Title: Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Jane Doe (2014-17)

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO   
Docket No. 42291 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
TERMINATION OF THE PARENTAL 
RIGHTS OF JANE DOE (2014-17). 
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IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & 
WELFARE, 
 
       Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
JANE DOE (2014-17),   
 
       Respondent-Appellant. 
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Boise, October 2014 Term 
 
2014 Opinion No. 133 
 
Filed:  December 15, 2014 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho, 
Bonneville County.  Hon. Ralph L. Savage, Magistrate Judge. 
Magistrate court decision terminating parental rights, affirmed. 
Crane Law, Idaho Falls, for appellant. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, for respondent. 
_________________________________ 
BURDICK, Chief Justice 
 
Jane Doe (“Mother”) appeals the Bonneville County magistrate court’s judgment that 
terminated her parental rights to three of her children. The magistrate court concluded that the 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (“IDHW”) proved by clear and convincing evidence 
that Mother and John Doe (“Father”) neglected their children and that terminating parental rights 
was in the children’s best interests. Mother argues IDHW did not show clear and convincing 
evidence, the court failed to properly consider her disability, and IDHW did not make reasonable 
efforts to help her comply with her case plan. We affirm the magistrate court’s judgment 
terminating Mother’s parental rights.  
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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND  
Mother and Father are married and have three biological children together. Their older 
daughter, B.M., was born in 2002. Their younger daughter, A.M., was born in 2004. Their son, 
S.M., was born in 2007. This case began as a child protection case in 2010, was vacated in 
January 2011, was reopened in 2012, and resulted in a judgment terminating parental rights in 
2014. The magistrate court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights is the subject of this appeal. 
In 2009, family members started to notice Mother and Father struggling. Father had lost 
his job with a law firm and had stopped attending school board meetings at his children’s school, 
where he was chairman of the board of education. The children’s grandparents grew concerned 
because of Mother and Father’s alcoholism, the home’s condition, and Mother and Father’s care 
for the children. IDHW first opened an informal case in 2009, after IDHW received several 
referrals from Mother and Father’s family members.  
Around that same time, teachers noticed that B.M. and A.M. missed many days of school. 
When B.M. and A.M. were at school, they had dirty uniforms, unkempt hair, and needed 
breakfast because they had not eaten at home. In November 2009, several teachers and the 
principal from the children’s school went to Mother and Father’s house to offer assistance and 
found the home cluttered and dirty. S.M. had no diaper or clothes on. Consequently, a teacher 
voluntarily took S.M. for several weeks. B.M. and A.M. went to live with their paternal 
grandmother next door. When S.M. returned home several weeks later, the home’s condition had 
not improved. That same month, an officer serving an arrest warrant on Mother noticed problems 
with the home’s condition, including that the home was cluttered and smelled like urine. The 
officer instructed Mother and Father to make changes within 48 hours. The officer found only 
slight changes two days later.  
On February 25, 2010, a case worker and an officer went to Mother and Father’s home. 
The officer found S.M. in the house unsupervised. B.M. and A.M. were still living with their 
grandmother next door at the time. The officer found problematic conditions inside the home and 
cited Father for misdemeanor injury to a child. The officer declared S.M. in imminent danger and 
placed S.M. into shelter care. Mother was incarcerated at the time, so she was not at the house.  
The Bonneville County prosecutor filed a petition under the Child Protective Act (CPA) 
to place all three children in shelter care. The next day, the magistrate court ordered the children 
removed from the home pending a shelter care hearing. The court held a shelter care hearing on 
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March 1, 2010, but Mother and Father did not attend. At the hearing, the court placed the 
children in IDHW’s care pending an adjudicatory hearing. The court determined there was 
reasonable cause to believe the children came within the CPA due to neglect. The court also 
determined that IDHW made reasonable efforts to prevent the need for placement and it was in 
the children’s best interests to give temporary legal custody to IDHW. The court later appointed 
a guardian ad litem (GAL).  
The court held an adjudicatory hearing on April 7, 2010. During that hearing, Mother and 
Father stipulated to give custody to IDHW. The court found IDHW had made reasonable efforts 
prior to placing the children in foster care and that it was in the children’s best interests to vest 
legal custody in IDHW. The court later approved IDHW’s case plan for Mother and Father. As 
part of the plan, the At Risk Family Intervention Program trained Mother and Father on 
parenting skills and basic house cleaning skills. Mother and Father completed this training. In 
July 2010, after the children were in foster care for five months, the court allowed an extended 
home visit. In September 2010, the family moved to a rental house because their mortgage had 
been foreclosed. The family prepaid their rent with Mother’s disability income. The children’s 
extended home visit continued until a January 2011 review hearing, when the GAL and case 
manager recommended vacating the case because the parents had complied with the case plan. 
This was despite reports that the home’s cleanliness was still an issue. Mother and Father did not 
attend that hearing. The court vacated the case on February 4, 2011.  
In July 2011, Mother and Father were cited for misdemeanor injury to a child because a 
police officer observed that their house was in an unsanitary condition. At the time, the officer 
observed that Mother and Father had been drinking alcohol. Mother and Father had been on a 
drinking binge for several weeks.  
In January 2012, Father was incarcerated because of a domestic violence incident that 
involved Mother. Both Mother and Father were intoxicated at their home during that incident, 
and Mother had locked herself in a bathroom and sent B.M. a text message to call police. A 
resulting no-contact order prohibited Father from contacting Mother. The court put Father on 
pre-trial release, but revoked that release because Father missed required appointments and did 
not complete his urinalysis.  
The court then issued a warrant, and officers went to Mother and Father’s house to look 
for Father. Mother claimed he was not in the house. The officers found Father in the house and 
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arrested both parents: Father for violating the no-contact order and Mother for obstructing an 
officer. The officers contacted IDHW because the only adult left at the home after Mother and 
Father’s arrest was Mother’s ex-mother-in-law, who was an alcoholic.  
IDHW re-opened the case and appointed a GAL. The first adjudicatory hearing was 
continued because Mother and Father did not attend and did not have sufficient notice. At the 
next adjudicatory hearing, Mother and Father stipulated that the court had jurisdiction because of 
an unstable home environment, but objected to giving IDHW custody. The court allowed the 
children to stay at home subject to IDHW’s protective custody. The court also ordered Mother 
and Father to sign medical releases for the children to update IDHW on the children’s progress. 
In April 2012, S.M.’s doctor complained to IDHW that S.M. was failing to thrive because he had 
regressed to diapers, had not received his prescribed medications, and was not increasing in 
weight. Mother and Father attended that visit, but the nurse found Mother would not give straight 
answers about S.M.’s care.  
On May 21, 2012, the court held a case plan hearing. The court ordered Mother and 
Father to participate in a group decision-making meeting, submit to drug tests, comply with the 
court’s orders, and allow IDHW home access. The court told Mother and Father that it could 
remove the children if Mother and Father failed to comply. Mother and Father submitted to hair 
follicle drug testing that day and both tested positive for methamphetamine. The results indicated 
“high, daily, constant use” for both parents. IDHW visited the home and found it cluttered, dirty, 
and unsanitary. The inspection revealed many problems, including large laundry piles, items 
resting against a wood stove, and a cup of mold on B.M.’s bedside table. IDHW gave Mother 
and Father 48 hours to clean their home, and Mother and Father failed to properly clean their 
home within that time.  
On May 24, 2012, the court placed all three children in foster care. The court did this 
because Mother and Father had tested positive for methamphetamine, refused to sign medical 
releases, had not cooperated with IDHW, and appeared ready to move to California. All three 
children were initially placed with their paternal grandmother, but S.M. was moved to a separate 
foster home a few weeks later. S.M.’s physical health immediately improved in foster care.  
A redisposition hearing was held on May 29, 2012. The court decided to keep the 
children in IDHW’s custody until a June 21, 2012 hearing. The court approved a case plan on 
June 25, 2012. The case plan included requirements that Mother and Father: participate in 
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substance abuse programs; sign releases allowing the case manager to assess Mother and 
Father’s progress in treatment; submit to random drug testing; keep all mental health 
appointments; follow probation; participate in visitation; attend their children’s medical 
appointments; and maintain a stable home.  
The court held more review hearings and continued to find it was in the children’s best 
interests to stay in IDHW’s custody. At an August 2012 review hearing, the court found Father 
had not worked with the case plan and Mother had only made some recent progress on the plan. 
Father did not attend this hearing. Mother and Father then both failed to attend a November 2012 
review hearing. Father also did not attend a January 2013 review hearing. At the hearing the 
court noted that Father did not comply with his case plan and that Mother had “somewhat 
complied,” but by residing with Father had showed she was unwilling to establish a safe 
residence. Mother and Father attended a March 2013 review hearing, where the court again 
found they were not making progress on the case plan and it was in the children’s best interests 
to remain in IDHW’s care.  
Mother and Father then had almost no contact with the GAL or IDHW for two months. 
They attended only one visit with the children between March 18 and May 13. Mother was 
arrested in April for petit theft after she stole from Walmart. Mother was also hospitalized for 
substance abuse in April. Around the same time, Mother and Father were evicted from their 
home and did not attend drug testing.  
The court held a permanency hearing on May 13, 2013. Mother and Father failed to 
attend the hearing. The court ultimately approved a permanency plan to terminate parental rights 
and ordered IDHW to file a termination petition. The court also suspended visitation because the 
parents had not complied with the court orders or their case plan and had missed two months of 
visitation and counseling. The court then suspended reunification efforts at a May 29, 2013 
hearing. Neither parent attended that hearing. IDHW filed petitions to terminate Mother and 
Father’s parental rights and later amended those petitions. The amended petitions and summons 
were personally served on Mother and Father on June 1, 2013.  
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On July 22, 2013, the court held a termination hearing. Mother and Father failed to 
attend.1 Mother’s attorney attended, but told the court he had not heard from Mother since 
March. Because both parents failed to attend, IDHW put on their prima facie case. The court 
then found that due to neglect and an unstable home, it was in the children’s best interests to 
terminate Mother and Father’s rights. The court entered a default termination decree.  
Mother and Father arrived in court two hours after the hearing was over, claiming car 
trouble. They filed a motion to set aside the judgment on August 5, 2013. The court granted that 
motion on November 1, 2013, due to excusable neglect and the interest of justice.2 The court 
held a review hearing three days later, which Mother and Father did not attend. At the review 
hearing, the court approved the permanency goal of adoption by a relative. On December 9, 
2013, the court allowed the children to be placed with Father’s half-sister (“Aunt”) who lives in 
Bozeman, Montana. Aunt is a professor at Montana State University. She and her partner 
(“Uncle”) have one son who is close in age to B.M.  
The trial was scheduled for three days in February 2014, but actually took ten days. The 
trial included over thirty witnesses. Father represented himself and attended every day. Mother 
was represented by counsel and did not attend one day because she was sick. At trial, Mother 
testified about her numerous health problems. She reported having a small stroke that continues 
to affect her memory. She testified that she suffers from bi-polar disorder, although her treating 
doctor testified that it was instead major depressive disorder. Mother also testified that she 
receives disability income due to these problems and others, including irritable bowel syndrome, 
post-traumatic stress syndrome, and migraines. She stated that her stroke and mental health did 
not affect her ability to clean the house, but did interfere with her memory.  
Many witnesses testified about Mother and Father’s abuse of drugs and alcohol. Mother 
and Father both completed substance abuse counseling in 2010. Both Mother and Father were 
admitted to the hospital for detoxification on May 17, 2013. Mother and Father tested positive 
for methamphetamine in 2012. B.M. knew about Mother and Father’s methamphetamine use. 
Mother and Father admitted that they used methamphetamine during 2011 and 2012, but denied 
that they were still using. Father testified that he has an anxiety disorder that contributes to his 
                                                 
1 On May 31, 2013, Father’s attorney filed a motion to withdraw. On June 24, 2013, the court granted that motion 
and ordered the attorney to send Father a copy of that order. Father was to indicate how he wanted to proceed. The 
court received nothing from Father, so it entered a default judgment against him with a decree terminating his rights.  
2 Mother and Father appealed the trial court’s July 22, 2013 decision to this Court. The appeal was dismissed 
because the trial court granted the motion to set aside.  
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alcohol abuse when his anxiety is uncontrolled. He testified that he is now on medication for 
anxiety and is not drinking alcohol. Mother’s probation officer reported that she tested negative 
three times for drugs after her 2013 theft charge. Mother and Father also consistently attended 
counseling and treatment with A to Z counseling since January of 2014, but that counseling did 
not include substance abuse treatment. Mother and Father did not provide the court with any 
recent tests to prove their sobriety.  
Many witnesses testified about the cluttered and dirty condition of the home from 2009 to 
2013. These witnesses included police officers, IDHW employees, and school employees. 
Witnesses reported dirty clothes in heaps on the floor, rotting food, unwashed dishes, dog feces 
on the floor, and sharp objects within S.M.’s reach. A landlady testified that when Mother and 
Father moved out, the carpet was ruined, moldy food was in the kitchen, and there were dog 
feces and liquor bottles in the bedrooms. Father and Mother testified that they were hoarders and 
had collected a lot of stuff, but now had a clean home.  
Other testimony focused on other troubles. Both parents had been incarcerated during the 
child protection case. Mother was arrested for driving without privileges, obstructing an officer, 
and failure to appear. Father was incarcerated for violating his work release and probation. He 
remained in jail for several months during 2012. Both parents were unemployed. Mother did not 
work because she was on disability. Father’s unemployment began in 2011 and continued 
through the trial. The family was evicted from at least three residences since 2009. Both parents 
also testified that they had extended episodes of alcohol abuse. During that time, they would be 
unable to care for the children or maintain a clean and sanitary home. When both parents used 
methamphetamine, they would lock themselves in their bedroom for days at a time.  
Numerous witnesses, including the IDHW case manager, foster parents, and Mother and 
Father’s family, all testified about how Mother and Father failed to attend planned visits and 
were late to visits. At one point, IDHW required Mother and Father to call and confirm visits 
several hours before so the children would not be disappointed. Mother and Father also missed 
parent-teacher conferences.  
The children’s foster parents, IDHW employees, CASA volunteers, and family all 
testified about the children’s health. The children remained in IDHW’s custody in several foster 
homes since May 24, 2012. The court found that while initially the children were traumatized by 
foster care placement, all showed improvement in their physical health since then. Testimony 
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indicated S.M. did well at his foster home. B.M. and A.M.’s mental, emotional, and physical 
health also improved at their foster home, and they were able to visit S.M. on weekends. The 
children moved to another home in fall of 2013, and that placement did not go as well as the 
others. But things did go well when the children were placed with Aunt in December 2013. All 
three children wanted Aunt to adopt them and were sad about their parents’ choices. All 
testifying extended family members confirmed that living with Aunt was in the children’s best 
interests. No family members, other than Mother and Father, indicated that termination was not 
in the children’s best interests.   
Both parties submitted closing briefs to the court. While IDHW’s petition sought to 
terminate Mother and Father’s rights on various grounds, IDHW’s closing brief primarily sought 
termination based on neglect. The trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
on June 11, 2014. The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother and Father 
had neglected the children and that terminating their parental rights was in the children’s best 
interests. Mother timely appealed. 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court erred by finding clear and convincing evidence to terminate 
Mother’s parental rights. 
 
2. Whether the trial court considered Mother’s alleged disabilities and IDHW’s support 
services. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The IDHW must show grounds for termination of parental rights “by clear and 
convincing evidence because each parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a 
relationship with his or her child.” Idaho Dep’t Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho 36, 41, 244 
P.3d 180, 185 (2010). Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that indicates the thing to be 
proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. Id. On appeal, we “will not disturb the 
magistrate court’s decision to terminate parental rights if there is substantial, competent evidence 
in the record to support the decision.” Id. Substantial, competent evidence is evidence that a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id.  
IV. ANALYSIS 
Here, the magistrate court terminated Mother and Father’s parental rights because it 
found neglect and that it was in the children’s best interests to terminate those rights. Father did 
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not appeal. Therefore, we will focus on Mother’s relationship with her three children. See In 
Interest of Cheatwood, 108 Idaho 218, 219, 697 P.2d 1232, 1233 (Ct. App. 1985). 
A. The trial court did not err when it terminated Mother’s parental rights because 
substantial and competent evidence supports that decision. 
Statutory grounds for termination of parental rights include: (a) abandonment; (b) neglect 
or abuse; (c) lack of a biological relationship between the child and a presumptive parent; (d) 
inability to discharge parental responsibilities for a prolonged period, which will injure the 
child’s health, morals, or well-being; or (e) a parent’s incarceration for a substantial period of 
time during the child’s minority. I.C. § 16–2005. To terminate parental rights, the trial court must 
find at least one of these grounds for termination and then also find that it is in the children’s best 
interests to terminate the parent-child relationship. I.C. § 16–2005(1).  
Here, the trial court found clear and convincing evidence of neglect and that it was in the 
children’s best interests to terminate parental rights. Mother argues the trial court erred in doing 
so.  
1. Substantial and competent evidence supports the trial court’s finding of neglect. 
Mother argues that because of her disabilities, the trial court could not have found she 
willfully failed to comply with the case plan or willfully neglected her children. However, willful 
neglect and willful non-compliance with the case plan is not the standard. Neglect is a statutory 
ground for terminating parental rights under Idaho Code section 16-2005. “Neglected” is defined 
in Idaho Code section 16-2002(3) as  
(a) Conduct as defined in section 16-1602(28), Idaho Code; or 
(b) The parent(s) has failed to comply with the court’s orders or the case plan in a 
child protective act case and: 
(i) The department has had temporary or legal custody of the child for 
fifteen (15) of the most recent twenty-two (22) months; and 
(ii) Reunification has not been accomplished by the last day of the 
fifteenth month in which the child has been in the temporary or legal 
custody of the department. 
Idaho Code section 16-1602(28) defines neglected as a child 
(a) Who is without proper parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or 
other care or control necessary for his well-being because of the conduct or 
omission of his parents, guardian or other custodian or their neglect or refusal to 
provide them; . . . or 
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(b) Whose parents, guardian or other custodian are unable to discharge their 
responsibilities to and for the child and, as a result of such inability, the child 
lacks the parental care necessary for his health, safety or well-being; or 
(c) Who has been placed for care or adoption in violation of law; or 
(d) Who is without proper education because of the failure to comply with section 
33-202, Idaho Code. 
Idaho Code section 16-2005 allows the court to terminate parental rights upon a showing of any 
of the enumerated conditions. In Interest of Dayley, 112 Idaho 522, 526, 733 P.2d 743, 747 
(1987). “Whether neglect has occurred is a question of fact to be established by clear and 
convincing evidence.” In re Doe, 156 Idaho 103, ___, 320 P.3d 1262, 1269 (2014).  
Mother argues that IDHW did not present clear and convincing evidence that terminating 
Mother’s parental rights was appropriate under Idaho Code section 16-2005. The trial court 
found clear and convincing evidence under both aspects of the “neglected” definition in Idaho 
Code section 16-2002(3). The court found Mother and Father displayed neglect when they: (1) 
were under the influence of drugs and alcohol in their bedroom while their children were 
unsupervised; (2) failed to attend visitation; (3) allowed S.M.’s health to grow poor in their 
custody; (4) did not meet the children’s needs for food; and (5) failed to properly supervise and 
care for the children. The court elaborated that the parents failed to maintain a normal 
relationship with the children, may lack the ability to change their conduct to assume parental 
responsibilities, lacked stable housing and employment, and used alcohol or drugs. This is 
neglectful behavior that showed Mother and Father failed to provide their children with proper 
parental care and control under section 16-2002(3)(a), as set forth in 16-1602(28). 
The court also found behavior that is clear and convincing evidence of neglect as defined 
in 16-2002(3)(b). The court found the parents completely failed to comply with the case plan 
during the first fifteen months of the 2012 case, IDHW had temporary custody of the children for 
the required time period, and reunification was not accomplished in the required time period. The 
court noted that both Mother and Father did not attend some visitations, did not provide releases 
to IDHW, did not submit to drug testing, did not remain drug free, and did not participate in 
counseling. These tasks were all part of their case plan. The court found that both parents had 
attempted to comply with the counseling portion of the case plan for several months before trial 
and testified they were sober at the time of the trial. However, the case plan provided that they 
prove sobriety through testing, which they did not do. The court found that despite any recent 
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efforts, Mother and Father failed to comply with the majority of the case plan, “especially during 
the most important phase of a child protection case.”  
Mother attacks the trial court’s neglect finding with specific arguments on certain areas 
of the trial court’s decision, but never argues that she followed the case plan or that none of her 
actions show neglect. We will address her individual arguments, but note that even if Mother’s 
arguments were valid, she should have followed the case plan to avoid a finding of neglect under 
Idaho Code section 16-2002(3)(b). Mother must also show the court did not have substantial and 
competent evidence of the conduct in section 16-2002(3)(a)’s definition. She does not argue 
either. Even if she had, trial testimony about missed visitations, incarceration, and instability in 
the home could provide substantial and competent evidence to support the trial court’s neglect 
finding.  
Mother argues that her issue with alcohol did not rise to a level that warranted 
termination because she admitted her past issues, reached out for help, and successfully went 
through a child protection action in 2010. However, both parents testified that they had episodes 
of alcohol abuse for extended periods of time from 2009 through 2013. During that time, 
numerous witnesses testified that Mother and Father were unable to care for the children or 
maintain a clean and sanitary home. Thus, evidence in the record supports the trial court’s 
decision that alcohol contributed to neglect. 
Additionally, Mother argues there was no evidence that showed any addiction or a long-
time use of methamphetamine. Therefore, she contends methamphetamine should not have been 
a continuing concern. The court found that Mother and Father used methamphetamine in their 
room and that use continued on a frequent basis through 2011 into 2012. Mother and Father 
testified that they used meth in 2011 and 2012, and both Mother and Father tested positive in 
May 2012 for levels that showed daily, constant use. However, the trial court made no finding 
that Mother was addicted to methamphetamine. Instead, the court found that Mother had 
neglected her children when she was under the influence and not supervising them. The court 
also found Mother had failed to comply with the case plan by not providing proof through testing 
that she was sober. Substantial and competent evidence supports these findings and therefore the 
court could properly use these findings in determining neglect.   
Mother argues that her many moves to different homes do not establish clear and 
convincing evidence of neglect because her children moved just as many times under IDHW’s 
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care. Mother explains that some of her moves won’t repeat themselves because she lost some 
disability income when the children were removed, so she had to move to a smaller house. The 
trial court explained that it found the moves concerning because they were evictions for non-
payment and not planned moves. The court explained that evictions are different because they 
are more emotional and traumatic on a family. While the children were not living with their 
parents for several of the evictions, the children had visitations with their parents at these 
residences and were aware of the evictions. The trial court considered the evictions as part of 
Mother and Father’s larger problem of instability, which was also established through Mother 
and Father’s time away from the children due to incarcerations and substance abuse problems. 
Thus, Mother’s many moves are evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support the 
court’s neglect finding. 
Mother additionally argues that no evidence showed the children suffered harm from an 
unsanitary home that would justify termination. However, “Idaho’s termination statute exists 
‘not merely to alleviate harm but to prevent it.’” In re Doe, 156 Idaho at ___, 320 P.3d at 1269 
(quoting In the Interest of Cheatwood, 108 Idaho at 220, 697 P.2d at 1234). Teachers from the 
children’s school, law enforcement officers, and social workers all testified that the home was 
cluttered and dirty in 2009 and 2010. While the 2010 case was vacated, in July 2011 an officer 
cited both Mother and Father for misdemeanor injury to a child because of their home’s 
condition. That officer found the home was a mess with garbage, dog feces, old food, and piles 
of clothes. Other witnesses testified that the piles of dirty clothes in the house at one point 
reached five-feet high, items rested against the wood stove, mold grew in a cup in B.M.’s room, 
and sharp objects were within S.M.’s reach. Any of these conditions could have caused the 
children immediate physical harm, but luckily they did not. Hence, the fact that Mother and 
Father’s homes were dirty and cluttered from 2009 until 2013 is a factor the trial court could rely 
on to find neglect. 
Further, Mother fails to recognize that the court did not terminate Mother’s rights solely 
because of Mother’s unsanitary home, multiple moves, methamphetamine use, or alcohol 
struggles. The record indicates that at several times during the case, Mother was under the 
influence of drugs and alcohol in her bedroom and did not supervise the children. Mother 
allowed S.M.’s health to grow poor enough that he was diagnosed with failure to thrive. Mother 
missed multiple visitations. Mother was incarcerated several times. Mother’s actions did not 
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comply with the case plan and showed she failed to provide her children with proper parental 
care and control. Thus, substantial and competent evidence supports the court’s finding that clear 
and convincing evidence established neglect.  
Mother also contends that at the time of trial, the parents’ home was without clutter and 
she was drug-free. The trial court acknowledged that Mother and Father may now have an 
uncluttered home. The court noted that Mother has attended counseling for several months and 
had not tested positive for drugs in several urine tests during her probation. The court indicated 
that although Mother and Father may be drug free, stable, and progressing in treatment, the court 
did not see any overwhelming evidence of this. Mother and Father did not provide any 
documentation to show they completed treatment. The court noted that Mother and Father’s 
improvements were “too little too late.”  
Even if the court had found that Mother had shown she was now fully complying with the 
case plan, compliance only occurred after the termination proceedings began. In another case, 
this Court affirmed a neglect finding where a father failed to demonstrate signs of improvement 
or compliance with his case plan until after the Department initiated the termination proceedings. 
In re Doe, 151 Idaho 356, 366, 256 P.3d 764, 774 (2011). Similarly, here the termination 
proceedings began in May 2013, and most of Mother’s claimed progress is unproven and has 
occurred since then. Because the progress is recent, it does not outweigh the long track record of 
neglect of her children.  
2. Substantial and competent evidence supports that trial court’s finding that terminating 
Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. 
When a trial court determines whether terminating parental rights is in the child’s best 
interests, 
the trial court may consider the stability and permanency of the home, 
unemployment of the parent, the financial contribution of the parent to the child’s 
care after the child is placed in protective custody, improvement of child while in 
foster care, the parent’s efforts to improve his or her situation, and the parent’s 
continuing problems with the law.  
In re Doe, 156 Idaho at ___, 320 P.3d at 1270. Mother argues the trial court abused its discretion 
when it found IDHW presented clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the 
children’s best interests because the trial court should have considered the children’s unique 
bond with their parents and the fact that the parents love their children and their children love 
them. 
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The court found it was in the children’s best interests to terminate Mother and Father’s 
parental rights due to numerous factors. The court noted that terminating parental rights 
protected the children from isolation from their grandparents. The court also noted termination 
gave them a home free from alcohol and drug abuse, a financially stable environment, a clean 
and sanitary home, stability, and a situation where their health and welfare was not at risk. 
Substantial and competent evidence in the record supports these findings. As discussed above, 
Mother and Father’s home had been unstable for over four years. They were incarcerated, 
evicted, and abused substances. They had trouble keeping a clean home. They did not attend the 
children’s appointments and visits. Mother and Father missed multiple hearings, which shows 
they do not have their children’s best interests as a main priority. The record also indicates that 
the children’s Aunt could provide a stable home for the children to grow up in. This was based 
upon the time Aunt and Uncle had already spent with the children and positive reports from 
family members and IDHW. Thus, substantial and competent evidence in the record supports the 
trial court’s finding that terminating Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. 
In addition to this evidence, love does not always translate into the ability to discharge 
parental responsibilities. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 149 Idaho 165, 171, 233 P.3d 
96, 102 (2010). Here, Mother’s love for her children does not override the court’s finding that 
terminating Mother’s parental rights was in her children’s best interests. The court acknowledged 
the children and parents loved each other. However, the court stated that Mother and Father’s 
testimony about love and a rich family life was contrary to testimony that they spent days in their 
bedrooms and that B.M. made dinner several times a week. Additional testimony indicated that 
B.M. and A.M. spent most of their time next door at their grandmother’s and that Mother and 
Father would not call to check on them. S.M.’s doctor found S.M. failed to thrive with Mother 
and Father and that his condition improved in foster care. Hence, substantial and competent 
evidence in the record supports the trial court’s finding that terminating Mother’s parental rights 
was in the children’s best interests despite the love between Mother and her children.  
B. The trial court properly considered Mother’s disabilities and IDHW’s services. 
Mother argues the trial court failed to consider her disabilities and the IDHW’s lack of 
meaningful supportive services. Mother argues that IDHW should have provided her additional 
services given her disabilities. She states that her disabilities include a loss of memory from a 
stroke she suffered after S.M. was born, which she made IDHW aware of early in the case. She 
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asserts that IDHW did not concern themselves with her counseling progress or how her memory 
and disabilities affected her visitation and her ability to keep a sanitary home. She contends that 
she also suffered from bi-polar disorder, irritable bowel syndrome, post-traumatic stress disorder, 
and migraines.  
First, the trial court did consider Mother’s disabilities in its decision. The court noted that 
Mother reported a stroke that affected her memory. However, the court pointed out that Mother 
put no medical testimony on at trial about how the stroke impacted her. The court concluded that 
because Mother had provided no medical testimony about her stroke, the court could not 
conclude that her stroke was the reason she had trouble with her memory. The court noted that 
the evidence suggested that her memory issues might also be drug-related. As an example, the 
court used Mother’s failure to remember shoplifting after she had taken a large amount of 
prescription drugs. The court acknowledged that Mother testified that she had bi-polar disorder, 
but one of Mother’s treating doctors instead testified it was major depressive disorder. The court 
noted Mother testified that her stroke and mental health condition did not affect her ability to 
clean and maintain the home. She instead stated that it only affected her ability to keep 
appointments. Therefore, the court did consider her disabilities, but also considered the fact that 
they were self-reported and occurring in conjunction with her drug and alcohol problems.  
Second, there is no evidence that IDHW failed to provide meaningful supportive services 
to the family. “Not infrequently, this Court is presented with arguments that the Department did 
not do enough when the analysis should primarily focus on what the putative parent did or did 
not do.” Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho 88, 91, 244 P.3d 232, 235 (2010). 
That is the case here.  
Mother contends that IDHW was aware of her stroke and her memory troubles, but 
offered her no special assistance in complying with her plan. Mother asserts that IDHW only 
provided her a written visitation schedule and did not follow up with additional contact to help 
her overcome her disabilities. The court instead found that Mother had not taken advantage of 
IDHW’s services and instead blamed others. Substantial and competent evidence supports this 
finding. Numerous witnesses testified that IDHW made repeated efforts to help the family. The 
case manager testified that she returned Mother’s phone calls. Other social workers added that 
the case manager and other IDHW employees also returned phone calls, provided written 
schedules, and reminded Mother after every visitation of when the next visit was. The court 
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found that throughout the case, Mother constantly blamed others rather than taking responsibility 
for the things she had control over. Indeed, one of Mother’s treating providers at counseling 
testified that Mother took little responsibility for the things she had control over. This lack of 
responsibility permeated Mother’s testimony at trial, where she very rarely took any 
responsibility for her actions. Additionally, at many hearings over the case’s life, the court found 
that IDHW provided reasonable efforts to reunify the parents with their children. The record 
indicates IDHW provided the parents visitation, drug testing, mental health counseling, and other 
services. Thus, the court properly considered IDHW’s services and found IDHW made 
reasonable efforts. 
The trial court properly considered Mother’s disability and the IDHW’s efforts, and 
substantial and competent evidence supports the trial court’s judgment that clear and convincing 
evidence supported termination of Mother’s parental rights due to neglect and the children’s best 
interests. Therefore, the trial court did not err in terminating Mother’s parental rights. 
V. CONCLUSION 
We affirm the trial court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights. Costs to 
IDHW. 
 
Justices EISMANN, J. JONES, HORTON and WALTERS, J., Pro Tem, CONCUR.