Title: Darcars v. Borzym

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Darcars Motors of Silver Spring, Inc. v. Marcin Borzym, No. 33 September Term, 2003.
[Tort Law - Conversion and punitive damages, held; the evidence was sufficient to support
the jury’s finding of actual malice and to support an award of punitive damages, where the
representatives of the car dealer, which had converted the customer’s property, had dismissed
the customer’s inquiries about the property, cursed at the customer, and told him to “get lost”
and “call your attorney.”]
[Tort Law - Reviewing an award of punitive damages, held; in determining whether a
plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to support an award of punitive damages, the
reviewing court shall consider the “clear and convincing” evidentiary standard.]
[Tort Law - Punitive damages, held; a plaintiff seeking punitive damages has no obligation
to establish a defendant’s ability to pay.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 33
September Term, 2003
DARCARS MOTORS OF SILVER
SPRING, INC.
 V.
 
MARCIN BORZYM
Bell, C.J.
                    *Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Filed:   February 9, 2004
*Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in
the hearing and conference of this case
while an active member of this Court; after
being recalled pursuant to the Constitution,
Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated
in the decision and adoption of this opinion.
1
Darcars never cashed the check and, at some point, returned it to Borzym.
Darcars Motors of Silver Spring, Inc., petitioned this Court to review an award for
punitive damages in favor of Marcin Borzym, who prevailed in a jury trial on a claim of
conversion against Darcars.  We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the
jury’s finding that actual malice motivated the tort.  Further, we hold that Borzym had no
duty to present evidence of Darcars’ financial condition in support of his pursuit of a punitive
damage award.
I. Background
In late March of 2000, Marcin Borzym, who was 21 years old at the time, visited
Darcars several times to consider purchasing a 1999 BMW 323i, which he had seen
advertised in a newspaper for $27,500.  The first of these visits took place on Sunday, March
26, when Borzym met with a salesperson, Juste Bahula, and test drove the BMW.  Borzym
returned to Darcars the following Monday to negotiate the purchase of the car.  Again, he
met with Bahula, who discussed various aspects of the potential purchase and accepted a
personal check for $3,000 from Borzym as a symbol of his willingness to negotiate
seriously.1  Two days later, Borzym stopped by Darcars for further negotiations after Bahula
telephoned him.  Borzym and Bahula discussed a lower purchase price of $26,000 because
there was a scratch on one of the wheel rims, and Darcars permitted Borzym to take the
BMW for inspection by another dealer.  On Thursday, after the inspection was completed
without any problems discovered, Borzym returned the BMW to Darcars.  Borzym then
informed Darcars that he would come back to the dealer the next day to purchase the BMW.
2
The purchase order, signed by both Quander and Borzym, indicates that a cash deposit
of $2,500 was submitted with the order and was credited to the purchase price of $26,000.
The retail installment contract, however, shows that a $5,000 deposit had been received.
-2-
Borzym returned to purchase the car during the evening of Friday, March 31.  To
complete the purchase, Borzym met with a finance manager of Darcars, Douglas Quander,
who was responsible for negotiating the amount of the down-payment and other payment
terms, including financing rates.  Borzym handed $2,500 in cash to Quander as a down-
payment.  In addition, Quander had Borzym complete and sign several documents, including
(1) a credit application, (2) a purchase order, (3) a retail installment contract, (4) a
supplementary agreement to a conditional sales contract, (5) an application for a certificate
of title, and (6) an agreement to provide accidental physical damage insurance.2  Borzym,
however, did not leave with the BMW that night, because he was unable to provide
information about a State Farm automobile insurance policy that he believed would cover the
BMW.  When he returned, once again, to the dealer early Saturday morning, he provided the
insurance information and left with the BMW.  On Sunday, Borzym realized that he had not
received any documents reflecting the BMW purchase, so he returned to Darcars, picked up
copies of the paperwork, and left without incident.
On Monday morning, Darcars representatives began to question the accuracy of some
of the information contained in the sales documents.  That day, Robin Stein, a financial
services manager from Darcars, and Quander contacted Borzym by phone to tell him that
there was a problem with his automobile insurance information and that he needed to provide
-3-
information of a different policy.  Borzym responded to their requests by obtaining a new
policy and informing Stein about that policy information on Tuesday morning.  Later that
afternoon, Stein called back several more times, however, complaining of further
discrepancies in the paperwork and asking Borzym to return to Darcars as soon as he could
so they could resolve the issue. 
Quander also called Tuesday afternoon in hopes of persuading Borzym to meet with
him as soon as possible to address the discrepancies in the paperwork.  He was so eager to
meet Borzym that he offered him a $500 car service credit if Borzym would come into the
dealership.  In addition, Quander told Borzym that he was willing to meet him on Tuesday
at 10:00 p.m. at Borzym’s health club.  No meeting took place on Tuesday, however.
Borzym had no further contact with Darcars until the morning of Thursday, April 6,
when he walked to the garage where he had parked the BMW and was surprised to see a
truck from a repossession company towing the car from the garage.  Borzym asked the driver
why the BMW was being repossessed, and the driver told him that there was a “problem”
with the “dealership” and that he should go there to resolve it.  Inside the BMW when it was
repossessed were, according to Borzym, his laptop computer, which he valued at
approximately $1500, and his collection of music CDs, which he valued at $300.  
Borzym called Darcars immediately and spoke to Stein.  When he asked why the
BMW had been repossessed, she refused to give him a reason over the phone but told him
to come to the dealer to discuss the matter.  Borzym complied, making it to Darcars later that
-4-
evening to meet with Stein and two other representatives of Darcars, a sales manager and the
head of Darcars security.  One of the Darcars representatives told Borzym that the car had
been repossessed because Borzym “didn’t pay anything.”  Borzym insisted that he had paid
$2,500.  He asked for the return of either the BMW with his belongings, the laptop and CDs,
or the return of his deposit and his belongings.  One of the Darcars  representatives replied,
“Forget about it.  Get out of here. . . . [C]all your attorney.”  The representative told Borzym
that the BMW had been taken to a different lot, and as for the laptop and CDs, he should
“[j]ust forget about it, just get out of the office, [and] get lost.”
Followed by Darcars staff, Borzym walked outside, where he met his father.  When
Borzym’s father learned what had happened with the BMW and his son’s belongings, he
became upset and confronted Darcars staff.  One of the personnel who had met with Borzym
began “waving goodbye and making fun” of the Borzyms.  This prompted Borzym’s father
to walk closer to the staff member, but a security officer stepped in the way.  The staff
member then began “cursing out” the Borzyms, accusing them of being “thieves.”  Darcars
did not return the $2,500 cash down-payment, nor did Borzym recover the laptop and CDs
that had been taken during the repossession.
Alleging causes of action for breach of contract, conversion, fraud, illegal
repossession and punitive damages, Borzym sued Darcars on May 8, 2000, in the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County.  The Circuit Court dismissed his claims of fraud, illegal
repossession and punitive 
damages, and Borzym amended his complaint to allege only breach
3
To reach a compensatory damage verdict of $4300, the jury added $1800, the value
of Borzym’s laptop and CDs, to the alleged cash down-payment of $2500.  We question
whether the $2500 cash payment should have been recovered in conversion, however.  As
a general rule, money, i.e., currency, is not subject to a claim of conversion unless the
plaintiff seeks to recover specific segregated or identifiable funds.  Allied Investment Corp.
& Allied Venture Partnership v. Jasen, 354 Md. 547, 564, 731 A.2d 957, 966 (1999); Lawson
v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 69 Md. App. 476, 481-82, 518 A.2d 174, 176-77
(1986); see also Limbaugh v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 732 F.2d 859, 862
(1984) (applying Alabama law and stating that, generally, an action for the conversion of
cash will not lie unless the cash is “specific money capable of identification”); ATD Corp.
v. Daimlerchrysler Corp., 261 F. Supp. 2d 887, 898 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (stating that, under
Ohio law, an action for conversion of cash lies “only where the money involved is
‘earmarked’ or is specific money capable of identification . . . and where there is an
obligation to keep intact and deliver this specific money rather than to merely deliver a
certain sum”).  Unlike with the laptop and CDs that were identifiable items over which
Darcars exercised control, Darcars did not have an obligation to return the specific bills used
for the down-payment.  Rather, once Darcars repossessed the BMW, Darcars owed a debt
of money, which could have been satisfied by payment by check or other currency besides
the specific bills that Borzym tendered.  It is doubtful that a claim of conversion was
available to Borzym as a means to recover the $2500.
Consequently, Borzym should have maintained the action for breach of contract to
recover the cash payment.  His breach of contract claim, however, never reached the jury
because the trial judge, mid-trial, decided not to instruct the jury on breach of contract and
narrowed the claims to one of conversion.  Whether this occurred at Borzym’s request, by
agreement of the parties, or by order of the judge, sua sponte, is not clear from the record.
What is clear, however, is that Darcars did not argue before the Circuit Court, the
Court of Special Appeals, or this Court that cash could not be the subject of conversion.
Moreover, neither Borzym nor Darcars have claimed in this proceeding that the conversion
claim, itself, was faulty or that the award of compensatory damages should be set aside.  We,
-5-
of contract, conversion, punitive damages, and illegal repossession.  Before trial, the court
granted summary judgment to Darcars on the illegal repossession claim, and, during trial,
Borzym abandoned his claim of breach of contract.  Only Borzym’s claim that Darcars
converted Borzym’s $2500 down-payment, laptop, and CDs went to the jury, which on April
3, 2001, returned a $4,300 verdict3 in favor of Borzym and made a specific finding that
therefore, have no occasion to disturb the jury’s verdict on those grounds.  See Maryland
Rule 8-131(b) (limiting the scope of this Court’s review, generally, to those issues raised in
the petition for certiorari or cross-petition).
4
Borzym also filed a cross appeal in which it claimed that the Circuit Court abused its
discretion in reducing the jury’s punitive damage award of $100,000 to $25,000.  The Court
of Special Appeals held that the Circuit Court used appropriate discretion in reducing the
award, and Borzym did not challenge this ruling in any cross-petition for certiorari.  
-6-
Darcars had acted with actual malice, warranting punitive damages. After hearing testimony
on the amount of punitive damages, the jury returned a punitive damage award of $100,000.
The Circuit Court reduced that award to $25,000 after Darcars filed a Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict and/or Motion for Remittitur.  Darcars thereafter appealed.
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court.  Darcars
Motors of Silver Spring, Inc. v. Borzym, 150 Md. App. 18, 818 A.2d 1159 (2003).  The
intermediate appellate court addressed three issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient
to support a finding of actual malice, (2) whether Borzym adequately pled a claim for
punitive damages, and (3) whether the evidence of Darcars’ financial condition was
sufficient to support the $25,000 punitive damage award.4  As to the first issue, the court held
that circumstances of the case allowed an inference to be drawn that Darcars acted with
actual malice when it converted Borzym’s down-payment, laptop, and CDs.  According to
the Court of Special Appeals, one incident that stood out as suggesting malice was the
conversation in which a Darcars employee told Borzym to “[f]orget about it,” “[g]et out of
here,” “[c]all your attorney,” and “[g]et lost.”  Id. at 51, 818 A.2d at 1177.  The court also
found it notable that Darcars did not assert a claim of right to the $2,500 or that it had an
-7-
honest belief that it was entitled to the $2,500 at issue.  Id. at 52, 818 A.2d at 1178.  With
respect to the second issue, the court concluded that Borzym’s pleadings constituted an
adequate demand for punitive damages and alleged facts that would support a claim of actual
malice.  Id. at 57, 818 A.2d at 1181.  Thirdly, as to the amount of the punitive damages, the
court identified evidence in the record that Darcars was profitable and financially sound and
that the dealer sold over 1000 cars per year at prices ranging from $32,000 and $61,000.
This evidence, the court held, was sufficient to support the “relatively modest” punitive
damage award of $25,000.  Id. at 58-59, 818 A.2d at 1182.
We granted Darcars’ petition for a writ of certiorari, Darcars v. Borzym, 376 Md. 49,
827 A.2d 112 (2003), which presented the following questions:
1. Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that
the evidence presented to support a conversion claim by a
preponderance of the evidence was legally sufficient to support
the finding of actual malice by clear and convincing evidence
required for a punitive damages verdict?
2. Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that
the substantive clear and convincing burden of proof applicable
to punitive damages claims has no bearing on the Court’s legal
determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support those
claims?
3. Whether a defendant’s ability to pay an award of punitive
damages is an essential element of a plaintiff’s claim for
punitive damages in which the plaintiff bears the burden of
proof and the plaintiff failed to meet that burden in this case?
We hold that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain a finding of actual
malice.  We further hold that, in determining the legal sufficiency of evidence supporting
-8-
actual malice, a trial court must consider the “clear and convincing” standard of proof.
Moreover, Borzym had no obligation to present evidence of Darcars’ financial condition;
therefore, the award of punitive damages stands.
II. Discussion
A. The Evidence is Sufficient to Support a Finding of Actual Malice
Darcars contends that the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that the evidence
presented in this case was sufficient to support a finding of actual malice by clear and
convincing evidence.  In Darcars’ view, the evidence minimally supports a claim of
conversion.  Darcars asserts that there was absolutely no evidence that any of its actions were
based on any evil motive, intent to injure, or fraud, and that, without more, the jury had to
“speculate” or “guess” to reach the conclusion that the conversion had been motivated by
actual malice.  Darcars further takes issue with the Court of Special Appeals’ reliance on
Darcars’ failure to raise defenses of “claim of right” or “honest belief” that it was entitled to
the $2,500 down-payment, as it posits that such defenses are not necessary to avoid the
imposition of punitive damages in a conversion claim.
In response to Darcars’ arguments, Borzym argues that clear and convincing evidence
of actual malice supports his claim for punitive damages.  The tort of conversion, according
to Borzym, has been committed with actual malice if the evidence shows that the defendant
consummated the conversion willfully and with knowledge of the wrong. In Borzym’s
opinion, Darcars demonstrated knowledge of the wrongfulness of the conversion when its
-9-
representative refused to return Borzym’s belongings and stated, “[f]orget about it. Get out
of here. Call your attorney. Get lost.”
Conversion is an intentional tort, consisting of two elements, a physical act combined
with a certain state of mind.  The physical act can be summarized as “any distinct act of
ownership or dominion exerted by one person over the personal property of another in denial
of his right or inconsistent with it.” Allied Investment Corp. v. Jasen, 354 Md. 547, 560, 731
A.2d 957, 963 (1999) (quoting Interstate Ins. Co. v. Logan, 205 Md. 583, 588-89, 109 A.2d
904, 907 (1954)).  This act of ownership for conversion can occur either by initially acquiring
the property or by retaining it longer than the rightful possessor permits.  As we explained
in Merchants’ Nat’l Bank v. Williams, 110 Md. 334, 351-52, 72 A. 1114, 1117 (1909):
Conversion, in the sense of the law of trover, consists either in
the appropriation of the property of another, or in its destruction,
or in exercising dominion over it in defiance of the owner’s
rights, or in withholding the possession from him under an
adverse claim of title, and all who aid, command, assist, or
participate in the commission of such unlawful acts are liable.
Later, in Wallace v. Lechman & Johnson, Inc., 354 Md. 622, 732 A.2d 868 (1999), we again
discussed the types of acts that may give rise to a claim of conversion:
[T]he gist of a conversion is not the acquisition of the property
by the wrongdoer, but the wrongful deprivation of a person of
property to the possession of which he is entitled.  Nor need
there exist a forcible dispossession of property to constitute an
act of the defendant a conversion.  A conversion may consist of
a wrongful, tortious or unlawful taking of property from the
possession of another by theft, trespass, duress, or fraud and
without his consent or approbation, either express or implied.
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Id. at 633, 732 A.2d at 874 (quoting Saunders v. Mullinix, 195 Md. 235, 240, 72 A.2d 720,
722 (1950)).  In this case, the jury found that Darcars’ act of retaining Borzym’s $2500
down-payment, laptop and music CDs amounted to an unlawful exercise of dominion over
that property.
Besides the physical act of exerting unlawful control, there is an intent element to the
tort of conversion, and a wide range of different states of mind qualify.  At a minimum, a
defendant liable of conversion must have “an intent to exercise a dominion or control over
the goods which is in fact inconsistent with the plaintiff’s rights.”  Keys v. Chrysler Credit
Corp., 303 Md. 397, 414, 494 A.2d 200, 208 (1985).  The defendant may have the requisite
intent even though he or she acted in good faith and lacked any consciousness of
wrongdoing, as long as there was an intent to exert control over the property.  For example,
“[a] purchaser of stolen goods or an auctioneer who sells them in the utmost good faith
becomes a converter, since the auctioneer’s acts are an interference with the control of the
property.”  Id.
We have said that, when conversion occurs in these circumstances, punitive damages
are not appropriate.  K & K Management v. Lee, 316 Md. 137, 174-79, 557 A.2d 965, 983-85
(1989) (holding that, although the defendant was liable for conversion, punitive damages
were unjustified because of an absence of actual malice); Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Hevey,
275 Md. 50, 56, 338 A.2d 43, 47 (1975) (reversing an award for punitive damages where the
defendant believed that it was entitled to the converted property and, therefore, committed
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the conversion without any evil or bad intention); Siegman v. Equitable Trust Co., 267 Md.
309, 316, 297 A.2d 758, 761 (1972) (holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to punitive
damages because the conversion occurred not out of an evil motive but as a result of the
defendant’s mistake of law).
Conversion, of course, also may occur when the defendant’s intent reaches the level
of “actual malice.” See Middle States Holding Co., Inc. v. Thomas, 340 Md. 699, 702, 668
A.2d 5, 7 (1995);  K & K Management, 316 Md. at 174-79, 557 A.2d 983-85; Food Fair
Stores, 275 Md. at 56, 338 A.2d at 47; Siegman, 267 Md. at 316, 297 A.2d at 761.  We have
held that, where a defendant commits a tort with “actual malice,” a jury may award the
plaintiff punitive damages.  Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 339 Md. 701, 736, 664 A.2d 916,
933 (1995); Ellerin v. Fairfax Savings, F.S.B., 337 Md. 216, 241, 652 A.2d 1117, 1129
(1995); Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. B. Dixon Evander & Assocs., Inc., 336 Md. 635, 652,
650 A.2d 260, 269 (1994); Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 463, 601 A.2d 633, 654
(1992).  Punitive damages are awarded “[based] upon the heinous nature of the defendant’s
tortious conduct,”  Zenobia, 325 Md. at 454, 601 A.2d at 649, and they serve the purpose of
punishing the particular tortfeasor and deterring conduct similar to that which underlay the
tort.  Id.; see Philip Morris, Inc. v. Angeletti, 358 Md. 689, 773-74, 752 A.2d 200, 246-47
(2000); Bowden v. Caldor, 350 Md. 4, 22, 710 A.2d 267, 276 (1998); Owens-Corning
Fiberglass Corp. v. Garrett, 343 Md. 500, 537-38, 682 A.2d 1143, 1161 (1996).   
In recent years, the law of punitive damages has undergone significant development.
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See, e.g., Montgomery Ward, 339 Md. at 736, 663 A.2d at 933; Ellerin, 337 Md. at 241, 652
A.2d at 1129; Alexander & Alexander, 336 Md. at 652, 650 A.2d at 269; Zenobia, 325 Md.
at 463, 601 A.2d at 654.  The leading case in this effort is Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, in
which Judge Eldridge, writing for the Court, made it clear that a jury may award punitive
damages only when a plaintiff has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant acted with “actual malice.”  325 Md. at 460, 601 A.2d at 652.  We have defined
the term “actual malice” as “conduct of the defendant characterized by evil motive, intent to
injure, ill will, or fraud.”  Id.; see Bowden, 350 Md. at 23, 710 A.2d at 276; Scott v. Jenkins,
345 Md. 21, 33, 690 A.2d 1000, 1006 (1997); Ellerin, 337 Md. at 228-29, 652 A.2d at 1123.
With respect to the clear-and-convincing standard of proof, we regarded it as “appropriate
in the assessment of punitive damages because of their penal nature and potential for
debilitating harm.”  Zenobia, 325 Md. at 469, 601 A.2d at 657.
Our opinions in recent punitive damage cases have examined the intent element of
various torts, other than conversion, and defined the type of wrongful motive that may
qualify as “actual malice.”  In Zenobia, this Court explained what is meant by “actual malice”
in the context of products liability, emphasizing that “negligence alone, no matter how gross,
wanton, or outrageous, will not satisfy [the] standard [of actual malice].”  325 Md. at 463,
601 A.2d at 654.  Rather, evidence supports a finding of actual malice if it shows by clear
and convincing evidence that the defendant made “a bad faith decision . . . to market a
product, knowing of the defect and danger, in conscious or deliberate disregard of the threat
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to the safety of the consumer.”  Id. (emphasis added).
In Ellerin, the Court considered the availability of punitive damages where the
defendant had committed fraud.  337 Md. at 234, 652 A.2d at 1126.  We examined whether
fraud “inherently involves the state of mind and conduct which is ordinarily required for the
allowability of punitive damage.”  Id. at 229, 652 A.2d at 1123.  We reemphasized that only
evidence of “actual malice” supports an award of punitive damages:  “Maryland law has
limited the availability of punitive damages to situations in which the defendant’s conduct
is characterized by knowing and deliberate wrongdoing.”  Id. at 228, 233, 652 A.2d at 1123,
1125.  Because one could commit fraud with only “reckless disregard” for the truth, we
concluded that not all instances of fraud warrant the imposition of punitive damages.  Id. at
235, 652 A.2d at 1126.  Nevertheless, a plaintiff satisfies the element of “actual malice” and
supports a punitive damage award when the evidence shows that the defendant committed
fraud with “actual knowledge of falsity, coupled with [an] intent to deceive.”  Id. at 234, 652
A.2d at 1126.  
In Montgomery Ward, a case involving the tort of malicious prosecution, we
reaffirmed the notion that only evidence of “actual malice” supports an award of punitive
damages.  339 Md. at 735-36, 663 A.2d at 933.  We stated that, in a claim of malicious
prosecution, punitive damages may be awarded only if there is clear and convincing evidence
of “the defendant’s wrongful or improper motive for instigating the prosecution” without
probable cause.  Id.  It was not enough for the plaintiff in that case to present evidence only
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of a lack of probable cause, because that alone would allow a punitive damage award where
there is an “inadequacy of investigation.”  Id. at 735, 663 A.2d at 933.  “Inadequacy of
investigation does not mean that [the defendant’s] motive was anything other than bringing
a thief to justice,” a motive that does not equate to actual malice.  Id.
Like in the context of products liability, fraud, and malicious prosecution, the
availability of punitive damages for the tort of conversion depends on the intent of the
tortfeasor.  While a plaintiff may obtain a compensatory damage award by proving merely
that the defendant, without bad faith, intended to exert unlawful dominion over the plaintiff’s
property, punitive damages may be awarded only if the defendant demonstrated “actual
malice” in carrying out the conversion.  The term “actual malice” in the context of
conversion requires little explanation beyond the definition we have established in our
previous cases: consciousness of the wrongdoing or “conduct of the defendant characterized
by evil motive, intent to injure, ill will, or fraud.”  Zenobia, 325 Md. at 460, 601 A.2d at 652;
see Bowden, 350 Md. at 23, 710 A.2d at 276; Scott, 345 Md. at 33, 690 A.2d at 1006;
Montgomery Ward, 339 Md. at 735-36, 663 A.2d at 933; Ellerin, 337 Md. at 228-29, 652
A.2d at 1123.  Where the defendant converts property with a consciousness of the
wrongfulness of that conversion, he or she possesses the requisite improper motive to justify
the imposition of punitive damages. 
The evidence presented in this case is sufficient to demonstrate that Darcars had an
improper motive in converting Borzym’s $2,500 cash down-payment, laptop, and music CDs.
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When Borzym met with Darcars employees to discuss the repossession of the BMW and to
inquire about his down-payment, laptop, and CDs, a Darcars representative told him to
“Forget about it.  Get out of here. . . . [C]all your attorney” and “get lost.”  Darcars did not
make the BMW available to Borzym to retrieve his belongings, and even after Borzym had
left the dealership office, Darcars representatives continued their inappropriate behavior.
Outside the office, when Borzym’s father learned of his son’s troubles and approached
Darcars officials, they began sarcastically waving goodbye to the Borzyms, and one Darcars
employee “cursed out” the father and son and accused them of being thieves.
Evidence of this conduct provides a sufficient basis for the jury’s conclusion that
Darcars representatives acted with actual malice in the unlawful retention of Borzym’s
property.  The evidence of Darcars employees pretentiously dismissing Borzym’s inquiries
about his property, cursing, and then commenting, “get lost” and “call your attorney,”
suggests malice.  That evidence, combined with evidence of the heated exchange between
Darcars personnel and Borzym, certainly could lead to the conclusion that the conversion of
the property was, in effect, a retaliation for Borzym’s failure to resolve the dispute on
Darcars’ terms.  Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of
actual malice.
B. Actual Malice Must Be Supported by Clear and Convincing Evidence
This Court’s holding in Zenobia left no question as to what level of proof is required
for a plaintiff to establish “actual malice” in support of a claim for punitive damages.  A
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party seeking punitive damages must prove actual malice by “clear and convincing
evidence.”  325 Md. at 469, 601 A.2d at 657.  As we stated in Zenobia:
Use of a clear and convincing standard of proof will help to
insure that punitive damages are properly awarded.  We hold
that this heightened standard is appropriate in the assessment of
punitive damages because of their penal nature and potential for
debilitating harm.  Consequently, in any tort case a plaintiff
must establish by clear and convincing evidence the basis for an
award of punitive damages. 
Id.
In the case now before us, after holding that the evidence in this case was legally
sufficient to support a finding of actual malice, the Court of Special Appeals deviated from
the central issues.  It expressed the view that the “clear and convincing” standard of proof
has no bearing on a court’s determination of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting actual
malice.  Stated somewhat differently, it held that a trial judge should not consider the
heightened standard in deciding whether a plaintiff had met the burden of production on the
issue of actual malice, which, if met, would allow the question of actual malice to reach the
jury.  In the intermediate appellate court’s view, “clear and convincing evidence” relates only
to the burden of persuasion –  the level of certainty at which the jury must be convinced that
“actual malice” motivated the tort.  Darcars argues that this holding contradicts precedent
from both this Court and the United States Supreme Court.  We agree.
The Supreme Court case of Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct.
2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986), speaks most directly to this issue.  Anderson involved a libel
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suit of the variety described in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710,
11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964), under which liability is established only upon a finding of “actual
malice” by clear and convincing evidence.  The inquiry before the Anderson Court was
“whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the heightened evidentiary requirements
that apply to proof of actual malice in this New York Times case need not be considered for
the purposes of a motion for summary judgment.”  Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247, 106 S. Ct.
2509, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 211. 
The Court discussed the analogous scenario of a motion for acquittal in a criminal
case, where “the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applies and . . . the trial judge asks
whether a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 252, 106 S. Ct.
at 2512, 91 L. Ed 2d at 214.  Comparing this to a decision to allow the question of “actual
malice” to go to the jury, the Court stated that a trial judge should consider “whether a
reasonable factfinder could conclude . . . that the plaintiff had shown actual malice with
convincing clarity.”  Id. (emphasis added).  The Court explained:
Thus, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge
must view the evidence presented through the prism of the
substantive evidentiary burden.  This conclusion is mandated by
the nature of the determination.  The question here is whether a
jury could reasonably find either that the plaintiff proved his
case by the quality and quantity of evidence required by the
governing law or that he did not.  Whether a jury could
reasonably find for either party, however, cannot be defined
except by the criteria governing what evidence would enable the
jury to find for either the plaintiff or the defendant: It makes no
sense to say that a jury could reasonably find for either party
without some benchmark as to what standards govern its
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deliberations and within what boundaries its ultimate decision
must fall, and these standards and boundaries are in fact
provided by the applicable evidentiary standards.   
Id. at 254-55, 106 S. Ct. at 2513, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 215-16.  The Court also stated that the trial
court must consider the “substantive evidentiary burden” at both the directed verdict and
summary judgment stages.  Id. at 255, 106 S. Ct. at 2514, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 216.  In summary,
the Court stated:
[A] court ruling on a motion for summary judgment must be
guided by the New York Times “clear and convincing”
evidentiary standard in determining whether a genuine issue of
actual malice exists – that is, whether the evidence presented is
such that a reasonable jury might find that actual malice had
been shown with convincing clarity.
Id. at 257, 106 S. Ct. at 2514-15, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 217. 
Our cases support a conclusion consistent with Anderson.  Recently, in White v. State,
363 Md. 150, 767 A.2d 855 (2001), we considered the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
a conviction for cocaine possession in light of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of
proof.  The function in reviewing evidentiary sufficiency, we explained, is to “determine
whether the verdict was supported by sufficient evidence, direct or circumstantial, which
could convince a rational trier of fact of the defendant’s guilt of the offenses charged beyond
a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 162, 767 A.2d at 862.  Furthermore, 
[a]lthough a conviction may rest on circumstantial evidence
alone, a conviction may not be sustained on proof amounting
only to strong suspicion or mere probability. . . . [The evidence]
must do more than raise the possibility or even the probability
of guilt.  It must afford the basis for an inference of guilt beyond
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a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 162-63, 767 A.2d at 862 (citations omitted).  Based on these principles after reviewing
the requirements for the crime of possession of cocaine, we reversed White’s conviction
because 
the circumstantial evidence upon which the State’s case rested
was insufficient as a matter of law to support, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that [White] exercised dominion or control
over the cocaine . . . .  Although [the evidence] might form the
basis for a strong suspicion as to [White’s] culpability, the
evidence, and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, does not
reach the standard of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 167, 767 A.2d at 864.
The test for sufficiency of the evidence in criminal cases, itself, demonstrates that the
heightened standard of proof plays a part in the outcome of this legal determination.  The
test, as recited in Will v. State, 329 Md. 370, 620 A.2d 295 (1993), is “whether the evidence
either shows directly or supports a rational inference of the facts to be proved, from which
a trier of fact could be convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the defendant’s guilt of the
offense charged.”  Id. at 376, 620 A.2d at 297 (quoting Wilson v. State, 261 Md. 551, 564,
276 A.2d 214 (1991).  It appears from this formulation that more facts are needed for a judge
to find evidentiary sufficiency under this test than where a claimant needs proof merely by
a preponderance of the evidence to show, for instance, civil negligence.  Thus, contrary to
the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals, the burden of production fluctuates depending
on the burden of persuasion in a given case. 
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Because meeting the burden of production requires different quanta of evidence
depending on the burden of persuasion, a judge must account for and consider the
appropriate burden of persuasion in deciding whether to allow the jury to decide an issue.
A judge must not let the jury decide a criminal defendant’s guilt if the evidence could not
establish that the elements have been met beyond a reasonable doubt.  A judge must grant
a civil defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law if the plaintiff failed to present
evidence that could persuade the jury of the elements of the tort by a preponderance of the
evidence.  Likewise, a judge must not allow the jury to consider the issue of “actual malice”
unless the evidence could establish “actual malice” clearly and convincingly.     
When discussing punitive damages, this Court has taken the position that a
determination of evidentiary sufficiency of actual malice requires consideration of the “clear
and convincing” standard.  In ACandS, Inc. v. Godwin, 340 Md. 334, 388, 390, 667 A.2d
116, 142-43 (1995), we affirmed the trial court’s determination that plaintiffs had not
presented sufficient evidence of “actual malice” to allow the jury to consider the issue.  The
plaintiffs, victims of asbestos-related disease, had prevailed in their personal injury and
wrongful death claims for compensatory damages against ACandS, Inc., an insulation
contractor.  Id. at 345, 667 A.2d at 121.  The plaintiffs argued that punitive damages were
warranted because the defendant acted with “actual malice” by marketing products
containing asbestos in “bad faith.”  Id. at 387, 667 A.2d at 141-42.  Following our review of
the evidence of bad faith, we stated that the “variety of inferences” drawn from that evidence
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“prevents [it] from rising to the clear and convincing standard of required for a finding of bad
faith marketing.”  Id. at 388, 667 A.2d at 142.  Clearly considering the heightened burden of
persuasion required for proving “actual malice,” we concluded that “[t]here is a want of clear
and convincing evidence that ACandS marketed asbestos products in bad faith, knowing of
the danger to bystanders, and in conscious or deliberate disregard of the threat to the safety
of bystanders.”  Id. at 390, 667 A.2d at 143.
In a related asbestos case, ACandS, Inc. v. Asner, 344 Md. 155, 686 A.2d 250 (1996),
we again relied on the “clear and convincing” standard in rejecting the plaintiffs’ claims of
punitive-damage liability.  In Asner, we reviewed the trial judge’s decision to submit the
issue of punitive damages to the jury.  Id. at 161, 686 A.2d at 253.  Because most of the
evidence presented in Asner was exactly the same as that which the Court reviewed in
Godwin, we held that it was insufficient to send to the jury.  Id. at 182, 686 A.2d at 263.  The
additional punitive-damage evidence presented did “not substantially assist the plaintiffs in
reaching the clear and convincing standard” for “actual malice.” Id. at 184, 686 A.2d at 264.
Moreover, the plaintiffs’ analysis of the evidence had no merit because it “ignore[d]” the
requirement that “actual malice” “be proven by clear and convincing evidence.”  Id. at 186,
686 A.2d at 265.
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Garrett, 343 Md. 500, 537-51, 682 A.2d 1143,
1161-68 (1996), provided us with another occasion to review whether certain evidence was
sufficient to allow the plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages to reach the jury.  Like in
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Godwin and Asner, the “clear and convincing” burden of persuasion guided our
determination that the question of “actual malice” should not have reached the jury.  We
stated:  “On the record before us, . . . we cannot say that the evidence of actual malice was
legally sufficient under a clear and convincing evidentiary standard to submit the question
of punitive damages to the jury.”  Id. at 551, 682 A.2d at 1168.    
These punitive-damage cases are consistent with this Court’s review of the evidentiary
sufficiency in fraud cases, where liability must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
See VF Corp. v. Wrexham Aviation Corp., 350 Md. 693, 715 A.2d 188 (1998).  In VF Corp.,
we held: “Our review of the record convinces us, particularly in light of the ‘clear and
convincing’ standard of proof, that there was insufficient evidence of either the knowledge
element or the intent to deceive element for the tort count to have been submitted to the jury.”
Id. at 706, 715 A.2d at 194.  The heightened standard of proof, therefore, affected our legal
determination of evidentiary sufficiency.      
Our conclusion that the “clear and convincing” standard influences the determination
of the evidentiary sufficiency of “actual malice” should not be construed to minimize the role
of the jury.  As the Supreme Court stated in Anderson:
Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the
drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury
functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion
for summary judgment or for a directed verdict.  The evidence
of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences
are to be drawn in his favor. [We do not] suggest that the trial
courts should act other than with caution in granting summary
judgment or that the trial court may not deny summary judgment
-23-
in a case where there is reason to believe that the better course
would be to proceed to a full trial.
477 U.S. at 255, 106 S. Ct. at 2513, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 216 (citations omitted).  Nevertheless,
when called upon to decide the sufficiency of the evidence in support of an award of punitive
damages, judges must consider that the claimant must prove “actual malice” by clear and
convincing evidence.  Notwithstanding our disagreement with the Court of Special Appeals
on this issue, we do concur with that court’s judgment, as we discussed in Part A, supra, that
the evidence presented in this case was sufficient to support a finding of actual malice.  
C.  Plaintiff Has No Burden to Present Evidence
of a Defendant’s Financial Condition
Darcars further argues that the jury and trial court could not make an informed
determination as to the appropriate amount of punitive damages, because Borzym did not
present sufficient evidence of Darcars’ financial condition or ability to pay.  According to
Darcars, Borzym had a burden to present clear and convincing evidence not only that Darcars
was liable for punitive damages, but also that Darcars had the financial ability to pay the
punitive damage award.  
Borzym counters that the jury awarded punitive damages based on “competent
evidence” of Darcars’ financial condition.  In addition, Borzym maintains that the punitive
damage award of $25,000 was not excessive and was reasonably calculated as a deterrent.
Courts currently allow, but do not compel, a plaintiff to present evidence of a
defendant’s financial condition.  Where the plaintiff seeks punitive damages, the trial court,
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may elect, but is not required, to bifurcate the trial so that the jury determines compensatory
claims separate from the claim of punitive damages.  Zenobia, 325 Md. at 473-74 n.29, 601
A.2d 633, 659 n.29.  In Zenobia, we described this practice, which trial courts frequently
employ in light of Maryland Code, § 10-913(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article (1974, 2002 Repl. Vol.) (prohibiting the admission of evidence of the defendant’s
financial means in personal injury actions unless the jury has found first that “punitive
damages are supportable under the facts”):  “[T]he trial court will instruct the jury on the
compensatory claims and on the defendant’s potential liability for punitive damages.  Then,
once the jury has made a finding of liability for punitive damages, the trial court will further
instruct the jury concerning the calculation of a punitive damage award.”  Id.  We stated
plainly in Zenobia, however, that the bifurcated procedure is not mandatory:
If there were two separate damages trials in every case, much of
the evidence at the trial solely on the issue of punitive damages
would duplicate the evidence admitted at the compensatory
damages trial.  Many of the same witness would have to be
recalled to repeat their testimony before the jury.  In light of the
fact that this duplication would burden both witnesses and jurors
as well as waste judicial resources, we believe that mandatory
bifurcation is undesirable.
Id.
Although this bifurcated procedure is not required, the general practice has been to
withhold evidence of a defendant’s ability to pay punitive damages “until and unless the jury
awards compensatory damages and decides to award punitive damages.”  Montgomery Ward
v. Wilson, 101  Md. App. 535, 551, 647 A.2d 1218, 1226 (1994), rev’d on other grounds, 339
-25-
Md. 701, 664 A.2d 916 (1995); see Cole v. Sullivan, 110 Md. App. 79, 86, 676 A.2d 85, 89
(1996).  In describing the rationale behind this practice, the Court of Special Appeals stated:
When and if the jury awards compensatory damages, then the
trial judge can instruct fully on punitive damages after the
presentation of evidence of the defendant’s ability to pay.  There
is but one jury and one trial, although the presentation of
financial evidence is delayed until the appropriate time. Thus,
the trial truly is not divided into two parts, and witnesses need
not be recalled.
Id. at 551, 647 A.2d at 1226.  Once liability for punitive damages has been established,
however, “evidence of a defendant’s ability to pay punitive damages should be considered.”
Id. at 550, 647 A.2d at 1226.
Our cases have never required clear and convincing evidence of a defendant’s
financial condition to support an award of punitive damages.  In Bowden, we made clear that
evidence of a defendant’s financial condition is relevant in determining whether a jury’s
award of punitive damages is excessive.  Bowden, 350 Md. at 28-29, 710 A.2d at 278-79.
We identified nine “legal principles or considerations which should guide a trial court in
determining if a punitive damage award is excessive.”   Id. at 25-26, 27-41, 710 A.2d at 277,
278-85.  Among the nine factors, we included the requirement that the “amount of punitive
damages ‘should not be disproportionate to . . . the defendant’s ability to pay.’”  Id. at 28, 710
A.2d at 278.  In describing this factor, we recognized that “[t]he purpose of punitive damages
is not to bankrupt or impoverish a defendant.”  Id.
We were clear, however, that the factors are not criteria that must be established but,
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rather, guideposts to assist a court in reviewing an award.  As to the nine principles or
factors, we said “not all . . . are pertinent in every case involving court review of punitive
damage awards.”  Id. at 41, 710 A.2d at 285.  In addition, the nine principles are “not
intended to be exclusive or all-encompassing,” and “[o]ther principles may appropriately be
applicable to judicial review of punitive damages awards under particular circumstances.”
Id. 
Sound reasoning supports our view that a plaintiff has no obligation to establish a
defendant’s ability to pay punitive damages.  Compelling a plaintiff seeking punitive
damages to present evidence of a defendant’s financial condition could, on the one hand,
require a plaintiff with limited financial resources to wage a complicated discovery campaign
against a monetarily sated defendant. On the other hand, it would license the plaintiff to
conduct extensive pre-trial discovery of the defendant’s finances to support a measure of
damages that may never be awarded.  Not only could the latter result in a severe invasion of
the defendant’s privacy, but it could also unnecessarily cost the defendant a great deal of time
and money to compile all of its financial information.  
Moreover, placing a burden on plaintiff to introduce evidence of a defendant’s
financial condition will enhance the risk that a jury will place undue emphasis on the
defendant’s wealth.  If that should occur, the jury may become more prone to use information
of a wealthy defendant’s finances to justify an award of punitive damages disproportionately
higher than the gravity of the defendant’s wrongdoing.  As we stated in Bowden, “merely
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because a defendant may be able to pay a very large award of punitive damages, without
jeopardizing the defendant’s financial position, does not justify an award which is
disproportionate to the heinousness of the defendant’s conduct.”  350 Md. at 28, 710 A.2d
at 279.
Based on these reasons, we see no reason to alter the way in which evidence of a
defendant’s ability to pay is presented.  Consequently, a plaintiff does not bear a burden to
present evidence of a defendant’s financial condition in support of its pursuit of punitive
damages.  Our approach comports with the significant number of other jurisdictions that have
addressed the issue.  See, e.g., Smith v. Lightning Bolt Productions, Inc., 861 F.2d 363, 373
(2nd Cir. 1988) (“The incompleteness of the record as to [the defendant’s] net worth is not a
basis for reducing the punitive damages award against him . . . .”); Tolliver v. Amici, 800
F.2d 149, 151 (7 th Cir. 1986) (rejecting the argument that a punitive damages award should
be reversed because the plaintiff failed to introduce sufficient evidence of the defendant’s
net worth); Evans v. Thompson, 762 P.2d 754, 754-55 (Colo. App. 1988) (observing that
evidence of a defendant’s financial condition is not a “prerequisite to an award of exemplary
damages”); Rinaldi v. Aaron, 314 So. 2d 762, 765 (Fla. 1975) (holding that “evidence of [a
defendant’s financial] worth is not a requisite to [a punitive damage] award”); Wilson v.
Colston, 457 N.E.2d 1042, 1044 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (holding that a plaintiff “may obtain an
award for [punitive] damages without introducing evidence of the defendant’s monetary
resources”); Nugent v. Kerr, 543 N.W.2d 688, 691 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that
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“evidence of a defendant’s financial condition . . . is not necessarily an essential element to
prove entitlement to [punitive] damages”); Wagner v. McDaniels, 459 N.E.2d 561, 564 (Ohio
1984) (stating that evidence of a defendant’s net worth is not required before punitive
damages may be awarded); Anderson v. Latham Trucking Co., 728 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Tenn.
1987) (“[T]he plaintiff or the defendant . . . may offer proof of the financial condition of a
defendant, . . . but it is not essential or mandatory that the record contain any such evidence
to sustain an award of punitive damages.”); Hall v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 959 P.2d 109, 112
(Utah 1998) (declining to adopt a rule requiring the plaintiff to present evidence of the
defendant’s relative wealth as a prerequisite to an award of punitive damages); Fahrenberg
v. Tengel, 291 N.W.2d 516, 527 (Wis. 1980) (“Failure to show net worth does not invalidate
the award of punitive damages, but eliminates one factor by which the reasonableness of the
award can be gauged.”).
The Circuit Court applied the correct procedures in this case.  After the jury found
Darcars liable for compensatory damages and that Borzym was entitled to punitive damages,
the Circuit Court allowed Borzym to present evidence regarding the amount of punitive
damages.  During this phase of the trial, Borzym, for the first time, elicited testimony relating
to Darcars’ financial condition and argued that it was able to pay $500,000 in punitive
damages.  Darcars offered no evidence during that part of the proceedings.  The judge then
instructed the jury according to Section 10:12 of the Maryland Civil Pattern Jury Instruction.
The jury determined, specifically, that Darcars converted Borzym’s property with actual
-29-
malice and, as a result, Borzym was entitled to punitive damages of $100,000, which the trial
court later reduced to $25,000.  Borzym had no obligation to establish that Darcars had the
financial ability to pay the award.  Consequently, we shall affirm the award of punitive
damages.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
AFFIRMED;
COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO
BE PAID BY PETITIONER.