Title: The Florida Bar v. Robert Joseph Ratiner

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC13-539 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR,  
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
ROBERT JOSEPH RATINER,  
Respondent. 
 
[February 22, 2018] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review a referee’s report recommending that Respondent, 
Robert Joseph Ratiner, be found guilty of professional misconduct in violation of 
the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar (Bar Rules), and that he be suspended from 
the practice of law for a period of three years.1   
Both The Florida Bar (Bar) and Ratiner have sought review of the referee’s 
report.  For the reasons discussed below, we approve the referee’s findings of fact 
and recommendations as to guilt.  We also approve the aggravating and mitigating 
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const. 
 
 
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factors found by the referee.  However, we disapprove the referee’s 
recommendation that Ratiner be suspended for a second three-year period, to run 
consecutive to an earlier suspension of three years.  Based upon Ratiner’s 
cumulative and escalating misconduct, the Court concludes that disbarment is the 
appropriate sanction. 
FACTS 
 
 Ratiner was admitted to practice law in 1990.  In each of the three 
disciplinary cases brought against Ratiner, two prior and the instant case, the 
misconduct arose in the course of his representation of plaintiffs against E.I. 
DuPont De Nemours & Co., Inc. (DuPont).  The first disciplinary case resulted in a 
sixty-day suspension and a public reprimand, to be followed by a two-year period 
of probation, Fla. Bar v. Ratiner, 46 So. 3d 35 (Fla. 2010), while the second case 
resulted in a three-year suspension.  Fla. Bar v. Ratiner, 177 So. 3d 1274, 2015 
WL 5156338, at *1 (Fla. 2015).  Because the referee in this case found that the 
prior cases constituted aggravating factors, and because we conclude that they 
demonstrate the progression of Ratiner’s disparaging misconduct towards other 
members of the legal profession, we discuss the earlier disciplinary cases below in 
the context of our determination that disbarment is warranted in this case. 
 
The Florida Bar filed a complaint on March 22, 2013, alleging that on June 
29 and December 14, 2011, and January 30, 2012, Ratiner violated the Bar Rules 
 
 
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in his representation of the plaintiff in the matter of Sidran v. E.I. DuPont De 
Nemours & Co., Inc., case number 92-18377, in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit 
(Miami-Dade County, Florida).  After the complaint was referred to a referee, we 
stayed the proceedings upon the motion of the referee while the Court considered 
the second disciplinary case brought against Ratiner, case number SC12-393.  
Following the disposition in that case, see Fla. Bar v. Ratiner, 177 So. 3d 1274, 
2015 WL 5156338 (Fla. 2015), we lifted the stay and the referee conducted a final 
hearing pertaining to whether Ratiner had violated the Bar Rules and the issue of 
sanctions.  The referee thereafter submitted his report for the Court’s review, in 
which he made the following pertinent findings and recommendations.2 
“Lie, Lie, Lie” 
 
One of the allegations of misconduct raised by the Bar was that Ratiner, 
during a post-trial hearing in the Sidran matter, was overheard saying “lie, lie, lie” 
in quick succession while opposing counsel conducted the direct examination of 
Ratiner’s law partner.  At the hearing before the referee, the judge presiding in the 
Sidran case, Judge Amy Steele Donner, testified that she had heard Ratiner utter 
the words “lie, lie, lie,” while at the time Ratiner denied that he had said those 
                                          
 
 
2.  The referee did not find that Ratiner engaged in additional misconduct as 
alleged by The Florida Bar.  Because the Bar does not challenge those findings by 
the referee, only the misconduct found by the referee is the basis for the 
recommendations as to guilt and is subject to the Court’s review.   
 
 
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words.  Ratiner testified before the referee that he had been talking to his associate 
in a low voice but that he had no recollection of saying “lie, lie, lie.”  In his report, 
the referee found Judge Donner’s testimony at the final hearing that Ratiner had in 
fact spoken the words “lie, lie, lie” “very credible.”  As a result, the referee found 
Ratiner guilty of violating Bar Rules 4-3.5(c) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct 
intended to disrupt a tribunal) and 4-8.4(a) (a lawyer shall not violate or attempt to 
violate the Rules of Professional Conduct). 
Kicking Counsel’s Table 
 
In its complaint, the Bar also alleged that Ratiner, in the post-hearing 
proceedings in the Sidran case, repeatedly kicked the leg of counsel’s table where 
he was seated.  The lead opposing counsel in the Sidran litigation, Andrew 
Brenner, testified before the referee that Ratiner was kicking counsel’s table “in a 
manner that was disruptive of the proceedings.”  The referee had Mr. Brenner 
demonstrate how Ratiner had been kicking the table, and found it to be “very 
loud.”  Judge Donner testified at the final hearing that she was aware that Ratiner 
had kicked the table, and she called a sidebar after he did it a second time.  As a 
result of the kicking incident, she ended the post-trial hearing.  Based upon the 
testimony of Judge Donner and Mr. Brenner, the referee concluded “that such 
behavior in fact would be disruptive to any judicial proceedings,” and found that 
Ratiner intended to disrupt the proceedings and was therefore guilty of violating 
 
 
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Bar Rules 4-3.5(c) and 4-8.4(d) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct in 
connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice). 
Evidence of Additional Misconduct 
 
Although the referee did not make recommendations on the issue of guilt 
with regard to additional alleged misconduct charged by the Bar, he did summarize 
testimony from various witnesses pertaining to the additional alleged misconduct.  
We conclude that such evidence, as supported in the record, is relevant to our 
determination of attorney discipline.  For that reason, we describe that additional 
evidence as follows. 
 
Judge Donner testified that limits on closing arguments were agreed to by 
the lawyers, and when Ratiner exceeded his time, she gave him a few additional 
minutes but he stated that he would take whatever time he needed.  Judge Donner 
also testified that she saw Ratiner “ ‘wrinkling and throwing’ documents and that 
after 4-5 times of this behavior she reprimanded Respondent.”  On cross-
examination, Judge Donner stated that she saw Ratiner throwing documents on 
counsel’s table, that he denied it, and that she told him that he was calling her a liar 
because she did see him do it.  Judge Donner described Ratiner’s behavior at trial 
as “awful, that he was not respectful to the court or obeyed orders, and that she was 
‘appalled.’ ”  Moreover, Judge Donner testified that Ratiner’s behavior “had been 
 
 
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totally disruptive, that he was a ‘bully’ and that she called the Bar about 
Respondent’s behavior.”  Finally, the referee found that there was clear and 
convincing evidence “that during the entire trial Respondent had been rude, overly 
aggressive, unprofessional and at times appeared to try to intimidate the witness.” 
Recommended Sanction 
In determining the appropriate sanction, the referee found four aggravating 
factors under Florida Standard for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 9.22, including the 
following:  (a) (prior disciplinary offenses); (c) (a pattern of misconduct); (g) 
(refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct); and (i) (substantial 
experience in the practice of law).  The referee found the following mitigating 
factors under Florida Standard for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 9.32:  (b) (absence 
of a dishonest or selfish motive); (g) (character or reputation); and (h) (physical or 
mental disability or impairment).3 
In addition to the above-cited aggravating and mitigating factors, the referee 
considered the following cases prior to recommending discipline:  Fla. Bar v. 
Kelner, 670 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 1996); Fla. Bar v. Wasserman, 675 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 
1996); Fla. Bar v. Morgan, 938 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 2006); Fla. Bar v. Abramson, 3 
                                          
 
 
3.  The last mitigating circumstance derived from Ratiner’s testimony at the 
final hearing that he had the flu on the day of closing arguments in the Sidran 
matter.  
 
 
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So. 3d 964 (Fla. 2009); Fla. Bar v. Norkin, 132 So. 3d 77 (Fla. 2013); Fla. Bar v. 
Ratiner, 46 So. 3d 35 (Fla. 2010); Fla. Bar v. Chosid, 500 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1987); 
Fla. Bar v. Vining, 761 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 2000); Fla. Bar v. Walkden, 950 So. 2d 
407 (Fla. 2007); Fla. Bar v. Rotstein, 835 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 2002); Fla. Bar v. 
Norkin, 183 So. 3d 1018 (Fla. 2015); and Fla. Bar v. Simring, 612 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 
1993).  As discussed in our analysis below, the referee did not discuss any of the 
individual cases cited or why the cases supported his recommended sanction. 
Based on his findings of fact, recommendations as to guilt, the aggravating 
factors and mitigating factors found, and cited case law, the referee recommended 
that Ratiner be suspended for a period of three years, to be served consecutively to 
his current three-year suspension.   
ANALYSIS 
 
Before the Court, the Bar seeks review of the referee’s recommended 
discipline of a consecutive three-year suspension.  Specifically, the Bar argues that 
Ratiner should be disbarred.  Ratiner filed a cross-notice of intent to seek review, 
challenging the referee’s findings of fact, recommendations as to guilt, and the 
recommended sanction, arguing instead that he should receive at most a suspension 
to run concurrent to his previously imposed three-year suspension.   
To the extent Ratiner challenges the referee’s findings of fact for the Bar 
Rule violations, the Court’s review of such matters is limited, and if a referee’s 
 
 
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findings of fact are supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record, the 
Court will not reweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the 
referee.  Fla. Bar v. Frederick, 756 So. 2d 79, 86 (Fla. 2000); see also Fla. Bar v. 
Jordan, 705 So. 2d 1387, 1390 (Fla. 1998).  To the extent Ratiner challenges the 
recommendation as to guilt, the Court has repeatedly stated that the referee’s 
factual findings must be sufficient under the applicable rules to support the 
recommendations as to guilt.  See Fla. Bar v. Shoureas, 913 So. 2d 554, 557–58 
(Fla. 2005).  Moreover, the party challenging the referee’s findings of fact and 
conclusion as to guilt has the burden of demonstrating that there is no evidence in 
the record to support the findings or that the record evidence clearly contradicts the 
conclusions.  Fla. Bar v. Germain, 957 So. 2d 613, 620 (Fla. 2007).  Lastly, 
because “the referee is in a unique position to assess witness credibility, this Court 
will not overturn his judgment absent clear and convincing evidence.”  Id. at 621; 
see Fla. Bar v. Batista, 846 So. 2d 479, 483 (Fla. 2003).   
We conclude that the referee’s factual findings pertaining to guilt are fully 
supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record and that the referee’s 
findings are sufficient to support the recommendations as to guilt.  Accordingly, 
we approve those findings and recommendations in full. 
With regard to Bar Rule 4-3.5(c) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct 
intended to disrupt a tribunal), the referee found that Ratiner violated this rule both 
 
 
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based upon his “lie, lie, lie” comment and his repeatedly kicking counsel’s table.  
According to the referee, “such behavior [kicking the table] in fact would be 
disruptive to any judicial proceedings,” and Ratiner intended to disrupt the 
proceedings.  Bar Rule 4-3.5(c) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in 
conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.”  As discussed above, Judge Donner 
testified that Ratiner did in fact say “lie, lie, lie” and Mr. Brenner testified that 
Ratiner had repeatedly kicked counsel’s table while a witness was testifying in the 
post-trial hearing.  Ratiner ignores this testimony, relying instead upon his own 
testimony at the final hearing denying that he engaged in the alleged conduct.  
That, however, is not the appropriate standard for the Court’s review.  “An 
attorney cannot meet his burden by simply pointing to contradictory evidence 
when there is also competent, substantial evidence in the record to support the 
referee’s findings.”  Fla. Bar v. Glueck, 985 So. 2d 1052, 1056 (Fla. 2008).  Here, 
the referee found Judge Donner and Mr. Brenner to be credible witnesses and 
rejected Ratiner’s testimony in finding him guilty.  
The referee further found that Ratiner’s conduct in saying “lie, lie, lie” 
violated Bar Rule 4-8.4(a) (Misconduct), which provides in pertinent part that “[a] 
lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct.”  
Ratiner challenges the referee’s findings on this issue by disregarding the 
testimony of Judge Donner, who was expressly found to be credible, and offering 
 
 
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his own testimony, which the referee rejected.  In addition to there being 
substantial and competent evidence in the record to support the referee’s findings, 
it is generally sufficient to find a respondent guilty of violating this rule where he 
or she has been found guilty of violating other Bar Rules.  See Fla. Bar v. Letwin, 
70 So. 3d 578, 582 (Fla. 2011) (Bar Rule 4-8.4(a), by its own terms, is necessarily 
violated whenever any other bar rule is violated). 
Bar Rule 4-8.4(d) provides in pertinent part that “[a] lawyer shall not engage 
in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice, including to knowingly, or through callous indifference, 
disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against litigants, jurors, witnesses, court 
personnel, or other lawyers.”  The referee found that Judge Donner and Mr. 
Brenner both testified about Ratiner’s behavior of kicking counsel’s table, that 
both witnesses were very credible, and that Ratiner violated Bar Rule 4-8.4(d) 
based upon the kicking of counsel’s table.  As before, Ratiner argues that he should 
not have been found guilty based on this conduct because he testified that he did 
not recall behaving in that manner.   
 
The referee was in the best position to judge the demeanor of the witnesses 
and their sincerity during the final hearing.  The record supports the referee’s 
factual findings, and Ratiner has failed to demonstrate that there is no evidence in 
the record to support those findings or that the record evidence clearly contradicts 
 
 
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the conclusions.  We therefore approve the referee’s findings of fact and 
recommendations as to guilt. 
We now turn to the referee’s recommended sanction, a three-year suspension 
to run consecutive to Ratiner’s current three-year suspension imposed in Ratiner, 
177 So. 3d 1274.  The Bar urges the Court to disapprove this sanction and disbar 
Ratiner.  In reviewing a referee’s recommended discipline, the Court’s scope of 
review is broader than that afforded to the referee’s findings of fact because, 
ultimately, it is the Court’s responsibility to order the appropriate sanction.  See 
Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989); see also art. V, § 15, Fla. 
Const.  At the same time, the Court will generally not second-guess the referee’s 
recommended discipline, as long as it has a reasonable basis in existing case law 
and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (Standards).  See Fla. 
Bar v. Temmer, 753 So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 1999).  In addition, the Court views 
cumulative misconduct more seriously than an isolated instance of misconduct, and 
cumulative misconduct of a similar nature warrants an even more severe sanction 
than might dissimilar conduct.  Walkden, 950 So. 2d at 410.   
 
In imposing a sanction, the Court considers the following factors:  “a) the 
duty violated; b) the lawyer’s mental state; c) the potential or actual injury caused 
by the lawyer’s misconduct; and d) the existence of aggravating and mitigating 
factors.”  Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 3.0. 
 
 
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To begin, we conclude that the referee’s recommendation of a consecutive 
three-year suspension is contrary to Standard 2.3, which provides in pertinent part:  
“Suspension is the removal of a lawyer from the practice of law for a specified 
minimum period of time. . . .  No suspension shall be ordered for a specific period 
of time in excess of three (3) years.”  Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 2.3 
(emphasis added).  In this case, while the referee specified that the recommended 
suspension was for three years, he also included that it be served consecutive to 
Ratiner’s current three-year suspension, which was effective October 2, 2015.  See 
Fla. Bar v. Ratiner, 177 So. 3d 1274, 2015 WL 5156338 (Fla. 2015).  Thus, the 
effect of the referee’s recommended sanction is that Ratiner would serve a six-year 
suspension, contrary to Standard 2.3.  Further, the referee did not identify which 
Standard(s) he relied upon in recommending imposition of a consecutive 
suspension, other than the findings of aggravating and mitigating factors. 
 
Standard 8.1 provides for disbarment, absent aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances, based upon prior disciplinary orders, as herein stated:  “Disbarment 
is appropriate when a lawyer . . . has been suspended for the same or similar 
misconduct, and intentionally engages in further similar acts of misconduct.”  Fla. 
Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 8.1(b).  Accordingly, without reference to the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances applicable here, the Standards reflect 
that disbarment is the appropriate sanction. 
 
 
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Turning to the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the referee, we 
conclude that there is competent, substantial evidence in the record to support the 
referee’s findings.  Moreover, “[a] referee’s findings in aggravation carry a 
presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or 
without support in the record.”  Fla. Bar v. Ticktin, 14 So. 3d 928, 937 (Fla. 2009).  
With regard to the aggravating factor of prior disciplinary offenses (Standard 
9.22(a)), we previously approved the facts and recommendations of guilt as 
provided in the separate referees’ reports.  Ratiner, 46 So. 3d at 36; Ratiner, 177 
So. 3d 1274, 2015 WL 5156338 at *1. 
Ratiner was disciplined in the first case for misconduct that occurred during 
a May 2007 deposition.  Ratiner, 46 So. 3d at 36.  The following findings of fact 
support the recommendations of guilt in that case: 
During the course of the deposition, [opposing counsel] attempted to 
place an exhibit sticker on the Respondent’s laptop computer. 
 
Just prior to [opposing counsel’s] attempting to place the exhibit 
sticker on the computer, the Respondent was standing up and 
speaking forcefully towards [opposing counsel]. 
 
As soon as [opposing counsel] attempted to place the exhibit sticker 
on the computer, the Respondent very briefly touched [opposing 
counsel’s] hand, then attempted to run around the table towards [him]. 
 
Additionally, the [deponent] expressed that she was very scared as a 
result of the Respondent’s conduct. 
 
 
 
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The Respondent’s own consultant had to attempt to calm the 
Respondent down and specifically told the Respondent to “take a 
Xanax.” 
 
Further, while the Respondent was acting as described above, the 
court reporter stated, “I can't work like this!” 
 
Respondent then proceeded to forcefully lean over the deposition 
table, lambast [opposing counsel] in a tirade while proceeding to tear 
up the evidence sticker, wad it up and flick or toss it in the direction of 
[opposing counsel]. 
 
The Respondent’s conduct during the deposition was outrageous, 
disruptive, and intimidating to the witness, opposing counsel, and 
other persons present during the deposition and otherwise prejudicial 
to the administration of justice. 
 
Id. at 37.  We found that Ratiner violated Bar Rules 3-4.3 (Misconduct and Minor 
Misconduct), 4-3.5 (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct intended to disrupt a 
tribunal), 4-4.4(a) (in representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have 
no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person or 
knowingly use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a 
person), 4-8.4(a) (a lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so 
through the acts of another), and 4-8.4(d) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct in 
connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice).  We determined that the appropriate sanction in this first case was a sixty-
day suspension and a public reprimand, to be followed by a probationary period of 
two years.  Id. at 41.  Also based upon the above-described misconduct, we agreed 
 
 
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that members of the Bar and law students could “view the video recording of the 
laptop incident in the context of a course on professionalism as a glaring example 
of how not to conduct oneself in a legal proceeding.”  Id. at 41 n.4. 
 
In the second disciplinary case, the Bar filed a complaint against Ratiner 
based upon misconduct on October 13-14, 2009, during a document review session 
in a lawsuit styled Frank Fuzzell, et al. v. E.I. DuPont, etc., et al.  Bonnie Daboll 
was the opposing counsel representing DuPont.  The findings of fact in support of 
the recommendations as to guilt included the following: 
On the first day of the document review session, Mr. Ratiner referred 
to Daboll’s co-counsel, Lea Souza-Rasile, also present that day, as a 
“dominatrix” and stated “you must enjoy dominating people.”  In a 
voice loud enough for everyone in the room to hear him, Mr. Ratiner 
made this comment to his expert, Dr. Fred Haupt, who was also 
present at the document review session.  Mr. Ratiner’s comments had 
no substantial purpose other than to embarrass Ms. Souza-Rasile.  Mr. 
Ratiner’s comments, whether knowingly or with callous indifference, 
did disparage, humiliate, and/or discriminate against another lawyer, 
Ms. Souza-Rasile. 
 
On the second day of the document review session, Daboll 
hired a videographer to record the remaining sessions due to Mr. 
Ratiner’s behavior. . . .  Mr. Ratiner vehemently objected to the 
placement of the professional videographer’s camera during this 
document review. 
 
On October 14, 2009, while reviewing a box of documents, Mr. 
Ratiner stated that the documents contained therein were inconsistent 
with the index provided to him beforehand.  Thereafter, Daboll 
removed the hard copy of her index from her notebook, walked over 
to Mr. Ratiner’s table, and showed Mr. Ratiner one page of her index, 
keeping the remaining index consisting of several pages in her left 
hand by her side.  Daboll kept her right hand on the document while 
 
 
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Mr. Ratiner viewed it.  Mr. Ratiner maintained that his index was 
different from the index that Daboll was holding in her hand and he 
demanded a copy of her index, which Daboll refused. 
 
Thereafter, Mr. Ratiner attempted to grab the document from 
underneath Daboll’s right hand, and then immediately reached across 
her body and grabbed the papers which she had in her left hand.  As 
Daboll attempted to hold on to the documents, she stated, “Don't grab 
[sic] ever again.”  Mr. Ratiner continued to attempt to forcibly take 
the papers from Daboll, causing a security guard (who was also 
present to assist in safeguarding the documents) to come across the 
room and intervene. 
 
Final Report of Referee at 3-4, Fla. Bar v. Ratiner, 177 So. 3d 1274 (Fla. 2015) 
(No. SC12-393).  We found that Ratiner violated Bar Rules 3-4.3 (the commission 
by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice); 4-4.4(a) 
(a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to 
embarrass, delay, or burden a third person); 4-8.4(a) (a lawyer shall not violate or 
attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce 
another to do so, or do so through the acts of another); and 4-8.4(d) (a lawyer shall 
not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to 
the administration of justice).  Consequently, on September 2, 2015, we imposed a 
three-year suspension.  Ratiner, 177 So. 3d 1274, 2015 WL 5156338 at *1. 
 
In addition to prior disciplinary history (Standard 9.22(a)), the referee also 
found the other aggravating factors under Standard 9.22, (c) (a pattern of 
misconduct), (g) (refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct), and (i) 
(substantial experience in the practice of law).  In view of Ratiner’s past 
 
 
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misconduct where he acted unprofessionally and disrupted legal proceedings, there 
clearly has emerged a pattern of similar misconduct.  The referee also found that 
Ratiner attempted to shift the blame to others, thus demonstrating that he refused to 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct.  Ratiner argues that this 
aggravating factor does not apply because he has consistently and in good faith 
claimed his innocence, citing Florida Bar v. Karten, 829 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 2002).  
To the contrary, we cannot agree that Ratiner’s claim of innocence is made in good 
faith.  Ratiner has denied the existence of such objectionable, disrespectful conduct 
over the years, even in the face of videotaped evidence and witness testimony.  His 
argument or belief that said conduct constitutes the zealous representation of his 
clients is completely unacceptable.  Finally, Ratiner admitted to the referee that he 
has been licensed to practice law since 1990, and thus has substantial experience in 
the practice of law. 
 
On the issue of mitigation, the referee found the mitigating factors under 
Standard 9.32 (Factors which may be considered in mitigation) as follows:  (b) 
(absence of a dishonest or selfish motive), (g) (character or reputation), and (h) 
(physical or mental disability or impairment).  Ratiner argues that Standards 9.32(i) 
(unreasonable delay in disciplinary proceeding) and 9.32(m) (remoteness of prior 
offense) should also apply.  Ratiner cites the fact that while the acts complained of 
occurred in 2011, the Bar did not file its complaint until March 22, 2013.  In 
 
 
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addition, Ratiner argues that the prior disciplinary actions concerned events 
occurring in 2007 and 2009, while the current case involved events occurring in 
2011.  These mitigators have not been established.  First, the Bar filed its 
complaint within the requisite time limitation.  See Bar Rule 3-7.16(a) (“Inquiries 
raised or complaints presented by or to The Florida Bar under these rules shall be 
commenced within 6 years from the time the matter giving rise to the inquiry or 
complaint is discovered . . . .”).  In addition, the referee sought to stay the 
proceedings, without objection by Ratiner4, in the event that resolution of case 
number SC12-393 could impact the disposition of the instant case.  Further, the 
prior cases are not especially remote in time, the prior offenses having occurred 
only two and four years earlier than the misconduct herein at issue.  See also Fla. 
Bar v. Varner, 992 So. 2d 224, 230 (Fla. 2008) (“A referee’s decision not to find 
that a mitigating or aggravating factor applies also carries a presumption of 
correctness and will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous or without support in 
the record.”). 
In cases where lawyers have previously been disciplined for engaging in 
misconduct of a similar nature, the Court has generally taken an incremental 
                                          
 
 
4.  We further observe that Ratiner himself had sought a stay before the 
referee and an extension of time for filing of the referee’s report, in light of 
continuing litigation in the Sidran case. 
 
 
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approach in imposing discipline, increasing the severity of discipline in each 
instance.  See Norkin, 132 So. 3d at 92.  The cases cited by the referee do not 
support imposition of an additional suspension; rather, two of those cases support 
disbarment.  For example, in Vining, 761 So. 2d at 1048, we held that disbarment 
was the appropriate sanction for an attorney who had been suspended twice 
previously for similar misconduct.  Similarly, in Walkden, 950 So. 2d at 411, we 
held that increasingly heavier sanctions, from a ninety-day suspension, to a ninety-
one-day suspension, to a one-year suspension, next warranted disbarment. 
Disbarment is an extreme form of discipline and is reserved for the most 
egregious misconduct.  See Fla. Bar v. Summers, 728 So. 2d 739, 742 (Fla. 1999); 
see also Fla. Bar v. Kassier, 711 So. 2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1998) (holding that 
disbarment is an extreme sanction that should be imposed only in those rare cases 
where rehabilitation is highly improbable).  Ratiner’s intentional and egregious 
misconduct continues to demonstrate an attitude that is wholly inconsistent with 
professional standards, and there is no indication that he is willing to follow the 
professional ethics of the legal profession.  As we observed in Norkin, 
One can be professional and aggressive without being obnoxious. 
Attorneys should focus on the substance of their cases, treating judges 
and opposing counsel with civility, rather than trying to prevail by 
being insolent toward judges and purposefully offensive toward 
opposing counsel.  This Court has been discussing professionalism 
and civility for years.  We do not tolerate unprofessional and 
discourteous behavior.  We do not take any pleasure in sanctioning 
 
 
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[Respondent], but if we are to have an honored and respected 
profession, we are required to hold ourselves to a higher standard. 
 
132 So. 3d at 92-93.  Thus, based upon the foregoing discussion, the Court is left 
with but one course of action, and that is to disbar Ratiner.     
CONCLUSION 
 
Accordingly, Robert Joseph Ratiner is hereby disbarred.  Because Ratiner is 
currently suspended, this disbarment is effective immediately.  Ratiner shall fully 
comply with Bar Rule 3-5.1(h).  Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East 
Jefferson Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from 
Robert Joseph Ratiner in the amount of $4,889.74, for which sum let execution 
issue. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, and 
LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
LEWIS, J., recused. 
 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS DISBARMENT. 
 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar  
 
Joshua E. Doyle, Executive Director, Tallahassee, Florida, Adria E. Quintela, Staff 
Counsel, Sunrise, Florida, and Tonya L. Avery, Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar, 
Miami, Florida,  
 
for Complainant  
 
Kevin P. Tynan of Richardson & Tynan, P.L.C., Tamarac, Florida,   
 
 
 
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for Respondent