Title: In Interest of SVG

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

In Interest of SVG1992 WY 18826 P.2d 237Case Number: C-91-7Decided: 02/04/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE 
INTEREST OF SVG, a Minor Child: TG, a/k/a TK, Appellant 
(Respondent),

 
 
v.

 
 
MARIANNE 
LEE, Director of NATRONA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND SOCIAL 
SERVICES, Appellee (Petitioner).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty, the Honorable Dan Spangler, 
Judge.

 
 
James A. 
Raymond of Brown, Raymond & Rissler, P.C., for appellant.

 
 
Joseph 
B. Meyer, Attorney General; Michael Lee Hubbard, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; and Richard E. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

 
 
Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY, and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

 
 
URBIGKIT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This appeal follows our 
recent decision in In Interest of DG, 825 P.2d 369 (Wyo. 1992) (No. C-91-2, 
decided 1/29/92) in again requiring us to address jurisdictional requirements to 
terminate parental rights to a very young child. The utilization of summary 
judgment for the parental rights termination action presents an additional issue 
in this appeal. 

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
reverse.

 
 

I. 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶3.]     Stated as issues by 
appellant are:

 
 
I.

 
 
Whether 
the order terminating appellant's parental rights is void because the case was 
filed by Marianne Lee, Director   of DPASS, and not by an attorney 
authorized to practice law in this state.

 
 
II.

 
 
Whether 
the court erred in granting summary judgment.

 
 
III.

 
 
Whether 
the district court's order should be reversed  because the district court 
did not make specific findings as to the grounds for termination of appellant's 
parental rights.

 
 

[¶4.]     We add the dispositive 
problem addressed in In Interest of DG of the lack of jurisdiction 
because of the failure to secure proper service of process. Gookin v. State 
Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 826 P.2d 229 (Wyo. 1992); Interest of DG, 825 P.2d 369 ( 
Wyo. 1992). 

 
 

II. 
FACTS

 
 

[¶5.]     This a parental 
termination case for a baby boy who has been, essentially since his birth, in 
the custody of the Natrona County Department of Public Assistance and Social 
Services, now known as the Department of Family Services (Agency). After passing 
his second birthday in Agency maintenance, a petition for termination of the 
mother's parental rights was filed. The father had earlier given the Agency a 
consent to termination and adoption. The petition was filed pro se by the Agency 
director while the mother was then living in Arkansas. The mother, when receiving telephone 
notice from her former mother-in-law about her possible parental rights 
termination, objected to service of process. She first participated individually 
in the  termination proceeding by filing a resistance to the termination 
and then, through appointed counsel, followed with an affidavit to oppose the 
entry of summary judgment against her. However, summary judgment was granted and 
the mother now appeals from that order.

 
 

III. 
LEGAL QUESTIONS PRESENTED

 
 
A. 
Petition Filed Pro Se by the Agency Director

 
 

[¶6.]     This subject has been 
dispositively considered in In Interest of DG. Since other reasons for 
reversal exist, we do not now determine whether the result is jurisdictional 
which would void the proceeding or, conversely, whether plain error would 
require reversal for this case. Cf. In Interest of DG, 825 P.2d 369 
(Wyo. 1992). 

 
 
B. 
Service of Process

 
 

[¶7.]     We are again required 
to examine the service of process for this parental termination case to 
determine whether the trial court ever achieved jurisdiction. Gookin, 826 P.2d 229 (Wyo.1992); Goss v. Goss, 780 P.2d 306 (Wyo. 1989); Midway Oil Corp. v. Guess, 714 P.2d 339 
(Wyo. 1986). 
The problem is similar, but the events not identical, to In Interest of 
DG in petitioner's failure to comply with  W.R.C.P. 4. 

 
 

[¶8.]     On November 15, 1990, 
the petition for termination was filed pro se by the Agency director. A stated 
date for a hearing of January 30, 1991 at 8:00 a.m. was included in the 
petition. A guardian ad litem for the child was appointed on November 16, 1990, 
and the office of the district attorney entered an appearance for the Agency 
twelve days later by the execution of a precipe for a summons. On the day the 
precipe was filed and the summons issued, November 28, 1990, the district 
attorney's office filed an affidavit which stated:  

 
 
COMES 
NOW the State of Wyoming, by and through * * *, 
Assistant District Attorney, and informs the Court that service of summons, 
petition and notification cannot be made on [the mother], natural mother of the 
minor child, * * *, within the State of Wyoming. That attempts of service on [the 
mother] at her last known address of 804 South Lincoln, Casper, Wyoming, were unsuccessful. FURTHER that 
attempts to locate [the mother] by reasonable diligence of the Natrona County 
District Attorney's Office has produced negative results in locating her. 
 

 
 
THEREFORE, 
the State of Wyoming informs the Court that pursuant to 
W.S.   § 14-2-313(b), service by publication to terminate the parental 
rights of [the mother] will be undertaken in accordance with the provisions of 
the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure 4(e), 4(f), 4(g) and 4(h), as said [mother] 
is not presently known to be a resident of the State of Wyoming nor is said 
[mother's] residence known at the present time to the State of Wyoming, FURTHER, 
the State of Wyoming requests that the Clerk of District Court make provision to 
obtain service on the natural mother by publication.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 

[¶9.]     On the same day, 
service of process was commenced with preparation and filing of a notice which 
was then published in a county newspaper of general circulation on December 2, 
9, 16 and 23, 1990, stating in published text:  

 
 
TO: [The 
Mother]

 
 
LKA: 804 
South Lincoln, Casper, Wyoming

 
 
YOU ARE 
HEREBY NOTIFIED * * * You are required to appear at the hearing on this matter 
which has been scheduled for January 30, 1991, at 8:00 a.m. You are further 
notified that failure to make answer to the Court in this matter within thirty 
(30) days [of] the last date of this publication will result in judgement by 
default being entered against you and your right to said minor child forever 
terminated.

 
 

[¶10.]  A summons was also issued on November 28, 
1990, which designated the sheriff to serve it, was then returned for filing on 
December 31, 1990, and included the following as its 
return:

 
 
I, 
   , Sheriff in and 
for said County of Natrona, in the State aforesaid, do hereby certify that I 
received the within Summons, together with a copy of the Petition filed in the 
above entitled matter, and that I served the same in the County aforesaid on the 
    day of 
   , 
19  , by delivering a copy of the same, together with a copy of 
the Petition to [the mother], 804 S. Lincoln, Casper, Wyoming 
82601.

 
 

After 
due and diligent search we were unable to locate [the mother], in Natrona County, Wyoming 12-27-90. MOVED no 
Forwarding.

 
 
Ronald 
L. Ketchum, Sheriff

 
 
By 
  [Signature], Deputy 
Sheriff

 
 

[¶11.]  In response to the published notice, the 
mother sent a letter dated January 17, 1991 to the district court with copies to 
the assistant district attorney and guardian ad litem:  

 
 
I am the 
natural mother of * * * and I have been told by my former mother-in-law who 
lives in Casper, Wyoming that a notice was filed in the 
newspaper in an effort to terminate  my parental 
rights.

 
 

I 
do not want my parental rights terminated. I want 
my child back. I want the opportunity to present my side in court, but I need 
the court to appoint an attorney for me. I have not been served properly with 
any papers and would request that I be served at the above 
address.

 
 
This 
matter is set for a hearing before you on Wednesday, January 30, 1991, at 8:00 
A.M. I would respectfully request a continuance from that date in order [to] 
secure an attorney and allow that attorney time to prepare a defense on my 
behalf. I would respectfully request that you appoint an attorney for me, and I 
would respectfully request that proper service be made on 
me.

 
 
Thank 
you very much for your consideration.

 
 
(Emphasis 
in original.)

 
 

[¶12.]  A pleading response was filed on January 
23, 1991, which stated:  

 
 
IN THE 
INTEREST OF

[SVG]

 
 
CIVIL 
NO. 66663

 
 
RESPONSE

 
 
Comes 
the natural mother of [SVG], * * *, and for her Response to the published notice 
to terminate her parental rights, and states as follows: 
 

 
 
1. I 
have been notified that a notice has been published in an effort to terminate my 
parental rights, but I have not been properly served with any   
papers.

 
 
2. I do 
not want my parental rights terminated. I want my child.

 
 
WHEREFORE, 
the natural mother prays that her parental rights not be terminated, that she be 
restored the custody of her child, and that she be properly served with all 
documents relating to this action, and for all other proper 
relief.

  

* * * 
Natural Mother

115A 
Jessie Turner Terrace

Van 
Buren, 
AR72956

* * 
*

 
 
  [Signature]

 
 
[The 
Mother], pro se

 
 
(Emphasis 
in original.)

 
 

[¶13.]  Included with the filing was a request 
for the appointment of an attorney and a pro se motion for continuance, which 
also stated in part:  

 
 
1. The 
above-styled matter has been set for hearing on the termination of my parental 
rights on Wednesday, January 30, 1991, at 8:00 A.M.

 
 
2. I 
have not been properly served with process and therefore do not know what the 
allegations are against me.

 
 
3. I do 
not have an attorney and have asked the court to appoint one for me. If the 
Court does appoint an attorney to represent me, my attorney will need sufficient 
time to prepare a defense on my behalf.

 
 
4. I 
live in the State of Arkansas and I need time 
[to] arrange transportation to the State of Wyoming.

 
 

[¶14.]  On the date of the  trial court's 
receipt of the three documents, the letter, response and motion, an attorney for 
the mother was appointed who, two days later, followed the previous filings with 
a demand for trial by a jury. In April, the Agency followed these pleadings with 
a motion for summary judgment which was thereafter granted based on the 
supporting and resistive affidavits. The record examination reveals that, as a 
response to the petition, every pro se filing by the mother included efforts to 
contest the adequacy of service of process. Consequently, that issue is now 
clearly presented as a viable appellate issue and no waiver can be interposed. 
Gookin, 826 P.2d 229 (Wyo. 1992); In 
Interest of DG, 825 P.2d 369 (Wyo. 1992); 
Colley v. Dyer, 821 P.2d 565 (Wyo. 1991). 

 
 

[¶15.]  W.R.C.P. 4(f), (g) and (h), which 
provides the Wyoming rule for substitution of service by 
publication, require:  

 
 
(f) * * 
* Before service by publication can be made, an affidavit of the party, his 
agent or attorney, must be filed stating that service of a summons cannot be 
made within this state, on the defendant to be served by publication, and 
stating his address,   if known, or that his address is unknown and cannot 
with reasonable diligence be ascertained * * *. In any case in which service by 
publication is made when the address of a defendant is known, it must be stated 
in the publication. Immediately after the first publication the party making the 
service shall deliver to the clerk copies of the publication, and the clerk 
shall mail a copy to each defendant whose name and address is known by 
registered mail with return receipt requested, directed to his address named 
therein, and make an entry thereof on the appearance 
docket.

 
 
In all 
cases in which a defendant is served by publication of notice and there has been 
no delivery of the notice mailed to him by the clerk, the party who makes the 
service, his agent or attorney, at the time of the hearing and prior to entry of 
judgment, shall make and file an affidavit stating the address of such defendant 
as then known to him, or if unknown, that he has been unable to ascertain the 
same with the exercise of reasonable diligence. Such additional notice, if any, 
shall then be given as may be directed by the court.

 
 
(g) * * 
* The publication must be made by the clerk for four (4) consecutive  weeks 
in a newspaper published in the county where the complaint is filed * * 
*.

 
 
(h) * * 
* Service by publication shall be deemed complete at the date of the   last 
publication, when made in the manner and for the time prescribed in the 
preceding sections; and such service shall be proved by 
affidavit.

 
 
In this 
case: (1) a copy of a notice was not delivered to the clerk for mailing; (2) 
lacking delivery of the notice, the second affidavit was not filed; and (3) 
service was not proved by affidavit.

 
 

[¶16.]  The requirement for litigant diligence in 
an effort to secure a proposed defendant's address is not illusory. It is real 
and absolute. Sincere efforts must be made. Colley, P.2d  (No. 90-210, decided 12/2/91); Midway 
Oil Corp., 714 P.2d 339; Emery v. Emery, 404 P.2d 745 (Wyo. 1965); 
National Supply Co. v. Chittim, 387 P.2d 1010 (Wyo. 1964); Note, Due 
Diligence Required for Service of Publication, 9 Wyo. L.J. 69 (1954). 
Passing the coincidence that the affidavit which was filed presupposed what 
would happen when the sheriff apparently attempted service a month later, 
this  record, as it comes to this court, provides strong indication that 
due diligence by the Agency or its counsel could have produced an address. The 
address of the mother's family in Van 
Buren, Arkansas was 
known. The name of the child's paternal grandmother was also well known to the 
Agency and that person obviously knew how to contact the mother since, when she 
saw the publication, she did forward the information. Additionally, the mother 
states in affidavit:  

 
 
[The 
Agency representative] states that I could not be reached so they placed my baby 
in foster care. They had my mother's telephone number. They knew that Vince was 
my husband and knew how to get in touch with me. They did nothing to attempt to 
contact me and misled the court in stating that I could not be reached. I could 
be reached; they just didn't try. I had been in Arkansas a month when the State took my child 
from me. They didn't try to notify me of anything. I did not receive any notice 
that I was losing my baby.

 
 

[¶17.]  Furthermore, she stated in other 
paragraphs of the affidavit that she had retained regular contact with the 
baby's paternal grandmother who then "told me that there was notice in the 
newspaper  seeking to terminate my parental rights. That's when I 
immediately wrote to the court and told them that I do not want my parental 
rights to [SVG] terminated."  

 
 
I did 
not abandon my son, * * *, nor leave him in the care of another person without 
provision for his support and without communication for at least one (1) year. I 
called [the baby's paternal grandmother] regularly and was misled about the 
circumstances of [SVG's] custody. I had thought [SVG] was with his father and my 
husband. Is it the law that a parent who leaves their child with the other 
parent has abandoned that child? I have not neglected nor abused my child, nor 
has there been any judicial determination that I did. No one has made any 
attempt to rehabilitate the family nor have I refused rehabilitative 
treatment.

 
 

[¶18.]  We need not attempt a factual 
determination on this aspect of service since substantial compliance with other 
requirements -- service by publication under W.R.C.P. 4 -- is not demonstrable 
in this record. Furthermore, it is hard to understand why, in January 1991, when 
objection to service of process was made a matter of record by the mother, that 
personal service in Arkansas was not pursued,   assuming appointed counsel 
and the mother would not accept service or waive the inadequacies of the prior 
efforts to secure service by publication as a matter of written documentation 
formally filed in the record.

 
 

[¶19.]  Lacking substantial compliance with the 
requirements of W.R.C.P. 4, the trial court never obtained jurisdiction to 
determine the termination of parental rights petition. Gookin, P.2d (No. 
91-130, decided 2/3/92); In Interest of DG, P.2d (No. C-91-2, decided 
1/29/92); Goss, 780 P.2d 306; Midway Oil Corp., 714 P.2d 339. 

 
 
C. 
Summary Judgment in the Absence of Specific Findings of Grounds for Termination 
of the Mother's Parental Rights

 
 

[¶20.]  Findings of fact creating the basis for 
termination were clearly not provided   in the order granting summary 
judgment. The statute which recites the grounds for termination states:  

 
 
(a) The 
parent-child legal relationship may be terminated if any one (1) or more of the 
following facts is established by clear and convincing evidence:  

 
 
(i) The 
child has been left in the care of another person without provision for the 
child's support and  without communication from the absent parent for a 
period of at least one (1) year. In making the above determination, the court 
may disregard occasional contributions, or incidental contacts and 
communications;

 
 
(ii) The 
child has been abandoned with no means of identification for at least three (3) 
months and efforts to locate the parent have been 
unsuccessful;

 
 
(iii) 
The child has been abused or neglected by the parent and efforts by an 
authorized agency or mental health professional have been unsuccessful in 
rehabilitating the family or the family has refused rehabilitative treatment, 
and it is shown that the child's health and safety would be seriously 
jeopardized by remaining with or returning to the parent;

 
 
(iv) The 
parent is incarcerated due to the conviction of a felony and a showing that the 
parent is unfit to have the custody and control of the 
child.

 
 
W.S. 
14-2-309 (1986). Then, for the order, the statute requires:  

 
 
The 
order terminating the parent-child legal relationship shall be in writing and 
shall contain the findings of the court. If the court terminates the 
parent-child legal relationship of either one (1) or both parents, it shall fix 
the responsibility  for the child's support and appoint a guardian of the 
child's person or estate or both.

 
 
W.S. 
14-2-315 (1986).

 
 

[¶21.]  The dispositive order and decree entered 
in this case from which this appeal is taken provided:  

 
 
THIS 
MATTER having come before the Court on June 18, 1991, the Petitioner appearing 
through * * *, Assistant District Attorney, the child being represented by the 
Guardian Ad Litem, * * *, and the respondent having appeared through the person 
of her attorney, * * *, and the Court having before it the State's Motion For 
Summary Judgment and Affidavits in support thereof, and the Affidavit of the 
Respondent in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment and the Court having 
reviewed the motion and affidavits and heard the argument of counsel and having 
considered the matter fully, hereby FINDS that there exists no issue of material 
fact as to whether grounds of the termination of the parental rights of [the 
mother] exist and that therefore the Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment 
should be and is hereby GRANTED.

 
 
IT IS 
FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that pursuant to said ruling the parent 
and child relationship between [SVG] with a date of birth of May 5, 1988,   
and [the mother], be, and is hereby terminated and severed forever and that the 
permanent care, custody, and control of the minor child shall be placed with the 
Department of Family Services for adoptive placement.

 
 
DATED 
THIS 27th day of June, 1991.

 
 

[¶22.]  Clearly, that decision provided no 
factual basis, defined within the strict scrutiny standard of clear and 
convincing evidence, for the decision that was made. Matter of EB, 795 P.2d 1212 (Wyo. 1990). The substantial compliance with 
the termination statute is required. In re Adoption of Strauser, 65 
Wyo. 98, 196 P.2d 862 (1948); Nugent v. 
Powell, 4 Wyo. 173, 33 P. 23 (1893). 

 
 

[¶23.]  Since the present adequacy of actual 
findings will be resolved after retrial, we are left with the procedural 
appropriateness of the summary judgment decision for the termination of parental 
rights. Matter of Adoption of JLP, 774 P.2d 624 (Wyo. 1989). The test of 
strict scrutiny and clear and convincing evidence required to be met in the 
parental termination renders the appropriate category of cases for summary 
judgment application to be, at most, significantly  limited. Matter of 
EB, 795 P.2d 1212.   This court has not determined that summary 
judgment cannot ever be appropriate in the proper case, see for example 
Matter of Adoption of JLP, 774 P.2d 624, where all of the historical 
facts were uncontroverted. However, where the petition is appropriately and 
diligently contested, summary judgment is seldom to be the procedural answer for 
parental rights termination. Matter of EB, 795 P.2d 1212; In Interest 
of F.H., 283 N.W.2d 202 (N.D. 1979); Matter of Christina T., 590 P.2d 189 (Okl. 1979). 

 
 

[¶24.]  In any event, summary judgment was not 
appropriately granted in this case. The affidavit of the mother raises a clear 
factual conflict which renders that summary disposition unavailable to determine 
the fundamental interest of parental rights in a termination proceeding. The 
application not only crosses the parameters of the normal summary judgment 
standard, Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625 (Wyo. 1986), but then enters the particular 
problems of strict scrutiny and clear and convincing evidence required for 
parental rights  termination. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982). See also Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 
103 S. Ct. 683, 74 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1983) and Lassiter v. Department of Social 
Services of Durham County, North Carolina, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S. Ct. 2153, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640, reh'g denied 453 U.S. 927, 102 S. Ct. 889, 69 L. Ed. 2d 1023 
(1981). "Proof by clear and convincing evidence is required 'where particularly 
important individual interests or rights are at stake,' such as the termination 
of parental rights, involuntary commitment, and deportation." Weiner v. 
Fleischman, 54 Cal. 3d 476, 286 Cal. Rptr. 40, 816 P.2d 892, 898 (1991). 

 
 

[¶25.]  The strict scrutiny rule for termination 
of parental rights has uniformly been stated and assiduously applied in the 
opinions written by this court. Matter of EB, 795 P.2d 1212; RW v. 
State ex rel. Laramie County Dept. of Public Assistance and Social Services, 
766 P.2d 555 (Wyo. 1989),  Thomas, J., specially concurring; In Interest 
of J.G., 742 P.2d 770 (Wyo. 1987); Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976 (Wyo. 
1984); Matter of SKJ, 673 P.2d 640 (Wyo. 1983); Matter of Parental 
Rights of SCN, 659 P.2d 568 (Wyo. 1983); Matter of Parental Rights of 
PP, 648 P.2d 512 (Wyo. 1982); Matter of Adoption of CCT, 640 P.2d 73 
(Wyo. 1982); DS v. Department of Public Assistance and Social Services, 
607 P.2d 911 (Wyo. 1980); Matter of Voss' Adoption, 550 P.2d 481 (Wyo. 
1976). See also Matter of Adoption of JLP, 774 P.2d 624. 

 
 

[¶26.]  The mother should be given the right to 
testify in person, or at least by deposition, before losing her parental rights 
to her child. There is a factual and legal difference between abandonment and 
exclusion when termination of parental rights is at issue. Matter of Juvenile 
Action No. S 624, 126 Ariz. 488, 616 P.2d 948 (1980); Matter of 
Christina T., 590 P.2d 189; State v. Grady, 231 Or. 65, 371 P.2d 68 
(1962).  Cf. Annotation, Parent's Involuntary Confinement, or 
Failure to Care for Child as Result Thereof, as Evincing Neglect, Unfitness, or 
the Like in Dependency or Divestiture Proceeding, 79 A.L.R.3d 417 (1977). 

 
 

[¶27.]  The evidentiary presentation of this 
case, as defined within the concepts of summary judgment and parental 
termination, could not justify the order entered when, as here, the mother 
denied abandonment, alleged exclusion, and strongly pursued her willingness and 
interest in retaining her parental rights. The factual conflict for jury 
resolution was overtly presented pursuant to W.S. 14-2-312 (1986), which 
provides in pertinent part: 

 
 
The 
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, including the right of a parent, child or 
interested person to demand a jury trial, are applicable in actions brought 
under this act.

 
 

[¶28.]  Finally, the requisite jury fee was paid. 
Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976. 

 
 

[¶29.]  Reversed.