Title: DALEY v. WENZEL

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DALEY v. WENZEL2001 WY 8030 P.3d 547Case Number: 00-131, 00-132Decided: 08/30/2001

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                            

 

                                   LT. E. DALEY, a Casper Police                                           

Officer, 
in his individual capacity;

SGT. 
P. EASTES, a Casper Police

Officer, 
in his individual capacity;

and 
MARVIN SHEPARD, a Casper Police

Officer, 
in his individual capacity,

 Appellants(Defendants),

 

v.

 

BEVERLY 
WENZEL and ROBERT WENZEL,

 Appellees(Plaintiffs).

 

BEVERLY 
WENZEL and ROBERT WENZEL,                 

 Appellants(Plaintiffs),

 

v.

 

THE 
LOUNGE BAR; THE TOWN OF CASPER;

CHIEF 
OF POLICE ART DE WERK,

in 
his individual capacity;

LT. 
E. DALEY, a Casper Police

Officer, 
in his individual capacity;

SGT. 
P. EASTES, a Casper Police

Officer, 
in his individual capacity;

and 
MARVIN SHEPARD, a Casper Police

Officer, 
in his individual capacity,

 Appellees(Defendants).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable Harry E. Leimback, Retired

 

 

Representing 
Lt. E. Daley, Sgt. P. Eastes, and Marvin Shepard:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; 
Francisco L. Romero, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. Romero. 

Representing 
Beverly Wenzel and Robert Wenzel:

Vonde M. 
Smith, J. Douglas McCalla, and Roy A. Jacobson, Jr., of Lawyers & Advocates 
for Wyoming, Jackson, Wyoming; Heather Noble of Jackson, Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. Noble.

 Representing 
The Lounge Bar:

Michele 
K. McKellar of Boley & McKellar, P.C., Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

  

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J.; GOLDEN and VOIGT, JJ.; DONNELL and PERRY, 
DJJ.

 

DONNELL, 
District Judge.

 [¶1]           
In this 
appeal we consider several issues surrounding a judgment resulting from a 
personal injury accident.  We affirm 
the judgment in all respects.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]           
Beverly 
and Robert Wenzel state the issues for the Court's 
consideration:

 

A.        
Whether W.S. § 1-39-118(a), which limits to $250,000 the amount of 
damages recoverable by a single claimant from a governmental entity, violates 
Article 10, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution, which bars the legislature 
from enacting limits on the amount of damages to be recovered for causing the 
injury or death of any person.

 

B.        The 
trial court erred in giving jury instruction stating that no person who has 
legally provided alcoholic liquor or malt beverage to any other person is liable 
for damages caused by the intoxication of the other person, when the instruction 
did not address any issue to be decided by the jury at trial, was cumulative of 
other instructions so that it overemphasized the issue of Mrs. Wenzel's 
intoxication, and was confusing as it stood in conflict with other negligence 
instructions.

 

C.        
Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment dismissing 
Plaintiff's dram shop claim, or whether the grant of immunity from dram shop 
liability contained in W.S. § 12-8-301(a) is unconstitutional under the equal 
protection provisions of the Wyoming constitution.

 

The 
Lounge Bar states the issues slightly differently:

 

I.          
Whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on Wyoming Statute § 
12-8-301(a) concerning dram shop immunity.

 

II.          
Whether Appellants Daley, Eastes and Shepard waived their right to object 
to the giving of Instruction No. 24 concerning dram shop immunity when they 
failed to make any objection prior to the submission of the instructions to the 
jury.

 

III.         
Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict 
finding The Lounge Bar 0% at fault.

 

IV.        
Whether Appellant Beverly Wenzel failed to properly challenge the 
constitutionality of Wyoming Statute § 12-8-301(a) at the trial court level, 
thereby waiving her right to present this issue on appeal.

 

V.        
Whether W.S. § 12-8-301(a) providing immunity from dram shop liability 
violates the equal protection provisions of the Wyoming 
Constitution.

 

Finally, 
Officers Daley, Eastes and Shepard (Officers) raise the following 
issues:

 

I.          
Did the district court commit prejudicial and/or plain error when it 
instructed the jury on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-8-301 concerning dram shop immunity 
thereby misleading and confusing the jury on the applicable principles of 
law?

 

II.          
Was the jury's verdict finding the Lounge Bar free from liability 
supported by sufficient evidence?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]           
On the 
afternoon of Friday, May 13, 1994, Beverly Wenzel accompanied her husband, 
Robert, and their daughter, Julie, to a bar in Casper, Wyoming.  The threesome remained at the bar until 
approximately 6:00 p.m. and then departed for home.  Beverly consumed some amount of alcohol 
while at the bar, but the exact amount was later disputed at 
trial.

 

[¶4]           
After 
returning home, Beverly decided to go to another bar while Robert remained at 
the house.  She arrived at The 
Lounge Bar sometime between 7:45 p.m. and midnight, the exact time again being 
disputed at trial.  The parties also 
disputed whether Beverly was intoxicated at the time she reached The Lounge 
Bar.

 

[¶5]           
Beverly 
entered The Lounge Bar and sat on her "usual" bar stool.  She consumed more alcohol, again the 
precise amount being a matter of contention. At some point, she became involved 
in a loud, profane argument with a patron that lasted approximately 15 to 20 
minutes.  At this point, Beverly 
apparently was intoxicated.  The 
owner of The Lounge Bar, Mr. Cliff Chew, asked Beverly to "quiet 
down."

 

[¶6]           
What 
happened a few minutes later also was disputed by the parties.  Apparently, Beverly either 1) put her 
head on her hands, became quiet, and rather suddenly "slid," feet-first, from 
the barstool gently onto the floor, or 2) passed out and fell forward from her 
barstool, hitting her head on the floor as she fell.  Once on the floor, Beverly curled into a 
fetal position.  A bar employee and 
Chew checked on Beverly, placed a cold towel on her forehead, and attempted to 
"awaken" her.  Both testified 
Beverly did not appear to have sustained any injuries.  Chew then called Beverly's husband at 
home but received no answer, so he contacted 911 dispatch.

 

[¶7]           
In 
Chew's brief conversation with 911 dispatch, he told the dispatcher that Beverly 
was drunk and had passed out.  He 
informed the dispatcher that Beverly did not have any medical problems "as far 
as he could tell" and was just "completely intoxicated."  However, he failed to mention she had 
fallen from a barstool.

 

[¶8]           
After 
the call, Chew and the other employee moved Beverly to a nearby chair, feeling 
it was best if Beverly was sitting upright in case she vomited.  Both individuals grabbed Beverly beneath 
her arms and dragged her to the chair, supporting her head against their 
bodies.  However, once seated, it 
became apparent that Beverly was unstable on the chair, as she "stretched out" 
and gave the impression she might fall again.  Chew and the employee again moved 
Beverly to the floor and propped her against a stack of beer cases in the 
corner.  During the course of these 
events, Beverly mumbled incoherently and made occasional movements but did not 
regain consciousness.

 

[¶9]           
Shortly 
after 1:00 a.m., about fifteen minutes after the 911 call, Officer Ed Daley 
arrived at the scene.  Daley spoke 
with Chew and asked if there were any medical problems, to which Chew replied 
"no" but confirmed that Beverly was intoxicated.  Daley attempted to speak with Beverly 
but she replied incoherently; he made no further attempts to ascertain her 
medical condition.  Shortly 
thereafter, Officer Pat Eastes arrived at the scene.  Daley and Eastes concluded Beverly was 
highly inebriated and decided to transport her via patrol car to the 
hospital.  While carrying Beverly 
from the bar, the Officers apparently lost their grip and either "dropped" or 
"sat" Beverly back to the ground.  
The Officers then continued to carry Beverly from the bar, with Daley 
grabbing her beneath the underarms or by the wrists and Eastes grabbing her by 
either ankles or the bottoms of her pants.

 

[¶10]       
Once 
outside, the officers placed Beverly on the sidewalk and awaited the arrival of 
Officer Marvin Shepard.1  Once Shepard arrived, all three officers 
began to lift Beverly into the patrol car but Shepard began to lose his grip and 
Beverly again was either "dropped" or "sat" back on the ground.  Shepard re-gripped Beverly by the wrists 
and loaded her into the car while another officer pulled her across the seat 
from the opposite side of the car.  
Shepard attempted to close the car door but Beverly's head was 
protruding.  The parties dispute 
whether the door was "firmly closed" on Beverly's head and "bounced back open" 
or whether her head was merely "touched."  
In any event, Beverly was pulled further on the seat so the door could be 
closed completely.

 

[¶11]       
After 
Beverly was loaded into Shepard's patrol car, she was transported to Wyoming 
Medical Center.  At the hospital, 
emergency room personnel removed Beverly from Shepard's vehicle, positioned her 
on a gurney, and wheeled her inside.  
The Officers left the hospital at that time but were later contacted and 
instructed to return to the hospital, where they learned Beverly had suffered a 
broken neck and was possibly paralyzed.  
The medical testimony established Beverly suffered a hyperflexion injury 
(chin to chest) to her cervical spine, at the C-5, C-6 level, which damaged her 
spinal cord.  The injury rendered 
Beverly quadriplegic, leaving her permanently paralyzed from the chest down, 
with some residual movement in her arms.

 

[¶12]       
On May 
8, 1997, Beverly and Robert Wenzel filed their complaint against The Lounge Bar; 
the City of Casper; the Chief of Police, Art de Werk, in his official and 
individual capacity; the individual police officers, Daley, Eastes, and Shepard; 
and John Doe defendants.  On January 
26, 1998, the City of Casper and Chief de Werk, in his official capacity, were 
dismissed from suit under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(2) and (b)(5).  Thereafter, on February 5, 1998, Wenzels 
filed a second action against the City of Casper and Chief de Werk, in his 
official capacity only.

 

[¶13]       
On May 
22, 1998, both suits were consolidated, and, on May 26, 1998, the district court 
granted partial summary judgment to the City of Casper and Chief de Werk on 
Wenzels' negligence, emotional distress, and consortium 
claims.

 

[¶14]       
On 
January 29, 1999, the district court issued its Decision Letter on subsequent 
motions for summary judgment.  In 
its letter, the trial court dismissed the "negligent serving of alcohol" claim 
against The Lounge Bar and granted summary judgment on certain constitutional 
claims against the City of Casper, Chief de Werk, and the Officers.  The court also disposed of certain 
emotional distress claims.  The 
district court denied summary judgment on the medical assistance and Good 
Samaritan issues raised by The Lounge Bar, the state law claims against the 
Officers (negligence and consortium), and the Officers' claims of qualified 
immunity.  All claims asserted 
against Chief de Werk in his individual capacity were dismissed.  Robert Wenzel later voluntarily 
dismissed his consortium claim on October 15, 1999.

 

[¶15]       
The 
remaining negligence issues were tried to a jury from October 18 through October 
26, 1999.  On October 25, 1999, 
Wenzels moved the district court to disallow The Lounge Bar's proposed 
instructions on the Good Samaritan and dram shop statutes.  The court refused the Good Samaritan 
instruction and gave Wenzels' instruction on the duty to a business invitee 
instead, but gave the instruction on the dram shop statute.  During the instruction conference, 
Wenzels' counsel objected to the dram shop instruction but no objection was 
lodged by the Officers.  The Lounge 
Bar originally tendered its instruction on dram shop liability, which was 
refused by the court, but the court proposed a modified version, Instruction No. 
24, which was given.2

 

[¶16]       
The jury 
returned a verdict, finding Beverly fifty percent (50%) at fault, The Lounge Bar 
zero percent (0%) at fault, Daley twenty-five percent (25%) at fault, Shepard 
ten percent (10%) at fault, and Eastes fifteen percent (15%) at fault.  The jury awarded Wenzels $2,500,000 in 
damages.  The verdict was entered on 
October 26, 1999.

 

[¶17]       
Post-trial, 
Wenzels submitted their proposed Judgment on Jury Verdict, asking for the full 
amount of damages awarded by the jury.  
The Lounge Bar also submitted a proposed judgment.  On December 13, 1999, the district court 
entered its Judgment on Jury Verdict, reducing the damage award by fifty percent 
(50%) to reflect Beverly's comparative fault and further reducing the award in 
compliance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-118 (LexisNexis 2001) of the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act ("WGCA"), to a total amount of two hundred fifty 
thousand dollars ($250,000).

 

[¶18]       
On 
December 17, 1999, Wenzels moved for additur and, in the alternative, for a new 
trial on their negligence claims against The Lounge Bar.  On January 12, 2000, the Officers filed 
their Notice of Appeal with the Wyoming Supreme Court.  Wenzels subsequently filed their Notice 
of Appeal on March 10, 2000.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

I.  The Constitutionality of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-39-118(a) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
12-8-301(a)

 

[¶19]       
This 
Court has emphasized repeatedly that "[it] strongly adhere[s] to the rule 
forbidding [it] to consider for the first time on appeal issues that were 
neither raised in, nor argued to, the trial court,' except for those issues 
which are jurisdictional or are fundamental in nature."  Bredthauer v. TSP, 864 P.2d 442, 
446 (Wyo. 1993).  Thus, where the 
issue of a statute's constitutionality is not raised in the trial court, we will 
not consider the matter unless the issue goes to jurisdiction or is otherwise of 
such a fundamental nature that the Court must take cognizance of it.  Nickleson v. People, 607 P.2d 904, 907-08 (Wyo. 1980).

 

[¶20]       
We have 
also stated "unless plain error is present, questions concerning the 
constitutionality of a statute are not considered on appeal if the party 
presenting them failed to present or argue the contentions in the trial 
court."  In Interest of DG, 
916 P.2d 991, 998 (Wyo. 1996).  The 
rationale for this rule is that "it is unfair to reverse a ruling of a trial 
court for reasons that were not presented to it, whether it be legal theories or 
issues never formally raised in the pleadings nor argued to the trial 
court."  Bredthauer, 864 P.2d  
at 446-47.

 

[¶21]       
In their 
appeal of the judgment below, Wenzels raise, essentially for the first time, 
claims of unconstitutionality of two Wyoming statutes.  The issues of the constitutionality of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-118(a) (LexisNexis 2001) (involving the WGCA) and Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 12-8-301(a) (LexisNexis 2001) (involving dram shop 
liability/immunity) were not properly presented to the trial court.  Wenzels raised no constitutional claims 
in their complaint or any other pleadings.  
In neither their response to The Lounge Bar's Motion for Summary Judgment 
nor in their response to its Renewal of Motion for Summary Judgment did Wenzels 
argue the constitutionality of either statute.  Nor did they assert such issues in their 
Pretrial Memorandum or their Motion to Disallow Defendant's "Good Samaritan" and 
"Dram Shop" Instructions.

 

[¶22]       
Arguably, 
the constitutional issue concerning Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-118 could not have 
been foreseen and raised until the implementation of the statute by the district 
court.  However, Wenzels failed to 
mention these concerns in their subsequent Motion for Additur or in the 
Alternative A New Trial on Negligence Claims Against The Lounge Bar. The only 
comment even approaching an objection to constitutionality of either statute was 
Wenzels' counsel's casual remark about the constitutionality of the dram shop 
statute during the final jury instruction conference.  At that point, the attorney 
stated:

 

The last 
one for our objection, we believe the dram shop act is unconstitutional.  It's special  gives specialized 
immunity to an industry that ought not have it and it violates equal 
protection.

 

This 
conclusory assertion hardly satisfies the well-established requirement of 
"formally raising or arguing" the constitutional claims to the trial court as 
required by this Court.  
Bredthauer, 864 P.2d  at 447.  
Except for a brief mention on a motion for costs, the record is 
completely devoid of any comment, conclusory or otherwise, as to the 
constitutionality of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-118 until Wenzels' appeal.  

 

[¶23]       
Because 
Wenzels failed to properly raise their constitutional claims regarding the 
Wyoming Governmental Claims Act and the dram shop statute at the trial court 
level, we will not entertain their constitutional challenges on 
appeal.

 

 

II.  The Sufficiency of the 
Evidence

 

[¶24]       
The 
standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence is clear:  "On review, this court assumes that the 
evidence in favor of the successful party is true. We leave out of consideration 
entirely the evidence presented by the unsuccessful party that conflicts with 
the evidence of the successful party, and we afford to the evidence of the 
successful party every favorable inference that may be reasonably and fairly 
drawn from it."  Turcq v. 
Shanahan, 950 P.2d 47, 51-52 (Wyo. 1997) (citations omitted); Richardson 
v. Schaub, 796 P.2d 1304, 1309-10 (Wyo. 1990).

 

[¶25]       
The jury 
apportioned zero percent (0%) of the fault in this matter to The Lounge 
Bar.  The Officers argue that, 
construing the evidence in Wenzels' favor, the jury's decision to 
exonerate The Lounge Bar from liability was not supported by sufficient 
evidence.  They assert that the 
evidence clearly proves that The Lounge Bar breached its duty of care by moving 
Beverly on two occasions and by failing to advise both the 911 dispatcher and 
the responding Officers of Beverly's barstool fall.

 

[¶26]       
The 
problem here lies in the Officers' misapplication of the standard of 
review.  Rather than reviewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to Wenzels, this Court reviews the evidence 
in the light most favorable to The Lounge Bar, who for purposes of this issue is 
considered the "successful party."  
Assuming the evidence in favor of The Lounge Bar to be true, as we are 
required to do, the evidence demonstrated the following:

 

A.        
Beverly entered The Lounge Bar at approximately midnight on May 14, 1994 
and did not appear intoxicated.  
After approximately one-half hour, Beverly began arguing with another bar 
patron.  Chew walked over to Beverly 
and asked her to "quiet down" and sit properly on her barstool.  Beverly complied but was unhappy with 
this request.

 

B.        
Approximately one-half hour later, Beverly suddenly went limp and slid 
off her barstool "like a cartoon character."  Her feet first hit the floor, her knees 
then buckled, and she slumped to the floor.  There was no noise associated with the 
slide from the stool and the barstool was not knocked over in the process, 
leaving no indication of any injury to Beverly.  Medical evidence indicated that such a 
"slide" would not produce the force necessary for a C-5, C-6 
dislocation.

 

C.        Chew 
and a bar employee immediately attended to Beverly, placing a cold towel on her 
forehead and talking to her.  They 
determined Beverly was intoxicated and called 911 for assistance.  The 911 tape indicated that Chew 
informed the dispatcher of Beverly's intoxication and was told that dispatch 
could not send anyone for thirty to forty minutes.  Chew showed concern for Beverly's 
intoxicated state, asked "[w]hat do ya do in this kind of ," and seemed to 
proceed with Beverly's care in mind.

 

D.        Chew 
and the bar employee moved Beverly to a chair, concerned she might vomit and 
choke.  When Beverly appeared 
unsteady in the chair, they moved her to a display of beer cases where she could 
be propped in an upright position.  
During this process, Beverly was able to move her arms and legs, scratch 
her nose, and open her eyes.

 

E.        When 
the Officers arrived, they treated Beverly as a "typical drunk," laughing about 
the situation.  They did not inquire 
about her condition or evaluate Beverly for injuries.  While transporting Beverly to the car, 
the officers dropped her a couple of time but continued, picking Beverly up by 
her wrists and ankles.  They had 
difficulty loading Wenzel into the patrol car, resulting in the car door being 
slammed on her head and bouncing back open.  Within minutes of arriving at the 
hospital, Beverly was complaining of neck pain for the first time.  Medical evidence demonstrated that the 
impact from the patrol car door slamming on Beverly's head was the only incident 
of sufficient force to cause the injury Beverly received.

 

[¶27]       
Having 
reviewed the evidence in a light most favorable to The Lounge Bar, the Court 
concludes there clearly is sufficient evidence to justify a jury's finding that 
The Lounge Bar was not at fault for Beverly's injuries.

 

 

III.  Jury Instruction No. 
24

 

[¶28]       
Review 
of an allegedly improper jury instruction is well settled.  W.R.C.P. 51(b) states in 
part:

 

No party 
may assign as error the giving . . . [of] an instruction unless that party 
objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating 
distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of his 
objection.

 

See also 
City of Cheyenne v. Simpson, 787 P.2d 580, 581 (Wyo. 1990).  If no 
objection to a jury instruction is lodged, "this Court will review an alleged 
improper instruction only if plain error exists."  Simpson, 787 P.2d  at 582.  The plain error doctrine permits this 
Court to address issues that were not brought to the attention of the trial 
court.  Carlson v. Carlson, 
888 P.2d 210, 213 (Wyo. 1995).

 

[¶29]       
If an 
objection properly is lodged, the appellate court reviews the instruction for 
error and prejudicial effect. Vasquez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 913 P.2d 441, 443 (Wyo. 1996).  In reviewing 
alleged errors in jury instructions, a finding of error alone is insufficient to 
reverse; prejudicial error must be found.  
In the Matter of CH, 783 P.2d 155, 159 (Wyo. 1989).  Such error is never presumed and must, 
instead, be demonstrated by the party asserting error.  Vasquez,  913 P.2d  at 443; McWilliams v. 
Wilhelm, 893 P.2d 1147, 1148 (Wyo. 1995).  To satisfy this burden, "there must be a 
reasonable possibility that, in the absence of error, the verdict might have 
been more favorable to a party, and the burden is on the appellant to show where 
the error is prejudicial."  In 
the Matter of CH, 783 P.2d  at 159.

 

[¶30]       
When 
generally examining the propriety of jury instructions, this Court reviews all 
instructions as a whole.  "On 
review, this Court considers whether the instructions, taken as a whole, 
adequately and clearly advise the jury of the applicable law."  Kemper Architects, P.C. v. McFall, 
Konkel & Kimball Consulting Engineers, Inc., 843 P.2d 1178, 1182 (Wyo. 
1992).

 

We have 
said the function of jury instructions is to give the jury guidance regarding 
the law of the case.  Hursh 
Agency, Inc. v. Wigwam Homes, Inc., Wyo., 664 P.2d 27 (1983).  The trial court is not obligated to give 
an instruction offered by a party as long as the jury is adequately instructed 
on the law as it pertains to that case.  
Matter of MLM, Wyo., 682 P.2d 982 (1984).  The trial court's ruling on an 
instruction will not constitute reversible error absent a showing of prejudice, 
and prejudice will not be said to result unless it is demonstrated that the 
instruction confused or misled the jury with respect to the proper principles of 
law.  Cervelli v. Graves, 
Wyo., 661 P.2d 1032 (1983).

 

Sellers 
v. Dooley Oil Transport, 2001 WY 
44, ¶9, 22 P.3d 207, ¶9 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting DeJulio v. Foster, 715 P.2d 182, 186 (Wyo. 1986)).  In past 
decisions, this Court has applied a five-factor test in measuring the degree of 
error that may be considered prejudicial.   Those factors 
are:

 

(1)  [t]he extent to which there is conflict 
in the evidence on critical issues;

(2) 
whether or not the . . . argument to the jury may have contributed to the 
instruction's misleading effect;

(3) 
whether or not the jury requested a re-reading of the erroneous instruction or 
of related evidence;

(4)  the closeness of the jury's verdict; 
and

(5)  the effect of other instructions in 
curing the error.

 

Simpson, 787 P.2d  at 581-82.

 

[¶31]       
We note 
at the outset that the Officers did not object to Instruction No. 24 at trial as 
required by W.R.C.P. 51(b).  As a 
result, The Lounge Bar argues a plain error standard must now apply.  However, Wenzels objected to Instruction 
No. 24 at trial, and they challenge the instruction now. The purpose of W.R.C.P. 
51's requirement for objection is to inform the trial court of the nature and 
specific grounds of error in the instruction so that court can reconsider it and 
make any necessary modifications so as to avoid the error.  Davis v. Consolidated Oil & Gas, 
Inc., 802 P.2d 840, 843 (Wyo. 1990).  
We continue to adhere to the maxim, "if the trial judge is fully informed 
of the specific grounds of [the] objection . . . , there is no need for 
repetition."  Edwards v. 
Harris, 397 P.2d 87, 93 (Wyo. 1964).  
Where, as here, the alleged error was brought to the attention of the 
trial court by one party, there was no need for additional parties also to 
object in order to satisfy W.R.C.P. 51's requirements.  Thus, we shall consider any alleged 
error for prejudicial effect alone rather than plain error, despite the 
Officers' failure to lodge a separate objection at trial.

 

[¶32]       
The 
parties dispute the propriety of Instruction No. 24, which 
stated:

 

No 
[p]erson who has legally provided alcoholic liquor or malt beverage to any other 
person is liable for damages caused by the intoxication of the other 
person.

 

This 
instruction is a verbatim recitation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-8-301(a) 
(LexisNexis 2001), Wyoming's dram shop statute.  As such, the instruction is a correct 
statement of general Wyoming law.  
However, Wenzels assert that the giving of Instruction No. 24 was 
prejudicial because, placing Instruction No. 24 in context with the parties' 
claims and with the other jury instructions, Instruction No. 24 was 
unnecessary.  They argue it did not 
address any issues to be determined by the jury at trial, was inappropriately 
cumulative of other jury instructions indicating an intoxicated person was held 
to the same standard as a sober person, and was confusing as it stood in 
conflict with other jury instructions.    

 

[¶33]       
Applying 
this Court's previously stated five-factor test for prejudice, first, the 
evidence presented at trial on critical issues was at conflict in many 
respects.  The evidence of Beverly's 
intoxication varied in great degree.  
Although the parties agreed Beverly was extremely intoxicated at the time 
of her fall, few other facts were undisputed.

 

[¶34]       
Whether 
or not Beverly was intoxicated when she entered The Lounge Bar and, if so, the 
degree of that intoxication were important issues at trial.  However, issues concerning the alleged 
negligent serving of alcohol had been dismissed earlier in the proceedings, and 
it was important that the jury understand, particularly in light of ongoing 
comments by counsel noted below, that liability could not be assigned to The 
Lounge Bar on that basis.  While 
there was a clear conflict in the evidence, that is not determinative 
here.

 

[¶35]       
Second, 
arguments to the jury did not contribute to Instruction No. 24's misleading 
effect.  Quite the contrary was 
true.  Despite the fact that the 
"negligent serving" claim had been dismissed, Wenzels' and the Officers' counsel 
continued to make remarks during the trial that suggested The Lounge Bar may be 
liable for negligent serving of alcohol.  
For example, in her opening statement, one of Wenzels' attorneys stated: 
"This case is about the responsibility of bar owners in our community who serve 
alcohol for profit . . . ."  The 
Lounge Bar's counsel objected to ongoing references to the negligent serving 
issue, but to little avail. For example, Wenzels' counsel asked Chew, the owner 
of The Lounge Bar:

 

Now, 
speaking of those policies, is it  is it your belief, Mr. Chew, that it would 
be an unreasonable thing to do to serve more alcohol to a highly intoxicated 
person?  [a]nd that is because somebody that's already intoxicated can be a 
danger to themselves or others; isn't that also true?

 

Again, 
counsel for The Lounge Bar objected.  
This sort of incident occurred frequently throughout the course of the 
trial.  

 

[¶36]       
It is 
clear that the trial court allowed Instruction No. 24, in large part, because of 
the continued improper references to the negligent serving of alcohol that 
peppered the trial.  Had the court 
not allowed the instruction, the jury may very well have mistakenly believed 
they could attribute liability to The Lounge Bar based on negligent 
serving.

 

[¶37]       
On the 
other hand, counsel were careful not to misconstrue dram shop immunity in 
closing arguments.  The Lounge Bar's 
counsel stated (emphasis added):

 

On the 
percentage of fault of who is at fault, don't be confused by the fact that just 
because Wenzel walked into Mr. Chew's establishment, that he automatically 
becomes at fault for what happens there.  
He is an ordinary human being, and he is to exercise reasonable 
care, and he did just that in all of his actions.  He took this seriously, he was 
concerned, and he acted responsibly.

 

Counsel 
for Wenzel stated:

 

Now, I'm 
not trying to suggest to you that the bar is liable for serving Beverly Wenzel 
alcohol, because that's not the law in this case.  If you look at Instruction Number 24 . . 
. that instruction says that a person who has legally provided alcoholic 
beverages to another person is not liable for damages caused by the intoxication 
of that person. . . . [T]he language in this statute clearly indicates that The 
Lounge is responsible for injuries it caused Beverly Wenzel.  And her damages that night weren't 
caused because she was intoxicated.  
They were caused because Cliff Chew moved her and failed to report her 
injuries . . . .

 

[¶38]       
It is apparent 
that closing argument did not mislead the jury regarding the application of the 
dram shop instruction.  Neither did 
The Lounge Bar's counsel mislead the jury into believing the dram shop statute 
precluded all liability on its part.  
Indeed, counsel clearly indicated that The Lounge Bar could be held to a 
"reasonable care" standard. 

 

[¶39]       
Third, 
the jury did not request a re-reading of Instruction No. 24 or any related 
evidence.  Fourth, there is no 
indication of the "closeness" of the jury's verdict other than any inferences 
that may be drawn from the fact that the jury deliberated for approximately four 
hours and fifty minutes, beginning at 11:30 a.m. and ending at 4:20 p.m.  They found a substantial amount of 
damages ($2.5 million), although less than what Wenzels had requested.  They also found Beverly to be as much at 
fault as possible while still affording her a recovery (50%) and allocated the 
remaining liability among the parties.

 

[¶40]       
Finally, 
we consider the effect of other instructions in curing the error.  Instruction No. 2, Wenzels' contention 
instruction, detailed their claims against The Lounge Bar and alleged 
negligence:

 

(1) for 
ignoring Beverly Wenzel's intoxicated state;

(2) by 
allowing her to fall asleep on a bar stool;

(3) by 
moving her to a chair after she slid off the bar stool;

(4) by 
moving her to the beer cases;

(5) by 
failing to convey proper in formation to 911 and to the police officers; 
and

(6) in 
caring for Wenzel after she slid off the barstool.

 

Wenzels' 
Instruction No. 19 stated that The Lounge Bar, as an owner and occupier of land, 
had a duty of reasonable care to Beverly while she was on the premises. Wenzels' 
Instruction No. 21 provided that a business whose employees are reasonably on 
notice that a customer is in distress and in need of emergency medical attention 
has a legal duty to come to the assistance of that customer.  Additionally, the jury received 
Instruction Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 12, the Wyoming Pattern Jury Instructions 
for:  the elements of negligence; 
causation; the plaintiff's burden of proof for negligence; the defendants' 
burden of proof for comparative fault; and the concept of comparative 
fault.

 

[¶41]       
Taken 
together, these instructions clearly indicated that The Lounge Bar could be 
liable for breaching a duty of reasonable care to Beverly, as a business 
invitee, and for failing to summon medical assistance.  The instructions also indicated that The 
Lounge Bar could not be liable for injuries resulting from Beverly's 
intoxication.  These instructions 
correctly stated the law, and Instruction 24 was the direct result of counsels' 
persistent attempts to "poison the well" during trial.  Under the circumstances of this case, 
the instruction was properly given.  
When all instructions are considered together, it is apparent there was 
no prejudice. 

 

[¶42]       
The situation 
here is at least somewhat analogous to those in which this Court has considered 
the invited error doctrine.  Here, 
Wenzels effectively set up the necessity for this instruction by their continued 
inferences that liability could attach for negligent serving of alcohol.  This despite the fact that the trial 
court had earlier determined and ordered this was not the case.  Having created this difficult situation, 
Wenzel now complains that the trial court took steps to clarify the issue for 
the jury.  Except in a situation 
where the error was necessarily prejudicial, we will not order a new trial under 
such circumstances.  Vanvorst v. State, 1 P.3d 1223, 1229-30 (Wyo. 2000); 
Sanville v. State, 593 P.2d 1340, 1344-45 (Wyo. 
1979).

 

[¶43]   The judgment of the district court 
is affirmed in all respects.

 

FOOTNOTES

1Apparently, these officers believed 
Officer Shepard should transport Beverly because he had vinyl seats in his 
patrol car.

2Instruction No. 24, as given, stated in pertinent 
part: "No 
Person who has legally provided alcoholic liquor or malt beverage to any other 
person is liable for damages caused by the intoxication of the other 
person."