Title: State v. Berry

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

THE STATE OF OHIO v. BERRY. 
[Cite as State v. Berry (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 371.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Death penalty — Defendant waives further 
challenges to his death sentence — Standard by which competency is to be 
evaluated — Execution warrant issued by Supreme Court. 
(No. 93-2592 — Submitted September 24, 1997 — Decided December 3, 1997.) 
ON MOTION to Adopt Findings of Fact and Opinion and to Issue Execution 
Warrant. 
 
Wilford Lee Berry, Jr., was convicted of the aggravated murder of Charles 
Mitroff and sentenced to death.  His conviction and death sentence were affirmed 
by the court of appeals and, in June 1995, by this court.  State v. Berry (1995), 72 
Ohio St.3d 354, 650 N.E.2d 433.  Berry desires to submit to execution of his death 
sentence, and therefore to terminate further challenges to his conviction and 
sentence.  The Ohio Public Defender, who has been representing Berry, claims 
that he is not mentally competent to make such a decision.  The state contends that 
Berry is competent. 
 
After repeated representations by Berry to this court and others that he 
desired to discontinue this litigation, the state filed a motion in this court for a 
competency hearing.  We ordered an evaluation of Berry’s competence and 
appointed Dr. Phillip J. Resnick to conduct the evaluation.  See State v. Berry 
(1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 1460, 656 N.E.2d 1296; 74 Ohio St.3d 1470, 657 N.E.2d 
511; (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 1492, 658 N.E.2d 1062.  Dr. Resnick examined Berry 
in April 1996. 
 
We articulated the standard by which Berry’s competence is to be evaluated 
as follows:  “A capital defendant is mentally competent to abandon any and all 
challenges to his death sentence * * * if he has the mental capacity to understand 
 
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the choice between life and death and to make a knowing and intelligent decision 
not to pursue further remedies.  The defendant must fully comprehend the 
ramifications of his decision, and must possess the ‘ability to reason logically,’ 
i.e., to choose ‘means which relate logically to his ends.’ ”  (Citations omitted.)  
State v. Berry (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 1504, 659 N.E.2d 796. 
 
Subsequently, we remanded the cause to the Court of Common Pleas of 
Cuyahoga County with directions to hold a hearing on the issue of Berry’s 
competence, render findings of fact, and return the case to this court for further 
proceedings.  State v. Berry (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 1439, 671 N.E.2d 1279. 
 
The state called two witnesses: Dr. Resnick and Dr. Robert W. Alcorn, a 
psychiatrist agreed upon by the state and the Public Defender and appointed by the 
common pleas court, who examined Berry in 1997.  Drs. Resnick and Alcorn 
found Berry to be competent.  The Public Defender also called two witnesses:  Dr. 
Sharon L. Pearson, a psychologist who examined Berry in 1995 at the Public 
Defender’s request and found him incompetent, and Dr. Jeffrey L. Smalldon, a 
psychologist who never examined Berry and had no opinion as to his competence, 
but who testified generally regarding schizotypal personality disorder and its 
relevance to determining a person’s competence.  (The Public Defender also 
proffered the testimony of attorney Alan Freedman, a specialist in appeals of 
capital cases, who gave an opinion of Berry’s chances of prevailing on federal 
habeas corpus; however, that testimony was not admitted.) 
 
After hearing the evidence, the trial judge found that Berry “is competent to 
forgo any and all further legal challenges.”  She found that Berry understands the 
choice between life and death, has the capacity to make a knowing and intelligent 
decision not to pursue further remedies and the capacity to reason logically, and 
fully comprehends the ramifications of his decision. 
 
3
 
She further found that Berry suffers from a mixed personality disorder with 
schizotypal, borderline, and antisocial features, and that he has no mental disease.  
Berry’s disorder does not prevent him from understanding his legal position and 
the options available to him, or from making a rational choice between those 
options.  He understands that abandoning his appeals will result in his being put to 
death, and he considers death preferable to life in prison. 
 
The judge found that the view of Resnick and Alcorn that Berry was 
competent is “more credible and convincing” than Pearson’s view that he was not.  
The judge noted that Resnick is highly experienced and “nationally recognized for 
his work.”  The judge regarded Pearson as “sincere” and her conclusions as 
“thoughtful,” but noted her “minimal experience in the area of forensic 
psychiatry.”  She also found it curious that Berry’s rigidity of thought, which 
Pearson had testified was the primary factor in her conclusions, was not mentioned 
in her written report.  The judge also based her conclusions on her own 
“opportunity to carefully observe the demeanor of Mr. Berry.”1 
 
Finally, after an extensive colloquy with Berry, the judge found that Berry 
has in fact voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently decided to forgo any future 
challenges to his conviction and death sentence, and that he is aware of his 
constitutional right to counsel and the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation. 
 
The hearing record was filed in this court on July 25, 1997.  The cause is 
now before us pursuant to our order of November 18, 1996, reported at 77 Ohio 
St.3d 1439, 671 N.E.2d 1279, supra, and upon the state’s motion for the issuance 
of an execution warrant. 
__________________ 
 
4
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Jeffrey S. Sutton, State Solicitor, 
Simon B. Karas, Deputy Chief Counsel, Sharon McClellan and Karl Wetzel, 
Assistant Attorneys General; Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Cuyahoga County 
Prosecuting Attorney, and George J. Sadd, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging 
allowance of the motion. 
 
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, Joseph E. Wilhelm, Appellate 
Supervisor, Death Penalty Division, and J. Joseph Bodine, Jr., Assistant Public 
Defender, urging denial of the motion. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  We have reviewed the record and considered the arguments of 
the state and the Public Defender.  Based on our review, we find that Berry is 
competent to forgo all further reviews of his conviction and sentence. 
I.  Jurisdiction 
 
The Public Defender argues that the Ohio Constitution gives us no 
jurisdiction to determine Berry’s competence.  Section 2(B)(1)(f), Article IV, Ohio 
Constitution, grants this court original jurisdiction “[i]n any cause on review as 
may be necessary to its complete determination.”  However, the Public Defender 
argues that, because this court has decided Berry’s direct appeal, Berry’s case is 
not presently a “cause on review” before this court. 
 
State v. Steffen (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 399, 639 N.E.2d 67, demonstrates that 
the term “cause on review” is not limited to cases currently pending on direct 
appeal.  In Steffen, we issued an order prohibiting other Ohio courts from granting 
further stays of execution to ten condemned prisoners.  Each of the ten had 
completed his direct appeal to this court and at least one motion for delayed 
reconsideration and/or reinstatement of his appeal.  Nine had also completed one 
round of postconviction relief under R.C. 2953.21.  Not one had any litigation 
 
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then pending before this court.  See 70 Ohio St.3d at 399-405, 639 N.E.2d at 69-
72.  In Steffen, we specifically cited Section 2(B)(1)(f) to support our exercise of 
jurisdiction, even though the capital cases were not then before us on appeal.  Id. 
at 407-408, 639 N.E.2d at 74. 
 
Similarly, we have regularly set execution dates and granted stays of 
execution well after issuing our mandate in capital appeals.2  Were the Public 
Defender correct, we could do neither. 
II.  The Test of Competence: Rees v. Peyton 
 
In Rees v. Peyton (1966), 384 U.S. 312, 86 S.Ct. 1505, 16 L.Ed.2d 583, one 
Rees (a condemned prisoner) filed a petition for certiorari in the United States 
Supreme Court seeking review of a federal court judgment denying habeas corpus 
relief.  Subsequently, Rees directed his counsel to withdraw the petition and forgo 
any further attacks on his conviction and sentence.  Counsel had Rees examined 
by a psychiatrist, who concluded that Rees was incompetent. 
 
The Supreme Court, while retaining jurisdiction over the cause, directed the 
federal district court to determine Rees’s mental competence, framing the question 
as follows:  “[W]hether he has capacity to appreciate his position and make a 
rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or on 
the other hand whether he is suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect 
which may substantially affect his capacity in the premises.”  384 U.S. at 314, 86 
S.Ct. at 1506, 16 L.Ed.2d at 584-585.  
 
The Public Defender contends that under Rees, if there exists even a 
possibility that Berry’s mental disorder has affected his decisionmaking capacity 
in any way and to any degree, this court must find him incompetent.  See 
Rumbaugh v. Procunier (C.A.5, 1985), 753 F.2d 395, 405 (Goldberg, J., 
dissenting).  We disagree. 
 
6
 
If a mere possibility were enough to render a defendant incompetent, there 
would have been no need in Rees for a competency determination by the federal 
district court.  Rees had been “examined by a psychiatrist who filed a detailed 
report concluding that Rees was mentally incompetent.”  384 U.S. at 313, 86 S.Ct. 
at 1506, 16 L.Ed.2d at 584.  Thus, before the decision in Rees, there was already a 
strong possibility that Rees’s decision was substantially affected by his mental 
condition. 
 
In Smith v. Armontrout (C.A.8, 1987), 812 F.2d 1050, the court expressly 
considered this issue.3  The “next-friend petitioners” in that case, like the Public 
Defender here, focused on the word “may” in the second half of the Rees test.  
“Rees, they maintain, indicates through its use of the word ‘may’ that an inmate 
must be found incompetent where the evidence establishes even a mere possibility 
that a mental disorder substantially affected the decision.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at 
1057. 
 
The Smith court rejected that analysis:  
 
“[T]he petitioner’s literal interpretation of the half of the Rees test which 
asks whether the prisoner suffers from ‘a mental disease, disorder, or defect which 
may substantially affect his capacity,’ would conflict with a similarly literal 
interpretation of the other half of the test, which asks whether the prisoner has, 
rather than absolutely, certainly, or undoubtedly has, the capacity to appreciate his 
position and make a rational choice.  Though Rees recites these two portions of the 
standard as disjunctive alternatives, there is necessarily an area of overlap between 
the category of cases in which at the threshold we see a possibility that a decision 
is substantially affected by a mental disorder, disease, or defect, and that of cases 
in which, after proceeding further, we conclude that the decision is in fact the 
product of a rational thought process. 
 
7
 
“Furthermore, we think it very probable * * * that in every case where a 
death-row inmate elects to abandon further legal proceedings, there will be a 
possibility that the decision is the product of a mental disease, disorder, or defect.  
Yet, Rees clearly contemplates that competent waivers are possible * * * and there 
is little point in conducting a competency inquiry if a finding of incompetency is 
virtually a foregone conclusion.”  812 F.2d at 1057. 
 
We agree with the Smith court’s analysis and therefore reject the notion that 
the bare possibility of a mental disorder’s substantially affecting the condemned’s 
decisionmaking capacity is enough to require a finding of incompetence.  
Ultimately, the question is not whether a defendant “may” lack the capacity to 
make a rational choice, but whether he in fact has that capacity.   
 
As for the standard we enunciated earlier in this case, it is wholly consistent 
with Rees, and in fact reflects a more specific definition of the general terms used 
in Rees.  Thus, in our view, a defendant “has capacity to appreciate his position,” 
Rees, supra, if he understands the choice between life and death, see Franz v. 
State (1988), 296 Ark. 181, 189, 754 S.W.2d 839, 843; State v. Dodd (1992), 120 
Wash.2d 1, 23, 838 P.2d 86, 97, and he fully comprehends the ramifications of his 
decision to waive further legal proceedings, see Cole v. State (1985), 101 Nev. 
585, 588, 707 P.2d 545, 547.  And a defendant has the capacity to “make a rational 
choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation,” Rees, supra, if 
he can make a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent decision, Franz, supra, at 189-
190, 754 S.W.2d at 844; Dodd, supra, at 23, 838 P.2d at 97; and he has the “ability 
to reason logically,” i.e., to choose “means which relate logically to his ends,” see 
State v. Bailey (Del.Super.1986), 519 A.2d 132, 137-138. 
 
In Whitmore v. Arkansas (1990), 495 U.S. 149, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 
135, when a condemned prisoner refused to pursue an appeal to the state supreme 
 
8
court, the issue was whether a “next friend” could seek a writ of certiorari on his 
behalf from the United States Supreme Court.  Whitmore held that the would-be 
“next friend” could not establish standing unless he could at least show that the 
prisoner “is unable to litigate his own cause due to mental incapacity * * * or other 
similar disability.”  Id. at 165, 110 S.Ct. at 1728, 109 L.Ed.2d at 151.  Whitmore 
further held that a “next friend” may not proceed on a prisoner’s behalf “where an 
evidentiary hearing shows that the defendant has given a knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary waiver of his right to proceed, and his access to court is otherwise 
unimpeded.”  Id. 
 
In Whitmore, the Arkansas trial court had held an evidentiary hearing and 
found the defendant to have the capacity to understand the choice between life and 
death and to knowingly and intelligently waive any and all rights to appeal his 
sentence.  See Simmons v. State (1989), 298 Ark. 193, 194, 766 S.W.2d 422, 423.  
That being so, the would-be “next friend” could not make the required showing of 
incapacity, and thus could not establish standing to litigate the prisoner’s case 
against his will. 
 
It appears, then, that the standard used to determine competence in Arkansas 
— capacity to understand the choice and to make a knowing and intelligent waiver 
— has been accepted by the United States Supreme Court.  See Dodd, 120 
Wash.2d at 22-23, 838 P.2d at 97, citing Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 165, 110 S.Ct. at 
1728, 109 L.Ed.2d at 151-152; Grasso v. State (Okla.Crim.App.1993), 857 P.2d 
802, 806.  Cf. Gilmore v. Utah (1976), 429 U.S. 1012, 1013, 97 S.Ct. 436, 437, 50 
L.Ed.2d 632, 633.4 
III.  Berry’s Mental Evaluations 
 
Dr. Sharon L. Pearson conducted the most extensive interviews.  She saw 
Berry three times during July and August 1995, not long after this court affirmed 
 
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his convictions and sentence.  Dr. Pearson spent 4.5 hours administering 
psychological tests, including the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory.  
She also interviewed Berry for a total of 7.5 additional hours.  Finally, Dr. Pearson 
reviewed an impressive amount of background material on Berry’s mental health 
history. 
 
Dr. Pearson found in Berry symptoms of a “schizotypal personality 
disorder,” a “rigid thought process,” a tendency toward “extreme isolation and 
withdrawal,” and a tendency to have psychotic episodes under stress.  She 
concluded that Berry was not competent to waive his rights.  Her conclusion was 
reached with reference to what she called a “clinical” definition of “competence,” 
not a legal one.5 
 
Dr. Philip J. Resnick interviewed Berry for 2.75 hours and reviewed 
extensive materials on his mental health history, as well as Dr. Pearson’s report. 
 
Dr. Robert W. Alcorn interviewed Berry for 1.5 hours.  He did not review 
any materials on Berry’s mental health history, but he did discuss Berry’s history 
with Berry himself, and he also reviewed the reports of Drs. Pearson and Resnick; 
those reports related Berry’s history to such an extent that Alcorn did not find it 
necessary to review the materials. 
 
Drs. Resnick and Alcorn diagnosed a mixed personality disorder with 
schizotypal, borderline, and antisocial features.  Dr. Alcorn explained that a 
“mixed personality disorder” means that a patient exhibits features of more than 
one type of disorder, but is “not clearly in one category or another.”  Both 
psychiatrists concluded that Berry was competent to decide against pursuing 
further remedies, measured by the legal standard established by this court. 
 
10
 
None of the three experts found Berry to be psychotic.6  Dr. Resnick 
testified that “psychosis is a major mental disorder in which a person is out of 
touch with reality * * *.” 
 
While imprisoned in Texas in the 1980s, Berry reported hallucinations, was 
diagnosed with schizophrenia, and was placed on antipsychotic medication.  
However, when he stopped taking the medicine, his hallucinations did not recur, 
leading Dr. Resnick to question the accuracy of the Texas diagnosis.  In 1990, Dr. 
Robert W. Goldberg diagnosed Berry with “psychotic disorder not otherwise 
specified.”  The 1990 diagnosis was made in connection with Berry’s then-
upcoming aggravated murder trial, in which Dr. Goldberg was a defense witness.  
Dr. Resnick testified that Berry may have been malingering in 1990, but Resnick 
could give no opinion on that point.  Drs. Alcorn and Pearson testified that Berry 
may have brief psychotic reactions under stress.  However, Dr. Resnick pointed 
out that the consistency of Berry’s desire to drop his appeals and be executed 
indicates that this desire is not the result of any transitory mental state. 
 
Berry believed that when he died, he would be judged by God and go to 
heaven or hell.  The psychiatric profession does not regard this sort of commonly 
held religious belief as a sign of mental illness, according to Dr. Alcorn.  Berry 
had no unusual or delusional beliefs about the afterlife.  He has considered 
donating his organs.  Both Dr. Resnick and Dr. Alcorn concluded that he 
understood the difference between life and death and the permanence of death.  
(Dr. Pearson was not asked her opinion on this point.) 
 
Berry told all three doctors that he would prefer freedom to death if he 
thought it a reasonable possibility.  Dr. Pearson did not believe that he was being 
deceptive about that, even though she also believed Berry had a compulsive desire 
 
11
to be dead.  Given the evidence, it seems clear that Berry understands the 
difference between life and death. 
 
The Public Defender’s chief contention at the evidentiary hearing was that, 
due to his mental disorder, Berry does not fully comprehend the ramifications of 
his decision.  Although he clearly understands that abandoning his legal remedies 
will lead to his death, he does not understand that pursuing them may mean 
freedom, which he says he prefers to death.  This lack of understanding, according 
to Dr. Pearson, results from the rigid thinking caused by his mental disorder.  
Having formed the fixed notion that he has little chance of freedom, he refuses to 
listen to his attorneys when they try to tell him otherwise. 
 
Berry’s “rigid thought process” was crucial to Dr. Pearson’s conclusion that 
Berry was incompetent.  According to Dr. Pearson, rigid thinking is a result, and a 
symptom, of Berry’s schizotypal disorder.  Pearson believed that Berry’s rigidity 
rendered him psychologically unable to absorb information from his attorneys if it 
conflicted with his preconceptions as to his chance of succeeding in further 
litigation. 
 
Pearson testified that Randy Ashburn of the Public Defender’s Office, one 
of Berry’s attorneys, told her Berry had a fairly good chance of success. She 
testified that she relayed that information to Berry, and she found him “very closed 
to that [idea] and very committed to the way he thought, which was he did not 
have any chance of prevailing.”  Berry’s attorneys told Pearson that they had tried 
to convey the same information to Berry. 
 
Dr. Pearson believed that Berry was “unable to take in” that information.  
However, her conclusion is undermined by her concession that Berry understands 
that the public defenders think his litigation can be successful.  Furthermore, Dr. 
Pearson conceded that it is “possible” that the rejection of his appeals by this court 
 
12
and the court of appeals may have contributed to Berry’s attitude, and when asked, 
“Isn’t he taking in information?” she replied, “Yes.” 
 
Moreover, Berry’s unwillingness to receive this information from Dr. 
Pearson does not necessarily support her belief that he was unable to absorb 
information that conflicted with his preconceptions.  There was no evidence that 
Dr. Pearson was giving Berry any new information; she was merely passing along 
the opinion of Berry’s attorneys, of which Berry was already aware and which he 
had already rejected.   
 
Moreover, Berry has not rejected the possibility of having his conviction 
overturned.  Berry told Dr. Resnick that he knows he is guilty of the Mitroff 
murder, and that “even if he had a second trial, he would be found guilty again, 
sentenced to death again and ultimately executed.”  (Emphasis added.)  He told 
Dr. Alcorn that “the confession of Lozar [Berry’s co-defendant] would lead to his 
own conviction and inevitable execution for the crime.” 
 
Thus, Berry does not want his conviction overturned, as he believes that 
will lead to a result he finds undesirable, as he told Dr. Resnick, “to wait around 
on death row for 20 years” only to be executed anyway.  Drs. Resnick and Alcorn 
stated that this was a rational choice.  According to Dr. Resnick, it is common for 
condemned inmates to at least “weigh whether they would prefer to be executed” 
because of the “misery” associated with life in prison. 
 
Pearson said that people with schizotypal disorder “latch onto one issue” 
which becomes “the focus of the obsessive thinking and the compulsive behavior.”  
Yet she then said that Berry’s desire to waive further review of his case was his 
“most significant issue” — implying that there might be others. 
 
13
 
When asked on what other issues Berry had shown rigidity, Dr. Pearson 
said, “I have no way of knowing.”  Despite that, she offered other examples of 
Berry’s rigidity. 
 
Many of her examples were unpersuasive.  For instance, Dr. Pearson 
testified that “there was some report of him writing threatening notes to a woman. 
* * * It may represent a rigid perception that was inaccurate that he would be 
acting on.”  However, Dr. Pearson conceded on cross-examination that she did not 
know whether Berry had rejected any information or advice from anyone with 
regard to that situation so that his perception could fairly be called “rigid.” 
 
According to Dr. Pearson, Berry was “adamant” in his belief that a lung 
condition he had suffered from would come back and kill him, even though it had 
been surgically corrected.  Berry told Dr. Pearson that his surgeon had told him 
that “he was a corpse looking for a place to die.”  Dr. Pearson testified that she 
consulted “medical people” and medical literature and found that “once corrected 
[the condition] was pretty much corrected.”  She told Berry this at a later 
interview, but he “did not * * * take it in.” 
 
However, Dr. Pearson is not a medical doctor.  Berry’s refusal to consider 
her opinion on a medical subject, as against the opinion of his surgeon,7 does not 
seem to be persuasive evidence of a disabling degree of rigidity.  In any case, he 
told Drs. Resnick and Alcorn he was not worried about his lung; while he did 
believe his lung condition might kill him, he seemed more worried about living a 
long time on death row. 
 
Dr. Pearson said Berry was rigid in his belief that “people can’t be trusted”; 
yet she conceded that he did trust Cynthia Yost, one of his attorneys. 
 
Dr. Pearson said Berry is rigid in his lifelong, compulsive desire to be dead.  
But Berry told Dr. Pearson he would rather be free than dead, and Dr. Pearson 
 
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conceded that Berry was not lying or being deceptive about this. Moreover, 
although Berry has a history of suicide attempts, it has been nine years since 
Berry’s last such attempt, and he told Dr. Resnick he thought suicide was “stupid.”  
And Dr. Pearson agreed with Drs. Resnick and Alcorn that Berry does not suffer 
from clinical depression, although he has so suffered in the past.  (Dr. Resnick 
noted that the consistency of Berry’s desire for execution indicates that his desire 
is not attributable to changes in his mood.) 
 
“Defensiveness” or “minimization” occurs when a patient tries to conceal 
symptoms and appear healthier than he is.  All three experts detected 
defensiveness on Berry’s part.  For instance, in the Alcorn and Pearson interviews, 
Berry initially denied ever having had hallucinations.  However, he ultimately 
admitted to all three doctors that he had suffered hallucinations in the past. 
 
Dr. Pearson testified that, particularly when defensiveness is suspected, it is 
important to spend enough time with the patient to “wear the person down,” 
because “[a]nybody can keep themselves [sic] together for a couple of hours.”  
However, according to Dr. Resnick, prolonging the interview is not helpful in 
detecting defensiveness.  In fact, as noted, all three experts were able to detect 
Berry’s defensiveness and evaluate his mental condition. 
 
Dr. Pearson administered an IQ test.  Berry’s IQ was one hundred, placing 
him “in the average level of intellectual functioning,” according to Dr. Pearson’s 
report.  Dr. Pearson testified that “Wilford is very bright and Wilford has a lot of 
intellectual ability.”  She also conceded that Berry was engaging in logical thought 
processes. 
 
Dr. Resnick described Berry as “articulate”; “his speech showed clear, 
logical thinking and no confusion or disorganization of thoughts.”  He showed 
“adequate concentration, attention and memory” and exhibited “fair” judgment.  
 
15
He further demonstrated reasoning ability by explaining to Dr. Resnick why he 
preferred electrocution to lethal injection and giving a specific, rational reason for 
his preference.  Dr. Alcorn noted that Berry did well on tests measuring 
concentration.  None of the three experts found any evidence of organic brain 
damage. 
 
All three experts were in agreement on many issues: that Berry has a 
disorder, but not a psychosis; that he is defensive; that he would prefer freedom to 
death; that he is logical and moderately intelligent.  To the extent that they 
differed, we find the conclusions of Dr. Resnick and Dr. Alcorn more credible 
than those of Dr. Pearson. 
 
Dr. Resnick, the Director of the Cuyahoga County Court Psychiatric Clinic 
since 1976, is an eminent authority in the field of forensic psychiatry.  He is a 
professor of psychiatry at the Case Western Reserve University School of 
Medicine.  He is also a lecturer in law and psychiatry at the Case Western Reserve 
University Law School and has held “distinguished visiting professorships” at four 
other institutions.  He serves as Director of the Fellowship in Forensic Psychiatry 
and Director of the Division of Forensic Psychiatry at the University Hospitals of 
Cleveland. 
 
Dr. Resnick is a past president of the American Academy of Psychiatry and 
the Law, chairman of the Ohio Psychiatric Association Forensic Committee, vice-
president of the Cleveland Psychiatric Society, a fellow of the American 
Psychiatric Association, and a member of the Council on Accreditation for 
Fellowships in Forensic Psychiatry.  He is certified by the American Board of 
Psychiatry. 
 
Dr. Resnick has given numerous lectures on such subjects as the detection 
of malingering, the insanity defense, and the psychiatric prediction of violence.  
 
16
His curriculum vitae reflects fourteen major international presentations and 
ninety-five major American presentations.  He has written or co-authored one 
book, twenty-five book chapters and contributions, and fifty articles in 
professional journals.  He has testified before the Judiciary Committees of the 
Ohio House of Representatives and Senate and the National Commission on the 
Insanity Defense.  Finally, he has testified numerous times in criminal cases, in 
Ohio and other jurisdictions. 
 
Dr. Alcorn is also highly experienced in forensic psychiatry.  After 
completing his residency in 1974, Dr. Alcorn worked for the Cuyahoga County 
Court Psychiatric Clinic between 1979 and 1995.  He is Medical Director of 
Mental Health Services, Inc., and assistant clinical professor in the psychiatry 
department of the Case Western Reserve School of Medicine.  He has received 
specialized education in criminal law and “psychiatry and the law,” and he is 
certified by both the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology and the 
American Board of Forensic Psychiatry.  His curriculum vitae indicates extensive 
teaching experience and lists eight scientific presentations on subjects including 
malingering in criminal cases, the insanity defense, and depression.  He has 
testified numerous times on competency and sanity issues. 
 
While Dr. Pearson is certainly qualified, her experience in forensic matters 
is limited.  Dr. Pearson has been a self-employed clinical psychologist since 1988.  
About twenty-five percent of her practice consists of forensic examination, and 
she has testified in approximately twenty cases, about a third of which were 
criminal.  Dr. Pearson is also a clinical assistant professor at the Wright State 
University School of Professional Psychology.  Her curriculum vitae lists several 
workshops and presentations, although none seems to have specifically dealt with 
forensic psychology. 
 
17
 
In our view, Dr. Pearson’s crucial testimony on the subject of “rigidity” was 
unpersuasive.  Moreover, we note Dr. Pearson’s failure to make any reference to 
Berry’s rigidity of thought in her written report, given her testimony that Berry’s 
rigidity was “the primary factor in my decision that he was not able to waive his 
rights * * *.” 
 
We note that Dr. Pearson was brought into the case by the Public Defender; 
the other two experts were court-appointed.  Dr. Pearson did not apply any legal 
standard of competence.  Instead, she used the following “clinical” definition of 
“competence”:  “If someone has the capacity, ability to do something.  If someone 
is competent that means they are functional, they are capable, able.”  This 
definition is logically circular, and therefore analytically useless. 
 
Dr. Pearson did spend over twice as much time with Berry as Drs. Resnick 
and Alcorn combined.  But Dr. Resnick testified that one need not spend a great 
deal of time with a patient to detect defensiveness — and both he and Dr. Alcorn 
did detect it in Berry and take it into account.  Moreover, Drs. Resnick and Alcorn 
had the benefit of reading Dr. Pearson’s report before making their own 
evaluations.  It is difficult to conclude that Drs. Resnick and Alcorn failed to 
spend an adequate amount of time with Berry, especially since their conclusions 
were, in many pertinent respects, the same as Dr. Pearson’s. 
IV.  Application of the Rees Standard 
 
We find that Berry possesses the mental capacity to appreciate his position 
and to make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further 
litigation. While Berry does have a mental disorder, it does not substantially affect 
his capacity in this respect.  Rees v. Peyton, supra. 
 
Berry is unquestionably a moderately intelligent man with demonstrated 
reasoning ability.  He suffers from a mental disorder, but is in touch with reality, 
 
18
and his mental disorder is not of such a nature as to preclude him from considering 
his options and making a voluntary, rational choice between them. 
 
Specifically, we find that Berry’s rejection of his counsel’s advice is not 
attributable to his mental disorder.  Berry is not using his death sentence to fulfill a 
death wish produced by his disorder, as the Public Defender argues.  Instead, he 
prefers freedom to death, but prefers a speedy execution to incarceration on death 
row during a protracted legal struggle.  Moreover, he believes that, even if his 
lawyers succeed in having his conviction overturned, he will simply be retried and 
resentenced to death.  We find that this belief of Berry’s, whether well founded or 
not, is not the product of his mental disorder. 
 
We find that Berry understands the difference between life and death and 
fully comprehends the ramifications of his decision to forgo further legal 
proceedings.  We find that he has the ability to choose means that relate logically 
to his ends.  We find that he is capable of making a voluntary, knowing, and 
intelligent decision to forgo further legal proceedings, and that his decision to do 
so is in fact voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. 
 
Pursuant to the standard enunciated in Rees v. Peyton, supra, we find Berry 
competent to decide for himself whether to pursue or forgo further legal 
challenges to his conviction and death sentence. 
V.  Claim of Judicial Bias 
 
The Public Defender claims that the trial judge who conducted the 
evidentiary hearing was predisposed to find Berry competent.  The portions of the 
record cited by the Public Defender do not, in our view, support this accusation.  
We reject this claim and find that the trial judge conducted a full and fair 
evidentiary hearing.  
VI.  Exclusion of Testimony 
 
19
 
The Public Defender further contends that the trial judge erred in excluding 
the testimony of attorney Alan Freedman regarding Berry’s chances to succeed in 
federal habeas corpus.8  We cannot agree.  The actual strength of Berry’s possible 
federal claim is not at issue.  The question is whether Berry has the capacity to 
decide for himself whether to pursue those claims.  It is relevant to that 
determination whether Berry is able to listen to and consider his attorneys’ 
opinion, but whether their opinion is right, wrong, or arguable is not relevant at 
all.  A competent person may choose to forgo even the strongest legal claim.9  Cf. 
State v. Torrence (1994), 317 S.C. 45, 47, 451 S.E.2d 883, 884, fn. 2:  “The test is 
not * * * whether the defendant in fact cooperates with counsel, but whether he 
has sufficient mental capacity to do so.” 
VII.  Claim that Postconviction Review Is Mandatory 
 
Finally, the Public Defender argues that Section 9, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution requires collateral review of all capital cases, irrespective of the 
defendant’s wishes and whether he is mentally competent or not. 
 
The clause cited states:  “Excessive bail shall not be required; nor excessive 
fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”  (Emphasis added.)  
We think it extraordinary to contend that this clause, part of Ohio’s basic law since 
1802,10 mandates the use of a form of action that did not exist until the General 
Assembly created it one hundred and sixty-three years later.  Even if the clause 
does give rise to procedural rights, there is surely nothing in the plain English of 
the clause that forbids a mentally competent person to waive those rights.   
 
The Public Defender’s reading of the clause reflects a radical paternalism 
outside the mainstream of American law and inconsistent with the human dignity 
of a competent adult.  A competent criminal defendant may plead guilty to a 
charge even though he believes himself to be innocent.  North Carolina v. Alford 
 
20
(1970), 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162.  He may testify on his own 
behalf, or refuse to do so, against the advice of counsel.  Jones v. Barnes (1983), 
463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 3312, 77 L.Ed.2d 987, 993.  He may choose to 
do without counsel altogether, and represent himself.  Faretta v. California 
(1975), 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562.  He may decide not to 
present any mitigating factors on his behalf in the penalty phase of a capital case.  
State v. Tyler (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 24, 27-29, 553 N.E.2d 576, 583-586; People 
v. Lang (1989), 49 Cal.3d 991, 1029-1031, 264 Cal.Rptr. 386, 411-412, 782 P.2d 
627, 652-653; People v. Silagy (1984), 101 Ill.2d 147, 175-181, 77 Ill.Dec. 792, 
806-809, 461 N.E.2d 415, 429-432.  However wise or foolish his decisions, they 
are his. 
 
Our law generally refuses “to imprison a man in his privileges and call it the 
Constitution.”  Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann (1942), 317 U.S. 269, 280, 
63 S.Ct. 236, 242, 87 L.Ed. 268, 275.  Therefore, absent a clear textual warrant for 
doing so — and we have none here — we cannot insert such a philosophy into the 
Ohio Constitution.  “The same value that guarantees a defendant a right to present 
mitigating evidence — ‘the right of the defendant to be treated with dignity as a 
human being’ * * * — also gives him the right to decide what is in his own best 
interest.”  State v. Tyler, supra, 50 Ohio St.3d at 29, 553 N.E.2d at 585, quoting 
Bonnie, The Dignity of the Condemned (1988), 74 Va.L.Rev. 1363, 1383. 
 
Nothing in the Ohio Constitution requires us to make Berry “a pawn to be 
manipulated on a chessboard larger than his own case.”  Lenhard v. Wolff (1979), 
443 U.S. 1306, 1312, 100 S.Ct. 3, 7, 61 L.Ed.2d 885, 890 (Rehnquist, Circuit 
Justice) (continuing stay of execution).  Since he is mentally competent to decide 
for himself, “[t]o deny him that would be to incarcerate his spirit — the one thing 
 
21
that remains free and which the state need not and should not imprison.”  Lenhard 
v. Wolff (C.A.9, 1979), 603 F.2d 91, 94 (Sneed, J., concurring). 
VIII.  Conclusion 
 
We conclude, based on the hearing record, that Berry is competent, in that 
he has the capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational choice with 
respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation.  Rees, supra.  Furthermore, 
we hold that the Ohio Constitution does not compel us to force postconviction 
review upon a competent individual who has decided, for reasons of his own, not 
to seek it. 
 
We therefore order that the sentence of death heretofore imposed on Wilford 
Lee Berry, Jr., be carried into execution on March 3, 1998.  An execution warrant 
will issue immediately. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. 
We note that Berry engaged in some disruptive conduct during status 
conferences that preceded the evidentiary hearing, but not during the hearing 
itself. 
2. 
See, e.g., State v. Phillips (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 656 N.E.2d 643, 
reconsideration denied (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 1485, 657 N.E.2d 1378, stay granted 
(1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 1503, 659 N.E.2d 795; State v. Scudder (1994), 71 Ohio 
St.3d 263, 643 N.E.2d 524, reconsideration denied (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 1459, 
644 N.E.2d 1031, stay granted (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 1488, 646 N.E.2d 464, stay 
terminated (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 1502, 659 N.E.2d 794, stay granted (1996), 74 
Ohio St.3d 1515, 660 N.E.2d 470. 
 
22
3. 
The Public Defender cites In re Heidnik (C.A.3, 1997), 112 F.3d 105, in 
support of his position, but Heidnik simply recites the Rees standard, without 
expressly considering whether a defendant must be deemed incompetent upon a 
mere possibility that a mental disorder substantially affects his capacity.  
4. 
The Public Defender questions the value of Whitmore and Gilmore, 
asserting that those cases turned on the issue of a next friend’s standing to press a 
condemned prisoner’s claims in federal court.  But the standing issue itself turns 
on the question of competence, and the Public Defender does not explain why the 
constitutional standard of competence used in state court should differ from that 
used in federal court. 
5. 
The Public Defender’s assertion that “Dr. Pearson * * * evaluated Berry 
under the Rees v. Peyton standard” is incorrect. 
6. 
The Public Defender asserts that Drs. Resnick and Alcorn based their 
findings of competence wholly upon the absence of an active psychosis.  They did 
not, however; indeed, Dr. Resnick testified that the absence of psychosis “isn’t the 
only issue in determining whether or not he is competent.” 
7. 
Dr. Pearson seemed to doubt Berry’s account of what his surgeon had told 
him, but there was no evidence one way or the other. 
8. 
According to Freedman’s proffered testimony, Berry’s confession, and 
perhaps other evidence as well, should have been suppressed on the ground that he 
was detained longer than forty-eight hours after his arrest without being brought 
before a judicial officer for a probable-cause determination.  See County of 
Riverside v. McLaughlin (1991), 500 U.S. 44, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49. 
9. 
Even if the strength of Berry’s McLaughlin claim were relevant, we would 
place little credence in Freedman’s opinion.  First, it is far from clear that the 
exclusionary rule will be applied to freestanding McLaughlin claims.  See Powell 
 
23
v. Nevada (1994), 511 U.S. 79, 85, 114 S.Ct. 1280, 1284, 128 L.Ed.2d 1, 8, fn.* 
(expressly reserving question); 3 LaFave, Search and Seizure (3 Ed.1996) 48, 
Section 5.1(f).  Moreover, although McLaughlin is retroactive, see Powell, supra, 
the application of the exclusionary rule to McLaughlin claims “remain[ed] an 
unresolved question,” 511 U.S. at 85, 114 S.Ct. at 1284, 128 L.Ed.2d at 8, fn.*, 
when Berry’s conviction became final in 1995; therefore, the exclusionary rule 
may not be retroactively applicable to McLaughlin claims in habeas corpus.  See, 
generally, Teague v. Lane (1989), 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334. 
 
Finally, the court of appeals expressly held that Berry had waived his 
McLaughlin claim by failing to raise it in the trial court.  See State v. Berry (Oct. 
21, 1993), Cuyahoga App. No. 60531, unreported, at 27, 1993 WL 425370.  We 
subsequently rejected the claim without specific explanation.  72 Ohio St.3d at 
358, 650 N.E.2d at 438.  A federal court would “look through” our unexplained 
decision to the last explained state-court decision.  Ylst v. Nunnemaker (1991), 501 
U.S. 797, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706.  Here, the last explained state-court 
decision explicitly found a procedural default; such a finding generally precludes 
federal habeas review of a claim.  See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac (1982), 456 U.S. 107, 
129, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1572, 71 L.Ed.2d 783, 801. 
10. 
See Section 13, Article VIII, 1802 Constitution.