Title: Cooney v. White

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Cooney v. White1992 WY 188845 P.2d 353Case Number: 88-174Decided: 12/31/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
THOMAS 
RUSSELL COONEY and LORA JOHN COONEY, Appellants (Plaintiffs),

 
 
v.

 
 
CHRIS 
J. WHITE, Appellee (Defendant).

 
 
L.B. 
Cozzens of Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole & Dietrich, Billings, Montana, for appellants.

 

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Attorney General; and Sylvia L. Hackl, Deputy Attorney General, for 
appellee.

 
 
Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT * and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

 
 
* 
Chief Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 
URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]           
This appeal involves a decision which was returned to the Wyoming Supreme 
Court by the United States Supreme Court regarding a prosecuting attorney's 
conduct, addressed adversely, by a 42 U.S.C. §  1983 (1982) damage complaint. Following 
a W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal by the state district court and this court's 
subsequent three-to-two decision in Cooney v. Park County, 792 P.2d 1287 
(Wyo. 1990) (Cooney I), the United States Supreme Court, with 
accommodation to Burns v. Reed, ___U.S.___, 111 S. Ct. 1934, 114 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1991), remand 958 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1992), requires our 
reconsideration by direction in decree, Cooney v. White, ___U.S.___, 111 S. Ct. 2820, 115 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1991):

 

[I]t 
is ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the above court in 
this cause is vacated with costs, and that this cause is remanded to the Supreme 
Court of Wyoming for further consideration in light of Burns v. Reed, 500 
U.S. ___ (1991).1

 

See 
Bush v. Lucas, 
647 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted 458 U.S. 1104 (1982), aff'd 462 U.S. 367, 103 S. Ct. 2404, 76 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1983) and Robert L. Stern, 
Eugene Gressman & Stephen M. Shapiro, Supreme Court Practice 279-80 
(6th ed. 1986).

 
 

[¶2.]           
With recognition that the federal law is determinative for application of 
immunity defenses for a 42 U.S.C. §  
1983 (§  1983) civil rights 
complaint, we will consider the direction given in Burns and in our 
companion case, Park County v. Cooney, 792 P.2d 1287 (Wyo. 1992) (No. 
91-182, decided 12/2/92) (Mayor), which involves the parole officer in 
the Cooney I civil rights and wrongful arrest 
complaint.

 
 
I. 
FACTS PRESENTED BY APPELLATE STATUS

 
 

[¶3.]           
The facts of this case, now postured with a request by the prosecuting 
attorney for absolute immunity, were exhaustively addressed in Cooney I, 
792 P.2d 1287 again considered in Mayor, 845 P.2d 346 as the companion 
appeal. Essentially, within this W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss record, the 
factual detail for testing prosecutorial absolute immunity is simple easily 
related. Chris J. White, assistant prosecuting attorney (prosecutor) in 
Park County, Wyoming, directed a probation officer, resident in 
Evanston, Uinta County, Wyoming, to prepare a false and perjured 
petition for revocation of probation against Thomas Russell Cooney.  Cooney was working in the oil patch at 
Bairoil, Wyoming, a corner of Sweetwater 
County, Wyoming, which is an area 
under the supervision of the parole office in Rawlins, Carbon County, Wyoming. The prosecutor, knowing that 
revocation was improper that the form which he, as deputy county attorney 
(county official), had directed the probation officer (state official) to 
prepare was untrue, arranged for the form to be filed in the district court. 
Based upon this false complaint, the prosecutor secured the issuance of a bench 
warrant resulting in the incarceration of Cooney for thirty-eight days without 
opportunity to post bail, be arraigned, secure the assistance of counsel or to 
obtain any hearing.

 
 

[¶4.]           
Following entry of this court's decision in Cooney I, appellants 
filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court 
since a §  1983 complaint was 
included as one count. The decision of this court in Cooney I involved 
application of absolute immunity to this conduct of the county official. The 
petition for writ of certiorari was held by the United States Supreme Court, 
without action, until Burns was published and then Cooney   I was vacated and remanded as 
noted.

 
 

[¶5.]           
This court requested supplementary briefing and, following review, now 
finds that Burns is controlling. We override our prior decision in 
Cooney I and reverse and remand the W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal for 
further district court proceedings.

 
 
II. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR THIS DECISION

 
 

[¶6.]           
Our decision is whether preclusive immunity (absolute immunity) existed 
in benefit to the prosecuting attorney against damage claims under §  1983 for a sequence of events, which was 
earlier stated in Cooney I, to include:

 
 
1. 
A knowingly perjurious statement in official form was prepared by a pole 
officer.

 
 
2. 
The perjured statement was knowingly prepared by the parole officer at the 
direction of the assistant county attorney.

 
 
3. 
The document was prepared within the jurisdiction of the parole officer to 
accomplish the arrest and confinement of a person on parole who was not 
within the jurisdictional responsibility of that particular parole 
officer.

 
 
4. 
The parole officer sent the perjured document to the prosecuting attorney for 
the prosecuting attorney's purpose in filing an order to secure an immediate 
arrest and a subsequent revocation of probation.

 
 
5. 
The prosecuting attorney knowingly filed the perjured document in order to, and 
did, secure a warrant for the arrest of the damaged 
individual.

 
 
 6. The individual was arrested and taken 
to the jail in Cody.

 
 
7. 
The prosecuting attorney was advised that the individual should be released 
since the proceeding was improper.

 
 
8. 
Without hearing or appearance before any member of the judiciary, the individual 
was held in jail for thirty-eight days before appearance and release by judicial 
action.

 

 Cooney I, 792 P.2d  at 1316, 
Urbigkit, J., dissenting (emphasis in original).

 
 

[¶7.]           
The real issue is whether, if Cooney is able to prove some, any, or all 
of these claims of prosecutorial misconduct, the prosecutor is protected from a 
damage judgment by some character of immunity authorized as a defense under 
§  1983. The issue as defined under 
Burns is what, if any, of this conduct by the prosecutor was "giving 
advice" and what, if any, of the conduct was essentially "prosecutorial" in 
nature.2

 
 

[¶8.]           
In reality, we determine, at least in part, whether telling a probation 
officer situate in a non-supervising office to prepare a false petition for 
probation revocation comes within the core criteria provided in Burns to 
be essentially prosecutorial or is moved outside of that core criteria into 
giving advice or other non-immunized conduct.3

 
 

[¶9.]           
The supplemental briefing of each litigant recognizes the functional test 
of Burns, 114 L. Ed. 2d 547, 111 S. Ct. 1934 and Imbler v. 
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S. Ct. 984, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128 (1976). It is also recognized, explicitly or at least by general 
application, that the determination of immunity which serves to create a defense 
under §  1983 is a question of 
federal law within which the United States Supreme Court "has refused to extend 
absolute immunity beyond a very limited class of officials * * *." Hafer v. 
Melo, ___U.S.___, 112 S. Ct. 358, 363-64, 116 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1991). See also 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982). Confined to that arena of argument, the State articulates a position 
that the activities of the prosecutor were functionally connected with the 
initiation and conduct of a prosecution and these were intrinsically associated 
with the judicial phase of the criminal process. Conversely, Cooney takes his 
test, also from Burns, and argues that the court official's conduct goes 
beyond the judicial/prosecutorial "function" and comes within the more broadly 
addressed concepts of giving legal advice or perhaps "suborning perjury." This 
argument tracks the position of Chief Justice Macy in Cooney I, 792 P.2d  
at 1352,  Macy, J., dissenting: "No 
one should be immune from civil liability for intentionally committing a 
criminal act, especially a public official who has taken an oath to uphold the 
constitution and the laws of the State of Wyoming."

 
 

[¶10.]        We 
re-examine this case without being predisposed toward a particular result and 
re-evaluate the purpose and effect of absolute prosecutorial immunity from civil 
liability within the context of §  
19834 --federal civil rights legislation 
designed to protect against public sector deprivation of constitutional rights. 
In reaching our decision, we recognize benefit from the United States Supreme 
Court's collaborative reasoning shared wisdom in Burns. We also look for 
guidance in how other courts have applied Burns in the prosecutorial 
immunity context.

 
 
III. 
BURNS AND OTHER CURRENT FEDERAL CASE LAW

 
 

[¶11.]        In 
Burns, the police were investigating the shooting wounding of Cathy 
Burns' two sons while they slept in her house.  Burns, 111 S. Ct.  at 1937. Despite 
Burns, repeated denials, passing a polygraph examination and a voice stress 
test, and submission of exculpatory handwriting samples, the police viewed her 
as a primary suspect. Conjecturing that she had multiple personalities, one of 
which did the shooting, the police wanted to place her under hypnosis and 
interview her. Concerned that this might be a legally unacceptable investigative 
technique, the police solicited deputy prosecutor Reed who advised them to 
proceed with an interview under hypnosis. Under hypnosis, Burns referred to the 
shooter and herself by the same name, "Katie," which the police believed 
supported their theory. Detailing Burns at the police station, the police again 
sought Reed's advice whether probable cause existed for arrest. Based upon 
Burns' statements under hypnosis, Reed told the police that they had probable 
cause for arrest. Id.

 
 

[¶12.]        
Acting on that advice, the police arrested Burns. The next day, Reed and 
one of the investigating policemen appeared at a probable cause hearing, held by 
a county court judge, seeking to obtain a search warrant for Burns' house and 
car. In response to Reed's questioning, the investigating policeman testified 
that Burns had admitted the shooting. Neither the policeman nor the deputy 
prosecutor told the judge that the "admission" was obtained under hypnosis nor 
that Burns had made repeated denials. Misled, the judge issued a search warrant 
and, later, the prosecutor's office charged Burns with attempted murder. Before 
trial, however, the trial court granted her motion to suppress the statements 
made under hypnosis. The prosecutor's office then dismissed all charges. 
Id.

 
 

[¶13.]        
Subsequently, Burns filed a civil rights action under §  1983 against Reed, among others.5 In the trial against the deputy 
prosecutor which followed, the district  
court held that Reed was absolutely immune from liability. On appeal, the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and the United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.  Id. at 
1937-38.

 
 

[¶14.]        In 
Burns, the United States Supreme Court was faced with the dual task of 
deciding whether a state prosecuting attorney was absolutely immune from §  1983 damage liability for: (1) 
participating in a probable cause hearing, and (2) giving legal advice to the 
police.6 Id. at 1936. The United States Supreme 
Court noted the existing split among the federal circuit courts as to where they 
"draw the line [for absolute prosecutorial immunity] between protected and 
unprotected activities." Id. at 1938 n.2.

 
 

[¶15.]        The 
United States Supreme Court began its analysis by considering its historical 
recognition of common law immunities within the context of §  1983 claims. The United States Supreme 
Court discussed the landmark Imbler, 424 U.S. 409, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128, 96 S. Ct. 984 decision (the first United States Supreme Court case addressing 
prosecutorial immunity from §  1983 
suits) and, on the underlying basis of necessity to protect the judicial system, 
reiterated its Imbler policy reasons, see Cooney I, 792 P.2d  at 
1290 n.3, supporting absolute immunity for certain prosecutorial functions.  Burns, 111 S. Ct.  at 1938-39. The 
United States Supreme Court reiterated its reliance on the Imbler 
functional approach to immunity determinations and cited its numerous decisions 
which emphasized that "the official seeking absolute immunity bears the burden 
of showing that such immunity is justified for the function in question. * * * 
The presumption is that qualified rather than absolute immunity is sufficient to 
protect government officials in the exercise of their duties." Id. at 
1939.

 
 

[¶16.]        In 
deciding the first of the two Burns immunity questions--Reed's 
participation in the probable cause hearing--the United States Supreme Court 
found that, traditionally, prosecutors were "absolutely immune from damages 
liability at common law for making false or defamatory statements in judicial 
proceedings * * *." Id. at 1941. Additionally, the United 
States Supreme Court found support for absolute immunity for participation in a 
probable cause hearing in the Imbler policy concerns7 and in the fact that the 
prosecutor's actions during the hearing "clearly involved his 'role as advocate 
for the State,' rather than his role as 'administrator or investigative officer 
* * *.'" Id. at 1942 (quoting 
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31). Consequently, the 
United States Supreme Court held that Reed was absolutely immune from §  1983 liability for his conduct during 
his appearance as the state's lawyer in the probable cause hearing.8

 
 

[¶17.]        In 
marked contrast to its resolution of the first immunity question in 
Burns, the United States Supreme Court held that Reed was not entitled to 
absolute immunity for his conduct in providing legal advice to the police in the 
investigative phase of the criminal case. Essentially, the United States Supreme 
Court applied the same three-factor test for absolute immunity claims set forth 
in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S. Ct. 2894, 57 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1978) 
that had previously been applied by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals (with a 
different result) in Burns v. Reed, 894 F.2d 949, 954 n.4 (7th Cir. 
1990), aff'd in part and rev'd in part 111 S. Ct. 1934 (1991), 
remand 958 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1992):

 

"First, 
we examine the historical or common-law basis for the immunity in question. 
Second, we examine whether the functions which the official performs subject him 
to the same obvious risks of entanglement in vexatious litigation as is 
characteristic of the judicial process. With this second factor we consider the 
possibility that losers will bring suit against the decision-makers in an effort 
to relitigate the underlying conflict and 'charge the participants in the first 
with unconstitutional animus.' And third, we consider whether the official is 
subject to checks upon abuses of authority, such as the correction of error on 
appeal."

 

Mother 
Goose [Nursery Schools, Inc. v. Sendak], 
770 F.2d [668] at 671 [(7th Cir. 1985)].

 
 

[¶18.]        
According to the United States Supreme Court, "absolute prosecutorial 
immunity [is justified] only for actions that are connected with the 
prosecutor's role in judicial proceedings, not for every 
litigation-inducing conduct." Burns, 111 S. Ct.  at 1943 (emphasis added). 
The United States Supreme Court could not find any historical or common-law 
support for extending absolute immunity to the act of providing legal advice to 
police officers.9 Id. at 1942. The United States Supreme 
Court stated that providing legal advice to the police was not "so 'intimately 
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process' * * * that it 
qualifies for absolute immunity." Id. at 
1943 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430). The United States 
Supreme Court re-emphasized its view that absolute immunity is not intended to 
protect prosecutorial misconduct occurring outside the confines of the immediate 
judicial process.10

 
 

[¶19.]        The 
United States Supreme Court also failed to find support for granting absolute 
immunity for giving legal advice under the second Butz "risk of vexatious 
litigation" factor since the United States Supreme Court felt that a suspect 
would probably not be as aware of the prosecutor's role in giving advice as 
he/she would be of the  prosecutor's 
involvement in initiating and conducting a prosecution.  Burns, 111 S. Ct.  at 1943. In this 
regard, the United States Supreme Court stated:

 

[T]he 
qualified immunity standard is today more protective of officials than it was at 
the time that Imbler was decided. "As the qualified immunity defense has 
evolved, it provides ample support to all but the plainly incompetent or those 
who knowingly violate the law."

 

Id. 
at 1944 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 
106 S. Ct. 1092, 89 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1986)) (footnote omitted). Finally, the United 
States Supreme Court found that the procedural and judicial safeguards designed 
to check prosecutorial abuses do not necessarily restrain out-of-court 
activities prior to the initiation of a prosecution.  Burns, 111 S. Ct.  at 
1944.

 
 

[¶20.]        In 
conclusion, the United States Supreme Court held that Reed had "not met his 
burden of showing that the relevant factors justify a extension of absolute 
immunity to the prosecutorial function of giving legal advice to the police." 
Id. at 
1944-45. Thus, the United States Supreme Court reversed that portion of the 
Seventh Circuit's judgment which extended absolute immunity to Reed's acts of 
giving legal advice to the investigating police officers.11

 
 

[¶21.]        
Having determined that Reed was entitled to absolute immunity from §  1983 liability for participating in a 
probable cause hearing but that he was not entitled to absolute immunity for 
giving legal advice to the police officers, the United States Supreme Court 
affirmed in part and reversed in part the Seventh Circuit's prior ruling in 
Burns, 894 F.2d 949.

 
 

[¶22.]        Upon 
remand, Reed requested the Seventh Circuit determine whether he was entitled to 
qualified immunity for the advice he gave the police officers. Burns, on the 
other hand, argued that since the only issue on appeal was the propriety of the 
district court's order granting absolute immunity to Reed, the Seventh Circuit 
should remand to the district court "for re-trial in a manner consistent with 
the Supreme Court opinion." Burns v. Reed, 958 F.2d 374 (Table) 
(Unpublished disposition at 1, 3/25/92) (7th Cir. 1992). The Seventh Circuit 
agreed with Burns:

 

With 
its decision [in Burns], the Supreme Court has altered the landscape regarding 
official immunity. 
We decline to review the issue of Reed's qualified immunity when the parties 
have not had a proper opportunity to present their case to the district court. 
Through Reed correctly points out that the district court already has heard all 
the relevant facts, he overlooks the fact that the district court has not had a 
opportunity to rule on Reed's alternative claim of qualified immunity for the 
advice he gave to the police officers. Therefore, we vacate our decision in 
Burns as far as it conflicts with the Supreme Court's opinion, and remand 
the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Indiana, Indianapolis Division, for retrial.

 

Id. 
at 2 (emphasis added).

 
 

[¶23.]        In 
the petition for a writ of certiorari, filed with the United States Supreme 
Court, Cooney accurately argued that conflicts existed within the federal 
circuits regarding the reach and preclusiveness of prosecutorial immunity. A 
case from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals closely anticipated the present 
Burns decision. In Rex v. Teeples, 753 F.2d 840 (10th Cir.), 
cert. denied 474 U.S. 967 (1985), the prosecution went beyond activities 
intrinsically associated with initiating a prosecution and presenting the 
state's case by personal involvement in a pre-indictment interrogation alleged 
by the accused to be unconstitutionally coercive. The Tenth Circuit 
said:

 

Absolute 
prosecutorial immunity extends no further than necessary to protect those 
activities. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 811, 
102 S. Ct. 2727,  2735, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982). Consequently, a prosecutor acting as an investigator has only 
qualified immunity. See id. 457 U.S.  at 811 n. 16 * * *. Although 
identifying those acts entitled to absolute immunity is not always easy, the 
determinative factor is "advocacy" because that is the prosecutor's main 
function and the one most akin to his quasi-judicial role.

 

Rex, 753 F.2d  at 
843. The direction by the prosecutor of police-related work in 
Rex is closely identifiable with what the prosecutor did in this case in 
regard to the direction given to the probation officer to advise and direct his 
action in utilization of the false text which was included in the revocation 
petition.

 
 

[¶24.]        A 
second case currently remanded by the United States Supreme Court, Buckley v. 
Fitzsimmons, ___U.S.___, 112 S. Ct. 40, 116 L. Ed. 2d 19 (1991), remand 
952 F.2d 965 (7th Cir.), cert. granted in part 113 S. Ct. 53 (1992), 
although demonstrably inflexible in delineation of core function, quasi-judicial 
from other activities, travelled a faster road. The circuit court denied relief 
to the defendant on remand and, on October 5, 1992, the United States Supreme 
Court granted the new writ of certiorari on the prosecutorial absolute immunity 
issue of pre-indictment supervision of law enforcement investigation activities 
alleged false "press conference" statements about the defendant and his guilt.12 

 

[¶25.]        A 
post-Burns Third Circuit Court of Appeals forfeiture case has 
matured.  Schrob v. 
Catterson, 948 F.2d 1402 (3rd Cir. 1991) is differentiated by allegation of 
the prosecutor lying to the judiciary in order to secure issuance of the search 
warrant. Even so, at best, qualified immunity would be provided to a "retention 
management of the seized property" function undertaken by the prosecutor in that 
case.  Id. at 1420. In 
reviewing that property return management category of the Schrob 
complaint, within a perspective with what was said in Burns, the court 
stated:

 
 
A 
significant factor in our decision to deny [the prosecutor] absolute immunity in 
connection with the retention and management of the seized property is that, as 
in Burns, the judicial process will not serve as an adequate check on a 
prosecutor's actions in those respects. In cases such as the present one, where 
the seizure is not authorized from the start, the property is returned without 
judicial process when the government admits its mistake. When such a wrongful 
seizure occurs, it causes the owner to lose the value of his property so long as 
it remains in government hands. A grant of absolute immunity  for such actions would allow the 
government to seize property wrongfully without 
accountability.

 

Schrob, 
948 F.2d  at 1420.

 
 

[¶26.]        
Consequently, Schrob found that retention and management functions 
"are not directly related to the judicial process;" but, instead, involved the 
prosecutor acting in an administrative role.  Id. at 1419. Thus, the court remanded 
that portion of the district court's decision denying the prosecutor absolute 
immunity for his property retention and management actions for determination as 
to whether or not he is shielded from liability on the basis of qualified 
immunity.13 Id. at 1420.

 
 

[¶27.]        There 
is an even more closely identifiable case of recent vintage from the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals.  Houston v. 
Partee, 978 F.2d 362 (7th Cir. 1992). As a result of the El Rukn gang 
prosecutions in Chicago, defendants were 
convicted of murder in the Illinois state court. Others, post trial, 
confessed to the crimes, but the prosecutors "confined the knowledge" of the 
confessions. Ultimately, the secret got out and the defendants, after release 
from prison, sued the prosecutors in a §  
1983 action. Absolute immunity was denied by the United States District 
Court and, following interim appeal, that decision was affirmed in a 
comprehensive and thoughtful decision by the court of 
appeals.

 
 

[¶28.]        
Incidentally, that court also recognized its Canon 3(B)(3) Code of 
Judicial Conduct responsibilities and "DIRECT[ED] THE CLERK OF COURT to send a 
copy of this opinion to the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary 
Commission to monitor further developments of this case on remand and to take 
any appropriate disciplinary measures it deems necessary." Id. at 
369.

 
 

IV. 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶29.]        With 
this background in the federal case law, we address the prosecutor's contention 
that the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Burns justifies 
continuing prosecutorial absolute immunity for this case. We disagree and have 
identified two primary reasons why our reconsideration of this case compels 
partial reversal of the district court's dismissal of the Cooneys' §  1983 claim against the prosecutor: (1) 
under Burns, the prosecutor failed to meet his burden of showing that 
extension of absolute immunity is required for some of his actions; and (2) this 
court's reliance on Blake v. Rupe, 651 P.2d 1096 (Wyo. 1982), cert. 
denied 459 U.S. 1208, 75 L. Ed. 2d 442, 103 S. Ct. 1199 (1983) in Cooney 
I was misplaced.

 
 
A. 
Extension of Absolute Immunity for Certain Actions is Not 
Justified

 
 

[¶30.]        
Burns, 
111 S. Ct.  at 1939, stated that "the official seeking absolute immunity bears the 
burden of showing that such immunity is justified for the function in question." 
Starting with the proposition that "qualified rather than absolute immunity is 
sufficient to protect government officials in the exercise of their duties," it 
is clear that the United States Supreme Court imposes a threshold requirement on 
any person seeking absolute immunity from §  1983 liability that must be met before 
absolute immunity will be available. Id. This is identical to the law for 
the Tenth Circuit in Rex, 753 F.2d 843 by citation to Harlow, 457 U.S.  at 811.

 
 

[¶31.]        In 
Cooney I, this court examined the prosecutor's conduct taken as a 
whole. It was then determined that the "challenged 
activities [were] intimately associated with the judicial phase of the 
criminal process and [were] functions to which the reasons for absolute immunity 
apply with full force." Cooney I, 792 P.2d  at 1298 (emphasis added). The 
"challenged activities" were, for the most part, not separately discussed; 
rather, they were viewed as part of the prosecutor's undifferentiated and 
ongoing involvement in Cooney's probation revocation process. In the present 
case, however, we are compelled by Burns to examine each 
phase of the prosecutor's alleged conduct to ascertain whether extension 
of absolute immunity to that particular activity is justified. See Snell v. 
Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 111 S. Ct. 1622 
(1991); Rex, 753 F.2d  at 843; and McSurely v. 
McClellan, 225 U.S. App. 
D.C. 67, 697 F.2d 309 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1005, 88 L. Ed. 2d 457, 106 S. Ct. 525 (1985).

 
 

[¶32.]        We 
begin by recognizing the specific allegations of prosecutorial misconduct raised 
by the Cooneys in their original complaint:

 
 
12. 
On January 24, 1986 Defendant Robert Mayor contacted Defendant Chris  J. White, who was then the Deputy County 
Attorney for Park County, Wyoming, and advised him that Mr. Cooney had failed to 
contact his probation officers as required by the terms of his probation, and 
that he had relocated from Riverton, Wyoming without permission and consent from 
his probation officers. At that time, Defendant Mayor was requested by 
Defendant White to prepare a petition for revocation of Mr. Cooney's 
probation.

 
 
13. 
On January 29, 1986 Cindy Johnson [Cooney's former probation officer in 
Riverton, Wyoming] telephoned Defendant Robert Mayor and advised him that the 
[Cooneys] were residing in Bairoil, Wyoming in accordance with permission 
previously given, that she had been in contact with Mr. Cooney by telephone, and 
that she had filed reports evidencing the required contact with the Department 
of Probation Parole for October and November, 1985. On that date Defendant 
Mayor telephoned Defendant White and advised him of the mistake of the 
Wyoming Department of Probation and Parole concerning the [Cooneys'] residence. 
Defendant Mayor further advised Defendant White that Mr. Cooney had actually 
been in contact with Department of Probation and Parole as required by the terms 
of his probation. Notwithstanding that information, Defendant White again 
requested Defendant Mayor to prepare and forward a petition to revoke Mr. 
Cooney's probation.

 
 
14. 
Pursuant to Defendant White's request, Defendant Mayor prepared a document 
entitled Petition for Revocation of Probation and Bench Warrant dated 
January 29, 1986 in which Defendant Mayor fraudulently and falsely with full 
knowledge of the falsity thereof, swore under oath that Mr. Cooney had failed to 
maintain contact with the Wyoming Department of Probation and Parole and that he 
had changed his address without prior notification.

 
 
15. 
Defendant Mayor forwarded the Petition For Revocation of Probation and Bench 
Warrant of Defendant White who wrongfully, and with knowledge of the falsity 
of said Petition, presented the Petition to [the Fifth Judicial District] Court, 
pursuant to which a Bench Warrant for the arrest of Mr. Cooney was issued on 
February 7, 1986.

 

* 
* *

 
 
18. 
* * * [O]n March 15, 1986 * * * an officer of the Wyoming Highway Patrol stopped 
the [Cooneys] and arrested Mr. Cooney pursuant to the Bench Warrant wrongfully 
obtained by Defendant White on February 7, 1986. Mr. Cooney was transported to 
the jail in Cody, Park County, Wyoming, leaving * * * Lora John Cooney stranded with all 
of the [Cooneys'] belongings and their child in Bairoil, Wyoming.

 
 
19. 
Defendant Mayor and White did nothing to prevent the arrest of Mr. Cooney 
even though they knew at the time they created and presented the Petition for 
Revocation of Probation Bench Warrant that the allegations contained therein 
were false, and even though they knew or should have known thereafter that Mr. 
Cooney was properly in contact with the probation officer in Rawlins, Wyoming 
and complying with the terms and conditions of his 
probation.

 
 
20. 
During the time that Mr. Cooney was incarcerated in the Park County Jail, 
Defendant Chris White was contacted by [a Park County Public Defender] who 
requested that Mr. Cooney be released from jail until the hearing on the 
Petition because the arrest warrant had originally been issued pursuant to false 
and inaccurate information. Defendant Chris White continued to refuse to 
allow the release of Mr. Cooney from jail.

 
 
21. 
Mr. Cooney remained incarcerated in the Park County Jail in Cody, Wyoming until 
April 21, 1986 at which time the Petition to revoke his [probation] was denied 
by [the Fifth Judicial District] Court after hearing.

 

* 
* *

 
 
26. 
In causing Mr. Cooney to be arrested and incarcerated for thirty-eight  (38) days for an alleged violation of 
the terms of his probation when the Defendants know or should have known that 
Mr. Cooney had not violated his probation, all of the Defendants acted under 
color of state law to deprive the [Cooneys] of the rights, privileges immunities 
secured to them by the United States Constitution and the laws of the United 
States, and are, therefore, liable to the [Cooneys] for the damages arising 
therefrom under 42 U.S.C. §  
1983.

 
 
27. 
Defendants Mayor and White prepared the Petition to revoke Mr. Cooney's 
probation, secured the Bench Warrant and allowed Mr. Cooney to be arrested and 
incarcerated for thirty-eight days with full knowledge that the Petition was 
false with the intent to deprive the [Cooneys] of their Constitutional rights 
and in reckless, willful and wanton disregard of the rights of the 
[Cooneys].

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 

[¶33.]        With 
the exception of the third category, the Cooneys' characterization of the 
appellate issue in this case accurately depicts the four categories of alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct originally challenged in their initial complaint 
regarding the prosecutor's: (1) conduct in causing the perjured probation 
revocation petition to be issued; (2) use of the perjured petition to obtain an 
arrest warrant; (3) conduct in using the arrest warrant to secure Cooney's 
arrest; and (4) role in causing Cooney to remain incarcerated for thirty-eight 
days. We apply functional analysis within the doctrinal framework of 
Burns as we consider each category of challenged 
conduct.

 
 
(1) 
Conduct in Causing the Perjured Probation Revocation Petition to be 
Issued

 
 

[¶34.]        The 
Cooneys contend that, on two separate occasions, the prosecutor requested the 
probation officer to prepare a petition for Cooney's probation revocation. The 
significant difference between the two requests is the allegation that, in the 
five-day interim between requests, both the probation officer and the prosecutor 
learned of Cooney's unblemished probationary status and yet, nonetheless, 
proceeded with preparation of the revocation petition.

 
 

[¶35.]        We 
recognize the procedural dissimilarity but conceptually analogous relationship 
between the prosecutor's proffer of solicited legal advice to the police 
officers in Burns and this prosecutor's second advisement that the 
probation officer should prepare a knowingly falsified probation revocation 
petition for Cooney. Consequently, our analysis in this section closely 
parallels section III-B in Burns, 111 S. Ct.  at 
1942-45.

 
 

[¶36.]        
Neither the parties in their briefs nor extensive research by this court 
have identified any common law or other historical basis for extending absolute 
immunity to the public official's actions in suborning the perjured probation 
revocation petition.14 Burns, 111 S. Ct.  at 1942. 
The prosecutor's involvement in advising the probation officer how best to 
proceed with the information at hand involved voluntary, non-judicially 
non-statutorily imposed conduct. Pursuant to statutory provisions for probation 
revocation in place at the time, Wyo. Stat. §  7-13-409 (renumbered  in 1987 to Wyo. Stat. §  7-13-408), there is nothing to compel 
county attorney involvement (whether solicited or otherwise) in the 
preparation phase of a revocation petition. As we noted in the companion 
case of Mayor, 845 P.2d 346, the Cooney-type of probation 
revocation proceeding involved a "discretionary, executive function"--it did not 
entail a probation officer or deputy county attorney acting at the direction of 
a court.  Hewitt v. State, 
835 P.2d 348 (Wyo. 1992). See also Petition of 
Padget, 678 P.2d 870 (Wyo. 1984). Cf.  Spaulding v. Nielsen, 599 F.2d 728 
(5th Cir. 1979).

 
 

[¶37.]        
Unlike the factual circumstance in Butz, 438 U.S. 478, 57 L. Ed. 2d 895, 98 S. Ct. 2894 (in which the United States Supreme Court found that 
Department of Agriculture officials were entitled to absolute immunity for 
performing functions analogous to those of a prosecutor), in this stage of the 
Cooney revocation proceeding the prosecutor was functioning more like a 
probation officer than as a county attorney responsible for criminal conduct 
prosecution. It was not his job to request probation revocation 
petitions--perjured or otherwise--from probation officers and the judicial 
system did not rely on him to do so. See McArdle v. Tronetti, 961 F.2d 1083 (3rd Cir. 1992). As set forth discussed in Mayor, 845 P.2d 346, a 
probation officer performing the discretionary function of preparing a petition 
to revoke probation is only entitled to qualified immunity. Thus, we do not find 
the prosecutor's conduct in this case to be "so 'intimately associated with the 
judicial phase of the criminal process' * * * that it qualifies for absolute 
immunity." Burns, 111 S. Ct.  at 1943 (quoting Imbler, 424 
U.S. at 430).

 
 

[¶38.]        
Similarly, we are unable to find a public policy argument to extend 
immunity for any action in allegedly suborning perjury15 at this preliminary and entirely 
out-of-court stage of Cooney's probation revocation proceeding. See Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 
922-23, 104 S. Ct. 2820, 81 L. Ed. 2d 758 (1984). In Burns, 111 S. Ct.  at 
1944 (quoting Malley, 475 U.S. at 341), the United States 
Supreme Court hit this prosecutor's status precisely on its figurative head when 
it asserted that qualified immunity provides ample protection for "all but the 
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Further, in 
recognizing that the absence of absolute immunity may cause prosecutors to more 
carefully consider their legal advice, the United States Supreme Court stated 
that "'"where an official could be expected to know that his conduct would 
violate statutory or constitutional rights, he should be made to 
hesitate."'"  Burns, 111 S. Ct.  at 1944 (quoting Malley, 475 U.S.  at 341 and Harlow, 457 
U.S. at 819) (emphasis in original). 
If the alleged facts in Cooney I are proven at trial, the prosecutor 
would have been well-advised to hesitate to the point of not acting instead of 
requesting the probation officer to proceed with preparation of the perjured 
revocation petition.

 
 

[¶39.]        
Finally, in reconsidering the availability of procedural safeguards other 
than §  1983 civil liability to 
deter prosecutorial misconduct, we conclude (just as the United States Supreme 
Court did in Burns, 111 S.Ct. at 1944) that the judicial process could 
not--and did not--serve to restrain the injurious out-of-court activities 
of the prosecutor. We do not now elect to follow the majority's discussion in 
Cooney I of "due process safeguards" or any conclusions about adequate 
protection in the probation revocation process.  Cooney I, 792 P.2d  at 1295. We 
base our departure from this segment of the majority in Cooney I on the 
critical factor that all such "due process safeguards" depend on judicial 
intervention and are premised on the  
assumption that the judge will be given complete and accurate 
information. Where, as here, the perjured petition is prepared prior to 
court involvement and the petition is then advanced through the revocation 
proceeding without the judge ever becoming informed of the inherent fallacy of 
the document's contents, the "safeguards" are useless.

 

[¶40.]        
Furthermore, this case presents contentions for our examination of 
immunized criminal conduct for which we do not find any "balancing" of 
protections for the victim to be a persuasive argument. That supposition or 
justification, judicially created to keep the law enforcement mechanism 
operational, does not justify adaptations to activities incrementally related to 
judicial immunity from which the entire protective umbrella was derived in the 
1896 Indiana case of Griffith v. Slinkard, 146 Ind. 117, 44 N.E. 1001 
(1896) to then be broadly applied for the §  1983 case law in Imbler, 424 U.S. 
at 421. See Seth F. Kreimer, The Source of Law in Civil Rights 
Actions: Some Old Light on Section 1988, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 601, 609 n.35 
(1985). In this circumstance, unrequited damage to the victim can hardly be 
equalized against potential rehabilatory assessment of "punishment" against the 
public officeholder miscreant. Damages paid for damages done is singularly more 
satisfying to the party injured and  
we consider, at least in this circumstances, justifiably 
so.

 
 
(2) 
Use of the Perjured Petition to Obtain an Arrest Warrant

 
 

[¶41.]        
Because the record in this civil case is void of material relevant to the 
district court hearing conducted for the purpose of issuing a bench warrant for 
Cooney's arrest, it is impossible to determine precisely what role the 
prosecutor played in securing the warrant.16

 

[¶42.]        
Appellants make no claim against the prosecutor as a damage claim for his 
activities involved in the conducted revocation hearing, so we need not address 
the absolute immunity application to that session.17 Holding as we do that absolute 
immunity does not apply to the advisement conduct of appellee in his directions 
given to the probation officer to prepare the revocation petition, we are left 
with the intermediate stages (numbers 2, 3 and 4) which followed petition 
preparation and preceded the hearing and consequent revocation rejection. 
Appellants, in their brief, detail the four stages of the prosecutor's conduct 
to be:

 

(1) 
His decision to request a perjured petition for revocation of probation and for 
a bench warrant from Robert Mayor.

 

(2) 
His decision to use that perjured petition to cause a warrant to be issued for 
Mr. Cooney's arrest.

 

(3) 
His conduct in using the bench warrant to cause Mr. Cooney to be 
arrested.

 

(4) 
His conduct in causing Mr. Cooney to remain incarcerated without a preliminary 
hearing or opportunity for bail for 38 days.

 
 

[¶43.]        
Essentially, items two and three address activities to cause arrest and 
item four considers the prosecutorial responsibility for judicial probation 
revocation pre-hearing proceedings. See Weisser v. State, 600 P.2d 1320 
(Wyo. 1979); Knobel v. State, 576 P.2d 941 (Wyo. 1978); and Wyo. Stat. §  7-13-408.18 We confined by this W.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6) record with minimal information. The Cooneys neither allege their 
knowledge of, or suspicion about, why  
the prosecutor did what he did. Nothing else adds detail or value to the 
complaint. One of the problems to be faced with this indeterminate status of 
what really happened and why (now after five years in litigation, nothing has 
been filed as an allegation pleading for the prosecutor professing contention of 
what he did and why) is that the law on the use of a perjured petition by 
the prosecutor to get an arrest warrant is, to put it mildly, unresolved by the 
United States Supreme Court. Left open, on that non-presented issue in 
Burns, is majority disinclination to determine prosecutorial immunity 
application to "motivation in seeking a search warrant." The identical subject 
is presented here by use of the perjured petition--not its presentation in court 
necessarily, but the original involvement in its creation and any subsequent 
usage knowing it was perjured as conduct "outside of the 
courtroom."

 
 

[¶44.]        This 
topic became the subject of the carefully written partial dissent by Justice 
Scalia in Burns to discuss "a form of prosecutorial action not addressed 
by the Court, and one that is arguably more difficult to analyze under the 
common law * * *." Burns, 111 S. Ct.  at 1946. In Burns, that 
question is stated by Justice Scalia to be whether "a constitutional violation 
occurred in the prosecutor's initiation of the search warrant proceeding." 
Id. at 
1945. Justice Scalia, in his partial dissent with two other justices joining, 
rejected any extension of absolute immunity beyond the courthouse door to 
activities involved in seeking a search warrant. A close comparison in system 
operational relevance can be discerned between the topic of his discussion and 
the course of events portrayed by allegations of the plaintiff in Cooney 
I.19

 
 

[¶45.]        With 
the choices available to this court following remand, we elect not to attempt to 
presently assess immunity, absolute or otherwise, to the activities of the 
prosecutor which were not conducted within court appearances. We reject absolute 
immunity for the initiated advice and direction to the probation officer to 
prepare a knowingly falsified petition, recognize no question presented about 
conduct of the finally conducted hearing, and leave for factual development 
differentiations in function between quasi-judicial and administrative 
activities for what occurred at other stages of this transaction, e.g., 
following prosecutor/attorney advice to the probation officer to prepare and 
sign the revocation petition and the date that a revocation hearing was later 
conducted by the district court.

 
 
(3) 
Retention in Jail Without Bond or Judicial Appearance

 
 

[¶46.]        The 
expectancy of bail under W.R.Cr.P. 33(f), then in effect, clearly existed. "The 
defendant may be admitted to bail pending such hearing." We do not have factual 
information within this record to attempt to overlay this conduct on the 
philosophic pinnings of prosecutorial behavior judicial immunity. Whether this 
unexcusable event resulted from judicial unavailability, prosecutorial 
inattention, neglect or negligence, or so undetermined intentional malicious 
reactivity is simply not factually addressed. To anticipate United States 
Supreme Court decisions based upon Burns, in the absence of some 
determination of fact regarding the activities of the governmental official to 
which absolute immunity could extend, poses a challenge for our factually 
hypothetical analysis which we choose not to undertake.20

 
 
B. 
MISPLACED RELIANCE ON BLAKE IN 
COONEY 
I

 
 

[¶47.]        In 
addition to applying the Imbler "functional approach" to balance a 
prosecutor's service to society against the rights of private citizens to be 
protected from prosecutorial abuse, Cooney I, 792 P.2d  at 1291, the 
majority in Cooney I also relied on Blake, 651 P.2d 1096 for the 
proposition that Wyoming had extended absolute immunity to county prosecuting 
attorneys performing investigative functions.

 
 

[¶48.]        
Blake 
involved a county attorney (Blake) who requested that an investigator for the 
prosecutor's office file a criminal complaint alleging perjury against an 
individual (Rupe) who had served as a juror on two previous trials. The criminal 
complaint alleged that Rupe had failed, during voir dire, to disclose a prior 
felony conviction which would have disqualified him as a juror. After the 
criminal complaint was dismissed on the basis of Rupe's presentation of evidence 
that he had received a pardon from his felony conviction for issuing a 
fraudulent check, Rupe brought suit stating various tort claims under state law 
and a §  1983 federal civil rights 
action against Blake the investigator.

 
 

[¶49.]        
During trial, the "count for violation of Rupe's civil rights under 42 
U.S.C. §  1983 was dismissed by the 
trial judge at the close of plaintiff's evidence and did not serve as a basis of 
the verdict and judgment." Blake, 651 P.2d  at 1101. Following trial, a 
jury verdict was returned on the remaining state tort claims and judgment was 
entered awarding Rupe $ 40,000 actual damages $ 105,000 punitive damages against 
Blake and $ 20,000 actual damages $ 35,000 punitive damages against the 
investigator. Id. at 1097-98. This court reversed 
remanded with directions to vacate the judgment after determining that the 
prosecutor and investigator were absolutely immune from 
suit.

 
 

[¶50.]        A 
closer look at this court's reliance on Blake in deciding Cooney I 
merits consideration. In Cooney I, 792 P.2d  at 1291, we 
said:

 

This 
court adopted the [Imbler] functional analysis in Blake. In 
Blake this court extended absolute immunity to a county and prosecuting 
attorney who employed and supervised an investigator to check both court and 
penitentiary records, investigated matters preliminary to initiating the 
prosecution, and presented the prosecution of the state's case of perjury 
charges against a juror.  
Blake, 651 P.2d  at 1104. Relying on Imbler and decisions 
following that case, this court determined that the prosecutor's challenged 
activities were intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal 
process.

 
 

[¶51.]        As 
noted in a dissenting opinion in Cooney I, 792 P.2d  at 1326-27, Urbigkit, 
J., dissenting, but unheeded by the then-majority of the court was the critical 
factor that Blake's extension of absolute immunity to prosecutors engaged 
in investigative activities involved only state tort claims and state common-law 
immunities--not immunity from suit under federal civil rights 
legislation. Thus, in actuality, since Blake only governs common law 
prosecutorial immunity from state tort claims, it provides no support for 
recognizing absolute prosecutorial immunity within the federal §  1983 context.

 
 

[¶52.]        If 
implemented, application of state common law or legislatively imposed statutory 
immunities to create a shield against federal legislation designed to deter 
civil rights violations would ignore Congressional intent and, more importantly, 
would eviscerate §  1983. 
Blake does not and should not compel imposition of state common-law 
prosecutorial immunities which, in effect, would circumvent federal civil rights 
legislation designed to protect individuals from state action depriving them of 
"any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws * * 
*." 42 U.S.C. §  1983. Thus, upon 
reconsideration of Cooney I, we find no support in Blake as a 
state immunity decision for extending absolute  immunity within federal law concepts of 
§  1983 to the prosecutor for his 
actions in preparing the petition to revoke probation his subsequent conduct in 
detaining Cooney in jail for thirty-eight days following his arrest under 
federal law concepts of prosecutorial immunity that will superintend our 
decision in this case.

 
 
V. 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶53.]        We do 
not necessarily determine the preclusion of immunity to claims involving 
motivation for arrest or reason for jail retention. Those now undisclosed 
subjects of this  litigation should 
best be resolved by the district court on some character of factual record 
examination. We hold that absolute immunity does not apply to the advisement and 
discussion with the probation officer regarding preparation of the original 
petition for revocation. Whether other conduct is actionable, despite defenses 
of immunity, will not be resolved by this court on this present W.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6) record.

 
 

[¶54.]        
Having found that appellee is not entitled to complete absolute immunity 
from liability, we remand this case for further proceedings in the district 
court. Unlike our disposition in Mayor, ___P.2d ___(No. 91-182, decided 
12/2/92) (the companion case involving Cooney's probation officer), we are not 
called upon and thus do not decide whether the prosecutor is, in any case, 
entitled to qualified immunity for whatever he did as a matter of law. Because 
of the district court's absolute immunity dismissal of the claims against him 
(and our affirmation in Cooney I, a determination has yet to be made as 
to whether the prosecutor is or is not entitled to qualified immunity. Even 
though we said in Cooney I, 792 P.2d  at 1288 that we were "asked to 
decide * * * what level of immunity * * * we will extend to [the prosecutor]," 
the qualified immunity question has not been adequately presented in any phase 
of these proceedings.21 

 
 

[¶55.]        In 
reaching this result and reversing particular aspects of Cooney I, we 
recognize a basic flaw in that case--it failed to account for the fundamental 
proposition that qualified immunity from civil liability is the rule rather than 
the exception. The United States Supreme Court has firmly established that 
qualified immunity provides adequate protection for many of the duties required 
of a prosecutor. A prosecuting attorney claiming absolute immunity is required 
to meet a threshold burden of entitlement before absolute immunity will be 
extended beyond the fundamental activities of the criminal case 
prosecution.

 
 

[¶56.]        
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings in conformity 
herewith.

 
 
CARDINE, 
J., concurred in the result.

 
 

THOMAS, 
Justice, dissenting.

 
 

[¶57.]        I, 
too, dissent from the resolution of this case upon vacation and remand by the 
Supreme Court of the United 
States. I join in the dissenting opinion of 
Justice Golden, which I find to present a correct analysis of the case before 
us, but I add some comments of my own.

 
 

[¶58.]        It is 
disingenuous for the court, even in a plurality opinion, to purport to adopt the 
facts articulated in Cooney v. Park County, 792 P.2d 1287 (Wyo. 
1990),  cert. denied and judgment 
vacated sub nom., Cooney v. White, ___U.S.___, 111 S. Ct. 2820, 115 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1991), on remand, Park County, White and Mayor v. Cooney, No. 
91-182, 1992 WL 350708 (Wyo. 1992), and then to quote  from the factual version found in the 
dissenting opinion in the first case. I am further troubled by the statement 
that the case is being reexamined without predisposition toward a particular 
result. It is clear to me that the dissents in the earlier case manifest ample 
evidence of a predisposition toward a particular result.

 
 

[¶59.]        
Perhaps the best way to characterize this decision is that it is a 
capital example of the adage that bad cases make bad law. No one can justify 
what occurred with respect to Thomas Russell Cooney. A supreme court, however, 
must avoid permitting its policy decisions to be driven by emotional reaction. A 
sense of outrage is not the appropriate premise from which to articulate 
policy.

 
 

[¶60.]        The 
majority seriously misstates the factual circumstances in this instance by 
assuming that the deputy county attorney was furnishing advice prior to the 
initiation of a judicial proceeding. The fact is that the case is the same one 
in which the conviction occurred, and the jurisdiction of the court continues 
during the probationary period. This is entirely different from the factual 
circumstances in Burns v. Reed, ___U.S.___, 111 S. Ct. 1934, 114 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1991), on remand, 958 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1992), in which the 
prosecuting attorney was furnishing advice to police officers prior to the 
initiation of any judicial proceeding. It appears that the majority chooses to 
misunderstand the reach of Burns.

 
 

[¶61.]        This 
case fits within Wyo. Stat. §  
7-13-305 (1987), which provides:

 
 
(a) 
The period of probation or suspension of sentence under W.S. 7-13-302 shall be 
determined by the court and may be continued or extended.

 
 
(b) 
Upon the satisfactory fulfillment of the conditions of suspension of sentence or 
probation under W.S. 7-13-302 the court shall enter an order discharging the 
defendant.

 
 
(c) 
For a violation of a condition of probation occurring during the probationary 
period, revocation proceedings may be commenced at any time during the period of 
suspension of sentence or probation under W.S. 7-13-302, or  within thirty (30) days thereafter, in 
which case the court may issue a warrant and cause the defendant to be arrested. 
If after hearing the court determines that the defendant violated any of the 
terms of probation or suspension of sentence, the court may proceed to deal with 
the case as if no suspension of sentence or probation had been 
ordered.

 
 
(d) 
The time for commencing revocation proceedings shall be automatically extended 
for any period of time in which the probationer is incarcerated outside this 
state during the probationary period for the conviction of an offense which is a 
violation of the conditions of probation, unless the probationer has made a 
valid request for final disposition under the interstate agreement on detainers, 
W.S. 7-15-101 through 7-15-106 [§ §  
7-15-101 through 7-15-105].

 

This 
statute clearly contemplates a judicial function. In advising the court, the 
probation officer was proceeding in accordance with statute. Wyo. Stat. §  7-13-408(a). When that notification was 
furnished to the deputy county attorney, an officer of the court, his request 
necessarily was a judicial function.

 
 

[¶62.]        I 
agree with the carefully reasoned opinion of the court in the first 
instance,  and with Justice Golden's 
views in his now dissenting opinion which I find correctly apply the functional 
analysis. There can be no question that the revocation of probation is a 
judicial function and, still, there is no question that the deputy county 
attorney's participation in the revocation proceedings was "the functional 
equivalent of the prosecutor's role as an advocate in a criminal proceeding." 
Cooney, 792 P.2d  at 1295. While hindsight is indeed helpful, it does 
serve to blind us to the possibility that, at the time of these events, the 
second set of circumstances communicated to the prosecutor may have been the 
incorrect one. He had received two versions from the probation and parole 
officers, with an assertion that one was correct and one was not. The best way 
to resolve that was to let the court, not the prosecuting attorney, 
decide.

 
 

[¶63.]        
Unfortunately, we have not really established a policy rule in this case 
because I note that one justice concurs only in the result. I fear, however, 
that, rather than appropriately applying the policy that justifies the 
functional analysis, we have made the functional analysis an ad hoc 
determination in every case. If that is to be an ad hoc determination in 
each case, then the judicial function is denied the freedom from litigation that 
the functional analysis depends upon in justifying immunity. Protecting the 
enforcement of criminal law from litigation is the basic policy justification 
for the functional analysis. In Wyoming, to my judgment, that protection of the 
prosecutor is forever lost because there will have to be litigation in each 
instance to determine whether the prosecutor is, or is not, engaged in a 
judicial function whenever there is dialogue with the executive department. That 
result is unfortunate.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice, dissenting.

 
 

[¶64.]        This 
case is on remand from the United Stabs Supreme Court for further consideration 
in light of Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 1934, 114 L. Ed. 2d 547 
(1991). In the prior Cooney opinion we held that all of a deputy county 
attorney's activities entitled him to absolute immunity in the probationer's 
civil rights action against him. We found that procuring a perjured probation 
revocation petition, assisting the Wyoming Department of Probation and Parole 
and its probation officer,  using 
the perjured probation revocation petition to obtain a bench warrant for the 
probationer's arrest and causing the probationer to be arrested and detained in 
jail for thirty-eight days were the functional equivalent of the prosecutor's 
role as an advocate in a criminal proceeding.  Cooney v. Park County, 792 P.2d 1287 (Wyo. 
1990), vacated and remanded sub. nom.  
Cooney v. White, 500 U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 2820, 115 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1991). In reaching our decision we relied on Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S. Ct. 984, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128 (1976); and our own Blake v. Rupe, 651 P.2d 1096 (Wyo. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1208, 
75 L. Ed. 2d 442, 103 S. Ct. 1199 (1983). In Blake this court 
applied Imbler and numerous federal court decisions decided in the 
intervening years. Thus, we held that the deputy county attorney's challenged 
activities involved in the attempted revocation of the probationer's probation 
were "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process and 
[were] functions to which  the 
reasons for absolute immunity apply with full force." Cooney, 792 P.2d  at 
1298.

 
 

[¶65.]        After 
due consideration of supplemental briefs filed by the parties, I have concluded 
that Burns does not dictate a contrary result. I would reaffirm this 
court's prior decision in all respects.

 
 

[¶66.]        This 
court's reconsideration of Cooney proceeds on the assumption that the 
United States Supreme Court's order vacating and remanding this case should not 
be read as implying that Burns necessarily mandates reversal. We 
understand "in this type of remand that the Court has merely 'flagged' this case 
as one upon which the intervening decision may have some bearing, but which the 
Court has not conclusively determined to be materially affected thereby." 
Bush v. Lucas, 647 F.2d 573, 575 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 
458 U.S. 1104 (1982), aff'd, 462 U.S. 367, 103 S. Ct. 2404, 76 L. Ed 2d 
648 see also A. Hellman, Granted, Vacated, and Remanded, 67 
Judicature 389, 395 (1984); and Robert L. Stern, Eugene Gressman and Stephen M. 
Shapiro, Supreme Court Practice 279-80 (6th ed. 
1986).

 
 

[¶67.]        The 
facts of the case are adequately set out in Cooney, 792 P.2d 1287, and 
will not be repeated here. Nothing in Burns affects or casts doubt upon 
that part of our decision in Cooney in which we affirmed the trial 
court's dismissal of the Cooneys' claims alleging liability under the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act, Wyo. Stat. §  
1-39-101 through 108 (Cum.Supp. 1985) against the State of Wyoming, the 
Wyoming Department of Probation and Parole, and Robert Mayor, because no waiver 
of immunity under the Claims Act to those parties could be found. Burns 
only requires that we focus on the level of immunity, absolute or qualified, to 
which the deputy county attorney is entitled under  the circumstances pleaded in the 
Cooneys' civil rights complaint.

 
 

[¶68.]        
Burns 
is distinguishable from Cooney. In Burns, the police were 
investigating the shooting and wounding of Mrs. Burns' two sons while they slept 
in her house. Despite Mrs. Burns' repeated denials, passing a polygraph 
examination and a voice stress test, and submission of exculpatory handwriting 
samples, the police viewed her as a primary suspect. Conjecturing that she had 
multiple personalities, one of  
which did the shooting, the police wanted to place her under hypnosis and 
interview her. Concerned that this might be a legally unacceptable investigative 
technique, the police sought and obtained deputy prosecutor Reed's advice to 
proceed with an interview under hypnosis. Under hypnosis, Mrs. Burns referred to 
the shooter and herself by the same name, "Katie," which the police believed 
supported their theory. Detaining Mrs. Burns at the police station, the police 
again sought deputy prosecutor Reed's advice whether probable cause to arrest 
her existed. Based upon Mrs. Burns' statements under hypnosis, deputy prosecutor 
Reed told the police there existed probable cause for arrest. Acting on that 
advice the police arrest her. The next day, deputy prosecutor Reed and one of 
the investigating policemen appeared at the probable cause hearing, held by a 
county court judge, seeking to obtain a search warrant for Mrs. Burns' house and 
car. In response to deputy prosecutor Reed's questioning, the investigating 
policeman testified that Mrs. Burns had admitted the shooting. Neither the 
policeman nor the deputy prosecutor told the judge about the interview under 
hypnosis or Mrs. Burns' previously repeated denials. Misled, the judge issued a 
search warrant. The prosecutor's office charged Mrs. Burns with attempted 
murder. Before trial, the trial judge granted her motion to suppress the 
statements made under hypnosis. The prosecutor's office dismissed all charges. A 
few years later, Mrs. Burns filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. §  1983 against deputy prosecutor Reed and 
others. In the trial against the deputy prosecutor, the trial court granted that 
official a directed verdict, holding that he was absolutely immune from 
liability. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The United 
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

 
 

[¶69.]        In 
its decision, the Supreme Court held that deputy prosecutor Reed was absolutely 
immune from §  1983 liability for 
his conduct during his appearance as the state's lawyer in the probable cause 
hearing. As for his conduct in providing legal advice to the police in the 
investigative phase of the criminal case, however, the Supreme Court held that 
conduct was not so intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal 
process as to qualify for absolute immunity. According  to the Supreme Court, "absolute 
prosecutorial immunity [is justified] only for actions that are connected with 
the prosecutor's role in judicial proceedings, not for every litigation-inducing 
conduct." Burns, 111 S. Ct.  at 1943.

 
 

[¶70.]        While 
I can understand that deputy prosecutor Reed's giving legal advice to the police 
during the investigative, pre-arrest stage of the criminal process is not action 
"connected with the prosecutor's role in judicial proceedings," that is not the 
prosecutorial action of which the Cooneys complain here. Instead, they complain 
of deputy county attorney White's activities in the initiation and pursuit of 
probation revocation proceedings. In our prior opinion, we reviewed the nature 
and substance of the imposition, supervision and revocation of probation under 
Wyoming law. 
We explained the sentencing judge's detailed involvement in that phase of the 
criminal process.  Cooney, 
792 P.2d  at 1293-94. We also explained the role of the prosecuting attorney to 
assist the sentencing judge both in the latter's consideration whether to grant 
probation to a offender and the latter's consideration  whether to retake or reincarcerate a 
probationer who allegedly has violated a condition of probation. Id. 
Importantly, we observed that although "[a] probation revocation hearing is not 
a trial on a new criminal charge," it is "an extension of the sentencing 
procedure resulting from conviction of the basic charge * * *."  Cooney, 792 P.2d  at 1294 (quoting 
from Minchew v. State, 685 P.2d 30, 31 (Wyo. 1984)). Moreover, we 
said:

 

[F]rom 
the granting of probation through the supervision of probation to the revocation 
of probation, the sentencing judge has continuing jurisdiction over the 
probationer during the sentencing stage of the criminal proceeding. Without a 
doubt, this sentencing stage is an integral part of the judicial phase of the 
criminal process. We emphasize and add to that said earlier: "The supervision of 
probation through his probation officers [and, we would add, the county 
attorney] is one of the most important duties performed by the trial judge." 
Smith [v. State, 698 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Wyo. 1979)].

 

 Cooney, 792 P.2d  at 
1294.

 
 

[¶71.]        In 
Cooney it was shown that the deputy county attorney performs "vital 
activities of informing the sentencing judge of possible probation violations 
and of presenting them to the judge under the probation revocation procedures." 
Cooney, 792 P.2d  at 1295. We concluded then, and I conclude now, in light 
of Burns, that deputy county attorney White's "challenged activities are 
advocatory and 'intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal 
process' and, therefore, 'are functions to which the reasons for absolute 
immunity apply with full force.'" Imbler, 424 U.S.  at 430, 96 S. Ct.  at 995, 47 L. Ed. 2d  at 143.

 
 

[¶72.]        I 
would hold that deputy county attorney White's challenged actions are connected 
with the prosecutor's role in judicial proceedings; therefore, absolute 
prosecutorial immunity is justified for his actions.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Contrary to suggestion in 
dissent, the action of the United States Supreme Court in "judgment vacation and 
remand in light of * * * has real meaning. See, for example on this immunity 
issue where the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals apparently thought otherwise, 
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 919 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. granted 
and judgment vacated in light of Burns, 112 S. Ct. 40 (1991), remand 
952 F.2d 965 (7th Cir.), cert. granted in part 113 S. Ct. 53 
(1992).

 
 

2The litigants would 
somewhat differently state that issue. Cooney 
indicates:

 
 
The sole issue considered 
in this brief is whether a state official who (1) caused a perjured petition to 
be issued, (2) knowingly used the perjured petition to obtain an arrest warrant 
for a probationer, (3) used the arrest warrant to cause the probationer to be 
arrested, and (4) caused the probationer to remain incarcerated without bail or 
preliminary hearing for 38 days, is entitled absolute immunity from liability 
under 42 U.S.C. §  
1983.

 

The prosecutor 
states:

 

Whether this court's 
decision in Cooney v. Park County is consistent with the holding and 
rationale articulated in Burns v. Reed. Whether this court should 
reaffirm its decision in Cooney.

 
 
In the petition for writ 
of certiorari, the issue was again somewhat differently stated by these parties. 
Cooney stated:

 

[W]hether a state official 
who caused a perjured petition to be issued, knowingly used the perjured 
petition to obtain an arrest warrant, and caused a probationer to be arrested 
and incarcerated without bail or a preliminary hearing for thirty-eight days, is 
entitled to absolute immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. §  1983.

 

The prosecutor 
related:

 

Whether a deputy county 
attorney's activities in using an allegedly perjured probation revocation 
petition to obtain a bench warrant and in causing the petitioner (Cooney) to be 
arrested and detained where the functional equivalent of a prosecutor's role as 
an advocate in a criminal proceeding in hence entitled to absolute 
immunity.

 
 

3The Wyoming process for 
consideration of probation revocation is presently addressed in W.R.Cr.P. 39 
(effective March 24, 1992) and its predecessor, W.R.Cr.P. 33. The two available 
processes and the procedural criteria provide due process were comprehensively 
discussed in Cooney I, 792 P.2d  at 1307, Urbigkit, J., dissenting. See 
also Wlodarczyk v. State, 836 P.2d 279 (Wyo. 1992) and Hewitt v. State, 835 P.2d 348 
(Wyo. 
1992).

 
 

442 U.S.C. §  1983 
provides:

 

Every person who, under 
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or 
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjects, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to 
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, 
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress.

 
 

5In addition to suing Reed, 
Burns also brought §  1983 claims 
against various police officers and an investigator from the county attorney's 
office. The district court denied the police officers' motions for summary 
judgment on the basis of qualified immunity and also held that the investigator 
was neither absolutely nor qualifiedly immune for submitting a knowingly false 
affidavit. Consequently, the police officers and the investigator settled with 
Burns prior to trial for $ 250,000.

 
 
The claim against Reed 
proceeded to trial after an initial district court ruling that Reed was not 
entitled to absolute immunity since the court could not ascertain whether Reed 
was acting within the scope of his prosecutorial duties. However, the district 
court granted Reed's motion for directed verdict at the close of Burns' 
case-in-chief after finding that Reed's involvement (the acts of appearing in 
court to secure a warrant and giving legal advice to the police officers) 
constituted conduct for which he was absolutely immune. Burns v. Reed 894 F.2d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 1990), aff'd in part and rev'd in part 111 S. Ct. 1934 (1991), remand 958 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 
1992).

 
 

6Reed's legal advice to the 
police officers actually fell into two separate categories as well: (1) giving 
solicited advice regarding the use of hypnosis; and (2) giving solicited advice 
relative to the existence of probable cause to arrest. Burns, 114 L. Ed. 2d 547, 111 S. Ct. 1939-40.

 
 

7The United State Supreme 
Court stated in Burns, 111 S.Ct. at 1942:

 

Pretrial court appearances 
by to prosecutor in support of taking criminal action against a suspect present 
a substantial likelihood of vexatious litigation that might have an untoward 
effect on the independence of the prosecutor. Therefore, absolute immunity for 
this function serves the policy of protecting the judicial process, which 
underlies much of the Court's decision in Imbler. * * * Furthermore, to judicial 
process is available as a check on prosecutorial actions at a probable cause 
hearing. "The safeguards built into the judicial system tend to reduce the need 
for private damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct." 
Butz [v. Economou], 438 U.S. [478] at 512, 98 S.Ct. [2894] at 
2913, [57 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1978)].

 
 

8The United States Supreme 
Court also stated that the "only 'question presented' in [Burns'] Petition for a 
Writ of Certiorari that related to the search warrant hearing was limited to 
[Reed's] conduct in the hearing[.]" Burns, 111 S. Ct.  at 1940 
(emphasis added). But see Justice Scalia's partial dissent in 
Burns, 111 S. Ct.  at 1945, in which he argues that Burns adequately raised 
an additional claim regarding the initiation of the search warrant 
proceeding.

 
 
As in discussed hereafter, 
this aspect of the Burns complaint essentially limited the scope of the 
United States Supreme Court's review and, at the same time, is readily 
distinguishable from the much broader language used by the Cooneys in their 
complaint against the prosecutor.

 
 

9Absolute immunity for 
prosecutors is a relatively modern judicial common law creation and certainly 
did not exist at the date the United States Congress enacted the Civil Rights 
Act in 1871. Except for the more broadly applied defamation immunity, see 
Burns, 111 S. Ct.  at 1946, Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part; see also Cooney I, 792 P.2d  at 1303 n.5, Urbigkit, J., dissenting, 
the first appearance of prosecutorial immunity as an affixation to judicial 
immunity was Griffith v. Slinkard, 146 Ind. 117, 44 N.E. 1001 (1896), 
which was subsequently brought into full flower and recognition in 
Imbler, 424 U.S.  at 421.

 
 

10The United States Supreme Court commented on an 
argument contained in an amicus brief filed by the United 
States:

 
 
The United States 
argues that giving legal advice is related to a prosecutor's roles in screening 
cases for prosecution and in safeguarding the fairness of the criminal judicial 
process. * * * That argument, however, proves too much. Almost any action by a 
prosecutor, including his or her direct participation in purely investigative 
activity, could be said to be in some way related to be ultimate decision 
whether to prosecute, but we have never indicated that absolute immunity is that 
expansive. Rather, as in Imbler, we inquire whether the prosecutor's 
actions are closely associated with the judicial 
process.

 

 Burns, 111 S. Ct.  at 
1944.

 
 

11The application of 
Burns on the conduct of prosecution offices has not gone unnoticed. 
See Thomas M. Davy, Prosecutor Immunity: The Impact of Burns v. 
Reed, 25 The Prosecutor 21 (Winter 1992).

 
 

12With Buckley back 
in the United States Supreme Court, there is a third case similarly remanded, 
Gidney v. Camden County Prosecutor's Office, ___U.S.___, 111 S. Ct. 2791, 
115 L. Ed. 2d 966 (1991), which has provided no post-Burns reported opinion 
from which precedent or logic in application of their interpretation of 
Burns could be derived.

 
 

13In setting forth the 
appropriate test for qualified immunity, the court in Schrob, 948 F.2d  at 
1420-21 (footnote omitted) stated:

 

[The prosecutor] will be 
shielded from liability of his "conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known." Harlow, 457 U.S.  at 818, 102 S. Ct.  at 2738 (citations 
omitted); see Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S. Ct.  at 3034, 
3039-40, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987). Since a motion to dismiss is determined from the 
face of the complaint, [the prosecutor] must be given an opportunity on remand 
to show that there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning the 
"objective reasonableness of his conduct," or that he had no involvement in the 
actions alleged. The limited record before this Court precludes us from making 
such a determination. See Brown v. United States, 851 F.2d 615, 619-20 
(3rd Cir. 1988) (record provided insufficient basis for resolution of qualified 
immunity issue on appeal).

 
 

14Despite what the dissents 
may contend, the issue in this appeal is whether the prosecutor should be 
immunized from a trial which is directed to determined the validity of alleged 
claim that he suborned perjury in accomplishing the arrest and confinement of 
Cooney. Perjury is a felony. Wyo. Stat. §  6-5-301 (1988). See n.14, 
infra. The county and prosecuting attorney, or his deputy, is charged in 
professional responsibility with law enforcement. Most likely, with the 
warning obviously provided in this decision, no reoccurrence of a case of this 
character should rationally be expected within the Wyoming justice delivery 
system.

 
 
The dissent of Justice 
Thomas is partially correct; this case is not like Burns, 114 L. Ed. 2d 547, 111 S. Ct. 1934. It is much worse in its present stage of admitted facts for 
pleading purposes in consideration of the W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 
record. The allegations against chief deputy prosecutor Reed in Burns did 
not include the contention that he committed perjury, e.g., a crime in arranging 
the arrest of Ms. Burns. See James Lappan, The Prosecutor, the 
Investigator, and the Administrator.  
42 U.S.C. §  1983 and 
Burns v. Reed: The Hammer Has Dropped, 62 Miss. L.J. 169 (1992) and the 
quotation included from James Joyce, Ulysses 455 
(1914).

 
 

15Perjury is a crime in 
Wyoming under 
Wyo. Stat. §  6-5-301 (1988) for 
which a maximum sentence of five years imprisonment and/or a fine of $ 5,000 and 
be imposed. Suborning perjury comes within the Wyoming accessory before the fact statute, 
Wyo. Stat. §  6-1-201 (1988), for 
which the same punishment as the principal offense is proscribed. "Subornation 
of perjury" is defined as "[t]he offense of procuring another to such a false 
oath as would constitute perjury in the principal." Black's Law Dictionary 1426 
(6th ed. 1990).

 
 

16All that was said in 
Cooney I 792 P.2d  at 1289, was that:

 

Mayor then forwarded the 
[probation revocation] petition to White who presented it to the district court. 
Based on the petition, the district court issued a bench warrant for Mr. 
Cooney's arrest on February 7, 1986.

 
 

17Clearly, following 
Burns, we would find that the proceeding falls within the judicially 
impacted compartment of prosecutorial activities and, consequently, is served by 
absolute in favor of the prosecutor.

 
 

18W.R.Cr.P. 39 (effective 
March 24, 1992) in rewriting the prior judicial probation revocation rule, 
W.R.Cr.P. 33(f), recognized in specific provisions the due process concerns 
created by the Cooney litigation. The rule includes an alternative 
process of an order to appear instead of a bench warrant and arrest. The rule 
then requires that if arrested, the individual is given the right to a mandatory 
forty-eight hour judicial appearance.

 
 

19There is also federal 
district and circuit court case law which questions prosecutorial absolute 
immunity in pre-indictment search and seizure activities, including arrest of a 
witness, Snell, 920 F.2d 673; Hooper v. Sachs, 618 F. Supp. 963 
(D.Md. 1985), aff'd 823 F.2d 547 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 484 U.S. 954, 98 L. Ed. 2d 373, 108 S. Ct. 347 (1987); or confinement in a particularly offensive jail, Price v. 
Moody, 677 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1982). See also Edgar v. Wagner, 101 
Nev. 226, 699 P.2d 110 (1985) (state court). Similarly, there is no immunity for the private 
lawyer.  Robinson v. 
Volkswagenwerk AG, 940 F.2d 1369 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 112 S. Ct. 1160 (1992).

 
 

20Somewhat apropos, Judge 
Baldock, in writing the majority opinion in the factually complex immunity 
determinative case of Snell, 920 F.2d  at 675, 
opined:

 
 
We should be careful to 
get out of an experience only the wisdom that is in it--and stop there; lest we 
be like the cat that sits down on a hot stove-lid. She will never sit down on a 
hot stove-lid again--and that is well; but she will never sit down on a cold one 
any more.

 

Pudd'nhead Wilson's New Calendar. M. 
Twain, Following the Equator ch. XI at 107 (Harper Bros. 
ed.).

 
 

21We recognize and 
anticipate a judicial economy argument that, since essentially the same alleged 
facts exists in Mayor as here, perhaps we should determine whether or not 
the prosecutor is entitled to qualified immunity. However, because we were not 
asked to make a qualified immunity determination in Cooney I and because 
the parties have not had an opportunity to present their case to the district 
court, we elect to remand. See Burns, 958 F.2d 374 (Seventh Circuit 
disposition following the United States Supreme Court's partial reversal and 
remand in Burns, 114 L. Ed. 2d 547, 111 S.Ct. 
1934).

 
 
Just as the United States Supreme Court 
did in reversing the "legal advice" issue in Burns, 111 S. Ct.  at 1945 
n.9, we also decline to express any views as to the underlying merits of the 
remaining portions of the Cooneys' §  
1983 action against the prosecutor and his corresponding arguments for 
qualified immunity to those claims.