Title: THREE SONS, LLC V. WYOMING OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH and SAFETY COMMISSION (OSHA)

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

THREE SONS, LLC V. WYOMING OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH and SAFETY COMMISSION (OSHA)2007 WY 93160 P.3d 58Case Number: 06-228Decided: 06/07/2007
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
THREE 
SONS, LLC,

 
 
Appellant

(Petitioner),

 
 
v.

 
 

WYOMING 
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH and SAFETY COMMISSION (OSHA),

 
 
Appellee

(Respondent).

            

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCarbonCounty

The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

John R. 
Hursh of Central Wyoming Law Associates, Riverton, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Steven 
R. Czoschke, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kristi M. Radosevich, Assistant 
Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 

KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1] 
     The Wyoming 
Occupational Health and Safety Commission (the Commission) issued a citation to, 
and assessed penalties against, Three Sons, LLC (Three Sons) for job site safety 
violations.  Three Sons contested 
the citation.  After a hearing, the 
hearing examiner recommended that the Commission uphold the citation.  The Commission accepted the 
recommendation and issued an order upholding the citation.  Three Sons filed a petition for review of 
the order in district court, which also upheld the citation.   On appeal, Three Sons contends reversal 
is required because the hearing examiner improperly allocated the burden of 
proof.  Alternatively, Three Sons 
claims the evidence presented was insufficient to support the citation.  We affirm.   

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]  Three Sons states the issues as 
follows:

 
 
            
A.        The 
District Court erred in finding that the misallocation of the burden of proof by 
the agency and the Hearing Officer was harmless error.

 
 
            
B.        The 
District Court erred in finding that the agency, even under an improper 
allocation of the burden of proof, [met] it[]s burden without any evidence of 
foreseeability or preventability of the misconduct in question being 
offered.

 
 
            
C.        The 
District Court erred in upholding the rejection of the employee misconduct 
defense and holding the employer to a strict liability 
standard.

 
 
The 
Commission re-states the issues as follows:

 
 
I.          
Whether the Order Upholding Citation, which upheld the determination that 
Three Sons, LLC committed a willful violation of OSHA regulation 1926.652(a)(1) 
requiring excavation cave-in protection, is supported by substantial evidence, 
is not arbitrary or capricious, and is in accordance with 
law?

 
 
II.         
Whether substantial evidence supports the Order Upholding Citation, which 
upheld the determination that Three Sons, LLC failed to carry its burden of 
proof with regard to its attempted defense of "employee 
misconduct?"

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]  On May 20, 2004, Wyoming Occupational 
Health and Safety (WOSHA) compliance officer, Dan Bulkley, conducted an 
inspection of Three Sons' work on a water main excavation in Riverton, Wyoming.  
Mr. Bulkley observed three employees in a seven to eight feet deep trench 
without cave-in protection in violation of the WOSHA regulations governing 
excavation safety.  Mr. Bulkley 
interviewed the employees who initially told him that another employee, later 
identified as Calvin English, instructed them to enter the trench.  Mr. Bulkley spoke with Mr. English who 
denied telling the employees to enter the trench.   The employees then changed their story, 
stating that they entered the trench on their own volition because they wanted 
to look busy.  

 
 
[¶4]  On June 14, 2004, after completing its 
investigation, WOSHA issued citations and a notification of penalties to Three 
Sons, describing the violations and proposed penalties as 
follows:

 
 

Citation 
1 Item 1    Type of Violation:   Willful

 
 
1926.652(a)(1)* 
 Each employee in an excavation 
shall be protected from cave-ins by an adequate protective 
system:

 
 
Three 
employees were in an excavation (7' to 8'7" in depth) without any means of 
cave-in protection.

 
 
 * * *

 
 
            
Proposed Penalty:   
$   
49500.00

            
   

Citation 
2 Item 1   Type of Violation:   Repeat

 
 
1926.651(c)(2)*  Means of egress from trench 
excavations.  A stairway, ladder, 
ramp or other safe means of egress shall be located in trench excavations that 
are 4 feet (1.22 m) or more in depth so as to require no more than 25 feet (7.62 
m) of lateral travel for employees.

 
 
One 
employee had to travel over 115 feet of lateral travel to get to ladder for 
means of egress in trench.

 
 
* * 
*

 
 
            
Proposed Penalty:   
$    
3000.00

 
 

Citation 
3 Item 1   Type of Violation:   Serious

 
 
1926.652(g)(1)(ii)*  Shields shall be installed in a manner 
to restrict lateral or other hazardous movement of the shield in the event of 
the application of sudden lateral loads:

 
 
Shield 
was installed in trench in a manner that could allow potential lateral or other 
hazardous movement of the shield in the event of sudden lateral loads.  The trench box was 3 feet 8 inches from 
the excavation wall on one side and 3 feet from the wall on the other 
side.

 
 
* * 
*

 
 
            
Proposed Penalty:   
$    
1500.00

 
 

Citation 
3 Item 2   Type of Violation:   Serious

 
 
1926.652(g)(1)(iii)*   Employees shall be protected from 
the hazard of cave-ins when entering or exiting the areas protected by 
shields:

 
 
Two 
employees not protected from the hazard of cave-ins while entering or exiting 
the areas protected by shield (ladder not setup properly to gain access from 
trench box to bank of trench or had to jump across top of trench box to bank of 
trench).  Employees could fall down 
between the wall of the excavation and the trench box which would expose them to 
the hazard of cave-in. 

 
 
* * 
*

 
 
Proposed 
Penalty    $    
1500.00

            

Citation 
4 Item 1   Type of Violation:   Nonserious

 
 
1926.651(j)(2)*   Employees shall be protected from 
excavated or other material or equipment that could pose a hazard by falling or 
rolling into excavations.  
Protection shall be provided by placing and keeping such materials or 
equipment at least 2 feet (.61 m) from the edge of the excavations, or by the 
use of retaining devices that are sufficient to prevent materials or equipment 
from falling or rolling into excavations, or by a combination of both if 
necessary:

 
 
Spill 
pile was located at the edge of excavation on one side.

 
 
* * 
*

 
 
Proposed 
Penalty    $          
0.00 

 
 
 [¶5]  Three Sons protested the citations and 
penalties and requested an informal conference to attempt to settle the case 
without a contested hearing.  A 
conference was held on June 28, 2004.  
During the conference, Three Sons claimed the violations were a result of 
employee misconduct.  Specifically, 
it claimed the employees had entered the trench in violation of their supervisor 
Cody Austin's express instructions not to enter the trench until protective 
equipment was in place.  WOSHA 
issued a letter on October 18, 2004, rejecting the claim on the ground that 
Three Sons had not shown that it had advised two of the three employees involved 
of the excavation safety rules prior to moving them from the concrete work they 
had been doing to work in the trench.    

 
 
[¶6] 
After receiving the letter, Three Sons submitted new documentation to WOSHA 
claiming the violation was the result of employee misconduct on the part of Mr. 
English rather than the three employees previously accused of misconduct.  Included in the documentation was a form 
indicating that Three Sons issued Mr. English a written warning after the WOSHA 
inspection for not knowing the trench safety rules and for allowing the three 
employees from his crew to enter an unprotected trench.  After reviewing the new documentation, 
WOSHA issued another letter rejecting Three Sons' claim of employee 
misconduct.  

 
 
[¶7] 
Three Sons requested a contested case hearing, which was held April 21 and 22, 
2005.  At the start of the hearing, 
Three Sons agreed not to contest Citations 2 and 4 and the parties reached an 
agreement as to the penalty amounts for those violations, leaving Citations 1 
and 3 for hearing.  Both parties 
presented evidence.  On May 18, 
2005, the hearing examiner issued a decision recommending that the Commission 
uphold the citations.

 
 
[¶8]  The Commission held a special meeting on 
September 14, 2005, to consider the recommendation.  The next day, the Commission issued an 
order upholding the citations and imposing the following 
penalties:

 
 
Citation 
1 Item 1       
$49,500.00

Citation 
2 Item 1       
$ 2,250.00

Citation 
3 Item 1       
$ 1,500.00

Citation 
3 Item 2       
$1,125.001   

 
 
[¶9]  Three Sons filed a petition for review 
of administrative action in the CarbonCounty district court asserting two 
claims.  First, it claimed the 
hearing examiner had disregarded Mr. Austin's testimony that the employees 
involved in the incident were ordered not to enter the trench until they were 
properly trained and a trench box was in place.  Second, it claimed the finding of a 
willful violation and the imposition of a $49,500 penalty for citation 1 were 
not supported by sufficient evidence, were arbitrary and were contrary to the 
evidence.  

 
 
[¶10]  Upon considering the record and the 
parties' briefs, the district court issued a decision letter in which it 
concluded:  1) the hearing examiner 
was justified in finding that Three Sons failed to communicate its rules to the 
three employees given the conflicting and inconsistent claims Three Sons 
presented; 2) the hearing examiner did not err in concluding that the violation 
was willful given the seriousness of the violation, Three Sons' prior violations 
of the same provision and WOSHA's desire to deter future violations; and 3) no 
evidence suggested the Commission exceeded its discretion in imposing the 
penalties it imposed.  The district 
court entered an order affirming the Commission's order upholding the 
citation.  Three Sons appealed from 
that order.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶11]  In reviewing an appeal from a district 
court's decision on a petition for review of administrative action, we afford no 
deference to the district court's decision and, instead, review the case as if 
it came directly from the agency.  
Bonsell v. State ex rel. Wyo. 
Workers' Safety and Comp. Div., 2006 WY 114, ¶ 7, 142 P.3d 686, 688 (Wyo. 
2006).  Judicial review of agency 
decisions is limited to those considerations specified in Wyo. Stat.  Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2005), 
which provides in pertinent part:

 
 
            
(c) To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the 
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret 
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or 
applicability of the terms of an agency action.  In making the following determinations, 
the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party 
and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

 
 
            
. . . 

 
 
            
   (ii) Hold unlawful 
and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

 
 
            
            
(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with law;

 
 
            
. . . 

 
 
            
            
(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record 
of an agency hearing provided by statute.

 
 
Additionally, 
we have said:

 
 
            
The substantial evidence test is the appropriate standard of review in 
appeals from contested case proceedings when factual findings are involved and 
both parties submit evidence.  
Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might 
accept in support of the agency's conclusions.  It is more than a scintilla of 
evidence.  Even if the factual 
findings are found to be supported by substantial evidence, the ultimate agency 
decision may still be found to be arbitrary or capricious for other 
reasons.  An appellate court does 
not examine the record only to determine if there is substantial evidence to 
support the agency's decision, but it also must examine the conflicting evidence 
to determine if the hearing examiner could have reasonably made its finding and 
order upon all of the evidence before it.  

 
 
            
We do not defer to the agency's determination on issues of law; instead, 
we will correct any error made by the agency in either interpreting or applying 
the law.  

 
 

Bonsell, ¶ 8, 
142 P.3d  at 688-89 (citations omitted).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

1.                  
Allocation 
of the Burden of Proof

 
 
[¶12]  In its first issue, Three Sons contends 
that the hearing examiner improperly placed the burden of proving employee 
misconduct on it, the employer, rather than on WOSHA.  Three Sons cites Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. 
v. OSHRC, 623 F.2d 155 (10th Cir 1980) and Capital Electric Line Builders of Kansas, 
Inc. v. Marshall, 678 F.2d 128 (10th Cir. 1982) as support for 
its assertion.  

 
 
[¶13]  Initially in these proceedings, Three 
Sons took the position that employee misconduct was an affirmative defense that 
it had the burden of proving once WOSHA established a prima facie case.  In his opening comments at the 
administrative hearing, Bill Langston, Three Sons' safety manager, said, 

 
 
I 
understand [employee misconduct] is an affirmative defense, but the paragraph in 
the regulations that govern affirmative defenses says an affirmative defense is 
a matter which, if established by the employer, will excuse the employer from a 
violation which has otherwise been proven by [OSHA].  They still must prove their case 
first.

 
 
The 
"regulation" to which Mr. Langston referred is found in the U.S. Department of 
Labor OSHA Field Inspection Reference Manual, CPL 2.103, Section 7, Chapter III 
C. 8 a.  In addition to the portion 
quoted by Mr. Langston, the section provides:

 
 
b.  Burden of Proof.  Although affirmative defenses must be 
proved by the employer at the time of the hearing, OSHA must be prepared to 
respond whenever the employer is likely to raise or actually does raise an 
argument supporting such a defense.  
[OSHA], therefore, shall keep in mind the potential affirmative defenses 
that the employer may make and attempt to gather contrary evidence when a 
statement made during the inspection fairly raises a defense.  * * *     

 
 
"Unpreventable 
employee misconduct" is specifically mentioned in the manual as one of the more 
common affirmative defenses and is described as follows:

 
 
(1)  Unpreventable Employee Misconduct or 
"Isolated 

Event".  The violative condition 
was:

 
 
(a)  Unknown to the employer; 
and

 
 
(b) In 
violation of an adequate work rule which was effectively communicated and 
uniformly enforced. 

 
 
[¶14] 
 Thus, initially in these 
proceedings both parties approached the employee misconduct claim as an 
affirmative defense that Three Sons had the burden of alleging and proving.  In her recommended decision, the hearing 
examiner agreed, reaching the following conclusions of law concerning the burden 
of proof:

 
 
1.  OSHA bears the burden of proof in the 
proceedings herein.  "The general 
rule in administrative law is that, unless a statute otherwise assigns the 
burden of proof, the proponent of an order has the burden of proof."  JM v. Department of Family Services, 922 P.2d 219, 221(Wyo. 1996).  

 
 
* * 
*

 
 
14.  In this case, Three Sons asserted the 
affirmative defense of employee misconduct.  In doing so, the burden of proof shifted 
to Three Sons to prove the following four elements:

 
 
1)  The employee misconduct is unknown to 
the employer;

 
 
2)  There is a rule or regulation that 
covers the particular type of behavior or action of the 
employee;

 
 
3)  The rule is effectively communicated to 
the employee;

 
 
4)  The rule was 
enforced.

 
 
Based 
upon the evidence presented, the hearing examiner concluded OSHA had met its 
burden of proving that Three Sons violated the excavation safety regulation and 
that Three Sons failed to meet its burden of proving employee misconduct.  

 
 
[¶15]  In its petition for review of the 
Commission's order upholding the citation, Three Sons did not raise the issue of 
the burden of proof.  Later, in its 
district court brief, however, Three Sons argued for the first time that the 
hearing examiner misallocated the burden of proof by requiring the employer to 
prove unpreventable employee misconduct. Citing Mountain States, 623 F.2d  at 158, Three 
Sons asserted that OSHA had the burden of disproving unpreventable employee 
misconduct.  It argued, "it is not 
sufficient that [OSHA] merely show the existence of the violation, [it] must 
also prove that the employer had knowledge of the violation."  Capital Electric, 678 F.2d  at 
129-30.  

 
 
[¶16]  Responding to this argument in its 
decision letter, the district court noted that a majority of courts have held 
that the employer has the burden of proving the affirmative defense of employee 
misconduct.  However, the district 
court said, a minority of courts, including the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
have held that when an employer invokes the defense, OSHA bears the burden of 
proving that a particular cited safety violation was foreseeable or 
preventable.  Under either 
allocation of the burden of proof, the district court concluded, the evidence 
was sufficient to support the hearing examiner's order.    

 
 
[¶17]  Addressing the burden of proof in 
administrative actions, we have said:

 
 
            
[The] allocation of the burden of proof is a matter of law.  The general rule in administrative law 
is that, unless a statute otherwise assigns the burden of proof, the proponent 
of an order has the burden of proof.  
In general, an agency is the proponent of its orders, while an applicant 
for benefits or for a license is the proponent in eligibility 
determinations.   

 
 

JM v. 
Dep't of Family Servs., 922 P.2d 219, 221(Wyo. 1996) (citations omitted).  In determining which party bears the 
burden of proof, we consider the applicable substantive statutes.  Id. 
at 222.  When the statutes do not 
assign the burden of proof, the proponent of the order has both the initial 
burden of production and the ultimate burden of persuasion in a contested case 
hearing.  Id.

 
 
[¶18]  The purpose of Wyoming's OSHA statutes 
is to prevent accidents and promote safety in the workplace.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-11-102 (LexisNexis 
2005).  The statutes do not assign 
the burden of proof.  Therefore, 
WOSHA, as the proponent of orders upholding citations and penalties, has both 
the initial burden of production and the ultimate burden of persuasion in a 
contested case hearing to prove an employer committed the violations.  Precisely what WOSHA must prove in order 
to satisfy its burden has not been addressed by this Court.  However, the question has been addressed 
by federal courts in the context of the federal OSHA regulations which were 
adopted verbatim by WOSHA.  

 
 
[¶19]  The majority of federal courts hold that 
unpreventable employee misconduct is an affirmative defense which the employer 
bears the burden of pleading and proving.  
See P. Gioioso & Sons, Inc. v. 
O.S.H.R.C., 115 F.3d 100 (1st Cir. 1997); New York State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. 
Secretary of Labor, 88 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 1996); Brock v. L.E. Myers Co., High Voltage 
Div., 818 F.2d 1270 (6th Cir. 1987); DCS Sanitation Mgmt., Inc. v. OSHRC, 82 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 1996); Daniel Int'l Corp. v. OSH, 683 F.2d 361 
(11th Cir. 1982).  The 
rationale for the majority view was stated in Brock, 818 F.2d  at 1277 (citations 
omitted):   

 
 
Congress 
has specifically imposed on the employer the "responsibility to assure 
compliance by his own employees.  
Final responsibility for compliance with the requirements of this Act 
remains with the employers."  S. Rep 
1282, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. 10-11 (1970).  The statutory duty to assure compliance 
with standards issued under the Act includes the obligation to prevent hazardous 
non[-]complying conduct by employees.  
* * * Since the Act itself places upon the employer the responsibility of 
taking all reasonable steps to eradicate preventable hazards, "including 
imposing work rules, communicating the rules to employees, and providing 
training, supervision and disciplinary action designated to enforce the rules," 
the Secretary makes out a prima facie 
case of the employer's awareness of a potentially preventable hazard upon the 
introduction of proof of the employer's failure to provided adequate safety 
equipment or to properly instruct its employees on necessary safety 
precautions.  

 
 
Thereafter, 
an employer may defend the citation on the ground that, due to the existence of 
a thorough and adequate safety program which is communicated and enforced as 
written, the conduct of its employee(s) in violating that policy was 
idiosyncratic and unforeseeable.  By 
its nature, information with respect to the implementation of its written safety 
program will be in the hands of the employer, and it is not unduly burdensome to 
require it to come forward with such evidence. If the employer's evidence 
preponderates, it has successfully established the defense of unforeseeable 
employee misconduct.        

 
 
[¶20]  In contrast to the majority of courts, 
the Tenth Circuit has held in two cases that error occurred when an 
administrative law judge (ALJ) placed the burden of proving employee misconduct 
on the employer.2  In Mountain States, 623 F.2d  at 158 
(citations omitted), the Tenth Circuit stated:

 
 
The 
question we decide here is whether the Commission erred when it placed upon 
Mountain States the burden of proving the violation was unpreventable.  The Fourth Circuit, in reviewing a 
Commission decision involving circumstances similar to those here, held the 
Commission may not place the burden on the employer.  We agree with the result reached by the 
Fourth Circuit.  

 
 
Factually, 
Mountain States involved a violation 
committed by a supervisor to whom the employer had entrusted its duty to assure 
employee compliance with safety standards.  
Under those facts, the Tenth Circuit held the government had the burden 
of proving the preventability of employee misconduct.  

 
 
[¶21]  Two years later, in Capital Electric, 678 F.2d  at 130, and a 
case involving a violation by a non-supervisory employee, the Tenth Circuit 
again held an ALJ erred in placing the burden of proving employee misconduct on 
the employer.  Citing Mountain States, the Court held that the 
burden to show preventability of employee misconduct rested with the Labor 
Secretary.  The Court stated:  "The Secretary can meet this burden by 
showing that the violation was foreseeable because of inadequacies in safety 
precautions, training of employees, or supervision."  Id.

 
 
[¶22]  For the reasons stated in Block, we find the majority rule to be 
the better rule.  The employer is 
ultimately responsible for ensuring compliance with OSHA regulations.  Although the agency has the initial 
burden of production and the ultimate burden of persuasion to prove that a 
violation occurred, it is reasonable and in accord with our usual evidentiary 
rules for the burden to shift upon presentation by WOSHA of a prima facie case to the employer to 
prove the affirmative defense of employee misconduct.  Therefore, we hold that the hearing 
examiner properly placed upon Three Sons the burden of proving the affirmative 
defense of unpreventable employee misconduct.  

 
 

2.                              
Sufficiency 
of the Commission's Prima Facie Case

 
 
[¶23] 
 In her order, the hearing examiner 
concluded that WOSHA met its burden of proving the violation.  Three Sons contends that proof of the 
violation was not sufficient to establish the Commission's prima facie case; the Commission was 
also required to show it was foreseeable that the employees would violate the 
safety rules by entering the trench despite Mr. Austin's instruction to stay out 
of the trench until protective equipment was in place.  Three Sons contends the Commission 
presented no evidence showing that the violation was foreseeable.  Given the absence of evidence that the 
violation was foreseeable, Three Sons asserts, the hearing examiner's ruling 
amounts to the imposition of strict liability, a result not intended by the OSHA 
statutes.  WOSHA responds that 
evidence was presented showing the violation was 
foreseeable.

 
 
[¶24]  Most courts that have addressed the 
issue have concluded it is not enough for the government to prove the 
violation.  In order to make the prima facie showing necessary to satisfy 
its burden of proof, the government must prove the violation occurred and the 
employer knew or with reasonable diligence could have known the violation was 
likely.  New 
York State Electric, 88 F.3d  at 105.  Proof of the employer's actual or 
constructive knowledge of the violation is essential to the government's prima facie case. Id.  Constructive knowledge may be shown by 
evidence that the employer failed to establish an adequate safety program 
promoting compliance with safety standards.  Id. 
at 105-06.

 
 
[¶25]  At the hearing, WOSHA presented Mr. 
Bulkley's testimony that he saw three men in the trench performing various types 
of work around what appeared to be a water line.   He also testified that he asked the 
men if they had been trained, they responded that they had not been, and when he 
asked them who told them to go into the trench, they pointed to Mr. 
English.  Mr. Bulkley asked Mr. 
English if he told the men to go into the ditch and he denied having done so. 
 Mr. Bulkley spoke with the three 
employees again and they recanted what they had said earlier and indicated they 
had gone into the trench on their own volition because they did not want it to 
appear that they were not working.  Mr. Bulkley then spoke to Mr. Austin, the 
supervisor on the job, who stated the men were new hires and had not been 
trained on trench safety prior to being moved over to the trench to assist with 
installing saddles on the water lines in the trench. 

 
 
[¶26]  WOSHA also presented the testimony of 
WOSHA compliance supervisor, Johnnie Hall.  
He testified that he asked Three Sons for documentation showing that the 
employees in the trench had been instructed on the rules concerning trench 
safety.  Three Sons provided no such 
documentation.  Mr. Hall also 
testified he reviewed documentation provided by Three Sons concerning safety 
meetings and it indicated only one of the three employees in the trench had 
attended any safety meetings and he had attended only one such meeting.  Mr. Hall also testified that he reviewed 
documentation showing that the day after the WOSHA inspection Three Sons 
reprimanded Mr. English for allowing three members of his crew to enter the 
trench without adequate protections in place.  

 
 
[¶27] 
This testimony alone was enough to establish a prima facie case that the violation was 
foreseeable because of inadequacies in safety precautions, employee training and 
supervision.  The evidence was 
undisputed that two of the three employees observed in the trench had not 
received excavation safety training and that only one of the employees had 
received any safety training at all.  
It was also undisputed that Mr. English received a written warning the 
day after the inspection for allowing three employees from his crew to enter the 
unprotected trench.  Although Three 
Sons presented evidence that Mr. English had no supervisory authority over the 
employees and did not instruct them to enter the trench, the hearing examiner 
was entitled to weigh the evidence and make findings and conclusions based upon 
what she deemed the more credible evidence.  Given that the evidence supports the 
conclusion that Three Sons knew, or with the exercise of reasonable care could 
have known, that a violation was likely, the hearing examiner's failure to 
specify that element of the state's burden in her written order does not give 
rise to reversible error.

 
 

3.                              
Sufficiency 
of the Evidence of Employee Misconduct

 
 
[¶28]  In its final issue, Three Sons claims 
that it established the affirmative defense of employee misconduct and the 
rulings of the hearing examiner and district court to the contrary were 
arbitrary and not supported by the evidence.  In support of its claim, Three Sons 
cites cases holding that an employer cannot foresee that an employee would 
violate a direct order and that intentional employee misconduct cannot form the 
basis of a citation.  Horne Plumbing & Heating Co. v. 
OSHRC, 528 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1976); Brennan v. OSHRC, 501 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1974).      

 
 
[¶29]  The following quotation from Horne, 528 F.2d  at 569, clearly 
demonstrates that it is distinguishable from the present 
case:

 
 
In the 
instant case, it is undisputed that Horne had an excellent safety program. A 
safety expert who had examined the company's program testified that it "far 
exceeds" that of similar companies, and the administrative law judge found on 
undisputed evidence that "Mr. Horne was diligent in providing for the safety of 
his employees. . . ." The record shows that Mr. Horne took virtually every conceivable 
precaution to ensure that his employees were aware of and understood the 
requirements of the Act and that they conducted themselves in accordance 
therewith. In fact, Mr. Horne's undisputed testimony shows that for many 
years prior to the passage of the Act, he had been actively engaged in efforts 
to provide safe working conditions; and that prior to the May 19 accident his 
company had an excellent record of almost twenty years without a lost-time 
accident. On the facts of this case, it 
is readily apparent that Mr. Horne did everything within his power to ensure 
compliance with the law, short of remaining at the job site and directing the 
operations himself. The question then becomes whether this final effort was 
required.

 
 
(emphasis 
added).  

 
 
[¶30]  In contrast, the evidence in the present 
case indicated that Mr. Austin, Three Sons' principal supervisor on the job 
site, knew the employees "had never seen a trench box or a ladder in their 
life.  When they laid pipe out on 
the reservation, I soon found out they never  they never used any safety 
means."  Despite its knowledge that 
the employees knew nothing about trench safety, working around trenches or 
safety in general, Three Sons took no precautions to ensure that these employees 
were aware of and understood the requirements of the OSHA excavation safety 
standards or that they conducted themselves in accordance with them.  Unlike Mr. Horne, Three Sons did not do 
everything in its power to ensure compliance with the law.  Rather, without providing any training 
in excavation safety to ensure these newly hired employees were aware of and 
understood the OSHA requirements and conducted themselves accordingly, Three 
Sons allowed them to begin work above a trench that was over seven feet deep 
without supervision with the ultimate intent of having them work in the 
trench.  Other than the testimony 
that Mr. Austin instructed them not to enter the trench, the significance of 
which was brought into question by the evidence that Mr. English allowed the 
three members of his crew to enter the trench, there was no evidence Three Sons 
did anything to ensure compliance with the law.    

 
 
[¶31]  Brennan, 501 F.2d 1196, is also 
distinguishable from the case before us.  
In Brennan, an employee was 
killed when he took it upon himself to cut the band holding railroad ties in 
place on the back of a transport truck.  
The labor secretary contended the violation was foreseeable because the 
employee was inexperienced and untrained and had been asked to be present at the 
place of unloading.  The Commission 
rejected the claim primarily on the basis that the employee was not assigned to 
assist in the unloading process.  In 
concluding the violation was not foreseeable under those circumstances, the 
Court stated:   

 
 
Where an 
employee is directly participating in a job, the employer may well, as the 
Commission noted, have a duty under the Act to instruct him on the safe 
procedure for handling the job. On the other hand, the Commission accurately 
recognized that training may be unnecessary for an employee who is wholly 
disassociated with the operation in question and who would not be foreseeably 
exposed to danger

 
 

Id. 
at 
1200.

 
 
[¶32]  In contrast to the employee in Brennan, the employees in the present 
case were at the excavation site specifically for the purpose of performing work 
in and around the trench.  They were 
not, therefore, "wholly disassociated with the operation in question" as the 
employee in Brennan was and it was 
foreseeable that they would be exposed to the dangers associated with excavation 
work.  It was undisputed that they 
had no experience or training in excavation work and no one communicated any 
safety rules to them before leaving them to begin work around the trench.  Given these facts, substantial evidence 
supported the district court's order affirming the hearing examiner and the 
order was not arbitrary.  

 
 
[¶33]  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The order 
did not mention Citation 4 because the parties agreed no penalty would be 
imposed.

 
 

2In 
Austin Bldg. Co. 
v. OSHRC, 647 F.2d 1063, 1067-68 (10th 
Cir. 1981) (citations omitted), the Court held:

 
 
The 
Secretary has the burden of showing that the employer knew or, with the exercise 
of reasonable diligence, could have known of the likelihood of the noncomplying 
condition or practice.  The employer 
may defend by showing that the violation was an unforeseeable occurrence.  Evidence that the employer effectively 
communicated and enforced safety policies to protect against the hazard permits 
an inference that the employer justifiably relied on its employees to comply 
with the applicable safety rules and that violations of these safety policies 
were not foreseeable or preventable.

 
 
Thus, in 
Austin, the Tenth 
Circuit was aligned with the majority of courts in holding that unpreventable 
employee misconduct was a defense available to the employer to disprove the 
alleged violation.