Title: Commonwealth v. Lang

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-10405 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  FRANCIS LANG. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 7, 2014. - August 4, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Cordy, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Public trial, Jury, Waiver of 
constitutional rights, Assistance of counsel.  Jury and 
Jurors.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Empanelment of 
jury, Public trial, Waiver, Instructions to jury, 
Assistance of counsel.  Mental Impairment. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on May 11, 2005. 
 
 
The case was tried before Stephen E. Neel, J., and one 
issue raised in a motion for a new trial, filed on May 6, 2009, 
was heard by him; the remaining issue raised in that motion for 
a new trial was heard by Patrick F. Brady, J., and a motion for 
reconsideration was considered by him. 
 
 
 
Ruth Greenberg for the defendant. 
 
John P. Zanini, Assistant District Attorney (Edmond J. 
Zabin, Assistant District Attorney, with him) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Leslie W. O'Brien, for Richard M. Boucher, Jr., amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  During an early morning altercation outside a 
bar in the Charlestown section of Boston, the defendant, Francis 
2 
 
Lang, stabbed the victim, Richard T. Dever, multiple times, 
causing his death.  On December 12, 2006, a jury convicted the 
defendant of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty.1  Represented by new counsel on appeal,2 the 
defendant claims (1) error in the denial of his motion for a new 
trial based on a violation of his right to a public trial during 
jury empanelment; (2) error in the judge's instructions to the 
jury; and (3) constitutionally ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel for failure to investigate and to pursue a defense of 
lack of criminal responsibility.3  We affirm the defendant's 
conviction and the orders denying his motion for a new trial, 
and we discern no basis to exercise our authority pursuant to 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
1.  Background.  The jury could have found the following 
facts.  Shortly before midnight on March 18, 2005, the 
defendant, with a can of beer in hand, entered a bar in 
Charlestown.  Because of an incident several years prior, the 
                     
 
1 The Commonwealth also had proceeded under a theory of 
deliberate premeditation, but the jury did not find the 
defendant guilty under that theory. 
 
 
2 The defendant is represented on appeal by counsel who 
represented him in connection with his motion for a new trial. 
 
 
3 The defendant's claims of a public trial violation and 
ineffective assistance of counsel initially were raised in one 
motion, but were dealt with separately and by different judges 
because the trial judge had retired. 
 
3 
 
defendant had been banned from the bar by the bartender who was 
on duty when the defendant arrived.  The bartender and his 
sister, a waitress at the bar, were the only employees working 
that night. 
 
The defendant approached the bartender and asked for a 
beer.  The bartender reminded the defendant4 that he was not 
welcome at the establishment.  The defendant protested, stating 
that a long time had passed and he was a "different person."  
The bartender repeated that the defendant was not welcome.  
Growing upset, the defendant told the bartender that he had 
better contact the police and "have them take me out because I 
am not leaving."  As the bartender headed over to a telephone 
behind the bar, the defendant started yelling obscenities. 
 
The bartender's sister, her boy friend, and the victim5 went 
over to the defendant.  The defendant apologized to the 
bartender's sister.  Someone asked the defendant to leave and 
tried to usher him to the front door.  Although he started to 
comply with their requests to leave, the defendant threw his 
beer can, smashing a glass object at the bar, and said, "Fuck 
you," to the bartender. 
                     
 
4 The defendant had an odor of alcohol on his breath and was 
slurring his words. 
 
 
5 The victim was at the bar with the bartender's sister's 
boy friend; they were friends. 
 
4 
 
 
Accounts by patrons inside the bar varied as to what next 
ensued, but there was evidence that a scuffle occurred in the 
small foyer at the entrance of the bar involving the defendant 
and the victim, and possibly others.  One witness testified that 
the victim threw punches at the defendant.  The scuffle moved 
outside onto the sidewalk in front of the bar.  There, the 
defendant and the victim exchanged punches.  The defendant took 
out a pocket knife and stabbed the victim several times, 
stating, "How do you like that, motherfucker?," and, "How's your 
motherfucking pretty face now?"  The defendant "gave the finger" 
and left.  Minutes later, he returned to the bar briefly, 
yelling and looking for his glasses.  He then fled the scene.  
Several hours later, the police found the defendant hiding in a 
basement apartment at a home in the area and arrested him. 
 
After the altercation, the victim, with the assistance of 
his friend, returned inside the bar.  The victim had blood all 
over his face from a gash inflicted during the stabbing.  His 
shirt was torn open revealing blood on his chest.  After 
stopping briefly at the back of the bar to sit down, the victim 
was brought to a room out of sight behind the bar.  Someone 
screamed, "Call an ambulance."  The bartender made the call, and 
police officers and paramedics arrived within minutes.  They 
found the victim covered in blood and gasping for air.  
Paramedics transported the victim to a nearby hospital where he 
5 
 
was pronounced dead in the early morning hours of the following 
day. 
 
The victim died as a result of multiple stab wounds.  He 
suffered three stab wounds to the left side of his chest, one of 
which perforated his heart, and one stab wound under his arm.  
Also, as a result of the attack, the victim had three incised 
wounds on his face, one of which exposed bone.6 
 
The defendant did not testify.  He called one witness, a 
patron at the bar.  The patron stated that before the stabbing, 
the defendant had been physically attacked by four people.  
Based on this witness's testimony, the defendant's trial counsel 
argued that the defendant had acted in self-defense.  
Alternatively, the defendant's trial counsel asserted that 
mitigating circumstances rendered the killing nothing more than 
voluntary manslaughter. 
                     
 
6 We have noted the distinction between stab and incised 
wounds in prior murder cases.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Vacher, 469 Mass. 425, 427 n.3 (2014); Commonwealth v. Chambers, 
465 Mass. 520, 524 (2013); Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 462 Mass. 
827, 832 (2012).  As understood in the forensic pathology 
community, "a stab wound is a wound from a cutting instrument 
that is deeper than [its surface length], whereas an incised 
wound . . . is a sharp force injury where the length on the 
surface is longer than the depth."  Commonwealth v. Phillips, 
452 Mass. 617, 622 (2008).  The medical examiner in this case 
testified consistent with this understanding:  "an incised 
injury is more of a long cut on the skin; a stabbing injury is 
usually smaller on the skin surface where the sharp instrument 
is pushed in." 
 
6 
 
 
In addition to instructing the jury on murder in the first 
degree, the judge instructed on murder in the second degree and 
on voluntary manslaughter based on excessive force in self-
defense, heat of passion on reasonable provocation, and heat of 
passion induced by sudden combat.  He also instructed on self-
defense and on the effect of a defendant's alcohol intoxication 
on intent. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Public trial.  In 2009, the defendant 
moved for a new trial, claiming a violation of his right to a 
public trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution when court officers excluded the 
public and his family from the court room during jury 
empanelment.  The trial judge conducted an evidentiary hearing 
on the motion and issued written findings of fact summarized as 
follows. 
 
Jury empanelment in the case took place during the course 
of two days.  At the time of the defendant's trial in 2006, the 
generally accepted practice at the Suffolk County Court House in 
circumstances where the venire likely would require all 
available seats was for a court officer to instruct the public 
to leave until seats became available.  If a family member or an 
interested citizen requested permission to remain in the court 
room during jury empanelment, a court officer would bring the 
request to the attention of the presiding judge, whose practice 
7 
 
was to hear the request and to attempt to accommodate the 
individual.  No such requests were brought to the judge's 
attention in this case. 
 
On the first day of jury empanelment, the court room, 
initially, was filled to capacity with prospective jurors.  As 
the empanelment proceeded that day, seats became available for 
persons other than prospective jurors.  The day concluded at 
4:30 P.M.  On the second day, there may have been extra seats in 
the court room from the outset, and certainly were at some point 
that morning before jury empanelment was completed at 12:30 P.M. 
 
Before commencing jury empanelment on the first day, the 
court officer in charge of the prospective jurors instructed the 
defendant's sister and her party7 to leave the court room because 
the seats were needed for prospective jurors.8  The defendant's 
sister asked if they could remain because they "were a little 
afraid of the other people waiting outside."  The court officer 
                     
 
7 The defendant's sister stated that her mother and boy 
friend were with her that day.  The defendant's mother submitted 
an affidavit in conjunction with the motion for a new trial, but 
did not testify at the evidentiary hearing in support of the 
motion.  The judge expressly discredited the entirety of the 
defendant's mother's affidavit.  The judge, however, found that 
the defendant's sister and one other person, either the 
defendant's sister's boy friend or mother, had been present at 
the court room on the first morning of jury empanelment. 
 
 
8 There was no evidence that any other members of the public 
also were inside the court room. 
 
8 
 
responded that they had to leave so there would be room for the 
prospective jurors. 
 
The defendant's sister and her party left the court room 
and sat on a bench in a hallway.  They remained there for the 
rest of jury empanelment, and at no time did the defendant's 
sister return to the court room to see whether seats had become 
available or to ask any of the three attending court officers 
whether seats had opened up.9 
 
During jury empanelment, none of the three court officers 
told anyone that the court room was "closed."  They did not lock 
the doors to the court room, and they did not post a sign or 
officer at the doors to the court room to prevent anyone from 
entering. 
 
During trial, the defendant was represented by experienced 
counsel.  The defendant's trial counsel was aware of the 
defendant's right to a public trial.  Defense counsel, however, 
did not object to what he believed to be the "acceptable common 
practice" of excluding the public during jury empanelment when 
the court room was filled with prospective jurors with no room 
remaining for the public.  Although he had no specific memory in 
the defendant's case (except that there were more prospective 
                     
 
9 The judge found that the defendant's sister had discussed 
with the defendant during trial the fact that she had been asked 
to leave the court room before the prospective jurors were 
escorted in. 
9 
 
jurors in the court room than seats available), the defendant's 
trial counsel often would tell members of a defendant's family 
that empanelment may be boring. 
 
The judge concluded that the defendant had not satisfied 
his burden of showing that, during the jury selection process, 
the court room was closed in any but a trivial or de minimis 
way.  He also determined that even if the court room were found 
to have been partially closed, the record established that the 
closure was not unconstitutional.  There was no error. 
 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees all criminal defendants "the 
right to a speedy and public trial."  See Waller v. Georgia, 467 
U.S. 39, 46 (1984).  In limited circumstances, a judge may bar 
spectators from portions of a criminal trial.  Commonwealth v. 
Martin, 417 Mass. 187, 194 (1994).  To do so, however, a judge 
must make a case-specific determination that closure is 
necessary, satisfying four requirements:  "[1] the party seeking 
to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is 
likely to be prejudiced, [2] the closure must be no broader than 
necessary to protect that interest, [3] the trial court must 
consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and 
[4] it must make findings adequate to support the closure."  
Id., quoting Waller, supra at 48. 
 
"The right to a public trial extends to the jury selection 
process."  Commonwealth v. Morganti, 467 Mass. 96, 101, cert. 
10 
 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 356 (2014), and cases cited.  "Conducting 
jury selection in open court permits members of the public to 
observe trial proceedings and promotes fairness in the judicial 
system."  Commonwealth v. Lavoie, 464 Mass. 83, 86, cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 2356 (2013).  Where closure during jury 
empanelment occurs over a defendant's objection, the 
requirements set forth in Waller, supra, must be satisfied to 
avoid violating a defendant's right to a public trial.  
Commonwealth v. Cohen (No. 1), 456 Mass. 94, 95, 107 (2010). 
 
"It is well settled that the violation of a defendant's 
right to a public trial is structural error requiring reversal."  
Commonwealth v. Wall, 469 Mass. 652, 672 (2014).  "However, even 
structural error 'is subject to the doctrine of waiver.'"  
Commonwealth v. Wall, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Cohen (No. 
1), 456 Mass. at 106.  "A defendant need not consent personally 
to the waiver of his right to a public trial; trial counsel may 
waive the right to a public trial as a tactical decision without 
the defendant's express consent."  Commonwealth v. Wall, supra, 
citing Commonwealth v. Lavoie, 464 Mass. at 88-89.  "Further, 
the right to a public trial may be procedurally waived whenever 
a litigant fails to make a timely objection to an error."  
Commonwealth v. Wall, supra, citing Commonwealth v. Morganti, 
467 Mass. at 102.  "A procedural waiver may occur where the 
11 
 
failure to object is inadvertent."  Commonwealth v. Wall, supra 
at 672-673, citing Commonwealth v. Morganti, supra. 
 
Our recent cases concerning waiver apply here.  As in 
Commonwealth v. Alebord, 467 Mass. 106, 108, 113, cert. denied, 
134 S. Ct. 2830 (2014), we conclude that the defendant waived 
his right to a public trial "where his experienced trial counsel 
was aware that the court room was routinely closed to spectators 
during the jury empanelment process and did not object" at trial 
to the partial closure.  The defendant did not need to consent 
to the waiver itself; his counsel could effectuate the waiver 
and did.  See Commonwealth v. Morganti, 467 Mass. at 102.  Nor 
was his trial counsel, in the circumstances, ineffective for 
failing to object to the closure.  See Commonwealth v. Alebord, 
supra at 114; Commonwealth v. Morganti, supra at 104-105. 
 
b.  Jury instructions.  The defendant argues error in the 
judge's instructions on extreme atrocity or cruelty based on 
second and third prong malice.  To prove malice required for a 
murder committed on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty, 
"the Commonwealth must prove one of three prongs:  (1) intent to 
kill the victim; (2) intent to cause grievous bodily harm to the 
victim; or (3) commission of an act that, in the circumstances 
known to the defendant, a reasonable person would have known 
created a plain and strong likelihood of death."  Commonwealth 
v. Riley, 467 Mass. 799, 821-822 (2014).  See Commonwealth v. 
12 
 
Grey, 399 Mass. 469, 470 n.1 (1987).  Specifically, the 
defendant, relying on the concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. 
Riley, supra, argues that we should alter our definition of 
malice by abrogating second or third prong malice because those 
prongs do not require an intent to kill.10,11  We decline the 
invitation to do so here.  The judge's instructions to the jury 
in this case were in accord with our common law of murder and 
followed our Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 12 (1999), 
which applied at the time of trial. 
 
We also reject the defendant's argument that third prong 
malice has "the same state of mind required for conviction of 
involuntary manslaughter," and that consequently his life 
sentence is a "disproportionate punishment."  We have explained: 
 
"The difference between the elements of the third 
prong of malice and wanton and reckless conduct amounting 
to involuntary manslaughter lies in the degree of risk of 
physical harm that a reasonable person would recognize was 
created by particular conduct, based on what the defendant 
knew.  The risk for the purposes of third prong malice is 
                     
 
10 The defendant objected to the charge below on these 
grounds, so the issue is preserved. 
 
 
11 The concurrence suggested that, "before a conviction of 
murder may be elevated to murder in the first degree based on 
extreme atrocity or cruelty," Commonwealth v. Riley, 467 Mass. 
799, 829 (2014) (Duffly, J., concurring), a jury should be 
required to find that "the defendant either intended to cause an 
extremely atrocious or cruel death or was indifferent to such a 
result."  Id.  The facts in Riley, however, took into account 
that "the jury apparently did not conclude that [the defendant] 
either intended to kill his daughter or to cause her grievous 
bodily harm."  Id. at 828.  The same cannot be said here. 
 
13 
 
that there was a plain and strong likelihood of death. 
. . .  The risk that will satisfy the standard for wilful 
and wanton conduct amounting to involuntary manslaughter 
'involves a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm 
will result to another.'" 
 
Commonwealth v. Vizcarrondo, 427 Mass. 392, 396 (1998), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Sires, 413 Mass. 292, 303-304 n.14 (1992).  The 
standards are not synonymous. 
 
c.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  The defendant 
argues that the motion judge12 erroneously denied his motion for 
a new trial based on his trial counsel's failure to investigate 
and pursue a defense of lack of criminal responsibility under 
the standards set forth in Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 
544, 546-547 (1967).  There was no error in the judge's ruling 
on the motion, although we affirm on different grounds. 
 
In a written memorandum of decision and order, issued after 
an evidentiary hearing, the judge made the following findings of 
fact.13  Twenty-two days before the victim was killed, the 
defendant had been released from Federal prison, where he had 
been serving time for a conviction of being a felon in 
                     
 
12 Because the trial judge had retired, a different judge 
heard and decided the ineffective assistance of counsel issue.  
See note 3, supra. 
 
 
13 The judge based his findings on the testimony of the 
defendant's trial counsel; the defendant's retained 
psychologist, Dr. Paul Spiers; and a psychologist retained by 
the Commonwealth, Dr. Tali K. Walters. 
 
14 
 
possession of ammunition.  Before the killing, the defendant had 
spent much of his adult life in prison. 
 
The defendant's trial counsel is a very able, experienced, 
and highly regarded defense attorney.  He has practiced criminal 
law since he was admitted to the bar in 1975 and has represented 
defendants in approximately fifty to one hundred murder cases.  
He was appointed by the court to represent the defendant in this 
case. 
 
When the defendant's trial counsel met with the defendant 
about his case, the defendant informed him that he had a 
psychiatric history.  Predecessor counsel had filed a motion for 
a motion for funds to screen the defendant for mental illness, 
but had not pursued it.  Although the defendant mentioned his 
psychiatric history to his trial counsel, the defendant did not 
express any particular interest in pursuing a mental health 
defense at trial.14  The defendant's explanation to his trial 
counsel concerning his conduct at the time of the killing was 
that he was attacked by several patrons of the bar and was 
defending himself.  His trial counsel believed that this defense 
was viable in that it was supported by at least one independent 
                     
 
14 The judge found that the defendant, in his posttrial 
interview with the Commonwealth's expert, stated his opposition 
to any suggestion of pursuing a lack of criminal responsibility 
defense. 
 
15 
 
witness.  At trial, the defendant's claim of self-defense was 
supported by the testimony of one patron from the bar. 
 
The defendant's trial counsel did not review the 
defendant's psychiatric history, consult with a mental health 
expert, or discuss the possibility of a defense of lack of 
criminal responsibility with the defendant, although defense 
counsel was familiar with this defense and had utilized it 
previously on behalf of other clients.  The defendant's trial 
counsel held a firm belief that this defense was rarely 
successful and should be raised only as a last resort and where 
no other viable defenses exist.  In his view, the inherent 
difficulty of a lack of criminal responsibility defense, coupled 
with the availability of a viable defense of self-defense, 
obviated the necessity of any action on the issue of the 
defendant's criminal responsibility. 
 
To support the defendant's motion for a new trial, Dr. Paul 
A. Spiers, a neuropsychologist, examined the defendant and 
prepared an affidavit.  Dr. Spiers met with the defendant, 
performed tests, and reviewed the defendant's psychiatric 
history.  In Dr. Spiers's opinion, the defendant was not 
criminally responsible for killing the victim because, at the 
time of the stabbing, the defendant did not appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his conduct and could not conform his conduct to 
the requirements of the law.  In reaching his opinion, Dr. 
16 
 
Spiers explained that the defendant suffered from a variety of 
mental disorders, including attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder, learning disabilities, anxiety, seizure disorder, 
opposition-defiant disorder, bipolar disorder, and frontal 
network dysfunction.15  In 2001, while being evaluated in Federal 
prison for competency to stand trial, the defendant was 
diagnosed with bipolar disorder, and since then has been 
prescribed numerous medications for that condition, and for his 
anxiety and seizure disorder.  On a number of occasions, mental 
health professionals who examined him in prison described the 
defendant's behavior as impulsive and noted that he was not able 
to control his behavior.  When Dr. Spiers interviewed him, the 
defendant insisted, as he had to his trial counsel and to the 
Commonwealth's expert, that he had acted in self-defense.  There 
is no evidence that the defendant ever suffered from visual or 
auditory hallucinations or thought disorder. 
 
The Commonwealth's expert, Dr. Tali K. Walters, a forensic 
psychologist, conducted a three-hour interview of the defendant 
on September 16, 2011, and reviewed all of his psychiatric 
records and relevant portions of the case investigation file.  
                     
 
15 Testing revealed that the defendant had an intelligence 
quotient (IQ) in an extremely low and defective range.  The 
expert testimony was that the defendant's IQ was the equivalent 
of a person whom experts in the field previously labeled as 
"mentally retarded." 
 
17 
 
Based on her examination and review of the records mentioned 
above, she opined that the defendant was criminally responsible 
for his actions at the time of the killing.  She based her 
opinion on a number of factors, including that there appeared to 
be no evidence in the twenty-two days before the crime, after 
the defendant's release from Federal prison, of him suffering 
from any symptoms of mental illness.  The defendant had not 
taken his medications with him from the prison, and had been 
without them for the duration preceding the crime, but Dr. 
Walters explained that the return of symptoms "takes weeks to 
months, sometimes years."  Dr. Walters added that, in the 
defendant's case, it did not appear that his symptoms had 
returned prior to the murder.  Nor, according to Dr. Walters, 
did the defendant experience symptoms of bipolar disorder or any 
other mental illness during the first seven months following his 
arrest and incarceration for the victim's murder. 
 
Applying the standard set forth in Commonwealth v. 
Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974), the judge denied the 
defendant's motion.  In doing so, he rejected the defendant's 
contention that defense counsel is obligated to investigate a 
defense of lack of criminal responsibility "in all cases in 
which a defendant may have a psychiatric background."  The judge 
concluded that defense counsel's opinion that such a defense is 
one of last resort to be used where no other viable defense 
18 
 
exists was not unreasonable, as it is a view "shared by other 
criminal defense attorneys."  The judge concluded as well that 
counsel ably represented the defendant in presenting a viable 
defense, self-defense.  The judge drew on his experience as a 
trial judge in murder cases, noting in his decision that 
"insanity verdicts are rare, even when . . . there is strong 
evidence of mental illness or bizarre human conduct," 
Commonwealth v. Walker, 443 Mass. 213, 226 n.2 (2005).  Last, 
the judge determined that presenting a defense of lack of 
criminal responsibility would have undermined or been 
inconsistent with self-defense and would not have accomplished 
anything material for the defendant, who had made it clear in 
postconviction interviews that he did not want to use such a 
defense in the event he was granted a new trial. 
 
In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in 
a defendant's appeal of a conviction for murder in the first 
degree, we "determine whether there exists a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, as required under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, which is more favorable to the defendant than is 
the general constitutional standard for determining ineffective 
assistance of counsel."  Commonwealth v. Frank, 433 Mass. 185, 
187 (2001). See Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 
(1992).  The inquiry is "whether there was an error in the 
course of trial (by defense counsel, the prosecutor, or the 
19 
 
judge), and, if there was, whether that error was likely to have 
influenced the jury's conclusion."  Id.  "Under this more 
favorable standard of review, we consider a defendant's claim 
even if the action by trial counsel does not 'constitute conduct 
falling "measurably below" that of an "ordinary fallible 
lawyer."'"  Commonwealth v. Williams, 453 Mass. 203, 205 (2009), 
quoting Commonwealth v. MacKenzie, 413 Mass. 498, 517 (1992). 
 
In this case, defense counsel made a strategic decision, 
without investigation or discussion with the defendant, not to 
pursue or to investigate a defense of lack of criminal 
responsibility (or other psychiatric defense).  This decision 
was based on his knowledge of the extreme rarity of not guilty 
by reason of insanity verdicts, and on his significant 
experience in the trial of murder cases that pursuing and 
focusing on any other viable defense is the better course of 
action.16  Where, as here, the defendant's ineffective assistance 
                     
 
16 At the evidentiary hearing on the motion, the defendant's 
trial counsel explained: 
 
 
"I think it's difficult to defend on a series of 
fallback position[s], you know, my [client] didn't do it.  
If he did, it was self-defense.  If you don't buy that, he 
was crazy.  I think you dilute your chances of winning if 
you throw up a series of defenses. . . .  It depends on the 
specifics of [each] case and what my goal is in the case, 
what I think is realistic.  I think you try cases -- there 
are two different kinds of cases to be tried.  One where 
you actually think you have a chance of winning, and one 
where you don't believe you actually have a chance of 
winning.  And I think your strategic behavior is different 
20 
 
claim is based on a tactical or strategic decision, the test is 
whether the decision was "manifestly unreasonable" when made.  
Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 446 Mass. 435, 442 (2006), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Adams, 374 Mass. 722, 728 (1978). "[S]trategic 
choices made after less than complete investigation are 
reasonable [only] to the extent that reasonable professional 
judgments support the limitation on investigation."  
Commonwealth v. Baker, 440 Mass. 519, 529 (2003), quoting 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-691 (1984).  We 
conclude that the standard for constitutionally effective 
assistance of counsel is not met where defense counsel, as a 
matter of practice, declines to investigate or otherwise 
consider the defendant's mental condition in circumstances where 
an alternative viable defense is available.  Regardless of the 
strategic choice of a defense, counsel must engage in a rational 
calculation of the need for and scope of an evaluation of the 
defendant's mental condition. 
                                                                  
in those two situations, and I would be much more likely to 
throw in the kitchen sink, so to speak, if I thought there 
was no chance of winning period. . . .  [I]f you think that 
you really do have a chance of winning, then you want to 
maximize that chance by not throwing in the kitchen sink, 
by focusing on what is . . . really at issue and not having 
a strategy that goes in two different directions." 
 
The defendant's trial counsel testified that he believed that in 
this case, the defense of self-defense was a potentially winning 
argument. 
 
21 
 
 
We previously have held that the "[f]ailure to investigate 
an insanity defense falls below the level of competence" 
demanded of an attorney "if facts known to, or accessible to, 
trial counsel raised a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's 
mental condition."  Commonwealth v. Roberio, 428 Mass. 278, 279-
280 (1998), quoting Commonwealth v. Doucette, 391 Mass. 443, 
458-459 (1984).  Here, it is undisputed that the defendant had a 
psychiatric history and that defense counsel was aware of that 
history.  The defendant revealed to defense counsel some aspects 
of his psychiatric history, which counsel described as 
"significant."  In addition, defense counsel was aware that 
predecessor counsel had sought funds for a social worker to 
develop a "social history [of the defendant] and screen for 
mental illness."  This information was sufficient to trigger an 
obligation to at least consider an investigation of the 
defendant's mental condition.  Here, however, counsel 
acknowledged a failure even to consider an investigation, 
explaining that he categorically rejects a lack of criminal 
responsibility defense, regardless of its merits, if any other 
defense is available.17  The failure to do so, given the 
                     
 
17  At the hearing on the motion for new trial, counsel 
testified as follows:  "I remember [that the defendant] 
mentioned [that] he had a significant psychiatric history [but] 
I was not that interested in a psychiatric defense.  And so, I 
wasn't pressing him and asking for details and engaging him in 
that conversation." 
22 
 
available information suggesting that the defendant had a 
substantial psychiatric history, did not meet this standard. 
 
We do not hold that counsel is obligated to pursue a full 
scale mental evaluation in every case where the facts or the 
defendant's background suggest only a hint of a mental issue.  
We conclude, however, that where counsel is aware of information 
that may call into question the defendant's criminal 
responsibility, he must first make a reasoned choice whether 
further investigation is warranted.  In this regard, we 
emphasize the distinction between the facts of this case and 
Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664 (2015), where we 
declined to impose on counsel a duty to investigate further the 
defendant's mental condition.  In Kolenovic, supra at 669-670, 
678, counsel arranged a preliminary psychiatric evaluation, but 
made an informed strategic decision not to pursue the matter 
further. 
Counsel's failure in this case to take any steps to inform 
himself of the defendant's mental condition rendered this aspect 
of his representation ineffective. 
 
As the defendant implicitly recognizes, a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel that focuses on counsel's 
asserted failure to investigate a lack of criminal 
responsibility defense is generally, and perhaps necessarily, 
linked to a claim that counsel was ineffective for not 
23 
 
presenting a lack of criminal responsibility defense at trial.  
Thus, here, the defendant's ineffective assistance claim joins 
the two:  although he emphasizes counsel's failure to 
investigate his mental condition, he also claims that counsel's 
failure to present a "mental impairment" defense was deficient.  
A defense attorney's duty in this respect is to exercise a 
reasonable judgment in making the ultimate choice of the defense 
to be presented at the trial, taking into account the array of 
potentially viable defenses. 
 
In our analysis of this issue, we assume, as the defendant 
argues, that Dr. Paul Spiers's expert opinion would have been 
available to counsel, if he had appropriately undertaken some 
investigation of the defendant's mental health history before 
trial.  The question then posed is whether, after failing to 
investigate a lack of criminal responsibility or mental 
impairment defense, counsel's decision not to present an 
available defense on that basis also was ineffective.  Based on 
this record, we are persuaded that, even assuming the 
availability of a viable lack of criminal responsibility 
defense, counsel's strategic choice to defend the case solely on 
a self-defense theory was not manifestly unreasonable.18 
                     
 
18 As we have said, the more favorable standard of review 
articulated in Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. at 682 applies 
where the defendant has been convicted of murder in the first 
degree and asserts a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
24 
 
 
This was not a case where defense counsel's strategic 
decision left the defendant without any defense at all,  
Commonwealth v. Haggerty, 400 Mass. 437, 441-442 (1987), and 
there is no suggestion in the record or by appellate counsel in 
argument that the alternative self-defense theory was not 
supported by the facts or that it was not presented competently 
by counsel.  In the absence of any record support for a 
conclusion that counsel irrationally pursued a defense that 
lacked viability, we will not disturb an otherwise reasonable 
strategic choice.  It was eminently reasonable to consider, 
regardless of the possibility of a favorable expert opinion that 
the defendant lacked criminal responsibility, the inherent 
difficulty in persuading a jury of the merits of that defense as 
a factor in the choice of a defense, and to reject this option 
in favor of a defense deemed to be more acceptable to a jury.  
See Commonwealth v. Spray, 467 Mass. 456, 473 (2014) ("a 
decision not to pursue an insanity defense for tactical reasons, 
for instance because in the circumstances the defense would be 
factually weak, is not tantamount to ineffective assistance of 
counsel"); Commonwealth v. Walker, 443 Mass. at 228 (affirming 
                                                                  
Notwithstanding the more limited deference to counsel when the 
defendant stands convicted of murder in the first degree, we may 
still rely on the manifestly unreasonable test in Commonwealth 
v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974), to evaluate the claimed 
inadequacy in counsel's performance. 
 
25 
 
denial of motion for new trial in part based on fact that 
defense counsel's trial strategy of pursuing one defense, as 
opposed to multiple defenses, was not manifestly unreasonable, 
"especially where the mental health defense would have 'severely 
weakened' the defense of self-defense"). In addition, as the 
judge found, presenting both defenses would have been 
pragmatically (although not legally) inconsistent.  See 
Commonwealth v. Walker, 443 Mass. at 226 (although mental health 
defense and self-defense would not necessarily have been 
incompatible, mental impairment defense "likely would have an 
adverse impact on the claim of self-defense"). 
 
Applying the manifestly unreasonable test to counsel's 
decision to forgo a lack of criminal responsibility defense in 
the circumstances of this case, we cannot say that "lawyers of 
ordinary training and skill" would not consider his strategic 
choice to be competent.  Thus, we conclude that counsel's 
decision to forgo a lack of criminal responsibility defense on 
this basis was not manifestly unreasonable. 
 
Also, consistent with the view expressed in Commonwealth v. 
Kolenovic, 471 Mass. at 678, we add that counsel was not 
obligated to present a defense based on Dr. Spiers's expert 
opinion that the defendant suffered from a mental impairment at 
the time of the offense.  Because we have recognized that "a 
defendant's legal counsel is uniquely qualified to assess the 
26 
 
nuances that attend the development of the trial strategy," 
counsel reasonably may decline to accept the advice of a 
retained expert.  Id. 
 
Last, the defendant's reliance on Commonwealth v. Federici, 
427 Mass. 740 (1998), to advance the argument that he was 
entitled to make the choice whether to present a mental 
impairment defense and that counsel's strategic decision not to 
do so constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, is 
misplaced.19  In Federici, supra at 743-744, we determined only 
that a defendant's choice to forgo an insanity defense is a 
constitutionally protected right.  Our holding did not reach the 
issue whether the defendant has an affirmative right to decide, 
independently of counsel, to present that defense.  Even if we 
were to adopt that view, the defendant would gain nothing by it 
given the particular circumstances of this case.  Contrary to 
the defendant in Federici, the defendant expressed no wish or 
choice on the subject of presenting or forgoing a lack of 
criminal responsibility defense, and did not attempt to make any 
                     
 
19 In Commonwealth v. Federici, 427 Mass. 740, 743-744 
(1998), the defendant, at trial, personally opposed the judge's 
proposal to instruct the jury on lack of criminal 
responsibility, then argued on appeal that the judge erred in 
failing to give that instruction despite the defendant's 
objection.  We concluded that, "[i]n the circumstances, the 
judge had no obligation to do more and was entitled to rely on 
the defendant's refusal to present a defense of insanity."  Id. 
at 746. 
 
27 
 
decision on the matter.  Also, as the record reflects, the 
defendant steadfastly maintains that he will not present a 
mental impairment defense even he is granted a new trial.20 
 
The confluence of these factors persuades us that counsel's 
strategic decision to forgo a defense of lack of criminal 
responsibility was not manifestly unreasonable.  Although we do 
not reach the issue of prejudice in our analysis, we discern no 
basis for concluding that counsel's strategic choices, even if 
erroneous, created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice where the evidence against the defendant was strong and 
counsel ably defended the indictment.  Commonwealth v. Wright, 
411 Mass. at 682. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  We affirm the defendant's conviction and 
the orders denying his motion for a new trial, and discern no 
basis to exercise our authority pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Orders denying motion for a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  new trial affirmed. 
 
                     
 
20 The defendant forcefully expressed his resolve not to 
present a mental impairment defense at a new trial.  In the 
interview with the Commonwealth's expert, the defendant stated:  
"No, I'm not going to do that, you mean insanity? . . . I'm not 
a retard.  I just have mental health history.  I don't want to 
go to Bridgewater. . . I know what it is to be NGI -- go to 
Bridgewater and be forced to take medication and all that 
stuff." 
 
 
LENK, J. (concurring, with whom Gants, C.J., and Cordy, J., 
join).  In this case, the court rejects the defendant's motion 
for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel 
because it determines that a hypothetical strategic decision, 
which defense counsel never actually made, was "not manifestly 
unreasonable."  Ante at    .  Because I believe that the 
"manifestly unreasonable" standard should apply only when we are 
assessing the strategic decisions that defense counsel actually 
made, and not imagined decisions that counsel could have made, I 
respectfully concur and write separately. 
 
The familiar test for claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, set forth by the United States Supreme Court in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984) 
(Strickland), and by this court in Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 
Mass. 89, 96 (1974) (Saferian), has two prongs.  The court asks 
"[1] whether there has been serious incompetency, inefficiency, 
or inattention of counsel -- behavior of counsel falling 
measurably below that which might be expected from an ordinary 
fallible lawyer -- and, if that is found, then [2] . . . whether 
it has likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise available, 
substantial ground for defence."  Id. at 96. 
 
The court in this case concludes that defense counsel's 
"failure even to consider an investigation" into a potential 
lack of criminal responsibility defense, "given the available 
2 
 
information suggesting that the defendant had a substantial 
psychiatric history, did not meet th[e] standard" for effective 
assistance of counsel.  Ante at   .  I agree with that 
determination.  Then, however, instead of proceeding to the 
second prong of the Saferian-Strickland test and asking whether 
counsel's error prejudiced the defendant's trial, the court 
reconstructs a hypothetical choice that counsel might have made, 
had counsel completed an adequate investigation.  The court 
"assume[s] . . . that Dr. Paul Spiers's expert opinion [that the 
defendant lacked criminal responsibility for the killing] would 
have been available to counsel, if he had appropriately 
undertaken some investigation of the defendant's mental health 
history before trial."  Ante at    .  Concluding that, "even 
assuming the availability of a viable lack of criminal 
responsibility defense, counsel's strategic choice to defend the 
case solely on a self-defense theory was not manifestly 
unreasonable," the court affirms the defendant's conviction.  
Id. 
 
Our case law does not support this assessment of counsel's 
strategic defense in isolation from his constitutionally 
inadequate investigation.  On the contrary, we have held that 
"strategic choices made after less than complete investigation 
are reasonable [only] to the extent that reasonable professional 
judgments support the limitation on investigation."  
3 
 
Commonwealth v. Baker, 440 Mass. 519, 529 (2003), quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-691.  In making a judgment about 
whether the scope of an attorney's investigation met the 
constitutional standard of effectiveness, therefore, we are also 
invariably making a judgment about the reasonableness of the 
attorney's strategic choices:  counsel's strategic choice was 
unreasonable because it involved deciding against a defense that 
counsel had done nothing to investigate. 
 
Furthermore, assessing defense counsel's strategic decision 
in isolation from the inadequate investigation violates the rule 
that we "evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the 
time."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  Normally this rule 
operates to protect attorneys against the "distorting effects of 
hindsight," id., and to combat the temptation "to second guess 
counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence," id.  
Yet I see no reason why it should not operate with the same 
force in cases like this one, where the defense attorney's 
strategic choice is unreasonable in light of the limited 
investigation on which it was based.  Id. 
 
Finally, because we are not assessing the strategic choice 
that counsel actually made, the "manifestly unreasonable" 
standard is inappropriate.  The court asserts that, despite the 
"more favorable standard of review" for convictions of murder in 
the first degree under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, "we may still rely 
4 
 
on the manifestly unreasonable test in . . . Saferian . . . to 
evaluate the claimed inadequacy in counsel's performance."  Ante 
at note 18.  While I agree that the "manifestly unreasonable" 
standard remains applicable under § 33E review, that standard 
does not constitute the general standard against which to 
measure any "claimed inadequacy in counsel's performance."  On 
the contrary, the "manifestly unreasonable" standard is a 
special standard that applies where the attorney's purportedly 
constitutionally ineffective conduct involved a strategic 
decision, rather than some other claimed inadequacy such as a 
lack of appropriate investigation or preparation by defense 
counsel.  Commonwealth v. Martin, 427 Mass. 816, 822 (1998).  We 
have emphasized that the "manifestly unreasonable" standard is 
highly deferential.  Commonwealth v. Glover, 459 Mass. 836, 843 
(2011).  That deference reflects the recognition that the 
"distorting effects of hindsight," while always present in 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, are especially severe 
where the court is assessing a trial strategy after it proved 
unsuccessful.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  See also 
Commonwealth v. Glover, supra. 
 
The deference involved in the "manifestly unreasonable" 
standard only makes sense if we are assessing the strategic 
choice that defense counsel actually made.  Had defense counsel 
here adequately investigated the defendant's psychiatric history 
5 
 
and then decided to forgo a lack of criminal responsibility 
defense in favor of a self-defense theory, we would be hard 
pressed to find that strategic decision manifestly unreasonable.  
But that is not what happened.  Instead, the choice that defense 
counsel actually made was to elect a defense without even 
investigating a lack of criminal responsibility defense.  That 
strategic decision was manifestly unreasonable, and I see no 
reason why our assessment of it should be any different simply 
because we can imagine a different lawyer who, after completing 
an adequate investigation into a lack of criminal responsibility 
defense, might have opted against it. 
 
To say that the court should assess only the strategic 
decision that counsel actually made does not mean that we must 
close our eyes to the weakness of the lack of criminal 
responsibility defense that defense counsel failed to 
investigate.  The second prong of the Saferian-Strickland test 
requires the court to ask whether counsel's errors caused 
prejudice to the defendant.  And whereas, in carrying out the 
analysis under the first Saferian-Strickland prong, we "evaluate 
the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time," the inquiry 
involved in the second prong is expressly hypothetical.  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  Where the case comes to this court 
on § 33E review, we ask whether "we are substantially confident 
that, if the error had not been made, the jury verdict would 
6 
 
have been the same."  Commonwealth v. Spray, 467 Mass. 456, 472 
(2014). 
 
Consequently, to establish prejudice here the defendant 
must show that "lack of criminal responsibility would have been 
a substantial defense."  Commonwealth v. Roberio, 428 Mass. 278, 
281 (1998).  In this case, I conclude that the defendant cannot 
make that showing.  The defendant, who bears the burden on both 
prongs of the Saferian-Strickland test, has offered no evidence 
indicating that he would have agreed to present a lack of 
criminal responsibility defense at the time of the original 
trial, and has clearly asserted that he would not present the 
defense at a new trial.  See Commonwealth v. Comita, 441 Mass. 
86, 90 (2004).  Because, under Commonwealth v. Federici, 427 
Mass. 740, 744-745 (1998), the decision to present a lack of 
criminal responsibility defense lies solely with him, his 
failure to produce any evidence indicating his willingness to 
present the defense prevents him from establishing prejudice as 
a result of counsel's failure to investigate such a defense.1 
                     
 
1 Even if the defendant had agreed to present a lack of 
criminal responsibility defense, I question whether it would 
have been a substantial defense in the circumstances and see no 
reasonable basis for thinking the outcome at trial likely would 
have been different.  I come to that view given the considerably 
less than compelling quality of the proposed lack of criminal 
responsibility defense as ultimately outlined by the defense 
expert, the fact that even a compelling lack of criminal 
responsibility defense rarely succeeds, and the diluting effect 
of such a defense on the viable self-defense claim actually 
7 
 
 
My disagreement with the majority is not merely a technical 
quibble.  On the contrary, the court's expansion of the highly 
deferential "manifestly unreasonable" standard beyond our 
evaluation of strategic decisions that counsel actually made 
could have a significant impact upon other cases, where the 
defendant is able to satisfy the prejudice prong of the 
Saferian/Strickland test.  Under the court's approach, a 
defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim would fail 
whenever the court can imagine a hypothetical lawyer who could 
have made a considered strategic judgment to present the case in 
a certain way, even if the court has already found that defense 
counsel's actual decision did not reflect such a considered 
strategic judgment.  That approach significantly diminishes the 
force of ineffective assistance of counsel claims as protection 
against wrongful or unfair convictions. 
 
                                                                  
presented at trial.  These considerations are, of course, the 
same factors that lead the court to determine that the 
hypothetical strategic choice to forgo an ineffective assistance 
of counsel defense was not manifestly unreasonable.