Title: Clarke v. Beckwith

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Clarke v. Beckwith1993 WY 109858 P.2d 293Case Number: 92-288Decided: 08/13/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
Debra S. 
CLARKE,

 Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

Rex BECKWITH, 

Appellee 
(Defendant).

Appeal from The District 
Court, Fremont County, D. Terry Rogers, J.

Steven R. 
Helling, Casper, for appellant.

Travis W. Moffat 
of Moffat & McKee, P.C., Lander, for appellee.

Before MACY, 
C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.

MACY, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Debra 
S. Clarke, who was injured when she slipped and fell on ice in a driveway, 
appeals from the district court's order granting a summary judgment in favor of 
Appellee Rex Beckwith, the owner of the premises where Ms. Clarke 
fell.

[¶2]      We reverse, 
remand, and abandon a portion of the common-law rule which distinguishes between 
tort claimants on the basis of whether their status is licensee or 
invitee.

[¶3]      Ms. Clarke 
pursues resolution of these questions:

Did the Trial Court err 
when it granted Appellee's (Defendant below) Motion for Summary Judgment? Were 
there genuine issues of material fact which precluded the entry of summary 
judgment? Was Appellee entitled to judgment as a matter of law?

     Under the facts of 
this case, these issues necessarily include the following 
sub-issues:

     What duty of care is 
owed by the owner and occupant of premises who expressly invites persons to his 
or her premises?

Was there a genuine issue 
of material fact as to whether Appellee breached that duty in this case, and was 
Appellee entitled to judgment as a matter of law?

[¶4]      In response, Mr. 
Beckwith articulates this summary of the matters to be settled:

1. Was Summary Judgment 
appropriately rendered in favor of Appellee Beckwith because

a. there were no genuine 
issues of material fact as to the legal status of Appellant Clarke at the time 
she fell on Appellee's driveway, and

b. there were no genuine 
issues of material fact supporting the contention that Appellee's conduct fell 
below the willful and wanton standard of care?

2. Should this Court 
abandon the common law classifications of trespasser, licensee, and invitee in 
favor of an ordinary negligence standard of care for entrants upon the land of 
others?

[¶5]      Ms. Clarke filed 
her complaint, alleging that she had been injured on December 23, 1991, when she 
fell in Mr. Beckwith's driveway as she arrived to attend an annual Christmas 
party. Mr. Beckwith answered the complaint and filed a motion for summary 
judgment, professing that Ms. Clarke was a social guest-licensee and that, 
because of her status, his only duty as to Ms. Clarke was not to cause her 
injury through willful and wanton misconduct. 

[¶6]      The facts are 
virtually undisputed. Mr. Beckwith hosted a Christmas party at his home in Sinks 
Canyon on Monday, December 23, 1991. Snow fell during the weekend preceding the 
party. Mr. Beckwith used his snowblower on Sunday afternoon to remove that snow 
from his driveway. On Monday afternoon, the day of the party, he used a scoop 
shovel to dislodge the remaining compacted snow which had not been removed by 
the snowblower.

[¶7]      Ms. Clarke was 
formally invited to attend the Christmas party. When she arrived at Mr. 
Beckwith's home, numerous other guests were already there so she had to park 
near the end of the 400-foot long driveway. At the house, which was located on a 
hillside, the driveway was as wide as the three-stall garage and had a 25-foot 
parking area to the west of the garage but it narrowed into a "regular driveway" 
about half way up the mountain to the road. The party began at seven o'clock in 
the evening, and it was dark when Ms. Clarke arrived.

[¶8]      Ms. Clarke 
attested that she slipped twice before she actually fell on what she 
characterized as being an icy spot. Although she directs special attention to 
the darkened condition of the driveway, she stated in her deposition that she 
could see from where she fell that the driveway appeared to be icy all the way 
to the front sidewalk and "that only the sidewalk in front of his house didn't 
have any snow or ice on it." Ms. Clarke maintained that she lay on the ground 
for about fifteen minutes before anyone came to help her. However, when her 
cries for help were heard, many people came out to assist, and she was 
immediately taken to a hospital. As a result of the fall, Ms. Clarke's leg was 
broken in seven places. Treatment has included surgical intervention and may 
require future surgeries.

[¶9]      The district 
court issued findings in conjunction with its grant of a summary judgment. 
Acknowledging the prior decisions of this Court, which we shall discuss in more 
detail later, the trial court described Ms. Clarke as being a social guest and 
identified Mr. Beckwith's duty toward her as being one "not to harm the licensee 
willfully or wantonly." Finding that no genuine issue of material fact existed 
relating to willful or wanton misconduct by Mr. Beckwith, the district court 
granted the summary judgment.

[¶10]   The common-law classification of 
tort plaintiffs as trespassers, licensees, and invitees has deep roots in 
Anglo-American jurisprudence. The classifications served to measure the limits 
of the owner's duty according to whether the entrant was considered to be an 
invitee, a licensee, or a trespasser. As to trespassers and licensees, the owner 
had only a duty not to willfully or wantonly harm. As to an invitee, on the 
other hand, the owner had a duty to exercise reasonable care. Over the years, 
courts have further refined and differentiated between the three classes in 
order to avoid the harshness of the primary classifications. This has, of 
course, tended to produce unusual results in some cases.

[¶11]   In Yalowizer v. Husky Oil Company, 
629 P.2d 465 (Wyo. 1981), we 
declined an opportunity to depart from the use of those classifications, which 
were recognized in Maher v. City of Casper, 67 Wyo. 268, 219 P.2d 125 (1950). As we begin 
our examination of this issue, it is essential for us to acknowledge that our 
decisions in both Maher (two boys drowned in an abandoned quarry which had 
filled with water) and Yalowizer (a driver was injured when she was using an 
abandoned service station's driveway as a shortcut) were primarily dicta and 
dealt with persons who were described as being trespassers rather than as being 
invitees or licensees.

[¶12]   Our decision today was presaged by 
Allen v. Slim Pickens Enterprises, 777 P.2d 79 (Wyo. 1989). We 
indicated in that case: "The key to the creation of a duty to the invitees on 
the premises is foreseeability." 777 P.2d  at 82 (citing Becker v. Diamond 
Parking, Inc., 768 S.W.2d 169 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)). Continuing, we 
held:

The status of this 
visitor, except to discern that he was not a trespasser, is unimportant under 
these circumstances. Within the particularized facts of a general invitation in 
a prior year and present visit to the unoccupied summer cabin without advance 
notice, the designation of the relationship is unnecessary in assessment that no 
duty of care was violated. Whether to be differentiated to be a bare licensee in 
legal theory or a social guest, the visit of Allen was unexpected, unplanned and 
unprepared.

Id.

[¶13]  Since our decision in Yalowizer, there 
has been considerable development of the law in this field. Three discrete rules 
are applied in various jurisdictions: One grouping of jurisdictions (with some 
variation in some of these states over the years) continues to apply the 
common-law rule; a second cluster of states makes no distinction between the 
three categories and applies a rule of "reasonable care under the 
circumstances"; and the third group continues to treat trespassers as a distinct 
group but applies the rule of "reasonable care under the circumstances" to all 
others. Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Modern Status of Rules Conditioning 
Landowner's Liability upon Status of Injured Party as Invitee, Licensee, or 
Trespasser, 22 A.L.R.4TH 294 (1983 & 1992 Supp.); 3 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL, 
THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 14:3 (1986).

[¶14]   The third rule has been ably 
expressed by the North Dakota Supreme Court:

In the instant case, 
rather than continue to predicate liability on the status of an entrant, we have 
decided to apply the ordinary principles of negligence to govern a landowner's 
conduct as to a licensee and an invitee. We do not change our rule as to 
trespassers. An occupier of premises must act as a reasonable man in maintaining 
his property in a reasonably safe condition in view of all the circumstances, 
including the likelihood of injury to another, the seriousness of the injury, 
and the burden of avoiding the risk. Having determined the judicial necessity 
for abandoning the use of the common law categories of licensee and invitee in 
premises liability cases, we have determined to do so prospectively except as to 
the parties in this action.

O'Leary v. 
Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746, 751 (N.D. 1977) (footnote omitted). See also Poulin v. 
Colby College, 402 A.2d 846 (Me. 1979); Waters by Murphy v. United States 
Fidelity & Guaranty Company, 369 N.W.2d 755 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (citing 
Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski, 70 Wis.2d 836, 236 N.W.2d 1 (1975)); and Hudson v. 
Gaitan, 675 S.W.2d 699 (Tenn. 1984). We are persuaded that the third rule - 
trespassers will be treated as a distinct group but the rule of "reasonable care 
under the circumstances" will be applied to all others - should be and hereby is 
adopted by this Court. The foreseeability of the injury, rather than the status 
of the lawful entrant, should be the basis for liability. This decision is to be 
applied prospectively except as to the parties in this action.

[¶15]   Reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

CARDINE, Justice, 
concurring.

[¶16]   I concur upon the condition and 
with my understanding that this case has no application to and does not change 
our pronounced law governing landowner liability for natural accumulations of 
ice and snow. Upon remand, the parties may again move for summary judgment which 
now must be determined by the principles announced herein and those that pertain 
to accumulation of snow and ice, whether natural or unnatural. I would apply the 
rule retrospectively. Insurance coverage has been mentioned and, of course, it 
is no more a material fact for consideration than is the existence or 
non-existence of appellant's own health, hospitalization or accident insurance. 
The only question that ought to be considered is whether one party ought to 
compensate the other for injuries sustained by a social guest invited to a 
party.

GOLDEN, Justice, specially 
concurring with whom CARDINE, J., joins.

[¶17]   This appeal presents the narrow 
question whether a Wyoming landowner or occupier owes a duty of reasonable care 
to his or her social guests to protect them from physical harm while they are on 
his or her premises. I would hold that such a duty is owed. I would apply this 
ruling to Mrs. Clarke's case and prospectively to those social guests whose 
claims accrue after the date of this opinion. My preference for prospective 
application rests upon my desire to be fair to litigants and to protect reliance 
upon clear judicial precedent. The majority's decision today expressly accepts 
the invitation rejected by this court twelve years ago in Yalowizer v. Husky Oil 
Co., 629 P.2d 465, 22 A.L.R.4th 
285 (Wyo. 1981), when Mrs. Yalowizer asked this court to abolish the common law 
classifications and establish a unified duty of reasonable care regardless of 
the entrant's status. Our decision in Allen v. Slim Pickens Enter., 777 P.2d 79 (Wyo. 1989), offered no 
promise to abolitionists that this court was poised to repudiate decades of 
Wyoming jurisprudence following the common law classifications. In my judgment, 
the prudent Wyoming landowner or occupier, advised of judicial trends, would not 
have anticipated the expansion of exposure to liability embodied in today's 
decision. Thus, for me, prospective application is the better 
course.

[¶18]   To the extent that the majority 
opinion answers the narrow question presented by the facts of Mrs. Clarke's 
case, I concur in the result. I must part company with my colleagues, however, 
when their decision today exceeds the boundary of the narrow question presented 
in order to cut the wider swath and abolish wholesale the common law categories 
of invitee and licensee.1

[¶19]   To address the narrow question 
presented in context, I first note the obvious, that historically English and 
American common law courts have classified persons entering another's land as 
either invitees, licensees, or trespassers. See, JOSEPH A. PAGE, THE LAW OF 
PREMISES LIABILITY, chs. 2, 3, 4 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1993-94); Comment, The 
Common Law Tort Liability of Owners and Occupiers of Land: A Trap for the 
Unwary?, 36 Md.L.Rev. 816, 822-34 (1977). As a common law court,2 this court has long said that the 
entrant's status on the land determines the duty of care owed to him or her by 
the landowner or occupier. See:

 Thunder Hawk by and through Jensen v. 
Union Pacific R. Co., 844 P.2d 1045 (Wyo. 1992) (child injured upon jumping from a moving train car 
concedes he was either trespasser or bare licensee; this court adopts the 
attractive nuisance doctrine as stated by Restatement (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 
(1965));

 Slim Pickens, 777 P.2d 79 (the status of the 
landowner's long-time friend who unexpectedly visited the landowner's unopened 
and unprepared summer cabin in response to landowner's year-old general 
invitation is unimportant under the particular facts of the case; although the 
unexpected visitor was not a trespasser, he was either a licensee or a social 
guest);

 Yalowizer, 629 P.2d 465 (adult motor vehicle 
operator who drives onto vacant service station premises as a short-cut "was a 
trespasser and at the most a licensee" as to whom premises owner owes duty not 
to wantonly injure; this court expressly rejected the trespasser-licensee's 
request calling for the abolition of the common-law classifications and 
establishment of a uniform standard of reasonable care under the 
circumstances);

 Buttrey Food Stores Div. v. Coulson, 620 P.2d 549, 20 A.L.R.4th 419 (Wyo. 1980) (store owner owes duty of reasonable care 
to customer);

 Sinclair Refining Co. v. Redding, 439 P.2d 20 (Wyo. 1968) (affirming a judgment entered upon a jury verdict against a 
service station lessor and for a motor vehicle passenger who suffered injuries 
when she tripped and fell while returning from using the restroom to her motor 
vehicle which had stopped on the premises only for the purpose of letting the 
passenger use the restroom, this court held, among other things, that the 
evidence was sufficient to raise a jury issue whether the passenger was an 
invitee or licensee; in its analysis, this court discussed the determination of 
"invitee" status on the basis of the "economic benefit" test and the 
"invitation" test and concluded that sufficient evidence existed upon which a 
jury could find potential economic advantage to the service station lessor in 
this factual scenario);

 Stilwell v. Nation, 363 P.2d 916 (Wyo. 1961) (trailer 
court owner owes duty of reasonable care to child of trailer court 
tenant);

 Maher v. City of Casper, 67 Wyo. 268, 219 P.2d 125 (1950) (Blume, J.) (landowner city's mere tolerance and passive 
permission of, and acquiescence in, the use of a water-filled gravel pit as a 
playground by children does not make the children "invitees" as to whom the 
landowner owes a duty of reasonable care; the children, if not trespassers, are 
at most "bare licensees" as to whom the landowner owes a duty not to wantonly 
injure);

 Honan v. Moss, 359 P.2d 1002 (Wyo. 1961) (in 
affirming the trial court's judgment for the service station owner, this court 
discussed the rules of law relating to invitees and licensees in the context of 
the possibility that a customer's movement from one part of the premises to 
another in search of a restroom may change the customer's status from invitee to 
licensee);

 Dudley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 64 
Wyo. 357, 192 P.2d 617 (1948) 
(store customer is invitee as to whom storekeeper owes duty of reasonable 
care);

 Afton Elec. Co. v. Harrison, 49 Wyo. 367, 
54 P.2d 540 (1936) (Blume, J.) 
(child is a trespasser as to whom land occupier owes a duty not to willfully 
injure; however, when child is lured to an electric pole erected on the 
premises, the land occupier owes that child a duty of reasonable 
care);

 Loney v. Laramie Auto Co., 36 Wyo. 339, 
255 P. 350, 53 A.L.R. 73 (1927) 
(Blume, C.J.) (auto repair garage customer's agent is an invitee as to whom auto 
repair garage proprietor owes duty of reasonable care);

 Ramirez v. City of Cheyenne, 34 Wyo. 67, 
241 P. 710, 42 A.L.R. 245 (1925) 
(since landowner city did not contend that child was a trespasser, no reason 
existed to apply the attractive nuisance doctrine; child killed by a falling 
swing in a public park held to be a public invitee as to whom the landowner owes 
a duty of reasonable care);

[¶20]   As our case law reveals, the 
Wyoming landowner or occupier owes the invitee a duty of reasonable care and 
owes the licensee and the trespasser only a duty to refrain from willfully or 
wantonly injuring him or her. Generally speaking, this court has not been 
particularly troubled in determining whether a trial court or jury properly 
defined the status of a given entrant. It is noteworthy, however, that this 
court struggled in Redding as it stretched to transparency the "economic 
benefit" test for determining "invitee" status to apply to a motor vehicle 
passenger who was injured after using landowner's restroom, which use was the 
only reason for her being on the premises.

[¶21]   Interestingly enough, none of this 
court's cases in this specific area of premise liability law has involved a 
social hostguest relationship such as the instant case presents to us. Thus, in 
that precise sense, this is a case of first impression. After thoroughly 
studying our case law, the case law from other jurisdictions, and the scholarly 
commentary in the treatises and legal periodicals, I have concluded, as did the 
Indiana Supreme Court recently in Burrell v. Meads, 569 N.E.2d 637, 642 (Ind. 
1991), "[m]uch of the discomfort in our recent premises liability decisions 
reflects a sense late in this century that the economic benefit test promotes 
injustice when applied to social guest cases." After a solid analysis of this 
issue, the Burrell court held, correctly in my view, that a social guest is an 
invitee and, thus, entitled to a duty of reasonable care from a landowner or 
occupier as that duty is defined in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 
(1965).3 Burrell, 569 N.E.2d  at 
643.

[¶22]   Striking to the heart of the issue, 
the Burrell court stated:

Courts have justified the 
exclusion of social guests from the invitee category on the basis that guests 
come only to receive their hosts' hospitality and therefore have no right to 
expect that the hosts will take more precautions for their safety than the hosts 
would ordinarily take for the safety of members of their own households. This 
justification simply does not comport with modern social practices.

Burrell, 569 N.E.2d  at 643 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

[¶23]   Continuing in its analysis, the 
Indiana court remarked:

As we see it, the reasons 
for the Restatement's use of an invitation-based test support requiring 
landowners to exercise reasonable care for the protection of their invited 
social guests. If a landowner induces a social guest to enter his land by 
express or reasonably implied invitation, then the landowner leads that guest, 
like any other entrant, to believe that the land has been prepared for his 
safety.

Burrell, 569 N.E.2d  at 643. The Burrell analysis captures my thinking quite well. In this 
regard, I recall the words of Justice Cardozo who wrote:

I think that when a rule, 
after it has been duly tested by experience, has been found to be inconsistent 
with the sense of justice or with the social welfare, there should be less 
hesitation in frank avowal and full abandonment. * * * There should be greater 
readiness to abandon an untenable position when the rule to be discarded may not 
reasonably be supposed to have determined the conduct of the litigants, and 
particularly when in its origin it was the product of institutions or conditions 
which have gained a new significance or development with the progress of the 
years * * *.

If judges have woefully 
misinterpreted the mores of their day, or if the mores of their day are no 
longer those of ours, they ought not to tie, in helpless submission, the hands 
of their successors.

BENJAMIN 
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 120 (1921) (quoted in FRED W. 
CATLETT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS AND THE EXTENT TO 
WHICH IT SHOULD BE APPLIED, 21 Wn.L.Rev. 158, 166 (1946)).

[¶24]   Mrs. Clarke and her fellow 
Christmas party-goers were all individuals known to Mr. Beckwith, the landowner, 
and they came to his premises upon his express invitation. I conclude that he 
owed his expressly invited Christmas party guests a duty of reasonable 
care.

[¶25]   Although this conclusion removes a 
significant obstacle to the presentation of Mrs. Clarke's negligence action, 
another equally formidable one looms large, namely, the 
natural-accumulation-of-snow-and-ice rule. See, Sherman v. Platte County, 642 P.2d 787 (Wyo. 1982). Under the application of this rule, a landowner's duty of 
reasonable care is suspended from operation in the case of a natural 
accumulation of snow and ice on his or her premises. Recently, in Eiselein v. 
K-Mart, Inc., No. 92-43, oral argument was heard on the question whether the 
natural-accumulation rule should be abolished. This court asked for re-briefing 
in that case by order dated June 25, 1993. Our decision in that case will, of 
course, significantly determine the future course of Mrs. Clarke's case upon 
remand.

FOOTNOTES

1 The majority claims that 
in the twelve years since Yalowizer considerable development has occurred in 
this area of premises liability law. Slip. op. at 5. The majority cites to four 
decisions from other jurisdictions, apparently to demonstrate that considerable 
development. The North Dakota case of O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746 (N.D. 
1977) and the Maine case of Poulin v. Colby College, 402 A.2d 846 (Me. 1979), 
were decided several years before Yalowizer. In contrast to the other two 
decided a few years after Yalowizer, viz., Waters by Murphy v. United States 
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 369 N.W.2d 755 (Wis.App. 1985), and Hudson v. Gaitan, 
675 S.W.2d 699 (Tenn. 1984), according to one scholar, by the late 1970's 
increasing numbers of courts either specifically refused to abolish the common 
law classifications, postponed the decision to abolish them, or reaffirmed the 
traditional rules. JOSEPH A. PAGE, THE LAW OF PREMISES LIABILITY, § 6.7 at 139 
(2d ed. 1988).

Since 1988, five courts 
have refused to abandon the traditional rules. See, Moore v. Tucson Elec. Power 
Co., 761 P.2d 1091 (Ariz. 1988); Baldwin by Baldwin v. Mosley, 295 Ark. 285, 748 S.W.2d 146 (1988); Kirschner by Kirschner v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 743 S.W.2d 840 (Ky. 1988); Lohrenz v. Lane, 787 P.2d 1274 (Okla. 1990); Preston v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 550 N.E.2d 191 (Ohio App. 1988).

Among our Rocky Mountain 
sister states, Utah rejected the invitation to abolish the common law 
classifications in 1979, Tjas v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438 (Utah 1979); Idaho 
reaffirmed the traditional rules in 1975, Springer v. Pearson, 531 P.2d 567 
(Idaho 1975) and again in 1980, Huyck v. Hecla Mining Co., 101 Idaho 299, 612 P.2d 142 (1980); and in Colorado the legislature reinstated the common law 
categories in 1986, only to have the Colorado Supreme Court invalidate the 
legislative effort in 1989 because as written the law violated the equal 
protection clauses of both the state and federal constitutions, Gallegos v. 
Phipps, 779 P.2d 856 (Colo. 
1989).

Based upon the foregoing 
activity since Yalowizer in 1981, one is hard-pressed to conclude that a trend 
in favor of abolition of the common law categories is developing.

2 WYO. STAT. § 8-1-101 
(1989).

3 § 343. Dangerous 
Conditions Known to or Discoverable by Possessor

A 
possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his 
invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he

(a) 
knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and 
should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, 
and

(b) 
should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to 
protect themselves against it, and

(c) 
fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the 
danger.