Title: Sanders v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

348 N.E.2d 642 (1976)
Bernard SANDERS, Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
No. 276S43.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
June 18, 1976.
George T. Popcheff, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Charles M. Russell, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
HUNTER, Justice.
Appellant Bernard Lee Sanders appeals his conviction for kidnapping, rape and robbery. He was indicted and tried by jury. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for kidnapping, two years for rape and ten to twenty-five years for robbery.
The first issue presented is whether the verdict is supported by sufficient evidence. The evidence most favorable to the state and the reasonable inferences therefrom reveal that appellant forced his way at gunpoint into a vehicle parked at an Indianapolis shopping center. Appellant then taped the arms and mouth of the driver, and took her purse. After examining the purse, appellant was convinced by an accomplice to drive the vehicle away from the shopping center. During the drive, the accomplice threw the victim into the back *643 seat, cut away her clothing and began to fondle her. When the vehicle stopped, appellant got out of the car and went into a house, while his accomplice remained in the car with the victim. Appellant returned to the car and told the accomplice that "the house was o.k.," whereupon the victim was taken inside and raped by the accomplice. While the victim was being raped, appellant was walking about conversing with the accomplice. After the rape, appellant helped the victim get her clothing on, retied her, and told her she could leave after fifteen minutes if she could free herself. The evidence also indicated that approximately two hundred dollars was missing from the victim's purse.
This evidence is clearly sufficient to support the verdict of guilty on the robbery and kidnapping charges, and we so hold. A more serious question arises with regard to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the rape conviction. The evidence unmistakably shows that appellant was not the principal in the rape; the legality of his conviction rests upon the sufficiency of the evidence of his accessoryship.
In Pace v. State (1966) 248 Ind. 146, 148-49, 224 N.E.2d 312, 313-14, we stated:
The evidence contained in the record discloses more than negative acquiescence on appellant's part. It discloses that appellant agreed to drive the car away after the robbery and continued driving the vehicle while his accomplice was forcefully fondling the victim in the back seat. It discloses that appellant went inside the house to check on its suitability for the rape, reported that it was o.k., and that appellant remained in voice contact with the accomplice while the accomplice was raping the victim. These actions represent *644 affirmative conduct from which the jury could reasonably find appellant guilty of rape as an accessory.
The second issue is whether the trial court erred in allowing a police officer to relate inculpatory statements made by the accused during custodial interrogation. The officer testified that appellant was advised of his rights and then executed a waiver. When the officer began to relate his conversation with the appellant, defense counsel objected to the admission of such testimony because the written waiver had not been offered into evidence. The trial court overruled the objection and appellant assigns such action as error. Under the facts of this case, we find appellant's reliance upon the best evidence rule to be misplaced. As McCormick notes:
McCormick on Evidence § 243 (2d ed. 1972).
Appellant made no pre-trial motion to suppress his confession on the ground that it was the product of an invalid or defective waiver, nor did he object at trial, and even at this level he does not assert that his confession was involuntarily given. The specific language of the written waiver was not critical to the admissibility of appellant's confession, and the court did not err in overruling appellant's objection.
Appellant urges that the trial court committed reversible error in permitting the jury to take the final instructions and exhibits with them to the jury room. Appellant is correct that the trial court contravened the prevailing practice in both instances. Snelling v. State (1975) Ind. App., 325 N.E.2d 227 (instructions); Eden v. Lingenfelter (1872) 39 Ind. 19 (real evidence). Nevertheless, we do not believe that these errors, separately or together, are of sufficient magnitude to warrant reversal in this otherwise properly tried case.
Finding no reversible error, the judgment is affirmed.
GIVAN, C.J., and ARTERBURN, DeBRULER and PRENTICE, JJ., concur.