Title: Silver Lake v. Metro Regional Transit Auth.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Silver Lake v. Metro Regional Transit Auth., 111 Ohio St.3d 324, 2006-Ohio-5790.] 
 
 
VILLAGE OF SILVER LAKE, APPELLANT, v. METRO REGIONAL TRANSIT 
AUTHORITY ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Silver Lake v. Metro Regional Transit Auth., 111 Ohio St.3d 324, 
2006-Ohio-5790.] 
Regional transit authorities — Lease of unused rail line and right-of-way — R.C. 
306.35(G). 
(No. 2005-1074 — Submitted March 15, 2006 — Decided November 22, 2006.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County,  
No. CA-22199, 2005-Ohio-2157. 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} The village of Silver Lake appeals from a decision of the Summit 
County Court of Appeals, which reversed the judgment of the trial court and 
authorized the Metro Regional Transit Authority to lease the Akron Secondary 
railroad track which borders Silver Lake, to a subsidiary of the Adrian & 
Blissfield Railroad, known as the Cuyahoga Falls & Hudson Railway Company, 
for the operation of a dinner-excursion train.  For the reasons that follow, we 
affirm that decision. 
{¶ 2} In 1972, the cities of Akron, Barberton, and Cuyahoga Falls each 
passed ordinances creating the Metro Regional Transit Authority for the purposes 
of preserving and maintaining the existing level of mass transit service in the area 
and providing the administrative and financial capability to upgrade that service 
in the future.  In 1995, using funds from the Federal Transit Administration and 
the Ohio Department of Transportation, Metro purchased the tracks and right-of-
way known as the Akron Secondary, from milepost 8.0 in Cuyahoga Falls north 
to milepost 1.45 in Hudson, from the Consolidated Rail Corporation.  One and 
one-half miles of that track are located along the western border of Silver Lake 
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and run parallel to State Route 8.  Eight-tenths of a mile adjoin 33 homes in the 
village.  In 2002, the Adrian & Blissfield Railroad contacted Metro regarding the 
possibility of operating a dinner-excursion train on the Akron Secondary.  Metro 
invited public bidding for the venture and ultimately accepted a proposal 
submitted by the Cuyahoga Falls & Hudson Railway Company.  Metro then 
leased the track and right-of-way to the Cuyahoga Falls & Hudson Railway for a 
period of five years for the operation of the dinner train. 
{¶ 3} The proposed dinner train was initially to consist of two dining 
cars, a kitchen car, and two locomotives, with passengers departing from and 
returning to Cuyahoga Falls.  The parties anticipated the excursion train to be a 
revenue-producing project for Metro.  In addition, pursuant to the terms of the 
lease, Cuyahoga Falls & Hudson Railway Company agreed to maintain and 
improve the railroad infrastructure. 
{¶ 4} As a result of the proposed dinner train, the village of Silver Lake 
sued Metro in the Summit County Common Pleas Court to enjoin it from leasing 
the Akron Secondary, asserting that its zoning code does not permit the operation 
of a railroad for a commercial use and urging that a dinner-excursion train is not a 
transit facility.  The village timely sought a judgment declaring that Metro lacked 
the statutory authority to lease its facilities to operate a dinner train.  The trial 
court granted Silver Lake’s request for both injunctive and declaratory relief, and 
found both that there was an “imminent threat” that the proposed dinner train 
would violate the Silver Lake zoning code and that the dinner train did not fit the 
definition of a transit facility; it therefore held that the lease exceeded the scope of 
Metro’s statutory authority. 
{¶ 5} On appeal, the Summit County Court of Appeals reversed the trial 
court, determining that because the Akron Secondary had been excluded from any 
zoning designation in the Silver Lake zoning code, the dinner train would not 
violate any zoning code restrictions.  It further held that Metro had the statutory 
January Term, 2006 
3 
authority to lease the Akron Secondary regardless of whether the dinner train 
itself was a transit facility.  Silver Lake appealed to our court, and we granted 
discretionary review on the limited question of Metro’s statutory authority to 
lease the Akron Secondary.  Silver Lake v. Metro Regional Transit Auth., 106 
Ohio St.3d 1532, 2005-Ohio-5146, 835 N.E.2d 382. 
{¶ 6} Silver Lake asserts in our court that Metro exceeded its statutory 
authority in leasing the Akron Secondary to the Cuyahoga Falls & Hudson 
Railway Company to operate a dinner-excursion train, contending that a regional 
transit authority is confined to utilizing its property only for an activity in which 
the primary purpose is the regularly scheduled mass movement of passengers. 
{¶ 7}  Metro, on the other hand, argues that the law permits a regional 
transit authority to lease transit facilities to accomplish the purposes of its 
organization and that the law authorizes a regional transit authority to lease real 
property to protect and improve its transit facilities or for any other necessary 
purpose.  Therefore, Metro claims, it leased the Akron Secondary for the dinner-
excursion train in accordance with its statutory authority, not only to generate 
revenue for Metro but also to obligate the railway to assume responsibility for the 
maintenance and improvement of the Akron Secondary until Metro can engage in 
the regularly scheduled mass movement of passengers on that line. 
{¶ 8} The issue then presented for our review concerns the scope of the 
statutory authority of a regional transit authority, specifically, whether the Metro 
Regional Transit Authority is authorized to lease the Akron Secondary to the 
Cuyahoga Falls & Hudson Railway Company on an interim basis for the 
operation of a dinner train until Metro can use the tracks for the mass movement 
of passengers, or whether Metro is restricted to leasing property that is only being 
utilized as a transit facility. 
{¶ 9} A transit facility is defined in R.C. 306.30: “As used in sections 
306.30 to 306.53, inclusive, of the Revised Code, ‘transit facility’ means any: 
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{¶ 10} “(A) Street railway * * * or other ground * * * transportation 
system having as its primary purpose the regularly scheduled mass movement of 
passengers between locations within the territorial boundaries of a regional transit 
authority, including all right-of-way * * * attendant thereto * * *.” 
{¶ 11} Also relevant to this issue, however, are subsections (G) and (J) of 
R.C. 306.35, which provide additional statutory authorization for a regional transit 
authority to lease transit facilities or to lease real property.  Specifically, R.C. 
306.35 provides: 
{¶ 12} “Upon the creation of a regional transit authority * * *, the 
authority shall exercise in its own name all the rights, powers, and duties vested in 
and conferred upon it by sections 306.30 to 306.53 of the Revised Code.  Subject 
to any reservations, limitations, and qualifications that are set forth in those 
sections, the regional transit authority: 
{¶ 13} “* * * 
{¶ 14} “(G) May acquire, construct, improve, extend, repair, lease, 
operate, maintain, or manage transit facilities within or without its territorial 
boundaries, considered necessary to accomplish the purposes of its organization 
and make charges for the use of transit facilities;  
{¶ 15} “* * * 
{¶ 16} “(J) May * * * lease as lessee or lessor * * * real and personal 
property, or any interest or right in real and personal property, * * * for the 
location or protection of transit facilities and improvements and access to transit 
facilities * * * or for any other necessary purpose * * *.” (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 17} These foregoing subsections require no judicial interpretation: 
“When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear 
and definite meaning, there is no need for this court to apply the rules of statutory 
interpretation.”  Symmes Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Smyth (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 549, 
553, 721 N.E.2d 1057.  “Statutory interpretation involves an examination of the 
January Term, 2006 
5 
words used by the legislature in a statute, and when the General Assembly has 
plainly and unambiguously conveyed its legislative intent, there is nothing for a 
court to interpret or construe, and therefore, the court applies the law as written.”  
State v. Kreischer, 109 Ohio St.3d 391, 2006-Ohio-2706, 848 N.E.2d 496. 
{¶ 18} Thus, two bases exist that authorize the Metro Regional Transit 
Authority to lease the Akron Secondary to the Cuyahoga Falls & Hudson Railway 
Company for the operation of a dinner train.  First, assuming that the Akron 
Secondary, consisting of a railroad right-of-way and six and one-half miles of 
railroad track, is a transit facility, Metro is authorized to lease it while it is being 
held for future use.  Second, Metro is authorized to lease the Akron Secondary 
because it is owned by Metro and it consists of real property that may be leased 
for the protection of or improvement and access to transit facilities, or for any 
other necessary purpose. 
R.C. 306.35(G): Lease of Transit Facilities 
{¶ 19} Consistent with R.C. 306.35(G), a regional transit authority is 
authorized to acquire or lease transit facilities “considered necessary to 
accomplish the purposes of its organization.”  The ordinances of Akron, 
Barberton, and Cuyahoga Falls that created the Metro Regional Transit Authority 
set forth its purposes:  to preserve and maintain the current level of mass transit 
service and to provide the administrative and financial capability to improve and 
upgrade mass transit service in the future. 
{¶ 20} In addition, the Ohio Department of Transportation provided partial 
funding for Metro’s purchase of the Akron Secondary to further the Department’s 
commitment to secure feasible transportation options for the future.  The 
Department believed that retaining Conrail’s Akron-to-Hudson rail line for future 
rail freight, passenger, and commuter service is one action consistent with that 
goal.  Further, Federal Transit Administration policies also encourage transit 
systems to participate in joint development projects, including leases of real 
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property “to secure a revenue stream for the transit system” while the property is 
held for a future use.  Federal Transit Administration Policy on Transit Joint 
Development, 62 F.R. 12266-01.  Therefore, although the Akron Secondary is not 
currently used by Metro for the regularly scheduled mass movement of 
passengers, it nonetheless constitutes a transit facility, as it is a rail line acquired 
with federal and state funds to preserve a potential future commuter rail line.  
Metro is thus authorized to lease the tracks to accomplish the goals of its 
organization, and the dinner-train lease will not only generate revenue for Metro 
but will also obligate the lessee, the Cuyahoga Falls & Hudson Railway 
Company, to maintain and improve the Akron Secondary. 
R.C. 306.35(J): Lease of Real Property 
{¶ 21} Even if the Akron Secondary is not considered to be a transit 
facility, the Metro Regional Transit Authority is nonetheless authorized to lease it 
because it is real property consisting of a railroad right-of-way and a rail line.  
The plain language of R.C. 306.35(J) authorizes Metro to lease the Akron 
Secondary for the protection of or improvement and access to transit facilities or 
for any other necessary purpose.  The terms of the dinner-train lease provide that 
the Cuyahoga Falls & Hudson Railway Company will maintain and improve the 
rail line, and the anticipated revenue from the lease will provide the financial 
capability to improve transit facilities in the future. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 22} Where a regional transit authority acquires an existing rail line and 
right-of-way, R.C. 306.35(G) and (J) independently confer upon it the discretion 
to lease the rail line and right-of-way while it is being held for future use to 
accomplish the purposes of its organization, to make charges for the use of transit 
facilities, for the protection of or improvement and access to transit facilities, or 
for any other necessary purpose. 
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{¶ 23} Here, the Metro Regional Transit Authority leased the Akron 
Secondary to the Cuyahoga Falls & Hudson Railway Company for the operation 
of a dinner train in accordance with this statutory authority.  Therefore, we are 
compelled to affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK and O’CONNOR, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 24} R.C. Chapter 306 governs the creation and authority of regional 
transit authorities, including the appellee, Metro Regional Transit Authority.  As 
creatures of statute, regional transit authorities may exercise only those powers 
that are expressly granted or that may be reasonably inferred from an express 
grant of authority.  See D.A.B.E., Inc. v. Toledo-Lucas Cty. Bd. of Health, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 250, 2002-Ohio-4172, 773 N.E.2d 536; Burger Brewing Co. v Thomas 
(1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 377, 71 O.O.2d 366, 329 N.E.2d 693.  Implied powers are 
those that are incidental or ancillary to an expressly granted power; the express 
grant of power must be clear, and any doubt as to the extent of the grant must be 
resolved against it.  State ex rel. A. Bentley & Sons Co. v. Pierce (1917), 96 Ohio 
St. 44, 47, 117 N.E. 6. 
{¶ 25} Pursuant to R.C. 306.31, a regional transit authority may be created 
for the purpose of “acquiring, constructing, operating, maintaining, replacing, 
improving, and extending transit facilities” and for similar acts, such as 
controlling and administering the public utilities franchise of transit facilities; 
entering, supervising, and accepting the assignment of franchise agreements; and 
accepting assignment of and exercising a right to purchase a transit system 
according to the terms of an existing franchise agreement.  The General Assembly 
thus conferred some breadth upon the counties, townships, and municipalities to 
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create regional transit authorities.  Metro suggests that once a regional transit 
authority has been created, it can then act broadly to exercise an array of rights, 
including proprietary and contractual rights.  But while some breadth of rights 
may be conferred in the creation of a regional transit authority, the exercise of the 
authority’s power is not unlimited.  Rather, any exercise of that power must be 
consistent with the purposes of the statute. 
{¶ 26} Central to the understanding of R.C. 306.31 and other sections of 
R.C. Chapter 306 is the definition of “transit facility.”  The legislature expressly 
defined that term to mean a transportation system (e.g., a street railway, motor 
bus, subway, ferry, helicopter) that has “as its primary purpose the regularly 
scheduled mass movement of passengers between locations within the territorial 
boundaries of a regional transit authority.”  (Emphasis added.) R.C. 306.30(A). 
The General Assembly’s definition thus expressly requires that a regional transit 
facility must have as its “fundamental” or “principal” act, see Webster’s Third 
New International Dictionary (1986) 1800 (defining “primary”), the “chang[ing] 
of place,” id. at 1480 (defining “movement”), of “a large body of persons in a 
compact body,” id. at 1388 (defining “mass”).  When Metro helps thousands of 
residents of Summit County get to work, school, appointments, and social events 
through its bus lines, it serves the transportation needs of the public and acts 
clearly as a “transit facility.”  Here, however, Metro is not operating such a 
service. 
{¶ 27} The train at issue in this litigation clearly was not intended to 
provide the people of Summit County with a form of mass transit.  
Transportation, after all, necessarily involves the movement, conveyance, or 
travel of people and things from one place to another.  Branson Scenic Ry. v. Dir. 
of Revenue (Mo.App.1999), 3 S.W.3d 788, 791.  See, also, United States v. 
Mohrbacher (C.A.9, 1999), 182 F.3d 1041, 1048-1049; Golden Gate Scenic 
Steamship Lines, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1962), 57 Cal.2d 373, 380, 19 
January Term, 2006 
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Cal.Rptr. 657, 369 P.2d 257, quoting Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania 
(1885), 114 U.S. 196, 5 S.Ct. 826, 29 L.Ed. 158 (noting that the word 
“transportation” “has been judicially defined as implying ‘the taking up of 
persons or property at some point and putting them down at another’ ”).  Mere 
mobility does not equate to transportation, particularly when, as here, the 
movement in question is limited to a circuital route.  Branson Scenic Ry., 3 
S.W.3d at 792 (“Carousels, pony rides, riverboat rides, trail rides, miniature train 
rides, and the antique car ride at [an amusement park] * * * carry (transport) 
patrons * * * Yet, no one could argue persuasively that these rides were 
transportation rather than amusement”). 
{¶ 28} Nor is there any showing in this record that a significant number of 
people will ever ride the train.  Indeed, we can infer that a relatively small number 
of passengers will be able to avail themselves of the train, which Metro stipulates 
will have limited (one or two) weekly runs and will consist, in its entirety, of two 
dining cars, a kitchen car, and two locomotives. 
{¶ 29} Thus, we know that the train was intended neither for the masses 
nor for transportation.  Nor is there any indication that it will foster the important 
public policies and benefits that are believed to flow from mass transit systems, 
such as providing commuting workers with a safe and reliable mode of 
transportation, decreasing motor vehicle traffic and concomitant harms to the 
environment caused by vehicle emissions, or improving domestic security by 
reducing dependence on foreign petroleum products. 
{¶ 30} Indeed, although the majority opinion, Metro, and Metro’s amici 
rather nebulously suggest that operation of the dinner train will help maintain and 
improve the railway tracks for future use as a passenger line, it seems abundantly 
clear that the real purpose of the proposed train is to produce revenue for Metro 
by attracting consumers interested in purchasing a meal and entertainment.  I 
agree with the common pleas court that initially heard this case, as well as courts 
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elsewhere in the country, that excursion trains operating for purposes of 
entertainment and profit are not instruments of mass transit.  See, e.g., Belton v. 
Smoky Hill Ry. & Historical Society, Inc. (Mo.App.2005), 170 S.W.3d 429, 435, 
quoting Branson Scenic Ry. v. Dir. of Revenue, 3 S.W.3d at 792 (“ ‘[w]hen a 
carrier offers rides for fun, as opposed to offering them for the purpose of actually 
getting the rider to a particular place, then the carrier is providing amusement 
rides.  It is not in the transportation business, even though its mode of amusement 
is mobile’ ”).  See, also, Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc. Petition for Declaratory 
Order, 7 I.C.C.2d 954, 965 (noting that a train operating on 18 miles of a railroad 
line in Napa Valley, California, was “more a local tourist excursion than a 
conveyance for the through movement of passengers”). 
{¶ 31} The majority’s holding too generously reads beyond the express 
wording of the enabling statute, unreasonably extends the powers properly 
conferred on regional transit authorities, and ignores critical distinctions that 
courts and legislatures historically have drawn in considering passenger trains and 
excursion trains, see, e.g., Chicago & Alton RR.. Co. v. People (1883), 105 Ill. 
657, to find that the proposed train adequately serves the fundamental purposes 
for which the Metro Regional Transit Authority was created initially — to 
preserve, maintain, and improve the current level of mass transit service of its 
constituents.  Because I do not believe that there is a sufficient and reasonable 
showing of a tangible nexus between the proposed train and the regularly 
scheduled mass movement of passengers, I dissent. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and RESNICK, J., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Mazanec, Raskin & Ryder Co., L.P.A., Todd M. Raskin, Timothy R. 
Obringer, and Martin J. O’Connell; and Hoover, Heydorn & Herrnstein Co., 
L.P.A., and Robert W. Heydorn, for appellant. 
January Term, 2006 
11 
 
Roetzel & Andress, Amie L. Bruggeman, Stephen W. Funk, and Caroline 
Regallis, for appellee. 
Lawrence Gawell, for amicus curiae Ohio Public Transit Association. 
Max Rothal, Akron Director of Law, and David A. Muntean, Assistant 
Director of Law, for amicus curiae city of Akron. 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., Richard L. Moore, and Erica D. 
Gann, for amicus curiae Southwest Ohio Regional Transit Authority. 
Barry M. Byron, Stephen L. Byron, and John Gotherman, for amicus 
curiae Ohio Municipal League. 
______________________