Title: ER Squibb and Sons, Inc. v. Farnes

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

697 So. 2d 825 (1997)
E.R. SQUIBB AND SONS, INC., et al., Petitioners,
v.
Boyd B. FARNES, Respondent.
No. 87632.

Supreme Court of Florida.
June 19, 1997.
*826 Arthur J. England, Jr., and Alison Marie Igoe of Greenberg, Traurig, Hoffman, Lipoff, Rosen & Quentel, P.A., Miami, for petitioners.
Charles H. Sinclair of Thornton, Mastrucci & Sinclair, Coral Gables, for respondent.
SHAW, Justice.
We have for review Farnes v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 667 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), which conflicts with Smith v. Brown, 525 So. 2d 868 (Fla.1988). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We quash Farnes.
Boyd Farnes worked at a drug rehabilitation clinic in the Florida Keys, and because his work entailed an increased risk of viral infection, the clinic offered, and he accepted, a flu shot. He was inoculated by nurse Cynthia Fox (by designation of Dr. Paul Jahnig) in October 1989, and subsequently developed a recurrence of Guillain-Barre Syndrome (GBS), a rare neurological disorder. He sued Connaught Laboratories, Inc., E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., and Henry Schein, Inc., the manufacturer and distributors of the vaccine (referred to collectively as "Connaught"), alleging that the package insert was inadequate to warn of the risk of GBS.
The jury returned a verdict for Farnes for $13,500,000, but the trial judge ordered a new trial, finding that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The district court reversed, reasoning thusly:
Farnes, 667 So. 2d  at 1005 (citations omitted).
Farnes claims that the trial court impermissibly reweighed the evidence, and that the district court applied the proper standard for abuse of discretion. We disagree.
This Court addressed a similar scenario in Smith v. Brown, 525 So. 2d 868 (Fla.1988), wherein we described the circumstances under which a trial court "can and should" grant a new trial:
Id. at 870 (emphasis added and omitted) (citations omitted).
Due to procedural concerns and the trial court's favored vantage point, this "abuse of discretion" standard is highly deferential:
Id. at 869-70 (emphasis added) (quoting Baptist Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Bell, 384 So. 2d 145, 146 (Fla.1980)).
Applying this standard to the present case, we note that the package insert contained information about health-related risks and included the following statements:
Connaught argues that its package insert warnings could not have been the proximate cause of Farnes's condition in light of nurse Fox's testimony which demonstrated that she understood the warnings, knew the associated risks, but failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into Farnes's medical history. In its order granting Connaught's motion for a new trial, the court focused on the language of the insert and the other evidence, but first explained that Connaught's duty was to warn the physician, not Farnes:
Our review of the record shows that although there was an evidentiary basis for the jury verdict, there also was extensive evidentiary support for the trial court's ruling. In fact, the key piece of information, i.e., that flu vaccines used since 1976 had not been associated *828 with an increased risk of GBS, was uncontroverted. Further, as the trial court pointed out in its order, Farnes's expert, Dr. Lichtenfeld, had himself suffered from GBS and could give no particular basis, other than personal preference, for his opinion that the insert was inadequate. Connaught's expert, Dr. Weiderholt, on the other hand, presented convincing testimony that the insert accurately reflected the state of medical knowledge in 1989.
Based on the foregoing, "we are unable to say, after viewing the evidence as a whole, that reasonable [persons] could not have concluded that the verdict ... was against the manifest weight of the evidence." See Smith, 525 So. 2d  at 870. In short, reasonable persons could agree with the trial court.
We quash Farnes and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.[1]
It is so ordered.
KOGAN, C.J., and OVERTON, GRIMES, HARDING and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion.
WELLS, Judge, dissenting.
I dissent because the Third District's revised opinion does not conflict with Smith v. Brown, 525 So. 2d 868 (Fla.1988). I also dissent because the majority's decision makes the judge a super-juror in violation of the respondent's guaranteed right to a trial by jury.
[1]  We decline to address Connaught's claim that its package insert was adequate as a matter of law.