Title: McGuiness v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
KATHLEEN MCGUINESS, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No.  438, 2022 
 
      
Defendant Below,   
 
§ 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
Court Below:  Superior Court 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§  
of the State of Delaware (K) 
§  
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No.  2206000799 
§ 
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§  
 
 
Submitted: November 15, 2023 
 
Decided: 
February 13, 2024 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, LEGROW and 
GRIFFITHS, Justices; constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Delaware. AFFIRMED IN 
PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. 
 
Steven P. Wood, Esquire (argued), Chelsea A. Botsch, Esquire, McCARTER & 
ENGLISH, LLP, Wilmington, DE, Dean A. Elwell, Esquire, McCARTER & 
ENGLISH, LLP, Boston, MA, Attorneys for Appellant Kathleen McGuiness.  
 
David C. McBride, Esquire (argued), M. Paige Valeski, Esquire, YOUNG 
CONAWAY STARGATT & TAYLOR, LLP, Wilmington, DE, Attorneys for 
Appellee State of Delaware.  
 
 
 
LEGROW, Justice, for the Majority:
1 
 
An elected state official was indicted and tried on criminal charges arising 
from her conduct while in office.  The parties vigorously litigated the case, and the 
trial court issued numerous well-reasoned and even-handed decisions before, during, 
and after the trial.  The jury ultimately convicted the defendant of three charges while 
acquitting her of two others.  She now appeals, arguing that “the trial that led to the 
convictions was profoundly unfair and unconstitutional.”1 
Notwithstanding the defendant’s inflamed rhetoric, the record amply 
demonstrates that she received a fair trial.  The defendant raises a mélange of issues 
on appeal, including that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of the charged 
crimes and violated the defendant’s due process rights by suppressing exculpatory 
evidence.  We reject those arguments because they distort the trial court’s holdings 
or misapply the law.  We conclude, however, that one of the defendant’s convictions 
must be reversed because the legal insufficiency of one of the charges resulted in the 
spillover of evidence that prejudiced the jury’s consideration of a closely linked 
charge.  We therefore reverse the defendant’s conviction for Official Misconduct.  In 
all other respects, we affirm the trial court’s decisions and the defendant’s 
convictions. 
 
 
 
1 Video of Oral Argument, at 1:30–1:36 (Nov. 15, 2023). 
2 
 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Investigation and The Indictment 
Kathleen McGuiness was elected as the State of Delaware Auditor of 
Accounts in 2018 and was sworn into office in January 2019.2  In April 2020, three 
Office of the Auditor of Accounts (“OAOA”) employees who reported to McGuiness 
contacted the Delaware Department of Justice (the “DOJ”) and alleged that she had 
engaged in misconduct.3  These employees included the OAOA’s fiscal manager, an 
outgoing administrative auditor, and a senior auditor.4  The employees’ chief 
complaints concerned office spending, McGuiness’s engagement in political activity 
while working, and the misuse of no-bid contracts.5  In addition to their concerns 
about McGuiness’s misconduct, the employees expressed fear that they would face 
retaliation for their roles as whistleblowers.6   
Several months later, McGuiness’s Chief of Staff contacted the DOJ regarding 
his concern that McGuiness had awarded a state contract to a company called “My 
Campaign Group” (“MCG”) for campaign work and that the contract became more 
 
2 App. to Opening Br. at A31 (Indictment). 
3 Id. at A4153–54 (Cousin Direct Exam.); A4244 (Haw-Young Direct Exam.); A4354–55 (Horsey 
Direct Exam.). 
4 Id. at A4416 (Robinson Direct Exam.). 
5 Id. at A4090–111 (Van Horn Direct Exam.). 
6 Id. at A4153–54 (Cousin Direct Exam.); A4244 (Haw-Young Direct Exam.); A4354–55 (Horsey 
Direct Exam.). 
3 
 
lucrative when MCG changed its name to “Innovate Consulting.”7  The Chief of 
Staff reported that McGuiness had directed him to pay an MCG invoice for $1,950 
using his state-issued credit card because the invoice had been rejected by the 
Delaware Division of Accounting.8  
Later, in October 2020, two more whistleblowers came forward—an 
administrative assistant and a human resources specialist—citing concerns that 
McGuiness’s daughter (“Daughter”) and Daughter’s friend were on the state payroll 
while they were living and attending college out of state.9  The Chief of Staff also 
questioned the propriety of Daughter’s employment, suggesting that she did not do 
much work.10 
Toward the end of 2020, McGuiness emailed the Delaware Department of 
Technology and Information (“DTI”), asking for the names of “anyone who had 
requested records for anyone in the auditors [sic] office since Jan 2019.”11  In the 
first few months of 2021, McGuinness placed one of the whistleblowers—the 
administrative auditor—on a performance improvement plan and fired her Chief of 
 
7 Id. at A3988–989 (Van Horn Direct Exam.). 
8 Id. at A3985–86 (Van Horn Direct Exam.); 4190–92 (Thomas Direct Exam.). 
9 Id. at A4423 (Robinson Direct Exam.); A4281–83 (Elder Direct Exam.); A4294–96 (Moreau 
Direct Exam.). 
10 Id. at A3991 (Van Horn Direct Exam.). 
11 Id. at A4427 (Robinson Direct Exam.). 
4 
 
Staff.12  The Chief of Staff later testified that, although McGuiness cited an 
inappropriate work relationship as the reason for his termination, that relationship 
ended months before he was fired.13 
The DOJ began investigating the allegations against McGuiness in earnest in 
May 2021.14  First, an investigator from the DOJ’s Division of Civil Rights and 
Public Trust (the “Division”), Franklin Robinson, contacted two OAOA casual-
seasonal employees to determine whether Daughter and Daughter’s friend were 
receiving benefits that other casual-seasonal employees were not.15  Both employees 
with whom Robinson spoke stated that they were paid less than Daughter and 
Daughter’s friend and were not permitted to “bank” their hours as Daughter and 
Daughter’s friend did.16  The process of “banking” hours allows employees to work 
extra hours during one pay period and apply those extra hours to a later pay period.17 
The following month, Robinson called Daughter’s friend to follow up on these 
reports.18  After the call ended, Robinson received a call from a blocked number, 
 
12 Id. at A4279–80 (Haw-Young Direct Exam.); A3977 (Van Horn Direct Exam.). 
13 Id. at A3973–75 (Van Horn Direct Exam.). 
14 Id. at A4464–65 (Robinson Direct Exam.). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at A3314 (Vargas Direct Exam.). 
17 Answering Br. at 8. 
18 App. to Opening Br. at A3063 (Bateman Direct Exam.). 
5 
 
which he later determined belonged to McGuiness.19  Robinson also received a call 
from McGuiness’s new Chief of Staff that same day.20  Later that summer, 
McGuiness’s new Chief of Staff requested that DTI change Daughter’s job title from 
“Public Information Officer” to “Intern,” and McGuiness filed requests to monitor 
some of her current and former employees’ emails and one of the whistleblowers’ 
private messages.21 
Robinson continued his investigation into the fall of 2021, conducting 
interviews with McGuiness’s current Chief of Staff and Daughter.22  During her 
interview, Daughter told Robinson that McGuiness’s former Chief of Staff initially 
interviewed her for the position, but she could not remember what questions she was 
asked.23  In response to inquiries about her limited email correspondence—which 
Robinson had obtained under a search warrant—Daughter told Robinson that she 
spent “essentially the whole day” on her email.24  Robinson’s investigation also 
 
19 Id. at A4431–34 (Robinson Direct Exam.). 
20 Id. at A4430–34 (Robinson Direct Exam.). 
21 Id. at A2921–22 (Herron Direct Exam.); A2975–76 (Herron Direct Exam.); A4445–46 
(Robinson Direct Exam.). 
22 Id. at A4663 (Robinson Direct Exam.); A3795 (Ziamba Direct Exam.). 
23 Id. at A3796–97 (Ziamba Direct Exam.). 
24 Id.  
6 
 
revealed that Daughter’s onboarding paperwork and payroll documents listed 
McGuiness as her supervisor.25 
On September 28, 2021, the DOJ obtained a search warrant for the OAOA 
office, authorizing a search of: 
the books, papers, records and other documents of any officer, 
department, board, agency, instrumentality or commission of the state 
government. In this case, the places to be searched are the state offices 
of the Auditor of Accounts. Though the Attorney General may have 
right of access to state records and that the expectations of privacy may 
be diminished in state offices, your affiant believes probable cause 
nonetheless exists to show that the offices of the Auditor of Accounts 
reasonably contain evidence of the crimes described above.26 
The following day, the DOJ executed the warrant and seized numerous laptops 
and computers from the OAOA office.27  Following the seizure, on October 8, 2021, 
the DOJ obtained a warrant to search the digital devices’ contents.28  In an effort to 
ensure that investigators did not see McGuiness’s privileged communications, the 
DOJ implemented a filter process for searching the OAOA devices.  Under that 
process, the Delaware State Police High Tech Crimes Unit first searched the devices 
and provided those search results to a DOJ team, which would be uninvolved in 
McGuiness’s prosecution (the “filter team”).  The filter team reviewed all the 
 
25 Id. at A2694–95 (Sclesky Direct Exam); A3912-A3916 (Moore Direct Exam.). 
26 Id. at A720 (Office Search Warrant). 
27 App. to Answering Br. at B192 (DOJ Timeline). 
28 Id. at B189 (Digital Search Warrant). 
7 
 
material for privileged communications and then sent all non-privileged materials to 
the prosecution team.29 
On October 11, 2021, a grand jury indicted McGuiness for five criminal 
charges relating to her conduct as the State’s Auditor of Accounts.  Count I charged 
McGuiness with Conflict of Interest in violation of 29 Del. C. § 5805.30  The basis 
for Count I was McGuiness’s role in hiring Daughter, acting as Daughter’s 
supervisor, and giving Daughter a “position with advantages unavailable to other 
employees.”31   
Count II of the Indictment charged McGuiness with felony Theft in violation 
of 11 Del. C. § 841.32  Daughter’s employment also formed the basis of this count, 
and the State contended that McGuiness had taken, exercised control over, or 
 
29 Answering Br. at 12. 
30 App. to Opening Br. at A31 (Indictment). 29 Del. C. § 5805(a)(1) provides that “[n]o state 
employee, state officer or honorary state official may participate on behalf of the State in the review 
or disposition of any matter pending before the State in which the state employee, state officer or 
honorary state official has a personal or private interest, provided, that upon request from any 
person with official responsibility with respect to the matter, any such person who has such a 
personal or private interest may nevertheless respond to questions concerning any such matter. A 
personal or private interest in a matter is an interest which tends to impair a person's independence 
of judgment in the performance of the person's duties with respect to that matter.” 
31 Id. at A35 (Indictment). Even Daughter’s friend did not, according to the State, receive the same 
set of benefits as Daughter. 
32 Id.  11 Del. C. § 841 provides that “[a] person is guilty of theft when the person takes, exercises 
control over or obtains property of another person intending to deprive that person of it or 
appropriate it. Theft includes the acts described in this section, as well as those described in §§ 
841A-846 of this title.” 
8 
 
obtained property owned by the State of Delaware valued at more than $1,500 when 
she hired Daughter and gave her benefits not available to other employees.33   
Count III charged McGuiness with Non-Compliance With Procurement Law 
in violation of 29 Del. C. § 6903.34  This count arose from McGuiness’s decision to 
award MCG a state contract totaling less than $50,000 so that the contract would not 
be subject to a public bidding process.35  Additionally, the State posited that the 
invoices issued under that contract were artificially divided into amounts totaling 
less than $5,000 in order to circumvent review by the Delaware Division of 
Accounting.36  The State also alleged that, after a State employee objected to the 
contracts being awarded to a political campaign company, MCG established another 
company called Innovate Consulting, and McGuiness awarded Innovate Consulting 
contracts totaling $77,500.37   
 
33 Id.   
34 Id. at A36 (Indictment).  29 Del. C. § 6903 provides that “Any person, who, with intent to avoid 
compliance with this chapter, wilfully fragments or subdivides any contract for the purchase of 
materiel, nonprofessional services, public works or professional services, shall be subject to the 
penalties listed in this section.” 
35 Id. at A36–37 (Indictment). 
36 Id. at A37 (Indictment). 
37 Id. at A38 (Indictment). 
9 
 
Count IV of the Indictment charged McGuiness with Official Misconduct in 
violation of 11 Del. C. § 1211.38  Count IV alleged that McGuiness engaged in 
misconduct relating to Daughter’s employment and the MCG contract with an intent 
to obtain a personal benefit and with knowledge that the conduct was unauthorized.39   
Count V charged McGuiness with Act of Intimidation in violation of 11 Del. 
C. § 3532.40  The State alleged that McGuiness used email surveillance and 
discriminatory office policies to target whistleblowers in a knowing attempt to 
prevent or dissuade employees from testifying against her.41 
 
38 Id. at A39 (Indictment).  Under 11 Del. C. § 1211(1) and (3), “A public servant is guilty of 
official misconduct when, intending to obtain a personal benefit or to cause harm to another person, 
the public servant knowingly does any of the following: 
(1) Commits an act constituting an unauthorized exercise of official functions, knowing 
that the act is unauthorized. 
(3) Performs official functions in a way intended to benefit the public servant's own 
property or financial interests under circumstances in which the public servant's actions 
would not have been reasonably justified in consideration of the factors which ought to 
have been taken into account in performing official functions.” 
39 Id. at A39–40 (Indictment). 
40 Id. at A40 (Indictment).  11 Del. C. § 3532 provides that “every person who knowingly and with 
malice prevents or dissuades (or who attempts to prevent or dissuade) any witness or victim from 
attending or giving testimony at any trial, proceeding or inquiry authorized by law is committing 
an act of intimidation and is guilty of a class D felony. A person who knowingly and with malice 
retaliates against any victim or witness who has attended or given testimony at any trial proceeding 
or inquiry authorized by law by committing any crime as defined by the laws of this State against 
such victim or witness is committing an act of intimidation and is guilty of a class D felony.” 
41 Id. at A41. 
10 
 
B. Pre-Trial Proceedings 
Following her indictment, McGuiness vigorously defended the charges 
against her, resulting in extensive motion practice before the trial court.  We 
summarize the relevant pretrial proceedings with as much brevity as possible in light 
of the wide-ranging issues raised on appeal. 
1. Motion for Appointment of Private Counsel 
McGuiness filed her first motion just days after the grand jury returned the 
Indictment.  McGuiness retained private counsel to represent her in the criminal 
proceedings and sought to have her counsel’s fees paid by the State.  Under Delaware 
law, when a State employee is the subject of litigation arising from her employment, 
the employee is entitled to representation by the DOJ.  But when, as here, the 
employee is facing criminal charges filed by the State, the DOJ is conflicted and 
cannot represent the employee’s legal interests.  In her Petition for Appointment of 
Private Counsel, McGuiness reasoned that under Delaware Supreme Court Rule 68, 
the DOJ’s conflict allowed her to retain private counsel at the State’s expense.42  
Under Rule 68(f), “the court may appoint an attorney from the private bar, if the 
court is satisfied that such [DOJ] conflict exists or may exist.”43 
 
42 Id. at A43 (Petition for Appointment of Private Counsel for a State Officer). 
43 Id. (quoting Supr. Ct. R. 68(f)). 
11 
 
In response to the petition, the State argued that under 10 Del. C. § 3925,44 
McGuiness was required to first seek appointment of counsel from the Delaware 
Office of Defense Services (“ODS”) or the Office of Conflicts Counsel (“OCC”),45 
not a lawyer from the private bar whose fees typically are substantially higher than 
the fees paid to OCC attorneys.46  The State further argued that because ODS did not 
have a conflict in McGuiness’s case, her petition should be denied.47  The State also 
contended that, to the extent Supreme Court Rule 68 and Section 3925 differ as to 
the procedures for appointing counsel, the statute controls.48 
 
44 10 Del. C. § 3925 provides that “[a]ny public officer or employee, in a criminal or civil action 
against the person arising from state employment, shall be entitled to petition the court for a court-
appointed attorney to represent the person's interests in the matter. If the judge, after consideration 
of the petition, examination of the petitioner and receipt of such further evidence as the judge may 
require, determines that the petition has merit, the judge shall appoint an attorney to represent the 
interests of such public officer or employee. The court-appointed attorney shall represent such 
person at all stages, trial and appellate, until the final determination of the matter, unless the 
attorney is earlier released by such person or by the court. The court may first appoint an attorney 
from the Department of Justice. If the court determines that the Department is unable to represent 
such public officer or employee, the court may appoint an attorney from the Office of Defense 
Services in criminal actions only, and in civil actions may appoint an attorney licensed in this State. 
This section shall also apply to all federal courts within this State.” 
45 The Office of Defense Services represents indigent criminal defendants in Delaware, and the 
Office of Conflicts Counsel appoints members of the private bar to represent indigent criminal 
clients whom the Office of Defense Services cannot represent due to a conflict. 
46 App. to Opening Br. at A98 (State’s Response in Opposition to Petition for Appointment of 
Private Counsel).  McGuiness’s counsel charged $550 per hour in her case whereas conflicts 
counsel is paid $100 per hour.  A44 (Defendant’s Petition for Appointment of Private Counsel for 
a State Officer); A104 (State Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Petition for Appointment of 
Private Counsel for a State Officer). 
47 Id. at A101 (State’s Response in Opposition to Petition for Appointment of Private Counsel). 
48 Id. at A102 (State’s Response in Opposition to Petition for Appointment of Private Counsel). 
12 
 
In denying the petition, the Superior Court held that McGuiness had bypassed 
Section 3925’s requirement that she first seek appointment of counsel from ODS.49  
Private counsel continued to defend McGuiness through trial and on appeal.  
2. Motion to Compel Discovery 
The State produced some initial discovery to McGuiness on December 17, 
2021.50  That production included emails from McGuiness’s state email account, 
spreadsheets with casual-seasonal employees’ compensation, Daughter and 
Daughter’s friend’s employment paperwork and compensation information, 
Daughter’s state email correspondence, and financial information regarding the 
MCG and Innovate Consulting contracts.51  The State’s letter indicated that the data 
from certain digital devices was not included in the production because the filter 
team had not yet completed its review.52   
McGuiness filed a motion to compel discovery on January 31, 2022, arguing 
that the State had failed to provide all discoverable materials in its possession.53  In 
her January Motion to Compel, McGuiness sought discovery relating to her theory 
that she was being subjected to a “selective prosecution” because the conduct 
 
49 State v. McGuiness, 2021 WL 5013826 (Del. Super. Oct. 28, 2021). 
50 App. to Opening Br. at A158 (Defendant’s Discovery Request); App. to Answering Br. at B32 
(State’s Response to Defendant’s Discovery Request). 
51 App. to Answering Br. at B32–34 (State’s Response to Defendant’s Discovery Request). 
52 Id. at B34 (State’s Response to Defendant’s Discovery Request). 
53 App. to Opening Br. at A156 (Mot. to Compel Discovery). 
13 
 
forming the basis of her criminal charges was common in state government, but no 
other State official or employee had ever been prosecuted.54  The Superior Court 
granted the January motion in part because it held that McGuiness had demonstrated 
a “colorable basis” for a selective prosecution defense by adequately alleging some 
elements of that claim.55   
3. Motion to Dismiss Count V and Motion for a Bill of Particulars 
In February 2022, McGuiness moved to dismiss Count V of the Indictment.56  
In that motion, she argued that the indictment was facially deficient as to Count V 
because it insufficiently described McGuiness’s knowledge of the proceedings or 
witnesses against her and therefore failed to provide her with sufficient notice as to 
the conduct for which she was being prosecuted.57  The State argued in response that 
the indictment provided sufficient detail regarding the nature of the whistleblowers’ 
allegations and McGuiness’s efforts to prevent the whistleblowers from testifying, 
specifically by surveilling their emails and enacting office policies targeting 
whistleblowers.58 
 
54 Id. at A163–66 (Mot. to Compel Discovery). 
55 State v. McGuiness, 2022 WL 1184407, at *2 (Del. Super. Apr. 13, 2022). 
56 App. to Opening Br. at A228 (Mot. to Dismiss Count V). 
57 Id. at A233–34 (Mot. to Dismiss Count V). 
58 Id. at A253–55 (State’s Response to Mot. to Dismiss Count V). 
14 
 
Also pending before the court was McGuiness’s Motion for a Bill of 
Particulars filed in November 2021.59  In that motion, McGuiness sought clarity and 
additional facts regarding all five counts.60  Before responding to the motion, and 
before the court could rule on it, the State filed a superseding indictment against 
McGuiness on March 28, 2022 (the “Superseding Indictment”).61  The Superseding 
Indictment did not add any new charges, but it expanded the date range 
corresponding to Counts IV and V and added facts to support Count III.62  The State 
then responded to McGuiness’s motion the next day, arguing that the additional facts 
in the Superseding Indictment mooted McGuiness’s arguments as to Count III and 
that her argument concerning the other counts sought information that need not be 
contained in an indictment, such as the State’s theory of the case.63  McGuiness 
responded with a supplemental motion for a bill of particulars, maintaining her 
previous arguments and contending that the Superseding Indictment did not rectify 
the lack of factual allegations.64   
 
59 Id. at A128 (Mot. for Bill of Particulars). 
60 Id. at A131–41 (Mot. for Bill of Particulars). 
61 Id. at A270 (Superseding Indictment). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at A266 (State’s Response to Mot. for Bill of Particulars). 
64 Id. at A283–85 (Supplemental Mot. for Bill of Particulars). 
15 
 
The Superior Court issued a memorandum opinion on April 21, 2022, granting 
in part and denying in part McGuiness’s Motion for a Bill of Particulars.65  The court 
granted her motion as to Counts III and V, holding that if the State planned to 
introduce contracts in support of Count III other than those awarded to MCG, it must 
provide those contracts to McGuiness.66  The court also held that Count V of the 
indictment was insufficiently particular because it did not identify the names of the 
witnesses whom McGuiness was accused of intimidating.  The court directed the 
State to provide that information to McGuiness.67 
A week later, in May 2022, the court denied McGuiness’s Motion to Dismiss 
Count V, holding that the Superseding Indictment sufficiently alleged that she acted 
with the requisite knowledge and intent to dissuade the whistleblowers from 
testifying against her.68  The court also held that although the indictment did not set 
forth a specific date by which McGuiness had knowledge of the investigation, the 
State had clarified during oral argument that she had knowledge of the investigation 
no later than September 11, 2021, the day she was served with a grand jury 
subpoena.69   
 
65 State v. McGuiness, 2022 WL 1410034 (Del. Super. Apr. 21, 2022). 
66 Id. at *2. 
67 Id. 
68 State v. McGuiness, 2022 WL 1489572, at *2 (Del. Super. May 2, 2022). 
69 Id. at *3. 
16 
 
4. Motion to Dismiss Count III and Motion to Dismiss the Indictment 
In April 2022, McGuiness filed a Motion to Dismiss Count III of the 
Indictment along with a Motion to Dismiss the Indictment or Alternatively to 
Sanction the State for Discovery Violations.70  In her Motion to Dismiss Count III, 
McGuiness argued that the State changed its theory as to Count III in the 
Superseding Indictment by abandoning the multiple invoice theory and adopting a 
new theory that each invoice was paid from different sources.71  These facts, 
McGuiness argued, were vague and failed to allege that her conduct was illegal.72  
McGuiness also argued that Count III should be dismissed because the facts 
contained within it had been known to the State at the time it obtained the first 
Indictment, and the delay in presenting the Superseding Indictment to the grand jury 
had prejudiced McGuiness.73   
In its response to the motion, the State argued that because Count III of the 
Superseding Indictment did not charge McGuiness with a new crime, and because 
the Superseding Indictment did not change the State’s theory of Count III, but rather 
 
70 App. to Opening Br. at A301 (Mot. to Dismiss Count III); A378 (Mot. to Dismiss or Sanction). 
71 Id. at A318 (Mot. to Dismiss Count III). 
72 Id. at A319 (Mot. to Dismiss Count III). 
73 Id. at A314–17 (Mot. to Dismiss Count III). 
17 
 
explained the allegations in greater detail, McGuiness had failed to demonstrate 
prejudice.74 
The Superior Court denied the motion on May 13, 2022, holding that the 
indictment sufficiently alleged that McGuiness had engaged in conduct satisfying all 
the elements of 29 Del. C. § 6903.75  The court found that the indictment specifically 
alleged that McGuiness divided payments under the MCG contract to circumvent 
the Delaware Division of Accounting’s review, which the court held met Section 
6903’s “fragmenting or subdividing” element.76 
In her Motion to Dismiss the Indictment or Alternatively Sanction the State, 
McGuiness contended that on April 8, 2022, the State produced electronically stored 
information (“ESI”) consisting of 511,255 documents collected from some of the 
devices it had seized when it executed the search warrant in September 2021.77  
McGuiness argued that this delayed production severely prejudiced her ability to 
prepare for trial because she could not reasonably review all the documents in the 
six or seven weeks remaining before trial.78  McGuiness further contended that 
because the State waited seven months to produce the documents, which were in its 
 
74 Id. at A373–74 (State’s Response to Mot. to Dismiss Count III). 
75 State v. McGuiness, 2022 WL 1538488, at *3 (Del. Super. May 13, 2022). 
76 Id. at *3–4. 
77 App. to Opening Br. at A379 (Mot. to Dismiss the Indictment or Alternatively Sanction the 
State). 
78 Id. at A388 (Mot. to Dismiss the Indictment or Alternatively Sanction the State). 
18 
 
possession throughout that period, it had violated both its discovery obligations and 
its obligation under Brady v. Maryland79 to disclose exculpatory or impeachment 
evidence.80   
McGuiness asked the court to dismiss the Superseding Indictment because the 
prejudice caused by the late production could not be cured by a trial continuance, 
namely because she intended to run for re-election in the fall of 2022 and wanted the 
trial to be complete before the election.81  McGuiness alternatively asked the court 
to sanction the State for the late production by ordering it (i) not to introduce any of 
the newly produced evidence at trial; (ii) to pay the costs she incurred reviewing the 
voluminous discovery on an expedited basis; and (iii) to confirm that the newly 
produced evidence did not include exculpatory evidence.82 
In response to this motion, the State acknowledged that it had recently 
produced a large volume of discoverable information, specifically data obtained 
from McGuiness’s computer and Daughter’s laptops, but contended that much of the 
data included emails and attachments from McGuiness’s email account to which she 
maintained access during the pendency of the litigation and that the State had already 
 
79 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
80 App. to Opening Br. at A390–92 (Mot. to Dismiss the Indictment or Alternatively Sanction the 
State). 
81 Id. at A393 (Mot. to Dismiss the Indictment or Alternatively Sanction the State). 
82 Id. at A394–95 (Mot. to Dismiss the Indictment or Alternatively Sanction the State). 
19 
 
produced in December 2021.83  The State explained that the delayed production 
occurred because the computer and laptops’ password protection and encryption 
required the State to hire a third-party vendor to search the data, which began in 
February 2022.84  After data was extracted from the laptops and computer, the filter 
team finished sorting through the privileged and confidential communications in late 
April 2022.85  Notably, the State provided McGuiness with the discovery weeks 
before its own prosecution team had access to the materials.86 
The Superior Court decided the motion on May 18, 2022, granting some of 
the requested discovery sanctions but denying the ultimate sanction of dismissal.87  
The court agreed with the State that much of the ESI in the new production was 
previously available to McGuiness, including OAOA network files and McGuiness’s 
and Daughter’s state email.88  The court also pointed out that the State had produced 
the ESI in a searchable format, allowing McGuiness to identify exculpatory 
information in a timely fashion.89  The court held that although the State violated the 
 
83 Id. at A440–44 (Response in Opposition to Mot. to Dismiss the Indictment or Alternatively 
Sanction the State). 
84 Id. at A453 (Response in Opposition to Mot. to Dismiss the Indictment or Alternatively Sanction 
the State Ex. B). 
85 Id. at A454 (Response in Opposition to Mot. to Dismiss the Indictment or Alternatively Sanction 
the State Ex. B). 
86 Id. 
87 State v. McGuiness, 2022 WL 1580601 (Del. Super. May 18, 2022). 
88 Id. at *5. 
89 Id. 
20 
 
court’s discovery deadlines by making the late production, it did not do so in bad 
faith, and dismissing the Indictment therefore was not warranted.90  The Superior 
Court further held that McGuiness had not established a claim under Brady because 
she had not demonstrated prejudice.91  The court ultimately precluded the State from 
introducing any of the newly produced evidence in its case-in-chief.92  The trial court 
also offered to continue the trial, which McGuiness declined out of concerns 
regarding the upcoming election. 
5. Pre-Trial Venue Change 
On May 26, 2022, which was to be the first day of trial, McGuiness first 
challenged whether venue was properly maintained in New Castle County because 
none of the events described in the Indictment occurred there.93  The State conceded 
that Kent County was the proper venue and thereafter entered a nolle prosequi on all 
the indicted counts.94  The State then re-indicted McGuiness in Kent County, and on 
June 6, 2022, a Kent County grand jury returned an indictment substantively 
identical to the previous Superseding Indictment.95 
 
90 Id. at *4. 
91 Id. at *5. 
92 Id. at *4. 
93 Answering Br. at 1. 
94 App. to Answering Br. at B263 (State’s Letter). 
95 App. to Opening Br. at A796 (Kent County Indictment).  See A769 (State’s Letter Identifying 
Slight Amendments to Indictment). 
21 
 
McGuiness then argued one more motion to dismiss in early June 2022 before 
trial began.96  McGuiness renewed her motions that the court previously denied, 
contending that it should reconsider its holdings in light of the case’s relocation to 
Kent County.97  The court issued an order the next day, on June 9, ordering that its 
decisions in the New Castle County case would be binding in the Kent County 
proceedings.98   
C. Trial 
The trial began on June 14, 2022.99  In total, 28 witnesses testified for the 
State, most of whom were current and former state employees.100  Six witnesses 
testified for McGuiness, including Investigator Robinson, whom McGuiness re-
called as a witness after he testified for the State.101  On June 30, 2022, the parties 
 
96 Id. at A784 (Omnibus Mot. to Dismiss). 
97 Id. at A786 (Omnibus Mot. to Dismiss). 
98 Id. at A1066–67 (June 9, 2022 Order). 
99 Id. at A2607; A2629 (Trial Tr.). 
100 See id. at A2685 (Sclesky Direct Exam.); A2698 (Spano Direct Exam.); A2777 (Hyler Direct 
Exam.); A2793 (Grossman Direct Exam.); A2815 (Reuban Direct Exam.); A2861 (Purdy Direct 
Exam.); A2890 (Herron Direct Exam.); A2995 (Cole Direct Exam.) A3058 (Bateman Direct 
Exam.); A3066 (Robinson Direct Exam.); A3282 (Maurice Direct Exam.); A3304 (Vargas Direct 
Exam.); A3353 (Schenck Direct Exam.); A3399 (Hamilton Direct Exam.); A3470 (Burd Direct 
Exam.); A3605 (Gross Direct Exam.); A3770 (Elizabeth McGuiness Direct Exam.);A3794 
(Ziamba Direct Exam.);A3881 (Vasilikos Direct Exam.); A3908 (Moore Direct Exam.); A3969 
(Van Horn Direct Exam.); A4113 (Thomas Direct Exam.); A4187 (Cousin Direct Exam.); A4239 
(Elder Direct Exam.) A4254 (Haw-Young Direct Exam.) A4344 (Zolper Direct Exam.); A4350 
(Horsey Direct Exam.); A4677 (Moreau Direct Exam.). 
101 See id. at A4525 (Bayline Direct Exam.); A4560 (Robinson Direct Exam.); A4735 (Gulli Direct 
Exam.); A4810 (Marshall Direct Exam.); A4847 (August Direct Exam.); A4898 (Mitchell-Rogers 
Direct Exam.). 
22 
 
gave their closing arguments and the jury began its deliberations.102  The following 
day, on July 1, the jury returned a verdict finding McGuiness guilty of Counts I, III, 
and IV and not guilty of Counts II and V.103 
D. Post-Trial Proceedings 
After the jury returned its verdict, McGuiness moved for judgment of acquittal 
and a new trial.104  In her Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, McGuiness contended 
that the court should enter judgment in her favor on Counts I, III, and IV.105  As to 
Count I, McGuiness posited that the State failed to introduce evidence sufficient for 
a rational jury to conclude that Daughter had received benefits that other casual-
seasonal employees in her same position did not receive.106  As to Count III, 
McGuiness reasserted her argument that Count III failed to charge her with criminal 
conduct.107  She alternatively argued that the State had not offered any evidence as 
to McGuiness’s mens rea when structuring the MCG and Innovate Consulting 
contracts and therefore did not meet its burden of proof.108   
 
102 Id. at A4974 (State’s Closing Argument); A4006 (Defense’s Closing Arguments); A5077 
(Charge to the Jury). McGuiness raised several motions during trial, some of which renewed 
arguments she raised before trial began.  To the extent these motions are relevant to the appeal, we 
identify them within our analysis of McGuiness’s appellate arguments. 
103 Id. at A5115–16 (Verdict). 
104 Id. at A1104 (Mot. for Judgment of Acquittal); A1474 (Mot. for New Trial). 
105 Id. at A1141 (Mot. for Judgment of Acquittal). 
106 Id. at A1106–08 (Mot. for Judgment of Acquittal). 
107 Id. at A1120, n.2 (Mot. for Judgment of Acquittal). 
108 Id. at A1116–24 (Mot. for Judgment of Acquittal). 
23 
 
McGuiness also argued that the court should enter a judgment of acquittal as 
to Count IV because (i) a guilty verdict on that count was predicated on the jury 
finding her guilty of Counts I or III—which she argued could not stand,109 (ii) the 
State had failed to present evidence that she knowingly committed an unauthorized 
act when she hired Daughter,110 (iii) the State failed to present evidence that 
McGuiness intended to benefit her own financial interests when she hired 
Daughter,111 and (iv) Count IV was multiplicitous of Counts I and III and therefore 
offended the Constitution’s prohibition against double jeopardy.112 
In her Motion for a New Trial, McGuiness argued that a new trial was justified 
because (i) the State continued to withhold exculpatory evidence in violation of its 
Brady obligations even after the Court denied McGuiness’s Motion to Dismiss the 
Indictment;113 (ii) the court improperly admitted character evidence as to Count V, 
which then spilled over into the other counts for which she was found guilty;114 (iii) 
the State’s theory of Count III evolved such that McGuiness did not have adequate 
notice of the conduct for which she was charged;115 (iv) the court improperly 
 
109 Id. at A1125 (Mot. for Judgment of Acquittal). 
110 Id. at A1126 (Mot. for Judgment of Acquittal). 
111 Id. at A1128 (Mot. for Judgment of Acquittal). 
112 Id. at A1132–35 (Mot. for Judgment of Acquittal). 
113 Id. at A1477 (Mot. for New Trial). 
114 Id. at A1502 (Mot. for New Trial). 
115 Id. at A1518 (Mot. for New Trial). 
24 
 
commented on Investigator Robinson’s credibility when it stated that McGuiness’s 
counsel was unfairly implying that Robinson was “lying”;116 (v) Count IV was 
multiplicitous of Counts I and III;117 and (vi) the cumulative effect of these errors 
mandated a new trial.118 
The Superior Court addressed both motions in an August 30, 2022 opinion in 
which it denied McGuiness’s Motion for a New Trial, granted her Motion for 
Judgment of Acquittal as to Count III, and denied her Motion for Judgment of 
Acquittal as to Counts I and IV.119  In granting her Motion for Judgment of Acquittal 
as to Count III, the court agreed with McGuiness that the State had failed to prove 
that she intentionally fragmented one contract into multiple contracts in violation of 
Section 6981.120  The court further held that because Section 6981 does not 
criminalize conduct that fragments multiple payments under one invoice, the State’s 
evidence of such conduct was not sufficient to support a conviction.121   
The court then denied McGuiness’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal as to 
Counts I and IV, reasoning that the State had met its burden of proving that Daughter 
received benefits that other casual-seasonal employees did not—namely the ability 
 
116 Id. at A1526 (Mot. for New Trial). 
117 Id. at A1528 (Mot. for New Trial). 
118 Id. at A1529 (Mot. for New Trial). 
119 State v. McGuiness, 2022 WL 3971195 (Del. Super. Aug. 30, 2022). 
120 Id. at *5. 
121 Id. 
25 
 
to work remotely while attending college.122  The court further held that Count IV 
included conduct that exceeded the conduct within the scope of Counts I and III such 
that Count IV was not multiplicitous.123 
The Superior Court also denied McGuiness’s Motion for a New Trial.  As to 
her Brady arguments, the court held that she had not sufficiently alleged ongoing 
Brady violations because the State’s delayed production of ESI did not amount to a 
suppression of exculpatory evidence, and the State was not aware of potential 
witnesses who could have testified that Daughter’s benefits were equivalent to 
OAOA’s other casual-seasonal employees.124   
As to McGuiness’s remaining arguments in support of her Motion for a New 
Trial, the court held that evidence of McGuiness’s conduct toward employees before 
September 11, 2021, was relevant and properly admitted as to Count V because the 
State argued that McGuiness knew of the investigation well before she received the 
grand jury subpoena.125  The court rejected McGuiness’s contention that the court’s 
comment regarding Robinson’s testimony was improper, holding that the trial judge 
has discretion to control the mode of defense counsel’s cross-examination and, even 
 
122 Id. at *3. 
123 Id. at *7. 
124 Id. at *8–9. 
125 Id. at *10.  The court also held that McGuiness’s argument regarding Count III was moot 
because the court granted her Motion for Judgment of Acquittal as to Count III. Id. at *11. 
26 
 
if the comment was improper, the jury instructions cured any prejudice.126  Finally, 
the court denied the motion as to cumulative error because McGuiness failed to 
demonstrate that any of the errors caused her prejudice that resulted in an unfair 
trial.127 
The Court sentenced McGuiness on October 19, 2022, to serve one year at 
Level V incarceration suspended for one year at Level I probation for Count I, and 
one year at Level V incarceration suspended for one year at Level I probation for 
Count IV.128  The court also ordered McGuiness to pay a $10,000 fine for Count I, 
restitution for Count IV, and the costs of the prosecution.129  McGuiness timely 
appealed her convictions. 
ANALYSIS 
McGuiness raises eight arguments on appeal.  In her first two arguments, she 
contends that the State violated her due process rights under Brady v. Maryland by 
delaying the production of voluminous discovery until less than two months before 
trial was scheduled to start and by impeding her efforts to investigate and raise 
selective or vindictive prosecution defenses.  McGuiness next challenges each of her 
 
126 Id. at *11–12.  The court also held that McGuiness’s multiplicity argument was unsupported 
for the same reasons it denied McGuiness’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal as to Count IV—
that Counts I, III, and IV encompassed different conduct. Id. at *13. 
127 Id. 
128 App. to Opening Br. at A5146 (Sentencing Tr.). 
129 Id. 
27 
 
convictions for various reasons, including that (i) the State did not admit sufficient 
evidence to support her conviction for Count I; (ii) the improper admission of 
character evidence relating to Count V prejudiced the jury’s consideration of Counts 
I and IV; (iii) the trial court’s failure to dismiss Count III before the case was 
submitted to the jury resulted in evidence that prejudicially spilled over into the 
jury’s deliberations as to the other counts; and (iv) Counts I and IV were 
multiplicitous—and therefore violated double jeopardy principles—because they 
penalized the same conduct.  McGuiness also contends that the Superior Court’s 
comments in the jury’s presence concerning Investigator Robinson’s veracity 
amounted to an unconstitutional comment on the witness’s credibility and entitle her 
to a new trial.  Lastly, McGuiness argues that the court erred when it denied her 
motion to appoint private counsel at State expense, and she asks the court to remand 
that issue for further proceedings. 
A. McGuiness’s arguments arising under Brady v. Maryland and its progeny 
In her first two arguments on appeal, McGuiness maintains that the State 
violated her due process rights by failing to meet its obligation under Brady v. 
Maryland130 to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence within its 
possession.  First, McGuiness argues that the State violated her constitutional rights 
by producing a large volume of ESI less than two months before her scheduled trial 
 
130 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
28 
 
and by then failing to properly search that ESI for exculpatory evidence.  Second, 
she contends that she was entitled, under Brady, to the names of the attorneys who 
participated in drafting inaccurate statements in the affidavit of probable cause that 
supported the warrant to search OAOA files.  McGuiness argues that either or both 
of these violations entitle her to a new trial.  We review questions of law de novo, 
including issues surrounding the State’s obligation to disclose exculpatory or 
impeachment evidence.131   
1. 
McGuiness is not entitled to a new trial based on the State’s delayed 
production of ESI. 
McGuiness first argues that the State suppressed a substantial amount of ESI 
until two months before trial and that this suppression fatally undermines confidence 
in the trial’s fairness and the jury’s verdict.  McGuiness contends that the State’s 
delayed production of this volume of discovery, coupled with its failure to search the 
ESI for exculpatory or impeachment evidence and point McGuiness to it, resulted in 
an unfair trial in violation of her due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution.  We disagree that the State’s delayed production 
violated Brady and further hold that the proper remedy for the State’s delayed 
production, if any, was a continuance of the trial, which the Superior Court offered 
and McGuiness refused. 
 
131 Risper v. State, 250 A.3d 76, 87 (Del. 2021); Wright v. State, 91 A.3d 972, 982 (Del. 2014). 
29 
 
Under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Brady, the government 
violates a defendant’s due process rights if the prosecution suppresses or withholds 
evidence that is favorable to the defense and material to the defendant’s guilt or 
punishment.132  The State’s Brady obligations arise from a prosecutor’s 
responsibility to “search for truth” in criminal cases133 and are founded on the 
premise that “[s]ociety wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when 
criminal trials are fair.”134  Under Brady and its progeny, the State must produce 
exculpatory and impeachment evidence in its possession to a defendant when that 
evidence could be material to a case’s outcome.135  A prosecutor therefore is charged 
with learning of any evidence favorable to the defense and “known to the others 
acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police.”136 
A defendant who alleges that her Brady rights were violated bears the burden 
of proving three elements: (1) evidence exists that is favorable to the defendant 
because it is exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the State suppressed that evidence; and 
 
132 Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 75 (2012); Brady, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“[S]uppression by the 
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the 
evidence is material to either guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution.”). 
133 Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999). 
134 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
135 Risper, 250 A.3d at 90; Wright, 91 A.3d at 972. 
136 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995); Wright, 91 A.3d at 988. 
30 
 
(3) the suppression prejudiced the defendant.137  The State argues that McGuiness 
has not met her burden to prove any, let alone all, of these elements. 
McGuiness argues that the State’s delayed production of ESI violated Brady 
in two ways.  First, she maintains that the State had an affirmative obligation to 
search the ESI for exculpatory or impeachment information and provide it to 
McGuiness, the State failed to do so, and this failure alone warrants a new trial.138  
Second, she contends that specific information contained within the ESI was 
exculpatory, but the delayed production prevented her counsel from finding that 
evidence and using it at trial, which also violated Brady. 
As to McGuiness’s first argument, we cannot conclude in these circumstances 
that the State’s failure to review every file within the ESI for exculpatory material 
violated Brady.  Caselaw does not support McGuiness’s contention that Brady 
requires the State to meticulously review the ESI—which was obtained from 
computers belonging to McGuiness and her daughter—to specifically identify 
exculpatory or impeaching information.  To the contrary, courts that have considered 
similar issues have concluded that the government generally satisfies Brady by 
 
137 United States, v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674–75 (1985); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 
154–55 (1972) (holding that impeachment evidence falls within the State’s Brady obligations); 
Risper, 250 A.3d at 90; Starling v. State, 882 A.2d 747, 756 (Del. 2005). 
138 Opening Br. at 12. 
31 
 
adopting an open file policy,139 ensuring that the file includes the information known 
to other government agencies, including the police,140 and directing a defendant to 
exculpatory evidence of which the government is aware.141   
For example, in U.S. v. Warshak, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
the government satisfied Brady by adopting an open file policy, even though the file 
contained a substantial amount of ESI that the government had not painstakingly 
reviewed for exculpatory evidence.142  In so holding, the Warshak court expressly 
rejected the same argument that McGuiness advances here, i.e., that the State “was 
obliged to sift fastidiously through evidence—the vast majority of which came from 
[defendant]—in an attempt to locate anything favorable to the defense.”   
 
139 See, e.g., United States v. Gray, 648 F.3d 562, 567 (7th Cir. 2011) (“To charge prosecutors with 
knowledge of exculpatory evidence buried in the computer databases of institutions that collect 
and store vast amounts of digitized data would be an unreasonable extension of the Brady rule.  
The courts, rightly in our view, have refused to make it.  The government is not ‘obliged to shift 
fastidiously’ through millions of pages (whether paper or electronic). . . . It is ‘under no duty to 
direct a defendant to exculpatory evidence [of which it is unaware] within a larger mass of 
disclosed evidence.’”); United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 296–98 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding 
that the government did not “abdicate” its Brady obligations by adopting an open file policy that 
contained millions of electronic documents when there was no evidence that the government acted 
in bad faith or deliberately concealed evidence); United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 576–77 
(5th Cir. 2009) rev’d on other grounds, 561 U.S. 358 (2010) (finding that the government’s use of 
an open file policy for a file that consisted of several hundred million pages of documents did not 
violate Brady); United States v. Gross, 424 F. Supp. 3d 800, 803–04 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (holding that 
the government’s open file production of ESI consisting of six million pages of documents did not 
violate Brady when the government did not conceal exculpatory material in the voluminous 
production, pad its file with pointless information to increase the defendant’s burden, or otherwise 
act in bad faith). 
140 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437; Wright, 91 A.3d at 988. 
141 Gray, 648 F.3d at 567; Starling, 130 A.3d at 333; Wright, 91 A.3d at 988. 
142 Warshak, 631 F.3d at 296–98. 
32 
 
The Warshak court relied, in part, on the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ 
decision in United States v. Skilling,143 which similarly rejected the defendant’s 
argument that the government’s open file consisting of several hundred million pages 
of documents resulted in “the effective concealment of a huge quantity of 
exculpatory evidence.”144  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals also has adopted 
the Warshak and Skilling courts’ interpretation of Brady.145  McGuiness has not 
pointed to a single authority supporting her contrary position. 
All those courts cautioned that the government must act in good faith and 
refrain from either padding an open file with superfluous information or producing 
the file in a manner that impedes a defendant’s ability to review the information.146  
This interpretation of Brady is consistent with its due process roots.  Brady is 
intended to ensure that a defendant receives a fair trial and can present an effective 
defense.  At the same time, the prosecution cannot realistically be charged with 
searching each electronic document within a voluminous file for material that may 
be exculpatory.147 
 
143 554 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2009). 
144 Id. at 576. 
145 Gray, 648 F.3d at 567. 
146 Warshak, 631 F.3d at 297–98; Skilling, 554 F.3d at 577. 
147 It is not disputed that the government must point a defendant to exculpatory evidence of which 
the government becomes aware.  That is not the issue raised in this appeal.   
33 
 
In McGuiness’s case, the trial court found that the State acted in good faith in 
producing the ESI, and McGuiness points to no evidence that the State intentionally 
padded the production in order to conceal Brady material.  The State provided the 
ESI to McGuiness as soon as it was available, and the record does not support the 
conclusion that the State intentionally or recklessly delayed processing the ESI to 
prevent McGuiness from using it in her own defense.148  Rather, the encryption and 
filtering issues that contributed to the delayed production were matters largely 
outside the State’s control.  Once decrypted, the files were produced to McGuiness 
even before they were provided to the prosecution team.  If anything, the delayed 
production prejudiced the State because the Superior Court sanctioned the State for 
violating discovery deadlines by precluding the prosecution from using the newly 
produced ESI in its case-in-chief.149  We can discern no Brady violation from these 
facts. 
McGuiness also argues that the delayed production prevented her from finding 
and using exculpatory evidence at trial.  She points to two categories of 
 
148 McGuiness, 2022 WL 1580601, at *3 (Del. Super. May 18, 2022) (“While the State[’s] 
justification reflects their failure to use a commonsense management of potential critical 
documents, there is nothing to suggest they did so in bad faith or to obtain a litigation advantage.”).  
See Gray, 648 F.3d at 567–68 (“the government cannot make disclosure until the exculpatory 
evidence comes into its possession . . . that did not happen here until mid-trial; nor was the delay 
deliberate or otherwise in bad faith.  As soon as the government received the evidence it turned it 
over to the defense—which had time to use it but did not do so.”). 
149 McGuiness, 2022 WL 1580601, at *4 (Del. Super. May 18, 2022). 
34 
 
“exculpatory” documents that she argues were effectively suppressed by the State’s 
delayed production: (1) eleven “List of Authorized Positions” reports (the “LAP 
Reports”),150 and (2) OAOA documents bearing Daughter’s name or listing her as 
the file custodian.151  McGuiness does not carry her burden of proof under Brady 
with respect to any of this evidence. 
First, McGuiness has not established that the evidence to which she points is 
exculpatory.  Evidence is exculpatory if it is “material either to guilt or to 
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”152  
McGuiness argues that the LAP Reports identify other casual-seasonal employees 
who received some of the same employment benefits as Daughter, thereby 
undermining the State’s theory that Daughter received benefits not available to other 
employees in her same classification.  McGuiness argues that these reports show that 
other casual-seasonal employees were paid more than Daughter in the relevant 
timeframe, and at least three other casual-seasonal employees were permitted—like 
Daughter—to work remotely while attending college.  As explained below regarding 
the sufficiency of the evidence for Count I, even without these LAP Reports, the 
defense presented evidence to the jury that OAOA casual-seasonal employees hired 
 
150 Opening Br. at 15–17. 
151 Reply Br. at 4–5.   
152 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
35 
 
in 2021 received benefits similar to Daughter, and the jury nevertheless convicted 
McGuiness of Count I.  McGuiness has not established the materiality of this 
additional evidence. 
McGuiness fares no better with her argument that a group of OAOA 
documents were exculpatory because they contained Daughter’s name or listed her 
as file custodian.  McGuiness advances this argument in a single paragraph in her 
reply brief without explaining how the documents weaken the State’s position that 
Daughter was paid without performing any work.153  The fact that OAOA documents 
used Daughter’s name or listed her as file custodian does not demonstrate that 
Daughter performed work commensurate with her compensation, and McGuiness 
does not otherwise elaborate on this argument. 
Second, McGuiness has not shown that the State suppressed the ESI obtained 
from the laptops.  McGuiness correctly points out that suppression under Brady is 
not limited to cases where the government altogether fails to produce exculpatory or 
impeachment evidence to a defendant.  Suppression also occurs when the 
government’s belated disclosure of exculpatory or impeachment evidence precludes 
 
153 McGuiness did not mention this category of documents in her opening brief, and the argument 
therefore is waived.  Supr. Ct. R. 14(b)(vi)(A)(3) (“The merits of any argument that is not raised 
in the body of the opening brief shall be deemed waived and will not be considered by the Court 
on appeal.”).  Moreover, McGuiness argues that these documents were found in a “cursory 
analysis” of the ESI, directly contradicting her contention that the defense team could not 
effectively use the ESI.  Reply Br. at 4. 
36 
 
a defendant from effectively presenting or using the evidence.154  But the State 
cannot disclose evidence that it does not have, and the record shows that the State 
provided the ESI to McGuiness as soon as it was available.  The delayed production 
was directly attributable to the decryption and filtering the State was required to 
undertake to convert the ESI to a useable format.   
McGuiness also has not shown that the delay prevented her counsel from 
using the material “with some degree of calculation and forethought.”155  Once the 
ESI was decrypted, the State produced it in a searchable format.  When the 
prosecution team obtained access to the ESI—which was after McGuiness received 
it—the State provided McGuiness with a report regarding the materials contained in 
the ESI.  Additionally, at least some of the evidence included in the ESI was 
duplicative of evidence provided to McGuiness in December 2021, including OAOA 
network files, McGuiness’s and Daughter’s state email records, and OAOA 
employees’ correspondence with Daughter using her personal email account.  The 
ESI was drawn from computers that belonged to McGuiness and Daughter, who 
presumably were familiar with their contents and able to assist counsel with 
 
154 Risper, 250 A.3d 76, 91 (“[t]he opportunity for use under Brady . . . [includes] the opportunity 
for a responsible lawyer to use the information with some degree of calculation and forethought.”) 
(quoting Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89, 101 (2d Cir. 2001)); Dickens v. State, 437 A.2d 159 (Del. 
1981) (“[w]hile the State may have violated the rule in [Brady], the defense has not demonstrated 
that the tardy disclosure prevented it from effectively presenting the evidence.”). 
155 Risper, 250 A.3d at 91 (quoting Leka, 257 F.3d at 101). 
37 
 
identifying relevant material.  Moreover, the trial court offered McGuiness a 
continuance, which would have allowed her counsel additional time to utilize the 
ESI.  McGuiness made the strategic decision to decline the continuance because of 
her political plans regarding the election, but that choice is not a basis on which she 
may seek a new trial. 
Finally, McGuiness has not shown that she was prejudiced by the delayed 
production.  Evidence is “material” within Brady’s prejudice prong when “there is a 
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.”156  Although a defendant is not required to 
show that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted in an acquittal, 
Brady also does not require a reviewing court to order a new trial whenever a 
defendant turns up “evidence possibly useful to the defense but not likely to have 
changed the verdict.”157  Ultimately, the question is whether the government’s 
suppression of evidence undermines confidence in the trial’s outcome.158  The 
evidence McGuiness identified, even if possibly useful to her defense, was not likely 
to change the jury’s verdict.  To the contrary, its exculpatory value was at best 
questionable, and even on appeal McGuiness could not identify material within the 
 
156 Smith, 565 U.S. at 75 (quoting Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 469–70 (2009)). 
157 Wright, 91 A.3d at 988 (quoting Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154). 
158 Id. 
38 
 
production that carried a reasonable likelihood of changing the trial’s outcome.  Her 
Brady claim regarding the ESI therefore fails. 
2. 
McGuiness is not entitled to a new trial or to additional discovery 
relating to her vindictive or selective prosecution theories. 
McGuiness next argues that she was entitled under Brady to know the names 
of the attorneys who contributed to false statements contained in the September 2021 
search warrant for OAOA files.  She argues that the trial court’s refusal to compel 
the State to disclose that information prevented her from exploring selective and 
vindictive prosecution defenses.   
McGuiness first raised the specter of selective or vindictive prosecution in her 
initial discovery requests, which sought, among other things, the production of (i) 
state agency personnel policies prohibiting or limiting nepotism in State 
employment; (ii) contracts for professional services in the amount of $50,000 or less 
entered into by the DOJ or any other state agency within a specified date range; and 
(iii) the identity of, and compensation received by, any person, firm, or entity 
employed by the DOJ or the State of Delaware who made “any campaign 
contributions” during a specified date range.159  The State objected to those requests, 
although it produced a copy of the DOJ’s anti-nepotism policy.  McGuiness then 
 
159 McGuiness, 2022 WL 1184407, at *3 (Del. Super. Apr. 13, 2022). 
39 
 
moved to compel, arguing that the evidence sought was relevant to a “selective 
prosecution defense.”160 
The trial court granted McGuiness’s motion in part, holding that she had 
presented “a ‘colorable basis’ for a selective prosecution defense” by alleging that 
she was the first person criminally prosecuted under 29 Del. C. §§ 5805 and 6903, 
even though others in state government acted similarly.161  Based on McGuiness’s 
allegations, the court ordered the State to produce the following information: 
1. The name and job description of any employee, full-time or 
seasonal, who is or was hired by the office of a statewide elected official 
and who fits within the category of a “close relative” as defined by 
Chapter 29 of the Delaware Code, between January 1, 2019, and the 
present[;] and[] 
2. All professional service contracts in the amount of $50,000 or 
less, between January 1, 2019 and the present that were approved by 
the Attorney General and/or the Governor.162 
The trial court denied the motion to compel as to all the other information 
McGuiness sought. 
In April 2022, McGuiness filed a motion seeking an evidentiary hearing to 
establish that law enforcement included false allegations in the affidavit supporting 
the September 2021 search warrant application and that the fruits of that warrant 
 
160 Id. at *4–5. 
161 Id. at *5. 
162 Id. at *6. 
40 
 
therefore should be suppressed under Franks v. Delaware.163  The trial court 
conducted an evidentiary hearing at which Investigator Robinson testified about the 
averments in the warrant application as compared to the facts known to the DOJ at 
the time it applied for the warrant.164  At the hearing’s conclusion, the trial court held 
that the information contained in Paragraph 24 of the affidavit was “critical” to the 
application, “inaccurate,” and “placed in there to imply that the defendant reduced 
invoices to less than $5,000 to avoid oversight by the [Division] of Accounting.”165  
The court therefore suppressed the documents related to the false statements.166 
At trial, Robinson testified several times that the warrant’s inaccuracies were 
attributable to the “investigative team” as a whole, including multiple lawyers.167 
Robinson’s testimony during the Franks hearing had not referred to other team 
members’ participation in drafting the affidavit.  Robinson also acknowledged at trial 
that several of the statements were “false” and contrary to other information known 
at the time.168  Based on Robinson’s trial testimony, McGuiness asked the State to 
(i) identify the attorneys who participated in the affidavit’s drafting, and (ii) produce 
 
163 438 U.S. 154, 155 (1978).  See App. to Opening Br. at A699–758 (Defendant’s Mot. to Suppress 
and Request for a Franks Hearing). 
164 See App. to Opening Br. at A2451–2531 (Suppression Hearing Tr.). 
165 Id. at 2528–29 (Suppression Hearing Tr.). 
166 Id.  The Court held that the State could use the documents if it established that it obtained them 
from a source independent of the warrant.   
167 Id. at A4481, A4487–88, A4494–96 (Trial Tr. – Robinson). 
168 Id. at A4484, A4486, A4487 (Trial Tr. – Robinson). 
41 
 
any communications between Robinson and any DOJ lawyer or investigator 
regarding the affidavit.169  The State told McGuiness that the members of the 
investigative team involved in drafting the affidavit included lead trial counsel and 
the Chief Deputy Attorney General, as well as other DOJ attorneys.170  The State, 
however, refused to produce any communications regarding the affidavit’s contents, 
and the trial court denied McGuiness’s motion to compel any such production.171 
McGuiness argues on appeal that she was entitled under Brady to know the 
names of the attorneys who drafted the inaccurate statements and to see their 
communications regarding the warrant application.  She contends that the evidence 
would have been exculpatory or impeaching because it would have (i) contributed 
to her investigation and possible use of defenses for selective or vindictive 
prosecution, and (ii) undermined the investigation’s thoroughness and good faith. 
McGuiness again fails to carry her burden with respect to Brady, even when 
we consider this evidence in combination with the State’s delayed production of 
ESI.172  First, McGuiness has not shown that the names of the attorneys who 
 
169 Id. at A1989 (Email from Defense Counsel to DOJ). 
170 Id. at A4554–55 (Trial Tr.). 
171 Id. at A4559 (Trial Tr.). 
172 See Wright, 91 A.3d at 990 (holding that a reviewing court must consider the cumulative 
prejudicial effect of undisclosed Brady evidence); cf. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 440–41 (reversing a 
conviction because it was unclear whether the Court of Appeals considered the cumulative 
materiality of the Brady evidence). 
42 
 
participated in drafting the affidavit or the investigative team’s internal 
communications regarding those averments were remotely related to any cognizable 
claim for selective or vindictive prosecution.  Although McGuiness places 
significant emphasis on the fact that the trial court previously held that she had 
alleged a “colorable” basis for a selective prosecution defense, that finding did not 
entitle her to unlimited discovery into tangential information in support of theoretical 
defenses for which she adduced no further support.  Second, McGuiness has not 
shown that the trial court’s refusal to compel production of this information 
prejudiced her defense in this case. 
McGuiness’s Brady claim first falters because she failed to show that the 
information would have been exculpatory or impeaching.  Specifically, she does not 
explain how the information at issue would help her investigate or prove either 
selective or vindictive prosecution.  It is true that the State may not selectively 
enforce the law based on a defendant’s protected status, such as race or gender.173  
Selective enforcement of that sort would violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause.174  But a defendant’s burden to prove selective prosecution or 
selective enforcement is a demanding one.175 
 
173 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); Drummond v. State, 909 A.2d 594, 2006 
WL 2842732, at *2 (Del. Oct. 5, 2006) (TABLE). 
174 Whren, 517 U.S. at 813. 
175 Drummond, 2006 WL 2842732, at *2 (citing United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 
(1996)). 
43 
 
To make a prima facie case of selective prosecution, two elements must 
be established.  The defendant must show that (1) the policy to 
prosecute or enforce the law had a discriminatory effect and (2) it was 
motivated by a discriminatory purpose.  To show a discriminatory 
effect, the defendant must show that a similarly situated person [not in 
the protected class] could have been arrested for the same offense for 
which the defendant was arrested, but was not.  To show discriminatory 
purpose, the defendant must demonstrate that intent to discriminate was 
a ‘motivating factor in the decision to enforce the criminal law against 
the defendant.’176 
McGuiness did not attempt to argue or provide a basis for any of these 
elements in either the trial court or on appeal.  McGuiness never identified the 
protected class in which she contends she falls.  She likewise has not explained how 
the evidence at issue would have helped her make out a prima facie showing of 
selective enforcement.   
McGuiness has similarly failed to identify any factual basis to support a 
vindictive prosecution claim.177  The United States Supreme Court has recognized 
that claims for vindictive prosecution may arise when an individual is prosecuted 
because they exercised constitutionally protected rights such as freedom of speech 
or the right to appeal a conviction.178  McGuiness has neither articulated what 
constitutional right she ostensibly exercised that prompted the prosecution nor 
 
176 Drummond, 2006 WL 2842732, at *2 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
177 We note that the trial court never found that McGuiness articulated even a “colorable” basis for 
a vindictive prosecution claim. Compare McGuiness, 2022 WL 1184407, at *3 (Del. Super. Apr. 
13, 2022) (“The Court finds that Defendant presents a ‘colorable basis’ for a selective prosecution 
defense and will permit discovery.”).  
178 See Acara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974). 
44 
 
explained how the purported Brady evidence would be relevant to establishing a 
vindictive prosecution claim. 
McGuiness also does not carry her burden with respect to Brady’s prejudice 
component.  Even when we consider this evidence cumulatively with the State’s late 
production of ESI, McGuiness has not shown that there is a reasonable probability 
that the additional information would have changed the jury’s verdict.  McGuiness 
argues that the information would have undermined the jury’s confidence in the 
investigation.  But McGuiness pointedly demonstrated to the jury that the 
investigative team obtained a search warrant based on an affidavit that contained 
false statements.179  And McGuiness emphasized that evidence in closing arguments 
to the jury: 
Here's what you know for sure: Chief Investigator Robinson made 
repeated false statements under oath in a search warrant application in 
front of a judge and then to a grand jury, and in this trial . . . we learned 
it wasn’t just his mistake.  That search warrant was reviewed by a 
special team of investigators and lawyers and they still got it horribly 
wrong.  Can you trust that special team of investigators and lawyers to 
get it right now?180 
A review of the trial record demonstrates that McGuiness’s counsel effectively 
highlighted the deficiencies in the State’s investigation.  She was permitted to 
present evidence of those deficiencies and argue their implications to the jury.  
 
179 See App. to Opening Br. at A4481–4574 (Trial Tr.). 
180 Id. at A5008 (Trial Tr.).  See also id. at A5016–17 (pointing out several times that statements in 
the affidavit were false and the investigation therefore could not be trusted). 
45 
 
McGuiness has not established that the individual attorneys’ names or the 
investigative team’s internal communications were reasonably likely to alter the 
jury’s verdict. 
For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the State did not violate 
McGuiness’s due process rights under Brady v. Maryland. 
B. The sufficiency of the evidence supporting Count I 
McGuiness next argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion for 
judgment of acquittal as to Count I.  We review a trial court’s decision on a motion 
for judgment of acquittal de novo, specifically deciding “whether any rational trier 
of fact, viewing the evidence and all the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom 
in the light most favorable to the State, could find the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt of all the elements of the crime.”181 
Count I charged McGuiness with Conflict of Interest relating to the hiring and 
supervision of Daughter as an OAOA casual-seasonal employee.  The charge arose 
under 29 Del. C. § 5805, which defines “prohibitions relating to conflicts of interest” 
for State employees, officers, and officials.  Section 5805 relevantly provides: 
a) Restrictions on exercise of official authority. (1) No state employee, 
state officer or honorary state official may participate on behalf of the 
State in the review or disposition of any matter pending before the State 
in which the state employee, state officer or honorary state official has 
a personal or private interest, provided, that upon request from any 
person with official responsibility with respect to the matter, any such 
 
181 Hopkins v. State, 293 A.3d 145, 150 (Del. 2023). 
46 
 
person who has such a personal or private interest may nevertheless 
respond to questions concerning any such matter. A personal or private 
interest in a matter is an interest which tends to impair a person’s 
independence of judgment in the performance of the person’s duties 
with respect to that matter. 
(2) A person has an interest which tends to impair the person’s 
independence of judgment in the performance of the person’s duties 
with respect to any matter when: 
a. Any action or inaction with respect to the matter would result in a 
financial benefit or detriment to accrue to the person or a close relative 
to a greater extent than such benefit or detriment would accrue to others 
who are members of the same class or group of persons; 
For purposes of Count I, the State was required to prove that McGuiness was 
a “state officer” at the time of the charged offense, she participated on the State’s 
behalf in reviewing or disposing of a matter pending before the State, and she had a 
personal or private interest in that matter as defined by Section 5008.182  The trial 
court instructed the jury that the “simple hiring of one’s close relative, without more, 
is not a crime.”183  On appeal, McGuiness only challenges whether the State 
presented sufficient evidence regarding Count I’s “personal or private interest” 
element. 
Count I’s “personal or private interest” element required the jury to decide 
whether, as a result of her employment with OAOA, financial benefits accrued to 
Daughter that were greater than those received by “others who are members of the 
 
182 See App. to Opening Br. at A1073–74 (Jury Instructions).   
183 Id. at A1074 (Jury Instructions).   
47 
 
same class or group of persons.”184  McGuiness argues that, in denying her motion 
for judgment of acquittal, the trial court improperly limited its comparison of 
Daughter’s employment benefits to those received by the handful of casual-seasonal 
employees hired at the same time as Daughter.185  McGuiness further argues that, 
even if that small group comprised the “class or group of persons” to which Daughter 
should be compared, the State did not present sufficient evidence of the benefits 
received by that group.186 
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the trial court properly denied 
McGuiness’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to Count I.  The jury was charged 
with making the factual determination as to which employees fell within the “same 
class or group of persons” as Daughter.  McGuiness argued to the jury that the group 
should include all OAOA’s casual-seasonal workers employed in 2020 and 2021.187  
The State presented the jury with two alternative theories: (1) the relevant class or 
group of persons comprised only those casual-seasonal employees who, like 
Daughter, were employed at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic and before 
McGuiness knew she was under investigation;188 and (2) even if the jury considered 
 
184 29 Del. C. § 5008(2)(a); see App. to Opening Br. at A1073 (Jury Instructions).   
185 Opening Br. at 28–29. 
186 Id. at 29–30. 
187 See App. to Opening Br. at A5026–27, A5038 (Trial Tr.). 
188 See id. at A5063–64 (Trial Tr.).   
48 
 
the broader group for which McGuiness advocated, including those casual-seasonal 
employees hired in 2021, none of the employees received the same cumulative 
benefits as Daughter.189   
The State presented evidence in support of both its theories, and a rational 
trier of fact could have found McGuiness guilty beyond a reasonable doubt under 
either theory.  As to the group of employees to whom Daughter should be compared, 
the State presented evidence from which the jury could conclude that the comparator 
group should be the casual-seasonal employees hired around the same time as 
Daughter.  Specifically, the State offered evidence that Daughter and Daughter’s 
friend were hired at the beginning of the pandemic as casual-seasonal employees, 
were employed without being interviewed by OAOA staff, and were paid more than 
two of the other three casual-seasonal workers whom OAOA employed at that 
time.190  A number of those employees lost hours at work while Daughter and 
Daughter’s friend were working at or close to the maximum hours permitted for 
casual-seasonal employees.191  Daughter was allowed to continue working remotely 
when she returned to college out of state, but no other casual-seasonal employees 
 
189 See id. at A4978–4982 (Trial Tr.).   
190 Id. at A3290 (Maurice Direct Exam), A3059 (Bateman Direct Exam.), A3994 (Van Horn Direct 
Exam.), A3779 (Elizabeth McGuiness Direct Exam.), A3807 (Ziamba Direct Exam.); A3314 
(Vargas Direct Exam.). 
191 Id. at A3099–3101 (Robinson Direct. Exam.).  
49 
 
were offered that opportunity until after McGuiness likely was aware that Daughter’s 
employment was being scrutinized.192   
As to the State’s second theory, the State offered evidence that, even if the 
jury considered all of OAOA’s casual-seasonal employees in 2020 and 2021, no 
single employee received the same cumulative benefits as Daughter.  To this end, the 
State offered evidence that no casual-seasonal employee other than Daughter was 
permitted to work the number of hours she worked at the hourly rate she received, 
while also being permitted to work remotely and “bank” extra hours for use in future 
weeks.   
Because there was evidence from which a rational jury could find that the 
State met the statutory elements of this charge beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial 
court correctly denied McGuiness’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to Count I. 
C. The trial court’s admission of evidence relating to Count V 
McGuiness next argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to admit 
evidence in support of Count V that had no logical relevance to that charge.  
McGuiness contends that this inadmissible evidence prejudiced her and constituted 
improper character evidence.  Count V charged McGuiness with “Act of 
Intimidation” on the basis that, while acting in her capacity as an elected official and 
 
192 Id. at A3061–63 (Bateman Direct Exam.), A3366 (Schenk Cross Exam.), A3776 (Elizabeth 
McGuiness Direct Exam.). 
50 
 
public servant, McGuiness knowingly and maliciously attempted to prevent or 
dissuade witnesses from giving testimony against her in the DOJ investigation or the 
trial.193  The indictment alleged that between March 1, 2019 and March 25, 2022, 
McGuiness surveilled the communications of potential whistleblowers or adverse 
witnesses, monitored employees’ email, discriminated against employees who 
questioned her misconduct, enacted office policies to limit interactions between 
current and former employees, and engaged in several intimidating acts, directly and 
indirectly, after she became aware of the investigation into her conduct.194 
Under 11 Del. C. § 3532, McGuiness could be found guilty of an Act of 
Intimidation if the State proved that she “knowingly and with malice prevent[ed] or 
dissuade[d] (or [] attempted to prevent or dissuade) any witness or victim from 
attending or giving testimony at any trial, proceeding or inquiry authorized by law.”  
McGuiness repeatedly argued to the trial court that she was not aware of the DOJ 
investigation until September 11, 2021, when she received a grand jury subpoena, 
and any evidence of her conduct toward employees before that date therefore was 
irrelevant for purposes of Count V.  The State, however, argued that although 
McGuiness unquestionably was aware of the investigation when she received the 
September 2021 subpoena, the State had evidence that she knew about the 
 
193 Id. at A282 (Superseding Indictment Count V). 
194 Id. at A280–82 (Superseding Indictment Count V). 
51 
 
investigation before that date and was using “intimidating tactics” to impede 
employees from reporting her conduct.195 
McGuiness continued to object before and during trial to the relevance of 
evidence regarding her conduct toward employees before September 11, 2021.196  
The trial court overruled those objections.  At trial, the State argued that the evidence 
showed McGuiness was aware of the investigation no later than June 2021,197 and 
the State further argued to the jury that McGuiness’s other conduct toward 
employees, including monitoring their State email in real time, showed that she was 
aware of the investigation in 2020.198  
The jury ultimately acquitted McGuiness of Count V.  She argues on appeal, 
however, that the trial court’s evidentiary rulings allowed the jury to hear irrelevant 
and inadmissible character evidence that prejudiced the jury’s consideration of the 
other charges against her.  We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse 
of discretion.199  “An abuse of discretion occurs when a court has exceeded the 
 
195 Id. at A693 (State’s Response to Def.’s Mot. in Limine). 
196 In addition to moving to dismiss Count V, McGuiness also filed a motion in limine to exclude 
evidence relating to her conduct before September 2021.  The trial court denied that motion.  See 
Id. at A530 (Mot. in Limine); A2570–71 (Pretrial Hearing Tr.). 
197 Id. at A4997–5001 (Trial Tr.).  The State’s evidence that McGuiness was aware of the 
investigation in June 2021 was based on Robinson’s call to Daughter’s friend on June 15, 2021, 
which immediately triggered calls from McGuiness and her Chief of Staff.   
198 Id. at A4995–96 (Trial Tr.). 
199 Milligan v. State, 116 A.3d 1232, 1235 (Del. 2015). 
52 
 
bounds of reason in light of the circumstances, or so ignored recognized rules of law 
or practice [] as to produce injustice.”200 
In our view, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting most of the 
evidence at issue.  Although McGuiness maintained throughout trial that she was not 
aware of the investigation until she received the subpoena in September 2021, the 
trial court properly allowed the State to present evidence to the contrary.  The DOJ 
began receiving whistleblower complaints in April 2020 alleging that McGuiness 
was engaged in misconduct.201  Those complaints came from OAOA employees who 
expressed concerns about retaliation.202  The State presented evidence and argued to 
the jury that McGuiness’s decision to begin monitoring certain employees’ emails 
shortly after the 2020 complaints were made, and her discipline and termination of 
whistleblowers in early 2021, was evidence that she was aware of the complaints 
and the investigation well before she received the subpoena.  The trial court did not 
err in concluding that this evidence was relevant or that its probative value was not 
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.203  The evidence also was not 
improper character evidence; the State presented McGuiness’s conduct toward 
 
200 Chaverri v. Dole Food Co., 245 A.3d 927, 935 (Del. 2021) (en banc) (quoting Senu-Oke v. 
Broomall Condo., Inc., 77 A.3d 272, 2013 WL 5232192, at *1 (Del. Sept. 16, 2013) (TABLE) 
(ORDER) (citations omitted)).  
201 App. to Opening Br. at A4153–54, 4244, 4354–55 (Trial Tr.). 
202 Id. 
203 See D.R.E. 403.  The evidence related directly to one of the indicted charges. 
53 
 
employees beginning in April 2020 as direct evidence of the crime for which she 
was charged.204   
McGuiness argues that the trial court also erred in admitting evidence of her 
conduct toward employees in 2019, even before complaints first were made to the 
DOJ.205  We agree that this evidence was not relevant to Count V and its admission 
therefore amounted to error.  The evidence, however, was limited in both scope and 
presentation, and we conclude that its admission was harmless.   
An error is harmless when, “the evidence exclusive of the improperly 
admitted evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction.”206  The jury acquitted 
McGuiness of Count V, but she argues the irrelevant evidence prejudiced the jury’s 
consideration of the other counts.  The record does not show prejudice occurred in 
this instance.  The jury’s not-guilty verdict with respect to Count V strongly suggests 
that it was not swayed by the irrelevant evidence.  McGuiness argues that the jury’s 
guilty verdict for Count III establishes prejudice because the trial court later 
acquitted McGuiness of this charge.207  But, as we later discuss, the trial court 
 
204 See D.R.E. 403, 404(b). 
205 App. to Opening Br. at A3533–38 (trial testimony regarding McGuiness seeking former 
employees’ passwords and monitoring employee email in 2019); A3883–98 (trial testimony that 
witness worked in 2019 and early 2020 for OAOA before leaving because the environment was 
“oppressive” and “toxic”); A4125–30 (trial testimony regarding McGuiness monitoring employee 
email and yelling at employees in 2019). 
206 Cooke v. State, 97 A.3d 513, 547 (Del. 2014) (quoting Nelson v. State, 628 A.2d 69, 77 (Del. 
1993) (citation omitted)).  
207 Opening Br. at 40. 
54 
 
acquitted McGuiness of Count III because the charge was legally insufficient.  And 
because we separately have concluded that McGuiness’s conviction for Count IV 
must be reversed, Count I is the only remaining count to consider for purposes of 
our harmless error analysis.  We already have concluded that the admissible evidence 
relating to Count I was sufficient to allow the jury to convict McGuiness beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  The trial court’s error in admitting some of the evidence relating 
to Count V therefore does not warrant a new trial. 
D. The prejudicial spillover of evidence from Count III to Count IV 
McGuiness next argues that she is entitled to a new trial because the Superior 
Court’s failure to dismiss Count III before trial allowed the jury to hear “highly 
prejudicial evidence and instruction, which spilled over to the remaining 
[c]ounts.”208  McGuiness’s argument on this point relies on the doctrine of 
“prejudicial spillover,” which addresses whether evidence relating to a vacated 
conviction affected the jury’s consideration of any remaining, closely linked 
charges.209  Although Delaware has not yet adopted a test for determining whether 
prejudicial spillover occurred, the Third Circuit employs a well-defined two-step test 
that we believe is an appropriate standard to apply to spillover arguments.210  
 
208 Id. at 42. 
209 Wright, 665 F.3d at 575. 
210 See, e.g. United States v. Murphy, 323 F.3d 102, 122 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Cross, 308 
F.3d 308, 318–19 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 898–99 (3d Cir. 1994).  
55 
 
When properly preserved, prejudicial spillover is a question of law that we 
review de novo.211  Although the dissent contends that plain error review applies 
because this issue was not preserved for appeal, we respectfully disagree.  
McGuiness challenged Count III’s legal sufficiency several times before and during 
trial, but the trial court consistently rejected that argument and allowed the jury to 
consider the evidence and return a verdict.  McGuiness could not reasonably be 
expected to raise a theoretical prejudicial spillover argument in her post-trial motion 
in anticipation that the trial court would finally adopt her legal insufficiency 
argument.212 
Count III charged McGuiness with “Structuring: Non-Compliance with 
Procurement Law” relating to the December 2019 contract that McGuiness executed 
with MCG for “communication services.”  Because the contract was for $45,000, it 
fell below the State’s $50,000 threshold for public bidding.  The State, however, 
alleged that McGuiness artificially split payments to MCG to reduce the invoices 
below $5,000 so that the Delaware Division of Accounting did not need to approve 
payments under the contract.  The State alleged that McGuiness violated 29 Del. C. 
 
211 See United States v. Fattah, 914 F.3d 112, 186 (3d Cir. 2019) (“We exercise plenary review 
over a district court’s denial of a claim of prejudicial spillover.”).      
212 Just as a party need not reassert an issue in a motion for reargument in order to preserve it for 
appeal, see Allen v. Scott, 257 A.3d 984, 992 (Del. 2021), we cannot realistically expect parties to 
re-raise arguments in post-trial motions and also present all the possible permutations of those 
previously rejected arguments.  To hold otherwise would only increase the burden on our trial 
courts. 
56 
 
§ 6903 by intentionally subdividing payments under the MCG contract to avoid 
compliance with the State’s Procurement Code.213  
McGuiness consistently argued to the trial court that Count III was legally 
insufficient because it failed to charge her with a criminal offense.214  The trial court 
rejected that legal argument both when it denied McGuiness’s pre-trial motion to 
dismiss and when it deferred ruling during trial on her multiple motions for judgment 
of acquittal as to Count III.215  After trial, however, the court entered judgment of 
acquittal in McGuiness’s favor as to Count III, belatedly adopting her view that 29 
Del. C. §§ 6891 and 6903 do not criminalize subdividing invoices into amounts less 
than $5,000 to avoid review by the Division of Accounting.216  The court held that, 
although such conduct violates the State’s accounting procedures, it does not fall 
within the conduct criminalized in Section 6903.217 
McGuiness now argues on appeal that the trial court’s delay in recognizing 
Count III’s legal insufficiency allowed the jury to hear a substantial amount of 
evidence that it would not otherwise have heard, and that evidence “spilled over” 
into the jury’s consideration of the remaining counts, particularly Counts I and IV.  
 
213 App. to Opening Br. at A278–79. 
214 See id. at A317–20 (Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Count III).  
215 McGuiness, 2022 WL 1538488 (Del. Super. May 13, 2022).  See also May 17 2022 decision 
denying Mot. for reargument; App. to Opening Br. at 4695–4733, 4968–69 (Trial Tr.). 
216 McGuiness, 2022 WL 3971195 (Del. Super. Aug. 30, 2022). 
217 Id. 
57 
 
The State responds that McGuiness has not shown prejudicial spillover in this case, 
arguing in particular that the evidence relating to Count III was also relevant—and 
therefore independently admissible—with respect to Count IV.218 
United States v. Wright provides the clearest statement of the Third Circuit’s 
prejudicial-spillover test, which that court has taken to calling the “Wright spillover 
test.”219  The Wright test typically applies when two charges are “closely linked” and 
an appellate court vacates a conviction on one of them.220  The Third Circuit has, 
however, applied the Wright spillover test in the context of a trial court’s acquittal of 
one closely linked charge, as happened in this case.221   
It is plain that Counts III and IV were closely linked; Count IV charged 
McGuiness with Official Misconduct, and some of the misconduct that the State 
alleged in Count IV also formed the basis for Count III.  Specifically, the State 
alleged that McGuiness committed Official Misconduct by (1) hiring Daughter and 
Daughter’s friend into State employment and affording Daughter benefits not 
available to other state employees (i.e. the conduct that formed the basis for Count 
I); or (2) “structuring payments in a no-bid contract to a political campaign 
 
218 Answering Br. at 43–44. 
219 See Fattah, 914 F.3d at 188.   
220 See Wright, 665 F.3d at 575. 
221 See Fattah, 914 F.3d at 188 (“The District Court’s acquittal of Vederman on the RICO count 
establishes that step one of the Wright spillover test has been met.”). 
58 
 
consulting company” (i.e. the conduct that formed the basis for Count III).222  The 
trial court instructed the jury that “[i]n order to find the Defendant guilty of Official 
Misconduct, you must unanimously agree that one or both of these allegations have 
been established by the State.  To be clear, you must be unanimous in which act 
occurred, if any.”223  Because the charges are closely linked and the Superior Court 
acquitted McGuiness of Count III after trial because of the charge’s legal sufficiency, 
it is appropriate to apply the Wright spillover test to determine whether prejudicial 
spillover occurred with respect to Count IV.224 
The Wright spillover test employs two steps for assessing prejudicial spillover 
claims.  First, a reviewing court considers “whether the jury heard evidence that 
would have been inadmissible at a trial limited to the remaining valid count[s].”225  
If the jury did not hear evidence that would have been inadmissible, the inquiry ends 
and any conviction on the remaining valid counts stands.226  If, however, any 
 
222 App. to Opening Br. at A1082 (Jury Instructions). 
223 Id. at A1082–83 (Jury Instructions). 
224 McGuiness argued in passing that her conviction on Count I also resulted from prejudicial 
spillover.  See Opening Br. at 45.  But Counts I and III were not closely linked charges.  To the 
contrary, they involved entirely separate allegations of misconduct.  The Wright prejudicial 
spillover test applies only in the context of closely linked charges.  
225 Wright, 665 F.3d at 575 (quoting Cross, 308 F.3d at 317). 
226 Id. 
59 
 
evidence would have been inadmissible, the court proceeds to the second step: 
determining whether that evidence was prejudicial.227   
Wright’s first step requires us to examine the evidence introduced at trial and 
determine whether any evidence would have been inadmissible in a “hypothetical 
trial” on the remaining valid counts.228  That analysis can be somewhat textured; 
Wright instructs courts to consider, among other things, not only the relevance of 
certain evidence but also any likely limitations on relevant evidence’s admissibility 
under Rules 403 and 404.229  Wright also, however, “acknowledg[ed] the generous 
discretion that [the evidence rules] vest in district courts.”230  In our view, that 
discretion—and the associated standard of review we apply to a trial court’s 
evidentiary decisions—counsels against concluding that evidence would have been 
inadmissible when it is a close question.   
Notwithstanding the State’s argument to the contrary, McGuiness meets the 
first step of the Wright test.  First, even if we accepted the theoretical basis for the 
State’s position that Count III evidence would have been independently admissible 
to prove Official Misconduct for Count IV, that is not the theory that the State 
presented at trial.  The record shows that the State effectively treated Count III as a 
 
227 Id. 
228 Id. 
229 Id. at 576. 
230 Id. at 576. 
60 
 
predicate offense for Count IV.  The State argued to the jury in closing that “if you 
find that the defendant committed unauthorized acts, an act unauthorized in Count 1 
. . . , Count 2 . . . , or Count 3 of structuring, not all, but any, then you can consider 
whether the defendant intended to gain some personal benefit by committing these 
acts.”231  The jury instructions likewise came close to treating Counts I and III as 
predicate offenses to Count IV.  In other words, neither the State’s closing argument 
nor the jury instructions suggest that the State pursued the theory that McGuiness’s 
invoice splitting amounted to Official Misconduct even if those actions were not 
criminal under Count III. 
Moreover, even if the State had pursued that theory at trial, it is unlikely that 
the trial court would have admitted much of the payment-structuring evidence in the 
absence of Count III.  The State’s closing argument bears this out.  In discussing 
Count III, the State noted: “Let’s be real.  90 percent of this trial was seemingly spent 
on the intricacies and the technicalities of this one charge.”232  That statement 
emphasizes the admissibility concerns that would have arisen regarding this 
evidence—including under Rules 403 and 404—had Count III been dismissed 
before trial.   
 
231 App. to Opening Br. at A4991–92 (Trial Tr.). 
232 Id. at A4986 (Trial Tr.). 
61 
 
Because we conclude that the jury heard evidence that would not have been 
admissible without Count III, the Wright spillover test’s first step is satisfied, and we 
must examine whether the otherwise inadmissible evidence was prejudicial.  The 
Wright test prescribes four factors that a reviewing court weighs to determine 
whether the evidence was prejudicial, specifically whether:  
(1) the charges are intertwined with each other; (2) the evidence for the 
remaining counts is sufficiently distinct to support the verdict on these 
counts; (3) the elimination of the invalid count significantly changed 
the strategy of the trial; and (4) the prosecution used language of the 
sort to arouse a jury.233 
As with most factor-based tests, the analysis is a fact-intensive, case-by-case inquiry. 
We first must consider whether Counts III and IV are so intertwined “as to 
create substantial confusion on the part of the jury.”234  Courts undertaking this 
inquiry have considered, among other things, whether the same facts underlie both 
the defective count and the valid count,235 and whether the jury instructions 
“intermingled” the prosecution’s legal theories.236  “[M]ere relatedness,” however, 
is not always enough to find prejudice.237  McGuiness has established that Counts 
 
233 Wright, 665 F.3d at 575 (quoting Murphy, 323 F.3d at 118). 
234 United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 181 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 898). 
235 See Wright, 665 F.3d at 576–77 (“The same facts underlay both Count Ten (honest services) 
and Count Twelve (traditional) . . . .”). 
236 Id. 
237 See Fattah, 914 F.3d at 188.  In Fattah, the Third Circuit held that a predicate offense for bribery 
was not intertwined with the compound racketeering charge.  But Fattah involved the converse to 
the situation presented here; in Fattah the trial court acquitted the defendant of the compound 
racketeering offense.  The Third Circuit held that “[r]egardless of the evidence pertaining solely to 
62 
 
III and IV were so intertwined that there was a risk of confusion on the jury’s part.  
The instructions given to the jury came close to treating Count III (Structuring) as a 
predicate to Count IV (Official Misconduct).  Moreover, the State expressly argued 
to the jury that, if it found McGuiness guilty of Count III, it could consider whether 
she obtained a personal benefit from structuring the payments in the manner alleged 
and therefore convict her of Count IV.  
The second factor in step two of the Wright test examines whether there was 
evidence supporting the remaining valid counts that did not also support the 
defective count.238  In other words, whereas the first factor examines the charges, the 
second factor examines the evidence supporting the charges.  This factor weighs 
against finding prejudicial spillover in this case.  Even if evidence related to the 
Structuring charge had been excluded entirely, the jury received sufficient evidence 
to convict McGuiness of Conflict of Interest, which also supported the Official 
Misconduct charge. 
 
the [racketeering] conviction, the evidence supporting [] the bribery charges . . . would have 
remained the same.” Id.  Here, however, McGuiness was acquitted by the court of the predicate 
offense, and the evidence admitted for the compound offense would not have been the same.  
Although Count IV could have remained in the case because it also was premised on Counts I and 
II, the evidence admitted for Count IV would not have included the Count III evidence.  
238 See Wright, 665 F.3d at 577; Lee, 612 F.3d at 182 (“The second Pelullo factor asks whether the 
evidence relating to each charge was sufficiently distinct that a verdict as to one could be supported 
without reference to evidence regarding the other.”). 
63 
 
Next, when addressing whether elimination of the invalid count would have 
significantly changed the government’s trial strategy, a reviewing court “assess[es] 
the extent to which the parties would have called different witnesses and, 
correspondingly, the extent to which their opening and closing arguments would 
have differed.”239  In Wright, the court considered the evidence and arguments that 
the parties “would not have needed to present” if the defective charge had not 
proceeded to trial.240  As we previously explained, if the Superior Court had 
dismissed Count III before trial, the parties arguably would not have offered or 
addressed any evidence involving the MCG contract.  At a minimum, the trial court 
likely would not have permitted the State to spend such a substantial portion of the 
trial presenting that evidence.  We cannot confidently conclude that the State’s trial 
strategy (or McGuiness’s for that matter) would have been the same had Count III 
not remained in the case.241 
Finally, in evaluating the prosecution’s use of language to arouse the jury, a 
reviewing court generally focuses on the government’s opening statements and 
closing arguments.242  The court considers whether the prosecution’s language was 
so pejorative or inflammatory as to damage the defendant in ways that would not 
 
239 Wright, 665 F.3d at 577 (citing Lee, 612 F.3d at 182–83; Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 898–99). 
240 Id. 
241 The State did not address this factor in its brief. 
242 See Wright, 665 F.3d at 577.  
64 
 
have occurred if the improper charge was not at issue.243  We agree with McGuiness 
that there is a substantial risk that the State’s rhetoric regarding Count III inflamed 
the jury in this case.  For example, the State was permitted to portray McGuiness as 
someone who deliberately broke the State’s fiscal rules, which are the same rules 
that she was elected to ensure others followed.244 
Accordingly, three of the four factors in Wright’s prejudice test support finding 
prejudicial spillover.  Although the second factor weighs against finding prejudice, 
we are not persuaded that this single factor outweighs our findings with respect to 
the other three.  We recognize that the jury unanimously convicted McGuiness of 
Count I, which also served as a predicate to Count IV, but we cannot confidently 
conclude that the jury would have convicted McGuiness of Count IV irrespective of 
the evidence relating to Count III.   
We reach that conclusion because the State blended Counts I and III when it 
argued Count IV’s personal-benefit element to the jury.  Recall that, to convict 
McGuiness of Official Misconduct in Count IV, the jury needed to find that she 
 
243 Id.; Cross, 308 F.3d at 317 (“Of the four factors, this one most clearly highlighted the damage 
done by the evidence related to Count 54.  Because the District Court allowed the Government to 
introduce the evidence supporting Count 54, the defendant ‘was not only branded as a convicted 
felon and a racketeer by the government, but also portrayed as a person associated with the 
Mafia.’”)(quoting United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 65 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
244 See, e.g. App. to Opening Br. at A2607 (“Delaware’s Auditor of Accounts, the public official 
designed to ensure that others follow the State’s fiscal rules, was instead[] the one breaking those 
rules.”); A4991 (“McGuiness knew just how to play the system, and she did.”). 
65 
 
intended to obtain a personal benefit in connection with the charged misconduct.245  
In arguing that McGuiness received such a benefit, the State relied on the evidence 
collectively supporting Counts I and III.  Specifically, the State argued that 
McGuiness received a “personal benefit” by using social media campaigns, 
giveaways, and events directed by Daughter and MCG to personally promote herself 
and advance her political career.246  Based on this record, we cannot conclude that 
the jury would have found that the State established a personal benefit if it only 
considered the evidence supporting Count I.  Accordingly, although the second 
factor weighs against finding prejudice, the remaining factors support such a finding.  
Having concluded that both parts of the Wright spillover test are satisfied, we 
hold that there was prejudicial spillover between Counts III and IV, and we therefore 
reverse McGuiness’s conviction for Count IV and remand that count to the Superior 
Court for a new trial on that charge.  
E. McGuiness’s multiplicity argument 
McGuiness next argues that Counts I and IV were unconstitutionally 
multiplicitous and her convictions therefore should be reversed.247  The “multiplicity 
doctrine” arises from the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy and 
 
245 Id. at A1082 (Jury Instructions). 
246 Id. at A4992–93, A5067–86 (Trial Tr.). 
247 Although we have reversed McGuiness’s conviction for Count IV, this issue is not moot because 
the State may seek to retry McGuiness on that count, which it could not do if we conclude that 
Counts I and IV are multiplicitous.   
66 
 
prohibits the State from “dividing one crime into multiple counts by splitting it into 
a series of temporal or spatial units.”248  We review claims of multiplicity de novo.249 
The Double Jeopardy Clauses in the United States and Delaware Constitutions 
protect a person against (1) successive prosecutions; (2) multiple charges under 
separate statutes, and (3) multiple charges under the same statute for the same act.250  
Here, McGuiness contends that the second protection was violated.  This argument 
requires us to apply the United States Supreme Court’s Blockburger test.   
In Blockburger v. U.S., the Supreme Court held that “where [an] act . . . 
constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to 
determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each [statutory] 
provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.”251 As we recently 
explained in White v. State,  
Where the charges derive from two different statutes “the question is 
whether, both sections being violated by the same act, the accused 
committed two offenses or only one” for which the inquiry is “whether 
each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” This 
is a principle of statutory construction that derives from the underlying 
assumption that the legislature does not intend to punish the same 
offense under two different statutes.  However, that rule of construction 
“gives way in the face of clear legislative intent to the contrary.” This 
test is codified in Delaware statute at 11 Del. C. § 206, and is satisfied 
 
248 White v. State, 243 A.3d 381, 396 (Del. 2020). 
249 Mills v. State, 201 A.3d 1163, 1169 (Del. 2019).   
250 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); Nance v. State, 903 A.2d 283, 286 (Del. 
2006). 
251 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). 
67 
 
where an inquiry into the statutes demonstrates “each requires proof of 
at least one element that is not required to prove the others.”252 
McGuiness rests her argument that Counts I and IV violated the multiplicity 
doctrine on the jury instructions in this case.  Specifically, she relies on the Superior 
Court’s instruction to the jury that, to find McGuiness guilty of Official Misconduct 
for Count IV, it must unanimously find that she engaged in the conduct forming the 
basis for Counts I or III.253  McGuiness contends that because a conviction of Count 
IV required proof of either Count I or Count III, plus proof that McGuiness “intended 
to obtain a personal benefit,” Counts I and III were included in Count IV and neither 
Count I nor Count III “required proof of a fact” that Count IV did not.254   
This argument misapplies the multiplicity doctrine because it relies on the jury 
instructions rather than the statutes themselves.  As White and our other cases 
demonstrate, application of this part of the multiplicity doctrine is “a question of 
statutory construction,”255 and that statutory inquiry does not support McGuiness’s 
position.  Count I charged McGuiness with Conflict of Interest under 29 Del. C. § 
5805.  Section 5805 required the State to prove McGuiness: (i) was a State employee, 
officer, or honorary official; (ii) participated on the State’s behalf in the review or 
 
252 White, 243 A.3d at 397–98 (internal citations omitted). 
253 App. to Opening Br. at A1082–83 (Jury Instructions). 
254 Opening Br. at 48 (quoting White, 243 A.3d at 397). 
255 White, 243 A.3d at n.67.  See also Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368–69 (1983); Nance, 
903 A.2d at 286; Poteat v. State, 840 A.2d 599, 603–04 (Del. 2003). 
68 
 
disposition of a matter pending before the State in which she had a personal or 
private interest; and (iii) the personal or private interest was one that tended to impair 
her independent judgment in the performance of her duties, meaning that any action 
or inaction with respect to the matter would cause a financial benefit or detriment to 
accrue to McGuiness or her close relative to a greater extent than that benefit or 
detriment would accrue to others in the same class or group of persons.256  
Count IV charged McGuiness with Official Misconduct under 11 Del. C. § 
1211, which provides: 
(a) A public servant is guilty of official misconduct when, intending to 
obtain a personal benefit or to cause harm to another person, the public 
servant knowingly does any of the following: 
(1) Commits an act constituting an unauthorized exercise of official 
functions, knowing that the act is unauthorized. 
* 
* 
* 
(3) Performs official functions in a way intended to benefit the public 
servant’s own property or financial interests under circumstances in 
which the public servant’s actions would not have been reasonably 
justified in consideration of the factors which ought to have been taken 
into account in performing official functions. 
A comparison of these statutes shows that Conflict of Interest contains an 
element absent from Official Misconduct, namely, whether the matter at issue would 
cause an inequivalent benefit or detriment to accrue to McGuiness or a close relative.  
 
256 29 Del. C. § 5805(a).  The recitation of these statutory elements contains only the elements 
relating to the specific charge against McGuiness.  The statute contains alternative elements that 
are not relevant in this case. 
69 
 
Likewise, Official Misconduct contains a unique element, specifically, whether 
McGuiness intended to obtain a personal benefit through performance of an official 
function.  Although McGuiness seems to urge us to find multiplicity because the 
State alleged that the same act violated both statutes, that is not the inquiry.  The only 
question before us is “whether the statutory elements of one offense necessarily 
satisfy the other, not whether, in a specific case, a single act completed both 
offenses.”257  Because each statute at issue requires “proof of facts not necessary to 
complete the other,” they can “support separate convictions and punishments 
without offending the Double Jeopardy Clauses.”258 
F. The trial court’s comment regarding Robinson’s testimony 
McGuiness next contends that the trial court violated the Delaware 
Constitution by commenting on Robinson’s testimony.  Article IV, Section 19 of the 
Delaware Constitution prohibits judges in jury trials from commenting on the weight 
or credibility of the evidence.259  Because this is a constitutional claim, we review 
the trial court’s comments de novo.260 
This appeal point arises from questions McGuiness’s counsel posed to 
Robinson when he was re-called to the witness stand during the defense’s case.  
 
257 White, 243 A.3d at 399 (citing Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304). 
258 White, 243 A.3d at 399 (emphasis omitted). 
259 Wright v. State, 405 A.2d 685, 689 (Del. 1979). 
260 Zebroski v. State, 12 A.3d 1115, 1119 (Del. 2010). 
70 
 
Counsel questioned Robinson about calls he made to OAOA employees in May and 
June 2021 and whether he told those employees that he was contacting people 
“throughout state government” regarding casual-seasonal employment during the 
pandemic.261  Robinson conceded that these statements were inaccurate in the sense 
that he only contacted OAOA employees, but he refused to agree with McGuiness’s 
counsel that his statements were “false.”262  In sustaining the State’s objection that 
counsel’s questions were “asked and answered,” the trial court remarked in the jury’s 
presence: 
THE COURT: If you want to pursue this, we all know what it is.  It’s 
an investigative technique used by the officer.  You want to ask him 
that, that’s fine.  But to imply that because this is false, he is lying.  
That’s simply unfair, Mr. Wood.  So you can ask him about investigative 
techniques if you like.  But to imply otherwise is not acceptable.263 
The trial court then instructed McGuiness’s counsel to “Move on.”264 
The State argues that the court was not commenting on the evidence but only 
exercising its discretion to control the mode and order of witness interrogation.265  
But the rules of evidence do not diminish constitutional principles, and the Delaware 
Constitution’s prohibition against judges commenting on evidence extends to any 
 
261 App. to Opening Br. at A4889–93 (Trial Tr.). 
262 Id. at A4890–92 (Trial Tr.). 
263 Id. at A4892 (Trial Tr.). 
264 Id. at A4893 (Trial Tr.). 
265 D.R.E. 611. 
71 
 
comment made by the judge that directly or indirectly conveys the court’s estimation 
of the truth, falsity, or weight of a witness’s testimony.266  In commenting on 
Robinson’s testimony and counsel’s characterizations of it, the trial court at least 
indirectly conveyed its view regarding the truth and weight of Robinson’s testimony.  
If the trial court believed McGuiness’s counsel was badgering the witness by unfairly 
characterizing his investigative technique, the judge should have raised that concern 
outside the jury’s presence.   
We conclude, however, that this single comment was harmless error.  When 
an error relates to a constitutional right, we must determine if it was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt.267  In applying that test, we weigh the “significance of the error 
against the strength of the untainted evidence of guilt to determine whether the error 
may have affected the judgment.”268  Here, the testimony at issue related to a minor 
point regarding information provided to OAOA employees during investigatory 
calls.  McGuiness was permitted to present evidence and thoroughly cross-examine 
the State’s witnesses regarding the DOJ’s good faith and accuracy in conducting its 
investigation.  The trial court also instructed the jury that they were the “sole judges 
of the credibility of each witness,” they should not view any of the trial judge’s 
 
266 Randy J. Holland, The Delaware Constitution: A Reference Guide 149–51 (2002). 
267 Williams v. State, 141 A.3d 1019, 1035 (Del. 2016). 
268 Id. 
72 
 
evidentiary rulings as a sign of favoritism toward one side, and nothing the judge 
said during the course of the trial should be viewed as expressing an opinion about 
the case’s outcome.269  Given that record, we are confident that the trial court’s 
isolated comment about Robinson’s testimony was not significant to the jury’s 
judgment.270   
G. McGuiness’s request for appointment of private counsel at State expense 
Finally, McGuiness argues that the trial court misinterpreted 10 Del. C. § 3925 
and thereby erred in denying her request for the State to pay the costs for private 
counsel.271  It is undisputed that McGuiness chose to forgo seeking representation 
from ODS or OCC.  She asserts that because of her “distrust of other state agencies 
due to the nature of her case” she was “forced [] to hire her own private counsel for 
trial.”272  McGuiness now asks this Court to “vacate the trial court’s October 28, 
2021[] Order and order a hearing on remand to determine the extent of McGuiness’s 
expenditures in hiring private counsel and order reimbursement by the State for those 
expenses.”273 
 
269 App. to Opening Br. at A1092, A1097, A1100 (Jury Instructions). 
270 See Wright, 405 A.2d at 690 (noting that the comments and remarks of the trial judge, standing 
alone, may not have constituted error). 
271 Opening Br. at 53. 
272 Id. at 58. 
273 Id. 
73 
 
This Court reviews issues of statutory construction de novo.274  But, when a 
statute gives the trial court discretion, this Court reviews the application of that 
discretion to determine whether the court exceeded the bounds of reason in light of 
the circumstances, or so ignored recognized rules of law or practice [] as to produce 
injustice.275 
Section 3925 gives the trial court discretion to appoint private counsel in 
certain circumstances.  It provides: 
Any public officer or employee, in a criminal or civil action against the 
person arising from state employment, shall be entitled to petition the 
court for a court-appointed attorney to represent the person’s interests 
in the matter. If the judge, after consideration of the petition, 
examination of the petitioner and receipt of such further evidence as the 
judge may require, determines that the petition has merit, the judge shall 
appoint an attorney to represent the interests of such public officer or 
employee. The court-appointed attorney shall represent such person at 
all stages, trial and appellate, until the final determination of the matter, 
unless the attorney is earlier released by such person or by the court. 
The court may first appoint an attorney from the Department of 
Justice. If the court determines that the Department is unable to 
represent such public officer or employee, the court may appoint an 
attorney from the Office of Defense Services in criminal actions 
 
274State v. Barnes, 116 A.3d 883, 888 (Del. 2015) (“We review issues of statutory construction de 
novo.”); Zhurbin v. State, 104 A.3d 108, 110 (Del. 2014) (“[W]e review legal rulings, including 
the interpretation of statutes, de novo.”); Wilson v. Sico, 713 A.2d 923, 924 (Del. 1998) (explaining 
that when a claim on appeal involves a trial court’s statutory interpretation, it is reviewed de novo 
to determine if the trial court erred as a matter of law in formulating or applying legal precepts). 
275 See Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 240 (Del. 1982) (applying abuse of discretion 
standard); Pitts v. White, 109 A.2d 786, 788 (Del. 1954) (explaining the abuse of discretion 
standard in the context of application of a statute by a trial judge). 
74 
 
only, and in civil actions may appoint an attorney licensed in this State. 
This section shall also apply to all federal courts within this State.276 
Section 3925 states that the trial court “may” appoint an attorney from ODS 
if the DOJ is unable to serve as counsel.  Although the appointment of counsel from 
ODS is discretionary, it does not follow that the trial court may overlook the statute’s 
clear legislative mandate or apply an incorrect legal standard.  To do so would be to 
abuse its discretion.277   
Here, McGuiness has not demonstrated that the trial court incorrectly applied 
the statute.  McGuiness asserts that the trial court “concluded that . . . [Section] 3925 
barred appointment of private counsel at public expense.”278  This was not the trial 
court’s holding.  The trial court agreed with McGuiness “that the DOJ is unable to 
represent [her],” but the court found that “ODS is able to represent her.”279  The trial 
court therefore declined to appoint private counsel.  McGuiness chose to forgo ODS 
representation in favor of proceeding with private counsel.  Although she vaguely 
cites on appeal a generalized distrust of State agencies, she did not articulate to the 
trial court any reason why ODS or an OCC conflict attorney could not represent her.  
 
276 10 Del. C. § 3925 (emphasis added). As the trial court correctly explained, the statute provides 
a simple process whereby “[a] public officer charged with conduct arising from her State 
employment is entitled to a defense provided by the [DOJ]. If the DOJ is unable to represent the 
public officer, the [ODS] is the public officer's court-appointed alternative.” McGuiness, 2021 WL 
5013826, at *2 (Del. Super. Oct. 28, 2021). 
277 Giuricich, 449 A.2d at 240 (applying abuse of discretion standard). 
278 Opening Br. at 55. 
279 McGuiness, 2021 WL 5013826, at *2 (Del. Super. Oct. 28, 2021). 
75 
 
As such, we hold that it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny 
McGuiness’s petition for appointment of private counsel at State expense. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM McGuiness’s conviction as to Count 
I, REVERSE her conviction as to Count IV, and REMAND this matter to the 
Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  Jurisdiction is 
not retained.
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
SEITZ, Chief Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part: 
 
I concur in the persuasive opinion of my colleagues in the Majority on all but 
one issue – that McGuiness’s conviction for Count IV should be reversed and a new 
trial ordered because of “prejudicial spillover.”  According to the Majority, evidence 
relevant to Count III prejudicially spilled over into McGuiness’s conviction for 
Count IV after the Superior Court dismissed Count III after trial.  I disagree for the 
following reasons. 
 
First, McGuiness did not make the Count III/Count IV “prejudicial spillover” 
argument before the Superior Court.  The Superior Court did not plainly err when it 
dismissed Count III and found that evidence relevant to Count III could support a 
conviction under Count IV.       
 
Second, the Majority relies on United States v. Wright, where the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit employed a “prejudicial spillover” 
test.  To find prejudicial spillover under Wright, evidence relevant to Count III could 
not be used to support a conviction under Count IV.  The Superior Court found to 
the contrary.  We should defer to its assessment.   
 
And finally, there was no prejudice to McGuiness from dismissing Count III 
after trial.  I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
2 
 
I. 
 
Appellate review starts by asking two questions – do we have jurisdiction, and 
if so, what is our standard of review?  In this case, McGuiness filed a timely appeal 
and we have jurisdiction to hear criminal appeals from the Superior Court.1  For the 
second question, we give great deference to a jury’s factual findings, we review the 
trial court’s discretionary rulings to decide whether it exceeded its discretion, and 
we review its legal determinations de novo.2  But under Supreme Court Rule 8, 
unless the interests of justice require otherwise, the appellant must first fairly raise 
the issue on appeal in the trial court.  If the appellate issue has not been fairly raised 
below, the argument is forfeited, and we usually review for plain error.3   
 
Plain error occurs only when the error is “so clearly prejudicial to substantial 
rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”4  It is “limited 
to material defects which are apparent on the face of the record; which are basic, 
 
1 Del. Const. art. IV, § 4(1)(b). 
2 Young v. Frase, 702 A.2d 1234, 1236 (Del. 1997) (“Under Delaware law, enormous deference is 
given to jury verdicts,”); Zimmerman v. State, 628 A.2d 62, 65 (Del. 1993) (“Under an abuse of 
discretion standard, this Court will disturb a discretionary ruling of the trial court only when the 
ruling is based upon unreasonable or capricious grounds.”); Nat’l Ass’n v. Sun Life Assurance Co. 
of Canada, 294 A.3d 1062, 1071 (Del. 2023) (“This Court reviews questions of law de novo.”). 
3 Baker v. State, 906 A.2d 139, 150 (Del. 2006) (“Where defense counsel fails to raise a timely and 
pertinent objection to alleged prosecutorial misconduct at trial and the trial judge does not 
intervene sua sponte, we review only for plain error.”).   
4 Smith v. Delaware State Univ., 47 A.3d 472, 479 (Del. 2012). 
3 
 
serious and fundamental in their character, and which clearly deprive an accused of 
a substantial right, or which clearly show manifest injustice.”5   
 
Plain error review is a high bar for important reasons.  Trial court review gives 
the parties “a fair chance to address arguments at the trial court.”6  It is also “prudent 
for the development of the law that appellate courts have the benefits that come with 
a full record and input from learned trial judges.”7  In other words, “fair presentation 
facilitates the process by which the application of rights in an individual case affects 
others in other cases and society in general.”8  Here, McGuiness did not fairly raise 
the Count III/Count IV prejudicial spillover issue in the Superior Court.9  In a 
criminal appeal where the appellant did not raise the issue below, the issue is 
forfeited and we review for plain error or for waiver.10   
 
5 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 
6 Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152, 169 (Del. 2017). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Under Supreme Court Rule 14(b)(vi) A (1), the appellant must make a “clear and exact” reference 
to the appendix pages where “a party preserved each question in the trial court.”  McGuiness does 
not cite to where the Count III/IV spillover argument was raised below.  McGuiness cited A301-
A371, which was McGuiness’s Motion to Dismiss Count Three (which does not speak to spillover 
or Count IV) and Opening Brief at 43 (“McGuiness moved pursuant to Rule 29(a) for judgment 
of acquittal on Count Three based on the same legal argument raised in her motion to dismiss”).  
It would have been preferable if McGuiness acknowledged that the argument was being raised for 
the first time on appeal or point us to the exact place where the Count III/IV spillover issue was 
raised and considered by the Superior Court.   
10 See, e.g., Shawe, 157 A.3d at 168; Czech v. State, 945 A.2d 1088, 1097 (Del. 2008) (“Failure to 
raise a contemporaneous objection to allegedly prejudicial testimony constitutes a waiver of that 
issue on appeal, unless the error is plain.  Counsel’s failure to object to the admission of improper 
evidence does not bar plain error review unless the party consciously refrains from objecting as a 
tactical matter, in which case the issue is waived and not reviewable.”); Crawley v. State, 929 A.2d 
783 (Del. 2007) (“The record shows that defense counsel made a tactical decision to use the drug 
4 
 
 
The Majority skips over Supreme Court Rule 8 and applies de novo review 
because they believe it would be unfair to apply plain error review in this instance.  
According to the Majority, McGuiness could not predict whether the Superior Court 
would accept her post-trial motion to dismiss Count III, and she should not have to 
argue the consequences that flow from a favorable result.  But McGuiness sought to 
dismiss Count III before, during, and after trial and could have argued the 
consequences that flowed from dismissal.  And she was aware of the Wright 
spillover argument.  In her post-trial motion, McGuiness raised a prejudicial 
spillover argument under Wright, but based on evidence related to Count V, not 
Count III.11  McGuiness’s Count V Wright arguments in the Superior Court were 
similar to those in this appeal.   
 
Finally, to employ de novo review, the Majority relies on United States v. 
Fattah, where the Third Circuit applied “plenary review over a district court’s denial 
of a claim of prejudicial spillover[.]”12  As the italicized words show, in Fattah the 
 
related evidence in a way he believed to be to his client’s advantage; that tactical decision 
constitutes a waiver and bars plain error review.”).  
11 A1508-A1517 (McGuiness’s post-trial motion); A1508 (“[T]estimony was therefore wholly 
irrelevant to the charged offenses as a matter of law, and therefore unfairly prejudicial”); A1509 
(“The evidence was clearly irrelevant to the charged conduct, and thus constituted impermissible 
uncharged misconduct evidence.”); A1514 (“[T]he admission of this uncharged misconduct 
evidence tainted the jury’s consideration of Counts One, Three, and Four.  Under the doctrine of 
“prejudicial spillover,” evidence erroneously admitted in support of one charge can have a 
deleterious effect on a jury’s consideration of other charges.”  United States v. Fattah, 914 F.3d 
112, 186 (3d Cir. 2019).  Prejudicial spillover is a widely recognized basis for a new trial.  United 
States v. Wright, 665 F.3d 560, 575 (3d Cir. 2012), as amended (Feb. 7, 2012) (vacating judgment 
of conviction and remanding for new trial).”). 
12 United States v. Fattah, 914 F.3d 112, 186 (3d Cir. 2019) (emphasis added). 
5 
 
Third Circuit reviewed the trial court’s prejudicial spillover decision, which is not 
the case here.  And regardless, a closer look at Fattah shows that de novo review is 
the incorrect standard of review when a prejudicial spillover argument is not raised 
in the trial court.    
 
To decide the standard of review in Fattah, the Third Circuit relied on its 
decision in United States v. Lee.13  In Lee, the appeals court confronted a situation 
like here where “the issue of taint was never raised before the District Court” because 
the jury acquitted the defendant of the charge.14  After acquittal on one charge, the 
defendant argued on appeal that evidence relevant to the acquitted charge tainted his 
conviction on another charge.  Like here, the defendant could not have known until 
after trial that he would be acquitted of the charge.   
 
Addressing the standard of review as a matter of first impression, the Third 
Circuit set clear standards depending on whether the issue was first raised in the 
district court.  If the appellant raised prejudicial spillover in the district court, the 
Lee court looked to “how we address challenges to the sufficiency of evidence as a 
guide.”15  In that situation, the standard of review is plenary and the court decides 
whether there was substantial evidence that, when viewed in the light most favorable 
 
13 United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 178 (3d Cir. 2010). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
6 
 
to the government, would allow a rational trier of fact to convict.16  Even with a 
plenary standard of review, the court noted that the standard is still “highly 
deferential.”17  But when, like here, the issue was not raised below, the court held 
that it reviews for plain error.18  Thus, like Lee, where the prejudicial spillover 
argument did not arise until after the jury verdict, the standard of review here is plain 
error.   
II. 
 
McGuiness argues that, during trial, the jury was exposed to supposedly 
inadmissible and inflammatory evidence relevant to Count III that “spilled over” and 
prejudiced the jury’s consideration of Count IV.  As a matter of first impression, the 
Majority adopts a test from Wright v. United States to assess the prejudicial spillover 
issue.  
In Wright, the government charged the defendants with honest services fraud, 
“traditional” mail fraud, and conspiracy.  The judge instructed the jury that the 
defendants could be convicted for honest services fraud under either a “conflict of 
interest” theory or a “bribery” theory.19  On appeal from the convictions, the Third 
Circuit ruled that an honest services fraud jury instruction that included the conflict-
 
16 Id. (quoting United States v. Bornman, 559 F.2d 150, 152 (3d Circ. 2009)). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 179.  
19 Wright, 665 F.3d, at 567. 
7 
 
of-interest theory was flawed and not harmless error based on an intervening 
Supreme Court decision that excluded conflicts-of-interest from the definition of 
honest services fraud.  Thus, the jury could have mistakenly inferred an intent from 
the conflict-of-interest evidence that would not support a bribery theory.   
As a threshold matter, the Wright court found that evidence related to conflict 
of interest would have been inadmissible to support an honest services fraud 
conviction.  After making this necessary determination, the court also found that the 
“trial environment . . . emphasized the conflict-of-interest theory” and the jury 
instructions contained “about eight times more words to the conflict-of-interest 
theory than they did to the bribery theory.”20  Also, prejudice existed with “scant” 
evidence relevant solely to the preserved fraud count and “most of [the] case’s four-
volume appendix” focused on evidence “essentially irrelevant to the” valid fraud 
theory.21 
 
Applying the Wright prejudicial spillover test here, the Superior Court did not 
plainly err by failing to detect a “material defect” which was “apparent on the face 
of the record.”  As required by Wright, the threshold question is whether the State 
introduced evidence that would have been inadmissible if the trial was limited to the 
remaining valid count.22  The Superior Court found that the Count III evidence 
 
20 Id. at 572. 
21 Id. at 575-77.  
22 Id. at 575.  
8 
 
would be admissible as to Count IV.23  We should defer to that finding and end the 
inquiry here.24   
 
But the Majority continues on, stating that “even if we accepted the theoretical 
basis for the State’s position that Count III evidence would have been independently 
admissible to prove Official Misconduct for Count IV, that is not the theory that the 
State presented at trial.”25  The Majority believes it “unlikely that the trial court 
would have admitted much of the payment-structuring evidence in the absence of 
Count III,” relying on the fact that the State “seemingly spent 90 percent of this trial 
on Count III” and “effectively treated Count III as a predicate offense for Count 
IV.”26  But this has no bearing on the admissibility of evidence. 
 
Under the first step of the Wright analysis, the question is whether the 
evidence would be admissible in a hypothetical trial that discarded Count III.27  By 
mixing a trial court’s admissibility determination at a hypothetical trial with the 
State’s conduct at the actual trial, the Majority misapplies the Wright test and fails 
 
23State v. McGuiness, 2022 WL 3971195, at *6 n.51 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 30, 2022) (“While this 
Court has found the jury’s verdict as to Count Three was not supported by the evidence, the facts 
surrounding the interaction between MyCG, Christie Gross and the Defendant can still be 
considered and are relevant to whether the facts support the Official Misconduct offense found in 
Count Four.  Count Three is a technical one relating specifically to the procurement process while 
Count Four is broader in scope and relates to the relationship between the Defendant, Daughter, 
and MyCG.”). 
24 Id. 
25 Majority Opinion (“Op.”) at 59, 60.  
26 Id. at 59, 58.  
27 Wright, 665 F.3d, at 575. 
9 
 
to defer to the Superior Court’s express finding.  And it is hard to reconcile with the 
Majority’s acknowledgment that Wright “counsels against concluding that evidence 
would have been inadmissible when it is a close question.”28  The Superior Court 
did not err in concluding Count III was relevant to Count IV and “can still be 
considered” to “support the Official Misconduct offense[.]”29    
 
Finally, even if the Court reached the prejudice prong of the Wright test, there 
was no prejudice here.  As explained above, the State would have been allowed to 
introduce the same evidence relevant to Count III to convict under Count IV, even 
if the court dismissed Count III before trial.   The Majority also agrees that sufficient 
distinct evidence could support McGuiness’s conviction on Count IV.30  In other 
words, “[e]ven if evidence related to Structuring had been excluded entirely, the jury 
received sufficient evidence to convict McGuiness of Conflict of Interest, which also 
supported the Official Misconduct charge.”31  Also, unlike Wright, each count 
charged a separate crime.32   Here, the Superior Court instructed the jury to consider 
each count independently.  The jury reached a discriminating verdict.  We presume 
 
28 Majority Op. at 58.  
29 State v. McGuiness, 2022 WL 3971195, at *6 n.51 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 30, 2022). 
30 Majority Op. at 63. 
31 Id.  
32 Wright, 665 F.3d, at 576, 577. 
10 
 
that juries follow their instructions.33  The jury was not confused by the relationship 
between the counts.  
 
Under Wright, the court must also consider the language employed by the 
State at trial.  But the analysis is incomplete without considering the language 
employed by both parties throughout the proceeding.  Given McGuiness’s counsel’s 
highly charged language,34 McGuiness was not damaged “in ways that would not 
have occurred” but for Count III.35  
 
The Superior Court did not plainly err when it found that the evidence relevant 
to Count III would support a conviction under Count IV.  I respectfully dissent from 
the reversal of McGuiness’s conviction under Count IV.  
 
33 United States v. Fattah, 914 F.3d 112, 189 (3d Cir. 2019), Guy v. State, 913 A.2d 558, 566 (Del. 
2006).  See generally Phillips v. State, 154 A.3d 1146, 1154 (Del. 2017) and Revel v. State, 956 
A.2d 23, 27 (Del. 2008). 
34 A5008 (“[W]e tell you with reservation and maybe even a tinge of sadness that when the State 
tells you she’s guilty, you simply cannot trust what they say because the evidence tells you 
something else.”); A5012 (“[the State’s] investigation was incompetent, incomplete, and biased.”);  
A5006-A5007 (“the State’s investigation and prosecution is not based on the truth, the whole truth, 
and nothing but the truth.”); A5007 (“Folks, the evidence shows that the State’s investigation in 
this case was incomplete, incompetent, and biased from the very beginning.”); A5011-A5012 
(“You simply can’t trust the State.”); A5032 (“If you’re going to trust somebody in this 
investigation, you’re going to trust a woman like Amy Gulli who doesn’t live in Delaware and 
doesn’t work for the auditor’s office who you saw?  Or are you going to trust the State, who wraps 
itself in Thomas Van Horn who they know is a liar who perjured himself in front of a grand jury?”); 
A5049 (“This investigation was incompetent, incomplete, and biased from the very beginning.  
This was not an investigation designed to ferret out the truth.  Early on the State decided Kathy 
McGuiness was guilty.  They made a conscious choice to ignore evidence that might show she 
wasn’t guilty, and when they ran into that evidence anyway, they made a conscious choice to ignore 
it here in this trial.”). 
35 The Majority cites United States v. Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 316 (3d Cr. 2002) but in Cross, like 
Pelullo, the defendant was estopped from contesting the characterizations at issue.  That is different 
from here, where McGuiness used similar inflammatory tactics throughout a contentious trial.