Title: Russell Co. Dept. of Social Services v. O'Quinn

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
RUSSELL COUNTY DEPARTMENT  
OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 990309 
January 14, 2000 
 
SHEILAH JACKSON O'QUINN 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RUSSELL COUNTY 
Nicholas E. Persin, Judge Designate 
 
 
The primary issue we consider in this appeal is whether 
Code §§ 8.01-186 and -191, which are contained in the Virginia 
Declaratory Judgment Act, authorize a circuit court to award 
attorney's fees to a prevailing litigant. 
 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  The Russell 
County Department of Social Services reassigned its employee, 
Sheilah Jackson O'Quinn, from a position of child protective 
services worker to a different position within the Department 
of Social Services.  O'Quinn considered the reassignment a 
demotion, and she filed a grievance utilizing the Russell 
County grievance procedure. 
 
James Gillespie, Russell County Administrator, ultimately 
determined that O'Quinn should be reinstated to her former 
position as a child protective services worker.  The 
Department of Social Services filed a bill of complaint for 
declaratory judgment in the circuit court, styled Russell 
County Department of Social Services v. O'Quinn, and requested 
that the court declare that the county administrator had 
erroneously determined that O'Quinn's complaint was grievable.  
The circuit court dismissed the bill of complaint because the 
court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  
 
O'Quinn instituted this proceeding by filing a suit for 
declaratory and injunctive relief.  She requested that the 
circuit court compel the Department of Social Services to 
reinstate her to the position of child protective services 
worker.  She also requested attorney's fees and costs.  The 
circuit court entered a decree which, among other things, 
ordered O'Quinn's reinstatement and established a schedule for 
the filing of O'Quinn's verified petition for attorney's fees 
and costs.  Subsequently, the court considered O'Quinn's 
petition for attorney's fees, and memoranda submitted by 
counsel for O'Quinn and the Department of Social Services, and 
entered a decree which awarded O'Quinn $6,405 in attorney's 
fees and $1,075 in costs.  The court stated in its decree that 
a "[c]ourt, sitting in equity, is vested with the authority 
and discretion to award reasonable attorney's fees and costs 
as 'further relief' pursuant to . . . Code . . . §§ 8.01-186 
and 8.01-191."  The Department of Social Services appeals. 
 
Code § 8.01-186 states: 
 
"Further relief based on a declaratory judgment 
order or decree may be granted whenever necessary or 
proper.  The application shall be by motion to a 
court having jurisdiction to grant the relief.  If 
the application is deemed sufficient the court 
 
2
shall, on reasonable notice, require an adverse 
party whose rights have been adjudicated by the 
declaration of right to show cause why further 
relief should not be granted forthwith." 
 
Code § 8.01-191 states: 
 
"This article is declared to be remedial.  Its 
purpose is to afford relief from the uncertainty and 
insecurity attendant upon controversies over legal 
rights, without requiring one of the parties 
interested so to invade the rights asserted by the 
other as to entitle him to maintain an ordinary 
action therefor.  It is to be liberally interpreted 
and administered with a view to making the courts 
more serviceable to the people." 
 
 
The Department of Social Services argues that the circuit 
court erred in awarding attorney's fees to O'Quinn because 
neither the Virginia Declaratory Judgment Act nor any other 
statute provides for such an award.  Responding, O'Quinn 
asserts that Code §§ 8.01-186 and -191 authorize a circuit 
court to award attorney's fees to a prevailing litigant.  
Continuing, O'Quinn contends that Code § 8.01-191 mandates 
that courts liberally construe the statutes contained in the 
Virginia Declaratory Judgment Act and that the words "further 
relief" contained in Code § 8.01-186 authorize a court to make 
an award of attorney's fees.  We disagree with O'Quinn. 
 
The plain language contained in Code § 8.01-191 requires 
that the courts interpret and administer the Virginia 
Declaratory Judgment Act "with a view to making the courts 
 
3
more serviceable to the people."  This statute, however, does 
not authorize a court to make an award of attorney's fees. 
 
We have repeatedly stated that the "general rule in this 
Commonwealth is that in the absence of a statute or contract 
to the contrary, a court may not award attorney's fees to the 
prevailing party."  Prospect Development Co. v. Bershader, 258 
Va. 75, 92, 515 S.E.2d 291, 300 (1999); accord Gilmore v. 
Basic Industries, Inc., 233 Va. 485, 490, 357 S.E.2d 514, 517 
(1987).  Even though we have recognized that there are certain 
exceptions to this rule, none of those exceptions is pertinent 
here.  See Bershader, 258 Va. at 92, 515 S.E.2d at 300.  
Rather, O'Quinn must identify a specific statutory grant of 
authority that enables a court to award attorney's fees to 
her. 
 
Contrary to O'Quinn's assertion, the phrase "further 
relief" contained in § 8.01-186 does not authorize a court to 
award attorney's fees to a litigant.  Rather, that term 
permits a court to enter necessary orders to implement or 
enforce a declaratory judgment entered by the court.  See 
Winborne v. Doyle, 190 Va. 867, 872-73, 59 S.E.2d 90, 93 
(1950).  We simply cannot, and will not, infer that the 
General Assembly intended to authorize a court to award 
attorney's fees in a declaratory judgment action when the 
 
4
Virginia Declaratory Judgment Act fails expressly to grant 
such authority. 
 
The Department of Social Services also contends that the 
circuit court erred in awarding costs to O'Quinn that included 
costs she incurred in the first proceeding that the Department 
of Social Services initiated, and the present proceeding.  The 
Department of Social Services asserts that the proceedings are 
two distinct proceedings, and O'Quinn is not entitled to 
recover for costs incurred in the former proceeding.  The 
Department of Social Services also asserts that the circuit 
court abused its discretion by awarding certain costs because 
such costs are not recoverable.  O'Quinn argues that the 
Department of Social Services failed to raise these issues in 
the circuit court and, therefore, these issues cannot be 
asserted for the first time on appeal.  We agree with O'Quinn. 
 
The Department of Social Services argued in the circuit 
court that the decision to award costs was within the 
discretion of the court, but it "would not be 'just and 
proper'" to award costs to O'Quinn.  The Department of Social 
Services did not assert in the circuit court the arguments 
that it raises here.  We will not permit the Department of 
Social Services to raise these issues for the first time on 
appeal.  Rule 5:25. 
 
5
 
Accordingly, we will affirm that portion of the circuit 
court's judgment which awards costs to O'Quinn, we will 
reverse that portion of the judgment which awards attorney's 
fees, and we will enter final judgment here. 
Affirmed in part, 
 
reversed in part, 
and final judgment. 
 
6