Title: State v. Ronald Jackson

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-1618 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Ronald Jackson,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS. 
Reported at:  212 Wis. 2d 203, 567 N.W.2d 920 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997) 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
March 20, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
January 6, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha 
 
JUDGE: 
S. Michael Wilk 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there 
were briefs by Marguerite M. Moeller, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and 
oral argument by Glenn L. Cushing, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
No. 96-1618-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-1618-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Ronald Jackson,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant.  
FILED 
 
MAR 20, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
¶1 
ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   The 
State 
of 
Wisconsin 
("State") seeks review of a published decision of the court of 
appeals1 that reversed the defendant's convictions as a repeat 
offender of first-degree sexual assault, kidnapping while armed, 
robbery, threat to injure, and armed burglary.  The State 
asserts that the circuit court properly excluded evidence of 
prior consensual sexual relations between the defendant and the 
complainant, and correctly permitted the State to admit hostile 
letters written by the defendant for purposes of impeaching a 
witness.  Because we determine that the circuit court's refusal 
to admit evidence of the prior sexual relationship was proper 
under Wisconsin's rape shield statute, Wis. Stat. § 922.11 
                     
1 State v. Jackson, 212 Wis. 2d 203, 567 N.W.2d 920 (Ct. 
App. 1997)(overruling decision of Circuit Court for Kenosha 
County, S. Michael Wilk, Judge).  
No. 96-1618-CR 
 
2 
(1993-94),2 and that any error in allowing the State to reference 
the letters written by the defendant was harmless, we reverse 
the decision of the court of appeals. 
¶2 
In mid 1994, the complainant moved into a townhouse 
already occupied by the defendant and his girlfriend.  The 
defendant contends that at that time, he and the complainant had 
a brief sexual relationship consisting of sexual intercourse on 
three occasions. 
¶3 
Subsequently, the defendant's girlfriend fell behind 
on payment of her share of the rent and utility bills, forcing 
the complainant to cover the difference.  The complainant 
apparently then began asking the defendant to cover the 
difference.  He refused and a strained relationship developed 
between the parties. 
¶4 
On December 1, 1994, the police were called to the 
townhouse by the complainant.  She alleged that an assailant had 
entered her room carrying a knife and ordered her to remove her 
clothing.  She tried to escape and he chased her over all three 
floors of the home.  The complainant and the assailant struggled 
over the knife, leaving the complainant injured.  After the 
assailant robbed her, save for a $20 bill left at the 
complainant's request, the assailant fled.  While interviewing 
the complainant, the police searched the townhouse.  Only when 
                     
2 Unless 
otherwise 
indicated, 
all 
future 
statutory 
references are to the 1993-94 volumes.  
No. 96-1618-CR 
 
3 
they advised her that no one else was present did she then 
identify the defendant as her assailant. 
¶5 
The State charged the defendant with one count each of 
sexual assault, robbery, kidnapping while armed, threat to 
injure, and armed burglary, all as a repeater.3  Three days 
before trial the defendant filed a motion to admit evidence of a 
prior consensual sexual relationship with the complainant, 
evidence alleged to be relevant to "the issue of consent to 
sexual contact, the voluntariness relative to kidnapping and 
related matters." 
¶6 
The morning of the first day of trial the defendant 
apparently changed his defense and admitted that an altercation 
with the complainant had taken place, but denied that any sexual 
contact occurred during the incident.  Nevertheless, defense 
counsel continued to argue for admission of the sexual history 
evidence, since "[i]t is not directly a question of consent, but 
it is a question of what consent on prior occasion implies about 
the whole relationship . . . ."  The circuit court denied the 
motion.  The court ruled that since the defendant was denying 
sexual contact during the incident in question, consent was not 
an issue and the proffered evidence failed to meet the 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 971.31(11)4 that evidence be 
probative and material. 
                     
3 In 
violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stats. 
§§ 940.225(1)(b), 
943.32(1)(a), 940.31(1)(b), 939.63, 943.30(1), 943.10(1)(f), 
943.10(2)(a), respectively. 
4 Wis. Stat. 971.31(11) provides: 
No. 96-1618-CR 
 
4 
¶7 
The 
defendant's 
argument 
at 
trial 
centered 
on 
portraying the complainant as a vindictive and malicious liar 
who had filed trumped-up charges against the defendant.  Prior 
to the State's cross-examination of the defendant, the defense 
had not offered proof of any secondary motivation for the 
complainant's 
charges 
other 
than 
the 
parties' 
financial 
disagreements and the complainant's dislike of the defendant.  
While exploring the defense's theory that the complainant had 
lied, the State reiterated the defendant's prior testimony 
concerning motive and asked the defendant, "And you're offering 
here, for the motive for why she wants to do that, the fact that 
she had some disagreement over finances with you in the home?"  
The defendant replied, "No, it was more to it than it.  It was 
more issues that could have been brought out into court that I 
was told I couldn’t talk about." 
¶8 
The defendant then argued to the circuit court, out of 
the presence of the jury, that this colloquy opened the door to 
evidence of the complainant's prior sexual history with the 
defendant 
and 
that 
the 
court 
should 
remove 
its 
earlier 
prohibition on such testimony.  The circuit court disagreed and 
again prohibited the defendant from mentioning the prior sexual 
relationship. 
                                                                  
In actions under s. 940.225, 948.02, 948.025 or 
948.095, 
evidence 
which 
is 
admissible 
under 
s. 
972.11(2) must be determined by the court upon 
pretrial motion to be material to a fact at issue in 
the case and of sufficient probative value to outweigh 
its inflammatory and prejudicial nature before it may 
be introduced at trial.  
No. 96-1618-CR 
 
5 
¶9 
During the course of trial the State attempted to 
utilize portions of two letters written by the defendant to his 
girlfriend.  The letters appeared to be threatening and 
contained obscene language.  The circuit court admitted the 
letters during the girlfriend's testimony to establish the 
defendant's common use of particular slang terminology. 
¶10 The circuit court also allowed the State to use 
excerpts from one of the letters during the State's cross-
examination 
of 
the 
girlfriend's 
sister 
(hereinafter 
"the 
sister").  The sister referenced that letter on her own 
initiative, 
but 
immediately 
dismissed 
its 
contents 
as 
nonthreatening.  The circuit court allowed the State to attempt 
to impeach this statement and the underlying credibility of the 
sister's testimony by reading five excerpts.  Finally, the State 
also referenced the excerpts from the letter on three occasions 
during closing arguments--without objection from the defense. 
¶11 The jury convicted the defendant on each of the five 
counts. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
then 
sentenced 
him 
to 
an 
indeterminate term of at least 65 years in prison with 
concurrent probation for 25 years.  The defendant appealed the 
conviction. 
¶12 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
reversed 
the 
defendant's 
conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.  While the 
appellate court agreed with the circuit court's initial denial 
of the defendant's motion to admit evidence of a prior sexual 
relationship under the rape shield law, it concluded in a split 
decision that the State had opened the door to the evidence in 
No. 96-1618-CR 
 
6 
its cross-examination of the defendant about the complainant's 
motives.  Because the circuit court excluded the evidence after 
the door was opened, the court of appeals held that the 
defendant's constitutional right to present a defense had been 
violated.  Finally, the court of appeals also determined that 
the State's use of the defendant's threatening letters during 
cross-examination of the girlfriend and her sister, as well as 
the State's references to the letters during closing arguments, 
constituted prejudicial error. 
¶13 We are thus confronted with two questions: (1) whether 
the circuit court properly excluded the defendant's proffer of 
evidence of the complainant's sexual history with him, despite 
the defendant's constitutional rights to confrontation and to 
present a defense, and (2) whether the circuit court's decision 
not to bar the State's use of the defendant's threatening 
letters constitutes prejudicial error.  The admission of 
evidence is a decision left to the discretion of the circuit 
court.  See In Interest of Michael R.B., 175 Wis. 2d 713, 723, 
499 N.W.2d 641 (1993).  We will not find an erroneous exercise 
of discretion where the circuit court applies the facts of 
record to accepted legal standards.  See State v. Kuntz, 160 
Wis. 2d 722, 745, 467 N.W.2d 531 (1991). 
¶14 A determination of whether the circuit court's actions 
violate the defendant's constitutional rights to confrontation 
and to present a defense is a question of constitutional fact.  
See State v. Heft, 185 Wis. 2d 288, 296, 517 N.W.2d 494 (1994). 
 For purposes of reviewing a question of constitutional fact, we 
No. 96-1618-CR 
 
7 
adopt the circuit court's findings of fact, unless clearly 
erroneous, 
but 
independently 
apply 
those 
facts 
to 
the 
constitutional standard.  See State v. McMorris, 213 Wis. 2d 
156, 165, 570 N.W.2d 384 (1997). 
I.  Admission of Evidence of Prior Consensual Sex 
¶15 The 
defendant 
argues 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously exercised its discretion by refusing to admit 
evidence of his prior sexual relationship with the complainant 
as evidence of her motivation to fabricate the charges.  The 
defendant further asserts that this refusal constitutes a 
constitutional deprivation of his right to confront adverse 
witnesses and to present a defense. 
¶16 The 
constitutional 
rights 
to 
confrontation 
and 
compulsory process are based in Article I, Section 7 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution5 and in the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.6  These clauses guarantee to criminal 
                     
5 Article I, Sec. 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution states in 
pertinent part: 
Rights of accused.  Section 7.  In all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be 
heard by himself and counsel; to demand the nature and 
cause of the accusation against him; to meet the 
witnesses face to face; to have compulsory process to 
compel 
the 
attendance 
of 
witnesses 
in 
his 
behalf . . . . 
 
6 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
requires: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
No. 96-1618-CR 
 
8 
defendants the right to cross-examine witnesses and to present 
evidence in their own defense.  See State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 
2d 633, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990).  While these rights are 
fundamental and essential to a fair trial, they are not 
absolute.  See id. at 645-46.  Confrontation and compulsory 
process only grant defendants the constitutional right to 
prevent relevant evidence that is "not substantially outweighed 
by its prejudicial effects."  Id. at 646. 
¶17 The defendant's proffer of past sexual contact with 
the complainant in this case directly implicates Wis. Stat. 
§ 972.11,7 Wisconsin's rape shield statute.  Under the rape 
                                                                  
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence.  
 
7 Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2) provides: 
(2)(a) In this subsection, "sexual conduct" means 
any conduct or behavior relating to sexual activities 
of the complaining witness, including but not limited 
to prior experience of sexual intercourse or sexual 
contact, use of contraceptives, living arrangements 
and life-style. 
 
(b) If the defendant is accused of a crime under 
s. 
940.225, 
948.02, 
948.025, 
948.05, 
948.06 
or 
948.095, 
any 
evidence 
concerning 
the 
complaining 
witness's 
prior 
sexual 
conduct 
or 
opinions 
of 
witness's prior sexual conduct and reputation as to 
prior sexual conduct shall not be admitted into 
evidence during the course of the hearing or trial, 
nor shall any reference to such conduct be made in the 
presence of the jury, except the following, subject to 
s. 971.31(11): 
No. 96-1618-CR 
 
9 
shield statute, a defendant may not offer evidence relating to a 
victim's past sexual history or reputation absent application of 
a statutory or judicially created exception.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 972.11(2)(b)1-3; Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d at 647. 
¶18 Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b)1 creates such an exception 
to the general bar on evidence of prior sexual history by 
allowing a defendant to offer "[e]vidence of the complaining 
witness's past conduct with the defendant."  This exception, and 
its brethren, encompass those limited factual scenarios in which 
the legislature has determined that evidence of a complainant's 
sexual history may be sufficiently probative of a material issue 
to overcome the prejudicial nature of such evidence.  See 
Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d at 644.   
¶19 However, merely offering proof of the general type 
described in a particular exception is not enough to defeat the 
rape shield statute.  The exceptions to the rape shield statute 
are also governed by reference to Wis. Stat. § 971.31(11), which 
provides: 
 
In actions under s. 940.225, 948.02, 948.025 or 
948.095, 
evidence 
which 
is 
admissible 
under 
s. 
972.11(2) must be determined by the court upon 
pretrial motion to be material to a fact at issue in 
the case and of sufficient probative value to outweigh 
its inflammatory and prejudicial nature before it may 
be introduced at trial. 
                                                                  
 
1.  Evidence of the complaining witness's past 
conduct with the defendant.  
No. 96-1618-CR 
 
10
It is noteworthy that § 971.31(11) inverts the normal "weighing 
of evidence" under Wis. Stat. § 904.038 that evidence should be 
admitted unless its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by its potential prejudice.  Section 971.31(11) assumes a bias 
in its balancing test that, absent an evidentiary showing to the 
contrary, the proffered evidence is more prejudicial than 
probative. 7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: Evidence 
§ 420.4, at 177 (1991). 
¶20 Accordingly, 
under 
the 
terms 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 972.11(2)(b)1 and 971.31(11), the defendant must make a 
three-part showing that: (i) the proffered evidence relates to 
sexual activities between the complainant and the defendant; 
(ii) the evidence is material to a fact at issue; and (iii) the 
evidence 
of 
sexual 
contact 
with 
the 
complainant 
is 
of 
"sufficient probative value to outweigh its inflammatory and 
prejudicial nature."  See § 971.31(11); § 972.11(2)(b)1; State 
v. DeSantis, 155 Wis. 2d 774, 785, 456 N.W.2d 600 (1990) 
(applying three-part test to § 972.11(2)(b)3).  Having laid out 
the legal standard, we turn then to an analysis of the circuit 
court's discretionary decision. 
                     
8 Wis. Stat. § 904.03 provides: 
Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.  Although 
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair 
prejudice, 
confusion 
of 
the 
issues, 
or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
No. 96-1618-CR 
 
11
¶21 In applying the first step of the DeSantis test, we 
note initially that the rape shield statute provides no guidance 
as to the evidentiary burden placed upon the defendant to 
conform with Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b)1.  Faced with the same 
void under another exception, § 972.11(2)(b)3, the DeSantis 
court required a defendant to offer sufficient evidence to allow 
a circuit court to "conclude from the proffered evidence that a 
reasonable person could reasonably infer that the complainant 
made prior untruthful allegations of sexual assault."  DeSantis, 
155 Wis. 2d at 788.  The rationale for adopting that evidentiary 
burden for purposes of § 972.11(2)(b)3 in DeSantis is equally 
applicable to § 972.11(2)(b)1.  See id. at 787-89.  The circuit 
court must be able to conclude from the defendant's proffer that 
a reasonable person could reasonably infer that the prior sexual 
conduct occurred. 
¶22 In this case the circuit court held a pretrial 
evidentiary hearing to consider the defendant's motion to admit 
evidence 
of 
prior 
sexual 
conduct 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 972.11(2)(b)1.  At the hearing the defendant testified that he 
had had sexual intercourse with the complainant on three prior 
occasions.  The State responded to the defendant's testimony by 
representing to the court that the complainant would deny that a 
sexual relationship ever existed.  However, the State did not 
offer the complainant's testimony at the evidentiary hearing. 
¶23 Based on the defendant's testimony, the circuit court 
assumed that he had met his burden of demonstrating the prior 
sexual conduct.  Relying on this assumption, the court then 
No. 96-1618-CR 
 
12
ruled that the evidence was not material, and even if it were, 
it should be barred as overly prejudicial. 
¶24 This evidentiary decision by the circuit court was not 
an erroneous exercise of discretion.  A reasonable person could 
reasonably infer from the defendant's testimony that a sexual 
relationship with the complainant had existed.  The State 
offered no direct evidence to contradict the defendant's 
assertions. 
 
Accordingly, 
the 
circuit 
court's 
threshold 
assumption of the existence of a sexual relationship was not 
error.  Because the evidence related to the complainant's prior 
sexual conduct with the defendant, the first DeSantis factor is 
established. 
¶25 The second step of the analysis, whether the evidence 
is material to a fact at issue in the case, is more problematic. 
 We agree with the circuit court that consent was not at issue 
in this case.  While the defendant had originally represented to 
the court that the evidence was offered for purposes of proving 
consent to the alleged sexual contact, the defense reversed its 
position on the first morning of trial and, in lieu of its prior 
representation, asserted that the alleged sexual assault never 
occurred.  However, the defense still maintained its motion, 
arguing to the circuit court that the evidence of prior sexual 
history was important because "the question of consent . . . is 
relevant to . . . why she would raise the issue on this occasion 
on December 1st aside from her anger or perhaps jealousy at [the 
girlfriend] concerning the relationship [the defendant] had with 
her." 
No. 96-1618-CR 
 
13
¶26 The circuit court then allowed the defendant to 
testify at the motion hearing concerning his alleged consensual 
sexual relationship with the complainant.  It is noteworthy that 
when defense counsel asked the defendant about the complainant's 
motivations, "When the fight happened . . . what did you 
perceive the reasons to be for the fight, aside from the money," 
the defendant responded, "That was it." 
¶27 Following this testimony, defense counsel argued that 
the testimony: 
 
is relevant, or is material, because of the fact that 
my client indicates that there was consensual sex in 
the 
past, 
and 
that 
that 
issue 
demonstrates 
a 
relationship 
between 
those 
parties, 
and 
that 
relationship can be explained by the fact that they 
had relations in the past, and can explain what 
happened on that date.   
¶28 When the court pressed for further explanation as to 
why the evidence was material, defense counsel responded: 
 
I think that in a case like that, you have to look at 
the 
entire 
set 
of 
circumstances 
concerning 
the 
relationship that people had . . . . And certainly the 
fact that they had had a relationship in the past 
certainly would add to the anger that she was 
experiencing at that point in time. . . .  So it's not 
directly a question of consent, but it's a question of 
what consent on prior occasion implies about the whole 
relationship that went on between those parties, and 
explains why human beings in this situation might have 
disagreement concerning what happened because of that 
prior relationship. 
The circuit court then stated that it found the offer of proof 
to be "very general," a conclusion which defense counsel said he 
understood, and the court denied the defendant's motion. 
No. 96-1618-CR 
 
14
¶29 In Milenkovic v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 272, 284, 272 
N.W.2d 320 (Ct. App. 1978), the court of appeals determined that 
an offer of proof "need not be stated with complete precision or 
in unnecessary detail but it should state an evidentiary 
hypothesis underpinned by a sufficient statement of facts to 
warrant the conclusion or inference that the trier of fact is 
urged to adopt."  Despite several opportunities to show that the 
evidence of the prior sexual relationship was material, the 
defendant relied upon only vague arguments and bald assertions 
to tie his suggestion that the complainant acted out of 
preexisting anger or jealousy to the facts of this case.  Even 
accepting the allegations of the prior sexual relationship as 
true, the existence of such a relationship, without more, does 
not lead to an inference that the complainant was angry or 
jealous when it ended.  The existence of such a relationship, 
without more, does not lead to an inference that false 
accusations were leveled in revenge for the termination of that 
relationship. 
¶30 Had 
the 
defendant 
proffered 
sufficient 
facts to 
support his undeveloped anger or jealousy theory, the circuit 
court could have found the prior sexual relationship to be 
material for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 971.31(11).  However, in 
the absence of such a proffer, we conclude that the evidence was 
properly excluded.  Any other result would be contrary to the 
legislature's purpose in enacting the rape shield statutory 
framework and would allow defendants to routinely skirt the 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 971.31(11).  In this case the 
No. 96-1618-CR 
 
15
materiality requirement in the second DeSantis prong was not 
established and the evidence was properly excluded. 
¶31 This 
conclusion 
is 
further 
strengthened 
by 
our 
agreement with the circuit court that even if the defendant had 
made a proffer comporting with Milenkovic and established the 
materiality of the evidence, he failed to meet the requirements 
of the third prong of DeSantis.  Wis. Stat. § 971.31(11) 
embodies the legislature's distrust of evidence of a victim's 
prior sexual history by initially weighting the balance in favor 
of a determination that the evidence is inherently prejudicial. 
 See 7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: Evidence, § 420.4, 
at 177 (1991).  To satisfy the third prong of DeSantis, the 
defendant must convince the circuit court that the probative 
nature of the evidence outweighs any prejudice to the defendant. 
¶32 The circuit court determined that the defendant had 
not met this burden and we agree.  The defendant offered no 
evidence to support his vaguely stated theories that the 
complainant may have falsely accused him in revenge for his 
termination of their prior sexual relationship.  Accordingly, 
because the defendant failed to establish that the probative 
value of the evidence outweighed its inherent prejudice, the 
circuit court's decision not to admit the evidence was not an 
erroneous exercise of discretion.   
¶33 It is true that a circuit court may not deprive a 
defendant of his constitutional rights through rote application 
of this state's rules of evidence.  See Davis v. Alaska, 415 
U.S. 308 (1974); DeSantis, 155 Wis. 2d at 793.  However, because 
No. 96-1618-CR 
 
16
the defendant has failed to meet the materiality and weight of 
probative evidence requirements of Wis. Stat. § 971.31(11) and 
DeSantis in this case, the circuit court's actions do not 
endanger the defendant's constitutional rights to confrontation 
and to present a defense.  The defendant is constitutionally 
entitled to present only relevant, material, and probative 
evidence.  See State v. McCall, 202 Wis. 2d 29, 44, 549 N.W.2d 
418 
(1996). 
 
Accordingly, 
the 
defendant's 
constitutional 
challenge to the circuit court's refusal to lift the rape shield 
must fail. 
¶34 The defendant asserts in the alternative that his 
defense was also prejudiced by the circuit court's refusal to 
reconsider its decision barring the sexual history evidence 
after the State "opened the door" during cross-examination of 
the defendant at trial.  During the defendant's testimony, the 
following colloquy took place: 
 
Q.  And you're offering here, for the motive for why 
she wants to do that, the fact that she had some 
disagreement over finances with you in the home? 
 
A.  No, it was more to it than it.  It was more issues 
that could have been brought out into court that I was 
told I couldn't talk about. 
 
Q.  Mr. Jackson, you're suggesting here that this 
woman just has it in for you, aren't you? 
 
A.  Very much so. 
 
Q.  And one of the things that you used to support 
that is this claim that she owed you money, or you 
owed her money rather, and that is one of her 
motivations, right? 
 
No. 96-1618-CR 
 
17
A.  That's what she said. 
In a split decision, a majority of the court of appeals panel 
agreed with the defendant and determined from this chain of 
questions and responses that the State had "opened the door." 
¶35 However, as the dissent in the court of appeals 
decision acknowledged, this is not a case of the State 
accidentally or purposefully opening the door to take advantage 
of a particular piece of evidence that had previously been ruled 
inadmissible, thereby requiring this court to apply the doctrine 
of curative admissibility.  See Jackson, 212 Wis. 2d at 218-19 
(Brown, J., dissenting); see also Bertrang v. State, 50 Wis. 2d 
702, 706, 184 N.W.2d 867 (1971).  This is a case of the 
defendant attempting to beat the door down on his own initiative 
by taking advantage of a question which did nothing more than 
summarize the theory repeatedly asserted by the defense that the 
complainant was acting vindictively over a financial dispute.   
To declare the State's question in this case sufficient to open 
the door would effectively prohibit the State from revisiting 
the defendant's earlier testimony in any way.  Consequently, we 
determine that the circuit court properly declined to reconsider 
its decision barring sexual history evidence.  
II.  Admission of the Defendant's Letters to Impeach 
Witness 
¶36 Finally, the defendant also attacks the State's use of 
certain letters written by the defendant to his girlfriend.  The 
State first attempted to use the letters in its cross-
examination of the girlfriend to establish the use of particular 
No. 96-1618-CR 
 
18
words by the defendant.  The circuit court allowed their use for 
that purpose.  The State then attempted to use language from the 
letters to impeach the girlfriend's credibility by showing she 
was lying out of fear of the defendant.  The circuit court 
sustained the defendant's objection and barred the evidence.   
¶37 Later, during the cross-examination of the sister, the 
sister referenced one of the letters on her own initiative, 
characterized statements therein as harmless, and indicated that 
the defendant was just "fooling around."  The circuit court then 
allowed the State to enter five excerpts from that letter for 
the purposes of impeaching the sister.  The statements included: 
(i) "I've got to wax your ass;" (ii) "Don't make me pull your 
eyeball out of your head;" (iii) "I'm beating your ass, too;" 
(iv) "[D]on't make me break on your ass;" (v) "I'm going to cut 
off your God dam [sic] arm and beat you to death with it." 
¶38 The State also attempted to use the excerpts in its 
cross-examination of the defendant.  The circuit court barred 
the testimony as inherently prejudicial.  Finally, the State 
referenced the previously listed statements three times in its 
closing arguments, apparently to show a character trait of the 
defendant. 
¶39 We note first that the defendant explicitly concedes 
the appropriateness of the circuit court's admission of the 
letters to prove the defendant's common choice of words. While 
the record is ambiguous, the circuit court apparently allowed 
the State to reference the threatening statements to either show 
that the sister was biased toward the defendant, or to impeach 
No. 96-1618-CR 
 
19
the sister's testimony that the letters were nonthreatening.  
Even assuming that the excerpts could have been admitted with 
proper evidentiary license, the circuit court should have also 
considered the prejudicial nature of the excerpts and weighed 
that prejudice in the balance with the probative nature of the 
evidence.   
¶40 "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 904.03.   "Evidence is 
prejudicial if it has a tendency to influence the outcome by 
improper means or if it appeals to the jury's sympathies, 
arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish or 
otherwise causes a jury to base its decision on something other 
than the established propositions in the case."  Gonzalez v. 
City of Franklin, 137 Wis. 2d 109, 138, 403 N.W.2d 747 
(1987)(quoting Lease America Corp. v. Ins. Co. of North America, 
88 Wis. 2d 395, 401, 276 N.W.2d 767 (1979)(internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
¶41 We agree with the conclusion of the court of appeals 
that admission of excerpts of the letters and reference to those 
excerpts in closing arguments were unfairly prejudicial to the 
defendant.  Even if the excerpts were probative of the State's 
attack on the sister's credibility or the accuracy of her 
description 
of 
the 
defendant, 
the 
excerpts 
conveyed 
an 
underlying message about the character of the defendant that a 
jury would find hard to ignore.  Character evidence is generally 
barred at trial because it tends to show that a person acted in 
No. 96-1618-CR 
 
20
conformity with a particular characteristic, or that the person 
suffers from a propensity to engage in a specific pattern of 
conduct--proof that is generally irrelevant to the issue of 
whether the defendant committed a crime in this case.  See State 
v. Evers, 139 Wis. 2d 424, 431, 407 N.W.2d 256 (1987); State v. 
Balistreri, 106 Wis. 2d 741, 757, 317 N.W.2d 493 (1982).9   
¶42 As the State acknowledged at oral arguments, the 
excerpts were inflammatory.  Any probative value incumbent in 
the excerpts was outweighed by the threat of the defendant's 
vitriolic assertions being misused by the jury.  The circuit 
court should have ruled the hostile excerpts from the letters 
inadmissible under Wis. Stat. § 904.03. 
¶43 Having determined that the circuit court did err in 
allowing the State to cross-examine the sister about the threats 
contained in the excerpts of the defendant's letter, we must 
next consider whether that error was harmless.  Under State v. 
Dyess, the test for harmless error is "whether there is a 
reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the 
conviction."  Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 543, 370 N.W.2d 222 
(1985).  If that question is answered in the affirmative, the 
defendant's conviction must be reversed.  See id. 
¶44 Based on the substantial amount of physical evidence 
corroborating the allegations of the complainant, we determine 
                     
9 Such evidence may, however, be admitted "for other 
purposes, 
such 
as 
proof 
of 
motive, 
opportunity, 
intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident."  Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2).  
No. 96-1618-CR 
 
21
that the circuit court's error in admitting the evidence was 
harmless.  While the defendant acknowledges that he had an 
altercation with the complainant, he denies the allegations of 
sexual assault, denies that the dispute ever reached the 
basement of the home, denies that he threatened the complainant 
with a knife, and denies that the complainant received any 
injuries beyond a scratch to the face. 
¶45 Yet, photographs of the complainant taken by the 
police after the incident demonstrate injuries, including a long 
cut to the complainant's hand, which are consistent with her 
allegations that the parties struggled over a knife brandished 
by the defendant.  The subsequent discovery of the knife with 
which the wound was allegedly inflicted, a knife that the 
defendant acknowledges owning, also supports the complainant's 
version of events.   
¶46 Moreover, the police discovered bloodstains in the 
basement of the home, the location of the alleged attempted 
sexual assault of the complainant by the defendant.  Other 
physical evidence, such as the stained and torn condition of the 
clothing the complainant was wearing on the night of the attack, 
the discovery of a $20 bill which the defendant allegedly left 
the complainant after taking the rest of her money, and the 
disarray 
of 
specific 
household 
goods 
disturbed 
by 
the 
complainant's attempts to escape, also support the complainant's 
allegations over the defendant's denials. 
¶47 We also find convincing the complainant's initial 
refusal to identify her attacker when the police arrived.  Only 
No. 96-1618-CR 
 
22
after the police had searched her entire home and assured her 
that no was else was present did the complainant identify the 
defendant as her assailant.  Such reticence is consistent with a 
fear of additional attacks and inconsistent with the defendant's 
proffered theory that the complainant purposefully attempted to 
set him up.  
III.  Conclusion 
¶48 We 
conclude 
that 
the 
defendant 
neither 
offered 
sufficient facts to warrant an inference by the circuit court 
that 
evidence 
of 
a 
prior 
sexual 
relationship 
with 
the 
complainant was material, nor established that such evidence was 
more probative than prejudicial.  Thus, the rape shield could 
not be lifted.  Because we also determine that the State did not 
open the door to such evidence, the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion in barring the testimony.  
Finally, while the circuit court did not properly exercise its 
discretion in admitting excerpts of the defendant's letters, 
such error was harmless.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision 
of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
1