Title: State v. Walter Junior Hamilton

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2003 WI 50 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-1014 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re Elaine J. Hamilton, Petitioner v. Walter 
Junior Hamilton, Respondent: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Walter Junior Hamilton,  
 
Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2002 WI App 89 
Reported at:  253 Wis. 2d 805, 644 N.W.2d 243 
(Ct. App. 2002-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 30, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 6, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Gerald C. Nichol 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-respondent-petitioner the cause was 
argued by Stephen J. Nicks, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs (in the 
court of appeals) by Robert A. Ramsdell, Madison, and oral 
argument by Robert A. Ramsdell. 
 
 
2003 WI 50 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-1014   
(L.C. No. 
77 FA 81331) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re Elaine J. Hamilton, Petitioner v.  
Walter Junior Hamilton, Respondent: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent- 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Walter Junior Hamilton,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 30, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals,1 which reversed a Dane County 
Circuit Court decision denying Walter Junior Hamilton's (Walter) 
motion to dismiss the State's action to collect unpaid child 
support. 
¶2 
Walter was divorced in 1970 and ordered to pay child 
support for his two children.  The child support judgment was 
                                                 
1 State v. Hamilton, 2002 WI App 89, 253 Wis. 2d 805, 644 
N.W.2d 243. 
No. 01-1014 
 
2 
 
amended in 1977.  The State filed an independent action to 
collect Walter's child support arrearages in 2000, almost 30 
years after the original judgment, more than 20 years after the 
amended judgment, and more than 15 years after Walter's youngest 
child reached the age of majority. 
¶3 
Walter's case raises questions about the application 
of statutes of limitations to child support collection actions.  
The issue presented is whether the State, as an assignee of 
Walter's deceased former wife, filed a timely action to collect 
child support arrearages in 2000.  Payments missed between 1970 
and June 30, 1980, are not at issue.  See infra ¶13, n.8.  Thus, 
the specific questions of law are: (1) Does Wis. Stat. § 893.40 
(2001-2002)2 apply to independent actions to collect child 
support not paid after July 1, 1980, and (2) if § 893.40 
applies, when does the 20-year limitations period in the statute 
begin to run? 
¶4 
We 
hold 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 893.40, 
which 
became 
effective on July 1, 1980, governs the time within which a party 
may bring an independent action to collect child support 
arrearages that accumulated after the statute's effective date.  
In addition, we conclude that, under the statute, an action 
brought to enforce a child support judgment must be commenced 
within 20 years of the date when the judgment is entered.  The 
period of limitation begins to run upon entry of judgment, 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-2002 volumes unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 01-1014 
 
3 
 
irrespective of whether any payment under that judgment has been 
missed. 
¶5 
The last judgment ordering Walter to pay child support 
was entered on November 9, 1977.  Consequently, the State had 
until November 9, 1997, to commence an action against Walter to 
collect arrears that accrued after July 1, 1980.  Because the 
State's action to collect arrearages was not initiated until May 
2000, 
it 
must 
be 
deemed 
untimely 
and 
barred 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 893.40. 
I. BACKGROUND FACTS 
¶6 
The relevant facts of this case are not in dispute.  
Walter and Elaine Hamilton were divorced in Grant County on June 
22, 1970, after approximately five years of marriage.  The 
divorce judgment required Walter to make payments to Elaine 
every two weeks: $10.00 as alimony and $20.00 for each of their 
two children as child support.  By 1977 Walter was residing in 
Dane County.  On November 9, 1977, the Dane County Circuit Court 
entered 
an 
order 
amending 
the 
judgment, 
pursuant 
to 
a 
stipulation by the parties.  This order expunged all alimony 
arrearages and eliminated Walter's future obligation to pay 
alimony, but it revised Walter's child support payments to a 
fixed sum of $50.00, to be paid every two weeks until further 
ordered by the court.  The 1977 order was the last court order 
regarding child support directed at Walter prior to the 
commencement of this action. 
No. 01-1014 
 
4 
 
¶7 
The youngest Hamilton child reached the age of 
majority on April 4, 1985.3  From the date of the original 
divorce judgment in 1970 through April 1985, Walter failed to 
make a substantial number of child support payments. 
¶8 
Elaine died on June 7, 1989.  She did not file any 
enforcement actions to collect on Walter's child support arrears 
before her death. 
¶9 
On May 22, 2000, the State filed a motion in Dane 
County Circuit Court requesting the court to order Walter to pay 
the child support arrearages and interest that had accumulated 
as of January 12, 2000.  Specifically, the State sought 
$15,501.85 in child support arrearages and $10,948.50 in 
interest.4  In an accompanying affidavit, the State alleged that 
it was a real party in interest under Wis. Stat. § 767.075.  
Documents in the record show that the State was acting in part 
to recoup AFDC payments made to Elaine during periods when 
Walter was failing to pay child support.  
                                                 
3 Elaine and Walter had only two children together, both of 
whom were ordered to receive support payments from Walter.  As a 
matter of grammatical purity, the second child should be 
referred to as the "younger" child, not the "youngest" child.  
However, since the principle of law at issue is concerned only 
with the child who is the youngest among whatever pool of 
children are receiving support, we will refer to the Hamiltons' 
second child as their "youngest" child. 
4 The court of appeals noted that both Walter and the State 
agree that the State's motion is an "independent action" upon 
the judgment.  Hamilton, 253 Wis. 2d 805, ¶3 n.2.  Apparently, 
neither party argues that the State could not bring a motion 
within the context of the original action.  Id.  We do not 
address this issue because it has no bearing on our present 
decision. 
No. 01-1014 
 
5 
 
¶10 In response to the State's motion, Walter argued that 
the statute of limitations for actions on judgments had expired 
and thus barred the State's action.  A family court commissioner 
and the Dane County Circuit Court, Gerald C. Nichol, Judge, 
agreed 
that 
the 
20-year 
statute 
of 
limitations 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.40 applied.  Relying on case law interpreting 
and applying earlier statutes, the circuit court determined that 
the State's cause of action did not accrue until the date Walter 
and Elaine's youngest child reached the age of majority.  This 
ruling made the State's action in 2000 timely, on the theory 
that the State had 20 years from April 4, 1985, the accrual 
date, to commence an action.  
¶11 The circuit court remanded the matter to the family 
court commissioner, who ordered Walter to pay $15,024.85 in 
arrearages and $7,944.39 in interest.  When the matter returned 
to the circuit court, the court affirmed the arrearage amount 
but expunged all existing and future interest because of the 
State's unreasonable delay in seeking enforcement.5  Walter was 
ordered to pay $100 per month toward the arrears, as well as an 
annual receiving and disbursement fee.  The circuit court 
rejected Walter's renewed motion that it had lost jurisdiction 
                                                 
5 The State has not appealed the circuit court's ruling 
denying interest on the arrearage. 
No. 01-1014 
 
6 
 
because the State's claim had expired under the statute of 
limitations.6  Walter appealed.  
¶12 On March 28, 2002, the court of appeals reversed the 
circuit court's decision.  State v. Hamilton, 2002 WI App 89, 
¶1, 
253 
Wis. 2d 805, 
644 
N.W.2d 243. 
 
Interpreting 
Wis. Stat. § 893.40, the court noted that a substantive change 
had been made in the law regarding the starting date of the 20-
year time limit for actions on a judgment or decree.  Id., ¶15.  
The court asserted that two distinct groups of missed child 
support payments were at issue in the case.  Id., ¶¶7, 16.  The 
court reasoned that § 893.40 applied to arrearages arising after 
its effective date of July 1, 1980, and that the statute of 
limitations began to run on these missed payments upon the entry 
of the last judgment in 1977.  Id., ¶18.  The court concluded 
that two former sections, Wis. Stat. §§ 893.14 and 893.16(1) 
(1977), governed the arrearages arising before July 1, 1980, 
inasmuch as the State had acquired a vested right "in the prior 
statute of limitations at the time the new statute became 
effective."  Id., ¶¶17, 21.7  Hence, the 20-year period in which 
                                                 
6 The circuit court expressly found that the action was an 
action on a judgment and that Wis. Stat. § 893.40 applied to the 
matter.  Nonetheless, it held that the cause of action did not 
accrue until April 4, 1985, for all of Walter's arrears. 
7 The court of appeals applied Wis. Stat. §§ 990.06 and 
991.07, explaining that 
when a statute of limitations is replaced or amended, 
a cause of action that has accrued prior to the 
effective date of the new statute or amendment is 
governed by the prior statute, unless the legislature 
specifies otherwise.  Conversely, a cause of action 
No. 01-1014 
 
7 
 
to bring an action to collect the arrearages arising before July 
1, 1980, did not end until June 30, 2000——a little more than one 
month after the State filed its action.  Id., ¶17.  Accordingly, 
the court of appeals found the State's action timely with 
respect to the pre-July 1, 1980, arrearages but untimely with 
respect to the arrearages accruing after that date.  Id., ¶¶17, 
19. 
¶13 The State petitioned this court for review of that 
portion of the court of appeals' decision barring it from 
seeking payment on arrearages accumulating after July 1, 1980.8  
                                                                                                                                                             
that has not yet accrued prior to the effective date 
of the new statute or amendment is governed by the new 
language, unless otherwise specified. 
Hamilton, 253 Wis. 2d 805, ¶11. 
8 Walter did not cross-petition the court of appeals' 
decision that the State's action was timely with respect to the 
arrears that accumulated prior to July 1, 1980.  In oral 
argument, 
Walter's 
counsel 
theorized 
that, 
because 
an 
independent cause of action to collect child support arrears 
under the prior statutory scheme did not fully accrue until the 
youngest child reached majority, the pre-1980 arrears never 
actually "accrued."  This was a renewal of his earlier argument, 
rejected by the court of appeals, that Wis. Stat. § 893.40 
applies to bar all the arrears he owed.  See Hamilton, 253 
Wis. 2d 805, ¶21.   
The court of appeals pointed to Wis. Stat. §§ 990.06 and 
991.07 to support the proposition that the former statute of 
limitations applied to pre-July 1, 1980, arrears.  It rejected 
the argument that the accrual date for a cause of action for 
child support arrearages always is the date of the youngest 
child's majority.  Id., ¶25.  "[T]here are other events that can 
and do give rise to a last-cause-of-action date in child support 
arrearage cases . . . ."  Id.  The court went on to say that 
"Walter's analysis fails to take into account the vested right 
the State had in the prior statute of limitations at the time 
the new statute became effective."  Id., ¶21. 
No. 01-1014 
 
8 
 
We granted review to address this important, recurring issue in 
child support enforcement. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶14 This case involves a determination of the appropriate 
statute of limitations to apply to an independent action to 
collect child support arrearages, as well as the interpretation 
and application of that statute.  These matters present 
questions of law that we review de novo.  Construction of a 
statute 
is 
a 
question 
of 
law 
that 
this 
court 
decides 
independently of the circuit court and the court of appeals, 
benefiting from their analyses.  See Meyer v. School Dist. of 
Colby, 226 Wis. 2d 704, 708, 595 N.W.2d 339 (1999).  Whether a 
statutory limitations period requires dismissal of an action 
where the underlying facts are not in dispute is also a question 
of law.  See Smith v. Milwaukee County, 149 Wis. 2d 934, 937, 
440 N.W.2d 360 (1989). 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶15 When the State filed its May 22, 2000, motion to order 
Walter to pay child support arrearages and interest, it was 
commencing an action on a judgment.  The original judgment was 
the June 22, 1970, divorce judgment.  The modified judgment was 
the November 9, 1977, order amending the original judgment. 
                                                                                                                                                             
There is no challenge before this court concerning the 
arrears 
that 
Walter 
accumulated 
prior 
to 
July 
1, 
1980.  
Therefore, we do not consider the court of appeals' analysis or 
decision relating to these arrears.  
No. 01-1014 
 
9 
 
¶16 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.40 prescribes the time within 
which a party may bring an action on a judgment: 
Action on judgment or decree; court of record.  
Except as provided in s. 846.04(2) and (3), action 
upon a judgment or decree of a court of record of any 
state or of the United States shall be commenced 
within 20 years after the judgment or decree is 
entered or be barred. 
¶17 This statute was enacted in 1980.  See § 28, Ch. 323, 
Laws of 1979 (effective July 1, 1980).  There is no dispute 
between the parties that § 893.40 applies to arrearages that 
occurred after July 1, 1980, because these arrearages accrued 
subsequent to the time when the old statute of limitations was 
repealed and the new statute took effect.  Applying § 893.40 to 
the 
payments 
missed 
after 
July 
1, 
1980, 
conforms 
to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 990.06 and 990.07, first, because the limitation 
under the former statute had not yet "begun to run" before it 
was repealed, and, second, because a cause of action on payments 
not yet missed had not accrued under the former statute.  The 
dispute in this case is about when the new statute began to run.   
¶18 The statute's answer is seemingly clear: any action 
upon a judgment of a court of record must be commenced within 20 
years after the judgment is entered.  The statute is not limited 
to child support enforcement actions; it is much broader.  
Conversely, it does not except child support enforcement 
actions, as it excepts certain real estate foreclosures.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 846.04(2), (3).  No other statute sets time 
limitations for independent actions to collect arrearages on 
child support judgments.  Thus, an independent action for child 
No. 01-1014 
 
10 
 
support arrearages is an action upon a judgment, governed by 
this 
statute 
of 
limitations. 
 
Kroeger 
v. 
Kroeger, 
120 
Wis. 2d 48, 52, 353 N.W.2d 60 (Ct. App. 1984); see also Miller 
v. Miller, 17 B.R. 717, 719 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982). 
¶19 Prior to July 1, 1980, the limitations period within 
which to bring actions upon a judgment was prescribed by the 
interaction of two statutes, Wis. Stat. §§ 893.14 and 893.16(1) 
(1977). 
¶20 The first of these two statutes, § 893.14, formerly 
served as an umbrella provision for most statutes of limitations 
in Chapter 893.  It read: 
Actions, time for commencing.  The following 
actions 
must 
be 
commenced 
within 
the 
periods 
respectively hereinafter prescribed after the cause of 
action has accrued except that the period shall not be 
considered to have expired when the court before which 
the action is pending shall be satisfied that the 
person 
originally 
served 
knowingly 
gave 
false 
information to the officer with intent to mislead him 
in the performance of his duty in the service of any 
summons or civil process.  In the event the court so 
finds the period of limitation shall be extended for 
one year.  
Wis. Stat. § 893.14 (1977) (emphasis added).  This statute 
introduced the question of when a cause of action accrues into 
the determination of limitations. 
¶21 In Halmu v. Halmu, 247 Wis. 124, 134, 19 N.W.2d 317 
(1945), overruled on other grounds by Griffin v. Reeve, 141 
Wis. 2d 699, 416 N.W.2d 612 (1987), this court said that the 
applicable statute of limitations for independent actions on 
child support arrearages did not begin to run until after the 
No. 01-1014 
 
11 
 
youngest child had reached majority.9  The court recognized the 
authority to seek enforcement of alimony and child support 
provisions of a divorce judgment through contempt proceedings in 
the divorce court at any time, so long as the divorce court 
retained jurisdiction to revise its judgment.  But it declared 
that an independent action to enforce the judgment would result 
in overlapping and confusion if it were permitted to go forward 
before the divorce court lost its jurisdiction.  Halmu, 247 Wis. 
at 134-35.  Inasmuch as the continuing jurisdiction of the 
divorce court over child support terminated at the youngest 
child's majority, the court decided that the statute of 
limitations "begins to run upon attainment of majority by the 
children."  Id. (citing Beck v. First Nat'l Bank of Oshkosh, 244 
Wis. 418, 12 N.W.2d 665 (1944); Ashby v. Ashby, 174 Wis. 549, 
554, 183 N.W. 965 (1921); Yates v. Yates, 157 Wis. 219, 147 N.W. 
60 (1914)).  In short, the youngest child's age of majority was 
the date when the independent cause of action was said to 
"accrue." 
¶22 The second statute, § 893.16(1), established a 20-year 
statute of limitations, which applied to "(1) An action upon a 
                                                 
9 The Halmu court also held that the circuit court did not 
have "jurisdiction to enforce its order to pay child support by 
contempt 
proceedings 
on 
accrued 
unpaid 
instalments 
[sic] 
commenced after the child has reached majority."  Halmu v. 
Halmu, 247 Wis. 124, 132, 19 N.W.2d 317 (1945) (quoting Lowry v. 
Lowry, 118 P.2d 1015, 1016 (Okla. 1941)).  This holding 
regarding contempt proceedings after the age of majority was 
overruled by this court in Griffin v. Reeve, 141 Wis. 2d 699, 
704, 416 N.W.2d 612 (1987). 
No. 01-1014 
 
12 
 
judgment or decree of any court of record of this state . . . ."  
Wis. Stat. § 893.16(1) (1977). 
¶23 These provisions, read together in the context of 
state-ordered child support judgments, created a 20-year statute 
of limitations period for independent actions on child support 
arrearages that began to run on the date of the youngest child's 
majority.  See Kroeger, 120 Wis. 2d at 50 (citing Halmu, 247 
Wis. at 134). 
¶24 Sections 893.14 and 893.16(1) were repealed in 1980 as 
part of the repeal and recreation of Chapter 893, § 28, ch. 323, 
Laws of 1979, and new provisions, including Wis. Stat. §§ 893.04 
and 893.40, were created. 
¶25 In the present case, the circuit court focused 
exclusively on the new § 893.40.  It nonetheless relied upon the 
language and rationale from Halmu and Kroeger in reaching its 
conclusion that the 20-year limitations period of the new 
statute did not begin to run until Walter's youngest child 
reached majority in 1985.  The State continues to plug the 
rationale 
of 
Halmu 
and 
Kroeger, 
noting 
that, 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1)(a), 
courts 
possess 
continuing 
jurisdiction to modify child support judgments and that such 
revisions are common.  These points merge into the proposition 
that the total amount of arrears owing under a judgment ordering 
child support cannot be known and fixed until the youngest child 
receiving support reaches majority.  That, the State argues, is 
when the cause of action accrues. 
No. 01-1014 
 
13 
 
¶26 This argument downplays the fact that the statutory 
language has changed, altering the substance of the law. 
¶27 In 1977 § 893.16 provided simply that "[a]n action 
upon a judgment or decree of any court of record of this state" 
had a 20-year statute of limitations.  Wis. Stat. § 893.16(1) 
(1977).  By comparison, current § 893.40 reads: Action on 
judgment or decree; court of record.  Except as provided in s. 
846.04(2) and (3), action upon a judgment or decree of a court 
of record of any state . . . shall be commenced within 20 years 
after the judgment or decree is entered or be barred."  The new 
statute is explicit in asserting that an action upon a judgment 
shall be commenced "within 20 years after the judgment . . . is 
entered."  Wis. Stat. § 893.40 (emphasis added).  It leaves no 
room for an interpretation that the statute begins to run when 
the cause of action accrues.   
¶28 This clear directive is significant because of the 
language in another statute created in 1980, § 893.04, which 
reads: "Unless otherwise specifically prescribed by law, a 
period of limitation within which an action may be commenced is 
computed from the time that the cause of action accrues until 
the action is commenced."  Wis. Stat. § 893.04 (emphasis added).  
The language in this section is substantially the same as the 
language in former § 893.14 (1977), except that the new statute 
adds the clause "[u]nless otherwise specifically prescribed by 
law."  In our view, current § 893.40 specifically prescribes an 
alternative to the time "the cause of action accrues," namely, 
No. 01-1014 
 
14 
 
the date "the judgment . . . is entered," and that specific 
statutory alternative makes § 893.04 inapplicable. 
¶29 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 893.40 
is 
different 
from 
its 
predecessor, § 893.16(1) (1977), in another way.  The new 
statute is a statute of repose.  Statutes of repose operate 
differently from statutes of limitations.  A statute of 
limitations usually establishes the time frame within which a 
claim must be initiated after a cause of action actually 
accrues.  Aicher v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶26, 
237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849.  A statute of repose, by 
contrast, limits the time period within which an action may be 
brought based on the date of an act or omission.  Id.  A statute 
of repose does not relate to the accrual of a cause of action.  
In fact, it may cut off litigation before a cause of action 
arises.  In this case, the "act" that triggers the statute of 
repose is the entry of the judgment. 
¶30 In short, § 893.40 is plain and unambiguous in its 
declaration that the statute of limitations begins to run upon 
the entry of judgment. 
¶31 The State refrains from arguing that the language of 
§ 893.40 is ambiguous or that an action to collect child support 
arrearages is not an "action upon a judgment."  Instead, it 
asserts that a literal reading of § 893.40 will lead to absurd 
and unreasonable results, and it offers several suggestions on 
how to avoid them. 
¶32 One option is to have this court construe "entry" of 
judgment to include the expiration of the child support order 
No. 01-1014 
 
15 
 
when the youngest child reaches majority.  The State reasons 
that a support judgment is not really "entered" until the court 
ordering 
child 
support 
loses 
revision 
jurisdiction 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 767.32.  Only then do we see the finality typical 
of other types of judgments.  However, this suggestion is a mere 
restatement of the Halmu rule in a manner amenable to § 893.40's 
replacement of accrual with entry of judgment as the event 
triggering the period of limitation. 
¶33 There are at least two reasons why construing "entry" 
of judgment to include the final total arrearage upon expiration 
of the support order would be problematic. 
¶34 First, the legislature is clear as to when a judgment 
of a court of record is entered.  Wisconsin Stat. § 806.06(1) 
provides: 
Rendition, perfection and entry of judgment.  
(1)(a) A judgment is rendered by the court when it is 
signed by the judge or by the clerk at the judge's 
written direction. 
(b) A judgment is entered when it is filed in the 
office of the clerk of court. 
(c) A judgment is perfected by the taxation of 
costs and the insertion of the amount thereof in the 
judgment. 
(d) A judgment is granted when given orally in 
open court on the record. 
No. 01-1014 
 
16 
 
Wis. Stat. § 806.06(1) 
(emphasis 
added).10 
 
The 
State's 
construction 
would 
require 
us 
to 
disregard 
or 
rewrite 
§ 806.06(1)(b) to facilitate a rewriting of § 893.40.   
¶35 Second, deviation from the statutory definition of 
when a judgment is entered might impact other situations in 
which actions on judgments are pursued.  We doubt that judgments 
directing periodic child support payments are the only judgments 
involving periodic payments, or the only judgments potentially 
affected by the proposed interpretation.  In fact, many civil 
judgments are not completely "final" at the time they are 
entered. See Wis. Stat. § 806.07 (permitting a party to move for 
relief from a judgment or order). 
¶36 Another option suggested by the State is to define 
"judgment" as not including child support judgments or orders 
and to then blend the 20-year limitation period of § 893.40 with 
the accrual rule of § 893.04.11  The State premises this 
suggestion on the reality that few judgments are of such a 
continuing nature as child support judgments.  We agree that the 
type of judgment generating an ongoing child support obligation 
is not typical of the judgments to which § 893.40 applies.  
                                                 
10 Similarly, an order of a circuit court is entered when it 
is 
filed 
in 
the 
office 
of 
the 
clerk 
of 
court.  
Wis. Stat. § 807.11(2). 
11 As noted in ¶28, Wis. Stat. § 893.04 provides: "Unless 
otherwise specifically prescribed by law, a period of limitation 
within which an action may be commenced is computed from the 
time that the cause of action accrues until the action is 
commenced."  Wis. Stat. § 893.04 (emphasis added). 
No. 01-1014 
 
17 
 
Nevertheless, Wisconsin courts have held that an action to 
collect child support arrears is an action upon a judgment.  See 
Kroeger, 120 Wis. 2d at 52; see also Miller, 17 B.R. at 719; cf. 
Schafer v. Wegner, 78 Wis. 2d 127, 131-32, 254 N.W.2d 193 (1977) 
(holding that an action to recover household furniture awarded 
to former wife under a divorce judgment falls under the 20-year 
limitation on judgments); Zellmer v. Sharlein, 1 Wis. 2d 46, 52, 
82 N.W.2d 891 (1957) (holding that an action to enforce a life 
insurance provision that was part of a divorce judgment involves 
the 20-year limitation on judgments). 
¶37 In truth, the State's suggestions are nothing but 
creative efforts to resurrect the law that existed for actions 
on child support judgments prior to enactment of § 893.40.  
However desirable this might be as a matter of public policy, it 
is simply not the outcome engineered by the legislature in its 
1980 revisions of Chapter 893.  Wisconsin Stat. § 893.40 clearly 
and unambiguously specifies that the date when a cause of action 
to collect past-due child support payments begins to run is the 
date when a judgment ordering such payments is entered. 
¶38 Our goal in statutory interpretation is to determine 
and give effect to the intent of the legislature.  Patients 
Comp. Fund v. Lutheran Hosp.-La Crosse, 223 Wis. 2d 439, 455-56, 
588 N.W.2d 35 (1999).  Our first resort is to the plain language 
of the statute.  Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc., 201 Wis. 2d 320, 
327, 548 N.W.2d 519 (1996).  If the language is plain and 
unambiguous, we normally apply it without further inquiry into 
extrinsic interpretation aids.  State v. T.J. Int'l, Inc., 2001 
No. 01-1014 
 
18 
 
WI 76, ¶20, 244 Wis. 2d 481, 628 N.W.2d 774 (citing UFE Inc. v. 
LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 281, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996)).  If we go 
beyond unambiguous text and inquire into legislative history, 
our investigation should serve the purpose of showing how the 
legislative history supports our interpretation of a statute 
that is clear on its face.  Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, 
¶52, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659.  The court should not 
search for ambiguity.  It should enforce a clear statute. 
¶39 One of the few exceptions to this sound principle is 
that the court will seek to avoid a truly absurd or unreasonable 
result.  See State v. Burkman, 96 Wis. 2d 630, 642, 292 
N.W.2d 641 (1980); State v. Mendoza, 96 Wis. 2d 106, 115, 291 
N.W.2d 478 
(1980); 
Kayden 
Indus., 
Inc. 
v. 
Murphy, 
34 
Wis. 2d 718, 732, 150 N.W.2d 447 (1967).  
¶40 Here, 
the 
State 
contends 
that 
its 
proffered 
alternatives 
must 
be 
embraced 
to 
avoid 
the 
purportedly 
unreasonable and absurd results of strictly applying § 893.40 in 
No. 01-1014 
 
19 
 
the context of child support judgments.12  These unreasonable 
results are asserted to be (1) the inequality of treatment among 
beneficiaries of child support orders, stemming from widely 
different time limits depending on when a couple divorces in 
relation to the ages of the children and whether an amended 
judgment is entered; (2) the difficulty imposed on the State and 
others in collecting child support from hard-to-find parents; 
(3) 
the 
unfairness 
that 
results 
from 
extinguishing 
the 
collection rights of those who have relied upon prior published 
decisions; and (4) contravention of the vital public policy of 
requiring parents to support their children. 
¶41 As examples of the inequality and unfairness flowing 
from a literal interpretation of the statute, the State provides 
the following hypotheticals: Couple A divorces when their 
youngest child is one year old, but the obligated parent makes 
support payments for the child until the child is 16.  Couple B 
                                                 
12 The State points to Alberte v. Anew Health Care Services, 
Inc., 2000 WI 7, ¶10, 232 Wis. 2d 587, 605 N.W.2d 515, and cases 
cited therein, to support its proposition that the plain meaning 
maxim of statutory construction can be overcome in this case.  
In Alberte, we held that that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e(17)(1994), and the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994), did not 
subject employers' agents to personal liability for their 
discriminatory acts.  Id., ¶11.  We reached this conclusion by 
reasoning that Congress did not intend to hold agents personally 
liable 
under 
the 
statutes, 
because 
to 
do 
so 
would 
be 
inconsistent with the entire remedial scheme of Title VII and 
the ADA and would produce unreasonable results.  Id., ¶¶1, 11.  
Straightforward 
interpretation 
and 
application 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 893.40 does not "thwart the obvious purpose of the 
statute," as was found in Alberte.  Id., ¶10. 
No. 01-1014 
 
20 
 
divorces when their child is 16, and the obligated parent never 
pays the child support that is ordered.  The effect of applying 
§ 893.40 
as 
written 
is 
that 
the 
limitations 
period 
for 
collection against a delinquent parent in the Couple A context 
is effectively 5 years, while the collection period in the 
Couple B context is 20 years. 
¶42 The inconsistent results in these hypotheticals are 
merely the consequence of modifying a statute of limitations in 
the manner the legislature did when it created the present 
§ 893.40. 
 
Limitation 
periods 
for 
causes 
of 
action 
are 
legislative pronouncements of policy barring actions for various 
policy reasons regardless of the merit of the action.  See Sopha 
v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 230 Wis. 2d 212, 240, 601 
N.W.2d 627 (1999) (citing State v. Chrysler Outboard Corp., 219 
Wis. 2d 130, 
580 
N.W.2d 203 
(1998)).13 
 
In 
§ 893.40, 
the 
legislature is not silent on the issue of when the limitations 
period commences for actions on judgments; it is quite explicit 
as to when suits must be brought in order not to be time-barred.  
While the time in which to bring actions to collect arrearages 
is shorter and more variable under § 893.40 than under prior 
§§ 893.14 and 893.16(1) (1977), it is not so absurdly short and 
variable as to compel going beyond the plain language of the 
                                                 
13 See also Colby v. Columbia County, 202 Wis. 2d 342, 350, 
550 N.W.2d 124 (1996) (quoting William B. Tanner Co. v. Estate 
of Fessler, 100 Wis. 2d 437, 448, 302 N.W.2d 414 (1981)); Ortman 
v. Jensen & Johnson, Inc., 66 Wis. 2d 508, 522, 225 N.W.2d 635 
(1975) ("periods of limitation are subject to a relatively large 
degree of legislative control"). 
No. 01-1014 
 
21 
 
statute.  We see no instance in which the time to bring an 
independent collection action after a child reaches majority 
will be less than one year.14  At any earlier time, a parent may 
bring an enforcement action when the obligated parent fails to 
make timely payment.  See Wis. Stat. § 767.30(3).15 
¶43 The facts of this case illustrate the ample time the 
State had to bring its action.  Because Walter's missed support 
                                                 
14 There would only be a year in the rare circumstance where 
the sole judgment or order demanding support occurs on the date 
of the child's birth and the child is in a program pursuing a 
high school diploma (or its equivalent) up until the date of his 
19th birthday. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 767.25(4) (child support pursuant to a 
judgment of annulment, divorce or legal separation, or an order 
or a judgment in a paternity action) and Wis. Stat. § 767.51(3) 
(for paternity judgments) each limit child support payments to 
"child[ren] of the parties who is less than 18 years old, or any 
child of the parties who is less than 19 years old if the child 
is pursuing an accredited course of instruction leading to the 
acquisition of a high school diploma or its equivalent."  See 
generally Roberta Jo W. v. Leroy W., 218 Wis. 2d 225, 578 
N.W.2d 185 (1998) (discussing the history and operation of these 
sections). 
15 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.30(3) provides: 
(3) If the party fails to pay a [child support] 
payment ordered under sub. (1) or to give security 
under sub. (2), the court may by any appropriate 
remedy enforce the judgment, or the order as if it 
were a final judgment, including any past due payment 
and interest.  Appropriate remedies include but are 
not limited to: 
. . . . 
(c) Money judgment for past due payments. 
Wis. Stat. § 767.30(3). 
No. 01-1014 
 
22 
 
payments after July 1, 1980, were in violation of the November 
1977 amended judgment, the State had more than 12 years from the 
time the youngest Hamilton child reached majority to commence a 
timely action.  It had more than eight years after Elaine 
Hamilton passed away to commence an action.  Even if there had 
not been any amended judgment and the original 1970 divorce 
judgment served as the trigger to the limitations period, the 
State would still have had a little more than five years to act 
after the youngest child reached majority. 
¶44 Finally, the State argues that legislative intent, 
reflected in part by revisions to the Family Code in the 1977 
Divorce Reform Act, has consistently been to expand judicial 
means of enforcing financial orders entered in divorce actions.  
See Griffin, 141 Wis. 2d at 704.  The State asserts, therefore, 
that interpreting § 893.40 to shorten the limitations period for 
collecting support obligations in actions for money judgment is 
unreasonable.  We disagree.  While this result may be contrary 
to the trend in favor of collection rights and may reflect that 
the legislature did not contemplate child support judgments 
under § 893.40, it is not such an unreasonable outcome that it 
significantly subverts existing policy.16 
                                                 
16 The State correctly argues that there does not appear to 
be any legislative history to suggest that the legislature 
considered the uniqueness of child support judgments when it 
switched the beginning of the limitations period for an action 
upon a judgment from the moment of accrual to the entry of 
judgment.  However, the State has not offered, nor have we 
independently found, any legislative history to suggest that 
child support judgments were to be treated differently. 
No. 01-1014 
 
23 
 
¶45 Although a strict application of § 893.40 in the 
context of child support obligations runs counter to the desire 
previously expressed by the legislature and courts to ensure 
that parents do not shirk their duty of child support, this 
inconsistency does not rise to the level of absurdity or utter 
contravention of public policy.  Without such an effect, this 
court is bound to apply the language of § 893.40 as plainly 
directed.  See UFE, 201 Wis. 2d at 281-82.  We exceed our 
authority when we ignore the clear language of a statute and 
attempt to surgically reconstruct the statute to accommodate 
alternative 
public 
policies. 
 
See 
State 
v. 
Martin, 
162 
Wis. 2d 883, 907, 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991); State v. Richards, 123 
Wis. 2d 1, 12, 365 N.W.2d 7 (1985).  Consequently, we decline to 
adopt the State's creative interpretations. 
¶46 We also note that there are several aspects of the 
enforcement of child support obligations that mitigate any 
seemingly harsh result from applying § 893.40 in the context of 
child support judgments.  First, it is no longer true that an 
                                                                                                                                                             
The most pertinent statement of legislative intent comes 
from the 1979 Judicial Council Committee's Note on the revision 
of Chapter 893.  It reads in part: 
This section has been created to combine the 
provisions of repealed ss. 893.16(1) and 893.18(1).  A 
substantive change from prior law results as the time 
period for an action upon a judgment of a court of 
record sitting without this state is increased from 10 
years to 20 years and runs from the time of entry of a 
judgment. 
Judicial 
Council Committee's 
Note, 
1979, § 893.40, 
Stats. 
(emphasis added). 
No. 01-1014 
 
24 
 
independent action for money judgment seeking child support 
arrearages cannot be brought until the child reaches majority.  
See Wis. Stat. § 767.30(3).  A party to whom child support is 
owed need not wait until the youngest child reaches majority 
before going to court to enforce collection. 
¶47 Second, contempt proceedings remain a viable option 
for persons aggrieved by a parent's refusal to pay child 
support.  In Griffin, we explained that the contempt sanction 
remains available "after the child reaches majority, and so long 
as that obligation imposed by court order continues."  Griffin, 
141 Wis. 2d at 708.  This is because a "parent's failure to pay 
child support after the child reaches majority is a continuing 
disobedience of a court order."  Id.  
¶48 Finally, it is well established that laches is not a 
viable defense for actions to recoup child support arrearages.  
Paterson v. Paterson, 73 Wis. 2d 150, 155, 242 N.W.2d 907 
(1976); see also Douglas County Child Support Enforcement Unit 
v. Fisher, 185 Wis. 2d 662, 669, 517 N.W.2d 700 (Ct. App. 1994).  
Therefore, parties with a valid interest in unpaid child support 
arrearages may utilize as much of the 20-year limitations period 
to bring an independent action as their circumstances permit. 
¶49 To the extent that this court's application of 
§ 893.40 in the context of actions upon judgments involving 
child support payments represents an unintended and undesired 
result, the legislature may rectify the situation in new 
legislation.  Cf. Richards, 123 Wis. 2d at 11-13 (calling upon 
the legislature to address policy issues raised and to remedy 
No. 01-1014 
 
25 
 
questionable statutory framework).  In the meantime, the State 
may not sleep on Walter's arrearages longer than Rip Van Winkle 
slept in the Catskill Mountains and still retain its right to go 
to court. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶50 For 
the 
foregoing 
reasons, 
we 
hold 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 893.40 governs the time within which a party may 
bring an independent action to collect child support arrearages 
that have amassed after July 1, 1980.  The clear language of 
this section requires that actions brought in Wisconsin courts 
on entered judgments, including child support judgments, be 
commenced within 20 years of when the judgments are entered (or 
when the judgments are amended and entered). 
¶51 Applying 
these 
principles, 
the 
State 
had 
until 
November 9, 1997, to file an independent action to collect the 
child support arrearages.  That was 20 years after the last 
amended judgment ordering Walter to pay child support was 
entered on November 9, 1977.  Because the State did not initiate 
this action until May 2000, it is properly barred.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the court of appeals' decision and remand the action 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No. 01-1014   
 
 
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