Title: Bedini v. Frost

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Bedini v. Frost (94-624); 165 Vt 167; 678 A.2d 893

[Opinion Filed 15-Mar-1996]

[Motion for Reagrument Denied 3-Apr-1996]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 No. 94-624


Frances Bedini                                    Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            Department of Labor & Industry

Oakley Frost, M.D.                                October Term, 1996


Mary S. Hooper, Commissioner

Ronald A. Fox of Biggam, Fox & Skinner, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellant

Phyllis G. Severance and Thomas P. Simon of McCormick, Fitzpatrick &
  Mertz, P.C., Burlington, for defendant-appellee


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



       ALLEN, C.J.   Plaintiff Frances Bedini appeals the Department of Labor
  & Industry Commissioner's denial of her workers' compensation claim.  We
  affirm.

       Plaintiff was hired by a medical clinic in March 1992 as a medical
  receptionist/medical assistant.  Although she had prior experience as a
  medical receptionist, she had never worked as a medical assistant.  She
  expressed an interest in a career as a medical assistant, and saw the job
  as an opportunity for on-the-job training.  When she was hired, her
  employer explained the duties of the job to her.

       After a few weeks at the job, plaintiff's enthusiasm waned, and she
  began to feel the job was more than she could handle.  Her employer,
  however, never asked her to perform duties beyond those in the job
  description.  In July 1992, plaintiff complained about job-related stress
  to her physician, who was treating her for a preexisting physical
  condition.  She never informed her employer of this stress.

       Plaintiff's employer became increasingly dissatisfied with her job
  performance and

 

  counseled her several times about her deficiencies.  In April 1993, the
  plaintiff requested an opportunity to meet with her supervisor to discuss
  her job performance.  At this meeting, plaintiff's supervisor noted various
  problems with her job performance.  Plaintiff left the meeting and did not
  return to work again.  She again visited with her physician, who referred
  her to a licensed social worker for psychological counseling.  On April 12,
  1993, plaintiff was hospitalized for treatment.

       Plaintiff subsequently filed a workers' compensation claim, which was
  denied by her employer's insurer.  She then filed for a hearing on the
  denial before the Commissioner of the Department of Labor & Industry.  The
  Commissioner found that plaintiff was not subjected to unusual working
  conditions and that her injury resulted from her inability to master her
  job. The Commissioner denied her claim, and she then filed this appeal.

       The only issue on appeal is whether the standard adopted by the
  Commissioner for mental injury claims is unreasonable and unjust and
  without legal basis.  In this case, the Commissioner concluded that "in
  order for mental injury caused by stress at work to be compensable, a
  claimant must show that the stresses at work were of a significantly
  greater dimension than the daily stresses encountered by all employees."

       Because the Commissioner's standard derives from her interpretation of
  the workers' compensation statute,(FN1) we review the Commissioner's standard
  with deference.  Absent compelling indication of an error, interpretation
  of a statute by an administrative body responsible for its execution will
  be sustained on appeal.  In re Duncan, 155 Vt. 402, 408, 584 A.2d 1140,
  1144 (1990).  We will not upset that interpretation unless it is unjust or
  unreasonable or leads to absurd consequences.  In re Verburg, 159 Vt. 161,
  165, 616 A.2d 237, 239 (1992).

       The Commissioner's standard is supported by reasonable policy
  concerns.  In earlier

 

  cases, the Commissioner noted that medical authorities agree that the
  precise etiology of most mental disorders is inexplicable.  Because a
  mental injury could have resulted from such diverse factors as social
  environment, culture, heredity, age, sex, family relationships, and other
  interpersonal relationship, as well as employment, a high degree of
  uncertainty exists in the diagnosis of cause.  The unusual-stress standard
  also permits a more objective inquiry into the cause of the injury. 
  Greater objectivity is necessary in mental injury cases because the
  claimant's subjective impression that work-related stress caused her injury
  often forms the basis for the medical opinion that the injury was caused
  primarily by work-related stress.  See, e.g., Seitz v. L & R Indus.,