Title: Carter v. Fred's Plumbing & Heating, Inc.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Carter v. Fred's Plumbing & Heating Inc. (2001-533); 174 Vt. 572;
816 A.2d 490

[Filed 04-Nov-2002]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2001-533

                             OCTOBER TERM, 2002


  Harold Carter	                       }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
       v.	                       }	Department of Labor and Industry
                                       }	
  Fred's Plumbing & Heating Inc.,      }
  Employers Mutual, American           }	DOCKET NO. M-25299
  Fidelity/AIG, Travelers/Aetna,       }
  Fidelity/Continental	               }	

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Plaintiff appeals a summary judgment by the Commissioner of Labor and
  Industry, which held that his claim against defendants was barred by the
  five-year statute of limitations encompassed in the Occupational Disease
  Act, 21 V.S.A. § 1006(a) (1987) (repealed by 1999, No. 41, § 8(a)(1) (the
  "ODA").  We affirm.

       From 1957 until 1988, plaintiff worked as a plumber.  He was employed
  first by Hackett's Plumbing and Heating, and then by Hackett's successor in
  interest, defendant Fred's Plumbing and Heating, Incorporated.  Until 1981,
  he worked in the field.  Over the course of his career, it is alleged that
  plaintiff was exposed to asbestos.  After being diagnosed with pulmonary
  asbestosis on June 4, 1999, plaintiff filed a Worker's Compensation claim
  on July 7, 1999.  Eighteen years lapsed between his last allegedly
  injurious exposure to asbestos in 1981 and his diagnosis with the disease
  in 1999.  

       After plaintiff filed his claim, five insurance companies moved for
  summary judgment, arguing that any claim was barred by the statute of
  limitations.  Additionally, each denied its own specific liability.  At the
  time of those motions, however, the employer was unrepresented and had not
  yet participated in the case.  After the Commissioner of Labor and Industry
  issued an order granting the insurers' motions, plaintiff filed a notice of
  appeal with the Orleans Superior Court.  Promptly thereafter, the
  Commissioner withdrew her decision and invited an appearance from the
  employer.  The Commissioner then received a motion for summary judgment
  from the employer, as well as renewed motions for summary judgment from the
  insurers, and granted all in an amended ruling.  

       In so ruling, the Commissioner relied primarily on the fact that the
  ODA and its five-year limitations period was in effect both at the time
  plaintiff was alleged to be injured by asbestos, and when he was finally
  diagnosed with pulmonary asbestosis, the date of disablement.  In either
  case, the Commissioner held that the limitations period ran from the "last
  injurious exposure."  Id. § 1006(a) (1987).
   
 

       Defendant-insurers maintain that the Commissioner's jurisdiction was
  lost at the time claimant appealed the first summary judgment ruling to the
  Orleans Superior Court.  They argue that the Commissioner lacked the
  jurisdiction to unilaterally withdraw her June 6, 2001 ruling.  Therefore,
  defendants argue that her amended ruling has no legal effect and cannot now
  be properly appealed.  Claimant argues that Commissioner's order was never
  final, because it preceded any appearance by the true party defendant the
  employer.  

       In her amended ruling, the Commissioner noted that "any determination
  as to the liability of the insurers is one for the superior court, not this
  department."  Indeed, while the liability of an insurer under the statute
  is primary when the insurer undertakes to defend an employer,  Morrisseau
  v.Legac, 123 Vt. 70, 78,