Title: Lambert v. Clancy

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Lambert v. Clancy, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1483.] 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-1483 
LAMBERT, APPELLEE, v. CLANCY1, HAMILTON COUNTY  
CLERK OF COURTS, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Lambert v. Clancy, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1483.] 
When the allegations contained in a complaint are directed against an office of a 
political subdivision, the officeholder named as a defendant is sued in his 
or her official capacity, rather than in his or her individual capacity — 
The political-subdivision-immunity analysis set forth in R.C. 2744.02 
applies to lawsuits in which the named defendant holds an elected office 
within a political subdivision and that officeholder is sued in his or her 
official capacity. 
(No. 2008-2183 — Submitted September 15, 2009 — Decided April 8, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, 
No. C-070600, 178 Ohio App.3d 403, 2008-Ohio-4905. 
__________________ 
                                                 
1. Patricia Clancy currently serves as Hamilton County Clerk of Courts.  Greg Hartmann held that 
office at the time this litigation commenced, and the caption of this case was Lambert v. Hartmann 
in the trial court and court of appeals. 
 
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  When the allegations contained in a complaint are directed against an office of 
a political subdivision, the officeholder named as a defendant is sued in 
his or her official capacity, rather than in his or her individual or personal 
capacity. 
2. The political-subdivision-immunity analysis set forth in R.C. 2744.02 applies to 
lawsuits in which the named defendant holds an elected office within a 
political subdivision and that officeholder is sued in his or her official 
capacity. 
__________________ 
 
CUPP, J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we are asked to determine the appropriate R.C. 
Chapter 2744 political-subdivision-immunity analysis to apply to a lawsuit in 
which the named defendant holds an elected office within a political subdivision.  
We conclude that because the allegations contained in the complaint are directed 
against the office of the political subdivision, the officeholder was sued in his 
official capacity rather than in his individual or personal capacity.  We also 
conclude that the three-tiered political-subdivision-immunity analysis set forth in 
R.C. 2744.02, and not the employee-immunity provision of R.C. 2744.03(A)(6), 
is to be applied in such a circumstance.  Because the appellate court concluded 
otherwise, we reverse its judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
{¶ 2} A traffic-violation citation was issued in September 2003 to 
plaintiff-appellee, Cynthia Lambert.  The ticket recorded Lambert’s name, 
signature, home address, birth date, driver’s license number, and social security 
number.  After the officer filed the ticket with the Hamilton County Clerk of 
Court’s office, the ticket information was published on the county’s website.  
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Lambert alleges that because of a transcription error on the ticket, an incorrect 
driver’s license number was posted on the website. 
{¶ 3} Lambert was notified in 2004 that suspicious credit activity was 
taking place in her name.  Someone made approximately $20,000 in unauthorized 
charges using Lambert’s personal information.  The person was subsequently 
identified, arrested, and pleaded guilty to federal felony charges related to the 
theft of Lambert’s identity.  Lambert claims that it is evident that this person used 
the clerk of court’s website to get her information because the personal 
information used to make the unauthorized charges included Lambert’s incorrect 
driver’s license number as posted on the county’s website. 
{¶ 4} From 1999 to 2004, as a matter of policy and practice, the 
Hamilton County Clerk of Court’s office published on its website every document 
filed with the office in its original and unredacted form, except for juvenile 
records and documents that were filed under seal.  This practice continued despite 
warnings to the clerk of court that publishing personal and private information on 
the website provided “fertile ground for identity theft.”  Lambert asserts that when 
she requested that such personal information be removed from the clerk of court’s 
website, she was told that such action would require a vast amount of manpower 
and that the theft of her identity was not necessarily a result of information posted 
on the clerk of court’s website.  In December 2004, pursuant to the adoption of a 
new local rule, the clerk of court’s website ceased offering unrestricted access to 
documents filed with the clerk of courts. 
{¶ 5} Also in December 2004, Lambert filed a complaint alleging 
various federal and state claims in a federal district court lawsuit against “Greg 
Hartmann, in his official capacity as Clerk of Courts,” and the “Hamilton County 
Board of County Commissioners.”  The district court dismissed the complaint, 
concluding that Lambert’s federal claims were not entitled to relief under Section 
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1983, Title 42, U.S.Code.  The district court also declined supplemental 
jurisdiction on the state claims. 
{¶ 6} After the federal court’s disposition, Lambert filed a complaint in 
the Hamilton County Common Pleas Court alleging violation of Ohio’s privacy 
act, invasion of privacy, unlawful publication of private facts, and public 
nuisance.  Lambert filed her complaint against “Greg Hartmann, Hamilton 
County, Ohio Clerk of Courts.”  The trial court dismissed Lambert’s complaint 
pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) and (C), without opinion. 
{¶ 7} Lambert appealed, and the appellate court reversed.  As pertinent 
to this appeal, the court held that Lambert’s claims were not barred by the 
Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, R.C. Chapter 2744, under the provisions 
applicable to employees of political subdivisions.  Lambert v. Hartmann, 178 
Ohio App.3d 403, 2008-Ohio-4905, 898 N.E.2d 67, ¶ 2.  The appellate court 
stated that “if the trial court dismissed Lambert’s claims because it believed that 
the clerk had immunity [under R.C. 2744.02], the trial court erred.”  Id., ¶ 13.  
Thereafter, we accepted review under our discretionary jurisdiction.  Lambert v. 
Hartmann, 120 Ohio St.3d 1524, 2009-Ohio-614, 901 N.E.2d 244. 
{¶ 8} R.C. Chapter 2744 was enacted in 1985 and addresses when 
political subdivisions, their departments and agencies, and their employees are 
immune from liability for their actions.  Determining whether a political 
subdivision is immune from liability under R.C. 2744.02, as this court has 
frequently stated, involves a three-tiered analysis.  Elston v. Howland Local 
Schools, 113 Ohio St.3d 314, 2007-Ohio-2070, 865 N.E.2d 845, ¶ 10; Greene 
Cty. Agricultural Soc. v. Liming (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 551, 556, 733 N.E.2d 
1141.  A general grant of immunity is provided within the first tier, which states 
that “a political subdivision is not liable in damages in a civil action for injury, 
death, or loss to person or property allegedly caused by any act or omission of the 
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5 
 
political subdivision or an employee of the political subdivision in connection 
with a governmental or proprietary function.” R.C. 2744.02(A)(1). 
{¶ 9} The second tier in the immunity analysis focuses on the five 
exceptions to this immunity, which are listed in R.C. 2744.02(B).  Elston, 113 
Ohio St.3d 314, 2007-Ohio-2070, 865 N.E.2d 845, ¶ 11.  If any of the exceptions 
to immunity are applicable, thereby exposing the political subdivision to liability, 
the third tier of the analysis assesses whether any of the defenses to liability 
contained in R.C. 2744.03 apply to reinstate immunity.  Id. at ¶ 12. 
{¶ 10} Immunity is also extended to individual employees of political 
subdivisions.  R.C. 2744.03(A)(6); O'Toole v. Denihan, 118 Ohio St.3d 374, 
2008-Ohio-2574, 889 N.E.2d 505, ¶ 47; Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 113 Ohio 
St.3d 266, 2007-Ohio-1946, 865 N.E.2d 9, ¶ 17; Fabrey v. McDonald Village 
Police Dept. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 351, 356, 639 N.E.2d 31.  For claims against 
individual employees, the three-tiered analysis used to determine whether a 
political subdivision is immune is not used.  Cramer, 2007-Ohio-1946, ¶ 17.  
Instead, R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) provides that an employee is personally immune 
from liability unless “(a) The employee's acts or omissions were manifestly 
outside the scope of the employee's employment or official responsibilities; 
(b) The employee's acts or omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or 
in a wanton or reckless manner; [or] (c) Civil liability is expressly imposed upon 
the employee by a section of the Revised Code.”  For these purposes, allegations 
of negligence are insufficient to overcome the immunity granted to an employee 
of a political subdivision who acts within his or her official duties.  Fabrey, 70 
Ohio St.3d at 356. 
 
{¶ 11} Moreover, if the employee acted in good faith and not manifestly 
outside the scope of his or her employment or official responsibilities, the 
political subdivision has a duty to provide a defense for the employee if a civil 
action or proceeding against the employee for damages is commenced.  R.C. 
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2744.07(A)(1); Whaley v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 
574, 576, 752 N.E.2d 267.  The political subdivision has a further duty to 
indemnify and hold harmless an employee if a judgment is obtained against the 
employee for acts or omissions in connection with a governmental or proprietary 
function, provided the employee acted in good faith and within the scope of his or 
her employment or official responsibilities.  R.C. 2744.07(A)(2); Whaley, 92 Ohio 
St.3d at 578, 752 N.E.2d 267. 
{¶ 12} As a starting point in this case, we are confronted with a question 
regarding the effect of the language used in the complaint Lambert filed in the 
common pleas court.  Lambert asserts in briefs and at oral argument that she sued 
Hartmann in his capacity as an individual employee of Hamilton County.  
Hartmann, however, contends that Lambert’s suit is in actuality directed against 
the office of the Hamilton County Clerk of Courts, an office of the political 
subdivision of Hamilton County.  The determination whether Hartmann was sued 
individually or in his capacity as the elected officeholder of the political 
subdivision, i.e., in his official capacity, ultimately determines the appropriate 
R.C. Chapter 2744 immunity analysis to be applied in this case. 
{¶ 13} It is not apparent to us whether the trial and appellate courts 
considered the status of the defendant as an officeholder of the political 
subdivision in the context of their immunity analyses.  The trial court simply 
dismissed the complaint without opinion, apparently presuming that the complaint 
was against the clerk of court’s office and applying the political-subdivision-
immunity analysis of R.C. 2744.02. 
{¶ 14} The appellate court, without any discussion, appears to have 
assumed that the complaint was brought against Hartmann individually, as an 
employee of the clerk of court’s office.  That court summarily applied an R.C. 
2744.03(A)(6) analysis to conclude that Lambert pleaded sufficient allegations 
that Hartmann acted recklessly, willfully, and purposefully in publishing 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
Lambert’s personal and private information on the county website to overcome a 
motion to dismiss on the basis of immunity.2  According to the court, it applied 
the R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) analysis because “the immunity granted under [R.C. 
2744.02] does not apply to elected officials or individual employees of a political 
subdivision.”  Lambert, 178 Ohio App.3d 403, 2008-Ohio-4905, 898 N.E.2d 67, ¶ 
11. 
{¶ 15} Notwithstanding the appellate court’s conclusion, our review of the 
complaint leads us to conclude that Lambert asserted her claims against Hartmann 
in his official capacity as an officeholder of the political subdivision.  The 
complaint filed in the federal court identifies the defendants as “Greg Hartmann, 
in his official capacity as Clerk of Courts” and “Hamilton County Board of 
County Commissioners.”  The complaint filed in the state court, however, names 
“Greg Hartmann, Hamilton County, Ohio, Clerk of Courts” as the only defendant.  
The complaint does not add the words “personally,” “individually,” “an employee 
of the Hamilton County Clerk of Courts,” or anything similar to denote that he is 
being sued in his individual capacity as a county employee as opposed to being 
sued in his official capacity as the clerk of court. 
{¶ 16} Additionally, the allegations in the state-filed complaint pertain to 
the policies and practices of the clerk of court’s office and not to actions taken by 
Hartmann personally.  For example, the complaint alleges that despite the known 
risks, “the Clerk of Court’s Office recklessly, willfully and purposefully 
continued its practice of publishing personal information on the internet.”  In fact, 
some of the allegations pertain to policies and practices employed by the clerk of 
court’s office prior to the time Hartmann became the clerk of courts.  Moreover, 
                                                 
2.  Noting that this matter was before it on a motion to dismiss, the appellate court did imply that 
the evidence outside the pleadings, which Hartmann asserted would persuasively rebut the 
allegations made by Lambert in her complaint, could be considered under a different procedural 
stance; i.e. summary judgment.  Lambert, 178 Ohio App.3d 403, 2008-Ohio-4905, 898 N.E.2d 67, 
¶ 14. 
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the allegations in the complaint filed in the state court mirror those in the 
complaint filed in the federal court, and the federal complaint was clearly against 
Hartmann in his official capacity.  Thus, although Lambert’s prayer for relief in 
the state complaint asks for relief solely from Hartmann and not any public body 
or office, we conclude that Lambert’s complaint asserts claims against the office 
of the clerk of the Hamilton County Clerk of Courts, an elected position within a 
political subdivision held by Greg Hartmann at the time the complaint was filed.  
Thus, the complaint is one that asserts its claims against Greg Hartmann in his 
official capacity as the Hamilton County Clerk of Courts.3 
{¶ 17} Next we must determine whether the political-subdivision-
immunity analysis or the employee-immunity provisions apply to lawsuits in 
which the named defendant holds an elected office within a political subdivision, 
such as the clerk of courts, and that officeholder is sued in his official capacity.  
We conclude that the three-tiered political-subdivision-immunity analysis set 
forth in R.C. 2744.02 applies and not the employee-immunity provisions of R.C. 
2744.03(A)(6). 
{¶ 18} This conclusion derives from several principles.  One principle is 
that a county is a political subdivision and the operation of a clerk of court’s 
office is a governmental function.  See R.C. 2744.01(F) (the term “political 
subdivision” includes counties); R.C. 2744.01(C)(2) (a nonexclusive list of 
governmental functions). 
                                                 
3.  In November 2008, Patricia Clancy was elected the Hamilton County Clerk of Courts.  After 
Clancy took office, the Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney filed a Notice of Substitution of 
Clancy for Hartmann pursuant to Civ.R. 25(D)(1) (“When a public officer is a party to an action in 
his official capacity and during its pendency * * * ceases to hold office, the action does not abate 
and his successor is automatically substituted as a party”).  Lambert did not object to that filing, 
but in her merit brief to this court, she asserts that substitution is clearly inappropriate.  Lambert 
contends that Civ.R. 25(A) applies so that Hartmann, as an elected official, cannot “escape all 
personal liability for his willful, wanton and/or reckless actions simply by leaving office.”  
However, in accordance with our resolution of this case, Civ.R. 25(D), not Civ.R. 25(A), controls 
here. 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
{¶ 19} A second principle is that many of the governmental functions 
listed in R.C. 2744.01(C) are performed by political subdivisions through 
departments, agencies, and offices.  When the departments, agencies, and offices 
perform their assigned governmental functions, each is an integral part and 
instrumentality of the political subdivision.  Wilson v. Stark Cty. Dept. of Human 
Servs. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 450, 452-453, 639 N.E.2d 105.  An office of a clerk 
of courts is such an office and an instrumentality of a county political subdivision. 
{¶ 20} By logical necessity, the immunity granted by statute to a political 
subdivision is also extended to the political subdivision’s departments, agencies, 
and offices, which implement the duties of the political subdivision.  Id. at 
paragraph two of the syllabus.  See also Rankin v. Cuyahoga Cty. Dept. of 
Children & Family Servs., 118 Ohio St.3d 392, 2008-Ohio-2567, 889 N.E.2d 521, 
¶ 16.  Thus, because a clerk of court’s office is an instrumentality of the county, 
through which the county’s governmental functions are carried out, the clerk of 
court’s office, like the county itself, is cloaked with the immunity granted to the 
political subdivision under R.C. 2744.02. 
{¶ 21} As a natural extension of these principles, when allegations are 
made against the elected holder of an office of a political subdivision who is sued 
in an official capacity, the officeholder is also entitled to the grant of immunity 
contained in R.C. 2744.02.  We recognize that officeholders are employees of 
political subdivisions and that immunity for the actions of employees or officers 
sued in their individual capacities is addressed in another section of the Revised 
Code.  See R.C. 2744.01(B) (the term “employee” “includes any elected or 
appointed official of a political subdivision”); R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) (detailing 
conditions when employees are personally immune from liability for actions 
taken).  Here, however, the allegations contained in the complaint are ostensively 
directed against the office and against the named officeholder in the 
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officeholder’s official capacity.  This is the equivalent of suing the political 
subdivision rather than the officeholder in an individual or personal capacity. 
{¶ 22} For the reasons set forth herein, we hold that when the allegations 
contained in a complaint are directed against an office of a political subdivision, 
the officeholder named as a defendant is sued in his or her official capacity, rather 
than in his or her individual or personal capacity.  Moreover, the political-
subdivision-immunity analysis set forth in R.C. 2744.02 applies to lawsuits in 
which the named defendant holds an elected office within a political subdivision 
and that officeholder is sued in his or her official capacity. 
{¶ 23} We reverse the judgment of the appellate court and remand this 
matter to the trial court for further proceedings to consider the applicable 
immunity exceptions and defenses under R.C. 2744.02 and R.C 2744.03. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J.,4 and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, and 
LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents and would dismiss the appeal as having been 
improvidently accepted. 
__________________ 
 
Law Office of Marc Mezibov, Marc D. Mezibov, and Stacy A. Hinners, 
for appellee. 
 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Pamela J. 
Sears and Michael G. Florez, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant. 
_____________________ 
                                                 
4.  The late Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer participated in the deliberations in, and the final 
resolution of, this case prior to his death.