Title: State v. Clayborn

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Clayborn, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-2123.] 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-2123 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. CLAYBORN, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Clayborn, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-2123.] 
Criminal appeals — App.R. 4(A) — An appeal from an R.C. Chapter 2950 sexual-
offender classification is an appeal in a criminal case that must be filed 
pursuant to App.R. 4(A) within 30 days after judgment is entered — 
Judgment affirmed. 
(No. 2009-0971 — Submitted February 17, 2010 — Decided May 20, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 08AP-593,  
2009-Ohio-1751. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
An appeal from an R.C. Chapter 2950 sexual-offender classification is an appeal 
in a criminal case that must be filed pursuant to App.R. 4(A) within 30 
days after judgment is entered. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
{¶ 1} Today this court must decide whether an appeal of an R.C. Chapter 
2950 sexual-offender classification is an appeal of a criminal matter that must be 
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filed within 30 days after judgment in the case is entered, or whether it is a civil 
matter for which the 30-day deadline is tolled until the defendant has been served 
with a copy of the judgment entry.  See App.R. 4(A).  Because we hold that an 
appeal of a R.C. Chapter 2950 sex-offender classification is governed by the time 
within which the defendant may appeal the criminal judgment (conviction and 
sentence), we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals, but for reasons 
different from those of the court of appeals. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 2} On August 6, 2007, Byron Clayborn, defendant-appellant, was 
indicted on 26 felony counts of pandering sexually oriented matter involving a 
minor in violation of R.C. 2907.322.  On May 27, 2008, Clayborn pleaded guilty 
to one second-degree felony count of pandering sexually oriented matter 
involving a minor. 
{¶ 3} At the plea and sentencing hearing, after the trial court advised 
Clayborn of his rights under Crim.R. 11, the trial court informed Clayborn that 
pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2950, as amended by 2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10 (“S.B. 
10”), his guilty plea to the charge of pandering sexually oriented matter involving 
a minor rendered him a Tier II sexual offender.  Then, pursuant to R.C. 2950.03, 
the trial court notified Clayborn of his duties to periodically register with his 
county sheriff. 
{¶ 4} On May 30, 2008, the trial court issued a judgment entry in 
Clayborn’s case.  The entry imposed a two-year prison sentence with credit for 
time served, fines and costs, and a mandatory term of five years of post-release 
control.  The conviction automatically classified Clayborn as a Tier II sexual 
offender pursuant to S.B. 10, with registration duties every 180 days for 25 years. 
{¶ 5} Clayborn filed a notice of appeal on July 15, 2008 – 46 days after 
the entry of the May 30, 2008 judgment.  Clayborn challenged his classification, 
not his conviction or sentence, arguing that the clerk of the court did not serve 
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him as mandated in Civ.R. 58(B) and that this lack of service indefinitely tolled 
the time for filing his notice of appeal.  Clayborn argued that although more than 
30 days had passed since the date of the trial court’s judgment, sexual-offender-
classification proceedings are civil in nature and therefore fall within the App.R. 
4(A) tolling provisions.  The court of appeals held that the appeal was criminal, 
and therefore, Clayborn’s notice of appeal was untimely.  The court sua sponte 
dismissed his appeal for noncompliance with App.R. 4(A).  State v. Clayborn, 
Franklin App. No. 08AP-593, 2009-Ohio-1751, ¶ 9.  The cause is now before this 
court pursuant to the acceptance of a discretionary appeal.  State v. Clayborn, 122 
Ohio St.3d 1502, 2009-Ohio-4233, 912 N.E.2d 107. 
Analysis 
{¶ 6} Since 1963, Ohio has had a sex-offender-registration statute.  See 
former R.C. Chapter 2950, 130 Ohio Laws 669-672.  In 1996, the General 
Assembly rewrote R.C. Chapter 2950 as part of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 180, 146 Ohio 
Laws, Part II, 2560, otherwise known as “Megan’s Law.”  When Clayborn 
committed the crime, Megan’s Law, R.C. Chapter 2950, was in effect.  When 
Clayborn was convicted and sentenced on May 30, 2008, Ohio’s newest version 
of R.C. Chapter 2950, S.B. 10, otherwise known as the Adam Walsh Act, was in 
effect.  Under S.B. 10, a violation of R.C. 2907.322 is a Tier II offense pursuant 
to R.C. 2950.01(F)(1)(a).  Consequently, pursuant to S.B. 10, the trial court 
properly notified Clayborn of his duty to register as a Tier II offender. 
{¶ 7} Clayborn filed his appeal 46 days after entry of the judgment.  
App.R. 4(A) states, “A party shall file the notice of appeal required by App.R. 3 
within thirty days of the later of entry of the judgment or order appealed or, in a 
civil case, service of the notice of judgment and its entry if service is not made on 
the party within the three day period in Rule 58(B) of the Ohio Rules of Civil 
Procedure.”  But on appeal, Clayborn argued that the sexual-offender 
classifications are intended to be administrative, not punitive, and are therefore 
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civil determinations.  Therefore, because Clayborn did not receive service of the 
judgment and entry, he claims that the portion of App.R. 4(A) addressing civil 
cases should apply and that his appeal was timely filed. 
{¶ 8} The court of appeals disagreed, concluding that Clayborn was 
appealing “from a quintessential criminal case – a case initiated with an 
indictment alleging that Clayborn committed criminal offenses and concluded 
with a conviction for one of those offenses and a two-year sentence.”  (Emphasis 
sic.)  Clayborn, 2009-Ohio-1751, ¶ 7.  We agree. 
{¶ 9} Clayborn argues that although the collateral consequences are the 
result of a criminal prosecution, this court has consistently held that the 
classification, registration, and community-notification provisions of all versions 
of Chapter 2950 are civil and remedial in nature.  We look to our line of cases 
involving Chapter 2950 for guidance. 
{¶ 10} In State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 700 N.E.2d 570, we 
held that the registration and notification provisions of Megan’s Law serve a 
remedial purpose of protecting the public and therefore are remedial, not punitive, 
in nature.  Id. at 423.  In State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 
865 N.E.2d 1264, syllabus, we held that “[b]ecause sex- offender-classification 
proceedings under R.C. Chapter 2950 are civil in nature, a trial court’s 
determination in a sex-offender-classification hearing must be reviewed under a 
civil manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard * * * .”  In State v. Ferguson, 120 
Ohio St.3d 7, 2008-Ohio-4824, 896 N.E.2d 110, this court held that the 2003 
amendments (Am.Sub.S.B. No. 5) to Chapter 2950 are remedial in effect and 
therefore were not unconstitutional ex post facto laws. Id. at ¶ 43.  However, those 
challenges to R.C. Chapter 2950 were filed and accepted as part of the underlying 
criminal cases.  While we have held that the classification, registration, and 
notification system enacted as part of Megan’s Law, as amended, are civil and 
remedial, the classification and its concomitant duties appear in the criminal 
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judgment.  We have not converted sex-offender-classification proceedings into 
separate civil cases procedurally or assigned them a civil docket number. 
{¶ 11} Thus far, this court has not yet addressed whether S.B. 10 is 
punitive or remedial, but our holdings in Cook, Wilson, and Ferguson do not turn 
the sex offender classification proceedings in the underlying criminal case, which 
has a criminal case number, into a civil case.  While sex-offender-classification 
proceedings are civil in nature and require a civil manifest-weight-of-the-evidence 
standard, we hold that an appeal from a sexual offender classification is a civil 
matter within the context of a criminal case.  Therefore, although the court 
reviews the classification matter on civil standards, the appeal requirements 
applicable to criminal cases nonetheless apply. 
{¶ 12} The state argues that constitutional challenges to retroactive 
application of S.B. 10 cannot be heard in this appeal because Clayborn’s sexual-
offender classification is an automatic consequence of conviction by virtue of the 
definitions set forth in R.C. 2950.01.  Thus, the state contends that the trial court’s 
judgment plays no role in the imposition of the classification, and therefore, there 
is no final, appealable order, and the appropriate remedy to challenge the 
constitutionality of S.B. 10 would have been to bring a declaratory judgment 
action.  We disagree. 
{¶ 13} In State v. Hayden, 96 Ohio St.3d 211, 2002-Ohio-4169, 773 
N.E.2d 502, a case involving a prior version of R.C. Chapter 2950, we held that 
due process did not require a trial court to conduct a hearing to determine whether 
a defendant was a sexually oriented offender because according to that version, if 
a defendant had been convicted of a sexually oriented offense as defined in R.C. 
2950.01(D), and is neither a habitual sex offender nor a sexual predator, “the 
sexually oriented offender designation attaches as a matter of law.”  Id. at 
paragraph two of the syllabus.  Moreover, the state cites State v. Zerla, Franklin 
App. No. 04AP-1087, 2005-Ohio-5077, in which the court of appeals, citing 
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Hayden, concluded that defendant’s status as a sexually oriented offender arose 
by operation of law and not as a result of the trial court’s judgment.  
Consequently, the court of appeals dismissed his appeal for lack of standing. 
{¶ 14} Even though Hayden involved an appeal of a classification that 
arose via statute, we accepted and reviewed the case as a criminal appeal.  Thus, 
we disagree with the state’s contention and the court of appeals’ conclusion that 
the trial court took no action under R.C. Chapter 2950 because defendant’s 
classification occurred as a matter of law.  As the dissent below stated: “[T]he 
trial court decided an appealable issue under R.C. Chapter 2950: whether the 
amended provisions may be applied retroactively.”  Clayborn, 2009-Ohio-1751, ¶ 
16 (Bryant, J., dissenting).  Even though the classification occurred as a matter of 
law, to the extent that Clayborn wishes to challenge its application to him, the 
time to do so was the time frame within which he could challenge on appeal the 
underlying criminal judgment.  (We express no opinion on Clayborn’s challenge 
to the application of S.B. 10 to him.) 
{¶ 15} From Cook to Ferguson and all cases in between, appellate courts 
have had the ability to review constitutional challenges to sexual-offender 
registration requirements on direct appeal.  The state argues that the sexual-
predator designation in some of those cases somehow distinguishes them from 
cases involving a sexually-oriented-offender designation.  However, this court 
finds no such distinction.  Clayborn was adversely affected by the trial court’s 
finding him subject to the new tier-classification system, and we emphasize that 
challenges to the constitutionality of S.B. 10 on direct appeal from a criminal 
judgment are proper, regardless of the sexual-offender designation. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 16} Accordingly, we hold that an appeal of an R.C. Chapter 2950 
sexual-offender classification is an appeal in a criminal matter that must be filed 
pursuant to App.R. 4(A) within 30 days after judgment is entered.  Having passed 
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the appeal time in this case, Clayborn may file a motion for leave to appeal 
pursuant to App.R. 5(A), which the court of appeals may consider under the 
standards that exist for accepting delayed appeals.  Therefore, we affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals but for reasons different from those of the 
appellate court.  We note again that the defendant may seek relief through a 
motion for leave to appeal pursuant to App.R. 5(A). 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER and LANZINGER, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
 
BROWN, C.J., not participating. 
__________________ 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. 
Taylor, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Yeura R. Venters, Franklin County Public Defender, and Allen V. Adair, 
Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. 
______________________