Title: Campbell v. Harmon

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
JERRY ALLEN CAMPBELL, EXECUTOR 
OF THE ESTATE OF GORDON LITTLE 
OPINION BY 
v. 
Record No. 051410 
 
 
 
  JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE 
April 21, 2006 
D. GREGORY HARMON, TRUSTEE  
OF THE MARGARET STEWART LITTLE  
MARITAL TRUST, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAUQUIER COUNTY 
Jeffrey W. Parker, Judge 
 
Jerry Allen Campbell, executor of the estate of Gordon 
Little, appeals from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Fauquier 
County, which held that he lacked standing to seek an accounting 
from D. Gregory Harmon and Peter B. Valentine, trustees of The 
Margaret Stewart Little Marital Trust (“Trustees”).1  At issue in 
this appeal is whether the personal representative of the estate 
of a decedent who was a lifetime beneficiary of a trust has 
standing to seek an accounting from the trust fiduciaries.  For 
the reasons set forth below, we will affirm in part, and reverse 
in part, the judgment of the trial court. 
 
 
                     
1 The Trustees are both certified public accountants who 
served as full-time trustees not only for the Margaret Stewart 
Little Marital Trust established by Mrs. Little, but also serve 
as fiduciaries for other trusts established by her and the 
Stewart family.  The trust at issue in this case was created in 
California and the Trustees reside there.  However, no party 
disputes that Virginia law controls the issues arising in the 
case at bar. 
 
 
2
I. 
BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Margaret Stewart Little, as part of a trust agreement 
created during her lifetime, established the Margaret Stewart 
Little Marital Trust (“the Marital Trust”) for the benefit of 
her husband, Gordon Little, which took effect at her death in 
1984.  The following terms governed the Marital Trust’s 
administration and distribution: 
1. 
The Trustees shall pay to or for the benefit of 
[Gordon Little], all of the trust net income, in 
installments to be selected by the Trustees . . . 
provided, however, that the Trustees shall pay to 
[Gordon] not less than the sum of $3,000 per month 
. . . . 
 
In addition to the net income the Trustees may pay 
to or for the benefit of [Gordon Little] as much of 
the trust principal as the Trustees, in their 
absolute discretion, deem necessary for his support 
and health expenses, including, but not limited to, 
medical, hospital, doctors, nursing, dental and 
other health expenses. 
 
Under the terms of the Marital Trust, Little was the sole 
income beneficiary of that trust during his lifetime and payment 
of the net trust income to him was a mandatory requirement of 
the trust.  The Marital Trust further provided that upon 
Little’s death it would terminate and any remaining trust 
property, “excluding undistributed income, [would] vest in and 
be added to the Family Trust.”2  “The undistributed income held 
                     
2 Neither Gordon Little nor his estate was a beneficiary of, 
had any interest in, or control of the Family Trust, which was 
also created by Margaret Stewart Little. 
 
 
3
by the Trustees as of the date of” Little’s death, however, 
would “be paid to the personal representative of his estate for 
the purposes of administration therein.”  By its terms, the 
Marital Trust qualified for the marital deduction on the United 
States estate tax return of the estate of Margaret Stewart 
Little, as a qualified terminable interest property trust under 
Internal Revenue Code § 2056(b)(7). 
From 1984 until his death in June 1999, Little received 
certain distributions from the Trustees out of the Marital 
Trust.  The Trustees never rendered an accounting to Little 
during his lifetime as to the discharge of their fiduciary 
duties under the Marital Trust.  The record does not indicate 
Little formally requested an accounting.  Following Little’s 
death, his will was admitted to probate and Campbell qualified 
as the executor of Little’s estate.  A provision of Little’s 
will provides: “I grant unto my Executor all rights and powers 
set forth in Section 64.1-57 of the Code of Virginia.” 
A disagreement arose between Campbell and the Trustees as 
to the administration of the Marital Trust prior to Little’s 
death and as to the disposition of certain tangible personal 
property after Little’s death.  In July 2000, Campbell filed a 
bill of complaint to compel an accounting and other relief from 
the Trustees.  Citing the trial court’s authority to order an 
accounting under Code § 8.01-31, Campbell sought to have the 
 
 
4
Trustees account for two events:  First, for tangible personal 
property the Trustees “removed from Heritage Farm[3] following 
the death of Gordon Little,” and, second, “for their 
administration of the Margaret Stewart Little [Marital] Trust.”  
Campbell asserted that the Trustees wrongfully removed tangible 
personal property from Heritage Farm after Little’s death that 
belonged to Little personally.  Campbell further alleged that a 
“full, complete and fair accounting by the Defendant Trustees 
will show that moneys are due from the [Marital Trust] to the 
Estate of Gordon Little.” 
 
During a June 2, 2003 hearing, the trial court observed 
that under Code § 8.01-31, Little would have been entitled to an 
accounting from the Trustees during his lifetime for their 
administration of the Marital Trust.  However, the trial court 
questioned whether Campbell, as executor of Little’s estate, now 
had standing to compel an accounting.  Campbell argued he 
succeeded to Little’s Code § 8.01-31 right to an accounting by 
virtue of the survival provisions of Code § 8.01-25.  The 
Trustees contended Code § 8.01-25 did not apply and that their 
delivery of “financial statements” to Little during his lifetime 
satisfied any obligation to account for administration of the 
Marital Trust.  Campbell disagreed and argued the “financial 
                     
3 Until his death, Little continued operating a thoroughbred 
farm located in Fauquier County and known as Heritage Farm, 
 
 
5
statements” did not constitute a fiduciary accounting under 
Virginia law. 
In a July 7, 2003 decree, the trial court found that the 
“[f]inancial [s]tatements . . . did not constitute an 
‘accounting’ for the years” for which they were prepared.  No 
appeal of this finding by the trial court was made and it now 
constitutes the law of this case.  Pollard & Bagby, Inc. v. 
Pierce Arrow, L.L.C., 258 Va. 524, 527-28, 521 S.E.2d 761, 763 
(1999).  The trial court deferred a final ruling on whether 
Campbell was entitled to an accounting from the Trustees in 
order to “fully analyze and consider the authorities on whether 
or not [Campbell] has ‘standing’ as Executor of the Estate of 
Gordon Little under § 8.01-31 of the Code of Virginia to compel 
such an accounting.”  Both parties submitted written memoranda 
addressing this issue. 
After an unexplained delay, the trial court eventually 
ruled by a final decree, dated April 6, 2005, in which it found: 
[T]hat there is no right to an accounting under 
Virginia Code Section 8.01-25; the right to an 
accounting is generally provided for under Virginia 
Code Section 8.01-31; the Will does not incorporate 
Section 8.01-31 into the Executor’s powers and does 
not direct that the Executor seek an accounting; and 
the closest statute that might apply is 64.1-57(1)(n) 
which does not apply because no trusts were created in 
Gordon Little’s will. 
                                                                  
which was an asset of the Marital Trust. 
 
 
6
 
Consequently, the trial court ordered that “Campbell as 
Executor of the Estate of Gordon Little does not have standing 
to seek an accounting and overrules his motion for an 
accounting.”  We awarded Campbell this appeal. 
II. ANALYSIS 
Campbell’s assignments of error posit a central question: 
whether the trial court erred in ruling that an executor lacks 
standing to maintain an action for an accounting from the 
trustees of a trust of which the decedent was a beneficiary.  
Campbell argues the trial court erred because as Little’s 
executor, he succeeded to Little’s cause of action for an 
accounting under Code § 8.01-31 by virtue of the survival 
provisions of Code § 8.01-25.  Campbell also argues an executor 
has that right regardless of whether a decedent specifically 
grants such a right to his fiduciary by will.  Furthermore, 
Campbell contends the incorporation of Code § 64.1-57 into 
Little’s will does not affect his standing to compel an 
accounting because it is one of the “other powers granted by 
law” under the terms of the statute. 
Campbell avers that at common law and under Code § 8.01-31, 
a “beneficiary of a trust had the absolute right to judicially 
require his Trustee, in a suit in equity, to render accountings 
 
 
7
of his management of the Trust assets.”4  Campbell contends that 
the standing to compel an accounting continues in the person of 
a decedent’s personal representative because Code § 8.01-25 
provides that “[e]very cause of action whether legal or 
equitable, which is cognizable in the Commonwealth of Virginia, 
shall survive . . . the death of the person in whose favor the 
cause of action existed . . . .”  In effect, Campbell argues he 
stands in Little’s shoes in seeking to compel an accounting 
under Code § 8.01-31 by virtue of his status as Little’s 
executor.  Campbell contends that construing Code § 8.01-25 as 
the trial court has done renders the statute “meaningless” 
because it bars a cause of action for an accounting from 
surviving the decedent contrary to the plain language of the 
statute. 
 
The Trustees respond that although Code § 8.01-25 “on its 
face appears to be rather broad, nothing in it confers standing 
upon a personal representative to pursue every cause of action.”  
To support this contention, the Trustees cite Code §§ 8.01-56, 
8.01-57, 8.01-63, 8.01-173, 64.1-144, and 64.1-145, which 
specifically provide that an individual or his “personal 
representative” may bring or be subject to the particular causes 
                     
4 Code § 8.01-31 states: “An accounting in equity may be had 
against any fiduciary or by one joint tenant, tenant in common, 
or coparcener for receiving more than comes to his just share or 
 
 
8
of action addressed in those statutes.  Without citation to 
authority, the Trustees assert that the presence of these 
statutes would be superfluous if Code § 8.01-25 were intended to 
“give standing to personal representatives to pursue every cause 
of action.”  They aver that Code § 8.01-25, notwithstanding its 
language, should not be read to include every cause of action 
existing in favor of a decedent at his death.  The Trustees thus 
conclude that a cause of action for an accounting does not 
survive a beneficiary’s death under Code § 8.01-25 and is not 
separately authorized under Code § 8.01-31 because that statute 
does not expressly provide a cause of action for an accounting 
to a personal representative. 
 
The issue before the Court in this case is a matter of 
statutory interpretation, a “pure question of law subject to de 
novo review.”  Crawford v. Haddock, 270 Va. 524, 528, 621 S.E.2d 
127, 129 (2005) (quoting Horner v. Dep’t of Mental Health, 
Mental Retardation, & Substance Abuse Servs., 268 Va. 187, 192, 
597 S.E.2d 202, 204 (2004)).  The question thus put before us is 
whether the cause of action for an accounting existing in a 
beneficiary under Code § 8.01-31 continues in his personal 
representative by virtue of Code § 8.01-25 after the 
beneficiary’s death.  We agree with Campbell that such a cause 
                                                                  
proportion, or against the personal representative of any such 
party.” 
 
 
9
of action does survive and is enforceable by the personal 
representative of the decedent.5 
“When interpreting statutes, courts must ascertain and give 
effect to the legislature’s intention, which is to be deduced 
from the words used, unless a literal interpretation would 
result in a manifest absurdity.”  Id.  If the statute’s text is 
“clear and unambiguous, courts may not interpret them in a way 
that amounts to a holding that the legislature did not mean what 
it actually has expressed.  In other words, courts are bound by 
the plain meaning of clear statutory language.”  Id. (citing 
Horner, 268 Va. at 192, 597 S.E.2d at 204); Woods v. Mendez, 265 
Va. 68, 74-75, 574 S.E.2d 263, 266-67 (2003); Halifax Corp. v. 
First Union Nat’l Bank, 262 Va. 91, 99-100, 546 S.E.2d 696, 701 
(2001) (quoting Watkins v. Hall, 161 Va. 924, 930, 172 S.E. 445, 
447 (1934)); see also Melanson v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 178, 
183, 539 S.E.2d 433, 435 (2001) (“The primary objective of 
statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to 
legislative intent.  The plain, obvious, and rational meaning of 
a statute is to be preferred over any curious, narrow, or 
strained construction.”). 
                     
5 No issue was raised by the parties or the trial court 
contesting whether Little had a cause of action for an 
accounting prior to his death.  We will therefore assume, 
without deciding, that a cause of action did accrue to Little by 
virtue of the Trustees’ failure to account and that such failure 
 
 
10
 
Applying these principles to the statutes at issue in the 
case at bar, we find that the text of Code §§ 8.01-25 and 8.01-
31 is clear and unambiguous.  The language of Code § 8.01-25 
reflects the General Assembly’s clear intent that:  “Every cause 
of action whether legal or equitable, which is cognizable in the 
Commonwealth of Virginia, shall survive . . . the death of the 
person in whose favor the cause of action existed . . . .”  
(Emphasis added.)  Assuming the trial court correctly found that 
Little had a cause of action for an accounting from the Trustees 
for their administration of the Marital Trust prior to his 
death, that cause of action survives Little’s death under Code 
§ 8.01-25 because it “existed” prior to his death.  Contrast 
Rutter v. Jones, Blechman, Woltz & Kelly, P.C., 264 Va. 310, 
313-14, 568 S.E.2d 693, 694-95 (2002) (claim for legal 
malpractice brought by decedent’s personal representative did 
not survive because claim did not arise until after decedent’s 
death). 
Contrary to the Trustees’ assertion, the broad language 
contained in Code § 8.01-25 making it applicable to “[e]very 
cause of action” is not derogated by other statutes conferring 
standing to personal representatives in particular situations.  
Indeed, the Trustees’ position ignores situations where Code 
                                                                  
was the necessary injury or damage by which a cause of action 
accrued. 
 
 
11
§ 8.01-25 would not apply to preserve a cause of action, but the 
specific authorization to sue or be sued by a decedent’s 
personal representative in other Code sections permits the 
claim. 
Code § 8.01-25 only applies to causes of action 
“exist[ing]” prior to the decedent’s death and provides that a 
“cause of action asserted by the decedent in his lifetime” for 
personal injury does not “survive,” but rather can be amended as 
a wrongful death action under Code § 8.01-56.  Hendrix v. 
Daugherty, 249 Va. 540, 542, 457 S.E.2d 71, 73 (1995); see also 
Code §§ 8.01-63 and 8.01-57.  Thus, Code § 8.01-56, as well as 
§§ 8.01-57 and 8.01-63, for example, provide the basis for a 
separate cause of action, wrongful death, which did not exist 
during the decedent’s lifetime and thus could not be maintained 
under the aegis of Code § 8.01-25. 
Moreover, to adopt the Trustees’ position would render Code 
§ 8.01-25 meaningless because the only causes of action that 
would survive an individual’s death would be those where the 
decedent’s personal representative is specifically granted 
standing to bring an action by another statute.  In effect, the 
Trustees’ position as adopted by the trial court is a judicial 
repeal of Code § 8.01-25.  This result eviscerates the principle 
well-established in our jurisprudence that when “the legislature 
has used words of a plain and definite import[,] the courts 
 
 
12
cannot put upon them a construction which amounts to holding the 
legislature did not mean what it actually has expressed.”  
Jenkins v. Director of the Va. Ctr. For Behavioral Rehab., 271 
Va. 4, 10, 624 S.E.2d 452, 457 (2006); Barr v. Town & Country 
Properties, 240 Va. 292, 295, 396 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1990); 
Watkins, 161 Va. at 930, 172 S.E. at 447; see also Crawford, 270 
Va. at 528, 621 S.E.2d at 129 (citing Horner, 268 Va. at 192, 
597 S.E.2d at 204); Trent v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 119 Va. 
805, 811, 89 S.E. 921, 922-23 (1916) (judicial repeal of a 
statute usurps legislative function). 
Consequently, Little’s cause of action to compel an 
accounting from the Trustees for the administration of the 
Marital Trust under Code § 8.01-31 survives Little’s death 
pursuant to Code § 8.01-25.  Thus, Campbell, in his capacity as 
executor of Little’s estate, has standing to bring an action to 
compel an accounting by the Trustees for the administration of 
the Marital Trust while Little was a beneficiary of that trust. 
The fact that Little’s will does not expressly grant the 
executor of his estate authority to pursue actions under Code 
§ 8.01-31 does not alter our analysis.  In Isbell v. Flippen, 
185 Va. 977, 41 S.E.2d 31 (1947), the appellants argued “that 
since the will . . . did not specifically authorize [the 
personal representative] to do so, the executor had no right to 
institute the present suit.”  Id. at 981, 41 S.E.2d at 33.  
 
 
13
Soundly rejecting this contention, the Court noted that it “is 
so lacking in merit that it hardly needs discussion.”  Id.  The 
Court then cited the statutory duty of personal representatives 
to: “administer, well and truly, the whole personal estate of 
his decedent.”  Id. (quoting Code § 5377, now codified at 
§ 64.1-139).  Because “[o]ne of the primary obligations of the 
personal representative is to collect the assets of the estate,” 
the personal representative had not only the authority, but most 
likely even the duty, to file suit to collect debts owed to the 
decedent’s estate.  Id. (“failure to proceed promptly with the 
collection of assets due the decedent’s estate is negligence, 
for which the personal representative may be liable”); see also 
O’Brien v. O’Brien, 259 Va. 552, 557, 526 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2000).  
Thus, Campbell’s power to seek an accounting under Code § 8.01-
31 is part of his fiduciary duty and authority as executor of 
Little’s estate. 
Similarly, Campbell’s standing to seek an accounting under 
Code §§ 8.01-25 and 8.01-31 is unaffected by the clause in 
Little’s will granting Campbell “all rights and powers set forth 
in [Code §] 64.1-57.”  The statutory powers incorporated into a 
will by reference to Code § 64.1-57 are not the only powers 
possessed by an executor.  As the text of Code § 64.1-57 plainly 
states: “The following powers, in addition to all other powers 
granted by law, may be incorporated in whole or in part in any 
 
 
14
will or trust instrument by reference to this section.”  
(Emphasis added.)  By incorporating the powers listed in Code 
§ 64.1-57, a testator does not thereby exclude “all other powers 
granted by law” from the executor.  The right to compel an 
accounting is such an “other power granted by law” as the 
foregoing discussion of Code §§ 8.01-31 and 8.01-25 reflect. 
Accordingly, the mere fact that Little’s will incorporates 
Code § 64.1-57 and does not contain a specific grant of 
authority to the executor to seek an accounting is no barrier to 
Campbell exercising “all other powers granted by law.”  The 
trial court’s judgment was thus in error to hold that Campbell 
lacked standing to compel an accounting from the Trustees as to 
their administration of the Marital Trust prior to Little’s 
death. 
Having determined that Campbell, as Little’s executor, had 
standing to compel an accounting by the Trustees, we must now 
resolve whether that cause of action encompasses all the relief 
requested in his Bill of Complaint.  In that regard, Campbell 
contends he has a right to an accounting to determine whether 
Little “received all of the net income and other benefits due 
him under the terms of the said Marital Trust.”  For the reasons 
set forth above, the Trustees can be required to so account as 
to the administration of the Marital Trust through the time of 
Little’s death.  Thus, the Trustees, subject to any valid 
 
 
15
defenses on the merits, none of which are before this Court, 
must account to Campbell for their administration of the Marital 
Trust during Little’s lifetime, including the computation and 
distribution of the trust net income.  This accounting would 
include any undistributed income of the Marital Trust accrued as 
of the date of Little’s death, as Little had a right to such 
income up until that time.  The trial court erred in ruling to 
the contrary. 
Campbell also contends he has a cause of action for an 
accounting from the Trustees for their alleged removal of 
tangible personal property purportedly belonging to Little from 
Heritage Farm following Little’s death.  Campbell does not 
assert a basis for an accounting as to the tangible personal 
property other than by nexus to his argument of the right by 
survival under Code §§ 8.01-31 and 8.01-25.  But Code § 8.01-25 
cannot apply to authorize an accounting for the tangible 
personal property because the statute only permits survival of 
causes of action existing at the time of the decedent’s death.  
Little clearly had no cause of action against the Trustees 
during his lifetime for the alleged removal of property that 
occurred after his death.  As the executor’s powers are 
derivative of Little’s, Campbell acquired no standing to compel 
an accounting for the operation of the Marital Trust after the 
date of Little’s death, when Little’s right to an accounting had 
 
 
16
ceased.  Code § 8.01-25 thus cannot be the basis for granting 
Campbell standing to compel an accounting for the conversion of 
tangible personal property that only occurred after Little’s 
death.  See Rutter, 264 Va. at 313-14, 568 S.E.2d at 694-95. 
The trial court thus did not err in denying Campbell’s 
request for an accounting as to the tangible personal property 
alleged to have been removed by the Trustees.6 
III.  CONCLUSION 
A decedent’s personal representative has standing under the 
plain language of Code § 8.01-25 to maintain a cause of action 
existing at the time of the decedent’s death, which includes the 
right to compel an accounting under Code § 8.01-31 from the 
trustees of a trust of which the decedent was a beneficiary.  
Accordingly, the trial court erred in ruling that Campbell 
lacked standing to compel an accounting by the Trustees for 
their administration of the Marital Trust during Little’s 
lifetime.  However, because Little did not have a cause of 
action during his lifetime to seek an accounting for tangible 
personal property removed from Heritage Farm after his death, 
the trial court did not err in adjudging that Campbell did not 
                     
6 The issue is not before us as to what rights, if any, 
Campbell may assert under Code § 64.1-145 or otherwise as to the 
claim for wrongfully removed tangible personal property and we 
express no opinion in that regard. 
 
 
17
have standing to seek an accounting by the Trustees for that 
property. 
Therefore, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court 
denying the claim for an accounting of tangible personal 
property removed from Heritage Farm, but will reverse the 
judgment of the trial court regarding the claim for an 
accounting by the Trustees for the administration of the Marital 
Trust during Little’s lifetime.  We will remand the case for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
                                                and remanded.