Title: City of Tulsa v. State ex rel. Public Employees Relations Board

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

City of Tulsa v. State ex rel. Public Employees Relations Board  City of Tulsa v. State ex rel. Public Employees Relations Board 1998 OK 92 967 P.2d 1214 69 OBJ 3242 Case Number: 89422 Decided: 09/22/1998 Mandate Issued: 10/22/1998 Supreme Court of Oklahoma CITY OF TULSA, OKLAHOMA, a home rule charter municipal corporation, Appellant, v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ex rel. THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RELATIONS BOARD, and INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, Tulsa Local No. 523, Appellees, APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TULSA COUNTY STATE OF OKLAHOMA; HONORABLE DAVID L. PETERSON, TRIAL JUDGE. ¶0 The trial court affirmed a decision of the Oklahoma Public Employees Relations Board (Board) ruling City of Tulsa (City) airport safety officers (ASOs) are "police officers" covered by the Oklahoma Fire and Police Arbitration Act (FPAA), 11 O. S. 1991, § 51-101 et seq., as amended and ordering an election for the ASOs to choose the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Tulsa Local No. 523, as their bargaining agent. Held: Board had no authority to order a bargaining agent election under the FPAA because the ASOs are not "police officers" covered by the FPAA. TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED; DECISION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RELATIONS BOARD REVERSED. David L. Pauling, City Attorney; William M. Northcutt and Martha Rupp Carter, Deputy City Attorneys; Ellen Hinchee, Assistant City Attorney; and Robert H. Garner, Airports Attorney, Tulsa, Oklahoma for Appellant. W. A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General of Oklahoma and James Robert Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for Appellee, Public Employees Relations Board. [967 P.2d 1216] Thomas F. Birmingham of Birmingham, Morley, Weatherford & Priore, Tulsa, Oklahoma for Appellee, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Tulsa Local No. 523. LAVENDER, J. ¶1 This case presents the issue of whether appellee, the Oklahoma Public Employees Relations Board (Board) was correct in ruling airport safety officers (ASOs) employed by appellant, City of Tulsa (City) are "police officers" covered by the Oklahoma Fire and Police Arbitration Act (FPAA), 11 O. S. 1991, § 51-101 et seq., as amended PART I. FACTS, PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND POSITIONS OF PARTIES. ¶2 Initially passed in 1971 ¶3 In May 1996 Union filed a certification petition with the Board claiming a substantial number of the ASOs desired Union's representation for purposes of collective bargaining and that it sought certification as their bargaining agent. The petition alleged the bargaining unit consisted of twenty (20) employees, referred to as "airport police officers". City opposed certification and a hearing on the matter was held before the Board in August 1996. ¶4 One issue raised by City in opposition to the petition - which it continues to raise on appeal - is the Board had no authority over Union's petition because ASOs do not fit the FPAA definition of "police officers". The definition, found at § 51-102(1), includes by reference the definition set out in the Oklahoma Police Pension and Retirement System Act (OPPRSA), 11 O. S. 1991, § 50-101 et seq., as amended. Section 51-102(1) states in relevant part: As used in this article, unless the context requires a different interpretation: 1. "[P]olice officers" shall mean the permanent paid members of any . . . police department in any municipality within the State of Oklahoma but shall not include the chief of police and an administrative assistant . . . . "Police officers" as used herein shall be those persons as defined in Section 50-101 of this title. 11 O. S. Supp. 1996, § 50-101(6) of the OPPRSA defines officer as follows: "Officer" means any duly appointed and sworn full-time officer of the regular police department of a municipality whose duties are to preserve the public peace, protect life and property, prevent crime, serve warrants, enforce all laws and municipal ordinances of this state, and any political subdivision thereof, and who is authorized to bear arms in the execution of such duties; ¶5 City's position has two bases. One, ASOs do not fit within the plain and unambiguous definition contained in § 50-101(6), which requires employment by the regular police department of the municipality, because they are not TPD employees, but, instead, are City employees, who work for, and are controlled and supervised by, personnel of the Tulsa Airport Authority. [967 P.2d 1218] ¶6 Union and the Board, although agreeing ASOs are not employees of the TPD, argue they fall within the "police officer" definition, asserting, in essence, the Legislature intended the FPAA to apply to all municipal employees who are authorized to and, in fact, do carry out the law enforcement duties spelled out in § 50-101(6) of the OPPRSA. They assert the ASOs meet this "functional" test because they are CLEET certified as peace/police officers, whose duties, within the confines of the City airport, include all those law enforcement functions set out in § 50-101(6) and they are authorized to and, in fact, do bear arms in the execution of those duties. Basically, their position is the ASOs - as a group - are a separate City police department from the TPD entitled to FPAA coverage. Both also essentially posit the phrase "duly appointed and sworn full-time officer of the regular police department of a municipality" (emphasis added) is an attempt by the Legislature to distinguish between "regular" police officers employed by a municipality and "reserve" municipal police officers, who when so employed by a municipality, also have authority to carry out all the law enforcement duties specified in § 50-101(6), so that "regular" officers are covered by the FPAA and "reserve" officers are not. ¶7 City and Union stipulated to certain facts before the Board. In effect, the stipulations are: as of June 10, 1996 there were twenty-one (21) ASOs; the ASOs are employees of City; City is a municipal corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Oklahoma; ASOs' duties include responding to airport security checkpoints ¶8 The bulk of the factual dispute at the hearing concerned the ASOs' duties - City trying to show only a minimal part of their duties involved law enforcement activities and Union attempting to prove most of the duties were law enforcement related. In such regard, competent evidence shows the ASO position was created in January 1994 by an Executive Order of City's Mayor. Essentially, the ASO position was intended to, and did, combine what formerly had been the separate positions of community service officer (CSO) and airport operation officer (AOO). CSOs were City employees working for the TPD as lower-level law enforcement officers than entry level TPD police officers. The CSOs performed mainly building and airport security. They were CLEET certified, but did not meet the educational requirements of the TPD for entry level police officer. AOOs, in contrast, were civilian employees working for the Tulsa Airport Authority in its Operations Division. The position involved many duties concerning airport safety, including air field snow removal, collection of aircraft landing fees, perimeter inspections of airport outer fence, runway, taxiway and ramp inspections, monitoring weather conditions and response duties in aircraft emergencies. ¶9 The combined ASO position primarily performs the duties of the TPD CSO and the prior civilian AOO, i.e. both law enforcement and non-law enforcement related duties. [967 P.2d 1219] Law enforcement duties, within the jurisdictional area of the airport property ¶10 Additionally, the parties' stipulations, coupled with other undisputed evidence consistent with them, unequivocally show ASOs are not under the command and control of any TPD personnel, nor are they hired or disciplined by the TPD. They work for, and are ultimately controlled and supervised by, civilian employees working for the Tulsa Airport Authority. ¶11 Based on the above evidence, the Board ruled in favor of Union and ordered an election. The trial court affirmed. City appealed, we retained jurisdiction and now reverse the Board's ruling and the trial court judgment affirming it. PART II. STANDARD OF REVIEW. ¶12 In that the correctness of an administrative agency order is before us, the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act (OAPA), 75 O. S. 1991, § 250 et seq., as amended, governs our review. Under the OAPA a district court, the Court of Civil Appeals and this Court apply the same review standards to the administrative record. State ex rel. Bd. of Trustees of Teachers' Retirement System v. Garrett, 1993 OK CIV APP 29, 848 P.2d 1182 , 1183-1184 f. n. 8; Seely v. Oklahoma Horse Racing Commission, 1987 OK CIV APP 61, 743 P.2d 685 , 689-690. Except in certain cases of alleged irregularities in procedure before the agency - a situation not applicable here - the review is confined to the record made before the administrative tribunal. 75 O. S. 1991, § 321; Lowry v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners, 1981 OK 80, 631 P.2d 737 . Generally, an administrative decision like that here should be affirmed if it is a valid order and the administrative proceedings are free from prejudicial error to the appealing party. 75 O. S. 1991, § 322(3). An administrative order, however, is subject to reversal if an appealing party's substantial rights are prejudiced because the agency's decision is entered in excess of statutory authority or jurisdiction, or an order is entered based on an error of law. § 322(1)(b) & (d). ¶13 Reversal is also appropriate if the agency's findings are clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, material, probative and substantial competent evidence in the record. § 322(1)(e). As to factual questions, neither a district court or this Court is entitled to substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence. Id.; Board of Examiners of Veterinary Medicine v. Mohr, 1971 OK 64, 485 P.2d 235 , 240. With these standards in mind we turn to our review. [967 P.2d 1220] PART III. ASOS DO NOT FALL WITHIN THE UNAMBIGUOUS DEFINITION OF "POLICE OFFICER" AND IT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN THEIR EXCLUSION FROM FPAA COVERAGE IS DEMONSTRABLY AT ODDS WITH THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT BEHIND THE FPAA. ¶14 The primary goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and follow the intention of the Legislature. TRW/Reda Pump v. Brewington, 1992 OK 31, 829 P.2d 15 , 20; Ledbetter v. Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Laws Enforcement Commission, 1988 OK 117, 764 P.2d 172 , 179. Generally, that intent is ascertained from the whole legislative act in light of its general purpose and object. City of Bethany v. Public Employees Relations Board, 1995 OK 99, 904 P.2d 604 , 609. Further, the plain meaning of statutory language is conclusive except in the rare case in which literal construction will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of the Legislature. ABC Rentals of San Antonio, Inc. v. Commissioners of Internal Revenue, 142 F.3d 1200, 1207 (10 ¶15 The Legislature has given us a specific definition of the term "police officer" for FPAA coverage purposes. In our opinion, the OPPRSA definition of officer contains two plain and unambiguous general requirements before a law enforcement officer will fall within FPAA coverage. One, the officer must be a duly appointed and sworn full-time officer of the regular police department of a municipality. Two, the officer's duties must be to preserve the public peace, protect life and property, prevent crime, serve warrants, enforce all State laws and municipal ordinances, and they must be authorized to bear arms in the execution of such duties. Unquestionably, ASOs meet the second or functional part of § 50-101(6)'s definition. They do not, however, meet the first part. ¶16 In our view, the phrase "the regular police department of a municipality" is a plain and unambiguous reference to that department of municipal government that has been given the responsibility to carry out the normal law enforcement functions within the municipality. In this case, that department is the TPD. The ASOs are not officers employed by the TPD, but are a specialized group of municipal law enforcement personnel authorized to exist by virtue of the Municipal Airports Act of 1947 who are ultimately controlled and supervised by civilian employees of the Tulsa Airport Authority. There is simply no indication the Legislature intended to include such individuals within FPAA coverage. ¶17 Union and the Board posit the phrase "the regular police department of a municipality" was intended by the Legislature to somehow distinguish between so-called regular municipal police officers and reserve municipal police officers. We disagree with this contention and have been presented with no persuasive argument that such was the intent of the Legislature. Reserve municipal police officers, by definition, are part-time municipal police officers with limits - depending on the population of the municipality - on the number of hours such officer can work in any calendar month. [ 967 P.2d 1221 ] 11 O. S. Supp. 1997, § 34-101(B). ¶18 We have further been provided with no viable argument that exclusion of ASOs from FPAA coverage is demonstrably at odds with the legislative intent behind that Act. The legislative purpose behind the FPAA, as noted, is to give permanent members of any paid fire or police department in any municipality all the rights of labor, except the right to strike. § 51-101(B). No showing has been made that exclusion of ASOs, i.e. a specialized group of law enforcement personnel working, not for a municipal police department, but for a civilian City department or agency with a limited geographical zone of responsibility, is somehow at odds with the legislative design. Without such a showing, we must apply the legislative definition as written because it is the duty of a court to give effect to legislative acts, not to amend, repeal or circumvent them. Toxic Waste Impact Group, Inc. v. Leavitt, 1988 OK 20, 755 P.2d 626 , 630. This Court has no power to rewrite legislation simply because the legislative definition may not comport with our conception of prudent public policy. Id. If ASOs are to be included within the ambit of FPAA coverage, that inclusion must come from the legislative body, not this Court under the guise of statutory construction or interpretation. PART IV. CONCLUSION. ¶19 The Board's decision that ASOs are within FPAA coverage failed to give effect to the applicable plain and unambiguous legislative definition. That definition mandates only those officers employed by the TPD fall within the FPAA ambit. Therefore, the Board erred and acted in excess of its authority when it ordered an election for the ASOs to choose Union as their bargaining agent under the FPAA. ¶20 The Board decision and the trial court judgment affirming it are REVERSED. ¶21 ALL JUSTICES CONCUR. FOOT