Title: Dickey v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DANA YVETTE DICKEY v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 136Case Number: S-11-0062Decided: 09/28/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2011

 
DANA 
YVETTE DICKEY, 
Appellant 
(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF WYOMING, 
Appellee 
(Plaintiff).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County
The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge 
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellant Counsel; Kirk A. Morgan, 
Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel, Wyoming Public Defender 
Program
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory 
A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
GOLDEN, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      Appellant Dana 
Yvette Dickey entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of a 
controlled substance, a felony.  She 
reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of her motion to 
suppress the methamphetamine found in her purse following a traffic stop.  In this appeal, Dickey claims the 
evidence should have been suppressed as the fruit of a constitutionally infirm 
detention under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  We disagree, and affirm the district 
court’s suppression ruling.
 
ISSUE
 
[¶2]      Dickey offers the 
following issue for our consideration:
 
Did 
the district court err when it failed to suppress evidence obtained in violation 
of [her] Fourth Amendment rights after law enforcement extended a traffic stop 
beyond the time reasonably required to complete the issuance of the citations, 
without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity?1
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      On September 20, 
2009, Deputies Robert Proffitt and Trevor Budd of the Campbell County Sheriff’s 
Department stopped a pickup truck driven by Dickey after observing it cross the 
center line on three occasions.  
Deputy Proffitt made contact with Dickey, whom he knew from prior 
contacts, while Deputy Budd spoke with the passenger.  After gathering the appropriate 
documents from Dickey and her passenger, the deputies returned to their patrol 
car.  
 
[¶4]      Deputy Proffitt 
then contacted dispatch to run a check on Dickey and her passenger.  While awaiting a response from dispatch, 
the deputies discussed their prior drug-related encounters with Dickey and her 
family members.  Shortly thereafter, 
dispatch reported that Dickey and her passenger had no outstanding warrants, 
although both had a history of contacts with law enforcement regarding 
controlled substances.  At that 
point, knowing that the sheriff’s department did not have a canine unit on duty, 
Deputy Proffitt called the Gillette Police Department and requested that Officer 
Greg Brothers bring his drug dog Eddy to the scene.  
 
[¶5]      Deputy Proffitt 
then began writing a warning citation for Dickey’s failure to maintain a single 
lane of travel.  Before Deputy 
Proffitt issued the citation, Officer Brothers arrived with his drug dog and 
conducted an exterior sniff of the truck.  
Approximately thirteen and one-half minutes into the stop, the dog 
alerted to the presence of controlled substances.  Officer Brothers searched the truck’s 
interior and discovered a purse underneath the passenger seat, which contained a 
syringe loaded with methamphetamine and a copy of Dickey’s birth 
certificate.  When questioned, the 
passenger reported that Dickey handed her the purse with directions to place it 
under the seat.  

 
[¶6]      Dickey was taken 
into custody and charged with possession of a controlled substance, her third or 
subsequent such offense, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(i)(C) 
(LexisNexis 2011).2  She filed a motion to suppress the 
methamphetamine found in her purse, claiming it was the product of an unlawful 
detention.  Dickey and the State 
later agreed that an evidentiary hearing would not be necessary to resolve the 
suppression motion and filed a stipulation to that effect.  They also stipulated that the district 
court could rely on the relevant pleadings, a video of the traffic stop, as 
recorded by the camera in Deputy Proffitt’s patrol car, and an audio recording 
of Dickey’s preliminary hearing, during which Deputy Proffitt testified, in 
deciding the merits of her motion.  
After considering that information, the district court denied the 
motion.  The district court rejected 
Dickey’s contention that the deputies had improperly extended the duration of 
the traffic stop to enable the dog sniff to occur.  The district court determined that the 
canine unit arrived within the time it took Deputy Proffitt to complete his 
investigation and prepare the warning citation, and that the amount of time 
taken to complete the citation was not unreasonable.  
 
[¶7]      Thereafter, 
Dickey entered a conditional guilty plea to the possession charge, reserving the 
right to appeal the district court’s suppression ruling.  The district court sentenced her to 
eighteen to thirty-six months, which it suspended in favor of four years of 
supervised probation.  This appeal 
followed.
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶8]      When reviewing 
the denial of a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the district court and defer to its factual findings unless they 
are clearly erroneous.  We review de novo the ultimate determination 
regarding the constitutionality of a particular search or seizure.  Wallace v. State, 2009 WY 152, ¶ 8, 221 P.3d 967, 969 (Wyo. 2009); Garvin v. 
State, 2007 WY 190, ¶ 10, 172 P.3d 725, 728 (Wyo. 
2007).
 
 
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶9]      The Fourth 
Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures.  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  A routine traffic stop constitutes a 
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment “even though the purpose of 
the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief.”  Damato v. State, 2003 WY 13, ¶ 9, 64 P.3d 700, 704 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 
99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1979)).  The reasonableness of a traffic stop is 
determined by applying a two-part analysis:  (1) whether the initial stop was 
justified; and (2) whether the officer’s actions during the detention were 
“reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the 
interference in the first instance.”   
            
Garvin, ¶ 13, 172 P.3d  at 
728-29 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)); see also Wallace, ¶ 12, 221 P.3d  at 970; 
Damato, ¶ 9, 64 P.3d  at 
705.
 
[¶10]   With respect to the second prong of 
the analysis, this Court has stated:
 
During 
a routine traffic stop, a law enforcement officer may request a driver’s 
license, proof of insurance and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and 
issue a citation.  Generally, the 
driver must be allowed to proceed on his way without further delay once the 
officer determines the driver has a valid driver’s license and is entitled to 
operate the vehicle.  In the absence 
of consent, an officer may expand the investigative detention beyond the purpose 
of the initial stop only if there exists an objectively reasonable and 
articulable suspicion that criminal activity has occurred or is occurring.  
 
Garvin, 
¶ 14, 172 P.3d  at 729 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  We have never imposed an arbitrary time 
limit when determining the permissible length of a traffic stop.  Lindsay v. State, 2005 WY 34, ¶ 19, 108 P.3d 852, 857 (Wyo. 2005).  Instead, 
we examine whether law enforcement “diligently pursued a means of investigation 
that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly and without undue 
delay in detaining a defendant.”  Id.
 
[¶11]   In this case, Dickey does not 
dispute the validity of the initial traffic stop.  Rather, her complaint concerns the 
duration of the stop and the reasonableness of her detention.  Dickey acknowledges that the Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit a dog sniff of the exterior of a vehicle during a 
lawful traffic stop.  See Illinois v. Cabelles, 543 U.S. 405, 
407-10, 125 S. Ct. 834, 837-38, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842 (2005); Wallace, ¶ 15, 221 P.3d  at 970-71.  However, she contends the deputies 
impermissibly prolonged the stop beyond the time necessary to issue the warning 
citation in order to enable the drug-detection dog to conduct a free air sniff 
of the vehicle she was driving.
 
[¶12]   Dickey’s claim is based on the 
premise that a five-minute delay occurred between the time Deputy Proffitt 
completed the warning citation and the time the canine unit arrived at the 
scene. The only evidence Dickey can muster to support the alleged five-minute 
delay is Deputy Proffitt’s preliminary hearing testimony.  However, Deputy Proffitt’s testimony 
regarding the timing of the canine unit’s arrival and the completion of the 
warning citation is at best equivocal and is inconsistent with his affidavit of 
probable cause and the video of the traffic stop.  In the affidavit, Deputy Proffitt noted 
that Officer Brothers and his dog Eddy arrived at the scene before he completed 
the warning.  Furthermore, the video 
of the traffic stop, which is the best evidence of what actually transpired 
during the stop, amply demonstrates that Deputy Proffitt was still investigating 
and gathering information directly related to the traffic stop immediately 
before the canine unit arrived.  
Although the video does not visually confirm when the warning citation 
was completed, Deputy Proffitt can be heard speaking with dispatch about the 
vehicle’s ownership approximately sixteen seconds before K-9 Eddy began barking, 
signifying his arrival at the scene.3  After examining the entire record, we 
are unable to conclude that Deputy Proffitt impermissibly stalled issuing the 
citation in order to allow for the arrival of the canine unit, as Dickey 
maintains.
 
[¶13]   In addition, we find nothing in the 
record indicating that the duration of Dickey’s detention was so prolonged as to 
be unjustified.  The record reveals 
that Deputy Proffitt engaged in a conscientious and reasonable investigation 
related to the purpose of the initial stop.  He contacted dispatch, awaited 
information, and then contacted the canine unit.  His encounter with Dickey was focused, 
and he promptly set out to complete the warning citation.  The canine unit arrived at the scene 
before the citation had been issued, and the dog sniff did not prolong the stop 
to any extent.  The entire encounter 
– from the initial stop to the dog’s alert – lasted approximately thirteen and 
one-half minutes.  

 
[¶14]   Considering the length of the 
detention in conjunction with the investigative methods employed therein, we 
have no trouble concluding that Dickey’s detention lasted no longer than 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, and that its duration was 
reasonable.  The dog sniff occurred 
while Dickey was being lawfully detained and, as Dickey has acknowledged, the 
use of the drug dog during her lawful detention did not violate any 
constitutionally protected right.  
After the drug dog alerted to the presence of controlled substances, 
Officer Brothers and the deputies had probable cause to search the vehicle.  Consequently, the district court did not 
err by denying Dickey’s motion to suppress the methamphetamine 
evidence.
 
[¶15]   Affirmed.
 
FOOTNOTES
 
1Dickey has opted not to challenge the legality of her detention under the 
Wyoming Constitution. 
2Generally, possession of a controlled substance in the amount discovered 
in this case is a misdemeanor offense punishable by imprisonment up to twelve 
months and/or a fine of not more than $1,000.00.  However, a third or subsequent offense 
elevates the crime to a felony level offense, thereby subjecting the defendant 
to a maximum prison term of five years and a fine of $5,000.00.     

3Deputy Proffitt contacted dispatch to verify ownership of the truck 
because Dickey was unable to produce the vehicle’s 
registration.