Title: WALKER v TSCHACHE

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12493 I N THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1973 F R E D W A L K E R , BRIA V . HOLJE e t a 1. , P l a i n t i f f s and Respondents, -vs - JUNIOR W. TSCHACHE, Defendant and Appellant. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING : Counsel of ~ e c o r d : For Appellant : Landoe and Gary, Bozeman, Montana. Joseph Gary argued, Bozeman, Montana. For Respondent: James H. Goetz argued, Bozeman, Montana. Gregory 0. Morgan argued, Bozeman, Montana. Submitted: April 30, 1973 Decided : jdYn 1 6 Filed : MAY 1 C ; 1 3 7 3 M r , J u s t i c e Wesley Castles delivered the Opinion of the Court, This i s an o r i g i n a l proceeding brought by Junior W. Tschache seeking a w r i t of supervisory control, o r other appropriate w r i t , a f t e r a judgment rendered i n the d i s t r i c t court of the eighteenth j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , county of Gallatin. The d i s t r i c t court, a s well a s Fred Walker and fourteen other p a r t i e s a r e respondents. In l a t e February 1973 p e t i t i o n e r , owner of the Wagon Wheel Park, a t r a i l e r park located i n Bozeman, Montana, gave notice t o h i s tenants, respondents herein, t h a t he was going t o increase the t r a i l e r park rent from $35 per month t o $50, such increase t o be e f f e c t i v e April 1, 1973. The notice t o each respondent tenant was i n writing, placed in an envelope addressed t o the tenant, and deposited i n the mail box of the addressed tenant. Some of the tenants f e l t the increase was not f a i r and refused t o pay, For t h e purpose of discussing the necessity of the increase with the owner of the t r a i l e r park, the tenants organized a meeting t o which a l l the tenants and the owner were invited. This meeting did not change the positions of the p a r t i e s . Thereafter t h e tenant respondents tendered only $35 f o r t h e i r r e n t , which was refused by the owner, Upon t h e i r r e f u s a l t o pay the r e n t increase, t h e owner served these tenants with three day notices of d e f a u l t , in- tending t o follow up with actions f o r unlawful detainer. Respondent tenants then f i l e d an action f o r declaratory judg- ment i n the d i s t r i c t court. The court granted a temporary r e s t r a i n - ing order enjoining further action by the owner and requiring the tenants t o post a bond. T r i a l without a jury was held on April 13, 1973, a t which time fourteen of the f i f t e e n respondent tenants stipulated t h a t they had received the notices more than the statutory f i f t e e n days p r i o r t o the e f f e c t i v e date of t h e increase, After presentation of the evidence, t h e court ordered o r a l argument on t h e issue of delivery of notice. A t the conclusion thereof, counsel f o r p e t i t i o n e r ~ o v e d and requested the court t o r u l e from the bench; p e t i t i o n e r 3 1 ~ 0 waived any r i g h t t o b r i e f the a a t t e r further. I n support ji h i s request, p e t i t i o n e r called a t t e n t i o n t o the f a c t t h a t t h e 4atc was April 13 and i f notice was i n s u f f i c i e n t he wanted t o know 2 0 t h a t he could then attempt t o make proper service of notice d i t h i n the statutory time l i m i t . The court refused p e t i t i o n e r ' s request and called f o r b r i e f s and findings of f a c t from the parties. O n April 18, 1973 the court rendered i t s findings which held t h ~ t as a matter of law under section 67-710, R.C.M. 1947, f o r a landlord t o change the terms of a r e n t a l agreement from month t o month he must serve written notice upon the tenant personally, i n a manner i n which return could be provided and apy other service was inadequate and without e f f e c t , Following t h a t judgment, p e t i t i o n e r made application t o t h i s Court f o r a w r i t of supervisory control and, i n response thereto, an order t o show cause was issued t o respondents and t o the d i s t r i c t court. Hearing on the order was held on April 30, 1973, Two issues a r e presented for t h i s Court's review: (1) whether t h i s Court, i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n , should issue an order of supervisory control, and (2) was the service made by the owner on the tenants proper and within section 67-710, R.C.M. 1947? Respondents argue t h i s i s not the proper situation f o r the issuance of a w r i t of supervisory control. In support they base t h e i r argument on State ex r e l . Whiteside v. F i r s t Judicial D i s t r i c t Court, 24 Mont. 539, 63 P. 395. In the i n s t a n t case i t i s apparent thsre are no factual issues t o be argued, The important f a c t qucs- tion was stipulated by the p a r t i e s -- t h a t respondents did 1 receive written notice of the increase p r i o r t o f i f t e e n days before the e f f e c t i v e date of the increase. There i s only a question of l a w t o be determined--was the notice given proper? It i s a l s o c l e a r t h a t although t h i s law s u i t i s maintained by only f i f t e e n tenants there a r e approximately one hundred other tenants whose r i g h t s could be affected by a decision t h a t the owner gave improper notice. Based on these f a c t s , w e find t h i s i s a proper s i t u a t i o n for a ~ ~ r j - t of supervisory contrsl. O n t h i s question we find c l e a r support for our position i n recent cases decided by t h i s Court. In S t a t e of Montana v , D i s t r i c t P .,ourt, 155 Mont, 344, 349,350, 472 P.2d 302, t h i s same argument &as presented. The p a r t i e s there argued t h a t an application f o r 31 w r i t of supervisory control was unwarranted because: "9: +C * the remedy by appeal a f t e r t r i a l i s available and because the p e t i t i o n f o r supervisory control does not allege circumstances of an emergency nature author- izing intervention by t h i s Court by means of an extra- ~ r d i nary w r i t . " 3f course, the f a c t s i n the above quoted case d i f f e r from those of the i n s t a n t case, but the reasoning employed i s applicable here. 'de stated there t h a t a w r i t should issue, p a r t l y because: " ~ d d i t i o n a l expense t o l i t i g a n t s and taxpayers becomes u n j u s t i f i a b l e . * * * Under these circum- stances the discretionary exercise of supervisory control i s both 'necessary' and 'proper' t o the complete exercise of an appellate jurisdiction within t h e meaning of A r t i c l e VIII, Sec, 3 of the Montana Constitution. I t i s equally authorized 1 \ere a s necessary' and 'proper' supervisi.on of a t r i a l court other than hy appeal within the ambit . ~ f Rule 17 (a) of the Montana Rul-es of Appellate Civi. 1 Procedure. 11 One of the most recent cases concerning the question of a proper tine ):o issue an extraordinary w r i t i s State ex r e l , Stzte Eighway n ,.,o~~mission v. D i s t r i c t Court, M o n t . , 499 P. 2d 1228, 29 it,Rep. 615. The f a c t s of t h a t case a r c somewhat similar t o the instant case. The quzstion of the case was a question of law, whether the service of process i n the action was proper and i n accordance with the appropriate s t a t u t e . That case could a l s o have had an e f f e c t on a number of possible lienholders. There we c i t e d earlier Montana cases which discussed the need t o prevent extended and needless litigation and the f a c t t h a t the request f o r a w r i t :?as wi thin a reasonabl-e time a f t e r the action sought t o be remedied xas taken. In that instance we issued the w r i t , even though the remedy of appeal was available. Here we find a similar s i t u a t i o n , there i s no factual dispute only a question of law on thc proper service; the decision could a f f e c t the r i g h t s of a large number of tenants; and t h i s action w i l l prevent needless l i t i g a t i o n . With these circumstances and p r i o r case law upholding our position, we w i l l issue the w r i t . The second issue i s whether the service of notice upon the tenants was proper and within the s t a t u t e . Section 67-710, R,C.M, 1947, provides: 1 1 Terms of lease may be changed by notice. I n a l l leases of lands o r tenements, o r of any i n t e r e s t therein, from month t o month, the landlord may, upon giving notice i n writing a t l e a s t f i f t e e n days before the expiration of the month, change the terms of the lease, t o take e f f e c t a t the expiration of the month, The notice, when served upon the tenant, s h a l l of i t s e l f operate and be effectual t o c r e a t e and estab- l i s h , a s a p a r t of t h e lease, the terms, r e n t , and conditions specified in the notice, i f the tenant s h a l l continue t o hold the premises a f t e r the expira- t i o n of the month, I v Section 67-710 requires "giving notice i n writing". Respon- dents argue t h a t t h i s notice means the same a s j u r i s d i c t i o n a l service, a s contemplated by the r u l e s of c i v i l procedure. Under t h a t theory we would be imposing the requirements of service of process f o r j u r i s d i c t i o n a l matters upon landlord and tenant notices. This i s an attempt t o merge the separate concepts of notice and j u r i s d i c t i o n , which the United States Supreme Court has seen f i t t o separate and hold a p a r t , I n Pfullane v, Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company, 339 U,S. 306, 70 S,Ct. 652, 94 L ed 865, 873, the court was faced with the problem of notice requirements. Mullane involved an accounting by the t r u s t e e bank f o r a common t r u s t fund. There were both %n-state and out-of-state beneficiaries and the t r u s t e e had given notice t o both categories only by publication pursuant t o a N e w York s t a t u t e . In s t r i k i n g down t h i s inadequate form of notice f o r the i n - s t a t e beneficiaries, the court defined the due process requirements of notice: I I An elementary and fundamental requirement of due prn cess i n any proceeding which i s t o be accorded f i n a l i t y is notice reasonabl-y calculated, under a l l the circumstances, t o apprise interested p a r t i e s of the pendency of the action and afford them an oppor- t u n i t y t o present t h e i r objections. * * * The notice must be of such a nature as reasonably t o convey the required information * 5 ; " dnd it must afford a reasonable time f o r those interested t o make t h e i r appearance ik +r 9 ~ . But i f with due regard f o r the ~ r a c t i c a l i t i e s and p e c u l i a r i t i e s of the case these conditions a r e reasonably met, the constitutional requirements a r e s a t i s f i e d . 11 Larer in Yullane t h e court said, with reference t o giving not%ce: "The means employed must be such a s one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt t o accomplish it. I I Applying the above standard t o the i n s t a n t case, there i s no doubt the owner was attempting t o communicate with o r actually inform the tenants of the increase i n r e n t , The means employed was by placing the addressed envelopes i n the mail boxes of t h e tenants. I t i s c l e a r the tenants were a c t u a l l y n o t i f i e d of the increase; fourteen of the f i f t e e n respondents so stipulated. Their only argument is t h a t t h i s notice i s not the same notice required i n order t o attempt t o gain jurisdiction over another. That i s not our view of the i n t e n t of section 67-710, R.C.M. 1947. The i n t e n t of the s t a t u t e i s t o inform tenants of an increase i n r e n t , vihich was done i n t h i s instance. Respondents c i t e Colyear v. Tobriner, 7 Cal.2d 735, 62 P.2d 741, 745. They argue t h a t case involved a s t a t u t e which was the pattern f o r ~ o n t a n a ' s s t a t u t e and the interpretation given the s t a t u t e by the California court should be persuasive i n t h i s Court. fn discussing the type of service required by the s t a t u t e , the California court i n Colyear said: I 1 As t o the matter of notice, it may be said t h a t where a s t a t u t e requires notice and does not specify how i t s h a l l be given, the presumption i s t h a t personal service i s required, * * However, personal service may be made through the instrumentality of the mails. The post o f f i c e department, a s well a s any other type r ~ f messenger, may be used t o e f f e c t personal service. Shearman v. Jorgensen, 106 Cal. 4 8 3 , 39 P. 8 6 3 ; Heinlen v, Heilbron, 94 Cal, 636, 30 P. 8 . I I Here, the ovner u t i l i z e d a d i f f e r e n t type of messenger service than the United States Post Office; the notices were delivered by hand t o the mail boxes. There i s no mandate i n the s t a t u t e , or in the case c i t e d by respondents, which requires service a s con- templated i n the r u l e s of procedure. It does not follow t h a t by placing a stamp on these notices and placing them i n the mail, a s the d i s t r i c t court s t a t e s i n i t s Memorandum, t h a t an otherwise improper service would then meet the s t a t u t o r y requirements. W e hold t h a t t h e n o t i c e required i n section 67-710, R.C.M. 1947, does not mean j u r i s d i c t i o n a l senrice and t h a t p e t i t i o n e r did serve proper notice upon respondents within the s t a t u t o r y time l i m i t , Respondents a l s o contend the owner improperly and unlawfully used the mail boxes. Perhaps the federal government has an i n t e r e s t here, but it does not impress t h i s Cot~rt a s an issue pertinent t o whether notice was given and received. While we do not approve of the method used, the tenants stipulated t h a t they i n f a c t received notice i n writing, such i s s u f f i c i e n t . W e therefore order t h a t the w r i t issue; the judgment of the d i s t r i c t court be annulled; and such f u r t h e r proceedings be had a s i n the premises required, ', C , &J.A/i ,,,-rC*~*,,---", ---"-41,,,,-,-,-,- Associ'ate J u s t i c e