Title: Lewis v. State

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

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No. 26338

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

 

MARITA LEWIS AND HANK OPPENHEIMER, Plaintiffs-Appefiees, z

vs. Be

STATE OF WAWAY'T, Defendant-Appeliant,
2

We

 

ONY

and

O22 hd 91 ay

JOHN DOES 1-5, JOHN DOE CORPORATIONS 1-5, JoKN SHOE
PARTNERSHIPS 1-5, ROE NON-PROFIT CORPORATIONS 1-5,
AND ROE GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES 1-5, Defendants

 

APPEAL FROM THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT
(CIV. NO. 02-1-0257)

st prs NORD

(By: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy JJ.)

inafter, the

 

Defendant-Appellant State of Hawai‘i (hi
State] appeals from the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit's
Decenber 18, 2003 final judgment awarding damages in favor of
Plaintiffs-Appellees Marita Lewis and Hank Oppenheiner
(hereinafter, collectively, Plaintiffs] and against the State in
the total amount of $287,777.64.) The State contends that the
circuit court erred in: (1) denying the State's Hawai'i Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b) (1) motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction based on the “discretionary function”
exception to the State’s waiver of immunity for liability for the

torts of its employees set forth in Hawai'i Revised Statutes

(HRS) § 662-15(1) (1993), of the State Tort Liability Act (STLA),

 

‘The Honorable Joel £, August presided over this bench trial.

aad
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eee

HRS chapter 662 (1993);? (2) finding that the State had a duty to
adequately warn pedestrians of, or protect them from, the
dangerous condition on its land created by the unguarded culvert
into which Lewis fell; (3) finding that Lewis's negligence was
508 and the State’s negligence was S08; (4) finding that the
State's failure to warn of, or protect from, the danger presented
by the unguarded culvert, was a substantial factor and a legal
cause of Plaintiffs’ injuries and damages; (5) sustaining an
objection, on relevancy grounds, to testimony regarding the
impact of requiring the State Department of Transportation (DOT)

and (6)

 

to mitigate the hazards of its entire highway syster
awarding Plaintiffs prejudgment interest.

upon carefully reviewing the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to
the arguments advocated and the issues raised, we hold as
follows

(2) The circuit court's finding that the State was not
immune from suit under the “discretionary function” exception,

HRS § 662-15(1), was not clearly erroneous. See State v

2 ghe STIA provides that “(t]he State hereby waives its inmnity for
Ldabitity fer the torte of its employees and shall be Liable in the sane
Banner ond to the sare extent ae a private individual uncer like
TEndunstances{s]” ARS $ 662-2 (990). Notwithstanding this general waiver of
Emmunity, ‘the STLA contains an exception fo) ae the
Ghereise of perfornance of the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
EGnetion or Buty on ene part of a state officer or employee, whether or not
fhe discretion involved has been abuseg[.)” HRS § 662-15(1). This portion of
Setelon ee2-15(1) 18 generally referred to as the “discretionary function”
exception

 

      

 
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Rimring, $2 Haw. 477, 478, 479 P.2d 205, 206 (1970) ("Whether an
act of a State officer or employee comes within the discretionary
function exception is a question of fact.”); Tavlor-Rice vy.
State, 91 Hawai'i 60, 68, 979 P.2d 1086, 1095 (1999) (stating
that findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous); State v. Okumura, 78 Hawai'i 383, 392, 894 F.2d 80,
89 (1995) ("A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when (1) the
record lacks substantial evidence to support the finding, or (2)
despite substantial evidence in support of the finding, the
appellate court is nonetheless left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.” (Citation omitted.)).
In order for the “discretionary function” exception to
apply, actions of the State employee(s) must involve the
evaluation of broad public policy factors, such as a decision to
purchase certain aircraft, a decision to activate an airbase, a
decision not to build a prison, or a decision not to reconstruct
the Moanalua Stream Bridge. Breed v, Shaner, 57 Haw. 656, 667,
562 P.2d 436, 443 (1977); Julius Rothschild & Co, v, State, 66
Haw. 76, 80-81, 655 P.2d 877, 881 (1982); Tavlor-Rice, 91 Hawai'i
at 78, 979 P.2d at 1104, In this case, the State’s decision to
provide @ fence, which had the result, intended or not, of
Preventing a pedestrian from falling into the culvert on the
makai side of the Kahana Kai Bridge on Honoapi‘ilani Highway in

Kahana, Maui, but pot to provide such a fence on the mauka side
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of the bridge where Lewis fell sixteen and one-half feet into the
unguarded culvert, o£ provide a warning of the danger presented
by the unguarded culvert, did not require evaluation of broad
public policy factors. The record shows substantial evidence to
support the circuit court’s finding that this was an operational
level decision that did not fall within the “discretionary
function” exceptions

(2) The circuit court correctly determined that the
State had duty to adequately warn pedestrians of, or protect
then from, the dangerous condition on its land created by the
unguarded culvert. See Knodle v. Waikiki Gateway Hotel, Inc., 69
Haw. 376, 365, 742 P.2d 377, 383 (1987) ("The existence of a duty
owed by the defendant to the plaintiff . . . is entirely a
question of law.”); Rickard v. City & County of Honolulu, $1 Haw
134, 135, 452 P.2d 445, 446 (1969) (*[Aln occupier of land has a
duty to use reasonable care for the safety of all persons

reasonably an’

 

pated to be upon the premises, regardless of the
legal status of the individual.”).?
The circuit court's finding that it was reasonably

2 although the circuit court relied on the state's duty to maintain ite
highways and shoulders thereot, pursuant to HRS § 264-43 (1993) and Anders vs
State, 60 aw. 361, 382, 590 ?.24 564, 5€7 (1979), we need not consider here
Shether rights-of-way £011 within the = duty to "maintain
Ete nighways and shoulders thereot|,] ‘ay in the present
Case ig state-owned land such that the theory of premises Liability provides 6
Softiclent grouncs for holding that the State had a duty. See Boe vs Hawai
Labor Relations ed. 87 Sawait 191, 197, 993 P.2¢ 568, 575 (1998) (explaining
HROCRIAESGIE Sha) ateiem a Judgment of the lower court on any ground in the
Fecord that supports affirmance”) (citation omitted).

 

   
  

 

 

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foreseeable that 2 pedestrian would walk on the unpaved right-of-
way at night wes not clearly erroneous. See Knodle, 69 Haw. at
385, 742 P.2d at 383 (“Whether there was @ breach of duty or not
.  . is a question for the trier of fact. For under the
prevailing rule duty . . . is bounded by the foreseeable range of
danger, and reasonable foreseeability of harm is the very
prototype of the question a jury mist pass upon in
particularizing the standard of conduct in the case before it.”
(internal citations, brackets, and quotation marks onitted.)).
‘The record contains substantial evidence to support the circuit
court’s finding of foreseeability, and hence, its finding that
the State breached its duty to adequately warn pedestrians of the
dangerous condition on its land created by the unguarded culvert,
Af it elected not to provide a protective fence on the mauka side
of the bridge, such as was provided on the makai sides
(3) The circuit court's finding that Lewis was 508

negligent and the State was 50% negligent was not clearly
erroneous. See HRS § 663-31 (1993) (“[T]he court, in @ nonjury
trial, shall make findings of fact . . . which shall state: . .

(2) The degree of negligence of each party, expressed as @
percentage."). There is substantial evidence in the record to
support the circuit court's findings that both Lewis and the
State were negligent and that the negligence should be

apportioned equally;
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(4) The circuit court’s finding that the State's
failure to warn of, or protect from, the danger presented by the
unguarded culvert, was @ substantial factor and 2 legal cause of
Plaintiffs’ injuries and damages, was not clearly erroneous. See
Mitchell v. Branch, 45 Haw. 128, 132, 363 P.2d 969, 973 (1961)
(noting that, in order to hold the defendant liable for the
plaintiff’s injuries, the defendant’s negligence “need not have
been the whole cause or the only factor [in bringing about the
harm], It was enough that his negligence was a substantial
factor in causing plaintiff’s injuries”); Knodle, 69 Haw. at 385,
742 P.2d at 383 ("The presence of a reasonably close connection
between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury,
ue.l,) ‘whether the breach of duty was more likely than not a
substantial factor in causing the harm complained of{,] is
normally a question for the [trier of fact].’" (Citation and
brackets omitted.)). There is substantial evidence in the record
to support the circuit court's finding that the State’s failure
to warn of, or protect from, the danger presented by the
unguarded culvert, was a substantial factor in causing
Plaintiffs’ injuries and damages;

(5) The edzcuit court did not err in sustaining an
objection, on relevancy grounds, to testimony of a State's
witness regarding the impact of requiring the State DOT to

mitigate the hazards of its entire highway system. See Hawai'i

6
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Rules of Evidence, Rule 401 (defining “relevant evidence” as
“evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence”). The testimony sought to be introduced was not
relevant as it was not of consequence to the determination of the
issues to be decided by the trier of fact in this case, which
were site-specific and did not implicate the “entire highway
systen":

(6) Both parties agreed that the circuit court abused

 

its discretion in granting prejudgnent interest. See HRS § 662-2
(stating that the State “shall not be liable for interest prior
to judgment”). ‘Therefore,

IP IS HEREBY ORDERED that the circuit court's
December 18, 2003 final judgnent is reversed in part to reflect
that the State is not liable for prejudgment interest and is
affirmed in all other respects.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, February 16, 2006.

on the briefs:

Charles F. Fell Y .

Eindy'S.. Inouye,
Deputy Attorneys General, Pisa Roaten.
for. defendant-appeliant Sacer titr weyoren

State of Hawai'i

for plaintiffs-eppellees
Marita Lewis and Hank Wan 4, Doce
Oppenheimer