Title: PULLAR v. HUELLE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

PULLAR v. HUELLE2003 WY 9073 P.3d 1038Case Number: 02-192Decided: 07/31/2003
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

 

LEON 
PULLAR and LINDA PULLAR,

 

Appellants(Defendants),

 

v.

 

GERALD 
HUELLE and CINDA LOU

HUELLE, 
husband and wife,

 

Appellees(Plaintiffs).

 

 

Representing 
Appellants:

 

            
Tassma A. Powers of Perkins & Powers, P.C., Casper, 
Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellees:

 

            
Ken McCartney of the Law Offices of Ken McCartney, P.C., Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      Leon and Linda 
Pullar (appellants) appeal from a summary judgment granted to Gerald and Cinda 
Lou Huelle (appellees) in a dispute over a real estate purchase contract.  The district court found that the 
contract did not violate the statute of frauds, and that the appellants had 
anticipatorily breached the contract.  
We reverse.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Both parties 
identify the following issues:

 

I.          
Whether the District Court erred as a matter of law in finding that the 
Contract was legally binding on [the appellants] and [that] they were required 
to perform.

 

II.          
Whether the District Court erred as a matter of law in finding that the 
[appellants] anticipatorily breached or repudiated the 
Contract.

 

III.         
Whether the District Court erred as a matter of law in finding that the 
contract was ambiguous but appropriate for summary 
judgment.

 

IV.        
Whether the District Court erred as a matter of law in finding that the 
legal description did not violate the statute of frauds.

 

V.        
Whether the District Court erred as a matter of law in awarding Appellees 
the $40,000.00 without a finding of reasonableness or presentation of actual 
damages and without providing the [appellants] with due 
process.

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      The appellants 
contacted a realtor about purchasing land in Fremont County.  The realtor showed them property owned 
by the appellees.  On April 3, 2001, 
the appellants signed a Contract to Buy and Sell Real Estate (the 
contract).  Significant terms of the 
contract included:

 

1.         
The property was described as "the following described real estate 
situate in the City or Town of Pavillion, County of Fremont, Wyoming, commonly 
known as and more particularly described as . . . [a] parcel of land in the 
NW1/4SW1/4, Sec. 16, T.3N., R2E., W.R.M., Fremont County, 
Wyoming."

 

2.   The purchase price was 
$148,500.00.

 

3.         
An earnest money deposit of $40,000.00 was required, and in case of 
default by the appellants, the appellees "may elect to terminate the Contract 
and retain all payments made hereunder as liquidated damages, such amount being 
agreed by the parties hereto to constitute compensation for the loss of 
opportunity suffered by [the appellees] due to such 
breach."

 

4.         
On April 6, 2001, the appellees were to produce a commitment for a title 
insurance policy in the amount of the purchase price.

 

5.         
The appellants' offer was "contingent upon property appraising for at 
least the sale price."

 

6.         
Closing was to occur on April 10, 2001, with the appellants having the 
right to pre-closing possession on April 7, 2001.

 

[¶4]      The appellees 
accepted the appellants' offer by signing the contract on April 4, 2001.  On April 5, 2001, before they were 
informed of the contract's acceptance, the appellants told the realtor that they 
wanted to rescind their offer.1  The realtor told them that rescission 
was not possible.  The appellants 
followed up their oral "rescission" with a letter to the realtor that 
read:

 

This 
letter is to confirm the rejection of the [appellees'] property.  Make the cashier check out to both Leon 
& I and deliver to us now.

 

As 
you are the listing agent this contract is not valid.

 

[¶5]      The appellants 
did not purchase the land.  The 
appellees brought this action, seeking a declaration by the district court that 
the appellants had breached the contract and that the appellees were entitled to 
the earnest money deposit plus attorney's fees.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶6]      Summary judgment 
is appropriate in a declaratory judgment action so long as there are no genuine 
issues of material fact.2  Snake River Brewing Co., Inc. v. Town 
of Jackson, 2002 WY 11, ¶ 4, 39 P.3d 397, 402 (Wyo. 2002).  We recently repeated our standard for 
review of summary judgments rendered under W.R.C.P. 56:

 

            
When a motion for summary judgment is before this court, assuming there 
is a complete record, we have exactly the same duty and materials as did the 
district court and must follow the same standards.  Hoblyn v. Johnson, 2002 WY 152, ¶ 
11, 55 P.3d 1219, ¶ 11 (Wyo.2002).  
The propriety of granting summary judgment depends upon the correctness 
of a court's dual findings that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id.  This court looks at the record from the 
viewpoint most favorable to the party opposing the motion, giving to him all the 
favorable inferences which may be drawn from the facts contained in affidavits, 
depositions, and other materials appearing in the record.  Id.

 

            
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of 
establishing a prima facie case for a summary judgment.  If the movant carries this burden, the 
party opposing the summary judgment must come forward with specific facts to 
demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact does exist.  Eklund v. PRI Environmental, Inc., 
2001 WY 55, ¶ 10, 25 P.3d 511, ¶ 10 (Wyo.2001).  A material fact has been defined as a 
fact upon which the outcome of the litigation depends in whole or in part.  Hoblyn, 2002 WY 152, ¶ 11, 55 P.3d 1219, ¶ 11.

 

Bertagnolli 
v. Louderback, 2003 
WY 50, ¶¶ 10-11, 67 P.3d 627, 630-31 (Wyo. 2003).

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶7]      We find the 
fourth-listed issue to be determinative in this case.  The statute of frauds requires contracts 
for the sale of real property to be in writing.3  The appellants contend that the contract 
in this case fails to satisfy the statute of frauds because the legal 
description of the land is insufficient.  
The legal description in the contract reads as 
follows:

 

[T]he 
following described real estate situate in the City or Town of Pavillion, County 
of Fremont, Wyoming, commonly known as and more particularly described as . . . 
[a] parcel of land in the NW1/4SW1/4, Sec. 16, T.3N., R.2E., W.R.M., Fremont 
County, Wyoming.

 

[¶8]      This Court has on 
several occasions addressed the question of the sufficiency of a property 
description to meet the statute of frauds.  
Noland v. Haywood, 46 Wyo. 101, 23 P.2d 845, 845 
(1933), 
was an action for specific performance of a real estate sales contract in which 
the land was described as "280 acres of Land on Clear Creek in Town ship [sic] 
54Range 79 . . . in Sheridan Co . . .."  
In concluding that this description was insufficient under the statute, 
we held that the writing must contain an adequate description or must furnish 
the means by which the land can be identified.  Id. at 848-49.  The simple problem in Noland was 
that the writing did not specify what 280 acres were intended.  Id. at 850.

 

[¶9]      In Flygare v. 
Brundage, 76 Wyo. 350, 302 P.2d 759, 761 (1956), 
the property to be sold was described as 13 acres of land in the NE1/4NW1/4, 
Sec. 22, T. 41N., R. 116W., 6th P.M., Teton County, Wyoming, lying west of U.S. 
Highway 89 and 187.  Upon 
examination of the abstract of title, it was discovered that the tract of land 
in that section lying west of the highway was only 7.9 acres.  Id. at 760.  We held that the error in total acreage 
did not make the description too vague to comply with the statute of frauds 
because there was no mistaking the land to be sold.  Id. at 763.

 

[¶10]   We most recently dealt with this 
issue in Matter of Estate of Jackson, 892 P.2d 786 (Wyo. 
1995).  In Matter of Estate of Jackson, 
we first held that whether a writing's property description is sufficient under 
the statute of frauds is a question of law.  Id. at 788.  We then relied on Noland, 23 P.2d  
at 845, 846, 850-51, 
for the following propositions of law:

 

            
1.         
A written memorandum purporting to convey real estate must sufficiently 
describe the property so as to comply with the requirements of the statute of 
frauds and permit specific performance.

 

            
2.         
A valid contract to convey land must expressly contain a description of 
the land, certain in itself or capable of being rendered certain by reference to 
an extrinsic source which the writing itself designates.

 

            
3.         
The writing's essential provisions may not be supplied by inferences or 
presumptions deduced from oral testimony.  
Parol evidence is admissible to identify described property, but parol 
evidence may not supply a portion of the description.  Matter of Estate of Jackson, 892 P.2d  at 789.

 

[¶11]   In addition, specifically in regard 
to the facts in Matter of Estate of Jackson, 892 P.2d  at 
789-90, 
we also held:

 

            
4.         
Where a writing purports to convey land, but reserves a portion of it, if 
the description of the reserved tract is indefinite and uncertain, then the 
general description of the land to be conveyed is also indefinite and uncertain, 
and the conveyance fails under the statute of frauds.

 

            
5.         
Where a writing only states the total acreage and does not describe the 
location of the land, the statute of frauds is not 
satisfied.

 

[¶12]   The description of the land in the 
contract in the instant case simply does not pass muster under these rules of 
law.  The operative portion of the 
description is "[a] parcel of land in the NW1/4SW1/4, Sec. 16 . . .."  The phrase "a parcel of land" identifies 
neither the size nor the specific location of the land.  And there is nothing within the contract 
that guides us to specific extrinsic evidence of those facts.  Nothing is attached to the contract, 
incorporated into the contract, or even referred to in the contract that would 
provide the missing information.  To 
go beyond the contract to determine both the size and location of the land being 
sold would undermine the very purpose of the statute of 
frauds.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶13]   The Contract to Buy and Sell Real 
Estate was void because its insufficient property description violated Wyoming's 
statute of frauds.  Reversal of the 
summary judgment on that ground renders the other issues moot, although such 
reversal also requires reversal of the district court's damage award.  We reverse and remand to the district 
court for entry of a judgment in favor of the appellants consistent with this 
opinion.

 

 

FOOTNOTES

 

  1These facts are being presented in 
the light most favorable to the appellants.  The appellants contend that they 
attempted to "rescind [their] offer . . .."  The realtor testified by affidavit that 
the appellants attempted to "cancel the Contract."

 

  2Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-103 
(LexisNexis 2003) states:  "Any 
person interested under a . . . contract . . . may have any question of 
construction or validity arising under the instrument determined and obtain a 
declaration of rights, status or other legal relations."  While there is some question whether a 
declaratory judgment action is an appropriate method to seek damages for breach 
of contract, that issue has not been raised and the parties have generally 
treated this as a breach of contract action.  See Porcelain Enamel & 
Manufacturing Co. of Baltimore v. Jeffrey Mfg. Co., 177 Md. 677, 11 A.2d 451, 453 (1940); 
Jacobsen v. King County Medical Service Corp., 23 Wash. 2d 324, 160 P.2d 1019, 1021 (1945); 
and Annotation, 26 C.J.S., Declaratory Judgments § 57 (2001).  But see, Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas 
Ass'n v. State, 645 P.2d 1163, 1167-68 (Wyo. 1982) ("the existence of another adequate 
remedy will not, of itself, preclude declaratory judgment relief.").

 

  3Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-23-105(a) 
(LexisNexis 2003) states, in pertinent part:

 

In 
the following cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement, or some 
note or memorandum thereof be in writing, and subscribed by the party to be 
charged therewith:

 

* 
* *

 

(v)         
Every agreement or contract for the sale of real estate, or the lease 
thereof, for more than one (1) year[.]