Title: Huey v. Stevens

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
WILLIAM A. HUEY,
Respondent Below-
Appellant,
v.
DCSE/JOALLYNN STEVENS,
Petitioners Below-
Appellees.
§
§
§  No. 186, 2001
§
§
§  Court Below—Family Court
§  of the State of Delaware,
§  in and for Kent County
§  File No. 192290
§  Petition No. 00-16535
§
Submitted: April 12, 2002
  Decided:   May 30, 2002
Before WALSH, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices
O R D E R
This 30th day of May 2002, upon consideration of the briefs on
appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1)
The respondent-appellant, William A. Huey, filed this appeal
from an order of the Family Court dated March 28, 2001, which affirmed1
the commissioner’s November 20, 2000 order finding Huey’s child support
payments to be in arrears, finding Huey to be in contempt of a previous
child support order and ordering Huey to pay retroactive support on a
monthly basis.
                                                          
1Pursuant to DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 915(d) (2001).
2
(2)
In this appeal, Huey claims that the Family Court
commissioner abused his discretion and violated Huey’s right to due
process by failing to suspend the hearing once Huey requested an attorney.
Huey contends that he would not have agreed to proceed with the hearing
if he had known the prosecutor would ask the commissioner to commit him
to the work release program.  To the extent Huey has not argued other
grounds to support his appeal that were previously raised, those grounds
are deemed waived and will not be addressed by this Court.2
(3)
On November 20, 2000, Huey appeared before a Family
Court commissioner on a petition for support arrears filed by the Division
of Child Support Enforcement.3  The petition alleged that Huey had failed
to comply with a previous order of the Family Court to pay child support.
According to Huey, he informed the Family Court judge prior to the
hearing that he had retained private counsel, but then agreed to proceed
pro se when his attorney did not appear. The transcript of the hearing
reflects that, during closing argument, the prosecutor requested that Huey
                                                          
2Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993).  On appeal to the Family Court
judge, Huey also argued that his child support obligation should have been reduced when
his son turned 18, he should have been allowed to offer proof that he had made certain
child support payments not reflected on the court’s account statement, and there was no
evidence showing that his daughter was enrolled in high school.
3Pursuant to DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 2201 et seq. (1999).
3
be committed to the work release program, at which point Huey stated, “I
want my lawyer here now.”  The transcript further reflects that, following
Huey’s statement, the commissioner directed the prosecutor to proceed
with his argument and stated he would address Huey’s request at a later
time.  Although the commissioner found Huey to be in contempt of the
Family Court’s child support order, he did not commit Huey to the work
release program.
(4)
It is within the discretion of the trial court to determine
whether a continuance should be granted and the trial court’s decision will
not be disturbed on appeal unless it was unreasonable or capricious.4
While it is  presumed under principles of due process that counsel should
be appointed for an indigent support obligor who is at risk of
incarceration,5 in this case there was no finding that Huey was indigent.6
Moreover, while the prosecutor requested Huey’s commitment to the work
release program, the commissioner did not grant the request.  Under these
                                                          
4Raymond Heartless, Inc. v. State, 401 A.2d 921, 923 (Del. 1979).
5Black v. DCSE/Black, 686 A.2d 164, 168 (Del. 1996).
6In fact, Huey told the commissioner that he had retained his own counsel.  The Family
Court record also indicates that, at the time Huey was sent notice of the child support
hearing, he was sent a notice informing him that he was entitled to move for the
appointment of counsel in case of indigency.  The record does not reflect that Huey ever
filed such a motion.
4
circumstances, the commissioner’s denial of Huey’s request for a
continuance of the hearing so he could contact his attorney did not
constitute an abuse of discretion.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the
Family Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Randy J. Holland
Justice