Title: Ellerbee v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC15-2010 
____________ 
 
TERRY MARVIN ELLERBEE, JR., 
Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC16-922 
____________ 
 
TERRY MARVIN ELLERBEE, JR., 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JULIE L. JONES, etc., 
Respondent. 
 
[December 21, 2017] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Terry Marvin Ellerbee, Jr., appeals an order of the circuit court denying his 
motion to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death filed 
under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, and petitions this Court for a writ 
 
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of habeas corpus.  The State cross-appeals the circuit court’s finding of deficient 
performance of penalty phase trial counsel.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, 
§ 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For the reasons explained below, we affirm the 
postconviction court’s order to the extent that it denies Ellerbee relief based upon 
his claim of ineffective assistance of guilt phase counsel.  However, we conclude 
that Ellerbee is entitled to a new penalty phase proceeding pursuant to Hurst v. 
State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2161 (2017), and Mosley 
v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248 (Fla. 2016), and based on his claim of ineffective 
assistance of penalty phase counsel. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This Court detailed the following facts on direct appeal: 
 
[O]n September 29, 2006, the body of Thomas Dellarco was found 
dead and decomposing, hidden under a blanket in the garage of his 
home.  Dellarco was killed by a single .22 caliber bullet which entered 
the center of the top of his skull and traveled through his brain.  
Dellarco was seventy-two at the time of his death and had a number of 
health problems including gout, arthritis, partial blindness, trouble 
with his hearing, and difficulty with walking.  Notwithstanding these 
infirmities, Dellarco lived alone with his pet dogs in a clean house on 
the Viking Prairie (the Prairie), a desolate, rural, and wooded area in 
Okeechobee County. 
The sheriff deputies investigating the scene of the killing found 
cigarette butts strewn throughout Dellarco’s house, blood stain 
patterns consistent with Dellarco having been shot from a distance 
greater than eighteen inches while he was sitting in the kitchen area of 
the home, and blood stains indicating that someone had attempted to 
clean the scene and dragged Dellarco’s body into the garage.  One of 
Dellarco’s large German shepherd dogs—the one most protective of 
his master—was found dead outside the home with fatal bullet 
 
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wounds.  Further investigation conducted by law enforcement 
revealed that, in the days following Dellarco’s demise, someone was 
using Dellarco’s bank card to obtain cash and make retail purchases, 
and someone unsuccessfully attempted to cash a $1000 check drawn 
on Dellarco’s bank account—and in doing so left an inked thumbprint 
with a bank in Sebring, Florida. 
The cigarette butts found in Dellarco’s house contained saliva 
deposits which, when tested, contained DNA that uniquely linked 
Terry Marvin Ellerbee, Jr.—a twenty-one-year-old man who was 
living with his girlfriend and her infant child in various hunting camps 
on the Prairie—to the scene of the crime.  The thumbprint and video 
footage obtained from the Sebring bank confirmed that Ellerbee was 
the individual who attempted to cash the check purportedly signed by 
Dellarco.  Moreover, additional evidence, including receipts, 
eyewitness testimony, banking records, and video surveillance, 
established that Ellerbee was using Dellarco’s vehicle and was the 
individual using Dellarco’s bank card in the days following his death.  
When apprehended, Ellerbee ultimately confessed to entering 
Dellarco’s house and killing him. 
. . . . 
. . . Ellerbee admitted that on the day of the murder he 
approached Dellarco’s home and spoke in a friendly and “neighborly” 
manner to Dellarco, whom he otherwise did not know.  Dellarco gave 
Ellerbee a cigarette and informed Ellerbee that he would be travelling 
into town, a considerable distance, to run errands.  Ellerbee then 
walked into the woods adjoining Dellarco’s home and, after watching 
Dellarco leave for town, he shot one of Dellarco’s dogs that was in the 
yard.  Ellerbee entered the house armed with a single-shot .22 caliber 
rifle and a pistol that he brought to “back [him] up, for the dogs.”  
Ellerbee told police that he remained in Dellarco’s house while 
Dellarco was away on his trip to town for a “good hour,” and that he 
watched from inside the house as Dellarco returned and parked his 
vehicle outside the gate to the yard.  Ellerbee stated that Dellarco, 
after first parking his vehicle, observed the dead dog and then walked 
across the yard.  Thereafter, Dellarco came into the house angered, 
and then left the house to attend to his other dogs.  During this time, 
Ellerbee remained in the house and hid in Dellarco’s bedroom.  After 
Dellarco was finished tending to his dogs outside, he came back inside 
the house and sat down at the kitchen table to make telephone calls.  
At this time, Ellerbee emerged from the bedroom, braced himself in a 
 
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doorway across the room, raised the .22 caliber rifle and fired it, 
killing Dellarco.  According to Ellerbee, Dellarco did not threaten him 
in “any way”; rather, the victim was not aware of Ellerbee’s presence 
in the house.  Ellerbee admitted that after he killed Dellarco, he took a 
wallet and cash from the dead man’s pants, and he then took and used 
Dellarco’s vehicle.  Ellerbee admitted to using Dellarco’s bank card 
and trying to cash a check drawn on Dellarco’s bank account, and 
taking a .20 gauge shotgun that he found in the house.  Ellerbee also 
admitted that he moved Dellarco’s body to the garage and covered it 
with a blanket when he could no longer “stand the smell.” 
. . . And, later in his confession, Ellerbee told police that, 
although he shot and killed Dellarco, he intended his single shot—
which was fatal and hit the victim in the center of the top of the 
skull—to be a “miss shot” so as to distract the victim to facilitate an 
escape.  Further, Ellerbee stated that he entered Dellarco’s house 
looking for food and money. 
 
Ellerbee v. State, 87 So. 3d 730, 734-37 (Fla. 2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 
1093 (2013). 
 
Following a jury trial, Ellerbee was convicted of the first-degree murder of 
Dellarco.  Id. at 733.  He was also charged with and convicted of cruelty to animals 
for shooting and killing one of Dellarco’s dogs; burglary with an assault or battery 
while armed; grand theft of a firearm for stealing Dellarco’s shotgun; and grand 
theft of a motor vehicle for stealing Dellarco’s automobile.  Id.  The jury 
recommended a sentence of death for the murder by a vote of eleven to one.  Id.  
After a Spencer1 hearing, the trial court entered a sentencing order that accepted 
the jury’s recommendation.  Id. 
                                          
 
 
1.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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The trial court found the existence of four statutory aggravators, which it 
merged into three: (1) the capital crime was committed while the defendant was on 
felony probation; (2) the capital crime was committed during the commission of a 
burglary, merged with pecuniary gain; and (3) the capital crime was cold, 
calculated, and premeditated without any pretense of moral or legal justification 
(CCP).  Id. at 738.2 
 
The trial court’s findings as to mitigation were as follows: 
 
(1) [Ellerbee] grew up without his mother, felt rejected by her, and 
was raised by his father (proven, but assigned little weight); (2) he did 
not have proper parental guidance from his father (proven in part—
father was less than perfect, but loved Ellerbee, and never physically 
abused, neglected, or abandoned, him—very little weight); (3) he had 
a difficult childhood (proven, minimal weight); (4) he had a history of 
drug and alcohol abuse (proven, very little weight); (5) he suffers 
from a poor self-concept (proven, very little weight); (6) his parents 
were divorced, and he was from a broken home (proven, very minimal 
weight); (7) his mother suffered from mental illness (proven, very 
little weight); (8) his father abused his mother in front of him (proven, 
little weight); (9) his mother was cruel and unpredictable (proven, 
little weight); (10) he would go long periods without maternal contact 
(proven, very little weight); (11) his father abused drugs and alcohol 
(proven, little weight); (12) he has limited education (proven, very 
little weight); (13) he has a low IQ of 83 (proven, very little weight); 
(14) he suffered childhood trauma (proven, very little weight); (15) he 
has a history of suicide attempts and self-destructive behavior 
(proven, little weight); (16) he showed kindness to others (proven, 
minimal weight); (17) he was under the influence of intoxicants 
before, during, and after this incident (to the extent the evidence 
                                          
 
 
2.  The State presented evidence of a fifth aggravator—the victim was 
particularly vulnerable due to advanced age or disability—but the trial court 
determined it was not established beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
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established that Ellerbee used drugs before and after the murder, the 
trial court found these factors warranted very little weight—
nevertheless, the court found that Ellerbee did not prove he was using 
or under the influence of drugs on the day of the murder, and the court 
specifically found that Ellerbee was able to “plan things”); 
(18) Ellerbee cooperated with authorities (proven, in part—Ellerbee 
cooperated after he was caught—little weight); (19) Ellerbee was a 
hard worker at several trades (“some evidence,” little weight);  
(20) Ellerbee will adjust to prison life (proven, very little weight);  
(21) Ellerbee has “mental health issues,” . . . (the trial court found that 
Ellerbee did not prove he suffered from fetal alcohol syndrome, a 
significant brain injury, bipolar disorder, ADD/ADHD, or memory 
deficits, and assigned little weight “to the defendant having a 
cognitive disorder”); (22) Ellerbee suffers from poor dental hygiene 
(proven, but no relationship established with murder—very little 
weight); (23) Ellerbee exhibited appropriate courtroom behavior 
(proven, little weight). 
 
Id. at 742 n.3.  The trial court concluded “the proven aggravating circumstances 
substantially outweigh the non-statutory mitigating factors,” and imposed a 
sentence of death.  Id. at 738-39. 
Direct Appeal Proceedings 
 
Ellerbee raised eleven issues on direct appeal: (1) whether trial counsel 
presented an invalid defense to felony murder, and if so, whether Ellerbee was 
thereby denied due process, his right to a jury trial, and effective assistance of 
counsel; (2) whether the trial court erred in finding CCP; (3) whether the trial court 
erred in instructing the jury on the aggravating circumstance that the victim was 
particularly vulnerable due to advanced age or disability; (4) whether the trial court 
erred in overruling Ellerbee’s objection to the prosecutor asking defense expert 
 
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Dr. Michael Riordan whether he telephoned the jail to advise that Ellerbee needed 
psychotropic medications; (5) whether the trial court erred in failing to consider 
certain statutory mitigating circumstances proposed by Ellerbee; (6) whether the 
trial court erred in denying Ellerbee’s motion to suppress the evidence from the 
location where Ellerbee temporarily resided on the Prairie; (7) whether the trial 
court erred in denying Ellerbee’s motion for special verdict forms; (8) whether the 
felony murder aggravator in section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes (2006), is 
unconstitutional on its face and as applied; (9) whether the trial court failed to 
make the findings necessary for the imposition of the death penalty; (10) whether it 
was error for the trial court to use the aggravating circumstance that Ellerbee 
committed the murder while on probation; and (11) whether Florida’s death 
penalty statute violates the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution.  Id. at 739-48.  This Court rejected all claims and 
affirmed Ellerbee’s convictions and sentences.  Id. at 748. 
Postconviction Proceedings 
 
On December 20, 2013, Ellerbee timely filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment 
of Conviction and Sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  
Ellerbee filed an amended motion on May 27, 2014.  In his amended motion, 
Ellerbee raised the following claims: (1) the application of rule 3.851 to Ellerbee’s 
case violates his rights to due process and equal protection because the rule applies 
 
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only to capital defendants and allows only one year to file a capital postconviction 
motion; (2) section 27.7081, Florida Statutes (2016), and Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.852 are unconstitutional both facially and as applied because they 
impermissibly restrict capital defendants’ access to public records; (3) Florida Rule 
of Professional Responsibility 4-3.5(d)(4) is unconstitutional both facially and as 
applied because it prohibits a defendant from investigating claims of juror 
misconduct and bias that may be inherent in the jury’s verdict; (4) the State failed 
to disclose exculpatory or impeachment evidence or both in violation of Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (5) trial counsel failed to disclose a conflict of 
interest; (6) trial counsel was ineffective during the guilt phase for (a) failing to 
move for a change of venue, (b) failing to object to prosecutorial misconduct 
during voir dire, (c) failing to properly challenge Ellerbee’s waiver of his Miranda3 
rights and the voluntariness of his confession, (d) failing to move in limine to 
prevent the admission of irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial evidence, and 
(e) presenting an invalid defense to felony murder; (7) trial counsel was ineffective 
during the penalty phase for (a) failing to challenge the CCP aggravator, and 
(b) failing to investigate and present available mitigation evidence; and (8) section 
922.105, Florida Statutes (2016), which governs execution of the death sentence 
and the existing lethal injection protocol, is unconstitutional.  
                                          
 
3.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
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An evidentiary hearing was granted on claims 4, 5, 6(c), 6(e), and 7.  The 
hearing was conducted in two phases: Phase I was held on October 20-21, 2014, 
October 23, 2014, and January 22, 2015.  Ellerbee presented twelve witnesses: 
attorney Stanley Glenn (trial defense second chair),4 Amy Perron (trial defense 
investigator), Dr. Michael Riordan (trial defense mental health expert), attorney 
Norman Tebrugge (American Bar Association death penalty guidelines expert), 
Marvin Mosely, Sr. (Ellerbee’s great uncle), Linda Mosely (wife of Marvin 
Mosely, Sr.), Marvin Mosely, Jr. (Ellerbee’s second cousin), Starla Mosely (wife 
of Marvin Mosely, Jr.), Robert Ellerbee (Ellerbee’s uncle), Randall Ellerbee 
(Ellerbee’s uncle), Joshua Ellerbee (Ellerbee’s cousin), and Cheryl Smith 
(Ellerbee’s childhood guidance counselor).  Phase II was conducted on June 25-26, 
2015.  Ellerbee presented two mental health experts: James Garbarino, Ph.D., and 
Marlyne Israelian, Ph.D.  The State presented testimony from Dr. Riordan. 
On September 29, 2015, the postconviction court entered an order denying 
all claims.  In its order, the court concluded trial counsel was deficient for “failing 
to discover the noncumulative evidence of paternal neglect, paternal abuse, and the 
extent of paternal substance abuse.”  As a result, the postconviction court 
                                          
 
 
4.  Attorney Mark Harllee was first chair and was in charge of case 
management, strategy, and presentation of the penalty phase defense.  Harllee died 
prior to the evidentiary hearing. 
 
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reweighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  The court elevated the 
weight assigned to mitigating factors (2), (3), and (11) to “moderate weight,” but 
concluded the aggravating circumstances still substantially outweighed the 
mitigation.  The court therefore determined Ellerbee was not prejudiced as a result 
of trial counsel’s deficiency and denied relief on the claim of ineffective assistance 
of penalty phase counsel. 
This appeal follows.  On May 27, 2016, Ellerbee filed a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus with this Court, seeking relief pursuant to Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. 
Ct. 616 (2016). 
ANALYSIS 
Ellerbee presents several claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  A 
defendant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must prove: (1) counsel’s 
performance was deficient; and (2) the deficiency prejudiced the defendant.  
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  If the defendant fails to 
establish prejudice, the reviewing court need not make a specific ruling regarding 
deficiency.  Id. 
To establish deficiency, the defendant “must identify particular acts or 
omissions of the lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
competent performance under prevailing professional standards.”  Maxwell v. 
Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986).  The act or omission must constitute 
 
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an error “so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed    
. . . by the Sixth Amendment.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  However, there is a 
strong presumption that trial counsel’s performance was not ineffective, and 
“[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.”  Id. at 
689.  We have held that “strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance 
of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel’s 
decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct.”  Occhicone v. 
State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000).  Therefore, “the defendant must 
overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 
‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting 
Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).  Moreover, “[a] fair assessment of 
attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting 
effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged 
conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”  Id. 
To establish prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate “there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  “Reasonable 
probability” is defined as “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.”  Id.  In other words, the defendant must show that counsel’s “clear, 
substantial deficiency . . . so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceeding 
 
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that confidence in the outcome is undermined.”  Maxwell, 490 So. 2d at 932.  Mere 
speculation is not sufficient to form the basis for postconviction relief.  See Derrick 
v. State, 983 So. 2d 443, 462 (Fla. 2008) (“[I]n order to sufficiently undermine this 
Court’s confidence in the outcome of resentencing, [the defendant] must rely on 
more than mere speculation.”); see also Maharaj v. State, 778 So. 2d 944, 951 (Fla. 
2000) (“Postconviction relief cannot be based on speculation or possibility.”). 
 
When reviewing a postconviction court’s ruling on an ineffectiveness claim, 
this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the trial court’s 
findings on factual issues that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, 
and reviewing the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo.  Bruno v. State, 807 So. 
2d 55, 62 (Fla. 2001). 
Venue 
Ellerbee first contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move 
for a change of venue.  In considering this claim, we must determine whether there 
is a “reasonable probability that the trial court would have, or at least should have, 
granted a motion for change of venue” had counsel made such a motion.  Griffin v. 
State, 866 So. 2d 1, 12 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Wike v. State, 813 So. 2d 12, 18 (Fla. 
2002)).  In other words, the inquiry “is whether a change of venue was proper and 
whether counsel would have been successful had he moved for a change of venue.”  
Id. 
 
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Under Florida law, a “defendant may move for a change of venue on the 
ground that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county where the case is 
pending for any reason other than the interest and prejudice of the trial judge.”  Fla. 
R. Crim. P. 3.240.  “The test for determining whether to grant a change of venue is 
whether the inhabitants of a community are so infected by knowledge of the 
incident and accompanying prejudice, bias, and preconceived opinions that jurors 
could not possibly put these matters out of their minds and try the case solely on 
the evidence presented in the courtroom.”  Griffin, 866 So. 2d at 12.  “In exercising 
its discretion regarding a change of venue, a trial court must make a two-pronged 
analysis, evaluating: (1) the extent and nature of any pretrial publicity; and (2) the 
difficulty encountered in actually selecting a jury.”  Id.  However, it is well-
established that “pretrial publicity is normal and expected in certain kinds of cases, 
and that fact standing alone will not require a change of venue.”  Id.  There are 
several factors to consider when evaluating pretrial publicity, including: 
(1) when the publicity occurred in relation to the time of the crime and 
the trial; (2) whether the publicity was made up of factual or 
inflammatory stories; (3) whether the publicity favored the 
prosecution’s side of the story; (4) the size of the community exposed 
to the publicity; and (5) whether the defendant exhausted all of his 
peremptory challenges in seating the jury. 
State v. Knight, 866 So. 2d 1195, 1209 (Fla. 2003). 
 
Regarding the second prong of the analysis, the critical inquiry is “whether 
any difficulty encountered in selecting a jury . . . reflected a pervasive community 
 
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bias against [the defendant] which so infected the jury selection process that it was 
impossible to seat an impartial jury” in the county where the trial was held.  
Rolling v. State, 695 So. 2d 278, 287 (Fla. 1997).  “The ability to seat an impartial 
jury in a high-profile case may be demonstrated by either a lack of extrinsic 
knowledge among members of the venire or, assuming such knowledge, a lack of 
partiality.”  Id. at 285.  A change of venue is required if “it is impossible to select 
jurors who will decide the case on the basis of the evidence, rather than the jurors’ 
extrinsic knowledge.”  Id. (citing Copeland v. State, 457 So. 2d 1012, 1017 (Fla. 
1984)).  However, “jurors need not be totally ignorant of the facts of the case nor 
do they need to be free from any preconceived notion at all . . . .  [I]f prospective 
jurors can assure the court during voir dire that they are impartial despite their 
extrinsic knowledge, they are qualified to serve on the jury, and a change of venue 
is not necessary.”  Id. (citing Davis v. State, 461 So. 2d 67, 69 (Fla. 1984)).  This 
Court has also recognized: 
 
In some instances, the percentage of prospective jurors 
professing an extrinsic knowledge of the case or a fixed opinion has 
been used to determine whether pervasive community prejudice 
exists.  However, even where a substantial number of prospective 
jurors admit a fixed opinion, community prejudice need not be 
presumed.  For instance, in [Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975)], 
the United States Supreme Court evaluated these percentages as 
follows: 
 
In the present case, . . . 20 of 78 persons [or 25.6%] 
questioned were excused because they indicated an 
opinion as to petitioner’s guilt.  This may indeed be 20 
 
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more than would occur in the trial of a totally obscure 
person, but it by no means suggests a community with 
sentiment so poisoned against petitioner as to impeach 
the indifference of jurors who displayed no animus of 
their own. 
 
421 U.S. at 803 (footnote omitted). 
Id. (parallel citations omitted). 
Here, Ellerbee has failed to establish that a change of venue would have 
been proper or that trial counsel would have been successful had he moved for a 
change of venue.  Pretrial publicity in this case was minimal: the local newspaper, 
the Okeechobee News, published only two articles about the murder.  Ellerbee 
does not allege that these publications were either inflammatory or favored the 
prosecution.  Further, the articles were published shortly after the murder occurred, 
approximately three years prior to jury selection. 
We have held that a change of venue was not warranted in several cases 
involving much more extensive pretrial publicity.  In Rolling, the defendant was 
convicted of the murders of five local college students.  695 So. 2d at 281.  On 
direct appeal, this Court rejected Rolling’s argument that the trial court abused its 
discretion when it denied his motion for a change of venue.  Id. at 287-88.  We 
acknowledged it was “undisputed that the brutal slaying of five young students 
deeply affected the college community of Gainesville, Florida and generated 
overwhelming local and national media attention.  While the amount of media 
 
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coverage in this case makes it unique, the extent of publicity it received was 
certainly not surprising or unwarranted given the circumstances of this case.”  Id. 
at 287 (emphasis added).  In rejecting Rolling’s contention “that the responses of 
both prospective and actual jurors during voir dire further demonstrated a real, 
community-wide prejudice and animosity toward him,” the Court explained: 
Not surprisingly, of course, every member of the venire had some 
extrinsic knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding this 
case.  Also as expected, the responses of certain prospective jurors 
showed that their knowledge of the case prevented them from sitting 
impartially on the jury.  Nevertheless, the animus toward Rolling 
expressed by these individuals reflected nothing more than their own 
personal beliefs or opinions.  Contrary to Rolling’s assertions, we find 
no reason to believe that certain prospective jurors who voiced a bias 
against Rolling—none of whom sat on Rolling’s jury—somehow 
spoke for the entire Alachua County community. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Copeland, the defendant was convicted of the kidnapping, rape, 
and murder of a nineteen-year-old woman in Wakulla County.  457 So. 2d at 1014.  
The defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his motion for a change of 
venue because the “general atmosphere of hostility against him was established by 
testimony that the crimes were the main topic of conversation in the rural 
community of Wakulla County.”  Id. at 1017.  We disagreed, holding a change of 
venue is not required “in every highly publicized criminal prosecution in a rural 
community.”  Id.  Even where “every member of the jury panel had read or heard 
something about the crime,” a presumption of impartiality is supported by 
 
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veniremembers’ assurances that “they would be able to disregard the previously 
gained information and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.”  
Id.  It is the defendant’s burden to overcome this presumption and “demonstrate 
‘the actual existence of such an opinion in the mind of the juror as will raise the 
presumption of partiality.’ ”  Id. (quoting Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800 
(1975)). 
According to Ellerbee, the fact that so many jurors acknowledged having at 
least some extrinsic knowledge of the case reflects the existence of pervasive 
community prejudice.  Roughly 32% of the veniremembers indicated they either 
had been previously exposed to the facts of the case or knew someone involved in 
the trial.  However, as exemplified by the decision in Rolling, this fact alone is not 
sufficient to warrant a change of venue. 
Further, to prevent the members of the venire from hearing the potentially 
prejudicial opinions of other jurors, trial counsel moved for individual, sequestered 
voir dire on several topics, including prior knowledge about the case.  Nearly forty 
jurors were interviewed individually, many of whom indicated they remembered 
reading something about the case in the local newspaper shortly after the murder.  
However, because the articles were published approximately three years prior to 
voir dire, those jurors indicated they only had vague recollections of the media 
coverage.  Of those jurors who were individually interviewed, nearly all stated they 
 
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had not formed an opinion as to Ellerbee’s guilt and would decide the case based 
on the facts presented during trial, rather than relying on facts learned through 
extrinsic knowledge.  Trial counsel moved to strike any juror who so much as 
implied they could not be impartial, even if the juror explicitly stated he or she 
could be. 
Ellerbee’s trial counsel questioned jurors extensively about their ability to 
follow the law and remain impartial, and those who ultimately sat on the jury 
provided assurances they could.  All members of the venire who believed they 
could not be impartial were excused.  Therefore, to overcome the presumption of 
impartiality, Ellerbee must “demonstrate ‘the actual existence of such an opinion in 
the mind[s] of the juror[s] as will raise the presumption of partiality.’ ”  Copeland, 
457 So. 2d at 1017.  However, he has failed to do so.  Ellerbee’s general assertions 
of community prejudice fall short of demonstrating that any of the jurors actually 
seated on his jury held an opinion that could be construed as partial. 
Moreover, there is no indication that trial counsel had any difficulty 
selecting a jury, and Ellerbee does not allege as much.  Nothing in the record even 
hints at the existence of a pervasive community bias against Ellerbee.  On the 
contrary, the “jury selection process employed in this case and the responses of 
actual jurors during questioning show[] that it was possible to seat an impartial 
jury” in Okeechobee County.  Rolling, 695 So. 2d at 288. 
 
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As evidenced by the foregoing, this is not a case where “the inhabitants of 
[the] community [were] so infected by knowledge of the incident and 
accompanying prejudice, bias, and preconceived opinions that jurors could not 
possibly put these matters out of their minds.”  Griffin, 866 So. 2d at 12.  There is 
no reasonable probability the trial court would, or should, have granted a motion 
for change of venue.  Accordingly, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to 
make such a motion, and we affirm the denial of this claim. 
Prosecutor’s Comments During Voir Dire 
Ellerbee next argues that the prosecutor made improper comments about 
God and the Bible during voir dire, and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object or move for a mistrial.  During voir dire, the prosecutor questioned 
veniremembers about their ability to withstand pressure from other jurors during 
deliberations.  The prosecutor proposed several hypothetical scenarios wherein 
their beliefs could be challenged, or where they could feel pressured to reach a 
compromise.  When the prosecutor reached one juror, the following exchange 
ensued: 
[STATE]:  . . . Oh, my, Mr. . . . is a pastor.  
 
[JUROR]:  Yes, sir.  
[STATE]:  . . . [P]erhaps you could cite, Pastor . . ., Romans for us as 
it relates to the function or—of government or am I putting you on the 
spot?  
[JUROR]:  To what phase?  
[STATE]:  I don’t know.  I’m not a biblical scholar.  I figured you 
could help me out a little bit.  Big trouble.  I guess it’s—what I’m 
 
- 20 - 
 
referring to is the concept that the law here as it exists in the 
courtroom and it is our obligation to respect man’s law?  
[JUROR]:  Yes, absolutely.  
[STATE]:  How about—you’re a pastor.  You are—I mean, I don’t 
know where you fall on the pantheon of nurses and teachers but, I 
mean, you—care about the ultimate issue which is the human soul.  
[JUROR]:  Absolutely.  
[STATE]:  What does the death penalty issue—what does this raise in 
your mind, what concerns does it create with you?  
[JUROR]:  Well, I believe strongly that while there is always 
forgiveness, there are also consequences for your actions. 
[STATE]:  Okay.  What do you mean—when you say that, what does 
that mean? 
[JUROR]:  I mean, by consequences? 
[STATE]:  Yeah. 
[JUROR]:  Well, the forgiveness ultimately through God does not 
excuse us all from the consequences of man. 
[STATE]:  Okay.  And are you telling us that you would be able to, if 
you were selected as a juror in this case, . . . if convinced that there 
were beyond a reasonable doubt, . . . sufficient aggravations to 
warrant [the] death penalty and insufficient mitigation, that you could 
not only vote for the death penalty, but sign off on the verdict form? 
[JUROR]:  Yes, sir. 
[STATE]:  Could you stand in front of your congregation Sunday 
morning having done that? 
[JUROR]:  Yes, sir. 
[STATE]:  Okay.  You feel that—so when you say there are 
consequences for our actions, are the consequences dictated by what 
we do?  
[JUROR]:  Yes, they are, and in regards to the law. 
[STATE]:  Right.  Right.  And do you see that—well you may have 
Christian beliefs that allow you to forgive people and—and so forth.  
You understand that here in court, unfortunately you gotta leave, I 
won’t say God, because I think you probably should take God with 
you into the jury room, but, you’ve got to rely on the law as provided 
you by the judge?  
[JUROR]:  Yes, sir. 
[STATE]:  Okay. 
. . . 
[STATE]:  Okay.  And you’re gonna follow the law? 
 
- 21 - 
 
[JUROR]:  Yes, sir. 
 (Emphasis added.) 
 
Ellerbee contends the prosecutor in effect told the jury it was ultimately up 
to God whether Ellerbee was convicted and sentenced to death, not them, thereby 
excusing the jury from responsibility for their verdict and sentence in violation of 
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985).  In Caldwell, the United States 
Supreme Court held it is constitutionally impermissible to minimize a jury’s sense 
of responsibility for its role in capital sentencing.  Id. at 333.  In capital cases, 
jurors are placed “in a very unfamiliar situation and called on to make a very 
difficult and uncomfortable choice.  They are confronted with evidence and 
argument on the issue of whether another should die, and they are asked to decide 
that issue on behalf of the community.”  Id.  Under these circumstances, “the 
uncorrected suggestion that the responsibility for any ultimate determination of 
death will rest with others presents an intolerable danger that the jury will in fact 
choose to minimize the importance of its role.”  Id.   
Here, although the prosecutor said, “I think you probably should take God 
with you into the jury room,” he immediately followed up by asking the juror if he 
agreed that “you’ve got to rely on the law as provided [to] you by the judge.”  We 
conclude the statement with regard to God did not minimize the jury’s role: the 
prosecutor did not imply that the jurors should consider God when reaching their 
decision, nor did he imply it was ultimately up to God whether Ellerbee was 
 
- 22 - 
 
convicted.  On the contrary, the prosecutor’s remarks clarified that the jury’s role is 
to follow the law as provided by the court, regardless of their faith or beliefs.  
When read in context, it is clear the prosecutor intended to ascertain whether the 
juror could set aside his religious convictions and follow the law.  This conclusion 
is bolstered by the fact that the prosecutor asked the juror not once, but twice, 
whether he would follow the law.  Trial counsel cannot be deficient for failing to 
object to these remarks, which were reasonable in evaluating a pastor’s ability to 
serve as a juror. 
 
This Court has cautioned prosecutors “that arguments invoking religion can 
easily cross the boundary of proper argument and become prejudicial.”  Lawrence 
v. State, 691 So. 2d 1068, 1074 n.8 (Fla. 1997); see also Ferrell v. State, 686 So. 2d 
1324, 1328 (Fla. 1996) (“Without question, trial judges and attorneys should 
refrain from discussing religious philosophy in court proceedings.”).  However, not 
every statement referencing God or the Bible is prejudicial.  “A new trial should be 
granted when it is ‘reasonably evident that the remarks might have influenced the 
jury to reach a more severe verdict of guilt than it would have otherwise done.’ ”  
Breedlove v. State, 413 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1982) (quoting Darden v. State, 329 So. 
2d 287, 289 (Fla. 1976)).  In Lawrence, the defendant alleged the prosecutor made 
improper comments during closing statements “that equated the jury’s sentencing 
task to ‘God’s judgment of the wicked.’  In his closing argument, the prosecutor 
 
- 23 - 
 
recounted a biblical story in order to describe the weighing process a jury must 
employ.”  691 So. 2d at 1074.  Lawrence argued the “prosecutor’s comments 
appealed to the jurors’ emotions rather than reason and thus tainted the jury’s 
recommendation.”  Id.  This Court noted trial counsel failed to object to the 
statements and concluded that “in the context of the entire argument [they did] not 
amount to fundamental error.”  Id. 
 
Similarly, in Ferrell, this Court determined the trial court’s comments to the 
jury about the Bible, which counsel did not object to, did not constitute 
fundamental error.  686 So. 2d at 1328.  There, the trial judge made comments 
during voir dire regarding the origins of the Biblical commandment “thou shalt not 
kill”: 
THE COURT: Let me add one thing here, counsel, every time this 
comes up we have different opinions about it. . . . 
Inquiry has been made over the last twenty or thirty years that 
both Hebrew and Christian scholars, they tell us—these are students 
who have been studying it for long years—they tell us in the original 
Bible, in Greek, Hebrew, and Arabic, the Ten Commandments say 
“Thou shalt not commit murder.”  It doesn’t say anything about “Thou 
shalt not kill.”  It says, “Thou shall not commit murder.”  It does not 
say, “Thou shalt not kill.” 
Id. at 1327-28.  This Court determined “the judge’s brief discussion was harmless 
when viewed in light of the entire record.”  Id. at 1328. 
 
As previously discussed, the prosecutor’s comments in this case were 
appropriate when viewed in context.  They were intended to ascertain the ability of 
 
- 24 - 
 
a pastor to set aside his religious convictions and follow the law.  Ellerbee has 
failed to establish that trial counsel’s failure to object to these comments was 
outside the “broad range of reasonably competent performance under prevailing 
professional standards.”  Maxwell, 490 So. 2d at 932.  Therefore, trial counsel was 
not deficient for failing to object to such comments. 
Additionally, in light of the overwhelming evidence against him, Ellerbee 
cannot demonstrate prejudice.  The prosecutor’s remarks were isolated: jury 
selection took several days and yielded a transcript of over 1100 pages.  Moreover, 
the pastor was not selected to sit on the jury.  There is no reasonable probability 
that the outcome of the trial would have been different if trial counsel had objected 
to the prosecutor’s comments, and our confidence in the outcome of the guilt phase 
proceedings has not been undermined.  Accordingly, we affirm the denial of this 
claim. 
Answering Machine Tape 
In Ellerbee’s next claim, he argues that trial counsel was ineffective during 
the guilt phase for failing to move in limine to prevent admission of the victim’s 
answering machine tape or for failing to redact certain portions of the tape.  During 
trial, the State introduced as evidence an answering machine tape from Dellarco’s 
home.  The messages span the days between when Dellarco was killed and when 
his body was found.  The tape contained messages from various people, including 
 
- 25 - 
 
individuals who had business with Dellarco, such as his realtor, banker, doctor, and 
veterinarian.  Other messages were from family and friends expressing concern 
about their inability to reach Dellarco.  Examples include: “Where are you?  Where 
are you?  I haven’t talked to you on the phone in a while”; “I’m very concerned 
about you.  We’ve been trying to reach you since Friday and you’re not answering 
your phone”; “I can’t understand this.  Please pick up the phone. . . .  Answer your 
calls, come on, Tom”; “I tried to get a hold of you last Friday, and today again on 
Monday”; “I’ve been trying you all weekend and now it’s Tuesday evening around 
five. . . .  I’m getting very concerned”; “Boy, I’m getting real worried now.  I’m 
going to call the police.  You’ve got to call me or I’m going to call the police”; “It 
is Wednesday night about 6:30.  Tommy, I’m so worried.”  Many of the messages 
from friends and family ended with the caller saying “I love you.” 
During trial, a detective testified that the answering machine tape was 
helpful to the investigation because the number of messages on the tape provided a 
time frame as to how long Dellarco was not answering his phone, as well as who 
was trying to contact him.  Trial counsel initially objected to the introduction of the 
tape as hearsay.  The State countered that the tape was not being offered for the 
truth of the matter; rather, it established a time frame as to when Dellarco stopped 
answering his phone, and showed how the investigation led to Ellerbee as a 
 
- 26 - 
 
suspect.5  Trial counsel then withdrew the objection.  The postconviction court 
rejected this claim, concluding Ellerbee could not “demonstrate prejudice on this 
record containing overwhelming evidence of guilt.”  The court did not address 
whether counsel was deficient.  Id. 
Ellerbee argues trial counsel should have moved to exclude Dellarco’s 
answering machine tape because the messages served only to incite the sympathy 
of the jurors and did not clearly establish a time frame because the machine’s time 
stamp was not set.  However, several of the callers did state when they were calling 
and when they were last able to reach Dellarco.  Moreover, as the detective 
explained, the number of messages left on the tape (twenty-five) indicated that a 
significant amount of time had passed since Dellarco had last answered his phone. 
Because an evidentiary hearing was denied on this claim, it is impossible to 
ascertain why trial counsel withdrew his objection and why he did not move to 
redact the messages that lacked a time reference.  However, even if trial counsel 
was deficient, Ellerbee cannot establish prejudice.  Ellerbee did not deny killing 
Dellarco, but insisted it was accidental.  Consequently, the tape did not bear on 
Ellerbee’s guilt, and there is no reasonable probability the outcome of the trial 
                                          
 
 
5.  The tape included a message from a bank representative expressing 
concern about a check of Dellarco’s that was presented to be cashed.  It was later 
established that Ellerbee was the individual trying to cash the check.  Ellerbee, 87 
So. 3d at 734. 
 
- 27 - 
 
would have been different if counsel had objected to the tape’s introduction or 
redacted portions of it.  Accordingly, our confidence in the outcome of the guilt 
phase proceedings has not been undermined, and Ellerbee is not entitled to relief 
on this claim. 
Theory of Defense 
In his final guilt phase claim, Ellerbee argues trial counsel was ineffective 
for presenting a legally invalid defense.  Counsel incorrectly stated that Ellerbee’s 
actions could not constitute felony murder because the killing was accidental.  
Ellerbee asserts trial counsel should have pursued a valid defense to the underlying 
felony to attack the felony murder theory, but fails to identify what that defense 
could be.6  Although an evidentiary hearing was granted on this issue, Ellerbee 
failed to present any witnesses or other evidence to prove this claim.  Therefore, 
the postconviction court denied this claim as being abandoned or waived.  We 
agree and affirm.  See Wickham v. State, 124 So. 3d 841, 860 (Fla. 2013) (holding  
ineffective assistance of counsel claim was abandoned or waived where the claim 
was raised in the postconviction motion and an evidentiary hearing was granted to 
address the claim, but the defendant failed to pursue it). 
                                          
 
 
6.  Given the overwhelming evidence of guilt—including a full confession—
Ellerbee admits the defense’s only viable option may have been to concede guilt 
and immediately pursue a mitigation strategy. 
 
- 28 - 
 
Ineffective Assistance of Penalty Phase Counsel 
 
Based on our conclusion that Ellerbee is entitled to a new penalty phase 
proceeding pursuant to Hurst and Mosley, we would normally decline to reach his 
penalty phase claims.  Nevertheless, we feel compelled to address this issue 
because of the egregious nature of Ellerbee’s upbringing, counsel’s failure to 
discover it, and the prejudice Ellerbee suffered as a result.7  Due to the multiple 
failures of trial counsel to explore and present various aspects of Ellerbee’s 
childhood, compounded with the presentation of conflicting evidence during the 
penalty phase, we cannot say the outcome of the penalty phase would have been 
the same had the jury heard this evidence. 
In his postconviction motion, Ellerbee argued trial counsel was ineffective 
during the penalty phase for failing to discover and present “statutory and 
nonstatutory mitigating evidence of: PTSD, physical and emotional abuse by his 
alcoholic, drug-addicted father, and expert testimony about the physical, 
emotional, and psychological effects of child abuse and witnessing spousal 
violence.”  After an evidentiary hearing was held on this claim, the postconviction 
court found “deficient performance of trial counsel in failing to discover the 
                                          
 
7.  Our discussion of Ellerbee’s claim of ineffective assistance of penalty 
phase counsel is limited to whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
discover and present certain mitigation.  We decline to address Ellerbee’s claim 
that penalty phase counsel was ineffective for failing to move to exclude evidence 
related to the CCP aggravator. 
 
- 29 - 
 
noncumulative evidence of paternal neglect, paternal abuse, and the extent of 
paternal substance abuse.”  While we agree with the postconviction court that 
penalty phase counsel was deficient, we disagree with its conclusion that Ellerbee 
was not prejudiced by that deficiency. 
Failure to Discover Childhood Abuse 
During the penalty phase, eleven lay witnesses testified about Ellerbee’s 
upbringing.  Several of them testified regarding the abuse Ellerbee and his siblings 
suffered at the hands of their mother, Brenda Jacobs (Brenda).  Shannon Smith 
(Shannon), Ellerbee’s half brother, lived with Brenda and Ellerbee’s father, Terry 
Ellerbee, Sr. (Terry),8 for several years, but was eventually removed from their 
care by the Department of Children and Families (DCF) when bruises were 
discovered on his body.  Shannon testified the bruises were a result of being beaten 
by Brenda and Terry.  Shannon testified that during his stay with the Ellerbees, he, 
Ellerbee, and Ellerbee’s half sister were mistreated.  For example, Brenda told the 
children they were worthless, poked them with a cattle prod, forced them to drink 
castor oil as punishment, and beat them with hoses, switches, and cutting boards.  
Terry sometimes beat them with his belt.  The children were always hungry 
                                          
 
 
8.  Because Ellerbee and his father share the same name, we refer to the 
defendant’s father as “Terry” and the defendant as “Ellerbee.” 
 
- 30 - 
 
because Brenda did not feed them consistently.  She kept a padlock on the 
refrigerator and punished the children for asking for food. 
Ellerbee’s uncle testified that Brenda wanted nothing to do with Ellerbee.  In 
his opinion, “she hated [Ellerbee] very much.”  He said this rejection was very 
hard for Ellerbee.  Ellerbee’s paternal grandmother testified that “Brenda was a 
mean, cold hearted person” who was not involved much in Ellerbee’s life.  Brenda 
eventually walked out on the family when Ellerbee was seven years old. 
However, only limited testimony was presented during the penalty phase 
regarding abuse by Terry.  In fact, several witnesses testified that Ellerbee and 
Terry were close and were more like friends than father and son.  Although 
testimony was presented that Terry was a heavy drinker who exposed Ellerbee to 
drugs and alcohol at an early age, other witnesses, including Terry himself, 
contradicted these assertions.  The overall sentiment was that Terry did the best he 
could for Ellerbee, even if he was not a perfect father or role model.  This is 
reflected in the trial court’s sentencing order: 
[T]his Court is convinced that as imperfect as his father was, he loved 
the defendant and spent as much free time with his son as he could.  
He would take the defendant when he was a child to work with him 
and ride the tractor, as at times, there was no one to watch the 
defendant while his father worked.  [Terry] took the defendant to hog 
and deer hunt and to fish.  [Terry] never physically abused the 
defendant, although he may have spanked him.  [Terry] provided for 
his son as best he could given their circumstances and never neglected 
or abandoned him. 
 
- 31 - 
 
(Emphasis added.)  As a result, the trial court assigned “very little weight” to the 
nonstatutory mitigator that Ellerbee had little proper parental guidance from his 
father.  In addition, other related mitigators (Ellerbee suffered from a difficult 
childhood, and Terry abused drugs and alcohol) were afforded minimal weight and 
little weight, respectively. 
However, testimony presented during the evidentiary hearing painted a 
much darker picture of Ellerbee’s childhood, and it was revealed that Terry 
physically abused Ellerbee.  Witnesses testified that Terry would whip and beat 
Ellerbee with his belt, punch him in the chest to “knock the air outta him,” and 
frequently hit him with his fists or the back of his hand.  One witness testified that 
she saw Terry punch Ellerbee in the head when he was very young, between three 
and six years of age.  Family members opined the beatings went beyond normal 
discipline. 
Terry would bring Ellerbee to the “bad part of town” while he looked for 
women and drugs, sometimes locking Ellerbee in the toolbox of his truck while he 
did so.  On other occasions, Terry would drop Ellerbee off with a relative for 
several days, often wearing dirty clothes with nothing to change into, while Terry 
went on a bender.  When Ellerbee was sixteen or seventeen, Terry asked his aunt if 
Ellerbee could stay with her family, saying “it was his last chance of having any 
kinda life.”  She testified she believed Terry “didn’t want” Ellerbee and was just 
 
- 32 - 
 
trying to get rid of him.  Ellerbee was described as “undernourished” when he 
arrived at his great-aunt’s house.  Ellerbee became possessive of his food, and 
“would act like he wasn’t never gonna [get] another bite.” 
According to Cheryl Smith, Ellerbee’s middle and elementary school 
guidance counselor, Terry was not involved in Ellerbee’s education and was 
unresponsive to correspondence from the school.  Smith found Terry to be 
“intimidating,” and “felt that he didn’t want to be there and didn’t particularly care 
what we did with [Ellerbee].”  Ellerbee was frequently absent from school, a fact 
that concerned Smith.  She explained that Ellerbee was placed in a dropout 
prevention program in middle school, but Terry withdrew Ellerbee from the 
program in the eighth grade.  Ellerbee eventually dropped out of school at age 
sixteen, after unsuccessfully attempting to complete the ninth grade. 
Testimony was also presented regarding Terry’s alcohol and substance 
abuse.  Terry’s nephew described him as a “bar hopper” who drank, used drugs, 
and “had a lot of women through his house.”  He was not welcome in certain 
family members’ homes because of his lifestyle.  Another family member testified 
that Terry was always drunk, and she tried to stay away from him because he made 
her uncomfortable.  Ellerbee’s great-aunt described Terry as a womanizer who had 
no respect for anybody and was drunk most of the time. 
 
- 33 - 
 
According to the testimony of several family members, Terry also failed to 
provide Ellerbee with his basic needs, including decent clothing, housing, or 
nourishment.  Ellerbee almost never had clean clothes to wear, and his head was 
always kept shaved due to lice infestations.  Ellerbee’s great-uncle testified that on 
one occasion, he had to purchase new pants for Ellerbee because the ones he was 
wearing were soiled with feces.  Family who visited Terry and Ellerbee at their 
trailer described it as “filthy” and “unsanitary,” saying it “should have been 
condemned.”  When Ellerbee’s great-uncle was asked to describe the living 
conditions, he said, “If you can imagine a dump, it’s worse.”  The trailer had bugs, 
rotten furniture, and piles of dirty dishes everywhere.  The clutter made it difficult 
to walk around.  Some family members avoided visiting them because of the filth. 
Further, in contrast to the rosy image of Terry taking Ellerbee on father/son 
hunting trips as presented during the penalty phase, testimony presented during the 
evidentiary hearing cast these trips in a different light.  According to witnesses’ 
first-hand accounts, the trips were usually taken at night, involved a lot of drinking, 
and were described as “crazily dangerous” because the hogs were “very mean” and 
often massive in size—nearly 400 pounds with six-inch tusks.  Ellerbee was 
allowed to drink on the trips, too, despite being only thirteen or fourteen years old.  
If the adults became too intoxicated, Ellerbee was forced to drive them home.  
Hunting dogs were always taken on the trips, but they were often mistreated by 
 
- 34 - 
 
Terry, who would kick them and strike them with his hands or a flashlight.  Terry 
killed the dogs that were injured or refused to hunt—something Ellerbee witnessed 
first-hand.  On one particular trip, when Ellerbee was seven or eight, his father 
took him hunting in the middle of the night, and “the dogs were howling, the pigs 
were squealing, the men were drunk, shots were fired off, he was really terrified . . 
. and he start[ed] to cry” as he hid in Terry’s truck.  When Terry discovered him, 
he pulled him out through the window and proceeded to beat him for crying, 
saying he would “give [Ellerbee] something to cry about if [he] didn’t stop.” 
All of the witnesses who testified during the evidentiary hearing stated they 
were never contacted by trial counsel, but would have been available and willing to 
testify if they had been contacted. 
Failure to Develop Mental Health Mitigation 
In his postconviction motion, Ellerbee argued that trial counsel was 
ineffective during the penalty phase for failing to present expert testimony to 
explain how Ellerbee’s abusive background and extensive drug use damaged his 
brain and affected his cognitive development.  The postconviction court found that 
trial counsel was not deficient.  We disagree.  Trial counsel’s presentation of 
mental health mitigation consisted of conflicting evidence and unsubstantiated 
claims that Ellerbee suffered from various mental disorders.  When viewed in the 
 
- 35 - 
 
context of the entire penalty phase, we conclude that trial counsel was ineffective 
in the presentation of mental health mitigation. 
The testimony presented during the postconviction evidentiary hearing not 
only expanded upon the abuse Ellerbee suffered during his upbringing, but also 
explained how that abuse directly impacted Ellerbee’s development.  According to 
the postconviction testimony of defense expert Dr. James Garbarino, a professor of 
psychology, “most children who grow up in severely abusive, neglectful homes 
who experience early trauma grow up to be very damaged and impaired in 
executive function[ing] and emotional regulation” which can result in “a variety of 
antisocial behavior as well as self-destructive behavior, of which committing a 
murder is certainly one.”  He explained there is “growing evidence . . . that child 
abuse is one of the most powerful destructive forces in the life of a child.” 
Dr. Garbarino also testified about Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACE) 
and studies that have drawn a correlation between adverse experiences in 
childhood and bad outcomes later in life.  There are ten possible ACEs identified 
by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention as adversely affecting child and 
adolescent development: (1) emotional abuse, (2) physical abuse, (3) incarceration 
of a household member, (4) emotional neglect, (5) physical neglect, (6) divorced or 
separated parents, (7) domestic violence, (8) exposure to substance abuse, 
(9) depression or mental illness of a family household member, and (10) sexual 
 
- 36 - 
 
abuse.  Ellerbee was exposed to at least the first nine adverse experiences.  Only 
one-tenth of one percent (or one in one thousand people) are exposed to more than 
seven ACEs.  In other words, Ellerbee was in the “bottom 1 percent as far as 
quality of life as a child growing up.”  Dr. Garbarino explained that children 
exposed to at least nine of these adverse experiences will have impaired 
development, including impaired emotional regulation, executive function, and 
decision making.  A high exposure to ACEs, such as what Ellerbee experienced, is 
correlated to an increased risk of substance abuse, depression, domestic violence, 
and suicide, among other negative outcomes. 
Dr. Garbarino also testified regarding psychological maltreatment as a 
source of abuse.  He explained that psychological abuse comes in many forms:   
(1) rejection (giving the child messages of rejection; telling them they are 
worthless), (2) isolation (cutting the child off from normal social experiences that 
are critical to becoming well-socialized), (3) ignoring (depriving the child of 
interaction), (4) terrorizing (using fear to manipulate and threaten the child), and 
(5) corrupting (missocializing the child; engaging the child in inappropriate 
experiences with substance abuse, sexuality, or illegal behavior).  Dr. Garbarino 
found instances of all five forms of psychological abuse throughout Ellerbee’s 
childhood. 
 
- 37 - 
 
Dr. Garbarino opined that Brenda’s rejection and abandonment of Ellerbee, 
both before and after she walked out on the family, profoundly affected his 
development.  Dr. Garbarino explained that parental rejection is a very powerful 
form of psychological maltreatment.  “[P]arental rejection by itself accounts for 
about 25 percent of bad outcomes in development,” whereas “smoking only 
accounts for 15 percent of lung cancer.”  Therefore, he opined, parental rejection 
“is sort of worse for you developmentally than smoking is physiologically.”  Dr. 
Garbarino explained that maternal abandonment and rejection “is both statistically 
unusual and . . . because of the primacy of the maternal/child bond, particularly 
devastating and destructive and . . . the kind of rage and sadness and depression 
and damage it does is—is paramount.” 
Dr. Garbarino also found Ellerbee’s age of twenty-one at the time of the 
murder to be significant.  He acknowledged the “legal bright line” of eighteen 
being the age of adulthood, but opined that such a bright line is at odds with 
developmental psychology.  He explained that a person’s brain does not fully 
develop emotional regulation, executive function, and decision making until he 
reaches his late twenties.  He added, “And that’s for a normal population who 
hasn’t had traumatic abuse at childhood.”  He opined that while Ellerbee was 
legally an adult, he was not “a fully functioning adult” developmentally.  
 
- 38 - 
 
According to Dr. Garbarino, Ellerbee’s abusive childhood would have further 
impaired his intellectual and emotional development. 
 
Defense expert Dr. Marlyne Israelian also testified during the evidentiary 
hearing about how Ellerbee’s abusive childhood and subsequent drug use affected 
his brain development and behavior.  She explained that humans are born with 
brains that are still developing, and environmental factors play a significant role in 
postnatal brain development.  For example, emotion is regulated by the frontal 
lobe.  Because the frontal lobe is not fully developed at birth, an infant needs to 
look to the primary care giver, usually the mother, to learn appropriate reactions to 
new situations.  Therefore, “bonding, nurturing, [and] soothing affection” are 
critical to development of the frontal lobe, and consequently, emotional regulation.  
Children who are deprived of such bonding—because they have been abandoned 
or neglected by their mothers, for example—will “have tremendous difficulties in 
adulthood with relationships and with emotional regulation.” 
Dr. Israelian also explained that “the circuits in the brain are drastically and 
permanently changed by chronic stress and maltreatment.”  If a child grows up in a 
dangerous or abusive environment, his or her brain will constantly be responding 
to stressors by sending distress signals to the rest of the body.  The body reacts 
accordingly—respiration, perspiration, and heart rate increase, senses are 
heightened, etc.—to prepare the body for “fight or flight.”  Similar to how a 
 
- 39 - 
 
muscle strengthens the more it is used, the “fight or flight” response is 
strengthened the more the distress signals are fired.  As a result, the brain will 
begin sending distress signals even in the absence of real danger or conflict.  
Consequently, the brain will develop in such a way that the individual’s reactions 
are governed by his or her emotions, not reason. 
In addition, stressful events result in the body releasing cortisol.  
Dr. Israelian explained, “[Y]ou know how we say stress kills you?  It does it 
through cortisol.”  Chronic levels of cortisol can cause damage to organ systems 
and brain functioning.  Consequently, children who have been chronically 
maltreated have an increased risk of depression, anxiety, posttraumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD), substance abuse, personality disorders, and psychosis.  Chronic 
maltreatment also impairs the development of the frontal lobe, resulting in 
difficulties with problem solving, impulse control, and considering the long-term 
consequences of one’s actions. 
 
Dr. Israelian described the chronic maltreatment Ellerbee suffered as a child 
and opined that it would have had profound effects on Ellerbee’s development.  Dr. 
Israelian’s interview of Ellerbee’s family revealed that his mother, Brenda, never 
held Ellerbee or showed any interest in him.  Brenda would lock the food away and 
refused to feed the children all day.  The children would only be fed at night, after 
the adults ate.  Brenda would lock the children out of the house for hours without 
 
- 40 - 
 
food or water, and if she caught them sneaking food, she would beat them.  On 
several occasions, Brenda forced the children to stand on their toes, and if their feet 
dropped from fatigue, she would whip the backs of their heels.  The abuse was so 
severe that Ellerbee’s half brother and half sister were removed from the home by 
DCF.  Shortly after, Brenda moved out, leaving Ellerbee with Terry.  The couple 
subsequently divorced. 
 
When Ellerbee was ten, he went to live with Brenda.  However, the living 
arrangement ended abruptly.  One day when Ellerbee was visiting his grandmother, 
“Brenda drove out there with all of his clothes, dumped it on [his grandmother’s] 
front yard and told him not to come back to the house, and . . . [Ellerbee] just 
collapsed and sobbed.” 
 
For a couple of years, Ellerbee would visit his grandmother after school 
where “there was always food, she taught him to swim, [and] they played.”  
Ellerbee described those years as the happiest of his life.  However, the sense of 
safety and stability that his grandmother provided came to an end when Terry 
relocated them to Kenansville, a small community in Osceola County.  There, the 
two lived in a filthy trailer. 
 
Ellerbee began to heavily use methamphetamine and crack cocaine as a 
teenager.  Dr. Israelian explained that methamphetamine is toxic to the brain and 
particularly affects the frontal lobe, an area of Ellerbee’s brain that was already 
 
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impaired due to the chronic maltreatment he experienced as a child.  Chronic 
methamphetamine use causes brain damage “that is sustained well past sobriety,” 
and can be permanent.  It also can cause hallucinations, delusions, and paranoia.  It 
impairs rational thought, preventing users from regulating their actions in order to 
stop maladaptive behaviors.  Dr. Israelian administered a battery of tests to 
Ellerbee, and the results were consistent with “what you expect to find with 
someone who has had methamphetamine exposure, and has frontal lobe deficits.” 
Although trial counsel did present mental health mitigation during the 
penalty phase through the testimony of defense expert Dr. Riordan, his testimony 
did not provide a detailed explanation of the effect that abuse and drug use can 
have on cognitive development.  Instead, and at trial counsel’s direction, 
Dr. Riordan’s testimony focused on the possibility that Ellerbee’s 
neuropsychological deficits were caused by fetal alcohol syndrome, head injuries, 
or both.  During the penalty phase, Dr. Riordan opined that Ellerbee’s family 
history “contains quite a bit of alcoholism and the mother in particular had a strong 
history of alcohol, so there’s a[n] . . . indication that some of the 
neuropsychological deficits that I found were related to the pregnancy with him 
and the use of alcohol by the mother.”  However, during cross-examination, 
Dr. Riordan conceded Ellerbee had not been previously diagnosed with fetal 
 
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alcohol syndrome.9  In fact, Terry testified during the penalty phase that Brenda 
did not drink when she was pregnant with Ellerbee.  It is unclear why trial counsel 
directed Dr. Riordan to focus on fetal alcohol syndrome while simultaneously 
presenting testimony directly contradicting its existence. 
Application 
We agree with the postconviction court’s conclusion that trial counsel was 
deficient for failing to discover paternal neglect, paternal abuse, and the extent of 
paternal substance abuse.  Although some witnesses described Brenda’s abusive 
behavior, trial counsel failed to properly explore how her abuse affected Ellerbee’s 
emotional and cognitive development.  Moreover, Terry’s physical abuse of 
Ellerbee was not revealed during the penalty phase, despite the fact that those who 
testified about the abuse during the evidentiary hearing were members of 
Ellerbee’s family.  Notably, these were not distant family members: they were 
aunts, uncles, and cousins who were close to Ellerbee as a child and, in some cases, 
even resided with him.  They witnessed the abuse Ellerbee suffered and were more 
than willing to testify about it.  However, these crucial witnesses were never 
contacted by trial counsel.  It is well established that “counsel has a duty to make 
                                          
 
9.  Similarly, trial counsel presented as mitigation Dr. Riordan’s testimony 
that Ellerbee suffered from mental health issues, including cognitive disorder, 
bipolar disorder, and attention deficit disorder.  However, Dr. Riordan conceded on 
cross-examination that Ellerbee had never been diagnosed with any of these 
disorders. 
 
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reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular 
investigations unnecessary.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.  Here, trial counsel relied 
on a witness list compiled by Ellerbee, without instructing his mitigation 
specialists to find additional witnesses.  Counsel’s failure to conduct a complete 
investigation was unreasonable under the circumstances, and it resulted in an 
incomplete presentation of mitigation. 
Further, as previously discussed, trial counsel presented conflicting 
testimony during the penalty phase.  According to Dr. Riordan, trial counsel 
instructed him to focus on the theory that Ellerbee suffered from fetal alcohol 
syndrome, but this theory was undermined by Terry’s testimony that Brenda did 
not drink while she was pregnant with Ellerbee.  In addition, trial counsel 
instructed his mitigation specialists to focus on lay witness testimony of Brenda’s 
abuse of Ellerbee, but this was undermined by Brenda and Terry’s testimony that 
they only occasionally spanked him.  This contradictory evidence would have 
confused the jury at best and, at worst, raised suspicions of defense counsel’s 
honesty.  Moreover, because Brenda and Terry’s testimony was videotaped, trial 
counsel could—and should—have moved to redact the inconsistencies.  No 
reasonable attorney would have presented such conflicting evidence during the 
penalty phase of a capital case.  Thus, trial counsel’s performance fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. 
 
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We disagree with the postconviction court’s conclusion that Ellerbee was 
not prejudiced by trial counsel’s deficiency.  Although the jury heard the testimony 
of various family members and friends who testified about Ellerbee’s 
impoverished childhood and abusive mother, the jury never heard the testimony of 
family members who witnessed the chronic abuse he suffered at the hands of his 
father.  We also disagree that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to present 
expert testimony to explain how Ellerbee’s cognitive development was affected by 
his drug use and the horrific physical, emotional, and psychological abuse he 
suffered as a child.  The jury heard defense expert Dr. Riordan’s mitigation theory 
of fetal alcohol syndrome, only to later hear completely contradictory testimony.  
Moreover, although the jury heard that Ellerbee’s mother abandoned him as a 
child, and that he was exposed to drugs at a young age and used them heavily as a 
teenager, they did not hear how these experiences affected the development of his 
brain. 
Had the jury heard about the extensive abuse Ellerbee suffered and how it 
affected his emotional and cognitive development, in addition to the other 
mitigation presented during the penalty phase, there is a reasonable probability that 
they would have arrived at a different conclusion regarding sentencing.  
Accordingly, we hold that confidence in the outcome of the penalty phase has been 
undermined, and penalty phase counsel was ineffective.  Therefore, even if 
 
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Ellerbee was not receiving relief pursuant to Hurst and Mosley, he would be 
entitled to a new penalty phase proceeding pursuant to Strickland. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Ellerbee argues his death sentence 
is unconstitutional under Hurst v. Florida.  In Hurst v. Florida, the United States 
Supreme Court held that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional 
because “[t]he Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact 
necessary to impose a sentence of death.  A jury’s mere recommendation is not 
enough.”  136 S. Ct. at 619.  On remand, in Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 
2016), we held: 
[B]efore the trial judge may consider imposing a sentence of death, 
the jury in a capital case must unanimously and expressly find all the 
aggravating factors that were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, 
unanimously find that the aggravating factors are sufficient to impose 
death, unanimously find that the aggravating factors outweigh the 
mitigating circumstances, and unanimously recommend a sentence of 
death. 
 
Id. at 57.  In Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248 (Fla. 2016), we concluded that Hurst 
applies retroactively to those defendants whose sentences became final after the 
Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  Mosley, 209 So. 3d 
at 1283.  In light of the nonunanimous jury recommendation to impose a sentence 
of death, it cannot be said that the failure to require a unanimous verdict here was 
harmless.  See, e.g., Hodges v. State, 213 So. 3d 863, 880-81 (Fla. 2017). 
 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief.  
However, we grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus, vacate Ellerbee’s death 
sentence, and remand for a new penalty phase proceeding. 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
LEWIS, J., concurs in result. 
CANADY, J., concurs in result with an opinion, in which POLSTON, J., concurs. 
LAWSON, J., concurs specially with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
CANADY, J., concurring in result. 
 
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that Ellerbee is entitled to relief on his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding the penalty phase proceedings.  
See majority op. at 28-29.  I therefore concur with the decision to vacate the 
sentence of death. 
POLSTON, J., concurs. 
LAWSON, J., concurring specially. 
 
I fully concur in the majority opinion except for the conclusion that Ellerbee 
is entitled to relief pursuant to Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 2161 (2017), and Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248 (Fla. 2016).  
For reasons explained in Okafor v. State, 225 So. 3d 768, 775-76 (Fla. 2017) 
 
- 47 - 
 
(Lawson, J., concurring specially), I specially concur in that portion of the opinion 
granting Hurst relief. 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Okeechobee County,  
Dan Lewis Vaughn, Judge - Case No. 472006CF000814CFAXMX 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus  
 
Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Nicole M. Noël, Assistant 
Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Marta Jaszczolt, Staff Attorney, Southern 
Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
for Appellant/Cross-Appellee/Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Lisa-Marie Lerner, 
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
for Appellee/Cross-Appellant/Respondent