Title: State of Idaho v. Kay James Kofoed Possession of methamphetamine

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 34589 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
KAY JAMES KOFOED, 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
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Boise, February 2009Term 
 
2009 Opinion No.  49 
 
Filed: April 6, 2009 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for Payette County.  The Hon. Stephen W. Drescher, District Judge. 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.  Justin M. Curtis 
argued. 
 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.  Daniel W. Bower 
argued. 
 
 
EISMANN, Chief Justice. 
 
This is an appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress alleging that law enforcement 
officers executing a search warrant did not wait long enough after knocking and announcing their 
authority and purpose.  We affirm the district court‟s denial of the motion to suppress. 
 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Based primarily upon information that he obtained on October 24 and 30, 2006, 
Detective Sergeant Huff of the Fruitland Police Department had probable cause to believe that 
methamphetamine was being manufactured in outbuildings associated with a workshop in which 
Kay Kofoed worked and resided.  On November 2, 2006, Detective Huff obtained a warrant to 
search the workshop and outbuildings for controlled substances including methamphetamine; for 
materials used to store, conceal, or package controlled substances; for any documentary or 
electronically recorded records of transactions in or a possessory interest in controlled 
 
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substances; for drug paraphernalia; for indicia of ownership, occupancy, or control of the 
premises to be searched; and for any document suggesting the manufacture, sale, distribution, or 
use of any unauthorized controlled substances. 
 
On November 3, 2006, at about 1:00 p.m., city and county law enforcement officers 
executed the search warrant.  Two officers walked up to the door of the workshop and knocked 
on it.  After waiting about two seconds, one of them announced, “Sheriff‟s Office, search 
warrant!”  They then heard a sound like something was dropped or kicked and then footsteps 
moving quickly away from the door.  The announcing officer opened the unlocked door and 
entered the workshop, where they encountered Kofoed.  The time lapse between the officer 
announcing his authority and purpose and his opening of the door was about four seconds. 
 
Based upon evidence found during the search, Kofoed was charged with felony 
possession of methamphetamine.  He moved to suppress the evidence found during the search on 
several grounds, including that the officers‟ failure to wait longer after knocking and announcing 
their authority and purpose violated Idaho‟s “knock and announce” statutes1 and the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  The district court held that there were exigent 
circumstances that justified any alleged violation of the knock and announce requirement.  The 
court found that when the officers “heard sounds that indicated people were quickly moving 
away from the door, it was reasonable for them to believe that evidence was being, or was about 
to be, destroyed, thereby creating exigent circumstances that justified the officers‟ hurried entry 
into the building.”  The court denied Kofoed‟s motion to suppress. 
 
After the denial of the motion to suppress, Kofoed entered into a plea agreement under 
which Kofoed agreed to plead guilty and reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to 
suppress.  He later pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine and was sentenced to four 
years in the custody of the Idaho Board of Correction, with one and one-half years fixed and two 
and one-half years indeterminate.  The court retained jurisdiction for one hundred eighty days.  
Kofoed then timely appealed. 
 
                                                 
1 Idaho Code § 19-4409 provides: 
Service of warrant – Breaking open doors.  The officer may break open any outer or 
inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house, or any thing therein, to execute the 
warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance. 
 
 
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II.  ANALYSIS 
The issue on appeal is whether the officers violated the Fourth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States by failing to wait longer before entering the workshop to 
execute the search warrant.2  In Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995), the United States 
Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment incorporates the common-law rule requiring 
officers entering a dwelling to knock on the door and announce their identity and purpose before 
attempting forcible entry.  The interests protected by the rule are avoiding violence that may 
result from a resident being surprised by an unannounced entry, giving the resident an 
opportunity to avoid damage to the property that could result from forced entry, and protecting 
privacy by giving residents an opportunity to prepare themselves for the police entry.  Hudson v. 
Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006). 
“In order to justify a „no-knock‟ entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that 
knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous 
or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing 
the destruction of evidence.”  Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997).  The showing 
required for a reasonable suspicion is not high; it is less than probable cause.  Id. 
  Even if there are no circumstances justifying a “no-knock” entry when the police arrive, 
those circumstances may develop after the officers knock and announce their identity and 
purpose.  United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 38 (2003).  “[T]here is no reason to treat a post-
knock exigency differently from the no-knock counterpart.”  Id. at 40.  Once they have knocked 
and announced, the officers could reasonably suspect that persons in the premises would know of 
the officers‟ presence and purpose.  The issue then becomes what would be a reasonable waiting 
time before making a forcible entry.  Id. at 39.  That determination is made based upon the facts 
known to the police at the time, not upon 20/20 hindsight.  Id. 
                                                 
2 In his motion to suppress, Kofoed stated that the basis of the motion was, “The evidence was seized 
pursuant to an invalid search warrant and in violation of Defendant‟s Constitutional rights as more fully set out in 
the attached Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress.”  In his supporting memorandum, Kofoed wrote that 
he brought the motion to suppress “for violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United 
States Constitution and his rights under Idaho Constitution Article I, Section 17.”  With respect to the alleged knock-
and-announce violation, Kofoed cited the Fourth Amendment and stated that the officer‟s conduct violated “this 
State‟s knock and announce statute.”  His only other mention of the Idaho Constitution in his memorandum was in 
support of his argument that the search warrant was invalid.  Kofoed did not argue below that either Article I, § 17, 
of the Idaho Constitution or Idaho Code § 19-4409 provide greater protection than the Fourth Amendment. 
 
 
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If there are exigent circumstances, a reasonable wait time is not determined by how long 
it would take someone in the residence to answer the door after the police knocked.  Id. at 40.  If 
the police claim there was an exigency justifying their actions, then the inquiry is whether the 
police had reasonable suspicion that the exigency existed and, if so, what wait time would be 
reasonable in light of that exigency.  Id. at 37-40.  “Once the exigency ha[s] matured, the officers 
[are] not bound to learn anything more or wait any longer before going in, even though their 
entry entail[s] some harm to the building.”  Id. at 40. 
In this case, the exigency claimed was that the persons present in the workshop may 
destroy evidence.  Thus, the inquiry is whether the officers could reasonably suspect that 
someone in the workshop may attempt to destroy evidence and how long the officers could 
reasonably suspect it would take to do so.  Id.  Because the exigency justifies an entry to prevent 
the destruction of evidence, a reasonable wait time would be less than the time the officers 
reasonably suspected it would take to do so.  In denying the motion to suppress, the district court 
found as follows: 
In this case the warrant was executed close to noon, when people would normally 
be up and about.  However, the officers could not be sure of the amount of drugs 
or other evidence that would be present.  Thus, when they heard sounds that 
indicated people were quickly moving away from the door, it was reasonable for 
them to believe that evidence was being, or was about to be, destroyed, thereby 
creating exigent circumstances that justified the officers‟ hurried entry into the 
building.  As the officers‟ entry was justified based on the exigent circumstances, 
the evidence discovered as a result thereof should not be excluded. 
 
After the officers knocked and announced that they were from the sheriff‟s office and had 
a search warrant, they heard people moving quickly away from the door.  They could reasonably 
suspect that those persons would attempt to destroy evidence.  The purpose of the search warrant 
was to obtain controlled substances, including methamphetamine, and other evidence related to 
the manufacture, use, or sale of that drug.  The officers could reasonably suspect that the time it 
would take to dispose of or destroy evidence would be quite short.  For example, in Richards v. 
Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997), several police officers went to the defendant‟s motel room to 
execute a search warrant for drugs and related paraphernalia.  The lead officer was dressed as a 
maintenance man, but one of the officers accompanying him was in uniform.  The lead officer 
knocked on the door and stated he was a maintenance man.  With the chain still on the door, the 
defendant cracked it open.  When he saw the officer in uniform standing behind the lead officer, 
the defendant slammed the door shut.  The officers waited two or three seconds before kicking 
 
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and ramming the door to force it open.  As they were kicking the door in, they announced that 
they were police officers.  When they finally broke into the room, they saw the defendant 
attempting to escape through a window.  The Supreme Court held that the officers‟ no-knock 
entry into the motel room did not violate the Fourth Amendment.  It reasoned, “These actual 
circumstance – petitioner‟s apparent recognition of the officers combined with the easily 
disposable nature of the drugs – justified the officers‟ ultimate decision to enter without first 
announcing their presence and authority.”  520 U.S. at 396. 
Kofoed argues that there was no exigency in this case because the officers suspected that 
he was manufacturing methamphetamine, and it would take longer to dispose of evidence of 
manufacturing than to dispose of the drug itself.  He also argues that they had no knowledge of 
the quantity of drugs on the premises and therefore would not know how long it would take to 
dispose of all of the drugs.  These arguments are unavailing for two reasons.  First, the 
manufacturing was suspected to be occurring in the outbuildings, not in the workshop where 
Kofoed lived.  More importantly, “[s]uspects have no constitutional right to destroy or dispose of 
evidence.”  Kerr v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 39 (1963).  The exigency permitting noncompliance 
with the knock-and-announce rule is not intended merely to prevent the destruction of every 
shred of evidence located in the premises.  The police do not have to wait at the door in order to 
give the suspect time to destroy some of the evidence.  In stating this exigency, the Supreme 
Court wrote that it is not necessary to knock and announce “if there is „reason to believe that 
evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were given.‟”  Hudson v. Michigan, 547 
U.S. 586, 589 (2006).  It did not quantify the amount of evidence that there must be reason to 
believe would likely be destroyed. 
In this case, the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.  We therefore 
affirm the judgment. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
 
 
Justices BURDICK, J. JONES, W. JONES and HORTON CONCUR.