Title: Hartmann v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DETLEF F. HARTMANN, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 4, 2011 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  Cr. ID 9912000027 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted:  February 25, 2011 
 
 
 
 
  Decided:  April 19, 2011 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and JACOBS, Justices 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 19th day of April 2011, upon consideration of the appellant’s opening 
brief, the State’s motion to affirm, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court 
that: 
 
(1) 
The appellant, Detlef Hartmann, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s order denying several motions Hartmann had filed in that court, including 
a motion for postconviction relief.  The State of Delaware has filed a motion to 
affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the face of 
Hartmann’s opening brief that his appeal is without merit.  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record reflects that Hartmann pled guilty in 2001 to one count of 
second degree unlawful sexual intercourse and two counts of unlawful sexual 
 
2
contact.  Hartmann’s victim was a male minor.1  The Superior Court sentenced 
him, effective December 1, 1999, to a total period of nineteen years at Level V 
incarceration, to be suspended after serving ten years for seven and a half years at 
decreasing levels of supervision.  Hartmann was designated a Tier III sex offender 
and was ordered to have no contact with minors, except for his biological children.  
Hartmann did not file a direct appeal from his sentence. 
 
(3) 
Hartmann is now serving the Level III probationary portion of his 
sentence.  On February 24, 2009, the State filed a motion for modification of that 
portion of Hartmann’s sentence relating to the no contact provision with minors.  
On March 20, 2009, the Superior Court modified that condition of Hartmann’s 
sentence to provide for no contact with any minor child, including “any biological 
child who has been adopted by another, following defendant’s termination of 
parental rights.”   Hartmann’s appeal from that modified sentence was dismissed as 
being untimely filed.2   
Hartmann then filed a series of motions, including a 
motion for postconviction relief.  The Superior Court denied all of his motions in 
an order dated December 22, 2010.  This appeal followed.   
 
(4) 
In his opening brief on appeal, Hartmann argues that the Superior 
Court erred by: (i) denying postconviction relief; (ii) denying the appointment of 
counsel to represent him; and (iii) denying his motion to remove a condition of his 
                                                 
1 Hartmann v. State, 2003 WL 1524623 (Del. Mar. 20, 2003). 
2 Hartmann v. State, 2009 WL 1474712 (Del. May 27, 2009). 
 
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probation prohibiting him from having internet access.  To the extent that 
Hartmann raised other issues in the Superior Court, those claims are deemed 
waived for his failure to brief them on appeal.3 
 
(5) 
We find no abuse of discretion in the Superior Court’s denial of 
postconviction relief.  In reviewing Hartmann’s motion for postconviction relief, it 
is unclear whether the issues he raised below challenged his criminal convictions 
in the Superior Court or the termination of his parental rights in the Family Court.  
To the extent he was challenging his 2001 guilty plea as fraudulent, his petition 
clearly was untimely and he failed to overcome that procedural hurdle.4  To the 
extent he was challenging the termination of his parental rights, such an issue is not 
within the Superior Court’s jurisdiction to review.5  To the extent he was 
challenging the Superior Court’s modification of the condition of his probation 
prohibiting him from having contact with any of his biological children for whom 
his parental rights had been terminated, we find no merit to that argument.  The 
Superior Court has broad discretion to impose reasonable probation conditions.6  
Once Hartmann’s parental rights to his children were terminated, it was entirely 
appropriate for the Superior Court to extend the no-contact provision of his 
probationary sentence to include those children. 
                                                 
3 Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993). 
4 See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1), (5) (2011).  
5 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 921 (1999) (setting forth exclusive original civil jurisdiction of the Family Court). 
6 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4204(m) (2007); Wyatt v. State, 498 A.2d 1088, 1089 (Del. 1985). 
 
4
 
(6) 
Hartmann next challenges the Superior Court’s denial of his request 
for the appointment of counsel.  There is no constitutional or statutory right to 
counsel in collateral criminal proceedings, however.7  We find no abuse of 
discretion in the Superior Court’s denial of Hartmann’s motion for appointment of 
counsel to review the conditions of his probation. 
 
(7) 
Finally, we find no abuse of the Superior Court’s discretion in 
restricting Hartmann’s access to the internet while on probation.  Hartmann had 
been charged with possessing child pornography and the victim of his assaults was 
a child.  The restriction on Hartmann’s internet access during his probationary term 
was a reasonable condition to ensure the safety of the public.8  While it may have 
constricted his access to the courts and hindered his ability to conduct legal 
research, his fundamental right to access the courts remains unfettered.9 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele_ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
                                                 
7 Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555-56 (1987). 
8 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4204(m) (2007). 
9 James v. State, 2007 WL 3034805 (Del. Oct. 17, 2007).