Title: Miller v.Reynolds, et al.

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JOHN E. MILLER, 
 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
BRIAN REYNOLDS, BRUCE 
BURTON, PERRY PHELPS, 
 
Defendants Below- 
Appellees. 
§ 
§  No. 633, 2015 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  C.A. No. N14C-06-083 
§   
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: March 4, 2016 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: May 9, 2016 
 
Before HOLLAND, VALIHURA, and VAUGHN, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 9th day of May 2016, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs 
and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, John Miller, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s final order, dated November 18, 2015, which denied reargument of 
its November 5, 2015 order granting summary judgment to the appellees on 
Miller’s complaint challenging a prison disciplinary hearing.  Miller is an 
inmate incarcerated at the Vaughn Correctional Center (“VCC”).  The 
appellees are employed by the Department of Correction (“DOC”). We find 
 
2 
no merit to Miller’s appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court’s 
judgment. 
(2) 
The record reflects that Miller obtained a $6540 default 
judgment from the Justice of the Peace Court against a former inmate, 
Robert Dorn.  Miller transferred the default judgment to the Superior Court 
in Civil Action No. S12J-05-282 and sought to execute on it by filing a lien 
against Dorn’s real property.  On February 15, 2013, the Superior Court held 
a hearing on Dorn’s motion to stay the scheduled Sheriff’s sale of his 
property.  Both Miller and Dorn appeared at the hearing.   
(3) 
During the course of that proceeding, the Superior Court asked 
Miller why Dorn owed him money.  Miller explained that he and Dorn had 
entered into a contract while they were both in prison together.  Miller 
explained that he contracted to “look[] out for [Dorn’s] best interests and, 
you know, other items that came up.  I wouldn’t call it protection, body 
guard services.  The man is a handful, to say the least.”1  Miller stated on the 
record that he explained to Dorn that if Dorn did not want his help, Dorn had 
the option to go into protective custody or he could rely on the prison guards 
to protect him, but Dorn chose to “man-up and stay out on the compound 
                                                 
1 Hearing Transcript at 3, Miller v. Dorn, C.A. No. S12-05-282 (Del. Super. Feb. 15, 
2013). 
 
3 
and around … all the inmates.”2  When the Superior Court questioned the 
legitimacy of such a contract, Miller stated that “it is for a fact, it’s against 
the rules for inmates to enter into contracts, but I didn’t find anything that 
made it illegal or against the law.”3 
(4) 
After some discussion on the record, Dorn agreed to write 
Miller a check for $3200 in settlement of Miller’s default judgment.  The 
Superior Court stayed the Sheriff’s sale of Dorn’s property.  Because Miller 
was not permitted to carry Dorn’s check back into the prison, Miller asked 
the Superior Court to mail the check to the warden of the prison with a letter 
from the judge explaining the situation so the warden would deposit the 
check into Miller’s account for him.  After the warden received the letter 
from the Superior Court judge enclosing the check from Dorn to Miller, the 
DOC opened an investigation into the circumstances regarding Miller’s 
judgment against Dorn. 
(5) 
On April 17, 2013, DOC Lieutenant Frank Kromka received a 
copy of the transcript of the February 15, 2013 hearing in Miller v. Dorn.  
As a result of that transcript, Kromka filed an incident report the same day 
charging Dorn with violating multiple DOC rules, including “extortion, 
                                                 
2 Id. at 4. 
3 Id. 
 
4 
blackmail, or protection” and “bartering.”  Kromka also filed a 
corresponding disciplinary report.  Miller signed a copy of that report the 
same day, indicating that he received a copy of the charges against him, pled 
not guilty to the allegations, and understood that a hearing would be held.  
Miller specifically indicated on his signed notice that he did not request 
counsel or witnesses to be present on his behalf at the hearing, but he did 
request that his accuser, Kromka, be present.     
(6) 
The disciplinary hearing was held on May 2, 2013 before 
appellee Staff Lieutenant Brian Reynolds, but was continued after several 
hours so that Reynolds could conduct a further investigation by interviewing 
two people identified by Miller as witnesses.  Reynolds talked to the two 
individuals identified by Miller and, without reconvening the hearing, issued 
his written decision finding Miller guilty of the charged violations on May 7, 
2013.  The decision set forth Reynolds’ specific factual findings in support 
of each charge.  The decision recommended that Miller be punished by 
losing 730 days of earned good time because of the egregious nature of 
Miller’s contract for protection with Dorn and Miller’s past history of 
conduct.  After Miller appealed the decision to Captain Bruce Burton and 
former VCC Warden Perry Phelps, the violations were upheld but the 
sanction was reduced to a loss of 365 days of good time.  
 
5 
(7) 
On June 10, 2014, Miller filed a complaint in the Superior 
Court, alleging that the disciplinary hearing violated his rights.  On initial 
review of Miller’s complaint under 10 Del. C. § 8803(b),4 the Superior Court 
issued an order, dated July 14, 2014, summarily dismissing Miller’s claims 
seeking to appeal the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings but allowing 
his claims concerning the disciplinary process to move forward.5  Thereafter, 
the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  On November 5, 
2015, the Superior Court denied Miller’s motion for summary judgment and 
granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, holding that Miller 
had failed to establish that he was denied due process at the prison 
disciplinary hearing.  On November 18, 2015, the Superior Court denied 
Miller’s motion for reargument.  This appeal followed. 
(8) 
Miller enumerates seven overlapping issues in his opening brief 
on appeal.  The gist of his arguments is that the Superior Court erred in 
granting summary judgment on his procedural due process claims because 
                                                 
4 10 Del. C. § 8803(b) (2013).  Section 8803(b) permits the reviewing court, after 
granting a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, to summarily dismiss an indigent 
plaintiff’s complaint if the claims are factually or legally frivolous or malicious. 
5 See Proctor v. Taylor, 2002 WL 1058187 (Del. May 23, 2002) (affirming the Superior 
Court’s summary dismissal of the plaintiff’s appeal from the decision of the prison 
disciplinary board because the Superior Court had no constitutional or statutory 
jurisdiction to review the DOC’s disciplinary decision); State v. Cubbage, 210 A.2d 555, 
564 (Del. Super. 1965) (holding that the courts have no jurisdiction to sit in judgment of 
administrative decisions of correctional authorities absent an “arbitrary and capricious 
abuse of discretion” or “a deprivation or infringement of constitutional rights of 
inmates”). 
 
6 
there were material issues of fact in dispute and because the Superior Court 
incorrectly interpreted Wolff v. McDonnell.6  Miller also includes a vague 
claim that the Superior Court erred in summarily dismissing his claims 
challenging the DOC’s factual findings and disciplinary sanction. 
(9) 
We find no merit to Miller’s appeal.  Although the federal 
Constitution does not guarantee a right to good time credit, the United States 
Supreme Court recognized in Wolff v. McDonnell that, if the State has 
created a statutory right to good time, as Delaware has done, then a prisoner 
is entitled “to those minimum procedures appropriate under the 
circumstances” to ensure that “the state-created right [to good time] is not 
arbitrarily abrogated.”7  The minimum requirements of procedural due 
process that must be provided to a prisoner facing the loss of good time as 
the result of a prison disciplinary hearing are: “(1) advance written notice of 
the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with 
institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present 
documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement by the 
factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary 
                                                 
6 418 U.S. 539 (1974). 
7 Id. at 557. 
 
7 
action.”8  Prison officials have discretion to refuse to call witnesses, so long 
as the reasons for doing so meet due process requirements.9   
(10) Contrary to Miller’s suggestion, the determination of whether 
the standard is satisfied does not require an examination of the entire record, 
an independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or a weighing of 
the evidence considered by the disciplinary authority.10  Judicial review of a 
prison disciplinary decision is limited to ensuring that the prisoner was 
afforded certain minimal procedures, that the action against him was not 
arbitrary, and that the ultimate decision is supported by “some evidence in 
the record.”11 
(11) The record in this case reflects that Miller was given advance 
written notice of the disciplinary charges against him and was informed in 
that written notice that he could be represented and that he could present 
witnesses.  Miller indicated by his signature that he neither desired counsel 
nor wished to present any witnesses.  Before the hearing, Miller was 
permitted to file a 13-page document with 4 pages of attachments, setting 
                                                 
8 Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985). 
9 Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 497 (1985). 
10 Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. 
11 Id at 454. 
 
8 
forth his defenses and objections.  In that document, Miller first requested 
the opportunity to present six witnesses on his behalf.   
(12) Miller sought to present witnesses to establish that the DOC 
officials were aware of Miller’s alleged misconduct and delayed bringing 
disciplinary charges against him in violation of an alleged requirement that 
charges be brought within 24 hours.  Notwithstanding Miller’s belated 
identification of these witnesses, Reynolds, the hearing officer, postponed 
making any final decision on the outcome of the hearing until he interviewed 
the only two witnesses who allegedly could provide relevant information.12  
In Reynolds’ affidavit attached to the State’s motion for summary judgment, 
Reynolds stated that one witness, a prison paralegal, denied having any 
knowledge about the investigation into Miller’s misconduct.  The other 
witness, a prison official, told Reynolds that the disciplinary report had been 
completed within 24 hours of receipt of the Superior Court hearing 
transcript.   
(13) After completing those interviews, Reynolds issued a written 
decision setting forth the evidence he relied on in support of each violation 
                                                 
12 Of the six witnesses identified by Miller, one was deceased and one, Robert Dorn, was 
no longer in DOC custody.  Two other witnesses, both DOC officials, were determined to 
be unnecessary because Reynolds stipulated to the fact for which Miller sought their 
testimony (namely, that DOC officials had been aware of Miller’s alleged misconduct 
since at least March when the Superior Court wrote the warden enclosing Dorn’s check to 
Miller). 
 
9 
found.  Reynolds’ decision set forth the justification for his recommended 
sanctions.  Under these circumstances, Miller received all of the due process 
protections to which he was legally entitled.  The action against him was not 
arbitrary, and there was more than “some evidence” to support the findings 
and the disciplinary action taken. 
(14) After careful consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record 
on appeal, it is clear that the Superior Court’s judgment must be affirmed.  
Upon de novo review, we find no error in the Superior Court’s grant of 
summary judgment to the defendants on Miller’s procedural claims or in its 
summary dismissal of Miller’s claims attempting to appeal the substance of 
the DOC disciplinary proceeding.    
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Karen L. Valihura 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice