Title: U S MFG DIST CORP v CITY OF

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 13188 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1976 U.S. MANUFACTURING AND DISTRIBUTING CORPORATION, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, CITY OF GREAT FALLS, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court o f t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Paul G. H a t f i e l d , Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : E. F. G i a n o t t i argued and Ralph Randono argued, Great F a l l s , Montana For Respondent : Larsen and Gliko, Great F a l l s , Montana David V. Gliko argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Submitted: February 4, 1976 Decided: -: 5 :.E ..j/fj . , F i l e d : -. , - 4 4 7 : i J M r . J u s t i c e C a s t l e s d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t of t h e e i g h t h j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , County ~ a s c a d e / , h a s declared a portion of Montana's r e c e n t l y amended obscenity law, s e c t i o n s 94-8-110 and 94-8-110.1, R.C.M. 1947, t o be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y infirm. I n t h i s appeal from t h a t d e c l a r a t o r y judgment we r e v e r s e t h e determination of t h e d i s - trict c o u r t and uphold t h e obscenity law enacted by t h e Forty- f o u r t h Legislature. The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e here a r o s e from a somewhat complicated procedural s e t t i n g . U.S.Manufacturing and Distribu- t i n g Corporation, h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o a s a p p e l l a n t , sought a temporary r e s t r a i n i n g order a g a i n s t respondent C i t y of Great F a l l s . Appellant sought t o enjoin t h e c i t y from i n t e r f e r e n c e with its business operation through t h e enforcement of a r e c e n t l y enacted municipal ordinance on obscenity. The m a t e r i a l p o r t i o n of t h a t ordinance, No. 1862, reads: "6-1-9: OBSCENE MATERIAL PROHIBITED: S a l e and D i s t r i b u t i o n of Obscene Material --- It is unlawful t o any person t o knowingly send o r cause t o be s e n t , bring o r cause t o be brought i n t o t h e C i t y of Great F a l l s f o r s a l e o r d i s - t r i b u t i o n o r prepare, publish, p r i n t , e x h i b i t , d i s t r i b u t e o r o f f e r t o d i s t r i b u t e , o r have i n h i s possession with i n t e n t t o d i s t r i b u t e o r t o e x h i b i t o r o f f e r t o d i s t r i b u t e any obscene m a t e r i a l . " Respondent's answer denied t h e p r o p r i e t y of i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f and moved t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment t o r e s o l v e t h e admitted c o n f l i c t between t h e municipal ordinance and t h e state s t a t u t e r e g u l a t i n g obscenity. That s t a t u t e provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "94-8-110 Obscenity (1) A person commits t h e offense of obscenity when, with knowledge of t h e obscene n a t u r e t h e r e o f , he purposely o r knowingly: " ( a ) S e l l s , d e l i v e r s o r provides, o r o f f e r s o r agrees t o s e l l , d e l i v e r o r provide any obscene w r i t i n g , p i c t u r e , record, o r o t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o r embodiment of t h e obscene t o anyone under t h e age of eighteen (18) ; o r " ( b ) Presents o r d i r e c t s an obscene play, dance o r o t h e r performance o r p a r t i c i p a t e s i n t h a t portion thereof which makes it obscene t o anyone under t h e age of eighteen ( 1 8 ) ; o r " ( c ) Publishes, e x h i b i t s , o r otherwise makes a v a i l a b l e anything obscene t o anyone under t h e age of eighteen ( 1 8 ) , o r " ( d ) Performs an obscene act o r otherwise p r e s e n t s an obscene e x h i b i t i o n of h i s body t o anyone under t h e age of eighteen (18) ; o r " ( e ) Creates, buys, procures o r possesses obscene matter o r m a t e r i a l with t h e purpose t o disseminate it t o anyone under t h e age of eighteen ( 1 8 ) ; o r " ( f ) Advertises o r otherwise promotes t h e s a l e of obscene m a t e r i a l o r m a t e r i a l s represented o r held o u t by him t o be obscene. " (5) N o c i t y o r municipal ordinance may be adopted which is more r e s t r i c t i v e a s t o obscenity than t h e provisions of t h i s s e c t i o n and s e c t i o n 94-8-110.1." ~ h u s while t h e municipal ordinance and t h e s t a t e s t a t u t e d e f i n e obscene m a t e r i a l i n s u b s t a n t i a l l y t h e same terms, t h e c i t y o r d i - nance p r o h i b i t s s a l e o r d i s t r i b u t i o n of such m a t e r i a l t o those I over eighteen (18) years a s well. W e are not here concerned with t h e wisdom of e i t h e r p r o h i b i t i o n . Appellant joined respondent's r e q u e s t f o r a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment. Hearing was had. Subsequently t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t entered a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment which s t a t e d i n p a r t : "IT IS THEREFORE O R D E R E D t h a t Senate B i l l No. 250 [ s e c t i o n s 94-8-110 and 94-8-110.11 enacted by t h e 44th L e g i s l a t u r e of t h e S t a t e of Montana and made e f f e c t i v e on A p r i l 1 4 , 1975, i s un- c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n p a r t by e f f e c t i n g t o restrict C i t i e s and m u n i c i p a l i t i e s from enacting ordinances more r e s t r i c t i v e than s a i d S t a t e law and t h a t Ordinance No. 1862, passed by t h e Commission of t h e C i t y of Great F a l l s on May 6th, 1975, i s v a l i d . " Appellant r a i s e s t h e s e i s s u e s f o r review of t h a t judg- ment by t h i s Court: 1. Whether proper c e r t i f i c a t i o n t o t h i s Court and n o t i c e t o t h e Attorney General pursuant t o Rule 38, Montana Rules of Appellate C i v i l Procedure, was given? 2. Whether s e c t i o n s 94-8-110 and 94-8-110.1, R.C.M. 1947, a s amended, a r e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n view of r u l i n g s of t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court on obscenity? 3. Whether a municipal corporation has t h e power t o enact a v a l i d and binding ordinance r e l a t i n g t o obscenity i n excess of l i m i t s imposed on such ordinances by t h e s t a t e l e g i s - l a t u r e ? Appellant's argument concerning compliance with Rule 38, M.R.App.Civ.P., is of l i t t l e m e r i t . I n Grant v . Grant, Mont . , 531 P.2d 1007, 32 St.Rep. 191, 193; Clontz v. Clontz, Mont . , 531 P.2d 169, 32 St.Rep. 169, 172; and G i l b e r t v. G i l b e r t , Mont . , 533 P.2d 1079, 32 St.Rep. 163, 165; t h i s Court declined t o r u l e on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e s r a i s e d on appeal because c e r t i f i c a t i o n t o t h i s Court and n o t i f i c a t i o n t o t h e Attorney General had n o t been given pursuant t o Rule 38. Requir- ing such n o t i c e t o t h e s t a t e ' s chief l e g a l o f f i c e r i s t o enable him t o appear i n defense of t h e challenged l e g i s l a t i v e a c t s . I n t h i s matter c e r t i f i c a t i o n t o t h i s Court and n o t i c e t o t h e Attorney General w e r e accomplished on November 19, 1975. Such n o t i c e provided ample opportunity f o r t h e Attorney General t o prepare f o r t h e hearing held February 4 , 1976. The s p i r i t of t h e r u l e appears s a t i s f i e d when such opportunity t o prepare f o r t h e con- s t i t u t i o n a l challenge i s given. Accordingly, w e r e j e c t t h e em- p h a s i s which a p p e l l a n t seeks t o p l a c e on t h e immediacy of t h e n o t i c e required by Rule 38. W e next consider whether t h e s t a t u t e s i n question, sec- t i o n s 94-8-110 and 94-8-110.1, R.C.M. 1947, a r e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y i n v a l i d when viewed i n t h e l i g h t of r e c e n t United S t a t e s Supreme Court obscenity decisions. I n t h i s regard, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t made t h e s e conclusions of l a w : "I. That t h e most r e c e n t United S t a t e s Supreme Court d e c i s i o n s rendered i n t h e a r e a of obscenity provides f o r ' b a s i c g u i d e l i n e s ' t o be applied i n t h e determination of 'obscene m a t e r i a l ' , to-wit: ( a ) whether t h e average person applying contempo- r a r y community standards would f i n d t h e work, taken a s a whole, appeals t o t h e p r u r i e n t i n t e r e s t * * *. M i l l e r v. C a l i f o r n i a , 413 U.S. 15, 31, 37 L Ed 2d 419, 93 S.Ct. 2607. "11. That t h e 'community standards' e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e Supreme Court a r e l o c a l standards as opposed t o statewide standards. "111. That t h e s a i d S t a t e law attempts t o e s t a b l i s h statewide standards by its l i m i t a t i o n on t h e munici- p a l i t i e s of t h e S t a t e of Montana from passing more r e s t r i c t i v e ordinances than t h e s a i d S t a t e l a w - and i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t o t h a t e x t e n t . " I V . That Ordinance No. 1862 of t h e C i t y of Great Falls allows t h e l o c a l community t o e s t a b l i s h its standard of obscenity f o r persons of a l l ages and is t h e r e f o r e v a l i d . " (Emphasis added. ) - With r e s p e c t t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s conclusion of l a w I1 which i s b a s i c t o t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e i n t h i s matter, w e can f i n d no b a s i s i n t h e law on obscenity a s a r t i c u l a t e d by t h e Supreme Court f o r such a l i m i t i n g d e f i n i t i o n of "community standards" a s t h a t a r r i v e d a t by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t . F u r t h e r , t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t has n o t r e l a t e d t h i s l i m i t i n g d e f i n i t i o n of "community standards" t o t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n which it claims i s v i o l a t e d by t h e s t a t e s t a t u t e s . Statewide standards f o r obscenity are c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y permissible. M i l l e r v. C a l i f o r n i a , 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L Ed 2d 419. The United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n Kaplan v. C a l i f o r n i a , 413 U.S. 115, 121, 93 S.Ct. 2680, 37 L Ed 2d 492, 498, s t a t e d : " * * * t h e Court today holds t h a t t h e '"con- temporary community standards of t h e s t a t e of C a l i f o r n i a " ' , as opposed t o ' n a t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s , ' a r e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y adequate t o e s t a b l i s h whether a work is obscene. * * *" (Emphasis added.) I n United S t a t e s v. 12 200-Ft. R e e l s , 413 U.S. 123, 129, 93 S.Ct. 2665, 37 L Ed 2d 500, 507, t h e Supreme Court s a i d : "As t h i s case came t o us on t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s summary d i s m i s s a l of t h e f o r f e i t u r e a c t i o n , no determination of t h e obscenity of t h e m a t e r i a l s involved has been made. W e have today a r r i v e d a t standards f o r t e s t i n g t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of s t a t e l e g i s l a t i o n r e g u l a t i n g obscenity. See M i l l e r v. C a l i f o r n i a , 413 U.S. a t 23, 25, 37 L Ed 2d a t 431. * * *" (Emphasis added.) Support f o r t h e broad d e f i n i t i o n of "community standards" is a l s o found i n an appeal of a r e c e n t f e d e r a l criminal prose- c u t i o n f o r obscenity. I n United S t a t e s v. Danley, 523 F.2d 369, 370, D i s t r i c t Judge Russell E. Smith, s t a t e d : "In judging t h e community standard, t h e c o u r t , d e a l i n g a s it was with laws r e g u l a t i n g t h e m a i l s and i n t e r s t a t e commerce, properly considered t h e community as embracing more than t h e S t a t e of Oreqon. While under M i l l e r v. C a l i f o r n i a , supra, t a k e r i n conjunction with United S t a t e s v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8 MM. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 93 S.Ct. 2665, 37 L Ed 2d 500 (1973), it i s permissible i n f e d e r a l prosecution t o d e f i n e t h e state as a community, it is c l e a r from Hamling v. United S t a t e s , 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887. 4 1 L Ed 2d 590 (1974), t h a t cbnsideration m a ; be given t o standards without t h e state. United S t a t e s v. Harding, 507 F.2d 294 (10th C i r . 1974), c e r t . denied, U.S. , 95 S.Ct. 1437, 43 L Ed 2d 679 (1975); United S t a t e s v. M i l l e r , 505 F.2d 1247 ( 9 t h C i r . 1974) ." (Emphasis added.) The d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s conclusion No. I1 f i n d s no support i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l a w on obscenity. A judgment based on an erroneous conclusion of t h e l a w cannot stand. W e next consider t h e t h i r d i s s u e r a i s e d by t h i s appeal-- whether t h e municipal corporation has t h e power t o r e g u l a t e obscenity notwithstanding a l e g i s l a t i v e enactment which expressly preempts t h e f i e l d . Since t h e r e a r e no f i n d i n g s of f a c t nor con- c l u s i o n s of law suggesting t h a t a municipal corporation has such an inherent power, t h a t power cannot form a foundation f o r t h i s judgment, o r s i m i l a r l y an appeal from it. Granted though t h i s we judgment may suggest such inherent powers,/view t h e judgment based on t h e d i s t r i c t court's conclusions of law. See: Crncevich v. Georgetown Recreation Corporation, Mont . , 541 P.2d 56, 32 St-Rep. 963, 969. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e 1972 Montana Constitu- t i o n c o n t a i n s a new provision on l o c a l government i n A r t i c l e X I , Section 6 , which s t a t e s i n p a r t : "Self-government powers. A l o c a l government u n i t adoptinq a self-qovernment c h a r t e r may exercise- any-power n o t prohibited by t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n , law, o r c h a r t e r . * * *" (Emphasis added. ) The c i t y ordinance here which is admittedly i n c o n f l i c t with t h e p r o h i b i t i o n of s e c t i o n 94-8-110(5), R.C.M. 1947, cannot stand i n t h e f a c e of such a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provision. The judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s reversed. / /Chief J u s t i c e