Title: Kormondy v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC14-2428 
____________ 
 
JOHNNY SHANE KORMONDY, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[January 5, 2015] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Johnny Shane Kormondy, a prisoner under sentence of death and under an 
active death warrant,1 appeals from an order denying his first successive motion for 
postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 
after his death warrant was signed.  We have jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. 
Const.  In this motion, Kormondy once again claims that he was not the shooter 
and that his codefendant, Curtis Buffkin, who received a life sentence, was the 
shooter and therefore more culpable.  We have previously rejected alleged newly 
                                          
 
 
1.  On November 24, 2014, Governor Rick Scott issued Kormondy’s death 
warrant.  Kormondy’s execution is scheduled for Thursday, January 15, 2015, at 
6:00 p.m. 
 
 
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discovered evidence of Buffkin’s testimony that he was the shooter of the victim in 
this case.  Kormondy v. State (Kormondy III), 983 So. 2d 418, 438-40 (Fla. 2007).  
In this successive motion, Kormondy primarily reargues that newly discovered 
evidence, consisting of affidavits from prison inmates that Buffkin told them he 
was the shooter, supports a finding that he did not shoot the victim.  Because 
Kormondy claims he is less culpable, he contends that his death sentence should be 
reduced to life imprisonment.  We conclude that the affidavits from the prison 
inmates do not meet the test for newly discovered evidence as they are not of such 
nature that they would probably yield a life sentence.  Kormondy is therefore not 
entitled to relief.   
 
In addition to the claim of newly discovered evidence, Kormondy raises a 
claim of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel, which we reject as not 
cognizable in this state court proceeding.  Banks v. State, 39 Fla. L. Weekly S661, 
S662 (Fla. Nov. 3, 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 511 (2014).  Accordingly, for the 
reasons we more fully explain below, we affirm the trial court’s order denying 
Kormondy postconviction relief. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
The facts of this case are set forth in Kormondy’s direct appeal: 
 
The victim Gary McAdams was murdered, with a single gunshot 
wound to the back of his head, in the early morning of July 11, 1993 
[in Pensacola, Florida].  He and his wife, Cecilia McAdams, had 
returned home from Mrs. McAdams’ twenty-year high-school 
 
 
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reunion.  They heard a knock at the door.  When Mr. McAdams 
opened the door, Curtis Buffkin was there holding a gun.  He forced 
himself into the house.  He ordered the couple to get on the kitchen 
floor and keep their heads down.  James Hazen and Johnny Kormondy 
then entered the house.  They both had socks on their hands.  The 
three intruders took personal valuables from the couple.  The blinds 
were closed and phone cords disconnected. 
 
 
At this point, one of the intruders took Mrs. McAdams to a 
bedroom in the back.  He forced her to remove her dress.  He then 
forced her to perform oral sex on him.  She was being held at gun 
point. 
 
 
Another of the intruders then entered the room.  He was 
described as having sandy-colored hair that hung down to the 
collarbone.  This intruder proceeded to rape Mrs. McAdams while the 
first intruder again forced her to perform oral sex on him. 
 
 
She was taken back to the kitchen, naked, and placed with her 
husband.  Subsequently, one of the intruders took Mrs. McAdams to 
the bedroom and raped her.  While he was raping her, a gunshot was 
fired in the front of the house.  Mrs. McAdams heard someone yell for 
“Bubba” or “Buff” and the man stopped raping her and ran from the 
bedroom.  Mrs. McAdams then left the bedroom and was going 
towards the front of the house when she heard a gunshot come from 
the bedroom.  When she arrived at the kitchen, she found her husband 
on the floor with blood coming from the back of his head.  The 
medical examiner testified that Mr. McAdams’ death was caused by a 
contact gunshot wound.  This means that the barrel of the gun was 
held to Mr. McAdams’ head. 
 
  
Kormondy was married to Valerie Kormondy.  They have one 
child.  After the murder, Mrs. Kormondy asked Kormondy to leave 
the family home.  He left and stayed with Willie Long.  Kormondy 
told Long about the murder and admitted that he had shot Mr. 
McAdams.  He explained, though, that the gun had gone off 
accidentally.  Long went to the police because of the $50,000 reward 
for information. 
 
 
 
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A grand jury indicted Kormondy, Buffkin, and Hazen on July 
27, 1993.  Each was ultimately tried separately.  Buffkin was offered a 
plea bargain by the State in return for assistance in the prosecution of 
Kormondy and Hazen.   
 
Kormondy v. State (Kormondy I), 703 So. 2d 454, 456-57 (Fla. 1997) (footnote 
omitted).   
 
Buffkin pled guilty to first-degree murder and received a life sentence.  
Hazen v. State, 700 So. 2d 1207, 1208 (Fla. 1997).  Buffkin did not testify at 
Kormondy’s trial.  In addition to implicating Kormondy as the shooter in his 
statement to the police and in his deposition, Buffkin testified during Hazen’s trial 
that Kormondy was the shooter.  Kormondy III, 983 So. 2d at 426 n.1, 439.  It was 
“clear from Buffkin’s own testimony that he and Kormondy were the instigators of 
this criminal episode” and that “[o]nce inside the home, the events proceeded as 
‘[Buffkin] and Kormondy had talked about it.’ ” Hazen, 700 So. 2d at 1214.  
Hazen testified at his own trial that Buffkin admitted to killing Mr. McAdams.  
Kormondy v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corrs. (Kormondy V), 688 F.3d 1244, 1269 (Fla. 
11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 764 (2012).  Hazen was convicted of first-
degree murder, three counts of sexual battery with the use of a deadly weapon or 
physical force, burglary of a dwelling with an assault or while armed, and robbery 
while armed.  Hazen, 700 So. 2d at 1208.  The jury recommended a death sentence 
for Hazen by a vote of seven-to-five, which the trial court followed.  Id.  In 
Hazen’s direct appeal, we determined that Buffkin’s life sentence precluded a 
 
 
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death sentence for Hazen.  Id. at 1214.  Because Buffkin was “a prime instigator” 
and more culpable than Hazen, we determined that Hazen’s death sentence was 
disproportional.  Id. at 1211, 1214.  Accordingly, we vacated Hazen’s death 
sentence and remanded for the imposition of a life sentence on his murder 
conviction without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years.  Id. at 1215. 
 
Kormondy has never denied being a participant in the criminal episode but 
denied he was responsible for the murder or rape and claimed that Buffkin was 
responsible.  As this Court stated in Kormondy III, “Kormondy had continually 
admitted his participation in the burglary and robbery.  In fact, in the statement 
made to law enforcement officers, which was presented to the jury by the State, 
Kormondy admitted his involvement in both crimes.”  983 So. 2d at 431.  “Officer 
Hall testified that Kormondy told him in an unrecorded statement that Buffkin 
fired the fatal shot and Hazen was in the back of the house with Mrs. McAdams.  
In a tape-recorded confession played for the jury, Kormondy again said that 
Buffkin shot the victim.”  Kormondy I, 703 So. 2d at 456 n.1. 
 
In July 1994, Kormondy was found guilty of first-degree murder, three 
counts of sexual battery with the use of a deadly weapon or physical force, 
burglary of a dwelling with an assault or while armed, and robbery while armed.  
Id. at 457.  At the penalty phase, the jury recommended a death sentence by a vote 
 
 
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of eight to four.  Id.  The trial court ultimately followed the jury’s recommendation 
and sentenced Kormondy to death.  Id. at 458.  
 
On direct appeal, Kormondy raised the following six claims: (1) the trial 
court erred in allowing Deputy Allen Cotton to bolster Willie Long’s testimony; 
(2) the trial court should have granted a judgment of acquittal as to the charge of 
premeditated murder because the State’s own evidence failed to discount the 
reasonable hypothesis that the shooting was accidental; (3) the trial court erred in 
admitting bad character evidence in the form of unconvicted crimes or nonstatutory 
aggravating circumstances; (4) the trial court erred in its treatment of aggravating 
circumstances; (5) the trial court erred in its treatment of mitigation; and (6) 
Kormondy’s death sentence was disproportionate.  Id. at 458-60.   
 
While we determined that the evidence could not support a finding of 
premeditation as to the unlawful killing of Mr. McAdams, we affirmed 
Kormondy’s conviction for first-degree murder because the record supported a 
first-degree felony murder conviction.  Id. at 460.2  Because we concluded that it 
was reversible error for the jury to have heard that Kormondy said he would kill 
William Long and Mrs. McAdams if he ever got out of jail, we vacated 
Kormondy’s death sentence and remanded for a new penalty phase.  Id. at 460, 
                                          
 
 
2.  This Court also affirmed Kormondy’s convictions for three counts of 
armed sexual battery, one count of burglary of a dwelling with an assault and an 
intent to commit a theft, and one count of armed robbery.  Id. at 463.   
 
 
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463.  Although we stated that “we need not address the remaining [penalty-phase] 
issues,” we noted “certain other errors that should be avoided in the new penalty-
phase proceeding.”  Id. at 460.3  
 
On remand, Kormondy “knowing[ly] and voluntarily waived his right to 
present mitigation evidence.”  Kormondy III, 983 So. 2d at 436.  The new 
sentencing jury recommended a sentence of death—again by an eight-to-four 
vote—which the trial court again followed.  Kormondy v. State (Kormondy II), 
845 So. 2d 41, 46 (Fla. 2003).  The trial court found that the following two 
aggravators were established: (1) previous conviction of a felony involving the use 
of threat or violence, namely, the robbery of Mr. and Mrs. McAdams or the sexual 
battery of Mrs. McAdams; and (2) the crime for which Kormondy was being 
sentenced was committed while he was engaged in or an accomplice in the 
commission of an attempt to commit a crime of burglary.  Id. at 48.  The trial court 
gave great weight to both aggravators.  Id.  In its sentencing order, the trial court 
expressly found that “[t]he evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Gary McAdams was killed by the discharge of a .38 caliber bullet fired at point 
blank range by Defendant Kormondy from a pistol held to the head of Gary 
                                          
 
 
3.  We cautioned the trial court that (1) the cold, calculated, and 
premeditated aggravator cannot be found if premeditation is not established; and 
(2) a sentencing order must reflect only facts from the record in the particular case.  
Id. at 463. 
 
 
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McAdams.”  State v. Kormondy, No. 93-3302 (Fla. 1st Cir. Ct. July 7, 1999) 
(Sentencing Order, at 4).  The trial court found no statutory mitigation and 
considered and rejected several nonstatutory mitigators.  Kormondy II, 845 So. 2d 
at 48.  The trial court “reject[ed] Kormondy’s argument that he was a minor 
participant and less culpable than his accomplices.”  Id.  Having rejected all of 
Kormondy’s claims, we affirmed Kormondy’s death sentence in the appeal of his 
resentencing.  Id. at 54.4  The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.  
Kormondy v. Florida, 540 U.S. 950 (2003).   
                                          
 
 
4.  Kormondy set forth the following seven issues: 
(1) whether the death penalty is constitutional and whether this 
sentence was proportional in this case given that (a) the codefendants, 
Curtis Buffkin and James Hazen, were given life sentences and (b) the 
death was caused by an accidental firing of the weapon; (2) whether 
the resentencing trial and order violated this Court’s mandate from the 
first appeal, violated principles of law protecting the accused from 
having questions of ultimate fact relitigated against him, and violated 
Kormondy’s rights by finding aggravators not tried or argued; (3) 
whether the trial court reversibly erred in its mitigation findings 
because the trial court defied this court’s mandate, committed legal 
and factual errors, and contradicted itself; (4) whether the trial court 
erred by allowing the State to present irrelevant, cumulative, and 
unduly prejudicial collateral crime and nonstatutory aggravating 
evidence about Kormondy’s capture by a canine unit more than a 
week after the crime took place; (5) whether Kormondy was denied 
his right to cross-examine and confront state witness Cecilia 
McAdams concerning her ability to identify and distinguish the 
perpetrators; (6) whether the introduction of compound victim impact 
evidence, much of which was inadmissible, was fundamental error 
that undermined the reliability of the jury’s recommendation; and (7) 
whether the imposition of death in the absence of notice of the 
 
 
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In August 2004, Kormondy filed an initial motion for postconviction relief 
pursuant to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and 3.851, which was 
subsequently amended.  Kormondy alleged a claim of newly discovered evidence 
which consisted of Hazen claiming that he saw Buffkin holding a pistol against the 
head of Mr. McAdams before he heard the gunshot and that Buffkin said it was an 
accident.  Kormondy also alleged newly discovered evidence that Buffkin stated 
that he, not Kormondy, shot Mr. McAdams.  In support, Kormondy attached an 
affidavit from Buffkin.5   
 
At the evidentiary hearing, which took place in 2005, Buffkin testified that 
he accidentally killed Mr. McAdams.  As this Court explained Buffkin’s 
testimony, “Kormondy was in the kitchen with him searching Mrs. McAdams’ 
purse while Buffkin held the gun at Mr. McAdams’ head.  Buffkin said that he 
                                          
 
aggravators sought or found, or of jury findings of the aggravators and 
death eligibility, offends due process and the protection against cruel 
and unusual punishment under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 
(2000). 
 
Id. at 46-47. 
 
 
5.  Buffkin’s March 30, 2005, affidavit, stated as follows: 
 
On July 11, 1993, I Curtis Buffkin was holding the gun when Gary 
got shot in the head.  I didn’t try to kill him.  It was an accident.  I said 
it was Shane Kormondy who kill[ed] Gary, but the truth was I was the 
man who was with the gun when it went off.  Shane Kormondy didn’t 
kill Gary.  
 
 
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bumped Mr. McAdams in the head with the gun and the gun fired.”  Kormondy III, 
983 So. 2d at 439.   
 
The trial court denied Kormondy postconviction relief.  Id. at 427.  As to 
Kormondy’s claim of newly discovered evidence, the trial court found that 
Buffkin’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing was not credible, after comparing 
the statement with all of the circumstances of the case, which consisted of 
testimony from both William Long and Cecilia McAdams.  Id. at 439.  The trial 
court therefore concluded that Buffkin’s evidentiary hearing testimony did not 
warrant a new trial for Kormondy: 
Mrs. McAdams’s testimony, and Mr. Long’s testimony regarding the 
crimes in question carry far more weight than that of Buffkin.  [B]oth 
Mrs. McAdams and Long provided unwavering, credible testimony 
regarding the crimes in question.  Buffkin’s most recent testimony, 
claiming that he threatened and kidnapped Hazen and [Kormondy] so 
that they would participate in the crimes, and which contains inherent 
contradictions, is simply unbelievable and of little weight.[6]  
Buffkin’s testimony, when weighed with the other evidence adduced 
at [Kormondy’s] trial, would not have changed the outcome of 
[Kormondy’s] trial. 
 
State v. Kormondy, No. 93-3302 (Fla. 1st Cir. Ct. June 20, 2005) (Order Denying 
Defendant’s Amended Motion to Vacate Judgment of Conviction and Sentence, at 
43).  The trial court additionally found that Hazen’s recent statement was not 
                                          
 
 
6.  We note that Kormondy himself affirmed in open court during the new 
penalty-phase proceeding that he and his counsel agreed that it “is not the case” 
that Kormondy “acted under the extreme influence, dominion, duress, or control of 
another.”  Kormondy V, 688 F.3d at 1267. 
 
 
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credible and that such evidence would not have led to an acquittal or resulted in a 
different sentence for Kormondy.  Kormondy III, 983 So. 2d at 439. 
 
On appeal of the denial of relief, Kormondy argued that the trial court erred 
by determining that the newly discovered evidence was not credible and that it 
would not have changed the outcome of the trial.  Id. at 437.7  We first noted that 
“[o]n three occasions Buffkin said Kormondy shot Mr. McAdams—in his 
statement to law enforcement officers, at his deposition, and at Hazen’s trial.”  Id. 
at 439.  This Court concluded, “Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the 
                                          
 
 
7.  Kormondy raised the following eleven issues on appeal: 
(1) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the guilt phase 
of trial by failing to require Kormondy’s presence at pretrial 
conferences; (2) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by 
allowing Kormondy’s statements to law enforcement officers to be 
introduced into evidence; (3) trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance by conceding Kormondy’s guilt for burglary and robbery; 
(4) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to impeach 
the State’s witnesses; (5) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance 
by failing to move for the disqualification of Judge Kuder and failing 
to withdraw from representation before the first trial; (6) trial counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance during the second penalty phase; (7) 
[the] trial court erred by finding that the newly discovered evidence of 
recanted testimony was not credible; (8) rule 4–3.5(d)(4) of the Rules 
Regulating the Florida Bar, which prevents counsel from contacting 
jurors, is unconstitutional; (9) execution by electrocution and lethal 
injection are cruel or unusual punishment or both; (10) his 
constitutional right against cruel and unusual punishment will be 
violated as he may be incompetent at the time of execution; and (11) 
the cumulative effect of errors deprived Kormondy of a fair trial.   
 
Id. at 427-28. 
 
 
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evidence presented at trial, and the circumstances presented, the trial court properly 
found that Buffkin’s recent statement was not credible and it would not have 
changed the outcome of Kormondy’s trial or penalty phase.”  Id. at 440.  In 
addition, we determined that the evidence supported the trial court’s denial of relief 
on the claim as it related to Hazen’s recent statement.  Id. at 439.  We also 
explained that “there is corroborating evidence to demonstrate that Kormondy was 
the shooter”: 
 
The evidence concerning the identity of the shooter comes from 
both the testimony of Mrs. McAdams and William Long.  Long 
testified that Kormondy confessed to shooting Mr. McAdams on two 
separate occasions—once when they saw a reward poster about the 
crimes and again when they returned home from drinking.  
Additionally, Mrs. McAdams testified that Buffkin was in the 
bedroom with her when Mr. McAdams was shot.  She testified that 
she recognized the voice of the man who was in the bedroom with her 
as the man who first entered the McAdams’ home with the gun; that 
man was Buffkin.  Thus, if Buffkin was the only man in the bedroom 
with her when Mr. McAdams was shot, the shooter had to be either 
Hazen or Kormondy.  However, there is no evidence pointing to 
Hazen as the shooter.  Therefore, even if Mrs. McAdams had been 
impeached with this inconsistent statement about the number of men 
in the bedroom when Mr. McAdams was shot, there is other evidence 
to show that Kormondy was in fact the shooter. 
 
Id. at 433.  We affirmed the trial court’s denial of Kormondy’s initial motion for 
postconviction relief.  Id. at 443.  We also denied Kormondy’s petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus.  Id.8  Thereafter, we denied Kormondy’s motion for rehearing. 
                                          
 
8.  In his habeas petition, Kormondy raised the following three claims: 
 
 
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In July 2008, Kormondy filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida in which he 
maintained that he was “actually innocent” of the circumstances warranting the 
death penalty because he was not the shooter.  Kormondy v. Tucker (Kormondy 
IV), No. 3:08cv316–RH, 2011 WL 9933762, at *20 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2011).9  In 
                                          
 
(1) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue to this Court 
that the trial court’s order failed to consider record mitigation in 
violation of Farr v. State, 621 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 1993); (2) appellate 
counsel was ineffective for not presenting Mrs. McAdams’ prior 
deposition testimony on direct appeal to this Court in order to 
establish that the trial court erred by not allowing Kormondy to 
confront Mrs. McAdams; and (3) appellate counsel was ineffective for 
failing to argue that Kormondy’s waiver of mitigation was invalid 
because the trial court did not ask trial counsel what investigation for 
mitigation was done and what mitigation was available in violation of 
Koon v. Dugger, 619 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 1993). 
 
Id. at 441.   
 
 
9.  Kormondy argued the following claims in the federal district court: 
 
(1) at the penalty-phase retrial, the court deprived Mr. Kormondy of 
the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses when the court 
sustained the objection to the question the defense attempted to ask 
Mrs. McAdams about her prior deposition testimony; (2) the penalty-
phase-retrial attorney rendered ineffective assistance by failing to 
investigate and present mitigation evidence; (3) the attorney in the 
second direct appeal rendered ineffective assistance by not asserting 
that the resentencing court should have considered the mitigation 
evidence from the first penalty-phase trial; (4) the original attorney or 
the penalty-phase-retrial attorney . . . rendered ineffective assistance 
by failing to impeach Mr. Long and Mrs. McAdams; (5) the original 
attorney had constitutionally impermissible conflicts of interest; (6) 
 
 
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addressing this claim, the federal district court determined that Kormondy failed to 
show by clear and convincing evidence that he was not the shooter: 
 
The evidence that Mr. Kormondy was the shooter included—
and still includes—Mr. Long’s testimony that Mr. Kormondy 
admitted it.  The evidence included—and still includes—Mrs. 
McAdams’ testimony that Mr. Buffkin was not the shooter.  It is still 
true that nobody says Mr. Hazen was the shooter.  And other 
evidence—though not introduced in Mr. Kormondy’s trial—also 
supports the conclusion that Mr. Kormondy was the shooter.  Mr. 
Buffkin originally said Mr. Kormondy was the shooter.  And for all 
the controversy over who was with Mrs. McAdams when the shot was 
fired, everyone who was at the house has consistently said that Mr. 
Kormondy was not in the back room; he was in the kitchen with Mr. 
McAdams.  Mr. Buffkin now says that he, not Mr. Kormondy, was the 
shooter, and Mr. Hazen says that before going into the back room, he 
saw Mr. Buffkin holding a gun to Mr. McAdams’ head.  But Mr. 
Buffkin and Mr. Hazen originally gave different accounts.  There are 
good grounds to doubt that they are now telling the truth.  These were 
participants in a horrific crime who have demonstrated a willingness 
to lie about what happened.  They are serving life sentences and have 
little to lose by trying to help a confederate get off death row.  Clear 
and convincing evidence this is not. 
 
Id. at *20 (emphasis added).  Finding that Kormondy was not entitled to relief on 
his claims, the district court denied the petition, id. at *22, which the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, Kormondy V, 688 F.3d at 1285. 
 
 
                                          
 
Mr. Kormondy is “actually innocent” of the death penalty; and (7) 
Florida’s method for administering lethal injection is unconstitutional. 
 
Id. at *8. 
 
 
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Kormondy’s Current Motion 
 
On December 4, 2014, after his death warrant was signed, Kormondy filed a 
Successive Motion to Vacate Judgment and Sentence with Special Request for 
Leave to Amend pursuant to rule 3.851, asserting (1) a claim of newly discovered 
evidence; and (2) that he “is entitled to equitable relief and consideration of the 
merits regarding his claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and/or 
the State violated Brady v. Maryland[, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),] and Giglio v. United 
States[, 405 U.S. 150 (1972)].”  With regard to his first claim, Kormondy alleged 
that in 1993, Buffkin told inmate Enoch Hall that he was attempting to escape and 
that he had no problem shooting people to effectuate his escape as he had just 
“blew McAdams mother f***ing brains out.”  Kormondy further alleged that Hall 
relayed Buffkin’s statement to Kormondy in August 2014.  To support 
Kormondy’s claim that Buffkin was the person who shot Mr. McAdams, 
Kormondy attached to his motion affidavits from inmates Christopher Michelson, 
Russell Binstead, Roger Livingston, and John Turner.  On December 10, 2014, the 
trial court denied an evidentiary hearing on Kormondy’s claims.  On December 15, 
2014, the trial court denied Kormondy’s successive motion for postconviction 
relief.10  This appeal followed.    
                                          
 
 
10.  On December 7, 2014, Kormondy filed a motion to disqualify the trial 
court, which it denied the following day.  Because Kormondy does not claim in his 
 
 
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ANALYSIS 
 
Kormondy claims that the trial court erred in (1) summarily denying his 
claim of newly discovered evidence; and (2) summarily denying his claim of 
ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel.  We address these claims in turn. 
Claim of Newly Discovered Evidence  
 
Kormondy contends that the trial court erred in summarily denying his claim 
of newly discovered evidence, which consisted of five individuals stating that 
Buffkin made certain incriminating statements to each of them in prison, 
establishing that Buffkin—and not Kormondy—was the person who shot Mr. 
McAdams.  Kormondy asserts that this newly discovered evidence demonstrates 
that his death sentence is constitutionally unreliable and would probably result in 
Kormondy receiving a life sentence.  According to Kormondy, this newly 
discovered evidence establishes that he was not more culpable than his 
codefendants and provides credibility to Buffkin’s prior evidentiary hearing 
testimony that he was the shooter.  Additionally, Kormondy contends that the trial 
court’s basis for denying Kormondy’s initial motion for postconviction relief was 
erroneous.  We disagree. 
                                          
 
initial brief that the trial court erred in denying his motion to disqualify, we do not 
consider whether his motion was properly denied. 
 
 
- 17 - 
 
According to Kormondy’s motion, Buffkin told inmate Hall in 1993, that he 
had just “blew McAdams mother f***ing brains out.”  The substance of the 
affidavits are as follows.  In his December 5, 2014, affidavit, Christopher 
Michelson provided that he was in prison with Buffkin or “Buffy.”  Between 1996 
and 1998, Michelson maintained that: 
Buffy told me that he was the one that shot and killed the victim.  He 
stated that he put the shooting on Kormondy because he knew if he 
didn’t put it on one of his co-defendants he was going to get sentenced 
to death.  He chose to put it [on] Kormondy because he blamed 
Kormondy for the threesome getting caught.  Buffy stated that if 
Kormondy kept his mouth shut none of them would have been 
apprehended. 
 
Russell Binstead stated in his December 5, 2014, affidavit, that in approximately 
2011, Buffkin told him in prison that he was the person who killed the victim in his 
case, that he should be on death row, and that he felt guilty that one of his 
codefendants had a death sentence for a murder he committed.  According to 
Roger Livingston’s December 5, 2014, affidavit, after meeting Buffkin in prison in 
roughly 2012, Buffkin told him “that his co-defendant who was on death row was 
not the one that killed the victim.  He told me that he was going to try to free the 
man and that one day he would end up on death row himself.”  In John Turner’s 
December 9, 2014, affidavit, Turner stated that while in prison in 2012 Buffkin 
told him that “he put his co-defendant on death row and felt bad about it.  He told 
me he was the ring leader and responsible for the murder.  He stated that his co-
 
 
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defendant who was on death row was there wrongfully.”  Thus, Buffkin’s 
statements were reportedly made to inmates in prison around 2011 and 2012, with 
the exception of Buffkin’s remarks to Christopher Michelson, which occurred 
between 1996 and 1998, and Enoch Hall, which occurred in 1993.   
 
The trial court found that Kormondy’s claim was procedurally barred 
because Kormondy was re-litigating a prior claim raised in his initial motion for 
postconviction relief.  With regard to the information provided by Hall and 
Michelson, the trial court found that in light of Buffkin’s 2005 evidentiary hearing 
testimony, Kormondy was unable to show that the defense could not have known 
of the evidence by the use of diligence as Buffkin confessed to both Hall and 
Michelson before 2005.  The trial court further found that the proposed newly 
discovered evidence was inadmissible hearsay and cumulative to prior testimony 
from Buffkin and Hazen.  Moreover, the trial court concluded that “Buffkin’s 
confession as told through the five inmates would not have produced an acquittal 
or yielded a less severe sentence for [Kormondy].”  Finally, the trial court found 
that Buffkin “could not have been the person who shot and killed Mr. McAdams” 
based on the totality of the evidence submitted at trial. 
 
The standard of review of a summarily denied successive postconviction 
motion is as follows: 
 
A successive rule 3.851 motion may be denied without an 
evidentiary hearing if the records of the case conclusively show that 
 
 
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the movant is entitled to no relief.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B).  
This Court reviews the circuit court’s decision to summarily deny a 
successive rule 3.851 motion de novo, accepting the movant’s factual 
allegations as true to the extent they are not refuted by the record, and 
affirming the ruling if the record conclusively shows that the movant 
is entitled to no relief. 
 
Walton v. State, 3 So. 3d 1000, 1005 (Fla. 2009).  “A postconviction court’s 
decision whether to grant an evidentiary hearing on a rule 3.850 motion is 
ultimately based on written materials before the court.  Thus, its ruling is 
tantamount to a pure question of law, subject to de novo review.”  Franqui v. State, 
59 So. 3d 82, 95 (Fla. 2011) (footnote omitted). 
 
 
This Court has set forth a two-prong test that a defendant must satisfy in 
order to obtain relief in cases involving newly discovered evidence: 
 
To obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a 
defendant must meet two requirements.  First, the evidence must not 
have been known by the trial court, the party, or counsel at the time of 
trial, and it must appear that the defendant or defense counsel could 
not have known of it by the use of diligence.  Second, the newly 
discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably 
produce an acquittal on retrial.  See Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 
521 (Fla. 1998) (Jones II).  Newly discovered evidence satisfies the 
second prong of the Jones II test if it “weakens the case against [the 
defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his 
culpability.”  Jones II, 709 So. 2d at 526 (quoting Jones v. State, 678 
So. 2d 309, 315 (Fla. 1996)).  If the defendant is seeking to vacate a 
sentence, the second prong requires that the newly discovered 
evidence would probably yield a less severe sentence.  See Jones v. 
State, 591 So. 2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1991) (Jones I). 
 
Marek v. State, 14 So. 3d 985, 990 (Fla. 2009).  The postconviction court must 
consider the effect of the newly discovered evidence, in addition to all of the 
 
 
- 20 - 
admissible evidence that could be introduced at a new trial.  Swafford v. State, 125 
So. 3d 760, 775-76 (Fla. 2013). 
 
Relying on his assertion that Kormondy’s counsel first learned of Enoch 
Hall in August 2014, Kormondy claims that the trial court erred in finding that he 
was unable to show that the defense could not have known of the evidence by the 
use of diligence.  We disagree.  The trial court properly determined that Kormondy 
failed to show that the defense could not have known about Hall and Michelson—
as to the alleged confessions made by Buffkin to each of them in the 1990s—by 
the use of diligence.  In 2005, Buffkin testified during Kormondy’s evidentiary 
hearing on his initial postconviction motion that “[t]here was [sic] a few other 
inmates that knew that I was the triggerman.”  Therefore, counsel could have 
sought out Hall and Michelson after Buffkin’s evidentiary hearing testimony.   
 
In addition, the newly discovered evidence offered by Kormondy, as to what 
Buffkin reportedly said, constitutes hearsay.  See § 90.801(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2014); 
see also Wyatt v. State, 71 So. 3d 86, 104 n.15 (Fla. 2011) (agreeing that an 
inmate’s affidavit used for a claim of newly discovered evidence was inadmissible 
hearsay).  In other words, all of the inmates’ statements consist of relating that 
Buffkin told them at various times that he was the shooter. 
 
Even if Kormondy satisfies the first prong of Jones II as to all of the alleged 
inculpatory statements Buffkin made, as presented by Kormondy, and even if such 
 
 
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evidence is admissible in the guilt phase or in the penalty phase,11 we conclude that 
the newly discovered evidence is not of such nature that it would probably produce 
an acquittal on retrial or yield a less severe sentence.  This Court previously 
concluded that the trial evidence demonstrated that Kormondy was the shooter 
separate from any testimony from Buffkin, consisting of both Kormondy’s 
admissions to William Long and the observations of Cecilia McAdams, the 
surviving victim.   
 
In Kormondy’s original direct appeal, we observed that Kormondy admitted 
to William Long that he had shot Mr. McAdams, explaining to him that the gun 
had gone off accidentally.  Kormondy I, 703 So. 2d at 457.  In the appeal of 
                                          
 
 
11.  Section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (2014), provides, in pertinent part, 
that in a separate sentencing proceeding 
 
evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems 
relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of the defendant 
and shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances enumerated in subsections (5) and (6).  Any 
such evidence which the court deems to have probative value may be 
received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of 
evidence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to 
rebut any hearsay statements. 
 
§ 921.141(1), Fla. Stat. (2014) (emphasis added).  Although the statute “relaxes the 
evidentiary rules during the penalty phase of a capital trial, the statute clearly states 
that the defendant must have an opportunity to fairly rebut the hearsay evidence in 
order for it to be admissible.  This rule applies to the State as well.”  Blackwood v. 
State, 777 So. 2d 399, 411-12 (Fla. 2000) (citation omitted). 
 
 
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Kormondy’s resentencing, Kormondy claimed that his death sentence was 
disproportionate to the life sentences Buffkin and Hazen received.  Kormondy II, 
845 So. 2d at 47.  Kormondy argued that Buffkin was “the leader,” and a “prime 
instigator,” Hazen, 700 So. 2d at 1214, and that Hazen was “the lead rapist,” 
Kormondy II, 845 So. 2d at 47.  We concluded that the record evidence refuted 
Kormondy’s claim: “[t]he evidence from trial and the resentencing demonstrates 
that Kormondy committed the homicide and is more culpable than his 
codefendants; therefore, his sentence of death is not disproportional on this 
basis.”  Id.  Further, we reasoned: 
 
Although Kormondy, in a taped statement . . . contended that 
Buffkin was the trigger man, the evidence in this case demonstrates 
otherwise.  Mrs. McAdams, decedent’s wife, who was sexually 
assaulted during the robbery, testified that the second person who 
raped her had shoulder-length hair.  She also stated that while the first 
person who entered the home, Buffkin, was assaulting her, the 
shortest person (Hazen) and the long-haired one, Kormondy, were in 
the kitchen with her husband Gary when he was shot. 
 
Mrs. McAdams’ description of Kormondy was supported by the 
testimony of several other witnesses as well as inconsistencies in 
Kormondy’s taped statement.  Allen Cotton also testified that 
Kormondy had longer hair than the others on the day he was arrested 
and that Hazen was shorter than Kormondy.  Terri Kilgore, the officer 
who pursued Kormondy on foot, also described Kormondy as having 
long hair at the time of his arrest.  This testimony tends to place 
Kormondy, not Buffkin, in the kitchen with the victim and Hazen 
when the fatal shot was fired. 
 
Kormondy’s confession to Will Long also belies Kormondy’s 
version of events.  According to Long, he and Kormondy went to a 
convenience store the day after the murders and Kormondy 
 
 
- 23 - 
commented, upon seeing a reward poster related to the murders, that 
the only way the police would find the killer would be if they were 
walking behind him and Long at that moment.  Later that day, 
Kormondy admitted killing the victim and tearfully explained that it 
was an accident.  The testimony presented at trial tends to prove that 
Kormondy was the triggerman, and therefore his sentence of death is 
not disproportionate to the life sentences received by his 
codefendants. 
 
Id. at 48 (emphasis added). 
 
The newly discovered evidence now offered by Kormondy in the form of the 
affidavits is not of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on 
retrial or yield a less severe sentence.  As noted above, Buffkin alleged that he shot 
Mr. McAdams during his testimony at Kormondy’s evidentiary hearing on his 
claim of newly discovered evidence brought in his initial motion for postconviction 
relief.  This claim was rejected by the trial court, which we affirmed on appeal.  
While it is true that in denying Kormondy’s initial motion for postconviction relief 
the trial court found that “the sole reason Buffkin claimed that he shot Mr. 
McAdams was to afford Buffkin an opportunity to come to court and to escape” 
and that “Buffkin fabricated his most recent statement in an attempt to escape 
again,” the trial court properly determined that Buffkin was not credible based on 
Buffkin’s evidentiary hearing testimony along with its review of Buffkin’s prior 
inconsistent statements.  Kormondy III, 983 So. 2d at 440.  On appeal, we 
considered all of the circumstances of the case, including the fact that Buffkin had 
previously told law enforcement officers and testified at deposition and Hazen’s 
 
 
- 24 - 
trial that Kormondy was the shooter.  Id. at 439.  As the federal district court 
observed in rejecting a similar claim regarding the credibility of Buffkin and 
Hazen:  
There are good grounds to doubt that they are now telling the 
truth.  These were participants in a horrific crime who have 
demonstrated a willingness to lie about what happened.  They are 
serving life sentences and have little to lose by trying to help a 
confederate get off death row. 
 
Kormondy IV, 2011 WL 9933762, at *20.   
 
The presentation of statements from a number of fellow inmates who 
maintain that they also heard Buffkin confess to being the shooter does not change 
this picture, does not change the corroborating evidence, and would not probably 
produce a life sentence.  The testimony from Long and Mrs. McAdams at 
Kormondy’s trial—establishing that Kormondy shot and killed Mr. McAdams—
has remained unrefuted in postconviction proceedings.  Thus, the record 
conclusively shows that Kormondy is entitled to no relief.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the trial court’s summary denial of this claim.   
Ineffective Assistance of Postconviction Counsel 
 
Kormondy asserts that during the proceedings on his initial motion for 
postconviction relief, postconviction counsel was deficient in arguing claims of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
 
 
- 25 - 
668 (1984), as well as Brady and Giglio relating to trial witness William Long.12  
For this claim, Kormondy relies on Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), and 
Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013), and this Court’s equitable powers.  The 
trial court denied this claim, concluding that neither Martinez nor Trevino is 
applicable and that ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel claims are not 
cognizable in a rule 3.851 motion.   
 
In Banks, we recently denied Banks’ claim of ineffective assistance of 
postconviction counsel.  39 Fla. L. Weekly at S662.  We explained that ineffective 
assistance of postconviction counsel claims are not cognizable.  Id.; see also Moore 
v. State, 132 So. 3d 718, 724 (Fla. 2013); Chavez v. State, 129 So. 3d 1067, 1067 
(Fla. 2013) (table); Atwater v. State, 118 So. 3d 219 (Fla. 2013) (table); Mann v. 
                                          
 
 
12.  In addressing one of Kormondy’s guilt-phase claims raised on direct 
appeal, we observed that “Long was subjected to extensive cross-examination by 
the defense [and that] [t]he jury was given ample opportunity to assess Long’s 
credibility.”  Kormondy I, 703 So. 2d at 459.  In Kormondy III, Kormondy claimed 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach William Long as to “his 
prior felony conviction, the benefits he received from the State in exchange for his 
testimony against Kormondy, and the inconsistency between Long’s deposition 
statements and his trial testimony.”  983 So. 2d at 432.  We concluded that 
Kormondy failed to establish prejudice regarding trial counsel’s failure to 
specifically question Long about his felony conviction.  Id.  Because Kormondy 
did not argue in the trial court the other areas of impeachment which Kormondy 
complained of on appeal, we determined that those subclaims were not properly 
before us.  Id. at 432 & n.4.  We note that the federal district court found that 
Kormondy “ha[d] shown no prejudice at all from the failure to impeach Mr. Long 
on the additional grounds now proposed.”  Kormondy IV, 2011 WL 9933762, at 
*17. 
 
 
- 26 - 
State, 112 So. 3d 1158, 1164 (Fla. 2013); Howell v. State, 109 So. 3d 763, 774 
(Fla. 2013); Gore v. State, 91 So. 3d 769, 778 (Fla. 2012), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
1904 (2012).  Furthermore, we reasoned that neither Martinez nor Trevino supports 
an independent basis for relief in state court proceedings.  Banks, 39 Fla. L. 
Weekly at S662; see also Zakrzewski v. State, 147 So. 3d 531 (Fla. 2014) (table); 
Howell, 109 So. 3d at 774; Chavez, 129 So. 3d at 1067; Gore, 91 So. 3d at 778.  
We decline Kormondy’s invitation to reconsider our previous rulings on this issue.  
Accordingly, Kormondy is not entitled to relief on this claim.   
CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Kormondy 
postconviction relief.  No rehearing will be entertained by this Court and the 
mandate shall issue immediately. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Escambia County,  
Linda Lee Nobles, Judge - Case No. 171993CF003302AXXXXX 
 
Michael Paul Reiter, Ocala, Florida,  
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Carolyn Marie Snurkowski, Associate 
Deputy Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,  
 
 
for Appellee