Title: State v. Gregg

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

226 Kan. 481 (1979)
602 P.2d 85
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
RICK F. GREGG, Appellant.
No. 50,511

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed October 27, 1979.
Charles M. Tuley, of Atchison, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellant.
Samuel L. Schuetz, county attorney, argued the cause, and Robert T. Stephan, attorney general, and John L. Weingart, assistant county attorney, were on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
McFARLAND, J.:
This is a direct appeal by Rick F. Gregg from his convictions by jury trial of aggravated sodomy (K.S.A. 21-3506) and aggravated indecent solicitation of a child (K.S.A. 21-3511), as a lesser included offense of the charged crime, indecent liberties with a child (K.S.A. 1978 Supp. 21-3503).
The charges herein arise from two separate incidents involving defendant and an eight-year-old girl, Michelle. The household in question included two women and their five children. Various male acquaintances of the women visited or resided in the home on varying bases. Defendant was one of these individuals, although *482 he was married and had a residence of his own. Defendant assisted in caring for the children.
The aggravated sodomy charge arose from the December 13, 1977, occurrence, and may be designated as the "bathroom incident." The victim stated that defendant forced her to commit fellatio with him. Defendant's version was that he was high on drugs and liquor and that the little girl had, on her own initiative, committed the act before he was aware of what was occurring.
The indecent liberties with a child charge (conviction of aggravated indecent solicitation of a child as a lesser included offense) arose from the occurrence on December 9, 1977, and may be designated as the "nosebleed incident." The victim had received a nosebleed from a facial blow inflicted by one of the other children. Defendant then took the child upstairs to a bedroom.
The victim's version of what occurred in the bedroom was that defendant shut the door, told her to pull down her pants, pulled down his pants, "got on top" of her, hurt her in the genital area, and told her not to tell anyone. Defendant denied that anything untoward had occurred in the bedroom.
Defendant claims error in the refusal of the trial court to instruct on lewd and lascivious behavior (K.S.A. 21-3508) and indecent solicitation of a child (K.S.A. 21-3510) as lesser included offenses on both counts.
A lesser offense is considered a lesser included offense under K.S.A. 21-3107(2)(d) when all elements necessary to prove the lesser offense are present to establish the elements of the greater offense. State v. Arnold, 223 Kan. 715, 576 P.2d 651 (1978).
The following chart shows the charges, the lesser included instructions given, and those denied:
Count I ("bathroom incident")
Convicted: Aggravated Indecent Solicitation of a Child
The elements of the offenses concerned herein are as follows:
K.S.A. 1978 Supp. 21-3503. Indecent liberties with a child.
"(a) The act of sexual intercourse;
K.S.A. 21-3508. Lewd and lascivious behavior.
"(1) Lewd and lascivious behavior is:
K.S.A. 21-3510. Indecent solicitation of a child.
K.S.A. 21-3511. Aggravated indecent solicitation of a child.
Indecent solicitation of a child makes certain acts with a child under sixteen years of age illegal. Aggravated indecent solicitation of a child makes the same acts with a child under twelve years of age illegal also, but with a greater penalty (class E felony as opposed to a class A misdemeanor).
Although defendant's position is not too clear on this point, apparently he is contending that indecent solicitation of a child is an automatic lesser included offense of aggravated indecent solicitation of a child since a child under twelve years of age must of necessity be a child under sixteen years of age. Defendant cites no authority in support of this contention.
Clearly, the legislature has seen fit to affix a greater penalty to certain acts committed with a young child than with an older child. There was no dispute as to the child's age. Under aggravated indecent solicitation of a child it was incumbent upon the State to prove the child was under twelve years of age. No error is shown in refusing to instruct on indecent solicitation of a child.
Defendant further complains that instructions on both counts should have been given on the lesser included offense of lewd and lascivious behavior (K.S.A. 21-3508). A reading of the statute shows the gist of the proscribed behavior is the exhibitionist aspect of the sexual behavior. This, accordingly, is not an offense necessarily proven on a prosecution of indecent liberties with a child or aggravated sodomy, nor is there an identity of elements. For illustration, both the latter offenses could transpire in total darkness; whereas, it would be virtually impossible to commit lewd and lascivious behavior under such circumstances.
This precise issue as to aggravated sodomy was decided in State v. Crawford, 223 Kan. 127, 573 P.2d 982 (1977), cert. denied 435 U.S. 930 (1978), wherein this court said at 128:
Crawford is equally good authority for the proposition that lewd *485 and lascivious behavior is not a lesser offense of indecent liberties with a child.
No error is shown by the trial court on either count in refusing to instruct on indecent solicitation of a child or lewd and lascivious behavior.
Defendant's next point of claimed error is the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a psychiatric examination of Michelle, the complaining witness.
The day before the trial commenced, court and counsel had a pretrial conference. At that time defense counsel stated:
Later, but prior to the testimony of Michelle, the trial court and the prosecutor questioned her as to her knowledge of the truth.
The matter of ordering a psychiatric examination of the complaining witness in a sex crime case is an issue of first impression in Kansas. The court may order a psychiatric examination of a defendant in a criminal case for the limited purposes set forth in K.S.A. 1978 Supp. 22-3302, 22-3219, and 21-4604. A psychiatric examination of a party in a civil action may be ordered pursuant to K.S.A. 60-235 when the party's mental condition is in issue.
Numerous other jurisdictions have determined the question of the right of an accused in a sex crime case to have a psychiatric examination of the complaining witness. The jurisdictions which have determined the issue fall into three general categories. No attempt will be made for an exhaustive analysis of each jurisdiction, but illustrative of the categories are the following:
The District of Columbia, Oregon, Illinois, and New York are *486 jurisdictions commonly cited as belonging in this category. See Annot., Sex Crimes-Psychiatric Examination, 18 A.L.R.3d 1433, § 3. However, even these jurisdictions have suffered erosion. An example is State v. Walgraeve, 243 Or. 328, 412 P.2d 23, rehearing denied 243 Or. 331, 413 P.2d 609 (1966), wherein the court found that a discretionary power to direct a psychiatric examination of a complaining witness would invade the jury's province as to determining the credibility of a witness. The Oregon court reasoned any such fundamental change should come from the legislature. The Oregon courts continue to apply Walgraeve, but now make it clear that the intent of Walgraeve was to refuse a mandatory rule, not deprive a court of discretion to order such an examination. State v. Clasey, 252 Or. 22, 446 P.2d 116 (1968); State v. Forsyth, 20 Or. App. 624, 533 P.2d 176 (1975).
This category has always been a minority view and it appears to be declining even further.
Indiana, in Burton v. State, 232 Ind. 246, 111 N.E.2d 892 (1953), required that the uncorroborated testimony of a complaining witness in a sex case be supported by psychiatric evidence supporting her credibility. Burton was overruled in Wedmore v. State, 237 Ind. 212, 223, 143 N.E.2d 649, 654 (1957), wherein the Indiana Supreme Court stated that it did not have the power or authority to require the state to support the testimony of a prosecuting witness in a sex case by requiring her to submit to a psychiatric examination, the report of which was to be used in evidence to support the conviction. However, no request had been made at trial in Wedmore for a psychiatric examination.
Defendant herein notes the dicta of the court in Wedmore, 237 Ind. at 223:
The above statement could be interpreted as referring to a direct inquiry of the witness under oath by the court. Regardless of the meaning attached to the statement in Wedmore, however, it is clear from subsequent cases that Indiana is a discretionary state. See, e.g., McNeely v. State, ___ Ind. App. ___, 349 N.E.2d 204, 206 (1976):
This is the rule in the vast majority of jurisdictions which have considered the issue. The most widely cited case in support of this position is Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302, 410 P.2d 838 (1966). In Ballard, a physician charged with the rape of a patient sought, inter alia, to restrain the proceedings of the trial court pending relief. He contended the trial court should not have denied his request for an order requiring the complaining witness to undergo psychiatric examination for the purpose of determining whether her mental and emotional condition affected her veracity. The California Supreme Court extensively reviewed the various authorities and rejected "the polar extremes of an absolute prohibition and an absolute requirement that the prosecutrix submit to a psychiatric examination"; it accepted the "middle ground," placing the matter within the discretion of the trial judge. 64 Cal. 2d  at 177.
Portions of the court's reasoning in Ballard are set forth as follows:
....
See also Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1433.
We, too, adopt the "middle ground" and hold a trial judge has the discretion to order a psychiatric examination of the complaining witness in a sex crime case if the defendant presents a compelling reason for such examination. Even if a trial court finds a compelling reason for ordering the psychiatric examination, the further safeguard as to its admissibility remains. This result is in harmony with the "Rape Shield Statute", K.S.A. 60-447a.
In the case before us the judge did not deny the motion for lack of authority to grant it. Instead, in his discretion, he overruled the motion. The question then becomes whether the trial court abused its discretion in the denial of the motion.
*490 The motion for the examination, made the day before trial, rested on such factors as the child's age, the seriousness of the crime, and the lack of corroborating evidence (in fact, her testimony was not wholly uncorroborated). No facts were stated or evidence introduced as to the child's mental instability, lack of veracity, similar charges against other men proven to be false, or any other reason why this particular child should be required to submit to such an examination. The motion was clearly a fishing expedition embarked upon in the hope something damaging and admissible in the trial would be unearthed. The trial court and prosecutor subsequently questioned the child about her understanding of telling the truth and nothing unusual surfaced. Defense counsel was offered the opportunity to question the child, but declined. At trial the cross-examination of the child was brief.
In short, no compelling reason for ordering a psychiatric examination of the child was shown or even alluded to. No abuse of discretion by the trial court is shown in denying defendant's motion for psychiatric examination of the complaining witness.
Defendant's final point is that, based on the issues previously raised herein, the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for a new trial. The points urged in support of the motion for new trial have been determined adversely to defendant, which disposes of this point.
The judgment is affirmed.
FROMME, J., not participating.