Title: STEVEN EDWARD PAINOVICH V. JACQUELINE LOUISE PAINOVICH

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

STEVEN EDWARD PAINOVICH V. JACQUELINE LOUISE PAINOVICH2009 WY 116216 P.3d 501Case Number: S-09-0031Decided: 09/22/2009
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
STEVEN 
EDWARD PAINOVICH,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
JACQUELINE 
LOUISE PAINOVICH,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sweetwater County

The 
Honorable Jere A. Ryckman, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

James 
M. Peterson and John M. Kuker of Romsa & Kuker, LLC, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

John 
A. Zebre of Zebre Law Offices, P.C., Rock Springs, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      On July 11, 2006, 
Jacqueline Louise Painovich (the appellee) filed for divorce from her husband, 
Steven Painovich (the appellant).  
The appellant subsequently answered the complaint and retained 
counsel.  Following a hearing to 
dispose of the marital property, in which the appellant failed to appear, the 
district court entered judgment in favor of the appellee.  The appellant filed a Motion to Vacate 
Judgment pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(b), which motion the district court 
denied.  Finding no abuse of 
discretion, we will affirm the district court's denial of the 
motion.

 
 

ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Did the district 
court commit an abuse of discretion in denying the appellant's W.R.C.P. 60(b) 
motion?

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      After twelve 
years of marriage, the appellee, through her attorney, filed for divorce against 
the appellant.  The appellant was 
properly served the summons and complaint.  
He subsequently filed an answer and counterclaim.  The district court entered a decree of 
divorce and a hearing was then set relating to the division of property.  Proper notice indicating the time and 
date of the hearing was sent to both parties.  The appellant failed to appear at the 
hearing and the district court entered judgment dividing the marital 
property.  The judgment was entered 
on January 11, 2008.  Proper notice 
of the judgment was sent to both parties.

 
 
[¶4]      On August 25, 
2008, approximately seven months after entry of the property division judgment, 
the appellant filed a motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to W.R.C.P. 
60(b).  Following a hearing on the 
motion, the district court denied the motion to vacate the judgment.  The appellant timely filed a notice of 
appeal.

 
 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶5]                  
Review of a court's decision on a Rule 60(b) motion is confined to a 
determination of whether the court abused its discretion, and it is the movant's 
burden to bring his cause within the claimed grounds of relief and to 
substantiate these claims with adequate proof.  We will reverse an order denying relief 
under Rule 60(b) only if the trial court clearly was 
wrong.

 
 

In 
re Injury to Seevers, 
720 P.2d 899, 901 (Wyo. 1986).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶6]      The appellant 
asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion 
to vacate the judgment pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60, which provides as 
follows:

 
 
(a)   Clerical mistakes.  
Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors 
therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any 
time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, 
if any, as the court orders. 

 
 
(b)   Other reasons.  On motion, 
and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's 
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the 
following reasons:  (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move 
for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse 
party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, 
or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. . . .

 
 
[¶7]      The appellant's 
motion alleged:

 
 
Said 
judgment was obtained either by fraud, or as a result of mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise or excusable neglect, in that the Defendant's failure to appear at the 
final hearing herein held on December 5, 2007, was the result of a communication 
from Plaintiff indicating that the hearing had been cancelled and would be 
rescheduled.

 
 
While 
the appellant used language from W.R.C.P. 60 in his motion, he did not specify 
which subsection of the rule he was asking the district court to apply.  The only specific allegation was that he 
failed to appear at the hearing because the appellee told him that it had been 
cancelled.  Such a claim sounds of 
fraud, and so we assume that he was seeking relief from the judgment under 
W.R.C.P. 60(b)(3).  This assumption 
is further necessitated by the fact that the appellant did not file a legal 
memorandum supporting the motion, and the record on appeal contains no 
transcript of the hearing.  
Essentially, the motion is the only evidence in the record supporting the 
appellant's claim. 

 
 
[¶8]      We have stated 
that "the express purpose of Rule 60(b) is to provide the courts with the means 
of relieving a party from the oppression of a final judgment or order, on a 
proper showing' where such judgments are unfairly' or mistakenly' 
entered."  Erhart v. Flint Eng'g & Constr., 939 P.2d 718, 722 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting 
Westring v. Cheyenne Nat'l Bank, 393 P.2d 119, 123-24 (Wyo. 1964)).  A motion pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(b) must 
be clearly substantiated.  Atkins v. Household Fin. Corp. of 
Casper, 581 P.2d 193, 195 (Wyo. 1978).  
"[W]here fraud and misrepresentation is relied upon as a ground for 
relief sought pursuant to a Rule 60(b) motion, it must be proved by clear and 
convincing evidence.  Fraud is never 
presumed, and the burden of proof to clearly establish such fraud or 
misrepresentation is upon the party seeking relief."  Crawford v. Crawford, 757 P.2d 563, 567 
(Wyo. 1988) (quoting Stevens v. 
Murphy, 680 P.2d 78, 79 (Wyo. 1984)).

 
 
[¶9]      We have 
repeatedly stated that "[i]t is the appellant's burden to bring a complete 
record to this Court" for review.  
Beeman v. Beeman, 2005 WY 45, 
¶ 10, 109 P.3d 548, 551 (Wyo. 2005).  
When the appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, "we 
must accept the district court's findings as being based upon sufficient 
evidence."  Witowski v. Roosevelt, 2009 WY 5, ¶ 37, 
199 P.3d 1072, 1083 (Wyo. 2009).  As 
noted, above, essentially the only evidence in the record is the appellant's own 
motion.  See supra ¶ 7.  The record contains absolutely no 
evidence of what, if anything, the appellant presented to the district court to 
support his claim.  The appellant's 
failure to provide us with more than an unsubstantiated claim of fraud prevents 
us from concluding that the appellant satisfied his burden of bringing his claim 
within W.R.C.P. 60(b).  Accordingly, 
there is no way for us to say that the district court abused its discretion in 
denying appellant's motion to vacate.

 
 
[¶10]   After the W.R.C.P. 60 motion was 
denied, the appellant filed a subsequent motion for relief from judgment 
pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(b) where he more specifically articulated his arguments 
for relief.  Although this motion 
was also denied, the appellant did not appeal that denial.  Nevertheless, that motion was included 
in the record on appeal, and many of the arguments he makes on appeal are based 
on contentions he made in the second motion.

 
 
[¶11]   W.R.A.P. 2.01 requires that an 
appeal from a district court be taken by filing a notice of appeal within thirty 
days from the entry of an appealable order.  Furthermore, W.R.A.P. 2.07 sets forth 
the substance of what must be contained within the notice of appeal, including 
identifying the judgment or appealable order that is being appealed and 
attaching, as an appendix, the order or judgment that is being appealed.  "The notice of appeal effects an appeal 
of the order identified in the notice."  
Nish v. Schaefer, 2006 WY 85, 
¶ 23, 138 P.3d 1134, 1143 (Wyo. 2006).  
These requirements were not met.  
The appellant failed to appeal the denial of the motion for relief from 
judgment as required by the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure. Consequently, 
the latter claims and arguments are not properly before us, and we cannot 
consider them in this appeal.  We 
are limited to the consideration of whether the district court abused its 
discretion in denying the original Motion to Vacate Judgment.  See Nish, 2006 WY 85, ¶¶ 22-24, 138 P.3d at 
1142-43; Dep't of Family Servs. v. 
PAJ, 934 P.2d 1257, 1259-60 (Wyo. 1997). 

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶12]   After reviewing the record on 
appeal, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in denying 
the appellant's motion to vacate, filed pursuant to W.R.C.P 60.  The appellant failed to provide a record 
on appeal adequate for us properly to evaluate the district court's exercise of 
discretion.  Furthermore, many of 
the appellant's arguments in this appeal were related to the denial of a second 
W.R.C.P. 60 motion that was not appealed.  
Accordingly, we affirm.