Title: D'Arge v. Davis

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

D'Arge v. Davis1985 WY 205710 P.2d 830Case Number: 85-93Decided: 12/18/1985RALPH D'ARGE, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

LAVERNE DAVIS, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
RALPH D'ARGE, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT), 

v. 

LAVERNE DAVIS, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, Albany County, Arthur T. Hanscum, J.

 
 
George L. 
Zimmers, Laramie, for 
appellant.

Michael D. 
Zwickl, Casper, for 
appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., 
BROWN and CARDINE, JJ., ROSE, J. (Retired), and ROONEY, J. 
(Retired).

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Laverne Davis, 
appellee, brought suit against Ralph D'Arge, appellant, as co-guarantor of a 
loan made by Wyoming National Bank to Whole-Cel Manufacturing, Inc. This appeal 
is from the trial court's judgment in favor of appellee in the amount of 
$11,097.45.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Appellant raises the 
following issue: 

"What is the appropriate 
value to give property which was taken by fellow board of directors agent; 
should the value subscribed be the value of the property at the time of the 
taking or conversion or should it be the value at the time of the disposal of 
the property?"

[¶4.]     Appellee states the 
issue as follows:

"Is it within the 
province of the trial court to determine the credibility of defendant's 
witnesses?"

[¶5.]     In 1981, the parties to 
this action, along with several other individuals, invested in an oil field 
equipment company known as Whole-Cel Manufacturing, Inc. Appellant acquired a 
seventeen percent interest in the company. When Whole-Cel began to experience 
financial difficulties in March of 1982, the company was forced to obtain two 
loans from Wyoming National Bank, one for $40,000 and the other for 
$25,000.

[¶6.]     As security for the 
$40,000 loan, appellee pledged certain personal assets. In return, several of 
the original investors, including appellant, signed an instrument entitled 
"Guarantee for Repayment of a Note Secured by Monies of Laverne Davis" in which 
they agreed to repay appellee in the event of default by 
Whole-Cel.

[¶7.]     As security for the 
$25,000 loan and any future extensions of credit made by the bank to Whole-Cel, 
several of the same shareholders, again including appellant, signed individual 
documents entitled "Continuing Guarantee." Again the documents served as a 
guarantee by the shareholders that in the event of default by Whole-Cel, the 
indebtedness would be promptly paid. Appellant's guarantee covered loans to 
Whole-Cel of up to $30,000.

[¶8.]     In August of 1982, as 
Whole-Cel's financial problems worsened and the company proved unable to repay 
the loans when due, the bank demanded payment from the company's guarantors. 
Appellee agreed to satisfy the indebtedness in full in return for an assignment 
of the bank's rights under the continuing guarantees. When appellee sought 
reimbursement on the basis of the assignment and the Guarantee for Repayment, 
appellant refused to pay and appellee brought suit. Appellant counterclaimed 
alleging that he had been induced to sign the guarantees by appellee's 
misrepresentations and fraudulent conduct. He alleged further that if the court 
found that appellee was entitled to reimbursement, the amount awarded should be 
reduced by the amount of the company's assets already appropriated by appellee. 
The latter claim referred to the removal by an agent of appellee of 
approximately 5,737 bags of circulation material from the company plant to a 
field near Casper. A portion of the material was later sold and the proceeds 
went to appellee. The remainder was left in the field.

[¶9.]     Directing the court's 
attention to appellant's answer and affidavit, in which he admitted signing and 
agreeing to the guarantees, appellee moved for summary judgment. The trial court 
granted a partial summary judgment with respect to the Guarantee for Repayment 
and awarded appellee $7,982.94 (seventeen percent of the $40,000, plus 
interest). The court set the matter of appellant's liability under the 
Continuing Guarantee for trial.

[¶10.]  Upon hearing all of the evidence, the 
trial court found that there was not sufficient evidence of misrepresentation or 
fraud and that appellee was entitled to a pro rata contribution from appellant 
based on his percentage of ownership in the company. However, the court also 
found that appellant was entitled to a set-off in the amount of the assets of 
the company already received by appellee.

[¶11.]  The record reflects that evidence as to 
the value of those assets came from two sources: the testimony of Warren 
Schroefel, the buyer of the circulation material, and the deposition of Carl 
Engvall, a former employee of Whole-Cel. Both witnesses testified on behalf of 
appellant. Mr. Schroefel testified that he purchased 1,000 bags of circulation 
material located in a field near Casper at a price of one dollar per bag. 
However, he testified further that, in his opinion, the material was only worth 
fifty cents per bag at the time of purchase. Mr. Engvall testified in his 
deposition that the 5,737 bags of material taken from the plant to the field 
were invoiced out at $27,659.90 at the time of removal. Other than the invoice 
itself, which indicated that the $27,659.90 did not represent the value of only 
the circulation material but included certain machinery as well, there was no 
other evidence as to the value of the circulation 
material.

[¶12.]  After considering all of the evidence, 
the trial court concluded that the proper standard for assessing the amount of 
set-off to which appellant was entitled was the amount of the company's assets, 
already received by appellee. In arriving at the appropriate value for those 
assets, the trial court relied on the actual price paid by Mr. Schroefel. As 
stated above, appellant now claims that the trial court erred in assessing the 
value of those assets on the basis of the one-dollar-per-bag purchase rather 
than on the value of the material at the time it was taken from the plant to the 
field. We cannot agree.

[¶13.]  The general rule is that the measure of 
damages for the loss or destruction of personal property is its market value at 
the time of loss; however that rule is not inflexible. Rocky Mountain Packing Co. v. Branney, 
Wyo., 393 P.2d 131 (1964). The value of property is a question of fact. Stearns v. Stearns, 4 Conn. App. 323, 
494 A.2d 595 (App. 1985); and Payne v. 
Holiday Towers, Inc., 283 S.C. 210, 321 S.E.2d 179 (1984). There is no 
universal standard for determining the value of property and, therefore, the 
question is one left to the determination of the trier of fact based on the 
facts and circumstances of each case. 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 324, p. 424 
(1965).

[¶14.]  When reviewing cases on appeal, we 
presume the trial court's findings of fact to be correct and we will not disturb 
such findings unless clearly erroneous or contrary to the great weight of the 
evidence. Matter of Abas, Wyo., 701 P.2d 1153 (1985). In the present case, the trial court considered the 
conflicting testimony of two witnesses testifying for appellant as to the value 
of the circulation material.

[¶15.]  As indicated above, the first witness, 
Mr. Schroefel, testified that he paid one dollar per bag but that in his 
estimate the material was only worth fifty cents per bag at the time he 
purchased it. The second witness, Mr. Engvall, testified by deposition that 
5,737 bags of the material were invoiced out at $27,659.90. He did not attribute 
a precise value to the material itself and the record reflects that the 
$27,659.90 quoted by Mr. Engvall and appearing on the invoice included the value 
of machinery as well as the value of the circulation material. There was no 
evidence presented that a market for the material existed at the time it was 
taken from the plant to the field. Nor was there evidence presented that the 
material had ever sold at the price reflected on the invoice and in Mr. 
Engvall's deposition. There was, therefore, no credible evidence presented as to 
the value of the material other than the testimony of Mr. 
Schroefel.

[¶16.]  Upon weighing the evidence that was 
presented, the trial court concluded that the value of the material for purposes 
of assessing the set-off amount was one dollar per bag. The value of the product 
was introduced by appellant in support of his set-off. It was appellant's burden 
to persuade the trial court what the value of this product was. He failed to 
prove to the satisfaction of the court that it was worth more than a dollar a 
bag.

[¶17.]  We cannot say that the trial court's 
conclusion was clearly erroneous or contrary to the great weight of the 
evidence.

[¶18.]  Affirmed.