Title: Kelley v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Robert Leon Kelley, Jr. v. State of Maryland, No. 45, September Term 2007.  Opinion by
Wilner, J.
WHERE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS FINDING THAT DEFENDANT, WHO STOLE
MULTIPLE ITEMS OF PROPERTY FROM THREE DIFFERENT OWNERS AT
DIFFERENT TIMES AND PLACES, HAD A SINGLE SCHEME TO STEAL FROM
EACH OWNER SEPARATELY BUT NO SINGLE SCHEME TO STEAL FROM ALL
THREE COLLECTIVELY, IT WAS PERMISSIBLE FOR STATE TO CHARGE
THREE SEPARATE FELONIES, ONE FOR THE VARIOUS ITEMS OF PROPERTY
STOLEN FROM EACH OWNER, AND, AS TO EACH COUNT, TO AGGREGATE
THE VALUE OF INDIVIDUAL ITEMS STOLEN FROM THAT OWNER TO MEET
MONETARY THRESHOLD FOR FELONY THEFT, AND IT WAS PERMISSIBLE
FOR THE COURT, UPON CONVICTIONS ENTERED ON EACH COUNT, TO
IMPOSE THREE CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND
No. 45
September Term, 2007
_______________________________________
ROBERT LEON KELLEY, JR.
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
_______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Wilner, Alan M. (Retired, Specially           
        Assigned),
Cathell, Dale R. (Retired, Specially            
        Assigned),
JJ.
_______________________________________
Opinion by Wilner, J.
_______________________________________
                         Filed:   January 9, 2008
1 The Criminal Information filed against Kelley contained 22 counts.  In addition
to the three theft offenses, he was charged with various burglaries and conspiracy.  We
are concerned here only with the sentences imposed on the theft convictions.
Petitioner, Robert Kelley, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for
Washington County on three counts of felony theft – theft of property having a value of
$500 or more.  See Maryland Code, § 7-104(g) of the Criminal Law Article (CL).  The
maximum penalty prescribed for felony theft is imprisonment for fifteen years and a fine
of $25,000.  Upon each of the three convictions in this case, the court imposed a six-year
prison sentence, the sentences to run consecutively for an aggregate of eighteen years.  
The thefts, which petitioner no longer contests, involved multiple items of property
taken from three different owners, over differing periods of time, from three separate
locations a mile or more apart from one another.  Count 5 charged the theft of two items
of property from Mary Trumpower between December 4 and December 18, 2003.  During
that period, an antique sleigh was stolen from her barn and an antique wheelbarrow was
taken from her garage.  Count 11 involved the theft of several items from Donald
Spickler.  During the period November 27 to 29, 2003, an antique sleigh was taken from
Mr. Spickler’s barn and miscellaneous glassware and a toy tank were taken from his
house.  Count 16 dealt with various items taken from Eliza Spickler, Donald Spickler’s
mother.  During the period November 1 to December 18, 2003, certain items were taken
from her vacant house and others were taken from her store.  The house was vacant
because Ms. Spickler was in a nursing home.1  
In each of the theft counts, the State relied on CL § 7-103(f) to aggregate the value
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of each item taken in order to reach the $500 threshold for felony theft.  Section 7-103(f),
which is part of the section dealing with the determination of value for purposes of the
theft law, provides:
“When theft is committed in violation of this part under one
scheme or continuing course of conduct, whether from the
same or several sources:
(1) The conduct may be considered as one crime; and
(2) the value of the property or services may be
aggregated in determining whether the theft is a felony or a
misdemeanor.”
Kelley believes that it is impermissible for the State to aggregate the value of the
property taken with respect to the three individual counts, so as to make the separate
takings one felony theft in each case, but then to consider the three series of thefts
separate for sentencing purposes.  The necessary underpinning of his argument is that he
had but one scheme to steal from all three victims, not three separate schemes, and that all
of the thefts were therefore committed pursuant to that one scheme as one continuing
course of conduct.  Accordingly, he urges, there was only one crime of felony theft, for
which only one sentence could lawfully be imposed.  The argument, as he articulates it, is
that “where the State aggregates and there are not separate schemes, consecutive
sentences merge under the single larceny doctrine.”  As an alternative, he insists that,
because Donald Spickler was in effective control of the property of his mother, Eliza, the
theft of her property must be aggregated with the theft of his property, so, at the most,
there could be only two felony thefts.
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The Court of Special Appeals saw no merit in his argument and, in an unreported
opinion, affirmed the judgment entered by the Circuit Court.  We also see no merit to the
argument and shall therefore affirm the judgment of the intermediate appellate court.
At issue is what is known as the “single larceny doctrine,” the substance of which
this Court first recognized in State v. Warren, 77 Md. 121, 26 A. 500 (1893) and
discussed most recently in State v. White, 348 Md. 179, 702 A.2d 1263 (1997).  The
doctrine developed as a common law principle, and, as we pointed out in White, the issue
of its application, as a common law principle, has arisen principally in three contexts:
“(1) whether a count in a charging document alleging that the
defendant stole the property of several persons at the same
time charges more than one offense and is therefore
duplicitous; (2) whether a prosecution, conviction, or
sentencing for stealing the property of one person bars, under
double jeopardy principles, the prosecution, conviction, or
sentencing for having stolen the property of another person at
the same time; and (3) whether, when the property of different
persons is stolen at the same time, the values of the separate
items of property may be aggregated to raise the grade of the
offense or the severity of the punishment, to the extent that
either is dependent on the value of the property taken.”
Id. at 182, 702 A.2d at 1264.
It was in the first context that the principle arose in Warren, the issue being
whether a count in an indictment that charged the defendant with stealing, at the same
time, several sums of money belonging to different owners was duplicitous: “Does the
stealing of several articles of property at the same time, belonging to several owners,
constitute one offense, or as many separate offenses as these different owners of the
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property stolen?”  Warren, 77 Md. at 122, 26 A. at 500.  
Although recognizing that, at the time, there was some conflict regarding the
matter, this Court, without mentioning the single larceny rule by name, concluded that,
upon principle, “the stealing of several articles at the same time, whether belonging to the
same person or to several persons, constituted but one offense.”  Id.  (Emphasis added). 
The rationale for that ruling was as follows:
It is but one offense because the act is one continuous act, --
the same transaction; and, the gist of the offense being the
felonious taking of the property, we do not see how the legal
quality of the act is in any manner affected by the fact that the
property stolen, instead of belonging to one person, is the
several property of different persons.”
Id.
The Warren Court stressed that the rule applied only when the stealing of the
different articles occurred at the same time, which was consistent with the “one
continuous act” characterization, and was careful to note that “the stealing of property at
different times, whether belonging to the same person or different persons, constituted
separate offenses, . . . .” Id. at 123, 26 A. at 500.  (Emphasis added).  That caveat, which,
in light of the facts of the case was in the nature of dicta, was essentially ignored in at
least two subsequent cases.  In Delcher v. State, 161 Md. 475, 158 A. 37 (1932), the
Court found non-duplicitous a single count of larceny where a bill of particulars showed
that the defendant had stolen money from his employer on several occasions over a nearly
two-year period.  It was not necessary, the Court said, for there to be separate counts
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“covering each of the items in a series of continuing offenses, . . . .”  Id. at 483, 158 A. at
41.
In Horsey v. State, 225 Md. 80, 169 A.2d 457 (1961), the Court, in a per curiam
Opinion that cited neither Warren nor Delcher, essentially followed the Delcher
approach. The defendant was charged with stealing various items of clothing and
accessories on May 23, 1960, from the store at which he was employed, i.e., from a single
owner.  The evidence showed, however, that those items were not all taken at one time
and that he was in possession of some of the property in March.  In light of that, the
defendant argued that separate crimes had been committed and that the State could not
add the value of the property taken in March to the value of the property taken in May in
determining whether the felony threshold had been met.  The Court rejected that
argument and concluded that the trial court could properly have found “that the separate
takings were pursuant to a common scheme or intent” and that it “is generally held that if
they are, the fact that the takings occur on different occasions does not establish that they
are separate crimes.”  Id. at 83, 169 A.2d at 459.  As an alternative holding, the Court
quickly observed that there was sufficient evidence to show that the value of the property
found in the defendant’s possession in March surpassed the felony threshold, and that
“[t]his alone would support the verdict.”
Delcher and Horsey expanded Maryland common law to the point of recognizing
the single larceny doctrine, or at least its substance, where several items of property are
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stolen either at the same time from the same or different people or at different times from
the same owner.  See also Govostis v. State, 74 Md. App. 457, 538 A.2d 338 (1988)
(where evidence showed that defendant loaded victim’s clothing into victim’s car and
then stole both, as part of one criminal scheme, separate sentences for stealing the car and
the clothing could not stand).  The one circumstance still outside the common law rule, or
at least not addressed in that context, was where several items are stolen from different
owners at different times.  That circumstance – the one now before us – is addressed by
statute.
In 1978, the General Assembly, following the lead of the Model Penal Code,
enacted a new, consolidated theft statute that encompassed seven pre-existing larceny
offenses.  See 1978 Md. Laws, ch. 849.  The new statute was the product of a joint
subcommittee of the Legislature.  See REVISION OF MARYLAND THEFT LAWS AND BAD
CHECK LAWS, Joint Subcommittee on Theft Related Offenses, Maryland General
Assembly (1978).  As part of the statute, the Legislature codified the common law single
larceny doctrine as it had been applied in Warren, Delcher, and Horsey and extended it to
cover the previously unaddressed circumstance.  That statute, now codified as CL § 7-
103(f), makes clear that, when theft is committed “under one scheme or continuing course
of conduct, whether from the same or several sources: (1) the conduct may be considered
as one crime; and (2) the value of the property or services may be aggregated in
determining whether the theft is a felony or a misdemeanor.”
2 At the end of that Comment, the joint subcommittee added “For a general
discussion of this provision see Model Penal Code sec. 206.15(3), Comment (Tent. Draft
No. 2, 1954).”  The text of what was then § 206.15(3) of the draft Model Penal Code
(current § 223.1(2)(c)) was very similar to the text proposed by the joint subcommittee
and, with only style changes, is now codified as CL § 7-103(f).  The Comment to §
206.15(3) in Tentative Draft 2 noted: “The scope of the actor’s disregard of property
rights cannot always be judged by looking only at the amount which he takes at a single
moment from a single person.  The bank teller who day after day steals a $20 bill from his
employer will have $600 at the end of a month, and is clearly engaged in felonious theft. 
The driver of a department store delivery truck containing hundreds of parcels, each
worth less than $50, ought not to be regarded as a petty thief, guilty of multiple offenses,
when he sells the contents of the truck to a ‘fence’ and makes off with the proceeds.  A
swindler who moves along the street cheating housewives out of individually petty
amounts is in the same situation, criminologically, although both the place and the victim
change with each transaction.  Subsection (3) adopts unity of victim and unity of scheme
or course of conduct, as alternative bases for determining the scope of the actor’s
thieving.”
-7-
In its Report, the joint subcommittee noted:
“The paragraph on aggregation was inserted on the basis that
a person who steals property at different times from several
persons and places as part of a continuing scheme has
engaged in activity which is just as reprehensible as a person
who steals an equal amount from a single person and place at
one time.  It is a marked departure from the common law
which requires that the property be stolen from a single
person at a single time and place.”2
In that last sentence, the joint subcommittee apparently overlooked this Court’s
pronouncements in Warren, Delcher, and Horsey, which were not mentioned but where,
as noted, the Court had applied at least the substance of the single larceny doctrine where
property was stolen from several persons at the same time or, if as part of a continuing
scheme, from one person at different times.  In those settings, the statute merely codified
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the then-existing Maryland common law.  What the statute clearly added to the law,
however, was that the doctrine could also apply in the setting not reached in Warren,
Delcher, or Horsey –  where, as part of one continuing scheme or course of conduct,
several items are stolen from different persons at different times.
The Court of Special Appeals considered this statutory expansion in State v. Hunt,
49 Md. App. 355, 432 A.2d 479 (1981).  In that case, the defendant was charged in two
counts with stealing goods from seven different stores on a single day.  The two counts
were identical, except that one charged felony theft and the other misdemeanor theft. 
Although all of the thefts were alleged to have occurred on the same day, it appeared that
all of the stores were in one shopping mall, so the court treated the thefts as having
occurred at different times, as Hunt went from one store to another.  Hunt contended that
the counts were duplicitous, because they charged separate offenses, and both the circuit
court and the Court of Special Appeals agreed with him.  
Citing the Maryland statute and the joint subcommittee’s comment, the
intermediate appellate court observed that “before a series of thefts from different owners
at different times and places can be considered as one offense, charged in a single count
of the charging document, and the value of the stolen property aggregated, the thefts must
be committed pursuant to one scheme or continuing course of conduct.”  Id. at 361, 432
A.2d at 482.  The court then added:
“The charging documents in question allege a series of thefts
but fail to allege that they were committed pursuant to one
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scheme or continuing course of conduct.  Therein lies the
problem.  Absent such an allegation, the charging documents
merely allege separate and distinct crimes in a single count
which makes them duplicitous.”
Id.
Although in Hunt the single larceny doctrine was not applied because the
indictment failed to allege a single scheme and continuing course of conduct, the clear
implication is that, had the indictment contained such an allegation and had the State been
able to prove that allegation, a conviction for felony theft would have been sustained.  
White involved the theft of two items of property – a canvas bag and a small
television set –  from a schoolhouse office shared by two or more teachers.  The evidence
indicated that White entered the office and stole the two items at the same time.  It was
not clear who owned the television set, but the case proceeded on the assumption that it
was not owned by the teacher whose canvas bag was stolen, so the case presented the
situation of the theft of two items owned by different persons at the same time.  Instead of
aggregating the value of the items, however, the State charged White with two counts of
misdemeanor theft, of which he was convicted and for which he received consecutive
sentences of eighteen months.  On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals applied the single
larceny doctrine, regarded the two takings as one offense, and merged the convictions,
thereby striking one of the sentences.  We affirmed.
In White, the Court addressed two basic issues raised by the State: first, whether
Maryland had ever, in fact, adopted the common law single larceny rule, and second,
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whether what is now CL § 7-103(f) precluded application of that rule.  As to the first, we
“ma[d]e explicit what might otherwise have been implicit from Warren – that, although
application of the [single larceny] doctrine may depend on the factual circumstances
presented, the single larceny doctrine was part of Maryland common law” and that, under
that common law “the stealing of several articles of property at the same time, belonging
to several owners (or the same owner) ordinarily constituted one offense.”  348 Md. at
192, 702 A.2d at 1269.  (Emphasis in original).  In a footnote to that statement, we
observed that we stressed the word “ordinarily” so as not “to foreclose the prospect of a
different result where the facts clearly would have indicated that separate and distinct
thefts were intended and accomplished” and that, “[i]n such a circumstance, the different
result would not arise from rejection of the single larceny doctrine but rather from a
conclusion that it did not apply.”  Id., n.5.
The second issue raised in White had two parts.  The State argued that, because the
statute defined the crime of theft in terms of exercising unauthorized control over the
property of “the owner” for the purpose of depriving “the owner” of the property, the
Legislature, by referring to “the owner” in the singular, intended to permit separate
convictions for stealing from different owners.  Although accepting that proposition in
principle, we concluded that it did not suffice to repeal the single larceny doctrine, as
contended by the State.  The term “owner,” we said, was not intended to define the unit of
prosecution but merely to identify whose property a person may not exercise unauthorized
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control over.  The State also argued that CL § 7-103(f) was adopted solely for the purpose
of allowing aggregation and that it therefore did not apply in any other context, including
defining the unit of prosecution.  We rejected that as well, concluding that there was
nothing in the legislative history of the statute even to suggest an intent to abrogate the
single larceny doctrine as it had developed in the common law.
We are not concerned here with the pleading issue addressed in Hunt.  As noted,
the Criminal Information filed against Kelley did not co-mingle the thefts from the three
owners, but charged, in separate counts, the thefts from each.  Under Delcher and Horsey,
it was appropriate to regard the multiple takings from each owner as part of one scheme
or continuing course of conduct with respect to that owner and thus to aggregate the value
of the different items stolen from each such owner for purposes of charging one felony
offense.  Kelley does not contest those aggregations.
Two things are clear from White, and most particularly from our footnote 5 in the
White Opinion, see ante.  First, when considering whether the theft of multiple items of
property, at the same time or at different times, from the same owner or from different
owners, constitutes one offense or separate offenses (and with that, whether the value of
the different items can be aggregated or not aggregated), the ultimate criterion is whether
the separate takings were part of a single scheme or continuing course of conduct.  If so,
one offense must be charged and the values may be aggregated to determine whether the
offense is a felony.  To the extent that is not the case, the takings constitute separate
3 The sufficiency of the charging document is ordinarily determined based on what
it alleges; if it seeks to include in one count multiple takings at different times, from
either the same or multiple owners, does it allege a single scheme or course of conduct? 
See State v. Hunt, supra, 49 Md. App. 355, 432 A.2d 479. 
4 Which of the two the State must prove, of course, depends on what the State has
charged and how it has elected to proceed.  In this case, it charged three separate felonies,
and that is what it was obliged to show.
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offenses and aggregation of values is permissible only with respect to the takings
included in each of the respective separate offenses.  
The second lesson from White is that the determination of whether multiple takings
were part of a single scheme or course of conduct, for any purpose other than resolving
the sufficiency of the charging document, 3 is a factual matter that must be based on
evidence.  We observed there that the single larceny doctrine “rests on the notion that the
separate takings are all part of a single larcenous scheme and a continuous larcenous act,
and, when the evidence suffices to establish that fact, directly or by inference, most courts
have had no problem applying the doctrine.”  White, 348 Md. at 188-89, 702 A.2d at
1268.  (Emphasis added).  The question, then, is whether the State has sufficiently
established beyond a reasonable doubt that there was, or, in this case, was not, a single
larcenous scheme or course of conduct. 4
This is necessarily a fact-intensive matter, and, to the extent that it is influenced by
the defendant’s intent, one that, in most instances, must be determined on the basis of
inference.  In Richardson v. Commonwealth, 489 S.E.2d 697, 700 (Va. App. 1997), the
Virginia court noted that “[t]he circumstances to be considered that will bear upon the
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issue are the location of the items stolen, the lapse of time between their taking, the
general and specific intent of the thief, the number of owners, and whether intervening
events occurred between the takings.”  Even with this kind of guidance, however, some of
the decisions in other States are not easy to reconcile.
Our case law, supplemented by CL § 7-103(f) and the gloss put on that statute by
the Comment of the legislative subcommittee that drafted it, makes it much easier to find
the requisite single scheme or continuing course of conduct and apply the single larceny
doctrine to the taking of property from one or several owners at the same time or multiple
takings from a single owner, even if carried out over a period of time.  That seems to be
consistent with the law nationally.  See Daniel H. White, Single or Separate Larceny
Predicated Upon Stealing Property from Different Owners at the Same Time, 37 ALR 3d
1407 (1971); Peter G. Guthrie, Series of Takings Over a Period of Time as Involving
Single or Separate Larcenies, 53 ALR 3d 398 (1973); also White, supra, 348 Md. 179
and cases cited at 188, 702 A.2d 1263 at 1267-68; and cases cited in Dyson v. State, 163
Md. App. 363, 376-77, 878 A.2d 711, 719 (2005).
Although the same principles apply where there are multiple takings from different
owners at different times and at different locations, the courts have been very reluctant to
find a single scheme or continuing impulse or course of conduct in that situation.  See
State v. Rowell, 908 P.2d 1379 (N.M. 1995); People v. Perlstein, 467 N.Y.S.2d 682 (A.D.
1983); State v. Maggard, 61 S.W. 184 (Mo. 1901); State v. Cabbell, 252 N.W.2d 451
-14-
(Iowa 1977).  Indeed, the general rule outside of Maryland seems to be that the takings in
that situation may not be consolidated and regarded as a single offense, but must be
treated as separate offenses.  Professors Torcia and LaFave are in agreement on that
principle.  Torcia notes:
“When several articles are stolen by the defendant from
different owners on different occasions, multiple larcenies are
committed.  It matters not that the takings occur on the same
expedition, and are committed in rapid succession or in
pursuance of a larcenous scheme or plan.”
3 Charles E. Torcia, W HARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW, § 347 (1995).  LaFave states, just as
succinctly, “A thief may steal different articles from different victims at different times
and places, and such takings cannot be aggregated for the purpose of making one grand
larceny out of several petit larcenies.”  3 Wayne R. LaFave, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL
LAW, § 19.4(b) at 82 (2nd ed. 2003).
CL § 7-103(f) is not so rigid.  It would allow a court, upon evidence establishing
the fact beyond a reasonable doubt, to find that takings from different owners at different
times and locations were pursuant to a single scheme and constituted a continuing course
of conduct.  Such a single scheme conceivably may be found where multiple takings from
different owners at different locations are in quick and unbroken succession and from a
limited area.  As noted, State v. Hunt, supra, 49 Md. App. 355, 432 A.2d 479, left that
implication. Where there is a more significant time lapse between the takings, however,
or they occur from locations that are not in very close proximity, the general rule that the
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takings are not part of a single scheme or a continuing course of conduct should be
applied, for it is far more difficult to infer a single scheme or continuing impulse or
course of conduct in that situation.
This is not a case in which the takings from the three owners occurred in quick and
unbroken succession or from a limited area or from locations that were in close 
proximity.  They occurred during different time periods, at least two of which (Mary
Trumpower and Donald Spickler) did not even overlap; there was no evidence that any of
the takings from one owner occurred in quick or unbroken succession of those from
another; and, as noted the locations were separated from each other by at least a mile.  For
these reasons, we agree that the State proved three separate felony thefts and that separate
sentences were appropriately imposed on each of them.  The fact that Donald Spickler
exercised some general dominion and control over the property of his mother, Eliza,
while she was in a nursing home, is irrelevant.  There were still separate thefts.
JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.