Title: Mobile County, et al. v. Ashley Rich, District Attorney

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL:03/11/2016
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2015-2016
____________________
1130359
____________________
Mobile County et al.
v.
Ashley Rich, District Attorney
____________________
1130404
____________________
Ashley Rich, District Attorney
v.
Mobile County et al.
Appeals from Mobile Circuit Court
(CV-12-901111)
1130359, 1130404
SHAW, Justice.
In case no. 1130359, Mobile County, the Mobile County
Commission ("the Commission"), and the individual members of
the  Commission (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the
County"), 
the 
defendants/counterclaim 
plaintiffs 
below, 
appeal
from the Mobile Circuit Court's judgment ordering the County
to provide certain funding to the District Attorney's Office
for 
the 
Thirteenth 
Judicial 
Circuit 
(hereinafter 
"the 
District
Attorney's Office").  In case no. 1130404, Ashley Rich, who is
the district attorney for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit and
the 
plaintiff/counterclaim 
defendant 
below, 
cross-appeals. 
 
We
affirm in case no. 1130359.  In case no. 1130404, we affirm in
part, reverse in part, and remand.  
Facts and Procedural History
On May 25, 2012, Rich, in her capacity as district
attorney, filed a complaint against the County seeking
declaratory relief and damages.  Rich alleged that, under Act
No. 82-675, Ala. Acts 1982 ("the 82 Act"), as amended by Act
No. 88-423, Ala. Acts 1988 ("the 88 Act") (hereinafter
referred to collectively as "the local acts"), the County was
obligated to provide certain funding to the District
2
1130359, 1130404
Attorney's Office for the 2011-2012 fiscal year and it had
failed to do so.  Specifically, Rich contended that the 88 Act
gave the 
district 
attorney for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit
the authority to appoint 27 assistant district attorneys
("ADAs") and 1 chief assistant district attorney ("CADA").  At
the time Rich filed the complaint, only 22 ADAs were employed
in the District Attorney's Office.  Rich also argued that the
local acts required the County to provide funding for certain
other employees of the District Attorney's Office and that the
funding levels for those employees had increased over time. 
Rich alleged that the County had failed to provide sufficient
funds to pay salaries for the full number of employees for the
District Attorney's Office as required by the local acts.  
Rich contended that the 82 Act required the County to
provide 
funds 
sufficient 
to 
compensate 
eight 
"legal
stenographers" and to purchase certain equipment and supplies
for the investigative unit of the District Attorney's Office. 
Further, Rich contended that the 82 Act authorized the County
to pay for office supplies and equipment for the District
Attorney's Office.  Although the County had appropriated
$1,555,203 for the District Attorney's Office for the 2011-
3
1130359, 1130404
2012 fiscal year, Rich contended that significantly 
more funds
were due to be appropriated under the local acts.  The
complaint was later amended to add similar claims for later
fiscal years.  
All the judges of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit recused
themselves from the action.  Judge George K. Elbrecht of the
Monroe District Court was appointed to preside over the
action.1
The County filed an answer and a counterclaim.  The
County contended, among other things, that it had complied
with the funding requirements of the local acts.  Further, the
County argued that the District Attorney's Office 
had 
received
funding from other sources and, thus, that Rich was required
to remit to the County some of the funds that had previously
been provided the District Attorney's Office pursuant to the
local acts.  
The parties subsequently filed opposing motions for a 
summary judgment.  The trial court held a hearing on the
This 
case 
presents 
numerous 
and 
complicated 
legal 
issues.
1
Several different court reporters shared responsibility in
reporting this case.  Judge Elbrecht's efforts in handling
such a case, away from his home jurisdiction, deserve to be
complimented.  
4
1130359, 1130404
motions on March 26, 2013, and then ordered the parties to
mediation, which was unsuccessful.  
On April 15, 2013, the County filed its second amended
counterclaim arguing, among other things, that the local acts
were unconstitutional. Rich moved to strike the amendment,
which motion was denied.  On June 6, 2013, in what was styled
as its third amended counterclaim, the County moved for leave
to amend its pleadings to allege additional constitutional
claims.   
On August 27, 2013, the County again moved for leave to
amend its answer, this time to allege waiver, stating that
"[p]rior District Attorneys have failed to enforce and follow
the requirements of the 82 and 88 Acts."  The trial court
granted that request.  
On November 18, 2013, the trial court issued an "order on
pending motions."  The trial court denied the motion for leave
to file the third amended counterclaim; thus, the trial court
refused to consider certain constitutional arguments by the
County contained in that pleading.  The trial court went on to
hold that the local acts were not unconstitutional based on
the arguments presented by the County.  Further, it held that
5
1130359, 1130404
Rich was entitled to hire a CADA and a total of 27 ADAs, that
the salary-funding schedule provided in the 88 Act applied and
amended the salary-funding schedule in the 82 Act, and that
the salary-funding schedule would increase when raises are
provided to State or County employees.  However, the trial
court held that the fact that prior district attorneys and the
County had previously not followed the salary-funding
schedules in the local acts amounted to a waiver of any
request for  funding for those previous years; thus, no
additional funding amounts were required to be paid for the
period between 1982 and 2011.  Additionally, the trial court
held that the salary-funding schedules had not been modified
by raises by the County or State occurring before its order,
but would be increased by any future raises.  Further, the
trial court ruled that the County was responsible for
providing all funding under the salary-funding schedule, less
the State's funding liability, which was limited to $15,000
for each position and did not increase.
Further, the trial court held that the 82 Act required
the County to pay for up to eight "legal stenographers." 
Although the District Attorney's Office did not 
have employees
6
1130359, 1130404
with that title, the trial court held that the employees
called "trial coordinators" filled the role contemplated by
the phrase "legal stenographers" in the 82 Act and, thus, that
the County must henceforth provide the funding for those
positions.  Further, the trial court held that the County was
required under the 82 Act to purchase supplies for the
investigative unit (but not to fund the salaries of employees
for that unit) and that it had the discretion, but was not
required, to fund the general-office expenses of the District
Attorney's Office.  Finally, the trial court held that the
County was not required under the local acts to provide funds
for vacant employee positions.2
On November 18, 2013, the trial court entered a "final
order" making certain evidentiary rulings, denying a 
motion 
by
the County to reconsider its decision to disallow the third
amended counterclaim, and further noting that neither party
owed the other any damages. Both sides filed postjudgment
motions, which the trial court denied.  
The trial court required Rich to submit, under Ala. Code
2
1975, § 11-8-3, a budget to the County. However, because the
County and prior district attorneys had a past agreement that
a budget was not necessary, and because no budget package had
been submitted by the County to Rich, Rich was not required to 
submit a budget for the 2014 fiscal year.  
7
1130359, 1130404
Case No. 1130359
I.
On appeal, the County contends that the local acts
violate Ala. Const. 1901, Art. IV, § 96, § 72, and § 68.
A. § 96
As to § 96, the County notes that there exists a
historical trend to eliminate local supplementary funding to
county courts.  It argues that the local acts are barred by §
96, which states: "The legislature shall not enact any law not
applicable to all the counties in the State, regulating costs
and charges of courts, or fees, commissions or allowances of
public officers."  The County explains that the purpose of the
provision is to ensure uniform court costs and charges State-
wide.  See Barnes v. State ex rel. Tate, 26 Ala. App. 450,
451, 162 So. 404, 405 (1935) ("'Section 96 of the Constitution
... was a declaration of public policy of the State of Alabama
that the costs and charges of court should be uniform
throughout the State.'" (quoting circuit judge's order)). It
then argues that although local amendments to 
the 
constitution
can exempt counties from this provision, no such local
amendment exists for Mobile County.  See Jefferson Cty. v.
8
1130359, 1130404
Dockerty, 33 Ala. App. 30, 33, 30 So. 2d 469, 471 (1947)
(noting that the "yoke" of § 96 was "lifted" in Jefferson
County by the Jefferson County Salary Amendment to the
constitution, now Ala. Const. 1901, Local Amendments,
Jefferson County, § 5 (Off. Recomp.)).
The County further contends that Act No. 1205, Ala. Acts
1975, the act implementing the Unified Judicial System
provided in the judicial article to the constitution adopted
by Amendment No. 328 to the Alabama Constitution of 1901 (now
§ 139 et al. (Off. Recomp.)), designates that the salaries of
ADAs are "costs and charges of courts" as contemplated by §
96.  The portion of Act No. 1205 the County cites, codified at
Ala. Code 1975, § 12-19-2, states:
"(a) All counties shall continue, from January
16, 1977, through September 30, 1977, to support
court services within their respective counties at
not less than the same level of expenditures for
such court services during the fiscal year ending
September 30, 1976; provided, that the county level
of expenditure for court services may be decreased
to the extent and for individual items, formerly
paid by the county, assumed by the State on January
16, 1977.
"(b) All authorized appropriations for court
services of any kind, including but not limited to
county solicitors, assistant district attorneys and
other prosecution and defense expenses, in effect on
January 15, 1977, for county courts to be abolished
9
1130359, 1130404
and replaced by district courts and for circuit
courts shall continue to be provided by the counties
from January 16, 1977 through September 30, 1977,
for district and circuit court services."
(Emphasis added.)  
3
The 
language 
in 
§ 
12-19-2 
appears 
to 
describe
appropriations for ADAs in terms of appropriations for "court
services."  However, this is nothing more than a description
of the appropriations arrangement under the structure that
existed before, and that was phased out by, the establishment 
of the Unified Judicial System.  It does not designate 
appropriations for ADAs' salaries as "costs and charges of
courts" as contemplated by § 96.  
4
The County also contends that this act is a general law
3
that supersedes the local acts.
The County also contends that Ala. Code 1975, § 12-10A-
4
6(a), prevents county supplements for district attorneys. 
That Code section provides:
"Any district attorney or constitutional officer
other than a judge whose compensation is affected by
this chapter who receives a local supplement shall
have his or her supplement reduced by any increase
in his or her State compensation until the
supplement is eliminated. No officer appointed or
elected after October 1, 2001, shall receive a
county supplement or expense allowance in addition
to his or her State salary and no salary supplement
or expense allowance may increase after June 10,
1999."
10
1130359, 1130404
Further, Rich notes that prior opinions indicate that §
96 governs only situations involving laws applicable 
to 
county
officers.  See Opinion of the Justices No. 122, 255 Ala. 656,
658, 53 So. 2d 367, 369-70 (1951) ("[S]ection 96 only applies
to such county offices as are common to all counties."); State
ex rel. Shirley v. Lutz, 226 Ala. 497, 501, 147 So. 429, 432
(1933) ("The members of the board here created are State
officers, not county officers. Their fees and allowances
provided in the act are not within section 96 of the
Constitution. This section deals with county officers, and
only such county officers as are common to all the counties of
the State."); and Baumhauer v. State ex rel. Smith, 240 Ala.
10, 13, 198 So. 272, 274 (1940) ("The act was not offensive to
Section 96 of the Constitution. This section was only
applicable to such county officials or officers as are common
Although the County appears to cite this Code section to show
a general trend of ending county supplements to certain
officials, we nevertheless note that the local acts do not
appear to run afoul of this Code section.  The "compensation"
of Rich, as district attorney, is not impacted by the local
acts, and no argument is presented indicating that employees 
of the District Attorney's Office are "constitutional
officers" as contemplated by this Code section or that funding
of their salaries equates to a local or county supplement or
expense allowance "in addition" to their salaries.
11
1130359, 1130404
to all the counties of the State.").  The local acts 
explicitly designate the CADA and the ADAs as State officers. 
Thus, it does not appear that CADAs or ADAs are "public
officers" as described in § 96.  For these reasons, we see no
merit in the argument that the local acts violate § 96.  
B. § 72
The County next argues that the local acts violate § 72. 
That section provides:
"No money shall be paid out of the treasury
except upon appropriations made by law, and on
warrant drawn by the proper officer in pursuance
thereof; and a regular statement and account of
receipts and expenditures of all public moneys shall
be published annually, in such manner as may be by
law directed."
(Emphasis added.) 
 
The County maintains that the salaries of the employees
of the District Attorney's Office are paid by checks drawn on
the State treasury.  It states: "[The salaries] were 'payable'
and paid out of the State treasury. With this direct evidence
of payment of State employees in the [District Attorney's
Office] from the State treasury, it is clear that the Local
Acts compelling solely Mobile County to do the same are
unconstitutional and void."  Specifically, the County argues
12
1130359, 1130404
that to compel it "to pay these State expenses violates
Section 72."  
Section 72 is a "legislative restriction on the power to
make appropriations."  Opinion of the Justices No. 78, 249
Ala. 389, 390, 31 So. 2d 558, 559 (1947).  Here, the local
acts do not, themselves, "appropriate" money from the State
treasury; instead, they require the County to provide funding
to the District Attorney's Office.  Nothing before us
indicates that the County's payments are "paid out of the 
[State] treasury."  There is also no authority cited or
argument presented that funding  provided by a county must
comply with § 72.  Further, there is no argument that the
actual warrants received by the employees of the District
Attorney's Office were not properly issued pursuant to lawful
appropriations. The County thus has not demonstrated a
violation of § 72.
C. § 68
The County argues that the local acts violate § 68.  That
section provides:
"The legislature shall have no power to grant or
to authorize or require any county or municipal
authority to grant, nor shall any county or
municipal authority have power to grant any extra
13
1130359, 1130404
compensation, fee, or allowance to any public
officer, servant, or employee, agent or contractor,
after service shall have been rendered or contract
made, nor to increase or decrease the fees and
compensation of such officers during their terms of
office ...."
The County contends that Rich "sought retroactive pay for
her [ADAs] and [CADA] by mathematically assuming all State and
county merit and cost of living increases be included in her
new 
salary 
schedule 
for 
[ADAs]. 
This 
remedy 
is
unconstitutional under Section 68."  County's brief at 31.
No 
"retroactive 
pay" 
was 
awarded 
in 
this 
case. 
Specifically, the trial court held that previous district
attorneys and the County had, in the past, not followed the
funding requirements of the local acts.  Thus, the trial court 
held that it would not grant "back pay or amounts due" for
salary increases that should have occurred before 2011.    
5
The County acknowledges that the trial court "denied the
retroactive claim," but it states that the trial court's
remedy "is outright unconstitutional under Section 68." 
County's brief at 32.  However, the County does not explain
Although Rich argues that the salary-funding amounts in
5
the local acts are nevertheless deemed to have increased, see
the discussion, infra, under the heading "Case No. 1130404," 
there is no challenge to the trial court's ruling that backpay
or past amounts due from the County would not be awarded.   
14
1130359, 1130404
why this is the case.  
As Rich argues, the local acts do not require "extra"
compensation for ADAs "after service [has] been rendered," 
but
instead require funding for compensation provided at the time
"services" were rendered.  See generally Op. Att'y Gen. No.
1982–00336 (May 11, 1982) ("Section 68 does not prohibit the
payment for services previously rendered where the right to
compensation arose at the time services were rendered."). 
Additionally, it does not appear that the CADA and the ADAs,
who, according to Rich, are at-will employees, are "officers"
with "terms of office" who, under § 68, cannot have an
"increase" in "compensation."  Specifically, in Cobbs v. Home
Insurance Co. of New York, 18 Ala. App. 206, 208, 91 So. 627,
628-29 (1920), the Court of Appeals suggested that § 68 does
not apply to at-will employees, because their "salary or wage
may be changed at any time, either by law or by mutual
contract," and that the  subsequent creation of a pension for
such employees "is not a gratuity, but a part of the
stipulated consideration, for which they contracted and
served."  18 Ala. App. at 208, 91 So. at 629.  Further, in
Opinion of the Justices No. 72, 249 Ala. 88, 91, 30 So. 2d 14,
15
1130359, 1130404
17 (1947), the Justices stated that an "increase in
compensation" to "officers who have a fixed and unexpired
term" would violate § 68, but no such increase in compensation
to "all others whose compensation may be increased" would 
violate § 68.  
Here, the County has not demonstrated that the CADA and
the ADAs are "officers" for purposes of § 68, or that the
requirement to provide funding for any employee positions in
the 
District 
Attorney's 
Office 
 
constitutes 
"extra
compensation ... after service [was] rendered."  Therefore,
the trial court's judgment is due to be affirmed on this
ground.
II.
The County contends that the trial court erred in
disallowing its June 6, 2013, third amended counterclaim,
which attempted to add allegations that the local acts
violated certain constitutional provisions.  
The factual scenario leading to the trial court's
decision is as follows.  At the March 26 hearing on the
motions for a summary judgment, the trial court noted that
there was no challenge to the constitutionality of the local
16
1130359, 1130404
acts and indicated that it was inclined to enter a summary
judgment for Rich on several dispositive issues.  However, it
desired the parties to mediate the issue of the proper salary-
funding schedule required by the 88 Act.  The County suggested
that there was no need for a trial, and the trial court thus
ordered that the hearing on the remaining summary-judgment
issues be heard on April 15, the date originally scheduled for
trial.
At the April 15 hearing, it was reported in open court
that mediation to arrive at the proper 
salary-funding schedule
had failed.  The County also raised several constitutional
issues and filed a motion for leave to file a  second amended
counterclaim delineating those 
claims.  Rich objected 
to 
those
new arguments, maintaining, among other things, that the
County was raising new, purportedly dispositive issues after
the trial court had previously indicated its intentions to
rule in Rich's favor.  The trial court, however, accepted the
second amended counterclaim and ordered briefs.
On May 13, the County filed its brief. Rich argued that
the County raised constitutional issues in that brief that
were not specifically alleged in the second amended
17
1130359, 1130404
counterclaim, including the challenge to the 82 Act on the
basis of Ala. Const. 1901, Art. IV, § 106; Art. XII, § 218;
Art. XVII, § 281; and Amendment No. 397 (now Local Amendments,
Geneva County, § 6 (Off. Recomp.)).  Thereafter, on June 6,
the County filed its request to submit its third amended
counterclaim, which alleged the new constitutional arguments
discussed in the May 13 brief. The request stated: 
"In accordance with Rule 15(b)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,]
the County files this Third Amended Counterclaim to
conform to the evidence presented in the County's
Brief on Constitutional Issues and responded to by
the District Attorney in its Motion to Strike and
Response to the County's brief."
Rich filed a response to the motion, contending that the
latest effort to amend the pleadings was "in response to [her]
uncontested averment that the defendants have failed to plead
several constitutional arguments made in their [May] brief."
Rich challenged the applicability of Rule 15(b), Ala. R. Civ.
P., and whether the County had shown good cause under Rule
15(a), Ala. R. Civ. P.  Further, Rich argued that Rule 15(b)
does not allow parties to "ambush" opposing parties at the
last minute.  The motion for leave to file the third amended
counterclaim was denied in open court at a July 1 hearing.
On appeal, the County's sole argument is that the trial
18
1130359, 1130404
court was required by Rule 15(b) to accept the third amended
counterclaim.
Rule 15(b) states:
"When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried
by express or implied consent of the parties, they
shall be treated in all respects as if they had been
raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to
conform to the evidence and to raise these issues
may be made upon motion of any party at any time,
even after judgment; but failure so to amend does
not affect the result of the trial of these issues.
If evidence is objected to at the trial on the
ground that it is not within the issues made by the
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be
amended and shall do so freely when the presentation
of the merits of the action will be subserved
thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the
court that the admission of such evidence would
prejudice the party in maintaining the party's
action or defense upon the merits. The court may
grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to
meet such evidence. An amendment shall not be
refused under subdivision (a) and (b) of this rule
solely because it adds a claim or defense, changes
a claim or defense, or works a complete change in
parties. The Court is to be liberal in granting
permission to amend when justice so requires."
In deciding whether a trial court should accept an
amendment under Rule 15(b), this Court has stated:
"'Rule 
15(b) 
is 
not 
permissive: 
it 
provides 
that
issues tried by express or implied consent shall be
treated as if raised in the pleadings.'  Hawk v.
Bavarian Motor Works, 342 So. 2d 355, 358 (Ala.
1977) (first emphasis added).  'If a party objects
to the introduction of evidence at the trial on the
19
1130359, 1130404
ground that it is not within the issues framed by
the pleadings, he must show that he would be
actually prejudiced in maintaining his action or
defense on the merits by the  admission of the
evidence.'  Id. (emphasis added).
"'We also note that a determination "as to
whether [an] issue has been tried by express or
implied consent under Rule 15(b) is a matter for the
trial court's sound discretion, which will not be
altered on appeal absent an abuse [of that
discretion]."'  International Rehab. Assocs., Inc.
v. Adams, 613 So. 2d 1207, 1214 (Ala. 1992) (quoting
McCollum v. Reeves, 521 So. 2d 13, 16 (Ala. 1987)). 
'"[W]hether pleadings are deemed to be amended in
order to conform to the evidence presented is also
a matter within the discretion of the trial court,"
and a decision in that regard will not be disturbed
on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.'  Adams,
613 So. 2d at 1214 (quoting McCollum, 521 So. 2d at
16-17)."
Ammons v. Tesker Mfg. Corp., 853 So. 2d 210, 216-17 (Ala.
2002) (final emphasis added).
As Rich notes, the request for leave to file the third
amended counterclaim was not filed after a "trial."   
"Regardless 
of 
whether 
[the 
defendants] 
would 
be
prejudiced 
by 
the 
proposed 
amendment, 
the
plaintiffs' motion is ill-founded because Rule 15(b)
provides for amendments to the complaint in order to
conform to evidence presented during a trial, and
there has been no trial in this case. Rule 15(b)
states, in pertinent part: 'When issues not raised
by the pleadings are tried by express or implied
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all
respects as if they had been raised in the
pleadings.' (Emphasis added.)"
20
1130359, 1130404
Swanstrom v. Teledyne Continental Motors, Inc., 43 So. 3d 564,
582 (Ala. 2009) (first emphasis added).
Although evidentiary materials were filed in the various
hearings on the parties' motions, we see no "trial" on the
evidence as contemplated by Rule 15(b).  Here, the County's
third amended counterclaim, for all that appears, was not in
response to evidence presented at trial, but in response to
Rich's objection that certain constitutional issues argued by
the County in support of the second amended counterclaim were
not specifically alleged in that pleading.  The County cites
no authority for the proposition that amendments to the
pleadings under Rule 15(b) are applicable in the context of
responses 
to 
dueling 
summary-judgment 
motions; 
no 
authority 
is
cited showing that such a scenario equates to a trial on the
evidence.  
6
"Generally, amendments are to be liberally allowed. 
However, the trial court is given discretion in the exercise
of that liberality."  First Alabama Bank of South Baldwin v.
Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, 619 So. 2d 1313, 1317
(Ala. 1993).  Although by no means an automatic rule, this
The County denies that it is seeking relief under Rule
6
15(a).
21
1130359, 1130404
Court has upheld the exercise of discretion by trial courts in
disallowing, in certain contexts, amendments filed shortly
before or after motions for summary judgment are filed or
heard.  See Brackin v. Trimmier Law Firm, 897 So. 2d 207, 228
(Ala. 2004) (holding that the trial court did not exceed its
discretion in disallowing an amended complaint that, among
other things, was filed "after the defendants had already
submitted their motions seeking a summary judgment and briefs
in support of those motions"); Hays Corp. v. Bunge Corp., 777
So. 2d 62 (Ala. 2000) (holding that the trial court did not
exceed its discretion in disallowing an amendment to a
complaint filed six days before a hearing on a motion for
summary judgment), overruled on other grounds, Jim Walter
Homes, Inc. v. Saxton, 880 So. 2d 428 (Ala. 2003); Government
Street Lumber Co. v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 553 So. 2d 68 (Ala.
1989) (holding that the trial court did not exceed its
discretion 
in 
striking 
an 
amended 
complaint 
filed
contemporaneously with a response to the opposing party's
motion for summary judgment); and Puckett, Taul & Underwood,
Inc. v. Schreiber Corp., 551 So. 2d 979, 984 (Ala. 1989)
(holding that the trial court properly struck an amendment to
22
1130359, 1130404
a complaint that was filed within two weeks of the setting for
hearing of the motion for summary judgment).  Cf. Deputy
Sheriffs Law Enforcement Ass'n of Mobile Cty. v. Mobile Cty.,
590 So. 2d 239, 243 (Ala. 1991) (holding that the trial court
did not exceed its discretion in disallowing an amendment
filed after summary judgment had been entered).  Rule 15(b)
does not, on its face, appear applicable in this case, and we
do not believe that the County has demonstrated that the trial
court exceeded its discretion or otherwise erred in refusing
the tardy amendment.  Because the claims in the third amended
counterclaim were not ruled upon by the trial court and the
County has suffered no adverse judgment on the merits of those
claims, we pretermit any discussion of them.
III.
The County next argues that the trial court erroneously
interpreted the local acts.  
"'"Words used in a statute must be given
their 
natural, 
plain, 
ordinary, 
and
commonly understood meaning, and where
plain language is used a court is bound to
interpret that language to mean exactly
what it says. If the language of the
statute is unambiguous, then there is no
room for judicial construction and the
clearly 
expressed 
intent 
of 
the 
legislature
must be given effect."'
23
1130359, 1130404
"Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Nielsen, 714 So. 2d
293, 296 (Ala. 1998) (quoting IMED Corp. v. Systems
Eng'g Assocs. Corp., 602 So. 2d 344, 346 (Ala.
1992)) ...."
DeKalb Cty. LP Gas Co. v. Suburban Gas, Inc., 729 So. 2d 270,
275–76 (Ala. 1998).
First, as noted above, Rich argued in the trial court
that the 82 Act required that the funding levels for the
salaries of the CADA and the ADAs be increased every time
either the State or the County gave raises to their employees. 
Specifically, § 14 of the 82 Act provides: 
"At any time that the Legislature ... shall approve
an increase in the salaries of State employees, and
at any time [the County] shall approve an increase
in the salaries of County employees, the salaries
paid employees of the District Attorney for the
Thirteenth Judicial Circuit shall be increased
accordingly; and the schedules of salaries paid
personnel of the District Attorney's Office as set
out in the provisions of this Act shall be
increased."
(Emphasis added.)  Rich also contended that, after the
enactment of the 88 Act, the County was obligated to provide
funding for raises provided by both the County and the State. 
Section 1(d) of the 88 Act provides:
"Of the total annual compensation to be paid the
aforementioned [CADA] and [ADAs], each shall be paid
an annual salary by the State of Alabama of
$15,000.00 .... The remainder of the annual
24
1130359, 1130404
compensation as provided in the schedule of salaries
hereinabove set out, of each of the aforementioned
[CADA] and [ADAs] shall be paid by the county
comprising the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, which
sum shall be paid from the general funds of said
County, in equal installments as the salaries of
other county officers are paid."
(Emphasis added.)  
The trial court agreed with Rich and held:
"[T]he plain language of this provision makes the
County responsible for all but $15,000 of the
salaries of each [ADA]. Prospectively the County
shall be responsible for paying raises approved by
the State and/or County. When the State approves a
raise [for] State employees and/or when the County
approves a raise for County employees, the County
shall fund all but $15,000 of the salaries of [ADAs]
...."
On appeal, the County contends that, under the language
of § 1(d) of the 88 Act, the County is obligated to provide
funding only at the levels explicitly stated in the salary-
funding schedule found in the 88 Act.  Specifically, it points
to the language in that section stating that, after $15,000 is
paid by the State for the CADA and each ADA, the County pays
the remainder of the compensation found "in the schedule of
salaries."  The County appears to interpret this to mean that
it pays only the amounts listed in the schedule found in the
88 Act, not adjusted to reflect any raises that might have
25
1130359, 1130404
subsequently followed.  
The County's argument does not, however, square with the
language of § 14 of the 82 Act, which remains effective after
the enactment of the 88 Act.  Specifically, § 14 of the 82 Act
requires that any raises by either the State or the County
increase the salary-funding schedules.  The 88 Act replaced
the CADA and the ADA schedule in the 82 Act; there is now a
new funding schedule, but that schedule is still "increased"
under § 14 every time the County or the State gives its
respective employees a raise.  The State's obligation is now,
by the 88 Act, "capped" at $15,000, necessarily requiring the
County to fund the remainder of the salaries.  In other words,
the State is required to fund only the first $15,000 of each
position, and the County pays the remainder found in the
salary-funding schedules as modified, via § 14 of the 82 Act,
by subsequent raises to State or County employees.  We see no
merit in the County's argument.  
The 
County 
also 
contends 
that 
the 
trial 
court
misinterpreted § 14 of the 82 Act.  Specifically, it argues
that the language of § 14 actually requires the County and the
State separately to fund the raises they may provide their
26
1130359, 1130404
employees.  Any time either the legislature or the County
increases the salaries of their respective employees, the
County explains, under § 14 "the salaries paid employees of
the District Attorney ... shall be increased accordingly." 
The County contends that what is "increased accordingly" is
the State's or the County's respective obligation to provide
funding for the raises they may have adopted.
We disagree.  It is clear from the language that the
salary-funding levels of the employees are "increased
accordingly" by any raises those entities may provide, and not
the County or State's respective funding obligations.   The
7
County contends that this historically has not been the case,
and that the State has actually funded past increases. 
Nevertheless, the language of the local acts is clear on this
particular issue, despite both the County's and State's prior 
widespread failure to follow the local acts. 
IV.
The County's and the State's funding obligations were
7
originally addressed in § 1(d) of the 82 Act. The 82 Act
required 60% of the ADAs' salaries to be paid by the State and
40% by the County, irrespective of which gave a raise to its
employees.  The 88 Act amended § 1 and, in part (d), capped
the State's obligation at $15,000.      
27
1130359, 1130404
The County also challenges the trial court's holding that
it must fund eight "legal stenographer" positions in the
District Attorney's Office.  Specifically, § 7 of the 82 Act
permitted 
the 
appointment 
of 
up 
to 
eight 
"legal
stenographers."  The section provided a "compensation" range
with a maximum of $12,000 and provided that the salaries of
the legal stenographers be funded by the County.  The trial
court held that Rich's employees designated as "Trial
Coordinators," which, under § 5 of the 82 Act, were funded by
the State, were actually "legal stenographers" that must be,
under § 7, funded by the County.
On appeal, however, the County contends that Rich does
not actually employ "legal stenographers"; instead, she
employs persons who have the title "Trial Coordinators." 
Section 5 of the 82 Act authorized the district attorney to
hire a "Trial Coordinator" and designated that the State would
fund that employee's compensation.  The County contends that
the 82 Act contemplates that "Trial Coordinators" and "legal
stenographers" are different positions funded by different
sources.
In support of its argument, the County cites Rich's
28
1130359, 1130404
deposition testimony.  In it, she explains that the employees
at 
issue, 
although 
classified 
as 
"Trial 
Coordinators" 
actually
performed the duties of legal stenographers and that "[t]hey
take notes for the lawyer." They were called "Trial
Coordinators," she testified, because "many legal secretaries
... don't like to be called legal secretaries" and because
they "perform services for the lawyer. They go to court with
the lawyer. They write down everything the lawyer does in
court. They write down in the -- they document, document,
document. Their job is to document everything that the lawyer
is doing with regard to that file."  The business manager for
Rich's office also testified that those employees "do more
than just legal stenographer work."  
The 82 Act does not define either the term "Trial
Coordinator" or the term "legal stenographer."  This Court is
presented with nothing more than undisputed 
testimony that the
employees in Rich's office called "Trial Coordinators"
actually perform the work of "legal stenographers" (among
other things).  With no analysis by the County as to how those
employees should be considered "Trial Coordinators" and not 
"legal stenographers," as those terms are used in the 82 Act,
29
1130359, 1130404
we have been given no reason to overturn the trial court's
decision on this ground.  
V.
The County claimed in the trial court, and claims on
appeal, that it is entitled to a reimbursement of certain
funds it has previously provided to the District Attorney's
Office.  Specifically, the County contends that that office
has received funding from certain outside sources (e.g.,
grants) that was earmarked to pay salaries or portions of
salaries of members of Rich's staff whose salaries were also 
being funded by the County.  The County thus contends that it
is entitled to a reimbursement for the portions of the
salaries it funded that were also covered by funding from
other sources.
Alabama law, through the local acts, requires the County
to provide certain funding for certain positions in the
District Attorney's Office.  That Rich's office may receive
funding from other sources does not impact that requirement;
the outside funding does not impact the County's statutory
obligation.  The County contends that Rich was forbidden from
wrongfully expending funds, see Ala. Code 1975, § 41-4-95, but
30
1130359, 1130404
provides no authority or legal argument to demonstrate that
any funds that the County was required to provide and that
were duplicative must be refunded. Therefore, the trial
court's judgment on this issue is affirmed.    
VI. 
Finally, the County contends that the trial court erred
in granting a postjudgment motion by Rich seeking to require
the County to provide funding for two additional ADAs hired in
October 2013 during the proceedings in this case and before
the trial court's final judgment.  Specifically, the County
notes that the trial court's judgment requires Rich, under
Ala. Code 1975, § 11-8-3, to submit a budget request to the
County so that it can budget the funds it will provide to the
District Attorney's Office.  The County contends that the
hires that occurred during the middle of the budget year by
Rich and her demand that the County fund those hires are
outside the normal budgetary process and violate the trial
court's order that Rich participate in that process.  It is
unclear whether those hires violate the trial court's
judgment, because they were made before the trial court's
November 18, 2013, orders in this case directing Rich to
31
1130359, 1130404
submit a budget under § 11-8-3.  Additionally, it is unclear
how the hires negatively impacted the County's budgeting
process, because it appears that the County was, pursuant to
its position that the local acts were ineffective, not fully
funding the District Attorney's Office as required by the
local acts in the first place.  Thus, the trial court's order
on this ground is affirmed.
VII.
The trial court's rulings that are challenged by the
County are affirmed.   
Case No. 1130404
I.
Rich, in her cross-appeal, appears to identify two issues
as to which she says the trial court erred. First, she
contends that the trial court erred in holding that the 82 Act
did not require the County to provide funding for the salaries
of certain individuals working in the investigation unit of
the 
District 
Attorney's Office.  Specifically, Rich notes that
§ 2(d) of the 82 Act states: 
"The County ... shall purchase from its general
fund, upon application by the District Attorney, all
equipment and supplies, including but not limited to
automobiles, radios and other electronic equipment,
32
1130359, 1130404
which are necessary in the proper performance of the
duties of such investigators and pay for such other
expenses which are reasonably necessary in the
suppression of crime, the apprehension of criminals
and the duties assigned them. The governing body of
said county shall be responsible for the maintenance
and upkeep of such equipment."
Rich contends that "other expenses which are reasonably
necessary" includes the "expense" of compensating non-
investigators in the unit, including a criminal-history
investigator, a secretary, and off-duty sheriff's deputies
"who serve as warrant officers."  
In light of the full text of § 2 of the 82 Act, we
disagree.  The remainder of the section states:   
 
   "(a) The District Attorney ... shall be
authorized 
to 
appoint 
not 
less 
than 
four
investigators. ...
"(b) The District Attorney ... shall be
authorized to designate one investigator to serve as
Chief 
Investigator. 
... 
The 
total 
annual
compensation paid to the Chief Investigator shall be
paid by the State of Alabama from the general fund
of the State in equal installments as the salaries
of other State officers are paid.
"(c) The total annual compensation paid to each
investigator, excluding the Chief Investigator,
shall be not less than $16,000.00 nor more than
$27,000.00, said compensation to be determined by
the District Attorney. The total annual compensation
paid to each investigator shall be paid by the State
of Alabama from the general fund of the State in
equal installments as the salaries of other State
33
1130359, 1130404
officials are paid."
It is clear from the text of the 82 Act that the salaries
of certain personnel in the investigation unit are explicitly
referred to by the terms "salaries" and "compensation."  It
also explicitly designates the entity that must fund those
salaries: the State.  Nothing before us indicates that
"salaries" or "compensation" of other personnel would be
included in the different term "expenses."  Further, § 2(d)
generally appears to refer to funding for equipment and
supplies, not personnel.  The language of the 82 Act does not
support 
Rich's 
argument; 
therefore, 
the 
trial 
court's 
judgment
on this issue is affirmed. 
Second, Rich argues that the trial court erred in
determining the amounts required by the salary-funding
schedule for the CADA, the ADAs, and the legal stenographers. 
Specifically, in the trial court Rich noted that § 14 of the
82 Act, quoted above, which was not impacted by the amendments
effected by the 88 Act, required that the salary-funding
schedule 
set 
forth 
in 
the 
local 
acts 
be 
increased
concomitantly with any raises granted by either the County or
the State.  She thus argued that the salary-funding schedule
34
1130359, 1130404
for the CADA and the ADAs found in the 88 Act, as well as the
range provided for legal stenographers in § 7 of the 82 Act, 
had been modified by raises given over subsequent years to
both County and State employees.  
The trial court, however, declined to adjust the salary-
funding schedule for past raises.  As for the CADA and the
ADAs, the trial court held that the schedule found in the 88
Act "is the salary schedule that applies today," and that it
would not be modified by County or State raises effected since
1988.  According to the trial court, § 14 would require
adjustment to the funding levels only when future raises are
given by the County or the State to its employees.  The trial
court's rationale appears premised on the fact that the
funding requirements of the local acts had never been adhered
to:
"[A]s a result of the prior agreements and/or
practices between previous District Attorneys of
this Circuit and the County, the statutory scheme
for increasing the schedule of salaries was not
followed.  It appears to this court that with regard
to office funding, the relationship between previous
District Attorneys and the County was different from
the relationship between the present District
Attorney and the County.  The Court finds and
declares that the decision by previous District
Attorneys and the County not to follow Section 14 of
the 1982 Act, constitutes a waiver of strict
35
1130359, 1130404
compliance with the statutes.  By not adhering to
the statutes, the raises authorized therein were
waived.  Accordingly, this court finds and declares
that it will not consider nor grant any back pay or
amounts due for County and State salary increases
that should have occurred in accordance with the
1982 and 1988 Acts, between 1982 and 2011." 
For similar reasons, it also appears that the trial court
did not accept the argument that the salary scale for legal
stenographers should be increased to reflect past raises by
the County or State and instead declared that the County was
required to fund legal stenographers' salaries at no less than
$12,000 per legal stenographer.  
On appeal, Rich contends that the result of the trial
court's order saddles the District Attorney's Office with
funding at a 1988 salary level.  Specifically, the 88 Act
salary-funding schedule adopted by the trial court set the
funding levels for ADAs at a salary range from $28,000 to
$58,000.  According to the record, the salaries actually paid
to the ADAs in the District Attorney's Office during the
proceedings ranged from $46,315.50 to $123,306.02.  
On the other hand, the County notes that, if all the
County and State salary raises are used to adjust the salary-
funding schedule in the 88 Act, then the funding obligation
36
1130359, 1130404
would be astronomically higher: Rich's motion for a summary
judgment 
presented 
a 
salary-funding 
schedule 
adjusted 
for 
both
County and State raises that ranged from $103,752 for the
lowest level ADA to $245,676 for the highest level CADA.8
On appeal, Rich challenges whether the doctrine of waiver
can be applied in this case.  Specifically, she notes that it
is an affirmative defense that was not pleaded by the County
until late in the proceedings when it filed an amended answer
on August 27.   The amended answer contended that "[p]rior
9
District Attorneys have failed to enforce and follow the
requirements of the 82 and 88 Acts. Therefore any claims
between 1982 and 2011 have been waived."  The trial court
allowed this amended answer, even though it was filed after
the third amended counterclaim, which 
the trial 
court 
declined
to accept.  
We find no authority for the proposition that the failure
There were, at the time of lower court proceedings, five
8
Level 1 Step 6 ADAs, whose salaries ranged from $77,817.11 to
$123,306.02, that, under Rich's calculations, would be funded
at $211,542 each if the salary-funding levels were adjusted to
reflect County and State raises.
The County does note that, in its first answer, it
9
pleaded waiver as to Rich's claim for funds to pay the
salaries of legal stenographers.
37
1130359, 1130404
of past district attorneys to insist that the County adhere to
statutorily mandated funding requirements prevents self-
executing modification of the salary-funding-schedule amounts
provided by the local acts. "[W]aiver consists of a 'voluntary
and intentional surrender or relinquishment of a 
known 
right,'
and the burden of proof in establishing a waiver rests upon
the party asserting the claim." Bentley Sys., Inc. v.
Intergraph Corp., 922 So. 2d 61, 93 (Ala. 2005) (quoting
Dominex, Inc. v. Key, 456 So. 2d 1047, 1057 (Ala. 1984)). 
Although prior district attorneys used their discretion to
make agreements with the County to accept lesser funding
amounts, nothing before us indicates that they waived--or
could have waived--the actual changes to the CADA and ADA
salary-funding 
schedule 
or 
the 
legal-stenographer 
salary 
range
that were effected when the County and State gave raises. 
They accepted lesser amounts, but this did not alter the text
of the local acts.10
We note that the arguments in this case and the historic
10
practice are based on the premise that the local acts govern
the funding amounts that must be provided by the County for
salaries of certain employees in the District Attorney's
Office.  As the trial court held, funding does not have to be
provided for positions not occupied and, by necessity, does
not have to be provided above the salary amounts the varying
levels of District Attorney's Office employees are currently
38
1130359, 1130404
The portions of the trial court's decision denying
modification of salary-funding amounts for the CADA, 
the 
ADAs,
and the legal stenographers for all raises that occurred after
the enactment of the local acts is reversed; the trial court,
on remand, shall increase the salary-funding schedule and
legal-stenographer scale in accord with any County and State
raises that have occurred since the enactment of the local
Acts.11
II.  
The portion of the trial court's judgment holding that
the 82 Act did not require the County to provide funding for
the 
salaries 
of 
certain 
individuals 
working 
in 
the
investigation unit of the District Attorney's Office is
affirmed.  The portion of the judgment holding that raises
being paid.  Thus, although the ceiling for salary funding for
the CADA and ADA positions, adjusted as mandated in the local
acts, may be shockingly high, the County is to provide funding
for the actual salaries, and not funding for the potential
funding levels the local acts anticipated. The adjusted
salary-funding schedule provides merely a maximum. As the
record demonstrates, the actual salaries paid to the CADA and
ADAs do not come near the potential funding obligation
required of the County for each position.
Rich also twice mentions in her brief that the trial
11
court erred in holding that the County was not required to
fund vacant positions. However, we see no 
argument 
elaborating
on this purported error.  
39
1130359, 1130404
subsequently effected by the County and the State did not
impact the salary-funding amounts found in the local acts is
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.  
1130359 -- AFFIRMED.
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ.,
concur.  
Murdock, J., concurs specially.  
Moore, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
1130404 -- AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND
REMANDED.
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Murdock, Main, Wise, and Bryan,
JJ., concur.  
Moore, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
40
1130359, 1130404
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially in case no. 1130359).
I write specially to emphasize that Rule 15(a), Ala. R.
Civ. P., has not been asserted as a ground for reversal of the
trial court's disallowance of the County's third amended
complaint; only  Rule 15(b) has been asserted.  Because I
agree with the main opinion's conclusion that Rule 15(b) is
not applicable in this case, I concur.  No issue as to whether
the trial court otherwise exceeded its discretion or erred in
disallowing the County's third amended 
complaint is before us. 
Like the present case, the status of a summary-judgment
motion was a consideration in the cases cited in the final
paragraph of Part II of the discussion in case no. 1130359 of 
the main opinion and, in each of them, this Court upheld a
trial court's decision disallowing an 
amendment to a pleading. 
It also appears the trial courts in those cases considered
something more than just the pendency of a summary-judgment
motion (e.g., an extended litigation history) that further
augured in favor of the trial court's decision.  Because those
decisions were made under Rule 15(a), any differences or
similarities between those cases and the present case need not
be addressed further here. 
41
1130359, 1130404
MOORE, Chief Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
I concur with Parts I, II, IV, V, and VI of the main
opinion in its discussion of case no. 1130359. Because I
believe that Act No. 88-423, Ala. Acts 1988, nullified the
effect of § 14 of Act No. 82-675, Ala. Acts 1982 ("the 82
Act"), however, I dissent from Part III of its discussion of
case no. 1130359 and from its discussion of case no. 1130404
insofar as the Court applies § 14 of the 82 Act.
42