Title: Nave v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JEFFREY A. NAVE,
Defendant Below-
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
Plaintiff Below-
Appellee.
§
§
§  No. 152, 2001
§
§  Court Below—Superior Court
§  of the State of Delaware,
§  in and for New Castle County
§  Cr.A. No. IN91-02-0921
§
§
§
Submitted: June 25, 2001
  Decided:
July 30, 2001
Before WALSH, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices.
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED and
REMANDED.
Jeffrey A. Nave, pro se, Smyrna, Delaware.
Loren C. Meyers, Esquire, Chief of Appeals Division, Department of
Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellee.
HOLLAND, Justice:
2
The defendant-appellant, Jeffrey A. Nave, filed this appeal from a
Superior Court judgment dated March 15, 2001, which, sua sponte,
corrected a sentencing order dated January 10, 1992. Nave originally was
sentenced to fifteen years at Level V incarceration, suspended after serving
ten years in jail for five years of work release and probation.  The Superior
Court amended Nave’s 1992 sentence in 2001 to reflect that Nave must
serve fifteen years at Level V incarceration, without suspension of any
portion of the sentence.
On appeal, Nave raises several claims of error.  Nave contends that he
was denied due process because the Superior Court’s corrected sentencing
order imposed a harsher punishment, sua sponte, and did not reflect the
Superior Court’s original intent as expressed in its 1992 sentencing order.
Nave also asserts that the Superior Court had no authority to issue a
corrected sentence in response to Nave’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
The State concedes that the Superior Court erred when it amended Nave’s
sentence without first affording Nave the opportunity to appear before the
Superior Court.
After 
careful 
consideration, 
we 
agree 
with 
the 
State’s
acknowledgement that the Superior Court erred in this case by sentencing
Nave in absentia.  We also conclude that the Superior Court’s sua sponte
3
decision to correct Nave’s original sentence was erroneous.  Therefore, we
hold that the corrected sentencing order must be vacated and the matter
remanded for further proceedings.
Original Sentence
The record reflects that Nave was convicted in 1991 of possession of
marijuana with intent to deliver.  The Superior Court declared Nave to be a
habitual offender, pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4214(a), and sentenced him to
fifteen years at Level V incarceration, suspended after serving ten years in
jail for five years of work release and probation.  This Court affirmed
Nave’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal.1  Thereafter, Nave filed a
number of unsuccessful letters and petitions challenging the legality of his
sentence.
“Corrected” Sentence
In March 2001, Nave, acting pro se, filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus asserting that he should be released from custody.  Nave
contended that he already had completed the ten-year jail term contemplated
by the Superior Court’s 1992 sentencing order.  Nave further asserted that
the five-year, suspended portion of the Superior Court’s 1992 sentencing
order was illegal and that he should be discharged from serving any portion
4
of it.  According to Nave, the trial court cannot suspend any portion of a
sentence imposed pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4214(a).  The Superior Court
denied Nave’s petition for habeas relief but corrected its 1992 sentencing
order, sua sponte, and reimposed a full fifteen-year term of incarceration
without suspending any portion of the sentence.
The State agrees with Nave’s position that the Superior Court lacked
authority under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a) to suspend any portion of Nave’s 1992
sentence.  The State argues, however, that the Superior Court had authority
to correct Nave’s illegal sentence “at any time.”2  The State also asserts that
the Superior Court’s correction of Nave’s sentence to impose a fifteen-year
jail term, without any suspension, was within the Superior Court’s
discretion.  Nonetheless, the State concedes error in the present case because
the Superior Court resentenced Nave without Nave being present, which was
contrary to this Court’s ruling in Jones v. State.3
Original Sentence Authorized By Section 4204(l)
This Court has considered the parties’ respective positions very
carefully.  The parties appear to agree that Section 4214(a) prohibits the trial
court from suspending any portion of a sentence imposed pursuant to that
                                                                                                                                                
1Nave v. State, Del. Supr., Nos. 397, 1991 & 59, 1992, Walsh, J. (Mar. 8, 1993)
(ORDER).
2 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(a).
5
subsection.4  The parties also agree that Nave’s sentence required correction,
although they disagree about how the sentence should have been corrected.
After careful consideration, we hold that the Superior Court was not required
to correct Nave’s sentence to reimpose a full fifteen-year term of
incarceration, notwithstanding Section 4214(a)’s prohibition against
suspended sentences.
In its response to Nave’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the State
originally suggested that the Superior Court could correct the “illegality” in
Nave’s suspended sentence by imposing a ten-year prison sentence followed
by a combination of work release and/or probation pursuant to 11 Del. C. §
                                                                                                                                                
3 Jones v. State, Del. Supr., 672 A.2d 554, 556 (1996).
4 11 Del. C. § 4214(a) provides in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any provision of this title to the contrary, any sentence so
imposed pursuant to this subsection shall not be subject to suspension by
the court, and shall be served in its entirety at a full custodial Level V
institutional setting without benefit of probation or parole, except that any
such sentence shall be subject to the provisions of §§ 4205(h), 4217, 4381,
and 4382 of this title.
6
4204(l).5  As the State noted, “[r]estructuring the sentence in that manner
would appear to reflect the [Superior] Court’s original sentencing plan.”  On
appeal, however, the State asserts that its understanding of the Superior
Court’s original intent “appears to be wrong.”
As the State correctly stated in its response to Nave’s petition in the
Superior Court, 11 Del. C. § 4204(l) expressly requires the sentencing court
to impose a period of custodial supervision of not less than six months at
Level IV, III, or II in order to facilitate a defendant’s transition back into the
community.  This transition period may be in addition to the maximum
sentence of imprisonment established by statute.  Clearly the intent of
Section 4204(l) is to ensure that no incarcerated individual is returned
directly to the community without any transition or follow-up supervision.
The need for transition from prison back to society is even more apparent in
the case of a habitual offender.
We agree with the parties and the Superior Court that Section 4214(a),
by its terms, prohibits any portion of a sentence imposed pursuant to that
                                                
5 11 Del. C. § 4204(l) provides:
Whenever a court imposes a period of incarceration at Level V
custody for 1 or more offenses that totals 1 year or more, then that court
must include as part of its sentence a period of custodial supervision at
either Level IV, III or II for a period of not less than 6 months to facilitate
the transition of the individual back into society.  The 6-month transition
period required by this subsection may, at the discretion of the court, be in
7
subsection from being suspended for probation.  We also agree with the
State, however, that Section 4204(l) clearly requires the sentencing court to
impose a period not less than six months of custodial supervision at Level
IV, III, or II, i.e., probation, to follow any Level V sentence of one year or
more.  This includes a sentence imposed pursuant to Section 4214(a).
In Nave’s case, it appears from the unambiguous language of the 1992
sentencing order that the Superior Court intended for Nave to serve ten years
in jail followed by five years of transitional custody, i.e., work release and
probation.  Each component of that sentence was “integral to the sentencing
judge’s overall ‘sentencing scheme.’”6  Even though the Superior Court
incorrectly denominated Nave’s fifteen-year sentence under Section 4214(a)
as being “suspended” for work release and probation after serving ten years,
the Superior Court, in its discretion, could have properly denominated
Nave’s sentence as a ten-year term of imprisonment followed by five years
of supervised custody at decreasing levels pursuant to Section 4204(l).  In
fact, the Superior Court was required by Section 4204(l) to impose some
period of supervised custody in addition to any term of imprisonment it
imposed in excess of one year under Section 4214(a).
                                                                                                                                                
addition to the maximum sentence of imprisonment established by the
statute.
6 Defoe v. State, Del. Supr., 750 A.2d 1200, 1202 (2000).
8
This Court has held that the imposition of a sentence is within the
discretion of the trial court and, whenever possible, effect should be given to
its intent.7 Accordingly, we conclude under the circumstances of this case
that the Superior Court could have corrected the error in its 1992 sentencing
order in a manner that would have been consistent both with the intent of its
original sentencing scheme and with Section 4204(l) and would not have
been “illegal” under Section 4214(a).  Therefore, we find that the Superior
Court’s corrected sentencing order must be vacated, and this matter should
be remanded for further proceedings, at which Nave is permitted to appear,
to allow the Superior Court to resentence Nave in a manner consistent with
its original sentencing scheme.
Conclusion
The judgment of the Superior Court is reversed.  The corrected
sentence is vacated.  This matter is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
                                                
7 See Weber v. State, Del. Supr., 655 A.2d 1219, 1221 (1995); Faircloth v. State, Del.
Supr., 522 A.2d 1268, 1272-73 (1987).