Title: Michael Watkins v. Arnold Peacock Property easement

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO    
Docket No. 33684 
 
MICHAEL 
WATKINS 
and 
LOUISE 
WATKINS, husband and wife,     
                                                          
          Plaintiffs-Respondents,                         
                                                          
v.                                                        
                                                          
ARNOLD PEACOCK, a single man,                   
                                                          
          Defendant-Appellant.                            
-------------------------------------------------------   
ARNOLD PEACOCK, a single man,                   
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
) 
                                                          
          Counterclaimant,                                
                                                          
v.                                                        
                                                          
MICHAEL 
WATKINS 
and 
LOUISE 
WATKINS, husband and wife,  
                                                       
          Counterdefendants.                           
                                                       
Boise, March 2008 
 
2008 Opinion No. 63 
 
Filed:  May 7, 2008 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, 
Kootenai County.  Hon. John P. Luster, District Judge. 
District court order granting summary judgment, affirmed. 
Arnold Peacock, Post Falls, pro se appellant. 
Scott W. Reed, Coeur d’Alene, for respondents. 
__________________________________ 
BURDICK, Justice 
Appellant Arnold Peacock appeals from a district court order granting Respondents 
Michael and Louise Watkins’ motion for summary judgment, dismissing Peacock’s 
counterclaims with prejudice, and ordering Peacock to restore the roadway to its prior condition.  
We affirm. 
 
1
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This case has a long and storied history, characterized by Peacock’s obstinance and 
refusal to recognize and comply with valid and final court orders.  The easement at issue has 
already been the subject of one appeal to this Court and a petition for a writ of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court of the United States. 
The facts of the underlying lawsuit are set out fully in Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 
991 P.2d 362 (1999), but will be summarized here.  The Watkins’ predecessors in interest, 
Raymond and Marybel Davis, owned property south of Peacock’s property.  Both the parcels of 
land were originally one parcel, but were divided in 1941.  In 1969 the Davises purchased one 
parcel of land, and in 1986 Peacock purchased his parcel of land.  Access to the Davis parcel was 
by way of a private road located on the Peacock parcel.  Beginning in 1995, Peacock physically 
obstructed the road across his property.  The Davises then filed a complaint, and the district court 
entered an order granting them an implied easement across Peacock’s property and enjoining 
him from interfering with or obstructing the roadway.  Peacock appealed; we affirmed the 
district court.  We determined that the Davises had an implied easement by prior use, and that 
Peacock was subject to that easement as he had notice.  Peacock petitioned for certiorari, but was 
denied.  Peacock v. Davis, 529 U.S. 1078 (2000). 
However, Peacock continued to obstruct the roadway.  The Davises then moved to hold 
him in contempt.  The district court found that Peacock was in contempt and ordered him to 
restore the roadway to the condition it was in prior to January 20, 1998, and that he complete this 
restoration prior to March 30, 2000.   
Subsequently, the Watkins purchased the Davis parcel, and, despite the order enjoining 
him from obstructing the roadway, Peacock continued his unlawful actions.  The Watkins then 
filed suit against Peacock.  They alleged that Peacock obstructed the roadway, obstructed a city 
water line located under the roadway and created a hazardous slope that threatened the existing 
roadway.  They sought an order enjoining Peacock from encroaching on the easement and 
requiring him to “restore the existing driveway to the condition existing prior to the time when . . 
. Peacock first caused debris to come onto said roadway.”  They also sought an order holding 
Peacock in contempt until he removed the obstructions from the roadway.   
Peacock, acting pro se, filed an answer and counterclaims.  He asserted various 
affirmative defenses and raised four counterclaims: fraud, malicious prosecution, punitive 
 
2
damages, and libel.  Peacock filed a motion to dismiss, and the Watkins filed a motion for 
summary judgment.  The district court held a hearing on these motions and announced its 
decision from the bench.  It then entered judgment granting the Watkins’ motion for summary 
judgment, dismissing Peacock’s counterclaims with prejudice, and ordering Peacock to restore 
the roadway described in Davis v. Peacock to its prior condition.  That order also allowed the 
Watkins to restore the roadway if Peacock failed to act within sixty days, awarded them the costs 
of such work if it was necessary, and permanently enjoined Peacock causing or allowing “any fill 
or waste material of any kind or nature” to be placed on the roadway or the hill adjacent to the 
roadway.  Peacock appeals. 
II. ANALYSIS 
 
Peacock, once again acting pro se,1 attacks the district court’s jurisdiction and raises 
numerous issues surrounding the validity of the underlying easement.  He also assigns error to 
the order granting the Watkins’ motion for summary judgment, denying his motion to dismiss 
and dismissing his counterclaims.  He seeks to have the award of costs to the Watkins reversed.  
Finally, both parties request attorney’s fees on appeal.  We will address each issue in turn. 
A. Jurisdiction 
 
Peacock asserts the district court lacked jurisdiction to decide this case.  He argues that 
the Watkins cannot prove damages in excess of the $10,000 limit to file in district court.  
Questions of jurisdiction must be addressed prior to reaching the merits of an appeal, and 
jurisdiction is a question of law over which we exercise free review.  Bach v. Miller, 144 Idaho 
142, __, 158 P.3d 305, 307-08 (2007).   
It appears that Peacock is attacking both the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction 
and the assignment of the case to the district court rather than to a magistrate court.  In Idaho, 
district courts are courts of general jurisdiction.  Article V, section 20 of the Idaho Constitution 
provides that the district court shall have original jurisdiction to hear all cases, both at law and in 
equity. Peacock’s assertion that the district court lacked jurisdiction has no merit, and the issue 
of assignment to the magistrate court is irrelevant on appeal.  See Wilbanks v. State, 126 Idaho 
                                                 
1 At certain points in his brief, Peacock appears to ask for leniency due to his pro se status.  This Court adheres to 
the rule that persons acting pro se are held to the same standards and rules as those represented by attorneys.  Suitts 
v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 709, 117 P.3d 120, 123 (2005).    
 
3
341, 344, 882 P.2d 996, 999 (Ct. App. 1994). Thus, we hold that the district court had subject 
matter jurisdiction to hear this dispute.  
B. Res Judicata 
The majority of Peacock’s brief attacks the validity of the underlying easement and seeks 
to have this Court reconsider its decision in Davis v. Peacock.  He maintains that this Court 
failed to recognize the law surrounding implied easements.  According to him, the easement is 
not valid, and therefore, the Watkins cannot request that he do anything to maintain the 
easement.  Alternatively, he claims that if they own a valid easement, it is satisfied so long as the 
Watkins have a way across the property; they cannot claim the right to a particular roadway or 
that the roadway be in a particular condition.  Noticeably, he has failed to support these 
arguments with citations to Idaho law.  The Watkins argue that these claims are barred by res 
judicata, as the issues have already been decided in Davis v. Peacock. 
Res judicata is comprised of true res judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel 
(issue preclusion).  Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002).  Whether 
claim preclusion or issue preclusion bars the relitigation of issues adjudicated in prior litigation 
between the same parties is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review.   
Lohman v. Flynn, 139 Idaho 312, 319, 78 P.3d 379, 386 (2003).   
Idaho uses a transactional approach to claim preclusion.  U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v. 
Kuenzli, 134 Idaho 222, 226, 999 P.2d 877, 881 (2000).  “The doctrine of claim preclusion bars 
not only subsequent relitigation of a claim previously asserted, but also subsequent relitigation of 
any claims relating to the same cause of action which were actually made or which might have 
been made.”  Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho at 94, 57 P.3d at 805.  Claim preclusion has three elements: 
(1) same parties or their privies; (2) same claim; and (3) final judgment.  Ticor Title Co. v. 
Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, ___, 157 P.3d 613, 618 (2007). 
Here, Peacock’s claims are barred by claim preclusion.  First, as the Davises’ successors 
in interest, the Watkins are their privies.  See id.  Second, the issue in Davis v. Peacock was the 
validity of the easement – the same issue Peacock wishes us to now consider.  Third, the district 
court determined the Davises had an easement, and this Court affirmed the existence of an 
implied easement by prior use.  There was a final judgment on the merits in Davis.  Therefore, 
the doctrine of claim preclusion applies here to bar the consideration of Peacock’s claims 
regarding the validity of the easement.  
 
4
C. District Court’s Order 
Peacock also claims the district court’s order granting the Watkins’ motion for summary 
judgment, dismissing his motion to dismiss and dismissing his counterclaims was in error.  He 
writes:  
There is not a single material fact that both parties agree to; we disagree about the 
location, use, and suitability, therefore according to Rule 56, Summary Judgment 
is improper.  And unless this court has concluded that the Plaintiffs do not have 
enough evidence to support a claim of action, or explain how they are injured, and 
issues a declaratory judgment in my favor, we should proceed to trial. 
When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, this Court uses the same standard 
employed by the trial court when deciding such a motion.  Kolln v. St. Luke’s Regl. Med. Ctr., 
130 Idaho 323, 327, 940 P.2d 1142, 1146 (1997).  “[I]f the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law” summary 
judgment is proper.  I.R.C.P. 56(c).  The burden is on the moving party to prove an absence of  
genuine issues of material fact.  Evans v. Griswold, 129 Idaho 902, 905, 935 P.2d 165, 168 
(1997).  However, “as the trier of fact, the district court is entitled to arrive at the most probable 
inferences based upon the undisputed evidence properly before it and grant the summary 
judgment despite the possibility of conflicting inferences.”  Davis, 133 Idaho at 640, 991 P.2d at 
365.  These inferences will be reviewed to determine if the record reasonably supports them.  Id. 
Below, the Watkins moved for summary judgment, and Peacock moved to dismiss their 
claim or for a judgment on the pleadings.  The district court properly treated these as cross-
motions for summary judgment.  In support of their motion for summary judgment, the Watkins 
filed a statement of material facts not in dispute, a certification of pleadings before the district 
court in the Davis case, five affidavits, and a certification of survey.  In support of his motion, 
Peacock filed only a brief (containing photographs of the property), but no other supporting 
materials.  At the hearing on the motions, he sought to introduce additional photographs.  The 
Watkins objected to those as untimely, and the district court correctly granted their motion.   
 
After the hearing, the district court ruled from the bench.  It first laid out the standards for 
summary judgment, and then noted that the issues Peacock sought to litigate had been decided in 
the Davis v. Peacock case.  It noted the final judgment in Davis  
decreed the existence of an easement.  That judgment provided that the plaintiffs 
were entitled to a perpetual easement upon the existing roadway 12.5 feet in width 
 
5
across the following described real property owned by the defendant.  This was in 
benefit of the real property owned by plaintiff.  Both of those property 
descriptions were contained within the judgment. 
The court also noted the existence of two prior contempt orders entered against Peacock, the 
second of which ordered him to restore the roadway to the condition it was in prior to January 
20, 1998.  The district court found that the parties agreed to the material facts: Peacock had not 
restored the roadway to the condition it was in prior to January 20, 1998.  It then determined that 
Peacock had failed to comply with a previous court order, and granted the Watkins’ motion for 
summary judgment.   
 
The district court’s order was proper in this instance.  All of the material facts in the 
record show exactly what the district court stated they showed: Peacock has failed to comply 
with the order to restore the roadway.  Although Peacock strenuously disagrees, the parties’ 
disagreements about the “location, use, and suitability” of the easement were not material to the 
issues before the district court.  The Watkins supported their motion with evidence; Peacock 
tried once again to argue the validity of the easement, and failed to provide the court any 
evidence to support his motion to dismiss.  As such, we affirm the district court order granting 
the Watkins’ motion for summary judgment. 
D. Costs and Attorney’s Fees 
Peacock also appeals the district court’s granting costs to the Watkins, and both parties 
seek an award of attorney’s fees on appeal.  We will address each issue in turn. 
1. Costs Below 
The district court awarded the Watkins costs.  Peacock did not object to those below, and 
he did not appeal from the judgment awarding costs.  “It is well established that in order for an 
issue to be raised on appeal, the record must reveal an adverse ruling which forms the basis for 
an assignment of error.”  Mountainview Landowners Coop. Assn. v. Cool, 142 Idaho 861, 866, 
136 P.3d 332, 337 (2006).   Therefore, since there is no adverse ruling, we will not consider 
Peacock’s arguments. 
2. Attorney’s Fees on Appeal 
Peacock requests attorney’s fees on appeal.  Since we affirm the district court, Peacock is 
not the prevailing party and cannot be awarded attorney’s fees.  Additionally, he has not 
provided the Court with statutory authority for the award.  This Court has “repeatedly held that 
we will not consider a request for attorney fees on appeal that is not supported by legal authority 
 
6
 
7
or argument.”  VFP VC v. Dakota Co., 141 Idaho 326, 337, 109 P.3d 714, 725 (2005).  We have 
extended the general rule that we will not consider unsupported arguments to decline hearing 
unsupported arguments from pro se litigants.  Huff v. Singleton, 143 Idaho 498, 500, 148 P.3d 
1244, 1246 (2006).  Therefore, we decline to award Peacock attorney’s fees. 
The Watkins also request attorney’s fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121.  “An award of 
attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 is appropriate where a party’s claim or defense is frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation.”  Kiebert v. Goss, 144 Idaho 225, __, 159 P.3d 862, 865 
(2007).  In addition to being vexatious, Peacock’s pursuit of this appeal was frivolous, 
unreasonable and without foundation.  Thus, we award the Watkins attorney’s fees. 
III. CONCLUSION 
We affirm the district court.  The district court had jurisdiction. Peacock’s claims 
surrounding the validity of the easement are barred by claim preclusion.  Additionally, the 
district court found that there were no genuine issues of material fact and correctly entered 
summary judgment in favor of the Watkins and dismissed Peacock’s claims.   
Peacock raised his claims regarding the award of costs below for the first time on appeal, 
thus we decline to consider them.  Finally, we award the Watkins attorney’s fees as Peacock has 
pursued this appeal frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation.  Costs to Respondents. 
 
Chief Justice EISMANN and Justices J. JONES, W. JONES and HORTON, CONCUR.