Title: State v. Dinkins

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2012 WI 24 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP1643-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
William Dinkins, Sr., 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 330 Wis. 2d 591, 794 N.W.2d 236 
(Ct. App. 2010-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 13, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 6, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
CIRCUIT 
 
COUNTY: 
DODGE   
 
JUDGE: 
ANDREW P. BISSONNETTE 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ROGGENSACK, J. concurs (Opinion filed).    
 
DISSENTED: 
ZIEGLER, J. dissents (Opinion filed).  
GABLEMAN, J. joins dissent.    
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by James M. Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief and oral 
argument by Steven D. Phillips, assistant state public defender. 
 
 
2012 WI 24
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2009AP1643-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2008CF233) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
William Dinkins, Sr., 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 13, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The State seeks review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals that reversed a 
judgment and order of the circuit court finding William Dinkins, 
Sr. guilty of knowingly failing to comply with the sex offender 
registration statute.1  That statute required Dinkins to provide 
the Department of Corrections (DOC) with "the address at which 
[he] . . . will be residing" at least ten days prior to his 
                                                 
1 State v. Dinkins, 2010 WI App 163, 330 Wis. 2d 501, 794 
N.W.2d 236 (reversing judgments of the circuit court for Dodge 
County, Judge Andrew P. Bissonnette, presiding). 
No. 
2009AP1643-CR  
 
2 
 
release from prison.2  The circuit court found that Dinkins 
attempted to comply with the registration requirements but was 
unable to find housing for himself prior to his release.  
Nevertheless, 
relying 
on 
the 
testimony 
adduced 
at 
the 
preliminary hearing, the circuit court adjudged Dinkins guilty 
of a Class H felony.  
¶2 
The State asserts that the court of appeals erred in 
reversing the circuit court's judgment.  It contends that 
homelessness is not a defense to failing to comply with the 
registration requirements and that Dinkins could have complied 
with the statute by listing a park bench or other on-the-street 
location as the place he would be residing.     
¶3 
We agree with the State that homeless registrants are 
not exempt from registration requirements and that homelessness 
is not a defense to failing to comply with the registration 
requirements.  However, we disagree that Dinkins was capable of 
complying with the statute by listing a park bench or other on-
the-street location. 
¶4 
In examining the text and context of the sex offender 
registration 
statute, 
we 
determine 
that 
the 
legislature 
anticipated that a registrant might be unable to provide the 
information required by the statute.  Significantly, the 
legislature set forth an alternative procedure for monitoring 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 301.45(2)(a)5., (2)(d), and (2)(e)4.  
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 
2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2009AP1643-CR  
 
3 
 
the whereabouts of registrants who are unable to provide an 
address without imposing criminal liability.   
¶5 
By 
applying 
well-settled 
principles 
of 
statutory 
construction, we conclude that a registrant cannot be convicted 
of violating Wis. Stat. § 301.45(6) for failing to report the 
address at which he will be residing when he is unable to 
provide this information.  We determine that a registrant is 
unable to provide the required information when that information 
does not exist, despite the registrant's reasonable attempt to 
provide it.  Here, the circuit court found that Dinkins 
attempted to comply with the statute, that he was unable to find 
housing on his own, and that the DOC would have to find housing 
for 
him. 
 
These 
findings 
are 
not 
clearly 
erroneous.  
Accordingly, albeit upon a different rationale, we affirm the 
court of appeals.   
I 
¶6 
In 1999, Dinkins was convicted of a sex offense and 
received a 10-year sentence.  He served his sentence, without 
parole, at Oshkosh Correctional Institution.      
¶7 
As a collateral consequence of his 1999 conviction, 
Dinkins must register as a sex offender under Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.45.  That statute provides that 10 days prior to release 
from prison, Dinkins was required to provide certain information 
to the DOC, including "[t]he address" at which he "will be 
residing."  Wis. Stat. §§ 301.45(2)(a)5. and (2)(e)(4).  Knowing 
failure to comply with the registration requirements is, with 
No. 
2009AP1643-CR  
 
4 
 
one exception that is inapplicable here, a Class H felony.  
Wis. Stat. § 301.45(6)(a)1.3     
¶8 
Dinkins' maximum discharge date was July 20, 2008.  As 
of that date, he would no longer be under the supervision of the 
DOC.4 
¶9 
On several occasions in the months leading up to his 
maximum discharge date, Dinkins conferred with Myra Smith, a DOC 
social worker employed at the prison.  According to DOC records, 
Dinkins initially resisted the DOC's request that he provide 
information about his post-release plans.  However, once he was 
informed that he could be charged with a crime for failure to 
provide the information, Dinkins made efforts to secure a 
residence.  He expressed hope that he could live with his 
daughter upon release, and he made unsuccessful efforts to 
contact her and other family members.     
¶10 A little more than a month before his discharge date, 
Smith assisted Dinkins in filling out a standardized form 
labeled Sex Offender Registration.  Smith filled out Dinkins' 
                                                 
3 As an additional consequence of his conviction, Dinkins is 
subject to lifetime GPS tracking under Wis. Stat. § 301.48.          
4 Dinkins was sentenced prior to the advent of the truth in 
sentencing statutory scheme.  Accordingly, he was eligible for 
mandatory release on a certain date as determined by the parole 
board.  See Wis. Stat. § 302.11(1) and (1g).  When an inmate is 
released on parole prior to the completion of his sentence, the 
inmate is released into the custody of the DOC.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 304.06(3).  Here, Dinkins served until his maximum release 
date.  But for the criminal complaint issued in this case, he 
would have been released into the community without DOC 
supervision.     
No. 
2009AP1643-CR  
 
5 
 
name, his identifying information, and information about his 
crime.  She checked "unemployed" in the place for providing 
employment information and "does not drive" in the place for 
providing vehicle information.   
¶11 In the place designated for providing his "residence 
street," Smith entered: "To be determined by Agent."  She later 
testified: 
"I've 
used 
that 
[designation] 
before 
when 
an 
individual does not have an approved residence.  And sometimes 
it is within days before a person is getting out that a 
residence is found, and then this can be updated."     
¶12 According to Smith, in the typical case where a 
homeless registrant would be subject to extended supervision or 
parole upon release from incarceration, a DOC agent would look 
"for a transitional living [arrangement] . . . in a halfway 
house of some sort."  However, in a maximum discharge case like 
Dinkins', the DOC provides "[u]sually no help" because it is 
understaffed and has no responsibility for supervising the 
registrant upon release.5   
                                                 
5 Q: In a situation where the discharge date and the 
[mandatory release] date are one in the same, what 
response do you get from Community Corrections when 
they are asked to help a defendant find a place to 
live? . . .  
A: . . . Usually no help. 
Q: And do they provide a reason why they're not 
helpful? 
A: I think they're as understaffed as we are. 
Q: Do they have any resources once someone discharges 
or any authority to set them up in a halfway house? 
No. 
2009AP1643-CR  
 
6 
 
¶13 DOC records indicate that Lisa Gallitz, a DOC agent, 
made efforts to contact family members who would be willing to 
take in Dinkins, all to no avail.  She later explained, "I have 
e-mails showing that people as high as the Secretary of 
Department of Corrections were involved in this situation."   
¶14 On July 1, 2008, Gallitz sent the following email to 
advise the Sex Offender Registry Program (SORP) that Dinkins had 
been unable to secure a residence:  
I 
was 
told 
to 
contact 
you 
regarding 
William 
Dinkins. . . . He does not have a residence plan at 
this point. . . . I have done quite a bit of work to 
try to locate a family member willing to take him in 
so we can set up GPS.  However, he really doesn't have 
much for family.  His daughter, who he is counting on, 
hasn't returned my call——even after I left her a 
message that I would like a call back either way.  My 
supervisor said . . . to contact you because if he 
doesn't provide a residence to SORP 10 days prior to 
release/discharge, he can be charged.   
¶15 On July 3, Gallitz advised Smith that registrants who 
are actively seeking a residence but unable to find one are not 
typically charged with a crime:  
Per my conversation with [SORP] this morning, this is 
still a wait and see situation.  [The SORP employee's] 
experience is that the DA has not charged someone who 
is actively seeking residence prior to release but 
just unable to find anything.  So, law enforcement and 
the DA's office will not get involved until after the 
fact if he fails to keep SORP informed of his 
residence and fails to cooperate with GPS.  So, we are 
no further ahead at this point.  We still have the Sgt 
from Oshkosh on board to transport him on 7/20/08 but 
need a residence yet.  And, GPS cannot be arranged 
                                                                                                                                                             
A: I'm not familiar with that.  I don't believe they 
have authority, but I do not know.   
No. 
2009AP1643-CR  
 
7 
 
until we have an address.6  Not sure what else to say 
at this point.   
¶16 Nevertheless, 
four 
days 
prior 
to 
his 
scheduled 
release, the DOC sent a letter to the Dodge County District 
Attorney requesting that Dinkins be prosecuted for violating the sex 
offender registration statute.  The circuit court granted the 
District Attorney's petition for a writ of habeas corpus ad 
prosequendum, and Dinkins' initial appearance was scheduled for 
July 18.   
¶17 On the morning of the initial appearance, Dinkins' 
daughter called Gallitz.  She indicated that she would like to 
take her father into her home, but she was unable to do so 
because she had a three-year-old daughter and because her fiance 
and her landlord would not agree to the arrangement.     
¶18 Following his initial appearance, Dinkins was released 
into the custody of the Dodge County Jail on a $10,000 cash 
bond.  He filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that 
the circuit court lacked jurisdiction.  Dinkins relied on 
Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(d), which provides:  
A person subject to [registration requirements] who is 
not under the supervision of the [DOC] or the 
department of health services [DHS] shall provide the 
information specified in par. (a) to the [DOC] in 
accordance with the rules under sub. (8).  If the 
                                                 
6 Although DOC employees repeatedly stated that it was 
necessary for Dinkins to have a land line to install GPS 
monitoring, that appears to not be the case.  After oral 
argument, the State submitted a letter advising the court that 
in the case of a sex offender who lacks a fixed address, the DOC 
uses cellular GPS trackers that do not require a land line but 
need to be charged every day.     
No. 
2009AP1643-CR  
 
8 
 
person is unable to provide an item of information 
specified 
in 
par. 
(a), 
the 
[DOC] 
may 
request 
assistance from a circuit court or the [DHS] in 
obtaining that item of information.  A circuit court 
and the [DHS] shall assist the [DOC] when requested to 
do so under this paragraph.       
Dinkins 
asserted 
that 
criminal 
prosecution 
was 
not 
the 
appropriate remedy for his failure to provide an address.   
¶19 At the scheduled preliminary hearing, the court denied 
Dinkins' motion to dismiss, concluding that the option provided 
in Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(d) was permissive, not mandatory.  The 
court heard testimony from Smith, Gallitz, and another witness.  
It found that there was probable cause to believe Dinkins 
violated Wis. Stat. § 301.45(6).  Dinkins entered a not guilty 
plea.   
¶20 The parties did not dispute the relevant facts.  
Rather, they disagreed about the legal implications of those 
facts——whether a person in Dinkins' position could be convicted 
of a felony for failing to provide his residence 10 days prior 
to release from prison.  To that end, Dinkins filed three 
additional 
motions 
to 
dismiss, 
arguing 
(1) 
selective 
prosecution; (2) insufficient probable cause; and (3) that the 
statute was unconstitutional due to vagueness, overbreadth, and 
equal protection.    
¶21 The circuit court issued a memorandum decision and 
order.  It stated that "the evidence adduced at the preliminary 
examination seems to indicate that [Dinkins] attempted to comply 
with the statute, but has been unable to find housing for 
himself upon release."  Noting that it took "no position on the 
No. 
2009AP1643-CR  
 
9 
 
propriety or wisdom of the criminal prosecution in this matter," 
the circuit court denied Dinkins' motions.  It stated: "the 
statute 
criminalizes 
the 
knowing 
failure 
to 
provide 
the 
information.  Intentional failure is not required."  (Emphasis 
in original.)  
¶22 Subsequently, after reviewing the evidence adduced at 
the preliminary hearing, the circuit court found Dinkins guilty 
as charged.7  It withheld sentence and placed him on probation 
for 30 months.  During sentencing, the circuit court commented: 
"I assume [the DOC is] going to have to find him a place.  I 
mean, he can't find himself a place."   
¶23 The circuit court imposed 90 days at the Dodge County 
Jail as a condition of probation.  It commented that once the 
DOC found housing for Dinkins, the court would "stay the balance 
of the conditional jail and get him transferred to that 
placement."  The court urged the DOC "to obtain a placement as 
soon as reasonably practicable[.]"  
¶24 Dinkins filed a motion for postconviction relief.  The 
circuit court denied his motion, and Dinkins appealed.    
¶25 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
reversed 
based 
on 
its 
interpretation of the term "residing."  State v. Dinkins, 2010 
WI App 163, 330 Wis. 2d 591, 794 N.W.2d 236.  It referred to an 
"apparent unintended gap" in the statute that is created by the 
                                                 
7 Because there was no dispute of fact, Dinkins waived his 
right to a jury trial and agreed that the court could decide the 
case on the basis of the exhibits and testimony elicited at the 
preliminary hearing.   
No. 
2009AP1643-CR  
 
10 
 
"questionable 
assumption" 
that 
"all 
soon-to-be-released 
prisoners are able, in advance of leaving prison, to identify a 
location at which they may reside."  Id., ¶4.   
¶26 We note that in response to the court of appeals' 
opinion, the DOC has attempted to close this unintended gap by 
issuing 
Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Corrections 
Administrative 
Directive #11-04, DOC-1356 (Rev.), effective July 1, 2011.  The 
directive provides guidance for addressing homeless registrants 
who 
are 
on active DOC supervision as well as homeless 
registrants who have been terminated from supervision.8  Because 
it was not in effect at the time of Dinkins' violation and 
prosecution, this new directive does not resolve the issues 
presented in this case. 
II 
¶27 We begin by clarifying what is not at issue in this 
case.  It is undisputed that Dinkins was required to register, 
                                                 
8 The directive provides that registrants who have been 
terminated from supervision need not obtain placement approval 
prior to establishing a residence or moving to a new residence.  
Wis. Dep't of Corrections Admin. Directive #11-04, DOC-1356 
(Rev.).  If the registrant is "unable to secure permanent 
residence," the registrant must call the Sex Offender Registry 
every seven days to report "homeless" status, the locations 
where the registrant has been frequenting and sleeping in the 
past seven days, and the registrant's anticipated plan for the 
upcoming seven days.  Id.  When possible, the registrant must 
also provide an emergency contact person and telephone number.  
Id.  Terminated registrants who fail to adhere to this policy 
are subject to non-compliance prosecution.  Id.    
The validity of this new directive is not before the court 
and is not addressed in this opinion.   
No. 
2009AP1643-CR  
 
11 
 
and continues to be required to register, as a sex offender.  It 
is undisputed that, as part of his registration, Dinkins is 
required to provide his address.  This case is not about whether 
homeless 
registrants 
are 
"exempt" 
from 
registration 
requirements.  They are not. 
¶28 Rather, this case presents the narrow question of 
whether, under the circumstances where Dinkins attempted to 
comply with the registration requirements but was unable to find 
housing, he can be convicted of a felony for failing to notify 
the DOC of "[t]he address at which" he would "be residing" upon 
his release from prison.  To resolve this question, we must 
interpret 
the 
sex 
offender 
registry 
statute. 
 
Statutory 
interpretation 
is 
a 
question 
of 
law, 
which 
we 
review 
independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit 
court and the court of appeals.  State v. Leitner, 2002 WI 77, 
¶16, 253 Wis. 2d 449, 646 N.W.2d 341.   
¶29 Statutory 
interpretation 
begins 
with 
the 
plain 
language of the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court, 
2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  We generally 
give words and phrases their common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning.  Id.  "However, the plain meaning [of a statute] is 
seldom determined in a vacuum[.]"  Osterhues v. Bd. Adjustment 
for Washburn County, 2005 WI 92, ¶24, 282 Wis. 2d 228, 698 
N.W.2d 701 (citing Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46).  Accordingly, 
we interpret statutory language "in the context in which it is 
used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to 
the 
language 
of surrounding or closely-related statutes."  
No. 
2009AP1643-CR  
 
12 
 
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  Additionally, we interpret 
statutory language reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable 
results."  Id.  An interpretation that contravenes the manifest 
purpose of the statute is unreasonable.  Id., ¶49.            
III 
¶30 We begin our analysis by examining the text of the 
relevant 
statutory 
provisions. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 301.45 
establishes a statewide registry of sex offenders.  That statute 
provides that the registry "shall contain" information about 
each registrant, including, among other things, identifying 
information, employment information, and "[t]he address at which 
the person is or will be residing."  Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(a)5.   
¶31 Registrants who are not under DOC or DHS supervision 
"shall provide" the required information to the DOC.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.45(2)(d).  "If the person is being released from prison 
because he or she has reached the expiration date of his or her 
sentence," the registrant must provide the required information 
to the DOC "no later than 10 days before being released from 
prison."  Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(e)4.   
¶32 Subsection (6) prescribes penalties for violating the 
sex 
offender 
registration 
statute. 
 
It 
provides 
that 
a 
registrant who "knowingly fails to comply with any requirement 
No. 
2009AP1643-CR  
 
13 
 
to provide information" is "guilty of a Class H felony."9  
Wis. Stat. § 301.45(6)(a)1.   
¶33 In isolation, the penalty subsection of the statute 
appears 
to 
criminalize 
the 
failure 
to 
provide 
required 
information——without regard to the registrant's ability to 
provide that information.  However, it is a well-settled 
principle of statutory construction that "the plain meaning [of 
a statute] is seldom determined in a vacuum," and we therefore 
do not read words of a statute in isolation.  Osterhues, 282 
Wis. 2d 228, ¶24.  Instead, "statutory language is interpreted 
in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part 
of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or 
closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or 
unreasonable results."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.       
¶34 When the penalty subsection is read in context, two 
propositions become clear.  First, the legislature anticipated 
that a registrant might be unable to provide the required 
information.  Second, the legislature set forth an alternative 
procedure for monitoring the whereabouts of registrants who are 
                                                 
9 Dinkins offers an interpretation of the statute that 
focuses on the term "knowingly."  He argues that the term 
"knowingly" means not only that the registrant had knowledge of 
his failure to provide information, but also that the registrant 
had knowledge of the information itself.       
The 
text 
of 
the statute does not support such an 
interpretation.  "Knowingly" is an adverb, which modifies the 
verb phrase "fails . . . to provide."  It does not modify the 
noun "information." 
No. 
2009AP1643-CR  
 
14 
 
unable 
to 
provide 
an 
address 
without 
imposing 
criminal 
liability.   
¶35 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 301.45(2)(b)-(d) set forth the 
manner 
in 
which 
information 
required 
for 
sex 
offender 
registration is provided to the DOC.  The manner depends upon 
whether the registrant is under the supervision of the DOC, 
under the supervision of the DHS, or not supervised by either 
department.  When the registrant is not under any supervision, 
the statute specifically anticipates that the registrant may be 
unable to provide the required information.   
¶36 Subsection (2) provides in part: 
(b) If the [DOC] has supervision over a person subject 
to [the registration requirements], the [DOC] shall 
enter into the registry under this section the 
information specified in par. (a) concerning the 
person. 
(c) If the [DHS] has supervision over a person subject 
to [the registration requirements], [the DHS], with 
the assistance of the person, shall provide the 
information specified in par. (a) to the [DOC] in 
accordance with the rules under sub. (8). 
(d) 
A 
person 
subject 
to 
[the 
registration 
requirements] who is not under the supervision of the 
[DOC] or the [DHS] shall provide the information 
specified in par. (a) to the [DOC] in accordance with 
the rules under sub. (8).  If the person is unable to 
provide an item of information specified in par. (a), 
the [DOC] may request assistance from a circuit court 
or the [DHS] in obtaining that item of information.  A 
circuit court and the [DHS] shall assist the [DOC] 
when requested to do so under this paragraph.        
Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(b)-(d) (emphasis added).   
¶37 The term "unable" is not defined in the statute.  When 
a term is not defined, a general principle of statutory 
No. 
2009AP1643-CR  
 
15 
 
construction is that the term should be given its "common, 
ordinary, and accepted meaning."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.   
¶38 One 
dictionary defines "unable" as "lacking the 
necessary power, authority, or means, not able; incapable."  
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1940 (3d 
ed. 1992).  Another defines "unable" as "lacking the necessary 
power, competence, etc., to accomplish some specified act."  
Random House Unabridged Dictionary 2052 (2d ed. 1993).  In the 
context of the statute, we conclude that a registrant is 
"unable" 
to 
provide 
the 
required 
information 
when 
that 
information does not exist, despite the registrant's reasonable 
attempt to provide it.         
¶39 The second proposition which becomes clear when the 
statute is read in context is that the legislature set forth an 
alternative procedure by which required information can be 
provided.  Under sub. (2)(f), the DOC may require a registrant 
to 
report 
to 
a 
police station to provide any required 
information "that the person has not previously provided": 
The [DOC] may require a [registrant] to provide the 
[DOC] 
with 
his 
or 
her 
fingerprints, 
a 
recent 
photograph of the person and any other information 
required under par. (a) that the person has not 
previously provided.  The [DOC] may require the person 
to report to a place designated by the [DOC], 
including an office or station of a law enforcement 
agency, for the purpose of obtaining the person's 
fingerprints, the photograph or other information.   
Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(f) (emphasis added).   
¶40 Exercising its authority under this statute, the DOC 
can require a registrant who is unable to provide an address to 
No. 
2009AP1643-CR  
 
16 
 
report to a local police station upon release.  Id.  If, upon 
reporting to the police station, the registrant continues to be 
unable to provide an address, the DOC can require him to 
continue reporting to the police station on a regular basis 
until he is able to do so.  Id.  Meanwhile, it can require the 
registrant to provide information about the places he is 
frequenting.  Id.      
¶41 The parties agree that the registration requirements 
protect the public by assisting law enforcement officers to 
monitor known sex offenders.  By exercising its authority under 
sub. (2)(f), the DOC can ensure that a registrant who is unable 
to 
provide 
required 
information 
provides 
its 
functional 
equivalent and therefore can be effectively monitored without 
resorting to a preemptive prosecution.10   
¶42 The State's brief makes scant reference to sub. 
(2)(f).  The implication of its argument is that there is no 
need to consider this alternative statutory procedure because 
all homeless registrants are inherently capable of supplying 
information about where they "will be residing" 10 days in 
advance of release.   
                                                 
10 Contrary to the dissent's assertion, homeless registrants 
cannot leave "law enforcement, the Wisconsin public, and their 
victims in the dark about their whereabouts without any 
repercussions whatsoever."  Dissent, ¶112.  If the DOC requires 
a registrant to report to the police station and provide 
information under Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(f) and the registrant 
knowingly fails to do so, it would appear that the State could 
charge the registrant for "knowingly fail[ing] . . . to provide 
information under subs. (2) to (4)[.]"  Wis. Stat. § 301.45(6). 
No. 
2009AP1643-CR  
 
17 
 
¶43 The State asserts: "because everyone has to live and 
sleep somewhere (even if descriptively 'homeless'), a soon-to-
be-released sex offender . . . necessarily knows that he will be 
living and sleeping somewhere upon leaving prison . . . and thus 
is inherently capable of providing that information before 
release."  The State contends that a registrant who is unable to 
find housing can comply with the requirements by providing the 
address of a park bench or other on-the-street location where he 
intends to sleep.   
¶44 While 
we 
agree 
with 
the 
State 
that 
homeless 
registrants are not exempt from registration requirements and 
that homelessness is not a defense to failing to comply with the 
registration 
requirements, 
we 
disagree 
with 
the 
State's 
interpretation of the statute.  If listing a park bench or other 
on-the-street 
location 
were 
sufficient 
to 
satisfy 
the 
requirements, the purpose of the statute would be significantly 
undermined.  Such an interpretation is unreasonable.   
¶45 The sex offender registration statute "does not evince 
the [legislature's] intent to punish sex offenders, but rather 
reflects the [legislature's] intent to protect the public and 
assist law enforcement."  State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶21, 232 
Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199.  This purpose is served when the 
public and law enforcement officers have accurate information 
about the whereabouts of known sex offenders so that they can be 
monitored.     
¶46 Prison confinement limits not only a registrant's 
ability to secure a residence, but also the registrant's ability 
No. 
2009AP1643-CR  
 
18 
 
to learn about places where he could potentially live upon 
release.  From the vantage point of prison, a registrant may 
well be unaware of locations in the community where homeless 
individuals are permitted to congregate and sleep.  If listing a 
park bench is sufficient to satisfy the reporting requirement, a 
homeless registrant will be encouraged to simply provide an 
uninformed guess, with no assurance that the registrant would 
actually be able to stay in that location.  
¶47 An uninformed guess reported for the sole purpose of 
technical compliance with the statute would provide little 
protection for the public.  On the contrary, it might provide 
false reassurance that Dinkins' whereabouts were known. 
¶48 Further, once a registrant has reported an address to 
the DOC, that registrant has a 10-day grace period to update any 
information that has changed.  Wis. Stat. § 301.45(4)(a).  If 
transient registrants may simply guess at a possible location 
and then need not report any change in location for 10 days, 
they could easily slip off the grid, altogether undermining the 
purposes underlying registration.  Accordingly, we disagree with 
the State's assertion that a registrant can comply with the 
statute by listing a park bench or other on-the-street location 
as his residence.   
¶49 A final principle of statutory interpretation that 
informs our discussion is that a statute must be interpreted 
"reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  The sex offender registration statute is 
not intended to be punitive in nature.  Bollig, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 
No. 
2009AP1643-CR  
 
19 
 
¶21.  It is unreasonable to think that the legislature intended 
that a registrant be prosecuted for a Class H felony, which 
carries a maximum sentence of six years in prison, for failing 
to provide information which the registrant was unable to 
provide.   
¶50 The unreasonableness of such an interpretation is 
further 
illustrated 
by 
reviewing 
the 
other 
reporting 
requirements.  In addition to providing "the address at which 
[the registrant] is or will be residing," a registrant must 
provide the "name and address of place at which [the registrant] 
is or will be employed."  Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(a)8.  Just like 
the registrant's residence, the name and address of the 
registrant's employer must be provided 10 days prior to release.  
Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(e)4.   
¶51 If the legislature intended that a registrant be 
prosecuted for failing to provide information, even if that 
information does not exist despite an attempt to provide it, a 
registrant who is unable to secure employment could also be 
subjected to a Class H felony for failing to provide employment 
information 10 days in advance of release from prison.  Surely 
the legislature could not have intended such an unreasonable 
result.        
¶52 By 
applying 
well-settled 
principles 
of 
statutory 
construction, we conclude that a registrant cannot be convicted 
of violating Wis. Stat. § 301.45(6) for failing to report the 
address at which he will be residing when he was unable to 
provide this information.  We determine that a registrant is 
No. 
2009AP1643-CR  
 
20 
 
unable to provide the required information when that information 
does not exist, despite the registrant's reasonable attempt to 
provide it.11    
¶53 We emphasize that our interpretation of the statute is 
unlikely to apply to a large number of registrants.  Typically, 
registrants leaving prison will be under the supervision of the 
DOC or the DHS.  The DOC has recently declared: "Lacking a 
residence is unacceptable as a supervision strategy.  Every 
effort must be made . . . in establishing a residence if the 
offender is unable to propose suitable housing."  Wis. Dep't of 
Corrections Admin. Directive #11-04.   
¶54 Additionally, looking forward, the DOC has promulgated 
new reporting requirements and guidelines for addressing the 
                                                 
11 At the outset, the dissent mischaracterizes the holding 
of the majority and asserts facts that are unfounded.  See 
dissent, ¶88.   
The dissent takes aim at a straw man by mischaracterizing 
the 
majority's 
holding 
and 
then 
attacking 
its 
own 
mischaracterized version.  Under our holding, a registrant must 
do 
much 
more 
than 
merely 
"claim" 
homelessness 
to 
avoid 
prosecution for failing to provide an address.  Rather, a 
registrant must be unable to find housing, despite reasonably 
attempting to do so.  If a circuit court concludes that the 
registrant did not reasonably attempt to find housing, a 
prosecution may proceed. 
Additionally, the "facts" relied upon by the dissent are 
not in this record.  See dissent, ¶¶90-91.  It has long been the 
law that an appellate court's review is circumscribed by the 
record before it.  See, e.g., Keplin v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 
24 Wis. 2d 319, 324, 129 N.W.2d 321 (1964).  Tempting as it may 
be to conduct our own inquires outside the circuit court's 
record, we, as well as the litigants before us, are required to 
adhere to the rule of law.        
No. 
2009AP1643-CR  
 
21 
 
problem presented in this case.  Id.  When read in conjunction 
with the DOC's authority under Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(f), the 
directive may provide additional monitoring for registrants who 
have been terminated from supervision and who are unable to 
secure housing.  Id.    
¶55 Having interpreted the statutory language, we turn to 
applying that interpretation to the facts of this case.  Here, 
the circuit court found that Dinkins "attempted to comply with 
the statute, but has been unable to find housing for himself 
upon release."  During sentencing, the court reiterated that 
finding: "I assume [the DOC is] going to have to find him a 
place.  I mean, he can't find himself a place."  Implicit in the 
court's discussion is the assessment that Dinkins reasonably 
attempted to find housing for himself but was unsuccessful.          
¶56 It is undisputed that Dinkins did not have a home of 
his own.  The evidence in the record suggests that Dinkins made 
efforts to secure housing with relatives, but these efforts were 
unavailing.  A DOC agent testified that, other than facilitating 
contact between Dinkins and his relatives, the DOC did not offer 
him additional assistance.12  The circuit court's finding that 
                                                 
12 Q: "[I]t was never really discussed that there may 
be other options other than his daughter's residence? 
A: I never suggested anything else. 
Q: Okay.  Essentially, the onus was put on him to come 
up with a residence, correct? 
A: That's correct. 
No. 
2009AP1643-CR  
 
22 
 
Dinkins was unable to provide the required information to the 
DOC because it did not exist, despite his attempt to provide the 
information, is not clearly erroneous.     
IV 
¶57 Although our interpretation focuses on the statutory 
term "unable," the court of appeals focused on a different 
statutory term: "residing."  Thus, before concluding our 
analysis, we pause to address an issue raised by the court of 
appeals' interpretation.   
¶58 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
concluded 
that 
the 
term 
"residing" means "to live in a location for an extended period 
of time."  Dinkins, 330 Wis. 2d 591, ¶20.  It appeared to 
acknowledge that its interpretation would apply to all homeless 
registrants, and that under its interpretation, the statute 
would "fail[] to ensure that persons who lack 'an address at 
which 
they 
are 
or 
will 
be 
residing'--i.e., 
homeless 
registrants--provide information about their whereabouts to the 
[DOC]."   Id., ¶25 n.12.     
                                                                                                                                                             
Q: There was no——it wasn't explained to him that there 
were other options other than him coming up with his 
own residence? 
A: Well, I'm not aware of any other option.  Because 
when he came out on July 20th, he was no longer on 
supervision.  So the Department of Corrections was 
responsible to pick him up, transport him, wait until 
the GPS was hooked up; and then we were no longer ——
 . . . we didn't have any authority on him at that 
point.  
No. 
2009AP1643-CR  
 
23 
 
¶59 We 
do 
not 
agree 
with 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
interpretation of the term "residing."  Certainly, an address 
where a registrant intended to live for an extended period of 
time would constitute a place where a registrant "will be 
residing."  However, we think the statutory term "residing" is 
broader, encompassing more temporary living arrangements as 
well.   
¶60 The term "residing" is undefined in the statute and 
the relevant administrative code.  The court of appeals' narrow 
interpretation of the term would appear to undermine the purpose 
of the statute.  It would ill serve the statute's purpose to 
exempt a class of registrants who are without a location to live 
"for an extended period of time," without regard to the 
registrant's ability to secure some type of temporary or 
transitional housing.   
¶61 In sum, we agree with the State that homeless 
registrants are not exempt from registration requirements and 
that homelessness is not a defense to failing to comply with the 
registration requirements.  However, we disagree that Dinkins 
was capable of complying with the statute by listing a park 
bench or other on-the-street location. 
¶62 In examining the text and context of the sex offender 
registration 
statute, 
we 
determine 
that 
the 
legislature 
anticipated that a registrant might be unable to provide the 
information required by the statute.  Significantly, the 
legislature set forth an alternative procedure for monitoring 
No. 
2009AP1643-CR  
 
24 
 
the whereabouts of registrants who are unable to provide an 
address without imposing criminal liability.   
¶63 By 
applying 
well-settled 
principles 
of 
statutory 
construction, we conclude that a registrant cannot be convicted 
of violating Wis. Stat. § 301.45(6) for failing to report the 
address at which he will be residing when he is unable to 
provide this information.  We determine that a registrant is 
unable to provide the required information when that information 
does not exist, despite the registrant's reasonable attempt to 
provide it.  Here, the circuit court found that Dinkins 
attempted to comply with the statute, that he was unable to find 
housing on his own, and that the DOC would have to find housing 
for 
him. 
 
These 
findings 
are 
not 
clearly 
erroneous.  
Accordingly, albeit upon a different rationale, we affirm the 
court of appeals.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.           
No.  2009AP1643-CR.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
¶64 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (concurring).   Homeless 
convicted sex offenders are not exempt from the registration 
requirements set out in Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(a).  In this 
case, we are faced with the question of how homeless convicted 
sex offenders satisfy their statutory obligations in a manner 
that will promote the purpose of § 301.45, which has been 
interpreted as informing law enforcement of the whereabouts of 
convicted sex offenders.1  The majority opinion and the 
dissenting opinion, as well as this concurrence, struggle with 
the interpretation of a statute that did not envision the 
compliance problems that the Department of Corrections (DOC) 
must face when confronting the registration of homeless persons 
who are required to provide an address that they do not have.  
¶65 I conclude that William Dinkins, Sr., a homeless, 
unemployed, convicted sex offender, could have satisfied the 
first step of his Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(a)5. obligation to 
report "[t]he address at which [he] is or will be residing" and 
his § 301.45(2)(a)8. obligation to report "[t]he name and 
address of the place at which [he] is or will be employed" by 
reporting that he was "homeless" and "unemployed" on the DOC Sex 
Offender Registration form #1759, at least ten days before his 
release from prison.  Then, because Mr. Dinkins is a convicted 
homeless 
sex 
offender 
who 
was 
"unable 
to 
provide" 
more 
                                                 
1 See "Policy Statement:  It is the intent of the Division 
of Community Corrections and the Sex Offender Registry Program 
to monitor and track whereabouts of the sex offender registrants 
. . . ."  Administrative Directive #11-04.  
No.  2009AP1643-CR.pdr 
 
2 
 
particularized information on residence and employment, the DOC 
was obligated to request assistance from a circuit court or the 
Department of Health Services (DHS) before it could seek 
prosecution.  See Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(d).  If the DOC had 
requested assistance, a circuit court or the DHS would have been 
obligated to cooperate with the DOC in order to permit law 
enforcement agencies to obtain the information they needed to 
ascertain Mr. Dinkins' whereabouts.  Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(d) 
and (9). 
¶66 Furthermore, when DOC seeks assistance under Wis. 
Stat. § 301.45(2)(d) and (9), a circuit court or the DHS shall 
establish a plan to provide the required information to the DOC.  
Such a plan could include directing a homeless or unemployed 
convicted sex offender who is to be released from prison and who 
will not be under supervision upon release to personally report 
to a designated law enforcement facility during a weekday, at 
least once per week, to provide law enforcement with the 
specific location(s) in the city and state that the convicted 
sex offender has been frequenting and sleeping the previous 
seven days, together with a report of the places from which he 
has sought employment.   
¶67 Because 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 301.45 
was 
not 
properly 
interpreted or applied, the circuit court erred in convicting 
Mr. Dinkins of failing to comply with the sex offender reporting 
requirements.  Therefore, although I do not agree with the 
majority opinion's reasoning, I do agree that Mr. Dinkins' 
conviction should be reversed, and I would remand the matter for 
No.  2009AP1643-CR.pdr 
 
3 
 
further proceedings before the circuit court.  I also agree with 
the dissent's concern that convicted sex offenders should not be 
left unaccounted for once they are released from prison; 
however, I do not agree a homeless sex offender's failure to 
provide an address should result in immediate prosecution.2  
Simply convicting Mr. Dinkins of a Class H felony will not 
provide 
the 
public 
or 
law 
enforcement 
with 
meaningful 
information such that they can locate Mr. Dinkins.  Accordingly, 
although I do not join the majority opinion, I respectfully 
concur. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶68 On February 4, 1999, Mr. Dinkins was convicted of 
first-degree sexual assault of a child, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02(1).  He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment that 
concluded on July 20, 2008, his mandatory release date.  As a 
result of his sexual assault conviction and his upcoming release 
from prison, Mr. Dinkins was required to register as a sex 
offender in accordance with the provisions of Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.45(2)(d).  He did complete a DOC Sex Offender Registration 
form 
#1759 
that 
elicits 
the 
information 
required 
by 
§ 301.45(2)(a).  However, because Mr. Dinkins did not have a 
place to live upon release from prison, "To be determined by 
Agent" was written on the form for "Residence," and for 
"Employment," "unemployed" was checked. 
¶69 Because Mr. Dinkins did not provide a specific address 
to the DOC, the DOC requested that the State prosecute him for a 
                                                 
2 See dissent, ¶¶88-89. 
No.  2009AP1643-CR.pdr 
 
4 
 
willful violation of the statutory registration requirements, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 301.45(6).  That prosecution resulted 
in Mr. Dinkins' conviction of a Class H felony.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶70 This case requires us to interpret and apply various 
provisions of the sex offender registration law, Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.45. 
 Statutory construction and application present 
questions of law for our independent review.  Richards v. Badger 
Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶14, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581.  
However, as we conduct our review, we benefit from prior 
analyses of the court of appeals and the circuit court.  Id.   
B.  Wisconsin Stat. §301.45 
¶71 The parties agree that the information Mr. Dinkins is 
required to report is set out in Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(a).  
Failing 
to 
report 
all 
of 
the 
information 
listed 
in 
§ 301.45(2)(a) may result in prosecution and conviction of a 
Class H felony.  Wis. Stat. § 301.45(6).     
¶72 Statutory interpretation "begins with the language of 
the statute."  Richards, 309 Wis. 2d 541, ¶20 (quoting State ex 
rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110).  We assume that the meaning of the 
statute is expressed in the words that the legislature chose to 
use.  Id.  The context in which statutory terms are considered 
is helpful to our understanding.  Id.  When the statutory 
language is unambiguous, we apply the plain, clear meaning of 
No.  2009AP1643-CR.pdr 
 
5 
 
the statute.  Id.  Statutory purpose also is important to 
statutory construction.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶48. 
¶73 Mr. Dinkins had served the full term of the imposed 
sentence; therefore, no supervision was to be provided upon his 
release from prison.  Accordingly, I begin with Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.45(2)(d), which sets out the registration process for a 
sex offender no longer subject to supervision.  Section 
301.45(2)(d) provides: 
 
A person subject to sub. (1g) who is not under 
the supervision of the department of corrections or 
the department of health services shall provide the 
information specified in par. (a) to the department of 
corrections in accordance with the rules under sub. 
(8).  If the person is unable to provide an item of 
information specified in par. (a), the department of 
corrections may request assistance from a circuit 
court 
or 
the 
department 
of 
health 
services 
in 
obtaining that item of information.  A circuit court 
and the department of health services shall assist the 
department of corrections when requested to do so 
under this paragraph.  
¶74 Wisconsin Stat. § 301.45(2)(d) states that "[i]f the 
person is unable to provide an item of information specified in 
par. (a)" certain assistance is available.  For example, the DOC 
"may request" that a circuit court assist in providing the 
required information, or the DOC "may request" assistance from 
the DHS.  Section 301.45(2)(d) also provides that if the DOC 
makes such a request, a circuit court or the DHS "shall assist 
the department of corrections."  Accordingly, the plain wording 
of the statute shows that the legislature anticipated that a 
person who would no longer be subject to supervision may be 
No.  2009AP1643-CR.pdr 
 
6 
 
"unable to provide" the required information and when that 
occurs, assistance is to be provided.   
¶75 In the case now before us, the DOC did not request a 
circuit court or the DHS to assist Mr. Dinkins in meeting his 
registration requirements.  Instead, it immediately sought 
prosecution of Mr. Dinkins in circuit court for willfully 
failing to register.  Apparently, the DOC concluded that because 
Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(d) states that the DOC "may" ask for 
assistance when a convicted sex offender is "unable to provide 
an item of information" required by § 301.45(2)(a), the DOC was 
not obligated to request assistance.   
¶76 Although the term "may" usually does not compel 
action, we interpret statutory terms in the context in which 
they are used.  Spiegelberg v. State, 2006 WI 75, ¶20, 291 
Wis. 2d 601, 717 N.W.2d 641.  Terms are also interpreted to 
support the purpose of the statute in which they are used.  
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶48.  Therefore, "may" can be mandatory 
when such a construction supports the purpose underlying the 
statute.  Bouchard v. Bouchard, 107 Wis. 2d 632, 634, 321 N.W.2d 
330 (Ct. App. 1982).   
¶77 Here, the purpose underlying Wis. Stat. § 301.45 is to 
permit law enforcement to know the whereabouts of convicted sex 
offenders and what they are doing.  Therefore, obtaining 
information about where the sex offender will be staying when he 
or she is released from prison, even when he or she is homeless, 
should be the primary focus for the DOC.  Although at first 
blush, the requirement that the DOC seek assistance may seem 
No.  2009AP1643-CR.pdr 
 
7 
 
discretionary, the statutory context makes it mandatory when one 
observes that the joint efforts of the department and the 
circuit court would ensure that a homeless sex offender's 
whereabouts could be monitored and thereby satisfy the purpose 
underlying § 301.45.   
¶78 Furthermore, statutory interpretation that directs the 
DOC to request assistance from a circuit court or the DHS has 
the 
consequence 
of 
compelling 
assistance. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 301.45(2)(d).  That assistance is required is emphasized by 
§ 301.45(9), 
which 
provides: 
 
"The 
department 
of 
health 
services, 
the 
department 
of 
children 
and 
families, 
the 
department of transportation and all circuit courts shall 
cooperate with the department of corrections in obtaining 
information under this section."  Stated otherwise, the focus of 
§ 301.45 
is 
on 
obtaining 
information, 
not 
on 
immediate 
prosecution.  
¶79 Accordingly, I conclude that the term "may" in Wis. 
Stat. § 301.45(2)(d) is not discretionary; rather, it directed 
the DOC to request assistance from the circuit court or the DHS 
so that a plan could have been determined to permit law 
enforcement to know the whereabouts of Mr. Dinkins, a homeless 
person.  Because no plan was made that would promote the purpose 
of § 301.45 in regard to Mr. Dinkins, I would dismiss the 
complaint alleging a § 301.45(6) violation and remand the matter 
to the circuit court to determine such a plan.   
¶80 My interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(d) is 
strengthened by comparing it with the reporting and assistance 
No.  2009AP1643-CR.pdr 
 
8 
 
requirements of § 301.45(2)(c).  Both para. (2)(d) and para. 
(2)(c) 
incorporate 
the 
reporting 
requirements 
of 
§ 301.45(2)(a)5., which requires reporting "The address at which 
the person is or will be residing."  Both are registration 
directives that apply when a convicted sex offender is being 
released from prison.  Accordingly, both serve the purpose of 
permitting law enforcement to ascertain the whereabouts of 
convicted sex offenders.   
¶81 Mr. Dinkins was not subject to supervision upon his 
release from prison.  Therefore, the obligation to provide the 
DOC with the information listed in Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(a) is 
his alone, according to the provisions of § 301.45(2)(d).   
¶82 However, 
if 
Mr. 
Dinkins 
had 
been 
subject 
to 
supervision upon release from prison, Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(c) 
would have applied to the requirement to provide information to 
the DOC.  Under § 301.45(2)(c), the DHS, not the convicted sex 
offender, is obligated to provide the information required by 
§ 301.45(2)(a) to the DOC.3  The convicted person simply 
"assists" the DHS.   
¶83 Query, if a DHS employee designates the sex offender's 
residence as "To be determined by Agent," would the health 
services 
employee 
who 
completes 
the 
form 
be 
subject 
to 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 301.45(2)(c) provides: 
 
If 
the 
department 
of 
health 
services 
has 
supervision over a person subject to sub. (1g), that 
department, with the assistance of the person, shall 
provide the information specified in par. (a) to the 
department of corrections in accordance with the rules 
under sub. (8). 
No.  2009AP1643-CR.pdr 
 
9 
 
prosecution for a Class H felony based on what he or she wrote 
on the form?  One would hope not, yet Wis. Stat. § 301.45(6) 
says, "Whoever knowingly fails to comply with any requirement to 
provide information under subs. (2)" is subject to the listed 
penalties, and, it is the DHS that has the duty to provide 
information under § 301.45(2)(c).   
¶84 Accordingly, I conclude a proper interpretation of 
§ 301.45(2)(d) must cause the effect on two homeless convicted 
sex offenders to be consistent.  Therefore, because a homeless 
convicted sex offender who is subject to supervised release 
would receive assistance in providing the necessary information, 
assistance should have been provided to Mr. Dinkins as well.  
Immediate prosecution of Mr. Dinkins was not appropriate.  
¶85 On remand it will be helpful to note that although the 
DOC was authorized by statute to provide "rules necessary to 
carry out its duties," Wis. Stat. § 301.45(8), prior to Mr. 
Dinkins' conviction for willfully failing to register, the DOC 
had no rules directed to homeless persons.  However, subsequent 
to Mr. Dinkins' conviction, the DOC issued Administrative 
Directive #11-04, and while not a DOC rule, it does establish a 
protocol for obtaining the required information about homeless 
sex offenders.  In so doing, it furthers the public safety 
purpose of the registration requirement that drives the dissent,4 
by assisting law enforcement in determining the whereabouts of 
homeless sex offenders.   
¶86 Administrative Directive #11-04 provides:  
                                                 
4 See dissent, ¶90 n.2. 
No.  2009AP1643-CR.pdr 
 
10 
 
While homeless, the sex offender registrant must call 
and speak with a staff member of the Sex Offender 
Registry or designated Registry Specialist every seven 
days, on a weekday, to report "homeless" status and 
the location(s) in the city and state where he/she has 
been frequenting and sleeping for the previous seven 
days and plans for the next seven days along with all 
other required registry data.  
The Administrative Directive also provides that a sex offender 
who is no longer under supervision who "fail[s] to adhere to 
policy 
set 
[in 
Administrative 
Directive 
#11-04] 
will 
be 
considered non-compliant with the Sex Offender Registry and be 
subject to non-compliance prosecution."  Therefore, while not 
based expressly on an interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 301.45, the 
Administrative Directive recognizes that homeless persons may 
satisfy their registration requirements in ways that differ from 
a convicted sex offender who is not homeless.  It also forms a 
basis for holding homeless sex offenders accountable if they 
fail 
to 
provide 
the 
required 
registration 
information.  
Accordingly, Administrative Directive #11-04 may be a useful 
starting point for the circuit court on remand. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶87 Because Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(d) was not properly 
interpreted or applied, the circuit court erred in convicting 
Mr. Dinkins of failing to comply with the sex offender reporting 
requirements.  Therefore, I agree with the majority opinion that 
Mr. Dinkins' conviction should be reversed, and I would remand 
the matter for further proceedings before the circuit court.  
Accordingly, although I do not join the majority opinion, I 
respectfully concur.   
 
No.  2009AP1643-CR.pdr 
 
11 
 
 
 
No.  2009AP1643-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
 
¶88 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (dissenting).  Today, 
the majority creates a registration loophole for arguably some 
of the most dangerous sex offenders: those whose whereabouts are 
unknown and who are otherwise not subject to supervision by the 
Department of Corrections (DOC).  Pursuant to the majority 
opinion, the newly pronounced dictate is that a convicted and 
released sex offender who, like Dinkins, is not otherwise 
subject to any supervision, can no longer be adjudged criminally 
liable for failing to provide to the DOC his or her address as 
required under Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(a)5., so long as he or she 
claims to be homeless and unable to find housing.  In other 
words, in spite of the manifest purpose behind the sex offender 
registration statute——to assist law enforcement in locating, 
investigating, and apprehending sex offenders in order to 
protect the public——the majority provides homeless sex offenders 
a means to escape from sex offender registration, thereby 
rendering those sex offenders essentially invisible to law 
enforcement and to the Wisconsin public.  To the majority, it 
matters not that Dinkins has twice been convicted of sexual 
assault and that his most recent conviction for first-degree 
sexual assault of a ten-year-old child occurred only two years 
after he was discharged from parole for his prior sex offense.  
The majority condones Dinkins' failure to comply with the sex 
offender registration statute by evading the statute's plain 
language and creating a statutory procedure for dealing with 
homeless sex offenders where none has been provided by the 
legislature.  The legislature could have enacted such a 
No.  2009AP1643-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
procedure, as other state legislatures have.1  It did not.  By 
creating a statutory procedure for dealing with homeless sex 
offenders, the majority substitutes its own judgment for that of 
the 
legislature 
and 
leaves 
sex 
offenders 
like 
Dinkins 
unaccounted for, contravening the very purpose of the sex 
offender registration statute.  Surely, law enforcement, the 
Wisconsin public, and those who have been victimized by homeless 
sex offenders deserve more.  I cannot join the majority's 
strained, result-driven statutory interpretation. 
¶89 Based upon the plain language of the sex offender 
registration statute, I conclude that Dinkins was properly 
convicted of knowingly failing to comply with the requirement 
that he provide to the DOC the address at which he will be 
residing upon his release from prison.  Whether Dinkins and 
other homeless sex offenders ought to be exempt from that 
requirement is a question for the legislature——not this court——
to decide.  
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶90 On February 4, 1999, Dinkins was convicted of one 
count of first-degree sexual assault of a child in violation of 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 290.011 (2008); 730 Ill. 
Comp. Stat. 150/6 (2007); Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 3a 
(2010); Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.130(5) (2009). 
No.  2009AP1643-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1) (1997-98).  The complaint2 alleged that on 
or around April 18, 1998, Dinkins sexually assaulted his then 
girlfriend's ten-year-old daughter by bending her over the bed 
and rubbing his penis along the crack of her buttocks and 
against her vagina.  When asked if anything else happened, the 
victim told the investigating officer that "white stuff was 
coming out of the end of [Dinkins'] ding dong" and that "he had 
placed his ding dong in her mouth and made her suck on it." 
¶91 According to the complaint, at the time of the 
assault, Dinkins was living with the victim's mother.  The 
complaint identified Dinkins' address as one in Fox Lake, 
Wisconsin. 
¶92 Dinkins was sentenced to ten years imprisonment for 
sexually assaulting his ten-year-old victim.  He served his 
sentence at Oshkosh Correctional Institution, a medium security 
prison, until his maximum discharge date of July 20, 2008.  In 
other words, Dinkins, unlike many criminals, served the entire 
length of his sentence in prison.  Consequently, but for the 
criminal complaint issued in the instant case for failure to 
comply with the sex offender registration statute, Dinkins would 
                                                 
2 The complaint filed against Dinkins, including the nature 
of the charge, is public record.  Moreover, but for the 
majority's holding today, law enforcement and the public would 
typically be entitled to track a registered sex offender like 
Dinkins through the online sex offender registry, see Wisconsin 
DOC, 
Sex 
Offender 
Registry, 
http://offender.doc.state.wi.us/public/ (last visited Feb. 9, 
2012), and easily ascertain the nature of the sex offender's 
conviction. 
No.  2009AP1643-CR.akz 
 
4 
 
have been released into the community without DOC supervision.  
See majority op., ¶8 & n.4. 
¶93 There is no question that as a result of his 
underlying conviction for a "sex offense," first-degree sexual 
assault of a child, Dinkins was required to register as a sex 
offender.  See Wis. Stat. § 301.45(1d)(b), (1g)(a).  The 
legislature has charged the DOC with maintaining a registry of 
all sex offenders in Wisconsin.  § 301.45(2)(a).  The purpose of 
sex offender registration is not to further punish sex offenders 
but rather to protect the public.  See State v. Smith, 2010 WI 
16, ¶26, 323 Wis. 2d 377, 780 N.W.2d 90; State v. Bollig, 2000 
WI 
6, 
¶¶20-21, 
232 
Wis. 2d 561, 
605 
N.W.2d 199. 
 
More 
specifically, registration assists law enforcement in locating, 
investigating, and apprehending sex offenders in order to 
protect the health, safety, and welfare of the Wisconsin public.  
Bollig, 232 Wis. 2d 561, ¶20.  In addition, the public has 
online access to information about sex offenders and their 
whereabouts. 
 
See 
Wisconsin 
DOC, 
Sex 
Offender 
Registry, 
http://offender.doc.state.wi.us/public/.  As part of maintaining 
the registry, the DOC must collect certain information about 
each sex offender in Wisconsin, including "[t]he address at 
which the person is or will be residing."  § 301.45(2)(a)5.  In 
this case, Dinkins was required to provide such information to 
the DOC no later than ten days before his release from prison——
in 
other 
words, 
no 
later 
than 
July 
10, 
2008. 
 
See 
§ 301.45(2)(e)4.  Section 301.45(6)(a)1. expressly provides that 
"[w]hoever knowingly fails to comply with any requirement to 
No.  2009AP1643-CR.akz 
 
5 
 
provide information" under § 301.45(2) through (4) is guilty of 
a Class H felony.  The penalty provision has no exceptions. 
¶94 The registration requirements are no surprise to sex 
offenders and to Dinkins in particular.  In this case, the DOC 
was responsible for notifying Dinkins of his need to comply with 
the requirements of the sex offender registration statute.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 301.45(3)(b)2.  The DOC so notified Dinkins.  What 
is more, Dinkins had prior experience in registering as a sex 
offender.  Dinkins' underlying conviction for first-degree 
sexual assault of a child was not his first conviction for a sex 
offense.  As early as January 1996, Dinkins was required to 
register as a sex offender as a result of being convicted in 
1992 of attempted second-degree sexual assault in violation of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 939.32 and 940.225(2) (1991-92).  Still, on June 
2, 2008, seven weeks before the date of Dinkins' maximum 
discharge, Lisa Gallitz, a parole agent from the DOC, spoke with 
Dinkins via telephone and notified him that he was required to 
register as a sex offender as a result of his conviction for 
first-degree sexual assault of a child and that he could be 
criminally charged for failing to inform the DOC of his specific 
residential address. 
¶95 Two days later, on June 4, 2008, Myra Smith, a social 
worker at Oshkosh Correctional Institution, gave Dinkins a copy 
of a Notice of Requirements to Register and a standardized sex 
offender registration form.  See Wis. Stat. § 301.45(3)(b)3m.  
The notice stated that "under Wisconsin Statute 301.45, you are 
required to comply with, and provide information/changes in your 
No.  2009AP1643-CR.akz 
 
6 
 
RESIDENCE, EMPLOYMENT, SCHOOL ENROLLMENT, VEHICLE USE OR CHANGE 
OF NAME status . . . ."  Furthermore, the notice specified that 
Dinkins had to comply with the sex offender registration 
requirements "[a]t least 10 days prior to [his] sentence or 
commitment expiration." 
¶96 Smith filled out the sex offender registration form on 
Dinkins' 
behalf. 
 
The 
form 
indicated 
that 
Dinkins 
was 
unemployed, was not enrolled in school, and did not drive.  In 
addition, in the space reserved for "RESIDENCE STREET," Smith 
wrote, "To be determined by Agent." 
¶97 Dinkins signed and dated the bottom of the form.  The 
following clause was printed above Dinkins' signature:  
I have been notified of my duty to register in 
accordance with Wisconsin Statute 301.45.  I have read 
the requirements as indicated on the reverse side of 
this form.  I understand that I am legally obligated 
to supply this information, and that failure to 
comply, or providing false information, may be cause 
for revocation and/or further criminal prosecution.  I 
understand that this information will be used for law 
enforcement purposes and other purposes established by 
law. 
¶98 In the ensuing weeks, Smith made several attempts to 
help Dinkins find living arrangements.  Smith first offered to 
help on June 10, 2008, but Dinkins declined.  On June 17, 2008, 
Smith arranged for Dinkins to telephone his ex-wife, but the 
line was busy.  From that point forward, up until Dinkins' 
maximum discharge date, Smith contacted Dinkins "at least 
weekly" to inquire about his living arrangements.  According to 
Smith, Dinkins "was always waiting for a reply from his 
daughter." 
No.  2009AP1643-CR.akz 
 
7 
 
¶99 By July 10, 2008, ten days before his maximum 
discharge, Dinkins still had not given the DOC any indication as 
to where he would be residing upon his release from prison.  
Consequently, on July 17, 2008, Dinkins was charged with 
knowingly failing to comply with the requirement that he provide 
to the DOC the address at which he will be residing upon his 
release from prison, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 301.45(6)(a). 
II. ANALYSIS 
¶100 Whether Dinkins was properly convicted of violating 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 301.45(6)(a) 
involves 
a 
straightforward 
interpretation and application of the sex offender registration 
statute.  Our canons of statutory interpretation are often-
stated and well understood.  "[W]e have repeatedly held that 
statutory interpretation 'begins with the language of the 
statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily 
stop the inquiry.'"  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for 
Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
(quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 
612 N.W.2d 659).  The rationale is simple:  
[C]anons of construction are no more than rules of 
thumb that help courts determine the meaning of 
legislation, and in interpreting a statute a court 
should always turn first to one, cardinal canon before 
all 
others. . . . [C]ourts 
must 
presume 
that 
a 
legislature says in a statute what it means and means 
in a statute what it says there.   
Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992). 
¶101 In 
addition, 
"scope, 
context, 
and 
purpose 
are 
perfectly relevant to a plain-meaning interpretation of an 
unambiguous statute," so long as they are ascertainable from the 
No.  2009AP1643-CR.akz 
 
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statute itself.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶48.  Importantly, "a 
plain-meaning interpretation cannot contravene a textually or 
contextually manifest statutory purpose."  Id., ¶49 (internal 
footnote omitted).   
¶102 Applying these canons of statutory interpretation to 
the sex offender registration statute, I conclude that Dinkins 
was properly convicted of violating Wis. Stat. § 301.45(6)(a).  
Section 301.45(6)(a)1. states, in relevant part, that "[w]hoever 
knowingly fails to comply with any requirement to provide 
information" under § 301.45(2) through (4) is guilty of a Class 
H felony.  Significantly, although it could have, the statute 
does not exempt from its reach any certain sex offenders, 
homeless or otherwise.  Pursuant to the plain language of 
§ 301.45(6)(a), a person is criminally liable if he or she was 
required to provide information under § 301.45(2) through (4) 
and knowingly failed to provide the information as required.  
See Wis JI——Criminal 2198.   
¶103 Here, there is no question that Dinkins was required 
under Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2) to provide to the DOC certain 
information about himself and was required to do so no later 
than July 10, 2008, ten days before his release from prison.  
See § 301.45(2)(a), (2)(e)4.  Specific to this case, the 
required 
information 
included 
"[t]he 
address 
at 
which 
[he] . . . will be residing" upon his release from prison.  See 
§ 301.45(2)(a)5.   
¶104 Furthermore, 
there 
is 
no 
question 
that 
Dinkins 
knowingly failed to provide his address as required.  Dinkins 
No.  2009AP1643-CR.akz 
 
9 
 
received written and verbal notice of his need to provide to the 
DOC his specific residential address at least ten days prior to 
the expiration of his sentence.  Still, as of July 10, 2008, 
Dinkins had not given the DOC any indication whatsoever as to 
where he would be residing upon his release from prison.  As far 
as 
the DOC knew, 
Dinkins' address was merely "[t]o be 
determined"; in other words, Dinkins could be living anywhere in 
the world. 
¶105 Given these circumstances, Dinkins violated the plain 
language of Wis. Stat. § 301.45(6)(a).  The majority, at least 
initially, seems to agree.  See majority op., ¶33 ("In 
isolation, the penalty subsection of the statute appears to 
criminalize the failure to provide required information——without 
regard 
to 
the 
registrant's 
ability 
to 
provide 
that 
information.")  This court's analysis ought to end there.  When 
the words of a statute are plain, "'judicial inquiry is 
complete.'"  Germain, 503 U.S. at 254 (quoting Rubin v. United 
States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)). 
¶106 Nevertheless, 
the 
majority, 
unsatisfied 
with 
the 
result yielded by a plain-meaning interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.45(6)(a), proceeds to conclude that Dinkins was not 
properly convicted of violating § 301.45(6)(a).  The majority so 
concludes by doing an end-around interpretation of the sex 
offender registration statute and creating a statutory procedure 
for dealing with homeless sex offenders where none exists. 
¶107 Relying on Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(d) and (2)(f), the 
majority concludes that the legislature envisioned a scenario 
No.  2009AP1643-CR.akz 
 
10 
 
like Dinkins' and set forth a procedure for dealing with 
homeless sex offenders like him without imposing criminal 
liability.  See majority op., ¶¶4, 34-41.  In actuality, 
§ 301.45(2)(d) and (2)(f) say no such thing. 
¶108 Wisconsin Stat. § 301.45(2)(d) is specific to sex 
offenders, like Dinkins, who are not under the supervision of 
the DOC.  Subsection (2)(d) states:  
A person subject to [the requirements of sex 
offender 
registration] 
who 
is 
not 
under 
the 
supervision of the department of corrections or the 
department 
of 
health services shall provide the 
information specified in par. (a) to the department of 
corrections in accordance with the rules [promulgated 
by the DOC] under sub. (8).  If the person is unable 
to provide an item of information specified in par. 
(a), 
the 
department 
of 
corrections 
may 
request 
assistance from a circuit court or the department of 
health services in obtaining that item of information.  
A circuit court and the department of health services 
shall 
assist 
the department of corrections when 
requested to do so under this paragraph. 
§ 301.45(2)(d).  As the majority points out, the plain language 
of subsection (2)(d) contemplates that a sex offender like 
Dinkins may be "unable to provide an item of information 
specified" in subsection (2)(a).  Majority op., ¶36; see also 
concurrence, ¶75.  If such is the case, the DOC then has the 
option of requesting assistance from a circuit court or the 
No.  2009AP1643-CR.akz 
 
11 
 
Department of Health Services (DHS) in obtaining that item of 
information.3  § 301.45(2)(d). 
¶109 Wisconsin Stat. § 301.45(2)(f) gives the DOC the 
authority to require a sex offender to report to a designated 
location for the purpose of providing fingerprints, a recent 
photograph, or any other required information that was not 
previously provided:  
The department may require a person covered under 
[the sex offender registration statute] to provide the 
department with his or her fingerprints, a recent 
photograph of the person and any other information 
required under par. (a) that the person has not 
previously provided.  The department may require the 
person to report to a place designated by the 
department, including an office or station of a law 
enforcement agency, for the purpose of obtaining the 
person's 
fingerprints, 
the 
photograph 
or 
other 
information. 
¶110 To be sure, Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(d) and (2)(f) 
reveal that the legislature anticipated that a sex offender may 
be unable to, or simply may choose not to, provide information 
required under subsection (2)(a), including his or her address.  
However, § 301.45(2)(d) and (2)(f) say nothing about a sex 
offender 
being 
exempt 
from 
criminal 
liability 
under 
                                                 
3 The concurrence concludes that the DOC is obligated to 
request assistance from a circuit court or the DHS in obtaining 
the missing item of information.  Concurrence, ¶78.  I disagree.  
I 
decline 
to 
construe 
the 
word 
"may" 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 301.45(2)(d) as "shall," particularly when the word "shall" 
appears in the very next sentence.  See Karow v. Milwaukee Cnty. 
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 82 Wis. 2d 565, 571, 263 N.W.2d 214 (1978) 
("When the words 'shall' and 'may' are used in the same section 
of a statute, one can infer that the legislature was aware of 
the different denotations and intended the words to have their 
precise meanings."). 
No.  2009AP1643-CR.akz 
 
12 
 
§ 301.45(6)(a) for failing to provide such required information.  
Instead, § 301.45(2)(d) and (2)(f) simply give the DOC options 
for obtaining the missing information, either by requesting 
assistance from a circuit court or the DHS or by requiring the 
sex offender to report to a designated location.  Indeed, these 
options assist the DOC in fulfilling its duty to maintain a 
registry that contains all of the required information with 
respect to each and every sex offender in Wisconsin.  See 
§ 301.45(2)(a). 
¶111 Rather than taking Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(d) and 
(2)(f) for what they are on their face, simply different means 
for the DOC to obtain missing information about a sex offender, 
the majority takes the extraordinary leap of interpreting these 
provisions to mean that the legislature did not intend for a sex 
offender to be presumptively prosecuted for failure to provide 
certain required information.  See majority op., ¶41.  Specific 
to the address requirement, the majority proceeds to create a 
procedure for dealing with homeless sex offenders, explaining 
that the DOC can require a homeless sex offender to regularly 
report to a police station until he or she is able to provide an 
address and, in the meantime, can require the sex offender to 
provide information about the places he or she frequents.  Id., 
¶40.  The majority substitutes its own judgment for that of the 
legislature and creates a statutory procedure for dealing with 
homeless sex offenders where none exists.   
¶112 The majority's interpretation of the sex offender 
registration statute flies in the face of the plain language of 
No.  2009AP1643-CR.akz 
 
13 
 
Wis. Stat. § 301.45(6)(a), which imposes criminal liability for 
the 
failure 
to 
comply 
with 
"any 
requirement 
to 
provide 
information" under § 301.45(2) through (4), without regard to 
the sex offender's ability to provide such information.  Worse 
still, 
the 
majority's 
interpretation 
leaves 
homeless 
sex 
offenders like Dinkins unaccounted for, contravening the very 
purpose of the sex offender registration statute.  See Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶49 ("[A] plain-meaning interpretation cannot 
contravene 
a 
textually or contextually manifest statutory 
purpose."  (Internal footnote omitted.)).  The unreasonableness 
of the majority's interpretation is best demonstrated by an 
example: had Dinkins still been under the DOC's supervision and 
thus had his whereabouts subject to scrutiny, he could have been 
sent back to prison for failing to provide his address as 
required under § 301.45(2)(a)5.  As it stands now, however, 
Dinkins and other sex offenders like him can claim homelessness; 
escape criminal liability; and leave law enforcement, the 
Wisconsin public, and their victims in the dark about their 
whereabouts without any repercussions whatsoever.  Surely, the 
public is more adequately protected from the sex offender who is 
still subject to supervision by the DOC, and yet, that is the 
sex offender whom the majority subjects to incarceration for 
failing to comply with the sex offender registration statute, 
while the sex offender who is without any supervision is free to 
roam our streets and be entirely unaccounted for.  Indeed, the 
majority's own fabricated procedure for dealing with homeless 
sex offenders begs the question: if a homeless sex offender like 
No.  2009AP1643-CR.akz 
 
14 
 
Dinkins cannot be prosecuted for failing to provide to the DOC 
his or her address and is not otherwise under the DOC's 
supervision, how is the DOC supposed to locate such a sex 
offender for the purpose of requiring him or her to regularly 
report to a police station?  The majority does not say.  Surely 
the legislature did not intend such a backwards result.  See 
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 (directing that we interpret 
statutory language "reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable 
results"). 
¶113 Rather, consistent with the plain language of the sex 
offender registration statute and its manifest purpose, I 
conclude that all sex offenders in Wisconsin, even those who are 
homeless, must comply with the address requirement under Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 301.45(2)(a)5. 
or 
risk 
criminal 
liability 
under 
§ 301.45(6)(a).  Such an interpretation is not novel or unique.  
As articulated by the United States Department of Justice 
(USDOJ), "[r]equiring registration only where a sex offender has 
a residence or a home in the sense of a fixed abode would be too 
narrow 
to 
achieve 
[the 
Sex 
Offender 
Registration 
and 
Notification Act]'s objective of 'comprehensive' registration of 
sex offenders . . . ."  Office of the Attorney General; The 
National 
Guidelines 
for 
Sex 
Offender 
Registration 
and 
Notification, 73 Fed. Reg. 38,030, 38,061 (July 2, 2008) 
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2006)).4  Similar to Wisconsin's sex 
offender 
registration 
statute, 
the 
federal 
Sex 
Offender 
                                                 
4 All subsequent references to the United States Code are to 
the 2006 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2009AP1643-CR.akz 
 
15 
 
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) requires each sex 
offender to provide "[t]he address of each residence at which 
the 
sex 
offender 
resides 
or 
will 
reside." 
 
42 
U.S.C. 
§ 16914(a)(3).  SORNA defines "resides," with respect to an 
individual, as "the location of the individual's home or other 
place where the individual habitually lives."  § 16911(13).  In 
interpreting SORNA, the USDOJ has recognized that homeless sex 
offenders cannot provide the residence address required by 
§ 16914(a)(3) "because they have no definite 'address' at which 
they live."  Office of the Attorney General; The National 
Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 73 
Fed. Reg. at 38,055.  Nevertheless, in order to fulfill the 
purpose of SORNA, the USDOJ still requires homeless sex 
offenders to meet the functional equivalent of the address 
requirement by providing specific descriptions of where they 
habitually live:  
[S]ome more or less specific description should 
normally be obtainable concerning the place or places 
where such a sex offender habitually lives——e.g., 
information about a certain part of a city that is the 
sex offender's habitual locale, a park or spot on the 
street (or a number of such places) where the sex 
offender stations himself during the day or sleeps at 
night, 
shelters 
among 
which 
the 
sex 
offender 
circulates, 
or 
places 
in 
public 
buildings, 
restaurants, libraries, or other establishments that 
the sex offender frequents.  Having this type of 
location information serves the same public safety 
purposes as knowing the whereabouts of sex offenders 
with definite residence addresses. 
Id. at 38,055-056. 
¶114 Likewise, in this case, I conclude that Dinkins could 
have complied with the address requirement under Wis. Stat. 
No.  2009AP1643-CR.akz 
 
16 
 
§ 301.45(2)(a)5., thereby avoiding criminal liability under 
§ 301.45(6)(a), by providing to the DOC a specific description 
of the place or places which he will be spending his days and 
nights upon his release from prison.  Such information would 
have served the purpose of the sex offender registration statute 
by assisting law enforcement in locating Dinkins in order to 
protect the public.  As it stood, however, the DOC knew only 
that Dinkins' address was "[t]o be determined," leaving law 
enforcement, the public, and his victim at a total loss as to 
his whereabouts.  By informing the DOC only that his address was 
"[t]o be determined," Dinkins violated the plain language of 
§ 301.45(6)(a) and defied the very purpose of the sex offender 
registration statute. 
¶115 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶116 I am authorized to state that Justice MICHAEL J. 
GABLEMAN joins this dissent. 
 
 
No.  2009AP1643-CR.akz 
 
 
 
1