Title: People v. Burns

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Illinois Official Reports 
 
Supreme Court 
 
 
People v. Burns, 2016 IL 118973 
 
 
 
Caption in Supreme 
Court: 
 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
TARON R. BURNS, Appellee. 
 
 
 
Docket No. 
 
118973 
 
 
 
Filed 
 
 
March 24, 2016 
 
 
 
Decision Under  
Review 
 
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Fourth District; heard in that 
court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Champaign County, the 
Hon. Harry E. Clem, Judge, presiding. 
 
 
Judgment 
Affirmed. 
Counsel on 
Appeal 
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Julia Rietz, 
State’s Attorney, of Urbana (Carolyn E. Shapiro, Solicitor General, 
and Michael M. Glick and Eldad Z. Malamuth, Assistant Attorneys 
General, of Chicago, and Patrick Delfino, David J. Robinson and 
David Mannchen, of the Office of the State’s Attorneys Appellate 
Prosecutor, of Springfield, of counsel), for the People. 
 
L. Keith Hays, Jr., of Monticello, for appellee. 
 
 
Digitally signed by 
Reporter of Decisions 
Reason: I attest to the 
accuracy and integrity 
of this document 
Date: 2016.05.11 
08:40:48 -05'00'
 
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Justices 
JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with 
opinion. 
Justices Freeman, Burke, and Theis concurred in the judgment and 
opinion. 
Chief Justice Garman specially concurred, with opinion. 
Justice Thomas dissented, with opinion, joined by Justice Karmeier. 
 
 
 
OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
The circuit court of Champaign County determined that the warrantless use of a 
drug-detection dog at 3:20 a.m. at defendant’s apartment door, located within a locked 
apartment building, violated defendant’s rights under the fourth amendment to the United 
States Constitution. U.S. Const., amend. IV. The appellate court affirmed. 2015 IL App (4th) 
140006. We now affirm. 
 
¶ 2 
 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 3 
 
Defendant, Taron R. Burns, lives in unit No. 10 of a three-story apartment building located 
at 409 W. Elm, Urbana, Illinois. The apartment building contains twelve units and is secured 
by two locked entrances located on the east and west sides of the building. The apartment 
building common areas are not accessible to the public. Defendant lives on the third floor of 
the apartment building. Her floor consists of a small landing with two apartments, unit Nos. 9 
and 10, and a storage closet. The apartment doors to unit Nos. 9 and 10 are located directly 
across from one another, and the storage room door faces the stairwell. 
¶ 4 
 
On November 29, 2012, the Urbana police department’s Crimestoppers hotline received an 
anonymous tip that defendant was selling marijuana. The tipster indicated that defendant sold 
approximately two pounds of marijuana a week and received shipments of marijuana from her 
brother (name unknown) in California. According to the tipster, defendant received a shipment 
of two pounds of marijuana on November 21, 2012. The tipster also indicated that defendant 
sold ecstasy to the tipster’s girlfriend. 
¶ 5 
 
Investigating the tip, Urbana police detective Matthew Mecum discovered that in October 
2008, defendant was issued a notice to appear from the city of Urbana for possession of 
marijuana and drug paraphernalia. Defendant was also arrested in 2003 for possession of 
marijuana in a neighboring town, Villa Grove, Illinois. Detective Mecum also observed 
“pictures containing images for the legalization of marijuana,” “a picture containing actual 
marijuana,” and “a picture containing large amounts of U.S. currency” on defendant’s personal 
social media page. 
¶ 6 
 
Sometime after midnight on January 10, 2013, Detective Mecum went to defendant’s 
apartment building to “confirm her address.” Detective Mecum wore jeans and a winter jacket, 
not displaying any law enforcement indicia. Detective Mecum’s badge and firearm were not 
visible. Detective Mecum had visited the apartment building several times and always found 
the entrance doors locked. According to Detective Mecum, he knocked on the door and an 
unidentified tenant let him in the building. While walking through the apartment building, 
 
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Detective Mecum observed a package addressed to defendant with a shipping label identifying 
the sender as “Ben Jones in Oakland, California.” Detective Mecum did not indicate where in 
the building he observed the package or the dimensions of the package. 
¶ 7 
 
At approximately 3:20 a.m., Officer Michael Cervantes entered defendant’s apartment 
building, without a warrant, with his drug-detection dog. The dog is trained in the detection of 
cocaine, marijuana, methamphetamine, and heroin. Officer Cervantes was admitted into the 
building by Sergeant Loschen. Officer Cervantes did not know how Sergeant Loschen 
obtained access to the apartment building. Officer Cervantes took his drug-detection dog to the 
third floor and the dog alerted to the presence of narcotics at defendant’s apartment door. The 
affidavit for a search warrant in this case states that as Officer Cervantes and his dog were 
exiting the apartment building, Officer Cervantes used his drug-detection dog “to conduct an 
open air sweep of the doors to two apartments located on the west side of the first floor of the 
building.” Officer Cervantes testified during the hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress 
that using his drug-detection dog, he “started on the third floor, swept Number 9, the storage 
unit in the middle between 9 and 10, swept 10, proceeded to the alert that my canine detected 
an odor of illegal drugs, and then on the way out I swept 2 more apartment doors on the first 
floor on the west side.” Officer Cervantes did not explain why he swept these other 
apartments’ doors for drugs. 
¶ 8 
 
Later that same day, Detective Mecum applied for a search warrant for defendant’s 
apartment. The complaint and affidavit for search warrant indicated that on November 29, 
2012, the Urbana police department received a Crimestoppers tip that defendant was receiving 
shipments of marijuana from her brother (name unknown) in California; that defendant 
received a shipment on November 21, 2012; that defendant sold ecstasy to the tipster’s 
girlfriend; that defendant sells approximately two pounds of marijuana a week; and that 
defendant has a personal social media page showing United States currency. The complaint 
and affidavit for search warrant does not indicate that the tipster provided defendant’s address. 
¶ 9 
 
The complaint and affidavit for search warrant also indicated that in October 2008, 
defendant was issued a notice to appear from the city of Urbana for possession of marijuana 
and drug paraphernalia, that defendant was arrested in 2003 for possession of marijuana in 
Villa Grove, and that defendant’s personal social media page contained “images for the 
legalization of marijuana” as well as “a picture containing actual marijuana” and “a picture 
containing large amounts of U.S. currency.” The complaint and affidavit for search warrant 
stated that on “January 10, 2012 [sic],” Officer Michael Cervantes used his drug-detection dog 
to conduct a sweep of defendant’s apartment door, along with three additional apartment doors 
and a closet door, and that the dog alerted to drugs at defendant’s apartment door. Detective 
Mecum stated in the complaint and affidavit for search warrant that on January 10, 2013, while 
walking through the apartment building, he observed a package addressed to defendant at “409 
W. Elm #10” with a return shipping label listing “a Ben Jones in Oakland California.” 
Detective Mecum also stated that the only apartment without a number on the door is on the 
third floor directly across from unit No. 9, and he subsequently confirmed that unit No. 10 is 
located on the third floor. The trial judge granted the search warrant application, and the police 
searched defendant’s apartment later that day, resulting in discovery of marijuana. 
¶ 10 
 
On January 11, 2013, the State charged defendant with unlawful possession with intent to 
deliver between 500 and 2,000 grams of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/5(e) (West 2012)), a Class 2 
 
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felony. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the dog sniff of the 
entrance to her apartment violated the fourth amendment under Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 
___, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013). The trial court issued a written order granting defendant’s motion 
to suppress. The trial court found that People v. Trull, 64 Ill. App. 3d 385, 387 (1978) (holding 
that police officers’ warrantless entry into a defendant’s locked apartment building violated the 
defendant’s fourth amendment rights and that evidence found after officers entered the 
apartment building must be suppressed) had not been overruled and was controlling authority. 
¶ 11 
 
The trial court also noted that both the authors of the majority and the dissenting opinions 
in Jardines recognized that the implied invitation or license for an individual to approach the 
door to a home would not extend to a stranger, with or without a dog, who approached the door 
without a specific invitation in the middle of the night. The trial court determined the dog sniff 
conducted by Officer Cervantes and his dog in the middle of the night “violated the 
no-night-visits rule referred to in the Jardines decision.” 
¶ 12 
 
The trial court’s order further noted that the complaint and affidavit for search warrant 
erroneously stated that the canine sweep occurred a year earlier, on January 10, 2012, and was 
sworn to by Detective Mecum with the erroneous statement uncorrected. The court held that 
“[t]he sniff of Defendant’s apartment door, located within a locked apartment building, at 3:20 
a.m. on January 10, 2013, violated Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.” The court further 
determined that the remaining facts pleaded in the complaint and affidavit for search warrant 
were insufficient to establish probable cause for issuance of the search warrant requested and 
that the good-faith exception to suppression was not applicable to the facts of this case. 
¶ 13 
 
The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the search warrant was issued on the basis of 
an unconstitutional, warrantless dog sniff. The appellate court further concluded that the 
recovered marijuana was “fruit of the poisonous tree and the exclusionary rule applies.” 2015 
IL App (4th) 140006, ¶ 65. We allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 
(eff. Jan. 1, 2015). 
 
¶ 14 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 15 
 
The State appeals from the judgment of the appellate court affirming the trial court’s order 
granting defendant’s motion to suppress. This court gives great deference to the trial court’s 
findings of fact when ruling on a motion to suppress. People v. Cregan, 2014 IL 113600, ¶ 22. 
We will reverse the trial court’s findings of fact only if they are against the manifest weight of 
the evidence. Cregan, 2014 IL 113600, ¶ 22. Here, there is no dispute concerning the trial 
court’s factual findings. 
¶ 16 
 
The trial court’s legal ruling on whether the evidence should be suppressed is reviewed 
de novo. People v. Bridgewater, 235 Ill. 2d 85, 92-93 (2009). The question of law at issue in 
this appeal is whether the warrantless use of a drug-detection dog at an apartment door, located 
within a locked apartment building, in the middle of the night, violated defendant’s fourth 
amendment rights. We review this question of law de novo. Woods v. Cole, 181 Ill. 2d 512, 516 
(1998). 
 
¶ 17 
 
 
 
 I. Whether Defendant’s Fourth Amendment Rights Were Violated 
¶ 18 
 
The State argues that use of the drug-detection dog did not violate defendant’s fourth 
amendment rights because it did not occur in defendant’s home or its curtilage. According to 
 
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the State, the officers conducted a dog sniff on the landing outside of defendant’s apartment 
door. The State contends that the landing was not part of defendant’s curtilage. Defendant 
counters that use of the drug-detection dog at the entrance to her apartment was unreasonable 
and violated both the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. 
IV) as well as the search and seizure provisions of article I, section 6, of the Illinois 
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6). 
¶ 19 
 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
 
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const., 
amend. IV. 
Similarly, the Illinois Constitution provides: 
 
“The people shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
other possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or 
interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other means. No warrant 
shall issue without probable cause, supported by affidavit particularly describing the 
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6. 
“This court interprets the search and seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution in ‘limited 
lockstep’ with its federal counterpart.” People v. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 16 (quoting 
People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 314 (2006)). 
¶ 20 
 
The parties disagree whether the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Florida 
v. Jardines, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013), controls. The State argues that the officers 
conducted a dog sniff on the landing outside of defendant’s apartment door and that the landing 
was not part of the defendant’s curtilage under the “property-based” analysis announced in 
Jardines. Defendant counters that under Jardines, a search warrant is required to conduct a 
dog-sniff search at the entrance to a home. 
¶ 21 
 
In Jardines, the Miami-Dade police department received an “unverified tip” that marijuana 
was being grown in defendant’s home. Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1413. A month 
later, police went to defendant’s home with a drug-detection dog. The dog approached the 
front porch and, after sniffing the base of the front door, gave a positive alert for narcotics. On 
the basis of the dog sniff, police applied for and received a warrant to search defendant’s 
residence. A subsequent search of the residence resulted in discovery of marijuana plants. 
Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1413. 
¶ 22 
 
The lead opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, limited its review “to the question of whether 
the officers’ behavior was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Jardines, 
569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1414. The Supreme Court held that a warrantless “dog sniff” of 
an individual’s front porch was a search for purposes of the fourth amendment and suppressed 
the recovered evidence. The Supreme Court began its analysis by emphasizing that the fourth 
amendment establishes: 
“a simple baseline, one that for much of our history formed the exclusive basis for its 
protections: When ‘the Government obtains information by physically intruding’ on 
persons, houses, papers, or effects, ‘a “search” within the original meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment’ has ‘undoubtedly occurred.’ ” Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. 
 
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Ct. at 1414 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. ___, ___ n.3, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 
n.3 (2012)). 
¶ 23 
 
The Court in Jardines recognized that its decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967), holding that property rights are not the sole measure of the fourth amendment’s 
protections, may add to this baseline, but does not subtract anything from the fourth 
amendment’s protections “ ‘when the Government does engage in [a] physical intrusion of a 
constitutionally protected area.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. 
at 1414 (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in 
the judgment, joined by Marshall, J.). The Supreme Court stated that the principle in such a 
case is straightforward: 
“The officers were gathering information in an area belonging to Jardines and 
immediately surrounding his house—in the curtilage of the house, which we have held 
enjoys protection as part of the home itself. And they gathered that information by 
physically entering and occupying the area to engage in conduct not explicitly or 
implicitly permitted by the homeowner.” Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1414. 
¶ 24 
 
The Supreme Court in Jardines initially considered whether police intruded upon a 
constitutionally protected area. “The Fourth Amendment does not *** prevent all 
investigations conducted on private property ***.” “But when it comes to the Fourth 
Amendment, the home is first among equals.” Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1414. 
“At the Amendment’s ‘very core’ stands ‘the right of a man to retreat into his own home and 
there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’ ” Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. 
Ct. at 1414 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). “[T]he area 
‘immediately surrounding and associated with the home’—what our cases call the curtilage” is 
regarded as “ ‘part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.’ ” Jardines, 569 U.S. at 
___, 133 S. Ct. at 1414 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)). “This area 
around the home is ‘intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically,’ and is 
where ‘privacy expectations are most heightened.’ ” Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 
1415 (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986)). The Court found “no doubt” 
that the police officers entered the curtilage of Jardines’s home as “[t]he front porch is the 
classic exemplar of an area adjacent to the home and ‘to which the activity of home life 
extends.’ ” Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1415 (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 n.12). 
¶ 25 
 
After determining that police officers intruded upon a constitutionally protected area in 
Jardines, the Court turned to whether the police conduct in entering this constitutionally 
protected area with a drug-detection dog was “accomplished through an unlicensed physical 
intrusion.” Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1415. The Court recognized that law 
enforcement officers need not “ ‘shield their eyes’ when passing by the home ‘on public 
thoroughfares,’ ” but an officer’s ability to gather information is “sharply circumscribed” after 
stepping off the public thoroughfare. Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1415 (quoting 
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213). The Court also recognized an implicit license for individuals, 
including police, “to approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be 
received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave.” Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. 
Ct. at 1415. 
¶ 26 
 
“Thus, a police officer not armed with a warrant may approach a home and knock, 
precisely because that is ‘no more than any private citizen might do.’ ” Jardines, 569 U.S. at 
 
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___, 133 S. Ct. at 1416 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469 (2011)). There is no 
customary invitation, however, for police to introduce “a trained police dog to explore the area 
around the home in hopes of discovering incriminating evidence.” Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 
133 S. Ct. at 1416. 
¶ 27 
 
The Court in Jardines noted that it was unnecessary to decide whether the officers’ 
investigation violated Jardines’s reasonable expectation of privacy under Katz. “The Katz 
reasonable-expectations test ‘has been added to, not substituted for,’ the traditional 
property-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment, and so is unnecessary to consider 
when the government gains evidence by physically intruding on constitutionally protected 
areas.” (Emphases in original.) Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1417 (quoting Jones, 
565 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 951-52). Nor did it need to consider whether Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), applied because “when the government uses a physical intrusion to 
explore details of the home (including its curtilage), the antiquity of the tools that they bring 
along is irrelevant.” Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1417. The Supreme Court 
concluded that “[t]he government’s use of trained police dogs to investigate the home and its 
immediate surroundings is a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Jardines, 
569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1417-18. 
¶ 28 
 
Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, concurred in the majority 
opinion to express that the police conduct in Jardines violated the fourth amendment on 
privacy as well as property grounds. Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1418 (Kagan, J., 
concurring, joined by Ginsburg and Sotomayor, JJ.). Property concepts and privacy concepts 
will “align” in cases involving a search of a home as “[t]he law of property ‘naturally enough 
influence[s]’ our ‘shared social expectations’ of what places should be free from governmental 
incursions.” Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1419 (Kagan, J., concurring, joined by 
Ginsburg and Sotomayor, JJ.) (quoting Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006)). 
¶ 29 
 
According to the concurring Justices, if this case had been decided on privacy grounds, 
then it would have been resolved by Kyllo. In Kyllo, the Court highlighted its “intention to 
draw both a ‘firm’ and a ‘bright’ line at ‘the entrance to the house.’ ” Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 
133 S. Ct. at 1419 (Kagan, J., concurring, joined by Ginsburg and Sotomayor, JJ.) (quoting 
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40). In Kyllo, the Supreme Court announced the rule: “ ‘Where, as here, the 
Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that 
would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 
“search” and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.’ ” Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 
133 S. Ct. at 1419 (Kagan, J., concurring, joined by Ginsburg and Sotomayor, JJ.) (quoting 
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40). The special concurrence concluded that police use of a drug-detection 
dog—a device not in general public use—to examine Jardines’s home violated his expectation 
of privacy in his home. Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1420 (Kagan, J., concurring, 
joined by Ginsburg and Sotomayor, JJ.). 
¶ 30 
 
Justice Alito dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy and Breyer. 
The dissent opined that the law of trespass provided no support for the Court’s holding and that 
there was no violation of the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy under Katz because 
“[a] reasonable person understands that odors emanating from a house may be detected from 
locations that are open to the public.” Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1421 (Alito, J., 
dissenting, joined by Roberts, C.J., Kennedy and Breyer, JJ.). The dissent also disagreed with 
 
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Justice Kagan’s special concurrence, seeing “no basis for concluding that the occupants of a 
dwelling have a reasonable expectation of privacy in odors that emanate from the dwelling and 
reach spots where members of the public may lawfully stand.” Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 
S. Ct. at 1424 (Alito, J., dissenting, joined by Roberts, C.J., Kennedy and Breyer, JJ.). 
¶ 31 
 
The State attempts to distinguish this case from Jardines by arguing: (1) the landing in 
front of defendant’s apartment does not qualify as curtilage under Jardines; (2) the landing 
does not qualify as curtilage under the four-factor test set forth in United States v. Dunn, 480 
U.S. 294 (1987); (3) the borders of the curtilage should be straightforward and there is no easy 
way to determine where the boundaries are if common areas are considered curtilage; and (4) 
the common landing is not associated with the intimate activities of the home that animate the 
curtilage concept. 
¶ 32 
 
On the State’s first argument—that the landing in front of defendant’s apartment does not 
qualify as curtilage under Jardines—the State contends that the landing is different than the 
front porch at issue in Jardines. The State argues that the landing did not belong to defendant 
and she had no possessory interest in the landing. The State suggests that Jardines is applicable 
only to single-family residences and not applicable to leased apartments or condominiums 
because there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in common areas of such multiunit 
dwellings. 
¶ 33 
 
We are not persuaded by the State’s argument. Here, the entrances to defendant’s 
apartment building were locked every time police attempted to enter the secured building. 
Officers were only admitted to an area not accessible to the general public by a resident or by 
another officer. We emphasize that the “common areas” of the secured apartment building 
were clearly not open to the general public, a fact known by the officers who entered 
defendant’s secured apartment building in the middle of the night. 
¶ 34 
 
We are equally unpersuaded by the State’s second argument—that the landing does not 
qualify as curtilage under the four-factor test set forth in Dunn, 480 U.S. 294. In Dunn, the 
Supreme Court stated that the common-law concept of “curtilage” extended to the “area 
immediately surrounding a dwelling house” and the curtilage concept “plays a part, however, 
in interpreting the reach of the Fourth Amendment.” Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300. Dunn recognized 
that “the Fourth Amendment protects the curtilage of a house and that the extent of the 
curtilage is determined by factors that bear upon whether an individual reasonably may expect 
that the area in question should be treated as the home itself.” Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300 (citing 
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180). Dunn further recognized that the central component of the curtilage 
inquiry is “whether the area harbors the ‘intimate activity associated with the “sanctity of a 
man’s home and the privacies of life.” ’ ” Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300 (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 
180, quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). The Supreme Court set forth a 
four-factor inquiry for analyzing curtilage questions: (1) “the proximity of the area claimed to 
be curtilage to the home”; (2) “whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding 
the home”; (3) “the nature of the uses to which the area is put”; and (4) “the steps taken by the 
resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.” Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301. 
¶ 35 
 
Considering the first Dunn factor, “the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the 
home,” the State does not dispute that the landing is located directly in front of defendant’s 
apartment. We find that the proximity of the landing to defendant’s apartment strongly 
supports an inference that the landing be treated as curtilage under the first Dunn factor. 
 
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¶ 36 
 
The State contends that the last three Dunn factors weigh heavily against treating the 
landing as curtilage of defendant’s apartment. Specifically, the State argues that the area was 
not included within an enclosure surrounded by the home that excluded others, there is no 
evidence that defendant put the landing to any use other than accessing her apartment, and that 
no effort was made by defendant to protect the area from observation. We disagree. 
¶ 37 
 
Here, the landing to defendant’s apartment is an area located within a locked structure 
intended to exclude the general public. The third-floor landing is located directly outside of 
defendant’s apartment door and the nature of its use is generally limited to defendant, the 
tenant of unit No. 9, and their invitees. The third-floor landing is an area with limited access, 
located within a locked building and not observable by “people passing by.” We find the last 
three Dunn factors weigh in favor of finding that the landing to defendant’s apartment is 
curtilage and reject the State’s argument to the contrary. 
¶ 38 
 
The State’s third argument against a determination that the landing in front of defendant’s 
apartment is curtilage is equally unavailing. The State argues that the boundaries of curtilage 
should be straightforward and there is no easy way to determine boundaries if common areas 
are considered curtilage. The State notes that the “boundaries of the curtilage are generally 
‘clearly marked,’ [and] the ‘conception defining the curtilage’ is at any rate familiar enough 
that it is ‘easily understood from our daily experience.’ ” Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. 
at 1415 (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 n.12). 
¶ 39 
 
As the State argues, “[t]his clarity is important for residents, who should know where they 
can expect privacy, and for officers, who need to make judgments, often quickly, in the field 
*** there is no easy way to determine where the boundaries would be if the common area were 
considered to be within the apartment’s curtilage.” The boundary to the landing of defendant’s 
apartment is easily understood as curtilage. The landing is a clearly marked area within a 
locked building with limited use and restricted access, “familiar enough that it is ‘easily 
understood from our daily experience.’ ” Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1415 (quoting 
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 n.12). We therefore reject the State’s argument suggesting that the 
border of the landing to defendant’s apartment is not straightforward and should not be 
considered curtilage. 
¶ 40 
 
We also disagree with the State’s fourth argument that the landing in front of defendant’s 
apartment “is not associated with the intimate activities of the home that animate the curtilage 
concept.” The State’s argument is simply a restatement of the concepts we have already 
addressed in the State’s Dunn argument. The State quotes People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502, 
516 (2004), where this court stated: “[i]n determining whether a particular area falls within a 
home’s curtilage, a court asks whether the area harbors the intimate activities commonly 
associated with the sanctity of a person’s home and the privacies of life.” In Pitman, this court 
noted: “[t]he extent of the curtilage is determined by factors ‘that bear upon whether an 
individual reasonably may expect that the area in question should be treated as the home 
itself.’ ” Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d at 516 (quoting Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300). This court then applied the 
Dunn four-factor test to the facts of that case. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d at 516 (citing Dunn, 480 U.S. 
at 301). We have already examined the facts of this case under the Dunn four-factor test and, 
therefore, reject the State’s argument that the landing to defendant’s apartment is not 
associated with the intimate activities of the home. 
 
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¶ 41 
 
We reiterate that the entrances to defendant’s apartment building were locked every time 
police attempted to enter the secured building and officers entered the building with the 
knowledge that the building they entered was not accessible to the general public. Thus, this 
case is distinguishable from situations that involve police conduct in common areas readily 
accessible to the public. Accordingly, we reject the State’s argument that defendant’s landing 
should not be treated as curtilage for purposes of the fourth amendment. 
¶ 42 
 
Even the Jardines dissent made observations that support our conclusion that the police 
conduct in this case violated the fourth amendment. The dissenting opinion in Jardines noted 
that custom grants “members of the public may lawfully proceed along a walkway leading to 
the front door of a house.” Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1421-22 (Alito, J., 
dissenting, joined by Roberts, C.J., Kennedy and Breyer, JJ.). The dissent specifically noted, 
however, that this license has certain spatial and temporal limits: 
“A visitor must stick to the path that is typically used to approach a front door, such as 
a paved walkway. A visitor cannot traipse through the garden, meander into the 
backyard, or take other circuitous detours that veer from the pathway that a visitor 
would customarily use. *** 
 
Nor, as a general matter, may a visitor come to the front door in the middle of the 
night without an express invitation. See State v. Cada, 129 Idaho 224, 233, 923 P. 2d 
469, 478 (App. 1996) (‘Furtive intrusion late at night or in the predawn hours is not 
conduct that is expected from ordinary visitors. Indeed, if observed by a resident of the 
premises, it could be a cause for great alarm’).” Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 
1422 (Alito, J., dissenting, joined by Roberts, C.J., Kennedy and Breyer, JJ.). 
¶ 43 
 
Under the facts in Jardines, the dissent believed the officer did not exceed the scope of the 
license to approach Jardines’s door. The officer “adhered to the customary path; he did not 
approach in the middle of the night; and he remained at the front door for only a very short 
period (less than a minute or two).” Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1423 (Alito, J., 
dissenting, joined by Roberts, C.J., Kennedy and Breyer, JJ.). In contrast to Jardines, the 
police conduct in this case certainly exceeded the scope of the license to approach defendant’s 
apartment door when the officers entered a locked building in the middle of the night and they 
remained in the building for more than “a very short period of time,” even taking time to have 
the drug-detection dog conduct an open-air sweep of other apartment doors in the building, for 
some unknown reason. See Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1423 (Alito, J., dissenting, 
joined by Roberts, C.J., Kennedy and Breyer, JJ.). 
¶ 44 
 
We conclude that, under Jardines, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1409, when police entered 
defendant’s locked apartment building at 3:20 a.m. with a drug-detection dog, their 
investigation took place in a constitutionally protected area. We hold that the trial court 
properly determined that the warrantless use of the drug-detection dog at defendant’s 
apartment door violated defendant’s rights under the fourth amendment to the United States 
Constitution. U.S. Const., amend. IV. 
¶ 45 
 
The dissent would find there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in the odors that waft 
from an apartment to common areas of an apartment building. Infra ¶ 121. Our application of 
Jardines, however, makes it unnecessary to address the merits of whether use of the 
drug-detection dog violated defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy. See Jardines, 569 
 
- 11 - 
 
U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1417. 
 
¶ 46 
 
 
 
II. Whether the Good-Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule Applies 
¶ 47 
 
The State asserts that even if this court determines the officers violated the fourth 
amendment in this case, the evidence should not be suppressed because the officers acted in 
good-faith reliance on established precedent. Generally, courts will not admit evidence 
obtained in violation of the fourth amendment. People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 227 
(2006). The fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine is an outgrowth of the exclusionary rule 
providing that “the fourth amendment violation is deemed the ‘poisonous tree,’ and any 
evidence obtained by exploiting that violation is subject to suppression as the ‘fruit’ of that 
poisonous tree.” People v. Henderson, 2013 IL 114040, ¶ 33. “[T]he ‘prime purpose’ of the 
exclusionary rule ‘is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the 
guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ ” Illinois v. 
Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 
(1974)). 
¶ 48 
 
The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule has been codified in section 
114-12(b)(1), (b)(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963: 
 
“(1) If a defendant seeks to suppress evidence because of the conduct of a peace 
officer in obtaining the evidence, the State may urge that the peace officer’s conduct 
was taken in a reasonable and objective good faith belief that the conduct was proper 
and that the evidence discovered should not be suppressed if otherwise admissible. The 
court shall not suppress evidence which is otherwise admissible in a criminal 
proceeding if the court determines that the evidence was seized by a peace officer who 
acted in good faith. 
 
(2) ‘Good faith’ means whenever a peace officer obtains evidence: 
 
(i) pursuant to a search or an arrest warrant obtained from a neutral and detached 
judge, which warrant is free from obvious defects other than non-deliberate errors in 
preparation and contains no material misrepresentation by any agent of the State, and 
the officer reasonably believed the warrant to be valid; or 
 
(ii) pursuant to a warrantless search incident to an arrest for violation of a statute or 
local ordinance which is later declared unconstitutional or otherwise invalidated.” 725 
ILCS 5/114-12(b)(1), (b)(2) (West 2012). 
¶ 49 
 
The Supreme Court has expanded the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule to 
include good-faith reliance upon binding appellate precedent that specifically authorized a 
particular practice but was subsequently overruled. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, ___, 
131 S. Ct. 2419, 2429 (2011). The Davis expansion of the good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule was recently adopted by this court in LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶¶ 29-31. 
¶ 50 
 
Here, the appellate court rejected the State’s argument that the evidence should not be 
suppressed because the officers acted in good-faith reliance on established precedent. The 
appellate court held that no binding precedent specifically authorized the officers’ conduct (see 
Davis, 564 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2429) and the exception to the exclusionary rule 
announced in Davis is not applicable to this case. 2015 IL App (4th) 140006, ¶ 60. At the time 
the appellate court issued its decision in January 2015, it did not have the benefit of our recent 
decision in LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799. 
 
- 12 - 
 
¶ 51 
 
In LeFlore, this court began its analysis by recognizing that “[t]he mere fact of a fourth 
amendment violation does not mean that exclusion necessarily follows” because there “is no 
constitutional right to have the evidence resulting from an illegal search or seizure suppressed 
at trial.” LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 22. Rather, the exclusionary rule has been applied only to 
“unusual cases” when its application will deter future fourth amendment violations. LeFlore, 
2015 IL 116799, ¶ 22. Exclusion of evidence is a court’s last resort, not its first impulse. 
LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 22. Importantly, this court noted in LeFlore: 
 
“In order for exclusion of the evidence to apply, the deterrent benefit of suppression 
must outweigh the ‘substantial social costs.’ [United States v. ]Leon, 468 U.S. [897,] 
907 [(1984)]. ‘ “Exclusion exacts a heavy toll on both the judicial system and society at 
large,” because it “almost always requires courts to ignore reliable, trustworthy 
evidence bearing on guilt or innocence,” and “its bottom-line effect, in many cases, is 
to suppress the truth and set the criminal loose in the community without 
punishment.” ’ [United States v. ]Stephens, 764 F.3d [327,] 335 [(4th Cir. 2014)] 
(quoting Davis, 564 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2427). ‘As this result conflicts with the 
“truth-finding functions of judge and jury,” [citation] exclusion is a “bitter pill,” 
[citation] swallowed only as a “last resort,” [citation].’ [Citation.] In order for the 
exclusionary rule to be appropriate then, the deterrent benefits must outweigh its heavy 
costs. Davis, 564 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2427.” LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 23. 
¶ 52 
 
We recognized in LeFlore that when there is no illicit conduct to deter, the deterrent 
rationale loses much of its force, and, thus, “exclusion is invoked only where police conduct is 
both ‘sufficiently deliberate’ that deterrence is effective and ‘sufficiently culpable’ that 
deterrence outweighs the cost of suppression. [Citations.]” LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 24. We 
emphasized that in determining whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
applies in any case, the inquiry is “ ‘whether a reasonably well trained officer would have 
known that the search was illegal in light of all of the circumstances.’ [Citation.]” LeFlore, 
2015 IL 116799, ¶ 25. 
¶ 53 
 
The State argues that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply for 
three reasons: (1) the officers relied on binding United States Supreme Court precedent 
holding that dog sniffs are not fourth amendment searches; (2) the officers relied on Illinois 
precedent holding that residents have no reasonable expectations of privacy in apartment 
building common areas; and (3) the officers relied on federal precedent holding that dog sniffs 
outside residence doors were not fourth amendment searches. According to the State, it was 
objectively reasonable for the officers to rely in good faith on the legal landscape that existed at 
the time of the dog sniff. Additionally, the State argues that the officers seized the evidence in 
good-faith reliance on the search warrant. 
¶ 54 
 
The State cites United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), City of Indianapolis v. 
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000), and Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005), in arguing that 
officers relied on binding United States Supreme Court precedent holding that dog sniffs are 
not fourth amendment searches. In Place, the Supreme Court held that use of a drug-detection 
dog to sniff luggage at an airport “did not constitute a ‘search’ within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.” Place, 462 U.S. at 707. In City of Indianapolis, the Supreme Court held 
that there was no fourth amendment search when officers conducted a dog sniff of an 
automobile at a highway checkpoint. City of Indianapolis, 531 U.S. at 40. In Caballes, the 
 
- 13 - 
 
Supreme Court held that “the use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dog—one that ‘does not 
expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view,’ 
[citation]—during a lawful traffic stop generally does not implicate legitimate privacy 
interests.” Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409 (quoting Place, 462 U.S. at 707). 
¶ 55 
 
The appellate court determined that the United States Supreme Court precedent did not 
specifically authorize the conduct of the officers in this case because those cases did not 
involve use of drug-detection dogs to sniff a home. 2015 IL App (4th) 140006, ¶ 57. The 
appellate court recognized that use of a drug-detection dog to sniff a home in the hopes of 
discovering incriminating evidence presents a very different issue than use of drug-detection 
dogs on automobiles during a lawful traffic stop and in public areas. 2015 IL App (4th) 
140006, ¶ 57. We agree with the appellate court that the United States Supreme Court 
precedent concerning use of drug-detection dogs to sniff areas other than a home did not 
specifically authorize the officers’ conduct in this case. 
¶ 56 
 
Indeed, contrary to the State’s argument, United States Supreme Court precedent has long 
provided that the home has heightened expectations of privacy and that at the core of the fourth 
amendment is “the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from 
unreasonable governmental intrusion.” Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511. The Supreme Court has 
stressed “ ‘the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our 
traditions since the origins of the Republic.’ ” Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178 (quoting Payton v. New 
York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980)). The curtilage, being the area “immediately surrounding and 
associated with the home,” is also regarded as “part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment 
purposes.” Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180. Here, the police conduct involving the warrantless use of a 
drug-detection dog at 3:20 a.m. at defendant’s apartment door, located within a locked 
apartment building, is simply not supported by an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that 
their conduct was specifically authorized under any United States Supreme Court precedent. 
¶ 57 
 
The State next argues that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply 
because the officers relied on binding Illinois precedent holding that residents had no 
reasonable expectations of privacy in apartment building common areas. The State relies on 
People v. Smith, 152 Ill. 2d 229 (1992), and People v. Lyles, 332 Ill. App. 3d 1 (2002), to assert 
that Illinois precedent established that tenants in an apartment building have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in common areas. 
¶ 58 
 
In Smith, police officers went to the defendant’s apartment building, opened the building’s 
unlocked rear door, and walked to a common-area hallway. While standing in the hallway, the 
officers overheard a conversation relating to a murder they were investigating. This court held 
that the officers’ conduct did not constitute a search under the fourth amendment. Smith, 152 
Ill. 2d at 245-46. Contrary to the State’s assertion, Smith did not hold that tenants have no 
expectation of privacy in common areas of locked apartment buildings. Rather, Smith 
concerned an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in things overheard by the police 
while standing in a common area of an unlocked apartment building. Consequently, Smith does 
not support the State’s position. 
¶ 59 
 
In Lyles, police officers arrested three suspects emerging from the back of an apartment 
building that had a locked outer door. While arresting the suspects, the officers held open the 
outer door and subsequently ascended the staircase, where they found two guns in a garbage 
can on the defendant’s back porch. The appellate court in Lyles held that a tenant “has no 
 
- 14 - 
 
reasonable expectation of privacy in common areas of an apartment building that are 
accessible to other tenants and their invitees.” Lyles, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 7. Here, the appellate 
court determined that Lyles, an Appellate Court, First District decision, did not involve the use 
of a drug-detection dog and was not binding on the Appellate Court, Fourth District. 2015 IL 
App (4th) 140006, ¶ 58. 
¶ 60 
 
Instead, the appellate court determined that its own decision in Trull, 64 Ill. App. 3d 385, 
was binding appellate court precedent relating to the officer’s conduct. 2015 IL App (4th) 
140006, ¶ 59. In Trull, the officers used keys found at the site of a burglary to open the outer 
door to defendant’s apartment building. In determining that the entry into a locked common 
area of an apartment building in Trull violated the fourth amendment, the appellate court 
stated: 
 
“A person’s legitimate expectations of privacy are to be protected. (Katz v. United 
States (1967), 389 U.S. 347, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 88 S. Ct. 507.) Federal cases have 
indicated that the common areas of a locked apartment building are protected under the 
fourth amendment. (United States v. Carriger (6th Cir. 1976), 541 F.2d 545; United 
States v. Fluker (9th Cir. 1976), 543 F.2d 709; United States v. Case (7th Cir. 1970), 
435 F.2d 766; United States v. Blank (N.D. Ohio 1966), 251 F. Supp. 166.) *** We 
discern a marked difference between an individual’s expectation of privacy in a locked 
apartment building as compared to an unlocked one. It seems rather elementary to us 
that a locked door is a very strong manifestation of a person’s expectation of privacy. 
Thus, we conclude that the common entries and hallways of a locked apartment 
building are protected by the fourth amendment.” Trull, 64 Ill. App. 3d at 389. 
The appellate court determined that the conduct of the officers in entering the defendant’s 
locked apartment building with a drug-detection dog was not authorized under Trull. 2015 IL 
App (4th) 140006, ¶ 59. 
¶ 61 
 
The State contends that under Smith and Lyles, Trull was no longer good law. The State 
further argues that the officers could reasonably rely on Smith and Lyles to conduct their dog 
sniff because defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common landing 
outside her apartment door under Smith and Lyles. We reject the State’s argument. As 
explained earlier in this opinion, Smith did not hold that tenants have no expectation of privacy 
in common areas of locked apartment buildings; rather, Smith concerned an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy in things overheard by the police while standing in a 
common area of an unlocked apartment building. Supra ¶ 58. 
¶ 62 
 
Moreover, at the time of the officers’ conduct in this case, Trull stood, and still stands, as 
binding Appellate Court, Fourth District precedent extending the protection of the fourth 
amendment to the common areas of a locked apartment building. We agree with the appellate 
court’s conclusion that there was no binding Illinois precedent specifically authorizing the 
officers’ conduct in this case. More critically, Trull constitutes binding Appellate Court, 
Fourth District precedent finding similar police conduct unconstitutional. 
¶ 63 
 
Likewise, the State’s argument that Trull was no longer good law under Lyles is not 
accurate. Both Trull and Lyles relied on federal precedent. Trull, an Appellate Court, Fourth 
District case, relied on federal cases holding that common areas of a locked apartment building 
are protected under the fourth amendment. See United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545 (6th 
 
- 15 - 
 
Cir. 1976); United States v. Fluker, 543 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Case, 435 
F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1970); United States v. Blank, 251 F. Supp. 166 (N.D. Ohio 1966). 
¶ 64 
 
Lyles, an Appellate Court, First District case, noted that Trull relied on Case, 435 F.2d 766, 
among other federal cases, and that Case was subsequently overruled in United States v. 
Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1991). Lyles relied on federal cases holding that a tenant 
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of apartment buildings, even if 
the door to the apartment building is locked. See United States v. Barrios-Moriera, 872 F.2d 
12, 14-15 (2d Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 
(1990); United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Nohara, 3 
F.3d 1239, 1242 (9th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Miravalles, 280 F.3d 1328, 1329, 
1333 (11th Cir. 2002) (no reasonable expectation of privacy where the lock on the front door of 
the apartment building was not working on the day police entered the building). 
¶ 65 
 
Lyles did not hold that Trull was no longer good law. Rather, Lyles simply recognized that 
one of the federal cases relied on in Trull was subsequently overruled and that there were cases 
from other federal circuits holding that tenants have no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the common areas of a locked apartment building. Lyles merely showed a split in authority in 
the federal courts and created a conflict between the First and Fourth Districts of the Illinois 
Appellate Court. 
¶ 66 
 
Here, the appellate court properly determined that Trull, an Appellate Court, Fourth 
District case, was binding authority in this case and that the Appellate Court, First District case 
of Lyles was distinguishable and not binding in the Fourth District. See People v. Collings, 95 
Ill. App. 3d 325 (1981) (rulings of the appellate court of any district are binding precedent on 
all circuit courts if there are no contrary rulings of another district on the same issue but rulings 
are not binding precedent upon the other districts of the appellate court). We therefore reject 
the State’s argument that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply 
because the officers could reasonably rely on Smith and Lyles. 
¶ 67 
 
The State also cites federal cases holding that officers acted in good faith when they 
conducted pre-Jardines dog sniffs outside homes. United States v. Gutierrez, 760 F.3d 750 
(7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Davis, 760 F.3d 901 (8th Cir. 2014); United States v. Winters, 
782 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2015); United States v. Givens, 763 F.3d 987 (8th Cir. 2014); United 
States v. Hunter, 770 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 2014); Jones v. United States, 14 F. Supp. 3d 811 
(W.D. Tex. 2014); United States v. Parrilla, No. 13 Cr. 360(AJN), 2014 WL 2111680 
(S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2014). The State urges this court to join those other jurisdictions in finding 
that the officers did not act culpably by conducting the pre-Jardines dog sniff. Significantly, as 
even the State acknowledges in its brief, these cases relied on binding precedent of their own 
jurisdictions in applying the good-faith exception to officer conduct that occurred prior to the 
United States Supreme Court decision in Jardines. Nevertheless, the State argues that even if 
there were no binding precedent specifically authorizing the officers’ conduct, the officers 
could have relied on the “legal landscape” to perform a dog sniff in an apartment building 
common area. Again, the State focuses on nonbinding precedent of other jurisdictions. The 
State’s reliance on those cases is irrelevant to our inquiry of whether the officers in this case 
acted in good faith based on binding precedent when existing Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth 
District authority (Trull) was applicable. 
 
- 16 - 
 
¶ 68 
 
Not only was there no binding precedent specifically authorizing the officers’ conduct in 
this case, Trull constitutes binding Appellate Court, Fourth District authority specifically 
prohibiting the conduct. We therefore hold that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule announced in Davis, 564 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2429, and adopted in LeFlore, 2015 IL 
116799, does not apply to the officers’ warrantless use of a drug-detection dog at defendant’s 
apartment door, located within a locked apartment building. 
¶ 69 
 
The State also argues that the officers seized the evidence in good-faith reliance on the 
search warrant. Generally, evidence will not be excluded when officers reasonably relied on a 
search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate, even when the warrant application was later 
determined to be insufficient to establish probable cause. Leon, 468 U.S. at 913, 922. The State 
acknowledges that the officers’ reliance on the warrant must be reasonable. Given “ ‘the 
purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct, *** evidence obtained 
from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had 
knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional 
under the Fourth Amendment.’ ” Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 
U.S. 531, 542 (1975)). At the time of the officers’ conduct in this case, Trull, holding that 
common areas of locked apartment buildings are protected by the fourth amendment, was 
binding Appellate Court, Fourth District precedent. Trull, 64 Ill. App. 3d at 387. The officers 
are, therefore, charged with the knowledge that the search violated the fourth amendment 
under Trull. We find that the officers’ reliance on the warrant issued on the basis of 
information obtained in violation of Trull was unreasonable. 
¶ 70 
 
The only cases the State relies on for this point are from other jurisdictions. The State cites 
State v. Scull, 862 N.W.2d 562, 565-66 (Wis. 2015), where officers performed a pre-Jardines 
dog sniff in front of Scull’s house, then obtained a search warrant based on the dog’s positive 
alert. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
applied to evidence seized in the subsequent search of Scull’s home because “the officers 
ultimately obtained a warrant to search Scull’s home and that warrant was issued by a detached 
and neutral commissioner,” whose “decision to grant the warrant was a reasonable application 
of the unsettled state of the law at the time the warrant issued.” Scull, 862 N.W.2d at 568. 
¶ 71 
 
Scull is not controlling and is distinguishable from this case. In contrast to the “unsettled” 
state of the law in Wisconsin, at the time of the officers’ conduct in this case, Trull, holding 
that common areas of locked apartment buildings are protected by the fourth amendment, was 
binding Appellate Court, Fourth District precedent in Illinois. Trull, 64 Ill. App. 3d at 387. 
¶ 72 
 
The State also cites United States v. Ponce, 734 F.3d 1225, 1228-29 (10th Cir. 2013), 
where the court similarly applied the good-faith exception to a pre-Jardines warrant obtained 
using a dog sniff outside a garage because the officer reasonably could have believed that the 
dog sniff was not a fourth amendment search and that the area was not within the curtilage of 
the house and thus could reasonably rely on the warrant. We find Ponce distinguishable from 
the facts of this case. Ponce involved a dog sniff outside a garage, not a dog sniff of a landing in 
a locked apartment building. 
¶ 73 
 
For these reasons, we hold that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule is not 
applicable. 
 
 
 
- 17 - 
 
¶ 74 
 
 
 
III. Whether the Remaining Evidence Established Probable Cause for 
 
 
 
 
Issuance of the Search Warrant 
¶ 75 
 
The State argues that even if the officers’ use of the drug-detection dog in this case violated 
the fourth amendment and the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply, the 
remaining evidence in the warrant application established probable cause to search defendant’s 
apartment. “[I]f the lawfully obtained information amounts to probable cause and would have 
justified issuance of the warrant, apart from the tainted information, the evidence seized 
pursuant to the warrant is admitted.” People v. Free, 94 Ill. 2d 378, 399 (1983). The “existence 
of probable cause in a particular case means simply that the totality of the facts and 
circumstances *** was sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the 
law was violated and evidence of it is on the premises to be searched.” (Internal quotation 
marks omitted.) People v. McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d 109, 153 (2006). The “probable cause 
requirement is rooted in principles of common sense,” and a court asks “whether, given all the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit *** there is a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 
McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d at 153. 
¶ 76 
 
The trial court determined that if the paragraphs regarding the dog sniff were excised from 
the affidavit for a search warrant, the remaining facts pleaded were insufficient to establish 
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. Aside from the dog sniff evidence, the 
application included an uncorroborated Crimestoppers tip that defendant was receiving 
shipments of marijuana from her brother in California, whose name was unknown; she had 
recently received a two-pound package of marijuana on November 21, 2012; that she was 
selling two pounds of marijuana per week; and that defendant had sold ecstasy to the tipster’s 
girlfriend. 
¶ 77 
 
In considering an informant’s tip, the court must consider the detail of the tip, whether the 
tip established the basis of the informant’s knowledge, whether the informant witnessed 
criminal behavior, and whether the tip accurately predicts future activity of the suspect. See 
People v. Kline, 355 Ill. App. 3d 770 (2005). Here, the anonymous tipster did not indicate how 
knowledge of defendant’s alleged criminal activity was gained, nor did the tipster claim to 
have witnessed defendant’s criminal behavior or provide an address where defendant was 
allegedly receiving and selling contraband. The tipster did not provide a name of the person 
allegedly sending defendant the contraband. An uncorroborated anonymous tip alone is 
insufficient to establish probable cause. See People v. Ledesma, 206 Ill. 2d 571, 587 (2003), 
overruled on other grounds in People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502 (2004). 
¶ 78 
 
The State also relies on the package from California addressed to defendant seen by 
Detective Mecum in the apartment building. However, the record does not indicate when 
Detective Mecum observed the package, where in the building the package was observed, or 
the dimensions of the package to indicate whether it could reasonably be tied to drug sales. 
¶ 79 
 
We agree with the trial court and the appellate court that the application for search warrant 
in this case, absent the dog sniff, was insufficient to establish probable cause for a search 
warrant of defendant’s home. As the appellate court aptly noted: 
 
“Absent the dog sniff, the evidence relied upon in the complaint and affidavit for a 
search warrant is scanty at best. We cannot determine from the record the specific time 
on January 10 when [Detective] Mecum observed a package addressed to defendant 
 
- 18 - 
 
with a return address shipping label from an individual in California. [Defendant’s 
personal social media] showing images favoring the legalization of marijuana and 
images of marijuana and currency coupled with defendant’s prior police contacts for 
possession are not sufficient to establish probable cause for a search warrant of 
defendant’s home.” 2015 IL App (4th) 140006, ¶ 64. 
We likewise find that the remaining evidence in the complaint and affidavit for a search 
warrant in this case was insufficient to support probable cause for issuance of a search warrant. 
 
¶ 80 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
¶ 81 
 
We hold that the warrantless use of a drug-detection dog at 3:20 a.m. at defendant’s 
apartment door, located within a locked apartment building, violated defendant’s rights under 
the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. U.S. Const., amend. IV. We conclude 
that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply. We further determine 
that, absent the dog sniff, the evidence relied upon in the complaint and affidavit for search 
warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause for a search warrant of defendant’s home. 
We affirm the judgment of the appellate court and affirm the trial court’s judgment granting 
defendant’s motion to suppress. 
 
¶ 82 
 
Affirmed. 
 
¶ 83 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE GARMAN, specially concurring: 
¶ 84 
 
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the dog sniff at issue here violated the fourth 
amendment as contemplated in Florida v. Jardines. I likewise take no issue with its analysis on 
the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule and its analysis on the other information 
contained within the warrant application. However, I would focus on the central location of the 
fourth amendment interest to address the Jardines question. This analysis produces uniform 
results for multiunit dwellings and recognizes the degree to which residents share spaces in a 
multiunit dwelling. 
¶ 85 
 
The State notes Jardines depended on fourth amendment property-rights analysis and that 
the concurrence finding a violation of a “reasonable expectation of privacy” under Katz v. 
United States did not carry the day. See generally Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. ___, ___, 133 
S. Ct. 1409, 1418-20 (2013) (Kagan, J., concurring, joined by Ginsburg and Sotomayor, JJ.). 
Thus, the State contends Jardines applies only under a property-rights analysis framework. I 
have concerns about this conclusion. While the United States Supreme Court’s majority 
opinion confined its analysis to trespass on a constitutionally protected area, it did so through a 
finding that the porch was curtilage. The curtilage, unlike the open fields, is protected by the 
fourth amendment. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987). Whether an area is 
protected as curtilage depends on “factors that bear upon whether an individual reasonably 
may expect that the area in question should be treated as the home itself.” Id. (citing Oliver v. 
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)). The Supreme Court has specifically “defined the 
curtilage, as did the common law, by reference to the factors that determine whether an 
individual reasonably may expect that an area immediately adjacent to the home will remain 
private.” Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180. Where the curtilage is distinguished from unprotected open 
fields by “reference to the factors that determine whether an individual reasonably may 
 
- 19 - 
 
expect” that area “will remain private,” the curtilage finding may inherently incorporate a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. 
¶ 86 
 
Even if Jardines stands only for a property-based analysis, the landing immediately outside 
defendant’s front door may yet qualify as curtilage.1 Notably, the curtilage need not be “the 
home itself”; instead, the question is whether it qualifies to be “treated as the home itself.” 
(Emphasis added.) Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300. The “central component” of the question is 
“whether the area harbors the ‘intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man’s home 
and the privacies of life.’ ” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 
180). To answer this question, the Supreme Court has stated a four-factor test: “the proximity 
of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an 
enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps 
taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.” Id. at 301. The 
Court specifically has cautioned against a mechanistic application of these factors. “We do not 
suggest that combining these factors produces a finely tuned formula that, when mechanically 
applied, yields a ‘correct’ answer to all extent-of-curtilage questions. Rather, these factors are 
useful analytical tools only to the degree that, in any given case, they bear upon the centrally 
relevant consideration—whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself 
that it should be placed under the home’s ‘umbrella’ of Fourth Amendment protection.” Id. 
¶ 87 
 
The majority opinion addresses, as two separate questions, whether defendant’s landing 
and door qualified as curtilage under Jardines and whether defendant’s landing and door 
qualified as curtilage under the four-part Dunn test. The Supreme Court has stated that 
“curtilage questions should be resolved with particular reference to four factors” as 
enumerated in Dunn (id.), yet in Jardines it did not apply those factors or even cite Dunn. 
However, it does not appear this constitutes an abandonment or abrogation of the Dunn 
four-factor test. The Supreme Court appears to have found Jardines’s front porch to be such a 
textbook example of curtilage that it found no need to assess each of the four factors. “Here 
there is no doubt that the officers entered [the curtilage]: The front porch is the classic 
exemplar of an area adjacent to the home and ‘to which the activity of home life extends.’ ” 
Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1415 (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 n.12). By all 
appearances, then, Dunn remains the dominant curtilage test, and I would apply its factors in a 
manner consistent with the facts in Jardines, rather than trying to address the two questions 
separately. I would also closely examine the fourth amendment interest protected in Jardines. 
¶ 88 
 
Cases assessing whether to consider an area protected curtilage fall into two general 
classes, revealing that curtilage actually serves two distinct fourth amendment purposes. The 
first class of cases examines whether an area outside the home should be granted equivalent 
protection to the home, for activities and possessions within that area. In effect, the curtilage in 
                                                 
 
1There is no per se rule that apartments do not have curtilage for fourth amendment purposes. In 
People v. McNeal, this court assumed, without deciding, that a garbage can containing the defendant’s 
gun was located in the curtilage to his residence, which was described as an “apartment” and a 
“townhouse.” 175 Ill. 2d 335, 342, 343 (1997). People v. Vaglica found that the back porch of an 
apartment, accessible from a backyard, was curtilage. 99 Ill. App. 2d 194, 197 (1968) (“Traditionally, 
courts have held that the curtilage, whether fenced or open, is an area protected from unreasonable 
searches. The porch in question, being within the curtilage, will therefore be considered as within the 
zone of protection.”). 
 
- 20 - 
 
these cases enlarges the home. The second class of cases is less concerned with the space for 
life activities and instead examines the degree to which surveillance by law enforcement 
intrudes upon the life activities within the home. Such cases are more concerned with the 
vantage point of police. The curtilage in these cases shields the core fourth amendment area of 
the home itself.2 
¶ 89 
 
In Dunn, the defendant was convicted of conspiring to manufacture phenylacetone and 
amphetamine based on what drug enforcement agents observed within his barn. Dunn, 480 
U.S. at 296-98. Agents sought a search warrant after observing what appeared to be a 
phenylacetone laboratory within the barn, by peering over its doors. The Supreme Court 
considered the four factors in turn. Noting that the barn was 50 yards from the fence 
surrounding the house, and 60 yards from the house itself, the Court found the first factor cut 
against a finding of curtilage. Id. at 302. Next, the Court noted that the barn was located outside 
the fence surrounding the house and concluded “it is plain that the fence surrounding the 
residence serves to demark a specific area of land immediately adjacent to the house that is 
readily identifiable as part and parcel of the house.” Id. 
¶ 90 
 
As to the third factor, the Court found it “especially significant that the law enforcement 
officials possessed objective data indicating that the barn was not being used for intimate 
activities of the home.” (Emphasis added.) Id. The Court then described signs of various 
activities of phenylacetone production in the barn, noting that “the above facts indicated to the 
officers that the use to which the barn was being put could not fairly be characterized as so 
associated with the activities and privacies of domestic life that the officers should have 
deemed the barn as part of respondent’s home.” Id. at 303. Finally, the Court noted the 
defendant had done little to protect the barn area from observation by those standing in the 
open fields; various interior fences on the farm property served no function “other than that of 
the typical ranch fence,” to corral livestock and not to prevent human observation. Id. 
¶ 91 
 
The incriminating activities and search in Dunn occurred outside the physical structure of 
the home itself. Whether the barn was curtilage was, fundamentally, a question of whether 
Dunn could carry out activities and store possessions there “under the home’s ‘umbrella’ of 
Fourth Amendment protection.” Id. at 301. Dunn fits within the home-extending curtilage 
cases. See also Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179 (noting that curtilage, in contrast to the open fields, 
extends “the setting for those intimate activities”). This court has reached the same result under 
very similar circumstances in assessing whether a building outside the home qualifies as 
curtilage. See, e.g., Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d at 518. 
¶ 92 
 
On the other hand, the curtilage may also act as a buffer to shield the core fourth 
amendment area within the home, and these cases typically focus on where law enforcement 
officers stand in making their observations. This court has recognized that, where an officer 
uses his own natural senses from a permitted vantage point on public property to discover what 
is occurring inside a private residence, it is not a search in violation of the fourth amendment. 
                                                 
 
2These two distinct purposes also happen to line up with the two primary definitions of the 
transitive verb “to harbor,” which the Supreme Court and this court have employed in describing how 
“the primary focus is whether the area in question harbors those intimate activities associated with 
domestic life and the privacies of the home.” Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301 n.4; Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate 
Dictionary 529 (10th ed. 1998) (“1 a : to give shelter or refuge to b : to be the home or habitat of”); see 
also People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502, 516 (2004); People v. Nielson, 187 Ill. 2d 271, 281 (1999). 
 
- 21 - 
 
People v. Wright, 41 Ill. 2d 170, 175 (1968). This court noted “the absence of a trespass under 
our reading of Harris is of major if not decisive importance in cases involving the plain-view 
doctrine.” Id. at 176. The question of trespass in the curtilage is, as a general matter, resolved 
by inquiry into the license afforded the general public to approach. Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 
133 S. Ct. at 1415-16 (“This implicit license typically permits the visitor to approach the home 
by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to 
linger longer) leave. Complying with the terms of that traditional invitation does not require 
fine-grained legal knowledge; it is generally managed without incident by the Nation’s Girl 
Scouts and trick-or-treaters. Thus, a police officer not armed with a warrant may approach a 
home and knock, precisely because that is ‘no more than any private citizen might do.’ 
Kentucky v. King, 563 U. S. ___, ___[, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1862] (2011) ***.”). 
¶ 93 
 
“On the other hand, if the police stray from that path to other parts of the curtilage in order 
to conduct the surveillance, then the use of natural sight or hearing or smell to detect what is 
inside is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search 
and Seizure § 2.3(c), at 756-57 (5th ed. 2012). The focus thus becomes not the outside area 
observed and the activities to which it has been put, but rather where police stand in observing 
defendants’ activities within the home itself. See, e.g., Hardesty v. Hamburg Township, 461 
F.3d 646, 652-53 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding that home’s back deck, from which officers peered 
through window to observe a bloodied and unresponsive young man, was part of the home’s 
curtilage); People v. Greene, 289 Ill. App. 3d 796, 799-800 (1997) (describing officers’ entry 
onto a screened porch to observe defendant through the window and concluding the porch 
qualified as curtilage). In such cases, the curtilage question does not govern an extended area 
for activities; it determines whether the area acts as curtilage to shield the interior of the home. 
The protection claimed by defendant in this case fits neatly within the home-shielding curtilage 
cases. There is no claim defendant’s activities or possessions were outside the home but within 
an area that should be protected as though it were the home. Instead, defendant’s motion to 
suppress relies on the vantage point employed by police to observe what was taking place 
within her apartment. 
¶ 94 
 
Somewhat complicating our analysis of this question is the Jardines Court’s brevity in 
holding that front porch to be curtilage. “The front porch is the classic exemplar of an area 
adjacent to the home and ‘to which the activity of home life extends.’ ” Jardines, 569 U.S. at 
___, 133 S. Ct. at 1415 (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 n.12 (finding that field of marijuana a 
mile from petitioner’s home was unprotected “open fields” and not curtilage)). Consideration 
of the Dunn factors, however, yields important similarities between the protection found in 
Jardines and the protection claimed here. The front porch is, naturally, extremely close to the 
house. There was no discussion in Jardines about any enclosure surrounding the porch or the 
home. We can reasonably conclude the Court intended its curtilage finding to apply to 
enclosed and unenclosed porches alike. The front door obviously acts as a passage into the 
house, and there is no further discussion of home activities taking place there. 
¶ 95 
 
However, whether we presume the porch was enclosed or unenclosed, Jardines could not 
have engaged in his cultivation of cannabis on the porch with any expectation it would be 
“placed under the home’s ‘umbrella’ of Fourth Amendment protection.” Dunn, 480 U.S. at 
301. Jardines does not turn on protecting a zone outside the house for activities and 
possessions. Instead, the relevant question in Jardines was the vantage point of the officers on 
the curtilage and their actions in observing Jardines’s activities within the home. The porch’s 
 
- 22 - 
 
extreme proximity to the house and its status as a primary entrance to the house are thus 
particularly important. Viewed in this light, Jardines must be understood as a case in which the 
curtilage acts as a shield. While the porch was deemed to be a “constitutionally protected area,” 
the property-based fourth amendment interest to be vindicated was centered within the home. 
Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1415. “This right would be of little practical value if the 
State’s agents could stand in a home’s porch or side garden and trawl for evidence with 
impunity; the right to retreat would be significantly diminished if the police could enter a 
man’s property to observe his repose from just outside the front window.” Id. at ___, 133 S. Ct. 
at 1414. 
¶ 96 
 
Both proximity and acting as an entry to the home are equally present in defendant’s case. 
In every relevant sense, defendant’s front door and landing appear indistinct from Jardines’s 
front door and porch. Were this court to hold that an apartment uniformly lacks fourth 
amendment curtilage, we would additionally hold that those who live in apartments have less 
property-based fourth amendment protection within their homes than those who live in 
detached housing. This conclusion would, likewise, apply to those who live in duplexes, 
condominiums, and all other forms of multiunit housing. 
¶ 97 
 
I would conclude that, where officers carry out a canine sniff of the door to an apartment or 
other dwelling unit over which the defendant has exclusive control, a search is being carried 
out and the fourth amendment applies. The fact that defendant lived within a locked apartment 
building is helpful to her argument that her front door and landing were curtilage, but not 
dispositive. The State notes that another resident may grant police entry to the common areas 
of the apartment building, but nothing indicates defendant’s fellow residents may give the 
police license to carry out a dog sniff of the door. Further, there is no indication the front door 
and porch in Jardines were anything other than physically open to the world. Recognizing that 
the fourth amendment interest here centers within the home likewise produces a uniform result 
for multiunit dwellings irrespective of whether the unit’s door is within a locked building, 
within an unlocked building, or opens directly onto outdoor private property. In such cases, the 
front door and area immediately surrounding it must be viewed as “so intimately tied to the 
home itself that it should be placed under the home’s ‘umbrella’ of Fourth Amendment 
protection,” due to its extreme proximity to that core fourth amendment area and its entry into 
that area. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301. 
¶ 98 
 
Recognizing that the curtilage question in this case protects the core fourth amendment 
area within the home does not, on the other hand, lead to a result that every police entry into a 
common area of an apartment building will be a search. To the extent a defendant might claim 
curtilage as an extended area for the activities of the home, courts must recognize the 
individual facts and circumstances indicating defendant shares that area with others. See, e.g., 
People v. Smith, 152 Ill. 2d 229, 245 (1992) (finding no search occurred because “the area 
where the officers overheard defendant’s conversation was a common area shared by other 
tenants, the landlord, their social guests and other invitees”; area was unlocked; defendant’s 
voice was raised; and officers employed only their natural senses). Such shared control directly 
impacts the license that may be granted to the police or public. 
¶ 99 
 
Police here exceeded any license offered to the public or that might have been offered by 
one of defendant’s fellow tenants. Defendant herself neither granted nor implied any license to 
approach with a drug-detecting dog. Her front door and landing are, in all relevant respects, 
 
- 23 - 
 
identical to the front door and porch in Jardines. The fourth amendment interest to be 
vindicated here centers within her apartment, and she employs the curtilage concept only as a 
shield for that core area. These reasons all militate in favor of a finding that, under Jardines, 
police carried out a search in violation of the fourth amendment with a warrantless dog sniff of 
her apartment door. 
¶ 100 
 
This approach yields a uniform result within the homes of multiunit residents and likewise 
recognizes the degree to which they share space for activities and possessions outside the 
home. 
¶ 101 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I specially concur. 
 
¶ 102 
 
JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting: 
¶ 103 
 
I disagree with the majority’s holding that the common area of the hallway landing outside 
of defendant’s apartment constituted curtilage under the property-based trespass analysis of 
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013). The better view is that the concept 
of curtilage has no application to the common areas of multiple-unit structures. See 1 Wayne 
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.2(g), at 50; § 2.3(c), at 55 (5th ed. Supp. 2015). I would also 
reject defendant’s alternative argument that she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
common area of the apartment building. The great weight of federal authority holds that there 
is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building, even if 
it is locked or secured. See, e.g., United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding 
that defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in common area of a secured 
apartment building); United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1985) (same); United 
States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814 (8th Cir. 1977) (same). 
 
¶ 104 
 
 
 
 
I. Facts 
¶ 105 
 
Urbana police department’s Crimestoppers hotline received a tip that defendant was selling 
two pounds of marijuana per week, had received shipments of marijuana from her brother in 
California, and had sold ecstasy to the tipster’s girlfriend. Officer Matthew Mecum went to 
defendant’s apartment building on January 10, 2013, to confirm defendant’s address. The 
three-story, twelve-unit building had two sides with two outer doors that led to two common 
area stairwells that accessed six apartments per side, two per story. Defendant lived on the east 
side of the building. 
¶ 106 
 
Officer Mecum knocked on the outer door to defendant’s side of the building and a resident 
let him in. At the time, Mecum was wearing blue jeans and a winter jacket, and he did not 
display any indicia to show that he was a police officer. Mecum observed a package addressed 
to defendant at apartment No. 10 from “Ben Jones in Oakland, California.” 
¶ 107 
 
Later that night, Officer Michael Cervantes took a trained narcotics-detection dog named 
Hunter to defendant’s apartment building. The common entrance that accessed the east 
stairwell leading to defendant’s apartment was locked, but another officer who was already 
inside opened the door for Cervantes. Once inside the outer common door, there was nothing 
obstructing the path to the third-floor landing. 
¶ 108 
 
Hunter alerted to the presence of drugs outside of defendant’s apartment door in the 
common area of the third-floor landing. Located on that landing were the doors for defendant’s 
apartment (unit No. 10), another apartment (unit No. 9), and a storage compartment. Hunter 
 
- 24 - 
 
was allowed to sniff in the common area near unit No. 9 and in the common area near the two 
first-floor apartments. He did not alert to the aroma of drugs at any of those other locations.3 
¶ 109 
 
Officer Mecum prepared a complaint and affidavit for a search warrant that included the 
Crimestoppers information, defendant’s past history with cannabis, the information on her 
Facebook page, and the fact that Mecum had observed the package addressed to defendant 
from California. A judge authorized the warrant. During a subsequent search of defendant’s 
apartment, the police seized 1011.99 grams of cannabis, assorted drug paraphernalia, and 
United States currency. 
 
¶ 110 
 
 
 
 
II. No Trespass of the Curtilage Occurred 
¶ 111 
 
Justice Kilbride, writing for a majority of this court, holds that the common area of the 
landing outside of defendant’s apartment door qualifies as curtilage under Jardines. Justice 
Kilbride concludes that this is so for several reasons. First, he finds that the outside common 
door to the building had a locking mechanism and the common stairwell behind it was 
therefore an area of “limited access” that was “not accessible to the general public.” Supra 
¶¶ 33, 37. And second, he finds it significant that the officers entered “in the middle of the 
night.” Supra ¶ 33. 
¶ 112 
 
Both points relied upon by the majority—the locked common door and the nighttime 
nature of the visit—are irrelevant to any discussion of the issue presented in this case as to the 
scope of the curtilage. The crucial facts in Jardines were that “[t]he officers were gathering 
information in an area belonging to Jardines and immediately surrounding his house—in the 
curtilage of the house, which [the Court has] held enjoys protection as part of the home itself. 
And they gathered that information by physically entering and occupying the area to engage in 
conduct not explicitly or implicitly permitted by the homeowner.” (Emphasis added.) 
Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1414. 
¶ 113 
 
Here, in contrast to Jardines, the defendant as lessee of apartment No. 10 had no right to 
explicitly or implicitly exclude the officers from physically entering or occupying the area of 
the third-floor landing. “[T]he concept of curtilage has little if any application to commercial 
structures or to multiple-unit [apartment] dwellings,” and therefore a dog sniff in the common 
areas of such structures “would likely be deemed a non-search” by the United States Supreme 
Court. 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.2(g), at 50 (5th ed. Supp. 2015). See also 
Reeves v. Churchich, 484 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2007) (areas outside of individual units of 
duplex not “curtilage” with respect to either unit if shared with occupants of other unit); see 
also State v. Williams, 862 N.W.2d 831, 838 (N.D. 2015) (interest in common hallway was not 
exclusive and therefore the hallway “was not curtilage”); State v. Nguyen, 841 N.W.2d 676, 
682 (N.D. 2013) (even though the main entrances were locked and secured at all times and 
officer gained entry by catching the door after another person gained entry, there was no search 
under Jardines where dog alerted to drugs within a particular apartment because the curtilage 
“concept is significantly modified when applied to a multifamily dwelling.”). 
¶ 114 
 
Unlike in Jardines, the area in question here did not belong to defendant, nor did she have 
exclusive control over it, and there was therefore no trespass as far as defendant was 
                                                 
 
3The dog did not search inside any of the apartments; he sniffed the air outside of them while being 
walked through the common hallway. 
 
- 25 - 
 
concerned. Everyone understands that tenants of an apartment building do not own or possess 
the common areas. The majority’s analysis ignores that a large amount of people that 
defendant has no control over have access to the common areas outside of defendant’s 
apartment door; the list includes the occupants of the other 11 apartments and anyone they let 
in, plus the landlord and anyone he lets in, plus anyone who is let in by someone who is already 
inside. 
¶ 115 
 
The majority makes much of the notion that the area behind the locked common door was 
not readily accessible to the public. Aside from being irrelevant, this does not even appear to be 
true, as Officer Mecum, who went to the unit in plain clothes, was let into the building by 
another tenant after simply knocking on the door. The officer also no doubt could have easily 
gained access by following an occupant through the door before it latched. See Nguyen, 841 
N.W.2d at 678-79 (officer gained access to the secured building by catching the door as an 
unidentified female either exited or entered); see also 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§ 2.3(c), at 59 n.145.70 (5th ed. Supp. 2015) (discussing Nguyen, 841 N.W.2d at 682, as 
holding that because of the lack of any expectation of privacy in the area outside of one’s 
apartment door, “the curtilage ‘concept is significantly modified when applied to a multifamily 
dwelling’ ”). At any rate, the concept of curtilage does not apply to an area that is not within a 
resident’s property rights. 
¶ 116 
 
For the same reason, it is irrelevant that the visit by Officer Cervantes and Hunter occurred 
“in the middle of the night.” Justice Kilbride quotes language from Justice Alito’s dissent in 
Jardines: “The officer ‘adhered to the customary path; he did not approach in the middle of the 
night; and he remained at the front door for only a very short period (less than a minute or 
two).’ ” Supra ¶ 43 (quoting Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1423 (Alito, J., dissenting, 
joined by Roberts, C.J., Kennedy and Breyer, JJ.)). But this language quoted from the Jardines 
dissent—that is now relied upon by Justice Kilbride—was written to show that the officers in 
Jardines had a license or an implied invitation to enter onto the curtilage of Jardines’s property 
to conduct a dog sniff despite the area being curtilage. The quoted language was not written, as 
Justice Kilbride apparently surmises, to settle a dispute as to whether the area in question was 
in fact curtilage. All nine justices in Jardines agreed that the porch owned by the defendant in 
that case was curtilage. In contradistinction to Jardines, the fact that the dog sniff in the present 
case occurred in the common area outside of any area belonging to defendant makes the time 
of day irrelevant because the area was not curtilage and therefore a license was not required to 
satisfy the fourth amendment. 
¶ 117 
 
Another reason that the majority suggests for finding the common area of the landing to be 
curtilage is based on the four factors set forth in United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 
(1987). There, the Court stated that curtilage questions should be resolved with particular 
reference to four factors: (1) the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home; (2) 
whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home; (3) the nature of the 
uses to which the area is put; and (4) the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from 
observation by people passing by. Id. The Court cautioned that it was not suggesting “that 
combining these factors produces a finely tuned formula that, when mechanically applied, 
yields a ‘correct’ answer to all extent-of-curtilage questions. Rather, these factors are useful 
analytical tools only to the degree that, in any given case, they bear upon the centrally relevant 
consideration—whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it 
should be placed under the home’s ‘umbrella’ of Fourth Amendment protection.” Id. 
 
- 26 - 
 
¶ 118 
 
The majority calls the Dunn factors a “test” and concludes that all four weigh in favor of 
finding that the landing was the curtilage of defendant’s apartment. Supra ¶¶ 34, 37. At the 
outset, I question the sufficiency of the Dunn factors to determine whether a dog sniff in a 
common area of a multiunit dwelling is a search where the tenants have a lessened expectation 
of privacy in such areas by virtue of their neighbors and others’ right to use or occupy the same 
common area. See State v. Williams, 2015 ND 103, ¶ 24, 862 N.W.2d 831 (“An analysis of the 
Dunn factors regarding curtilage, alone, is insufficient to determine whether the drug sniff was 
a search; a reasonable expectation of privacy analysis must also be conducted. It is undisputed 
Williams [as a condominium owner] has a property interest in the hallway, but his interest is 
not exclusive. *** [T]he common hallway of the condominium building was available for the 
use of the other co-owners and their guests and others having legitimate reasons to be on the 
premises, and Williams cannot unilaterally exclude individuals from the area because his 
co-owners also have a property interest in the shared space. [Citation.] *** [W]e conclude the 
condominium building’s common hallway was not curtilage, and Williams had no reasonable 
expectation that the shared space would be free from any intrusion.”). Also, I would note that 
the United States Supreme Court has never used the Dunn factors to find that an area not 
belonging to defendant’s home can be his curtilage. See generally 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search 
and Seizure § 2.2(g), at 50; § 2.3(c), at 55 (5th ed. Supp. 2015). 
¶ 119 
 
In any event, I disagree with the majority’s application of the Dunn factors and would 
reach the exact opposite conclusion, finding that all four factors weigh in favor of finding that 
the common landing area was not curtilage. 
¶ 120 
 
With respect to the first factor, the majority finds that the proximity of the landing to 
defendant’s apartment strongly supports an inference that the landing be treated as curtilage. I 
would not weigh this factor in favor of a finding of curtilage in this case, however, because the 
landing was not on defendant’s property and she had no property right in it. And, although it 
was close to defendant’s apartment, it was also close to another apartment and a storage area. 
¶ 121 
 
The remaining three factors all weigh heavily against the conclusion that the common 
landing belonged to the apartment’s curtilage. The area was not included within an enclosure 
that excluded others—any of the tenants of the building, the landlord, their invitees and the 
officers in this case could have accessed the landing and defendant could not exclude them. 
See People v. Lyles, 332 Ill. App. 3d 1, 7 (2002) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
apartment building common area); State v. Nguyen, 2013 ND 252, 841 N.W.2d 676 
(post-Jardines case where court found that a dog sniff in the common area of a locked 
apartment building where dog alerted on the defendant’s apartment door was not a search 
because defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area and it was 
therefore not curtilage); United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009, 1016 (8th Cir. 2010) (dog sniff 
of exterior doorframe of defendant’s apartment that occurred in common hallway did not 
constitute a search because the sniff occurred in the common area where others could be 
lawfully present); cf. United States v. Burston, 806 F.3d 1123 (8th Cir. 2015) (post-Jardines 
case that accepted the holding of Scott, distinguishing it from the facts before it, which the 
Burston court characterized as involving the search of an uncommon area six to ten inches 
from Burston’s window, which was prevented from being a common area by a strategically 
placed bush and grill). In the present case, there is no evidence that defendant put the landing to 
any use other than accessing her apartment. Nor was there any evidence that her lease 
permitted any other use or that any other use was feasible in light of the landing’s size and 
 
- 27 - 
 
design. Under these circumstances, the landing was not curtilage under the factors enunciated 
in Dunn. 
¶ 122 
 
Justice Kilbride concludes his analysis on whether the landing should be treated as 
curtilage by making the puzzling claim that “[e]ven the Jardines dissent made observations 
that support our conclusion that the police conduct in this case violated the fourth amendment.” 
Supra ¶ 42. Justice Kilbride’s claim is a real head-scratcher because the issue in Jardines was 
whether the front porch of defendant’s home was curtilage, not whether the common area of an 
apartment building can be curtilage. Justice Kilbride’s claim becomes all the more startling, 
however, given that the dissenters in Jardines actually told us how they felt about a dog sniff of 
a common area of an apartment building: 
 
“The concurrence suggests that a Kyllo-based decision would be ‘much like’ the 
actual decision of the Court, but that is simply not so. The holding of the Court is based 
on what the Court sees as a ‘ “physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area.” ’ 
[Citation.] As a result, it does not apply when a dog alerts *** in the corridor of a 
building to which the dog and handler have been lawfully admitted. 
 
The concurrences’s Kyllo-based approach would have a much wider reach. When 
the police used the thermal imaging device in Kyllo, they were on a public street, 533 
U. S., at 29, and ‘committed no trespass.’ Ante, at 3. Therefore, if a dog’s nose is just 
like a thermal imaging device for Fourth Amendment purposes, a search would occur if 
a dog alerted while on a public sidewalk or in the corridor of an apartment building. 
And the same would be true if the dog was trained to sniff, not for marijuana, but for 
more dangerous quarry, such as explosives or for a violent fugitive or kidnaped child. I 
see no ground for hampering legitimate law enforcement in this way. 
 
*** 
 
The conduct of the police officer in this case did not constitute a trespass and did 
not violate respondent’s reasonable expectations of privacy. I would hold that this 
conduct was not a search ***.” (Emphases added.) Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. 
at 1426 (Alito, J., dissenting, joined by Roberts, C.J., Kennedy and Breyer, JJ.). 
¶ 123 
 
The special concurrence of Chief Justice Garman in this case also finds the common area of 
the landing and the exterior of defendant’s doorway to be curtilage. Supra ¶ 99. Chief Justice 
Garman sets forth two fourth amendment purposes at play in considering whether an area 
should be considered curtilage and urges that “[t]he protection claimed by defendant in this 
case fits neatly within the home-shielding curtilage cases.” Supra ¶ 93. But in the end it is clear 
that her determination that the common area at issue in this case should be treated as the 
curtilage of the apartment rests upon an egalitarian concern for creating privacy rights for 
apartment dwellers on par with the occupants of single-family homes regardless of the 
significant legal differences between the two situations. See supra ¶ 96 (“Were this court to 
hold that an apartment uniformly lacks fourth amendment curtilage, we would additionally 
hold that those who live in apartments have less property-based fourth amendment protection 
within their homes than those who live in detached housing.”). The problem with the special 
concurrence’s approach is that apartment doors that open to common areas of a multiunit 
apartment building have less home-shielding protection by nature than single-family home 
properties do. Odors, sounds and activities may be detected from the vantage point of the 
 
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common areas of the apartment building where others may not be excluded.4 I would submit 
that the reaction to this reality should not lie in morphing the concept of curtilage beyond its 
rightful parameters. 
 
¶ 124 
 
 
 
 
III. No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
¶ 125 
 
Having concluded that the common stairway and landing of the apartment complex is not 
the curtilage of defendant’s apartment, I would also find that defendant did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the odors that waft from inside her apartment to places 
that others may lawfully stand. The overwhelming weight of federal authority is in agreement 
with that proposition. See United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009, 1015-16 (8th Cir. 2010) (dog 
sniff of exterior door frame of defendant’s apartment door occurring in common hallway did 
not violate defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 
1239 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
common area of a secured apartment building); United States v. Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248 (3d Cir. 
1992) (same result with unsecured building); United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170 (7th 
Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1985) (same result with 
secured building); United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814 (8th Cir. 1977) (same); United States 
v. Cruz Pagan, 537 F.2d 554 (1st Cir. 1976) (holding that defendant had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in parking garage of condominium). The Sixth Circuit appears to be the 
only circuit that recognizes a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallway or common 
areas of a locked apartment building. See United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 
1976). The majority position among the states that have considered the question also appears to 
be solidly in favor of finding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common 
areas of a locked apartment building. State v. Nguyen, 2013 ND 252, ¶ 9, 841 N.W.2d 676 
(collecting cases); State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173 (Minn. 2007). 
¶ 126 
 
The rationale for holding that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy that protects a 
renter from a dog sniff in the common area of an apartment building outside the renter’s door 
has been set forth in numerous cases. The rejected arguments of the defendants in those cases 
were along the lines that the defendants’ privacy interest inside their residences was intruded 
upon because police conducted dog sniffs to detect something therein. The defendants usually 
relied upon Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), where the Supreme Court found that 
law enforcement’s use of a thermal imaging device outside the home, but directed into the 
home, was a search for fourth amendment purposes. 
                                                 
 
4Chief Justice Garman leaves it somewhat ambiguous as to the extent of the area she would find to 
be constitutionally protected. At one point, she states that “where officers carry out a canine sniff of the 
door to an apartment or other dwelling unit over which the defendant has exclusive control, a search is 
being carried out.” Supra ¶ 97. Later, she states it is the “front door and area immediately surrounding 
it” (id.) and the “front door and landing” (id. ¶ 99) that are constitutionally protected. I simply disagree 
that the landing or any of the area outside of defendant’s door was under defendant’s exclusive control 
in this case. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record that Hunter was actually allowed to touch 
defendant’s door with his nose. Additionally, it may be possible that a trained officer can tell if the dog 
was alerting to the presence of drugs before its nose hits the door or it begins to scratch it. At any rate, I 
would not find the exterior of the apartment door to be curtilage. 
 
- 29 - 
 
¶ 127 
 
Courts have responded by noting that no legitimate expectation of privacy is violated by 
police conduct that can reveal only information about contraband and nothing about arguably 
private rights. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123-24 (1984); United States v. Place, 
462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (canine inspection of luggage at airport). Drug-sniffing dogs, unlike 
thermal imaging devices, are not “capable of detecting lawful activity” such as the “intimate 
details” in the home. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409-10 (2005) (canine inspection of an 
automobile during a traffic stop) (clarifying Kyllo). The resident’s interest in the inside of his 
dwelling was intruded in Kyllo because the device used was capable of detecting lawful as well 
as unlawful activity going on inside the residence. Here, defendant does not make any claim 
that the dog used outside her apartment was capable of detecting anything beyond the odor of 
illegal drugs emanating from inside the apartment to the outside. A dog sniff does not expose 
noncontraband that would otherwise remain hidden from public view, but “discloses only the 
presence or absence of narcotics.” Place, 462 U.S. at 707. A dog sniff is considered sui generis 
because there is “no other investigative procedure that is so limited both in the manner in 
which the information is obtained and in the content of the information revealed by the 
procedure.” Id. Kyllo is therefore distinguishable, and it can be easily concluded that the 
likelihood that the use of a drug-sniffing dog in the common area of an apartment building will 
compromise any interest in privacy is too remote to characterize the use of the dog as a 
violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409-10. 
¶ 128 
 
I would also note that the purpose of an apartment building having locking exterior doors 
leading into the common areas is not to provide privacy, but to provide safety for the tenants. 
Eisler, 567 F.2d at 816. In other words, locked common doors are meant to keep the crime out, 
not the police out. If there were no murders, rapes or robberies in the world, the current fashion 
of automatic-locking apartment doors would likely disappear. “An expectation of privacy 
necessarily implies an expectation that one will be free of any intrusion, not merely 
unwarranted intrusions.” Id. Here, it is clear that others—including the landlord, other tenants, 
and their invitees—had the right to use the common stairwell, including the third-floor landing 
outside defendant’s apartment door. Accordingly, the officer’s entry into that area with Hunter 
did not violate any reasonable expectation of privacy and was not a search. 
¶ 129 
 
Finally, I address the special concurrence’s statement “that another resident may grant 
police entry to the common areas of the apartment building, but nothing indicates defendant’s 
fellow residents may give the police license to carry out a dog sniff” near defendant’s door. 
Supra ¶ 97. As I have already explained, the dog sniff occurred in the common area of the 
third-floor landing that cannot be considered curtilage and there was no reasonable expectation 
of privacy, and therefore no license was required. I might add, however, that apartment 
dwellers living in close quarters with drug dealers or manufacturers would no doubt prefer to 
see an occasional police dog in their common hallway. The same would be even more true “for 
more dangerous quarry, such as explosives or for a violent fugitive or kidnaped child.” 
Jardines, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1426 (Alito, J., dissenting, joined by Roberts, C.J., and 
Kennedy and Breyer, JJ.). The majority is wrongly foreclosing this useful and legitimate law 
enforcement tool. 
 
 
 
 
 
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¶ 130 
 
 
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
¶ 131 
 
I would hold that the use of the drug-sniffing dog in the common area outside of 
defendant’s apartment door did not constitute a trespass onto the curtilage and was not a 
violation of defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy. The police therefore did not 
conduct an illegal search, and there was no violation of the fourth amendment. Accordingly, I 
dissent. 
¶ 132 
 
JUSTICE KARMEIER joins in this dissent.