Title: Lloyd v. Delaware

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
 
ANDREW LLOYD, 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 680, 2015 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§  
  
Appellant, 
 
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Superior Court 
§ 
of the State of Delaware 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 1410016737 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Submitted:  October 25, 2016 
Decided:     December 20, 2016 
 
Before HOLLAND, VAUGHN, and SEITZ, Justices. 
 
Upon Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Delaware: AFFIRMED.   
 
Peter W. Veith, Esquire (Argued), Wilmington, Delaware, for Defendant-Below, 
Appellant, Andrew Lloyd. 
 
Elizabeth R. McFarlan, Esquire (Argued), Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, 
for Plaintiff-Below, Appellee, State of Delaware. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SEITZ, Justice: 
2 
I. 
Introduction 
Andrew Lloyd appeals his convictions for racketeering and other offenses 
related to his role in a Delaware heroin trafficking ring.  He raises four issues on 
appeal.  First, Lloyd argues that the Superior Court abused its discretion by giving 
a jury instruction that did not adequately define “enterprise” according to the 
Delaware RICO statute.  Second, he argues that the State presented insufficient 
evidence to prove that Lloyd was engaged in an “association-in-fact” enterprise 
under the RICO statute.  Third, he argues that the State improperly vouched for 
and bolstered certain witnesses’ testimony by asking several of the witnesses about 
the contents of their plea agreements.  Finally, Lloyd argues that the cumulative 
effect of the errors violated his due process rights. 
After a careful review of the record on appeal, we find Lloyd’s claims to be 
without merit.   Read as a whole, the racketeering jury instruction adequately 
informed the jury of the essential elements of a RICO violation under Delaware 
law.  The State also presented substantial evidence of Lloyd’s participation in a 
racketeering enterprise.  Further, the trial judge did not plainly err by permitting 
the State to question witnesses on direct examination about their plea agreements 
after defense counsel did not object to their admission into evidence.  Finally, 
because we do not find cumulative errors, Lloyd’s due process claim is without 
merit.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.  
3 
II. 
Facts And Procedural Background 
In January 2014, after a string of shootings in the region, the Wilmington 
Police Department and the FBI began investigating a heroin dealing ring in 
Wilmington, Delaware.  Andrew Lloyd was one of the main subjects of the 
investigation.  The Wilmington Police and the FBI also collaborated with the 
Delaware State Police and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration who were 
conducting a parallel investigation of Lloyd and one of his co-defendants, Jarrell 
Brown (“Jarrell”).  
During the course of the investigation, Lloyd took part in many large-scale 
drug transactions, moving an average of 1,000-1,600 bundles1 of heroin per week.  
He operated primarily through his associates, having them package, pick up, and 
deliver the drugs.  Lloyd used the homes of Lakenya Howard, Wanda Lloyd 
(“Wanda”), Jarrell, and others to store, package, and prepare heroin for 
distribution.  Lloyd also used places and names associated with national political 
figures to identify the homes and his associates. 
On October 30, 2014, after months of surveillance and investigation, police 
obtained a search warrant and searched Lloyd’s home and the homes of his many 
associates.  They seized $12,932 and a car from Lloyd’s home in Newark.  They 
                                                 
1 E.g., App. to Opening Br. at 298; Hunter v. State, 945 A.2d 594, 2008 WL 625566, at *1 n.1 
(Del. 2008) (Table) (“A bundle of heroin is 13 individual bags wrapped together.”). 
4 
did not find drugs in Lloyd’s home, but found them in his associates’ homes.  
Police then arrested Lloyd and forty other individuals. 
After earlier indictments, in late 2014, a New Castle County grand jury 
handed down a final 163-count, multiple-defendant indictment.  The grand jury 
indicted Lloyd for a litany of offenses including criminal racketeering, conspiracy 
to commit criminal racketeering, multiple counts of aggravated possession of 
heroin, drug dealing heroin, second degree conspiracy, and possession of drug 
paraphernalia.  
In October 2015, the Superior Court conducted an eight-day joint trial for 
co-defendants Lloyd and Antoine Miller.  At the trial, over fifty witnesses testified 
for the State, including seventeen of Lloyd’s co-defendants, twenty-seven law 
enforcement officers, several expert witnesses, a civilian, and Lloyd’s former 
cellmate.  Jarrell, Howard, Steven Roscoe, and Yasmeena Brown (“Yasmeena”) 
were four of the co-defendant witnesses.  Jarrell, Howard, and Roscoe testified 
about their relationship with Lloyd and the various drug deals they had done 
together.  At the end of their testimony, the State asked each of them if their plea 
agreements required them to testify truthfully.  The State also asked Roscoe if he 
was in fact testifying truthfully.  
Yasmeena also testified as a witness for the State.  She was uncooperative 
and repeatedly said she “did not remember” when the prosecutor asked her 
5 
questions, even after the prosecutor attempted to refresh her memory with the 
transcript of her police interview.  To prompt Yasmeena to answer the questions, 
the prosecutor asked: 
State:  
And you agreed as part of your plea down in the 
condition section to testify truthfully here today?  
 
Yasmeena:  Um-hmm. 
 
State:  
 
Ms. Brown, did you testify truthfully here today? 
 
Yasmeena:  Yes.2  
 
Lloyd did not object to the admission into evidence of the plea agreements 
by the State in its direct examination of witnesses, or the prosecutor’s questioning 
of these witnesses on the contents of their plea agreements.3   
On October 19, 2015, the State submitted to the court a proposed jury 
instruction on the charge of racketeering.  Lloyd agreed with the instruction.  The 
instruction included a specific definition of enterprise: 
In order to convict the defendant of Criminal Racketeering, you must 
find that the State has established all of the following elements and 
sub-elements beyond a reasonable doubt:  
 
                                                 
2 App. to Opening Br. at 608.  
3 It appears that the State admitted into evidence on direct examination without objection sixteen 
of Lloyd’s co-defendants’ plea agreements.  Id. at 87-88 (Davonte Lewis), 165 (Zechariah 
Palmer), 168 (Wanda), 174 (Blayton Palmer), 176-81 (Kimwanya Allen), 186-87 (Galen 
Collins), 194 (Demetrius Brown), 255 (Brian Miller), 368 (Jarrell), 411 (Janelle Lloyd), 442-43 
(Roscoe), 474 (Howard), 497 (Kareem Keyes), 503-04 (Brian Palmer), 505 (Felicia Pagan), 607-
08 (Yasmeena Brown).  
6 
(1) 
The defendant was associated with an enterprise.  The term 
“enterprise” includes any group of persons associated in fact, 
although not a legal entity.  In order for you to conclude that the 
State has established beyond a reasonable doubt the existence 
of an enterprise consisting of a group of persons associated in 
fact, although not a legal entity, you must be satisfied that each 
of the following three sub-elements has been established 
beyond a reasonable doubt: 
 
(a) 
First, there must be an “on-going organization formal or 
informal.”  To prove the existence of an ongoing organization, 
the State is require to present evidence that some type of 
structure exists within the group for making decisions and that 
there is a mechanism for controlling the affairs of the group on 
an on-going, rather than ad hoc, basis; and 
 
(b) 
Second, the enterprise may consist of various units but those 
units must function as a continuing unit.  To show a continuing 
unit, the State must show that each person within the enterprise 
has a  role consistent with the decision-making structure; and 
 
(c) 
Third, the enterprise existed separate and apart from the 
“pattern of racketeering,” a term which I shall shortly define for 
you.  While the evidence used to prove the existence of an 
enterprise and a pattern of racketeering may coalesce, and while 
it is not necessary to show that the enterprise has some function 
wholly unrelated to racketeering activity, the State must show 
that the enterprise had an existence beyond that which is 
necessary to commit each of the acts charge.  However, an 
enterprise can be inferred from proof of a pattern of 
racketeering.  This third sub-element eliminates the possibility 
that minimal associations of people jointly committing crimes 
can be designated as racketeering enterprises by association-in-
fact[.]4 
 
                                                 
4 Id. at 794-95. 
7 
 On October 28, the State withdrew the original instruction and submitted an 
alternative jury instruction.  This instruction, which had been in the court’s draft 
instructions, included a more succinct definition of an “enterprise”: 
In Delaware[,] it is unlawful for a person associated with an 
enterprise to conduct the enterprise’s affairs [through] a pattern of 
racketeering activity[,] or to participate in the enterprise’s affairs 
through a pattern of racketeering activity.  To find the defendant 
guilty of criminal racketeering, you must find that each of the 
following elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt: 
 
One, defendant was associated with an enterprise; and two, 
defendant conducted the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering 
activity or defendant participated in the enterprise’s affairs through a 
pattern of racketeering; and, three, defendant’s conduct or 
participation in the pattern [of] racketeering was intentional. 
 
Under the law, an enterprise includes a group of people 
associated in fact for a common purpose.  Pattern racketeering activity 
shall mean two or more felonies including, but not limited to, felony 
aggravated possession or drug dealing which are related to the 
enterprise’s affairs but are not so closely related to each other as 
connected in time and place to constitute a single act, yet the felonies 
were not more than ten years apart.  The underlying felonies are 
sometimes referred to, as I said, as predicate offenses. 
 
 
Conduct or participate in an enterprise’s affairs means acting in 
a way that is necessary or helpful in carrying out the enterprise’s 
business or operations, including the predicate offenses.  Intentionally 
as used in the criminal racketeering law means it was defendant’s 
conscious object and purpose to do the acts that constitute the alleged 
pattern of racketeering activity.5   
 
                                                 
5 Id. at 769. 
8 
 
Over defense objection, the Superior Court gave the jury the alternative 
instruction. 
On October 30, 2015, the jury found Lloyd guilty of all charges.  The 
Superior Court sentenced Lloyd to a total of sixty-four years at Level V 
incarceration followed by probation.  The Superior Court later modified Lloyd’s 
sentence to run all Level V time concurrently, reducing Lloyd’s sentence to 
twenty-five years at Level V incarceration, followed by two years of decreasing 
levels of supervision.  This appeal followed.                                                                                    
III. 
Analysis 
A. The Racketeering Jury Instruction 
Lloyd first argues that the Superior Court’s jury instruction did not 
adequately define “enterprise” under the RICO statute because it did not require “a 
decision-making framework” or that “the enterprise exist[ed] separate and apart 
from its pattern of racketeering.”6  We review the denial of a requested jury 
instruction de novo.7 
“In evaluating the propriety of a jury charge, the jury instructions must be 
viewed as a whole.”8  A jury instruction is not a ground for reversal if “it is 
                                                 
6 11 Del. C. § 1503. 
7 Bentley v. State, 930 A.2d 866, 875 (Del. 2007). 
8 Culver v. Bennett, 588 A.2d 1094, 1096 (Del. 1991) (citing Probst v. State, 547 A.2d 114, 119 
(Del. 1988)). 
9 
reasonably informative, not misleading and does not undermine the jury’s ability to 
intelligently perform its duty.”9  “Although a party is not entitled to a particular 
jury instruction, a party does have the unqualified right to have the jury instructed 
with a correct statement of the substance of the law.”10  “An instruction which 
tracks the statutory language is adequate to inform the jury.”11 
Lloyd relies on Stroik v. State, where we held that the Delaware RICO 
statute is “essentially an adaptation of its federal counterpart” and thus, “reliance 
on federal precedent in this limited factual setting is warranted.”12  This Court then 
looked to United States v. Turkette,13 a United States Supreme Court case, and 
United States v. Riccobene,14 a Third Circuit case, to refine the statutory definition 
of “enterprise” for purposes of a RICO violation.15  Citing the so-called Turkette-
Riccobene factors, we held that to establish an “enterprise” under the RICO statute, 
the State had to demonstrate that (1) the enterprise is an ongoing organization with 
some sort of framework for making or carrying out decisions; (2) the various 
                                                 
9 Koutoufaris v. Dick, 604 A.2d 390, 399 (Del. 1992) (citing Sirmans v. Penn, 588 A.2d 1103 
(Del. 1991)). 
10 Culver, 588 A.2d at 1096 (citing Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d 104, 128 (Del. 1983)).  
11 Robertson v. State, 596 A.2d 1345, 1354 (Del. 1991). 
12 Stroik v. State, 671 A.2d 1335, 1340 (Del. 1996). 
13 452 U.S. 576 (1981). 
14 709 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1983), overruled by United States v. Bergrin, 650 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 
2011).  
15 Stroik, 671 A.2d at 1340-41. 
10 
associates function as a continuing unit; and (3) the enterprise is separate and apart 
from the pattern of activity in which it engages.16 
Later, in Boyle v. United States, the United States Supreme Court revisited 
the structural elements of a RICO violation and eliminated some of the earlier 
requirements to establish an association-in-fact enterprise:  
As we said in Turkette, an association-in-fact enterprise is simply a 
continuing unit that functions with a common purpose.  Such a group 
need not have a hierarchical structure or a “chain of command”; 
decisions may be made on an ad hoc basis and by any number of 
methods—by majority vote, consensus, a show of strength, etc. 
Members of the group need not have fixed roles; different members 
may perform different roles at different times. The group need not 
have a name, regular meetings, dues, established rules and 
regulations, disciplinary procedures, or induction or initiation 
ceremonies.  While the group must function as a continuing unit and 
remain in existence long enough to pursue a course of conduct, 
nothing in RICO exempts an enterprise whose associates engage in 
spurts of activity punctuated by periods of quiescence.  Nor is the 
statute limited to groups whose crimes are sophisticated, diverse, 
complex, or unique; for example, a group that does nothing but 
engage in extortion through old-fashioned, unsophisticated, and brutal 
means may fall squarely within the statute’s reach.17 
Relying on Boyle, the Third Circuit expressly overruled its holding in 
Ricobenne.18 
                                                 
16 Id. at 1341.  
17 Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 948 (2009). 
18 Bergrin, 650 F.3d at 266 n.5 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214, 
221-24 (3d. Cir. 1983)) (“Long before Boyle, we held in United States v. Riccobene that 
establishing an enterprise requires proof of an ‘ongoing organization’ with a ‘superstructure or 
framework,’ members who ‘each ... perform a role in the group consistent with the 
organizational structure,’ and ‘an existence beyond that which is necessary merely to commit 
 
11 
Lloyd did not cite Boyle in his opening brief, and failed to take into account 
its effect on our decision in Stroik.  At oral argument, Lloyd conceded that after 
Boyle, the instruction did not have to include the three Turkette-Ricobenne factors.  
He then shifted his attack to the lack of a longevity requirement in the instruction 
explaining that the group must remain in existence “long enough to pursue a course 
of conduct.”19    
Although it might have been helpful to the jury if the Superior Court 
elaborated on the longevity requirement, the jury instruction as given did not 
“undermine the jury’s ability to intelligently perform its duty.”  The instruction 
tracked the language of the Delaware RICO statute.  The jury was also instructed 
that to find Lloyd guilty of racketeering, it had to find that he was associated with 
an enterprise that was engaged in a pattern of racketeering, and that a pattern of 
racketeering is established by the commission of two or more felonies not too close 
in time to be considered a single act, but no more than ten years apart.20  Thus, the 
jury was informed that it had to find that the defendants committed multiple 
felonies over time.  Although we recommend that, in the future, the Superior Court 
                                                                                                                                                             
each of the acts charged as predicate racketeering offenses.’  To the extent that this holding is 
inconsistent with Boyle, it is no longer good law.”). 
19 Boyle, 556 U.S. at 948. 
20 App. to Opening Br. at 769 (“[T]wo or more felonies including, but not limited to, felony 
aggravated possession or drug dealing which are related to the enterprise’s affairs but are not so 
closely related to each other as connected in time and place to constitute a single act, yet the 
felonies were not more than ten years apart.”).  
12 
give a more comprehensive jury instruction similar to the Third Circuit’s model 
instruction,21 reading the instruction here as a whole, it was sufficient to inform the 
jury of the elements of racketeering under Delaware law. 
B. Insufficient Evidence of Association–In-Fact Enterprise 
Lloyd next makes a related claim that the State presented insufficient 
evidence of an “association-in-fact” enterprise under the RICO statute to convict 
him of racketeering.  Ordinarily, we review claims of insufficiency of the evidence 
“to determine whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution could have found the essential elements of the 
charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.”22  But Lloyd did not raise the issue 
below.  Therefore, we review only for plain error.23  Plain error “is limited to 
material defects which are apparent on the face of the record, which are basic, 
serious, and fundamental in their character, and which clearly deprive an accused 
of a substantial right, or which clearly show manifest injustice.”24 
                                                 
21 See THIRD CIRCUIT MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations (RICO), No. 6.18.1962C RICO – Conducting or Participating in the Conduct of 
the Affairs of an Enterprise Through a Pattern of Racketeering Activity; Elements of the 
Offense; No. 6.18.1962C-2 RICO – “Enterprise;” Association in Fact Defined, available at, 
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/sites/ca3/files/Chap%206%20RICO%20May%202013Rev.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 16, 2016). 
22 Hardin v. State, 844 A.2d 982, 990 (Del. 2004) (internal citations omitted).  
23 Bullock v. State, 775 A.2d 1043, 1046 (Del. 2001). 
24 Wainright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 
13 
Once again Lloyd relies on Stroik v. State, and claims that the State was 
required to prove that the enterprise had an existence “separate and apart from the 
pattern of activity in which it engages.”25  But as explained previously, Boyle v. 
United States changed the RICO landscape by dispensing with the “separate” or 
“ascertainable” structure requirement.  After Boyle, under the RICO statute the 
State need only prove that an association-in-fact enterprise has three 
characteristics: (1) a purpose, (2) relationships among those associated with the 
enterprise, and (3) longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the 
enterprise’s purpose.  
Here the State presented ample evidence of an association-in-fact enterprise 
under the RICO statute as interpreted by Boyle.  Lloyd, Howard, Wanda Lloyd 
(“Wanda”), and Galen Collins, the top ranks of the group, referred to themselves as 
national political figures.26  Wanda testified that Lloyd and his various associates 
would package, pick up, and deliver heroin at her house, the “White House.”27  
Multiple witnesses testified that Lloyd was the leader of the group, and that they 
                                                 
25 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 577 (1981); see also Stroik v. State, 671 A.2d at 1341 
(Del. 1996) (The State must show “that the enterprise [is] separate and apart from the pattern of 
activity in which it engages.”). 
26 Multiple witnesses testified that Lloyd was “Obama,” Howard was “Michelle,” Collins was 
“Biden,” Wanda was “Condoleeza,” and Wanda’s house was the “White House.”  E.g., App. to 
Opening Br. at 169 (Wanda), 188 (Collins), 475-78 (Howard). 
27 Id. at 170-71. 
14 
acted at Lloyd’s direction.28  Demetrius Brown,29 Brian Miller,30 Jarrell,31 and 
Roscoe32 testified that they sold thousands of bundles of heroin for Lloyd over 
many weeks’ time.  The State introduced wiretap recordings, evidence of 
controlled buys, videos, and the testimony of over fifty witnesses establishing 
criminal activity spanning multiple incidents over a lengthy period of time.  Much 
of the evidence was corroborated by multiple witnesses.  Thus, the Superior Court 
did not plainly err by failing to declare a mistrial for lack of evidence of an 
association-in-fact enterprise.  
C. Prosecutorial Misconduct  
Lloyd next argues that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct.  
Specifically, he alleges that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility 
of certain witnesses and bolstered their testimony by asking co-defendants on 
direct examination about their plea agreements and whether they were required to 
testify truthfully.  He also argues that the prosecutor improperly bolstered 
                                                 
28 Id. at 168 (Wanda testified that, at Lloyd’s direction, she would rent cars for herself and 
Blayton Palmer throughout December 2013 to October 2014); 375-75 (Jarrell testified he would 
rent cars and switch his cell phones at Lloyd’s direction, and that he would make deliveries for 
Lloyd), 437 (Roscoe testified that Lloyd would tell him when and where to make deliveries), 479 
(Howard testified that she would switch cell phones often at Lloyd’s direction). 
29 Id. at 193-94. 
30 Id. at 245-57. 
31 Id. at 297-332. 
32 App. to Opening Br. at 433-37. 
15 
testimony from co-defendants about Lloyd’s illegal activities by calling witnesses 
to testify that they pled guilty to racketeering.   
Lloyd did not object at trial when the State offered the plea agreements into 
evidence during the direct examination of the co-defendants.  Once the plea 
agreements were admitted into evidence on direct examination without objection, 
the State was free to examine the witnesses about the plea agreements and their 
contents.  The trial judge thus did not plainly err in permitting co-defendants to be 
examined on direct examination about their plea agreements.33          
D. Cumulative Error 
Finally, Lloyd argues that the cumulative impact of the errors in the jury 
instructions and prosecutorial misconduct amount to plain error.  “[W]here there 
are several errors in a trial, a reviewing court must weigh the cumulative impact to 
determine whether there was plain error.”34  We have previously held that the trial 
court did not err in instructing the jury, and that the Superior Court did not plainly 
err by allowing the State to examine the co-defendants on their plea agreements 
which were admitted into evidence without objection.  Thus, Lloyd’s cumulative 
error claim fails.     
                                                 
33 We express no opinion on the admissibility of plea agreements under the Delaware Rules of 
Evidence, or limitations on the use of plea agreements by the State during the direct examination 
of co-defendants.    
34 Wright v. State, 405 A.2d 685, 690 (Del. 1979). 
16 
IV. 
Conclusion 
We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.