Title: County Court Judges Ass'n v. Sidi

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

County Court Judges Ass'n v. Sidi1988 WY 47752 P.2d 960Case Number: 87-203Decided: 03/30/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
COUNTY COURT JUDGES 
ASSOCIATION AND STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL. COUNTY COURT JUDGES 
ASSOCIATION, PETITIONERS (PLAINTIFFS),

v.

JACK SIDI, WYOMING STATE AUDITOR, 
RESPONDENT (DEFENDANT).

John J. Rooney of Rooney, 
Bagley, Hickey, Evans & Statkus, Cheyenne, for 
petitioners.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., and Sylvia Lee Hackl (argued), Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

Before BROWN, C.J., CARDINE, URBIGKIT and MACY, 
JJ., and GUTHRIE, J., Retired. 

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This was an action to 
require the state auditor to pay Wyoming county court judges the increased 
salary granted them by the 1985 Wyoming legislature amending and reenacting § 
5-5-119, W.S. 1977, which provides in pertinent part:

"Each judge of a county 
court shall receive an annual salary of forty-six thousand five hundred dollars 
($46,500.00) effective July 1, 1985, subject to constitutional provisions 
concerning when the salaries can be effective, to be paid by the state. When a 
new salary is effective for any judge of a county court upon new appointment or 
the commencement of a new term, it shall be effective for all judges of the 
county courts."

Pursuant to § 
1-13-101, W.S. 1977, and Rule 52(c), W.R.C.P., the district court, upon the 
joint motion of the parties, reserved and sent to us for determination the 
following questions:

"1. Does Article 3, 
Section 32, Wyoming Constitution prevent increases in salaries of the County 
Court Judges as authorized by Chapter 218, Session Laws of Wyoming 1985 (Sec. 
5-5-119 W.S.) as of July 1, 1985?

"2. If such increase is 
not prevented from being effective as of July 1, 1985, does Article 3, Section 
35, Wyoming Constitution make ineffective a peremptory writ of mandamus 
directing payment of amount of past due salaries to the County Court 
Judges?"

[¶2.]     In an opinion dated 
August 1, 1985, the Wyoming attorney general advised the state 
auditor that payment of the increased salary to county court judges during the 
term for which they were elected would be violative of Art. 3, § 32 of the 
Wyoming 
Constitution. The state auditor, relying upon the attorney general's opinion, 
has refused to pay increased salaries to county court judges during the term 
they were serving prior to the enactment of § 5-5-119, supra. Ten judges, 
retained in office November 1986, have, since January 1, 1987, been paid the 
increased salary of $46,500 per year. Nine county court judges, not up for 
retention, who were in office at the time of enactment of § 5-5-119 and who are 
doing the same work and have the same responsibilities, are being paid $40,000 
per year, or $6,500 less than the newly retained county 
judges.

ARTICLE 5, § 
17

[¶3.]     The writers of the 
Wyoming Constitution in 1889 were determined to ensure that salaries of certain 
public officers should not be increased or diminished after their election or 
after appointment to fill a vacancy in an unexpired term. Thus, with respect to 
the legislative branch of government, Art. 3, § 6 of the constitution provides 
in part, "but no legislature shall fix its own compensation," and Art. 3, § 9 
provides, "[n]o member of either house shall, during the term for which he was 
elected, receive any increase of salary or mileage under any law passed during 
that term."

[¶4.]     With respect to the 
executive department, Art. 4, § 13 of the Wyoming Constitution provides that the 
salaries of the governor, secretary of state, state auditor, state treasurer, 
and superintendent of public instruction "shall not be increased or diminished 
during the period for which they were elected * * *." And with respect to the 
supreme court justices and district court judges in the judicial branch of 
government, Art. 5, § 17 of the Wyoming Constitution, before amendment in 1953, 
provided that salaries of judges of the supreme and district courts "shall not 
be increased or diminished during the term for which a judge shall have been 
elected * * *."

[¶5.]     Article 5, § 17 of the 
Wyoming Constitution, prohibiting increase or decrease in salaries during a 
judge's term, resulted in extreme unfairness in the salaries of judges. Supreme 
court justices were elected to staggered terms of eight years. When the 
legislature granted a salary increase for the supreme court, a justice, 
reelected the fall preceding the legislative session, would not receive that 
salary increase for seven and one-half years. That was bad enough, but worse was 
the fact that the justice next reelected after the salary increase would receive 
it one and one-half years after passage; the second justice, three and one-years 
after passage; and the third justice five and one-half years to seven and 
one-half years after passage. The situation could become even more intolerable 
if a justice were appointed to fill a vacancy in the office. It was possible 
that three justices (the court has since been increased to five), with the same 
responsibilities and doing the same work, were being paid substantially 
different salaries at the same time.

[¶6.]     The district court 
judges, elected to six-year terms, suffered the same salary inequities. There 
were occasions when salary increases, granted to both the supreme court justices 
and the district court judges, became effective for some district court judges 
years before they became effective for supreme court justices. In these 
instances, district court judges were being paid greater salaries than supreme 
court justices. There were also occasions when judges, newly appointed to fill 
vacancies, were making far more in salary than experienced judges who had served 
long terms upon the bench. The unfairness was obvious. The same unfairness in 
other jurisdictions was corrected by constitutional amendment. Thus, in Peterson 
v. Speakman, 49 Ariz. 342, 66 P.2d 1023, 1026 (1937), it was 
stated:

"It is a well-known fact, 
as shown by the argument in the publicity pamphlets distributed before the 
election of 1930, that the reason for the amendment being submitted was the 
obvious injustice that several different men, holding the same office, doing 
similar work and coequal in authority therein should draw different salaries, 
and it was because, doubtless, of this injustice, that the amendment was 
approved by the people." See 67 C.J.S. Officers § 230 
(1978).

[¶7.]     To correct the 
unfairness in compensating Wyoming judges, House Joint Resolution No. 5, 
adopted in 1953, resulted in the amendment of Art. 5, § 17 of the Wyoming 
Constitution, which now provides:

"The judges of the 
supreme and district courts shall receive such compensation for their services 
as may be prescribed by law, which compensation shall not be increased or 
diminished during the term for which a judge shall have been elected, and the 
salary of a judge of the supreme or district court shall be as may be prescribed 
by law; provided, however, that when any 
legislative increase or decrease in the salary of the justices or judges of such 
courts whose respective terms of office do not expire at the same time, has 
heretofore or shall hereafter become effective as to any member of such court, 
it shall be effective from such date as to each of the members thereof." 
(Emphasis added.)

[¶8.]     The same inequities 
that existed among supreme court justices and district court judges before 
amendment of Art. 5, § 17 in 1953 exist now among county court judges. It has 
been suggested that amended Art. 5, § 17 of the constitution was intended to 
apply to all state court judges elected to staggered terms. If there had been a 
county court or if anyone had foreseen this new tier of courts in 1953 when the 
amended Art. 5, § 17 was adopted, it is reasonable to assume that county courts 
would have been included. But county courts were not included, nor was there a 
general clause providing for inclusion of "such other courts as the legislature 
might designate." Amended Art. 5, § 17 makes reference only to "supreme and 
district courts." When reference is made to "such court" in amended Art. 5, § 
17, it is a reference back to "supreme and district courts." The words "supreme 
and district court" in Art. 5, § 17 are clear, plain, and unambiguous. A clear, 
understandable provision in a constitution that is free of ambiguity must be 
accepted by the court. Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 50 P. 819 (1897). In such case, 
construction is not permissible, nor may the court interpolate or add to the 
constitution what it concludes should have been there. United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 51 S. Ct. 220, 75 L. Ed. 640, 71 A.L.R. 1381 (1931). The same rules apply to the 
construction of provisions of the constitution as apply to the construction of 
statutes. Zancanelli v. Central Coal & Coke Company, 25 Wyo. 511, 173 P. 981, 991 
(1918). Thus, when a constitutional provision is unambiguous, courts are not at 
liberty to undertake its construction nor search for a meaning beyond the 
instrument itself. Clark v. City of Tucson, 1 
Ariz. App. 
431, 403 P.2d 936, 938 (1965). We cannot in good conscience interpret "supreme 
and district courts" to include county courts, nor can we add county courts to 
Art. 5, § 17. If that is to be done, it must be by constitutional amendment, not 
court decision.

ARTICLE 3, § 
32

[¶9.]     Because increase or 
decrease in county court judges salaries is not mentioned in Art. 5, which 
establishes the judicial branch, nor governed by Art. 5, § 17, it is claimed 
that their salaries are governed by Art. 3, § 32 of the Wyoming Constitution, 
which provides as follows:

"Except as otherwise 
provided in this constitution, no law shall extend the term of any public officer or increase or diminish 
his salary or emolument after his election or appointment * * *." 
(Emphasis added.)

Article 3, § 32 
applies only to a public officer 
having a specific term of office to 
which he is elected or 
appointed.

Public 
Officer

[¶10.]  Article 3, § 32, though found in the part 
of the constitution pertaining to the legislative branch, is of a general 
character and intended to apply also to public officers in the executive and 
judicial branches. Thus, speaking of a county attorney, a part of the executive 
branch, we said:

"The meaning of this 
section is clear. There is no ambiguity about it. The words are pointed and 
direct. They mean just what they say, and construe themselves. When it says that 
the salary of a public officer shall not 
be increased or diminished after his election, it means that the salary or 
compensation for the term to which he was 
elected shall not be changed after, but becomes fixed as of the date of the 
election * * *." (Emphasis added.) Nickerson v. Winslow, 22 Wyo. 259, 138 P. 184, 186 
(1914).

[¶11.]  In Ballantyne v. Bower, 17 Wyo. 356, 99 P. 869, 871 
(1909), the court, considering the nature of the office of justice of the peace, 
stated:

"[T]he words `civil 
office under the state' import an office in which is reposed some portion of the 
sovereign power of the state, and, of necessity, having some connection with the 
`legislative, judicial, or executive department of the government' * * *. `[A]ll 
officers whose duties are prescribed by general law, however trivial, perform 
their own particular portion of the business of the 
state.'"

The county judge 
occupies a public office. This broad definition of public officer might also 
include public service commissioners (appointment and removal pursuant to §§ 
37-2-101 and 28-12-101, W.S. 1977), attorney general (§§ 9-1-601 and 9-1-202, 
W.S. 1977), chief executive officer, livestock board (§ 11-18-101, W.S. 1977), 
director, employment security commission (§ 27-3-601, W.S. 1977), director, game 
and fish commission (§ 23-1-201, W.S. 1977), state examiner (§§ 9-1-501 and 
9-1-202, W.S. 1977), state entomologist (§ 11-4-101, W.S. 1977), state engineer 
(Art. 8, § 5, Wyoming Constitution), state chemist (§ 35-7-201, W.S. 1977), 
state librarian (§ 9-2-417, W.S. 1977), director, state archives (§ 9-2-404, 
W.S. 1977), director, recreation commission (§ 36-4-101, W.S. 1977), state board 
of equalization (§ 39-1-302), commissioner of public lands (§ 36-3-101), and 
others.

Definite Term 
Required

[¶12.]  Public officer was further described in 
Blackburn v. Board of County Commissioners, 67 Wyo. 494, 226 P.2d 784, 789 (1951), as an 
office with a definite term and duties. We said:

"Where the duties of the 
office are to be exercised for the benefit of the public for a stipulated 
compensation to be paid by the public, where the term is definite and the 
tenure certain, and where the powers, duties, and emoluments become vested in a 
successor when the office becomes vacant, it can confidently be affirmed that 
the occupant of the place is a public officer within the meaning of the 
Constitution." (Emphasis added.)

 

[¶13.]  Blackburn, supra, and Art. 3, § 32 require that the office 
be for a definite term with tenure. 
Of the public officers listed above, only the public service commissioners, 
director of employment security commission, state engineer, commissioner of 
public lands, and members of the state board of equalization are appointed to a 
definite term with tenure. The public service commissioners, state engineer, 
commissioner of public lands, and members of the state board of equalization are 
appointed by the governor. The director of the employment security commission is 
appointed by the commission. All are appointed to definite terms and have 
certain tenure, for they generally may be removed only for cause. All executive 
branch personnel "except for the positions of Governor, Secretary of State, 
State Auditor, State Treasurer, Superintendent of Public Instruction, District 
Attorney, and positions within the University of Wyoming," Ch. IX § 1, Personnel 
Rules, are covered by the personnel rules, providing for classification, 
allocation of positions, pay ranges, and merit increases. All receive salaries 
set by the personnel department of the executive branch of government. It has 
been the practice of the executive branch to raise the salaries of these 
appointed public officials during their term. These appointed public officers 
have never been considered as within the prohibition in Art. 3, § 32 against 
increasing salaries during their term, although they, like county court judges, 
are appointed to a public office having a definite term.

Elective or Appointive 
Public Office

[¶14.]  It is also required by Art. 3, § 32 that 
the public officer, whose compensation may not be increased or diminished, 
occupy a public office by election or appointment. The question now presented 
for our determination is whether the public office referred to is only an 
elective office or whether it also includes nonelective offices. The question is 
one of first impression for this court. Every case heretofore presented to us 
involved a public officer occupying an elective office or appointed to fill a 
vacancy in an elective public office. Barber v. Board of County Commissioners of 
Uinta County, 73 Wyo. 222, 277 P.2d 977 (1954); Blackburn v. Board of County 
Commissioners of Park County, supra 226 P.2d 784; Ballangee v. Board of County 
Commissioners of Fremont County, 66 Wyo. 390, 212 P.2d 71 (1949); Nickerson v. 
Winslow, supra 138 P. 184; Guthrie v. Board of Commissioners of Converse County, 
7 Wyo. 95, 50 P. 229 (1897); Board of Commissioners of Converse County v. Burns, 
3 Wyo. 691, 30 P. 415 (1892). If public office includes also appointment to a 
nonelective office, then the public service commissioners, employment security 
commission director, game and fish commission director, state highway department 
director, state engineer, commissioner of public lands, members of the state 
board of equalization and others may be barred from receiving an increase in 
compensation during their respective terms. If, however, appointment refers to 
appointment to an elective office that becomes vacant, Art. 3, § 32 would affect 
none of the above public officers who are appointed to nonelective offices. The 
meaning of appointment of a public officer to public office in Art. 3, § 32 is 
ambiguous and unclear, requiring that we ascertain the intent of those adopting 
the amendment and the meaning to be attributed to the words 
used.

[¶15.]  In construing the constitution, the chief 
and fundamental purpose is to determine and give effect to the intention of the 
framers. Thomson v. Wyoming In-Stream Flow Committee, Wyo., 651 P.2d 778 (1982); Witzenburger v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Community Development Authority, Wyo., 575 P.2d 1100, reh. denied 577 P.2d 1386 
(1978); Zancanelli v. Central Coal & Coke Company, supra 173 P. 981; 
Rasmussen v. Baker, supra 50 P. 819. Every statement in the constitution must be 
interpreted in light of the entire document. Bower v. Big HornCanal 
Association, 77 Wyo. 80, 307 P.2d 593 (1957). The constitution 
should not be interpreted to render any portion of it meaningless, with all 
portions of it to be read in pari materia and every word, clause, and sentence 
considered so no part will be inoperative or superfluous. Reliance Insurance 
Company v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., Wyo., 713 P.2d 766 (1986); Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, Wyo., 701 P.2d 1139 (1985); Haddenham v. City of 
Laramie, Wyo., 648 P.2d 551 (1982). Where a provision in a constitution creates a restriction 
orlimitation as upon compensation of public officials and its intended extent is 
uncertain, the purpose should mark the limit of the provision. Ballengee v. 
Board of County Commissioners of FremontCounty, supra 212 P.2d 71.

[¶16.]  The policy reasons for providing that the 
salaries of public officers may not be increased or decreased during their term 
are to protect the public officer against legislative threats, reprisals or 
punishment by threatening to decrease his salary or seeking to influence a 
public officer to act in a certain way by promising an increase in salary. The 
prohibition is said also to protect the legislature against pressures that might 
be asserted by public officers seeking increases in salary after election. 
Blackburn v. Board of County Commissioners of ParkCounty, 
supra 226 P.2d 784; Ballangee v. Board of County Commissioners of FremontCounty, supra 212 P.2d 71.

"Limitations of this type 
are designed to establish the complete independence of the officers affected by 
them, and to protect them against 
legislative oppression which might flow from party rancor, personal spleen, 
enmity, or grudge." 63A Am.Jur.2d Public Officers and Employees § 444 at 993 
(1984).

[¶17.]  If there is a place where there is power 
that can be used to cause a public official in one branch of government or the 
other to act in a certain way upon threat of granting or withholding money, it 
is the political sector. Those occupying elective office face no more important 
task than that of reelection, for, in the absence of reelection, they hold no 
public office. Public image created by perception, competence, ability to 
accomplish things for constituents and acceptance in the political power 
structure are of paramount importance. Most often those at the top of the 
political structure are those elected to political public office. Thus, the five 
elected public officials - the governor, treasurer, auditor, secretary of state, 
and superintendent of public instruction - are usually acknowledged as leaders 
in or the head of their respective parties. They have a broad constituency and 
have close ties with political leaders over the entire state. Their endorsement, 
approval or support is a considerable benefit to one seeking election. The 
granting or withholding of an endorsement might involve considerable pressure to 
accede to requests by the head of the party. And there are elected legislators 
and elected county officers who, because of long tenure, competence and ability, 
and their considerable involvement in the political process, exercise this same 
kind of power.

"These restrictions are 
designed to protect the public against the evil of permitting a public official 
to use his official power and prestige to augment his own salary * * 
*.

"Furthermore, the 
restrictions are designed to benefit the officers by removing temptation from 
the legislature to influence a public officer through threat or promise of a 
change in compensation * * *." 67 C.J.S. Officers § 231 
(1978).

[¶18.]  It cannot be seriously said that county 
judges can bring pressure to increase their salaries. They have no constituency, 
no political party; they are a small isolated group. They must decide 
controversies in which someone always loses. They cannot always be popular. They 
have no choice but to apply the law as it exists. Those who witnessed the effort 
to raise county judges' salaries to at least the amount paid district attorneys 
who appear in their court can attest that they can bring no pressure upon anyone 
to raise their salaries. Judges historically have been unable to obtain even 
cost-of-living increases in their salaries granted all other state employees. 
So, where is the power and the danger of a raid on the public treasury? Judges 
are a small group having few votes and little support. They are easily and often 
popularly denied salary adjustments given to all others. With respect to the 
possibility of the legislature influencing county judges by increasing or 
decreasing their salaries, that potential is more fiction than fact. The judges' 
decisions are subject to review by two appellate courts. They are not the final 
arbiter of the constitutionality of legislative or executive action, nor 
construction of provisions of the constitution or statutes. The county courts 
are not of constitutional origin, but were created by statute and can be 
eliminated at any time by repeal or amendment of the statute. If they are 
subject to a decrease in salary, that is no different than many other 
non-constitutional public officers appointed to a definite term. We conclude, 
therefore, that it is only public officers in elective public office and public 
officers appointed to fill vacancies in elective public offices that are 
prohibited by Art. 3, § 32 from receiving an increase or decrease in salary 
during their term.

[¶19.]  Having determined that Art. 3, § 32 
applies only to elective office, the final question we must resolve is whether 
the county judge is an elected public official holding elective office. The 
primary meaning of the word election as used in Art. 3, § 32 is the act of 
selection or choosing a public officer from among several candidates for the 
public office by qualified voters of a community, political subdivision or 
state. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, Fla., 116 So. 2d 425 (1959); Am.Jur.2d 
Elections § 1 (1966). Before amendment of Art. 5, § 4, judges were elected under 
§ 2540, W.S. 1920, which provided:

"[T]he county clerk or 
other official * * * shall prepare a separate ballot similar and substantially 
in the same general form and the names rotated on said ballot as hereinbefore 
provided for in §§ 2536 to 2540 for the nomination of judicial officers at the 
primary election; and the two candidates receiving the highest number of votes 
at the primary election shall be entitled to have their names printed on the 
official ballot at the general election. The candidate receiving the highest 
number of votes at said general election shall be declared duly elected to the 
office for which said person was a candidate." See also § 22-111, W.S. 
1957.

An elective 
office for purposes of this discussion is one for which voters choose between 
competing candidates at a general election.

[¶20.]  From 1889 until 1971 the Wyoming court system 
consisted of the supreme court at the appellate level; district courts, which 
were courts of general jurisdiction, at the trial level; and justice of the 
peace courts. During that time, all judicial officers were elected, i.e., each 
candidate for judgeship filed for the office, ran in a primary election, and 
then in the general election against an opponent seeking the same office. 
Sections 31-108 and 31-109, C.S. 1945; Art. 5, § 4, Wyoming 
Constitution.

[¶21.]  Amended Art. 5, § 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution was adopted in 1971 at a time when there were no county courts. It, 
therefore, was made applicable to the courts then existing, i.e., the supreme 
court and district courts. It provides initially for the appointment of justices 
of the supreme court and judges of the district court by the governor from a 
list of three nominees provided by the Judicial Nominating Commission and then 
provides:

"(g) Each justice or 
judge selected under these provisions shall serve for one year after his appointment and until the first Monday 
in January following the next general election after the expiration of such 
year. He shall, at such general election, stand for retention in office on a 
ballot which shall submit to the appropriate electorate the question whether 
such justice or judge shall be retained in office for another term or part of a 
term * * *." (Emphasis added.)

[¶22.]  The amendment of the constitution to 
provide for the selection and retention of judges was intended to depoliticize 
the judiciary. Canon 7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides in 
part:

"(1) A judge or a 
candidate for election to judicial office should not:

"(a) Act as a leader or 
hold any office in a political organization;

"(b) Make speeches for a 
political organization or candidate or publicly endorse a candidate for public 
office; 

"(c) Solicit funds for or 
pay an assessment or make a contribution to a political organization or 
candidate, attend political gatherings, or purchase tickets for political party 
dinners, or other functions, except as authorized in subsection 
A(2)."

In states where 
judges attain office by contested election, as in the state of Texas, it is a matter of 
record that lawyers contribute large sums ($20,000-$35,000) to the election of 
judges before whom they appear and present their cases. That system of judicial 
election in Texas was the subject of considerable adverse comment in national 
publications discussing Pennzoil Company v. Texaco, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 107 S. Ct. 1519, 95 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1987).

[¶23.]  Wyoming judges, however, do not belong to 
political parties, may not contribute to political parties or candidates, and 
may be involved in the political process in only a limited way. Not having an 
opponent in a contested election, judges need not raise campaign funds or 
conduct political campaigns or expend large sums of money in advertising and 
getting elected. Not having to solicit campaign funds, they do not become 
obligated to contributors, supporters, and campaign workers. The judiciary is 
freed from potential conflict of interest problems, obligations to political 
organizations, and pressures resulting from the business of a contested election 
and the world of politics.

[¶24.]  In 1971, the legislature established 
county courts by enactment of §§ 5-5-101 through 5-5-175, W.S. 1977. Initially, 
county court judges stood for election against an opponent seeking the same 
office. Vacancies in office were filled by the county commissioners from three 
nominees supplied by the district court judge. Sections 5-5-113 and 5-5-115. In 
1978, §§ 5-5-110 and 5-5-111, W.S. 1977, were amended to provide that county 
judges be appointed and retained under the provisions of Art. 5, 
§ 4 of the Wyoming Constitution in the same manner as supreme court and district 
court judges. Thus, county judges now always first take office by appointment by 
the governor. They never stand for election, but only for retention. An elector never votes for a 
county judge or his opponent, but votes only upon the question, "shall the 
county judge be retained." The county judge, therefore, is not an elected public 
official as that term is used in Art. 3, § 32.

[¶25.]  A constitution is not lifeless, but is a 
flexible, living document intended to accommodate new conditions and 
circumstances in a changing society, State v. McAdams, Wyo., 714 P.2d 1236 
(1986), to promote convenience and ensure only that which is reasonable, logical 
and just. State ex rel. Department of Revenue and Taxation, Motor Vehicle 
Division v. McNeese, Wyo., 718 P.2d 38 (1986). With the amendment of the 
constitution, changes in statutes, and appointment rather than election of 
county judges, there is no longer a valid reason for prohibiting an increase in 
salary during the judges' terms.

[¶26.]  Since the judge is not a member of a 
political party, not involved in party functions and business, and is prohibited 
from contributing to the party or candidate, it hardly seems that party 
officials could be angry or want to vent their spleen against him because of 
party politics. For the legal and policy reasons stated, we conclude that the 
county judge is not an elected public official, nor is he appointed to an 
elective public office; therefore he is not prevented by Art. 3, § 32 of the 
Wyoming Constitution from receiving the salary increase granted by the enactment 
of § 5-5-119, W.S. 1977.

[¶27.]  Our conclusion finds support also in the 
fact that neither the executive nor legislative branches have considered Art. 3, 
§ 32 to apply to public officers serving as public service commissioners, 
director of employment security commission, state engineer, commissioner of 
public lands, and members of the state board of equalization to prohibit salary 
increase or decrease during their terms. These public officers appointed to a definite 
term receive salary increases during their terms. These appointed public 
officials have no real constituency; and, although some may be somewhat 
political, they have no power that does not come from the appointing official. 
While not determinative of the question of the proper construction of Art. 3, § 
32, we do consider the interpretations placed thereon by other branches of 
government as some evidence of what is reasonable.

APPROPRIATION OF 
FUNDS

[¶28.]  The State next contends that a peremptory 
writ of mandamus directing payment of past-due salaries would be ineffective 
because the legislature failed to appropriate funds for payment of these 
salaries as required by Art. 3, § 35 of the Wyoming Constitution. Article 3, § 35 
provides:

"Except for interest on 
public debt, money shall be paid out of the treasury only on appropriations made 
by the legislature, and in no case otherwise than upon warrant drawn by the 
proper officer in pursuance of law."

[¶29.]  The legislature enacted § 5-5-119, W.S. 
1977, providing salaries to be paid county judges subject only to 
"constitutional provisions concerning when salaries can be effective." We have 
held county judges are neither elected nor appointed to a vacant elective office 
and that the constitution does not prevent their salaries becoming effective 
during their terms. In State ex rel. Henderson v. 
Burdick, 4 Wyo. 272, 33 P. 125 (1893), the legislature 
provided an annual salary of $2,000 for the state examiner but neglected an 
appropriation of funds to pay the salary of the examiner. The office of state 
examiner is a constitutionally created office. We held in Blackburn v. Board of 
County Commissioners, supra 226 P.2d 784, that constitutional provisions 
concerning salaries applied in the same manner to constitutional public offices 
and those created by the legislature. We stated in Burdick, supra 33 P. at 
127-131:

"If the constitution had 
fixed the salary, and the time and manner of payment, there would have been no 
doubt, under the great weight of authority, that this would have been an 
appropriation made by `law,' * * *."

"Although some courts 
seem to distinguish between salaries fixed by the constitution and those fixed 
by an unrepealed statute, it seems that this is a distinction more nice than 
wise. In either case, the people have given their assent * * 
*."

"No specific 
appropriation was made otherwise than by this act, and none was necessary * * 
*."

"The act before us is in 
effect and operation an appropriation act, and it stands unrepealed and 
unmodified. It provides for the compensation of a public officer, and requires 
the treasurer to pay it. It does not require any other legislation, or a special 
appropriation at each biennial and regular session of the legislature, to keep 
it alive and effective."

"The direction to the 
treasurer to pay the amount of the annual salary of the examiner to that officer 
may be held by implication to be an appropriation of a sufficient amount of 
money to make the required payments. Campbell v. Board, etc., 115 Ind. 594, 18 N.E.Rep. 33. 
The fund set apart and allotted to this purpose is the general fund of the state 
provided from the general revenue."

And, quoting 
with approval from Reynolds v. Taylor, 43 Ala. 420, 430 (1869), we 
said

"that, in order to 
authorize the comptroller to issue his warrant on the treasury for the amount of 
the salary, it was not necessary that there should be a special annual 
appropriation by act of the legislature, where there was a general law fixing 
the amount of the salary, and prescribing its payment at particular periods; and 
the court observed: `We are not aware that this decision has been doubted from 
that day to the present time.' It has been no unusual thing for a legislature to 
adjourn without making appropriations for the salaries of state officials, or 
some of them, either through intention or mistake." State v. Burdick, supra 33 P.  at 129.

The act 
establishing salaries of county court judges, § 5-5-119, supra, was effective to 
appropriate funds for payment.

EFFECTIVE 
DATE

[¶30.]  Section 5-5-119, W.S. 1977, also provided 
that the increased salaries would be effective July 1, 1985, "subject to 
constitutional provisions concerning when the salaries can be effective." We 
have held that there is no constitutional provision concerning when county court 
judges' salaries become effective. According to § 5-5-119, supra, the effective 
date for county judges' salaries was July 1, 1985, and the state auditor should 
have paid them. He did not. The appellant did nothing until May 26, 1987, almost 
two years later, when this action seeking mandamus was filed. Although mandamus 
is a legal remedy, its issuance is controlled by equitable principles. It is 
said that

"[a] writ of mandamus, as 
we have above pointed out, is not awarded as a matter of right, but on equitable 
principles. An application for the writ should be made seasonably and within a 
reasonable time after the alleged default or neglect of duty." Buell v. 
CountyCourtofJeffersonCounty, 175 Or. 402, 152 P.2d 578, 582, 155 A.L.R. 1135 (1944).

We were given no 
reason for the year and eleven month delay in pursuing this writ. We assume 
there is none. The increased salaries, therefore, must be paid to the county 
court judges not now receiving them commencing May 26, 1987, the date 
petitioners filed suit to require such payments.

[¶31.]  The peremptory writ is allowed in 
accordance with this opinion.

URBIGKIT, J., filed a specially 
concurring opinion.

MACY, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion in which GUTHRIE, J., Retired, joined.

GUTHRIE, J., Retired, filed a 
dissenting opinion.

URBIGKIT, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶32.]  Although not necessarily adopting the 
rationale of the court in granting the relief requested in this appeal nor 
denying the logic of the dissents, I join the majority by this special 
concurrence from a different persuasion, based on the historical developments of 
the judicial article within the Wyoming Constitution. This history, provided in 
1890 by Art. 5, Judicial Department, established in § 1 
that:

"The judicial power of 
the state shall be vested in the senate, sitting as a court of impeachment, in a 
supreme court, district courts, justices of the peace, courts of arbitration and 
such courts as the legislature may, by general law, establish for incorporated 
cities or incorporated towns."

[¶33.]  As was then considered and now noted both 
in this court's opinion and in dissents, the Constitution also, as encompassing 
the salary-change limitations of both Art. 5, § 17 and Art. 3, § 32 when applied 
to the extended terms provided for the judiciary, had created an anomaly of 
differentiated salaries dependent upon date of election of members. This 
recognized unfairness led the legislature to present, and the electorate to 
ratify, a constitutional change of that section in 1953 by the equality salary 
provision now provided in Art. 5, § 17:

"* * * provided, however, 
that when any legislative increase or decrease in the salary of justices or 
judges of such courts whose respective terms of office do not expire at the same 
time, has heretofore or shall hereafter become effective as to any member of 
such court, it shall be effective from such date as to each of the members 
thereof."

[¶34.]  In the decade that followed, a 
broad-based reaction, under the sponsorship of the Wyoming State Bar and the 
League of Women Voters, to the constitutionalized justice of the peace courts 
matured to legislative presentation and electorate adoption of the 1965 
constitutional amendment effective January 17, 1967, which changed the 
Wyoming 
judicial structure as now provided in Art. 5, § 1:

"The judicial power of 
the state shall be vested in the senate, sitting as a court of impeachment, in a 
supreme court, district courts, and such subordinate courts as the legislature 
may, by general law, establish and ordain from time to 
time."

[¶35.]  Although the electorate had progressively 
spoken by adoption of the constitutional amendment, any replacement system as a 
substitute for the part-time justice of the peace as the first general level of 
adjudication was buffeted in change to the county court system by local 
provincialism and operational costs then, and continued to date, by an extremely 
difficult birth and maturity process.

[¶36.]  County courts were originally established 
in only two counties, Laramie and Natrona, by Ch. 261, S.L. of 
Wyoming 1971. The law was first legislatively tailored so that county judges 
could only be available in those two counties, with an effective date of January 
1, 1975, to be selected by popular election in the fashion of the superseded 
justices of the peace. Heavy and continued modernization demands from 
progressive elements of the Wyoming justice-delivery system, accommodated 
by action of the legislature, not only expanded very substantially the 
availability of the county courts, but also invoked Art. 5, § 4(b) of the 
Constitution to effect a modified Missouri-plan method of selection and 
retention by Ch. 45, S.L. of Wyoming 1978, § 5-5-111, W.S. 1977, 1987 Cum.Supp. 
With selection and retention addressed for those judges in identical fashion as 
was required for the other full-time judges and justices of the state, the 
jurisdiction of the county courts was also expanded to encompass a significant 
area of the adjudicative function formally reserved to the district courts in 
earlier time when only the predecessor justice of the peace courts had 
existed.

[¶37.]  In 1971, when the law was enacted to be 
effective in 1975, the legislature provided that the county court would have 
jurisdiction concurrently with district 
courts in a general civil case level of $1,000, criminal jurisdiction of 
misdemeanors, and a provision for preliminary hearings of felony offenses. In 
succeeding legislation, in addition to similarity by selection pursuant to the 
provisions of Art. 5, § 4 of the Constitution, the county courts were given 
exclusive jurisdiction for all actions in an amount not exceeding $7,000, and 
more specific criminal authority, including adjudication of high misdemeanors 
for all non-felony offenses. Further provision was made to constitute the 
district court as an intermediate appellate court for appeal from decisions of 
the county court, both criminal and civil. With the enactment of this exclusive 
jurisdiction by elimination of concurrent jurisdiction, combined with the 
nonpartisan selection and retention process, it is apparent that the functioning 
county court embraced not only an area of responsibility previously exercised by 
the justice of the peace courts, but also a singular arena of adjudicatory 
jurisdiction which had previously been vested solely in the district 
court.

[¶38.]  My consideration of the applicability of 
Art. 5, § 1 to the earlier existent Art. 5, § 17 affords no logical basis to 
continue a discrimination against a class of full-time judges solely on the 
basis of its nomenclature, without regard for the intrinsic nature of the 
judicial function involved. Peterson v. Speakman, 49 Ariz. 342, 66 P.2d 1023 
(1937). In practical application, this court considers whether the constraining 
general language of Art. 3, § 32 applies a continued salary limitation to the 
judicial article after adoption of the equalization amendment for types of 
courts not then in existence. I reject that result as did the legislature in the 
enacted salary bill which is here in question.

[¶39.]  It is apparent that in enacting the 
salary increase by Ch. 218, S.L. of Wyoming 1985, the legislature intended an 
effective date as soon as constitutionally possible and rejected salary 
discrimination if, within their power, avoidance could be 
achieved.

"When a new salary is 
effective for any judge of a county 
court upon new appointment or the commencement of a new term, it shall be effective for all judges of the 
county courts." (Emphasis added.)

The further 
language, "subject to constitutional provisions concerning when the salaries can 
be effective, to be paid by the state," was obviously intended to deter the 
increase from the effective date of July 1, 1985 until the effectuation process 
of Art. 5, § 17 of the Constitution could be applied. From the specific language 
used in the salary-increase law, it is apparent that the legislature then 
intended, as I now conclude, that the appointment or retention-election of a new 
county judge would provide the constitutional basis for all judges to similarly 
and simultaneously receive the increased compensation. It is in this regard that 
I may differ with both the majority and the dissents, because each separately, 
although for totally different reasons, seems, in effect, to hold that the 
specific provision of the salary-increase statute is constitutionally invalid by 
a rejection of the simultaneous effective date for all judges of the county courts as 
effective upon the commencement of a term for any one of the 
members.

[¶40.]  Likewise apparent for the denial of 
enacted salary benefit is the absence of any basis for differentiation premised 
on function or responsibility, since the denial determination is only justified 
by application of the title applied to the separate classes of judicial 
officers. If, for example, in creating this people's court trial system, as both 
a substitute for the justices of peace and a portion of the function of the 
district court the name of the class of judges had been entitled as district 
judges category B, the constructional question would have been eliminated. 
Likewise, if the present county courts had been named district courts, and the 
district courts renamed superior courts, little question would exist that the 
application of the salary equalized provision to all members of each of these 
levels of the judiciary would result.

[¶41.]  I relate the Constitution in interest and 
effect to the functional nature of the justice-delivery system. Obviously, 
county courts, circuit courts, trial courts, or any other designated 
categorization, could not have been included at the passage of the 
constitutional amendment to Art. 5, § 17, since at that time the kinds of courts 
were constitutionally limited to "supreme courts, district courts, justices of 
the peace, courts of arbitration" and municipal courts. I would find intent in 
the expansion of the section to retain its ameliorative effect for similar 
functional systems. Obviously, if someone in authority had been able to think 
all of this out, the more specific terminology might have been included, as it 
was in the subsequently adopted Art. 5, § 4(b), to provide equivalency of status 
to the developing county court system after constitutional authorization for 
establishment of the alternate class of courts had been achieved by the 1967 
amendment.1

[¶42.]  Furthermore, it has to be noted, if one 
relates to historical perspective, that in current time with passage of the 
minimum jurisdiction amounts for the county courts, and in provisions for 
certiorari provided by § 5-2-119, W.S. 1977, and Rule 13, W.R.A.P., the 
historical function of the supreme court, as envisioned by the monumental debate 
in the constitutional convention, has been significantly changed by the 
application to the district courts of an appellate function not then 
contemplated.2 Likewise to be considered is that 
in 1966 the civil jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court was $200 
(concurrent jurisdiction in the district court above $100), and criminal 
jurisdiction then as now excluded high misdemeanors. The county courts today 
embrace more than half the case responsibility in high misdemeanors and the 
$7,000 exclusive jurisdiction which once was embodied by assignment to the 
district court.

[¶43.]  My conclusion on this issue of 
constitutional salary interpretation denies determination by a name unrelated to 
function and essential characteristics. Logic also tells me that I do no harm to 
the concept of the public employee salary limitation which serves as a severe 
and well-founded question in dissent. Cf. Blackburn v. Board of County 
Commissioners of Park County, 67 Wyo. 494, 226 P.2d 784 (1951); Ballangee v. 
Board of County Commissioners of Fremont County, 66 Wyo. 390, 212 P.2d 71 
(1949); Reals v. Smith, 8 Wyo. 159, 56 P. 690 (1899).

[¶44.]  In this analysis, I apply a rational 
interpretation in constitutional analysis consistent with an evolving society. 
The comparison may seem in part to be mundane, but I see no difference in the 
attitude and application afforded by the premier jurist in the history of the 
state of Wyoming, Fred H. Blume, where in Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. 
v. Hall, 46 Wyo. 380, 26 P.2d 1071, 1073 (1933), the court was called to 
determine the status of railroad tie-preserving plants in a constitutional 
context for taxation as something that was not in existence when the 
Constitution had been written:

"* * * [I]t is apparently 
argued by counsel for defendant that tie-preserving plants were not in use in 
1889; that they were not in the contemplation of the framers of the Constitution 
or of the people; and that they cannot, accordingly, be considered as embraced 
in, or contemplated by, the section of the Constitution now under consideration. 
This contention, we think, is too broad. The section is a part of our organic 
law. The Constitution is, in a sense, a living thing, designed to meet the needs 
of a progressive society, amid all the detailed changes to which such society is 
subject. * * * Hence, though tie-preserving plants were not in existence at the 
time of the adoption of the Constitution, still, if it can be said that the 
language used in the section under consideration, naturally construed, may 
fairly be said to embrace them, we would not be justified in excluding them 
therefrom merely for the reason that they were not in existence at the time of 
the adoption of the Constitution."

[¶45.]  I find in the fact that county courts did 
not exist and could not have existed at the time of the passage of the 
ameliorative constitutional equalization provision, that, fairly contemplated, 
all courts of a similar kind with a function and operation as then not 
identified could not be expected at a future time to fall beyond the remedies 
then intended. Following the constitutional amendment which was adopted to 
permit the establishment of the county courts, I now deny requirement of another 
constitutional amendment to afford to these newly established and 
constitutionally permitted elements of the judiciary the same standard of 
equalized compensation for similar responsibility. On a similar subject of 
equality of voting, see Schaefer v. Thomson, 240 F. Supp. 247 (D.Wyo. 
1964).

[¶46.]  It is recognized that it may seem 
somewhat constrained to compare a new kind of industry in constitutional terms 
with the adaptation of a third system of courts, but this causes me no 
difficulty in concurrence and recognition of the impreciseness of legislative 
capacity to exactly identify the future and my recognition of function over name 
or formalism as the test of effectuated definition and responsibility. 

[¶47.]  This utilization of the living 
Constitution policy standard enunciated by Justice Blume many years before the 
current colloquy initiated by politically inspired revisionism as a philosophy 
of the law in no regard lessens the appropriate precedent and teaching of those 
early jurists of this state.3 In Grand Island & Northern 
Wyoming Railroad Co. v. Baker, 6 Wyo. 369, 45 P. 494, 496 (1896), Justice 
Potter, who was a member of the constitutional convention, 
re-emphasized:

"* * * If the people of 
the commonwealth, by adopting a constitution, have committed themselves to a 
mistaken policy, the only remedy is an amendment by constitutional methods, of 
that instrument. Within the province of the legislature, recourse must be had to 
that body for the correction of any errors of policy which may have induced its 
enactments. The jurisdiction of the courts extends only to the construction and 
enforcement of the constitution and laws as they exist. That jurisdiction should 
be zealously guarded, but not used as a cloak to encroach upon the functions of 
the other departments of government."

[¶48.]  I would not find this rule, nor the Blume 
philosophy, to singularly differ from the pronouncements in Rasmussen v. Baker, 
7 Wyo. 117, 50 P. 819, 822 (1897):

"So, the language of the 
constitution is to be understood in the sense in which it was used at the time 
when it was adopted."

[¶49.]  Seventy years ago, this court in an 
extended constitutional review summarized:

"The general principles 
governing the construction of statutes apply to the construction of 
constitutions. 12 C.J. 699. And the fundamental purpose in such construction is 
to ascertain the intent of the framers and the people who adopted it, and give 
effect thereto. 12 C.J. 700. And an amendment will prevail over a provision of 
the original Constitution inconsistent with the amendment. 12 C.J. 709. The 
amendment, being the latest expression of the will of the people, cannot be 
limited or controlled by previous existing provisions of the Constitution. In 
construing the amendment the court should keep in view the Constitution as it 
was before it was amended, the evil to be remedied, and the terms of the 
amendment. Ferrell v. Keel, 105 Ark. 380, 151 S.W. 269.

"`The safe way is to read 
its language in connection with the known condition of affairs out of which the 
occasion for its adoption may have arisen, and then to construe it, if there be 
therein any doubtful expressions, in a way, so far as is reasonably possible, to 
forward the known purpose or object for which the amendment was adopted. * * *' 
Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 602, 20 Sup.Ct. 448, 494, 
44 L. Ed. 597." Zancanelli v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 25 Wyo. 511, 173 P. 981, 991 
(1918).

This conclusion 
does no ill justice to the intent of the 1953 legislature when, by passage of 
House Joint Resolution No. 5, the endorsed statement was adopted for electorate 
vote and with that success to be now applied:

"This proposed amendment 
to the Constitution to the State of Wyoming allows the Legislature by law to fix 
during their terms the salaries of Justices and Judges of the Supreme Court and 
the District Courts, so that each justice and each judge performing similar 
duties will receive like salaries."4

[¶50.]  Consequently, I believe this court will 
accurately apply both the intent of the constitutional amendment and the 
expressed desire of the legislature in determination that the pay increase was 
equally applicable for all judges of the county court with the commencement of 
the term of those newly retained in popular election by the November, 1986 
vote.

[¶51.]  Based on this history of the development 
of the Wyoming Constitution, I join with the court in determination that the 
writ should issue.5

FOOTNOTES

1 In 1890, Art. 3, § 32 of 
the Constitution provided in relevant part:

"Except as otherwise 
provided in this constitution, no law shall extend the term of any public 
officer or increase or diminish his salary or emolument after his election or 
appointment * * *."

Article 5, § 17 
provided:

"The judges of the 
supreme and district courts shall receive such compensation for their services 
as may be prescribed by law, which compensation shall not be increased or 
diminished during the term for which a judge shall have been elected, and the 
salary of a judge of the supreme or district court shall be as may be prescribed 
by law."

By the 1953 
amendment, Art. 3, § 32 was unchanged, and Art. 5, § 17 was 
restated:

"The judges of the 
supreme and district courts shall receive such compensation for their services 
as may be prescribed by law, which compensation shall not be increased or 
diminished during the term for which a judge shall have been elected, and the 
salary of a judge of the supreme or district court shall be as may be prescribed 
by law; provided, however, that when any legislative increase or decrease in the 
salary of the justices or judges of such courts whose respective terms of office 
do not expire at the same time, has heretofore or shall hereafter become 
effective as to any member of such court, it shall be effective from such date 
as to each of the members thereof."

2 One of the major debates 
of the 1889 Wyoming constitutional convention, as raised 
in three separate sequences, was whether or not there should be a supreme court 
at all, or whether the constituency of the district bench should en banc 
constitute the appellate tribunal. After extended and continued debate, the 
independent supreme court was only approved by the rather minimal vote in the 
convention of 21 to 17 in the late stages of the composition process of the 
present Wyoming Constitution. See Journals and Debates of the Constitutional 
Convention of the State of Wyoming, pp. 330-338, 478-495, 514-533 (1893). Now, 
for the first time, a total automatic right of direct appeal to the Wyoming 
Supreme Court in every case no longer exists, since as to municipal, justice of 
the peace, and county courts, the district courts serve as the intermediate 
courts of appeal.

3 See among a multitude of 
current writing a recent article, McGraw and Crittenden, The Role of Original 
Intent in Reading a Two Hundred Year Old Constitution, 90 W.Va.L.Rev. 17 
(1987).

4 In retrospect, it is 
interesting to note some of the membership of the legislature who voted for 
passage in the House by 50 votes in favor, 2 opposed, and 4 excused, including 
lawyers John F. Sullivan, Robert S. "Stan" Lowe, T.C. Daniels, E. Keith Thomson, 
William A. Riner, Jr., William F. Swanton. Those in the Senate voting in favor 
included lawyers Byron Hirst, David Hitchcock, and Thomas O. Miller; the vote 
was not so favorable in the Senate, initially failing passage by 17 in favor, 8 
opposed, and 2 excused, and then, upon reconsideration, 19 in favor, 7 opposed, 
and 1 excused.

5 In practical difference 
with the plurality, I would apply the constitutional limitations for any salary 
increase (or decrease) for judges of the county courts except as permitted by 
the equalization proviso of Art. 5, § 17, while the plurality decision would 
deny any constraining constitutional limitation. In this case it makes no 
difference, since I specially concur in approving the date of institution of 
litigation rather than the earlier date of January 5, 1987 which would have been 
otherwise constitutionally established.

MACY, Justice, dissenting, 
with whom GUTHRIE, Retired Justice, 
joins.

[¶52.]  I dissent. The majority has succumbed to 
the temptation to correct what it perceives to be an extreme injustice by 
changing our Constitution through judicial activism.

[¶53.]  Article 3, § 32 of the Wyoming 
Constitution provides in pertinent part:

"Except as otherwise 
provided in this constitution, no law shall extend the term of any public 
officer or increase or diminish his salary or emolument after his election or 
appointment * * *."

[¶54.]  After quoting this section in Nickerson 
v. Winslow, 22 Wyo. 259, 268, 138 P. 184, reh. denied 140 P. 834 (1914), the Wyoming Supreme Court 
stated:

"The meaning of this 
section is clear. There is no ambiguity about it. The words are pointed and 
direct. They mean just what they say and construe 
themselves."

The majority now 
states:

"The meaning of 
appointment of a public officer to public office in Art. 3, § 32 is ambiguous 
and unclear, requiring that we ascertain the intent of those adopting the 
amendment and the meaning to be attributed to the words used." At 
964.

I 
disagree.

[¶55.]  The constitutional provision is clear and 
unambiguous. When it says that the salary of a public officer shall not be 
increased or decreased after his election or appointment, it means that the 
salary of a public officer is fixed for the term for which he was elected or 
appointed. A county judge occupies a public office and is a public officer. A 
county judge is initially appointed for a fixed term and may thereafter be 
retained or removed from such public office by the public at an election. 
Article 5, § 4(h) of the Wyoming Constitution provides in pertinent part 
that,

"if a majority of those 
voting on the question vote affirmatively, the justice or judge shall be elected to serve the succeeding term 
prescribed by law." (Emphasis added.)

[¶56.]  Courts do not have the freedom to ignore 
the plain meaning of words in the Constitution so that they can search for some 
speculative intent. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 13 S. Ct. 3, 36 L. Ed. 869 (1892); City of Buffalo v. Lawley, 6 A.D.2d 66, 175 N.Y.S.2d 547 (1958); 16 Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law § 111 (1979). Even though a 
constitutional provision may be unwise, unjust, inconvenient, harsh, or not in 
harmony with some public sentiment, courts are not authorized to ignore it or 
indirectly nullify it by analyzing it away. State ex rel. Anderson v. Chapman, 86 Wn.2d 189, 543 P.2d 229 (1975); 16 Am.Jur.2d, supra at § 
89.

[¶57.]  If there is a need to change the 
Constitution, it must be done by a vote of the people, not by judicial fiat. 
Witzenburger v. State ex rel. Wyoming Community Development Authority, 
Wyo., 575 P.2d 1100, reh. denied 577 P.2d 1386 (1978).

GUTHRIE, Justice, Retired, 
dissenting.

[¶58.]  I wholeheartedly join in Justice Macy's 
dissent. It is my opinion that, if one reads the majority opinion and his 
dissent, it will be clear that the majority has played word games to emasculate 
a clear constitutional commandment in seeking a result. In my view, this opinion 
demonstrates on its face that the writer is in search of a result rather than 
making a logical disposal under the law.

[¶59.]  In addition to the fact that I am most 
disturbed by this result, it is my view that a group of county judges, in search 
of immediate gratification, have succeeded in achieving a classification which 
also removes them from the protections they should have as judicial officers. 
This case must logically apply to salary decreases as well as increases, along 
with other protections proper for judicial officers. This group may well rue the 
day of their apparent victory.

[¶60.]  If for no other reason than my personal 
pride, I could not join in or participate in games of semantics that the 
majority has used to avoid the clear and obvious words of a constitutional 
amendment. Shakespeare may have more clearly described this opinion than is 
possible for me when he said:

"He draweth out the 
thread of his verbosity finer than the staple of his argument." Loves Labour 
Lost, Act 5, Scene 1.