Title: State v. Mears

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Mears (98-252); 170 Vt. 336; 749 A.2d 600

[Filed 28-Jan-2000]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter  of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of 
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 98-252

State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

	                                         On Appeal from
     v.		                                 District Court of Vermont,
	                                         Unit No. 1, Orange Circuit

Jason Mears	                                 September Term, 1999

Shireen Avis Fisher, J.

       James D. McKnight, Orange County State's Attorney, and Pamela Hall
  Johnson, Deputy State's Attorney, Specially Assigned, Chelsea, for
  Plaintiff-Appellee.

       Robert Appel, Defender General, and Anna Saxman, Appellate Attorney,
  Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       AMESTOY, C.J.   Defendant Jason Mears appeals his Orange District
  Court conviction  for attempted murder in the first degree.  Defendant
  argues that (1) the trial court erroneously  admitted statements he made to
  police, (2) he did not waive his rights to silence and to counsel 
  knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and (3) the court should have
  granted his motion for a  mistrial because a prosecution witness's
  testimony prejudiced defendant.  We affirm.
					
                                  I. Facts

       The relevant facts are not in dispute.  Briefly stated, on October 7,
  1996, defendant, armed  with a revolver, entered neighbor Yvonne Campbell's
  Braintree home and brutally assaulted her, 

 

  leaving her for dead.  He initially pled guilty to attempted second degree
  murder, but then withdrew  his plea.  At trial, defendant did not contest
  that he committed the attack, but presented a  diminished-capacity defense,
  claiming that he intended only to steal from the Campbells but raged  out
  of control when his plan went awry.  Defendant was convicted of attempted
  first-degree murder  in March 1998.

       Because defendant's first claim of error relates to statements made by
  defendant after he  was taken into custody, we briefly recount the
  circumstances.  At approximately 9:30 a.m. on  October 7, 1996, Ms. Campell
  called 9-1-1 and, speaking in a whispered and panicked voice, told  the
  dispatcher that defendant had stabbed her.  A half-hour later, an emergency
  medical team  arrived at the scene of the attack.  Although bleeding
  profusely from gaping wounds in her head,  neck, and leg,  Ms. Campbell was
  conscious and again identified defendant as her attacker.  

       Shortly after 1:00 p.m. on the same day, police took the
  then-seventeen-year-old defendant  to the Vermont State Police barracks in
  Bethel.  Defendant was reluctant to call his father, but did  so at the
  insistence of Officer Terry Lewis. Defendant's father, Bruce Mears, arrived
  at the barracks  at approximately 3:30 p.m.  During the two hours defendant
  was at the barracks without his father,  he was not questioned.  He was
  allowed from time to time to walk outside and smoke.  Upon his  arrival at
  the barracks, Mr. Mears was informed by Officer Lewis that his son was a
  suspect in a  stabbing at the Campbell residence, that the police needed to
  interview defendant, and that Mr.  Mears could talk privately with his son
  in one of the interview rooms and decide whether they  wanted to talk to
  the police.  

       Mr. Mears and defendant went into the private room and, after an
  unspecified period of  time, Mr. Mears emerged from the room and told
  Officer Lewis: "We'll talk to you."  Officer Lewis  responded that
  questioning would not begin until Detective Gloria Danforth returned to the 
  barracks 

 

  because she was to conduct the interview.  Detective Danforth, who had
  talked extensively with  Ms. Campbell when the victim called 9-1-1 to
  report the attack, was at the Mears residence  conducting a search pursuant
  to a valid warrant.  Detective Danforth's arrival was delayed about  two
  hours, during which time defendant, Mr. Mears, and defendant's mother,
  Naomi Mears, who  had arrived after Mr. Mears, went in and out of a private
  interview room.

       At approximately 5:30 p.m., Detective Danforth arrived at the
  barracks, at which time  defendant and his parents were outside smoking. 
  Detective Danforth told Mr. Mears, out of  defendant's presence, that she
  wanted to question his son but that, because defendant was only  seventeen
  years old, she needed parental permission.  Detective Danforth ensured that
  Mr. Mears  understood that he did not have to give such permission, but Mr.
  Mears responded that he felt that it  was very important to prove his son's
  innocence, that he and defendant had discussed at great length  the kinds
  of questions that would be asked, and that he had no problem with the
  interview.   Following this conversation, Detective Danforth and Mr. Mears
  rejoined defendant and Mrs.  Mears, where she informed them that there was
  a search warrant being served at their residence.   Mrs. Mears went home to
  be present during the search.

       Detective Danforth met with Mr. Mears and defendant in a barracks
  interview room, where  she advised both of them of all Miranda warnings,
  ascertained that they understood their rights, and  recorded their
  responses on a written form.  She then stated that she was legally
  obligated to leave  the room to give Mr. Mears and defendant a private
  opportunity to discuss whether they wanted to  sign a Miranda waiver and
  agree to the interview.  As Detective Danforth got up to leave the room, 
  Mr. Mears told her that it was not necessary for her to leave and indicated
  that they wished to waive  the rights and speak with her.  Detective
  Danforth remained in the room, and both Mr. Mears and  defendant signed the
  waiver.

 

       Detective Danforth, Mr. Mears, and defendant engaged in a three-way
  conversation in  which defendant and Mr. Mears expressed hatred for the
  Campbells, especially Ms. Campbell,  whom they suspected had reported them
  for violating local ordinances.  Defendant then stated that  he felt that
  the police were always picking on him, as he had previously been questioned
  by  Randolph police for unrelated minor violations.  Defendant denied ever
  being at the Campbell  residence or meeting Ms. Campbell and shrugged his
  shoulders when Detective Danforth asked  him why Ms. Campbell would have
  identified him as her attacker if he had never been there.

       When Detective Danforth questioned defendant about blood found on a
  firearm seized from  the Mears home, he started quivering, hung his head,
  and stated that he wanted to tell her the whole  story.  Detective Danforth
  asked defendant if she could tape record his statement, but defendant 
  requested that she write his statement instead.  At this point, Mr. Mears
  intervened, stating that he  did not want Detective Danforth to ask
  defendant any more questions.  Defendant and his father  then began
  shouting at one another about hiring a lawyer for defendant, and defendant
  berated  himself several times.  The exchange between defendant and Mr.
  Mears escalated in tension, and  Detective Danforth attempted to diffuse
  the situation, asking defendant what she could do for him.   Defendant
  responded by requesting Detective Danforth give him her gun and he would
  shoot  himself.  Defendant continued to talk of killing himself and was
  eventually taken to a holding cell.   Detective Danforth learned that the
  crime scene investigators had not located defendant's clothing  or the
  knife used in the attack, and that the police were planning to secure the
  Mears home until  morning so they could search the exterior in daylight. 
  Detective Danforth asked Mr. Mears if he  would ask defendant where these
  items were so that the Mears family could return to their home  that night. 
  Mr. Mears spoke privately with defendant, then told Detective Danforth that
  defendant  did not want to talk to her and that she would never find the
  items because defendant had thrown  them in a brook.

 

       At trial, a jury found defendant guilty of attempted first-degree
  murder, and the court  sentenced him to thirty-five years to life
  imprisonment.  Defendant appeals, arguing that: (1) the   court erroneously
  admitted statements he made to Detective Danforth before Mr. Mears
  terminated  the interview at the Bethel Barracks; (2) he did not waive his
  rights to silence and to counsel  knowingly, intelligently, and
  voluntarily; and (3) the court should have granted his motion for a 
  mistrial because a prosecution witness's testimony prejudiced defendant.

                               II.  Discussion

                   A.  Admission of Defendant's Statements

       In response to defendant's motion to suppress all statements he made
  to Detective Danforth,  the court suppressed statements made after Mr.
  Mears terminated the interrogation "including, but  not limited to those
  prompted by question about the defendant's well[-]being or about where he
  hid  evidence."  However, the court ruled that all statements made prior to
  that termination were  voluntary and admissible.  Defendant claims that the
  court erroneously admitted these statements in  violation of our decision
  in In re E.T.C., 141 Vt. 375, 499 A.2d 937 (1982).

       In E.T.C., we held that, for a waiver of a juvenile's rights against
  self-incrimination and to  counsel under Chapter I, Article 10 of the
  Vermont Constitution to be voluntary and intelligent, the  following
  criteria must be met:

     (1) he must be given the opportunity to consult with an adult; (2) that 
     adult must be one who is not only genuinely interested in the welfare 
     of the juvenile but completely independent from and disassociated 
     with the prosecution, e.g., a parent, legal guardian, or attorney 
     representing the juvenile; and (3) the independent interested adult 
     must be informed and be aware of the rights guaranteed to the 
     juvenile.

  Id. at 379, 449 A.2d  at 940.  Defendant argues that the court's admission
  of defendant's statements 

 

  to Detective Danforth was error because (1) there was no "meaningful
  consultation" between  defendant and Mr. Mears, id., and (2) Mr. Mears
  could not waive defendant's rights for him.  

       The first argument fails because Detective Danforth provided the
  opportunity for Mr. Mears  to meet with defendant "in the absence of police
  pressures."  Id. at 380, 449 A.2d  at 940.  This  meets E.T.C.'s requirement
  that "[a] private consultation should be provided."  Id.  Moreover, Mr. 
  Mears - defendant's father - is an adult who is "genuinely interested in
  the welfare of the juvenile  but completely independent from and
  disassociated with the prosecution."  Id. at 379, 449 A.2d  at  940.  The
  opportunity to meet with an "independent, impartial, responsible,
  interested adult[,]" id.  at 380, 449 A.2d  at 940, outside the atmosphere
  of the interrogation room satisfies E.T.C.'s  "meaningful consultation"
  requirement. (FN1)  Id. at 479, 449 A.2d  at 940.  That opportunity was 
  provided here, and defendant's failure to take advantage of it does not
  render Detective Danforth's  subsequent interrogation violative of E.T.C.  

       Defendant's second argument - that Mr. Mears could not waive
  defendant's rights for him - was not preserved at trial.  Thus, we review
  this argument only for plain error.  See V.R.Cr.P. 52(b)  ("Plain errors or
  defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not
  brought  to the attention of the court.").  We stated the relevant standard
  in State v. Pelican:

     Plain error exists 'only in exceptional circumstances where a failure
     to recognize  error would result in a miscarriage of justice, or where
     there is glaring error so grave  and serious that it strikes at the very
     heart of the defendant's constitutional rights.'  Plain error doctrine
     requires 'an appellate court to find that the claimed error not  only
     seriously affected 'substantial rights,' but that it had an unfair
	
 

     prejudicial impact on the jury's deliberations.'  Prejudice must exist 
     to demonstrate that error undermined fairness and contributed to a 
     miscarriage of justice.

160 Vt. 536, 538-39,