Title: Tunnell v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Anthony Marlin Tunnell v. State of Maryland 
No. 28, September Term 2019 
 
 
Criminal Procedure – Speedy Trial – Deadline for Trial.  Under a State statute and 
related court rule, a criminal trial in a circuit court must commence within 180 days of the 
defendant’s first appearance in that court or entry of appearance of defense counsel – a 
requirement often referred to as the “Hicks rule.”  Under the Hicks rule, a trial may be 
continued from the scheduled trial date if the administrative judge (or designee) finds good 
cause for the continuance.  Unless the defendant waives the Hicks rule, a failure to comply 
with the Hicks rule is to result in dismissal of the charges.  Maryland Code, Criminal 
Procedure Article, §6-103; Maryland Rule 4-271. 
 
Criminal Procedure – Speedy Trial – Deadline for Trial.  The deadline for commencing 
trial under the Hicks rule is not automatically extended by the length of time needed for a 
party to obtain a DNA analysis of evidence.  Nor is that deadline automatically extended 
when a party needs a continuance of the trial date to make a timely disclosure, in 
accordance with Maryland Code, Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, §10-915, of the 
party’s intention to introduce DNA evidence.  However, either of those circumstances may 
be good cause for an administrative judge to grant a continuance of the trial date under the 
Hicks rule.   
 
Criminal Procedure – Speedy Trial – Postponement of Trial Date – Appellate Review.  
A defendant who seeks appellate review of the decision of an administrative judge to grant 
a continuance of a trial for good cause that ultimately results in a trial date beyond the 
deadline under the Hicks rule has the burden of showing that the circumstances did not 
constitute good cause as a matter of law, that the administrative judge abused the judge’s 
discretion in making a finding of good cause, or that there was an inordinate delay in 
rescheduling the trial.   
 
Criminal Procedure – Speedy Trial – Postponement of Trial Date – Determination of 
Good Cause.  Although there was some confusion in the circuit court in this case as to 
whether a request for a DNA examination of evidence “tolled” the deadline for trial under 
the Hicks rule, the administrative judge did not abuse his discretion or err as a matter of 
law when he found good cause for postponing the originally scheduled trial date based on 
the prosecution’s need to provide additional discovery to the defendant.  Nor did the 
defendant carry his burden of demonstrating that there was an inordinate delay in 
rescheduling the trial date when the trial commenced a little more than a month after the 
Hicks date. 
 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 28 
 
September Term, 2019 
 
 
 
ANTHONY MARLIN TUNNELL 
 
V. 
 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
 
_____________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Barbera, C.J., 
 
 
 
McDonald 
 
 
 
Watts 
 
 
 
Hotten 
 
 
 
Getty 
 
 
 
Booth 
 
 
 
Greene, Clayton, Jr. 
 
 
 
     (Senior Judge,  
      Specially Assigned),  
 
 
 
 
 
JJ. 
 
______________________________________ 
 
Opinion by McDonald, J. 
Watts, J., dissents. 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed:  January 16, 2020
Circuit Court for Worcester County 
Case No. C-23-CR-17-000018 
Argument:  November 4, 2019 
 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act  
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document 
is authentic.
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk  
Suzanne Johnson
2020-04-03 14:14-04:00
 
 
The aphorism “justice delayed is justice denied” states a principle common to most 
legal systems.1  A tool to avoid delay is to set a deadline – the bane and prod of those who 
must do what needs to be done.  Like most rules of general application, deadlines have 
exceptions.  This case concerns the application of an exception to the deadline for the trial 
of a criminal case in a State circuit court. 
Under a State statute and related court rule, collectively known as the “Hicks rule,” 
a criminal trial in a circuit court must commence within 180 days of the first appearance of 
the defendant or defense counsel in that court, a deadline known as the “Hicks date.”  
Unless the defendant consents to a trial date beyond the Hicks date, a continuance of the 
trial beyond the Hicks date may be granted only for “good cause.” 
 
In this case, the trial of Petitioner Anthony Marlin Tunnell on murder and firearms 
charges was postponed from the original trial date when the administrative judge found 
good cause for a continuance based on the State’s need to provide additional discovery to 
the defense.  However, both the court and the prosecution apparently believed that the 
deadline under the Hicks rule was “tolled” or extended for the period of time during which 
evidence was at a laboratory for DNA analysis.  Mr. Tunnell’s trial ultimately began 
approximately 40 days after the Hicks date.
                                              
1 The Wikipedia entry for this aphorism documents various statements of this 
principle ranging from the ancient Hebrew scriptures to the Magna Carta to William Penn 
to Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Letter from Birmingham Jail. 
2 
 
 
We hold that the Hicks rule does not incorporate a mechanism for “tolling” or 
extending the Hicks date.  Nevertheless, the administrative judge did not abuse his  
discretion when he found good cause for the continuance of the trial date and Mr. Tunnell 
has not carried his burden of demonstrating that there was an “inordinate delay” in the new 
trial date.  Accordingly, we affirm his conviction. 
I 
Background 
A. 
The “Hicks Rule” 
 
A criminal trial in a Maryland circuit court must begin within 180 days of certain 
triggering events.  This deadline is set forth in statute and rule.  In its current iteration, the 
statute provides: 
 (a) (1) The date for trial of a criminal matter in the circuit court 
shall be set within 30 days after the earlier of: 
 
  
(i) 
the appearance of counsel; or  
 
    
   (ii)  the first appearance of the defendant before the 
circuit court, as provided in the Maryland Rules. 
 
 
   (2) The trial date may not be later than 180 days after the 
earlier of those events. 
 
 (b) 
(1) For good cause shown, the county administrative judge or 
a designee of the judge may grant a change of the trial date in a circuit 
court: 
 
   
(i) 
on motion of a party; or  
 
   
(ii) on the initiative of the circuit court. 
 
    
 (2) If a circuit court trial date is changed under paragraph (1) 
of this subsection, any subsequent changes of the trial date may only be 
3 
 
made by the county administrative judge or that judge’s designee for 
good cause shown. 
 
 (c) 
The Court of Appeals may adopt additional rules to carry out 
this section. 
   
 
Maryland Code, Criminal Procedure Article (“CP”), §6-103.  This Court has adopted a rule 
consistent with the statute.  Maryland Rule 4-271.   
 
As is evident, the statute does not specify the consequences of a failure to begin a 
trial by the statutory deadline.  In a 1979 decision involving prior versions of the statute 
and rule,2 this Court held that compliance with the deadline in the rule was mandatory and 
that any postponement beyond that deadline must be authorized by the administrative judge 
for the requisite cause.3  State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 318, on motion for reconsideration, 
285 Md. 334 (1979).  The Court held that a failure to commence a trial in accordance with 
this timeline necessitates dismissal of the charges with prejudice.  Id.  The requirements 
                                              
2 The statute was enacted in 1971 and codified as Maryland Code, Article 27, §591.  
Chapter 212, Laws of Maryland 1971.  In its original form, the statute set the deadline for 
trial at “six months” after a triggering event.  The statute was later amended to replace that 
time frame with the roughly equivalent “180 days,” a specification perhaps more amenable 
to precise computations.  Chapter 378, Laws of Maryland 1980.  As part of code revision, 
the statute was recodified as amended, without substantive change, as part of the then new 
Criminal Procedure Article in 2001.  Chapter 10, §2, Laws of Maryland 2001. 
As first adopted in 1977, the rule was codified as Maryland Rule 746 and provided 
that a trial should commence within 120 days of a triggering event.  In November 1979, 
the Court amended the rule on an emergency basis to have the same deadline as the statute.  
The rule was recodified as Maryland Rule 4-271 in 1984. 
3 The original versions of the statute and rule required a showing of “extraordinary 
cause” to change a trial date.  Shortly after the Hicks decision, the General Assembly 
amended the statute to substitute a standard of “good cause.”  Chapter 378, Laws of 
Maryland 1980.  This Court amended the rule to conform it to the statutory amendment.   
4 
 
established by the statute and rule are often referred to colloquially as the “Hicks rule” and 
the deadline for commencing trial under those provisions as the “Hicks date.”  
 
As discussed at greater length later in this opinion, the Hicks rule was intended 
primarily to carry out the public policy favoring the prompt disposition of criminal cases, 
independent of a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial under the Sixth 
Amendment of the federal Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights.  Compliance with the Hicks rule would also presumably satisfy the constitutional 
constraint.  See 5 W. LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure §18.3(c) & n. 71 (4th ed.  Dec. 
2019 update) (noting that state speedy trial statutes usually impose stricter time limits than 
the constitutional standard). 
B. 
The Murder of James Allen and the Prosecution of Mr. Tunnell 
 
On the evening of December 1, 2016, 26-year old James “Bumpy” Allen was 
murdered in a shooting in Pocomoke City.  There apparently were no eyewitnesses to the 
shooting, although at least one person observed Mr. Allen shortly after he was shot, 
staggering and bloodied from his wounds.  The police retrieved various items from the 
scene of the murder, which were sent off for forensic analysis,4 and commenced an 
investigation.  
 
Shortly after the murder, Mr. Tunnell was taken into custody.  On January 24, 2017, 
a grand jury in the Circuit Court for Worcester County returned a six-count indictment 
                                              
4 The results of that analysis ultimately did not establish a direct connection to Mr. 
Tunnell.  Neither party introduced the forensic results at trial, although, as recounted later 
in this opinion, Mr. Tunnell considered doing so. 
5 
 
against him related to the murder.  Mr. Tunnell was tried before a jury on three of those 
counts during September 11-12, 2017.5  The State’s case consisted of: 
• testimony of Mr. Tunnell’s niece concerning text messages that she 
received from Mr. Tunnell indicating that he believed that her 
boyfriend and Mr. Allen had stolen a marijuana stash that had been 
hidden near the Tunnell residence in Virginia and that Mr. Tunnell was 
planning a violent revenge;  
 
• testimony of others who observed Mr. Tunnell in Pocomoke City near 
the time and location of the shooting with two men in a car wearing ski 
masks;  
 
• eyewitness testimony that Mr. Allen was seen staggering and dying on 
the street shortly after the shooting;  
 
• testimony concerning the recovery of physical evidence, including a ski 
mask, at the scene of the shooting; and  
 
• telephone company records documenting Mr. Tunnell’s text messages.   
Mr. Tunnell elected not to testify and called one alibi witness.  After deliberating for an 
hour, the jury found Mr. Tunnell guilty of first-degree murder.6 
 
Mr. Tunnell appealed his conviction, raising a number of issues that, he argued, 
required reversal of his conviction.7  In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals 
                                              
5 Prior to the trial, the State’s Attorney nolle prossed three counts charging Mr. 
Tunnell with various firearms violations. 
6 At the close of the State’s case, the trial judge granted Mr. Tunnell’s motion for 
judgment of acquittal on one count charging possession of a firearm by a person previously 
convicted of drug trafficking, in violation of Maryland Code, Public Safety Article, §5-
133(c).  The jury acquitted Mr. Tunnell of the remaining count charging him with use of a 
firearm in the commission of a crime of violence, in violation of Maryland Code, Criminal 
Law Article, §4-204(b). 
7 Among those issues were an alleged discovery violation by the prosecution, the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support Mr. Tunnell’s conviction, the Circuit Court’s 
6 
 
rejected those contentions and affirmed his conviction.  Tunnell v. State, 2019 WL 1313412 
(March 22, 2019).  Mr. Tunnell filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which we granted 
in part. 
 
The issue before us concerns neither the sufficiency of evidence at trial nor any trial 
ruling made by the Circuit Court.  Rather, it concerns whether the timing of Mr. Tunnell’s 
trial complied with the Hicks rule.  Accordingly, we will recount in some detail the pretrial 
proceedings concerning the scheduling of Mr. Tunnell’s trial. 
C. 
Pretrial Proceedings 
 
An Assistant Public Defender entered his appearance on behalf of Mr. Tunnell on 
February 2, 2017.  It is undisputed that, as a result, the deadline for commencing Mr. 
Tunnell’s trial – the Hicks date – was August 1, 2017.  The Circuit Court issued a notice 
that set April 7, 2017 as the date for a hearing on pretrial motions and May 9, 2017 as the 
date for the trial – a date well before the Hicks date.  During the course of four pretrial 
proceedings before four different judges of the Circuit Court, the trial date was ultimately 
postponed to September 11, 2017 – a date after the Hicks date. 
 
1. 
April 7 Hearing 
 
On April 7, 2017 – the date originally designated for a pretrial motions hearing – 
the parties appeared before the administrative judge of the Circuit Court.  Mr. Tunnell was 
represented by the Assistant Public Defender.  The State’s Attorney informed the judge 
                                              
decision not to grant a mistrial as a result of a witness’ reference to Mr. Tunnell’s 
incarceration, and the alleged violation of the Hicks rule, which is the subject of this 
opinion.  
7 
 
that a “large package” of discovery materials had been sent to defense counsel, but that 
there were additional investigative reports, audio recordings, and a requested DNA 
examination that the State still expected to receive and turn over to the defense in discovery.  
The State’s Attorney requested a postponement of the trial date and asked that the currently 
scheduled trial date (May 9, 2017) be converted to a status conference.  Referring to what 
apparently was a widely-shared misconception, the State’s Attorney told the judge that a 
postponement granted as a result of the pending DNA examination would “toll” the Hicks 
date and cited Maryland Code, Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”), §10-915.8  
Defense counsel neither opposed nor consented to a postponement, but expressed a 
willingness to go to trial as soon as discovery was made and the court set a trial date.  
 
The administrative judge granted the State’s request, stating that the need to 
complete discovery “alone” was good cause for a continuance.  Like the State’s Attorney, 
the administrative judge also specifically referred to the prospective DNA examination as 
a basis for a continuance as “it does, in fact, toll the Hicks date.”  The court did not set a 
new trial date and left May 9, 2017 on the calendar as a motions hearing date.   
                                              
8 CJ §10-915 concerns the admissibility of DNA profiles in criminal proceedings 
and requires that a party seeking to introduce such evidence provide notice and discovery 
to other parties by at least a specified number of days before a proceeding.   CJ §10-915(d) 
provides a trial court with discretion to grant a continuance if the party seeking admission 
of such evidence is unable to make a timely disclosure.   
As explained later in this opinion, a delay occasioned by an effort to obtain a DNA 
analysis or to make a timely disclosure under CJ §10-915 may be “good cause” for 
obtaining a continuance of a trial date beyond the Hicks date.  However, this statute does 
not provide for automatic “tolling” of the Hicks date.  See Part II.B. of this opinion. 
8 
 
 
Three weeks later, the Assistant Public Defender withdrew his appearance on behalf 
of Mr. Tunnell.  Private defense counsel entered her appearance on April 29, 2017.  As a 
result, the May 9 hearing was converted to another status conference. 
 
2. 
May 9 Status Conference 
 
On May 9, 2017, the Deputy State’s Attorney and Mr. Tunnell’s new defense 
counsel appeared before a different judge of the Circuit Court for the status conference.  
The prosecutor moved “to continue what is an ongoing postponement.”  He noted that he 
had just provided Mr. Tunnell’s new counsel with “a voluminous amount of discovery,” 
that he expected to make additional discovery, and that, while a preliminary DNA report 
had been received, he expected to receive the full report soon.  He asked for a postponement 
to a “date not yet determined.”  He repeated the understanding that the delay for the full 
DNA report tolled the Hicks date and advised that he would call the assignment office after 
the report arrived to determine a date convenient for all parties and the court.  Defense 
counsel joined the motion while expressing Mr. Tunnell’s desire to get a trial date as soon 
as possible.  The Circuit Court granted the motion.   
 
3. 
August 8 Status Conference 
 
Three months later, on August 8, 2017, the parties appeared for a status conference 
before yet another judge of the Circuit Court.  Since the previous hearing, no motions had 
been filed by either side as to the trial date.9  However, the status conference focused 
entirely on the effort to schedule a trial date in compliance with the Hicks rule.  
                                              
9 As part of a form omnibus motion filed at the outset of the case, the Assistant 
Public Defender who initially represented Mr. Tunnell had asserted that the prosecution 
9 
 
The State’s Attorney presented the court with transcripts of the April and May status 
conferences and summarized the prior events – the scheduling of the original trial date of 
May 9 in light of a Hicks date of August 1, 2017, the delay in obtaining the full DNA 
report, the finding of “good cause” for a postponement of the trial by the administrative 
judge, the receipt of the DNA report on May 18 and its delivery to defense counsel.10  The 
prosecutor stated that one of the reasons he had asked for the status conference was to set 
a trial date consistent with what he referred to as the “new Hicks date,” which he identified 
as September 12, 2017.  That calculation was apparently based on the understanding that 
the delay in obtaining the DNA report “tolled” the Hicks date for a period equivalent to 
that delay, which the prosecutor calculated to expire on September 12.11   He asked the 
court to schedule a motions hearing and the trial before that date.  He also detailed some 
potential scheduling issues, but promised that the State would be ready to try the case on 
                                              
was barred as a result of, among other things, a violation of the Hicks rule.  That omnibus 
motion was filed together with the defense counsel’s entry of his appearance on February 
2, 2017 – the first day of the 180-day period under the Hicks rule.  As best we can tell, 
neither party later made reference to that motion in the Circuit Court.  In any event, a form 
omnibus motion that prematurely raises a host of issues that may never pertain to the 
particular case may be ineffective to preserve an appellate issue.  See Sinclair v. State, 444 
Md. 16, 27-36 (2015). 
10 The State’s Attorney informed the court that the State had decided not to use 
information from the report in its case. 
11 The State’s Attorney also indicated that he wished to have the Circuit Court 
clerk’s office make corrections in the court’s electronic case filing system (MDEC) to 
reflect the “new” Hicks date of September 12.  That request was apparently accomplished.  
A review of the electronic record for the Circuit Court case reveals a “comment” for the 
date of the hearing that alludes to a “suspension” of the Hicks date for 41 days, consistent 
with the tolling theory. 
10 
 
September 11.  The court clerk agreed with the prosecutor’s calculation of the “tolling” 
period and the Circuit Court accepted the premise that September 12 was the new deadline 
for commencing the trial.  
 
Defense counsel then raised a question as to whether the Hicks date could be tolled.  
While acknowledging that delays in the receipt of DNA reports had been a commonly-
accepted basis for postponing a trial date, she questioned whether there was a basis in 
statute or case law for “tolling” the Hicks date.  Defense counsel stated: 
…What I’m trying to understand and again, maybe it’s not – my 
understanding it needs to be, you know, solidified here, but the Court’s 
understanding.  I don’t understand why – I’m trying to find out where 
the precedent is for tolling Hicks.  I know it’s always been a procedure 
that we’ve done, we’ve always tolled Hicks with regard to DNA.  I 
would like to know if there’s a statute or case that specifically says that, 
just for satisfaction on that particular issue. … Our argument would be 
that even though – even if you did toll Hicks and even if the second 
postponement was to get the DNA, our problem is that there was still 
enough time to set the case back in well within the Hicks date in 
compliance with the DNA coming back. 
 
Defense counsel took the position that the original August 1 Hicks date still applied and 
that, in the absence of a postponement that explicitly took the trial date beyond that date, it 
had remained the obligation of the State and the Circuit Court to bring Mr. Tunnell to trial 
by that date.  The upshot of that argument was that Mr. Tunnell’s trial had not begun by 
the deadline set by statute and rule.  In response to questions from the Circuit Court, defense 
counsel conceded that she had agreed at the May 9 hearing to seek a new trial date from 
the clerk’s office jointly with the prosecutor, but had not done so.  
 
Defense counsel also argued that the delay in obtaining the full DNA report had 
been unnecessary because the prosecution had unnecessarily obtained the report in two 
11 
 
parts, and suggested that there had been no basis for the indefinite postponement that the 
administrative judge had previously granted.  After the Circuit Court pointed out that the 
transcript of the earlier proceeding demonstrated that the administrative judge had 
explicitly found “good cause” for the postponement, defense counsel returned to the issue 
of “tolling” the Hicks date as a result of a request for a DNA examination.  Defense counsel 
argued: 
Your Honor, the argument is that if there is a tolling of Hicks then why 
– why did all of these other cases go to the Court of Appeals?  I don’t 
see in the cases that I’m pulling up anything about tolling Hicks or 
about that being an issue.  So I just would like to have some authority 
so we know what we’re arguing about on how the tolling of Hicks 
works.  Is it a statutory tolling or is it by case law?  And again, I wasn’t 
able to find anything on it.  The cases that I found were situations 
basically arguing Hicks, but they don’t say anything about well, the 
case was tolled, I don’t see anything to that effect. 
 
 
In response, the Circuit Court noted that the potential for a Hicks date to be “tolled” 
appeared to be “recognized,” although that recognition was “not dispositive.”  The court 
also concluded that the administrative judge’s finding of “good cause” for a postponement 
“still stands irrespective of the Hicks [tolling] analysis.”  The prosecutor offered to conduct 
some research on the issue.  The court and the parties worked out the schedule for a motions 
hearing and trial in light of the court’s understanding of the “revised Hicks date” of 
September 12, 2017 and the constraints of defense counsel’s calendar.12  A pretrial motions 
                                              
12 The court offered to schedule the trial in August, but defense counsel stated that 
her schedule did not permit her to agree to an August trial date.  
12 
 
hearing was scheduled for September 1 and the trial was scheduled to commence on 
September 11. 
 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court and the parties discussed whether Mr. 
Tunnell would waive the Hicks deadline in order for the defense to present the arguably 
favorable DNA results13 at trial – which would require 45 days advance notice by the 
defense under CJ §10-915.   Defense counsel stated that Mr. Tunnell did not wish to waive 
the Hicks deadline for that purpose if it would preclude him from raising the Hicks issue 
on appeal.  The Circuit Court declined to provide an “advisory opinion” on that question.  
The defense elected not to waive the Hicks deadline at that juncture pending defense 
counsel’s research concerning “options,” such as an interlocutory appeal on the Hicks date 
issue.14  
 
4. 
September 1 Motions Hearing 
 
On September 1, 2017, the parties appeared for the motions hearing before another 
judge, who was also assigned to try the case.  After several defense motions were resolved, 
defense counsel again raised the question whether the delay in obtaining DNA reports 
“tolled” the Hicks date and whether the State had “dragged out” that delay unnecessarily.  
The prosecutor responded that it was “a collaterally estopped issue” – i.e., that the matter 
had already been ruled upon at the August 8 hearing.   
                                              
13 As noted above, the DNA examination apparently did not directly connect any of 
the items tested to Mr. Tunnell. 
14 Defense counsel presumably determined that an interlocutory appeal was not 
available or desirable as no such appeal was filed.  
13 
 
 
The Circuit Court agreed with the State, telling defense counsel: 
Well, I don’t even know what you’re asking from the Court.  The 
Hicks date from the Court’s perspective I gather has been determined 
at a prior hearing by a judge of this court.  And it doesn’t seem to me 
there’s anything more to talk about with respect to that. 
 
If you believe that that decision by that judge was incorrect and 
some remedy flows from that and your client is ultimately found guilty 
of any of these charges, then I suppose that’s an appellate issue to raise.   
 
The trial commenced ten days later, as scheduled, on September 11, and concluded the 
following day. 
II 
Discussion 
A. 
Preservation 
 
Mr. Tunnell asserts that the charges against him should have been dismissed when 
his trial did not commence by August 1, 2017, because the Circuit Court relied on an 
erroneous theory that the Hicks date had been “tolled” or extended when the court 
scheduled the trial after that date.15  As a threshold matter, the State argues that Mr. Tunnell 
did not adequately preserve the Hicks date issue for appellate review.16   
 
An appellate court “ordinarily” will not address an issue unless “it plainly appears 
by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court.”  Maryland Rule 8-131(a).  
                                              
15 Mr. Tunnell does not assert that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was 
violated. 
16 The Court of Special Appeals agreed with the State that Mr. Tunnell had not 
preserved the issue, but apparently believed that the question was sufficiently close that it 
proceeded to address the merits of the issue in its opinion. 
14 
 
An appellate court may address an unpreserved issue “if necessary or desirable to guide 
the trial court.”  Id.  
At the outset of the case, the Assistant Public Defender who initially represented 
Mr. Tunnell filed a formal, but premature, motion to bar his prosecution for violation of 
the Hicks rule.17  There was no basis for such a motion at that time, as August 1 was six 
months in the future and neither the court nor the parties ever referred to that motion, as 
best we can tell.  The successor defense counsel did not specifically renew that motion and 
ask for dismissal of the indictment for violation of the Hicks rule when the trial did not 
begin by August 1.  But it is also true that the Circuit Court held an extensive hearing on 
August 8, 2017, devoted exclusively to the Hicks issue and the selection of an appropriate 
trial date – a hearing that occupies 36 pages of transcript.  At that hearing, defense counsel 
repeatedly questioned the validity of the “tolling” theory that, in the belief of the State and 
the Circuit Court, established a “new” Hicks date of September 12.  Indeed, the State’s 
Attorney volunteered to provide the court with legal authority for the tolling theory after 
that hearing.  No such legal justification was ever provided to the court. 
It seems clear that the issue of the computation of, and compliance with, the Hicks 
date was “raised in” the Circuit Court, even if one believes that it was not conclusively 
“decided by” that court, pending the State’s provision of legal authority for the tolling 
theory.  Perhaps this was not a model for how a defendant should preserve an issue for 
appellate review.  But in this case the purpose of the preservation requirement was 
                                              
17 See footnote 9 above. 
15 
 
adequately served.  It cannot be said that either the State or the Circuit Court was 
sandbagged by this issue.  It is evident from the dialogue between defense counsel and the 
Circuit Court at the conclusion of the August 8 conference, and the statements of the trial 
judge and prosecutor at the September 1 motions hearing, that the parties and the court 
believed that the defense had raised – and lost – the issue of compliance with the Hicks 
rule in the Circuit Court and that it was a potential appellate issue if the trial resulted in a 
conviction.  Moreover, given the confusion in the trial court concerning the effect of CJ 
§10-915 on the Hicks date, it appears useful to address this issue as “necessary or desirable 
to guide the trial court.”   
B. 
The Tolling Issue 
It appears from the discussion at the pretrial hearings that the two prosecutors, as 
well as the Circuit Court, were under the misimpression that CJ §10-915 “tolls” the Hicks 
date in some way.  The calculations done during the pretrial hearings in the Circuit Court 
appeared to assume that the length of the interval between the date that evidence is sent to 
a laboratory for DNA analysis and the date the results are received is to be added to the 
180-day time limit.  In addition, there appeared to be an assumption that, if a party belatedly 
gave notice of an intent to use DNA evidence, the length of a continuance necessary to 
comply with the disclosure requirements of CJ §10-915 would necessarily be tacked onto 
the 180-day time limit under the Hicks rule.   
There are many speedy trial laws that operate in the manner imagined in the trial 
court.  Such statutes identify an event (such as the appearance of counsel) that triggers a 
speedy trial clock, specify a number of days within which a defendant must be brought to 
16 
 
trial, and exclude certain time periods from the computation of those days.  In other words, 
the speedy trial clock may be stopped or “tolled” when such an event occurs and then 
restarted later.  See 5 W. LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure §18.3(c) (4th ed.  Nov. 2018 
update).   
For example, under the federal Speedy Trial Act,18 a defendant must be brought to 
trial within 70 days of indictment, but various periods of time are excluded in computing 
those 70 days – e.g., the period between the filing of a motion and the conclusion of a 
hearing or other disposition of that motion.19  Some of the excluded periods are limited to 
delays in the proceedings deemed reasonable, but other periods are excluded without 
reference to whether the particular delay is reasonable.  The exclusion of such time periods 
from calculations under the Speedy Trial Act is sometimes referred to as “tolling” the 
speedy trial clock.  See, e.g., United States v. Stoudenmire, 74 F.3d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1996). 
Unlike the federal Speedy Trial Act or similar speedy trial statutes in other 
jurisdictions, the Maryland statute and rule do not rely on a system of counting and 
excluding time periods to determine the deadline for commencing a criminal trial.  The 
Maryland General Assembly, and this Court, elected not to require such mathematical 
computations, but instead opted for a system with a benchmark date – the Hicks date – with 
                                              
18 18 U.S.C. §3161 et seq. 
19 Also in contrast to the Hicks rule, a dismissal of charges under the federal Speedy 
Trial Act may be with or without prejudice, depending upon several factors.  18 U.S.C. 
§3162. 
17 
 
allowance for a continuance past that date for good cause.20  Thus, under the Hicks rule, a 
request for a DNA examination of evidence does not automatically extend or toll the 
deadline for trial. 
A party’s need to obtain a forensic analysis of evidence, such as a DNA 
examination, may well constitute “good cause” for an administrative judge to grant a 
continuance that extends a trial date beyond the Hicks date.  See, e.g., Moody v. State, 209 
Md. App. 366, 372-75 (2013); Ashton v. State, 185 Md. App. 607, 619-20, cert. denied, 
410 Md. 165 (2009).  Similarly, the circumstances that support a continuance under CJ 
§10-915 in order for a party to provide the requisite notice of DNA evidence may also 
amount to good cause for a continuance for purposes of the Hicks rule.  Ashton, supra.  But 
a continuance authorized by CJ §10-915 does not automatically toll the Hicks date in the 
manner imagined in the Circuit Court in this case.   
 
In its appellate filings in this case, the State has appropriately conceded that the 
request for a DNA examination did not automatically toll the Hicks date under CJ §10-915 
                                              
20 The courts have also recognized that, although not explicitly stated in the statute 
and rule, a defendant may consent to a trial date beyond the Hicks date.  See Part II.C.1 of 
this opinion. 
18 
 
or otherwise.21  The question then is, putting the tolling theory aside, whether the 
circumstances of this case require dismissal of the indictment under the Hicks rule.22 
C. 
Whether the Hicks Rule Requires Dismissal in the Absence of “Tolling”  
 
1. 
The Policies Underlying the Hicks Rule 
 
Prior to the Hicks decision, it was widely understood that the deadline for trial set 
forth in statute and rule was directory rather than mandatory.  That understanding was 
based in part on the absence of any sanction in the statute or rule for failure to meet the 
deadline – an understanding that was initially confirmed with respect to the statute by the 
appellate courts.  See Young v. State, 15 Md. App. 707 (Moylan, J.), aff’d, 266 Md. 438 
(1972).23  The Hicks decision upended that understanding. 
 
In Hicks, the trial was scheduled well within the rule’s (then) 120-day deadline, but 
postponed when it turned out that the defendant was incarcerated in another state.  At a 
                                              
21 The dissenting opinion argues that the State’s concession means that there is not 
a “justiciable controversy” before the Court.  However, the parties reach different 
conclusions concerning the consequences in this case of the absence of tolling under the 
Hicks rule and have extensively briefed their adverse positions.  As set forth in the text, the 
issue of compliance with the Hicks rule has been adequately preserved under Maryland 
Rule 8-131(a).   
22 In a somewhat similar context, the Court of Special Appeals rejected a trial court’s 
indication that the Hicks date was “tolled” while a defendant was sent for a competency 
evaluation, but the intermediate appellate court went on to assess whether a postponement 
for that purpose amounted to good cause for a continuance beyond the Hicks date.  See 
Thompson v. State, 229 Md. App. 385, 396-99 & n.5 (2016). 
23 At the time of the Young decision, only the statute was in effect; the court rule 
had not yet been adopted. 
19 
 
motions hearing approximately 40 days past the deadline,24 the circuit court dismissed the 
charges for failure to comply with the deadline.  The circuit court held that the 1977 
adoption of the court rule set forth a mandatory deadline for commencement of a trial in a 
criminal case and that the failure to try the defendant in that case by the deadline required 
dismissal of the charges.   
On appeal, this Court agreed that the rule established a mandatory deadline, 
although it also concluded that there was “extraordinary cause” – the standard set forth in 
the rule at that time – for continuance of the trial past the deadline.  The Court therefore 
reversed the dismissal of the charges.25   
The Court explained that its conclusion that the rule was mandatory was based on 
the underlying purpose of the statue and court rule “to obtain prompt disposition of criminal 
charges.”  285 Md. at 316.  Quoting a prior decision of the Court of Special Appeals, the 
Court observed that postponement of criminal trials resulted in trial courts and court-
supporting agencies “spinning their wheels,” wasted time of attorneys and witnesses, and 
frustrated other persons involved in the system, all of which impaired public confidence in 
the courts.  Id. at 316-17.  The Court was careful to distinguish this rationale from a 
                                              
24 The deadline under the rule was a date in late August 1978; the motions hearing 
was held on October 2, 1978. 
25 This Court found that the prosecutor’s explanation for the non-appearance of the 
defendant at the scheduled trial date – that the defendant was incarcerated in another state 
– was an “implicit” request for a continuance and that the trial court’s decision to postpone 
the trial for that reason satisfied the “extraordinary cause” standard.  285 Md. at 318-19. 
20 
 
defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial, stating that the court rule “stands on a 
different legal footing” from the constitutional speedy trial requirement.  Id. at 320.26 
 
Although the Court in Hicks found that the “extraordinary cause” standard was met 
under the circumstances of that case and allowed the prosecution to go forward, its holding 
set a strict standard that presaged dismissal of cases scheduled under the prior 
understanding of the rule, with results that could be unfair and unforeseen in pending 
prosecutions.  There were four immediate moderating responses to the sweeping nature of 
the Hicks holding – three provided by the Court itself.   
First, in a supplemental opinion filed in response to the State’s motion for 
reconsideration in Hicks, the Court specified that the Hicks rule would be “applied 
prospectively only” – that is, only to future prosecutions and pending cases in which the 
120-day period had not yet begun to run.  Id. at 334-38.  This avoided the potential windfall 
to defendants in existing cases where trials had been scheduled beyond the 120-day 
deadline on the understanding that the rule was directory. 
 
Second, for those cases that were subject to the new understanding of the rule, the 
Court indicated in the same supplemental opinion that dismissal of criminal charges would 
be “inappropriate” in situations where the defendant, personally or through counsel, seeks 
or expressly consents to a trial date that does not comply with the Hicks rule.  Hicks, 285 
                                              
26 The Court has emphasized this distinction in subsequent cases.  See, e.g., Dorsey 
v. State, 349 Md. 688, 701 (1998) (“[T]he mechanism of the Hicks Rule serves as a means 
of protecting society’s interest in the efficient administration of justice.  The actual or 
apparent benefits [it] confer[s] upon criminal defendants are purely incidental.”).  
21 
 
Md. at 335-36.27  While neither the statute nor the rule provided for such an exception, this 
gloss on the statute and rule eliminated the potential for manipulation of the (newly 
understood) mandatory rule by a defendant agreeing to a postponement and then seeking 
dismissal based on that postponement. 
 
Third, a few months after the Hicks decision, in an emergency measure that became 
effective immediately, the Court amended the court rule to extend the deadline for 
commencement of a trial from 120 days to 180 days – the same deadline as the statute.  The 
Court thereby lengthened the mandatory deadline for commencing trial under the rule by 
50 percent of the prior deadline. 
 
Fourth, the General Assembly, at its next session following the Hicks decision, 
loosened the standard under the statute for allowing a continuance beyond the mandatory 
deadline from “extraordinary cause” to “good cause.”  Chapter 378, Laws of Maryland 
1980.  This Court followed suit by promptly broadening the standard under the court rule 
to the same effect.  See State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 458-62 (1984) (recognizing that this 
amendment of the statute and rule broadened the grounds on which a continuance might 
be granted); State v. Toney, 315 Md. 122, 130-31 (1989) (same).  
 
Less immediately, in a number of cases decided in the years shortly after Hicks, the 
Court also made clear that the unavailability of a judge, prosecutor, or courtroom – or 
general court congestion in a particular jurisdiction – could satisfy the good cause standard 
                                              
27 The Court also clarified that dismissal was not an appropriate sanction for a 
failure, within 30 days of a triggering event, to set a trial date – as required by the statute 
and rule.  Hicks, 285 Md. at 335. 
22 
 
for a continuance under the Hicks rule.  See, e.g., State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422 (1984) 
(overcrowded docket); State v. Beard, 299 Md. 472 (1984) (unavailability of judge or jury 
to hear case); State v. Bonev, 299 Md. 79 (1984) (general court congestion); Pennington v. 
State, 299 Md. 23, 30-31 (1984) (caseload volume); State v. Brookins, 299 Md. 59 (1984) 
(unavailability of a court); State v. Toney, 315 Md. 122 (1989) (unavailability of 
prosecutor). 
 
At first glance, some of these developments appear at odds with the underlying 
policy recognized in Hicks of ensuring the public interest in the “prompt disposition of 
criminal cases.”  For example, if this is the policy at stake – as opposed to the defendant’s 
constitutional right to a speedy trial – why is a defendant alone able to waive the deadline 
and thereby waive the public interest in prompt disposition of a criminal case? 28  Similarly, 
allowing general court congestion to be “good cause” for extending a trial date beyond the 
Hicks date would appear to bow to the cause of delays in the criminal justice system rather 
than eliminate them. 
 
The answer appears to be that there is more than one public policy in play here.  The 
dismissal sanction that the Court has read into the statute and rule must also take account 
of the public interest in the disposition of criminal cases on the merits – whether acquittal 
                                              
28 Indeed, in a subsequent case the Court explained that the holding in Hicks that 
dismissal is “inappropriate” when a defendant expressly consents to a continuance of the 
trial beyond the Hicks date is not based on a “waiver” of a right possessed by the defendant, 
reiterating that the Hicks rule is not a “codification” of the defendant’s constitutional 
speedy trial right, but rather a “prophylactic measure” to further a public interest in the 
“prompt disposition of criminal trials.”  State v. Brown, 307 Md. 651, 657 (1986) (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
23 
 
or conviction.  In holding that dismissal of charges was not appropriate under the Hicks 
rule in Farinholt v. State, 299 Md. 32, 41 (1984), this Court explained that “[d]ismissal of 
a serious criminal case, on grounds unrelated to the defendant’s guilt or innocence, is a 
drastic sanction” to be used “only … when … needed” to further the goal of judicial 
efficiency.  A criminal justice system can only call itself a justice system if cases are 
generally decided on their merits.  The Hicks rule is not simply a mechanism for efficiently 
clearing dockets in a statistical sense.29 
 
In this light, it makes sense that a defendant may consent to a trial beyond the Hicks 
date, as the defendant is the individual with the most at stake in the disposition of the 
charges on the merits.  The blanket lengthening of the deadline from 120 days to 180 days 
for trial and the liberalizing of the grounds for a postponement without risk of dismissal 
recognized a need to allow a case to be decided on the merits after the deadline, if there 
was a good reason for doing so.  Thus, while the speedy trial requirement of the Hicks rule 
is a mandate that must be complied with at the risk of jeopardizing the prosecution, it is a 
mandate that must be carried out in a common sense way. 
 
With those principles in mind, we turn first to the standard of appellate review of a 
decision to continue a criminal case that results in a trial past the Hicks date and then apply 
that standard of review to the circumstances of this case. 
                                              
29 Of course, the defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial reflects an 
overarching policy to avoid delay in bringing a defendant to trial.  As the Court observed 
in Farinholt, even if dismissal would not be appropriate under the Hicks rule, a defendant 
“remains protected by his federal and state constitutional rights to a speedy trial.”  299 Md. 
at 41.   
24 
 
 
2. 
Appellate Review of a Decision to Continue a Trial Date 
To assess the consequences of a postponement of a criminal trial past the Hicks date, 
courts have evaluated the delay in two steps:  (1) Was there “good cause” for the 
administrative judge to grant a postponement of the scheduled trial date?  (2) Was there an 
inordinate delay from the scheduled trial date to the new trial date in commencing the trial?  
See Rosenbach v. State, 314 Md. 473, 479-80 (1989); Frazier, 298 Md. at 448.   
An administrative judge’s determination that there is good cause for a continuance 
is “a discretionary matter, rarely subject to reversal upon review.”  Frazier, 298 Md. at 
451.  The defendant must show an abuse of discretion or a lack of good cause as a matter 
of law.  State v. Fisher, 353 Md. 297, 307 (1999).  The critical determination for appellate 
review is the postponement that extends the trial date beyond the Hicks date, whether or 
not the administrative judge was precisely aware of the relation of postponement to the 
Hicks date at the time that judge granted the continuance.  Fisher, 353 Md. at 305-6; Goins 
v. State, 293 Md. 97, 111-12 (1982).30   
The issue of inordinate delay is also reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.  
State v. Brown, 355 Md. 89, 98 (1999).  The defendant has the burden of demonstrating 
that a delay was excessive, in view of all the circumstances of the case.  Rosenbach, 314 
                                              
30 In the Hicks case, this Court concluded that a continuance satisfied the requisite 
standard under the rule, even though the administrative judge neither made an explicit 
finding as to “extraordinary cause” nor made any reference to the Hicks date when he 
granted the continuance that ultimately resulted in a trial date at least 40 days past the Hicks 
date. 
25 
 
Md. at 479.  If a defendant makes a prima facie showing of inordinate delay, the burden 
shifts to the State to justify that delay.  Frazier, 298 Md. at 462. 
3. 
Compliance with the Hicks Rule in this Case 
Whether there was good cause for a postponement 
In this case, the critical postponement was the indefinite postponement granted by 
the administrative judge on April 7.31  There is no question that there was good cause for 
the administrative judge’s action in granting the continuance that ultimately took the trial 
past the Hicks date.  As outlined above, the administrative judge found good cause for 
postponing the trial date based on the State’s recent provision of discovery to the defense 
and the anticipated provision of additional discovery, including a DNA report, in the future.  
That justification remained true on May 9 – the originally scheduled trial date – as Mr. 
Tunnell had obtained new defense counsel, who was just receiving the prior discovery; 
additional discovery, including the DNA report, remained outstanding.  Indeed, the defense 
understandably joined the motion to continue the postponement at the time.  The specific 
length of the postponement was only resolved, and a new trial date set, at the status 
conference on August 8 (Even then, it was not clear initially whether the defense intended 
to present the DNA results at trial and whether additional time would be necessary for the 
defense to make the requisite notice under CJ §10-915). 
                                              
31 As the State concedes, defense counsel’s consent to the continued postponement 
on May 9 does not bring this case within the consent exception to the dismissal sanction as 
the May 9 action was not the critical postponement for purposes of the Hicks rule.  
However, it does provide some context in assessing whether the delay in bringing the case 
to trial was inordinate. 
26 
 
While the court and the prosecution also labored under a misunderstanding that CJ 
§10-915 had the effect of “tolling” the Hicks date when a DNA examination is requested, 
the administrative judge did not rely on that theory alone when he granted the continuance 
on April 7.  The administrative judge’s determination that a continuance was necessary for 
the provision of discovery was well within his discretion; nor was it an error of law.32  
Whether there was inordinate delay in the rescheduled trial date 
This case involved a 125-day delay from the original trial date (May 9) to the new 
trial date ultimately selected (September 11).33  This was likely due to the fact that, at the 
April 7 hearing the administrative judge did not continue the trial to a specific future date.  
The administrative judge apparently believed that the choice of a new trial date was being 
                                              
32 Mr. Tunnell relies primarily on Calhoun v. State, 299 Md. 1 (1984).  In that case, 
trial of two co-defendants was scheduled to commence five days before the Hicks date.  
The circuit court severed the trials of the defendants and proceeded with the trial of the 
first defendant.  By the time the administrative judge set a new date for trial of the second 
defendant it was already past the Hicks date.  This Court held the administrative judge’s 
retroactive finding of good cause for the continuance did not comply with the Hicks rule, 
and thus dismissal of the charges was required.  This case is readily distinguishable from 
Calhoun as the administrative judge granted the critical postponement based on a finding 
of good cause well before the Hicks date.  
33 This delay exceeded the periods between a scheduled trial date and the 
rescheduled trial date in most reported cases.  See, e.g., Fisher, 353 Md. at 310-11 (77 
days); Rosenbach, 314 Md. at 499 (78 days); Bonev, 299 Md. at 81 (101 days); Brookins, 
299 Md. at 61-62 (104 days); Frazier 298 Md. at 435-45, 462 (consolidated case involving 
postponements of 80 to 116 days).  However, unlike this case, each of those cases involved 
postponements to a specific new trial date.  In a case in which a continuance was granted 
without a specific new trial date, other points of comparison may be more appropriate.  See 
State v. Parker, 347 Md. 533 (1995) (in case in which trial date was indefinitely postponed 
after defendant apparently absconded, the Court looked to period between the defendant’s 
subsequent arrest and the new trial date to assess whether there was inordinate delay).  
27 
 
deferred for a month to the hearing scheduled for the original May 9 trial date.  But that 
became unrealistic when, shortly before the May hearing, Mr. Tunnell hired a new defense 
counsel who understandably joined in a motion at that time to continue the indefinite 
postponement.  A more relevant point of comparison in this case would measure the new 
trial date that was later selected against the Hicks date. 
With reference to the Hicks date, trial commenced on September 11 – 41 days after 
the Hicks date of August 1.  That delay might have been shorter, as the Circuit Court was 
willing to schedule the trial in August, but defense counsel’s schedule did not allow for an 
August trial.  That delay also compares favorably to delays in other cases in which the 
Court concluded that the delay either was not inordinate or did not shift the burden to the 
State to justify the delay on appeal.  See, e.g., Fisher, 353 Md. at 310-11 (delay of 42 days 
beyond Hicks date); Rosenbach, 314 Md. at 476-77 (23 days after Hicks date); Beard, 299 
Md. 472 (1984) (in three cases, delays of 10, 70, and 113 days past the respective Hicks 
dates); Brookins, 299 Md. at 60-61 (delay of 26 days past Hicks date); Frazier, 298 Md. at 
435-45, 462 (four cases in which delay was four, 27, 29, and 86 days after the respective 
Hicks dates).  In Hicks itself, this Court reversed a dismissal of a case that occurred 40 days 
after the deadline for trial.  
In the Circuit Court, the defense did not articulate its view on why the delay was 
inordinate, other than to contend that the State should have requested the DNA analysis all 
at once, instead of in two parts.  The Circuit Court rejected that contention, and we cannot 
say that the court abused its discretion in doing so.  Accordingly, Mr. Tunnell failed to 
28 
 
carry his burden of demonstrating that the length of the delay resulting from the 
postponement for good cause violated the Hicks rule. 
The misunderstanding as to the possible effect of CJ §10-915 on the Hicks date was 
unfortunate and one might imagine a case in which such a misunderstanding results in a 
delay in a trial far beyond what could be deemed reasonable.  However, that did not happen 
here.  Trial took place only a little over a month after the Hicks date.  In hindsight, it would 
have been preferable to set a specific trial date as part of the continuance, which would 
have clearly put the onus for seeking any further continuance on the parties – either the 
State, if further time was required in order to obtain a DNA examination and comply with 
the notice requirements of CJ §10-915, or the defense, if it wished to present the DNA 
evidence itself or had scheduling difficulties. 
III 
Conclusion 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we hold: 
 
(1) 
The Hicks date is not automatically tolled by the length of time needed to 
obtain a DNA examination of evidence.  Nor is the Hicks date automatically extended 
when a party needs a continuance of a trial date to make a timely disclosure under CJ §10-
915 of DNA evidence that the party intends to introduce.  However, either of those 
circumstances may be “good cause” for continuance under the Hicks rule – i.e., CP §6-
103(b) and Maryland Rule 4-271(a). 
 
(2) 
Although there was confusion in the trial court in this case as to whether a 
Hicks date could be “tolled,” the administrative judge did not commit an error of law or 
29 
 
abuse his discretion when he found good cause for postponing the originally scheduled trial 
date based on the State’s need to provide additional discovery to the defense.  Nor was 
there an inordinate delay in the commencement of the trial approximately one month 
beyond the Hicks date, in light of the good cause finding of the administrative judge and 
the appearance of new defense counsel shortly before the originally scheduled trial date. 
 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS 
AFFIRMED.  COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER. 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 28 
 
September Term, 2019 
______________________________________ 
 
ANTHONY MARLIN TUNNELL 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
______________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty 
Booth 
Greene, Clayton, Jr. (Senior 
Judge, Specially Assigned), 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Watts, J. 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed: January 16, 2020 
 
Circuit Court for Worcester County 
Case No. C-23-CR-17-000018  
Argued: November 4, 2019  
 
Respectfully, I dissent.  I would have dismissed the writ of certiorari as 
improvidently granted and refrained from issuing an opinion in the case.  From my 
perspective, any opinion issued by this Court is an advisory opinion as to the issue of 
whether DNA testing tolls the Hicks date.1  The State, Respondent, has conceded that its 
argument in the Circuit Court for Worcester County—that DNA testing tolls the Hicks 
date—was wrong.  This issue was not advanced in the Court of Special Appeals and is 
arguably not preserved for appellate review.   
Before this Court, the State has readily acknowledged that DNA testing does not 
toll the Hicks date.  On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals recognized that the State did 
not advance the argument made by the prosecutor in the circuit court that the Hicks date 
was tolled due to DNA testing, and the Court of Special Appeals did not address whether 
DNA testing may toll the Hicks date.  Tunnell v. State, No. 2061, Sept. Term, 2017, 2019 
                                              
1The “Hicks date” or “Hicks Rule” refer to this Court’s opinion in State v. Hicks, 
285 Md. 310, 318, 403 A.2d 356, 360 (1979), in which this Court held that the time limits 
within which a criminal trial must be held in a circuit court are mandatory and cannot be 
violated absent a finding of good cause.  Currently, Maryland Rule 4-271 and Md. Code 
Ann., Crim. Proc. (2001, 2018 Repl. Vol.) § 6-103 provide that the date of a criminal trial 
in the circuit court shall not be later than 180 days after the earlier of the appearance of 
counsel or the first appearance of the defendant before the circuit court.  Nevertheless, 
pursuant to both the Rule and statute, for good cause shown, the county administrative 
judge or the judge’s designee may change the trial date in the circuit court. 
Here, in the absence of tolling of the Hicks date based on the request for DNA 
examination—a circumstance that the parties agree did not result in tolling of the Hicks 
date—the only potential issue before this Court could be the consequence of the circuit 
court’s good cause finding to allow the trial date to exceed the Hicks date.  As explained 
below, this issue was not raised in the petition for a writ of certiorari and is simply not 
before the Court. 
 
- 2 - 
WL 1313412, *6 n.9 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Mar. 22, 2019).2  Rather, the Court of Special 
Appeals held that any issue with respect to violation of the Hicks date was not preserved 
for appellate review because, although defense counsel “identified a possible Hicks 
violation, [she] did not seek any relief from the court either at the August 8, 2017 hearing, 
at [a] motions hearing, or at trial[,]” i.e., defense counsel’s “failure to move to dismiss the 
charges against [Anthony Marlin Tunnell, Petitioner,] le[ft the Court] nothing to review.”  
Id. at *6 (footnote omitted).  The Court of Special Appeals nevertheless addressed the 
matter on the merits and concluded that, independent of the DNA testing issue, the circuit 
court did not err because the administrative judge did not abuse his discretion in 
determining that good cause existed for the postponement.  See id. at *7.  Specifically, the 
Court of Special Appeals explained: 
On April 7, 2017, [the administrative judge] granted a postponement of the 
trial date based upon a finding of good cause occasioned by ongoing 
discovery and pending DNA results.  No new trial date was scheduled at that 
time, but the original trial date was converted to a status conference.  At the 
status conference, the parties agreed to a continuation of the April 7, 2017 
indefinite postponement and again, no trial date was set.  The trial date 
ultimately was set at the August 8, 2017 hearing, which was one-week post-
Hicks.  As [case law] makes clear, because the indefinite postponement 
granted on April 7, 2017 had the effect of carrying the trial date beyond the 
180-days, it was the critical postponement. . . . [The administrative judge] 
was not obligated to personally reset or cause to be reset a particular trial 
                                              
2On August 8, 2017, one week after the Hicks date expired, the parties appeared 
before the circuit court for a status conference.  At that time, the prosecutor asked the circuit 
court to have the docket entries corrected to reflect a “new Hicks date” and to determine if 
a three-day jury trial could be scheduled before the new date.  The circuit court accepted 
the State’s position that the DNA testing tolled the Hicks date for forty-two days, extending 
the Hicks date to September 12, 2017.  The circuit court also ruled that, at the April 7, 2017 
hearing, the judge made a “good cause” finding and that “original finding of good cause . 
. . still” stood.  Trial was scheduled for September 11, 2017, and a jury trial began on that 
date.   
- 3 - 
date.  Because we discern no abuse of discretion in [the administrative 
judge]’s determination of good cause for that postponement, the only 
remaining issue would be whether the delay between that postponement and 
the trial date was inordinate.  And because [Tunnell] did not argue before the 
trial court that there had been an inordinate delay (nor does he make that 
argument on appeal), that issue is not before us. 
 
Id. (cleaned up) (emphasis in original).   
Thereafter, Tunnell filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari, raising the 
following three issues: 
1.  
Is the 180-day deadline set forth by M[aryland] Rule 4-271 and Crim. 
Proc. [§] 6-103, known as the “Hicks Rule,” “tolled” while the State awaits 
the results of DNA testing? 
 
2.  
Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that [Tunnell] was 
properly tried after his Hicks date where, a week after the expiration of 
[Tunnell]’s August 1, 2017 Hicks date, the circuit court ruled that the 180-
day deadline had been “tolled” for 42 days between April 7 and May 18, 
2017 while the State had awaited DNA results that it never intended to use 
at trial, and granted the State’s request to therefore “move” [Tunnell]’s Hicks 
date from August 1 to September 12, 2017? 
 
3.  
Given that dismissal of the charges is the only remedy for a violation 
of the Hicks Rule, did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that a Hicks 
issue was not preserved for appellate review because, although trial counsel 
argued Hicks was not complied with, she did not explicitly request that the 
charges against [Tunnell] therefore be dismissed?   
 
Significantly, on July 12, 2019, this Court granted the petition, limited to the first issue 
only, i.e., the DNA testing issue.  See Tunnell v. State, 464 Md. 589, 212 A.3d 396 (2019).  
The other two issues are not before this Court. 
Three days later, on July 15, 2019, the State filed in this Court a “Motion to Dismiss 
Writ of Certiorari as Improvidently Granted,” arguing that any issue as to whether DNA 
testing “tolled” the Hicks date was not in controversy because, as the Court of Special 
- 4 - 
Appeals noted, on appeal, the State did not raise the argument that the Hicks date was tolled 
due to outstanding DNA testing.  The State also contended that any issue as to whether the 
Hicks date was violated was not preserved for appellate review because Tunnell never 
moved in the circuit court to dismiss the charges, either at the hearing to set the trial date 
or at trial.  And, the State correctly asserted that the administrative judge provided “grounds 
for the critical postponement independent of the mistaken notion that the Hicks date would 
be ‘tolled’”—namely, the need to complete discovery.  Nonetheless, on July 24, 2019, this 
Court issued an order denying the motion to dismiss.   
In its brief filed in this Court, the State renewed its argument that the writ of 
certiorari should be dismissed as having been improvidently granted.  The State noted that 
there is “no dispute about the answer to th[e] question” of whether the Hicks date may be 
“tolled” for DNA testing because the parties agree that the circuit court erred in stating that 
DNA testing tolls the Hicks date and the State “readily acknowledged in the Court of 
Special Appeals that the circuit court’s statement was erroneous.”  The State contended: 
Therefore, in order to gain a reversal of his conviction, Tunnell is 
asking this Court to proceed on two different questions that, in addition to 
not being issues on which this Court granted review, were not preserved for 
review below: whether the administrative judge had good cause for the 
critical postponement that had the effect of delaying trial past the Hicks date, 
and whether there was good cause for the length of the delay.  In short, these 
issues are not preserved for review because Tunnell never moved for a 
dismissal of his charges in circuit court.  Because the Court is prevented from 
reaching either of the questions Tunnell now raises, the writ of certiorari 
should be dismissed as improvidently granted. 
 
(Emphasis in original).  The State acknowledged that its motion to dismiss had been denied, 
but requested that this Court “reconsider the issue in light of the briefs.”  The State asserted 
- 5 - 
“that the issue of whether there was good cause for the length of delay was never raised in 
Tunnell’s petition.”  
Against this backdrop, it is readily apparent that a writ of certiorari should not have 
been granted, but, given that it was, the writ should have been dismissed as having been 
improvidently granted.  At bottom, Tunnell has alleged a violation of the Hicks date, with 
his case being tried forty-one days after the Hicks date.  In this Court, Tunnell filed a 
petition for a writ of certiorari raising three issues related to the Hicks date.  This Court 
granted certiorari limited to one issue only, namely, whether the Hicks date is “‘tolled’ 
while the State awaits the results of DNA testing[.]”  The issue of whether DNA testing 
tolls the Hicks date: (1) is not in controversy in this Court, as the State has conceded that 
its argument in the circuit court—that DNA testing tolls the Hicks date—was wrong; (2) 
was not addressed, let alone decided, by the Court of Special Appeals; and (3) is arguably 
not preserved for review, as Tunnell never moved to dismiss the charges in the circuit court.   
It is well settled that, “before addressing any issue raised by the parties, we must be 
satisfied that there is a justiciable controversy that is ripe for our consideration[,]” i.e., “that 
there be interested parties asserting adverse claims upon a state of facts which must have 
accrued wherein a legal decision is sought or demanded.”  Smigiel v. Franchot, 410 Md. 
302, 320, 978 A.2d 687, 698 (2009) (cleaned up).  Here, the parties are not asserting 
adverse claims—both Tunnell and the State agree that DNA testing does not toll the Hicks 
date.  Thus, the issue for which the writ of certiorari was granted is actually non-justiciable, 
thereby placing this Court in the position of rendering an advisory opinion.  See id. at 320, 
978 A.2d at 698 (“If this Court were to address [a non-justiciable issue], then this Court 
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would be placed in the position of rendering purely advisory opinions, a long forbidden 
practice in this State.”  (Cleaned up));  see also Hatt v. Anderson, 297 Md. 42, 45-46, 464 
A.2d 1076, 1078 (1983) (“[T]he existence of a justiciable controversy is an absolute 
prerequisite to the maintenance of a declaratory judgment action. . . . [T]he addressing of 
non-justiciable issues would place courts in the position of rendering purely advisory 
opinions, a long forbidden practice in this State.”  (Cleaned up)).  Because there is no longer 
any existing controversy between the parties as to the issue of whether DNA testing tolls 
the Hicks date, the case could also be said to be moot, and any opinion issued by this Court 
is purely advisory for that reason too.  The opinion issued by this Court will simply be 
advisory, with the Court opining about an issue that is not in dispute.  From my perspective, 
given the lack of controversy between the parties, that the State has acknowledged that 
DNA testing does not toll the Hicks date, that the issue was not decided in the Court of 
Special Appeals and was not the basis for affirmance of Tunnell’s conviction, and given 
the long-standing principle that courts should not render purely advisory opinions, this 
Court should have dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.  Beyond this 
case, it is important for obvious reasons that this Court adhere to the principle of not issuing 
advisory opinions and not granting certiorari on issues where the parties have conceded 
the matter is not in dispute. 
Finally, although the majority opinion spends a great deal of time discussing the 
matter, the issue of the administrative judge’s good cause finding is not before this Court.  
In the circuit court, the administrative judge granted the State’s initial request to postpone, 
finding, in relevant part, that “the need to complete discovery” was “good cause for a 
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continuance.”  Later, the circuit court ruled that the administrative judge had made a “good 
cause” finding and that the “original finding of good cause . . . still” stood.  On appeal, 
addressing the merits, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed, concluding that the circuit 
court did not err because the administrative judge did not abuse his discretion in 
determining that good cause existed for the postponement.  Tunnell, 2019 WL 1313412, 
*7.  This Court granted a writ of certiorari only as to the issue of whether DNA testing 
tolls the Hicks date, and not any other issue related to the Hicks date, i.e., not any issue 
related to the consequences of the administrative judge’s good cause finding.  Put plainly, 
any issue concerning the administrative judge’s good cause finding is simply not before 
the Court. 
In sum, this Court should have granted the State’s motion to dismiss, as it is clear 
that certiorari has been improvidently granted and the opinion issued by this Court is 
advisory only.  For the above reasons, respectfully, I dissent. 
The correction notice(s) for this opinion(s) can be found here:  
https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/appellate/correctionnotices/coa/28a19cn.pdf