Title: State ex rel. Peterson v. Licking County Board of Elections

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Peterson v. Licking Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-646.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-646 
THE STATE EX REL. PETERSON v. LICKING COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS 
ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Peterson v. Licking Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip 
Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-646.] 
Elections—Prohibition—Mandamus—Disqualification of counsel—Relator, a 
village mayor, failed to show that she was entitled to writ of prohibition 
preventing respondent village from setting date for recall election or 
preventing respondent boards of elections from conducting that election—
Relator failed to show that she was entitled to writ of mandamus ordering 
respondent boards of elections to remove recall election from ballot—Writs 
denied—Relator’s motion to disqualify counsel for respondent village 
denied. 
(No. 2024-0155—Submitted February 15, 2024—Decided February 21, 2024.) 
IN PROHIBITION and MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} In this expedited election case, relator, Jeryne Peterson, seeks writs of 
prohibition and mandamus against respondents, the Licking County Board of 
Elections and its members, the Fairfield County Board of Elections and its 
members, and the village of Buckeye Lake and its council president, Linda 
Goodman.1  Peterson is the mayor of Buckeye Lake.  Buckeye Lake has scheduled 
a special election for February 27, 2024, for a vote on the recall of Peterson.  She 
seeks a writ of prohibition preventing the village and the boards of elections from 
setting the recall-election date and from conducting the recall election on that date.  
She also seeks a writ of mandamus ordering the boards of elections to remove the 
recall election from the February 27 ballot.  We deny the writs. 
I.  FACTUAL, PROCEDURAL, AND LEGAL BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} Buckeye Lake is a village located primarily in Licking County, with 
a small portion located in Fairfield County.  Buckeye Lake has adopted a charter, 
which provides that its elected officials may be recalled.  See Buckeye Lake Village 
Charter, Section 10.02.  The recall procedure generally provides that electors of the 
village may submit a petition to the clerk of the village council demanding the 
removal of an elected official.  Id. at Section 10.02(b).  The petition must contain 
the signatures of at least 15 percent of the village’s registered voters at the time of 
the last general election.  Id.  Upon submission of the petition to the clerk of council, 
the clerk must determine whether the petition contains sufficient valid signatures.  
Id. at Section 10.02(c).  If the petition does not contain sufficient signatures, the 
petitioner is allowed ten days to obtain them.  Id.  If the clerk certifies that the 
 
1. The individual members of the Licking County Board of Elections are Freddie Latella, Dave 
Rhodes, Kaye Hartman, and Park Shai.  The individual members of the Fairfield County Board of 
Elections are Angela D. White, Michael Oatney, Kyle Joseph Farmer, and Paul R. Johnson.  In this 
opinion, “Licking County Board of Elections” refers to both that board and its members, and 
“Fairfield County Board of Elections” refers to both that board and its members. 
 
January Term, 2024 
 
 
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petition contains sufficient signatures—either initially or after the ten-day period 
for curing an insufficient petition—the village council must schedule a recall 
election to occur between 40 and 65 days after the date of the clerk’s certification 
of the petition’s sufficiency to the council.  Id. at Section 10.02(c) and (d). 
{¶ 3} Peterson, the current mayor of Buckeye Lake, was elected to that 
office in November 2021 for a four-year term.  On November 13, 2023, an elector 
of Buckeye Lake filed with the clerk of council a notice of intent to circulate 
petitions for the recall of Peterson.  On December 11, an elector filed with the clerk 
part-petitions demanding the recall of Peterson.  The clerk then delivered the part-
petitions to the Licking County Board of Elections for signature verification.  The 
clerk did not deliver any part-petitions to the Fairfield County Board of Elections, 
because none of the signatures appeared to be of Fairfield County residents. 
{¶ 4} On December 18, the Licking County Board of Elections notified the 
clerk of council of the number of signatures that the board had determined were 
valid.  On December 20, the clerk notified the petitioner that the recall petition did 
not contain a sufficient number of valid signatures.  On January 2, 2024, the 
petitioner submitted to the clerk of council additional part-petitions containing 
additional signatures.  The clerk forwarded those part-petitions to the Licking 
County Board of Elections for signature verification, and on January 5, the Licking 
County Board of Elections notified the clerk of the new number of signatures that 
the board had determined were valid. 
{¶ 5} Also on January 5, the clerk of council sent a “Certificate of Sufficient 
Recall Petitions” to the village council, in which the clerk notified the council that 
she had determined that the recall petition was sufficient and contained elector 
signatures totaling at least 15 percent of the number of the village’s registered 
voters at the time of the last general election.  On January 8, the village council 
passed an ordinance setting the recall election for February 27.  By its terms, the 
ordinance would be effective only if Peterson did not resign by January 12.  On 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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January 12, the clerk of council found that Peterson had not resigned, and the clerk 
sent the ordinance to the Licking County Board of Elections. 
{¶ 6} The Licking County Board of Elections then began the process of 
conducting the special recall election.  Because only 12 registered voters who 
would be eligible to vote in the recall election then resided in Fairfield County, the 
Fairfield County Board of Elections assigned those voters to Licking County for 
purposes of the recall election.  See R.C. 3503.01(B) (allowing a county board of 
elections to assign voters residing in a portion of a precinct within that county to an 
adjoining county for purposes of a special election).  On January 30, absentee 
ballots were sent out and early voting began. 
{¶ 7} On February 1, Peterson filed her verified complaint for writs of 
mandamus and prohibition in this court.  She seeks a writ of prohibition preventing 
the village and the boards of elections from setting the recall-election date and from 
conducting the recall election on that date.  She also seeks a writ of mandamus 
ordering the boards of elections to remove the recall election from the February 27 
ballot.  She generally argues that the clerk of council did not perform her duty to 
determine the sufficiency of the petition, because the Licking County Board of 
Elections actually verified the petition signatures.  She also argues that the recall 
petitioner took more than ten days to file additional signatures after the clerk of 
council initially determined that the number of signatures was insufficient, in 
violation of the village’s charter. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Motion to disqualify the village’s attorney 
{¶ 8} As an initial matter, Peterson filed a motion asking this court to 
disqualify the village’s attorney in this matter—Bradley Nicodemus—from 
representing the village due to a conflict of interest.  We deny the motion. 
{¶ 9} Nicodemus serves as Buckeye Lake’s village solicitor pursuant to a 
contract authorized under Buckeye Lake’s charter.  The charter provides, “Prior to 
January Term, 2024 
 
 
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the creation of a Department of Law, the Mayor shall appoint, pursuant to a contract 
with an individual attorney or law firm, and the Council shall confirm, by a majority 
vote, such person or firm as legal advisor.”  Buckeye Lake Village Charter, 
Section 6.06(a).  “The Solicitor or the attorney or law firm engaged * * * shall be 
the legal advisor, prosecuting attorney and counsel for the Village, and subject to 
the direction of Council, shall represent the Village in all proceedings in Court or 
before any administrative board or body.”  Id. at Section 6.06(c).  The village 
contracted with Nicodemus for him to serve as the village’s solicitor. 
{¶ 10} As a general matter, an attorney may not represent a client if that 
representation will be directly adverse to another client or there is a substantial risk 
that the attorney’s ability to represent the client will be materially limited by the 
attorney’s responsibilities to another client, a former client, a third person, or the 
attorney’s personal interests.  Prof.Cond.R. 1.7(a).  A court has inherent authority 
to supervise attorneys appearing before it, which “necessarily includes the power 
to disqualify counsel in specific cases.”  Morgan v. N. Coast Cable Co., 63 Ohio 
St.3d 156, 161, 586 N.E.2d 88 (1992).  But “[t]ypically, courts do not disqualify an 
attorney on the grounds of conflict of interest unless there is (or was) an attorney-
client relationship between the party seeking disqualification and the attorney the 
party seeks to disqualify.”  Id. at 159. 
{¶ 11} The village itself, not any individual officer or employee of the 
village, is Nicodemus’s client.  See Buckeye Lake Village Charter, Section 6.06(c) 
(the solicitor “shall be the legal advisor, prosecuting attorney and counsel for the 
Village” [emphasis added]); see also Prof.Cond.R. 1.13(a) (“A lawyer employed or 
retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its 
constituents.  A lawyer employed or retained by an organization owes allegiance to 
the organization and not to any constituent or other person connected with the 
organization”).  The village solicitor’s duties to the village may at times put him at 
odds with the village’s mayor, but that does not mean that the solicitor is conflicted 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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from representing the village in such instances.  For example, the solicitor may 
bring a mandamus action against the mayor to compel the mayor to perform her 
duties.  R.C. 733.58; see also Buckeye Lake Village Charter, Section 6.06(c) (the 
solicitor “shall perform all other powers, duties and functions now or hereafter 
imposed on Village Solicitors under the laws of Ohio”).  Nicodemus is representing 
the village and its council president (in her official capacity) in this case, and 
Peterson points to no authority suggesting that Nicodemus is conflicted from 
defending them in a lawsuit brought by Peterson in her personal capacity. 
{¶ 12} Peterson also claims that Nicodemus disclosed attorney-client-
privileged information at a public village-council meeting in September 2023.  But 
the information allegedly disclosed did not relate to the recall election or to this 
case,  and Nicodemus denies that he disclosed any privileged information.  Even if 
Nicodemus did disclose privileged information, Peterson has not explained how 
such a disclosure created a conflict of interest that necessitates Nicodemus’s 
disqualification from this case, nor has she explained how his representation of the 
village interferes with her ability to obtain the writs she requests in this case. 
{¶ 13} In addition, Peterson argues that Nicodemus should be disqualified 
because, in her view, he is no longer the village solicitor.  Although Peterson 
misclassifies this issue as one involving a conflict of interest, she is correct that as 
a general matter, an attorney may not represent a client if the attorney has been 
discharged.  See Prof.Cond.R. 1.16(a)(3). 
{¶ 14} The root of this argument lies in a dispute among Nicodemus, 
Peterson, and the village council.  On January 8, Peterson, in her role as mayor of 
the village, sent Nicodemus a letter informing him that she was terminating him as 
village solicitor.  Nicodemus responded, stating that Peterson’s attempt to terminate 
him as village solicitor violated his contract to represent the village, that only the 
village council could terminate that contract, and that he remained the village 
solicitor. 
January Term, 2024 
 
 
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{¶ 15} A client of an attorney has an absolute right to discharge the attorney 
at any time, subject to the obligation to compensate the attorney for services 
rendered.  Reid, Johnson, Downes, Andrachik & Webster v. Lansberry, 68 Ohio 
St.3d 570, 629 N.E.2d 431 (1994), paragraph one of the syllabus.  But the village, 
not Peterson, is Nicodemus’s client, and the village has not filed any notice that it 
has discharged Nicodemus or substituted counsel.  Peterson provides no authority 
supporting her argument that a court may grant a party’s motion to disqualify a 
different party’s attorney based on an alleged discharge of the attorney.  Further, 
Peterson has not submitted a copy of Nicodemus’s contract with the village or any 
other evidence enabling us to evaluate her argument that the village’s mayor may 
unilaterally discharge a village solicitor like Nicodemus without the approval of the 
village council.  See Util. Serv. Partners, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 124 Ohio St.3d 
284, 2009-Ohio-6764, 921 N.E.2d 1038, ¶ 39-40 (holding that a party’s failure to 
submit a contract as evidence was fatal to its claim based on the contract). 
{¶ 16} For these reasons, we deny Peterson’s motion to disqualify 
Nicodemus. 
B.  Service 
{¶ 17} The Licking County Board of Elections alleges that Peterson did not 
properly serve it with a copy of her complaint; it alleges that Peterson sent the 
complaint to the wrong email address.  The board argues that the complaint should 
thus be dismissed because Peterson did not serve the complaint in accordance with 
S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.08(C), which provides that “[a]ll documents in expedited election 
cases, except those filed to initiate a case under this rule, shall be served on the date 
submitted for filing by personal service, facsimile transmission, or email” 
(emphasis added).  The board does not provide any evidence in support of its 
allegation that Peterson sent the complaint to the wrong email address.  But even if 
she did send it to the wrong email address, the complaint was the document she 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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filed to initiate this case, so S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.08(C) is inapplicable.  We reject the 
board’s request to dismiss the complaint for failure of service. 
C.  Prohibition 
{¶ 18} Peterson seeks a writ of prohibition “preventing the Licking County 
and Fairfield County Boards of Election[s] from holding [the] recall election.”  To 
be entitled to a writ of prohibition, Peterson must prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that (1) respondents exercised or are exercising quasi-judicial power, 
(2) the exercise of that power was or is unlawful, and (3) she lacks an adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Federle v. Warren Cty. Bd. 
of Elections, 156 Ohio St.3d 322, 2019-Ohio-849, 126 N.E.3d 1091, ¶ 10. 
{¶ 19} Neither the Licking County Board of Elections nor the Fairfield 
County Board of Elections has exercised quasi-judicial authority in this matter.  “A 
board of elections exercises quasi-judicial authority when it decides a protest after 
a mandatory hearing that includes sworn testimony.”  State ex rel. Moscow v. 
Clermont Cty. Bd. of Elections, 169 Ohio St.3d 161, 2022-Ohio-3138, 202 N.E.3d 
684, ¶ 15.  And “extraordinary relief in prohibition is not available when there is 
no statute or other law requiring a board of elections to conduct a quasi-judicial 
hearing on a protest.”  State ex rel. Fritz v. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Elections, 165 Ohio 
St.3d 323, 2021-Ohio-1828, 179 N.E.3d 67, ¶ 10.  Here, Peterson did not file an 
election protest, and neither of the boards of elections conducted a quasi-judicial 
hearing.  Nor does Peterson point to any authority that would have allowed her to 
file a protest or would have required the boards to hold a quasi-judicial hearing.  
See State ex rel. King v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2023-
Ohio-3668, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 21-22 (a board of elections does not exercise quasi-
judicial authority when it holds a recall election for which no election protest was 
filed); State ex rel. Wright v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 120 Ohio St.3d 92, 
2008-Ohio-5553, 896 N.E.2d 706, ¶ 9 (board of elections did not exercise quasi-
judicial authority in placing a city-charter amendment on the ballot, and no legal 
January Term, 2024 
 
 
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authority required the board to conduct a quasi-judicial hearing on protest 
challenging the ordinance submitting the amendment issue to the electorate; case 
did not involve written protest against petitions or candidacies, which would have 
required quasi-judicial proceedings). 
{¶ 20} Peterson also seeks a writ of prohibition against the village and its 
council president.  Specifically, she seeks a writ “preventing [them] from setting a 
day for holding a recall election until the requirements of the Village Charter are 
met.”  But like the boards of elections, the village and its council have not exercised 
quasi-judicial authority in this matter. 
{¶ 21} “Quasi-judicial authority” refers to the “power to hear and determine 
controversies between the public and individuals that require a hearing resembling 
a judicial trial.”  State ex rel. Wright v. Registrar, Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 87 
Ohio St.3d 184, 186, 718 N.E.2d 908 (1999).  “When a public entity takes official 
action but does not conduct proceedings akin to a judicial trial, prohibition will not 
issue.”  State ex rel. Save Your Courthouse Commt. v. Medina, 157 Ohio St.3d 423, 
2019-Ohio-3737, 137 N.E.3d 1118, ¶ 27.  Here, although the village and its clerk 
determined the sufficiency of the petition and set a date for the recall election, they 
“did not receive evidence, place witnesses under oath, or take any other actions that 
qualify as judicial,” id. at ¶ 28.  It follows that they did not exercise quasi-judicial 
authority.  Accordingly, prohibition will not lie. 
D.  Mandamus 
{¶ 22} Peterson also requests a writ of mandamus ordering the boards of 
elections “to remove the special recall election from the February 27, 2024, ballot.”  
To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Peterson must establish by clear and 
convincing evidence (1) a clear legal right to the relief requested, (2) a clear legal 
duty on the part of the boards of elections to provide that relief, and (3) the lack of 
an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Clark v. 
Twinsburg, 169 Ohio St.3d 380, 2022-Ohio-3089, 205 N.E.3d 454, ¶ 16. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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{¶ 23} Peterson cannot show that she has a clear legal right to an order 
requiring the boards of elections to remove the recall election from the ballot.  
Peterson’s argument is premised on the belief that the recall petition and the 
village’s ordinance setting the recall election were invalid.  But the determination 
whether the recall petition was sufficient was properly made by the clerk of 
council—not the boards of elections.  See Buckeye Lake Village Charter, 
Section 10.02(c) (“Within ten days after the day on which such [a recall] petition is 
filed, the Clerk of Council shall determine whether or not it meets the requirements 
[of this charter]. * * * If the Clerk of Council finds the petition to be sufficient, the 
Clerk shall, within five days, certify that fact to council”).  No provision of either 
the village’s charter or the Revised Code allowed the boards of elections to make 
that determination. 
{¶ 24} To be sure, R.C. 3501.39(A) requires a board of elections to reject a 
petition described in R.C. 3501.38 if the petition violates certain requirements 
established by law.  See R.C. 3501.39(A)(4).  But here, the Licking County Board 
of Elections was not presented with a petition pursuant to a statute requiring the 
board’s review of the petition.  Rather, the board was presented with an ordinance 
passed by the village setting a special election.  Such an ordinance is not a petition 
described in R.C. 3501.38.  See State ex rel. King v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 
__ Ohio St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-3959, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 19-20; see also Wright, 120 
Ohio St.3d 92, 2008-Ohio-5553, 896 N.E.2d 706, at ¶ 9 (city ordinance providing 
for the submission of a proposed charter amendment to the electorate was not a 
petition under R.C. 3501.39(A)).  Therefore, the boards of elections had no duty to 
reject the recall-election-certification ordinance.  Rather, the duty of the boards of 
elections upon receiving the ordinance was to hold the special election.  See King 
at ¶ 20.  Thus, mandamus does not lie to order the boards of elections to remove 
the recall election from the ballot. 
January Term, 2024 
 
 
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{¶ 25} Given our holdings in this matter, we need not decide whether the 
recall petitioner timely submitted the part-petitions or whether the clerk of council 
complied with her duties regarding determining the sufficiency of the petition.  We 
also need not decide respondents’ laches argument.  See id. at ¶ 24. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 26} Peterson has not shown that she is entitled to a writ of prohibition 
preventing the village from setting a date for the recall election or preventing the 
boards of elections from conducting the recall election.  Nor has she shown that she 
is entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering the boards of elections to remove the 
recall election from the ballot.  We therefore deny Peterson’s request for writs of 
prohibition and mandamus.  We also deny her motion to disqualify the village’s 
counsel. 
Writs denied. 
KENNEDY, C.J., and DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER, and 
DETERS, JJ., concur. 
FISCHER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
_________________ 
The Behal Law Group, L.L.C., and John M. Gonzales, for relator. 
Jenny Wells, Licking County Prosecuting Attorney, and Joshua M. Kunkel, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondents Licking County Board of 
Elections, Freddie Latella, Dave Rhodes, Kaye Hartman, and Park Shai. 
R. Kyle Witt, Fairfield County Prosecuting Attorney, and Amy Brown 
Thompson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondents Fairfield County Board 
of Elections, Angela D. White, Michael Oatney, Kyle Joseph Farmer, and Paul R. 
Johnson. 
The Nicodemus Law Office, L.P.A., and Bradley S. Nicodemus, for 
respondents village of Buckeye Lake and Linda Goodman. 
_________________