Title: State v. Davis

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Davis, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-5028.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-5028 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. DAVIS, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Davis, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-5028.] 
Criminal law — Death penalty — Jurisdiction — Motion for a new trial — 
Pursuant to Sections 2(B)(2)(c) and 3(B)(2), Article IV of the Ohio 
Constitution, a court of appeals has jurisdiction, in a case in which a 
death penalty has been imposed, to consider the appeal of a trial court’s 
denial of a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence — 
A trial court has jurisdiction to decide a motion for a new trial based on 
newly discovered evidence in a case in which the imposition of the death 
penalty has been affirmed on appeal. 
(No. 2009-2028 — Submitted June 8, 2011 — Decided October 4, 2011.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Licking County, No. 09-CA-00019,  
2009-Ohio-5175. 
__________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Pursuant to Sections 2(B)(2)(c) and 3(B)(2), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, a 
court of appeals has jurisdiction, in a case in which a death penalty has 
been imposed, to consider the appeal of a trial court’s denial of a motion 
for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. 
A trial court has jurisdiction to decide a motion for a new trial based on newly 
discovered evidence in a case in which the imposition of the death penalty 
has been affirmed on appeal. 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} This appeal by defendant-appellant, Roland Davis, involves a 
capital case in which we are asked to determine two jurisdictional issues: 1) 
whether a court of appeals has jurisdiction to consider an appeal of a trial court’s 
order denying a motion for a new trial in a death-penalty case and 2) whether a 
trial court has jurisdiction to consider a motion for a new trial1 based on newly 
discovered evidence in light of State ex rel. Special Prosecutors v. Judges, Court 
of Common Pleas (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 94, 9 O.O.3d 88, 378 N.E.2d 162.  We 
hold that the trial court would have had jurisdiction over Davis’s motion for a new 
trial based on newly discovered evidence and that the appellate court had 
jurisdiction to entertain the appeal of the denial of the motion for a new trial.  
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court, and we remand this 
case to the court of appeals. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Davis’s motion was actually titled “Motion For Finding Defendant Was Unavoidably Prevented 
From Discovering New Evidence Within 120 Days Of Verdict Under Ohio R. Crim. P. 33(B).”  
Under Crim.R. 33, the defendant must file this type of motion to gain the court’s approval for 
filing the motion for a new trial when more than 120 days have passed since the verdict was 
handed down. We will, however, proceed to refer to defendant’s motion as a motion for a new trial 
throughout the bulk of the opinion. 
January Term, 2011 
3 
 
I. Factual Background 
{¶ 2} A jury convicted Roland Davis of aggravated murder, murder, 
kidnapping, aggravated burglary, and aggravated robbery in 2005 in connection 
with the murder of 86-year-old Elizabeth Sheeler in her Newark, Ohio apartment, 
despite Davis’s contention that the perpetrator was his brother.  Davis was 
sentenced to death, and this court affirmed his convictions and death sentence.  
State v. Davis, 116 Ohio St.3d 404, 2008-Ohio-2, 880 N.E.2d 31. 
{¶ 3} On January 14, 2008, the trial court dismissed Davis’s petition for 
postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing.  The court of appeals 
affirmed the trial court’s judgment.  5th Dist. No. 2008-CA-16, 2008-Ohio-6841.  
We declined jurisdiction over his appeal.  122 Ohio St.3d 1409, 2008-Ohio-2751, 
907 N.E.2d 1193. 
{¶ 4} On October 31, 2008, Davis filed a motion for leave to file a 
motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence.  Davis alleged that 
he was unavoidably prevented from discovering and producing the evidence at 
trial or within 120 days of the verdict, as set forth in Crim.R. 33(B). 
{¶ 5} The newly discovered evidence was the affidavit of a DNA expert, 
Dr. Laurence Mueller, a professor in the Ecology and Evolutionary Biology 
Department at the University of California, Irvine.  Mueller stated that he had 
reviewed the state’s DNA reports and tests, the testimony of the state’s DNA 
experts, and other DNA evidence in the Davis case.  In his affidavit, Mueller 
concluded “with a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that the DNA evidence 
recited in these reports and the testimony presented” at trial was questionable for 
four reasons:  (1) the state’s DNA experts failed to account for the database “hit”2 
in the statistical analysis of the DNA test results, (2) there is no mention of 
laboratory error as a source of uncertainty in DNA profiling, (3) Meghan 
                                                 
2 The “hit” is a statistic that scientists must account for in performing the database search.   
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
Clement, one of the state’s DNA experts, incorrectly testified that it was 
impossible for nonidentical twins to have the same DNA, and (4) the state’s 
experts overstated the value of the DNA evidence found on the bed sheets in the 
victim’s bedroom. 
{¶ 6} In his motion for a new trial, Davis argued that Mueller’s affidavit 
undermined the state’s DNA evidence, which was essential to its case against 
him.  Davis argued that the affidavit demonstrated that trial counsel were 
ineffective by failing to mount an effective challenge to the state’s DNA 
evidence.  Davis also asserted that based on this new evidence, he “may be 
actually innocent of this capital offense.” 
{¶ 7} The trial court denied Davis’s motion. The court found that 
Davis’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel did not demonstrate that he was 
unavoidably prevented from procuring Dr. Mueller’s testimony within 120 days 
after the trial.  The trial court also found that Davis failed to demonstrate that “but 
for trial error—the unavailability of Dr. Mueller’s testimony—no reasonable 
factfinder would have found him guilty.”  The court stated, “Nothing in Dr. 
Mueller’s testimony suggests that Roland Davis can be conclusively excluded as 
the source of the DNA evidence.  Neither does Dr. Mueller’s affidavit suggest 
that the DNA conclusively matches that of defendant’s brother.” 
{¶ 8} On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District held that the 
trial court did not err because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to act on a motion 
for a new trial.  The court relied upon Special Prosecutors, 55 Ohio St.2d 94, 9 
O.O.3d 88, 378 N.E.2d 162, in holding that “the trial court’s granting of 
Appellant’s motion for new trial would be inconsistent with the judgment of the 
Ohio Supreme Court, affirming Appellant’s convictions and sentence.”  State v. 
Davis, 5th Dist. No. 09-CA-0019, 2009-Ohio-5175, ¶ 12. 
{¶ 9} We accepted Davis’s discretionary appeal on January 27, 2010, on 
one of two propositions of law presented: “When the issue to be decided by the 
January Term, 2011 
5 
 
trial court does not fall within the judgment on appeal, the trial court retains 
jurisdiction to decide the motion before it.  Further, to meet due process, a trial 
court must be able to consider a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered 
evidence even after an appeal has been taken.  U.S. Const. amend. XIV.” 
{¶ 10} We later ordered the parties to address “[w]hether the court of 
appeals had jurisdiction to consider the trial court’s denial of Davis’ motion for 
new trial based on newly discovered evidence under Section 2(B)(2)(c) and 
Section 3(B)(2), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution.”  127 Ohio St.3d 1483, 
2010-Ohio-6371, 939 N.E.2d 182. 
II. Analysis 
A. The Court of Appeals’ Jurisdiction 
{¶ 11} We will first address the question on which we ordered briefing, 
that is, whether the court of appeals had jurisdiction to consider Davis’s appeal of 
the trial court’s denial of his motion for a new trial in his death-penalty case.  
Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and is properly raised by this court 
sua sponte.  State v. Lomax, 96 Ohio St.3d 318, 2002-Ohio-4453, 774 N.E.2d 249, 
¶ 17. 
{¶ 12} On November 8, 1994, Ohio voters approved an amendment to the 
Ohio Constitution to provide this court with direct appellate review of death-
penalty cases. Section 2(B)(2)(c), Article IV, Ohio Constitution.: Before the 
amendment, the Ohio Constitution granted jurisdiction to courts of appeals over 
appeals from a death sentence.  Capital defendants were entitled to file an appeal 
as of right first to the court of appeals and then to file a second appeal as of right 
to the Ohio Supreme Court.  The amendment eliminated direct review by the 
courts of appeals for all defendants sentenced to death for a crime that occurred 
on or after January 1, 1995.  Section 3(B)(2), Article IV, Ohio Constitution. 
{¶ 13} Section 2(B)(2)(c), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution provides:  
“The supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction as follows: * * * In direct 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
appeals from the courts of common pleas or other courts of record inferior to the 
court of appeals as a matter of right in cases in which the death penalty has been 
imposed.”  (Emphasis added.)  Section 3(B)(2), Article IV of the Ohio 
Constitution, however, provides:  “Courts of appeals shall have such jurisdiction 
as may be provided by law to review and affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or 
final orders of the courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the 
district, except that courts of appeals shall not have jurisdiction to review on 
direct appeal a judgment that imposes a sentence of death.”  (Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 14} The General Assembly then amended R.C. 2953.02 to provide: “In 
a capital case in which a sentence of death is imposed for an offense committed 
on or after January 1, 1995, the judgment or final order may be appealed from the 
trial court directly to the supreme court as a matter of right.”  (Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 15} The foregoing language limits the jurisdiction of the supreme court 
to the appeal of a judgment sentencing a defendant to death. 
{¶ 16} We upheld the constitutionality of the amendments changing 
appellate review of death-penalty cases in State v. Smith (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 
104, 684 N.E.2d 668: “[T]he plain language of the amendments speaks of ‘cases 
in which the death penalty has been imposed’ and ‘judgment that imposes the 
sentence of death.’ * * * Section 2(B)(2)(c), Article IV and Section 3(B)(2), 
Article IV of the Ohio Constitution.  Thus the Supreme Court has jurisdiction 
over the whole case, instead of counts, charges, or sentences.”  (Emphasis 
deleted.).  We did not, however, address postconviction motions in that opinion.  
We must now determine whether the constitutional requirement that we review all 
direct appeals of cases in which the death penalty was imposed includes review of 
appeals from a trial court’s order denying a defendant’s motion for a new trial. 
{¶ 17} Davis argues that the wording of the amendments is critical.  
According to him, the court of appeals lost jurisdiction over only those appeals 
taken from the judgment that imposed a sentence of death.  He asserts that the 
January Term, 2011 
7 
 
court of appeals has jurisdiction to consider appeals from all other postjudgment 
motions..  Accordingly, Davis contends that the court of appeals properly ruled on 
his appeal from the trial court’s judgment denying his motion for a new trial. 
{¶ 18} The state points out that Davis fails to address the language of 
Section 2(B)(2)(c), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution in his argument.  The state 
argues that every judgment in a case in which the death penalty was imposed must 
be appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Ohio.  In support of this argument, 
the state asserts that Sections 2(B)(2)(c) and 3(B)(2), Article IV of the Ohio 
Constitution should be read in para materia.  See State ex rel. Toledo v. Lucas Cty. 
Bd. of Elections (2002), 95 Ohio St.3d 73, 78, 765 N.E.2d 854, quoting Toledo 
Edison Co. v. Bryan (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 288, 292, 737 N.E.2d 529 (“ ‘Where 
provisions of the Constitution address the same subject matter, they must be read 
in pari materia and harmonized if possible’ ”).  Thus, the state argues, if the two 
sections appear to be ambiguous when read together, this court must "make every 
effort to resolve this dilemma in a way that will preserve the amendment[s], and 
give [them] that effect which [it] conclude[s] was the desire of the electorate at 
the time of its adoption." State ex rel. Rhodes v. Brown (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 101, 
103, 63 O.O.2d 189, 296 N.E.2d 538. 
{¶ 19} The purpose of Sections 2(B)(2)(c) and 3(B)(2), Article IV, Ohio 
Constitution, was to alleviate the general public’s dissatisfaction with the delays 
in enforcing the death penalty by eliminating the intermediate appellate review of 
those cases. See Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d at 100, 684 N.E.2d 668.  However, as we 
noted in Smith, “the state has taken other steps to expedite the resolution of 
criminal cases, including capital cases, such as limiting the time within which to 
file postconviction petitions.”  Id. 
{¶ 20} Courts of appeals have routinely ruled on appeals of judgments 
denying motions for new trials in cases in which a defendant was convicted of a 
murder that occurred after July 1, 1995, and in which a death penalty was 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
imposed.  State v. Stojetz, 12th Dist. No. CA2002-04-006, 2002-Ohio-6520; State 
v. Lindsey, 12th Dist. No. CA2003-07-010, 2004-Ohio-4407; State v. Jackson, 
190 Ohio App.3d 319, 2010-Ohio-5054, 941 N.E.2d 1221; State v. Bethel, 10th 
Dist. No. 09AP-924, 2010-Ohio-3837. 
{¶ 21} The Trumbull County Court of Appeals appears to have been the 
only court to address the jurisdictional issue in the context of a motion for a new 
trial in a capital case.  State v. Jackson (May 13, 2010), 11th Dist. No. 2008-T-
0050.  In Jackson, the state filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the court of 
appeals did not have the authority to entertain the appeal because a decision 
denying a new trial in a death-penalty case can be appealed only to the supreme 
court. The court of appeals ruled on the motion before conducting oral argument. 
The court concluded that “[Section 3(B)(2), Article IV, Ohio Constitution] refers 
expressly to a specific judgment that a court of appeals does not have the 
authority to review; i.e., the final sentencing judgment which sets forth the order 
regarding the imposition of the death penalty. Given the narrowness of the 
jurisdictional exception in Section 3(B)(2), logic dictates that the provision was 
not intended to totally deprive a court of appeals of all authority to review a final 
judgment stemming from a case in which the death penalty was imposed. Rather 
the wording of Section 3(B)(2) supports the conclusion that an appellate court has 
the jurisdiction to review final judgments rendered in such a proceeding, except 
for the entry containing the weighing exercise which leads to the imposition of the 
‘death’ sentence.” Jackson at 4. 
{¶ 22} We agree.  A holding that the supreme court has exclusive 
jurisdiction over all matters relating to a death-penalty case would be contrary to 
the language of the constitutional amendments and the statute and would have the 
effect of delaying the review of future cases, a scenario that the voters expressly 
January Term, 2011 
9 
 
rejected in passing the constitutional amendments.3  We see no reason why the 
courts of appeals may not currently entertain all appeals from the denial of 
postjudgment motions in which the death penalty was previously imposed.  We 
now hold that pursuant to Sections 2(B)(2)(c) and 3(B)(2), Article IV of the Ohio 
Constitution, a court of appeals has jurisdiction to consider a trial court’s denial of 
a motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered 
evidence in a case in which the death penalty was previously imposed. 
B. The Trial Court’s Jurisdiction Over The Motion For a New Trial 
{¶ 23} Having resolved the issue of the court of appeals’ jurisdiction over 
Davis’s motion for a new trial, we now turn to the issue of the trial court’s 
jurisdiction.  As stated earlier, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District, citing 
Special Prosecutors, 55 Ohio St.2d 94, 9 O.O.3d 88, 378 N.E.2d 162, held that 
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to act on Davis’s motion for a new trial. 
{¶ 24} Crim.R. 33(B) sets forth the grounds on which the trial court may 
grant a motion for a new trial.  The rule states:  
{¶ 25} “Application for a new trial shall be made by motion upon written 
grounds, and except for the cause of newly discovered evidence material for the 
person applying, which he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered 
and produced at the trial, shall be filed within three days after the verdict was 
rendered * * *, unless it is made to appear by clear and convincing proof that the 
defendant was unavoidably prevented from filing his motion for a new trial in 
which case it shall be filed within three days from the order of the court finding 
that he was unavoidably prevented from filing such motion within the time 
provided therein. 
                                                 
3 We do note, however, that there have been cases in which this court has treated a capital 
defendant’s appeal of the noncapital aspects of his case as an appeal as of right.  See, e.g., State v. 
Elmore, 122 Ohio St.3d 472, 2009-Ohio-3478, 912 N.E.2d 582, and State v. Ketterer, 126 Ohio 
St.3d 448, 2010-Ohio-3831, 935 N.E.2d 9. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
{¶ 26} “Motions for new trial on account of newly discovered evidence 
shall be filed within one hundred twenty days following the day upon which the 
verdict was rendered, or the decision of the court where trial by jury has been 
waived.  If it is made to appear by clear and convincing proof that the defendant 
was unavoidably prevented from discovery of the evidence upon which he must 
rely, such motion shall be filed within three days from an order of the court 
finding that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence within 
the one hundred twenty day period.” 
{¶ 27} Crim.R. 33 does not otherwise limit the time for filing a motion for 
a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.  The Court of Appeals in this 
case, relying on Special Prosecutors, held that the trial court did not have 
jurisdiction to entertain Davis’s motion for a new trial after his conviction had 
been affirmed on appeal.  2009-Ohio-5175 at ¶ 12. 
{¶ 28} In Special Prosecutors, 55 Ohio St.2d 94, 9 O.O.3d 88, 378 N.E.2d 
162, the trial court granted a defendant’s motion to withdraw a guilty plea after a 
conviction and sentence based on the plea had been affirmed on appeal.  After a 
trial date had been set, we granted a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial from 
proceeding.  This court stated, “[T]he trial court's granting of the motion to 
withdraw the guilty plea and the order to proceed with a new trial were 
inconsistent with the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's 
conviction premised upon the guilty plea. The judgment of the reviewing court is 
controlling upon the lower court as to all matters within the compass of the 
judgment. Accordingly, we find that the trial court lost its jurisdiction when the 
appeal was taken, and, absent a remand, it did not regain jurisdiction subsequent 
to the Court of Appeals' decision.”  Id. at 97. 
{¶ 29} We addressed a similar issue in State ex rel. Cordray v. Marshall, 
123 Ohio St.3d 229, 2009-Ohio-4986, 915 N.E.2d 633.  In that case, the 
defendant claimed in his appeal of a conviction for murder that the trial court had 
January Term, 2011 
11 
 
erred by failing to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense.  The court of 
appeals rejected this claim and affirmed his conviction.  Id. at ¶ 3.  Several years 
later, the defendant filed a motion for relief from judgment and raised the same 
claims that had been rejected in his appeal.  Citing the law-of-the-case doctrine, 
we held that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to grant a posttrial motion that 
raised the same issues that had previously been rejected on appeal.  Id. at ¶ 27-28, 
42. 
{¶ 30} The law-of-the-case doctrine holds that “the decision of a 
reviewing court in a case remains the law of that case on the legal questions 
involved for all subsequent proceedings in the case at both the trial and reviewing 
levels.”  (Emphasis added.)  Nolan v. Nolan (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 11 OBR 
1, 462 N.E.2d 410.  This doctrine prevents a litigant from relying on arguments at 
retrial that were fully litigated, or could have been fully litigated, in a first appeal.  
See Hubbard ex rel. Creed v. Sauline (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 402, 404-405, 659 
N.E.2d 781. 
{¶ 31} Davis argues that under this doctrine, the trial court should have 
been permitted to rule on his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered 
evidence because a reviewing court had never considered Dr. Mueller’s affidavit 
during previous appeals.  Davis asserts that there would not have been a conflict 
between the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the motion for a new trial 
and the appellate courts’ affirmance of his conviction and of his denial of 
postconviction relief because the issue to be decided was not “within the 
compass” of the appellate courts’ judgments.  See Special Prosecutors, 55 Ohio 
St.2d at 97, 9 O.O.3d 88, 378 N.E.2d 162. 
{¶ 32} Several Ohio courts of appeals have permitted trial courts to 
consider motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence after 
judgments of conviction had been affirmed on appeal.  See State v. Gaines, 1st 
Dist. No. C-090097, 2010-Ohio-895, ¶ 36 (the trial court abused its discretion in 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
deciding defendant’s new-trial motion without an evidentiary hearing); State v. 
Rossi, 2d Dist. No. 23682, 2010-Ohio-4534 (due process requires that a motion 
for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence must, at some point, be 
considered on the merits); and State v. Franklin, 7th Dist. No. 09 MA 96, 2010-
Ohio-4317 (Special Prosecutors does not provide grounds for denying motion for 
a new trial based on newly discovered evidence). 
{¶ 33} In his motion, Davis argued that his counsel were ineffective for 
failing to present a DNA expert at trial to refute the testimony of the state’s expert 
witness.  The state points out that Davis raised the same issue on direct appeal 
when he claimed that his counsel were ineffective by stipulating to evidence 
establishing the admissibility of DNA evidence. See Davis, 116 Ohio St.3d 404, 
2008-Ohio-2, 880 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 344. 
{¶ 34} Contrary to the state’s argument, the earlier claim is not related to 
Davis’s present claim that newly discovered evidence (Mueller’s affidavit) 
warrants a new trial.  Indeed, this issue could not have been raised on direct 
appeal and decided by this court because it rests upon evidence not considered by 
the trial court—an affidavit by a qualified DNA expert.  A reviewing court on 
direct appeal could not have considered an affidavit that was not part of the 
record.  State v. Ishmail (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 406, 8 O.O.3d 405, 377 
N.E.2d 500 (a reviewing court is limited to the record made of the proceedings in 
the trial court). 
{¶ 35} The state also claims that Special Prosecutors is only a conditional 
bar on the trial court’s jurisdiction to consider Davis’s motion for a new trial, for 
we held there that “the trial court lost its jurisdiction when the appeal was taken, 
and, absent a remand, it did not regain jurisdiction subsequent to the Court of 
Appeals’ decision.”  (Emphasis added.)  55 Ohio St.2d at 97, 9 O.O.3d 88, 378 
N.E.2d 162.  Thus, the state argues that Davis has a remedy by filing a motion 
with this court showing that his motion for a new trial has merit and then seeking 
January Term, 2011 
13 
 
a remand of his case to the trial court, which would then consider the new-trial 
motion.  The state maintains that this court is in the best position to determine 
what issues were addressed in its previous judgment. 
{¶ 36} The state’s suggested remedy is cumbersome.  The trial court is 
better equipped than this court is to consider testimony and other evidence matters 
alleged to be newly discovered.  The trial court is also capable of deciding 
whether Dr. Mueller’s affidavit involved matters “within the compass” of this 
court’s previous decisions. 
{¶ 37} We did not decide Special Prosecutors based on the law-of-the-
case doctrine.  However, that doctrine would not prevent the trial court from 
considering the effect of previous decisions on Davis’s newly-discovered-
evidence claim.  We take this opportunity to specify that the holding in Special 
Prosecutors does not bar the trial court’s jurisdiction over posttrial motions 
permitted by the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure.  These motions provide a 
safety net for defendants who have reasonable grounds to challenge their 
convictions and sentences.  The trial court acts as the gatekeeper for these 
motions, and, using its discretion, can limit the litigation to viable claims only.  In 
light of the foregoing, we hold that a trial court retains jurisdiction to decide a 
motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence when the specific 
issue has not been decided upon direct appeal. 
III. Conclusion 
{¶ 38} We hold that pursuant to Sections 2(B)(2)(c) and 3(B)(2), Article 
IV of the Ohio Constitution, a court of appeals has jurisdiction, in a case in which 
a death penalty has been imposed, to consider the trial court’s denial of a motion 
for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. 
{¶ 39} We also hold that a trial court has jurisdiction to decide a motion 
for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence in a case in which the 
imposition of the death penalty has been affirmed on appeal. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
 
{¶ 40} Because the court of appeals misapplied the holding of Special 
Prosecutors in concluding that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider 
Davis’s motion for a new trial based on his claim of newly discovered evidence, 
we remand this case to the court of appeals to reconsider the trial court’s ruling in 
accordance with this holding. 
Judgment reversed  
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, CUPP, 
and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Kenneth W. Oswalt, Licking County Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick and 
Randall L. Porter, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant. 
Robert L. Tobik, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and John T. Martin 
and Cullen Sweeney, Assistant Public Defenders, urging reversal for amici curiae 
Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and Cuyahoga County Public 
Defender. 
Davis, Polk, & Wardwell, L.L.P., Sharon Katz, Sarah E. Malkerson, Sagar 
K. Ravi, and Edward Sherwin, urging reversal for amicus curiae The Innocence 
Network. 
______________________