Title: STATE EX REL EQUITY SUPPLY CO v

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No, 12214 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A STATE O F M O N T A N A ex rel, EQUITY SUPPLY C O M P A N Y , P e t i t i o n e r , T H E DISTRICT C O U R T O F T H E E L E V E N T H JUDICIAL DISTRICT O F T H E STATE O F MONTANA, i n and f o r the County of Flathead and the Honorable Robert S. Keller, a Judge thereof, Respondents. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: Counsel of Record For Petitioner: Korn,Warden,Walterskirchen & Christiansen ,Kalispe11 Merritt Warden argued, Kalispell, Montana. For Respondents: McGarvey, Morrison and Hedman, Whitefish, Montana. Frank B Morrison argued, Whitefish, Montana. Submitted: February 25, 1972 Decided: MAR 9 - 1972 M r . J u s t i c e Wesley Castles delivered the Opinion of t h e Court. This is an o r i g i n a l proceeding i n which r e l a t o r Equity Supply Company seeks a w r i t of supervisory control directed t o t h e d i s t r i c t court of the eleventh j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , Flat- head County, Hon. Robert S. Keller presiding. Relator is one of the defendants named in Cause No. 21,801 i n Flathead County f i l e d March 22, 1971, e n t i t l e d Edward Pagel and Leona Pagel, P l a i n t i f f s vs. P h i l l i p Barr and Equity Supply Company, Defendants, wherein p l a i n t i f f s seek damages f o r personal i n j u r i e s a r i s i n g out of a motor vehicle c o l l i s i o n on January 31, 1964, i n Lincoln County. Defendant, P h i l l i p Barr, has never been served with process and has not appeared i n t h e action. Barr was allegedly the driver of a motor vehicle owned by Equity Supply Company. A p r i o r i d e n t i c a l action, Cause No. 18,685 i n the same court i n Flathead County, was f i l e d on January 27, 1967, N o summons was issued on the complaint i n t h a t action. O n March 3, 1969, an amended complaint was f i l e d seeking i d e n t i c a l damages. On t h a t date summons was issued and served on the defendant, r e l a t o r herein, on March 4, 1969, over f i v e years a f t e r the acci- dent. On April 3, 1969, defendant Equity Supply Company appeared by motion t o quash summons and t o dismiss the action, pursuant to Rule 41(e), M.R.Civ.P. Briefs were f i l e d and on March 15, 1971, t h e presiding judge granted t h e motion f o r the reason t h a t summons was not issued within one year of the date of commencement of the action. The d i s t r i c t judge wrote t h e following memorandum with h i s order: "Section 93-4705 (7) , RCM, 1947, s p e c i f i c a l l y provided f o r the dismissal of actions wherein summons had not been issued within one year. This s t a t u t e was repealed i n 1961, concurrently with the adoption of the Rules of C i v i l Procedure. Rule 41(e), which has no counterpart i n the Federal Rules, was adopted i n 1963, and it pro- vided t h a t unless summons s h a l l have been served and return made within three years a f t e r commence- ment of the action, the action should be dismissed. Rule 41(e) was again amended i n 1965, but the 1963 r u l e came out of t h e old Section 93-4705. That s t a t u t e not only provided for a dismissal i f summons had not been issued within one year, but it a l s o provided f o r a dismissal i f service and return of summons had n o t been made within three years, a s Rule 41(e), i n i t s 1963 version attempted t o s t a t e . Rule 41(e), a s amended i n 1965, is, f o r t h e part t h a t is relevant t o t h i s motion, taken almost d i r e c t l y from Section 93-4705. "Section 93-3002, RCM, 1947, s p e c i f i c a l l y provided t h a t p l a i n t i f f may have summons issued within one year a f t e r t h e f i l i n g of the complaint. This s t a t u t e was not repealed when the r u l e s were adopted and i n f a c t has never been repealed a s such, but was superseded by Rule 41(e) a s amended by Supreme Court Order 10750. Rule 41(e), i n its 1963 version, was amended t o its present version by Supreme Court Order 10750, i . e . , t h e present Rule 41(e) supersedes Section 93-3002, and based upon the commission note t o the 1965 amendment, it a l s o incorporates Section 93-4705(7), RCM, 1947, now repealed, 1 I It is now c l e a r t h a t a l l actions now commenced s h a l l be dismissed by the Court: "1. Unless summons s h a l l have been issued within one year, o r , "2. Unless summons issued within one year s h a l l have been served and return made and f i l e d with the Clerk within three years a f t e r t h e com- mencement of the action, o r , "3. Unless appearance has been made by the defendant therein within s a i d three years. "The complaint i n t h i s action was f i l e d on January 27, 1967, and i f a summons were then issued, it has not been returned, insofar a s t h e f i l e r e f l e c t s . A n amended complaint was f i l e d on March 3, 1969, and a summons was then issued on the amended complaint. This was improper. N o summons can issue within one year a f t e r the f i l i n g of the complaint, and the amended complaint would r e l a t e back t o the date of the f i l i n g of the o r i g i n a l complaint." During the seven year period, d i f f e r e n t counsel appeared both a s t o the o r i g i n a l complaint and the amended complaint. Following the dismissal of Cause 18,685 on March 15, 1971, another new counsel appeared and on March 22, 1971, a complaint was f i l e d a s a new action, but i d e n t i c a l i n a l l ways t o the previously dismissed action. After service of process on r e l a t o r a s one of the defendants, r e l a t o r f i l e d its answer s e t t i n g f o r t h a s affirmative defenses section 93-2605, R.C .M. 1947, (the three year s t a t u t e of limitations), and res judicata by reason of t h e dismissal of Cause No. 18,685. A t t h e same time, r e l a t o r f i l e d a motion for summary judgment a s t o t h e issue of l i a b i l i t y by reason of the affirmative defenses. O n January 12, 1972, Judge Keller denied the motion f o r summary judgment. Again, a s i n the previous case, Judge Keller wrote a memorandum: "Whitcraft vs. Semenza, 1965, 145 Mont. 94, 97, 399 Pac 2d. 757, is a case d i r e c t l y i n point, and it c l e a r l y holds t h a t a dismissal under the provi- sions of Rule 41(e) is not res judicata, does not c o n s t i t u t e a bar t o another s u i t on the same claim, and is not a dismissal upon the merits. "Plaintiff r e l i e s upon the provisions of Section 93-2708, RCM, 1947, t o avoid the s t a t u t e of limita- t i o n s , which ordinarily would have run i n t h i s case. Defendant takes t h e position t h a t t h a t s t a t u t e is not applicable i n t h i s case since t h e previous d i s - missal of t h i s case under t h e provisions of Rule 41(e) constituted a dismissal of the complaint f o r neglect t o prosecute the action. Cited cases, and l e g a l a u t h o r i t i e s , a r e divided on the question of whether o r not t h e f a i l u r e t o issue summons is a neglect t o prosecute the action. Suffice it t o say t h a t Rule 41(b) provides t h a t a f a i l u r e t o prosecute the a c t i o n operates a s an adjudication upon the merits, and then provides f o r Rule 41(e) which is a dismissal f o r f a i l u r e t o serve a summons, i . e . , the l a t t e r cannot be a neglect t o prosecute the action. 11 The two memorandums of the t r i a l judge a c t u a l l y s e t f o r t h t h e problem presented here. This Court granted an ex parte a l - t e r n a t i v e order t o show cause. Return was made, b r i e f s f i l e d and the matter f u l l y argued. ela at or 's position is t h a t the dismissal of Cause No. 18,685 under Rule 41(e), M.R.Civ.P., f o r f a i l u r e t o have summons issued within one year constituted "a dismissal of the complaint f o r neglect t o prosecute the action" and therefore p l a i n t i f f s were not e n t i t l e d t o the extension of limitations provided f o r i n section 93-2708, R.C.M. 1947. This being the case, r e l a t o r reasons, the three year s t a t u t e of limitations provided f o r i n section 93-2605, R.C.M. 1947, is applicable t o Cause No. 21,801 and the motion f o r summary judgment should have been granted. Relator a l s o urges t h a t t h e e f f e c t of the dismissal of Cause No. 18,685 for f a i l u r e t o have the summons issued within one year was a dismissal f o r f a i l u r e t o prosecute and operates a s an adjudica- t i o n upon the merits and is thus r e s judicata. P l a i n t i f f s below r e l y on section 93-2708, R.C,M. 1947, which provides : I I Provision where judgment has been reversed. I f an action is commenced within t h e time limited therefor, and a judgment therein is reversed on appeal, without awarding a new t r i a l , o r t h e action is terminated i n any other manner than by a voluntary discontinuance, a dismissal of t h e complaint f o r neglect t o prosecute the action, o r a f i n a l judgment upon t h e merits, t h e p l a i n t i f f , o r , i f he d i e s , and t h e cause of action survives, h i s representative, may commence a new action f o r the same cause, a f t e r the expiration of the time s o limited, and within one year a f t e r such a reversal o r termination. 1 I P l a i n t i f f s argue t h a t section 93-2708 is a "saving s t a t u t e " enabling p l a i n t i f f s t o r e f i l e even though the s t a t u t e of limitations had run and the f i r s t case had been dismissed f o r f a i l u r e t o have a summons issued within one year. P l a i n t i f f s go on t o argue t h a t the only way a dismissal under Rule 41 (e) , M.R.Civ.P., could be an adjudication upon the merits would be i f Rule 41(e) is contemplated i n the language of Rule 41(b) a s a ''failure t o prosecute". A s noted i n the second memorandum of Judge Keller, the case of Whitcraft v. Semenza, 145 Mont. 94, 96, 399 P.2d 757, contains language concerned here. Also, a s noted i n Judge ~ e l l e r ' s memorandums, the history of Rule 41, M.R.Civ.P., is involved. I n S t a t e ex r e l . Baldwin v. D i s t r i c t Court, 142 Mont. 64, 68, 381 P.2d 473, decided i n 1963 p r i o r t o the amendment i n 1965 of Rule 41(e), t h i s Court held t h a t where a summons issued w a s on May 23, 1958, butlnot served u n t i l December 20, 1962, section 93-4705, R.C.M. 1947, operated so a s t o place a limitation of three years on service of summons for a l l purposes. In a somewhat p a r a l l e l s i t u a t i o n a s here involved, t h e Court i n Baldwin said: "The a f f i d a v i t f i l e d by the p l a i n t i f f adminis- t r a t o r i n the d i s t r i c t court indicates changes of counsel and apparent lack of diligence i n effecting t h e service by counsel. These matters a r e unfortunate, particularly here where the s t a t u t e of limitations has run against the claim f o r r e l i e f , but there a r e two s i d e s i n a l l l i t i g a - tion. Here the wreck occurred December 17, 1956. O n December 20, 1962, the defendant was served with process c a l l i n g upon him t o defend an action f o r damages which had occurred s i x years and three days previously. Such delay i n prosecution should not be tolerated, and is not under our law. Whether or not actions of counsel selected by the p l a i n t i f f - administrator can'be excused o r condoned is not before us i n t h i s proceeding." Fallowing Baldwin, Whitcraft was decided on March 5, 1965. Rule 41(e) was amended t h e r e a f t e r and the Commission note reads a s follows: "This c l a r i f i e s and brings together the laches provisions with respect t o issuance and service of summons. A t present Rules 4 C ( l ) , 41(e), Section 93-3002, R.C.M. 1947, and Rule 12(b) a l l need t o be referred to. This amendment in- corporates the laches provision of Section 93- 4705(7), R.C.M. 1947, which was repealed by Chapter 13 of the 1961 Session Laws. "This amendment renders Section 93-3002, R.C .M. 1947, unnecessary, and t h a t section superseded and added t o Tables B and C." In Whitcraft the Court held t h a t t h e raising of f a i l u r e t o serve summons within three years a f t e r issuance could be by motion r a t h e r than pleaded; and t h a t the f a i l u r e t o serve t h e summons within three years could be raised a s a bar even though section 93-4705, R.C.M. 1947, had been repealed; and even though Rule 41(e) had not been adopted t o cover the s i t u a t i o n presented. In Whitcraft the following language appears : "It must be borne i n mind t h a t the Rule is nothing more than a r u l e of procedure, de- signed t o encourage promptness i n the prose- cution of actions. Dismissal thereunder is not based upon t h e absence of a claim, nor upon any defect i n the substantive r i g h t , nor is t h e Rule a s t a t u t e of limitation barring the claim a f t e r lapse of the specified time. While an action may be dismissed t h e claim remains. A n order of dismissal is not res judicata, it does not c o n s t i t u t e a bar t o another s u i t on the same claim. It is a funda- mental r u l e t h a t a judgment is not r e s judicata unless it is on the merits, and a dismissal under the Rule is not." This language makes Judge ~ e l l e r 's feeling of obligation under- standable. However, i n the context i n which i t was used, a s a prelude t o the discussion of ~ h e t h e r .Rble 41(e) was then t o be used retrospectively a s contended by the appellant i n Whitcraft, t h e language is limited t o t h a t context. A s Rule 41(e) is now written, an order of dismissal is a bar t o another s u i t on t h e same claim, i f , a s here, the s t a t u t e of limitations as well a s the period provided f o r by t h e r u l e , have run. Section 93-2708, R.C.M. 1947, a s quoted previously, has been limited t o t h a t extent by the application of Rule 41. A s we said i n the above quoted portion of Baldwin, such delay i n prosecution should not be tolerated, and is not under our law. Rule 41(e) is e x p l i c i t and incorporates the laches provisions previously contained i n sectzon 93-470>(7), R.C .M. 1947. Any other interpretation would make Rule 41, M.R.Civ.P., and i t s subdivisions meaningless and they would simply become technical defects which could be endlessly corrected upon being c a l l e d t o t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e Court. Having found t h a t section 93-2708, R.C.M. 1947, does not operate t o save a claim where t h e f a i l u r e t o have summons issued within the s t a t u t o r y period of limitations had occurred, it then follows t h a t the order of the d i s t r i c t court should be reversed and the case dismissed. It is so ordered. "7 ,c # - r - - % l ~ ' - , - , - , , , , - , - - - - - - - Associate J u s t i c e Associate Justices. M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell, s p e c i a l l y concurring. I concur i n t h e r e s u l t reached by t h e majority, but disagree with its interpretation of Rule 41(e), M.R.Civ.P. The majority holds t h a t an order of dismissal is a bar t o another s u i t by the same p a r t i e s on t h e same claim only i f t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s , a s well a s t h e period provided i n Rule 41(e), has run. In m y view, a dismissal under Rule 41(e) operates independently of any s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s , and a dismissal thereunder f o r f a i l u r e t o have a summons issued within one year bars a subsequent action between the same p a r t i e s on the same claim. The operative words of Rule 41(e) t h a t a r e pertinent here provide: 'I* * * a l l a c t i o n s heretofore o r h e r e a f t e r commenced s h a l l be dismissed by the court i n which t h e same s h a l l have been commenced * * * unless summons s h a l l have been issued within one year * * *." The purpose of t h i s Rule is not only t o promote d i l i g e n t prosecution of claims once s u i t has been f i l e d thereon, a l s o t o bar f u r t h e r prosecution of lached lawsuits. The Commission Note t o amended Rule 41(e) makes t h i s c l e a r i n t h e following language, quoted i n p a r t a s follows: "This c l a r i f i e s and brings together t h e laches provisions with respect t o issuance and s e r v i c e of summons * * *. This amendment incorporates t h e laches provisions of Section 93-4705 (7) ,R. C.M. 1947, which was repealed by Chapter 13 of t h e 1961 Session Laws * * *." (Emphasis added) This purpose is completely defeated by i n t e r p r e t i n g Rule 41(e), M.R.Civ.P. , t o permit a subsequent r e f i l i n g of a lached lawsuit previously dismissed s o long a s t h e s t a t u t e of limitations has not expired. Accordingly, I would d i r e c t l y overrule the language quoted i n t h e majority opinion from Whitcraft v. Semenza, 145 Mont. 94, 399 P.2d 757, decided prior t o the amendment of Rule 41 (e) , which I believe t o be a t variance with the purpose and express language of amended Rule 41 (e) , M.R.Civ. P. O n t h e foregoing basis, I would hold t h a t Judge ~ e l l e r 's order of March 15, 1971, dismissing the o r i g i n a l s u i t for t a i l u r e t o have summons issued within one year ended further prosecution of the same claim irrespective of the s t a t u t e of limitations. Associate Justice.