Title: Blagrove v. JB Mechanical, Inc.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Blagrove v. JB Mechanical, Inc.1997 WY 53934 P.2d 1273Case Number: 96-192Decided: 04/09/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

SUSAN PERRIN BLAGROVE and JESSE 
BLAGROVE,

Appellants(Plaintiffs), 

v. 

JB 
MECHANICAL, INC., 

Appellee(Defendant).

Appeal from the District Court of Sublette 
County

The Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, 
Judge

Representing 
Appellants:

Robert W. Horn and 
Vonde M. Smith of Robert W. Horn, P.C., Jackson.

Representing 
Appellee:

Stephen K. Gerdes 
and Sherri L. Sweers of White and Steele, P.C., Denver, 
CO.

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, 
GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellants Susan 
and Jesse Blagrove (Blagroves) sued to recover damages for mental anguish they 
allege they suffered when flooding from a failed plumbing connection seriously 
damaged their new home and destroyed personal possessions. Appellee JB 
Mechanical, Inc., the plumbing contractor, moved for summary judgment asserting 
that mental anguish was not compensable for negligence which caused property 
damage. On this basis, the district court granted partial summary judgment to JB 
Mechanical and the Blagroves appeal.

[¶2]      We affirm the 
district court's ruling.

ISSUES

[¶3]      The Blagroves 
present the following issues for our review:

I. Where the 
negligence of a party causes substantial destruction to the home and accumulated 
possessions of the victims, may damages for emotional distress be recovered for 
the mental anguish associated with the destruction of the home and its 
contents?

II. Does W.S. § 
1-1-109(a)(v) authorize claims for emotional distress damages in a negligence 
action in which the fault of an actor caused an injury to 
property?

[¶4]      JB Mechanical 
states the issues as:

I. Whether 
emotional distress damages are recoverable in the absence of any physical injury 
to either party and where the only damage is to appellants' 
property.

II. Whether 
Wyoming's Comparative Fault Statute, W.S. § 1-1-109(a)(v) intended to permit 
recovery for emotional distress for property damage alone.

FACTS

[¶5]      Shortly before 
they were to be married in December of 1994, the Blagroves moved possessions 
into the home they had begun building in May of 1994 in the Hoback Ranches area 
of Sublette County, Wyoming. The couple viewed it as their dream home and had 
involved the help of their families as they built it together. The couple 
planned to move in immediately after their December 28th 
wedding.

[¶6]      In November, they 
hired JB Mechanical, a plumbing contractor, to hook up the hot and cold water 
and provide a drain line to the bath tub. After the installation was completed, 
Jesse Blagrove returned to the home and discovered that the hot water plumbing 
connection had failed, resulting in the flooding of the home for a period of 
time and causing catastrophic damage to the structure and the interior of the 
home. Water had spread throughout the home and collected in the basement, 
destroying many personal, irreplaceable possessions including mementos, pictures 
and videos of friends and family, some of whom are deceased, family recipes, and 
letters, cards, and notes from friends and relatives. The Blagroves did move 
into their home after the wedding but endured cracked windows, buckled walls, 
places where the plywood floor showed, extensive delamination to the exterior of 
the home, ruined sheet rock and wallpaper, and soaked furniture. The couple had 
difficulty adjusting to the destruction they faced and Susan has experienced 
extreme stress in the aftermath of the destruction and suffered emotionally over 
the loss of their possessions.

[¶7]      The Blagroves 
allege that the plumber failed to adequately support the run of pipe when 
hooking up the water lines and movement of the pipes under water pressure caused 
the joints to fail. They filed suit for negligence and listed mental suffering 
as part of the damages they had incurred. JB Mechanical denied it was negligent 
and moved for partial summary judgment asserting that the emotional distress 
claims could not be brought because the Blagroves had not been physically 
injured in the flood and the damage which gave rise to their emotional distress 
was damage to property alone. The district court agreed that emotional distress 
damages caused by property damage could not be recovered and granted partial 
summary judgment. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

[¶8]      The Blagroves 
contend that the analysis of Daily v. Bone, 906 P.2d 1039 (Wyo. 1995), 
leads to the conclusion that emotional damages are recoverable for property 
damage without accompanying physical injury. They claim that Daily 
recognized that mental anguish damages are available where a plaintiff shows 
the existence of a completed tort, namely, negligence. Daily, 906 P.2d  at 
1044. JB Mechanical contends that Daily did not overrule the longstanding 
rule that mental anguish damages are generally not available when the injury is 
to property alone. The issue whether mental anguish damages caused by property 
damage alone are compensable presents a question of law.

Standard of 
Review

[¶9]      Summary judgment 
is proper when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the prevailing 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Downen v. Sinclair Oil 
Corp., 887 P.2d 515, 517-518 (Wyo. 1994). Summary judgment serves the 
purpose of eliminating formal trials where only questions of law are involved. 
England v. Simmons, 728 P.2d 1137, 1141 (Wyo. 1986). We review a grant of 
summary judgment deciding a question of law de novo and afford no 
deference to the district court's ruling. Sammons v. American Auto. 
Ass'n, 912 P.2d 1103, 1105 (Wyo. 1996).

Emotional Distress Damages for 
Negligence

[¶10]   In Wyoming, our decisions have 
restricted recovery for emotional distress damages without accompanying physical 
injury. Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 195 (Wyo. 1986). We have 
recognized the torts of intentional and negligently inflicted emotional distress 
but their application is narrowly construed to allow recovery for emotional 
distress only under limited circumstances. Gates, 719 P.2d  at 195; 
Leithead v. American Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059, 1066 (Wyo. 1986). We 
have permitted recovery for emotional distress as an element of damages in 
certain underlying actions: 1) some intentional torts, Waters v. Brand, 
497 P.2d 875, 877-878 (Wyo. 1972) (false imprisonment); Cates v. Eddy, 
669 P.2d 912, 921 (Wyo. 1983) (malicious prosecution); 2) violation of certain 
constitutional rights, Town of Upton v. Whisler, 824 P.2d 545, 549 (Wyo. 
1992); and 3) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, State 
Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shrader, 882 P.2d 813, 833 (Wyo. 1994). 
Outside of these few instances, we have adhered to the general concept that 
negligence permits recovery for personal injury or property damage but usually 
will not result in liability for emotional distress. Gates, 719 P.2d  at 
195; Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171, 178 (1982); W. 
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 54, at 359-60 (5th ed. 1984) 
(few courts permit compensation for negligence which causes fright, shock, or 
mental disturbance). In a negligence action for personal injury, Wyoming permits 
recovery for emotional distress accompanying physical injury, but has not yet 
answered whether emotional distress damages are compensable where the defendant 
negligently damages or destroys real property.

[¶11]   The Blagroves contend that Daily 
provides authority for permitting recovery of their emotional distress 
damages under a negligence theory. In Daily, Bone drove his snowmobile 
through a stop sign onto a major highway causing a collision with Daily's 
vehicle and killing Bone. Daily, 906 P.2d  at 1042. Daily was not 
physically injured but her witnessing Bone's impact and death caused her mental 
suffering of post traumatic stress disorder, depression, and agoraphobia. 
Id. Daily sued Bone's estate for emotional distress caused by Bone's 
negligence and we decided that, under the circumstances of the case, she was 
entitled to a trial to determine if Bone's negligence had caused her emotional 
distress damages. Id. at 1044.

[¶12]   Daily is not helpful to the 
Blagroves because it has the limited scope of allowing recovery for mental 
injury absent physical injury in an automobile collision case. Under the general 
rule, if Daily had been physically injured in the automobile collision she could 
have recovered damages for pain and suffering associated with her physical 
injuries and she could have recovered for the emotional distress of witnessing 
Bone's death. Id. at 1043. But because the general rule linked physical 
injury to an emotional distress claim, that rule would not permit Daily to 
recover for the emotional distress of witnessing Bone's death if she was not 
physically injured in the collision. Id. We determined that the absence 
of a physical injury should not prevent her from recovering for her mental 
injury under a negligence theory. She alleged sufficient facts to create a 
question for the jury and we remanded it for trial. Id. at 1044. Our 
decision in Daily resulted from the particular facts involved, did not generally 
establish that a claim for negligence alleging only mental injury had been 
recognized in Wyoming, and does not provide an analysis which would extend its 
result to a property damage situation.

[¶13]   Emotional distress is not usually 
recoverable as an element of property damages unless an improper motive is 
involved. Valley Development Co. v. Weeks, 147 Colo. 591, 364 P.2d 730, 
733 (1961); see Towns v. Anderson, 39 Colo. App. 332, 567 P.2d 814, 815 
(1977), reversed on other grounds, 195 Colo. 517, 579 P.2d 1163 (1978). 
It is generally agreed that mere sorrow, anger, worry and fear are not 
compensable and recovery for more serious emotional distress is restricted 
because of the burden for the judicial system and defendants. The likelihood 
that courts will be burdened with either fraudulent claims or those of a 
temporary or trivial nature, and the perceived unfairness of imposing heavy and 
disproportionate financial burdens upon a defendant, whose conduct was only 
negligent, for consequences which appear remote from the wrongful deed usually 
act to restrict recovery. Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509, 
519 (1970); KEETON, supra § 54 at 360-61.

[¶14]   In deciding whether the plaintiff's 
interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant's conduct, we 
must balance the interest of the injured parties against the view that a 
negligent act should have some end to its legal consequences. Gates, 719 P.2d  at 196. We are persuaded that the concerns which have acted to prevent 
recovery for emotional distress when property is damaged remain relevant and 
weigh against permitting recovery. While we do not doubt that the Blagroves were 
justifiably and seriously distressed over the damage to the home they had built 
together with their families, adopting a rule allowing trial on the issue and 
recovery if proved would result in unacceptable burdens for both the judicial 
system and defendants. We therefore hold that emotional distress damages in 
connection with property damages are not compensable.

Intent of the Comparative Fault 
Statute

[¶15]   The Blagroves contend that the 
Wyoming Comparative Fault Statute, WYO. STAT. § 1-1-109(a)(v), evidences an 
intent by the legislature that emotional distress damages should be considered 
by the jury in relation to injury to property. The relevant part of section (a) 
of the statute provides:

(a) Contributory 
negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action by any person or his legal 
representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury 
to person or property, if the contributory negligence of the said person is not 
more than fifty percent (50%) of the total fault. Any damages allowed shall be 
diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the person 
recovering.

WYO. STAT. § 1-1-109(a) (1988). This section 
was later expanded to include definitions of various terms. Section (v) defines 
"injury to person or property" as:

(v) "Injury to 
person or property," in addition to bodily injury, includes, without limitation, 
loss of enjoyment of life, emotional distress, pain and suffering, 
disfigurement, physical or mental disability, loss of earnings or income, damage 
to reputation, loss of consortium, loss of profits and all other such claims 
and causes of action arising out of the fault of an actor; . . . 
.

WYO. STAT. § 1-1-109(a)(v) (Cum.Supp. 1996) 
(emphasis added). The Blagroves do not provide us with an argument explaining in 
what way the definition of this term evidences an intent to permit emotional 
distress damages in connection with an injury to property. We have said that 
absent an express intent by the legislature to abrogate a common law rule 
limiting recovery, we will find no such intent by the legislature. Eiselein 
v. K-Mart, 868 P.2d 893, 896 (Wyo. 1994). That ruling applies here and we do 
not find an intent by the legislature to permit emotional distress damages in 
this case.

CONCLUSION

[¶16]   Wyoming will adhere to the general 
rule that emotional distress damages in connection with property damage are not 
compensable. We do not find an intent by the legislature to change that general 
rule and permit emotional distress damages for property damage. The district 
court's order granting partial summary judgment is 
affirmed.