Title: Florida Board of Bar Examiners Re: John Doe

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

1  John Doe is a fictitious name. We use it because we exercise our discretion to keep this file
confidential as to the applicant involved.  
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC96664
____________
FLORIDA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS
IN RE:  JOHN DOE.1
.
[November 2, 2000]
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner Doe asks this Court to review the recommendation of the Florida
Board of Bar Examiners that his admission to The Florida Bar be denied.  We have
jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  For the reasons expressed below, we
approve the Board’s recommendation that Doe not be admitted at this time.
FACTS
On November 15, 1997, Doe filed an application for admission to The
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Florida Bar.  During the course of the Florida Board of Bar Examiners' character
and fitness investigation, certain items of information reflecting adversely on Doe's
character and fitness were discovered.  After an investigative hearing, the Board
filed several specifications against Doe.  The first specification alleged that in
March 1990, Doe reapplied to for admission to a law school after being
academically excluded for failing two courses there earlier.  Doe certified that all
information in the application was accurate.  One item on the application asked
“Are there any criminal charges pending or expected to be brought against you?” to
which  Doe responded “no.”  This answer was false because Doe had a battery
charge pending against him at that time.  This charge was not dismissed until
January 7, 1991.   
Specification 2(a) alleged that in his application to The Florida Bar, Doe also
falsely denied ever being “accused of a violation of an honor code or student
conduct code, warned, placed on scholastic or disciplinary probation, suspended,
requested or advised to discontinue your studies, dropped, expelled or requested
to resign.”  On February 8, 1990, the Chair of the Academic Standing Committee at
the law school Doe attended notified him by letter that he was academically
excluded from further law studies based upon Doe’s failing grades in two courses
taken during fall 1989.  Specification 2(b) alleged that Doe also answered this
2   The Judicial Committee for the law school eventually entered a decision on June 15, 1993,
concluding that Doe had not violated any law school rule. 
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question falsely because in 1993, a female student accused Doe of violating his law
school’s Honor Code.2 Specification 2(c) alleged that in a 1998 amendment to his
Bar application, Doe falsely stated that he voluntarily withdrew from law school in
1989 due to health problems, when in fact the Chair of the Academic Standing
Committee of the law school notified Doe by letter that he was academically
excluded from further studies.  Specification 3 alleged that Doe also testified falsely
at the investigative hearing to the effect that officials at the law school only
suggested that he withdraw from school, when he had in fact been academically
excluded.
In his answer to Specification 1, Doe admitted the factual averments, but
denied that they lacked candor.  Doe stated that he honestly believed that “his
criminal case had been, or was about to be, dismissed.”  In his answer to
Specifications 2(a), 2(c) and 3 regarding his academic exclusion from law school,
Doe denied that he lacked candor in his bar application, in his amendments, or at
the investigative hearing.  As to Specification 2(b), Doe admitted that he wrongfully
failed to report the honor code violation accusation filed against him.
In its report, the Board found all specifications proven.  In finding
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Specifications 1, 2(a), 2(c) and 3 proven, the Board noted that a conflict existed
between Doe’s position and the circumstantial evidence surrounding his
misconduct.  The Board concluded that the circumstantial evidence of Doe’s guilt
was reasonable and substantial, and “the applicant’s formal hearing testimony as to
the disputed allegations was not credible.”
 The Board found that the proven Specifications were collectively
disqualifying in that they "establish that [Doe] has been untruthful and has displayed
a lack of candor in his dealings with others, especially the Board.  The omission
and lack of candor alleged in Specifications 2 and 3 are of particular concern in that
the applicant was a law school graduate and a member of a [bar of a different
jurisdiction] at the time of those allegations."    The Board stated that Doe did not
raise rehabilitation as an affirmative defense and, if Doe had intended to raise
rehabilitation, the formal hearing presentation was “insufficient to establish such
defense by clear and convincing evidence.”
The Board recommended that Doe not be admitted to The Florida Bar at this
time.  However, the Board stated that it would recommend Doe’s admission to the
Bar in two years without further proceedings before the Board so long as he
demonstrates his compliance with the elements of rehabilitation set forth in Florida
Bar Admission Rule 3-13 and there are no disclosures of matters adversely
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reflecting upon his character and fitness during this period.  As part of Doe’s
demonstration of rehabilitation, the Board noted that Doe must (1) attend The
Florida Bar’s ethics school, (2) submit an essay to the Board on the importance of
candor for lawyers, and (3) submit a sworn report to the Board detailing his efforts
at rehabilitation with particular emphasis on his candor and truthfulness in his
dealings with others since his formal hearing.
Doe now seeks review of the Board's recommendation, raising two
challenges.  First, Doe argues that the Board did not properly find that
Specifications 1, 2(a), 2(c), and 3 were proven.  Second, he challenges the Board’s
finding that, if proven, the Specifications are disqualifying.
ANALYSIS
 
As a preliminary matter, Doe admitted Specification 2(b) (his failure to
disclose the Honor Code violation accusation), and the Board found that this
specification was proven.  Since Doe does not contest this finding, we find that
Specification 2(b) has been proven.  We now address each of Doe’s challenges in
turn.  
A.   Whether the Board properly found 
Specifications 1, 2(a), 2(c), and 3 proven. 
This Court has held that the Board’s findings of fact should be approved if
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they are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record.  See, e.g.,
Florida Bd. of Bar Exam’rs re G.J.G., 709 So. 2d 1377, 1379 (Fla. 1998);  Florida
Bd. of Bar Exam’rs re M.C.A., 650 So. 2d 34, 35 (Fla. 1995); Florida Bd. of Bar
Exam’rs re E.R.M., 630 So. 2d 1046, 1048 (Fla. 1994).
As to Specification 1, Doe does not deny that his pending battery charge
was not final at the time he filed his re-application to the law school from which he
had been excluded.  Rather, Doe argues that he assumed that the case was final,
and that such an assumption was reasonable.  Doe stated that he became aware that
the charge had not been dismissed only after he submitted his reapplication to the
school.
On the other hand, the Board found that Doe willfully concealed his pending
criminal charge from the school.  In reaching this finding, the Board noted that Doe
wrote in his answer to Specification 1 that at the time of his reapplication he
believed the charge had been, or was about to be, dismissed and that he “should
have verified that his case had actually been dismissed when he filed his
application.”  Such a statement provides competent substantial evidence that Doe
lacked candor in filing his reapplication with the law school.  As the Board
convincingly argues in its reply brief, “[t]he simple,  straightforward question on his
admissions application did not allow him the option of concealing information
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because a pending criminal charge ‘was about to be dismissed.’  The test of
candor required disclosure.  Doe failed such test.”  Therefore, we find
Specification 1 to be proven.  
As to Specifications 2(a), 2(c), and 3,  Doe does not contest that he was
excluded from a law school in February, 1990 for failing two courses.  Rather, Doe
argues that he had been sick during his first semester of law school, the time during
which he failed those classes.  He states that the date that he voluntarily withdrew
from law school for medical reasons was the same date that the Academic Standing
Committee’s letter excluding him from the school was sent.  The letter arrived after
his withdrawal and he inadvertently forgot about it.  Thus, he honestly believed at
the time of filing his application to the Bar, the filing of his amendments, and his
testimony at the investigative hearing that he voluntarily withdrew from school.  
The Court usually defers to the Board’s findings on a witness’s credibility
because the Board has had the opportunity to observe the witness during
testimony.  See Florida Bd. of Bar Exam’rs re C.W.G., 617 So. 2d 303, 304 (Fla.
1993) (adopting Board’s finding that applicant lacked candor where the “Board
observed that [the applicant’s] credibility, during his testimony, was lessened by his
demeanor, including the manner in which he answered questions and the time he
took to answer them”); Florida Bd. of Bar Exam’rs re R.D.I., 581 So. 2d 27, 30
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(Fla. 1991) (noting that “[t]he Board did not have to believe the petitioner’s version
of events”).  Further, the Board may find that facts are proven by circumstantial
evidence where “the inference of the fact preponderates over other inferences.”  Id.
at 29.  
In the instant case, the Board found that there was a conflict between the
position taken by Doe in his answers and affirmed by him during his formal hearing
testimony and the circumstantial evidence supporting the allegations of the
specifications.  The Board determined that Doe’s testimony was not credible.  The
Board further found that circumstantial evidence, including a letter written by Doe
to the Academic Standing Committee prior to his exclusion in which he stated, “I
hope that the committee will pass favorably on my petition to continue studies at . .
. law school,” demonstrated that Doe intentionally failed to disclose his academic
exclusion from the law school.  Given that Doe admitted to writing the above-
referenced letter to the committee, and his admission at the formal hearing that he
received the committee’s February 8, 1990, letter excluding him from law school,
there is competent substantial evidence in the record to support the Board’s finding
that Doe intentionally failed to disclose his academic exclusion.  Therefore, we
defer to the Board and find that Specifications 2(a), 2(c), and 3 have been proven.  
B.  Whether the Board erred in finding that
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 Doe’s conduct was disqualifying.   
Generally, in judging an applicant's character and fitness to be granted
admission to the Bar, two questions must be resolved: “First, are the facts in this
case such that a reasonable man would have substantial doubts about the
petitioner's honesty, fairness, and respect for the rights of others and for the laws
of the state and nation? Second, is the conduct involved in this case rationally
connected to the petitioner's fitness to practice law?”  Florida Bd. of Bar Exam’rs
re G.W.L., 364 So. 2d 454, 459 (Fla. 1978).
In the past this Court has held that “no qualification for membership in the
Florida Bar is more important than truthfulness and candor,”  Florida Bd. of Bar
Exam’rs re E.R.M., 630 So. 2d 1046, 1048 (Fla. 1994), and that “[a] lack of
candor on the part of an applicant is intolerable and disqualifying for membership in
the Bar,” Florida Bd. of Bar Exam’rs re C.A.M., 639 So. 2d 612, 613 (Fla. 1994). 
In the instant case, each of the specifications filed against Doe alleged a lack
of candor; that is, Doe (1) failed to disclose to his law school that at the time of his
reapplication he had a criminal charge pending; (2) failed to disclose to the Board
that he had been academically excluded from law school; and (3) failed to disclose
to the Board that he had been accused of an Honor Code violation.  The fact that
the latter two omissions occurred while Doe was a member of another state’s bar
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seriously calls into doubt Doe’s honesty.  It is beyond comprehension that one
encountering the fate of exclusion from law school would have a mere lapse of
memory of such a traumatic event. 
Nevertheless, even when an applicant has committed significant wrongful
acts, this Court has admitted the applicant to the Bar if the applicant has established
by clear and convincing evidence his or her rehabilitation.  Evidence of
rehabilitation includes, but is not limited to: 
(a) strict compliance with the specific conditions of any
disciplinary, judicial, administrative or other order, where applicable;
(b) unimpeachable character and moral standing in the
community;
(c) good reputation for professional ability, where applicable;
(d) lack of malice and ill feeling toward those who by duty were
compelled to bring about the disciplinary, judicial, administrative or
other proceeding;
(e) personal assurances, supported by corroborating evidence,
of a desire and intention to conduct one's self in an exemplary fashion
in the future;
(f) restitution of funds or property, where applicable;
(g) positive action showing rehabilitation by such things as a
person's occupation, religion, or community or civic service.  Merely
showing that an individual is now living as and doing those things he
or she should have done throughout life, although necessary to prove
rehabilitation, does not prove that the individual has undertaken a
useful and constructive place in society.  The requirement of positive
action is appropriate for applicants for admission to the Bar because
service to one's community is an implied obligation of members of the
Bar.
Fla. Bar Admiss. R. 3-13.
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Doe argues that he has established a defense of rehabilitation.  At his hearing,
Doe testified that he has had a spotless career as an attorney in another jurisdiction
since 1993.  Further, at the hearing Doe entered into evidence various affidavits
attesting to his favorable work ethic.  Doe also testified at his investigative hearing
that he has performed pro bono work.  Finally, at the hearing, Doe testified that he
has been living with and supporting his disabled sister since October, 1998. 
We conclude that Doe has not demonstrated adequate rehabilitation to justify
his admission to the Bar.  Doe fails to specify and sufficiently document the type
and extent of pro bono service that he has performed.  This Court has held that the
mere statement of positive acts without supporting documentation is not sufficient
to demonstrate clear and convincing evidence of rehabilitation.  See, e.g., Florida
Bd. of Bar Exam’rs re J.J.J., 682 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1996); Florida Bd. of Bar
Exam’rs re L.H.H., 660 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 1995).  Even more damaging, however,
is the fact that Doe made false statements to the Board while he was an active
member of the bar of a different jurisdiction.  Some of these statements were made
as recently as November, 1998, at Doe’s investigative hearing.  Such a lack of
candor in a currently practicing lawyer is a valid cause of very serious concern to
any state bar, and Doe’s presentation of rehabilitation is simply  insufficient to
mitigate his dishonesty in communicating with the Board.  
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CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, we approve the Board’s recommendation that Doe
be denied admission to the Bar at this time.  Nevertheless, he will be eligible to
reapply for admission in two years and, if he complies with the conditions in its
recommendation, the Board states that it will recommend Doe for admission to the
Bar at that time without further proceedings.  It must be noted, however, that the
requirement of proof of rehabilitation is firm and fixed.  This is not a mere pro
forma requirement, but one requiring meaningful substance.  The Board was, in our
view, somewhat lenient in its recommendation and the petitioner must clearly and
convincingly satisfy the rehabilitation requirements. 
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Original Proceeding - Florida Board of Bar Examiners
Robert A. McNeely of McFarlain, Wiley, Cassedy & Jones, P.A., Tallahassee,
Florida,
for Petitioner
Randall W. Hanna, Chair, Kathryn E. Ressel, Executive Director, and Thomas A.
Pobjecky, General Counsel, Florida Board of Bar Examiners, Tallahassee, Florida,
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for Respondent