Title: Atchison v. IPC Industries, Inc.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

rel: 10/14/2011
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2011-2012
_________________________
1100764
_________________________
Ex parte McNeese Title, LLC, et al.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  James E. Atchison
v.
IPC Industries, Inc., et al.)
(Mobile Circuit Court, CV-10-900356)
WOODALL, Justice.
McNeese Title, LLC, a Florida limited liability company
owned and  operated  by  Richard McNeese, and Richard McNeese
1100764
2
(hereinafter referred to collectively as "McNeese"), and Peggy
S. Owens petition this Court for a writ of mandamus, directing
the Mobile Circuit Court to vacate its order denying the
motions of McNeese and Owens to dismiss the action filed
against them by Mobile County resident James E. Atchison and
to enter an order dismissing the action for lack of in
personam jurisdiction.  We grant the petition and issue the
writ.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
This dispute arose out of Atchison's purchase of two
residential lots in the Villa Lago subdivision ("the
subdivision"), which was originally a 14-acre tract of land in
the Golf and Beach Resort of Sandestin, Florida.  On September
29, 2005, Atchison  signed two documents entitled "Sandestin
Villa Lago Subdivision Home Purchase and Sale Agreement" ("the
agreements") for the purchase of two lots, namely, lots 61 and
81.  Each of the agreements required Atchison to pay to
McNeese Title a "non-refundable deposit" of $15,000.  The
seller was identified as C-D Jones & Company, Inc. ("C-D
Jones"), of Destin, Florida.  The agreements stated, in
pertinent part:
1100764
3
"3. Payment of Purchase Price.  The purchase price
specified above shall be paid as follows:
"(a) Deposit.  Upon complete execution of
this Agreement, [Atchison] shall deposit
with Seller's escrow agent, McNeese Title,
LLC, whose address is ...  Destin, Florida
... (the 'Agent'), that Deposit described
above to be held until closing in a
federally 
insured 
non-interest 
bearing
account until closing.
"(b) Remainder.  The remaining Purchase
Price for the Lot along with [Atchison's]
closing costs shall be paid by cashier's
check or wire transfer of funds to Seller
at the Closing described here.
"4. Closing.  The closing of the Lot (the 'Closing')
shall be held at the office of [McNeese Title], on
such a date as the parties may hereafter agree, but
in no event later than the Closing Date described
above (unless extended pursuant to Paragraph 26
hereof), 
time 
being 
of 
the 
essence 
of 
this
Agreement. ...
"....
"26. Contingencies to Close.  This contract and the
obligations of the parties herein are specifically
contingent upon the following:
"....
"(b) The successful closing of all Lots
within the subdivision on or before the
Closing Date.  In the event the closings of
all Lots do not occur on or before the
Closing Date, the Closing Date may be
extended, at the option of Seller, for a
period not to exceed sixty (60) days."
1100764
331 Partners, LLC, is a Florida limited liability
1
company, having its primary place of business in Mobile. 
4
(Emphasis added.) 
According to Atchison,  these agreements were sent to him
by  the "developers," who, he says, "developed, marketed and
sold  the  lots"  in the subdivision.  Atchison's brief, at 4.
He identifies those developers as C-D Jones and 331 Partners,
LLC.   In that connection, Atchison also signed a "compliance
1
agreement limited power of attorney," designating Richard
McNeese or Owens as Atchison's "attorney in fact for [his] use
and benefit, ... for the purpose of ... signing or initialing
on [his] behalf, any and all documents affecting the closing
or refinance of the [lots]."  The closing was held on November
3, 2005, at which time  Atchison allegedly paid McNeese "no
less than $683,589."  At that time, however, many of the other
lots in the subdivision had not closed, contrary to ¶ 26(b) of
the agreements. 
Eventually, Atchison sued a number of individuals and
entities, including C-D Jones, 331 Partners, McNeese, and
Owens, alleging that he had suffered damage as a result of
activities conducted by C-D Jones and 331 Partners after the
1100764
According to Atchison, Owens is an officer or employee
2
of McNeese Title.
5
closing.  Essentially, the counts against McNeese and Owens2
averred that McNeese knowingly misrepresented to Atchison just
prior to closing that all the lots in the subdivision had sold
and would close by the closing date for his lots as required
by ¶ 26(b) of the agreements; that McNeese nevertheless
accepted Atchison's payments on the date of closing and paid
the amount over to the developers without ensuring compliance
with ¶ 26(b) of the agreements, thus resulting in damage to
Atchison because of the post-closing activities of C-D Jones
and 331 Partners.
McNeese and Owens moved to dismiss the action for lack of
personal  jurisdiction.   See  Rule  12(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P.
Their motions were accompanied by affidavits addressing the
limited extent of their contacts with Alabama.  The trial
court denied the motions to dismiss; this mandamus petition
followed.
II. Discussion
"[A] petition for a writ of mandamus is the proper device
by which to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss for
lack of in personam jurisdiction."  Ex parte Dill, Dill, Carr,
1100764
6
Stonbraker & Hutchings, P.C., 866 So. 2d 519, 525 (Ala. 2003).
"A petitioner may be entitled to a writ of mandamus in such a
case upon a showing of a clear legal right to an order
dismissing the action against it."  Ex parte First Western
Bank, 898 So. 2d 701, 704 (Ala. 2004).  "'The burden of
establishing a clear legal right to the relief sought rests
with the petitioner.'"  Ex parte Dangerfield, 49 So. 3d 675,
680 (Ala. 2010) (quoting Ex parte Metropolitan Prop. & Cas.
Ins. Co., 974 So. 2d 967, 972 (Ala. 2007)). 
Jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants is acquired
pursuant to Rule 4.2(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., which provides, in
pertinent part: 
"An appropriate basis exists for service of process
outside of this state upon a person or entity in any
action in this state when the person or entity has
such contacts with this state that the prosecution
of the action against the person or entity in this
state is not inconsistent with the constitution of
this state or the Constitution of the United States
...."
In other words, "[t]his rule extends the personal jurisdiction
of Alabama courts to the limit of due process under the United
States and Alabama Constitutions."  Hiller Invs., Inc. v.
Insultech  Group,  Inc.,  957  So. 2d  1111, 1115 (Ala. 2006).
1100764
7
Under this rule, the exercise of jurisdiction is appropriate
so long as the out-of-state defendant has "'some minimum
contacts with this state [so that] ... it is fair and
reasonable to require the person to come to this state to
defend an action.'"  Dillon Equities v. Palmer & Cay, Inc.,
501 So. 2d 459, 461 (Ala. 1986) (quoting former Rule
4.2(a)(2)(I), Ala. R. Civ. P.).
According to McNeese and Owens, Atchison has failed to
show that jurisdiction over them is proper in this case.
Specifically, they argue:
"[I]n this case, [Atchison's] Complaint and Amended
Complaint are completely devoid of any factual
allegations 
that 
would 
establish 
personal
jurisdiction over the [Petitioners].  Instead, the
Complaint and Amended Complaint contain only generic
allegations that the Petitioners are subject to
personal jurisdiction in Alabama, with no supporting
factual allegations.  Indeed, the Complaint and
Amended Complaint contain no factual allegations
whatsoever 
as 
to 
any 
contacts 
between 
the
Petitioners and the State of Alabama.  Based on this
fact alone, Petitioners believe [Atchison's] claims
against them are due to be dismissed for want of
personal jurisdiction, regardless of any other
evidentiary submissions."
Petition, at 9.  We agree.
"This Court has explained the appropriate
analysis and the parties' respective burdens on a
personal-jurisdiction 
issue 
as 
follows. 
'The
plaintiff has the burden of proving that the trial
1100764
8
court  has personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
Ex parte Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904 So. 2d 226
(Ala. 2004).'  J.C. Duke & Assocs. Gen. Contractors,
Inc. v. West, 991 So. 2d 194, 196 (Ala. 2008).
"'"'In considering a Rule
12(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion
to dismiss for want of personal
jurisdiction, 
a 
court 
must
consider as true the allegations
of the plaintiff's complaint not
controverted by the defendant's
affidavits, Robinson v. Giarmarco
& Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253 (11th
Cir. 
1996), 
and 
Cable/Home
Communication Corp. v. Network
Productions, Inc., 902 F.2d 829
(11th Cir. 1990), and "where the
plaintiff's complaint and the
defendant's affidavits conflict,
the ... court must construe all
reasonable inferences in favor of
the plaintiff."  Robinson, 74
F.3d at 255 (quoting Madara v.
Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th
Cir. 1990)).'"
"'Wenger Tree Serv. v. Royal Truck &
Equip., Inc., 853 So. 2d 888, 894 (Ala.
2002) (quoting Ex parte McInnis, 820 So. 2d
795, 798 (Ala. 2001)).  However, if the
defendant makes a prima facie evidentiary
showing that the Court has no personal
jurisdiction, 
"the 
plaintiff 
is 
then
required 
to 
substantiate 
the 
jurisdictional
allegations in the complaint by affidavits
or other competent proof, and he may not
merely reiterate the factual allegations in
the complaint."  Mercantile Capital, LP v.
Federal Transtel, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 2d
1243, 1247 (N.D. Ala. 2002) (citing Future
Tech. Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys.,
1100764
9
218 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 2000)). See
also Hansen v. Neumueller GmbH, 163 F.R.D.
471, 474-75 (D. Del. 1995) ("When a
defendant 
files 
a 
motion 
to 
dismiss
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), and
supports that motion with affidavits,
plaintiff is required to controvert those
affidavits with his own affidavits or other
competent evidence in order to survive the
motion.") (citing Time Share Vacation Club
v. Atlantic Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 63
(3d Cir. 1984)).'
"Ex parte Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904 So. 2d
226, 229-30 (Ala. 2004) (emphasis added; footnote
omitted)."
Ex parte Excelsior Fin., Inc., 42 So. 3d 96, 103 (Ala. 2010).
   However, when the complaint fails to allege any
jurisdictional basis, "there is nothing in the complaint ...
that the court must consider as true and that therefore places
[any]  burden  on [the defendant] to controvert by affidavit."
Excelsior, 42 So. 3d at 104 (defendant need not present
evidence of absence of jurisdiction when the complaint
contains no jurisdictional averments).  
Atchison does not direct us to any paragraphs of the
complaint, as amended, that he contends specifically allege
jurisdiction.  However, according to Atchison, his complaint
alleged 
that 
"the 
McNeese 
defendants 
were 
agents,
representatives and co-conspirators of the developers and
1100764
10
marketers associated with the development and sale of [the
subdivision]."  Atchison's brief, at 11 (citing ¶¶ 39, 40, 42,
57-60, and 61-82 of his complaint).  
Although it is true that personal jurisdiction may, in
some cases, be obtained by "imputing conduct to an alleged
coconspirator who has personally performed no overt act in
Alabama," Ex parte Reindel, 963 So. 2d 614, 624 (Ala. 2007),
"it is well established in Alabama that a plaintiff cannot
establish personal jurisdiction under a conspiracy theory
unless 
the 
plaintiff 'plead[s] with particularity the
conspiracy as well as the overt acts within the forum taken in
furtherance of the conspiracy.'"  Matthews v. Brookstone
Stores, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1066 (S.D. Ala. 2007)
(quoting Ex parte McInnis, 820 So. 2d 795, 806-07 (Ala.
2001)). See also Ex parte Troncalli Chrysler Plymouth Dodge,
Inc., 876 So. 2d 459 (Ala. 2003) (plaintiff is not entitled to
discovery on jurisdictional issue where the complaint does not
"'at least allege facts that would support a colorable claim
of jurisdiction.'" (quoting Schenck v. Walt Disney Co., 742 F.
Supp. 838, 840 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1990))).
1100764
11
In that connection, Atchison's first amended complaint
avers, in pertinent part:
"39. On November 3, 2005, after McNeese Title,
McNeese and Owens, actually and/or constructively
received Atchison's money, to-wit no less than
$683,589, C-D Jones and 331 Partners engaged in a
collusive transaction whereby 331 Partners purported
to sell lots in Villa Lago Subdivision, including
Lots 61 and 81, to C-D Jones in exchange for the
money previously transferred by Atchison and the
other buyers of Villa Lago lots, (hereinafter
referred to as the '331/C-D Jones Land Transfer').
"40. At the time of the 331/C-D Jones Land
Transfer, 331 Partners and C-D Jones were partners,
joint venturers and co-conspirators in a fraudulent
scheme to sell the lots to Atchison and other
similarly 
situated 
buyers 
under 
circumstances
constituting a fraudulent transfer under the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfers Act.
"....
"42. The transfer made through the 331/C-D Jones
Land Transfer was done with knowledge and/or
participation by Defendants ... McNeese Title,
McNeese and Owens, and with the actual intent to
hinder, delay or defraud Atchison, who was then or
subsequently became a Creditor of Debtors 331
Partners, C-D Jones and/or McNeese Title.
"....
"57. The transfer of assets from C-D Jones to
Defendant McNeese Title was done with knowledge
and/or participation by Defendant McNeese Title and
with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud
Atchison, who was then or subsequently became a
Creditor of C-D Jones.
1100764
12
"58. After McNeese Title received the assets of
C-D Jones and/or Atchison, McNeese and/or Owens
received all or part of said assets without payment
of reasonably equivalent value through dividends
and/or distributions from McNeese Title.
"59. In the case of each distribution by McNeese
Title 
to 
Defendant 
McNeese 
and/or 
Owens 
the
dividend(s) or distribution(s) were done under
circumstances constituting a fraudulent transfer
under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act.
"60. At the time of each distribution by McNeese
Title to McNeese and/or Owens, said Defendant(s) was
an Insider of McNeese Title and the dividend(s) or
distribution(s) 
which 
was 
received 
by 
said
Defendant(s) 
was 
made 
and 
accepted 
under
circumstances constituting a fraudulent transfer
under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act."
(Emphasis added.)
These paragraphs contain no jurisdictional averments.  To
be sure, ¶ 40 does use the terms "partners," "joint
venturers," and  "co-conspirators."  However, the allegations
in these paragraphs are directed solely to the merits of the
claims against C-D Jones and 331 Partners, that is, they do
not purport to identify a basis for jurisdiction.  In other
words, they allege no "'overt acts within the forum taken in
furtherance of the conspiracy.'"  Matthews v. Brookstone
Stores, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 2d at 1066 (quoting Ex parte
McInnis, 820 So. 2d at 806-07 (emphasis added)).   
1100764
13
Moreover, ¶ 40 fails even to mention McNeese.  Indeed,
Atchison states in his brief in support of the petition:
"Because this Petition involves only the challenge to
jurisdiction filed by McNeese Title, LLC, Richard McNeese and
Peggy Owens, ... discussion will be limited to their
involvement in the sale of the lots with references to other
parties  only  as  needed."    Atchison's  brief,  at  2  n.1.
However, without integrating the specific activities of
McNeese and Owens with those of the entities of which they are
alleged to be agents or coconspirators, it is difficult -- if
not impossible -- to impute the conduct of such others to
McNeese and Owens.  Thus, the complaint contains no specific
averments of conspiracy or agency.   
Similarly, although it mentions McNeese in passing, ¶ 39
is devoted to allegations concerning C-D Jones and 331
Partners.  The allegations are directed entirely to the merits
of the claims against those defendants and do not purport to
reveal how the selling of the lots in the subdivision, which
is located in Florida,  might form a basis for jurisdiction in
Alabama over any defendant. 
1100764
14
Paragraphs 42 and 57 aver in virtually identical terms
that Richard McNeese or McNeese Title knew about, and
participated in, the alleged sales of lots/transfer of assets
in order to "defraud Atchison."  They do not allege that such
sales or transfer -- or any other relevant activity --
occurred in Alabama.  The averments in ¶¶ 58-60 are similarly
restricted to the merits of the case, that is, they merely
allege that distributions were made from McNeese Title to
Richard 
McNeese 
and/or 
Owens 
"under 
circumstances 
constituting
a fraudulent transfer under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers
Act."  Thus, they are irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes.
Paragraphs 61-82 of the complaint, which are not quoted
above, are as jurisdictionally insignificant as the paragraphs
just discussed.  Paragraphs 69-71 aver that Richard McNeese
made certain misrepresentations to Atchison but fail to
disclose  the  mode  or  location  of  those  conversations.
Likewise, ¶¶ 72-73 aver that Atchison executed a power of
attorney in favor of McNeese but allege no specifics regarding
the location or manner of that transaction.  In essence, ¶¶
61-82 merely purport to describe the manner in which McNeese
allegedly  breached  "contractual  obligations"  to  Atchison.
1100764
15
Conspicuously absent are references to the situs of any
relevant conduct of McNeese or to the identity of the party
initiating the transactions.  Such factors would be material
for jurisdictional purposes, as this Court has noted.  See,
e.g., Hiller Invs., Inc. v. Insultech Group, Inc., 957 So. 2d
at  1119 (the first-contact factor is "highly significant");
Ex parte Phase III Constr., Inc., 723 So. 2d 1263, 1265 (Ala.
1998) (jurisdiction was proper where the foreign defendant
initiated the business contact with the Alabama resident); and
Ex parte AmSouth Bank, N.A., 675 So. 2d 1305, 1308 (Ala. 1996)
(discussing Steel Processors, Inc. v.  Sue's Pump, Inc.,
Rentals, 622 So. 2d 910 (Ala. 1993), in which this Court found
no 
personal 
jurisdiction 
"where 
(1) 
the 
contractual
relationship was initiated by the Alabama plaintiff, (2) 'the
repair project in Florida was developed by an Ohio business;
[3] the repairs were made in Florida; and [4] no goods or
services went out of Florida.'"). 
In short, Atchison's first amended complaint failed to
allege any basis for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction
over McNeese and Owens and, therefore, "place[d] [no] burden
on [McNeese and Owens] to controvert [anything] by affidavit."
1100764
16
Ex parte Excelsior, 42 So. 3d at 104.  Because the first
amended complaint contains no factual averments to the effect
that McNeese and Owens purposefully directed their activities
at Alabama, we need not analyze the evidence they offered in
support of their motions.  Id.  Consequently, McNeese and
Owens have demonstrated a clear legal right to an order
dismissing the action against them.  
III. Conclusion
For the above-stated reasons, we grant the petition and
direct the trial court to dismiss the claims against McNeese
and Owens based on a lack of in personam jurisdiction.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Malone, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Shaw, Main, and
Wise, JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., concurs in the result.
 
1100764
17
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in the result).
The main opinion begins its analysis by quoting the
following argument made by McNeese Title, LLC, and Richard
McNeese (hereinafter referred to collectively as "McNeese")
and Peggy S. Owens:
"'[T]he Complaint and Amended Complaint contain no
factual allegations whatsoever as to any contacts
between the Petitioners and the State of Alabama.
Based on this fact alone, Petitioners believe [James
E. Atchison's] claims against them are due to be
dismissed 
for 
want 
of 
personal 
jurisdiction,
regardless of any other evidentiary submissions.'"
___ So.  3d at ___.  The main opinion then states that it
agrees with this argument.  I do not.  
The main opinion embraces the notion that a complaint
that fails to allege grounds for personal jurisdiction must be
dismissed based merely upon this fact.  In so doing, I believe
it recognizes a new basis for dismissal of a claim, one that
does not fit within either Rule 12(b)(2) or Rule 12(b)(6),
Ala. R. Civ. P.
Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a complaint should be
dismissed if it "fail[s] to state a claim" cognizable under
Alabama law.  That is not what is at issue here.  The question
1100764
18
of in personam jurisdiction is a question that, instead, is
governed by Rule 12(b)(2).  
Unlike Rule 12(b)(6), Rule 12(b)(2) does not entitle a
defendant to dismissal upon a plaintiff's "failure to state"
personal jurisdiction, but only if there is in fact a lack of
personal jurisdiction.  Accordingly, for a defendant to be
entitled to a dismissal there must at least be some
evidentiary showing sufficient to satisfy the court that, as
a matter of fact, Alabama courts do not have personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.  
The purpose of this Court's holding in Ex parte Covington
Pike Dodge, Inc., 904 So. 2d 226 (Ala. 2004), was to explain
the circumstances under which the defendant will have been
deemed to have made a sufficient evidentiary showing to carry
the day.  On neither its facts nor its express holding can
Covington Pike Dodge be said to address whether a defendant is
entitled to the dismissal of a complaint solely because the
complaint contains no express allegations as to personal
jurisdiction.  We are made aware of no case holding as to a
state court of general jurisdiction that a rule of procedure
comparable to Alabama's Rule 12(b)(2) provides a basis for the
1100764
19
dismissal of a complaint based merely on the failure of the
complaint to allege facts regarding personal jurisdiction. 
Instead, Covington Pike Dodge addressed the issue of
which would prevail as between mere allegations in a
complaint, on the one hand, and sworn averments presented in
opposition thereto by a defendant, on the other hand.
Covington Pike Dodge and its progeny do not address the
question of the appropriate outcome when a defendant has made
no averments in support of a motion under Rule 12(b)(2) but,
instead, merely alleges a lack of personal jurisdiction or, as
here, seeks to rely merely on the fact that the complaint
contains no allegations in favor of personal jurisdiction.
Similarly, this Court's decision in Ex parte Excelsior
Financial, Inc., 42 So. 3d 96, 103 (Ala. 2010), relied upon by
the main opinion, states only that "'[t]he plaintiff has the
burden of proving that the trial court has personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.'"  (Quoting J.C. Duke &
Assocs.  Gen.  Contractors, Inc.  v.  West, 991 So. 2d 194,
196 (Ala. 2008).)  Nothing in Covington Pike Dodge or
Excelsior states that "[t]he plaintiff has the burden of
pleading that the trial court has personal jurisdiction over
1100764
20
the defendant."  I believe today's opinion incorrectly reads
such an additional requirement into Excelsior, Covington Pike
Dodge, and Rule 12(b)(2).
Quoting Covington Pike Dodge, 904 So.  2d at 229 (quoting
in turn Wenger Tree Service v. Royal Truck & Equip., Inc., 853
So. 2d 888, 894 (Ala. 2002)), the Court in Excelsior explained
that, "'[i]n considering a Rule 12(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P.,
motion to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction, a court
must consider as true the allegations of the plaintiff's
complaint not controverted by the defendant's affidavits" and
that, "'where the plaintiff's complaint and the defendant's
affidavits conflict, the ... court must construe all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.'"  Excelsior,
42 So. 3d at 103 (emphasis and internal quotation marks
omitted).  Although Excelsior and Wenger Tree Service
correctly observe that "a court must consider as true the
allegations of the plaintiff's complaint not controverted by
the defendant's affidavits," nothing in either of those cases
holds that there must be allegations in the plaintiff's
complaint regarding the basis for personal jurisdiction over
the defendants.  The point of both cases -- indeed, all the
1100764
21
related cases cited in Excelsior -- is that when a complaint
does contain allegations setting forth potential bases for the
exercise of personal jurisdiction, a defendant can prevail on
a Rule 12(b)(2) motion only if it controverts those
allegations with evidence.  Excelsior then goes on to explain
that it is when sufficient allegations of grounds for personal
jurisdiction are not "left standing" in the complaint after a
comparison 
is 
made 
with 
the 
defendant's 
evidentiary
submissions that the plaintiff must meet the evidentiary
submissions of the defendant with evidence of its own in order
to avoid a dismissal of the complaint.  "'[I]f the defendant
makes a prima facie evidentiary showing that the Court has no
personal jurisdiction, "the plaintiff is then required to
substantiate the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint
by affidavits or other competent proof, and he may not merely
reiterate the factual allegations in the complaint."'"
Excelsior, 42 So.  3d at 103 (quoting Covington Pike Dodge,
904 So.  2d at 229, quoting in turn Mercantile Capital, LP v.
Federal Transtel, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1247 (N.D. Ala.
2002)) (emphasis omitted; emphasis added).  Nothing in
Excelsior (or for that matter Covington Pike Dodge or related
1100764
As the defendants, McNeese and Owens, themselves put it
3
in their petition in this case, "once the defendant makes a
prima 
facie 
showing 
that 
the 
Court 
lacks 
personal
jurisdiction, the plaintiff must then substantiate any
jurisdictional allegations with competent proof."  Petition,
at 8, citing Ex parte Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 15 So. 3d
511, 515 (Ala.  2009) (emphasis added).  The petition goes on
to say that, "because Petitioners have presented a prima facie
evidentiary showing that they are not subject to personal
jurisdiction in Alabama, the burden shifts back to the
Plaintiff to establish personal jurisdiction by competent
proof." Petition, at 10 (emphasis added).
22
cases) states that when a defendant does not put on a prima
facie evidentiary showing of lack of personal jurisdiction,
the plaintiff nonetheless labors under a pleading requirement
as 
to 
personal 
jurisdiction 
that, 
if 
not 
satisfied,
necessitates the dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint upon
the defendant's mere request.3
I note that later in the Excelsior opinion the Court
states that it is "do[ing] something Excelsior has failed to
do -- analyz[ing] the [plaintiffs'] complaint for specific
allegations 
that 
relate to personal jurisdiction over
Excelsior."  42 So.  3d at 103.  The Court undertook this
analysis in Excelsior, however, not because every complaint
must contain allegations of personal jurisdiction, but because
in Excelsior itself the defendant did make a prima facie
evidentiary showing and, under the principles laid out in
1100764
23
Covington Pike Dodge, it became necessary for this Court to
determine if there were allegations in the complaint "left
standing" in the face of that evidentiary showing that would
provide a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction. 
The main opinion contains the following statement:
"[W]hen 
the 
complaint 
fails 
to 
allege 
any
jurisdictional basis, 'there is nothing in the
complaint ... that the court must consider as true
and that therefore places [any] burden on [the
defendant] to controvert by affidavit.' Excelsior,
42 So. 3d at 104 (defendant need not present
evidence of absence of jurisdiction when the
complaint contains no jurisdictional averments)." 
___ So. 3d at ___.  I believe that when the entirety of the
quoted sentence from Excelsior is considered in context, its
meaning is not the meaning suggested by the main opinion.  The
full statement in Excelsior, without any omission, reads as
follows:  "Consequently, there is nothing in the complaint
dealing with conspiracy that the court must consider as true
and that therefore places the burden on Excelsior to
controvert by affidavit."  42 So. 3d at 104 (emphasis added).
In other words, the Court in Excelsior was not saying in some
general sense that "there is nothing in the complaint" in the
way of jurisdictional allegations and that, therefore, the
defendant has no burden of putting on any evidence in order to
1100764
24
"join the issue" of the trial court's personal jurisdiction
over it.  Instead, the statement is one in which the Excelsior
Court is specifically explaining that there are no allegations
in the complaint "dealing with conspiracy" and that,
therefore, it was not necessary for the success of the
defendant's evidentiary showing that it specifically address
that potential ground. 
It also is important to note the narrow focus of the
Court's statement.  The statement is made in the context of
the Court's having first determined that the defendant had
joined the issue of in personam jurisdiction by submitting an
affidavit sufficient to constitute a "prima facie evidentiary
showing" that there were not sufficient contacts between the
defendant and the State of Alabama to confer jurisdiction.
Bearing in mind the principle, as stated earlier, that, even
when a defendant has made an prima facie evidentiary showing,
"a court must consider as true the allegations of plaintiff's
complaint not controverted by the defendant's affidavits," 42
So. 3d at 103, the Excelsior Court simply was engaged in the
process of determining whether there were, in that case,
allegations in the complaint that would support in personam
1100764
25
jurisdiction 
and 
that 
were 
"not 
controverted 
by 
the
defendant's affidavits."  42 So.  3d at 101.  The Court first
looked at the fact that the complaint contained allegations of
fraudulent conduct in Alabama committed by Excelsior through
an agency relationship with other defendants.  The Court
observed, however, that the affidavits submitted on behalf of
Excelsior did in fact "expressly deny an agency relationship
with 
the 
other 
defendants 
and 
therefore 
refute 
the
allegations" of agency in the complaint.  42 So.  3d at
103-04.  On that basis, the Court reasoned that "the petition
for the writ of mandamus filed by Excelsior establishes a
clear legal right to the dismissal of the complaint as to it
to the extent that personal jurisdiction was alleged in the
complaint to have been based upon an agency relationship."  42
So.  3d at 104 (emphasis added).  
The Court then expressly considered whether, in light of
the prima facie evidentiary showing otherwise contained in
Excelsior's affidavits, there was any other sufficient basis
for personal jurisdiction alleged in the complaint that was
not defeated by evidentiary submissions of the defendant.  The
Court noted one other potential basis suggested by the
1100764
26
complaint in this regard, namely, the allegation in the
complaint of a conspiracy.  The Court, however, found that the
allegation of conspiracy was "devoid of the requisite
specificity."  42 So.  3d at 104.  It was for this reason that
the Court found it unnecessary to go further and specifically
consider whether the evidentiary averments in Excelsior's
affidavits would have been sufficient to counter the
allegations of conspiracy: 
"[T]he allegation of conspiracy in the complaint is
devoid 
of 
the 
requisite 
specificity. 
 
...
Consequently, there is nothing in the complaint
dealing with conspiracy that the court must consider
as true and that therefore places the burden on
Excelsior to controvert by affidavit."
42 So. 3d at 104 (emphasis added).  To emphasize, the Court
merely was explaining that there was nothing in the complaint
"dealing with conspiracy" that Excelsior was obligated "to
controvert by affidavit" in order to prevail on its motion,
having already made a general prima facie evidentiary showing
of lack of jurisdiction over it.
In the next paragraph of its opinion, the Excelsior Court
simply restates and summarizes what it has theretofore
explained in more detail:
1100764
27
"Excelsior argues extensively that the evidence
presented by the parties does not show any action by
Excelsior purposefully directed toward Alabama and
that its contacts with Alabama resulted from the
unilateral activity of third persons. However, the
complaint, other than the allegations of agency,
which were refuted without contradiction from the
Tillises, does not contain any allegations that
Excelsior, independent of an agency relationship,
purposefully directed its actions toward Alabama. In
the absence of such allegations, we need not analyze
the evidence as Excelsior suggests."
42 So. 3d at 104 (emphasis added).  Read in context with the
analysis that proceeded it, the emphasized sentence -- part of
a restatement and summary of that analysis -- simply means
that, in the absence of sufficient allegations regarding the
conspiracy, we needed not analyze the evidence presented by
Excelsior to determine if it specifically rebutted conspiracy
as a potential basis for personal jurisdiction.  
Thus, I disagree with the holdings in the main opinion
that a defendant is entitled to the dismissal of a complaint
against it based merely upon a motion asserting the absence of
sufficient jurisdictional allegations in the complaint and
that, in order to obtain such a dismissal, a defendant has no
burden of initially coming forward with an evidentiary showing
of a lack of personal jurisdiction.  Notwithstanding the
disagreement with these holdings, I can agree with the result
1100764
Although somewhat general in nature, the allegations in
4
this regard in the complaint are indeed "factual allegations."
I therefore cannot agree with the assertion by McNeese and
Owens as quoted in the main opinion that "'the Complaint and
Amended Complaint contain no factual allegations whatsoever as
to any contacts between the Petitioners and the State of
Alabama.'"  ___ So.  3d at ___ (emphasis added).
28
reached in this particular case because it is not one in which
these particular holdings are necessary to the result.
Specifically, this is not a case in which the defendant has
failed to make a prima facie evidentiary showing of lack of
personal jurisdiction over it.  
In point of fact, the complaint and amended complaint in
this case actually do contain "generic allegations that the
Petitioners are subject to personal jurisdiction in Alabama."4
In order to counter this general allegation that the
petitioners are subject to personal jurisdiction in Alabama,
the defendants, McNeese and Owens, submitted an affidavit from
Richard McNeese averring that "McNeese Title is not licensed
to do business in Alabama and has never done business in
Alabama," "does not have offices in Alabama, and has never
actively pursued business in Alabama or otherwise advertised
in Alabama," "owns no real property in Alabama," does not hold
bank accounts in Alabama, and does not employ Alabama
1100764
29
citizens.  The affidavit continues by explaining that McNeese
Title provides closing, title, and escrow services for
transactions involving real property in Florida" and that
"McNeese Title has never served as title agent, closing agent,
and/or escrow agent for real property located in any state
other than Florida.  Finally, Richard McNeese's affidavit
states that his "only contacts with Alabama are rare
communications made on behalf of McNeese Title and/or McNeese
law firm, or when I travel through Alabama on trips."  An
affidavit from Owens to similar effect also was submitted.
Clearly, these affidavits are of sufficient substance and
breadth to provide a prima facie evidentiary showing of a lack
of personal jurisdiction by Alabama courts over McNeese and
Owens.  
The question in this case, as it was in Excelsior, then
becomes whether the plaintiff, Atchison, put on contrary
evidence.  As in Excelsior, he did not.  It therefore falls to
this Court, as it did to the Court in Excelsior, to consider
whether there are allegations in the complaint (1) that have
not specifically been rebutted by the evidentiary submission
of the defendants and, therefore, are "left standing" and
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30
(2) that are of a nature sufficient to provide a basis for the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendants.  As in
Excelsior, there are not.  Specifically, just as in Excelsior,
there are allegations touching upon conspiracy that are not
controverted by the defendants' evidentiary submission.  Just
as in Excelsior, however, those allegations lack the
specificity required by law and therefore are not sufficient
to provide a basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over the defendants.  Accordingly, I agree with the result
reached by the main opinion.