Title: Ex parte State of Alabama.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: 6/12/15
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2014-2015
____________________
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____________________
Ex parte State of Alabama
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: Phillip Allen Moore
v.
State of Alabama)
(Tuscaloosa Circuit Court, CC-12-2616;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-13-0113)
BRYAN, Justice.
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WRIT DENIED. NO OPINION.
Moore, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Main, and Wise,
JJ., concur.
Murdock and Shaw, JJ., dissent.
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MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).
I write separately for what I believe to be two important
reasons.  First, it is particularly important to note, as
Justice Shaw correctly explains in his dissent, that the main
opinion in Ex parte Pate, 145 So. 3d 733 (Ala. 2013), was a
plurality opinion in which only four Justices concurred and is
not binding precedent. ___ So. 3d at ___ n. 5 (Shaw, J.,
dissenting).  The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded its
analysis in this case by stating that, if not for the decision
in Pate, it would not have reversed the trial court's judgment
convicting Phillip Allen Moore of the offense of menacing. 
Moore v. State,  [Ms. CR-13-0113, Nov. 21, 2014] ___ So. 3d
___, ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2014).  That court states, however,
that it was "bound by the Pate decision." ___ So. 3d at ___. 
For the reasons explained by Justice Shaw in his separate
writing, that statement is incorrect. 
The other reason I write separately is to note that this
is the first "menacing case" to come before this Court since
Pate was decided and that the facts presented and the result
reached in this case corroborate the concern I expressed in
Pate as to "the continued viability of the crime of menacing"
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if Pate were to be followed.  145 So. 3d at 740 (Murdock, J.,
dissenting).  Indeed, in contrast to Justice Shaw (whose views
generally coincide with mine), I believe the present case
presents no less a manifestation, and perhaps an even stronger
manifestation, of this concern than do the facts and the
result in Pate. 
Menacing is a Class B misdemeanor and is defined simply
as follows:  "A person commits the crime of menacing if, by
physical action, he intentionally places or attempts to place
another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury." 
§ 13A–6–23(a), Ala. Code 1975.  To prove that the misdemeanor
of menacing has occurred the State must prove simply (1) some
"physical action," by which (2) the defendant "intentionally
place[d] or attempt[ed] to place" another in fear of "imminent
serious physical injury."  
The main opinion in Pate took the position that, as a
matter of law, the act of retrieving a firearm did not
constitute "physical action" for purposes of satisfying the
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first element of menacing.  Obviously, this is a position with
which I strenuously disagreed in Pate and still do.  
1
The facts in Pate (and in turn the factual parallels
between Pate and the present case), however, were not limited
to the bare act of arming one's self.  In Pate, after verbally
threatening the victim, the defendant did in fact engage in
the "physical action" of walking to his truck and retrieving
a shotgun from that vehicle.  In addition, however, the
defendant in Pate then engaged in the further "physical
action" of turning and beginning to advance toward the victim
with the weapon in hand.  Ex parte Pate, 145 So. 3d at 736
n.2.  Here, Moore likewise, after retrieving his weapon,
turned and advanced toward the victim with the weapon in hand. 
Furthermore, the facts of both cases include very explicit,
The judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals, as well as
1
Justice Shaw, also disagree with this position.  Both judges
of the Court of Criminal Appeals who dissented, Judge Windom
and Judge Burke, obviously disagree.  See, e.g., Moore, ___
So. 3d at ___ (Burke, J., dissenting).  And the other three
judges on the Court of Criminal Appeals concurred in a per
curiam opinion that states that, "[b]efore Pate," they too
"would have been inclined to recognize" what they refer to as
"the inherent logic" of the State's position on what
constitutes physical action, as well as the type of showing
that will satisfy the state-of-mind element of menacing.  See
Moore, ___ So. 3d at ___.
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verbal statements made by the defendants that provide context
for their physical actions and from which the jury in each
case reasonably could have drawn inferences as to the presence
of the state of mind required for an act of menacing.  See
Ex parte Pate, 145 So. 3d at 736; id. at 741 (Murdock, J.,
dissenting); Moore v. State, ___ So. 3d at ___; id. at ___
(Burke, J., dissenting).   
2
Bearing in mind the deference accorded the verdict of
jurors who have heard and assessed the testimony of witnesses
appearing before them, as well as the quantum of proof
required in a criminal case, the essential question is whether
there is substantial evidence from which 
the 
jurors reasonably
could have found that Moore intended or attempted to place the
victim in fear of imminent serious injury.  In the context of
preexisting conflict with the victim, a man retrieves a 3-
In the present case, the jury's assessment of both the
2
physical-action element and the state-of-mind element could
have been influenced by the general environment and state of
conflict created by Moore and his cohort, including the facts
that Moore, as well as his cohort and the cohort's girlfriend,
had been drinking; that Moore purposefully played music with
obscene lyrics loudly enough to be heard by the victim and his
wife and teenage daughter; that Moore and his cohort were
making lewd gestures directed at the victim; and that Moore's
cohort contemporaneously caused physical injury to the victim
by running into him with a car. 
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foot-long metal pipe and then turns and advances to a face-to-
face confrontation within 15 to 20 feet of the victim while
holding the 3-foot-long pipe in a threatening position ("kind
of like a batter" according to one witness).  Fifteen to 20
feet simply is not that much distance for an angry man
postured as described with a 3-foot-long metal pipe.  As the
State explained in a passage in its brief quoted with approval
by the majority opinion in the Court of Criminal Appeals:
"'Moore was in a position to inflict lethal damage
because he was capable of striking West and crushing
his skull in about 3 or 4 seconds.  Moore, in the
position in which he had the pipe, also could have
thrown this weapon at West.'"
Moore, ___ So. 3d at ___ (quoting the State's brief, p. 15).
Considering the evidence of Moore's physical actions,
Moore's demeanor, including the verbal abuse that preceded and
accompanied his physical actions, and other evidence of the
volatility of the situation heard by the jury, I cannot say --
or more appropriately, I do not believe the Court of Criminal
Appeals was correct in saying -- that, as a matter of law,
reasonable jurors were foreclosed from finding that Moore
engaged in an act of "menacing."  Because I believe that the
petition presents a probability of merit, I respectfully
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dissent from this Court's decision today not to grant that
petition.
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SHAW, Justice (dissenting).  
In the instant matter, the State of Alabama petitions
this Court for certiorari review of the decision of the Court
of Criminal Appeals in Moore v. State, [Ms. CR-13-0113, Nov.
21, 2014] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2014), reversing 
Phillip Allen Moore's conviction for menacing.  For the
reasons discussed below, I dissent from denying the State's
petition.
The crime of "menacing" is statutorily defined as
follows: "A person commits the crime of menacing if, by
physical action, he intentionally places or attempts to place
another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury." 
Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-6-23(a).  The main opinion in Ex parte
Pate, 145 So. 3d 733 (Ala. 2013), held that the act of arming
one's self with a firearm was not sufficient to constitute the
crime of menacing.  Specifically, the main opinion stated that
such action, as a matter of law, was not a "physical action"
for purposes of menacing.  145 So. 3d at 738.  
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In the instant case,  Moore, the defendant, armed himself
3
with a pipe.  This act, although threatening in nature, was
less likely than the act in Pate to place a victim in fear of
imminent serious physical injury: Moore was too far away from
the victim to hit him with the pipe, while the victim in Pate
was well within range of the defendant's much more dangerous
weapon.   That Moore approached the victim and taunted him
4
makes no difference; the defendant in Pate also approached the
victim after threatening the victim with actual physical harm
and then arming himself with a much more dangerous weapon than
did Moore. If Pate is to be followed, then there is no
probability of merit in the argument that the Court of
Criminal Appeals erred in reversing Moore's conviction.  See
Rule 39(f), Ala. R. App. P. ("If the Supreme Court, upon
preliminary consideration, 
concludes 
that 
there is 
a
probability of merit in the petition and that the writ should
issue, the Court shall so order ....").  Indeed, if Pate is to
The Court of Criminal Appeals described the facts in the
3
instant case in Moore, supra, and I see no need to repeat them
here.  
Moore could have been within range to throw the pipe at
4
the victim, but such possibility only shows that the facts of
this case are more similar to Pate, where the menacing
conviction was reversed. 
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be followed, it is difficult to imagine that § 13A-6-23(a) has
any meaningful field of operation.  However, I do not believe
that Pate is binding precedent. 
In Pate, four members of the Court concurred in the main
opinion, one concurred in the result, two dissented, and two
did not sit in the case.  Only four Justices--not a majority
of the Court--joined the main opinion, and it is not binding
precedent.  See Ala. Code 1975,  § 12-3-16 ("The decisions of
the Supreme Court shall govern the holdings and decisions of
the courts of appeals ...."), and KGS Steel, Inc. v. McInish,
47 So. 3d 780, 781 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (noting that only
"'decisions of the majority' of the Supreme Court" are
"decisions" for purposes of § 12-3-16) (quoting Willis v.
Buchman, 30 Ala. App. 33, 40, 199 So. 886, 892 (1940) (opinion
after remand)).  See also Jones v. City of Huntsville, 288
Ala. 242, 244, 259 So. 2d 288, 290 (1972).5
Rule 16(b), Ala. R. App. P., provides that, when, by
5
reason of disqualification, the number of Justices competent
to sit in the determination of a cause is reduced, a majority
shall suffice, but at least four Justices must concur.  The
concurrence of four Justices of a seven-member court "would
suffice" as a majority only when the Court is reduced to seven
members by reason of disqualification.  The opinion in Pate
does not state that the two Justices who did not vote in that
case had recused themselves from consideration of the case. 
Thus, it cannot be said that the number of Justices competent
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I dissented in Pate, and I remain convinced that Pate was
wrongly decided.  In my opinion, both the facts in Pate and
the facts in the instant case show acts--physical action--that
could place, or constitute an attempt to place, another person
in fear of imminent serious physical injury.  In the instant
case, I would decline to follow the nonbinding decision in
Pate, reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision, and
affirm Moore's menacing conviction.
to sit was reduced by "disqualification," and the number of
Justices required to constitute a majority was five, not four. 
See also Ala. Code 1975, § 12-2-14.
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