Title: MEEK v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MEEK v. STATE2002 WY 137 P.3d 1279Case Number: 00-321Decided: 01/09/2002
 OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                
     

 

MICHAEL 
JOSEPH MEEK, 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Tina 
N. Kerin, Assistant Appellate Counsel 

 Representing 
Appellee:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D.    Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General; and David L. Delicath, Assistant    Attorney General 

 

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 
            
KITE, Justice.

 [¶1]      Michael Meek was 
convicted on two counts of possessing a controlled substance in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031 (LEXIS 1999).  
He appeals contending an NCIC report was an inadequate basis for a 
reasonable suspicion to allow an investigatory stop and consequently the 
subsequent search of his vehicle was unlawful, he was not appropriately advised 
of his Miranda rights, and the trial court improperly allowed the 
information to be amended on the day of trial to allege he possessed cocaine 
instead of methamphetamine.  We 
affirm.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Mr. Meek presents 
these issues for our review:

 

            
I.  Did the trial court err in failing to suppress evidence 
based on the illegal stop of the vehicle Appellant was driving, and obtained in 
violation of Appellant's state and federal constitutional 
rights?

 

            
III.  Did the trial court err in failing to suppress evidence 
based on the failure to provide Miranda warnings to 
Appellant?

 

            
III.  Did the trial court err in allowing an amendment of the 
information the morning of trial?

 

The 
state phrases the issues as:

 

            
I.  Did the trial court correctly find that the investigatory 
stop, and subsequent search, of the vehicle Appellant was driving were 
lawful?

 

            
II.  Did the trial court correctly find that Appellant received 
appropriate Miranda warnings?

 

            
III.  Did the trial court correctly find that Appellant was not 
prejudiced by an amendment of the information immediately before his 
trial?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      On September 16, 
1999, Chris Walsh, a sergeant with the Casper Police Department, drove into the 
parking lot of a Casper convenience store and observed Mr. Meek simultaneously 
drive in, exit his vehicle, and walk toward the store.1  Sergeant Walsh concluded Mr. Meek was 
acting suspiciously when he "very obviously became nervous at my presence [and] 
jerked his head away to look away from me and then walked into the store."  Sergeant Walsh also went into the store 
but could not see Mr. Meek.  After 
about five minutes, the officer returned to his vehicle and ran an NCIC check on 
the license plate of the vehicle Mr. Meek was driving.  The report revealed the vehicle was 
stolen.  Sergeant Walsh called for 
back up assistance, drove down the street, pulled over, and waited for Mr. Meek 
to reappear.  Sergeant Walsh stopped 
Mr. Meek as he drove out of the parking lot.  He ordered Mr. Meek and the passenger, 
Karen Schlitt, out of the vehicle and obtained their identifications.  A check of Mr. Meek's driver's license 
revealed it was suspended.  He was 
subsequently arrested for driving under a suspended license and placed in the 
back seat of a patrol vehicle that had arrived on the scene.  During the stop, Sergeant Walsh was 
informed that the owner of the vehicle had indicated he would not press charges 
if Ms. Schlitt, his spouse, was with the vehicle.  Immediately after the arrest, Sergeant 
Walsh searched the vehicle and found a jacket in the back seat which contained a 
black bag in its sleeve.  The 
officer observed drug paraphernalia in the black bag which included plastic bags 
with white powder residue, syringes, and a spoon.  As Sergeant Walsh removed the items from 
the bag, Ms. Schlitt stated, "the drugs aren't mine." 

 

[¶4]      Mr. Meek was then 
transported to the Casper Police Department.  According to Sergeant Walsh's testimony, 
at the police department a second police officer, Officer Ritter, gave Mr. Meek 
a verbal warning of his Miranda rights.  A third police officer, Officer Cutrell, 
from the street drug unit was then called to assist in Mr. Meek's 
interview.  Upon Officer Cutrell's 
arrival, he was told Mr. Meek had received a verbal Miranda warning.  However, it was his practice to also use 
a written Miranda waiver which Mr. Meek read and signed.  Mr. Meek testified at the suppression 
hearing that he was given Miranda warnings only once, in written form. 
After waiving his right to remain silent, Mr. Meek agreed to speak to the 
officers.  In the course of the 
interview, Mr. Meek admitted the drugs were his and told the officers where he 
had obtained them.  Officer Cutrell 
asked Mr. Meek what the laboratory report would likely reveal about the 
substance on the paraphernalia, and he responded, "methamphetamine and possibly 
cocaine."  Mr. Meek was charged with 
one count of possessing methamphetamine and one count of possessing marijuana, 
both in violation of § 35-7-1031.  
Pursuant to § 35-7-1031(c)(i), he was subject to an enhanced penalty on 
both counts as a result of previous offenses.  He pleaded not guilty to both 
counts.

 

[¶5]      Mr. Meek filed a 
motion to suppress the statements he made to the police alleging he was not 
provided adequate warnings under the standards set forth in Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  
He made an additional motion to suppress all evidence obtained from the 
search and seizure of his vehicle alleging there was a lack of probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion to justify the stop and the search exceeded the allowed 
scope.  Pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 
11(e)(6), Mr. Meek also filed a motion to suppress all statements he made 
contending they were made in the course of plea discussions.  The trial court held a hearing on the 
motions which included testimony from the officers and Mr. Meek.  After considering the evidence, the 
trial court denied the motions.  

 

[¶6]      Mr. Meek waived a 
jury trial, and a trial to the court was held on July 17, 2000.  On the morning of the first day of 
trial, on the basis of the laboratory report, the state filed a motion to amend 
the information to specify the controlled substance Mr. Meek was charged with 
possessing was cocaine instead of methamphetamine.  The state argued it did not change the 
circumstances of the alleged crime or the penalty and Mr. Meek was aware of the 
possibility of the existence of cocaine and had so informed the officers upon 
his arrest.  Mr. Meek's counsel 
objected and claimed his client was prejudiced by the late amendment. The trial 
court concluded there was no prejudice because the laboratory report had been 
provided to the defense in advance and the new allegation would not 
substantially affect Mr. Meek's rights.  
Mr. Meek did not testify at trial.  
He was found guilty on both counts and sentenced on each count to not 
less than eighteen months nor more than forty-eight months with the terms to be 
served consecutively.  Mr. Meek now 
appeals.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

A.        
Investigatory Stop

            

[¶7]      First, Mr. Meek 
argues Sergeant Walsh lacked the necessary reasonable suspicion to stop his 
vehicle and, therefore, the evidence seized during the search of his vehicle 
should be suppressed.  He challenges 
the validity of the investigatory stop under the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.2  

 

[¶8]      Our standard of 
review is as follows:

 

When 
we review a district court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we do not 
interfere with the findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  When the district court has not made 
specific findings of fact, we will uphold its general ruling if the ruling is 
supportable by any reasonable view of the evidence.  We consider the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the district court's ruling because of the district court's 
ability to assess "the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and 
make the necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions" at the hearing on 
the motion.  The constitutionality 
of a particular search or seizure is, however, a question of law which we review 
de novo.

 

Frederick 
v. State, 
981 P.2d 494, 497 (Wyo. 1999) (citations omitted) (quoting Gehnert v. 
State, 956 P.2d 359, 361 (Wyo. 1998)); see also Buckles v. State, 998 P.2d 927, 930 (Wyo. 2000).

 

[¶9]      The state 
concedes this was an investigatory stop; therefore, our analysis centers on 
whether the stop was lawful.  An 
investigatory stop represents a seizure which invokes Fourth Amendment 
safeguards but is less intrusive than an arrest.  Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 
220 (Wyo. 1994).  The Fourth 
Amendment to the United State Constitution states:

 

The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized.

 

"The 
protection of the Fourth Amendment is applied to state action under the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."  Wilson, 874 P.2d  at 219.  We have previously said an investigatory 
stop "requires only the presence of specific and articulable facts and rational 
inferences which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed 
or may be committing a crime."  874 P.2d  at 220; see also Buckles, 998 P.2d  at 930.  "The validity of such a stop depends on 
whether, in light of the totality of the circumstances, an officer possessed 
sufficient information to create such a reasonable suspicion."  Frederick, 981 P.2d  at 497.  Mr. Meek argues the required reasonable 
suspicion must exist before an NCIC check is initiated.  The state asserts reasonable suspicion 
is not required to do an NCIC check but an officer may rely upon information 
obtained as a result of the check to create a reasonable 
suspicion.

 

[¶10]   Mr. Meek requests this court 
consider the ruling in Wilson, 874 P.2d 215.  In that case, an officer detained the 
defendant while he waited for the results from an NCIC check, and we said, "a 
seizure to conduct a computerized identification check without reasonable 
suspicion is not permitted."  874 P.2d  at 222.  The United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.1 (1968), 
recognized, "[o]nly when the officer, by means of physical force or show of 
authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude 
that a seizure' has occurred."  In 
contrast to Wilson, the officer in the instant case did not conduct a 
limited seizure or impose any restriction on Mr. Meek's freedom to leave while 
waiting for the NCIC check to be completed.  It was after he received a stolen 
vehicle report that the officer initiated the investigatory stop and a seizure 
occurred.  

 

[¶11]   In State v. Grimes, 1999 MT 
145, 982 P.2d 1037 (Mont. 1999), a police officer observed a vehicle traveling 
with a small child standing up unrestrained on the front seat and, for that 
reason, requested an NCIC check which resulted in the arrest of the 
occupants.  The Montana Supreme 
Court held that, under the circumstances in that case, the NCIC report alone 
properly served as a particularized suspicion which justified the investigatory 
stop.  Grimes, ¶17.  In the same vein, we fail to see how 
requesting an NCIC check alone could implicate Mr. Meek's constitutional 
rights.  Once the officer received 
information that the vehicle Mr. Meek was driving was stolen, he had a 
reasonable suspicion grounded in specific and articulable facts to believe the 
occupants of the vehicle had committed a crime.  

 

[¶12]   Mr. Meek also contends the evidence 
should have been suppressed because the information contained in the NCIC report 
was false and the vehicle was not in fact stolen.  As previously explained, Sergeant Walsh 
testified that the NCIC report indicated the vehicle was stolen.  Thereafter, the owner of the car 
indicated he would not insist on prosecution if his spouse was with the 
vehicle.  "The validity of such a 
stop depends on whether, in light of the totality of the circumstances, an 
officer possessed sufficient information to create such a reasonable 
suspicion."  Frederick, 981 P.2d  at 497; see also Buckles, 998 P.2d  at 930.  The officer was justified in relying 
upon the NCIC report communicated to him by law enforcement.  The fact that the owner of the vehicle 
did not subsequently insist on prosecution does not diminish the validity of the 
information the officer possessed at the time of the investigatory stop to 
create a reasonable suspicion.  In 
light of the totality of the circumstances, we conclude the investigatory stop 
was lawful and the motion to suppress the evidence subsequently seized incident 
to Mr. Meek's arrest was properly denied.

 

B.        
Miranda Warnings

 

[¶13]   Mr. Meek maintains the trial 
court erred when it failed to suppress statements he made post-arrest because 
they were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights.  "To comply with Miranda, law 
enforcement must advise an accused of his rights before any of the accused's 
statements, made during custodial interrogation, can be used against the accused 
at trial."  Mitchell v. 
State, 982 P.2d 717, 720 (Wyo. 1999).  
Failure to comply with these procedural safeguards requires the court to 
suppress such statements.  Id. 
 We review the entire record to 
determine whether the trial court could conclude, given the totality of the 
circumstances, that the police sufficiently followed Miranda.  Id.  "Denial of a motion to suppress is 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard."  Kolb v. State, 930 P.2d 1238, 
1242 (Wyo. 1996).  "Factual findings 
made by a trial court considering a motion to suppress will not be disturbed 
unless the findings are clearly erroneous."  Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 490.  The trial court has the opportunity to 
hear the evidence, assess the witnesses' credibility, and make the necessary 
inferences, deductions, and conclusions therefrom.  Therefore, the evidence is viewed in the 
light most favorable to the trial court's determination.  Id.

 

[¶14]   Mr. Meek was clearly in custody 
when he made the incriminating statements.  
He contends that he was not advised of his Miranda rights until he 
signed a written waiver at the police department and he made statements prior to 
that time.  Essentially, this 
argument centers on a determination of Mr. Meek's credibility versus the 
testifying officers' credibility.  
Sergeant Walsh testified he was present while Officer Ritter verbally 
advised Mr. Meek of his Miranda rights prior to Mr. Meek making any 
incriminating statements and Mr. Meek stated he understood his rights and agreed 
to speak to the officers.3  The trial court 
found:

 

[T]he 
statements offered that were incriminatory were given at the Casper Police 
Department.  They surely did constitute custodial interrogation, but 
it would appear to me that the evidence of the officers indicated there was an 
oral advisement of the Miranda warnings and also a written advisement of the 
Miranda warnings . . . the warnings were, in fact, given . . . and with that 
advisement [Mr. Meek] knowingly and voluntarily waived those rights and chose to 
speak to the law enforcement officers . . . .

 

 Viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the trial court's determination, we defer to its conclusion that 
the officers were more credible.  
The trial court properly denied Mr. Meek's suppression motion in light of 
the officers' testimony that Miranda warnings were provided twicean 
initial verbal warning followed by a written waiver.  

 

C.        
Amendment of the Information

 

[¶15]   On the day of trial, the state 
filed a motion to amend the information pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 3(e).  The motion sought to change the original 
information which, in part, charged Mr. Meek with possessing methamphetamine in 
violation of § 35-7-1031.  The 
motion to amend the information reflected that laboratory test results prompted 
the state to conform the information to the evidence and charge Mr. Meek with 
possessing cocaine rather than methamphetamine.  The amendment was made consistent with 
the provisions of  W.R.Cr.P. 3(e), 
which provides:

 

            
(e)  Amendment of information or citation.  Without 
leave of the court, the attorney for the state may amend an information or 
citation until five days before a preliminary examination in a case required to 
be tried in district court or until five days before trial for a case not 
required to be tried in district court.  
The court may permit an information or citation to be 
amended:

 

(1)  With 
the defendant's consent, at any time before sentencing.  

 

                        
(2)  Whether or not the defendant 
consents:

 

(A)  At 
any time before trial if substantial rights of the defendant are not 
prejudiced.  

 

(B)  At 
any time before verdict or finding if no additional or different offense is 
charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not 
prejudiced.

 

The 
trial court granted the state's motion over Mr. Meek's objection.  Mr. Meek complains this violated his 
right to prepare a defense.  

 

[¶16]   This court has 
said:

 

[A]n 
information may not be amended if it prejudices the defendant or charges a 
different offense.  The prohibition 
against charging additional or different offenses implicates the defendant's 
right to know the charges against him and to prepare a defense to those charges, 
which is protected by U.S. Const. amend. VI, and Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 
10.

 

McInturff 
v. State, 
808 P.2d 190, 193 (Wyo. 1991).  The Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution states in pertinent part:  "In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be informed of the nature and cause of 
the accusation."  Similarly, Article 
1, Section 10 of the Wyoming Constitution provides in pertinent part:  "In all criminal prosecutions the 
accused shall have the right . . . to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation."

 

[¶17]   We do express great concern as to 
why the state waited until the morning of trial to amend the information if, as 
Mr. Meek suggests, it had the laboratory results for a significant period of 
time preceding trial.  Such a delay 
does not comport with the principles of fairness essential to our judicial 
system and can only be attributed to carelessness.  However, we do not find error in the 
amendment of the information.  

 

[¶18]   First, no additional or different 
offense was charged by virtue of the amendment; rather, the amendment simply 
charged Mr. Meek with possessing a different controlled substance.  In People v. Garcia, 49 Cal. Rptr. 146, 147 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966), the defendant was indicted for selling 
heroin.  A chemist established the 
substance was marijuana, and, over the defendant's objection, the indictment was 
thereafter amended to reflect such evidence.  The California District Court of Appeal 
addressed whether the amendment charged a different offense: 

 

Although 
an indictment cannot be amended so as to change the offense charged (§ 1009, 
Pen. Code) both sections 11501 and 11531 make the sale of a narcotic a crime, 
and for the purpose of pleading, violation of either section is the offense 
charged; specification of the particular narcotic allegedly sold merely 
describes the manner in which the law was violated.  While this is an essential of an 
information or indictment, an amendment which substitutes "heroin" for 
"marijuana," . . . does not charge a different offense, within the meaning of 
section 1009. Clearly, there is authority to amend an indictment if the proof of 
the defendant's acts would be the same under either pleading, as in the present 
case.

 

49 Cal. Rptr.  at 147.  Furthermore, in 
United States v. Knuckles, 581 F.2d 305, 310 (2d Cir. 1978), an issue 
arose at trial as to whether the controlled substance charged was heroin or 
cocaine.  The trial court permitted 
the jury to convict the defendants on either count if it was convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the controlled substance involved was either 
substance.  The defendants were 
convicted, and on appeal they claimed this was an impermissible amendment of the 
information.  The court 
responded:

 

Further, 
the only variance alleged by the [defendants] is the exact nature of the 
substance involved, heroin or cocaine; the time, place, people, and object 
proved at trial are in all respects those alleged in Count Two of the 
indictment.  Whether the substance 
was cocaine or heroin makes no difference under 21 U.S.C. § 841, the statute 
cited in Count Two of the indictment.  
Such a variance, affecting neither the Government's case nor the sentence 
imposed, cannot have prejudiced the ability of the defendants to make their 
defense to the charge that they violated 21 U.S.C. § 841.

 

581 F.2d  at 311 (footnote omitted).  
Similarly, the amendment in this case did not result in a different 
potential sentence.  In fact, Mr. 
Meek had been convicted of possessing a controlled substance on three or more 
separate occasions; therefore, he automatically became subject to a prison term 
of not more than five years regardless of whether he was charged with possessing 
methamphetamine or with possessing cocaine.  

 

[¶19]   Mr. Meek next argues he suffered 
prejudice because his counsel was prepared to defend against a charge of 
possessing methamphetamine and not cocaine.  However, Mr. Meek admitted he possessed 
the paraphernalia on which the controlled substance was found.  When Officer Cutrell asked what the 
laboratory tests would reveal about the controlled substance on the seized 
paraphernalia, Mr. Meek responded, "methamphetamine and possibly cocaine," 
demonstrating he knew of the potential existence of cocaine.  Whether his counsel was to defend 
against a charge of possessing methamphetamine or a charge of possessing 
cocaine, the available defenses were equally applicable to both controlled 
substances.  Likewise, the same 
events were involved.  Clearly, he 
was not prejudiced.  We further note 
that Mr. Meek's counsel did not seek a continuance and cannot now be heard to 
complain that counsel was ill prepared to defend the case.  Under these circumstances, and in the 
absence of prejudice, the court did not err in permitting the information to be 
amended.

 

[¶20]   Affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

1For purposes of a complete recitation of the facts, we have relied upon 
the testimony provided in both the hearing on Mr. Meek's motion to suppress and 
the bench trial.  

 

2Mr. Meek fails to provide an independent state analysis based on the 
Wyoming Constitution, nor does he argue he is afforded greater protection under 
our state constitution.  "The issue 
of whether this Court should consider an independent interpretation of the 
Wyoming Constitution's search and seizure provision was answered affirmatively 
with instructions that a litigant must provide a precise, analytically sound 
approach when advancing an argument to independently interpret the state 
constitution."  Vasquez v. 
State, 990 P.2d 476, 484 (Wyo. 1999).  
"The failure to present proper citation of authority and argument 
supporting adequate and independent state grounds,' prevents this court, as a 
matter of policy, from considering other than the federal constitutional 
principles at issue."  Wilson v. 
State, 874 P.2d 215, 219 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983)).  

 

  
3This court has 
previously recognized that credibility determinations between defendants and 
police officers could be avoided if tape recorders were routinely used in 
interviews.  "[T]ape-recorded 
interviews do leave far fewer loose ends to be tied up and in many, if not most, 
instances would be a well-advised protocol to follow."  Lara v. State, 2001 WY 53, ¶13, 
25 P.3d 507, ¶13 (Wyo. 2001).