Title: Inman v. Wyoming

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012
 
DONALD 
E. INMAN,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Robert 
J. O’Neil, Attorney at Law, Gillette, Wyoming
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory 
A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Meri V. 
Geringer, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. 
Geringer.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
GOLDEN, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      Donald Inman 
(Inman) appeals his aggravated assault and battery conviction.  Inman did not deny that he assaulted the 
victim, but claimed he acted in defense of himself and his family.  On appeal, Inman asserts the district 
court erred in allowing a detective to provide lay opinion testimony as to the 
location of the assault.  He also 
asserts the district court erred in denying his motions for judgment of 
acquittal, arguing that the victim’s testimony was contradictory and so 
inherently unreliable that a reasonable juror could not have accepted the 
victim’s version of events and rejected Inman’s claim of self defense.  We affirm.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      Inman presents 
the following issues on appeal:
 
1.         
The denial by the Honorable District Judge John R. Perry of Defendant’s 
Motion in Limine: WRE 701 dated January 5, 2011 and the admission of improper 
lay opinion evidence of Gillette Detective Becky Elger; and 

 
2.         
The denial by the Honorable District Judge John R. Perry of Defendant’s 
Motion for Judgment of Acquittal – Criminal Rule 29(c) dated March 25, 
2011.
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      On September 14, 
2010, Jerrod Wilson (Wilson) moved from Oklahoma to Gillette, Wyoming, with his 
wife and their infant son.  Wilson’s 
wife is Inman’s sister, and when they arrived in Gillette, the Wilsons stayed 
with Inman in an apartment that he shared with his girlfriend and their two 
children.    

 
[¶4]      On September 17, 
2010, Inman and Wilson went together to run an errand and to a bar to celebrate 
Wilson’s new job.  Over the course 
of about two hours, Inman drank two to three beers, and Wilson drank four beers 
and two shots of hard liquor.  While 
they were drinking, Wilson told Inman that he had broken his wife’s nose, pushed 
her down when she was pregnant, and had been unfaithful to her.  Inman testified:
 
A.        He 
told me about the stuff that happened with my sister in the past, about the 
times he hit her and broke her nose.  
And I believe he pushed her down when she was pregnant.  And then I believe he said he was – 
hadn’t been faithful as well.
 
Q.        How 
did that make you feel?
 
A.        
Uneasy and not good, but, you know, I was still wanting to give him the 
benefit of the doubt.  He came up 
here for a new start, and I was going to give it to him.
 
Q.        How 
was his attitude about telling you about these things about your 
sister?
 
A.        It 
sucked when he was talking about it.  
It’s like he had like an I-don’t-care attitude.  It was real – it disturbed me.  It really did.  It was a really shitty 
attitude.
 
Q.        Did 
you think those things were a big deal?
 
A.        
Yes.  That’s my sister.  Yeah.  Yeah.
 
* 
* * * 
 
Q.        How 
was the ride back to your apartment?
 
A.        It 
was pretty quiet.  We really didn’t 
talk much.  I didn’t want to talk to 
him that much to tell you the truth.
 
[¶5]      When the two men 
returned to Inman’s apartment, Wilson began arguing with his wife, who was upset 
with him for being gone too long.  
Inman intervened in the argument, exchanged words with Wilson, and 
ordered Wilson to leave the apartment.  
Wilson left the apartment and went to the parking lot of the apartment 
building.  He sat down by a 
dumpster, became cold, and yelled to Inman, who was standing outside on the 
balcony, to throw him a jacket.  
Inman refused.  

 
[¶6]      Inman and Wilson 
provided different accounts of how the assault occurred.  Inman testified that Wilson came back to 
the apartment, which was on the building’s second floor, and began yelling, and 
banging and kicking on the door.  
Inman feared for the safety of his family and himself because of the way 
Wilson was acting and because he knew of Wilson’s prior abusive behavior and 
that Wilson had been diagnosed with a bipolar condition.  Inman grabbed a pipe from near the 
apartment’s front door.  He 
described the pipe as a safety rod with a V on one end that fits under a door 
handle and a sharp plastic tip on the other end that grips the carpet.  Inman opened the apartment door and 
Wilson fled through the stairwell door and down the stairs.  Inman chased Wilson down the stairs to 
make sure he left.   When Inman 
reached the landing between the two sets of stairs, Wilson turned and charged 
back toward Inman, which was when Inman struck Wilson on the head with the 
pipe.  
 
[¶7]      Wilson told a 
different version of events.  He 
testified that when Inman would not throw a jacket to him from the balcony, he 
came back in the building to get the jacket.  Wilson was just inside the building’s 
entrance door on the main floor, when Inman came down the stairs carrying a 
pipe.  Inman threatened Wilson with 
the pipe, and Wilson told Inman he just wanted a jacket.  Wilson testified that Inman then hit him 
with the pipe and everything went black.  

 
[¶8]      Wilson was taken 
to the hospital by ambulance, and a three-inch laceration to his head was closed 
with sutures and staples.  Because 
he was lapsing in and out of consciousness, Wilson was kept overnight in the 
hospital for observation.  

 
[¶9]      On September 20, 
2010, Inman was charged with one count of aggravated assault and battery.  On January 3, 2011, Inman filed a motion 
to dismiss based on the statements contained in a document entitled “Affidavit 
of Non-Cooperation and Request for Dismissal of Jerrod Wilson.”  In his affidavit, Wilson attested that 
he did not remember much about Inman’s assault on him because of the amount of 
alcohol that he had consumed earlier in the evening, and that he no longer 
wished to cooperate in the prosecution of Inman because Wilson had been acting 
irrationally that night and Inman struck him in self defense.  The district court denied the motion to 
dismiss.  
 
[¶10]   On January 5, 2011, Inman filed a 
motion in limine seeking to prevent law enforcement officers from testifying, as 
lay witnesses, to their opinions regarding the physical evidence collected at 
the scene of Inman’s assault.   
The district court denied the motion, explaining that the testimony at 
issue was not scientific, that the State had not performed any scientific 
analysis on the evidence at the scene, and that if the State were to perform 
such analysis, that information must be provided to Inman who would then be 
permitted to employ his own experts to verify the analysis.  
 
[¶11]   A jury trial on the charges against 
Inman was held on March 14, 2011, through March 15, 2011.  At the conclusion of the State’s case, 
Inman moved for a judgment of acquittal.  
The district court denied the motion, ruling that evidence had been 
presented on all elements of the charged crime, that the quality of the evidence 
was such that the case would be allowed to go forward, and that a jury may infer 
that all of the elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  On March 15, 2011, the jury 
returned a guilty verdict.  

 
[¶12]   On March 25, 2011, Inman renewed 
his motion for judgment of acquittal alleging insufficient evidence to sustain 
the verdict.  On April 5, 2011, the 
district court denied the motion, finding that “based upon the evidence 
presented at trial, the fact-finder could have reasonably concluded that the 
defendant committed the crime charged in the Information.”  
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶13]   This Court reviews decisions 
regarding the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion.  Boucher v. State, 2011 WY 2, ¶ 40, 245 P.3d 342, 361 (Wyo. 2011).
 
A 
trial court’s decision on the admissibility of evidence is entitled to 
considerable deference, and will not be reversed on appeal unless the appellant 
demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion. As long as there exists a legitimate 
basis for the trial court’s ruling, that ruling will not be disturbed on 
appeal.  
 
Id. 
(quoting Phillip 
v. State, 
2010 WY 14, ¶ 10, 225 P.3d 504, 509 (Wyo. 2010)).  “Determining 
whether the trial court abused its discretion involves the consideration of 
whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did, and whether it acted in 
an arbitrary or capricious manner.”  
Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 
45, ¶ 11, 43 P.3d 80, 87 (Wyo. 2002).  
Further, “[e]ven where a trial objection has been made to the admission 
of evidence, error cannot be found unless 'a substantial right of the party is 
affected.’”  Id., ¶ 12, 43 P.3d  at 87 (citing W.R.E. 
103).
 
[¶14]   Our standard applicable to review 
of a denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal is as 
follows:
 
Our 
responsibility in considering the propriety of a ruling on a motion for judgment 
of acquittal is the same as that of the trial court. Cloman 
v. State, 
Wyo., 574 P.2d 410 (1978). 
The question raised is the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the charge, 
which is a matter to be determined within the sound discretion of the trial 
court. Chavez 
v. State, 
Wyo., 601 P.2d 166 (1979); 
Montez 
v. State, 
Wyo., 527 P.2d 1330 (1974). 
In making that determination the district court must assume the truth of the 
evidence of the State and give to the State the benefit of all legitimate 
inferences to be drawn from that evidence. If a prima facie case is demonstrated 
when the evidence is so examined, the motion for judgment of acquittal properly 
is denied. Russell 
v. State, 
Wyo., 583 P.2d 690 (1978). 
It is proper to grant a motion for judgment of acquittal only if there is no 
substantial evidence to sustain the material allegations relating to the offense 
that is charged. Heberling 
v. State, 
Wyo., 507 P.2d 1 (1973), 
cert. denied 414 U.S. 1022, 94 S. Ct. 444, 38 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1973); 
Fresquez 
v. State, 
Wyo., 492 P.2d 197 (1971). 
Such a result is indicated if the evidence requires the jury to speculate or 
conjecture as to the defendant’s guilt or if a reasonable juror must have a 
reasonable doubt as to the existence of any of the essential elements of the 
crime when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State. 
Chavez 
v. State, supra; 
Russell 
v. State, supra.
 
Taylor 
v. State, 
2011 WY 18, ¶ 10, 246 P.3d 596, 598-99 (Wyo. 2011) (quoting Martinez 
v. State, 
2009 WY 6, ¶ 11, 199 P.3d 526, 530 (Wyo. 2009)); 
see also Benjamin v. State, 2011 WY 147, ¶ 44, 
264 P.3d 1, 12 (Wyo. 2011).
 
DISCUSSION
 
A.        
Lay Opinion Testimony of Detective Elger
 
[¶15]   Inman argues that the district 
court erred in denying his motion in limine and in allowing Detective Becky 
Elger of the Gillette Police Department to provide opinion testimony based on 
her observations of the physical evidence found at the scene.  Specifically, Inman objects to the 
admission of Detective Elger’s testimony based on his contention that the 
testimony used the technical terms “trail” and “splatter” and resulted in an 
opinion, based not on Detective Elger’s observations, but based instead on the 
application of specialized or expert knowledge.  Inman cites to the following testimony 
as impermissible:
 
Q.        And 
walk us through doing the crime scene.  
What does that entail?
 
A.        We 
took photographs.  One point there 
was a video taken.  We measured 
blood spots, picked up pieces of evidence that ultimately came from the end of 
the pipe that was used.  We 
collected the pipe.  We took 
measurements from the area of the first trail or spot of blood to where the 
final resting place was, where the blood – the biggest spot of blood was, where 
the officers stated Mr. Wilson had fallen.
 
* 
* * * 
 
A.        This 
is the hallway.  There’s a door here 
goes into the first floor hallway.  
Then the stairs take off right here, and there’s a series of stairs, I 
think seven or eight of them maybe that come up to a small landing.  And then there’s another set of stairs 
that go on up to the second floor.  
The blood trail went all the way through the door.  There was blood on the door and on the 
doorjamb.  Blood in the hall 
entryway and up to the bottom step of this first set of 
steps.
 
* 
* * * 
 
A.        He 
had – it was in the same trail of blood.  
Some of it was splatter.  
Some of it looked like maybe somebody had pushed the door.  And it was in the same trail as the 
blood spots out to the main pool of blood.
 
* 
* * * 
 
Q.        Based 
upon your review of where the blood was located and the plastic was located, 
were you able to determine where the assault occurred?
 
A.        It 
appeared the assault occurred at the bottom of the staircase on the first 
landing and entryway of the building.
 
[¶16]   Detective Elger’s testimony was not 
offered as expert opinion testimony, but was instead offered and admitted as lay 
opinion testimony pursuant to Rule 701 of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence.  Rule 701 provides:
 
If 
the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of 
opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) 
rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear 
understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in 
issue.
 
W.R.E. 
701.
 
[¶17]   In reviewing the history of 
revisions to the rules of evidence, this Court has observed: 

 
“It 
was the intent of the framers of the Rules of Evidence to considerably relax the 
prohibition against receipt of opinion testimony both by expert and lay 
witnesses. Generally, the rules should be liberally construed to allow the 
admission of such evidence. * * * ”
 
Brockett 
v. Prater, 
675 P.2d 638, 641 (Wyo. 1984) (quoting McCabe 
v. R.A. Manning Const. Co., Inc., 
674 P.2d 699, 705 (Wyo. 1983)).
 
[¶18]   Under 
Rule 701, “the witness must have perceived firsthand the pertinent events or 
matters, and his inferences or opinion must be rationally based on his 
perception; his testimony must be rejected if his firsthand observation was 
inadequate to support an opinion.”  
Tucker v. State, 2010 WY 162, 
¶ 18, 245 P.3d 301, 306 (Wyo. 2010) (quoting Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724, 735 
(Wyo. 1986)).  We have 
explained:
 
Lay 
opinion testimony is intended “only to help the jury or the court to understand 
the facts about which the witness is testifying and not to provide specialized 
explanations or interpretations that an untrained layman could not make if 
perceiving the same acts or events.” [United States v.] Peoples, 
250 F.3d [630,] 641 [(8th Cir. 2001)] 
(citing United 
States v. Cortez, 
935 F.2d 135, 139-40 (8th Cir. 1991); 
United 
States v. Figueroa-Lopez, 
125 F.3d 1241, 1244-45 (9th Cir. 1997)). In accordance with this principle, we have held that 
“W.R.E. 
701 
cannot be read to allow a witness who fails to qualify as an expert to offer 
opinion testimony 'where the subject in question lies outside the realm of 
common experience and requires special skill or knowledge.’” Carroll 
v. Bergen, 
2002 WY 166, ¶ 21, 57 P.3d 1209, 1217 (Wyo. 2002) 
(citing Kemper 
Architects, P.C. v. McFall, Konkel & Kimball Consulting Engineers, 
Inc., 
843 P.2d 1178, 1190 (Wyo. 1992) 
(quoting 3 David W. Louisell & Christopher B. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 
376 at 419 (Supp. 1992))).
 
* 
* * * 
 
If 
a witness’s testimony draws on experience beyond the ken of the average person, 
that witness must meet the qualification requirements of Rule 
702.
 
Tucker, 
¶¶ 20-21, 245 P.3d  at 307.
 
[¶19]   In Tucker, we found law enforcement 
testimony crossed the line between lay opinion and expert opinion when a police 
officer offered his opinion as to the positioning of a vehicle’s occupants at 
the time of an accident.  Tucker, ¶ 24, 245 P.3d  at 308.  The testifying 
officer based his opinion on “'the factors of the 
statements I have taken, the victims at the scene, their injuries, the blood 
splatters, the blood coming from the back and side, [and] the evidence taken for 
DNA [testing,]’ . . . '[and] the secondhand accounts from the witnesses at the 
bar and the DNA evidence obtained after it was sent to a crime lab for 
testing.’”  Id., ¶ 19, 245 P.3d  at 307.  The officer also provided accident 
reconstruction testimony based on his many hours in basic and advanced accident 
investigation courses.  Id., ¶ 23, 245 P.3d  at 308.  We 
concluded:
 
The 
officer’s testimony was not proper lay opinion testimony. The testimony was 
based on matters beyond the officer’s personal knowledge or perception, and was 
based in large measure on the officer’s training and experience, which were 
beyond the ken of the average person.
 
Tucker, 
¶ 24, 245 P.3d  at 308.
 
[¶20]   The testimony of Detective Elger is 
distinguishable from the testimony this Court found impermissible in Tucker.  Detective Elger’s testimony did not draw 
on scientific or specialized knowledge or experience, such as the size, shape or 
angle of individual blood drops, or technical characteristics of the blood 
trail.  Instead, Detective Elger’s 
opinion as to where the assault occurred was based directly on what she observed 
at the crime scene, that is, the location where she observed blood and pieces of 
plastic that broke off the weapon.  
Detective Elger testified to a common sense conclusion from her 
observations: the blood drops started at Point A and ended in a pool at Point B, 
where the victim fell, and parts of the weapon were likewise found at Point A, 
and therefore the assault took place at Point A.  We thus conclude that Detective Elger’s 
testimony satisfied the first requirement of Rule 701, that it was rationally 
based on her perceptions rather than the application of specialized 
knowledge.
 
[¶21]   We further find that Detective 
Elger’s opinion was helpful to the trier of fact, as required by the second 
prong of Rule 701.  Inman testified 
that he struck Wilson on the landing between the stairs leading from the second 
floor apartment to the building’s first floor, when Wilson charged him on that 
landing.  Wilson, on the other hand, 
testified that he had just reentered the building and was on the first floor 
when Inman attacked him with the pipe.  
Detective Elger’s conclusion that the assault occurred on the first floor 
near the building entrance was thus helpful to the jury in making its 
determination whether Inman was the aggressor or was acting in self 
defense.
 
[¶22]   Finally, we reject Inman’s 
suggestion that Detective Elger’s testimony invaded the province of the jury by 
allegedly removing the factual determination of self defense.  It is certainly true that “a witness, lay or expert, may not express an opinion as to 
the guilt of the accused.”  Cureton v. State, 2007 WY 168, ¶ 10, 169 P.3d 549, 551 (Wyo. 2007).  This 
Court has explained, however, that the proscription against such opinions is a 
narrow one.
 
Opinion 
testimony, however, is not improper simply because it “embraces an ultimate 
issue to be decided by the trier of fact.” W.R.E. 
704. 
“An interpretation of the evidence by a witness, even though that interpretation 
may be important in establishing an element of the crime and thus leading to the 
inference of guilt, is not in the same category as an actual conclusional 
statement on the guilt or innocence of the accused party.” Saldana 
v. State, 
846 P.2d 604, 616 (Wyo. 1993). 
Thus, error occurs only where the testimony constitutes a direct opinion about 
the accused’s guilt rather than relates information to assist the jury in 
resolving the factual issues placed before it.
 
Cureton, 
¶ 10, 169 P.3d  at 551.
 
[¶23]   Detective Elger’s testimony was 
relevant to the ultimate issue of self defense, but it did not express an 
opinion as to whether Inman acted in self defense.  Moreover, her opinion testimony was 
rationally based on her observations of the crime scene, was not drawn from 
specialized, technical, or scientific knowledge, and was helpful to the trier of 
fact.  We thus find no abuse of 
discretion in the district court’s admission of the 
testimony.
 
B.        
Denial of Motion for Judgment of 
Acquittal
 
[¶24]   Inman’s sole argument in support of 
his challenge to the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal relates to 
the contradictions between Wilson’s pretrial affidavit and his trial 
testimony.  Inman contends in his 
brief that “the testimony of Mr. Wilson is of such poor quality that no 
reasonable juror could believe it and consequently reject the claim of Appellant 
of self-defense and defense of others beyond a reasonable doubt.”  We reject Inman’s argument because it 
ignores our standard for reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment of 
acquittal, most particularly, the requirement that we accept the State’s 
evidence as true.  See Benjamin, ¶ 46, 264 P.3d  at 12 (“We keep in mind, as we evaluate this claim, that we 'accept 
as true the State’s evidence and all reasonable inferences which can be drawn 
from it. We do not consider conflicting evidence presented by the defendant.’”) 
(quoting Najera v. State, 2009 WY 
105, ¶ 5, 214 P.3d 990, 992 (Wyo. 2009)).
 
[¶25]   The record is clear that Wilson’s 
pretrial affidavit, prepared by Inman’s counsel, contradicts Wilson’s trial 
testimony.  Wilson testified, 
however, concerning his signing of the affidavit and the differences between his 
trial testimony and the affidavit.  
He testified that the affidavit came in the mail and that he did not 
prepare the document himself or provide any of the information that was 
contained in the affidavit.  He 
further testified that he signed the document without reading it, that he signed 
it because he believed that he then would not be required to testify, and that 
his trial testimony, not what was stated in the affidavit, was a true account of 
what happened the night of September 17, 2010.  Consistent with this testimony, Wilson’s 
wife testified that Inman told her that if Wilson would sign the affidavit, 
Wilson would not be required to testify.  
She also testified that this is what she then told Wilson.  Wilson’s wife further testified that 
Inman’s girlfriend drove them to the office of Inman’s attorney to sign the 
affidavit.  
 
[¶26]   If we accept the State’s evidence, 
including Wilson’s testimony concerning the affidavit, as true, the record 
contains sufficient evidence from which the jury could have accepted Wilson’s 
version of events and rejected Inman’s self-defense claim.  Moreover, even if the jury rejected 
Wilson’s version of events, and accepted Inman’s version, the jury still could 
have concluded that Inman did not act in self defense or defense of others when 
he unlocked his apartment door, grabbed a pipe and chased Wilson through a door 
and down two flights of stairs before striking him with the 
pipe.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶27]   The district court did not abuse 
its discretion in allowing Detective Elger’s Rule 701 opinion testimony, and it 
properly denied Inman’s motions for judgment of acquittal.  Affirmed.