Title: KENNEDY v. KENNEDY

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

Kennedy v. Kennedy1988 WY 117761 P.2d 995Case Number: 88-103Decided: 09/23/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
KEITH C. KENNEDY, 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

v.

MELANIE KENNEDY, APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, UintaCounty, John D. Troughton, 
J.

John A. Thomas 
of Phillips, Lancaster & Thomas, P.C., Evanston, for appellant.

Mark W. Harris 
of Harris & Morton, Evanston, for appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Keith C. 
Kennedy (husband) challenges a divorce decree entered March 22, 1988. He argues 
that the district court unfairly divided assets and obligations from his 
marriage to appellee Melanie Kennedy (wife). The issue raised in his initial 
brief was:

Whether the district 
court abused its discretion by inequitably dividing the property and debts of 
the parties in light of the amounts awarded to appellee for child support and 
alimony.

In his reply 
brief husband also argued:

Whether the district 
court abused its discretion by substituting its individual and extrajudicial 
knowledge for proof of facts not judicially cognizable.

[¶2.]     We reverse and remand 
based on the argument contained in the reply brief.

[¶3.]     The parties married on 
November 9, 1979, in Randolph, Utah. At that time husband was twenty years 
old, had a high school education, and had been trained as a welder in a 
Utah trade 
school. He had been welding for F.M.C. Corporation since finishing trade school. 
Wife was eighteen years old and had a high school 
education.

[¶4.]     The parties had three 
sons born in 1980, 1983, and 1985. During the eight year marriage, wife worked 
in the home as a housewife and also had various part-time and temporary 
full-time jobs that paid near minimum wage. Husband continued to work for F.M.C. 
Corporation throughout the marriage. An F.M.C. pay stub showed that husband's 
gross income through July of 1987 was $25,807.69. Husband testified that he 
might be able to earn overtime in his job, but that the amount of overtime 
possible would vary and could not be predicted.

[¶5.]     The parties accumulated 
personal and real property during their marriage including a 1971 pickup truck 
and camper, a 1979 Ford Pinto, a 1983 Chevrolet Blazer, various household 
appliances, two snowmobiles and other recreational items, miscellaneous 
household and personal items, and a family residence on a five-acre parcel of 
real estate. They bought land using a $3,000 gift from husband's father and a 
$17,000 loan from the First State Bank of Lyman. The parties completed and 
furnished the home in 1987. They paid for it with a $7,000 loan from wife's 
grandmother, $2,250 in proceeds from the sale of a mobile home they had on the 
property, and a $72,000 mortgage on the home from the First Wyoming Bank of 
Evanston. At the 
time the divorce decree was entered the parties owed wife's grandmother $4,000, 
and just under $72,000 to the bank on the mortgage debt. Other debts owed by the 
parties at that time totaled approximately $3,148, including $2,000 on the 1983 
Blazer.

[¶6.]     By the summer of 1987, 
irreconcilable differences had arisen between the parties. On August 19, 1987, 
husband filed a complaint for divorce. Wife answered two days later, and the 
case was tried on December 3, 1987. On December 7, 1987, the district court 
filed its decision letter in the case asking wife to submit a proposed decree. 
Wife did so on December 16, and husband filed objections to the proposed decree 
the next day. The district court filed additional decision letters on December 
29, 1987, and January 20, 1988. After more correspondence with the trial court 
in February, 1988, a final divorce decree was entered on March 22, 
1988.

[¶7.]     That decree granted 
wife custody of the children and monthly child support totaling the greater of 
either $200 per month per child or twenty-five percent of husband's net income. 
Husband was ordered to pay for medical insurance covering the children. Husband 
received one acre of the real property and the house on it. He was also ordered 
to pay the mortgage debt on the house along with the rest of the marital debt. 
Husband also received modest funds in the parties' personal checking and savings 
accounts and was allowed to claim two of the children as dependents for federal 
income tax purposes. The district court awarded wife alimony for five years 
totaling the greater of either $250 per month or ten percent of husband's net 
income. She also received four acres of the real property, unencumbered, and 
none of the outstanding debt listed above. The court gave husband the option to 
purchase this four acres from wife for $2,000 per acre in cash and to have that 
amount credited against alimony. He never exercised that option. The district 
court also gave wife the 1983 Blazer and the 1979 Pinto and one of the children 
as a dependent for federal income tax purposes. The court divided other personal 
property item by item, and the parties split their 1987 federal income tax 
refund.

[¶8.]     In this court husband 
challenges the decree by arguing in his initial brief that the property division 
was inequitable and reflected an abuse of district court discretion. Wife 
asserts the property division was fair based on the information before the trial 
court, and that we must defer to its findings and conclusions. In husband's 
reply brief, he claims the trial court improperly used its own personal opinion 
of land value to support its finding of the value of the four acres it awarded 
to wife. Husband asserts no other evidence existed in the record to support the 
$2,000 per acre value assigned to that land by the trial court. Wife moved to 
strike the reply brief under W.R.A.P. 5.03, as raising an issue not raised by 
her brief. This court considered that motion and allowed the appeal to 
proceed.

[¶9.]     The controlling statute 
in this case, W.S. 20-2-114 (June 1987 Repl.), provides:

In granting a divorce, 
the court shall make such disposition of the property of the parties as appears 
just and equitable, having regard for the respective merits of the parties and 
the condition in which they will be left by the divorce, the party through whom 
the property was acquired and the burdens imposed upon the property for the 
benefit of either party and children. The court may decree to either party 
reasonable alimony out of the estate of the other having regard for the other's 
ability and may order so much of the other's real estate or the rents and 
profits thereof as is necessary be assigned and set out to either party for 
life, or may decree a specific sum be paid by either 
party.

A trial court 
determines the disposition of marital property and alimony under this statute as 
an exercise of its sound discretion. Broadhead v. Broadhead, 737 P.2d 731, 
739-740 (Wyo. 1987) (citing Paul v. Paul, 616 P.2d 707 (Wyo. 
1980)). This court is not a forum of first impression in divorce cases, and we 
will not interfere with the trial court's property division and alimony 
decisions unless the record clearly shows an abuse of trial court discretion. 
Id. We define 
judicial discretion as "a composite of many things, among which are conclusions 
drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard 
to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously. [Citation.]" Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986). Further, we 
review the evidence on appeal in favor of the successful party below, ignoring 
the evidence of the unsuccessful party, and granting the successful party every 
reasonable inference that can be drawn from the record. Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 
677 P.2d 814, 818 (Wyo. 1984).

[¶10.]  These standards of review work in concert 
with the fundamental principle that a trial court's findings must be supported 
by sufficient evidence in the record. We have stated many times, in many 
different types of civil cases, that this court will not redecide questions of 
fact where sufficient evidence exists upon which the trial court could 
rationally base its findings. See, e.g., Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. Morris, 756 P.2d 774, 775 (Wyo. 1988); In the Matter of 
Bagshaw, 753 P.2d 1044, 1045 (Wyo. 1988); Miles 
v. CEC Homes, Inc., 753 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Wyo. 
1988) (citing Kvenild v. Taylor, 594 P.2d 972, 
976 (Wyo. 
1979)). A finding rendered without sufficient evidence, however, is erroneous 
and constitutes an abuse of discretion under the Martin standard. Miles, 753 P.2d  at 1022. This court may review a trial court's finding of fact in this 
context, even absent an objection lodged against the finding below, based on the 
plain language of W.R.C.P. 52(a). See also 9 C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure, § 2581 at 720-721 (1971 & Supp. 
1987).

[¶11.]  In this case a finding pivotal to the 
trial court's division of the marital real property was the value of the four 
acres given to wife. Husband presented evidence to the trial court suggesting 
that the value of that land should be the price the couple paid for it as 
evidenced by the loans and gifts they had applied to its purchase. Wife did not 
introduce any evidence to show what the value of the four acres was. In its 
third decision letter in the case the trial court made the following 
finding:

Mrs. Kennedy shall be 
awarded alimony in the sum of $250.00 per month or 10% of Plaintiff's net 
income, whichever is greater. To secure the payment of alimony and child 
support, the 4 acres which are free and clear of debt shall be set over unto 
Mrs. Kennedy. Plaintiff shall be given credit against the alimony in the sum of 
$3,000.00 Judge Troughton owns property 
within several miles of Robertson, Wyoming and the Court relies upon Judge 
Troughton's knowledge and experience of land values in the area, rather than on 
the opinions of Mr. and Mrs. Kennedy. The court rejects a price of $3,000 to 
$4,000 per acre for the land. Such prices were not even common in this area 
during the boom. Judge Troughton would like to obtain $3,000 an acre for his 
land. If Plaintiff desires, he may have the 4 acres, provided he pays Mrs. 
Kennedy $2,000 per acre, a total of $8,000 cash, which shall be credited against 
alimony. (Emphasis added.)

[¶12.]  This finding is entirely without 
evidentiary basis in the record. Perhaps the court was attempting to take 
judicial notice of land values in the Robertson, Wyoming, area. A land value is clearly not the 
type of adjudicative fact of which a trial court can take judicial notice. 
W.R.E. 201, explained in Nuspl v. Nuspl, 717 P.2d 341, 343-344 (Wyo. 
1986).

[¶13.]  Because the finding of land value is 
without any evidentiary support and is based upon extrajudicial information, it 
is clearly erroneous and must be reversed. The finding of land value is critical 
to a "just and equitable" disposition of the marital property in this case; 
therefore, we reverse the decree and remand the case to the trial court for a 
further hearing on the value of the four acres and a new decree based on the 
evidence presented.

[¶14.]  Reversed and 
remanded.

THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion. 

THOMAS, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶15.]  I would affirm the judgment of the 
district court in this instance. For that reason, I must dissent from the 
decision represented by the opinion of the majority. In my judgment, the decree 
entered by the district court fits well within the range of discretion suggested 
by the pertinent language of § 20-2-114, W.S. 1977 (June 1987 Repl.), which 
is:

"* * * The court may 
decree to either party reasonable alimony out of the estate of the other having 
regard for the other's ability and may order so much of the other's real estate 
or the rents and profits thereof as is necessary be assigned and set out to 
either party for life, or may decree a specific sum be paid by either 
party."

[¶16.]  The four acres of land are addressed and 
disposed of in paragraph ten of the divorce decree which is the alimony 
paragraph. The wife is awarded alimony in the sum of $250 per month or ten 
percent of the plaintiff's net income, whichever is greater, but the award is 
limited to five years and ends upon the husband's death, the wife's remarriage, 
or upon the event of her cohabitation with another man. At the rate of $250 per 
month for five years, the maximum alimony that the wife could receive would be 
$15,000. She could receive more according to the court's definition of net 
income which is found in the same paragraph of the decree. The trial court then 
proceeded to award the four acres of land to the wife, subject to a proviso that 
the husband could purchase the land from her for $8,000. If he should exercise 
that option, the full $8,000 is credited against the alimony payments. If the 
husband chooses not to purchase the four acres for $8,000, the land is awarded 
to the wife with a proviso that the husband receive a credit of $3,000 against 
the alimony payments. It is obvious that the court was endeavoring to provide a 
cash advance to the wife for her needs which the alimony award addressed. Under 
the circumstances, I do not agree that the value of the four acres is as 
material as the majority perceives it to be, treating it as a division of 
property. The husband asserted the value to be greater than the court believed, 
and he is afforded the opportunity to capture the larger value. If his opinion 
is correct, he should pay the $8,000 to the wife and obtain title to the four 
acres. In fact, if the land is worth anything at all, he should pay the $8,000, 
receive credit against the alimony that he owes, and retain whatever value is 
attributable to the property.

[¶17.]  While I do not quarrel with the fact that 
land value is not an adjudicative fact of which a trial court can take judicial 
notice, I do not perceive that using the property in the way that the court did 
for purposes of inducing the payment of alimony or as part payment for alimony 
results in an abuse of discretion simply because the court made an indiscrete 
comment in its decision letter. The comment in the decision letter is not 
repeated in the divorce decree, nor are the decision letters adopted by 
reference in the decree of divorce. Consequently, the matter which the majority 
treats as dispositive does not seem to be relevant with respect to operation of 
the decree.

[¶18.]  As I have indicated, I would affirm the 
judgment of the district court in this regard even though I do not approve of 
the utilization of judicial notice with respect to land values, particularly if 
premised upon the personal knowledge of the judge. I see absolutely no purpose 
in reversing this judgment and remanding it for a further hearing. The parties 
will have to employ an expert to provide an opinion with respect to the value of 
the property and will have to absorb the further expenses of litigation. That 
determination of value will probably have no substantial impact upon the 
approach taken by the trial court in endeavoring to secure the payment of the 
alimony. The expense seems an unwarranted price for the parties to absorb in 
order for this court to discipline the trial judge for this 
indiscretion.

[¶19.]  In retrospect, it is clear that we should 
have granted the appellee's motion to strike the reply brief in this case. I 
think we permitted it simply because of an assumption that it really would not 
make any difference in our consideration of the case. Now we have made the point 
raised in the appellant's reply brief case dispositive without affording the 
appellee an opportunity to respond by oral argument or otherwise. I question the 
fundamental fairness of that approach.

[¶20.]  I would affirm the judgment of the 
district court.