Title: Martin v. Ziherl

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
MUGUET S. MARTIN 
 
v.  Record No. 040804   
OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
January 14, 2005 
KRISTOPHER JOSEPH ZIHERL 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Theodore J. Markow, Judge 
 
In this appeal we consider whether Zysk v. Zysk, 239 Va. 
32, 404 S.E.2d 721 (1990), which disallows tort recovery for 
injuries suffered while participating in an illegal activity, 
precludes Muguet S. Martin from maintaining a tort action 
against Kristopher Joseph Ziherl for injuries allegedly 
inflicted during sexual intercourse, a criminal act of 
fornication proscribed by Code § 18.2-344, in light of the 
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), holding unconstitutional a 
Texas penal statute prohibiting certain sexual acts. 
FACTS 
 
Because the case was decided on demurrer, we recite the 
facts contained in the pleadings and all reasonable inferences 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.  
McDermott v. Reynolds, 260 Va. 98, 100, 530 S.E.2d 902, 903 
(2000).  Martin and Ziherl were unmarried adults in a sexually 
active relationship from approximately October 31, 2001 
through November 3, 2003.  Martin experienced a vaginal 
 
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outbreak in June 2003, which her physician diagnosed as 
herpes.  Martin filed a motion for judgment against Ziherl 
alleging that he knew he was infected with the sexually 
transmitted herpes virus when he and Martin were engaged in 
unprotected sexual conduct, knew that the virus was 
contagious, and failed to inform Martin of his condition.  In 
the two-count motion for judgment, Martin asserted claims of 
negligence, intentional battery and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress and sought compensatory and punitive 
damages. 
 
Ziherl filed a demurrer asserting that Martin's injuries 
were caused by her participation in an illegal act and 
therefore, under Zysk, the motion for judgment did not state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted.  Following a 
hearing, the trial court applied Zysk and sustained Ziherl's 
demurrer holding that Lawrence did not "strike down" Code 
§ 18.2-344 and that valid reasons such as the protection of 
public health and encouraging marriage for the procreation of 
children are "rationally related to achieve the objective of 
the statute."  We awarded Martin an appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
 
Before turning to the merits of Martin's appeal, we 
consider Ziherl's assertion that Martin lacks "standing" to 
challenge the constitutionality of Code § 18.2-344.  In making 
 
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his "standing" argument, Ziherl refers to the lack of real or 
threatened prosecution of Martin under Code § 18.2-344 and 
states that invalidation of the statute would not impact her 
liberty interest but, instead, would only allow her to 
maintain her action for damages.  Regardless of the approach, 
well established law precludes us from considering Ziherl's 
"standing" challenge. 
A basic principle of appellate review is that, with few 
exceptions not relevant here, arguments made for the first 
time on appeal will not be considered.  Ziherl did not assert 
before the trial court that Martin lacked "standing" to 
challenge the constitutionality of Code § 18.2-344.  We have 
repeatedly held that challenges to a litigant's standing must 
be raised at the trial level, and the failure to do so 
precludes consideration of a litigant's standing by this Court 
on appeal.  In Walt Robbins, Inc. v. Damon Corp., 232 Va. 43, 
348 S.E.2d 223 (1986), the Court considered whether the 
appellee's mechanics' lien was unenforceable for failure to 
make the trustees and the beneficiary of the antecedent deed 
of trust parties to the suit to enforce the lien.  Id. at 46, 
348 S.E.2d at 225.  On appeal, the appellee challenged the 
"appellants' standing to assert the rights of the trustees and 
beneficiary," but the Court refused to consider this argument, 
finding that it had been waived for failure to preserve it in 
 
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the lower court.  Id. at 46 n.2, 348 S.E.2d at 226 n.2.  The 
Court concluded that "a standing question cannot be raised for 
the first time on appeal."  Id.; see also Princess Anne Hills 
Civic League v. Susan Constant Real Estate Trust, 243 Va. 53, 
59 n.1, 413 S.E.2d 599, 603 n.1 (1992)(refusing to consider 
contention that defendant lacked standing to maintain its 
cross-bill because issue not raised in pleadings or referred 
to the factfinder in earlier proceedings); Shenandoah Pub. 
House, Inc. v. Fanning, 235 Va. 253, 258 n.1, 368 S.E.2d 253, 
255 n.1 (1988) (refusing to notice standing argument on brief 
because it was neither raised in trial court nor assigned as 
error); Andrews v. Cahoon, 196 Va. 790, 805, 86 S.E.2d 173, 
181 (1955) (declining to consider the capacity of an executrix 
to maintain a wrongful death action because the issue was 
raised for first time on appeal); Crawley v. Glaze, 117 Va. 
274, 277, 84 S.E. 671, 673 (1915) (finding that a demurrer 
cannot be sustained upon an allegation of lack of standing 
when the record from the circuit court fails to indicate 
whether such an argument was presented below and consequently 
is an insufficient record for an appellate court to consider 
the argument on appeal).  
While we will not entertain a standing challenge made for 
the first time on appeal, the Court will consider, sua sponte, 
whether a decision would be an advisory opinion because the 
 
5
Court does not have the power to render a judgment that is 
only advisory.  See Commonwealth v. Harley, 256 Va. 216, 219-
20, 504 S.E.2d 852, 854 (1998).  In the case at bar, the 
Court's decision on the constitutionality of Code § 18.2-344 
will determine Martin's right to pursue her tort claim for 
damages.  Thus, we find that this case presents a justiciable 
issue and a decision by this Court will not be an advisory 
opinion. 
 
Martin asserts that the reasoning of the Supreme Court of 
the United States in Lawrence renders Virginia's statute 
criminalizing the sexual intercourse between two unmarried 
persons, Code § 18.2-344, unconstitutional.  The issue in 
Lawrence, as stated by the Court, was "whether the petitioners 
were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the 
exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution."  Id. at 564.  
Lawrence had been convicted of violating a Texas statute that 
made it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in 
certain intimate sexual conduct described as the act of 
sodomy.  Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.06(a) (2003).  Lawrence 
challenged his conviction in the Texas courts, asserting that 
the Texas statute was unconstitutional, but the Texas court 
rejected that challenge, relying on Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 
U.S. 186 (1986).  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 363.  In Bowers, the 
 
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Supreme Court had held that a Georgia statute making it a 
crime to engage in sodomy, regardless of the sex of the 
participants, was constitutional.  478 U.S. at 189. 
 
Acknowledging that the Texas court properly considered 
Bowers as "then being authoritative," Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 
563, the Supreme Court reexamined its prior decision and 
concluded that "Bowers was not correct when it was decided, 
and is not correct today."  Id. at 578.  The Court explained 
that the liberty interest at issue was not a fundamental right 
to engage in certain conduct but was the right to enter and 
maintain a personal relationship without governmental 
interference.  Id. at 567.  The Court determined that the 
statutes proscribing certain acts between persons of the same 
sex sought to control a personal relationship that is "within 
the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as 
criminals."  Id.  The Court explained that the constitution 
protects the liberty interests of persons to maintain a 
personal relationship "in the confines of their homes and 
their own private lives" and that an element of that 
relationship is its "overt expression in intimate conduct."  
Id. at 567. 
In overruling Bowers, the Court also stated that the 
analysis of Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion in 
 
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Bowers should have been applied in that case and "should 
control" in Lawrence.  Id. at 578.  That analysis is: 
Our prior cases make two propositions abundantly 
clear.  First, the fact that the governing 
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a 
particular practice as immoral is not a 
sufficient reason for upholding a law 
prohibiting the practice; neither history nor 
tradition could save a law prohibiting 
miscegenation from constitutional attack.  
Second, individual decisions by married persons, 
concerning the intimacies of their physical 
relationship, even when not intended to produce 
offspring, are a form of "liberty" protected by 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Moreover, this protection extends to 
intimate choices by unmarried as well as married 
persons. 
 
Id. at 577-78.  Applying Justice Stevens' analysis, the Court 
stated, "The State cannot demean their existence or control 
their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.  
Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them 
the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention 
of the government."  Id. at 578. 
We find no relevant distinction between the circumstances  
in Lawrence and the circumstances in the present case.*  As 
described in Justice Stevens' rationale adopted by the Court 
in Lawrence, decisions by married or unmarried persons 
regarding their intimate physical relationship are elements of 
                                                          
 
* Indeed, but for the nature of the sexual act, the 
provisions of Code § 18.2-344 are identical to those of the 
 
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their personal relationships that are entitled to due process 
protection.  Using this rationale, the Supreme Court found 
that the Texas statute criminalizing a specific sexual act 
between two persons of the same sex violated the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because such statute 
improperly abridged a personal relationship that was within 
the liberty interest of persons to choose.  Id. at 578-79.  We 
find no principled way to conclude that the specific act of 
intercourse is not an element of a personal relationship 
between two unmarried persons or that the Virginia statute 
criminalizing intercourse between unmarried persons does not 
improperly abridge a personal relationship that is within the 
liberty interest of persons to choose.  Because Code § 18.2-
334, like the Texas statute at issue in Lawrence, is an 
attempt by the state to control the liberty interest which is 
exercised in making these personal decisions, it violates the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Ziherl argues, and the trial court held, that Code 
§ 18.2-344 withstands constitutional scrutiny because "[v]alid 
public reasons for the law exist," including protection of 
public health and "encouraging that children be born into a 
family consisting of a married couple."  Regardless of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Texas statute which Lawrence determined to be 
unconstitutional. 
 
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merit of the policies referred to by the trial court, the 
Supreme Court in Lawrence indicated that such policies are 
insufficient to sustain the statute's constitutionality.  Id. 
at 578. 
The Supreme Court did not consider the liberty right 
vindicated in Lawrence as a fundamental constitutional right 
which could be infringed only if the statute in question 
satisfied the strict scrutiny test.  Rather, the Court applied 
a rational basis test, but held that "[t]he Texas statute 
furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its 
intrusion into the personal and private life of the 
individual."  Id.  This statement is not limited to state 
interests offered by the state of Texas in support of its 
statute, but sweeps within it all manner of states' interests 
and finds them insufficient when measured against the 
intrusion upon a person's liberty interest when that interest 
is exercised in the form of private, consensual sexual conduct 
between adults.  As we have said, this same liberty interest 
is invoked in this case when two unmarried adults make the 
choice to engage in the intimate sexual conduct proscribed by 
Code § 18.2-344.  Thus, as in Lawrence, the Commonwealth's 
interests do not warrant such encroachment on personal 
liberty. 
 
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Therefore, applying the reasoning of Lawrence as Martin 
asks us to do, leads us to conclude that Code § 18.2-344 is 
unconstitutional because by subjecting certain private sexual 
conduct between two consenting adults to criminal penalties it 
infringes on the rights of adults to "engage in the private 
conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution."  Id. 
at 564. 
It is important to note that this case does not involve 
minors, non-consensual activity, prostitution, or public 
activity.  The Lawrence court indicated that state regulation 
of that type of activity might support a different result.  
Our holding, like that of the Supreme Court in Lawrence, 
addresses only private, consensual conduct between adults and 
the respective statutes' impact on such conduct.  Our holding 
does not affect the Commonwealth's police power regarding 
regulation of public fornication, prostitution, or other such 
crimes. 
 
We now turn to the application of Zysk to this case.  The 
rule applied in Zysk was that "a party who consents to and 
participates in an immoral and illegal act cannot recover 
damages from other participants for the consequence of that 
act."  239 Va. at 34, 404 S.E.2d at 722 (quoting Miller v. 
Bennett, 190 Va. 162, 164-65, 56 S.E.2d 217, 218 (1949)).  We 
 
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adhere to that rule.  However, in light of our determination 
regarding the constitutionality of Code § 18.2-344, the sexual 
activity between Martin and Ziherl was not illegal and "the 
fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally 
viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient 
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice."  
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577.  Therefore, Zysk is no longer 
controlling precedent to the extent that its holding applies 
to private, consensual sexual intercourse. 
For the reasons stated above, we will reverse the 
judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE HASSELL, concurring. 
 
I concur in the judgment of the majority.