Title: Ford Motor Co. v. Gordon

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims, 
JJ., and Russell, and Koontz, S.JJ. 
 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY 
 
v.  Record No. 100070  
OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
April 21, 2011 
JOHN T. GORDON, JR. 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
In this appeal in which a claimant's change-in-condition 
application for benefits was rejected by the Workers' 
Compensation Commission ("commission") as being time-barred, we 
consider whether the Court of Appeals erred by reversing the 
commission's decision and by holding that the provision in Code 
§ 65.2-708(C) tolling the statute of limitations set out in 
Code § 65.2-708(A) runs anew under each successive award of 
compensation for a compensable injury. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
John T. Gordon, Jr. ("Gordon") suffered a compensable 
injury by accident on January 9, 2000, while working at Ford 
Motor Company's ("Ford") production plant in Norfolk.  Based on 
this injury, the commission entered a series of awards of 
compensation to Gordon for various periods of temporary total 
and temporary partial disability.  The last of these awards, 
entered on January 13, 2003, was an open-ended award for 
temporary partial disability.  Gordon received his last direct 
payment of compensation under this award on February 23, 2003. 
Following his injury, Gordon continued to work for Ford 
intermittently, between periods of temporary total disability, 
in a light-duty position due to restrictions arising from the 
injury.  From October 23, 2000 to January 3, 2001, and from 
April 1, 2002 through June 30, 2002, Gordon worked in this 
light-duty position and earned wages at or above his pre-injury 
wage.  Gordon also worked in a light-duty capacity for Ford 
from April 20, 2003 through September 11, 2006, again earning 
wages equal to or higher than his pre-injury average weekly 
wage. 
On September 11, 2006, Gordon was temporarily laid off 
from his position at Ford because the plant was shut down for 
production reasons.  On September 25, 2006, Gordon filed a 
change-in-condition application seeking temporary total 
disability benefits based on lost wages caused by this 
"change in condition."  Shortly thereafter, Gordon also 
requested that the commission "address[] the issue of 
temporary partial [disability] benefits," and added 
additional dates for which he was seeking "an award for . . . 
benefits and a change in condition as well."1 
                                                 
1 While the record in this case indicates that Gordon 
submitted additional claims in November 2006, after the 
September 25, 2006 application, the language of both the 
commission's and Court of Appeals' decisions indicate that 
Gordon's claims have been treated as a single change-in-
condition application.  See Gordon v. Ford Motor Co., 55 Va. 
 
2
Ford defended against Gordon's 2006 application for 
benefits, in part, by arguing that it was time-barred.  Ford 
asserted that the application was not filed within two years 
of Gordon's last payment of compensation on February 23, 
2003, that this last payment triggered the running of the 
two-year statute of limitations under Code § 65.2-708(A), and 
therefore the application was untimely. 
Relying on Code § 65.2-708(C), Gordon argued that his 
application was not time-barred because all the wages he 
received for the first twenty-four months of the last period 
he worked for Ford in a light-duty capacity, from April 20, 
2003 to September 11, 2006, were deemed to be compensation.  
Gordon therefore asserted that the two-year statute of 
limitations in Code § 65.2-708(A) did not begin to run until 
April 20, 2005, meaning that his application filed in 
September 2006 was timely. 
Ford responded that the twenty-four-month tolling 
provision in Code § 65.2-708(C) could be triggered only once,  
                                                                                                                                                           
App. 363, 374, 685 S.E.2d 880, 885 (2009); Gordon v. Ford Motor 
Co., 53 Va. App. 616, 624, 674 S.E.2d 545, 549 (2009).  
Accordingly, we will do likewise for the purposes of this 
opinion because, regardless whether Gordon's claims are treated 
as a single change-in-condition application, the relevant dates 
at issue affect neither the analysis nor outcome of this 
opinion. 
 
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which occurred when Gordon returned to work in a light-duty 
position in October 2000.  Ford asserted that when Gordon was 
again awarded temporary total disability benefits in January 
2001, the tolling provision was no longer applicable.  Thus, 
Ford concluded, "thereafter, all claims for further 
compensation would have to be filed within two years from the 
date for which compensation was last paid per [Code] § 65.2-
708(A) and that [Code § 65.2-708(C)] could not be used to 
extend the period during which compensation was said to be 
paid."  Ford maintained that because Gordon was last paid 
workers' compensation benefits on February 23, 2003, he only 
had until February 23, 2005, to apply for benefits based on a 
change in condition. 
The deputy commissioner rejected Ford's argument and 
awarded Gordon the benefits he requested.  The deputy 
commissioner determined that "[n]othing in the statute 
indicates that the provisions of Code § 65.2-708(C) do not 
begin to run anew after later periods of temporary partial 
disability or temporary total disability for which awards are 
entered." 
Ford appealed the deputy commissioner's decision to the 
full commission.  The commission held that Gordon's change-
in-condition application was time-barred based, in part, upon 
its conclusion that the Code § 65.2-708(C) tolling provision 
 
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does not " 'begin to run anew' after later periods of awarded 
disability."  In other words, the commission held that the 
provision is applicable only once to a compensable injury 
regardless of the number of awards of compensation for 
subsequent periods of disability that may arise from the 
injury.  Gordon appealed the commission's decision to the 
Court of Appeals. 
 
A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the 
commission's decision.  Gordon v. Ford Motor Co., 53 Va. App. 
616, 624, 674 S.E.2d 545, 548-49 (2009).  Ford subsequently 
moved for a rehearing en banc, and the Court of Appeals again 
reversed the commission's decision, concluding that 
the Code § 65.2-708(A) statute of limitations 
runs anew under each successive award of 
compensation for a particular compensable injury, 
and is triggered on the last day for which 
compensation was paid. Subsection C, in providing 
for wages to be treated as compensation under 
subsection A, is likewise subject to application 
under each such award as subsection C supplements 
subsection A, A and C operating in conjunction 
with each other. Subsection C is not a stand-
alone provision – it instead provides a 
definition for the tolling mechanism applied to 
subsection A, where a claimant has received wages 
(rather than compensation) as provided in 
subsection C. The Code § 65.2-708 change-in-
condition/statute of limitations scheme thereby 
functions, in its entirety, on an award-by-award 
basis – not on what amounts to a hybrid award-by-
award/injury-by-injury basis under the 
commission's construction of the statute. 
 
 
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Gordon v. Ford Motor Co., 55 Va. App. 363, 373-74, 685 S.E.2d 
880, 885 (2009).  Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded 
that when Gordon returned to light-duty work equal to or above 
his pre-injury wage on April 20, 2003, following the 
commission's January 2003 award of compensation to Gordon for 
temporary partial disability, his wages for the next two years 
"were to be 'considered compensation' for purposes of tolling 
the Code § 65.2-708 statute of limitations," which was "thus 
tolled through April 20, 2005, meaning Gordon's change-in-
condition application, filed in 2006, was not time-barred."  
Id. 
Ford timely filed its notice of appeal, and we granted an 
appeal on the following assignments of error: 
1. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the Commission 
based on its interpretation that the tolling provision 
set forth in Va. Code § 65.2-708(C) allows a claimant 
numerous periods of tolling so long as he has not 
remained at work for an uninterrupted period of 24 
consecutive months. 
 
2. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the Commission 
because it erroneously interpreted Va. Code § 65.2-
708(C) to restart each time an award is modified by the 
Commission. 
 
3. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the Commission 
because it erroneously interpreted Va. Code § 65.2-
708(C) as providing multiple period [sic] of tolling 
instead of one period. 
 
 
II.  Analysis 
A. 
Standard of Review 
 
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An issue of statutory interpretation is a pure question of 
law which we review de novo.  Conyers v. Martial Arts World of 
Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007). 
When the language of a statute is unambiguous, we 
are bound by the plain meaning of that language.  
Furthermore, we must give effect to the 
legislature’s intention as expressed by the 
language used unless a literal interpretation of 
the language would result in a manifest 
absurdity.  If a statute is subject to more than 
one interpretation, we must apply the 
interpretation that will carry out the 
legislative intent behind the statute. 
 
Id. (citations omitted).  "The plain, obvious, and rational 
meaning of a statute is to be preferred over any curious, 
narrow, or strained construction."  Meeks v. Commonwealth, 274 
Va. 798, 802, 651 S.E.2d 637, 639 (2007) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Additionally,  
we have a duty, whenever possible, to interpret 
the several parts of a statute as a consistent 
and harmonious whole so as to effectuate the 
legislative goal.  Generally, the Court will look 
to the whole body of [a statute] to determine the 
true intention of each part.  [A] statute should 
be read and considered as a whole, and the 
language of a statute should be examined in its 
entirety to determine the intent of the General 
Assembly from the words contained in the statute.  
In doing so, the various parts of the statute 
should be harmonized so that, if practicable, 
each is given a sensible and intelligent effect. 
 
Oraee v. Breeding, 270 Va. 488, 498, 621 S.E.2d 48, 52-53 
(2005) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
 
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B.  Code § 65.2-708 
According to Code § 65.2-708(A), a party may ask the 
commission to "review any award" of benefits based upon "the 
ground of a change in condition."  However, "[n]o such review 
shall be made after twenty-four months from the last day for 
which compensation was paid, pursuant to an award under this 
title . . . ."  Code § 65.2-708(A).  Code § 65.2-708(C) 
operates as a tolling provision that extends subsection A's 
limitation by expanding the definition of "compensation" under 
subsection A to include wages which meet certain conditions.  
Specifically, Code § 65.2-708(C) declares:  
All wages paid, for a period not exceeding 
twenty-four consecutive months, to an employee 
(i) who is physically unable to return to his 
pre-injury work due to a compensable injury and 
(ii) who is provided work within his capacity at 
a wage equal to or greater than his pre-injury 
wage, shall be considered compensation.  
 
 
It is undisputed in this case that: (i) Gordon was 
physically unable to return to his pre-injury work due to his 
compensable injury; and (ii) Ford paid Gordon "at a wage equal 
to or greater than his pre-injury wage" for performing light-
duty work while under awards for temporary partial disability 
during three different periods following his compensable 
injury.  Code § 65.2-708(C).  The first two such periods 
occurred from October 2000 into January 2001 and from April 
2002 through June 2002.  The third such period occurred between 
 
8
April 20, 2003 and September 11, 2006, after the commission's 
January 2003 award of compensation to Gordon for temporary 
partial disability. 
The parties disagree, however, as to the meaning and 
application of Code § 65.2-708(C) to the facts of this case.  
The commission concluded, and Ford argues, that Code § 65.2-
708(C) "grants one period of tolling to each claimant," and 
does not grant new periods of tolling each time an award is 
entered pursuant to Title 65.2.  We disagree with the 
commission and Ford. 
According to the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act, a 
claimant may be paid compensation pursuant to multiple awards 
based on multiple periods of disability arising from the same 
compensable injury, as occurred in this case.  Code § 65.2-708, 
in particular, contemplates a series of awards by authorizing 
the commission to "review any award" upon "the ground of a 
change in condition," and "on such review . . . make an award 
ending, diminishing or increasing the compensation previously 
awarded . . . ."  (Emphasis added.)  Subsection A also includes 
language that acts, in effect, as a statute of limitations.  
Specifically, Code § 65.2-708(A) provides that "[n]o such 
review shall be made after twenty-four months from the last day 
for which compensation was paid, pursuant to an award under 
this title . . . ."  This two-year statute of limitations under 
 
9
subsection A is tolled while the claimant receives 
compensation, "pursuant to an award."  Code § 65.2-708(A).  
Accordingly, the determining factor concerning whether a 
change-in-condition application is time-barred under Code 
§ 65.2-708(A) is the date "for which compensation was [last] 
paid, pursuant to an award . . . ." 
 
Code § 65.2-708(C) provides that, "[a]ll wages paid [under 
particular circumstances] shall be considered compensation."  
In so providing, Code § 65.2-708(C) tolls the operation of the 
subsection A statute of limitations in the same manner as the 
payment of compensation pursuant to an award.  However, the 
tolling provision of subsection C has its own restrictive 
language.  It is subject to the condition that all wages paid 
"for a period not exceeding twenty-four consecutive months 
. . . shall be considered compensation" under Code § 65.2-
708(A).  Code § 65.2-708(C). 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that "subsection C 
supplements subsection A," Gordon, 55 Va. App. at 373, 685 
S.E.2d at 885, and that the two subsections "operat[e] in 
conjunction with each other. Subsection C is not a stand-alone 
provision – it instead provides a definition for the tolling 
mechanism applied to subsection A, where a claimant has 
received wages (rather than compensation) as provided in 
subsection C."  Id. 
 
10
Accordingly, we hold that the Code § 65.2-708(A) statute 
of limitations runs anew under each successive award of 
compensation for a particular compensable injury and is 
triggered on the last day for which compensation was paid.  We 
also hold that Code § 65.2-708(C), by providing for wages 
meeting certain prescribed conditions to be treated as 
compensation under Code § 65.2-708(A), applies to each such 
award. 
In this case, Gordon received his last direct payment of 
compensation pursuant to an award on February 23, 2003.  Gordon 
subsequently worked in a light-duty capacity for Ford from 
April 20, 2003 through September 11, 2006, and was paid wages 
equal to or greater than his pre-injury wage.  Accordingly, 
Code § 65.2-708(C) requires that the wages Ford paid to Gordon 
during the first twenty-four months of the third period of 
Gordon’s light-duty employment for Ford, from April 20, 2003 
through April 20, 2005, be considered "compensation" for 
purposes of tolling the Code § 65.2-708(A) statute of 
limitations.  Consequently, we hold that the Code § 65.2-708(A) 
statute of limitations was tolled through April 20, 2005, and 
that Gordon’s change-in-condition application, filed in 
September 2006, was not time-barred under the statute. 
 
 
 
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III.  Conclusion 
Based on the foregoing, we will affirm the Court of 
Appeals' judgment reversing the commission's decision.2 
Affirmed. 
                                                 
2 The Court of Appeals relied, in part, upon its 
interpretation of the language, "for a period not exceeding 
twenty-four consecutive months," as it appears in Code § 65.2-
708(C), to reach the conclusion that Gordon's application was 
not time-barred.  Gordon, 55 Va. App. at 372-74, 685 S.E.2d at 
884-85.  Because the facts of this case render such analysis 
unnecessary, we decline to address or interpret that language 
in this opinion. 
 
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