Title: Taylor v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
LEONARD M. TAYLOR, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  No. 333, 2011 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  Court Below – Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§  in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  Cr. I.D. 0907019543A 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§  Cr. A. Nos. IN-09-08-1815,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§      IN-09-08-1816 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
    Submitted:  March 21, 2012 
 
 
 
 
      Decided:  April 17, 2012 
 
Before HOLLAND, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 17th day of April 2012, it appears to the Court that: 
 
1) 
Following a jury trial in the Superior Court, the defendant-
appellant, Leonard M. Taylor (“Taylor”), was convicted of Murder in the 
First Degree and Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a 
Felony.  Taylor was sentenced to be incarcerated for life, without parole, for 
the murder.  He was sentenced to an additional five years of incarceration 
for the weapons offense.   
 
2) 
Taylor raises two arguments in this direct appeal.  First, Taylor 
contends that the trial judge erred when he denied his motion for a mistrial 
due to the prejudicial statements of one of the State’s key witnesses, Ricardo 
2 
 
Rimpal (“Rimpal”).  According to Taylor, the State’s improper comments 
and questions during the direct examination of Rimpal elicited testimony 
that prejudicially affected his right to a fair trial.  Taylor’s trial counsel 
objected to Rimpal’s remarks and moved for a mistrial.  Taylor argues that 
the trial judge’s instruction to the jury was not sufficient to cure any 
prejudice and that he is entitled to a new trial.  Second, Taylor submits that 
the trial judge erred when he denied a defense motion to exclude statements 
made by Taylor to Eric Briggs (“Briggs”).  According to Taylor, the 
statements to Briggs were obtained in violation of his right to due process 
under the Delaware Constitution.  We have concluded that both of Taylor’s 
arguments are without merit.  Therefore, the judgments of the Superior 
Court are affirmed. 
3) 
On May 4, 2009, a body was found in a wooded area in Carney 
Point, New Jersey, shot three times in the head.  The victim had trash bags 
over his head and legs and did not have any identification on his person 
when he was discovered. The victim was later identified by fingerprints as 
Sven Hinds (“Hinds”).1  
4) 
In late January 2009, Hinds along with two associates, Dharrion 
Newton (“Newton”) and Rimpal, migrated from the State of New York to 
                                          
 
1 The factual recitations in this Order are taken directly from Taylor’s Opening Brief. 
3 
 
the Delaware area to pursue a clothing line and t-shirt business.  The t-shirt 
business was primarily a front for the real purpose of illegal narcotic sales.  
The fourth member of this drug sales operation was Taylor, who provided 
clientele for the drug operation as well as access to heroin, while Hinds had 
several contacts for cocaine.  The “business” was conducted in both the State 
of Delaware and the State of Maryland.  
5) 
The four business associates spent a great deal of time in 
different hotels in the Newark area, from which they were able to both create 
and sell t-shirts along with engage in the sale of narcotics.  The police were 
able to determine that Taylor had rented several vehicles from American 
Auto Rental, which was located in Edgewood, Maryland.  Specifically, from 
April 7, 2009 through May 5, 2009, Taylor had rented a 2006 Toyota 
Avalon.  The rented Avalon was equipped with a GPS unit which had a daily 
self-check device that allowed the business owner of the vehicle to be able to 
locate the vehicle on a daily basis.  On May 2, 2009 and May 3, 2009, the 
2006 Avalon was located at a shopping center in Newark, Delaware.  
Located next to that shopping center was a Super Eight Motel at 268 East 
Main Street, Newark, Delaware.  
6) 
Business records from the Super Eight Motel revealed that 
Taylor had rented two rooms at the motel from April 17, 2009 through May 
4 
 
6, 2009, specifically rooms 219 and 115.  The Newark Police Department 
executed a search warrant on Room 219, where several blood stains were 
found on the carpet and the carpet padding in the center of the room.  A 
DNA analysis was completed on the blood sample contained in the carpet 
from Room 219, and was matched to Hinds, the victim.  
7) 
Throughout the investigation, which included several police 
agencies in three different states, there was no physical evidence to identify 
who murdered Hinds. The murder weapon was never located, there was no 
DNA evidence that identified the perpetrator or perpetrators, and there was 
no identifying fingerprint evidence to link to the individual or individuals 
who murdered Hinds.  
8) 
Believing that the murder was not random or committed in the 
course of a robbery, the police theorized that the murder was committed by 
someone who knew and associated with Hinds and had a motive to commit 
the murder. The police were ready to focus their investigation on identifying 
a person who met those criteria.  
9) 
As a result, the investigation focused on interviewing Hinds’ 
business associates as well as other people who spent time with Hinds’ 
business associates. Newton and Rimpal were both interviewed several 
times and each gave several contradictory versions to the police as to what 
5 
 
occurred on the evening of May 2, 2009, and who was involved.  Newton 
and Rimpal both lied to the police numerous times in their statements to law 
enforcement and routinely explained that the basis for their lies was fear of 
retaliation from Taylor and or Hinds and their associates and families.  
However, the one feature common to all of their respective statements prior 
to trial was that Taylor was the person in Room 219 on May 2, 2009, and 
that when they (Rimpal and Newton) arrived in the room that evening, Hinds 
was lying dead on the floor.  
10) 
The trial began on January 10, 2011.  One of the State’s key 
witnesses was Rimpal, who testified that on the night of the murder, he 
received a phone call from Taylor asking for Rimpal to purchase a few items 
from Wal-Mart.  Those items included latex gloves, peroxide, and a 
container/storage bin, and were all commonly used as part of the t-shirt 
business.  Rimpal was with Sheena Testerman (“Testerman”) at the time of 
the phone call and trip to Wal-Mart.  She testified consistently with Rimpal 
regarding the products purchased at Wal-Mart.  Rimpal testified that he 
drove from the Wal-Mart to the Super Eight motel with Testerman.  As they 
exited the vehicle, Testerman went to the first floor motel room and Rimpal 
proceeded upstairs.  Rimpal testified as he entered the upstairs motel room, 
Newton and Taylor were in the room and he did not see Hinds.  However, as 
6 
 
he entered the room he saw Hinds’ feet between the two beds on the floor.  
Rimpal testified that he saw a small pistol tucked in Taylor’s waistband and 
then later saw Hinds with a gunshot in his temple.  
11) 
During his testimony, Rimpal acknowledged that in prior 
interviews with law enforcement he was not truthful and also minimized his 
involvement in the murder of Hinds.  He explained the basis for his actions 
was that he was afraid of the repercussions from back where he lived.  
Rimpal further testified before the jury, over objection by Taylor’s trial 
counsel, that the basis for his fear was that he had been assaulted on a couple 
of occasions, insinuating Taylor had something to do with these assaults. 
Trial counsel for Taylor objected at sidebar and asked for a mistrial due to 
the clear implication, made by Rimpal, that Rimpal was assaulted three 
times and Taylor had something to do with it.  The trial judge denied the 
motion for mistrial and instead gave the jury a curative instruction.  
12) 
Rimpal also provided the State with information regarding 
motive. Rimpal testified that Taylor and Hinds dealt with each other and 
often engaged in mutual childish “hazing.”  Rimpal also testified that Hinds 
ordered him to do nasty things to Taylor’s mother.  In furtherance of 
Rimpal’s desire to create a motive for the State, he testified how he informed 
Taylor of Hind’s instructions regarding threatening Taylor’s mother and 
7 
 
destroying Taylor’s father’s property.  Rimpal also told the jury that Taylor 
was aware that Hinds did not like him and Taylor was putting up a front and 
dealing with it.  Rimpal was not arrested or charged for anything in 
connection with the murder of Hinds.  
13) 
Newton testified for the State regarding his recollection of what 
occurred the evening of Hinds’ murder.  Newton testified, consistent with 
Rimpal, that they both entered the room separately, that Taylor was in the 
motel room with a pistol, and Hinds was on the floor.  Newton also testified 
that he and Rimpal, along with Taylor, all cleaned up the room where Hinds 
was murdered, and that they all placed trash bags on Hinds body and 
transported the body to New Jersey where it was dumped in a wooded area.  
14) 
Newton acknowledged that throughout his time in Delaware 
and Maryland he smoked a great deal of marijuana. Newton also testified 
that in prior interviews with law enforcement he was not truthful and also 
minimized his involvement in the murder of Hinds.  The basis for his 
actions, he explained, was that he was afraid of the repercussions from back 
where he lived, because there was a motto, “snitches get stitches.”  For that 
reason, he was worried for the sake of himself and his family.  As a result of 
the numerous lies and false statements to the police, Newton was charged 
with hindering prosecution in February 2010.  Newton pled guilty to that 
8 
 
felony level offense.  His sentencing was scheduled for the month after 
Taylor’s trial, in February 2011.  
15) 
Eric Briggs was a prison snitch who testified to statements 
made by Taylor while both were incarcerated in Harford County, Maryland. 
On January 19, 2011, before Briggs testified, Taylor’s counsel filed a 
Motion to Exclude Taylor’s statements to Briggs.  After hearing oral 
arguments on the motion prior to Briggs’ testimony, the trial judge denied 
Taylor’s Motion to Exclude.   
16) 
Briggs testified that Taylor told him that Taylor shot the victim 
three times in the head and then drove the body and dumped it in the woods 
in New Jersey.  Briggs also claimed that Taylor told him that the victim was 
planning on taking over his drug business and had threatened harm to 
Taylor’s mother.  Briggs corroborated several facts concerning Taylor’s 
drug operation, which Newton and Rimpal previously testified to.  In his 
testimony, Briggs confirmed that in his July 20, 2009 interview he was told 
by law enforcement to find out more detailed incriminating statements from 
Taylor.  Briggs also testified that the purpose of gaining more detailed 
statements from Taylor was to then report back to the police with the hope 
of receiving a “break.”  
9 
 
17) 
Taylor’s first argument is that the trial judge erred when he 
denied his motion for a mistrial due to the prejudicial statements of one of 
the State’s key witnesses, Rimpal.  The prosecutor questioned Rimpal about 
his reluctance to testify and to cooperate with the police.  Rimpal admitted 
that he had not been wholly truthful in his initial statements to police.  When 
the prosecutor asked him why, Rimpal replied, “I was afraid.  I am scared 
right now, tell the truth.”  Rimpal went on to explain that he was afraid that 
his involvement in the aftermath of the murder might lead to his arrest.  
When the prosecutor asked whether he was afraid of anything else, defense 
counsel asked to speak with the prosecutor.  Defense counsel and the 
prosecutor conversed briefly, and the prosecutor then asked, “Are you afraid 
of any repercussion from back where you live?”  When Rimpal replied 
affirmatively, the prosecutor asked him to “please explain to the jury why.”  
Rimpal answered, “Because on a couple of occasions I have been assaulted.” 
 
18) 
The prosecutor and defense counsel simultaneously asked to 
approach the bench.  The prosecutor explained to the judge that the previous 
evening she had learned that Rimpal had been assaulted in his Brooklyn 
neighborhood on three occasions and warned of the consequences of being a 
“snitch.”  She also stated, however, that there was no evidence to prove that 
Taylor had personally initiated these attacks or warnings.  Therefore, she had 
10 
 
cautioned Rimpal not to mention the attacks during his testimony, but rather 
to explain to the jury, in general terms, about the “no snitching” culture in 
which he lived.  
 
19) 
Defense counsel agreed that the witness had not responded as 
both he and the prosecutor expected:  “I thought . . . what the witness was 
going to say is that it is not good to be [] a snitch, there is a culture where 
you don’t talk about your people, don’t snitch on other people.”  Defense 
counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that the jury would conclude from 
Rimpal’s testimony that Taylor was somehow “behind this.” 
 
20) 
The prosecutor argued that an instruction to the jury would be 
sufficient to cure any possible unfair prejudice to the defense.  The trial 
judge agreed with the State’s argument.  Taylor’s motion for a mistrial was 
denied and the jury was then instructed: 
THE COURT: 
All right, [l]adies and gentlemen.  Ladies 
and gentlemen, I have the following instruction.  Listen 
carefully. 
 
I have determined that the witness’s last answer which referred 
to assaults in New York is not admissible under the rules of 
evidence.  There is no evidence that relates such incidents to 
this case in anyway.  Therefore, I instruct you to disregard that 
last answer completely and not to allow it to affect your 
deliberations in anyway.  All right, proceed. 
 
 
21) 
The decision to grant or deny a mistrial is within the trial 
judge’s discretion, since the judge is in the best position to determine the 
11 
 
effect and prejudice caused by the alleged error.2  The granting of a mistrial 
is appropriate only where there is a manifest necessity or the ends of justice 
would otherwise be defeated.3  The record supports the trial judge’s 
determination that a mistrial was unnecessary.  The Rimpal testimony at 
issue was a single sentence in a trial that lasted eleven days.  The parties 
agreed the remark was unexpected.4  Under these circumstances, a curative 
instruction was a meaningful and practical alternative to a mistrial.5  We 
hold that there was no abuse of discretion in the manner in which the trial 
judge resolved this matter.   
22) 
Taylor’s second argument is that the trial judge committed legal 
error in refusing to suppress incriminating statements that he made to a 
cellmate while incarcerated on unrelated charges in Harford County, 
Maryland.  In July 2009, Taylor was arrested on a Maryland violation of 
probation in Harford County.  As a result of that arrest, Taylor was held in 
default of bail in the Harford County Correctional Institute. At that time, 
although a suspect, Taylor had not been formally arrested for the murder of 
Hinds.  
                                          
 
2 Thompson v. State, 399 A.2d 194, 199 (Del. 1979).   
3 Fanning v. Superior Court, 320 A.2d 343, 345 (Del. 1974).   
4 Defense counsel, in moving for a mistrial, stated that the motion was not based on 
prosecutorial misconduct:  “[The prosecutor] did nothing wrong, she assured me that is 
not what he was going to say.” 
5 Justice v. State, 947 A.2d 1097, 1102 (Del. 2008). 
12 
 
23) 
During the time that Taylor was held at the Harford County 
Correctional Institute, he shared a cell with Briggs.  Briggs contacted the 
prosecutor in Harford County advising that he had been speaking with 
Taylor and he had information relevant to the homicide of Hinds.  
24) 
On July 20, 2009, Detective DiGregorio (“DiGregorio”) of the 
New Jersey State Police, along with his partner, visited Briggs at the Harford 
County Detention Center.  At that time, a statement was taken from Briggs. 
During the course of the statement, Briggs indicated that he had spoken with 
Taylor and that Taylor had made certain admissions to him regarding the 
murder of Hinds.  Briggs also indicated during that interview, that Taylor 
had been visited by an attorney who was going to represent him regarding 
not only the violation of probation but also any charge that may result from 
the Delaware offenses.  Briggs explained that Taylor had shown him a 
business card of the attorney who had visited Taylor at the correctional 
facility, and who was going to be representing Taylor on all matters going 
forward.  In the course of the July 20, 2009 interview, Briggs was instructed 
by DiGregorio to return to the dorm where Taylor was located and attempt 
to find out more detailed incriminating statements from Taylor.  
25) 
After the July 20, 2009 interview, at the request of DiGregorio, 
Briggs continued to have contact with Taylor and questioned him further 
13 
 
about the murder of Hinds. In response to these questions, Briggs allegedly 
secured more detailed incriminating admissions from Taylor as DiGregorio 
requested.  On July 30, 2009, law enforcement interviewed Briggs a second 
time, regarding these more detailed admissions by Taylor.  Taylor was 
arrested for the murder of Hinds on August 19, 2009.  
 
26) 
At trial, Taylor moved to suppress the July 30 statement by 
Briggs.  Taylor conceded that any statements he made to Briggs before the 
July 20 interview were admissible.  Taylor argued, however, that on July 20, 
Briggs became a state agent.  Therefore, Taylor argues, because Taylor had 
told Briggs that he was represented by a lawyer, and Briggs had so informed 
the police, the police were not permitted to question Taylor about the 
murder, either directly or through the agency of Briggs.   
 
27) 
On appeal, as in the Superior Court, Taylor acknowledges that 
neither his Fifth nor Sixth Amendment rights were violated by the police use 
of Briggs as an informant after the July 20 interview.  Although Taylor was 
a suspect in Hinds’ murder, he had not yet been charged or arrested.6  Nor 
was Briggs required to give Miranda7 warnings.8   
                                          
 
6 See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 
(1985). 
7 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
8 Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990). 
14 
 
28) 
Taylor argues, however, that Taylor’s post-July 20 admissions 
to Briggs were inadmissible under the Delaware Constitution.9  In support of 
that argument, Taylor relies on this Court’s decision in Bryan v. State.10   
 
29) 
The trial judge denied Taylor’s motion to suppress.  The trial 
judge agreed with the parties that the Sixth Amendment was not implicated 
because, with regard to Hinds’ murder, adversarial proceedings had not yet 
begun.  The trial judge also agreed with the parties that Fifth Amendment 
rights had not attached either, since Taylor had not been charged with Hinds’ 
murder.  Lastly, the trial judge rejected Taylor’s argument under the 
Delaware Constitution, and in so doing, found Bryan v. State,11 to be 
distinguishable.  
30) 
In Bryan, as the Superior Court observed, the defendant had 
already been arrested for the crime (murder) about which the police 
interrogated him.  Therefore, in Bryan, the Fifth Amendment right to 
counsel had attached, and the issue was whether the defendant’s waiver of 
Miranda rights was valid when police failed to inform the defendant that his 
attorney had just telephonically contacted the police and told them not to 
                                          
 
9 Del. Const. art. I, § 7. 
10 Taylor also relies upon Jackson v. State, 643 A.2d 1360 (Del. 1994).  Our holding in 
Jackson, however, was based upon the Sixth Amendment and, therefore, does not support 
Taylor’s argument under the Delaware Constitution.   
11 Bryan v. State, 571 A.2d 170 (Del. 1990). 
15 
 
question his client.  This Court held that under Article I, section 7 of the 
Delaware Constitution, the police had erred in not informing Taylor of his 
attorney’s call.12   
31) 
In Bryan, we reaffirmed our prior holding in Weber v. State.13  
Relying in part on Article I, section 7 of the Delaware Constitution, we held 
in Weber that: 
To . . . effectuate the protection given to the accused by 
Miranda, and ensure that a suspect knowingly and intelligently 
waives his rights, we establish the following rule for the 
guidance of the trial court:  if prior to or during custodial 
interrogation, and unknown to the suspect, a specifically 
retained or properly designated lawyer is actually present at the 
police station seeking an opportunity to render legal advice or 
assistance to the suspect, and the police intentionally or 
negligently fail to inform the suspect of that fact, then any 
statement obtained after the police themselves know of the 
attorney’s efforts to assist the suspect, or any evidence derived 
from any such statement, is not admissible on any theory that 
the suspect intelligently and knowingly waived his right to 
remain silent and his right to counsel as established by 
Miranda.14 
 
In Bryan, we noted that “Weber was decided in the context of a lawyer being 
present at a police station and attempting to render legal advice to his 
client.”15  We then held that “[f]or purposes of the protections afforded by 
the Delaware Constitution, there is no distinction between an in-person 
                                          
 
12 Id. at 177. 
13 Id. at 174-77. 
14 Id. at 175 (quoting Weber v. State, 457 A.2d 674, 686 (Del. 1983)).  
15 Id. 
16 
 
request by retained counsel to render assistance to his client and a telephonic 
request by that lawyer.”16   
32) 
Taylor had not yet been arrested for Hinds’ murder when he 
was speaking with Briggs.  Since the investigation of Hinds’ murder was 
ongoing, the following holding from Bryan is particularly relevant to 
Taylor’s case:   
 
Furthermore, when counsel has been specifically 
designated and retained to represent a suspect and the suspect 
has clearly made police aware of his desire to deal with police 
only through his counsel during the investigation leading to the 
arrest, we impose a heavy presumption against waiver if the 
lawyer is present and denied access to his client, or, as here, has 
repeatedly advised the police that no interrogations of the 
defendant were to occur.17   
 
33) 
None of the critical facts that led to our holding in Bryan are 
present in Taylor’s case.  The record does not reflect that Taylor specifically 
retained an attorney.  Assuming arguendo that Taylor had retained an 
attorney, the record does not reflect that the attorney had ever been in 
contact with the police.  A fortiori, the record does not reflect the police 
were “clearly made aware of [Taylor’s] desire to deal with police only 
through his counsel during the investigation leading to the arrest.”18  
Accordingly, we hold that Taylor’s rights under the Delaware Constitution 
                                          
 
16 Id. 
17 Id.  
18 Id. 
17 
 
were not violated under our holding in Bryan v. State.19  Therefore the 
Superior Court properly denied Taylor’s motion to suppress his statements 
to Briggs after July 20.  
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgments 
of the Superior Court are affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                          
 
19 Id.