Title: State v. Beyer

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2021 WI 59 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP1983-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Jacob Richard Beyer, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 15, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 15, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
William E. Hanrahan   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ROGGENSACK, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, 
DALLET, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined, and in which HAGEDORN, J., 
joined with respect to Part I and Parts II.A., C., and D. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there were briefs filed by Mark 
A. Eisenberg, Jack S. Linberg, and Eisenberg Law Offices, S.C., 
Madison. There was an oral argument by Jack S. Linberg. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by Kara 
Lynn Janson, assistant attorney general; with whom on the brief 
was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral argument 
by Kara Lynn Janson. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Ellen Henak and Ellen 
Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
2021 WI 59 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2019AP1983-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2017CF2831) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Jacob Richard Beyer, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
JUN 15, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ROGGENSACK, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, 
DALLET, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined, and in which HAGEDORN, J., 
joined with respect to Part I and Parts II.A., C., and D. 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and order of the Circuit Court for 
Dane County.  Reversed and cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   This case is before us 
on certification from the court of appeals1 pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.61 (2019-20).2  The certified issue is:  "whether the 
                     
1 State v. Beyer, No. 2019AP1983-CR, certification (Wis. Ct. 
App. Sep. 24, 2020). 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2019AP1983-CR   
 
2 
 
guilty-plea-waiver rule applies when a defendant pleads not guilty 
to an offense, but stipulates to the inculpatory facts supporting 
each element of the offense, and explicitly agrees to a finding of 
guilt at a hearing before the circuit court at which no witness 
testifies." 
¶2 
We conclude that the occurrence in the circuit court, 
while not a guilty plea made in the customary mode, also was not 
a court trial.  We further conclude that, while parties may 
stipulate to facts for purposes of a criminal trial, trials based 
on stipulated facts and a stipulated finding of guilt are not 
permissible in Wisconsin.  Finally, we conclude that Beyer cannot 
be held to the stipulation he entered in circuit court because he 
entered it relying on a procedure that we conclude is invalid.  
Therefore, this matter is remanded to the circuit court so that 
Beyer can choose whether to enter a plea or proceed to trial.  
Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the circuit court for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
The City of Madison Police Department executed a search 
warrant on Jacob Beyer's apartment on October 28, 2017.  The basis 
for the warrant was the result of a Department of Justice (DOJ) 
investigation "'on peer to peer file sharing networks' looking for 
child pornography."  Through its investigation, DOJ "discovered a 
file containing [child pornography]," and the suspect IP address 
led to an apartment in Madison occupied by Beyer.  After Madison 
police executed the search warrant, Beyer admitted to possessing 
No. 
2019AP1983-CR   
 
3 
 
child pornography, and a search of his computer revealed at least 
ten images of child pornography. 
¶4 
The State charged Beyer with ten counts of possession of 
child pornography contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.12(1m).  At Beyer's 
initial appearance, he entered a plea of not guilty.  Subsequently, 
"Beyer hired a forensic computer examiner to confirm that the video 
that served as the basis for the search warrant existed on his 
computer."  Beyer's forensic examiner did not find the video on 
Beyer's hard drive.  Beyer, challenging the State's basis for 
probable cause for the search warrant, filed a "Notice of Motion 
and Motion to View the State's Computer and its Undercover 
Software."  The circuit court3 denied Beyer's discovery motion 
concluding that a "suppression motion hearing . . . would be the 
proper forum" to address Beyer's evidentiary claims. 
¶5 
Beyer filed a motion to suppress arguing that the search 
warrant was invalid because "(1) the search warrant lacked 
probable cause in and of itself; (2) the agents relying on the 
search warrant knew that the search warrant lacked probable cause; 
(3) the agents omitted and provided misleading information 
concerning its undercover investigative software."  After a 
hearing, the circuit court denied Beyer's motion to suppress.  The 
circuit court found that "[the DOJ agent] truthfully asserted that 
he's relied upon this type of evidentiary trail in the past and 
found it to be accurate and reliable."  Despite the circuit court's 
desire for more individually tailored warrants and "a more candid 
                     
3 The Honorable William E. Hanrahan presided. 
No. 
2019AP1983-CR   
 
4 
 
assessment of the reliability of this method of a search," the 
court found no police misconduct. 
¶6 
After the circuit court denied Beyer's motion to 
suppress, Beyer indicated that he did not intend to go to trial.4  
Rather, the State and Beyer agreed to a truncated procedure wherein 
the parties "stipulate[d] and agree[d] that the [c]ourt may make 
a finding of guilt based upon the following set of facts."  The 
stipulation listed nine facts, which satisfied the elements of 
possession of child pornography.  Stipulation 10 stated "Jacob 
Beyer waives his right to a jury trial and agrees to have the 
[c]ourt find him guilty based upon the above stipulated set of 
facts."5 
¶7 
The circuit court, noting the rarity of the procedure at 
hand, asked Beyer's defense counsel if there were any "legal or 
strategic advantage[s] . . . for proceeding in this fashion as 
opposed to appeal."  Beyer's defense counsel reasoned that "when 
someone pleads guilty to a charge, you preserve the right for your 
suppression motion, but if you recall, there was a also a discovery 
motion in this case, and I'm convinced that if . . . Mr. Beyer 
pleads guilty, he waives that right to the discovery issue."   
¶8 
The circuit court confirmed with Beyer that Beyer 
intended to move forward with the proposed procedure.  In doing 
                     
4 Beyer also filed a motion for reconsideration, which the 
circuit court denied. 
5 As part of the stipulated trial agreement, the prosecutor 
agreed to move to dismiss nine of the ten charges of possession of 
child pornography and read them in at sentencing. 
No. 
2019AP1983-CR   
 
5 
 
so, the court explained to Beyer that by agreeing to the procedure 
he was waiving certain rights including his right to a trial by 
jury, his right to be present during witness testimony, and his 
right to present a defense.  Beyer acknowledged that he understood 
his rights and confirmed that he intended to waive them.  The 
circuit court ensured that Beyer was not threatened or coerced 
into making this decision and asked Beyer's counsel if he thought 
Beyer's assent was knowing, intelligent and voluntary.  Beyer's 
counsel confirmed that he believed that it was.  Beyer's defense 
counsel agreed that the stipulated facts proved, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, each element of the charged offense.  Therefore, 
the circuit court convicted Beyer and sentenced him to three years' 
initial confinement and two years' extended supervision.  Beyer's 
sentence was stayed pending appeal. 
¶9 
Beyer appealed, and the court of appeals certified the 
above issue to us.  The issues raised at the court of appeals that 
caused 
it 
to 
certify 
the 
appeal 
to 
us 
were 
the 
following:  "(1) whether the procedure used at what the State 
refers to as the 'so-called trial' is the functional equivalent of 
a guilty plea; (2) whether that procedure triggers application of 
the guilty-plea-waiver rule to bar Beyer from raising on appeal a 
challenge to the circuit court's denial of his discovery motion; 
and (3) whether the procedure is recognized under Wisconsin law."  
We accepted the certification, and we accordingly assume 
jurisdiction over all issues presented on appeal.  See State v. 
Denk, 2008 WI 130, ¶29, 315 Wis. 2d 5, 758 N.W.2d 775. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
No. 
2019AP1983-CR   
 
6 
 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶10 Whether a proceeding was a trial is a question of law; 
we review questions of law independently.  See, e.g., City of 
Pewaukee v. Carter, 2004 WI 136, ¶¶23, 31-35, 276 Wis. 2d 333, 688 
N.W.2d 449 (determining whether a municipal proceeding was a trial 
such that a party is entitled to a new trial for purposes of Wis. 
Stat. § 800.14(4)).  Further, whether an attempted method of 
criminal procedure is permitted in Wisconsin is a question of law 
that we review independently.  See State v. Riekkoff, 112 Wis. 2d 
119, 
124-25, 
332 
N.W.2d 
744 
(1983) 
(determining 
whether 
conditional guilty pleas are permissible in Wisconsin).   
¶11 Finally, "[w]hether a plea is knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary is a question of constitutional fact."  State v. Brown, 
2006 WI 100, ¶19, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906.  In such cases, 
"[w]e accept the circuit court's findings of historical and 
evidentiary facts unless they are clearly erroneous but we 
determine independently whether those facts demonstrate that the 
defendant's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary."  Id. 
B.  Pleas Versus Trials 
¶12 At the outset, because the parties' main contention is 
whether the guilty plea waiver rule should attach to the procedure 
that Beyer agreed to, we determine whether the "stipulated trial", 
in which  Beyer stipulated to his guilt, was actually a trial or 
whether it was the functional equivalent of a guilty plea despite 
its label.  Our discussion informs both whether the procedure here 
was permissible and whether Beyer can be held to his stipulation.  
No. 
2019AP1983-CR   
 
7 
 
We first explain the differences between the two procedures; we 
then determine which more closely fits what occurred here. 
1.  Pleas 
¶13 We begin with guilty pleas.  A guilty plea "is an 
'admission that [the defendant] committed the crime charged 
against him.'"  United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570 (1989) 
(quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 32 (1970)).  "By 
entering a plea of guilty, the accused is not simply stating that 
he did the discrete acts described in the indictment; he is 
admitting guilt of a substantive crime."  Broce, 488 U.S. at 570.  
Importantly, a guilty plea "is an admission that 'all of the 
factual and legal elements necessary to sustain a binding, final 
judgment of guilt . . . ' are true."  State v. Kelty, 2006 WI 101, 
¶30, 294 Wis. 2d 62, 716 N.W.2d 886 (quoting Broce, 488 U.S. at 
569).  Accordingly, "nothing remains [for the circuit court] but 
to give judgment and determine punishment."  Boykin v. Alabama, 
395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).  Although they do not contain the same 
express admission of guilt as a guilty plea, we have held that 
pleas of no contest and Alford pleas6 have the same practical 
effect as traditional guilty pleas.  See State v. Nash, 2020 WI 
85, ¶34, 394 Wis. 2d 238, 951 N.W.2d 404.   
¶14 When a defendant enters a guilty, no contest, or Alford 
plea, the defendant ordinarily "waives all nonjurisdictional 
                     
6 "An Alford plea is a conditional guilty plea, which allows 
the defendant to maintain his or her innocence outright, but 
nonetheless accept a conviction and sentence for the crime."  State 
v. Nash, 2020 WI 85, ¶33, 394 Wis. 2d 238, 951 N.W.2d 404 (citing 
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). 
No. 
2019AP1983-CR   
 
8 
 
defects, including constitutional claims."  Kelty, 294 Wis. 2d 62, 
¶18.  This "guilty-plea-waiver rule" is a practical effect of 
entering a guilty plea.  "The guilty-plea-waiver rule is a rule of 
administration and does not involve the court's power to address 
the issues raised."  Id. (citing Riekkoff, 112 Wis. 2d at 124).  
There are limited exceptions to this general rule.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 971.31(10) codifies two exceptions that relate to evidentiary 
issues.  Section 971.31(10) provides, "An order denying a motion 
to suppress evidence or a motion challenging the admissibility of 
a statement of a defendant may be reviewed upon appeal from a final 
judgment or order notwithstanding the fact that the judgment or 
order was entered upon a plea of guilty or no contest to the 
information or criminal complaint."  See also Riekkoff, 112 Wis. 
2d at 124-25. 
2.  Trials 
¶15 We have defined trials as "fact-finding mission[s] to 
determine the truth of allegations in a pleading."  City of 
Cedarburg v. Hansen, 2020 WI 11, ¶35, 390 Wis. 2d 109, 938 N.W.2d 
463.  Trials are also understood as "formal judicial examination[s] 
of evidence and determination[s] of legal claims in an adversarial 
proceeding."  Id. (quoting Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)).  
What we can gather from the above definitions is that a trial's 
distinguishing feature is the fact-finding mission, which leads to 
an ultimate determination of guilt or innocence.  See State v. 
Zamzow, 2017 WI 29, ¶25, 374 Wis. 2d 220, 892 N.W.2d 637 (noting 
No. 
2019AP1983-CR   
 
9 
 
that "the purpose of a trial is to ascertain a defendant's guilt 
or innocence").   
¶16 Simply calling a proceeding a trial does not necessarily 
make it so.  To determine whether a proceeding was a trial, we 
look to the proceeding's substance, not its form.  See Carter, 276 
Wis. 2d 333, ¶¶23, 31-35, (citing with approval the indicia of 
trials set forth in First Bank of Marietta v. Mascrete, Inc., 684 
N.E.2d 38, 41 (Ohio 1997), and applying those factors to the 
proceedings before it).  Such indicia include "whether arguments 
were presented in court by counsel," "whether issues of fact were 
decided by the judge or magistrate" and "whether a judgment was 
rendered on the evidence."7  Carter, 276 Wis. 2d 333, ¶23 (quoting 
First Bank of Marietta, 684 N.E.2d at 41). 
3.  The "stipulated trial" 
¶17 By examining the substance of what occurred here, we 
conclude that the "stipulated trial" more closely resembled a 
guilty plea than a trial.  The record shows that the parties 
stipulated to every fact necessary to convict Beyer of possession 
of child pornography.  Furthermore, they stipulated to the circuit 
court finding Beyer guilty.  In turn, all the circuit court was 
                     
7 The remaining indicia are "whether the proceeding was 
initiated by pleadings," "whether it took place in court," "whether 
it was held in the presence of a judge or magistrate," "whether 
the parties or their counsel were present," "whether evidence was 
introduced" and "whether the issues decided were central or 
ancillary to the primary dispute between the parties."  City of 
Pewaukee v. Carter, 2004 WI 136, ¶23, 276 Wis. 2d 333, 688 
N.W.2d 449 (quoting First Bank of Marietta v. Mascrete, Inc., 684 
N.E.2d 38, 41 (Ohio 1997)). 
No. 
2019AP1983-CR   
 
10 
 
left to do was enter "judgment and determine [the] punishment," 
which is the functional equivalent of a guilty plea.  See Boykin, 
395 U.S. at 242.  What did not occur here is more telling of the 
proceeding's substance than what did occur.  At the stipulated 
trial, there were no witnesses sworn or examined, no additional 
evidence introduced and no arguments by the parties regarding the 
legal sufficiency of the State's factual foundation.  As the record 
reflects, Beyer affirmatively waived those ordinary aspects of a 
trial.  Accordingly, regardless of the proceeding's label, we are 
unconvinced that in substance it was a trial; we conclude that it 
was more akin to a guilty plea.8 
C.  Stipulated Trials in Wisconsin 
¶18 Having determined that the procedure here was more akin 
to a guilty plea than a trial, we next determine whether stipulated 
trials that also stipulate to the defendant's guilt are permissible 
in Wisconsin.  For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that 
they are not. 
¶19 We begin by reemphasizing the procedure that occurred 
here:  Beyer stipulated to all of facts necessary for the circuit 
                     
8 Our conclusion that this procedure was tantamount to a 
guilty plea is consistent with decisions of other jurisdictions 
that have examined this question.  See People v. Smith, 319 N.E.2d 
760, 764 (Ill. 1974) (noting that the "stipulated bench trial" was 
"tantamount to a guilty plea" and not condoning the procedure); 
see also State v. Steelman, 612 P.2d 475, 480 (Ariz. 1980) 
(differentiating between "submission[s] on transcripts" that are 
"tantamount to a guilty plea because it is obvious that . . . the 
defendant has no hope of acquittal" and those where the "court 
[is] . . . required to review the record offered to see if there 
is, in fact, sufficient evidence to convict" and noting that 
"Steelman's submission was not the equivalent of a guilty plea."). 
No. 
2019AP1983-CR   
 
11 
 
court to find him guilty, and he also stipulated that the court 
conclude he was guilty of possession of child pornography.  Parties 
may continue to stipulate to certain facts, and even to certain 
elements of a crime, during a criminal proceeding.  Doing so 
supports the expeditious resolution of trials and can have the 
effect of protecting victims of crimes from having to testify.  
See State v. Benoit, 229 Wis. 2d 630, 636-40, 600 N.W.2d 193 (Ct. 
App. 1999) (explaining that the defendant still received a full 
jury trial on all of the elements of his crime, including the 
element that he stipulated to, and that the stipulation was "a 
matter of expediency" that relieved the victims of the burglary 
from having to testify).9   
¶20 However, we will not permit parties to stipulate to every 
fact that satisfies a defendant's guilt and the defendant's guilt 
as well.  This is true whether the proffered procedure is agreed 
upon to preserve appellate review of issues that the defendant 
would otherwise waive by entering a guilty plea or whether it was 
employed due to other factors.    
¶21 Our reasoning for disallowing such a procedure is not 
complex.  Simply put, Wisconsin's rules of criminal procedure do 
                     
9 Just as the court of appeals distinguished Benoit from Kemp 
v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 125, 211 N.W.2d 793 (1973), this case is 
equally distinguishable.  In Kemp, the defendant, his attorney and 
the prosecutor "stipulated and requested the court to make the 
determination of guilt or innocence from the record of the 
preliminary examination."  Id. at 130.  The parties did stipulate 
to a court trial; however, the parties did not stipulate to Kemp's 
guilt.  See generally id.  The circuit court was required to 
consider the preliminary examination and the arguments made by 
counsel to establish whether Kemp was guilty.  Id. 
No. 
2019AP1983-CR   
 
12 
 
not expressly permit conditional guilty pleas as the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure do.  The conditional guilty plea rule under 
the Federal Rules provides as follows: 
With the consent of the court and the government, a 
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere, reserving in writing the right to have an 
appellate court review an adverse determination of a 
specified pretrial motion.  A defendant who prevails on 
appeal may then withdraw the plea. 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2).  The procedure that occurred here was, 
in essence, an attempt at a conditional guilty plea intended to 
preserve appellate review of an otherwise waived discovery issue. 
¶22 We have expressly disallowed parties from attempting 
conditional guilty pleas without a statute so permitting.  
Riekkoff, 112 Wis. 2d at 130.  In Riekkoff, the circuit court held 
a pretrial hearing on Riekkoff's mental capacity but found that 
the expert testimony that Riekkoff intended to introduce was 
inadmissible.  Id. at 121-22.  Thereafter, Riekkoff pled guilty 
with the prosecutor's agreement that Riekkoff's plea was 
conditional upon appellate review of the pretrial evidentiary 
matter.  Id.  The circuit court, although "not explicit in [its] 
acquiescence in the defendant's position [to preserve appellate 
review], nevertheless . . . did not disagree with it" and accepted 
Riekkoff's plea.  Id. at 122.  We were tasked with deciding whether 
"review may be preserved when the plea of guilty is conditioned 
upon the right to assert the question on appeal and there is 
agreement by the prosecutor and acceptance of the plea by the trial 
judge."  Id. 
No. 
2019AP1983-CR   
 
13 
 
¶23 Due to the explicit evidentiary exceptions to the 
guilty-plea-waiver rule found in Wis. Stat. § 971.31(10), we 
concluded that no other similar exceptions were permitted absent 
legislation.  Id. at 130.  Ultimately, we held "that conditional 
guilty pleas are not to be accepted and will not be given effect, 
except as provided by statute."  Id.  Although we noted the 
arguments in favor of conditional guilty pleas, we left to the 
legislature the decision to include such a plea in Wisconsin's 
rules of criminal procedure.  Id. 
¶24 In the 38 years since Riekkoff, the legislature has not 
amended the rules of criminal procedure to include a conditional 
guilty plea option such as Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2).  Wisconsin 
law currently permits criminal defendants to enter four types of 
pleas:  (1) guilty;10 
(2) not 
guilty; 
(3) no 
contest 
with 
permission from the circuit court; and (4) not guilty due to mental 
disease or defect.  Wis. Stat. § 971.06(1)(a)-(d).  Because 
Wisconsin does not permit conditional guilty pleas in the federal 
form, we conclude that "stipulated trials," which ultimately have 
the same effect, also are not permissible.11  We continue to defer 
to the legislature to determine whether it should legislate 
                     
10 Again, an Alford plea is a type of guilty plea.  Nash, 394 
Wis. 2d 238, ¶33.  
11 Because we conclude that this procedure is impermissible, 
we do not address whether the guilty-plea-waiver rule attached to 
the procedure at hand.  See Maryland Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 
2010 WI 64, ¶48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15 ("Issues that are 
not dispositive need not be addressed."). 
No. 
2019AP1983-CR   
 
14 
 
conditional guilty plea rules as part of Wisconsin's criminal 
procedure. 
D.  Beyer's "Stipulated Trial" 
¶25 Because we conclude that Beyer's "stipulated trial" was 
an attempt at a prohibited conditional guilty plea, we next 
consider whether the circuit court may hold Beyer to the parties' 
stipulation.  In light of our conclusion that the procedure that 
occurred here is invalid, we conclude that the circuit court could 
not validly accept the stipulation and Beyer cannot be held to its 
terms.  Therefore, on remand Beyer is to choose whether to plead 
or go to trial.  
¶26 This conclusion is supported by our reasoning in 
Riekkoff.  There, after we rejected the procedure that the parties 
employed, and we described the effect of utilizing such a faulty 
procedure on Riekkoff.  Riekkoff, 112 Wis. 2d at 128.  We reasoned: 
One thing . . . clearly stands out from the record, and 
that is that Riekkoff pleaded guilty believing that he 
was entitled to an appellate review of the reserved 
issue.  Both the prosecutor and the trial judge 
acquiesced in this view and permitted Riekkoff to 
believe that, despite his plea, appellate review could 
be had of the evidentiary order.  Because Riekkoff 
thought he could, with the acquiescence of the trial 
court and the prosecutor, stipulate to the right of 
appellate review, it is clear that Riekkoff was under a 
misapprehension with respect to the effect of his plea.  
He thought he had preserved his right of review, when as 
a matter of law he could not.  Under these circumstances, 
as a matter of law his plea was neither knowing nor 
voluntary. 
Id.   
¶27 Riekkoff teaches that when a defendant, his counsel, the 
prosecutor and the court misapprehend the legal effect of a 
No. 
2019AP1983-CR   
 
15 
 
procedure they employ, generally, the defendant will not be 
entering a plea that is knowing, intelligent and voluntary.  See 
also State v. Woods, 173 Wis. 2d 129, 140, 496 N.W.2d 144 (Ct. 
App. 1992) (citing Riekkoff, 112 Wis. 2d at 128) ("The record is 
clear that Woods, at least in part, made the decision to plead 
guilty based on inaccurate information provided to him by the 
lawyers and judge.  The plea agreement to a legal impossibility 
necessarily rendered the plea an uninformed one.").   
¶28 Here, and similar to the misapprehension in Riekkoff, 
Beyer agreed to the "stipulated trial" and ultimately stipulated 
to his guilt based upon the advice of his defense attorney, the 
prosecutor's agreement and the circuit court's acquiescence.  
Because we conclude that such a procedure is invalid, as a matter 
of law, it necessarily follows that Beyer cannot be held to the 
stipulation.  On remand, Beyer is entitled to choose whether to 
enter a plea or proceed to trial.12   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶29 We conclude that the occurrence in the circuit court, 
while not a guilty plea made in the customary mode, also was not 
a court trial.  We further conclude that, while parties may 
stipulate to facts for purposes of a criminal trial, trials based 
on stipulated facts and a stipulated finding of guilt are not 
permissible in Wisconsin.  Finally, we conclude that Beyer cannot 
be held to the stipulation he entered in circuit court because he 
                     
12 Because we remand the case to the circuit court on 
procedural grounds, we do not reach the merits of Beyer's discovery 
claims. 
No. 
2019AP1983-CR   
 
16 
 
entered it relying on a procedure that we conclude is invalid.  
Therefore, this matter is remanded to the circuit court so that 
Beyer can choose whether to enter a plea or proceed to trial.  
Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the circuit court for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
By the Court.—The judgment and order of the circuit court is 
reversed and cause remanded.  
No. 
2019AP1983-CR   
 
 
 
1