Title: Brace v. Commonwealth

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12841 
 
MICHAEL BRACE  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
February 24, 2020. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  Sex 
Offender.  Practice, Civil, Sex offender, Interlocutory 
appeal. 
 
 
 
The petitioner, Michael Brace, appeals from a judgment of a 
single justice of this court denying his petition pursuant to 
G. L. c. 211, § 3.  We affirm. 
 
 
On June 24, 1993, Brace pleaded guilty, pursuant to North 
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970), to a two-count 
indictment alleging sex offenses.  On the first count, he was 
sentenced to a committed term in State prison.  On the second 
count, he received a suspended sentence of ten to fifteen years 
in State prison, from and after the sentence imposed on the 
first count, and he was placed on probation for five years under 
certain conditions.1  In 2005, while on probation, Brace was 
charged with a new crime, his probation was revoked, and the 
suspended portion of his sentence was imposed. 
 
 
Brace's anticipated release date was April 1, 2019.  On 
March 26, 2019, the Commonwealth filed a petition to commit him 
as a sexually dangerous person, pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, 
§ 12 (b) (SDP petition).  The Commonwealth's motion for 
temporary commitment was allowed and, on or about April 1, 2019, 
Brace was transferred to the Massachusetts Treatment Center.  
                     
 
1 The respondent's pleas preceded enactment of the Truth in 
Sentencing Act, St. 1993, c. 432, § 11, which eliminated the 
authority to suspend a sentence of incarceration in State 
prison, pursuant to G. L. c. 127, § 133. 
2 
 
 
 
Prior to that, on March 14, 2019, Brace had filed a motion 
seeking sixteen days of jail credit, reflecting time spent in 
custody while he awaited trial on an unrelated State charge, and 
to correct the mittimus.  On April 8, 2019, after Brace had 
completed his sentence, a second judge allowed Brace's motion, 
purportedly revising his release date to March 16, 2019. 
 
 
In May, 2019, Brace moved to dismiss the Commonwealth's SDP 
petition on the ground that, at the time it was filed, he was 
not a "prisoner" as defined by G. L. c. 123A, § 12 (b), because 
the release date had been revised.  The motion was denied, as 
was his motion for reconsideration.2  Brace thereafter filed a 
petition in the county court, pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  A 
single justice of this court denied the petition, and Brace 
appealed. 
 
 
The case is now before us pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as 
amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), which requires a petitioner to 
"set forth the reasons why review of the trial court decision 
cannot adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse 
judgment in the trial court or by other available means."  Brace 
failed to make such a showing.  We recognize that, in sexual 
dangerous person proceedings, "an individual may seek 
interlocutory relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, from the 
denial of a motion to dismiss a petition on the basis that the 
Commonwealth failed to timely petition for trial."  Flood v. 
Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 1015, 1016 (2013).  In that very limited 
circumstance, the "right at issue is a right not to be tried" 
beyond the statutory maximum.  Id.  See Gangi v. Commonwealth, 
462 Mass. 158, 163 (2012). 
 
 
Brace's claim is different in kind, because it implicates 
the merits of the Commonwealth's SDP petition.  He essentially 
alleges that the Commonwealth cannot demonstrate (among other 
things) that he was a "prisoner" for purposes of G. L. c. 123A, 
§ 12 (b), at the time his discharge petition was filed.  Claims 
of this nature "can be raised on appeal from an adverse final 
judgment in this matter, and the single justice did not err or 
abuse [her] discretion in concluding that the ordinary appellate 
process provides an adequate remedy."  Schumacher v. 
Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 1005, 1006 (2017) (ordinary appellate 
process adequate to address claim that district attorney lacked 
authority to file SDP petition; allegation that petitioner had 
not been convicted of sex offense within meaning of G. L. 
                     
 
2 Brace also filed a notice of appeal from that ruling in 
the Superior Court. 
3 
 
 
 
c. 123A, § 1; and constitutional considerations).  See 
Commonwealth v. Sargent, 449 Mass. 576, 579 (2007) (noting use 
of G. L. c. 231, § 118, first par., for review of interlocutory 
ruling in c. 123A proceeding); Sheridan, petitioner, 422 Mass. 
776, 777 (1996).  See also Crittenden v. Commonwealth, 481 Mass. 
1028, 1029 (2019). 
 
 
We express no view as to the merits of Brace's claim at 
this juncture.  His claim can adequately be resolved by the 
Appeals Court (see note 2, supra) in the ordinary course.  See 
Commonwealth v. Ballard, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 701, 707 (2018) 
(notwithstanding subsequent withdrawal of guilty plea, defendant 
was prisoner for purposes of G. L. c. 123A, § 12 [b], at time 
petition was filed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by 
a memorandum of law. 
 
Joseph M. Kenneally for the petitioner.