Title: Idaho v. Mullins

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO   
Docket No. 45632 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
  
               Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
JOHN MULLINS, 
  
               Defendant-Appellant. 
                                                                                    
 
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Boise, December 2018 Term 
 
Opinion Filed: December 19, 2018 
 
Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk  
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, State of Idaho, 
Bannock County.  Hon. Robert C. Naftz, District Judge. 
District court denial of motion to suppress, affirmed. 
Eric D. Frederickson, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 
Kimberly A. Coster, Deputy State Appellate Public Defender argued. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise for respondent.  Jeffery D. 
Nye, Deputy Attorney General argued.  
_____________________________ 
 
BURDICK, Chief Justice.  
 
In an appeal arising out of Bannock County, John Mullins challenges the district court’s 
denial of his motion to suppress. Mullins and his wife, Tera, were arrested at the federal 
courthouse in Pocatello after security officers found a vial of methamphetamine in Tera’s 
backpack. The Pocatello police seized the methamphetamine, 65 plastic baggies, and $403 from 
the backpack. Prior to taking Mullins and Tera to jail, the couple’s personal effects, including the 
backpack, were placed into the Mullinses’ pickup that was in the parking lot pursuant to Tera’s 
instruction. A K-9 officer later ran his drug dog around the pickup, and the dog positively alerted 
to the presence of drugs in the pickup. The police obtained a search warrant for the pickup based 
on the dog sniff alert as well as the other evidence seized from the backpack. During the search, 
the police found methamphetamine in the pickup. Mullins moved to suppress the drug evidence 
found in the pickup claiming the warrant lacked probable cause because the police placed the 
backpack, which had previously contained methamphetamine, into the pickup. Thus, Mullins 
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contended, the dog would have alerted to the residual odor in the backpack rendering its sniff 
alert unreliable. The district court denied the motion, stating Mullins had not shown the police 
deliberately or recklessly omitted information from the affidavit to mislead the magistrate judge, 
and, that even without the dog sniff, there was sufficient evidence to issue the warrant. Mullins 
timely appeals, and we affirm.   
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On March 1, 2016, Mullins and his wife Tera arrived at the federal courthouse in 
Pocatello, Idaho. When Mullins entered the courthouse he was carrying a backpack and as he 
approached security he handed it to Tera who placed it into a plastic bin that goes through a 
security scanner. One item in the backpack, later determined to be a stapler, did not clear the 
security scan. The security officer operating the scanner asked Tera for permission to look in the 
backpack and Tera granted him permission. While searching the backpack, the security officer 
found a small, brownish vial containing a white powdery substance inside as well as 65 small, 
plastic baggies. The backpack also contained $403 in cash. The security officer radioed for a 
U.S. Marshall and the U.S. Marshall called the Pocatello police.  
 
Sergeant Diekemper and Detective Edwards responded. Sergeant Diekemper spoke with 
Mullins and Tera and asked them about the vial that was found in the backpack. Tera stated the 
backpack was hers, though both Tera and Mullins confirmed they possessed the backpack 
coming into the courthouse. However, both denied ownership of the vial. The substance in the 
vial tested presumptively positive for methamphetamine. Subsequently, both Mullins and Tera 
were placed under arrest for possession of methamphetamine. The police kept the 
methamphetamine, baggies, and money in their possession, but asked Tera what she wanted to 
do with the backpack and the other personal effects that she could not take to jail. Tera asked that 
the backpack and the other personal effects be put into the Mullinses’ pickup, which was in the 
courthouse parking lot. The police then accompanied Tera to the pickup and put the backpack in 
the pickup at Tera’s direction, and locked the vehicle.   
 
Based on the baggies and cash that were found with the methamphetamine in the 
backpack, Sergeant Diekemper and Detective Edwards thought that there may be evidence of 
drug distribution in the Mullinses’ pickup. Sergeant Diekemper contacted Officer Peterson, who 
had a drug detection dog, and asked him to conduct an exterior sniff of the pickup. Officer 
Peterson’s dog positively alerted during the sniff, indicating there was a possibility of drugs in 
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the pickup. Following the dog sniff, Detective Edwards remained with the pickup while Sergeant 
Diekemper obtained a search warrant for the pickup. Sergeant Diekemper and Detective 
Edwards then searched the pickup and found vials of methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, and 
$1,000 in cash.  
 
Based on the search of the pickup, Mullins was charged with possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to deliver. Mullins moved to suppress1 the evidence found in the pickup, 
challenging the evidence upon which the warrant was based. Mullins contended that the police 
had not described the “personal effects” put into the pickup prior to the dog sniff, so the 
magistrate judge who issued the warrant could not have known the backpack that had previously 
contained methamphetamine was put back into the pickup before the sniff. Mullins also argued 
the dog sniff did not provide probable cause because the police placed the backpack into the 
pickup, knowing it had methamphetamine residue in it, and the dog would alert to it. When 
asked at the suppression hearing if the drug dog could detect residual odors Officer Peterson 
stated, “[h]e can. It’s not even a question. He can.” Based on this, Mullins contended there would 
not have been probable cause for the warrant if either the “personal effects” had been described 
to include the backpack, or if the sniff was excluded from the probable cause determination.  
 
The district court denied Mullins’s motion to suppress stating there was no evidence the 
police had intentionally or recklessly omitted information from the warrant in an attempt to 
mislead the magistrate judge, nor was there any evidence the police placed the backpack in the 
pickup to make sure the dog would alert on it. The court noted it was Tera who asked that the 
backpack be placed in the pickup. The court also concluded that even excluding the information 
Mullins was challenging, there was still sufficient information for the magistrate judge to 
conclude there was probable cause to issue the warrant. Mullins subsequently entered a 
conditional plea of guilty to an amended charge of possession of a controlled substance, retaining 
his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The district court withheld judgment and 
sentenced Mullins to four years of probation. Mullins timely appeals the district court’s denial of 
his motion to suppress. 
II. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Whether the district court erred when it denied Mullins’s motion to suppress. 
                                                 
1 There was some question at the hearing if Mullins was actually moving to suppress, or was in actuality moving to 
dismiss. In deciding the motion, the judge stated there was no “basis for suppressing the evidence” and he had to 
“deny the motion to suppress and/or dismiss.” On appeal, both parties are treating it as a motion to suppress.  
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III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.” State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 
230, 232, 127 P.3d 133, 135 (2005). “When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the 
Court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but 
freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.” State v. 
McNeely, 162 Idaho 413, 414–15, 398 P.3d 146, 147–48 (2017) (quoting State v. Page, 140 
Idaho 841, 843, 103 P.3d 454, 456 (2004)).  
[T]he defendant ha[s] the burden of convincing the trial court that the information 
challenged in the affidavit was false and that the officers supplied the information 
either knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth. Unless 
the trial court committed clear error in reaching its findings as to these issues, we 
will affirm the motion to suppress.  
State v. Peightal, 122 Idaho 5, 7, 830 P.2d 516, 518 (1992).  
IV. 
ANALYSIS  
For a search warrant to be valid, it must be based on probable cause. State v. Nunez, 138 
Idaho 636, 642, 67 P.3d 831, 837 (2003). In Franks v. Delaware, the United States Supreme 
Court held that a defendant can void a search warrant and suppress the fruits of the search when 
the affidavit used to procure the warrant (1) contains a knowingly and intentional or recklessly 
false statement, (2) that is material to the probable cause determination. 438 U.S. 154, 155–56 
(1978). This Court has applied Franks and said, 
[t]he Court in Franks held that if the defendant in an evidentiary hearing 
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the false statement was 
included in the warrant affidavit by the affiant knowingly and intentionally, or 
with reckless disregard for the truth, and with false information discarded, the 
remaining content of the affidavit is insufficient to establish probable cause, then 
“the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the 
same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit.”  
State v. Lindner, 100 Idaho 37, 41, 592 P.2d 852, 856 (1979) (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 156). 
However, this Court “has made clear that a warrant is valid even if probable cause is based on 
false evidence so long as the evidence is not presented intentionally or with reckless disregard 
for the truth.” State v. Fisher, 140 Idaho 365, 370, 93 P.3d 696, 701 (2004). 
 
In State v. Guzman, this Court extended the rule in Franks to also apply to deliberate or 
reckless omissions of information in affidavits. 122 Idaho 981, 983–84, 842 P.2d 660, 662–63 
(1992). We stated, “[w]e can conceive of no cogent reason why Franks should not be extended 
to challenges to affidavits based on deliberate or reckless omissions of facts which might cause a 
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seemingly straightforward affidavit to mislead the magistrate.” Id. at 983, 842 P.2d at 662 
(quoting State v. Beaty, 118 Idaho 20, 24, 794 P.2d 290, 294 (Ct. App. 1990)). “The failure to 
inform a magistrate of a known exculpatory fact may be misleading, if not more misleading, than 
the furnishing of false information in applying for a search warrant.” Id. at 983–84, 842 P.2d at 
662–63 (quoting Beaty, 118 Idaho at 24, 794 P.2d at 294). 
 
The first requirement in Franks considers whether the defendant has proved the affidavit 
underlying the warrant contains a deliberate or recklessly false statement or omission. Franks, 
438 U.S. at 156; see also Guzman, 122 Idaho at 983–84, 842 P.2d at 662–63. Mullins argues 
there was a deliberate or reckless omission from the affidavit underlying the warrant because the 
affidavit did not state that the backpack had been placed into the pickup prior to the dog sniff; 
rather, it only stated “personal effects” were placed into the pickup. Mullins argues “the affidavit 
fails to inform the magistrate that the drug dog . . . was, without question, able to detect the 
residual odor” from the backpack. Thus, Mullins contends, the drug dog alert was meaningless 
and misleading. This argument is unavailing. At the evidentiary hearing on the suppression 
motion, the district court asked Mullins’s counsel, “[d]o you believe that the detectives placed 
that backpack back in there and purposely did not disclose that to the magistrate when they 
presented the affidavit of probable cause?” Mullins’s counsel responded, “I can’t say that . . . I 
mean, I don’t know. It could have been just, you know, just—not negligence but just, you know, 
them thinking personal effects and not thinking that they needed to specify.” Thus, Mullins 
conceded that the police stating “personal effects” in the affidavit, rather than listing each item 
including the backpack, did not even amount to negligence.  
 
This Court has stated that a negligent misrepresentation is not sufficient to satisfy the rule 
articulated in Franks. Fisher, 140 Idaho at 370, 93 P.3d at 701. “[N]egligent or innocent 
misrepresentations, even if necessary to establish probable cause, will not invalidate a warrant.” 
Lindner, 100 Idaho at 41, 592 P.2d at 856. Here, Mullins conceded that the police were not even 
negligent, let alone intentional or reckless. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record that 
Sergeant Diekemper, the officer who applied for the search warrant, knew of the drug dog’s 
ability to detect residual odors from the backpack in the Mullinses’ pickup. The district court 
stated: 
I didn’t hear any testimony from either of the detectives with regard to that—that 
they did this on purpose. It was actually T[e]ra who asked that her property be 
placed back into the truck. She was given the opportunity to say, don’t put it back 
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in the truck. . . . There was no testimony that suggested that the officers or the 
detectives did this on purpose to make sure that the drug dog would hit on the 
vehicle so that they could execute the search warrant. 
Thus, the district court found that Mullins “failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that 
the information included and omitted from the affidavit was done intentionally or recklessly in 
order to mislead the magistrate in his determination of probable cause to issue the search 
warrant.”  
 
The district court’s finding is supported by substantial evidence. See Weinstein v. 
Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299, 315, 233 P.3d 1221, 1237 (2010) (“Substantial 
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.”) (citation omitted). Here, the evidence supports the district court’s determination 
that the police did not intentionally, or in reckless disregard of the truth, omit from the affidavit 
that the backpack was in the pickup and that the drug dog could detect residual odor. Put simply, 
Mullins has shown no evidence of a deliberate or reckless inclusion or omission in the affidavit 
on the part of the police that was intended to mislead the magistrate judge. Moreover, there is no 
evidence in the record that Sergeant Diekemper knew of the drug dog’s ability to detect residual 
odors—thus he would not be able to intentionally or recklessly omit something he did not know. 
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Mullins’s motion to suppress.  
 
Mullins has failed to satisfy the first requirement in Franks—that the affidavit contained 
a statement that was deliberately false or in reckless disregard of the truth. Franks, 438 U.S. at 
156. Thus, this Court need not reach the second requirement in Franks that considers whether the 
false statement was material. Lindner, 100 Idaho at 41, 592 P.2d at 856; Franks, 438 U.S. at 156. 
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Mullins’s motion to suppress.   
V. 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the district court’s denial of Mullins’s motion to suppress.  
Justices HORTON, BRODY, BEVAN and STEGNER, CONCUR.