Title: Smith v. Galaz

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Darren SMITH and USA Truck, Inc. v. Dorien
GALAZ

97-281                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered October 16, 1997


1.   Damages -- excessive jury award -- standard of review. -- The
     standard of review utilized in deciding whether a jury award
     is excessive is whether the verdict is so great as to shock
     the conscience of the court or demonstrate passion or
     prejudice on the part of the trier of fact; the supreme court
     reviews the proof and all reasonable inferences most favorably
     to the appellee; in determining whether the amount of damages
     is so great as to shock the conscience, the court considers
     such elements as past and future medical expenses, permanent
     injury, loss of earning capacity, scars resulting in
     disfigurement, and pain, suffering, and mental anguish; a
     determination of whether a jury verdict is so excessive as to
     shock the conscience is made on a case-by-case basis; the jury
     has much discretion in awarding damages in personal-injury
     cases. 

2.   Jury -- causation and credibility -- questions of fact for
     jury. -- Matters of causation and credibility are questions of
     fact for the jury to decide.

3.   Damages -- proof supported conclusion appellee suffered
     permanent injury that changed life -- verdict not excessive. -
     - Where appellee produced evidence that the accident caused
     her to suffer a ruptured disc; that she would suffer some
     permanent loss of normal function in that she would have
     continuous pain; that she would have difficulty using her
     neck; and that she suffered mental anguish as a result of the
     accident, the proof supported the conclusion that appellee
     suffered a permanent injury that will cause her pain and
     discomfort and that has changed her life in that she can no
     longer pursue either her chosen career as a truck driver or
     her preferred social activities such as horseback riding; the
     verdict of $300,000.00 was not so great as to shock the
     conscience of the supreme court or to demonstrate passion or
     prejudice on the part of the jury.

4.   Evidence -- trial court's ruling on admission -- when
     reversed. -- On appeal, the supreme court will not reverse the
     trial court on a ruling on the admission of evidence absent an
     abuse of discretion.  

5.   Evidence -- testimony offered to prove truth of matter
     asserted -- appellant not prejudiced by admission -- no abuse
     of discretion found. -- Where appellee offered the deposition
     testimony of a manager of the pancake restaurant where she
     worked after the accident to prove the truth of the matter
     asserted -- that she had physical limitations in her new job
     after the accident -- and the declarant was present and
     testified in front of the jury, appellants were not prejudiced
     by the admission of the portion of the manager's deposition
     testimony at issue; nor did the trial court abuse its
     discretion in admitting this evidence under Ark. R. Evid.
     803(3) as evidence of a then-existing physical condition.
     

     Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court, First Division; Marion
Humphrey, Judge; affirmed.
     Wright, Lindsey & Jennings, by:  James M. Moody, Jr. and Troy
A. Price, for appellants.
     Gary Eubanks & Associates, by:  Willaim Gary Holt, for
appellee.

     W.H."Dub" Arnold, Chief Justice.
     Appellee Dorien Galaz was injured when her parked tractor-
trailer was struck by another tractor-trailer owned by appellant
USA Truck, Inc., and driven by appellant Darren Smith.  The
accident occurred in the parking lot of a North Little Rock truck
stop on July 27, 1994.  Galaz sued USA Truck and Smith for
negligence, and a jury returned a $300,000.00 verdict in Galazþs
favor.  After the trial court entered judgment in the amount of the
verdict, USA Truck and Smith filed a motion for new trial on the
ground of excessive damages.  The trial court denied the motion,
from which USA Truck and Smith now appeal, raising two issues: (1)
that the jury award is excessive and (2) that the trial court erred
in admitting hearsay testimony at trial.  Because we conclude that
neither argument has merit, we affirm the trial courtþs judgment.
1.  Excessive jury award
     Smith first alleges that the jury award of $300,000.00 was so
excessive as to shock the appellate courtþs conscience.  We have
stated that the standard of review we utilize in deciding whether
a jury award is excessive is whether the verdict is so great as to
shock the conscience of this court or demonstrate passion or
prejudice on the part of the trier of fact.  Houston v. Knoedl, 329
Ark. 91, 947 S.W.2d 745 (1997); Collins v. Hinton, 327 Ark. 159,
937 S.W.2d 164 (1997).  In doing so, we review the proof and all
reasonable inferences most favorably to the appellee.  Id.  In
determining whether the amount of damages is so great as to shock
the conscience, we consider such elements as past and future
medical expenses, permanent injury, loss of earning capacity, scars
resulting in disfigurement, and pain, suffering, and mental
anguish.  Builderþs Transp., Inc. V. Wilson, 323 Ark. 327, 914 S.W.2d 742 (1996).  Our determination of whether a jury verdict is
so excessive as to shock the conscience is made on a case-by-case
basis.  Id.  We have said that the jury has much discretion in
awarding damages in personal injury cases.  Id.
     In the present case, Galaz was standing in the cab of her
tractor-trailer when Smith, who was speeding to make a left turn to
back into a parking space, clipped the left front fender of her
trailer with his rig.  According to Galaz, upon impact, her neck
snapped, then she fell back and hit the wall of the sleeper bunk in
her rig.  She did not go to the doctor immediately because she
thought the pain would eventually go away.  On August 29, 1994,
approximately one month after the accident, Galaz, feeling pain in
her left shoulder and experiencing numbness in her left arm, went
to see Dr. Carl McKenney, a neurologist.  After ordering a CT test,
Dr. McKenney recommended that Galaz undergo physical therapy and an
EMG nerve conduction.  He also prescribed Darvocet, a pain
medication, and suggested that she see Dr. Richard Hamer, a
neurologist, and Dr. Samuel Finn, a neurosurgeon, for further
treatment.
     At trial, Galaz offered the deposition testimony of Dr. Hamer,
who testified that Galaz had osteoarthritis, a degenerative
condition common among truck drivers, a small posterior central
disc herniation, and a ruptured disc, a new injury.  According to
Dr. Hamer, there was no question that the osteoarthritis existed
prior to the accident.  However, according to Dr. Hamer, with this
chronic condition, any added force could rupture the disc -- þit
[was] like an accident waiting to happen.þ  It was Dr. Hamerþs
testimony that þthe thing that really brought [Galaz] to the doctor
was the ruptured disc.þ  Regarding permanent impairment, he
testified that Galaz would have a continuous pain requiring Advil,
Tylenol, or similar medications, and would have difficulty using
her neck.
     Dr. James Bland, a neurosurgeon, saw Galaz on November 28,
1994, on February 17, 1995, April 20, 1995, June 8, 1995, and July
20, 1995.  During each of these visits, Galaz complained of pain on
the left side of her neck and numbness in her left arm.  According
to Dr. Bland, Galazþs symptoms were common among those persons
suffering from aggravated degenerative disc disease.
     The accident in question resulted in $3,334.79 in property
damages to the tractor-trailer Galaz was driving.  In addition to
these damages, Galaz presented evidence that she incurred $7,409.74
in medical expenses.  Her weekly average income as a truck driver
prior to the accident was $455.54.  Galaz returned to work in
November 1995, taking a job as a server at Shoneyþs.  In April
1996, she began working at International House of Pancakes.  She
assumed full duties as a server with the exception of heavy
lifting.  She worked between thirty-six and forty hours per week at
$2.13 per hour plus tips, which amounted to an extra $400 to
$600.00 per month.
     When reviewing the facts at bar, it is clear that Galaz was
simply an þeggshell plaintiff,þ or one who was susceptible to
enhanced injury by virtue of an existing condition, which, in this
case, was osteoarthritis.  See Avery v. Ward, 326 Ark. 829, 933 S.W.2d 810 (1996).  Matters of causation and credibility are
questions of fact for the jury to decide.  Id.  Galaz produced
evidence that the accident caused her to suffer a ruptured disc. 
Dr. Hamer testified that Galaz would suffer some permanent loss of
normal function in that she would have continuous pain requiring
medications such as Advil or Tylenol, and that she would have
difficulty using her neck.
     Galaz also presented proof of mental anguish as a result of
the accident.  It was her testimony that she was not happy with her
position as a waitress, for she would rather be out on the road as
a truck driver where she could enjoy traveling and seeing the
country.  The accident had an emotional impact on her; she felt as
though she had been stripped of her livelihood.  She could no
longer ride horses, whereas she had been very active in horse shows
and horseback riding prior to the accident.
     When considering this evidence, we conclude that the proof
supported the conclusion that Galaz suffered a permanent injury
that will cause her pain and discomfort and that has changed her
life in that she can no longer pursue either her chosen career as
a truck driver or her preferred social activities such as horseback
riding.  We cannot say that the verdict of $300,000.00 is so great
as to shock the conscience of this court or to demonstrate passion
or prejudice on the part of the jury.
2. Hearsay objection
     At trial, Galaz offered the deposition testimony of Joe Neal
Hilman, a manager of the pancake restaurant where Galaz worked
after the accident.  Smith objected to the following portion of the
deposition being shown to the jury:
     QUESTION: Did you observe [Galaz] having any problems or
     limitations from the injuries that she attributed to the
     accident?
     ANSWER: Observations, no sir.  But she explained to me
     that she had limitations in her capacity as a server,
     because there is a requirement to take the bus tub from
     the table and some lifting over -- between 15 and 25
     pounds.  And she explained to me about the accident.  And
     I told her she didnþt have to do it if that was the
     situation, and that I would take care of it.
On appeal, Smith claims that the trial court erred in admitting
this testimony because it was hearsay, and, under A.R.E. 802, the
jury could have taken it as proof of Galazþs limitations in her new
job.  Smith further claims that the error was not harmless because
this evidence þfrom a seemingly disinterested third party seems
likely to have influenced the assessment of damages.þ  According to
Smith, it is þimpossible to say that the jury did not credit
[Galazþs] employer on the matter of whether [her] injury prevented
her from having a future as a capable and efficient server.þ
     Galaz argued at trial that the portion of Hilmanþs deposition
testimony at issue was admissible as an exception to the hearsay
rule.  Particularly, she argued that the testimony was admissible
under A.R.E. 803 (3) as a then-existing physical condition.  On
appeal, we will not reverse the trial court on a ruling on the
admission of evidence absent an abuse of discretion.  Warhurst v.
White, 310 Ark. 546, 837 S.W.2d 857 (1992).  The evidentiary rule
at issue, A.R.E. 803 (3), provides as follows:
          Then existing mental, emotional, or physical
     condition.  A statement of the declarantþs then existing
     state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition,
     such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling,
     pain, and bodily health, but not including a statement of
     memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed
     unless it relates to the execution, revocation,
     identification, or terms of declarantþs will.

In the present case, Galaz offered the testimony of Hilman to prove
the truth of the matter asserted -- that she had physical
limitations in her new job after the accident.  It is significant
that the declarant, Galaz, was present and testified in front of
the jury.  In fact, she also testified that she could not do any
heavy lifting at the pancake restaurant because of the accident. 
Under these circumstances, we cannot say that Smith and USA truck
were prejudiced by the admission of the portion of Hilmanþs
deposition testimony at issue.  Nor can we say that the trial court
abused its discretion in admitting this evidence under A.R.E. 803
(3) as evidence of a then-existing physical condition.
     We affirm the judgment of the trial court.