Title: Waste Management of Nevada, Inc. v. West Taylor Street, LLC

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

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135 Nev., Advance Opinion 4a
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

 

 

WASTE MANAGEMENT OF NEVADA, No. 74876

INC.,

Appellant

oe FILED

WEST TAYLOR STREET, LLC, A

LIMITED LIABILITY COMP: JUN 27 2013

Respondent. ELIE ono
™ Bae

Appeal from a final judgment in a declaratory relief action.
Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Connie J. Steinheimer,
Judge.

Reversed and remanded.

‘Simons Law, PC, and Mark G. Simons, Reno,
for Appellant.

C. Nicholas Pereos, Ltd., and C. Nicholas Pereos, Reno,
for Respondent.

Peterson Baker, PLLC, and Tamara Beatty Peterson and Nikki L. Baker,

Las Vegas,
for Amicus Curiae.

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.

1A-271Uo

 
em ee

 

OPINION
By the Court, GIBBONS, C.J.:

In 2005, the Nevada Legislature enacted the garbage lien
statute to give waste collection companies a method for collecting
delinquent payments for their services. See NRS 444.520. For the first
we are asked to interpret this statute and the procedures required to perfect
and foreclose on a garbage lien. This dispute focuses on whether NRS
444.520(3)s reference to the mechanics’ lien statute incorporates only the

  

ime,

mechanics’ lien statute's procedural requirements for foreclosure, as set
forth in NRS 108.239. Or, rather, if that reference to the mechanics’ lien
statute also incorporates the requirements for perfecting a lien, as set forth
in NRS 108,226. Additionally, we are asked to determine if the perpetual
nature of the garbage lien means that the foreclosure of a garbage lien is
not subject to a statute of limitations. We hold that the reference to the
mechanics’ lien statute in NRS 444.520(3) incorporates only the mechanics’
lien statute's procedural requirements for foreclosure. We also hold that no
limitations period applies to the foreclosure of a garbage lien.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Respondent West Taylor Street, LLC, is the owner of a duplex
in Reno. This duplex has two addresses, and each address has a waste
service account with appellant Waste Management of Nevada, Inc. At some
point, both of these waste services accounts became delinquent. As a result,
Waste Management filed three notices of liens against the property. West
Taylor filed a complaint with the district court asking, among other things,
for declaratory relief. West Taylor alleged that Waste Management did not
properly follow the lien perfection requirements under NRS 108.226, which
West Taylor argued the Legislature incorporated by reference into the
garbage lien statute. West Taylor filed a motion for partial summary

 

 
 

judgment as to this issue. The district court granted West Taylor's motion
for summary judgment, holding that the lien perfection requirements
outlined in NRS 108.226 applied to the garbage lien statute. Therefore, the
district court held that Waste Management did not properly record the lien
because it failed to record it within 90 days of the completion of the work.
‘The district court also held, in the alternative, that Waste Management
could no longer foreclose on its liens because a two-year limitations period
applied to the foreclosing on garbage liens. As a result of this ruling, Waste
Management voluntarily released all three of its liens against the property.
‘The parties proceeded to litigate other claims, until West Taylor voluntarily
dismissed those claims. Waste Management now challenges the grant of
summary judgment in West Taylor's favor as to the recordation of the liens.
DISCUSSION

This case is not moot

As an initial matter, we address West Taylor's argument that
this matter is moot because Waste Management released the three liens.
As a general rule, this court will decline to hear any case in which there is
no actual controversy. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev. v. Nevadans for
Sound Gov't, 120 Nev. 712, 720, 100 P.3d 179, 186 (2004) (“[T]he duty of
every judicial tribunal is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which
‘can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or
abstract propositions, or to declare principles of law which cannot affect the
matter in issue before it.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). ‘Therefore,
if a case comes before this court when there is no actual controversy, even
if the case had a live controversy at the outset, then we will dismiss the case
as moot. Personhood Nev. v. Bristol, 126 Nev. 599, 602, 245 P.3d 572, 574
(2010) (holding that a case has to have an actual controversy during “all
stages of the proceeding” or it would be dismissed as moot). Because the

3

 
district court’s order granting summary judgment prevents Waste
Management from refiling its garbage liens against West Taylor, we
conclude that there is still a live controversy, and the case is not moot.

The plain language of NRS 444.520(3) incorporates only the foreclosure
procedures from the mechanics’ lien statutes

We review questions of statutory construction de novo. Tam v.
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 181 Nev. 792, 799, 358 P.3d 234, 240 (2015).
“If the plain meaning of a statute is clear on its face, then {this court] will
not go beyond the language of the statute to determine its meaning.” Beazer
Homes Nev., Inc. v. Bighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 575, 579-80, 97
P.3d 1132, 1135 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in
original). When a statute is clear on its face, this court gives the statute's,
plain language its “ordinary meaning.” UMC Physicians’ Bargaining Unit
of Nev. Serv. Emps. Union v. Nev. Serv. Emps. Union /SEIU Local 1107, 124
Nev. 84, 88, 178 P.3d 709, 712 (2008). Ifa statute is ambiguous, meaning
that it is susceptible to multiple “natural or honest interpretationls],” then
this court will look beyond that statute to determine its meaning. Tam, 131
Nev. at 799, 358 P.3d at 240.

‘The plain meaning of NRS 444.520(3) is clear on its face. NRS
444.520(8) states:

Until paid, any fee or charge levied pursuant to
subsection 1 constitutes a perpetual lien against
the property served, superior to all liens, claims
and titles other than liens for general taxes and
special assessments. The lien is not extinguished
by the sale of any property on account of
nonpayment of any other lien, claim or title, except
liens for general taxes and special assessments.
‘The lien may be foreclosed in the same manner as,
provided for the foreclosure of mechanics’ liens.

 

 
Based on the definition of foreclosure, the statute's meaning is clear on its
face as to which provision of the mechanics’ lien statutes is incorporated
into the garbage lien statute. “Foreclosure” is defined as ‘[a) legal
proceeding to terminate a mortgagor's interest in a property
instituted . .. either to gain title or to force a sale to satisfy the unpaid debt
secured by the property.” Foreclosure, Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004)
(emphasis added). Under this definition, the ordinary meaning of the word
“foreclosure” involves the actual legal proceeding itself and not the
prerequisites of establishing the garbage lien and perfecting it. Therefore,
to foreclose on a garbage lien, the lien holder must follow the foreclosure
procedure established in the mechanics’ lien statutes, which is outlined in
RS 108.239. Based on the statute's plain meaning, the only provision of
the mechanics’ lien statutes incorporated into NRS 444.520 is NRS 108.239.

‘Therefore, the district court erred in incorporating into NRS
444.520 the perfection requirements under the mechanics’ lien statute as
outlined in NRS 108.226, which is separate from NRS 108.239's foreclosure
procedures, NRS 444.520(3) references mechanics’ liens in the foreclosure
context, not in the context of recording or perfecting a garbage lien.
Further, NRS 444.520(4) already provides a method of perfecting a garbage
lien. ‘Thus, under the plain language of the garbage lien statute, the
perfection requirements of the mechanics’ lien statute, or any other

requirements that do not involve the foreclosure of a mechanics’ lien, are
not incorporated. The district court erred when it incorporated anything
beyond NRS 108.239 into the garbage lien statute. Accordingly, we hold
that the district court erred in concluding that Waste Management needed
to record its lien within 90 days of completing the work in accordance with
NRS 108.226, and we reverse the district court’s order on this ground.

 

 

 
‘The district court erred by concluding that there is a two-year statute of
limitations to foreclose on garbage liens

Next, we address whether a statute of limitations applies to
garbage liens, as the district court concluded that even if Waste
Management had properly perfected its liens, it would be required to
foreclose on those liens within two years. To determine whether there is an
applicable limitations period for the foreclosure of a garbage lien, we again
turn to the text of the statute,

RS 444.520(3) provides that “{ulntil paid, any fee or charge
levied pursuant to subsection 1 constitutes a perpetual lien against the
property served, superior to all liens, claims and titles other than liens for
general taxes and special assessments.” (Emphasis added.) “Perpetual” is,
defined as “lasting for eternity: never ending.” Perpetual, Webster's II New
College Dictionary (2011). Under a plain reading of the statute, the lien
against the property should last until the debt is paid. Perpetual liens,
while unusual, are not uncommon in the context of tax or assessment law.
See 85 C.J.S. Taxation § 970 (“The duration of a tax lien is generally
governed by statute and, ordinarily, a tax lien continues until the tax is paid
or the property is sold for the tax.”). States that have enacted perpetual
liens have generally held that the liens last forever, and the ability to
foreclose upon these liens is not limited by a general statute of limitations.
See, e.g., James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 132 (1972) (“Florida's recoupment
law has no statute of limitations and the State is deemed to have a

 

 

perpetual lien against the defendant's real and personal property and
estate.”); Forman Realty Corp. v. Brenza, 144 N.E.24 623, 628 (Ill. 1957)
(“The purpose of this statute is to make taxes a lien superior to all other
liens without regard to priority in point of time and to continue such liens
without limitation of time until taxes are paid. . .."); Swingley v. Riechoff,

 

 

 

 
112 P.2d 1075, 1079 (Mont. 1941) (“The government's lien for taxes is based
upon express statutory provision, and is a perpetual lien against which no
statute of limitations ean successfully be interposed.”).

While the district court agreed that the garbage lien was
perpetual, and that therefore the six-month statute of limitations in the
mechanics’ lien statute did not apply, it went on to conclude that the two-
year statute of limitations under NRS 11.190(4)(b) applied. To support this
proposition, the district court relied on an early case from this court, State
v. Yellow Jacket Silver Mining Co., 14 Nev. 220 (1879). In that case, this
court held that a tax lien could be perpetual, but the remedy of foreclosure
was subject to a statute of limitations. Id. at 232.

However, the reasoning underlying this conclusion in Yellow
Jacket is outdated, and therefore we decline to apply it here. See Bryan A.
Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent 178 (2016) (“(Plrecedents
become obsolete if the conditions or facts that existed when they were
rendered are different or no longer exist, or if the underlying rationale is no
longer sound.”). In Yellow Jacket, this court, following California law,
reasoned that the remedy of foreclosure could expire under the statute of
limitations, but the obligation of the debt could remain. See id. at 232. (“A
mortgage debt is not destroyed or extinguished by the statute of imitations.
‘The remedy only is taken away.” (citing McCormick v. Brown, 36 Cal, 180,
185 (1868). However, separating the foreclosure remedy from its
underlying debt is paradoxical, and as such, many states have rejected the

INRS 11.190(4\(b) provides two years for bringing actions “upon a
statute for a penalty or forfeiture, where the action is given to a person or
the State, or both, except when the statute imposing it prescribes a different
limitation.”

 

 
notion that the debt may be separated from the foreclosure remedy. Nancy
Saint-Paul, Distinction Between Mortgage Lien and Mortgage Debt,
Clearing Land Titles § 6:2 (3d ed. 2018); see also Cal. Civ. Code § 2911(1)
(climinating the separation of the underlying debt from the foreclosure
remedy). Nevada, like other states, has moved toward eliminating this
separation under the “one action rule,” which states that “[tJhere may be
but one action for the recovery of any debt, or for the enforcement of any
right secured by a mortgage or other lien upon real estate.” NRS 40.4301);
see also McDonald v. D.P. Alexander & Las Vegas Boulevard, LLC, 121 Nev.
812, 816, 123 P.3d 748, 751 (2005). Therefore, given that the underlying
rationale for separating the remedy from the lien is outdated, we decline to
follow the rule outlined in Yellow Jacket.

‘The plain language of NRS 444.520(3) indicates that the lien is,
perpetual, and therefore the remedy of foreclosure must also be perpetual.
As another court has held regarding perpetual liens, “it is impossible to
believe that the legislature meant to subject this lien, and the right to
enforce it, to any limitation law; for then we would witness the anomalous
condition, presented by a perpetual lien . . . without any power in the public
to make such lien available.” Wells Cty. v. McHenry, 74 N.W. 241, 248 (N.D.
1898). As that court aptly observed, “la) lien that cannot be enforced is no
lien at all.” Id.

Accordingly, we hold that the district court properly concluded
that garbage liens are perpetual but erred in applying both the lien

perfection requirements set forth in NRS 108.226 and the two-year statute
of limitations set forth in NRS 11.190(4Xb) to the foreclosure of those liens
under NRS 444.520. Since a garbage lien is perpetual, it is not subject to a
statute of limitations. Therefore, a municipal waste management company

 

 
may foreclose upon such a lien at any time so long as it properly perfects
the lien under NRS 444.520(4). Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the
district court and remand this case to the district court for further

consideration consistent with this opinion.

CJ.
Gibbons.
We concur:
i »
Pickering
(hunter, 3
‘desty
J.

Parraguirre