1)(c)1.,11 or a 
previous conviction under this section or s. 
947.013(1r), (1t), (1v), or (1x).12 
(b) 
The actor has a previous conviction for a crime, 
the victim of that crime is the victim of the 
present violation of sub. (2), and the present 
violation occurs within 7 years after the prior 
violent conviction. 
(c) 
The actor intentionally gains access or causes 
another person to gain access to a record in 
electronic 
format 
that 
contains 
personally 
identifiable information regarding the victim in 
order to facilitate the violation. 
(d) 
The person violates s. 968.31(1) or 968.34(1) in 
order to facilitate the violation. 
(e) 
The victim is under the age of 18 years at the 
time of the violation. 
(3) Whoever violates sub. (2) is guilty of a Class F 
felony if any of the following applies: 
. . . . 
Wis. Stat. § 940.32 (emphasis added).13 
                                                 
11 These 
felonies 
include 
various 
classifications 
of 
homicide, felony murder, battery, mayhem, sexual assault, taking 
hostages, kidnapping, endangering safety by use of a dangerous 
weapon, disarming a peace officer, arson, Molotov cocktails, 
several types of burglary, carjacking, robbery by use of a 
dangerous weapon, various classifications of sexual assault, 
exploitation or abuse of a child, child enticement, soliciting a 
child for prostitution, and abduction of a child.   
12 These subsections define various classifications of 
harassment.   
13 The following facts are elements of Class F felony 
stalking under Wis. Stat. § 940.32(3): 
(a) The act results in bodily harm to the victim or a 
member of the victim's family or household. 
No. 
2007AP105-CR   
 
13 
 
¶24 The statute creates three distinct classifications of 
stalking offenses.  Sub. (2) defines the underlying offense of 
stalking, a Class I felony.  Sub. (2m) enumerates five facts 
which elevate the offense to a Class H felony.  Sub. (3) 
enumerates three facts which elevate the offense to a Class F 
felony.  The subsection at issue in this review is sub. (2m)(a), 
which elevates the crime of stalking to a Class H felony if the 
defendant has a prior conviction for a violent crime, a crime of 
stalking, or a crime involving harassment.    
¶25 Warbelton asserts that sub. (2m)(a) is akin to a 
penalty enhancer much like the enhancers designated for repeat 
offenders 
under § 939.62, "Increased penalty for habitual 
offender."14  He argues that stalking is always criminal 
                                                                                                                                                             
(b) The actor has a previous conviction for a violent 
crime, as defined in s. 939.632(1)(c)1., or a 
previous conviction under this section or s. 
947.013(1r), (1t), (1v), or (1x), the victim of 
that crime is the victim of the present violation 
of sub. (2), and the present violation occurs 
within 7 years after the prior conviction. 
(c) The actor uses a dangerous weapon in carrying out 
any of the acts . . . . 
14 In relevant part, Wis. Stat. § 939.62(1) (2005-06) 
provides: 
If the actor is a repeater, as that term is defined in 
sub. (2), and the present conviction is for any crime 
for 
which 
imprisonment 
may 
be 
imposed . . . the 
maximum term of imprisonment prescribed by law for 
that crime may be increased as follows: 
(a) 
A maximum term of imprisonment of one year or 
less may be increased to not more than 2 years. 
No. 
2007AP105-CR   
 
14 
 
behavior, 
regardless 
of 
whether 
the 
defendant 
has 
been 
previously convicted of a violent crime.  He asserts that there 
is no reason to treat a prior conviction for a violent crime as 
a substantive element that must be determined by the jury.       
¶26 Although there are similarities between sub. (2m)(a) 
and the increased penalty for habitual criminality statute, 
there are significant differences as well.  An analysis of the 
statutory history and the text of the stalking statute reveals 
that the legislature intended a prior conviction for a violent 
crime to be a substantive element of Class H felony stalking.    
¶27 Section 940.32 was first created by 1993 Wisconsin Act 
96.  Under this statute, the underlying crime of stalking was a 
Class A misdemeanor defined in Wis. Stat. § 940.32(2) (1993-94).  
The statute also provided that stalking was an aggravated Class 
E felony if either of the following facts was present: (a) the 
act resulted in bodily harm to the victim, or (b) the actor had 
a previous stalking conviction for a violation against the same 
victim within the past seven years.  Id. § 940.32(3).   
                                                                                                                                                             
(b) 
A maximum term of imprisonment of more than one 
year but not more than 10 years may be increased 
by not more than 2 years if the prior convictions 
were for misdemeanors and by not more than 4 
years if the prior conviction was for a felony. 
(c) 
A maximum term of imprisonment of more than 10 
years may be increased by not more than 2 years 
if the prior convictions were for misdemeanors 
and by not more than 6 years if the prior 
conviction was for a felony.  
No. 
2007AP105-CR   
 
15 
 
¶28 The statute was amended once in 1993, shortly after 
its creation.  See 1993 Wis. Act 496.  Among other revisions, 
the act created sub. (2m), which provided that anyone who 
commits the underlying crime of stalking is guilty of a Class D 
felony if he or she intentionally gains access to an electronic 
record containing personal information regarding the victim in 
order to facilitate the stalking offense.  Id. § 940.32(2m). 
¶29 In 2001, the legislature significantly restructured 
and revised the statute, adding the language that is the subject 
of Warbelton's appeal.  See 2001 Wis. Act 109.  Among other 
changes, these amendments broadened the definition of stalking15 
and revised the structure of the statute to reflect the three 
tiers of stalking offenses delineated above.  An examination of 
the text reveals that the legislature designated a prior violent 
conviction as an element of Class H Felony Stalking, rather than 
as a penalty enhancer.  The following textual clues lead to this 
determination. 
¶30 First, sub. (2m)(a) designates a list of specific 
crimes that elevate a simple stalking offense to a Class H 
felony.  These enumerated prior convictions are for a specific 
set of violent crimes, prior stalking offenses, and harassment 
offenses.  The legislature's focus on the nature of the prior 
crime, rather than the simple fact of a prior conviction, 
demonstrates that the legislature's intent was not simply to 
                                                 
15 The amendments clarified that the course of conduct 
constituting stalking would create fear in a reasonable person 
with the same experiences as the victim. 
No. 
2007AP105-CR   
 
16 
 
provide an enhanced punishment for habitual criminality.  The 
selection 
of 
these 
specific 
crimes 
indicates 
that 
the 
legislature defined stalking as an aggravated crime when the 
perpetrator has a history of violent or obsessive behavior. 
¶31 Second, although the habitual criminality statute 
provides a number of years that a judge may add to a sentence if 
there are prior convictions, the stalking statute specifies that 
defendants are guilty of a higher class of felony if they have 
specific prior convictions.  Under sub. (2m), if any of the 
listed conditions are met, then the defendant is guilty of a 
Class H felony.  § 940.32(2m).  A prior conviction for a violent 
crime, by itself, subjects the defendant to an entirely 
different class of felony.  This indicates that the legislature 
intended a prior conviction to be an element of the offense 
rather than a penalty enhancer.   
¶32 Third, the stalking statute is not structured like the 
habitual criminality statute, which defines penalty enhancers 
rather than substantive elements.  Instead, the stalking statute 
sets up three classes of stalking, with increasing punishments——
Class I felonies under § 940.32(2), Class H felonies under 
§ 940.32(2m), and Class F felonies under § 940.32(3).   
¶33 Apart from sub. (2m)(a), the four subsections under 
sub. (2m) contain alternative facts that require proof to a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  These alternative facts are a prior 
conviction for any offense against the same victim within the 
past seven years, the use of an electronic record in order to 
facilitate 
the 
stalking 
violation, 
the 
interception 
and 
No. 
2007AP105-CR   
 
17 
 
disclosure of another person's communication in order to 
facilitate the stalking violation, and a victim who is under the 
age of 18.  § 940.32(2m)(b)-(e).16   
¶34 Thus, it is unlikely that the legislature intended 
sub. (2m)(a) to define a penalty enhancer, when all of the other 
facts enumerated in subs. (2m) and (3) appear to be essential 
elements that must be proven to a jury.  The structure of the 
statute, viewed in its entirety, indicates that a prior 
conviction for a violent crime is an essential element for a 
conviction under § 940.32(2m)(a).   
¶35 Our analysis is confirmed by the legislative history 
of stalking statutes in Wisconsin and nationally.  Stalking 
statutes were passed nationwide in the early 1990s in response 
to several high-profile murders of women who had previously been 
stalked by their killers.  See Nat'l Inst. of Justice, U.S. 
Dep't of Justice, Project to Develop a Model Anti-Stalking Code 
for States 5 (1993).  Wisconsin's initial enactment closely 
                                                 
16 Further, the subsections listed under § 940.32(3) contain 
alternative facts that must be proven to a jury before a 
defendant can be convicted of Class F stalking.  These facts 
are: (a) bodily harm to the victim; (b) a prior conviction for a 
violent crime, a stalking crime, or harassment against the same 
victim of the current charge and within the past seven years; or 
(c) use of a weapon during the commission of the crime.  
§ 940.32(3)(a)-(c). 
No. 
2007AP105-CR   
 
18 
 
tracks much of the language of a model statute promulgated in 
1993 by the National Institute of Justice.17   
¶36  The Institute noted, "Stalkers may be obsessive, 
unpredictable, and potentially violent.  They often commit a 
series of increasingly violent acts, which may become suddenly 
violent, and result in the victim's injury or death."  Id. at 
49.  Unlike with other crimes against life and bodily security, 
the mental state of the victim——as well as the mental state of 
the perpetrator——is an element of the crime of stalking.  The 
Institute explained, "Stalking may involve conduct intended to 
be an expression of the stalker's feelings toward the victim."  
Id. at 9.  "Since stalking statutes criminalize what otherwise 
would be legitimate behavior based upon the fact that the 
behavior induces fear, the level of fear induced in a stalking 
victim is a crucial element of the stalking offense."  Id. at 
48. 
¶37 At the time that the model statute was promulgated, 
nine states permitted enhanced penalties for stalking if the 
                                                 
17 Compare Wis. Stat. § 940.32 (1993-94) with Nat'l Inst. of 
Justice, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Project to Develop a Model Anti-
Stalking Code for States 43-44 (1993).  The definitions are 
nearly identical in the Institute's model statute and the 
Wisconsin statute.  Further, both define the underlying crime of 
stalking using the same elements, with minor substitutions in 
language.  Compare § 940.32(2) with Nat'l Inst. of Justice, 
supra, at 43-44.  The 1993 Wisconsin Statute included additional 
aggravating factors not included in the model statute.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 940.32(3) (1993-94).  
We note, however, that there is no direct reference to the 
model statute recorded in the legislative history of Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.32. 
No. 
2007AP105-CR   
 
19 
 
defendant has previously been convicted of another felony.  Id. 
at 28.  The Institute recommended that states "consider 
establishing a continuum of charges that could be used by law 
enforcement officials to intervene at various stages."  Id. at 
49. 
¶38 The Institute explicitly discussed benefits of a 
graduated system of punishment: 
If stalking is not treated as a felony, a state may 
wish to consider incorporating a system of aggravating 
factors into its stalking sentencing policy so that a 
particular stalking incident can be elevated from a 
misdemeanor to a felony if those aggravating factors 
are present.  
Id.  Further, the Institute stated, "As an alternative to 
penalty enhancements, states may wish to consider creating a 
separate crime——for example, aggravated stalking——to deal with 
convicted stalkers who have committed previous felonies or 
stalking offenses."  Id. at 50. 
¶39 This is precisely what is borne out in the Wisconsin 
Statutes.  Wisconsin's anti-stalking statute delineates three 
degrees of stalking depending on the presence of aggravating 
factors——Class I felony, Class H felony, and Class G felony.   
¶40 Based 
on 
the 
above, 
we 
conclude 
that 
a 
prior 
conviction for a violent crime under Wis. Stat. § 940.32(2m)(a) 
is an element of the stalking crime, rather than a penalty 
enhancer. 
IV. 
¶41 We determine next whether the court erred by admitting 
the stipulation into evidence and by submitting the element to 
No. 
2007AP105-CR   
 
20 
 
the jury for its determination.  Warbelton contends that even if 
a prior conviction for a violent crime is an element of Class H 
felony stalking, the circuit court erred by refusing to follow 
State v. Alexander, 214 Wis. 2d 628, 571 N.W.2d 662 (1997).  He 
asserts that the probative value of the stipulation was 
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.  As such, he argues 
that under Alexander, the stipulation should not have been 
admitted into evidence and the jury should not have been asked 
to determine whether he had a prior conviction for a violent 
crime.   
¶42 In Alexander, the defendant was on trial for operating 
while intoxicated——third offense.  One of the elements of this 
crime is at least two prior convictions, suspensions, or 
revocations.  The parties agreed to a stipulation, which stated 
that 
the 
defendant 
had 
two 
or 
more 
prior 
convictions, 
suspensions, or revocations.  Id. at 637.  This sanitized 
stipulation did not inform the jury that the prior convictions, 
suspensions, or revocations were for drunk driving.  The State 
refused, however, to consent to Alexander's proposed waiver of a 
jury trial on the element.  Id. 
¶43 In Alexander, we stated, "It is highly likely that 
jurors' experiences and common sense would tell them that when a 
defendant is charged with driving with a prohibited alcohol 
concentration, 
the 
prior 
convictions, 
suspensions 
or 
revocations . . . must be driving offenses and likely drunk-
driving offenses."  Id. at 648.  The court concluded that 
evidence of the priors would lead the jury to think that because 
No. 
2007AP105-CR   
 
21 
 
he had driven drunk at least twice before, "he was probably 
driving while intoxicated on the date in question."  Id. at 649-
50. 
¶44 Due 
to 
the 
likelihood 
of 
unfair 
prejudice, 
we 
concluded 
that 
"the 
evidence 
of 
the 
defendant's 
prior 
convictions, suspensions or revocations should be excluded and 
the [prior conviction] element not submitted to the jury because 
the 
probative 
value 
of 
the 
defendant's 
admission 
is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to 
the defendant."  Id. at 645. 
¶45 The nature of the drunk driving offense and the social 
stigma attached to it are compelling factors that we took into 
account when rendering our decision in Alexander.  Given these 
factors, "passion, prejudice[, or] public feeling . . . may 
[have] render[ed] impossible or unlikely an impartial trial by 
jury" if the jury was aware of prior convictions, suspensions, 
or revocations.  See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 37-38 
(1965).18  Under these circumstances, we concluded that it was 
                                                 
18 In Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 37-38 (1965), 
the United States Supreme Court left open the possibility that 
in some situations, a defendant might be able to insist upon a 
bench trial.  The court stated: 
We need not determine in this case whether there might 
be some circumstances where a defendant's reasons for 
wanting to be tried by a judge alone are so compelling 
that the Government's insistence on trial by jury 
would result in the denial to a defendant of an 
impartial trial.  Petitioner argues that there might 
arise situations where passion, prejudice[,] public 
feeling or some other factor may render impossible or 
unlikely an impartial trial by jury. 
No. 
2007AP105-CR   
 
22 
 
not a matter for determination by the jury.  Alexander, 214 
Wis. 2d at 651.  
¶46 Despite the parallels between Alexander and this case, 
we decline to extend Alexander's holding to the stalking 
statute.  Alexander is limited to prosecutions for driving while 
under the influence of an intoxicant or with a prohibited 
alcohol concentration.  In these unique cases, the risk of 
unfair prejudice is extremely high, given the likelihood that 
jurors will make prohibited inferences based on the fact of 
multiple prior convictions, suspensions, or revocations.   
¶47 First, upon learning that the defendant has prior 
convictions, suspensions, or revocations, jurors are likely to 
infer that these prior offenses were also for drunk driving——
precisely the same offense the defendant is charged with now.  
Second, upon learning that the defendant had multiple prior 
offenses, jurors are likely to infer that the current charge is 
part of a pattern of behavior——that is, that the defendant 
habitually 
drives 
while 
intoxicated. 
 
Third, 
given 
the 
defendant's probable habit of driving while intoxicated, jurors 
might conclude that even if the defendant is not guilty on the 
particular occasion charged, the defendant likely committed the 
same offense on many other occasions without being caught.  
Thus, the jury is likely convict, even if there is not 
persuasive proof that the defendant is guilty of the instant 
charge.   
                                                                                                                                                             
Id. (quotations and footnote omitted). 
No. 
2007AP105-CR   
 
23 
 
¶48 These likely inferences are at the heart of Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.04,19 the rule that prohibits a verdict based not on proof 
of the charged offense, but rather on the defendant's propensity 
to commit bad acts.  In contrast, the element of the stalking 
statute that requires proof of a prior violent crime does not 
pose equivalent risks.  Here, the jury is not likely to infer 
that because the defendant was convicted of a prior violent 
crime, it was a stalking offense.  The prior offense could be 
one of a number of violent offenses.  Additionally, the statute 
does not require multiple prior offenses, and therefore does not 
suggest a pattern of behavior.  Finally, because the element 
does not imply a particular habit, jurors are unlikely to return 
a guilty verdict despite insufficient evidence of the crime 
charged. 
¶49 Having determined that Alexander is not applicable to 
this situation, we turn to Warbelton's arguments.  Prior to 
trial, Warbelton invoked two distinct procedures used in 
criminal trials to deal with uncontested facts——a stipulation to 
an agreed fact,20 and a partial jury waiver.  A stipulation to an 
                                                 
19  Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a) provides in part:  
Except as provided in par. (b), evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that the person 
acted in conformity therewith. . . .   
20 When both the defendant and the district attorney agree 
that a fact is proven, the parties can stipulate to the 
existence of that fact.  The stipulation dispenses with the need 
for further proof of the fact and is presented to the jury.  
Meyers v. State, 193 Wis. 126, 127, 213 N.W. 645 (1927).   
No. 
2007AP105-CR   
 
24 
 
agreed fact is evidence, and its admissibility is governed by 
the statutory rules of evidence.  In contrast, a waiver of one 
or more elements of a crime is a partial jury waiver, and it is 
governed by separate statutory and constitutional rules.21 
¶50 We address Warbelton's arguments in turn.  First, he 
contends that the stipulation should not have been admitted into 
evidence because it was unfairly prejudicial under Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.03.22   
¶51 Because a prior conviction is an element of the crime 
charged, 
evidence 
of 
the 
prior 
conviction 
is 
certainly 
probative.  Evidence of a prior crime can also be prejudicial.  
When, as here, prejudicial evidence is necessary to prove the 
element of a crime charged, the court must take great care to 
minimize the risk of unfair prejudice in all ways possible.  See 
State v. McAllister, 153 Wis. 2d 523, 451 N.W.2d 764 (Ct. App. 
1989); Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997).  The 
State can be compelled to limit its proof of the element to a 
sanitized stipulation to the prior conviction.  See McAllister, 
                                                 
21 See State v. Villarreal, 153 Wis. 2d 323, 330-31, 450 
N.W.2d 519 (Ct. App. 1989).  In such a case, the defendant 
receives a bench trial on one or more elements of the charged 
crime, and the evidence relevant to these elements is not 
admitted to the jury.     
22 Wis. Stat. § 904.03 provides:  
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
No. 
2007AP105-CR   
 
25 
 
153 Wis. 2d 523 (concluding that, in a prosecution for felon in 
possession of a firearm, evidence of the prior felony conviction 
was irrelevant when the defendant offered to stipulate to the 
prior felony conviction); Old Chief, 519 U.S. 172 (concluding 
that the judge abused his discretion by admitting evidence of a 
prior felony when the defendant offered to stipulate that he had 
a prior felony conviction).   
¶52 In McAllister, the court of appeals addressed the 
felon in possession of a firearm statute, Wis. Stat. § 941.29, 
in which one of the elements is a prior conviction of a felony.  
The court reasoned that evidence offered to prove the element is 
always relevant.  McAllister, 153 Wis. 2d at 529.  However, the 
statute required proof only of the fact of a prior felony 
conviction.  The type of felony conviction and narrative details 
regarding the felony conviction were not relevant to prove the 
felon in possession of a firearm charge.  Id. 
¶53 To this end, the court stated: 
Where the defendant offers to stipulate to or admit 
the felony-conviction element of the crime with which 
he or she is charged, and the other-crimes evidence is 
not offered under sec. 904.04(2). Stats., to show the 
defendant's motive, opportunity, intent, or one of the 
other 
permissible 
exceptions, 
such 
evidence 
is 
irrelevant and should be excluded. 
Id.  When the defendant agrees to a sanitized stipulation 
admitting the prior conviction, there is no need for further 
proof relating to the nature of the conviction.  
¶54 Here, Warbelton offered to stipulate to the fact that 
he had a prior conviction for a violent crime.  The State agreed 
No. 
2007AP105-CR   
 
26 
 
to the stipulation, and the court determined that evidence about 
the nature of the prior conviction would not be before the jury.  
Although Warbelton's 1995 judgment of conviction was entered 
into evidence, it was not published to the jury.  The jury was 
told only that Warbelton had been convicted of a violent crime, 
and that the stipulation was conclusive proof.  This procedure 
was proper under McAllister and Old Chief. 
¶55 Having determined that admission of the stipulation 
was not error, we turn to Warbelton's second argument.  Before 
trial, Warbelton asked the court to grant his request to waive a 
jury determination of the element.  The State, however, did not 
consent to jury waiver of the element.  Warbelton argues that 
the State's approval was not necessary, and that the circuit 
court erred by declining to grant a partial jury waiver. 
¶56 A defendant has a constitutional right to a jury 
trial.  This right is personal and fundamental and cannot be 
waived unless the defendant makes a voluntary, knowing, and 
intelligent waiver on the record.  State v. Livingston, 159 
Wis. 2d 561, 569-70, 464 N.W.2d 839 (1991).   
 ¶57 It does not follow, however, that the defendant has 
the right to insist upon a bench trial.  See Singer, 380 U.S. at 
26 (concluding that there is no federal constitutional right to 
waive jury trial).  Our court of appeals has twice concluded 
that, in accordance with Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1), the court must 
approve and the State must consent to the defendant's request to 
waive a jury trial.  See State v. Burks, 2004 WI App 14, 268 
Wis. 2d 747, 674 N.W.2d 640 (determining that even when the 
No. 
2007AP105-CR   
 
27 
 
defendant and the State agree to waiver, a judge can refuse to 
approve it and is not required to give reasons for doing so); 
State v. Cook, 141 Wis. 2d 42, 413 N.W.2d 647 (Ct. App. 1987) 
(concluding that the State is neither constitutionally nor 
statutorily required to consent to the defendant's jury waiver). 
¶58 The procedure for waiving a jury trial is outlined in 
Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1):   
[C]riminal cases shall be tried by a jury . . . unless 
the defendant waives a jury in writing or by statement 
in open court . . . with the approval of the court and 
the consent of the state. 
¶59 The rule requiring the State's consent to a full jury 
waiver applies to waiver of a jury trial on one element as well. 
See State v. Villarreal, 153 Wis. 2d 323, 332, 450 N.W.2d 519 
(Ct. App. 1989); see also State v. Hauk, 2002 WI App 226, ¶32, 
257 
Wis. 2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393 (citations and quotations 
omitted): 
The right to a jury trial includes the right to have a 
jury determine each element of the crime.  Further, 
defendants 
retain 
this 
right 
no 
matter 
how 
overwhelming the evidence.  Therefore, whether Hauk 
waived her right to have the jury determine all the 
elements of the crime or only some of them, the waiver 
analysis is the same. 
No. 
2007AP105-CR   
 
28 
 
These cases make clear that waiver of one element requires the 
same procedure as a full jury waiver.23  This is the procedure 
described in Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1), where the defendant, the 
State, and the court must all agree to the partial jury waiver. 
¶60 In this case, the State refused to consent to partial 
jury waiver.  Warbelton could not waive a jury trial on the 
element without the consent of the State.  Thus, the circuit 
court did not err in submitting the element to the jury for its 
determination. 
V. 
¶61 In sum, we conclude that a prior conviction for a 
violent crime under Wis. Stat. § 940.32(2m)(a) is an element of 
the stalking crime, rather than a penalty enhancer.  We further 
determine that Alexander is applicable only to prosecutions for 
driving while under the influence of an intoxicant or with a 
prohibited alcohol concentration.  Here, the circuit court did 
not err by admitting the stipulation into evidence and by 
                                                 
23 State v. Benoit, 229 Wis. 2d 630, 600 N.W.2d 193 (Ct. 
App. 1999) does not contravene this doctrine.  In Benoit, the 
defendant's attorney stipulated to the second element of 
burglary——nonconsent of the owner——in order to prevent the owner 
from testifying.  See id. at 634.  The court instructed the jury 
on all elements of the crime, including nonconsent.  Id. at 635.  
The court also instructed the jury that because nonconsent had 
been stipulated, it was considered proven.  Id.  After trial, 
Benoit appealed, arguing that the colloquy was insufficient to 
support his partial jury waiver.  Id. at 636. The court of 
appeals determined that there was no jury waiver because the 
jury "made a complete and final determination of guilt based on 
the evidence presented; the court played no role as fact 
finder."  Id. at 637. 
No. 
2007AP105-CR   
 
29 
 
submitting the element to the jury for its determination.  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 
2007AP105-CR   
 
 
 
1