Title: New Jersey v. Covil

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

SYLLABUS

This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the
Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the
Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.

                       State v. Roger Covil (A-35/36-18) (081267)

Argued September 9, 2019 -- Decided January 22, 2020

PATTERSON, J., writing for the Court.

        This appeal presents two issues. First, the Court considers defendant Roger
Covil’s challenge to the admission of the opinions of the State’s drug expert witnesses --
as elicited through hypothetical questions -- in light of State v. Cain,  224 N.J. 410 (2016),
and State v. Simms,  224 N.J. 393 (2016), which limited the State’s use of hypothetical
questions in the presentation of drug expert testimony in criminal trials but which were
decided two years after defendant’s trial. Second, the Court addresses defendant’s
argument that the trial court violated his constitutional rights and principles of
fundamental fairness when it admitted into evidence a notice of motion for a writ of
replevin and supporting certification that he served in a civil forfeiture action that had
been stayed at his attorney’s request. The Court considers that question against the
backdrop of its recent holding in State v. Melendez, ___ N.J. ___ (2020), that an answer
filed in a civil forfeiture action is inadmissible in the claimant’s criminal trial.

       Defendant was arrested when he received a package suspected of containing
cocaine. A search of defendant incident to his arrest revealed three cellphones and $656
in cash. Laboratory testing later indicated that the package contained cocaine. The
officers searched defendant’s residence pursuant to a warrant and found a vacuum meal
storage system, three boxes of heat-sealable bags, a roll of shrink wrap, two bags of
rubber bands, $70,863, two cellphones, a cellphone charger, and financial and personal
documents bearing defendant’s name. Defendant was indicted on first-degree possession
with intent to distribute five or more ounces of cocaine and two other charges.

       Shortly after defendant was indicted, the State filed a civil forfeiture action
seeking forfeiture of the $71,519 in currency seized. Defendant filed an answer to the
complaint in the civil forfeiture action, stating a general denial of the allegations in the
complaint. And, with the State’s consent, the judge assigned to the civil forfeiture action
stayed discovery as to defendant in that action and the forfeiture trial.

       Notwithstanding the stay, defendant prepared and served on the State a notice of
motion for the issuance of a writ of replevin and a supporting certification, in which he
asserted that the currency in dispute was his property and demanded its return.
                                             1
        In a pretrial proceeding in defendant’s criminal case, the trial court considered the
admissibility of the testimony of the State’s expert witnesses, Detective Omar Belgrave
and Detective Jeffrey Dockery. The trial court admitted their testimony and authorized
the State to pose to each expert a hypothetical question based exclusively on the trial
evidence. The trial court later ruled that the notice of motion for a writ of replevin and
certification were also admissible with minor redactions.

       Defendant was tried over seven days and was convicted of first-degree possession
with intent. Defendant appealed.

        Citing State v. Green,  447 N.J. Super. 317, 328 (App. Div. 2016), the Appellate
Division afforded this Court’s decisions in Cain and Simms pipeline retroactivity and
applied the principles of those cases to this appeal. It held that the State’s expert opinion
testimony improperly addressed the question of whether defendant possessed cocaine
with intent to distribute, thereby usurping the jury’s constitutional role as factfinder, and
it reversed defendant’s conviction. The Appellate Division did not reach defendant’s
constitutional challenge to the admission of the notice of motion for a writ of replevin
and certification but stated that, if the State were to retry defendant, the trial court should
reexamine its decision with respect to that issue.

       The Court granted the State’s petition for certification,  236 N.J. 241 (2018), and
granted defendant’s cross-petition limited to two issues: “(1) the use of defendant’s
answer filed in the civil forfeiture action, and (2) the testimony of the State’s expert and
the court’s response thereto,”  236 N.J. 241, 241-42 (2018).

HELD: The new rule stated in Cain and Simms was intended to apply prospectively to
guide future trials, not retroactively to proceedings conducted prior to those decisions. At
the time of defendant’s trial, the governing law authorized the use of hypothetical
questions such as the questions posed to the State’s experts in this case. And in light of
the distinctions between Melendez and the present case, there was no error in the trial
court’s admission of defendant’s notice of motion for a writ of replevin and certification.

1. In State v. Odom, the Court cautioned that a hypothetical question posed to elicit drug
expert testimony should be “carefully phrased” and required that it “clearly indicate that
it is the witness’ opinion that is being sought and that that opinion was formed assuming
the facts and circumstances adduced only at trial”; the Court also required that the expert
advise the jury “of the basis for that opinion.”  116 N.J. 65, 81-82 (1989). The Court
imposed some restrictions on what experts could say and directed trial courts to instruct
jurors on the weight due the expert’s opinion and to “emphasize[] that the determination
of ultimate guilt or innocence is to be made only by the jury.” Ibid. The Court applied
and refined the principles stated in Odom in several decisions. The Court reviews those
decisions and explains that the rule of Odom, as explained in those later decisions,
provided the governing standard at the time of defendant’s trial. (pp. 19-22)
                                               2
2. While defendant’s appeal was pending, the Court decided Cain and Simms. The
Court reviews Cain and notes that the following principle is stated in that decision to
guide courts and counsel in drug prosecutions: “We now join those jurisdictions that
limit the scope of expert testimony in drug cases. Going forward, in drug cases, an expert
witness may not opine on the defendant’s state of mind.”  224 N.J. at 429. In Simms, the
Court reiterated that holding and applied the principles set forth in Cain to exclude expert
testimony in response to a lengthy hypothetical question on the existence of a conspiracy
to distribute drugs.  224 N.J. at 403-09. Cain and Simms thus restricted the use of
hypothetical questions that Odom and its progeny had permitted. (pp. 23-25)

3. The Court reviews the principles that guide retroactivity analysis and notes that Cain
provided express guidance as to the appropriate application of the new rule it announced
through the use of the phrase “going forward.” Cain,  224 N.J. at 429. The Cain Court
stressed that it “now join[ed]” jurisdictions that limit the use of hypothetical questions in
the presentation of drug expert evidence. Ibid. It stated a new rule for future trials and
explained its decision to reverse the conviction in the case before it, notwithstanding the
otherwise prospective application of its new rule. Id. at 426-29, 431-33. Thus, in Green -
- on which the appellate court here relied -- the Appellate Division misconstrued the
language of Cain. The Court reaffirms that the rule stated in Cain and Simms was
intended to apply only to the appeals in those two cases and to cases tried after the date of
those decisions. (pp. 25-29)

4. The Court reviews the testimony of Belgrave and Dockery. Each testified within the
parameters of Odom and its progeny, and their testimony was followed by a proper
limiting instruction. There was no error in the trial court’s application of the law on drug
expert testimony that governed at the time of defendant’s trial. (pp. 29-32)

5. To avoid a conflict between a defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination and
right to assert an interest in property, the Court concluded in Melendez that a claimant’s
answer filed in a civil forfeiture action pursuant to  N.J.S.A. 2C:64-3(d) should not be
admitted in his or her criminal trial. ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 18-20). (pp. 32-34)

6. When defendant served his notice of motion and certification, he was not required by
any statute to do so. This appeal thus raises none of the Fifth Amendment concerns
addressed in Melendez. Moreover, defendant affirmatively used those documents in his
own defense at trial. The trial court’s admission of the notice of motion for a writ of
replevin and certification did not constitute error. (pp. 34-35)

      The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and defendant’s
convictions are REINSTATED.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, FERNANDEZ-
VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’s opinion.
                                             3
       SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
           A-35/
36 September Term 2018
                       081267

                 State of New Jersey,

        Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Respondent,

                          v.

                    Roger Covil,

       Defendant-Respondent/Cross-Appellant.

        On certification to the Superior Court,
                  Appellate Division .

       Argued                       Decided
  September 9, 2019             January 22, 2020

Paul H. Heinzel, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause
for appellant/cross-respondent (Michael H. Robertson,
Somerset County Prosecutor, attorney; Paul H. Heinzel
and Alexander C. Mech, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel
and on the briefs).

Daniel S. Rockoff, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for respondent/cross-appellant (Joseph
E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Daniel S.
Rockoff, of counsel and on the briefs).

Valeria Dominguez, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey
(Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Valeria
Dominguez, of counsel and on the brief).

                          1
          JUSTICE PATTERSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

      Defendant Roger Covil was convicted of first-degree possession with

intent to distribute five ounces or more of cocaine. The Appellate Division

reversed defendant’s conviction, and this Court granted cross-petitions for

certification filed by the State and defendant.

      This appeal presents two issues. First, we consider defendant’s

challenge to the trial court’s admission of the opinions of the State’s drug

expert witnesses. Responding to hypothetical questions that tracked the

evidence admitted at trial, one expert witness testified about the significance of

packaging materials and currency in the distribution of cocaine, and the other

testified about the use of cellphones in drug distribution.

      Two years after defendant’s trial, the Court decided State v. Cain,  224 N.J. 410 (2016), and State v. Simms,  224 N.J. 393 (2016). Those decisions

limited the State’s use of hypothetical questions in the presentation of drug

expert testimony in criminal trials. Reversing defendant’s conviction in this

case, the Appellate Division retroactively applied Cain and Simms, and held

that the trial court committed error when it admitted the testimony of the

State’s expert witnesses.

                                        2
      As the language of Cain makes clear, the new rule stated in Cain and

Simms was intended to apply prospectively to guide future trials, not

retroactively to proceedings conducted prior to those decisions. At the time of

defendant’s trial, the governing law authorized the use of hypothetical

questions such as the questions posed to the State’s experts in this case . The

Court accordingly reverses the Appellate Division’s judgment with respect to

that issue.

      Second, we address defendant’s argument that the trial court violated his

constitutional rights and principles of fundamental fairness when it admitted

into evidence a notice of motion for a writ of replevin and supporting

certification that he served in a civil forfeiture action that had been stayed at

his attorney’s request. In those pleadings, defendant asserted that he owned

$71,519 in currency that had been seized from his person and his residence,

claimed that he lawfully obtained those funds, and demanded the return of

those funds.

      As we just held in State v. Melendez, three provisions of the civil

forfeiture statute --  N.J.S.A. 2C:64-3(d), -3(e), and -3(f) -- could operate to

compel a criminal defendant to choose between asserting his due process right

to claim property subject to forfeiture and invoking his Fifth Amendment

privilege against self-incrimination, thus implicating the United States

                                         3
Supreme Court’s ruling in Garrity v. New Jersey,