Title: MESSER v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MESSER v. STATE2004 WY 9896 P.3d 12Case Number: 03-231Decided: 08/25/2004
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                            

 

JOHN 
ANTHONY MESSER,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Ken Koski, State Public Defender, PDP; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel; and Marion Yoder, Senior Assistant Public Defender.  Argument by Ms. Yoder.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Daniel M. 
Fetsco, Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Fetsco.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

KITE, 
Justice.
 

[¶1]      John Messer was 
convicted by a jury of felony domestic violence in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-2-501(b) and (f)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003).  Mr. Messer appeals his conviction, 
claiming the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, he was denied 
due process because he was not given adequate notice of the prior convictions 
upon which the State was relying to obtain a sentence enhancement, and the jury 
was not properly instructed, which allowed it to convict on insufficient 
evidence.  We find no error and 
affirm.  

 

 ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Mr. Messer raises 
the following issues: 

 

I.          
Whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the 
merits of this case.

 

II.          
Whether the defendant was improperly accorded notice of all aspects of 
the specific offense or denied due process when the State obtained sentencing 
enhancement upon convictions other than those identified in the charging 
document and at the preliminary hearing.

 

III.         
Whether the jury was improperly instructed on the charge in question and 
the evidence was sufficient to sustain appellant's 
conviction.

 

[¶3]      The State 
rephrases the same issues.

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      Mr. Messer was 
arrested on August 31, 2002, for assault and battery against a household member 
in violation of § 6-2-501(b).  The 
charging documents alleged that if convicted of the charged offense, this would 
be Mr. Messer's third such offense against a household member.  The affidavit supporting the criminal 
complaint also alleged this was possibly Mr. Messer's third family violence 
offense.  Although the affidavit 
indicated documentation of his criminal history was attached, no such 
documentation appears in the record.  
The circuit court conducted a preliminary hearing on November 21, 2002, 
at which time it made notations in the record to the effect that Mr. Messer had 
prior convictions in California in 1996, Iowa in 1994 and Wyoming in 2002.  The circuit court bound Mr. Messer over 
to district court on felony charges pursuant to § 6-2-501(b) and (f)(ii). 

 

[¶5]      On February 19, 
2003, Mr. Messer filed a motion in district court requesting that his case be 
remanded to circuit court.  Mr. 
Messer claimed the statute under which he was charged required proof of two 
prior convictions of assault and battery upon a household member.  He asserted he had not been provided 
with any documentation demonstrating that the 2002 conviction met the 
requirements for making the current charge a third time family violence 
conviction and a felony.  
Specifically, he asserted that because the judgment and sentence on the 
2002 reckless endangerment conviction did not reference the Family Violence 
Protection Act, the State failed to establish that he committed a felony over 
which the district court had subject matter jurisdiction.  Under these circumstances, Mr. Messer 
contended he should be back in circuit court facing a misdemeanor 
charge.

 

[¶6]      The district 
court conducted a hearing on the motion on February 20, 2003.  In its ruling from the bench denying Mr. 
Messer's motion, the district court concluded the circuit court bound the case 
over after finding there was probable cause to do so.  The district court also concluded the 
judgment and sentence from the 2002 conviction for reckless endangerment under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-504(a) (LexisNexis 2003) counted as one of the three 
offenses supporting a felony charge and sentence enhancement because it was one 
of the offenses specifically mentioned in § 6-2-501(f)(ii).  The district court concluded Mr. Messer 
was entitled to notice of the precise convictions upon which the State relied in 
seeking enhancement and that the 2002 judgment and sentence provided that 
notice.  The district court also 
concluded the State still had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt at 
the enhanced penalty proceeding that the prior convictions existed and applied 
to this case.  The district court 
denied Mr. Messer's  motion without 
prejudice to reassert it in the enhanced sentencing proceeding. 

 

[¶7]      The case 
proceeded to trial and Mr. Messer was convicted.  He was sentenced to 18 to 24 months in 
the Wyoming State Penitentiary.  The 
sentence was suspended and he was required to serve six months in the Natrona 
County Detention Center, complete 24 months of supervised probation and 
successfully complete the felony program at Community Alternatives of 
Casper.

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶8]      Questions of 
subject matter jurisdiction are matters of law which we review de novo.  Routh v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Div., 952 P.2d 1108, 1114 (Wyo. 1998); Nyberg v. 
State Military Department, 2003 WY 43, ¶ 8, 65 P.3d 1241, ¶ 8 (Wyo. 
2003).  Constitutional questions and 
questions concerning the accuracy of jury instructions are likewise matters of 
law subject to de novo review.  
Joyner v. State, 2002 WY 174, ¶ 7, 58 P.3d 331, ¶ 7 (Wyo. 2002); 
Paugh v. State, 9 P.3d 973, 975 (Wyo. 2000). 

 

[¶9]      When reviewing 
jury instructions, we consider the following:

 

Jury 
instructions should inform the jurors concerning the applicable law so that they 
can apply that law to their findings with respect to the material facts, 
instructions should be written with the particular facts and legal theories of 
each case in mind and often differ from case to case since any one of several 
instructional options may be legally correct, a failure to give an instruction 
on an essential element of a criminal offense is fundamental error, as is a 
confusing or misleading instruction, and the test of whether a jury has been 
properly instructed on the necessary elements of a crime is whether the 
instructions leave no doubt as to the circumstances under which the crime can be 
found to have been committed. 

 

AMG 
v. State (In re CG), 
2003 WY 166, ¶ 4, 81 P.3d 208, ¶ 4 (Wyo. 2003) (citation omitted).  We also

 

must 
determine whether the instructions, taken as a whole, adequately advise the jury 
of the applicable law.  Proper 
instructions should be clear declarations of the pertinent law.  The ruling of a trial court on an 
instruction will not constitute reversible error unless there is a showing of 
prejudice, which connotes a demonstration by the complaining party that the 
instruction misled or confused the jury with respect to the applicable 
principles of law.

 

Jensen 
v. Fremont Motors Cody, Inc., 
2002 WY 173, ¶ 12, 58 P.3d 322, ¶ 12 (Wyo. 2002).  Our standard for reviewing the 
sufficiency of the evidence is as follows:

 

When 
reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim in a criminal case, we must 
determine whether a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of 
the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  We do not consider conflicting evidence 
presented by the unsuccessful party, and afford every favorable inference which 
may be reasonably and fairly drawn from the successful party's evidence.  We have consistently held that it is the 
jury's responsibility to resolve conflicts in the evidence.  We will not substitute our judgment for 
that of the jury, . . . our only duty is to determine whether a quorum of 
reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, have come to the same 
result as the jury actually did.

  

Urbigkit 
v. State, 
2003 WY 57, ¶ 44, 67 P.3d 1207, ¶ 44 (Wyo. 2003).

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

1.         
Subject matter jurisdiction

 

[¶10]   Mr. Messer asserts the district 
court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because the initial charge was 
for violation of § 6-2-501(b), the misdemeanor offense of battery, over which 
the circuit court, not the district court, had jurisdiction.  He contends that § 6-2-501(f)(ii) 
requires proof of two or more previous convictions of similar charges within the 
preceding ten years as a condition precedent to the district court's assumption 
of jurisdiction of the case.  He 
claims the State did not meet its burden of proving the previous convictions by 
a preponderance of the evidence at the preliminary 
hearing.

 

[¶11]   The State argues the evidence of 
prior convictions presented at the preliminary hearing was sufficient for the 
circuit court to bind Mr. Messer over to district court.  Citing Wilson v. State, 655 P.2d 1246, 1251 (Wyo. 1982), the State asserts it was not required to prove its case 
for enhanced sentencing at the preliminary hearing but only to present such 
proof as would "cause a person of ordinary prudence to conscientiously entertain 
a reasonable belief that a public offense has been committed in which the 
accused participated."  That it 
ultimately relied upon different family violence crimes for sentencing 
enhancement than those alleged at the preliminary hearing, the State contends, 
did not deprive the district court of subject matter jurisdiction.  

 

[¶12]   Mr. Messer was charged with 
violating the following provisions of § 6-2-501:

 

(b) 
A person is guilty of battery if he unlawfully touches another in a rude, 
insolent or angry manner or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily 
injury to another.

 

. 
. .

 

(f) 
A household member as defined by W.S. 35-21-102 who commits a second or 
subsequent battery against any other household member shall be punished as 
follows:

 

. 
. .

 

(ii) 
A person convicted upon a plea of guilty or no contest or 
found guilty of a third or subsequent offense under this 
subsection against any other household member, after having been 
convicted upon a plea of guilty or no contest 
or found guilty of a violation of W.S. 6-2-501(a), (b), (e) 
or (f), 6-2-502, 6-2-503, 6-2-504 or other substantially similar 
law of this or any other state, tribe or territory against any 
other household member within the previous ten (10) years is 
guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than two (2) 
years, a fine of not more than two thousand dollars ($2,000.00), or both.  (emphasis added).

 

As 
stated earlier in this decision, the charging documents alleged that this was 
Mr. Messer's third violation under this provision, making the charge a felony 
rather than a misdemeanor. 

 

[¶13]   Subject matter jurisdiction is the 
power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings 
in question belong.  Fuller v. 
State, 568 P.2d 900, 902-03 (Wyo. 1977).  We have said:

 

"It is fundamental, if not axiomatic, that, 
before a court can render any decision or order having any effect in any case or 
matter, it must have subject matter jurisdiction.  Jurisdiction is essential to the 
exercise of judicial power.  Unless 
the court has jurisdiction, it lacks any authority to proceed, and any decision, 
judgment, or other order is, as a matter of law, utterly void and of no effect 
for any purpose.  Subject matter 
jurisdiction, like jurisdiction over the person, is not a subject of judicial 
discretion.  There is a difference, 
however, because the lack of jurisdiction over the person can be waived, but 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be.  Subject matter jurisdiction either 
exists or it does not and, before proceeding to a disposition on the merits, a 
court should be satisfied that it does have the requisite jurisdiction."  

 

United Mine Workers of America Local 1972 v. 
Decker Coal Co., 774 P.2d 1274, 1283-84 (Wyo. 1989).  In the context specifically of criminal 
cases, we have said:  subject matter 
jurisdiction over the offense charged is fundamental and indispensable to a 
prosecution. Mendicoa v. State, 771 P.2d 1240, 1246 (Wyo. 1989).  District courts in Wyoming have 
jurisdiction over all criminal cases except those for which other provision is 
made.  Fuller, 568 P.2d  at 
902, citing Article 5, § 10, Wyoming Constitution.  Circuit courts have original 
jurisdiction in all misdemeanor criminal cases and are required to conduct 
preliminary hearings for all persons charged with a felony.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 5-9-129 and 132 
(LexisNexis 2003). 

 

[¶14]   The purpose of a preliminary 
hearing is to establish the existence of probable cause to hold the accused for 
prosecution.  Weddle v. 
State, 621 P.2d 231, 239 (Wyo. 1980). Although some discovery results as a 
by-product of the hearing, discovery is not the purpose of the hearing.  Id.  It also is not the purpose of a 
preliminary hearing to establish guilt.  
Wilson, 655 P.2d  at 1253.  
Likewise, it was not the purpose of the preliminary hearing to establish 
whether Mr. Messer did or did not have prior convictions for family 
violence.  The sole purpose was to 
establish whether probable cause existed to bind him over to district court on a 
felony family violence charge. 

 

 [¶15]  In Brehm v. State, 427 So. 2d 825 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), the defendant was charged with misdemeanor tampering 
with a parking meter.  The 
information did not allege that he had a prior conviction for the same 
offense.  At the sentencing hearing, 
the trial court discovered the prior conviction and sentenced the defendant as a 
felon under the applicable sentencing enhancement provision.  Applying the rule that subject matter 
jurisdiction is determined from the face of the charging document, the appellate 
court held that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over 
the felony offense when the information alleged a 
misdemeanor.

 

[¶16]   Mr. Messer's case is 
distinguishable from Brehm in that the charging documents alleged that 
this was his third family violence offense, making the offense a felony and 
bringing into play the enhancement provision of § 6-2-501(f)(ii).  Applying the rule that subject matter 
jurisdiction is determined from the face of the charging documents, the district 
court had subject matter jurisdiction over the felony offense because the 
charging documents alleged the elements constituting a 
felony.

 

[¶17]   Mr. Messer cites two Wyoming cases 
in support of his argument:  
Brisson v. State, 955 P.2d 888 (Wyo. 1998) and Abeyta v. 
State, 2003 WY 136, 78 P.3d 664 (Wyo. 2003).  Neither of these cases supports his 
position.  In Brisson, we 
held that the defendant's prior conviction for family violence, based upon a 
guilty plea entered without the assistance of counsel after the defendant 
requested counsel, could not be relied upon to impose or enhance a sentence on a 
later family violence conviction.  
Mr. Messer's prior convictions were not uncounseled.  In Abeyta, the defendant claimed 
the State failed to prove his prior family violence convictions.  We did not address the merits of the 
claim, but did say that prior convictions could be established through 
authenticated copies of judgments and sentences.  Abeyta, however, did not address 
the question of subject matter jurisdiction.

 

[¶18]   Considering these authorities and 
the parties' arguments, we hold that the district court had subject matter 
jurisdiction to proceed with the trial under the particular circumstances of 
this case.  The charging documents 
alleged this to be Mr. Messer's third family violence offense within the 
previous ten years in violation of § 6-2-501(b) and (f)(ii), making the offense 
a felony and, upon a finding of probable cause to bind the case over, properly 
within the jurisdiction of the district court. 

 

 

2.         
Due process

 

[¶19]   Mr. Messer asserts he was denied 
due process in that he was not provided adequate notice of the specific prior 
convictions upon which the State intended to rely to obtain an enhancement of 
his sentence.  The State contends 
Mr. Messer received adequate notice of the prior convictions at the January 7, 
2003, arraignment.  We hold that Mr. 
Messer received adequate notice of the prior convictions and he was not denied 
due process.  

 

[¶20]   The charging documents alleged this 
was Mr. Messer's third family violence offense within the previous ten 
years.  At the preliminary hearing 
on November 27, 2002, a law enforcement officer testified that Mr. Messer had 
two prior family violence convictions, one from 1996 in Placerville, California 
and one from 1994 in Webster City, Iowa.  
The officer also testified that Mr. Messer had a prior reckless 
endangerment conviction in Wyoming, although he did not identify it as a family 
violence conviction. 

 

[¶21]   At the arraignment in district 
court on January 7, 2003, the State informed the court that Mr. Messer was 
originally charged with a misdemeanor but the case was re-filed as a felony 
based upon Mr. Messer's prior criminal history involving family violence against 
the same victim in 2001 and 2002.  
On February 19, 2003, the State filed a notice of intent to use evidence 
in which it described the following prior convictions supporting the felony 
charge:

 

Ms. 
Gomez and the Defendant have had an intimate relationship for several years. 
Over the course of that relationship, Ms. Gomez has been a victim of Mr. 
Messer's violence. For example, in July of 2001, Mr. Messer struck and choked 
Ms. Gomez with a wire clothes hanger. During that assault he also forced her 
head through a sheet-rock wall by repeatedly slamming her head into the wall. Ms 
Gomez had to flee the residence to get assistance. At the time of the assault, 
Mr. Messer was intoxicated. Upon arrest, Mr. Messer denied committing the 
assault. Mr. Messer was convicted of "Second Offense" [b]attery in Converse 
County regarding this incident.

 

            
On another occasion, in June of 2002, the Defendant again battered Ms. 
Gomez and threatened her with a firearm. The Defendant was intoxicated at the 
time of this offense. Ms. Gomez was able to free herself from the Defendant and 
get to safety. The Defendant subsequently barricaded himself in his home when 
Law Enforcement arrived. Mr. Messer was convicted of Reckless Endangerment for 
this incident.

 

[¶22]   In State ex rel. Motor Vehicle 
Division v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732, 738 (Wyo. 1983), we recognized that due 
process requires notice if a former conviction is to be used to enhance 
punishment.  Spinner v. 
State, 2003 WY 106, ¶ 29, 75 P.3d 1016, ¶ 29 (Wyo. 2003).  Where a statutory enactment providing 
for sentence enhancement does not expressly require notice of prior convictions, 
the accused is entitled to the due process protections required in any criminal 
prosecution, meaning reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding 
the possibility of an enhanced sentence for recidivism.  Heinemann v. State, 12 P.3d 692, 
699 (Wyo. 2000).  We applied this 
standard in Heinemann to conclude the defendant received adequate notice 
and there was no denial of due process where he was advised prior to trial that 
the State intended to seek enhancement under the habitual criminal statute and 
then informed after the jury found him guilty of third degree sexual assault 
that the State would seek enhancement under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-306(d) 
(LexisNexis 2003) of the sexual assault statutes.  In reaching this result, we cited 
federal appellate court cases holding that in the absence of statutory notice 
standards, pretrial notice of intent to seek sentence enhancement is not 
required.  Heinemann, 12 P.3d  
at 699, citing United States v. Mauldin, 109 F.3d 1159, 1162-63 
(6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Gibson, 64 F.3d 617, 625-26 
(11th Cir. 1995).  Given 
this federal precedent, we held that the notice in Heinemann satisfied 
due process.

 

[¶23]   Section 6-2-501(f), the sentencing 
enhancement provision for battery against a household member, does not contain a 
notice requirement.  Mr. Messer, 
therefore, was entitled to reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard 
regarding the possibility of an enhanced sentence for recidivism.  Heinemann, 12 P.3d  at 699.  He was notified in the original charging 
documents that a conviction on the current charge would constitute his third 
conviction under the Family Violence Protection Act.  At his arraignment, Mr. Messer was 
notified of the prior convictions upon which the State later relied for enhanced 
sentencing.  These circumstances 
satisfy the requirements of due process and we find no error in this 
regard.         

 

 

3.      Jury 
instructions/sufficiency of the evidence

 

[¶24]   Mr. Messer asserts that jury 
instruction No. 6 and the verdict form improperly allowed for alternative 
findings and a conviction based upon insufficient evidence.  The State responds that the jury 
instruction correctly stated the law and there was sufficient evidence to 
support the jury's finding of guilty on both alternatives.  Jury instruction No. 6 stated as 
follows:

 

The 
elements of the crime of battery, as charged in this case, 
are:

 

1.                  
On 
or about the 31st day of August, 
2002

 

2.                  
In 
the County of Natrona, and State of Wyoming 

 

3.                  
The 
Defendant, John Anthony Messer

 

4.                  
Unlawfully 
touched another, Jessica Gomez

 

5.                  
A 
household member

 

6.                  
In 
a rude, insolent or angry manner.

 

OR

3.           
Intentionally, 
knowingly or recklessly

 

4.           
Cause 
bodily injury to another, Jessica Gomez

 

5.           
A 
household member.

 

If 
you find from your consideration of all of the evidence that each of these 
elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the 
Defendant guilty.

 

If, 
on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all of the evidence that 
any of these elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
should find the Defendant not guilty.

 

The 
verdict form stated as follows:

 

            
We the jury, duly empaneled and sworn to try the above-entitled cause, do 
find as follows:

 

            
1(A).    As to the 
charge of Battery by unlawfully touching Jessica Gomez in a rude, insolent or 
angry manner, charged in the Amended Information, we find the Defendant, John 
Anthony Messer:

 

            
_______  
Guilty

 

            
_______  Not 
Guilty

 

            
1(B).  As to the charge of 
Battery by intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing bodily injury to 
Jessica Gomez, charged in the Amended Information, we find the Defendant, John 
Anthony Messer:

 

            
_______  
Guilty

 

            
_______  Not 
Guilty

 

After 
deliberating for one hour and twenty minutes, the jury sent the following 
question out to the district court:

 

on 
the verdict do we have to find for charge 1(A) or 1(B), or 
both?

 

After 
consulting with counsel and obtaining their agreement, the district court 
answered the question as follows without objection:

 

. 
. . the answer is both. I would advise you that separate determinations need to 
be made on both 1(A) and 1(B) for which there must be proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt of all of the elements of the respective breakdown of the 
charges.

 

            
That is, there needs to be proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all the 
elements necessary to support the offense of battery as referred to in 1(A), and 
there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt to establish all of the elements 
of proof for the battery as would be determined in question 1(B). Those elements 
are set forth in Instruction 6 of the packet that's been 
provided.

 

The 
jury went back to the jury room to deliberate further and returned a verdict of 
guilty on both 1(A) and 1(B).  
Consistent with the jury verdict, and following the sentencing hearing, 
the district court entered judgment finding Mr. Messer guilty on one count of 
assault and battery (FVPA), third offense, a felony, in violation of § 
6-2-501(b) and (f)(ii). 

 

[¶25]   We review Mr. Messer's claim for 
plain error because he did not object to the instruction or verdict form.1  Therefore, he must prove that a clear 
and unequivocal rule of law was violated in a clear and obvious way resulting in 
denial of a substantial right and material prejudice.  Urbigkit, ¶ 41. 

 

[¶26]   We have addressed the propriety of 
jury instructions and verdict forms presenting alternative grounds for 
conviction in several recent cases.  
Id.; May v. State, 2003 WY 14, 62 P.3d 574 (Wyo. 2003); 
Tanner v. State, 2002 WY 170, 57 P.3d 1242 (Wyo. 2002).  Prior to those cases, we also addressed 
the issue in Bush v. State, 908 P.2d 963, 966 (Wyo. 1995), where we held 
that a verdict must be set aside in cases where the verdict is supportable on 
one ground but not on another and it is impossible to tell which ground the jury 
selected.  As in the present case, 
all of those prior cases involved jury instructions that quoted language 
directly from a criminal statute containing alternative grounds for conviction 
of the crime charged. Urbigkit concerned Wyoming's aggravated assault and 
battery statute and involved the alternative theories that the defendant 
knowingly caused or attempted to cause, or threatened to cause, bodily injury 
with a deadly weapon.  We upheld two 
of the convictions but reversed four others because there was no evidence the 
defendant caused injury or attempted to cause injury or threatened to cause 
injury with a deadly weapon to four of the victims. Urbigkit, ¶ 48. 
Bush and Tanner concerned Wyoming's burglary statute while 
May involved aggravated burglary.  
In each case, however, the jury was instructed that the defendant was 
guilty of the crime charged if the evidence showed he entered a building without 
authority with the intent to commit larceny or the intent to commit a 
felony.  Because the evidence was 
not sufficient to show entry with the intent to commit both larceny and a 
felony, we reversed the burglary convictions in Bush and Tanner 
and the aggravated burglary conviction in May. 

 

[¶27]   As in these prior cases, the jury 
instruction given in Mr. Messer's case quoted language directly from the statute 
containing alternative grounds for conviction of the crime charged.  In the present case, however, the 
verdict form required the jury to identify the alternative statutory grounds 
upon which its verdict was based.  
The jury found Mr. Messer guilty on both alternatives  unlawfully 
touching a household member in a rude, insolent or angry manner and 
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing bodily injury to a household 
member. Therefore, the question we must decide is whether sufficient evidence 
supported the jury determination on both. 

   

[¶28]   Evidence was presented at trial 
that the victim was awakened from sleeping on the couch at the residence where 
she and Mr. Messer were temporarily living by Mr. Messer punching her in the 
face.  We agree with the State that 
whether such actions are viewed as an unlawful touching of another in a rude, 
insolent or angry manner, or as intentionally, knowingly and recklessly causing 
bodily injury to another, they meet the requirement for conviction under § 
6-2-502.  We hold that substantial 
evidence supported the jury verdict of guilty under both alternatives and there 
was no error in this regard.

 

[¶29]   Affirmed. 

            

 

FOOTNOTES

1In 
fact, instruction 6 was in substance identical to the elements instruction 
offered by the defense.