Title: Pooshs v. Philip Morris

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 5/5/11 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
NIKKI POOSHS, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S172023 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
9th Cir. No. 08-16338 
PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC., et al., 
) 
 
) 
N.D. Cal. No. 
 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
3:04-cv-01221-PJH 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Plaintiff was a cigarette smoker for 35 years, from 1953 through 1987.  In 
1989, she was diagnosed with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), 
which plaintiff knew was caused by her smoking habit.  Nevertheless, she did not 
sue the manufacturers of the cigarettes that she had smoked, and the statutory 
period for doing so elapsed. 
In 1990 or 1991, plaintiff was diagnosed with periodontal disease, which 
she knew was caused by her smoking habit.  Again, she did not sue the various 
cigarette manufacturers, and the statutory period for doing so elapsed. 
In 2003, plaintiff was diagnosed with lung cancer.  This time, she sued.  We 
must decide whether the lawsuit is barred by the statute of limitations, which 
requires that a suit be brought within a specified period of time after the cause of 
action accrues. 
The matter comes to us from the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit.  (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.548.)  The Ninth Circuit has asked 
us to answer two questions:  “(1) Under California law, when may two separate 
2 
physical injuries arising out of the same wrongdoing be conceived of as invading 
two different primary rights?  [¶]  (2) Under California law, may two separate 
physical injuries — both caused by a plaintiff‟s use of tobacco — be considered 
„qualitatively different‟ for the purposes of determining when the applicable 
statute of limitations begins to run?”  (Pooshs v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc. (9th Cir. 
2009) 561 F.3d 964, 966-967 (Pooshs).)  In granting the Ninth Circuit‟s request, 
we restated the two questions in a single question:  “When multiple distinct 
personal injuries allegedly arise from smoking tobacco, does the earliest injury 
trigger the statute of limitations for all claims, including those based on the later 
injury?” 
We hold that two physical injuries — both caused by the same tobacco use 
over the same period of time — can, in some circumstances, be considered 
“qualitatively different” for purposes of determining when the applicable statute of 
limitations period begins to run.  (Grisham v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc. (2007) 40 
Cal.4th 623, 645 (Grisham).)  Specifically, when a later-discovered disease is 
separate and distinct from an earlier-discovered disease, the earlier disease does 
not trigger the statute of limitations for a lawsuit based on the later disease.  This 
holding is consistent with the conclusions reached by courts in other jurisdictions 
addressing the same issue, often in the context of asbestos-related litigation.1  We 
                                              
1  
The leading case is Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (D.C. Cir. 1982) 
684 F.2d 111, 112 (Wilson), in which a federal Court of Appeals concluded “that 
time to commence litigation does not begin to run on a separate and distinct 
disease until that disease becomes manifest.”  Cases from jurisdictions throughout 
the United States have followed Wilson.  (See, e.g., Nicolo v. Philip Morris, Inc. 
(1st Cir. 2000) 201 F.3d 29; Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (5th Cir. 1984) 
727 F.2d 506; Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co. (3d Cir. 1976) 534 F.2d 566; 
Agles v. Merck & Co., Inc. (D.Hawaii 1995) 875 F.Supp. 701; Anderson v. W.R. 
Grace & Co. (D.Mass. 1986) 628 F.Supp. 1219; Fearson v. Johns-Manville Sales 
Corp. (D.D.C. 1981) 525 F.Supp. 671; Sheppard v. A.C. & S. Co. (Del.Super.Ct. 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
3 
limit our holding to latent disease cases, without deciding whether the same rule 
should apply in other contexts. 
In addressing the issue presented here, we emphasize that our role is only to 
answer the “question of California law” that the Ninth Circuit posed to us.  (Cal. 
Rules of Court, rule 8.548(a).)  We play no role in assessing the merits of 
plaintiff‟s factual assertions, which must be determined in the federal court.  
Specifically, plaintiff asserted in the federal district court that her lung cancer is a 
disease that is separate and distinct from her other two smoking-related diseases.  
Although this assertion appears plausible on its face, its resolution requires 
medical expertise.  Here, the factual record was never developed because the 
federal court considered plaintiff‟s separate-disease assertion to be irrelevant for 
purposes of applying the statute of limitations, and it granted summary judgment 
for defendants.  On plaintiff‟s appeal to the Ninth Circuit, that court then asked us 
whether plaintiff‟s assertion that her diseases are separate and distinct has any 
relevance under California statute of limitations law.  The Ninth Circuit‟s 
reference order states:  “For the purposes of summary judgment . . . [i]t is 
uncontested that the etiology for lung cancer is distinct from the etiology for 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
1985) 498 A.2d 1126, affd. in Keene Corp. v. Sheppard (Del. 1986) 503 A.2d 192; 
VaSalle v. Celotex Corp. (Ill.App.Ct. 1987) 515 N.E.2d 684; Pierce v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp. (Md. 1983) 464 A.2d 1020; Board of Trustees v. Mitchell 
(Md.Ct.Spec.App. 2002) 800 A.2d 803; Larson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. 
(Mich. 1986) 399 N.W.2d 1; Sweeney v. General Printing Inc. (N.Y.App.Div. 
1994) 621 N.Y.S.2d 132; Marinari v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd. (Pa.Super.Ct. 1992) 
612 A.2d 1021; Shadle v. Pearce (Pa.Super.Ct. 1981) 430 A.2d 683; Potts v. 
Celotex Corp. (Tenn. 1990) 796 S.W.2d 678; Pustejovsky v. Rapid-American 
Corp. (Tex. 2000) 35 S.W.3d 643; Niven v. E.J. Bartells Co. (Wn.Ct.App. 1999) 
983 P.2d 1193; see also cases cited in Grisham, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 643, fn. 
12.) 
4 
COPD and periodontal disease.”2  (Pooshs, supra, 561 F.3d at p. 967.)  Therefore, 
in addressing the issue before us, we assume plaintiff‟s assertion to be true, and we 
focus solely on its legal implications. 
I 
Plaintiff Nikki Pooshs filed this action in San Francisco Superior Court in 
January 2004, less than a year after she was diagnosed with lung cancer.  The 
complaint named various corporate defendants, many of them cigarette 
manufacturers.  Plaintiff alleged that she smoked cigarettes from 1953 until the 
end of 1987, that she was ignorant of many of the dangers associated with 
cigarette smoking, and that defendants misled her about those dangers, concealed 
from her the addictive properties of tobacco, and took other steps to induce her to 
smoke.  She asserted 13 theories of recovery, including allegations of negligence, 
products liability, misrepresentation, fraud, conspiracy, failure to warn, unfair 
competition, and false advertising. 
Defendants removed the case to federal court and then filed several motions 
to dismiss.  After several dismissals, only four cigarette manufacturers and their 
public relations agent remained as defendants.  These remaining defendants sought 
dismissal of the complaint, citing the Ninth Circuit‟s decision in Soliman v. Philip 
Morris Inc. (9th Cir. 2002) 311 F.3d 966 (Soliman).  In that case, a California 
plaintiff alleged that he had smoked cigarettes since the late 1960‟s and could not 
quit.  (Id. at p. 969.)  He claimed nicotine addiction as one of his injuries, in 
addition to several respiratory and emotional disorders.  (Id. at pp. 969-970, 972.)  
                                              
2  
At oral argument before this court, defendants clarified that this factual 
point is “uncontested” only for purposes of the summary judgment issue.  
Defendants contend that even if plaintiff‟s diseases are separate and distinct, the 
point is irrelevant to the application of the statute of limitations bar, and the 
validity of that contention is the legal issue before us. 
5 
He further claimed that he did not learn that smoking was addictive (and that he 
was addicted) until late 1999.  In March 2000, he sued various tobacco companies 
in state court.  (Id. at p. 970.)  The Soliman defendants removed the case to federal 
court and then moved to dismiss the complaint on statute of limitations grounds.  
The defendants doubted that the plaintiff, who had smoked for 32 years, could 
have discovered his health problems only months before bringing suit.  They 
argued that he had constructive knowledge much earlier, and therefore his suit was 
time-barred.  The district court, applying California law, dismissed the complaint 
because of expiration of the statute of limitations period.  The plaintiff appealed to 
the Ninth Circuit.  (Ibid.) 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court‟s judgment in Soliman, supra, 
311 F.3d 966.  The Ninth Circuit observed that the plaintiff alleged addiction as 
one of his injuries and he had constructive knowledge of that addiction long before 
he filed suit.3  (Soliman, at pp. 972-973.)  The court reasoned that the general 
public is “presumed by California law to know that smoking causes addiction” (id. 
at p. 974) and therefore a “longtime smoker” like the plaintiff may not claim 
delayed discovery of that injury (id. at p. 975).  Because the plaintiff could be 
“charged with this knowledge” long before he filed suit, the Ninth Circuit in 
Soliman concluded that the action was time-barred.  (Ibid.) 
Here, relying on Soliman, supra, 311 F.3d 966, the federal district court 
granted defendants‟ motion to dismiss.  The court found that “while the plaintiff in 
                                              
3  
In Soliman, supra, 311 F.3d 966, the Ninth Circuit did not decide whether, 
under California law, addiction alone is an actionable injury.  Instead, the court 
relied on the fact that the plaintiff had alleged addiction as an injury.  The court 
said:  “Soliman can‟t claim that his addiction is an appreciable injury and, at the 
same time, ask us to ignore it in determining when his claim accrued.”  (Id. at 
p. 973.) 
6 
the present case may not claim addiction as an injury in quite so specific a way as 
did the plaintiff in Soliman, the allegation that the plaintiff here became addicted 
to nicotine and was injured by that addiction runs as a thread throughout the 
complaint.”  (Pooshs v. Altria Group, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2004) 331 F.Supp.2d 1089, 
1095.)  The district court found Soliman to be controlling and dismissed with 
prejudice plaintiff‟s claims against defendants. 
Plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which held the appeal in abeyance 
pending our decision in Grisham, supra, 40 Cal.4th 623.  In Grisham, we 
considered whether the Ninth Circuit in Soliman, supra, 311 F.3d 966, had 
correctly construed California law.  Grisham addressed these two questions:  (1) Is 
there a presumption under California law that, at least since 1988, the general 
public has been aware of the addictive nature and health dangers of smoking 
(thereby barring under the statute of limitations a cause of action for addiction-
based economic losses) and (2) If the cause of action for addiction-based economic 
losses is time-barred, is a claim for physical injuries resulting from the same 
tobacco use also time-barred?  (Grisham, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 628.) 
With respect to the first question, we held in Grisham, supra, 40 Cal.4th 
623, that there is no special presumption that smokers are aware of the dangers of 
smoking.  We observed, however, that there is a general, rebuttable presumption 
that a plaintiff has knowledge of the wrongful causes of an injury.  To rebut this 
general presumption a plaintiff must make certain specific allegations that the 
plaintiff in Grisham had not made and, in light of her other allegations, could not 
plausibly make.  (Id. at pp. 638-639.)  Accordingly, in that case the plaintiff‟s 
economic injury claim was time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations.  
(Id. at p. 639.) 
With respect to the second question in Grisham, supra, 40 Cal.4th 623, we 
expressly chose not to decide whether a claim alleging smoking-related physical 
7 
injury involves a different primary right than a claim alleging smoking-related 
economic injury.  (Id. at pp. 643, 646.)  Instead, we decided the case solely as a 
matter of statute of limitations law.  We noted that economic injury and physical 
injury are “qualitatively different” types of injury (id. at p. 645; see also id. at 
p. 643), and we concluded that an appreciable injury of the first type does not 
commence the statutory period for suing based on a later-discovered injury of the 
second type (id. at p. 644).  We did not, however, address in Grisham whether this 
same distinction would apply in a case like the one now before us, where both 
injuries are physical.  (Id. at p. 643.) 
While Grisham, supra, 40 Cal.4th 623, was pending before us, defendants 
in this case took plaintiff‟s deposition and learned that she had suffered from 
significant medical effects from smoking long before she was diagnosed with lung 
cancer and long before she filed her current, lung-cancer-based lawsuit.  
Specifically, she was diagnosed in 1989 with COPD, which is a diagnosis used to 
describe both emphysema and chronic bronchitis.  Plaintiff also admitted knowing 
as early as 1989 that this pulmonary disease was caused by smoking.  And later, in 
1990 or 1991, she was diagnosed with periodontal disease, which her periodontist 
told her was caused by smoking.  She did not sue defendants for either of these 
diseases despite knowing that they were caused by smoking. 
After we decided Grisham, supra, 40 Cal.4th 623, the Ninth Circuit vacated 
the district court‟s judgment in this case and remanded the matter to that court.  
Defendants then moved for summary judgment, this time asserting that plaintiff‟s 
physical injuries diagnosed in 1989 (COPD) and in 1990 or 1991 (periodontal 
disease) commenced the statutory period for bringing her present action, which is 
based on the third disease (lung cancer).  Having suffered significant physical 
injuries with knowledge that smoking was the cause of those injuries, and having 
failed to sue defendants within the applicable statutory periods, plaintiff could not 
8 
— in defendants‟ view — later bring suit and assert that her physical injuries 
turned out to be worse than previously thought.  Allowing the suit under those 
circumstances, defendants asserted, would conflict with the well-settled rule that a 
statute of limitations starts to run when the plaintiff suffers “appreciable and actual 
harm, however uncertain in amount.”  (Davies v. Krasna (1975) 14 Cal.3d 502, 
514 (Davies); see also DeRose v. Carswell (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1022 
(DeRose).) 
Plaintiff responded that her three physical injuries (COPD, periodontal 
disease, and lung cancer) were separate diseases, and that each was therefore the 
basis of a distinct primary right.  Plaintiff stated “that COPD is a separate illness, 
which does not pre-dispose or lead to lung cancer and that it has nothing 
medically, biologically, or pathologically to do with lung cancer.”  She further 
argued that the primary right at issue here is not the right to be free from the 
wrongful exposure to tobacco smoke; rather, it is the right to be free from lung 
cancer caused by the wrongful exposure to tobacco smoke, and that this primary 
right is different from the right to be free from COPD or from periodontal disease 
caused by the wrongful exposure to tobacco smoke.  The federal district court, to 
which the case had been remanded by the Ninth Circuit, rejected that argument. 
In the view of the federal district court, plaintiff‟s various physical injuries 
were merely different ways in which she was damaged by a single alleged wrong 
(tobacco exposure), like suffering a broken arm and a broken leg from a single car 
accident.  To draw distinctions among the different types of physical injury (i.e., 
COPD, periodontal disease, and lung cancer) that plaintiff suffered from smoking 
and then to allow separate suits for each injury, would — the district court said — 
conflict with the rule against splitting a cause of action:  “The longstanding rule in 
California . . . is that „[a] single tort can be the foundation for but one claim for 
9 
damages.‟ ”  (DeRose, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 1024, fn. 5.)  Accordingly, the 
district court granted summary judgment for defendants. 
Plaintiff again appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which then asked us for 
clarification of California law on the application of the statute of limitations when 
two separate diseases arise at different times from the same alleged wrongdoing.  
(Pooshs, supra, 561 F.3d at pp. 966-967.)  We granted the Ninth Circuit‟s request. 
II 
A statute of limitations strikes a balance among conflicting interests.  If it is 
unfair to bar a plaintiff from recovering on a meritorious claim, it is also unfair to 
require a defendant to defend against possibly false allegations concerning long-
forgotten events, when important evidence may no longer be available.  Thus, 
statutes of limitations are not mere technical defenses, allowing wrongdoers to 
avoid accountability.  (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 395-397.)  
Rather, they mark the point where, in the judgment of the legislature, the equities 
tip in favor of the defendant (who may be innocent of wrongdoing) and against the 
plaintiff (who failed to take prompt action):  “[T]he period allowed for instituting 
suit inevitably reflects a value judgment concerning the point at which the interests 
in favor of protecting valid claims are outweighed by the interests in prohibiting 
the prosecution of stale ones.”  (Johnson v. Railway Express Agency (1975) 421 
U.S. 454, 463-464.) 
Critical to applying a statute of limitations is determining the point when 
the limitations period begins to run.  Generally, a plaintiff must file suit within a 
designated period after the cause of action accrues.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 312.)  A 
cause of action accrues “when [it] is complete with all of its elements” — those 
elements being wrongdoing, harm, and causation.  (Norgart v. Upjohn Co., supra, 
21 Cal.4th at p. 397.) 
10 
Application of the accrual rule becomes rather complex when, as here, a 
plaintiff is aware of both an injury and its wrongful cause but is uncertain as to 
how serious the resulting damages will be or whether additional injuries will later 
become manifest.  Must the plaintiff sue even if doing so will require the jury to 
speculate regarding prospective damages?  Or can the plaintiff delay suit until a 
more accurate assessment of damages becomes possible?  Generally, we have 
answered those questions in favor of prompt litigation, even when the extent of 
damages remains speculative.  Thus, we have held that “the infliction of 
appreciable and actual harm, however uncertain in amount, will commence the 
statutory period.”  (Davies, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 514.) 
The most important exception to that general rule regarding accrual of a 
cause of action is the “discovery rule,” under which accrual is postponed until the 
plaintiff “discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action.”  (Norgart v. 
Upjohn Co., supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 397.)  Discovery of the cause of action occurs 
when the plaintiff “has reason . . . to suspect a factual basis” for the action.  (Id. at 
p. 398; see also Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1110-1111.)  “The 
policy reason behind the discovery rule is to ameliorate a harsh rule that would 
allow the limitations period for filing suit to expire before a plaintiff has or should 
have learned of the latent injury and its cause.”  (Buttram v. Owens-Corning 
Fiberglas Corp. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 520, 531.) 
III 
Defendants‟ core argument is that plaintiff‟s 1989-diagnosed COPD, either 
alone or in combination with the 1990- or 1991-diagnosed periodontal disease, 
constituted “appreciable and actual harm” (Davies, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 514), 
triggering the running of the pertinent statute of limitations on her indivisible 
cause of action for smoking-related injury.  In 2003, plaintiff was diagnosed with 
lung cancer, which led her to sue defendants.  As of 1991, defendants assert, 
11 
plaintiff had suffered actual harm, her damages were not merely nominal,4 and she 
knew that the harm she had suffered was from smoking.  Therefore, in defendants‟ 
view, plaintiff should have brought her lawsuit at that time.  That she might 
eventually develop lung cancer in 2003 was, according to defendants, merely an 
uncertainty as to the amount of harm, which did not delay the running of the 
statute of limitations.  In short, defendants‟ view is that plaintiff could have sued 
in 1991 but failed to do so.  Because defendants‟ argument depends heavily on the 
“appreciable and actual harm” rule we announced in Davies, supra, 14 Cal.3d at 
page 514, and then clarified in Grisham, supra, 40 Cal.4th at page 644, we discuss 
those cases in detail below. 
Unlike this case, Davies, supra, 14 Cal.3d 502, was not a personal injury 
case.  Rather, Davies involved a cause of action for “breach of confidence” — that 
is, the breach of an obligation, imposed by law, to maintain the confidentiality of a 
story idea.5  In 1951, the plaintiff, Valentine Davies, submitted a written story in 
confidence to the defendant, Norman Krasna, who later incorporated the idea into 
a successful Broadway play.  (Davies, at pp. 504-505, 511.)  Davies knew as early 
as 1955 that Krasna had breached his obligation to maintain the confidentiality of 
the story (id. at p. 512), and Davies suffered actual harm at that time (because the 
breach “ „substantially destroyed the marketability of [the] story‟ ” (id. at p. 514)).  
Nevertheless, Davies did not sue Krasna until 1958, when Krasna began profiting 
                                              
4  
According to the United States Department of Health & Human Services, 
COPD is the fourth leading cause of death in the United States.  (See Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, Nat. Center for Health Statistics, Leading Causes 
of Death  [as of May 5, 2011].) 
5  
This court‟s decision in Davies, supra, 14 Cal.3d 502, did not actually 
recognize the validity of this “breach of confidence” cause of action; instead, we 
assumed (based on the law of the case) that the plaintiff had stated a valid cause of 
action, and we proceeded to address the statute of limitations issue.  (Id. at p. 508.) 
12 
financially from the story.  We held that the applicable two-year statute of 
limitations began to run in 1955 when Davies first learned of the breach and 
suffered “appreciable and actual harm.”  In that context, we said:  “[N]either 
uncertainty as to the amount of damages nor difficulty in proving damages tolls 
the period of limitations.”  (Ibid.) 
Significantly, in Davies, supra, 14 Cal.3d 502, we were considering only a 
single type of injury (economic injury based on the misappropriation of 
intellectual property), and the issue was whether uncertainty as to the extent of the 
damages associated with that single injury delayed the running of the statute of 
limitations.  Thus, we did not consider in Davies whether “the infliction of 
appreciable and actual harm” of one type (for example, economic injury) would 
“commence the statutory period” with respect to harm of a completely different 
type (for example, physical injury).  (Id. at p. 514.)  Nor did we consider whether 
“the infliction of appreciable and actual harm” in the form of a specific disease 
(such as COPD here) would “commence the statutory period” with respect to a 
separate and distinct disease (as the lung cancer here is alleged to be).  (Ibid.)  
Therefore, Davies does not govern this case.  We have never stated what 
commences the running of the statutory period in a case like this one, in which a 
later-discovered physical injury is alleged to be separate from an earlier-
discovered physical injury.  Our decision in Grisham, supra, 40 Cal.4th 623, 
emphasized the limits of our holding in Davies, supra, 14 Cal.3d 502. 
As relevant here, the plaintiff in Grisham, supra, 40 Cal.4th 623, sued 
cigarette manufacturers for smoking-related injuries.  She contended that the 
cigarette manufacturers had wrongfully induced her addiction to tobacco, and she 
alleged claims for economic injury (the cost of purchasing cigarettes) and personal 
injury (emphysema and periodontal disease).  (Id. at pp. 629-631.)  We concluded in 
Grisham that the economic injury claim was barred by the applicable statute of 
13 
limitations because the plaintiff knew or should have known about her injury long 
before she filed suit.  (Id. at pp. 638-639.)  That conclusion raised the question 
whether the personal injury claims were also barred, on the theory that the plaintiff 
had suffered only one indivisible harm and that the physical injuries were simply 
another category of damages related to that single harm.  In addressing this question 
in Grisham, we did not decide whether the two injuries (economic and physical) 
implicated two separate primary rights.  (Id. at pp. 643, 646.)  Instead, we focused 
exclusively on the statute of limitations, and we held that appreciable harm in the 
form of an economic injury does not begin the running of the statute of limitations 
on a suit to recover damages for a physical injury.  (Id. at pp. 643-646.)  Grisham 
interpreted the “appreciable and actual harm” rule of Davies, supra, 14 Cal.3d at 
page 514, to be limited to cases involving a single type of injury, and we found no 
case applying that rule to a later-discovered injury of a different type.  (Grisham, at 
p. 644.)6 
                                              
6  
As mentioned, the court in Grisham, supra, 40 Cal.4th 623, concluded the 
plaintiff‟s later manifesting claim for physical injury was timely without also 
determining whether that claim involved the same primary right as the plaintiff‟s 
earlier manifesting claim for economic damage.  In so doing, we necessarily, 
albeit implicitly, assumed that, even if the plaintiff‟s various claims involved only 
a single primary right (as the defendants there asserted), we could still apply the 
statute of limitations separately to the plaintiff‟s physical injury claim.  (Id. at 
pp. 643, 646.)  In other words, we necessarily accepted the possibility that a 
plaintiff can have a single cause of action that accrues (for statute of limitations 
purposes) at different times with respect to different types of harm, thus permitting 
some damage claims to proceed although others are time-barred. 
 
To that extent, Grisham, supra, 40 Cal.4th 623, logically supports the 
recognition of an exception to the rule that “a single tort can be the foundation of 
but one claim for damages.”  (Miller v. Lakeside Village Condominium Assn. 
(1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1622; DeRose, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1024.)  
Because the exception is inferred from Grisham‟s holding, it is necessarily limited 
to cases presenting the same legal and factual situation, that is, a statute of 
limitations defense to a claim alleging a latent disease that is separate and distinct 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
14 
In Grisham, supra, 40 Cal.4th 623, we also emphasized the impractical 
consequences of a contrary conclusion, relying on Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, 
Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797 (Fox).  There, the plaintiff underwent gastric bypass 
surgery.  She later sued the surgeon and the hospital for medical malpractice.  
During discovery, she learned that her alleged injury might have been caused by a 
defective stapler manufactured by a nonparty.  The plaintiff then amended her 
complaint to add as a defendant the stapler manufacturer, which asserted the 
statute of limitations as a defense.  (Id. at pp. 803-805.)  We concluded in Fox that 
knowledge of the facts supporting a medical malpractice cause of action against 
one defendant does not necessarily commence the running of the statute of 
limitations with respect to a separate products liability cause of action against a 
different defendant.  (Id. at pp. 813-815.) 
Grisham, supra, 40 Cal.4th 623, involved a claim against the same 
defendants alleging different injuries, whereas Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th 797, 
involved a claim against different defendants alleging the same injury.  
Nevertheless, we held that the policy underlying our holding in Fox was equally 
applicable in Grisham.  In Grisham, we quoted the following language from Fox:  
“ „[I]t would be contrary to public policy to require plaintiffs to file a lawsuit “at a 
time when the evidence available to them failed to indicate a cause of action.”  
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
from, and becomes manifest long after, the initial effects of the plaintiff‟s injury.  
(Grisham, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 644.)  Of course, the need for such an exception 
in any particular case depends on how the relevant primary rights are defined.  If 
two primary rights (and hence two causes of action) are alleged, those two causes 
of action can accrue independently for purposes of applying the statute of 
limitations without the need for an exception to the rule that a single tort supports 
only a single claim.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 312.) 
15 
[Citations.]  Were plaintiffs required to file all causes of action when one cause of 
action accrued, . . . they would run the risk of sanctions for filing a cause of action 
without any factual support.  [Citations.]  Indeed, it would be difficult to describe 
a cause of action filed by a plaintiff, before that plaintiff reasonably suspects that 
the cause of action is a meritorious one, as anything but frivolous.  At best, the 
plaintiff‟s cause of action would be subject to demurrer for failure to specify 
supporting facts [citation].‟ ”  (Grisham, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 644-645, quoting 
Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 815.) 
Applying that language from Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at page 815, to the 
facts in Grisham, supra, 40 Cal.4th 623, we rejected a rule that “would compel 
cigarette smokers either to file groundless tort causes of action based on physical 
injury against tobacco companies as soon as they discovered they were addicted to 
cigarettes and had an unfair competition cause of action . . . , or risk losing their 
right to sue in tort for such physical injury.”  (Id. at p. 645.)  Such a requirement, 
Grisham said, “would violate the essence of the discovery rule that a plaintiff need 
not file a cause of action before he or she „ “has reason at least to suspect a factual 
basis for its elements.”  [Citations.]‟  [Citation.]”  (Ibid.)  Furthermore, 
“[i]t would directly contravene „the interest of the courts and of litigants against 
the filing of potentially meritless claims.‟  [Citation.]”  (Ibid.) 
In Grisham, supra, 40 Cal.4th 623, we expressly stopped short of deciding 
the issue presented here, in which a single wrong gives rise to two injuries of the 
same general type (physical injuries), but the two injuries become manifest at 
different times and are alleged to be separate and distinct.  (Id. at p. 646.)  
Nevertheless, we see no reason not to apply to this case the logic of Grisham.  In 
both cases, the injuries arose at different times and were separate from one 
another.  In Grisham, the injuries were separate from one another in that one was 
16 
economic and the other was physical; here, the Ninth Circuit has asked us to 
assume that the injuries are three separate diseases.  (See pp. 3-4, ante.) 
It is critical to consider the posture in which this matter comes to us.  To 
defeat summary judgment in the federal district court, plaintiff needed to identify 
an issue of fact that, if decided in her favor, would allow her to overcome 
defendants‟ statute of limitations defense.  (See generally Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc. (1986) 477 U.S. 242, 248; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1986) 477 U.S. 
317, 322.)  The issue of fact that plaintiff identified in the federal district court was 
that her lung cancer is a disease that is separate from her earlier-discovered COPD 
and periodontal disease.  For example, plaintiff stated “that COPD is a separate 
illness, which does not pre-dispose or lead to lung cancer and that it has nothing 
medically, biologically, or pathologically to do with lung cancer.”  It is not our 
role to decide or even question the factual validity of that assertion.  Rather, our 
role is to determine, as a legal matter, whether plaintiff‟s assertion has any 
relevance under California law for purposes of applying the statute of limitations, 
for that is the question that the Ninth Circuit asked us to decide.  In other words, 
the Ninth Circuit has asked us to assume plaintiff‟s assertion to be true and to 
decide, as a matter of California law, whether two physical injuries that constitute 
separate diseases and that become manifest at different times can be considered 
“qualitatively different” (Grisham, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 645) for purposes of 
applying the statute of limitations.  The answer is “yes.” 
As already discussed (see pp. 14-15, ante), we emphasized in Grisham that 
it made little sense to require a plaintiff whose only known injury is economic to 
sue for personal injury damages based on the speculative possibility that a then 
latent physical injury might later become apparent.  (Grisham, supra, 40 Cal.4th at 
pp. 644-645.)  Likewise, here, no good reason appears to require plaintiff, who 
years ago suffered a smoking-related disease that is not lung cancer, to sue at that 
17 
time for lung cancer damages based on the speculative possibility that lung cancer 
might later arise.  Nothing we said in Davies, supra, 14 Cal.3d 502, requires such 
a rule, and defendants here have cited no case that supports such a rule.  Moreover, 
although we reaffirm the application of the “appreciable and actual harm” rule (id. 
at p. 514) to cases that do not involve latent diseases, application of that rule to bar 
plaintiff‟s lung cancer claim before her lung cancer had become manifest would 
violate the policy underlying the discovery rule, which, as we noted earlier, is to 
prevent “the limitations period . . . [from] expir[ing] before a plaintiff has or 
should have learned of the latent injury and its cause.”  (Buttram v. Owens-
Corning Fiberglas Corp., supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 531.) 
It is true that here plaintiff‟s COPD involved the same part of the body (the 
lungs) as her lung cancer.  Nevertheless, as we noted earlier, the Ninth Circuit has 
asked that in deciding the statute of limitations issue we accept as true plaintiff‟s 
factual assertion “that COPD is a separate illness, which does not pre-dispose or 
lead to lung cancer and that it has nothing medically, biologically, or 
pathologically to do with lung cancer.”  (See p. 16, ante.)  Assuming that assertion 
to be true, it does not matter that both diseases affect the lungs.  The significant 
point is that the later-occurring disease (lung cancer) is, according to plaintiff‟s 
offer of proof, a disease that is separate and distinct from the earlier-occurring 
disease (COPD).  Therefore, under the logic of our decision in Grisham, supra, 40 
Cal.4th 623, the statute of limitations bar can apply to one disease without 
applying to the other. 
18 
 
IV 
In response to the Ninth Circuit‟s inquiry, we conclude that when a later-
discovered latent disease is separate and distinct from an earlier-discovered 
disease, the earlier disease does not trigger the statute of limitations for a lawsuit 
based on the later disease. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
SUZUKAWA, J.*
                                              
* 
Associate Justice, Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division 
Four, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 
California Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Pooshs v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding XXX on certification pursuant to rule 8.548, Cal, Rules of Court 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S172023 
Date Filed: May 5, 2011 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: 
County: 
Judge: 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Brayton ♦ Purcell, Alan R. Brayton, Gilbert L. Purcell and Lloyd F. LeRoy for Plaintiff and Appellant.   
 
Law Office of Holly L. Hostrop and Holly L. Hostrop for Tobacco Trial Lawyers Association as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Jones Day, Peter N. Larson, Stephen J. Kaczynski and Ashlie E. Case for Defendants and Respondents R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co. and Brown & Williamson Holdings, Inc. 
 
Munger, Tolles & Olson, Daniel P. Collins and David S. Han for Defendant and Respondent Philip Morris 
USA Inc. 
 
Shook, Hardy & Bacon and Kevin Underhill for Defendant and Respondent Lorillard Tobacco Co. 
 
Krieg, Keller, Sloan, Reilley & Roman, Stan G. Roman and Tracy M. Clements for Defendant and 
Respondent Hill & Knowlton, Inc. 
 
Daniel J. Popeo, Richard A. Samp; Bergeson and Mark E. Foster for Washington Legal Foundation as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Gilbert L. Purcell 
Brayton ♦ Purcell 
222 Rush Landing Road 
Novato, CA  94948 
(415) 898-1555 
 
Daniel P. Collins 
Munger, Tolles & Olson 
355 South Grand Avenue, 35th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA  90071-1560 
(213) 683-9100