Title: Jonathan Cantwell v. City of Boise Wrongful termination

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 34283 
 
  
JONATHAN CANTWELL,                                  
 
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          Plaintiff-Appellant,                         
                                                       
v.                                                     
                                                       
THE CITY OF BOISE, JOHN WALHOF, 
RICHARD DEES and WILLIAM NARY,         
                                                       
          Defendants-Respondents.                 
                                                              
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Boise, June 2008 Term 
 
2008 Opinion No. 96 
 
Filed:  July 17, 2008 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, Ada County.  Hon. Ronald J. Wilper, District Judge. 
 
The decision of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Michael B. Schwarzkopf, Boise, for appellant. 
 
Boise City Attorney’s Office, Boise, for respondent.  Scott B. Muir argued. 
 
_____________________ 
 
J. JONES, Justice 
 
Jonathan Cantwell brought suit against the City of Boise, claiming he was wrongfully 
terminated from his employment in the City’s Public Works Department.  His suit included 
claims against several fellow employees.  The City moved for summary judgment on all claims 
and the district court granted the same.  Cantwell appealed.   
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Jonathan Cantwell commenced employment with the City of Boise as a maintenance 
worker in the Public Works Department around February 1, 1994.  On February 3, 1994, he 
acknowledged (1) receipt of a copy of the Boise City Employee Policy Handbook and (2) an 
understanding that the policies, rules and standards contained therein would be used to govern 
his employment with the City.  On February 13, 2003, Cantwell acknowledged receipt of certain 
1 
policy changes by the City, including revisions to its Harassment Policy, Due Process Procedure, 
and Problem Solving Procedure.  Cantwell claims these documents constituted a binding 
employment contract between himself and the City. 
 
On March 30, 2004, Larry Bryant, Cantwell’s manager, informed Rich Dees, the Public 
Works Operations Manager, that Cantwell had acted inappropriately toward a coworker, Belinda 
Trapasso, the previous day.  According to Bryant, Cantwell “cussed profusely” at Trapasso in 
response to her request that he complete his timesheet.  Bryant then prepared a written reprimand 
and sent it to Dees for review.  Dees apparently noticed the word “violence” in the reprimand 
and contacted Bryant for further explanation.  Dees also contacted some of Cantwell’s coworkers 
to question them about his recent behavior.  Dees was concerned about what he heard and 
therefore contacted the Human Resources Division Manager, John Walhof.  Walhof instructed 
the HR Advisor, Sarah Martin, to assemble a workplace violence assessment team to conduct an 
investigation.  The City placed Cantwell on administrative leave while the assessment team 
conducted an investigation into his workplace behavior.  At this time, Dees spoke with Cantwell, 
reminded him about the counseling services offered by the City’s Employee Assistance Program 
(EAP), and strongly encouraged him to utilize those services.   
Following his placement on leave, Dees and Martin interviewed four of Cantwell’s 
coworkers, his supervisor, and an additional plant employee.  They first interviewed Trapasso, 
who stated that Cantwell blew up when asked repeatedly to complete his timesheet.  Trapasso 
indicated she had never witnessed violent behavior by Cantwell, other than yelling, and noted 
that his behavior had been escalating since his father died in December.  In a written statement, 
another coworker present at the scene, Steve Lawler, described the exchange in more detail.  
Lawler claimed the conversation was a “one-way rant session that lasted several minutes.”  
 
Other coworkers detailed additional incidents.  Ron Birkenbine told interviewers that 
Cantwell “has threatened people both inside and outside the City. . . . His threats are very 
abrasive.  He describes how he will shoot someone and then watch the blood spill out of their 
body.”  Birkenbine also claimed to have heard Cantwell say he was going to blow up City Hall.  
Birkenbine described an incident where he complained to Bryant because Cantwell refused to do 
a job.  According to Birkenbine, Bryant said to let it go, and someone else had to do the job.  
Bryant stated that if Cantwell could control his temper he would be a good employee, but he did 
not know whether that would be possible.   
2 
 
Dees and Martin interviewed Cantwell on April 7.  Cantwell had not yet contacted the 
EAP, but told them he planned to make an appointment later that day.  Regarding the March 29 
incident, Cantwell recalled getting “pretty bent out of shape” about the timesheet situation, but 
he did not recall saying anything threatening.  Cantwell stated, “I’m not going to say I didn’t, but 
I don’t remember saying anything.”  He denied making a comment about blowing up City Hall.  
When asked if he ever stated he was “going to come to work and [annihilate] everyone,” 
Cantwell claimed he “would never say [he was] going to do anything.”  Rather, he would have 
said, “I wish, or it wouldn’t be bad if somebody did, or if this happened I wouldn’t lose any 
sleep.”  He continued, “Obviously this type of behavior, shooting people, doesn’t prove 
anything, and only gets you dead or in prison and I have no intention what-so-ever of going 
there.”  Cantwell did not recall ever seriously telling anyone he would not do a work assignment.  
He further stated that Bryant had never counseled him regarding his behavior.   
Cantwell concluded by stating he was not upset with any particular individuals, but by 
the whole situation, including his personal life.  Cantwell explained that his father had passed 
away six months ago, and that he had to care for his mother every day.  This had been a great 
frustration, but the situation was improving.  Cantwell did feel his coworkers were avoiding him 
in the past few months, and that it was “understandable given his emotional state.”  He was 
surprised when asked if he knew his coworkers were concerned with his potential for violent 
behavior.  Cantwell further stated he had no hard feelings toward his coworkers for reporting this 
and that he understood why people were tired of it.  Finally, when asked what he thought should 
happen, Cantwell said he should go to counseling, and would like the chance to clean up his act.  
He further said if he doesn’t straighten up, he should be sent down the road, but that he would 
like to give it a shot.   
On April 19, 2004, the City terminated Cantwell’s employment based on the results of its 
investigation into his workplace conduct.  Cantwell timely appealed his termination, requesting a 
grievance hearing, which was held before a hearing officer on May 25, 2004.  In his findings of 
fact, the hearing officer noted “no evidence was introduced showing that Cantwell’s job 
performance was unsatisfactory during this time and no disciplinary action was taken against 
Cantwell by the City as a result of his complaints.”  The hearing officer noted that, while some 
coworkers were concerned about Cantwell’s talk of violence, others did not take his statements 
seriously.  He specifically stated that Cantwell’s supervisor did not take them seriously, 
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considering the fact he took no action with regard to them, did not report them to anyone until 
the timesheet incident, and did not consider any of Cantwell’s statements to constitute a direct 
threat to City employees.  Based on these findings, the hearing officer concluded that Cantwell 
violated the City’s general workplace harassment policy in connection with the Trapasso 
incident, but that termination was “unduly harsh.”  Nevertheless, he found the nature of the 
Trapasso incident to justify disciplinary action beyond a written reprimand, and ultimately 
concluded Cantwell should be suspended for 30 days and that he must offer sincere oral and 
written apologies prior to reinstatement.   
As to the threat of violence, the hearing officer determined that Cantwell’s alleged 
statements were more appropriately analyzed under the City’s Workplace Violence Policy.  On 
this front, the hearing officer noted the City failed to follow its own policy in that it failed to 
report or to address any of the alleged danger signals presented by Cantwell’s statements and 
because the City’s workplace violence assessment team was not properly constituted, changed 
over time, and did not include an EAP representative.  Thus, the hearing officer concluded the 
City could not terminate Cantwell as a result of his violation of the Workplace Violence Policy.  
In reaching this conclusion, the hearing officer penned a paragraph, the interpretation of which is 
the crux of both parties’ claims on appeal, and which provided the basis for the City’s imposition 
of additional conditions for Cantwell’s reinstatement.  This paragraph states: 
The Hearing Officer is mindful that by overturning Cantwell’s dismissal, a 
potentially dangerous individual might be returned to the workplace.  However, 
the Hearing Officer must decide the case he is presented with.  Also, it is equally 
plausible that a properly constituted WVAT, one including an EAP team member, 
might devise a different intervention plan for Cantwell or recommend disciplinary 
action short of dismissal.  Also, this Decision does not prohibit the City from 
pursuing disciplinary action against Cantwell for allegedly violating the 
workplace violence policy.  The City has a right to proceed against Cantwell if it 
so chooses, in accordance with this Decision.  If the City follows its workplace 
violence policy, and afterwards decides to discipline Cantwell for any violation of 
it, Cantwell has a right, if he so chooses, to subsequently contest that action 
pursuant to the City’s due process procedures. 
 
 
Following the hearing officer’s decision, the City prepared a letter outlining certain 
requirements Cantwell would have to satisfy in order to return to work following his 30-day 
suspension (hereinafter the 6/17 Memo).  In the 6/17 Memo, the City confirmed that it would 
reinstate Cantwell pursuant to the hearing officer’s decision, and warned Cantwell it would not 
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tolerate further inappropriate behaviors or retaliation of any kind.  The City listed seven 
additional requirements for returning to work.  They included a requirement that Cantwell 
undergo a fitness-for-duty evaluation by a specified doctor at the City’s expense.  This doctor 
would have to recommend that Cantwell was fit to return to the job.  In addition, the City 
required Cantwell to cooperate with any follow-up appointments at his own expense to the extent 
they would not be covered by insurance.  Accordingly, Cantwell had to sign a release to allow 
release of relevant information to City management regarding his compliance with the 
conditions.  Finally, Cantwell would be required to submit a written plan describing how he 
planned to achieve and sustain an acceptable level of performance relative to his behavior at 
work, and prepare a written apology to his coworkers.  Cantwell was required to comply with all 
terms of the 6/17 Memo in order to continue his employment with the City.  The 6/17 Memo 
further provided that “[t]hese requirements are not grievable under the City’s Due Process or 
Problem Solving Procedures.”   
 
Cantwell, along with his union representative, met with the City and agreed to these 
terms.  At this meeting, Cantwell stated he had no problem going for a fitness-for-duty 
examination, and that he looked forward to seeing the results.  Cantwell executed the 6/17 
Memo, indicating he agreed to the conditions.  Cantwell gave the City no indication at the 
meeting that he had any problem with the requirements.  Nevertheless, on June 28 the City 
received a fax from Andrew Hanhardt, Cantwell’s union representative, claiming the City lacked 
authority to enforce the terms of the 6/17 Memo and declaring it “null and void.”  Cantwell 
failed to appear for the scheduled examination.  The June 28 fax also indicated that Cantwell 
intended to initiate the City’s Problem Solving Process in regard to the return-to-work 
requirements.  In response, the City sent a letter reaffirming its position that, pursuant to the 6/17 
Memo, the requirements for Cantwell’s return to work were not grievable.  The City also stated 
its intention was merely to ensure Cantwell was fit to return to the workplace for the benefit of 
the City’s employees, the taxpayers, and Cantwell himself.  It continued, “If you are unable to 
return to work pursuant to the conditions in the [6/17 Memo], the City of Boise will consider 
your action to be job abandonment and insubordination and will take disciplinary action up to 
and including dismissal.” 
 
The City terminated Cantwell’s employment on July 19, 2004.  Prior to this action, a 
number of things happened.  Michael Schwarzkopf, Cantwell’s attorney, sent a letter to the City 
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suggesting it was attempting to circumvent the hearing officer’s decision and retaliating against 
Cantwell.  In response to this letter, the City met with Schwarzkopf and Cantwell a number of 
times in attempt to resolve the issue.  After two unsuccessful meetings, the City determined 
Cantwell was unwilling to comply with the conditions.  Thus, it terminated Cantwell’s 
employment effective July 19, 2004.  The letter terminating his employment also informed 
Cantwell of his right to initiate the Due Process Procedure if he did not agree with its decision.  
 
Cantwell timely appealed his second termination, and requested another grievance 
hearing.  The same hearing officer heard his appeal, and ultimately upheld the City’s 
termination.  The hearing officer considered whether the City met its burden of “good cause” for 
terminating Cantwell pursuant to its Due Process Procedure.  The hearing officer found the 
return-to-work conditions imposed by the City were not punitive, but rather required by the City 
as a good faith attempt to insure Cantwell was psychologically able to return to work.  He also 
noted that the City’s Due Process Procedure expressly provided that it was not intended to 
modify the existing management rights of the City.  Thus, the hearing officer determined the 
City had authority to impose the conditions contained in the 6/17 Memo.  In addition, the hearing 
officer found the requirements the City imposed were reasonable, and that Cantwell did not have 
proper justification to refuse to comply with them.  For these reasons, the hearing officer found 
Cantwell was guilty of insubordination when he refused to comply with the conditions and that 
the City had good cause to terminate his employment.  
Over a year later, Cantwell filed a civil complaint in district court against the City of 
Boise, and City employees John Walhof, Richard Dees, and William Nary.  In his complaint, 
Cantwell alleged that the City breached the employment contract, including its covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, by imposing additional conditions upon Cantwell’s reinstatement from his 
first termination, by refusing to allow Cantwell to object to these conditions through the Due 
Process Procedure, and by terminating Cantwell a second time for refusing to comply with the 
additional conditions.  Cantwell claimed the City terminated his employment in retaliation for 
using the Due Process and Problem Solving Procedures with regard to the first termination, thus 
violating public policy.  Cantwell alleged violations of procedural and substantive due process, 
claiming the City violated his due process rights when it refused to allow him to object to the 
additional conditions using the Due Process and Problem Solving Procedures, which resulted in 
his second termination.  Cantwell alleged that Walhof, Nary, and Dees tortiously interfered with 
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his employment contract by these same actions, and that they tortiously interfered with his 
prospective economic advantage for future employment.   
The City filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims, which the district court 
granted.  Cantwell appeals “the totality” of the district court’s decision.   
II. 
DISCUSSION 
 
In this case, we consider whether the district court erred when it struck portions of an 
affidavit submitted on Cantwell’s behalf; whether the district court erred when it granted 
summary judgment with regard to Cantwell’s various claims; and whether either party is entitled 
to attorney fees. 
A. 
Standard of Review 
 
When a party appeals a district court’s grant of summary judgment, this Court applies the 
same standard the district court used when it ruled on the motion.  Carnell v. Barker Mgmt., Inc., 
137 Idaho 322, 326, 48 P.3d 651, 655 (2002).  Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.”  Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c).  The Court construes all disputed facts in favor of the 
nonmoving party, and draws all reasonable inferences it can draw from the record in favor of the 
nonmoving party.  Carnell, 137 Idaho at 327, 48 P.3d at 656.  While this Court will draw 
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, the non-moving party cannot rest upon 
mere speculation.  Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 896-97, 155 P.3d 695, 697-98 (2007).  The 
nonmoving party must submit more than just conclusory assertions that an issue of material fact 
exists to withstand summary judgment.  Id.  A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as 
to the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.  Id.  Summary judgment is 
appropriate where the nonmoving party bearing the burden of proof fails to make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the party’s case.1  Carnell, 137 
Idaho at 327, 48 P.3d at 656.   
                                                 
1 Although Cantwell bases his appeal on an assertion that material issues of fact exist that preclude summary 
judgment, we fail to find any such issues of fact.  Rather, the issues raised by Cantwell all appear to be questions of 
law, largely unsupported by citation to the record or to legal authority. 
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B. 
The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion By Striking Portions of the Affidavit 
 
Cantwell argues the trial court erred when it struck paragraph 12 and exhibits 3 and 4 
from the affidavit of Cantwell’s union representative, Andrew Hanhardt.  When reviewing the 
trial court's evidentiary rulings, this Court applies an abuse of discretion standard. An abuse of 
discretion review requires a three-part inquiry: (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the 
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the boundaries of such discretion 
and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the 
court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.  McDaniel v. Inland Northwest Renal Care 
Group-Idaho, LLC, 144 Idaho 219, 221-22, 159 P.3d 856, 858-59 (2007).  The appellant has the 
burden of showing that the district court abused its discretion.  W. Cmty.  Ins. Co. v. Kickers, 
Inc., 137 Idaho 305, 306, 48 P.3d 634, 635 (2002).   
The district court struck paragraph 12 because it was based on conjecture and exhibits 3 
and 4 because they lacked foundation.  In paragraph 12, Hanhardt affies that he learned the City 
intended to rely on a newly revised Due Process Procedure during Cantwell’s second termination 
hearing.  He then affies the City did in fact rely on the new procedure during the second hearing.  
Following this, he describes the changes made to the policies, and attaches the revised policies as 
exhibits 3 and 4 to his affidavit.  On appeal, Cantwell argues, without citing any authority, that 
the stricken testimony and exhibits were admissible based on Hanhardt’s personal knowledge.  
He further asserts that he established proper foundation for admission of the documents because 
Hanhardt testified he was involved in preparing for Cantwell’s second termination hearing.  He 
relies on the opposing party’s affidavits for further foundation.  Cantwell has not met his burden 
of proving the trial court abused its discretion.  Cantwell does not cite even one rule of evidence 
to support his claim that the documents were admissible notwithstanding the district court’s 
decision to the contrary.  Since Cantwell failed to demonstrate how the judge allegedly abused 
his discretion, we decline to find he did so.   
C. 
The City Did Not Breach Any Contractual Agreement Between Itself and Cantwell 
 
Cantwell bases his breach of contract claim upon the City’s imposition of additional 
conditions for his return to work, and its subsequent termination of his employment for refusing 
to comply with these conditions.  Although it is slightly unclear, Cantwell appears to argue that 
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the City breached a number of alleged contractual obligations, including the provisions of the 
Policy Handbook and the Due Process and Problem Solving Procedures.2  Cantwell claims the 
hearing officer’s first decision foreclosed the City from imposing additional conditions (not 
imposed by the hearing officer himself) upon Cantwell’s return to work.  As to the breach of the 
Due Process Procedure, Cantwell claims the imposed conditions were punitive, and therefore not 
within the realm of the City’s contractually-retained management rights.3  The district court 
granted summary judgment against Cantwell on his breach of contract claims, finding that 
“neither the contract nor the decision of the Hearing Officer state that the City would be 
precluded from imposing non-punitive conditions on the Plaintiff’s ability to return to work.”  
We agree.   
While the hearing officer found in his first decision that the City did not follow the 
Workplace Violence Policy, the hearing officer specifically found that, “[T]his Decision does not 
prohibit the City from pursuing disciplinary action against Cantwell for allegedly violating the 
workplace violence policy.  The City has a right to proceed against Cantwell if it so chooses, in 
accordance with this Decision.”  Thus, the hearing officer’s decision required the City to allow 
Cantwell to return to work, but nowhere denied the City the right to impose conditions 
reasonably necessary to ensure Cantwell did not pose a threat to his coworkers or to the City.  In 
addition, the Due Process Procedure expressly states that it does not modify or circumscribe any 
management rights of the City.  As the district court noted, the alleged contractual documents 
contained no restriction on the City’s ability to ensure the psychological fitness of its employees.  
To the contrary, the City expressly retained the right to make employment decisions in order to 
                                                 
2 Cantwell did not include the Policy Handbook in the record.  However, the City attached copies of the applicable 
policies, including the Workplace Violence Policy, the Due Process Procedure, and the Problem Solving Procedure, 
to its affidavit in support of summary judgment.  It is also worth note that Cantwell most likely failed to rebut the 
presumption that his employment was at-will.  He merely argues that this Court has considered an employment 
manual to create a contract of employment in some cases, but does not attach any applicable provisions from the 
manual, either here or below.  However, the City conceded, for the purposes of summary judgment only, that 
Cantwell was not an at-will employee, so we nevertheless address his arguments as if he had properly rebutted the 
at-will presumption. 
3 Cantwell also alleges the City terminated him in violation of public policy.  “In Idaho, the only general exception 
to the employment at-will doctrine is that an employer may be liable for wrongful discharge when the motivation for 
discharge contravenes public policy.”  Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Prods., 139 Idaho 172, 176, 75 P.3d 733, 737 
(2003).  In this case, Cantwell does not allege he was an at-will employee, but alleges the City breached his contract 
of employment.  Since the public policy exception applies only to at-will employees, and Cantwell and the City 
agreed for the sake of the summary judgment motion that Cantwell’s employment was not at-will, Cantwell cannot 
prevail on this claim. 
9 
maintain efficiency and to demote or dismiss employees for proper cause, and the hearing officer 
expressly stated the City could pursue disciplinary action against Cantwell “if it so chooses.” 
The City chose to impose additional conditions to ensure Cantwell posed no threat in the 
workplace.  The City imposed conditions that were not at odds with the hearing officer’s initial 
decision.  These conditions were reasonable in light of the threats Cantwell reportedly made 
prior to the first proceeding.  The conditions were not disciplinary in nature, but reasonable 
measures to ensure a safe workplace.  Indeed, Cantwell’s final termination was not for making 
the remarks, but for failure to comply with these reasonable requests by his employer.4  The City 
did not breach its contract with Cantwell when it imposed reasonable conditions upon his return 
to work, or when it terminated his employment for failure to comply with the conditions.   
D. 
Cantwell Has No Claim for Violation of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
 
Cantwell argues the trial court erred when it held that the City imposed the extra 
conditions in good faith.  According to Cantwell, these conditions and his second termination 
violated, qualified, or significantly impaired his contract rights, as represented by the Due 
Process Procedure, Workplace Violence Policy, and the first decision of the Hearing Officer.  He 
points to a number of actions taken by the City, which he claims call into question the City’s 
good faith and fair dealing, including “the animosity they demonstrated toward the hearing 
officer,” as well as toward the policies and procedures that existed at the time of Cantwell’s first 
termination.  The only non-stricken evidence Cantwell presents in support of this claim is his 
description of a conversation between Nary and Hanhardt in which Nary “loudly and angrily” 
told Hanhardt he was going to make sure a decision like the hearing officer’s first decision never 
happened again.  
Idaho law recognizes a cause of action for breach of an implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing.  Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 242, 108 P.3d 380, 389 (2005).  
Such a covenant is found in all employment agreements, including employment at-will 
                                                 
4 As a side note, Cantwell expressly agreed to these conditions in the June 17 Memorandum.  Cantwell presents no 
reason why this document does not form part of the employment contract.  Nor does he provide any grounds for 
avoiding this agreement, such as duress, fraud, or lack of consideration.  As such, there is no reason to find that 
Cantwell was not bound to comply with the terms of this agreement.  The City expressly stated that refusal to 
comply with the conditions could result in termination, and acted in accordance with this agreement when it 
terminated Cantwell the second time. 
 
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relationships.  Id. at 242-43, 108 P.3d at 389-90.  The covenant requires the parties to perform, in 
good faith, the obligations required by their agreement.  Fox v. Mountain W. Elec., 137 Idaho 
703, 710-11, 52 P.3d 848, 855-56 (2002).  An action by one party that violates, qualifies or 
significantly impairs any benefit or right of the other party under an employment contract, 
whether express or implied, violates the covenant.  Jenkins, 141 Idaho at 243, 108 P.3d at 390.  
In the present case, Cantwell received the benefits and rights granted to him under his contract.  
Since the City did not impair any rights or benefits provided to Cantwell under the contract, 
Cantwell has no claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  The covenant 
does not provide additional rights unavailable under the negotiated contract. 
E. 
The City Did Not Violate Cantwell’s Procedural or Substantive Due Process Rights 
i. 
Procedural Due Process 
 
 
Cantwell claims the City violated his procedural due process rights because it claimed the 
imposition of the return-to-work conditions was not grievable under its Problem Solving 
Procedure.  He also seems to argue the procedures actually employed by the City were not 
adequate because the reasons it provided for his termination were pretextual, relying on this 
Court’s opinion in Lubcke v. Boise City/Ada County Housing Authority, 124 Idaho 450, 460, 860 
P.2d 653, 663 (1993). 
When a state has conferred a property interest in employment, the Due Process Clause 
prevents the deprivation of such an interest without appropriate procedural safeguards, including 
notice and an opportunity to be heard.  Anderson v. Spalding, 137 Idaho 509, 516, 50 P.3d 1004, 
1011 (2002) (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 
1493 (1985)).  Due process requires that, prior to termination, an employee must be given (a) 
oral or written notice of the reason(s) for the termination, (b) an explanation of the employer’s 
evidence, and (c) an opportunity to present his or her side of the story.  Anderson, 137 Idaho at 
516, 50 P.3d at 1011.  There does not need to be a full-blown evidentiary hearing prior to the 
termination, so long as one may be had after the termination.  Id.  In the present case, Cantwell 
had two hearings before a hearing officer.  At each hearing, he had an opportunity to present his 
side of the case, and the hearing officer considered his side of the story.  Prior to these hearings, 
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Cantwell received notice and an opportunity to be heard through his interviews with his 
employers.  Thus, the City afforded Cantwell appropriate procedural safeguards. 
Further, Cantwell cannot rely on Lubcke.  In Anderson, this Court explained that “the 
principle underlying Lubcke is that giving pretextual reasons for termination may deprive a 
person of a meaningful opportunity to be heard.”  137 Idaho at 516, 50 P.3d at 1011.  Cantwell 
does not point to any evidence showing the City’s alleged reasons for termination are any 
different than those reasons the hearing officer considered in his decisions.  To the extent 
Cantwell and the City disagree with regard to the City’s reasons for terminating Cantwell’s 
employment, Cantwell had the opportunity to present his side of the story to the hearing officer.  
As such, his procedural due process rights were satisfied. 
ii. 
Substantive Due Process 
 
 
Cantwell argues the trial court erred when it held there was no evidence from which a 
reasonable jury could find the City denied Cantwell’s substantive due process.  According to 
Cantwell, the City denied him substantive due process when it forced him to choose between his 
privacy rights and compliance with the City’s return-to-work conditions.  “Because [the 
conditions] shock the conscience and demonstrate no attempt at balancing Appellant’s privacy 
rights with the city’s asserted desire to assure itself of Appellant’s self-control, conditioning his 
continued employment on agreement with them is a violation of Appellant’s constitutional right 
to privacy and, thus, a violation of substantive due process.”   
 
The City disagrees, arguing Cantwell’s contention here “simply does not rise to the high 
level of conscience shocking behavior that the legal history of this claim demonstrates is 
required.”  The City further looks to Yin v. State of California, 95 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 1996), to 
argue that “[t]he balancing of interests in this matter supports the trial court’s conclusion that 
requiring Cantwell to undergo a fit for duty examination was neither a violation of his right to 
privacy nor conscience shocking.” 
A substantive due process claim “protects individual liberty against certain governmental 
actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.”  Anderson, 137 
Idaho at 517, 50 P.3d at 1012 (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Texas, 503 U.S. 115, 
125 (1992); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).  Both parties address the 
applicability of Yin, where the Ninth Circuit considered whether the state of California could 
12 
compel an employee with a prolonged and egregious history of absenteeism and a record of on-
the-job illnesses to undergo a fitness-for-duty medical examination.  95 F.3d at 866.  In that case, 
the Ninth Circuit announced it would analyze Fifth Amendment claims in the employment 
context under the same rubric it uses to address Fourth Amendment claims: 
[I]n addition to implicating the Fourth Amendment, forcing employees to submit 
to a medical examination would implicate their rights under the Due Process 
Clause because such an examination would inevitably reveal private medical 
information.  We do not believe, however, that it would make sense to divide 
medical examinations into two categories – those that implicate the Fourth 
Amendment and those that implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or 
Fourteenth Amendment – or to examine such intrusions under two different 
approaches.  Because various types of medical tests and examinations have 
already been classified as implicating the Fourth Amendment, we believe that all 
such tests and examinations should be analyzed under the rubric of that 
Amendment. 
   
Id. at 870-871. 
The Ninth Circuit noted that medical examinations and medical tests not conducted as 
part of a criminal investigation are generally subject to a balancing test, not the warrant/probable 
cause requirement.  Yin, 95 F.3d at 869.  Under the balancing test, the court determines if a 
search is reasonable by weighing the privacy interests of the individual against the government's 
interest in the search.  Id. at 870.  The Yin court noted that an employee has a somewhat 
diminished expectation of privacy in the workplace, and that courts must examine an employee’s 
expectation of privacy in the context of the employment relationship.  Id. at 871.  Given the 
overall context of Cantwell’s employment relationship with the City, the City’s request was not 
highly intrusive, and the City had a significant interest in requiring that Cantwell be 
psychologically fit to return to work.  Cantwell expressly agreed to these conditions, in the 
presence of the City’s representatives and his union representative, but, even if he had not, the 
City still had the right to impose reasonable return-to-work conditions in order to address 
legitimate concerns regarding workplace safety.   
Given the foregoing, we cannot say the City infringed upon Cantwell’s substantive due 
process rights.  Given Cantwell’s history, we cannot say it was unreasonable to require Cantwell 
to undergo evaluation and to disclose certain medical information to ensure his fitness to return 
to work.   
13 
F. 
Cantwell Cannot Establish A Claim for Tortious Interference 
 
Cantwell claims the extra conditions significantly impaired his prospective ability to 
enforce his right to maintain employment with the City because it forced him to forego his right 
to address the extra conditions without putting his job on the line.  He claims the trial court erred 
when it held there was no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find the City terminated 
him by improper means or with improper purpose.  The City argues Cantwell’s assertion that the 
City imposed these conditions for any improper reason is pure speculation, unsupported by the 
record. 
 
To establish a claim for intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage, 
Cantwell must show (1) the existence of a valid economic expectancy, (2) knowledge of the 
expectancy on the part of the interferer, (3) intentional interference inducing termination of the 
expectancy, (4) the interference was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the 
interference itself, and (5) resulting damage to the plaintiff whose expectancy has been disrupted.  
Highland Enter., Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 338, 986 P.2d 996, 1004 (1999).  The trial court 
granted summary judgment on this claim because Cantwell failed to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact concerning whether or not the defendants engaged in a wrongful interference.  The 
district court did not err.  In a recent case, this Court denied a claim for tortious interference with 
contract because the plaintiff failed to establish the alleged interferor was a third party to the 
contractual relationship.  See BECO Constr. Co. v. J-U-B Eng’rs, No. 33378, 2008 WL 1913874, 
at *4-5.  The same result obtains here.5  Cantwell does not allege the defendants here acted 
outside the scope of their duties as Cantwell’s supervisors.  The actions of an agent are the 
actions of the corporation.  Ostrander v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 123 Idaho 650, 
654, 851 P.2d 946, 950 (1993).  An agent is only liable for actions which are outside its scope of 
duty to the corporation.  Id.  Since Cantwell fails to establish that the defendants acted outside 
the scope of their authority, he fails to show any wrongful interference.  Since there is no third 
party to the relationship, Cantwell cannot state a claim for tortious interference.  See Ostrander, 
123 Idaho at 654, 851 P.2d at 950; BECO, 2008 WL 1913874, at *5-6. 
                                                 
5 This Court has previously noted that the torts of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage and 
intentional interference with contract are similar, and that cases and commentary addressing the two torts often 
apply interchangeably for proving the common elements.  See Highlands Enter., 133 Idaho at 338 n.3, 986 P.2d at 
1004 n.3.  
14 
G. 
Neither Party Is Entitled to Attorney Fees 
 
The City contends the Court should award it attorney fees because Cantwell’s brief is 
“noticeably devoid of citations to the record and to legal authority to support the numerous legal 
issues he brings on appeal and he has not made any good faith argument for the extension, 
modification or reversal of existing law.”  I.C. § 12-117(1) provides:  
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative or civil judicial 
proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency, a city, a county or other 
taxing district and a person, the court shall award the prevailing party reasonable 
attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the 
party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in 
fact or law. 
 
To award attorney fees under I.C. § 12-117, the Court must not only find in favor of the party 
requesting fees, but it must also find that he acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.  
Canal/Norcrest/Columbus Action Comm. v. City of Boise, 136 Idaho 666, 671, 39 P.3d 606, 611 
(2001).  In this case, Cantwell raised legitimate issues regarding the tension between 
employment rights and prevention of workplace violence and the required disclosure to an 
employer of personal medical information.  We cannot say the action was without a reasonable 
basis in fact or law, and therefore decline to award attorney fees to the City.6 
III. 
DISPOSITION 
 
We affirm the district court’s summary judgment to the City.  Costs to the City.  No 
attorney fees.  
 
 
Chief Justice EISMANN, and Justices BURDICK, W. JONES and HORTON CONCUR. 
                                                 
6 Cantwell also seeks attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3).  Since Cantwell does not prevail on any of his claims, he 
is not entitled to fees under this provision. 
15