Title: In the Matter of Termination of Parental Rights Dept. of Health & Welfare v. John Doe II & Jane Doe I

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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Appeal from the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Gooding County.  
Hon. Barry Wood, District Judge. Hon. Casey Robinson, Magistrate Judge. 
 
The decision of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Capitol Law Group, PLLC, Gooding, for appellant Jane Doe I. 
 
Rockne Lammers, Jerome, for appellant John Doe II. 
 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 
____________________________________ 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No.  35592/35593 
 
IN THE MATTER OF TERMINATION OF 
PARENTAL RIGHTS OF JANE DOE, 
JOHN DOE, JOHN DOE I, CHILDREN 
UNDER 18 YEARS OF AGE, 
_______________________________________ 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & 
WELFARE, 
 
                                 Plaintiff/Respondent,                                                                                     
v.                                                       
                                                         
JOHN DOE II, 
                                                         
                                 Defendant/Appellant. 
_______________________________________ 
IN THE MATTER OF TERMINATION OF 
PARENTAL RIGHTS OF JANE DOE, 
JOHN DOE, JOHN DOE I, CHILDREN 
UNDER 18 YEARS OF AGE, 
_______________________________________ 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & 
WELFARE, 
 
                                          Plaintiff/Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
JANE DOE I, 
 
                                          Defendant/Appellant. 
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Boise, May 2009 
 
2009 Opinion No. 76 
 
Filed:  May 29, 2009 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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W. JONES, Justice 
NATURE OF CASE 
Jane Doe I and John Doe II (Appellants) separately appeal Fifth Judicial District Judge 
Barry Wood‟s decision to affirm Magistrate Judge Casey Robinson‟s decision to terminate their 
parental rights to their children based on neglect and the best interest of the children.  This Court 
consolidated the cases.  Appellants allege on appeal that there is insufficient evidence to justify 
termination of their parental rights.  We affirm. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Appellants had four children that lived in their home prior to the commencement of this 
action, including two girls and two boys.  The oldest child, a daughter, is from the husband‟s 
prior marriage and is not involved in this case.  Appellants are the natural parents of the other 
three children, who were seven, four and three when this action commenced. 
In May 2005, the Department of Health and Welfare (the Department) received a call that 
Appellants‟ three-year-old child was wandering the streets in the City of Gooding.  Soon 
thereafter, in-home family services from Northstar were offered to Appellants.  In August 2005, 
the child was again found wandering the streets and law enforcement notified the Department.  
These events led to the declaration that three of Appellants‟ children were in imminent danger.  
The children were subsequently returned to the family under protective supervision with a safety 
plan.  At that time, a case plan was created that required Appellants to attend counseling, obtain 
adequate housing with a fenced yard, get mental health assessments and follow the 
recommendations contained in those assessments.  Appellants were also required to get services 
for the wife‟s disability (she suffers from seizures that cause her to blackout) and to make sure 
the children were never left alone with her.  The husband was required to maintain employment.   
Appellants complied with a portion of the plan.  They tried to keep a clean home, they 
installed locks and alarms on the house and they tried to incorporate discipline in the home.  
However, Appellants did not complete all of the case plan requirements.  Specifically, the 
husband had trouble maintaining employment and he did not feel that he or his wife needed 
counseling.  Appellants did not follow Northstar‟s recommendations, they never set up daycare, 
and they did not follow the safety plan.     
 
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The magistrate court held hearings on this matter in June 2007.  A former teacher of one 
of the children testified that while the child was in foster care, she “blossomed,” but after the 
home visits with her parents she did not do well and was “really difficult.”  The child was not 
clean when she was with her parents.     
A Psycho-Social Rehabilitation (PSR) worker that was assigned to work with Appellants 
and their children testified that the youngest child had extreme disruptive behaviors; at age five 
he could not say how old he was, could not say his colors, and could not count to ten.  The PSR 
worker also testified that the child would smear feces on the floor in the home.  The PSR worker 
testified that the child is doing much better in foster care and that the child needs structure, 
consistency and clear boundaries.  The PSR worker also worked with Appellant‟s middle child; 
his behavior was similar to the youngest child‟s, but less extreme.  The PSR worker testified that 
the parents used extremely poor judgment, there was not a safe area in the house and there were 
nails and junk strewn around.  Additionally, although the children wanted to see their parents 
during the visits, there was little to no interaction between the wife and daughter.   
The daughter‟s foster parent testified that the daughter could not read or write when she 
went into foster care, they had to work very hard to get the child to the level of performance that 
she should have been at in school, and the child needs a stable environment with love and 
attention.  The daughter would anticipate the visits with her parents and then would become very 
emotional and act out after the visits were over.   
A speech therapist for the Gooding Schools testified that all of the children‟s hygiene has 
improved greatly since going into foster care and that when the children have home visits their 
“behavior goes off the charts.”  The principal of Gooding Elementary testified that when the 
daughter was in Appellants‟ care she missed twenty-eight days of kindergarten and forty-four 
days of first grade.  Since going into foster care, the daughter has missed only three days of 
second grade and two days of third grade.   
A case worker from the Department testified that the husband had made threats to the 
children‟s daycare provider and refused to work with the in-home services provided to 
Appellants.  Additionally, the husband would leave his wife home alone with the children in 
contravention of the safety plan.  Appellants generally refused to follow the recommendations of 
the psychological evaluations.  The case worker recommended terminating Appellants‟ parental 
rights.   
 
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A worker from Northstar also testified that she worked in Appellants‟ home three times 
per week for an hour at a time from June 2005 through March 2006.  This was an unusually long 
period of time, as Northstar typically only works with families for three months.  She testified 
that although Appellants became more cooperative over time, she saw no significant change in 
their ability to parent.  Moreover, while Appellants love their kids “dearly,” their efforts to 
improve their parenting skills were not consistent or long-lasting.  The worker never saw 
evidence of physical abuse, but Appellants did verbally abuse the children while she was present.  
The verbal abuse lessened as Northstar worked with Appellants.   
The magistrate court entered a Memorandum Decision on November 26, 2007 and 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree on December 5, 2007.  The magistrate court 
terminated Appellants‟ parental rights to their three children based on neglect and the best 
interest of the children.  Appellants each appealed the magistrate court‟s decision to the district 
court.  On June 25, 2008, the district court affirmed the magistrate court‟s decision to terminate 
Appellants‟ parental rights.  Appellants then each appealed the district court‟s decision to this 
Court and this Court consolidated the cases. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Whether there was substantial, competent evidence in the record to support the district 
court‟s decision to affirm the magistrate court‟s decision to terminate Appellants‟ parental 
rights? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Supreme Court reviews the magistrate court record to determine whether there is 
substantial, competent evidence to support the magistrate‟s findings of fact and whether the 
magistrate‟s conclusions of law follow from those findings.  Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 
672, 183 P.3d 758, 760 (2008).  If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow 
therefrom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate‟s decision, we affirm the district 
court‟s decision as a matter of procedure.  Id.   
In order to terminate parental rights, the magistrate court must find that termination is in 
the best interest of the child and that one or more of the conditions listed in  I.C. § 16-2005(1) 
exists, which include: (a) The parent has abandoned the child; (b) The parent has neglected or 
abused the child; (c) The presumptive parent is not the biological parent of the child; (d) The 
parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities and such inability will continue for a 
 
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prolonged indeterminate period and will be injurious to the health, morals or well-being of the 
child; and (e) The parent has been incarcerated and is likely to remain incarcerated for a 
substantial period of time during the child‟s minority.  Grounds for termination of parental rights 
must be established by clear and convincing evidence.  I.C. § 16-2009.   
  
ANALYSIS 
The magistrate court terminated Appellants‟ parental rights based on neglect and the best 
interest of the children.  Neglect for the purposes of the Child Protective Act is defined at I.C. § 
16-2002(3): “The parent(s) has failed to comply with the court‟s orders in a child protective act 
case or the case plan, and reunification of the child with his or her parent(s) has not occurred 
within the time standards set forth . . . .”  I.C. § 16-1602(25) further defines a neglected child as 
one “[w]ho is without proper parental care and control, or subsistence, education, medical or 
other care or control necessary for his well-being because of the conduct or omission of his 
parents, guardian or other custodian or their neglect or refusal to provide them . . . ” or “[w]hose 
parents, guardian or other custodian are unable to discharge their responsibilities to and for the 
child and, as a result of such inability, the child lacks the parental care necessary for his health, 
safety or well-being.”   
In this case, the magistrate court found there was clear and convincing evidence that 
Appellants neglected their children and termination of parental rights was in the best interest of 
the children.  Specifically, the court found that there was a consistent lack of supervision and 
financial support; Appellants never completed their case plan, which had been ongoing since 
September 1, 2005; the children were dirty, unsupervised, and lacking a stable environment; the 
school age children were absent from school on an alarming number of days; two of the three 
children had severe behavioral problems that Appellants failed to deal with and progress was 
made on these problems after removal from Appellants‟ care; and the oldest of the three children 
could not read or write until she went into foster care.  The district court found there was 
substantial, competent evidence to support the magistrate court‟s conclusion.   
Although this case is not as clear-cut as most parental termination cases that come before 
this Court, there is substantial, competent evidence in the record to support terminating 
Appellants‟ parental rights.  Appellants failed to comply with the magistrate court‟s orders to 
complete their case plan, which meets the definition of neglect in I.C. § 16-2002(3).  
Additionally, the children were without proper parental care when they would spend time with 
 
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Appellants and Appellants were unable to appropriately discharge their responsibilities as 
parents, as evidenced by the lack of supervision over the children.  The health, safety and well-
being of the children were at risk when they were in Appellants‟ care, which meets the definition 
of neglect in I.C. § 16-1602(25).   
Appellants assert that it is improper for a court to compare the natural parents to foster 
parents when deciding if parental rights should be terminated.  They cite to Santosky v. Kramer, 
455 U.S. 745, 759, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (1982), for the proposition that a finding of unfitness 
does not “purport to determine whether the natural parents or the foster parents would provide 
the better home.”  In this case, neither the magistrate court nor the district court relied on a 
comparison between the natural and foster parents to determine whether there was clear and 
convincing evidence of neglect.  Rather, the district court and magistrate court considered 
Appellants‟ failure to commit fully to making the necessary changes in their lives that would 
provide a more stable environment for their children.  Additionally, both courts considered that 
the children‟s well-being was in danger when they were in Appellants‟ care.  “The magistrate 
judge has a better „opportunity to observe witnesses‟ demeanor, to assess their credibility, to 
detect prejudice or motive and to judge the character of the parties.‟”  Dept. of Health & Welfare 
v. Doe, 145 Idaho 662, 664, 182 P.3d 1196, 1198 (2008) (quoting In re Aragon, 120 Idaho 606, 
608, 818 P.2d 310, 312 (1991)).  Appellants‟ argument that “there are no set, prescribed methods 
on how parents should raise their children” is well taken, but it does not address Appellants‟ 
numerous, documented shortcomings in raising the young children.  Appellants were given 
plenty of opportunity over a period of more than two years to show the magistrate court that they 
were not neglecting their children and that the Department‟s recommendation to remove the 
children from their care was unwarranted.  Appellants‟ efforts fell short.   
Appellants additionally argue that this Court should take into consideration the fact that 
the husband‟s teenage daughter has never been subject to the court‟s jurisdiction under the Child 
Protective Act.  This argument is unavailing.  The record does not have enough information for 
this Court to properly consider the daughter‟s situation; in fact, the record suggests that the 
daughter spent a significant amount of time outside Appellants‟ home when she was living with 
her natural mother.  Moreover, whether Appellants are capable of raising a teenager does not 
shed light on the question of neglect of the three young children under the age of ten that is 
before this Court.   
 
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We hold there is substantial, competent evidence to support the magistrate‟s findings of 
fact and conclusions of law; thus, because the district court affirmed the magistrate court, we 
affirm the district court as a matter of procedure.  
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the district court‟s decision to affirm the magistrate court‟s decision to 
terminate Appellants‟ parental rights to their three children.   
 
Justices BURDICK, J. JONES, HORTON and J. pro tem TROUT, CONCUR.