Title: Barbara Sands v. The Whitnall School District

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2008 WI 89 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP1026 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Barbara Sands, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
The Whitnall School District, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2007 WI App 3 
Reported at: 298 Wis. 2d 534, 728 N.W.2d 15 
(Ct. App. 2007-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 11, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 11, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Clare L. Fiorenza   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Thomas Nelson and Hawks Quindel Ehlke & Perry, S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Thomas Nelson. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by Jeffrey A. 
Schmeckpeper, Patti J. Kurth, and Kasdorf, Lewis & Swietlik, 
S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Jeffrey A. Schmeckpeper. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Robert J. Dreps, 
Patricia L. Wheeler, and Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Madison, on 
behalf of the Wisconsin Freedom of Information Council, the 
Wisconsin Broadcasters Association, and the Wisconsin Newspaper 
Association. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Bruce A. Olsen, 
assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was J.B. Van 
Hollen, attorney general, on behalf of the Wisconsin Department 
of Justice. 
 
 
2008 WI 89
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP1026  
(L.C. No. 
2004CV3623) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Barbara Sands, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
The Whitnall School District, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
JUL 11, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   This is a review of a 
published court of appeals opinion1 reversing and remanding a 
non-final order of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, the 
Honorable Clare L. Fiorenza presiding.  The circuit court issued 
an order directing the Whitnall School District (the District) 
to provide answers to interrogatories from Barbara Sands (Sands) 
regarding a discussion about her employment during a closed 
session of the Whitnall School Board (the Board).   
                                                 
1 Sands v. Whitnall School District, 2007 WI App 3, 298 Wis. 
2d 534, 728 N.W.2d 15. 
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
2 
 
¶2 
The District appealed, claiming that the circuit court 
granted Sands' motion to compel based on its erroneous failure 
to recognize that discussions transpiring during a closed 
meeting are privileged under the provisions of Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.85(2005-06)2 
authorizing 
the 
closed 
meeting, 
or, 
alternatively, under a "deliberative process privilege."  The 
court of appeals agreed, holding that the language of § 19.85 
indicates that the legislature intended to protect the substance 
of closed sessions from public disclosure, and that such an 
implicit privilege is authorized by Wis. Stat. § 905.01.  Sands 
v. Whitnall School District, 2007 WI App 3, ¶¶10, 15, 298 Wis. 
2d 534, 728 N.W.2d 15.  The court of appeals reversed the 
circuit court's order and remanded the cause with directions to 
deny Sands' motion to compel.  Id., ¶15. 
¶3 
Sands petitioned this court for review.  She argues 
that it was the court of appeals, not the circuit court, which 
issued 
an 
erroneous 
ruling 
because 
there 
is 
neither 
a 
"deliberative process privilege" in Wisconsin nor any other 
privilege implicit in Wis. Stat. § 19.85 shielding the contents 
of closed sessions from discovery. 
¶4 
We agree with Sands and conclude that the court of 
appeals decision was based on an erroneous interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 19.85 and 905.01.  Consequently, we reverse the 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
3 
 
decision of the court of appeals and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I 
¶5 
The pertinent facts and procedural background of this 
case are not in dispute.  In 1998, the Whitnall School District 
hired Sands to run the District's Gifted and Talented Education 
Program.3  After closed session meetings on April 29, 2002, and 
May 13, 2002, addressing Sands' employment, the Board voted in 
an open session not to renew Sands' contract.  Sands was 
informed of the decision three days later, on May 16, 2002. 
¶6 
On April 23, 2004, Sands filed a lawsuit stating that 
because she had served as an "administrator" within the meaning 
of Wis. Stat. § 118.24(6),4 she was entitled to, but had been 
                                                 
3 Although the parties disagree about Sands' title and the 
extent to which her position was primarily administrative in 
nature, they agree that at least some of her duties included 
monitoring and instructing classroom teachers on units of 
instruction for students in the program, developing curricula to 
be delivered by the teachers, developing and administering 
methods of identifying students for the program, planning and 
administering the use of the program's budget, and acting as a 
substitute administrator-principal.  
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 118.24(6) provides in pertinent part: 
The employment contract of any person described under 
sub. (1) shall be in writing and filed with the school 
district clerk.  At least 4 months prior to the 
expiration of the employment contract, the employing 
school board shall give notice in writing of either 
renewal of the contract or of refusal to renew such 
person's contract.  If no such notice is given, the 
contract then in force shall continue in force for 2 
years.  Any such person who receives notice of renewal 
or who does not receive notice of renewal or refusal 
to renew the person's contract at least 4 months 
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
4 
 
denied, that statute's protections.  Specifically, the complaint 
alleged that because Sands did not receive four-months' notice 
that her contract would not be renewed, the District had 
violated her rights under § 118.24(6), and she was therefore 
entitled to receive a salary and certain benefits, including an 
early retirement option and post-retirement health insurance, 
for two years.  
¶7 
In its answer, the District denied that Sands' job 
duties were solely or principally administrative and that her 
contract was subject to Wis. Stat. § 118.24.  The District also 
alleged 
affirmative 
defenses, 
including 
unsatisfactory 
job 
performance by Sands, her knowledge that failure to improve her 
job performance would result in a decision not to renew her 
contract, the lack of any guaranteed salary or benefits to 
Sands, Sands' own failure to comply with § 118.24, and the 
applicability of the doctrine of laches.  
¶8 
During discovery, the District produced documents 
requested by Sands, but refused to provide complete answers to 
the following interrogatories seeking content from the two 
closed sessions:5 
                                                                                                                                                             
before the contract expiration shall accept or reject 
the contract in writing on or before a date 3 months 
prior to the contract expiration. . . .  
5 Sands does not dispute that the meetings were properly 
held in closed session pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 19.85, which 
provides in pertinent part: 
(1) . . . A closed session may be held for any of the 
following purposes: 
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
5 
 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2:  Separately, for each person 
identified in response to interrogatory 1 [those 
present at the closed sessions], state the substance 
of the person's knowledge about the decision not to 
renew Dr. Sands' contract. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5:  Identify each person who spoke 
during the deliberations that resulted in the school 
board's decision not to renew Dr. Sands' contract. 
INTERROGATORY No. 6:  Separately for each person 
identified in response to question 5, above, state the 
substance of what he or she said about renewing Dr. 
Sands' contract. 
In response to all three requests, the District declined to 
answer, claiming that the information was privileged under Wis. 
Stat. § 19.85 and under a "deliberative process privilege."6  
Sands filed a motion to compel,7 and the District opposed the 
motion, repeating its privilege claims.  
                                                                                                                                                             
. . . . 
(c) Considering employment, promotion, compensation or 
performance evaluation data of any public employee 
over which the governmental body has jurisdiction or 
exercises responsibility. 
6 The District, notably, did not object on the basis of 
relevance and has not raised a relevance issue on appeal.   
7 Originally, Sands' motion requested that the District be 
ordered to answer all three interrogatories.  However, in 
correspondence with the District's counsel negotiating proposed 
order language and in the hearing on her motion, Sands' attorney 
subsequently dropped all reference to Interrogatory No. 2 and 
instead limited the motion to compel request to Interrogatories 
No. 5 and 6.  When, as requested by the parties, the language of 
the court's order was limited to Interrogatories No. 5 and 6, 
with no reference to Interrogatory No. 2, Sands similarly did 
not object.  Consequently, although she at times appears to 
attempt 
to 
resurrect 
her 
original 
request 
related 
to 
Interrogatory No. 2, this court will not address the substance 
of such arguments related to Interrogatory No. 2, which we 
construe to have previously been waived. 
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
6 
 
¶9 
The circuit court ruled in favor of Sands, concluding 
that the District was required to provide the information 
requested in the interrogatories.  The court explained that it 
was granting the motion to compel because privileges in 
Wisconsin are narrowly construed; because Wisconsin has never 
recognized a deliberative process privilege; and because, as a 
litigant, Sands is entitled to discovery, which the court 
differentiated from open records requests.  In support of its 
conclusion that the discovery process allows Sands' request for 
information, the court relied on and quoted the language in 
Burnett v. Alt, 224 Wis. 2d 72, 85, 589 N.W.2d 21 (1999), that 
"[p]rivileges are the exception, not the rule," and that unless 
such a privilege applies, parties "are entitled to every 
person's evidence" (citation omitted).  The circuit court in 
this case concluded:  
I guess if the Supreme Court wants to create a 
privilege in this case, then they can create one.  I 
don't think there's a privilege in this case.  I think 
that [Sands] has a right to this discovery process.  
And if the Supreme Court wants to find that I'm wrong, 
that's why we have appellate cases and maybe they'll 
view me differently.  But the cases that I've read and 
my gut feeling with respect to this whole discovery 
process, 
and 
clearly 
—— 
you 
know, 
parties 
in 
litigation are entitled to same person's evidence.  
And I don't see a privilege and I don't see that's 
inherent in the statute.  I just don't view it that 
way.  And someone else—— In all due respect, someone 
else might view it a different way and I'll be 
reversed then.  And that's my gut call after reading 
the cases.  I think that the [District] has to produce 
this information in this lawsuit with respect to Miss 
Sands' 
employment, 
of 
not 
giving 
proper 
notice 
regarding 
termination. 
 
I 
don't 
know 
what 
was 
discussed during that closed session.  I guess that's 
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
7 
 
what 
[Sands'] 
counsel 
wants 
to 
know, 
what 
was 
discussed.  And it doesn't mean it's admissible.  It 
might not be relevant, but they have a right during 
discovery to search out information that may support 
their position.   
¶10 In an order dated April 12, 2005, the court granted 
Sands' 
motion 
and 
directed 
the 
District 
to 
answer 
Interrogatories No. 5 and 6.  The District appealed.  
¶11 The court of appeals decision issued on December 27, 
2006, reversed the circuit court decision and remanded the cause 
with directions to enter an order denying Sands' motion to 
compel.  Sands, 298 Wis. 2d 534, ¶15.  The court of appeals held 
that the plain text of Wis. Stat. § 19.85 "clearly indicates 
that discussions occurring in a properly noticed closed session 
are not subject to disclosure.  The statute contains no 
exceptions to the non-disclosure principle, none for litigation 
or any other circumstances."  Id., ¶10.  The court of appeals 
also cited Wis. Stat. § 905.01 to hold that "a privilege of non-
disclosure is implicit within [§ 19.85]."  Id.  It rejected 
Sands' reference to § 19.85(1)(b), which specifies that notice 
of closed sessions is required so the employee can demand that 
an evidentiary hearing be held in open session, explaining that 
this is not a subsec. (1)(b) case involving an evidentiary 
hearing.  Id., ¶13.  The court of appeals concluded that 
based on the statutory language of Wis. Stat. § 19.85, 
the legislature intended for the substance of closed 
sessions to remain protected from public disclosure.  
Accordingly, the discussions which occurred at the 
closed sessions in this matter are not discoverable. 
Id., ¶15. 
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
8 
 
¶12 Sands petitioned this court for review of the court of 
appeals' decision, and on June 12, 2007, we granted review. 
II 
¶13 We review a circuit court's order compelling discovery 
under an erroneous exercise of discretion standard.  Lane v. 
Sharp Packaging Sys., Inc., 2002 WI 28, ¶19, 251 Wis. 2d 68, 640 
N.W.2d 788.  Under that standard, we will sustain discretionary 
acts if we find the circuit court examined the relevant facts, 
applied a proper standard of law, and using a demonstrative 
rational process, reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge 
could reach.  Id.  However, whether the circuit court applied 
the proper legal standard is a question of law we review 
independently of the circuit court but benefiting from its 
analysis.  Id.  The burden of proof is on the appellant to show 
that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in 
granting a litigant's right to discovery.  Shibilski v. St. 
Joseph's Hosp. of Marshfield, Inc., 83 Wis. 2d 459, 470-71, 266 
N.W.2d 264 (1978). 
¶14 Determining whether the circuit court applied the 
correct legal standards in this case requires us to interpret 
various statutes, including Wis. Stat. §§ 905.01 and 19.85.  
Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review 
de novo.  State v. Waushara County Bd. of Adjustment, 2004 WI 
56, ¶14, 271 Wis. 2d 547, 679 N.W.2d 514.  
¶15 Statutory interpretation begins with the text of the 
statute; if the meaning of the statute is plain, this court 
ordinarily stops the inquiry.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
9 
 
Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis.2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110 (citations omitted).  "[S]tatutory language is 
interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in isolation 
but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of 
surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to 
avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id., ¶46.  If a statute 
is ambiguous, i.e., capable of being understood in more than one 
way by reasonably well-informed persons, the court may examine 
external sources such as legislative history to determine the 
statute's meaning.  Id., ¶¶47-48.  However, the court may also 
consult extrinsic sources "to confirm or verify a plain-meaning 
interpretation."  Id., ¶51. 
III 
¶16 The procedural posture of this case governs the lens 
through which we view it.  Although the District attempts to 
frame this case as an open meetings case, the order on appeal is 
a motion to compel in the context of a standard Wis. Stat. 
§ 804.01 discovery request.  Consequently, § 804.01 governs this 
case.  Therefore, although we will address the District's claims 
of an implicit privilege and of a "deliberative process 
privilege" under the closed meetings statute, we will review 
those claims through the appropriate lens, bearing in mind that 
this is ultimately a § 804.01 discovery case. 
A 
¶17 Wisconsin Stat. § 804.01(2)(a), which sets forth the 
general scope of allowable discovery, states: 
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
10 
 
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not 
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter 
involved in the pending action, whether it relates to 
the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or 
to the claim or defense of any other party, including 
the existence, description, nature, custody, condition 
and location of any books, documents, or other 
tangible things and the identity and location of 
persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter.  
It is not ground for objection that the information 
sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the 
information sought appears reasonably calculated to 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
The express language of this statute clearly provides that 
parties shall have access to relevant information, including 
information that may be inadmissible at trial, so long as that 
information is not "privileged."  In this case, the mere fact 
that the information Sands sought was related to the contents of 
a closed session does not mean that such information is 
"privileged."  To explain why, we begin by addressing the broad 
nature of a litigant's right to discovery. 
¶18 The right to discovery is an essential element of our 
adversary system.  In order for our adversary system to 
effectively ensure the ability of litigants to uncover the 
truth, and to seek and be accorded justice, it is our 
responsibility to render decisions that do no harm to the 
fundamental and important right of litigants to access our 
courts.  In Glenn v. Plante, 2004 WI 24, 269 Wis. 2d 575, 676 
N.W.2d 413, we elaborated upon these principles, explaining the 
fundamental importance of discovery rights:  
In general, the public has a right to every 
person's evidence at trial.  At its core, the 
adversary system is based upon the proposition that an 
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
11 
 
examination of all of the persons possessing relevant 
information, which will lead to the discovery of all 
of the relevant facts, will produce a just result.  
Nevertheless, this fundamental legal principle is 
tempered by constitutional, common law, or statutory 
privileges.  Because the adversary system places a 
premium on the discovery of relevant information, 
courts are cautious not to overly interfere with this 
goal.  
Id., ¶20 (citations omitted).   
¶19 The parameters of permissible discovery are broad by 
necessity.  As we have explained, "[t]his breadth is essential 
because the purpose of discovery is identical to the purpose of 
our trial system——the ascertainment of truth."  Crawford ex rel. 
Goodyear v. Care Concepts, Inc., 2001 WI 45, ¶13, 243 Wis. 2d 
119, 625 N.W.2d 876.  See also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 
683, 709-10 (1974); Shibilski, 83 Wis. 2d at 466; Davison v. St. 
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 75 Wis. 2d 190, 199, 248 N.W.2d 433 
(1977).  We cannot render meaningful legal decisions without 
first determining the true facts of each case.  "One of the 
fundamental policies of our law, and one which dominates in the 
absence of a special policy arising in particular types of 
situations, is that the judicial system and rules of procedure 
should provide litigants with full access to all reasonable 
means of determining the truth."  Jacobi v. Podevels, 23 Wis. 2d 
152, 156-157, 127 N.W.2d 73 (1964).  
¶20 The quest for truth in each case, in turn, demands 
that we allow litigants to build complete records, investigating 
and preparing their cases thoroughly before presenting their 
cases to fact-finders.  As such, we are even more loath to 
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
12 
 
impose limitations upon discovery than we are to limit public 
access to government records.   
¶21 We must, therefore, tread carefully in the face of 
potential threats to a litigant's pursuit of truth and justice.  
Such threats to a litigant's access to truth and justice may 
come in the form of overly broad claims of evidentiary 
privilege.  In a case emphasizing the fundamental importance of 
protecting access to discovery, the court of appeals has 
explained that "[e]videntiary privileges . . . interfere with 
the trial's search for the truth, and must be strictly 
construed, consistent with the fundamental tenet that the law 
has the right to every person's evidence."  State v. Echols, 152 
Wis. 2d 725, 736-37, 449 N.W.2d 320 (Ct. App. 1989).   
¶22 In respect of these fundamental principles which lie 
at the core of discovery rights and are the foundation of our 
adversary system, we have held that "[p]rivileges are the 
exception, not the rule."  Alt, 224 Wis. 2d at 85.  The scope of 
that exception is the subject of this case.  
B 
¶23 Our inquiry into the scope of discovery privileges 
begins with a look at the relevant statutory language regarding 
privileges.  First, Wis. Stat. § 804.01(2)(a) provides that 
parties may obtain relevant discovery regarding any matter, as 
long as it is "not privileged."  Wisconsin Stat. § 905.01, in 
turn, describes the scope of evidentiary privileges, and states: 
Except as provided by or inherent or implicit in 
statute or in rules adopted by the supreme court or 
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
13 
 
required by the constitution of the United States or 
Wisconsin, no person has a privilege to: 
(1) Refuse to be a witness; or 
(2) Refuse to disclose any matter; or 
(3) Refuse to produce any object or writing; or 
(4) Prevent another from being a witness or disclosing 
any matter or producing any object or writing. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶24 The remainder of Chapter 905 proceeds to set forth a 
number of explicit privileges, none of which apply in this case.  
The District does not claim that any of the explicit statutory 
privileges contained within ch. 905 apply.  Rather, the 
District's arguments are primarily focused on a different 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 19.85, which it argues contains an 
implicit 
privilege 
against 
disclosure 
of 
closed 
meeting 
contents.  Section 19.85 provides in pertinent part: 
(1) Any meeting of a governmental body, upon motion 
duly made and carried, may be convened in closed 
session under one or more of the exemptions provided 
in this section.  The motion shall be carried by a 
majority vote in such manner that the vote of each 
member is ascertained and recorded in the minutes.  No 
motion to convene in closed session may be adopted 
unless the chief presiding officer announces to those 
present at the meeting at which such motion is made, 
the nature of the business to be considered at such 
closed 
session, 
and 
the 
specific 
exemption 
or 
exemptions under this subsection by which such closed 
session 
is 
claimed 
to 
be 
authorized. 
 
Such 
announcement shall become part of the record of the 
meeting.  No business may be taken up at any closed 
session except that which relates to matters contained 
in the chief presiding officer's announcement of the 
closed session. . . .  
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
14 
 
The District's argument that the above statutory language 
creates an evidentiary privilege relies in part on a premise 
that reading such a privilege into § 19.85 is authorized by the 
above "inherent or implicit" language of Wis. Stat. § 905.01.   
¶25 Sands, in turn, argues that the open meetings law does 
not create such an implicit or inherent privilege.  Sands seeks 
to reinstate the judgment of the circuit court in this case, 
which rejected the District's claim to an implicit privilege 
under Wis. Stat. § 19.85, ruling instead that parties to 
litigation are generally entitled to evidence and that no 
inherent privilege precludes such discovery in this case.  
¶26 Before turning to Wis. Stat. § 19.85, we look at the 
statute authorizing privileges, Wis. Stat. § 905.01.  Our task 
is first to determine the meaning of the "inherent or implicit" 
privilege language in § 905.01. 
¶27 To the extent that there may be any ambiguity created 
by the language of Wis. Stat. § 905.01's "inherent or implicit" 
privilege provision, we find guidance in the Judicial Council 
Committee's note to the statute.  The Judicial Council note 
provides in pertinent part: 
The phrase "or inherent or implicit in statute" is 
designed to insure that the "work product" immunity 
rule and the interpretations of s. 19.21 [19.35] are 
unaffected.  The Wisconsin "work product" immunity 
rule like the federal rule originates in the discovery 
statutes.  However, the federal rule has now been 
incorporated expressly in revised Rule 26(b)(3) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Wisconsin does not 
appear 
to 
be 
inconsistent 
with 
this 
manner 
of 
restricting privileges.  Common law privileges, not 
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
15 
 
originating in the constitution, could not be enlarged 
on a case by case basis.  [Citations omitted.] 
This section recognizes that there are other statutory 
privileges that are not included in this chapter.  
However, they are provided for in other statutory 
provisions. . . .  
The right of a member of the public to inspect public 
documents as specified in s. 19.21 [19.35] (formerly 
s. 18.01) remains subject to the procedure outlined in 
State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis. 2d 672, 137 
N.W.2d 470 (1965), modified and rehearing denied 28 
Wis. 2d 672, 139 N.W.2d 241 (1965) and Beckon v. 
Emery, 36 Wis. 2d 510, 153 N.W.2d 501 (1967).  
Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1974, Wis. Stat. § 905.01, 59 
Wis. 2d R101-102 (emphasis added).  This Judicial Council note 
reveals that the "inherent or implicit" language in the Rule is 
quite narrow in scope and was included by this court to preserve 
a particular work product privilege already recognized at the 
time this language was added to the statute, while leaving other 
privileges to be provided for more expressly in other statutory 
provisions (aside from privileges against Wis. Stat. § 19.35 
open records requests that are still governed by a common law 
balancing test).  
¶28 This Judicial Council note's discussion of the meaning 
of Wis. Stat. § 905.01's "inherent or implicit" language was 
explained by Justice Bradley's dissenting opinion in Alt: 
According to the Judicial Council's notes on Wis. 
Stat. § 905.01, the phrase "inherent or implicit" was 
inserted, not to give a court some device with which 
to "interpret" additional privileges.  Rather, the 
notes strongly suggest that the phrase was inserted 
solely to protect the "work-product privilege"——a 
privilege the court created prior to 1973 in State ex 
rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis. 2d 559, 150 
N.W.2d 387 (1967). . . .  
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
16 
 
This latter interpretation is consistent with the 
tenor of the rule:  new privileges are not to be 
created except by legislation or Supreme Court rule.  
Davison v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 75 Wis. 2d 
190, 205-06, 248 N.W.2d 433 (1977).  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 905.01 is not a license for courts to create, 
modify, or expand privileges; that task must be 
accomplished by legislative or rule-making action. 
Alt, 224 Wis. 2d at 101 n. 2 (Bradley, J., dissenting).8   
¶29 Davison was a tort case against a hospital which 
reached our court on appeal after the circuit court refused to 
recognize a common law or statutory testimonial privilege 
protecting the proceedings and reports of certain hospital 
committees from disclosure through discovery.  Davison, 75 Wis. 
2d at 192-94.  This court rejected the hospital's claims to a 
common law privilege as unsupported by any legal authority.  Id. 
at 201-02.  As to the claimed statutory privilege, the hospital 
in Davison argued that language in the administrative code9 
indicates a clear legislative intent to keep the committee's 
reports and proceedings confidential, thereby affording a 
privilege against discovery under Wis. Stat. § 905.02's language 
recognizing privileges "if provided by law."  Id. at 196.  This 
court rejected that claim, explaining that § 905.02 codifies 
                                                 
8 The majority opinion in Burnett v. Alt, 224 Wis. 2d 72, 
589 N.W.2d 21 (1999), did not similarly address the meaning of 
the Judicial Council note, and no other Wisconsin case has 
addressed the meaning of the "inherent or implied" clause of the 
Rule as explained in the Judicial Council note. 
9 Section H24.04(1)(n) of the Wisconsin Administrative Code 
required the hospital tissue committee to issue its findings in 
a coded form which discusses cases in hypothetical terms.  See 
Davison v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 75 Wis. 2d 190, 195-
96, 248 N.W.2d 433 (1977). 
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
17 
 
only those privileges that are specifically and unequivocally 
granted, that this court has consistently interpreted such 
privileges strictly and narrowly, and that there is no statutory 
right of testimonial privilege protecting the documents in 
question from discovery.  Id. at 195-201.  Finally, this court 
rejected the hospital's suggestion that this court is authorized 
to create a privilege judicially on a case-by-case basis, 
explaining that if the sought-after privilege arises from common 
law, it must be adopted by supreme court rule or by statute.  
Id. at 205-06.  
¶30 Although in Davison the rule that statutory privileges 
must be specifically and unequivocally granted was discussed in 
terms of Wis. Stat. § 905.02, the Judicial Council note to Wis. 
Stat. § 905.01 clarifies that this principle is embraced as well 
in § 905.01, which added the phrase "inherent or implicit" only 
for the purpose of "insur[ing] that the 'work product' immunity 
rule and the interpretations of [Wis. Stat. § 19.35] are 
unaffected," while other statutory privileges may still be 
specifically 
provided 
for 
in 
other 
statutory 
provisions.  
Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1974, Wis. Stat. § 905.01, 59 
Wis. 2d R101-102.   
¶31 In addition, the underlying emphasis in Davison on the 
narrow and limited nature of privileges against discovery is 
consistent with the approach taken across the country.  In 
Davison, this court quoted the following passage from the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in Nixon:  "'. . . these exceptions to 
the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor 
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
18 
 
expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search 
for truth.'"  Davison, 75 Wis. 2d at 199 (quoting Nixon, 418 
U.S. at 709-10);10 see also Shibilski, 83 Wis. 2d at 466. 
¶32 Even 
where 
a 
statute 
contains 
confidentiality 
requirements, 
an evidentiary privilege is not necessarily 
created 
as 
a 
result, 
because 
"'confidential' 
and 
'legal 
privilege' are very different" concepts.  Custodian of Records 
for LTSB v. State, 2004 WI 65, ¶¶14-15, 272 Wis. 2d 208, 680 
N.W.2d 792.  Legal privilege is a broader concept than 
confidentiality.  While confidential data is "meant to be kept 
secret," legal privilege includes "the legal right not to 
provide certain data when faced with a valid subpoena."  Id., 
¶15.  Similarly, even though the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Wis. 
Stat. § 804.01(3)(a)7., creates confidentiality protections for 
trade secrets, it also provides that trade secrets, "or other 
confidential research, development, or commercial information 
not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way[,]" 
may nonetheless be subject to discovery in a lawsuit, with 
protective orders available to protect confidentiality.  
¶33 As such, as a general rule, and even in the case of 
confidential information, the scope of allowable discovery is 
                                                 
10 The Supreme Court in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 
(1974), was emphatic in ruling that privileges must not be 
lightly created or expansively construed, being in derogation of 
the search for truth.  The decision dramatically illustrated 
that even the confidential communications of the President of 
the United States are not automatically privileged and shielded 
from discovery requests.  
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
19 
 
necessarily broad, being central to the core purpose and 
principles of our adversary system.  Efforts to curtail a 
litigant's quest for truth should not be liberally rewarded, but 
must be scrutinized with caution and an eye toward preserving 
the principles of our adversary system. 
C 
¶34 Having explained the broad access to information 
accorded by our discovery statutes and the contrasting narrow 
nature of the privileges that may be claimed in the face of 
discovery requests, we now address the particular statutes that 
are more directly implicated by the District's privilege 
argument:  the open meetings law and the closed session 
exemptions thereto.   
¶35 Wisconsin's open meeting laws, like our discovery 
statutes, reflect our State's policy of a strong presumption in 
favor of openness and access.  Wisconsin Stat. § 19.81, the 
official "Declaration of policy" of the open meetings subchapter 
under which Wis. Stat. § 19.85 falls, explicitly describes the 
intent of the legislature and policy underlying the open 
meetings law as follows:  
(1) In recognition of the fact that a representative 
government of the American type is dependent upon an 
informed electorate, it is declared to be the policy 
of this state that the public is entitled to the 
fullest and most complete information regarding the 
affairs of government as is compatible with the 
conduct of governmental business. 
The subchapter's declaration of policy proceeds to further 
explain that the policy of the open meetings subchapter is also 
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
20 
 
"[t]o implement and ensure the public policy herein expressed, 
all meetings of all state and local governmental bodies shall be 
publicly held in places reasonably accessible to members of the 
public and shall be open to all citizens at all times unless 
otherwise expressly provided by law."  Wis. Stat. § 19.81(2). 
 
¶36 This declaration of policy underscores the general 
tenor of the open meetings statute:  a recognition that meetings 
of governmental bodies must be more open to the public than 
meetings of nongovernmental bodies.  Those nongovernmental 
bodies' meetings that are not open to the public are still 
generally subject to litigation discovery requests.  It would be 
incongruous with the clear policy articulated in the open 
meetings statute for the legislature to include in the open 
meetings statute, which generally holds governmental bodies to a 
higher degree of scrutiny and openness than nongovernmental 
bodies, a privilege against litigation discovery to which only 
governmental bodies, not nongovernmental bodies, are entitled.    
¶37 Furthermore, the closed session exemptions to the open 
meetings law are limited in scope, confined to those specific 
contexts listed in Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1)(a)-(j).  Even in those 
contexts, the statute only permits, but does not require, 
meetings to convene in closed session, i.e., with members of the 
public not allowed to attend.  See Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1)(certain 
governmental meetings "may be convened in closed session under 
one or more of the exemptions provided in this section" and a 
"closed 
session 
may 
be 
held 
for 
any 
of 
the 
following 
purposes. . .")(emphasis added).   
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
21 
 
 
¶38 The particular closed session provision at issue in 
this case is Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1)(c), which allows closed 
sessions 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
"[c]onsidering 
employment, 
promotion, compensation or performance evaluation data of any 
public 
employee 
over 
which 
the 
governmental 
body 
has 
jurisdiction or exercises responsibility."  We disagree with the 
court of appeals' conclusion that "a privilege of non-disclosure 
is implicit within this statute."  Sands, 298 Wis. 2d 534, ¶10.  
  
¶39 Courts in other states with similar statutes that have 
addressed this issue have rejected such an approach that equates 
the creation of closed session exemptions from open meetings 
laws with the creation of closed meeting discovery privileges.  
See, e.g., County Comm'rs for St. Mary's County v. Lacer, 903 
A.2d 
378, 
387 
(Md. 
2006)(upholding 
circuit 
court 
order 
permitting discovery related to the statements and actions of a 
county board during a closed session meeting); State ex rel. 
Upper Republican Natural Res. Dist. v. Dist. Judges of the Dist. 
Ct. 
for 
Chase 
County, 
728 
N.W.2d 
275, 
279-81 
(Neb. 
2007)(concluding that there is no privilege for communications 
by virtue of the communications having been made during a closed 
session); Springfield Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Ohio Ass'n 
of Pub. Sch. Employees, 667 N.E.2d 458, 467 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1995)("there is no absolute privilege to be accorded discussions 
held in executive session [although] a trial court, in its 
discretion, may limit discovery").  See also Dillon v. City of 
Davenport, 366 N.W.2d 918, 921 (Iowa 1985): 
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
22 
 
While section 28A.5 provides specific direction 
concerning the preservation of the occurrences in a 
closed session and details the extent to which the 
minutes 
or 
a 
recording 
of 
the 
meeting 
may 
be 
disclosed, it does not specify that the discussions at 
the closed meeting acquire the status of confidential 
communications which are privileged from any use other 
than that specified.  Subsection 28A.5(4) does provide 
that such matters "shall be sealed and shall not be 
public records open to public inspection," except in 
an enforcement action after examination by the court 
in camera; this is not an enforcement action.  On the 
other hand, our discovery rule provides that the 
parties "may obtain discovery regarding any matter, 
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject 
matter involved in the pending action."  Iowa R. Civ. 
P. 122(a).   
¶40 Even Illinois, a state that grants qualified immunity 
to some types of closed session communications, does so in a 
manner that preserves any discovery rights to which a litigant 
may be entitled.  In a decision concluding that labor-
negotiating strategy sessions were entitled to a type of 
privilege against discovery requests, the Illinois Supreme Court 
was careful to limit that privilege to a qualified privilege 
which still allows litigants access to the requested information 
through an in camera inspection, after the party seeking 
disclosure of the privileged information shows a "'compelling 
necessity' for the specific information requested."  Illinois 
Educ. Labor Relations Bd. v. Homer Cmty. Consol. Dist., 547 
N.E.2d 182, 187-88 (Ill. 1989).  In a later decision, the court 
similarly recognized that "it is unjust to afford the government 
the benefit of withholding relevant evidence while requiring its 
opponent to adhere to the established rules of open discovery."  
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
23 
 
People ex rel. Birkett v. City of Chicago, 705 N.E.2d 48, 52 
(Ill. 1998).   
¶41 We find particularly compelling the examination of 
this issue by the Nebraska Supreme Court, which held that its 
open meetings act did not, by including a closed session 
exception, thereby create a closed session discovery privilege 
in Upper Republican NRD.  In that case, a nonprofit organization 
called WaterClaim, along with several concerned residents of a 
natural resources district, sued the Upper Republican Natural 
Resources District (NRD) and its board of directors for a 
violation of Nebraska's Open Meetings Act.  Upper Republican 
NRD, 728 N.W.2d at 277-78.  When the plaintiffs attempted to 
depose some of the defendants, the defendants filed a motion in 
limine, arguing in part that discussions held in closed session 
are exempt from discovery because they are confidential.  Id. at 
278.  In response, the plaintiffs filed a motion to compel, 
which the presiding judge granted, explaining that  
[i]f the Court were to rule in the [defendants'] favor 
on this matter, it would prevent any lawsuit, at any 
time, claiming a violation of the Open Meetings [Act] 
to move forward because all of the evidence involved 
in the violation of the Open Meetings [Act] was at the 
meeting held in private. 
Id.   
¶42 In a mandamus action, the Nebraska Supreme Court 
affirmed, applying a thorough analysis of the relationship 
between closed session exemptions to open meetings laws and 
privileges against discovery, which the court explained are 
necessarily distinct concepts.  Id. at 279-81.  The court 
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
24 
 
explained that its state's public meetings laws are liberally 
construed to fulfill the objective of openness in favor of the 
public, while closed session provisions are narrowly and 
strictly construed.  Id. at 279.  The court contrasted the 
express language creating discovery privileges in other contexts 
with the lack of any comparable language in its state's open 
meetings act indicating that the Nebraska legislature "intended 
to create an absolute privilege for all communications occurring 
while a public body is in a closed session."  Id. at 279-80. 
¶43 After concluding there was no explicit privilege in 
the text of the statute or evidence of legislative intent to 
create such a privilege, the court explored the strong policy 
reasons for not denying discovery access to closed session 
contents: 
Our conclusion is also based on the fact that if these 
communications were privileged solely because they 
occurred during a closed session, a private litigant 
would be left without the ability to challenge the 
validity of the public body's actions during a closed 
session.  To determine whether a public body, in a 
closed session, has acted outside of its authority, a 
private 
litigant 
must 
have 
access 
to 
those 
communications by means of a legitimate discovery 
request.  To conclude otherwise would, in essence, 
immunize a public body from any challenge relating to 
the propriety of its closed session. 
Id. at 280.  
¶44 Like the Nebraska Supreme Court, we find no language 
in our own open meetings laws indicating that our legislature 
intended 
to 
create 
a 
broad 
discovery 
privilege 
for 
communications occurring in closed sessions of governmental 
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
25 
 
bodies, in contrast with the numerous other privileges that 
explicitly are provided for in our discovery statutes.  
¶45 To the contrary, the language of Wis. Stat. § 19.85 
does not describe the contents of closed meetings as either 
secret11 or exempt from discovery.  In addition, the text of 
§ 19.85 allowing closed meetings in some circumstances is 
permissive, not mandatory.  We will not infer a mandatory 
discovery privilege for closed session contents when the closed 
session statute itself speaks in permissive terms, not requiring 
any meeting to be closed in the first place. 
¶46 Most importantly, as we have explained, the rights of 
private litigants to engage in legitimate discovery requests are 
critical to the functioning of our truth and transparency-
focused adversary system.  While certain government bodies may 
be entitled to have some meetings closed to the general public, 
we do not view such permissive limitations upon the physical 
presence 
of 
the 
general 
public 
at 
meetings 
to 
justify 
automatically mandating the denial of discovery to litigants 
whose rights such meetings may directly affect.   
                                                 
11 While we recognize that Wis. Stat. § 19.81(3), in 
conformance with Article IV, section 10 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, allows for secrecy within each house of the 
legislature 
when 
the 
public 
welfare 
requires 
it, 
these 
provisions are not implicated in this case.  Despite our 
recognition of the secrecy provisions of § 19.81(3) and our 
explanation that the subsection is not at issue in this case, 
the dissent suggests that our opinion somehow ignores or limits 
both the legislative secrecy provision of § 19.81(3) and other 
explicit exemptions of the open meetings statute.  See dissent, 
¶¶50-53.  We again emphasize that we do not address that issue. 
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
26 
 
¶47 Consistent with decisions in other states that have 
addressed this issue, we therefore conclude that in allowing 
governmental bodies to conduct closed sessions in limited 
circumstances, Wis. Stat. § 19.85 does not thereby create a 
blanket 
privilege 
shielding 
closed 
session 
contents 
from 
discovery.   
¶48 While 
our 
holding 
here 
is 
consistent 
with 
the 
conclusions reached by other states, it is also consistent with 
our own past decisions such as LTSB, in which this court 
explained that "not all confidential data is that over which the 
custodian or owner may assert a privilege."  LTSB, 272 Wis. 2d 
208, ¶15 (citations omitted).12  Thus, just because a meeting may 
                                                 
12 We note that our holding is also consistent with the 
approach taken in open records cases in this state.  In 
Wisconsin State Journal v. University of Wisconsin-Platteville, 
160 Wis. 2d 31, 38, 465 N.W.2d 266 (Ct. App. 1990), the court of 
appeals held that "[i]t does not follow that, simply because 
meetings were properly closed under sec. 19.85(1)(f), Stats., 
documents compiled in conjunction with those meetings are exempt 
from disclosure under sec. 19.35(1)."  In Zellner v. Cedarburg 
School District, 2007 WI 53, ¶48, 300 Wis. 2d 290, 731 N.W.2d 
240, this court similarly held that although a settlement 
meeting between Zellner and the District in that case "was 
closed to the public, it does not follow that records which were 
compiled in conjunction with that meeting are automatically 
exempt from release under the Open Records Law."  In the present 
case, Sands urges us similarly to "refuse to create a new 
privilege for what is said in closed session meetings, just as 
it has refused to privilege what is written for closed 
sessions."  We agree that the same principle applies:  it does 
not follow that simply because meetings are closed under Wis. 
Stat. § 19.85, the contents of such meetings are exempt from 
disclosure in response to discovery requests, just as they are 
not automatically exempt from open records requests.  The clear 
policy of discovery statutes, open records laws, and open 
meetings laws alike is transparency and access.  
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
27 
 
be kept closed from the public, even if some of the meeting 
contents are thereby "confidential" in some sense of the word, 
it does not necessarily follow that the District has a legal 
privilege to refuse compliance with discovery requests. 
¶49 The District concedes that not all statutes allowing 
confidentiality necessarily create a privilege, but attempts to 
distinguish LTSB by asserting that the closed meeting provisions 
of Wis. Stat. § 19.85 "extend far beyond" the custodial 
requirement in LTSB that data maintained by the legislative 
technology services bureau be kept confidential.  
¶50 The District argues that the more applicable cases are 
Alt, 224 Wis. 2d at 85-86, in which this court found a privilege 
in Wis. Stat. § 907.06(1) precluding expert witnesses from being 
appointed 
against 
their will; cases identifying qualified 
privileges for journalists under Article I, Section 3 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution; and cases that address the importance of 
protecting candor in the decision-making process.  The District 
concludes that in the present case, an implicit privilege is 
apparent due to the purpose of Wis. Stat. § 19.85, which the 
District describes, without any legislative history or other 
citations, in the following terms:   
The legislature weighed the competing interests in 
enacting the open meetings law, and balanced those 
interests when it created statutory exemptions.  In 
that process, it determined that, in the circumstances 
defined 
in 
§ 19.85(1)(a) 
through 
(j), 
society's 
interest 
in 
not 
having 
those 
discussions 
and 
deliberations publicly disclosed outweighs society's 
interest in "open government." 
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
28 
 
¶51 The District's arguments fail for a number of reasons.  
First, the District has it backwards when it cites DeHart v. 
Wisconsin Mutual Insurance Co., 2007 WI 91, ¶31, 302 Wis. 2d 
564, 734 N.W.2d 394, for the rule against judicial creation of 
exceptions to clear and unambiguous statutory provisions.  The 
District attempts to apply DeHart to argue that the circuit 
court in this case improperly created a discovery exception to 
the closed meeting provisions of Wis. Stat. § 19.85.  However, 
Dehart actually serves to defeat the District's arguments 
because it reaffirms the impropriety of judicially creating an 
exception to the clear and unambiguous statutory language of 
Wis. Stat. § 804.01, which is in essence what the District is 
asking us to do.   
¶52 Second, the District's argument that Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.85 "extends far beyond" the custodial requirement in LTSB 
in its protection of information is not persuasive.  LTSB, a 
case involving a criminal investigation of certain legislators 
and legislative employees, involved a subpoena duces tecum 
ordering the production of electronically stored communications 
in the possession of the Legislative Technology Services Bureau 
(LTSB).  LTSB, 272 Wis. 2d 208, ¶¶1-4.  The confidentiality 
protections asserted in LTSB were expressly set forth in Wis. 
Stat. § 13.96, which provides that LTSB "shall at all times 
observe the confidential nature of the data and information 
originated, maintained or processed by electronic equipment 
supported by it."  Id., ¶13 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 13.96).   
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
29 
 
¶53 In contrast, there is no such explicit confidentiality 
mandate in the text of Wis. Stat. § 19.85.  Indeed, unlike the 
statute at issue in LTSB, there is no pertinent mandatory 
language at all in § 19.85.  Rather, § 19.85(1) uses permissive 
language, allowing that certain governmental meetings "may be 
convened" and "may be held" in limited circumstances (emphasis 
added).  The District has failed to explain how material that is 
not explicitly designated "confidential" is more entitled to a 
privilege 
against 
disclosure 
than 
material 
that 
is 
so 
designated.  Consequently, the argument that § 19.85 "extends 
far beyond" Wis. Stat. § 13.96 in its protection of certain 
information is not a viable argument.   
¶54 Third, the District's description of Alt is flawed.  
Alt actually illustrates why the closed sessions statute in this 
case does not create such a privilege.  In Alt, this court found 
a privilege in the text of Wis. Stat. § 907.06(1),13 the language 
of which this court held was "clear and unambiguous" in 
expressly providing that expert witnesses may not be appointed 
by the court against their will.  Alt, 224 Wis. 2d at 86.  This 
                                                 
13 Wisconsin Stat. § 907.06(1) provides in pertinent part: 
(1) Appointment.  The judge may on the judge's own 
motion or on the motion of any party enter an order to 
show 
cause 
why 
expert 
witnesses 
should 
not 
be 
appointed, and may request the parties to submit 
nominations.  The judge may appoint any expert 
witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint 
witnesses of the judge's own selection.  An expert 
witness shall not be appointed by the judge unless the 
expert 
witness 
consents 
to 
act. . . .  
(Emphasis 
added.) 
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
30 
 
court held in Alt that "this express grant implies a privilege 
to refuse to testify if the expert is called by a litigant.  If 
a court cannot compel an expert to testify, it logically follows 
that a litigant should not be able to so compel an expert."  Id. 
(emphasis added).  
¶55 Although this court described the privilege in Alt as 
"implicit" as it pertained to an expert's right to refuse a 
judge's request for testimony, this court emphasized that its 
conclusion that such implicit privilege existed was based on the 
explicit, unambiguous, and express statement in Wis. Stat. 
§ 907.06 establishing the right of experts to refuse litigants' 
requests for them to testify.  Id. at 85-86.  As such, Alt's 
significance for the present case is that, unlike in Alt, the 
statute in the present case does not contain any similar 
language which explicitly, unambiguously, and expressly allows 
the District to refuse to turn over meeting contents to any 
person, let alone a litigant or judge.  Quite the contrary; the 
policy underlying the interplay of Wis. Stat. §§ 19.81, 19.85, 
804.01(2)(a) and 905.01 is one of openness.  Consequently, the 
District does not provide grounds for our deviating from the 
general rule articulated in the opening of our analysis in Alt 
that "[p]rivileges are the exception, not the rule."  Id. at 85. 
 
¶56 Fourth, the District's argument that an implied 
privilege 
for 
contents 
of 
closed 
meetings 
is 
like 
the 
constitutional qualified privilege for journalists is a flawed 
analogy.  The case upon which the District relies to make this 
argument, State v. Knops, 49 Wis. 2d 647, 183 N.W.2d 93 (1971), 
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
31 
 
was a case about constitutional privilege, and was decided 
before Wis. Stat. § 905.01 was enacted, restricting the creation 
of new evidentiary privileges.   
¶57 Finally, the District's description of the policy 
underlying Wis. Stat. § 19.85 is unpersuasive.  The District 
highlights the court of appeals' citation of National Labor 
Relations Board v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150-51 
(1975), for the proposition that one purpose of § 19.85 is to 
allow candid discussion by closed meeting participants, free 
from worries that the discussion will be disclosed, and that a 
privilege is necessary to accomplish that purpose.  However, 
NLRB is inapposite.  The case does not address either § 19.85 or 
discovery statutes at all, but rather addresses an explicit 
exemption from disclosure for certain intra-agency memorandums 
under section 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5)(1970) of the federal Freedom 
of Information Act (FOIA), an exemption which the Supreme Court 
held did not even apply in that case.  NLRB, 421 U.S. at 155.  
Consequently, there may be an executive privilege from FOIA 
disclosure 
for 
certain intra-agency memorandums under the 
express language of 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) of the federal Freedom 
of Information Act, but the present case involves a discovery 
request for information pertaining to a lawsuit, not a FOIA 
request made to a federal agency.   
¶58 The 
District's 
related 
argument, 
that 
the 
legislature's intent to create a discovery privilege in enacting 
Wis. Stat. § 19.85 can be inferred from the fact that, according 
to the District, the legislature balanced competing public 
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
32 
 
interests and found that society's interest in making closed 
session discussions private outweighs society's interest in 
access to the content of such discussions, also fails.  This 
argument is unsupported by any citation to legislative history, 
statutory 
or 
case 
law evincing such a decision by the 
legislature.   
¶59 For all of these reasons, we conclude that allowing 
limited exceptions to the open meetings statute does not equate 
to creating an implicit evidentiary privilege against discovery 
requests.  Wisconsin Stat. § 19.85 provides only that some 
meetings may be closed, not that their contents are privileged 
against discovery requests under Wis. Stat. § 804.01.  In other 
words, "closed meeting" is not synonymous with "a meeting that, 
by definition, entails a privilege exempting its contents from 
discovery."  Considering the general presumptions of openness 
and access underlying both our discovery and open meetings 
statutes, there is no compelling justification for denying a 
litigant's rights to discovery regarding the substance of closed 
session discussions pertaining to that litigant.  Therefore, we 
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
33 
 
conclude that § 19.85 does not create a privilege shielding 
contents of closed meetings from discovery requests.14   
IV 
¶60 The District alternatively refers to the privilege it 
seeks as a "deliberative process privilege [which] prohibits the 
compelled disclosure of the Board's discussions."  However, no 
such "deliberative process privilege" has ever been recognized 
by 
the 
Wisconsin 
courts, 
and 
we 
decline 
the 
District's 
invitation to create a new privilege judicially.   
¶61 The only justification the District gives for adopting 
a new "deliberative process privilege" is a string citation of 
federal cases that have no bearing on the present case, and that 
do not support the argument that a "deliberative process 
privilege" is implicit in Wis. Stat. §§ 19.85 and 19.31.   
                                                 
14 Even if Wis. Stat. § 19.85 did create a privilege 
shielding contents of closed meetings from discovery, Sands 
points out that those statutory privileges explicitly enumerated 
in ch. 905 of the Wisconsin Statutes are subject to limitations.  
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 905.11, 
for 
example, 
provides 
that 
an 
individual "upon whom this chapter confers a privilege against 
disclosure of the confidential matter or communication waives 
the privilege if the person or his or her predecessor, while 
holder of the privilege, voluntarily discloses or consents to 
disclosure 
of 
any 
significant 
part 
of 
the 
matter 
or 
communication."  Consequently, even if § 19.85 created a 
privilege similar to those statutorily created in ch. 905, Sands 
argues that any such privilege may be considered waived by 
virtue 
of 
the 
fact 
that 
the 
District 
admitted 
in 
its 
interrogatory answers that an individual who was not a member of 
the Board, Dr. Petric, was present at the closed meeting.  See, 
e.g., Johnson v. Rogers Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 2005 WI 114, ¶¶124, 
143-45, 
283 
Wis. 2d 384, 
700 
N.W.2d 27 
(Prosser, 
J., 
concurring).  While this argument by Sands may appear to have 
merit, we need not reach it, having established that there is no 
privilege in the first place established by § 19.85. 
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
34 
 
¶62 The first case cited by the District, Tennessean 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Federal Housing Administration, 464 F.2d 657 
(6th Cir. 1972), merely discussed in passing an explicit 
privilege against FOIA requests established by the plain text of 
the federal Freedom of Information Act, which exempts from FOIA 
requirements 
"inter-agency 
or 
intra-agency 
memorandums 
or 
letters which would not be available by law to a party other 
than an agency in litigation with the agency."  5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(b)(5)(1970)(emphasis added).  See Tennessean Newspapers, 
Inc., 464 F.2d at 659.  Not only does this case address an 
explicit exemption from FOIA, as opposed to an implicit 
exemption from discovery requests, but this FOIA exemption 
recognizes the importance of broad access to information in 
litigation, enabling access to such information even in the face 
of a FOIA exemption.  
¶63 All the other cases the District cites in this section 
save one pertain to interpretations of the FOIA exemption as 
well, and their discussions of FOIA are not authoritative in our 
deliberations 
of 
a 
different 
breed 
of 
claimed 
implicit 
privileges under our state law.  
¶64 NLRB, 421 U.S. at 150, for example, explains that 
"Congress had the Government's executive privilege specifically 
in mind in adopting Exemption 5."  Department of the Interior v. 
Klamath Water Users Protective Association, 532 U.S. 1, 9 
(2001), also describes limitations on the FOIA exemption.  In 
that case, the Court explained that the point of the FOIA 
exemption:  
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
35 
 
is 
not 
to 
protect 
Government 
secrecy 
pure 
and 
simple . . . and the first condition of Exemption 5 is 
no less important than the second; the communication 
must be "inter-agency or intra-agency," 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(b)(5). . . .   "[A]gency" means "each authority 
of the Government of the United States," § 551(1), and 
"includes 
any 
executive 
department, 
military 
department, 
Government 
corporation, 
Government 
controlled corporation, or other establishment in the 
executive 
branch 
of 
the 
Government . . . or 
any  
independent regulatory agency, § 552(f)." 
Id. 
¶65 The 
final 
FOIA 
case 
cited 
by 
the 
District 
as 
supporting an implicit privilege under our state laws is Enviro 
Tech 
International, 
Inc. 
v. 
United 
States 
Environmental 
Protection Agency, 371 F.3d 370 (7th Cir. 2004).  The District 
argues that this case stands for the proposition that "[t]o 
qualify for protection under the deliberative process privilege, 
the 
documents 
or 
other evidence in issue must be both 
'predecisional and deliberative' in nature."  To the extent that 
this description implies that the issues in Enviro Tech overlap 
with those implicated in the present case, it is an inaccurate 
description of Enviro Tech.  Enviro Tech is a FOIA case and 
clearly describes the deliberative process privilege at issue in 
that case as a privilege contained specifically in the FOIA 
exemption, explaining that "materials are routinely shielded 
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
36 
 
from disclosure by the deliberative process privilege under FOIA 
Exemption 5."  Id. at 373 (emphasis added)(citation omitted).15 
¶66 In the only deliberative process privilege case cited 
by the District that was not a FOIA case, Lang v. Kohl's Food 
Stores, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 542, 550-51 (W.D. Wis. 1998), a single 
magistrate judge did recognize a broader "deliberative process 
privilege" beyond the context of FOIA requests.  In that case, 
however, the magistrate explained that the privilege can be 
overcome by a showing of individual need for information: 
I also find that the [Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission's] claim of deliberative process privilege 
is well-taken.  The deliberative process privilege 
protects communications that are part of the decision-
making process of a governmental agency.  Because 
frank discussion of legal and policy matters is 
essential to the decisionmaking process of government 
agencies, communications made prior to and as part of 
an agency determination are protected from disclosure.  
The privilege does not apply to communications made 
subsequent to the agency's decision.  The privilege 
may 
be 
overcome 
by 
a 
sufficient 
showing 
of 
particularized 
need 
outweighing 
the 
reasons 
for 
confidentiality.  The privilege should be applied as 
narrowly 
as 
consistent 
with 
efficient 
government 
operation.  
Id. (citations omitted)(emphasis added).  
                                                 
15 We note that "deliberative process privilege" is a phrase 
used by cases interpreting the FOIA exemption and is not in the 
text of the federal statute itself.  See Enviro Tech Int'l, Inc. 
v. EPA, 371 F.3d 370, 371 (7th Cir. 2004)("The EPA asserted, and 
the district court agreed, that the withheld documents were 
exempt from disclosure under section 552(b)(5) pursuant to the 
so-called deliberative process privilege.").  See also 5 
U.S.C.A. § 552("(b) This section does not apply to matters that 
are-- (5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters 
which would not be available by law to a party other than an 
agency in litigation with the agency"). 
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
37 
 
¶67 Most importantly, none of the cases the District cites 
address either Wis. Stat. § 19.85 or § 804.01, or hold that such 
a closed meeting privilege against discovery requests exists 
under Wisconsin law.16  In fact, Wisconsin does not recognize a 
deliberative process privilege.  Wisconsin Stat. § 905.01 
precludes the extension of common law privileges by the court on 
a case-by-case basis, but rather requires common law privileges 
not originating in the constitution to be adopted by statute or 
court rule.  See Davison, 75 Wis. 2d at 205-06.   
¶68 Even if it were within our general authority to create 
new privileges, the deliberative process privilege recognized by 
federal courts as explicitly contained in the Freedom of 
Information Act's fifth exemption does not lend itself to 
recognition as an implicit privilege applicable to discovery 
requests under Wisconsin law.  This is because our state laws 
reflect a strong policy of transparency and access, particularly 
in the context of discovery requests where such a broad 
privilege would be detrimental to the search for truth central 
to our adversary process.  
                                                 
16 The same is true of those cases cited by the dissent, 
several of which we have just explained are inapplicable; the 
dissent ignores our discussion of these cases.  See dissent, 
¶85.  As to the remainder of the cases cited by the dissent as 
recognizing a deliberative process privilege, two (International 
Paper Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 438 F.2d 1349 (2d Cir. 
1971), and Daily Gazette Co. v. West Virginia Development 
Office, 482 S.E.2d 180 (W.Va. 1996)) are FOIA cases and 
therefore inapposite for the reasons we have just discussed; 
none are Wisconsin cases; and none apply a deliberative process 
privilege to shield information from discovery requests, whether 
in a closed meeting or otherwise. 
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
38 
 
¶69 In addition to generally flying in the face of 
longstanding principles of open access, there are potential 
dangers inherent in the District's requested approach to 
privileging closed meeting contents against discovery requests.  
This approach would dramatically affect civil litigation and 
discovery in many areas where government bodies are litigants.  
One 
specific 
context 
where 
such 
a 
privilege 
could 
most 
detrimentally impair the judicial process is that of employment 
discrimination litigation, in which cases government employees 
who are denied access to their employers' closed discussions 
about their negative treatment would no longer have access to 
the discussions about their termination.  In such contexts, 
employees who are discriminated against would not be able to 
avail themselves of standard discovery to disprove as pretext 
the employers' proffered reasons for their treatment, which is 
necessary to prove many federal and state discrimination claims.  
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973); 
State v. Lamon, 2003 WI 78, ¶32, 262 Wis. 2d 747, 664 N.W.2d 
607; State v. Walker, 154 Wis. 2d 158, 176 n. 11, 453 N.W.2d 127 
(1990). 
¶70 The District has failed to explain the parameters of 
the new privilege it seeks, leaving unclear, for example, who 
could invoke it in which circumstances.  Nothing would prevent 
legislative and administrative bodies from going into closed 
session to escape judicial review any time they fear litigation, 
in effect granting themselves immunity at whim on a regular 
basis.  
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
39 
 
V 
¶71 Although we conclude that the closed session exemption 
to the open meetings laws does not create an evidentiary 
privilege which exempts the District from discovery compliance 
in this case, our decision should not be viewed as undermining 
the ability of government bodies to conduct certain meetings in 
closed session where authorized statutorily.  While discovery 
rights are broad and paramount to our justice system, they are 
not without limit.  Wisconsin Stat. § 804.01(2)(a), setting 
forth the scope of allowable discovery, provides that subjects 
of discovery requests may object to requests that are not 
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action.  
Section 804.01(3) provides additional protections in the form of 
protective 
orders 
in 
response 
to 
annoying, 
embarrassing, 
oppressive, unduly burdensome or unduly expensive discovery 
requests, as follows: 
(3) Protective orders.  (a) Upon motion by a party or 
by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for 
good cause shown, the court may make any order which 
justice requires to protect a party or person from 
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden 
or expense, including but not limited to one or more 
of the following: 
1. That the discovery not be had; 
2. That the discovery may be had only on specified 
terms and conditions, including a designation of the 
time or place; 
3. That the discovery may be had only by a method of 
discovery other than that selected by the party 
seeking discovery; 
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
40 
 
4. That certain matters not be inquired into, or that 
the scope of the discovery be limited to certain 
matters; 
5. That discovery be conducted with no one present 
except persons designated by the court; 
6. That a deposition after being sealed be opened only 
by order of the court; 
7. That a trade secret, as defined in s. 134.90(1)(c), 
or 
other 
confidential 
research, 
development, 
or 
commercial 
information 
not 
be 
disclosed 
or 
be 
disclosed only in a designated way; 
8. That the parties simultaneously file specified 
documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes 
to be opened as directed by the court. 
(b) If the motion for a protective order is denied in 
whole or in part, the court may, on such terms and 
conditions as are just, order that any party or person 
provide or permit discovery.  Section 804.12(1)(c) 
applies to the award of expenses incurred in relation 
to the motion. 
(c) Motions under this subsection may be heard as 
prescribed in s. 807.13. 
As 
such, 
just 
because 
closed 
meeting 
contents 
are 
not 
categorically exempt from discovery compliance, it is not the 
case that every such discovery request should or will be 
granted.   
¶72 In addition, there may be situations in which a 
discovery request implicates sensitive information to which the 
general public should not be given access.  Although we do not 
know whether this is such a case, we recognize the potential for 
such cases involving sensitive government information that would 
be harmful to release to the general public.  In such cases, the 
public is not necessarily entitled to as much information about 
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
41 
 
government matters as a private individual seeking discovery 
about an issue directly affecting him or her.  However, we also 
note that protections against such dangers are built into our 
discovery laws.  
¶73 The U.S. Supreme Court has described cases in which 
litigants obtain information potentially damaging to reputation 
and privacy if publicly released, for example, in the following 
terms:  
[t]he government clearly has a substantial interest in 
preventing this sort of abuse of its processes.  Cf. 
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176-177 (1979); Gumbel 
v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131, 145-146 (1888).  As stated by 
Judge Friendly in International Products Corp. v. 
Koons, 
325 
F.2d 
403, 
407-408 
(2d 
Cir. 
1963), 
"[w]hether or not the Rule itself authorizes [a 
particular protective order] . . . we have no question 
as to the court's jurisdiction to do this under the 
inherent 'equitable powers of courts of law over their 
own 
process, 
to prevent abuses, oppression, and 
injustices'" (citing Gumbel v. Pitkin, supra).  The 
prevention of the abuse that can attend the coerced 
production of information under a State's discovery 
rule is sufficient justification for the authorization 
of protective orders. 
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1984).  Such 
protective orders are explicitly authorized by Wis. Stat. 
§ 804.01(3)(a)7., which allows the issuance of protective orders 
establishing 
that 
"confidential 
research, 
development 
or 
commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in 
a designated way." 
 
¶74 In addition to issuing protective orders, courts may 
consider motions to seal the record, or may conduct in camera 
proceedings 
to 
ensure 
that 
the 
information 
requested 
is 
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
42 
 
necessary to the litigant and does not exceed the scope of 
allowable discovery.  See State ex rel. Ampco Metal, Inc. v. 
O'Neill, 273 Wis. 530, 78 N.W.2d 921 (1956). 
 
¶75 Finally, we again find guidance in Upper Republican 
NRD.  After concluding that Nebraska's closed meeting statute, 
which is similar to Wisconsin's, does not create a discovery 
privilege, the court in Upper Republican NRD added: 
We recognize that under certain circumstances, 
allowing a public body to enter into a closed session, 
away from the public view, serves to protect the 
public's interest.  However, we do not conclude that 
granting a litigant access to communications of a 
closed session, by way of a limited, legitimate 
discovery request, will harm the public interest.  In 
dealing 
with 
a 
discovery 
request 
relating 
to 
information from a closed session, a trial court may 
increase its supervision of the discovery process to 
ensure that sensitive or confidential information is 
protected through the creation of an appropriately 
tailored protective order. 
Furthermore, our determination that there is no 
absolute discovery privilege for communications that 
occur during closed sessions does not necessarily mean 
that all communications during closed sessions are 
discoverable. 
 
All 
other 
recognized 
evidentiary 
privileges are still applicable.  Thus, although there 
is 
no 
absolute 
privilege 
for 
closed 
session 
communications, 
to 
the 
extent 
the 
communications 
implicate other evidentiary privileges, such as the 
attorney-client 
privilege, 
the 
communications 
are 
protected. 
Upper Republican NRD, 728 N.W.2d at 280.  As in Nebraska, 
government bodies in Wisconsin that are subject to discovery 
requests related to closed meeting contents may similarly 
request courts to increase their supervision of the discovery 
process to ensure the protection of sensitive information.   
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
43 
 
 
¶76 The dissent decries our decision today, conceding that 
"governmental bodies may continue to meet lawfully behind closed 
doors," but describing the effect of our decision as being that 
"what is said there no longer will be privileged to stay there."  
Dissent, ¶1.  What the dissent fails to recognize is that there 
is no closed meeting privilege against discovery compliance.    
¶77 Neither the parties nor the dissent in this case can 
point to any statutes or case law establishing a closed meeting 
privilege against statutory discovery requests.  It is therefore 
quite disingenuous for the dissent to accuse the majority of 
sweeping too broadly and violating the separation of powers 
doctrine.17  Rather, it is the dissent that would have this court 
                                                 
17  The closest the dissent comes to explaining its claim 
that we are somehow violating separation of powers in our 
opinion today is its internally inconsistent statement that 
"[i]n the absence of express legislative directive, it is unwise 
for this court, as a policy matter, to conclude that there are 
no 'privilege[s] implicit in Wis. Stat. § 19.85 shielding the 
contents of closed sessions from discovery.'"  Dissent, ¶33 
(emphasis in original).  The fallacy of this statement that a 
legislature must expressly set forth the lack of an implicit 
privilege is even more evident in light of the dissent's later 
passage explaining that the dictionary definition of "implied" 
is "[n]ot directly expressed."  Id., ¶74.  
We further note that the law review article cited in 
paragraph 38 of the dissent, Russell L. Weaver & James T. R. 
Jones, The Deliberative Process Privilege, 54 Mo. L. Rev. 279, 
(1989), illustrates the United States Supreme Court's rejection 
of a separation of powers argument as a basis for a privilege: 
In 
United 
States 
v. 
Nixon, 
which 
involved 
the 
executive 
rather 
than 
the 
deliberative 
process 
privilege, President Nixon argued that the separation 
of powers doctrine precluded judicial review of his 
privilege claims.  The United Sates Supreme Court 
disagreed.  Relying on Marbury v. Madison, the Court 
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
44 
 
engage in judicial activism by creating a new privilege never 
before recognized by courts in this state and unauthorized by 
the legislature.  Our decision today merely preserves the status 
quo, in contrast with the dissent's proposal that we establish a 
new privilege not requested by the parties18 that would create 
unprecedented 
government 
exemptions 
from 
valid 
litigation 
discovery requests.  The dissent admonishes this court with the 
reminder that this court must "remember the limitations on its 
rule-making powers," dissent, ¶54, but such limitations are 
precisely the basis of our decision today.  This reminder is one 
that the dissent itself should heed, rather than engaging in 
Orwellian "doublethink."19     
VI 
¶78 We conclude that the court of appeals decision 
reversing the circuit court's order granting Sands' motion to 
compel was based on an erroneous interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.85 as containing a privilege shielding the content of 
                                                                                                                                                             
emphasized that the courts are charged with the 
obligation "to say what the law is."  The Court held 
that 
its 
duty 
extended 
to 
claims 
of 
privilege 
including the executive privilege.  Lower federal 
courts 
have 
extended 
Nixon's 
holding 
to 
the 
deliberative process privilege. 
Id. at 312 (citations omitted). 
18 One privilege the dissent seeks to establish that the 
parties never sought is the so-called "state secrets" privilege 
it claims exists under common law.  Dissent, ¶¶39-53.   
19 See George Orwell, 1984 176-77 (The Penguin Group 
1983)(1949). 
No. 
2005AP1026   
 
45 
 
closed sessions from discovery requests.  Consequently, we 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals, and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
¶79 By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶80 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  This seemingly 
small case, involving two discovery requests by a teacher whose 
contract was non-renewed by a local school board, seriously 
threatens the right of governmental bodies to deliberate in 
closed session before making a public decision, even though the 
Wisconsin Statutes explicitly authorize governmental bodies to 
meet in closed session for deliberation in specific, enumerated 
situations.  See Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1)(a)——(j).  Of course, 
governmental bodies may continue to meet lawfully behind closed 
doors.  But what is said there no longer will be privileged to 
stay there.  Painting with very broad strokes, the majority 
fashions a discovery rule that virtually destroys any privilege 
to keep deliberations by governmental bodies confidential when a 
lawsuit is filed. 
¶81 This 
case 
requires 
the 
court 
to 
interpret 
two 
statutes, Wis. Stat. §§ 19.85 and 905.01, but it also implicates 
the Wisconsin Constitution and the power of this court.  In my 
view, the court's decision sweeps too broadly, frustrates the 
purpose of permitting governmental bodies to meet in statutorily 
authorized closed session, violates the separation of powers, 
and is incompatible with the conduct of governmental business.  
Accordingly, I must dissent. 
¶82 This dissent will discuss the facts giving rise to 
this litigation, explore the implications of the court's 
decision, 
examine 
constitutional 
and 
common 
law 
history, 
interpret Wis. Stat. §§ 19.85 and 905.01, and then set out a 
deliberative process privilege, based on Wisconsin statutes, 
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
2 
 
that would enable governmental bodies to keep their closed 
deliberations confidential.  
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶83 This case pits Dr. Barbara Sands (Dr. Sands), a Ph.D., 
against the Whitnall School District (the District) and members 
of the Whitnall School Board (the Board).  On April 29 and May 
13, 2002, the Board met in closed session to discuss the 
employment status of Dr. Sands, who had been hired by the 
District in 1998 to head its Gifted and Talented Education 
Program.  The Board proceeded properly into closed session under 
a specific statutory exception to Wisconsin's open meetings law, 
namely, Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1)(c).1  This exception authorizes a 
closed 
session 
to "[c]onsider[] 
employment, 
promotion, 
compensation or performance evaluation data of any public 
employee over which the governmental body has jurisdiction or 
exercises responsibility."  Id.   
¶84 Following the closed session on May 13, the Board 
moved into open session and voted against renewing Dr. Sands' 
most 
recent 
employment 
contract 
on 
grounds 
of 
poor 
job 
performance. 
¶85 After the Board's decision, Dr. Sands filed a lawsuit 
against the District, alleging that the non-renewal of her 
employment contract violated Wis. Stat. § 118.24(6) because the 
District failed to provide her written notice of non-renewal at 
least four months before her contract expired.  In its answer, 
                                                 
1 The Board members were joined in their closed sessions by 
the District's superintendent, Dr. Karen Petric. 
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
3 
 
the District denied that Dr. Sands was entitled to four months' 
advance notice of non-renewal because she did not qualify as an 
"administrator" within Wis. Stat. § 118.24(1). 
¶86 During 
discovery, 
Dr. 
Sands 
requested 
documents, 
records, and testimonial evidence relating to whether she was, 
in fact, an "administrator" with a statutory right to advance 
notice of her non-renewal.  Responding to the discovery request, 
the District produced all documents relating to its decision to 
non-renew Dr. Sands, all documents relating to Dr. Sands' job 
performance, and all documents relating to whether Dr. Sands was 
an administrator.  However, the District refused to answer three 
questions among the interrogatories served upon it.  The 
District refused to answer questions as to the deliberations 
that had taken place in the Board's closed sessions about Dr. 
Sands and the decision not to renew her contract.  The 
interrogatories, and the District's responses, read as follows: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Separately, for each person 
identified in response to interrogatory 1 [those 
present at the closed sessions], state the substance 
of the person's knowledge about the decision not to 
renew Dr. Sands' contract.   
ANSWER: Each of the individuals identified in 
answer to interrogatory 1, except Dr. Petric, were 
members of the Whitnall School Board and all were 
present 
during 
the 
Whitnall 
School 
Board's 
deliberations concerning the employment of Dr. Sands.  
Those deliberations occurred in closed session, are 
privileged and not subject to discovery pursuant to § 
19.85(1)(c), Stats., and the deliberative process 
privilege.  The motion and vote, which was the 
decision of the board, is reflected on Exhibit H 
hereto. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Identify each person who 
spoke during the deliberations that resulted in the 
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
4 
 
school board's decision not to renew Dr. Sands' 
contract. 
ANSWER: During the public meeting on May 13, 
2002[,] then counsel for Dr. Sands addressed the 
Whitnall School Board on the issue of Dr. Sands' 
employment.  All other discussions occurred during the 
Board's closed session deliberations and are therefore 
not subject to discovery pursuant to § 19.85(1)(c), 
Stats., and the deliberative process privilege. 
INTERROGATORY 
NO. 
6: 
Separately[,] 
for 
each 
person identified in response to question 5, above, 
state the substance of what he or she said about 
renewing Dr. Sands' contract. 
ANSWER: See response to number 5. 
¶87 As I understand it, Interrogatory No. 2 is not at 
issue in this review and is not addressed here.  See majority 
op., ¶8 n.7. 
¶88 Upon 
the 
District's 
refusal 
to 
answer 
all 
the 
interrogatories completely, Dr. Sands moved to compel the 
District's answers.  The District objected to the motion on 
grounds that the information sought about discussions during the 
Board's 
closed 
sessions 
was 
privileged, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1)(c).   
¶89 The circuit court ruled that the District was required 
to answer the interrogatories and that no privilege protected 
the information:   
I don't think there's a privilege in this case.  
I think that Plaintiff has a right to this discovery 
process. . . .  I don't see a privilege and I don't 
see that's inherent in the statute.  I just don't view 
it that way. . . .  In all due respect, someone else 
might view it in a different way. . . . 
¶90 However, the court of appeals reversed the circuit 
court's decision, concluding that a testimonial privilege is 
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
5 
 
implicit in Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1)(c).  Sands v. Whitnall Sch. 
Dist., 2007 WI App 3, ¶15, 298 Wis. 2d 534, 728 N.W.2d 15 ("We 
hold that based on the statutory language of Wis. Stat. § 19.85, 
the legislature intended for the substance of closed sessions to 
remain protected from public disclosure."). 
¶91 The court of appeals explained its decision as 
follows:   
Our conclusion is supported by the language of 
the statute and the public policy upon which the 
closed session statute was created.  The legislature 
recognized that a governmental body's right to meet in 
closed session and maintain the confidentiality of its 
discussions 
on 
certain 
matters 
was 
paramount.  
Society's interest in having certain matters discussed 
in closed session outweighs society's interest in 
"open government."  See Oshkosh N.W. Co. v. Oshkosh 
Library Bd., 125 Wis. 2d 480, 482-83, 373 N.W.2d 459 
(Ct. App. 1985).  The closed sessions at issue here 
addressed Sands's employment and performance, which 
fall 
squarely 
into 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
19.85(1)(c).  
Undoubtedly, one policy reason supporting a closed 
session to discuss such matters is to allow a candid 
discussion without concern that what is discussed will 
be disclosed.  See N.L.R.B. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 
421 U.S. 132, 150-52 (1975).  Such candid discussion 
is a necessary part of the decision-making process of 
governmental agencies. . . .  [I]f we were to conclude 
that disclosure of the substance of the closed 
discussion is permitted we, in essence, vitiate the 
need for the closed session at all.  Such an 
interpretation would render the statute meaningless, 
which we cannot do. . . .  The closed session loses 
its meaning if filing a lawsuit opens the door to what 
was once closed.  We must presume that the legislature 
intended the statute to be interpreted in a manner 
that advances the purposes of the statute[——]not 
defeats those purposes. . . .  If the closed session 
is rendered meaningless by the filing of a lawsuit, 
then the purpose of the law enacted by the legislature 
is defeated.  The careful crafting by our lawmakers in 
balancing what should be open to the public and what 
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
6 
 
should take place in a closed session is effectively 
destroyed. 
Id., ¶11 (citations omitted). 
¶92 This court granted Dr. Sands' petition for review and 
now reverses the court of appeals.  Majority op., ¶¶4, 78. 
II. THE COURT'S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS  
¶93 Dr. Sands states the issue in this case as follows: 
"In Wisconsin's Open Meetings law, do the closed session 
provisions 
of 
§ 19.85(1)(c), 
Stats. 
implicitly 
create 
a 
privilege preventing discovery during civil litigation?"  The 
District states the issue differently: "Where a public body 
properly meets in closed session pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.85(1), can a civil litigant compel disclosure of the 
discussions that took place during that closed session?" 
¶94 In my view, the District's statement of the issue 
accurately pinpoints the dispute.  The District did not obstruct 
discovery in any material sense, as it supplied all requested 
documents and divulged the names of all persons present at the 
closed sessions.  It objected to disclosing the name of each 
person who spoke during confidential deliberations and to 
providing the substance of what each person had to say. 
¶95 The majority responds to these issues by hammering on 
its 
thesis 
that 
closed 
session 
discussions, 
although 
"confidential," are not privileged from discovery:   
1. 
"[T]here is neither a 'deliberative process privilege' 
in Wisconsin nor any other privilege implicit in Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.85 
shielding 
the 
contents 
of 
closed 
sessions 
from 
discovery."  Majority op., ¶3.   
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
7 
 
2. 
"[T]he mere fact that the information Sands sought was 
related to the contents of a closed session does not mean that 
such information is 'privileged.'"  Majority op., ¶17. 
3. 
"[W]e find no language in our own open meetings laws 
indicating that our legislature intended to create a broad 
discovery privilege for communications occurring in closed 
sessions of governmental bodies."  Majority op., ¶44. 
4. 
"Wis[consin] Stat. § 19.85 does not . . . create a 
blanket 
privilege 
shielding 
closed 
session 
contents 
from 
discovery."  Majority op., ¶47.  See also majority op., ¶59 
("[W]e conclude that [Wis. Stat.] § 19.85 does not create a 
privilege shielding contents of closed meetings from discovery 
requests."). 
5. 
"[J]ust because a meeting may be kept closed from the 
public, even if some of the meeting contents are thereby 
'confidential' 
in 
some sense of the word, it does not 
necessarily follow that the District has a legal privilege to 
refuse compliance with discovery requests."  Majority op, ¶48. 
6. 
"Wisconsin does not recognize a deliberative process 
privilege."  Majority op. ¶67. 
¶96 The majority attempts to soften its far-reaching 
holding by suggesting potential limitations on the right to 
crack open closed sessions.  The majority points to a Wis. Stat. 
§ 804.01(3) protective order as a mechanism to protect against 
annoying, embarrassing, oppressive, unduly burdensome, or unduly 
expensive discovery requests.  See majority op., ¶¶71-73.  The 
majority also suggests that circuit courts might "increase their 
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
8 
 
supervision of the discovery process" to protect sensitive 
information.  Id., ¶75.  It does not explain what this means. 
¶97 Before proceeding to analyze the question presented, 
it is important to reflect upon the implications of the 
majority's decision in the real world.  The non-party brief of 
the Wisconsin Department of Justice (Department) inadvertently 
exposes the practical impact of the decision:  
In the open meetings law alone, there are 13 
statutory exemptions in Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1).  Each 
of those exemptions permits, but does not require, a 
governmental body to have a closed session discussion 
of the identified subject matter.  None of those 
exemptions contains a litigation exemption.  From the 
analytic 
perspective 
of 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
decision, nothing distinguishes the closed session 
exemption in Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1)(c) from the other 
12 exemptions.[2]  (Emphasis added.) 
                                                 
2 Closed sessions are permitted under the current version of 
Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1) for the following purposes:  
(a) Deliberating concerning a case which was the 
subject of any judicial or quasi−judicial trial or 
hearing before that governmental body.  
(b) Considering dismissal, demotion, licensing 
or discipline of any public employee or person 
licensed by a board or commission or the investigation 
of charges against such person, or considering the 
grant or denial of tenure for a university faculty 
member, and the taking of formal action on any such 
matter; provided that the faculty member or other 
public employee or person licensed is given actual 
notice of any evidentiary hearing which may be held 
prior to final action being taken and of any meeting 
at which final action may be taken. The notice shall 
contain a statement that the person has the right to 
demand that the evidentiary hearing or meeting be held 
in open session.  This paragraph and par. (f) do not 
apply to any such evidentiary hearing or meeting where 
the employee or person licensed requests that an open 
session be held.  
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
9 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
(c) Considering 
employment, 
promotion, 
compensation or performance evaluation data of any 
public employee over which the governmental body has 
jurisdiction or exercises responsibility.  
(d) Except as provided in s. 304.06 (1) (eg) and 
by 
rule 
promulgated 
under 
s. 
304.06 
(1) 
(em), 
considering 
specific 
applications 
of 
probation, 
extended 
supervision 
or 
parole, 
or 
considering 
strategy for crime detection or prevention.  
(e) Deliberating or negotiating the purchasing 
of public properties, the investing of public funds, 
or 
conducting 
other 
specified 
public 
business, 
whenever competitive or bargaining reasons require a 
closed session.  
(ee) Deliberating by the council on unemployment 
insurance in a meeting at which all employer members 
of the council or all employee members of the council 
are excluded.  
(eg) Deliberating by the council on worker's 
compensation in a meeting at which all employer 
members of the council or all employee members of the 
council are excluded. 
(em) Deliberating under s. 157.70 if the location 
of a burial site, as defined in s. 157.70 (1) (b), is 
a subject of the deliberation and if discussing the 
location in public would be likely to result in 
disturbance of the burial site.  
(f) Considering financial, medical, social or 
personal histories or disciplinary data of specific 
persons, 
preliminary 
consideration 
of 
specific 
personnel problems or the investigation of charges 
against specific persons except where par. (b) applies 
which, if discussed in public, would be likely to have 
a substantial adverse effect upon the reputation of 
any person referred to in such histories or data, or 
involved in such problems or investigations.  
(g) Conferring 
with 
legal 
counsel 
for 
the 
governmental body who is rendering oral or written 
advice concerning strategy to be adopted by the body 
with respect to litigation in which it is or is likely 
to become involved.  
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
10 
 
¶98 From the analytic perspective of the Department, all 
13 categories of statutorily authorized closed sessions are 
subject to litigation to reveal the content of discussions on 
the identified subject matter of the sessions.  In the 
Department's view, none of the 13 statutory exemptions implies a 
privilege of non-disclosure. 
¶99 The Department's non-party brief continues: 
Because the Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1)(c) exemption 
applies equally to every closed session meeting of 
every governmental body covered by the open meetings 
law, the legal principle established by the court of 
appeals' 
opinion 
will 
apply 
statewide 
to 
all 
governmental bodies involved in litigation with their 
former 
employees, 
where 
the 
substance 
of 
the 
litigation 
concerns the reasons for the adverse 
employment action.  Unless reversed, the court of 
appeals' decision is thus likely to affect a large 
number of actions against government employers. 
¶100 Conversely, 
because 
the 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.85(1) 
exemptions apply to every closed session meeting of every 
governmental body covered by the open meetings law, the legal 
principles established by the majority in its opinion will apply 
statewide 
to 
all 
governmental 
bodies 
involved 
in 
litigation . . . and will not be limited to litigation involving 
"former employees."   
                                                                                                                                                             
(h) Consideration of requests for confidential 
written advice from the government accountability 
board under s. 5.05 (6a), or from any county or 
municipal ethics board under s. 19.59 (5). 
(i) Considering any and all matters related to 
acts by businesses under s. 560.15 which, if discussed 
in public, could adversely affect the business, its 
employees or former employees. 
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
11 
 
¶101 In sum, the majority has promulgated a sweeping rule 
with broad application.  The rule has no exceptions.  It is not 
limited 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1)(c). 
 
Instead, 
the 
rule 
precludes any claim of privilege based on the exemptions to the 
open meetings law stated in Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1).  As a result, 
the 
content 
of 
a 
closed 
session 
discussion 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1) is likely discoverable, simply by filing a 
lawsuit. 
¶102 The full implications of this decision cannot be 
appreciated without examining, one-by-one, the 13 exemptions in 
Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1) and surmising how the new discovery rule 
might be employed in each setting.  To illustrate my concern, I 
will point to three of the exemptions. 
¶103 First, 
Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1)(b) 
authorizes 
governmental 
bodies 
to 
convene 
in 
closed 
session 
to 
"[c]onsider[] dismissal, demotion, licensing or discipline of 
any 
public 
employee 
or 
person 
licensed 
by 
a 
board 
or 
commission."  This exemption implicates not only teachers, 
university 
faculty 
and 
staff, 
fire 
fighters, 
and 
police 
officers, but also lawyers, doctors, and most other licensed 
professionals.  
¶104 Second, Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1)(h)3 authorizes closed 
sessions to consider "requests for confidential written advice 
from the government accountability board under s. 5.05(6a), or 
from any county or municipal ethics board under s. 19.59(5)."  
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.85(1)(h) was amended by 2007 Wis. Act 
1, § 133. 
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
12 
 
The 
Government 
Accountability 
Board, 
with 
its 
multiple 
functions, is likely to be a prime target of the new discovery 
rule because it will be a good place to dig up dirt against 
candidates for public office. 
¶105 Third, Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1)(e) authorizes closed 
sessions for "[d]eliberating or negotiating the purchasing of 
public properties, the investing of public funds, or conducting 
other 
specified 
public 
business, 
whenever 
competitive 
or 
bargaining reasons require a closed session."  In State v. 
Beaver Dam Area Development Corp., 2008 WI 90, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 
___ N.W.2d ___, a majority of this court determined that a local 
economic development authority met unlawfully in closed session.  
This ruling may provide the legal basis for a lawsuit to obtain 
the substance of the closed meetings. 
¶106 Although these examples hint at how the majority's 
ruling may adversely affect deliberations by government bodies 
and the tenuous relationship these bodies will now have with 
private individuals and organizations, we need not rely on 
imagination or speculation.   
¶107 Consider the Nebraska case of State ex rel. Upper 
Republican Natural Resources District v. District Judges of the 
District Court for Chase County, 728 N.W.2d 275 (Neb. 2007) 
(Upper Republican NRD), which the majority cites with approval.  
Majority op. ¶¶41-43.  In Upper Republican NRD, the plaintiffs' 
complaint alleged that a public natural resources district and 
its 
board 
of 
directors 
"'knowingly 
engaged 
in 
repeated, 
intentional, and pervasive closed sessions at public meetings at 
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
13 
 
which public policy was debated and discussed' in violation of 
the Open Meetings Act."  Upper Republican NRD, 728 N.W.2d at 
277.  The trial court ordered the public body to "answer all 
questions posed with regard to the closed sessions."  Id. 
(emphasis added).  The Nebraska Supreme Court agreed with this 
reasoning.  Id. at 280.  Forcing a government or quasi-
governmental 
body 
to 
answer 
all 
questions 
regarding 
the 
substance of discussions held in closed session ultimately 
defeats the purpose of allowing the government to hold such 
sessions.  The striking significance of the present case is that 
a court may force disclosure of confidential discussions, even 
though a governmental body has fully complied with the open 
meetings law. 
¶108 Another case cited by the majority with approval, 
People ex rel. Birkett v. City of Chicago, 705 N.E.2d 48 (Ill. 
1998), see majority op. ¶40, is illustrative of the problems 
that 
may 
arise 
from 
the 
majority's 
rule 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1)(e).   
¶109 In Birkett, the City of Chicago, which owns and 
operates O'Hare International Airport, became embroiled in 
litigation with several municipalities located near O'Hare 
regarding the City's plans for expanding the airport.  Birkett, 
705 N.E.2d at 55-56.  The municipalities sought discovery of all 
information, documents, records, and discussions that the City 
had in closed session regarding the planned expansion.  Id. at 
48-49.  The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's 
decision 
to 
supply 
the 
information 
and 
rejected 
any 
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
14 
 
"deliberative process privilege" to protect documents giving 
"confidential advice."  Id. at 49-50.  It thus disregarded an 
exemption in the Illinois Freedom of Information Act for 
"[p]reliminary drafts, notes, recommendations, memoranda and 
other records in which opinions are expressed, or policies or 
actions are formulated."  Id. at 51 (quoting 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
140/7(1)(f) (West 1994)). 
¶110 The dissent by Justice Michael Bilandic was blunt:  
The types of documents sought by the plaintiffs 
should be protected from disclosure.  The affidavits 
in the record reveal the planning process from which 
these 
documents 
were 
generated. 
 
According 
to 
affidavits submitted by various deputy commissioners 
of the City's department of aviation, the documents 
requested by the plaintiffs reflect preliminary and 
predecisional 
planning 
deliberations 
concerning 
development 
options 
and 
alternatives 
at 
O'Hare.  
Included in these deliberations are opinions expressed 
during meetings and recommendations by City personnel 
and hired consultants.  The affidavits further state 
that the documents contain confidential advice given 
to municipal policymakers evaluating policy options.  
Such planning documents go to the heart of the City 
officials' ability to engage in open and honest 
discussions relating to future planning.  I believe 
that these officials should be able to discuss all 
pertinent policy options without fear that their 
candid assessments of each option's strengths and 
weaknesses 
will 
be 
disclosed 
to 
the 
airport's 
opponents.  The affidavits of the deputy commissioners 
establish the importance of protecting these airport 
planning deliberations from disclosure in order to 
maintain the candid evaluation of proposals within 
that process. 
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
15 
 
Id. at 56 (Bilandic, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).4 
¶111 In view of decisions like Birkett, the continued 
confidentiality of documents subject to the attorney-client 
privilege may be compromised, especially if those documents are 
discussed as part of a deliberative process in statutorily 
authorized closed meetings. 
¶112 As 
demonstrated 
by 
the 
above 
discussion, 
the 
majority's rule in this case is too broad.  In the absence of 
express legislative directive, it is unwise for this court, as a 
policy matter, to conclude that there are no "privilege[s] 
                                                 
4 The Birkett decision was followed by a decision with a 
different result.  Thomas v. Page, 837 N.E.2d 483 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2005), involved a defamation suit filed by a sitting justice of 
the Illinois Supreme Court based upon the publication of certain 
newspaper articles regarding the supreme court's consideration 
of a disciplinary proceeding involving the Kane County State's 
Attorney.  Id. at 487.  During the course of proceedings in the 
trial court, the defendants issued subpoenas that were served 
upon the other six Illinois Supreme Court justices and their law 
clerks seeking the production of all documents referring or 
relating to the defamation proceedings.  Id.  Additionally, the 
defendants caused the issuance of subpoenas for the depositions 
of the sitting justices and their law clerks.  Id.  The 
subpoenaed parties challenged the subpoenas, and the circuit 
court certified the question of privilege to the Illinois 
Appellate Court, Second District.  Id. at 487-88. 
The Illinois Appellate Court, Second District, recognized 
an 
absolute 
judicial 
deliberation 
privilege 
protecting 
confidential communications among judges and between judges and 
the court's staff made in the course of the performance of their 
judicial duties and relating to official court business.  Id. at 
490-91, 493.  In doing so, the court distinguished the Birkett 
case on the ground that that case involved the question of one 
branch of government creating an evidentiary privilege for 
another branch of government.  Id. at 490 (citing People ex rel. 
Birkett v. City of Chicago, 705 N.E.2d 48 (Ill. 1998)). 
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
16 
 
implicit in Wis. Stat. § 19.85 shielding the contents of closed 
sessions from discovery."  Majority op. ¶3. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL AND COMMON LAW BACKGROUND 
¶113 In examining evidentiary privileges, it is useful to 
set out some constitutional and common law background. 
¶114 Article XIV, Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
reads as follows: "Such parts of the common law as are now in 
force in the territory of Wisconsin, not inconsistent with this 
constitution, shall be and continue part of the law of this 
state until altered or suspended by the legislature." 
¶115 This section was interpreted in Menne v. City of Fond 
du Lac, 273 Wis. 341, 345, 77 N.W.2d 703 (1956):   
The common law in effect at the time of the 
adoption of our state constitution is difficult of 
definition. We do not think that it is confined to 
English 
statutes 
and 
the 
decisions 
of 
English 
courts. . . .  Perhaps the term "common law" is broad 
enough to embrace customs and usages and legal maxims 
and principles in vogue at that time [statehood]. 
¶116 Although one could cite court decisions to the effect 
that the common law referred to in Section 13 is the common law 
"as it existed, modified and amended by English statutes passed 
prior to the [American] revolution," Budd v. Hansen, 11 
Wis. 2d 248, 257, 105 N.W.2d 358 (1960) (quoting Coburn v. 
Harvey, 18 Wis. 156 [*147], 162 [*153] (1864)), the better view 
is that the "common law" includes both pre-statehood English law 
and pre-statehood common law from other states, inasmuch as our 
courts have always been free to accept or reject common law from 
other jurisdictions. 
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
17 
 
¶117 The point of this discussion is that pre-statehood 
common law, including the common law of evidentiary privileges, 
continues as part of the law of Wisconsin until such time as it 
has been displaced by the legislature or modified by court 
decision or rule. 
¶118 For centuries there has been an imprecise privilege 
relating to select governmental information.  "The deliberative 
process privilege originated in the principles underlying the 
English 'crown privilege.'"  Russell L. Weaver & James T.R. 
Jones, The Deliberative Process Privilege, 54 Mo. L. Rev. 279, 
283 (1989).  The "crown privilege" makes secret such things as 
parliamentary 
deliberations, 
state 
secrets 
and 
papers, 
confidential 
proceedings 
of 
the 
Privy 
Council, 
and 
communications by or to public officials in the discharge of 
their public duties.  Id. at 283 n.24 (citation omitted). 
¶119 Part of the "crown privilege" was the protection from 
disclosure of the speeches of a member of the House of Commons.  
In Plunkett v. Cobbett, 5 Esp. N.P. 136, 170 Eng. Rep. 736 (K.B. 
1804), the court held that a witness called to prove the 
plaintiff's expressions in parliament was privileged from 
disclosing the tenor of the speeches.  See 8 Wigmore, Evidence 
§ 2378(c), at 794 n.3 (McNaughton rev. 1961). 
¶120 McKelvey on Evidence gives the "crown privilege" a 
different label: "State Secrets."  The treatise provides:   
STATE SECRETS——With respect to public matters, 
the 
privilege 
extends to public officers, their 
subordinates, and any who may be cognizant of such 
matters, though not in public office.  
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
18 
 
. . . .   
State secrets consist of communications between 
public officers, transactions in public bodies, acts 
of the executive department, information obtained in 
the course of, or for the purpose of, the enforcement 
of the criminal law, and other like matters. 
John J. McKelvey, McKelvey on Evidence §§ 226, 228, at 372 (West 
Publ'g Co., 2d ed. 1907). 
¶121 McKelvey cites Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487, 
12 Am. Rep. 736 (1872), which reads in part:   
It is the duty of every citizen to communicate to 
his government any information which he has of the 
commission of an offense against its laws.  To 
encourage him in performing this duty without fear of 
consequences, the law holds such information to be 
among the secrets of State, and leaves the question 
how far and under what circumstances the names of the 
informers and the channel of communication shall be 
suffered to be known, to the absolute discretion of 
the government, to be exercised according to its views 
of what the interests of the public require.  Courts 
of justice therefore will not compel or allow the 
discovery 
of 
such 
information, 
either 
by 
the 
subordinate officer to whom it is given, by the 
informer himself, or by any other person, without the 
permission of the government.  The evidence is 
excluded, not for the protection of the witness or of 
the party in the particular case, but upon general 
grounds of public policy, because of the confidential 
nature of such communications. 
Id. at 488-89 (emphasis added). 
¶122 Worthington cited, among many authorities, Rex v. 
Akers, 6 Esp. 125, 170 Eng. Rep. 850 (1790), which it described 
as the "earliest case upon the subject."  Worthington, 109 Mass. 
at 489.  Worthington, in turn, has been approvingly cited in the 
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
19 
 
opinions of the Wisconsin Attorney General.  See 41 Wis. Op. 
Att'y Gen. 237, 241 (1952).5 
¶123 In his commentaries on evidence, Burr W. Jones, a 
professor of evidence at the College of Law of the University of 
Wisconsin and, later, a justice of this court, gives the 
privilege a still different name: "Privileged communications——
Affairs of state."  4 Burr W. Jones, Commentaries on the Law of 
Evidence in Civil Cases § 762(780), at 576 (Bancroft-Whitney Co. 
1914) (hereinafter Jones).  Jones wrote in part:   
The President of the United States, the governors 
of the several states and their cabinet officers, are 
not bound to produce papers or disclose information 
committed to them, in a judicial inquiry, when, in 
their own judgment, the disclosure would, on public 
grounds, be inexpedient.  On the same principle, the 
heads 
of 
the 
departments 
of 
national 
or 
state 
governments cannot be compelled to produce letters or 
documents as evidence, when, in their judgment, such 
production would be prejudicial to the public service.  
Nor can disclosure of communications between the heads 
of the departments of state and their subordinate 
officers be compelled. 
Id., § 762(780), at 577-78 (footnotes omitted).  Jones pointed 
to "the leading case" in the United States Supreme Court, Boske 
v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900), where a collector of internal 
revenue had been imprisoned by order of a state court in 
Kentucky for refusing to produce to his office certain monthly 
reports of liquor manufactured by a certain manufacturer.  Id. 
at 462-63.  The Supreme Court ruled that imprisonment was 
improper and that the documents were "privileged, and to a 
                                                 
5 In 40 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 34 (1951), the Attorney General 
alluded to the "privilege for 'state secrets.'"  Id. at 38.  
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
20 
 
certain extent, quasi-confidential, communications, the use of 
which is limited to the purposes for which they are made, unless 
the parties interested consent to a more extensive use."  Jones, 
supra, at 578-79 (summarizing the holding in Boske).  Professor 
Jones noted that the Wisconsin Supreme Court had followed and 
cited Boske in Meyer v. Home Insurance Co., 127 Wis. 304, 106 
N.W. 1087 (1906).  Jones, supra, at 578 n.97.   
¶124 Wigmore's treatise on evidence also recognized the 
"state secrets" privilege.  Although critical of the privilege 
early on, Wigmore nonetheless asked: "[I]s there still a genuine 
testimonial privilege which is to protect public officers from 
the disclosure of certain kinds of facts or communications 
received through their official duties?  Some such privilege 
undoubtedly exists."  8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2378(g), at 792 
(McNaughton rev. 1961). 
¶125 One facet of the "state secrets" privilege is embodied 
in the United States Constitution in Article I, Section 5, 
Clause 3, which reads: "Each House shall keep a Journal of its 
Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting 
such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy . . . ."  
(Emphasis added.)  The Wisconsin Constitution has a similar 
provision in Article IV, Section 10: "Each house shall keep a 
journal of its proceedings and publish the same, except such 
parts as require secrecy.  The doors of each house shall be kept 
open except when the public welfare shall require secrecy."  
(Emphasis added.) 
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
21 
 
¶126 In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), the 
Supreme Court rejected the President's claim of an absolute 
executive privilege.  Id. at 707.  Nonetheless, it recognized 
the existence of an executive privilege.  See id. at 713-14.  
Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote of the "valid need for 
protection of communications between high Government officials 
and those who advise and assist them in the performance of their 
manifold duties; the importance of this confidentiality is too 
plain to require further discussion."  Id. at 705.  Burger added 
that "[h]uman experience teaches that those who expect public 
dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a 
concern for appearances and for their own interests to the 
detriment of the decisionmaking process."  Id. 
¶127 In a very significant passage, Burger wrote:  
The 
expectation 
of 
a 
President 
to 
the 
confidentiality 
of 
his 
conversations 
and 
correspondence, like the claim of confidentiality of 
judicial deliberations . . . has all the values to 
which we accord deference for the privacy of all 
citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity 
for protection of the public interest in candid, 
objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in 
Presidential decisionmaking. 
Id. at 708 (emphasis added). 
¶128 My purpose in reviewing English common law and other 
sometimes-ancient precedent is not to contend what the law 
should be but to show what the law once was. 
¶129 The law has been changed dramatically by the enactment 
of public records and open meetings laws.  The legislature, with 
the approval of the governor, passed the open meetings law in 
1959.  Ch. 289, Laws of 1959.  The legislature, with the 
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
22 
 
approval 
of 
the 
governor, 
created 
exceptions 
authorizing 
"executive or closed sessions" for various purposes, including 
"considering 
employment, 
dismissal, 
promotion, 
demotion, 
compensation, licensing or discipline of any public employe or 
person licensed by 
a state board or commission or the 
investigation of charges against such person, unless an open 
meeting 
is 
requested 
by 
the 
employe 
or 
person 
charged, 
investigated or otherwise under discussion."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 14.90(3)(b) (1959) (emphasis added).  The 1959 law was 
popularly known as the "Anti-Secrecy Law."  49 Wis. Op. Att'y 
Gen. Introduction (1960). 
¶130 What is astounding about the majority opinion is that 
it contends that the legislature and the governor preserved 
nothing of the common law privilege of confidential deliberation 
in the 13 exemptions to the "Anti-Secrecy" open meetings law.  
Its conclusion is breathtaking because the very first exemption 
in Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1)(a) authorizes closed sessions for 
courts. 
¶131 This court adopted the rules of evidence in 1973, more 
than a decade after the open meetings law was enacted.  The 
court included elements of the "state secrets" privilege in Wis. 
Stat. §§ 905.02, 905.09, and 905.10.  There is no logical reason 
why the legislature did not see a deliberative process privilege 
as "inherent or implicit" in the exemptions it had created in 
Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1).  It certainly referenced an element of 
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
23 
 
the legislative privilege of "secret" deliberation in Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.81(3).6 
¶132 This court may have full authority to regulate the 
scope 
of 
discovery 
vis-à-vis 
courts 
and 
judicial 
branch 
agencies, but it cannot, by judicial rule, wipe out common law 
privileges that are inherent or implicit in statutes that apply 
to coordinate branches of government without raising serious 
separation of powers questions.  The majority seems to be saying 
that a court could order the disclosure of deliberations during 
a legislative session at which the doors were closed. 
¶133 This court must also remember the limitations on its 
rulemaking powers.  Wisconsin Stat. § 751.12(1) clearly provides 
that court rules "shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify the 
substantive rights of any litigant [including a governmental 
body in a different branch of government]." 
¶134 The Federal Advisory Committee's Note to the federal 
rules on privilege, printed as part of the introduction to Ch. 
905, see 59 Wis. 2d R1, R102-09, indicates that privileges 
created by state law are in some instances given greater status 
than previously in federal courts: "The arguments advanced in 
favor of recognizing state privileges are: [in part] a state 
privilege is an essential characteristic of a relationship or 
status created by state law and thus is substantive in the Erie 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.81(3) reads: "In conformance with 
article IV, section 10, of the constitution, which states that 
the doors of each house shall remain open, except when the 
public welfare requires secrecy, it is declared to be the intent 
of the legislature to comply to the fullest extent with this 
subchapter." 
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
24 
 
[R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)] sense."  Id. at R106 
(emphasis added).  In Davison v. St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Insurance Co., 75 Wis. 2d 190, 248 N.W.2d 433 (1977), the court 
declined to apply retroactively a new statute relating to civil 
immunity for persons evaluating health care providers and 
facilities and providing confidentiality of information acquired 
in such reviews.  Id. at 199-201.  The court explained that "the 
long expressed general rule cited by this court is that statutes 
granting or rescinding substantive rights will not be given 
retroactive effect unless such intent was clearly expressed by 
the legislature."  Id. at 200 (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). 
¶135 On the basis of Davison and the Federal Note, the 
court cannot dismiss the wiping out of common law privileges 
affecting other branches of government as non-substantive.   
IV. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
¶136 The majority devotes most of its attention to Wis. 
Stat. § 905.01, which requires interpretation. 
¶137 Statutory interpretation is a question of law that 
requires de novo review.  State v. Waushara County Bd. of 
Adjustment, 2004 WI 56, ¶14, 271 Wis. 2d 547, 679 N.W.2d 514.  
The interpretation of a statute begins with its text, and the 
words of the text, unless otherwise defined, are given their 
common and ordinary meanings.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. 
for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110.  If the meaning is plain from the text, the inquiry 
ceases.  Id.   
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
25 
 
¶138 The general rule for discovery may be stated as 
follows: "Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not 
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in 
the pending action."  Wis. Stat. § 804.01(2)(a).  This is a 
broad right for litigants.  See Crawford ex rel. Goodyear v. 
Care Concepts, Inc., 2001 WI 45, ¶13, 243 Wis. 2d 119, 625 
N.W.2d 876; see also majority op. ¶¶17-19.  However, this right 
is not absolute; it is qualified by another's right to a 
testimonial privilege.  See Wis. Stat. § 804.01(2)(a).   
¶139 To protect information from discovery, a party must 
demonstrate to the court that a privilege applies.  See Phelps 
v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., Inc., 2005 WI 85, ¶53, 282 
Wis. 2d 69, 698 N.W.2d 643.  Here, the District must answer all 
questions asked in interrogatories unless it can demonstrate a 
testimonial privilege that applies to the closed session 
discussions of the Board.   
¶140 In Wisconsin, testimonial privileges are governed by 
Wis. Stat. § 905.01.  Wisconsin Stat. § 905.01 reads in full:  
Privileges recognized only as provided.  Except 
as provided by or inherent or implicit in statute or 
in rules adopted by the supreme court or required by 
the constitution of the United States or Wisconsin, no 
person has a privilege to:  
(1) Refuse to be a witness; or  
(2) Refuse to disclose any matter; or  
(3) Refuse to produce any object or writing; or  
(4) Prevent another from being a witness or 
disclosing any matter or producing any object or 
writing. 
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
26 
 
¶141 Wisconsin Stat. § 905.01 was promulgated by supreme 
court order in 1973 as part of the revision to the Wisconsin 
Rules of Evidence.  Sup. Ct. Order, 59 Wis. 2d R1, R101 (1973).  
The terms "implicit" and "inherent" are not defined by the rule.  
However, a Judicial Council Committee's Note (Note) was prepared 
to aid in interpreting the Rule:  
The introductory part of this section has been 
redrafted to apply to Wisconsin; the four subsections 
remain the same as the federal rule.  Constitutional 
provisions which relate to admissions or exclusions of 
evidence are not included in this chapter nor are they 
affected by this section. 
The phrase "or inherent or implicit in statute" 
is designed to insure that the "work product" immunity 
rule 
and 
the 
interpretations 
of 
s. 
19.21 
are 
unaffected.  State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court [for 
Milwaukee County], 34 Wis. 2d 559, 150 N.W.2d 387 
(1967); State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis. 2d 
672, 137 N.W.2d 470, [modified and rehearing denied 28 
Wis. 2d 672,] 139 N.W.2d 241 (1965); Beckon v. Emery, 
36 Wis. 2d 510, 153 N.W.2d 501 (1967).  The Wisconsin 
"work product" immunity rule like the federal rule 
originates in the discovery statutes.  However, the 
federal rule has now been incorporated expressly in 
revised Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
 
Wisconsin 
does 
not 
appear 
to 
be 
inconsistent 
with 
this 
manner 
of 
restricting 
privileges.  State v. Driscoll, 53 Wis. 2d 699, 193 
N.W.2d 851 (1972); State v. Knops, 49 Wis.2d 647, 183 
N.W.2d 
93 
(1971). 
 
Common 
law 
privileges, 
not 
originating in the constitution, could not be enlarged 
on a case by case basis. 
This section recognizes that there are other 
statutory privileges that are not included in this 
chapter.  However, they are provided for in other 
statutory provisions.  Statutory provision regarding 
fire marshal reports, s. 165.55 (8) [concerning arson 
investigations] would not be altered. . . .  
Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1974, Wis. Stat. § 905.01, 59 
Wis. 2d R1, R101-02. 
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
27 
 
¶142 The majority gives great weight to the Note and relies 
heavily 
on 
it 
for 
its 
ultimate 
conclusion 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 19.85 does not create an inherent or implicit 
testimonial privilege.  See majority op., ¶¶27-30.  It argues, 
with only a dissenting opinion as support, the following:  
This Judicial Council note reveals that the "inherent 
or implicit" language in the Rule is quite narrow in 
scope and was included by this court to preserve a 
particular work product privilege already recognized 
at the time this language was added to the statute, 
while leaving other privileges to be provided for more 
expressly in other statutory provisions (aside from 
privileges against Wis. Stat. § 19.35 open records 
requests, that are still governed by a common law 
balancing test).   
Id., ¶27.  This passage incorrectly interprets the Note, as well 
as Wis. Stat. § 905.01. 
 
¶143 There is no denying the substance of the first 
sentence of the Note's second paragraph: "The phrase 'or 
inherent or implicit in statute' is designed to insure that the 
'work product' immunity rule and the interpretations of s. 19.21 
are unaffected."  Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1974, 
Wis. Stat. § 905.01, 59 Wis. 2d at R101.  However, this sentence 
requires closer analysis than it has been given to date.   
¶144 First, Justice Bradley's dissent in Burnett v. Alt, 
224 Wis. 2d 72, 99-115, 589 N.W.2d 21 (1999) (Bradley, J., 
dissenting), gives a plainly mistaken spin to the sentence.  
Justice Bradley wrote:   
According to the Judicial Council's notes on Wis. 
Stat. § 905.01, the phrase "inherent or implicit" was 
inserted, not to give a court some device with which 
to "interpret" additional privileges.  Rather, the 
notes strongly suggest that the phrase was inserted 
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
28 
 
solely to protect the "work-product privilege"——a 
privilege the court created prior to 1973 in State ex 
rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis. 2d 559, 150 
N.W.2d 387 (1967). 
Alt, 224 Wis. 2d at 101 n.9 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added). 
¶145 By no means does the Note say or imply that the phrase 
"inherent or implicit" was inserted "solely" to protect the work 
product privilege.  The Note explains that the phrase "is 
designed to insure that the 'work product' immunity rule and the 
interpretations of s. 19.21 [19.35] are unaffected. . . .  This 
section recognizes that there are other statutory privileges 
that are not included in this chapter.  However, they are 
provided for in other statutory provisions."  Judicial Council 
Committee's Note, 1974, Wis. Stat. § 905.01, 59 Wis. 2d R1, 
R101-02 (emphasis added).  The word "solely" is clearly rebutted 
by the Note itself. 
¶146 Second, the intent of the Note is illuminated by the 
fact that the "work product" privilege was not explicit in any 
statute or rule adopted by the supreme court at the time Wis. 
Stat. § 905.01 was adopted.  The "work product" privilege 
referenced in the Note was not codified in statute until 1975. 
Wis. Stat. § 804.01(2)(c)1.; Sup. Ct. Order, 67 Wis. 2d 585, 
654-59 (1975); see Patricia Graczyk, The New Wisconsin Rules of 
Civil Procedure: Chapter 804, 59 Marq. L. Rev. 463, 470 (1976) 
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
29 
 
("[S]ubsection (2)(c) codifies [the work product] doctrine.").7  
The Judicial Council Notes describe the "work product" privilege 
as originating in the discovery statutes, i.e., inherent or 
implicit in discovery statutes.  In the eventual codification of 
the privilege in Wis. Stat. § 804.01(2)(c)1., the court did not 
use the word "privilege."   
 
¶147 Third, the Note observes that Wis. Stat. § 905.01 
"recognizes that there are other statutory privileges that are 
not included in this chapter [Chapter 905, Wisconsin Rules of 
Evidence]." 
 
Judicial 
Council 
Committee's 
Note, 
1974, 
Wis. Stat. § 905.01, 59 Wis. 2d at R101.  They are provided for 
in other statutory provisions.  As an example, the statutory 
provision regarding fire marshal reports, Wis. Stat. § 165.55(8) 
(relating to arson investigations) "would not be altered."  Id. 
at R102.  This passage suggests that the privilege contained 
within Wis. Stat. § 165.55(8) is not affected by the passage of 
Wis. Stat. § 905.01.  See Gilbertson v. State, 205 Wis. 168, 
171, 236 N.W. 539 (1931); Black v. General Elec. Co., 89 
Wis. 2d 195, 205, 278 N.W.2d 224 (Ct. App. 1979) ("Once the 
secrecy privilege is exercised by the State Fire Marsha[l], 
                                                 
7 Specifically, a set of proposed rules, including Wis. 
Stat. § 804.01(2)(c)(1), were presented to this court on 
November 1, 1973, and hearings were held on the proposals with 
modifications made to them throughout 1974.  See 67 Wis. 2d at v 
(Preface).  Finally, on February 17, 1975, the rules were 
adopted and they became effective January 1, 1976.  Id.  Again, 
this timeline for the adoption of the work product privilege 
statute under Wis. Stat. § 804.01(2)(c)(1) demonstrates that the 
privilege was not included in a statute nor any court rule at 
the time Wis. Stat. § 905.01 was adopted on April 16, 1973, 
effective January 1, 1974.  See 59 Wis. 2d at Riv (Foreword). 
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
30 
 
courts cannot force deputy fire marsha[ls] to testify concerning 
investigations of the origins of specific fires").   
 
¶148 The fire marshal's "privilege" referenced by the Note, 
however, is not explicit in that statute; thus, it must be 
inherent or implicit therein.  See Wis. Stat. § 165.55(8) ("All 
investigations held by or under the direction of the state fire 
marshal, or his or her subordinates, may, in the fire marshal's 
discretion, be private, and persons other than those required to 
be 
present 
may 
be 
excluded 
from 
the 
place 
where 
such 
investigation is held . . . .").   
 
¶149 Because the fire marshal's privilege is not explicit 
in the statute, see id., and because the Note expressly states 
that the privilege implicit in the statute will not be affected 
by Wis. Stat. § 905.01, Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1974, 
Wis. Stat. § 905.01, 59 Wis. 2d at R102, this paragraph of the 
Note confirms that the "inherent or implicit in" language is not 
designed to protect the work product privilege alone.   
 
¶150 The majority relies on a Note that has no force of 
law.8  59 Wis. 2d at Rv (Editor's Note) ("[N]either the 
commentary of the Federal Advisory Committee nor that of the 
Wisconsin Judicial Council Evidence Committee is adopted.  They 
                                                 
8 One who wishes to rely on the Note must take into account 
the sentence: "Common law privileges, not originating in the 
constitution, could not be enlarged on a case by case basis."  
Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1974, Wis. Stat. § 905.01, 59 
Wis. 2d R1, R101. 
Prohibiting enlargement of a common law privilege is quite 
different from prohibiting enforcement of a common law privilege 
if that privilege is inherent or implicit in a statute or court 
rule. 
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
31 
 
are 
printed 
for 
information 
purposes. . . .  
Judicial 
consideration of the interpretation given as reflected in each 
comment will be made by the Supreme Court on a case-by-case 
basis.") (emphasis added); see also Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶69 
(Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) ("The Judicial Council notes 
appear with the text of the rules and laws in the Wisconsin 
Statutes, but neither the court nor the legislature ordinarily 
adopts the Notes as part of the statute or rule.") (citations 
omitted).  The majority should have relied upon the plain 
language of Wis. Stat. § 905.01, giving each word its common and 
ordinary meaning, to determine how the phrase "inherent or 
implicit in" should be interpreted.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶45. 
 
¶151 Two undefined words——"inherent" and "implicit"——are 
central to the interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 905.01. 
 
¶152 The root word for "inherent" is "inhere."  See 
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 593 (1977) ("[T]o be 
inherent.").  It is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as a verb 
that means "[t]o exist as a permanent, inseparable, or essential 
attribute or quality of a thing," Black's Law Dictionary 787 
(7th ed. 1999); see also Webster's, supra, at 593 (defining 
"Inherent" to mean "involved in the constitution or essential 
character of something"); Random House Unabridged Dictionary 982 
(2d ed. 1993) (defining "Inherent" as "existing in someone or 
something as a permanent and inseparable element, quality, or 
attribute"). 
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
32 
 
 
¶153 The other word is "implicit."  "Implied" means "[n]ot 
directly 
expressed." 
 
Black's, 
supra, 
at 
757; 
see 
also 
Webster's, supra, at 576 (defining "Imply" to mean "express[ed] 
indirectly"); Random House, supra, at 961 (defining "Imply" as 
"indicat[ing] or suggest[ing] without being explicitly stated").  
The 
American 
Heritage 
Dictionary 
defines 
"implicit" 
as 
"[i]mplied or understood though not directly expressed" or 
"[c]ontained in the nature of something though not readily 
apparent."  The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 906 (3d. ed. 1992).    
 
¶154 Taking these definitions and applying them to Wis. 
Stat. § 905.01 results in a rule that requires all testimonial 
privileges to be provided by, essential to, or expressed 
indirectly by the statute or supreme court rule at issue.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 905.01; Black's, supra, at 757, 787; Webster's, 
supra, at 576, 593.  This is the plain meaning of the statute as 
written.  Because Wis. Stat. § 905.01 is not ambiguous, the 
inquiry into the Note is not necessary, see Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 
633, ¶45, and it should not be permitted to override the meaning 
of clear text. 
 
¶155 This plain meaning interpretation of the statute is 
supported by our case law.  In Alt, this court found a 
testimonial privilege for expert witnesses to be "inherent in 
Wis. Stat. § 907.06."  Alt, 224 Wis. 2d at 86. 
 
¶156 In Alt, the plaintiffs attempted to compel the expert 
testimony of a local doctor who refused to serve as a witness.  
Id. at 79-80.  The doctor claimed he was privileged from giving 
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
33 
 
testimony due to the language in Wis. Stat. § 907.06(1), see id. 
at 84, which states, "An expert witness shall not be appointed 
by the judge unless the expert witness consents to act."  Id. at 
85-86 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 907.06(1)).  The doctor argued that, 
although no privilege was expressly stated in the statute, the 
statute implied a testimonial privilege as contemplated by Wis. 
Stat. § 905.01.  Id. at 84-85.  In its decision, this court 
agreed and concluded "that this express grant [that an expert 
may not be appointed without consenting] implies a privilege to 
refuse to testify if the expert is called by a litigant. . . .  
Any other result would be inconsistent and fly in the face of 
logic."  Id. at 86 (emphasis added).   
 
¶157 Alt remains good law.  This is evidenced by this 
court's citation to Alt in the unanimous decision of Glenn v. 
Plante, 2004 WI 24, 269 Wis. 2d 575, 676 N.W.2d 413: 
In Wisconsin, a person may not refuse to be a witness, 
"(e)xcept as provided by or inherent or implicit in 
statute or in rules adopted by the supreme court or 
required by the constitution of the United States or 
Wisconsin. . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 905.01 (2001-02).  See 
also Alt[,] 224 Wis. 2d at 85.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 907.06 implicitly provides expert witnesses with 
such a privilege. . . .  We have concluded that, 
implicit in this statutory language, an expert witness 
has the privilege to refuse to testify if he or she is 
called by a litigant.  Alt, 224 Wis. 2d at 86.   
Id., ¶21 (footnote omitted); see also Carney-Hayes v. Nw. Wis. 
Home Care, Inc., 2005 WI 118, ¶¶18-35, 284 Wis. 2d 56, 699 
N.W.2d 524. 
 
¶158 Alt and its progeny demonstrate that a plain language 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 905.01 is consistent with the way 
this court has interpreted the "inherent or implicit in" 
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
34 
 
language 
of 
the 
statute. 
The 
majority's 
interpretation, 
embracing Justice Bradley's dissent in Alt, is erroneous. 
¶159 In my view, a plain language reading of the words 
"inherent or implicit" in Wis. Stat. § 905.01 not only permits 
but requires the recognition of a testimonial privilege to 
protect the contents of closed sessions authorized by Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.85(1) because that privilege is essential to or expressed 
indirectly by the language of the statute. 
V. THE DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE 
¶160 What is the nature of the privilege inherent or 
implicit in Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1)(c)?  I conclude that the 
legislature intended to create a deliberative process privilege 
to foster candid deliberations in closed session in specific, 
enumerated situations authorized by statute.  This privilege 
protects the confidentiality of what is said in deliberation.  
It does not protect the identity of who was present.  That is a 
fact. 
¶161 McCormick on Evidence discusses the nature of the 
deliberative process privilege.  See 1 John W. Strong, McCormick 
on Evidence § 108(a), at 430-32 (5th ed. 1999).  "Th[e] 
privilege protects communications made between governmental 
personnel, 
or 
between 
governmental 
personnel 
and 
outside 
consultants."  Id. at 430.  The privilege "seeks to encourage a 
free flow of communication in the interest of some larger end——
[namely,] establishing agency policy only after consideration of 
the full array of contrasting views on the subject."  Id.  
"[T]he assumption is that total candor will be enhanced, and the 
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
35 
 
quality 
of 
governmental 
decision-making 
correspondingly 
improved, 
by 
an 
assurance 
of 
at 
least 
qualified 
confidentiality."  Id. at 430-31.9 
¶162 A deliberative process privilege has been recognized 
in several jurisdictions, including numerous federal courts.  
See, e.g., NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150 
(1975); In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1997); 
United States v. Farley, 11 F.3d 1385, 1389 (7th Cir. 1993); 
Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657, 660 (6th Cir. 
1972); Int'l Paper Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 438 F.2d 1349, 
1358-59 (2d Cir. 1971); Daily Gazette Co., Inc. v. W. Va. Dev. 
Office, 482 S.E.2d 180, 188-89 (W. Va. 1996); Capital Info. 
Group v. Office of the Governor, 923 P.2d 29, 33-34 (Alaska 
1996); McClain v. College Hosp., 492 A.2d 991, 998 (N.J. 1985); 
Hamilton v. Verdow, 414 A.2d 914, 924 (Md. 1980); State ex rel. 
Att'y Gen. v. First Judicial Dist. Ct., 629 P.2d 330, 334 (N.M. 
1981); see also, Lang v. Kohl's Food Stores, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 
525, 532 (W.D. Wis. 1998).   
¶163 The deliberative process privilege has been said to 
protect from discovery intra-agency discussions that are pre-
decisional and deliberative to ensure that the agencies are not 
                                                 
9 The Bender's Forms of Discovery treatise acknowledges an 
"official information privilege" for confidential governmental 
business.  See 12 Bender's Forms of Discovery § 5.08[3], at 5-
120——5-131 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2007).  "[T]he purpose of 
the official information privilege is to foster the process of 
governmental decision-making by shielding from disclosure the 
flow of ideas and advice among government officials."  Id. at 5-
120 (citing Nixon v. Freeman, 670 F.2d 346, 355 (D.C. Cir. 
1982), cert. denied sub. nom. Nixon v. Carmen, 459 U.S. 1035 
(1982)).  
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
36 
 
"forced to operate in a fishbowl."  Michael N. Kennedy, Comment, 
Escaping the Fishbowl: A Proposal to Fortify the Deliberative 
Process Privilege, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1769, 1772-74 (2005) 
(quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 87 (1973)).  This privilege 
allows the intra-agency discussions to be open and frank, 
enabling the agency to reach the proper determination without 
outside, undue influence.  See Russell v. Dep't of the Air 
Force, 682 F.2d 1045, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
¶164 For purposes of this case, however, we have no need to 
explore a deliberative process privilege that goes beyond the 
protection from disclosure of the substance of deliberations in 
statutorily authorized closed sessions on statutorily authorized 
subjects.   
¶165 The deliberative process privilege can be overcome, on 
a case-by-case basis, by a litigant's sufficient showing of need 
for the information requested.  In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 
737; Lang, 186 F.R.D. at 532 ("The privilege may be overcome by 
a sufficient showing of particularized need outweighing the 
reasons for confidentiality.").  The factors considered by the 
courts in determining whether the privilege can be overcome by 
the circumstances of a case include the following: (1) "the 
relevance of the evidence sought to be protected;" (2) "the 
availability of other evidence;" (3) "the 'seriousness' of the 
litigation and of the issues involved;" (4) "the role of the 
government in the litigation;" and (5) "the possibility of 
future timidity by government employees who will be forced to 
recognize that their secrets are violable."  In re Franklin 
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
37 
 
Nat'l Bank Sec. Litig., 478 F. Supp. 577, 583 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).  This analysis strikes a 
fair balance between the government's need to deliberate and 
discuss internal policy privately, as is allowed by Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.85(1), and a litigant's ability to discover relevant 
information when it is necessary to prove her case.   
¶166 Recognizing a qualified testimonial privilege inherent 
or implicit in Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1)(c) stays true to the 
language of Wis. Stat. § 905.01 ("Except as provided by or 
inherent or implicit in statute or in rules adopted by the 
supreme court . . . no person has a privilege . . . .") and 
gives full force and effect to the policy underlying Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.85(1)(c)——allowing governmental bodies to meet in closed 
session to discuss and deliberate prior to promulgating a final 
decision.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶44. 
¶167 The policy embodied by this privilege was alluded to 
by Justice Stanley Reed, sitting by assignment in the United 
States Court of Claims.  Justice Reed said:   
Free 
and 
open 
comments 
on 
the 
advantages 
and 
disadvantages of a proposed course of governmental 
management would be adversely affected if the civil 
servant or executive assistant were compelled by 
publicity to bear the blame for errors or bad judgment 
properly chargeable to the responsible individual with 
power to decide and act.  Government from its nature 
has necessarily been granted a certain freedom from 
control beyond that given the citizen.  It is true 
that it now submits itself to suit but it must retain 
privileges for the good of all.   
There is a public policy involved in this claim 
of 
privilege . . . ——the 
policy 
of 
open, 
frank 
discussion between subordinate and chief concerning 
administrative action. 
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
38 
 
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 
939, 945-46 (Ct. Cl. 1958).   
¶168 It was also explained by Judge Carl McGowan of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit:   
The basis of . . . the privilege . . . is the 
free and uninhibited exchange and communication of 
opinions, ideas, and points of view——a process as 
essential to the wise functioning of a big government 
as it is to any organized human effort.  In the 
Federal Establishment, as in General Motors or any 
other hierarchical giant, there are enough incentives 
as it is for playing it safe and listing with the 
wind; Congress clearly did not propose to add to them 
the threat of cross-examination in a public tribunal. 
Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
¶169 Finally, Judge George Edwards, Jr. of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit summed up the 
policy in these words:   
Congress undertook to protect the decision making 
processes of government agencies. Government policy 
makers (at whatever level) when assigned to mutual 
consultation and full debate on a decision should not 
be limited in thought or expression to just those 
preliminary views which they were prepared to defend 
in the public prints.  Many a quick comment——which in 
itself reveals lack of full consideration and thought—
—nonetheless 
may 
shed 
continuing 
and 
useful 
illumination on the problem at hand. No one needs to 
remind 
the 
courts 
of 
the 
value 
of 
advocacy, 
confrontation and debate.  These are the recognized 
tools of the judicial fact finding process and they 
are frequently involved in judicial decision making 
too.  We would not fail to protect their availability 
to another branch of government. 
Tennessean Newspapers, Inc., 464 F.2d at 660. 
 
¶170 Would that Judge Edwards could weigh in on this case. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
39 
 
¶171 After 
today's 
decision, 
legitimate, 
independent 
plaintiffs are likely to be able to discover closed session 
discussions of governmental bodies, but so will third-party 
organizations, 
deep-pocketed 
individual 
plaintiffs 
with 
political or economic agendas, and the simply curious.  This 
litigation will lead to unwarranted disclosure of confidential 
pre-decisional deliberations, and have a chilling effect on such 
deliberations. 
¶172 Contrary to the majority, I conclude that there is a 
qualified 
testimonial 
privilege 
inherent 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.85(1) that allows governmental bodies and their employees 
to 
withhold 
the 
content 
of 
pre-decisional, 
deliberative 
discussions that take place during the body's properly held 
closed sessions.  I do not understand how disclosing the 
deliberations of the Whitnall School Board will affect the 
determination of whether Dr. Sands was an administrator.  Thus, 
I do not see why the deliberative process privilege of the Board 
should be overcome. 
¶173 For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent. 
No.  2005AP1026.dtp 
 
1