Title: People v. Hall

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 90776-Agenda 12-September 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								GLEN HALL, Appellant.
Opinion filed November 21, 2001.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	The defendant, Glen Hall, pleaded guilty to forgery, and the
Vermilion County circuit court placed him on a two-year term of
probation conditioned upon, inter alia, his cooperation with
substance abuse counseling or treatment recommendations. Less
than a year later, the State filed a petition to revoke the defendant's
probation, alleging that he failed to report to the probation office
and that he was unsuccessfully discharged from Prairie Center, a
substance abuse treatment facility.
	On July 23, 1999, at the probation revocation hearing, defense
counsel informed the trial court that the defendant would admit the
State's allegations. This exchange followed:
			"THE COURT: You are Glen Hall?
			THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
			THE COURT: Do you understand that you would be
admitting allegations in the petition *** which, in effect,
allege that you violated the probation order by not
reporting to probation since October 26, '98, and that you
were unsuccessfully discharged from the Prairie Center on
February 11, '99?
			THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
			THE COURT: You've had enough time to talk to Mr.
Sohn [defense counsel] about these allegations?
			THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
			THE COURT: Mr. Sohn, have you explained to your
client the possible penalties that he faces?
			MR. SOHN: Forgery is a Class Two, is it not? No, it's
a Class Three.
			[Assistant State's Attorney]: Three.
			MR. SOHN: Yes, we have, your Honor.
			THE COURT: Has anybody forced you into coming in
and entering into this admission, sir?
			THE DEFENDANT: No, Ma'am.
			THE COURT: Has anybody made any promises to you
in return for your admission?
			THE DEFENDANT: No.
			THE COURT: Are you under the influence of any drugs
or alcohol?
			THE DEFENDANT: No.
			THE COURT: Taking any prescription medication?
			THE DEFENDANT: No.
			THE COURT: You know clearly what you're doing?
			THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
			THE COURT: It's a free and voluntary act on your part,
sir?
			THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
			THE COURT: Could I have a factual basis, please.
			[Assistant State's Attorney]: Judge, we'd present
testimony from representatives from Prairie Center that on
February 11 of this year he was unsuccessfully discharged
from the program at Prairie Center.
			We'd also present testimony from Jana Arbuckle from
the Vermilion County Probation Office that Mr. Hall has
not reported as of the date of filing of this petition since
October 26, 1998.
			THE COURT: Would that be a substantially correct
recitation as you understand it?
			MR. SOHN: Yes, your Honor.
			THE COURT: Do you still wish to admit, Mr. Hall?
			THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
			THE COURT: I'll accept your admission, finding it
knowingly and voluntarily made. A violation finding will
be made. I will reserve the question of revocation of your
probation. That means you're still under the probation
order."
	On December 17, 1999, the trial court revoked the
defendant's probation and sentenced him to three years'
imprisonment. The trial court denied a motion to reconsider the
defendant's sentence. The defendant appealed, arguing that the
proceeding where he admitted probation violations did not comply
with due process. The appellate court disagreed with the
defendant, affirming his probation revocation and sentence. No.
4-00-0188 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
	We granted the defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 177
Ill. 2d R. 315(a). We now reverse and remand for further
proceedings.

ANALYSIS
	Before this court, the defendant again contends that his due
process rights were violated because the trial court accepted his
admission to probation violations without admonishing the
defendant that he had a right to a probation revocation hearing at
which he could confront adverse witnesses, and without
determining whether the defendant understood the applicable
sentencing range. Our review of this legal question is de novo.
People v. Dameron, 196 Ill. 2d 156, 162 (2001).
	Fairness, the core meaning of our due process guarantees (see
U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2), is a flexible
concept which calls for procedural safeguards tailored to the
demands of a particular legal context. See Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 481, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484, 494, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2600
(1972). Probation revocation proceedings occur only after a
criminal conviction, and a defendant responding to a petition to
revoke probation is entitled to fewer procedural rights than a
defendant facing trial. See People v. Allegri, 109 Ill. 2d 309, 313
(1985); People v. DeWitt, 78 Ill. 2d 82, 85 (1979); People v.
Goleash, 311 Ill. App. 3d 949, 955 (2000). In Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
411 U.S. 778, 786, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656, 664, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 1761-62
(1973), the United States Supreme Court outlined the minimum
requirements of due process in a probation revocation hearing: (1)
written notice of the claimed probation violation; (2) disclosure of
the evidence against the defendant; (3) the opportunity to be heard
in person and present testimonial and documentary evidence; (4)
the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; (5) a
neutral arbiter; and (6) a written statement of the evidence relied
upon and the reason for revoking probation. This case, however,
does not involve the constitutionality of a probation revocation
hearing, but rather the constitutionality of proceedings which
resulted in the defendant's admission to probation violations.
	We first addressed what due process means in this context in
People v. Pier, 51 Ill. 2d 96 (1972). In Pier, the defendant was
convicted of burglary and placed on probation. The State later
filed a petition alleging that the defendant had violated his
probation. At a hearing on the State's petition, the defendant
admitted his probation violation and was sentenced to 2-15 years'
imprisonment. In a post-conviction petition, the defendant claimed
that his admission was induced by an unfulfilled prosecution
promise to recommend a lower sentence. The trial court dismissed
the defendant's petition without an evidentiary hearing, and the
defendant appealed.
	We held that the trial court improperly dismissed the
defendant's petition. Pier, 51 Ill. 2d  at 100. Regarding the
defendant's admission, we stated:
		"The consequences of a determination that the probation
order has been violated are so serious that the appellate
courts have surrounded the defendant at a revocation
hearing with many of the same due-process safeguards
that are accorded to a defendant a[t] a trial to determine
his guilt. [Citations.] Since the results of a probation
revocation may be a deprivation of liberty and,
consequently, as serious as the original determination of
guilt, we agree with the holdings of these cases that due
process of law requires that a defendant charged with
having violated his probation be entitled to a
conscientious judicial determination of the charge
according to accepted and well recognized procedural
methods. *** Justice demands that he also be entitled to
the protection of the same due-process requirements
which pertain to pleas of guilty when he waives his right
to a judicial determination of the charge that he violated
his probation and confesses or admits the charges of the
revocation petition. If he does so in reliance upon an
unfulfilled promise by the State's Attorney, then his
confession or admission to the charge is not voluntary for
the same reason that a plea of guilty entered in reliance
upon an unfulfilled promise of the State's Attorney is not
voluntary." Pier, 51 Ill. 2d  at 99-100.
	Two years later, in People v. Beard, 59 Ill. 2d 220 (1974), we
again addressed the due process requirements for admissions to
probation violations. The defendants in consolidated cases both
were charged with violating the terms of their probation. Both
defendants admitted probation violations, and both were sentenced
to imprisonment. The defendants appealed, claiming that they
were denied due process because they did not receive warnings
comparable to the admonitions required under Supreme Court
Rule 402 (see 177 Ill. 2d R. 402) for defendants pleading guilty.
	We reviewed Pier and limited its broad language to the facts
of that case:
			"We cannot subscribe to the broad constitutional basis
which defendants seek to engraft upon our decision in
People v. Pier. *** In People v. Pier we did not consider
the applicability of Rule 402 upon probation revocation
proceedings. We merely expressed the view that due
process required that a defendant's admission must be
voluntarily made." Beard, 59 Ill. 2d  at 225.
 We concluded that due process concerns did not necessitate Rule
402 admonitions for defendants admitting probation violations.
Beard, 59 Ill. 2d  at 226-27. See also People v. Tufte, 165 Ill. 2d 66,
75 (1995) (Supreme Court Rule 605(b), governing admonitions to
defendants about rights on appeal, does not apply to defendants
who admit violations of conditional discharge).
	Our appellate court has struggled to reconcile Pier and Beard.
See, e.g., People v. Butcher, 288 Ill. App. 3d 120, 122 (1997). In
People v. Followell, 165 Ill. App. 3d 28, 30-31 (1987), the
appellate court quoted at length from Pier before concluding:
			"Although the trial court need not give all of the
admonitions contained in Supreme Court Rule 402
[citation] prior to accepting an admission to a petition to
revoke probation [citation to Beard], we believe that in
order to protect a defendant's due process rights, and to
make a conscientious judicial determination of the charge,
the court must at least determine that the defendant knows
what the specific allegations in the petition are, that he
knows that he has a right to a hearing with counsel
present, that he is not making the admission on the basis
of any promises or coercion, and that he understands the
consequences of his admission."
See also People v. Foehrer, 197 Ill. App. 3d 754, 755-56 (1990).
	In the present case the appellate court correctly observed that
"Illinois law regarding due process in the context of probation
revocation proceedings is not well defined." After reviewing
relevant case law, the appellate court stated that a fact-based
approach to determining due process standards in the context of
admissions to probation violations "may not be preferable, for
comprehensive adherence to the considerations enumerated in
Followell carries the virtue of ensuring consistency and uniformity
within our judicial system." The appellate court, however,
ultimately held that the defendant's admission met due process
requirements: "[O]ur reading of the entire record here does not
convince us that the instant proceedings were fundamentally
deficient or unfair ***."
	Although we disagree with the conclusion reached by the
appellate court in this case, we agree that Followell provides a
suitable framework for protecting defendants' due process rights.
People v. Barker, 62 Ill. 2d 57, 59 (1975), and People v. Baker, 94 Ill. 2d 129, 134 (1983), where we held that a waiver of counsel in
a probation revocation proceeding is invalid unless the court
admonishes the defendant as to the purpose of the proceeding and
the nature of the alleged violation, as well as his rights of
confrontation, cross-examination, and representation by counsel,
provide additional guidance. In an effort to clarify the meaning of
due process in this context, we now hold that before accepting a
defendant's admission to a probation violation, the trial court
should admonish the defendant to determine whether:
			(1) the defendant understands the specific allegations in
the State's petition to revoke probation;
			(2) the defendant understands that he has the right to a
hearing with defense counsel present at which that the
State must prove the alleged violation, and that he has the
rights of confrontation and cross-examination at such a
hearing;
			(3) the defendant's admission is voluntarily made and
not made on the basis of any coercion or promises, other
than any agreement as to the disposition of his case;
			(4) the defendant understands the consequences of his
admission or the sentencing range for the underlying
offense; and
			(5) a factual basis exists for the admission.
	These warnings appropriately balance the interests of the State
with the liberty of defendants, and they also comport with the
language of the probation revocation statute. See 730 ILCS
5/5-6-4(b) (West 1998) (the defendant has the right to a hearing
on the alleged probation violation); 730 ILCS 5/5-6-4(c) (West
1998) (at a probation revocation hearing, the State bears the
burden of proof, and the defendant has the rights of confrontation,
cross-examination, and representation by counsel); see People v.
Bell, 296 Ill. App. 3d 146, 152 (1998).
	Here, the trial court's exchange with the defendant and
defense counsel touched upon some of the requisites of due
process which we have identified. The court initially determined
whether the defendant understood the allegations of the State's
petition. The court also determined that the defendant's admission
was voluntary and was not prompted by prosecution promises.
Defense counsel indicated that he had discussed the sentencing
range with the defendant, and in accepting the defendant's guilty
plea, the court previously had advised the defendant of the
possible penalty for forgery. See People v. Cox, 197 Ill. App. 3d
239, 244-45 (1990). Finally, the State offered a factual basis for
the defendant's admission.
	The court, however, did not advise the defendant of his right
to a probation revocation hearing or the specifics of such a
hearing. This deficiency denied the defendant due process. See
People v. Marion, 275 Ill. App. 3d 494, 496 (1995) (the
defendant's admission to a probation violation did not satisfy due
process where the trial court did not admonish the defendant that
by her admission she was waiving her right to present and confront
witnesses); People v. Hoyt, 129 Ill. App. 3d 331, 337 (1984) (the
trial court afforded the defendant minimum due process when,
prior to accepting the defendant's admission to a probation
violation, it admonished the defendant that she was waiving her
right to a hearing).

CONCLUSION
	For the reasons we have discussed, we reverse the judgments
of the appellate and circuit courts and remand to the circuit court
for further proceedings.
Judgments reversed;
cause remanded.
	JUSTICE GARMAN took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.