Title: First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Miami v. Fisher

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

60 So. 2d 496 (1952)
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN ASS'N OF MIAMI
v.
FISHER et al.

Supreme Court of Florida, en Banc.
June 27, 1952.
Rehearing Denied August 7, 1952.
Blackwell, Walker & Gray, Miami, for appellant.
Morton Rothenberg, Miami Beach, for appellees.
CHAPMAN, Justice.
On September 16, 1939, a final decree of divorce and property settlement was entered in the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, in the case of Freda Y. Fisher v. Porter G. Fisher. The following pertinent provisions are set out in the final decree:
The following stipulations signed by Freda Y. Fisher and husband, Porter G. Fisher, were before the Court at the time of the entry of the divorce decree and property settlement on September 16, 1939, to-wit:
Some two or three months after the date of the decree, on November 13, 1939, Porter G. Fisher remarried and the second wife was Alma F. Fisher. On July 19, 1946, Porter G. Fisher and wife, Alma F. Fisher, made, executed and delivered their promissory note in the sum of $10,400 payable to the First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Miami. Simultaneously with the execution and delivery of the aforesaid promissory note they secured the payment thereof by execution of a mortgage to the Federal Savings Bank, which described the home owned by Porter G. Fisher located at 531 49th Street, Miami Beach, Florida. The mortgage was duly recorded in the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida. The home described in the mortgage supra was in the possession of Freda Y. Fisher and son, Porter G. Fisher, Jr., when the note and mortgage were executed by the husband, Porter G. Fisher, Sr., and the second Mrs. Fisher (Alma F. Fisher). It appears that the first Mrs. Fisher and son occupied the home pursuant to the divorce stipulations made a part of the final decree.
The Federal Savings and Loan Association, on February 9, 1949, filed foreclosure proceedings on the mortgage given it by Porter G. Fisher and wife, Alma F. Fisher. The proceeding progressed to a final decree, when the property was sold by a Special Master, and a Special Master's deed was executed conveying the residential property supra to the First Federal Savings and Loan Association. On June 25, 1950, Freda Y. Fisher filed in her divorce suit her motion for a final decree for arrears in support and also to enforce the provisions of paragraph 7 of the stipulations, to-wit: "7. In the event defendant dies or remarries, then, in that event, the defendant's (Porter G. Fisher's) interest in the house shall be conveyed to the son P. Graham Fisher." The Chancellor below heard the parties on the motion and other appropriate pleadings and entered its order requiring Porter G. Fisher to convey his right, title and interest in the home occupied by Freda Y. Fisher and son situated at 531 49th Street, Miami, Florida, in accordance with the provisions of Section 7 supra of the stipulations signed by the parties when the divorce decree was entered. On May 25, 1951, Porter G. Fisher and wife, Alma F. Fisher, executed and delivered to Porter G. Fisher, Jr., a deed to the described property, pursuant to an order or decree of the Court below. It was recorded among the public records of Dade County, Florida, on June 4, 1951.
On August 15, 1951, Porter G. Fisher, Jr., filed in the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, his suit to quiet title as against the First Federal Savings and Loan Association and alleged that the Special Master's deed acquired by it through the foreclosure of its mortgage was subject to, inferior and subservient to the title conveyed to Porter G. Fisher, Jr., by his father, Porter G. Fisher, Sr., and wife, Alma F. Fisher, and said conveyance was a cloud which created doubt and suspicion as to the true fee simple title held and owned by Porter G. Fisher, Jr. That the title conveyed by the Special Master to the Federal Savings and Loan Association was made with full knowledge and notice of the provisions described in Section 7 of the divorce stipulation, which was approved and confirmed by the final decree of divorce. Section 7 thereof could have been ascertained by an examination of the final decree of divorce duly recorded among the public records of Dade County, Florida. Also, Freda Y. Fisher and son, Porter G. Fisher, Jr., were in the open, adverse and continuous possession of the home and were residing therein prior and subsequent to the date of giving the note and mortgage to the Savings Association. The Chancellor, by an appropriate decree, cancelled the Special Master's deed to the First Federal Savings and Loan Association as a cloud upon title *499 as held by Porter G. Fisher, Jr. The Federal Savings and Loan Association appealed.
On this appeal counsel for the appellant Association contend that provision 7, supra, of the marriage agreement, which was approved and confirmed by the terms of the final decree of divorce entered between Freda Y. Fisher and husband Porter G. Fisher, Sr., was legally insufficient to constitute notice, implied or constructive, of the claims and interest of Porter G. Fisher, Jr., in and to the described property, although Fisher, Sr., had not lived or resided in the home from 1939 until giving the mortgage on July 16, 1946. He remarried within ninety days after the divorce decree was entered. It was the Chancellor's conclusion that the divorce decree and divorce stipulation were legally sufficient to constitute lawful notice of the interest of Porter G. Fisher, Jr., in and to the described property.
In the case of Sapp v. Warner, 105 Fla. 245, 141 So. 124, 143 So. 648, 144 So. 481, we held that notice is of two kinds: actual and constructive. Constructive notice has been defined as notice imputed to a person not having actual notice, for example: such as would be imputed under the recording statutes to persons dealing with property subject to those statutes. Actual notice is also said to be of two kinds: first, express, which includes what might be called direct information and, second, implied, which is said to include notice inferred from the fact that the person had means of knowledge, which it was his duty to use and which he did not use, or as it is sometimes called implied actual notice. Constructive notice is a legal inference, while implied notice is an inference of fact, but the same facts may sometimes be used to prove both constructive and implied actual notice. The foregoing rule has been reaffirmed by this Court. See Rinehart v. Phelps, 150 Fla. 382, 7 So. 2d 783.
The record reflects that Porter G. Fisher, Sr., under the terms of the divorce agreement, was to provide his first wife and son with a home and furnishings. It is not disputed that they lived in the original home of the parties located at 531 49th Street, Miami. It is not contended that P. Graham Fisher, Sr., ever lived in the home after the divorce decree, but married again within approximately three months thereafter. If the appellant had made inquiry as to the possession of the property upon which it later made a loan of $10,400 and accepted a mortgage, the fact would have developed that P. Graham Fisher, Sr., was not in possession of the property but the possession thereof was in his divorced wife. Under these circumstances we are forced to hold that the appellant failed to exercise, in the acceptance of the note and mortgage that degree of care as the law imposed upon it.
Another theory of the case is that the appellant, by searching the records in the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, would have found the divorce decree and property settlement appearing upon the record, and a provision thereof which is viz.: "Ordered, adjudged and decreed that the agreement heretofore entered into by and between the complainant and defendant herein, dated September 11, 1939, providing the matters of custody of the child, P. Graham Fisher, his maintenance, the matters of alimony and property settlements, be and the same is hereby in all respects approved * * *."
It is our view and conclusion that the decree appealed from should be and it is hereby affirmed on the authority of Sapp v. Warner, supra.
Affirmed.
TERRELL, ROBERTS and MATHEWS, JJ., concur.
SEBRING, C.J., and THOMAS and HOBSON, JJ., dissent.