Title: State v. Fischer

State: north-dakota

Issuer: North Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

231 N.W.2d 147 (1975) STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Patrick Arthur FISCHER, Defendant-Appellant. Cr. No. 486. Supreme Court of North Dakota. April 24, 1975. Rehearing Denied June 24, 1975. *148 Bjella & Jestrab, Williston, for defendant and appellant, argued by John R. Gordon, Williston. *149 Leroy P. Anseth, State's Atty., Williston, for plaintiff and appellee. SAND, Judge (On Reassignment). The appellant, Patrick Arthur Fischer, was convicted in Williams County District Court of murder in the second degree for the fatal shooting of Ruby Ramsey, on February 8, 1973, in the City of Williston. On February 22, 1974, a criminal judgment and order of commitment to the state penitentiary at Bismarck was entered by the district court, sentencing the appellant for an indeterminate term of from 27 to 30 years. It is from this judgment and order of commitment that Mr. Fischer appeals. Two allegations of error are the bases of Mr. Fischer's appeal. They are: Those requested jury instructions are: During the course of Mr. Fischer's trial, his appointed counsel moved the court on his behalf to declare a mistrial on the basis of Mr. Fischer's incompetency to stand trial and assist in his defense. His counsel further moved the court to fix a time for a hearing to determine Mr. Fischer's competency to stand trial, pursuant to Section 29-20-01, N.D.C.C., which provides: One of the pertinent questions before us is whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant the motion for a hearing regarding defendant's competency to stand trial at the time. The evidence before the trial court, in addition to oral examination by the court and the discourse between the defendant and the court, consisted primarily of affidavits of defendant's court-appointed attorneys and a report from the State Hospital *150 consisting of a letter from Hubert A. Carbone, M.D., with attached copies of the mental examination dated March 17, 1973, psychological evaluation dated March 29, 1973, social history dated April 13, 1973, diagnostic staff conference dated April 16, 1973, and a letter to Harry M. Pippin, co-counsel for the defendant, dated May 8, 1973, from Dr. Hubert A. Carbone. The chronological sequence of events, for a better understanding, is as follows: Each of the three court-appointed attorneys for the defendant, John R. Gordon, Vern C. Neff and Aldean Allen Wahl, submitted supporting affidavits on the motion for a hearing pursuant to the provisions of Section 29-20-01, N.D.C.C. The affidavit of Neff in substance stated that he informed the defendant that the State was willing to accept a plea to manslaughter but defendant refused to plead. Defendant said he was entitled to a jury trial and would testify on his own behalf. *151 An opening statement was made predicated upon defendant's assurance that he would testify on his own behalf. On February 12, 1974, defendant, for the first time, informed the affiant he would not testify. Defendant told this affiant that Gordon, one of his attorneys, told the jury what happened and that is all the jury needed to know. (This apparently refers to the opening statement.) The affiant stated that in his opinion the defendant's decision was not rationally arrived at or rationally conceived and that the defendant did not have the ability to make a decision or have a rational understanding of the situation. Gordon, in his affidavit, in substance stated that he was appointed as defense counsel by the county court on September 24, 1973, and was also appointed as defense counsel by the district court on October 16, 1973. Affiant stated that he had examined the report from the State Hospital and decided that there was no basis for a defense of insanity. On October 16, 1973, defense counsel secured cooperation of the defendant, who admitted recollection of the events on February 8, 1973, but the defendant refused to disclose full details until February 11, 1974, when he did so at approximately 4:30 p.m. On January 15, 1974, defendant advised that he would not enter a plea of guilty to any charge. On January 24, 1974, defendant refused to disclose details of conversations with decedent and again refused to plead guilty to a lesser charge but insisted upon a jury trial. The defendant would not talk while a recording machine was on. Defendant agreed to testify. Affiant, with co-counsel, interviewed defendant on numerous occasions in an effort to secure a complete disclosure of the events, but in each instance were met with definite reluctance on the part of the defendant to discuss any of the events involved in the defense and an absolute refusal to discuss matters which the defendant considered not important. On February 7, 1974, defendant was advised of the scope of cross-examination and that it might include matters relating to his past history. On February 11, defense counsel had further discussion with the defendant at which time he advised counsel of the nature of the conversation with the decedent on February 8, 1973. Counsel advised defendant of what was intended to be covered or contained in the opening statement. The defendant advised counsel he intended to testify. On February 12, 1974, at about 8:30 p.m., the defendant was advised that the State's Attorney would cross-examine him and explained to him the nature and form of the examination by the State's Attorney. After some more discussion with the defendant, the defendant stated he would not testify. Defendant was then advised that under the evidence presently in the record the jury would convict him of first degree murder. The defendant refused to listen. The affiant stated that, in his opinion, the defendant does not comprehend or have the ability or capability of rationally or logically evaluating anything explained to him relating to his defense. Aldean Allen Wahl's affidavit, in substance, stated that the defendant refused to plea bargain on January 15, 1974. The defendant, on November 5, 1973, had stated that he would not testify but changed his mind on January 24, 1974, and agreed to testify, but then again changed his mind on February 12, 1974, and decided not to testify. The defendant accused him and other counsel of lying to him and conspiring with the State's Attorney and that the witnesses were merely playing a part against him. In our view, the defendant's changes of mind from not testifying, to testifying, and back again to not testifying on his own behalf, as stated in the affidavit of Wahl, suggests that the defendant may have been consistently reluctant or uncertain about testifying. *152 Relevant excerpts of the transcript relating to the oral examination of the defendant by the court, and dialogue between the court, the defendant, and the defendant's attorneys, are as follows: After some further questioning and dialogue, the Court said: Later the Court said: This oral examination and dialogue disclose that the defendant did not wish to testify principally because of his fear of cross-examination by the State's Attorney. The trial court concluded that the defendant seemed to understand the situation and made the decision not to testify. *153 The April 16th report of the State Hospital, under the heading DIAGNOSIS states that the defendant has "Schizophrenic Reaction in Remission." Under the heading Recommendation it is stated that "Mr. Fischer is competent to stand trial and should be returned to the court's jurisdiction at the earliest possible time." The term "in remission" means no symptoms were found to show that the individual was schizophrenic. The diagnosis of schizophrenic reaction must, out of necessity, be based upon the "record" previously made and submitted to and reviewed by the staff at the State Hospital. It is a finding based upon a record made by some person or persons prior to the current examination. It is not made upon current observations or tests conducted by the State Hospital. In this respect, the following statement in the report bears this out: The Hospital report does not disclose any organic disability of defendant which suggests that any prior abnormal behavior was of exogenic origin. The report states, "Psychological studies of his personality at this time do not demonstrate psychotic pathology." The court record before us does not demonstrate or show any noticeable behavioral changes on the part of the defendant since the examination at the State Hospital. The record of the State Hospital, notably, states that "we are dealing with an evasive, guarded individual who does not admit to any of his previous difficulties unless he is confronted with them and forced to acknowledge them." Diagnosis Staff Evaluation, dated April 16, 1973, by Dr. Carbone. This personality trait was found to exist at the time the defendant was observed and examined by the hospital staff and by Dr. Carbone, who concluded that the defendant was competent to stand trial. If defendant's reluctance to discuss personal matters did not constitute grounds for a finding of incompetence to stand trial to the experts it certainly does not constitute "reasonable ground" to the trial court for purposes of proceeding under Section 29-20-01, N.D.C.C. This leaves only defendant's changes of mind as to testifying as a basis for creating a "reasonable ground." If changing one's mind constitutes incompetency, we would have many incompetents. We do not believe that defendant's refusal to plea bargain is irrational, nor do we believe that refusing to waive a constitutional right and not testify on one's own behalf as a defendant is irrational. Neither do we believe that it is irrational to insist upon the law taking its due course. And finally, we do not believe it is irrational on the part of the defendant to change his mind about testifying on his own behalf after hearing the opening statement of the State's Attorney and some of the principal testimony against him, especially where he knew that the trial court had refused to limit the State's Attorney's scope of cross-examination. The defendant's actions conceivably may have been unwise, but they were not irrational. The trial court, from the evidence submitted, did not believe that there was reasonable ground to believe that the defendant was unable to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense and, therefore, did not fix a date for a competency hearing as provided for in Section 29-20-01. Nor do we believe from examining the record that such reasonable doubt existed. In addition, the court had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the defendant, whereas we have only the written word. However, the record of the proceedings had before the court on February 13, in which the trial court orally examined defendant in depth and at length, particularly with reference to defendant's decision *154 not to testify, clearly discloses that the defendant understood the nature of the charge and was capable of aiding in his own defense. The record, when considered as a whole, does not require that we conclude that the trial court erred in denying the motion for an examination. The evidence submitted does not raise a reasonable doubt as to defendant's competency. See Moore v. United States, 464 F.2d 663, 666 (9th Cir. 1972). Defendant asserts that Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S. Ct. 836, 15 L. Ed. 2d 815 (1966), is controlling. However, an indiscriminate comparison of similarities between that case and this, without due consideration or examination of essential differentiating elements is laden with pitfalls. Keeping this in mind, it is appropriate to make some observations or comparisons of essential matter between this case and the Robinson case. Fischer's mental history contained in the State Hospital's report is, in pertinent part, as follows: Fischer exhibited no indications of abnormal behavior until 1968 (at which time he was 33 years of age); that in 1968 Fischer was hospitalized at St. Michael's Hospital in Grand Forks and was at that time considered to be suffering from a schizophrenic reaction as well as depression (Fischer apparently left the hospital in Grand Forks without medical approval); and in 1972 Fischer was committed to the High Ridge Hospital in Racine, Wisconsin, and at that time he exhibited "clearcut florid psychotic symptomatology," consisting of delusions and "persecutory ideation" in which mental state he believed he was being followed, that the Mafia was after him and the FBI were probably looking for him; and that Fischer had made three attempts at suicidetwice by shotgun and once by cutting his wrists. (The information regarding the suicide attempts is found in the social worker's report based upon information received from the defendant's ex-wife, but this information was not recited in the staff diagnostic evaluation.) In Robinson the uncontradicted evidence shows that when the defendant was seven or eight years old a brick dropped from a third floor and hit him on the head. Thereafter, according to the testimony of his mother, he acted a little peculiar; that, in her vernacular, the blow had knocked him "cockeyed." She further testified that he suffered headaches during his childhood and his conduct was noticeably erratic, that he appeared on occasions to be in a daze with a glare in his eyes, that at times he had a starey look and seemed to be just a "little foamy" at the mouth, and on occasion reacted violently. The evidence shows that the defendant had a history of such abnormal behavior and had been confined as a psychopathic patient. It was also undisputed that the defendant had committed acts of violence, including the killing of his infant son, and attempts at suicide. Four lay witnesses who had direct dealings or contacts with the defendant testified that he was insane. The only rebuttal to the lay testimony presented was in the form of a stipulation that if the director of the behavioral clinic of the criminal court of Cook County were called as a witness to testify he would state that in his opinion, based on his examination two or three months before trial, the defendant knew the nature of the charges against him and was able to cooperate with counsel. The case record does not disclose the nature of the examination or what information had been considered by the director of the behavioral clinic. The court in this respect observed as follows: Also in the Robinson case the prosecutor on appeal argued that the defendant had waived the defense of incompetence to stand trial, but the United States Supreme Court said: There are two major distinctions between the Robinson case and the instant case. In the Robinson case sanity at the time of the act and sanity at the time of the trial were both in issue, which fact was recognized by the United States Supreme Court. In the instant case, as to competency, we have a complete report wherein Mr. Fischer's past history and behavior was considered by the State Hospital. In Robinson we have only a proposed stipulation which does not allude to or disclose the evidence or manner in which the conclusions by the proposed expert witness (director of the behavioral clinic) were reached. Furthermore, in the instant case we have no sanity question as to the time of the alleged act but only the question of competency to understand the nature of the proceedings and to assist counsel at trial. In the instant situation, only the case history or record purports to disclose prior unusual behavior, whereas in Robinson at least four witnesses testified as to abnormal behavior and expressed opinions that the defendant was insane. The doctors at the State Hospital who conducted the examination of Mr. Fischer had all of the prior history available. They nevertheless concluded and found that the defendant was competent to stand trial. The only major development since the defendant was examined at the State Hospital is the fact that he has changed his mind about testifying. This would be the major item which could not have been considered by the experts at the Hospital. This change of mind cannot be considered as a basis for establishing reasonable grounds to the court for purposes of conducting a hearing under Section 29-20-01. The trial court was aware of the Robinson case and the record discloses an oral examination of Fischer by the district court which was extensive, consisting of approximately thirty pages of transcript. This Court in State v. Iverson, 225 N.W.2d 48 (N.D.1974), in syllabus paragraph 5, said: The same rule would apply to the question of whether or not reasonable grounds exist so as to require a hearing under Section 29-20-01, N.D.C.C. The Judge may also rely, in part, on his own impressions, observations and conclusions. The proceedings before the trial court, on the motion for mis-trial, constituted a hearing to determine if reasonable grounds existed which required a further hearing under Section 29-20-01. A reluctance to testify is not uncommon, hence the need for subpoena powers. The defendant, having heard the testimony against him on the first day of trial and believing he would be subject to vigorous cross-examination, could easily be hesitant or have normal reluctance to testify. A brief review of the testimony heard on the first day of trial and the defendant's expected testimony, as asserted by defendant's counsel in his opening statement, reveals strong indications and reasons why the defendant may have changed his mind about testifying on his own behalf. A condensed version of the pertinent testimony produced on the first day of trial consists of the following: *156 Kenneth Marmon testified that on February 8, 1973, while at his mother's house, at about the noon hour, he received a telephone call from Ruby Ramsey. The phone was in good operating condition. Fischer got on the telephone with Ruby and was going to tell him about "that big woman." There was some kidding going on for a short while between the parties on the telephone. Marmon testified, Fischer's voice sounded angry or mad. Within fifteen minutes after he hung up the telephone his sister, who lives next door to Ruby Ramsey, came in and said that Ruby was deadhad been shot. David Trowbridge testified that on February 8, 1973, he went to the Ruby Ramsey house at about one o'clock to do baby sitting (he had done this before). When he got to the house he knocked on the door but did not receive an answer. After knocking again, Ruby came to the door, unlocked it and pushed him out of the way. She was screaming for help. He was on the porch. Ruby pushed him away and ran through the gate out in front of the house. He saw a shotgun come through the door opening, and about the same time heard it discharge. He looked up and saw Fischer with the shotgun. Ruby fell to the sidewalk. Fischer told him to get out of there, otherwise he was going to be the next one to get it. He then took off, running. He ran past Ruby. She was still breathing and he saw that she had a hole in the left shoulder. She was lying face down. He then ran to the police station. Fischer did not appear to be injured. Leonard Reed testified that on February 8 he and his wife, during the noon hour, were standing in front of the Kalloch shoe store. He heard a shot which came from the south and then he saw a young man running up the street towards them. He looked down the street at a home three or four hundred feet away and saw a screen door open and the barrel of a gun sticking out, with a man behind the screen door. After a little while the screen door closed and he heard another shot. Katherine Reed, the wife of Leonard Reed, was present and corroborated Reed's testimony. Stan Lyson testified that he was a police officer of the City of Williston, and on February 8, 1973, David Trowbridge came in and reported, "Rick [Fischer] just shot Ruby." He went to the scene at about 1:13 p.m. He found Ruby; she had no pulse. He also saw a man lying just north of Ruby. The two persons were taken away by ambulance. Two small children were crying. He found two spent shotgun shells just inside the front door and one shotgun shell in the gun. All had been recently fired. The shotgun with the shell in it was found in a small hallway and doorway leading into the rear bedroom. He found pieces of a knife in several places. The handle was found in the living room, and two other parts of the knife were found underneath the gun. A small piece of the knife blade was found in Fischer's clothing at Mercy Hospital. While at Ruby's house he attempted to use the telephone but it did not work. He could hear the other person keep repeating "hello, hello," and saying, "speak up." He did speak up but the other person still said "hello." Several days later, on February 15, 1973, he examined the clothes of Fischer which were taken from him on February 8. He found a mouthpiece for a telephone which fitted into the telephone at Ruby's home. He found blood in the dining room, on the kitchen ceiling and walls, and on the kitchen floor. He also found blood on the doorway and frame between the kitchen and living room. Also, he saw blood on the couch by the south wall of the living room. Blood trailed from the living room past the couch area. There were a few spots of *157 blood from the kitchen, through the living room, and through the front door. He also found blood under both bodies, Ruby and Fischer. He took several pictures with an instamatic camera. A piece (receiver) of the shotgun was found near the shotgun. Without this piece the gun is inoperative and operates only as a single shot. (The gun was a pump Remington.) One shot was fired, which hit Ruby; one shot hit the ice and ricocheted off into the right door of the car setting in front of the residence. The ice was about seventeen inches from Ruby's head. The other shot was in the kitchen. There were bb's, or buckshot, on the walls and ceiling in the kitchen. This testimony does not mean that the shots were fired in the sequence stated. The defendant's testimony would have been as follows, as asserted by his defense counsel: In his opening statement to the jury, defense counsel stated the defendant Fischer would testify on his own behalf and that he (defense counsel) expected Fischer to testify that on February 8, 1973, he (Fischer) had purchased a record and a loaf of bread which he intended to give to Ruby Ramsey (the victim). Fischer arrived at her house at approximately noon and was admitted to the house. Fischer and Ruby Ramsey talked and drank coffee until she made a telephone call to Kenneth Marmon. Shortly after this conversation, Ruby became angry at Fischer. She told him to get out of the house, and he simply ignored her. Fischer sat at the kitchen table with his back to the hallway and bedroom. She went into the bedroom, presumably to get dressed. Suddenly she appeared in the kitchen with a shotgun and ordered him to leave the house. Fischer reached or jumped up to take the gun away from her, and in the struggle the firearm discharged, striking Fischer in the groin and knocking him down. A knife he sometimes carried in his belt was shattered by the blast. Ruby Ramsey ran from the house. Somehow, Fischer managed to regain his feet and, probably using the shotgun as a prop, he made his way to the door. In a rage of anger and pain, Fischer fired the gun at Ruby Ramsey. Fischer went back into the house and fell against the couch in the living room. Fischer did not remember how he got out on the sidewalk, where the police found him. By comparing the foregoing testimony of the prosecution's witnesses with the testimony expected from the defendant, as asserted by his counsel, it can be readily understood that the defendant would be concerned and that his concern was rational. The defendant could easily recognize that the jury may have difficulty accepting his version as to what happened and that he could harm his case by presenting his version and subjecting himself to cross-examination. The defendant's decision, under the circumstances, not to testify did not constitute irrational behavior nor did it constitute reasons for having a hearing under the provisions of Section 29-20-01, N.D.C.C. A presumption of competency exists which is evidenced by the provisions of Section 29-20-01. The Hospital report supports rather than detracts from the presumption. The contents of a report, rather than its age, in the absence of other factors, should be controlling. The Supreme Court of Nebraska, in State v. Boston, 187 Neb. 388, 191 N.W.2d 452, 453 (1971), said the reasonable "`doubt referred to is a doubt arising in the mind of the trial judge, as distinguished from uncertainty in the mind of any other person. Hence, except as otherwise provided by statute, the matter of granting an investigation rests in the discretion of the trial court. * * *'" The factual situation in the Boston case was somewhat different, but the basic principle of law applies in this case. During oral argument, appellant referred us to the case of Rand v. Swenson, 501 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1974), which is an appeal from the case reported in 365 F. Supp. 1294 (D.C. Mo.1973), to support defendant's position, *158 but we find Rand is readily distinguishable from the instant case and does not apply. The United States Supreme Court, on February 19, 1975, issued its opinion in the case of James Edward Drope, Petitioner, v. State of Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 95 S. Ct. 896, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103. One of the main questions before the Court was whether the defendant was competent as a matter of law to stand trial. Defendant's counsel filed a motion for a continuance in order to have the defendant examined and to receive psychiatric treatment. The motion was denied. Counsel for the defendant objected to the trial on the grounds and for the reasons that "`the defendant is not a person of sound mind and should have a further psychiatric examination before the case should be forced to trial.'" In support of the motion, defendant's counsel submitted a report made by the doctor who had examined the defendant at counsel's request. The report, among other things, recited his past medical history which described the defendant as "markedly agitated and upset" but noted that he "appeared to be cooperative in this examination but had difficulty in participating well." The report continued by stating that the defendant "had a difficult time relating," that the defendant was "markedly circumstantial and irrelevant in his speech." The report concluded that the defendant "certainly needs the aid of a psychiatrist" and "is a very neurotic individual who is also depressed and perhaps he is depressed for most of the time." The report then made the following diagnoses: Defendant's wife testified that defendant, with four of his acquaintances, forcibly raped her and subjected her to other bizarre abuse and indignities. The defendant in mid-trial attempted to commit suicide but the court, even with the benefit of the pyschiatric report, nevertheless concluded that defendant was competent to stand trial and continued the trial in absentia. The United States Supreme Court did not agree with the trial court's determination that Drope was competent to stand trial, and held that the trial court failed to accord proper weight to the evidence suggesting Drope's incompetence. The Supreme Court said: By applying the above three-part standard, any one of which may in some circumstances be sufficient to require a hearing, to the instant case we find: (1) There is no evidence of Fischer's irrational behavior other than the medical history which had been considered by and upon which the medical staff of the State Hospital concluded that Fischer was competent to stand trial. (2) There is no evidence that Fischer's demeanor at the trial was irrational or that he had a lack of understanding. (3) There is evidence of a prior medical opinion based upon medical history and an examination of Fischer after he was charged with the crime of murder in the first degree, which concluded that Fischer was competent to stand trial. We would further observe that the Drope case materially differs from the instant *159 case in that the Drope case had no medical report which concluded that the defendant was competent to stand trial as was the situation in the instant case. Drope's attempted suicide during the time the trial was going on is another distinguishing feature, as well as the diagnoses in the psychiatric report in Drope, as compared to the diagnoses in the psychiatric report in the instant case. In Drope the Supreme Court referred to Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S. Ct. 788, 4 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1960), as the leading case on the question of competency to stand trial. The Supreme Court's per curiam opinion in Dusky basically concluded that the record did not sufficiently support the court's findings of competency to stand trial. It further concluded that the test must be whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him. The per curiam opinion in Dusky v. United States, supra, did not set forth what was in the record, but the Court of Appeals' opinion, as reported in 271 F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1959), contains the medical reports and records, including the diagnoses made by the examining doctors. These reports and records generally concluded that because of the defendant's mental illness he was unable to properly understand the proceedings against him and was unable to adequately assist counsel in his defense. The trial court, however, concluded that the defendant was oriented as to time and place, was able to assist counsel in his own defense and therefore was mentally competent to stand trial. The Dusky record in this respect substantially differs from the record in the present case before us, which record supports the conclusions of the district court. For us to conclude that Dusky, Robinson and Drope require setting aside Fischer's conviction would necessarily require us to extend the impact of those decisions beyond what the United States Supreme Court intended. Repeated examinations upon request of counsel or on scanty evidence can paralyze the judicial process. We are aware that the United States Supreme Court in Robinson and in Drope observed that provisions such as those found in Section 29-20-01, N.D.C.C., are designed to jealously guard the defendant's right to a fair trial. This was accomplished in the present case by the trial court when it heard the motion, weighed the evidence, and balanced the interests of all parties. The trial court was justified in concluding that Fischer responded as a person having a rational mind would respond, and that a reasonable doubt as to Fischer's competency was not established. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in denying a hearing as requested by the defendant under Section 29-20-01, N.D.C.C. As to the instructions, the defendant alleges error on the grounds that the court refused to give requested instructions Nos. 1 and 2. Section 29-21-06, N.D.C.C., provides as follows: The question is whether or not the trial court's instructions, when viewed as a whole, adequately covered this provision of law in the instructions to the jury. Instructions must be considered as a whole, and if when so considered they correctly advise the jury as to the law, they are sufficient although portions thereof standing alone may be insufficient or erroneous. State v. Steele, 211 N.W.2d 855 (N.D.1973). See also State v. Williams, 150 N.W.2d 844 (N.D.1967). The trial court, in addition to the regular routine instructions, gave the following relevant *160 instructions to the jury as to the issues raised, of which pertinent portions are hereafter set forth: The standard Murder in the First Degree instructions as found in NDJI 1679, including the elements of the offense. This instruction was followed by The Instruction for Murder in the First Degree was followed by NDJI 1680, which is an instruction for Murder in the Second Degree. It is a standard instruction setting forth the elements of the offense, and in this instance begins with the following statement: This was followed by the Duty of Jury charge set out above. Then came the instruction for Manslaughter in the First Degree, as set out in NDJI 1691, which contained the following opening: After setting out the various elements of the offense, the Duty of Jury charge was again repeated, as set out above. The instruction as to the Forms of Verdict was as follows: The court also gave the following instructions: We conclude that the instructions as a whole are adequate and it was not error to refuse the requested instructions because the instructions requested were adequately contained in the instructions as a whole. The judgment is affirmed. ERICKSTAD, C.J., and PEDERSON, J., concur. PAULSON, Judge (dissenting). I dissent. The record before us contains a plethora of evidence that should have raised a reasonable doubt as to Fischer's competency in the mind of the trial judge. The psychiatric report prepared by the staff of the State Hospital at Jamestown revealed that Fischer's history of abnormal mental behavior is extensive. In 1968 Fischer was hospitalized in St. Michael's Hospital in Grand Forks and was at that time considered to be suffering from a schizophrenic reaction as well as from depression. In 1972 Fischer was committed to the High Ridge Hospital in Racine, Wisconsin, and at that time exhibited "clearcut florid psychotic symptomatology", consisting of delusions and "persecutory ideation". He believed he was being followed and that the Mafia and the FBI were probably looking for him. Fischer attempted suicide at three different timestwice by shotgun and once by cutting his wrists. In support of their motion to hold a competency hearing, Fischer's counsel submitted affidavits to the trial judge further evidencing Fischer's incompetency to assist in his defense. Their three affidavits, considered together, asserted that Fischer had agreed to plead guilty to a charge of manslaughter and that, after negotiations were made and the opportunity presented to Fischer, he refused to so plead; that Fischer informed his counsel that he would testify on his own behalf, that defenses were formulated with the expectation that Fischer would so testify, that defense counsel in his opening statement informed the jury that Fischer would testify, and that, thereafter, Fischer refused to testify; that Fischer gave his counsel no rational basis for refusing to testify; that Fischer had accused his counsel of lying to him and of conspiring with the state's attorney and the police to convict him of murder in the first degree; and that, on the basis of these facts, Fischer's counsel concluded that Fischer was incompetent and unable to assist in his own defense. Despite this evidence, the trial court concluded that there existed no reasonable doubt of Fischer's competency to stand trial. This conclusion was apparently based upon the trial court's questioning of Fischer, the State Hospital staff's recommendation that Fischer was competent to stand trial, or both.[1] I do not dispute the psychiatrist's recommendation, nor do I question the fact that Fischer's responses to the trial court's questions could be construed to be those of a rational man.[2] My objection is *162 that, in making its determination that no reasonable doubt of competency existed, the trial court weighed this evidence against the contrary evidence of Fischer's mental history and the affidavits of his counsel. That this type of balancing is proscribed by the United States Constitution is made clear by a reading of the applicable federal decisions. The United States Supreme Court has decided the precise issue that we now have before us. In Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385-386, 86 S. Ct. 836, 15 L. Ed. 2d 815 (1966), the defendant was convicted of murdering his common-law wife and was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court it was urged that the defendant should have been granted a competency hearing under Illinois law, notwithstanding his counsel's failure to request such hearing. The evidence before the Illinois trial court included the uncontradicted facts that the defendant had a history of abnormal behavior, and had been confined as a psychopathic patient. It was also undisputed that the defendant, Robinson, had committed acts of violence, including the killing of his infant son, and that Robinson had also attempted suicide. In rebuttal, the State offered a stipulation that an expert witness, if called, would testify that the defendant Robinson, when examined two or three months before trial, was competent and able to assist his counsel. The trial court also questioned the defendant orally, at which time the defendant apparently appeared to be competent. On these facts, the Illinois trial court concluded that a hearing was not required. The decision of the trial court was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Illinois, under the case name People v. Robinson, 22 Ill. 2d 162, 174 N.E.2d 820 (1961). The case was then heard in the federal courts on a petition for habeas corpus. The Supreme Court of the United States held in Pate, supra 383 U.S. at 385-386, 86 S. Ct. at 842, that, on the facts presented, a hearing was required under the United States Constitution, stating: The mandate of Pate is clear: once evidence creating a reasonable doubt as to a defendant's competency is raised, a competency hearing is required. The doubt raised may not be dissipated by resort to contrary *163 evidence that may offer some indication of competency. Pate clearly controls our present determination. I can see no meaningful distinctions between the instant case and Pate. In both Pate and the instant case, the defendants had long histories of mental illnesses, including hospitalizations at mental institutions, and repeated attempted suicides. In both cases the defendants were found by psychiatrists to be competent to stand trial, notwithstanding the defendants' prior histories. In both cases the defendants were questioned by the trial judges and their respective "colloquies" with the judges indicated that the defendants appeared to be rational. If there is a material distinction between Pate and this case, it is that, in Pate, counsel for the defendant never moved to conduct a competency hearing, nor otherwise directly suggested to the trial judge that Robinson was not competent to stand trial. In the instant case, Fischer's counsel not only moved to conduct a competency hearing, but also submitted affidavits wherein they related to the trial court evidence of Fischer's incompetency to stand trial, as well as examples of his lack of cooperation with counsel. Although this circumstance is not conclusive, it is a further factor that should have raised a reasonable doubt as to Fischer's competency, and is one that makes this an even stronger case for reversal than Pate. The absence of this factor in Pate was one of the main bases for the dissent in that case.[3] Moore v. United States, 464 F.2d 663 (9th Cir. 1972), a case not discussed by the majority, further illuminates the issue before us. In Moore, the defendant pleaded guilty to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) [bank robbery]. He later sought federal collateral relief, alleging that he was incompetent at the time he entered his guilty plea. The issue before the Circuit Court of Appeals was whether the record before it revealed facts that compelled a Pate hearing. The record showed that Moore was examined by a psychiatrist shortly before his arraignment and was found to be competent to stand trial. The recommendation to proceed with trial was made even though Moore manifested abnormal mental trends at the time of examination.[4] A Federal Bureau of Prisons report was also in evidence, relating Moore's history of mental illness. No other testimony was introduced at the time of arraignment. On these facts, the Circuit Court of Appeals in Moore held that a competency hearing should have been held, and that the failure to hold a hearing deprived Moore of due process of law. The Court cited Pate as authority for its holding, and it is the Court's interpretation of Pate that is pertinent to this case. In Moore, supra 464 F.2d at 666, that Court stated: Moore makes it clear, if Pate did not, that the finding of a "reasonable doubt" as to competency is not to be made by balancing conflicting evidence. If the right to a competency hearing is to be more than a paper right, trial judges must not decide the ultimate issue of competency until after a hearing has been afforded the defendant. In Rand v. Swenson, 501 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1974), the defendant was convicted in a Missouri state court of second degree murder. After exhausting his state remedies, Rand brought an action in federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging, among other things, that he was improperly denied a psychiatric examination or hearing on the question of his competency to stand trial. The United States District Court granted relief,[5] and, on appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, the basic issue was "whether there was sufficient evidence before the state court trial judge to raise a `bona fide doubt' as to Rand's competency to stand trial". Rand, supra 501 F.2d at 395. The evidence before the state trial court consisted solely of affidavits of Rand's counsel wherein counsel related that, from their examination of hospital records, counsel had discovered that the defendant had been previously diagnosed as having mental problems, and he had previously attempted suicide. The affidavits of Rand's counsel further stated that, in counsel's opinion, formed from their own observations of Rand, Rand lacked the capacity to assist in his own defense. The record revealed in Rand that the trial judge overruled the motion for a competency hearing on the basis of his own observations of the defendant during the trial. In rejecting this as a permissible basis for denial of the motion for a competency hearing, the Court of Appeals stated, in Rand, supra 501 F.2d at 395: I recognize from a reading of Pate, Moore, and Rand, among others, that no test has yet been devised which, once applied to the facts of a particular case, will yield a precise determination of the issue now before us. As stated in Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180, 95 S. Ct. 896, 908, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103, 1975, wherein Pate was clarified and reaffirmed: Yet we do know that certain factors are deemed relevant, and Pate has prescribed the method by which these factors are to be analyzed. Quoting again from Drope, supra, 420 U.S. at 180, 95 S. Ct. at 908, the United States Supreme Court stated: Another factor that should definitely be considered is a lawyer's representations concerning the competence of his client. Drope, supra, 420 U.S. at 177-178, 95 S. Ct. at 906-907, n. 13. In the present case, we do not have one factor "standing alone". Rather, we have many indicia of Fischer's inability to aid in his defense. Fischer has a long history of severe mental problems, including institutionalizations, diagnoses of psychosis, and attempted suicides. Fischer evinced a marked lack of cooperation with his counsel and, in fact, accused his counsel of conspiring against him. His counsel made repeated representations to the trial court that, in their opinion, Fischer was not competent to aid in his defense. Whatever the perimeter of "reasonable doubt" of competency may be, the above factors surely place this case within those outer limits. Fischer's colloquies with the trial judge and the psychiatrist's report, although relevant, may not be held to dissipate this doubt. I would vacate the conviction and remand for a new trial, provided, of course, that at a proper hearing Fischer is first found to be competent to assist in his defense. VOGEL, J., concurs. [1] The trial court's reliance upon its oral examination of Fischer is evidenced by the following statement made by the court at the time it denied Fischer's motion to hold a competency hearing: "Well, I think [Fischer] understands. He seems to understand this. I have interrogated him with some of the most incisive questions that I could devise, and he seems to respond with a complete understanding." [2] It is significant to note, however, that the psychiatrist's recommendation was made approximately nine months prior to trial and stated that the defendant "should be returned to the court's jurisdiction at the earliest possible time". Considering this wording together with the diagnosis "schizophrenic reaction in remission"which, by definition, is but a temporary statethe continued validity of the recommendation at the time of trial is certainly questionable. [3] As stated in Pate, supra 383 U.S. at 391, 86 S. Ct. at 845 (Harlan, J., dissenting): "The conclusive factor is that Robinson's own lawyers, the two men who apparently had the closest contact with the defendant during the proceedings, never suggested he was incompetent to stand trial and never moved to have him examined on incompetency grounds during trial ...." [4] Although Moore may be distinguished from the present case on this groundas Fischer was in a state of "remission" at the time he was examinedthis distinction does not detract from the Circuit Court of Appeals' interpretation of Pate, which is what is relevant in the instant case. [5] Rand v. Swenson, 365 F. Supp. 1294 (E.D.Mo.1973).