Title: Matter of Adoption of MSVW

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matter of Adoption of MSVW1998 WY 134965 P.2d 1158Case Number: C-98-2Decided: 10/21/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

In the 
Matter of the Petition for ADOPTION OF MSVW, a minor child: LVW, Appellant 
(Petitioner),

v.

J and JR, Appellees 
(Respondents).

 

Appeal from the District Court, 
Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J.

 

Cheryl Wadas, Cheyenne, 
for Appellees.

Stacey L. Best and Mark A. 
Bishop of Bishop Law Offices, Cheyenne, for 
Appellees.

 

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and 
TAYLOR,* JJ.

 * Chief Justice at time of 
conference.

 

MACY, 
Justice.

 [¶1] Appellant LVW (the natural father) appeals from 
the district court's order that granted a summary judgment in favor of Appellees 
J (the mother) and JR (the adoptive father) and denied the natural father's 
motion for a summary judgment. The district court's order effectively upheld the 
adoptive father's adoption of MSVW (the child).

 

[¶2] We 
affirm.

 

                                 
            ISSUES

 

[¶3] The natural father 
presents the following issues for our review:

 

I. 
Did the trial court err in denying Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
the issue of defective service of process?

 

A. 
Is due diligence required for proper service when constructive service is used 
in adoption cases?

 

B. 
If a party fails to file an accurate affidavit as prescribed by W.R.C.P. 4(f) 
and Wyo. Stat. § 1-22-107, does this deprive the trial court of personal 
jurisdiction over Appellant or in the alternative void the 
service?

 

C. 
Even if due diligence had not been used, and the proper affidavit is not filed, 
is improper service of process cured by an entry of 
appearance?

 

II. Is a hearing statutorily mandated in all adoption 
proceedings and does failure to conduct a hearing render the order of Adoption 
void pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(b)(4)?

 

A. 
Does execution of a consent to adoption deprive the Appellant of standing to 
appear at the hearing to revoke his consent?

 

                                              
FACTS

 

[¶4] The child was born on 
December 20, 1991. The mother and the natural father apparently lived together 
for awhile and parted in October 1993. The mother married the adoptive father in 
May 1994, and, shortly thereafter, the adoptive father petitioned to adopt the 
child. The mother consented to the adoption and averred that she was not sure 
about the identity of the child's biological father because she had sexual 
relations with three men at or near the time of the child's conception. The 
mother swore further that she could not locate any of the men who were the 
child's potential biological fathers. The adoptive father subsequently effected 
service of process by publishing a 
notification of the adoption petition.

 

[¶5] One of the natural 
father's friends informed him that a notification of the adoption petition had 
been published, and the natural father sent a lengthy letter to the clerk of the 
district court. Although the letter was somewhat confusing, the natural father 
did state that he waived his rights to the child. On November 3, 1994, the 
natural father filed an affidavit with the district court, consenting to the 
adoption of the child. A hearing to consider the adoptive father's petition was 
scheduled for December 19, 1994; however, the district court canceled the 
hearing because the natural father had consented to the adoption and the mother 
and the adoptive father had relocated to another state. The district court 
approved the adoptive father's adoption of the child on November 29, 
1994.

 

[¶6] On March 12, 1997, the 
natural father moved to set aside both his consent to the adoption and the 
adoption. The mother and the adoptive father responded to the natural father's 
motion. The parties filed opposing motions for a summary judgment, and the 
district court held a hearing on October 16, 1997, to consider the motions. The 
district court granted the mother and the adoptive father's motion for a summary 
judgment and denied the natural father's motion. The natural father subsequently 
perfected his appeal to the Wyoming 
Supreme Court.

 

                                           
DISCUSSION

 

A. Appealability of the Denial of the Motion for a 
Summary Judgment

 

[¶7] The natural father 
contends that the district court erred by denying his motion for a summary 
judgment. Before we consider the merits of this case, we must determine whether 
the case is properly before us. The general rule is that a denial of a motion 
for a summary judgment is not an appealable final order. Lawson v. Garcia, 912 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Wyo. 1996). The purpose of this rule is to prevent piecemeal 
litigation. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Peaton, 168 Ariz. 
184, 812 P.2d 1002, 1012 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990); see also Knudson v. Hilzer, 551 P.2d 680, 685 n. 3 (Wyo. 1976). The Wyoming Supreme Court has, however, 
recognized at least one exception to the general rule. "[D]enial of a motion for 
summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity is an appealable final 
order." Lawson, 912 P.2d  at 1138.

 

[¶8] Many courts recognize 
an additional exception to the general rule that the denial of a motion for a 
summary judgment is not subject to appeal. See R.F. Chase, Annotation, 
Reviewability of Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment, 15 A.L.R.3d § 9[b] 
(1967).

 

Where opposing motions for summary judgment have 
resulted in the court's denying one and granting the other, a number of cases 
have held that the party whose motion was denied may have this denial reviewed 
on the appeal from the order granting the other motion for summary 
judgment.

 

Id. at 925. This subject has 
also been addressed in a famous series of treatises: "[I]f the trial court's 
order denying summary judgment is coupled with the grant of summary judgment to 
the opponent, both decisions are immediately appealable." 10A CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER AND MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
2715 at 268 (3d ed. 1998). The Colorado Supreme Court has ruled that an order 
denying a motion for a summary judgment is subject to appeal when the lower 
court also grants the opposing party's motion for a summary judgment and the 
lower court's order "effectively put[s] an end to the litigation without further ruling by 
the court." Glennon Heights, Inc. v. Central Bank & Trust, 658 P.2d 872, 875 
(Colo. 1983) (en banc). See also Peaton, 812 P.2d  at 1012.

 

[¶9] Allowing an appeal from 
a denial of a motion for a summary judgment in this limited situation is 
consistent with W.R.A.P. 1.05 and our cases that have applied that rule. 
W.R.A.P. 1.05 states in pertinent part:

 

          
An appealable order is:

 

(a) An order affecting a substantial right in an 
action, when such order, in effect, determines the action and prevents a 
judgment; or

 

(b) An order affecting a substantial right made in a 
special proceeding; or

 

(c) An order made upon a summary application in an 
action after judgment . . .

 

In Park County v. Cooney, 
845 P.2d 346, 349 (Wyo. 1992), we quoted W.R.A.P. 1.05 and stated that "a final 
order from which appeal may be taken is one which 'determines the merits of the 
controversy and leaves nothing for future consideration.' Public Serv. Comm'n v. 
Lower Valley Power and Light, Inc., 608 P.2d 660, 661 (Wyo. 1980)." We conclude, 
therefore, that, when the district court grants one party's motion for a summary 
judgment and denies the opposing party's motion for a summary judgment and the 
district court's decision completely resolves the case, both the grant and the 
denial of the motions for a summary judgment are subject to appeal. If we were 
to refuse appeals in such cases, the unsuccessful party would be denied an 
opportunity to have his case reviewed by this Court.

 

[¶10] The parties in this 
case filed opposing motions for a summary judgment. The district court disposed 
of the entire case in a single order by denying the natural father's motion and 
granting the mother and the adoptive father's motion. We hold that the natural 
father is entitled to have appellate review of the district court's 
order.

 

B. Standard of Review

 

[¶11] Our review of the 
district court's decision in this case is limited to issues of law. We do not 
accord special deference to the district court's decisions on matters of law. 
Rist v. Taylor, 955 P.2d 436, 437 (Wyo. 1998); Nylen v. Dayton, 770 P.2d 1112, 
1114 (Wyo. 1989).

 

C. Personal Jurisdiction Over the Natural 
Father

 

[¶12] The natural father 
maintains that the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over him in 
the original adoption proceeding because the adoptive father did not follow the 
proper procedures in serving him with process. The district court determined 
that the natural father waived his right to challenge the service of process 
when he appeared in the case without questioning the propriety of the service of 
process.

 

[¶13] In order for a court 
to acquire personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant must be 
properly served with process or he must voluntarily appear in the matter. Pease 
Brothers, Inc. v. American Pipe & Supply Co., 522 P.2d 996, 1000 (Wyo. 
1974). A judgment that has been entered without the court having jurisdiction 
over the defendant is null and void. Id. A defendant may waive his right to 
challenge a court's jurisdiction over him. W.R.C.P. 12(h)(1); State ex rel. 
Sheehan v. District Court of Fourth Judicial District, in and for Johnson County, 426 P.2d 431, 435 (Wyo. 
1967). "[T]he general rule [is] that it is necessary to question [the] 
jurisdiction of the court over the person at the earliest opportunity, failing 
in which the defense will be considered waived." Pease Brothers, Inc., 522 P.2d  
at 1002. When a defendant voluntarily appears without questioning the court's 
personal jurisdiction over him, his appearance is the equivalent of proper 
service of process. Id.

 

[¶14] In the instant case, 
the adoption petition and the mother's affidavit stated that the natural 
father's location was not known. The adoptive father attempted to serve the 
natural father with process by publishing a notice of the adoption proceeding. 
After his friend sent the published notice to him, the natural father filed a 
lengthy letter with the district court. In that letter, he stated that he waived 
his rights to the child. In contradiction to the adoption petition, the mother's 
affidavit, and the published notification, the natural father claimed that the 
mother was, in fact, aware of his location. The natural father argues that his 
letter should have been construed as being "an attempt to question the service of process 
by publication."

 

[¶15] The natural father's 
letter stated that the mother knew where he was; however, it did not state that 
he contested the propriety of the service of process or the district court's 
jurisdiction over his person. The natural father subsequently filed a sworn 
affidavit consenting to the adoptive father's adoption of the child. Again, the 
natural father's affidavit did not contain an objection to the district court's 
jurisdiction. To the contrary, the natural father expressly acquiesced to the 
district court's scheduling of the matter for a hearing. We conclude that the 
natural father voluntarily appeared in the adoption proceeding and waived his 
right to contest the validity of the service of process. The district court, 
therefore, had personal jurisdiction over him.

 

D. Validity of the Final Adoption 
Decree

 

[¶16] The natural father 
claims that the district court erred by denying his motion for relief from the 
judgment under W.R.C.P. 60(b)(4).1 He argues that the adoption decree 
was void because the district court violated the adoption statutes when it 
failed to hold a hearing on the adoption. The district court determined that the 
natural father waived his right to attend a hearing when he consented to the 
adoption. The district court stated in its order that, once the natural father 
signed the consent, he "had no standing to attend the proceedings, so his due 
process rights were not violated and the absence of a hearing [did] not affect 
this [c]ourt's subject matter jurisdiction."

 

[¶17] In the usual case, 
granting a motion for relief under W.R.C.P. 60(b) is a matter within the 
district court's discretion, and this Court limits its review to whether the 
district court abused its discretion. State ex rel. TRL by Avery v. RLP, 772 P.2d 1054, 1057 (Wyo. 1989). In cases such as this, however, where the judgment 
is challenged under W.R.C.P. 60(b)(4), the district court is not allowed to 
exercise its discretion. Id. The judgment is either valid or void, and, "once 
the question of its validity is resolved, the [district] court must act 
accordingly." Id.

 

[¶18] The party who is 
seeking to have an order vacated pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) has the burden of 
establishing his right to have that relief. JW v. State ex rel. Laramie County 
Department of Public Assistance and Social Services (In re WM), 778 P.2d 1106, 
1110 (Wyo. 1989). A judgment is considered to be void only under very limited 
circumstances. Id. A party who is claiming that a judgment is void must show 
that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the parties or the subject 
matter of the controversy or that it acted in a manner that was inconsistent 
with due process. Id.

 

[¶19] Adoption was not known 
at common law; therefore, our statutes set out the exclusive procedures that 
have to be followed to accomplish an adoption. PR v. Shannon (Parental Rights to 
TR), 777 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Wyo. 1989). Adoption statutes are subject to strict 
construction, and adoption proceedings must be conducted in substantial 
compliance with the relevant statutes. Id. The natural father maintains that the 
adoption statutes mandated that a hearing be held and that he was entitled to 
attend the hearing. He suggests that, if he had attended a hearing, he would 
have revoked his consent to the adoption on the basis of fraud and 
duress.

 

[¶20] WYO. STAT. ANN. § 
1-22-106 (1997) directs the district court to set an adoption petition for 
hearing when it is filed. The only persons who may attend the hearing, however, 
are "court officials, parties to the proceeding, counsel, nonconsenting parents, 
the nonconsenting putative father of the child and witnesses." WYO. STAT. ANN. § 
1-22-105 (1997). By specifically stating that nonconsenting parents and 
nonconsenting putative fathers are allowed to attend the adoption hearing, but 
not including consenting parents or consenting putative fathers on the list of 
persons who are allowed to attend the hearing, the legislature clearly permitted 
only those persons who had a continuing 
stake in the proceedings to appear. Consistent with § 1-22-105, this Court has 
determined that, once the issue of consent has been resolved, the natural father 
is "a stranger to the adoption proceedings." PAA v. Doe (Adoption of RHA), 702 P.2d 1259, 1264 (Wyo. 1985). The district court was, therefore, correct when it 
determined that, because the natural father had consented to the adoption, he 
did not have standing to request or attend a hearing on the merits of the 
adoption.

 

[¶21] Throughout his 
argument, the natural father insists that he had the right to attend the hearing 
so that he could have the opportunity to revoke his consent on the basis of 
fraud and duress. The fatal error in the natural father's argument is that he 
did not indicate, in any way, to the district court that he intended to revoke 
his consent until March 12, 1997, when he moved to set aside both his consent to 
the adoption and the adoption. The natural father filed his motion more than two 
years after the final adoption decree was entered. If the natural father had 
made his claim prior to the entry of the final adoption decree, he would have 
been entitled to attend a hearing and contest the validity of his consent. WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 1-22-109(d) (1997).2 Additionally, W.R.C.P. 60(b) gave 
the natural father up to one year after the adoption decree had been entered to 
challenge the validity of his consent on the ground that it had been obtained by 
fraud. The natural father's attempt to revoke his consent and vacate the final 
adoption decree more than two years after the district court entered the decree 
was untimely. The district court properly determined that the natural father was 
not entitled to be relieved from the adoption decree.

 

[¶22] 
Affirmed.

 

 

FOOTNOTES

1 
W.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) states: "On motion, and upon such terms as are just, the court 
may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (4) the judgment is 
void."

  

2 Section 
1-22-109(d) states in pertinent part:

 "Consent 
to adoption and the relinquishment of a child for adoption are irrevocable 
unless obtained by fraud or duress."