Title: Great Lakes Excavating, Inc. v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2022 WI 44 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP2095 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Great Lakes Excavating, Inc., 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
AMCON Design and Construction Co., LLC, 
Riverworks Development Corporation and John H. 
Burkemper, 
          Defendants, 
Riverworks City Center, LLC, 
          Intervenor-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS   
Reported at 397 Wis. 2d 10, 959 N.W.2d 351 
PDC No: 2021 WI App23 - Published  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 22, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 7, 2022    
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
William S. Pocan   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of 
the Court, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, HAGEDORN, and 
KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion, 
in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by John E. Machulak and Machulak, Robertson & Sodos, S.C., 
Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by John E. Machulak. 
 
For the intervenor-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Steven J. Slawinski, Jessica K. Haskell and O’Neil, Cannon, 
 
 
2 
Hollman, DeJong & Laing S.C., Milwaukee. There was an oral 
argument by Steven J. Slawinski.   
 
 
 
2022 WI 44 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2019AP2095 
(L.C. No. 
2019CV2945) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Great Lakes Excavating, Inc., 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 
 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
AMCON Design and Construction Co., LLC, 
Riverworks Development Corporation and John H. 
Burkemper, 
 
          Defendants, 
 
Riverworks City Center, LLC, 
 
          Intervenor-Respondent. 
FILED 
 
JUN 22, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of 
the Court, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, HAGEDORN, and 
KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion, 
in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
No. 
2019AP2095   
 
2 
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   Great Lakes Excavating, 
Inc. (Great Lakes) seeks review of a court of appeals decision1 
affirming an order of the circuit court,2 which granted partial 
summary judgment to Riverworks City Center, LLC (Riverworks) 
after finding Great Lakes fully waived its construction lien.  
Before signing a form lien waiver document titled "Waiver of 
Lien to Date," the owner of Great Lakes crossed off the words 
"to Date," replaced them with the handwritten word "Partial," 
and initialed next to the change.  Great Lakes argues this 
change "specifically and expressly" limited the lien waiver to 
the 
amount 
received——$33,448——in 
accordance 
with 
the 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 779.05(1), and asserts extrinsic 
evidence reveals all parties intended the waiver to be partial.  
Alternatively, Great Lakes contends equitable estoppel precludes 
Riverworks from asserting Great Lakes waived its lien in full.  
Riverworks maintains the form constituted a full waiver of Great 
Lakes' lien rights because it failed to satisfy the statutory 
procedure to limit the waiver.   
¶2 
We hold the waiver document satisfied Wis. Stat. 
§ 779.05(1) (2019–20)3 by "specifically and expressly" limiting 
the waiver to "a particular portion of . . . labor, services, 
                                                 
1 Great Lakes Excavating, Inc. v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 
2021 WI App 23, 397 Wis. 2d 210, 959 N.W.2d 351. 
2 The Honorable William S. Pocan, Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court, presided. 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2019AP2095   
 
3 
 
materials, plans, or specifications" in the amount of $33,448.  
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
¶3 
In this construction lien waiver dispute, Riverworks 
contracted with AMCON Design and Construction Co. (AMCON) to 
construct a commercial building and parking lot in Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin, called the Riverworks City Center project (the 
Project).4  Dollar Tree Stores, Inc. (Dollar Tree) was slated as 
the anchor tenant.  AMCON subcontracted with Great Lakes to 
perform excavating work for installation of the parking lot.  
The original contract amount for this work was $37,165, but once 
the installation started, Great Lakes encountered poor soil 
quality necessitating additional excavating work.  As a result, 
and following a series of change orders, the amount AMCON owed 
Great Lakes ultimately totaled $222,238.   
¶4 
After completing its work on the Project, Great Lakes 
invoiced AMCON for $222,238 and, when no payment was received, 
served Riverworks and Dollar Tree with a notice of intent to 
file a claim for a construction lien.  At that point, and upon 
AMCON's invitation, the owner of Great Lakes, Duwayne Bruckner 
(Bruckner), went to AMCON's office to collect payment.  A 
representative from AMCON told Bruckner only $33,448 was 
available for payment, and presented to Bruckner a preprinted 
lien waiver form, titled "Waiver of Lien to Date" for his 
                                                 
4 This case comes to us on review of a partial grant of 
summary judgment.  The facts as stated are undisputed by the 
parties. 
No. 
2019AP2095   
 
4 
 
signature.  The printed body of the document provided, in 
relevant part: 
The 
undersigned, 
for 
and 
in 
consideration 
of 
$33,448.00 
Dollars 
and 
other 
good 
and 
valuable 
consideration, 
the 
receipt 
whereof 
is 
hereby 
acknowledged, does hereby waive and release any and 
all lien or claim of, or right to, lien, under the 
statutes of the State of WI, relating to liens of 
mechanics, laborers and materialmen, with respect to 
and upon the foregoing described property, and the 
improvements 
thereon, 
and 
with 
respect 
to 
any 
statutory lien bond, and on the material, fixtures, 
apparatus or machinery furnished, and on the moneys, 
funds or other considerations due or to become due 
from the Company, on account of labor, services, 
material, fixtures, apparatus or machinery furnished 
to this date by the undersigned for the foregoing 
described property. 
Prior to signing the waiver and accepting the $33,448 check, 
Bruckner crossed off "to Date" in the document title, replaced 
it with the handwritten word, "Partial," and initialed next to 
the modification.  Bruckner made no other changes to the form. 
¶5 
Following unsuccessful efforts to receive payment for 
the outstanding amount due, Great Lakes filed a "Subcontractor 
Claim for Lien" pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 779.06 and sued for the 
balance of $188,790.  Riverworks moved for partial summary 
judgment as to the claim for foreclosure of the lien, which 
Dollar Tree joined, on the grounds that Great Lakes did not 
comply with Wis. Stat. § 779.05(1)'s procedure for limiting the 
waiver to a particular portion of the work, resulting in a full 
waiver of its lien rights.  The circuit court agreed, granting 
Riverworks' motion because "[m]erely changing the title of the 
lien 
waiver, 
without 
additional 
explanation, 
does 
not 
No. 
2019AP2095   
 
5 
 
specifically and expressly limit the waiver to apply to a 
particular portion of such labor, services, materials, plans, or 
specifications."5   
¶6 
The court of appeals affirmed, concluding neither 
"crossing off 'to Date' and writing in 'Partial' in the title of 
the document" nor referencing "$33,448 Dollars" in the document 
"specifically and expressly limit the waiver to a particular 
portion of the work," "such as the labor in the original 
contract, which totaled $37,165."  Great Lakes Excavating, Inc. 
v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 2021 WI App 23, ¶¶21–22, 397 
Wis. 2d 210, 959 N.W.2d 351.  The court emphasized the waiver's 
"broad[]" statement that Great Lakes waived "any and all 
lien . . . on account of labor, services, material, fixtures, 
apparatus or machinery furnished to this date[.]"  Id., ¶22.  
Great Lakes moved for reconsideration, which the court of 
appeals denied.  We granted Great Lakes' petition for review. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶7 
This court reviews a grant of summary judgment 
independently, "using the same methodology of the circuit court 
                                                 
5 Because Dollar Tree's involvement in the case was based 
solely on Great Lakes' claim for foreclosure against Riverworks, 
the 
circuit 
court's 
July 
31, 
2019 
order 
dismissing 
the 
foreclosure claim had the effect of disposing of all claims 
between Great Lakes and Dollar Tree.  The order did not 
explicitly dismiss Dollar Tree, so Great Lakes and Dollar Tree 
stipulated 
to 
Dollar 
Tree's 
dismissal 
from 
the 
case, 
acknowledging in the stipulation that Great Lakes would appeal 
the dismissal.  Great Lakes appealed the orders dismissing 
Dollar Tree and granting partial summary judgment to Riverworks, 
and Riverworks intervened.  Great Lakes maintains additional 
claims against Riverworks not at issue in this appeal. 
No. 
2019AP2095   
 
6 
 
and the court of appeals."  Kemper Indep. Ins. Co. v. Islami, 
2021 WI 53, ¶13, 397 Wis. 2d 394, 959 N.W.2d 912 (quoting Talley 
v. Mustafa, 2018 WI 47, ¶12, 381 Wis. 2d 393, 911 N.W.2d 55).  
"Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine 
dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law."  Id. (quoting Talley, 381 
Wis. 2d 393, ¶12). 
¶8 
This case also requires the interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 779.05(1).  "Issues of statutory interpretation and 
application present questions of law."  James v. Heinrich, 2021 
WI 58, ¶15, 397 Wis. 2d 517, 960 N.W.2d 350 (citing Police Ass'n 
v. City of Milwaukee, 2018 WI 86, ¶17, 383 Wis. 2d 247, 914 
N.W.2d 597). 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. 
Construction Lien Statutes 
¶9 
"A construction lien is a remedy created by statute to 
insure 
payment 
to 
contractors, 
subcontractors, 
tradesmen, 
laborers, and materialmen who have furnished labor or materials 
in good faith for improvement of another's property."  Hoida, 
Inc. v. M & I Midstate Bank, 2004 WI App 191, ¶20, 276 
Wis. 2d 705, 688 N.W.2d 691 (quotation marks omitted).  Statutes 
governing construction liens were first enacted more than "150 
years 
ago 
to 
encourage 
construction 
by 
protecting 
the 
contractors and subcontractors of building projects."  Kraemer 
Bros., Inc. v. Pulaski St. Bank, 138 Wis. 2d 395, 399, 406 
N.W.2d 379 (1987).   
No. 
2019AP2095   
 
7 
 
¶10 The lien laws of this state have consistently been 
described as "remedial in character," with the purpose of 
"protecting the claims of tradesmen, laborers and materialmen 
for work and materials supplied."  Bayland Bldgs., Inc. v. 
Spirit Master Funding VIII, LLC, 2017 WI App 42, ¶2, 377 
Wis. 2d 149, 900 N.W.2d 94 (quoting Wes Podany Constr. Co. v. 
Nowicki, 120 Wis. 2d 319, 324, 354 N.W.2d 755 (Ct. App. 1984)); 
see also Goebel v. Nat'l Exchangors, Inc., 88 Wis. 2d 596, 606, 
277 N.W.2d 755 (1979); Tri-State Mech., Inc. v. Northland Coll., 
2004 WI App 100, ¶8, 273 Wis. 2d 471, 681 N.W.2d 302 ("[O]ne of 
the general purposes of construction lien laws is to protect 
subcontractors of building projects." (citing Kraemer Bros., 138 
Wis. 2d at 399)).  Because construction liens are "purely 
statutory," 
"[o]ne 
pursuing 
rights 
under 
the 
Wisconsin 
construction lien law must follow the statute or lien rights 
fail."  Wes Podany Constr. Co., 120 Wis. 2d at 324.  
¶11 Construction liens can be waived under Wis. Stat. 
§ 779.05(1).  That statute provides in relevant part: 
Any waiver document shall be deemed to waive all lien 
rights 
of 
the 
signer 
for 
all 
labor, 
services, 
materials, 
plans, 
or 
specifications 
performed, 
furnished, or procured, or to be performed, furnished, 
or procured, by the claimant at any time for the 
improvement to which the waiver relates, except to the 
extent that the document specifically and expressly 
limits the waiver to apply to a particular portion of 
such 
labor, 
services, 
materials, 
plans, 
or 
specifications. 
The statute further directs that "[a]ny ambiguity in such 
document shall be construed against the person signing it."  
No. 
2019AP2095   
 
8 
 
§ 779.05(1).  The lien waiver statute, created in 1968 as Wis. 
Stat. § 289.05(1) and renumbered in 1979, was "primarily a 
codification of what was common practice in the construction 
industry."  Druml Co., Inc. v. City of New Berlin, 78 
Wis. 2d 305, 310, 254 N.W.2d 265 (1977) (citing Walter B. 
Raushenbush, Wisconsin Construction Lien Law 1974 (1975)); see 
also § 3, ch. 351, Laws of 1967; Wis. Stat. § 289.05(1) (1967–
68); § 57, ch. 32, Laws of 1979.     
B. 
The Lien Waiver Document 
¶12 Resolution of this dispute revolves around whether 
Great Lakes "follow[ed] the statute" in limiting its lien waiver 
to the $33,448 received in consideration for the waiver, by 
replacing "to Date" with "Partial" in the document title.  See 
Wes 
Podany 
Constr. 
Co., 
120 
Wis. 2d at 
324; 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 779.05(1).  Riverworks asserts this handwritten modification 
creates an ambiguity because the printed body of the waiver 
document otherwise constitutes a full waiver under which Great 
Lakes "waive[s] and release[s] any and all lien or claim of, or 
right to, lien, . . . on account of labor, services, material, 
fixtures, apparatus or machinery furnished to this date," and as 
of that date, all of the work had been completed.  Under 
§ 779.05(1), Riverworks argues the resulting ambiguity must be 
"construed against the person signing it."  Great Lakes 
disagrees, arguing the waiver is unambiguously a partial waiver 
because there is no competing interpretation of the document.  
We agree with Great Lakes that the waiver document is not 
ambiguous and satisfies § 779.05(1) as a partial waiver of the 
No. 
2019AP2095   
 
9 
 
lien with respect to only the $33,448 paid.6  The handwritten 
term "Partial," in conjunction with the specific amount of 
consideration, indicates the lien was waived only to the extent 
of that portion of the total amount owed. 
1. 
The Waiver is Unambiguously Partial 
¶13 In construing the lien waiver document, we first 
address the inconsistency between the printed terms and the 
handwritten language.  Read in isolation, the printed text of 
the 
waiver 
document, 
waiving 
all 
lien 
rights 
to 
date, 
constitutes a full lien waiver; it is undisputed that all of the 
work on the Project had been completed at the time Bruckner 
signed the waiver form.  The handwritten addition of "Partial" 
in the document title, replacing the printed words "to Date," 
conflicts with the preprinted language in the body of the 
document indicating Great Lakes "does hereby waive and release 
any and all lien . . . on account of labor, services, material, 
fixtures, apparatus or machinery furnished to this date" with 
respect to the Riverworks property.   
                                                 
6 Riverworks argued in its briefing, "The lien waiver 
contains no language relating the $33,448 to a particular 
portion of the work performed by Great Lakes."  The court of 
appeals invalidated the waiver on this same basis.  See Great 
Lakes Excavating, 397 Wis. 2d 210, ¶¶21–22.  Riverworks later 
conceded at oral argument that a reference to a monetary value 
can satisfy the statutory requirement to limit the waiver to a 
"particular portion" of the work.  As we explain further in 
Section III.B.2, we agree that limiting the lien waiver in this 
case 
to 
a 
specific 
dollar 
amount 
satisfies 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 779.05(1) irrespective of Riverworks' concession.   
No. 
2019AP2095   
 
10 
 
¶14 Because a lien waiver document is a release, we apply 
contract principles to resolve this conflict.  See Druml Co., 78 
Wis. 2d at 311 (holding that a claimant's letter constituted a 
waiver under the lien waiver statute because it was "clear in 
its intent to release the lien claim"); Marx v. Morris, 2019 WI 
34, ¶63, 386 Wis. 2d 122, 925 N.W.2d 112 ("A release is to be 
treated as a contract." (quoting Gielow v. Napiorkowski, 2003 WI 
App 249, ¶14, 268 Wis. 2d 673, 673 N.W.2d 351)).  Riverworks 
contends a construction lien waiver is not a contract because 
Wis. Stat. § 779.05(1) does not "require" "an offer, acceptance, 
and consideration."  While the statute does not require these 
elements, nothing in the statutory text strips the release in 
this case of its contractual nature.  The lien waiver satisfies 
each element of a contract; accordingly, contract principles 
apply to its interpretation. 
¶15 "[I]n accord with the general rule that all parts of a 
contract are to be given effect, the courts must seek to 
reconcile inconsistencies between the changed or added terms and 
the printed matter.  When, however, the printed contract 
provisions irreconcilably conflict with the provisions added by 
the parties, the added provisions will control."  11 Williston 
on Contracts § 32:13 (4th ed.).  The handwritten and printed 
terms in the waiver document are irreconcilable:  the document 
is either a partial lien waiver or a full lien waiver, but it 
cannot be both.  "Where written provisions are inconsistent with 
printed provisions (of a contract), an interpretation is 
preferred which gives effect to the written provisions."  
No. 
2019AP2095   
 
11 
 
Tollefson v. Green Bay Packers, 256 Wis. 318, 322, 41 N.W.2d 201 
(1950) (quoting Restatement, Contracts § 236(e)); see also Hicks 
Pub. Co. v. Wis. Cent. Ry. Co., 138 Wis. 584, 120 N.W. 512, 514 
(1909) ("It is a canon of construction that where a contract 'is 
written in part and printed in part, as where it has been filled 
in upon a printed form, the parties usually pay much more 
attention to the written parts than to the printed parts.  
Accordingly, if the written provisions cannot be reconciled with 
the printed, the written provisions control.'").  In accordance 
with black letter contracts law, we reconcile this inconsistency 
by giving effect to the handwritten terms.7 
                                                 
7 Remarkably, the dissent claims contract principles should 
not be applied to a contract.  Dissent, ¶32.  Legislative 
enactments concerning contracts do not displace the entire body 
of legal principles governing them.  "To accomplish a change in 
the common law, the language of the statute must be clear, 
unambiguous, 
and 
peremptory." 
 
Fuchsgruber 
v. 
Custom 
Accessories, Inc., 2001 WI 81, ¶25, 244 Wis. 2d 758, 628 
N.W.2d 833.  "[L]egislation in derogation of the common law 
should be strictly construed so as to have minimal effect on the 
common law rule."  Augsburger v. Homestead Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 
WI 
133, 
¶40, 
359 
Wis. 2d 385, 
856 
N.W.2d 874 
(citing 
Fuchsgruber, 244 Wis. 2d 758, ¶25; NBZ, Inc. v. Pilarski, 185 
Wis. 2d 827, 836, 520 N.W.2d 93 (Ct. App. 1994)).  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 779.05(1) directs our treatment of ambiguity in lien 
waivers, but it does not abrogate the entire suite of common law 
contract principles.  Because the legislature removed a tool, 
the dissent abandons the whole toolbox.  This is not the law.   
In NBZ, the court of appeals determined covenants not to 
compete under Wis. Stat. § 103.465 are "subject to common law 
contract principles as well as [statutory] requirements."  NBZ, 
185 
Wis. 2d at 
836. 
 
Section 
103.465 
"sets 
forth 
the 
requirements for a[] . . . covenant in an employment contract 
but does not address on its face the question of whether a 
restrictive covenant must be supported by consideration."  Id. 
at 835.  The court concluded such a covenant requires 
consideration 
because 
the 
statute 
did 
not 
"abandon 
the 
No. 
2019AP2095   
 
12 
 
¶16 The existence of an inconsistency between preprinted 
and handwritten contract terms is distinct from contractual 
ambiguity; the latter exists if a document is "reasonably or 
fairly susceptible of more than one construction."  Borchardt v. 
Wilk, 156 Wis. 2d 420, 427, 456 N.W.2d 653 (Ct. App. 1990).  By 
contrast, the presence of an inconsistency or conflict between 
terms precludes a reasonable interpretation of the document; 
read together, the terms are irreconcilable.  See, e.g., Ketay 
v. Gorenstein, 261 Wis. 332, 334, 53 N.W.2d. 6 (1952) 
(explaining the court cannot "reject certain portions of the 
contract" "unless it presents an irreconcilable inconsistency").  
The lien waiver in this case cannot be construed as a full 
waiver because the handwritten word "Partial" must be given 
                                                                                                                                                             
principles by which a contract is formed in the first instance."  
Id. at 837.     
So too here.  The lien waiver we construe in this case is a 
contract, "subject to common law contract principles as well as 
[statutory] requirements" under Wis. Stat. § 779.05(1).  See 
id. at 836.  The rule giving controlling effect to handwritten 
terms over preprinted contract provisions is neither expressly 
abrogated by § 779.05(1) nor in conflict with it, and the 
policies underlying the principle are not "irrelevant to the 
legislature's choice" to recognize lien waivers as a statutory 
matter.  See Hinrichs v. DOW Chem. Co., 2020 WI 2, ¶55, 389 
Wis. 2d 669, 937 N.W.2d 37 (declining to apply common law 
principles because "the policies underlying the economic loss 
doctrine——the allocation of risk and the distinction between 
tort and contract law——are irrelevant to the legislature's 
choice to provide a purely statutory cause of action and remedy 
by 
way 
of 
§ 100.18"). 
 
That 
"the 
common 
law 
contract 
rule . . . is irrelevant" to a non-contractual waiver does not 
negate its application to a contractual waiver.  See dissent, 
¶32.   
No. 
2019AP2095   
 
13 
 
effect.  Because the word "Partial" is handwritten, it governs 
over the preprinted language waiving all lien rights to date.   
¶17 This principle that handwritten terms control over 
preprinted provisions "is based on the inference that the 
language inserted by handwriting . . . is a more recent and more 
reliable expression of [the parties'] intentions than is the 
language of a printed form."  Edwin W. Patterson, 
The 
Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 
833, 855 (1964) (citing Restatement, Contracts § 236(e) (1932)).  
"Since the parties actually chose to add to or modify the 
printed contract, the written terms presumably better reflect 
their intention than those contained in a printed contract 
intended for general use."  11 Williston on Contracts § 32:13 
(4th ed.).   
¶18 Consistent with the principle that handwritten terms 
control over the form's printed provisions, the term "Partial" 
prevails over the language in the printed body of the document 
waiving all lien rights to date.  Resolving this conflict leaves 
no ambiguity as to whether the document is a full or partial 
waiver.  Because it can be only one or the other, there is no 
reasonable alternative construction of the document other than 
as a partial waiver.   
2. 
The Waiver is "Specifically and Expressly" Limited to 
$33,448 
¶19 Concluding that the document is a partial waiver does 
not alone resolve the case; ambiguity could exist if the lien 
waiver is not specifically and expressly limited to a particular 
No. 
2019AP2095   
 
14 
 
portion of work.  This is not so in this case.  "Partial" 
unambiguously applies to the "particular portion of such labor, 
services, materials, plans, or specifications" represented by 
the amount of the "$33,448 Dollars" written on the waiver form 
and received in consideration for the partial release.8  Wis. 
Stat. § 779.05(1).   
¶20 Riverworks conceded during oral argument that a waiver 
could be limited to a dollar amount, and suggested Great Lakes 
could have satisfied Wis. Stat. § 779.05(1) by agreeing "I 
hereby waive my lien rights to the extent of X dollars."  
Although this would have been a clearer limitation of the 
waiver, we decline to adopt such a formulaic reading of 
                                                 
8 The dissent claims our contract construction "rests on the 
false premise that when a party receives a certain amount of 
money in exchange for a waiver, it must be waiving its lien only 
up to that dollar amount," and suggests Great Lakes could have 
accepted the $33,448 "in exchange for waiving its lien claims 
related to the original contract amount of $37,165" or "any 
other dollar amount."  Dissent, ¶30.  Great Lakes could have 
chosen to limit its waiver as the dissent describes, which we 
would have honored had the lien waiver document so indicated.  
But no such limitation can be reasonably gleaned from the 
document before us.  The dissent posits purely hypothetical 
intentions 
possibly 
underlying 
Great 
Lakes' 
addition 
of 
"Partial," which, according to the dissent, make the waiver 
ambiguous. In doing so, the dissent reaches beyond the four 
corners of the document to introduce ambiguity where it does not 
exist.  There are myriad ways Great Lakes might have intended to 
limit its lien waiver, but we need not consider any of these 
speculative iterations because our review is confined to the 
four corners of the lien waiver document, which——as the dissent 
acknowledges——is "all the property owner has to go on[.]"  Id., 
¶26.  Confined to its four corners, the lien waiver document in 
this case yields but one reasonable interpretation, and while it 
does not mirror the model forms reproduced by the dissent, it 
nonetheless meets the statutory bar. 
No. 
2019AP2095   
 
15 
 
§ 779.05(1).  The statute specifies only that a partial lien 
waiver must be "specific[] and express[]."9  The partial waiver 
satisfies § 779.05(1) because it is unambiguously partial——
waiving Great Lakes' lien rights only in the amount of "$33,448 
Dollars"——an amount representing the "particular portion" of the 
work to which the waiver applies.   
¶21 In further support of this reading, as of the date the 
lien waiver was signed, no one contended that any of the 
$222,238 allegedly due to Great Lakes did not cover lienable 
work.  Prior to 2006, waivers of construction lien rights were 
limited to "labor and materials furnished or to be furnished by 
the claimant at any time for the improvement to which the waiver 
relates[.]"  Wis. Stat. § 779.05(1) (2003–04).  In 2006, the 
legislature amended § 779.05(1) to include "all labor, services, 
materials, plans, or specifications performed, furnished, or 
procured, or to be performed, furnished, or procured, by the 
claimant at any time for the improvement to which the waiver 
relates[.]"  2005 Wis. Act 204; § 779.05(1) (2005–06).  Because 
no party maintains that any portion of the fully completed work 
is not lienable, limiting the waiver to a specific dollar value 
does not create any additional ambiguity. 
                                                 
9 Contrary to Riverworks' suggestion at oral argument that 
we are left to "divine" what portion of work the waiver 
attempted to release, no divination is required.  Construing the 
document as a partial waiver limited to $33,448 is the only 
reasonable interpretation of the contract.  Interpreting the 
waiver before us does not involve the kind of "guessing games" 
Riverworks and the dissent assert the statute is designed to 
avoid.  See dissent, ¶31. 
No. 
2019AP2095   
 
16 
 
¶22 Because we conclude the lien waiver document within 
its four corners satisfies the statutory requirements by 
specifically and expressly limiting the waiver to the $33,448 
Great Lakes received in consideration, we need not decide the 
other issues presented, including the propriety of considering 
extrinsic evidence of intent, or whether equitable estoppel 
precludes Riverworks' claim. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶23 The construction lien waiver document on its face 
satisfies the statutory requirements of Wis. Stat. § 779.05(1) 
necessary to limit the waiver of Great Lakes' lien rights.  The 
document "specifically and expressly" restricts the lien waiver 
to "a particular portion of such labor, services, materials, 
plans, or specifications"——the $33,448 received in consideration 
of the waiver. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
No.  2019AP2095.rfd 
1 
 
 
¶24 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (dissenting).  This case 
presents a straightforward application of a straightforward 
statute.  The majority's reliance on common law contract 
principles is misguided, resulting in a decision at odds with 
the legislature's chosen policy regarding construction-lien 
waivers.  I therefore respectfully dissent. 
¶25 Wisconsin Stat. § 779.05(1) provides that if a party 
wants to limit a construction-lien waiver to only a portion of 
what it's owed, it must "specifically and expressly limit[] the 
waiver to apply to a particular portion of [the] labor, 
services, materials, plans, or specifications" (emphases added).  
Such specificity is necessary because if the party limits the 
waiver in an ambiguous way, that ambiguity "shall be construed 
against the person signing" the waiver.  Id.  Without a 
specific, express, and unambiguous limitation, the waiver 
applies to "all [of that party's] lien rights."  Id. (emphasis 
added). 
¶26 The rationale for both the statute's heightened-
clarity requirement and its presumption in favor of a complete 
waiver is rooted in the "reliance placed on waivers by 
owners . . . making payouts."  See Legislative Council Note, 
1967, Wis. Stat. § 289.05.1  Wisconsin allows both general and 
subcontractors to file lien claims, regardless of whether the 
property owner is aware of the subcontractor's work.  Thus, if a 
                                                 
1 Section 289.05 was eventually renumbered as § 779.05, but 
the relevant language was unchanged.  See § 57, ch. 32, Laws of 
1979. 
No.  2019AP2095.rfd 
2 
 
property 
owner 
hires 
a 
general 
contractor, 
who 
hires 
a 
subcontractor, 
who 
hires 
a 
subcontractor, 
that 
last 
subcontractor has the same right to file a construction lien for 
its work as does the general contractor.  And because a general 
contractor, not the property owner, hires and supervises 
subcontractors, the owner may not know how much work a 
subcontractor has performed or what they are owed for that work.  
In addition, the property owner is often not a party to a 
construction-lien waiver between contractors.  Thus, when a 
subcontractor who signed a lien waiver later attempts to 
foreclose on a lien, claiming that the waiver was only partial, 
all the property owner has to go on is what is within the four 
corners of the waiver document.  See generally Walter B. 
Raushenbush, Wisconsin Construction Lien Law 8–12 (1975).  This 
explains the statute's requirements that a lien waiver "shall be 
deemed to waive all lien rights" unless it "specifically and 
expressly limits the waiver to apply to a particular portion" of 
the claimant's work.  See § 779.05(1); see also Robert J. Smith 
et al., Wisconsin Construction Law and Construction Liens 218 
(1989) (cautioning that "care should always be taken" when 
writing a partial lien waiver because any "attempt to hold back 
part of the claimant's rights will be construed against the 
claimant"). 
No.  2019AP2095.rfd 
3 
 
¶27 There is no one form a party must use to limit the 
scope of its lien waiver, but the following sample forms 
demonstrate the specificity required under § 779.05.  The State 
Bar's Construction Lien Law Handbook contains the following 
example: 
No.  2019AP2095.rfd 
4 
 
Steven W. Martin & Bridget M. Hubing, Wisconsin Construction 
Lien Law Handbook app. II at 14 (4th ed. 2019).  One of the 
statute's drafters offers another option:2 
LIMITED WAIVER OF CONSTRUCTION LIEN 
For value received, the undersigned hereby waives all 
rights to or claims for a lien on the land hereafter 
described, for any and all work, materials, plans or 
specifications furnished between the ___ day of _____, 
[20]__, which was the last day of furnishing any labor 
or materials to which this waiver relates, for the 
improvement of said lands, said improvements being 
done for [owner] by [contractor], said lands being 
situated in _____ County, State of Wisconsin, and 
described 
as 
follows:___________________________________________. 
It is expressly stipulated that this waiver applies 
only 
to 
work 
done 
or 
materials, 
plans 
or 
specifications furnished on or before the above-stated 
last date of furnishing any labor or materials to 
which this waiver relates, and that the work done or 
materials furnished by the undersigned for said job on 
or before said date was __________________________ 
[describe].  The amount of compensation due or paid 
for such work, for which lien is hereby waived, is 
__________ 
[Here 
insert 
the 
dollar 
amount 
of 
compensation waived by this partial waiver]. 
The right to assert construction lien rights for work 
done or materials furnished after said date on said 
job is hereby expressly reserved. 
Walter B. Raushenbush, Wisconsin Construction Lien Law 267–69 
(1975).  Both sample forms include specific spaces for the lien 
claimant to expressly limit the waiver to a certain "percentage 
performed, 
dollar 
value, 
and/or 
dates . . . necessary 
to 
                                                 
2 See Walter B. Raushenbush, Wisconsin Construction Lien 
Law, at iv (1975) (explaining Raushenbush's role in the 
statute's drafting process). 
No.  2019AP2095.rfd 
5 
 
accurately describe the [w]ork to which the [w]aiver relates, 
stating exceptions, if any."  See Martin & Hubing, supra.   
¶28 Great Lakes' waiver stands in stark contrast to those 
samples 
in 
that 
it 
lacks 
the 
"careful 
detailing," 
see 
Raushenbush, supra, at 268–69, of the particular portion of work 
covered by the waiver:   
The waiver plainly states that Great Lakes waived and released 
"any and all" liens or claims related to all of work Great Lakes 
"furnished to this date [March 20, 2017]."  Great Lakes had 
completed all of its work on the Riverworks project in November 
2016, so here, "to this date" encompasses the entirety of Great 
Lakes' work.  The only change Great Lakes made to the waiver was 
to the document's title, where it changed "Waiver of Lien to 
Date" to "Waiver of Lien Partial."  
No.  2019AP2095.rfd 
6 
 
¶29 Nowhere, 
however, 
does 
Great 
Lakes' 
waiver 
specifically and expressly identify what particular "part" of 
Great Lakes' lien claims were waived.  The waiver is not limited 
to a certain dollar amount's worth of services, work completed 
up to a certain date (short of the date Great Lakes signed the 
waiver), or certain raw materials, for example.  Rather, it 
expressly states that, in exchange for $33,448, Great Lakes 
waived "any and all" lien claims related to all work it had 
furnished to date——which, since it had already completed the 
project, encompassed the original contract as well as all of the 
subsequent change orders.  See Tufail v. Midwest Hosp., LLC, 
2013 WI 62, ¶26, 348 Wis. 2d 631, 833 N.W.2d 586 (explaining 
that courts "construe [an unambiguous] document according to its 
literal terms" because we "presume the parties' intent is 
evinced by the words they chose").  Accordingly, § 779.05(1) 
mandates the court to construe the waiver as waiving all lien 
claims. 
¶30 Great Lakes argues, and the majority mistakenly 
agrees, that because Great Lakes received $33,448 in exchange 
for the lien waiver, the waiver applies to $33,448 worth of the 
$222,238 Great Lakes claims it was owed for the project.  But 
that argument rests on the false premise that when a party 
receives a certain amount of money in exchange for a waiver, it 
must be waiving its lien only up to that dollar amount.3  For 
                                                 
3 Had Great Lakes intended to limit its waiver to $33,448 
worth of its services, it could have specifically and expressly 
done so by waiving its lien claims "to the extent of $33,448 
only of the $222,238 worth of services provided."  See Smith, 
supra, at 262. 
No.  2019AP2095.rfd 
7 
 
example, Great Lakes could have accepted AMCON's $33,488 payment 
in exchange for waiving its lien claims related to the original 
contract amount of $37,165.  Or Great Lakes could have accepted 
$33,488 to waive its lien claims related to any other dollar 
amount.  The point is:  we don't know.4  And given that every 
other term in the document indicates a complete waiver, 
interpreting it as such is the only option. 
¶31 Great Lakes also argues that its handwritten edit 
reflects its and AMCON's intent for the waiver to be a partial 
one, and therefore Riverworks (who hired AMCON) should be held 
to that understanding.  The problem with that argument is two-
fold.  First, Riverworks was not a party to the waiver and the 
record does not indicate that AMCON was Riverworks' agent, such 
that Riverworks would be bound by AMCON's actions.  See Romero 
v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 2016 WI App 59, ¶38, 371 Wis. 2d 478, 
885 N.W.2d 591 (summarizing general agency principles).  Plus, 
because Riverworks was not a party to the waiver, it has no way 
of knowing what Great Lakes intended other than by reading the 
document——which says that Great Lakes waived "any and all" lien 
claims for all of its work.  See Tufail, 348 Wis. 2d 631, ¶26.  
Second, even if crossing out "to date" and writing "partial" in 
the title is enough to indicate that Great Lakes and AMCON 
intended the document to waive only part of Great Lakes' lien 
                                                 
4 All we can do is guess about what Great Lakes' handwritten 
edit to the waiver's title means.  But even if we knew what 
"partial" meant, it would still be at odds with the rest of the 
waiver's text, making the waiver at best ambiguous.  And 
§ 779.05(1) requires the court to resolve any ambiguity against 
Great Lakes. 
No.  2019AP2095.rfd 
8 
 
claims, 
we——and 
Riverworks——are 
still 
left 
to 
guess 
the 
particular portion of work to which Great Lakes is waiving its 
lien claims.  The point of § 779.05(1), however, is to eliminate 
such a guessing game from how courts or third-parties understand 
a lien waiver.  As one of the statute's drafters explained, the 
statute tilts heavily in favor of construing lien waivers as 
waiving 
all 
lien 
claims 
because 
other, 
less 
stringent 
possibilities present "serious problems of proof" regarding the 
portion of work to which a partial waiver would apply.  
Raushenbush, supra, at 102–03.  Great Lakes' position would 
circumvent the statute's text and must therefore be rejected. 
¶32 Instead of focusing on the text of § 779.05(1), the 
majority wrongly relies upon default principles of contract law.  
It claims that the handwritten "term" places the waiver in 
irreconcilable conflict with itself, and therefore we must apply 
the common law rule that a handwritten provision controls over a 
conflicting printed provision.  For starters, Great Lakes did 
not change a "term" of the contract; it changed part of the 
title while leaving all of the substantive terms unchanged.  But 
more importantly, common law contract rules are irrelevant here 
because a construction lien is a "purely statutory right" that 
"cannot be maintained" outside of the relevant statutory rules.  
See Goebel v. Nat'l Exchangors, Inc., 88 Wis. 2d 596, 606, 277 
N.W.2d 755 (1979) (quoting Rees v. Ludington, 13 Wis. 308, 
311-12 (1860); Scott v. Christianson, 110 Wis. 164, 167, 85 
N.W. 658 (1901) ("The lien being purely a statutory right, it 
must be pursued as the statute directs, or it fails.").  
Section 779.05 provides the statutory rule for how to construct 
No.  2019AP2095.rfd 
9 
 
and interpret lien waivers.  Under that rule, a waiver is 
binding even without consideration——that is, even if the waiver 
is not a contract.5  Accordingly, the common law contract rule 
the majority references is irrelevant.  See Goebel, 88 Wis. at 
606; see also Hinrichs v. DOW Chem. Co., 2020 WI 2, ¶55, 389 
Wis. 2d 669, 
937 
N.W.2d 37 
(explaining 
that 
common 
law 
principles are "irrelevant" when the legislature enacts a 
statute directly addressing the same issue). 
¶33 Concluding that Great Lakes waived all of its lien 
claims would undoubtedly be a harsh result.  But just because 
Great Lakes waived its lien claims does not mean that it can't 
try to recover what it's owed under the construction contract.  
See § 779.05(1) (explaining that a lien waiver "is a waiver of 
lien rights only, and not of any contract rights of the claimant 
otherwise existing").  Moreover, the legislature has made the 
policy choice that construction-lien waivers should be treated 
as complete waivers unless they contain specific and express 
limitations.  The legislature can change that policy by amending 
the statute to allow a party to limit a waiver in the way Great 
Lakes attempted to here.  See Kohn v. Darlington Cmty. Schs., 
2005 WI 99, ¶43, 283 Wis. 2d 1, 698 N.W.2d 794.  As § 779.05(1) 
reads now, Great Lakes' claim fails.  I would therefore affirm 
the court of appeals' decision. 
                                                 
5 Although a waiver doesn't have to be a contract, Great 
Lakes' waiver is one because it gave up something of value——all 
of its lien claims——in exchange for consideration.  But the 
lien-waiver statute applies whether or not the lien waiver is a 
contract.  See Goebel, 88 Wis. at 606; Christianson, 110 Wis. at 
167. 
No.  2019AP2095.rfd 
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¶34 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
 
No.  2019AP2095.rfd 
 
 
1