Title: Waity v. Lemahieu

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2022 WI 6 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2021AP802 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Andrew Waity, Judy Ferwerda, Michael Jones and 
Sara  
Bringman, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
     v. 
Devin Lemahieu, in his official capacity and 
Robin Vos, in  
his official capacity, 
          Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
 
ON PETITION TO BYPASS THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 27, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 1, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Stephen E. Ehlke 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and HAGEDORN, JJ., 
joined.  DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN 
WALSH BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
defendants-appellants-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs filed by Misha Tseytlin, Kevin M. LeRoy and Troutman 
Pepper Hamilton Sanders, Chicago. There was an oral argument by 
Misha Tseytlin. 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents, there was a brief filed by 
Lester A. Pines, Tamara B. Packard, Aaron G. Dumas, Leslie A. 
Freehill, Beauregard W. Patterson and Pines Bach LLP, Madison.  
There was an oral argument by Lester A. Pines.  
 
 
2 
 
There was an amicus curiae brief filed on behalf of 
Wisconsin Democracy Campaign by Jeffrey A. Mandell, Douglas M. 
Poland and Stafford Rosenbaum LLP, Madison; and Mel Barnes and 
Law Forward, Inc.  
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 6 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2021AP802   
(L.C. No. 
2021CV589) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Andrew Waity, Judy Ferwerda, Michael Jones and 
Sara Bringman, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Devin LeMahieu, in his official capacity and 
Robin Vos, in his official capacity, 
 
          Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 27, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and HAGEDORN, JJ., 
joined.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring opinion.  DALLET, J., 
filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and 
KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the Circuit Court 
for Dane County, Stephen E. Ehlke, Judge.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   This case is before 
the court on bypass pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.60 
(2019-20).1  On bypass, we review an order of the Dane County 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated.   
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
2 
 
circuit court,2 Waity v. LeMahieu, No. 2021CV589 (Dane Cnty. Cir. 
Ct. Apr. 29, 2021), granting summary judgment in favor of 
Respondents, Andrew Waity, Judy Ferwerda, Michael Jones, and 
Sara Bringman, and against Petitioners, Devin LeMahieu and Robin 
Vos.3  In its order, the circuit court enjoined the Petitioners 
from issuing payments under two contracts for legal services, 
and it declared the contracts void ab initio.  
¶2 
Petitioners, on behalf of the legislature, entered 
into contracts for attorney services regarding the decennial 
redistricting process and resulting litigation.  Respondents 
claim that Petitioners lacked authority to enter into the 
contracts, and they ask us to declare the agreements void ab 
initio.  Because Petitioners had authority under Wis. Stat. 
§ 16.744 
to 
"purchase[]" 
for 
the 
legislature 
"contractual 
                                                 
2 The Honorable Stephen E. Ehlke presided. 
3 Senator LeMahieu is the majority leader of the Wisconsin 
State Senate, while Representative Vos is Speaker of the 
Wisconsin 
State 
Assembly. 
 
Together, 
they 
represent 
the 
leadership of the Wisconsin Legislature.  
4 The relevant portion of Wis. Stat. § 16.74 is provided 
below: 
(1)  All 
supplies, 
materials, 
equipment, 
permanent personal property and contractual services 
required within the legislative branch shall be 
purchased by the joint committee on legislative 
organization or by the house or legislative service 
agency utilizing the supplies, materials, equipment, 
property 
or 
services. 
All 
supplies, 
materials, 
equipment, permanent personal property and contractual 
services required within the judicial branch shall be 
purchased by the director of state courts or the 
judicial 
branch 
agency 
utilizing 
the 
supplies, 
materials, equipment, property or services. 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
3 
 
services," the agreements at issue were lawfully entered.  The 
circuit court's decision to enjoin enforcement of the contracts 
was improper. 
¶3 
We reverse the circuit court's grant of summary 
judgment in Respondents' favor, and instead, we remand this case 
to the circuit court with instructions to enter judgment in 
favor of Petitioners.  In addition, we clarify the standard for 
granting a stay of an injunction pending appeal.  The circuit 
court in this case incorrectly applied that standard and refused 
to stay its injunction pending appeal of its decision.  Further 
                                                                                                                                                             
. . . 
(2)(b)  Contracts for purchases by the senate or 
assembly shall be signed by an individual designated 
by the organization committee of the house making the 
purchase.  Contracts for other legislative branch 
purchases shall be signed by an individual designated 
by the joint committee on legislative organization. 
Contracts for purchases by the judicial commission or 
judicial council shall be signed by an individual 
designated by the commission or council, respectively. 
Contracts for other judicial branch purchases shall be 
signed by an individual designated by the director of 
state courts. 
. . . 
(4)  Each legislative and judicial officer shall 
file all bills and statements for purchases and 
engagements made by the officer under this section 
with the secretary, who shall audit and authorize 
payment of all lawful bills and statements.  No bill 
or statement for any purchase or engagement for the 
legislature, the courts or any legislative service or 
judicial branch agency may be paid until the bill or 
statement 
is 
approved 
by 
the 
requisitioning 
or 
contracting officer under sub. (2). 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
4 
 
explanation from this court is needed to ensure the standard for 
stays pending appeal is correctly followed in the future.   
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶4 
For decades, the Wisconsin Legislature has hired 
attorneys to provide competent legal advice on redistricting.  
Faced with the inherent challenges of drawing new political 
boundaries in the state, described both as a "thicket," Jensen 
v. Wis. Elections Bd., 2002 WI 13, ¶11, 249 Wis. 2d 706, 639 
N.W.2d 537, and "a critical . . . part of politics," Rucho v. 
Common Cause, 588 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2498 (2019), the 
legislature has repeatedly consulted specialists to assist them 
in developing maps and to prepare for subsequent litigation.  
See Jensen, 249 Wis. 2d 706, ¶10 ("[R]edistricting is now almost 
always 
resolved 
through 
litigation 
rather 
than 
legislation . . . ."); see also, e.g., Wis. State AFL-CIO v. 
Elections Bd., 543 F. Supp. 630 (E.D. Wis. 1982) (redistricting 
litigation for the 1980 census); Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 
F. 
Supp. 
859 
(W.D. 
Wis. 
1992) 
(litigation 
regarding 
redistricting after the 1990 census); Baumgart v. Wendelberger, 
Nos. 01-0121 & 02-C-0366, unpublished slip op. (E.D. Wis. 
May 30, 2002) (redistricting litigation surrounding the 2000 
census); Baldus v. Members of Wis. Gov't Accountability Bd., 849 
F. Supp. 2d 840 (E.D. Wis. 2012) (litigation challenging maps 
enacted by the Wisconsin Legislature and signed by the governor 
after the 2010 census); Johnson v. WEC, No. 2021AP1450-OA, 
unpublished order (Wis. Sept. 22, 2021, amend. Sept. 24, 2021) 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
5 
 
(granting petition for leave to commence an original action on 
redistricting for the 2020 census).   
¶5 
For the 1980 and 1990 redistricting processes, the 
legislature hired attorneys to provide advice and represent its 
interests in litigation in federal and state court.  Similarly, 
for the 2000 and 2010 processes, the Senate Committee on 
Organization authorized payments for attorney services for the 
Wisconsin Senate, while the Wisconsin Assembly obtained counsel 
for redistricting through separate agreements. 
¶6 
In line with historical precedent, the substantial 
legislative demands redistricting created, and the need for pre-
litigation advice, both houses of the legislature retained legal 
counsel for the 2020 redistricting process.  On December 23, 
2020, Petitioners, on behalf of the senate and assembly, 
executed an attorney services contract to begin on January 1, 
2021, with the law firm Consovoy McCarthy PLLC ("Consovoy"), in 
association with Attorney Adam Mortara.  Consovoy and Mortara 
agreed to consult with the legislature on "possible litigation 
related 
to 
decennial 
redistricting," 
"provide 
strategic 
litigation direction," and "provide . . . day-to-day litigation 
resources."5  
¶7 
On 
January 
5, 
2021, 
the 
Committee 
on 
Senate 
Organization issued authorization for purchase of attorney 
services. 
 
The 
committee 
voted 
to 
"authorize[] 
the 
senate . . . to 
retain 
and 
hire 
legal 
counsel" 
for 
                                                 
5 The agreement was revised and re-signed on March 3, 2021. 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
6 
 
redistricting.  The authorization was to remain "in force the 
entire 2021-2022 legislative session," and it provided Senator 
LeMahieu with the authority to "approve all financial costs and 
terms of representation."  
¶8 
On January 6, 2021, Senator LeMahieu, acting on behalf 
of the senate, signed an engagement agreement with the law firm 
Bell Giftos St. John LLC ("BGSJ").  The firm agreed to advise 
the legislature on redistricting, including the "constitutional 
and 
statutory 
requirements," 
"the 
validity 
of 
any 
draft 
redistricting legislation," and for "judicial . . . proceedings 
relating to redistricting."   
¶9 
On 
March 
24, 
2021, 
the 
Committee 
on 
Assembly 
Organization followed the lead of the senate committee and voted 
to authorize Speaker Vos to "hire . . . law firms, entities or 
counsel necessary related to . . . legislative redistricting."  
In addition, the committee noted that Speaker Vos "has always 
[been] authorized" to contract for attorney services "beginning 
on January 1, 2021." 
¶10 To perform their contract obligations, the legislature 
followed the same procedure it follows for all billings and 
expenditures for the legislative branch.  A bill or statement 
was provided to business managers at the senate and assembly.  
The managers entered the billing information into an online 
software 
program 
called 
PeopleSoft; 
the 
information 
in 
PeopleSoft was checked by the chief clerks, who then approved 
the purchases and transmitted the information to the Department 
of Administration ("DOA").  The DOA, as with all purchases made 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
7 
 
by the legislature, received details through the PeopleSoft 
software on the payments requested by the legislature.  The 
agency received: (1) the names of the billing entities and 
individuals (here the law firms contracted to provide services); 
(2) invoice codes specific to the purchases at issue; (3) 
invoice dates; (4) total dollar amounts requested; and (5) a 
general accounting code that categorized the types of purchases 
requested, 
i.e., 
legal 
services. 
 
After 
receiving 
this 
information from the legislature, DOA approved the purchases and 
transferred the requested funds to the senate and assembly.  
¶11 On March 10, 2021, Respondents filed this taxpayer 
lawsuit in Dane County circuit court.  They sought a declaration 
that the two attorney services agreements the legislature 
entered into were void ab initio.  The complaint alleged that no 
legal authority permitted the Petitioners to sign the contracts 
on behalf of the senate and assembly.  Soon after filing the 
complaint, Respondents moved for a temporary injunction barring 
the legislature from issuing payment under the attorney services 
contracts and prohibiting Petitioners from seeking legal advice 
other than from the Wisconsin Department of Justice.  
¶12 Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint.  After a 
hearing, the circuit court denied the request for a temporary 
injunction and converted Petitioners' motion to dismiss into a 
motion for summary judgment.6  The circuit court ordered 
                                                 
6 Under Wis. Stat. § 802.06(2)(b), a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim is converted into a motion for summary 
judgment where "matters outside of the pleadings are presented 
to and not excluded by the court." 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
8 
 
additional briefing.  In a response brief to the motion for 
summary judgment, Respondents stated that the court should not 
only deny Petitioners' motion, but also grant summary judgment 
in Respondents' favor.    
¶13 On April 29, 2021, the circuit court issued a written 
decision agreeing with Respondents.  The circuit court held that 
there was not statutory or constitutional authority by which 
Petitioners could enter into and perform on the attorney 
engagement 
agreements 
with 
Consovoy, 
Mortara, 
and 
BGSJ. 
Specifically, the court quoted Wis. Stat. § 16.74(1), which 
states, in relevant part:  "All supplies, materials, equipment, 
permanent personal property and contractual services required 
within the legislative branch shall be purchased by the joint 
committee on legislative organization or by the house or 
legislative service agency utilizing the supplies, materials, 
equipment, property or services."  (Emphasis added.)  The 
circuit court read the provision as allowing the legislature to 
purchase supplies, materials, and contractual services, but only 
contractual services that are "relate[d] to" and "required" by 
purchases 
of 
other 
physical 
property. 
 
Thus, 
while 
the 
legislature 
could 
hire 
a 
repairman 
to 
inspect 
an 
air 
conditioning unit, it could not contract for stand-alone 
attorney services.  In addition, the circuit court held that, 
while the legislature "could probably . . . hire counsel to 
review [redistricting maps] it has drawn," it could not legally 
enter into the contracts at issue because the agreements were 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
9 
 
"preemptive" and "litigation . . . may not even occur."7  Thus, 
the circuit court declared the relevant contracts void ab initio 
and enjoined Petitioners from authorizing any further payments 
under the contracts. 
¶14 The day after the circuit court issued its opinion, 
Petitioners filed a notice of appeal and an emergency motion for 
a stay pending appeal.  On May 10, 2021, the circuit court held 
a hearing and denied the request for a stay.  In so doing, the 
circuit court reviewed the arguments the Petitioners advanced 
and noted that it "disagree[d] with their legal analysis."  The 
circuit court reiterated that it had considered the caselaw in 
support of Petitioners' position and it "reaffirm[ed]" its 
conclusions of law.  In its reasoning, the circuit court noted 
that Petitioners had "re-present[ed] . . . what was originally 
before [the circuit court]."  The circuit court reasoned that it 
would "merely be repeating what [it] already set forth" in the 
April 29 opinion.  Consequently, the circuit court held that 
Petitioners were unlikely to succeed on appeal.  The circuit 
court continued, stating that Petitioners would not suffer 
irreparable harm because they could rely on institutions such as 
the Attorney General's office for legal advice, and Petitioners 
could hire private firms if redistricting litigation was 
initiated.  Finally, according to the circuit court, because the 
                                                 
7 In addition, the circuit court held that Petitioners did 
not have independent authority to enter into the contracts under 
Wis. Stat. § 13.124, Wis. Stat. § 20.765, or the legislature's 
powers under the Wisconsin Constitution.  
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
10 
 
contracts constituted unauthorized expenditure of public funds, 
harm would befall the general public, and a stay was not 
warranted. 
¶15 On May 12, 2021, Petitioners filed a motion for a stay 
pending appeal at the court of appeals.  On June 29, 2021, two 
months after the circuit court enjoined enforcement of the 
attorney services contracts, the court of appeals issued a 
decision, declining Petitioners' request for a stay.  Waity v. 
LeMahieu, No. 2021AP802, unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. 
June 29, 2021).  The court of appeals explained that the circuit 
court properly analyzed the relevant standard, and its decision 
was not an erroneous exercise of discretion.  Id. at 6-7.  
¶16 On June 30, 2021, Petitioners filed with this court a 
petition to bypass the court of appeals and a motion to stay the 
circuit court's injunction pending appeal.  On July 15, 2021, we 
granted the Petitioners' request to bypass the court of appeals, 
and, in an unpublished order, granted the motion for stay.  
Waity v. LeMahieu, No. 2021AP802, unpublished order (Wis. 
July 15, 2021) (granting motion for relief pending appeal).  In 
so doing, we analyzed the circuit court's stay analysis and 
concluded that the circuit court misapplied the relevant 
standard. 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
11 
 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶17 In this case, we are asked to review motions for 
summary judgment.8  "Whether the circuit court properly granted 
summary judgment is a question of law that this court reviews de 
novo."  Racine County v. Oracular Milwaukee, Inc., 2010 WI 25, 
¶24, 323 Wis. 2d 682, 781 N.W.2d 88 (quotations omitted).  
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  A 
party opposing summary judgment "'may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of the pleadings' but instead, through 
affidavits or otherwise, 'must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial.'"  Oracular Milwaukee, 
323 Wis. 2d 682, ¶26 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 802.08(3) (2007-08)).  
¶18 This 
case 
also 
presents 
questions 
of 
statutory 
interpretation.  "Interpretation of a statute is a question of 
law that we review de novo, although we benefit from the 
analyses of the circuit court and the court of appeals."  Estate 
of Miller v. Storey, 2017 WI 99, ¶25, 378 Wis. 2d 358, 903 
N.W.2d 759. 
 
"[S]tatutory 
interpretation 
begins 
with 
the 
                                                 
8 Petitioners originally moved to dismiss the complaint, 
which the circuit court converted into a motion for summary 
judgment.  See Wis. Stat. § 802.06(2)(b).  In response to the 
motion, at the circuit court, Respondents requested summary 
judgment in their favor.  We review the cross motions for 
summary judgment on appeal. 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
12 
 
language of the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is 
plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry.  Statutory language is 
given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that 
technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their 
technical or special definitional meaning."  State ex rel. Kalal 
v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110 (citations and quotations omitted).  In addition, 
"statutory language is interpreted in the context in which it is 
used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to 
the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and 
reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id., ¶46.  
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶19 The Respondents argue that Petitioners lacked any 
legal authority to enter into legal contracts with Consovoy, 
Mortara, and BGSJ.  In response, Petitioners claim that, at a 
minimum, Wis. Stat. § 16.74 provides Petitioners, acting on 
behalf of the legislature, the necessary authority.9  Petitioners 
argue that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment 
in Respondents' favor, and that in fact, summary judgment is 
warranted in favor of Petitioners. 
¶20 We agree with the Petitioners.  For the reasons 
provided below, Wis. Stat. § 16.74 grants the legislature 
                                                 
9 Petitioners also argue that they had authority to enter 
the legal services contracts under Wis. Stat § 13.124, Wis. 
Stat. § 20.765, and the Wisconsin Constitution.  Because we hold 
that Wis. Stat. § 16.74 provides Petitioners independent legal 
authority 
to 
enter 
the 
contracts, 
we 
will 
not 
address 
Petitioners' other claims.  
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
13 
 
authority 
to 
enter 
into 
legal 
contracts 
to 
assist 
in 
redistricting and related litigation.   
¶21 In addition, we address the circuit court's decision 
to deny a stay of its injunction pending appeal.  The circuit 
court misapplied the standard for granting stays pending appeal.  
Although we reversed the circuit court's decision in an 
unpublished order on July 15, 2021, additional explanation of 
our prior decision is needed to ensure compliance with the law.  
 
A.  The Legislature's Authority To Enter  
Into Legal Services Contracts Under Wis. Stat. § 16.74. 
1.  The circuit court decision 
¶22 Wisconsin Stat. § 16.74(1), titled "Legislative and 
judicial branch purchasing," states that "[a]ll supplies, 
materials, 
equipment, 
permanent 
personal 
property 
and 
contractual services required within the legislative branch 
shall be purchased by the joint committee on legislative 
organization or by the house or legislative service agency 
utilizing the supplies, materials, equipment, property or 
services."  The circuit court reasoned that, although the 
legislature could purchase some services under this agreement, 
because the legal services at issue were not related to other 
"supplies, 
materials, 
equipment, 
[or] 
permanent 
personal 
property," the legal services fell outside the scope of the 
statute. 
¶23 The circuit court misinterpreted Wis. Stat. § 16.74.  
The statute explicitly permits each house of the legislature to 
purchase "contractual services" that are "required within the 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
14 
 
legislative branch."  § 16.74(1).  The text of § 16.74 does not 
state that purchase of services must be tied to other physical 
property purchases.  In fact, Wis. Stat. § 16.70(3) defines 
"contractual services" under § 16.74 to include "all services, 
materials to be furnished by a service provider in connection 
with services, and any limited trades work involving less than 
$30,000 to be done for or furnished to the state or any agency."  
(Emphasis added.)  In § 16.74, the legislature did not enact a 
limited purchasing power.  
¶24 "Service" is defined as "[t]he action or fact of 
working or being employed in a particular capacity (irrespective 
of whom the work is done for)."  Service, Oxford English 
Dictionary (2021); see also service, Black's Law Dictionary 
(11th ed. 2019) ("Labor performed in the interest or under the 
direction of others.").  The term "contractual services" 
includes the provision of work or labor to another in exchange 
for 
compensation, 
under 
an 
enforceable 
agreement.  
Unambiguously, this includes the provision of legal services 
under contract.   
¶25 The circuit court's statutory interpretation appears 
to rely heavily on logic embodied in the noscitur a sociis 
canon.  However, the canon does not alter our conclusion.  
Noscitur a sociis serves to read in context ambiguous terms that 
could be defined literally in a manner conflicting with the 
statute's plain meaning.  Therefore, in the list "tacks, 
staples, 
nails, 
brads, 
screws, 
and 
fasteners," 
the 
word 
"staples" should not be read to mean "reliable and customary 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
15 
 
food items."  Antonin Scalia & Bryan A Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 196 (2012); see also Stroede v. 
Soc'y Ins., 2021 WI 43, ¶¶1, 19, 397 Wis. 2d 17, 959 N.W.2d 305 
(interpreting a list of "possessor[s] of real property," which 
included "owner, lessee, tenant, or other lawful occupant of 
real property," to not encompass a patron at a bar who lacked 
"possession or control over the property" (citing Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.529 (2017-18)).   
¶26 The term "contractual services" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 16.74 is unambiguous and includes attorney services.  See 
Benson v. City of Madison, 2017 WI 65, ¶31, 376 Wis. 2d 35, 897 
N.W.2d 16 (holding that the term "corporation" was unambiguous 
and thus there was "no need to resort to the [noscitur a sociis] 
canon").  Furthermore, the broad scope of "contractual services" 
is in harmony with the shared meaning of "supplies, materials, 
equipment, [and] permanent personal property" under § 16.74(1) 
as all items in the list must, by statute, be "required within 
the legislative branch."  See State v. Quintana, 2008 WI 33, 
¶35, 308 Wis. 2d 615, 748 N.W.2d 447 (noting that, under the 
noscitur a sociis canon, a list of specific items indicated a 
general common meaning which permitted an "expansive, not 
restrictive" reading of the statute).  
¶27 Confirming the plain meaning and statutory definition 
of "contractual services," the official legislative annotation 
of Wis. Stat. § 16.70(3) states that "'[c]ontractual services' 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
16 
 
include technical and professional services."10  Wis. Stat. 
§ 16.70, historical note (citing 65 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 251 
(1976)); see Madison Metro. Sch. Dist. v. Cir. Ct. for Dane 
Cnty., 2011 WI 72, ¶65 n.12, 336 Wis. 2d 95, 800 N.W.2d 442 
(stating that, although "titles and histor[ical] notes" are not 
part of statutes, "they provide valuable clues to the meaning of 
statutory text" (citing Wis. Stat. § 990.001(6) (2007-08))).  Of 
course, attorneys are considered professionals.  
¶28 The circuit court also held that the attorney services 
contracts at issue were not "required within the legislative 
branch" 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 16.74 
because 
redistricting 
                                                 
10 The legislative annotation relies on an Attorney General 
opinion from 1976, which interpreted the meaning of "contractual 
services" under the version of Wis. Stat. § 16.70 that existed 
at the time.  65 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 251 (1976); see Milwaukee 
J. Sentinel v. City of Milwaukee, 2012 WI 65, ¶41, 341 
Wis. 2d 607, 815 N.W.2d 367 ("The opinions of the Attorney 
General are not binding on the courts but may be given 
persuasive effect.").  The definition in 1976 had no material 
differences to the current version.  See Wis. Stat. § 16.70 
(1975-76) (defining "contractual services" to include "all 
materials and services").  In the opinion, the Attorney General 
reviewed the legislative history of § 16.70 and explained that a 
prior version of the statute was amended to define "contractual 
services" to include "all . . . services."  65 Wis. Op. Att'y 
Gen. at 255-56.  When making that change, the legislature was 
concerned that the prior version of the statute excluded 
"technical and professional services."  Id.  Thus, the Attorney 
General concluded that § 16.70's definition of "contractual 
services" included professional services, such architectural and 
engineering consulting services.  Id. at 252.  This legislative 
history confirms the plain language of § 16.70.  Teschendorf v. 
State Farm Ins. Co., 2006 WI 89, ¶14, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 
N.W.2d 258 ("[I]f the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
sometimes look to legislative history to confirm the plain 
meaning.").  "Contractual services" under § 16.70 extends to all 
professional services, including legal services. 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
17 
 
litigation had not yet begun.  Of course, in cases of complex 
litigation, legal advice to prepare clients for upcoming court 
proceedings, develop legal strategies, and mitigate litigation 
risk can be of material significance.  Understanding the stakes 
and 
potential 
consequences 
of 
a 
given 
action——here, 
a 
redistricting map——may serve to ensure greater legal compliance, 
reduce the need for judicial intervention, and lower burdens on 
the court system.  There is no support found in either the text 
of § 16.74 or in basic principles of litigation practice that 
counseling prior to the filing of a lawsuit is not worthwhile or 
helpful.  In fact, it can be of equal or greater importance than 
representation in subsequent legal proceedings.  This is 
especially true in an area such as redistricting, where multiple 
levels of law from both state and federal sources present 
substantial compliance difficulties to even the most astute 
legal mind, and litigation is extraordinarily likely, if not 
inevitable.  Jensen, 249 Wis. 2d 706, ¶10 ("[R]edistricting is 
now almost always resolved through litigation rather than 
legislation . . . .").   
¶29 Furthermore, any distinction between the existence and 
nonexistence of a present lawsuit is largely unworkable.  While 
the legislature may have authorization to purchase legal 
services under Wis. Stat. § 16.74 once a lawsuit was initiated, 
under the circuit court's reasoning, the legislature would be 
prohibited from hiring counsel to file a lawsuit on its behalf, 
as no lawsuit would exist prior to the lawsuit being filed.  
Such an interpretation is absurd.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
18 
 
¶46 (stating that statutes must be interpreted "reasonably, to 
avoid absurd or unreasonable results").    
¶30 The parties do not dispute that Petitioners, on behalf 
of the legislature, contracted with Consovoy and Mortara to 
provide 
advice 
and 
strategic 
direction 
on 
redistricting 
litigation.  BGSJ was contracted to review "constitutional and 
statutory 
requirements" 
and 
the 
"validity 
of 
any 
draft 
redistricting legislation," as well as to assist the legislature 
in redistricting-related legal proceedings.   
¶31 It strains credulity to conclude that the need for 
legal advice in this area was fictitious or somehow disconnected 
from legitimate legislative activities.  Every ten years, the 
legislature is constitutionally responsible for drawing district 
boundaries in this state.  See Jensen, 249 Wis. 2d 706, ¶6 
(noting that the Wisconsin Constitution gives "the state 
legislature the authority and responsibility" to draw district 
boundaries); Wis. Const. art. IV, § 3 ("[T]he legislature shall 
apportion and district anew the members of the senate and 
assembly . . . ."). 
 
The 
legislature 
clearly 
has 
a 
constitutionally-rooted institutional interest in litigating 
redistricting disputes.   
¶32 The undisputed facts show that, in line with decades 
of bipartisan precedent, the Senate and Assembly Committees on 
Organization determined that the hiring of legal counsel to 
assist with redistricting was needed.  By taking these votes, 
the legislature rationally took steps to make more informed 
decisions in drawing maps, navigate extraordinarily complex 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
19 
 
legal issues, and prepare for related litigation.  As a matter 
of law, there is no genuine dispute of fact that the attorney 
services contracts were "required within the legislative branch" 
under Wis. Stat. § 16.74.  See Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  
2.  The Respondents' arguments 
¶33 The Respondents' arguments on appeal move away from 
the circuit court's legal reasoning.  Instead, they claim that 
Wis. Stat. § 16.74 contains no conferral of purchasing authority 
at all.  According to Respondents, some other statutory 
provision must provide authority to the legislature to make 
basic purchasing decisions.  Under Respondents' theory, § 16.74 
simply identifies which entities may make purchases for the 
legislature and the procedure by which those purchases are 
completed.  
¶34 Wisconsin Stat. § 16.74(1) confirms that "supplies, 
materials, 
equipment, 
permanent 
personal 
property 
and 
contractual services," must be purchased by the joint committee 
on legislative organization, a house of the legislature, or a 
legislative service agency to the extent that the purchases are 
"required within the legislative branch."  By the very operation 
of this provision, those entities entitled to make purchases 
must have, under the statute, the legal authority to do so.  If 
no authority exists, the responsibility to make "purchase[s]" 
under the statute would have little applicability or utility.  
The statute includes no indication, explicit or implicit, that 
purchasing authority is vested, defined, or limited by other 
statutory provisions.  For example, § 16.74(1) does not state, 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
20 
 
"If authorized" under a different statute, "[a]ll supplies, 
materials, 
equipment, 
permanent 
personal 
property 
and 
contractual 
services" 
shall 
be 
purchased. 
 
Instead, 
the 
provision states, without ambiguity, that such goods and 
services "shall be purchased" to the extent they are needed by 
the legislature.  Respondents fail to cite a conflicting 
provision in the Wisconsin code that ties purchases under 
§ 16.74 to separate statutory provisions.    
¶35 In other words, for the plain text of Wis. Stat. 
§ 16.74(1) to have effective meaning, the legislature must have 
the authority to make purchases under the provision.  This basic 
principle is not foreign to our jurisprudence.  For example, in 
Bank of New York Mellon v. Carson, we interpreted a foreclosure 
statute which stated, upon a court's finding of abandonment, a 
judgment "shall be entered" which indicates that "the sale of 
such mortgaged premises shall be made upon the expiration of 5 
weeks from the date [of judgment]."  2015 WI 15, ¶20, 361 
Wis. 2d 23, 859 N.W.2d 422 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 846.102 (2011-
12)).  We interpreted the statute to provide "the circuit court 
the authority to order a bank to sell the property."  Id.  
Further, Wis. Stat. § 808.03(2) states that a civil "judgment or 
order [of a circuit court] . . . may be appealed to the court of 
appeals in advance of a final judgment or order" if certain 
conditions are met.  Naturally, we have read § 808.03(2) to 
provide litigants with the ability to "appeal[] by permission."  
Heaton v. Larsen, 97 Wis. 2d 379, 397, 294 N.W.2d 15 (1980).   
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
21 
 
¶36 When 
interpreting 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 846.102(1) 
and 
808.03(2), we did not demand separate statutory authority for a 
court to order a foreclosure sale or for a litigant to appeal by 
permission of the court.  Such authority was inherent in the 
plain meaning and operation of the statutes.  We did not read 
§ 846.102(1) as solely describing the content of foreclosure 
judgments, and we did not read § 808.03(2) as merely explaining 
conditions precedent to appeal.  Contrary to Respondents' 
claims, Wis. Stat. § 16.74, like §§ 846.102(1) and 808.03(2), 
does not only identify the individuals or entities who may have 
legal authority to make legislative branch purchases if another 
statute says as much, nor does the provision serve only to 
clarify procedure for making such purchases.  Instead, § 16.74 
is an independent grant of legal authority by which the 
legislature can buy the goods and services it needs.11  
¶37 The context of Wis. Stat. § 16.74 confirms this plain 
meaning.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 ("[S]tatutory language 
                                                 
11 Similarly, Article I, Section 4 of the United States 
Constitution states that, "The times, places and manner of 
holding elections for senators and representatives, shall be 
prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof." (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 16.74(1), 
which 
states 
"[a]ll . . . contractual 
services 
required 
within 
the 
legislative branch shall be purchased by . . . the house or 
legislative service agency utilizing [the services]," uses an 
almost identical linguistic structure.  It is not seriously 
disputed that, under the text of Article I, Section 4, states 
are vested the authority to regulate the manner of federal 
elections.  See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 
779, 805 (1995) (explaining that the provision is an "express 
delegation[] of power to the States to act with respect to 
federal elections"). 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
22 
 
is interpreted in the context in which it is used . . . .").  
Section 16.74(3) states that the individuals "authorized to make 
purchases or engage services under this section [16.74] may 
prescribe the form of . . . contracts for the purchases and 
engagements."  (Emphasis added.)  Similarly, § 16.74(4) states 
that "bills and statements for purchases and engagements" made 
"under this section" must be submitted to the DOA.  (Emphasis 
added.)  These provisions heavily imply that § 16.74 provides an 
independent basis by which the legislature can make purchases.  
It would be deeply counterintuitive for § 16.74 to specify that 
purchases are made under its own terms when, in fact, a 
completely separate, unidentified statute confers the needed 
legal authority to make the purchases.  By stating that 
purchases are made under § 16.74, the legislature confirmed 
that, 
indeed, 
purchases 
can 
be 
made 
under 
the 
statute.  
Respondents' arguments are not supported by the text of § 16.74 
and cannot be accepted.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45 ("If 
the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the 
inquiry." (quotations omitted)).12 
                                                 
12 It is noteworthy that Wis. Stat. § 16.74 also provides 
the statutory basis for making judicial branch purchases.  See 
§ 16.74(1) 
("All 
supplies, 
materials, 
equipment, 
permanent 
personal property and contractual services required within the 
judicial branch shall be purchased by the director of state 
courts . . . .").  An almost identically worded statute provides 
the DOA with the authority to complete necessary purchases "for 
all [executive branch] agencies."  Wis. Stat. § 16.71(1); see, 
e.g., Glacier State Dist. Servs. v. DOT, 221 Wis. 2d 359, 362, 
585 N.W.2d 652 (Ct. App. 1998) (noting that all purchases for 
"the de-icing of state highways" in Wisconsin were made under 
§ 16.71).  If Respondents' interpretation were correct, legal 
uncertainty would surround basic purchases by the legislative, 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
23 
 
¶38 Putting aside the question of purchasing authority 
under Wis. Stat. § 16.74, Respondents claim that a more specific 
statute for hiring attorneys applies and thus, Petitioners 
cannot rely on § 16.74 to enter into the contracts with 
Consovoy, Mortara, and BGSJ.  Wisconsin Stat. § 13.124 states 
that the senate majority leader or the assembly speaker, or 
both, may at their "sole discretion," "obtain legal counsel 
other than from the department of justice . . . in any action in 
which the [senate or assembly] is a party or in which the 
interests 
of 
the 
[senate 
or 
assembly] 
are 
affected, 
as 
determined 
by 
the 
[senate 
majority 
leader 
or 
speaker]."  
§ 13.124(1)(b), (2)(b).  It is true that "where two conflicting 
statutes apply to the same subject, the more specific statute 
controls."  
Lornson v. Siddiqui, 2007 WI 92, ¶65, 302 
Wis. 2d 519, 735 N.W.2d 55; see also Scalia & Garner, supra ¶25, 
at 183 ("The general/specific canon . . . deals with what to do 
when 
conflicting 
provisions 
simply 
cannot 
be 
reconciled . . . .").  However, "conflicts between different 
statutes, by implication or otherwise, are not favored and will 
not be held to exist if they may otherwise be reasonably 
construed."  State ex rel. Hensley v. Endicott, 2001 WI 105, 
¶19, 245 Wis. 2d 607, 629 N.W.2d 686.   
¶39 Here, there is no statutory conflict that bars the use 
of Wis. Stat. § 16.74 to purchase attorney services.  Under a 
                                                                                                                                                             
judicial, and executive branches.  Under what authority, for 
instance, would courts be able to buy note pads on which judges 
and clerks write?   
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
24 
 
plain reading of Wis. Stat. § 13.124, the provision applies only 
where there is an "action" in which the senate or assembly are 
parties, or their interests are affected.  The provision also 
vests authority solely in the discretion of the senate majority 
leader and assembly speaker.  By contrast, § 16.74 grants the 
legislature authority to purchase attorney services, but only if 
approved by "the joint committee on legislative organization or 
by the house or legislative service agency" using the services.  
There is no limitation in § 16.74 that the purchase be made for 
an "action" like in § 13.124.  Thus, § 13.124 provides a quick, 
streamlined basis for the legislature's leadership to obtain 
counsel for the legislature in "any action."  By contrast, 
§ 16.74 allows each house of the legislature to obtain counsel 
as needed, irrespective of whether an "action" exists.  Sections 
13.124 and 16.74 are different statutes that apply in distinct 
circumstances.  They provide separate statutory authority for 
the hiring of attorneys, and the general/specific cannon does 
not apply.13  See Lornson, 302 Wis. 2d 519, ¶65 (requiring 
"conflicting statutes"); Endicott, 245 Wis. 2d 607, ¶19 (noting 
that 
interpretations 
rendering 
statutes 
in 
conflict 
are 
disfavored in the law).  
¶40 In addition, Respondents claim that, even if Wis. 
Stat. § 16.74 provides the legislature authority to contract for 
                                                 
13 We reserve, without deciding, the question of whether 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 13.124 
provided 
the 
Petitioners 
authority, 
independent of Wis. Stat. § 16.74, to enter into attorney 
services contracts prior to the initiation of a redistricting 
lawsuit.  
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
25 
 
attorney services, Petitioners did not comply with procedural 
requirements.  Under § 16.74(1), purchases must be made by "the 
joint committee on legislative organization or by the house or 
legislative service agency utilizing the" goods or services.  
"Contracts for purchases by the senate or assembly shall be 
signed by an individual designated by the organization committee 
of the house making the purchase."  § 16.74(2)(b).   
¶41 Here, the undisputed facts show that the Senate and 
Assembly Committees on Organization, who were designated by 
their respective houses to review and complete purchases for 
attorney services, vested the Petitioners with authority to 
enter into the contracts with Consovoy, Mortara, and BGSJ.  On 
January 5, 2021, the Committee on Senate Organization approved 
the hiring of attorneys for redistricting and explicitly granted 
Senator LeMahieu authority to enter into contracts.  Further, on 
March 24, 2021, the Committee on Assembly Organization vested 
Speaker 
Vos 
with 
the 
authority 
to 
hire 
counsel 
for 
redistricting, noting that Speaker Vos had "always [been] 
authorized" to contract for attorney services. 
¶42 Respondents note that the agreement with Consovoy and 
Mortara was signed on December 23, 2020, and the Senate and 
Assembly Committees on Organization approved the hiring of 
counsel after that date, on January 5 and March 24, 2021, 
respectively.  Therefore, the legislature indisputably approved 
the attorney agreements signed by Petitioners in January and 
March 2021.  It is well established that a contract is valid, 
even if originally signed by an agent without authority, when 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
26 
 
the principal subsequently ratifies the agreement and agrees to 
be bound by its terms.  See M&I Bank v. First Am. Nat'l Bank, 75 
Wis. 2d 168, 
176, 
248 
N.W.2d 475 
(1977) 
(explaining 
that 
"[r]atification is the manifestation of intent to become party 
to a transaction purportedly done on the ratifier's account"); 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §380 cmt. a (1981) ("A party 
who has the power of avoidance may lose it by action that 
manifests a willingness to go on with the contract."); see, 
e.g., Milwaukee J. Sentinel v. DOA, 2009 WI 79, 319 Wis. 2d 439, 
768 N.W.2d 700 (reviewing a public records law challenge to a 
statute enacted by the legislature to ratify a previously 
negotiated collective bargaining agreement).  The legislature 
adopted the contracts at issue, even given the fact that it did 
so after the agreements were signed.  The agreements are valid 
and enforceable. 
¶43 Respondents also claim that the contracts are void 
because the legislature failed to provide adequate information 
to the DOA, and the payments to Consovoy, Mortara, and BGSJ were 
not properly audited.  Wisconsin Stat. § 16.74(4) states that 
"[e]ach legislative and judicial officer shall file all bills 
and statements for purchases and engagements made by the officer 
under this section with the secretary [of the DOA], who shall 
audit and authorize payment of all lawful bills and statements."   
¶44 It is undisputed that the legislature submitted 
information on bills from the relevant attorney services 
contracts to the DOA.  Petitioners submitted undisputed evidence 
that, as with all purchases for the legislature, including 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
27 
 
attorney services, information from the bills was inputted into 
a software program, PeopleSoft.  A business manager submitted 
basic accounting details, such as the name of the billing 
entities, transaction-specific invoice codes, invoice dates, the 
amount of funds needed, and the general accounting code 
describing the subject matter of the transaction, i.e., legal 
services.  The information was reviewed by at least two 
employees at the legislature, including the chief clerks, and 
was then transferred to the DOA for review.  The DOA received 
the information and issued payments.  The uncontested facts show 
that the legislature properly allowed the DOA to audit and 
review "bills and statements" for the attorney services at 
issue.  Wis. Stat. § 16.74(4).   
¶45 Respondents cite a response to a public records 
request provided by DOA's Chief Legal Counsel, Ann Hanson, which 
stated that the DOA did not have access to bills and statements 
that originated from Consovoy and BGSJ.  However, DOA's response 
also indicated that the DOA was given payment requests and, in 
fact, issued payments.  Clearly, at the time of the payments, 
DOA believed the legislature had provided sufficient information 
to review the requests and comply with Wis. Stat. § 16.74's 
procedural requirements.  As with all purchasing requests 
submitted by the legislature, DOA had online access to the 
information taken from the attorney services bills submitted 
through PeopleSoft.  The fact that the legislature, working with 
the DOA, streamlined the acquisitions process and transitioned 
to software programs in lieu of submitting original billing 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
28 
 
statements is of no legal significance.  As required by § 16.74, 
the DOA had access to basic accounting information for the 
purchases at issue, and, predictably, the DOA issued payments.  
¶46 To the extent that DOA failed to perform a proper 
audit under Wis. Stat. § 16.74 of the legislature's purchasing 
requests, Respondents must direct their complaint toward the 
DOA, not the legislature.  Section 16.74(4) unambiguously vests 
the duty to "audit and authorize payment[s]" with the DOA.  
Respondents cite no legal authority that the legislature had the 
obligation or responsibility to oversee DOA's internal auditing 
process.  In this case, DOA received billing requests and 
information, responded to the legislature, and issued payments.  
If, in doing so, DOA failed to fully perform its administrative 
duties, purchasing by the legislature under § 16.74 cannot be 
ground to a halt.14   
¶47 In all, the legislature complied with Wis. Stat. 
§ 16.74 
and 
received 
the 
payments 
it 
properly 
approved, 
validated, and requested.  Consequently, as a matter of law, 
summary judgment in Petitioners' favor is warranted.15   
                                                 
14 Furthermore, any failure of those authorized to make 
purchases under Wis. Stat. § 16.74 to provide information to the 
DOA for audit would implicate the legality of payments for the 
legal services contracts, not the legality of the contracts 
themselves.  There is no substantiated argument that failing to 
send proper documentation to the DOA would render the contracts 
unenforceable.  While Respondents filed this lawsuit in part to 
bar payments under the contracts, if Petitioners violated 
§ 16.74's audit procedures as Respondents allege, the separate 
remedy of declaring the contracts void ab initio would not be 
appropriate. 
15 The dissent does not dispute that attorney services 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
29 
 
B.  The Standard For Stays Pending Appeal 
¶48 After awarding summary judgment in Respondents' favor, 
the circuit court in this case enjoined Petitioners from 
                                                                                                                                                             
constitute "contractual services" under Wis. Stat. § 16.74, nor 
does it claim, as do the Respondents, that § 16.74 fails to 
provide independent legal authority to complete legislative 
purchases.  Instead, the dissent advances a distinct statutory 
interpretation undeveloped by Respondents on appeal.  It notes 
that § 16.74(1) permits purchases by "the joint committee on 
legislative organization or by the house or legislative service 
agency utilizing" the goods or services, and it claims that 
neither the joint committee nor the senate or assembly as a 
whole voted to approve the contracts at issue.  Yet, the statute 
does not bar the senate or assembly from designating committees 
to complete purchases on behalf of the two houses.  It is well 
understood that the legislature adopts and utilizes internal 
rules to "govern[] how it operates."  Custodian of Recs. for 
Legis. Tech. Servs. Bureau v. State, 2004 WI 65, ¶28, 272 
Wis. 2d 208, 680 N.W.2d 792; see also League of Women Voters of 
Wis. v. Evers, 2019 WI 75, ¶39, 387 Wis. 2d 511, 929 N.W.2d 209 
(noting that the legislature has the discretion "to determine 
for itself the rules of its own proceedings"); see, e.g., Flynn 
v. 
DOA, 
216 
Wis. 2d 521, 
531-32, 
576 
N.W.2d 245 
(1998) 
(explaining that the legislature delegated to a committee the 
authority to narrow and eliminate alternatives of proposed 
legislation).  The senate and assembly may, as was done in this 
case, appoint committees on organization to approve necessary 
purchases on behalf of the two houses.  Under the dissent's 
reading, if purchases are not made through the joint committee 
on organization, the entirety of each house would be forced to 
vote on specific, and often mundane, legislative purchases.  The 
text of § 16.74 does not require the legislature to engage in 
such 
inefficient 
practices. 
 
In 
fact, 
§ 16.74 
expressly 
contemplates 
the 
designation 
of 
committees 
to 
facilitate 
necessary purchasing.  The statute states that contracts for 
purchases by either house must be signed "by an individual 
designated by the organization committee of the house making the 
purchase."  § 16.74(2)(b) (emphasis added); see State ex rel. 
Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 
681 
N.W.2d 110 
("[S]tatutory 
language 
is 
interpreted in the context in which it is used . . . .").  That 
is exactly what occurred in this case.    
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
30 
 
performing the attorney-services contracts signed with Consovoy, 
Mortara, and BGSJ.  In addition, the circuit court declined to 
issue a stay of the injunction pending appeal.  In July 2021, we 
reversed that decision in an unpublished order.  See Waity v. 
LeMahieu, No. 2021AP802, unpublished order (Wis. July 15, 2021) 
(granting motion for relief pending appeal).  We now take the 
opportunity to explain our decision.   
¶49 Courts must consider four factors when reviewing a 
request to stay an order pending appeal: 
(1) whether the movant makes a strong showing 
that it is likely to succeed on the merits of the 
appeal; 
(2) whether the movant shows that, unless a stay 
is granted, it will suffer irreparable injury; 
(3) whether the movant shows that no substantial 
harm will come to other interested parties; and 
(4) whether the movant shows that a stay will do 
no harm to the public interest. 
See State v. Scott, 2018 WI 74, ¶46, 382 Wis. 2d 476, 914 
N.W.2d 141.  
At times, this court has also noted that 
"[t]emporary injunctions are to be issued only when necessary to 
preserve the status quo."  Werner v. A.L. Grootemaat & Sons, 
Inc., 80 Wis. 2d 513, 520, 259 N.W.2d 310 (1977).  The relevant 
factors "are not prerequisites but rather are interrelated 
considerations that must be balanced together."  State v. 
Gudenschwager, 191 Wis. 2d 431, 440, 529 N.W.2d 225 (1995). 
¶50 On appeal, a circuit court's decision to grant or deny 
a motion to stay is reviewed under the erroneous exercise of 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
31 
 
discretion standard.  Id. at 439.  The circuit court's decision 
must be affirmed if it "examined the relevant facts, applied a 
proper standard of law, and using a demonstrative rational 
process, reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could 
reach."  Lane v. Sharp Packaging Sys., Inc., 2002 WI 28, ¶19, 
251 Wis. 2d 68, 640 N.W.2d 788.  In this case, the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion by applying an incorrect 
legal standard.   
¶51 First, in reviewing whether Petitioners made "a strong 
showing that [they were] likely to succeed on the merits of the 
appeal," the circuit court repeatedly referred to its own legal 
reasoning employed when it granted summary judgment and issued 
an injunction in favor of Respondents.  The circuit court noted 
that it "disagree[d] with [Petitioners'] legal analysis."  It 
stated it reviewed the caselaw cited by Petitioners and 
"reaffirm[ed]" its conclusions of law.  In the circuit court's 
view, Petitioners had, in their motion for a stay, "re-
present[ed] . . . what 
was 
originally 
before 
[the 
circuit 
court]," and the circuit court would "merely be repeating what 
[it] already set forth" in its decision to award summary 
judgment and enjoin enforcement of the relevant contracts.   
¶52 The circuit court's analysis was flawed.  When 
reviewing a motion for a stay, a circuit court cannot simply 
input its own judgment on the merits of the case and conclude 
that a stay is not warranted.  The relevant inquiry is whether 
the movant made a strong showing of success on appeal.  
Gudenschwager, 191 Wis. 2d at 440.  Of course, whenever a party 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
32 
 
is seeking a stay, there has already been a determination at the 
trial level adverse to the moving party.  If the circuit court 
were asked to merely repeat and reapply legal conclusions 
already made, the first factor would rarely if ever side in 
favor of the movant.  As we explained in our July 15, 2021, 
order, "very few stays pending appeal would ever be entered 
because almost no circuit court judge would admit on the record 
that he [or] she could have reached a wrong interpretation of 
the law."  Waity, No. 2021AP802, unpublished order, at 9. 
¶53 When reviewing the likelihood of success on appeal, 
circuit courts must consider the standard of review, along with 
the possibility that appellate courts may reasonably disagree 
with 
its 
legal 
analysis. 
 
For 
questions 
of 
statutory 
interpretation, as are presented in this case, appellate courts 
consider the issues de novo.  See Estate of Miller, 378 
Wis. 2d 358, ¶25.  Here, the circuit court relied on its own 
interpretation of statutes such as Wis. Stat. § 16.74, which 
neither this court nor the court of appeals had previously 
interpreted, to conclude that an appeal would be meritless.  
Instead, the circuit court should have considered how other 
reasonable jurists on appeal may have interpreted the relevant 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
33 
 
law and whether they may have come to a different conclusion.16   
If the circuit court had done so, its stay analysis would have 
been different.  As explained above, under the plain language of 
§ 16.74, the legislature had authority to hire counsel for 
redistricting, and reasonable judges on appeal could easily have 
disagreed with the circuit court's holdings.   
¶54 When reviewing the likelihood of success on appeal, 
"the probability of success that must be demonstrated is 
inversely proportional to the amount of irreparable injury the 
plaintiff will suffer absent the stay."  Gudenschwager, 191 
Wis. 2d at 441.  Thus, the greater the potential injury, the 
less a movant must prove in terms of success on appeal.  
However, "the movant is always required to demonstrate more than 
the mere possibility of success on the merits."  Id. (quotations 
omitted). 
¶55 In this case, the risk of harm to Petitioners absent a 
stay was substantial and irreparable.  The circuit court 
concluded that the legislature did not suffer harm because they 
could obtain advice on redistricting from other government 
                                                 
16 By contrast, appeals of decisions left primarily to the 
discretion of circuit courts, such as the length of a criminal 
sentence or the admissibility of evidence under Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.03, have a smaller likelihood of success than appeals 
requiring de novo interpretation of statutes.  See State v. 
Taylor, 2006 WI 22, ¶17, 289 Wis. 2d 34, 710 N.W.2d 466 ("A 
circuit court exercises its discretion at sentencing, and 
appellate review is limited to determining if the court's 
discretion was erroneously exercised."); State v. Plymesser, 172 
Wis. 2d 583, 595, 493 N.W.2d 367 (1992) ("Section 904.03 gives a 
judge discretion to exclude evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.").  
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
34 
 
actors such as the Attorney General.  However, as explained 
above, redistricting presents extraordinarily complex questions 
of state and federal law.  It is a process that takes place only 
every ten years; it can have a substantial effect on elections 
and the right to vote; and it is almost inevitable that 
redistricting will be litigated.  Contrary to the circuit 
court's belief, the legislature's determination that it needed 
assistance from qualified specialists, outside the Attorney 
General's office, was abundantly reasonable.  
¶56 The circuit court also mentioned in its harm analysis 
that litigation surrounding redistricting had not yet begun.  As 
thoroughly discussed above, pre-litigation counsel can be 
indispensable when potential legislation implicates significant 
legal questions and litigation is highly likely.   
¶57 When considering potential harm, circuit courts must 
consider whether the harm can be undone if, on appeal, the 
circuit court's decision is reversed.  If the harm cannot be 
"mitigated or remedied upon conclusion of the appeal," that fact 
must weigh in favor of the movant.  Waity, No. 2021AP802, 
unpublished order, at 11 (quoting Serv. Empls. Int'l Union v. 
Vos, No. 2019AP622, unpublished order, at 6-7 (Wis. June 11, 
2019)).  Here, due to the circuit court's order, the legislature 
was deprived of counsel of its choice for two and a half months.  
In the meantime, the demands of redistricting continued as the 
legislature prepared to draw new maps and the risk of litigation 
materialized.  The circuit court failed to consider that, if its 
order were overturned, the legislature could not get legal 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
35 
 
advice "back" for this critical time in which an injunction was 
in effect.  Because the harm the legislature would experience 
absent a stay was significant, Petitioners were required to show 
only "more than the mere possibility of success on the merits."  
Gudenschwager, 191 Wis. 2d at 441 (quotations omitted).  The 
Petitioners clearly met that standard.  
¶58 By comparison, the harm to Respondents was minimal.  
In conducting a stay analysis, courts consider whether the 
movant "shows that no substantial harm will come to other 
interested parties."  Scott, 382 Wis. 2d 476, ¶46.  However, 
similar to the circuit court's consideration of harm to the 
movant, courts consider the period of time that the case is on 
appeal, not any harm that could occur in the future.  Courts 
must consider the extent of harm the non-movant will experience 
if a stay is entered, but the non-movant is ultimately 
"successful 
in 
having 
the . . . injunction 
affirmed" 
and 
reinstated.  Waity, No. 2021AP802, unpublished order, at 11 
(quoting Serv. Empls. Int'l Union, No. 2019AP622, unpublished 
order, at 6-7).  Thus, the stay analysis is not a mere 
repetition of any harm analysis conducted by the circuit court 
when it originally issued an order granting relief, which may 
consider generally all future harms to the non-movant.  See 
Kocken v. Wis. Council 40, 2007 WI 72, ¶27 n.12, 301 
Wis. 2d 266, 732 N.W.2d 828 (explaining that "[a] permanent 
injunction will not be granted unless there is the threat of 
irreparable injury that cannot be compensated with a remedy at 
law"). 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
36 
 
¶59 Here, the circuit court reasoned that Respondents were 
substantially harmed because "[t]ens, if not hundreds of 
thousands of [taxpayer] dollars . . . will be spent" under the 
contracts at issue.  First, in making this finding, the circuit 
court failed to specify or tailor its cost estimates to expenses 
that would have been incurred while the case was on appeal, as 
opposed to over the course of the entire life of the contracts, 
e.g., until redistricting disputes are settled.  Second, the 
harm alleged by Respondents in this case was the loss of 
taxpayer money.  As three individuals out of a state population 
of 5.8 million, Respondents' harm as taxpayers was orders of 
magnitude less than any final dollar amount Petitioners may have 
improperly spent.  The circuit court failed to consider this 
basic fiscal reality, which substantially reduced any potential 
harm to the Respondents.  Furthermore, the circuit court failed 
to consider whether any financial losses to Respondents, to the 
extent they existed, could be recovered through a disgorgement 
remedy.   
¶60 Finally, when reviewing the fourth factor, harm to the 
public interest, the circuit court reiterated that the contracts 
at issue would wrongfully expend public monies.  The potential 
for unauthorized expenditures of public funds was a valid 
consideration of the circuit court.  However, the circuit court 
failed also to address the public interest served in allowing 
the legislature to obtain needed legal advice for redistricting.  
The legislature has the constitutional responsibility to set 
district boundaries, and the process can have a material effect 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
37 
 
on the rights of Wisconsin voters.  See Wis. Const. art. IV, 
§ 3.  Consequently, the public is better served when the 
legislature 
has 
effective 
representation 
in 
performing 
redistricting and preparing for subsequent litigation.  This 
interest was more significant, during the time period of appeal, 
than the public interest in preventing allegedly unauthorized 
expenditures.  
¶61 In all, the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion by refusing to stay its injunction pending appeal.  
See Lane, 251 Wis. 2d 68, ¶19.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶62 Petitioners, on behalf of the legislature, entered 
into 
contracts 
for 
legal 
advice 
regarding 
the 
decennial 
redistricting process and any resulting litigation.  Respondents 
claim that Petitioners lacked authority to enter into the 
contracts, and they ask us to declare the agreements void ab 
initio.  Because Petitioners had authority under Wis. Stat. 
§ 16.74 
to 
"purchase[]" 
for 
the 
legislature 
"contractual 
services," the agreements were lawfully entered.  
¶63 The circuit court's decision to enjoin enforcement of 
the contracts was improper.  We reverse the circuit court's 
grant of summary judgment in Respondents' favor, and instead, we 
remand this case to the circuit court with instructions to enter 
judgment in favor of Petitioners.  In addition, we clarify the 
standard for granting a stay of an injunction pending appeal, 
which the circuit court in this case incorrectly applied. 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802  
 
38 
 
By the Court.—The judgment and the order of the circuit 
court are reversed, and the cause is remanded with instructions. 
 
 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802.bh  
 
1 
 
¶64 BRIAN 
HAGEDORN, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
I 
join 
the 
majority opinion.  I write separately, however, to respond to 
the dissent's misinterpretation of the majority opinion's stay 
analysis.  In a number of cases that have crossed our desks, 
circuit courts rule against a party, and then, pro forma, 
conclude their ruling means there is little to no likelihood of 
success on appeal and deny a stay.  That is what happened here, 
and this improper understanding of the law is why we reversed 
the circuit court's stay decision.  The dissent misreads the 
court's discussion of this problem as if the majority is setting 
forth a new standard.  It is not. 
¶65 We adopted the Gudenschwager test to guide the 
determination of whether to grant a stay pending appeal.1  The 
relevant factors——which encompass the likelihood of success on 
the merits of the appeal, the anticipated harms to the parties, 
and harm to the public——"are not prerequisites."2  Rather, the 
factors 
constitute 
a 
balancing 
test 
of 
"interrelated 
considerations" that call for the court's considered judgment.3  
Of particular relevance here, the likelihood of success on 
appeal a movant must show "is inversely proportional to the 
amount of irreparable injury the [movant] will suffer absent the 
stay"——i.e., a sliding scale.4  A high degree of harm paired with 
                                                 
1 State 
v. 
Gudenschwager, 
191 
Wis. 2d 431, 
440, 
529 
N.W.2d 225 (1995) (per curiam). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 441. 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802.bh  
 
2 
 
a lower likelihood of success on appeal may be sufficient to 
grant a stay.5  And the higher the likelihood of success on 
appeal, the less pertinent the harm to the movant becomes.6 
¶66 The dissent suggests that under the majority's logic, 
a stay must always be granted when it is possible an appellate 
court might disagree on a novel question of law.  Incorrect.  
All the majority says on this point is that the circuit court's 
stay analysis should account for the standard of review on 
appeal.  The dissent, in contrast, seems to think that if a 
court disagrees with a party's legal argument, a stay will 
rarely be appropriate.  But that is not the law. 
¶67 This case is a classic example of when the circuit 
court should have granted a stay pending appeal despite its 
conclusion on the merits.  Denying a stay deprived the 
legislature of the attorneys of its choice during a time it 
concluded legal representation was necessary.  This was a 
substantial harm.  Attorneys are not fungible.  The attorney-
client relationship is based on trust, and the loss of timely 
counsel from a trusted attorney is a real deprivation.  The harm 
to the Respondents and the public, on the other hand, was rooted 
entirely 
in 
dollars 
and 
cents——allegedly 
unauthorized 
contractual payments.  This is not nothing, but it's not much, 
at least in this context.  Under these facts, this does not 
                                                 
5 Though "the movant is always required to demonstrate more 
than a mere 'possibility' of success on the merits."  Id. 
6 Id. 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802.bh  
 
3 
 
amount 
to 
the 
kind 
of 
"substantial 
harm" 
Gudenschwager 
contemplates.  Even accepting the circuit court's disagreement 
with the Petitioners' arguments, they surely had some nontrivial 
likelihood of persuading a higher court that their legal 
arguments were correct.7  Here the Petitioners' substantial harm 
was paired with at least a reasonable likelihood of success on 
appeal, and granting a stay would bring limited harm to the 
Respondents and the public.  Therefore, a stay was most 
appropriate.8 
¶68 More importantly, the message to courts moving forward is 
that the likelihood of success on appeal is a flexible, sliding-
                                                 
7 The dissent states that when cases are not "close calls," 
the likelihood of success on appeal will be low.  Dissent, ¶93.  
True enough.  But this isn't one of those cases.  Even without 
the benefit of our decision today, the circuit court should have 
recognized another court could reasonably disagree with its 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 16.74.  Before the circuit court, 
no one argued for the reading of § 16.74 it articulated.  That 
should have been a clue that another court might read the 
statute differently. 
8 The dissent is correct that appellate courts should not 
reweigh and second guess a circuit court's good faith attempts 
to balance the factors.  Our review is under the erroneous 
exercise of discretion standard.  Gudenschwager, 191 Wis. 2d at 
439-40.  However, the circuit court in this case applied the 
wrong standard of law which is, by definition, an erroneous 
exercise of discretion.  See State v. Carlson, 2003 WI 40, ¶24, 
261 Wis. 2d 97, 661 N.W.2d 51 ("[A]n exercise of discretion 
based on an erroneous application of the law is an erroneous 
exercise of discretion.").  The circuit court's error was not 
that it continued to agree with its previously announced merits 
analysis. 
 
The 
circuit 
court's 
error 
was 
thinking 
that 
referencing to its prior decision was all it needed to say about 
the likelihood of success on appeal. 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802.bh  
 
4 
 
scale factor to be balanced against the relevant harms.9  Rather 
than conduct this analysis, the circuit court here treated the 
likelihood of success on appeal as shorthand for its own prior 
merits decision.  Applying the test correctly, it should not be 
uncommon, particularly when faced with a difficult legal 
question of first impression, to rule against a party but 
nonetheless stay the ruling.  
                                                 
9 The dissent's fundamental error is failing to appreciate 
that the likelihood of success is a sliding-scale factor.  The 
dissent seems to think some unnamed threshold of likely success 
is necessary.  It finds confusing the majority's recitation of 
black-letter law that some chance of success is required, yet no 
particular threshold is needed.  The dissent's bewilderment 
notwithstanding, this isn't contradictory at all.  It is, and 
has been, the law. 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802.rfd  
 
1 
 
¶69 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (dissenting).  As leaders 
of the legislature, Petitioners have a say in what the law is, 
but they are, like everyone else, bound by the laws the 
legislature enacts.  Thus, Petitioners are bound by Wis. Stat. 
§ 16.74, which requires that all contractual services "shall be 
purchased by the joint committee on legislative organization 
[JCLO] or by the house . . . utilizing the . . . services."1  The 
record here demonstrates that Petitioners' contracts with 
outside counsel were neither entered into nor later ratified by 
the JCLO or the house using those services, and therefore the 
contracts are invalid.  In ignoring this statutory requirement, 
the majority wrongly allows Petitioners to exercise purchasing 
authority they don't have, thereby eliminating a safeguard 
against the misuse of taxpayer dollars. 
¶70 I also disagree with the majority's novel application 
of the law regarding stays pending appeal.  It reduces what has 
traditionally 
been 
a 
four-factor 
balancing 
test 
to 
two 
questions:  (1) is the issue being appealed subject to de novo 
review?; and (2) would the court of appeals or this court likely 
grant a stay?  In doing so, the majority undermines circuit 
courts' discretion to weigh the equities of each case while 
providing no guidance for how to implement its unprecedented 
approach. 
                                                 
1 Legislative service agencies, such as the Legislative 
Reference Bureau, can also purchase contractual services, but no 
such agency is involved in this case. 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802.rfd  
 
2 
 
I 
¶71 Petitioners raise four possible sources of authority 
for the legal-services contracts they entered into with outside 
counsel:  the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 20.765, 
§ 13.124, 
and 
§ 16.74. 
 
Because 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
conclusion rests entirely on § 16.74, I focus on that statute 
before touching on the other three sources. 
A 
¶72 Wisconsin Stat. § 16.74 controls who may purchase 
"contractual services" and who may sign the contracts for those 
services. Subsection (1) states that "[a]ll . . . contractual 
services required within the legislative branch shall be 
purchased by the joint committee on legislative organization or 
by the house . . . utilizing the . . . services."  This is the 
sole 
provision 
in 
§ 16.74 
that 
authorizes 
purchases 
of 
contractual services within the legislature, and it exhaustively 
identifies the entities that may do so:  the JCLO or the house 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802.rfd  
 
3 
 
using the services (the senate or the assembly).2  For 
contractual services that only the senate or the assembly will 
use, § 16.74(2)(b) provides that those contracts "shall be 
signed by an individual designated by the organization committee 
of the house making the purchase."  See also id. (adding that 
"contracts for other legislative branch purchases shall be 
signed 
by 
an 
individual 
designated 
by" 
the 
JCLO).  
Subsection (2)(b) is not an authorization to make purchases; it 
simply identifies who may sign a contract on the senate's or the 
assembly's behalf when either house purchases services under 
subsec. (1), saving every senate or assembly member from having 
to sign individually. 
¶73 I agree with the majority opinion that legal services 
are "contractual services," as that term is defined broadly in 
                                                 
2 There is at least some surface-level tension between the 
text of § 16.74(1) and that of § 16.74(3) in that the latter 
implies that a legislative "officer" may be authorized to 
purchase 
contractual 
services. 
 
See 
§ 16.74(3) 
("Each 
legislative and judicial officer who is authorized to make 
purchases or engage services under this section may prescribe 
the form of requisitions or contracts for the purchases and 
engagements.").  Nowhere in § 16.74, however, is a legislative 
officer authorized to do so (a judicial officer——the director of 
state courts——is authorized to make purchases or engage services 
under § 16.74(1)).  Nevertheless, there is no contradiction 
between the two subsections as subsec. (3) does not authorize 
anyone to purchase contractual services; rather, it provides 
that those who are so authorized may dictate the form of 
requisitions or contracts for purchases of those services.  The 
only subsection that authorizes anyone to actually purchase 
contractual services is subsec. (1). 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802.rfd  
 
4 
 
§ 16.70(3) to include "all services."3  And no party argues that 
these legal services are not "required within the legislative 
branch."  See § 16.74(1).  The legal-services contracts are not 
valid, however, unless they were purchased by the JCLO or the 
specific house utilizing the services. 
¶74 A careful review of the record reveals that they were 
not.  The record contains no action by the JCLO, the senate, or 
the assembly to purchase these services.  A review of the 
legislature's journals reveals the same.  See, e.g., Medlock v. 
Schmidt, 29 Wis. 2d 114, 121, 138 N.W.2d 248 (1965) (the 
legislature's records are "properly the subject of judicial 
notice").  They contain no legislative act from the JCLO, the 
senate, or the assembly approving the legal-services contracts.4  
Without such evidence, there is no factual basis for the 
majority opinion's conclusion that these contracts are valid 
under § 16.74(1).  The majority suggests that the senate or 
                                                 
3 The 
majority 
opinion's 
reasoning 
is 
correct 
but 
inconsistent with the court's holding in James v. Heinrich, 2021 
WI 58, 397 Wis. 2d 516, 960 N.W.2d 350.  There, despite no 
textual limitation on the phrase "all measures necessary to 
prevent, suppress, and control communicable disease," the 
majority wrongly held that it "cannot be" that "all" such 
measures means "any" measures.  See id., ¶¶21–22.  Here, the 
majority correctly reaches the opposite conclusion, explaining 
that "all" means "all."  See majority op., ¶23; see also James, 
397 Wis. 2d 516, ¶70 (Dallet, J., dissenting) (explaining that 
the court may not read into a statute a "phantom limitation"). 
4 Section 16.74 does not specify the mechanics of how the 
senate or assembly must act in order to purchase contractual 
services.  Regardless of what compliance looks like, however, 
there is no evidence of any action by either house in this case. 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802.rfd  
 
5 
 
assembly could skirt this statutory requirement by simply 
adopting 
an 
internal 
rule 
appointing 
their 
respective 
organization 
committees 
to 
approve 
contractual-services 
purchases.  But that never happened——and even if it had, our 
precedent makes clear that internal rules cannot trump explicit 
statutory restrictions.  See White Constr. Co. v. City of 
Beloit, 178 Wis. 335, 338, 190 N.W. 195 (1922) (explaining that 
governmental bodies "may enter into a valid contract in the way 
specified by law and not otherwise"). 
¶75 To be sure, the senate and the assembly's separate 
committees on organization purported to approve the contracts, 
but those committees have no authorization under § 16.74(1) to 
do so.  The majority attempts to sidestep that problem by 
treating 
"the 
organization 
committee 
of 
the 
house" 
in 
§ 16.74(2)(b) and "the house" in § 16.74(1) as one and the same.  
That interpretation is flawed in two ways.  First, "the house" 
and "the organization committee of the house" have different 
meanings and refer to different things.  See State v. Matasek, 
2014 
WI 27, 
¶¶17–21, 
353 
Wis. 2d 601, 
846 
N.W.2d 811 
(reiterating that when the legislature uses different terms in 
the same or a closely related statute, we should presume that 
the terms have different meanings).  "The house" refers to 
either of the two houses that constitute the legislature:  the 
senate or the assembly.  See Wis. Const. art. IV.  "The 
organization committee of the house," on the other hand, refers 
to the senate's or the assembly's organization committee, both 
of which are defined by rule and are made up of certain members 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802.rfd  
 
6 
 
of the senate and assembly leadership, respectively.  See 
Assembly Rule 9(3) (2021); Senate Rule 20(1) (2021).  Simply 
put, the senate organization committee is not the senate; the 
assembly organization committee is not the assembly. 
¶76 Section 16.74 
makes 
the 
distinction 
between 
"the 
house" and "the organization committee of the house" even 
clearer by explicitly authorizing each house and each house's 
organization committee to do different things.  Each house is 
authorized to purchase services under § 16.74(1), while the 
organization committees of those houses are authorized only to 
designate a person to sign those contracts under § 16.74(2)(b).  
An authorization to sign contracts is not the same as an 
authorization to purchase services.  If it were, the first 
sentence of § 16.74(2)(b) would make no sense:  "Contracts for 
purchases by the senate or assembly shall be signed by an 
individual designated by the organization committee of the house 
making the purchase."  The text of § 16.74 therefore makes clear 
that a house's organization committee cannot make or approve 
purchases for contractual services. 
¶77 Second, there is no statutory basis for the majority's 
assertion that the senate and assembly organization committees 
were "designated by their respective houses" to contract with 
outside counsel, or that those committees "vested" Petitioners 
with the authority to enter into the contracts.  See majority 
op., ¶41.  Nowhere does § 16.74(1) authorize either house to 
designate its respective organization committee to exercise that 
authority.  Therefore, neither house may do so.  See Fed. Paving 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802.rfd  
 
7 
 
Corp. v. City of Wauwatosa, 231 Wis. 655, 657–59, 286 N.W. 546 
(1939); White Constr. Co., 178 Wis. at 338.  If the legislature 
had wanted to permit such designation, it would have done so 
explicitly——just as it did regarding purchase requests and 
contract signatories in § 16.74(2).  See § 16.74(2)(a) (purchase 
requisitions "shall be signed by the cochairpersons of the 
[JCLO] or their designees for the legislature, by an individual 
designated by either house of the legislature for the house, or 
by the head of any legislative service agency, or the designee 
of that individual, for the legislative service agency") 
(emphases added); § 16.74(2)(b) (same regarding who must sign 
contracts); see also, e.g., Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n, 110 Wis. 2d 455, 463, 329 N.W.2d 143 (1983) (explaining 
that when one statute contains a provision and a similar statute 
omits the same provision, the court must not read in the omitted 
provision).  And, contrary to the majority's baseless claim, 
nothing in the record indicates that either house's organization 
committee was in fact designated to purchase contractual 
services.  Lastly, because neither the assembly's nor the 
senate's organization committee has purchasing authority under 
§ 16.74(1), they cannot "vest" their non-existent authority in 
Petitioners.  See Wis. Carry, Inc. v. City of Madison, 2017 
WI 19, ¶¶23, 28, 373 Wis. 2d 543, 892 N.W.2d 233 (a government 
body "cannot delegate what it does not have"). 
¶78 For similar reasons, the majority's assertion that the 
"legislature" ratified the contracts also fails.  The majority 
claims that, § 16.74(1) notwithstanding, the contracts are valid 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802.rfd  
 
8 
 
because the senate and the assembly's organization committees 
"adopted the contracts at issue," thereby ratifying them.  See 
majority op., ¶42.  But when a government entity enters a 
contract "without [proper] authority," as Petitioners did here, 
"the acts relied upon for ratification must be sufficient to 
have supported a contract originally."  See Ellerbe & Co. v. 
City of Hudson, 1 Wis. 2d 148, 155–58, 83 N.W.2d 700 (1957); 
Fed. Paving Corp., 231 Wis. at 657 (a government body must 
ratify a contract "with the formality required by statute to 
make [the] contract").  That means that only the JCLO or the 
house utilizing the services could ratify Petitioners' contracts 
with outside counsel because only those entities are authorized 
to form the contracts in the first place.  And, as explained 
above, the record contains no action by any necessary body 
regarding these contracts. 
¶79 There is therefore no basis for the majority opinion's 
conclusion that the contracts are valid under § 16.74. 
B 
¶80 Petitioners 
offer 
three 
alternative 
sources 
of 
authority for the contracts.  The first two——the Wisconsin 
Constitution and Wis. Stat. § 20.765——say nothing about the 
issue.  Setting aside that both sources speak only to the 
legislature as a whole and not Petitioners specifically, 
Petitioners point to no language in the Wisconsin Constitution 
that grants the legislature inherent authority to contract with 
whomever it wants; nor do they cite a case that says as much.  
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802.rfd  
 
9 
 
While the Constitution requires the legislature to redistrict 
the state's electoral maps every ten years, it says nothing 
about whether the legislature can hire outside counsel to help 
it do so.  Likewise for § 20.765, which deals only with how the 
legislature pays its expenses, not with its authority to incur 
them.  It does not follow from the statute's "appropriat[ing] to 
the legislature . . . a sum sufficient" to carry out its 
functions, that Petitioners may spend money on anything they 
want regardless of any other statutory limitations.  See 
§ 20.765 (emphasis added). 
¶81 The other statute, Wis. Stat. § 13.124 (titled "Legal 
Representation"), 
also 
does 
not 
authorize 
the 
contracts.  
Section 13.124 provides that the leader of the appropriate house 
may, in her "sole discretion," hire outside counsel "in any 
action in which the assembly [or senate] is a party or in which 
[its] interests . . . are affected."  The statute also leaves it 
to the houses' leaders' discretion to determine whether a 
particular action actually affects the house's interests.  See 
§ 13.124.  What is not left to their discretion, however, is 
determining whether there is an "action" to begin with.  And it 
is undisputed that as of the date Petitioners contracted with 
outside counsel, there was no pending action in which the 
assembly or senate was a party or in which either houses' 
interests were affected.  Therefore, the plain text of § 13.124 
precluded Petitioners from entering into the contracts. 
¶82 Petitioners counter that the court should read "any 
action" as including any "imminent" action, pointing to Wis. 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802.rfd  
 
10 
 
Stat. § 990.001(3) for support.  Section 990.001(3) states that, 
"when applicable," the present tense of a verb includes the 
future tense.  But even assuming that § 990.001(3) applies to 
§ 13.124, it doesn't help Petitioners.  Substituting "will be" 
for the present-tense verbs "is" and "are" results in the 
assembly speaker being able to hire outside counsel "in any 
action in which the assembly is will be a party or in which the 
interests of the assembly are will be affected."  That 
construction, however, just allows the house leaders to retain 
outside counsel if they believe their house will eventually 
become involved in an already pending action.  It doesn't change 
the fact that a currently pending action is still required by 
the statute's plain text.  Since there was none here, § 13.124 
provides no authority for the contracts. 
¶83 Petitioners' 
alternatives, 
therefore, 
cannot 
save 
these contracts from the fact that they were not properly 
authorized under § 16.74, and the majority errs in concluding 
otherwise. 
II 
¶84 While the majority's statutory analysis is wrong, at 
least its effects are likely to be limited.  The same cannot be 
said for the majority's discussion about the standard for stays 
pending 
appeal. 
 
Despite 
its 
claim 
that 
it 
is 
merely 
"explain[ing]" an earlier unpublished order, majority op., ¶48, 
the majority unsettles what was a well-established, long-
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802.rfd  
 
11 
 
standing test for stays, applying the Gudenschwager factors in a 
novel and unworkable way. 
¶85 As we have explained time and again, appellate courts 
are required to give a high degree of deference to a circuit 
court's decision to grant or deny a stay pending appeal, 
reviewing the decision only for an erroneous exercise of 
discretion. 
 
See, 
e.g., 
State 
v. 
Gudenschwager, 
191 
Wis. 2d 431, 439–40, 
529 
N.W.2d 225 
(1995). 
 
Accordingly, 
appellate courts must "search the record for reasons to sustain" 
the circuit court's decision, not manufacture reasons to reverse 
it.  E.g., State v. Dobbs, 2020 WI 64, ¶48, 392 Wis. 2d 505, 945 
N.W.2d 609; Gudenschwager, 191 Wis. 2d at 439–40.  So long as 
the circuit court "demonstrated a rational process[] and reached 
a decision that a reasonable judge could make," an appellate 
court must affirm, even if it would have reached a different 
conclusion.  Weber v. White, 2004 WI 63, ¶40, 272 Wis. 2d 121, 
681 N.W.2d 137.  An appellate court may reverse the circuit 
court's stay decision only if the circuit court applied the 
wrong legal standard or reached a conclusion not reasonably 
supported by the facts.  See Gudenschwager, 191 Wis. 2d at 440; 
State 
v. 
Jendusa, 
2021 
WI 24, 
¶16, 
396 
Wis. 2d 34, 
955 
N.W.2d 777. 
¶86 The correct legal standard for deciding whether to 
grant a stay pending appeal is a four-factor balancing test that 
has been used by the federal courts for at least 60 years.  See, 
e.g., Gudenschwager, 191 Wis. 2d at 439–40; Va. Petroleum 
Jobbers Ass'n v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802.rfd  
 
12 
 
Cir. 1958).  We expressly adopted it over 25 years ago in 
Gudenschwager: 
A stay pending appeal is appropriate where the moving 
party:  (1) makes a strong showing that it is likely 
to succeed on the merits of the appeal; (2) shows 
that, unless a stay is granted, it will suffer 
irreparable injury; (3) shows that no substantial harm 
will come to other interested parties; and (4) shows 
that a stay will do no harm to the public interest. 
191 Wis. 2d at 440.  Although not identical, the test is similar 
to that for temporary and preliminary injunctions.  See, e.g., 
Werner v. A.L. Grootemaat & Sons, Inc., 80 Wis. 2d 513, 520, 259 
N.W.2d 310 (1977) (unlike with stays pending appeal, a factor 
for courts to consider regarding injunctions is whether an 
injunction is "necessary to preserve the status quo"). 
¶87 Here, the circuit court clearly applied all four 
Gudenschwager factors.  On the first factor, it concluded that 
Petitioners had presented "nothing" to suggest "they [we]re 
likely to succeed on appeal on [the statutory] issues" and that 
it was "unlikely [its] decision will be reversed on appeal."  
The court then addressed the second factor, concluding that 
Petitioners had failed to "meet their burden" of showing that 
they were "likely to suffer irreparable harm."  Finally, the 
circuit court determined that the "third and fourth factors also 
weigh against granting a stay" because allowing Petitioners to 
improperly spend taxpayer money would harm both these plaintiffs 
and the general public.  The court of appeals then affirmed the 
circuit court——twice.  Given that the circuit court weighed each 
Gudenschwager factor, there is no question that it applied the 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802.rfd  
 
13 
 
correct legal standard.5  So when the majority and the 
concurrence claim that the circuit court applied the wrong legal 
standard, what they really mean is that they disagree with the 
circuit court's conclusion.  But that disagreement is an 
insufficient reason to hold that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion. 
 
See 
McCleary 
v. 
State, 
49 
Wis. 2d 263, 281, 181 N.W.2d 512 (1971) ("An appellate court 
should not supplant the predilections of a trial judge with its 
own."); Gudenschwager, 191 Wis. 2d at 440. 
¶88 Instead of applying the Gudenschwager test as it's 
been traditionally understood, the majority and the concurrence 
appear to craft a new approach, seemingly reinterpreting the 
legal standard for each factor.  Making matters worse is their 
failure to provide the lower courts with any guidance on how to 
apply those standards.   
¶89 The majority and the concurrence stumble right out of 
the gate, failing to apply the first Gudenschwager factor.  
Gudenschwager requires the moving party to make a "strong 
showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits," adding that 
"more than the mere possibility" of success on appeal is "always 
required."  191 Wis. 2d at 440–41.  Both the majority and the 
concurrence pay lip service to that standard, yet neither 
explains how Petitioners met it.  The concurrence suggests that 
                                                 
5 The concurrence talks itself in circles on this point.  It 
claims both that the Gudenschwager test is the same as it's 
always been and that the circuit court, which applied that 
traditional test, applied the wrong legal standard.  Both of 
those things can't be true at the same time. 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802.rfd  
 
14 
 
a stay was warranted in part because likelihood of success is a 
"sliding-scale factor" and Petitioners had a "nontrivial" and 
"reasonable" chance of succeeding.  See concurrence, ¶¶67–68.  
Of course, it is black-letter law that in any multi-factor 
balancing test, all factors exist on a sliding scale in that 
each 
must 
be 
weighed 
against 
the 
others. 
 
See, 
e.g., 
Gudenschwager, 191 Wis. 2d at 440.  But that still doesn't 
explain why Petitioners had made a strong showing they were 
likely to succeed on the merits, or whether "nontrivial" and 
"reasonable" chances of success are somehow synonymous with 
"more than a mere possibility of success." 
¶90 The majority next errs by falsely equating a "strong 
showing" of likely success on appeal with the fact that the 
court of appeals reviews questions of law de novo.  It provides 
no explanation for how the de novo standard of review, on its 
own, gives the moving party more than a mere possibility of 
success on appeal.  To be sure, de novo review gives an 
appellant a better chance of winning on appeal than a more 
deferential standard of review——but it "does not make the merits 
of a party's arguments any stronger."  League of Women Voters v. 
Evers, 
No. 2019AP559, 
unpublished 
order, 
at 
11 
(Wis. 
Apr. 30, 2019) (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., dissenting).  There is 
therefore no reason to believe that a party who lost on the 
merits at summary judgment has any more than a mere possibility 
of winning on appeal under a de novo review. 
¶91 The majority is unfazed by that logic, perhaps because 
its position makes the merits irrelevant.  Under the majority's 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802.rfd  
 
15 
 
view, when the circuit court interprets statutory language for 
the first time, it must always grant a stay because it's 
possible another court may disagree with the circuit court's 
analysis on appeal.  That is, the moving party has somehow made 
a "strong showing" it will win on appeal because it lost on the 
merits in the circuit court.  That "reasoning" is nonsensical on 
its face.  Plus, the fact that a party lost on a novel 
statutory-interpretation question is a strong reason for a 
circuit court to deny a stay:  If an appellate court has yet to 
interpret the statutory language at issue, the circuit court has 
no reason to think that another court is likely to interpret the 
statute differently.  Even if it does, that does not necessarily 
mean 
the 
moving 
party 
will 
win, 
because 
different 
interpretations do not necessarily lead to different outcomes.  
The bottom line is that de novo appellate review, on its own, 
says nothing about whether a party has "more than a mere 
possibility of success" on appeal——a bar that the majority and 
the concurrence acknowledge that the moving party must "always" 
clear.  See Gudenschwager, 191 Wis. 2d at 441. 
¶92 It is therefore hard to make sense of the majority's 
claim 
that 
had 
the 
circuit 
court 
considered 
"how 
other 
reasonable jurists on appeal may . . . interpret[] the relevant 
law" under the de novo standard of review, the circuit court's 
analysis would have been "different."  See majority op., ¶53.  
The record shows that the circuit court was well aware it was 
deciding a question of law that would be reviewed de novo, even 
if it did not explicitly reference that standard of review.  
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802.rfd  
 
16 
 
Whatever the circuit court was supposed to do differently, the 
majority and the concurrence do not say, leaving circuit courts 
to guess at how de novo appellate review should factor into 
their analyses.   
¶93 The majority and the concurrence also fault the 
circuit court for resting on its summary-judgment analysis in 
evaluating Petitioners' likelihood of success on the merits, but 
again fail to say why that's a problem.  It will often be the 
case a party is unlikely to succeed on appeal for the same 
reasons it did not succeed on summary judgment, particularly in 
cases that aren't close calls.  That is why we have previously 
concluded that when a circuit court decides a question of law 
and "believe[s] its decision [i]s in accordance with the law," 
that reason is good enough in most cases for it to also conclude 
that the losing party "would not be successful on appeal."   See 
Weber, 272 Wis. 2d 121, ¶36.  Conversely, "if the circuit court 
concludes the issue is a close or complex one, the likelihood of 
success on appeal will generally be greater."  See Scullion v. 
Wis. Power & Light Co., 2000 WI App 120, ¶19, 237 Wis. 2d 498, 
614 N.W.2d 565.  There is nothing in this record, though, 
indicating 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
found 
the 
statutory-
interpretation issue to be close or complex.  And the fact that 
this court ultimately reached a different conclusion on the 
merits doesn't mean the circuit court was wrong on that score. 
¶94 The upshot is that the majority may be right that the 
first factor will "rarely if ever" favor the movant.  See 
majority op., ¶52.  Most parties who lose at summary judgment 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802.rfd  
 
17 
 
will have a difficult time showing that they are likely to win 
on appeal.  But that does not mean that a circuit court will 
never grant those parties a stay.  There are three other factors 
under the Gudenschwager test, and a stronger showing on those 
may outweigh the moving party's low likelihood of success on the 
merits.  See Weber, 272 Wis. 2d 121, ¶35 (explaining that the 
factors 
are 
not 
"prerequisites, 
but 
rather 
interrelated 
considerations that must be balanced together"). 
¶95 The majority's discussion of those other factors, 
however, provides little clarity for how a circuit court should 
analyze them.  The majority's application of the second factor——
irreparable injury——lowers the bar for when an injury is 
considered "irreparable."  Traditionally, "irreparable injury" 
means an injury that, without a stay, will harm the movant in a 
way that "is not adequately compensable in damages" and for 
which there is no "adequate remedy at law."  See Allen v. Wis. 
Pub. Serv. Corp., 2005 WI App 40, ¶30, 279 Wis. 2d 488, 694 
N.W.2d 420.  "The possibility that adequate compensatory or 
other corrective relief will be available at a later date, in 
the ordinary course of litigation, weighs heavily against" a 
claim that an injury is irreparable.  Sampson v. Murray, 415 
U.S. 61, 90 (1974) (quoted source omitted); see also Brock v. 
Milwaukee Cnty. Pers. Rev. Bd., No. 97-0234, unpublished op., 
1998 WL 261627, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. May 26, 1998). 
¶96 The majority lowers that threshold by conflating an 
"adequate remedy at law" with Petitioners' preferred remedy.  It 
describes Petitioners' injury as their being unable to retain 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802.rfd  
 
18 
 
"counsel of [their] choice" to assist with redistricting, and 
insists that the injury was irreparable because Petitioners 
"could not get legal advice 'back' for this critical time in 
which an injunction was in effect."  See majority op., ¶57.  The 
concurrence further muddies the waters by labeling Petitioners' 
inability to retain counsel of their choice a "substantial harm" 
and a "real deprivation."  See concurrence, ¶67.  But neither 
the majority, the concurrence, nor Petitioners explain why 
Petitioners' injury, however characterized, was irreparable.  
None explain why outside counsel could not give Petitioners the 
same advice once the "risk of litigation materialized" and 
Petitioners could then hire them under Wis. Stat. § 13.124.  See 
majority op., ¶57.  Moreover, as the circuit court pointed out, 
myriad alternatives were available to Petitioners during that 
time: 
If 
the 
Legislature 
needs 
assistance 
in 
its 
redistricting 
work, 
it 
has 
plenty 
of 
options. . . . [I]t 
has 
available 
to 
it 
the 
Legislative 
Reference 
Bureau, 
the 
Legislative 
Technology Services Bureau, the Wisconsin Legislative 
Council, and the Attorney General's Office.  Among 
those various agencies and groups there are plenty of 
resources available to the Legislature to engage in 
their redistricting role. 
In any event, Petitioners could have avoided any harm altogether 
by entering into or ratifying the contracts "in the way 
specified" by § 16.74(1).  See White Constr. Co., 178 Wis. 
at 338. 
 
Plain 
and 
simple, 
Petitioners' 
injury 
was 
not 
irreparable. 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802.rfd  
 
19 
 
¶97 On the third factor——potential harm to the non-moving 
party——the 
majority 
proposes 
an 
unprecedented 
per 
capita 
calculation for taxpayer harms.  The majority claims that 
potential harm to the plaintiffs was "minimal" because they are 
only "three individuals out of a state population of 5.8 
million," see majority op., ¶¶58–59, implying that even if 
Petitioners were illegally spending taxpayers' money, the only 
relevant harm to the plaintiffs were their per capita shares.  
Not only is there no support in our jurisprudence for such a 
narrow view of taxpayers' harms, the majority offers no 
explanation for what number of taxpayers or how high of a per 
capita share is significant enough to weigh against a stay——
again leaving circuit courts in the dark.  Our precedent also 
undermines the concurrence's implication that so long as 
government officials' wrongdoing can be measured only in 
"dollars and cents," there's "not much" of a harm to taxpayers, 
concurrence, ¶67.  See S.D. Realty Co. v. Sewerage Comm'n of 
City of Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 2d 15, 22, 112 N.W.2d 177 (1961) 
(explaining the "substantial interest" that every taxpayer has 
in preventing the "illegal expenditure of public funds").  As 
for the majority's claim that the circuit court should have 
considered whether the plaintiffs could pursue "a disgorgement 
remedy," majority op., ¶59, it is unclear how that would work.  
Disgorgement requires a party to give up profits obtained 
illegally, e.g., Country Visions Coop. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland 
Co., 2020 WI App 32, ¶46, 392 Wis. 2d 672, 946 N.W.2d 169, aff'd 
on other grounds, 2021 WI 35, 396 Wis. 2d 470, 958 N.W.2d 511, 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802.rfd  
 
20 
 
but Petitioners have no profits to give up because they were 
allegedly spending money illegally.  Outside counsel profited, 
and they are not parties to this case. 
¶98 Finally, 
in 
addressing 
the 
fourth 
Gudenschwager 
factor——that the moving party show that a stay will do "no harm" 
to the public interest, 139 Wis. 2d at 440——the majority and the 
concurrence again identify no error by the circuit court.  
Instead, the majority improperly conflates the legislature's 
interest in obtaining outside legal advice and the public's 
interest in the legislature obtaining such advice.  At a 
minimum, there are two conflicting public interests at play 
here——the public's interests in informed legislative decision-
making and in preventing Petitioners from unlawfully spending 
taxpayer funds.  The majority makes no attempt to resolve that 
conflict, instead baldly asserting that the "public is better 
served" by the legislature retaining outside counsel.  See 
majority op., ¶60.  All the majority is saying here is that it 
would weigh the parties' competing interests differently than 
the circuit court.  The same goes for the concurrence's 
suggestion that the unauthorized expenditure of taxpayer funds 
is a "limited" harm to the public and "not nothing."  See 
concurrence, ¶4.  But, again, whether there is a different way 
to weigh the parties' competing interests or whether the court 
disagrees with how the circuit court weighed them, neither 
reason is sufficient to reverse the circuit court's stay 
decision.  E.g., McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 281.  So long as the 
circuit court "demonstrated a rational process[] and reached a 
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802.rfd  
 
21 
 
decision that a reasonable judge could make," this court must 
affirm.  See Weber, 272 Wis. 2d 121, ¶40.  The record here 
reveals the circuit court did just that, and neither the 
majority nor the concurrence says otherwise. 
¶99 Before today, our precedent for how circuit courts 
should decide whether to grant a stay pending appeal was well 
settled and easily applied.  But here the majority reinterprets 
the legal standard for each of the four Gudenschwager factors, 
and provides circuit courts with precious little guidance for 
how to apply them.  The result is a guessing game about how to 
conduct a Gudenschwager analysis.  We can and should do better. 
¶100 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
¶101 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and JILL J. KAROFSKY join this opinion.  
 
 
 
   No.  2021AP802.rfd  
 
1