Title: State v. Tongue

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Tongue (98-516 & 99-126); 170 Vt. 409; 753 A.2d 356

[Filed 17-Mar-2000]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter  of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                            Nos. 98-516 & 99-126

State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 3, Franklin Circuit

Edward L. Tongue	                         December Term, 1999

Charon A. True, Acting J. (98-516)

Michael S. Kupersmith, J. (99-126)

Edward G. Adrian, Franklin County Deputy State's Attorney, St. Albans, for 
  Plaintiff-Appellee.

Robert Appel, Defender General, and Anna Saxman, Appellate Attorney, Montpelier, 
  for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       SKOGLUND, J.  In these consolidated cases, defendant Edward Tongue
  appeals from the  civil suspension of his driver's license and from the
  district court's denial of his motion to suppress  and motion to reconsider
  in the related criminal case.  On appeal, defendant argues that (1) the
  court  erred in denying his motion to dismiss the civil suspension
  proceeding; (2) the court in the civil  suspension proceeding erred in
  denying his motion to suppress; and (3) the court in the criminal 
  proceeding erred because it denied defendant's motion to suppress and
  motion to reconsider without  holding a hearing, without making findings of
  fact, and without reaching the merits of the motion.  We affirm in part and
  reverse in part.

 

       The relevant facts are not in dispute.  On August 23, 1998, at
  approximately two o'clock  in  the morning, Trooper John Young was driving
  down Shaw Road on his way to investigate a  domestic dispute.  While en
  route, he observed defendant sitting behind the steering wheel of a car 
  parked off of the traveled portion of Shaw Road.  The car's lights were off
  and its engine was not  running.  After completing the response to the
  domestic dispute, Trooper Young, joined by Trooper  Raymond, returned to
  the area on Shaw Road where Trooper Young had seen defendant's car 
  approximately twenty minutes earlier.  Both troopers approached the car and
  saw that defendant was  apparently asleep.  They detected a strong odor of
  intoxicants coming through the partially opened  car window, knocked on the
  window, awakened defendant, and, based upon their observations,  processed
  defendant for driving while intoxicated (DWI). 

       On August 28, 1998, Trooper Young sent defendant a notice of intent to
  suspend his driver's  license.  See 23 V.S.A. § 1205(c).  On August 30,
  1998, defendant requested a hearing before the  district court on the issue
  of license suspension.  See id. § 1205(f).  On October 5, 1998, the court 
  held a preliminary hearing.  See id. § 1205(g).  On October 19, 1998,
  fifty-seven days after the date  of the alleged offense, the court held a
  final hearing.  See id. § 1205(h).  Defendant moved to dismiss  the final
  hearing because it had not been held within forty-two days of the date of
  the alleged  offense, as required by § 1205(h).  The court denied
  defendant's motion, finding that there was good  cause for the delayed
  hearing because "one assumes that the State has done all that it can to
  bring  the charge within the 21 days and we have scheduled the final
  hearing within 21 days of the  preliminary."  See id. ("[T]he court shall
  schedule a final hearing on the merits to be held within 21  days of the
  date of the preliminary hearing.  In no event may a final hearing occur
  more than 42 days  after the date of the alleged offense without the
  consent of the defendant or for good cause shown.").

 

       Defendant also moved to suppress all of the evidence that flowed from
  the seizure, arguing  that the troopers did not have a reasonable and
  articulable suspicion to justify seizing him.  See State  v. Lamb, 168 Vt.
  194, 196,