Title: Sylvester v. Chicago Park District

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Sylvester v. Chicago Park District, No. 81138 (12/4/97) 
 
      NOTICE: Under Supreme Court Rule 367 a party has 21 days 
      after the filing of the opinion to request a rehearing. 
      Also, opinions are subject to modification, correction or 
      withdrawal at anytime prior to issuance of the mandate by 
      the Clerk of the Court. Therefore, because the following 
      slip opinion is being made available prior to the Court's 
      final action in this matter, it cannot be considered the 
      final decision of the Court. The official copy of the 
      following opinion will be published by the Supreme Court's 
      Reporter of Decisions in the Official Reports advance 
      sheets following final action by the Court. 
 
 
 
              Docket No. 81138--Agenda 13--March 1997. 
           ALICE SYLVESTER, Appellee, v. THE CHICAGO PARK 
                        DISTRICT, Appellant. 
                  Opinion filed December 4, 1997. 
 
          JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court: 
          Plaintiff, Alice Sylvester, filed a complaint 
     against defendant, the Chicago Park District, to recover 
     damages for injuries she sustained as a result of a fall 
     on Park District property. The complaint alleged the Park 
     District was negligent in allowing a concrete parking 
     abutment to block a walkway adjacent to a parking lot 
     exit located south of Soldier Field. 
          The Park District moved to dismiss the complaint 
     pursuant to section 3--106 of the Local Governmental and 
     Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity 
     Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 85, par. 3--106). Section 
     3--106 provides: 
                    "Neither a local public entity nor a 
                    public employee is liable for an injury where 
                    the liability is based on the existence of a 
                    condition of any public property intended or 
                    permitted to be used for recreational 
                    purposes, including but not limited to parks, 
                    playgrounds, open areas, buildings or other 
                    enclosed recreational facilities, unless such 
                    local entity or public employee is guilty of 
                    willful and wanton conduct proximately causing 
                    such injury." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 85, 
                    par. 3--106. 
     The trial judge denied the Park District's motion to 
     dismiss. 
          Following a bench trial, the judge ruled in favor of 
     plaintiff. However, the judge reduced plaintiff's damages 
     by 10% due to her comparative negligence. The Park 
     District appealed. The appellate court affirmed. No. 1-- 
     93--3639 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). 
          The Park District filed a petition for leave to 
     appeal. 155 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). We allowed the Park 
     District's petition. We also allowed the Illinois 
     Association of Park Districts, the Illinois Municipal 
     League, and the Illinois Governmental Association of 
     Pools to file a joint amici curiae brief. 155 Ill. 2d R. 
     345(a). While the appeal was pending here, plaintiff 
     filed a motion in this court seeking leave to file a 
     first amended complaint in the trial court. Plaintiff's 
     motion has been taken with the case. 
 
                           BACKGROUND 
          On September 23, 1991, plaintiff and her husband 
     parked their car at a McCormick Place parking lot and 
     walked toward Soldier Field in order to meet their 
     daughters for a Monday evening Chicago Bears football 
     game. While walking to Soldier Field, plaintiff tripped 
     over a concrete parking abutment (a "car stop") and fell. 
     Employees of the Park District admitted that the car stop 
     was improperly blocking a walkway. 
          The record reveals that at the time of plaintiff's 
     fall, the car stop was located on a walkway adjacent to 
     a parking lot exit at the northeast corner of Soldier 
     Field's south parking lot. In her complaint, plaintiff 
     alleged that this location was owned, operated, 
     possessed, and maintained by the Park District. The Park 
     District admitted this allegation. 
          Plaintiff stated in her complaint that she was 
     walking on Park District property in order to reach 
     Soldier Field to attend a football game. Plaintiff has 
     not alleged and the record does not reveal whether 
     plaintiff's fall occurred within the confines of a park. 
     Evidence was introduced, however, to show that the 
     Burnham Park maintenance department cleans the south lot 
     after events occurring at Soldier Field. 
          Plaintiff allegedly sustained a number of injuries 
     as a result of her fall. Plaintiff sued the Park District 
     under a theory of negligence. Plaintiff alleged that the 
     Park District was negligent in either placing the car 
     stop on the walkway or in failing to remove the car stop 
     from the walkway. Plaintiff also alleged that the Park 
     District was negligent in failing to warn pedestrians of 
     the car stop's location and in failing to illuminate 
     adequately the area in which the car stop was located. 
     Plaintiff did not allege any willful or wanton misconduct 
     on the part of the Park District. 
          Relying on section 3--106 of the Tort Immunity Act, 
     the Park District filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's 
     complaint under section 2--619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil 
     Procedure. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 2-- 
     619(a)(9). The Park District claimed in its motion that 
     plaintiff's use of its property was for the recreational 
     purpose of attending a football game. The Park District 
     stated that this use was intended and permitted by the 
     Park District. Thus, the Park District argued that 
     plaintiff's allegations of negligence were barred by 
     section 3--106. 
          In support of its motion to dismiss, the Park 
     District stated that the parking lot and walkway were 
     recreational property because they allowed patrons of 
     Soldier Field to park in close proximity to the stadium. 
     The Park District stated that parking in proximity to the 
     stadium furthers a patron's recreational activity of 
     attending a Chicago Bears football game. The Park 
     District's motion to dismiss was denied. 
          In its answer to plaintiff's complaint, the Park 
     District asserted several affirmative defenses. The Park 
     District again relied on section 3--106. The Park 
     District claimed that it was not liable for the 
     negligence alleged by plaintiff because plaintiff's fall 
     occurred on public property used for recreational 
     purposes. 
          In a further affirmative defense, the Park District 
     also relied on section 3--102(a) of the Tort Immunity Act 
     (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 85, par. 3--102(a)). Section 
     3--102(a) provides that a local public entity shall not 
     be liable for injury occurring on public property unless 
     it is proven that the local public entity has actual or 
     constructive notice of the injury causing condition. The 
     Park District stated it had neither actual nor 
     constructive notice of the car stop's improper placement 
     on the walkway. Lacking notice, the Park District alleged 
     that it was immune from liability. 
          In the alternative, the Park District relied on 
     section 3--102(b) of the Tort Immunity Act (Ill. Rev. 
     Stat. 1989, ch. 85, par. 3--102(b)). Section 3--102(b) 
     provides that a local public entity does not have 
     constructive notice of an injury causing condition 
     located on public property if the local public entity 
     operates a reasonably adequate inspection system. The 
     Park District alleged that its pregame traffic control 
     and parking lot setup routine around Soldier Field 
     qualified as an "inspection system" under section 3-- 
     102(b). The Park District claimed that its inspection 
     system provided a defense to any finding of constructive 
     notice. 
          Following a bench trial, the judge ruled in favor of 
     plaintiff. In reaching this result, the judge found that 
     the Park District was negligent in failing to provide 
     reasonably safe access to Soldier Field. The judge then 
     addressed, and rejected, the Park District's defenses 
     under sections 3--106 and 3--102. 
          The judge found that the Park District's section 3-- 
     106 defense did not apply. The judge stated: "As I 
     previously said, the Park District can't rely on Section 
     3--106, which grants immunity for recreational 
     facilities, because this parking lot that is access to 
     Soldier Field is not a recreational facility." 
          The judge also found that there was no evidence to 
     indicate that the Park District had actual notice of the 
     car stop's location on the walkway. However, the judge 
     did find that the Park District had constructive notice 
     of the car stop's location. The car stop was conspicuous 
     because it weighed approximately 100 pounds and took 
     several men or a forklift to move. Also, based on the 
     photographs entered into evidence, the judge stated, 
     "this conspicuous obstacle did exist, and it must have 
     been there, I found, for enough time for the Park 
     District to become aware of it." Because the Park 
     District had constructive notice of the car stop's 
     improper placement on the walkway, the judge found that 
     the Park District was not immune from liability under 
     section 3--102(a). 
          The judge further found no evidence to support the 
     Park District's claim that its pregame traffic control 
     and parking lot setup routine qualified as an inspection 
     system that would have led to the discovery of the 
     improperly positioned car stop. Thus, section 3--102(b) 
     did not provide a defense to the Park District's 
     constructive notice of the car stop's improper location 
     on the walkway. 
          The appellate court affirmed. No. 1--93--3639 
     (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The 
     appellate court examined the Park District's section 3-- 
     106 defense in light of Bubb v. Springfield School 
     District 186,  167 Ill. 2d 372  (1995). In Bubb, we 
     addressed whether a school district is immune from 
     liability for negligence under section 3--106 when a 
     student is injured on a sidewalk surrounding a school 
     when that sidewalk is used for recreation. 
          Relying on Bubb, the appellate court attempted to 
     determine whether the location of plaintiff's fall was a 
     recreational area under section 3--106. The court stated 
     that the Park District failed to present evidence 
     regarding the recreational character of the location of 
     plaintiff's fall. Lacking this evidence, the court 
     concluded the trial judge was correct to find that 
     section 3--106 did not provide immunity for the Park 
     District. 
          During its appeal to the appellate court, the Park 
     District, for the first time in its reply brief, asked 
     the appellate court to take judicial notice of the fact 
     that plaintiff's fall occurred within Burnham Park. The 
     court declined to do so. The court stated that even if it 
     were to take judicial notice of the location of Burnham 
     Park, the Park District still failed to carry its burden 
     of establishing a section 3--106 affirmative defense. The 
     court found that the Park District did not introduce any 
     evidence that plaintiff's fall occurred in an area 
     traditionally used for recreational purposes. 
          The appellate court also reviewed the trial judge's 
     two section 3--102 findings. Because the car stop was 
     conspicuous and improperly positioned long enough for the 
     Park District to become aware of it, the court concluded 
     that a finding of constructive notice under section 3-- 
     102(a) was not against the manifest weight of the 
     evidence. 
          In addition, the appellate court agreed with the 
     trial judge that there was no evidence to demonstrate 
     that the Park District operated a reasonably adequate 
     inspection system. Thus, the trial judge's section 3-- 
     102(b) finding was not against the manifest weight of the 
     evidence. 
 
                           DISCUSSION 
          The Park District asks this court to take judicial 
     notice of the fact that plaintiff's fall occurred within 
     Burnham Park. Assuming we take judicial notice of this 
     fact, the Park District argues that it is automatically 
     entitled to immunity under section 3--106 because parks 
     are by definition "property intended or permitted to be 
     used for recreational purposes." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, 
     ch. 85, par. 3--106. For the reasons that follow, we 
     decline to take judicial notice of the location of 
     plaintiff's fall. 
          Prior to trial, the Park District did not claim in 
     its motion to dismiss or in its answer to plaintiff's 
     complaint that plaintiff's fall occurred within Burnham 
     Park. During trial, the Park District did not claim or 
     introduce evidence to demonstrate that plaintiff was 
     injured in a park. In fact, the Park District concedes in 
     its brief that "no evidence was presented at trial 
     technically fixing the situs of plaintiff's injury as a 
     sidewalk located in Burnham Park." Furthermore, the Park 
     District never asked the trial judge to take judicial 
     notice of the fact that plaintiff was injured in Burnham 
     Park. 
          The Park District in its reply brief in the 
     appellate court asked that court to take judicial notice 
     that plaintiff was injured in Burnham Park. The appellate 
     court declined to do so. The court stated that even if it 
     were to take judicial notice of the location of 
     plaintiff's fall, the Park District failed to establish 
     that plaintiff's fall occurred in an area traditionally 
     used for recreational purposes. 
          The Park District has waived its contention that 
     plaintiff was injured in a park by failing to present 
     evidence or seek judicial notice of this fact in the 
     trial court. "[I]t is axiomatic that where evidence was 
     not offered during the trial of a matter, it cannot be 
     introduced for the first time on appeal." H.J. Tobler 
     Trucking Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,  37 Ill. 2d 341 , 344 
     (1967). Also, "[i]t is required that the points argued on 
     appeal be commensurate with the issues presented at 
     trial." Kravis v. Smith Marine, Inc.,  60 Ill. 2d 141 , 147 
     (1975). Moreover, the Park District's contention that 
     plaintiff was injured in a park was raised for the first 
     time in its reply brief in the appellate court. Under 
     Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7), points not argued in an 
     appellant's brief are waived and shall not be raised in 
     the reply brief. 155 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7). 
          In the alternative, the Park District argues that 
     plaintiff's fall occurred on "property intended or 
     permitted to be used for recreational purposes." Ill. 
     Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 85, par. 3--106. The evidence shows 
     that plaintiff's fall occurred on the walkway of a Park 
     District parking lot serving Soldier Field. The Park 
     District intended for and permitted football fans to park 
     in the lots adjacent to Soldier Field and use the 
     walkways to gain access to the stadium. Plaintiff 
     possessed a ticket to attend the football game and was 
     injured while walking to the game. Thus, the Park 
     District argues that the location of plaintiff's fall was 
     part of the recreational purpose of Soldier Field. We 
     agree. 
          In Bubb, we found that section 3--106 "applies if 
     public property is intended or permitted to be used for 
     recreational purposes, regardless of the primary purpose 
     of the property." Bubb, 167 Ill. 2d  at 384. Application 
     of a section 3--106 defense does not depend only on a 
     plaintiff's active engagement in a recreational activity 
     at the time of injury. See J. DeAno, Governmental 
     Immunities for Recreational Injuries, 82 Ill. B.J. 28, 
     28-29 (1994). 
          In addition, section 3--106 may apply to facilities 
     or structures that increase the usefulness of public 
     property intended or permitted to be used for 
     recreational purposes. These facilities or structures 
     need not be recreational in character for section 3--106 
     to apply. See S. Puiszis, Illinois Municipal Tort 
     Liability sec. 4--10, at 183 (1996). Although the 
     walkways and parking lots adjacent to Soldier Field may 
     not be primarily recreational, Soldier Field itself is 
     certainly recreational and these facilities increase its 
     usefulness. Taken as a whole, we find that Soldier Field 
     and its adjacent walkways and parking lots are intended 
     or permitted to be used for recreational purposes. 
          A review of the legislative history supports our 
     conclusion. Prior to 1986, local public entities were 
     faced with difficulties affording liability insurance. As 
     stated by Senator Rock, legislators were "somewhat 
     appalled that counties and park districts and 
     municipalities were confronted with the fact that they 
     were uninsurable or that the insurance that was offered 
     to them was unaffordable." 84th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate 
     Proceedings, June 30, 1986, at 78 (statements of Senator 
     Rock). 
          The legislature responded to these difficulties by 
     enacting Public Act 84--1431 which, among other things, 
     amended portions of the Tort Immunity Act. In order to 
     decrease the costs of liability insurance, the 
     legislature expanded the scope of immunity provided to 
     local public entities under section 3--106. The 
     legislature accomplished this expansion of immunity by 
     abandoning the focus on specific types of public property 
     and instead focusing on the intended or permitted use of 
     the property. 
          Prior to its amendment in 1986, "section 3--106 
     immunity was specifically limited to parks, playgrounds, 
     and open areas used for recreational purposes." Bubb, 167 Ill. 2d  at 378. Following its amendment, immunity was 
     expanded by including "public property intended or 
     permitted to be used for recreational purposes, including 
     but not limited to parks, playgrounds, open areas, 
     buildings or other enclosed recreational facilities." 
     Pub. Act 84--1431, art. 1, sec. 2, eff. November 25, 1986 
     (amending Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 85, par. 3--106). 
          Thus, under section 3--106 as amended, it is the 
     character of the property as a whole that determines 
     whether immunity applies. See Bubb, 167 Ill. 2d  at 379, 
     381 (agreeing with the reasoning of courts that examine 
     "the nature of the property as a whole"). In this case, 
     an examination of the property as a whole indicates that 
     the parking lot in which plaintiff fell was an integral 
     part of the Soldier Field recreational facility. We 
     therefore believe that the trial judge erred in narrowly 
     focusing on only whether the parking lot by itself was 
     being used for recreational purposes. 
          We note that our conclusion is consistent with the 
     Seventh Circuit's decision in Diamond v. Springfield 
     Metropolitan Exposition Auditorium Authority, 44 F.3d 599 
     (7th Cir. 1995). In Diamond, the plaintiff was on her way 
     to a career related conference when she was injured in 
     the doorway of an underground tunnel leading to a 
     facility used for conventions, shows, and sporting 
     events. 
          The court stated that section 3--106 immunity 
     depends on "the character of the property as a whole, 
     rather than whether the injured person was engaged in a 
     nonrecreational activity." Diamond, 44 F.3d  at 604. 
     Because both participants in and spectators of sporting 
     events are engaged in recreation (see Diamond, 44 F.3d at 
     603), the court found that the facility was permitted to 
     be used for recreational purposes (see Diamond, 44 F.3d 
     at 604-05). Accordingly, the court concluded that 
     plaintiff's negligence action was barred by section 3-- 
     106. 
          Our appellate court has reached similar results. In 
     Annen v. Village of McNabb, 192 Ill. App. 3d 711 (1990), 
     plaintiff was injured in a restroom located in a park. 
     Under section 3--106, the appellate court affirmed the 
     dismissal of plaintiff's negligence claim. The court 
     stated that "[w]hile a restroom building itself is not 
     intended to be used for recreational purposes, it allows 
     a park user to continue using the park ***. This 
     increases the usefulness of the park and advances the 
     legislative purpose." Annen, 192 Ill. App. 3d at 713. 
          In Lewis v. Jasper County Community Unit School 
     District No. 1, 258 Ill. App. 3d 419 (1994), plaintiff 
     was injured by falling against a pumphouse located on a 
     school playground. Relying on section 3--106, the 
     appellate court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's 
     negligence claims. The court stated that the "immunity 
     provisions of section 3--106 have been held to apply to 
     nonrecreational equipment and structures located on 
     premises used for recreational activities." Lewis, 258 
     Ill. App. 3d at 423. 
          Similar results may be found in additional cases. 
     See, e.g., Conoway v. Hanover Park Park District, 277 
     Ill. App. 3d 896 (1996) (plaintiff was barred from 
     recovery when injured by falling into a drainage ditch in 
     a park); Hanover Insurance Co. v. Board of Education of 
     the City of Chicago, 240 Ill. App. 3d 173 (1992) (worker 
     was barred from recovery when injured by slipping on 
     cracked concrete in a school playground while performing 
     masonry repairs); Kirnbauer v. Cook County Forest 
     Preserve District, 215 Ill. App. 3d 1013 (1991) 
     (plaintiff was barred from recovery when injured by a 
     cable barricade restricting entry to a forest preserve 
     access road). 
          Because we find that the Park District is not liable 
     in actions for negligence in the circumstances presented 
     here, we do not address the Park District's additional 
     immunity arguments regarding constructive notice under 
     section 3--102 nor do we address the Park District's 
     argument that parks are automatically entitled to 
     immunity under section 3--106. 
          We must still dispose of plaintiff's pending motion 
     seeking leave to file a first amended complaint under 
     Supreme Court Rule 362. 155 Ill. 2d R. 362. The purpose 
     of Rule 362 is to amend the pleadings to conform to the 
     evidence presented at trial. A movant "must show the 
     amendment to be necessary, that no prejudice will result 
     to the adverse party if the amendment sought is 
     permitted, and that the issues sought to be raised by the 
     amendment are supported by the facts in the record on 
     appeal." 155 Ill. R. 362(b). "Rule 362 is not a vehicle 
     to raise wholly new issues on appeal." Local 165 v. 
     Bradley, 149 Ill. App. 3d 193, 213 (1986). 
          In plaintiff's motion, she seeks leave to add a 
     second count to her complaint alleging that the Park 
     District engaged in willful and wanton misconduct. The 
     trial had proceeded only on a theory of negligence. In 
     fact, plaintiff's attorney stated to the trial court: 
     "First of all, I would just like to state again for the 
     record this case is based upon [a] theory of negligence, 
     and it is not incumbent upon my client in this action to 
     prove any willful and wanton conduct on the part of the 
     Park District." 
          In Griffin v. Darda, 28 Ill. App. 3d 693 (1975), 
     plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile that collided 
     with another vehicle. Plaintiff filed suit against the 
     driver of the automobile in which she was riding. 
     Plaintiff alleged the driver was guilty of willful and 
     wanton misconduct. Following a bench trial, judgment was 
     entered in the driver's favor. On appeal, plaintiff 
     sought to amend her complaint to add a count alleging 
     negligence against the driver. After citing Rule 362, the 
     appellate court stated that the trial below had: 
                    "proceeded on the theory that when 
                    [plaintiff] was injured, [the driver] was 
                    guilty of willful and wanton misconduct. 
                    Witnesses were called, cross-examination was 
                    conducted, and evidence was presented in 
                    accordance with this theory. There is no fact 
                    in the record to support the notion that 
                    negligence was a theory of the case." Griffin, 
                    28 Ill. App. 3d at 696-97. 
     The appellate court denied plaintiff's motion seeking 
     leave to file an amended complaint. 
          In this case, plaintiff proceeded on a theory of 
     negligence and specifically stressed that point in the 
     trial court. There are no facts in the record which 
     indicate that a theory of willful and wanton misconduct 
     on the part of the Park District was a theory at trial. 
     Like the Park District's request that we take judicial 
     notice of the parking lot's location within Burnham Park 
     to which the plaintiff objected, plaintiff's attempt to 
     amend her complaint comes too late. Plaintiff's motion 
     seeking leave to file a first amended complaint is 
     denied. 
 
                           CONCLUSION 
          For the foregoing reasons, we find that the Park 
     District is entitled to immunity under section 3--106 of 
     the Tort Immunity Act. Accordingly, we reverse the 
     judgments of the appellate and trial courts. In addition, 
     we deny plaintiff's motion seeking leave to file a first 
     amended complaint. 
 
     Judgments reversed. 
 
                                                                      CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring: 
          My colleagues hold that plaintiff's fall occurred on 
     "property intended or permitted to be used for 
     recreational purposes" as provided in section 3--106 of 
     the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort 
     Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, 
     ch. 85, par. 3--106). Therefore, they find that the Park 
     District is not liable for injuries which the plaintiff 
     sustained. I concur with the majority's conclusion that 
     the property on which plaintiff fell is intended or 
     permitted to be used for recreational purposes. However, 
     I believe that the majority's application of the 
     increased usefulness test will provide broader immunity 
     than the legislature intended.  
          Specifically, the majority asserts that the Park 
     District intended for and permitted football fans to park 
     in the lots adjacent to Soldier Field and use the 
     walkways to gain access to the stadium. Because plaintiff 
     possessed a ticket to attend the football game and was 
     injured while walking to the game, the majority concludes 
     that the location of plaintiff's fall was part of the 
     recreational purpose of Soldier Field. 
          The majority bases its reasoning on appellate court 
     cases which have held that, taken as a whole, a facility 
     or structure will be considered to fall within the scope 
     of section 3--106 if it increases the usefulness of 
     public property intended or permitted to be used for 
     recreational purposes. See Conoway v. Hanover Park Park 
     District, 277 Ill. App. 3d 896, 900 (1996); Kirnbauer v. 
     Cook County Forest Preserve District, 215 Ill. App. 3d 
     1013, 1022-23 (1991). This test was first espoused in 
     Annen v. Village of McNabb, 192 Ill. App. 3d 711 (1990). 
     In Annen, the plaintiff was using a restroom located 
     within a park when a sink fell from a wall, seriously 
     injuring her. The court found that the purpose of section 
     3--106 manifested an intent to include restroom 
     facilities within a park as part of the park itself. The 
     court stated: 
                    "A restroom facility located within a 
                    park is a part of the park. While a restroom 
                    building itself is not intended to be used for 
                    recreational purposes, it allows a park user 
                    to continue using the park without having to 
                    leave the park to use restroom facilities. 
                    This increases the usefulness of the park and 
                    advances the legislative purpose." Annen, 192 
                    Ill. App. 3d at 713. 
     The majority in the instant case adopts the reasoning in 
     Annen and concludes that, "[a]lthough the walkways and 
     parking lots adjacent to Soldier Field may not be 
     primarily recreational, Soldier Field itself is certainly 
     recreational and these facilities increase its 
     usefulness." Slip op. at 7. 
          Although the increased usefulness test provides a 
     fairly straightforward means to determine whether certain 
     property is subject to section 3--106 immunity, I do not 
     believe that the test should be so mechanically applied 
     such that any consideration of the injured party's use of 
     the property is ignored. In fact, we considered limiting 
     the scope of the "increased usefulness" test in Bubb, 
     where we stated: 
               "Providing immunity to any public property 
                    where recreation might occur would eviscerate 
                    the duty codified in section 3--102. *** [A]t 
                    some point, the use of public property for 
                    recreation may be so incidental that section 
                    3--106 does not apply." Bubb v. Springfield 
                    School District 186,  167 Ill. 2d 372 , 382 
                    (1995). 
          I believe that this case is one in which plaintiff's 
     use of the property was so incidental that section 3--106 
     should not apply. The record reveals that the plaintiff 
     parked her car in the McCormick Place parking lot, 
     approximately one mile from Soldier Field. However, the 
     injury occurred as she was crossing the south parking 
     lot, which is located across the street from Soldier 
     Field. The parking lot where plaintiff was injured does 
     increase the usefulness of Soldier Field; the lot 
     provides convenient parking for the public. However, 
     plaintiff's actual use of the property was incidental, as 
     she was merely walking across the lot to reach Soldier 
     Field. It is only happenstance that the lot is available 
     to increase the use of Soldier Field. Plaintiff's 
     presence on the lot had nothing to do with the lot's 
     availability for parking. Plaintiff merely chose the lot 
     as the path by which she could access Soldier Field. Had 
     plaintiff chosen a different path to access Soldier 
     Field, that property, simply because it provided 
     convenient access, would not merit section 3--106 
     immunity.  
          I do not believe that the legislature intended to 
     expand the scope of section 3--106 to provide immunity to 
     governmental units for use that is merely incidental to 
     the purpose of the property. For all practical purposes, 
     unless the increased usefulness test is limited in its 
     application and scope, the duty of a governmental unit to 
     exercise even ordinary care will be diminished. 
 
          JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting: 
          I agree with Justice Freeman's conclusion that 
     section 3--106 should not apply to this case.  In my 
     view, however, this conclusion must yield a different 
     result. Because the Park District is not entitled to 
     immunity under section 3--106, there is no basis for 
     disturbing the judgments of the circuit and appellate 
     courts, and those judgments should be affirmed.  
     Accordingly, I dissent. 
 
          JUSTICE NICKELS, also dissenting: 
          Plaintiff was injured when she fell upon a walkway 
     which is adjacent to a Soldier Field parking lot. The 
     majority finds the Park District immune from liability 
     for plaintiff's injuries under section 3--106 of the 
     Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort 
     Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, 
     ch. 85, par. 3--106), because plaintiff's fall occurred 
     on property intended or permitted to be used for 
     recreational purposes. Because I cannot concur with the 
     majority's conclusion in this case, I respectfully 
     dissent. 
          The legislature codified the general duty of a local 
     public entity to use ordinary care to maintain public 
     property in section 3--102 of the Tort Immunity Act (Ill. 
     Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 85, par. 3--102). However, section 
     3--106, on which the majority relies, provides a public 
     entity with an affirmative defense, which, if properly 
     raised and proven, bars a plaintiff's right to recovery. 
     Bubb v. Springfield School District 186,  167 Ill. 2d 372 , 
     378 (1995). Section 3--106 provides in pertinent part 
     that a local public entity shall not be liable for an 
     injury where the liability is based on the existence of 
     a condition of any public property intended or permitted 
     to be used for recreational purposes. Ill. Rev. Stat. 
     1989, ch. 85, par. 3--106. Whether public property is 
     intended or permitted to be used for a recreational 
     purpose within the meaning of section 3--106 requires a 
     case-by-case examination of the nature of the property 
     involved. Bubb, 167 Ill. 2d  at 384. 
          The majority agrees with the Park District's 
     contentions that the parking lots and walkways adjacent 
     to Soldier Field were intended to be used by football 
     fans on their way to games at the stadium. They agree 
     that, because plaintiff possessed a ticket to a football 
     game and was injured while walking to the game, the 
     walkway where plaintiff fell was part of the recreational 
     purpose of Soldier Field. 
          In coming to this conclusion, the majority relies on 
     appellate court cases which hold that section 3--106 
     immunity may apply to a facility or structure that 
     increases the usefulness of public property intended or 
     permitted to be used for recreational purposes. I believe 
     the majority's holding is an unwarranted expansion of 
     immunity to public entities which far exceeds the 
     legislature's intent. 
          First, the appellate court cases on which the 
     majority relies are readily distinguishable. Unlike the 
     instant case, the plaintiffs in all those cases were 
     barred from recovery under the Tort Immunity Act because 
     their injuries occurred while they were actually within 
     a recreational facility. See Bubb, 167 Ill. 2d  at 382 
     (plaintiff injured on school property designated as part 
     of the playground); Conoway v. Hanover Park Park 
     District, 277 Ill. App. 3d 896, 900 (1996) (plaintiff 
     injured in drainage ditch in a park); Lewis v. Jasper 
     County Community Unit School District No. 1, 258 Ill. 
     App. 3d 419, 420 (1994) (plaintiff injured on a pumphouse 
     inside a playground); Hanover Insurance Co. v. Board of 
     Education, 240 Ill. App. 3d 173, 174 (1992) (plaintiff 
     injured on cracked concrete of a playground); Annen v. 
     Village of McNabb, 192 Ill. App. 3d 711, 713 (1990) 
     (plaintiff injured in restroom within a park); Diamond v. 
     Springfield Metropolitan Exposition Auditorium Authority, 
     44 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 1995) (plaintiff injured in tunnel 
     that was part of a convention center). 
          Furthermore, in Bubb and Diamond, neither court was 
     concerned with whether the site of the plaintiff's injury 
     increased the usefulness of the recreational property. In 
     Bubb, at issue was whether the sidewalk where plaintiff 
     was injured was intended and permitted to be used as part 
     of the playground and, therefore, was within the scope of 
     section 3--106. See Bubb, 167 Ill. 2d  at 382-83. In 
     Diamond, the issue before the court was whether the 
     convention center where plaintiff was injured could be 
     considered recreational property because it sponsored 
     recreational as well as nonrecreational events. See 
     Diamond, 44 F.3d  at 604. 
          Moreover, that plaintiff in the instant case was 
     injured while walking to the stadium to attend a football 
     game should not influence the determination of whether 
     the locale of her injury was recreational property. 
     Immunity under section 3--106 "depends on the character 
     of the property in question, not the activity performed 
     at any given time." Bubb, 167 Ill. 2d  at 379; see also 
     Larson v. City of Chicago, 142 Ill. App. 3d 81, 87 (1986) 
     (immunity did not apply to a roller skating injury on a 
     public sidewalk because a public sidewalk is not 
     recreational property like a park or playground); John v. 
     City of Macomb, 232 Ill. App. 3d 877, 880 (1992) 
     (immunity did not apply to an injury suffered at a band 
     concert on a courthouse lawn because permitting that 
     recreational activity did "not so alter the character of 
     a public area not generally used for recreational 
     activity that it would necessarily fall within the 
     intended scope of section 3--106"). 
          The 1986 amendment to the Tort Immunity Act 
     evidences the legislature's intent to expand the scope of 
     section 3--106 to include within its coverage any 
     recreational property similar in nature to the types of 
     properties listed in the statute. Bubb, 167 Ill. 2d  at 
     378, citing Bonfield v. Jordan, 202 Ill. App. 3d 638, 645 
     (1990). However, unlike the majority, I do not believe 
     that the legislature intended to provide immunity for all 
     property that surrounds a recreational facility and 
     which, incidentally, accommodates the public's use of the 
     recreational facility. 
          As noted earlier, local public entities have a 
     general statutory duty to exercise ordinary care to 
     maintain public property. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 
     85, par. 3--102. This court, when construing a 
     legislative act, should consider each section in 
     connection with other sections. Castaneda v. Illinois 
     Human Rights Comm'n,  132 Ill. 2d 304 , 318 (1989). 
     Although section 3--106 of the Tort Immunity Act provides 
     immunity for recreational property, providing immunity to 
     any public property which somehow accommodates or make 
     more convenient the use of other public recreational 
     property would totally eviscerate the duty codified in 
     section 3--102. Cf. Bubb, 167 Ill. 2d  at 382. 
          I believe that the use of a walkway adjacent to a 
     Soldier Field parking lot is a mere convenience and is so 
     incidental that it simply cannot be considered property 
     intended or permitted to be used for recreational 
     purposes. For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the 
     judgment of the appellate court. 
 
          JUSTICE HARRISON joins in this dissent.