Title: Anderson v. Massillon

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Anderson v. Massillon, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5711.] 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-5711 
ANDERSON, ADMR., APPELLEE, v. CITY OF MASSILLON ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Anderson v. Massillon, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5711.] 
(No. 2011-0743—Submitted February 8, 2012—Decided December 6, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Stark County, 
No. 2010 CA 00196, 193 Ohio App.3d 297, 2011-Ohio-1328. 
_______________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. Willful, wanton, and reckless describe different and distinct degrees of care and 
are not interchangeable.  (Thompson v. McNeill (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 102, 
559 N.E.2d 705, modified.) 
2. Willful misconduct implies an intentional deviation from a clear duty or from a 
definite rule of conduct, a deliberate purpose not to discharge some duty 
necessary to safety, or purposefully doing wrongful acts with knowledge 
or appreciation of the likelihood of resulting injury.  (Tighe v. Diamond, 
149 Ohio St. 520, 80 N.E.2d 122 (1948), approved and followed.) 
3. Wanton misconduct is the failure to exercise any care toward those to whom a 
duty of care is owed in circumstances in which there is great probability 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
that harm will result.  (Hawkins v. Ivy, 50 Ohio St.2d 114, 363 N.E.2d 367 
(1977), approved and followed.) 
4. Reckless conduct is characterized by the conscious disregard of or indifference 
to a known or obvious risk of harm to another which is unreasonable 
under the circumstances and substantially greater than negligent conduct. 
(2 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, Section 500 (1965), adopted.) 
5. The violation of a statute, ordinance, or departmental policy enacted for the 
safety of the public is not per se willful, wanton, or reckless conduct but 
may be relevant to determining the culpability of a course of conduct. 
_______________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} The city of Massillon and firefighters Susan Toles and Richard 
Annen appeal from a judgment of the Fifth District Court of Appeals that reversed 
a trial court decision entering summary judgment in their favor. Cynthia Anderson 
filed a wrongful-death action against the city and the firefighters arising out of the 
deaths of Ronald E. Anderson, her husband, and Javarre J. Tate, her grandson, 
who died when a Massillon fire engine operated by Toles and commanded by 
Annen collided with her husband’s vehicle. 
{¶ 2} Relevant to this appeal are two statutes, one relating to a defense 
available to political subdivisions and the other relating to immunity for 
employees of political subdivisions. R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(b) affords political 
subdivisions a full defense to liability for injuries caused by the operation of a 
fire-department vehicle responding to an emergency if the operation of the vehicle 
does not constitute willful or wanton misconduct.  R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b) provides 
immunity to political-subdivision employees for acts or omissions not committed 
in a wanton or reckless manner. 
{¶ 3} The appellate court determined that the willful or wanton 
misconduct referred to in R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(b) is the functional equivalent of 
January Term, 2012 
3 
recklessness.  Admittedly, these degrees of care have been confused, but they 
have different meanings, involve different degrees of culpability, and are not 
interchangeable.  Accordingly, we clarify their meaning, and we affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals but remand the case to the common pleas court 
for further proceedings to determine, pursuant to our clarification of these terms, 
whether the city has a full defense to liability and whether the firefighters are 
entitled to immunity. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 4} On the morning of May 6, 2008, Tammy Lockey called 9-1-1 to 
report a car fire at 1272 Huron Road in Massillon, Ohio.  The fire dispatcher, 
Thomas Thornberry, called for Engine 214, a pumper truck, to respond.  
However, after the caller indicated that the car fire was near a house, Thornberry 
dispatched Engine 211, an aerial ladder truck. 
{¶ 5} Engine 214 left the station before Engine 211, headed south on Erie 
Street, and turned east on Walnut Road. Engine 211, driven by Toles and 
commanded by Annen, followed the same route. 
{¶ 6} Walnut Road is a narrow, two-lane street in a residential area with a 
speed limit of 25 m.p.h.  Stop signs and a flashing red light control the 
intersection traffic at Walnut Road and Johnson Street.  A tree, a utility pole, a 
fence, bushes, cars, and a house close to the street partially obstructed the view of 
traffic approaching the intersection on Walnut Road. 
{¶ 7} Firefighter Batavius Greenwood, the driver of Engine 214, slowed 
down at Johnson Street to ensure the intersection was clear of traffic before 
proceeding through it.  At that time, according to the driver of a car behind his 
van, Ronald Anderson, who was taking his grandson to preschool, approached the 
intersection from the south, stopped at the stop sign, and waited for Engine 214 to 
pass. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
{¶ 8} Seconds later, Engine 211 approached the intersection traveling at a 
speed in excess of the posted limit.  Toles slowed the engine as she approached a 
school bus which had stopped beyond the intersection to assure that no children 
were in the street and that the intersection was clear of traffic.  The firefighters did 
not see Ronald Anderson’s minivan stopped on Johnson Street at Walnut Road. 
{¶ 9} As Engine 211 approached, Anderson entered the intersection, and 
the fire truck broadsided the minivan, crushing the driver, ejecting Tate, and 
pushing the van for more than 360 feet before it came to rest.  Tragically, both 
Anderson and Tate died. 
{¶ 10} Fredrick J. Cook, a state trooper, assisted in the investigation of the 
accident, and in his reconstruction report, he calculated that Engine 211 had been 
traveling between 44 and 50 m.p.h.  He also opined that given the decreased range 
of visibility caused by obstructions near the intersection, a driver stopped at the 
stop sign on Johnson Street might not have been able to see the fire truck 
approaching. 
{¶ 11} Cynthia Anderson filed a wrongful-death action alleging that the 
city of Massillon, Toles, and Annen had willfully, wantonly, and recklessly 
caused the deaths of her husband and her grandson. 
{¶ 12} Her expert, Choya R. Hawn, calculated the fire truck’s minimum 
speed at the point of impact to be between 49 and 52 m.p.h., and he opined that 
because of roadside obstructions, Engine 211 was not visible to Ronald Anderson 
at the time he entered the intersection.  Hawn also stated that he believed 
emergency vehicles approaching a stop sign should proceed at 10 m.p.h. or slower 
to ensure the ability to stop, and he further noted the danger of emergency 
vehicles running in tandem, because the siren of the first vehicle could have 
masked the siren of the second, preventing Ronald Anderson from noticing the 
approaching fire truck. 
January Term, 2012 
5 
{¶ 13} Scott A. Noll, an accident reconstructionist who testified for the 
city and the firefighters, concluded that Engine 211 had traveled at 39 m.p.h. and 
that Toles had allowed adequate time and distance to evaluate the lanes of travel 
before proceeding through the intersection.  Noll further opined that Anderson 
had caused the accident by failing to stop at the stop sign. 
{¶ 14} The city, Toles, and Annen moved for summary judgment, and the 
trial court ruled in their favor, concluding that the city had a full defense to 
liability pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(b), because Engine 211 was responding 
to an emergency call and the operation of the fire truck did not constitute willful 
or wanton misconduct. The court further concluded that the firefighters were 
entitled to immunity pursuant to R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b), because Anderson failed 
to present any evidence that the firefighters had acted with malicious purpose, in 
bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner. 
{¶ 15} The Fifth District reversed, stating that based on “the high rate of 
speed at which [the fire truck] was traveling in conjunction with the claimed 
obstructions in the intersection that would interfere with a clear view of the whole 
intersection, we find that reasonable minds could find that [Toles and Annen’s] 
actions in this case were reckless”  and that the firefighters therefore were not 
entitled to immunity pursuant to R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b).  Anderson v. Massillon, 
193 Ohio App.3d 297, 2011-Ohio-1328, 951 N.E.2d 1063, ¶ 73 (5th Dist.).  The 
court also stated that “[t]he ‘wanton or reckless misconduct’ standard set forth in 
R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) and [the] ‘willful or wanton misconduct’ standard set forth in 
R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)[b] are functionally equivalent.”  Id. at ¶ 46.  The appellate 
court ruled that the city and its firefighters were not immune if the firefighters had 
acted recklessly in causing the collision.  Id. at ¶ 73.  It held that genuine issues of 
material fact existed whether the firefighters’ operation of the vehicle was 
reckless, and thus summary judgment was not appropriate.  Id. at ¶ 74-75. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
{¶ 16} The city of Massillon, Toles, and Annen appealed to this court and 
contend that the terms “willful,” “wanton,” and “reckless” are not interchangeable 
but describe different degrees of care. They contend that R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(b) 
affords a full defense to political-subdivision liability for the operation of a fire 
truck responding to an emergency if the operation of the vehicle does not 
constitute willful or wanton misconduct, and they point out that “the General 
Assembly did not include reckless conduct as part of [the] exception from the 
‘full defense to * * * liability’ found therein.”  Further, they argue that Toles and 
Annen are immune from personal liability pursuant to R.C. 2744.03(A)(6), unless 
they operated the fire truck in a wanton or reckless manner, emphasizing that 
recklessness is the perverse disregard of a known risk.  In their view, the city has 
a full defense to liability because the firefighters did not commit willful or wanton 
misconduct and the firefighters have immunity because they did not act in a 
wanton or reckless manner. 
{¶ 17} Anderson maintains that the appellate court properly determined 
that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Toles and Annen 
operated Engine 211 recklessly, because the evidence shows that the fire truck 
entered a “blind intersection” controlled by stop signs at more than 52 m.p.h. 
without stopping or slowing down and violating city ordinances and fire-
department policies.  Further, Anderson emphasizes that her husband had stopped 
at the intersection and yielded to Engine 214, but the high rate of speed of Engine 
211 combined with the visual obstructions along the road prevented him from 
appreciating that a second fire truck was responding to the fire.  Relying on 
Thompson v. McNeill, 53 Ohio St.3d 102, 559 N.E.2d 705 (1990), and the 
Restatement of the Law, 2d, Torts,  Anderson argues that willful or wanton 
misconduct is the equivalent of wanton or reckless conduct, so each standard 
refers only to recklessness.  She also asserts that this court has mistakenly defined 
recklessness in civil cases as the perverse disregard of a known risk, which is the 
January Term, 2012 
7 
definition for recklessness found in criminal law.  Anderson urges that if a greater 
showing than recklessness is required to deprive a political subdivision of 
immunity, then contrary to principles of respondeat superior, its firefighters could 
be liable in a tort action when the political subdivision is not. 
{¶ 18} Accordingly, the question presented on this appeal is whether the 
standard in R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(b), which affords a full defense to liability to a 
political subdivision unless the operation of a fire-department vehicle constitutes 
willful or wanton misconduct, is equivalent to the standard in R.C. 
2744.03(A)(6)(b), which grants immunity to employees of political subdivisions 
unless their acts or omissions were committed in a wanton or reckless manner. 
Law and Analysis 
Defenses to Liability of Political Subdivisions and 
Immunity of Political Subdivision Employees 
{¶ 19} Two separate statutes, one dealing with full defenses to liability for 
a political subdivision and the other dealing with the question of immunity from 
suit for employees of a political subdivision, use the term “wanton” as a standard 
of conduct to describe when a full defense to liability arises and when an 
employee is immune from suit.  We recognize that a defense to liability is 
different from immunity from suit. 
{¶ 20} R.C. 2744.02(B)(1) addresses the liability of a political subdivision 
and full defenses for the operation of a motor vehicle by employees, including 
firefighters:  
 
Except as otherwise provided in this division, political 
subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to person or 
property caused by the negligent operation of any motor vehicle by 
their employees when the employees are engaged within the scope 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
of their employment and authority. The following are full defenses 
to that liability:  
* * *  
(b) A member of a municipal corporation fire department 
or any other firefighting agency was operating a motor vehicle 
while engaged in duty at a fire, proceeding toward a place where a 
fire is in progress or is believed to be in progress, or answering any 
other emergency alarm and the operation of the vehicle did not 
constitute willful or wanton misconduct. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 21} R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) sets forth the immunity of political subdivision 
employees and the exceptions thereto: 
 
In addition to any immunity or defense referred to in 
division (A)(7) of this section and in circumstances not covered by 
that division or sections 3314.07 and 3746.24 of the Revised Code, 
the employee is immune from liability unless one of the following 
applies: 
* * * 
(b) The employee’s acts or omissions were with malicious 
purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner. 
 
{¶ 22} Also relevant to this case is R.C. 2744.07(A)(1), which specifies: 
 
[A] political subdivision shall provide for the defense of an 
employee, in any state or federal court, in any civil action or 
proceeding which contains an allegation for damages for injury, 
January Term, 2012 
9 
death, or loss to person or property caused by an act or omission of 
the employee in connection with a governmental or proprietary 
function. The political subdivision has the duty to defend the 
employee if the act or omission occurred while the employee was 
acting both in good faith and not manifestly outside the scope of 
employment or official responsibilities. 
 
And R.C. 2744.07(A)(2) states: 
 
[A] political subdivision shall indemnify and hold harmless an 
employee in the amount of any judgment, other than a judgment 
for punitive or exemplary damages, that is obtained against the 
employee in a state or federal court or as a result of a law of a 
foreign jurisdiction and that is for damages for injury, death, or 
loss to person or property caused by an act or omission in 
connection with a governmental or proprietary function, if at the 
time of the act or omission the employee was acting in good faith 
and within the scope of employment or official responsibilities. 
 
{¶ 23} In the foregoing statutes, the General Assembly set forth different 
degrees of care that impose liability on a political subdivision or on an employee 
of a political subdivision.  The legislature expressly stated that a political 
subdivision has a full defense to liability when the conduct involved is not willful 
or wanton, and therefore, if the conduct is only reckless, the political subdivision 
has a full defense to liability.  In addition, the legislature expressly removed 
immunity from employees of a political subdivision for wanton or reckless 
conduct in R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b).  By implication, an employee is immune from 
liability for negligent acts or omissions. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
Willful, Wanton, and Reckless Conduct 
{¶ 24} In Res. Trucking Co. v. Fairchild, 128 Ohio St. 519, 531-532, 191 
N.E. 745 (1934), we distinguished between willful and wanton conduct: 
 
While the legal effect of willful misconduct and of wanton 
misconduct may, in many respects, be equivalent, it can only 
conduce to confusion and unsound reasoning to speak of them as 
though they were interchangeable terms. “Willful misconduct,” as 
has been said, implies the element of intent or purpose to injure. 
“Wanton negligence,” on the other hand, implies the failure to 
exercise any care toward those to whom a duty of care is owing 
when the probability that harm will result from such failure is great 
and such probability is actually known to the defendant. 
 
{¶ 25} We further defined “wanton” in Universal Concrete Pipe Co. v. 
Bassett, 130 Ohio St. 567, 200 N.E. 843 (1936), and held at paragraph two of the 
syllabus:  
 
Wanton misconduct is such conduct as manifests a 
disposition to perversity, and it must be under such surrounding 
circumstances and existing conditions that the party doing the act 
or failing to act must be conscious, from his knowledge of such 
surrounding circumstances and existing conditions, that his 
conduct will in all common probability result in injury. 
 
{¶ 26} In Tighe v. Diamond, 149 Ohio St. 520, 80 N.E.2d 122 (1948), we 
distinguished willful misconduct, which “implies an intention or purpose to do 
wrong, an intentional deviation from clear duty or from a definite rule of conduct, 
January Term, 2012 
11 
and not a mere error of judgment,” id. at paragraph three of the syllabus, from 
wanton misconduct, defined as “an entire absence of all care for the safety of 
others and an indifference to consequences,” id. at 526, and “a failure to exercise 
any care toward those to whom a duty of care is owing when the probability that 
harm will result from such failure is great, and such probability is known to the 
actor,”  id. at 526. 
{¶ 27} In Roszman v. Sammett, 26 Ohio St.2d 94, 97, 269 N.E.2d 420 
(1971), we explained that in order to establish wanton misconduct had occurred, 
the evidence must show “a disposition to perversity, such as acts of stubbornness, 
obstinacy or persistency in opposing that which is right, reasonable, correct or 
generally accepted as a course to follow in protecting the safety of others.” 
{¶ 28} In Hawkins v. Ivy, 50 Ohio St.2d 114, 363 N.E.2d 367 (1977), the 
court abandoned “disposition to perversity” as an element of the definition of 
wanton misconduct. 
{¶ 29} In 1990, in companion cases considering the standard of care owed 
by participants in sporting activities, we adopted the definition of recklessness 
articulated by 2 Second Restatement of the Law, 2d, Torts, Section 500 (1965).  
In Marchetti v. Kalish, 53 Ohio St.3d 95, 559 N.E.2d 699 (1990), and Thompson 
v. McNeill, 53 Ohio St.3d 102, 559 N.E.2d 705 (1990), we concluded that 
individuals engaging in recreational or sports activities assume the ordinary risks 
of the activity and cannot recover for injury unless the other participant’s actions 
were either “intentional” or “reckless,” as defined by the Restatement.1   
{¶ 30} Given the cross-application of these terms in our caselaw, it is not 
surprising that Ohio appellate courts have reached the conclusion that the willful, 
                                                          
 
1 In a footnote in Thompson, however, we indicated, “The term ‘reckless’ is often used 
interchangeably with ‘willful’ and ‘wanton.’ Our comments regarding recklessness apply to 
conduct characterized as willful and wanton as well.”  53 Ohio St.3d at 104, 559 N.E.2d 705,  
fn.1.  This footnote is the apparent source of confusion in cases decided since that time.  See, e.g., 
Fabrey v. McDonald Village Police Dept., 70 Ohio St.3d 351, 639 N.E.2d 31 (1994), which 
seemingly equated wantonness and recklessness. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
wanton, and reckless standards are “functionally equivalent.”  See, e.g.,  
Marchant v. Gouge, 187 Ohio App.3d 551, 2010-Ohio-2273, 932 N.E.2d 960, ¶ 
32 (5th Dist.); Whitfield v. Dayton, 167 Ohio App.3d 172, 2006-Ohio-2917, 854 
N.E.2d 532, ¶ 34 (2d Dist.); Brockman v. Bell, 78 Ohio App.3d 508, 516, 605 
N.E.2d 445 (1st Dist.1992); Jackson v. Butler Cty. Bd. of Cty. Commrs., 76 Ohio 
App.3d 448, 454, 602 N.E.2d 363 (12th Dist.1991).  And in Minnick v. 
Springfield Local Sch. Bd. of Edn., 81 Ohio App.3d 545, 550, 611 N.E.2d 926 
(1992),  the Sixth District Court of Appeals noted that our treatment of the willful, 
wanton, and reckless standards made “a departure from the traditional definition 
of these terms in personal injury cases.” 
{¶ 31} However, as the historical development of these terms in our 
jurisprudence demonstrates, willful, wanton, and reckless describe different and 
distinct degrees of care and are not interchangeable.  We therefore disavow the 
dicta contained in Thompson, 53 Ohio St.3d at 104, 559 N.E.2d 705, fn. 1, that 
willfulness, wantonness, and recklessness are equivalent standards. 
{¶ 32} Willful misconduct implies an intentional deviation from a clear 
duty or from a definite rule of conduct, a deliberate purpose not to discharge some 
duty necessary to safety, or purposefully doing wrongful acts with knowledge or 
appreciation of the likelihood of resulting injury.  Tighe v. Diamond, 149 Ohio St. 
at 527, 80 N.E.2d 122; see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1630 (8th Ed.2004) 
(describing willful conduct as the voluntary or intentional violation or disregard 
of a known legal duty). 
{¶ 33} Wanton misconduct is the failure to exercise any care toward those 
to whom a duty of care is owed in circumstances in which there is great 
probability that harm will result.  Hawkins, 50 Ohio St.2d at 117-118, 363 N.E.2d 
367; see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1613-1614 (8th Ed.2004) (explaining that 
one acting in a wanton manner is aware of the risk of the conduct, but is not trying 
to avoid it and is indifferent to whether harm results). 
January Term, 2012 
13 
{¶ 34} Reckless conduct is characterized by the conscious disregard of or 
indifference to a known or obvious risk of harm to another which is unreasonable 
under the circumstances and substantially greater than negligent conduct.  
Thompson, 53 Ohio St.3d at 104-105, 559 N.E.2d 705, adopting 2 Restatement of 
the Law 2d, Torts, at 587 (1965); see also Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed.2004) 
1298-1299 (explaining that reckless conduct is characterized by a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk of harm to others and a conscious disregard of or indifference to 
the risk, but the actor does not desire harm). 
{¶ 35} The dissent claims that if the terms willful, wanton, and reckless 
are not construed as interchangeable, then employees of political subdivisions will 
be immune for their acts of willful misconduct, because R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b) 
provides express exceptions to immunity only for acts committed in a “wanton or 
reckless” manner.  But see Dobbs, The Law of Torts, Section 26 and 27 (2000) 
(indicating that intentional conduct would suffice to prove recklessness and that 
reckless conduct would suffice to prove negligence). 
{¶ 36} When the General Assembly used the terms willful or wanton in 
R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(b) to deny a full defense to liability for a political subdivision 
and the terms wanton or reckless in R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b) to remove the 
immunity of an employee of the political subdivision, it intended different degrees 
of care. 
{¶ 37} Further, it is well established that the violation of a statute, 
ordinance, or departmental policy enacted for the safety of the public is not per se 
willful, wanton, or reckless conduct but may be relevant to determining the 
culpability of a course of conduct.  See Higbee Co. v. Jackson, 101 Ohio St. 75, 
90, 128 N.E. 61 (1920);  Payne v. Vance, 103 Ohio St. 59, 77, 133 N.E. 85 
(1921); Boyd v. Natl. RR. Passenger Corp., 446 Mass. 540, 549, 845 N.E.2d 356 
(2006); Wise v. Broadway, 315 S.C. 273, 276, 433 S.E.2d 857 (1993); Whitley v. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
Progressive Preferred Ins. Co., 1st Dist. No. C-090240, 2010-Ohio-356, ¶ 16; 2 
Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, Section 500, Comment e (1965). 
{¶ 38} However, as the Restatement explains,  
 
In order that the breach of [a] statute constitute reckless disregard 
for the safety of those for whose protection it is enacted, the statute 
must not only be intentionally violated, but the precautions 
required must be such that their omission will be recognized as 
involving a high degree of probability that serious harm will result. 
 
2 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965) 587, Section 500, cmt. e.  Thus, as we 
concluded in O'Toole v. Denihan, 118 Ohio St.3d 374, 2008-Ohio-2574, 889 
N.E.2d 505, “[w]ithout evidence of an accompanying knowledge that the 
violations ‘will in all probability result in injury,’ Fabrey [v. McDonald Village 
Police Dept.], 70 Ohio St.3d [351] at 356, 639 N.E.2d 31 [1994] evidence that 
policies have been violated demonstrates negligence at best.” Id. at ¶ 92. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 39} R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(b) provides a political subdivision with a full 
defense to liability for injuries caused by the operation of a fire-department 
vehicle while engaged in duty at a fire, proceeding toward a place where a fire is 
in progress or is believed to be in progress, or answering any other emergency 
alarm if its operation does not constitute willful or wanton misconduct.  R.C. 
2744.03(A)(6)(b) provides immunity to employees of a political subdivision for 
acts that are not committed in a wanton or reckless manner. 
{¶ 40} The terms willful, wanton, and reckless as used in these statutes are 
not interchangeable.  Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is 
affirmed as modified by our clarification of these terms, and the matter is 
January Term, 2012 
15 
remanded to the common pleas court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, 
JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER and LANZINGER, JJ., concur in judgment in part and dissent in 
part. 
______________________ 
LANZINGER, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 41} I dissent from the majority’s holding that the words “willful,” 
“wanton,” and “reckless” describe different and distinct degrees of care and are 
not interchangeable for purposes of R.C. Chapter 2744.  I also do not agree with 
the majority that its opinion offers “clarification” of the meaning of these three 
words, because the definitions overlap rather than distinguish different conduct. 
{¶ 42} Although sometimes described as being on a continuum, i.e., 
willful conduct is more culpable than wanton, and wanton conduct is more 
culpable than reckless, the words are functionally equivalent in the immunity 
statute because each describes conduct that exceeds negligence.  The city of 
Massillon has a defense to liability in this case if the firefighters were responding 
to an emergency call and did so without “willful or wanton misconduct.” 
(Emphasis added.)  R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(b).  The firefighters themselves are 
provided immunity unless they acted “with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a 
wanton or reckless manner.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b). 
{¶ 43} If the majority is correct that the words are not interchangeable, 
then a political subdivision would not be liable for reckless conduct because 
“willful or wanton misconduct” is separate and distinct from reckless conduct.  
R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(b).  And employees would have immunity for their willful 
acts, because the word “willful” is not included as an exception to immunity along 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
with “wanton” or “reckless.” R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b).  Stated differently, the city 
would be liable if the firefighters were willful and wanton, but not if they were 
reckless; the firefighters would be liable if they were wanton or reckless, but not 
if they were willful.  Or in other words, willful acts would implicate the political 
subdivision, not the employees, and reckless acts would implicate the employees, 
not the political subdivision. 
{¶ 44} This interpretation runs counter to precedent, since both political 
subdivisions and their employees are generally protected against litigation based 
on negligence, rather than on willful, wanton, or reckless conduct.  See, e.g., 
O’Toole v. Denihan, 118 Ohio St.3d 374, 2008-Ohio-2574, 889 N.E.2d 505, ¶ 92. 
{¶ 45} We have stated that negligence is conduct that falls below the 
reasonable standard of ordinary care and relates to protecting against foreseeable 
risks to others.  See Menifee v. Ohio Welding Prods., Inc., 15 Ohio St.3d 75, 77, 
472 N.E.2d 707 (1984).  “Negligence” is defined as “[t]he failure to exercise the 
standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a 
similar situation.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1133 (9th Ed.2009)  But the terms 
“willful,” “wanton,” and “reckless” within R.C. Chapter 2744 refer to something 
more than negligence and are used in contradistinction to it.  As the First District 
Court of Appeals has stated, 
 
As the probability increases that certain consequences will flow 
from certain conduct, the actor’s conduct acquires the character of 
intent and moves from negligence toward intentional wrongdoing. 
See Pariseau v. Wedge Products, Inc. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 124, 
126, 522 N.E.2d 511, 516 (citing 1 Restatement of the Law 2d, 
Torts [1965] 15, Section 8A, Comment b). Therefore, the terms 
“wanton,” “willful” and “reckless,” as used to describe tortious 
conduct, might best be defined at points on a continuum between 
January Term, 2012 
17 
negligence, which conveys the idea of inadvertence, and 
intentional misconduct. 
 
Brockman v. Bell, 78 Ohio App.3d 508, 514-515, 605 N.E.2d 445 (1st Dist.1992). 
{¶ 46} Thus, reckless conduct and wanton and willful misconduct could 
be considered as a progression of blameworthiness, but all involve conduct that is 
more than negligent.  Whitfield v. Dayton, 167 Ohio App.3d 172, 2006-Ohio-
2917, 854 N.E.2d 532, ¶ 34 (2d Dist.). 
{¶ 47} The goal of the immunity statute is to protect political subdivisions 
and their employees from liability for negligent conduct, but not for conduct 
exceeding negligence.  Although there may be subtle differences among 
“reckless,” “wanton,” and “willful,” in the context of the immunity statute the 
three words all function to describe conduct greater than negligence. 
{¶ 48} There are material issues of facts for the jury in this case as to 
whether the firefighters’ conduct was greater than negligent—whether they 
intended to harm anyone (willful conduct), whether they failed to exercise any 
care whatsoever (wanton misconduct), or whether they knew or should have 
known there was a greater probability of substantial harm to anyone due to their 
actions (recklessness).  I therefore concur in the remand to the trial court, but I 
would also affirm the court of appeals’ order reversing summary judgment in this 
case. 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
________________________ 
 
Tzangas, Plakas, Mannos & Raies, Ltd., David L. Dingwell, James G. 
Mannos, and Edmond J. Mack; and Davis & Young and David G. Utley, for 
appellee. 
 
Baker, Dublikar, Beck, Wiley & Mathews, Gregory A. Beck, Mel L. Lute 
Jr., and James F. Mathews, for appellant. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
Murray & Murray Co., L.P.A., John T. Murray, and Patrick G. O’Connor, 
urging affirmance on behalf of amici curiae John Huffman and Olivia Duty. 
 
Landskroner, Grieco, Merriman L.L.C., and Drew Legando, urging 
affirmance on behalf of amicus curia Ohio Association for Justice. 
________________________