Title: State v. Nunez

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 121,284 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
CASIMIRO NUNEZ, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5231 creates a true immunity that prevents the State from 
criminally prosecuting individuals who are statutorily justified in their use of force.  
 
2. 
To effectuate immunity under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5231, district courts must 
perform a gatekeeping function and insulate these qualifying cases from continued 
prosecution and trial. A defendant invokes the district court's gatekeeping function by 
filing a motion under the statute, which then imposes a burden on the State to come 
forward with evidence establishing probable cause that the defendant's use of force was 
not statutorily justified.  
 
3. 
When considering a motion under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5231, a district court 
must consider the totality of the circumstances, weigh the evidence before it without 
2 
 
 
 
deference to the State, and determine whether the State has carried its burden to establish 
probable cause that the defendant's use of force was not statutorily justified.  
 
4. 
A district court is to follow a two-step process when making probable cause 
determinations on pretrial immunity motions. First, the district court must make findings 
of fact based on the stipulations of the parties and evidence presented at the hearing, 
along with any reasonable inferences therefrom. Second, the district court must then 
reach a legal conclusion as to whether the State has met its probable cause burden based 
on the court's factual findings. 
 
5. 
A district court is not required to make any particularized findings when ruling on 
an immunity motion, but it must be apparent from the record that the district court not 
only recognized, but also applied, the appropriate legal standard in reaching its probable 
cause determination. 
 
6. 
Under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5405(a)(4), involuntary manslaughter in the form of 
imperfect self-defense, that is, killing based on a lawful act committed in an unlawful 
manner, may be characterized as a lawful exercise of self-defense, but with excessive 
force. 
 
7. 
The crime of imperfect self-defense involuntary manslaughter contains an element 
not contained in second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter:  lawfully acting in 
self-defense but in a manner made unlawful through the exercise of excessive force. 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; KEVIN O'CONNOR and STEPHEN J. TERNES, judges. 
Opinion filed May 14, 2021. Reversed and remanded. 
 
Korey A. Kaul, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause, and was on the brief for 
appellant.  
 
Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Marc Bennett, district attorney, 
and Derek L. Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
ROSEN, J.:  Casimiro Nunez appeals from his conviction by a jury of one count of 
premeditated first-degree murder and one count of possession of methamphetamine with 
intent to distribute. Finding error in the instructions the jury received, we reverse the 
murder conviction and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
FACTS 
 
At 2:35 in the morning of October 29, 2016, the Wichita emergency services 
dispatcher received a 911 call in broken English, and a Spanish interpreter joined the 
conversation. The caller, later identified as Nunez, reported that he shot and killed 
someone who had threatened and tried to rob him. The caller told the dispatcher, "I wasn't 
going to let him alive and he threatened me!" He went on to say, "It's my life or his." 
While the caller was on the phone, a man identified as Nunez' son, Paul, could be heard 
in the background. Paul shouted expletives at Nunez, who sometimes responded that he 
had been threatened and attacked and sometimes told the dispatcher that a man was dead. 
4 
 
 
 
When Paul asked him, "What did you do?" the caller replied, "I didn't do anything! He 
came after me." 
 
At about the same time as the call, Officer Donald Moore of the Wichita Police 
Department drove by a house on his way to another call. He saw Nunez standing in the 
doorway; Nunez waved and called out to him. A short time later, Moore received a 
dispatcher alert that a shooting had occurred at the house, and he returned and waited 
outside the house until other officers arrived. 
 
As the officers approached the house, they saw Nunez and Paul standing on the 
front porch. Paul was holding a handgun and appeared to be very intoxicated. At the 
direction of the police, Paul tossed the gun away from himself. The gun had jammed, and 
a shell casing was projecting from the extraction port. Upon entering the front door, the 
officers saw a dead man, later identified as Antonio Guzman, lying face-down on the 
floor about 6 feet from the entrance. Three shell casings were on the hallway floor near 
the victim. Guzman had a small folding knife clipped to his pants. In one pocket, he had 
cash and a baggie containing methamphetamine. The subsequent toxicology report 
revealed that Guzman had relatively high concentrations of methamphetamine and 
alcohol in his system. 
 
Guzman had received three bullet wounds. One was on the left side of his torso, 
one was on the back left side of the chest, and one was on the left side of his head. There 
was a bullet indentation in the floor under Guzman's body, suggesting that he had been 
shot at least once while he was lying on the floor. There were close contact burns, also 
called stippling, around the head wound. 
 
5 
 
 
 
Officer David Cruz talked to Nunez at the scene in Spanish, and the conversation 
was recorded on Cruz' body camera. Nunez told Cruz that Paul was present during the 
shooting:  Guzman came at him with a large kitchen knife, grabbing him by the neck and 
holding the knife to his throat. Paul disarmed Guzman, and then "they" shot him. Nunez 
later told Detective Christian Cory that Guzman was reaching for his knife even after he 
had been shot twice and was lying on the floor. 
 
 
Nunez stated that he had been robbed several times previously and he was tired of 
people breaking into his home, which was why he bought a gun. At the scene, he told 
police he shot Guzman in self-defense and in defense of his property. He told Officer 
Cruz, "He came in to steal. This man came in to steal and he threatened us with a, with a, 
and well, we defended ourselves. Well, it's my house. This man came in to steal . . . ." He 
went on to say, "[W]e didn't want to do that but, but he threatened me, he also grabbed 
me with a knife here, here on the neck and, but fortunately we took it from him and it 
happened and what had to happen." He concluded by saying, "Hey, well, it's my house, 
we're already, we're already tired officer, it's that you all also, there are many reports, and 
don't blame us anymore, and one has to defend themselves, what do you want, my life or 
his. . . . And it's my house, I'm not somewhere else, I am in my house and they came to 
steal and I defended myself and my son too." These statements were all volunteered by 
Nunez without prompting by investigators. 
 
After police cleared the area, a search of the premises revealed evidence of drug 
possession. In a bedroom dresser drawer, police found a large bag and several smaller 
bags containing methamphetamine. They also found a digital weighing scale. Outside the 
house, alcohol cans and bottles were strewn around the ground. Police found a kitchen 
knife with a 6-inch blade lying on the ground near an outside corner of the house. 
 
6 
 
 
 
About four hours after the shooting, Sergeant Michael Linnehan participated in an 
interview with Nunez at the police station. In the course of the interview, Nunez provided 
three differing accounts of what transpired. 
 
In the first account, Nunez said Paul had some friends over to the house. Nunez 
heard a loud disturbance coming from the front of the house, and he saw an individual 
whom he did not know, who would later be identified as Guzman. Guzman had Paul in a 
headlock and was holding a knife towards Paul. When Nunez pulled a gun from his 
waistband, Guzman released Paul, tossed the knife on the floor, and started toward 
Nunez, saying "Give me your money, give me your money." Nunez responded, "[W]e 
don't have any money, what are you talking about."  
 
A couple of Paul's friends came to Nunez' aid, and there was a struggle over the 
gun. During the struggle, Nunez was able to transfer the gun to Paul. After Paul's friends 
pushed Guzman against the wall, Paul fired, causing Guzman to slump down. Nunez 
heard three more shots, and then there was chaos in the house. After the party guests had 
left, he made the 911 call.  
 
Linnehan asked Nunez whether Guzman might have been trying to steal drugs 
from him, and Nunez responded that he did not have drugs in the house and he did not 
use drugs. But when Linnehan told him that police found methamphetamine in the house, 
Nunez acknowledged that, although he did not use or sell the drug, he kept some in his 
bedroom for a female friend.  
 
Nunez subsequently gave Linnehan a second version of the events. He admitted it 
was he who shot Guzman. In this account, Guzman was attempting to rob them and was 
holding Paul in a headlock at knifepoint. Nunez pulled his gun from his waistband, 
7 
 
 
 
whereupon Guzman tossed the knife on the floor and tried to grab the gun. Nunez fired 
two shots, hitting Guzman and causing him to fall to the floor. Nunez believed Guzman 
was reaching for the knife, and Nunez fired one more shot. Nunez then corrected himself 
and said Guzman still had the knife in his hand when he went for Nunez' gun.  
 
On further questioning, Nunez gave a third version of what happened. In this 
account, Paul was not present when the confrontation and shooting occurred. Guzman 
was armed with a knife and threatened to rob Nunez. One of Paul's friends grabbed hold 
of Guzman and pushed him to the floor. As the friend was pushing him away, Nunez 
fired two shots, striking Guzman in the midsection. Guzman fell to the floor next to the 
knife, which he struggled to pick up even as he was lying on the floor. Believing Guzman 
was reaching for the knife and intended to attack him again, Nunez shot Guzman in the 
head. 
 
The State initially charged Nunez with one count of voluntary manslaughter. 
Nunez filed a motion for dismissal and for a declaration of self-defense immunity. The 
State filed a response asserting that Nunez shot Guzman while committing an inherently 
dangerous felony—distribution of drugs—and he was therefore guilty of felony murder 
and not eligible to assert self-defense immunity. The State then amended its complaint to 
charge one count of premeditated first-degree murder and one count of possession of 
methamphetamine with intent to sell.  
 
 
The trial court combined the preliminary hearing with a hearing on the immunity 
motion. It found insufficient evidence to support a charge of felony murder but denied 
Nunez immunity from prosecution, finding probable cause to prosecute on homicide 
charges and possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. 
 
8 
 
 
 
At trial, in addition to the testimony and reports of law enforcement, jurors heard 
two witnesses who were at the scene of the shooting testify about what they saw. Irvin 
(Chavo) Rodriguez told the jury he went to the party at Nunez' house after work that day. 
That night, he saw someone attack Nunez with a kitchen knife. The assailant grabbed 
Nunez by the throat and, at knifepoint, demanded his gun. Rodriguez intervened and 
pushed the assailant backwards. As the assailant fell to the ground, Rodriguez started to 
leave out the door. He heard a gunshot and looked back inside the house, where he saw 
the assailant on the floor. As he left for home, Rodriguez woke up Paul, who was asleep 
in his van, and told him his father had shot somebody.  
 
Christina Jones testified as a rebuttal witness for the State. She told the jury that 
she and her sister were friends of Paul and they sometimes spent the night at Nunez' 
house. The night of the party, she became angry with Nunez because he fired some 
random gunshots in the house, although not aiming at anyone and not trying to hurt 
anybody. She told him, "[N]o more," and he stopped firing. Then she relaxed on a sofa 
and began to feel tired, so she and her sister went to a spare bedroom and went to sleep.  
 
She was awakened by a commotion and went out to the living room, where she 
saw Nunez and Guzman "going at each other." Everybody around her was saying that 
Guzman had a knife, and she remembered that she might have seen a knife but ultimately 
testified she did not see the knife. When she stepped between them and told Nunez to 
calm down, he pushed her out of the way. She heard a gunshot, and she and her sister ran 
out of the house. She said Paul was not present during the shooting, and she saw him 
asleep in his van when she left the house.  
 
The jury found Nunez guilty of first-degree premeditated murder and possession 
of methamphetamine with intent to distribute less than 1 gram. The court sentenced him 
9 
 
 
 
to a hard 50 life sentence for the murder conviction and a concurrent term of 18 months 
for the drug charge. Nunez took a timely appeal to this court. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Immunity from Prosecution 
 
A threshold issue is whether the trial court erroneously allowed the homicide 
prosecution to proceed in light of Nunez' assertion of self-defense. If Nunez had statutory 
immunity from prosecution, then his other issues become moot. We determine, however, 
that the State adequately established, and the trial court properly found, that immunity 
was not a bar to prosecution.  
 
In an appeal from the denial of a motion for self-defense immunity, this court 
reviews the district court's findings of fact arising from disputed evidence for substantial 
competent evidence and reviews the ultimate legal conclusion drawn from those facts de 
novo. State v. Phillips, 312 Kan. 643, 656, 479 P.3d 176 (2021). 
 
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5231 provides that people who use force in the defense of 
themselves or others or their property are immune from prosecution: 
 
"(a) A person who uses force which, subject to the provisions of K.S.A. 2020 
Supp. 21-5226, and amendments thereto, is justified pursuant to K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-
5222, 21-5223 or 21-5225, and amendments thereto, is immune from criminal 
prosecution and civil action for the use of such force . . . . As used in this subsection, 
"criminal prosecution" includes arrest, detention in custody and charging or prosecution 
of the defendant. 
. . . . 
10 
 
 
 
"(c) A prosecutor may commence a criminal prosecution upon a determination of 
probable cause." 
 
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5231 creates a "true immunity" that prevents the State from 
criminally prosecuting individuals who are statutorily justified in their use of force. To 
effectuate this immunity, district courts must perform a gatekeeping function and insulate 
these qualifying cases from continued prosecution and trial. A defendant invokes the 
district court's gatekeeping function by filing a motion under the statute, which then 
imposes a burden on the State to come forward with evidence establishing probable cause 
that the defendant's use of force was not statutorily justified. See Phillips, 312 Kan. at 
655-56. 
 
When considering a motion under the statute, the district court must consider the 
totality of the circumstances, weigh the evidence before it without deference to the State, 
and determine whether the State has carried its burden to establish probable cause that the 
defendant's use of force was not statutorily justified. A district court is to follow a two-
step process when making probable cause determinations on pretrial immunity motions. 
First, the district court must make findings of fact based on the stipulations of the parties 
and evidence presented at the hearing, along with any reasonable inferences therefrom. In 
this first step, the district court usually must resolve conflicts in the evidence in favor of 
one party or the other. Second, the district court must then reach a legal conclusion as to 
whether the State has met its probable cause burden based on the court's factual findings. 
See Phillips, 312 Kan. at 656. 
 
Because the immunity statute is designed to prevent prosecutions when the State 
fails to show probable cause that the defendant did not act in self-defense, the remedy for 
erroneous prosecution would be dismissal of murder charges with prejudice. Simply 
11 
 
 
 
because a jury might later find against the defendant's self-defense theory does not negate 
the statutory immunity. This court has explained: 
 
"[A] defendant's right to statutory immunity should be adjudicated at the early stages of 
the proceeding based on the evidentiary record submitted at the motion hearing. 
Otherwise, the immunity protections afforded by our Legislature would be rendered 
meaningless if the resolution of the immunity question, including disputed facts relevant 
to it, were delayed until trial. Moreover, these decisions illustrate an important difference 
in the injury a defendant potentially suffers as a result of immunity-related errors, 
compared to other trial errors. With other trial errors, the defendant's potential harm or 
injury relates to the fairness or legitimacy of the jury's verdict. However, in the case of 
immunity-related error, the potential harm or injury is the continued prosecution of the 
case in violation of defendant's statutory right to immunity. Quite simply, immunity error 
does not implicate the verdict." Phillips, 312 Kan. At 659. 
 
At the preliminary hearing, which also served as a hearing on the motion for 
dismissal based on immunity, the trial court heard the testimony of Lori Scott, a forensic 
investigator. She testified that the autopsy showed that Guzman was shot in the head at an 
angle from behind him and the shot was fired from a close-enough range to cause 
stippling around the wound. Detective Cory testified about different versions of the 
events that Nunez gave to investigators soon after the shooting.  
 
 
The trial court made the following findings regarding immunity: 
 
 
"Regarding the issue of immunity, what I did hear about the immunity was, the 
defendant gave three statements. And this came out during direct examination and in 
cross. He gave three statements. I don't know if they were all being able to say, "one, two, 
three," but there were three versions, so to speak. His initial statement was, according to 
evidence, that the victim attacked his son, and his son shot the victim; that then was 
12 
 
 
 
modified to the victim attacked his son, and he shot the victim; and then it became the 
victim attacked me, and I shot the victim. 
 
". . . [T]here has been a motion for immunity filed pursuant to K.S.A. 21-5231. 
And in consideration of the totality of the circumstances and weighing the evidence, 
without deference to the State, I will find that the State has carried its burden to establish 
probable cause that the defendant's use of force was not statutorily justified. 
 
 
"What I have is, I have information that Mr. Guzman was on the ground after 
being shot twice and then was shot in the head at a range where there was stippling on the 
wound. And based upon the evidence that I heard, I will make a finding that the State has 
carried its burden to establish that there's probable cause that the defendant's use of force 
was not statutorily justified. And that doesn't necessarily preclude a request for a self-
defense instruction at the time of trial, but I'm just addressing the issue of immunity from 
prosecution. And I will find that the State has carried its burden to show—the probable 
cause burden to show that he is not entitled to statutory immunity."  
 
A district court is not required to make any particularized findings when ruling on 
an immunity motion. It must be apparent from the record, however, that the district court 
not only recognized, but also applied, the appropriate legal standard in reaching its 
probable cause determination. In short, the record must show that the district court 
considered the totality of the circumstances, weighed the evidence without deference to 
the State, and resolved conflicting evidence in arriving at its legal conclusion regarding 
the probable cause determination. Phillips, 312 Kan. at 658. 
 
Here, the trial court applied the correct legal standard. To be sure, the trial court 
did not make detailed, point-by-point factual findings. As Nunez points out in his brief, 
merely citing to inconsistent stories presented by the defendant likely would not suffice 
for the State to sustain its burden of showing probable cause that Nunez did not act in 
13 
 
 
 
self-defense. But the court did make the explicit finding—supported by the evidence—
that Guzman was on the ground when at least one of the shots was fired into him. While 
that finding was not explored in detail, it was sufficient to support the probable cause 
finding, especially in light of the totality of the circumstances, which could include the 
inconsistent stories. 
 
 
 
Although we have not defined a quantum of proof that is required from the State 
in order to overcome the statutory presumption of an assertion of self-defense, we 
determine the State's case was sufficient to proceed with prosecution. 
 
Involuntary Manslaughter Instruction 
 
Nunez' attorney requested an instruction on involuntary manslaughter under 
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5405(a)(4):  the theory that he lawfully committed self-defense in 
an unlawful manner by exercising excessive force. 
 
The State argued, and the trial court agreed, that an instruction on involuntary 
manslaughter was legally inappropriate because the evidence showed Nunez intended to 
shoot and kill Guzman. This took place shortly before this court issued its opinion in 
State v. James, 309 Kan. 1280, 1298, 443 P.3d 1063 (2019), and shortly after this court's 
opinion in State v. Pulliam, 308 Kan. 1354, 1361-62, 430 P.3d 39 (2018). Those cases 
undercut the basis for the trial court's rejection of Nunez' requested instruction. On 
appeal, the State retreats to a position that the instruction was factually inappropriate. A 
review of the evidentiary record demonstrates, however, that the instruction should have 
been given and a jury might well have selected an involuntary manslaughter option. 
 
This court performs a four-step review of challenges to jury instructions: 
14 
 
 
 
 
First, the court considers the reviewability of the issue from both jurisdiction and 
preservation viewpoints, exercising an unlimited standard of review. Next, the court 
applies an unlimited review to determine whether the instruction was legally appropriate. 
Then, the court determines whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the defendant or the requesting party, that would have supported the 
instruction. Finally, if the trial court erred, this court determines whether the error was 
harmless, utilizing the test and degree of certainty set forth in State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 
541, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 565 U.S. 1221 (2012). James, 309 Kan. at 1297. 
 
A defendant is generally entitled to instructions on the law applicable to his or her 
defense theory if the evidence sufficed for a rational fact-finder to find for the defendant 
on that theory. If the defendant requested the instruction at trial, the court must view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant. James, 309 Kan. at 1298. 
 
Nunez urges this court to apply a constitutional harmlessness standard to the jury 
instruction in this case. This approach was explicitly rejected under similar circumstances 
in James, where the court elected to continue to apply the statutory test, and we decline to 
depart from the James analysis. Under the statutory test, the court "must be persuaded 
that there is no reasonable probability that the error will or did affect the outcome of the 
trial." Ward, 292 Kan. at 565. The burden of demonstrating harmlessness is on the party 
benefiting from the error, which, in this case, is the State. See James, 309 Kan. at 1302. 
 
Here, the trial court instructed the jury on premeditated first-degree murder and 
the lesser offenses of intentional second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. The 
court also instructed the jury on Nunez' theory of defense of self or property, instructing: 
 
15 
 
 
 
"Defendant is permitted to use against another person physical force that is likely 
to cause death or great bodily harm only when and to the extent that it appears he 
reasonably believes such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to 
himself or someone else or his dwelling from the other person's imminent use of unlawful 
force entering into or remaining within his dwelling.  
 
. . . . 
 
"You must presume that a person had a reasonable belief that use of physical 
force likely to cause death or great bodily harm was necessary to prevent imminent death 
or great bodily harm to himself, someone else or his dwelling if you find the following:  
No. 1, at the time the force likely to cause death or great bodily harm was used on the 
individual against whom the force was used unlawfully or forcefully entered and was 
presently within the dwelling of the person using the force, and No. 2, the person using 
the force knew or had reason to believe the individual against whom the force was used 
unlawfully or forcefully entered and was presently within the dwelling of the person 
using the force. 
 
"This presumption may be overcome if you are persuaded beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the person did not reasonably believe that use of force likely to cause death or 
great bodily harm was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to 
himself or someone else." 
 
The State objected to Nunez' request for an involuntary manslaughter-excessive 
force instruction, arguing that the evidence was overwhelming that the shooting was a 
voluntary act, so an involuntary manslaughter instruction would be legally inappropriate.  
 
The trial court agreed with the State: 
 
16 
 
 
 
"[T]his instruction . . . appears to be inconsistent with the defense which states that there 
was a—was an intentional shooting, two shots to the body, one shot in the side of the 
head which would seem to be an intentional killing. 
 
"The defendant's claim, of course, that this was in self-defense, him or me type 
situation. Under those circumstances and given the evidence, I think [the State] is correct 
that there is no evidence that this is something unintentional, that an instruction on 
involuntary manslaughter would be inappropriate here. So I will overrule the request of 
defense." 
 
 
This conclusion by the trial court incorrectly stated the law, which the State 
concedes on appeal. The current involuntary manslaughter and culpable mental state 
statutes do not require admitted evidence that the killing was reckless or unintentional. 
Pulliam, 308 Kan. at 1369. 
 
Involuntary manslaughter in the form of imperfect self-defense, that is, killing 
based on a "lawful act [committed] in an unlawful manner," has been characterized as a 
"lawful exercise of self-defense, but with excessive force," State v. McCullough, 293 
Kan. 970, 976, 270 P.3d 1142 (2012). It was first recognized in State v. Gregory, 218 
Kan. 180, 185-86, 542 P.2d 1051 (1975), and is based on K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-
5405(a)(4). In Gregory, the court acknowledged that a defendant might kill when it was 
not reasonably necessary even though the defendant perceived a threat of death or great 
bodily harm. In such a case, the use of force could be found to be an "unlawful manner" 
of committing the lawful act of self-defense, thus supplying the requisite element of 
involuntary manslaughter. 218 Kan. at 186. 
 
In James, 309 Kan. at 1298, the trial judge rejected the requested imperfect self-
defense instructions based on the third step of appellate analysis, whether the instructions 
17 
 
 
 
were factually appropriate. "His interpretation of the admitted evidence was that, even 
under James' self-defense version, James acted intentionally, because he feared the men 
surrounding him." 309 Kan. at 1298. This was the same reasoning the trial judge used in 
the present case, and this court held it was error in James. 
 
In Pulliam, this court recognized that, when the alleged lawful act that is a 
component of the crime under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5405(a)(4) is self-defense, "a jury 
instruction on involuntary manslaughter must be supported by evidence from which a 
jury could find that the defendant possessed a reasonable and honest belief that physical 
force was required." 308 Kan. at 1368-69. 
 
Here, the evidence that Nunez possessed a reasonable and honest belief in the 
necessity of physical force to defend himself or his property, at least initially, was 
substantial. One testifying witness from the scene stated that Guzman had taken Nunez 
by the neck and was holding a blade to him, a blade that may have left the mark on 
Nunez' neck that was noted by law enforcement. Nunez repeatedly told law enforcement 
officers that Guzman had attacked him with a knife. Although it was not a kitchen knife, 
as described by Nunez, a boxcutter was found close to Guzman's body. And Nunez told 
the 911 dispatcher that it was a situation of either Nunez or Guzman surviving the attack.  
 
To be sure, Nunez later gave conflicting accounts of what happened, and the only 
kitchen knife matching the description the witnesses gave was found outside the house, 
but we view the evidence supporting the instruction in the light most favorable to the 
requesting party. See James, 309 Kan. at 1297-98. All told, the requested instruction 
would have been factually appropriate. It was therefore error for the trial court to deny 
the requested instruction. 
 
18 
 
 
 
The next step in the analysis, then, is whether the error was harmless.  
 
Under the statutory harmless error standard, the court must be persuaded that there 
is no reasonable probability that the error will or did affect the outcome of the trial. Ward, 
292 Kan. at 565. In James, this court concluded there was no reasonable probability the 
instruction error affected the outcome: 
 
"Despite the theoretical possibility that the jury could have reached an 
involuntary manslaughter verdict based on imperfect self-defense, such a verdict was 
highly improbable. According to Gorrill's expert testimony and other witnesses, the 
second shot that killed McClennon appears to have hit him as he was running away from 
James after the first shot. Shooting an unarmed person in retreat is antithetical to self-
defense, perfect or imperfect." 309 Kan. at 1304. 
 
The circumstances in the present case are different. If the jury accepted parts of 
Nunez' theory of his defense that were supported by the evidence, it could conclude that 
Nunez was afraid for his life after being attacked by a knife-wielding assailant. Although 
a third party pulled Guzman off of Nunez, causing Guzman to fall down, in the short time 
that followed, Nunez might well have been afraid for his life, fearing that Guzman would 
stand back up and renew his attack, possibly using the nearby boxcutter. Nunez 
repeatedly told police that he saw Guzman reaching for a knife even while he was 
wounded and on the ground. The excessive force would consist of fatally shooting an 
assailant three times while the assailant was falling down or lying on the floor, but such a 
scenario is what imperfect self-defense is intended to address. 
 
The State also asks this court to apply the so-called skip rule, pointing out that the 
jury rejected self-defense, second-degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter. The State 
19 
 
 
 
argues that the logical conclusion is that the jury would not have chosen the even-lesser 
offense of involuntary manslaughter. 
 
Under this "rule," when a lesser included offense has been the subject of an 
instruction and the jury convicts of the greater offense, the reviewing court deems any 
error resulting from failure to give an instruction on another still lesser included offense 
to be cured. The skip rule is not actually a rule but a logical deduction that may be drawn 
from jury verdicts in certain cases. This court does not apply the deduction automatically 
or mechanically, but considers it to be one factor, among many, when analyzing 
instructional issues for harmlessness. See State v. Gentry, 310 Kan. 715, 729, 449 P.3d 
429 (2019); see also State v. Williams, 303 Kan. 585, 600, 363 P.3d 1101 (2016) (skip 
rule not amenable to mechanical application, should be viewed as providing route to 
harmlessness when elements of crime of conviction, as compared to rejected lesser 
included crime, necessarily show jury would have rejected still lesser included crime). 
 
 
Here, the trial court instructed on three levels of homicide:  first-degree murder, 
second-degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter. As instructed, the jury could have 
found—and did find—under the evidence that Nunez, acting with premeditation, shot 
Guzman with the intent to kill him. The jury also had the option, under second-degree 
murder, to find that Nunez intended to kill Guzman, but with no premeditation. And the 
jury had a third option, voluntary manslaughter. To establish that charge, the State would 
have to prove that Nunez knowingly killed Guzman, and the killing was predicated on 
either a sudden quarrel or an unreasonable but honest belief that circumstances existed 
justifying deadly force in defense of a person or property. See K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-
5404. 
 
20 
 
 
 
The skip rule does not apply here because involuntary manslaughter, the 
instruction that Nunez requested, has an element not contained in the other instructions. 
The instruction would have directed the jury to consider imperfect self-defense 
involuntary manslaughter. Under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5405(a)(4), he argued that he 
lawfully engaged in self-defense in an unlawful manner by exercising excessive force.  
 
This element is different from both voluntary manslaughter and second-degree 
murder. In particular, it differs from voluntary manslaughter in that voluntary 
manslaughter requires showing he had an "unreasonable but honest belief that 
circumstances existed" justifying deadly force. K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5404(a)(2); Salary, 
301 Kan. at 598. 
 
Involuntary manslaughter requires a reasonable belief that the circumstances 
justified force, but the exercise of the force was excessive. These are two very different 
requirements. The jury could find that voluntary manslaughter was not appropriate but 
involuntary manslaughter was appropriate. The jury might well have believed that 
Guzman attacked Nunez with a knife and Nunez overreacted by killing him. 
 
Without the excessive force instruction, the jury may have seen no other option 
than premeditated murder. With the instruction, the jury could have found that, even 
though the shooting was intentional, it was the result of excessive force in the form of 
shooting an assailant who was already wounded and fallen.  
 
In Pulliam, this court considered it a realistic possibility that the jury might have 
accepted the defendant's theory of imperfect self-defense:  despite some changes to the 
defendant's initial statements to detectives, he testified that he heard a gun cock and 
thought that he was about to be shot in the back. This testimony supported the instruction 
21 
 
 
 
given on the imperfect self-defense form of the lesser included offense of voluntary 
manslaughter. "Had the jury believed one version of Pulliam's account, it could have 
convicted him of killing Burton in the commission of the lawful act of self-defense in the 
unlawful manner of using excessive force." 308 Kan. at 1369. 
 
The Pulliam court nevertheless elected not to reverse because Pulliam did not 
request an imperfect self-defense involuntary manslaughter instruction, which resulted in 
a review for clear error. Under the clear error standard, Pulliam was required to firmly 
convince the court that the jury would have reached a different verdict if it had been 
instructed on imperfect self-defense involuntary manslaughter, and he failed to sustain 
that burden of persuasion. Pulliam, 308 Kan. at 1370.  
 
Here, because Nunez requested the instruction, the standard of review is inverted 
from that in Pulliam; as noted above, the court must be persuaded no reasonable 
probability exists that the error will or did affect the outcome of the trial. See Ward, 292 
Kan. at 565.  
 
The error may have affected the outcome of the trial because the requested 
instruction could have focused the attention of the jury on the legitimacy of the initial 
self-defense, mitigated by the subsequent exertion of unnecessary force. We conclude the 
error was prejudicial and reverse the murder conviction, remanding the case for further 
appropriate proceedings.  
 
Because we reverse on the instruction issue, we need not rule on Nunez' other 
contentions of error.