Title: DUNCAN v ROCKWELL MANUFACTURING CO

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 13675 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1977 ROY C. DUNCAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, ROCKWELL MANUFACTURING COMPANY et al., Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Honorable E. Gardner Brownlee, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Jon E. Ellingson argued, Missoula, Montana James E . Congdon, Missoula, Montana For Respondents: Garlington, Lohn and Robinson, Missoula, Montana Gary Graham argued, Missoula, Montana Worden, Thane and Haines, Missoula, Montana Ronald A . Bender argued, Missoula, Montana Submitted: May 26, 1977 Decided : ~ b & 3 + -L77 - & & - s > + - - +- L::L 2 , Filed: Clerk M r . Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal by the plaintiff i n a personal injury action from an order of the d i s t r i c t court, Missoula County, granting summary judgment t o a l l defendants. The complaint proceeded upon the theories of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y i n t o r t and implied wa ranty of fitness for a particular purpose, against the I manufactur$r and r e t a i l e r of an allegedly defective, injury causing prqduct, and the sales agent of the product. The record conslists of the pleadings, interrogatories t o the de- fendants, equests f o r admissions of the defendants, p l a i n t i f f ' s Ii deposition, defendants ' motion for summary judgment together with affidavits in support and i n opposition, and the order of the d i s t r i c t court granting the motion. Plaintiff appeals the order. Plaintiff Roy C. Duncan purchased a table saw manufactured by defendant Rockwell Manufacturing Company, from defendant Allied Stores Marketing Corporation, through its agent, defendant Wallace W. Payson, i n Missoula, Montana i n April 1971. The saw was fully assembled a t the time of the purchase. Duncan was able t o observe and inspect the saw prior t o the sale and noticed no defect. The saw was then placed on its back i n the rear of Dun- can's pickup truck and taken 80 m i l e s t o the vicinity of Flathead Lake for use i n the building of a structure. The building job lasted approximately three t o four months, and the saw was used a t l e a s t once each day. N o trouble was experienced with the saw a t that t i m e . I n June 1971, following the completion of the work, Duncan again loaded the saw i n the rear of h i s pickup, laying it on its back. The saw was transported t o Missoula, placed i n a storage area behind ~ u n c a n ' s garage and remained there u n t i l September 1972. On September 25, 1972, Duncan and h i s son removed the saw from the storage area and placed it i n the center of h i s garage floor. Duncan commenced t o ripsaw a long, narrow board without checking the saw for stability. Fifteen seconds l a t e r , a s he was pushing the board through the saw, the saw t i l t e d and the board jammed. Duncan's right hand was pulled into the moving blade, resulting i n the amputation of h i s index finger below the f i r s t joint and lacerations t o h i s second finger. Subse- quent t o the accident, it was discovered one of the four legs of the table saw was one-fourth inch shorter than the other three. I n h i s deposition Duncan indicated he had been actively involved a s a carpenter since 1950 and was presently qualified a s a master carpenter. Duncan admitted he was fully familiar with both the table saw i n question and table saws generally, being aware of the dangers associated with the use of such equipment and the necessary precautions therefor. Plaintiff urges three contentions on appeal: 1. The d i s t r i c t court erred i n granting summary judgment where genuine issues of material fact exist between appellant and respondents. 2. That any defense raised by respondents, particularly that of contributory negligence, cannot be established a s a matter of law i n a summary judgment proceeding. 3. S t r i c t l i a b i l i t y i n t o r t i s properly applicable to a r e t a i l e r of a defective product. Here the legal problem presented i s essentially one of the propriety of summary judgment i n the context of a particular products l i a b i l i t y action. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P., provides i n part: "* * * The judgment sought shall be rendered forth- with i f the pleadings, depositions, answers to interro- gatories, and admissions on f i l e , together with the affidavits, i f any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment a s a matter of law. * * *" This Court has held that, under Rule 56, the party moving for summary judgment has the i n i t i a l burden of establishing the complete absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Mustang Beverage Co. v. Jos.Schlitz Brewing Co., 162 Mont. 243, 511 P.2d 1; Harland v. Anderson, Mont . 9 548 P.2d 613, 33 St.Rep. 363. Further, in Kober & Kyriss v. Billings Deaconess Hospital, 148 Mont. 117, 122, 417 P.2d 476, t h i s Court quoting with approval from 6 Moore's Federal Practice 2d, 156.15, said: "'The courts hold the movant t o a s t r i c t standard. To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that i s quite clear what the truth i s , and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact.'" This Court has also held that the party opposing the motion i s afforded the benefit of a l l reasonable inferences which may be drawn from his offered proof. Kober & Kyriss v. Billings Deaconess Hospital, supra. Certainly,, summary judgment is not a viable substitute for a t r i a l where a factual controversy exists. "* * * Summary judgment i s not a proper tool for resolving disputed issues of fact and is accordingly improper whenever material factual matter i s i n dis- pute. * * *I1 Flanagan v. Curran, 164 Mont. 262, 265, 521 P.2d 200. However, the summary judgment procedure does not end here. Since the purpose of the procedure is t o promote the stream- lining of the judicial process through a "screening-out" and elimination of questions which do not merit resolution by liti- gation, the burden is shifted to the party opposing the motion where the record reveals no genuine issue of material fact. Such burden i s as substantial as that i n i t i a l l y imposed upon the movant . ' I 1 * * * the opposing party's facts must be material and of a substantial nature, not fanciful, frivolous, 1 1 1 gauzy, nor merely suspbcious. Silloway v. Jorgenson, 146 Mont. 307, 310, 406 P.2d 167, quoting from 6 Moore's Federal Practice 2d, 156.11. A plaintiff in a products l i a b i l i t y action has the i n i t i a l burden of establishing three elements prior to recovery, regard- less of whether h i s cause of action is phrased in terms of negligence, warranty or s t r i c t liability: First, the plaintiff must show that he was injured by the product. Second, he must present proof the product was defective and unreasonably unsafe. Third, it must be demot-strated such defect existed when the product l e f t the hands of the particular defendant. Prosser Torts 4th ed. 5103. It is the third element w e are concerned with here. The theory of 5402A, Restatement of Torts 2d,adopted by t h i s Court i n Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268, only imposes l i a b i l i t y on the manufacturer or seller i f : "* * * the product is, a t the time it leaves the s e l l e r ' s hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which w i l l be unreasonably dangerous to him. * * *" Restatement of Torts 2d 5402A, Comment: g. It is clear the conduct of the s e l l e r or manufacturer i n placing the product i n the stream of commerce i n a defective condition, to which the injury must be identified, is the cornerstone of the p l a i n t i f f ' s proof i n a s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y case. The law i n Montana i s well established that unless evidence is offered supporting the conclusion the product was defective a t the time it l e f t the hands of the particular seller or manufacturer, there can be no l i a b i l i t y . Barich v. Ottenstror, Mont . , 550 P.2d 395, 33 St.Rep. 481. The law w i l l not automatically presume the defect to have been extant a t the time the product was under the control of the defendant, from a mere demonstration of a possible defect a t the time of the acci- dent. Barich v. Ottenstror, supra. In other words, from the nature of the alleged defect, coupled with evidence of the surrounding circumstances, it may be reasonable to infer the defect did not exist a t the time of manufacture or sale. Upon a review of the record, w e find respondents sustained their i n i t i a l burden of proof as parties movant under Rule 56, M.R.Civ .P. , by demonstrating the product involved was subjected t o substantial wear by moving it long distances and by continued actual use. Continued usage of a product w i l l not i t s e l f prevent recovery where satisfactory proof of an original defect i s offered. However, where no direct evidence of such defect exists and proof must be made by inference, as here, continued use by plaintiff may well preclude a finding the product was defective when placed i n the stream of trade. This case is t o be distinguished from those where there is a malfunction of a recently acquired machine, which manifests a latent defect. On the contrary such a defect as is involved - 6 - here, had it exis t ~ d prior to the accident, would be obvious t o anyone using the product for even the shortest period of time upon a simple inspection. Appellant offers no real evidence i n opposition to respon- dents' proof, other than the mere assertions he was present whenever the saw was moved and was aware of the occasions of its use and the identities of the various users. As the party opposing the movant under the rule of Harland, appellant had the substantial burden of refuting the inferences drawn from undis- puted facts concerning the continued use and consequent wear upon the table saw,to raise again a genuine and material factual issue, Appellant's mere assertions do not constitute facts which are "material and of a substantial nature" such a s would prevent summary judgment, When the complaint i s viewed i n the light of appellant's statements i n his deposition and affidavit i n opposition to the motion for summary judgment, together with a l l exhibits presented, it i s apparent there is no genuine, material factual issue i n t h i s case. The d i s t r i c t court was correct i n ruling that respondents were entitled t o judgment as a matter of law, Appellant's second contention i s that under the general rule as enunciated in Hagen v. Great Northern Railway Co., 153 Mont. 309, 456 P.2d 51 and Dean v, First National Bank of Great Falls, 152 Mont. 474, 452 P.2d 402, the affirmative defense of contributory negligence raised by respondents is not susceptible to summary adjudication. While there may be exceptions i n unusual circum- stances, w e find appellant's contention to be a correct statement of the law. It cannot be disputed that in most cases the presence or absence of negligence remains a question of fact which i t s e l f requires a trial under traditional negligence principles. However where, as here, appellant's own claim is defective and respondents' demonstration of a complete absence of material issues of fact remains uncontroverted, more than adequate grounds exist for summary judgment. Therefore we need not consider whether summary judgment was the proper vehicle in the instant case for establishing contributory negligence as a matter of law. Because this case is decided on other grounds, it is not necessary to discuss the question of whether a retailer of a defective product may be held strictly liable. The summary judgment of the district court is affirmed. We Concur: Justices. Mr. Justice Frank I . Haswell, dissenting: I would vacate the summary judgment and remand the case for trial on the merits. My disagreement with the majority is on the facts, not upon the law. Admittedly the record is barren of direct testimonial proof that the defect existed at the time the saw left the hands of defendants. However, in my view the record supports an inference that it did. Proof of a defect in the product may be made through inferences drawn from && circumstantial evidence as well as by evidence. Barich v. Ottenstror, Mont . , 550 P.2d 395, 33 St.Rep. 481 (1976); Kober & Kyriss v. Billings Deac. Hosp., 148 Mont. 117, 417 P.2d 476; Brandenberger v. Toyota Motor Sales, 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268, Because this inference must be weighed against oppos- ing evidence to determine where the truth lies, this case presents a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment in my opinion. Justice M r . Justice Daniel J. Shea dissenting: I concur with the dissent of Justice Haswell and I further dissent because the d i s t r i c t court used h i s own personal standards in assessing plaintiff's conduct and also because the d i s t r i c t court erred i n ruling the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. The d i s t r i c t court's summary judgment order stated: "One of the instructions t h i s court always gives t o the t r i a l jury is that ' i n considering the evidence you have a right t o do so based upon your conmhon general knowledge formed by ordinary experiences and observations i n your daily affairs of l i f e . ' In this action the defendants have moved for a sunnnary judg- ment based upon the facts presented by the pleadings and a s further explained by depositions and other papers i n the court f i l e . "In determining whether or not there is a genuine issue of fact for the jury t h i s judge deems himself bound by the same rules a s would apply to the jury. This judge has been the owner of a Rockwell Table Saw for over 40 years. That saw has been used often and it has been used to cut many short pieces of both one- inch and two-inch lumber to be used a s ' j o i s t bracing. I This judge has also suffered an injury t o his l e f t index finger from that saw. This judge has often moved that e m and has always f e l t it necessary t o t e s t the stability of the saw before use and often has found it necessary to shim one leg as was done by the p l a i n t i f f ' s employee when the saw here in question was used. "The court holds a s a matter of l a w that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent i n failing t o take the most elementary precautions before attempting t o use the saw. The court also holds that a s a matter of law the injury could not have happened because of the 1/4 inch shorter leg unless the plaintiff was himself negligent i n the feeding of the material into the saw blade. "The motion for summary judgment is granted." It is clear the t r i a l court relied on his own personal experiences i n determining the standard to which the plaintiff in t h i s case must be held. While it is laudable that the d i s t r i c t court takes the precautions he does when he operates a table saw, nevertheless, this is not the standard he must use when deter- mining a motion for summary judgment. The basis of the ruling was that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. However contributory negligence is not a defense in a case involving s t r i c t liability. Prosser 9 L on Torts, 4th Ed., pp. 522-525;l~estatement of Torts 2d, $402~4, p. 356. The Restatement provides: "since the l i a b i l i t y with which t h i s Section deals is not based upon negligence of the seller, but is s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y , the rule applied to s t r i c t liability/ @#ffes. Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence consists merely in a failure t o discover the defect in the pro- duct, or to guard against the possibility of the existence. On the other hand the form of contributory negligence which consists i n voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a knwwn danger, and commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this Section a s i n other cases of s t r i c t liability. I f the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably t o make use of the product and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery." I n t h i s case plaintiff i n his deposition testified that he had seen the saw standing two times before he was injured, and a t neither time was he aware of its instability. It is clear that a t least on the basis of the p l a i n t i f f ' s testimony, and there was no other proof, that he was not even aware of a defect in the saw a t the time he was injured. Under these c i r - cumstances the defense of assumption of r i s k would not efen be available. Moreover, even i f it were, t h i s defense should not be subject t o summary adjudication, but rather, is a question for the jury. Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Company, I would reverse the summary judgment order and order the case be tried t o a jury on its merits.