Title: Mares v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Mares v. State1997 WY 72939 P.2d 724Case Number: 95-296Decided: 06/10/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

EDWIN IKE MARES,

Appellant(Defendant), 

v. 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District Court, Natrona 
County

The Honorable Harry E. Leimback, 
Judge

Representing 
Appellant:

Sylvia Lee Hackl, 
State Public Defender; and Deborah Cornia, Appellate 
Counsel

Argument by Ms. 
Cornia.

Representing 
Appellee:

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Tibbetts.

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, 
GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant, Edwin 
Ike Mares, appeals the judgment and sentence of the district court convicting 
him of felony murder, aggravated burglary, and conspiracy to commit burglary. 
Mares bases his appeal on what he perceives to be the unfair application of the 
felony murder rule as it currently exists in Wyoming, advocating that we 
judicially modify the statute. In the alternative, he argues that the sentence 
he received was constitutionally infirm under a proportionality analysis. We 
vacate Mares' sentence for the underlying felony of aggravated burglary. In all 
other respects, the district court's order of judgment and sentence is 
affirmed.

[¶2]      Mares presents 
the following issues for our review:

I. Whether the 
Appellant should have been convicted under the felony murder rule as he did not 
commit, cause, solicit or aid in the homicide; he had no reason to believe that 
a cohort would engage in conduct likely to cause serious bodily injury or death; 
he was not armed with a deadly weapon and he had no reason to believe one of his 
companions was armed with a deadly weapon.

II. Whether the 
Wyoming felony-murder doctrine denies the Appellant his due process rights 
pursuant to the United States and Wyoming Constitutions.

III. Did the trial 
court err when it imposed a sentence which was disproportionate to the sentences 
received by the co-defendants in this case, as well as other criminals convicted 
of the same offense in Wyoming?

The State phrases the issues as 
follows:

I. Was Appellant 
properly convicted of the crime of felony murder?

II. Are the 
sentences Appellant received unconstitutionally 
disproportionate?

FACTS

[¶3]      On November 30, 
1993, Marie Bressler celebrated her 81st birthday by going to dinner with her 
two granddaughters. Bressler's long-time friend, 76-year-old Velma Filener, was 
visiting Bressler at the time but did not accompany the Bressler party to 
dinner. Bressler and her granddaughters left the house around 6:15 p.m. 
Approximately two hours later, Bressler returned to her unlocked and well-lit 
home and found the body of Filener lying between the laundry room and kitchen. 
Filener had been stabbed seventeen times, and her body had been dragged from a 
hallway near the entry of the home to the laundry room. The home obviously had 
been burglarized. The county coroner estimated Filener's time of death to be 
between 7:30 and 8:15 p.m.

[¶4]      Five months 
later, 16-year-old Heather Carrillo informed police and counselors at the 
Wyoming Girls' School that she was involved in the Bressler burglary. At Mares' 
trial, Carrillo testified that on November 30, 1993, she stole her mother's car 
and drove Victor Madrid to Bressler's home, where they met Mares and Christine 
Sievers. After waiting for a car to leave the residence, the four teenagers 
entered the residence wearing rubber gloves provided by Madrid. Once inside, the 
teens split up and went to different rooms. Upon hearing a female voice confront 
Madrid, Carrillo became scared and left the house. Carrillo testified that as 
she waited in the car, Mares came out of the house, followed by Sievers, and 
finally Madrid. Madrid was covered in blood.

[¶5]      Two other 
witnesses for the State testified that Mares told them he had been in the 
Bressler home when Madrid stabbed Filener. Although Mares did not testify at his 
trial, during an interview with two detectives from the Casper Police Department 
on June 2, 1994, he confessed to participating in the crime. The detectives 
testified at Mares' trial. Mares told the detectives that he, Victor Madrid, 
Christine Sievers, and an unknown female (later identified as Carrillo) entered 
the Bressler residence with the intent of "doing a little burglary." Mares 
stated that he was in a back bedroom of the house when he heard what sounded 
like a woman falling down stairs and screaming. He came out of the bedroom and 
witnessed Madrid stabbing the victim. Carrillo immediately ran out of the house. 
Mares and Sievers implored Madrid to leave, but he refused and told them to 
"just go," and they left the house through the front door. Madrid followed them 
outside, and then went back inside with Sievers. Mares told the detectives that 
he returned to the car where Carrillo was waiting. Shortly thereafter, Madrid 
and Sievers returned to the car and the four left. Mares also told the 
detectives that Madrid stabbed Filener with a "butterfly knife" which Mares had 
given Madrid a few days earlier.

[¶6]      After a ten-day 
trial, the jury found Mares guilty of felony murder, aggravated burglary, and 
conspiracy to commit burglary for his part in the burglary of the Bressler home 
and the murder of Filener. He received a sentence of life imprisonment for the 
felony murder conviction, a concurrent term of 20 to 25 years in prison for the 
aggravated burglary conviction, and a consecutive term of 4 to 5 years in prison 
for conspiracy. He timely appeals the judgment and 
sentence.

DISCUSSION

I. Affirmative 
Defense

[¶7]      Mares argues that 
because the stabbing was a purely independent act of a co-felon, the rigid 
application of the felony murder doctrine, resulting in a life sentence, is 
unduly harsh. Mares advocates we adopt an affirmative defense to felony murder 
which would apply if a defendant satisfies a list of conditions refuting the 
defendant's culpability for the killing. Several jurisdictions have statutorily 
created a no-culpability-as-to-the-homicide defense, with the most common 
conditions being that the defendant 1) did not commit the homicidal act or in 
any way cause, solicit, or aid the commission thereof, 2) had no reason to 
believe that any other participant would engage in conduct likely to cause death 
or serious bodily injury, 3) was not armed with a deadly weapon, and 4) had no 
reason to believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon. Paul 
H. Robinson, 1 CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 104, at 504-05 (1984); Wayne R. LaFave 
& Austin W. Scott, Jr., CRIMINAL LAW § 7.5(c), at 624 (2nd ed. 
1986).

[¶8]      The legislature 
abolished common law crimes in Wyoming, but chose to retain common law defenses 
unless provided otherwise by statute. W.S. 6-1-102 (1988). Therefore, our first 
inquiry is whether the defense proposed by Mares is recognized in Wyoming by 
statute or judicial decision. Bouwkamp v. State, 833 P.2d 486, 490 (Wyo. 
1992). Mares contends that although we have not explicitly adopted the defense, 
the defense is inherent in our prior felony murder decisions because in each of 
those decisions at least one of the four elements for the affirmative defense 
was not satisfied. In other words, our prior cases involved situations where the 
defendant carried out or participated in the murderous act, was armed, or knew 
that one or more of the participants was armed. See Jansen v. State, 892 P.2d 1131, 1133-34 (Wyo. 1995) and cases cited therein. However, the fact that 
one or more elements of the defense was not satisfied does not mean that the 
court would have reached a different result if all the elements had been met, 
and we find no discussion or analysis in any of our prior felony murder cases 
which would lead us to conclude otherwise.

[¶9]      Two Wyoming 
felony murder cases addressed the issue of a defendant's individual culpability, 
both in the context of the death penalty. In Engberg v. State, 686 P.2d 541 (Wyo. 1984), the appellant argued that pursuant to the United States Supreme 
Court decision of Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1140 (1982), the court has the duty of appraising the culpability of a 
defendant sentenced to death. A similar argument was made in Osborn v. 
State, 672 P.2d 777 (Wyo. 1983). Enmund held that a capital sentence 
could not be imposed upon an accomplice convicted under a felony murder theory 
if the accomplice "does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a 
killing take place or that lethal force will be employed." 458 U.S.  at 797, 102 S. Ct.  at 3376-77. In both Engberg and Osborn, the court found 
Enmund inapposite because the appellants in those cases actually killed 
their victims. Engberg, 686 P.2d  at 551; Osborn, 672 P.2d  at 794. 
We have not had occasion to apply Enmund, much less expand its holding to 
include noncapital cases. The no-culpability defense and/or its individual 
elements simply have not been considered in Wyoming, and we reject the 
suggestion that the defense has been implicitly accepted.

[¶10]   Further, Mares does not provide, 
nor does our own research reveal, any authority that the proffered defense is a 
recognized common-law defense in any other jurisdiction. The jurisdictions that 
have created a no-culpability-as-to-the-homicide defense for felony murder have 
done so legislatively, not judicially. See ROBINSON, supra, at 507 
& 85 (Supp. 1997), n. 8 (listing statutes which provide no-culpability 
defense).

[¶11]   The felony murder rule is the 
subject of much criticism for its potential harshness, for instance in the 
circumstance where the killing is an independent act of a co-felon, as in Mares' 
case. Id. at 503-04; LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra, at 622-40; Nelson 
E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at 
Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L.REV. 446, 446-48 (1985). Adopting an 
affirmative defense is but one of many mechanisms that other jurisdictions have 
utilized to mitigate the potential harshness of the rule. For example, the rule 
has been limited by permitting its use only as to certain types of felonies, by 
strictly interpreting the requirement of proximate or legal cause, by narrowly 
construing the time period during which the felony is committed, by downgrading 
the offense to a lesser degree crime, and by requiring a mens rea of 
malice. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra; ROTH & SUNDBY, supra; 
see also W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Judicial Abrogation of 
Felony-Murder Doctrine, 13 A.L.R.4th 1226 (1982); People v. Aaron, 
409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304, 313-16 (1980). Wyoming has narrowed the scope of 
the felony murder rule by limiting its application to "crimes of violence" which 
are enumerated in W.S. 6-2-101(a); Cook v. State, 841 P.2d 1345, 1351 
(Wyo. 1992). Additionally, the legislature has considered the culpability issue 
with regard to sentencing. Wyoming Statute 6-2-102(j)(iv) (Supp. 1996) provides 
that if the defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another person 
and his participation in the homicidal act was relatively minor, that shall 
count as a mitigating circumstance in determining whether the defendant should 
be sentenced to death. In our view, the determination of whether the felony 
murder doctrine should be further limited in Wyoming and, if so, the appropriate 
manner of so doing, are matters for the legislature. Consequently, we decline to 
judicially adopt appellant's suggested affirmative defense to felony 
murder.

II. Mens 
Rea

[¶12]   At the time of the offense, 
Wyoming's first degree murder statute provided:

(a) Whoever 
purposely and with premeditated malice, or in the perpetration of, or attempt to 
perpetrate, any sexual assault, arson, robbery, burglary, escape, resisting 
arrest or kidnapping, kills any human being is guilty of murder in the first 
degree.

W.S. 6-2-101(a) (Supp. 1993)1. Under this provision, when a 
killing arises out of one of the enumerated felonies, it makes no difference 
whether or not there was an intent to kill. Bouwkamp, 833 P.2d  at 491 
(citing Richmond v. State, 554 P.2d 1217, 1232 (Wyo. 1976)). Mares argues 
that the failure to require that the State prove a defendant acted with malice 
violates due process. He asserts that felony murder should require an intent to 
kill or the intent to do an act greatly dangerous to the lives of others or with 
knowledge that the act creates a strong probability of death or great bodily 
harm.

[¶13]   Mares' due process challenge 
appears to be based on Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S. Ct. 2450, 
61 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1979), in which defendant's conviction was reversed because of a 
jury instruction which stated that "[t]he law presumes that a person intends the 
ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts." 442 U.S.  at 512, 524, 99 S. Ct.  at 
2453, 2459. The instruction was found to shift the burden of persuasion to the 
defendant and invade the factfinding function of the jury. 442 U.S.  at 523, 99 S. Ct.  at 2459. As a result, the Court held that, in the case where intent is an 
element of the crime charged, such an instruction violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment's requirement that the State prove every element of a crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 442 U.S.  at 512, 524, 99 S. Ct.  at 2453, 2459. Mares' argument, 
then, is that the felony murder rule violates this constitutional requirement 
because it presumes the mental state required for murder from the intent 
required for the underlying felony.

[¶14]   Mares directs us to State v. 
Ortega, in which the New Mexico Supreme Court, relying in part on 
Sandstrom, held that New Mexico's felony murder statute requires proof 
that the defendant intended to kill or was knowingly heedless that his or her 
acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. Ortega, 
112 N.M. 554, 817 P.2d 1196 (1991). The relevant language in New Mexico's 
statute provides:

A. Murder in the 
first degree is the killing of one human being by another without lawful 
justification or excuse, by any of the means with which death may be caused: * * 
*

(2) in the 
commission of or attempt to commit any felony * * *.

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1(A)(2) (Michie 
1984). We find the dissent in Ortega persuasive and more in line with our 
previous holdings in Wyoming. The dissent considered Sandstrom inapposite 
because the New Mexico statute does not require an intent to kill where a 
killing has been committed during a felony. Id. at 1218-19 (Baca, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part). In Osborn v. State, we pointed 
out that viewing the commission of the statutory felony as the legal equivalent 
of the malice and premeditation required for first degree murder is a legal 
fiction that is unnecessary under our statute:

[T]he Wyoming 
Statute, § 6-4-101 * * *, does not relate the killing of a human being in the 
perpetration of robbery (or the other crimes listed) to "purposely and with 
premeditated malice," but separated that clause with an "or." The legislature 
has thus merely labeled the latter crime as first degree murder because it is 
considered to be of equal wickedness justifying the ultimate 
penalty.

Osborn, 672 P.2d  at 794. The felony murder statute imposes 
a form of strict responsibility on those perpetrating the underlying felony for 
killings occurring during the commission of that felony; the intent to kill is 
not an element of the crime. Jansen v. State, 892 P.2d  at 1138. Even so, 
the State is not relieved of establishing a mens rea. Rather, the 
necessary intent the State must prove to convict a person of felony murder is 
the intent associated with the underlying felony. Id.; Jones v. 
State, 568 P.2d 837, 844 (Wyo. 1977).

[¶15]   Mares also directs us to People 
v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304, in which the Michigan Supreme Court 
held that malice, defined as "the intention to kill, the intention to do great 
bodily harm, or the wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that the 
natural tendency of defendant's behavior is to cause death or great bodily 
harm," is an essential element of felony murder. Id. at 326. However, the 
Michigan statute provides that "murder" committed in the perpetration of 
specified crimes is murder in the first degree. The court determined that the 
statute's purpose is to raise an already established murder to the level of 
first degree. Id. at 321-22. Although "murder" is undefined in the 
Michigan statutes, case law had established that malice aforethought is an 
essential element of murder. Id. at 326. Therefore, the Michigan court 
reasoned that the legislature intended a conviction for felony murder to require 
a finding of malice. Id. Wyoming's statute provides that a "killing" in 
the course of one of the enumerated felonies is first degree murder. The 
difference in statutory language is dispositive, for malice is not an essential 
element of "killing." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 734, 870 (6th ed. 1990). As a 
result, the analysis used by the Aaron court to reach the conclusion that 
felony murder requires a mens rea of malice is not applicable to our 
statute.

[¶16]   There is no question the 
legislature has the authority to revise the current statute to include a mens 
rea of malice for killings occurring during the perpetration of a felony. 
The legislature has the exclusive power to determine and declare what acts shall 
constitute crimes. Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 415 (Wyo. 1990). Our 
judicial task is to effectuate the statute as written. Id. at 415-16. The wisdom 
or desirability of a change in the felony murder rule is solely a matter for the 
consideration of the legislature and, accordingly, arguments concerning the 
addition of elements to the statute should be addressed to the legislature, not 
this court.

III. 
Sentence

[¶17]   A defendant convicted of first 
degree murder in Wyoming shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or death, 
pursuant to W.S. 6-2-101(b) (Supp. 1993). Mares received a sentence of life 
imprisonment for the felony murder conviction. He also received a concurrent 
term of 20 to 25 years in prison for the aggravated burglary conviction and a 
consecutive term of 4 to 5 years in prison for conspiracy, both of the latter 
sentences within the parameters set by the legislature for those crimes. W.S. 
6-3-301(a), (b) (1988); W.S. 6-1-304 (1988). Mares contends that the court 
abused its discretion and violated his constitutional rights by treating him 
more harshly than his codefendants as well as other persons in Wyoming who have 
been convicted of felony murder where the underlying felony is 
burglary.

[¶18]   At the outset, the State concedes, 
and we agree, that the sentence imposed for the aggravated burglary conviction, 
which was the underlying felony for purposes of the felony murder conviction, 
was improper. In Wyoming, multiple punishments for felony murder and the 
underlying felony are impermissible and such a sentence is error. Roderick v. 
State, 858 P.2d 538, 552 (Wyo. 1993); Castle v. State, 842 P.2d 1060, 
1061 (Wyo. 1992); Cook v. State, 841 P.2d  at 1352-53. As a result, we 
vacate the sentence of 20 to 25 years on Mares' aggravated burglary conviction. 
Castle, 842 P.2d  at 1061.

[¶19]   Remaining for our consideration are 
the life sentence for the felony murder conviction and the prison term of 4 to 5 
years for conspiracy to commit burglary. In Wyoming, a life sentence for first 
degree murder equates to a life sentence without eligibility for parole. 
See W.S. 7-13-402 (1995); Weldon v. State, 800 P.2d 513, 514 (Wyo. 
1990). Mares contends his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment and urges we undertake the proportionality 
analysis utilized by the United States Supreme Court in Solem v. Helm, 
463 U.S. 277, 292, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3011, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 
(1983):

In sum, a court's 
proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should be guided by 
objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness 
of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same 
jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime 
in other jurisdictions.

We do not undertake a lengthy analysis under 
all three of the Solem criteria except in cases where a comparison of the 
crime with the sentence gives rise to an inference of gross disproportionality. 
Smith v. State, 922 P.2d 846, 849 (Wyo. 1996) (citing Harmelin v. 
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2707, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).2 In making that threshold 
determination, the court will look to the gravity of the offense and the 
procedures and circumstances under which the sentence is imposed. Smith, 
922 P.2d  at 849.

[¶20]   Mares' primary contention is that 
the relative length of his sentence is extreme when compared to the gravity of 
the offense, which he describes as "merely [] involvement in a simple burglary." 
The offenses for which Mares was convicted resulted in the death of another 
human being. This court has previously rejected the argument that the death 
penalty is disproportionate to the crime of murder committed in the course of a 
robbery. Osborn, 672 P.2d  at 794. We likewise find no inference of gross 
disproportionality when we compare Mares' crimes, conspiracy to commit burglary 
and murder committed in the course of that burglary, to his sentence for those 
crimes, life without possibility of parole. See Harmelin, 501 U.S.  at 
961-62, 992-94, 111 S. Ct.  at 2684, 2700-01 (no proportionality analysis 
undertaken where defendant received a mandatory life sentence without 
possibility of parole for possessing 672 grams of cocaine). Consequently, a 
proportional analysis of Mares' sentence compared with others in Wyoming or 
across the country is not required.

[¶21]   Mares' challenge is aimed, at least 
in part, at the disparity in charging the participants in this crime. Charging 
decisions fall within the discretion of the prosecuting attorney, Billis v. 
State, 800 P.2d  at 417-18, and are not subject to a proportionality 
analysis. Absent evidence that a charging decision was based on some 
unjustifiable standard, it is not subject to our review. 
Id.

[¶22]   Mares' life sentence for felony 
murder and the consecutive sentence of 4 to 5 years for aggravated burglary 
stand as imposed.

CONCLUSION

[¶23]   We decline to judicially modify the 
felony murder rule in Wyoming by adopting an affirmative defense or establishing 
a mens rea of malice. We vacate the sentence of 20 to 25 years for aggravated 
burglary and affirm the life sentence for felony murder and the 4 to 5 year 
sentence for conspiracy to commit burglary. Affirmed as 
modified.

Footnotes

1 This statute was amended July 1994, 
adding an additional enumerated offense of "abuse of a child under the age of 
sixteen (16) years."

2 Harmelin was a plurality 
opinion. Two justices in Harmelin would have limited proportionality 
review to capital cases. 501 U.S.  at 994, 111 S. Ct.  at 
2701.