Title: Consumer Protection v. George

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Consumer Protection Division v. Paris G. George
No. 12, September Term, 2004
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT – AFFIRMATIVE ACTION – The term “affirmative action”
may be used to justify a variety of actions taken by the Consumer Protection Division when those
actions are corrective measures that address the specific violations that are the subject matter of the
Division’s Final Order.  The term “affirmative action,” however, will not justify all actions taken
by the Division simply because they are in furtherance of the purpose of the statute.  When an
interpretation of statutory language is not supported by the statutory language, history, relevant case
law, etc., we will not uphold that interpretation.
  
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT – AFFIRMATIVE ACTION – PERFORMANCE BOND – the
authority to order the posting of a performance bond in a consumer protection case is derived from
the equitable jurisdiction of the courts and its authority to grant ancillary equitable relief in
connection with an injunction.  The Consumer Protection Act authorizes the Agency to seek an
injunction from the court when a cease and desist order proves to be insufficient in preventing
continued violations of the Act.  The Agency may apply to the court for an order requiring the
posting of a performance bond, however, it does not have the authority on its own to order such a
requirement.
CONSUMER PROTECTION – RESTITUTION – FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES – The Consumer
Protection Division is expressly authorized to order restitution and assess civil penalties against
persons found to have violated the Consumer Protection Act.  CL II §§ 13-403 and 13-410.  It is also
authorized to seek from the court an order of judgment necessary to restore to a person any money
or real or personal property acquired from him by means of any prohibited practice.  CL II § 13-
406(b)(2).  Once an order of judgment has been obtained the Agency is entitled to certain financial
disclosures pursuant to the Maryland Rules of Civil Procedure, Md. Rule §§ 2-633(a) and 3-633(a).
 In the Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Civil No. 03-C-02-008007
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 12
September Term, 2004
______________________________________
CONSUMER PROTECTION DIVISION
v.
PARIS G. GEORGE
____________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Greene, J.
______________________________________
Filed:   November 9, 2004
1 The Division states the issue as follows:
Did the Consumer Protection Division err when, pursuant to §
13-403(b)(1) of the Consumer Protection Act, it ordered Paris
George, who had repeatedly taken substantial amounts of money
from consumers for medical goods and related services that
George did not provide, to take affirmative action consisting of
the posting of a security designed to prevent reoccurrence of his
past violations and the disclosure of financial information to
facilitate redress of past violations? 
2Although George participated in the administrative appeal to the Circuit Court sitting
in Baltimore County of the Division’s Final Order, George did not participate in the
proceedings before this Court either by counsel or pro se.
The issue before the Court is whether the language, “to take affirmative action,” found
in the Consumer Protection Act, Md. Code (1975, 2000 Repl. Vol), § 13-101 et seq. of the
Commercial Law Article (“Act”), permits the Consumer Protection Division to order a
person adjudicated in violation of the Act to post a surety bond before engaging in further
business transactions and to disclose certain financial information.1  Our narrow holding is
that § 13-403(b)(1) does not authorize the Division “to take affirmative action”either to
require a violator of the Act to post a bond or to disclose financial information to aid the
Division’s enforcement of a cease and desist order.  Thus, we affirm the judgment of the
Circuit Court for Baltimore County. 
The Facts
Paris George, (“George”),2 is the sole proprietor of a company that sells durable
medical equipment and other supplies.  He operates out of his home under various trade
names, including Allied Home Healthcare, Allied Healthcare, Allied Medical Equipment Co.,
3 In one instance, a customer contacted George to purchase a chairlift.  After George
met with the customer and her husband in their home in February of 1999, the customer
contracted to purchase a chairlift for $2,650.00.  The customer gave George a deposit of
$1,886.50 representing two thirds of the purchase price and sales tax of $134.75.  George
gave the customer a receipt indicating installation would take place in 30 days.  After 30 days
passed with no word from George, the customer repeatedly attempted to get in contact with
George.  He never returned the calls.  Finally, in May of 1999, the customer contacted the
Attorney General’s Office and in August George refunded the deposit.
4 George claimed to be an authorized dealer of the chairlift company, Bruno
Independent Living Aids, Inc. (“Bruno”).  Bruno, however, had informed George that they
(continued...)
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Maryland Home Healthcare Services, Access Professionals, and Access Medical Equipment
Co.  He advertises in the yellow pages the sale and rental of durable medical equipment, i.e.,
wheelchairs, scooters, and stairlifts, as well as sickroom equipment, i.e., hospital beds, bed
rails, and bathing equipment.  His customers are seriously ill or disabled people or their
families.  The average consumer paid George more than $800.00 for equipment while others
paid as much as $6,000.00. 
In a hearing before Administrative Law Judge Beverly Sherman Nash (“ALJ”), the
ALJ found that George violated the Consumer Protection Act, Md. Code (1975, 2000 Repl.
Vol), § 13-101 et seq. of the Commercial Law II Article, the Door-to-Door Sales Act, Md.
Code (1975, 2000 Repl. Vol), § 14-301 et seq. of the Commercial Law II Article, and the
Merchandise Delivery Law, (1975, 2000 Repl. Vol), § 14-1801 et seq. of the Commercial
Law II Article.  Specifically, the ALJ found that George engaged in repeated violations of
the Acts by, among other things, failing to deliver the purchased items,3 claiming to be an
authorized dealer of a certain manufacturer when he was not,4 failing to refund money after
4(...continued)
would no longer do business with him when he failed to pay for his initial equipment order
with the company.  Nevertheless, George continued to hold himself out as a dealer and sold
seven Bruno chairlifts following the notification from Bruno.  The seven orders were never
forwarded to Bruno.
5 In one instance George entered into a contract to provide a hospital bed with a half
rail and an extra wide wheelchair.  He delivered a hospital bed with a full rail and a regular
wheelchair.  Despite repeated requests, George refused to deliver the conforming goods or
refund the customers’ money. 
6 The ALJ found that George collected $9,832.92 in Maryland sales tax on medical
devices that are not taxable.  The money was deposited in George’s regular bank account and
was not forwarded to the Maryland State taxing authorities.
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not delivering the product or after delivering nonconforming goods,5 and charging sales tax
on nontaxable items.6  He also failed to properly notify customers of their rights to cancel
orders and to provide written estimated delivery dates as required by law.  When customers
called to inquire about their ordered products, their calls often went unreturned.  When
customers did reach a live person at Allied, the person often identified himself as “Pat,” an
alias used by George, who informed them that George was unavailable or that he, Pat, would
check on their items and call them back, which he would fail to do.
Based on the above violations, the Division issued a Final Order against George on
June 24, 2002.  George appealed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, the Honorable
John F. Fader II, presiding.  The circuit court affirmed the order in the following respects:
1.
Ordering George to cease and desist from violating
Maryland law;
2.
Requiring George to make modifications to the contracts
used by him so as to comply with Maryland law and to
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give fair notice to customers;
3.
To provide refunds and restitution;
4.
To require George to list his prior customers and the
specifics of transactions with them, so as to identify and
locate individuals who may be entitled to a refund from
him, and to establish a claims process for those who are
entitled to a refund;
5.
To pay restitution in the amount of $32,510.92;
6.
To establish a restitution account to be maintained by the
Division for future claims against George; and
7.
Imposing a civil penalty against George in the amount of
$75,000 for violations of the consumer protection laws,
and requiring that he pay the costs of the administrative
proceedings in the amount of $4,357.
The circuit court reversed the order of the Division with regard to the following two
provisions:
1.
Requiring George to post a surety bond in the amount of
$30,000 for the protection of future customers; and
2.
Requiring George to list his assets, sources of income,
and a list of all transfers of assets or payments in an
amount greater than $1,000 to anyone in the previous two
years.
In reversing the order regarding the bond, the circuit court noted that: 
[w]hile the court is aware of the general remedial purpose of the
statutes to protect consumers, it is not convinced that the general
right to “fence in” a person found to have violated the law
includes the right to order the posting of a bond . . . .  Where the
Maryland Legislature has meant there to be a requirement for
the posting of a bond, they have so provided as part of other
-5-
statutory schemes.
With regard to the second issue, the disclosure of George’s assets and transfers, the circuit
court noted “[t]he statute does not give that authority; the Division can point to no specific
case law interpreting any part of the State or Federal consumer protection statutes as giving
this authority, and no case law interpretation can be strained or bent to say the authority
exists.”  
On March 12, 2004, the court issued an order and monetary judgment against George
in the amount of $111,867.92, representing the sum of the civil penalty, restitution order, and
costs in the case.
The Division appealed the circuit court’s conclusions regarding the surety bond and
the financial disclosure provisions.  The Division argues that “[t]he [Division’s] Order
against George furthered the purpose of the Consumer Protection Act, was issued pursuant
to the [Division’s] statutory authority and was reasonably tailored to address the violations
committed by George . . . .”  We granted certiorari before consideration of the matter in the
Court of Special Appeals.  380 Md. 617, 846 A.2d 401 (2004).
II.
Standard of Review
In Watkins v. Dept. of Public Safety and Correctional Services, 377 Md. 34, 831 A.2d
1079 (2003), Judge Battaglia, writing for this Court, summarized the relevant standard of
review:
-6-
Because an appellate court reviews the agency decision under
the same statutory standards as the circuit court, we reevaluate
the decision of the agency, not the lower court.  Generally,
“judicial review of administrative agency action is narrow.”  The
reviewing court must not “substitute its judgment for the
expertise of those persons who constitute the administrative
agency.”  We must respect the expertise of the agency and
accord deference to its interpretation of a statute that it
administers; however, we “may always determine whether the
administrative agency made an error of law.”  Typically, such a
determination requires considering “(1) the legality of the
decision and (2) whether there was substantial evidence from the
record as a whole to support the decision.”
Id. at 45-46, 831 A.2d at 1086 (internal citations omitted). 
In interpreting a statute we have said that the “predominant goal, when construing
statutes, is to ascertain and implement the legislative intent.”  Baltimore County v. RTKL, 380
Md. 670, 678, 846 A.2d 433, 437 (2004).  In ascertaining the intent of the General Assembly
we “look first to the words of the statute,” id.; however,  
if the true legislative intent cannot readily be determined from
the statutory language alone, we look to other indicia of that
intent, including the title to the bill, the structure of the statute,
the inter-relationship of its various provisions, its legislative
history, its general purpose, and the relative rationality and legal
effect of various competing constructions.  
RTKL, 380 Md. at 678, 846 A.2d at 437-38 (internal citations omitted).
The Consumer Protection Division
The Consumer Protection Division is entrusted with broad powers to enforce and
interpret the Consumer Protection Act, Md. Code (1975, 2000 Repl. Vol), § 13-101 et seq.
of the Commercial Law II Article.  Consumer Protection Division v. Consumer Pub’l Co.,
-7-
304 Md. 731, 745, 501 A.2d 48, 55 (1985).  In adopting the Act, the General Assembly
concluded that “it should take strong protective and preventive steps to investigate unlawful
consumer practices, to assist the public in obtaining relief from these practices, and to
prevent these practices from occurring in Maryland.  It is the purpose of this title to
accomplish these ends and thereby maintain the health and welfare of the citizens of the
State.”  CL § 13-102(b)(3).  The General Assembly further provided that the Act should be
“construed and applied liberally to promote its purpose.”  CL § 13-105.
We summarized the statutory powers of the Division in Consumer Publishing: 
The statutory powers of the Division include the power to
receive and investigate consumer complaints, initiate its own
investigation of any possibly unfair and deceptive trade
practices, issue cease and desist orders, adopt rules and
regulations which further define unfair or deceptive trade
practices or otherwise effectuate the purposes of the Act, and
seek a temporary or permanent injunction in a civil enforcement
proceeding.  §§ 13-204 and 13-403(c)(2).  The statute further
provides that the Division may “exercise and perform any other
function, power and duty appropriate to protect and promote the
welfare of consumers.” § 13-204(11).
Consumer Publishing, 304 Md. at 745, 501 A.2d at 55.  
The cease and desist provision of the statute is found at CL § 13-403(b)(1).  It
provides:
If, at the conclusion of the hearing, the Division determines on
the preponderance of evidence that the alleged violator violated
this title, the Division shall state its findings and issue an order
requiring the violator to cease and desist from the violation and
to take affirmative action, including the restitution of money or
property.  The order shall contain a notice which states that if
7 The relevant section of the Final Order provides:
13. Within thirty (30) days of this Final Order, [George] shall either: (a) post
a surety bond with the [Division], in a form acceptable to the [Division], in the
amount of $30,000.00. (i) The Bond shall be issued by a surety licensed to do
business in the State of Maryland and shall provide that [George] and the
surety are held and firmly bound to consumers who suffer any loss in
(continued...)
-8-
the Division determines that the violator has not corrected the
violation and complied with the order within 30 days following
service of the order, the Division shall proceed with
enforcement pursuant to this title.
CL § 13-403(c)(2) provides:
To obtain compliance with its order, the Division may institute
a civil proceeding, including a proceeding which seeks a
restraining order and a temporary or permanent injunction.
CL § 13-406 provides:
(a) The Attorney General may seek an injunction to prohibit a
person who has engaged or is engaging in a violation of this title
from continuing or engaging in the violation. (b) The Attorney
General shall serve notice of the general relief sought on the
alleged violator at least seven days before the action for an
injunction is filed. (c) The court may enter any order of
judgment necessary to: (1) Prevent the use by a person of any
prohibited practice; (2) Restore to a person any money or real or
personal property acquired from him by means of any prohibited
practice; or (3) Appoint a receiver in case of wilful violation of
this title.
The Surety Bond
The Division ordered George to post a surety bond in the amount of $30,000.00 within
thirty days of the date of the Final Order. 7  The Order provides that the bond 
7(...continued)
connection with their purchase of medical equipment, devices, supplies or
related services from [George]. (ii) The bond shall permit any consumer who
suffers any loss in connection with his or her purchase of medical equipment,
devices, supplies or related services from [George] to file a claim for their loss
with the surety and, if the claim is not paid, to bring an action based on the
bond and recover against the surety; the bond shall also permit the [Division]
to file a claim with the surety for any loss suffered by a consumer in
connection with his or her purchase of medical equipment, devices, supplies
or related services from [George].  (iii) The bond posted by [George] pursuant
to this paragraph shall remain in effect until three (3) years from the last claim
that is made against it, or if no claims are made, three years from the date it
was first posted.  (iv) [George] shall maintain accurate records of any bond
posted under this Final Order, including records of the bond and premium
payments made on it.  Commencing ninety (90) days from the date of this
Final Order, and annually thereafter for the duration of the bond [George] shall
provide copies of all records maintained by him concerning the bond,
including a copy of the bond itself and any documents reflecting premium
payments made on it, to the [Division]. or (b) Provide the Proponent with a
letter of credit or cash deposit in the amount of $30,000.00. (i) Consumers who
suffer any loss in connection with their purchase of medical equipment,
devices, supplies or related services from [George] shall have the right to file
a claim for their loss against the letter of credit or cash deposit provided by
[George].  The [Division] may also file a claim against the letter of credit or
cash deposit for any loss suffered by a consumer in connection with his or her
purchase of medical equipment, devices, supplies or related services from
[George]. (ii) The [Division] may hold [George’s] letter of credit or cash
deposit for three (3) years from the last claim that is made against the letter of
credit or cash deposit or if no claims are made three years from its receipt of
the letter of credit or cash deposit. (iii) The Agency shall resolve all claims
made by either consumers or the [Division] against [George’s] letter of credit
or cash deposit.
14. [George] Shall include in his contracts or order forms used to offer and sell
medical equipment, devices, supplies or related services a written statement,
in boldface type, at least 10 points or larger, that states as follows: “If you feel
that you have suffered any loss in connection with your purchase of medical
(continued...)
-9-
7(...continued)
equipment, devices, supplies or related services, you may contact the Maryland
Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division at (410) 576-6300 or by
writing to Consumer Protection Division, 200 St. Paul Place, 16th floor,
Baltimore, MD 21202.”
15. [George] shall include in his contracts or order forms used to offer and sell
medical equipment, devices, supplies or related services, the address and
telephone number of any surety from whom [George] obtains a surety bond
pursuant to this Final Order. [George’s] contracts or order forms used to offer
and sell medical equipment, devices, supplies or related services, shall also
inform consumers of their right to file a claim against [George’s] surety bond
or any letter of credit or cash deposit held by the Consumer Protection
Division.
16. If [George] believes that due to changed circumstances any of the specific
prohibitions or affirmative obligations that are imposed by this Final Order
should be changed, he may petition the Agency to amend this Order.
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shall permit any consumer who suffers any loss in connection
with his or her purchase of medical equipment, devices, supplies
or related services from [George] to file a claim for their loss
with the surety and, if the claim is not paid, to bring an action
based on the bond and recover against the surety; the bond shall
also permit the [Division] to file a claim with the surety for any
loss suffered by a consumer in connection with his or her
purchase of medical equipment, devices, supplies or related
services from [George].
According to the terms of the bond, it shall remain in effect for three years following the last
claim made against it, or if no claims are made, for three years from the date that the bond
is posted.  In the alternative, George has the option of providing the Division with a letter of
credit or cash deposit in the same amount, subject to the same rules, in lieu of posting the
8 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “surety” as: “A person who is primarily  liable for
the payment of another’s debt or the performance of another’s obligation.” Black’s Law
Dictionary 1455 (7th ed. 1999).  For the definition of “surety bond,” Black’s says: “See
Performance Bond.” Id. at 172.
-11-
surety bond.  Although the Division titled the bond a “surety bond,” it is clear that the
purpose of the bond is to insure performance of any contract George entered into with
consumers.8  Thus, for the purposes of our analysis, we shall treat the three options as a
performance bond.  See Black’s Law Dictionary 1158 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “performance
bond” as “a bond given by a surety to ensure the timely performance of a contract”).
The trial court concluded that the Division exceeded its statutory authority by
requiring the posting of a bond.  The court noted the general remedial purpose of the Act but
concluded that whenever the General Assembly has intended for the posting of a bond it has
expressly done so in other statutes.
The Division contends that the authority to order the posting of a bond is encompassed
within CL § 13-403(b)(1)’s grant of authority “to take affirmative action” when a person is
found to have violated the Act.  The Division argues that the bond will protect future
customers by providing a financial incentive to George to actually deliver the ordered goods
and services because he otherwise will not make a profit on the sale.  The bond will also
provide an efficient means of financial recovery to future customers, allowing them to
purchase the necessary equipment from an alternative dealer should George fail to deliver
the correct goods.  It notes that in the interim between when the Division’s Order was issued
9 Pursuant to the cease and desist order issued by the Division, the violator was
required to disclose with regard to the sale of its “diet” plan : (1) that dieting was required
to lose weight; (2) every  part of the plan that was necessary for someone to achieve
significant weight loss; (3) the active ingredients; and (4) a notice that “If you feel that this
product does not live up to the claims we have made for it in our advertising, we would like
to hear about it.  Please notify us and the Maryland Consumer Protection Division.”
Consumer Publishing, 304 Md. at 772, 501 A.2d at 69.  The Court noted that the U. S.
Supreme Court has held that unlawful commercial speech is not protected by the First
Amendment but declined to reach the ultimate question presented, whether the Division had
the authority to require the disclosures in a national advertising campaign, because the issue
was not raised at the administrative level.  Consumer Publishing, 304 Md. at 772-775, 501
A.2d at 69- 71.
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and when the appeal was pending in the circuit court, George continued to take money from
consumers for medical-related equipment and services without providing the equipment or
a refund.
The term “affirmative action” is not defined in the statute beyond the instruction that
“affirmative action” includes “the restitution of money or property.”  CL § 13-403(b)(1).  In
Consumer Publishing, we stated that the affirmative action language authorized the Division
to include “affirmative disclosure provisions” in future advertisements.9  Consumer
Publishing, 304 Md. at 772 n.18, 501 A.2d at 69 n.18.   In Consumer Protection Division v.
Outdoor World Corporation, 91 Md. App. 275,  603 A.2d 1376 (1992), the Court of Special
Appeals applied the “affirmative action” language to authorize the Division to require that
any future notices from an out-of-state campground sent into Maryland disclose, “in
meaningful terms, what would be expected of the recipients should they attempt to claim any
prizes [advertised in the notice] and what the likelihood is that they will receive a prize of
10 Now found at § 11(e).  Md. Code (1957, 1998 Rep. Vol.) Art. 49B § 11(e).
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any significant value.”  Outdoor World Corporation, 91 Md. App. at 290, 603 A.2d at 1383.
And in Luskin’s Inc. v. Consumer Protection Division, 353 Md. 335, 726 A.2d 702 (1999),
we acknowledged the Division’s authority to require a violator to take “affirmative action,”
but held that the cease and desist order in question imposed requirements that went beyond
the deceptive practices engaged in by the violator in the underlying matter and was, therefore,
too broad.  Luskin’s, 353 Md. at 380-82, 726 A.2d at 724-25. 
We have addressed the meaning of the term “affirmative action” in cases involving
the Commission on Human Relations, Md. Code (1957, 1972 Repl. Vol.), Art. 49B, which
contained a provision with statutory language similar to the language in question here.
Section 14(e) of Art. 49B authorized the Commission to issue a cease and desist order
provided that:
If upon all the evidence, the Commission finds that the
respondent has engaged in any discriminatory act within the
scope of any of these subtitles, it shall so state its findings.  The
Commission thereupon shall issue and cause to be served upon
the respondent an order requiring the respondent to cease and
desist from the discriminatory acts and to take such affirmative
action as will effectuate the purpose of the particular subtitle.
(Emphasis added.)10
Expounding upon the term “affirmative action,” in Bulluck v. Pelham Wood Apartments, 283
Md. 505, 520, 390 A.2d 1119, 1127 (1978), we said that the term “affirmative action”
authorized the Commission to require an apartment complex “to initiate a program of tenant
11  The statute has since been amended by the General Assembly to authorize monetary
awards, including back pay.  Art. 49B § 11(e).
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recruitment designed to reach minorities” after the apartment complex was found to have
engaged in a discriminatory action in violation of § 14(e) of the Act.  
In Gutwein v. Easton Publishing Company, 272 Md. 563, 325 A.2d 740 (1974),
however, we held that the term “affirmative action” did not authorize the Commission to
order monetary awards for compensatory or other damages resulting from the discriminatory
practices.  Gutwein, 272 Md. at 575, 325 A.2d at 746.  Similar to the argument of the
Division here that the purpose of the surety bond is to provide financial recovery for victims
and protect future customers from fraud, it was argued in Gutwein that the purpose of the
monetary award was “to make whole victims of discrimination as well as insure against
future unlawful conduct.” Gutwein, 272 Md. at 568, 325 A.2d at 743.  We concluded that
based on “the Commission’s legislative background, the failure of [§ 13(e)] to specifically
authorize an award of compensatory damages, the unlikelihood of a legislative grant of
unbridled power to an administrative agency to make monetary awards without guidelines
or limitations, and the [state and federal cases cited in the opinion],” that the Commission
exceeded its statutory authority by awarding compensatory damages.11  Gutwein, 272 Md.
at 576 - 77, 325 A.2d at 747.   
Based on the cases discussed above, it is clear that the term “affirmative action” may
be used to justify a variety of actions taken by the Division when those actions are corrective
-15-
measures that address the specific violations that are the subject matter of the Division’s
Final Order.  See Consumer Publishing, 304 Md. 731, 501 A.2d 48; Outdoor World, 91 Md.
App. 275, 603 A.2d 1376; Bulluck, 283 Md. 505, 390 A.2d 1119.  It is equally clear,
however, that the term “affirmative action” will not justify all actions taken by the Division
simply because they are in furtherance of the purpose of the statute.  See Luskin’s, 353 Md.
335, 726 A.2d 702; Gutwein, 272 Md. 563, 325 A.2d 740.  When the interpretation of
“affirmative action” sought by the Division is not supported by the “relevant indicia of
statutory intent,” we will not uphold the Division’s interpretation.  See RTKL, 380 Md. at
678, 846 A.2d at 438 (noting that in interpreting ambiguous statutory language, “the
[language] can take its proper meaning only by reference to other relevant indicia of
legislative intent, the clearest and most pertinent evidence of which lies in other provisions
of the statute . . .”). 
According to the Division’s own assessment, the bond is designed to ensure future
compliance with the Act.  We agree with the Division that the requirement of posting a bond
is an action in furtherance of the purposes of the statute.  The bond will “assist the public in
obtaining relief from [unlawful consumer] practices, and . . . prevent these practices from
occurring in Maryland.”  See CL § 13-102(b)(3).  If read in isolation, the term “affirmative
action” may indeed justify the posting of a bond.  We do not, however, read ambiguous
statutory language in isolation.  Here, the express language of the statute provides the
Division a means of enforcing future compliance of its orders.  The Division may institute
12   In FTC v. Ruberoid, 343 U.S. 470, 72 S.Ct. 800, 96 L.Ed. 1081 (1952), in
interpreting the authority of the FTC to prevent illegal practices in the future, the Supreme
Court said:
If the Commission is to attain the objectives Congress
envisioned, it cannot be required to confine its road block to the
narrow lane the transgressor has traveled; it must be allowed
effectively to close all roads to the prohibited goal, so that its
order may not be by-passed with impunity. 
 343 U.S. at 473, 72 S.Ct. at 803, 96 L.Ed. at 1087.
13We need not address whether, in an action to enforce a cease and desist order, a
court would have authority under its general equitable power to require a violator of the cease
(continued...)
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other civil proceedings to restrain or enjoin continuing violations of its orders when a cease
and desist order proves to be ineffective in stopping the unfair and deceptive practice.  CL
§§ 13-403(b)(1), 13-403(c)(2), and 13-406; Outdoor World, 91 Md. App. at 289, 603 A.2d
at 1383 (“Sections 13-403 and 13-406 authorize the Attorney General to require violators of
the Consumer Protection Act to cease their violations and upon noncompliance, to seek an
injunction against continued violations.”).  Because the plain language of the statute
specifically addresses the steps to take in the case of noncompliance with the Act, we will
not strain for a reading of the statute that would permit the same result as one expressly
authorized.  To do so would constitute a violation of the rule of statutory construction which
requires that we “look first to the words of the statute . . . .”  RTKL, 380 Md. at 678, 846 A.2d
at 437.  The Division has broad authority to construct the roadblock necessary to “close all
roads to the prohibited goal,”12 it must do so, however, within the confines of the statutory
authorization which in this case requires intervention of the courts.13
13(...continued)
and desist order to post a bond.  But see CL § 13-406 which authorizes the Division to seek
injunctive relief in consumer protection cases.  See also § 13(b) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 53(b), which permits the FTC to seek a preliminary or, in
the proper case, permanent injunction when “a person, partnership, or corporation is
violating, or is about to violate any provision of law enforced by the [FTC].”  In a number
of federal consumer protection cases, § 13(b) has been construed to authorize the posting of
performance bonds as ancillary equitable relief.  See  FTC v. SlimAmerica, Inc., 77 F.Supp.2d
1263 (S.D.Fl. 1999);  FTC v. Wolf, 1996 WL 812940 (S.D.Fl. 1996); FTC v. Career
Assistance Planning, Inc., 1996 WL 929696 (N.D.Ga. 1996); FTC v. US Sales Corp., 785
F.Supp. 737 (N.D. Ill. 1992).  The authority to grant ancillary relief, including the
requirement of a performance bond, is derived from the court’s equity jurisdiction. 
In US Sales Corp., the court interpreted § 13(b) of the FTC Act, and held that the Act
authorizes a performance bond because
ancillary equitable relief is necessary to accomplish complete
justice in this case. Merely prohibiting the advertisements
discussed in this opinion is insufficient, especially considering
Defendants’ contemptuous behavior in violating the Preliminary
Injunction Order.  Ancillary equitable relief will be necessary to
effectuate enforcement of Section 5 of the FTC Act and to deter
future violations by these Defendants.
The court concludes therefore that the permanent injunction
should require Defendants to obtain a performance bond for any
future sales of credit card or auction information.
US Sales Corp., 785 F.Supp. at 753.
  In SlimAmerica, the defendants engaged in deceptive practices in connection with
the sale of ineffective weight-loss products.   The court ordered ancillary equitable relief in
the form of a requirement that the defendants post a performance bond before engaging in
any business related to weight-loss specifically and telemarketing in general.  SlimAmerica,
77 F.Supp.2d at 1276.  The court noted that “ancillary equitable relief is necessary to protect
consumers and ensure that the defendants do not perpetrate new frauds.” Id.  Accordingly,
the court concluded, “that a performance bond requirement is an appropriate remedy to 
(continued...)
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13(...continued)
protect consumers and prevent defendants from engaging in further deceptive practices.”  Id.
 
In Wolf, the defendants violated the FTC Act by employing deceptive telemarketing
techniques in connection with a scheme that promised substantial returns on business
opportunities offered by the defendants. Wolf, 1996 WL 812940 at 1.  After noting that
“[b]road injunctive provisions are often necessary to prevent transgressors from violating the
law in a new guise,” the court ordered the defendants to post a $5,000,000 performance bond
before engaging in any form of telemarketing. Wolf, 1996 WL 812940 at 8-9.  The court
concluded that “[t]he telemarketing skills mastered by the defendants make it imperative that
the public be protected from future exploits by them.”  Wolf, 1996 WL 812940 at 9.
And in Career Assistance Planning, the defendants violated the FTC Act by failing
to deliver promised college scholarship information, misrepresenting the success rate of its
customers, and using credit card information without authorization.  Career Assistance
Planning, 1996 WL 929696 at 1-2.  The court concluded that the FTC was entitled to all
ancillary relief it sought, including the requirement that the defendants post a performance
bond before engaging in telemarketing sales in the future.  Career Assistance Planning, 1996
WL 929696 at 4.  The court agreed with the FTC that “in light of the [defendants’] proven
propensity to engage in fraud and to refuse cooperation with law enforcement authorities,”
the posting of a performance bond was warranted.  Id.
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The Consumer Protection Division and the Attorney General of Maryland, like the
Federal Trade Commission, clearly have a mandate “to protect the consumer” from
“deceptive practices.”  See CL § 13-102; Consumer Publishing, 304 Md. at 765, 501 A.2d
at 66.  Not unlike the FTC which has “wide discretion in its choice of a remedy deemed
adequate to cope with the unlawful practice disclosed,” (Ruberoid, 343 U.S. at 473, 72 S.Ct.
at 803, 96 L.Ed. at 1087 (internal citation omitted)), the Maryland Consumer Protection
Division also has “broad powers to enforce and interpret the Consumer Protection Act.”
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Consumer Publishing, 304 Md. at 745, 501 A.2d at 55.  Those broad powers, however, must
fit within the statutory scheme established by the General Assembly.
Financial Disclosures
The “Restitution” section of the Division’s Final Order provides that within 30 days
of the date of the Final Order, George must pay the Division $32,510.92, to be placed in an
account for the payment of restitution to consumers.  A mechanism for determining
individual consumer claims is also set forth in the Order.  Additionally, if the $32,510.92
proves to be insufficient for satisfying claims against George, the Division is  required to
notify him of any necessary additional sums.  George would then have 14 days to comply by
submitting the additional funds.  The two provisions of the restitution section in question on
this appeal state:
31.
[George] shall, within forty-five (45) days of the date of
this Final Order, provide the [Division] with a complete
listing of all of his assets and sources of income.  The
listing shall cover all assets in which [George] has any
interest whatsoever.  The listing shall fully identify any
banks or similar institutions in which [George] has
deposited money or other assets.
32.
[George] shall, within forty-five (45) days of the date of
this Order, provide the [Division] with a complete listing
of all transfers of assets he has made within the past two
(2) years and of all payments he has made to anybody in
the amount of $1,000 or more within the past two (2)
years.
The trial court reversed the Final Order regarding the two provisions mentioned
above, stating that
14 The Division subsequently obtained an Order of Judgment against George in the
amount of $111,867.92 on March 12, 2004.
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[t]he statute does not give that authority; the Division can point
to no specific case law interpreting any part of the State or
Federal consumer protection statutes as giving this authority and
no case law interpretation can be strained or bent to say the
authority exists.  As a follow through, the Division points to
Rule 2-633 allowing a creditor to take steps in aid to enforce a
judgment.  Simply stated, the Division does not yet have a
judgment.14  
The Division, on the other hand, contends that the authority to require the disclosure
is encompassed in CL §§ 13-403(b)(1) and 13-410 which authorize the Division to order
restitution and civil penalties.  As previously noted, George  has been ordered to pay
$32,510.90 in restitution and $75,000 in civil penalties.  The disclosure provisions, according
to the Division, are designed to facilitate the payment of the money owed by George. It
contends that, “[r]equiring George to provide [the financial] information was a reasonable
exercise of the [Division’s] authority to order affirmative action, including the payment of
restitution . . . and fulfill the General Assembly’s stated purpose of ‘assisting the public in
obtaining relief from these [unlawful] practices’.”
There is no doubt that the Division may order an alleged violator to pay restitution if,
based on a preponderance of the evidence, the Division determines the alleged violator
violated the Act.  CL § 13-403(b)(1).  The Division may also assess civil penalties, not to
exceed $1,000 per violation of the Act, for first time offenders, (CL § 13-410(a)), and not
more than $5,000 per subsequent violation.  CL § 13-410(b).  The question is whether the
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Division’s authority to assess penalties encompasses the authority to enforce the penalties
through the disclosure of financial information as a requirement in a cease and desist order.
We hold that it does not.
We have held that an order of restitution pursuant to the Act is intended to divest a
violator of “‘benefits it would be unjust for him to keep.’”  Luskin’s Inc. v. Consumer
Protection Division, 353 Md. 335, 383, 726 A.2d 702, 726 (1999) (discussing the purpose
of restitution verses damages and finding that an order of restitution is “‘not aimed at
compensating the plaintiff but at forcing the defendant to disgorge benefits it would be unjust
for him to keep.’”) (quoting Consumer Publishing, 304 Md. at 776, 501 A.2d at 71);   State
v. Andrew, 73 Md. App. 80, 89 n. 7, 533 A.2d 282, 287 n. 7 (1987) (“To permit the [retention
of] even a portion of the illicit profits would impair the full impact of the deterrent force that
is essential if adequate enforcement [of the law] is to be achieved.”) (quoting Consumer
Publishing).  To this end the General Assembly has expressly authorized the Division to
apply to a court for an “order of judgment necessary to restore to a person any money or real
personal property acquired from him by means of any prohibited practice.”  CL § 13-406(c).
In this case, the order of restitution represents money George took from consumers
in violation of the Act.  Clearly, it would be unjust for George to continue to profit from his
behavior by eluding the restitution order.  The proper procedure for preventing this outcome,
according to the express language of the statute, is for the Division to obtain a judgment.
Armed with a money judgment, the Division could obtain information to aid in its
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enforcement of the judgment.  See Md. Rule 2-633(a) (Circuit Court) (“A judgment creditor
may obtain discovery to aid enforcement of a money judgment (1) by use of depositions,
interrogatories, and request for documents.”); Md. Rule 3-633(a) (District Court) (“A
judgment creditor may obtain discovery to aid enforcement of a money judgment (1) by use
of interrogatories pursuant to Rule 3-421.”).  
On March 12, 2004, the Division obtained a judgment against George in the amount
of $111,867.92.  Pursuant to the above mentioned rules the Division is in the position to
enforce the judgment.  The Division erred by seeking the information prior to receiving an
order of judgment from a court of appropriate jurisdiction.
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
CIRCUIT
COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY
AFFIRMED W ITH COSTS.