Title: DAWSON A. REECE v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DAWSON A. REECE v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 121193 P.3d 274Case Number: No. S-07-0296Decided: 10/09/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 

DAWSON 
A. REECE,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNiobraraCounty

The 
Honorable John C. Brooks, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; and David E. 
Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Graham M. 
Smith, Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Dawson A. Reece 
challenges his probation revocation, stating that the terms of his probation 
failed to specify the required, and the prohibited, conduct, and that the 
district court did not make adequate findings to justify the revocation.  On appeal, we 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Reece presents 
two issues for review:

 
 

1.                             
WERE 
[REECE]'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS VIOLATED BY THE NON-SPECIFICITY OF THE TERMS OF HIS 
PROBATION AND A FAILURE TO ADVISE HIM OF THE CONDUCT THAT WAS REQUIRED AND 
PROHIBITED?

 
 

2.                             
DID 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO MAKE SPECIFIC FINDINGS REQUIRED BY LAW AMOUNT TO 
ARBITRARY AND CAPRISOUS ACTION AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION?

 
 
The 
State rephrases the issues as follows:

 
 

1.                              
THE 
TERMS OF [REECE]'S PROBATION WERE SUFFICIENTLY SPECIFIC AND HE WAS PROPERLY 
ADVISED OF THE TERMS OF HIS PROBATION; THEREFORE, HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE 
NOT VIOLATED.

 
 

2.                              
THE 
DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT MAKE EXPRESS 
FINDINGS OF FACT  BEYOND ACCEPTING [REECE]'S OWN ADMISSION THAT HE VIOLATED A 
TERM OF HIS PROBATION  TO SUPPORT ITS FINDING THAT A PROBATION VIOLATION 
OCCURRED.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In August of 
2005, Reece was charged with two counts of kidnapping, two counts of aggravated 
assault, one count of felonious restraint, one count of domestic violence, and 
one count of cruelty to animals.  
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Reece pled guilty to one count of felonious 
restraint and one count of aggravated assault, with the remaining charges 
dismissed.  Concurrent prison terms 
of three to five years and five to eight years were imposed.  The court recommended that Reece 
complete the Boot Camp program, and contemplated that if he successfully 
completed Boot Camp, Reece would be transferred to an Adult Community 
Corrections (ACC) program to be followed by three years of supervised 
probation.

 
 
[¶4]      Reece 
successfully completed Boot Camp, and on June 13, 2007, was released from 
custody, placed on probation, and transferred to the Wyoming Substance Abuse 
Treatment and Recovery Center (WYSTAR), a residential treatment facility in 
Sheridan.  The WYSTAR placement occurred after 
Reece was denied admission to ACC and intensive supervised 
probation.

 
 
[¶5]      On July 18, 2007, 
the State filed a petition to revoke Reece's probation, alleging that Reece 
violated the terms of his probation by failing to successfully complete the 
WYSTAR program.  Reece was 
discharged from WYSTAR because he was "unsuccessful under criteria for readiness 
for change."  A WYSTAR clinician 
also indicated that "because of Reece's intimidating verbal behavior, it became 
necessary to discharge him in immediate fashion."

 
 
[¶6]      Reece's probation 
was revoked.  The court stated that 
Reece "voluntarily admitted violating his probation as alleged in the Petition 
for Revocation of Probation and the accompanying affidavit and [Reece] provided 
a sufficient factual basis to support his admission."  Both of Reece's sentences were 
reinstated, but the court again suspended the five to eight year sentence in 
favor of three years of supervised probation, following the completion of the 
three to five year sentence.

 
 
[¶7]      This appeal 
followed.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]      As we stated in 
the case, In Re CT, 2006 WY 101, 
¶ 8, 140 P.3d 643, 646 (Wyo. 2006):

 
 
The 
appellant's claim that his constitutional due process rights have been violated 
is reviewed de novo by this Court.  
Meyers v. State, 2005 WY 163, ¶ 8, 124 P.3d 710, 714 (Wyo. 
2005).  The party claiming an 
infringement on his right to due process has the burden of demonstrating both 
that he has a protected interest and that such interest has been affected in an 
impermissible way.  DH v. 
Wyo. Dep't of 
Family Servs. (In re "H" Children), 2003 WY 155, ¶ 38, 79 P.3d 997, 
1008 (Wyo. 2003), reh'g denied (January 13, 2004).  Generally, sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion.  Bitz v. State, 
2003 WY 140, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d 257, 259 (Wyo. 2003).  Such discretion is limited, however, 
inasmuch as a court may not enter an illegal sentence.  White v. State, 934 P.2d 745, 746 
(Wyo. 
1997).  A sentence is illegal if it 
violates the constitution or other law.  
Martinez v. State, 2002 WY 10, 
¶ 9, 39 P.3d 394, 396 (Wyo. 2002).  
An "error of law committed by the court under the circumstances" is an 
abuse of discretion.  White, 
934 P.2d  at 746 (quoting Garcia v. State, 777 P.2d 603, 607 (Wyo. 1989)).  If there was no objection below, alleged 
errors are reviewed under our plain error standard, where the appellant must 
show (1) a clear record of the alleged error; (2) the violation of a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law; (3) denial of a substantial right; and (4) material 
prejudice.  Butcher v. State, 
2005 WY 146, ¶¶ 29, 33, 123 P.3d 543, 552, 553 (Wyo. 
2005).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Probation 
Revocation/Due Process

 
 
[¶9]      Reece's first 
issue on appeal is that his due process rights were violated because the terms 
of his probation failed to specify the required, and the prohibited, 
conduct.  The State responds that 
the terms of probation were specific enough and that due process was not 
violated.

 
 
[¶10]   Revocation of probation is largely 
governed by court rule, W.R.Cr.P. 39.  
Under Rule 39, the State is required to establish the violation of the 
conditions of probation alleged in the petition by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  W.R.Cr.P. 
39(a)(5).

 
 
[I]n 
order to revoke probation for the violation of a condition of probation not 
involving the payment of money, the violation must be willful, or, if not 
willful, must presently threaten the safety of society.

 
 

Messer 
v. State, 
2006 WY 141, ¶ 9, 145 P.3d 457, 460 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
            
The proceedings for probation revocation consist of a two-part 
process.  The first part, the 
adjudicatory phase, requires the district court to determine by a preponderance 
of the evidence whether a condition of probation was violated.  W.R.Cr.P. 39(a)(5)  The second, dispositional phase, is 
triggered only upon a finding that a condition of probation was violated.  In this phase, the district court must 
deliberate not only upon the violation, but also the reasons the conditions were 
originally imposed and the circumstances surrounding the 
violation.

 
 

Mapp 
v. State, 
929 P.2d 1222, 1226 (Wyo. 1996).  "Willfulness is determined at the 
dispositional phase of the proceedings."  
Sinning v. State, 2007 WY 193, 
¶ 10, 172 P.3d 388, 390 (Wyo. 2007).  
As a general rule of criminal 
law, probationary conditions must be specific, but general conditions are 
acceptable if specific guidelines will follow:

 
 
Generally, 
the probationer should be apprised of the conditions with which he or she must 
comply, and the court should 
state in its order the terms and conditions on which it grants the suspension or probation.  In order to be enforceable, a 
condition of probation must not be vague, indefinite, or uncertain, and a general condition of 
probation is permissible only so long as it is contemplated that the court or 
its designee will provide the probationer with reasonable, specific direction 
within the ambit of the initially expressed general condition, and such guidance 
is in fact given.

 
 
24 
C.J.S. Criminal Law § 2151 at 226 (2006) (internal footnotes 
omitted).

 
 
[¶11]   Unfortunately for the parties in 
this appeal, they did not have the benefit of our recent opinion in Edrington v. State, 2008 WY 70, 185 P.3d 1264 (Wyo. 2008).  Similar to the 
facts here, Mr. Edrington sought review of his probation revocation after he was 
terminated from an inpatient treatment program, the completion of which was a 
condition of his probation.  The 
difference between the two cases, however, is that in Edrington, both sides readily agreed 
that the defendant failed to complete the program assigned to him, and that he 
was terminated from the program because he violated its rules.  Here, Reece contends that he was not in 
violation of the rules, as they were not spelled out for him.  Edrington's justification for not 
following the rules was that he suffered from a mental illness.  However, upon review, this Court 
concluded that Edrington's mental illness did not prevent him from understanding 
the rules of his program, or the nature and consequences of his actions.  Accordingly, in our estimation the 
district court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked Edrington's 
probation pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 39 and reinstated his full 
sentence.

 
 
[¶12]   Though the facts of Edrington and this case differ slightly, 
we are able to take away from Edrington its main message  that 
violating a main condition of one's probation is enough for revocation.  Here, Reece contends that the actual 
terms of his probation failed to specify the required, and the prohibited, 
conduct.  However, the probation 
order clearly stated that Reece "must successfully complete the WYSTAR Resident 
Treatment Program."  Reece was aware 
that his completion of the program was a requirement of his continued probation 
and was aware that by failing to complete the program, he would violate the 
terms of his probation.  Reece 
stated the following at his probation revocation hearing:

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:     You were 
discharged from the WYSTAR program?

            
[REECE]:                               
It was the 11th day of July.

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:     But you 
didn't complete that program, and they discharged you, 
correct?

            
[REECE]:                               
Yes.

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:     You knew 
that  so that was part of your probation, to complete that 
program?

            
[REECE]:                               
Yes, sir.

 
 
Also, 
Reece's probation officer met with him to tell him to "follow the rules" and 
"not to intimidate or act upset or angry."

 
 
[¶13]   The State refers us to United States v. Gallo, 20 F.3d 7, 12 
(1st Cir. 1994), which held:

 
 
[T]hough 
a probationer is entitled to notice of what behavior will result in a violation, 
so that he may guide his actions accordingly, fair warning is not to be confused 
with the fullest, or most pertinacious, warning imaginable.  Conditions of probation do not have to 
be cast in letters six feet high, or to describe every possible permutation, or 
to spell out every last, self-evident detail.  Conditions of probation may afford fair 
warning even if they are not precise to the point of pedantry.  In short, conditions of probation can be 
written  and must be read  in a commonsense way.

 
 
We 
are of the same mind.  After a 
thorough review of the record on appeal, we find nothing that leads us to a 
conclusion that Reece's due process rights were violated.  Reece was fully aware that his 
successful completion of the WYSTAR program was a valid and essential 
requirement of his continued probation.  
He cannot now complain that he received inadequate notice as to what was 
required and prohibited within the terms of his probation.  Rather, the revocation of his probation 
was entirely within the lower court's discretion, and we 
affirm.

 
 
Probation 
Revocation/Findings of Fact

 
 
[¶14]   
Reece's second and final argument on appeal is that the district 
court failed to make adequate findings to justify the revocation of his 
probation.  He complains that the 
court did not specify the probation condition that was violated, find that the 
probation violation was willful, or provide reasons for the revocation.  In response, the State insists that the 
district court's findings were adequate, and that given Reece's admission that 
he did not complete the WYSTAR program, the court properly found that Reece 
violated his probation.

 
 
[¶15]   As we stated above, probation 
revocation proceedings are governed by W.R.Cr.P. 39, and we have previously 
stated that the process consists of two parts:

 
 
The 
first part, the adjudicatory phase, requires the district court to determine by 
a preponderance of the evidence whether a condition of probation was violated. 
The second, dispositional phase, is triggered only upon a finding that a 
condition of probation was violated. In this phase, the district court must 
deliberate not only upon the violation, but also the reasons the conditions were 
originally imposed and the circumstances surrounding the violation. After 
consideration of all these factors, the district court must then determine the 
appropriate consequences of the probationer's violation.

 
 

Mapp, 929 P.2d  at 1226.  Though Reece is seemingly unclear on 
"what the specific violation of probation was or what the probation revocation 
is based upon," we find clear support in the record that the revocation was 
based upon Reece's failure to complete the WYSTAR program, which was an explicit 
condition of his probation.

 
 
[¶16]   The district court relied upon 
Reece's admission that he was discharged from WYSTAR during the revocation 
hearing.  The court also relied upon 
the following testimony from Reece, also from the revocation 
hearing:

 
 
[Defense 
Counsel]: You were discharged from the 
WYSTAR program?

            
[Reece]:                     
It was the 11th of 
July.

[Defense 
Counsel]: But you didn't complete that 
program, and they discharged you, correct?

            
[Reece]:                     
Yes.

[Defense 
Counsel]: You knew that  so that was part 
of your probation, to complete that program?

[Reece]:                     
Yes, sir.

            

            
. . . .

 
 
The 
Court:                 
All right, I find there is a factual basis for the admission.  The admission has been made 
voluntarily.

 
 
The 
court also heard from Reece's WYSTAR Clinician, Byron Lee, and Reece's probation 
officer, Jim Fudge, both of whom confirmed that Reece did not complete WYSTAR. 
Lee testified at length about Reece's WYSTAR experience.  First, he stated that he had concerns 
about Reece's "willingness to change, combative mentality, and [defiant] 
behaviors."  Lee also testified that 
Reece's unwillingness to change was exacerbated by "a number of ill feelings and 
resentment towards the legal system and the victim in the case," and that he 
appeared "to [have] an inability to fully accept and hold himself accountable to 
those standards and move on."  Lee 
discussed Reece's "vulgar language  and extreme and unhealthy thoughts on 
gender roles."  Lee also 
stated:

 
 
There 
comes a point where we really look at a willingness to change at this facility, 
because we have to look at and honor the 30 other guys we have here in treatment 
also.  And in order to do that, you 
know, that openness and honesty is invited and it is necessary, because that 
does give us the therapeutic opportunity to work through that.  [Reece] was good at bringing that stuff 
out; however, from  my opinion is, you know, the ability for a man to disagree, 
and then from [Reece]'s perspective in my opinion, there was a barrier put up 
saying, I will not do this. I am not going to go and proceed with 
this.'"

 
 
[¶17]   Along with testimony, the court 
also considered the Petition for 
Revocation of Probation, which bolstered the court's decision to 
revoke.  Attached to the petition 
were several documents, including an affidavit by Fudge, a letter from Fudge to 
the State's attorney, and a letter by Byron Lee to the district court.  In Fudge's letter, he stated that, " 
WYSTAR could provide him classes in anger management but that the anger 
management classes were bullshit' and that he would not apply it once he is on 
the street."  In Lee's letter, he 
summed up Reece's time at WYSTAR as follows:

 
 
During 
treatment, [Reece] demonstrated uneven progress.  At times, [Reece] appeared invested in 
the treatment experience; however, clinical staff had concerns about his 
willingness to change, combative mentality, and defiant behaviors.  These concerns were based on [Reece's] 
unwillingness to be open-minded to input and his strong negative bias against 
staff and the legal system.  His 
verbal disrespect for clerical, mentoring and clinical staff created significant 
tension and became a safety concern.  
Throughout his treatment, [Reece] minimized the presence of his 
aggressive nature and combative verbal tactics.  He stated to his clinician that, I will 
never use' the information provided 
to him through domestic violence and anger management classes in his life 
outside of treatment.

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
Because 
of Mr. Reece's intimidating verbal behavior it became necessary to discharge him 
in immediate fashion, and a continuing care plan was not devised, as the client 
was released to the custody of the Sheridan County Probation and 
Parole.

 
 
[¶18]   Based upon Reece's admission that 
he did not complete the WYSTAR program, as well as the testimony heard and 
documents reviewed by the district court, we conclude it was not an abuse of 
discretion for the district court to revoke Reece's probation.  Furthermore, the district court had a 
more than adequate factual basis upon which to base the revocation.  The court expressly found that Reece 
knowingly admitted to his violation.  
Only after contemplating the information it had before it did the court make its 
decision that Reece's violation warranted probation 
revocation.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶19]   After finding that Reece willfully 
violated the rules of his probation by failing to complete his inpatient 
treatment program, it was not a violation of Reece's due process rights, nor was 
it an abuse of discretion for the district court to conclude that his probation 
should be revoked.  Furthermore, the 
court's factual basis for revocation was more than 
sufficient.

 
 
[¶20]   
Affirmed.