Title: Dolphin v. Wilson

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Beatrice D. DOLPHIN v. Henrietta J. WILSON
and Jimmie L. Wilson

96-631                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered April 7, 1997


1.   Judges -- recusal -- when proper. -- Judges must refrain from
     presiding over cases in which they might be interested and
     must avoid all appearance of bias.

2.   Judges -- review of refusal to recuse. -- The supreme court will not
     reverse a judgment on the basis of a trial judge's decision
     not to disqualify unless the judge has abused her discretion;
     to decide whether there was an abuse of discretion, the court
     reviews the record to determine if any prejudice or bias was
     exhibited.

3.   Judges -- presumption of impartiality -- burden of showing bias on party
     seeking disqualification. -- The question of bias is usually
     confined to the conscience of the judge; judges are presumed
     to be impartial, and the party seeking disqualification has
     the burden of showing otherwise.

4.   Appeal & error -- argument raised for first time on appeal not addressed.
     -- Where appellant did not mention Canon 1 of the Arkansas
     Code of Judicial Conduct at the trial level, the supreme court
     did not address that portion of her argument for the first
     time on appeal.

5.   Judges -- recusal -- appellant did not meet burden of proving bias --
     issue not well developed. -- Where no hearing was held on the issue
     of recusal, and none was requested; where appellant did
     nothing more on the issue than file a motion making certain
     assertions; and where the chancellor denied the motion without
     comment, there was little information in the record; because
     appellant had not met her burden of proving that the
     chancellor was biased, the supreme court was obliged to
     conclude that the chancellor did not abuse her discretion in
     failing to recuse from the case; the court added, however,
     that the recusal issue was not well developed in the case and
     noted that the outcome might be different in another case with
     a better-developed record.

6.   Statute of frauds -- contract for sale of lands -- making and performance
     of oral contract must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. --
     Under Ark. Code Ann.  4-59-101(a)(4)(Repl. 1996), contracts
     for the sale of lands must be in writing to be enforceable; to
     take an oral contract out of the statute of frauds, both the
     making of the oral contract and its performance must be proven
     by clear and convincing evidence.

7.   Statute of frauds -- satisfaction by valuable and substantial improvements
     to land. -- To satisfy the statute of frauds, improvements to
     land must be so valuable and substantial that it would be
     inequitable to refuse specific performance.

8.   Statute of frauds -- only evidence of agreement was appellees' payment for
     land in appellant's name and maintenance of property -- chancellor erred
     in finding clear and convincing evidence of agreement between parties --
     matter reversed and remanded. -- Where the only evidence of an
     agreement was appellees' payment for the land in appellant's
     name and the maintenance rather than the valuable and
     substantial improvement of the property, the supreme court
     concluded that appellees' evidence lacked the clarity and
     cogency that the law demands; where the written evidence that
     appellant offered reflected that she only authorized appellee
     to obtain information relating to the sale of her property,
     that she continued her own efforts to cancel the indebtedness
     on the land, and that she paid taxes on the land in 1994, the
     supreme court concluded that the chancellor clearly erred in
     finding that there was clear and convincing evidence that an
     agreement existed between the parties; the court held that
     appellees' complaint was barred by the statute of frauds and
     reversed and remanded the matter.


     Appeal from Phillips Chancery Court; Kathleen Bell,
Chancellor; reversed and remanded.
     David Solomon, for appellant.
     Wilson Law Firm, P.A., by: E. Dion Wilson, for appellees.

     W.H. "Dub" Arnold, Chief Justice.
     The case concerns an alleged oral contract for the sale of
land.  The appellees, Jimmie L. Wilson and Henrietta J. Wilson,
filed suit for specific performance against appellant Beatrice D.
Dolphin.  The chancellor ruled in favor of the Wilsons, and Mrs.
Dolphin appeals, raising two issues.  The first question presented
is whether the chancellor, a former law partner of Mr. Wilson's,
should have recused from the case.  The second issue is whether the
complaint for specific performance was barred by the statute of
frauds.  Because we disagree with the chancellor's conclusion that
the proof of the alleged agreement was clear and convincing, we
hold that the complaint was barred by the statute of frauds, and
reverse and remand.  
     Mrs. Dolphin and her late husband owned approximately 22 acres
of farm land in Phillips County.  It was heavily encumbered by over
$300,000.00 in liens.  The great majority of the encumbrance was
due to farm loans made by the Farmers Home Administration.  Mrs.
Dolphin left the Phillips County area in 1988 and had very little
to do with the land thereafter.
     On April 5, 1994, the FmHA obtained a judgment in the amount
of about $271,000.00 as the result of an in rem foreclosure action
filed in federal district court.  The land was set to be sold at
public auction when Mr. Wilson, an attorney, saw the auction notice
in the newspaper and contacted Mrs. Dolphin in Ohio the week before
the auction.  At this point, Mrs. Dolphin and the Wilsons offer
conflicting accounts of what happened.  According to Mr. Wilson,
Mrs. Dolphin agreed that, if he could purchase the land in her name
for its appraised value, approximately $13,000.00, and if he could
clear up all outstanding indebtedness, she would deed the land to
him.  However, when it came time to sign the deed, Mrs. Dolphin
refused.  Mrs. Dolphin denies the existence of an agreement.  

                           1. Recusal
     We first consider the question of whether the chancellor
should have recused from the case.  After the Wilsons filed their
complaint for specific performance, Mrs. Dolphin filed a motion
asking Chancellor Kathleen Bell to recuse.  The basis of the motion
was that Mr. Wilson was Judge Bell's law partner from 1981 to 1989. 
The motion also stated that Judge Bell's name remained listed in
the yellow pages of the Helena-West Helena telephone directory as
an attorney in private practice with the same address and phone
number as listed for Mr. Wilson.  
     On appeal, Mrs. Dolphin argues that the chancellor's failure
to recuse violates Canon 1, Canon 2(a), and Canon 3(e) of the
Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct.  Canon 1 is general in nature,
requiring a judge to uphold the integrity and independence of the
judiciary.  Canon 2(a) requires a judge to avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety.  Canon 3(e) requires a judge to
disqualify herself in a proceeding in which her impartiality might
reasonably be questioned, including where the judge has a personal
bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer.  
     Judges must refrain from presiding over cases in which they
might be interested and must avoid all appearance of bias.  Reel v.
State, 318 Ark. 565,