Title: Huff v. FirstEnergy Corp.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Huff v. FirstEnergy Corp., Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-5083.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-5083 
HUFF ET AL., APPELLEES, v. FIRSTENERGY CORPORATION ET AL.; OHIO EDISON 
COMPANY ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Huff v. FirstEnergy Corp., Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-5083.] 
Contracts — Third-party beneficiaries — For an injured third party to qualify as 
an intended third-party beneficiary under a written contract, the contract 
must indicate an intention to benefit that third party. 
(No. 2010-0857 — Submitted May 24, 2011 — Decided October 5, 2011.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Trumbull County, 
No. 2009-TR-00080, 2010-Ohio-1456. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
For an injured third party to qualify as an intended third-party beneficiary under a 
written contract, the contract must indicate an intention to benefit that 
third party. 
__________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
 
 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} This discretionary appeal was accepted in a personal-injury case 
involving a summary judgment that was reversed by the Eleventh District Court 
of Appeals.  We are asked to determine whether a person injured by a falling tree 
located near, but outside, the utility’s easement, is an intended third-party 
beneficiary of a contract between a utility and its service contractor.  We hold that 
under the facts of this case, a contract between a utility and a contractor that 
provides that “[t]he Contractor shall plan and conduct the work to adequately 
safeguard all persons and property from injury” does not create a duty on the part 
of the contractor, once the work has been completed, to protect a third party from 
injury. 
I. Case Background 
{¶ 2} In June 2004, appellee Lisa G. Huff was injured during a walk 
along Kings Grave Road in Hartford Township.  She alleges that during a heavy 
thunderstorm, a large sugar maple tree split in two approximately 25 feet above 
the ground, and a large limb from the tree struck her, causing serious and 
permanent injuries.  The tree was located on property owned by Gerald and 
Michelina Braho and stood about 30 feet from the center of Kings Grave Road 
and 20 feet from utility lines owned and maintained by appellant Ohio Edison 
Company, a subsidiary of FirstEnergy Corporation. 
{¶ 3} Ohio Edison maintained an easement near the tree, but the tree was 
outside the easement.  The tree did not present a hazard or threat to the power 
lines owned by the utility.  Ohio Edison had hired appellant Asplundh Tree Expert 
Company to inspect trees and vegetation along its power lines in this area and to 
remedy any situation in which trees or vegetation might affect the lines.  Ohio 
Edison and its contractors carry out this work to ensure that adequate clearance is 
maintained around electric lines.  Generally, Ohio Edison deferred to Asplundh’s 
January Term, 2011 
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decisions regarding tree and vegetation maintenance and would perform an 
overview inspection of the electrical circuit only to determine whether any 
vegetation was growing into the electrical wires or equipment.  Asplundh had last 
been in the area where Huff’s injury occurred in May 2001. 
{¶ 4} Huff, along with her husband, Reggie D. Huff, and children, filed 
suit against Ohio Edison and Asplundh, as well as FirstEnergy1 and the Brahos.2  
The Huffs alleged that Ohio Edison and Asplundh were liable for Huff’s injuries 
based upon their failure to inspect, maintain, and remove the tree or to warn the 
landowner and the public of the danger raised by the tree.3 
{¶ 5} Ohio Edison and Asplundh filed motions for summary judgment.  
Ohio Edison argued that it had no prior knowledge that the tree was dangerous, 
that it owed and assumed no duty to Huff regarding the tree, and that it was not 
negligent and did not proximately cause or contribute to Huff’s injuries.  
Asplundh argued that it owed no duty to Huff and that its activities did not 
proximately cause the injury to Huff.  The Huffs responded that Ohio Edison had 
contracted with Asplundh to inspect and maintain trees within the easement, and 
that Asplundh failed to recognize that the tree in question was diseased and a 
hazard and failed to remove the tree when it was on site in May 2001.  The Huffs 
also argued that Ohio Edison was responsible for maintaining trees within and 
around its easement, that Ohio Edison was aware of the tree based upon its 
                                                 
1 The court of appeals concluded that FirstEnergy is merely a holding company that owns Ohio 
Edison and that it did not exercise any control or supervision over Ohio Edison’s day-to-day 
vegetation clearing practices.  The court of appeals accordingly concluded that the trial court 
properly granted summary judgment in First Energy’s favor.  The Huffs did not appeal the 
judgment in favor of FirstEnergy.  
 
2 The Huffs subsequently dismissed the Brahos from the case.  
 
3 While the Huffs did not explicitly aver their status as third-party beneficiaries in the complaint, 
they generally referred to contractual duties owed by Ohio Edison to the public to inspect, prune, 
and maintain trees along its power lines.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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location within an inspection zone, and that Ohio Edison had a duty to remove the 
diseased tree. 
{¶ 6} The trial court found that while the tree leaned approximately 10 
degrees away from the power lines, “there is absolutely no credible evidence 
about when the tree began to lean or if it was leaning because of the way it grew.”  
It also noted that one of the Huffs’ experts admitted that he could not testify to a 
reasonable degree of probability when the tree became a hazard.  Finding no 
evidence that Ohio Edison or Asplundh actually inspected the tree or removed any 
branches, the court concluded that the Huffs failed to show that appellants ever 
had actual or constructive notice of any decay of the tree.  The court found that 
due to the tree’s location—leaning away from the power lines with no limbs near 
the power lines—Ohio Edison and Asplundh owed no duty to the Huffs.  With 
respect to Ohio Edison, the court also found that “Ohio Edison * * * did not have 
actual or constructive notice of any defects in this tree located on someone else’s 
property” and that there was a “complete lack of any evidence that * * * Ohio 
Edison had any notice whatsoever that the interior of one tree on a rural township 
road was decaying.”  After examining the contract between Ohio Edison and 
Asplundh, it concluded that the Huffs were not third-party beneficiaries under the 
contract.  It accordingly granted appellants’ motions for summary judgment. 
{¶ 7} On appeal, the Huffs argued that the trial court erred when it found 
that Ohio Edison and Asplundh had no duty to Lisa Huff.  Before considering 
whether appellants had a duty under the contract, the court of appeals first 
determined that no duty under traditional tort law existed:  “The duty analysis in 
this case * * * does not turn on the foreseeability of the danger which caused 
[Huff’s] injury.  Rather, it turns on the language of the contract into which Ohio 
Edison and Asplundh entered.”  Trumbull App. No. 2009-T-0080, 2010-Ohio-
1456, at ¶ 52.  As a result, it examined the contract between Ohio Edison and 
Asplundh and held that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding 
January Term, 2011 
5 
 
whether Huff had enforceable rights under the contract as an intended third-party 
beneficiary.  Id. at ¶ 62.  In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that a portion 
of the contract providing that “[Asplundh] shall plan and conduct the work to 
adequately safeguard all persons and property from injury” could be read in two 
ways: (1) a narrow reading that provides Asplundh must protect all persons from 
injury while Asplundh works on the site or (2) a broad reading that requires 
Asplundh to protect all persons from injury at all times, regardless of when the 
work is done.  Id. at ¶ 60-61.  The court accordingly held that the contract was 
ambiguous and reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Ohio 
Edison and Asplundh.  Id. at ¶ 61-64. 
{¶ 8} We first denied jurisdiction in this case.  126 Ohio St.3d 1546, 
2010-Ohio-3855, 932 N.E.2d 340.  On reconsideration, we granted jurisdiction on 
all propositions of law raised by Ohio Edison and Asplundh.  126 Ohio St.3d 
1620, 2010-Ohio-5101, 935 N.E.2d 856. 
II. Analysis 
{¶ 9} Ohio Edison’s and Asplundh’s propositions of law raise a number 
of challenges to the court of appeals’ holding that they owed a duty to the Huffs 
as intended third-party beneficiaries of the contract between Ohio Edison and 
Asplundh.  Because we hold that the contract between Ohio Edison and Asplundh 
did not create any duty to the Huffs as third-party beneficiaries, we reverse the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
{¶ 10} In Hill v. Sonitrol of Southwestern Ohio, Inc. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 
36, 40, 521 N.E.2d 780, we adopted the statement of law in Restatement of the 
Law 2d, Contracts (1981), Section 302.  Section 302(1)(b) provides that “a 
beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to 
performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the 
parties and * * * the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the 
beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.”  Comment e to Section 302 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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limits the creation of duties to third parties:  “[U]nless the third person is an 
intended beneficiary as here defined, no duty to him is created.” 
{¶ 11} In applying this rule, we referred to Norfolk & W. Co. v. United 
States (C.A.6, 1980), 641 F.2d 1201.  We adopted language from Norfolk & W. 
Co. explaining the “intent to benefit” test, which is used to determine whether a 
third party is an intended beneficiary of a contract:  “ ‘Under this analysis, if the 
promisee * * * intends that a third party should benefit from the contract, then that 
third party is an “intended beneficiary” who has enforceable rights under the 
contract.  If the promisee has no intent to benefit a third party, then any third-
party beneficiary to the contract is merely an “incidental beneficiary,” who has no 
enforceable rights under the contract.’ ”  Hill at 40, quoting Norfolk & W. Co. at 
1208. 
{¶ 12} Courts generally presume that a contract’s intent resides in the 
language the parties chose to use in the agreement.  Shifrin v. Forest City Ents., 
Inc. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 635, 638, 597 N.E.2d 499.  “Only when the language 
of a contract is unclear or ambiguous, or when the circumstances surrounding the 
agreement invest the language of the contract with a special meaning will 
extrinsic evidence be considered in an effort to give effect to the parties’ 
intentions.”  Id. at syllabus.  Ohio law thus requires that for a third party to be an 
intended beneficiary under a contract, there must be evidence that the contract 
was intended to directly benefit that third party.  Generally, the parties’ intention 
to benefit a third party will be found in the language of the agreement. 
{¶ 13} The facts in this case do not show that the agreement between Ohio 
Edison and Asplundh was intended to benefit the Huffs.  The court of appeals and 
the Huffs point to one specific portion of the contract that they argue creates a 
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Lisa Huff has an enforceable 
right under the contract.  This statement, which is found in an attachment entitled 
“FirstEnergy Vegetation Management Specifications” and incorporated into the 
January Term, 2011 
7 
 
Ohio Edison-Asplundh contract, provides that “[t]he Contractor shall plan and 
conduct the work to adequately safeguard all persons and property from injury.”  
The Huffs contend that this statement distinguishes their case from Hill and 
Norfolk & W. because it assigns to both Ohio Edison and Asplundh clearly 
defined duties—to safeguard the public—for the Huffs’ benefit. 
{¶ 14} When this statement is placed in context, however, it is 
unambiguous that neither Ohio Edison nor Asplundh intended to make the Huffs 
third-party beneficiaries under the contract. The contract was not entered into for 
the general benefit of the public walking on public roads.  It was designed to 
support the electrical service offered by Ohio Edison.  The contract states that it 
applies to work, consisting of “tree trimming, tree removal, clearance of rights-of-
way using either manual or chemical methods, and disposal of trees and brush,” 
completed by Asplundh on behalf of Ohio Edison.  The purpose of the contract, 
then, is to ensure that Ohio Edison’s equipment and lines are kept free of 
interference from trees and vegetation.  The remainder of the contract sets forth 
how this work is to be carried out, such as the standards by which Asplundh is to 
perform its work, the limits on liability for the performance of the work, and the 
necessary qualifications for the Apslundh employees who were to perform the 
work.  The contract contains no language establishing an ongoing duty to the 
general public on behalf of either Ohio Edison or Asplundh. 
{¶ 15} The document on vegetation management incorporated into the 
contract provides that “[t]he objective of all work covered by these documents is 
to maintain reliable and economical electric service, through effective line 
clearance and satisfactory public relations.”  A portion of that document sets forth 
safety standards for Asplundh to follow while it is on site: 
{¶ 16} “SAFETY 
PRECAUTIONS 
AND 
PROTECTION 
TO 
PROPERTY 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 17} “The Contractor shall plan and conduct the work to adequately 
safeguard all persons and property from injury. 
{¶ 18} “The Contractor shall take the necessary precautions to render the 
Work secure in order to decrease the probability of accident from any cause and 
to avoid delay in completion of Work.  The Contractor shall use proper safety 
appliances and provide first aid treatment and ambulance for emergency treatment 
of injuries and shall comply with all applicable Federal, State and Local Laws, 
rules and regulations with regard to the safe performance of the work.” 
{¶ 19} Working near electrical lines has its inherent hazards.  It is clear 
that this portion of the agreement establishes safety guidelines designed to protect 
persons and property from injury while the contractor performs its work.  This 
period is finite: until the work has been completed.  Contrary to the assertion of 
the court of appeals, the agreement cannot be plausibly read to require Ohio 
Edison or Asplundh to safeguard all persons from injury at all times, regardless of 
when the work is completed. 
{¶ 20} Even if the Huffs were able to show that at some point in time, 
members of the public using the road near the power lines might receive 
incidental or indirect benefits from the agreement, this would not satisfy the 
burden of proof established in Hill.  See Terry v. Hancock-Wood Elec. Coop., 
Inc., Erie App. No. E-08-060, 2009-Ohio-4925, at ¶ 29.  The agreement does not 
indicate that either Ohio Edison or Asplundh intended to give the general public 
the benefit of a promise to perform.  The Huffs thus fail to qualify as intended 
third-party beneficiaries, and the court of appeals improperly reversed the 
summary judgment granted to Ohio Edison and Asplundh. 
{¶ 21} It should be noted that while there is no contractual duty on behalf 
of Ohio Edison or Asplundh toward the Huffs, this fact did not preclude the Huffs 
from showing that appellants owed them a duty under traditional principles of tort 
law.  Indeed, during oral argument, the Huffs’ counsel proposed that either Ohio 
January Term, 2011 
9 
 
Edison or Asplundh had caused damage, at some unspecified time, to the tree that 
struck Lisa Huff and thus that appellants had a duty to make the tree safe for the 
general public.  Counsel admitted, however, that the Huffs had no direct evidence 
to support this theory.  In fact, the trial court found that the Huffs failed to show 
that either Ohio Edison or Asplundh was on notice of any decay in the tree when 
Asplundh was on the site in 2001.  Furthermore, the Huffs failed to preserve this 
issue on appeal.4 
III. Conclusion 
{¶ 22} We hold that for an injured third party to qualify as an intended 
third-party beneficiary under a written contract, the contract must indicate an 
intention to benefit that third party.  Because the contract between Ohio Edison 
and Asplundh does not indicate an intent to benefit the Huffs, the trial court 
properly granted summary judgment to Ohio Edison and Asplundh.  We therefore 
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment reversed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, 
JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 23} The issue in this case is whether Ohio Edison and Asplundh Tree 
Expert Company intended to make Huff and other members of the public third-
party beneficiaries of a contract that required Asplundh to conduct its work in a 
                                                 
4 We decline to address the specific issues contained within Ohio Edison’s third proposition of law 
and Asplundh’s fourth proposition of law, both of which propose general rules for contract 
interpretation that are rendered irrelevant to this case given our holding that the Huffs are not 
intended third-party beneficiaries as defined by Ohio law.  Furthermore, because the court of 
appeals limited its analysis to whether the Huffs are intended third-party beneficiaries under the 
contract, we also decline to address Asplundh’s first proposition of law, which addresses whether 
a utility or its contractor has a general duty to protect the public from trees that are not located on 
utility property or within a utility easement and do not pose a threat to utility equipment. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
manner that adequately safeguarded “all persons” from injury.  I agree with the 
majority that the parties did not intend to make Huff a third-party beneficiary of 
the contract and that she may not bring a claim against Ohio Edison or Asplundh 
for breach of that contract.  However, I concur in judgment only because, in my 
view, the majority creates a new requirement that the intention to benefit a third 
party must be indicated in the terms of the contract. This is not the law in Ohio. 
{¶ 24} In Hill v. Sonitrol of Southwestern Ohio, Inc. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 
36, 521 N.E.2d 780, we adopted the test found in the Restatement of the Law 2d, 
Contracts (1981), to define the duty that the parties to a contract owe to a third-
party beneficiary.  Quoting Section 302 of the Restatement, we stated:   
{¶ 25} “ ‘(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a 
beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to 
performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the 
parties and either 
{¶ 26} “ ‘(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of 
the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or 
{¶ 27} “ ‘(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give 
the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.’ ”  (Emphasis added.) 
Hill at 40. 
{¶ 28} Contrary to the holding of the majority as expressed in the syllabus 
in this case, the plain language of Section 302 of the Restatement does not require 
the parties to a contract to indicate their intention to benefit a third party in the 
terms of the contract.  As Professor John E. Murray Jr. explains in Corbin on 
Contracts, “The critical right of a third party is the right to sue the promisor.  
[However], the promisor and promisee will almost never state that intention 
explicitly.  Nonetheless, the critical test is whether the language of the contract, 
the extrinsic evidence interpreting that language and all of the surrounding 
circumstances manifest an intention by the promisee and promisor to confer that 
January Term, 2011 
11 
 
right on the third party.  If so, it is ‘appropriate’ for a court to recognize that right 
in the third party.”  (Footnotes omitted.) 9 Corbin on Contracts (2007) 65-66, 
Section 44.6. 
{¶ 29} Thus, courts applying the same Restatement test that we adopted in 
Hill recognize that “ ‘[a] court in determining the parties’ intention should 
consider the circumstances surrounding the transaction as well as the actual 
language of the contract.’ ”  Subaru Distributors Corp. v. Subaru of Am., Inc. 
(C.A.2, 2005), 425 F.3d 119, 124, quoting Restatement Section 302, Reporter's 
Note, comment a; see also Pub. Serv. Co. of New Hampshire v. Hudson Light & 
Power Dept. (C.A.1, 1991), 938 F.2d 338, 342; Beverly v. Macy (C.A. 11, 1983), 
702 F.2d 931, 940; Hickman v. SAFECO Ins. Co. of Am. (Minn.2005), 695 
N.W.2d 365, 370; 13 Lord, Williston on Contracts 67-68, Section 37:8 (noting 
that most jurisdictions follow this rule).  As the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
explained in Beverly,  “when determining whether the parties to the contract 
intended to bestow a benefit on a third party, a court may look beyond the 
contract to the circumstances surrounding its formation.”  702 F.2d at 940. 
{¶ 30} We have never held that the intention to benefit a third party must 
be indicated in the contract.  In fact, the court in Anderson v. Olmsted Util. 
Equip., Inc. (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 124, 573 N.E.2d 626, looked both to the terms 
of the contract and to extrinsic evidence of the intent of the parties to determine 
whether third parties could enforce the contract.  In that case,  the city of Niles 
had contracted with Olmsted Utility Equipment to inspect and repair the hydraulic 
arm of the city’s “cherry picker” truck before remounting it on a new truck.  
Anderson and Carlson, electrical linemen employed by the city, were 
subsequently injured when the arm failed and they fell to the ground.  They sued 
Olmsted Utility Equipment, asserting that it had breached the express warranty 
made to the city. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 31} We rejected the argument that Anderson and Carlson were at most 
incidental beneficiaries of the contract, stating:  
{¶ 32} “[I]n this case, it is clear to us that the city, as promisee, intended 
that Anderson and Carlson benefit from the contract. The specific terms of the 
contract provided that ‘[t]he City of Niles is interested in having this equipment 
rebuilt to 100% Holan specifications and safety.’ (Emphasis added.)  In addition, 
when questioned at trial concerning the inspection and rebuilding of the aerial 
device, Charles Burgess, the superintendent of the city's light department, testified 
that the purpose of rebuilding the aerial device was for safety of linemen who 
were to use the truck. 
{¶ 33} “Indeed, Anderson and Carlson were not merely incidental 
beneficiaries but were, in all respects, intended beneficiaries under the contract.”  
Anderson, 60 Ohio St.3d at 130, 573 N.E.2d 626. 
{¶ 34} Accordingly, the rule is not that “the contract must indicate an 
intention to benefit [the] third party.” Majority opinion at the syllabus.  Rather, 
the test is whether “recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is 
appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and * * * the circumstances 
indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the 
promised performance.”  Hill, 36 Ohio St.3d at 40, 521 N.E.2d 780. 
{¶ 35} Here, the language of the contract and the circumstances 
surrounding its formation do not show that either Ohio Edison or Asplundh 
intended to give Huff the benefit of the promised performance.  Since Huff is not 
a third-party beneficiary of the contract, she had no right to enforce its 
performance.  I therefore agree with the majority that the court of appeals’ 
judgment should be reversed because Huff is not a third-party beneficiary of the 
contract.  However, because the majority modifies the third-party beneficiary rule 
in Ohio by requiring that the contract—rather than the surrounding 
January Term, 2011 
13 
 
circumstances—must indicate an intention to benefit a third party,  I concur in its 
judgment but not its statement of law. 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
Betras, Kopp & Harshman, L.L.C., and David Betras, for appellees. 
 
Harrington, Hoppe & Mitchell, Ltd., and John T. Dellick, for appellant 
Ohio Edison Company. 
 
Reminger Co., L.P.A., Clifford C. Masch, Brian D. Sullivan, and Martin 
T. Galvin, for appellant Asplundh Tree Expert Company. 
______________________