Title: State v. Putnam

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

STATE_V_PUTNAM.95-344; 164 Vt 558; 675 A.2d 422

[Filed 12-Jan-1996]

  NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
  40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
  Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
  order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 95-344


State of Vermont                                  Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            District Court of Vermont,
                                                  Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit

Joshua S. Putnam                                  October  Term, 1995


Stephen B. Martin, J.

Dan M. Davis, Windham County State's Attorney, and James Maxwell, Deputy State's
  Attorney, Brattleboro, for plaintiff-appellee

Charles S. Martin of Martin & Paolini, Barre, and Stephen L. Fine, Athens, for
  defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


       DOOLEY, J.  Defendant, who has been charged with two counts of sexual
  assault, moved to disqualify Judge Theresa DiMauro, the presiding judge in
  the Windham District Court. Pursuant to V.R.Cr.P. 50(d)(3), Judge Dimauro
  referred the disqualification motion to the administrative judge for the
  trial courts, who denied the motion.   We granted an interlocutory appeal. 
  We affirm.

       The disqualification motion is before us on a sparse factual record. 
  State police officers stationed in the Rockingham barracks conducted the
  investigation of the sexual assaults allegedly committed by defendant.  The
  officer who led the investigation, Detective Sergeant David Tetrault, is on
  the State's witness list.  Two other officers, Troopers Burns and Cutting,
  were also involved in the investigation.  Judge DiMauro is married to
  Vincent DiMauro, who is a state police trooper also stationed in the
  Rockingham barracks.  Trooper DiMauro was not part of the investigation,
  nor do any of the troopers who may testify have a supervisory relationship
  over him.  In fact, there are two separate units that work out of the
  barracks: the bureau of

 

  criminal investigation in which the potential witnesses work and the
  uniform patrol division in which Trooper DiMauro works.  Defendant
  presented no evidence indicating either that Trooper DiMauro has any
  connection to the arrest or investigation of defendant, or that Judge
  DiMauro is familiar with the investigating officers.

       The heart of the decision of the administrative judge is found in his
  rejection of defendant's claim that "at least one close working associate
  of [Judge DiMauro's] husband and perhaps more than one will testify":

       The assertion that "one close working associate" will testify, [with
       whom a personal relationship exists between Trooper DiMauro
       and/or Judge DiMauro,] is unsupported by any evidence.  The
       defense does not name the "close associate" or indicate whether
       this "associate" has any connection to this case and/or is expected
       to testify.  Although it may be reasonable to believe that personal,
       as well as professional relationships exist, the defense does not
       offer any detail to support the assertion.  While the existence of a
       personal relationship between either Judge DiMauro and/or her
       husband and a potential witness in this proceeding would be
       relevant to this court's inquiry, no such evidence is presented in
       this case.

  The judge also concluded that the marital relationship between a judge and
  a state police officer who works in the same barracks as an officer who
  will testify in a case before the judge does not automatically require
  disqualification of the judge.

       Some background in our law is important to understanding the issue
  before us.  We have adopted, with some minor technical variations, the 1990
  American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct.  See Reporter's
  Notes, A.O. 10, Canon 3.  The Code contains specific per se
  disqualification rules, none of which are involved here.  See A.O. 10,
  Canon 3E(1)(a)-(d). It also contains the general standard relied upon by
  the defendant here:  a judge must disqualify himself or herself "in a
  proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be
  questioned."  Id., Canon 3E(1).

       We have recently detailed our approach to disqualification issues,
  relying on procedural reforms.  Our former approach was set out in Richard
  v. Richard, 146 Vt. 286, 288,