Title: Henley vs. State

State: tennessee

Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court

Document:

FILED December 15, 1997 Cecil W. Crowson Appellate Court Clerk FOR PUBLICATION 1 2 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE 3 4 AT NASHVILLE 5 (HEARD AT COLUMBIA) 6 7 8 9 10 STEVE HENLEY, ( 11 ( 12 Appellee, ( 13 ( Jackson Criminal 14 ( 15 v. ( Hon. J. O. Bond, Judge 16 ( 17 ( S. Ct. No. 01S01-9703-CC-00056 18 STATE OF TENNESSEE, ( 19 ( 20 Appellant. ( 21 22 23 24 25 DISSENTING OPINION 26 27 I dissent from the majority’s decision that the 28 petitioner in this case received effective assistance of counsel. 29 30 Even though the trial court denied the petition for 31 relief, that court obviously was not pleased with counsel’s 32 performance and attributed counsel’s failure to call any witnesses 33 other than petitioner’s grandmother to “trial strategy.” In 34 announcing his decision, the court stated: “I would have liked to 35 have had another witness maybe to have been put on. I would have 36 liked for the mother to have testified when she refused.” And 37 again: “I would have liked to have seen another witness or two, 38 but that’s trial strategy.” 39 40 -2- The Court of Criminal Appeals found that counsel’s 1 performance at the sentencing phase of the trial was deficient and 2 also prejudicial, and the case was remanded by that court to the 3 trial court for a new sentencing hearing. In support of my 4 dissent, I rely upon the following portions of the Court of 5 Criminal Appeals’ opinion, which was written by Judge John H. Peay, 6 with Presiding Judge Joe B. Jones and Special Judge Joseph H. 7 Walker concurring: 8 9 With respect to the sentencing phase of the 10 trial, however, we find that Mr. Reneau’s investigation 11 and preparation were constitutionally deficient. Our 12 Court has recognized that 13 14 ‘[a] lawyer also has a substantial 15 and important role to perform in 16 raising mitigating factors both to 17 the prosecutor initially and to the 18 court at sentencing. This cannot 19 effectively be done on the basis of 20 broad general emotional appeals or on 21 the strength of statements made to 22 the lawyer by the defendant. 23 Information concerning the 24 defendant’s background, education, 25 employment record, mental and 26 emotional stability, family 27 relationships, and the like, will be 28 relevant, as will mitigating 29 circumstances surrounding the 30 commission of the offense itself. 31 Investigation is essential to 32 fulfillment of these functions.’ 33 34 35 Adkins v. State, No. 03C0l-9l06-CR-00164, pp. 42-3, 36 Washington County (Tenn. Crim. App. filed December 2, 37 1In the petitioner’s offer of proof at the post-conviction hearing, one juror was quoted as saying, “If a man’s own mother won’t testify on his behalf then we know what we’ve got to do.” -3- 1994, at Knoxville) (citation omitted). Personal 1 background and character information are highly relevant 2 at a capital sentencing hearing “because of the belief, 3 long held by this society, that defendants who commit 4 criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged 5 background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be 6 less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.” 7 California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, 8 J., concurring). 9 10 Although many of Henley’s family members, 11 including his mother, testified at the post-conviction 12 hearing that they would have been willing to testify on 13 Henley’s behalf had they been asked, Mr. Reneau spoke to 14 none of them prior to the sentencing hearing. Mr. Reneau 15 called the petitioner’s mother to the stand at the 16 sentencing hearing without ever having spoken to her 17 about testifying. Not understanding what was expected of 18 her, she refused - in front of the jury - to testify. We 19 do not think it is assuming too much to conclude that a 20 jury is going to be prejudiced against a defendant upon 21 that person’s own mother refusing to testify on his or 22 her behalf.1 23 24 Had they been prepared and called at the 25 -4- sentencing hearing, Henley’s family members would have 1 testified that they loved the petitioner; that he was a 2 good and loving man; that he was not a violent man; that 3 the offenses of which he was convicted were totally out 4 of character for him; and that they were shocked by his 5 arrest. They would have pled for his life. 6 Additionally, the petitioner produced evidence at the 7 post-conviction hearing that other potentially mitigating 8 evidence existed that would have been discovered had 9 Mr. Reneau conducted a more thorough investigation. 10 Expert testimony indicated the possibility that Henley 11 had suffered from depression, alcohol and drug abuse, and 12 learning disabilities. In grade school, Henley’s I.Q. 13 tested at 89. He dropped out of high school after the 14 tenth grade. Not long before the murders, Henley 15 suffered severe financial losses, was forced to file 16 bankruptcy, and lost the family farm. All of this would 17 have been proper testimony for mitigation. Eddings v. 18 Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117 (1982) (the Constitution 19 requires the sentencer to “consider and weigh all of the 20 mitigating evidence concerning the petitioner’s family 21 background and personal history.”) (O’Connor, J., 22 concurring); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 23 24 In spite of all the mitigating evidence 25 available, only two people testified on Henley’s behalf 26 at the sentencing hearing: Henley himself and his 27 -5- grandmother. The jury had already indicated that it did 1 not believe Henley when it convicted him. Accordingly, 2 it is reasonable to presume that Henley’s testimony at 3 his sentencing hearing would not have been particularly 4 persuasive. It is also possible, if not likely, that 5 Henley’s grandmother was viewed with a certain amount of 6 hostility because Flatt testified that it was on her 7 behalf that Henley had felt compelled to attack the 8 Staffords. Thus, of all the people that Mr. Reneau had 9 available to him, the only two that testified were 10 arguably the two least helpful. 11 12 “When the record shows a substantial deficiency 13 in investigation, the normal deference afforded trial 14 counsel’s strategies is particularly inappropriate 15 . . . . [This] Court will not credit a strategic choice 16 by counsel when counsel ‘did not even know what evidence 17 was available.’” Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d at 530 18 (citation omitted). The record in this case shows such a 19 substantial deficiency. No psychological or psychiatric 20 evaluation was done on Henley. Other than Henley’s 21 grandmother, Mr. Reneau did not speak with Henley’s 22 family members prior to the sentencing hearing. There is 23 no evidence from Mr. Reneau’s file or otherwise that he 24 investigated Henley’s educational background, employment 25 history, or that he spoke with members of the community 26 familiar with Henley. He “‘should have investigated his 27 -6- background, checked his school records, . . . his medical 1 history, tried to find witnesses to demonstrate all 2 aspects of his character. [He] should have requested a 3 psychological evaluation.’” Bell v. State, No. 03C01- 4 9210-CR-00364, p. 42, Hamilton County (Tenn. Crim. App. 5 filed March 15, 1995, at Knoxville), cert. denied, 6 (quoting the court below). 7 8 While we have held that Mr. Reneau’s failure to 9 investigate his client’s mental health was not 10 ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the 11 guilt phase of this trial, we do find that it was 12 ineffective with respect to the sentencing phase. 13 14 “[T]here is a qualitative difference 15 between obtaining psychological 16 information for the purpose of 17 preparing a defense to the charges 18 and using such evidence for the 19 purpose of mitigating the punishment. 20 Thus, it is not incompatible to 21 present evidence of psychological or 22 mental impairment during sentencing, 23 even where a defense of factual 24 innocence has been interposed at the 25 guilt phase.” 26 27 28 29 Bell v. State, supra at 46 (citation omitted). Combined 30 with Mr. Reneau’s failure to investigate Henley’s 31 family’s availability and willingness to testify, and his 32 failure to investigate other aspects of Henley’s past, 33 Mr. Reneau failed to meet the level or competence 34 required by attorneys representing clients at the 35 2Unlike State v. Melson, 772 S.W.2d 417 (Tenn. 1989), this was not a case where the available mitigation evidence had already been presented during the guilt phase of the petitioner’s trial. -7- sentencing phase who are faced with the death penalty. 1 See State v. Terry, 813 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tenn. 1991) (the 2 qualitative difference between the death penalty and all 3 other punishments requires greater reliability in the 4 sentencing determination). 5 6 We also find that Mr. Reneau’s deficient 7 performance at the sentencing phase prejudiced the 8 petitioner. The petitioner made an offer of proof at the 9 post-conviction hearing that the jury considered the fact 10 that Henley’s mother refused to testify on her son’s 11 behalf. Even without this offer of proof, we hold that 12 the dearth of favorable testimony offered at the 13 sentencing hearing, when significant amounts of favorable 14 testimony were available, establishes a reasonable 15 probability that, but for Mr. Reneau’s deficient 16 performance with respect to the sentencing phase of 17 Henley’s trial, the result of the proceeding would have 18 been different.2 19 20 This well reasoned opinion by the Court of Criminal 21 Appeals compels the conclusion that the petitioner was denied 22 effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the state and federal 23 constitutions and therefore is entitled to a new sentencing 24 hearing. 25 -8- I am authorized to state that Justice Birch joins in this 1 Dissenting Opinion. 2 3 _________________________ 4 Reid, J. 5