Title: Wayne Kubsch v. State of Indiana

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Eric Koselke 
Steve Carter 
Brent Westerfeld 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
James B. Martin 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 71S00-0507-DP-333  
 
WAYNE KUBSCH, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the St. Joseph Superior Court, No. 71D02-9812-CF-592  
The Honorable William Albright, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
 
May 22, 2007 
 
 
Shepard, Chief Justice. 
 
 
 
Appellant Wayne Kubsch has been tried twice for triple murder.  Two juries found him 
guilty and both juries recommended the death penalty.  This appeal arises from his second trial.  
Among other claims, he contends that the trial court erred in failing to appoint a special 
prosecutor to the case because St. Joseph County Prosecutor Michael Dvorak had a previous 
professional relationship with a witness who testified against Kubsch.  We conclude that a 
special prosecutor was not necessary because no actual conflict existed between Dvorak and his 
duties to his former client, to Kubsch, or to the citizens of St. Joseph County. 
Facts and Procedural History  
 
 
On September 18, 1998, twelve-year-old Anthony Earley found the bodies of his step-
brother Aaron Milewski and Aaron’s father Rick Milewski in the basement of his Mishawaka 
home.  Anthony lived in the home with his mother Beth Kubsch, who was Aaron’s mother and 
Rick’s ex-wife, and Wayne Kubsch, Beth’s husband at the time.  Anthony looked more closely at 
the bodies, and then fled to a neighbor’s house, from which the police were eventually 
summoned.   
 
 
The Mishawaka Police Department arrived on the scene about 5:45 p.m.  When Wayne 
Kubsch arrived at the house, he had to be restrained from entering.  Kubsch then accompanied 
police officers to the South Bend Police Department for questioning by detectives of the special 
crimes unit.   
 
 
Around 9 p.m., after Kubsch left the police station, crime scene investigators informed 
the detectives that they had also found Beth Kubsch’s body in the basement, inside a “fort” 
Anthony had constructed underneath the stairs using old blankets.  Beth had been “hog-tied” 
with duct tape and her head covered in tape.  Like Aaron and Rick, she had been stabbed 
repeatedly.1
 
Upon learning about the discovery of Beth’s body, detectives instructed a junior police 
officer to locate Kubsch and bring him back to the station.  The officer complied, and returned 
with Kubsch.  The detectives requested that Kubsch allow a search of his vehicle, which he did, 
signing a consent form.  The police then impounded the vehicle and searched it.2
                                             
 
1 All three victims sustained severe stab wounds.  Subsequent autopsies revealed that Aaron and Rick were also shot 
at close range.   
2 The search of Kubsch’s vehicle and the manner in which he was questioned on the night of the murders were 
subjects of contention in his first appeal.  Kubsch v. State, 784 N.E.2d 905, 916-18 (Ind. 2003).  We held that both 
the search and questioning, as well as any evidence obtained, were valid.  Id. at 918.  Despite the rather delicate 
manner in which the matter was handled by the State, Kubsch objected to the introduction of that evidence again at 
his second trial.  (Trial Tr. at 1481.)  Kubsch raises the issue again on this appeal.  (Appellant’s Br. at 35-47.)   
He notes in his brief, however, that he raises this issue “to preserve Kubsch[‘s] rights to present them in 
subsequent federal court review.”  (Id. at 35.)  This time around, the claim does not rest on any new evidence at trial 
or citation to any new authority regarding the validity of the search.  In his second trial, Kubsch relied on the record 
 
 
 
2
In late December 1998, the State charged Kubsch with murdering Beth, Aaron, and Rick.  
In April 1999, the State filed notice of intent to seek the death penalty.  A trial ensued in June 
2000, and Kubsch was found guilty of the murders.  The jury recommended the death penalty, 
and the trial judge entered an order imposing death.  Kubsch appealed, claiming the order was 
defective.  We agreed and remanded to the trial court to enter a new order.  The trial court did so, 
and Kubsch appealed again.  We reversed on the basis of a Doyle violation and ordered a new 
trial.  Kubsch v. State, 784 N.E.2d 905, 910 (Ind. 2003).3
 
 
During the second trial, in March 2005, the prosecution presented essentially the same 
case as it had at the first, arguing that Kubsch killed Beth in order to collect on her life insurance 
policy.  Kubsch owed some $430,000 in mortgage debt on various rental properties, and another 
$23,000 in unsecured credit card debt.  The State showed that, less than two months before the 
murders, Kubsch and Beth increased Beth’s term life coverage to $575,000.   
 
Cell phone records revealed that Kubsch made calls from the area near the house where 
the killings occurred at a time when he initially claimed to be traveling to Michigan.  Testimony 
by Brad Hardy indicated that he and Kubsch had gone to Kubsch’s home during Wayne’s lunch 
hour, and that he had seen Beth in the house.  Hardy also testified that the day after the murders, 
Kubsch asked him to lie to the police about their activities the day before.   
 
The prosecution introduced some physical evidence linking Kubsch to the crime.  It 
managed to link a fiber found in the duct tape used to bind Beth to a fiber taken from Kubsch’s 
Geo Tracker.  A duct tape wrapper in the Tracker matched the brand of duct tape used to bind 
Beth.  A bank receipt, also found in the Tracker, showed a transaction made by Beth the morning 
of her murder.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
of his first trial to establish the facts surrounding this claim.   For this reason, and because Kubsch voluntarily 
foregoes our review, we do not address this claim. 
3 The State used videotapes at trial that were taken during Kubsch’s interviews with the police on the night of 
September 18, 1998.  Those videotapes showed Kubsch invoking his Fifth Amendment right to silence, and the 
State used Kubsch’s silence as “affirmative proof of its case in chief” in clear violation of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 
610 (1976).  Kubsch, 784 N.E.2d at 914.  We concluded that the State had “not carried its burden in demonstrating 
that references to Kubsch repeatedly invoking his right to silence [was] harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”   Id. at 
916.    
 
 
 
3
Kubsch testified at trial, giving an account different from the one he had given to the 
police during his initial interviews.  Kubsch admitted that he had gone home during his lunch 
hour, but said he went alone and smoked part of a marijuana cigarette before returning to work.  
Kubsch opined that it was likely during the stop at home that he collected the bank receipt and 
took it with him.  He also admitted that he had not gone immediately to Michigan as he 
previously told police.  Rather, he testified he had first stayed in his workplace parking lot 
hoping to buy marijuana from a co-worker, returned home and retrieved the remainder of the 
marijuana cigarette he smoked earlier that day, and then left for Michigan to pick up his son.    
Kubsch said no one was home when he arrived at the residence after work.   
 
Kubsch sought to exclude the evidence collected from his vehicle, claiming the search 
was illegal, and asked to introduce the previous testimony of Amanda Buck, who, according to 
the defense, would have testified that she saw Aaron after 3:30 p.m. on the day of the murders.  
The trial court denied Kubsch’s motion to exclude, and barred the defense from showing a 
videotape or reading transcripts of Buck’s previous testimony. 
 
Following the presentation of the evidence, the jury found Kubsch guilty of three counts 
of murder.  After the sentencing hearing, where Kubsch appeared pro se, the jury recommended 
death.  On April 18, 2005, the judge imposed a death sentence.   
 
Kubsch challenges both his conviction and sentence in this appeal.  As to guilt, Kubsch 
claims the court violated his right to present a defense by refusing to admit Buck’s previous 
testimony.  Second, and more significantly, Kubsch argues that the trial court should have 
appointed a special prosecutor to avoid a conflict of interest arising from St. Joseph County 
Prosecutor Michael Dvorak, who previously represented Brad Hardy in a related criminal matter.   
 
As for the sentence, Kubsch argues that his waiver of counsel at the sentencing phase was 
not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary, that the court should have instructed the jury that it must 
find the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigators beyond a reasonable doubt, that no 
individualized sentencing occurred, and that the trial judge failed to independently consider 
whether he was bound to follow the jury’s recommendation. 
 
 
 
4
I.  Special Prosecutor Properly Denied  
 
Kubsch pointed to Michael Dvorak’s earlier representation of Brad Hardy, one of the 
witnesses against Kubsch.  The State once charged Hardy with conspiring with Kubsch to 
commit the murders and with assisting a criminal.  These charges were filed against Hardy in 
May 2000, several months after Kubsch was charged.  Hardy retained Dvorak, who was in 
private practice at the time.  Dvorak represented Hardy at a deposition conducted by Kubsch’s 
attorneys and during Hardy’s testimony at the first murder trial in the summer of 2000.  During 
the representation, Hardy received use immunity for his testimony in the first trial.   
 
Kubsch was initially convicted on August 28, 2000.  The charges against Hardy pended, 
with Dvorak still representing him, until May 6, 2002 when the State moved to dismiss, and the 
court did so.  In November 2002, Dvorak was elected St. Joseph County Prosecutor.  He took 
office in January 2003, two months before we reversed Kubsch’s first conviction.  Following a 
pre-trial hearing on October 31, 2003, Judge Frese ruled there was no actual conflict of interest 
arising from this scenario and denied the request for a special prosecutor.4  Kubsch now claims 
that this ruling was incorrect and argues that it tainted the second trial sufficiently to warrant a 
third. 
 
At the time of Kubsch’s trial, our statutes afforded criminal defendants a vehicle for 
asking the trial court to appoint a special prosecutor when it is evident “by clear and convincing 
evidence that the appointment is necessary to avoid an actual conflict of interest . . . .”  Ind. Code 
Ann. § 33-39-1-6(b)(2) (West 2004).  A judge called upon to decide whether the prosecutor 
should be disqualified must determine whether “the controversy involved in the pending case is 
substantially related to a matter in which the lawyer previously represented another client.”  State 
ex rel. Meyers v. Tippecanoe County Court, 432 N.E.2d 1377, 1378 (Ind. 1982).  He must also 
examine “whether the prosecutor has received confidential information in the prior 
representation, and, more importantly, whether the information may have subsequently assisted 
the prosecution.”  Johnson v. State, 675 N.E.2d 678, 682 (Ind. 1996).   
                                             
 
4 This hearing and ruling occurred before Judge Frese, who presided at the first trial and recused himself from the 
second trial.  It was after that recusal that Judge Albright took the case. 
 
 
 
5
 
Perhaps recognizing that any argument about client confidences relates solely to Hardy 
and not to him, Kubsch argues that actual conflicts of interest arise not simply from the 
acquisition and use of client confidences by prosecutors, but any time circumstances exist “‘in 
which [the prosecutor] cannot exercise his or her independent [] judgment free of compromising 
interests [or] loyalties.’”  (Appellant’s Reply Br. at 1 (quoting State v. Culbreath, 30 S.W.3d 309, 
312 (Tenn. 2000)).)  Kubsch cites authority declaring that the unfair use of client confidences 
gained through the prior representation of a defendant or co-defendant is not generally 
recognized as the “only benchmark for determining whether there is an actual conflict of 
interest.”  (Id.); see also 63C Am. Jur. 2d Prosecuting Attorneys § 27 (1997).   
 
The language of Ind. Code § 33-39-1-6(b)(2) and our own case law indicate that the 
question of prosecutorial disqualification is not to be treated in the same manner in which 
attorney disqualification is determined in the civil context.  Johnson, 675 N.E.2d at 682.  Rather 
than limiting ourselves with “material adversity,” as we would in the civil context, we must 
determine whether the relationship between Hardy and Dvorak gave rise to an actual conflict that 
resulted in prejudice to Kubsch.  Id.
 
The substance of Kubsch’s claim is that during the second trial, Dvorak’s professional 
duties and obligations to Hardy as a former client rendered him unable to treat Kubsch fairly and 
impartially, or to represent the interests of the State without conflict.  (Appellant’s Br. at 20.)  As 
evidence of this disability, Kubsch points out that Dvorak was unable to testify fully at the pre-
trial hearing on whether a special prosecutor should be appointed.  Kubsch says such testimony 
would have theoretically assisted both the defense and the prosecution.  (Id. at 21.)  Kubsch also 
claims that the prior representation prevented Dvorak from seeking a plea bargain with Kubsch 
since doing so would have put his former client at risk of future prosecution.  (Id. at 21-22.) 
 
We think the trial judge got it right here.  While the relationships among the parties 
created the potential for a conflict, the subsequent actions of those involved demonstrate that no 
actual conflict arose.   
 
 
 
 
6
This is certainly true of Kubsch’s claim regarding Dvorak’s testimony at the pre-trial 
hearing.  Kubsch contends that Dvorak’s ethical obligations to Hardy prevented him from 
answering questions about the representation that might have revealed whether Dvorak 
possessed disqualifying confidential information about Kubsch and the murders.  Kubsch 
contends that his inability to question Dvorak ultimately prejudiced him by preventing him from 
subjecting Dvorak to a meaningful examination about the extent of his knowledge of the case 
that might have revealed disqualifying facts.  (Id. at 26-27.) 
 
It is clear enough from the record that Dvorak did not possess such information.  The 
State presented to the trial court all the statements, depositions, and testimony of Hardy that were 
a matter of record.  (Hr’g Tr. at 4-7.)  When asked if “you possess any other information about 
this case, about the murders . . . than what is contained in the exhibits that [the State] admitted 
into court today?” Dvorak responded, “I don’t believe so.”  (Id. at 14.)  Importantly, at the 
hearing, Hardy specifically relinquished his privilege and allowed Dvorak to answer one 
question relating to the representation: “Did I tell him anything different than what’s on them 
transcripts.” (Id. at 47.)  The prosecution subsequently asked Dvorak whether “there [is] any 
information that you possess from your conversations with Mr. Hardy that is different or omitted 
from any testimony and information he gave in depositions, testimony, or statements to Special 
Crimes?”  (Id. at 48.)  Dvorak answered no.  (Id.) 
 
Kubsch seeks to minimize the import of this disclosure by suggesting that it was 
insufficient to probe Dvorak’s knowledge of the defense.  The release of the privilege, however, 
provided an answer to the crucial question:  Did Dvorak possess information about the crime not 
otherwise available to another prosecutor?  Through the release of the privilege, Dvorak was able 
to show he had no more information that could have been used against Kubsch than any other 
prosecutor.  In the absence of such information, no actual conflict arose. 
 
Specifically, there is no indication Dvorak either gained any privileged or otherwise non-
public information from Hardy or subsequently used such information at the second trial.  And, 
inasmuch as Kubsch and Hardy had never engaged in a joint defense, Dvorak would not have 
learned anything from Kubsch for subsequent deployment, either.  Compare Banton v. State, 475 
 
 
 
7
N.E.2d 1160, 1164 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (prosecutor disqualified where “via a previous 
relationship with the same case, [prosecutor learned] the details of [defendant’s] case”)5 with 
Garren v. State, 470 N.E.2d 719, 723 (Ind. 1984) (prosecutor not disqualified where “[d]efendant 
has failed to show that the [p]rosecutor obtained information from him in confidence which was 
relevant to the facts of the [case at bar]”), and Williams v. State, 631 N.E.2d 485, 488 (Ind. 
1994) (prosecutor not disqualified where deputy prosecutor did not provide any “information or 
assistance to the prosecutor” or participate at defendant’s trial).  In Williams, we held it was 
appellant’s burden to show both that “deputy prosecutor received confidential information” and 
that “prejudice actually [] resulted” from the use of confidential information.  631 N.E.2d at 487.  
In this case, there was no evidence that confidential information was received or used.  Thus, 
there was no need to disqualify Dvorak.    
 
 
It is also apparent that no actual conflict arose as affected the possibility of a plea 
bargain.  As Judge Frese astutely noted, an actual conflict would have arisen had the parties 
entered into a plea bargaining process because doing so would have put Dvorak into a position 
where his own duty to Hardy would have conflicted with his duty of impartiality to Kubsch.  
(Hr’g Tr. at 60-61.)  Kubsch contends that Dvorak alone was unwilling to enter a plea 
agreement.  (Appellant’s Br. at 21.)  The record does not support this contention.  At the pre-trial 
hearing, Judge Frese conducted a private conference with Kubsch and the defense counsel.  
(Hr’g Tr. at 50-58.)  Judge Frese specifically asked Kubsch if he were willing to “discuss a plea 
agreement where the death penalty comes off the table.”  (Id. at 57.)  Kubsch responded that he 
had no interest in entering into plea discussions.  (Id. at 58.)  During the subsequent description 
of the substance of the conference in open court, Judge Frese indicated his perception that 
Kubsch was unwilling to enter into any plea bargaining process.  (Id. at 82-84.)  Kubsch’s 
attorneys made no attempt to object to these statements, suggesting it accurately reflected 
Kubsch’s position.  As Kubsch now seems to be contending that Dvorak’s prior representation 
made a plea bargain unattainable, we observe that one cannot be unfairly denied something that 
he did not want.  We see no actual conflict of interest along these lines. 
 
                                             
 
5 Defendant who prosecutor formally represented “testified he told [prosecutor] everything concerning the crimes 
alleged, including material he would not reveal to the prosecutor.”  Banton, 475 N.E.2d at 1164. 
 
 
 
8
 
Kubsch does make one other point worthy of mention here.  He contends that Dvorak 
unfairly and prejudicially failed to investigate Hardy’s alleged role in the murders since doing so 
would have placed his former client at risk.  (Appellant’s Br. at 28.)  In doing so, Kubsch 
contends Dvorak ignored potentially exculpatory evidence because of his interest in protecting 
his own former client.  This argument might have more punch had not Dvorak’s predecessor as 
St. Joseph County Prosecutor, Christopher Toth, whom Dvorak defeated in a dramatic electoral 
contest, treated Hardy in exactly the same way as Dvorak.  Prosecutor Toth granted Hardy use 
immunity for his testimony during the first trial and ultimately dismissed the charges against 
him.  (Appellant’s App. at 235, 237-38.)  For all that appears, Toth simply concluded that Hardy 
was not culpable.  There is no evidence otherwise.6  
 
Ultimately, it is the defendant’s burden to produce evidence of an actual conflict, and in 
this case he has not.  He has also failed to make convincing arguments regarding his due process 
claims.  We conclude the trial court rightly denied the motion for appointment of a special 
prosecutor. 
 
 
II. 
Amanda Buck’s Videotaped Statement  
 
 
Amanda Buck was nine years old at the time of the murders and lived across the street 
from Aaron Milewski.  She gave a videotaped statement to Police Officer Riehl on September 
22, 1998, four days after the murders; in the videotape, she said she saw Aaron at his house after 
3:30 p.m. on the day of the murders.  At trial, however, Buck testified that she had no memory of 
the police interview and that she did not see Aaron on the day in question.  Kubsch attempted to 
read a transcript of the videotape into evidence as a recorded recollection exception to hearsay, 
or alternatively to impeach Buck with the prior inconsistent statement.  The trial court denied 
admission of the videotape and any impeachment.   
 
                                             
 
6 We note briefly that Kubsch also raises claims that his due process rights under the Federal and Indiana 
Constitutions were violated, because he was denied trial at the hands of a disinterested prosecutor.   (Appellant’s Br. 
at 27-29.)  On these points Kubsch makes no citation to authority in support of his position.   
 
 
 
9
 
Kubsch argues on appeal that the recorded recollection exception applied, that he should 
have been able to impeach Buck, and that the trial court violated his right to present a defense 
when it refused to admit the videotape.   
 
 
A.  Recorded Recollection.   
A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a witness once had 
knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify 
fully and accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when 
the matter was fresh in the witness’s memory and to reflect that knowledge 
correctly . . . . 
Ind. Evidence Rule 803(5). 
 
 
The final element – the recording reflects the witness’s knowledge correctly – is the one 
at issue.  The recorded recollection exception applies when a witness has insufficient memory of 
the event recorded, but the witness must be able to “vouch for the accuracy of the prior 
[statement].”  Gee v. State, 271 Ind. 28, 36, 389 N.E.2d 303, 309 (1979); see also Williams v. 
State, 698 N.E.2d 848, 851 n. 4 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (requiring “some acknowledgement that the 
statement was accurate when it was made”).  Buck testified twice that she had no memory of 
being interviewed by the police in 1998.  (Trial Tr. at 2985.)  As a result, the trial court correctly 
denied Kubsch the opportunity to read Buck’s statement into evidence, because Buck could not 
vouch for the accuracy of a recording that she could not even remember making. 
 
 
B.  Prior Inconsistent Statement.  The trial court ruled that Kubsch could not impeach 
Buck with her statements in the videotape because Buck gave no substantive evidence in her trial 
testimony.  (Id. at 3031-32, 3120.)  The court observed that Buck simply stated that she could not 
remember being interviewed by the police four days after the murder, and therefore, there was 
“no positive fact . . . subject to impeachment.”  (Id. at 3120.) 
 
 
It was within the trial court’s discretion to rule that Buck’s testimony that she could not 
remember the police interview was not inconsistent with her statements to the police that she saw 
Aaron around 3:30 in the afternoon.  See Dunlap v. State, 761 N.E.2d 837, 845 (Ind. 2002) 
 
 
 
10
(“statement at trial of ‘I am not sure’ or ‘I don’t remember’ is not necessarily inconsistent with 
an earlier statement that provides the answer to the question being asked”). 
 
 
Buck’s claim of lack of memory, however, was not her only testimony.  In response to 
defense counsel’s attempt to establish Buck did not remember her statements to the police, Buck 
offered, “I probably didn’t see [Aaron], because I go straight [from] home to the day care, and 
then I would go home afterwards.”  (Trial Tr. at 2985.)  This testimony directly contradicts her 
statement to the police that she saw Aaron that afternoon, and Kubsch should have been allowed 
to impeach her on this matter. 
 
 
We hold this error harmless, nonetheless.  Monica Buck, Amanda’s mother, was present 
with Amanda during the videotaped interview on September 22, 1998.  (Id. at 3025.)  Three days 
after the interview, Monica’s husband Lonnie called Officer Riehl to tell Riehl that Amanda was 
mistaken and instead saw Aaron the afternoon before the murders.  (Id. at 3012-14.)  Monica 
followed up with a subsequent statement indicating that it was not Friday that she and Amanda 
saw Aaron.  (Id. at 3013.)  The prosecution was prepared to put both Officer Riehl and Monica 
on the stand to testify to this effect.7  (Id. at 3014-15.)  Amanda’s testimony should have been 
impeached, but other testimony would have supported hers had she been impeached, and 
therefore, her testimony likely did not contribute to the conviction.  See Pavey v. State, 764 
N.E.2d 692, 703 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (“An error in the admission of evidence is not prejudicial if 
the evidence is merely cumulative of other evidence in the record.”). 
 
 
III.  Kubsch’s Waiver of Counsel Was Knowing and Intelligent  
 
 
Kubsch asked to represent himself during the penalty phase, and the court permitted it.  
He now contends Judge Albright failed to adequately warn him of the dangers and difficulties of 
self-representation, and thus his decision to represent himself was not knowing and intelligent.  
                                             
 
7 The availability of this testimony is also the reason why Kubsch’s claim that he was denied his federal 
constitutional right to present a defense fails.  See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (protecting 
defendant’s due process right by recognizing an exception to application of evidence rules where evidence found to 
be trustworthy). 
 
 
 
11
In particular, Kubsch argues that the judge minimized the difficulty of self-representation and led 
him sufficiently astray to invalidate the waiver of his right to counsel.   
 
 
The Sixth Amendment does not “force a lawyer upon [a criminal defendant] . . . when he 
insists that he wants to conduct his own defense.”  Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 
(1975).  Nevertheless, in order to waive the constitutionally protected right to counsel, a 
defendant “must ‘knowingly and intelligently’ forgo those relinquished benefits” provided by 
counsel, and be advised of the potential pitfalls surrounding self-representation so that it is clear 
that “‘he knows what he is doing and [that] his choice is made with eyes open.’”  Id. at 835 
(citations omitted).  There are no magic words a judge must utter to ensure a defendant 
adequately appreciates the nature of the situation.  Rather, determining if a defendant’s waiver 
was “knowing and intelligent” depends on the “particular facts and circumstances surrounding 
[the] case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”  Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).   
 
We have elected to follow the lead of the Seventh Circuit in adopting a means for an 
appellate court to review the adequacy of a waiver.  We consider four factors: “‘(1) the extent of 
the court’s inquiry into the defendant’s decision, (2) other evidence in the record that establishes 
whether the defendant understood the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, (3) the 
background and experience of the defendant, and (4) the context of the defendant’s decision to 
proceed pro se.”’  Poynter v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1122, 1127-28 (Ind. 2001) (quoting United States 
v. Hoskins, 243 F.3d 407, 410 (7th Cir. 2001)).  Considering these factors as they relate to the 
facts and circumstances of this case, we conclude Kubsch’s waiver was knowing and intelligent. 
 
First, we examine whether the court held any formal inquiry into Kubsch’s decision to 
proceed pro se.  A court need not provide an exhaustive list of the dangers of pro se 
representation, but must “impress upon the defendant the disadvantages of self-representation.”  
United States v. Todd, 424 F.3d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Moya-Gomez, 
860 F.2d 706, 732, 734 (7th Cir. 1988)).  Indeed, it has been noted that the production of an 
exhaustive list would not necessarily ensure the knowingness and intelligence of waiver since 
even affirmative answers to pro forma “questions do not evidence understanding of the 
 
 
 
12
complexities that lie ahead.”  United States v. Hill, 252 F.3d 919, 928 (7th Cir. 2001).  Rather, 
we look to whether the warnings issued were sufficient to apprise the defendant of the dangers he 
is facing in the particular matter at hand.  Id.
 
Kubsch presents a list of what he calls critical omissions: not told his failure to object to 
perceived legal error would waive issues for appeal; not told he would need to submit his own 
jury instructions if he objected to those of the State; not told the precise nature and procedure to 
be followed during the penalty phase; and judge minimized the dangers and difficulty of self-
representation by telling Kubsch that “your representation would not be as complicated . . . if 
you were handling the whole trial.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 48-52; Trial Tr. at 3342.) 
 
 
Kubsch himself eliminated the need for many of these warnings.  Kubsch was certainly 
made aware that at the penalty phase he could produce witnesses and other evidence in 
mitigation.  He was notified what evidence his attorneys planned to present and declined to 
present that information himself.  (Trial Tr. at 3337-38.)  In doing so, Kubsch rendered the 
penalty phase significantly less procedurally complicated than it could have been.  He also made 
any court warnings about the potential difficulties in offering evidence for admission, or about 
making timely objections to the evidence submitted by the prosecution much less useful than 
they might customarily be.  Indeed, as the trial judge pointed out (before the statement Kubsch 
claims impermissibly minimized the danger of self-representation) in the absence of mitigating 
or aggravating evidence, there was little more to the process than allowing both sides to address 
the jury.  (Id. at 3338, 3341-42.)  The judge repeatedly made it clear that Kubsch would have this 
right, as well as the right to present evidence if he chose to do so.   
 
The court also warned Kubsch that were he to proceed pro se, his trial counsel could not 
speak for him during the penalty phase, and Kubsch responded that he understood this warning.  
(Id. at 3343.)  At the same time, the court informed Kubsch that his trial counsel would be 
available, and that he could seek their advice if he desired.  (Id.)  Moreover, the court warned 
Kubsch that by proceeding pro se, he waived any claim on appeal of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, and Kubsch indicated that he understood this as well.  (Id. at 3349-50.)  The judge 
informed Kubsch of the gravity of the proceedings and the nature of the potential punishments, 
 
 
 
13
and Kubsch indicated he understood.  (Id. at 3350-51.)  Taken together, these warnings were 
adequate to warn Kubsch of the relevant dangers related to self-representation during the penalty 
phase, and Kubsch’s responses demonstrate a knowing and intelligent decision to forgo the 
benefits of counsel.  Although they represent a basic set of warnings, their brevity alone is not 
dispositive of whether Kubsch’s waiver was knowing and intelligent.  The waiver must be 
viewed in light of all facts and circumstances. 
 
 
Second, we examine whether there is other evidence to suggest Kubsch understood the 
dangers of self-representation, and there is.  For example, the trial judge wanted it noted for the 
record:  
[T]hat the Court observed Mr. Kubsch throughout trial, that during trial he pretty 
much constantly was able to confer with his attorneys, was able to confer with his 
factual investigator that interviewed witnesses in this case, that he testified in this 
case, that the Court found his testimony to be coherent and relevant to the facts of 
this case, and that the Court has no reason to doubt Mr. Kubsch’s competency to 
represent himself in this matter.  
(Id. at 3340.) 
 
Kubsch’s competence was never an issue.  As Judge Albright pointed out, throughout 
trial Kubsch was alert, engaged, coherent, and capable of understanding the proceedings and 
their import.  There is no evidence to suggest that his abilities to comprehend complex matters 
diminished suddenly prior to his decision to proceed pro se.  Consequently, given Kubsch’s 
obvious intelligence and grasp of the issues surrounding his trial – as demonstrated during his 
testimony and his statement to the jury during the penalty phase – there is little reason to doubt 
that Kubsch’s waiver was made by a person who grasped the difficulties and dangers of self-
representation. 
 
 
Third, we consider Kubsch’s prior background and experience.  We examine Kubsch’s 
“educational achievements, prior experience with the legal system . . . and performance at trial in 
the case at bar.”  United States v. Sandles, 23 F.3d 1121, 1128 (7th Cir. 1994).  We have already 
noted, as the trial judge did, that Kubsch’s performance during his second trial demonstrates 
knowledge of criminal law and an understanding of the sentencing process.  We cannot help but 
 
 
 
14
note that at the time he chose to represent himself, Kubsch had already participated in two 
murder trials and one penalty phase.  Although Kubsch did not know all of the rules and 
procedures, he certainly had experience with the penalty phase proceeding.  In other words, he 
obviously knew from his own experience of his right to call witnesses, present other evidence, 
and propose mitigating factors. 
 
 
Finally, we consider the context of Kubsch’s decision.  The Seventh Circuit has observed 
that “a defendant who waives his right to counsel for strategic reasons tends to do so 
knowingly.”  Todd, 424 F.3d at 533 (citing United States v. Bell, 901 F.2d 574, 579 (7th Cir. 
2001)).  Kubsch waived his right to counsel for a strategic reason: he did not want to present 
witnesses.  
 
His lawyers stood ready to call ten witnesses with mitigating evidence to offer:  several 
members of Kubsch’s family, former employers, a correctional expert, and a Ph.D. social 
worker.  Kubsch not only declined to call witnesses, but during his statement to the jury, Kubsch 
indicated that he had not called witnesses or presented any mitigating evidence because he did 
not “even dare try to insult [the jury’s] intelligence” by suggesting the crimes he had been found 
guilty of did not deserve the death penalty.  (Trial Tr. 3372-73.)  Choosing to waive counsel 
because one does not agree with trial strategy is perhaps not the best choice, or even a good 
choice, but it can be a rational choice.   
 
 
Kubsch’s trial lawyers believed Kubsch received adequate advisements about the dangers 
of self-representation.  (Id. at 3342-43.)  They personally discussed these dangers with Kubsch.  
(Id. at 3336.)  Looking at all the facts and circumstances, we conclude that the trial judge 
correctly determined Kubsch’s waiver of counsel for the penalty phase was knowing and 
intelligent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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IV. 
Weighing Aggravators and Mitigators  
 
Kubsch argues that the trial court violated his due process and jury trial rights when it 
declined to instruct the jury that the jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating 
circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances.  (Appellant’s Br. at 53-61.)  First, contrary 
to Kubsch’s position, the weighing of the aggravators and mitigators does not have to be proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Ritchie v. State, 809 N.E.2d 258 (Ind. 2004).8    
 
Since we decided Ritchie, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the death 
penalty law of Kansas in which the prisoner made a similar argument about the standard of 
proof.  Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2524 (2006).  The Kansas statute called for imposition 
of death in instances where the jury found that aggravators and mitigating circumstances had 
equal weight.  The prisoner (and the dissenters) argued that the Constitution required that death 
only be ordered where the former outweighed the latter.  Id. at 2541 (Souter, J., dissenting).  The 
Court rejected this contention -- and a corollary claim that directing death when the 
circumstances are in equipoise prevented a jury from performing its proper functions.  Id. at 
2527. 
 
The breadth of the recent opinion in Marsh, led by the very justices who have 
championed Blakely and Booker, makes it apparent that Kubsch’s claim that the Constitution 
                                             
 
8 Ritchie analyzed Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9 in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
530 U.S. 466 (2000): 
 
[T]he Indiana Death Penalty Statute does not violate the Sixth Amendment as interpreted by 
Apprendi . . . .  Once a statutory aggravator is found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
Sixth Amendment . . . is satisfied.  Indiana now places the weighing process in the hands of the 
jury, but this does not convert the weighing process into an eligibility factor.  The outcome of  
weighing does not increase eligibility.  Rather, it fixes the punishment within the eligible range.  It 
is therefore not required to be found by a jury under a reasonable doubt standard. 
 
Ritchie, 809 N.E.2d at 268. 
  
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), was handed down after Ritchie, but its holding does not affect our 
decision in Ritchie.  Blakely defined statutory maximum as the maximum sentence a judge may impose based on the 
jury verdict or a defendant’s admissions without finding additional facts.  Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303.  Indiana’s death 
penalty statute, however, does not allow for judicial fact finding when the sentencing hearing is by jury.  See  Ind. 
Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9(e), (l). 
 
 
 
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requires that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigators beyond a reasonable doubt is 
untenable. 
 
 
V.  Was There Individualized Sentencing? 
 
 
Kubsch cites the Court’s declaration that an individualized decision is essential in capital 
cases.  Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).  He contends that the absence of 
mitigating evidence before the jury in his case meant that there was no such individualized 
sentence.  This state of the evidence, of course, is the direct result of the strategy Wayne Kubsch 
insisted on following – a strategy he discussed with his lawyers, articulated in open court, and 
discussed directly with the jury. 
 
 
Kubsch further contends that the trial judge erred by following the jury’s 
recommendation, rather than ordering a new pre-sentence report and determining for himself, 
apart from the jury’s recommendation, whether the evidence and the aggravators and mitigating 
factors warranted death or life without parole. 
 
 
This Court’s assessment of the role of jury and judge after the General Assembly’s 2002 
amendments to the statute on death and life without parole is a work in progress.  Still, two 
principles have been articulated that seem adequate to address the present case.  In one of several 
cases handed down together, we observed that “there is only one sentencing determination, 
which is made by the jury.”  Stroud v. State, 809 N.E.2d 274, 287 (Ind. 2004).  In another case, 
Justice Boehm said that the amendments were not intended to “overturn traditional checks on 
jury error or jury discretion, or to eliminate the trial judge’s function under Trial Rule 59.”  
Helsley v. State, 809 N.E.2d 292, 306 (Ind. 2004) (Boehm, J., concurring). 
 
 
Whatever else may be said about the sentencing process in this case, fashioned as it was 
by Kubsch himself (who declined the judge’s invitation even to make a statement before the 
court pronounced sentence), what we do know about the aggravating circumstances and the 
mitigating circumstances that counsel would have attempted to prove had Kubsch not prevented 
 
 
 
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it presents no basis for setting aside the jury’s recommendation and the trial court’s sentence 
based upon it.   
 
The aggravators were the fact of a triple murder and the fact that one of the victims was 
under the age of twelve.  These are two rather substantial factors.  The mitigating evidence 
Kubsch’s lawyers would have tried to present was that Kubsch was usually a caring person, a 
good worker, someone who would live an orderly prison life, and that his triple killing was an 
aberration to his personality.  (Appellant’s App. at 348-53.)  All in all, even had this evidence 
been placed before the trial judge, it does not appear to rise to the level necessary under, say, 
Trial Rule 59 for setting aside a jury verdict. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
 
Dickson, Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur. 
 
 
 
 
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