Title: P. v. Warner

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 8/10/06 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S126233 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 3 C038245 
BRIAN ERIC WARNER, 
) 
 
) 
Sacramento County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 99FO8985 
___________________________________ ) 
 
A jury convicted defendant Brian Eric Warner of three counts of lewd or 
lascivious conduct with a child under 14 years of age.  (Pen. Code,1 § 288, subd. 
(a).)  In addition, the jury found he had suffered a prior felony conviction in 
Nebraska for child sexual assault.  Because the record does not show defendant’s 
Nebraska crime contained all of the elements of any offense in California 
amounting to a serious felony, as defined in section 1192.7, subdivision (c), we 
conclude defendant was not subject to a serious-felony sentence enhancement 
(§ 667, subd. (a)) nor eligible to be sentenced under the three strikes law (§§ 667, 
subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12).  Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal. 
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise stated. 
 
2
FACTS 
Defendant was married to C.H. and lived with her and her two daughters, 
C., then five years old, and S., then three years old.  S. told her mother that 
defendant had touched her vagina.  C.H. reported the incident to child protective 
services, who contacted police.  An investigation led police to focus on three 
alleged incidents of lewd or lascivious behavior with S.  During a police 
interrogation, defendant admitted all three incidents of sexual molestation.  He 
also admitted the molestations to his wife, who surreptitiously tape-recorded his 
admission of one of the incidents.  A jury convicted defendant of three counts of 
lewd or lascivious conduct with a child under 14 years of age.  (§ 288, subd. (a).)  
After examining documents from Nebraska, the jury also sustained the allegation 
that defendant had previously suffered a conviction in Nebraska for child sexual 
assault in violation of Nebraska Revised Statutes section 28-320.01 (1995).  The 
trial court sentenced him under the habitual sexual offender law (§ 667.71) to 
consecutive terms of 25 years to life for the three substantive counts and added a 
serious-felony enhancement term of five years for the prior out-of-state conviction 
(§ 667, subd. (a)).  In the aggregate, defendant was sentenced to 80 years to life. 
The Court of Appeal affirmed defendant’s three convictions for violating 
section 288, subdivision (a) and the imposition of the serious-felony sentence 
enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a), but reversed the finding that 
defendant was eligible for sentencing under the habitual sexual offender law.  The 
court remanded the case for resentencing, noting that defendant was eligible for 
sentencing under the three strikes law.  On defendant’s petition, we granted review 
and limited the issue to whether his prior Nebraska conviction for child sexual 
assault qualified as a serious felony for California sentencing purposes.  In 
addition, at oral argument, we asked the parties to brief the further question 
whether, at the time of defendant’s prior conviction, the Nebraska law “contained 
 
3
the same mens rea element as Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a), in that it 
required the defendant to harbor the specific intent to arouse or gratify the sexual 
desires of himself or the victim.” 
DISCUSSION 
For criminal sentencing purposes in this state, the term “serious felony” is a 
term of art.  Severe consequences can follow if a criminal offender, presently 
convicted of a felony, is found to have suffered a prior conviction for a serious 
felony.  If the present conviction is also for a serious felony, the offender is subject 
to a five-year enhancement term to be served consecutively to the regular 
sentence.  (§ 667, subd. (a).)  Even if an offender’s present conviction is not for a 
serious felony, a prior conviction for a serious felony renders the offender subject 
to the more severe sentencing provisions of the three strikes law.  (§§ 667, subds. 
(b)-(i), 1170.12.)  
Whether a crime qualifies as a serious felony is determined by section 
1192.7, subdivision (c) (section 1192.7(c)), which lists and describes dozens of 
qualifying crimes.  Murder, robbery, kidnapping, and forcible sexual assaults are 
of course on the list.  At issue in this case are the crimes described in section 
1192.7(c)(6):  committing a “lewd or lascivious act on a child under the age of 14 
years.”  Defendant’s three present convictions for violating section 288, 
subdivision (a), which required proof he touched a child with lewd intent (People 
v. Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434), indisputably qualify as serious felonies.  The 
question is whether defendant’s prior felony conviction in Nebraska similarly 
qualifies.2   
                                              
2  
The question whether, consistent with due process of law, the jury and not 
the trial court must make this finding is not before us.  (See People v. McGee 
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 682.) 
 
4
Under our sentencing laws, foreign convictions may qualify as serious 
felonies, with all the attendant consequences for sentencing, if they satisfy certain 
conditions.  For a prior felony conviction from another jurisdiction to support a 
serious-felony sentence enhancement, the out-of-state crime must “include[] all of 
the elements of any serious felony” in California.  (§ 667, subd. (a)(1).)  For an 
out-of-state conviction to render a criminal offender eligible for sentencing under 
the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12), the foreign crime (1) must 
be such that, “if committed in California, [it would be] punishable by 
imprisonment in the state prison” (§§ 667, subd. (d)(2), 1170.12, subd. (b)(2)), and 
(2) must “include[] all of the elements of the particular felony as defined in” 
section 1192.7(c) (§§ 667, subd. (d)(2), 1170.12, subd. (b)(2)).3  We now turn to 
the question whether defendant’s prior conviction in Nebraska qualifies as a 
“serious felony.” 
I 
In 1996, defendant pleaded no contest in Nebraska to a charge of sexual 
assault of a child, in that he, “being a person nineteen years of age or older, 
subject[ed] [N.H.] whose date of birth is July 22, 1991, and who is a person of 
fourteen years of age or younger, to sexual contact,” a violation of Nebraska 
Revised Statutes section 28-320.01.  In order to determine whether this Nebraska 
crime contains “all of the elements” of a serious felony in California, we must first 
determine what elements are required by Nebraska law.  At the time of 
                                              
3  
A criminal offender may also be sentenced under the three strikes law if he 
or she has a prior conviction for a “violent felony,” as defined in section 667.5, 
subdivision (c).  (§§ 667, subd. (d)(2), 1170.12, subd. (b)(2).)  No party argues that 
the Nebraska crime of which defendant was convicted in 1996 qualifies as a 
“violent felony.” 
 
5
defendant’s crime, Nebraska Revised Statutes section 28-320.01 provided:  “(1) A 
person commits sexual assault of a child if he or she subjects another person 
fourteen years of age or younger to sexual contact and the actor is at least nineteen 
years of age or older.”  (Italics added.)  At that time, Nebraska Revised Statutes 
section 28-318(5) defined “sexual contact” as “the intentional touching of the 
victim’s sexual or intimate parts or the intentional touching of the victim’s 
clothing covering the immediate area of the victim’s sexual or intimate parts.  
Sexual contact shall also mean the touching by the victim of the actor’s sexual or 
intimate parts or the clothing covering the immediate area of the actor’s sexual or 
intimate parts when such touching is intentionally caused by the actor.  Sexual 
contact shall include only such conduct which can be reasonably construed as 
being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification of either party.”  (Italics 
added.)4  
Nebraska Revised Statutes section 28-318(5) does not, on its face, require 
that the prohibited touching be for any particular purpose or be accomplished with 
any specific intent.  The statutory language plainly states the actor must simply act 
intentionally; that is, he must intend to touch the victim.  The touching cannot be 
involuntary or accidental.  Instead of requiring specific intent, the statute requires 
proof the touching occurred under circumstances in which it “can be reasonably 
construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.”  (Neb. Rev. 
Stats., § 28-318(5).)  This plain meaning controls.  (Caspers Const. Co. v. 
                                              
4  
After defendant’s crime, Nebraska Revised Statutes section 28-318(5) was 
amended to add:  “Sexual contact shall also include the touching of a child with 
the actor’s sexual or intimate parts on any part of the child’s body for purposes of 
sexual assault of a child under section 28-320.01.”  (2004 Neb. Laws 943, § 4, eff. 
Apr. 16, 2004, italics added.)  This amendment is not at issue in this case. 
 
6
Nebraska State Patrol (2005) 270 Neb. 205, 209 [700 N.W.2d 587, 591] [“In 
construing a statute, an appellate court should consider the statute’s plain 
meaning”]; see In re Jennings (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 263 [we interpret statutes by 
giving statutory language its “ ‘plain, commonsense meaning’ ”].) 
Consistent with the statute’s plain language, the Nebraska Supreme Court 
has never required proof of specific lewd intent to sustain a violation of Nebraska 
Revised Statutes section 28-318(5).  According to the Nebraska Supreme Court, to 
prove “sexual contact” under Nebraska Revised Statutes section 28-318(5), the 
state need prove only that the “circumstances and conduct . . . could be construed 
as being for such a purpose [of sexually arousing or gratifying either the 
perpetrator or the victim].”  (State v. Osborn (1992) 241 Neb. 424, 433 [490 
N.W.2d 160, 167]; State v. Berkman (1988) 230 Neb. 163, 166 [430 N.W.2d 310, 
313].)  Of course, the Nebraska Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the meaning 
of its state’s laws.  (See Cooper v. Swoap (1974) 11 Cal.3d 856, 886 [California 
Supreme Court is “the final authority on matters of state law”]; see also Burford v. 
Sun Oil Co. (1943) 319 U.S. 315, 325 [recognizing Texas courts alone can give 
definitive interpretation of Texas state law].)   
Michigan courts, construing similar statutory language, have explicitly 
rejected the argument that proof of specific lewd intent is required.  The law in 
Michigan prohibiting sexual touching of a child, like the law in Nebraska, 
provides that “[a] person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the second degree 
if the person engages in sexual contact with another person” under certain 
circumstances, including that the victim is at least 13 years old but less than 16.  
(Mich. Comp. Laws, § 750.520c(1)(b), italics added.)  “Sexual contact” is defined 
in Michigan, as in Nebraska, as “the intentional touching of the victim’s or actor’s 
intimate parts or the intentional touching of the clothing covering the immediate 
area of the victim’s or actor’s intimate parts, if that intentional touching can 
 
7
reasonably be construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or 
gratification . . . .”  (Id., § 750.520a(n), italics added.)  Under this definition of 
“sexual contact,” according to the Michigan courts, “the defendant’s specific 
intent is not an essential element of the crime.  The actor must touch a genital area 
intentionally, but he need not act with the purpose of sexual gratification.  Rather, 
it suffices if ‘that intentional touching can reasonably be construed as being for 
the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.’ ”  (People v. Fisher (1977) 77 
Mich.App. 6, 13 [257 N.W.2d 250, 254].)   
The Fisher court explained the Michigan law was deliberately constructed 
to omit a requirement that specific intent be proved and that an earlier legislative 
proposal to require proof of the actor’s sexual purpose had been rejected.  “The 
[statutory] language . . . must be read as a substantial lessening of the prosecutor’s 
burden of proof:  the touching must be intentional, but the actor’s purpose need 
not be proven to the jury.  On the contrary, the jury may find that the actor’s actual 
purpose was other than sexual gratification, e.g., anger, revenge, but still find that 
‘sexual contact’ had taken place.”  (People v. Fisher, supra, 257 N.W.2d at p. 254, 
fn. 2.)  Construing an updated (but essentially identical) version of the same 
statute,5 the Michigan courts have retained this interpretation, noting that 
                                              
5  
Michigan Compiled Laws section 750.520c prohibits “sexual contact” by 
an adult and a minor in many circumstances.  Michigan Compiled Laws section 
750.520a(n) has been rewritten only slightly since it was interpreted by People v. 
Fisher, supra, 257 N.W.2d 250, and now reads:  “ ‘Sexual contact’ includes the 
intentional touching of the victim’s or actor’s intimate parts or the intentional 
touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim’s or actor’s 
intimate parts, if that intentional touching can reasonably be construed as being 
for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification, done for a sexual purpose, or in 
a sexual manner for:  [¶] (i) Revenge.  [¶] (ii) To inflict humiliation.  [¶] (iii) Out 
of anger.”  (Italics added.) 
 
8
“criminal sexual conduct is a general intent crime; a defendant’s specific intent is 
not at issue.”  (People v. Piper (1997) 223 Mich.App. 642, 646 [567 N.W.2d 483, 
485].) 
The People resist the interpretation of Nebraska Revised Statutes section 
28-318(5) that requires proof only of general intent to establish the crime of child 
sexual assault, but their arguments are unpersuasive.  They first contend the phrase 
“reasonably construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal” means a 
Nebraska prosecutor must prove the defendant acted with a sexual purpose.  As we 
have explained, this interpretation is at odds with the plain meaning of the 
statutory language and with the decisions of the Nebraska Supreme Court.  The 
People contend the Nebraska cases were “wrongly decided.”  Instead, they argue, 
“Nebraska merely requires that the proof of the defendant’s purpose be subject to 
a reasonable construction.”  To the extent the Nebraska Supreme Court is merely 
interpreting Nebraska law, we are not at liberty to disagree with it.  But even if we 
were, the People propose no explanation, and we are aware of none, why the 
Nebraska Legislature would deem it necessary to mandate, in a criminal statute, 
that evidence of criminal mens rea be subject to a “reasonable construction.”  We 
assume the trier of fact in a criminal case must interpret the evidence presented at 
trial in a reasonable fashion.  In sum, we reject the People’s proposed 
interpretation as unreasonable and unsupportable.  
II 
Having discerned the elements of the Nebraska crime of child sexual 
assault of which defendant was convicted in 1996, we turn to whether that crime 
contains all of the elements of a qualifying serious felony in California.  This 
state’s law proscribing comparable conduct is set forth in section 288, subdivision 
(a).  Unlike the Nebraska law, section 288, subdivision (a) requires proof of 
specific lewd intent, providing:  “Any person who willfully and lewdly commits 
 
9
any lewd or lascivious act, . . . upon or with the body, or any part or member 
thereof, of a child who is under the age of 14 years, with the intent of arousing, 
appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person or 
the child, is guilty of a felony.”  (Italics added.)  A violation of this section 
requires proof of “the specific intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the 
lust of the child or the accused.”  (People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 907, 
italics added.)  Because Nebraska Revised Statutes sections 28-320.01 and 28-
318(5) do not require proof of specific lewd intent, the Nebraska offense of child 
sexual assault does not include all of the elements of a violation of California’s 
section 288, subdivision (a). 
Section 1192.7(c)(6), however, in proscribing commission of a lewd or 
lascivious act on a child, does more than simply incorporate section 288, 
subdivision (a).  We discussed the scope of the section in People v. Murphy 
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 136 (Murphy).  At issue in Murphy was whether the 
defendant’s conviction for violating section 288a, subdivision (c)—oral 
copulation with a child under 14 years of age—constituted a serious felony under 
section 1192.7(c)(6).  Based on the use in section 1192.7(c)(6) of the “lewd or 
lascivious” act language from section 288, subdivision (a), the defendant argued 
the Legislature intended section 1192.7(c)(6) to refer only to violations of section 
288, subdivision (a).  (Murphy, at p. 144.)  We rejected the argument.  After 
considering a variety of factors indicative of the Legislature’s intent, including 
the statute’s plain language, its history, and the structure of section 1192.7(c) in 
general, we concluded that, “[a]lthough section 1192.7(c)(6) certainly includes 
acts that, because of the perpetrator’s intent, are lewd or lascivious under . . . 
section 288, it is not limited to those acts.”  (Murphy, at p. 147.)  Instead, it 
includes all types of felonies that involve lewd conduct with children under 14 
years of age.  Section 288, we explained, “is part of a statutory scheme that 
 
10
recognizes that some touchings of children are always harmful and improper, 
whereas others may or may not be, depending upon the actor’s intent.  To address 
the former, the Legislature passed statutes—like section 288a, subdivision (c)(1) 
[oral copulation with a minor]—that precisely describe the inherently harmful 
acts and prohibit them in all circumstances.  To address the latter, the Legislature 
passed section 288.  And to implement this statutory scheme, [People v.] 
Martinez[, supra, 11 Cal.4th 434] reaffirmed a broad definition of a lewd or 
lascivious act that includes any touching committed with the [specific] intent 
section 288 describes, so as to extend protection beyond the inherently lewd acts 
precisely described and prohibited by the other statutes in the family of felony sex 
offenses.”  (Murphy, at p. 147.)  Accordingly, we held in Murphy that “[a]n act of 
oral copulation on a child under 14 years of age by a person more than 10 years 
older than the child is a lewd or lascivious act under the common and ordinary 
meaning of those words [as used in section 1192.7(c)(6)].”  (Murphy, at p. 143; 
see People v. Fox (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 394 [same re sexual intercourse with a 
child under the age of 14].) 
In sum, certain sexually based offenses require a showing of only general 
intent, that is, the intent to commit an act “without reference to intent to do a 
further act or achieve a future consequence.”  (People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 
76, 82.)  Other sex crimes, by contrast, require a showing of specific intent, 
meaning the intent to “do some further act or achieve some additional 
consequence.”  (Ibid.)  “[R]ape (§ 261), sodomy (§ 286), and oral copulation 
(§ 288a) are all general intent crimes and, hence, contain no ‘sexual gratification’ 
specific intent element . . . .”  (People v. Whitham (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1282, 
1293.)  Lewd or lascivious conduct in violation of section 288, subdivision (a), on 
the other hand, requires “the specific intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying 
 
11
the lust of the child or the accused.”  (People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 907, 
italics added.) 
No evidence was presented to the jury, or reviewed by the trial court, 
shedding any light on the facts underlying defendant’s Nebraska offense.  
Although the trier of fact was entitled to examine and consider the entire record 
of the prior conviction (People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 53), the only 
evidence the People introduced to prove the prior conviction was People’s exhibit 
No. 4, which included the Nebraska information charging defendant with sexual 
contact with a child, a list of potential witnesses to the crime, the clerk’s 
transcript indicating defendant’s plea of no contest, and his sentence of three to 
five years in prison, less applicable credits.  This evidence proved nothing more 
than the least adjudicated elements of the crime (People v. Rodriguez (1998) 17 
Cal.4th 253, 261-262); certainly no evidence was presented indicating defendant 
committed rape, oral copulation, sodomy, or any other sex crime for which only 
general intent need be shown.  Defendant’s conduct may have been limited to 
“the intentional touching of the victim’s clothing covering the immediate area of 
the victim’s sexual or intimate parts” under circumstances which could be 
“reasonably construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification 
of either party.”  (Neb. Rev. Stats., § 28-318(5).)  Were that the case, as we have 
explained, without a finding defendant acted with specific lewd intent, his 
behavior in Nebraska would not have constituted a violation of section 288 or, 
indeed, of any California criminal statute defining a felony.  The Court of Appeal 
below agreed, concluding that “[d]efendant is correct that the Nebraska statute 
does not have the same specific intent requirement as . . . section 288, subdivision 
(a).”  
The appellate court nevertheless concluded defendant’s felony conviction 
in Nebraska qualified as a serious felony conviction under section 1192.7(c)(6) 
 
12
because “the minor would reasonably construe the touching as sexual” and thus 
the act “would always be harmful and improper.”  We disagree.  Such a touching 
in the abstract, which involves no definite or specific sexual act, no penetration, 
and not even necessarily an awareness by the victim that he or she was touched, 
does not qualify as one of the proscribed touchings that, according to Murphy, are 
“always harmful and improper” and are a felony in this state on a showing of 
general intent only.  (Murphy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 147.)  As we explained in 
People v. Martinez, supra, 11 Cal.4th at page 450, “[i]t is common knowledge 
that children are routinely cuddled, disrobed, stroked, examined, and groomed as 
part of a normal and healthy upbringing.  On the other hand, any of these intimate 
acts may also be undertaken for the purpose of sexual arousal.  Thus, depending 
upon the actor’s motivation, innocent or sexual, such behavior may fall within or 
without the protective purposes of section 288.”  The acts underlying defendant’s 
Nebraska crime may have been of this type.  Absent a statutory mandate requiring 
the trier of fact to find defendant acted with specific lewd intent, his acts—albeit 
felonious in Nebraska—would not necessarily constitute a felony in this state.  So 
far as the record indicates, defendant did not commit an act the character of 
which is always considered harmful to children and that would be a crime in this 
state even in the absence of specific intent. 
Relying on Murphy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at page 145, the People contend 
that, even if the actions underlying defendant’s prior conviction in Nebraska 
would not come within a particular felony statute in this state, his behavior 
nevertheless contains all of the elements of the conduct specified in section 
1192.7(c)(6), namely, a “lewd or lascivious act on a child under the age of 14 
years.”  Because section 1192.7(c)(6) describes conduct rather than “discreet 
felony offenses,” the People argue, “it is immaterial whether a prior conviction 
 
13
lacks the specific intent present in section 288, subdivision (a), or otherwise 
amounts to any other discrete California felony offense.”  (Italics added.)   
To the extent the People suggest defendant’s Nebraska crime can qualify 
as a serious felony under section 1192.7(c) despite lacking all the elements of a 
qualifying California felony, they are mistaken.  As noted, for purposes of the 
three strikes law, to count as a strike, a prior foreign criminal conviction must be 
for an offense that, had it been committed in California, would have been a 
felony.  (§ 667, subd. (d)(2); see also § 18 [felonies are punishable by 
imprisonment in state prison].)  Nor does Murphy, supra, 25 Cal.4th 136, hold 
otherwise.  We nowhere suggested in Murphy that conduct qualifying as a serious 
felony under the law need not be felonious conduct.  
People v. Equarte (1986) 42 Cal.3d 456, cited by the Murphy court in 
support, similarly fails to support the People’s argument.  In that case, we 
addressed whether the defendant’s present crime, assault with a deadly weapon in 
violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1), qualified as a serious felony.  
Although that offense is not specifically listed as a serious felony in section 
1192.7(c), the trial court had ruled it was such because the defendant used a 
deadly weapon, thereby coming within section 1192.7(c)(23):  “any felony in 
which the defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon.”  The 
defendant in Equarte argued this latter description referred only to crimes in 
which a deadly weapon enhancement—section 12022, subdivision (b)—had been 
pleaded and proven.   
This court disagreed.  In addition to listing specific crimes, we explained, 
section 1192.7 also described certain criminal conduct deemed sufficiently 
serious to warrant additional criminal sanctions.  In support, we highlighted two 
 
14
categories of serious felonies set forth in section 1192.7 that do not directly 
correspond to specific crimes:  residential burglary (§ 1192.7(c)(18))6 and 
furnishing certain drugs to minors (§ 1192.7(c)(24)).  (People v. Equarte, supra, 
42 Cal.3d at p. 464.)  Like those categories, we stated, use of a deadly weapon in 
connection with some other felony, whether or not charged as an enhancement 
under section 12022, may be found to constitute a serious felony if the prosecutor 
properly pleads and proves that the defendant personally used such a weapon in 
the commission of the offense.  (Equarte, at p. 465.)  But we nowhere held that 
use of a deadly weapon, in connection with conduct not otherwise a felony, 
would also constitute a serious felony under section 1192.7(c).  Moreover, the 
two examples of criminal conduct—residential burglary and furnishing drugs to a 
minor—were clearly criminal conduct.   
In short, nothing in Murphy, supra, 25 Cal.4th 136, or in People v. 
Equarte, supra, 42 Cal.3d 456, supports the proposition that conduct or behavior 
not amounting to a felony if committed in California could nevertheless qualify as 
a serious felony under section 1192.7(c).   
The People also contend that because the Nebraska law prohibits touching 
a child in a manner that can be “reasonably construed” as done with a sexual 
motive, “the victim is more likely to be aware of [the] sexual purpose” of such a 
                                              
6  
When section 1192.7(c)(18) was first enacted, it included in the definition 
of a “serious felony” a “[b]urglary of an inhabited dwelling house, vessel, as 
defined in the Harbors and Navigation Code, which is inhabited and designed for 
habitation, floating home, as defined in subdivision (d) of Section 18075.55 of the 
Health and Safety Code, trailer coach, as defined by the Vehicle Code, or the 
inhabited portion of any other building.”  (Stats. 1998, ch. 754, § 1.)  Proposition 
21, which passed on March 7, 2000, amended section 1192.7(c)(18) to read:  “any 
burglary of the first degree.”  (See People v. Garrett (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1417, 
1420-1421.) 
 
15
touching and will be harmed more by such a touching than by a violation of 
section 288, subdivision (a), “which can be effectuated through a touching that is 
objectively no different than the ‘cuddling’ associated with a ‘normal and healthy 
upbringing.’ ”  Even if the People were correct, a point we need not resolve here, 
we cannot conclude defendant’s prior conviction in Nebraska is a qualifying 
serious felony unless it meets the criteria set forth by our Legislature or by the 
electorate, having exercised the initiative power.  Because no evidence was 
presented to prove defendant committed a crime in Nebraska that contains all of 
the elements of a felony in California that would qualify as a “serious felony” 
under section 1192.7(c), he was not properly subject to a serious-felony sentence 
enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a).  In addition, the Court of Appeal 
erred in finding defendant’s prior Nebraska conviction would, on remand, render 
him vulnerable to sentencing under the three strikes law. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeal’s decision reversing the trial court’s finding that 
defendant was a habitual sexual offender under section 667.71, and its decision 
affirming defendant’s three convictions for violating section 288, subdivision (a), 
were not included in this court’s limitation of the issues and are therefore 
unaffected by our decision today.  The judgment of the appellate court affirming 
imposition of the five-year serious-felony sentence enhancement under section 
667, subdivision (a), as well as its implicit conclusion that defendant’s prior 
Nebraska conviction rendered him eligible, on remand, to be sentenced under the  
 
16
three strikes law, are reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with the views expressed herein. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY BAXTER, J. 
 
We granted review to decide when a prior out-of-state conviction 
constitutes a “lewd or lascivious act on [an underage] child” for serious felony 
sentencing purposes (Pen. Code, § 1192.7, subd. (c)(6))1 — a category that 
includes sexually motivated touching (§ 288, subd. (a) (section 288(a))) and sexual 
penetration.  (See People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 141-149.)  I agree with 
the majority that qualifying foreign convictions must contain “all of the elements” 
of such a serious felony in California.  (§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (d)(2).)  Plainly, the 
latter requirement excludes conduct that is not lewd, lascivious, and felonious 
because it either lacks sexual intent or is not inherently sexual in nature. 
I am less sanguine about the majority’s conclusion that the Nebraska lewd 
touching statute under which defendant was previously convicted lacks the same 
mens rea as section 288(a), California’s comparable law.  (Ibid. [requiring specific 
intent to arouse or gratify sexual desires of defendant or victim]; see People v. 
Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 444-445.)  As explained below, the Nebraska 
statute may reasonably be interpreted to require actual sexual intent.  Moreover, 
the majority fails to persuade me that the Nebraska courts have directly confronted 
the issue and squarely rejected actual sexual intent as an element of the Nebraska 
offense.  Contrary to what the majority seems to imply, several states have lewd 
                                              
1  
All unlabled statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
 
2 
touching laws like Nebraska’s.  Hence, the present case may have the unintended 
effect under California’s sentencing scheme of treating many recidivist child 
molesters as first time offenders, an issue the Legislature may wish to address. 
Nevertheless, I am not willing to subject this defendant to serious-felony 
consequences without greater certainty under Nebraska law of the requirements 
for violating that state’s lewd touching statute.  I therefore reluctantly concur in 
the outcome of the majority opinion. 
DISCUSSION 
Three years before he committed the present crimes against his three-year-
old stepdaughter, defendant was convicted under Nebraska Revised Statutes 
section 28-320.01 (1995) of felony “sexual contact” with another stepdaughter, 
who was then four years old.  At that time, and as pertinent here, Nebraska 
Revised Statutes section 28-318(5) defined “sexual contact” between an adult and 
underage victim as the “intentional touching” of “sexual or intimate parts,” 
whether clothed or unclothed, where the act “can be reasonably construed as being 
for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification of either party.”  The majority 
insists that a statutory violation occurs where the defendant “intend[ed] to touch 
the victim” under circumstances which could be “ ‘reasonably construed’ ” as 
sexual, and that the act need not be performed “for any particular purpose” or 
“with any specific intent.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 5.)  Under this view of the 
Nebraska law, the defendant’s actual intent to achieve sexual arousal is not an 
element, and the proscribed touching is criminal if it objectively seems lewd to an 
outside observer. 
I am not persuaded that this construction is compelled by the statutory 
language “on its face.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 5.)  Nor has the Nebraska Supreme 
Court held that “proof of specific lewd intent” is unnecessary under Nebraska 
Revised Statutes section 28-318(5).  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 6.)  Indeed, defendant 
 
3 
candidly states in supplemental briefing solicited by this court that no Nebraska 
decision “specifically considers” the issue.  An examination of the two provisions 
and relevant case law suggests that Nebraska’s lewd touching statute may, in fact, 
contain the same mental state as California’s version of the crime. 
One plausible view of the “reasonably construed” language is simply that it 
allows the jury to infer actual sexual intent from circumstantial evidence.  The 
legislative purpose may only have been to ensure that the fact finder need not 
accept the defendant’s disclaimers of sexual purpose where it is otherwise clear he 
actually had that intent.  However, by entirely excising such an intent requirement 
from the statute, the majority’s construction would preclude either side from 
litigating the issue.  It would insulate from conviction those defendants who 
intentionally touch a child’s private parts under objectively innocuous 
circumstances (e.g., relatives and caretakers), but who actually possess harmful 
lewd intent.  The majority offers no evidence that Nebraska lawmakers desired 
that result. 
As judicially construed, Nebraska Revised Statutes section 28-318(5) 
sounds more like a specific intent, than a general intent, provision.  Though not 
fully explored by the majority, Nebraska cases have said that the prohibited act 
must be committed “for the purpose of sexual gratification,” with no suggestion 
that the defendant’s true state of mind is irrelevant to this determination.  (State v. 
Max (1992) 1 Neb.App. 257, 265 [492 N.W.2d 887, 893] [allowing expert 
evidence on penile nature of anal contact to prove sexual purpose]; accord, State v. 
Styskal (1992) 242 Neb. 26, 30 [493 N.W.2d 313, 317] [allowing evidence of prior 
touchings of victims’ private parts during dental examinations to prove that 
“purpose” and “intent” of subsequent similar act was “for sexual arousal and 
gratification”].) 
 
4 
No Nebraska Supreme Court case cited by the majority clearly supports its 
contrary view.  In State v. Berkman (1988) 230 Neb. 163 [430 N.W.2d 310], for 
instance, the defendant caressed and kissed his girlfriend’s 13-year-old daughter, 
and rubbed her breasts and vaginal area for over a minute.  On appeal, the 
defendant claimed the evidence was insufficient to support his lewd touching 
conviction because he lacked the requisite intent.  The Nebraska high court 
rejected the claim.  The court emphasized that “[t]he intent with which an act is 
committed is a mental process and may be inferred from the words and acts of the 
defendant and from the circumstances surrounding the incident.”  (Id. at p. 166 
[430 N.W.2d p. 313].)  According to the court, the intimate nature of the touching 
raised a strong inference that it was “intentional and for the purpose of [the 
defendant’s] sexual arousal or gratification.”  (Id. at p. 167 [430 N.W.2d at 
p. 313].)  Nothing in this description of the statute suggests sexual purpose and 
intent are unnecessary or irrelevant in proving guilt. 
The foregoing authorities can be read to suggest that Nebraska Revised 
Statutes section 28-318(5) requires actual sexual intent, as “reasonably” inferred 
from all the circumstances by the trier of fact.  Indeed, this court has described 
section 288(a), including the requisite mental state, in language strikingly similar 
to that used by the Nebraska courts.  Section 288(a) prohibits any sexually 
motivated contact with an underage child.  (People v. Martinez, supra, 11 Cal.4th 
434, 444-445.)  We have said that, in determining guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 
the fact finder “ ‘looks to all the circumstances, including the charged act, to 
determine whether it was performed with the required specific intent.’ ”  (Id. at 
p. 445.)  Likewise, a particular touching is made criminal in California “by 
reference to the actor’s intent as inferred from all the circumstances.”  (Id. at 
p. 450.)  I see no clear sign that Nebraska and California have construed their lewd 
 
5 
touching statutes differently with respect to the mental state needed to commit the 
crime. 
The majority’s reliance on Michigan law, which defendant cites in his 
supplemental briefing, arguably adds little to the analysis.  Like Nebraska, 
Michigan criminalizes any “intentional touching” between an adult and underage 
child of “intimate parts,” whether or not clothed, if the act “can reasonably be 
construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification, done for a 
sexual purpose, or [done] in a sexual manner . . . .”  (Mich. Comp. Laws, 
§ 750.520a(n).)  The majority cites two intermediate court decisions for the 
proposition that the Michigan statute describes “ ‘a general intent crime,’ ” and 
that “ ‘a defendant’s specific intent is not at issue.’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 7-8, 
quoting People v. Piper (1997) 223 Mich.App. 642, 646 [567 N.W.2d 483, 485]; 
see People v. Fisher (1977) 77 Mich.App. 6, 13 [257 N.W.2d 250, 254].)  
However, even assuming these principles and authorities are well established in 
Michigan, they have never been cited or used by the Nebraska courts in 
interpreting the mental state requirements of their own law.  As noted earlier, 
Nebraska courts have instead described the lewd touching statute in terms echoing 
those this court has used under section 288(a). 
Moreover, the majority fails to observe that Michigan does not have the 
only lewd touching law similar to Nebraska’s.  Several other states also ban 
“intentional touching[s]” of “intimate” parts that can “reasonably” be “construed” 
as having a sexual purpose.  (E.g., Md. Crim. Code Ann., § 3-301(f); N.H. Rev. 
Stat. Ann., § 632-A:1(IV); R.I. Gen. Laws, § 11-37-1(7); Tenn. Code Ann., § 39-
13-501(6).)  Defendant cites no decision from any of these jurisdictions, and I am 
aware of none, concluding that specific or actual intent is not an element of these 
crimes.  In addition, two high court decisions from other states have resisted such 
an interpretation under former sexual touching laws similar to Nebraska’s current 
 
6 
statute.  (State v. Wield (2003) 266 Wis.2d 872, 880-882 & fn. 5 [668 N.W.2d 823, 
827-829 & fn. 5] [sentencing case equating former and current versions of statute 
requiring sexual purpose, even though former version said such purpose must 
“reasonably be construed” as sexual]; State v. Tibbetts (Mn. 1979) 281 N.W.2d 
499, 500 [instructional case invalidating “reasonably be construed” language 
appearing in former version of statute because it undermined reasonable doubt 
standard].)  Against this backdrop, the majority arguably overstates the 
significance of Michigan law in deciphering Nebraska law. 
In light of the foregoing, I have serious reservations about the majority’s 
conclusion that defendant’s prior Nebraska conviction lacks all of the elements of 
a lewd act amounting to a serious felony under section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(6).  
Nebraska statutory and decisional law suggest the opposite may be true. 
That said, I am reluctant to uphold a serious-felony determination based on 
a prior foreign conviction where the courts in that particular state have not 
precisely defined each element of the crime.  The consequences at stake, here and 
in other cases, include application of both the five-year serious-felony 
enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)), and the three strikes law (id., subds. (b)-(i)).  
Before any California court decides that a foreign conviction qualifies as a serious 
felony for such sentencing purposes, it should be more certain than I am now that 
the requisite congruity exists.  On that basis, I join the majority in reversing the 
Court of Appeal judgment insofar as it reaches a contrary result. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
I CONCUR: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Warner 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 119 Cal.App.4th 331 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S126233 
Date Filed: August 10, 2006 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Sacramento 
Judge: Roland L. Candee 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
John Ward, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Gary M. Mandinach for the California Public Defender’s Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief 
Assistant Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Patrick J. Whalen, Janet E. 
Neeley, Stan Cross and Lee E. Seale, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
John Ward 
584 Castro Street, #802 
San Francisco, CA  94114 
(415) 255-4996 
 
Lee E. Seale 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 324-5305