Title: PEOPLE OF MI V ROBERT RILEY

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chie f Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED APRIL 23, 2003  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v 
No. 121751  
ROBERT RILEY,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
AFTER REMAND  
PER CURIAM  
The prosecutor sought leave to appeal from the Court of  
Appeals decision reversing defendant’s first-degree murder  
conviction on the basis that his trial counsel was ineffective  
for failing to seek a directed verdict of acquittal.  We  
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the  
defendant’s conviction of felony murder. 
Because the  
prosecution 
presented 
sufficient 
evidence 
in 
its 
case-in-chief  
to support a finding that defendant was guilty of felony  
murder as an aider and abettor, defense counsel was not  
ineffective for failing to seek a directed verdict.  
I. Facts and Procedural History  
 
 
Defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree felony  
murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b), arising out of the death of Mark  
Seaton.  Defendant was observed at the victim’s apartment  
along with David Ware, whose whereabouts are unknown.  
Defendant gave a statement to the police, admitting that he  
brought Ware to the victim’s apartment and admitting to being  
present in the victim’s apartment at the time of the charged  
offense. Defendant claimed that he observed Ware commit the  
murder.
 Specifically, defendant told the police that he  
observed Ware strangle the victim, bind the victim’s hands and  
feet together, and then strangle the victim a second time  
after the victim resumed breathing. Shortly afterward, a  
neighbor knocked on the door.  
In addition to the admission of defendant’s statement,  
the prosecution presented the testimony of several neighbors,  
including Gloria Hollis.  Hollis testified that she sensed  
something was wrong and knocked on the victim’s apartment door  
twice.  On both occasions, defendant answered the apartment  
door, claimed that he and Ware were cousins of the victim and  
that the victim was not home.  After her first visit to the  
victim’s apartment, Hollis observed electronic components  
being carried out of the apartment to the victim’s car.  
Another neighbor testified that he observed defendant leaving  
the apartment with stereo equipment.  Defendant and Ware  
attempted to leave the scene in the victim’s car, but  
eventually fled on foot because the car would not start.  The  
victim was found dead in his apartment with his wrists and  
ankles bound with duct tape and electrical cord.  
2  
 
 
In his appeal of right, the Court of Appeals reversed  
defendant’s conviction on the basis that the trial court had  
erred in admitting hearsay testimony.1  This Court reversed  
that judgment in an opinion per curiam, holding that defendant  
had knowingly waived his right to challenge the admission of  
the hearsay testimony. We remanded the case to the Court of  
Appeals to consider defendant’s remaining issues.2  
On remand, the Court of Appeals again reversed  
defendant’s murder conviction in an unpublished opinion per  
curiam.3  A majority of the Court of Appeals panel held that,  
after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the  
prosecution, “a rational trier of fact could find the elements  
of first-degree murder proved 
beyond 
a 
reasonable 
doubt.” Slip  
op at 1.  
However, the majority found merit in defendant’s claim  
that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because  
his attorney failed to move for a directed verdict of  
acquittal after the prosecution presented its proofs.  The  
majority held that “the 
prosecution 
failed 
to 
present evidence  
that could establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant  
was the principal or that he aided and abetted in the  
1  Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued July 21, 2000 
(Docket No. 211368). The only defense witness presented was 
Mary McKinney, mother of David Ware.  She testified regarding 
inculpatory statements made to her by Ware.  Some of the  
inculpatory statements directly implicated defendant in the 
binding and subduing of the victim.  
2 465 Mich 442; 636 NW2d 514 (2001).  
3 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued April 5, 2002 
(Docket No. 211368).  
3  
 
commission of felony murder.”  Slip op at 4.  The majority  
further held that the failure to move for a directed verdict  
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that  
there was a reasonable probability that defendant would have  
been acquitted of the felony-murder charge had the motion been  
made.  The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial  
court for entry of judgment of conviction for larceny in a  
building, MCL 750.360.  
The concurring judge opined that the prosecution’s  
evidence was sufficient and that counsel was not ineffective  
for failing to move for a directed verdict.  However, because  
the issue regarding the sufficiency of the evidence without  
the defense witnesses’ testimony was decided in the previous  
Court of Appeals opinion, the concurring judge believed that  
the holding became the law of the case and was not subject to  
further review.  
II. Standard of Review  
Whether a defendant has been denied the effective  
assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact.  A  
judge must first find the facts and then must decide whether  
those facts constitute a violation of the defendant's  
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.  
People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575; 640 NW2d 246 (2002).  
Counsel’s alleged deficiency relates to the failure to  
move for a directed verdict.  Because a Ginther4 hearing was  
not conducted, our review of the relevant facts is limited to  
4 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).  
4  
 
 
mistakes apparent on the record.  People v Nantelle, 215 Mich  
App 77, 87; 544 NW2d 667 (1996).  
In assessing a motion for a directed verdict of  
acquittal, a trial court must consider the evidence presented  
by the prosecution to the time the motion is made and in a  
light 
most 
favorable 
to the prosecution, and determine 
whether  
a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential  
elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  
People v Hampton, 407 Mich 354, 368; 285 NW2d 284 (1979).  
III. Analysis  
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of  
counsel, 
a 
defendant 
must show both that counsel's 
performance  
was deficient and that counsel's deficient performance  
prejudiced the defense.  Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668,  
687; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984); People v Pickens,  
446 Mich 298, 302-303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994).  In order to  
demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient, the  
defendant must show that it fell below an objective standard  
of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.  In so  
doing, the defendant must overcome a strong presumption that  
counsel's performance constituted sound trial strategy.  
Strickland, supra at 690-691; People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643,  
687; 521 NW2d 557 (1994).  
To prove felony murder on an aiding and abetting theory,  
the prosecution must show that the defendant (1) performed  
acts or gave encouragement that assisted the commission of the  
killing of a human being, (2) with the intent to kill, to do  
great bodily harm, or to create a high risk of death or great  
5  
  
 
bodily harm with knowledge that death or great bodily harm was  
the probable result, (3) while committing, attempting to  
commit, or assisting in the commission of the predicate  
felony. 
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 755; 597 NW2d 130  
(1999).  
In order to satisfy the malice standard required under  
People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672, 299 NW2d 304 (1980), the  
prosecution must show that the aider and abettor either  
intended to kill, intended to cause great bodily harm, or  
wantonly and willfully disregarded the likelihood that the  
natural tendency of his behavior was to cause death or great  
bodily harm.  Further, if an aider and abettor participates in  
a crime with knowledge of the principal's intent to kill or to  
cause great bodily harm, the aider and abettor is acting with  
"wanton and willful disregard" 
sufficient 
to 
support 
a finding  
of malice.  See id. at 733; People v Kelly, 423 Mich 261; 378  
NW2d 365 (1985).  
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the  
prosecution, we conclude that a rational juror could find that  
the elements of felony murder were proved beyond a reasonable  
doubt on an aiding and abetting theory.  Defendant’s statement  
to the police indicates that Ware strangled the victim twice.  
After the victim had been strangled, defendant heard a knock  
on the door. Assuming arguendo that defendant was initially  
unaware of Ware’s intent to kill or cause great bodily harm,  
he certainly became aware of Ware’s intent after the  
strangling incidents.  Eyewitness testimony indicates that  
defendant participated in the crime by engaging in the  
6  
larceny.  In addition, Gloria Hollis’s testimony indicates  
that defendant performed acts that assisted the commission of  
the murder. Defendant’s acts at the apartment door possibly  
precluded the provision of medical assistance to the victim  
while he was still alive, hampered detection of the murder, or  
facilitated defendant and Ware’s escape.  
Because the prosecution submitted sufficient evidence,  
which included the defendant’s own incriminating statement  
corroborating his participation in the murder as an aider and  
abettor, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to  
make a motion for a directed verdict.  Because counsel's  
performance was not deficient, defendant is unable to satisfy  
the first prong of Strickland and Pickens. Ineffective  
assistance of counsel cannot be predicated on the failure to  
make a frivolous or meritless motion.  People v Darden, 230  
Mich App 597, 605; 585 NW2d 27 (1998); People v Gist, 188 Mich  
App 610; 470 NW2d 475 (1991).5  
IV. Conclusion  
Because 
defendant 
was 
not 
denied 
the 
effective 
assistance  
of counsel on the basis of counsel’s failure to seek a  
directed verdict, we reverse the judgment of the Court of  
Appeals 
and 
reinstate 
defendant’s 
conviction 
of 
felony 
murder.  
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh  
5 In addition, the law-of-the-case doctrine does not 
preclude this Court from considering the sufficiency of the 
prosecution’s proofs.  Where a case is taken on appeal to a 
higher appellate court, the law announced in the higher 
appellate court supersedes that set forth in the intermediate 
appellate court. Johnson v White, 430 Mich 47; 420 NW2d 87 
(1988).  
7  
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman  
8