Title: State v. Murray

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

200 Kan. 526 (1968)
437 P.2d 816
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
ROBERT MURRAY, a/k/a ALFRED W. MURRAY, Appellant.
No. 44,863

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed March 9, 1968.
David C. All, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the briefs for the appellant.
A.J. Focht, Deputy County Attorney, argued the cause, and Robert C. Londerholm, Attorney General, and Keith Sanborn, County Attorney, were with him on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HATCHER, C.:
This is an appeal from a conviction and sentence in a prosecution for grand larceny resulting from aiding and abetting in the theft of two men's suits.
The state's evidence disclosed facts substantially as follows. On the evening of May 5, 1966, the defendant, a Negro male, entered the J.C. Penney's Store in Eastgate Shopping Center in Wichita, Kansas. He was accompanied by a Negro woman and a Mexican girl. The three began moving about the racks on which men's suits were being displayed. The manager of the men's department became suspicious and placed the three under surveillance. The defendant picked up two dress shirts, paid for them without looking at the size and left the store. The two women left the store *527 and it was noted that there was a wide space in the suit rack where there had been suits previously. The manager directed an employee to follow the women out of the store.
The employee followed the women and saw them walking in the mall area in a manner which he described as pigeon toed. He started running towards them and part of a suit dropped out from between the legs of the younger of the two women. He requested that they return to the store but they refused. He went to the store and started knocking on the window for assistance. He turned around in time to see that each woman was stuffing a suit into a trash can. He got the suits out of the can and began following the girls. They split up and he followed the younger girl for a while, with the manager, who had come on the scene, following the colored woman. When their paths crossed, the men switched women which left the employee following the colored woman. She turned around and slapped him about a bit, landing a few rights to his jaw.
The defendant then drove up in a pink and white Oldsmobile, got out of the car and the colored woman ran over and got in. The employee took out his pencil and paper and started to write down the license number of the car and the defendant knocked the pencil and paper from his hand, stating, "Don't take my license number down." At that time the younger of the two women arrived followed by the manager. The defendant and the woman then got into the car and left after being told by the manager to wait until the police arrived.
The defendant was informed against as for grand larceny; he was convicted, and sentenced under the habitual criminal act as for a third felony conviction. He has appealed alleging numerous trial errors.
The appellant first contends that the trial court erred in not granting a new trial because of prejudicial remarks made in the prosecutor's closing argument.
We find no merit in the contention. The defendant would so construe the prosecutor's closing argument as to have him referring to the appellant's failure to testify. We do not so interpret the comments.
While counsel for appellant was making his closing argument to the jury he asked the question:
In his closing argument the prosecuting attorney answered as follows:
"The Court: No, I don't think it is either.
It is clear that both attorneys were referring to the two women. The state could not have forced the appellant to testify as a witness. The appellant, through his counsel, asked the question and got his answer. He is not now in position to complain. (State v. Hartsock, 144 Kan. 227, 58 P.2d 1144.)
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in supplementing its instruction on circumstantial evidence by adding the following:
We cannot find how, under the circumstances in this case, the appellant was in any way prejudiced by the instruction. The circumstantial evidence was to be applied equally in considering innocence or guilt.
The appellant relies on State v. Scott, 117 Kan. 303, 235 Pac. 380. In that case the trial court supplemented its instruction on circumstantial evidence as follows:
*529 This court considered the instruction and stated:
It will be noted that the instruction in the Scott case dealt with circumstantial evidence only as applied to guilt and gave it no potency to prove innocence. In the case under consideration the instruction gave circumstantial evidence the same potency to prove either innocence or guilt.
What has been said should not be understood as placing our approval on the instruction. This court disapproves any instruction by which the trial court attempts to stress the comparative weight or potency of any particular type of competent evidence.
We next note appellant's rather frivolous contention that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of petit larceny.
It will suffice to say that the goods found to be stolen consisted of two men's suits each of a value of at least $42.00 or a total of $84.00. There was no evidence to sustain a conviction of petit larceny. A trial court should not instruct on lesser offenses when there is no evidence to sustain them. (State v. Fletcher, 174 Kan. 530, 256 P.2d 847; State v. Lytle, 177 Kan. 408, 280 P.2d 924; State v. Diggs, 194 Kan. 812, 402 P.2d 300.)
We are constrained to agree with the appellant's contention that he was improperly sentenced under the habitual criminal act. The act insofar as material here provides:
*530 The appellant had previously, January 20, 1958, pled guilty to second degree burglary and larceny growing out of a single taking. On being so informed the trial court considered the 1958 sentence as on two separate convictions and sentenced the defendant on the present conviction as if "convicted a third time of felony."
In 24 A.L.R.2d 1262 we find the general rule stated as follows, and the cases are annotated supporting it:
Although there are no cases from this jurisdiction dealing directly with the question, what has been said appears to be in harmony with the general rule. In State v. Woodman, 127 Kan. 166, 272 Pac. 132, we stated the purpose of the habitual criminal act as follows:
Because two offenses grow out of a single act the actor has not become an habitual offender. In Johnson v. Crouse, 191 Kan. 694, 383 P.2d 978, we said:
The habitual criminal act was passed in the hope of bringing about a reformation of criminals by an increased penalty for a second offense and when that hope of reformation had passed then the increased punishment should be meted out for the third offense. The following statement was applied in State v. Felton, 194 Kan. 501, 504, 399 P.2d 817, covering the purpose of the act:
The Felton case is also authority for the statement that the appellant could not have been sentenced as for a second felony conviction under the 1958 conviction. We are forced to conclude that a convict must be subject to sentence for a second felony conviction before he can be sentenced for a third felony conviction. The appellant was improperly sentenced for conviction of a third time felony. He should have been sentenced as for a second time felony conviction.
The judgment is affirmed as to the conviction, reversed as to the sentence and the case is remanded to the district court with instructions to have the defendant returned and the sentence corrected in accordance with the views herein expressed.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.