Title: Moser v. Heffington

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Ronald F. Moser, et al. v. Kristi Heffington, et al., No. 62, September Term 2018 
Opinion by Raker, J. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) 
 
FIFTH AMENDMENT – WAIVER OF PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION – For the purpose of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, a deposition and the trial for which it is given are part of the same 
“proceeding.”  Thus, when the plaintiff waived her Fifth Amendment privilege at a 
deposition, she waived the privilege to the same extent at her subsequent trial. 
 
 
CIVIL PROCEDURE – MOTION TO STAY – When a plaintiff in a civil case moves 
to stay her civil case pending parallel criminal proceedings against her, the court must 
consider the relevant rights and interests of the parties and may consider the inconvenience 
to the court’s docket.  The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County did not abuse its 
discretion when it concluded that the plaintiff had waived her Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination, considered the defendants’ right to timely resolution of claims 
against them, and denied the motion. 
 
 
CIVIL PROCEDURE – MOTION FOR JUDGMENT – Where the plaintiffs consented 
to an abbreviated trial proceeding in which the plaintiffs presented no evidence, the Circuit 
Court for Prince George’s County did not err in granting the defendant’s motion for 
judgment pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-519. 
 
 
 
 
 
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County 
Case No. CAL16-07861 
Argued: April 8, 2019 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS  
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
 
 
No. 62 
 
September Term, 2018 
______________________________________ 
 
RONALD F. MOSER, et al. 
 
v. 
 
KRISTI HEFFINGTON, et al. 
______________________________________ 
 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
 
Greene*, 
 
McDonald, 
 
Watts, 
 
Hotten, 
 
Getty, 
Raker, Irma S. 
        (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),  
  
JJ. 
 ______________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Raker, J. 
______________________________________ 
 
 
 
Filed: August 16, 2019 
 
Greene, J., now retired, participated in the 
hearing and conference of this case while an 
active member of this Court; after being recalled 
pursuant to the Maryland Constitution, Article 
IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the 
decision and adoption of this opinion. 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal 
Materials Act 
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 
 
 
 
 
 
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk 
2019-10-17 13:57-04:00
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
At the heart of this case is whether a plaintiff in a civil lawsuit, a defamation action, 
who is also the defendant in a related criminal case, is entitled to a stay of the civil lawsuit 
she initiated pending resolution of the criminal case.  Petitioners, Ronald F. Moser, Anne 
M. Moser, and Ronald F. Moser, D.D.S., P.A. (“the Mosers”), appeal from the Court of 
Special Appeals’s reversal of a judgment in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County 
granting judgment at the end of plaintiff’s case in favor of the Mosers.  Before the Court 
of Special Appeals, respondents Kristi and Matthew Heffington (“the Heffingtons”) argued 
that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying their motion to stay the civil 
proceeding because it did not weigh properly Mrs. Heffington’s constitutional protection 
against self-incrimination against the Mosers’ interest in an expeditious trial of the claims 
against them.  The Court of Special Appeals agreed with the Heffingtons, holding that the 
trial court abused its discretion in not granting the stay, reversed, and remanded the matter 
for further proceedings.  Heffington v. Moser, 238 Md. App. 509, 192 A.3d 900 (2018).   
We granted the Mosers’ petition for a writ of certiorari to answer the following questions:   
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 
respondents’ motion to stay the civil proceedings in this 
defamation action pending resolution of the criminal 
proceedings pending against petitioner? 
 
2. Did employee waive her Fifth Amendment privilege in the 
civil action by testifying at her deposition and providing 
other discovery responses without invoking the privilege 
after she was on notice that the police were investigating 
her for embezzlement and identity theft? 
 
3. Given that employee had already answered questions at her 
deposition concerning acts of embezzlement and identity 
theft, did employee fail to preserve for review the denial of 
a stay of the civil action where she failed to proffer the 
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2 
 
questions as to which she intended to invoke her right to 
silence—which was necessary to determine if she could 
validly exercise the privilege or had waived it? 
 
4. Did the Court of Special Appeals unnecessarily decide a 
constitutional question, i.e., whether the trial court had 
failed to fully consider employee’s Fifth Amendment right 
by not granting a stay of her civil action, after it learned that 
employee had been convicted of the very conduct that 
formed the basis for dentist’s alleged defamation against 
her, which rendered moot her defamation claim? 
 
We shall hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
Heffingtons’ motion to stay the civil proceedings, and we shall reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Special Appeals.   
 
I. 
Procedural History 
 
On March 21, 2016, respondents Kristi and Matthew Heffington filed in the Circuit 
Court for Prince George’s County an eleven-count Complaint against petitioners Ronald 
F. Moser, Anne M. Moser, and Ronald F. Moser, D.D.S., P.A.  The Complaint alleged 
defamation per se, malicious use of process, tortious interference with prospective business 
advantage, tortious interference with contractual relations, and civil conspiracy, all based 
upon the Mosers’ allegedly false statements to the police, to the dental practice’s insurer, 
and to others.  The essence of the statements was that Kristi Heffington stole money from 
the dental practice and committed identity fraud. 
 
Following the circuit court’s denial of the Moser defendants’ motion to dismiss the 
Complaint, the parties engaged in discovery, including interrogatories and depositions.  
The circuit court set a trial date of June 19–22, 2017, and Mrs. Heffington was deposed on 
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3 
 
November 14, 2016.  On February 16, 2017, Mrs. Heffington was indicted by the Grand 
Jury for Prince George’s County for the same events underlying the defamation action.  
She was charged with a theft scheme of $10,000 to under $100,000 and four counts of 
fraud by identity theft.  Two further indictments—for related crimes in the same 
transactions—followed. 
 
On June 13, 2017, the Heffingtons filed a motion to stay the civil action.  They 
argued that Mrs. Heffington’s testimony in the civil action would implicate her Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination in her criminal case and that she therefore 
could not present her defamation action before she resolved her criminal case.  The circuit 
court denied the motion, and the matter proceeded to trial before a jury.  The Heffingtons 
waived opening statement and presented absolutely no evidence.  They moved for a 
mistrial, citing the arguments from their motion to stay.   The trial court denied the mistrial 
motion, and the Mosers reserved opening statements and then moved for judgment on all 
claims.   The court granted judgment in favor of all defendants on all counts. 
 
The Heffingtons filed an appeal in the Court of Special Appeals on July 5, 2017.  
On July 19, 2018, Mrs. Heffington pled guilty to identity fraud, making a false statement 
in an insurance claim, and conspiracy to commit identity theft, criminal offenses arising 
from the same facts in this civil action.   The Court of Special Appeals vacated the judgment 
of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, holding, inter alia, that the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying the Heffingtons’ motion to stay the proceedings.   Id., 238 
Md. App. at 541, 192 A.3d at 918.  We granted the Mosers’ Petition for Writ of Certiorari.   
Moser v. Heffington, 462 Md. 260, 199 A.3d 693 (2018). 
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4 
 
II. 
Factual Background 
Mrs. Heffington was an employee of Ronald F. Moser, D.D.S., P.A., a family dental 
practice.  She held the position of office manager.  She was responsible for depositing all 
cash and checks in the practice’s business account, balancing the daily transactions, and 
providing Dr. Moser with a daily report on revenue.  In April 2015, Dr. Moser fired Mrs. 
Heffington for stealing money from the practice.  The Mosers accused her of using the Visa 
terminal at the practice to process and later refund to herself charges on medical credit 
cards she obtained in her name and in the names of family members—without their 
knowledge or consent.  Dr. Moser reported Mrs. Heffington’s thefts to the City of Bowie 
Police Department and to the practice’s insurer.  Five days later, Mrs. Heffington’s cousin, 
Randall Tracey, reported to the Anne Arundel County Police Department that Mrs. 
Heffington stole his identity and used it to apply for a $10,000 medical loan.  He reported 
also that she stole his son’s identity and used it to apply for a medical credit card. 
Nearly one year later, in March 2016, the Heffingtons filed the eleven-count civil 
lawsuit underlying this appeal.  The circuit court scheduled the case for a four-day trial, 
from June 19–22, 2017. 
As part of the discovery process, Mrs. Heffington sat for a seven-hour deposition in 
November 2016.  She did not invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination and answered numerous inculpatory questions.  She testified that three weeks 
before she was fired, Mr. Tracey’s ex-wife asked her about an issue with Mr. Tracey’s 
credit report.  Mrs. Heffington said she learned from that conversation that she was accused 
of stealing Mr. Tracey’s identity.  Mrs. Heffington testified that she obtained medical credit 
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5 
 
cards in her own name and in the names of various family members, made transactions 
using those cards, and used the practice’s Visa terminal to refund the transactions.  She 
also testified about loans Dr. Moser extended to her and dental insurance claims she made 
on behalf of her aunt, who was never a patient of the practice.  She denied any wrongdoing, 
claiming that the transactions were proper and were made with the consent of her family 
members and Dr. Moser. 
 
Following Mrs. Heffington’s indictment, the Heffingtons and Mosers continued 
civil discovery.  The Heffingtons deposed Dr. Moser in March 2017, and the parties 
attended an unsuccessful mediation in May. 
On June 7, 2017, the court postponed the criminal trial at the State’s request.  On 
June 13 (six days before the civil trial), the Heffingtons filed a motion to stay the civil 
proceedings, requesting that the court stay the civil proceedings pending the outcome of 
the criminal case.  At the motion hearing, the Heffingtons requested a “short stay just to let 
the criminal trial get out of the way,” explaining that Mrs. Heffington’s testimony in the 
civil action would implicate her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and 
that without the stay, she would not be able to present her case.  The Heffingtons noted that 
because the statute of limitations in a defamation action is one year, see Md. Code (1974, 
2013 Repl. Vol.), § 5-105 of the Courts and Jud. Proc. Art., they had no choice but to file 
suit in 2016. 
Opposing the stay, the Mosers argued that the motion was untimely (coming just 
days prior to trial) and that they had incurred significant costs preparing for trial and should 
not be forced to delay defending themselves against the civil suit.  Significantly, they 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
6 
 
argued that Mrs. Heffington had waived her Fifth Amendment privilege by testifying 
without raising her privilege in her deposition and engaging in discovery after she was 
indicted.  They maintained that Mrs. Heffington had been free not to file suit, could dismiss 
her suit, could attempt to prove her case through other evidence, or could testify at the civil 
trial but invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege on a question by question basis.  They 
asserted that, given the likelihood of additional continuances in the criminal case and an 
appeal if a jury convicted Mrs. Heffington, any stay would not be “short.” 
The trial court denied the motion to stay, ruling as follows:   
“I think there is a good likelihood . . . that there may be a 
finding that [Mrs. Heffington] may have waived her Fifth 
Amendment privilege to a certain extent.  I haven’t looked at 
the depositions.  I don’t know what the testimony is, but there’s 
no dispute that she did give a deposition in this matter 
regarding the issue—surrounding the issues in this case, and 
that to a certain extent, from what I hear from counsel, the 
allegations in this case relate somewhat to the allegations in the 
criminal case. 
There is no guarantee when the criminal case is going 
to go forward when scheduled.  I think the criminal case was 
scheduled previously in this matter and got continued.  I have 
the criminal case here.  It doesn’t look like this criminal case is 
specially assigned to any judge, so there is extensive discovery, 
extensive documents in this case that may make this case go 
beyond the usual two- or three-day trial.   That may continue 
it. 
I just say all this to say you don’t have a guarantee that 
the [criminal] case is going to go forward on the date that it is 
currently assigned.  This is a civil case and it could be 
continued.  The civil case could be bumped further and further 
and further along.  I do find that the motion is filed somewhat 
late since you knew that she was indicted months ago. 
For those reasons and the extensive discovery and 
preparation on the part of the defendant, just to note you were 
just in pretrial where defense counsel noted that as far as the 
documents they have in this case for exhibits, it’s over a 
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7 
 
hundred documents in this matter.  The civil case was specially 
assigned to this member of the bench.  For those reasons, 
because there’s no guarantee that the criminal case will go 
forward when . . . it’s supposed to happen, I’m going to deny 
the motion to stay in this case.   
If [Mrs. Heffington] does invoke her Fifth Amendment 
right in the civil case, a jury is able to take that evidence and 
draw reasonable inferences from that evidence.  Those are 
things that she has to consider and I’m going to deny the 
motion to stay.” 
 
As indicated, the trial commenced, the circuit court granted judgment in favor of the 
Mosers, and the Heffingtons filed a timely notice of appeal. 
 
 
III.  The Court of Special Appeals Opinion 
The Court of Special Appeals held that the circuit court abused its discretion in 
denying the Heffingtons’ motion to stay the civil case.  Heffington v. Moser, 238 Md. App. 
at 509, 518 192 A.3d at 905.  Specifically, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that 
Mrs. Heffington did not waive her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
when she gave inculpatory testimony during her deposition prior to the February 2017 
indictment.  Heffington, 238 Md. App. at 532, 192 A.3d at 913.  The court held also that 
the circuit court erred when it failed to balance explicitly Mrs. Heffington’s right to assert 
her Fifth Amendment privilege and her right of access to the courts under the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights against the Mosers’ right to timely resolution of the claims against 
them without harm to their defense.   Id. at 540, 192 A.3d at 917. 
The Mosers argued in the Court of Special Appeals that Mrs. Heffington waived her 
Fifth Amendment privilege in two ways:  first, she did not take the witness stand and invoke 
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8 
 
the privilege, and second, she waived her Fifth Amendment privilege by testifying to the 
acts at issue in her deposition before she was indicted.   Id. at 527, 192 A.3d at 910.  The 
court held that as to the procedural default, i.e., that she did not invoke her privilege 
properly, the Mosers did not object below, and hence, that argument was waived and not 
preserved for appellate review.  Id. at 526, 192 A.3d at 909.  As to the waiver of the 
privilege by testifying at the deposition, the court held Mrs. Heffington did not waive her 
Fifth Amendment privilege.  The court held that “[i]n light of the uncertainty regarding 
potential criminal charges at the time of Kristi’s deposition and the change in circumstances 
brought about by her indictment, we hold that Kristi did not waive her Fifth Amendment 
privilege, for purposes of trial, by testifying before trial at her pre-indictment deposition.”  
Id. at 532, 192 A.3d at 913. 
 
The Court of Special Appeals acknowledged that if waived, the privilege is waived 
for the entire “proceeding” in which it was waived.  Id. at 529–30, 192 A.3d at 911.  But 
the court avoided addressing whether a deposition and a trial in the same case are different 
“proceedings” for Fifth Amendment waiver purposes.  The court held that even if they 
were part of the same proceeding, Mrs. Heffington’s later criminal indictment was a 
significant change in her circumstance between her deposition testimony and her trial.  Id. 
at 530–31, 192 A.3d at 912.  The court reasoned as follows: 
“Although, when she filed suit, Kristi knew that criminal 
charges might be brought against her, she reasonably could 
have believed by November 2016 that that might not happen, 
given the passage of time.  When she was indicted in February 
2017, the Fifth Amendment calculus changed dramatically.  
She no longer faced only a possibility of being charged with 
crimes arising from her employment at the Practice, but the 
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9 
 
absolute certainty of it. ‘[T]he potential for self-incrimination 
is greatest’ after an indictment is returned.  And, even if 
Kristi’s trial testimony merely repeated her deposition 
testimony, ‘reiteration adds to the credibility of the 
statement.’” 
 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 
 
The intermediate appellate court held that the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying Mrs. Heffington’s motion because the court “did not balance her Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination and her Article 19 right to access to the courts against the 
Mosers’ right to a timely resolution of the claims against them without harm to their 
defense.”  Id. at 541, 192 A.3d at 918.  The Court of Special Appeals elaborated that 
because the trial court held that Mrs. Heffington did not waive her Fifth Amendment 
privilege, the court erred by finding that she waived the privilege “to a certain extent” in 
her deposition testimony.  Id. at 540, 192 A.3d at 918.  Finally, the intermediate appellate 
court held that the trial court erred in not considering whether a stay would not merely 
inconvenience the Mosers but actually would prejudice them.  Id. at 542–43, 192 A.3d at 
919.   
The Court of Special Appeals vacated the judgment of the circuit court in favor of 
the Mosers.  The intermediate appellate court remanded for the trial court to consider the 
Mosers’ motion for summary judgment1 because, while the appeal was pending but after 
                                                     
 
1 The Court of Special Appeals explained as follows: 
 
“On May 26, 2017, before the stay was requested, the Mosers 
filed a motion for summary judgment.  The motion remained 
open on the first day of trial.  It was not ruled upon because the 
Mosers and the court agreed that it (footnote continued . . .) 
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10 
 
oral argument in the Court of Special Appeals, Mrs. Heffington entered into a plea 
agreement with the State that concluded the criminal case. 
  We granted certiorari to consider the issues presented. 
 
IV. Arguments of the Parties 
 
Before this Court, the Mosers ask that we vacate the judgment of the Court of 
Special Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s 
County.  The Mosers argue first that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
the motion to stay.  They argue in the alternative that the Heffingtons’ civil suit is moot 
because Mrs. Heffington pled guilty in the criminal case and that those convictions 
establish the defense of “truth” as a matter of law.   
On the merits, they argue that whatever the balancing test, the circuit court balanced 
properly the competing interests at stake.  They contend that the court considered the 
parties’ interests in resolving the case, the uncertainty of the length of the stay, the 
Heffingtons’ late filing of their motion after civil discovery, and the inference the jury 
could draw from invocation of the Fifth Amendment in a civil trial.  They emphasize that 
the Heffingtons filed their motion to stay months after Mrs. Heffington’s indictment and 
only six days before the civil trial.  They argue that the Heffingtons’ delay prejudiced them 
                                                     
 
would be rendered moot by the grant of the Mosers’ motion for 
summary judgment.  Our decision in this appeal, vacating the 
judgment in the Mosers’ favor, revives the motion for 
summary judgment.  We express no opinion about the 
appropriate outcome of the motion. 
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11 
 
because the Heffingtons initiated and responded to discovery requests in the interim 
months, incurring litigation costs for the Mosers. 
 
Turning to mootness, the Mosers argue that Mrs. Heffington’s guilty plea in her 
criminal case mooted the Heffingtons’ civil claim.  Mrs. Heffington pled guilty to identity 
fraud, making a false statement in an insurance claim, and conspiracy to commit identity 
theft.  At her plea hearing, Mrs. Heffington agreed that she used the personal information 
of Randall Tracey, Dr. Moser, and others to obtain for herself funds from a bank, an 
insurance company, and the dental practice.  The Mosers argue that her guilty pleas and 
the underlying admissions of fact form an absolute defense against the Heffingtons’ claim 
of defamation relating to the same issues, mooting the defamation claims against the 
Mosers. 
In response to the holding of the Court of Special Appeals that they waived the right 
to challenge Mrs. Heffington’s assertion of her Fifth Amendment privilege in the manner 
in which she did, the Mosers argue that they retain the right to challenge before this Court 
the improper procedure followed below in asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege.  They 
contend that they did not agree to waive potential defenses and that they “cannot reasonably 
be penalized for a decision made by the Heffingtons when, in fact, at no point did [Mrs. 
Heffington] even proffer which questions that, if asked, would likely cause her to invoke 
the privilege.” 
 
The Heffingtons pray that we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, 
asserting that the circuit court erred by failing to weigh the parties’ interests regarding the 
motion to stay.  Beginning with the timeliness of their motion to stay, the Heffingtons argue 
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12 
 
that their motion was timely because the criminal trial was postponed only the week before 
the civil trial.  They note that they filed their motion six days after the postponement. 
 
Turning to the merits of the circuit court’s decision, the Heffingtons argue that the 
circuit court failed to balance correctly the competing interests at stake.  Specifically, they 
assert that the circuit court found incorrectly that Mrs. Heffington waived her Fifth 
Amendment right by testifying at her deposition.  Because she was not indicted until after 
her deposition, they argue, she had no apprehension of criminal testimony and therefore no 
grounds for asserting a Fifth Amendment privilege.  They note also that the circuit court 
did not mention in its ruling her right to access the courts.  Further, they argue that delay 
would not harm the Mosers, only inconvenience them. 
 
Addressing the Mosers’ arguments, the Heffingtons contend that the Mosers cannot 
argue against the manner by which Mrs. Heffington asserted herFifth Amendment 
privilege.  The Mosers participated in the abbreviated trial procedure employed below, and 
the Heffingtons argue that their failure to object to the way Mrs. Heffington asserted the 
privilege precludes the Mosers from arguing on appeal that she improperly asserted the 
privilege. 
 
The Heffingtons argue that their civil suit is not moot.  Although Mrs. Heffington 
pled guilty to three criminal charges, they argue that she did not plead guilty to theft.  The 
Heffingtons argue that the nolle prosequi of that count is affirmative evidence that supports 
their claims that the Mosers defamed Mrs. Heffington when they stated that she stole from 
the practice.  Additionally, the Heffingtons point to Mr. Heffington’s independent claims 
against the Mosers, asserting that they remain viable. 
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13 
 
V.  Discussion 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “No person . 
. . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”  U.S. Const. 
Amend. V.  The Fifth Amendment privilege applies to the states through the 14th 
Amendment.  Robinson v. Robinson, 328 Md. 507, 514, 615 A.2d 1190, 1194 (1992).  
Although the language of the Fifth Amendment refers specifically to criminal cases, the 
privilege against self-incrimination applies in the civil context.  See McCarthy v. Arndstein, 
266 U.S. 34, 40, 45 S. Ct. 16, 17 (1924) (holding that the privilege does not depend upon 
the nature of the proceeding in which the testimony is sought and applies to both civil and 
criminal proceedings where the answer might incriminate the witness in a future criminal 
proceeding); Mitchell v. United State, 526 U.S. 314, 328, 119 S. Ct. 1307, 1315 (1999); 
Robinson, 328 Md. at 514–15, 615 A.2d at 1194.  It follows that a plaintiff in a civil case 
may invoke the privilege and does not surrender her constitutional right by the filing of a 
civil action.  See Robinson, 328 Md. at 515–16, 615 A.2d at 1194 (holding that invocation 
of the privilege by a party in a civil action allows for an adverse inference but does not 
change the burdens of proof); McMullen v. Bay Ship Management, 335 F.3d 215, 218 (3rd 
Cir. 2003) (holding that the privilege is available to civil plaintiffs). 
The United States Supreme Court has made clear that the privilege against self-
incrimination is one which should be exercised without penalty and that courts should 
avoid “the imposition of any sanction which makes assertion of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege ‘costly.’”  Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515, 87 S. Ct. 625, 628 (1967) (quoting 
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 85 S. Ct. 1229, 1233 (1965)).  In the context of a 
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14 
 
civil proceeding, this constitutional protection creates tension between the plaintiff’s right 
to protection against self-incrimination and a civil defendant’s right to timely refute the 
underlying claim.  See, e.g., Serafino v. Hasbro, Inc., 82 F.3d 515, 518 (1st Cir. 1996) 
(stating that, in a civil proceeding, “one party’s assertion of his constitutional right should 
not obliterate another party’s right to a fair proceeding”).  In Maryland, citizens have under 
Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights a general right of access to the courts.  
Thus, where an individual who initiates a civil lawsuit for damages is simultaneously 
defending herself against related criminal charges, proceedings must adequately protect the 
individual’s overlapping rights to access the courts and assert the Fifth Amendment 
privilege without penalty.2  McMullen, 335 F.3d at 218 (“It is inconceivable that by 
exercising the constitutional right to bring or defend an action a person waives his or her 
constitutional right not to be a witness against himself or herself, and no case has so held.” 
(quoting Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2018 (2d ed. 
1994)). 
Courts have inherent power to stay proceedings before them.  Dodson v. Temple 
Hill Baptist Church, Inc., 254 Md. 541, 546, 255 A.2d 73, 75 (1969); Waters v. Smith, 27 
Md. App. 642, 651–52, 342 A.2d 8, 13 (1975).  In Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 
248, 57 S. Ct. 163 (1936), the United States Supreme Court discussed the power of courts 
to stay proceedings, explaining as follows: 
                                                     
 
2 Article 22 of the Maryland Constitution’s Declaration of Rights seeks to provide the same 
protection and is generally read in pari materia with the federal provision.  Robinson v. 
Robinson, 328 Md. 507, 514, 615 A.2d 1190, 1194 (1992).  Article 22 states “[t]hat no man 
ought to be compelled to give evidence against himself in a criminal case.” 
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15 
 
“. . . the power to stay proceedings is incidental to the 
power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the 
causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, 
for counsel, and for litigants.  How this can best be done calls 
for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing 
interests and maintain an even balance. True, the suppliant for 
a stay must make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in 
being required to go forward, if there is even a fair possibility 
that the stay for which he prays will work damage to someone 
else.   Only in rare circumstances will a litigant in one cause be 
compelled to stand aside while a litigant in another settles the 
rule of law that will define the rights of both.  Considerations 
such as these, however, are counsels of moderation rather than 
limitations upon power.  There are indeed opinions, though 
none of them in this court, that give color to a stricter rule.  
Impressed with the likelihood or danger of abuse, some courts 
have stated broadly that, irrespective of particular conditions, 
there is no power by a stay to compel an unwilling litigant to 
wait upon the outcome of a controversy to which he is a 
stranger.   Such a formula, as we view it, is too mechanical and 
narrow.  All the cases advancing it could have been adequately 
disposed of on the ground that discretion was abused by a stay 
of indefinite duration in the absence of a pressing need.  If they 
stand for more than this, we are unwilling to accept them.  
Occasions may arise when it would be “a scandal to the 
administration of justice” in the phrase of Jessel, M. R. (Amos 
v. Chadwick, L. R. 9 Ch. Div. 459, 462), if power to coordinate 
the business of the court efficiently and sensibly were lacking 
altogether. 
We must be on our guard against depriving the 
processes of justice of their suppleness of adaptation to varying 
conditions.  Especially in cases of extraordinary public 
moment, the individual may be required to submit to delay not 
immoderate in extent and not oppressive in its consequences if 
the public welfare or convenience will thereby be promoted.” 
 
Id. at 254–56, 57 S. Ct. at 166 (internal citations omitted). 
 
Civil cases and simultaneous or successive criminal proceedings often overlap, 
creating parallel civil and criminal proceedings, as in the case here.  Absent substantial 
prejudice, parallel proceedings ordinarily are permissible and not barred by the United 
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16 
 
States Constitution.  SEC v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 628 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1980).  
Nevertheless, a court may exercise its discretion and grant a stay to protect parties involved 
in parallel proceedings.  Dodson, 254 Md. at 546, 255 A.2d at 75; Dresser Industries, 628 
F.2d at 1375-76.   The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
recognized in Dresser Industries that “the strongest case for deferring civil proceedings 
until after completion of criminal proceedings is where a party under indictment for a 
serious offense is required to defend a civil or administrative action involving the same 
matter.”  Id. at 1375–76.  The court reasoned that the civil proceeding, if not stayed, might 
undermine the party’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  Id. at 1376.  
After considering the impact the proceedings may have on a party’s Fifth 
Amendment rights, courts should exercise discretion by considering and weighing other 
factors relevant to the case.   In Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation v. 
Molinaro, 889 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1989), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit set out other factors a court should consider in granting or denying a stay, noting as 
follows:   
“(1) the interest of the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously 
with this litigation or any particular aspect of it, and the 
potential prejudice to plaintiffs of a delay; (2) the burden which 
any particular aspect of the proceedings may impose on 
defendants; (3) the convenience of the court in the management 
of its cases, and the efficient use of judicial resources; (4) the 
interests of persons not parties to the civil litigation; and (5) the 
interest of the public in the pending civil and criminal 
litigation.” 
 
Id. at 902–03 (quoting Golden Quality Ice Cream Co. v. Deerfield Specialty Papers, Inc., 
87 F.R.D. 53, 56 (E.D. Pa. 1980). 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
17 
 
 
We review the stay ruling of the trial court for abuse of discretion, reversing only if 
no reasonable person would rule as the trial court did or when the trial court acts without 
reference to any guiding rules or principles.  Fishman v. Murphy ex rel. Estate of Urban, 
433 Md. 534, 546, 72 A.3d 185, 191–92 (2013); Wilson v. John Crane, Inc., 385 Md. 185, 
198-99, 867 A.2d 1077, 1084 (2005).  But where the court’s discretionary decision is based 
on an underlying legal determination, we review the legal determination de novo.  Fishman, 
433 Md. at 546, 72 A.3d at 192; see also Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 535, 907 A.2d 
175, 184 (2006).  In Wilson, we explained the abuse of discretion standard as follows: 
“There is an abuse of discretion ‘where no reasonable person 
would take the view adopted by the [trial] court[]’. . . or when 
the court acts ‘without reference to any guiding principles.’  An 
abuse of discretion may also be found where the ruling under 
consideration is ‘clearly against the logic and effect of facts 
and inferences before the court[]’. . . or when the ruling is 
‘violative of fact and logic.’ 
Questions within the discretion of the trial court are 
‘much better decided by the trial judges than by appellate 
courts, and the decisions of such judges should be disturbed 
where it is apparent that some serious error or abuse of 
discretion or autocratic action has occurred.’ In sum, to be 
reversed ‘[t]he decision under consideration has to be well 
removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing 
court and beyond the fringe of what that courts deems 
minimally acceptable.’” 
 
Id. at 198-99, 867 A.2d at 1084.  In sum, an abuse of discretion “should only be found in 
the extraordinary, exceptional, or most egregious case.”   Id. at 199, 867 A.2d at 1084. 
 
A.  Waiver of Fifth Amendment Privilege 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
18 
 
 
One significant interest at stake was Mrs. Heffington’s privilege against self-
incrimination.  Petitioners argue that her testimony at her deposition waived the privilege, 
and the circuit court, in denying the motion to stay, found that there was “a good likelihood” 
that she waived the privilege “to a certain extent.”  Because the question of whether Mrs. 
Heffington waived her Fifth Amendment privilege is a legal one, we review it de novo to 
determine its effect on the motion to stay. 
 
The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is read broadly “to extend to 
witnesses in civil litigation where the answer to interrogation might tend to subject the 
witness to criminal prosecution.”  Robinson, 328 Md. at 514–15, 615 A.2d at 615 
(emphasis added).  The privilege may be invoked in the discovery stage as well as at trial.  
North River Ins. Co., Inc. v. Stefanou, 831 F.2d 484, 486–87 (4th Cir. 1987); Kramer v. 
Levitt, 79 Md. App. 575, 582, 558 A.2d 760, 764 (1989). 
But when a witness testifies to a subject, she waives the privilege for the rest of the 
“proceeding” to the extent necessary to cross-examine her on that subject.  Mitchell v. 
United States, 526 U.S. 314, 321, 119 S. Ct. 1307, 1311–12 (1999) (noting that “[i]t is well 
established that a witness, in a single proceeding, may not testify voluntarily about a subject 
and then invoke the privilege against self-incrimination when questioned about the 
details.”); Choi v. State, 316 Md. 529, 542–43, 560 A.2d 1108, 1114 (1989) (holding that 
when a witness answers “incriminating questions” at trial, she waives the privilege as to 
that subject).  The rule aims to prevent “self-selected testimony” from distorting the facts.  
Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 322, 119 S. Ct. at 1312.  Without it, a witness could testify to her 
version of events, then assert her Fifth Amendment privilege when confronted with 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
19 
 
conflicting information later in the same proceeding.  In the words of the United States 
Supreme Court, the Fifth Amendment would be “a positive invitation to mutilate the truth 
a party offers to tell.”3  Id. 
 
For Fifth Amendment purposes, a deposition and the trial in the same matter are 
stages of the same proceeding.   United States v. Parcel of Land, 903 F.2d 36, 43 (1st Cir. 
1990); Creative Consumer Concepts, Inc. v. Kreisler, 563 F.3d 1070, 1081 (10th Cir. 
2009).  In the instant case, Mrs. Heffington testified at her deposition to the details of the 
events underlying her claims.  Her statements were “testimonial,” meaning that they were 
made voluntarily under oath in the context of the same judicial proceeding.  They were 
“incriminating,” meaning that they did not merely deal with matters “collateral” to the 
events surrounding commission of a crime.  These statements, which were both 
“testimonial” and “incriminating,” contained information that Mrs. Heffington was 
privileged not to reveal.  Plainly, she had reason to know that her statements would put her 
in jeopardy, and thus it is not unfair to find that she waived her privilege.  By testifying to 
that subject within the same proceeding, she waived her Fifth Amendment privilege and 
                                                     
 
3 In considering the test for a testimonial waiver of the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against 
self-incrimination, Judge Learned Hand wrote in United States v. St. Pierre, 132 F.2d 837, 
840 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. dismissed, 319 U.S. 41, 63 S. Ct. 910 (1943), the following: 
 
“It must be conceded that the privilege is to suppress the truth, 
but that does not mean that it is a privilege to garble it; although 
its exercise deprives the parties of evidence, it should not 
furnish one side with what may be false evidence and deprive 
the other of any means of detecting the imposition.  The time 
for a witness to protect himself is when the decision is first 
presented to him; he needs nothing more, and anything more 
puts a mischievous instrument at his disposal.” 
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20 
 
would be unable to invoke it at trial, at least to the extent necessary for petitioners to cross-
examine her on it. 
 
The Court of Special Appeals held that Mrs. Heffington did not waive her Fifth 
Amendment privilege by testifying at her deposition and not claiming the privilege.  The 
court declined to address whether her testimony in the deposition was part of the same 
“proceeding,” holding instead that “[b]ecause [Mrs. Heffington]’s indictment created ‘new 
grounds for apprehension,’ one cannot reasonably infer from her pre-indictment deposition 
testimony a waiver of her Fifth Amendment privilege post-indictment.”  Heffington, 238 
Md. App. at 530–31, 192 A.3d at 912 (internal citations omitted).  The court reasoned that 
at the time of her deposition, Mrs. Heffington knew only that the police might be 
investigating her conduct.  The indictment followed her deposition testimony and gave her 
a new reason to assert the privilege against self-incrimination, citing and relying on In re 
Morganroth, 718 F.2d 161, 165 (6th Cir. 1983), as support.  We disagree.  It should be 
clear to any person in Mrs. Heffington’s situation that any testimony that she gave might 
tend to subject her to criminal prosecution, especially since the police investigation had not 
been closed. 
 
We believe Morganroth to be inapposite in evaluating appellant’s claim of privilege 
for several reasons.  First, Morganroth involved clearly different proceedings, not the same 
proceeding.  And as we have noted, waiver of the privilege at a deposition waives the 
privilege at the trial of the same case.  Morganroth testified voluntarily in a 1979 civil 
deposition, answering questions about his involvement in a loan transaction.  Id. at 163.  
He testified subsequently at a grand jury proceeding, where he invoked his Fifth 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
21 
 
Amendment privilege, and the government gave him immunity, thereby compelling his 
testimony.  Id.  Then, in 1981, he was deposed in a separate civil action but refused to 
answer questions about the transaction.  Id. at 164.  His 1979 and his 1981 depositions were 
not part of the same proceeding. 
 
Second, the Court of Special Appeals held, based on Morganroth, that the criminal 
indictment created “new grounds for apprehension” and, hence, permitted or revived the 
privilege.  Notably, Morganroth articulated the new grounds for apprehension—he alleged 
that he was apprehensive of providing incriminating evidence in regard to a possible 
perjury charge stemming from his responses in an earlier proceeding under oath.  Id.  at 
167.  Significantly, the Morganroth court required more than that assertion, noting that 
before Morganroth would be entitled to remain silent, there must be a valid assertion of the 
Fifth Amendment privilege.  Id. at 167.    The court made clear that a blanket assertion of 
the privilege is not sufficient, that the privilege cannot be claimed in advance of the 
questions, and that it must be asserted by a witness with respect to particular questions.  Id.  
And in each instance, the witness must testify under oath to a “sound basis” for the new 
apprehension of prosecution.  Id., see also Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486, 
71 S. Ct. 814, 818 (1951) (requiring a witness claiming the Fifth Amendment privilege to 
do so for specific questions for which “the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend 
danger from a direct answer”). The court must determine the propriety of the refusal to 
testify. Morganroth, 718 F.2d at 167. 
Nothing of the sort occurred here.  Mrs. Heffington’s counsel simply stated to the 
court that Mrs. Heffington intended to assert her Fifth Amendment privilege.  She did not 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
22 
 
testify under oath that she had any new basis for apprehension of criminal prosecution and 
never mentioned fear of a criminal charge of perjury.4  She did not assert the privilege as 
to particular questions but merely, through counsel, asserted a blanket privilege.  
Morganroth is no aid to respondents. 
 
B. The Circuit Court’s Denial of the Stay 
 
Because Mrs. Heffington waived her Fifth Amendment privilege on the subject of 
her fraudulent transactions by testifying in her deposition to that subject, the circuit court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying the stay.  The court found correctly that it should 
weigh Mrs. Heffington’s Fifth Amendment interest lightly in balancing the interests at 
stake.  The court balanced the Heffingtons’ interest in Mrs. Heffington attempting to assert 
a Fifth Amendment privilege at trial against the Mosers’ discovery and trial preparation 
expenses as well as the Mosers’ interest in a timely resolution of the civil case. 
We address briefly the Court of Special Appeals’s holding that the trial court failed 
to consider in its analysis Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  Article 19 
states as follows: 
“That every man, for any injury done to him in his person or 
property, ought to have remedy by the course of the Law of the 
Land, and ought to have justice and right, freely without sale, 
fully without any denial, and speedily without delay, according 
to the Law of the Land.”  
 
                                                     
 
4 At the hearing on the motion to stay, counsel for Mrs. Heffington stated only that after 
discovery, the Mosers had “a better chance of actually trapping her into saying something 
that could, quite frankly, impact her criminal case.” 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
23 
 
To be sure, the people have a right of access to courts.5   Article 19 ensures that rights 
belonging to citizens of Maryland are “not illegally or arbitrarily denied by the 
government.”  State v. Board of Education, 346 Md. 633, 647, 697 A.2d 1334, 1341 (1997).   
Nonetheless, our cases emphasize that access to the courts is subject to reasonable 
regulation.  Doe v. Doe, 358 Md. 113, 128, 747 A.2d 617, 624 (2000); Johnson v. Maryland 
State Police, 331 Md. 285, 297, 628 A.2d 162, 168 (noting that a “restriction upon access 
to the courts violates Article 19 only if the restriction is unreasonable”).  The applicability 
                                                     
 
5 In Jacome de Espina v. Jackson, 442 Md. 311, 335, 112 A.3d 442, 457 (2015), we noted 
that Article 19 essentially protects two interrelated rights, a right to a remedy for an injury 
to one’s person or property and a right of access to the courts.   We set out the history of 
Article 19 in Piselli v. 75th St. Med., 371 Md. 188, 205, 808 A.2d 508, 518 (2002), 
explaining as follows: 
 
“Article 19 was part of the original Maryland Declaration of 
Rights adopted in 1776, although it was then designated as 
Article 17 of the Declaration of Rights. Except for one word, 
the wording today is identical to the 1776 wording.  All of the 
original state constitutions adopted at the time of the 
Revolutionary War, except Virginia’s and North Carolina’s, 
contained provisions like Article 19.  While the United States 
Constitution contains no comparable provision, today the 
constitutions of 39 states have clauses similar to Article 19.  
These provisions, often referred to as ‘Remedy Clauses’ or 
‘Open Courts Clauses’ or ‘Access to Courts Clauses,’ are 
based on Chapter 40 of the Magna Carta or, more particularly, 
Lord Coke’s interpretation of Chapter 40 . . . 
Today’s language refers to ‘every man,’ whereas the 
1776 language referred to ‘every freeman.’  In light of the 
Equal Rights Amendment [to the Maryland Constitution], 
which is Article 46 of the Declaration of Rights, adopted in 
1972, the provision should be read as ‘every person.’” 
 
(Internal citations omitted.) 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
24 
 
of Article 19 was neither raised nor briefed in the trial court or before the Court of Special 
Appeals.   To the extent that the Heffingtons raised Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration 
of Rights and their right to access to the courts, the trial court balanced that interest in 
considering the stay although not explicitly referencing Article 19.  The right of access to 
the courts was implicit in the trial judge’s analysis and reasoning. 
The trial court noted that the stay would be for an undefined or indefinite duration 
because there was no guarantee that the criminal trial would begin on the scheduled date 
or conclude as quickly as “the usual two- or three-day trial.”  Postponing repeatedly the 
civil proceedings would be a burden on the Mosers as well as an inconvenience to the court 
and docket considerations, as the case was assigned specifically to a judge.  Similarly, the 
court noted that the motion to stay was filed “somewhat late” in the proceedings, months 
after the Heffingtons knew of the indictment. 
 
A trial court abuses its discretion only when its decision is manifestly unreasonable 
or is based on untenable grounds.  Mrs. Heffington waived her Fifth Amendment privilege 
to the extent necessary to cross-examine her on the conduct at issue, and a stay would cause 
substantial expense and uncertainty for the Mosers.  The decision of the circuit court to 
deny the stay was not based upon an incorrect standard, was not manifestly unreasonable, 
and hence was not an abuse of discretion. 
 
A party is entitled to a motion for judgment “when the evidence at the close of the 
case, taken in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, does not legally support the 
nonmoving party’s claim or defense.”  Giant Food, Inc. v. Booker, 152 Md. App. 166, 177, 
831 A.2d 481, 487 (2003); Rule 2-519.  In this case, the Heffingtons argued that they were 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
25 
 
unable to pursue their claims in the absence of a stay.  When the court denied the stay, the 
Heffingtons presented no evidence, and the Mosers moved for judgment in their favor.  The 
Heffingtons consented, stating “Plaintiffs cannot argue against that, Your Honor.”  The 
trial court did not err in granting the Mosers’ motion for judgment.6 
 
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
COURT 
OF 
SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED.  CASE 
REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH 
INSTRUCTIONS 
TO 
AFFIRM 
THE 
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT 
FOR 
PRINCE 
GEORGE’S 
COUNTY. 
COSTS IN THIS COURT TO BE PAID BY 
RESPONDENTS. 
 
                                                     
 
6 We need not address petitioners’ mootness argument because of our holding that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to stay.