Title: McCormick v. Alabama Power Company

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

306 So. 2d 233 (1975)
Cherry Ann McCORMICK
v.
ALABAMA POWER COMPANY.
SC 755.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
January 9, 1975.
*234 Cunningham, Bounds & Byrd, Mobile, for appellant.
Balch, Bingham, Baker, Hawthorne, Williams & Ward, James O. Spencer, Jr., Birmingham, and J. B. Blackburn, Bay Minette, for appellee.
BLOODWORTH, Justice.
The appellant (plaintiff below), Cherry Ann McCormick, obtained a jury verdict for $30,000.00 in the Circuit Court of Baldwin County against appellee (defendant below), Alabama Power Company. Judgment was entered in accordance with the verdict. The defendant Alabama Power Company then moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a new trial, alleging, inter alia, that the amount of the verdict was excessive and unjust. After a hearing thereon, the trial judge entered the following order:
"MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR A NEW TRIAL, GRANTED
[For the facts of this derivative suit, see Alabama Power Company v. Taylor (1975), 293 Ala. 484, 306 So. 2d 236.]
The sole issue dispositive of this appeal is whether, absent the consent of the plaintiff, the trial judge possessed the power to enter a judgment for an amount less than that awarded by the jury. We think not and reverse and remand this cause.
Appellant McCormick contends that the order of the trial judge is contrary to the provisions of Rule 59(f), A.R.C.P., which provides:
and, that a "forced remittitur is violative of a plaintiff's right to trial by jury."
Appellee Alabama Power Company appears to argue that, under Rule 59(f), A. R.C.P., and the more modern view taken by *235 the federal courts, a plaintiff's consent is not a condition precedent to the entry of a remittitur inasmuch as, contrary to former procedure, a plaintiff can now appeal a remittitur even if he accepts the same.
We cannot agree with appellee. In cases decided before the adoption of the new rules of civil procedure, this Court, as well as the then Court of Appeals, has held:
The federal decisions construing Rule 59, F.R.Civ.P., reach the same conclusion. These decisions may be summarized as follows:
It may be noted that Rule 59(f) "Remittitur," A.R.C.P. is not found in Rule 59, F.R.C.P. Lyons, Alabama Practice, Rules of Civil Procedure Annotated, § 59.6. Although no reason is given in the "Committee Comments" as to why subsection (f) was added to Rule 59, it would appear that it was to clearly establish the rule that acceptance of a remittitur does not prejudice the plaintiff's raising, on appeal by defendant, the right to have the original verdict reinstated in the full amount, in contradistinction to the former Alabama case law.
It is thus we conclude that, under our Rule 59(f), a remittitur gives the plaintiff a choice. He can accept the remittitur or he can refuse to accept the remittitur *236 and suffer a new trial. If he accepts the remittitur, and defendant appeals, he is not prejudiced in his right to raise the issue that the verdict should be reinstated in the full amount. Rule 59(f), A.R. C.P.; see also Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil, § 2815, p. 105. However, the trial judge cannot enter a judgment for an amount less than that awarded by the jury, absent consent of plaintiff by way of remittitur under Rule 59(f), in light of the issues and evidence here.[1]
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded for entry of a judgment on motion for new trial in conformity with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
HEFLIN, C. J., and MERRILL, COLEMAN, HARWOOD, MADDOX, FAULKNER and JONES, JJ., concur.
[1]  See 11 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil, § 2815, p. 99.