Title: Morris v. City of Soldotna

State: alaska

Issuer: Alaska Supreme Court

Document:

553 P.2d 474 (1976) Howard MORRIS, Administrator of the Estate of Rawlin Morris, Appellant, v. CITY OF SOLDOTNA et al., Appellees. No. 2286. Supreme Court of Alaska. July 27, 1976. *475 Marcus R. Clapp of Hughes, Thorsness, Gantz, Powell & Brundin, Fairbanks, for appellant. Sanford M. Gibbs of Hagans, Smith & Brown, Anchorage, for appellees. Before BOOCHEVER, C.J., RABINOWITZ, CONNOR and ERWIN, JJ., and DIMOND, J. pro tem. ERWIN, Justice. On May 28, 1972, Rawlin Morris met his death while painting a sewage treatment plant in Soldotna, Alaska. Howard Morris, Rawlin's brother, serving as the administrator of the estate, brought an action for damages pursuant to the Alaska Wrongful Death Act against the City of Soldotna and L.B. Anderson Construction Company, Inc., appellees herein. At the close of the evidence the trial court directed a verdict for appellees, and this appeal followed. We are presented with three issues in this appeal: (1) were AS 18.60.075 and the provisions of the Alaska General Safety Code applicable in this case; (2) whether the trial court erred in determining that reasonable people could not differ in their judgment as to the appellees' control over the work of Custom Painting, Morris' employer, so as to depart from the general rule that the employer of an independent contractor is not responsible for the negligence of the latter; and (3) did appellees owe any non-delegable duties to Rawlin Morris because of the nature of his work? In the latter part of July, 1971, the City of Soldotna (hereafter referred to as "City"), and L.B. Anderson Construction Company, Inc. (hereafter referred to as "Anderson"), entered into a contract for the construction of a sewage treatment facility and water storage reservoir for use by Soldotna's municipal residents. In order to successfully complete the requirements of this agreement, Anderson engaged a number of subcontractors to execute portions of the specialized work that were needed during the project. Anderson subcontracted with Custom Painting Company to do all the necessary painting on the sewage treatment plant. Decedent, Rawlin Morris, was employed by Custom Painting on this project. On Saturday, May 27, 1972, Morris worked with Ken Cariveau, the owner of Custom Painting, and Douglas Webster, a 16-year old nephew of Cariveau's. On that day Elden Sandvik, Anderson's superintendent on the project, talked with Morris and "discussed the procedure he was going to use to spray epoxy." Morris related to Sandvik that he would proceed to go into the tank for 10 or 15 minutes and then take a break for fresh air for an equal amount of time. Sandvik did not ask Morris if he planned to use some kind of breathing apparatus or ventilation system. Although the plant was usually closed on Sunday, it was known that Morris planned to paint in the settling tank on that day. Morris and Webster were the only two persons at the work site Sunday morning, and painting began pursuant to the procedure Morris had described to Sandvik the previous day. Webster's job was to man the compressor and remind Morris when it was time for a break. This proceeded until about 10:30 a.m., at which time Morris, who was in the tank, shouted for Webster to turn off the compressor. Morris then began screaming and convulsing, and fell down in approximately two feet of water *476 at the bottom of the tank. Webster immediately turned off the compressor and climbed into the tank. Upon reaching Morris he lifted him out of the water and heard him mumble incoherently. Webster turned and placed Morris against the ladder, and then he too passed out. At approximately 3:30 p.m. Leslie Cass, a City employee, arrived on the scene and discovered Webster, apparently unconscious on his feet, hanging onto the ladder, and Morris lying face down in the water at the bottom of the tank. A pathologist subsequently determined that the cause of Morris' death was asphyxiation contributed to by paint fumes and, as a final cause, drowning. Appellant's first contention in this appeal is that one of the provisions of Alaska's so-called "Safe Place to Work Act," AS 18.60.075,[1] imposed certain affirmative duties on the City and Anderson. AS 18.60.075 read in pertinent part as follows:[2] In addition, appellant submits that the Alaska General Safety Code was applicable to appellees and thereby imposed certain non-delegable duties. Specifically, he cites § 300-20,[3] which is almost identical in wording to AS 18.60.075, as well as § 304-03 and § 324-05. Section 304-03 provides in pertinent part that: Section 324-05 reads in part as follows: Without considering the scope of applicability of the statutory and regulatory duties imposed by the Act and Code, we find appellant's reliance upon those provisions misplaced. Morris apparently presumes that once a breach of these statutory and regulatory duties by appellees is established, tort liability flows therefrom as a matter of course. Appellant presumes too much. The Safe Place to Work Act specifically provides for civil penalties, in the form of fines to be imposed by the Commissioner of Labor, and for criminal sanctions.[4] Violations of the regulations enacted pursuant to Section 18.60.020 of the Act can also occasion these sanctions. However, nowhere in either the statute or the regulations can there be found authorization for a claim for relief and award of civil damages to an injured workman for harm resulting from the breach of the Act or General Safety Code. Of course, the fact that a private tort remedy is not specifically created by the terms of the Act is not, by itself, dispositive. In some instances a court may conclude that the legislature has impliedly authorized a private remedy,[5] or that a civil action sounding in tort is necessary to protect fully the person for whose benefit the legislation was enacted.[6] In this case, however, we think it inappropriate to undertake such judicial expansion of the Safe Place to Work Act or the General Safety Code and would therefore affirm the superior court's exclusion of the Act and Code. It is important to recognize that appellant's use of the legislation and regulations is very different from the use that we authorized in Ferrell v. Baxter, 484 P.2d 250 (Alaska 1971), and subsequent "negligence per se" cases. Those cases allow a trial court to adopt the terms of an applicable statute or regulation as a more precise definition of a previously-recognized common law duty of care. Thus, for example, in the recent case of Bachner v. Rich, 554 P.2d 430 (Alaska, 1976), the plaintiff asserted that defendants owed him a duty to exercise reasonable care to ensure that the scaffold they supplied him was safe for its intended use.[7] There we approve the superior court's decision to adopt certain provisions of the Safe Place to Work Act and the General Safety Code as a more particular articulation of that common law duty owed by the supplier of a chattel. By contrast, in the case at bar appellant has failed to cite any principle of tort law which establishes that either Anderson or the City owed Morris a common law duty of due care.[8] That being the case, the *478 doctrine of negligence per se is inapplicable.[9] During the course of the trial below, appellant argued that both appellees exercised a sufficient degree of control over the work of Custom Painting to make them liable for the negligence resulting in Morris' death. We note at the outset that the general rule is that the employer of an independent contractor is not responsible for the negligence of the latter. In Hobbs v. Mobil Oil Corp.[10] we observed that this Appellant attempted to introduce the contracts executed between the City and Anderson and Anderson and Custom Painting in support of his argument that appellees' control was such that a departure from the general rule against liability was warranted. The trial court sustained appellees' objection to the admission of both contracts, ruling that the provisions of the agreements were not relevant to the issues at trial. Based on its review of the evidence adduced at trial, the trial court determined that the appellees were not liable for Morris' death under this theory of liability as a matter of law and thereupon granted their motion for directed verdict. It is a question of fact for the jury to determine whether an employer of an independent contractor retains sufficient control so as to make him liable. In the case at bar the matter was disposed of by *479 directed verdict for the appellees. As this court recently observed:[12] Evidence presented at the trial disclosed that both the City and Anderson had an employee at the job site serving in a supervisory capacity; however, as previously noted, neither of these supervisors nor any other employee of appellees directed the work of Custom Painting's employees in any respect. While Anderson's construction superintendent questioned Morris about his painting procedure, he did not instruct Morris that a particular method should be used. We find that the record is devoid of any evidence that appellees actively controlled any aspect of Custom Painting's work. Appellant argues that certain provisions in the contracts, which were found to be irrelevant by the trial court, evidenced a retention of the right to control the work of Custom Painting. Specifically, appellant contends that the contracts between the parties imposed upon appellees certain standards regarding safety. Relying on a recent 5th Circuit case, Smith v. United States,[13] it is argued that a retention of the right to control the element of safety on the job is a way of retaining control over the way the work itself is performed. In Smith an employee of a subcontractor brought a suit against Ronlee, Inc., which was the general contractor for the United States, the cause of action based on Section 414 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. In reviewing the lower court's verdict against Ronlee, the 5th Circuit observed that the "remaining issue is the finding of negligence as to Ronlee based upon the contractual arrangement it had with the government for superintendence of safety at the job site."[14] Upon reviewing the contract between the United States and Ronlee, the court noted: In affirming the lower court holding, the 5th Circuit made the following observation: Smith is distinguishable from the case at bar in that the contracts between the City and Anderson and Anderson and Custom Painting were much narrower in scope. Our review of the contracts in this case indicate that they contain the standard boilerplate provisions with respect to safety.[17] Unlike Smith, the contracts in question did not provide for affirmative duties in connection with safety. Since appellees could not incur a duty to Custom Painting's employees merely by reserving the right to conduct safety inspections or to prescribe safety requirements, we are of the view that the trial court did not err in finding the contracts irrelevant. Our holding in Hobbs v. Mobil Oil,[18] a case cited by appellant, is not inconsistent with our holding in this case. In Hobbs we reversed entry of summary judgment for defendant Mobil Oil, which hired an independent contractor, Santa Fe, whose employee was injured on Mobil's drilling platform. This court concluded that there was a genuine factual issue as to whether Mobil Oil retained sufficient control over Santa Fe's operation so as to impose liability on Mobil Oil for an injury resulting from defective stairs on Santa Fe's equipment. In Hobbs the contract contained a provision which required Santa Fe to perform the drilling operations and "any other operations, in accordance with Operator's [Mobil's] written programs; and as Operator may direct."[19] Moreover, the evidence showed that one of Mobil Oil's employees actually directed Hobbs on two separate occasions to perform certain work on the platform. These circumstances are not present in the case at bar. Upon reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to appellant, we find that reasonable people could not differ in their judgment as to whether appellees retained sufficient control so as to make them liable. Thus, a directed verdict was appropriate as to this issue. Appellant additionally argued at trial that appellees were vicariously liable for Custom Painting's negligence in failing to provide safety equipment for Rawlin Morris. Citing sections 416[20] and 427[21] of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), it is appellant's position that Rawlin Morris' work was inherently dangerous, constituting an exception to the general rule that *481 employers of an independent contractor are not liable for the negligent acts or omissions of that contractor. In order for Rawlin Morris to be excepted from the general rule against liability, appellant was called upon to demonstrate that Morris was within the class of persons protected by the rule and that the work engaged in was inherently dangerous. This court has never determined whether an employee of an independent contractor falls within the class of persons protected by the rule in question. Nevertheless, the trial court granted appellees' motion for a directed verdict, finding that the theory of liability expressed in section 416 and section 427 protects only third persons, i.e., the public, and not employees of an independent contractor such as Morris. In a recent opinion on rehearing by this court, Sloan v. Atlantic Richfield,[22] 552 P.2d 157, we dealt with the scope of recovery permitted the employee of an independent contractor under common law tort principles. In that case the theory of liability was based on section 422 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides, The sole issue on rehearing was whether Sloan, as an employee of an independent contractor, was an "other" under the above language and thus a person to whom ARCO owed a duty. Upon reviewing the case law in various states, we observed: Finding that ARCO's purported liability under the facts was "essentially vicarious," we reasoned that they would not be held responsible and that "Sloan's proper remedy is via the workmen's compensation system."[24] In our view the distinction between employees at the work site and the general public is particularly appropriate in the context of ultra hazardous activities. Members of the public, whose proximity to danger would be merely coincidental, would probably be unaware of any danger until it struck; hence, there is no way they could adequately protect or insure themselves against harm. Employees at the work site, on the other hand, would possess some knowledge with respect to the nature of the project and thus could choose whether they wished to be exposed to a *482 dangerous activity. If they did participate in such an endeavor, their rate of pay would usually reflect the risk involved. In addition, they could take steps to avoid injury by acting carefully and would be protected statutorily by employer liability and the workmen's compensation act. Following our holding in Sloan, we find that because Morris was employed by an independent contractor, appellant's right to recovery cannot be based on any concept rooted in the doctrine of vicarious liability. Our review of the record reveals that any independent negligence in connection with Morris' death was that of Custom Painting. Appellees' purported liability under the facts presented would be vicarious. In light of the foregoing, Morris was not within the class of persons protected under this theory of liability, and the trial court did not err in so ruling. The order granting a directed verdict in favor of appellees is affirmed. BURKE, J., not participating. [1] AS 18.60.075 was amended by the Alaska State Legislature subsequent to Rawlin Morris' death. [2] At the time of this litigation the term "employer" was defined in AS 18.80.300(3) as follows: "`[E]mployer' means an employer of one or more persons in the state... ." [3] Section 300.20 comes under the heading GENERAL REQUIREMENTS and provides: 300-20 SAFE PLACE Every employer shall furnish employment and maintain a place of employment which are safe for the employees therein. No employer shall require any employee to go or be in any employment or place of employment which is not safe. No employer shall fail or neglect to: 1. Provide or use safety devices and safeguards. 2. Adopt and use methods and processes reasonably adequate to render the employment and place of employment safe. 3. Do everything reasonably necessary to protect the life and safety of employees. 4. Where any toxic materials are used or stored warning signs will be posted with a white background and red letters not less than 3 inches high. No employer, owner, or lessee of any property shall construct or cause to be constructed any place of employment that is not safe. This provision as well as others relied upon by appellant have been revised and renumbered since Morris' death. [4] AS 18.60.095. [5] J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 84 S. Ct. 1555, 12 L. Ed. 2d 423 (1964); cf. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S. Ct. 2080, 45 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1975). [6] Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874A (Tentative Draft No. 22) provides: (1) Legislation may expressly or impliedly expand or restrict the scope of a particular tort right or remedy. (2) In furtherance of the purpose of particular legislation and to assure its effectiveness, a court may, despite the absence of an express or implied provision to this effect, supply a civil action for damages affording relief to a person for whose benefit conduct of another was either proscribed or required by the legislation. (3) This civil action normally sounds in tort, involving either use of an appropriate existing tort or construction of a new right of action analogous to an existing tort. [7] Restatement (Second) of Torts § 392 (1965). [8] Appellant does cite common law principles of vicarious liability, as set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 416, 427 (1965), in arguing that Anderson and the City should be held liable for the negligence of Custom, the immediate employer of decedent Rawlin Morris. Liability of this type is, of course, not predicated upon a duty running from Anderson or the City directly to Morris. These principles are thus irrelevant to the instant discussion. [9] This distinction between negligence per se and the creation of new private remedies for statutory violations is also recognized in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874A, comment f (Tentative Draft No. 22). [10] 445 P.2d 933 (Alaska 1968). [11] Id. at 934-35 (footnotes omitted). [12] Teller v. Anchorage Asphalt Paving Co., Inc., 545 P.2d 177, 180 (Alaska 1976) (footnotes omitted). [13] 497 F.2d 500 (5th Cir.1974). [14] Id. at 510. [15] Id. at 511. [16] Id. at 513. [17] The agreement between the City of Soldotna and Anderson Construction was a form contract provided by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development which assisted in financing the project. The agreement between Anderson Construction and Custom Painting was a two-page form contract. [18] 445 P.2d 933 (Alaska 1968). [19] Id. at 935-36. [20] Restatement (Second) of Torts § 416 provides: One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should recognize as likely to produce during its progress a peculiar risk of physical harm to others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to them for the failure of the contractor to exercise reasonable care to take such precautions, even though the employer has provided for such precautions in the contract or otherwise. [21] Restatement (Second) of Torts § 427 provides: One who employs an independent contractor to do work involving a special danger to others which the employer knows or has reason to know to be inherent in or normal to the work, or which he contemplates or has reason to contemplate when making the contract, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to others by the contractor's failure to take reasonable precautions against such danger. [22] (Alaska 1976). [23] Id. at 160 (citations omitted). [24] Id.