Title: Shenandoah Acres Inc. v. D.M. Conner Inc.

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present: All the Justices 
 
SHENANDOAH ACRES, INCORPORATED 
 
v.  Record No. 972263 
 
D.M. CONNER, INCORPORATED 
 
 
OPINION BY 
 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
September 18, 1998 
 
ACRES SAND & STONE, L.L.C. 
 
v.  Record No. 972266 
 
D.M. CONNER, INCORPORATED 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF AUGUSTA COUNTY 
Thomas H. Wood, Judge 
 
In these appeals we consider whether the trial court properly 
determined that the owner of a non-exclusive easement may limit 
access to the easement by the servient landowner and its lessee. 
Background 
Since 1957, D.M. Conner, Incorporated (Conner) and its 
predecessors have held a mineral interest in the northeastern corner 
of property owned by Shenandoah Acres, Incorporated (Shenandoah) for 
the purpose of mining sand and gravel.  In June 1982, by deed of 
exchange, Shenandoah granted to Conner’s principal shareholder and 
his wife a 50-foot easement from State Route 660 running east along 
the northern edge of Shenandoah’s property to an adjacent parcel 
owned by the couple in exchange for the release of an existing 
right-of-way over Shenandoah’s property.  This easement was 
subsequently transferred to Conner by deed dated March 25, 1987. 
Conner constructed and maintains a 30-foot wide, surface-
treated road within the easement connecting Conner’s mining 
operations on Shenandoah’s property with State Route 660.  These 
improvements include a locked gate at the point where the road meets 
the state highway.  Conner’s sole current use of its easement is for 
access from the mining operation on Shenandoah’s property to the 
highway over this road. 
In November 1996, Shenandoah decided to terminate its mining 
agreement with Conner and entered into a lease agreement with Acres 
Sand & Stone, L.L.C. (Acres Sand), for use of a portion of 
Shenandoah’s property.  The purpose of this lease is to allow Acres 
Sand to conduct mining operations within the leasehold.  The 
leasehold area covers approximately 144 acres of Shenandoah’s 
property, including that portion currently being mined by Conner.*  
The lease further provides that Acres Sand will have use of the same 
                     
*At the time Shenandoah and Acres Sand entered into this lease, 
the nature and extent of Conner’s interest in Shenandoah’s property 
and its right to continue its mining operation there were in dispute 
and were already the subject of other litigation.  Pending the 
resolution of that litigation, Acres Sand is limited by its special 
use permit to conduct mining operations only on the undisputed 
portion of its leasehold.  Because Conner’s interest in Shenandoah’s 
property and its right to continue mining operations there were not 
issues in the suits from which these appeals arise, we express no 
opinion on these issues or the effect of the resolution of that 
litigation on the issues reviewed in this opinion.  
 
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right-of-way between State Route 660 and the leased premises 
previously granted to Conner.  Although Acres Sand had not begun 
mining operations at the time of trial, it was surveying a portion 
of the leasehold and making initial preparations to open a mine in 
an area nearer to Route 660 and west of Conner’s mining operations.  
Acres Sand plans to build a spur road to connect its mine to the 
road on the right-of-way. 
In February 1997, Shenandoah requested that Conner either 
relocate its gate to a point nearer Conner’s mining operations, or 
permit Shenandoah to have joint control over the gate in its current 
location.  Conner refused these requests.  On April 4, 1997, 
Shenandoah constructed a “loop” from the highway to the road to 
bypass Conner’s gate.  Shenandoah secured the loop with a second 
locked gate.  That same day, Conner parked a road grader on the 
easement road blocking the bypass. 
On April 7, 1997, Conner filed a bill of complaint seeking a 
temporary injunction against Shenandoah and Acres Sand to prohibit 
their interfering with Conner’s use of the easement, tampering with 
the existing form of the right-of-way, and disturbing the existing 
security for Conner’s mining operations until Conner’s property 
rights in the disputed portion of the leasehold could be determined.  
On April 9, 1997, Shenandoah and Acres Sand jointly filed a separate 
bill of complaint seeking an injunction prohibiting Conner from 
interfering with their use of the easement area. 
 
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Although not formally consolidated by the trial court, the two 
suits were considered together in the course of two ore tenus 
hearings.  At those hearings, the parties offered evidence on the 
current and proposed uses of the easement.  Shenandoah indicated 
that its current use of the easement was limited to checking the 
property two or three times a week.  Acres Sand offered evidence 
that it planned to begin mining operations within three months, but 
that its current use of the easement involved only survey and site 
preparation work.  Once mining operations begin, Acres Sand intends 
to use the easement road to move equipment into its mining area and 
remove gravel and sand in dump trucks. 
Conner offered testimony that continued use of the easement 
road was necessary for its mining operations on Shenandoah’s 
property.  Conner also presented evidence regarding the security 
requirements of the mining operations imposed by state regulation, 
and maintained that it was necessary to keep its gate locked during 
non-business hours.  In commenting on the evidence, the chancellor 
expressed concern that permitting Shenandoah and Acres Sand 
unlimited access to the easement might compromise the security of 
Conner’s mining operations. 
The trial court subsequently entered identical orders in each 
case in which it found that Conner’s easement was not exclusive, and 
that “[Shenandoah] retained the right to use the easement for any 
purposes which are not inconsistent with the use of the easement by 
 
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[Conner], and conversely, cannot make any use of the easement which 
is inconsistent with the rights granted to [Conner].”  The trial 
court further ordered that Shenandoah and Acres Sand could use the 
easement only during Conner’s “regular business hours.”  The orders 
are silent as to Shenandoah’s and Acres Sand’s request for 
injunctive relief.  We awarded Shenandoah and Acres Sand these 
appeals. 
Discussion 
We begin by noting that the final orders of the trial court 
were based on the easement granted by Shenandoah to Conner’s 
principal shareholder and his wife in the 1982 deed and subsequently 
transferred to Conner in the 1987 deed.  We further note that none 
of the parties assigns error to the trial court’s determination that 
the easement is non-exclusive.  Where error is not assigned to the 
holding of the trial court, that holding becomes the law of the 
current case and the basis for our decision.  Trustees of Asbury 
United Methodist Church v. Taylor & Parrish, Inc., 249 Va. 144, 154, 
452 S.E.2d 847, 852 (1995).  Accordingly, we will limit our review 
to the dispositive issue of whether the specific facts of this case 
would warrant permitting the owner of a non-exclusive easement to 
restrict the access of the servient landowner and its lessee. 
Under well-settled principles, a conveyance of an easement that 
is non-exclusive does not strip the servient landowner of its right 
to all use of the land.  Walton v. Capital Land, Inc., 252 Va. 324, 
 
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326, 477 S.E.2d 499, 501 (1996).  The servient landowner retains the 
right to use its property in any manner that does not unreasonably 
interfere with the lawful dominant use.  Id.  The servient 
landowner’s right to reasonably use the land includes the right to 
grant to others additional easements to use the same land so long as 
the additional uses are not unreasonably burdensome or inconsistent 
with the existing dominant uses of the easement.  Preshlock v. 
Brenner, 234 Va. 407, 410, 362 S.E.2d 696, 698 (1987). 
The party alleging such an unreasonably burdensome or 
inconsistent use has the burden of proving this allegation.  Hayes 
v. Aquia Marina, Inc., 243 Va. 255, 259, 414 S.E.2d 820, 822 (1992).  
Any use of a non-exclusive easement may be protected by an 
injunction prohibiting an interfering use when the harm from the 
interfering use is irreparable and cannot be adequately addressed in 
damages.  Black & White Cars, Inc. v. Groome Transp., Inc., 247 Va. 
426, 431-32, 442 S.E.2d 391, 395 (1994).  However, the party seeking 
relief must show that the alleged harm is imminent, and not merely 
speculative or potential.  See Ridgwell v. Brasco Bay Corp., 254 Va. 
458, 462-63, 493 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1997). 
Here, Conner failed to show any significant actual conflicting 
use of the easement by Shenandoah and Acres Sand.  Furthermore, any 
determination regarding the reasonableness of Shenandoah’s and Acres 
Sand’s future use of the easement, when such use is not imminent, is 
necessarily speculative.  Similarly, Conner’s concerns over 
 
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potential criminal acts or liability arising from trespassers are, 
at best, speculative.  Accordingly, we hold that Conner did not meet 
its burden to show that any actual or imminent use by Shenandoah or 
Acres Sand would irreparably harm or unreasonably interfere with 
Conner’s use of the road within its easement. 
The trial court, having determined that Conner’s easement is 
non-exclusive, may not craft an order creating a de facto exclusive 
easement.  Allowing the servient landowner’s use of an easement to 
be limited by Conner’s flexible and arbitrary choice, such as its 
hours of operation, creates just such a de facto exclusive easement 
and is improper.  Rather, any limitation on subsequent uses of the 
easement should be imposed narrowly and in such a manner as to 
prohibit only actual material interference with the existing 
dominant uses of the easement.  See generally, Hayes, 243 Va. at 
258, 414 S.E.2d at 822. 
For these reasons, we will reverse the trial court’s judgment 
in the suit initiated by Conner limiting Shenandoah and Acres Sand 
to the use of the easement only during Conner’s hours of operation 
and enter final judgment for Shenandoah and Acres Sand.  Because the 
trial court failed to address Shenandoah’s and Acres Sand’s request 
for an injunction prohibiting Conner’s interference with their use 
of the easement, we will reverse the judgment in that suit and 
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
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               Record Nos. 972263 and 972266  —  Reversed, remanded, 
                                              and final judgment. 
 
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