Title: Am. Assn. of Univ. Professors, Cent. State Univ. Chapter v. Cent. State Univ.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, CENTRAL STATE UNIVERSITY 
CHAPTER, APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT, v. CENTRAL STATE UNIVERSITY, 
APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Am. Assn. of Univ. Professors, Cent. State Univ. Chapter v. Cent. State 
Univ. (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 229.] 
Education — State universities — Faculty workload policies — R.C. 3345.45 
violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United States 
Constitutions. 
R.C. 3345.45 violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United States 
Constitutions since the classification contained therein bears no rational 
relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. 
(No. 97-568 — Submitted March 4, 1998 — Decided September 30, 1998.) 
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Greene County, No. 96-
CA-21. 
 
Plaintiff-appellee and cross-appellant, American Association of University 
Professors, Central State University Chapter (“AAUP”), is the certified collective 
bargaining agent for full-time faculty members at defendant-appellant and cross-
appellee, Central State University (“CSU”).  AAUP and CSU have engaged in 
collective bargaining since 1985.  Their most recent agreement was effective 
September 1, 1991 through August 31, 1994.  Article 19 of that agreement 
governed faculty workload and provided, among other things, that the “[n]ormal 
full-time workload will be twelve (12) contact hours per quarter,” and that “[i]f a 
Bargaining Unit member teaches more than twelve (12) contact hours  * * *, then 
the additional hours will be considered as an overload” entitling the member, at his 
or her option, to either “overload compensation” or “the equivalent in release time 
in a subsequent quarter.”  It also provided that “[b]argaining unit members will 
 
2
have at least eight (8) posted office hours per week and will be available for 
additional hours by appointment.” 
 
At the time the parties entered into this agreement, the provisions governing 
faculty workload were appropriate subjects for collective bargaining under R.C. 
4117.08(A), and binding on the parties under R.C. 4117.10(A).  However, while 
the agreement was in effect, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 3345.45 as part of 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 152, 145 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3767.  R.C. 3345.45, effective July 
1, 1993, provides as follows: 
 
“On or before January 1, 1994, the Ohio board of regents jointly with all 
state universities, as defined in section 3345.011 of the Revised Code, shall 
develop standards for instructional workloads for full-time and part-time faculty in 
keeping with the universities’ missions and with special emphasis on the 
undergraduate learning experience. The standards shall contain clear guidelines for 
institutions to determine a range of acceptable undergraduate teaching by faculty. 
 
“On or before June 30, 1994, the board of trustees of each state university 
shall take formal action to adopt a faculty workload policy consistent with the 
standards developed under this section. Notwithstanding section 4117.08 of the 
Revised Code, the policies adopted under this section are not appropriate subjects 
for collective bargaining. Notwithstanding division (A) of section 4117.10 of the 
Revised Code, any policy adopted under this section by a board of trustees prevails 
over any conflicting provisions of any collective bargaining agreement between an 
employees organization and that board of trustees.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Also enacted as part of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 152, Section 84.14, uncodified, 
provides: 
 
“Pursuant to section 3345.45 of the Revised Code, the Ohio Board of 
Regents shall work with state universities to ensure that no later than fall term 
1994 a minimum ten per cent increase in statewide undergraduate teaching activity 
 
3
be achieved to restore the reductions experienced over the past decade.  
Notwithstanding section 3345.45 of the Revised Code, any collective bargaining 
agreement in effect on the effective date of this act shall continue in effect until its 
expiration date.”  (Emphasis added.)  145 Ohio Laws, Part III, 4539. 
 
On April 15, 1994, AAUP and CSU began negotiations for a successor 
agreement.  On June 16, 1994, CSU unilaterally adopted a new workload policy 
pursuant to R.C. 3345.45, which it later amended in November 1994.  That policy, 
as amended, provides: 
 
“The normal full-time teaching load will be a range of 36 to 40 contact hours 
per academic year.  The normal teaching load in any quarter will not exceed 15 
contact hours.  Faculty members shall have at least ten office hours distributed 
over the five day work week.” 
 
On July 28, 1994, CSU notified AAUP that it would not bargain over the 
issue of faculty workload, “as faculty workload is no longer subject to the 
collective bargaining process as a result of House Bill 152.”  However, the parties 
entered into an agreement on December 14, 1994, as follows: 
 
“In the event that a court of competent jurisdiction rules that O.R.C. 3345.45 
is unconstitutional, or otherwise finds that the University and AAUP must or can 
bargain concerning faculty workload, the provisions of this article [Article 19] 
shall be reopened, and the University and AAUP shall commence negotiations 
concerning faculty workload.” 
 
Meanwhile, the parties continued to operate under the terms and conditions 
of the 1991-1994 agreement while bargaining on issues other than workload. 
 
On May 17, 1995, AAUP filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and 
injunctive relief, and a motion for a preliminary injunction pursuant to Civ.R. 
65(B), alleging that R.C. 3345.45 violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio 
and United States Constitutions, and Section 1, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.  
 
4
The trial court ordered trial on the merits of the action to be advanced and 
consolidated with the hearing on the application for preliminary injunction, in 
accordance with Civ.R. 65(B)(2). 
 
Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied AAUP’s requests for 
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, and held R.C. 3345.45 to be 
constitutional in its entirety.  In so doing, the court found: 
 
“The legislature had a legitimate governmental purpose in the enactment of 
Ohio Revised Code Section 3345.45.  The legitimate governmental purpose is to 
recapture the ten (10%) percent decline in teaching that had occurred in 
undergraduate teaching in State four (4) year universities, thereby enhancing the 
quality of undergraduate education at four (4) year State institutions.  Another 
legitimate governmental purpose is to reallocate faculty attention to teaching and 
away from research.  The legislative purpose also was to ensure that all State four 
(4) year universities uniformly implement workload policy consistent with the 
universities’ mission. 
 
“The collective bargaining language contained in Ohio Revised Code 
Section 3345.45 represents a legitimate governmental purpose as it enables the 
legislature to ensure that the ten (10%) percent decline will be recaptured 
uniformly by departments with the state universities consistent with each 
university’s individual mission. 
 
“Ohio Revised Code Section 3345.45 bears a rational relationship to the 
legitimate government purpose.  Ohio Revised Code 3345.45 requires the State 
universities to implement workload policies designed to recapture the ten (10%) 
percent decline in instructional teaching.  The collective bargaining provision 
contained in Ohio Revised Code Section 3345.45 ensures that each University will 
implement the workload policy consistent with the statute.” 
 
5
 
The court of appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.  In so doing, the 
appellate court found that the right to collectively bargain is a fundamental right, 
and that the trial court should have employed “intermediate scrutiny,” rather than 
the “rational relationship” test, in order to resolve the equal protection issue.  
However, the court of appeals did not determine whether R.C. 3345.45 runs afoul 
of equal protection, but instead remanded the cause to the trial court to determine 
whether the statute serves “important governmental objectives” and whether the 
classification contained therein is “substantially related to the achievement of those 
objectives.” 
 
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal and cross-appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff, L.L.P., Donald J. Mooney, Jr., 
James F. DeLeone and Mark D. Tucker, for appellee and cross-appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Lawrence J. Miltner and Jan A. 
Neiger, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant and cross-appellee. 
 
Snyder, Rakay & Spicer and Peter J. Rakay, for amicus curiae Ohio 
Education Association. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Lawrence J. Miltner, Assistant 
Attorney General, for amicus curiae Ohio Board of Regents. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.  The primary issue confronting the court today is 
whether R.C. 3345.45 violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United 
States Constitutions.  CSU challenges the court of appeals’ determination that 
collective bargaining is a fundamental right and its application of a heightened 
level of equal protection scrutiny.  Although AAUP seeks to defend the reasoning 
of the court of appeals, its primary focus is on arguing that the rationales advanced 
 
6
in support of R.C. 3345.45 cannot withstand any level of equal protection scrutiny.  
For the following reasons, we hold that both appeals have merit. 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that 
“[n]o State shall * * * deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”  Section 2, Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides that 
“[a]ll political power is inherent in the people.  Government is instituted for their 
equal protection and benefit * * *.”  These two provisions are functionally 
equivalent, and the standards for determining violations of equal protection are 
essentially the same under state and federal law.  State ex rel. Dayton Fraternal 
Order of Police Lodge No. 44 v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 1, 
6, 22 OBR 1, 5, 488 N.E.2d 181, 185; Fabrey v. McDonald Village Police Dept. 
(1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 351, 353, 639 N.E.2d 31, 33.  Accordingly, we will consider 
the propriety of R.C. 3345.45 under both of these constitutional provisions as a 
single question. 
 
The standards for determining whether a law runs afoul of equal protection 
generally involve identifying the means and ends of the law at issue and examining 
the relationship between them.  If the means employed by the law at issue create 
separate classes of persons who receive different treatment, the laws will be tested 
under the equal protection guarantee.  Otherwise, if no distinctions are drawn and 
no classifications are created, there is no reason to subject the law to equal 
protection scrutiny.  See State ex rel. Doersam v. Indus. Comm. (1989), 45 Ohio 
St.3d 115, 120, 543 N.E.2d 1169, 1174; State v. Thompkins (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 
558, 561, 664 N.E.2d 926, 929. 
 
There is no question that R.C. 3345.45 legislatively creates discrete classes 
of persons who receive differential treatment.  The statute isolates university 
faculty members as the only public employees as defined in R.C. 4117.01(C) who 
are precluded from collectively bargaining over their workload. 
 
7
 
However, the mere fact that R.C. 3345.45 creates separate classes of persons 
does not render it suspect under the Equal Protection Clause.  “The demand for 
‘equal protection’ cannot be a demand that laws apply universally to all persons.  
By the very nature of the work of the legislature, it must, if it is to act at all, impose 
special burdens upon or grant special benefits to special groups or classes of 
individuals.”  Doersam, supra, 45 Ohio St.3d at 119, 543 N.E.2d at 1173.  Instead, 
the fact of classification  serves only to subject the statute to equal protection 
scrutiny, that is, whether the classification created bears “a sufficient relationship 
to a required governmental purpose.”  Id., 45 Ohio St.3d at 120, 543 N.E.2d at 
1174. 
 
Generally, “[a] statutory classification which involves neither a suspect class 
nor a fundamental right does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Ohio 
Constitution if the classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
interest.”  Klepper v. Ohio Bd. of Regents (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 131, 133, 570 
N.E.2d 1124, 1127.  In other words, “[w]here neither a fundamental right nor a 
suspect class is involved, a legislative classification passes muster if the state can 
show a rational basis for the unequal treatment of different groups.”  Fabrey, 
supra, 70 Ohio St.3d at 353, 639 N.E.2d at 33. 
 
R.C. 3345.45 involves neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right.  
Although the court of appeals raised forceful arguments as to the value and 
importance of collective bargaining in Ohio, no authority of which we are aware 
has held the right of public employees to collectively bargain over their workload 
to be a fundamental right for equal protection purposes. 
 
In an effort to defend the court of appeals’ analysis, AAUP claims that this 
court applied a heightened level of scrutiny to a statute denying certain Dayton 
municipal employees the collective bargaining rights enjoyed by other similarly 
situated municipal employees in State ex rel. Dayton Fraternal Order of Police 
 
8
Lodge No. 44, supra.  AAUP argues that by framing the issue to be whether the 
Dayton exclusion “bears a fair and substantial relation to the object of the Public 
Employees Collective Bargaining Act,” we actually applied an intermediate level 
of scrutiny.  22 Ohio St.3d at 6, 22 OBR at 5, 488 N.E.2d at 186.  However, our 
focus in that case was clearly on whether the created classification was “rationally 
related to a legitimate government interest.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id., 22 Ohio St.3d 
at 6, 22 OBR at 5, 488 N.E.2d at 185.  At no point did we hold the right of 
collective bargaining to be a fundamental right or apply a heightened or 
intermediate level of equal protection scrutiny. 
 
The determinative issue in this case is, therefore, whether R.C. 3345.45 
bears a rational relation to a legitimate governmental interest.  In considering this 
issue, we are guided by the principles that all legislative enactments enjoy a strong 
presumption of constitutionality and that, under rational-basis scrutiny, a 
legislative distinction will be upheld if there exists any conceivable set of facts to 
justify it.  See Fabrey, supra, 70 Ohio St.3d at 352-353, 639 N.E.2d at 33; 
Denicola v. Providence Hosp. (1979), 57 Ohio St.2d 115, 119, 11 O.O.3d 290, 
293, 387 N.E.2d 231, 234. 
 
The goal of R.C. 3345.45, as set forth in Section 84.14 of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 
152, is “to ensure that no later than fall term 1994, a minimum ten percent increase 
in statewide undergraduate teaching activity be achieved to restore the reductions 
experienced over the past decade.”  The record suggests, and the parties agree, that 
the object of this legislation is not to increase total faculty workload, but to effect a 
change in the ratio between faculty activities in order to correct the imbalance 
between research and teaching at four-year undergraduate state institutions created 
by a faculty reward system which prizes research over teaching.  Intrinsically, this 
is a concern over the quality of undergraduate education and, therefore, is a 
legitimate governmental interest. 
 
9
 
The fact that the General Assembly chose to correct only the decline in 
teaching-related activity at this time, rather than attempt to address all at once the 
various factors that the record suggests have contributed to the instability of higher 
education in Ohio, does not diminish the legitimacy of its interest.  “It is generally 
recognized that when a legislative body chooses to act to correct a given evil it 
need not correct all the evil at once, but it may proceed step-by-step.”  State v. 
Buckley (1968), 16 Ohio St.2d 128, 134, 45 O.O.2d 469, 473, 243 N.E.2d 66, 71. 
 
However, the existence of a legitimate governmental interest will not enable 
the legislative classification to pass constitutional muster if the party attacking the 
legislation can show that there is no rational basis for the differential treatment.  
Many of the arguments advanced by CSU and its supporting amicus curiae, Ohio 
Board of Regents, seek to establish a general relationship between faculty 
workload and quality of education, or to justify treating differently the faculty at 
two- and four-year institutions.  Such arguments, however, miss the mark, as they 
fail to address the essential question of whether there exists a rational basis for 
placing faculty members in a class by themselves as the only public employees as 
defined in R.C. 4117.01(C) denied the right to collectively bargain over their 
workload. 
 
On this precise issue, CSU and the Ohio Board of Regents argue that in 
order to recoup the ten-percent decline in teaching, it is necessary to achieve 
uniformity, consistency, and equity in terms of faculty workload by university 
mission, and that collective bargaining produces considerable variation in faculty 
workload across the universities in departments having the same academic mission.  
In support of its position, CSU submitted as evidence to the trial court the 
following reports published prior and subsequent to the enactment of R.C. 
3345.45:  Report, Legislative Office of Education Oversight, The Faculty Reward 
System in Public Universities (July 1993); Report of the Managing for the Future 
 
10
Task Force, Challenges & Opportunities for Higher Education in Ohio (July 1992); 
Report of the Regents’ Advisory Committee on Faculty Workload Standards & 
Guidelines (Feb. 18, 1994); Report of the Regents’ Advisory Committee on 
Faculty Workload, The Evaluation & Reward of Teaching (June 1994); A Report 
of the Ohio Board of Regents, Securing the Future of Higher Education in Ohio 
(Dec. 1992); and the Basic Data Series, a biennial publication of tables reflecting 
statistical data collected from Ohio colleges and universities. 
 
We have reviewed each of these reports, and all other evidence contained in 
the record, and can conclude with confidence that there is not a shred of evidence 
in the entire record which links collective bargaining with the decline in teaching 
over the last decade, or in any way purports to establish that collective bargaining 
contributed in the slightest to the lost faculty time devoted to undergraduate 
teaching.  Indeed, these reports appear to indicate that factors other than collective 
bargaining are responsible for the decline in teaching activity. 
 
The Legislative Office of Education Oversight Report, supra, at 12, explains 
as follows: 
“FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO IMBALANCE 
 
“The imbalance of research over teaching and service in the faculty reward 
system is due to a combination of three factors, and their effects on one another.  
These factors are embedded in the process of granting promotions and tenure to 
faculty at four-year institutions throughout the country.  They include: 
 
“1.  A national competition among universities for prestige, funds, faculty, 
and students; 
 
“2.  The perceived difficulty of assessing faculty work other than research; 
and 
 
“3.  The nationwide culture of universities.” 
 
The Report of the Managing for the Future Task Force explains: 
 
11
 
“In Ohio, over the past ten years faculty time devoted to teaching and 
student advising has decreased somewhat, while time devoted to research has 
increased * * *.  Faculty course sections assigned each term have not changed in 
the aggregate, but the average ‘student credit hours taught’ (credit hour value of 
the course times the number of students enrolled in the course) has decreased by 
10% * * *.  This would indicate either that faculty are teaching courses with fewer 
students than in the past and/or they are spending their time on the research and 
service contributions that make up the balance of their work assignment.”  Id. at 
40. 
 
The Report goes on to list a number of priorities and to make 
recommendations under each priority.  “Priority 3” is entitled “Increase 
Productivity and Reduce Costs.”  Id. at 54.  Under this priority, the Task Force 
seeks in part to “[e]nsure that faculty time is allocated in the most productive 
manner, consistent with institutional and departmental missions,” and to 
accomplish this by having the Ohio Board of Regents require each public college 
and university to “[d]evelop an institutional faculty performance workload policy,” 
and “[d]evelop and implement a faculty performance evaluation and appropriate 
reward system consistent with institutional mission, goals and objectives.”  Id. at 
55. 
 
Although these concerns are strikingly similar to the arguments made by 
CSU and the Ohio Board of Regents, the Report itself does not support the 
elimination of collective bargaining rights in order to achieve consistency and 
uniformity.  To the contrary, the Task Force specifically recommended under this 
priority an assurance that “[t]he rights of employees to bargain collectively are 
protected.”  Id. at 56. 
 
The 1990 Basic Data Series indicates that teaching workload, at least in 
terms of average “credit hours assigned” and average “weekly contact hours” is 
 
12
generally higher at state universities where collective bargaining has occurred than 
at other universities.  Indeed, the Legislative Office of Education Oversight Report, 
supra, at 10, indicates that “71 percent of faculty report their interests lean toward 
or lay primarily in teaching,” that “78 percent of these professors [regarding 
research as essential for tenure] would prefer teaching to be essential for tenure,” 
and that “44 percent of faculty at public institutions felt that demands for research 
interfered with teaching.” 
 
In addition, Dr. Howard L. Gauthier, Executive Associate to the Chancellor 
for Planning of the Ohio Board of Regents and author of the Regents’ Report, 
testified as follows: 
 
“Q.  * * * I have gone through your report and response to that report,  * * * 
and I couldn’t find any recommendation in there on behalf of the Board of Regents 
that faculty not be allowed to bargain about their workload? 
 
“A.  That’s correct. 
 
“Q.  And in fact I found absolutely no reports anywhere in the exhibits that 
have been offered by the State that suggest before July 1, 1993, that faculty not be 
allowed to bargain about their workload.  Are you aware of any reports to that 
affect [sic]? 
 
“A.  I’m not. 
 
“ * * * 
 
“Q.  And I take it that you have done no other study either before or after the 
enactment of Section 3345.45 that suggested that somehow or another collective 
bargaining caused a reduction in any workload by faculty? 
 
“A.  That’s correct.” 
 
In light of the foregoing, we cannot find any rational basis for singling out 
university faculty members as the only public employees as defined in R.C. 
4117.01(C) precluded from bargaining over their workload.  Accordingly, we hold 
 
13
that R.C. 3345.45 violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United 
States Constitutions, since the classification contained therein bears no rational 
relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.  We find further that, in light of 
this holding, it is unnecessary to address AAUP’s remaining arguments. 
 
In light of all the foregoing, we conclude that AAUP is entitled to the 
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief that it has requested. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in the syllabus and judgment. 
 
MOYER, C.J., COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  Because I believe that a rational basis underlies R.C. 
3345.45, I respectfully dissent. 
 
I agree with the majority that collective bargaining does not rise to the level 
of a fundamental right and, therefore, the proper inquiry in this case is whether 
R.C. 3345.45 bears a rational relation to a legitimate government interest.  I depart, 
however, from the majority’s ultimate conclusion that R.C. 3345.45 fails rational-
basis scrutiny. 
 
R.C. 3345.45 represents a legislative response to a decade-long trend of 
declining teaching activity at four-year undergraduate state institutions in favor of 
research.  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 152, Section 84.14, uncodified, 145 Ohio Laws, Part 
III, 4539.  As noted by the majority, “The record suggests, and the parties agree, 
that the object of this legislation is not to increase total faculty workload, but to 
effect a change in the ratio between faculty activities in order to correct the 
imbalance between research and teaching at four-year undergraduate state 
institutions created by a faculty reward system which prizes research over 
teaching.” 
 
14
 
The majority recognizes that R.C. 3345.45 is aimed at a legitimate 
government interest — the quality of undergraduate education.  Nevertheless, it 
concludes that the statute violates the Equal Protection Clauses of our state and 
federal Constitutions because its means do not legitimately relate to its desired end.  
The majority supports its position by stating that “there is not a shred of evidence 
in the entire record which links collective bargaining with the decline in teaching 
over the last decade, or in any way purports to establish that collective bargaining 
contributed in the slightest to the lost faculty time devoted to undergraduate 
teaching.”  As I explain later in this dissent, however, that collective bargaining 
has not caused the decline in teaching proves nothing in assessing whether the 
faculty workload standards imposed pursuant to R.C. 3345.45 legitimately relate to 
that statute’s purpose of restoring losses in undergraduate teaching activity. 
 
Initially, it is important to recognize the strong presumption of validity in 
favor of legislative classifications that do not involve fundamental rights or suspect 
classifications. 
 
See, 
e.g., 
 
Fed. 
Communications 
Comm. 
v. 
Beach 
Communications, Inc. (1993), 508 U.S. 307, 314-315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 2101-2102, 
124 L.Ed.2d 211, 222;  Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools (1988), 487 U.S. 450, 
462, 108 S.Ct. 2481, 2489, 101 L.Ed.2d 399, 412.  Rational-basis scrutiny is 
intended to be a paradigm of judicial restraint, and where there are plausible 
reasons for the General Assembly’s action, a court’s inquiry must end. Beach 
Communications, 508 U.S. at 313-314, 113 S.Ct. at 2101, 124 L.Ed.2d at 221. “ 
‘The Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even 
improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and 
that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may 
think a political branch has acted.’ ”  Id., quoting  Vance v. Bradley (1979), 440 
U.S. 93, 97, 99 S.Ct. 939, 942-943, 59 L.Ed.2d 171, 176. 
 
15
 
Accordingly, to enact legislation that can withstand an equal protection 
challenge proceeding under rational-basis scrutiny, a legislature “need not ‘actually 
articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification.’  
Nordlinger [v. Hahn (1992)], supra, [505 U.S. 1] at 15 [112 S.Ct. 2326, 2334, 120 
L.Ed.2d 1, 16].  See also, e.g., United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 
U.S. 166, 179 [101 S.Ct. 453, 461, 66 L.Ed.2d 368, 378] (1980);  Allied Stores of 
Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528 [79 S.Ct. 437, 441, 3 L.Ed.2d 480, 486] 
(1959).  Instead, a classification ‘must be upheld against equal protection challenge 
if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational 
basis for the classification.’ Beach Communications, supra, [508 U.S.] at 313 [113 
S.Ct. at 2101, 124 L.Ed.2d at 221].  See also, e.g., Nordlinger, supra, [505 U.S.] at 
11 [112 S.Ct. at 2334, 120 L.Ed.2d at 13]; Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 485 
[110 S.Ct. 2499, 2504, 110 L.Ed.2d 438, 446] (1990); Fritz, supra, [449 U.S.] at 
174-179 [101 S.Ct. at 459-461, 66 L.Ed.2d at 375-379]; Vance v. Bradley, 440 
U.S. 93, 111 [99 S.Ct. 939, 949, 59 L.Ed.2d 171, 184] (1979);  Dandridge v. 
Williams [1970], supra, [397 U.S. 471] at 484-485 [90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161-1162, 25 
L.Ed.2d 491, 501]. 
 
“A State, moreover, has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the 
rationality of a statutory classification.  ‘[A] legislative choice is not subject to 
courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by 
evidence or empirical data.’ Beach Communications, supra, [508 U.S.] at 315 [113 
S.Ct. at 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d at 222].  See also, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, supra, [440 
U.S.] at 111 [99 S.Ct. at 949, 59 L.Ed.2d at 184]; Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap 
Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 812 [96 S.Ct. 2488, 2499, 49 L.Ed.2d 220, 232-233] (1976); 
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 
393 U.S. 129, 139 [89 S.Ct. 323, 328, 21 L.Ed.2d 289, 297] (1968).  A statute is 
presumed constitutional, see supra, at 319 [113 S.Ct. at 2642, 125 L.Ed.2d at 270], 
 
16
and ‘[t]he burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative 
every conceivable basis which might support it,’ Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto 
Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 [93 S.Ct. 1001, 1006, 35 L.Ed.2d 351, 358] (1973) 
(internal quotation marks omitted), whether or not the basis has a foundation in the 
record.” Heller v. Doe (1993), 509 U.S. 312, 320-321, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 2642-2643, 
125 L.Ed.2d 257, 270-271. 
 
Based on this standard, the majority does not demonstrate that R.C. 3345.45 
is unconstitutional when it says that there is no evidence in the record linking 
collective bargaining to the decline in teaching, or cites statistical evidence tending 
to show that university faculty members are more interested in teaching than 
research and would prefer teaching to be the essential criterion for tenure.  Under 
rational-basis scrutiny, “the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied so long as there is 
a plausible policy reason for the classification, see United States Railroad 
Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174, 179 [101 S.Ct. 453, 459, 461, 66 
L.Ed.2d 368, 376, 378] (1980), the legislative facts on which the classification is 
apparently based rationally may have been considered to be true by the 
governmental decisionmaker, see Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 
U.S. 456, 464 [101 S.Ct. 715, 724, 66 L.Ed.2d 659, 669] (1981), and the 
relationship of the classification to its goal is not so attenuated as to render the 
distinction arbitrary or irrational, see Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. 
[1985], 473 U.S. [432], 446 [105 S.Ct. 3249, 3257, 87 L.Ed.2d 313, 324].”  
Nordlinger v. Hahn (1992), 505 U.S. 1, 11, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 2332, 120 L.Ed.2d 1, 
13.  Because R.C. 3345.45 concerns a legitimate government interest, the only 
remaining question is whether the General Assembly rationally could have 
believed that imposing uniform workload standards would promote its objective. 
See W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of California (1981), 451 
U.S. 648, 671,  101 S.Ct. 2070, 2084-2085, 68 L.Ed.2d 514, 533. 
 
17
 
The evidence before the trial court tended to demonstrate that while the 
current imbalance between teaching and research is due to factors unrelated to 
collective bargaining, it is unlikely that the collective bargaining process will bring 
research and teaching into balance in the absence of legislative intervention.  
Research provides the primary basis for competition among universities for 
prestige, funds, faculty, and students.  This emphasis on research, in turn, leads 
teachers to focus their efforts disproportionately on research in hopes of increasing 
their value to their respective universities and marketability to more prestigious 
institutions.  Accordingly, neither the universities nor the faculty members would 
seem to have much incentive to bargain for an increase in the ratio of teaching to 
research. 
 
R.C. 3345.45 requires a joint effort between the board of regents and state 
universities to “develop standards for instructional workloads,” setting a “range of 
acceptable undergraduate teaching by faculty.”  It also removes that subject from 
collective bargaining in order to ensure that the workload standards are 
implemented consistently. 
 
The majority’s concern that collective bargaining did not cause the decline 
in teaching activity that R.C. 3345.45 seeks to rectify is inconsequential to our 
rational-basis review.  It matters not that the General Assembly fashioned R.C. 
3345.45 to treat an undesirable symptom rather than to eliminate its cause.  “ ‘The 
legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting 
the others.’ ” Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 316, 113 S.Ct. at 2102, 124 
L.Ed.2d at 223, quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. (1955), 348 
U.S. 483, 489, 75 S.Ct. 461, 465, 99 L.Ed. 563, 573.  Instead, once we have 
determined that the General Assembly acted with a legitimate government interest 
in mind, rational-basis scrutiny requires that we look only to the legislative action 
taken and determine whether it is arbitrary or irrational. 
 
18
 
“[C]ourts are compelled under rational-basis review to accept a legislature’s 
generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit between means and ends.  A 
classification does not fail rational-basis review because it  ‘ “is not made with 
mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.” ’ 
Dandridge v. Williams, supra, [397 U.S.] at 485 [90 S.Ct. at 1161, 25 L.Ed.2d at 
501-502], quoting  Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 [31 
S.Ct. 337, 340, 55 L.Ed. 369, 377] (1911). ‘The problems of government are 
practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations — 
illogical, it may be, and unscientific.’  Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 
U.S. 61, 69-70 [33 S.Ct. 441, 443, 57 L.Ed. 730, 734] (1913).  See also, e.g., 
Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648, 651 [112 S.Ct. 2184, 2187, 119 
L.Ed.2d 432, 438] (1992); Vance v. Bradley, supra, [440 U.S.] at 108 [99 S.Ct. at 
948, 59 L.Ed.2d at 183] and n. 26; New Orleans v. Dukes, supra, [427 U.S.] at 303 
[96 S.Ct. at 2516, 49 L.Ed.2d at 517]; Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 234 [101 
S.Ct. 1074, 1082, 67 L.Ed.2d 186, 198] (1981).” Heller, 509 U.S. at 321, 113 S.Ct. 
at 2642-2643, 125 L.Ed.2d at 271. 
 
The General Assembly’s choice to “single out” university faculty as the only 
class of public employees as defined in R.C. 4117.01(C) who are precluded from 
collectively bargaining over their workload is not arbitrary.  R.C. 3345.45’s goal of 
recovering recent decreases in teaching activity at state universities exclusively 
relates to the workload of university faculty members, providing a reasonable basis 
for the classification.  Further, imposing uniform workload standards upon 
university faculty at state four-year institutions is not an irrational means of  
effecting an increase in teaching activity.  In fact, it was probably the most direct 
means of accomplishing that objective available to the General Assembly. 
 
Based on all of the foregoing, I believe that R.C. 3345.45 is rationally 
related to a legitimate government interest and must be upheld against today’s 
 
19
equal protection challenge.  Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the court 
of appeals. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concur in the foregoing 
dissenting opinion.