Title: CHAD D. STRANDLIEN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CHAD D. STRANDLIEN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 66156 P.3d 986Case Number: 05-8Decided: 04/26/2007
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 

CHAD D. 
STRANDLIEN,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Nathan A. 
Preuss, Student Intern, State Public Defender Program.  Argument by Ms. 
Domonkos.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; James Michael Causey, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Causey.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Chad 
Strandlien seeks review of his conviction for aggravated vehicular homicide 
under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-106(b)(i) (LexisNexis 2005).1  Strandlien contends, among other things, 
that he was denied a speedy trial and that defense counsel rendered 
constitutionally deficient assistance by failing to consult with a pertinent 
expert witness.  We find no speedy 
trial violation, but we do find that Strandlien was denied effective assistance 
of counsel.  We therefore reverse 
Strandlien's conviction.

 
 

ISSUES

            

[¶2]      Strandlien raises 
the following issues in his opening brief:

 
 
I.          
Did the length of time between the traffic collision, the initial [DWUI] 
charge, and the subsequent Aggravated Homicide by Vehicle charge and conviction 
deny Mr. Strandlien's Constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy 
trial?

 
 
II.          
Did the destruction of the blood sample prohibit Mr. Strandlien from 
being able to refute testimony about how much he had to drink which may have 
affected whether the jury believed his drinking was the proximate cause of 
death?

 
 
III.         
Was [Mr. Strandlien] unconstitutionally prejudiced by ineffective 
assistance of counsel when:

 
 
            
(A)       
Mr. Roybal[2] failed to communicate 
a plea offer; and

            
(B)       
Mr. Murray[3] failed to present available 
defenses that were likely to change the outcome of the 
trial?

 
 
IV.        Did 
the accumulative [sic] effect of these errors prevent Mr. Strandlien from 
receiving a fair and just trial?

 
 
After 
this Court remanded the case to the district court for a hearing on Strandlien's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Strandlien submitted a supplemental 
brief on the issue:

 
 
Whether 
trial counsel was ineffective for not hiring an expert to refute the State's 
theory of the case.

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On May 29, 2001, 
while driving on a two-lane highway, Strandlien collided with another 
vehicle.  The sole occupant of the 
vehicle, Mary Terrell, was killed.  
A blood sample taken from Strandlien shortly after the accident revealed 
a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of .20 percent.  

 
 
[¶4]      The State 
initially charged Strandlien on September 12, 2001, with the misdemeanor offense 
of driving while under the influence of alcohol (DWUI) in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233 (LexisNexis 2001),4 and a warrant was issued for his 
arrest. Strandlien was arrested pursuant to that warrant on October 8, 
2002.  Approximately five months 
later, on March 14, 2003, the State moved to dismiss the DWUI charge, stating it 
intended to refile the case under a more appropriate charge.  The circuit court granted the State's 
motion and, on March 20, 2003, entered an order dismissing the DWUI charge. On 
June 12, 2003, the State filed a new criminal information charging Strandlien 
with aggravated vehicular homicide under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-106(b)(i).  After a two-day trial commencing on 
January 7, 2004, a jury found Strandlien guilty on the charged offense.  The district court sentenced him to a 
term of imprisonment of three to ten years.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
I.  Speedy 
Trial

 
 
[¶5]      We begin our 
discussion by addressing the speedy trial issue since a violation of 
Strandlien's speedy trial right would result in a dismissal with prejudice of 
the aggravated vehicular homicide charge.  
Sisneros v. State, 2005 WY 
139, ¶ 17, 121 P.3d 790, 797 (Wyo. 2005); Walters v. State, 2004 WY 37, ¶ 10, 87 P.3d 793, 795 (Wyo. 2004).  
Strandlien did not allege a speedy trial violation below.  Although we have no decision to review, 
we will nevertheless address the issue because it implicates a fundamental 
constitutional right.  See Wehr v. State, 841 P.2d 104, 113 
(Wyo. 1992) 
(it is not necessary for a defendant to assert his right to a speedy trial in 
order to claim a speedy trial violation).

 
 
[¶6]      Strandlien 
acknowledges that W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)5 was not violated in this case and 
that our review is limited to a constitutional analysis.  Under both the Wyoming and United States 
Constitutions, we determine whether a speedy trial violation has occurred by 
analyzing the four-part test articulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972).  The Barker test requires the balancing of 
four factors: the length of delay; the reason for the delay; the defendant's 
assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and the prejudice to the defendant 
resulting from the delay.  Barker, 407 U.S.  at 530, 92 S. Ct.  at 2192; Sisneros, ¶ 17, 121 P.3d  at 797; Warner v. State, 2001 WY 
67, ¶ 10, 28 P.3d 21, 26 (Wyo. 2001).  
None of these factors alone are dispositive.  Rather, they must be considered together 
and balanced in relation to all relevant circumstances.  Barker, 407 U.S.  at 533, 92 S. Ct.  at 2193; Warner, ¶ 10, 28 P.3d  
at 26.

 
 
[¶7]      The threshold 
issue to be resolved is the interval to be used to calculate the length of 
delay.  On this point, Strandlien's 
argument wavers as to precisely when the speedy trial clock began to run.  On one hand, he claims that the speedy 
trial period began upon the filing of the misdemeanor DWUI information.  On the other hand, he suggests that the 
clock started on the date of his arrest on the DWUI 
charge.

 
 
[¶8]      Under existing 
case law, the speedy trial period begins to run upon the filing of a criminal 
complaint or the arrest of the defendant, whichever occurs first.6  State v. Humphrey, 2005 WY 131, ¶ 11, 
120 P.3d 1027, 1029 (Wyo. 2005).  See also United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6-7, 102 S. Ct. 1497, 1501, 71 L. Ed. 2d 696 (1982); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 
313, 92 S. Ct. 455, 459, 30 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1971).  We have recognized that when one charge 
is dismissed and supplanted by another, the constitutional speedy trial clock is 
not affected.  Caton v. State, 709 P.2d 1260, 1264 
(Wyo. 1985)  Under such 
circumstances, "the periods of formal charge by a single sovereign for the same 
criminal act are tacked [together] even if the charges are different."  Id.

[¶9]      Based on these 
principles, we find that the speedy trial clock in this case began to run when 
Strandlien was initially charged with DWUI on September 12, 2001.  The clock stopped on March 20, 2003, 
when the circuit court dismissed the DWUI information.  Humphrey, ¶¶ 11-12, 120 P.3d 1029-31; 
see also MacDonald, 456 U.S.  at 6-10, 
102 S.Ct at 1501-03.  It resumed 
again on June 12, 2003, when the aggravated vehicular homicide charge was filed, 
and continued to run until Strandlien's trial began on January 7, 2004.  The total elapsed time to trial, 
excluding the period between the dismissal and refiling of the information, was 
762 days.  See Humphrey, ¶¶ 11-12, 120 P.3d 1029-31 
(the time between dismissal and recharging is not counted in the speedy trial 
calculation).  We agree with 
Strandlien that the length of delay is presumptively prejudicial and further 
analysis of the remaining speedy trial factors is required.  See Berry v. State, 2004 WY 81, ¶ 34, 93 P.3d 222, 232 (Wyo. 2004) (720-day delay); Warner, ¶ 12, 28 P.3d  at 26 (658-day 
delay).

 
 
[¶10]   We now turn to the reasons for the 
delay.  On this factor we examine 
which party was responsible for the delay.

 
 
"A 
deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be 
weighted heavily against the government.  
A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be 
weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate 
responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than 
with the defendant.  Finally, a 
valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate 
delay."

 
 

Wehr 
[v. State], 841 P.2d [104,] 112-13 
[(Wyo. 1992)] (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531, 
92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972)).  
Official bad faith in causing delay is weighed heavily against the 
government.  Barker, 407 U.S.  at 531, 92 S. Ct. 2182.  "Delays attributable to 
the defendant are deducted from the equation."  Jennings v. State, 4 P.3d 915, 921 (Wyo. 
2000).  "We weigh any delay properly 
attributable to the defendant against the delay chargeable to the State.  We have frequently acknowledged a 
defendant may defeat his claim to a speedy trial by his own dilatory 
practices."  Wehr, 841 P.2d  at 
113.

 
 

Whitney 
v. State, 2004 
WY 118, ¶ 42, 99 P.3d 457, 471-72 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
[¶11]   In Strandlien's case, we initially 
note that almost thirteen months elapsed between the filing of the DWUI 
information and Strandlien's arrest. As previously noted, Strandlien did not 
raise the speedy trial issue below.  
Consequently, the record is silent as to why the delay occurred in 
serving the arrest warrant.  Given 
the state of the record, we cannot weigh the 13-month delay in favor of or 
against either party.  See generally Warner, ¶ 13, 28 P.3d  at 
26.

 
 
[¶12]   We also find that several delays 
occurred with Strandlien's consent and other delays were the result of 
Strandlien's actions.  These delays, 
totaling 127 days, include a continuance of the initial hearing/arraignment on 
the DWUI charge, a continuance of his district court arraignment on the 
vehicular homicide charge, two continuances resulting from a change in defense 
counsel and a continuance of the trial date to accommodate an essential 
witness.  The record also reveals 
that Strandlien filed numerous pretrial motions, including two suppression 
motions and a motion to dismiss.  
The time required to resolve these motions must also be considered in 
determining the reasonableness of the delay.  Vargas v. State, 963 P.2d 984, 992 
(Wyo. 
1998).

 
 
 [¶13]  Shifting our attention to the third Barker factor, Strandlien concedes he 
did not pursue his speedy trial right at any time during the criminal 
proceedings below.  Although we have 
held that it is not absolutely necessary to demand a speedy trial in order to 
establish a speedy trial violation, the failure to assert that right is weighed 
heavily against Strandlien's speedy trial claim.  Whitney, ¶ 52, 99 P.3d  at 474; Campbell v. State, 999 P.2d 649, 656 
(Wyo. 2000). 

 
 
[¶14]   Finally, we consider the degree of 
prejudice Strandlien suffered as a result of the delay.  We assess prejudice in light of the 
particular evils the speedy trial right is intended to avert:  (1) lengthy pretrial incarceration; (2) 
pretrial anxiety; and (3) impairment of the defense.  Whitney, ¶ 54, 99 P.3d  at 475.  Of these factors, the most serious is 
impairment of the defense "because the inability of a defendant adequately to 
prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system."  Id. (citing Barker, 407 U.S.  at 532, 92 
S.Ct. at 2193).

 
 
[¶15]   Strandlien initially urges this 
Court to find that the delay herein was so lengthy as to give rise to a 
presumption of prejudice.  In Caton, we held that "until delay exceeds 
a point where there is a probability of substantial prejudice,' the burden of 
proving prejudice should remain with the accused."  Caton, 709 P.2d  at 1266.  Under the circumstances of this case, we 
do not find that the delay, alone, reached a point where we can say there was a 
probability of substantial prejudice.  
Therefore, we decline to relieve Strandlien of his burden of proving 
actual prejudice.

 
 
[¶16]   Strandlien claims he suffered 
excessive pretrial anxiety "because of the nature of the charges against him and 
the protracted nature of the proceedings."  
Strandlien, however, has not identified or addressed with any 
particularity the pretrial anxiety he allegedly suffered.  We have held that, because a certain 
amount of pretrial anxiety naturally exists, a defendant must demonstrate he 
"suffered prejudice in an extraordinary or unusual manner."  Campbell, 999 P.2d  at 656.  Strandlien has offered 
nothing more than a bare assertion of pretrial anxiety and, accordingly, we give 
this claim no consideration.

 
 
[¶17]   Strandlien also asserts prejudice 
from the fact his blood sample was destroyed before he had an opportunity to 
have it independently tested.7  He contends the destruction of the blood 
impaired his defense because independent testing "may have yielded a lower BAC 
than the state's testing," which could have affected the jury's determination on 
the issue of proximate cause.

 
 
[¶18]   The record shows that the state lab 
performed two separate tests on the blood sample, and both tests revealed a BAC 
of .20.  Testimony elicited at trial 
established that the machine used in conducting the testing is maintained on a 
regular basis and is operated under specific calibration and quality control 
standards.  Strandlien has not 
challenged the validity of the state's testing.  Nor has he offered any explanation as to 
what additional tests could have been performed or, for that matter, how 
retesting would have produced a different BAC result.  Simply put, Strandlien provides no facts 
to support his speculation that further testing of the blood would have yielded 
a lower BAC.  Consequently, we have 
no basis upon which we can conclude that the pretrial delay substantially 
impaired Strandlien's defense.  
Absent a showing of actual prejudice, this factor weighs against 
Strandlien.

 
 
[¶19]   Balancing the Barker factors, we hold there was no 
violation of Strandlien's right to a speedy trial.  Although the delay in bringing 
Strandlien to trial was extraordinary, the lack of evidence of actual prejudice 
to Strandlien, coupled with his failure to assert his speedy trial right, weighs 
against finding a speedy trial violation.  
Under the facts of this case, invoking the drastic remedy of dismissal of 
the charge against Strandlien with prejudice is 
unjustified.

 
 
II.  Ineffective assistance of 
counsel

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶20]   During the pendency of this appeal, 
we remanded this case to the district court for a hearing on whether Strandlien 
was denied effective assistance of counsel.  The district court determined that trial 
counsel rendered effective assistance.  
On review, we defer to the district court's findings of fact unless they 
are clearly erroneous.  We conduct a 
de novo review of the district court's "conclusions of law, which include the 
question of whether counsel's conduct was deficient and the question of whether 
the appellant was prejudiced by that deficient conduct."  Robinson v. State, 2003 WY 32, ¶ 16, 64 P.3d 743, 748 (Wyo. 2003); see also 
Barker v. State, 2006 WY 104, ¶ 42, 141 P.3d 106, 119 (Wyo. 
2006).

 
 

Analysis

 
 
[¶21]   Strandlien claims he was denied 
effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to secure the services 
of an expert in accident reconstruction.

 
 
"To 
establish that he has been denied effective assistance of counsel, a defendant 
is required to show that counsel's performance was deficient and that, but for 
this deficient performance, it is reasonably probable that the trial result 
would have been different."  McCoy v. State, 886 P.2d 252, 254 
(Wyo. 
1994).  "[S]trategic choices made 
after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent 
that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on 
investigation.  In other words, 
counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable 
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary."  Id. 
at 255 (emphasis omitted).

 
 
In McCoy, we recognized that failure to 
call an expert witness may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.  Id. 
at 255-56.   In Bloomquist v. State, 914 P.2d 812 
(Wyo. 1996), 
we stated that "the defendant must show that such expert testimony was available 
and necessary" and that "[a]ppellant must show that an expert was available who 
would have testified consistently with his theory."  Id. 
at 820.   Showing that an 
expert was available who would have testified consistently on a necessary issue 
is proof of deficient performance; however, a defendant must also show that this 
deficient performance prejudiced him.  
McCoy, 886 P.2d  at 256.  This showing of prejudice requires proof 
that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would 
have been different.  Id.

 
 

Lopez v. 
State, 2004 
WY 28, ¶¶ 29-30, 86 P.3d 851, 860 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
[¶22]   Strandlien's trial defense was 
that, although his BAC was above the legal limit, any impairment caused thereby 
was not the proximate cause of the accident.  Strandlien's description of the 
collision was that he was driving on the highway when he came upon a vehicle 
traveling well below the speed limit for no apparent reason.  He proceeded to attempt to pass the 
vehicle.  As he was drawing up 
alongside, the vehicle, without signaling, began to make a left-hand turn. 
Accordingly, Strandlien's assertion is that Terrell's actions in turning into 
Strandlien's lane without prior notice made the accident 
unavoidable.

 
 
[¶23]   In contrast, the State's two 
investigating law enforcement officers, Trooper Deskin and Lieutenant Zilka of 
the Wyoming Highway Patrol, both testified that the accident would not have 
occurred absent Strandlien's alcohol impairment.  Trial counsel was well aware of the 
troopers' opinions.  While we do not 
have a copy of their respective accident reports, both testified at a motion 
hearing held three months prior to trial.  
The version they gave of the collision at this hearing was at odds with 
Strandlien's version.  Both troopers 
believed that Strandlien had adequate notice to avoid the collision had he not 
been impaired.    

 
 
[¶24]   Obviously, the opinions of the 
troopers, derived from their respective personal attempts at reconstructing the 
crash, directly contradicted Strandlien's account of how the collision 
occurred.  Since the exact nature of 
how the collision occurred was vital to Strandlien's defense, we think a clear 
need was presented for Strandlien's trial counsel to consult with an independent 
accident reconstruction expert.  As 
was made clear at the remand hearing, such experts were available.  Under these particular circumstances, we 
find that trial counsel did not undertake a reasonable investigation into 
Strandlien's case.  Specifically, 
the failure to pursue the services of an accident reconstruction expert 
constituted deficient performance.

 
 
[¶25]   The next question we must answer is 
whether trial counsel's deficient performance prejudiced 
Strandlien.

 
 
In 
evaluating the prejudice component, the test is whether there is a reasonable 
probability that counsel's errors affected the outcome of the trial, primarily 
concerning whether the result was unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally 
unfair.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).  A "reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome."  Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052.  However, an "analysis 
focusing solely on mere outcome determination, without attention to whether the 
result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is 
defective."  Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369, 113 S. Ct. 838, 
122 L. Ed. 2d 180 (1993), cert. denied, 
525 U.S. 846, 119 S. Ct. 115, 
142 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1998); Newsted v. 
Gibson, 158 F.3d 1085, 1092 (10th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1093, 119 S. Ct. 1509, 143 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1999).

 
 

Allen v. 
State, 2002 
WY 48, ¶ 35, 43 P.3d 551, 564 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 
[¶26]   After the remand hearing the 
district court found that Strandlien's accident reconstruction expert had 
determined that:

 
 
a.         
the collision would have happened whether Mr. Strandlien was drinking or 
not because there was not enough time to respond to the event of Mrs. Terrell's 
van making a left handed turn while Mr. Strandlien was in the passing 
lane;

 
 
b.         
the state failed to properly investigate the 
accident;

 
 
c.         
the point of impact as reported and testified to by the state 
investigators appeared to be wrong;

 
 
d.         
Lieutenant Zilka was wrong in his testimony about human reaction time 
under these circumstances;

 
 
e.         
the state's testimony concerning the tungsten wire in the taillight of 
the decedent's vehicle was incorrect; and,

 
 
f.          
Trooper Deskin was incorrect in his testimony that the collision occurred 
at an intersection.  

 
 
[¶27]   These findings by the district 
court are adequately supported by the record.  The transcript from the remand hearing 
reveals that Strandlien's accident reconstruction expert's testimony supported 
Strandlien's theory of defense.  The 
expert also testified at length about the flaws in the reconstruction efforts of 
Trooper Deskin and Lieutenant Zilka.  
The expert disputed almost every element of the troopers' respective 
investigations and conclusions, ultimately opining that the troopers' 
investigations were inadequate and their opinions as to causation were 
invalid.  

 
 
[¶28]   After a careful review of the trial 
transcript, we are convinced that the absence of the services of an accident 
reconstruction expert prejudiced Strandlien.  An expert would have testified that the 
collision was unavoidable, reinforcing Strandlien's version as to how the 
collision occurred.  The expert also 
would have discredited the troopers' opinions as to the cause of the 
collision.  Although trial counsel 
cross-examined the troopers at trial, he did not touch on the majority of the 
inadequacies identified by the expert.  
We find that had the expert testified at trial, it is reasonably probable 
that the outcome of Strandlien's trial would have been 
different.

  

[¶29]   Our conclusion that this case must 
be reversed because of trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to consult an 
accident reconstruction expert makes it unnecessary to address Strandlien's 
other claims.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶30]   We hold that Strandlien's right to 
a speedy trial was not violated under the facts of this case.  However, we find that trial counsel's 
assistance was constitutionally deficient and, therefore, reverse Strandlien's 
conviction.  This case is remanded 
to the district court for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1§ 
6-2-106(b)(i) states:

 
 
(b)  A person is guilty of aggravated 
homicide by vehicle and shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary 
for not more than twenty (20) years, if:

 
 
            
(i)  While operating or 
driving a vehicle in violation of W.S. 10-6-103, 31-5-233 or 41-13-206, he 
causes the death of another person and the violation is the proximate cause of 
the death[.]

 
 

2Roybal was 
Strandlien's initial defense attorney.

 
 

3Murray replaced Roybal in 
September 2003 and represented Strandlien throughout the remaining district 
court proceedings.

 

4The statute 
was amended in 2002 to reduce the alcohol concentration from .10 percent to .08 
percent.  2002 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 
61.

 
 

5Rule 48(b) 
provides criminal defendants a procedural mechanism to ensure the protections of 
this constitutional right.  
Taylor v. State, 2001 WY 13, ¶ 8, 17 P.3d 715, 
718 (Wyo. 2001).  It requires 
criminal charges to be brought to trial within 180 days after arraignment except 
under specified conditions. 

 
 

6The Speedy 
Trial Clause does not apply to the period of time in which a defendant is 
neither under arrest nor formally charged. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313, 
92 S. Ct. 455, 459, 30 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1971).  
Therefore, we reject outright Strandlien's invitation to factor in the 
period between the criminal act and the commencement of the criminal proceedings 
against him.

 
 

7The blood 
sample was destroyed pursuant to laboratory policy in September 2002, 
approximately a month before Strandlien's arrest on the initial DWUI 
charge.