Title: NICOLAS CHRISTOPHER COUNTS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

NICOLAS CHRISTOPHER COUNTS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 156197 P.3d 1280Case Number: S-08-0095Decided: 12/31/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
NICOLAS 
CHRISTOPHER COUNTS,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE 
OF WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; 
David E. Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Westling.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Pojman.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The appellant 
contends that his constitutional right to due process of law was violated when 
his probation was revoked without him having received adequate notice of the 
basis for that revocation, and without the district court having supervised his 
removal from a community corrections facility.  Finding no error, we 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Was the 
appellant's right to due process of law violated by revocation of his probation 
without adequate notice to him of the basis for such revocation or by the 
district court's failure to supervise his removal from a community corrections 
facility?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The appellant 
pled guilty to unlawful delivery of a controlled substance and on January 9, 
2007, was sentenced to incarceration for a period of not less than 30 months and 
not more than 60 months.  That 
sentence was suspended, however, and he was placed on supervised probation for a 
period of 36 months.  One of the 
conditions of probation was the following:

 
 
            
4.  That the Defendant shall 
enter and successfully complete the residential felony program at Community 
Alternatives of Casper (CAC).  That 
the Defendant must apply to CAC within two (2) days.

 
 
[¶4]      The appellant 
arrived at Community Alternatives of Casper (CAC) on February 25, 2007.  He obtained employment at several 
businesses, eventually beginning work at an Old Chicago restaurant on July 24, 
2007.  On October 24, 2007, the 
appellant was "written up" on a disciplinary form containing the following 
allegation:

 
 
            
On [October 23, 2007] Resident Nicolas Counts #16973-B was signed out to 
work, however when this Employment Coordinator conducted an on-site check it was 
discovered that he was not actually there and that he had been clocked out of 
work since 1916.  Mr. Counts did not 
sign back into the Agency until 0018 on 10/24/2007, 5 hours unauthorized and 
unaccounted for by our staff at this facility, this is a direct violation of 
MJ47Failure to return to the community corrections facility on or before the 
time specified in the schedule of the release plan.  This includes failure to telephone the 
ACC as directed by staff when changing locations and absences from designated 
sign out locations without prior approval from staff.  This has become a pattern for Mr. 
Counts, he received a conduct order on 05/21/07 and several staffings addressing 
failure to follow Agency policies and procedures, specifically for being in 
places without staff authorization.  
He has also had 2 prior staff reports of being unauthorized on 04/28/07 
and 05/28/07.  Most recently, Mr. 
Counts has received a couple of formal Notice of Charges, one MJ46-Failure to 
telephone the community corrections facility upon changing location or failure 
to remain in the particular area designated in pass/furlough/leave on 08/19/07 
and a similar MJ47 on 09/17/07.

 
 
[¶5]      The appellant was 
arrested and jailed until a disciplinary hearing was held on October 26, 
2007.  He was served with a copy of 
the allegations along with an outline of his administrative rights.  A summary of the hearing indicates that 
the appellant presented the following explanation for his alleged absence from 
the restaurant:

 
 
Offender 
informs he was denied for his pass and called in to his work to verify his 
schedule for the day.  He claims to 
have permission form [sic] his manager to have dinner with his mother on the 
clock.  The offender even charged 
his meal to be taken for his pay, then he "Hung Out[.]"  See Record for further 
details.

 
 
The 
hearing officers found no mitigating factors, found two aggravating 
factorsprior similar acts and planned misconductand recommended termination 
from CAC.  The notice terminating 
the appellant from CAC stated the following as the reason for 
termination:

 
 
Resident 
Counts, Nicolas, ID# 16973-B, was found guilty during formal disciplinary 
hearing Case #C0710-09-148, of unauthorized movement while in the community, 
with aggravating factors of a continued history of the 
same.

 
 
[¶6]      On November 5, 
2007, the State filed a Petition for Revocation and Request for Bench Warrant, 
to which was attached an Affidavit for Revocation of Probation and Request for 
Bench Warrant containing the following pertinent 
allegation:

 
 
1.  That said Defendant, on October 26, 
2007, was terminated from the felony program at Community Alternatives of Casper 
in violation of condition number four (4) of his Judgment and 
Sentence.

 
 
[¶7]      The appellant was 
afforded an initial appearance in regard to the petition on November 7, 2007, at 
which time bond was set and counsel was appointed.  A revocation hearing scheduled for 
November 15, 2007, was continued at the request of the appellant's counsel. 
 Eventually, at a hearing on January 
8, 2008, the appellant admitted that he had been terminated from the CAC 
program, but contended that he could not defend himself against the revocation 
petition because the allegations therein were insufficiently specific, and 
because the discovery documents that had been provided to him covered too much 
time and too much conduct to narrow down the accusation.  Based upon the appellant's admissions, 
the district court adjudicated the issue of the violation, ordered the discovery 
documents be made a part of the court record, and granted the parties leave to 
seek additional discovery and to file briefs and motions prior to a 
dispositional hearing.

 
 
[¶8]      A little over one 
week later, the appellant filed a demand that the State amend its petition to 
set forth the grounds upon which the appellant had been terminated from CAC and 
upon which the State would rely in seeking revocation of probation.  The State responded with a memorandum of 
law, taking the position that the State was not required to prove anything 
beyond the appellant's termination from CAC.

 
 
[¶9]      The dispositional 
hearing was held on February 22, 2008.  The State relied generally upon the 
discovery documents that had been served upon the appellant, and specifically 
upon the termination report contained therein.  The appellant argued that the State had 
not met the requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 39(a) that a petition for revocation of 
probation must set forth "the conditions of probation which are alleged to have 
been violated by the probationer and the facts establishing the violation." 
 Further, the appellant argued that 
the State had failed to prove that the probation violation was 
willful.

 
 
[¶10]   At the end of the hearing, the 
district court concluded that the appellant had violated probation by failing 
successfully to complete the CAC program.  In reaching that conclusion, the district 
court relied not only upon the appellant's admission that he had been terminated 
from CAC, but also upon the CAC document that charged the Old Chicago incident, 
and upon the CAC documents showing the appellant's history at CAC.  The court further concluded that the 
documents and hearing testimony proved that the probation violation was willful. 
 The appellant's probation was 
revoked and the original sentence was re-imposed, with a recommendation for 
"Boot Camp."1

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶11]   A district court's decision whether 
to revoke probation, like other sentencing decisions, is discretionary, and 
generally is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Sinning v. State, 2007 WY 193, ¶ 8, 172 P.3d 388, 389-90 (Wyo. 2007).  
Probation revocation proceedings are, however, also subject to 
constitutional due process analysis, with any constitutional claims reviewed de novo.  Meyers v. State, 2005 WY 163, ¶ 8, 124 P.3d 710, 714 (Wyo. 2005); Shaw v. 
State, 998 P.2d 965, 967 (Wyo. 2000).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶12]   This discussion must take place in 
the context of the law that governs probation revocation, which law we recently 
set forth in Sinning, 2007 WY 193, ¶¶ 
9-10, 172 P.3d  at 390 (internal citations omitted):

 
 
            
The proceedings for probation revocation consist of a two-part 
process.  The first part, the 
adjudicatory phase, requires the district court to determine by a preponderance 
of the evidence whether a condition of probation was violated.  The second, dispositional phase, is 
triggered only upon a finding that a condition of probation was violated.  In this phase, the district court must 
deliberate not only upon the violation, but also the reasons the conditions were 
originally imposed and the circumstances surrounding the violation.  After consideration of all these 
factors, the district court must then determine the appropriate consequences of 
the probationer's violation.

 
 
            
In the adjudicatory phase, the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process 
and the Wyoming Rules of Evidence apply.  
In the dispositional phase, only general due process protections continue 
to attach and the rules of evidence are suspended.

 
 
            
In applying Rule 39, we have said that notice to a probationer of the 
grounds for revocation is fundamental and failure to provide such notice is a 
defect affecting a substantial right.  
In addition to the requirements contained in Rule 39, we have said that 
in order to revoke probation for the violation of a condition of probation not 
involving the payment of money, the violation must either be willful or threaten 
the safety of society.  Willfulness 
is determined at the dispositional phase of the 
proceedings.

 
 
[¶13]   In specific regard to 
notice:

 
 
Due 
process requires that a defendant be given written notice of the claimed 
violations of probation.  Shaw v. State, 998 P.2d 965, 967 (Wyo. 
2000).  In probation revocation 
proceedings, notice pertains to the charges regarding a violation of the 
conditions of probation, not to matters discussed during a dispositional 
phase.  W.R.Cr.P. 39(a)(4); Gailey v. State, 882 P.2d 888, 892 
(Wyo. 
1994).

 
 

Sweets 
v. State, 
2003 WY 64, ¶ 11, 69 P.3d 404, 406 (Wyo. 2003).  The conduct alleged as grounds for a 
revocation need not be alleged with the same specificity as required in a 
complaint, indictment, or information.  
Murphy v. State, 592 P.2d 1159, 1162 (Wyo. 1979).  Furthermore:

 
 
A 
probation revocation hearing is not a trial on a new criminal charge.  It is simply an extension of the 
sentencing procedure resulting from the conviction of the basic charge, coupled 
with the requirement that the probationer be afforded due process of law before 
being deprived of the conditional right to liberty granted by 
probation.

 
 

Sinning, 
2007 WY 193, ¶ 24, 172 P.3d  at 393.

 
 
[¶14]   The facts of this case, in the 
context of the law just recited, leave the appellant with no due process 
argument.  At the adjudicatory 
hearing on January 8, 2008, the appellant admitted that he had violated the 
terms of his probation:

 
 
            
THE COURT:  And then in the 
affidavit for revocation of probation of [the] Probation and Parole agent with 
the Wyoming Department of Corrections, there's a single allegation of violation 
of your probation.  And that reads 
that said defendant on October 26th, 2007, was terminated from the Felony 
Program at Community Alternatives of Casper, in violation of condition number 4 
of his Judgment and Sentence.

 
 
            
Do you admit to that violation of probation?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  Yes, Your 
Honor.

 
 
[¶15]   The appellant was represented by 
counsel at the adjudicatory hearing, and counsel's statement just preceding this 
admission made it clear that the appellant was admitting the violation without 
conceding the question of revocation:

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  We will admit to the 
violation in that a condition of his probation has been violated, not that 
probation should be revoked.

 
 
The 
appellant's admission conclusively proved the violation, leaving only the 
question of dispositionwhether or not probation should be revokedfor further 
hearing.  The admission effectively 
waived any due process rights the appellant may have had based on an alleged 
lack of notice.2  Sweets, 2003 WY 64, ¶¶ 10-13, 69 P.3d  at 
406.

 
 
[¶16]   We have made it clear that 
probation may not be revoked for a violation that has not been shown to be 
willful, and that willfulness is considered during the dispositional phase, 
rather than the adjudicatory phase, of the revocation proceedings.  Edrington v. State, 2008 WY 70, ¶ 7, 185 P.3d 1264, 1266-67 (Wyo. 2008).  To 
the extent that the appellant raises the purported lack of an allegation of 
willfulness as part of his argument that notice was lacking, we conclude that he 
conceded that allegation by admitting that he had violated a condition of 
probation.  To the extent, however, 
that his allegation of a lack of proof of willfulness goes to the dispositional 
phase, we will note that, after reviewing the CAC documentation and after 
hearing the witnesses' testimony, the district court found that the violation 
was willful.  Specifically, the 
court found "noncompliance with very clear rules and requirements of the ACC 
rules and regulations."  We cannot 
say that this finding was clearly erroneous.  See Edrington, 2008 WY 70, ¶ 9, 185 P.3d  
at 1267.  The district court was 
entitled to assess the credibility of the witnesses, to consider the 
administrative proceedings that led to the appellant's termination from CAC, and 
to consider the appellant's history at the CAC, especially that part of the CAC 
documentation that showed the appellant's disregard for and violation of  the very rule that formed the basis for 
the termination.

 
 
[¶17]   The second prong of the appellant's 
appellate argument is that the district court did not "supervise" his 
termination from CAC.  As best as we 
can understand this argument, it is based upon Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-18-113 
(LexisNexis 2007), which reads as follows:

 
 
§ 
7-18-113.  Confinement of 
violators.

 
 

            
If the administrator of an adult community correctional facility or any 
other appropriate supervising authority has cause to believe that an offender, 
parolee or inmate placed in an adult community correctional facility has 
violated any rule or condition of that person's placement in that facility or 
any term of post-release supervision or cannot be safely housed in that 
facility, the administrator or other authority shall certify to the department 
the facts which are the basis for the belief and execute a transfer order to the 
sheriff of the county in which the facility is located, who shall confine the 
offender, parolee or inmate in the county jail pending 
a determination by the appropriate judicial or executive authorities as to 
whether or not the offender, parolee or inmate shall remain in community 
corrections.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  The gist of the appellant's 
argument is that the highlighted language restricts the determination of whether 
an offender should be terminated from a community correctional facility to the 
judge who sent him or her there, or in the case of a parolee or inmate, to the 
parole board or department of corrections.

 
 
[¶18]   We do not agree with this 
interpretation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-18-113.  Although the title of the statute is not 
part of the statute, it does suggest that the purpose of the statute is to give 
the administrators of an adult community correctional facility the authority to 
have offenders, parolees, and inmates confined in jail pending disposition of 
alleged violations.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 8-1-105(c) (LexisNexis 
2007).  When the entirety of the 
Adult Community Corrections Act is read in pari materia, it is clear that 
offenders, parolees, and inmates may be removed from a particular community 
correctional facility by action of the administrators of that facility:  Wyo. Stat. Ann § 7-18-103(c) (LexisNexis 
2007) (unit of local government has authority to reject after acceptance any 
offender, parolee, or inmate); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-18-104(c) (LexisNexis 2007) 
(non-governmental entity operating an adult community correctional facility has 
authority to reject after acceptance any offender, parolee, or inmate); Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-18-106(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2007) (community corrections 
board may reject after acceptance any offender, parolee, or inmate); Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-18-108(b)(iii) (LexisNexis 2007) (court may place offender in an adult 
community correctional facility only if the offender is acceptable to the 
community corrections board); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-8-109(b)(v) (LexisNexis 
2007) (inmate may be transferred to an adult community correctional facility 
only if the inmate has been accepted by the community corrections board); Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-18-115(b)(iii) (LexisNexis 2007) (parolee may be required to 
participate in an adult community correctional facility or program only if the 
parolee has been accepted by the community corrections 
board).

 
 
[¶19]   Viewing this statutory scheme in 
its totality, it seems clear that the highlighted language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-18-113 simply reflects the common-sense rule that, in instances such as the 
current case, it is the sentencing court that determines whether probation 
should be revoked and, if so, whether the offender should be incarcerated or 
should be returned to probationary status and allowed to participate in a 
community correctional program.3  In fact, we see nothing in the Adult 
Community Corrections Act that suggests legislative intent that the judiciary 
have any supervisory authority over individual adult community correctional 
facilities.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶20]   Under the Adult Community 
Corrections Act, offenders, parolees, and inmates may be terminated from a 
community correctional facility by administrative action of the governing 
entity.  The appellant was afforded 
an administrative hearing before he was terminated from the CAC, with prior 
notice and an opportunity to be heard.  
He was also offered both an adjudicatory hearing and a dispositional 
hearing in the district court before his probation was revoked, during which 
judicial process he was represented by appointed counsel.  His only complaint with the discovery 
documents provided to him by the State was that there was "too much," not that 
there was "too little."  At the 
adjudicatory hearing, he admitted that he had violated a term of his probation, 
and the district court's finding that the violation was willful was not clearly 
erroneous.  

 
 
[¶21]   We affirm.

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The term 
"Boot Camp" is frequently used to identify Wyoming's statutory Youthful Offender 
Program, found at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1001 through 7-13-1003 (LexisNexis 
2007).

 
 

2We feel 
compelled to note that, even if the appellant had preserved his notice argument, 
we would find it factually to be just short of frivolous.  As noted herein, he was arrested 
immediately after the Old Chicago incident, he was served with a copy of the 
disciplinary write-up describing the Old Chicago incident, he was afforded an 
administrative hearing, the focus of which was the Old Chicago incident, and he 
presented a defense to the allegations of the Old Chicago 
incident.

 
 

3Reference 
to "executive authorities" suggests the same common-sense rule that the parole 
board or the department of corrections would exercise such authority for 
parolees and inmates, respectively.