Title: WILSON v. LUCERNE CANAL AND POWER COMPANY

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

WILSON v. LUCERNE CANAL AND POWER COMPANY2003 WY 12677 P.3d 412Case Number: 02-153Decided: 10/03/2003
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2003

                                                                                                                         

                                                                                                            

 

THOMAS 
L. WILSON and HELEN L. WILSON,

 

Appellants(Defendants),

 

v.

 

LUCERNE 
CANAL AND POWER COMPANY,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Goshen County

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Peter 
C. Nicolaysen, Casper, Wyoming

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Jerry 
M. Smith, Sigler & Smith Law Office, Torrington, 
Wyoming

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]           
Lucerne 
Canal and Power Company (Lucerne), an irrigation company, filed a complaint in 
1988 against landowners Thomas L. Wilson and Helen Wilson for damages and 
injunctive relief.  That filing was 
resolved in 1990 with the district court's issuance of a "Consent Decree and 
Judgment" which declared that Lucerne owned appurtenant easements across 
Wilsons' property for Lucerne's irrigation facilities and a related access 
road.  Lucerne returned to court in 
May 2002 and obtained first a temporary and then a permanent restraining order, 
enjoining Wilsons' interference with Lucerne's easements.  Wilsons appeal the permanent restraining 
order on several procedural grounds.  
Finding no fatal defects in the procedure, we 
affirm.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]           
The 
Wilsons present the issues as follows:

 

1.         
Whether the entry of a permanent injunction at the preliminary hearing is 
reversible error when the district court fails to enter an order of 
consolidation as required by W.R.C.P. 65(a)(2).

 

2.         
Whether Appellants had adequate notice of the consolidation and were thus 
afforded due process before the entry of permanent injunctive 
relief.

 

3.         
Whether the permanent injunction was properly entered despite a failure 
by Plaintiff/Appellee to plead a sufficient factual basis for permanent 
injunctive relief and despite a failure to make a written request for the entry 
of permanent injunctive relief.

 

4.         
Whether a permanent injunctive order that does not follow the form 
mandated by W.R.C.P. 65(d) must be vacated.

 

Lucerne 
reduces this to a single issue:

 

Whether 
the district court acted properly when it entered a permanent injunction against 
defendants/appellants.

 

 

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]           
We 
are limited in this appeal because of the lack of an evidentiary record.  The original proceedings were resolved 
without trial by entry of a "Consent Decree and Judgment" on May 4, 1990.  The permanent injunction in 2002 was 
issued following an evidentiary hearing; however, that hearing was not 
stenographically reported or electronically recorded, and the parties were 
unable to settle the record.1  For purposes of this discussion, the 
facts are therefore gleaned primarily from the 1990 Consent Decree and Judgment, 
the findings contained in the 2002 orders, and the admissions of the parties in 
their appellate briefs.

 

[¶4]           
Lucerne 
is a non-profit irrigation company in Goshen County, Wyoming.  It owns water rights in the North Platte 
River, with associated diversion and distribution facilities to deliver water to 
its stockholders.  Part of these 
facilities is on Wilson-owned property adjacent to the river.  The 1990 decree resolved that Lucerne 
owned an appurtenant easement across Wilsons' property for its facilities, as 
well as for a road to access, operate and maintain its facilities.  The decree 
ordered:

 

3.  That [Lucerne] has and shall continue to 
have a non-exclusive easement and right-of-way, which shall run with the land, 
for a road, upon, over and across [Wilson's property] . . . for so long as 
[Lucerne] maintains or operates any of its facilities, ditches, canals, or other 
irrigation facilities on or adjacent to the lands now owned by [Wilsons], of 
such a nature as to provide unobstructed ingress, egress and access for such 
vehicles, machinery and equipment as is reasonably necessary for [Lucerne] to 
operate, regulate, maintain, inspect, repair, replace, remove, renovate and for 
all other reasonably necessary purposes for its irrigation system, facilities, 
equipment and appurtenances.

 

4.  [Lucerne] has the right to maintain said 
road as is reasonably necessary to provide for such access and shall have 
unobstructed use of its easement.  
[Wilsons] shall not interfere with Lucerne's use of said Easements and 
rights-of-way.  

 

[¶5]           
In 
May 2002, Lucerne returned to the district court.  The exact chronology of the pleadings 
and orders is as follows:

 

May 
22, 2002            
Lucerne appeared before the district court with a Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order and presented testimony through its secretary-treasurer. 

 

The 
district court issued the Temporary Restraining Order, restraining Wilsons "from 
in any manner interfering with [Lucerne's] right to operate, regulate, maintain, 
inspect, repair, replace, remove or renovate its facilities including but not 
being limited to dams, channels, headgates and other water works which [Lucerne] 
uses in the supplying of water to its members."

 

The 
Goshen County Sheriff served a copy of the TRO on Thomas 
Wilson.

 

May 
23, 2002                        
Lucerne filed its Motion for Temporary Restraining Order.2

 

Lucerne 
filed a Notice of Hearing on Temporary Restraining Order and Whether A Permanent 
Injunction Should Be Granted, setting the hearing for May 31, 2002.  Certificate of service indicates service 
on Wilsons by mail.

 

May 
31, 2002            
Lucerne filed its Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Defendants Should 
Not Be Held in Contempt and for Damages, with Affidavit in 
Support.

 

Hearing 
conducted pursuant to the May 23 notice; the district court announced intention 
to enter permanent injunction.

 

June 
5, 2002              
The district court issued Permanent Injunction.

 

[¶6]           
Thomas 
Wilson appeared and testified at the hearing on May 31, 2002, as did Lucerne's 
secretary-treasurer.  The permanent 
injunction issued by the district court reads in its 
entirety:

 

            
This matter coming before the Court upon Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order and the Court being fully advised finds that Plaintiff should 
have the use of that roadway over and across Defendants [sic] property and the 
right to operate, regulate, maintain, inspect, repair, replace, remove or 
renovate its facilities including but not being limited to dams, channels, 
headgates and other water works which Plaintiff uses in the supplying of water 
to it  [sic] members and to use the 
hereinafter described property for the purpose of gaining access to the 
diversion dam, channel, canal and related facilities utilized by Plaintiff for 
diverting and transporting water from the North Platte Rive across Defendants 
[sic] property.

            
It is therefore ordered that Plaintiff, its agents, employees and 
contractors shall have the use of the following described property, to wit: 
[legal description], the use to be for the purpose of gaining access to the 
diversion dam, channel, canal and related facilities utilized by Plaintiff for 
diverting and transporting water from the North Platte River across Defendants' 
lands, and Defendants, their agents, employees and any other persons acting in 
their behalf be, and they are hereby permanently enjoined and restrained from 
interfering with Plaintiff, its agents, employees or contractors in the use of 
the lands of Defendants used as a roadway and for irrigation facilities 
henceforth and in perpetuity. 

 

[¶7]           
On 
June 13, 2002, the Goshen County sheriff served Thomas Wilson with the Motion 
for Order to Show Cause with Affidavit, Permanent Injunction, and Order setting 
a hearing for November 27, 2002.  
Wilsons appealed the permanent injunction. 

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶8]           
The trial 
proceedings in this case were not recorded or transcribed, and, as noted above, 
the appellants did not present a settlement of the record under W.R.A.P. 
3.03.  "We must, therefore, accept 
the trial court's findings as being the only basis for deciding the issues 
which pertain to the evidence.'"  Weiss v. Pederson, 933 P.2d 495, 
498  (Wyo. 1997) (abrogated on 
other grounds, White v. Allen, 
2003 WY 39, ¶¶10-11, 65 P.3d 395, 
¶¶10-11 (Wyo. 2003)) (quoting Willowbrook Ranch, Inc. v. Nugget 
Exploration, Inc., 896 P.2d 769, 771 (Wyo. 1995)).  "In the absence of anything to refute 
them, we will sustain the trial court's findings, and we assume that the 
evidence presented was sufficient to support those findings."  Willowbrook Ranch, Inc., 896 P.2d  at 
771-72.

 

[¶9]           
We also 
addressed injunctions in Weiss:

 

Although 
actions for injunctive relief are authorized by statute, Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-28-101 
to -111 (1988 & Supp. 1996), they are, by nature, requests for equitable 
relief which are not granted as a matter of right but are within the lower 
court's equitable discretion.  Rialto Theatre, Inc. v. Commonwealth 
Theatres, Inc., 714 P.2d 328, 332 (Wyo. 1986).  Injunctions are issued when the harm is 
irreparable and no adequate remedy at law exists.  Id.; Gregory v. Sanders, 635 P.2d 795, 
801 (Wyo. 1981).  Injunctive relief 
is appropriate when an award of money damages cannot provide adequate 
compensation.  Rialto Theatre, Inc., 714 P.2d  at 
332.  An injury is irreparable 
"where it is of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone 
for it.'  Gause v.  Perkins, 56 N.C. 177 (1857).  Frink v. North Carolina Board of 
Transportation, 27 N.C. App. 207, 218 S.E.2d 713, 714 (1975)."  Gregory, 635 P.2d  at 
801.

 

933 P.2d  at 
498-99.

 

[¶10]       
Also this 
year, in Polo Ranch Company v. City of 
Cheyenne, Board of Public Utilities, 2003 WY 15, ¶25, 61 P.3d 1255, ¶25 
(Wyo. 2003), we quoted with approval from Kincheloe v. Milatzo, 678 P.2d 855, 861 
(Wyo. 1984), regarding trial courts' injunction authority:

 

Preliminarily, 
it is to be remembered that, when courts are called upon to employ their 
injunctive authority, they must utilize this power with great 
caution.  We have said:

 

"The 
extraordinary remedy of an injunction is a far-reaching force and must not be 
indulged in under hastily contrived conditions.  It is a delicate 
judicial power and a court must proceed with caution and deliberation before 
exercising the remedy." Simpson v. 
 Petroleum, Inc., Wyo., 548 P.2d 1, 3 (1976).

 

We went on 
to state:

 

            
Injunctions are extraordinary remedies and are not granted as of 
right.  In granting an injunction, the court exercises broad, 
equitable jurisdiction.  Brown 
v. J.C. Penney Co., D.C. Wyo., 54 F. Supp. 488 (1943).  This 
discretion is, however, not unfettered, but "must be exercised reasonably and in 
harmony with well established principles," 43 C.J.S.   Injunctions § 14, p. 
772.  Where injunctive relief is sought, it is the trial court that 
grants or denies it, based upon the facts--not the appellate court, 43 C.J.S. 
Injunctions § 14, pp. 769, 773.  Crosby v. Watson, 144 Colo. 216, 355 P.2d 958 (1960); Hansen v. Galiger, 
123 Mont. 101, 208 P.2d 1049 (1949).

 

Polo Ranch 
Co., 
¶25.

 

[¶11]       
Therefore, 
assuming the evidence supports the trial court's findings, we will simply review 
the permanent injunction for an abuse of discretion by the trial court.  "Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means 
a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously."  Pasenelli v. Pasenelli, 2002 WY 159, 
¶11, 57 P.3d 324, ¶11 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 
(Wyo. 1998)).

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶12]       
Wilsons rely 
extensively in their brief on alleged non-compliance with W.R.C.P. 65.  It is important, however, to read the 
rule in the context of the actual proceedings in 2002.  Rule 65 is written in contemplation of a 
request for an injunction upon the filing of a complaint, prior to trial on the 
merits.  In this case, however, the 
merits of Lucerne's complaint were resolved in 1990 by the entry of the Consent 
Decree and Judgment.  Specifically, 
the court made the following findings of fact in 1990:

 

3.  That Defendants, Thomas L. Wilson and 
Helen Wilson, own or occupy lands upon which part of Lucerne Canal and Power 
Company's facilities are located, which property has been and must be crossed by Lucerne 
members, employees, agents and contractors in order to inspect, regulate, 
operate, maintain, repair and replace such facilities; and

 

4.  That Lucerne received from the United 
States Department of Interior, in 1894, and has continually since such time had 
an easement and right-of-way for its canal and associated facilities upon, over 
and across [Wilsons' property]; and . . . .

 

* * * 
*

 

7.  That Defendants have agreed that Lucerne 
has and shall continue to have an easement and right-of-way, for a road, for so 
long as it maintains or operates any of its facilities, ditches, water 
transportation facilities, or other irrigation facilities on or adjacent to the 
lands now owned by Defendants, of such a nature as to provide unobstructed 
ingress, egress and access for such vehicles, machinery and equipment, as is 
reasonably necessary for Plaintiff to operate, maintain, inspect, repair, 
replace, remove, renovate and for all other reasonably necessary purposes, its 
irrigation system, facilities, equipment and appurtenances . . . 
.

 

Based on 
those and other facts, the district court ordered that:

 

4.  Plaintiff has the right to maintain said 
road as is reasonably necessary to provide for such access and shall have 
unobstructed use of its easement.  
Defendants shall not interfere with Lucerne's use of said Easements and 
rights-of-way.

 

The 2002 
injunction, therefore, states no more and no less than did the 1990 Consent 
Decree and Judgment.

 

[¶13]       
Wilsons are 
correct that W.R.C.P. 65(a) allows the court to "order the trial of the action 
on the merits to be advanced and consolidated with the hearing of the 
application" for a preliminary injunction.   However, we will not apply the 
rules blindly without contextual considerations.   The rule is obviously written in 
contemplation of an application for an injunction at the beginning of an 
action.  Wilsons' argument, that 
they were prejudiced by the failure of the court to issue a consolidation order, 
is more than a little bit disingenuous.

 

[¶14]       
First, we 
note that the notice of hearing, pursuant to which Wilsons attended the May 31, 
2002, hearing, was entitled, "Notice of Hearing on Temporary Restraining Order 
and Whether a Permanent Injunction Should Be Granted."   Second, the factual merits of the 
application were resolved by consent decree twelve years earlier.  The 2002 order, although denominated an 
injunction, is more in the nature of an action to enforce the existing decree 
than it is to preserve the status quo pending determination of the parties' 
rights.  In that respect, this case 
is strikingly similar to Polo Ranch 
Company, supra. The underlying rights of the parties were determined in 
earlier litigation and court-approved stipulations and are now res judicata.  Since there could be no trial on 
these issues, let alone one to be advanced on the court's docket, there can be 
no violation of Rule 65(a)'s requirement of a consolidation 
order.

 

[¶15]       
The same 
reasoning applies to Wilsons' due process argument.  We have said that consolidation of a 
trial on the merits with an injunction hearing involves due process concerns, 
and that "[i]t is one thing to appear for a hearing on the matter of a 
preliminary injunction and another to walk away from that hearing saddled with a 
permanent injunction." Simpson v. 
Petroleum, Inc., 548 P.2d 1, 2 (Wyo. 1976).   However, in this case Wilsons were 
not "saddled with" any more restraint in 2002 than they were in 1990. We stated 
in Weiss: "With regard to easements in 
particular, injunctive relief is appropriate to prohibit the servient estate 
owner from interfering with the dominant estate owner's use of his 
easement.  See Bard Ranch Company v. Weber, 557 P.2d 722 (Wyo. 1976); Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc., 
519 P.2d 972 (Wyo. 1974)."  933 P.2d  
at 499.  That is precisely the issue 
resolved in 1990, and we will not interpret procedural rules to avoid the 
principle of res judicata and permit serial violations of injunctions 
involving established water rights and easements.

 

[¶16]       
Wilsons' 
next argument directly attacks the factual basis pled and proved for the entry 
of the injunction.  As noted above, 
it is the appellant's obligation to provide an adequate record on appeal and, 
failing that, we accept "the trial court's findings as being the only basis for 
deciding the issues which pertain to the evidence."  Weiss, 933 P.2d  at 498.  The affidavit of Lucerne's 
secretary-treasurer states that the Wilsons had placed a dike in the river 
channel that kept the water from reaching Lucerne's diversion structure.  We assume that he testified 
consistently when he was a witness at both the temporary restraining order and 
preliminary/permanent injunction hearings, and that the evidence supports the 
district court's finding that Wilsons were violating Lucerne's easements.  Again, that assumption is much easier to 
make when the permanent injunction merely reiterates the terms of the injunction 
from the 1990 decree.

 

[¶17]       
Wilsons next 
challenge the sufficiency of the form of the permanent injunction, specifically 
the specificity requirements under W.R.C.P. 65(d).  We have said that the specificity 
requirement is "designed to prevent uncertainty and confusion on the part of 
those faced with injunctive orders, and to avoid the possible founding of a 
contempt citation on a decree [too] vague to be understood."  Bard Ranch Co., 557 P.2d  at 733.  We look at the injunction in 
context.  Wilsons had a history of 
interfering with the Lucerne easements, leading to the earlier two-year 
litigation and eventual consent decree.  
In addition to the permanent injunction contained within the 1990 consent 
decree, they had earlier in the course of the litigation, while represented by 
counsel, filed a "Consent to Entry of a Preliminary Injunction," which 
recited:

 

            
Defendants hereby consent to the entry by the Court of a Preliminary 
Injunction granting Plaintiff the use of that roadway particularly described on 
Exhibit 1 attached to Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 
enjoining and restraining Defendants from interfering with Plaintiff, its 
agents, employees or contractors and from interfering with Plaintiff's use of 
that roadway for the operation, maintenance and repair of Plaintiff's facilities 
utilized for diverting and transporting water across Defendants' property. 

 

[¶18]       
The 2002 
injunction, therefore, was the third time that Wilsons had been enjoined from 
interfering with Lucerne's rights.  
While the injunction could have been more complete in its findings and 
conclusions, there was absolutely no possibility of uncertainty or confusion 
when the merits of the case had already been decided and the latest injunction 
merely told Wilsons for the third time that they were restrained from 
interfering with the company's access to its facilities.  In the context of this case, we do not 
find the injunction insufficient.  
By so ruling, however, we do not impliedly overrule Bard Ranch Company or any other 
decisions under Rule 65 and still require injunctions to include appropriate 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, especially when they are in fact 
preliminary to a trial on the merits.

 

[¶19]       
Wilsons in 
their briefs cite several cases for the proposition that due process rights of 
notice and opportunity to be heard are implicated before a previously entered 
order is modified or amended.  Macy v. Macy, 714 P.2d 774, 782 (Wyo. 
1986); Barker Bros., Inc. v. 
Barker-Taylor, 823 P.2d 1204, 1208 (Wyo. 1992).  The record shows that Wilsons did 
receive notice of and participated in the May 31 hearing.  Nevertheless, the cited cases are 
distinguishable.  Macy involved a motion to modify the 
terms of a divorce decree, which we characterized as "a separate and distinct 
case involving new issues and new facts."  
Barker Bros., Inc. involved a 
post-judgment hearing on debtor's claim of exempt property, at which the debtor 
was allowed to collaterally attack the default judgment.  We reversed and remanded so the judgment 
creditor could be appropriately notified on a motion to set aside the default 
judgment.  In the present case, 
Lucerne did not seek to modify or amend any part of the 1990 Consent Decree and 
Judgment, but only to have its permanent injunction provision reiterated in 
nearly identical terms.

 

[¶20]       
Finally, 
Wilsons argue that the 2002 permanent injunction is different from the 1990 
injunction because it restrains them "henceforth and in perpetuity," while the 
earlier one was "only so long as [Lucerne] maintains or operates any of its 
facilities . . . on or adjacent to the lands now owned by [Wilsons] . . . 
."  This argument strains 
credulity.  The easement in favor of 
Lucerne is repeatedly described as being for purposes of the irrigation 
facility.  Moreover, the 2002 
injunction restrains Wilsons from interfering with Lucerne "in the use of the 
lands of Defendants used as a roadway and for irrigation facilities 
henceforth and in perpetuity."  
(Emphasis added).  We do not 
perceive a significant difference.  
No reasonable person could interpret that language as extending the 
easements beyond their irrigation purpose.

  

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶21]       
We see no 
indication that the trial court failed to exercise sound judgment with regard to 
what is right under the circumstances.  
If Wilsons were not restrained from interfering with Lucerne's rights to 
access the river water, irreparable injury would have occurred to the company 
and its shareholders in a year of severe drought, and money damages could not 
adequately compensate for the water lost downstream.  Under the circumstances, we cannot say 
that the district court abused its discretion or violated any of Wilsons' rights 
when it granted Lucerne's request and reiterated the earlier injunctions.  We affirm the district 
court.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1The May 31, 2002, hearing was not stenographically or electronically 
recorded.  According to the briefs, 
pursuant to W.R.A.P. 3.03, Lucerne prepared a Statement of the Evidence, to 
which Wilsons did not object, and submitted it to the court.  The court requested instead a stipulated 
Statement of the Evidence, which the parties submitted.  The Court informed the parties on 
October 8, 2002, that the stipulation was not complete or accurate and that the 
court could therefore not order the record settled.  Neither of the proffered Statements of 
Evidence are part of the record on appeal.

 

2Although not 
clear from the record, Lucerne explains in its brief that the Motion for TRO it 
was prepared to file on May 22 was supported by affidavit, but had to be re-done 
to reflect that the district court instead took live testimony from Lucerne's 
secretary-treasurer.