Title: People v. Marci

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

People v. Marci (Ill. S.Ct.)
Docket No. 80107-Agenda 2-September 1997.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. GENO 
F. MACRI, Appellant.
Opinion filed October 29, 1998.
JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
The defendant, Geno F. Macri, was charged by indictment with one count of 
intentional murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 1994)), one count of knowing 
murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 1994)), four counts of felony murder (720 
ILCS 9-1(a)(3) (West 1994)), one count of aggravated criminal sexual assault 
(720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(2) (West 1994)), and one count of unlawful possession of a 
stolen motor vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 1994)). Following a bench 
trial in the circuit court of Du Page County, defendant was found guilty of 
all charges. Defendant thereafter requested a jury for the sentencing 
proceedings. In the first phase of the sentencing hearing, the jury found 
defendant eligible for the death penalty on four separate eligibility factors: 
defendant committed the murder in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner 
pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme or design to take a life by unlawful 
means (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(11) (West 1994)); and defendant committed the murder in 
the course of an aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 
1994)), in the course of an armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1994)) and 
in the course of a robbery (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1994)). After hearing 
additional evidence in the second phase of the hearing, the jury concluded that 
there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the 
death penalty. Accordingly, the trial court sentenced defendant to death. The 
trial court also sentenced defendant to 60 years' imprisonment on the aggravated 
criminal sexual assault conviction, and a consecutive 7 years' imprisonment on 
the possession of a stolen motor vehicle conviction. Defendant's death sentence 
has been stayed pending direct review by this court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, 
§4(b); 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 603, 609(a). Defendant's appeal is limited solely to 
alleged errors committed by the trial court during the sentencing proceedings. 
For the reasons which follow, we affirm defendant's sentence.
BACKGROUND
Defendant's convictions stem from the murder of Maria Djordjic, who was 
killed by repeated blows to the head with a crowbar on August 14, 1993. During 
the eligibility phase of the sentencing hearing, the State called 21 witnesses, 
essentially duplicating its presentation at the guilt-determination phase of the 
proceedings, while the defense called one witness.
Testimony during the eligibility hearing established that in the fall of 
1992, defendant moved into the one-bedroom condominium of Floyd and Susan Graf, 
which was located in Addison, Illinois, a suburb of Chicago. Defendant, who was 
acquainted with Floyd Graf as a result of their working together, converted the 
den of the condominium into a bedroom and had been paying the Grafs rent in the 
amount of $60 per week. The victim, Maria Djordjic, was a close friend of Susan 
Graf. On occasion, Maria stayed in the Grafs' home and slept on the sofa bed 
located in the living room. At the end of July 1993, Maria, who was 19 years old 
at the time of her murder, had moved out of an apartment she had shared with a 
girlfriend and asked the Grafs if she could stay with them for a few weeks until 
she could move back into her father's home in preparation of returning to 
college in the fall. Around this same time, defendant had been given notice by 
the Grafs to move out of the condominium because he had failed to pay rent and 
cover his own expenses.
The testimony further established that on Saturday, August 14, 1993, Floyd 
Graf departed the condominium at 7:30 a.m. for his job and Susan left around 
noon with their three-year-old daughter, Marcie, to attend a relative's birthday 
party. At the time Susan and Marcie left, Maria was sleeping on the sofa bed. 
When Susan and Marcie Graf returned on the afternoon of August 14, 1993, they 
discovered Maria's body on the sofa bed, naked from the waist down, her head 
covered with a pillow. Defendant had disappeared, along with Maria's purse, VCR 
and car.
Defendant's arrest for the murder of Maria Djordjic occurred in New York City 
on June 10, 1994, nearly one year after the crime took place. Upon learning of 
defendant's arrest, Detectives Mark Van Stedum and Michael Simo, both of the 
Addison police department, flew to New York City. Detective Van Stedum testified 
that after informing defendant of his Miranda rights, he and Detective 
Simo began an unrecorded conversation with defendant, during which defendant 
confessed to Maria's murder and recounted details of the crime. Detective Van 
Stedum testified that this first conversation lasted a little over an hour and 
defendant thereafter agreed to give a taped statement repeating his 
confession.
The sentencing jury heard both Detective Van Stedum's testimony recollecting 
defendant's first statement to the police, as well as the audio tape of 
defendant's confession. In his conversations with the detectives, defendant 
recounted that the week before the murder, the Grafs had given defendant three 
weeks' notice to vacate the premises due to defendant's unpaid bills. Defendant 
also stated that he had missed a meeting with his probation officer, and he knew 
that a warrant for his arrest would be forthcoming. Defendant then told the 
detectives that on the day of the murder, he was alone in the condominium with 
Maria and he saw her sleeping on the sofa bed. She then got up, took a shower, 
and dressed in green shorts and a top. Defendant asked Maria if she wanted "to 
fool around a little bit, kiss and stuff like that." Maria declined and 
defendant stated that he "got upset." Defendant told the detectives that he went 
into his bedroom to retrieve a crowbar, returned to Maria, who was sitting on 
the corner of the sofa bed, and hit her over the head with the crowbar. 
Defendant related that after the first time he struck Maria in the head, she 
fell back on the bed and started bleeding. Defendant then jumped on top of her 
and repeatedly hit her in the head with the crowbar. Although Maria initially 
attempted to fend off the blows by lifting her hands and kicking at him, 
defendant stated, she eventually stopped moving and, at that point, defendant 
believed that he had killed her. Defendant told the detectives that he 
thereafter tried to clean up some of the blood splatters on the wall behind the 
sofa bed, and then he cleaned himself up and did his laundry. Defendant related 
that while his laundry was washing, defendant placed a pillow over Maria's head, 
took off her green shorts, and had sexual intercourse with her. Defendant stated 
that he then took Maria's car and drove to a neighboring suburb, where he pawned 
Maria's VCR, as well as some of his own items. According to defendant, he then 
returned to the condominium, gathered his laundry from the dryer, packed his 
things together, and planned to take Maria's car and go to New York City. 
Defendant related that on the way out of the Grafs' condominium, he again saw 
Maria lying on the sofa bed and had sexual intercourse with her a second time. 
Defendant told the detectives that on both occasions that he had intercourse 
with her, he believed Maria was dead. Defendant stated to the detectives that he 
covered Maria's head with a pillow before he left.
The detectives questioned defendant about the crowbar. Defendant stated that 
he kept the crowbar in his room and that he had purchased it for "protection" 
and "for, you know, 'cause I-I was-the year before I was, you know, kind of 
planning on doing the same thing." When Detective Van Stedum inquired whether 
defendant meant hitting a girl over the head, defendant replied, "Right, or 
taking her purse or, you know ***." Defendant stated that he had planned to 
commit these attacks along the Illinois Prairie Path.
Defendant related to the detectives that on his way to New York, he stole 
Ohio license plates to replace the Illinois plates on Maria's car. Defendant 
further stated that he had attempted to sell Maria's car at six different car 
dealerships in New Jersey, but because none would purchase the car without the 
title, he ended up selling pieces of the car. Defendant also told the detectives 
that he had unsuccessfully attempted to use Maria's ATM card in a bank in New 
Jersey.
In addition to his testimony concerning defendant's confession, Detective Van 
Stedum related occurrences in the investigation which took place in the days 
after Maria's murder. On August 15, the day after the murder, Van Stedum had a 
conversation with Tom Richardson, a friend of defendant. Van Stedum testified 
that he and Richardson went to an Ace Hardware store in Addison where Richardson 
identified a crowbar similar to the crowbar Richardson had previously seen in 
defendant's possession. On August 17, Van Stedum received information from the 
Itasca Bank that Maria's ATM card had been used at an ATM machine at the United 
Jersey Bank in Teterboro, New Jersey. Detective Van Stedum also testified that 
he was called back to the murder scene by Floyd Graf on the 18th of August, 
because Graf had discovered a green pair of shorts and a black pair of underwear 
rolled up inside the shorts under a chair in defendant's room. Van Stedum 
related that on August 19, he received a call from the New York City police 
department that Maria's vehicle, which displayed stolen Ohio license plates, had 
been recovered. On that date Van Stedum also received copies of photo stills 
from the videotape taken at the United Jersey Bank showing defendant using 
Maria's ATM card.
Testimony from Floyd and Susan Graf was presented to the jury. Floyd Graf 
testified that he had met defendant in 1990 at Olympus Auto Parts, where both 
men worked, and defendant had come to live with them in the fall of 1992. 
However, defendant failed to make his rent payments and in August 1993, the 
Grafs' phone was disconnected because defendant had made excessive calls to 
"900" numbers. Graf stated that he took away defendant's house keys and told 
defendant to move out. According to Graf, on the day of the murder, Graf had 
left for work at 7:30 a.m. and did not return to his home until Maria's body had 
been found by his wife and daughter. Graf related that a few days after the 
murder, the police allowed him to go back into his apartment, and, while he was 
clearing everything out with the intention of moving, he found a pair of green 
shorts with black underwear inside under a chair in defendant's room. He then 
called police and Detective Van Stedum came to investigate.
Susan Graf testified that Maria had been her best friend for five years, and 
that prior to moving into their apartment, Maria would stay with them a few 
times per month. According to the witness, Maria purchased the VCR and left it 
at the Grafs' residence so that the Grafs' three-year-old daughter, Marcie, 
could watch videos. The witness further testified that a few weeks before the 
murder she and her husband told defendant to move out of their residence because 
defendant owed them money for the rent and other expenses, and that defendant 
stole money from their daughter's piggy bank. On the day of the murder, Susan 
and her daughter Marcie left their residence to attend a birthday party shortly 
before noon, and when they returned at approximately 5 p.m., Marcie discovered 
Maria's body on the sofa bed.
The State then called several witnesses who testified to defendant's 
whereabouts on the afternoon of the murder. William Madalinski, a friend of 
defendant, testified that on August 14, he and another friend, Ernie Silvesteri, 
went to defendant's apartment to see if defendant wanted to play basketball. 
Madalinski stated that sometime between 12:20 p.m. and 12:45 p.m., Silvesteri 
beeped his car horn from the parking lot and defendant came to the window. From 
the window, defendant told them that he did not want to go with them, and, a few 
minutes later, defendant came down to the parking lot and repeated that they 
should go without him. George Jakes testified that he worked at Village Pawn and 
Jewelry in Elk Grove Village, and that defendant pawned a Goldstar VCR on August 
14, 1993. The bill of sale for that transaction showed the time as 1:40 p.m., 
and was signed by defendant. Denise Feinberg, a neighbor of the Grafs, testified 
that at about 2 p.m. on August 14, she was sitting in a chair by the window 
looking down at the complex's parking lot and saw defendant drive Maria's car 
into the lot.
The State next called witnesses to testify regarding the scene of the crime. 
Richard Carnaggio, a firefighter/paramedic for the Addison fire department, 
arrived at the scene and found Maria lying on the sofa bed with a pillow over 
her head. As he removed the pillow, a sock, which was stuck to the pillow as a 
result of dried blood, was dislodged from Maria's mouth. Carnaggio stated that 
he observed a great deal of blood at the scene, and that the large wounds to 
Maria's head resembled a crushing injury. Michael Tierney, an Addison police 
officer assigned to assist as an evidence technician in the murder 
investigation, testified that a sock matching the sock recovered from Maria's 
body was found in defendant's room.
Dr. Shaku Teas, a forensic pathologist, testified that she performed the 
autopsy on Maria on August 15, 1993. Upon an external examination of the 
injuries to Maria's head, Dr. Teas discovered multiple chop and incised wounds 
of varying lengths scattered over Maria's face and to both sides of her head. 
Dr. Teas also testified to numerous blunt trauma injuries, bruises, and 
abrasions which were visible on Maria's face and head. Dr. Teas also found 
defensive wounds on Maria's hands, with bruising on the left hand and bruises, 
abrasions, and characteristics of a sharp instrument on the right hand, as well 
as abraded areas on Maria's wrist.
Dr. Teas then testified concerning her findings upon an internal examination 
of Maria's skull and head area. Maria suffered multiple fractures of the skull 
as well as a large amount of subgaleal hemorrhage, which Dr. Teas described as a 
hemorrhage inside the scalp. Dr. Teas testified in detail concerning the 
numerous fractures suffered by Maria, including: a fracture on top of the skull; 
a fracture which extended forward into the forehead region, in a v-shaped form; 
and a fracture that extended from above Maria's ear all the way to the back of 
her head, with two portions of the fractured area having been displaced. Dr. 
Teas additionally testified to fractures found inside Maria's skull, including a 
large fracture extending in a semi-circular fashion. Dr. Teas related that the 
portions of the skull which support the nose, right eye, and left inner ear had 
all suffered fractures. Dr. Teas opined that a considerable amount of force 
would be necessary to cause these types of fractures. Dr. Teas concluded her 
recitation of Maria's specific injuries by noting that in addition to the 
numerous fractures, Maria's brain suffered a subarachnoid hemorrhage. Dr. Teas 
then related her finding that the cause of Maria's death was craniocerebral 
injuries due to blunt and sharp force injury, and testified that a crowbar would 
be consistent with causing the type of injuries suffered by Maria.
The State also called Tom Richardson, who testified that he met defendant in 
high school in 1989, and worked together with defendant for a short time in 
1992. Richardson stated that he became acquainted with Maria in the fall of 1992 
when he met her at the Grafs' apartment during his visits to defendant. 
Richardson testified that on October 31, 1992, he had visited defendant at the 
Grafs' condominium, and during a conversation in defendant's room, defendant 
told Richardson that defendant was going to hit Maria over the head with a 
crowbar, rape her, and take off to New York City in her car. Defendant told 
Richardson that defendant would attack Maria upon her exit from the bathroom of 
the apartment, which was located between defendant's room and the Grafs' 
bedroom. During this conversation, defendant also showed Richardson a crowbar, 
which defendant retrieved from his dresser, one end of which had been wrapped in 
black electrical tape. Defendant at that time also told Richardson that he 
wanted to ask Maria out but that she probably would laugh at him because he was 
short.
Richardson testified that he had two other conversations with defendant in 
which defendant mentioned his plan to attack Maria. According to Richardson, in 
April 1993, as he and defendant were driving in Richardson's truck, defendant 
again stated that he planned to hit Maria over the head with the crowbar, rape 
her, and steal her car to escape to New York City. Defendant repeated these 
statements to Richardson once again in May 1993.
Richardson testified that on August 15, 1993, Detective Van Stedum came to 
talk to him regarding Maria's murder, and it was at that time that Richardson 
told the police about the conversations he had with defendant concerning Maria. 
Richardson then went with Detective Van Stedum to a hardware store to show the 
detective the type of crowbar that defendant had shown Richardson in defendant's 
room. On cross-examination, Richardson admitted that he did not previously go to 
the police concerning the conversations he had with defendant about Maria, nor 
did he ever inform Maria about defendant's statements. Richardson testified that 
he remained silent because at the time he thought defendant was only joking.
The sole witness called by defendant during the eligibility phase was 
Detective Michael Simo, and the sole inquiry of the detective was a conversation 
Simo had with Susan Graf the day after Maria's murder. Detective Simo testified 
that Susan told him that defendant wanted to purchase a small quantity of 
marijuana from Maria, but that Maria would not give it to him until he paid the 
Grafs the money that he owed them on his bills.
Following arguments by counsel, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that 
defendant was eligible for the death penalty in that he was 18 years of age or 
older at the time of the murder and that four statutory aggravating factors 
existed: (1) commission of first degree murder in the course of an aggravated 
criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1994)); (2) commission of 
first degree murder in the course of an armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) 
(West 1994)); (3) commission of first degree murder during the course of a 
robbery (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1994)); and (4) commission of the murder in 
a cold, calculated and premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan, 
scheme or design to take a life by unlawful means (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(11) (West 
1994)).
At the aggravation and mitigation phase of the sentencing hearing, the State 
presented 25 witnesses in aggravation. In mitigation, the defense called five 
witnesses and defendant elected to speak in allocution. The majority of the 
State's evidence in aggravation concerned defendant's criminal record. The State 
first called Detective Michael Simo, who informed the jury that while defendant 
was in New York City, defendant had been arrested for disorderly conduct and 
possession of marijuana. Defendant pled guilty to the marijuana charge and was 
fined $50, while the disorderly conduct charge was dropped. Defendant never 
returned to court to pay the $50 fine. Detective Simo testified that defendant 
informed him about defendant's history of committing burglaries in the Chicago 
suburban area, including burglaries at suburban recreational vehicle dealers, 
public storage facilities, and trucking firms. Defendant also told Detective 
Simo he stole money from the piggy bank of the Grafs' daughter.
The State then presented numerous witnesses, including friends of defendant 
and law enforcement officers, who testified regarding the burglaries committed 
by defendant. The evidence indicated that defendant staked out various 
businesses in order to assess whether they presented good prospects for a 
burglary, and then related this information to his friends in an effort to 
induce them to join him in the burglary. Because these burglaries remained 
unsolved, no arrests were made and no charges were filed against defendant in 
connection with these crimes. In one instance, however, defendant was arrested 
when he and three friends attempted to burglarize a public storage facility in 
Bensenville. Craig Grude, a sergeant with the Bensenville police department, 
testified that defendant provided a handwritten statement confessing that the 
burglary had been planned and that defendant was involved. However, defendant 
was not charged in connection with this incident.
Robert Budig, an officer with the Villa Park police department, testified 
that he stopped a pickup truck containing defendant and two friends. In the bed 
of the pickup truck, the officer discovered numerous items which had been 
reported stolen from a Wisconsin campground. Michael King, a sergeant with the 
Villa Park police department, also responded to the traffic stop and upon a 
search of the truck's cab recovered spent .380-caliber shell casings, narcotics 
paraphernalia, and a .380 semiautomatic from between the front seats. All three 
individuals were transported to the police station, where defendant was charged 
with felony theft. Upon being placed in a jail cell, defendant was observed 
throwing a plastic bag containing a green leafy substance into the cell's 
urinal. Officer Budig retrieved the bag, field tested the bag's contents, and 
additionally charged defendant with possession of cannabis. Defendant was 
convicted of felony theft and sentenced to 24 months' probation.
Next, the State introduced testimony concerning defendant's commission of 
thefts from his employers. Genaro Esposito, a police officer with the Villa Park 
police department, testified that in July 1990 he investigated a theft from 
Olympus Auto Parts, a store where defendant was employed at that time. The owner 
informed police that $1,050 was missing from a bank bag which the owner placed 
in a desk drawer in his office. The owner notified police, and Officer Esposito 
phoned defendant's residence and informed defendant's father that defendant was 
a suspect in the theft. During this conversation, defendant arrived home and 
denied he was involved in the theft. However, after being induced by his father 
to tell the truth, defendant admitted that he stole the money and returned $400 
to the owner, stating that he had already spent the balance. The owner decided 
not to prosecute defendant on the condition that defendant would return the 
remainder of the missing money.
Steven Kowalewski, a controller for National Plan Service, testified 
regarding defendant's employment with that company in 1992. Kowalewski stated 
that defendant's duties including working in the warehouse and delivering the 
mail on a daily basis, which allowed defendant access to the firm's minivan. On 
August 3, 1992, the minivan was discovered missing, and sometime thereafter it 
was found abandoned in Cicero, Illinois. Kowalewski testified that although he 
received an anonymous call that defendant had stolen the van, no charges were 
filed against defendant in connection with the missing van. However, two of 
defendant's friends, Daniel Kapellen and Tom Richardson, testified that 
defendant admitted to them that he had stolen the van. Richardson further 
testified that in September 1992, defendant told Richardson that he had 
duplicated the van's key and would routinely take the van after work on Fridays 
and return it before the weekend was over. Defendant stated to Richardson that 
defendant had to leave the van in Cicero because on one of his outings the van 
had a flat tire which he was unable to change.
The State also called several witnesses to testify regarding defendant's 
conduct and attitudes towards women. Detective Simo testified that defendant 
told him that while defendant was in New York City, on at least two occasions 
defendant had thought about hitting two different women over the head and raping 
them. Mark Heuser, a friend of defendant, testified that defendant often spoke 
about torturing women, and that defendant was the only one in their circle of 
friends to make such comments. Another friend of defendant, Daniel Kapellen, 
testified to conversations with defendant wherein defendant spoke in detail of 
sexually abusing and torturing defendant's former girlfriend. Kapellen also 
testified to various other conversations he had with defendant wherein defendant 
detailed plans to assault and rape other women. Defendant told Kapellen that 
defendant already owned a crowbar and that defendant had taped one end for a 
handle. According to Kapellen, defendant stated that he kept the crowbar at home 
and sometimes in his backpack. The State also called Tom Richardson, who 
testified that in addition to the specific conversations with defendant 
concerning Maria in April and May of 1993, defendant also spoke in general terms 
concerning his desire to kill and rape other women.
Cynthia Ledlow, another friend of defendant, testified that in the spring of 
1989, defendant asked her to go on a drive to Springfield. Thereafter, Mark 
Heuser and his brother approached her and told her that defendant planned to 
rape her if she went to Springfield with him and then throw her body in a field. 
Consequently, she refused to accompany defendant.
The State also called Roshanna Tokh, who testified that in June 1984, when 
she was five years old, defendant assaulted her. Defendant, who was 
approximately 12 years old at the time, was questioned by the police and 
subsequently released into his mother's custody.
The State then introduced evidence of defendant's conduct while he was 
incarcerated in the Du Page County jail, awaiting trial in this matter. 
Nikki Cokinis, a deputy for the Du Page County sheriff's department, 
testified that in the fall of 1994, she transported defendant on two or three 
occasions from the jail to a holding cell in the courthouse for his court 
appearances. Deputy Steven Smith testified that in October 1994, he was 
escorting defendant to the courthouse when defendant asked Smith if Deputy 
Cokinis could escort him to the courtroom. In November 1994, while escorting 
defendant, Deputy Smith testified that defendant inquired whether Smith could 
handcuff defendant and Deputy Cokinis together and send them up in the elevator 
to court. Thereafter, Deputy Smith informed Deputy Cokinis about defendant's 
comments and requested that Cokinis no longer escort defendant to and from 
court. Further, Deputy Smith testified that his superior, Chief Smith, 
circulated a memo on November 22, 1994, in reference to a statement made by 
defendant that he was going to rape a female in the courthouse if he received a 
long sentence. After the memo was circulated, female bailiffs were no longer 
allowed to escort defendant.
Thomas Hughes testified that in the fall of 1994, while he was at 
Du Page County jail awaiting trial on a retail theft charge, he became 
familiar with defendant, who was housed in the same jail pod. Hughes testified 
that in November 1994, he and defendant were watching television in a common 
area of the pod when a female appeared on the screen. According to Hughes, 
defendant stated that he wanted to hit her over the head with a cinder block and 
have sexual intercourse with her afterwards. Hughes further testified that on 
another occasion, defendant stated that if it were possible, defendant wanted to 
throw Deputy Cokinis to the ground, take her panic button from her, get her out 
of the camera's view, and rape her. According to Hughes, defendant stated that 
he would attack Cokinis in the holding cell, that defendant thought it would be 
fairly easy to overpower her, and that defendant wanted to take advantage of the 
opportunity because it would probably be his last chance of having sex or 
contact with a woman. Finally, Hughes related to the jury that defendant spoke 
to him concerning Maria's murder. Defendant told Hughes that defendant felt that 
Maria owed him something and she was not going to give it up, so defendant had 
to resort to physical violence. Defendant used vulgarities to refer to Maria, 
and defendant showed Hughes Maria's autopsy reports.
The final witness for the State was Maria's father, Jovan Djordjic, who read 
into evidence a victim impact statement. After he testified, the State 
rested.
Defendant called five witnesses in mitigation. Dr. Carl Wahlstrom, a 
board-certified expert in forensic psychiatry, testified that prior to meeting 
with defendant, he spent approximately 10 hours reviewing a wide array of 
records pertaining to defendant, including defendant's school records, 
psychological and psychiatric records, drug-treatment records, and work records. 
In addition, Dr. Wahlstrom reviewed details regarding defendant's arrest and 
confession, as well as the police reports and the autopsy records. Dr. Wahlstrom 
testified that he examined defendant over a three-day period, for a total of 
less than eight hours.
Dr. Wahlstrom testified that, in his opinion, at the time of the murder 
defendant was not out of touch with reality. However, based upon his examination 
of defendant's drug-treatment records and his conversations with defendant, 
Wahlstrom concluded that defendant suffered from dependence on PCP, cocaine, 
LSD, and marijuana. Wahlstrom related that defendant stated that subsequent to 
inflicting the blows to Maria's head, defendant hallucinated that he saw snakes 
and bugs on Maria's face. Based upon defendant's description of these 
hallucinations, Wahlstrom believed that at the time of the murder defendant was 
under hallucinogen intoxication with perceptual disturbances.
Dr. Wahlstrom also testified that he diagnosed defendant as having an 
antisocial personality disorder, characterized by a disregard for the rights of 
others. Wahlstrom testified that there were indications of this disorder during 
defendant's childhood, including defendant's talking back to teachers, 
threatening teachers, setting fields on fire, and displaying cruelty to animals. 
As an adult, defendant evidenced periodic failures to conform to social norms 
with respect to lawful behavior, had indications of impulsivity, and failed to 
plan ahead. Defendant also showed reckless disregard for the safety of others, 
as evidenced by the driving of a car while intoxicated, as well as repeated 
failure to follow and honor financial obligations.
Dr. Wahlstrom also diagnosed defendant as having a borderline personality 
disorder, characterized by a disturbed view of one's self-image. This disorder, 
according to Wahlstrom, involves very unstable relationships with others, an 
unstable mood, and impulsivity. Defendant met the criteria by engaging in 
frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment, and showed impulsivity in 
spending, sex, substance abuse and reckless driving. Defendant also evidenced 
recurrent suicidal behavior, inappropriate intense anger or difficulty 
controlling his anger, and fantasies of hurting other individuals.
Dr. Wahlstrom stated that defendant had an avoidant personality disorder, 
characterized by feelings of inadequacy, social inhibition, and hypersensitivity 
to negative evaluations of others. As a result, defendant showed restraint with 
intimate relationships because of his fear of being shamed or ridiculed, and 
defendant was preoccupied with being criticized and rejected in social settings, 
viewing himself as being socially inept, personally unappealing, and inferior to 
others. Wahlstrom related that defendant's sole dating relationship occurred at 
age 15, and defendant patronized prostitutes because that was the only sexual 
intimacy that he felt he could accomplish.
Dr. Wahlstrom further testified that family dysfunction affected defendant's 
self-image. There was marital stress between defendant's mother and father, who 
divorced when defendant was 12, and there was differential dislike by 
defendant's mother, who treated defendant differently than his siblings. For 
example, Wahlstrom related that defendant's mother would kiss defendant's 
brother while ignoring defendant, thereby pushing defendant away emotionally, 
and hindering his development of good self-esteem. However, Wahlstrom 
acknowledged that defendant was neither physically nor sexually abused as a 
child.
In addition, Dr. Wahlstrom testified that at the time of the murder, 
defendant was under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, 
due to various emotional stresses including the disruption of defendant's 
family, the failure of in-patient drug and mental health treatment, constant job 
losses, defendant's history of arrests, defendant's impending eviction from his 
residence, and acute feelings of rejection due to Maria's spurning of 
defendant's sexual advances. Dr. Wahlstrom testified that defendant fantasized 
that he had a real relationship with Maria, and on the day of the murder he was 
building up his courage to ask her for a sexual relationship, which she 
declined. According to Wahlstrom, this fantasy, Maria's rejection, and 
defendant's poor self-esteem combined to result in an "experience of extreme 
rage and a feeling of a culmination of all the mistreatment regarding everyone 
who he felt didn't think him to be any good, and I think that at that moment in 
time the culmination of all these caused him to have - to commit a senseless, 
irrational act."
In regards to defendant's fantasies of torturing women, Dr. Wahlstrom stated 
that it is only through the fantasies that defendant can realize total power and 
control. Dr. Wahlstrom acknowledged that defendant has a "chronic history" of 
violent fantasies towards women, and additionally related that while defendant 
was awaiting trial in this matter, defendant had made a comment in reference to 
a television program where a girl was found murdered. Defendant stated to his 
fellow inmates that because the girl had only been murdered and not raped, it 
was a "waste of a good body."
Dr. Wahlstrom opined that defendant could be treated in a secured 
institution, but defendant would have to cooperate and avail himself of the 
treatment, something defendant had refused to do in the past. Wahlstrom 
acknowledged that defendant has an inability to experience a feeling of remorse 
due to defendant's antisocial personality disorder, and concluded that because 
of defendant's feelings of inadequacy defendant can have only a very limited 
emotional attachment with other human beings. When asked if defendant is a 
dangerous person, Dr. Wahlstrom replied, "I think he has shown himself to be a 
dangerous individual."
On cross-examination, Dr. Wahlstrom related that defendant's only thoughts 
immediately after he killed Maria and left for New York City was that it was too 
late to change anything; defendant had no thoughts concerning Maria. Also during 
cross-examination, Dr. Wahlstrom admitted that defendant told him that defendant 
wanted to have sex with Maria "before she got cold and stiff," that defendant 
was satisfied with his life after the murder, and that defendant's life at the 
Du Page County jail had been "great."
Finally, the State questioned Dr. Wahlstrom during cross-examination 
concerning defendant's truthfulness regarding his drug use, since in all testing 
done from August 19, 1991, through June 20, 1994, by the Du Page County 
probation department, defendant never tested positive for PCP or cocaine, and 
only tested positive for marijuana use. Defendant also told his probation 
officer that he stopped using PCP in 1990. Wahlstrom admitted that he was aware 
of these reports, but that they did not change his opinion regarding defendant's 
drug dependence on the night of the murder. The State questioned Dr. Wahlstrom 
concerning a probation report wherein defendant said that his family life was 
good because defendant had a good relationship with his mother, father, 
stepmother and siblings. Again, Wahlstrom stated that this fact would not change 
his opinions.
The next witness called by the defense in mitigation was Robin Boothby, a 
probation officer with the division of adult special services in Du Page 
County, who prepared a presentence report detailing defendant's criminal 
history. Defendant's first arrest was in April 1989 for unlawful possession of 
cannabis, and resulted in defendant's paying a fine. In September 1990, 
defendant was arrested for driving under the influence and sentenced to court 
supervision with the condition that he complete drug counseling. This 
supervision was subsequently revoked along with defendant's driver's license. In 
April 1991, defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, and 
again sentenced to court supervision. Due to defendant's noncompliance with the 
conditions of supervision, the supervision was revoked. After being convicted of 
theft on August 19, 1991, defendant was placed on probation for a period of 24 
months, with the condition that he complete outpatient drug-treatment 
counseling. Defendant failed to comply with the counseling requirement, was 
found in violation of his probation, and was sentenced to 14 days in the 
Du Page County jail. Shortly thereafter, defendant was again found in 
violation of probation due to noncompliance with drug counseling and a second 
petition to revoke defendant's probation was filed. The witness further 
indicated that drug screenings performed on defendant in January 1992 and July 
1993 were positive only for cannabis.
Donald Knoll, a sergeant in the Du Page County sheriff's department, was 
the next witness called by the defense in mitigation. Knoll testified that 
defendant was the subject of 12 jail incident reports since defendant arrived in 
the jail in June 1994. These reports included several incidents of damage to 
property, disorderly conduct, disrespect of jail guards, abusive language, and 
failure to follow orders. Five of these incidents resulted in defendant's being 
placed in disciplinary segregation. Knoll also testified that special rules in 
regards to defendant are in place prohibiting female guards from escorting 
defendant in order to assure the guards' safety.
Defendant testified that he grew up in a house in suburban Elmhurst, and that 
his everyday life as a child was not really happy because he did not have many 
friends and was constantly fighting with his brother and sister. According to 
defendant, he did not have a good relationship with his mother, who gave 
defendant far less attention than his siblings. Defendant also stated that his 
mother beat him with a shoe, chased him with a knife, and on one occasion threw 
scissors at him after defendant had hit his brother, causing his mother to leave 
her job and come home from work early. Defendant stated that he moved out of the 
family home and into the Grafs' residence because his mother remarried and her 
husband did not get along with defendant. However, defendant also related that 
on two occasions when he was behind in his rent payments to the Grafs, his 
mother gave him $260 to cover his expenses.
On cross-examination, defendant stated that he had a good relationship with 
his father and that defendant believed that he was his father's favorite child. 
Defendant also admitted that he told the probation department in August 1994 
that he had a good relationship with his mother, father, stepmother and 
siblings. During cross-examination defendant acknowledged that his parents had 
arranged for counseling; defendant refused to accept that help and informed his 
parents that drug treatment was a waste of time because he intended to return to 
drug usage.
Defendant further testified on cross-examination that "[i]t wasn't a choice" 
to murder Maria; instead, "[i]t was something that happened." Defendant agreed 
that his main objective after inflicting the blows to Maria's head was to rape 
her before she became cold and stiff. Defendant further admitted on 
cross-examination that he could hear the life leaving Maria's body as he raped 
her the first time, and he placed the pillow over her head when he returned from 
the pawn shop because he was hallucinating that there were snakes on her face. 
Defendant also admitted on cross-examination that he has thought about hitting 
women over the head since murdering Maria, and that he wanted to rape Deputy 
Cokinis.
The last witnesses to testify in mitigation were defendant's parents, Eugene 
Macri and Kathleen Koutsogiannis, who related that their marriage had been in 
trouble since defendant was two years old, and that many arguments and instances 
of violence occurred in the household. Defendant's parents also related that 
they placed defendant in treatment but that defendant refused to continue with 
the programs. Defendant's father testified that defendant's mother scolded 
defendant more harshly than their other children and, in his opinion, 
defendant's mother never liked defendant. Defendant's father additionally 
related that he and defendant had a good relationship and that they would do 
many activities together, including going to shows and participating in Little 
League. Defendant's mother testified that her relationship with defendant was 
not close, and that she never took an interest in him the way that she did with 
her other children. She testified that during defendant's childhood, she 
belittled him by telling him he was stupid, no good, and short. She related that 
defendant shared a bedroom with his brother, and when she came home, she would 
kiss defendant's brother but never defendant.
After closing arguments, the jury returned a verdict finding no mitigating 
factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty. Defendant 
was sentenced to death. All post-trial motions were denied. This appeal 
followed.
ANALYSIS
Defendant's appeal to this court is limited solely to alleged errors 
committed by the trial court during his sentencing proceeding. Defendant asserts 
numerous claims of error at both phases of his sentencing hearing, and argues 
that each of these claimed errors requires that he be given a new sentencing 
hearing.
I. Eligibility
Jury Selection
Defendant raises two issues concerning the selection of a jury for the 
sentencing phase of his trial. Defendant first contends that his constitutional 
rights to due process of law and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment were 
violated because the trial court refused to pose three tendered questions to 
prospective jurors during voir dire questioning. In the alternative, 
defendant asserts that the trial court's refusal to ask these questions 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. Defendant tendered to the trial judge three 
voir dire questions to inquire of potential jurors whether, if they 
should determine that a death sentence was not appropriate, they could withstand 
pressure from their cojurors during deliberation and stand alone against 
imposition of a death sentence. The following are the proffered questions:
The trial court ruled that only the first sentence of question No. 114 ("Will 
you consider all the evidence presented?") would be asked at voir dire, 
and declined to ask the remainder of question No. 114 as well as question No. 
115 and No. 116. The record reveals that the trial judge based this decision on 
her belief that all three questions covered the same issue, and that these 
questions related to the jurors' deliberation process, a matter the trial court 
indicated was properly within the province of predeliberation jury instructions. 
Further, the trial judge specifically ruled that she did not "think it[ ] 
appropriate to single out some aspects of the [jury] instructions and not 
others."
Defendant contends that the purpose of the three proffered questions was to 
determine a potential juror's "bias" or "prejudice" towards the statutory 
requirement of section 9-1(g) of the Criminal Code of 1961 that a jury's 
determination that the death penalty should be imposed must be unanimous. 720 
ILCS 5/9-1(g) (West 1994). Defendant argues that he has a constitutional right 
to inquire whether a potential juror could be swayed by the majority of cojurors 
during deliberations and not vote his or her conscience in a death penalty case. 
Based upon this contention, defendant concludes that he was denied his 
constitutional right to an impartial jury.
In support of his argument, defendant relies upon Morgan v. 
Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992). In 
Morgan, the Supreme Court held that a defendant is constitutionally 
entitled to inquire at voir dire whether prospective jurors would 
automatically impose the death penalty to the same extent that the State may 
inquire of prospective jurors pursuant to Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776, 88 S. Ct. 1770 (1968), whether they would 
automatically vote against the death penalty. In Morgan, the defendant 
tendered the following question to the trial court to be asked of prospective 
jurors on voir dire: "If you found [the defendant] guilty, would you 
automatically vote to impose the death penalty no matter what the facts are?" 
Morgan, 504 U.S.  at 723, 119 L. Ed. 2d  at 499, 112 S. Ct.  at 2226. The 
trial court refused the defendant's request, on the basis that it believed that 
it had asked the question "in a different vein substantially in that nature." 
Morgan, 504 U.S.  at 723, 119 L. Ed. 2d  at 499, 112 S. Ct.  at 2226.
In determining that the trial court's refusal to ask the question proffered 
by the defendant violated defendant's due process rights to an impartial jury, 
the Supreme Court held that in a capital case, the trial court is 
constitutionally required, if requested by the defendant, to ask potential 
jurors during voir dire whether they would automatically vote for the 
death penalty if the defendant were convicted of murder. The Court based its 
ruling on the reasoning that "[a] juror who will automatically vote for the 
death penalty in every case will fail in good faith to consider the evidence of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to do." 
Morgan, 504 U.S.  at 728-29, 119 L. Ed. 2d  at 502-03, 112 S. Ct.  at 
2229. The Supreme Court reasoned that "because such a juror has already formed 
an opinion on the merits, the presence or absence of either aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances is entirely irrelevant to such a juror." 
Morgan, 504 U.S.  at 728-29, 119 L. Ed. 2d  at 502-03, 112 S. Ct.  at 
2229.
This court has previously read Morgan in a narrow context, observing 
that "Morgan held only that the defendant is entitled to have 
potential jurors questioned as to whether they would automatically vote 
to impose the death penalty upon a finding of guilt, without regard to 
the aggravating or mitigating circumstances present in the case." (Emphasis in 
original.) People v. Hope, 168 Ill. 2d 1, 29 (1995). As we noted in 
Hope, "Morgan specifically directed its holding toward the end 
of discovering jurors for whom `the presence or absence of either aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances is entirely irrelevant.' " Hope, 168 Ill. 2d  at 29-30, quoting Morgan, 504 U.S.  at 729, 119 L. Ed. 2d  at 502-03, 
112 S. Ct.  at 2229; see also People v. Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d 30, 59-60 
(1998) (similarly narrowly construing the Morgan holding).
In the case at bar, defendant argues that jurors "who could not follow their 
own consciences when challenged by other jurors *** are conscienceless jurors 
who cannot follow the law or their oath." Defendant concludes that, based upon 
the rationale of Morgan, voir dire questions inquiring whether 
a juror can "stand alone" and vote his or her conscience against all the 
remaining jurors is likewise constitutionally compelled.
We find defendant's reliance upon Morgan misplaced. Morgan 
focused its inquiry upon those prospective jurors who "had predetermined the 
terminating issue of [defendant's] trial, that being whether to impose the death 
penalty." Morgan, 504 U.S.  at 736, 119 L. Ed. 2d  at 507, 112 S. Ct.  at 
2233. In the cause at bar, we find that there is no correlation between the 
inquiry proposed by defendant's tendered voir dire questions and 
defendant's assertions that the questions serve to detect bias or prejudice 
within the meaning of the Morgan decision.
We agree with the trial judge's assessment that the three questions tendered 
by defendant concern matters relating to the jury-deliberation process and, 
therefore, were properly covered by the trial court during the jury instruction 
phase of trial. The record reveals that the trial judge appropriately instructed 
the jurors at both the eligibility phase and the aggravation-mitigation phase of 
defendant's sentencing hearing concerning the unanimity requirement. At 
eligibility, the trial judge gave the jury the following instructions, 
substantially tracking Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 7B.01 
(3d ed. 1992) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 3d):
Similarly, at the aggravation-mitigation stage, the jury was provided with 
two verdict forms and the trial court judge gave the jurors the following 
instructions, substantially tracking IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.05:
The jury in this case was therefore clearly instructed that a sentence of 
death could be imposed only if the jurors unanimously decided that defendant was 
eligible for death and that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficient to 
preclude imposition of the death penalty.
In his brief to this court, defendant points out that the court asked the 
prospective jurors questions concerning 11 different areas, including inquiry 
into any biases and prejudices the prospective jurors had in conjunction with 
the standards set forth in Witherspoon and Morgan. To this 
end, the trial court judge questioned the prospective jurors regarding any 
religious, moral or personal beliefs they might have against the imposition of 
the death penalty, whether the jurors could determine facts based upon the 
evidence presented and then follow the law as instructed, and whether the jurors 
would automatically vote to impose death in every murder conviction. Although 
defendant uses this series of questions as a basis for his argument that none of 
the questions asked at voir dire constituted an adequate 
substitute for the three tendered questions, this series of questions 
underscores that the trial court's inquiry assured that those jurors who would 
ignore all of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances were discovered. In 
sum, we find that the trial court's refusal to ask the three voir 
dire questions tendered by defendant did not deprive defendant of his 
constitutional rights and thus does not warrant reversal.
Defendant also argues that the trial court's refusal to ask his three 
tendered questions violates the holding of People v. Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d 472 (1984). In Zehr, this court examined Supreme Court Rule 234 (134 
Ill. 2d R. 234), which is made applicable to criminal cases by Rule 431 (134 
Ill. 2d R. 431). At that time, rule 234 provided:
The noncapital defendant in Zehr had tendered voir dire 
questions to the court concerning the presumption of innocence, the State's 
burden of proof, and the right of the defendant not to testify. The 
Zehr trial court refused to ask the submitted questions, determining 
that the proposed questions violated the provisions of Supreme Court Rule 234 to 
the extent that such questions may neither directly nor indirectly concern 
matters of law or jury instructions. This court, in reversing defendant's 
convictions of home invasion, burglary, and battery, held that the trial court's 
refusal to ask the questions resulted in prejudicial error. The Zehr 
court observed that "essential to the qualification of jurors in a criminal case 
is that they know that a defendant is presumed innocent, that he is not required 
to offer any evidence in his own behalf, that he must be proved guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and that his failure to testify in his own behalf cannot be 
held against him. If a juror has a prejudice against any of these basic 
guarantees, an instruction given at the end of trial will have little curative 
effect." Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d  at 477. This court further observed in 
Zehr that each of the defendant's tendered questions went " `to 
the heart of a particular bias or prejudice which would deprive defendant of his 
right to a fair and impartial jury' [citation], and although they need not have 
been asked in precisely the form submitted, the subject matter of the questions 
should have been covered in the course of interrogation on voir dire." 
Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d  at 477.
In the cause at bar, defendant does not contend that the prospective jurors 
had a bias or prejudice against any of the basic guarantees enumerated in 
Zehr. Instead, defendant reiterates the argument raised in connection 
with his constitutional challenge that his proposed inquiry into whether a juror 
would be able to "stand alone" in a no-death decision allows defendant to detect 
any bias or prejudice concerning the venireperson's ability to apply the 
unanimity rule, a rule which defendant contends is as fundamental to every 
capital sentencing hearing as are the rules discussed in Zehr. We 
reject defendant's argument and repeat our holding above that the three 
questions proffered by defendant at voir dire are unrelated to juror 
prejudice or bias; rather, the questions concern jury instructions, a matter 
precluded from voir dire inquiry under Rule 234, which specifies 
that "questions shall not directly or indirectly concern matters of law or 
instructions." Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to ask 
defendant's three tendered questions at voir dire.
Defendant's second claim of error concerning the selection of the jury for 
his sentencing determination is that the trial court improperly barred the 
defense from inquiring at voir dire whether a prospective juror would 
be able to hold the State to its burden of proving eligibility beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Venireperson Barbara Wettstaedt, who ultimately became a juror 
and deliberated upon defendant's sentence, was asked the following at voir 
dire:
Defendant asserts that he was denied a fair sentencing hearing as a result of 
the trial court's ruling sustaining the prosecutor's objection to defense 
counsel's questions regarding whether the venireperson could hold the State to 
its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant argues that counsel's 
question had not been previously asked and answered because counsel's earlier 
questions of this prospective juror merely referred to the burden being on the 
prosecution, and never specifically referred to the standard of proof as being 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, defendant contends that the court's 
questioning did not inquire of the prospective juror whether she would be able 
to hold the State to the beyond a reasonable doubt burden as to eligibility. 
Although defendant acknowledges that the court had advised the jury panels that 
at the eligibility phase the State was required to prove defendant's eligibility 
for the death sentence beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant contends that 
counsel's question was focused upon ascertaining the juror's bias or inability 
to determine defendant's eligibility based upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 
thereby violating defendant's due process rights.
Defense counsel accepted venireperson Wettstaedt as a juror. It is well 
established that the failure of defense counsel to challenge a juror for cause 
or by peremptory challenge waives any objection to that juror. People v. 
Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 546-47 (1995); People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 271 (1985).
Defendant, however, urges us to consider his claim for relief under the plain 
error doctrine. 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). Under the doctrine of plain error, a 
reviewing court may consider an error not properly preserved at trial where the 
evidence is closely balanced or the error was so fundamental and of such 
magnitude as to deny the defendant a fair trial. People v. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167, 191-92 (1996). We do not believe that either of these circumstances 
applies to defendant's claim.
In his brief to this court, defendant acknowledges that all venire panels 
were told the following by the trial court: "In this case, the State must prove 
the defendant eligible for the death penalty beyond a reasonable doubt. That is 
their burden and it will remain with them throughout that phase." Furthermore, 
during voir dire, venireperson Wettstaedt was asked by defense counsel 
whether she understood that the sentencing determination consisted of two 
separate parts, and that during the first phase the State carried the burden to 
establish eligibility. She responded that she had no "problems or 
preconceptions" with that concept, and that she would wait to hear all the 
evidence before deciding whether the State had "met their burden for 
eligibility." Further, venireperson Wettstaedt responded that she would have no 
difficulty in finding defendant ineligible for a sentence of death if the State 
failed to meet its burden. Thus, the record establishes that venireperson 
Wettstaedt was aware prior to being empaneled that the State had the burden of 
proving defendant eligible for the death penalty beyond a reasonable doubt and 
that she was willing to hold the State to that burden. Defendant is unable to 
point to anything in the record to indicate that venireperson Wettstaedt 
disagreed with this proposition or was in any aspect biased or prejudiced. 
Accordingly, the court's ruling did not constitute plain error.
Trial Court's Refusal to Exclude Portions of 
Defendant's
ConfessionDefendant next argues that he was denied a 
fair eligibility hearing due to the trial court's failure to grant a motion 
in limine to redact portions of defendant's confession, an error which 
defendant contends was compounded by Detective Van Stedum's "inaccurate and 
misleading" characterization of the confession as containing an admission of 
defendant's previous intent to assault other women with a crowbar and rape them, 
thereby tainting the jury with "speculative" other-crimes evidence which was 
substantially prejudicial and unfair.
Prior to the eligibility phase, the defense moved in limine to 
exclude or redact from defendant's confession any statements regarding 
defendant's thoughts involving hitting women over the head with a crowbar on the 
Illinois Prairie Path. The trial judge denied this motion, allowing the State to 
introduce evidence "into why [defendant] procured the crowbar, that he procured 
it, that it was prior to these events." The trial judge further ruled that 
"[t]he crowbar and the conversation about the crowbar, any statements about the 
crowbar, that is probative and its very relevant and it should come in." 
Defendant unsuccessfully renewed the motion to redact the confession after 
voir dire was concluded.
Defendant contends that the references to the Prairie Path statement are 
"prejudicial and inflammatory" and asserts that the statement is "at worst 
ambiguous and, at best, says only that defendant admitted thinking about or 
planning to hit a girl over the head with the crowbar, not to rape but to rob." 
Defendant concludes that this evidence did not bear upon any issues to be 
decided by the jury and only served to distract the jurors from their limited 
consideration of the issue of eligibility.
Defendant never objected to Detective Van Stedum's testimony in his 
post-trial motions. This court has held that in order for a defendant to 
preserve a claim of error for review, "[b]oth a trial objection 
and a written post-trial motion raising the issue are required for 
alleged errors that could have been raised during trial." (Emphasis in 
original.) People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). A defendant's 
failure to comply with these requirements results in a waiver of that issue on 
appeal. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d  at 186. Thus, defendant's challenge 
concerning this claim is waived.
We further determine that defendant's properly preserved claim concerning the 
trial court's failure to grant defendant's motion in limine to redact 
portions of defendant's confession lacks merit. We have repeatedly held that 
evidence having "a direct bearing on the statutory prerequisites" may be 
admitted at the eligibility stage. E.g., People v. Simms, 
143 Ill. 2d 154, 175 (1991); People v. Brisbon, 106 Ill. 2d 342, 371 
(1985); see also 720 ILCS 5/9-1(e) (West 1994) ("During the proceeding any 
information relevant to any of the [aggravating] factors *** may be presented by 
either the State or the defendant under the rules governing the admission of 
evidence at criminal trials"). Defendant's purpose in purchasing and keeping the 
crowbar, in conjunction with his statements to Tom Richardson concerning his 
intent to kill Maria, relate directly to whether the murder was "committed in a 
cold, calculated and premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme 
or design to take a human life by unlawful means." 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(11) (West 
1994). Thus, defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to redact 
the Prairie Path statements from his confession, and no error occurred.
Prosecutor's Remarks During Rebuttal Closing 
Argument
Defendant next contends that he was deprived of a fair eligibility hearing in 
violation of his rights to due process and to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment because the prosecutor remarked that by killing Maria, defendant at 
the same time eliminated a witness in a rape case. Defendant claims the trial 
court erred in overruling defense counsel's objection and allowing the same 
comments to be repeated at the aggravation-mitigation phase, thereby prejudicing 
defendant's jury with an uncharged and legally unavailable aggravating factor. 
During rebuttal closing argument at the eligibility stage, the prosecutor 
stated:
During the prosecutor's closing rebuttal argument during the 
aggravation-mitigation stage, the prosecutor similarly commented: "[Defendant] 
murdered her to eliminate a witness against him in a rape case."
Defendant contends that under this court's decision in People v. 
Brownell, 79 Ill. 2d 508, 535-36 (1980), the trial court's ruling was 
erroneous as a matter of law because it allowed the jury to consider a legally 
unavailable aggravating circumstance. Defendant additionally relies upon this 
court's subsequent decision in People v. Adams, 109 Ill. 2d 102 (1985), 
where this court held a similar argument to constitute plain error and vacated 
the defendant's death sentence. Defendant admits that although defense counsel 
at trial objected to the prosecutor's remarks, the point was not preserved in 
defendant's post-trial motion. However, defendant contends that the trial 
court's ruling constitutes plain error. 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). In response, the 
State acknowledges that although the prosecutor's remarks may have been 
improper, the State nevertheless contends that no reversible error occurred.
We find that the two challenged comments made by the prosecutor do not 
constitute error under either Brownell or Adams, which are 
factually distinguishable from the cause at bar. In Brownell, the 
defendant was found eligible for the death penalty on two grounds: that the 
murdered individual was killed in the course of two other felonies, aggravated 
kidnapping and rape (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6), now 720 ILCS 
5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1994)); and that the murdered individual was an eyewitness 
against the defendant (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(7), now 720 
ILCS 5/9-1(b)(8) (West 1994)). Brownell, 79 Ill. 2d  at 514. Section 
9-1(b)(7) provided for imposition of the death sentence where "the murdered 
individual was a witness in a prosecution against the defendant, gave material 
assistance to the state in any investigation or prosecution of the defendant, or 
was an eye witness or possessed other material evidence against the defendant." 
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(7).(2) 

In Brownell, this court, in construing the murdered-witness 
aggravating factor, determined that this statutory factor in aggravation does 
not allow the State to regard the slain individual as both the victim of a 
murder as well as a witness to the crime of his or her own murder. In reaching 
this conclusion, this court held that "[w]e do not think this particular factual 
situation was intended by the General Assembly to be included within this 
aggravating factor. Rather, we think the General Assembly intended to include 
situations where, during an investigation or prosecution of a separate offense 
which has previously taken place, a witness is killed in an attempt to stymie 
the investigation or prosecution." Brownell, 79 Ill. 2d  at 525-26. 
Therefore, because the trial court determined that the defendant in 
Brownell was eligible for the death penalty on the basis of a 
nonexistent statutory factor in aggravation, and subsequently weighed this 
improper aggravating factor in reaching its decision to impose a sentence of 
death, this court vacated the defendant's death sentence and remanded the cause 
for a new sentencing hearing. Brownell, 79 Ill. 2d  at 535-36.
We determine that defendant's reliance upon Brownell is 
factually inapposite to the cause at bar. Unlike in Brownell, where the 
defendant was improperly found eligible for the death penalty pursuant to a 
nonexistent statutory aggravating factor, in the cause at bar neither did the 
State seek to prove defendant eligible for the death sentence based upon the 
section 9-1(b)(8) statutory factor in aggravation, nor was the jury instructed 
at either stage of the sentencing proceedings regarding this aggravating factor. 
Defendant was found eligible for the death penalty on four grounds, none of 
which was the section 9-1(b)(8) aggravating factor. Further, whereas in 
Brownell, the trial court's error continued into the 
aggravation-mitigation stage because the section 9-1(b)(8) statutory aggravating 
factor was weighed in arriving at imposing defendant's death sentence, there is 
nothing in the record in the matter at bar which indicates that the jury was 
improperly influenced by the prosecutor's comments.
Defendant additionally challenges the prosecutor's remarks under People 
v. Adams, 109 Ill. 2d 102 (1985). In Adams, this court determined 
that remarks by the prosecutor at both the first and second phase of the 
sentencing hearing that the defendant qualified for the death penalty because he 
intended to, and did, kill a "witness" to a crime were so prejudicial as to 
entitle the defendant to a new sentencing hearing. The prosecutor in 
Adams told the jury in closing arguments at the eligibility phase:
Further, at the aggravation-mitigation stage of the sentencing hearing, the 
prosecutor in Adams stated: 
This court in Adams determined that the prosecutor's comments 
improperly called for the jury "to weigh as an aggravating factor a circumstance 
that under Brownell was nonexistent." Adams, 109 Ill. 2d  at 
128. Based upon the entirety of the prosecutor's extended remarks, this court 
found reversible error because it was unclear whether the jury's deliberations 
and verdict were influenced by the prosecutor's improper argument. 
Adams, 109 Ill. 2d  at 128.
We determine that the challenged remarks made by the prosecutor in the cause 
at bar do not constitute plain error. Generally, prosecutors are permitted wide 
latitude in their closing arguments. People v. Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d 422, 482 (1993). As a result, a reviewing court will find reversible error based 
upon improper prosecutorial arguments only in those instances where the remarks 
are "clearly prejudicial." Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d  at 482. In determining 
whether the remarks are prejudicial, we have referred to the "content of the 
language used, its relation to the evidence, and its effect on the rights of the 
accused to a fair and impartial trial." Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d  at 
482-83.
Upon review of the challenged remarks made by the prosecutor in closing 
argument in the cause at bar, we find that the two brief statements alluding to 
defendant's elimination of a witness in a rape case do not approach the level of 
the comments found to constitute reversible error in Adams. In the 
cause at bar, the prosecutor did not, as in Adams, tell the jury that 
because defendant killed Maria to eliminate a witness in a rape case, this 
action independently qualified him for the death penalty. Moreover, the 
prosecutor in the instant matter neither emphasized the comments nor dwelled 
upon this argument. Therefore, we conclude that the two challenged sentences 
uttered by the prosecutor in the cause at bar are distinguishable from the 
prolonged and clearly prejudicial comments made by the prosecutor in 
Adams.
In sum, we do not believe that the brief comments constituted error so 
fundamental or of such a great magnitude as to deprive defendant of a fair and 
impartial sentencing hearing. Further, we do not believe that the isolated 
comments had any effect on the jury's determination that the defendant was 
eligible for the death penalty. As noted, the eligibility determination rested 
on four separate grounds and indicates that the evidence was far from being 
closely balanced. On this record we decline to consider these comments as plain 
error.
Defendant's second point of error regarding prosecutorial comments during 
rebuttal closing arguments at the eligibility phase is that he was denied a fair 
hearing because the State's rebuttal argument "mischaracterized" the defense as 
blaming the victim and as justifying the murder due to the victim's provocation. 
Defendant contends that the trial court improperly overruled defense objections 
to these arguments, thereby violating defendant's due process rights and the 
cruel and unusual punishment clause.
During the State's rebuttal argument at the eligibility phase, defense 
counsel unsuccessfully objected to remarks made by the State. Defendant claims 
error in the following exchange:
Defendant additionally claims error in the prosecutor's subsequent remarks to 
the jury:
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor's mischaracterization of defense 
counsel's arguments as stating that the victim was responsible for her own death 
and/or that she provoked her murder are prejudicial and inflammatory, to the 
extent that a jury would find it offensive for defendant to blame the victim in 
this case. Defendant points out that during closing arguments at eligibility, 
although defense counsel argued that when Maria spurned his sexual advances 
defendant suffered an uncontrollable rage which led to the murder, counsel never 
blamed the victim for declining defendant's advances. Therefore, defendant 
contends that the trial court erred in overruling defense counsel's objections 
concerning the impropriety of the prosecutor's arguments.
Defense counsel did not raise this claim for relief in defendant's post-trial 
motion; therefore, it is deemed waived. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d  at 186. 
Defendant nevertheless urges us to consider this claim under the plain error 
rule. However, because defendant cannot meet either prong of the plain error 
doctrine, we decline to consider defendant's claim as plain error.
As stated, because a prosecutor has great latitude in presenting his closing 
argument, reversal is only appropriate where the remarks are clearly prejudicial 
to the defendant. Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d  at 482. The trial court is in 
the best position to determine the prejudicial effect of a remark made during 
closing argument, and, therefore, absent a clear abuse of discretion, its ruling 
should be upheld. Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d  at 483.
Our review of the record indicates that the trial court did not err in 
overruling defense counsel's objections to the challenged statements. During the 
sentencing hearing, defense counsel argued that defendant's murder of Maria was 
precipitated by an uncontrollable rage. As defendant himself points out in his 
brief to this court, defense counsel contended during closing arguments that 
once Maria spurned defendant's sexual advances, "[a] rage built up, a well of 
emotion, if you will, a wave. And like a wave in the ocean, he couldn't stop it 
*** this rage he can't control." Therefore, the prosecutor's statements validly 
questioned defendant's theory of the case and did not deprive defendant of his 
right to a fair trial. We additionally note that any alleged error resulting 
from this remark would also have been cured by the trial judge's instruction to 
the jury that the closing arguments of counsel do not constitute evidence. 
Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d  at 482. In sum, because we find that defendant did 
not suffer any substantial prejudice as a result of the trial court's rulings, 
and that the evidence at eligibility was not closely balanced, the plain error 
doctrine is not applicable to defendant's claim.
The Section 9-1(b)(11) Aggravating Factor
Defendant was found eligible for the imposition of the death sentence on four 
aggravating factors, including section 9-1(b)(11), which provides for death 
sentence eligibility where the defendant was 18 years or older at the time of 
the offense, and where "the murder was committed in a cold, calculated and 
premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme or design to take a 
human life by unlawful means, and the conduct of the defendant created a 
reasonable expectation that the death of a human being would result therefrom." 
720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(11) (West 1994). Defendant contends that this aggravating 
factor is "unconstitutionally vague on its face." Specifically, defendant 
contends that the use of "vague" language in section 9-1(b)(11), such as "cold," 
"calculated," and "premeditated," violates the eighth amendment of the United 
States Constitution, as it impermissibly fails to narrow the class of those 
defendants eligible for death because it requires no additional mental state 
beyond intent, a mental state defendant asserts is "present in almost all 
murders."
This court has repeatedly rejected the argument that the language employed by 
the legislature in section 9-1(b)(11) is unconstitutionally vague. In People 
v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 356, 372-73 (1993), this court held that the terms 
"cold, calculated and premeditated" as used in section 9-1(b)(11) "provide 
adequate guidance for assessing death eligibility." More recently, in People 
v. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d 158 (1996), we rejected arguments virtually 
identical to those made by defendant at bar. In Munson, the defendant 
asserted that he had been deprived of a fair sentencing hearing because the 
terms "cold, calculated and premeditated" contained in section 9-1(b)(11) "could 
apply to every defendant eligible for the death penalty [and] [t]hus, this 
factor fails to place any inherent restraint on a capital sentencer's discretion 
in imposing death." Munson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 191. In rejecting the 
defendant's argument in Munson, we held that the aggravating factor 
contained in section 9-1(b)(11) "pertains to the intent to murder pursuant to a 
particular plan, scheme or design. It is not simply the intent to commit murder. 
As such, this factor is not present in every murder case. Thus, contrary to 
defendant's argument, the factor does place the necessary restraint on the 
sentencer's discretion to impose death." Munson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 
191.
Although defendant in the cause at bar acknowledges that this court has 
previously rejected the claim for relief he is presently requesting, he 
nevertheless urges this court to reconsider this issue in light of a 1994 
decision rendered by the Florida Supreme Court in Jackson v. State, 648 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 1994). We decline to reconsider our previous holdings that the 
language employed in section 9-1(b)(11) is not unconstitutionally vague. 
Defendant articulates no new and compelling reason for this court to deviate 
from our well-established precedent.
Defendant also contends in his brief to this court that the "totality of the 
evidence at the sentencing hearing showed that the murder was not committed in a 
cold, calculated, and premeditated manner, but resulted from a rage erupting 
from [defendant's] personality structure and the victim's rejection of his 
request for consensual sex." Defendant maintains that this was not a carefully 
planned murder subject to the section 9-1(b)(11) eligibility factor. Therefore, 
defendant argues that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing without the 
section 9-1(b)(11) factor.
We determine that the jury could have found that the evidence adduced at the 
sentencing hearing established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant 
committed the murder in a "cold, calculated and premeditated manner pursuant to 
a preconceived plan, scheme or design to take a human life by unlawful means." 
720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(11) (West 1994). The record establishes that the victim had 
been a longtime friend of the Grafs, and would often sleep at the Grafs' 
apartment a few times a month before she moved in with them during August 1993. 
Defendant had been living with the Grafs since the fall of 1992, and was 
acquainted with Maria since that time. Defendant's friend, Tom Richardson, 
testified that on October 31, 1992, defendant told him that defendant intended 
to hit Maria over the head with a crowbar, rape her, steal her car, and escape 
to New York City, all of which eventually transpired. In addition, Richardson 
testified that defendant told him that defendant planned to attack Maria after 
she had taken a shower in the Grafs' bathroom, which was located between 
defendant's room and the Grafs' bedroom, again, foreshadowing the circumstances 
of this crime. Richardson testified that defendant then showed him a crowbar 
which defendant retrieved from his dresser drawer, one end of which defendant 
had wrapped with electrical tape. Once again, this foreshadowed the events of 
the crime, to the extent that defendant used such a crowbar as the murder 
weapon. Richardson further testified that in April and May of 1993, defendant 
repeated his plan to hit Maria over the head with a crowbar, rape her, steal her 
car, and leave for New York City.
In addition, in the course of the confession defendant gave to Detectives Van 
Stedum and Simo in New York City on June 10, 1994, defendant told the police 
officers that the year before the murder he was "planning on doing the same 
thing." When asked if the "same thing" meant hitting a girl over the head, 
defendant replied, "Right, or taking her purse or, you know ***." From 
defendant's confession, the jury could determine that defendant had a 
generalized preconceived plan of attacking women by hitting them over the head 
with a crowbar and robbing and raping them, and, in furtherance of this scheme, 
purchased a crowbar, taped the end, and secreted it in his bedroom.
In addition, the record supports the conclusion that defendant's actions were 
"cold" and "calculated" within the meaning of section 9-1(b)(11). In his 
confession, defendant related that after he inflicted the first blow to Maria's 
head, she fell back on the bed and her head started bleeding. Defendant then 
jumped on top of her and repeatedly struck Maria's head with the crowbar. When 
he thought he had killed her, he attempted to clean the blood splatters from the 
wall and then cleaned himself up and did his laundry. In the interim, defendant 
placed a pillow over Maria's head, took off her clothes, and raped her. Upon 
completion of the rape, defendant drove Maria's car to an Elk Grove Village pawn 
shop and pawned Maria's VCR. He then returned to the apartment, gathered his 
things, and decided to rape Maria a second time before, in defendant's words, 
Maria became "cold and stiff." Defendant thereafter took Maria's purse and 
departed in her car for New York City.
Therefore, the evidence supports the jury's determination that defendant 
murdered Maria in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner pursuant to a 
preconceived plan, scheme or design to take her life by unlawful means. 
Furthermore, defendant's repeated striking of Maria over the head with the 
crowbar created a reasonable expectation that she would die. Thus, the evidence 
was sufficient to prove the existence of the aggravating factor set forth in 
section 9-1(b)(11).
In his brief to this court, defendant asserts that the "totality of the 
evidence" at the sentencing hearing reveals that this murder was not cold, 
calculated and premeditated within the meaning of the section 9-1(b)(11) 
aggravating factor. In support of this assertion, defendant argues that the 
testimony given by Dr. Wahlstrom during the aggravation-mitigation phase 
"disproved" the section 9-1(b)(11) statutory factor in aggravation. Even if Dr. 
Wahlstrom's testimony had been presented as part of the evidence during the 
initial, eligibility phase, we are not persuaded that it would alter the 
conclusion that the jury found defendant eligible for the death sentence on the 
section 9-1(b)(11) aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt.
As a final argument, defendant urges this court to adopt a standard of 
"heightened premeditation" for the aggravating factor of cold, calculated and 
premeditated murder. Defendant cites to decisions rendered by the Supreme Court 
of Florida where that court adopted the phrase "heightened premeditation" to 
distinguish the cold, calculated and premeditated aggravating factor from the 
premeditation element of first degree murder. See, e.g., Jackson v. 
State, 648 So. 2d 85, 89 (Fla. 1994); Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 1064 (Fla. 1990). Under Florida's standard, although "heightened 
premeditation" may be demonstrated by the manner of the killing, the evidence 
"must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant planned or arranged to 
commit murder before the crime began." Porter, 564 So. 2d  at 1064. As 
stated, this court has repeatedly upheld section 9-1(b)(11) against 
constitutional challenges and has found that this aggravating factor does not 
apply to every murder, but only to those perpetrated pursuant to a particular 
plan, design or scheme. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 191. Defendant offers no 
persuasive reason why we should depart from our previous holdings.
Challenges to Eligibility Based Upon the Felony-Murder 
Aggravation Evidence
Defendant argues that the jury's verdicts on eligibility based upon felony 
murder were legally insufficient because they omitted the mental elements of the 
underlying felonies. The section 9-1(b)(6) aggravating factor provides for 
eligibility in murder cases where the defendant was 18 years or older at the 
time of the offense (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b) (West 1994)), and where the victim was 
killed in the course of another felony (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1994)); was 
killed by the defendant or was physically injured by the defendant substantially 
contemporaneously with the injuries that caused death (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6)(a) 
(West 1994)); the defendant acted with the intent to kill the murdered 
individual or the knowledge that his acts created a strong probability of death 
or great bodily harm (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6)(b) (West 1994); and the other felony 
was one of those enumerated in the statute (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6)(c) (West 
1994)).
Relying upon this court's decision in People v. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d 525 (1995), defendant contends that the verdict forms finding defendant eligible 
for the death penalty on the three felony-murder aggravating factors are legally 
insufficient because they omitted the requisite mental state language that 
"defendant acted with the intent to kill the murdered individual or with the 
knowledge that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily 
harm." 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6)(b) (West 1994). Defendant is correct that the 
verdict forms on the felony murder eligibility factors were legally insufficient 
in that they failed to include defendant's mens rea. People v. 
Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d  at 68, citing People v. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d 525, 538 (1995).
Notwithstanding, the State argues that defendant has waived this claim of 
error, as defendant neither objected to these points at trial nor raised this 
claim in his post-trial motions. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d  at 186. Defendant 
argues that the deficiency falls within the purview of the plain error rule, 
which permits a reviewing court to take notice of plain errors and defects 
affecting substantial rights in instances where the evidence is closely balanced 
or where the error affected the fundamental fairness of the proceeding. 
People v. Fields, 135 Ill. 2d 18, 56 (1990).
We need not decide this question, because we have determined that defendant 
was properly found eligible for the death sentence under section 9-1(b)(11), 
specifically, that defendant committed the murder in a cold, calculated and 
premeditated manner. This court has repeatedly recognized that under the 
Illinois death penalty statute, special emphasis is not accorded to any 
aggravating factor and no added significance is given to multiple aggravating 
factors as opposed to a single factor. People v. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d 132, 164 (1996). Therefore, in those instances where a defendant is eligible 
based upon two or more statutory aggravating factors, the fact that one of those 
factors may later be invalidated may not impair the eligibility finding as long 
as a separate, valid aggravating factor supported eligibility. Brown, 
169 Ill. 2d  at 165 (citing People v. Page, 156 Ill. 2d 258, 268 (1993), 
and Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 880-90, 77 L. Ed. 2d 235, 252-58, 
103 S. Ct. 2733, 2744-50 (1983)).
Defendant also argues that he was denied a fair capital sentencing hearing 
because he was unduly prejudiced when the trial judge allowed the jury to hear 
that defendant had already been convicted of six counts of murder by the judge 
at the guilt phase of his trial. Defendant argues that pursuant to section 
9-1(b), the only information an eligibility jury needs to know about findings at 
trial is that the defendant has been "found guilty of first degree murder." 720 
ILCS 5/9-1(b) (West 1994). Defendant therefore contends that the six murder 
counts should have been merged into one murder conviction, and only that 
conviction should have been introduced to the jury. Defendant maintains that the 
events here created a presumption of eligibility in spite of the fact that a 
defendant is presumed ineligible until proven eligible beyond a reasonable 
doubt. According to defendant, the introduction of findings of guilt of all the 
multiple forms of murder as evidence at the eligibility phase constitutes 
reversible error as it overwhelmed the jury and tainted the entire eligibility 
hearing, including the jury's determination as to the section 9-1(b)(11) 
aggravating factor.
We need not address defendant's assertions concerning this issue because we 
have already determined that defendant was properly found eligible for the death 
penalty under the cold, calculated and premeditated aggravating factor. Even if 
we were to invalidate a finding of eligibility based upon the three 
felony-murder aggravating factors, defendant would still be eligible on the 
basis of the jury's verdict on the cold, calculated and premeditated aggravating 
factor. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d 132, 165 
(1996) (citing People v. Page, 156 Ill. 2d 258, 268 (1993), and 
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 880-90, 77 L. Ed. 2d 235, 252-58, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2744-50 (1983)). We additionally reject defendant's assertion that 
the alleged error rendered the entire eligibility hearing unfair. The record 
discloses no support for the defendant's assertion that the jury was overwhelmed 
by the introduction of the court's findings of guilt.
II. Aggravation-Mitigation Stage
Prosecutorial Comments During Closing Arguments
Defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible error by 
sustaining the State's objection to defense counsel's closing argument at the 
aggravation-mitigation stage that defendant suffered from a severe mental 
illness, thereby giving the jury the impression that the court agreed with the 
State's position that no extreme mental or emotional disturbance mitigator had 
been established, when there was evidence presented of defendant's history of 
emotional deprivation and personality disorders. Defendant challenges the 
following exchange:
Defense counsel immediately thereafter continued his closing argument as 
follows:
Defendant contends that the court erred in sustaining the State's objection 
because there was substantial evidence that defendant had been emotionally 
deprived as a result his home environment and that defendant suffered from 
severe mental and/or emotional disturbances, specifically three different 
personality disorders. Defendant therefore maintains that the court's ruling 
favored the State because it supported the State's argument that there was 
insufficient evidence of an extreme mental and emotional disturbance to defeat a 
death sentence. Defendant also complains that during the State's rebuttal 
argument, the court overruled the defense objection to the State's argument that 
defendant showed "cowardice" in "trying to blame his mother for his actions in 
murdering another woman." Defendant contends that his rights under the eighth 
and fourteenth amendments were violated because both of the court's rulings 
unduly burdened the defense in establishing his mitigation case under the 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance mitigator of section 9-1(c)(2) (720 ILCS 
5/9-1(c)(2) (West 1994)).
Regarding the trial court's sustaining of the prosecutor's objection to 
defense counsel's use of the phrase "severe mental disturbances," although 
defendant objected at trial to the complained-of remark, the record indicates 
that defendant did not raise this claim of error in his post-trial motions. 
Therefore, this specific claim is waived. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d  at 186. 
However, in capital cases, this court has also recognized that the procedural 
bar will be excused if a timely trial objection has been made and the claims can 
be raised later in a post-conviction hearing petition. People v. Keene, 
169 Ill. 2d 1, 10 (1995); Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d  at 190. Because defendant 
has framed his argument as a deprivation of due process based upon the 
fourteenth amendment, as well as an eighth amendment violation against cruel and 
unusual punishment, both of which may be entertained under the Post-Conviction 
Hearing Act (see 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1994)), we address the merits of 
defendant's claim.
The sustaining of an objection to defense counsel's statement is not an 
indication of the court's opinion as to the facts or the verdict. We reject 
defendant's assertion that the ruling improperly indicated to the jury that 
defendant had not established the existence of severe mental and emotional 
disturbances. To the contrary, the jury was presented with Dr. Wahlstrom's 
testimony that defendant was under an extreme mental or emotional disturbance at 
the time he killed Maria, and that he suffered from three disorders: antisocial 
personality disorder, borderline personality disorder, and avoidant personality 
disorder. Further, the record shows that when defense counsel proceeded with his 
argument and mirrored the expert's testimony concerning borderline personality 
disorder, no objections were made by the State. Finally, the jury was instructed 
that the court's remarks and rulings did not indicate the court's opinion 
regarding any facts or the verdict. We therefore conclude that defendant's claim 
lacks merit.
Concerning defendant's challenge to the "cowardice" comment, which was 
properly preserved for review, it is well established that prosecutors are 
afforded wide latitude in closing argument, and a prosecutor's comments in 
closing argument will result in reversible error only when they engender 
"substantial prejudice" against the defendant to the extent that it is 
impossible to determine whether the verdict of the jury was caused by the 
comments or the evidence. People v. Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d 258, 323 
(1990). Closing arguments must be reviewed in their entirety, and the challenged 
remarks must be viewed in context. People v. Kitchen, 159 Ill. 2d 1, 38 
(1994). Examining the challenged remarks in context, we determine that the 
comments of the prosecutor in the cause at bar do not constitute reversible 
error. Rather, the remarks were designed to rebut the defense claim that 
defendant's actions resulted from a mother who had emotionally abandoned him, 
which allegedly caused defendant to have violent sexual fantasies leading to 
murder. However, defendant presented no evidence that defendant's mother had 
ever perpetrated any sexual or physical abuse against defendant. Further, the 
evidence showed that shortly before the murder, defendant's mother on two 
occasions provided defendant with rent money when his rent was in arrears. 
During the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor may contest the significance and 
weight of the defendant's mitigating evidence, and is not required to agree that 
the evidence offered in mitigation by defendant is indeed mitigating. People 
v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401, 454-55 (1993). Here, the prosecutor's statement 
did not restrict or limit the defendant's presentation of mitigating evidence, 
nor did it misstate to jurors the applicable law governing their consideration 
of the evidence. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d  at 455. Finally, the record 
reveals that the jury had also been instructed that the attorney's closing 
arguments were not evidence. In sum, the prosecutor's comment did not deny the 
defendant a fair trial and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
overruling defendant's objection.
Defendant's second point of error in connection with remarks made by the 
prosecutor at the aggravation-mitigation stage of the hearing is that his rights 
to due process and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment were violated by 
the prosecutor's closing argument that mitigation evidence concerning 
defendant's allegation that he suffered from an antisocial personality disorder 
should be taken as aggravation. Defendant admits that this claim was not 
preserved, but urges us to consider it under the plain error doctrine.
During its initial closing argument at the aggravation-mitigation phase, the 
State addressed the testimony given by Dr. Wahlstrom that defendant suffered 
from an antisocial personality disorder which frequently abates when individuals 
reach their forties. Defendant challenges comments made by the prosecutor in 
response to the assertion that defendant had an antisocial personality 
disorder:
A similar argument was repeated by the State in rebuttal closing 
argument:
Defense counsel made no objection to these remarks. Defendant now contends 
that the prosecutor committed plain error in stating that defendant's mitigating 
evidence was actually aggravating evidence. According to defendant, the remarks 
made by the State improperly restricted the jury's consideration of the 
mitigating evidence introduced by defense counsel at the sentencing hearing, as 
the comments could have led the jury to believe that defendant's antisocial 
personality disorder constituted an aggravating circumstance which in and of 
itself was a reason to sentence defendant to death.
Defense counsel neither raised an objection to the prosecutor's remarks at 
trial nor included this claim of error in defendant's post-trial motion. 
Accordingly, defendant's claim for relief has been waived. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d  at 186. Although defendant urges us to consider this claim of error 
under the plain error rule, because the evidence is not closely balanced and the 
alleged error is not so fundamental and of such magnitude as to deny defendant a 
fair trial, defendant has met neither requirement of the plain error doctrine. 
See Miller, 173 Ill. 2d  at 191-92.
We have repeatedly held that a prosecutor's remarks constitute reversible 
error only when they engender "substantial prejudice" against the defendant. 
E.g., Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d  at 323; Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d  at 482. We find that the remarks of the prosecutor fall within the 
parameters of proper closing argument. After carefully reviewing the record, we 
conclude that the remarks of the prosecutor summarized Dr. Wahlstrom's findings. 
Dr. Wahlstrom testified that individuals with antisocial personality disorder 
are prone to deceit and manipulation, to the extent that they "may repeatedly 
lie, use an alias, con others, or malinger," that they fail to conform to social 
norms with respect to lawful behavior, constituting "[a] disregard for and 
violation of the rights of others," and that they continue committing this 
pattern of repetitive behavior "up to a certain point and then they tend to slow 
down, especially with relation to criminal behavior, and that's in the fourth 
decade of life, or in the 40s." Further, Dr. Wahlstrom could not state that 
defendant would cease to commit crimes. Thus, much of the prosecutor's argument 
reflected the testimony given by defendant's expert regarding the antisocial 
personality disorder.
Further, we have rejected precisely the same argument made by defendant in 
the instant matter in People v. McNeal, 175 Ill. 2d 335 (1997). There, 
the defendant argued, as defendant does in the matter at bar, that the 
prosecutor violated the eighth amendment by remarking during closing arguments 
that the defendant's antisocial personality disorder constituted aggravating, 
rather than mitigating, evidence. In McNeal, the prosecutor argued as 
follows:
In rejecting the defendant's assertions in McNeal, we determined 
that "defendant's antisocial personality disorder is *** a double-edged sword 
for purposes of mitigation and aggravation *** [as] not every mental or 
emotional condition that can be classified as a `disorder' will necessarily be 
mitigating." McNeal, 175 Ill. 2d  at 370. In McNeal, we 
concluded that "the prosecutor merely disagreed with the defendant's 
characterization of that evidence as mitigation, as he is permitted to do." 
McNeal, 175 Ill. 2d  at 371. As in McNeal, the prosecutor in 
the cause at bar at no time suggested to the jurors that the law did not allow 
them to consider the evidence presented in mitigation and defendant makes no 
assertion that the jury was not properly instructed by the trial court 
concerning its consideration of mitigation evidence. We adhere to our decision 
in McNeal and find that the prosecutor's characterization of 
defendant's antisocial personality disorder as a factor in aggravation did not 
deprive defendant of a fair and reliable sentencing hearing. Accordingly, no 
plain error occurred.
Jury Instructions
Defendant raises errors concerning the instructions given to the jury at the 
conclusion of the aggravation-mitigation stage of the sentencing hearing. 
Defendant contends that he was denied a fair sentencing hearing because of the 
instruction given to the jury concerning defendant's violent sexual fantasies 
against women other than the victim in this case. At the eligibility phase of 
the proceedings, the trial court granted defendant's motion in limine 
to exclude all evidence of defendant's sexual fantasies, which included acts of 
violence against women. The court allowed testimony concerning defendant's 
purchase of the crowbar. However, the trial court denied defendant's same motion 
in limine at the aggravation-mitigation stage of the proceedings, 
ruling that the evidence would be admissible and that the court would also give 
the jury a cautionary instruction pursuant to this court's decision in 
People v. Devin, 93 Ill. 2d 326 (1983). Both sides eventually agreed on 
the following instruction:
Because all parties ultimately agreed to this instruction, defendant now 
brings this claim for relief under the plain error rule (134 Ill. 2d R. 
615(a)).
Defendant has not met either of the requirements to invoke the plain error 
doctrine, for, as stated, the evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing was 
not closely balanced, and, further, the alleged error did not deprive defendant 
of a fair and impartial trial. See Fields, 135 Ill. 2d  at 69-70. 
Defendant contends that the instruction given by the trial court not only failed 
to comply with Devin, but also violated his rights to due process to 
the extent that it misled the jury that all of defendant's sexual fantasies 
discussed during the proceedings were corroborated. Thus, defendant maintains 
that the jury could have applied the instruction to conclude that the 
uncorroborated fantasies were accurate descriptions of conduct in which 
defendant had actually engaged.
We find defendant's reliance upon this court's decision in Devin 
unavailing. In Devin, the defendant had been diagnosed as a sociopath 
by psychiatrists retained by both the defendant and the State. These 
psychiatrists agreed that a sociopathic personality frequently engages in 
fantasies and that much of the conduct of a sociopathic personality results from 
efforts to carry out those fantasies. Numerous witnesses testified that the 
defendant had told them that he had tortured and killed several people. The jury 
heard this testimony concerning the witness' conversations with the defendant 
without being given a cautionary instruction that there was no corroborating 
evidence which tended to prove that any of the conduct described had actually 
occurred. In light of the fact that "[t]he jury was given no guidance that would 
assist them in the determination of whether the conversations to which the 
witnesses testified purported to recount actual occurrences or whether they were 
pure fantasy," this court determined that a jury could "reach a conclusion as to 
defendant's `character and propensities,' not on the basis of his conduct, but 
on the basis of his sociopathic fantasies." Devin, 93 Ill. 2d  at 
349.
In contrast to the "extraordinary circumstances" (Devin, 93 Ill. 2d 
at 349) with which this court was presented in Devin, the same level of 
potential for confusion between defendant's fantasies and reality is not present 
in the instant cause. The witnesses who testified during the aggravation stage 
concerning defendant's fantasies all spoke in terms of defendant's thoughts and 
desires. The record clearly indicates that these witnesses were describing 
conversations in which defendant discussed his desires or fantasies. The record 
in the instant matter is replete with testimony that defendant "would like to," 
"wanted to," and "planned on" doing certain violent acts towards women, but no 
witness' testimony at aggravation indicated that defendant had professed to 
actually carrying out his desires. These conversations are distinguishable from 
the conversations in Devin, where the defendant professed to be 
relating prior actual conduct. Therefore, defendant's reliance upon 
Devin is inapposite, and no plain error occurred.
We additionally find that the instruction given by the trial court was 
adequate to protect defendant's right to a fair sentencing hearing. The 
challenged instruction stated that it was within the discretion of the jury to 
consider what extent the testimony regarding defendant's violent sexual 
fantasies were corroborated. The instruction also informed the jury that 
corroborating evidence was not offered regarding some of the testimony of 
defendant's violent fantasies. As such, the instruction provided the jury with 
the appropriate level of guidance in light of the plain language of the witness' 
testimony indicating that defendant was not relating actual prior conduct. 
Additionally, defense counsel in summation argued that defendant's fantasies 
were the product of his alleged mental condition and that he merely talked about 
his desires and wishes, and did not act upon them.
Defendant's second point of error in connection with the instructions given 
to the jury at the aggravation-mitigation stage of the hearing is that the trial 
court committed reversible error by rejecting the following jury instruction 
submitted by the defense:
The trial court refused to give this instruction because it was a non-pattern 
instruction. Instead, the trial judge gave IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.05, which 
provides:
Defendant contends that his due process and eighth amendment rights were 
violated by the trial court's refusal to give his tendered instruction on the 
unanimity rule because absent such instruction there was a great likelihood that 
the jury misunderstood that it had to be unanimous in the event it voted for a 
sentence other than death.
We disagree. We have previously held that "it is for the trial court to 
determine, after considering the facts and the governing law, whether the jury 
should be instructed on a particular subject." People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 519 (1996). However, "[i]f an appropriate IPI instruction exists, 
it must be used." Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d  at 519. In the cause at bar, the 
trial court rejected defendant's tendered instruction and instead gave the jury 
IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.05, which clearly and completely informed the jury of the 
unanimity rule. "An abuse of discretion in the refusal of a non-IPI instruction 
occurs only when there is no IPI instruction that applies to the subject on 
which the jury would have been instructed." Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d  at 
519. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing defendant's 
non-pattern jury instruction concerning the unanimity rule where there was an 
applicable pattern instruction regarding the same subject matter.
Further, this court has repeatedly rejected a related argument that jury 
instructions mirroring IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.05 impermissibly misled jurors 
into believing that unanimity was required before a mitigating factor could be 
considered. This court determined that the language of the instructions 
sufficiently informed the jury that it did not need to unanimously agree upon a 
specific mitigating factor in order to consider such a factor. People v. 
Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167, 196-98 (1996); People v. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d 1, 58-59 (1996). Therefore, as the challenged instructions are clear enough 
to inform the jury that it need not be unanimous on a specific mitigating factor 
in order to consider that factor in its deliberations, the instructions are 
likewise clear enough to inform the jury that any decision declining to impose a 
death sentence need not be unanimous, a concept which is far more apparent in 
the plain language of the instructions. Accordingly, we conclude that the jury 
was appropriately and sufficiently instructed that unanimity was not required to 
relieve defendant from the death sentence. The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to give defendant's tendered instruction.
Defendant's third and final point of error concerning the jury instructions 
at the aggravation-mitigation phase of his sentencing hearing is that the jury 
was improperly instructed upon the felony-murder aggravating factors. Defendant 
contends that the instruction improperly omitted the mental elements of the 
underlying felonies:
Defendant contends that in weighing and considering the felony-murder 
aggravating factors at the final phase of the sentencing hearing, the jury was 
misguided concerning these factors in aggravation and this influenced the 
determination for death. Although there was no objection raised at trial and the 
claim of error was not preserved in defendant's post-trial motions, defendant 
contends that waiver does not apply because this alleged error falls within the 
purview of the plain error doctrine. However, defendant fails to satisfy either 
prong of the plain error doctrine.
As stated, the evidence in this proceeding was not closely balanced. Further, 
we determine that the error alleged by defendant was not so fundamental and of 
such magnitude as to deny defendant a fair trial. See Miller, 173 Ill. 2d  at 191-92. After having found defendant eligible for the death penalty, the 
jury was free to consider, during the second phase of the sentencing hearing, 
the circumstances of the defendant's offense. People v. Todd, 154 Ill. 2d 57, 76 (1992). This court has repeatedly held that during the second phase of 
the hearing, the jury is free to consider any relevant and reliable evidence in 
aggravation and mitigation. Todd, 154 Ill. 2d  at 76; People v. 
Terrell, 132 Ill. 2d 178, 225 (1989). Thus, even if the jury were 
"misguided," as defendant urges, concerning the three felony-murder aggravating 
factors, defendant raises no claim that inadmissible evidence was before the 
jury during its sentencing deliberations or that defendant had been precluded 
from adducing relevant mitigating evidence. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 887, 77 L. Ed. 2d 235, 256, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2748 (1983). The record 
discloses no support for defendant's claim that the jury's deliberations were 
improperly influenced by the instructions given to the jury.
Defendant's Attempted Waiver of All Sentences Other Than 
Natural Life in Prison
Defendant contends that his rights to due process and to be free from cruel 
and unusual punishment were violated when the trial court refused to allow 
defendant to waive lesser prison sentences and face only the alternative of 
natural life in prison if the jury should determine that he was not eligible for 
death. Defense counsel offered the trial court a written waiver, signed by 
defendant, to any sentence less than natural life in prison, and argued that 
upon acceptance of such a waiver the jury could be instructed, under this 
court's ruling in People v. Gacho, 122 Ill. 2d 221 (1988), that the 
only alternative to a sentence of death would be a sentence of natural life in 
prison without parole. In defendant's brief to this court, defendant states that 
he "perceived the Gacho natural life instruction as a positive 
advantage in his effort to defeat the death penalty. To make that instruction 
valid, he would have to waive all lesser sentences. This he was willing to do." 
In rejecting defendant's proffered waiver, the trial court judge ruled that 
"[defendant] can't waive himself into a specific sentence." Defendant asserts 
that the trial court's ruling constitutes reversible error.
We are not persuaded by defendant's arguments. In People v. Simms, 
168 Ill. 2d 176, 198 (1995), the defendant argued, as does defendant in the 
matter at bar, that the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury 
that the defendant would be sentenced to natural life in prison if he did not 
receive a sentence of death. In Simms we rejected the defendant's 
argument and held that a natural life jury instruction is available only under 
the circumstances stated in Gacho, specifically, where the sentencing 
options for a particular defendant are limited to either natural life or the 
death penalty. Simms, 168 Ill. 2d  at 199. Such an instruction is 
unavailable where, as here, the defendant is statutorily eligible for a sentence 
less than natural life in prison. Simms, 168 Ill. 2d  at 199.
Our ruling in the instant cause additionally comports with the general 
principle that sentencing is a matter within the sound discretion of the court. 
See People v. Wilson, 143 Ill. 2d 236, 250 (1991). In the cause at bar, 
if the jury had determined that death was not an appropriate sentence for 
defendant, the trial court would have possessed sole discretion in sentencing 
defendant to a term of imprisonment for the murder. Allowing defendant to 
execute a waiver would usurp the court's sentencing function, and defendant 
offers no rationale why he should be afforded the authority to remove the 
sentencing decision from the trial court. Further, we do not condone a 
defendant's attempt to choose a sentence that suits him, and, by so doing, 
manipulate the sentencing process in order to obtain a Gacho 
instruction. Finally, acceptance of such a waiver could engender additional 
litigation challenging the waiver's validity. Accordingly, the trial court did 
not violate defendant's constitutional rights nor did it abuse its discretion in 
refusing to accept defendant's tendered waiver of sentence.
Defendant also contends that a jury's sentencing decision is denied the 
requisite level of constitutional reliability under the eighth amendment if the 
jury is unaware of other viable sentencing options. We have previously rejected 
this argument. People v. Simms, 143 Ill. 2d 154, 181-82 (1991) ("it is 
not error to refuse to instruct the jury of the possible terms of imprisonment 
which the defendant might receive if not sentenced to death").
In a related argument, defendant contends that his rights to due process, 
equal protection, and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment were violated 
when the trial court denied his request to inform the sentencing jury that one 
of the sentences available was life imprisonment without possibility of parole. 
Defendant contends that he was constitutionally entitled to this instruction 
because the State argued that defendant's future dangerousness was a reason to 
impose a sentence of death. In support of this argument, defendant relies upon 
the 1994 United States Supreme Court decision in Simmons v. South 
Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 129 L. Ed. 2d 133, 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994), and 
argues that without such sentencing information, the jury could have considered 
him too dangerous for any sentence other than death, especially if the jury 
believed that defendant might, as an alternative to death, receive a 
parole-eligible prison sentence.
At the outset, we note that defendant never argued his equal protection claim 
below. It is well established that "[o]bjections at trial on specific grounds 
waive all other grounds of objection." People v. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167, 191 (1996). Therefore, defendant's equal protection challenge to the trial 
court's ruling has been waived.
Defendant argues that the United States Supreme Court decision in 
Simmons compelled the trial court to instruct the jury on the 
alternative sentences the defendant could serve if he was not sentenced to 
death. As we held in People v. Simpson, 172 Ill. 2d 117, 152 (1996), 
the Simmons holding "addresses those situations where state law 
mandates that if the defendant is not sentenced to death, the only alternate 
sentence is natural life imprisonment." Accordingly, the trial court did not err 
in its ruling.
Challenge to Imposition of the Death Sentence Based Upon The 
"Totality of the Evidence" Regarding the Section 9-1(b)(11) Aggravating 
Factor
Defendant next contends that the "totality of the evidence" at the sentencing 
hearing establishes that the murder was not "cold, calculated, and premeditated" 
within the meaning of section 9-1(b)(11), but rather that it resulted from a 
rage caused by defendant's personality structure and the victim's rejection of 
his request for consensual sex. Relying upon the testimony of Dr. Wahlstrom 
during the aggravation-mitigation phase of the sentencing hearing, defendant 
contends that he "disproved" the section 9-1(b)(11) factor in aggravation and 
therefore the jury improperly determined that there were no mitigating factors 
sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence in regards to that 
aggravating factor.
In determining whether a death sentence was properly imposed, this court 
assesses "the character and record of the individual offender and the 
circumstances of the particular offense." Woodson v. North Carolina, 
428 U.S. 280, 304, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944, 961, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2991 (1976) (plurality 
opinion); People v. Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d 253, 277-78 (1989). We are 
also mindful that "each capital case is unique and must be evaluated on its own 
facts, focusing on whether the circumstances of the crime and the character of 
the defendant are such that the deterrent and retributive functions of the 
ultimate sanction will be served by imposing the death penalty." 
Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d  at 280.
As we have extensively discussed in connection with our treatment of 
defendant's challenge to the jury's eligibility finding pursuant to section 
9-1(b)(11), the evidence adduced at the sentencing hearing established beyond a 
reasonable doubt that defendant committed the murder in a "cold, calculated and 
premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme or design to take a 
human life by unlawful means." 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(11) (West 1994). In addition, 
during the second phase of the sentencing hearing, the State presented 21 
witnesses in aggravation, detailing defendant's extensive criminal record 
beginning in his early teenage years, as well as his conduct after his arrest 
for Maria's murder, including statements which continued to evidence his violent 
thoughts towards women and his lack of remorse. In contrast, defendant presented 
five witnesses in mitigation, two of whom were his parents, with the majority of 
the evidence presented by Dr. Wahlstrom.
Under our statutory scheme, at the second stage of the sentencing proceedings 
the jury weighs and balances any mitigating factors against the aggravating 
factors to determine whether a death sentence is appropriate. E.g., 
Munson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 185. If the jury unanimously determines that 
there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the 
death penalty, the court shall sentence the defendant to death. 720 ILCS 
5/9-1(g) (West 1994). Upon careful consideration of the character of defendant 
and the circumstances of his crime, we conclude that the evidence presented 
during defendant's sentencing hearing supports the jury's decision that the 
penalty of death was appropriate.
Constitutional Challenges to the Death Penalty 
Statute
Defendant's constitutional challenge to the death penalty statute is confined 
to section 9-1(g) which provides that a defendant shall be sentenced to death if 
the capital sentencing jury determines that there are "no mitigating factors 
sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence." 720 ILCS 5/9-1(g) 
(West 1994). Defendant contends that the Illinois statute violates both the 
eighth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution because an 
impermissibly high burden of proof is placed upon defendants to show that 
mitigating evidence outweighs aggravating evidence and because it precludes a 
jury from effectively considering mitigating evidence. Defendant also maintains 
that because the jury instructions given in his case tracked the language of the 
statute, they are likewise unconstitutional because the "language does not 
suggest that the sentencer should come to a subjective, discretionary, 
unfettered decision whether death should be imposed in a particular case but 
rather suggests that death should be imposed unless a particular standard of 
acquittal of death is met."
Defendant first argues that section 9-1(g) violates both the eighth and 
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution because the statutory 
phrase "sufficient to preclude" unfairly places a burden on the defense to 
establish that death is not a possible sentence. Defendant contends that this 
language impermissibly requires a capital defendant to negate eligibility for 
death. In People v. Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d 489, 538 (1992), this court 
rejected an argument substantially identical to that presented by defendant at 
bar. We reiterate our conclusion in Strickland that "[t]he defendant's 
theory rests on a strained interpretation of the statutory language *** the 
sentencing authority is asked only to determine whether death is the appropriate 
sanction in the particular case. [Citations.] The statutory language does not 
require the sentencer to find that the death penalty should be deemed 
`impossible.' " Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d  at 539; see also 
People v. Cole, 172 Ill. 2d 85, 114 (1996). We adhere to our previous 
rejection of defendant's contention, and decline to address this issue anew.
Defendant additionally attacks section 9-1(g) on the basis that the text of 
the statute precludes full, meaningful, and effective consideration of the 
mitigating factors. We recently reiterated our rejection of the argument that 
the Illinois capital sentencing statute places a burden of proof on defendants 
that precludes a meaningful consideration of mitigating evidence. People v. 
Taylor, 166 Ill. 2d 414, 439 (1995); see also People v. Edgeston, 
157 Ill. 2d 201, 247 (1993); People v. Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d 41, 76-77 
(1992); People v. Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d 71, 116-17 (1992); People v. 
Simms, 143 Ill. 2d 154, 183-84 (1991); People v. Fields, 135 Ill. 2d 18, 76 (1990). Defendant presents no new and compelling argument for us to 
depart from our previous decisions.
As a final matter, defendant attacks the constitutionality of one of the 
Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions which was given to the jury. Defendant argues 
that because IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.05 mirrors the "sufficient to preclude" 
statutory language of section 9-1(g), this instruction likewise sets an 
impermissibly high standard for imposition of a sentence other than death. In 
light of our holding reaffirming the constitutionality of section 9-1(g), jury 
instructions which track section 9-1(g)'s language withstand a similar 
constitutional challenge.
In a related argument, defendant contends that even if this court finds no 
constitutional infirmity in the language used in section 9-1(g), the 
instructions given to the sentencing jury violated his eighth amendment rights 
because the instructions: failed to provide adequate guidance to the jurors 
concerning their task in weighing the aggravating and mitigating evidence; 
misled the jurors in that the instructions do not suggest that the jury has 
unfettered discretion in making the death sentence determination; and 
incorrectly conveyed the standard under which the jury determines that the death 
penalty is inappropriate, because, according to defendant, the instruction 
"overstat[es] the mitigation required" by use of the phrase "sufficient to 
preclude." In sum, defendant reiterates his argument concerning section 9-1(g) 
of the statute, and likewise contends that the jury instructions precluded the 
jury from giving full, meaningful and effective consideration to valid 
mitigation evidence.
We reject defendant's argument. IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.05 tracks the language 
of section 9-1(g), which, as stated, contains no constitutional infirmity. In 
addition, in People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 520 (1996), this court 
determined that IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.05 accurately reflects the statutory 
provisions of section 9-1(g). Further, under Rule 451(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 
451(a)), "[w]henever Illinois Pattern Instructions, Criminal ***, contains an 
instruction applicable in a criminal case *** and the court determines that the 
jury should be instructed on the subject, the IPI Criminal [3d] instruction 
shall be used, unless the court determines that it does not accurately state the 
law." Thus, the trial court was required to give IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.05 and 
that instruction, which tracks the language of section 9-1(g), likewise contains 
no constitutional infirmities.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page 
County is affirmed. The clerk of this court is directed to enter an order 
setting Tuesday, January 12, 1999, as the date on which the sentence of death 
entered in the circuit court of Du Page County is to be carried out. 
Defendant shall be executed in the manner provided by law. 725 ILCS 5/119-5 
(West 1996). The clerk of this court shall send a certified copy of the mandate 
in this case to the Director of Corrections, to the warden of Stateville 
Correctional Center, and to the warden of the institution where defendant is 
confined.
Affirmed.
1. At oral argument before this court, defense counsel 
acknowledged that question No. 116 is "vague," and that defense counsel at 
sentencing "were submitting as many questions they thought they reasonably might 
get."
2. Section 9-1(b)(7) was subsequently recodified as section 
9-1(b)(8) (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(8) (West 1994)) and although the text of the 
present statute differs somewhat from its predecessor, the aggravating factor 
remains similar in substance. Section 9-1(b)(8) presently makes the killing of 
an eyewitness a factor which qualifies for the imposition of the death penalty 
in those instances where: