Title: Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will County Collector

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 88110-Agenda 23-May 2000.
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY, Appellant, v.
WILL COUNTY COLLECTOR, Appellee.
Opinion filed May 3, 2001.
 
	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
	In 1994, the General Assembly enacted tax rate amendments
to section 5-1024 of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/5-1024 (West
1994)) and section 9-107 of the Local Governmental and
Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act)
(745 ILCS 10/9-107 (West 1994)). The issue presented in this
case is whether these amendments should be applied to certain tax
levies that were adopted by Will County shortly before the
amendments became effective. The appellate court concluded that
the amendments should be so applied. 305 Ill. App. 3d 819. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm.

BACKGROUND
	Section 5-1024 of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/5-1024
(West 1994)) grants the authority to non-home-rule counties, such
as Will County, to levy property taxes for what is commonly
referred to as general corporate purposes. Section 5-1024 also sets
a limit on the amount of taxes that a county may raise for such
purposes. This limit is expressed as a rate, specifically, a
percentage of the value of taxable property as equalized or
assessed by the Department of Revenue. Prior to 1995, the rate at
which Will County could levy for its general corporate fund (the
general corporate rate limitation) was set at $0.25 per $100 of
assessed valuation.
	While section 5-1024 authorizes levies for general corporate
funds, various other statutory provisions authorize levies for more
specific purposes. Among these other statutory provisions is
section 9-107 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/9-107
(West 1994)). Section 9-107 provides that a local public entity
may levy property taxes to cover the cost of insuring or otherwise
defending itself against workers' compensation claims and tort
claims for which the local public entity is liable under the Tort
Immunity Act.
	Section 5-1024 of the Counties Code lists many of the taxes
that a county is statutorily authorized to levy for specific purposes
and further provides that these taxes are exempt from the general
corporate rate limitation. Before 1995, however, taxes for workers'
compensation and tort immunity defense funds that were
authorized by section 9-107 of the Tort Immunity Act were not
listed under section 5-1024 as being exempt from the general
corporate rate limitation.
	In 1993, our appellate court held that, under the then-existing
language of section 5-1024 of the Counties Code and section
9-107 of the Tort Immunity Act, property taxes levied by a non-home-rule county for tort liability insurance had to be included
within the general corporate rate limitation established under
section 5-1024. See In re Application of the Du Page County
Collector, 243 Ill. App. 3d 823 (1993). Taxes levied for tort
liability insurance were held void "to the extent the general
corporate tax rate would have exceeded the maximum rate [under
section 5-1024] if the liability insurance rate had been included in
the general corporate rate." Du Page County Collector, 243 Ill.
App. 3d at 825.
	In response to this decision, in January of 1994, House Bill
2627 was introduced in the Illinois House of Representatives. This
bill added language to both section 5-1024 of the Counties Code
and section 9-107 of the Tort Immunity Act which makes it clear
that taxes for workers' compensations funds and tort immunity
defense funds are excluded from the general corporate rate
limitation. House Bill 2627 was passed in the General Assembly
on May 29, 1994. On June 27, 1994, the Governor signed House
Bill 2627 into law as Public Act 88-545 (Act). The effective date
of the Act was January 1, 1995.
	On November 17, 1994, approximately six weeks prior to the
Act's effective date, Will County adopted its 1994 levies for its
corporate fund, tort immunity insurance fund and workers'
compensation fund. After January 1, 1995, the Will County clerk
extended these levies against the assessed values of property
within the county. The rates of the levies, as certified by the
county clerk, were $0.25 for the general corporate fund, $0.0223
for the workers' compensation fund, and $0.0155 for the tort
immunity insurance fund. The total rate of these three levies was
$0.2878 per $100 of assessed valuation.
	The plaintiff, Commonwealth Edison Company (Edison), paid
the first installment of its 1994 Will County property taxes on June
1, 1995, and the second installment on September 1, 1995. On
November 3, 1995, Edison filed a tax objection complaint in the
circuit court of Will County. Citing to Du Page County Collector,
243 Ill. App. 3d 823, Edison asserted that Will County's 1994
levies for its tort immunity insurance and workers' compensation
funds had to be included within the county's general corporate rate
limitation and, therefore, that Will County had exceeded the
corporate rate limitation of $0.25 by a total of $0.0378 (the
combination of the workers' compensation rate and the tort
immunity insurance rate). Thus, according to Edison, Will
County's 1994 tax levies for its workers' compensation and tort
immunity insurance funds were illegal and void. The circuit court
sustained Edison's objection. In so doing, the court rejected an
argument advanced by defendant, the Will County collector
(collector), that the amendments to section 5-1024 and section
9-107 enacted by the General Assembly in Public Act 88-545
should be applied retroactively to validate the levies.
	The appellate court reversed. 305 Ill. App. 3d 819. The
appellate court concluded that the plain language of the
amendments to sections 5-1024 and 9-107 indicated that the
General Assembly intended the amendments to be applied to
levies adopted prior to January 1, 1995, and, therefore, that the
Will County levies were legally valid. The appellate court also
determined that, because no vested right was involved, the
application of the amendments to the levies did not violate
Edison's rights under the due process clause of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). We granted Edison's
petition for leave to appeal.177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).


ANALYSIS


	Before discussing the merits of this appeal, we address a
preliminary procedural matter.
	After oral arguments were held in this cause, Edison and the
collector filed in this court an "Agreed Motion for Leave to
Substitute Named Party." In this motion, Edison and the collector
stated that Edison had "settled its claim" with the collector. Edison
and the collector then asked this court to substitute another
company, Illinois Bell Telephone Company/Ameritech, for Edison
as "the named party appellant." According to a sworn statement
made within the motion, Illinois Bell was one of numerous tax
objectors who brought the instant appeal. On the basis of this
representation, the motion was allowed, and an order substituting
"Illinois Bell Telephone Company/Ameritech as the named party
appellant" was entered by this court on November 16, 2000.
	Upon subsequent review of the record, however, and
following the issuance of a rule to show cause and the filing of an
answer, this court has determined that the statement made in the
agreed motion that numerous tax objectors were involved in this
appeal was incorrect. At the time the agreed motion for
substitution of named party was filed, the only parties to this cause
were Edison and the collector. Because Illinois Bell was not, in
fact, a party to the present action or the judgment appealed from,
we have concluded that the motion to substitute Illinois Bell as the
"named party appellant" was improvidently granted. Therefore,
simultaneously with this opinion, an order has been issued
vacating the order substituting "Illinois Bell Telephone
Company/Ameritech as the named party appellant."
	As noted, in the "Agreed Motion for Leave to Substitute
Named Party," Edison and the collector stated that Edison has
settled its tax objection claim. Notably, neither party sought, as
Edison's counsel should have sought, to dismiss Edison from this
proceeding. Nor did either party indicate that this appeal might be
moot.
	However, even assuming that the instant appeal is moot, we
choose to address the merits of the case pursuant to the public
interest exception to the mootness doctrine. Whether statutory
amendments that affect tax rates should be given retroactive
application is an issue of substantial public importance, the issue
is likely to recur, and, as will be discussed below, our case law
regarding the retroactive application of statutory amendments is in
conflict. See In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (2000). Accordingly, we
turn to the merits.
	At issue in this case is whether the tax rate amendments to
section 5-1024 of the Counties Code and section 9-107 of the
Tort Immunity Act should be applied to levies that were adopted
by Will County for its workers' compensation and tort immunity
defense funds approximately six weeks before the amendments
became effective. In order to resolve this issue, we must consider
and apply the legal principles that govern the retroactive
application of statutory amendments. Unfortunately, however,
recent decisions of this court, beginning with First of America
Trust Co. v. Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d 282 (1996), have left these
principles "in the state of some muddle." Kopec v. City of
Elmhurst, 193 F.3d 894, 906 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J.,
dissenting).
	In Armstead, this court addressed whether a newly enacted
statutory amendment should be applied in that appeal.
Recognizing that the principles for determining whether a statutory
amendment applies to an existing controversy on appeal had "not
been consistently stated" (Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d at 287-88), this
court set out to clarify this area of the law. The court began its
effort by examining prior case law that had addressed the issue of
retroactivity. The court determined that previous opinions had
generally followed one of two different approaches to retroactivity,
either the "legislative intent approach" or the "vested rights
approach." Generally stated, under the legislative intent approach,
statutory amendments are presumed to operate prospectively
unless the ' "express language or necessary implication' " of the
amendment " 'clearly indicate[s] that the legislature intended a
retroactive application.' " Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d  at 288, quoting
Rivard v. Chicago Fire Fighters Union, Local No. 2, 122 Ill. 2d 303, 309 (1988). Under the vested rights approach, in contrast,
legislative intent is "largely ignored." Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d  at 289.
Instead, the law is applied as it exists at the time of the appeal
unless to do so would interfere with a vested right, i.e., an interest
protected from legislative interference by the due process clause
of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). Armstead,
171 Ill. 2d  at 289.
	After setting forth the two lines of case law, this court in
Armstead held that the vested rights approach to retroactivity was
"the better approach." Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d  at 289. The court
reached this conclusion based upon its understanding of "true"
retroactivity. The Armstead court noted that " 'a statute is not
retroactive just because it relates to antecedent events, or because
it draws upon antecedent facts for its operation.' " Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d  at 289-90, quoting United States Steel Credit Union v.
Knight, 32 Ill. 2d 138, 142 (1965). Instead, a retroactive change in
the law is defined as ' " 'one that takes away or impairs vested
rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation,
imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect of
transactions or considerations already past.' " ' Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d  at 290, quoting United States Steel Credit Union, 32 Ill. 2d  at
142, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes §412 (1953). Accordingly, the
Armstead court observed that "[w]here no vested rights are
involved, either because they are not yet perfected or because the
amendment is procedural in nature, the amendment can be applied
to the existing controversy without any retroactive impact."
Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d  at 290. Applying this definition of
retroactivity, the Armstead court concluded that "there is little
reason to focus on legislative intent." Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d  at 290.
Rather, "a reviewing court should simply apply the law as its
exists at the time of the appeal, unless doing so would interfere
with a vested right." Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d  at 290. See also
Dardeen v. Heartland Manor, Inc., 186 Ill. 2d 291 (1999)
(applying the Armstead vested rights approach); Henrich v.
Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 402-06 (1998) (same).
	Although Armstead adopted the vested rights approach to
retroactivity, subsequent decisions from this court have continued
to focus on legislative intent to resolve questions concerning the
retroactive application of newly enacted legislation. For example,
in Atkins v. Deere & Co., 177 Ill. 2d 222 (1997), this court was
asked to determine whether the repeal of the Structural Work Act
(740 ILCS 150/0.01 et seq. (West 1994)) was retroactive. In
answering this question in the negative, the court looked solely at
legislative intent, rather than vested rights. Atkins, 177 Ill. 2d  at
233 n.2. No mention was made of Armstead or of that opinion's
rejection of the legislative intent approach to retroactivity. See P.
Phillips & A. Zahaykevich, Prospective-Only Repeal of the
Structural Work Act-and a New Approach to Saving Clauses?, 86
Ill. B.J. 76, 80 (1998) ("In [Armstead] the supreme court said the
vested rights approach was better than the legislative intent
approach. In Atkins, the court obviously followed the legislative
intent approach"); R. Feldmeier, Armstead and Its Progeny: The
Illinois Supreme Court's 'Vested Rights' Approach to the
Application of Statutory Amendments to Pre-existing Cases or
Causes of Action, 25 S. Ill. U. L.J. 95, 124-26 (2000) (noting that
the analysis in Atkins was based on legislative intent rather than
vested rights).
	Similarly, in People v. Digirolamo, 179 Ill. 2d 24 (1997), in
setting forth the rules for determining whether a new statutory
amendment should be applied in that appeal, this court did not
refer to Armstead or the vested rights approach to retroactivity.
Instead, reference was made exclusively to the legislative intent
approach. Digirolamo, 179 Ill. 2d  at 50. See also White v. Sunrise
Healthcare Corp., 295 Ill. App. 3d 296, 299 (1998) (noting
conflict between Digirolamo and Armstead); 25 S. Ill. U. L.J. at
123-24 (noting that Digirolamo followed the legislative intent
rather than vested rights approach).
	In an effort to resolve the conflict between the principles
espoused in Armstead, and those set forth in Atkins and
Digirolamo, several members of this court have proposed that we
adopt the approach to retroactivity endorsed by the United States
Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244,
128 L. Ed. 2d 229, 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994). See Premier Property
Management, Inc. v. Chavez, 191 Ill. 2d 101, 117 (2000)
(Freeman, J., specially concurring, joined by McMorrow, J.);
People v. Ramsey, 192 Ill. 2d 154, 159 (2000) (Bilandic, J.,
specially concurring); Ramsey, 192 Ill. 2d  at 174 (Freeman, J.,
specially concurring, joined by McMorrow, J.); Johnson v.
Halloran, No. 89594, slip op. at 6 (December 1, 2000) (Bilandic,
J., specially concurring, joined by Freeman and McMorrow, JJ.).
	In Landgraf, the Supreme Court confronted many of the same
issues regarding retroactivity and statutory interpretation with
which this court has struggled. In particular, the Court addressed
the "apparent tension" between "the rule that 'a court is to apply
the law in effect at the time it renders its decision,' [citation]" and
"the axiom that '[r]etroactivity is not favored in the law,' and its
interpretive corollary that 'congressional enactments and
administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect
unless their language requires this result.' [Citation.] " Landgraf,
511 U.S.  at 264, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 251, 114 S. Ct.  at 1496. The
Court resolved the "tension" between these rules by adopting the
following test for determining when a new federal statute will be
applied to existing controversies:
			"When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after
the events in suit, the court's first task is to determine
whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's
proper reach. If Congress has done so, of course, there is
no need to resort to judicial default rules. When, however,
the statute contains no such express command, the court
must determine whether the new statute would have
retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a
party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability
for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to
transactions already completed. If the statute would
operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches
that it does not govern ***." Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 280,
128 L. Ed. 2d  at 261-62, 114 S. Ct.  at 1505.
	See also Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 352, 144 L. Ed. 2d 347, 356-57, 119 S. Ct. 1998, 2003 (1999) (restating the same
test).
	In this test, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the "traditional
rule" that new "statutes do not apply retroactively unless Congress
expressly states that they do." (Emphasis in original.) Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 237, 131 L. Ed. 2d 328, 354,
115 S. Ct. 1447, 1461-62 (1995). The Court explained the
importance of requiring the legislature to clearly indicate the
temporal reach of newly enacted legislation:
			"The presumption against statutory retroactivity had
special force in the era in which courts tended to view
legislative interference with property and contract rights
circumspectly. In this century, legislation has come to
supply the dominant means of legal ordering, and
circumspection has given way to greater deference to
legislative judgments. [Citations.] But while the
constitutional impediments to retroactive civil legislation
are now modest, prospectivity remains the appropriate
default rule. Because it accords with widely held
intuitions about how statutes ordinarily operate, a
presumption against retroactivity will generally coincide
with legislative and public expectations. Requiring clear
intent assures that Congress itself has affirmatively
considered the potential unfairness of retroactive
application and determined that it is an acceptable price to
pay for the countervailing benefits. Such a requirement
allocates to Congress responsibility for fundamental
policy judgments concerning the proper temporal reach of
statutes, and has the additional virtue of giving legislators
a predictable background rule against which to legislate."
(Emphasis in original.) Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 272-73, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 256-57, 114 S. Ct.  at 1500-01.
	Under the Landgraf test, if the legislature has clearly indicated
what the temporal reach of an amended statute should be, then,
absent a constitutional prohibition, that expression of legislative
intent must be given effect. However, when the legislature has not
indicated what the reach of a statute should be, then the court must
determine whether applying the statute would have a retroactive
impact, i.e., "whether it would impair rights a party possessed
when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or
impose new duties with respect to transactions already
completed." Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 280, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 261-62,
114 S. Ct.  at 1505. If there would be no retroactive impact, as that
term is defined by the court, then the amended law may be applied.
Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 273-74, 275, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 257, 258, 114 S. Ct.  at 1501, 1502. If, however, applying the amended version of
the law would have a retroactive impact, then the court must
presume that the legislature did not intend that it be so applied.
Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 280, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 261-62, 114 S. Ct.  at
1505.
	As examples of statutory changes that normally do not have
a retroactive impact, the Court mentioned statutes that affect
jurisdiction and statutes that affect certain procedural rules.
Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 273-76, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 257-59, 114 S. Ct. 
at 1501-03. The Court also observed:
		"A statute does not operate 'retrospectively' merely
because it is applied in a case arising from conduct
antedating the statute's enactment [citation] or upsets
expectations based in prior law. Rather, the court must
ask whether the new provision attaches new legal
consequences to events completed before its enactment.
The conclusion that a particular rule operates
'retroactively' comes at the end of a process of judgment
concerning the nature and extent of the change in the law
and the degree of connection between the operation of the
new rule and a relevant past event. Any test of
retroactivity will leave room for disagreement in hard
cases, and is unlikely to classify the enormous variety of
legal changes with perfect philosophical clarity. However,
retroactivity is a matter on which judges tend to have
'sound ... instinct[s],' [citation] and familiar
considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and
settled expectations offer sound guidance." Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 269-70, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 254-55, 114 S. Ct.  at
1499.
	We have carefully considered the principles discussed in
Landgraf and conclude that the approach to retroactivity described
in that opinion provides the appropriate means of determining
when new legislation should be applied to existing controversies.
We further observe that the Landgraf test adequately resolves the
"tension" reflected in our case law in decisions such as Armstead,
Atkins and Digirolamo. Accordingly, we hereby adopt the
approach to retroactivity set forth in Landgraf.
	Pursuant to Landgraf, our first task in the case at bar is to
determine whether the General Assembly has "expressly
prescribed" (Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 280, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 262, 114
S. Ct. at 1505) the temporal reach of the amendments to sections
5-1024 and 9-107. To answer this question, we turn to the
language of the amendments.
	Section 5-1024 of the Counties Code states, in part:
			"A county board may cause to be levied and collected
annually, except as hereinafter provided, taxes for county
purposes, including all purposes for which money may be
raised by the county by taxation, *** at a rate not
exceeding .25% ***." 55 ILCS 5/5-1024 (West 1994).
	Public Act 88-545 amended section 5-1024 by adding the
following language:
			"except taxes levied under Section 9-107 of the Local
Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort
Immunity Act.
			Those taxes a county has levied and excepted from the
rate limitation imposed by this Section or Section 25.05
of 'An Act to revise the law in relation to counties',
approved March 31, 1874, in reliance on this amendatory
Act of 1994 are not invalid because of any provision of
this Section that may be construed to or may have been
construed to restrict or limit those taxes levied and those
taxes are hereby validated. This validation of taxes levied
applies to all cases pending on or after the effective date
of this amendatory Act of 1994." Pub. Act 88-545, §5,
eff. January 1, 1995 (amending 55 ILCS 5/5-1024 (West
1992)).
	Public Act 88-545 amended section 9-107 of the Tort
Immunity Act by adding the following language:
			"With respect to taxes levied under this Section, either
before, on, or after the effective date of this amendatory
Act of 1994:
				(1) Those taxes are excepted from and shall not be
included within the rate limitation imposed by law on
taxes levied for general corporate purposes by the local
public entity authorized to levy a tax under this Section.
				(2) Those taxes that a local public entity has levied
in reliance on this Section and that are excepted under
paragraph (1) from the rate limitation imposed by law
on taxes levied for general corporate purposes by the
local public entity are not invalid because of any
provision of the law authorizing the local public
entity's tax levy for general corporate purposes that
may be construed or may have been construed to
restrict or limit those taxes levied, and those taxes are
hereby validated. This validation of taxes levied applies
to all cases pending on or after the effective date of this
amendatory Act of 1994." Pub. Act 88-545, §10, eff.
January 1, 1995 (amending 745 ILCS 10/9-107 (West
1992)).
	Edison argues that the General Assembly did not intend for
the amendments to sections 5-1024 and 9-107 to apply to levies
adopted prior to the amendments' effective date. Edison notes that
Public Act 88-545 was signed into law on June 27, 1994, but that
the effective date of the Act was delayed until January 1, 1995.
Edison maintains that if the General Assembly had intended that
the amendatory provisions in Public Act 88-545 be applied to
levies made in November of 1994, "it would have made [the Act]
effective immediately upon signature of the Governor on June 27,
1994."
	Edison also observes that the amendatory language of sections
5-1024 and 9-107 states that the amendments apply to levies
made "in reliance on" the "amendatory Act of 1994." The
amendatory language of section 5-1024 provides:
			"Those taxes a county has levied and excepted from the
rate limitation imposed by this Section *** in reliance on
this amendatory Act of 1994 *** are hereby validated."
Pub. Act 88-545, §5, eff. January 1, 1995 (amending 55
ILCS 5/5-1024 (West 1992)).
Similar language is found in the amendment to section 9-107,
which states, "Those taxes that a local public entity has levied in
reliance on this Section *** are hereby validated." Pub. Act
88-545, §10, eff. January 1, 1995 (amending 745 ILCS 10/9-107
(West 1992)).
	Edison contends that, since the amendments did not become
effective until January 1, 1995, the amendments could not, in fact,
be "relied upon" to validate levies enacted in November 1994.
Therefore, according to Edison, the General Assembly must have
intended the amendments to have a prospective effect. We
disagree.
	As the collector points out, there is no logical reason why a
county could not "levy in reliance on a statute which has been
enacted into law but prior to the law's effective date where the law
specifically provides that a levy made prior to the effective date in
reliance on the law is validated." Further, while Edison is correct
in noting that the postponement of an effective date may, as a
general matter, constitute evidence that the legislature intended the
amendment to have a prospective application (see, e.g., People v.
Ramsey, 192 Ill. 2d 154, 174 (2000) (Freeman, J., specially
concurring, joined by McMorrow, J.) (and authorities cited
therein)), that general rule may not, in this case, trump the plain
language of the amendments to sections 5-1024 and 9-107.
	Both the amendment to section 5-1024 and the amendment to
section 9-107 expressly state that the amendments' validation of
taxes "applies to all cases pending on or after the effective date of
this amendatory Act of 1994." The tax objection brought by
Edison in this case was filed in late 1995 and, thus, was pending
after the effective date of the Act. Moreover, the amendment to
section 9-107 expressly validates levies adopted "either before, on
or after the effective date of [the Act]." This statement is an
unequivocal expression of legislative intent. The General
Assembly clearly intended to validate levies, such as those at issue
in the case at bar, that were enacted prior to the amendments'
effective date.
	Edison argues, however, that, even if the General Assembly
intended the amendments to sections 5-1024 and 9-107 to be
applied to Will County's November levies, that intent may not be
given effect here. According to Edison, the amendments may not
be applied to the November levies because to do so would violate
Edison's rights under the due process clause of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2).
	"A retroactive tax measure does not necessarily violate the
due process provisions of either the Illinois or the Federal
constitution (U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,
sec. 2). A court must consider the nature of a tax measure and the
circumstances leading to its adoption before the court may
determine 'that its retroactive application is so harsh and
oppressive as to transgress the constitutional limitation.' " General
Telephone Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill. 2d 363, 378-79 (1984), quoting
Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147, 83 L. Ed. 87, 93, 59 S. Ct. 121, 126 (1938); see also 2 N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory
Construction §41.10 at 412 (5th ed. 1993) ("If the retroactive
feature of a tax law is arbitrary and burdensome, the statute will
not be sustained. The reasonableness of each retroactive tax statute
depends on the circumstances of each case").
	In determining whether a retroactive tax measure is " 'so
harsh and oppressive as to transgress the constitutional
limitation' " (General Telephone Co., 103 Ill. 2d  at 379, quoting
Welch, 305 U.S.  at 147, 83 L. Ed.  at 93, 59 S. Ct. at 126), courts
have considered such factors as the legislative purpose in enacting
the amendment (see, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26,
32, 129 L. Ed. 2d 22, 29, 114 S. Ct. 2018, 2023 (1994); Landgraf;
511 U.S.  at 266-67, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 253, 114 S. Ct.  at 1497-98
(noting that legislative purpose is a concern with retroactive
legislation because the legislature "may be tempted to use
retroactive legislation as a means of retribution against unpopular
groups or individuals")), the length of the period of retroactivity
(see, e.g., Carlton, 512 U.S.  at 32-33, 129 L. Ed. 2d  at 29-30, 114
S. Ct. at 2023), whether the taxpayer reasonably and detrimentally
relied on the prior law (see, e.g., General Telephone Co., 103 Ill.
2d at 379), and whether the taxpayer had adequate notice of the
change in the law (see, e.g., General Telephone Co., 103 Ill. 2d at
379).
	Parenthetically, we note that the United States Supreme Court
has strictly limited the scope of inquiry under the due process
clause of the federal constitution, holding that neither lack of
notice nor detrimental reliance are "dispositive" factors in
determining whether the retroactive application of a tax
amendment violates the due process clause of the federal
constitution. See Carlton, 512 U.S.  at 33-34, 129 L. Ed. 2d  at 30-31, 114 S. Ct.  at 2023; see also C. Hochman, The Supreme Court
and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 Harv. L.
Rev. 692, 706 (1960) ("The Court has been extremely reluctant to
override the legislative judgment as to the necessity for retroactive
taxation"). We need not decide, in this case, whether the due
process clause of the Illinois Constitution is similarly limited.
Even if we give full consideration to all the factors noted above,
it is clear that no due process violation would occur if the
amendments to section 5-1024 and 9-107 were applied to Will
County's November levies.
	First, no argument has been made, and there is nothing of
record which indicates, that the purpose of the General Assembly
in enacting the amendments to section 5-1024 and 9-107 was
"illegitimate or arbitrary." See Carlton, 512 U.S.  at 32, 129 L. Ed. 2d  at 29, 114 S. Ct.  at 2023. The General Assembly was correcting
a law, not "targeting" a group of taxpayers for retribution or other
illegitimate purposes. See Carlton, 512 U.S.  at 32, 129 L. Ed. 2d 
at 29, 114 S. Ct.  at 2023. Second, as applied to Will County's
November levies, the period of retroactivity of the amendments is
extremely modest, going back only six weeks from the
amendments' effective date. See Carlton, 512 U.S.  at 33, 129 L. Ed. 2d  at 30, 114 S. Ct.  at 2023 (upholding a retroactive tax
amendment where "the actual retroactive effect" of the amendment
"extended for a period only slightly greater than one year"). Third,
no argument has been made, and there is nothing of record which
indicates, that Edison detrimentally relied upon the tax rate that
existed prior to the enactment of the amendments. This is not
surprising, given that the first installment of Edison's 1994 tax bill
was not due, and was not paid, until June 1995, some six months
after the amendments' effective date. Finally, Edison had adequate
notice of the impending amendatory change in the tax rate. The
amendments, which clearly state that they will apply to validate
levies such as those in the case at bar, became law in June of 1994,
months before the November levies were adopted. Thus, in sum,
there is nothing in the instant case which indicates that the
application of the amendments to the November levies would be
" 'harsh and oppressive' " (General Telephone Co., 103 Ill. 2d  at
379, quoting Welch, 305 U.S.  at 147, 83 L. Ed.  at 93, 59 S. Ct. at
126) or, indeed, unfair in any sense.
	Edison also argues, however, that application of the
amendments to sections 5-1024 and 9-107 to the November levies
is foreclosed by this court's decision in Henrich v. Libertyville
High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 402-06 (1998). At issue in Henrich
was whether a new amendment to section 3-108(a) of the Tort
Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/3-108(a) (West 1994)) applied on
appeal to a claim brought by the plaintiff that alleged willful and
wanton misconduct on the part of the defendant high school.
Under the amendatory language, the plaintiff's claim was properly
brought. Without the amendatory language, the school district was
immunized from claims alleging willful and wanton misconduct
and plaintiff's claim was barred. Henrich, 186 Ill. 2d  at 395.
	Applying Armstead, this court held that the amendment to
section 3-108(a) did not apply to the controversy on appeal
because the school district had a vested right to the immunity
afforded by section 3-108(a) as it existed when the cause of action
arose. Henrich, 186 Ill. 2d  at 405. The court stated:
			"This court has agreed with the view that ' "an
exemption from a demand or an immunity from
prosecution in a suit is as valuable to the one party as the
right to the demand or to prosecute the suit is to the
other." ' [Citation.] Thus, it has long been recognized that
'[a] vested ground of defense is as fully protected from
being cut off or destroyed by an act of the legislature as is
a vested cause of action.' [Citations.] Put simply, the
legislature lacks the power to reach back and breathe life
into a previously barred claim. [Citations.]
			When this cause of action arose, the school district's
immunity under the unamended section 3-108 was
'unconditional,' and ' "immediate, fixed and determinate" '
[citation]; it did not depend on the entry of a judgment.
Thus, the school district's right to the total immunity
provided by the unamended section 3-108 vested when the
cause of action accrued. [Citation.] The amended section
3-108 cannot reach back and take that vested right away,
impose a new duty on the school district, and breathe life
into this previously barred claim." Henrich, 186 Ill. 2d  at
404-05.
	Edison argues that its objection to Will County's November
1994 levies, based on the holding of In re Application of the
Du Page County Collector, 243 Ill. App. 3d 823 (1993), was a
"defense" identical to the school district's defense that it was
immune from liability in Henrich. Edison emphasizes that the
validity of a tax rate is determined at the time of the levy. See, e.g.,
People ex rel. Carr v. Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis
Ry. Co., 316 Ill. 410, 414 (1925) ("[W]hen a tax is once ordered
or laid, its extension,-a ministerial function,-must be at a rate not
exceeding that authorized when the levy was made"). Edison
argues, therefore, that its defense against the tax rates accrued on
November 17, 1994, the date Will County adopted its levies.
According to Edison, on that date, its tax defense was as
"unconditional, immediate, fixed and determinate" as the school
district's tort immunity defense in Henrich. Thus, Edison
maintains that its tax defense vested on November 17, 1994, and
that the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution prevents the
amendments to section 5-1024 and 9-107 from "reaching back
and taking [its] vested right away."
	Initially, we note that Henrich was decided under the
principles espoused in Armstead rather than those set forth in
Landgraf. Nevertheless, Henrich remains relevant in this case
insofar as it defines those interests that are protected from
legislative interference by the due process clause of the Illinois
Constitution. With this understanding in mind, we consider the
holding of Henrich.
	In assessing whether the application of a new statutory
amendment to an existing controversy violates due process, the
question is not simply whether the " 'rights' allegedly impaired are
[labeled] 'vested' or 'non-vested.' " In re Marriage of Semmler,
107 Ill. 2d 130, 137 (1985). Rather,
		"[t]he question of the validity of the application of a
statute rests on subtle judgments concerning the fairness
or unfairness of applying the new statutory rule to affect
interests which accrued out of events which transpired
when a different prior rule of law was in force. One
fundamental consideration of fairness is that settled
expectations honestly arrived at with respect to substantial
interests ought not to be defeated. [Citation.] The
determination of whether the application of the statute
unreasonably infringes upon the rights of those to whom
it applies involves a balancing and discrimination
between reasons for and against the application of the
statute to this class of individuals. [Citation.]" Moore v.
Jackson Park Hospital, 95 Ill. 2d 223, 241-42 (1983)
(Ryan, C.J., specially concurring, joined by Underwood
and Moran, JJ.).
See also 2 N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction §41.05,
at 369 (5th ed. 1993) ("Analysis of the practical considerations
influencing the question whether a retroactive application of a new
law is fair and just should afford more meaningful standards of
judgment than either catchpenny phrases or the ambivalent
concept of 'vested' ").
	This court's holding in Henrich that the school district's tort
immunity defense had "vested," and thus was protected from
legislative interference, is simply a specific example of the general
maxim that "settled expectations honestly arrived at with respect
to substantial interests ought not to be defeated." Moore, 95 Ill. 2d 
at 241-42 (Ryan, C.J., specially concurring, joined by Underwood
and Moran, JJ.). The facts that supported the conclusion that the
school district's defense was a "settled expectation" that could not
be disturbed are readily distinguishable from the facts in the case
at bar. In Henrich, the school district's defense accrued on
February 2, 1995, the date the plaintiff's cause of action arose. The
amendment to section 3-108(a) became effective on December 2,
1998. Applying the amendment to section 3-108(a) to plaintiff's
claim would therefore have meant imposing a period of
retroactivity on the school district of almost four years. In contrast,
the period of retroactivity at issue in this case is only six weeks.
	Further, in Henrich, this court concluded that the preamended
version of section 3-108(a) completely and unconditionally
immunized the school district from plaintiff's claim alleging
willful and wanton misconduct. Henrich, 186 Ill. 2d  at 395. Thus,
applying the amendment to section 3-108(a) on appeal would have
meant resurrecting a claim that had previously been barred in its
entirety. See Henrich, 186 Ill. 2d  at 405, citing Sepmeyer v.
Holman, 162 Ill. 2d 249 (1994). Here, in contrast, even assuming
that Edison had a defense to the tax rate on November 17, 1994,
that defense did not completely bar Will County's "claim" to
Edison's property taxes. Edison knew that, under either the old or
new versions of sections 5-1024 and 9-107, it would be obligated
to pay 1994 county property taxes. The only question was how
much its tax bill would be. Edison's position would be more like
the high school's in Henrich, and more an upsetting of "settled
expectations," if an entirely new tax, rather than a new tax rate,
were being imposed by the amendments to sections 5-1024 and
9-107. This important distinction between a new, retroactive tax
rate and a new, retroactive tax has been frequently noted:
		" 'Nobody has a vested right in the rate of taxation, which
may be retroactively changed at the will of Congress at
least for periods of less than twelve months; Congress has
done so from the outset. . . . The injustice is no greater
than if a man chance to make a profitable sale in the
months before the general rates are retroactively changed.
Such a one may indeed complain that, could he have
foreseen the increase, he would have kept the transaction
unliquidated, but it will not avail him; he must be
prepared for such possibilities, the system being already
in operation. His is a different case from that of one who,
when he takes action, has no reason to suppose that any
transactions of the sort will be taxed at all.' " (Emphasis
added.) United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292, 298,
66 L. Ed. 2d 513, 518-19, 101 S. Ct. 549, 552-53 (1981),
quoting Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 545 (2d
Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.).
	Unlike the high school's situation in Henrich, the "subtle
judgments concerning the fairness or unfairness of applying the
new statutory rule" (Moore, 95 Ill. 2d  at 241-42 (Ryan, C.J.,
specially concurring, joined by Underwood and Moran, JJ.)) do
not, in this case, weigh in Edison's favor. Accordingly, we hold
that Edison's right to due process under the Illinois Constitution
is not violated by the application of the amendments to sections
5-1024 and 9-107 to Will County's November 1994 levies.


CONCLUSION


	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court
is affirmed.