Title: SEVEN LAKES DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, L.L.C.; and DAVID W. KUHN V. JOHN MAXSON and MARILYN MAXSON, husband and wife

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

SEVEN LAKES DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, L.L.C.; and DAVID W. KUHN V. JOHN MAXSON and MARILYN MAXSON, husband and wife2006 WY 136144 P.3d 1239Case Number: 06-6Decided: 10/27/2006
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
SEVEN 
LAKES DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, L.L.C.; and DAVID W. KUHN,

 
 
Appellants

(Defendants),

 
 
v.

 
 
JOHN 
MAXSON and MARILYN MAXSON, husband and wife,

 
 
Appellees

(Plaintiffs).

 
 
Appeal from theDistrictCourtofCarbonCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellants:

William 
L. Hiser, Kelly Neville Heck, and Lindsay Hoyt of Brown & Hiser LLC, 
Laramie, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Hiser.

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

M. 
Gregory Weisz and Devon O'Connell Coleman of Pence and MacMillan LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Weisz.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, and BURKE, JJ, and YOUNG, 
DJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 

VOIGT, Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellants Seven 
Lakes Development Company, L.L.C. and David Kuhn ("the Appellants") appeal the 
district court's determination that Appellees John and Marilyn Maxson ("the 
Maxsons") hold a profit a prendre (profit) to hunt and fish on the Appellants' 
land and that such profit: (1) has not been abandoned; (2) has not been 
extinguished through adverse possession; (3) allows the use of motorized 
vehicles; and (4) allows access to adjacent federal lands.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]     1.   Did the district court properly 
determine on summary judgment that the Maxsons held a profit in the Appellants' 
land?

 
 
           
2.   Did the district 
court err when it found that the profit had not been abandoned by the Maxsons or 
their predecessors in interest?

 
 
           
3.   Did the district 
court err when it found that the profit had not been extinguished through 
adverse possession?

 
 
           
4.   Did the district 
court err when it found that the profit allows the use of motorized vehicles by 
the Maxsons while exercising their rights under the 
profit?

 
 
           
5.   Did the district 
court err in its findings regarding the Maxsons' right to enter adjacent public 
lands from the Appellants' property while exercising their rights under the 
profit?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      At the outset, we 
will generally describe the facts relevant to this appeal, but will discuss 
other facts relevant to each issue in the discussion of those issues.  On April 4, 1955, Clarence McKinley 
("McKinley") received a patent granting him title to 480 acres of land in 
Carbon County, Wyoming.  
The land is legally described as "N½N½, SW¼NW¼, N½SW¼, SW¼SW¼" of section 
22 and "W½W½" of section 27 in Township 18 North, Range 78 West of the 
6th Principal Meridian, Wyoming.  McKinley also owned an additional piece 
of land in section 22 that is now held by SevenLakes.

 
 
[¶4]      McKinley 
apparently intended to subdivide the land in sections 22 and 27 and form a small 
community he called "Woodedge."  He 
created twenty-four 10-acre plots that were to be sold with the intent that the 
buyers would erect cabins thereon.  
McKinley intended to build certain improvements on the land he retained, 
including a road, a toboggan run, and a lodge; however, such improvements were 
never completed.  Two of the parcels 
that McKinley conveyed in this manner are now owned by the Maxsons.  As we will more closely examine in our 
discussion, infra, the deeds from 
McKinley to the Maxsons' predecessors contained language indicating that the 
original grantees were also granted a "privilege" to hunt and fish on the lands 
owned by McKinley.  A large portion 
of the land in the Woodedge area that was subject to the "privilege" is now 
owned, through various conveyances, by the Appellants.  Seven Lakes owns the land at issue in 
section 22 and David Kuhn owns the land in section 27.

 
 
[¶5]      The instant 
appeal arose from an action filed by the Maxsons against the Appellants and 
Clear Creek Cattle Company.1  The Maxsons sought a declaratory 
judgment on the legal status of their interest in the lands originally retained 
by McKinley and now owned by the Appellants.  On cross-motions for summary judgment, 
the district court determined that the "privileges" to hunt and fish held by the 
Maxsons constituted a covenant running with the land, namely, a 
profit.

 
 
[¶6]      The district 
court later held a bench trial to determine the scope of the profit and whether 
the profit had been extinguished in the time between the grant from McKinley in 
the 1950s and the filing of the present action.  After the trial, the district court 
concluded, among other determinations, that the profit had not been abandoned by 
the Maxsons' predecessors in interest, had not been adversely possessed by the 
Kuhn family, allowed motorized vehicles to be used in the enjoyment of the 
profit by the dominant estate owners, and did not allow a general access 
easement across the Appellants' lands to adjacent public lands.  The district court also determined, 
however, that the Maxsons could not be prevented from crossing into public lands 
during their proper use of the profit.  
The instant appeal followed.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]      Our standard of 
review for summary judgments is well known:

 
 
            
Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue as to any material 
fact exists and the prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter 
of law.  Eklund v. PRI 
Environmental, Inc., 2001 WY 55, ¶ 10, 25 P.3d 511, ¶ 10 
(Wyo.2001); see also W.R.C.P. 56(c). A genuine issue 
of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would have the 
effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action 
or defense that has been asserted by the parties. Williams Gas Processing-Wamsutter Co. v. Union Pacific 
Resources Co., 2001 WY 
57, ¶ 11, 25 P.3d 1064, ¶ 11 
(Wyo.2001). We examine the record from the vantage point most favorable to the 
party who opposed the motion, and we give that party the benefit of all 
favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the record.  Id. We evaluate the propriety 
of a summary judgment by employing the same standards and by using the same 
materials as were employed and used by the lower court.  Scherer Constr., LLC v. Hedquist Constr., Inc., 2001 WY 23, ¶ 15, 18 P.3d 645, ¶ 15 
(Wyo.2001). We do not accord any deference to the district court's decisions on 
issues of law. Id.

 
 

Trabing v. Kinko's, Inc., 2002 WY 171, ¶ 8, 57 P.3d 1248, 1252 (Wyo. 
2002).

 
 
[¶8]      When reviewing 
findings of fact and conclusions of law after a bench trial, we apply the 
following standard of review:

 
 
            
"The factual findings of a judge are subject to a broader scope of review 
than a jury verdict, and the appellate court may examine all of the properly 
admissible evidence in the record."  R.C.R., Inc. v. Rainbow Canyon, Inc., 978 P.2d 581, 586 
(Wyo.1999) (citing Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 538 
(Wyo.1993)).  
The findings of fact made by the district court will not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous.  Hopper, 861 P.2d  at 538.  The district court's conclusions of law are 
not binding on the reviewing court and are reviewed de novo.  

 
 

Baker v. Pike, 2002 WY 34, ¶ 9, 41 P.3d 537, 541 (Wyo. 
2002).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Legal classification of the Maxsons' interest in the 
Appellants' lands

 
 
[¶9]      We must first 
determine whether the district court erred in construing the Maxsons' interest 
in the Appellants' lands as a profit.  The issue is one of law and comes before us 
on a grant of summary judgment in favor of the Maxsons; therefore, our review is 
de novo.  See Smith v. Nugget 
Exploration, 857 P.2d 320, 323 (Wyo. 1993).  We find that the 
district court properly applied the law and agree that a profit was created.

 
 
[¶10]   All parties agree that whatever 
interest the Maxsons have was created by McKinley's warranty deeds to the 
original purchasers of the Maxsons' land.  Our rules of construction for deeds are well 
known:

 
 
            
We interpret a warranty deed like a contract "from specific language of 
the deed," and "begin by looking at the instrument itself."  Bixler [v. Oro Mgmt., 
L.L.C., 2004 WY 29], ¶ 16[, 86 P.3d 843, 849 
(Wyo.2004)].  
We must first examine the terms of the deed and give them their plain and 
ordinary meaning.  
Plain meaning is that "meaning which [the] language would convey to 
reasonable persons at the time and place of its use."  Id., ¶ 14.  When the provisions 
in the contract are clear and unambiguous, the court looks only to the "four 
corners" of the document in arriving at the intent of the parties.  Determining the 
parties' intent is our prime focus in interpreting or construing a 
contract.  Boley v. Greenough, 
2001 WY 47, ¶ 11, 22 P.3d 854, ¶ 11 (Wyo.2001).

 
 

Gilstrap v. June Eisele Warren Trust, 2005 WY 21, ¶ 12, 106 P.3d 858, 862 (Wyo. 
2005).

 
 
[¶11]   Before we analyze the language of the 
original warranty deeds, however, we must review certain non-possessory 
privileges and interests in land. 

 
 
            
A license is a privilege to do certain acts of a temporary character on 
the land of another which is revocable at the will of a licensor unless a 
definite time has been specified, or unless it is coupled with an interest.  Coumas v. 
Transcontinental Garage, 68 Wyo. 99, 230 P.2d 748, 758 
(1951).  A 
license does not give any interest in the land, but means that one who possesses 
a license is not a trespasser.  Anthony Wilkinson Live Stock Co. v. McIlquam, 14 
Wyo. 209, 226-27, 83 P. 364, 369 (1905); Metcalf v. Hart, 3 
Wyo. 513, 527, 27 P. 900, 905 
(1891).  A 
license may be created by parol, a writing, or can be implied from the acts of 
the parties, from their relations, and from usage and custom.  Kendrick v. Healy, 
27 Wyo. 123, 148, 192 P. 601, 610 
(1920).

 
 

Sammons v. American Auto. Ass'n, 912 P.2d 1103, 1105 (Wyo. 1996).  Licenses are 
distinguishable from servitudes, which are interests in land:

 
 
            
(1)       A servitude is 
a legal device that creates a right or an obligation that runs with land or an 
interest in land.

           
(a)   
Running with the land means that the right or obligation passes 
automatically to successive owners or occupiers of the land or the interest in 
land with which the right or obligation runs.

           
(b)   
A right that runs with land is called a "benefit" and the interest in 
land with which it runs may be called the "benefited" or "dominant" estate.

           
(c)    
An obligation that runs with land is called a "burden" and the interest 
in land with which it runs may be called the "burdened" or "servient" 
estate.

 
 
Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 1.1(1) (2000 
& Cum. Supp. 2006).  

 
 
[¶12]   A "servitude" is a general category 
that includes a variety of non-possessory interests in land, including easements 
and profits.  
Id. § 1.1(2).  "An easement is 
defined as an interest in land which entitles the easement holder to a limited 
use or enjoyment over another person's property.'"  Hasvold v. Park County 
Sch. Dist. No. 6, 2002 WY 
65, ¶ 13, 45 P.3d 635, 638 (Wyo. 
2002) (quoting Mueller v. Hoblyn, 887 P.2d 500, 504 
(Wyo. 1994)).  Profits have been 
referred to as "easements plus.'"  Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 
1.2 cmt. e.  
The Restatement explains that "[p]rofits are easements (rights to enter 
and use land in the possession of another) plus the right to remove something 
from the land."  
Id.  Similarly, 28A 
C.J.S. Easements 
§ 9 (1996) notes that "[t]he [profit] right is in the nature of an easement, and 
it is often called an easement; but it is more than an easement.  It is an interest 
or an estate in the land itself as distinguished from a mere personal obligation 
of the owner of realty."  Cf. 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and 
Licenses § 3 (2004) ("[A] profit a prendre is a liberty in one person to 
enter another's soil and take from it the fruits not yet carried away.  A profit a prendre 
is therefore distinguishable from an easement, since one of the features of an 
easement is the absence of all right to participate in the profits of the soil 
charged with it.")  
In agreement with these general rules, we have said that a "profit a 
prendre is . . . a right to take a certain thing or things from the land of 
another.  If, 
accordingly, the right to take does not exist, the right cannot, at least 
strictly, be called a profit a prendre."  Denver Joint Stock Land Bank of Denver v. Dixon, 122 P.2d 842, 847 (Wyo. 1942).

 
 
[¶13]   Profits and easements may be 
appurtenant to a dominant estate or held in gross.  25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and 
Licenses §§ 3, 8, 9; 28A C.J.S. Easements §§ 9-11.  An "appurtenant" non-possessory interest in 
land "means that the rights or obligations of a servitude are tied to ownership 
or occupancy of a particular unit or parcel of land."  Restatement (Third) 
of Prop.: Servitudes § 1.5(1).  An interest is "in gross," however, when the 
right "is not tied to ownership or occupancy of a particular unit or parcel of 
land."  
Id. § 1.5(2).

 
 
[¶14]   Finally, we note that "[t]he principle 
difference between a servitude and a license is that a license is revocable at 
will.  An 
easement or profit, by contrast, is normally irrevocable.  Easements and 
profits can be revoked only if the right to revoke is expressly reserved and 
properly exercised."  
Id. § 2.2 cmt. h.

 
 
[¶15]   The Maxsons currently own two parcels 
that were conveyed to their predecessors in interest by McKinley in 1957 and 
1958, respectively.  
The relevant language in those warranty deeds is nearly identical:

 
 
Reserving unto Grantors all Ski and road rights of way and 
subject to the following Restrictive and Protective Covenants for all land now 
owned or hereafter acquired by Grantors in Section[s] 22 and 27, Township 18 
North, Range 78 West of the 6th P.M., Wyoming:

            
1.   
There shall be no pollution of the East Fork of Dutton Creek or any of 
its tributaries;

            
2.   
Grazing rights are limited to land owned by grantees herein or hereafter 
acquired by grantees herein.

            
3.   
Each pruchaser [sic] from grantor herein to lands in Section[s] 22 and 27 
in said Township shall have equal water rights and water rights of way to the 
said East Fork of Dutton Creek and its tributaries in said areas;

            
4.   
All building sites and all buildings that shall be built by grantees upon 
the above described lands shall be maintained in a neat and orderly manner;

            
5.   
Hunting and fishing 
privileges are extended to all lands now owned by grantor, or hereafter acquired 
by grantor in said Sections 22 and 27, but said privileges must not be 
commercialized by grantees herein;

            
6.   
These covenants are to run with the land and shall be binding on grantors 
and grantees and all persons claiming under them.

            
7.   
If the parties hereto, or any of them or their heirs or assigns shall 
violate or attempt to violate any of the covenants herein, it shall be lawful 
for any other person or persons owning any real property situated in W½W½ of 
Section 27 and W½W¼ Section 22 in said Township to prosecute any proceedings at 
law or in equity against the person or persons violating or attempting to 
violate any such covenants and either to prevent him or them from so doing or to 
recover damages or the dues for such violation.[2] 

 
 
(Emphasis added.)

 
 
[¶16]   The Appellants argue that the hunting 
and fishing language in paragraph 5, above, created a revocable license between 
McKinley and the original grantees.  The Maxsons argue that the district court 
correctly construed the language and McKinley created a profit.  Though the parties 
disagree about the meaning of the language, neither party argues that the deed 
is ambiguous.  
Mere disagreement as to the meaning of language in a deed does not 
necessarily mean that the deed is ambiguous.  Newman v. Rag Wyo. Land Co., 2002 WY 132, ¶ 11, 53 P.3d 540, 544 (Wyo. 
2002).  

 
 
[¶17]   In the similar context of determining 
whether an easement or license was created by a grant, we have said that 
when

 
 
determining whether an easement or a license exists, the 
critical factor to consider is the parties' intent, identified by the manner in 
which the right was created, the nature of the right created, the duration of 
the right, the amount of consideration given for the right, and whether there is 
a reservation of power to revoke the right.

 
 

Baker, ¶ 20, 41 P.3d  at 543.  See also Markstein v. Countryside I, L.L.C., 2003 WY 122, ¶ 33, 77 P.3d 389, 399-400 
(applying the Baker factors to a grant of fishing rights).

 
 
[¶18]   In the instant case, we note that (1) 
the hunting and fishing "privileges" were created in a warranty deed for 
property in the Woodedge area; (2) the grant created a legally enforceable right 
to enter and take wildlife and fish from the land of the grantor; (3) no time 
was specified for the "privileges" to continue or at which they would 
automatically cease; (4) consideration was paid for the warranty deed, including 
all items listed as "Restrictive and Protective Covenants"; and (5) the only 
implied basis for revoking the "privileges" was if they were 
"commercialized."  
We are further cognizant of the following characteristics of the language 
in the warranty deed:

 
 

 
 
Based on the language in the warranty deeds, it seems clear 
that McKinley created in the original grantees a right to enter and take game 
and fish, which right was appurtenant to the land and irrevocable unless the 
grantees or their heirs or assigns commercialized the right.3  

 
 
[¶19]   The Appellants, however, argue that the 
warranty deed did not contain grant language sufficient to create an interest in 
the land and also that, if an interest was created, it cannot properly be 
considered a profit.  
This argument is not persuasive.  The Appellants focus on the phrase 
"privileges are extended" and argue that these are not "apt" words granting a 
profit to hunt and fish on the McKinley land.  They correctly point out that the ultimate 
goal in determining whether a grant of an interest in land was made is to 
determine the intent of the parties to the deed.  With the foregoing discussion in mind, we see 
no other intent than to grant a profit in the lands retained by McKinley.  When read as a 
whole, the "covenants" in the warranty deedsincluding the "privileges" to hunt 
and fishevidence an intent to create a right in the grantees that was to run 
with the land, pass to the heirs and assigns of the grantees, and was 
irrevocable unless commercialized.  We are similarly not persuaded that the use 
of the word "privileges" to describe the grant indicates an intent to create a 
revocable license.  
35A Am. Jur. 2d Fish, Game, and Wildlife Conservation § 8 (2001) notes 
that a right granted to hunt and fish on the land of another, while a property 
right, is properly considered a "privilege" because the ability to take game and 
fish is actually granted by the state.  See also Barton v. Gammell, 143 Ga.App. 291, 293-94, 238 S.E.2d 445, 447 (1977) (grant of lake "privileges" constituted an easement, not a mere 
license); Council v. 
Sanderlin, 183 N.C. 253, 111 S.E. 365, 367 (1922) ("[a] deed for shooting 
privileges on land is a grant of a profit a prendre"); and 35A Am. Jur. 2d Fish, Game, and 
Wildlife Conservation § 27 ("where a grantor has reserved the hunting 
privileges . . ."; "a qualified right to hunt which is subject to the fee of 
hunting privileges reserved . . .").  We, therefore, hold that the use of the term 
"privileges" in the grant is sufficient to convey a profit in the land.

 
 
[¶20]   The Appellants' final argument against 
categorizing the grant in the McKinley deeds as a profit is that, if an interest 
was created, it is not properly labeled a profit and we should instead recognize 
the right as an easement.  The Appellants rely on Jon W. Bruce & 
James W. Ely, Jr., The Law of Easements and Licenses in 
Land (rev. ed. 2001 & Supp. 2006) and Herman H. Hahner, An Analysis of Profits 
a Prendre, 25 Or. L. Rev. 217 (1946), for the proposition that game and fish 
are not "profits" of the soili.e., they belong to the State, not the private 
landownerand, therefore, a profit was not created.  At most, the 
Appellants argue, the McKinley deeds created an easement that, for public policy 
reasons, should be construed as an easement in gross.  We find this 
argument to be without merit.  First, a large majority of courts and 
secondary sources treat hunting and fishing rights in the land of another as 
profits.  See 25 Am. Jur. 2d 
Easements and 
Licenses § 3; 28A C.J.S. Easements § 9; L. S. Tellier, Annotation, Right Created by 
Private Grant or Reservation to Hunt or Fish on Another's Land, 49 A.L.R.2d 
1395 (1956) and citations therein.  The fact that game and fish do not grow from 
the soil of land and are considered the property of the State and not of the 
servient estate owner does not persuade us to abandon a long-established and 
widely-recognized rule of property law.  Second, even if we were to decide that a 
profit cannot be created for hunting and fishing rights as a matter of law, the 
warranty deeds in the instant case clearly intended that the rights "run with 
the land" and were, therefore, appurtenant and automatically pass to subsequent 
grantees of the property.

 
 
[¶21]   Because the language in the McKinley 
deeds clearly evidenced an intent to create an irrevocable, appurtenant profit 
to hunt and fish on the lands retained by McKinley, the district court properly 
granted summary judgment on this issue in favor of the Maxsons (the successors 
in interest to the grantees of the McKinley deeds).  We find no 
indication from the four corners of the warranty deeds that the parties to those 
conveyances intended to create a revocable license or an easement in gross.

 
 
Abandonment

 
 
[¶22]   The Appellants claim that, even if a 
profit was created, such profit was abandoned prior to the Maxsons' ownership of 
the dominant estate.  
"The question of abandonment is one of fact, depending upon intention and 
conduct."  Boatman v. Andre, 
44 Wyo. 352, 12 P.2d 370, 374 
(1932).  As a 
question of fact, we review the district court's determination that the profit 
was not abandoned under the "clearly erroneous" standard of review.  

 
 
[¶23]   The Appellants first claim that the 
profit was abandoned along with the larger development scheme to build a lodge, 
a ski area, and other improvements on the land retained by McKinley.  At trial, the 
Appellants presented the testimony of witnesses who described their 
understanding of the general development scheme and further testified that such 
scheme had never been implemented.  They also refer us to two "Agreements" 
introduced at trial that recite the terms of the development scheme.  The Appellants' 
argument, as we understand it, is that (1) the profit was merely one right in a 
more general development scheme; (2) under the development scheme, McKinley was 
obligated to build certain improvements on the lands retained by him and subject 
to the profit; (3) such improvements were not built; therefore, (4) the scheme 
was abandoned and all rights thereunder were extinguished by abandonment.  

 
 
[¶24]   The district court determined that 
"although the general plan or scheme of the recreation community may have been 
abandoned, such is insufficient to allow for a per se abandonment 
of every covenant."  
The district court's findings are not clearly erroneous.  

 
 
[¶25]   The agreements relied upon by the 
Appellants were executed in 1955 between McKinley and third parties not within 
the Maxsons' line of title.  Those agreements were specifically 
incorporated into the warranty deeds in their respective transactions.  In contrast, the 
Maxsons have never arguedand we have been presented with no direct 
evidencethat their land was part of the general development scheme.  Further, there is 
no evidence that the McKinley conveyances to the Maxsons' predecessors were 
subject to the development scheme, but those conveyances did expressly grant 
rights to hunt and fish on the lands retained by McKinley.4  Therefore, the 
district court's determination that the profit to hunt and fish was not 
extinguished by McKinley's conducteven if the general development scheme was 
abandonedis not clearly erroneous and must be affirmed.5

 
 
[¶26]   The Appellants next argue that, even if 
the profit has not been totally extinguished by abandonment as discussed above, 
then it was abandoned as to the Kuhns' land in section 27 by the Woodedge owners 
in the years subsequent to the conveyances from McKinley.  According to the 
Appellants:

 
 
The privilege to hunt and fish on grantor's lands has only 
been exercised by members of the Woodedge community within Section 22, and they 
have been cut off from Section 27 since at least the mid-1960s.  In a footnote, the 
district court states that the evidence reflected that hunters ignored the off 
limits' nature of the W ½ W ½ of Section 27 and continued to hunt therein.  The record supports 
the statement that individuals hunted within Appellants' lands in Section 
27.  However, 
there was no evidence presented that these individuals were members of the 
Woodedge community.

 
 
[¶27]   The district court addressed this issue 
in its decision letter as follows:

 
 
Defendants assert that, particularly as to the W ½ W ½ of 
Section 27, there has been no demonstration that the Maxsons or any other 
Woodedge landowner ever hunted in the vicinity.  While, at times, the Section 27 lands 
certainly were deemed "off limits" to hunting based on certain evidence, other 
evidence demonstrated that hunters, in fact, ignored the methods utilized to 
restrict hunting in the area and continued to hunt therein. 

 
 
The district court's findings of fact on this issue are not 
clearly erroneous.

 
 
[¶28]   We agree with the district court's 
reliance on First 
Nat'l Bank v. Konner, 367 N.E.2d 1174, 1177 (Mass. 1977), wherein it was stated 
that

 
 
it is clear that a profit a prendre, like an easement, can 
be abandoned.  
Gerhard v. 
Stephens, 68 Cal. 2d 864, 882[, 69 Cal. Rptr. 612, 442 P.2d 692] (1968).  Restatement of 
Property §§ 504, 450, special note (1944).  3 H. Tiffany, Real Property § 847 (3d ed. 
1939).  In 
cases dealing with easements, we have held that the rights of a dominant owner 
will not be extinguished under the theory of abandonment unless there is a 
nonuser coupled with an intent to abandon.  Nonuser alone, no matter how long continued, 
will not suffice.  
Desotell v. 
Szczygiel, 338 Mass. 153, 158-159[, 154 N.E.2d 698] (1958).  
It is also necessary to show "acts by the owner of the dominant estate 
conclusively and unequivocally manifesting either a present intent to relinquish 
the easement or a purpose inconsistent with its further existence.  Willets v. 
Langhaar, 212 Mass. 573, 575[, 99 N.E. 466] 
[1912]."  Dubinsky v. Cama, 
261 Mass. 47, 57[, 158 N.E. 321, 324] 
(1927).

 
 
Further, the "servient estate owner must prove that the 
dominant estate owner intended to abandon the easement and such intention may 
be inferred only from strong and convincing evidence.'"  Hasvold, ¶ 26, 45 P.3d  at 641 (quoting Mueller v. Hoblyn, 887 P.2d 500, 506 
(Wyo. 1994)).

 
 
[¶29]   In the instant appeal, we are not 
convinced that the district court erred in determining that the profit was not 
abandoned.  The 
evidence relied on by the Appellants is as follows:  (1) Mike McGill6 attempted to block off the primary trail for 
entering section 27 from the Woodedge properties with a cable in the "middle to 
later" 1960s; (2) McGill had no knowledge of use of section 27 for hunting 
and fishing by the Woodedge owners after he barred their access; and (3) the 
Woodedge Property Owners Association had no record of any complaints from 
Woodedge owners regarding their lack of access to section 27 from the mid-1960s 
until 1994.

 
 
[¶30]   We must affirm the factual 
determination of the district court on this issue because the foregoing evidence 
fails to demonstrate that the district court clearly erred.  As noted above, the 
Appellants bore the burden of proving intent to abandon the profit and an overt 
act of abandonment.  
At best, the Appellants' arguments tend to show nonuse of the profit for 
a period of time.  
Even that showing, however, is made in the negativei.e., the argument 
only alleges that McGill was unaware of any exercise of the rights under the 
profit.  
Further, the Maxsons argue that (1) there was evidence that the cable 
across the path could easily be pushed to the ground and driven over; (2) Peter 
Kuhn installed a gate in 1994 to stop "the flow of traffic going south into 
Section 27"; (3) he also saw people hunting "in the Woodedge Subdivision"; and 
(4) John Maxson testified that it was common knowledge that Woodedge owners 
hunted and fished on sections 22 and 27.

 
 
[¶31]   Given the lack of evidence of intent to 
abandon the profit in the 1960s, the abundant evidence of exercise of the profit 
rights in the 1990s, and the Appellants' own admission that hunting was being 
conducted but "there was no evidence presented that these individuals were 
members of the Woodedge community," we are unable to conclude that the district 
court clearly erred when it determined that the profit was not abandoned.  We, therefore, 
affirm the district court's factual finding that the profit was not 
abandoned.

 
 
Adverse possession

 
 
[¶32]   The Appellants next argue that the 
profit in section 27 was extinguished by adverse possession, which adverse 
possession began when McGill placed a cable across the main ingress from 
Woodedge to section 27 during the 1960s.  In conjunction with the cable, the Appellants 
emphasize that McGill notified the Woodedge community that hunting and fishing 
would no longer be allowed and he began patrolling section 27 and ejecting 
trespassers.

 
 
[¶33]   In Davis v. Chadwick, 
2002 WY 157, 55 P.3d 1267, 1270 (Wyo. 
2002) (quoting Hillard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d 1255, 1258 
(Wyo. 1995)), we said:

 
 
            
In order to establish adverse possession, the claiming party must show 
actual, open, notorious, exclusive and continuous possession of another's 
property which is hostile and under claim of right or color of title.  Rutar Farms & 
Livestock, Inc. v. Fuss, 651 P.2d 1129, 1132 (Wyo.1982); City of Rock 
Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. 494, 502, 273 P. 908, 910 
(1929).  
Possession must be for the statutory period, ten years.  W.S. 1-3-103 
(1988); Connaghan v. 
Eighty-Eight Oil Co., 750 P.2d 1321, 1323 (Wyo.1988); Doenz v. Garber, 665 P.2d 932, 935 
(Wyo.1983).

 
 
While we have not dealt directly with the issue of 
extinguishment of a profit through adverse possession by a servient estate 
owner, we have discussed the analogous situation of extinguishment of an 
easement through adverse possession.

 
 
            
The elements of adverse possession of land are very similar to the 
elements necessary to establish adverse possession of an easement.  There is, however, 
an analytical distinction between the two categories of adverse possession.  The owner of the 
servient estate claiming adverse possession of an easement already has the right 
to possess and use the land so long as that use is not inconsistent with the 
easement.  WYMO Fuels, Inc. v. 
Edwards, 723 P.2d 1230, 1236 
(Wyo.1986).  
Therefore, the owner of a servient estate must prove the use of the 
servient estate made during the period of adverse possession is sufficiently 
hostile and inconsistent with the use permitted by the easement.

To extinguish an easement over (or use of) the servient 
tenements, the servient tenement owner must demonstrate a visible, notorious and 
continuous adverse and hostile use of said land which is inconsistent with the 
use made and rights held by the easement holder, not merely possession which is 
inconsistent with another's claim of title.

Estojak v. Mazsa, 522 Pa. 353, 562 A.2d 271, 
275 (1989).  Accord Abbott v. 
Thompson, 56 Or.App. 311, 641 P.2d 652, 655 (1982).  Just as the 
creation of an easement by prescription is not favored in the law, the 
termination of an easement by adverse possession is not favored.  Shumway v. Tom Sanford, 
Inc., 637 P.2d 666, 670 
(Wyo.1981). 

 
 

Mueller v. Hoblyn, 887 P.2d 500, 507 (Wyo. 1994).  See also 
Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 7.7 (2000) ("To the extent that a use 
of property violates a servitude burdening the property and the use is 
maintained adversely to a person entitled to enforce the servitude for the 
prescriptive period, that person's beneficial interest in the servitude is 
modified or extinguished").

 
 
[¶34]   Applying the foregoing rules, the 
district court in the instant case determined that the "Maxsons and Woodedge 
landowners have, in fact, made use of lands in Sections 22 and 27 despite 
Defendants' protests."  Therefore, the use of the servient estate was 
not sufficiently hostile and inconsistent with the use of the profit to 
extinguish such profit through adverse possession.  

 
 

[¶35]   After a careful review of the record, we find that 
sufficient evidence supports the district court's findings and affirm its 
decision on this issue.  The evidence at trial indicated that:  (1) as noted above, 
the cable meant to block access to section 27 could easily be disregarded; (2) 
McGill testified that he allowed hunting on section 22 but that "trespassers" 
were "a nightmare" during hunting season each year on the other lands owned by 
his family, which lands included the section 27 lands; (3) the defendants at 
trial did not produce any evidence that the Woodedge owners were actually 
prevented from exercising their rights under the profitinstead, evidence was 
presented that McGill was merely unaware of any hunting or fishing; and (4) 
McGill admitted that William Moore, a Woodedge owner, clearly indicated his 
intent to hunt on any of the land owned by McGill's family.  It may have been 
possible for the district court to reach a different conclusion; however, our 
standard of review requires us to affirm the decision of the district court if 
it is not clearly erroneous.  Based on the evidence in the record, the 
district court could properly find that the Woodedge owners and the Maxsons' 
predecessors in interest were still able to enjoy their rights under the profit 
and McGill's possession was not, therefore, sufficiently hostile and 
inconsistent to extinguish such profit through adverse possession.

 
 
Use of motorized vehicles while exercising rights under 
profit

 
 
[¶36]   Because the profit was not extinguished 
by adverse possession or abandonment, we must next ascertain whether the 
district court erred when it determined that the Maxsons could use motorized 
vehicles on the servient estates while exercising their rights under the 
profit.  The 
Appellants argue that:

 
 
            
In establishing the scope of the Appellees' hunting and fishing profit, 
it should be based on how fishing and hunting were practiced in the 1940s and 
1950s in Wyoming as this is the pertinent 
vicinity and time of execution of the deeds in question. . . .  Appellees should be 
limited to the scope of that intention, and the methods of that place and time 
period.

 
 
In its decision letter, the district court determined, 
however, that:

 
 
Although motorized vehicle access may have been limited in 
the area at the time, the Court cannot conclude McKinley intended to limit 
hunting so as to exclude motorized vehicles.  Rather, the use of a vehicle is "reasonably 
necessary and convenient" to the enjoyment of a hunting profit.

 
 
[¶37]   In reaching its decision, the district 
court relied on Isherwood v. Salene, 61 Ore. 572, 123 P. 49 (1912) and Bland Lake Fishing 
& Hunting Club v. Fisher, 311 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. App. 1958).  In Isherwood, 123 P. 
at 50, the Oregon court stated that the right 
to hunt ducks and fowl in that case was "limited to the usual and reasonable 
methods generally used in the vicinity at the time of the execution of the 
deed."  See also 35A Am. 
Jur. 2d Fish, Game, 
and Wildlife Conservation § 27 (2001) ("In the absence of anything to the 
contrary in a grant of hunting or fowling privileges, the right to hunt and fowl 
is limited to the usual and reasonable methods generally used in the vicinity at 
the time of the execution of the grant . . . .").  However, in Bland Lake, 311 S.W.2d  at 715-16, while dealing with the scope of a profit, it was said 
that:

 
 
Every easement carries with it the right of doing whatever 
is reasonably necessary for the full enjoyment of the easement itself.  Extent of such 
incidental rights depends upon the purpose and extent of the grant itself.  Such right is 
limited and must be exercised in such a reasonable manner as not injuriously to 
increase the burden upon the owner of the fee.  Nothing passes by implication as incidental 
to a grant except what is reasonably necessary to its fair enjoyment.  What is reasonably 
necessary for the full enjoyment of the easement will be determined by a 
construction of the language of the express grant, considered in the light of 
the surrounding circumstances.  28 C.J.S. Easements § 76, p. 
754.

 
 
[¶38]   While the preceding rules appear to be 
contradictory, we view them merely as aids to interpretation of the scope of the 
original grant.  
As we discussed extensively above, intent is the touchstone of deed 
interpretation.  
When creating the profit at issue in this appeal, McKinley was free to 
restrict the right to its usual methods at the time of the grant, but he was 
also free to allow exercise of the profit to adapt to changing technologies and 
practices.  The 
district court determined that McKinley intended to make a broad grant of a 
profit that allowed motorized vehicles to be used by the dominant estate owners 
while enjoying the profit.  We agree.

 
 
[¶39]   The language of the deeds clearly 
indicated an intent that the profit could be expanded prospectively.  McKinley granted 
the profit not only in land currently owned by him, but also in any lands he may 
later acquire.  
While that language alone does not answer the instant question, it is 
probative as to the issue of whether we should narrowly or broadly construe 
McKinley's intent when the deeds were conveyed.  The district court, in analyzing the profit, 
correctly weighed evidence outside of the warranty deeds when it determined that 
use of motorized vehicles was within the scope of the profit.  That evidence 
indicated that Erskine Harton, a grantee of land from McKinley in section 27, 
used a four-wheel drive vehicle to access his land beginning in 1955 and, 
indeed, traveled to the land with McKinley in a vehicle on an established 
trail.  The 
evidence also indicated that vehicle use in exercising the profit was prevalent 
enough in the decade after the right was created to prompt McGill to attempt to 
block access to section 27 by running a cable across the main access point.  Under these 
circumstances, we will affirm the conclusion of the district court that 
reasonable motorized vehicle use is allowed in exercising the Maxsons' profit 
right to hunt on the servient estates in sections 22 and 27.

 
 
Right to enter adjoining public lands

 
 
[¶40]   The Appellants' final argument is that 
the district court erred when it held that: 

 
 
11.   Plaintiffs are prohibited from using 
the lands of the Defendants as a general access right, but are permitted to 
enjoy their hunting and fishing rights on the lands of the Defendants as 
outlined herein and adjacent lands which Plaintiffs have a lawful authority to 
enter.  This Court has no 
authority to prohibit Plaintiffs from lawfully crossing over into lands upon 
which they are lawfully permitted, including, but not limited to, lands owned by 
the United States Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management.

 
 
(Emphasis added.)  The crux of the Appellants' argument is that 
the Maxsons, as well as other Woodedge owners, are enforcing their profit rights 
not to hunt and fish on the burdened land, but to use the land as a general 
access easementspecifically, they allege that the Woodedge owners wish to use 
their profit rights as an excuse conveniently to access Forest Service and 
Bureau of Land Management lands.  The Maxsons acknowledge that they do not have 
a "general right of ingress and egress across the lands of Appellants," but 
maintain that they have a right to enter Forest Service and BLM lands during the 
course of rightfully enjoying their profit.

 
 
[¶41]   Based on these arguments, it seems 
clear that both parties agree that the Maxsons may only enter the Appellants' 
land in section 277 to exercise their rights under the profit; 
i.e., they may only enter to hunt and fish.  Similarly, they agree that the Maxsons may 
not merely use the road over section 27 to reach and hunt upon public 
lands.  The 
disagreement arises where the Maxsons, properly exercising their right to hunt 
on the Appellants' land, wish to cross from such land onto adjacent public lands 
where, the evidence established, they may also legally hunt.  

 
 
[¶42]   We will affirm the order of the 
district court on this issue.  According to the terms of the grant, there is 
no requirement that the dominant estate owner enter or exit the servient estate 
in a certain location or manner.  As discussed at length in the first issue on 
appeal, the holder of a profit has a right to (1) enter land in possession of 
another; (2) use that land in a specified mannerhere, to hunt and fish; and (3) 
take certain things from the landhere, game and fish.  The Maxsons are not 
required, under the grant, to enter and exit the Appellants' land at the same 
point, nor are they required to hunt exclusively on that land.  The Maxsons may be 
on the Appellants' land while they are exercising their rights according to the 
profit.  If, in 
the course of exercising their rights, they leave the Appellants' land, they 
have not violated the profit.  Finally, we note that while all parties agree 
that the Maxsons may not merely travel from their parcels over the Appellants' 
property to public lands, it is also true that the Maxsons may not hunt on 
public lands and travel over the Appellants' property as the most direct route 
back to their parcels.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶43]   The district court properly concluded 
that the Maxsons hold a profit a prendre in certain lands of the Appellants and 
that the profit had not been subsequently extinguished through abandonment or 
adverse possession.  
Further, the district court did not err in defining the scope of the 
profit to include reasonable use of motorized vehicles, and to exclude a general 
access easement across the Appellants' lands.  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Clear Creek Cattle Company is a business that is closely 
related to Seven Lakes; however, Clear Creek no longer owns any land in sections 
22 or 27 and, therefore, it is no longer involved in this case.

 
 

2Some language in the 1958 conveyance differed in minor 
respects, but for purposes of this appeal, such disparities are of no 
consequence.

 
 

3There is no evidence in the recordand the Appellants have 
never allegedthat the Maxsons or anyone in their chain of title has attempted 
to commercialize hunting or fishing on the lands at issue in this appeal.

 
 

4We also note that the warranty deeds that incorporated the 
agreements contained language similar to the deeds at issue in this appeal 
within the deeds themselves.  There is no indication from those deeds, 
however, that the hunting and fishing privileges were intrinsically bound to the 
general development scheme that was described in the separate agreements.

 
 

5It is also true that McKinley, as the servient estate 
owner, had no power to abandon the rights of the dominant estate owners.  Hasvold, ¶ 26, 45 P.3d  at 641 (discussing abandonment of easements).

 
 

6While not the owner of the land at issue, members of his 
family were successors in interest to McKinley and they owned the land subject 
to the profit in the W ½ W ½ of section 27 at the time that the Appellants argue 
the profit was abandoned.

 
 

7While our analysis generally applies to all lands burdened 
by the Maxsons' profit, the Appellants' chief concern is with use of a road that 
connects the Maxsons' parcels with public lands over the northeast corner of the 
servient estate in section 27.