Title: Rees v. Carlisle.

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

 

00"

 

KEENE H. REES, Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

PETER CARLISLE, City and County of Honolulu
Prosecuting Attorney, in his official and
individual capacities, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 26996
APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(CIV, No, 03-1-1075)

MARCH 12, 2007

 

  

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ., AND
CIRCUIT JUDGE CRANDALL, IN PLACE OF NAKAYAMA, J., RECUSED

OPINION OF THE COURT BY DUFFY, J.
Plaintif£-Appellant Robert Rees’ appeals from the
November 23, 2004 final judgment of the Circuit Court of the
First Circuit,? granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant~
Appellee Peter Carlisle, City and County of Honolulu prosecuting
attorney, and against Rees on all counts, in a suit over the

legality of Carlisle's use of public funds and other public

 

 
 

 

keene #. Rees, widow of Robert Bees,

following the death of Mr. Fi

 

While thie cose wee on opt
woe aubetituted ae Flaintiff-Appel

 

 

‘The Honorable Gary W.B. Chang presided over this matter,

 
“OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

 

resources to advocate in a state-wide general election for
passage of an amendment to the Hawai'i Constitution.

(2) the

 

On appeal, Rees makes the following arguments:
circuit court erred in ruling that Carlisle's use of public funds
and resources to advocate for a particular election result is
authorized by state laws (2) the circuit court erred to the
extent it determined that Carlisie’s actions constituted

government speech; (3) the circuit erred in ruling that

 

carlisie’s actions did not viclate the First Anendnent to the
united states Constitution or article I, section 4 of the Hawai't
Constitution: (4) the circuit court erred in finding that
carlisie’s actions did net vielate the equal protection clauses
of the Fourteenth Anendnent to the United States Constitution and
article 2, section § of the Hawai'l Constitution; and (5) the
circuit court erred in ruling that it did not have jurisdiction
to consider whether Carlisle's conduct violated Revised
Ordinances of Honolulu (ROH) § 38.6.

Based on the following, we vacate the circuit court's
Noverber 23, 2004 final judgment, and remand to the circuit court
with instructions to grant Rees's motion for sunmary judgment on
his declaratory judgment claim that Carlisle acted without legal
authority when he used public funds and resources to advocate for

a proposed constituticnal amendment in a general election.

 
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

1. BACKGROUND
A. Factual B

peter Carlisle has been the elected prosecuting
attorney for the City and County of Honolulu since January 1997.
In 2001, Carlisle promoted a bill in the Hawai'i legislature that
proposed an amendment to the Hawai'i Constitution thet was
intended to “permit prosecutors and the attorney general to
initiate felony criminal charges by filing 2 written information
signed by the prosecutor or the attorney general setting forth
the charge in accordance uith procedures and conditions to be
provided by the state legislature.” §.B. No. 996, H.D. 1, C.D. 1
(Haw. 2002). Thie bill ds often referred to as the “direct
filing” bill.

Following legislative approval of the bill in 2002,
carlisle sought the opinion of the City and County of Honolulu
Ethics Commission a¢ to whether it would be appropriate under the
city and County ethics laws to use City and County resources,
including personnel, to work for approval of the proposed
anendnent. The Executive Director of the Commission, Charles W.
Toto, responded, in an e-mail correspondence dated June 7, 2002,
that “the short answer is yes, with sone restrictions.” The
e-mail continued:

You informed me th
Attorney] souls like to advocate en benalf of © m

 

(che Cepartment of the Prosecuting
sure thet

 

 
 

WEST'S HAWAT'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,

   

** FOR PUBLICATI

wide election ballot this Novenber
The issue is uhether the state constitution should be
feended to permit the process of “cirect filing” as an
Eiternetive means to begin felony prosecutions. You
Envision using. [the Department’ s) rescurces, such as
fersennel, facilities ano equipment, to werk for the
Epproval of cirect filing on the pellet.

wil be on the stat

 

 

 

 

OH Sec. 3-0.6 sete forth certain restrictions on the
Conduct of elty officers and employees regarding “Campsign
Seeistance.” “Cespaign azcistance” includes any service
Seed to seciet the effert to place # question on an election
Ballet or to approve er relect such ¢ question. ROH Sec.
See.ib) (2), Ae 8 result there are restrictions on the
Géticere and employees who are involved in supporting the
Elzect filing propoes!.” These restrictions are statec in
fol sec, 3-8:€{c)- They focus on protecting city perscanel
Exon coercion, genial sf expleyment, cischerge or Gencticn,
haracenent for failing to render canpaign assistanci

Porther, the limitations ben pronction and other advantages
Sig sesuit cf or officer's of employee's rendering campaign
Seeietance, You nay want to familiarize yourself with the
specific restrictions:

 

   

 

      

 

 

 

‘The ethics laws co net prohibit [the Department of the
Fresecuting Attorney) fron ueing city resources to advocate
For passage of the direct filing amendnent. However,
appears that ROH Sec. 3-6.6(c) gives officers and employees
ERe"right to refuse to resder campaign assistance regercing
b questicn on an election Bellot withect eny cisadvantage to
thelr employment resuiting form [eic) such # refusal, It
Sise ensure® that personnel sho render assistance will not
Ee treates faversbly compares with those who do net
Therefore, 1 reconnens that you inform each officer or
Gepleyee that he cr she Ray Opt cut of the werk related te
fhe cirect filing amendment without concern for any
Eesulting reward of reprisal.

 

 

Thereafter, Carlisle canpaigned extensively to promote
the proposed anenduent, identified as Question 3 on the Novenber
2002 ballot, in various ways, including the expenditure of public
resources and utilization of enployees in his office in that
effort. Carlisle admits to the following: (1) that he
canpaigned for the passage of Question 3 in his cepacity as

prosecuting attorney and not as a private citizen; (2) that he

 
   

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and other representatives of the Office of the Prosecuting
Attorney actively advocated for passage of Question 3 in speaking
engagements on sixty-six (66) separate dates between April 25 and
November 4, 2002 (3) that he and fifty-seven (57) other
representatives of his office sign-waved in support of

Question 3; (4) that his office used public resources, including
paper, copying equipment, telephones, and a website te promote

.ge of Question 3; (5) that the website of the Office of the

 

Pa
Prosecuting Attorney encouraged viewers to “Vote Yes” on
Question 3 (6) that in addition to the time that he and his
office employees spent advocating for passage of Question 3, his
office expended public resources of at least $2,404.27 in the
campaign for passage of Question 3; (7) that he sent an e-mail to
all employees in his office calling for their support in
advocating for passage of Question 3 in their interactions with
members of the public and asking for suggestions on “how to sell
this concept to the public”? and (6) that while all of his office
employees who participated in the campaign te promote the passage
of Question 3 were volunteers, some of the volunteers were asked
to work on proncting Question 3 on official work time.

The City and County wes not reimbursed for the time,
labor, and resources utilized by the Office of the Prosecuting

Attorney in advocating for the passage of Question 3.
 

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Rees filed suit against Carlisle in his personal and
official capacity on May 21, 2002, stating the following legal
claims: (1) that Carliele's activity viclated Rees’ s
constitutional free speech rights under article I, section 4 of
the Hawai'i Constitution and the First Amendnent to the United

States Constitution and that such violation is actionable

 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) that Carlisie’s activity

violated Rees’s constitutional right to a free and fair election
under the due process clauses of article I, section 5 of the
Hawai'i Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, actionable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3)
common law qui ten; and (4) that Rees is entitled to a
declaratory judgment under Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 632-1
(1993) that Carlisie’s actions (a) exceeded any authority granted
to the prosecuting attorney by the City Charter and were not
authorized by HRS § 28-10.6, (b) were in violation of ROH

$ 3.8-6, and (c) violated Rees’s free speech and free and fair
election rights under the Hawai'i and United states
Constitutions, as previously alleged. In addition to requesting
2 declaratory judgment regarding Carlisle's activity, Rees also
requested: (1) an injunction ordering Carlisle to compensate the

city for (a) all taxpayer resources used to promote passage of
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the amendment and (b) the portion of the salaries paid to
employees of his office for time spent campaigning for passage of
the amendment; and (2) an injunction prohibiting Carlisle from

sistance of city employees, or

 

campaigning, requesting campaign a
using taxpayer funds to campaign on ballot questions in the
future.

on Novenber 4, 2003, Carlisle filed a motion to dismiss
or for summary judgment, in which Carlisle argued: (1) that Rees

(2) thet

 

lacked standing to challenge Carlisle's conduc’
Carlisle’s actions did not constitute a “forced speech” claim

actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) that Cerlisle’s actions

  

did not constitute infringement of fundamental voting rights

 

actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (4) that Hawai'i law does
net recognize a connon lew qui tam claim.

on August 6, 2004, Rees filed a motion for summary
judgment and declaratory relief on the constitutional claims? and
for declaratory relief as described earlier herein.

Both dispositive motions were argued on August 24,
2004. Disclaiming the validity of the constitutional issue
raised by Rees, Carlisle's counsel esserted at the hearing that

the issue of Carlisie’s authority to use public funds to advocate

 

Rees’ s summary judgnent motion did not raise the qui tam claim that
was part cf the complaint) only the ehree counts reseed in the notion remained
In the action

 
 

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for a ballot question was the only real issue: “[s]o you've
seized on the absolute issue when you ask about authority ‘cause
that’s really where it is... . [WJhat we have here is just 2
good old garden variety case of gee, did this public official
have the authority to spend this money for this purpose?”
Carlisie’s counsel clained that Carlisle's authority te so
advocate using public funds and resources came from the City
Charter, which empowered him te prosecute ali offenses under the
authority of the attorney genezal of the State: “The ordinance

dally the authority of the

 

[sic] confides to Mr. Carlisle essen
attorney general with regard to activities within the City and
county of Honcluls concerning crime.”

Following the hearing, the circuit court tock the
matter under advisement. On Septerber 24, 2004, after concluding
that Rees had standing to prosecute the action on the basis of
his statue as @ taxpayer, the circuit court granted Carlisle’s
notion for summary judgment and denied Rees’s motion, end

rendered the following oral ruling:

turning firet_to the question regarding whether the
cefendant viclated Secticn 3-£.6(c) of the Revises
Grdinances of Acneluls, that section prohibits certain
Behavior relating to the coercion or solicitation of public
exployeer in connection with campaign activities. The
sEeletion of Section S-€-6(c] ie 8 petty misdeneancr
Section 3-€-6(¢) ‘does not appear to create @ private right
of action in saver of a taxpayer's challenge to the
expenditure cf public funds, The adjudiertion of an slleced
ssoletion of Section 3-8.€(c) is properly addressed to 3
Eininel prosecution, not a civil action, Therefore,

 

   

 

   

     

    
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plaintiff se not entitled to any relief pursuant to Section
Erevelc) of the Revises Ordinances of Honciula.

‘The gravemen of the xensining claims relate to the
alleged unconstitutional expenditure of public funds. The
Prosecutor 1s an elected efficial who is charged with the
Fesponsibility to prosecute alleged violations of she Hawaii
Fenei code, This responsibility is delegated to the
Prosecutor by the Attorney General. The duties of the
Prosecutor is {eici to lobby the Legieisture regarding bills
Ehot inpact upon the prosecution of criminal defendants

‘The Prosecstor is sige peraitted to utilize public resources
fo educste the public regerding issues that Felate to the
Eepie of eine in Honclvit and cther matters relating to the
Ecbiness of the Prosecutor's Office. Courts have recognized
that public funde and rescurces expended in furtherance of
these poredite are not unconstitutional.

 

 

The objection plaintsf# raises is that the Prosecutor
did not simply educate the public regarding question 3 on
fhe beitot, bur he went tec fer when he urged voters to vote
Yer on question 3. The lew not only tolerates public
BEACL Ie thpending putiie funce ond resources fo address
political issues that are germane to the business porposes
Ge the office, but it expects such conduct. Question >
Ghich related to the criminal sndictnent process i clearly
Qermane te the business cf the Prosecutor's Office. Public
Seiieisis often neke renarks cr public statenente or take
positions on matters that are germane to the business of
Ehtir offices whicn etatenents or positions are objected te
of disagreed with by taxpayers. This ie not unusual.

 

   

 

 

 

 

 

hen» public officisl fron en office such as the
Prosecutor's Office, which is charged with a specitic
Rlesien to prosecute criminal defendants, maker a public
Btatenent oh a Ballot question, there ie no doubt which way
the Prosecstor wants the public to vote. Se to draw
Bright line between constitutional and unconststutione
Of public sescurces based upon whether or not the Prosecutor
Geys vote yer would be an artificial and arbitrary
Gistineticn and flies in the face of the reality that every
Voter snows how the Prosecutor wants the public te vote ona
matter such as question 3. Therefore, if the law tolerat
the Prosecutor speaking on matters that are germane to the
presecuticn of criminal defendants, then the Constitution
ust allow the Prosecutor to urge Goth the passage of
Tegisiaticn pending before cur Legislature and the adoption
ef ballot questions. Therefore, for these and any other
Good cause shown in the record, the court will respectfully
Grant the defendant's moticn for susmary Judgnent and deny
the plaintsff'e motion fer sursary judment.

 

 

 

 
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A final Judgment was entered on Novenber 24, 2004, and
Rees filed a timely appeal.

11. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
|. Motion for Summary Judanent

Me review the circuit court's grant or dental of sumary
“Gdgnent de nove. fiauall isicl Community federal Cress
pier v, Keke, 94 Havel 21%, 201, 11 Poa ty 3 12000),

The standera for granting e notion for summary judgnens is
settiea:

 

(S)urmery judgnent is appropriate if the pleadings,
depositions, snewere te interregstories, en
Baniseione cn fSle, together with the affidavits, if
Shy, how that there ie no genuine issue as to any
hatérie: fact ana that the moving percy is entitled to
Suagment ass matter of law. A fact if material if
preat of thet fect would have the effect of

‘ablishing or refuting che of the essentiai elenente
bf s ceute of action oF defense asserted by the
parties. The evidence must be viewed in the light
Rost favorable to the nonsneving party. Jn cther
rors, we must view al of the evicence and the
Inferéncee drawn therefrom in the Light sest favorable
to the party opposing the motion.

   

 

      

 

 

 

 

Id. (citations and internal quotation

cose Honoluly, 96 Hawal'l 233, 244-48, 47
Bolg Se, Suse) (ees) lesson alteration sn original!

 

Kau v. City and County of Honolulu, 104 Hawai'i 468, 474, 92 P.3d

477, 483 (2004).

B. Interpretation of Municipal Charter and Ordinances
Statutory interpretation is “a question of law

reviewable de nove.” State v, Levi, 102 Hawai'l 262, 265, 75

P.3d 1173, 1176 (2003) (quoting State v. Arcec, #4 Hawai'i 1, 10,

928 F.2d 843, 852 (1996)). This court’s statutory construction

is guided by established rules:

10
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Firat, the fundamental starting point for statutory
Interpretation se the language of the statute itself.
Second, where the statutory language is plain end
Grenbiguous, cur sole duty 18 to give effect te its plein
and obvious meaning. Thiré, implicit in the task of
statutory construction is oor foremost obligation te
ascertein and gave effect to the intention of the
Legislature, watch is to be obtained primarily from the
Language contained in the statute itself. fourth, when
there 1s coubt, doubleness of meaning, oF indistinctiveness
br uncertsinty of an expression used ine statute, an
anbsgusty exists.

Peterson v. Hawaii Elec, Light Co., Inc., 85 Hawai'i 322, 327-28,
944 P.2d 1265, 1276-72 (1997), superseded on cther arounds by HRS

 

 

 

  

§ 269-15.5 (Supp. 1999) (block quotation format, brackets,
citations, and quotation marks omitted) .
“When interpreting @ municipal ordinance, we apply the
same rules of construction that we apply to statutes.” Weinberg
city & County of Honolulu, 62 Hawai'i 317, 322, 922 P.2d 371,
376 (1996) (quoting Bishop Souare Assoc, v. City & County of
Honolulu, 76 Hewas's 232, 234, 673 P.2d 770, 772 (1994) (quoting
Waikiki Resort Hotel v. City & County of Honolulu, 63 Haw. 222,
239, 624 P.2d 1353, 1365 (1981)}). “The purpose of the ordinance
may be obtained primarily from the language of the ordinance
itself[.J" Id.
III, DISCUSSION
A. Bagic Claims and Defenses

Rees’s legal claims are three-fol

 

(2) that Carlisle
acted without legal authority when he used public funds and

resources to advocate for passage of the proposed constitutional
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amendment Question 3;‘ (2) that Carlisle's conduct violated

Rees’s constitutional rights; and (3) that Carlisle's conduct was

 

in violation of Revised Ordinances of Honolulu (ROH) § 3-8.6.
Carlisle denies that he viclated Rees’s constitutional rights,
and claims thet Section 6-104 of the Revised Charter of Honolulu
and HRS § 26-10.6 give him the legal authority to use public
funds and resources to advocate for passage of the proposed
constitutional amendment Question 3. In addition, Carlisle
asserted a number of affirmative defenses, including: lack of
standing, mootness, and failure to state @ claim upon which
relief can be granted. The cizcuit court ruled that Rees had
standing to assert the claim, and Carlisle did not challenge this

finding on appeal.

Since the issue of legal authority for the conduct at
issue is fundamental to our analysis, we will begin with a review

of Carlisle’s claimed authority.

 

Authority to Use Public Funds to Advocate for an Election

The Revised Charter of Honolulu (RCH) sets out the

Prosecuting attorney's “powers, duties, and functions” in Section

 

+ In addition to challenging this claim on the nerits, Carlisle argues
that thie point should be disregarded because che circuit court never made the
“finding” in question ang therefore the point of error viciates RU
26h) (2) (c) of the Howai'i Rules of Appellate Frocedure (HRAF)- We disagree:
The circuit court implicitly feune ‘Conduct wae authorized by
statute, end Rees" = Opening ‘here in the record the sileged
error cccurres.” HRAP 28 (3) (4

 

       

 

      

     
   

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8-104 (Supp. 2003), in accordance with authorizing state law.
‘See HRS § 46-1.5(27) (1993) ("Each county shall have the power to
provide by charter for the prosecution of all offenses and to
prosecute for offenses against the laws of the State under the
authority of the attorney general of the state.”). RCH § 6-104
provides thet

‘the prosecuting attorney shall

a) Attend ail courte in the city and cenduct, on behalf of
‘the people, oil prosecutions therein fer offenses against the laws
cf the state and the ordinences and roles and regulations of the
ciey

 

(b) Frosecute offenses against the lave of the etate under
the authority of the attorney general cf the state.

c) Appear in every crininel case where there ie 2 change of
venue fron the courts in the city and prosecute the same in any
juriseiceion tc which the came if enanoes cr Fencved. The expense
Of auen preceeding shell be pasa by the city.

{id} Institute proceedings before the district judges for the
arrest of perscne charged with or resecnably suspectes of public
offenses, when the prosecuting attorney has information thet any
Such effenses have been comitted, anc for thet purpose, take
Charge of erininal cases before the district Judges esther in
person or by 2 deputy or by such other prosecuting officer or in
‘Such other Banner ex the prosecuting atterney shell dei hen
approval of the district court er in accorsance with 8 eran
alt indicteents and attend before and give advice to the grand
jury wnenever cases are presented to it for ite consideration; and
investigate ali matters which may properly cone before the
prosecuting attorney. Nothing herein conteines shell prevent the
Conduer of proceedings by private counsel befere ceurts of record
Unger the direction of the prosecuting attorney.

 

 

 

 

     

 

  

RCH § 8-104 (citations omitted).
Ae the most general statement of the prosecuting
attorney’s powers, RCH § 8-104 provides the proper starting point
for enalyzing the extent of Carlisle's authority. See, e.c.
mt ing, 11 Haw. 140, 76 P.2d 943 (1990) (analyzing

language of Honolulu Charter, section 8-104, to determine that

 
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prosecuting attorney is empowered, in his discretion, to employ
private counsel te prosecute particular cases). RCH § 6-104,
which is focused on the prosecution of offenses, the institution

of arrest proceedings, and court appearances, clearly lacks any

 

express grant of power to use public funds te advocate for
changes in the law. See Marsland v. Fang, § Haw. App. 463, 472,
701 P.2d 175, 184 (1985) ("The prosecutor's powers and functions
are limited to those expressly accorded to his office by the
statute creating it.” (Citing 638 An. Jur. 2d Prosecuting
Attorneys § 20 (1984).) (Emphasis added.)). Conceding that
express authority is not provided by section @-104, Carlisle

“power to comment on non-partisan ballot measures

 

argues that th

x in which he can initiate prosecutions

 

that impact upon the man:
is fairly implied fron” his power and duty to prosecute crimes.
We agree with Carlisle that the power to publicly
comment on ballot measures that implicate the manner in which he
can initiate prosecutions is fairly implied from his power and
duty to prosecute crimes.’ The problem in this case is that

Carlisle’s conduct went far beyond providing information to the

 

public on how the criminal justice system can be improved; he

ading a battle campaign using public

 

became 2 partisan advocate

ele may “comment” on such iseues
by the First Anendwent not at
for & specific election cutcone

   

of couree, whether Car
feat prove

           
 

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funds and other resources to tell voters how to vote. As noted
earlier, Carlisle mobilized the Office of the Prosecuting
Attorney and together they collectively advocated for the passage
of Question 3 in speaking engagements on sixty-six (66) separate
dates between April 25 and November 14, 2002, sign-waved on
twenty (20) separate dates, prepared campaign materials in the
office during business hours, urged voters to vote “Yes” on the
website of the Office of the Prosecuting Attorney, and utilized
public funds, labor, and resources in this overt advocacy
campaign.

‘The distinction between providing information and
blatant advocacy was made by the New Jersey Supreme Court in
Citizens to Protect Pub, funds v. Bd. of Educ., 98 A.2d 673 (N.J.
1953), a case that concerned the legality of @ school board’s
expenditure of public funds on a booklet promoting a school
building program, which was to be funded by a bond measure if
approved by the voters in a local referendum election. In an
opinion written by then New Jersey Supreme Court Justice and
future United States Suprene Court Justice William Brennan, the
court ruled that while express advocacy was not permitted, the
school board had implied power under its budgeting powers ~~
which included @ provision regarding school building -- that

“plainly embraces the making of reasonable expenditures for the

a
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

purpose of giving voters relevant facts to aid them in reaching
an informed judgment when voting upon the proposal.” Id. at 676.
But rather than a fair presentation of facts, the court stated,
“the board made use of public funds to advocate one side only of
the controversial question without affording the dissenters the

nt their

 

opportunity by means of that financed medium to pre
side, and thus imperilled the propriety of the entire
expenditure.” Id. at 677. This was improper, Justice Brennan

explained, because

     

 

(che public ed to the belong equally te
the proponents ong opponents of the proposition, and the use
of the funds to finance not the presentation of fects aerely

     

st gorente to perevade the votere chat only one #ide
has merit, gives the dissenters Just cause fer complsint,
The expenciture se then net within the implied power and de
ot lawfui in the absence of express authority fron the

 

 

Ia
‘The New Jersey Supreme Court analysis is consistent

of

 

with that of other jurisdictions that have considered the u
public funds to advocate in elections. In Stenson v. Mott, the
caligornia Suprene Court ruled that while the Celifornia
Department of Parks and Recreation may have disseminated neutral
information relating to the bond election without running efoul
of the law, it was not authorized to “expend public funds to
promote @ partisan position in @ general election." 17 Cal. 3¢
551 7.26 1, 3 (1976). The

 

206, 208-10, 130 Cel. ptr. €97, 69

California Supreme Court stated:
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FOR PUBLICA’

 

Indeec, every court which has addressed the Sesue to
date has fsund the use of public funds for partisan compas
Purposes isproper, either on the grouné that such use wea
Rot exeiicitiy authorizes or on the brosder ground thet such
Capencitures tre never appropriates =

‘Underlying thie snisorm sedicial ‘reluctance to
sanction the se of public funds fer electicn cempaigne
EIECS Sh Sgaiele Setcgnstson enae sven expenditures raise
potentiolly serious constiturienal questions.

 

 

 

17 Gal, 3d at 217, 130 Cal. Aptr. at 704-05, S51 F.2d at 8-9,

Having concluded that the Revised Charter of Honolulu
provides neither express nor implied authority to use public
funds to advocate for a proposed constitutional amendment in a
general election, we now consider Carlisle's argument that such
authority is provided by HRS § 26-10.6.

c. HRS § 28-10.6 0. r isle's
ix Does Net Apply to the Prosecuting Attorney.
Chapter 28 of the Hawai'i Revised Statutes is entitled

wattorney General.” HRS § 28-10.6 provides es follows:

Ceine research, prevention, and education:
adainistrator and staff. (2) The cepartrent of the attorney
general shall initiate, develop, and perform cr coordinate
Prograns, projects, and activities, as determined by the

von the subject of crise, snciuding But net
arch, prevention, end education. The

 

  

y
‘arch, evaluate, and make reconnendetions

 

criminal justice system to the governor, the

Tegisleure, the judiciary, criminal justice

apencies, of the general public, 2= pprepriate:

(2) Develop and implement er coordinate statewide

Grine preventien progrene end ectavities,

Snetuetng:

(Bh) Providing erine prevention training
prograns for law enforcenent agencies,
Eltizens, Businesses, anc civic sroupe:
one

(B) Resisting in the organizetion of crine
Breventign teams in communities ts

 
 

+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,

 

encourage the development of comunity

chine prevention provrersy

(3) Develop public education programs through
various broadcast or print media to provide to
the general public information that will assist
citizens in Seveloping the knowlesge and
Confidence te prevent crine and to avoid

. Becoming victine of ezine:

(4) " Establish, ae dened by the attorney general to
be necessary or eppropriate, citizen and
Sovernment agency representative seudy teams to
Beudy epecific etine eubject® or erimnal
Justice eyster problens, in order to obtain
input or advice from e more specializes sesnent
of the erinins! Sustice or public community on
those specific matters; and

3

 

(b) The attorney
chapter 76, and 8: the

feral nay enpioy, without regard to
‘Stney generel's plessure disniee,
Sn astinsetravor and ‘Suppers staff necessary for the
Performance er cocrdination ef the prograns, projects, and
Eetivities on the subject of crine

   
 

 

 

HRS § 28-10.6 (1993 and Supp. 2002).
Carlisle argues that because section 8-104(b) of the
Revised Charter of Honolulu gives him authority to “prosecute

offenses against the law of the state under the authority of the
att "RCH § 8-104 (b) (emphasis added),

he enjoys the same authority given to the attorney general by the

legislature in HRS § 2€-10.€, at least with respect to

 

subsections (1)- (3

«tn nie snended anewer ang mencrensun in opposition to Rees’® summary
judgnent motion in the circuit court, Carlisle stared that “[ulnder the
authority of the attorney general, af it concerne the subject of crine, the
Prosecuting ties aise may include Grime research,
prevention, and education, snciudins ivities discueseo in HAS © 26-
Fores" wndee enumeration wae quoted cirectly from HRS § 26-106

 

 

  
 

 

 
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **

The statutory language in question does not support
Carlisle's argunent. HRS chapter 26 is entitled “Attorney
General.” HRS § 28-1 provides, among other things, that the
attorney general shall appear for the State personally or by
Geputy, in all cases criminal in which the State may be a party
or be interested. HRS § 26-2 is entitled “Prosecutes offenders,
enforces bonds” and provides, among other things, that the
attorney general shall prosecute offenders against the laws of
the State. HRS § 28-10.6 is entitled “Crime research,
prevention, and education: adninistrator and staff.” A review of
this statutory language shows that the language is indeed
specifically directed to the departnent of the attorney general,
and its duties with respect to crime research, prevention, and
education. There is no mention of the prosecuting attorney in
the statute indeed the language refers only to the attorney

general's powers. Subsections (1), (2), and (3) cited by

 

Carlisle are prefaced with “The attorney general may:” and
subsection (2) refers expressly to “statewide crime prevention
programs and activities,” HRS § 28-10.6, although the prosecuting

attorney is not a statewide officer.”

  
 

Although we need not cor
neening ie plain, Petersen, 85 Mawes's at 327-28, 944 F.2d at 127
Tegielative hietory of BRE § 26-10.¢ etrengthens the conclusion
only applies te the attorney generai. The original bill that ©
$'26-10.6 was entitied "A fill for an Act Relating to the Department of the

eont inveds -)

 

     

 

18
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ye, it cannot be

 

With this clear statutory leng

 

seriously contended that the legislature intended to vest the
office of the Frosecuting Attorney of the City and County of
Honolulu with the same powers as were granted to the state
attorney genersl in HRS § 28-10.6.' The Revised Charter of

Honolulu section 8-104(b) language granting the prosecuting

 

attorney the power to prosecute offenses under the authority of
the attorney general refers to the prosecutor's authority to
prosecute offenses, and not the attorney general's powers given
by the legislature with respect to crime research, prevention,
and education. The enabling HRS provision also supports this
conclusion. See HRS $ 46-1.5(17) ("Each county shall have the
power to provide by charter for the prosecution of all offenses
and to prosecute for offenses against the laws of the State under

the authority of the attorney general of the Stete.”); see also

(..continued)
astorney General.” 8.B, No. 2800, 18th. leg, Reg. Sese. (1989). In addition
tothe grovisions regarding crime research, prevention, and education, the
Bit"Sibe adged theo sections to HRS chapter 26, eetabliching the Hawais
Exininal justice commiseien within the departeent of the attorney general and
Eloviing rolesneking authority for thet Sepertment. Furtnerrore, a6 2 report
EF the Senate Juciciary Comnsttee atated in part, "the purpose of thie bili
Sas to incluge the progress, provecte, and activities on the subject of crime

Tesearch, prevention, and education, .
Ee Eneral” Sen. Stang. Conn. Hep. No. 28, in 196s Senate Journel, at

HGStiSisasis sddea). This legisiecive history makes clear that the
Tegisistore enly had’ in mind the department of the atterney generé
posed the Jew giving rise to HRS § 2620.6.

   

 

when se

 

   

1 has pursuant te

  

mas § 21
20
 

pmemiva v. Sapienze, 63 Haw. 424, 427, 629 P.24 1126, 1129 (1961)
(stating that the prosecuting attorney shell “prosecute offenses
against the laws of the State under the authority of the attorney
general of the State.”) (citing predecessor of RCH § 8-104).

Stated simply, the powers granted to the attorney
general by the legislature in HRS § 28-10.6 do not apply te the
prosecuting attorney.”

Having held that neither the Revised Charter of
Honolulu nor HRS § 28-10.6 authorize the prosecuting attorney to
use public funds to advocate for a proposed constitutional
election, we need not address the constitutional issues raised by

Rees. “A fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial

 

restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional

questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.” City

and County of Honolulu v, Sherman, 110 Hawai'i 39, 7 n.7, 129
P.3d $42, 589 n.7 (2006) (quoting Lyna v, NW indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1968)).

+ te is noteworthy that the Hewes" Attorney General, in an opinion
letter dated October 24) 2002 and directed to the Office of the Public
Pelender, she counterpart to the prosecuting attorney, concluded that the
Public Oefencer’s office did not have express statutory autherity te make
reelasendations tc the criminal justice aysten and thus stated "you er your

   

      
 

+++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***_—

D. s Claim Is Within the

Doctrine.
Carlisle asserts thet Rees’s claim for declaratory

" relief is moot under Hawai'i law as “the conduct complained of
has already occurred and there is no concrete dispute between the

parties.” However, there is an exception to the moctness

 

doctrine “in cases involving questions that affect the public
interest and are ‘capable of repetition yet evading review.‘
Okada Trucking v. Bd. of Water Supply, 99 Hawai'i 191, 196, 52
P.3d 799, 604 (2002). Rees’s claim falle squarely within the
exception as it affects the public interest and is capable of
epetition yet evading review.

Ee. the a ees Does Not Hav

Right of Action Under Aevised Orcinances of Honolulu Section
‘SCE. € Was Not Erroneous

While we have held herein that Carlisle's conduct was
without authority, which is dispositive of this case, we also
pass on Rees’s contention that the circuit court erred in finding
that it did not have jurisdiction to consider whether Carlisle's

conduct violated ROH § 3-8.6 (2002), a violation of which

W that section, entitled “Additional standards of conduct concerning

 

 

cempaign contributions ang canpaign assistance,” provides in relevant part:
le) An exempt officer or employee shall not:
(2) "coerce, denanc, oF ctherwise reqcire 2 cenpaign contribvtion

   

Gr campaign astistonce from another officer oF employ

(2) Deny enploynent toa person who will not agree, a6 @
condition ef the enployrent, te

RI Make 2 caspaign contribution cr request @ cenpaign

centinsed.

 

 

 

2
+4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

»

a

 

continued)

a

 

we
a
@

contribution from snother person? or

(B) Render campaign assistance or requ
to render campaign assistance:

Discharge, demote, secrease the cenpensation of, haress, or

Otherwise ponseh anther officer cr enployee because chat

officer or employee:

(A) Refused to make a campaign contribution or render
campaign assistance when requested cr cenanded by the
euenpt officer or enployee cr # third person:

(B) Sought or received an eavisory opinion fvom the ethics
Commission ons possible viclation of this subsections

(Cl Filed with a public agency cr officer » complaint
alleging @ velation of this subsection

Promise cr threaten te discharge, dencte, decrease the

Compensation of, harass, of ctherwise punish encther officer

or exployee unless thst officer cr encloyee!

Ta) ‘Makes » campaign contribution cr renders campaign
Beeistance so requested oF cemandes by the exense
officer cr employee or a thire person:

(B) Refraine from seeking en acviscry cpinion from the
ethice commission cn e possible viistion of this
subsection: oF

(c) Reseeine from filing with # public agency ox officer @
Conpleint alleging « vielation of this subsectsony

Fronote or increase the compensation of another officer or

employee because thet officer oF employee nace @ campaign

contribution or rendered campaign assistance when requested
or denanded by the exenpt officer or enployee or a third
persons

Eolicit or request a specified or minimum campaign

contribution ancunt. from another officer oF expieyee?

Request ancther officer or employee to provide @ specified

ef minim anount of canpaign assistance; or

Solicit er receive any campaign contribution from # person,

including ancther officer or enployee, in s building er

facility during ite use for official city functions,

te another person

 

 

 

 

 

kn exenpt officer or employee aise shall not request or direct
another exempt officer or eaployee to engage inan activity,
prohibited under this subsection.

The activities prohibited under subsection (c) shail not preclude
an exenpt officer or employee. from:

a
a

8)
w
i

 

Voting as the exespt officer or employee chooses:
Voluntarily expressing an opinion on any political
candidate, question, ex issuer

ily erving ase menber of ¢ politicel party,
yn conmsttee, or other politics: organization;
ily making a campaign contribstien or rendering
campaign assistance; or
Voluntarily seliciting or requesting = cenpaign contribution
oF canpaigh assistance from ancther persons se Long a= the

 

     
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would carry different penalties. In particular, Rees argues that

HRS § 632-1" vests the circuit court with jurisdiction to issue

|. continued)
Seligstation or request does not viclate subsection (cl.

(e) An exenpt ofticer of employee who violates any provisicn of
Subsection (c) shall be guilty of a petty misdenesncr.
The prosecution of a violation pursuant €o this subsection shall
Ee commenced within tuo yeare after commitment of the violation.
Ne vielation shail be prosecuted efter the expiration of the two
year pericd.
The prosecuting attorney shall be reepensible for prosecution of a
‘eletion. If the prosecuting attorney becomes disqualified, the
tate attcrney general shail have the respensibilicy for prosecution.
The penalty of thos subsection shall be in edaition to che penalty
provised onder Secticn 3-£.5{e). Both penelties may be inposed for
fhe sane vielaticn.

 

 

 

 

1H yng § 632-1, the first section of HRS Chapter 632, “Declarstory,
yudgnente,” is iteel¢ entities “Joriecieticn? controversies subject to,” end

provices,

 

 

 

In cases of actual controversy, courte of record, within the scope
of thelr fespective jurisdictions, shall have pouer to make binging
Sdjsdicaticns of right, whether of net consequential relict is, or at
the time could be, clained, and no ection or preceeding shell be cpen to
Shjecticn en the ground shat a jucgnent or crder merely declaratory of
fight ie preyes for) provided that declaratory relief may not be
Soteines in any distesee coure, or in any controversy witn respect te
Sixes, or in eny case where 2 Givorce or annuinent of marriage is
Sought, Controversies involving the intezpretation ef deeds, wills,
Sther instrunente of writing, statutes, municipal ordinances, and other
Governmental regslatione, nmoy be so determined, and this enueration
Sees nos exclude cther instances of actus! antagonistic assertion and
Senial of right

Relief by declaratory judgment may be granted in civil cases where
lan actusi controversy existe between contending parties, or where the
lore ie satisfied that antagonistic claims are present between the
farties invelvec which indicate imminent and ineviteble litigation, or
Ehere in any such cese the court ie aatiefied thet e party asserts a
Jegel relation, states, right, er priviiege in which the party has
Concrete interest and that there is challenge or denial of the
Sceertes relation, statue, right, or privilege by an adversary party who
aise hee or aseerte a concrete interest therein, and the court is
Eatisfied also that @ declaratory judgment will’ serve to terminate the
Gncerteinty ov controversy giving rise to the preceesing. Where,
However, # sratute provides # special form of renedy for a specific type
Gf ease, that svatutery renesy ensll be fellowee; ut the mere fact
fhot an actual cr threatenes controversy is susceptible of relief
Ehrcugh ¢ genere: coanen Jaw renedy, a remedy equitable in nature, or an
Gntracrdinary ea) renedy, shether such renedy is recognized or
Heguiates by statute or not, shel not ebar a party frem the privilege

Ieontinsee. ==)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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a declaratory judgment thet Carlisle’s conduct was illegal. Rees
is incorrect as a matter of law.

As the circuit court noted, a violation of ROH § 3-
8.6(c) is properly addressed in a criminal prosecution, as the
ordinance itself specifies. The court also stated that the
ordinance “does not appear to create a private right of action in
favor of a taxpayer's challenge to the expenditure of public
funds."

The declaratory judgnent statute, HRS § 632-1, grants
courts of record the power to make “binding adjudications of
right” in justiciable cases, in three types of civil cases:

[2] where an actual controversy existe between contending parties,
G2) Fi "inere the court is setisfied that antagonistic cleins ere

 

 

 

Present between the parties savelved uhich incicate imminent end
Thevitable iitigstion, or (3) where sn any such case the court ie
setistied that a party ssserts a lege: relation, status, right, ci

       

Privilege in which the porty hae 2 concrete interest and that
Flere ig a challenge or ceniel of the asserted relation, status,
Hight, or privilege by en adversary party whe also has or asserts
2 Eoncrete interest therein,

   

 

HRS § 632-1. In each case, the court must be “satisfied also
that a declaratory judgment will serve to terminate the
uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding.” Ids
As the declaratory judgment statute thus makes clear,
there must be some “right” at issue in order for the court to

issue relief. In Reliable Collection Agency v. Cole, 59 Haw.

 

(-sscontinued)
cf detaining # declaratory judgment in any case where the other
Slsentiais to euch relle! are present

 

 
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

 

503, $84 P.2d 107 (1978), this court incorporated the United
States Supreme Court's approach from Cort v, Ash, 422 U.S. 66

(1975), to determine whether “s private remedy is implicit ina

 

statute not expressly providing one” -~ an analysis that also
involves the determination of whether a statute creates a right
upon which a plaintiff may seek relief. Reliable, 58 Haw. at
507, 584 P.2d at 109 (quoting Cort, 422 U.S. at 78). The
Reliable Court discussed three relevant factors used in Cort to
make this determination:

Firet, de the plaintiff ‘one of the

Benefit the statute was enacted(?) «+
te on eke in few o econe,

fe there eny sndicotion of Legislative intent, expiicie oF

implicit, either to create such @ renecy.

Thins, if St conesstent with the underlying purposes of the

Legislative echene to imply such & renedy for the plaintifr?

r whose especie)
that is,

    

   

 

Id. at $07, $84, P.2d at 109 (first emphasis in original)

78). Subsequent to Cort, decisions of

 

(quoting Cort, 422 0.8.

 

the United States Supreme Court have emphasized that “the key
inquiry is whether Congress intended to provide the plaintiff
with a private right of action.” Whitey's Boat Cruises, Inc. v.

Napali-Kauai Boat Charters, Inc., 110 Hawai'i 302, 313 n.20, 132
P.3d 1213, 1224 n.20 (2006) (quoting First Pac. Bancorp, Inc. v,

Helfer, 224 F.3d 1117, 1121-22 (Sth Cir. 2000)). Therefore, es
we recognized in Whitev's Boat Cruises, “we apply Cort’s first

three factors in determining whether @ statute provides a private
right of action though understanding that legislative intent

26
+++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

appears to be the determinative factor.” id. See alse Gonzaga
Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 264 (2002) ("For a statute to create
private rights, its text must be phrased in terms of the persons

benefited.”

 

Alexander v. Sandoval, $32 U.S. 275, 286 (2001)
(The judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has
passed to determine whether it displays an intent to create not
just 2 private right but also a private renedy.”)-

Nothing in the text of ROH § 3-8.6 appears to create a
right protecting menbers of the public from the activities it
prohibits. Rather, it is in the nature of “standards of conduct”
for public officers. Although the public clearly benefits from
the existence of such stendards, it does not eppear that the
ordinance was passed for the special benefit of taxpayers as @
group. See Reliable, 59 Haw. at 507, $84 P.26 at 109 ("First, is
the plaintiff ‘one of the clase for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted{?"” (Quoting Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.)). More
importantly, the ordinance clearly states that: “[t]he
prosecuting attorney shall be responsible for prosecution of a
violation. If the prosecuting attorney becomes disqualified, the
state attorney general shall have the responsibility for
prosecution.” ROH § 3-€.6(e). The ordinance also states that
vieyne penalty of this subsection shall be in addition to the

penalty provided under Section 3-8.5(a),” which provides for
+##* FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

impeachment and lesser discipline by the appointing authority,
upon recommendation of the ethics commission, if the standards of
conduct of Article XI of the ROH are violated. ROH § 3-8.5(a).
Private enforcement of ROH § 3-8.6 by way of declaratory judgment
would not be consistent with the legislative scheme inherent in
the ordinance. See Reliable, $9 Hew. at 507, S84 P.2d at 109
(othire, is it congistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintif£?”
(Quoting Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.)).

‘These considerations make clear that ROH § 3-8.6 does
not create @ right for taxpayers, like Rees, to enforce; rather,
enforcenent is mandated through the prosecutor, attorney general,
ethics comission, and appointing authority. Therefore, a
declaratory judgment that the ordinance was violated is
inappropriate, and dismissal of this claim was not erroneous.

Iv. coNeuusron

Based on the foregoing, we vacate the circuit court's
Novenber 23, 2004 final judgment, and remand this matter with
Instructions to: (1) grant Rees’s motion for summary judgment in
favor of Rees and against Carlisle, in his official capacity
only, on Rees’s declaratory judgment claim that Carlisle lacked
legal authority fer his conduct; and (2) deny Carlisle's motion

to dismiss and for summary judgment. However, because this is a

2
 

‘s+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

case of first impression in this jurisdiction, and Carlisle
ostensibly relied upon an opinion of the City and County of
Honolulu Ethics Commission, ve believe as 2 matter of equity that
the renedial injunctive relief requested by Rees should not issue
under the circumstances of this case. Further, the prospective
injunctive relief requested by Rees would not appear to be
necessary in view of our explication of applicable law herein.

We therefore instruct the court to enter an order accordingly.

on the briefs:

Lois K. Perrin
(of American Civil Liberties
Union of Hawaii Foundation)

and Earle A. Partington .
(of Law Office of Earle A. Bl ifoZaemee—

farcington!. for plaintit?
sppellane Robert Rees ow
Jonn F. Perkin and

Brandes ek Faria

(of Perkin & Faria, LLLC) Games €, Bua Orv

{58 defencant~eppeliee .
Peter Carlisle, city and & Qandill
County of Honoiute Yregenen fea
Prosecuting Attorney,

in his official and
individual capacities