Title: Nieves v, State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

MANUEL NIEVES, §
§ No. 108, 2015
Defendant Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below—Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware in and
v. § for New Castle County
§
STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. 0107022700
§
Plaintiff Below, §
Appellee. §

Submitted: June 17,2015
Decided: September 1, 2015

Before VALIHURA, VAUGHN and SEITZ, Justices.
ORDER

This 1“ day of September 2015, upon consideration of the appellant's:
‘opening brief and the appellee's motion to affirm under Supreme Court Rule
25(a), it appears to the Court that:

(1) The appellant, Manuel Nieves, filed this appeal from the
Superior Court’s February 9, 2015 summary dismissal of his eighth motion
for postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”).
‘The State of Delaware has moved to affirm the Superior Court's judgment
‘on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Nieves’ opening brief that the

appeal is without merit. We agree and affirm.
(2) In 2002, a Superior Court jury convicted Nieves of thirty-two
criminal offenses, including twenty counts of first degree rape. The Superior
Court sentenced Nieves to more than three hundred years of mandatory
imprisonment. In 2003, this Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment
‘on direct appeal.' Since that time, Nieves has filed eight motions for
postconviction relief, all of which were denied or dismissed.

(3) When dismissing Nieves’ eighth motion for postconviction

relief, the Superior Court found that the m

 

“provide(d] little more than

matters which were previously adjudicated.” The Superior Court ruled that

 

“it will no longer continue to review and adjudicate claims which have
already been adjudicated.” Also, the Superior Court directed the
Prothonotary to reject any future motions for postconviction relief filed by
Nieves if the court “determines the motion is merely duplicative of past
motions.” This appeal followed.

(4) On appeal, Nieves claims, as he did in his postconviction

‘motion, that his trial counsel was ineffective. Also, Nieves claims that he is

entitled to a sentence modification under 11 Del. C. 3901(d) as recently

" Nieves v. State, 2003 WL 329589 (Del. Feb. 11, 2003).
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amended.’ Nieves claims that the Superior Court erred when it summarily

  

dismissed his eighth postconviction m
(5) Having reviewed the parties’ submissions on appeal and the

1r Court record, the Court concludes that Nieves’ eighth motion for

 
  

jon relief was subject to summary dismissal under Rule
61(4)(5)2_ Nieves’ sentence modification claim was not cognizable under

Rule 61.! Also, Nieves’ ineffective assistance of counsel claim was no

 

different than the claim he raised in his first motion for postconviction relief
filed on June 8, 2004, On July 27, 2004, Nieves’ trial counsel filed an
extensive and detailed affidavit in response to the claim. By order dated
August 16, 2004, the Superior Court denied the claim as without merit, and
‘on appeal this Court affirmed.’ The Court concludes that the ineffective

assistance of counsel claim raised in Nieves’ eighth motion for

 

Del. Laws, ch. 297, § 1 (2014) (codified at 11 Del. C. § 3901(4)). The amendment,
which became effective July 9, 2014, allows for concurrent terms of confinement.
> The Superior Court summarily dismissed Nieves’ motion under Rule 61(4(4).
Effective June 4, 2014, Rule 61(4),4) was renumbered as Rule 61(4)5).
* Rule 61 governs the procedure of an application by a person in custody seeking to set
aside the judgment of conviction ora capital sentence. Del. Super. Ct Crim. R. 61(2X1)
2014).
5 Stare x. Nieves, 2004 WL 1874669 (Del. Super. Aug. 16, 2004), aff'd, 2008 WL
1874669 (Del. May 18, 2005),
postconviction relief was barred as formerly adjudicated under Rule
61(i)(4)° and (5).”
(6) We endorse the Superior Court’s rejection of any future

motions for postconviction relief filed by Nieves if the court “determines the

 

m merely duplicative of past motions.” This Court also does not
intend to continue to invest scarce judicial resources in addressing repetitive
claims. If Nieves continues to file appeals from the denial of repetitive and
meritless claims regarding his convictions in this case, he risks being
enjoined from filing such appeals in this Court without first seeking leave of
the Court.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State's motion to

affirm is GRANTED. The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.

 

BY THE COURT:

ice

 

Rule 61(i}4) (2014) (barring formerly adjudicated claim),

7 Effective June 4, 2014, under Rule 61(iXS), a formerly adjudicated claim under Rule
61(3\(4) is barred unless the claim satisfies the pleading requirements of Rulle 61(4)(2)i)
or (ii), which require that the movant plead with particularity the existence of new
evidence “that creates a strong inference” of actual innocence or a new rule of
constitutional law that is retroactively applicable.

* Eg, Evans v. State, 2015 WL 214057, at *2 (Del. Jan. 14, 2015); Biggins v. Stare, 2011
WL 2731214, at *1 (Del. July 11, 2011}; Epperson v. Stare, 2006 WL 1547975, at *1
(Del. June 5, 2006).

4