Title: State v. Mauldin

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

215 Kan. 956 (1974)
529 P.2d 124
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellant,
v.
ROBERT MAULDIN, Appellee.
No. 47,542

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed December 7, 1974.
Nick A. Tomasic, District Attorney, argued the cause, and Vern Miller, Attorney General, was with him on the brief for the appellant.
Jay H. Vader, of Kansas City, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
KAUL, J.:
This is an appeal by the state under K.S.A. 1973 Supp. 22-3602 from an order dismissing a charge by information of felony murder (K.S.A. 1973 Supp. 21-3401). The question posed is one of first impression in this jurisdiction.
Omitting formalities the information reads as follows:
Our statute defining murder in the first degree reads as follows:
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss taking the position that the deceased was not killed nor did he die while the defendant was alleged to have been perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate a felony.
*957 The trial judge filed a well-reasoned memorandum decision setting forth the facts and thoroughly analyzing and discussing all of the issues and the cases from other jurisdictions cited by both parties. We believe the trial court's ruling was entirely correct. Therefore, we shall quote its memorandum decision in full:
On appeal the state reasserts the same contentions presented to the trial court and cites many of the cases discussed in the court's memorandum. We deem it unnecessary to reconsider matters fully covered by the trial court in its memorandum.
We would note that on the facts presented here the sole act of defendant was selling the heroin. The injection by the purchaser was out of the presence of defendant. In the California cases, cited by the state, the accused actively participated in administering the drugs as in People v. Poindexter, 51 Cal. 2d 142, 330 P.2d 763, or at least was present while the purchaser consumed an overdose of narcotic tablets as in People v. Cline, 270 C.A.2d 328, 75 Cal. Rptr. 459, 32 A.L.R.3d 582.
Even though the Arizona felony murder statute was said to have been adopted almost verbatim from California, the Supreme Court of Arizona declined to follow California decisions in the case of State v. Dixon, 109 Ariz. 441, 511 P.2d 623, wherein the Arizona court said:
The holding of the Arizona court in Dixon is in line with decisions in most of the other jurisdictions wherein the question has been considered. (See cases collected in 32 A.L.R.3d Anno., commencing at page 589.)
Our statute explicitly requires that the killing be "committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any felony." Under the facts presented in the instant case the commission of the felony (the act of selling heroin) completely terminated when the seller and the purchaser parted company. As pointed out by the trial court, this is not a case such as State v. Moffitt, 199 Kan. 514, 431 P.2d 879, wherein the felony relied upon (possession of a pistol after conviction of a felony) was a continuing one.
It is a long established rule in this jurisdiction that penal statutes must be strictly construed against the state. (State v. Bishop, 215 Kan. 481, 524 P.2d 712; State v. Finley, 199 Kan. 615, 433 P.2d 414; and State v. Jensen, 197 Kan. 427, 417 P.2d 273.) In State, ex rel., *960 v. American Savings Stamp Co. 194 Kan. 297, 398 P.2d 1011, we said:
The clear import of the language of the statute cannot be broadened so as to encompass felony murder upon the facts presented herein.
The judgment is affirmed.