Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE DISCIPLINE OF DETECTIVE CHRISTOPHER C. COOK Case No. 2005-04: CHRISTOPHER C. COOK V. MIKE CARD, THE CITY OF SHERIDAN CHIEF OF POLICE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISCIPLINE OF DETECTIVE CHRISTOPHER C. COOK Case No. 2005-04: CHRISTOPHER C. COOK V. MIKE CARD, THE CITY OF SHERIDAN CHIEF OF POLICE2007 WY 178170 P.3d 122Case Number: S-07-0025Decided: 11/06/2007
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE DISCIPLINE OF DETECTIVE CHRISTOPHER C. COOK Case No. 
2005-04:

 
 
CHRISTOPHER 
C. COOK,

Appellant(Petitioner),v.MIKE 
CARD, THE CITY OF SHERIDAN CHIEF OF 
POLICE,Appellee(Respondent).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofSheridanCounty

The 
Honorable David B. Park, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

H.W. 
Rasmussen and Newton "Rusty" S. Ludwig of 
Rasmussen & Ludwig, Sheridan, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Clint A. 
Langer of Davis & Cannon, Sheridan, Wyoming.       

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
J., delivers the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, C.J., files a dissenting opinion 
in which GOLDEN, J., joins.

 
 

KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]  After the Sheridan Police Department 
Civil Service Commission (the Commission) entered an order dismissing him from 
service with the Sheridan Police Department (the Department), Christopher C. 
Cook filed a notice of appeal in the district court.  Chief of Police, Mike Card, on behalf of 
the Department, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that Mr. Cook 
failed to comply with the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure in that he filed 
a notice of appeal rather than a petition for review.  The district court granted the 
motion.  On appeal to this Court, 
Mr. Cook contends the district court erred in granting the motion and dismissing 
his appeal.  We 
reverse.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]  Mr. Cook presented the following issues 
for this Court's determination:

 
 
1.         
The court abused its discretion as a matter of law by concluding it did 
not have discretion to allow Christopher C. Cook's notice of appeal to be 
amended.

 
 
2.         
The district court erred by considering the motion to dismiss filed by 
Mike Card, the City of Sheridan Chief of Police, because Mr. Card is not and 
cannot be a party.

 
 
3.         
The City of Sheridan is an indispensable party to this 
action.

 
 
The 
Department restates substantially the same issues.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]  Mr. Cook was employed by the Department 
as a detective.  On July 9, 2005, 
while off-duty, he attended a Harley Owners' Group (HOG) rally in Sheridan.  Sheridan Mayor Dave Kinskey was also 
present at the rally.  

 
 
[¶4]  During the rally, Detective Cook called 
the on-duty shift commander, Lieutenant Chris Dahmke, and told him that Mayor 
Kinskey had been drinking alcohol, was probably intoxicated and had just gotten 
into his vehicle and left the rally.  
A short time later, Lieutenant Dahmke stopped Mayor Kinskey's 
vehicle.  Ultimately, it was 
determined that the mayor was not intoxicated and could legally 
drive.

 
 
[¶5]  Chief Card requested an investigation of 
the events that occurred on July 9.  
As a result of the investigation, he recommended Detective Cook's 
termination.  A hearing was held 
before the Commission on February 6 and 7, 2006.  After the hearing, on April 27, 2006, 
the Commission issued an order consenting to Detective Cook's discharge.  

 
 
[¶6]  On May 17, 2006, Mr. Cook filed a notice 
of appeal in the district court.  
The Department filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on June 2, 2006, on 
the grounds that an appeal from the Commission's order was not authorized, the 
correct manner in which to seek review was by filing a petition for review 
pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.06, and no such petition was filed.  On June 5, 2006, nine days after the 
time for filing a petition for review had expired, Mr. Cook filed a motion for 
leave to amend his notice of appeal to which he attached a petition for review 
in compliance with rule 12.06.      

 
 
[¶7]  A hearing was scheduled for September 
11, 2006.  At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the district court orally granted the Department's motion to 
dismiss.  Mr. Cook appealed from the 
written order granting the motion.   

         

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]  When reviewing a district court order 
granting a motion to dismiss we accept as true the facts alleged in the 
complaint and view them more favorably to the party opposing the dismissal.  Veile v. Board of CountyComm'rs of WashakieCounty, 860 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Wyo. 1993).  Dismissal under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) is a 
drastic remedy which should be granted sparingly.  Id.  
However, when a party fails to comply with the rules of appellate 
procedure, the reviewing court may take such action as it deems appropriate, 
including dismissing the appeal.  
W.R.A.P. 1.03. 

 
 
[¶9]  We review a district court's decision to 
dismiss an appeal for failure to comply with the rules under the abuse of 
discretion standard.  McElreath v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 901 P.2d 1103, 1106 
(Wyo. 
1995).  In determining whether there 
has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court 
could reasonably conclude as it did.  
Humphrey v. Humphrey, 2007 WY 
72, ¶ 7, 157 P.3d 451, 453 (Wyo. 2007).  
When reviewing claims that a district court committed an error of law, 
however, we do not apply the abuse of discretion standard because a court does 
not have discretion with respect to such error.  Caldwell v. Cummings, 2001 WY 106, ¶ 11, 33 P.3d 1138, 1142 (Wyo. 2001).   

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
1.         
Propriety of Dismissal

 
 
[¶10] 
 In his first issue, Mr. Cook 
contends that the district court committed an error of law when it concluded it 
did not have the discretion to allow him to amend his notice of appeal.  Mr. Cook emphasizes the following 
portion of the district court's order:

 
 
There is 
no authority to allow an amendment of the Notice of Appeal.  The Court has very limited discretion 
and the only sanction which can be imposed is dismissal. . . .  The Court concludes that it does not 
have the ability to allow an amendment.  
The Court's only option is dismissal.

 
 
[¶11]  Responding to Mr. Cook's argument, the 
Department asserts that the district court properly denied the motion to amend 
and dismissed the appeal.  The 
Department contends the district court was correct in concluding that there is 
no authority under the rules for allowing an amendment to a notice of 
appeal.  It further asserts that the 
appropriate action for Mr. Cook to take after improperly filing a notice of 
appeal was to ask for an extension of time to file a petition for review under 
W.R.A.P. 12.04(b) on the basis of excusable neglect.  Given that he made no effort to invoke 
the relief available under the rules, the Department contends the district court 
properly did not allow Mr. Cook to obtain relief by a different process for 
which there is no authority.  Citing 
several Wyoming cases, the Department asserts that the 
rules were intended to provide a framework of certainty for litigants and the 
courts and the judicial process demands that they be consistently enforced.         

 
 
[¶12]  The Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure 
pertinent to the issue provide: 

 
 
Rule 
1.  General 
rules.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 

1.03.       
Failure 
to comply with rules.

 
 
The 
timely filing of a notice of appeal, which complies with Rule 2.07(a), is 
jurisdictional.  The failure to 
comply with any other rule of appellate procedure . . . does not affect the 
validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate 
court deems appropriate, including but not limited to:  refusal to consider the offending 
party's contentions; assessment of costs; dismissal; and affirmance.  

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
Rule 
12.  Judicial review of 
administrative action.

 
 

12.01.    
Generally.

 
 
            
To the extent judicial review of administrative action by a district 
court is available, any person aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by a 
final decision of an agency in a contested case . . . may obtain such review as 
provided in this rule. All appeals from administrative agencies shall be 
governed by these rules.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
12.03.  Institution of 
proceedings.

 
 

(a)   The 
proceedings for judicial review under Rule 12 shall be instituted by filing a 
petition for review in the district court having venue. . . .  The petition shall conform to the 
requirements set forth in Rule 12.06.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 

12.04.     
Time for 
filing petition; 

 
 

(a)    In a contested case, or in an uncontested 
case, even where a statute allows a different time limit on appeal, the petition 
for review shall be filed within 30 days after service upon all parties of the 
final decision of the agency . . . .

(b)   Upon a 
showing of excusable neglect the district court may extend the time for filing 
the petition for review, said extension not to exceed 30 days from the 
expiration of the original time prescribed in paragraph 
(a).

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 

12.06      
.  Requirements of 
petition.

 
 
. . . . 
The petition for review shall include:

(a)  A concise statement showing jurisdiction 
and venue;

(b)  The specific issues of law addressed to 
the district court for review;

. . . 
.

 
 
 (d) . . . .  A brief statement of the facts relevant 
to the legal issues raised before the agency, showing the nature of the 
controversy in which the legal issues arose; 

(e)  A copy of the agency decision attached 
as an appendix.  

 
 
[¶13]  These rules make clear that appeals from 
administrative agencies, such as Mr. Cook's appeal from the Commission's order, 
are governed by Rule 12.  Rules 
12.03 and 12.04(a) further make clear that judicial review of an administrative 
ruling is instituted by filing a petition for review in the district court and 
that such petition must be filed within 30 days after service of the agency's 
final decision.  Thus, Mr. Cook was 
required to file a petition for review in the district court within 30 days of 
service of the Commission's ruling.  
Upon a showing of excusable neglect, the district court was authorized 
under Rule 12.04(b) to extend the 30 days provided in Rule 12.04(a) for filing a 
petition for review.  Pursuant to 
this provision, upon realizing that he filed the wrong document, Mr. Cook could 
have filed for an extension of time to file his petition for review.  It is clear Mr. Cook did not do 
so.

 
 
[¶14]  In McElreath, 901 P.2d 1103, this Court 
considered the question of whether a district court properly dismissed an appeal 
from a final agency ruling denying a claim for worker's compensation 
benefits.  Mr. McElreath, like Mr. 
Cook, mistakenly filed a notice of appeal rather than a petition for review as 
the rules required.  The Division 
filed a motion to dismiss, claiming the district court lacked jurisdiction 
because a petition for review had not been timely filed.  Mr. McElreath filed an objection to the 
motion to dismiss, asserting the notice of appeal was sufficient to invoke the 
district court's jurisdiction.  He 
also sought leave to amend the notice of appeal by filing a petition for review. 
 The district court dismissed the 
appeal on the ground that the notice of appeal did not comply with W.R.A.P. 
12.06. 

 
 
[¶15]  On appeal from the order of dismissal, 
Mr. McElreath conceded that his notice of appeal did not comply with Rule 12.06 
because it did not state the specific issues for the district court's review or 
contain a brief statement of the facts relevant to the legal issues before the 
agency.  This Court likewise 
concluded that there was "a failure to comply with [a] rule of appellate 
procedure" as provided in W.R.A.P. 1.03.  McElreath, 901 P.2d  at 1106.  Therefore, pursuant to Rule 1.03, the 
district court was authorized to take "such action" as it "deem[ed] appropriate, 
including but not limited to . . . dismissal."  Id. 
Describing Rule 1.03 as a "classic statement of discretionary power," this Court 
concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the 
appeal for lack of compliance with Rule 12.06.  Id.

 
 
[¶16] 
Unlike the district court in McElreath, the district court in Mr. 
Cook's case concluded that it had no authority to allow him to amend his notice 
of appeal, very limited discretion in resolving the issue before it and 
basically no other choice but to dismiss the case.  The district court's conclusions are 
contrary to the second sentence of W.R.A.P. 1.03 which expressly gives appellate 
courts discretion to take "such action as [they deem] appropriate" when a party 
fails to comply with the appellate rules.  
Such action includes, but is not 
limited to, refusal to consider the party's contentions, assessment of 
costs, dismissal, and affirmance.  
In a situation such as the one before the district court in Mr. Cook's 
case, such action might also appropriately include allowing the party to file an 
amended pleading that brings the original pleading into compliance with the 
rules.           

 
 
[¶17]  Rule 15 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure authorizes a party to amend a pleading by leave of court after a 
responsive pleading is filed.  
Although Rule 15 typically has been considered in the context of trial 
court pleadings, the express language of the rule contemplates that leave to 
amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires."  This language, like the language of 
W.R.A.P. 1.03, indicates the intent to vest a considerable amount of discretion 
in the district courts when a motion to amend is filed.      

 
 
[¶18]  In at least two cases, this Court has 
"treated" a notice of appeal as a petition for review.  In the case of In re General Adjudication of Water 
Rights, 803 P.2d 61 (Wyo. 1990), we treated an attempted appeal as 
a petition for a writ of certiorari.  
Similarly, in Kittles v. Rocky 
Mountain Recovery, Inc., 1 P.3d 1220 (Wyo. 2000), we treated a notice of 
appeal as a petition for writ of review.  
We said the appealing party should have filed a petition for writ of 
review, and this Court could have dismissed the appeal.  Instead, however, we exercised our 
discretion and treated the notice of appeal as a petition for writ of 
review.  We see no reason why a 
district court should not have similar discretion to treat a notice of appeal as 
a petition for review.  Given the 
language of W.R.A.P. 1.03, we hold the district court erred as a matter of law 
in concluding that its discretion was limited and the only option was 
dismissal.       

   

2.         
Indispensable and Proper Parties         

 

[¶19]  Mr. Cook also claims the district court 
erred in considering the motion to dismiss filed by Mr. Card on behalf of the 
Department because, he asserts, Mr. Card did not have standing to participate in 
the appeal.  Mr. Cook further claims 
that the City of Sheridan, which was not named as a party, was 
an indispensable party.  Neither of 
these claims was presented to the district court.  We adhere to our long-standing rule that 
we will not consider issues on appeal that were not presented or argued before 
the district court.  Yates v. Yates, 2003 WY 161, ¶ 15, 81 P.3d 184, 190 (Wyo. 2003).  
Exceptions to this rule are rare and Mr. Cook has presented no argument 
warranting an exception in his case.            

 
 
[¶20]  We reverse the district court's order 
dismissing the notice of appeal on the ground that the district court erred as a 
matter of law in concluding its discretion was "very limited" and its only 
option was dismissal.  We remand to 
the district court for it to exercise its discretion under W.R.A.P. 1.03 by 
taking "such action as [it] deems appropriate." 

  

VOIGT, 
Chief 
Justice, dissenting, in which 
GOLDEN, Justice, joins.

 
 
[¶21]   I respectfully dissent.  W.R.A.P. 12.01 and 12.03 clearly require 
the review of administrative agency decisions to be "instituted by filing a 
petition for review."  W.R.A.P. 
12.04(a) requires the petition to be filed within 30 days after service of the 
final agency decision.  If that 
requirement is not met, it can be overcome under W.R.A.P. 12.04(b) by a showing 
of excusable neglect, coupled with a request for a filing extension not to 
exceed an additional 30 days.  None 
of that happened in this case.

 
 
[¶22]   The timely filing of a petition for 
review of administrative action is mandatory and jurisdictional.  Chevron U.S.A. v. Dep't of Revenue, 2007 
WY 62, ¶ 7, 155 P.3d 1041, 1043 (Wyo. 2007); Nyberg v. State Military Dep't, 2003 WY 
43, ¶ 30, 65 P.3d 1241, 1249 (Wyo. 2003); Sheridan Ret. Partners v. City of 
Sheridan, 950 P.2d 554, 557 (Wyo. 1997); Dep't of Revenue & Taxation v. 
Irvine, 589 P.2d 1295, 1301 (Wyo. 1979).  Admittedly, we have softened the blow of 
that pronouncement by declaring that the reviewing court does acquire 
jurisdiction "so long as some document evidencing an intention to seek judicial 
review is timely filed."  McElreath v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 901 P.2d 1103, 1106 
(Wyo. 1995); In re Claim of Taffner, 821 P.2d 103, 107 
(Wyo. 
1991).  All that means, however, is 
that, where an insufficient petition for review has been filed, the reviewing 
court has jurisdiction to apply the rules of appellate procedure in deciding 
what to do with it.1  That is where I would break from the 
majority's analysis.  I would not 
hold that the discretionary language of the second sentence of W.R.A.P. 1.03 
goes so far as to negate the specific requirement of W.R.A.P. 12.04(b) that 
excusable neglect be shown in order to enlarge the time for filing a petition 
for review.  Here, where there was 
no attempt to make such showing, the proper course was that taken by the 
district court; that is, to dismiss the notice of appeal.  It is clear from the Order of Dismissal 
that the district court recognized the discretionary nature of the second 
sentence of W.R.A.P. 1.03, but that it also recognized that "[t]hese proceedings 
are governed by Rule 12 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure."  Its effective conclusion was that Rule 
12 does not provide an alternative to the excusable neglect process of W.R.A.P. 
12.04(b) in the nature of an untimely amendment of a faulty filing.  I agree with that 
conclusion.

 
 
[¶23]   Finally, I would say that McElreath is poor precedent because it 
relied upon Taffner, in which this 
Court mistakenly applied present W.R.A.P. 9.04--the harmless error rule--in 
ruling upon an appellate error.  The 
harmless error rule, as well as the plain error rule found in W.R.A.P. 9.05, are 
applied as part of this Court's review of what took place below, not as part of 
this Court's review of appellate error.  
Beyond that, McElreath, 901 P.2d  at 1106, and Taffner, 821 P.2d  
at 107, are inconsistent in their treatment of prejudice in the review of 
appellate error.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1I do not believe that W.R.C.P. 15 
governing the amendment of pleadings should play any role in this 
process.