Title: Avis Rent A Car System, LLC v. Burrill

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2018 ME 81 
Docket: 
Som-17-352 
Argued: 
March 7, 2018 
Decided: 
June 19, 2018 
 
Panel: 
ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
Majority: 
MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
Dissent: 
ALEXANDER. J. 
 
 
AVIS RENT A CAR SYSTEM, LLC 
 
v. 
 
DARRON BURRILL 
 
 
HUMPHREY, J. 
[¶1]  Darron Burrill appeals from a partial summary judgment entered 
in favor of Avis Rent A Car System, LLC, on Avis’s claim for breach of contract 
in the District Court (Skowhegan).1  Burrill challenges the court’s (Fowle, J.) 
determination, issued as a partial summary judgment, that he is liable to Avis 
for breach of contract and the court’s (E. Walker, J.) determinations of 
damages and attorney fees, awarded after an evidentiary hearing.  Avis 
cross-appeals, challenging the court’s failure to award it pre- and 
post-judgment interest.  We affirm the partial summary judgment as to 
                                         
1  The caption of the court’s order on Avis’s motion for partial summary judgment lists the 
District Court location as Augusta while the text of the order states that the hearing on the motion 
was held at the District Court in Skowhegan.  Because this matter was docketed as a Skowhegan 
case, we assume that the reference to Augusta was a clerical error.   
 
2 
liability for breach of contract but vacate the award of damages and remand 
for further proceedings.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  The following facts relating to liability are taken from the parties’ 
statements of material fact and reflect the record as viewed in the light most 
favorable to Burrill as the nonprevailing party.  See Oceanic Inn, Inc. v. Sloan’s 
Cove, LLC, 2016 ME 34, ¶ 25, 133 A.3d 1021.  Facts relating to Avis’s alleged 
damages are as found by the court.   
[¶3]  On November 20, 2012, Burrill, a Maine resident, rented a 2012 
Ford Mustang from an Avis location in Las Vegas, Nevada.  Burrill executed a 
Rental Agreement and Addendum and declined the loss damage waiver 
protection that was offered to him.  By declining the loss damage waiver, 
Burrill agreed to be responsible for “all loss of or damage to the car regardless 
of cause, or who, or what caused it.”  That same day, the vehicle was damaged 
when it was involved in an accident in Las Vegas.  
[¶4]  According to Avis, the accident caused damages to the vehicle 
totaling $15,342.57.  Avis sent demands for payment to Burrill on January 16, 
2013, April 3, 2013, and August 14, 2014, but Burrill failed or refused to pay.   
 
3 
[¶5]  Avis filed a complaint against Burrill in the District Court on 
July 20, 2015, alleging breach of contract and negligence and seeking 
damages.  On March 31, 2016, after discovery was concluded, Avis moved for 
partial summary judgment to establish liability on the claim for breach of 
contract.  The court (Fowle, J.) held oral argument on the motion on 
September 29, 2016.   
[¶6]  In its order granting Avis’s motion for partial summary judgment, 
the court noted the parties’ agreement that the case is controlled by Nevada 
substantive law and Maine procedural law.2  The court then determined that 
there were no genuine issues of material fact that (1) the parties entered into 
a valid and enforceable rental contract; (2) Burrill breached that contract; and 
(3) “although the parties do dispute the extent of the damages sustained 
during the course of the accident . . . damages did indeed occur.”  As a result, 
the court concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to 
the elements of the claim for breach of contract and that Avis was entitled to 
partial summary judgment on the issue of liability as a matter of law.  The 
                                         
2  The rental agreement did not include a choice-of-law provision, but because the rental 
agreement was executed in Nevada and the accident took place in Nevada, Nevada substantive law 
applied.  See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188 (Am. Law Inst. 1971); see also 
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Koshy, 2010 ME 44, ¶ 46, 995 A.2d 651.   
 
4 
court granted the motion on October 5, 2016, and ordered a hearing on 
damages.3   
 
[¶7]  In dispute at the damages hearing on May 18, 2017, was whether 
the affidavit of damages executed by an Avis claims examiner included 
inadmissible hearsay.  Several documents were attached to the affidavit: the 
rental agreement; a vehicle valuation report prepared for Avis by J.D. Power 
and Associates; a bill for towing the damaged vehicle; and a record of the 
vehicle’s salvage value.  Burrill objected to the admission of the affidavit on 
the ground that, other than the rental agreement, the attachments were not 
“business records” pursuant to the hearsay exception in M.R. Evid. 803(6).  At 
the hearing, the court (E. Walker, J.) accepted the affidavit with its attachments 
de bene and did not then rule on its admissibility.  Avis then called a witness to 
testify about the amount of damages, but Burrill objected because the identity 
of the testifying witness had not been disclosed prior to the hearing.  Because 
the witness Avis had previously identified to Burrill was unable to attend, Avis 
brought a different witness to the hearing.  The court declined to accept the 
testimony of the witness present.  Before the hearing concluded, Avis offered a 
repair estimate as evidence of damages if the court determined that the 
                                         
3  The day before the damages hearing, Avis moved to dismiss its negligence claim.  The court 
granted the motion at the hearing.   
 
5 
attachments to the affidavit—specifically the vehicle valuation report—were 
inadmissible.  Again, Burrill objected on the basis of hearsay, and again the 
court took the submission de bene, reserving its ruling on its admissibility.   
[¶8]  In its order on damages, the court determined that the 
attachments to the affidavit, although containing hearsay, satisfied the 
business records exception.  The court devoted most of its discussion to the 
vehicle valuation report.4  The report was not prepared by the affiant, but 
instead by a third party, J.D. Power and Associates.  The valuation report 
purported to provide the market value of the vehicle prior to the loss by 
taking into account the value of comparable vehicles with similar mileage 
located in a similar geographic area, as well as any damage to the vehicle prior 
to the loss.  The affiant certified that the report was kept in the regular course 
of Avis’s business, that the affiant maintained the report as part of her duties 
as a claims examiner for Avis, and that it was made reasonably soon after the 
incident.  The court determined that there was sufficient foundation for the 
admissibility of the affidavit and all of the attachments.   
                                         
4  The rental agreement stated that in the event of damage, the renter of the vehicle “will pay our 
estimated repair cost, or if, in our sole discretion, we determine to sell the car in its damaged 
condition, you will pay the difference between the car’s retail fair market value before it was 
damaged and the sale proceeds.”   
 
6 
[¶9]  Based on the information in the affidavit, the court concluded that 
the damages and fees claimed by Avis were reasonable and granted Avis its 
requested amount of $15,342.57.  It also granted Avis attorney fees totaling 
$5,985.00 and costs in the amount of $433.24.  The court declined to award 
Avis pre- or post-judgment interest.   
[¶10]  Burrill appealed, challenging both the grant of Avis’s motion for 
partial summary judgment and the award of damages.  Avis cross-appealed, 
challenging the court’s failure to award it interest and costs in the amount it 
requested.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Breach of Contract 
 
[¶11]  Burrill first challenges the court’s grant of partial summary 
judgment on the issue of breach of contract.  “We review a trial court’s grant 
of a summary judgment de novo, considering the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the nonprevailing party.  Summary judgment is properly granted 
if the record reflects that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”  Oceanic Inn, 2016 ME 34, 
¶ 25, 133 A.3d 1021 (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted). 
 
7 
[¶12]  In order for a plaintiff to succeed in a claim for breach of contract, 
Nevada law requires a plaintiff to show “(1) the existence of a valid contract, 
(2) a breach by the defendant, and (3) damage as a result of the breach.”  Saini 
v. Int’l Game Tech., 434 F. Supp. 2d 913, 919-20 (D. Nev. 2006) (citing 
Richardson v. Jones, 1 Nev. 405, 408 (1865)).  
 
[¶13]  The parties agreed on the following material facts: (1) Burrill 
rented a car from Avis on November 20, 2012; (2) the vehicle was damaged 
on November 20, 2012, when it was involved in an accident in Las Vegas; 
(3) in the rental agreement, Burrill had waived the loss damage protection 
and therefore agreed to be “responsible . . . for all loss of or damage to the car 
regardless of cause, or who, or what caused it”; (4) Avis sent Burrill several 
demands for payment of the alleged damages prior to the lawsuit; and (5) 
Burrill failed or refused to pay the amount demanded.  Because Burrill 
admitted that the car was damaged in an accident while it was rented under 
his name in a contractual arrangement that made him responsible for any 
damage to the car, and acknowledged that he refused to pay the amount 
demanded by Avis, there was no genuine issue of material fact that Burrill 
 
8 
breached the rental agreement by failing to pay Avis after the car was 
damaged.5   
 
[¶14]  Because there were no genuine issues of material fact as to 
(1) the existence of a valid contract; (2) breach of that contract; and (3) some 
amount of damage as a result of the breach, we affirm the grant of Avis’s 
motion for partial summary judgment as to liability.  See M.R. Civ. P. 56(c) (“A 
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue 
of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of 
damages.”). 
B. 
Damages 
 
[¶15]  Although there was no genuine issue of material fact that damage 
did indeed occur, the parties disputed the extent of the damages, prompting 
the court to order a hearing to determine the specific amount of damages.  
Burrill argues that the court erred and abused its discretion when it admitted, 
pursuant to the business records exception to the hearsay rule, the affidavit of 
                                         
5  The trial court’s analysis of the breach element focused largely on the question of whether 
Burrill’s girlfriend, who the parties agree was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident, was an 
unauthorized driver according to the terms of the rental agreement.  The court rejected Burrill’s 
contention that a conversation he allegedly had with an Avis clerk prior to renting the vehicle 
created genuine issues of material fact on the ground that evidence regarding the alleged 
conversation would be barred by the parol evidence rule.  See Klabacka v. Nelson, 394 P.3d 940, 949 
(Nev. 2017).  This remains Burrill’s main argument on appeal.  It is a red herring, however.  Even if 
Burrill’s girlfriend was an authorized driver, he is still contractually responsible for the damage to 
the car.  By failing to pay for the damage after Avis sent demands for payment, Burrill breached the 
contract.   
 
9 
an Avis representative and its attachments6 as the sole evidence of the amount 
of damages.  See M.R. Evid. 803(6).7 
 
[¶16]  “When admission of evidence under the business records 
exception to the hearsay rule is challenged, we review a trial court’s 
foundational findings to support admissibility for clear error and its ultimate 
determination of admissibility for an abuse of discretion.”  JPMorgan Chase 
Bank, N.A. v. Lowell, 2017 ME 32, ¶ 8, 156 A.3d 727 (quotation marks omitted).  
“Business records are hearsay and therefore inadmissible pursuant to M.R. 
Evid. 802 unless they meet the requirements of the business records 
exception in M.R. Evid. 803(6).”  KeyBank Nat’l Ass’n v. Estate of Quint, 
2017 ME 237, ¶ 14, 176 A.3d 717 (quotation marks omitted). Rule 803(6) 
provides for the admissibility of a business record if 
(A)  The record was made at or near the time by—or from 
information transmitted by—someone with knowledge; 
 
(B)  The record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted 
activity of a business, organization, occupation, or calling, whether 
or not for profit;  
 
                                         
6  Burrill did not object to the admission of the rental agreement as a business record.   
7  Although we apply Nevada contract law in this case, the local law of the forum governs the 
admissibility of evidence.  See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 138; see also Beaulieu v. 
Beaulieu, 265 A.2d 610, 612 (Me. 1970); Holyoke v. Estate of Holyoke, 110 Me. 469, 477, 87 A. 40, 45 
(Me. 1913).  We therefore apply the Maine Rules of Evidence when determining whether the 
business records exception applies to the attachments to the affidavit. 
 
10 
(C)  Making the record was a regular practice of that activity; 
 
(D)  All these conditions are shown by the testimony of the 
custodian or another qualified witness, or by a certification that 
complies with Rule 902(11), Rule 902(12) or with a statute 
permitting certification; and  
 
(E)  Neither the source of information nor the method or 
circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.  
 
[¶17]  Here, the affiant sought to certify the business records by 
affidavit pursuant to Rules 803(6)(D) and 902(11).  “[S]ubdivision 11 of 
Rule 902 makes it possible to lay the foundation for domestic business 
records without the need to call a live witness.”8  Field & Murray, Maine 
Evidence § 902.11 at 554 (6th ed. 2007).   
[¶18]  A person certifying the records pursuant to Rule 902(11) must 
still be a qualified witness, however.  See M.R. Evid. 803(6), 902(11).  As we 
have previously explained, “[a] qualified witness is one who was intimately 
                                         
8  M.R. Evid. 902(11) requires that the party seeking to certify business records in accordance 
with the rule must, before the trial or hearing, provide the adverse party with reasonable written 
notice of the intent to offer the record and must make the record and certification available for 
inspection.  The purpose of the notice requirement is to ensure that the adverse party “has a fair 
opportunity to object to the authenticity of the record or on the basis of hearsay.”  See M.R. 
Evid. 902(11).  There is no indication in the record whether notice was provided, but at the outset 
of the hearing, Burrill appeared to have been aware of Avis’s plan to use the affidavit as proof of 
damages.  Neither at the hearing or to us has Burrill objected to the affidavit based on lack of notice 
pursuant to M.R. 902(11); his objections were and are to the attachments to the affidavit.  The rule 
provides that, “[i]n the event of an adverse party’s objection to a record offered under this 
paragraph, the court may in the interests of justice refuse to accept the certification under this 
paragraph and require the party offering the record to provide appropriate foundation by other 
evidence.”  M.R. Evid. 902(11).  The court did not do so at the hearing, and on appeal, Burrill does 
not challenge the court’s failure to do so.   
 
11 
involved in the daily operation of the business and whose testimony showed 
the firsthand nature of his knowledge” but who “need not be an employee of 
the record’s creator.”  Estate of Quint, 2017 ME 237, ¶ 15, 176 A.3d 717 
(quotation marks omitted).  Where records are created by one business and 
then transmitted to another, the records will be admissible pursuant to M.R. 
Evid. 803(6) “if the foundational evidence from the receiving entity’s 
employee is adequate to demonstrate that the employee had sufficient 
knowledge of both businesses’ regular practices to demonstrate the reliability 
and trustworthiness of the information.”  Beneficial Me. Inc. v. Carter, 2011 ME 
77, ¶ 13, 25 A.3d 96.  In order to satisfy the requirements for the business 
records exception in the circumstances of this case, the witness must 
demonstrate knowledge that 
• the producer of the record at issue employed regular business 
practices for creating and maintaining the records that were 
sufficiently accepted by the receiving business to allow 
reliance on the records by the receiving business; 
 
• the producer of the record at issue employed regular business 
practices for transmitting them to the receiving business; 
 
• by manual or electronic processes, the receiving business 
integrated the records into its own records and maintained 
them through regular business processes;  
 
• the record at issue was, in fact, among the receiving business’s 
own records; and 
 
12 
 
• the receiving business relied on these records in its day-to-day 
operations.  
 
Estate of Quint, 2017 ME 237, ¶ 16, 176 A.3d 717 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶19]  Here, the certification of the Avis representative failed to provide 
the foundational predicate necessary for admission in evidence of the 
attached vehicle valuation report.  See Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Eddins, 
2018 ME 47, ¶ 13, 182 A.3d 1241.  The affiant certified that the vehicle 
valuation report was (1) a business record kept within Avis’s claim file for the 
incident; (2) maintained as part of her duties as a claims examiner for Avis; 
(3) kept in the regular course of Avis’s business and as part of its regularly 
conducted activity; and (4) made reasonably soon after the incident.  
However, because the affiant did not certify that she had any knowledge of J.D. 
Power and Associates’s regular business practices, she failed to lay a proper 
foundation for the report pursuant to Rule 803(6), and the court abused its 
discretion by admitting the document in evidence.  See id. ¶ 14.  For these 
same reasons, the affiant failed to lay a proper foundation for the towing 
invoice and salvage proceeds documentation9 as well.10   
                                         
9  As Burrill points out, even if the salvage proceeds documentation were admissible, that record 
is meaningless without the market value of the vehicle provided in the vehicle valuation report.   
 
13 
[¶20]  Further, the affidavit was used to accomplish more than is 
contemplated by Rule 902(11).  In addition to Avis’s attempt to lay the 
foundation for the admission of the attachments pursuant to Rule 803(6), the 
affidavit set forth the basis for other portions of the damages award as well.  
Not only did the affiant provide the amount allegedly due for the damage to 
the vehicle itself and the towing fee, she also listed a loss-of-use fee of 
$1,238.79, title and license fees in the amount of $101.80, and an 
administrative fee of $150.00.  Although the rental agreement stated that the 
signatory to the agreement would be required to pay for such fees in the event 
of damage to the vehicle, none of the other attachments purported to provide 
a basis for the specific amounts of those fees.  A certification submitted 
pursuant to Rule 902(11) can only lay the foundation for a business record; it 
is not a device to provide a basis for damages that are not included in the 
attached business records.11  See Field & Murray, Maine Evidence § 902.11 at 
                                                                                                                                   
10  The affiant properly certified the rental agreement, however.  The rental agreement, unlike 
the vehicle valuation report, the towing invoice, and the salvage proceeds documentation, was 
prepared by Avis and meets the requirements of Rules 803(6) and 902(11).  Because it was not 
prepared by a third party and because the affiant laid the proper foundation pursuant to Rule 
902(11), the rental agreement would be admissible.  Although the rental agreement informs the 
signatory of the types of fees and costs he or she will incur in the event of damage to or loss of the 
vehicle, it does not provide the specific amounts of those fees and costs.  The rental agreement 
alone therefore cannot provide a basis for the damages award sought by Avis. 
11  Therefore, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the affidavit—which provide the total amount of damages 
suffered by Avis and a list of fees and costs that comprise that total—are not certifications pursuant 
to Rule 902(11) and are thus inadmissible hearsay.  See M.R. Evid. 801(c), 802.   
 
14 
554.  Because Avis presented no admissible evidence12 as to the amount of 
damages, it failed to prove it was entitled to the damages awarded to it.   
[¶21]  According to Nevada contract law, when a plaintiff has 
established liability on behalf of the defendant in a claim for breach of 
contract but has failed to provide proof for the specific amount of damages, 
the plaintiff is entitled only to nominal damages.13  See Gramanz v. T-Shirts & 
Souvenirs, 894 P.2d 342, 347 (Nev. 1995); Commercial Cabinet Co. v. Mort 
Wallin of Lake Tahoe, 737 P.2d 515, 517 (Nev. 1987) (explaining that “[a] 
plaintiff who proves a right to damages without proving the amount as well is 
only entitled to nominal damages”); Richardson, 1 Nev. at 408. Because Avis 
established liability on behalf of Burrill but failed to prove the amount of 
actual damages, we vacate the court’s award of damages and remand with 
instructions for the court to award Avis nominal damages in accordance with 
Nevada law.  Further, given that Avis will be entitled to an award of only 
                                         
12  Avis also offered a repair estimate at the conclusion of the damages hearing “if the fair market 
value report were to be rejected.”  The repair estimate, like the fair market value report, was 
prepared by a third party.  There was no reference to the repair estimate in the affidavit of 
damages, nor did an Avis representative testify to any personal knowledge of the business practices 
of the company that prepared the repair estimate.  Therefore, the repair estimate would likely have 
been inadmissible hearsay as well.  See Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Eddins, 2018 ME 47, 
¶ 14, 182 A.3d 1241.   
13  Nominal damages are defined as “[a] trifling sum” and are “awarded for the infraction of a 
legal right, where the extent of the loss is not shown.”  Nominal Damages, Black’s Law Dictionary 
(10th ed. 2014) (quotation marks omitted).  “The obtaining of nominal damages will also, in many 
cases, entitle a plaintiff to costs.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
 
15 
nominal damages, we vacate the award of attorney fees to Avis to allow the 
court on remand to determine whether and to what extent attorney fees are 
proper in this case pursuant to the rental agreement.   
[¶22]  Finally, we reach the issue raised in Avis’s cross-appeal of 
whether the court erred when it failed to award it interest pursuant to the 
express terms of the rental agreement.  Because Nevada contract law applies 
in this case, Nevada law also governs the recovery of interest.  See Roc-Century 
Assocs. v. Giunta, 665 A.2d 220, 221 (Me. 1995); see also Restatement (Second) 
of Conflict of Laws § 207 & cmt. e (Am. Law Inst. 1971).  On remand, we 
instruct the court to apply Nevada law to determine whether and to what 
extent interest should be awarded to Avis. 
The entry is: 
Partial summary judgment affirmed.  Award of 
damages vacated.  Remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ALEXANDER, J., dissenting. 
 
 
[¶23]  I concur in the Court’s holding affirming the trial court’s grant of 
partial summary judgment determining that Darron Burrill is liable for breach 
of contract as a result of his allowing an unauthorized driver to damage a 
 
16 
vehicle owned by Avis Rent a Car System, LLC.  With liability decided, the 
Court recognizes that there are no genuine issues of material fact that there 
was “some amount of damage as a result of the breach.”  Court’s Opinion ¶ 14.  
[¶24]  The amount of damage, including some amounts that do not 
appear to be disputed, is established by the affidavit submitted by the Avis 
claims representative.  The Court references M.R. Evid. 902(11) to suggest 
that Avis may have given insufficient notice of its intention to rely on the 
affidavit to prove a point without calling a live witness.  Court’s Opinion 
¶ 17 n.8.  As the Court’s opinion recognizes, Avis was prepared to present a 
live witness to support its damages evidence, but the live witness was, 
erroneously in my view, excluded by the trial court.  Court’s Opinion ¶ 7. 
[¶25]  The Court approves the use of the affidavit, recognizing that, 
pursuant to M.R. Evid. 902(11), it is possible to lay the foundation for 
admission of a business record, M.R. Evid. 803(6), without a live witness.  
Court’s Opinion ¶ 20.  I respectfully dissent from that part of the Court’s 
opinion holding that portions of the affidavit and supporting exhibits provided 
by the Avis claims representative, who was assigned to value the claim and be 
a custodian of the records related to the claim, do not qualify as business 
 
17 
records pursuant to M.R. Evid. 803(6), and thus may not support award of any 
damages in this matter.   
 
[¶26]  “Business records are hearsay and therefore inadmissible 
pursuant to M.R. Evid. 802 unless they meet the requirements of the business 
records exception in M.R. Evid. 803(6).”  KeyBank Nat’l Ass’n v. Estate of Quint, 
2017 ME 237, ¶ 14, 176 A.3d 717.  When admission of evidence as a business 
record is challenged, we review the trial court’s foundational findings to 
support admissibility for clear error and its ultimate determination of 
admissibility for an abuse of discretion.  JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Lowell, 
2017 ME 32, ¶ 8, 156 A.3d 727; Midland Funding LLC v. Walton, 2017 ME 24, 
¶ 18, 155 A.3d 864. 
[¶27]  M.R. Evid. Rule 803(6) authorizes the admissibility of a business 
record if 
(A)  The record was made at or near the time by—or from 
information transmitted by—someone with knowledge; 
 
(B)  The record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted 
activity of a business, organization, occupation, or calling, whether 
or not for profit;  
 
(C)  Making the record was a regular practice of that activity; 
 
(D)  All these conditions are shown by the testimony of the 
custodian or another qualified witness, or by a certification that 
 
18 
complies with Rule 902(11), Rule 902(12) or with a statute 
permitting certification; and  
 
(E)  Neither the source of information nor the method or 
circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.  
 
[¶28]  The purpose of the business records exception is “to allow the 
consideration of a business record, without requiring firsthand testimony 
regarding the recorded facts, by supplying a witness whose knowledge of 
business practices for production and retention of the record is sufficient to 
ensure the reliability and trustworthiness of the record.”  Beneficial Me. Inc. v. 
Carter, 2011 ME 77, ¶ 12, 25 A.3d 96.  Important for this case, “[t]he affiant 
whose statements are offered to establish the admissibility of a business 
record . . . need not be an employee of the record’s creator.”  Id. ¶ 13.  Thus, “if 
the records,” in this case vehicle valuation records, “were received and 
integrated into another business’s records and were relied upon in that 
business’s day-to-day operations, an employee of the receiving business may 
be a qualified witness.”  Id. 
[¶29]  A qualified witness must demonstrate knowledge that the 
producer of the record used regular business practices to create the record; 
the receiving business integrated the record into its own records and 
maintained them through regular business processes; and the receiving 
 
19 
business relied on these records in its day-to-day operation.  See id. ¶ 14.  If 
the affiant demonstrates the requisite knowledge, records created by another 
source, applying its regular business practice, will be admissible pursuant to 
M.R. Evid. 803(6).  Id. 
[¶30]  The Avis representative’s affidavit of damages bases its 
information on several sources, not just the J.D. Power report focused on by 
the Court.  There is no dispute that the Avis representative assembled and 
possessed the business records and that she, herself, calculated the damages 
amounts asserted by Avis and found by the trial court.  
[¶31]  The Avis records include a copy of an invoice for $155 for towing 
charges incurred by Avis.  A copy of that invoice is included in the appendix.  
Other than a generalized hearsay objection, there is no dispute indicated in 
the record that the towing charge was incurred, that Avis was billed for the 
charge, that the bill was paid, or that the bill was made a part of Avis’s 
business records in the regular course of Avis’s business.  Accordingly, the 
towing charge being part of Avis’s business records, there was no apparent 
basis to object to the trial court’s use of the $155 towing charge in calculating 
the total damages amount.  
 
20 
 
[¶32]  There also appears to be no dispute about the calculation of the 
salvage proceeds for the vehicle in the amount of $6,905.   
 
[¶33]  The primary dispute relates to the calculation of the fair market 
value of the vehicle at the time of the loss, which the claims representative 
asserted was $20,601.98.  This claim is based on a J.D. Power/Mitchell Vehicle 
Valuation Report attached as Exhibit B to the Avis representative’s affidavit.  
This report demonstrates that it is based on a review of documentary 
evidence, including vehicle valuations for comparable vehicles available for 
sale in the Las Vegas area.  These valuations are drawn from AutoTrader.com, 
Cars.com and other sources, including dealer contacts.  Most of the report 
appears to reflect document-based reviews, necessary considering the very 
fast time for preparation of the valuation report provided to the Avis claims 
representative.   
[¶34]  The trial court found that the Avis representative reasonably 
relied on the J.D. Power report in reaching her conclusions regarding the 
vehicle valuation and that the vehicle valuation report was admissible as part 
of the Avis business records pursuant to M.R. 803(6) after finding that “the 
Affidavit provide[d] a sufficient foundation for the reliability and 
trustworthiness of the report.”  The court based that finding on the following 
 
21 
observations: the vehicle valuation report was made within two days of the 
accident; preparing and maintaining such a report would be in the ordinary 
course of business for a claims representative at a car-rental company, whose 
job it is to create a complete and reliable record of the damage to a car; and 
nothing indicated that the report was prepared in an unusual or 
untrustworthy way.  The court also referenced the inclusion of J.D. Power’s 
valuation methodology in the report, which the court found to be “rigorously 
objective and mathematical, and transparent about its sources of 
information.”   
[¶35]  In reality it appears that the valuation report damages number 
was determined largely by subtracting the undisputed salvage proceeds from 
the valuations of comparable vehicles offered for sale in the Las Vegas area, 
identified by an internet review.   
[¶36]  Burrill has not demonstrated that the trial court clearly erred in 
its findings.  The Avis representative certified that the valuation report was 
“prepared at the request of and on behalf of Avis” and that the report was 
“kept within the claim file for this incident; maintained as part of [her] duties 
as a Claims Examiner for Avis; kept in the regular course of Avis’s business 
and part of its regularly conducted activity; that it was made at or reasonably 
 
22 
soon after the incident; and that the copy is an exact duplicate of the original.”  
Because the trial court did not err, and because the valuation report fits within 
this Court’s articulation of the purpose of the business records exception to 
the hearsay rule, it was within the court’s discretion to admit the affidavit in 
its entirety.  See Midland Funding LLC, 2017 ME 24, ¶ 18, 155 A.3d 864.   
[¶37]  As the trial court stated: “Avis may not be in the vehicle valuation 
business, but its car rental activities require reliable means of valuating cars,” 
especially in instances where its rental cars sustain damage.  The Avis claims 
examiner appropriately requested a third party in the vehicle valuation 
business to create a report on the vehicle’s valuation prior to damage from an 
accident.  The report was “kept within the claim file for [each] incident” and 
“kept in the regular course of Avis’s business and part of its regularly 
conducted activity.”  Although litigation may be possible in some instances of 
damage to Avis’s rental cars, a vehicle valuation report commissioned 
immediately after a vehicle has been damaged cannot be considered to have 
been “prepared in anticipation of litigation” by an advocate in the same way 
that a forensic report prepared by an expert advocating for one party would 
be.  See State v. Tomah, 1999 ME 109, ¶ 10, 736 A.2d 1047.   
 
23 
 
[¶38]  The Court’s application of the business records exception to 
reject all of Avis’s claimed damages and direct an award of only nominal 
damages disregards the damages not addressed in the J.D. Power report, 
including the apparently undisputed $155 towing charge.  Court’s Opinion 
¶ 41.  Thus, rather than nominal damages, damages of at least $155 are 
established without regard to the propriety, or impropriety, of the claims 
representative’s utilizing the J.D. Power report in making her calculations. 
 
[¶39]  As to that report, the trial court correctly found that the Avis 
representative properly utilized that valuation report, with its method of 
calculation explicitly documented and based largely on documentary 
information available in business records, vehicle valuation reports, or on the 
internet through websites such as AutoTrader.com and Cars.com—material 
that appears to be regularly and widely utilized in calculating car valuations 
and car appraisals in today’s internet age.   
[¶40]  Burrill does not challenge the amount of damages awarded; he 
only challenges the admission of the claims representative’s affidavit in its 
entirety as a basis for the award.  Because the trial court did not err or abuse 
its discretion in determining that the affidavit and its attachments satisfied 
M.R. Evid. 803(6), this Court should affirm the award of damages in the 
 
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amount of $15,342.57, or a lesser amount that includes the undisputed towing 
charge, and the undisputed salvage proceeds deducted from the comparable 
vehicle valuation based on apparently undisputed document reviews. 
[¶41]  Burrill also challenges the court’s award of attorney fees to Avis.  
He does not challenge the amount of the award but argues that because this 
Court should determine that the court erred in granting Avis’s motion for 
partial summary judgment, it should also vacate the attorney fees award as 
well.  Because this Court should affirm the grant of partial summary judgment 
and the award of damages, it should also affirm the award of attorney fees.  
See Estate of Gagnon, 2016 ME 129, ¶¶ 15-16, 147 A.3d 356.  The rental 
contract provided for attorney fees in the event of a breach.  Avis submitted an 
attorney fee affidavit outlining the charges.  It was within the trial court’s 
discretion to grant the attorney fees in the amount included in the attorney 
fees affidavit.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Walter F. McKee, Esq., and Henry E.M. Beck, Esq. (orally), McKee Law, P.A., 
Augusta, for appellant Darron Burrill 
 
Cheryl J. Cutliffe, Esq. (orally), Basham & Scott, LLC, Brunswick, for appellee 
Avis Rent A Car System, LLC 
 
 
Skowhegan District Court docket number CV-2015-152 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY