Title: State ex rel. Kesterson v. Kent State University

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Kesterson v. Kent State Univ., Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-5110.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-5110 
THE STATE EX REL. KESTERSON v. KENT STATE UNIVERSITY. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Kesterson v. Kent State Univ., Slip Opinion No. 
2018-Ohio-5110.] 
Mandamus—Public-records law—Public office’s production of all responsive 
public records was untimely—Writ denied—Statutory damages and 
attorney fees awarded—Costs denied. 
(No. 2016-1123—Submitted May 8, 2018—Decided December 20, 2018.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
________________ 
 
KENNEDY, J. 
{¶ 1} Relator, Lauren Kesterson, seeks a writ of mandamus to compel 
respondent, Kent State University, to comply with her records request under the 
Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43.  Because Kesterson has not shown that she is 
entitled to additional records beyond those that she has already received pursuant 
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to her request, we deny the writ.  We award Kesterson statutory damages in the 
amount of $1,000 and attorney fees, but deny court costs. 
Background 
{¶ 2} On April 13, 2016, by e-mail and certified mail, Kesterson sent a 
voluminous public-records request to Kent State, seeking the following records:   
 
1.  Any insurance policy that could be construed to cover 
claims against the University for violating Title IX [20 U.S.C. 1681 
et seq.] or denying a student-athlete the equal protection of the laws 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
2.  Any insurance policy that could be construed to cover 
claims against a present or former University employee for violating 
Title IX, denying a student-athlete the equal protection of the laws 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, or intentionally inflicting serious 
emotional distress on a student-athlete. 
3.  All records regarding Karen Linder’s departure from the 
University (including all communications such as emails, text 
messages, voicemails, etc.);  
4.  All records of any restrictions or limitations Kent State 
University placed on Karen Linder following or related to her 
departure (such as restrictions on contacting members of the softball 
team, accessing non-public areas of [Kent State] facilities such as 
the softball team’s locker room, using [Kent State] facilities for her 
own economic benefit, or disparaging or defaming any past or 
present members of the softball team or their parents); 
5.  All records of communications involving any Athletic 
Department personnel regarding Lauren Kesterson from August 28, 
2015 to the present;  
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6.  All records of communications between Joel Nielsen and 
Karen Linder from August 20, 2015 to the present regarding Lauren 
Kesterson, any complaint she initiated regarding Linder (including 
any investigation of that complaint), or Linder’s resignation 
(including the surrounding circumstances and the terms of her 
departure);  
7.  All records of communications between Janet Kittell and 
Karen Linder from August 20, 2015 to the present regarding Lauren 
Kesterson, any complaint she initiated regarding Linder (including 
any investigation of that complaint), or Linder’s resignation 
(including the surrounding circumstances and the terms of her 
departure);  
8.  All records of communications between Joel Nielsen and 
Erin Barton regarding Lauren Kesterson or Karen Linder from 
August 20, 2015 to September 30, 2015;  
9.  All records of communications between Joel Nielsen and 
Pamela Fitzgerald regarding Lauren Kesterson or Karen Linder 
from August 20, 2015 to the present;  
10.  All records of communications between Joel Nielsen 
and Loretta Shields regarding Lauren Kesterson or Karen Linder 
from August 20, 2015 to the present; 
11.  All records of communications between Joel Nielsen 
and any member of Human Resources Staff (including Office of 
Compliance/Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action or Title IX) 
regarding Lauren Kesterson or Karen Linder from August 20, 2015 
to the present;  
12.  All records Joel Nielsen generated or that were 
generated on his behalf regarding Lauren Kesterson (including 
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records regarding her rape report) or Karen Linder from August 20, 
2015 to the present including any handwritten notes, electronic 
notes, calendar entries, emails, text messages, etc.;  
13.  All records Joel Nielsen received regarding Lauren 
Kesterson (including records regarding her rape report) or Karen 
Linder from August 20, 2015 to the present including any 
handwritten notes, electronic notes, calendar entries, emails, text 
messages, etc.;  
14.  Records of any check(s) or payment(s) provided to 
Karen Linder after August 28, 2015 (including images of any 
check(s));  
15.  All records regarding Linder’s use of [Kent State] 
facilities since her August 28, 2015 resignation (including all 
communications such as emails, text messages, voicemails, etc.);  
16.  Regarding Kent State softball’s official Facebook and 
Twitter accounts: 
a.  All records of postings since August 28, 2015 (including 
deleted posts); 
b.  All records regarding which individuals have or had 
access to those accounts since August 28, 2015; 
17.  All records regarding any reports by Lauren Kesterson 
regarding sexual assault, failure to take appropriate steps in response 
to a sexual-assault report, retaliation for reporting sexual assault, or 
other mistreatment by any Kent State student, former student, 
personnel, or former personnel (including all communications such 
as emails, text messages, voicemails, etc.); 
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18.  All records regarding any efforts by the University to 
prevent or remedy retaliation against Lauren Kesterson for reporting 
that a Kent State baseball player had raped her;  
19.  All records regarding any efforts by the University to 
prevent or remedy retaliation against Lauren Kesterson for reporting 
that former head softball coach Karen Linder had engaged in a cover 
up of Lauren Kesterson’s rape report;  
20.  From August 2012 to the present, records of emails from 
April Hull to any member(s) of the softball team that include 
reference to training sessions (such as compliance or NCAA-
mandated training for student-athletes); and  
21.  All records of training or information provided to the 
Kent State varsity baseball team regarding Title IX, gender equity, 
sexual harassment, sexual assault, Sexual and Relationship Violence 
Support Services, or the University’s policies or procedures for 
reporting instances of gender-based harassment or sexual assault 
(from the 2012-2013 academic year to the present). 
 
{¶ 3} On April 15, 2016, Kent State acknowledged receipt of the request 
and stated that responsive records were being identified and gathered.  Kesterson’s 
attorney, Ashlie Sletvold, e-mailed Kent State twice in May, asking when she could 
expect a response.  She followed up with Kent State by e-mail again on June 7 and 
June 14, having received no documents. 
{¶ 4} On June 20, counsel for Kent State, Nichole DeCaprio, responded 
with a detailed letter and provided 446 pages of responsive records.  The records 
that Kent State sent were responsive to request numbers 1, 2, 9, 14, 16, 17, 20, and 
21, although Sletvold alleged that some responses were “merely partial and 
incomplete.”  Kent State objected to the remaining requests as overbroad.  
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Nonetheless, it searched for records responsive to request numbers 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 
and 13, but found none. 
{¶ 5} On June 29, 2016, another of Kesterson’s attorneys, Peter Pattakos, 
wrote to Kent State, raising concerns with its responses and its explanations for not 
responding to some requests.  Kesterson also revised her first and second requests 
to include “copies of all insurance policies that the University carries or has carried 
since 2014.”  Kent State provided no further response. 
{¶ 6} Kesterson filed her mandamus complaint on August 2, 2016, alleging 
that Kent State’s objections were meritless, and that her request “has been 
outstanding for 110 days.”  Kesterson asks for “a peremptory writ of mandamus 
directing Kent State to make responsive records available promptly,” an award of 
attorney fees and costs, an award of statutory damages, and “any other relief 
available to the firm *  *  * under R.C. 149.43.” 
{¶ 7} On October 11, 2017, we granted Kesterson an alternative writ setting 
forth a schedule for the parties to present evidence and submit briefs.  150 Ohio 
St.3d 1449, 2017-Ohio-8136, 83 N.E.3d 936.  Kent State filed 13 volumes of sealed 
evidence, and the parties filed briefs. 
Kesterson’s federal litigation 
{¶ 8} On February 9, 2016, Kesterson filed a complaint against Kent State 
and Karen Linder in federal district court alleging, among other claims, civil-rights 
violations under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, as amended.  
Kesterson v. Kent State Univ., N.D. Ohio Case No. 5:16-CV-00298.  In March 
2017, Kesterson served discovery requests on the defendants, including requests 
for production of documents (“RPD”).  In July 2017, Kent State produced 
approximately 6,100 pages of documents in response to Kesterson’s RPD, and in 
September, the university provided Kesterson with additional documents on two 
occasions.  Kesterson’s federal litigation is ongoing. 
 
 
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Ohio’s Public Records Act 
{¶ 9} It has long been the “ ‘rule in Ohio *  *  * that public records are the 
people’s records, and that the officials in whose custody they happen to be are 
merely trustees for the people.’ ”  State ex rel. Patterson v. Ayers, 171 Ohio St. 369, 
371, 171 N.E.2d 508 (1960), quoting 35 Ohio Jurisprudence, Inspection of Records: 
Generally, Section 41, at 45 (1934).  “The Public Records Act reflects [Ohio’s] 
policy that ‘open government serves the public interest and our democratic  
system.’ ”  State ex rel. Glasgow v. Jones, 119 Ohio St.3d 391, 2008-Ohio-4788, 
894 N.E.2d 686, ¶ 13, quoting State ex rel. Dann v. Taft, 109 Ohio St.3d 364, 2006-
Ohio-1825, 848 N.E.2d 472, ¶ 20.  It states that “[u]pon a request made in 
accordance with division (B) of this section * * * a public office * * * shall transmit 
a copy of a public record to any person * * * within a reasonable period of time 
after receiving the request for the copy.”  R.C. 149.43(B)(7). 
{¶ 10} The act defines “public record” as “records kept by any public office, 
including, but not limited to, state * * * units.”  R.C. 149.43(A)(1); see also R.C. 
149.011(A) (defining “public office”).  R.C. 149.011(G) provides that “ ‘[r]ecords’ 
includes any document, device, or item, regardless of physical form or 
characteristic * * * created or received by or coming under the jurisdiction of any 
public office of the state or its political subdivisions, which serves to document the 
organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other 
activities of the office.”  Moreover, “a state university is considered a ‘public office’ 
for purposes of the Public Records Act.”  State ex rel. Rea v. Ohio Dept. of Edn., 
81 Ohio St.3d 527, 530, 692 N.E.2d 596 (1998). 
  
Mandamus 
{¶ 11} At the time Kesterson filed her complaint, “[m]andamus [was] the 
appropriate remedy to compel compliance with R.C. 149.43, Ohio’s Public Records 
Act.”  (Emphasis added.)  State ex rel. Physicians Commt. for Responsible 
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Medicine v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 108 Ohio St.3d 288, 2006-Ohio-903, 
843 N.E.2d 174, ¶ 6; R.C. 149.43(C)(1).1  
{¶ 12} Despite the liberal construction of the Public Records Act “in favor 
of disclosure,” State ex rel. Zidonis v. Columbus State Community College, 133 
Ohio St.3d 122, 2012-Ohio-4228, 976 N.E.2d 861, ¶ 19, Kesterson “must still 
establish entitlement to the requested extraordinary relief by clear and convincing 
evidence,” State ex rel. McCaffrey v. Mahoning Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 133 Ohio 
St.3d 139, 2012-Ohio-4246, 976 N.E.2d 877, ¶ 16.  The standard of clear and 
convincing evidence is  
 
that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere 
“preponderance of the evidence,” but not to the extent of such 
certainty as is required “beyond a reasonable doubt” in criminal 
cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm 
belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established. 
 
Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the 
syllabus.  And, unlike in other mandamus cases, “[r]elators in public-records 
mandamus cases need not establish the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary 
course of law.”  State ex rel. Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Ohio v. Cuyahoga Cty. 
Bd. of Commrs., 128 Ohio St.3d 256, 2011-Ohio-625, 943 N.E.2d 553, ¶ 24. 
 
{¶ 13} Under R.C. 149.43(B), a public office may produce the requested 
records prior to the court’s decision, which renders the mandamus claim for 
                                                 
1 Relator’s complaint is governed by former R.C. 149.43 (2015 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 64), which was 
effective on the dates she made her public-records request and commenced her original action before 
this court.  See State ex rel. Doe v. Smith, 123 Ohio St.3d 44, 2009-Ohio-4149, 914 N.E.2d 159, ¶ 
24 (“Because this case was filed and pertains to a records request made after the effective date of 
the amendment [to R.C. 149.43], the amended version * * * applies here”).  All references to R.C. 
149.43, the Public Records Act, refer to that version unless otherwise noted. 
January Term, 2018 
 
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production of records moot.  State ex rel. Striker v. Smith, 129 Ohio St.3d 168, 
2011-Ohio-2878, 950 N.E.2d 952, ¶ 18-22.  Moreover, “[a]n event that causes a 
case to become moot may be proved by extrinsic evidence outside the record.”  
State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer, Div. of Gannett Satellite Information Network, 
Inc. v. Dupuis, 98 Ohio St.3d 126, 2002-Ohio-7041, 781 N.E.2d 163, ¶ 8.  
Nonetheless, a relator may still be entitled to other forms of relief if the production 
of records was not completed “within a reasonable period of time.”  R.C. 149.43(B) 
and (C). 
Analysis 
Records produced following Kesterson’s mandamus complaint 
{¶ 14} Kesterson contends that in connection with the mediation conducted 
in this court and her federal litigation, Kent State provided additional records that 
were responsive to the remaining requests.  Therefore, Kesterson argues Kent State 
was dilatory in responding to the April 2016 records request.  Indeed, in large part, 
Kesterson’s federal RPD was identical to her April 2016 records request. 
{¶ 15} Kent State maintains that it fully responded to Kesterson’s April 13, 
2016 request by October 28, 2016.  Despite DeCaprio’s attestation that the response 
to the request was complete in October 2016 and that any further records provided 
on or after that date were merely provided “as a courtesy,” the evidence 
demonstrates that Kent State provided many additional responsive records through 
December 2016.  Further, Kent State’s 2017 responses to Kesterson’s federal RPD 
seem to indicate that it provided even more records responsive to Kesterson’s April 
2016 request in that litigation. 
{¶ 16} According to DeCaprio, on October 28, 2016, Kent State provided 
Kesterson with records relating to Linder’s reservation of the Kent State Field 
House (an athletic facility) and records of “training provided to incoming students 
at Kent State,” which are responsive to request numbers 15 and 21.  On November 
8, Kent State produced a variety of insurance policies held by the university as well 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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as e-mail messages collected from Kent State employee Casey Cegles, a deputy 
athletic director, which are responsive to request numbers 1, 2, 5, and 12.  The next 
day, Kent State produced additional training records, which are responsive to 
request number 21.  On November 17, Kent State produced even more insurance 
policies, responsive to request numbers 1 and 2.  And on November 29, Kent State 
produced e-mails collected from Athletic Department personnel regarding 
Kesterson (responsive to request number 5) and e-mails from and to Nielsen 
regarding Kesterson (responsive to request numbers 11, 12, and 13). 
{¶ 17} On December 1, 2016, Kent State produced a slew of additional 
records, including a variety of e-mails regarding Kesterson and records of her rape 
report, which are responsive to request numbers 5, 9, 13, and 17.  The same day, 
Kent State provided Kesterson with even more e-mails collected from Eric Oakley, 
an assistant softball coach at Kent State, involving Kesterson and/or her rape report, 
which are responsive to request numbers 5, 12, 13, and 20.  Finally, on December 
2, 2016, Kent State provided additional e-mails between Athletic Department 
personnel, responsive to request numbers 5 and 20.  The evidence establishes that 
Kent State has also since provided records responsive to request numbers 3, 6, 7, 8, 
9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21. 
{¶ 18} While Kesterson does not concede that she has received all the 
records requested in April 2016, she fails to identify what categories of records are 
still incomplete.  Kesterson notes 11 “examples” of records Kent State produced 
during discovery in her federal case that she argues are responsive to some of the 
categories of records she requested in April 2016.  However, those documents have 
not been submitted as evidence in this case.  Moreover, there is no evidence in the 
record to indicate that Kent State is still withholding records responsive to 
Kesterson’s requests.  Absent contrary evidence in the record, the materials Kent 
State has provided defeats Kesterson’s allegation that the university has not fully 
responded to her April 2016 request.  Accordingly, Kesterson’s mandamus claim 
January Term, 2018 
 
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for the production of records is moot.  See State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Sage, 
142 Ohio St.3d 392, 2015-Ohio-974, 31 N.E.3d 616, ¶ 10 (observing that 
mandamus is an appropriate remedy to compel compliance with the Public Records 
Act, and thus that the burden of proof is on the relator to establish entitlement to 
the writ by clear and convincing evidence). 
Timeliness of Kent State’s production of responsive records 
{¶ 19} Even when a claim for the production of records has been satisfied, 
a separate claim based on the untimeliness of the response persists unless copies of 
all required records were made available “within a reasonable period of time.”  R.C. 
143.49(B)(1).  Under R.C. 149.43(C)(1), an award of statutory damages is available 
even if the records have been provided prior to the court’s decision.  Kesterson 
bears the burden to demonstrate that Kent State’s response to her public-records 
request was unreasonably delayed.  State ex rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Johnson, 
106 Ohio St.3d 160, 2005-Ohio-4384, 833 N.E.2d 274, ¶ 44. 
 
{¶ 20} Kesterson argues that Kent State violated R.C. 149.43 by failing to 
promptly prepare and provide all responsive records “within a reasonable time.”  
We may award statutory damages “if the public record has not been provided 
promptly.”  State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Deters, 148 Ohio St.3d 595, 2016-
Ohio-8195, 71 N.E.3d 1076, ¶ 22.  “Reasonable period of time” is not defined in 
the Public Records Act, but “the determination of what is ‘reasonable’ depends 
upon all the pertinent facts and circumstances.”  Id. at ¶ 23.  Moreover, “R.C. 
149.43(A) envisions an opportunity on the part of the public office to examine 
records prior to inspection in order to make appropriate redactions of exempt 
materials.”  State ex rel. Warren Newspapers, Inc. v. Hutson, 70 Ohio St.3d 619, 
623, 640 N.E.2d 174 (1994). 
Claimed exception: overbreadth 
{¶ 21} In defense of its failure to provide all responsive records when it 
responded to Kesterson’s April 13, 2016 request, Kent State contends that it 
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properly denied many of the requests as overbroad.  According to Kent State, the 
fact that it continued to provide records throughout the mediation conducted in this 
court and Kesterson’s federal litigation does not undermine its contention that it 
timely responded to the records request. 
{¶ 22} It is axiomatic that “ ‘[i]t is the responsibility of the person who 
wishes to inspect and/or copy records to identify with reasonable clarity the records 
at issue.’ ”  Zidonis, 133 Ohio St.3d 122, 2012-Ohio-4228, 976 N.E.2d 861, at ¶ 21, 
quoting State ex rel. Fant v. Tober, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 63737, 1993 WL 
173743, *1 (Apr. 28, 1993), aff’d, 68 Ohio St.3d 117, 623 N.E.2d 1202 (1993).  
Yet, we have “never held that in order to constitute a viable request, the requester 
must specify the author and date of the records requested.”  State ex rel. Morgan v. 
New Lexington, 112 Ohio St.3d 33, 2006-Ohio-6365, 857 N.E.2d 1208, ¶ 37.  And 
“[a]lthough this may be helpful in identifying the requested records, the failure to 
do so does not automatically result in an improper request for public records.”  Id.  
However, “[i]n identifying the records at issue, the Public Records Act ‘does not 
contemplate that any individual has the right to a complete duplication of 
voluminous files kept by government agencies.’ ”  Glasgow, 119 Ohio St.3d 391, 
2008-Ohio-4788, 894 N.E.2d 686, at ¶ 17, quoting Warren Newspapers at 624. 
Communications 
{¶ 23} Kent State argues that under Glasgow, Kesterson’s requests for “all 
records of communications” between various individuals regarding certain subjects 
(request numbers 5 through 11) are unenforceable because they are overly broad.  
In Glasgow, we considered the relator’s request for e-mail messages, text messages, 
and written correspondence sent and received by State Representative Shannon 
Jones during a period of approximately six months “specifically including, but not 
limited to, any [communications] having as their subject matter Substitute House 
Bill 151 of the 127th General Assembly or discussions that led to the introduction 
of Substitute House Bill 151 or any predecessor bill.”  Id. at ¶ 5-7.  Using the 
January Term, 2018 
 
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standards applicable to overbreadth challenges, we held that “insofar as Glasgow 
broadly sought all of Jones’s work-related e-mail messages, text messages, and 
correspondence during her entire tenure as state representative, his request was 
improper because it was overly broad” and “impermissibly sought what 
approximated a ‘complete duplication’ of Jones’s files.”  Id. at ¶ 19. 
{¶ 24} In another case involving a request to a city police department for 
“any and all records generated * * * containing any reference whatsoever to Kelly 
Dillery,” we determined the request was overbroad because the requesting party 
“failed in her duty to identify the records she wanted with sufficient clarity.”  
(Emphasis added.)  State ex rel. Dillery v. Icsman, 92 Ohio St.3d 312, 314, 750 
N.E.2d 156 (2001).  More recently, we decided that the relator’s request for “whole 
categories of complaint and litigation files without any limitation as to content or 
time period, was overbroad.”  (Emphasis added.)  Zidonis, 133 Ohio St.3d 122, 
2012-Ohio-4228, 976 N.E.2d 861, at ¶ 23.  We added that “without any temporal 
or content-based limitation,” id. at ¶ 26, requests for “ ‘broad categor[ies] of records 
listed within an agency’s retention schedule’ ” are not specific and enforceable 
under the Public Records Act, id. quoting State ex rel. Zidonis v. Columbus State 
Community College, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-961, 2011-Ohio-6817, ¶ 5. 
{¶ 25} While Kesterson did cast a wide net for “communications,” she 
limited each request temporally, by subject matter, and in all but one instance, by 
the specific employees concerned.  See State ex rel. Bott Law Group, L.L.C. v. Ohio 
Dept. of Natural Resources, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-448, 2013-Ohio-5219,  
¶ 40-41 (observing that while the requests were “complex and expansive,” they 
were limited by “timeframe, subject matter, and * * * specific employee(s) 
concerned,” and therefore “the relevant evidence and the applicable law d[id] not 
support the magistrate’s conclusion that such complexity and expansiveness 
relieved [the Ohio Department of Natural Resources] of its obligation to promptly 
prepare all responsive records”).  In short, Kesterson did not request the “complete 
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duplication” of anyone’s files, nor does any individual request approach the type of 
vague and impermissibly broad request that we refused to enforce in Glasgow, 
Dillery, or Zidonis. 
{¶ 26} We reject Kent State’s contention that Kesterson’s requests for 
communications required it to “guess at, and then provide, records with specific 
information of interest” to her.  Under the Public Records Act, “to constitute 
improper research, a record request must require the government agency to either 
search through voluminous documents for those that contain certain information or 
to create a new document by searching for and compiling information from existing 
records.”  State ex rel. Carr v. London Corr. Inst., 144 Ohio St.3d 211, 2015-Ohio-
2363, 41 N.E.3d 1203, ¶ 22, citing Morgan, 112 Ohio St.3d 33, 2006-Ohio-6365, 
857 N.E.2d 1208, at ¶ 30-31, 35.  Morgan makes clear that a request for e-mails 
sent or received by a specific individual regarding a specific topic during a 
reasonably short time period is not the type of request that we have previously 
found to constitute impermissible research.  Morgan at ¶ 30, 33-35 (observing that 
requests for information as opposed to specific records are improper under R.C. 
149.43, and determining that Morgan’s requests were not improper because they 
were for specific records, did not require the city to create new records, and 
specified individuals who would likely have and maintain the requested records).  
Under this precedent, Kesterson’s requests for communications between specified 
Kent State employees did not require Kent State to conduct impermissible research 
under R.C. 149.43. 
{¶ 27} And if any doubt remains, Kent State’s conduct throughout this 
original action and Kesterson’s federal litigation contradicts its claims of 
overbreadth.  Kent State initially denied as overbroad request numbers 6 through 
10 and 12 but also indicated that it performed a search for responsive e-mails, and 
January Term, 2018 
 
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in all but one instance,2 averred that “[t]here are no emails responsive to this 
request.”  Not only is such a response self-contradictory, it is also unreasonable, as 
these requests were limited to communications between specific individuals and 
the university’s failure to do any more than a search of e-mail correspondence was 
insufficient.  Moreover, when Kesterson lodged the same requests during her 
federal litigation, Kent State’s responsive pleading indicated that it produced 
additional records that were responsive to those requests, further undermining its 
claim that it timely and fully responded to Kesterson’s request as required by R.C. 
149.43(B). 
Request Numbers 3 and 4 
{¶ 28} Request number 3 sought “[a]ll records regarding Karen Linder’s 
departure from the University (including all communications such as emails, text 
messages, voicemails, etc.).”  The fourth request sought “[a]ll records of any 
restrictions or limitations Kent State University placed on Karen Linder following 
or related to her departure (such as restrictions on contacting members of the 
softball team, accessing non-public areas of KSU facilities such as the softball 
team’s locker room, using KSU facilities for her own economic benefit, or 
disparaging or defaming any past or present members of the softball team or their 
parents).”   
 
{¶ 29} These categories, in large part, impermissibly request “information” 
as opposed to specific records.  In its June 20, 2016 correspondence, Kent State 
thus appropriately objected to these requests as “overly broad” and asked Kesterson 
to “define the records you are seeking with sufficient clarity to allow us to identify 
the specific records you are requesting.”  Kesterson did not further define these 
requests, instead maintaining that they were “lawful requests, which pertain to 
limited and specifically identified categories of documents.” 
                                                 
2 As to request number 12, Kent State responded that “[t]here were no records responsive” to 
Kesterson’s request. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 30} While Kent State later apparently provided some records responsive 
to these requests, we hold that its objections were valid and therefore that as to those 
two requests, Kent State did not fail to uphold its duties under R.C. 149.43. 
Statutory damages 
{¶ 31} R.C. 149.43(C)(1)3 imposes damages at the rate of $100 “for each 
business day during which the public office *  *  * failed to comply with an 
obligation in accordance with division (B) of this section, beginning with the day 
on which the requester files a mandamus action to recover statutory damages, up to 
a maximum of one thousand dollars.”  The Public Records Act provides that an 
award of statutory damages can be reduced if two conditions are satisfied.  Carr, 
144 Ohio St.3d 211, 2015-Ohio-2363, 41 N.E.3d 1203, at ¶ 41, citing R.C. 
149.43(C)(1).  A court may reduce or not award statutory damages if the court 
determines that “based on the ordinary application of statutory law and case law as 
it existed at the time,” the public office “reasonably would believe that the conduct 
or threatened conduct of the public office *  *  * did not constitute a failure to 
comply with an obligation” under R.C. 149.43(B) and that the public office 
“reasonably would believe that the conduct or threatened conduct of the public 
office *  *  * would serve the public policy that underlies the authority that is 
asserted as permitting that conduct or threatened conduct.”  R.C. 149.43(C)(1)(a) 
and (b). 
{¶ 32} Kent State violated R.C. 149.43(B) when it did not fully respond to 
Kesterson’s request until, at the earliest, December 2, 2016, four months after 
Kesterson filed her mandamus complaint on August 2, 2016.  Sage, 142 Ohio St.3d 
392, 2015-Ohio-974, 31 N.E.3d 616, at ¶ 46.  Also, neither condition of R.C. 
149.43(C)(1)(a) or (b) is satisfied in this case.  Accordingly, we grant Kesterson an 
award of statutory damages in the amount of $1,000. 
                                                 
3 This provision is now found in R.C. 149.43(C)(2) of the current Public Records Act. 
January Term, 2018 
 
17 
Court costs 
{¶ 33} Kesterson is not, however, entitled to court costs.  On the date she 
made her public-records request and filed her mandamus complaint, the applicable 
version of the Public Records Act allowed for an award of court costs only “[i]f the 
court issues a writ of mandamus that orders the public office * * * to comply with 
division (B) of this section.”  R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(a).  Accordingly, because we hold 
that Kesterson’s mandamus claim is moot, we deny her request for court costs. 
Attorney fees 
{¶ 34} The plain and unambiguous language of the applicable version of 
R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(b)(i) requires an award of reasonable attorney fees when the 
public office or person responsible for the public records failed to timely respond, 
pursuant to R.C. 149.43(B), to the public-records request (“The court shall award 
reasonable attorney’s fees * * * when * * * [t]he public office or person responsible 
for the public records failed to respond affirmatively or negatively to the public 
records request in accordance with the time allowed under division (B)” [emphasis 
added]).  An award of attorney fees pursuant to R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(b)(i) is not 
dependent upon the court having issued a judgment that orders compliance with the 
public-records law.  See also R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(b)(i)4 (court may award attorney 
fees if the court renders a judgment that orders the public office to comply with 
R.C. 149.43(B) or if the court determines the public office failed to timely respond 
to the request).  The award of reasonable attorney fees is subject to reduction 
pursuant to R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(c). 
{¶ 35} An award of reasonable attorney fees is appropriate under R.C. 
149.43(C)(2)(b)(i) because Kent State violated R.C. 149.43(B) when it failed to 
produce all responsive records until at least four months after Kesterson filed this 
action.  The court will make a final determination of the amount of attorney fees 
                                                 
4 This reference is to the current Public Records Act, effective November 2, 2018.  This statutory 
amendment was originally adopted in 2016 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 321. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
upon review of Kesterson’s filing of an itemized application with independent 
evidence supporting the reasonableness of the hourly rates charged and the hours 
billed.  The statutory guidelines in R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(c) will aid the court in 
determining the amount of fees to be awarded.  Kesterson must demonstrate that 
she is entitled to an award of fees that is “reasonable” and “remedial.”  Id.  
Specifically, the itemized billing statements should only reflect time spent on the 
public-records request, mandamus action, and the proof of entitlement to and 
reasonableness of the requested fees.  Id.  Kent State is entitled to respond to 
Kesterson’s application, and this court, applying R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(c), could 
reduce the attorney fees if it found that a “well-informed public office or person 
responsible for the requested public records reasonably” would believe the conduct 
“did not constitute a failure to comply” with a statutory obligation and that such 
conduct would “serve the public policy [underlying] the authority that [was] 
asserted as permitting that conduct.”  R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(c)(i) and (ii); see Sage, 
142 Ohio St.3d 392, 2015-Ohio-974, 31 N.E.3d 616, at ¶ 37. 
{¶ 36} Any person submitting an application for attorney fees should note 
that “fee applications submitted to this court should contain separate time entries 
for each task, with the time expended on each task denoted in tenths of an hour” 
and that “this court will no longer grant attorney-fee applications that include block-
billed time entries.”  State ex rel. Harris v. Rubino, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2018-Ohio-
5109, ___N.E.3d ___, ¶ 7, 14. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 37} Kesterson has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that Kent 
State has failed to fully respond to her April 2016 records request.  Therefore, she 
has not established her entitlement to the requested extraordinary relief in 
mandamus, and we deny the writ.  Consequently, we also deny Kesterson’s request 
for court costs. 
January Term, 2018 
 
19 
{¶ 38} However, because Kent State failed to timely produce some of the 
responsive records, we award statutory damages to Kesterson under R.C. 
149.43(C)(1) in the amount of $1,000, and grant her request for reasonable attorney 
fees. 
Judgment accordingly. 
FRENCH, DEWINE, and DEGENARO, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part, and would deny the 
writ and award statutory damages, but would deny relator’s request for fees and 
costs. 
FISCHER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, and would deny the writ 
but would not award statutory damages, and would deny relator’s request for fees 
and costs. 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents and would grant the writ and would grant relator’s 
request for fees and costs. 
_________________ 
The Chandra Law Firm L.L.C., Subodh Chandra, Ashlie Case Sletvold, and 
Marvin C. Brown IV, for relator. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Jeffrey Knight and Sarah E. 
Pierce, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondent. 
_________________