Title: VIRGINIA K. HAMPTON V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

VIRGINIA K. HAMPTON V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 103141 P.3d 101Case Number: 05-269Decided: 08/23/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
VIRGINIA 
K. HAMPTON,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofSubletteCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Ryan R. 
Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Roden.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Pojman.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 

VOIGT, Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Virginia Hampton 
pled no contest to one count of forgery and one count of using false written 
statements to obtain property or credit.  
At sentencing, William Stevens sought restitution as a victim of the 
forgery.  Hampton contested such 
restitution, but the district court ultimately ordered her to pay Stevens 
$15,113.  Hampton now appeals the 
restitution order.  We 
reverse.

 
 

ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Did the district 
court err in ordering Hampton to pay restitution to 
Stevens?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Pursuant to a 
plea agreement, Hampton pled no contest to one count of forgery in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-602(a) (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2006) and one count of 
using false written statements to obtain property or credit in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-3-612(a) (LexisNexis 2005).  
The district court relied on the affidavit of Sublette County Deputy 
Sheriff Paul Raftery for the factual basis for Hampton's pleas.1  The affidavit alleged that:  (1) with respect to the forgery charge, 
Hampton applied forand subsequently received and useda Mastercard from MBNA in 
Stevens' name on December 28, 1999; and (2) with respect to the use of false 
written statements to obtain property or credit charge, Hampton obtained an 
American Express credit account in her daughter's name on August 29, 2000.2

 
 
[¶4]      In exchange for 
Hampton's no 
contest pleas, the State dismissed two other charges that had originally been 
filed against her.3  The plea agreement, as recited by the 
district court, also provided as follows:

 
 
The 
Defendant will be sentenced to a term of not less than 2 years nor more than 4 
years on each count, which sentences will run concurrently.  The sentences will be probated, and the 
Defendant will be placed on supervised probation for 3 years on each count, 
which terms of probation will run concurrently.  At sentencing, the victim will be 
allowed to address the Court and make any claim for restitution for all Counts 
involving the victim, and the Defendant can argue restitution to the 
Court.

 
 
[¶5]      At sentencing, 
Stevens sought $69,113 in restitution.  
Stevens claimed that his "credit was destroyed" by Hampton's actions and, 
therefore:  (1) he lost the 
opportunity to purchase real estate that later appreciated by $54,000; (2) he 
incurred a $10,847 federal income tax penalty and a $1,084 California income tax 
penalty because he "cashed out" a retirement account to build his house when he 
could not secure a loan; and (3) he had to pay a higher interest rate for an 
automobile loan that resulted in $3,182 more interest due over the life of the 
loan.  Ultimately, the district 
court ordered Hampton to pay Stevens restitution for the 
income tax penalties and the increased interest charges, but declined to order 
restitution for the $54,000 lost real estate opportunity.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶6]      We have said the 
following about our standard of review for restitution 
orders:

 
 
Appellate 
review of ordered restitution is confined to a search for procedural error or a 
clear abuse of discretion.  Aldridge v. State, 956 P.2d 341, 343 
(Wyo.1998).  The amount of 
restitution fixed by the trial court should be supported by evidence sufficient 
to afford a reasonable basis for estimating the loss.  Hilterbrand v. State, 930 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Wyo.1997).  A challenge to the 
amount of restitution set by the court must demonstrate an abuse of 
discretion.  "Judicial discretion is 
a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously."  Brock v. State, 967 P.2d 26, 27 
(Wyo.1998) (quoting Vaughn v. State, 
962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo.1998)).  We 
have held that a victim impact statement, such as that incorporated into the 
Presentence Report in this case, is credible evidence upon which a trial court 
may impose a restitution amount.  Stowe v. State, 10 P.3d 551, 553 
(Wyo.2000).

 
 

Brown v. 
State, 2003 
WY 72, ¶ 9, 70 P.3d 238, 241 (Wyo.2003).  
As explained in Merkison v. 
State, 996 P.2d 1138, 1141 (Wyo.2000) (emphasis in original), however, there 
is a distinction between the standard of review of factual challenges to the 
amount of restitution ordered and challenges to the authority of the court to 
make a restitution award:

 
 
The 
distinction between whether a defendant is making a factual challenge to an 
order of restitution or whether he is challenging the authority of the trial 
court to make a particular award of restitution is an important one.  Challenges to the factual basis of an award of 
restitution can be waived in certain circumstances by the defendant's voluntary 
actions, such as entering into a plea agreement, and then failing to make any 
objection at sentencing, as occurred in Meerscheidt [v. State, 931 P.2d 220 (Wyo.1997)].  See also Aldridge v. State, 956 P.2d 341, 343 (Wyo.1998).  Outside the 
context of a plea agreement, the failure to object to a factual determination in 
the awarding of restitution results in an appellate review for plain error.  See Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 857 
(Wyo.1998).  In contrast, a 
challenge by a defendant to the authority of a trial court to make a 
particular award of restitution is reviewed on appeal under a de novo statutory interpretation 
standard whether or not the defendant objected or entered into a plea 
agreement.  Meerscheidt, 931 P.2d  at 223-224, 
226-227.  

 
 

Penner 
v. State, 2003 
WY 143, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d 1045, 1047-48 (Wyo. 2003) (emphasis in 
original).

 
 
[¶7]      To the extent 
this case involves construing our restitution statutes, we have 
said:

 
 
            
We endeavor to interpret statutes in accordance with the legislature's 
intent.  State Department of Revenue and Taxation v. 
Pacificorp, 872 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wyo.1994).  We begin by making an "inquiry 
respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to 
their arrangement and connection.'"  
Parker Land and Cattle Company v. 
Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo.1993) (quoting Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 
823 (1897)).  We construe the 
statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we 
construe together all parts of the statute in pari materia.  845 P.2d  at 1042.

 
 
When the 
words used are clear and unambiguous, that language establishes the rule of 
law.  A statute is ambiguous only 
where its meaning is vague or ambiguous and subject to varying 
interpretations.  Only if the 
wording is ambiguous or unclear to the point of demonstrating obscurity with 
respect to the legislative purpose or mandate do we resort to additional 
construction.

 
 

Rivera 
v. State, 846 P.2d 1, 6 (Wyo.1993) (citations omitted).  
Penal statutes must be strictly construed and "cannot be enlarged by 
implication or extended by inference or construction."  Smith v. State, 902 P.2d 1271, 1284 
(Wyo.1995).  "We also recognize that 
ambiguity in a criminal statute should be resolved in favor of lenity."  ALJ v. State, 836 P.2d 307, 310 
(Wyo.1992).

 
 

Meerscheidt 
v. State, 931 P.2d 220, 223-24 (Wyo. 1997).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶8]      A trial court 
does not have the inherent power to award compensation to victims of crimes; it 
may only order restitution that is authorized by statute.  Penner, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d  at 1048.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-102 (LexisNexis 
2005 & Supp. 2006) states:

 
 
            
In addition to any other punishment prescribed by law the court shall, 
upon conviction for any misdemeanor or felony, order a defendant to pay 
restitution to each victim as determined under W.S. 7-9-103 and 7-9-114 unless 
the court specifically finds that the defendant has no ability to pay and that 
no reasonable probability exists that the defendant will have an ability to 
pay.

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-9-103 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2006), further provides, in 
pertinent part:

 
 
(a) 
 As part of the sentencing process . 
. . in any misdemeanor or felony case, the prosecuting attorney shall present to 
the court any claim for restitution submitted by any 
victim.

 
 
(b)  In every case in which a claim for 
restitution is submitted, the court shall fix a reasonable amount as restitution 
owed to each victim for actual pecuniary damage resulting from the defendant's 
criminal activity . . . .

 
 
A 
"victim" is "a person who has suffered pecuniary damage as a result of a 
defendant's criminal activities."  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-101(a)(v) (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2006).  "Criminal activity" that entitles a 
victim to restitution is defined as "any crime for which there is a plea of 
guilty, nolo contendere or verdict of guilty upon which a judgment of conviction 
may be rendered and includes any other crime which is admitted by the defendant, 
whether or not prosecuted."  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-9-101(a)(i).  

 
 
[¶9]      Reading these 
statutes together, pecuniary damages are a primary consideration in awarding 
restitution.  A person is not 
eligible to receive restitution unless he or she is a "victim" and that person 
is not a "victim" unless he or she suffers pecuniary damages.  Likewise, the amount of restitution a 
victim may receive is limited to the amount of the victim's pecuniary 
damages.  Indeed, the statutory 
definition of "restitution" is the "full or partial payment of pecuniary damage to a victim."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-101(a)(iv) 
(emphasis added).  "Pecuniary 
damage" means:

 
 
all 
damages which a victim could recover against the defendant in a civil action 
arising out of the same facts or event, including damages for wrongful 
death.  It does not include punitive 
damages and damages for pain, suffering, mental anguish and loss of 
consortium.  

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-9-101(a)(iii).  

 
 
[¶10]   We have previously discussed the 
importance on appeal of identifying a civil action under which a victim could 
recover based on the facts admitted by the defendant or determined by the 
fact-finder at trial.  Alcaraz v. State, 2002 WY 57, ¶ 8, 44 P.3d 68, 71 (Wyo. 2002).  Indeed, 
the parties in the instant appeal devote a great deal of their argument to this 
issue.  However, even if we assume 
for purposes of this appeal that there is a civil action that would have allowed 
Stevens to recover pecuniary damages, causation remains a necessary element of a 
restitution claim.  Id., ¶ 9, 44 P.3d  at 72.  

 
 
[¶11]   Victims are only entitled to 
receive pecuniary damages that are the "result of a defendant's criminal 
activities."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-9-101(a)(v).  We have said that, 
when seeking restitution, the State bears the burden of presenting credible 
evidence and proving the claim by a preponderance of the evidence.  Renfro v. State, 785 P.2d 491, 493 
(Wyo. 
1990).  In the instant case, the 
State did not attempt to prove that Stevens previously had "good credit" and, 
therefore, could have avoided the losses for which he sought restitution.4

 
 
[¶12]   The State's evidence regarding 
restitution consisted of Stevens' testimony at the sentencing hearing, a 
statement by Stevens contained in the presentence investigation report, and a 
victim impact statement from Stevens filed with the district court.  According to the presentence 
investigation report, Stevens learned that his credit was being misused by 
Hampton in "the 
Fall of 2000" when he "attempted to help [his] daughter purchase a home in 
Pinedale."  At that time he 
"declined to file charges" and, after speaking with Hampton's husband, he 
"assumed the problem had been taken care of."  In 2001, he attempted to secure a 
personal loan to complete construction of his home and was denied due to his 
"devastated credit."  In order to 
finish construction, Stevens chose to "cash-out" $40,000 from a retirement 
account, which resulted in a $10,847 federal income tax liability and 
approximately $1,084 due in California state income tax.  Also in 2001, Stevens testified that he 
"had to replace an aging pickup with a new unit" and due to his "bad credit" was 
unable to secure a 2.8 percent annual percentage rate automobile loan and had to 
finance the purchase at 6.5 percent annually resulting in $3,182 in additional 
finance charges over the life of the loan.

 
 
[¶13]   Though we generally defer to the 
factual findings of the district court in situations such as this, we find it 
unreasonable, based on the evidence presented in the instant case, for the 
district court to have ordered restitution in favor of Stevens.  The fundamental problem is the lack of 
credible evidence that Stevens would have qualified for the home loan and the 
low-rate automobile loan in the absence of Hampton's criminal activities.  Viewing the record most favorably to 
Stevens, it can be inferred that:  (1) in December 1999, Stevens' credit was 
positive enough to qualify for an MBNA Mastercard, which Mastercard was 
fraudulently issued to Hampton; and (2) in 2001, Stevens' credit history was not 
positive enough to qualify for a personal loan and a low-interest automobile 
loan.  However, the State failed to 
establish the causal link between Hampton's fraudulent acquisition and use of the 
credit card and the denials of credit in 2001.  On the causation issue, the record is 
silent.  While it may be possible to 
infer that Hampton's fraudulent use of the MBNA account 
damaged Stevens' credit, it is not logical to infer that, because Stevens' 
credit may have been damaged it must have been unblemished before such 
damage.  Because the State failed to 
prove that Stevens could have secured the necessary credit before Hampton fraudulently created the account, the State has 
failed to prove that Hampton was the factual cause of Stevens' 
denials of credit.  It was the 
State's burden to supply such proof and, without it, restitution is 
inappropriate.

 
 
[¶14]   The restitution order of the 
district court is reversed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Hampton did not 
object to such reliance.

 
 

2Because 
Hampton only appeals the restitution awarded to Stevens, the charge of using 
false written statements to obtain property or credit in her daughter's name has 
no bearing on our analysis.

3Both 
charges alleged that Hampton obtained credit through the 
unauthorized use of Stevens' personal identifying information in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-901(a) (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 
2006).

 
 

4Even with 
sufficient proof of "good credit" before the incident, the question of proximate 
cause remains, given the victim's subsequent decisions, with knowledge of the 
tort, to purchase a vehicle and obtain a real estate loan.  It could be argued that Hampton's conduct "only 
created a condition or occasion for the harm to occur."  Alcaraz v. State, 2002 WY 57, ¶ 9, 44 P.3d 68, 72 (Wyo. 2002).