Title: Jaramillo v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Jaramillo v. State1990 WY 141802 P.2d 872Case Number: 90-83Decided: 12/12/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
Michele JARAMILLO, 

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The STATE of 
Wyoming,

 Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Laramie County, Edward L. Grant, J.

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Steven E. Weerts, Sr. Asst. Public Defender, and 
David Lindsey, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Mary B. 
Guthrie, Sr. Asst. Attys. Gen., Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution 
Assistance Program, and Larry Saunders, Student Intern, for 
appellee.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

URBIGKIT, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      This appeal 
determines whether a trial judge is required to inform an immunized witness of 
the consequences of refusal to testify before charging and convicting that 
individual of criminal contempt.1

[¶2]      In her appeal, 
appellant Michele Jaramillo claims that "[t]he trial court's failure to 
adequately inform appellant of the nature and effect of a finding of criminal 
contempt warrants a reversal of the contempt judgment." She also challenges that 
"[t]he trial court's failure to provide appellant with the entire record as 
designated by appellant's attorney constitutes a violation of due process and 
equal protection."

[¶3]      The State, in 
response, believes that "[t]he trial court adequately informed appellant of her 
obligation to testify after immunity had been granted, and appellant was 
sufficiently informed of the consequences of refusal to testify to support the 
court's judgment of summary contempt." The State also asserts that "appellant 
was not denied due process and equal protection of the laws by the trial court's 
limitation of the transcript on appeal to the proceedings relating to 
appellant's appearance as a witness and the trial court's finding of 
contempt."

[¶4]      Because we agree 
that the trial judge must first inform the individual of the consequences of 
contempt for refusal to testify after testimonial immunity is extended, the 
trial judge's sentence for criminal contempt is reversed. 

[¶5]      Whether the trial 
judge abused his discretion circumscribes our standard of review "since the 
inherent power to summarily punish for contempt is securely vested within the 
discretion of a trial judge." Horn v. District Court, Ninth Judicial Dist., 647 P.2d 1368, 1375 (Wyo. 1982). In Horn, this court explained the difference 
between civil and criminal contempt as "a civil contempt is generally intended 
to compel a party to comply with a lawful court order, while a criminal contempt 
is punitive in character and is enforced so that the authority of the law and 
the court will be vindicated." Id. at 1373. We also noted the difference between 
"direct" contempt and "constructive" contempt:

     Thus, not only may a 
contempt of court be of a criminal or civil nature but it also can be either a 
direct contempt or a constructive, indirect one. Direct contempt are those 
committed in the court's presence and constructive contempt are those committed 
outside of the hearing or view of the judge.

Id. at 1373. See 
Connors v. Connors, 769 P.2d 336, 344 (Wyo. 1989).

[¶6]      Appellant's contempt 
charge fits into the direct criminal contempt category defined by W.R.Cr.P. 
41(a). Cf. Connors, 769 P.2d  at 345, where both civil and criminal contempt was 
involved.

[¶7]      In 1989, 
appellant pled guilty to a drug conspiracy charge. In exchange for the guilty 
plea, the State agreed not to prosecute her for other alleged drug-related 
offenses. Later, during the drug trial of her aunt, the State called appellant 
to testify as a prosecution witness. When the State then asked her about sales 
of cocaine to her aunt, appellant pled the Fifth Amendment. The State then asked 
the trial court, based on the earlier plea agreement, to extend immunity to the 
witness.2 After explaining that a grant of 
immunity prevents further prosecution and thereby removes her Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination, the trial judge granted appellant immunity and 
ordered her to testify against her aunt. When appellant refused, the trial judge 
summarily charged her with criminal contempt, and sentenced her to a six-month 
sentence to be served consecutively with her prior sentence of one to three 
years.3

[¶8]      The State claims 
the trial court adequately advised appellant of the consequences of her 
disobedience if she refused to testify. The record does not support the State's 
claim. In fact, the record reflects just the opposite. The brief discussion of 
whether appellant understood the consequences of not testifying occurred while 
she was not present. This occurred in chambers when the trial judge asked 
appellant's attorney if he had advised his client that she could no longer 
refuse to testify once she was given immunity. In the absence of his client, 
appellant's attorney then responded "she seems to understand the consequences of 
not testifying." The actual record does not indicate whether the attorney had 
ever advised the immunized witness that one of the "consequences" could include 
a charge of criminal contempt and the imposition upon her of an additional jail 
sentence consecutive to her guilty plea imposed penitentiary term.

[¶9]      The trial judge's 
discussion with appellant concerned only her grant of immunity and its effect on 
her Fifth Amendment right. At no point did the trial judge inform appellant she 
would be held in contempt - and its consequences - if she continued to refuse to 
testify. The trial judge certified in his findings that "[a]fter hearing the 
court's admonition that she could be held in contempt, Michele Jaramillo stood 
by her refusal." The record does not document any "admonition" which status was 
recognized by admission of counsel for the State during oral argument. 
Consequently, on the record presented here, appellant was never informed of the 
serious consequences she faced if charged with criminal contempt.

[¶10]   Appellant does not dispute that her 
refusal to testify may, under these circumstances, subject her to penal risk of 
contempt of court. Her claim is essentially that the trial judge must first 
inform a person of the consequences of being found in contempt in order for that 
person to make an informed decision whether to decline to testify. We agree with 
appellant's framing of the issue. Stripped to its core, the State argues that to 
require the trial judge, under these circumstances, to inform the individual in 
advance of the consequences of contempt is too great a burden. We disagree. It 
is the trial judge, and not the individual, who should shoulder the burden of 
notice. As stated by Justice Frankfurter: "Summary punishment of contempt is 
concededly an exception to the requirements of Due Process. Necessity dictates 
the departure. Necessity must bound its limits." Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 36, 72 S. Ct. 451, 468, 96 L. Ed. 717, reh'g denied 343 U.S. 931, 72 S. Ct. 756, 96 L. Ed. 1341 (1952), Frankfurter, Justice, dissenting.

[¶11]   This court has previously discussed 
the "necessity" for the trial judge's contempt power. In re Contempt of 
Haselhuhn, 740 P.2d 387 (Wyo. 1987). We have also placed limits on that 
necessity.4 If the totality of circumstances 
surrounding a particular case demonstrate the trial judge failed to inform the 
individual of the nature and effect of the finding of contempt, the contempt 
judgment cannot stand. Id. Such failure is an abuse of discretion.

[¶12]   We believe that necessity is best 
served when the trial judge uses his contempt power to promote the fair and 
orderly administration of justice and not to punish the uninformed. Thus, under 
the standard announced in In re Contempt of Haselhuhn, we rule that appellant 
was not adequately informed of the nature and effect of a finding of criminal 
contempt.5

[¶13]   The conviction of Michele Jaramillo 
for contempt of court is reversed.

THOMAS, Justice, concurring 
specially.

[¶14]   I have no difficulty with the 
substantive pronouncements found in the majority opinion, and it is clear that 
the contempt conviction of Michele Jaramillo must be reversed. I concur in that 
result. I would, however, premise that reversal on an entirely different 
ground.

[¶15]   In addressing the defendant, prior 
to the refusal to testify that led to her conviction, the trial judge told 
her:

"THE COURT: And because 
of the existence of this statute and the circumstances of this case and because 
you're granted immunity and I hereby state for the record that the - that you're 
granted immunity from prosecution for any activity that you may have engaged in 
or had any knowledge of between June 29th and August 4, 1989 in Laramie County, 
Wyoming, you're granted immunity from prosecution for any such offense at any 
time, and it would appear from the previous testimony that had been taken that 
your testimony may be necessary to secure the conviction; therefore, the terms 
of the statute are applicable. So you're granted immunity as I have outlined. Do 
you have any questions about the immunity?"

Section 
35-7-1043, W.S. 1977 (June 1988 Repl.), provides in pertinent part:

"* * * Any person who 
except for the provisions of this act, would have been privileged to withhold 
the testimony given or the evidence produced by him shall not be prosecuted, 
subjected to any penalty, forfeiture, for or on account of any transaction, 
matter or thing concerning which, by reason of said immunity, he gave testimony 
and produced evidence; and no such testimony given or evidence produced shall be 
received against him in any criminal proceeding."

[¶16]   It is apparent from the foregoing 
that the trial judge purported to limit the immunity to "prosecution for any 
activity that you may have engaged in or had any knowledge of between June 29th 
and August 4, 1989 in Laramie County, Wyoming." Since the statute requires that 
the immunity extend to "any transaction, matter or thing concerning which, by 
reason of said immunity, he gave testimony and produced evidence," there is no 
justification in the statute authorizing the grant of immunity for the court to 
limit the grant of immunity as it did. It is apparent to me that Ms. Jaramillo 
was not lawfully granted immunity under the statute. In the absence of a proper 
grant of immunity, she was entitled to refuse to testify for the reasons that 
she gave. There was no contemptuous conduct for the court to punish.

[¶17]   I would reverse the contempt 
conviction for the simple reason that there was no criminal contempt 
committed.

 FOOTNOTES

1    Appellant 
was charged with criminal contempt under W.R.Cr.P. 41(a). "A criminal contempt 
may be punished summarily if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the 
conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual 
presence of the court. The order of contempt shall recite the facts, shall be 
signed by the judge and entered of record." W.R.Cr.P. 41(a).

     This opinion does not 
address the case where an individual is charged with criminal contempt under 
W.R.Cr.P. 41(b).

2      The immunity 
section is found in the "Wyoming Controlled Substances Act of 1971" under W.S. 
35-7-1043, which provides in pertinent part:

[I]mmunity may also be 
granted to any person whose testimony is necessary to secure a conviction under 
this act with the consent of district judge in the district wherein prosecution 
is to take place. Any person granted immunity under this section shall not be 
excused from testifying or producing evidence on the ground that the testimony 
or evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to 
penalty or forfeiture. Any person who except for the provisions of this act, 
would have been privileged to withhold the testimony given or the evidence 
produced by him shall not be prosecuted, subjected to any penalty, forfeiture, 
for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which, by 
reason of said immunity, he gave testimony and produced evidence; and no such 
testimony given or evidence produced shall be received against him in any 
criminal proceeding. Provided, no person given immunity under this section shall 
be exempt from prosecution for perjury or contempt committed while giving 
testimony or producing evidence under compulsion as provided in this 
section.

3      Pursuant to 
W.R.Cr.P. 41(a), the trial judge included in the record his "Certification, 
Findings and Imposition of Sentence for Criminal Contempt" (Findings). W.R.Cr.P. 
41(a) requires the trial judge to "certify" he witnessed in court the 
contemptuous conduct and recite the facts supporting the contempt. See our 
discussion of the "procedural safeguards" required for summary disposition of 
criminal contempt under W.R.Cr.P. 41(a) in Horn, 647 P.2d 1368 and Townes v. 
State, 502 P.2d 991, reh'g denied 504 P.2d 46 (Wyo. 1972).

4      "[T]he power to 
punish for contempt is not without limitation." In re Contempt of Haselhuhn, 740 P.2d  at 390.

5      Since appellant 
prevailed on her first issue, we need not address whether the trial judge 
violated her right to due process and equal protection by designating for 
reproduction at the State's expense only a portion of the criminal prosecution 
record of her aunt, Marie Angela Cordova.