Title: Florida Parole Commission v. Joseph Robert Spaziano

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC06-1252 
____________ 
 
FLORIDA PAROLE COMMISSION,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JOSEPH ROBERT SPAZIANO,  
Respondent. 
 
[October 14, 2010] 
 
LABARGA, J. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the First District 
Court of Appeal in Spaziano v. Florida Parole Commission, 31 Fla. L. Weekly 
D1597 (1st DCA June 9, 2006).  In its decision, the district court certified a 
question of great public importance, which we have rephrased as follows: 
DOES THE EXEMPTION IN SECTION 57.085(10), FLORIDA 
STATUTES, APPLY TO ANY INMATE ACTIONS 
CHALLENGING THE FLORIDA PAROLE COMMISSION‘S 
DETERMINATION OF THE INMATE‘S PRESUMPTIVE PAROLE 
RELEASE DATE, THEREBY PRECLUDING IMPOSITION OF A 
LIEN ON THE INMATE‘S TRUST ACCOUNT TO RECOVER 
APPLICABLE COURT FILING FEES? 
 
 
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See 31 Fla. L. Weekly at D1599.1  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. 
Const.  We answer the certified question in the affirmative and approve the 
decision of the district court.  As we explain below, an action challenging the 
Florida Parole Commission‘s determination of an inmate‘s presumptive parole 
release date is a collateral criminal proceeding for the purposes of section 
57.085(10), Florida Statutes (2009), which exempts such proceedings from the fee 
and lien provisions of section 57.085. 
BACKGROUND 
Joseph Spaziano, an inmate currently incarcerated at the Taylor Correctional 
Institution, is serving a life sentence for ―forcible carnal knowledge,‖ a sexual 
offense, committed in 1975.  Under the law in effect when he was sentenced, he is 
eligible to be considered for parole.  In October of 2004, Spaziano filed a petition 
for writ of mandamus in the circuit court of the Second Judicial Circuit challenging 
the correctness of the Florida Parole Commission‘s determination of his 
                                          
 
 
1.  The actual question certified by the district court was the following: 
Does the holding in Schmidt v. Crusoe, 878 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 2003), 
extend to all actions, regardless of their nature, in which, if successful, 
the complaining party‘s claim would directly affect his or her time in 
prison, so to preclude imposition of a lien on the inmate‘s trust 
account to recover applicable filing fees? 
See Spaziano, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at D1599 (certifying by reference the same 
question certified in Cox v. Crosby, 27 So. 3d 45, 46 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), which 
was restated by this Court to limit the question to gain time challenges and 
answered in the affirmative in McNeil v. Cox, 997 So. 2d 343, 344 (Fla. 2008)). 
 
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presumptive parole release date (PPRD).  The Florida Parole Commission (―the 
Commission‖) determined that Spaziano‘s PPRD is April 28, 2060.  
Spaziano‘s PPRD of April 28, 2060, was originally determined in 1999.  
After a hearing before the Commission in 2004, that date was confirmed by the 
Commission in an order dated February 27, 2004.2   Spaziano filed his mandamus 
petition in the circuit court, alleging errors in the factors upon which his PPRD was 
based, but the circuit court denied the writ.3  After determining that Spaziano was 
indigent and could not prepay court fees, the circuit court entered an order pursuant 
to section 57.085, Florida Statutes (2004), requiring that a lien be placed upon 
Spaziano‘s inmate trust account to provide payment for the court filing fee and 
                                          
 
 
2.  The determination of a PPRD for parole-eligible inmates is required 
under chapter 947, Florida Statutes.  The procedure for that initial determination 
and for subsequent reviews of the date by the Commission is set forth in sections 
947.172-174, Florida Statutes (2009).  The correctness of the calculation of 
Spaziano‘s PPRD is not an issue before this Court.  The certified question in this 
case focuses only on whether Spaziano‘s court challenge is subject to imposition of 
a lien on his inmate trust account to pay filing and other court fees.  We also note 
that the Commission asserted below that Spaziano‘s petition was untimely, but the 
district court rejected that argument.  Timeliness of the petition is not an issue in 
this Court. 
 
3. In his petition, Spaziano alleged that the Commission erroneously relied 
upon five unsupported aggravating factors in calculating a presumptive parole 
release date that was in excess of the maximum matrix time range.  See Spaziano, 
31 Fla. L. Weekly at D1598.  He contended in his petition that if the erroneous 
factors were eliminated, the correct matrix time range under the applicable parole 
laws would be 228 months rather than the 1020 months determined by the 
Commission, and that he had already served 354 months.  
 
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partial setup fee.  Spaziano filed a motion in the circuit court to vacate that order, 
citing the exemption provided in section 57.085(10), Florida Statutes, for collateral 
criminal proceedings.  The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that an 
action challenging the Commission‘s determination of an inmate‘s PPRD is not a 
collateral criminal proceeding for the purposes of section 57.085(10), Florida 
Statutes, and is therefore not exempt from the payment and lien provisions of that 
statute. 
Spaziano appealed the circuit court‘s denial of the writ and the order 
requiring imposition of a lien on his inmate trust account to the First District Court 
of Appeal.  In its decision, the district court affirmed the denial of the writ, but 
reversed the circuit court‘s order imposing a lien on Spaziano‘s inmate trust 
account.  The district court explained its reasoning for concluding that a challenge 
to an inmate‘s PPRD was exempt from the inmate lien requirements of section 
57.085 in part as follows: 
We do, however, agree that the lower court departed from the 
essential requirements of law by denying petitioner‘s motion for relief 
from the order imposing a lien on his prison trust account for the 
purpose of covering his appellate costs.  In our judgment, a petition 
for writ of mandamus challenging a PPRD is a ―collateral criminal 
proceeding.‖  In Schmidt v. Crusoe, 878 So. 2d 361, 367 (Fla. 2003), 
the supreme court concluded ―that a gain time challenge is analogous 
to a collateral challenge to a sentence in a criminal proceeding 
because the end result is the same—the inmate‘s time in prison is 
directly affected.‖  Under such circumstances, the general indigency 
statute, section 57.01, Florida Statutes, applies. 
. . . . 
 
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The test adopted in Schmidt for treatment of an action as a 
collateral criminal proceeding for the purpose of the exemption from 
the prisoner indigency lien provision is whether the action affects the 
length of time an inmate will actually serve in prison.  In our 
judgment, a mandamus petition seeking the correct calculation of a 
prisoner‘s PPRD is analogous to an action raising a gain time issue, 
because a PPRD imposed outside the maximum matrix time range for 
a specific offense clearly affects the length of time an inmate will 
spend in prison.  Accordingly, we conclude the trial court departed 
from the essential requirements of law in denying petitioner‘s motion 
to vacate the lien on his inmate trust account.   
 
31 Fla. L. Weekly at D1599. 
 
The question of whether section 57.085(10) exempts judicial challenges to 
the Commission‘s determination of an inmate‘s PPRD is a pure question of law; 
thus, our review is de novo.  See D‘Angelo v. Fitzmaurice, 863 So. 2d 311, 314 
(Fla. 2003) (―The standard of review for the pure questions of law before us is de 
novo.‖); Borden v. East-European Ins. Co., 921 So. 2d 587, 591 (Fla. 2006) 
(holding that a question of statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review).  
Where, as here, the question of law turns on the provisions of a statute, we must 
first and foremost endeavor to give effect to the legislative intent underlying that 
statute, which is the polestar that guides us.  See, e.g., Knowles v. Beverly 
Enterprises-Florida, Inc., 898 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 2004).  In determining the 
Legislature‘s intent in enacting the statute, we look first to the text of the provision.  
See id.  Thus, we turn next to an examination of the pertinent provisions of section 
57.085.  We also review other pertinent provisions of the Florida statutes, as well 
 
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as our judicial precedent, all of which inform our analysis of the question presented 
in this case.   
THE APPLICABLE LAW 
 
A. Section 57.085, Florida Statutes, the Prisoner Indigency Statute  
Prison inmates are not completely exempt from the payment of court costs 
and fees for certain legal actions in Florida.  The general indigency statute, section 
57.081, Florida Statutes (2009), provides a general waiver of prepayment of court 
costs and fees for persons who are determined to be indigent, but expressly does 
not apply to prisoners who file or intervene in civil proceedings.  See § 57.081(1), 
Fla. Stat. (2009).  Under section 57.085, known as the ―Prisoner Indigency 
Statute,‖ prepayment of court costs is deferred rather than waived, meaning that an 
indigent prisoner, if he or she is able, must make an initial partial payment of court 
costs and fees.  A lien is then placed on that inmate‘s trust account for payment of 
the remaining costs and fees in monthly installments.  See § 57.085(4)-(5), Fla. 
Stat.  Importantly, the act expressly exempts criminal proceedings and collateral 
criminal proceedings from application of the payment and lien provisions of the 
statute.  See § 57.085(10), Fla. Stat. (2009).4  
                                          
 
 
4.  The provisions of section 57.085(10), Florida Statutes (2009), are 
identical to section 57.085(10), Florida Statutes (2004), in effect when Spaziano 
filed his petition.   
 
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Section 57.085 was enacted in 1996 in an effort to discourage frivolous civil 
suits by prison inmates.  See ch. 96-106, § 2, at 93-95, Laws of Florida.  The 
―Whereas‖ clauses in the preamble to chapter 96-106 focus on ―frivolous‖ inmate 
lawsuits and the fact that they ―congest civil court dockets and delay the 
administration of justice for all litigants.‖  The preamble provides in pertinent part: 
 
WHEREAS, frivolous inmate lawsuits congest civil court 
dockets and delay the administration of justice for all litigants, and 
 
 
WHEREAS, each year self-represented indigent inmates in 
Florida‘s jails and prisons file an ever-increasing number of frivolous 
lawsuits at public expense against public officers and employees, and 
 
 
WHEREAS, state and local governments spend millions of 
dollars each year processing, serving, and defending frivolous 
lawsuits filed by self-represented indigent inmates, and 
 
 
WHEREAS, the overwhelming majority of civil lawsuits filed 
by self-represented indigent inmates are frivolous and malicious 
actions intended to embarrass or harass public officers and employees, 
and 
 
 
WHEREAS, under current law frivolous inmate lawsuits are 
dismissable by the courts only after considerable expenditure of 
precious taxpayer and judicial resources . . . . 
 
Ch. 96-106, preamble, Laws of Fla. 
 
To effectuate the intent set forth in the preamble, section 57.085 calls upon 
the circuit court to screen inmate court filings to determine whether the prisoner‘s 
action is ―frivolous‖ or falls within the category of civil litigation that the 
Legislature seeks to discourage by implementation of this law.  See § 57.085(9), 
 
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Fla. Stat. (2009).  Those inmate actions found by the circuit court to be frivolous, 
malicious, or intended to harass may be dismissed.  See § 57.085(6), Fla. Stat. 
(2009). 5  As we explained in McNeil v. Cox, 997 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 2008), the 
Florida prisoner indigency statute ―was enacted to discourage filing of frivolous 
civil lawsuits involving challenges to prison conditions, such as [complaints about] 
‗peanut butter,‘ ‗pancake[s],‘ ‗dinner roll[s],‘ ‗salad,‘ ‗fine china,‘ ‗satellite 
television,‘ and ‗shoe brand[s].‘ ‖  Id. at 346 (footnotes omitted).   
Actions not found to be frivolous or malicious or otherwise subject to 
dismissal under the act will proceed, but with the requirement that the prisoner 
prepay filing fees and related costs or be subject to a lien on his or her inmate trust 
account.  However, the Legislature has expressly determined in section 57.085(10) 
that any criminal proceeding or collateral criminal proceeding brought by a 
prisoner is exempt from section 57.085.  Thus, when a prisoner files or intervenes 
                                          
 
 
5.  Section 57.085 also provides that the court may dismiss all or part of an 
indigent prisoner‘s claims if it finds that the action fails to state a cause of action, 
seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from suit, or seeks relief for 
mental or emotional injury where there is no allegation of physical injury.  See 
§ 57.085(6)(a)-(c), Fla. Stat. (2009).  The statute further provides that in any 
judicial proceeding in which a certificate of indigence has been issued to a 
prisoner, the court may dismiss the action in whole or in part on a finding that the 
prisoner‘s claim of indigence is false or if the action is frivolous or malicious.  See 
§ 57.085(8)(a), (d), Fla. Stat. (2009).  An action is frivolous under the statute if it 
has no arguable basis in law or fact, is similar to a previous claim involving the 
same parties or arises from the same operative facts as a previous claim, has little 
likelihood of success on its merits, or is based on allegations that are fanciful or not 
credible.  See § 57.085(9)(a)-(e), Fla. Stat. (2009).   
 
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in any judicial proceeding, the question arises as to whether the action is one 
intended to be exempt from the payment and lien requirements of section 57.085.  
It is instructive to our analysis to review the manner in which section 57.085 has 
been applied in our judicial precedent.  
B. Judicial Precedent 
  In Schmidt v. Crusoe, 878 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 2003), we considered whether 
an inmate‘s petition for writ of mandamus challenging forfeiture of gain time is 
essentially a collateral criminal proceeding or whether it is a civil proceeding 
subject to the payment and lien provisions of the Prisoner Indigency Statute.  We 
concluded that a gain time challenge was analogous to a collateral criminal 
proceeding for the purposes of section 57.085(10) and was therefore exempt from 
the fee and lien provisions of section 57.085.  In so holding, we recognized that 
section 57.085 was enacted as part of a Legislative effort intended to reduce 
unnecessary or frivolous prisoner filings.  Id. at 363; see also Geffken v. Strickler, 
778 So. 2d 975, 977 (Fla. 2001) (―The legislative history of these amendments 
makes clear that the intent of all the amendments was to reduce the filing of 
frivolous lawsuits and reduce the amount of funds unnecessarily expended on such 
lawsuits in the courts.‖).  Because gain time challenges, if successful, affect the 
amount of time a prisoner must spend in prison, we concluded in Schmidt that such 
challenges were analogous to collateral criminal proceedings.   
 
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In arriving at this holding in Schmidt, we also considered the provisions of 
the federal Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) enacted by Congress in 1996.  
See Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-10, 110 Stat. 1321-66 –1321-77 (1996) (codified 
in part at 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2006)).  We noted that the PLRA was also intended to 
discourage filing of frivolous inmate actions, but ―the federal courts have 
concluded that claims contesting the computation of criminal sentences should 
continue to be treated as traditional collateral criminal proceedings under habeas 
corpus, since they were not the type of civil lawsuits Congress meant to discourage 
or restrict.‖  Schmidt, 878 So. 2d at 365.  The federal courts have held that the 
PLRA was promulgated by Congress ―to curtail prisoner tort, civil rights and 
conditions litigation‖ and not the filing of habeas type suits.  Anderson v. 
Singletary, 111 F.3d 801, 805 (11th Cir. 1997). 6  We further explained in Schmidt 
that ―[t]he federal decisions have found no indication in the text of the PLRA or its 
                                          
 
 
6.  As we explained in Schmidt, the federal courts have not discussed the 
application of the federal Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, to 
mandamus petitions because all gain time petitions in the federal courts must be 
filed as habeas petitions.  878 So. 2d at 364 n.4.  In Florida, mandamus petitions 
are a proper vehicle for bringing a gain time challenge that will not result in 
immediate release.  See Bush v. State, 945 So. 2d 1207, 1210 (Fla. 2006), (―[I]f the 
prisoner alleges entitlement to immediate release, a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus is the proper remedy; whereas if the prisoner does not allege entitlement to 
immediate release, a petition for writ of mandamus is the proper remedy.‖ 
(footnote omitted)).  Mandamus is also the proper remedy in Florida for review of 
an order of the Commission determining a presumptive parole release date.  See 
Griffith v. Florida Parole & Probation Comm‘n, 485 So. 2d 818, 820 (Fla. 1986). 
 
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legislative history to indicate that Congress expected its filing fee payment 
requirements to apply to traditional hybrid civil-criminal, habeas-type actions in 
which inmates assert an entitlement to gain time and an accelerated release from 
prison but were not contesting their conditions of confinement.‖  Schmidt, 878 So. 
2d at 364.  We similarly concluded that Florida‘s Prisoner Indigency Statute, 
section 57.085, was intended only ―to discourage the filing of frivolous inmate 
lawsuits, but not to prevent the filing of claims contesting the computation of 
criminal sentences.‖  Id. at 366.  In holding that prisoners‘ gain time challenges are 
collateral criminal proceedings for purposes of section 57.085(10), we explained: 
Long ago, [the United States Supreme Court] made clear that ―[a] 
prisoner‘s eligibility for reduced imprisonment is a significant factor 
entering into both the defendant‘s decision to plea bargain and the 
judge‘s calculation of the sentence to be imposed.‖  Weaver v. 
Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 32 (1981). . . .  It is clear that the Supreme 
Court has refused to be bound by the variations in terminology used in 
the various challenges to the computation of an inmate‘s sentence.  
Instead, it has looked to the effect the challenged action had on the 
amount of time an inmate has to actually spend in prison.  We think 
we should do the same; thus, we conclude that a gain time challenge is 
analogous to a collateral challenge to a sentence in a criminal 
proceeding because the end result is the same—the inmate‘s time in 
prison is directly affected. 
 
In the instant case, Schmidt‘s loss of gain time effectively 
lengthened his sentence, since by the Department of Corrections‘ 
action he now has to serve that additional time in prison.  Therefore, 
we agree, in accord with the authorities discussed above, that his gain 
time challenge should be considered a ―collateral criminal 
proceeding,‖ and the Prisoner Indigency Statute should not apply.  To 
hold otherwise would result in an unlawful ― ‗chilling‘ of a criminal 
defendant‘s right to appeal or otherwise challenge the propriety or 
constitutionality of the conviction or sentence,‖ Geffken v. Strickler, 
 
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778 So. 2d 975, 977 n.5 (Fla. 2001), and raise a serious issue as to 
criminal defendants‘ constitutional rights of access to the courts to 
challenge their sentences. 
 
Schmidt, 878 So. 2d at 366-67 (footnote omitted).   
The next relevant decision in this line of cases is Cox v. Crosby, 27 So. 3d 
45 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).  In Cox, the First District had for consideration the 
question of whether Cox‘s petition for writ of mandamus challenging the 
constitutionality of a 1993 amendment to section 944.275, Florida Statutes, was 
exempt from the fee and lien requirements under section 57.085(10).  Section 
944.275, as amended, precluded Cox from receiving basic gain time.  The trial 
court in Cox held that the action was not exempt from the payment and lien 
provisions of section 57.085.  See id. at 45.  Cox sought review in the district court, 
where the State argued that the holding in Schmidt should be limited to actual gain 
time forfeitures and not apply to an action challenging a statute.  The First District 
disagreed and concluded that Cox‘s action was one that is exempt from payment 
and lien requirements because, if successful, it would directly affect the time that 
Cox would spend in prison.  Cox, 27 So. 3d at 46.  The district court then certified 
the following question to this Court in Cox v. Crosby: 
Does the holding in Schmidt v. Crusoe, 878 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 2003), 
extend to all actions, regardless of their nature, in which, if successful, 
the complaining party‘s claim would directly affect his or her time in 
prison, so to preclude imposition of a lien on the inmate‘s trust 
account to recover applicable filing fees? 
  
 
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Id. 
 
We granted review and rephrased the certified question in McNeil v. Cox, 
997 So. 2d 343, 346 (Fla. 2008).  After specifically limiting the question to all 
―gain time‖ actions, we answered it in the affirmative.  See id. at 344.  In so 
holding, we determined that ―[t]he prisoner indigency statute was intended to 
supplant the general indigency statute for most purposes where prisoners‘ civil 
filings are concerned.‖  Id. at 345.  We also concluded that ―the prisoner indigency 
statute was intended to ‗discourage the filing of frivolous civil lawsuits‘ with 
respect to prison conditions.‖  Id. at 348 (quoting Schmidt, 878 So. 2d at 366).  
Based on the text and intent of section 57.085 and on our decision in Schmidt, we 
held in Cox that all gain time actions, including actions challenging a gain time 
statute, are ―collateral criminal proceedings‖ for the purposes of section 
57.085(10), and thus exempt from the payment and lien requirements of the act.  
Cox, 997 So. 2d at 348.   
Because the question we answered in Cox was limited to gain time 
challenges, that decision is not dispositive of the question presented in this case, 
which pertains to actions challenging the Commission‘s determination of an 
inmate‘s presumptive parole release date.  We have never addressed the question 
now before us concerning whether an action challenging the Commission‘s 
determination of an inmate‘s PPRD is a collateral criminal proceeding intended to 
 
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be exempt from the lien provisions of section 57.085.  Thus, we must examine the 
statutory framework in which the Commission calculates a prisoner‘s presumptive 
parole release date and attempt to determine the effect that calculation has on the 
setting of an inmate‘s actual parole release date.  
C. The Statutory and Administrative Framework for 
Determination of PPRD and its Role in a Final Parole Decision 
 
The Commission contends that PPRD decisions are so different from gain 
time challenges that they cannot fall within the exemption set forth in section 
57.085(10), and that the rationale of Cox is not applicable to the determination of 
an inmate‘s PPRD because that calculation does not alter the stated term of the 
inmate‘s original sentence.  The Commission further contends that although gain 
time directly affects the length of an inmate‘s sentence and is essentially a 
sentence-related matter, parole decisions are discretionary determinations that are 
separate and apart from the sentence and from calculation of the length of the 
sentence.  We have considered each of these contentions and find that none of 
them supports the Commission‘s contention that section 57.085(10) is inapplicable 
to actions challenging an inmate‘s PPRD calculation.   
Chapter 947 sets forth the legislative scheme governing parole in this state.  
We recognize that section 947.002, Florida Statutes (2009), titled ―Intent,‖ 
confirms that parole is not a matter of right, but is one of legislative grace.  
§ 947.002(5), Fla. Stat. (2009).  Even so, an inmate who is entitled to consideration 
 
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for parole is entitled under chapter 947 to an initial determination by the 
Commission of a PPRD based on objective guidelines and relevant aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances.  Section 947.172, Florida Statutes (2009), 
―Establishment of presumptive parole release date,‖ provides that a hearing 
examiner shall conduct an initial interview with the inmate in preparation for 
recommending a PPRD to a panel of no fewer than two parole commissioners 
appointed by the Commission chair.  § 947.172(2), Fla. Stat. (2009).  Under 
section 947.172(2), Florida Statutes, the hearing examiner‘s recommendation of a 
PPRD is to be based on objective parole guidelines and ―any other competent 
evidence relevant to aggravating and mitigating circumstances.‖  § 947.172(2), Fla. 
Stat.; see also § 947.005(5), Fla. Stat. (2009) (defining ―Presumptive Parole 
Release Date‖ as the tentative parole release date ―as determined by objective 
parole guidelines‖). 7  Section 947.165, Florida Statutes (2009), directs the 
                                          
 
 
7.  Rule 23-21.009, Florida Administrative Code, establishes matrix time 
ranges for parole determinations.  Matrix time ranges are reported in months.  See 
Fla. Admin. Code R. 23-21.009.  ―Matrix Time Range‖ is defined in Florida Parole 
Commission rule 23-21.001(26), Florida Administrative Code, as ―the appropriate 
range of months found where the offender‘s salient factor score total intersects 
with the offender‘s severity of offense behavior.‖  Rule 23-21.010, Florida 
Administrative Code, provides that the Commission may render a decision outside 
the matrix time range based on ―competent and persuasive evidence relevant to 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances‖ under certain specified conditions.  Fla. 
Admin. Code R. 23-21.010(1).  Rule 23-21.010(5) sets forth a list of possible 
aggravating circumstances as follows: 
 
(a) Aggravation – Decisions above the matrix time range: 
 
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Commission to develop and implement the objective parole guidelines, ―which 
shall be the criteria upon which parole decisions are made.‖  § 947.165(10), Fla. 
Stat. (2009).  Under this statutory scheme, where aggravating circumstances are 
found to exist, additional months are added to the PPRD calculation.        
                                                                                                                                        
 
1. Reasons related to aggravation of the severity of offense 
behavior can include: 
a. The offense involved the use of a firearm or dangerous weapon; 
b. The offense resulted in great bodily injury or pecuniary loss; 
c. The offense involved multiple victims or knowingly created a 
great risk of bodily injury or death to many people; 
d. The offense involved exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior 
indicative of wanton cruelty; 
e. The offense was part of a large-scale organized scheme of 
criminal conspiracy; 
f. The offense was committed against a victim known to be 
particularly vulnerable, such as elderly persons, physically or mentally 
handicapped persons, children; 
g. The offense was committed in an unusually sophisticated 
manner; 
h. Any additional offenses; 
i. The inmate committed an offense while holding public office 
and the offense was related to his conduct in office; 
j. The inmate committed an offense using his professional 
reputation or position in the community to effectuate the offense or to 
afford him an easier means of perpetrating it; and 
k. The inmate committed an offense for the purpose of avoiding or 
preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape. 
 
2. Reasons related to likelihood of favorable parole outcome, 
negative indicants of parole prognosis can include: 
a. The offense was committed while on bond, after bond was 
entreated or on release on recognizance; 
b. The inmate has a history of alcohol or narcotics abuse; 
c. The inmate has a history of assaultive or violent behavior; and 
d. The inmate has failed or refused to make restitution when he 
was able to do so. 
 
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We also recognized in Florida Parole & Probation Commission v. Paige, 462 
So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1985), that although ―[p]lacement of the inmate on parole on the 
date of his presumptive parole release date . . . is not automatic,‖ the PPRD 
―becomes binding on the Commission in the sense that, once established, it is not 
to be changed except for reasons of institutional conduct, acquisition of new 
information . . . or for good cause in exceptional circumstances.‖  Id. at 819.  This 
is also reflected in section 947.172(3), which provides in pertinent part: 
 
(3)  A presumptive parole release date shall become binding on 
the commission when agreement [by the commissioners] on the 
presumptive parole release date is reached.  Should the presumptive 
parole release date fall outside the matrix time ranges as determined 
by the objective parole guidelines, the reasons for this decision shall 
be stated in writing with individual particularities. 
 
§ 947.172(3), Fla. Stat. (2009) (emphasis added).  The significance of a properly 
calculated PPRD is apparent when it is viewed within the statutory scheme for 
progressing to the next critical step in the parole process, determination of the 
inmate‘s ―effective parole release date.‖  Section 947.005(5), Florida Statutes 
(2009), defines ―[e]ffective parole release date‖ as ―the actual parole release date 
as determined by the presumptive parole release date, satisfactory institutional 
conduct, and an acceptable parole plan.‖  § 947.005(5), Fla. Stat. (emphasis 
added).  Section 947.1745, Florida Statutes (2009), directs the Commission to 
establish the inmate‘s effective parole release date and provides in pertinent part 
 
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that ―[i]f the inmate‘s institutional conduct has been satisfactory, the presumptive 
parole release date shall become the effective parole release date.‖8  Thus, only 
after the Commission determines the PPRD can the Commission progress to the 
point of setting the inmate‘s effective parole release date (EPRD).  
While it can be seen that the PPRD is not the final determination of the 
inmate‘s parole release date, we cannot ignore the fact that without this first critical 
step, none of the other statutory steps may be taken on the path to reaching an 
effective parole release date for the inmate.  Unless corrected, errors in 
determination of the PPRD, such as consideration of improper aggravating 
circumstances, will necessarily cause the effective parole release date and, if parole 
is ultimately granted, the actual release date to be delayed.      
As we noted in Schmidt, gain time credits ―are ‗one determinant of a 
petitioner‘s prison term . . . and [his] effective sentence is altered once this 
determinant is changed.‘ ‖  Schmidt, 878 So. 2d at 367 (quoting Lynce v. Mathis, 
519 U.S. 433, 445 (1997)).   Similarly, alterations to the calculation of an inmate‘s 
PPRD based upon elimination of an erroneous aggravating circumstance in turn 
alters a prisoner‘s presumptive parole release date and, thus, alters the effective 
parole release date, once that determinant is changed.    
                                          
 
 
8.  Rule 23-21.015, Florida Administrative Code, sets forth the specific 
procedures to be followed in determining the effective parole release date.   
 
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We therefore conclude that although the PPRD does not determine an 
inmate‘s actual parole release date, and while we recognize that parole is not a 
matter of right, an action challenging the correctness of the PPRD determination 
can directly affect the length of time that an inmate will spend in prison.  
Accordingly, challenges to the PPRD do not fall into the category of frivolous or 
malicious civil actions which the Legislature sought to discourage by the 
enactment of section 57.085, but are instead analogous to collateral criminal 
proceedings intended by the Legislature to be exempt from the fee and lien 
provisions of the act.  Such actions fall within the exception expressly set forth by 
the Legislature in section 57.085(10) for ―collateral criminal proceedings.‖  
Further, similar to the concern we voiced in Schmidt, to hold otherwise would 
effectively result in an unlawful ―chilling‖ of a prisoner‘s right to seek review of 
the Commission‘s determination of his presumptive parole release date.  See 
Schmidt, 878 So. 2d at 367 (citing Geffken, 778 So. 2d at 977 n.5).  For these 
reasons, we answer the rephrased certified question in the affirmative.   
THIS CASE 
 
Spaziano filed his challenge to the Commission‘s determination of his 
presumptive parole release date by petition for writ of mandamus in the circuit 
court, which is the proper vehicle for challenging such decisions.  His challenge 
was not determined to be frivolous or malicious by the circuit court or the district 
 
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court, nor do we view it as such.  Spaziano‘s challenge, if successful, would have 
directly affected his presumptive parole release date and, in turn, his effective 
parole release date.  Because these dates are critical to the calculation of an 
inmate‘s parole release date for those inmates who are ultimately granted parole, 
we conclude that Spaziano‘s challenge to the PPRD is a collateral criminal 
proceeding for the purposes of section 57.085(10).  The Legislature has 
specifically exempted collateral criminal proceedings from the fee and lien 
provisions of section 57.085, and we are not at liberty to ignore this express 
legislative directive.  For these reasons, we approve the decision of the First 
District Court of Appeal vacating the order of the circuit court, which imposed a 
lien upon Spaziano‘s trust account.   
CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the foregoing, we answer the rephrased certified question in the 
affirmative and approve the decision of the district court.  We hold that inmate 
challenges, regardless of their nature, to the Florida Parole Commission‘s 
determination of an inmate‘s presumptive parole release date constitute collateral 
criminal proceedings for the purposes of section 57.085(10).  Accordingly, when 
such an action is brought, section 57.085(10) precludes imposition of a lien on the 
inmate‘s trust account to recover applicable filing fees.  
  
 It is so ordered. 
 
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PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, C.J., dissents with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
CANADY, C.J., dissenting. 
Because a proceeding to challenge the Florida Parole Commission‘s 
determination of a presumptive parole release date (PPRD) is not a collateral 
criminal proceeding, I dissent. 
The requirements of the Prisoner Indigency Statute apply generally to any 
―prisoner who is intervening in or initiating a judicial proceeding.‖  § 57.085(2), 
Fla. Stat. (2004).  The only exceptions from the operation of the statutory 
requirements are for ―a criminal proceeding or a collateral criminal proceeding.‖  § 
57.085(10), Fla. Stat. (2004).  As we have previously recognized, ―collateral 
criminal proceedings‖ are proceedings ―which contest a criminal conviction or 
sentence.‖  Geffken v. Strickler, 778 So. 2d 975, 976 (Fla. 2001).  That is, they are 
proceedings which involve a collateral attack on the conviction or sentence entered 
in a criminal case. 
A proceeding challenging a parole commission PPRD determination is not a 
―collateral criminal proceeding.‖  A challenge to a PPRD does not involve a 
collateral attack on a criminal conviction or sentence.  An attack on a PPRD 
determination has nothing to do with the validity of the conviction or sentence.  ―A 
 
- 22 - 
parole hearing is an administrative proceeding‖ and ―it is not part of a criminal 
prosecution.‖  State v. Scarlet, 800 So. 2d 220, 221 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Scarlet v. 
State, 766 So. 2d 1110, 1110-11 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)). 
 
The majority here concludes, however, that because ―challenges to the 
PPRD‖ are ―analogous to collateral criminal proceedings‖ they ―fall within the 
exception expressly set forth by the Legislature in section 57.085(10) for 
‗collateral criminal proceedings.‘‖  Majority op. at 19 (emphasis added).  In 
reaching this conclusion, the majority relies on our decision in Schmidt v. Crusoe, 
878 So. 2d 361, 367 (Fla. 2003), where we held that ―a gain time challenge is 
analogous to a collateral challenge to a sentence in a criminal proceeding because . 
. . the inmate‘s time in prison is directly affected.‖  (Emphasis added.)  
 
But there is no justification for applying the unambiguous exception for ―a 
collateral criminal proceeding‖ to a proceeding which is not ―a collateral criminal 
proceeding‖ but which this Court determines to be ―analogous‖ to such 
proceedings.  Such an ―extension by analogy‖ of a statutory provision ―involves 
creative judicial lawmaking to produce consequences beyond what could 
reasonably be said to have been intended or communicated‖ by the statute.  2B 
Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 
55:1 (7th ed. 2008).  This violates ―the overarching principle that judges lack the 
power ‗to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, 
 
- 23 - 
or limit its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications.‘‖  Horowitz v. 
Plantation Gen. Hosp. Ltd. P‘ship, 959 So. 2d 176, 182 (Fla. 2007) (emphasis 
removed) (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984)).  Although 
―extension by analogy‖ is an important part of common law adjudication, it cannot 
properly be employed as a method of interpreting an unambiguous statutory text.  
The use of ―extension by analogy‖ in such a context is inconsistent with the respect 
due to the limits set by the Legislature in the statutory text. 
 
Moreover, legal challenges to PPRD determinations are not analogous to 
collateral criminal proceedings in the same way that the gain time proceedings at 
issue in Schmidt were analogous to collateral criminal proceedings.  Contrary to 
the majority‘s reliance on Schmidt, an attack on a PPRD determination does not 
challenge a decision by which ―the inmate‘s time in prison is directly affected.‖  
Schmidt, 878 So. 2d at 367.  Under the statutory scheme governing parole, an 
inmate does not have an enforceable right to release based on the PPRD.  See Fla. 
Parole & Prob. Comm‘n v. Paige, 462 So. 817, 820 (Fla. 1985) (―‗[T]he use of the 
terms ―guidelines‖ and ―presumptive parole release date‖ clearly conveys the 
message that the final parole decision will depend upon the commission‘s finding 
that the prisoner meets the conditions provided in section 947.18.‘  [May v. Fla. 
Parole & Prob. Comm‘n, 435 So. 2d 834, 837 (Fla. 1983)]. . . .  On the record 
before us, we find no abuse of discretion by the Commission in declining at this 
 
- 24 - 
time to set an effective parole release date.‖); see also § 947.002(5), Fla. Stat. 
(2004) (―It is the intent of the Legislature that the decision to parole an inmate 
from the incarceration portion of the inmate‘s sentence is an act of grace of the 
state and shall not be considered a right.‖). 
 
Here the majority thus pushes Schmidt‘s expansion of the statutory 
exemption for collateral criminal proceedings even beyond the bounds 
contemplated by Schmidt.  The majority‘s extension of Schmidt‘s reasoning to the 
context at issue here illustrates how far the trajectory of Schmidt‘s reasoning veers 
away from the governing statutory text.  I would return to the text of the statute 
adopted by the Legislature.  Failing to do so results in ―an abrogation of legislative 
power.‖  Holly, 450 So. 2d 219 (quoting Am. Bankers Life Assurance Co. of Fla. 
v. Williams, 212 So. 2d 777, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)). 
The rewriting of the unambiguous statutory exception in section 57.085(10) 
is not justified by the majority‘s assertion that applying the requirements of the 
Prisoner Indigency Statute to Spaziano would ―effectively result in an unlawful 
‗chilling‘ of a prisoner‘s right to seek review of the Commission‘s determination of 
his presumptive parole release date.‖  Majority op. at 19.  If application of the plain 
terms of the statute results in a constitutional violation, the constitutionality of the 
statute should be squarely addressed.  Vague assertions of constitutional 
 
- 25 - 
problems—unaccompanied by any analysis—do not provide a basis for deciding 
this or any other case. 
I therefore would quash the decision of the First District Court of Appeal 
and answer the rephrased certified question in the negative. 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Great Public Importance  
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D05-3506 
 
Sarah J. Rumph, General Counsel and  Susan Schwartz, Assistant General 
Counsel, The Florida Parole Commission, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
James M. Russ and Terrence E. Kehoe, Orlando, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent