Title: Bishop v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Robert Harvey Bishop, Jr. v. State of Maryland, No. 1, September Term 2010.
CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE – PRETRIAL PROCEDURES – HYBRID
PLEAS – AGREED STATEMENT OF FACTS AND STIPULATED EVIDENCE –
DISPUTED EVIDENCE – HARMLESS ERROR
In a case that proceeded on stipulated evidence, harmless error analysis could not be applied
to a suppressed confession, due to a record that included a muddled plea agreement and an
apparent dispute regarding the contents of telephone conversations, the recordings or
transcripts of which were never admitted into evidence.  In addition, a trial court may not
decide a case based on stipulated evidence when such a dispute exists.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 1
September Term, 2010
ROBERT HARVEY BISHOP, JR.
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Filed:  November 4, 2010
In this case, Robert Harvey Bishop, Jr., Petitioner, charged with two counts of sexual
abuse of a minor and related offenses, and the State, Respondent, entered into an agreement
entitled, “PLEA BARGAIN: EXPLANATION OF AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF
RIGHTS * * * NOT GUILTY, AGREED STATEMENT OF FACTS PLEA.”  Thereafter,
during a judicial proceeding, the State presented Bishop’s confession, which was later
suppressed by the Court of Special Appeals on Sixth Amendment grounds, as well as a
recording of telephone conversations, in which Bishop was a party, that was never admitted
into evidence, about which Bishop’s counsel expressed pause, without any attempt at
clarification by the State, in addition to a proffer of the two child victims’ testimony.  From
the decision of the Court of Special Appeals, affirming his conviction on the basis of
harmless error, Bishop filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in this Court, which we granted,
Bishop v. State, 411 Md. 740, 985 A.2d 538 (2009), in which he presented the following
questions:
1. Where the parties have proceeded by way of an agreed
statement of facts, may an appellate court rely on evidence that
was proffered by the State but disputed by the defense in
determining that the improper denial of a motion to suppress is
harmless error?
2. Under the circumstances of this case, did the intermediate
appellate court err in holding that the improper denial of the
motion to suppress Petitioner’s confession to the police is
harmless error?
In response to these questions, which we will address as one, we shall vacate the
judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remand to the Circuit Court for Cecil County
for further proceedings, because harmless error analysis cannot be applied to the suppressed
2
confession due to the murky record in this case, based upon the muddled plea agreement and
proceedings themselves, coupled with an apparent dispute regarding the contents of
telephone conversations, the recordings or transcripts of which were never admitted into
evidence.
In July 2007, Bishop, accompanied by counsel, appeared before a judge in the Circuit
Court for Cecil County.  An Assistant State’s Attorney called the case “for the purpose of
plea at this time,” and the following ensued:
[STATE’S ATTORNEY]: The defendant is going to enter a not
guilty on a statement of facts to Count 1 and Count 3, which are
both child sexual abuse counts.  The state will nolle pros the
other two counts in return for the plea.
We will be requesting a PSI and a new sentencing date.
At the time of sentencing the state would recommend that
twenty-five years be imposed; that ten be suspended; the
defendant to serve fifteen years; five years supervised probation
upon release.
The counts, of course, are mandatory registration counts,
and I believe that is a fair and accurate statement.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That’s correct, your Honor, that’s fair
and accurate.  For the record . . . we had a motions hearing on
the 25th of May; and for purposes -- for any appellate purposes
we are agreeing to go forward with the not guilty statement of
facts, based on the decisions made at the motions hearing, or the
denial of our motion for suppression at that motions hearing,
your Honor.
Following the presentation of the plea agreement, the following exchange occurred
between the clerk and the judge:
[CLERK OF THE COURT]: All right. Mr. Bishop, if you would
stand, please.
3
THE COURT: He doesn’t need to be sworn, madam clerk, for
a not guilty plea.
The judge then inquired into Bishop’s decision to waive his right to a jury trial:
THE COURT: Before we can proceed, Mr. Bishop, I have to ask
you a number of questions, make a number of statements, to
make sure in my mind that you understand what you are doing,
you are doing it voluntarily, with full understanding of possible
consequences.
First of all, you are here because you have been indicted
by the grand jury here in Cecil County.  Because of the nature of
the charges returned and the possible penalties, you are entitled
to a trial by jury.  Now obviously if you are attempting to
proceed on a not guilty plea agreed statement of facts there will
be no trial by jury; but you still have to waive that right
affirmatively on the record in open court.
Are you waiving your right to a trial by jury?
[BISHOP]: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: This form that you and your attorney have filled
out, do you have any questions about that form at all?
[BISHOP]: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: It explains to you in writing the rights that you
are waiving by not having a trial by jury.  Do you have any
questions about those rights at all?
[BISHOP]: No, your Honor.
The form referenced, which was signed by Bishop and his counsel, provided, in
pertinent part:
PLEA BARGAIN: EXPLANATION OF AND
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RIGHTS
NOT GUILTY, AGREED STATEMENT OF FACTS PLEA
FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT TO A GUILTY PLEA – NO
1
Rule 4-242(c) provides, in pertinent part:
(c) Plea of guilty.  The court may not accept a plea of guilty
until after an examination of the defendant on the record in open
court conducted by the court, the State’s Attorney, the attorney
for the defendant, or any combination thereof, the court
determines and announces on the record that (1) the defendant
is pleading voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the
charge and the consequences of the plea; and (2) there is a
factual basis for the plea.  In addition, before accepting the plea,
the court shall comply with section (e) of this Rule.  The court
may accept the plea of guilty even though the defendant does
not admit guilt.  Upon refusal to accept a plea of guilty, the court
shall enter a plea of not guilty.
4
DIRECT APPEAL RIGHT
(MD. RULE 4-242(c)) [1]
Before the Court can accept your proceeding by way of a not
guilty plea on an agreed statement of facts to one or more
offenses to which you will no doubt be found guilty, you must
answer some questions because the Court wants to make sure
that you know what you are doing, you know what your rights
are and you understand those rights, and that you are proceeding
by way of an agreed statement of facts voluntarily.
1. My name is [Robert Harvey Bishop].
2.  I am [36] years of age.
3.  The farthest I went in school was [high school grad.
& tech. school].
4.  I [can] read and write.
5.  I am not presently under the influence of alcohol,
drugs, narcotics, other pills or suffering from withdrawal
symptoms from the use of them.
5
6.  Have you ever been under the care of a psychiatrist or
a patient in a mental hospital or institution? [Yes].
7.  Is there anything presently wrong with you? [No].
8. I have discussed the matter of proceeding by way of an
agreed statement of facts with my attorney and my attorney has
advised me of my rights.  I am technically pleading not guilty to
the offense(s) listed below in paragraph 9.  However, my
attorney, the prosecutor and I have agreed on a particular
statement of facts concerning the offense(s) listed below in
paragraph 9.  Instead of my having a judge trial or a jury trial on
the offense(s) listed below, the state or defense will present our
agreed upon statement of facts to the court.  That agreed upon
statement of facts will be sufficient for the judge to find me
guilty of the offense(s) listed below in paragraph 9.  By
proceeding in this manner I am still pleading not guilty and
denying guilt.  I am not admitting to any of the conduct
necessary to establish guilt.  However, this is the “functional
equivalent” of a guilty plea in that I am giving up a number of
rights that a person entering a straight guilty plea under Md.
Rule 4-242(c) gives up.  After consulting with my attorney, I am
proceeding in this manner because of the plea agreement and
because I believe this is the best course of action I can take in
this case.
9.  I am proceeding by way of a not guilty plea on an
agreed statement of facts to the following: Offense #1: [child
sex abuse] and Offense #2: [child sex abuse].  As to each
offense, if I were to proceed to trial, the State would have to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury, if I had a jury trial,
or to a judge, if I had a Court trial, the following matters which
are 
called 
“elements” 
of 
the 
offense: 
Offense
#1:_______________ Offense #2:_______________.  In this
case the agreed statement of facts will be sufficient for the court
to find me guilty of each offense listed above.
10.  I understand that the offenses carry the following
maximum penalties: Offense #1: [25 yrs] [and] Offense #2: [25
yrs].
6
11.  No one made me a promise of a lesser sentence,
probation, reward, immunity or anything else in order to get me
to proceed in this manner, other than the plea agreement, which
is: [plea to above counts, dismiss remaining].
* * *
12.  I understand that by proceeding in this manner I am
giving up my absolute right to plead not guilty and have a trial.
If I pled not guilty and had a trial, the State would have to prove
each and every count against me by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt and to a moral certainty.  I understand that under the law
I am presumed to be innocent, and if I pled not guilty and had a
trial, the State would have this burden of proving each and every
count against me.
13.  I understand that in order for the State to prove me
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, it would have to bring into
open court witnesses who would have to testify in front of me,
and my attorney and I would have the right to cross-examine
them.  I understand that by proceeding in this manner today, I
am giving up that right to require the State to produce evidence
and witnesses against me and the right to cross-examine those
witnesses.
14.  I understand that by proceeding in this manner I am
giving up my right to be tried by a judge or jury.  A trial by a
judge would be a trial by a judge of the circuit court.  I could not
be found guilty in a judge trial unless the judge decided beyond
a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty that I was guilty.  A
jury trial would be a trial by a group of twelve men and women
from Cecil County chosen at random from the lists of registered
voters, licensed drivers, and persons not licensed but who have
state identification cards.  My attorney and I would participate
in the selection of that jury.  The jurors would be young and old,
black, white, male, female, educated, uneducated and their
verdict would have to be unanimous that I was either not guilty
or that I was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral
certainty.
15.  I understand that I am giving up my rights to present
7
evidence and to produce witnesses on my behalf, to file
preliminary motions, or to object to evidence and testimony
introduced by the State.
16.  I understand that I am giving up my right to testify
on my own behalf concerning my guilt or innocence or to
remain silent during a trial which is a Constitutional right
guaranteed me under the law, and whether it were a court or a
jury trial if I decided not to testify there could be no inference of
guilty by the fact that I didn’t testify, because I do have the right
to remain silent.  If it were a jury trial and I requested it of the
judge, the judge would advise the jury that there could be no
inference of guilt by reason of the fact that I did not testify,
because I do have the absolute right to remain silent.
* * *
18.  This is why my rights are being specified in this
paper and explained to me by my attorney.  I am proceeding in
this manner freely and voluntarily without threat or fear to
myself or anyone closely related to me.
19.  Are you presently on parole or probation? [No].  I
understand that if the offense(s) to which I am now proceeding
by way of a not guilty, agreed statement of facts occurred while
I was on parole or probation, OR if the offense(s) occurred after
I received a sentence in another case which was going to have
some term of probation in the future, my proceeding in this
manner today and the court’s entering a verdict of guilty could
be enough to violate that parole or probation and I could be
required to serve the unserved or suspended portion of that
sentence.
20.  I also understand that by proceeding in this manner
today and the court’s entering a verdict of guilty to a traffic
offense, the Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration can assess
points and/or suspend or revoke my driving privileges to the
extent permitted by law.
21.  If I am not a citizen of the U.S., my proceeding in
8
this manner today and the court’s entering a verdict of guilty
could be sufficient to cause me to be deported.
Paragraph 17 included the following language:
17.  I understand that I am giving up my rights to appeal
by proceeding in this manner.  Technically, I would still have
the right to file an application for leave or permission to appeal,
but if the Court of Special Appeals accepted the appeal, it would
be limited to the following issues: (1) whether or not this court
had jurisdiction to try the case; (2) whether the judge gave me
an illegal sentence; (3) whether or not my attorney had given me
fair and adequate representation; and (4) whether or not my plea
was made voluntarily, whether I knew my rights and were aware
of the full consequences of making the plea, and whether I
proceeded in this manner of my own free will.
This paragraph appears as excised–crossed out with an “X”–in the record, although without
initials of the parties. 
After the judge confirmed with Bishop that he understood the form and had no further
questions, the following colloquy occurred:
THE COURT: Very well.  The maximum penalty, should your
plea be accepted, or should you be found guilty after the
statement of facts, could be imprisonment of up to twenty-five
years on each one of the two charges.  At the time of sentencing
your attorney will be making a recommendation.  You heard the
recommendation of the prosecutor.  Parole and Probation will be
making a recommendation, and there will be sentencing
guidelines.
In the event that I exceed any or all of the
recommendations or the guidelines, that would not be grounds
for you to withdraw your plea and proceed on to trial.  Do you
understand that?
[BISHOP]: Yes, your Honor.
2
This form is a reference to Miranda v Arizona, the seminal case in which the
Supreme Court held:
[A]n individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed
that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the
lawyer with him during interrogation under the system for
protecting the privilege we delineate today. As with the
warnings of the right to remain silent and that anything stated
can be used in evidence against him, this warning is an absolute
(continued...)
9
THE COURT: Besides the plea negotiations of your attorney
has anybody made any promises, threats or other inducements to
you to get you to do what you’re doing here this afternoon?
[BISHOP]: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: Now in a not guilty plea agreed statement of
facts I will base my decision on your guilt or innocence on a
statement to be provided to me orally by the prosecutor.
Chances are after he provides me with the statement, together
with any additions or corrections that your attorney may make,
I will find you guilty.  In other words, I will base my decision
only on the statement provided. Understood?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: And you are electing to proceed in this fashion,
freely, voluntarily, with full understanding of the possible
consequences?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: All right.  I’m satisfied that Mr. Bishop
understands what he’s doing, he is doing it voluntarily, with full
understanding of the possible consequences.
The State’s Attorney then proffered the “not guilty statement of facts,” which included
the Miranda form,2 as well as Bishop’s written and recorded confessions:
2(...continued)
prerequisite to interrogation. No amount of circumstantial
evidence that the person may have been aware of this right will
suffice to stand in its stead. Only through such a warning is there
ascertainable assurance that the accused was aware of this right.
384 U.S. 436, 471-72, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1626, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 722 (1966).
3
Due to the graphic nature of this testimony and the fact that no party is
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in this case, we will not include this portion of
the transcript.
10
[STATE’S ATTORNEY]: Preliminarily at the time of the
motion the state entered three exhibits, the miranda advise [sic]
of rights form that the defendant was read and signed, the
defendant – secondly, the defendant’s written statement; and
third, a CD containing an audio recording of the statement that’s
taken by Detective Streight.  I would incorporate by reference
those three exhibits into the not guilty statement of facts.
THE COURT: Very well.
The State’s Attorney then recited that to which R.B., one of the alleged victims, would
have testified,3 wherein she would have described instances where Bishop sexually abused
R.B. and A.B., the other alleged victim.  Thereafter, the State’s Attorney described a series
of monitored telephone calls between Bishop and R.B., during which Bishop purportedly
acknowledged sexually abusing both R.B. and A.B., although neither the recordings nor
transcripts of them were admitted into evidence:
[STATE’S ATTORNEY]: Detective Streight at this point made
a series of consensual monitored telephone calls between [R.B.]
and [Bishop] during which time he acknowledged having sex
with [R.B.] and touching [A.B.].
If I may have just a second.  I don’t believe the
consensually monitored telephone calls were part of the
11
suppression hearing, so I would offer as State’s Exhibit, I guess,
4 now, for purposes of the statement of facts, the consensual
form for the consensually monitored telephone calls that Mr.
Bishop filled out.
Again, during the course of these consensually monitored
telephone calls the defendant acknowledged having vaginal
intercourse with [R.B.], and having touched [A.B.] in making a
sexual contact with her.
Following the description of the telephone conversations, the State’s Attorney
proffered the testimony of A.B. and described the events that led up to, and the substance of,
Bishop’s incriminating statements, which were subsequently suppressed by the Court of
Special Appeals.
The infusion of the later suppressed confession and the absence of the recording in
evidence was further complicated by a comment by Bishop’s counsel:
THE COURT: Any additions or corrections . . . ?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, the defense would agree
that the young ladies would testify as such.  The only corrections
is [sic] we would say that the audio tapes or CD’s of
communications between Mr. Bishop and the young ladies, he
did not acknowledge his guilt; but that does not obviously
change any of this, your Honor.
No clarification by the State ensued, but the judge proceeded to find Bishop guilty:
THE COURT: All right.  Sufficient facts have been presented to
justify entry of a guilty verdict to Counts 1 and 3.  Presentence
investigation is ordered.
Subsequently, Bishop was sentenced to two concurrent sentences of twenty-five years’
imprisonment for the two counts of sexual abuse of a minor, with all but twelve years
4
In Bellamy v. State, 403 Md. 308, 941 A.2d 1107 (2008), we set out the
(continued...)
12
suspended, to be followed by five years of supervised probation.  He also was required to
register as a sex offender and to have no contact with the victims.
How we characterize what happened in the proceeding, coupled with the agreement,
is the gravamen of the parties’ dispute.  According to Bishop and the State, Bruno v. State,
332 Md. 673, 632 A.2d 1192 (1993), is the dispositive case for determining whether harmless
error applies when evidence is suppressed on appeal after a proceeding in which a defendant
is found guilty based upon the State’s proffer of evidence.  In Bruno, we affirmed a
conviction in which the parties proceeded by way of stipulated evidence that included, among
other things, three incriminating statements by the Defendant, two of which were later found
inadmissible but which we determined to be immaterial in relation to the admissible
statement.  Id.  Bishop argues that Bruno stands for the proposition that harmless error
applies only when the evidence suppressed is not material, and that, in the present case, the
suppressed evidence, Bishop’s confession, was the “linchpin” of the State’s case, thus
making Bruno inapposite.  The State, on the other hand, argues that the admission of the
confession was harmless, because Bishop was convicted based on overwhelming evidence
of guilt, which included, notwithstanding the suppressed evidence, the proffered testimony
of R.B. and A.B. and a telephone conversation in which Bishop purportedly admitted to
sexually abusing R.B. and A.B.  Both Bishop and the State concede that the evidence was
sufficient to convict Bishop; they differ in the application of harmless error.4  
4(...continued)
appropriate standard for harmless error analysis:
In Dorsey v. State[, 276 Md. 638, 350 A.2d 665 (1976),] we
adopted the test for harmless error announced by the Supreme
Court in Chapman v. State [of Cal., 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824,
17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).]  As adopted in Dorsey, the harmless
error rule is:
When an appellant, in a criminal case, establishes
error, unless a reviewing court, upon its own
independent review of the record, is able to
declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the error in no way influenced the verdict, such
error cannot be deemed “harmless” and a reversal
is mandated. Such reviewing court must thus be
satisfied that there is no reasonable possibility that
the evidence complained of-whether erroneously
admitted or excluded-may have contributed to the
rendition of the guilty verdict.
In performing a harmless error analysis, we are not to find facts
or weigh evidence. Instead, “what evidence to believe, what
weight to be given it, and what facts flow from that evidence are
for the jury . . . to determine.” “‘Once it has been determined
that error was committed, reversal is required unless the error
did not influence the verdict; the error is harmless only if it did
not play any role in the jury's verdict.  The reviewing court must
exclude that possibility beyond a reasonable doubt.’” “‘To say
that an error did not contribute to the verdict is, rather, to find
that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury
considered on the issue in question, as revealed by the record.’”
The “harmless error rule . . . has been and should be carefully
circumscribed.”  Harmless error review is the standard of review
most favorable to the defendant short of an automatic reversal.
Id. at 332-33, 941 A.2d at 1121 (internal citations omitted).  
13
The complexity of the conundrum presented in this case, exacerbated by the fact that
5
Based upon what occurred in this case and our analysis thereof, we would
suggest to the Rules Committee that it consider whether to recommend the adoption of a Rule
embodying a conditional guilty plea akin to that found in Rule 11(a) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which provides, in pertinent part:
Rule 11.  Pleas
(a) Entering a Plea.
   (1) In general. A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or
(with the court's consent) nolo contendere.
   (2) Conditional Plea. With the consent of the court and the
(continued...)
14
defense counsel appeared, at the end of the colloquy, to contest a piece of the State’s
evidentiary foundation without any attempt of clarification by the State, involves an
agreement that claimed to be a “NOT GUILTY, AGREED STATEMENT OF FACTS
PLEA,” wherein a “no appeal” provision has been excised, and an abbreviated trial in which
Bishop pled “not guilty” but conceded that the State had “sufficient evidence” to convict.
So, before we can even entertain whether harmless error applies in this case, our task
involves first determining what happened and whether the Bruno analysis applies.
When facing criminal charges, an individual has various choices of pleas.  An accused
can plead not guilty and go to trial before a judge or a jury, or he or she may plead guilty and
relieve the State of having to bear its burden of proof.  The defendant also could plead nolo
contendere or take an Alford plea, two pleas that are akin to a guilty plea but have different
ramifications.  In the federal system, under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, there is also what is called a conditional guilty plea; we have nothing in the
Maryland Rules that embodies that procedure,5 although what has evolved appears to be
5(...continued)
government, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty
or nolo contendere, reserving in writing the right to have an
appellate court review an adverse determination of a specified
pretrial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal may then
withdraw the plea.
15
something akin to a hybrid plea, whereby the accused pleads not guilty, forgoes a full trial
and proceeds on an agreed statement of facts or stipulated evidence to preserve appeal on a
suppression issue.
Maryland Rule 4-242(a) expressly provides that “[a] defendant may plead not guilty”
in a criminal trial, under which an individual retains, inter alia, his or her right to confront
witnesses, the right against self-incrimination, and the right to a trial by jury.  With a plea of
not guilty, an accused forces the State to shoulder its burden of proof, see F. Bailey & K.
Fishman, Criminal Trial Techniques § 31:7 (2009), and retains appellate rights.  See
Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl. Vol.), Section 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article.
Conversely, pursuant to Rule 4-242(a), an individual may plead guilty.  A guilty plea
is an unconditional confession of guilt, under which a judge must adhere to the dictates of
Rule 4-242(c), which requires the following colloquy:
(c) Plea of guilty. The court may not accept a plea of guilty until
after an examination of the defendant on the record in open
court conducted by the court, the State's Attorney, the attorney
for the defendant, or any combination thereof, the court
determines and announces on the record that (1) the defendant
is pleading voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the
charge and the consequences of the plea; and (2) there is a
16
factual basis for the plea. In addition, before accepting the plea,
the court shall comply with section (e) of this Rule. The court
may accept the plea of guilty even though the defendant does
not admit guilt. Upon refusal to accept a plea of guilty, the court
shall enter a plea of not guilty.
In addition, the judge shall apprise the accused of the collateral consequences of his or her
guilty plea, pursuant to Rule 4-242(e), which provides:
(e) Collateral consequences of a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere. Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere, the court, the State's Attorney, the attorney for the
defendant, or any combination thereof shall advise the defendant
(1) that by entering the plea, if the defendant is not a United
States citizen, the defendant may face additional consequences
of deportation, detention, or ineligibility for citizenship, (2) that
by entering a plea to the offenses set out in Code, Criminal
Procedure Article, § 11-701, the defendant shall have to register
with the defendant's supervising authority as defined in Code,
Criminal Procedure Article, § 11-701 (i), and (3) that the
defendant should consult with defense counsel if the defendant
is represented and needs additional information concerning the
potential consequences of the plea. The omission of advice
concerning the collateral consequences of a plea does not itself
mandate that the plea be declared invalid.
  
Appellate review is generally limited to the trial court’s adherence to Rule 4-242(c) and (e),
which ensure that the accused entered his or her plea voluntarily and knowingly and with an
understanding of the consequences of the plea; the convicted forfeits any right to a direct
appeal with a guilty plea, Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl. Vol.), Section 12-302(e) of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, and “ordinarily waives all nonjurisdictional defects
in the proceedings.”  Bruno,  332 Md. at 688-89, 632 A.2d at 1200. 
Rule 4-242 also permits the accused, with the consent of the court, to enter a plea of
6
Rule 4-242(d) provides, in pertinent part:
(d) Plea of nolo contendere. A defendant may plead nolo
contendere only with the consent of court. The court may require
the defendant or counsel to provide information it deems
necessary to enable it to determine whether or not it will
consent. The court may not accept the plea until after an
examination of the defendant on the record in open court
conducted by the court, the State’s Attorney, the attorney for the
defendant, or any combination thereof, the court determines and
announces on the record that the defendant is pleading
voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and
the consequences of the plea. In addition, before accepting the
plea, the court shall comply with section (e) of this Rule.
Following the acceptance of a plea of nolo contendere, the court
shall proceed to disposition as on a plea of guilty, but without
finding a verdict of guilty. If the court refuses to accept a plea
of nolo contendere, it shall call upon the defendant to plead
anew.
17
nolo contendere.  See Rule 4-242(d).6  Literally meaning “I do not wish to contend,” nolo
contendere is a “plea by which the defendant does not contest or admit guilt.”  Black’s Law
Dictionary 1147, 1269 (9th ed. 2009).  The judge need not confirm the factual basis for the
plea but must determine that the defendant entered the plea voluntarily and with an
understanding of the nature of the charges,  Rule 4-242(d) (“The court may not accept the
plea until after an examination of the defendant . . . [in which it] determines and announces
on the record that the defendant is pleading voluntarily with understanding of the nature of
the charge and the consequences of the plea.”), as well as the collateral consequences of such
a plea.  See Rule 4-242(e).  Unlike a guilty plea, a nolo plea subsequently “does not estop the
defendant to plead and prove his innocence in a civil action.”  Hudson v. United States, 272
18
U.S. 451, 455, 47 S. Ct. 127, 129, 71 L. Ed. 347, 349 (1926).  Like a guilty plea, once
convicted, an accused waives the vast majority of appellate rights, as we noted in Cohen v.
State:
As in the case of the plea of guilty, . . . a plea of nolo contendere
waives all defenses other than that the indictment charges no
offense, and the right to trial and incidental rights. The plea also
waives all formal or nonjurisdictional defects or irregularities in
the indictment or information or in prior proceedings . . . .
Except under extraordinary circumstances, the plea of nolo
contendere leaves open for review only the sufficiency of the
indictment.
235 Md. 62, 68, 200 A.2d 368, 371 (1964) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 844, 85 S. Ct. 84, 13 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1964); see also id. at 69,
200 A.2d at 372 (“A plea of nolo contendere is an implied confession of guilt, and for the
purposes of the case is equivalent to a plea of guilty.”), quoting United States v. Reisfeld, 188
F. Supp. 631, 632 (D. Md. 1960).
An Alford plea, moreover, “‘lies somewhere between a plea of guilty and a plea of
nolo contendere.’”  Rudman v. Md. State Bd. of Physicians, 414 Md. 243, 260, 994 A.2d 985,
994-95 (2010), quoting Mannan v. District of Columbia Bd. of Med., 558 A.2d 329, 336
(D.C. 1989).  Drawing its name from North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160,
27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970), such a plea is “a guilty plea containing a protestation of innocence.”
Marshall v. State, 346 Md. 186, 189 n.2, 695 A.2d 184, 185 n.2 (1997), citing Pennington
v. State, 308 Md. 727, 728 n.1, 521 A.2d 1216, 1216 n.1 (1987).  As the Supreme Court
noted in Alford:
7
One commentator notes that
[a] defendant might choose to enter an Alford plea out of the
pragmatic 
reality 
that 
the 
prosecution’s 
evidence 
is
overwhelming, or because his mental state at the time of the
offense was so impaired (e.g., through extreme intoxication or
drug use) that he cannot truly say that he committed the offense
charged.
G. Nicholas Herman, Plea Bargaining 170 (2d ed. 2004) (citations omitted).
19
[W]hile most pleas of guilty consist of both a waiver of trial and
an express admission of guilt, the latter element is not a
constitutional requisite to the imposition of criminal penalty.  An
individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and
understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence
even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the
acts constituting the crime.[7]
400 U.S. at 37, 91 S. Ct. at 167, 27 L. Ed. 2d at 171.  Like a guilty plea and nolo plea, the
Alford plea waives challenges to adverse rulings on pretrial motions and all procedural
objections, constitutional or otherwise, limiting appeals to jurisdictional defects and
challenges based on the propriety of the trial court’s acceptance of the plea.  See Ward v.
State, 83 Md. App. 474, 480, 575 A.2d 771, 773 (1990) (holding “that an Alford plea is the
functional equivalent of a guilty plea . . .  and thus, judgments on Alford pleas are not subject
to direct appeal”).
Amidst the spectrum between not guilty pleas and guilty pleas, there exists the hybrid
plea, one in which an individual retains the right to appellate review of evidence subject to
a suppression motion but avoids going through the time and expense of a full trial.  By
pleading not guilty and agreeing to the proffer of stipulated evidence or an agreed statement
8
We would note that the highest and best use of a not guilty agreed statement
of facts plea is to preserve appellate review of the admissibility of tangible evidence that was
litigated at a motion for suppression hearing.
20
of facts, an individual, like with a guilty plea, waives a jury trial and the right to confront
witnesses but retains appellate review of the suppression decision.  Our Court and the Court
of Special Appeals have, on several occasions, attempted to discern the difference between
a case that proceeds on a not guilty plea on stipulated evidence or on an agreed statement of
facts.  This distinction apparently was explained initially in Barnes v. State, 31 Md. App. 25,
35, 354 A.2d 499, 505-06 (1976), wherein Charles E. Orth, Jr., then-Chief Judge of the Court
of Special Appeals, wrote:
There is a distinction between an agreed statement of facts and
evidence offered by way of stipulation.  Under an agreed
statement of facts both [the] State and the defense agree as to the
ultimate facts.  Then the facts are not in dispute, and there can
be, by definition, no factual conflict.  The trier of fact is not
called upon to determine the facts as the agreement is to the
truth of the ultimate facts themselves.  There is no fact-finding
function left to perform.  To render judgment, the court simply
applies the law to the facts agreed upon.  If there is agreement
as to the facts, there is no dispute; if there is dispute, there is no
agreement.  It would be well, to avoid confusion, that when the
parties are in agreement on the facts, the statement of them
begin with language to the effect, ‘It is agreed that the following
facts are true . . . .’ [8]
On the other hand, when evidence is offered by way of
stipulation, there is no agreement as to the facts which the
evidence seeks to establish.  Such a stipulation only goes to the
content of the testimony of a particular witness if he were to
appear and testify.  The agreement is to what the evidence will
be, not to what the facts are.  Thus, the evidence adduced by
such a stipulation may well be in conflict with other evidence
21
received.  For the trier of fact to determine the ultimate facts on
such conflicting evidence, there must be some basis on which to
judge the credibility of the witness whose testimony is the
subject of the stipulation, or to ascertain the reliability of that
testimony, to the end that the evidence obtained by stipulation
may be weighed against other relevant evidence adduced. . . .
We note that the usual way of introducing such a stipulation --
“If John Doe were to testify, he would testify as follows . . . .”
-- makes clear the status of the evidence so offered.
In Barnes, the importance of the distinction lay in a statement made by Barnes’s
counsel after the State’s proffer, in which he offered his own evidence, the purported
testimony of Barnes.   Id. at 31-32, 354 A.2d at 503.  According to the intermediate appellate
court, “[t]his evidence received without objection as to what the accused would say if she
testified was in direct conflict with the evidence received by way of stipulation as to what the
State’s witness would say if he testified.”  Id. at 32, 354 A.2d at 503-04.  Because this
evidence created a dispute of material fact, there could not be, by definition, an agreement
to the ultimate facts, and, in addition, stipulated evidence could not be submitted in such a
manner, because, absent the ability to determine the credibility of the parties’ witnesses, the
judge’s determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt could only be arbitrary.  Id. at 34,
354 A.2d at 505.
Generally, a determination of whether a proffer is stipulated evidence or an agreed
statement of facts is a matter of substance over form.  For instance, in Bruno, a rape case that
proceeded on what the court, prosecutor, and defense counsel referred to as a “not guilty
statement of facts,” the State’s proffer included a narrative in which the State’s Attorney
22
described the circumstances surrounding the victim’s rape.  Bruno, 332 Md. at 677-78, 690,
632 A.2d at 1194, 1201.  Following the description of the crime, the State proffered three
incriminating statements that Bruno made following his arrest.  Id. at 678, 632 A.2d at 1194-
95.  We determined that the State’s proffer was not an agreed statement of facts, because “it
[was] clear that the parties did not have an agreement as to ultimate fact, but merely an
agreement as to what the State’s witnesses would attest to if they were called to testify.”  Id.
at 690, 632 A.2d at 1201.  In Taylor v. State, we found that the parties’ “agreed statement of
facts” actually constituted stipulated evidence, because the parties were merely stipulating
as to what the testimony would be at trial.  388 Md. 385, 393-94, 879 A.2d 1074, 1079-80
(2005).
By entering a hybrid plea, the accused maintains the ability to argue legal issues, as
well as sufficiency.  In Bruno, while discussing the trial implications of such a plea, we noted
that, although “Bruno’s counsel declined the opportunity to present a closing argument, the
trial judge did ask for any ‘[a]rgument as to whether or not the Statement of Facts is
sufficient to constitute the offenses charged,’” and that, in a trial on stipulated evidence, the
State still risks acquittal by not presenting sufficient evidence to convict.  332 Md. at 684,
632 A.2d at 1197, 1198.  Likewise, in Taylor, we explained that the “procedure of having all
of the evidence presented through stipulation may be appropriate ‘when the parties sought
to argue solely legal issues at trial.’”   388 Md. at 398, 879 A.2d at 1082, quoting Atkinson
v. State, 331 Md. 199, 203 n.3, 627 A.2d 1019, 1021 n.3 (1993).  See also Harrison v. State,
23
382 Md. 477, 497-98, 855 A.2d 1220, 1232 (2004) (“If a prosecutor proceeds on a not-guilty
agreed statement of facts, he or she should take care to assure that the statement contains
evidence to support each element of the crime or crimes charged, or else acquittal necessarily
will follow.”); Polk v. State, 183 Md. App. 299, 312, 961 A.2d 603, 610 (2008) (holding that,
because the element of concealment was not sufficiently established in the agreed statement
of facts, the conviction for carrying a concealed dangerous weapon had to be reversed);
Barnes, 31 Md. App. at 28, 354 A.2d at 501 (stating that, in a case based on an agreed
statement of facts, “an accused must be acquitted if the evidence is not legally sufficient to
sustain his conviction”).
While the State risks reversal because of insufficient evidence contained in a proffer,
an accused must preserve his or her legal challenges by ensuring that the proffer includes the
challenged evidence.  Linkey v. State, 46 Md. App. 312, 416 A.2d 286 (1980), demonstrates
this conundrum.  In that case, after the trial judge denied Linkey’s pretrial motion to suppress
incriminating statements and other evidence, the parties proceeded by way of an agreed
statement of facts.  Based on this agreed statement of facts, the trial judge found Linkey
guilty of second-degree murder.  Id. at 314, 416 A.2d at 288.  In his appeal, Linkey argued
solely about the denial of his suppression motion.  Id.  In finding that Linkey did not preserve
appellate review of the pretrial motion, Judge Alan M. Wilner, then an associate judge on the
Court of Special appeals, wrote:
The threshold, and decisive, question before us, however, is
whether these issues have been preserved for appellate review.
24
We think they have not.
The reason for this becomes clear when we look at what
transpired at appellant’s trial. His conviction rested solely upon
an agreed statement of ultimate facts. He stipulated that he had
stabbed Howell to death and that he had done so with malice
and without premeditation, deliberation, justification, excuse, or
mitigating circumstance. All the court was asked to do was to
determine whether, as a matter of law, those facts sufficed to
constitute second degree murder.
In light of this agreement as to ultimate facts, it was, of course,
unnecessary to offer, or even refer to, any more particular
evidence tending to prove those facts. For that reason, we
presume, no mention was made of appellant’s statements to the
police or of the items obtained from his girlfriend. The
“evidence” challenged by appellant was never used as evidence
and, from the record before us, was never considered by the
court in determining his guilt.
Id. at 314-15, 416 A.2d at 288 (internal citations omitted).  Judge Wilner was careful to note:
[A]n accused is not necessarily put to the choice of abandoning
his challenge to the obtention of critical evidence by entering
into an agreement with the State.  But to preserve his complaint,
he must require the State to utilize the evidence which he has
unsuccessfully challenged, and not absolve the prosecutor of
that obligation by conceding the ultimate facts sought to be
proved by the allegedly improper evidence.
Id. at 316, 416 A.2d at 289.
The State’s proffer may not contain disputes of material fact, because the judge cannot
resolve credibility issues on a mere proffer.  In Taylor, the defendant was convicted in a case
that proceeded on stipulated evidence, wherein the State proffered “a recitation of [the
victim’s] version of the event and a statement, captioned ‘Additional facts,’ that contained
25
some statements of fact, some statements of what [the defendant] had told three of his
counselors, and some of what [the defendant] had said in his written statement.”  388 Md.
at 393, 879 A.2d at 1079.  Recognizing that the stipulated evidence contained competing
accounts of the incident in question, we reversed, holding:
[C]riminal cases cannot be resolved on the basis of stipulated
evidence that embodies disputes of material fact resolvable only
by credibility determinations, when there is nothing in the
stipulated evidence that would allow the court, properly, to
make such determinations. Should such a procedure be
presented, the court must reject it as inappropriate.
  
Id. at 399, 879 A.2d at 1083.  See also Barnes, 31 Md. App. at 35, 354 A.2d at 505 (stating
that, with an agreed statement of facts, because “the facts are not in dispute . . . there can be,
by definition, no factual conflict”).
Although we have made clear that harmless error may be applied both to cases that
proceed on an agreed statement of facts and cases in which the parties stipulate to evidence,
see Bruno, 332 Md. at 691, 632 A.2d at 1201 (“Guiding this decision is our belief that a
defendant should not be able to circumvent the application of the harmless error rule because
he or she opts to proceed to trial by stipulated evidence or an agreed statement of facts.”), the
distinction between the two types of hybrid pleas is not rendered meaningless in the context
of a harmless error analysis.  Rather, the implication of a plea in which a defendant agrees
to the ultimate facts of the case is palpable, compared to a plea in which the defendant merely
stipulates to the State’s evidence, making no admission to the facts that the State’s evidence
purports to establish.  In one, the accused is essentially making a judicial concession as to the
9
A “boggart” is a shape-shifting creature from the Harry Potter series of books
that takes the form of the viewer’s worst fears.  Because it instantly changes shape when
someone first sees it, no one knows what a boggart looks like when it is alone.  One way to
combat a boggart is with the charm riddikulus.  J.K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Prisoner
of Azkaban (New York: Scholastic 1999).
26
ultimate facts of the case, and in the other, the accused is not admitting to anything except
that the State would present the enumerated evidence.  This distinction is evidenced by
Bishop’s counsel’s concession, at oral argument:
[I]f we had defense counsel say at the conclusion of the
statement of facts, “your Honor, we agree that everything those
victims said would have been true,” I’d think we’d have a
problem.  I’d think we would have a very big harmless error
problem and that is where I think the difference is between a
trial of stipulated evidence and a trial of stipulated fact.
It is because of this distinction that, in the present case, the State and Bishop differ regarding
the type of plea that Bishop entered and the implications of that plea in light of the Court of
Special Appeals’ suppression of his confession.
Despite the parties’ attempts to characterize this case as one of the two types of hybrid
pleas, the context presented by the parties does not inform our determination of this
“boggart”9 of a plea and the implications of the suppressed confession, because, confronting
the totality of the plea agreement and the proceeding, we see an amalgamation of the array
of pleas that a defendant could enter in a criminal proceeding.  At first, it appears as though
Bishop entered a not guilty plea on an agreed statement of facts, mainly due to the initial
dialogue between the parties and the trial judge and the agreement into which the parties
27
entered.  The State asserts that this is, indeed, the type of plea that Bishop entered,
emphasizing that Bishop understood the nature of this plea, because he signed the form
entitled “NOT GUILTY, AGREED STATEMENT OF FACTS PLEA,” which described the
nature of an agreed statement of facts, and that Bishop confirmed that he understood the form
and its contents.
The State’s proffer, however, as Bishop argues (and we agree), was more illustrative
of what the testimony and evidence was going to be had the case gone to a full trial rather
than an agreement as to the ultimate facts, as exemplified by Bishop’s counsel’s statement
that the “defense would agree that the young ladies would testify as such,” and the State’s
characterization of R.B.’s statement as how she “would have testified had this gone to trial.”
See Barnes, 31 Md. App. at 35, 354 A.2d at 506 (“We note that the usual way of introducing
. . . stipulat[ed] [evidence] -- ‘If John Doe were to testify, he would testify as follows . . . .’
-- makes clear the status of the evidence so offered.”).  As in Taylor, 388 Md. at 393, 879
A.2d at 1079, and Bruno,  332 Md. at 690, 632 A.2d at 1201, despite the label affixed to this
plea, it is clear that the parties had no agreement as to the ultimate facts of the case and, at
best, were stipulating to the evidence that the State would have presented at trial.
The agreement entitled “NOT GUILTY, AGREED STATEMENT OF FACTS
PLEA” further complicates our analysis of Bishop’s plea, as it appears to be more like a nolo
contendere or Alford plea, from which appeal rights do not normally exist to preserve
suppression issues:
10
Paragraph 17, excised by the parties, articulated the basis for no appeal rights.
28
•
The caption of the form included the following: “FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT TO
A GUILTY PLEA - NO DIRECT APPEAL RIGHTS”10 (emphasis added).
•
The introduction paragraph stated that Bishop was proceeding “by way of a not guilty
plea on an agreed statement of facts to one or more offenses to which you will no
doubt be found guilty . . . .” (emphasis added).
•
Paragraph 8 contained the following: “I am technically pleading not guilty”; “Instead
of my having a judge trial or a jury trial . . . the state or defense will present our
agreed upon statement of facts to the court.  That agreed upon statement of facts will
be sufficient for the judge to find me guilty of the offense(s) . . . .”; and “By
proceeding in this manner I am still pleading not guilty and denying guilt.  I am not
admitting to any of the conduct necessary to establish guilt.” (emphasis added).
•
Paragraph 9 contained the following: “In this case the agreed statement of facts will
be sufficient for the court to find me guilty of each offense” (emphasis added).
•
Paragraph 12 contained the following: “I understand that by proceeding in this
manner I am giving up my absolute right to plead not guilty and have a trial.  If I pled
not guilty and had a trial, the State would have to prove each and every count against
me by proof beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty.” (emphasis added).
•
Paragraph 14 contained the following: “I understand that by proceeding in this
manner I am giving up my right to be tried by a judge or a jury.  A trial by a judge
would be a trial by a judge of the circuit court.  I could not be found guilty in a judge
trial unless the judge decided beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty that
I was guilty.” (emphasis added).
Our exploration of the proceedings below does not end here, however, as our analysis
is further muddied by the State’s proffer regarding the telephone conversations between
Bishop and R.B.  In its presentation of evidence, the State failed to introduce a recording of
the telephone conversations, or the transcripts thereof, that purported to contain Bishop’s
acknowledgment of sexually abusing R.B. and A.B., choosing to, instead, offer a
11
Because the State did not present a Conditional Cross-Petition for Writ of
Certiorari in which the suppression of Bishop’s confession was challenged, we will not
address the merits of that ruling.
29
characterization of those conversations.  When Bishop’s counsel offered a competing
explanation of that recording, the State did nothing to resolve the dispute, seemingly not
concerned about appellate review.11  Bishop argues that this exchange amounted to two
competing proffers, adding:
At no point during the trial does the judge recess to review the
tapes, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the tapes
were transcribed at the time of the trial, and there is nothing in
the record to suggest that the trial court reviewed the tapes prior
to trial.  As such, the dispute as to what significance, if any,
those tapes had in establishing [Bishop’s] guilt was never
resolved by the trial court.
According to the State, however, Bishop’s counsel’s assertion that he did not acknowledge
guilt in the telephone conversations does not create a dispute of material fact.  Rather, the
State argues, Bishop’s counsel’s contention “clearly related to the court’s role in applying the
law to the agreed facts in determining Bishop’s guilt” and did not constitute a challenge to
the substance of those communications.  The State distinguishes Taylor and contends that,
in Bishop’s case, “the material evidence [was] not in conflict and there [were] no significant
witness credibility issues,” as there were in Taylor.
We are unpersuaded by the State’s attempt to distinguish Taylor.  Because the
contents of the telephone conversation were never entered into evidence, it is impossible to
classify Bishop’s counsel’s statement as creating anything other than a dispute.  Absent
12
In its proffer, the State made brief mention of the recorded telephone
conversations between Bishop and R.B.  After Bishop’s trial counsel stated that Bishop did
not acknowledge guilt in those conversations, the State’s Attorney did absolutely nothing.
For some reason that is lost on this Court, the State’s Attorney did not do what he should
have done: either play the conversations in their entirety for the judge or simply stop the
proceeding and clarify, for the record, whether the defendant was simply reaffirming his not
(continued...)
30
anything to resolve credibility determinations, as was the case here, a disputed issue in a
hybrid plea invokes the dictates of Taylor, in which we declared:
In light of our holding as to the Agreed Statement, the verdicts
rendered below cannot stand. The deficiency is not one of
legally insufficient evidence, however, but rather one of trial
error -- the procedure used to determine guilt. The case must
therefore be remanded for new trial.
388 Md. at 399-400, 879 A.2d at 1083.  The issue becomes, then, one of trial error rather
than harmless error.  Accordingly, we cannot even entertain whether the admission of
Bishop’s confession was harmless, when Bishop’s guilt was determined based on, among
other things, two competing proffers of evidence, as the judge had no means to resolve that
dispute.  See id. at 399, 879 A.2d at 1083; Barnes, 31 Md. App. at 34, 354 A.2d at 505.   
In this case, Bishop’s counsel’s remarks created a dispute over the content of the
telephone conversations, one which the State left unresolved, making Bishop’s hybrid plea,
under Taylor, the incorrect vehicle for the Circuit Court judge to determine Bishop’s guilt.
Add to this the convoluted nature of the plea, wherein a hybrid plea was entered within the
framework of a nolo or Alford plea, and we are unable to even attempt a harmless error
analysis.12  As a result, because of the Taylor conflict regarding the recorded telephone
12(...continued)
guilty plea, as the State argues, or challenging the validity of the prosecutor’s
characterization of the recorded conversations, as Bishop argues.  Either way, we are left
wondering what was said during those telephone conversations, because, as the State
conceded during oral argument, no court could have listened to those recordings, as they
were never admitted into evidence.
This is not the first time we and our colleagues on the Court of Special Appeals have
admonished prosecutors for not doing their due diligence in cases that proceed on stipulated
facts or evidence.  In Harrison v. State, 382 Md. 477, 855 A.2d 1220 (2004), a case that
turned on a determination of whether a victim inhabited a “kill zone” created by the
defendant, which would have facilitated a finding of concurrent intent on the part of the
defendant and thus supported his conviction of second-degree murder, the State and the
defendant proceeded on an agreed statement of facts.  In finding that the agreed statement
of facts was insufficient to establish that the victim inhabited the “kill zone” created by the
defendant, this Court admonished prosecutors for proceeding with an agreed statement of
facts that was legally insufficient:
This Court and the Court of Special Appeals have heretofore
made clear that prosecutors risk acquittal when a not-guilty
agreed statement of facts fails to support the legal theory upon
which the State relies.  We renew that admonition today.  If a
prosecutor proceeds on a not-guilty agreed statement of facts, he
or she should take care to assure that the statement contains
evidence to support each element of the crime or crimes
charged, or else acquittal necessarily will follow.
Id. at 497-98, 855 A.2d at 1232 (internal citations omitted).  Recently, Judge Charles E.
Moylan, Jr., writing for the Court of Special Appeals, echoed our sentiments in Harrison and
commented on the circumstances that lead to such haphazard proffers:
Ironically, what frequently appears to be an almost total “cave
in” on the part of a defendant may sometimes, as in this case,
turn out to be a risky gamble for the prosecutor to take. The
danger is that the mood and tenor of the proceedings give every
appearance that the defendant is content to accept the lesser
penalty agreed upon and is uninclined to protest in any way
about anything. That easy-going geniality may insidiously lull
(continued...)
31
12(...continued)
the prosecution into letting down its guard and becoming less
than vigilant in its composition of the statement of facts.
Preparing such a statement can be a tricky exercise and should
never be approached casually.
Polk v. State, 183 Md. App. 299, 301-02, 961 A.2d 603, 604 (2008).  What these reprimands
demonstrate is that, notwithstanding a defendant’s willingness to absolve the State of putting
on a case, the onus is still on the State to protect the record for appellate review, especially,
as is the case here, in cases where the defendant is proceeding in such a manner specifically
to preserve appellate review of a pretrial ruling.
32
conversations and the muddled record, we shall vacate the judgment of the Court of Special
Appeals and remand the case back to the Circuit Court for Cecil County with instructions to
allow Bishop to withdraw his plea.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
VACATED.
CASE REMANDED TO THE COURT
OF 
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
WITH
DIRECTIONS TO REMAND TO THE
CIRCUIT 
COURT 
FOR 
CECIL
C O U N T Y  
F O R  
F U R T H E R
P R O C E E D I N G S  
N O T
I N C O N S I ST E N T 
W I T H  
T H IS
OPINION.  COSTS IN THIS COURT
AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS 
TO 
BE 
PAID 
BY
RESPONDENT.