Title: State ex rel. Pretty Products, Inc. v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

THE STATE EX REL. PRETTY PRODUCTS, INC., APPELLANT, V. INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Pretty Products, Inc. v. Indus. Comm. (1996), ____ 
Ohio St.3d ____.] 
Workers’ compensation -- Application for temporary total disability 
compensation -- Finding by Industrial Commission that claimant did not 
voluntarily abandon position of employment -- Order remanded to 
commission by Supreme Court for further explanation and clarification 
when order is vague. 
 
(No. 94-1845---Submitted July 24, 1996----Decided October 23, 
1996.) 
 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 
93APD05-682. 
 
On two different occasions, appellee-claimant, Maxine Dansby, 
injured her low back in the course of and arising from her employment 
for appellant-relator, Pretty Products, Inc., a self-insured employer.  The 
first incident occurred in February 1990.  Relator states that it certified 
the claim, which was allowed for “sprain/strain lumbosacral.”  After a 
 
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period of absence from work, claimant returned to her job at Pretty 
Products, Inc. 
 
On November 8, 1990, claimant again left work and went to the 
hospital because of low back pain.  Claimant saw her attending 
physician, Dr. Alfred H. Magness, for treatment.  In a series of medical 
excuse slips, Dr. Magness certified that claimant was unable to return to 
her former job.  The last of these medical slips certified that claimant 
could return to work on March 1, 1991. 
 
Claimant did not return to work on Friday, March 1, 1991, nor did 
she then produce an excuse slip that extended her disability.  Claimant 
did not report to work on the following Monday or Tuesday, and, 
consequently, she was terminated pursuant to a provision in the 
union/management agreement.  Relator states that although claimant 
eventually contacted her union representative about filing a grievance to 
challenge her discharge, claimant did not file a grievance because it 
would have been considered untimely. 
 
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In June 1991, claimant moved appellee Industrial Commission for 
temporary total disability (“TTD”) compensation beginning November 8, 
1990, based on the first claim.  In support of the motion, she submitted 
a June 8, 1991 C-84 “Physician’s Report Supplemental” that was based 
on an April 26, 1991 exam and that certified claimant as temporarily 
totally disabled beginning November 8, 1990, to an estimated return-to-
work date of August 1, 1991. 
 
In August 1991, claimant filed a second workers’ compensation 
claim alleging that she had injured her low back, neck and shoulders on 
November 8, 1990.  Relator refused to certify this claim, however, 
contending that it was a “reoccurrence” of the first claim.  In October, 
claimant filed a motion in the second claim requesting TTD 
compensation from November 8, 1990.  Claimant alternatively 
requested wage loss compensation in the event that TTD compensation 
was denied.  On November 25, 1991, a district hearing officer heard the 
allowance and wage compensation issues of the second claim, and 
 
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issued an order allowing claimant’s back injury as an “aggravation [of] 
pre-existing lumbosacral sprain/strain.”  Finding that claimant’s 
discharge constituted a voluntary abandonment of her former position of 
employment, the district hearing officer denied both TTD and wage loss 
compensation beyond March 4, 1991.  The regional board of review 
affirmed the district hearing officer’s order in the second claim.  On 
further appeal by claimant, staff hearing officers modified the district 
hearing officer’s order “to the extent that Temporary Total Disability 
compensation is payable from 3/5/91 to [sic] and to continue based on 
submission of medical proof.  It is found that the claimant did not 
voluntarily abandon her former position of employment on 3/4/91 for the 
reason that she did not timely submit an excuse slip from her doctor.”  
Relator’s motion for reconsideration was denied. 
 
Relator filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County, alleging that the commission had abused its discretion 
 
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in awarding TTD compensation beyond March 5, 1991.  The court of 
appeals upheld the staff hearing officers’ findings and denied the writ. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
______________ 
 
Emens, Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter and Ronald L. Mason, for 
appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Cheryl J. Nester, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
 
Larrimer & Larrimer, Terrence W. Larrimer and David H. 
Swanson, for appellee Maxine Dansby. 
______________ 
 
MOYER, C.J.  This case presents the question of whether the 
Industrial Commission abused its discretion by finding that the claimant 
did not voluntarily abandon her position of employment, and that further 
temporary total disability compensation should be awarded.  Because of 
 
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the vagueness of the commission’s order, we must remand for further 
explanation and clarification of the reasoning supporting that order. 
 
The receipt of temporary total disability (“TTD”) compensation 
rests on a claimant’s inability to return to his or her former job as a direct 
result of an industrial injury.  State ex rel. Ramirez v. Indus. Comm. 
(1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 630, 23 O.O.3d 518, 433 N.E.2d 586, syllabus.  
However, eligibility may be compromised when the claimant is no longer 
employed at that job.  Once a claimant is separated from the former 
position of employment, future TTD compensation eligibility hinges on 
the timing and character of the claimant’s departure. 
 
The timing of a claimant’s separation from employment can, in 
some cases, eliminate the need to investigate the character of 
departure.  For this to occur, it must be shown that the claimant was 
already disabled when the separation occurred.  “[A] claimant can 
abandon a former position or remove himself or herself from the work 
force only if he or she has the physical capacity for employment at the 
 
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time of the abandonment or removal.” State ex rel. Brown v. Indus. 
Comm. (1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 45, 48, 623 N.E.2d 55, 58. 
 
However, such situations are not common, and inquiry into the 
character of departure is the norm.  While voluntary departure generally 
bars TTD compensation, an involuntary departure does not. State ex 
rel. Rockwell Internatl. v. Indus. Comm. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 44, 531 
N.E.2d 678.  In the instant case, the commission found that claimant’s 
departure was involuntary.  Review of the commission’s order, however, 
is hindered because it is susceptible of several different interpretations. 
 
For example, one possible interpretation of the commission’s 
statement that “claimant did not voluntarily abandon her former position 
of employment on 3/4/91 for the reason that she did not timely submit 
an excuse slip from her doctor” could be that the separation was not 
voluntary because firings are per se involuntary.  If this is indeed the 
commission’s reasoning, it is wrong.  As this court has recently held, the 
underlying facts and circumstances of each case determine whether a 
 
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departure by firing may be voluntary or involuntary.  State ex rel. Smith 
v. Superior’s Brand Meats, Inc. (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 408, 411, 677 
N.E.2d 1217, 1219. 
 
Another possible reading of the commission’s order is that the 
commission modified the district hearing officer’s order based on the 
belief that termination for unexcused absence could not support a 
finding of voluntary abandonment.  This, too, is incorrect.  In State ex 
rel. Louisiana-Pacific Corp.  v. Indus. Comm. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 401, 
650 N.E.2d 469, the claimant, as in the present case, was fired for 
violating a policy prohibiting three consecutive unexcused absences.  
We held that the claimant’s discharge was voluntary, stating, “we find it 
difficult to characterize as ‘involuntary’ a termination generated by the 
claimant’s violation of a written work rule or policy that (1) clearly 
defined the prohibited conduct, (2) had been previously identified by the 
employer as a dischargeable offense, and (3) was known or should 
have been known to the employee.”  Id. at 403, 650 N.E.2d at 471.  
 
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However, there is an important distinction between Louisiana-Pacific 
and this case.  In the former, there was no evidence that the claimant’s 
absences were due to industrial injury, while in this case there is.  
Whether this distinction is ultimately outcome-determinative, however, 
cannot be decided absent clarification of the commission’s reasoning. 
 
A third possible interpretation of the commission’s order is that the 
commission found that claimant had been fired because of her industrial 
injury.  If that indeed was the case, a finding of involuntary departure 
could be sustained.  Rockwell, supra.  Again, however, without 
clarification, judicial review can proceed no further. 
 
Given the possibility that any of these interpretations could reflect 
the commission’s reasoning, the judgment of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the commission for clarification. 
 
Judgment reversed 
 
and cause remanded. 
 
RESNICK, PFEIFER, COOK and STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
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DOUGLAS and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., dissent and would affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals.