Title: West Linn-Wilsonville School Dist. 3 J T v. Seida

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed:  November 27, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

WEST LINN-WILSONVILLE SCHOOL
DISTRICT 3 J T,

									Petitioner on Review,

		v.

KENT SEIDA, JOYCE BURNETT, fka
JOYCE SEIDA AND DAVID SEIDA,

	Defendants,

		and

CURTIS M. HUNTER,

	Respondent on Review.

(CC 95-10408; CA A95504; SC S44283)

	On review of an order of the Court of Appeals allowing a
motion for summary determination of appealability.*

	Argued and submitted November 4, 1997.

	John Dudrey, of Williams, Fredrickson & Stark, P.C.,
Portland, argued the cause on behalf of petitioner on review. 
With him on the brief was Donald R. Stark.

	Jeffrey S. Seymour, Lake Oswego, argued the cause and filed
the briefs on behalf of respondent on review.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, and Kulongoski, Justices.**

	KULONGOSKI, J.

	The order of the Court of Appeals is vacated.  The case is
remanded to the Court of Appeals with instructions to dismiss
respondent's appeal as moot.

*	Appeal from order denying intervention,

	Clackamas County Circuit Court, 

	Raymond Bagley, Judge.

**	Fadeley, J., retired January 31, 1998, and did not
participate in this decision.  Graber, J., resigned March
31, 1998, and did not participate in this decision.

		KULONGOSKI, J.

		In October 1995, plaintiff West Linn-Wilsonville School
District 3 J T commenced an eminent domain proceeding, naming as
defendants Kent and David Seida and Joyce Burnett.  Defendants
jointly owned a parcel of land on which plaintiff planned to
build a new middle school.  One year later, before trial, Hunter
moved to intervene pursuant to ORCP 33 C.(1)  He alleged that he
had a contract with defendants for the purchase of boulders and
rocks from the subject parcel.  The circuit court entered an
order denying Hunter's motion.  Plaintiff and defendants then
settled.  

		In December 1996, Hunter appealed the circuit court's
order denying his motion to intervene.  Plaintiff challenged the
appealability of the order denying the motion to intervene in the
circuit court, moving for a summary determination of
appealability pursuant to former ORS 19.034(1) (1995).(2)  Hunter
then moved the Court of Appeals for a stay of the circuit court
proceedings, former ORS 19.034(2) (1995),(3) and for a summary
determination of the appealability of the circuit court's order
denying his motion to intervene, former ORS 19.034(3) (1995).(4) 
Hunter did not move the circuit court, as he might have done
pursuant to former ORS 19.034(2), for a stay of proceedings
pending the outcome of his appeal of the circuit court order
denying his motion to intervene. 

		The circuit court subsequently concluded that its
earlier order denying Hunter's motion to intervene was not
appealable.  The court then entered a final judgment in the
eminent domain proceeding based on the settlement between
plaintiff and defendants.(5)  That final judgment required
plaintiff to make an initial payment of $100,000 to defendants
within 10 days of entry of the judgment and to later deposit with
the circuit court the additional sum of $1,137,750 plus
stipulated damages, attorney fees, and costs.  Hunter did not
move either the circuit court or the Court of Appeals under
former ORS 19.034(2) for a stay of the proceedings to enforce
that final judgment or make a claim against the settlement fund.

		Plaintiff timely deposited the initial $100,000 payment
with the circuit court.  Defendants withdrew that sum, and the
circuit court entered an order approving that distribution.
Plaintiff later timely deposited the balance of the settlement
fund, $1,216,750, with the circuit court.  Defendants withdrew
that sum, and the circuit court entered an order approving that
final distribution of the settlement funds to defendants.  By
that time, the parties had carried out the court's judgment, and
no funds remained on deposit with the court.  Assuming, arguendo,
that the court's order denying intervention had some practical
effect on the rights of the parties, the court's subsequent
orders approving the disbursement of the settlement funds
eliminated any such effect in regard to this controversy.

		After all the foregoing had occurred, the Court of
Appeals granted Hunter's motions for a stay of proceedings in the
circuit court and for a summary determination of appealability. 
The Court of Appeals then determined that the circuit court's
order denying Hunter's motion to intervene was appealable. 
Plaintiff petitioned this court for review of that decision,
which we allowed.  See former ORS 19.034(3) (providing petition
for review procedure).  

		The difficulty is that the Court of Appeals' order was
issued after entry and execution of the final judgment.  By that
time, no action remained in which Hunter could intervene.  Even
if Hunter prevailed on appeal, reversal of the order denying
intervention could have no practical effect on the eminent domain
proceeding.  Thus, Hunter's appeal was moot.  See Brumnett v.
PSRB, 315 Or 402, 405-06, 848 P2d 1194 (1993) (cases in which a
court's decision no longer will have a practical effect on or
concerning the rights of the parties will be dismissed as moot). 
Because the appeal became moot, the Court of Appeals lacked
jurisdiction to proceed with the appeal after entry of final
judgment.  The court's order thus must be vacated.  Id. at 406.

		The order of the Court of Appeals is vacated.  The case
is remanded to the Court of Appeals with instructions to dismiss
respondent's appeal as moot.

1. 	ORCP 33 C provides:

		"At any time before trial, any person who has an
interest in the matter in litigation may, by leave of
court, intervene.  In exercising its discretion, the
court shall consider whether the intervention will
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties."

2. 	Former ORS 19.034(1) (1995), renumbered as ORS
19.235(1) in 1997, provided:

		"Notwithstanding ORS 19.033, if any party or the
trial court on its own motion, on receiving actual
notice of the filing of the notice of appeal, raises
the issue whether the decision being appealed is
appealable, the trial court shall have jurisdiction to
make a summary determination, with or without a
hearing, whether the decision is appealable.  As used
in this section, 'decision' means any trial court
ruling, either oral or written."

3. 	Former ORS 19.034(2) (1995), renumbered as ORS
19.235(2) in 1997, provided:

		"If the trial court determines that the decision
is not appealable, the trial court, in its discretion,
may proceed through entry of judgment or stay
proceedings pending an appellate court determination of
the existence of an appealable decision.  The trial
court may refer the question of the existence of an
appealable decision to the court to which the appeal is
taken.  Neither an order by the trial court to proceed
through entry of judgment, an order by the trial court
to stay proceedings pending an appellate court
determination, nor a trial court referral of the
question of the existence of an appealable decision to
the appellate court is appealable.  However, on motion
of any party or on its own motion the appellate court
may stay proceedings in the trial court or stay any
order or judgment entered by the trial court pending a
final determination of appealability."

4. 	Former ORS 19.034(3) (1995), renumbered as ORS
19.235(3) in 1997, provided, in relevant part:

		"When a party by motion, the trial court by
referral or the appellate court on its own motion
raises the issue whether the decision is appealable,
the appellate court may make a summary determination of
the appealability of the decision.  A summary
determination of the appealability of a decision under
this subsection is subject to review by the Supreme
Court as provided in ORS 2.520 except that the petition
for review shall be served and filed within 14 days
after the date of the court's determination.  Either
the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court may shorten
the time period within which the petition for review
shall be filed." 

5. 	Notwithstanding the pendency of Hunter's appeal, the
trial court, on determining that the order denying intervention
was not appealable, had jurisdiction under former ORS 19.034(2)
to enter final judgment.