Title: State v. Prior

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Prior (2000-441); 174 Vt. 49; 804 A.2d 770

[Filed 24-May-2002]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of  Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                No. 2000-441


State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit

Glenn Prior	                                 March Term, 2002


David A. Howard, J.

Dan M. Davis, Windham County State's Attorney, and Christopher C. Moll and 
  Tracy Kelly Shriver, Deputy State's Attorneys, Brattleboro, for 
  Plaintiff-Appellee.

Matthew F. Valerio, Defender General, and Henry Hinton, Appellate Attorney, 
  Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.


PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.


       JOHNSON, J.  Defendant appeals from his conviction for aggravated
  domestic assault,  simple domestic assault, disturbing the peace, and
  arson, following a jury trial.  Defendant claims 1)  that the court erred
  in denying his motion to dismiss in the interests of justice; 2) that the
  state  presented insufficient evidence that a knife used during one of the
  assaults was a "deadly weapon;"  and 3) that the court erred in admitting
  allegations of abusive behavior in an earlier marriage.  We  affirm.

       These charges arise from a series of confrontations between defendant
  and his wife on and  around February 21, 1998.  The couple got into a
  verbal fight that day, which quickly escalated to  physical confrontation,
  in which defendant punched his wife in the ribs.  The next day, defendant 

 

  threatened his wife with a knife while she was packing to leave with the
  couple's children.  After she  left to spend the night at a friend's house,
  defendant burned several of his wife's personal items in  their front yard,
  and made a threatening telephone call to another person.

       Defendant was initially tried on these charges in the fall of 1999,
  but the trial resulted in a  hung jury.  After a second trial in May 2000,
  defendant was convicted.  At trial, the principal dispute  was not whether
  defendant engaged in the alleged conduct, but whether he was criminally 
  responsible for it, because defendant alleged that he was insane at the
  time, suffering from a brief  psychotic disorder.

       Defendant's first claim on appeal is that the court erred in failing
  to grant his motion to  dismiss in the interests of justice pursuant to
  V.R.Cr.P. 48(b).  Rule 48(b)(2) provides that the trial  court may dismiss
  the indictment or information "[i]f the court concludes that such dismissal
  will  serve the ends of justice and the effective administration of the
  court's business."  The motion, filed  after the mistrial, was accompanied
  by an affidavit of the wife stating that she supported dismissal  because
  of the emotional and financial hardship a second trial would cause her and
  her family.  The  court denied the motion, holding that the reasons
  identified by defendant, namely the emotional and  financial toll that a
  second trial would impose, do not outweigh the public's interest in the
  proper  resolution of the case by a jury.  Defendant claims that this
  conclusion was in error because the court  identified many factors that
  weighed in favor of granting the motion, and that it improperly relied on 
  its concern for public appearances in denying the motion.

       The proper inquiry for a motion brought under V.R.Cr.P. 48(b) was
  explained in State v.  Sauve, 164 Vt.134,