Title: Commonwealth v. Leslie

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12176 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  BOBBY LESLIE 
(and five companion cases1). 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 7, 2016. - May 9, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & 
Budd, JJ.2 
 
 
Firearms.  Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress.  
Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Privacy.  Search 
and Seizure, Multiple occupancy building, Curtilage, 
Expectation of privacy. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 16, 2014. 
 
 
Pretrial motions to suppress evidence were heard by Charles 
M. Hely, J. 
 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Hines, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court 
for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by her to 
the Appeals Court.  The Supreme Judicial Court granted an 
application for direct appellate review. 
 
 
                     
 
1 Two against Bobby Leslie and three against Lacy Price. 
 
 
2 Justice Botsford participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
 
Zachary Hillman, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Patrick Levin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
Bobby Leslie. 
 
MarySita Miles for Lacy Price. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  The defendants, Bobby Leslie and Lacy Price, 
were indicted on charges of unlawful possession of a sawed-off 
shotgun,3 G. L. c. 269, § 10 (c); unlawful possession of a loaded 
firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n); and possession of ammunition 
without a firearm identification card, G. L. c. 269, § 10 
(h) (1).4  The indictments arose from a May, 2014, warrantless 
search of the porch and side yard of a three-family home in the 
Dorchester section of Boston where the defendant Price resided.  
The search revealed a loaded sawed-off shotgun under the porch.  
Leslie was arrested at the scene, and after further 
investigation, Price was arrested.  A judge of the Superior 
Court allowed the defendants' motions to suppress the sawed-off 
shotgun on the ground that a warrant was required to search the 
area under the porch in light of Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 
                     
 
3 General Laws c. 140, § 121, defines a sawed-off shotgun as 
"any weapon made from a shotgun, whether by alteration, 
modification or otherwise, if such weapon as modified has one or 
more barrels less than [eighteen] inches in length or as 
modified has an overall length of less than [twenty-six] 
inches." 
 
 
4 Price was also indicted as a subsequent offender on the 
charge of unlawful possession of a firearm, G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (d). 
3 
 
 
1409, 1417 (2013), and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights. 
 
The Commonwealth filed a timely appeal from the allowance 
of the defendants' motions to suppress.  A single justice of 
this court granted leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal and 
reported the case to the Appeals Court.  We allowed the 
defendants' application for direct appellate review to clarify 
the application of the Jardines warrant requirement to a search 
in a multifamily home.  Following the analytical framework set 
out in Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414-1417, we conclude that the 
side yard of the defendant's multifamily home was a 
"constitutionally protected area," and that the intrusion into 
that area to search for a weapon implicated the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 14.  Because the warrantless intrusion 
into this constitutionally protected area was an unreasonable 
search that violated the defendants' Federal and State 
constitutional rights, we affirm the order allowing the 
defendants' motions to suppress. 
 
Background.  We recite the facts as found by the motion 
judge, "supplemented by evidence in the record that is 
uncontroverted and that was implicitly credited by the judge."  
Commonwealth v. Warren, 475 Mass. 530, 531 (2016), citing 
Commonwealth v. Melo, 472 Mass. 278, 286 (2015).  On May 29, 
4 
 
 
2014, around 2 P.M., Boston police Detective Daniel Griffin was 
working in the drug control unit5 as a plainclothes officer, 
driving an unmarked vehicle, in the neighborhood of Bowdoin 
Street and Geneva Avenue in Dorchester.  Based on information 
from Officer Eric Merner, another member of his unit, Detective 
Griffin began observing a group of four men walking down Everton 
Street from Olney Street, toward Geneva Avenue.  The men 
appeared "nervous."6  Once Detective Griffin realized that the 
men were approaching a certain residence on Everton Street 
(residence), he communicated to Officer Merner that the 
residence was a known location of gang associates and that the 
neighborhood in which the residence is located was a "hotspot" 
for shootings and firearms offenses.7 
                     
 
5 The unit consisted of a sergeant detective, Detective 
Daniel Griffin, and five other police officers. 
 
 
6 Although the men were described as looking "nervous," 
Detective Griffin did not see Leslie grab at his waist, which 
can indicate that an individual possesses a firearm without a 
holster, but he noted that Leslie swiveled his head in a 
surveillance-conscious manner while walking towards a certain 
residence on Everton Street. 
 
 
7 Detective Griffin was familiar with that neighborhood of 
Dorchester, and specifically with Everton Street, from his 
experience in the youth violence strike force and the drug 
control unit.  He had arrested an individual with a firearm on 
the front porch of the residence sometime in the previous five 
years, but could not recall the date more specifically.  
Additionally, Detective Griffin had previously made other 
arrests in that neighborhood and on Everton Street.  However, 
neither defendant was present during the previous arrest at the 
residence and none of the men present at the residence on May 
5 
 
 
 
The property at the residence, which is a three-family 
home, was fenced in on the front and left side.  A chain link 
fence, with an attached gate at the walkway leading to the 
sidewalk, ran across the edge of the front yard.  A tall wooden 
fence ran along the left side8 of the lot, five to six feet from 
the side of the porch and the house.  The left-side porch area 
was blocked by a large, blue recycling bin, which obstructed the 
view of the area from Everton Street. 
 
After repositioning his vehicle down from and opposite the 
residence,9 Detective Griffin observed the four men, including 
Leslie, enter the front gate of the residence and meet a fifth 
man, Price, on the porch.  Approximately five minutes after the 
men arrived, Leslie walked off the front porch, swiveling his 
head from side to side in a surveillance-conscious manner, 
toward the left side of the front yard to the side porch area.  
Although Detective Griffin's view was obstructed by the 
recycling bin, two trees, and some motor vehicles, he was able 
                                                                  
29, 2014, was known to Detective Griffin or the other officers 
present. 
 
 
8 The fence was on the left side of the property from a 
vantage point of facing the front of the home. 
 
 
9 Everton Street is a one-way street running from Olney 
Street to Geneva Avenue.  Detective Griffin initially observed 
the residence from the right side of Everton Street directly 
across from the residence.  However, to avoid detection, he 
drove around the block and parked on the right side of Everton 
Street, about four houses away.  He estimated the trip around 
the block took him about ten seconds. 
6 
 
 
to observe Leslie crouch down and appear to manipulate something 
under the side porch.  Detective Griffin could not see what 
object Leslie was manipulating.  Based on Detective Griffin's 
experience with one hundred or more prior firearm arrests, 
Leslie's crouching down and swiveling his head more rapidly as 
he approached the side porch area were consistent with an 
individual who illegally possessed a firearm. 
 
Next, Detective Griffin observed Price walk over to the 
side porch area as Leslie had done previously, also swiveling 
his head in a surveillance-conscious manner, bending down, 
looking under the porch, and then returning to the group on the 
front porch.  Detective Griffin observed Leslie return to the 
side porch area two more times, each time swiveling his head as 
before, bending down, and manipulating something on the ground.  
On Leslie's third trip to the area, as he stood back up after 
having bent down, he made a distinctive gesture that Detective 
Griffin described as imitating the firing of a shotgun or rifle 
in the air.  Leslie raised his hands and forearms near his 
shoulders, with one hand near the trigger area, as he simulated 
recoil. 
 
From these observations, Detective Griffin suspected that a 
firearm was hidden under the left-side porch area.  He was aware 
from his experience as a police officer that individuals often 
place illegal firearms nearby but not on one's person, for easy 
7 
 
 
access.  Detective Griffin then contacted the other members of 
his unit and members of the youth violence strike force for 
assistance.  The officers intended to approach the men at the 
residence to conduct field interrogation observations to "see 
what [the men] were up to."10 
 
The officers, seven in total, walked through the front gate 
at the walkway and proceeded to the front porch.  Detective 
Griffin could not recall whether the gate was open, but it was 
not locked.  The officers approached the men on the porch and 
began to engage them in conversation.  Detective Griffin, 
however, veered off the walkway and walked to the left side of 
the yard, where Leslie and Price previously had gone.  He saw a 
sawed-off shotgun on the ground under the porch.  The wooden 
handle of the shotgun protruded out from under the porch.  
Although the shotgun was not visible from the street or from the 
gate near the sidewalk, it was plainly visible if one were 
present in the left side of the yard and walked behind the 
recycling bin. 
 
Detective Griffin immediately notified the other officers 
of the presence of the sawed-off shotgun, and Leslie was placed 
                     
 
10 "A 'field interrogation observation' . . . has been 
described as an interaction in which a police officer identifies 
an individual and finds out that person's business for being in 
a particular area."  Commonwealth v. Warren, 475 Mass. 530, 532 
n.5 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Lyles, 453 Mass. 811, 813 
n.6 (2009). 
8 
 
 
under arrest after officers determined that he did not have a 
firearm identification card.11  The officers obtained identifying 
information from the other men on the porch, and following 
further investigation, Price was also arrested in connection 
with the weapon.  Subsequently, the officers learned that Price 
lived at the residence in the second-floor apartment,12 but 
Leslie was not a resident. 
 
Discussion.  The judge allowed the motions to suppress, 
ruling that the search was governed by Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 
1417-1418, in which the United States Supreme Court held that a 
warrantless search of the front porch of a single-family home 
with a drug-sniffing dog violated the Fourth Amendment.  The 
Court reasoned that the porch was part of the curtilage to which 
the police could lawfully approach but that in bringing a drug-
sniffing dog, the police exceeded the scope of their implied 
license to enter the defendant's property.  The judge recognized 
that Jardines involved a single-family home, but he concluded 
that Price (and by extension Leslie) had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the side yard of the small three-
family home where the search occurred.  The intrusion into the 
side yard to search for a suspected hidden weapon was no 
                     
 
11 When Leslie was asked whether he had a license to carry a 
firearm he answered, "For what?  I don't have a gun on me." 
 
 
12 Nothing in the record establishes whether Price owned the 
residence or whether he resided there as a tenant. 
9 
 
 
different from bringing a drug-sniffing dog to the front porch 
of a single-family home.  Thus, the search required a warrant. 
 
The Commonwealth claims error in the judge's order, arguing 
that because Jardines does not apply to a multifamily home, the 
motion properly could be granted only if the defendants 
established that Price had either exclusive control over the 
home or a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area 
searched.  The Commonwealth also argues that even if the 
intrusion into the side yard was a search of a constitutionally 
protected area, the judge erred in finding that the police 
lacked probable cause and exigent circumstances to justify the 
search.  We address these arguments in turn. 
 
1.  Standard of review.  "In reviewing a ruling on a motion 
to suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact 
absent clear error . . . ."  Commonwealth v. Fernandez, 458 
Mass. 137, 142 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Scott, 440 Mass. 
642, 646 (2004).  "However, '[w]e review independently the 
application of constitutional principles to the facts found.'"  
Warren, 475 Mass. at 534, quoting Commonwealth v. Wilson, 441 
Mass. 390, 393 (2004).  Where, as here, the issue is whether a 
search occurred within the curtilage of a home, "we undertake 
our independent review cognizant that there is no 'finely tuned 
formula' that demarcates the curtilage in a given case."  
10 
 
 
Fernandez, supra, quoting United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 
301 (1987). 
 
2.  The entry into the side yard.  As a threshold matter, 
we briefly address the issue of standing.  "When a defendant is 
charged with a crime in which possession of the seized evidence 
at the time of the contested search is an essential element of 
guilt, the defendant shall be deemed to have standing to contest 
the legality of the search and the seizure of that evidence."  
Commonwealth v. Amendola, 406 Mass. 592, 601 (1990).  Here, the 
defendants were charged with possession of a sawed-off shotgun 
and ammunition.  Therefore, they have standing to challenge the 
legality of the search and seizure.  The Commonwealth argues 
that even if the defendants have automatic standing, they cannot 
meet their burden to show that a search in the constitutional 
sense occurred. 
 
In considering application of Jardines to a multifamily 
home, we begin with the observation that the Court's holding 
does not rest on the fact that the property was a single-family 
home.  Rather, the warrant requirement followed from the Court's 
determination that the police entry onto the porch of the home 
with a drug-sniffing dog was an unlicensed "physical intrusion 
[into] a constitutionally protected area."  Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 
at 1414, quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 
(1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).  We interpret 
11 
 
 
the Jardines holding as a clarification of the appropriate 
framework for the analysis of the applicability of the Fourth 
Amendment protection against an unreasonable search rather than 
a pronouncement limited only to single-family homes.  Thus, we 
decline to limit Jardines' holding to single-family homes or to 
fashion a rule categorically excluding areas associated with 
multifamily homes as curtilage and thus placing them beyond the 
reach of the protections of the Fourth Amendment and art. 14. 
 
We agree also that "[d]istinguishing Jardines based on the 
differences between the front porch of a stand-alone house and 
the closed hallways of an apartment building draws arbitrary 
lines."  United States v. Whitaker, 820 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 
2016).  Moreover, "a strict apartment versus single-family house 
distinction is troubling because it would apportion Fourth 
Amendment protections on grounds that correlate with income, 
race, and ethnicity."  Id.  Thus, we reject the Commonwealth's 
argument that in cases involving a search in a multifamily home, 
the validity of the search turns on the defendant's exclusive 
control or expectation of privacy in the area searched.  The 
teaching of Jardines is that when the search is in or about a 
person's home, the essential question is whether the area 
searched is within the home or its curtilage. 
 
In Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414, the Court refocused the 
analysis of "constitutionally protected area" to emphasize the 
12 
 
 
words of the Fourth Amendment, noting that "[t]he Fourth 
Amendment 'indicates with some precision the places and things 
encompassed by its protections':  persons, houses, papers, and 
effects."  Id., quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 
176 (1984).  Among the traditional property interests expressly 
protected by the Fourth Amendment, "the home is first among 
equals."  Jardines, supra.  Accordingly, Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence has developed to accommodate a home's place in the 
hierarchy of protected interests.  It regards "the area 
'immediately surrounding and associated with the home' -- what 
our cases call the curtilage -- as 'part of the home itself for 
Fourth Amendment purposes.'"  Id., quoting Oliver, supra at 180.  
And "[t]he front porch is the classic exemplar of an area 
adjacent to the home and 'to which the activity of home life 
extends.'"  Jardines, supra at 1415, quoting Oliver, supra at 
182 n.12.  Indeed, the "right [to be free of unreasonable 
government intrusion] would be of little practical value if the 
State's agents could stand in a home's porch or side garden and 
trawl for evidence with impunity."  Jardines, supra at 1414.  
Thus, the essential question here is whether the side yard of 
the home was within the curtilage of the defendant's home.  If 
so, the police intrusion constituted a search requiring a 
warrant. 
13 
 
 
 
In the years since Jardines, the Supreme Court has not 
directly addressed whether porches and side yards of a 
multifamily home are within the constitutionally protected 
curtilage.  However, the United States Courts of Appeals 
overwhelmingly have applied the four-factor test announced in 
Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301, to determine whether, in the multifamily 
home and apartment context, a particularly described area is 
curtilage.  See, e.g., United States v. Hopkins, 824 F.3d 726, 
731 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 522 (2016); United 
States v. Sweeney, 821 F.3d 893, 901 (7th Cir. 2016); United 
States v. Burston, 806 F.3d 1123, 1127 (8th Cir. 2015); United 
States v. Jackson, 728 F.3d 367, 373 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 1347 (2014).  Therefore, we rely on these 
cases for guidance in our analysis whether the side yard of the 
defendant Price's multifamily home was within the curtilage and 
apply the Dunn factors in resolving this issue.  Dunn, 480 U.S. 
at 301. 
 
In Dunn, the Supreme Court introduced a four-factor test to 
determine whether an area searched was within the home's 
curtilage:  (i) "the proximity of the area claimed to be 
curtilage to the home"; (ii) "whether the area is included 
within an enclosure surrounding the home"; (iii) "the nature of 
the uses to which the area is put"; and (iv) "the steps taken by 
the resident to protect the area from observation by people 
14 
 
 
passing by."  Id.  The Court cautioned, however, that "combining 
these factors [does not] produce[] a finely tuned formula that, 
when mechanically applied, yields a 'correct' answer to all 
extent-of-curtilage questions."  Id.  Instead, "these factors 
are useful analytical tools only to the degree that, in any 
given case, they bear upon the centrally relevant consideration 
-- whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the 
home itself that it should be placed under the home's 'umbrella' 
of Fourth Amendment protection."  Id.  Application of the Dunn 
factors to the facts found here supports the judge's conclusion 
that the porch and side yard of the residence were within the 
curtilage.  See Fernandez, 458 Mass. at 144-145. 
 
a.  Application of the Dunn factors.  i.  Proximity.  The 
porch was physically connected to the home itself, and as the 
Court in Jardines noted, "[t]he front porch is the classic 
exemplar of an area adjacent to the home and 'to which the 
activity of home life extends.'"  Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415, 
quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 n.12.  Although the sawed-off 
shotgun was found under the porch area, the side yard was very 
close in proximity to the porch and, by extension, the house.  
This factor weighs in favor of a determination that the porch 
and side yard were part of the home's curtilage. 
 
ii.  Enclosure.  The front yard was enclosed with a chain 
link fence and the left border of the front yard was enclosed 
15 
 
 
with a large wooden fence about five to six feet away from the 
porch where the sawed-off shotgun was recovered.  Additionally, 
the chain link fence enclosed both the house and the porch area, 
allowing the inference that the porch and side yard "should be 
treated as an adjunct to the house."  Dunn, 480 U.S. at 302.  As 
the Supreme Court noted in both Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 n.12, 
and Dunn, supra, "for most homes, the boundaries of the 
curtilage will be clearly marked; and the conception defining 
the curtilage -- as the area around the home to which the 
activity of home life extends -- is a familiar one easily 
understood from our daily experience." 
 
iii.  Nature of use.  The record reflects that the 
defendants were using the porch as an extension of Price's home.  
Price waited for his guests on the porch as they arrived, and 
the five men were on the porch and in the front yard for the 
entirety of the visit.  Price used the porch area as an 
extension of his living room, to greet and entertain guests.  
Compare Dunn, 480 U.S. at 303 (strong odor of chemicals and 
sound of engines running suggested that defendant was not using 
barn as extension of his home).  Although there is no evidence 
of Price's exclusive use of the porch and side yard, that fact 
is not dispositive, as it is merely a single factor in the 
calculus.  On balance, the nature of Price's use of the porch 
16 
 
 
and side yard allows the inference that those areas were 
intimately connected to his home. 
 
iv.  Steps taken to protect from observation.  Here, steps 
were clearly taken to obscure the view of the side yard and the 
area under the porch where the sawed-off shotgun was found.  A 
large, blue recycling bin was placed in front of the area, which 
obstructed the view from the street.  Additionally, the large 
wooden fence obscured the view of the area from the left side of 
the yard where the sawed-off shotgun was found.  Although 
Detective Griffin testified that the fence in the front yard did 
not obstruct his view completely, his testimony established that 
he could not see what Leslie was manipulating under the porch 
because his view from the street was obscured. 
 
Taking all four factors into consideration, we conclude 
that the porch and side yard area at the residence were part of 
the home's curtilage and thus entitled to Fourth Amendment and 
art. 14 protections against an unreasonable search and seizure.  
We emphasize the relevance of the Dunn factors for our courts in 
determining whether a challenged police action occurring within 
the boundaries of a home, which under the Fourth Amendment is 
expressly designated as a "constitutionally protected area," is 
compliant with its protections.  Application of the Dunn factors 
in appropriate cases follows Jardines, eschewing the "reasonable 
expectation of privacy" inquiry that is deemed necessary only 
17 
 
 
when the issue is whether the area is a "constitutionally 
protected area."  Thus, because Detective Griffin's search was a 
physical intrusion into the constitutionally protected area of 
the residence, Price and by extension Leslie are relieved of the 
burden to show that Price had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the area searched.  See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417, 
citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 408-409 (2012) 
(reasonable expectation of privacy test "is unnecessary to 
consider when the government gains evidence by physically 
intruding on constitutionally protected areas").  "That the 
officers learned what they learned only by physically intruding 
on [Price's] property to gather evidence is enough to establish 
that a search occurred."  Jardines, supra. 
 
b.  Police officer's physical intrusion into curtilage.  
Because we have determined that Detective Griffin entered into a 
constitutionally protected area, "we turn to the question of 
whether it was accomplished through an unlicensed physical 
intrusion."  Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415.  If so, the intrusion 
amounts to a search that must be justified by probable cause and 
a warrant or exigent circumstances.  See id. at 1413. 
 
As the Court explained in Jardines, a police officer, like 
any other citizen, has an implied license to walk up the path to 
the front door of a home and knock on the front door.  That 
license, however, is limited in scope, purpose, and duration.  
18 
 
 
See id. at 1415-1416.  Here, Detective Griffin and the other 
officers were entitled to open the front gate, walk up the path 
and onto the porch, and engage Price and his guests in 
conversation.  In veering off the path and venturing into the 
side yard of the home for the purpose of conducting a search for 
the weapon, Detective Griffin engaged in the precise conduct 
that Jardines found offensive to the Fourth Amendment.  See id. 
at 1416 ("the background social norms that invite a visitor to 
the front door do not invite him there to conduct a search").  
Just as the police officers in Jardines exceeded the scope of 
their license when they used a drug-sniffing dog to search the 
front porch, here Detective Griffin had neither express nor 
implied license to search the side yard and porch area.  See id. 
at 1417 ("their behavior objectively reveals a purpose to 
conduct a search, which is not what anyone would think he had 
license to do").  We conclude, therefore, that Detective 
Griffin's unlicensed physical intrusion into the curtilage of 
the defendant's home was a search for constitutional purposes. 
 
3.  Probable cause and exigent circumstances.  Having 
determined that a constitutional search occurred, we briefly 
address the Commonwealth's argument, raised for the first time 
on appeal, that Detective Griffin demonstrated probable cause 
and exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless search.  
Although the motion judge noted in passing that the evidence in 
19 
 
 
this case failed to show probable cause or exigent 
circumstances, we decline to address the Commonwealth's claim of 
error in that finding on the merits.  The Commonwealth failed to 
raise this argument below, and therefore it is waived.13  "[I]t 
is rare for us to consider an argument for reversal of a lower 
court which is first raised on appeal and is dispositive in 
favor of the party belatedly raising the issue."  Commonwealth 
v. Bettencourt, 447 Mass. 631, 633 (2006), quoting Commonwealth 
v. Morrissey, 422 Mass. 1, 4 n.5 (1996). 
 
Conclusion.  Because we conclude that the sawed-off shotgun 
was recovered as a result of an unlawful physical intrusion into 
the curtilage of the residence, and therefore in violation of 
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and art. 14, the 
allowance of the defendants' motions to suppress is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
 
13 The Commonwealth similarly failed to raise the argument 
that the search could be justified by reasonable suspicion 
below.  This argument is without merit.  The Commonwealth's 
citations to Terry-type frisk cases are inapposite.  See Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968).  Our laws do not recognize an 
exception to the warrant requirement based solely on reasonable 
suspicion, nor do we recognize a legal basis to "frisk" a 
private residence without a warrant.  "Belief, however well 
founded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling 
house, furnishes no justification for a search of that place 
without a warrant."  Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 
451 (1971), quoting Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 
(1925).