Title: Wyoming Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Woods

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Wyoming Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Woods1994 WY 148888 P.2d 192Case Number: 93-170Decided: 12/20/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
WYOMING INSURANCE 
GUARANTY ASSOCIATION,

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

William F. 
WOODS,

Appellee 
(Defendant).

 

Appeal from United States 
District Court for the District of Wyoming, Clarence A. Brimmer, 
J.

 

Bruce A. 
Salzburg of Herschler, Freudenthal, Salzburg, Bonds & Rideout, P.C., 
Cheyenne, for appellant.

Robert G. 
Pickering of Bailey, Pickering & Stock, Cheyenne, and Thomas H. Lambert, San 
Diego, CA, for appellee.

 

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE,* MACY,** and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

*Retired July 
6, 1994.

**Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 

TAYLOR, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      The certified 
question of law before this court is a consequence of a mobile society. The 
State of Wyoming established an insurance guaranty association to shield 
resident claimants or resident insureds from loss due to insolvent insurers. 
Now, in an era when many persons are no longer confined to one residence, the 
insurance guaranty association seeks to determine whether it must indemnify a 
loss suffered at the hands of an insured with multiple residences, including 
Wyoming. We have concluded that the legislative intent of the Wyoming Insurance 
Guaranty Association Act requires that a single "place of residence" be 
established at the time the insured event occurred. As a result, the certified 
question must be answered in the negative.

I. 
QUESTION

[¶2]      The certified 
question of law from the United States District Court for the District of 
Wyoming inquires:

The Court notes that 
"residence" is not defined in the Wyoming Insurance Guaranty Association Act. 
WYO. STAT. §§ 26-31-101 - 117 (1991). The interpretation of "residence" is 
critical to the final disposition of this case. Specifically, did the Wyoming 
legislature intend for an individual claimant to be able to have multiple 
[residences] within the context of the Wyoming Insurance Guaranty Association 
Act?

II. 
FACTS

[¶3]      In early 1989, 
William F. Woods (Woods), a San Diego, California attorney, considered 
purchasing a 1986 Pitts Model S2B aerobatics biplane (hereinafter the plane) on 
behalf of his professional corporation. The plane was owned by Paul Entrekin 
(Entrekin) and based in Pensacola, Florida. Woods and Entrekin agreed that the 
plane would be flown to San Diego before completing the purchase. Entrekin 
maintained $100,000.00 in liability insurance covering any "permissive user" of 
the plane under a policy written by the Ohio General Casualty Company (Ohio 
General).

[¶4]      Paul Crowley 
(Crowley), a retired airline transport pilot, agreed to fly the plane from 
Pensacola to San Diego for Woods. On February 11, 1989, Crowley and Woods met 
with Entrekin at the Pensacola airport and inspected the plane. After completing 
the inspection, Crowley and Woods began the flight to San Diego. The trip 
started uneventfully with Crowley piloting under visual flight rules. However, 
about one hour and fifty minutes into the flight, the plane ran out of fuel and 
crashed about five miles from the community of Walker, Louisiana. Crowley 
admitted that during the last half-hour of the flight, he had been unable to see 
a fuel quantity gauge and had failed to reset another fuel control 
device.

[¶5]      Woods suffered a 
fractured femur and other injures in the crash. He was unable to work full-time 
for about one year. Crowley was not injured, but the plane was a total loss. 
Woods made a claim for damages with Ohio General.

[¶6]      On June 27, 1989, 
Ohio General filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Florida to determine if coverage existed 
under its policy with Entrekin. The court determined that Ohio General had a 
duty to defend and indemnify Entrekin and Crowley for any liability they might 
have for the injuries suffered by Woods. Ohio General Ins. Co. v. Woods, 
No. 89-30177RV, slip op. at 16 (N.D.Fla. June 25, 1991). By the time the 
court issued its decision, however, the Ohio Department of Insurance had 
instituted proceedings to declare Ohio General insolvent. On February 15, 1991, 
the Department of Insurance of the State of Wyoming revoked Ohio General's 
Certificate of Authority to do business in Wyoming. Prior to that, Ohio General 
had been a member, in good standing, of the Wyoming Insurance Guaranty 
Association (the Association).

[¶7]      Before Ohio 
General was placed in the hands of insurance regulators, Woods filed a civil 
action in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Diego, 
seeking compensatory damages from Crowley and Entrekin. During pretrial 
proceedings, Entrekin was dismissed from the action for lack of personal 
jurisdiction. Before trial, Crowley agreed to pay Woods $40,000.00 for a 
covenant not to execute any judgment from the California proceedings against 
Crowley's personal assets. Furthermore, Crowley assigned any indemnification or 
other rights he might have held under the Ohio General policy to Woods. In a 
trial to the court, Woods was awarded a total of $1,396,993.56 in damages from 
Crowley. Woods v. Crowley, No. 620299, slip op. at 2 (Cal.Sup.Ct. Jan. 
31, 1992).

[¶8]      One of the 
documents Crowley executed in conjunction with the California civil proceeding 
assigned to Woods the rights to any claim Crowley may have against the 
Association. On February 24, 1992, Woods filed a claim, individually and as the 
assignee of Crowley, with the agent of the Association. Woods alleged that the 
Association owed a statutory duty to indemnify a loss resulting from the actions 
of a Wyoming resident, Crowley, who was the insured of Ohio General, an 
insolvent insurer.

[¶9]      Crowley is a 
person with multiple residences. At the time Crowley was hired by Woods to fly 
the plane from Pensacola to San Diego, Crowley was living in California but was 
a resident of both California and Wyoming. Crowley owned a home in Malibu, 
California and another home in Smoot, Wyoming. Typically, Crowley spent 
approximately six months of the year in California, during the winter and early 
spring, and six months of the year in Wyoming, during the summer and 
fall.

[¶10]   As a part of his multiple residence 
life-style, Crowley had motor vehicles registered in both California and 
Wyoming. However, his driver's license was issued by Wyoming. Crowley maintained 
checking and savings accounts at financial institutions in both California and 
Wyoming. Because his pension income was earned while working in California, 
Crowley was required to pay state income taxes there. Since Crowley stayed in 
Wyoming during the fall hunting season, Crowley voted in Wyoming. Crowley also 
obtained hunting licenses in Wyoming. The pilot's license issued to Crowley 
listed his address, at the time of the accident, as 
Malibu.

[¶11]   On August 6, 1992, the Association 
filed a declaratory judgment action in the District Court for the First Judicial 
District of Wyoming. The Association sought a declaration from the court that 
Woods was judicially estopped by admissions in the prior civil actions in 
Florida and California from claiming Crowley was a resident of Wyoming. The 
action was removed to the United States District Court for the District of 
Wyoming. Woods filed a counterclaim seeking payment of the $100,000.00 policy 
limit of the Ohio General policy, pre-judgment interest, attorney's fees and 
costs. During the pendency of this action, the California Insurance Guaranty 
Association denied coverage because Ohio General had never qualified to do 
business in that state. After extensive pretrial proceedings and motions, the 
certified question was presented to this court.

III. 
DISCUSSION

[¶12]   The Association was created by the 
Wyoming Insurance Guaranty Association Act, Wyo. Stat. §§ 26-31-101 through 
26-31-117 (1991) (hereinafter the Act). The Act, as adopted in Wyoming in 1971, 
is based upon the Post-Assessment Property and Liability Insurance Guaranty 
Association Model Act (the Model Act) prepared by the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners (N.A.I.C.) in 1969. District of Columbia Ins. Guar. 
Ass'n v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 565 A.2d 564, 565 (D.C.App. 1989); 1 N.A.I.C. 
Proc. 253 (1970). The Model Act was promulgated as an opposition response to 
federal legislation which sought to protect the public from loss due to 
insolvent insurers. 2 N.A.I.C. Proc. 549-52 (1969). Instead, the N.A.I.C. 
recommended a program in each state to establish a means to guarantee the 
payment of claims against insolvent insurers. Id.

[¶13]   The Act creates an involuntary 
nonprofit unincorporated legal entity, the Association, whose members are 
insurers qualified to transact business in Wyoming. Wyo. Stat. § 26-31-104(a) 
and (b). Each member contributes an assessment, based on a percentage of 
premiums from insurance policies written in Wyoming, to a fund which is used to 
pay claims. Wyo. Stat. § 26-31-107(a). When an insurance company is determined 
to be insolvent, the Association "steps into the shoes of the insolvent 
insurer." Washington Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Mullins, 62 Wn. App. 878, 816 P.2d 61, 63 (1991). The Association is deemed the insurer to the extent of its 
obligation for covered claims and the Association then has all rights, duties 
and obligations of the insolvent insurer. Wyo. Stat. § 26-31-106(a)(ii). In 
addition, the Association is required to aid in the detection and prevention of 
insurer insolvencies. Wyo. Stat. § 26-31-112.

[¶14]   The purpose of the Act is to 
provide a mechanism for the payment of covered claims which avoids excessive 
delay in payment and avoids financial loss to claimants or insureds because of 
the insolvency of an insurer. Wyoming Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Allstate Indem. 
Co., 844 P.2d 464, 466 (Wyo. 1992); T & N PLC v. Pennsylvania Ins. 
Guar. Ass'n, 822 F. Supp. 275, 280 (E.D.Pa. 1993); Algernon Blair, 
Inc., 565 A.2d  at 565; 1 N.A.I.C. Proc. 253 (1970). The Act seeks to remedy 
the social consequences resulting from the insolvency of an insurer. "[E]very 
insurance company failure undermines public confidence in and the value of the 
insurance institution whose continued existence is the result of the public's 
desire and need to be secure from risk." Jon S. Hanson, Drafting Model Post 
Assessment Guaranty Fund Legislation, 1 N.A.I.C. Proc. 262 (1970). 
Therefore, as remedial legislation designed for the public's protection, this 
court must liberally construe the Act to achieve its purposes and strictly 
construe all exceptions to indemnification. Houghton v. Franscell, 870 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Wyo. 1994); People v. Platte Pipe Line Co., 649 P.2d 208, 212 (Wyo. 1982); Vigil v. Tafoya, 600 P.2d 721, 724 (Wyo. 1979). 
See also Schreffler v. Pennsylvania Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 402 Pa. Super. 309, 
586 A.2d 983, 985 (1991) and 1 N.A.I.C. Proc. 254 (1970). 

[¶15]   Generally, decisions of other 
courts offer persuasive support when questions arise concerning the proper 
interpretation of uniform laws or model acts. B & W Glass, Inc. v. 
Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., 829 P.2d 809, 814 (Wyo. 1992). Some courts have 
considered whether a corporation may have multiple residences under an insurance 
guaranty act. The results, however, lack uniformity.

[¶16]   In Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress, 
Inc. v. Iowa Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 461 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Iowa 1990), the court 
said that the Iowa Insurance Guaranty Association Act "appears to recognize only 
one residence" for an insured seeking to recover a claim against more than one 
insurance guaranty association. The court held that a corporation has only one 
residence which is its principal place of business. Id. The court in 
Pennsylvania Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Charter Abstract Corp., 790 F. Supp. 82, 
87 (E.D.Pa. 1992) agreed that a corporation could have only one residence under 
the Pennsylvania Insurance Guaranty Association Act, but found it unnecessary to 
decide if that residence would be the place of incorporation or the principal 
place of business. In T & N PLC, 822 F. Supp.  at 284, the court 
determined that a corporation organized under the laws of England, with its 
principal place of business in England, did not meet the residence requirements 
of the Pennsylvania Insurance Guaranty Association Act. However, the court held 
that the residence of the parties making a claim against the corporation could 
be used to establish coverage. Id. at 286-89.

[¶17]   In Eastern Seaboard Pile Driving 
Corp. v. New Jersey Property-Liability Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 175 N.J. Super. 
589, 421 A.2d 597, 600 (1980), the court determined that a corporation with its 
principal place of business in New Jersey had established residence under the 
New Jersey Property-Liability Insurance Guaranty Association Act. The court in 
Alabama Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Colonial Freight Systems, Inc., 537 So. 2d 475, 476 (Ala. 1988) reached a contrary conclusion when it held that a 
corporation's residence under the Alabama Insurance Guaranty Act was established 
by its place of incorporation.

[¶18]   In McMahon v. Louisiana Ins. 
Guar. Ass'n, 596 So. 2d 1384, 1387 (La. App. 1992), the court considered 
whether a corporation could have multiple residences under the Louisiana 
Guaranty Law. The court held that the Louisiana legislature only required a 
legal residence in the state to make a claim. Id. at 1388. "As long as 
the claimant or the insured legally resides in Louisiana, it is immaterial that 
either may also qualify for residence in a state other than Louisiana." 
Id. The court found that the corporation had established residency in 
Louisiana when it incorporated in the state, despite the fact its principal 
place of business was now located in Texas. Id. at 
1389.

[¶19]   The various constructions given by 
these courts to the provisions of the Model Act offer only limited guidance. We 
do not find a persuasive consensus. Furthermore, we do not accept the argument 
that certified questions of law should be resolved by simply adopting the logic 
advanced in a particular line of decisions. B & W Glass, Inc., 829 P.2d  at 815.

[¶20]   Both Woods and the Association have 
suggested that guidance on the proper interpretation of the Act may also be 
found in a document styled as "Guiding Principles For Settling Disputes Between 
and Among Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Associations As to 
Responsibility For Claims" (hereinafter Guiding Principles). 1 N.A.I.C. Proc. 
458-59 (1986). This document was prepared by the National Committee on Insurance 
Guaranty Funds in August of 1985 and submitted to the various state associations 
to resolve disputes involving the situs of claims. 1 N.A.I.C. Proc. 457 (1986). 
The Association became a signatory of the Guiding Principles document sometime 
after September 6, 1985. The Guiding Principles, however, offer little 
assistance to our task of discovering legislative intent. The Guiding Principles 
merely represent an agreement among the signatory insurance guaranty 
associations to resolve disputes in a particular manner. The Guiding Principles 
do not have the force and effect of law. We must, therefore, turn to the express 
language of the Act as adopted by the Wyoming legislature and apply our rules of 
statutory construction.

[¶21]   The intent of the Wyoming 
legislature in forming the Association must be ascertained from the language of 
the statute which is viewed in light of its object and purpose. Barcon, Inc. 
v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization, 845 P.2d 373, 377 (Wyo. 1992). A 
statute is construed as a whole with the ordinary and obvious meaning applied to 
the words as they are arranged in paragraphs, sentences, clauses and phrases to 
express intent. Parker Land and Cattle Co. v. Wyoming Game and Fish Com'n, 
845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993). If reasonable persons are able to agree on 
the meaning consistently and predictably, a statute is considered unambiguous. 
Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 
220 (Wyo. 1991). Conversely, "a statute is ambiguous only if it is found to be 
vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations." Id. at 
219-20. When a statute is ambiguous, this court will apply general principles of 
statutory construction to discover legislative intent, including considering the 
statute's purpose and the public policy it is designed to facilitate. Parker 
Land and Cattle Co., 845 P.2d  at 1044. We presume the legislature enacts 
statutes with full knowledge of existing law and as part of a uniform system of 
jurisprudence. Id. (quoting Civic Ass'n of Wyoming v. Railway Motor 
Fuels, 57 Wyo. 213, 238, 116 P.2d 236, 245 (1941)).

[¶22]   The Act defines a "covered claim," 
in pertinent part, as:

(ii) "Covered claim" 
means an unpaid claim which arises out of and is within the coverage and does 
not exceed the applicable limits of an insurance policy to which this chapter 
applies issued by an insurer, if the insurer is an insolvent insurer and 
the claimant or insured is a resident of this state at the time of the insured 
event or the property from which the claim arises is permanently located 
in this state[.]

Wyo. Stat. § 
26-31-103(a)(ii) (emphasis added). This definition states several conditions for 
a covered claim. First, the claim must arise out of and be within the coverage 
intended by an insurance policy issued by an insurer. Second, the claim must not 
exceed the coverage limit of the insurance policy. Third, the insurance policy 
must be a kind of direct insurance to which the Act applies. See Wyo. 
Stat. § 26-31-102. Fourth, the insurer must be insolvent. Fifth, the "claimant 
or insured" must be a "resident" of Wyoming "at the time of the insured event" 
or the property from which the claim arises must be permanently located in 
Wyoming. The certified question requires us to consider, in detail, the 
legislative intent of the fifth condition.

[¶23]   A "covered claim" under the Act may 
be made by a "claimant or insured." Wyo. Stat. § 26-31-103(a)(ii). The use of 
the disjunctive "or" permitted the legislature to state, in plain language, that 
a claim may be filed by two distinct categories of persons. A "claimant," a 
person asserting a right, demand or a claim, Black's Law Dictionary 247 (6th ed. 
1990), or an "insured," the person who obtained coverage or is otherwise covered 
by insurance. Black's Law Dictionary 808 (6th ed. 1990). The Act defines a 
person as "any individual, corporation, partnership, association or voluntary 
organization." Wyo. Stat. § 26-31-103(a)(vi).

[¶24]   Either the "claimant" or the 
"insured" must be a "resident" of Wyoming to make a "covered claim." Wyo. Stat. 
§ 26-31-103(a)(ii). The Act, therefore, permits a foreign "claimant" to seek 
recovery when the "insured" is a "resident." Algernon Blair, Inc., 565 A.2d  at 568. Conversely, a foreign "insured" may also seek recovery when the 
"claimant" is a "resident." T & N PLC, 822 F. Supp.  at 286-89. 
Unfortunately, the legislature did not define the term "resident" in the Act. 
The comments to the Model Act provide only equivocal guidance by suggesting 
residence should be determined by state law and the "`residence' of a 
corporation should not necessarily be equated with its domicile." 1 N.A.I.C. 
Proc. 254 (1970).

[¶25]   The legislature's failure to define 
the term "resident" in the Act makes it an ambiguous term which is subject to 
varying interpretations. Allied-Signal, Inc., 813 P.2d  at 220. Accord, 
Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress, Inc., 461 N.W.2d  at 177-78 (holding under the 
Model Act as adopted in Iowa the failure to define "resident" resulted in 
ambiguity). See also Willis L.M. Reese and Robert S. Green, That 
Elusive Word, "Residence," 6 Vand.L.Rev. 561, 563 (1953) (recognizing that 
"residence" is a word with extremely uncertain meaning as used in statutes). 
Therefore, we must construe the meaning of a "resident" in light of the context 
of its use and with consideration for the purposes of the Act. Parker Land 
and Cattle Co., 845 P.2d  at 1044. Accord, Catalanotto v. Palazzolo, 
46 Misc.2d 381, 259 N.Y.S.2d 473, 476 (N.Y.Sup. 1965) (holding that the terms 
"residence," "resident" and "reside" do not have a uniform meaning in statutes 
so a meaning must be construed from the context of their 
use).

[¶26]   Wyoming has recognized a 
distinction between the "residence" of a person and the "domicile" of a person. 
State ex rel. School Dist. No. 1, Niobrara County v. School Dist. No. 12, 
Niobrara County, 45 Wyo. 365, 376, 18 P.2d 1010, 1013 (1933). "Residence" is 
given the more liberal interpretation. Id. "Domicile" is narrowly 
defined: "`the domicile of a person is the place where he has voluntarily fixed 
his habitation with a present intent to make it either his permanent home or his 
home for the indefinite future.'" Boswell v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 353 
Pa. Super. 108, 509 A.2d 358, 362 (1986) (quoting In re McKinley's 
Estate, 461 Pa. 731, 337 A.2d 851, 853 (1975)). As a result of this narrow 
definition, a person may have a "domicile" in only one place at a time; however, 
the same person may be a "resident" of several places at the same time. 
Casolari v. Pipkins, 253 Ill. App.3d 265, 191 Ill.Dec. 580, 582, 624 N.E.2d 429, 431 (1993); In re Yap, 39 Misc.2d 835, 241 N.Y.S.2d 976, 979 
(N.Y.Sup. 1963); Switzerland General Ins. Co. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 213 S.W.2d 161, 163 (Tex.Civ.App. 1948).

[¶27]   We assume that in using the term 
"resident" in the Act, the legislature understood the difference between the 
terms "domicile" and "resident." Parker Land and Cattle Co., 845 P.2d  at 
1044; L.U. Sheep Co. v. Board of County Com'rs of County of Hot Springs, 
790 P.2d 663, 669 (Wyo. 1990). Accord, Catalanotto, 259 N.Y.S.2d  at 476 
(noting that the legislature is presumed to be aware of the difference between a 
"resident" and a "domiciliary"). If the legislature had intended to restrict the 
Act to a "claimant or insured" with a "domicile" in Wyoming, it would have 
stated that intent in plain language. Therefore, the more liberal status of a 
"resident" is all that is required under the Act. This more liberal status is 
consistent with the purpose of the Act to avoid financial loss due to insurer 
insolvency.

[¶28]   The term "resident" has a primary 
meaning of "one actually living in a place for a time irrespective of domicile." 
In re Yap, 241 N.Y.S.2d  at 978. Accord, Hanson v. P.A. Peterson Home 
Ass'n, 35 Ill. App.2d 134, 182 N.E.2d 237, 239 (1962). A person does not 
have to have the intent to make a permanent home in a state to be considered a 
"resident." In re Yap, 241 N.Y.S.2d  at 978-79. Therefore, the ordinary 
meaning of the term "resident" is:

Any person who occupies a 
dwelling within the State, has a present intent to remain within the State for a 
period of time, and manifests the genuineness of that intent by establishing an 
ongoing physical presence within the State together with indicia that his 
presence within the State is something other than merely transitory in 
nature.

Black's Law 
Dictionary 1309 (6th ed. 1990). Accordingly, an occasional hotel stay, a 
vacation stay at a resort, or an occasional overnight visit to a business 
premises does not establish a residence, "but a permanent or recurrent hotel 
residence or a habitual summer residence does qualify as a residence." S. 
Axelrod Co., Inc. v. Mel Dixon Studio, Inc., 122 Misc.2d 770, 471 N.Y.S.2d 945, 952 (N.Y.City Civ.Ct. 1983).

[¶29]   As used in the Act, the term 
"resident" is modified by the phrase "of this state at the time of the insured 
event * * *." Wyo. Stat. § 26-31-103(a)(ii). This modification states the point 
in time at which the status of a "resident" is determined. However, the phrase 
leaves unanswered the basic question of whether a "resident" under the Act may 
simultaneously be a "resident" of more than one state.

[¶30]   The legislature provided an answer 
in another provision of the Act which states, in pertinent 
part:

(b) Any person having a 
claim which may be recovered under more than one (1) insurance guaranty 
association or its equivalent shall seek recovery first from the 
association of the insured's place of residence, except that if it is a 
first party claim for damage to property with a permanent location, he shall 
seek recovery first from the association of the location of the property. * * * 
Any recovery under this chapter shall be reduced by the amount of recovery from 
any other insurance guaranty association or its 
equivalent.

Wyo. Stat. § 
26-31-111(b) (emphasis added).

[¶31]   As used in the Act, "place of 
residence" is a term of art that designates a single locality. The primary 
meaning of the noun "place" is used to designate "an occupied 
situation or building." Black's Law Dictionary 1148 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis 
added). The locality in the term is delineated by the prepositional phrase "of 
residence." As used in Wyo. Stat. § 26-31-111(b), "place of residence" is a 
singular term. The plural form of the noun "place" is "places." While an 
individual may have several "places of residence," the Act does not speak in 
those terms.

[¶32]   Settled common law has accepted 
that a "place of residence" for an individual means "a fixed and permanent abode 
and dwelling place for the time being as contradistinguished from 
mere temporal local residence." Silvey v. Lindsay, 42 Hun. 116, 120, 49 
N.Y. Sup. Ct. 116, 120 (1886) (emphasis added). The accepted common law "place 
of residence" for a corporation is "`[t]he place where its principal office is 
located, or where its principal operations are carried on[.]'" 
Baltimore & Yorktown Turnpike Road v. Crowther, 63 Md. 558, 1 A. 279, 
285 (1885) (quoting Boone, Corp. § 33) (emphasis in 
original).

[¶33]   We hold the intent of the 
legislature as found in Wyo. Stat. § 26-31-111(b) is to designate a single 
"place of residence" for a "claimant or insured" making a "covered claim" under 
the Act. The point in time to determine the "place of residence" is "at the time 
of the insured event." Wyo. Stat. § 26-31-103(a)(ii). Under the Act, the "place 
of residence" for an individual with multiple residences is established by 
finding that individual's single fixed and permanent abode and dwelling 
place at the time the insured event occurred. The "place of residence" 
for a corporation is established by the location of the corporation's principal 
place of business at the time the insured event occurred.

[¶34]   In answering a certified question, 
this court's role does not include fact finding. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc., 713 P.2d 766, 769 (Wyo. 1986). The United States District Court 
for the District of Wyoming retains jurisdiction to apply the applicable rules 
of law stated in this opinion to determine the "place of residence" of the 
"claimant" and the "insured" under the Act at the time the insured event 
occurred. B & W Glass, Inc., 829 P.2d  at 812.

[¶35]   Woods also attempts to structure 
constitutional challenges to the residency requirement of the Act which we need 
only briefly address. He broadly argues that a residency requirement under the 
Act offends the equal protection clause, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; the 
privileges and immunities provisions, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2; and the right to 
travel, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 n. 6, 102 S. Ct. 2309, 2312 n. 6, 72 L. Ed. 2d 672 (1982) and 
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254-56, 94 S. Ct. 1076, 1080-81, 39 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1974). The residency requirement does not offend 
these constitutional provisions. The funding assessment the Association makes on 
insurers must obviously be limited to members doing business in Wyoming. 
Therefore, a residency requirement for a "claimant" or "insured" to receive 
indemnification bears a rational relationship to the purpose of the Act and the 
need to preserve this finite fund. See Hooper v. Bernalillo County 
Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 620, 105 S. Ct. 2862, 2867, 86 L. Ed. 2d 487 (1985) and 
Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission of Montana, 436 U.S. 371, 390, 98 S. Ct. 1852, 1863-64, 56 L. Ed. 2d 354 (1978). Similarly, we are unable to perceive 
any burden on the right to interstate travel created by the Act since there is 
no waiting period to establish a "resident" status. See Memorial 
Hospital, 415 U.S.  at 255, 94 S. Ct.  at 1081.

IV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶36]   The legislature passed the Wyoming 
Insurance Guaranty Association Act to protect residents from financial loss due 
to insolvent insurers. The complex factual situation presented by this case 
discloses the potential boundaries of that protection. The transactions between 
Woods, Crowley and Entrekin have resulted in litigation in state and federal 
courts in Florida, Ohio, California, and Wyoming. As a result of these actions, 
an injured party has been awarded damages for which at least partial 
indemnification was once available from an insurer.

[¶37]   The certified question from the 
United States District Court for the District of Wyoming inquired, in pertinent 
part:

Specifically, did the 
Wyoming legislature intend for an individual claimant to be able to have 
multiple [residences] within the context of the Wyoming Insurance Guaranty 
Association Act?

[¶38]   The answer is 
"no."