Title: Stachowski v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Kenneth Martin Stachowski, Jr. v. State of Maryland, No. 55, September Term, 2007.
DISMISSAL OF WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner, Kenneth Martin Stachowski, Jr., pled guilty to failing to perform a home
improvement contract in two district court cases, and pled guilty to acting as a contractor
without a license in a third district court case.  He was ordered to pay restitution to the
victims as a condition of his probation in each case; in none of them did Stachowski make
the required payments.  Subsequently, he was found in violation of probation in all three
cases and sentenced.  Stachowski appealed the violation of probation cases, Cases 8150,
8151 and 8152, to the Circuit Court.  Petitioner later pled guilty in the three violation of
probation cases, and the court revoked his probation and imposed consecutive sentences.
Stachowski also agreed to plead guilty in an unrelated, separate theft matter, Case 8089, that
originated in the Circuit Court, was sentenced, and was ordered to pay restitution to the
victims in the home improvement contract cases.  Petitioner filed Applications for Leave to
Appeal in the three violation of probation cases and in the unrelated theft case in the Court
of Special Appeals, asking the intermediate appellate court to review the legality of the
probation conditions imposed in the theft case.  Pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-132, the Court
of Special Appeals transferred the Applications for Leave to Appeal in the three violation
of probation cases to the Court of Appeals, which granted certiorari in those three cases.
The Court of Appeals dismissed Stachowski’s writ of certiorari and concluded that
Stachowski was challenging a circuit court order requiring him to pay restitution in a case
which is not before the Court.  The Court noted that any resolution of the issue presented
would have no effect on either Stachowski or the State.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 55
September Term, 2007
                                                                   
KENNETH MARTIN
STACHOWSKI, JR.
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
                                                                   
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Wilner, Alan M. (Retired,
specially assigned)
Cathell, Dale R. (Retired,
specially assigned),
JJ.
                                                                   
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
                                                                   
Filed:   January 9, 2008
1
The Maryland Home Improvement Law is codified at Section 8-101, et. seq.,
of the Business Regulation Article, Maryland Code (1992, 1998 Repl. Vol.).  Section 8-623,
the criminal penalty section, provides:
(a) Application of section. — This section only applies if there
is no greater criminal penalty provided under this title or other
applicable law.
(b) Penalty. — A person who violates this title is guilty of a
misdemeanor and, on conviction, is subject to a fine not
exceeding $1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 6 months or
both.
Md. Code (1992, 1998 Repl. Vol.), § 8-623 of the Business Regulation Article.
Kenneth Martin Stachowski, Jr., Petitioner, asks this Court to review the legality of
an order of the Circuit Court for Somerset County requiring him to pay restitution under the
Maryland Home Improvement Law1 to three individuals who were victims in three separate
criminal cases, as a condition of probation in a fourth, unrelated theft case, which is not
before us.  We conclude that the writ of certiorari should be dismissed.
I.  Introduction
Between October 2003 and February 2004, Petitioner entered into separate written
home improvement contracts with Darlene Wright, Ruth Daniels and Emma Daniels, but
later refused to perform the requested work.  The aggrieved individuals filed complaints
with the Maryland Home Improvement Commission, and as a result, Stachowski was
separately charged three times in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Somerset County,
with failing to perform home improvement contracts in violation of Section 8-605 of the
2
Section 8-605 of the Business Regulation Article, Maryland Code (1992, 1998
Repl. Vol.), states:
A contractor may not:
(1) abandon or fail to perform, without justification, a home
improvement contract; or
(2) deviate materially from plans or specifications without the
consent of the owner.
3
Section 8-601 of the Business Regulation Article, Maryland Code (1992, 1998
Repl. Vol.), provides:
(a) Contractor. — Except as otherwise provided in this title, a
person may not act or offer to act as a contractor in the State
unless the person has a contractor license.
(b) Subcontractor. — Except as otherwise provided in this title,
a person may not act or offer to act as a subcontractor in the
State unless the person has a contractor license or subcontractor
license.
(c) Salesperson. — Except as otherwise provided in this title, a
person may not sell or offer to sell a home improvement in the
State unless the person has a contractor license or salesperson
license.
(d) Penalty. — A person who violates this section is guilty of a
misdemeanor and, on first conviction, is subject to a fine not
exceeding $1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 30 days or
both and, on a second or subsequent conviction, is subject to a
fine not exceeding $5,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 2
years or both.
2
Business Regulation Article, Maryland Code (1992, 1998 Repl. Vol.),2 and with acting as
a contractor without a license in violation of Section 8-601 of the Business Regulation
Article, Maryland Code (1992, 1998 Repl. Vol.).3
In the Darlene Wright case (District Court Case 4G10084), Petitioner pled guilty to
failing to perform a home improvement contract, the State nolle prossed the charge for
3
acting as a contractor without a license, and Petitioner received a six months suspended
sentence, a $1,000.00 suspended fine, three years supervised probation, and was ordered to
pay restitution in the amount of $2,142.85, in $250.00 monthly installments.  In the Ruth
Daniels case (District Court Case 2G10348), Stachowski pled guilty to failing to perform
a home improvement contract, the State nolle prossed the charge for acting as a contractor
without a license, and Stachowski received a six months suspended sentence, a $1,000.00
suspended fine, three years supervised probation, and was ordered to pay restitution of
$8,997.00 in monthly payments of $250.00.  In the Emma Daniels case (District Court Case
3G10349), Petitioner pled guilty to acting as a contractor without a license, the State nolle
prossed the charge for failing to a perform home improvement contract, and Petitioner
received a thirty days suspended sentence, a $1,000.00 suspended fine, three years
supervised probation, and was ordered to pay restitution of $4,140.00 in monthly increments
of $250.00.  
The restitution orders were a condition of Stachowski’s probation in each case; in
none of them did he make the required payments.  Subsequently, Judge R. Patrick Hayman
of the District Court found Petitioner in violation of probation in all three cases and
sentenced Stachowski to six months incarceration in the Darlene Wright case, another six
months in the Ruth Daniels case, and another thirty days in the Emma Daniels case, all
sentences to be served consecutively.  Judge Hayman also separately imposed the $1,000.00
fine, heretofore suspended, in all three cases.  Stachowski timely appealed the disposition
4
of the three violation of probation cases to the Circuit Court.
On October 11, 2006, Petitioner pled guilty in the Circuit Court in the three violation
of probation cases, now numbered Cases 8150 (the Darlene Wright case), 8151 (the Ruth
Daniels case) and 8152 (the Emma Daniels case), which were consolidated for the purposes
of the hearing pursuant to a motion filed by the State.  Stachowski also agreed to plead guilty
in an unrelated, separate matter, Case 8089 that originated in the Circuit Court, in which he
was charged with theft under $500.00 in violation of Section 7-104 of the Criminal Law
Article.
Pursuant to the plea agreement, Stachowski admitted guilt in Case 8089, the
unrelated, separate, theft case, and was sentenced to eighteen months, with all but five
months suspended, and five years probation.  As part of Stachowski’s probation in Case
8089, the Court ordered restitution to be paid to the victims in the home improvement
contract cases.  In the three violation of probation cases, the Circuit Court revoked
Stachowski’s probation and imposed a six months sentence in Case 8150, another six
months sentence in Case 8151, and a thirty day sentence in Case 8152, all to be served
consecutively.  The following colloquy occurred:
[THE STATE]: Your Honor, I believe we’ve worked out a plea
agreement although I had not stated that on the record.  My
understanding of the plea agreement, your Honor, three of these
are an appeal for violation of probation from District Court.  I
think that we’re in agreement and the State would consent to the
fact that Judge Hayman had imposed all of the backup time for
the cases.  And in addition to that he had imposed a thousand
dollar fine per case and ordered that the Defendant serve that
5
off at ten dollars a day.
Your Honor, that portion that we’re in agreement with is that
the thousand dollar fine that he would serve off at ten dollars a
day was an illegal sentence.  My understanding as part of the
plea agreement the Defendant will agree to serve the suspended
portion of the sentence which was six months, six months and
thirty days.  If you need to know for each case it will take me a
minute to find that out.
[THE COURT]: I’ll look at it in a minute.  Go ahead and finish
up and we’ll make sure we have our numbers right.
[THE STATE]: Your Honor, as well the Defendant has agreed
to plead guilty in Case No. K-06-8089 to the only count, single
count of bad check.  Your Honor, the State would recommend
an active portion of five months incarceration which would be
consecutive to the three other sentences as well.  Those would
be six months consecutive, consecutive to six months,
consecutive to thirty days.
[THE COURT]: Sixty days isn’t it?  Did you say thirty or sixty?
[THE STATE]: I believe it’s thirty days, your Honor.  And
that’s consecutive to --
[COUNSEL FOR STACHOWSKI]: And that’s Case No. 8152.
[THE STATE]: Consecutive to five months.  In this case the
suspended portion, your Honor, we would leave up to you, but
we would recommend some sort of a split sentence with an
active period of incarceration.
As well, your Honor, restitution has already been paid in this
case.  His wife provided documentation this morning --
[THE COURT]: So all restitution is paid?
[THE STATE]: In this Case No. 8089 a hundred and eighty-two
dollars and fifty cents has been paid by cash to the victim.
[THE COURT]: Okay.
[THE STATE]: I just need a copy of that for the files.
Your Honor, as well, the State is not opposed to work release
for those active incarcerations as well as local time contingent
on the fact that if he is granted work release that he would pay
restitution to the victims in the violation of probation cases.
Your Honor, he will agree to pay three hundred dollars a month
that would be a hundred dollars per victim.  Your Honor, that’s
not going to be enough to cover all of the restitution but at least
they’ll be able to recover some portion of it.  And then either
6
sue him civilly or you know --
[THE COURT]: Central collection.
[THE STATE]: Central collection or put a lien on his house or
something of that nature.
And, your Honor, I believe that that would be the nature of the
nature of the plea agreement.
[COUNSEL FOR STACHOWSKI]: I would like to add that the
three hundred dollars a month starts at the end of the first full
calendar month he’s out.
[THE STATE]: Your Honor, that would be contingent on work
release.
[COUNSEL FOR STACHOWSKI]: Yeah, if he’s out on work
release.
[THE STATE]: Okay.  I thought you meant out of jail.
[COUNSEL FOR STACHOWSKI]: He’s out on work release.
[THE COURT]: Okay.
* * *
[THE COURT]: All right.  In 8089 the sentence of the Court
is the Defendant shall serve eighteen months in the Somerset
County Detention Center.  The Court is going to suspend all
but five months of that sentence.  Give him credit for forty-
five days time served.  I’m doing it this way for ease of
computation.
He’s placed on supervised probation for a period of five
years.  And I’ll come back to the probation in just a minute.
In case ending 8150 I’m going to revoke his probation and
impose a sentence of six months in the Somerset County
Detention Center consecutive to the sentence imposed in
8089.  The sentence in 8089 is consecutive to the last
sentence to expire of all outstanding and unserved
sentences.
So 8089 the one in which I just imposed eighteen months
suspended all but five is consecutive to the last sentence to
expire of all outstanding and unserved sentences.  
The six month sentence in 8150 is six months, I’ve revoked
his probation, to the sentence imposed in 8089.
In 8151 I’m going to revoke his probation and impose a
sentence of six months in the Somerset County Detention
7
Center consecutive to the sentence imposed in 8150 and the
sentence imposed in 8089.
In 8152 I’m going to revoke his probation and impose a
sentence of thirty days in the Somerset County Detention
Center consecutive to the sentence imposed in 8151, 8150
and 8089.
In all cases I’m going to waive fines, costs and fees given the
amount of restitution that’s due.
In 8150 the amount of restitution due is two thousand one-
forty-two-eighty-five.  The amount of restitution in 8151 --
that’s to Darlene Wright two thousand one-forty-two-
eighty-five.  Ruth Daniels is eight thousand nine hundred
and ninety-seven dollars.  Restitution is ordered in both of
those cases.  Likewise in 8152 restitution in the amount of
four thousand one hundred and fifty dollars is owed to
Emma Daniels.
As a condition of his probation in 8089 he’s to make
restitution to those three victims in the amount of three
hundred dollars per month beginning thirty days from the
last -- 
[COUNSEL FOR STACHOWSKI]: The end of the first full
calendar month.
[THE COURT]: The end of the first calendar month.  He’s
allowed on work release.
Work release will be allowed subject to the resolution of the
detainer in Delaware.
What have I forgotten other than his post trial rights?
[THE STATE]: Are you waiving the supervision fees as well?
[THE COURT]: Yes.  I always do.
(emphasis added).
Petitioner filed Applications for Leave to Appeal in the three violation of probation
cases and in the unrelated theft case in the Court of Special Appeals asking the intermediate
appellate court to review the legality of the probation conditions imposed in the theft case,
Case 8089, in which the judge ordered restitution to the three home improvement victims.
4
Maryland Rule 8-132 states:
If the Court of Appeals or the Court of Special Appeals
determines that an appellant has improperly noted an appeal to
it but may be entitled to appeal to another court exercising
appellate jurisdiction, the Court shall not dismiss the appeal but
shall instead transfer the action to the court apparently having
jurisdiction, upon the payment of costs provided in the order
transferring the action.
5
The Order provided:
ORDER
It appears from the record in the above captioned appeal
was noted to this Court improperly from a judgment of the
Circuit Court for Somerset County made in the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction in reviewing the decision of the District
Court.
It is, therefore, this 14th day of December, 2006, by the
Court of Special Appeals, on its own initiative,
ORDERED, pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-132 and
Courts Article, § 12-302 (a), that the above captioned appeal be
and is hereby transferred to the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
The “above captioned appeal” was “VOP NO. 2052,” “CC # 19-K-06-8150, 51 and 52,” the
three violation of probation cases.
8
Pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-132,4 the Court of Special Appeals transferred the Applications
for Leave to Appeal in the three violation of probation cases, Cases 8150, 8151 and 8152,
to this Court,5 after which Stachowski filed a Supplement to Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
which we granted.  Stachowski v. State, 400 Md. 647, 929 A.2d 890 (2007).  Stachowski
posed the following question:
Did the trial court, after finding Petitioner in violation of
probation in three cases, err in ordering restitution to three
9
victims as a condition of probation in a fourth unrelated case in
which no restitution was due?
In the theft case, Case 8089, the Court of Special Appeals denied Petitioner’s
application for leave to appeal.  Stachowski filed a motion for reconsideration and on June
28, 2007, the intermediate appellate court put a hold on the case, pending our resolution of
the case sub judice.
II.  Discussion
The State has filed a motion to dismiss in which the State contends that Stachowski’s
petition for certiorari in the violation of probation cases before us should be dismissed,
arguing that the issue is not “justiciable” because Petitioner’s argument deals exclusively
with the legality of the Circuit Court’s actions in ordering restitution for the three home
improvement victims as one of the conditions of probation in the unrelated theft case, which
is not before this Court.  Petitioner, conversely, argues that he is challenging the legality of
the restitution orders in the three violation of probation cases even though they were
imposed in the fourth, unrelated, theft case, and further asserts that were the issue lacking
in justiciability, the “question is deserving of an answer because the same situation could
arise in future cases.”
Although the State argues justiciability and Stachowski counters, in part, by arguing
an exception to that policy, the doctrine itself, analytically, has no application in the present
case.  Rather, Stachowski’s writ of certiorari must be dismissed, in accordance with our
jurisprudence, because the legality of the restitution order in the theft case is not before us.
10
In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Webb, 291 Md. 721, 436 A.2d 465 (1981),
we had the opportunity to address the validity of a “consent to sue” clause in an uninsured
motorist endorsement in light of the provisions of the uninsured motorist law.  Two petitions
for certiorari had been filed, seemingly, presenting the same legal issue.  In one, brought by
Anthony Franz, we held that “MAIF, having had notice of the tort action against the
uninsured motorist and ample opportunity to intervene, was bound by the judgment in the
tort suit.”  Id. at 743, 436 A.2d at 478.  In the other, filed by William Jackson Webb, we
declined to rule because the “consent to sue” clause relied upon by the insurer in the
litigation, Nationwide Mutual Insurance, was not applicable to the controversy.  Judge
Eldridge, speaking for this Court, opined:
If this case actually presented the same issues as Franz, what
was said in Part I of this opinion would be dispositive.
However, those issues cannot logically be reached in this case.
The factual basis for Nationwide’s position throughout this
litigation, and the express premise of the first “question” in the
certiorari petition, was that the uninsured motorist endorsement
contained in Mr. Webb’s policy was applicable, and that, under
the terms of that endorsement, Nationwide was not bound by
the outcome of the tort suit because it did not consent and
because it did not receive the suit papers.  However, the
endorsement relied upon by Nationwide has no application to
the controversy in this case.
* * *
Consequently, Nationwide cannot prevail because of the
threshold issue contained in the first question presented in its
certiorari petition.  There are in this case no policy clauses
supporting Nationwide’s position.  The entire foundation for
Nationwide’s contention that it is not bound by the tort judgment
11
are two clauses in endorsement number 576B:  (1) the consent
to sue clause; (2) the requirement that the insured forward to the
insurer the pleadings in the tort action.  Since these clauses have
no application to this accident, Nationwide's contention must be
rejected.
Id. at 747-48, 436 A.2d at 480-81.  
Similarly, in Haub v. Montgomery County, 353 Md. 448, 462, 727 A.2d 369, 376
(1999), we did not address issues presented by the petitioner because we recognized that
“some of the matters which have been argued by the parties are not actually presented by the
facts of the case and need not be reached by us.”  In Holiday Point Marina Partners v. Anne
Arundel County, 349 Md. 190, 201-04, 707 A.2d 829, 834 (1998), we declined to rule upon
an appeal from a declaratory judgment action where, as here, the issue raised by the
petitioner was in another case and not the one before us.
Further, in Insurance Commissioner v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 339 Md.
596, 664 A.2d 862 (1995), we were called upon to address the applicability and
constitutionality of various sections of Article 48A authorizing differentials in certain
insurance rates and underwriting based on gender if actuarially justified.  We declined
because of their inapplicability to the controversy before us:
The Insurance Commissioner’s order in this case was premised
entirely upon the applicability of Art. 48A, §§ 223(b)(2),
226(c)(2) and/or 234A(b), to Equitable’s gender based life
insurance rates.  Moreover, both the Insurance Commissioner's
and the circuit court’s interpretation and application of Art.
49B, § 8, was based upon the presumed applicability of the
more specific §§ 223(b)(2), 226(c)(2) and 234A(b).  We have
concluded that these three sections are inapplicable to the
12
present controversy; thus, the Insurance Commissioner’s order
must be vacated in its entirety.  Moreover, because of the
inapplicability of these sections, both the Insurance
Commissioner and the circuit court erred in ruling on the
constitutionality of the statutes.  Neither an administrative
agency nor a court should pass upon the [issues] which are
inapplicable to the controversy before the agency or the court.
Id. at 634-35, 664 A.2d at 881-82.
In St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. House, 315 Md. 328, 554 A.2d 404
(1989), we were asked to resolve a question of whether an insurer had to prove actual
prejudice resulting from a lack of notice or cooperation on the part of the insured in order
to disclaim coverage under a “claims made” liability policy because the claim was not made
while the policy was in effect.  We declined to address the question, noting that that “issue
is not presented on the facts of this case, however, because that issue arises only if the policy
here involved is construed as the insurer contends.”  Id. at 330, 554 A.2d at 405.  
Finally, in Clea v. Mayor of Baltimore, 312 Md. 662, 541 A.2d 1303 (1988), we
declined to address a respondeat superior issue regarding the liability of the Baltimore City
Police Department and its Commissioner, as state agencies, for the conduct of one of their
officers because the issue was not properly before us in the case.  See also Layton v. Howard
County Bd. of Appeals, 399 Md. 36, 45 n.6, 922 A.2d 576, 581 n.6 (2007)  (“Whether
reapplication prohibitions apply when the law itself is changed is an issue not directly
presented in this case and the resolution must await a case in which the issue is present.”).
13
In all of these cases, we declined to address questions raised in the petitions for
certiorari, because, for a number of reasons, the issues were not presented by the facts of the
cases.  In the present case, we also decline to address the question raised in the petition for
certiorari because Stachowski is challenging a circuit court order requiring him to pay
restitution in a case which is not before us.  Thus, any resolution of the issue presented
would have no effect on either Stachowski or the State; a reversal of the Circuit Court orders
in the home improvement cases, as requested by Stachowski, would have no effect on the
restitution order in the theft case.  As a result, we dismiss the writ of certiorari.
W R I T  
O F  
C E R T I O R A R I
DISMISSED WITH COSTS.