Title: State v. Rafuse

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Rafuse  (97-458); 168 Vt. 631; 726 A.2d 18

[Filed 8-Dec-1998]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 97-458

                            SEPTEMBER TERM, 1998

                                      
State of Vermont         }            APPEALED FROM:
                         }
                         }
     v.                  }            District Court of Vermont
                         }            Unit No. 3, Caledonia Circuit
James Rafuse             }
                         }            DOCKET NO. 1016-11-95 CaCr

       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Defendant James Rafuse appeals from a trial court order imposing a
  sentence of five to ten years each for two counts of sexual assault after a
  finding the defendant violated his deferred-sentence probation.  Defendant
  claims that the trial court erred by holding it had no alternative to
  imposing sentence.  We affirm.

       In July 1996, the trial court approved a deferred-sentence agreement
  between defendant and the state's attorney.  The agreement  placed
  defendant on probation and deferred for five years the sentence on two
  counts of sexual assault of a minor provided that defendant complied with
  the conditions of his probation.  See 13 V.S.A. § 7041(a)(authorizing
  deferred sentences when agreed to by state and defendant).  The potential
  sentence was five to ten years'  incarceration on each count.

       In February 1997, defendant's probation officer filed a  complaint
  alleging that defendant violated three conditions of his probation.  The
  trial court dismissed two of the alleged violations, but found that
  defendant had violated the condition of his probation requiring him to
  report to his probation officer in the manner and at such a time and place
  as the probation officer required. Defendant asked the trial court to
  continue defendant on the deferred sentence invoking 28 V.S.A. § 304
  (providing that, in cases of probation violation, "the court may, in its
  discretion, revoke probation and  require the probationer to serve the
  sentence").  The court  determined that § 304 applied only to probationers
  who had received suspended sentences, as opposed to those whose sentences
  are deferred.  The court also concluded that the discretionary language in
  § 304 is in conflict with the explicit command in § 7041(b) that deferred
  sentences "shall" be actively imposed in the event of a probation
  violation.  At sentencing, the court imposed five to ten years of
  incarceration concurrent on each count of sexual assault, all suspended
  except sixty days.  In addition, the court again placed defendant on
  probation.  Defendant began serving his sentence on November 7, 1997.  This
  appeal followed.

       Defendant argues that, pursuant to this Court's holding in  State v.
  Murray, 159 Vt. 198, 617 A.2d 135 (1992), the trial court had the authority
  to impose alternative punishments under § 304.  The State maintains that
  the trial court properly interpreted the language of § 7041(b) as a
  mandatory directive.  Section 7041(b) addresses probation violation in the
  context of deferred sentencing agreements and states in part: "[u]pon
  violation of the terms of  probation or of the deferred sentence agreement,
  the court shall impose sentence." 13 V.S.A. § 7041(b) (emphasis added).  In
  contrast,  28 V.S.A. § 304(a) addresses revocation of probation and
  imposition of a suspended sentence.  Section 304(b) identifies four
  alternatives to probation

 

  revocation and sentence imposition pursuant to § 304(a): continuing the
  existing sentence; effecting necessary or desirable changes or enlargements
  of the conditions of probation; conducting a conference with probationer
  re-emphasizing the necessity of compliance with the conditions of
  probation; or issuing a formal or informal warning to the probationer.  28
  V.S.A. §304(b).

       This Court interprets statutes using the general rule that the true
  intent and purpose of the Legislature must be ascertained and given effect. 
  See Shea v. Metcalf,      Vt.     ,     , 712 A.2d 887, 889 (1998).  See
  also State v. Goyet, 119 Vt. 167, 171,