Title: Darrar v. Bourke

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Darrar v. Bourke1996 WY 14910 P.2d 572Case Number: 95-92, 95-98Decided: 01/29/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming

Judith Ann DARRAR and Dickson 
Darrar, Husband and Wife, Petitioners,

v. 

Michael BOURKE; Michael Wyatt; 
and

 the City 
of Sheridan, a Municipal Corporation, Respondents. 

The 
CITY OF SHERIDAN, Petitioner, 

v. 

Judith Ann DARRAR and Dickson Darrar, Husband and 
Wife, Respondents.

 

On Petition for Writ of Review from the District 
Court of Sheridan County; John C. Brackley, Judge.

Michael K. Shoumaker of Northern Wyoming Law 
Associates, Sheridan, for Judith Ann Darrar and Dickson 
Darrar.

John R. Perry of Goddard, Perry & Vogel, 
Buffalo, for Michael Bourke and Michael Wyatt.

Debra J. Wendtland of Connor & 
Wendtland; and Robert W. Connor, Jr., City Attorney, Sheridan, for City of 
Sheridan.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, 
TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Chief Justice.

[¶1]      Judith Ann Darrar 
(Darrar) and her husband,1 Dickson 
Darrar, appeal the district court's decision to dismiss their negligence claims, 
filed pursuant to the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, against Michael Bourke 
and Michael Wyatt (officers). The district court determined the officers were 
entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed the claims against the officers. 
The City of Sheridan (Sheridan) appeals the district court's refusal to dismiss 
Darrar's claims against it. The two appeals were consolidated for purposes of 
briefing and oral argument.

[¶2]      We affirm the 
district court's refusal to dismiss the claims against Sheridan and reverse the 
order to dismiss the claims against the officers.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Darrar presents 
the following issues:

1. Is the claim of 
Judith Darrar and Dickson Darrar against police officers Michael Bourke and 
Michael Wyatt barred by qualified immunity?

2. If the police 
officers are given qualified immunity, must the claim of the plaintiffs against 
the City of Sheridan also be dismissed?

[¶4]      The officers 
present a single issue for review:

Did the trial court 
properly rule that Officers Bourke and Wyatt were protected by qualified 
immunity?

[¶5]      Finally, the City 
of Sheridan presents these issues:

I: Are Defendants 
Bourke and Wyatt entitled to qualified immunity?

II: Does the City 
have a duty of indemnity once the officers have been declared immune? 

III: What is the 
effect of W.S. § 1-39-104?

FACTS

[¶6]      On April 8, 1992, 
the officers, while employed as police officers for the City of Sheridan, 
encountered Danny Welch in Sheridan, Wyoming. Welch had been drinking alcoholic 
beverages and appeared to be emotionally upset and disturbed when the officers 
questioned him. Welch asked the officers for a ride and a place to stay because 
he had just been released from prison and did not have a place to stay in 
Sheridan.

[¶7]      One of the 
officers transported Welch to the police station, allowing Welch to call a 
friend for a ride and a place to stay. When Welch was unable to contact his 
friend, one of the officers directed a police dispatcher to call a taxicab for 
Welch. The dispatcher requested cab service at the police station to take an 
unnamed individual (Welch) out past the Skyline Drive-In. Within a short time 
Darrar arrived at the police station in her taxicab in response to the 
request.

[¶8]      The officers did 
not advise Darrar that Welch was a convicted felon, recently released from 
prison, that he had been drinking and exhibiting signs of emotional distress, or 
that they had been unable to confirm the identity or location of the person to 
whose home Welch stated he wished to go. Darrar picked Welch up at the police 
station, Welch's requested destination never materialized and Welch subsequently 
kidnapped and raped Darrar.

[¶9]      Darrar filed a 
tort action against the officers and Sheridan, based on the waiver of immunity 
for tortious acts of peace officers found in WYO. STAT. § 1-39-112 (1988) of the 
Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. Darrar claimed the officers were police 
officers for the City of Sheridan and were acting within the scope of their 
duties as police officers when they committed the negligent acts which resulted 
in Darrar's kidnapping and rape. Specifically, Darrar 
claimed:

20. That Officers 
Wyatt and Bourke were aware of the fact that Danny Welch was dangerous to Judith 
Darrar and that he was a threat to her well being because:

1. Each officer 
knew that Danny Welch had exhibited a propensity for violence in the 
past;

2. The officers 
knew Danny Welch had been drinking;

3. The officers 
knew Danny Welch was emotionally disturbed that night;

4. The officers 
should have been suspicious and concerned about sending a female cab driver to a 
supposed address that could not be located, had no listed telephone and whose 
very existence they failed to confirm.

21. That on April 
8, 1992, the Defendants had a custodial relationship with Mr. Welch as a result 
of investigating him, placing him in the police car and transporting him to the 
Sheridan Police Station.

22. That at the 
time of these events there existed a special relationship between Judith Darrar 
and the Defendants since they summoned the cab to the police station placing her 
at risk.

23. That the 
Defendants were negligent in failing to arrest Danny Welch for drinking alcohol 
while on parole from prison and a minor.

24. That the 
Defendants were negligent in failing to check and confirm the supposed 
destination of Danny Welch.

25. That the 
Defendants were negligent in failing to warn Mrs. Darrar that the person they 
summoned her to carry had a history of violence, had been drinking and was 
disturbed emotionally.

26. The negligence 
of the Defendants set in motion the special forces which allowed Danny Welch to 
commit his crimes and offenses against the Plaintiffs 
[Darrars].

[¶10]   The officers responded to Darrar's 
amended complaint with a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. Sheridan 
answered Darrar's complaint, denying, among other things, that the officers were 
acting within the scope of their duties2 and 
asserting governmental immunity and qualified immunity. Sheridan also claimed 
Darrar failed to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted and 
that Darrar was more negligent than Sheridan. After briefing and a hearing on 
the officers' motion, the district court dismissed Darrar's tort claims against 
the officers based on qualified immunity. Sheridan filed a motion to dismiss, 
arguing that if the officers were not liable, then Sheridan also escapes 
liability. The district court refused to dismiss Darrar's claim against Sheridan 
based on the waiver of immunity in the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. Darrar 
and Sheridan appeal from those decisions.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶11]   Stating the officers were entitled 
to qualified immunity and were immune from suit, the district court granted the 
officers' motion to dismiss. In Cranston v. Weston County Weed & Pest Board, 
we reiterated our oftcited standard of review of a trial court's order 
dismissing a complaint:

According to our 
standard of review we will sustain a dismissal of a complaint only if it shows 
on its face that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief under any set of 
facts. In considering such a motion, the "facts alleged in the complaint are 
admitted and the allegations must be viewed in the light most favorable to 
plaintiffs." Dismissal is a drastic remedy, and is sparingly 
granted.

Cranston v. Weston County Weed & Pest 
Bd., 826 P.2d 251, 254-55 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting Matter of Paternity of JRW, 814 P.2d 1256, 1259 (Wyo. 1991) (citations omitted)).

[¶12]   WYO.R.CIV.P. 8 provides that a 
generalized statement of facts is sufficient in a complaint. A plaintiff should 
have the opportunity to litigate a claim on its merits. Torrey v. Twiford, 713 P.2d 1160, 1165-66 (Wyo. 1986). WYO.R.CIV.P. 9(b) provides that malice, intent, 
or knowledge of a person may be averred generally, only fraud and mistake must 
be stated with particularity. Torrey, 713 P.2d  at 1166. Therefore, we must 
determine whether it appears beyond doubt that no set of facts in support of 
Darrar's claim would entitle her to relief. Id. (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 102, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957)).

Another reason that 
a litigant should usually have the opportunity to develop his claim beyond the 
complaint is that of judicial economy and expense to the parties if the appeals 
court reverses the dismissal. "* * * [A] motion to dismiss [is not] the only 
effective procedural implement for the expeditious handling of legal 
controversies. Pretrial conference; the discovery procedures; and motions for a 
more definite statement, judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment, all 
provide useful tools for the sifting of allegations and the determination of the 
legal sufficiency of an asserted claim. The salvaged minutes that may accrue 
from circumventing these procedures can turn to wasted hours if the appellate 
court feels constrained to reverse the dismissal of the action. * * * This is 
not to say or imply that a motion to dismiss should never be granted. It is 
obvious that there are cases which justify and indeed compel the granting of 
such motion. The line between the totally unmeritorious claims and the others 
cannot be drawn by scientific instruments but must be carved out case by case by 
the sound judgment of trial judges. That judgment should be exercised cautiously 
on such a motion." Rennie & Laughlin, Inc. v. Chrysler Corporation, 242 F.2d 208, 213 (9th Cir. 1957).

Torrey, 713 P.2d  at 
1166-67.

DISCUSSION

[¶13]   Historically, a peace officer was 
entitled to qualified immunity if, while acting within the scope of his duties, 
he performed his discretionary duties reasonably and in good faith. Blake v. 
Rupe, 651 P.2d 1096, 1107 (Wyo. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1208, 103 S. Ct. 1199, 75 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1983). "[C]ommon law has never granted police officers an 
absolute immunity." Id. (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 1218, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1967)). When considering whether a peace officer is 
entitled to qualified immunity, the district court must determine: 1) the 
officer was acting within the scope of his or her duties; 2) the officer was 
acting in good faith; 3) the officer's acts were reasonable under the 
circumstances; and 4) the officer's acts were discretionary duties and not 
merely operational or ministerial duties. See Oyler v. State, 618 P.2d 1042, 
1053 (Wyo. 1980); Blake, 651 P.2d  at 1110; Brown v. Avery, 850 P.2d 612, 617 
(Wyo. 1993) (Thomas, J., specially concurring) (quoting Kimbley v. City of Green 
River, 663 P.2d 871, 878 (Wyo. 1983)).

[¶14]   The terms "good faith," 
"reasonable," "ministerial" and "discretionary" were discussed by this court in 
the context of qualified immunity3 in Blake, 
Oyler, and DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643 (Wyo. 1986). The definitions in these 
cases instruct us in the case at bar. In Blake we defined "good faith" 
as:

being honest, 
lawful intent, and the condition of acting without knowledge of fraud and 
without interest to assist in fraudulent or otherwise unlawful scheme, together 
with the definition set out in Cone v. Ivinson, 4 Wyo. 203, 33 P. 31 
(1893):

"* * * `Good faith 
consists in an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious 
advantage of another, even though the forms or technicalities of law, together 
with an absence of all information or belief of facts which would render the 
transaction unconscientious.'"

Blake, 651 P.2d  at 1110 (citing Wendling v. 
Cundall, 568 P.2d 888, 890 (Wyo. 1977)).

[¶15]   We also noted in 
Blake:

While the term 
"reasonable" hardly needs defining, this court has undertaken to do so in 
Claussen v. State, 21 Wyo. 505, 516, 133 P. 1055, 1056 (1913), wherein it was 
explained from Webster "as having the faculty of reason; rational; governed by 
reason; being under the influence of reason; thinking, speaking, or acting 
rationally, or according to the dictates of reason; agreeable to reason; just; 
rational."

Blake, 651 P.2d  at 
1110.

[¶16]   In Oyler we stated a public 
official's duty is ministerial when:

". . . it is 
absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely the execution of a set task, 
and when the law which imposes it prescribes and defines the time, mode, and 
occasion of its performance with such certainty that nothing remains for 
judgment or discretion. More specifically, where the law imposes on the officer 
the performance of ministerial duties in which a private individual has a 
special, direct, and distinctive interest, the officer is liable to such 
individual for any injury which he may proximately sustain in consequence of the 
failure to perform the duty at all, or to perform it properly." (Footnote 
references omitted.) 67 C.J.S. Officers § 208, subsection c, "Ministerial Powers 
and Duties, p. 686.

Oyler, 618 P.2d  at 
1048-49.

[¶17]   Later, in DeWald, we held that 
"qualified immunity is available only with respect to executive policy 
functions." DeWald, 719 P.2d  at 649. These are the so-called "discretionary 
functions." Id. at 648.

[¶18]   Considering the requirements for 
qualified immunity and their definitions, cases involving the defense of 
qualified immunity should rarely be disposed of by a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. 
Patton v. Black, 646 So. 2d 8, 10 (Ala. 1994); 2A JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE ¶ 12.07 at 12-69, n. 22 (2d ed. 1991) (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1974)). Such cases are often reversed 
and remanded for factual development because the record is inadequate to 
determine whether the public official is entitled to qualified immunity. See 
e.g., Oyler, 618 P.2d  at 1053; Cooney v. White, 845 P.2d 353, 369 (Wyo. 1992), 
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 60, 126 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1993); T.M. v. 
Noblitt, 650 So. 2d 1340, 1346 (Miss. 1995); Roe v. Hamilton County Dept. of 
Human Services, 53 Ohio App.3d 120, 560 N.E.2d 238, 243 (1988). Unlike absolute 
immunity, a determination that qualified immunity is generally available to 
peace officers is not sufficient to sustain a motion to dismiss. The defense of 
qualified immunity presents mixed questions of fact and law. These questions are 
better suited for resolution at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings 
after the facts are sufficiently developed. Noblitt, 650 So. 2d  at 
1346.

[¶19]   On the record before us,4 we cannot conclude the district court properly 
determined the officers were entitled to qualified immunity based on the facts 
alleged in Darrar's complaint. The district court's preliminary determination 
that qualified immunity is available to peace officers under the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act is not sufficient to sustain a motion to dismiss. It is 
one thing to say qualified immunity is available to peace officers under the 
Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. It is quite another to determine whether 
officers in a particular case are entitled to qualified immunity. "Police 
officers are not immune from liability if they negligently perform an 
operational duty such as driving a patrol car. A qualified immunity is available 
only with respect to executive policy functions." DeWald, 719 P.2d  at 649. It is 
conceivable that Darrar could prove a set of facts that would show the officers 
were performing a ministerial or an operational function or that they did not 
act reasonably under the circumstances. We cannot say based on the limited facts 
available that it appears beyond a doubt that Darrar can prove no set of facts 
in support of her claim which would entitle her to relief. Therefore, we must 
reverse and remand to allow for further development of the facts. Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act and Qualified Immunity.

[¶20]   In Kimbley v. City of Green River, 
663 P.2d 871 (Wyo. 1983), we held qualified immunity was still available to 
peace officers when sued pursuant to the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. In 
DeWald we limited the holding in Kimbley to discretionary acts of peace 
officers. Once we determined that driving a police car was an operational act, 
not a discretionary act, we applied negligence principles. DeWald, 719 P.2d  at 
649. The legislature amended the Act5 after our 
decisions in Kimbley and DeWald and had the opportunity to correct our decisions 
interpreting the Act, if we were in error. It did not. Therefore, we may assume 
that Kimbley and DeWald correctly interpreted legislative intent when they held 
that peace officers are entitled to qualified immunity under the Act. Harvey v. 
Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 53 Wyo. 495, 500-01, 84 P.2d 755, 757 
(1938).

[¶21]   Based on our decisions in Kimbley 
and DeWald, the district court properly determined qualified immunity is 
available to peace officers in spite of the waiver of immunity in the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act. However, peace officers have never been entitled to 
absolute immunity. Blake, 651 P.2d  at 1107. The district court's decision to 
grant the officers' motion to dismiss without considering facts necessary to 
determine whether the officers were entitled to qualified immunity was, as a 
practical matter, an improper grant of absolute immunity to the 
officers.

The City of 
Sheridan

[¶22]   In a Wyoming Governmental Claims 
Act tort case against a peace officer, if the officer was acting within the 
scope of his or her duties, the governmental entity must provide a defense for 
the officer and assume and pay any judgment entered against the officer. WYO. 
STAT. § 1-39-104(b), (c) (1988). If the court determines the officer is entitled 
to qualified immunity, then as a matter of law, the officer is not liable. If 
the officer is entitled to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity, the 
conduct of the officer is not tortious, and no vicarious liability exists on the 
part of the governmental entity. DeWald, 719 P.2d  at 655 (Thomas, C.J., 
specially concurring). If the trial court determines that the officer is not 
entitled to qualified immunity, the officer's conduct is subject to the general 
principles of tort law. DeWald, 719 P.2d  at 649; Keehn v. Town of Torrington, 
834 P.2d 112, 114 (Wyo. 1992). However, if the officer was acting within the 
scope of his or her duties and is not entitled to qualified immunity - because 
the conduct was malicious or fraudulent - the governmental entity still must 
defend and indemnify the officer. WYO. STAT. § 1-39-104(b) 
(1988).

[¶23]   The district court's denial of 
Sheridan's motion to dismiss is affirmed. Sheridan relied on the dismissal of 
the case against the officers in its argument for dismissal. We have reversed 
that dismissal; therefore, Sheridan's argument is no longer valid. However, we 
also direct Sheridan's attention to the plain language of WYO. STAT. § 1-39-112 
(1988):

A governmental 
entity is liable for damages resulting from tortious conduct of peace 
officers while acting within the scope of their duties.

(Emphasis added). The court need not 
expressly find liability against the governmental entity under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior as Sheridan contends, rather, the statute itself makes the 
entity liable. Abalos v. Bernalillo County D.A.'s Office, 105 N.M. 554, 734 P.2d 794, 799 (Ct.App. 1987), cert. quashed, 106 N.M. 35, 738 P.2d 907 (1987) (citing 
Gonzales v. State, 29 Cal. App. 3d 585, 105 Cal. Rptr. 804, 808 (1972)). Without a 
determination that the officers were not acting within the scope of their duties 
or that their conduct was not tortious, the governmental entity does not escape 
liability for the tortious acts of its peace officers. The district court could 
not make such a determination based on the allegations in the complaint and 
properly denied Sheridan's motion to dismiss.

CONCLUSION

[¶24]   Darrar's complaint sufficiently 
alleges a cause of action for negligence and alleges facts sufficient to bring 
the reasonableness and the function of the officers' acts into question. The 
order granting the officers' motion to dismiss was in error. We reverse that 
order and remand the case for a determination of whether the officers are 
entitled to the protection afforded by qualified immunity under the 
circumstances of this case. Because Sheridan's argument on appeal was based on 
the district court's dismissal of the claims against the officers, we affirm the 
district court's denial of Sheridan's motion to dismiss.

Footnotes

1 Dickson 
Darrar joins in his wife's complaint with claims for the lost care, comfort, 
advice and society of Mrs. Darrar as well as loss of consortium and loss of 
their cab company. For simplicity, we will refer to the Darrars' claims as the 
claims of Mrs. Darrar. However, this in no way detracts from the fact that both 
Darrars are parties to this action.

2 
Sheridan's answer presents a dilemma with the district court's decision to grant 
the officers' motion to dismiss at this stage in the proceedings. Sheridan's 
answer inserts an issue which could divest the officers of qualified immunity. 
If, during the proceedings against Sheridan, the court finds the officers were 
not acting within the scope of their duties. Sheridan will not be liable 
pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 1-39-104(b) (1988) of the Governmental Claims Act. 
Then, because the court already dismissed the officers, Darrar may have a claim 
without a defendant.

3 Darrar's 
complaint alleged the officers were acting within the scope of their duties. 
Although Sheridan's answer denied this allegation, we must accept the 
allegations of the complaint as true when reviewing the grant of a WYO.R.CIV.P. 
12(b)(6) dismissal. Therefore, we do not discuss the meaning of "within the 
scope of his or her duties" here. However, we do note that this is an important, 
preliminary issue which must be addressed when determining whether the officers 
are entitled to qualified immunity and when determining whether the governmental 
entity must defend and indemnify the officers pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 1-39-104 
(1988).

4 The 
district court did not issue a decision letter explaining the basis for its 
determination that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity and no 
transcript of the hearing was provided for review.

5 See 1986 
Wyo. Sess. Laws Ch. 19, § 1 (amended § 1-39-104(b) to provide that the 
governmental entity shall assume any judgment rendered against the public 
employee); 1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws Ch. 74, § 2 (amended term "law enforcement 
officer" to "peace officer" in Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-39-103 and -112); 1988 Wyo. Sess. 
Laws Ch. 45, § 1 (amended §§ 1-39-104, -110, -115 and -118).