Title: Ex parte Dennis Morgan Hicks.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel:  November 18, 2022 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.  
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections 
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023  
 
_________________________ 
 
1210013 
_________________________ 
 
Ex parte Dennis Morgan Hicks 
 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI  
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 
 
(In re:  Dennis Morgan Hicks 
 
v. 
 
State of Alabama) 
 
(Mobile Circuit Court, CC-12-4867 and CC-12-4994; 
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-15-0747) 
 
WISE, Justice. 
Dennis Morgan Hicks was convicted of one count of capital murder 
for the killing of Joshua Duncan.  The murder was made capital because 
Hicks committed it while he was under a sentence of life imprisonment, 
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a violation of § 13A-5-40(a)(6), Ala. Code 1975.  Hicks was also convicted 
of one count of second-degree theft of property, a violation of § 13A-8-4, 
Ala. Code 1975.  By a vote of 11-1, the jury recommended that Hicks be 
sentenced to death on the capital-murder conviction.  The Mobile Circuit 
Court followed the jury's recommendation and sentenced Hicks to death 
on the capital-murder conviction;  it sentenced him to time served on the 
second-degree theft-of-property conviction.  Hicks appealed to the Court 
of Criminal Appeals, and, on original submission, that court affirmed 
Hicks's conviction but remanded the case for the trial court to address 
some sentencing issues.  Hicks v. State, [Ms. CR-15-0747, July 12, 2019] 
___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2019). 
On remand, the trial court entered a new sentencing order.  In the 
new sentencing order, the trial court addressed the "heinous, atrocious, 
or cruel' aggravating circumstance.  However, it omitted any discussion 
of two nonstatutory mitigating circumstances that it had explicitly 
considered in its original sentencing order.  On return to remand, the 
Court of Criminal Appeals noted in an order that, if the trial court had 
intentionally omitted the discussion of those nonstatutory mitigating 
circumstances, the trial court had exceeded the scope of its previous 
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remand instructions.  Therefore, in that order, the Court of Criminal 
Appeals remanded the case a second time, with instructions that the trial 
court include its discussion of the nonstatutory mitigating circumstances 
that had been omitted from the new sentencing order.  The Court of 
Criminal Appeals stated that, if the trial court had failed to consider 
those nonstatutory mitigating circumstances on remand, it must consider 
them on second remand.   
On return to second remand, the Court of Criminal Appeals 
unanimously affirmed the sentence of death in an opinion.  Hicks v. 
State, [Ms. CR-15-0747, May 28, 2021] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Crim. 
App. 2019)  (opinion on return to second remand).  Hicks filed an 
application for rehearing, which the Court of Criminal Appeals 
overruled, without an opinion.  Hicks then petitioned this Court for 
certiorari review.  We subsequently granted certiorari review as to Issues 
IV and V in Hicks's petition: 
Issue IV: Whether the Court of Criminal Appeals' holding 
that Hicks's right to counsel was not violated by 
the deprivation of counsel at the time of his 
pretrial mental evaluation conflicts the United 
States Supreme Court's decision in Estelle v. 
Smith, 451 U.S. 454  (1981). 
 
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Issue V: 
Whether the Court of Criminal Appeals' holding 
that the trial court properly admitted Dr. Karl 
Kirkland's testimony regarding the pretrial 
mental evaluation during the penalty-phase 
proceedings conflicts with State and federal law. 
 
 We denied certiorari review as to the remaining issues raised in his 
petition.   
Standard of Review 
"'"'On certiorari review, this Court accords no 
presumption of correctness to the legal conclusions of the 
intermediate appellate court. Therefore, we must apply de 
novo the standard of review that was applicable in the Court 
of [Criminal] Appeals.'"'  Ex parte S.L.M., 171 So. 3d 673, 677 
(Ala. 2014) (quoting Ex parte Helms, 873 So. 2d 1139, 1143 
(Ala. 2003), quoting in turn Ex parte Toyota Motor Corp., 684 
So. 2d 132, 135 (Ala. 1996))." 
 
Ex parte Jones, 322 So. 3d 970, 975 (Ala. 2019). 
Relevant Facts and Procedural History 
 
This Court granted certiorari review as to two issues that arose 
from Dr. Kirkland's pretrial mental evaluation of Hicks.  The following 
facts will be helpful to an understanding of those issues. 
On February 28, 2013, the initial judge assigned to the case, Judge 
Joseph Johnston, entered an order appointing Arthur Powell and Russell 
Bergstrom to represent Hicks.  Hicks was arraigned and entered a plea 
of not guilty on that same date.   Subsequently, Powell filed a motion to 
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withdraw as counsel, and Hicks filed a pro se motion to dismiss Powell 
as counsel.  Judge Johnston granted that motion and appointed Sidney 
Harrell to replace Powell. 
During a November 6, 2014, hearing, Hicks stated that he had filed 
a complaint against both of his attorneys, that "they misrepresented" and 
were ineffective, and that he was asking to remove both of his attorneys 
from his case.  In response, Judge Johnston stated: 
"Well, the first problem is when you filed those motions, which 
you had every right to do, they couldn't see you.  They couldn't 
do anything on your case by the rules.  They had to back off 
and that lost two, two and a half months of the case.  So you 
had to sit in jail two, two and a half months while they had to 
seek opinions about whether or not they could represent you." 
 
He went on to explain that not many attorneys wanted to represent 
capital defendants.  After some discussion, Hicks stated that he was 
going to file additional complaints against Harrell and Bergstrom, that 
there was a conflict of interest and trust issues, and that he did not want 
them as his attorneys if he could not trust them.  After some further 
discussions, Hicks stated that he had talked to another attorney, Steve 
Dugan, and that Dugan had said that he would be willing to represent 
Hicks.  Hicks further stated that he had also submitted to the trial court 
a list of attorneys who had capital-litigation experience.  Judge Johnston 
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ultimately stated that he was going to adjourn the hearing until the 
following week and that he wanted to talk Dugan.  Subsequently, the 
following occurred: 
 
"MR. HARRELL: I have filed a response to Mr. Hicks's 
asking the Court for instructions about [Hicks's] motion. 
 
"THE COURT:  I know. 
 
"MR. HARRELL:  I would just like to say I have 
contacted the office of general counsel, Alabama State Bar, 
and I was referred to Rule 1.7 conflict of interest and I would 
state on the record that I've been on Mr. Hick's case since 
April of 2014 and worked diligently on the case when I 
received this complaint and will continue to work diligently 
on the case even after all that and after the complaint.  I view 
the rule that I have -- it has no adverse impact on my ability 
to represent Mr. Hicks. 
 
"THE COURT:  I know.  My concern is what he just said 
that he intended to continue filing complaints, I feel like y'all 
would do a very good job but -- And I didn't know anybody else 
possible and then he's thrown Mr. Dugan's name out and I 
would like to talk to him. 
 
"MR. HARRELL:  I just wanted to state that for the 
record. 
 
"THE COURT:  Thank you.  We'll see you at two o'clock 
in one week." 
 
On November 19, 2014, Harrell and Bergstrom filed a joint motion 
to withdraw that was filed under seal.  In that motion, they asserted that 
Hicks had recently filed a Bar complaint against them and that, for a 
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two-month period, they could not visit with Hicks at the Mobile Metro 
Jail due to the pending Bar complaint.  However, they also asserted that, 
during that time, they had continued to diligently work on Hicks's case 
by interviewing witnesses and filing pretrial motions.  Harrell and 
Bergstrom further stated that, during the November 6, 2014, hearing, 
Hicks was advised in open court that the Bar had ruled that his grievance 
against his attorneys had no merit and that the case had been closed; 
that Hicks stated that he was going to continue to file Bar complaints 
against them; and that, based on what had transpired during that 
hearing, there was an irreparable breakdown in communication with 
Hicks.   
On November 20, 2014, Judge Johnston conducted another hearing.  
During that hearing, the following occurred: 
"THE COURT:  I don't know. It's just this constant 
lawyer shopping has put this case off for way too long and you 
don't deserve that and the family of the victim doesn't deserve 
that.  It needs to a conclusion to this.  And after what 
happened last week in court these lawyers are rightly 
concerned.  They don't want to represent you.  You may be at 
the point of having to represent yourself because of all this 
happening. 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  Amen.  I got the truth and God on 
my side.  So if that's what it takes I appreciate y'all and what 
y'all have done. 
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8 
 
 
"THE COURT:  There's one of these that I was 
concerned about their mental stability when they represent 
themselves. 
 
"[PROSECUTOR:]   Yes, Your Honor.  The State would 
request at this point a motion for a mental evaluation of the 
Defendant given some of the behavior in and out of court. 
 
"THE COURT:  I think that's reasonable considering 
you may need to represent yourself.  Some of y'all kind of 
know his schedule. When does he come through here?  It's like 
once a month on Monday. 
 
"MR. BERGSTROM:  I think as needed when he has a 
collection of -- But I understand that all has changed and 
there's like several other psychologists doing it.  But since this 
case goes back three years, I think he may still be the one who 
gets grandfathered in to do the evaluations. 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  My mitigation expert, she's a 
Ph.D. She's a licensed psychologist.  She said she would do it. 
 
"THE COURT:  This person kind of serves as the Court's 
expert.  One thing we need to make sure you're competent to 
stand trial.  If you have to represent yourself, I mean, I'm not 
saying you're crazy.  Crazy isn't even in it, the vocabulary. 
You know how it goes. 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir.  Let's get it on the record 
either I am or I'm not. 
 
"THE COURT:  That's right.  So cooperate.  I was going 
to tell you it's Dr. McKeown but it may be somebody else.  
They don't hypnotize you or anything.  They just talk to you. 
You know how it goes.  Hopefully that will happen in the next 
few weeks. I was going to tell you if -- but I can't predict that 
now, if he comes by on the first Monday or whatever.  We're 
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going to reset it maybe for about four weeks so you won't get 
lost. 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  Can I get a little clarification 
here? 
 
"THE COURT:  Yes. 
 
"THE DEFENDANT: I am now without counsel at this 
moment; correct? 
 
"THE COURT:  No. I'm going to keep I'm going to keep 
them on standby right now about whether to relieve them.  So 
they're still your counsel. 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  He just informed me that he 
didn't want to be.  I don't want him to be.  So I can't continue 
to write counselor and say -- 
 
"THE COURT: He's filed a motion to -- He's filed a 
motion to -- But I want to make sure that -- I'm sure you're 
okay but I want to make sure you are before I relieve them of 
being your counsel. 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  Whenever I write like Mr. Tyson 
or different ones out there, or John Beck, all these others I 
still have to say they're still here? 
 
"THE COURT:  Give them a copy of you want to do that, 
yes.  Send them a copy.  I want to make sure you are. 
 
"So we -- 
 
"THE CLERK:  Do we want to reset it to January? 
 
"THE COURT:  Maybe the first week in January. 
 
"THE CLERK:  It will be January 8th. 
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"THE COURT:  Okay.  Hopefully that will get done 
quicker than that. 
 
"THE DEFENDANT: Between now and January a 
psychologist is supposed to call me up and get evaluated? 
 
"THE COURT:  Right, should come by the jail.  They 
have room over there.  They'll interview you and get us a 
report. 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  During the meantime I can be on 
hunt for counsels that qualify? 
 
"THE COURT:  Sure you can do that if you want to.  Yes.  
Okay. 
 
"MR. BERGSTROM:  Thank you. Judge." 
 
(Emphasis added.)  The trial court subsequently entered a written "Order 
for Out-Patient Evaluation of Defendant's Competency to Stand Trial 
and Mental State at the Time of the Offense."   
 
On January 8, 2015, Judge Johnston conducted another hearing.  
Hicks, Harrell, and Bergstrom, among others, were present at that 
hearing.  During that hearing, Judge Johnston stated that, unbeknownst 
to him, the State had changed its procedure for appointing a psychologist 
to examine defendants; that, as he understood it, defendants were now 
being sent to Taylor Hardin Secure Medical Facility for such 
examinations; and that a psychologist there would examine them.  Judge 
1210013 
 
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Johnston stated that they "were going to find out what the procedure is 
and have that done."  He further stated that it was his understanding 
that Hicks's family might be looking for an attorney.  Subsequently, the 
following occurred: 
"THE DEFENDANT:  Yes.  They offered me some money 
and I wanted to get with the Court to see if -- they gave about 
three, four, five thousand, if the Court would back up the rest 
to start with a lawyer and when we run out of our money and 
then the Court appoint one. 
 
"THE COURT: I don't think we can really do that with 
a mixture like that.  What I'm going to do is I'm going to give 
you until January 30th and if you can hire an attorney fine; if 
not, I'm going to appoint someone at that time, end of the 
month.  Then we'll enter this order getting you to Taylor 
Hardin and then I'm granting their motion to withdraw right 
now and then if you can get somebody by the end of the month, 
fine; after that I'm going to appoint somebody.  We'll try to 
push this through as quick as we can.  It's just irritating that 
that happened. Based on where we are we're going to shoot 
for a trial date like in September." 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
On January 9, 2015, Judge Johnston entered an order stating, in 
pertinent part: 
 
"Defendant to be transported to Taylor Hardin for 
Mental evaluation.  See order in file. 
 
 
"Motion to Withdraw filed by Defendant's attorneys, 
Sidney Harrell and Russell Bergstrom -- GRANTED. 
 
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"Oral Motion by Defendant to have his family hire an 
attorney -- GRANTED.  Defendant's family has until January 
30, 2015 to retain an attorney.  If an attorney is not retained 
by January 30, 2015, one will be appointed." 
 
On that same date, the trial court entered an "Order for Outpatient 
Evaluation of Competency to Stand Trial and Mental State at the Time 
of the Offense."  That order stated, in pertinent part: "[T]he defendant 
through his attorney, has timely filed notice pursuant to Rule 15, 
Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, of his/her intent to pursue a 
special plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease."  The trial court 
also entered an "Order of Commitment to the Alabama Department of 
Mental Health (On Stipulation to Report of Examiner)."   
 
Hicks subsequently filed a pro se "Combine[d] Motion(s) for 
Appointment of Counsel and Dismissal of Case."  In that motion, Hicks 
asked the trial court "to entertain and consider setting a date and time 
for a hearing  to appoint legal representation."  That motion was stamped 
as filed on February 18, 2015. 
 
On February 21, 2015, Dr. Kirkland conducted a mental evaluation 
of Hicks at the Mobile Metro Jail.   
On February 23, 2015, Judge Charles Graddick entered a written 
order stating: 
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"The Court hereby revokes the appointments of Sid Harrell 
and Russell Bergstrom on February 23, 2015. 
 
"The Court having ascertained that the defendant is not 
represented by Counsel, desires the assistance of counsel, and 
is not able financially or otherwise to obtain the assistance of 
counsel; it is ordered and adjudged by the Court that Glenn 
Davidson, a licensed attorney, be and is hereby appointed to 
represent, assist and defend the defendant in this case."  
 
He also entered a separate order stating that Glenn Davidson was 
appointed to represent Hicks.  On March 30, 2015, Judge Graddick also 
entered an order appointing Debbie McGowin to represent Hicks.1 
Discussion 
 
Hicks argues that the trial court violated his constitutional rights 
by ordering him to undergo a pretrial mental evaluation while he was not 
represented by counsel.  Specifically, Hicks contends that he  
"was deprived of 'the guiding hand of counsel' during a critical 
stage of his capital trial, in violation of his Sixth Amendment 
rights.  Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 469-781 (1981); see also 
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1984); Gideon 
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963); Ex parte 
Pritchett, 117 So. 3d 356, 359 (Ala. 2012)."   
 
Hicks's brief at 9-10.  Hicks asserts that, on January 8, 2015, the trial 
court granted the motion to withdraw filed by Harrell and Bergstrom, 
 
1On March 30, 2015, this case was transferred to Judge Graddick's 
docket. 
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that Dr. Kirkland conducted the pretrial mental evaluation on February 
21, 2015, that new counsel was not appointed to represent him until 
February 23, 2015, and that he was completely without counsel during 
the six-week period preceding his mental evaluation.  He further asserts: 
"Harrell and Bergstrom's nominal representation of Mr. 
Hicks during the weeks leading up to their removal rendered 
him deprived of counsel for the purposes of the Sixth 
Amendment throughout the entire time the examination was 
at issue in this case.  [Ex parte]Pritchett, 117 So. 3d [356,] 361 
[(Ala. 2012)] (finding Sixth Amendment violation where 
defendant 'nominally had counsel' at critical stage of motion 
to withdraw plea because it was 'clear that the motion was 
prepared and relief was sought … without the involvement of 
that counsel').  On November 6, 2014, the trial court noted 
that the attorney-client relationship between Mr. Hicks and 
his lawyers had effectively ceased, and on November 19th, 
Harrell and Bergstrom filed their motion to withdraw, 
confirming that they had not met with Hicks in over two 
months (Sealed Joint Mot. to Withdraw).  Although counsel 
were in fact physically present for two hearings at which the 
possibility of a psychiatric examination were discussed -- on 
November 20, 2014, and January 8, 2015 -- it is clear that they 
maintained a no-contact policy toward Mr. Hicks through 
both hearings both inside and outside the courtroom." 
 
Hicks's petition at 48-49 (citations to the record omitted). 
 
In Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), Ernest Benjamin Smith 
was indicted for a murder committed during the robbery of a grocery 
store, and the State of Texas announced its intent to seek the death 
penalty.  Subsequently, the trial court, sua sponte, ordered the 
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prosecutor to arrange for Dr. James P. Grigson to conduct a psychiatric 
examination of Smith to determine his competency to stand trial.  Dr. 
Grigson examined Smith and concluded that he was competent to stand 
trial.  Subsequently, Smith was tried and convicted of murder.  Pursuant 
to Texas law at the time: 
"At the penalty phase, if the jury affirmatively answers three 
questions on which the State has the burden of proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the judge must impose the death 
sentence.  See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Arts. 37.071(c) and 
(e) (Vernon Supp. 1980).  One of the three critical issues to be 
resolved by the jury is 'whether there is a probability that the 
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would 
constitute a continuing threat to society.'  Art. 37.071(b)(2).  
In other words, the jury must assess the defendant's future 
dangerousness." 
 
Estelle, 451 U.S. at 457-58 (footnote omitted).  Subsequently, during the 
penalty phase of the proceedings, the prosecutor called Dr. Grigson as a 
witness.   
"Defense counsel were aware from the trial court's file of 
the case that Dr. Grigson had submitted a psychiatric report 
in the form of a letter advising the court that Smith was 
competent to stand trial.5   This report termed Smith 'a severe 
sociopath,' but it contained no more specific reference to his 
future dangerousness. …  Before trial, defense counsel had 
obtained an order requiring the State to disclose the witnesses 
it planned to use both at the guilt stage, and, if known, at the 
penalty stage.  Subsequently, the trial court had granted a 
defense motion to bar the testimony during the State's case in 
chief of any witness whose name did not appear on that list.  
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Dr. Grigson's name was not on the witness list, and defense 
counsel objected when he was called to the stand at the 
penalty phase. 
 
"In a hearing outside the presence of the jury, Dr. 
Grigson stated:  (a) that he had not obtained permission from 
Smith's attorneys to examine him; (b) that he had discussed 
his conclusions and diagnosis with the State's attorney; and 
(c) that the prosecutor had requested him to testify and had 
told him, approximately five days before the sentencing 
hearing began, that his testimony probably would be needed 
within the week.  …  The trial judge denied a defense motion 
to exclude Dr. Grigson's testimony on the ground that his 
name was not on the State's list of witnesses. Although no 
continuance was requested, the court then recessed for one 
hour following an acknowledgment by defense counsel that an 
hour was 'all right.' … 
 
"____________________ 
 
"5Defense counsel discovered the letter at some time 
after jury selection began in the case on March 11, 1974.  The 
trial judge later explained that Dr. Grigson was 'appointed by 
oral communication,' that '[a] letter of appointment was not 
prepared,' and that 'the court records do not reflect [the entry 
of] a written order.'  …  The judge also stated:  'As best I recall, 
I informed John Simmons, the attorney for the defendant, 
that I had appointed Dr. Grigson to examine the defendant 
and that a written report was to be mailed to me.'  …  
However, defense counsel assert that the discovery of Dr. 
Grigson's letter served as their first notice that he had 
examined Smith. … 
 
"On March 25, 1974, the day the trial began, defense 
counsel requested the issuance of a subpoena for the Dallas 
County Sheriff's records of Dr. Grigson's 'visitation to ... 
Smith.'  …" 
 
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Estelle, 451 U.S. at 458-59.  Dr. Grigson testified as to the issue of Smith's 
future dangerousness, and the jury answered the three requisite 
questions affirmatively, which mandated the imposition of the death 
penalty.  Smith sought a writ of habeas corpus in the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Texas, and that court vacated 
Smith's death sentence based on a finding of constitutional error in the 
admission of Dr. Grigson's testimony during the penalty phase of Smith's 
trial.  Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Tex. 1977).  The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the federal district 
court's decision, Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1979), and the 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari review "to consider 
whether the prosecution's use of psychiatric testimony at the sentencing 
phase of [Smith's] capital murder trial to establish his future 
dangerousness violated his constitutional rights."  451 U.S. at 456 
(emphasis added). 
 
Initially, the United States Supreme Court held that the admission 
of Dr. Grigson's testimony, which was based on Smith's statements made 
during the psychiatric examination, had violated Smith's Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination because Smith had not been 
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advised before the pretrial psychiatric examination that he had a right 
to remain silent and that any statement he made could be used against 
him during the penalty phase of his trial.   
The United States Supreme Court next addressed Smith's 
argument that he had been deprived of the right to counsel. 
"When [Smith] was examined by Dr. Grigson, he 
already had been indicted and an attorney had been 
appointed to represent him.  The Court of Appeals concluded 
that he had a Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of 
counsel before submitting to the pretrial psychiatric 
interview.  [Smith v. Estelle,] 602 F.2d [694,] 708-709 [(5th 
Cir. 1979)].  We agree. 
 
"The Sixth Amendment, made applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that '[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to 
have the assistance of counsel for his defense.'  The 'vital' need 
for a lawyer's advice and aid during the pretrial phase was 
recognized by the Court nearly 50 years ago in Powell v. 
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57, 71 (1932).  Since then, we have held 
that the right to counsel granted by the Sixth Amendment 
means that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer 'at or 
after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been 
initiated against him ... whether by way of formal charge, 
preliminary 
hearing, 
indictment, 
information, 
or 
arraignment.'  Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-689 (1972) 
(plurality opinion); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 226-229 
(1977).  And in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. [218,] 226-
227 [(1961),] the Court explained: 
 
"'It is central to [the Sixth Amendment] principle 
that in addition to counsel's presence at trial, the 
accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone 
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against the State at any stage of the prosecution, 
formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel's 
absence might derogate from the accused's right to 
a fair trial.'  (Footnote omitted.) 
 
"See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264  (1980); Massiah v. 
United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).  See also White v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 
52 (1961). 
 
"Here, [Smith's] Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
clearly had attached when Dr. Grigson examined him at the 
Dallas County Jail, and their interview proved to be a 'critical 
stage' of the aggregate proceedings against [Smith].  See 
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970) (plurality 
opinion); Powell v. Alabama, supra, 287 U.S., at 57.  Defense 
counsel, however, were not notified in advance that the 
psychiatric examination would encompass the issue of their 
client's future dangerousness,15 and [Smith] was denied the 
assistance of his attorneys in making the significant decision 
of whether to submit to the examination and to what end the 
psychiatrist's findings could be employed. 
 
"Because '[a] layman may not be aware of the precise 
scope, the nuances, and the boundaries of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege,' the assertion of that right 'often 
depends upon legal advise from someone who is trained and 
skilled in the subject matter.'  Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 
449, 466 (1975).  As the Court of Appeals observed, the 
decision to be made regarding the proposed psychiatric 
evaluation is 'literally a life or death matter' and is 'difficult 
... even for an attorney' because it requires 'a knowledge of 
what other evidence is available, of the particular 
psychiatrist's biases and predilections, [and] of possible 
alternative strategies at the sentencing hearing.'  602 F.2d, at 
708.  It follows logically from our precedents that a defendant 
should not be forced to resolve such an important issue 
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without 'the guiding hand of counsel.'  Powell v. Alabama, 
supra, 287 U.S., at 69. 
 
"Therefore, 
in 
addition 
to 
Fifth 
Amendment 
considerations, the death penalty was improperly imposed on 
[Smith] because the psychiatric examination on which Dr. 
Grigson testified at the penalty phase proceeded in violation 
of [Smith's] Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of 
counsel.16 
 
"_______________ 
 
 
"15It is not clear that defense counsel were even 
informed prior to the examination that Dr. Grigson had been 
appointed by the trial judge to determine [Smith's] 
competency to stand trial.  See n.5, supra. 
 
"16We do not hold that [Smith] was precluded from 
waiving this constitutional right.  Waivers of the assistance of 
counsel, however, 'must not only be voluntary, but must also 
constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which 
depends ... "upon the particular facts and circumstances 
surrounding [each] case...."'  Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 
[477,] 482 [(1981)], quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 
464 (1938).  No such waiver has been shown, or even alleged, 
here." 
 
Estelle, 451 U.S. at 469-71 (footnote 14 omitted). 
 
In this case, the State made an oral motion for a mental evaluation 
of Hicks during the November 20, 2014, hearing.  At that time, Hicks was 
represented by Harrell and Bergstrom, and both were in court during 
that hearing.  In fact, Bergstrom responded when the trial court had a 
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21 
 
question about the court-appointed psychologist's schedule.  Although 
Harrell and Bergstrom had filed a motion to withdraw, the trial court did 
not grant that motion at that time.  Thus, Hicks's attorneys were aware 
that the trial court had ordered a mental evaluation of Hicks.   
Harrell and Bergstrom were also present during the January 8, 
2015, hearing during which the trial court discussed what needed to be 
done to have Hicks evaluated.  However, at the end of that hearing, the 
trial court granted Harrell and Bergstrom's joint motion to withdraw.  
New counsel was not appointed until February 23, 2015, two days after 
Hicks's mental evaluation.  Hicks was not represented by counsel at the 
time of his mental evaluation or in the six weeks leading up to his mental 
evaluation.   Thus, it appears that Hicks's right to counsel during this 
critical stage of the proceedings was violated.  However, our inquiry does 
not end there. 
 
In his brief, Hicks asserts that he is entitled to reversal of his 
convictions and sentences based on this violation of his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel.  Specifically, he states:  
"'[W]hen a defendant is deprived of the presence and 
assistance of his attorney … during a critical stage in, at least, 
the prosecution of a capital offense, reversal is automatic.'  
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489 (1978); see also [Ex 
1210013 
 
22 
 
parte ]Pritchett, 117 So. 3d [356,] 358 [(Ala. 2012)] (where 
defendant deprived of counsel at critical stage, Sixth 
Amendment' stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid 
conviction and sentence depriving him of life or liberty)."   
 
Hicks's brief at 18.  However, in Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 
(1988), the United States Supreme Court "granted certiorari to decide 
whether harmless error analysis applies to violations of the Sixth 
Amendment right set out in Estelle v. State, 482 U.S. 905 (1987)."  486 
U.S. at 254.   
In Satterwhite, John T. Satterwhite was charged with capital 
murder on March 15, 1979.  The following day, before Satterwhite was 
represented by counsel, the trial court granted the State's request for a 
psychological evaluation to determine Satterwhite's competency to stand 
trial, his sanity at the time of the offense, and his future dangerousness.  
The State's motion and the court's order were placed in the court file but 
were not served upon Satterwhite.  Betty Lou Shroeder, a psychologist, 
examined Satterwhite pursuant to that order.  
 
Satterwhite was indicted on April 4, 1979, and counsel was then 
appointed to represent him.  Satterwhite was arraigned on April 13, 
1979.  On April 17, 1979, the State filed a second motion requesting a 
psychological examination to determine Satterwhite's competency to 
1210013 
 
23 
 
stand trial, his sanity at the time of the offense, and his future 
dangerousness.  However, the State did not serve a copy of the motion on 
defense counsel.  The following day, the trial court granted the motion 
and ordered the sheriff to produce Satterwhite for examination by 
Schroeder and John T. Holbrook, a psychiatrist.  The record did not show 
when the trial court's order was placed in the court file.  However,  
"[o]n May 18, a letter to the trial court from psychiatrist 
James P. Grigson, M.D., appeared in the court file. Dr. 
Grigson wrote that, pursuant to court order, he had examined 
Satterwhite on May 3, 1979, in the Bexar County Jail.  He 
further reported that, in his opinion, Satterwhite has 'a severe 
antisocial personality disorder and is extremely dangerous 
and will commit future acts of violence.'" 
 
486 U.S. at 252-53.   
 
Subsequently, Satterwhite was convicted of capital murder.   
"In accordance with Texas law, a separate proceeding was 
conducted before the same jury to determine whether he 
should be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment. See Tex. 
Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 37.071(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988). 
The State produced Dr. Grigson as a witness in support of its 
case for the death penalty.  Over defense counsel's objection, 
Dr. Grigson testified that, in his opinion, Satterwhite 
presented a continuing threat to society through acts of 
criminal violence. 
 
"At the conclusion of the evidence, the court instructed 
the jury to decide whether the State had proved, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, (1) that 'the conduct of the defendant that 
caused the death [was] committed deliberately and with the 
1210013 
 
24 
 
reasonable expectation that the death of [the victim] would 
result,' and (2) that there is 'a probability that the defendant 
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute 
a continuing threat to society.'  … Texas law provides that if 
a jury returns affirmative findings on both special verdict 
questions, 'the court shall sentence the defendant to death.'  
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 37.071(e) (Vernon Supp. 
1988).  The jury answered both questions affirmatively, and 
the trial court sentenced Satterwhite to death." 
 
Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 253.  On appeal, Satterwhite argued that the 
admission of Dr. Grigson's testimony during the sentencing hearing, 
which was based on his pretrial examination of Satterwhite, violated his 
right to counsel recognized in Estelle because defense counsel had not 
been given advance notice that Dr. Grigson's examination of Satterwhite 
would encompass the issue of Satterwhite's future dangerousness.  The 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals agreed but concluded that that error 
was harmless "because an average jury would have found the properly 
admitted evidence sufficient to sentence Satterwhite to death."  486 U.S. 
at 253.   
 
In addressing whether a harmless-error analysis can be applied to 
violations of the Sixth Amendment right recognized in Estelle, the United 
States Supreme Court concluded that the use of Dr. Grigson's testimony 
at the sentencing hearing on the issue of Satterwhite's future 
1210013 
 
25 
 
dangerousness violated the Sixth Amendment.  However, the Supreme 
Court went on to state: 
"Our conclusion does not end the inquiry because not all 
constitutional violations amount to reversible error.  We 
generally have held that if the prosecution can prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that a constitutional error did not 
contribute to the verdict, the error is harmless and the verdict 
may stand.  Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).  
The harmless error rule '"promotes public respect for the 
criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the 
trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of 
immaterial error."'  Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986) 
(quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986)). 
 
"Some constitutional violations, however, by their very 
nature cast so much doubt on the fairness of the trial process 
that, as a matter of law, they can never be considered 
harmless.  Sixth Amendment violations that pervade the 
entire proceeding fall within this category.  See Holloway v. 
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978) (conflict of interest in 
representation throughout entire proceeding); Chapman, 
supra, 386 U.S., at 23, n. 8 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335 (1963) (total deprivation of counsel throughout entire 
proceeding)); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (absence 
of counsel from arraignment proceeding that affected entire 
trial because defenses not asserted were irretrievably lost); 
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (same).  Since the 
scope of a violation such as a deprivation of the right to 
conflict-free representation cannot be discerned from the 
record, any inquiry into its effect on the outcome of the case 
would be purely speculative.  As explained in Holloway: 
 
"'In the normal case where a harmless-error rule 
is applied, the error occurs at trial and its scope is 
readily identifiable.  Accordingly, the reviewing 
court can undertake with some confidence its 
1210013 
 
26 
 
relatively narrow task of assessing the likelihood 
that the error materially affected the deliberations 
of the jury.  But in a case of joint representation of 
conflicting interests the evil -- it bears repeating     
-- is in what the advocate finds himself compelled 
to refrain from doing, not only at trial but also as 
to possible pretrial plea negotiations and in the 
sentencing process....  Thus, any inquiry into a 
claim of harmless error here would require, unlike 
most cases, unguided speculation.'  435 U.S., at 
490-491  (citations omitted). 
 
"Satterwhite urges us to adopt an automatic rule of 
reversal for violations of the Sixth Amendment right 
recognized in Estelle v. Smith.  He relies heavily upon the 
statement in Holloway that 'when a defendant is deprived of 
the presence and assistance of his attorney, either throughout 
the prosecution or during a critical stage in, at least, the 
prosecution of a capital offense, reversal is automatic.  Gideon 
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 
368 U.S. 52 (1961); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963).'  
435 U.S., at 489.  His reliance is misplaced, however, for 
Holloway, Gideon, Hamilton, and White were all cases in 
which the deprivation of the right to counsel affected -- and 
contaminated -- the entire criminal proceeding.  In this case, 
the effect of the Sixth Amendment violation is limited to the 
admission into evidence of Dr. Grigson's testimony.  We have 
permitted harmless error analysis in both capital and 
noncapital cases where the evil caused by a Sixth Amendment 
violation is limited to the erroneous admission of particular 
evidence at trial.  In Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 
(1972), for example, the Court held the admission of a 
confession obtained in violation of Massiah v. United States, 
377 U.S. 201 (1964), to be harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  And we have held that harmless error analysis applies 
to the admission of identification testimony obtained in 
violation of the right to counsel at a postindictment lineup.  
Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977); Gilbert v. California, 
1210013 
 
27 
 
388 U.S. 263 (1967) (capital case); United States v. Wade, 388 
U.S. 218 (1967).  Just last year we indicated that harmless 
error analysis would apply in a noncapital case to 
constitutional error in the use of a psychological evaluation at 
trial.  Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 425, n. 21, 107 S. 
Ct. 2906, 2919, n. 21 (1987). 
 
"It is important to avoid error in capital sentencing 
proceedings.  Moreover, the evaluation of the consequences of 
an error in the sentencing phase of a capital case may be more 
difficult because of the discretion that is given to the 
sentencer.  Nevertheless, we believe that a reviewing court 
can make an intelligent judgment about whether the 
erroneous admission of psychiatric testimony might have 
affected a capital sentencing jury.  Accordingly, we hold that 
the Chapman harmless error rule applies to the admission of 
psychiatric testimony in violation of the Sixth Amendment 
right set out in Estelle v. Smith." 
 
Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 256-58.   
I. 
 
In this case, as in Satterwhite, the deprivation of Hicks's right to 
counsel did not contaminate the entire criminal proceedings.  Even 
though Davidson was appointed to represent Hicks two days after the 
competency evaluation, Hicks did not object on this ground at or before 
trial.  Additionally, he did not object to the admission of Dr. Kirkland's 
testimony and report during the penalty-phase proceedings.  In his brief 
to this Court, Hicks asserts that "the pretrial psychiatric examination 
limited subsequent counsel's strategic options and played a key role in 
1210013 
 
28 
 
shaping both the parties' and the trial court's impressions of Mr. Hicks."  
Hicks's brief at 19-20.  However, he does not include any facts or citations 
to the record to support such that assertion.  Hicks also asserts that he 
was "unable to ensure that the question of his competency received a 
proper hearing.  See, e.g., Ala. R. Crim. P. 11.2 (requiring written demand 
for jury hearing on question of competency)."  Hicks's brief at p. 21. 
Rule 11.1, Ala. R. Crim. P., provides:  "A defendant is mentally 
incompetent to stand trial or to be sentenced for an offense if that 
defendant lacks sufficient present ability to assist in his or her defense 
by consulting with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding of the facts and legal proceedings against the defendant."  
With regard to competency hearings, Rule 11.6(a), Ala. R. Crim. P., 
provides: 
"After the examinations have been completed and the reports 
have been submitted to the circuit court, the judge shall 
review the reports of the psychologists or psychiatrists and, if 
reasonable grounds exist to doubt the defendant's mental 
competency, the judge shall set a hearing not more than forty-
two (42) days after the judge received the report or, where the 
judge has received more than one report, not more than forty-
two (42) days after the date the judge received the last report, 
to determine if the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, as 
the term 'incompetent' is defined in Rule 11.1[, Ala. R. Crim. 
P.].  At this hearing all parties shall be prepared to address 
the issue of competency." 
1210013 
 
29 
 
 
Dr. Kirkland generated a report of his evaluation on March 1, 2015.  
At that time, Hicks was represented by Davidson, and Dr. Kirkland's 
report refers to the fact that Hicks was represented by Davidson.  With 
regard to Hicks's competency, Dr. Kirkland concluded: 
"Assessment of competency was ordered by Judge Johnston.  
Assessment involved evaluation of Mr. Hicks's competency to 
stand trial using forensic evaluation and specific competency 
assessment devices.  Results reveal that Mr. Hicks is capable 
of understanding the charges and assisting counsel in 
preparing an adequate defense.  It is therefore recommended 
that the case proceed to hearing, disposition, and/or trial."   
 
Based on Dr. Kirkland's report, the trial court could have concluded that 
reasonable grounds did not exist to doubt Hicks's mental competency.  
Thus, the trial court was not required to conduct a hearing on Hicks's 
competency. 
 
Additionally, the record indicates that Dr. Thomas Bennett, a 
clinical psychologist, conducted another mental evaluation of Hicks in 
July 2015.  In the summary and conclusion section of his psychological 
report, Dr. Bennett stated, in pertinent part:  
"Mr. Hicks has an adequate understanding of the legal system 
and of the charges against him.  He has a great deal of 
difficulty listening well enough and focusing on specific issues 
to be very effective in assisting his attorneys in his own 
defense.  As is the case with many inmates, he believes that 
1210013 
 
30 
 
more should be done to exonerate him.  It may be possible for 
his attorneys and the investigator to communicate with him 
about the case by keeping their communications very simple 
and focusing on only one element at a time.  It would probably 
be wise to give him a written account of any evidence against 
him, as he is completely convinced that the state's case 
centers around the victim having been at his home and is 
based around the testimony of a four-year-old child.  In terms 
of the evidence that he believes exists to prove him not guilty, 
the information gleaned from each individual that he has 
named as a potential witness should be reviewed with him 
piecemeal. 
 
"While many inmates profess their innocence, it is this 
examiner's opinion that Mr. Hicks actually believes himself to 
be innocent.  If he were, in fact, guilty, then his belief system 
would rise to the level of delusion. 
 
"Mr. Hicks understands appropriate courtroom behavior and, 
for the most part, he should be able to demonstrate such 
behavior.  However, when important elements of his case are 
presented in court, he may have great deal of difficulty 
inhibiting himself from making comments to the court.  He 
should be strongly reminded not to speak out in court, as this 
could potentially interfere with his defense.  It may be 
necessary to take frequent breaks during any court 
proceeding, so that his attorneys can review with him what 
has happened and what will be happening next.  Should he be 
unable to inhibit expression of his frustration and agitation in 
the courtroom, he may need to be evaluat[ed] for medication 
to help control this agitation. 
 
"Mr. Hicks will probably be disappointed and frustrated with 
any attorneys who represent him, primarily because he may 
be giving inappropriate weight to a wide range of potential 
elements of evidence that or may not be helpful to him. 
 
1210013 
 
31 
 
"Given the approach described, Mr. Hicks can probably be 
assumed to be competent to stand trial at this point.  
However, it is also possible that his conduct could deteriorate 
rather quickly as the case progresses and evidence is 
presented." 
 
 
On January 15, 2016, after the jury-selection proceedings, Hicks's 
counsel filed an "Emergency Motion for Psychiatric Evaluation to 
Determine Competency to Stand Trial."  In the motion, defense counsel 
asserted that Hicks's "mental status had deteriorated over the past 
week."  They also asserted that Hicks's conduct before, during, and after 
the voir dire proceedings "clearly demonstrated that he does not possess 
a reasonable degree of rational understanding of the facts and the legal 
proceedings against him."  Counsel further asserted that Hicks had also 
demonstrated a "significant inability to control his behavior during 
breaks, in his interaction with the jail staff."  They also stated that Dr. 
Bennett's mental evaluation "foretells the exact difficulties now being 
presented by Mr. Hicks." 
During a hearing on the motion, the trial court stated: 
 
"All right.  Over the weekend, there was filed a motion 
to determine competency.  I have Dr. Bennett's and Dr. 
Kirkland's evaluation and I think both those evaluations are 
extremely thorough and make a more than reasonable and 
adequate assessment of Mr. Hicks.  And if the motion that has 
1210013 
 
32 
 
been filed is to ask for additional evaluation, I'm going to not 
rule on that at this point." 
 
After personally addressing Hicks, the trial court ultimately denied the 
emergency motion for a competency evaluation.   
Based on the foregoing, the record shows that the trial court 
properly addressed the question of Hicks's competency to stand trial.  
Thus, Hicks's argument that he was prevented from ensuring that "the 
question of his competency received a proper hearing" is without merit.  
Hicks's brief at 21. 
 
For these reasons, Hicks has not demonstrated that the violation of 
his right to counsel in this case contaminated the entire criminal 
proceedings.  See Satterwhite, supra.  Accordingly, Hicks's argument 
that the deprivation of his right to counsel should result in the automatic 
reversal of his convictions and sentences is without merit.   
II. 
In this case, as in Satterwhite, the violation of Hicks's Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel affected only whether Dr. Kirkland's 
testimony and report should have been admitted during the penalty-
phase proceedings.  Hicks did not object at the time Dr. Kirkland's 
1210013 
 
33 
 
testimony and report were admitted during the penalty-phase 
proceedings.   
Ultimately, in Satterwhite, the United States Supreme Court 
applied the harmless-error test set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 
U.S. 18 (1967), and concluded that it could not agree with the Texas Court 
of Criminal Appeals' conclusion that the erroneous admission of Dr. 
Grigson's testimony in that case was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  In reaching that conclusion, the Supreme Court stated: 
"[Dr. Grigson] stated unequivocably that, in his expert 
opinion, Satterwhite 'will present a continuing threat to 
society by continuing acts of violence.'  He explained that 
Satterwhite has 'a lack of conscience' and is 'as severe a 
sociopath as you can be.'  To illustrate his point, he testified 
that on a scale of 1 to 10 -- where 'ones' are mild sociopaths 
and 'tens' are individuals with complete disregard for human 
life -- Satterwhite is a 'ten plus.'  Dr. Grigson concluded his 
testimony on direct examination with perhaps his most 
devastating opinion of all:  he told the jury that Satterwhite 
was beyond the reach of psychiatric rehabilitation." 
 
Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 259-60.  The Supreme Court also pointed out 
that, during his closing argument, the district attorney had highlighted 
Dr. Grigson's credentials and conclusions.  The Supreme Court then 
concluded: 
 
"The finding of dangerousness was critical to the death 
sentence. Dr. Grigson was the only psychiatrist to testify on 
1210013 
 
34 
 
this issue, and the prosecution placed significant weight on 
his powerful and unequivocal testimony.  Having reviewed 
the evidence in this case, we find it impossible to say beyond 
a reasonable doubt that Dr. Grigson's expert testimony on the 
issue of Satterwhite's future dangerousness did not influence 
the sentencing jury." 
 
486 U.S. at 260. 
 
In his brief, Hicks asserts that Dr. Kirkland's evaluation  
"produced substantive evidence -- a diagnosis, a written 
report, and testimony -- that was used against Mr. Hicks's at 
his capital trial.  The majority of the State's penalty-phase 
testimony came from Dr. Kirkland, and he was their only new 
witness and only expert witness to testify at the penalty 
phase.  Further underscoring this focus, the prosecutor set Dr. 
Kirkland apart even from other expert witnesses -- giving him 
the imprimatur of apparent neutrality -- by prompting him to 
affirm that he was a 'court's expert as opposed to an expert for 
the State or the defense.'  
 
 
"It is further significant that the prosecutor went on to 
center his closing argument on Dr. Kirkland's diagnosis.  'The 
truth is and the evidence shows,' he began, 'that Dennis Hicks 
is a sociopath and he sees those people around him as objects 
that exist for his own benefit.'  Further, in arguing that they 
had proven Mr. Hicks's 'future dangerousness,' the prosecutor 
invited the jury to consider 'the testimony of Dr. Kirkland' and 
'his determination [that] the defendant has an antisocial 
personality disorder.'  The effect of these arguments is evident 
in the trial court's sentencing order, where it relied on and 
'agree[d] with' Dr. Kirkland's findings as grounds for 
imposing a death sentence." 
 
Hicks's brief at 20-21 (citations to the record omitted).   
1210013 
 
35 
 
 
During the penalty phase of the trial, the State presented evidence 
regarding three statutory aggravating factors -- that the capital offense 
was committed while Hicks was under a sentence of life imprisonment; 
that Hicks had previously been convicted of a felony involving the use or 
threat of violence to the person; and that the capital offense was 
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel compared to other capital offenses.   
The aggravating factor that Hicks had committed the murder while 
under a sentence of life imprisonment was established by the jury's 
verdict during the guilt phase.  With regard to the aggravating 
circumstance that Hicks had previously been convicted of a felony 
involving the use or threat of violence, the State presented certified 
convictions showing that Hicks had previously been convicted of two 
counts of murder in Mississippi.   
 
In the penalty-phase opening statements, the prosecutor stated 
that the State would also prove the aggravating circumstance of Hicks's 
future dangerousness.2  Subsequently, the prosecutor stated: 
 
2As the Court of Criminal Appeals noted in its opinion on original 
submission, although the prosecutor "improperly conflated future 
dangerousness with the three legitimate aggravating factors" during her 
penalty-phase opening statements, "any impropriety in the prosecutor's 
opening statement was rectified during closing argument and by the 
1210013 
 
36 
 
"Future dangerousness, you're going to see records. We 
will admit records in this portion of the trial, records from the 
Department of Corrections in Mississippi, and you're going to 
receive records from the Mobile County Metro Jail. 
 
"You're going to see throughout the records a history of 
attempted 
escapes, 
escape 
from 
the 
Department 
of 
Corrections. You're going to see history of shanks, knives, 
guards, razor blades, and dangerous activity all done while 
this defendant was incarcerated. And we will show that he is 
a future danger to this society." 
 
The State introduced into evidence records from the Mississippi 
Department of Corrections that included information about Hicks's 
conduct during while incarcerated.  Andrew Peak, who was the detective 
from the Mobile County Sheriff's Office that had investigated this case, 
testified that he had reviewed those records.  He testified that the records 
indicated that Hicks had been convicted of two counts of murder for the 
murder of two people.  He also testified about Hicks's escape attempts 
while incarcerated.  In one escape attempt, Hicks tried to take the 
corrections officer's weapon away from him.  Peak also testified about 
other incidents that had led to prison-discipline proceedings against 
Hicks's.  In some instances, Hicks had been involved in fights with other 
 
court's charge to the jury."  Hicks v. State, [Ms. CR-15-0747, July 12, 
2019] ___ So. 3d at ___. 
1210013 
 
37 
 
inmates.  During one of those fights, Hicks stabbed one of the corrections 
officers who came to break up the fight.  Also, there were incidents during 
which Hicks was found in possession of "shanks," which Peak described 
as "just any instrument that's found in jail that can be sharpened in any 
way"; a 10-inch homemade knife that was found in his sock; and a 
homemade stinger, which Peak described as "a weapon that's made on 
the end of a string or inside -- wrapped in a towel or bedsheet or 
something you can hit somebody with."  In another incident, Hicks had 
two razor blades hidden in a cast.  Hicks had also been involved in a mail-
fraud scheme that involved sending money orders through the mail.  
Hicks had telephoned the person who had reported that conduct to the 
prison facility, using obscene and abusive language and threatening to 
burn her house down.  Peak also testified that the records included an 
incident in which Hicks wrote a letter to his brother, accusing a 
corrections officer of stealing things from him and telling his brother that 
he had "propositioned another inmate that was HIV positive to give 
[Hicks] some of his blood so that he could infect the corrections officers 
with HIV."   
1210013 
 
38 
 
The State also introduced evidence from the Mobile Metro Jail that 
included information regarding Hicks's conduct while he was in custody 
for the present offenses.  Those records indicate that, while Hicks was in 
the Mobile Metro Jail, he had had issues with fighting and acting out.  
One report indicated that Hicks had been "acting insolent towards 
personnel, using abusive language, and disrupting religious and medical 
services and other jail activity" and that Hicks "was rioting and 
encouraging others to riot in a way that would disrupt the jail."  On that 
same day, Hicks had another disciplinary report.  Peak testified: 
"A nurse was trying to administer medicine and the report 
says [Hicks] became irate and angry and start[ed] asking 
about his dinner or lunch tray.  He was informed that the 
lunch tray had already been special ordered and that the 
kitchen was aware of his needs.  He just continued to be angry 
about lunch tray.  He got the nurse's medical books and threw 
them across the floor on the ground." 
 
Peak testified that, when corrections officers responded, they had to 
restrain Hicks and place him in handcuffs."  In another report, Hicks said 
that another inmate had been harassing him, that the other inmate 
bumped into him, and that he then hit the other inmate.   
During the penalty phase, Dr. Kirkland testified that he had 
conducted a forensic evaluation of Hicks and that he had completed a 
1210013 
 
39 
 
report regarding the results of that evaluation.  Dr. Kirkland testified 
that he had spent about two to two and one-half hours with Hicks.  
Subsequently, the following occurred: 
"[PROSECUTOR:]  And this is an initial court-ordered 
evaluation, it's not done specifically for the purpose of penalty, 
what we're here for today? 
 
"[DR. KIRKLAND:]  Correct. 
 
"This is a pre-trial evaluation to ensure that his 
constitutional rights are protected in the sense of that he can 
be present and is able to be present physically and 
psychologically, cognitively, and to cooperate with his 
attorneys and can continue to do that.  And so the focus of the 
evaluation is on answering that competency to proceed 
question.  And then to answer the question of what was his 
mental state like to the best that can be determined at the 
time of what he is alleged to have done -- 
 
"Again, my role is not to gather evidence either way. 
 
 
"-- and so -- and then to report that to the court." 
 
Dr. Kirkland testified that he had determined that Hicks's academic 
ability, reasoning, and intellectual ability were far above the range of 
mild intellectual impairment.  He further testified that the forensic 
evaluation was a standardized evaluation, that the results of the 
evaluation were all within the normal range, and that he had perceived 
nothing that suggested that Hicks was unable to understand the charges 
1210013 
 
40 
 
against him and cooperate with his attorney.  Dr. Kirkland further 
testified: 
"In fact, he appeared to have a greater than average 
knowledge of the legal system than most people that I speak 
with.  And that he -- and while he left school, formal 
education, early, he had -- I think he has a lot of common sense 
and a lot of knowledge of the world from a social and adaptive 
point of view and he was very much able to take care of 
himself.  And he was able to give me a comprehensive history. 
 
"He was able to understand the -- I'm required to inform 
him why I'm there and to tell him about how that affects his 
rights and the trial proceeding.  He was able to understand 
that. And he agreed to participate in the evaluation, signed 
the release form and proceeded." 
 
 (Emphasis added.) 
 
Dr. Kirkland also testified that he had had access to some of the 
material from the Mississippi Department of Corrections as well as the 
medical records and disciplinary records from the Mobile Metro Jail.  He 
further testified that, when he met with Hicks, he took an early history 
and gathered background information, including information about 
Hicks's criminal history, employment history, and substance-abuse 
history.   
Dr. Kirkland testified that Hicks had a high degree of social and 
adaptive intelligence and that Hicks "would characterize his history as 
1210013 
 
41 
 
being a person who works with what he's got to -- to survive and is able 
to use his -- those tools to protect himself."  Dr. Kirkland further stated: 
"He clearly is a -- if you look at the world in terms of givers and takers, 
he would be characterized as someone being more of a taker than a giver 
in that broad characterization."  
 
Dr. Kirkland testified that Hicks did not have a clinical disorder, 
that he was not depressed or psychotic, and that "[h]e would not meet the 
normal reasons that one would think a mental evaluation like this would 
be done."  He further testified: 
"And what I found the evidence for was he -- I mean, he 
had been in prison most of his adult life.  That he had multiple 
episodes of breaking the law or antisocial action, an antisocial 
personality disorder, which is described, really, as someone 
who characteristically has a hard time respecting the rights 
of other people, tends to see other people as objects that they 
can use to bring about goals, meeting their own goals, and 
those were the primary diagnoses." 
 
Subsequently, the following occurred: 
"[PROSECUTOR:]  And what about this defendant's 
history that you considered and his choices that you know of 
that you considered lead you to believe that he is antisocial? 
 
"[DR. KIRKLAND:]  Well, the repeated -- the thing that 
-- primarily the behavior itself.  The best place to look for that 
is the behavior itself.  And the second place to look is how a 
person characterizes and thinks about their own experience. 
 
1210013 
 
42 
 
"He is able to do that.  He does not have a lot of insight 
into how things might sound to another person.  So that he -- 
he tends to believe that -- 
 
"For example, what he said earlier about his perception 
about his role in the case.  I think that he tends to believe that 
but he doesn't necessarily -- not very good at taking into 
account how that might be perceived by other people.  And 
that's really a feature of the diagnosis, that he has a hard time 
seeing things from other people's point of view. 
 
"Taken to an extreme, that would be violating the rights 
of other people to an extreme.  And that's -- that's the basis 
for that diagnosis is that that's one of the main features is the 
lack of ability to consider the needs or rights of other people 
in a more mature way. 
 
"[PROSECUTOR:]  And how would someone who is 
antisocial tend to treat other people? 
 
"[DR. KIRKLAND:]  Well, they would often superficially 
treat them kind and -- and good enough to establish 
relationships but there -- but there would be a pattern of 
having a hard time regarding the rights of the other person, 
intending to see them more as useful to them in reaching their 
goals. 
 
"[PROSECUTOR:]  And as far as how someone who is 
antisocial personally acts, do they broadcast this to others or 
do they tend to present some other kind of persona? 
 
"[DR. KIRKLAND:]  Well, with different degrees of 
success -- and I think Mr. Hicks is likely to be perceived, at 
least initially, as being likable and -- and certainly someone 
who would be genuine in their attempts to interact with the 
other person. And that it -- that it appears to me, and I think 
what's documented in the history, that whether he's confined 
or outside that he has a hard time identifying and conforming 
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43 
 
to the needs that other people might present in terms of their 
own safety and needs. 
 
"[PROSECUTOR:]  And what about right and wrong? 
Someone that's antisocial, are they aware of what is right and 
wrong? 
 
"[DR. KIRKLAND:]  Sure.  And he's certainly aware of 
the difference between right and wrong and also aware of the 
difference between, technically, what's legal and illegal." 
 
Dr. Kirkland's report was also admitted into evidence.  The report was 
consistent with Dr. Kirkland's trial testimony.   
During the penalty phase, defense counsel presented the testimony 
of Dr. Marianne Rosenzweig, a forensic psychologist, who also had 
evaluated Hicks.  Dr. Rosenzweig testified that she had spent a total of 
19 and one-half hours with Hicks, that she had interviewed some of 
Hicks's family members and family acquaintances, that she had reviewed 
various records, including the records from the Mississippi Department 
of Corrections and the Mobile Metro Jail, that she had reviewed various 
other documents, and that she had administered two psychological tests 
to Hicks.  Dr. Rosenzweig did not generate a report of her evaluation.   
 
Dr. Rosenzweig testified that Hicks was the youngest of 10 children 
and that he had had a difficult childhood.  She further testified about the 
poor conditions in which Hicks's family had lived because his father  had 
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44 
 
refused to spend money on his family.  Dr. Rosenzweig testified that she 
had received information indicating that Hicks's father had been violent, 
that he had been much more violent when he was drunk, that Hicks's 
father would beat his mother, and that, on one occasion, his father had 
beaten one of Hicks's sisters until she was unconscious.   She also 
testified that Hicks did not remember witnessing any of his father's 
violence against his mother, but Hicks's siblings had different memories 
of that.  She testified, however, that Hicks had related things that he had 
heard regarding incidents of violence his father had committed against 
his mother.  Ultimately, Hicks's parents divorced and both remarried.  
Dr. Rosenzweig further testified that Hicks had no memory of his father 
beating him, but one of his older sisters testified about an incident when 
their father had "flung [Hicks] against the wall very hard and really hurt 
him."  Dr. Rosenzweig testified that she had learned about violent acts 
Hicks's father had committed against people outside the immediate 
family.  Dr. Rosenzweig further testified that, even if Hicks had been too 
young to remember these events, witnessing or experiencing such events 
could still have had an impact on his life. 
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45 
 
Dr. Rosenzweig testified that she concluded that Hicks suffered 
from some form of bipolar disorder, which includes manic episodes and 
major depressive disorder.  She further testified that experts do not know 
exactly what causes bipolar disorder but that the current consensus is 
that there are three factors that contribute to bipolar disorder -- the 
genetic background of the person, neurochemical factors, and 
environmental factors.  With regard to genetic factors, Dr. Rosenzweig 
testified that bipolar disorders run in families.  She also testified "that 
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder have been found to likely share the 
same genetic origin.  That is, they tend to co-occur in the same families, 
meaning that if somebody has schizophrenia, you will often see bipolar 
disorder in that same family."  With regard to environmental factors, she 
testified that a life event can trigger an episode, that hormonal problems 
and changes that fluctuate over the course of a person's life can be a 
factor, and that alcohol and drug abuse can be linked to a triggering 
episode.  Dr. Rosenzweig testified that one of Hicks's sisters had been 
committed to a hospital for mental-health treatment and had been 
diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder.  She 
also testified about impressions that she had formed based on discussions 
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46 
 
she had had with some of Hicks's other relatives, stated that some of 
Hicks's father's behavior resembled manic and hypomanic behaviors, and 
pointed out that Hicks's paternal grandfather was known to have a 
violent temper and that she had been told that he "was a very mean man 
who beat his kids."   
Dr. Rosenzweig also testified that, after Hicks's first escape attempt 
from Parchman Prison, which is where he had been incarcerated in 
Mississippi, Hicks had been seen by a psychologist.  She testified that 
that psychologist's notes stated: 
"This is a direct quote.  His mental status was marked 
by poor insight and very poor judgment, particularly 
impulsive.  Hostility and agitation are very evident.  Probably 
he is a high risk for suicide, not from clinical depression but 
from the traits which define his current mental status. 
 
 
"Psychological testing suggested a very malignant 
personality structure with marked antisocial and sexual 
conflicts. 
 
"Testing also suggested the presence of extreme 
hostility, and again capable of extreme forms of acting out, 
likely impulsively, and with the -- the underlined, that was 
not mine that was the psychologist -- very, very poor 
judgment. 
 
"The psychologist says he will consult with this other -- 
I think it was a psychiatrist -- to the possibility of short-term 
medication to reduce his agitation.  And his diagnostic 
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47 
 
impression was mixed personality disorder with emotional 
agitation." 
 
Subsequently, the following occurred: 
 
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  And can you explain what the 
psychologist meant when he wrote that the previous 
psychology testing suggested a very malignant personality 
structure with marked antisocial and sexual conflicts? 
 
"[DR. ROSENZWEIG:]  Okay.  Again, I -- there was no 
testing in the file that I got. And I'm guessing that the MMPI 
was the most frequently used psychological test in prisons at 
that point in time.  It's a personality test.  So I'm guessing 
that that was the test that he was referring to. 
 
"And it seems that the psychologist, when he's talking 
about a malignant personality structure, I -- my inference is 
he's talking about something called borderline personality 
disorder with antisocial features.  Borderline personality 
disorder is -- it's a diagnosis.  And it is characterized by people 
who have very rapid shifts in their mood.  They can have 
intense anger and be really impulsive among other symptoms. 
… 
 
"…. 
 
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  And what about the mixed 
personality disorder with mixed emotional agitation?  Can 
you explain that?  
 
"[DR. ROSENZWEIG:]  Yes.  That the mixed part means 
basically that the psychologist thought that [Hicks] is having 
more -- elements of more than one personality disorder. 
 
"Personality disorder is a classification within our 
diagnostic system.  It refers to patterns of -- enduring patterns 
of behavior, the way the person acts, the way they think that 
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48 
 
are maladaptive.  There are a number of different personality 
disorders.  And it looks like -- again, -- like I'm inferring again. 
I think that the psychologist here is referring to borderline 
and antisocial personality disorders." 
 
Dr. Rosenzweig further testified that she thought that all of Hicks's 
behavior that she had discussed could be better explained by her 
diagnosis of bipolar disorder.   She further testified about other incidents 
that had occurred during Hicks's incarceration at Parchman Prison that 
were consistent with her diagnosis.   
Dr. Rosenzweig testified that the information from the incident 
involving the nurse at the Mobile Metro Jail and the hearing regarding 
that incident was consistent with her diagnosis.   
 
Dr. Rosenzweig also testified that she had concluded that Hicks had 
bipolar disorder, that she could not say what type of bipolar disorder he 
had, that the difference between the two types of bipolar disorder is 
whether the person has had a manic episode, and that she had not seen 
Hicks have a manic episode.  She further testified that "[t]he descriptions 
of his behavior by the psychologist and the documentation in his prison 
records in Mississippi, it sounds as though he had a manic episode, but I 
don't -- I don't know that for a fact."  However, Dr. Rosenzweig testified 
1210013 
 
49 
 
that, every time she had seen Hicks, "he certainly falls into the kind of 
hypomanic behavior."   
Subsequently, the following occurred: 
 
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]   Now, this jury is aware that 
they've got a responsibility of imposing a sentence.  If [Hicks] 
were to be given a sentence of life without the possibility of 
parole as opposed to the death penalty, in your professional 
opinion, would he likely pose a risk of danger to others while 
in the penitentiary or even himself? 
 
"[DR. ROSENZWEIG:]  Yes.  I think given his diagnosis 
and his past history that, yes, I think that at times you could 
expect him to act out again to the point that he might be a 
danger to himself or to other people." 
 
She also testified that the Alabama Department of Corrections policies 
provide "that if an inmate becomes, because of a mental condition, … a 
danger to themselves or others, the Department of Corrections can force 
them to take medication."  She further testified that Hicks would be 
placed in a maximum-security setting, that Alabama prisons "are 
designed to be able to manage the behavior of people who are acting out," 
and that "they all have psych units in the prisons where they can 
basically manage the behavior of individuals with these kinds of 
problems."   
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50 
 
On cross-examination, Dr. Rosenzweig testified that, before her 
diagnosis, Hicks had never been diagnosed with or treated for bipolar 
disorder.   She agreed that Hicks could understand right from wrong and 
that he could make his own choices.  She also agreed that, if Hicks were 
incarcerated on a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole, "he could act out, would act, your words, and could be a danger to 
himself and others."   
During his penalty-phase closing argument, the prosecutor stated: 
 
"The defense expert would have you believe that Dennis 
Hicks is a product of his upbringing and his environment, his 
family, his genetics.  The truth is and the evidence shows that 
Dennis Hicks is a sociopath and he sees those people around 
him as objects that exist for his own benefit. 
 
 
"Ladies and gentlemen, that is not environment.  That 
is not genetics.  That is choice." 
 
The prosecutor then went on to discuss the aggravating and mitigating 
evidence in the case:  "And you'll hear other evidence, too, of [Hicks's] 
future dangerousness based on his behavior in the Alabama Department 
of Corrections, the Mississippi Department of Corrections, and the Metro 
Jail."  When discussing Hicks's future dangerousness, the prosecutor 
went on to state:   
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51 
 
"You have his Department of Corrections history now 
that shows his future dangerousness, that the entire time -- 
or after, you know, five years he was escaping, assaulting 
guards, other inmates, he was involved in the money order 
scheme, the mail fraud scheme.  It shows a history that you 
can infer the fact that he will be dangerous in the future. 
 
"And, you know, the defense paid Dr. Rosenzweig 
$30,000 to get up here on the witness stand and say that even 
she believes he'll be a future danger should he be incarcerated 
in the Alabama Department of Corrections.  Even she 
admitted to that. But she said, oh, that can be dealt with 
because, you know, they can strap him to a gurney and force 
medicate him for the rest of his life and only then will he not 
be a danger anymore.  Oh, and if they can't force medicate 
him, they can just restrain him.  So even the defense expert 
believed that the defendant will be a danger in the future. 
 
"You heard the testimony of Dorothy Hudson about 
Josh. And in a minute I'm going to get back to Josh because 
you've heard so much about the defendant over the last couple 
of days.  And the testimony of Dr. Kirkland, his determination 
was the defendant has an antisocial personality disorder." 
 
 
After discussing the heinous, atrocious, and cruel aggravating 
circumstance and the facts that he contended would support that 
aggravating circumstance, the prosecutor stated: 
 
"Josh didn't deserve that. Josh Duncan deserved life. He 
deserved every day of natural life that he had on God's green 
earth. And he didn't get that because this man took that away 
from him. And the way he did it was heinous, atrocious, and 
cruel. 
 
"I'm not being cruel about the defendant's past. I'm not 
being cruel about a mental disorder that he may have.  He 
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52 
 
may have had a tough life.  He might be bipolar.  A lot of 
people have tough lives.  A lot of people are bipolar. 
 
"Having a tough life and having bipolar, if he does, does 
not cause a man to murder.  
 
"Circumstances and environment do not cause a man to 
murder. 
 
"Dennis Hicks needed to murder Joshua Duncan for the 
most important person in Dennis Hicks's life.  Himself. 
 
"This isn't about vengeance for Josh either. Josh is gone. 
Josh is never coming back and this isn't about revenge.  This 
is about a choice.  It's a choice that each and every one of you 
have to make. 
 
"The defendant has chosen to be a cold-blooded 
murderer.  He's already served two life sentences. He's 
already murdered two people in Mississippi. He's already 
heinously, atrociously, and cruelly murdered Joshua Duncan 
when he hacked him to pieces.  The defendant deserves the 
death penalty." 
 
 
In rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor stated, in pertinent 
part: 
"I'm going to talk a little bit about the future 
dangerousness because their own expert, as you heard [the 
other prosecutor] say, and their expert testified to, their own 
expert that they paid an exorbitant amount of money for to 
come in here and testify says the defendant is going to be a 
danger to himself and to others.  May not be always but it will 
manifest. That's what she said. 
 
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53 
 
"And what do we know from the pattern, from the 
history?  Why did we admit all of these records?  To show you 
that history, to show you that pattern. 
 
"And what do they show?  Time and again, four different 
times of escapes, four different times.  One time tried to take 
a weapon from a corrections officer. 
 
"What do they show you?  The violence over and over 
and over again.  Throughout starting in 1988 all the way 
through Alabama, through Mississippi, assaulting inmates, 
having weapons, all the way through the Metro Jail and 
attempting to hurt and throw something from a nurse because 
the defendant didn't get his way and he didn't get the food he 
wanted on his cart. 
 
"What 
do 
they 
show? 
Violence 
and 
future 
dangerousness.  Future dangerousness." 
 
 
In this case, the State presented testimony from Dr. Kirkland that 
Hicks had antisocial personality disorder.  The State also referred to this 
testimony during its closing arguments.  However, this case is 
distinguishable from Estelle and Satterwhite.  First, Alabama law does 
not require the State to prove a capital defendant's future dangerousness 
to impose the death penalty.  Additionally, future dangerousness is not a 
statutory aggravating circumstance under § 13A-5-49, Ala. Code 1975.  
However, as the Court of Criminal Appeals noted in its opinion on 
original submission in this case, "the evidence regarding future 
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54 
 
dangerousness was a proper penalty-phase consideration."  Hicks v. 
State, [Ms. CR-15-0747, July 12, 2019] ___ So. 3d at ___. 
 
Additionally, unlike in Satterwhite, Dr. Kirkland did not provide 
"powerful 
and 
unequivocal 
testimony" 
as 
to 
Hicks's 
future 
dangerousness.  486 U.S. at 260.  Rather, he testified that he had 
diagnosed Hicks with antisocial personality disorder; that Hicks "would 
be characterized as someone being more of a taker than a giver in that 
broad characterization"; that someone with "an antisocial personality 
disorder, … is described, really, as someone who characteristically has a 
hard time respecting the rights of other people, tends to see other people 
as objects that they can use to bring about goals, meeting their own 
goals"; that Hicks did not have a lot  of insight into how things might 
sound to others; that Hicks has a hard time seeing things from other 
people's point of view; that, such behavior, "[t]aken to an extreme, … 
would be violating the rights of other people to an extreme"; that Hicks 
has a hard time identifying and conforming to the needs that other people 
might present in terms of their own safety and needs"; and that Hicks 
was aware of the difference between right and wrong and was "also aware 
of the difference between, technically, what's legal and illegal."  That 
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55 
 
testimony falls far short of the type of testimony the psychiatrist 
presented in Satterwhite.  Additionally, the State's closing arguments 
regarding future dangerousness did not center on Dr. Kirkland's 
testimony.  Rather, the State relied heavily on the evidence regarding 
Hicks's two prior murder convictions, Hicks's conduct while incarcerated 
in Mississippi and in the Mobile Metro Jail, and Dr. Rosenzweig's 
testimony that Hicks would be a danger to himself and others in the 
future.   
 
Additionally, in its sentencing order, the trial court addressed the 
statutory mitigating circumstance that the capital offense was 
committed while Hicks was under the influence of an extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance, § 13A-5-51(2), Ala. Code 1975, as follows: 
 
"Defendant Hicks offered the testimony of [Marianne] 
Rosenzweig, a mitigation expert, who testified that in her 
opinion the Defendant was under the influence of extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance in the form of Bipolar 
Disorder.  She testified that the Defendant suffered from 
problems associated with his upbringing in a dysfunctional 
family, as described by several of the Defendant's family 
members.  She indicated she believed the Defendant had a 
sibling who also suffered from mental disorders.  Dr. 
Rosenzweig based her opinion of bipolar disorder on her 
observation of the Defendant moving between manic or 
hypomanic episodes and major depressive episodes.  The 
Court notes that no evidence was presented of a clinical 
diagnosis for bipolar disorder; however Dr. Rosenzweig's 
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56 
 
observation are entitled to some weight.  Accordingly, this 
Court concludes that this mitigating circumstance has been 
established and assigns this mitigating circumstance some 
weight." 
 
"Section 13A-5-51(6), Ala. Code 1975, also provides as a mitigating 
circumstance that '[the] capacity of the defendant to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements 
of law was substantially impaired' during the commission of the capital 
offense."  Callen v. State, 284 So. 3d 177, 242 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017).   
With regard to that statutory mitigating circumstance, the trial court 
stated: 
 
"There was no compelling evidence that the Defendant 
suffered diminished capacity or was under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs at the time he killed Joshua Duncan.  To the 
contrary, Dr. Karl Kirkland testified in the sentencing portion 
of trial that the Defendant was competent at the time of the 
offense and that he was competent to stand trial.  This Court 
agrees with Dr. Kirkland in this regard and further 
specifically finds that the Defendant could appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct and conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law.  Accordingly, this Court does not assign 
weight to this statutory mitigating circumstance.  However, 
the Defendant's mental disturbance was established and 
weighed, as the Court previously explained." 
 
During the penalty phase, defense counsel never argued that Hicks did 
not have the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct.  In fact, 
Dr. Rosenzweig agreed that Hicks could understand right from wrong 
1210013 
 
57 
 
and that he could make his own choices.   Additionally, Dr. Rosenzweig 
did not specifically testify that Hicks's "capacity to conform his conduct 
to the requirements of law was substantially impaired" at the time of the 
offense.  In fact, she did not present any testimony about Hicks's mental 
capacity at the time of the offense.  Rather, throughout the trial, Hicks 
maintained that he did not kill Duncan.  Therefore, even excluding Dr. 
Kirkland's testimony and report, the evidence presented supported the 
trial court's finding that Hicks "could appreciate the criminality of his 
conduct and conform his conduct to the requirements of law."   
 
In light of the specific facts of this case, Hicks has not established 
that he was prejudiced by the admission of Dr. Kirkland's testimony and 
report during the penalty-phase proceedings.  Accordingly, any error in 
the admission of that testimony and report was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.   See Satterwhite, supra; Chapman, supra; Rule 45A, 
Ala. R. App. P.  Therefore, Hicks is not entitled to relief as to this claim.3 
 
3Hicks also argues that the trial court violated his rights under the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution by admitting the 
results of Dr. Kirkland's pretrial mental evaluation into evidence during 
the penalty-phase proceedings.  In his petition, Hicks asserts that the 
admission of Dr. Kirkland's testimony and report violated his Fifth 
Amendment rights because Dr. Kirkland did not inform him that 
anything he said during the evaluation could be used against him during 
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58 
 
Conclusion 
Based on the foregoing, we quash the writ. 
 
WRIT QUASHED. 
 
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Shaw, Bryan, Sellers, Mendheim, and 
Stewart, JJ., concur. 
 
Mitchell, J., concurs in the result, with opinion. 
 
 
 
the penalty-phase proceedings.  He also asserts that the admission of Dr. 
Kirkland's testimony and report further violated Alabama law because 
the trial court did not have the authority to order an evaluation of his 
mental state at the time of the offense because he had not entered a plea 
of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.  However, we 
previously determined that any error in the admission of Dr. Kirkland's 
testimony and report during the penalty-phase proceedings was 
harmless.  Therefore, Hicks is not entitled to relief as to either of those 
claims 
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59 
 
MITCHELL, Justice (concurring in the result). 
I agree that no reversible error occurred, but I reach that conclusion 
after applying what I believe is the correct standard of review.   
The main opinion reviews the issues presented for harmless error 
based on the United States Supreme Court's test announced in Chapman 
v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), and applied to Sixth Amendment 
violations in Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988).  In my view, that 
is the wrong standard of review.  Rather, on certiorari review, this Court 
applies "'"'de novo the standard of review that was applicable in the 
Court of [Criminal] Appeals.'"'"  Ex parte Jones, 322 So. 3d 970, 975 (Ala. 
2019) (quoting Ex parte S.L.M., 171 So. 3d 673, 677 (Ala. 2014)) (citations 
omitted).  As the State's brief makes clear, when a defendant who has 
been sentenced to death raises an issue that he did not properly raise in 
the proceedings below, the Court of Criminal Appeals reviews the trial 
court's decision for plain error only.  Rule 45A, Ala. R. App. P.; Ex parte 
Brown, 11 So. 3d 933, 935 (Ala. 2008).  That standard applies to all 
unpreserved issues, even those based on assertions that the defendant's 
constitutional rights were violated.  See United States v. Margarita 
Garcia, 906 F.3d 1255, 1266 (11th Cir. 2018) ("The constitutional errors 
1210013 
 
60 
 
here are trial errors.  Thus, normally, we would ask whether the 
government had met its burden of establishing that the errors were 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  But if a defendant fails to lodge a 
timely objection, we are required to apply plain error review instead." 
(citations omitted)).   
There are two important differences between harmless-error review 
under Chapman and plain-error review under Rule 45A.  First, harmless-
error review asks whether any constitutional errors occurred that did not 
"pervade the entire [criminal] proceeding" and, if so, places the burden 
on the prosecution to prove that the "error did not contribute to the 
verdict."  Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 256.  Plain-error review, by contrast, 
requires the reviewing court "to review the transcript of the proceedings 
for plain error."  Hall v. State, 820 So. 2d 113, 121 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999).  
Second, harmless-error review requires reversal when the trial court 
violated a defendant's constitutional rights unless the error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 250.  But 
plain-error review requires reversal only when it is evident from the 
record that the trial court made an error that "'"adversely affected the 
substantial right of the appellant"'" in a way that was "'"particularly 
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61 
 
egregious"'" and "'"seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings."'"  Brown, 11 So. 3d at 935-36 (quoting 
Hall, 820 So. 2d at 121) (citations omitted).  Because of these differences 
in burden and deference to the trial court, "'[t]he standard of review in 
reviewing a claim under the plain-error doctrine is stricter than the 
standard used in reviewing an issue that was properly raised in the trial 
court or on appeal.'"  Id. at 935 (quoting Hall, 820 So. 2d at 121); 
cf. Margarita Garcia, 906 F.3d at 1266 (explaining that, while the 
appellant could not "carry her burden under the plain error standard, the 
outcome may well have been different if trial counsel had preserved the 
errors").  
Plain-error review is all that is required here.  And if Dennis 
Morgan Hicks, the defendant in this case, is not entitled to any relief 
based on harmless-error review -- a standard that is more favorable for 
him -- we can comfortably infer that he fails under plain-error review as 
well.  Indeed, a review of the briefs and applicable record materials in 
this case confirms that there was no plain error on his Sixth Amendment 
claim.  Because the main opinion does not apply the correct standard of 
review, I am able to concur in the result only.