Title: Allen v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC19-1313 
____________ 
 
SCOTTIE D. ALLEN, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
June 3, 2021 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Scottie D. Allen appeals his conviction for first-degree murder 
and his sentence of death.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 
3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons below, we affirm Allen’s 
conviction and sentence of death. 
BACKGROUND 
 
Allen was indicted for the October 2, 2017, first-degree 
premeditated murder of Ryan Mason on June 25, 2018, and soon 
thereafter began asserting his right to self-representation.  After 
finding Allen competent and conducting two inquiries under Faretta 
 
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v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), the trial court ruled that Allen 
could represent himself pro se, without standby counsel.  Allen’s 
guilt phase occurred on February 19-20, 2018.  In his opening 
statement, Allen told the jury that he would not be presenting any 
evidence or calling any witnesses because it was the State’s burden 
to prove his guilt. 
The evidence presented at trial established that while serving a 
twenty-five-year prison sentence for second-degree murder, Allen 
strangled Mason to death in the cell they shared at Wakulla 
Correctional Institution.  Allen confessed to planning and carrying 
out Mason’s murder, including to an investigator from the Florida 
Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) during a recorded 
interview, which was played for the jury, without objection from 
Allen.  As the trial court cogently explained in its sentencing order, 
the evidence showed that: 
[Allen] planned the murder for weeks after learning 
Mason had lied to him about the nature of the criminal 
offense that landed Mason in prison.  Upon learning that 
Mason was convicted of child molestation, [Allen] decided 
he would kill him.  [Allen] raped Mason periodically over 
the following two weeks to make Mason’s life miserable.  
During this time, [Allen] was paying careful attention to 
the timing of the inmate head counts throughout each 
 
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day.  On October 1, 2017, [Allen] decided the following 
morning would be the day he killed Mr. Mason.  
On the morning of October 2, 2017, in-between 
head counts, [Allen] raised and draped a sheet over the 
cell bars to keep anyone from being able to see into the 
cell.  [Allen] then committed the murder and immediately 
made himself a cup of coffee, sat down, ate half of a 
honey bun and finished the cup of coffee.   
 
Allen then calmly reported to a correctional officer that he had 
murdered his cellmate, which resulted in the discovery of Mason’s 
body. 
During his recorded statement to the FDLE agent, Allen said 
that Mason was “kicking like crazy” and that, during the strangling, 
when Mason was still conscious, Allen told Mason, “I’m going to 
strangle the life out of you. . . . Tell the devil I said hello.” 
 
The medical examiner testified that Mason was choked with 
such force as to fracture his C6 vertebrae and that after three to five 
minutes of constant pressure, Mason suffered irreversible brain 
damage and died.  He further testified that the shirt found around 
Mason’s neck was wrapped and knotted so tightly it was difficult to 
cut through with a surgical scalpel, and that in addition to the 
injuries indicating that Mason’s cause of death was ligature 
 
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strangulation, Mason had injuries to his wrist, forearm, and ankle, 
as well as unusual bruising behind his left knee. 
 
The State presented testimony that the DNA mixture obtained 
from the shirt found around Mason’s neck was 130 billion times 
more likely to come from Allen and Mason than Mason and an 
unrelated individual.  In addition, the DNA mixture obtained from 
the victim’s left-hand fingernails was 700 billion times more likely 
to have come from Allen and Mason than Mason and an unrelated 
individual. 
 
After the State rested, Allen elected not to testify and rested 
without presenting a defense.  He also did not present a closing 
argument.  The jury found Allen guilty of first-degree murder on 
February 20, 2019.1  
 
The penalty phase occurred later the same day, and Allen, who 
continued to represent himself, did not present mitigation or 
argument to the penalty-phase jury.  Following the State’s 
presentation, Allen’s jury unanimously found that the State had 
established beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the 
 
1.  Allen’s jury was instructed on first-degree premeditated 
murder. 
 
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following four aggravating factors: (1) Allen was previously convicted 
of a felony and under sentence of imprisonment; (2) Allen was 
previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of 
violence to another person; (3) the first-degree murder was 
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and (4) the first-
degree murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and 
premeditated manner, without any pretense of moral or legal 
justification (CCP).2  In addition, the jury unanimously found that 
the aggravating factors it found the State had established beyond a 
reasonable doubt were sufficient to warrant a possible sentence of 
death; found that one or more individual jurors had not found that 
one or more mitigating circumstances was established by the 
greater weight of the evidence; and unanimously found that the 
aggravating factors it found the State had established beyond a 
reasonable doubt outweighed the mitigating circumstances.  
Finally, the jury unanimously found that Allen should be sentenced 
to death. 
 
2.  The jury unanimously found that the State had not 
established beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim’s murder 
was committed for financial gain. 
 
 
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Following the penalty-phase trial, Allen continued to represent 
himself and maintained his desire not to present mitigation during 
the Spencer3 hearing.  The trial court ordered a presentence 
investigation report (PSI) pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.710(b).  Additionally, the trial court appointed amicus 
counsel to develop and present mitigation to the trial court at the 
Spencer hearing.  Amicus counsel retained Dr. Martin Falb as a 
mental health expert, and Allen submitted to and cooperated with 
an evaluation by Dr. Falb. 
At the Spencer hearing, amicus counsel’s mitigation 
presentation included the testimony of a mitigation specialist, who 
testified regarding Allen’s background, and the testimony of Dr. 
Falb, a forensic psychologist.  Dr. Falb testified that he did not 
diagnose Allen with antisocial personality disorder because the 
psychologist who performed Allen’s competency evaluation had 
already done so.  However, Dr. Falb opined that as a result of 
Allen’s antisocial personality disorder, he is “likely unable” to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.  Dr. Falb also 
 
3.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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testified that Allen “suffered some extreme measures of trauma in 
terms of emotional abuse, physical abuse, and sexual abuse 
beginning at a young enough age, along with substance abuse,” and 
that Allen received a “very, very high” score of six on the ten-
question Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACE) test.  Based on the 
testimony of the mitigation specialist during the Spencer hearing, 
Dr. Falb testified that Allen’s ACE score could have been as high as 
eight out of ten.  Dr. Falb further opined that it was likely Allen 
suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).  In explaining 
his PTSD diagnosis, Dr. Falb testified that Allen told him during 
their interview, “I can’t say that what I did to him [the victim] wasn’t 
related to my being angry about what had happened to me [earlier 
in life], but I was mad that he had been lying to me [about why he 
was in prison] for nine months.”  Regarding Allen’s statement, “I 
can’t say that what I did to him wasn’t related,” Dr. Falb testified 
that this statement “makes the point” for “a recurrence of the PTSD 
of that experience of what happened to [Allen] when he was being 
molested back at the age of eight to eleven.”  However, Dr. Falb 
further testified that Allen’s statement, “I was mad at him for lying 
 
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to me for nine months,” was not “inconsistent with somebody rising 
to a level of anger if they’re antisocial.” 
 
Following amicus counsel’s mitigation presentation, the State 
relied on Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.202 to argue that it 
was entitled to have Allen evaluated by its own mental health 
expert, Dr. Greg Prichard, for purposes of rebutting the testimony of 
Dr. Falb.  Allen stated, “I will not submit to an interview by [the] 
prosecution’s doctor.”  Despite voicing uncertainty about how to 
proceed in light of Allen’s decision not to present mitigation—a 
circumstance which rule 3.202 does not address—the trial court 
ultimately ordered Allen to submit to an evaluation by the State’s 
mental health expert.  The trial court ruled that the evaluation 
would be limited in scope to the mitigation addressed by Dr. Falb 
and further told Allen that his “cooperation is appreciated” but that 
if, during Dr. Prichard’s interview, Allen got “to a situation . . . 
outside what [Allen] want[ed] to answer, then [Allen should] just tell 
them that.”  Allen cooperated with Dr. Prichard’s evaluation. 
 
At the continued Spencer hearing on June 21, 2019, the 
State’s mental health expert, Dr. Prichard, testified that he agreed 
with Dr. Falb that Allen has antisocial personality disorder and 
 
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further testified that “antisocial personality disorder is very much a 
driving factor for [Allen].”  However, Dr. Prichard disagreed with Dr. 
Falb’s PTSD diagnosis and testified that he did not see any 
indication of dissociation associated with PTSD.  Dr. Prichard 
further testified that Allen told him “he was completely sober and 
straight the day the murder occurred,” that Allen “said that he 
actually made the decision . . . on Friday that he was going to kill 
[the victim on] Sunday,” and that Allen’s statements regarding the 
murder indicate that the killing was “very calm and pretty well 
planned out.”  Consequently, Dr. Prichard opined that he “didn’t 
see any indication of . . . mental, emotional disturbance anywhere 
around the time of the offense.”  Regarding the statutory mitigator 
that Allen’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct 
and conform his conduct to the requirements of law were 
substantially impaired, Dr. Prichard agreed with Dr. Falb’s 
testimony that “antisocial personality disorder intervenes” when 
considering the mitigator.  However, Dr. Prichard testified that Allen 
“could conform and he did understand,” but acted “for his own 
selfish reasons.”  Dr. Prichard further opined that he did not see 
 
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any indication that Allen was under duress at the time of the 
murder.  
Upon cross-examination by amicus counsel, Dr. Prichard 
acknowledged that his disagreement regarding Dr. Falb’s PTSD 
diagnosis did not mean that Allen had not suffered trauma as a 
result of his background, including childhood sexual abuse.  
However, Dr. Prichard reiterated his position that he “definitely” 
disagrees with Dr. Falb’s PTSD diagnosis.  
Allen, who was still representing himself pro se, also cross-
examined Dr. Prichard.  While doing so, Allen referenced his 
“agreement to be interviewed by [Dr. Prichard] in our last court 
proceeding.”  Much of Allen’s cross-examination of Dr. Prichard 
focused on why Dr. Prichard disagreed with Dr. Falb’s PTSD 
diagnosis.   
On redirect, Dr. Prichard reaffirmed that he disagreed with Dr. 
Falb’s PTSD diagnosis and testified that “everything with Mr. Allen 
is better explained by personality issues than any kind of PTSD 
response associated with trauma.”  At the conclusion of Dr. 
Prichard’s testimony, the prosecutor stated, “[T]he evidence 
presented at trial is what we’re going to be relying on for the 
 
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substantial amount of the aggravating -- or for the aggravating 
circumstances.  This was just rebuttal to the Amicus case.” 
 
At the conclusion of the Spencer hearing, the trial court 
discussed sentencing memoranda with the parties.  Allen stated 
that he would submit a pro se memorandum, in which he would “be 
arguing toward the findings of Dr. Falb as far as the PTSD 
diagnosis” and the “extreme mental distress . . . mitigator as well.”  
Allen subsequently filed his sentencing memorandum, in which he 
stated, “I cannot refute the evidence that was presented which led 
to a finding of guilt[,] nor can I argue against the four aggravating 
factors . . . which led to a 12-0 jury verdict for a sentence of death.”  
Allen further stated, “I believe the amicus curiae you appointed for 
mitigation did a great job given the material and restrictions they 
had to contend with.  So I leave any findings they made or 
established unargued and supported.  The one concern I have 
though is the testimony of the State’s witness Dr. Prichard.  I found 
it to be made of 3⁄4 truths and spin as he said his ‘job’ was to refute 
the findings of Dr. Falb.  I don’t think he did that, as I tried to 
establish during questioning of him during his testimony.”  
 
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Thereafter, the trial court followed the jury’s recommendation 
and sentenced Allen to death on July 23, 2019.  The sentencing 
order reflects that the trial court found and assigned great weight to 
each of the four aggravating factors that Allen’s jury found to exist 
beyond a reasonable doubt.   
 
The trial court rejected the statutory mitigating circumstance 
proposed by amicus counsel that the capital felony occurred while 
Allen was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance.  In so doing, the trial court explained, in pertinent 
part:  
The Court finds competent evidence was presented to 
establish [Allen] has PTSD and Anti-Social Personality 
Disorder.  The Court, however, does not find [Allen] was 
under extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the 
time the murder was committed.  The murder was 
planned for weeks and was deliberate.  The evidence 
clearly established [Allen] was calm and coherent 
immediately following the murder.  There was no 
testimony or other credible evidence that [Allen] exhibited 
any signs of being under the influence of drugs, alcohol 
or from an episodic PTSD event at the time of the 
murder. 
 
However, the trial court found one statutory mitigating 
circumstance to which it assigned moderate weight, namely that 
Allen’s ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law 
 
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is substantially impaired “by adverse childhood experiences that 
have rendered him less than effective at making good decisions.”  In 
addition, the trial court found the following five nonstatutory 
mitigating circumstances and assigned them the noted weight: (1) 
the defendant has been diagnosed with alcohol abuse and drug 
dependency (some weight); (2) the defendant was diagnosed with 
major depression (moderate weight); (3) the defendant was raised in 
a dysfunctional family setting (great weight); (4) the defendant was 
courteous, respectful, and considerate to the court during every 
court appearance (some weight); and (5) the defendant did not want 
his family contacted for mitigation purposes (some weight). 
In sentencing Allen to death, the trial court further found as 
follows:  
The Court has conducted its own independent 
evaluation weighing the aggravating factors found by the 
jury in their verdict and weighing the mitigating 
circumstances presented and reasonably established by 
the evidence.  The Court assigned great weight to each of 
the four aggravating factors.  The Court finds the 
aggravating factors cumulatively outweigh the mitigating 
circumstances and a sentence of death is appropriate for 
the murder of Ryan Mason. 
 
 
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ANALYSIS 
 
In this direct appeal, Allen raises four unpreserved challenges 
to his sentence of death.  Specifically, Allen argues that (1) the trial 
court’s failure to renew the offer of counsel before commencing the 
penalty phase constitutes fundamental error; (2) a guilt-phase jury 
instruction and a penalty-phase argument by the prosecutor violate 
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), and collectively 
amount to fundamental error; (3) fundamental error occurred 
because the State violated Allen’s Fifth Amendment right against 
compelled self-incrimination during the Spencer hearing; and (4) the 
trial court fundamentally erred by failing to instruct the penalty-
phase jury that it must determine beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the aggravating factors were sufficient to justify the death penalty 
and that those factors outweighed the mitigating circumstances.  
The State raises the sufficiency of the evidence.  See Fla. R. App. P. 
9.142(a)(5). 
(1) Failure to Renew Offer of Counsel 
 
Allen first argues that the trial court’s failure to renew the offer 
of counsel before commencing the penalty phase constitutes 
fundamental error.  We review this question of law de novo, see 
 
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State v. Smith, 241 So. 3d 53, 55 (Fla. 2018), and hold that Allen is 
not entitled to relief because the trial court cured the error, thereby 
eliminating the need to address whether, had the error not been 
cured, it would amount to fundamental error. 
 
Contrary to our precedent and Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.111(d)(5), the trial court failed to renew the offer of 
counsel between the guilt and penalty phases.  See Traylor v. State, 
596 So. 2d 957, 968 (Fla. 1992) (interpreting article I, section 16 of 
the Florida Constitution as entitling a criminal defendant to “decide 
at each crucial stage of the proceedings whether he or she requires 
the assistance of counsel” and concluding that “[w]here the right to 
counsel has been properly waived, . . . the waiver applies only to the 
present stage and must be renewed at each subsequent crucial 
stage where the defendant is unrepresented”); Fla. R. Crim. P. 
3.111(d)(5) (“If a waiver is accepted at any stage of the proceedings, 
the offer of assistance of counsel shall be renewed by the court at 
each subsequent stage of the proceedings at which the defendant 
appears without counsel.”); see also Muehleman v. State, 3 So. 3d 
1149, 1156-57 (Fla. 2009) (applying Traylor and rule 3.111(d)(5) to 
a penalty-phase trial).   
 
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Although the offer of counsel was not renewed before the 
penalty phase began, at the State’s urging, immediately after the 
penalty-phase jury returned its recommendation, and again, sua 
sponte, at a hearing the next day, the trial court inquired of Allen as 
to whether, if the offer of counsel had been renewed between the 
guilt and penalty phases, he would have accepted the offer of 
penalty-phase counsel.  Further, upon the State’s request that an 
additional Faretta inquiry accompany the renewed offer of counsel, 
the trial court conducted a “nunc pro tunc Faretta inquiry”—the 
third Faretta inquiry in the case.  In his responses to the trial court, 
Allen consistently represented that he would have waived penalty-
phase counsel and that he would have continued to exercise his 
right to self-representation had the trial court renewed the offer of 
counsel before commencing the penalty phase.  The trial court 
found that Allen’s decisions, including to waive counsel, were 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.   
Because the record demonstrates that the trial court cured the 
error while it still had jurisdiction to do so, by confirming with Allen 
that he had not wavered in his decision to represent himself, see 
Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 968, we hold that there is no basis for 
 
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appellate relief.  Cf. Sullivan v. State, 170 So. 2d 632, 635 (Fla. 
1974) (“It is well-established law that where the trial judge has 
extended counsel an opportunity to cure any error, and counsel 
fails to take advantage of the opportunity, such error, if any, was 
invited and will not warrant reversal.”). 
(2) Caldwell 
Next, Allen argues that the trial court’s guilt-phase jury 
instruction that it was “the judge’s job to determine a proper 
sentence” if the jury found Allen guilty of first-degree premeditated 
murder, combined with the prosecutor’s statement during the 
State’s penalty-phase opening argument that it would ask the jury 
to return a “recommendation” of death, violate Caldwell and 
collectively constitute fundamental error requiring a new penalty-
phase trial.  We review this question of law de novo, see Davis v. 
State, 136 So. 3d 1169, 1201 (Fla. 2018), and hold that Allen is not 
entitled to relief. 
Taking the statements in reverse order, no error, let alone 
fundamental error, occurred as a result of the prosecutor’s 
statement that he would ask the jury to return a “recommendation” 
of death because the statement did not “improperly describe[] the 
 
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role assigned to the jury by local law.”  Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 
U.S. 1, 9 (1994) (“[T]o establish a Caldwell violation, a defendant 
necessarily must show that the remarks to the jury improperly 
described the role assigned to the jury by local law.”) (quoting 
Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 407 (1989)).  Under the plain text 
of Florida’s death penalty statute, a sentencing “recommendation” is 
precisely what the penalty-phase jury provides.  See § 921.141(2), 
Fla. Stat. (2018). 
Regarding the guilt-phase instruction, “[w]hen the jury is to be 
involved in a penalty phase,” the standard jury instructions direct 
trial courts to “omit” from the instructions the following italicized 
sentence: “Your duty is to determine if the defendant has been 
proven guilty or not, in accord with the law.  It is the judge’s job to 
determine a proper sentence if the defendant is found guilty.”  Fla. 
St. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.10 (emphasis added).  The purpose of the 
italicized sentence is to prevent a jury pardon on the issue of guilt.  
See generally Broughton v. State, 790 So. 2d 1118, 1119 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 2001) (explaining that the italicized sentence reflects “the 
evolving policy of removing from a noncapital jury any knowledge of 
potential penalties for the crimes with which a defendant is 
 
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charged” to ensure “ ‘that the jury should decide a case in 
accordance with the law and the evidence and disregard the 
consequences of its verdict’ ”) (quoting Legette v. State, 718 So. 2d 
878, 881 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)).  Precluding an improper jury pardon 
on the issue of guilt is just as relevant in a capital case as a 
noncapital case.  However, because the instruction is an incomplete 
statement of Florida law where the jury may go on to participate in 
a penalty phase, the trial court should not have included it in the 
guilt-phase instructions. 
In addressing the instructional error, the State argues that 
Allen “waived” any claim that the guilt-phase instruction 
constitutes fundamental error because he “agreed” to it.  The State 
is correct that Allen stated he had “no objection” to the entirety of 
the guilt-phase instructions read by the trial court.  However, the 
State’s attempt to label Allen’s statement as a “waiver” fails because 
the statement does not amount to “the voluntary and intentional 
relinquishment of a known right” that is necessary to establish a 
“waiver.”  Major League Baseball v. Morasani, 790 So. 2d 1071, 
1077 n.12 (Fla. 2001).  The record is devoid of any indication that 
 
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Allen knew the instruction at issue deviated from the standard jury 
instruction, but agreed to its use anyway. 
Although the State’s claim is more properly analyzed as one of 
“invited error,” that label also does not fit the facts.  This Court’s 
precedent requires more than “mere acquiescence” to an incorrect 
jury instruction to support the conclusion that the defendant 
invited the error and thereby is precluded from challenging the 
error on appeal, even under a fundamental-error standard.  See 
Lowe v. State, 259 So. 3d 23 at 50 (Fla. 2018).  More specifically, to 
support a finding of invited error, defense counsel must either 
request the incorrect instruction or be aware an instruction is 
incorrect but agree to it anyway: 
[This Court has] also recognized, in the context of certain 
erroneous jury instructions, a fundamental error analysis 
exception “where defense counsel affirmatively agreed to 
or requested the incomplete instruction.”  State v. Lucas, 
645 So. 2d 425, 427 (Fla. 1994), receded from on other 
grounds by State v. Spencer, 216 So. 3d 481 (Fla. 2017).  
However, [this Court] also recognized in that context that 
the exception did not apply “where defense counsel 
merely acquiesced to [the incomplete] instructions.”  
Spencer, 216 So. 3d at 486.  
 
 
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Id.4   
Applying Lowe to Allen’s case, the conduct necessary to 
support a finding of invited error did not occur.  However, we agree 
 
4.  In Lowe, we also cited approvingly to Black v. State, 695 
So. 2d 459, 461 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), for the proposition that 
“defense counsel [(1)] must be aware that an incorrect instruction is 
being read and [(2)] must affirmatively agree to, or request, the 
incomplete instruction.”  259 So. 3d at 50.  However, this language 
has proven to be problematic, as it has caused some courts to 
conflate two different factual scenarios—i.e., acquiescing to an 
incorrect instruction versus requesting or affirmatively agreeing to 
an incorrect instruction—and improperly label unpreserved error as 
unreviewable, invited error.  See, e.g., Calloway v. State, 37 So. 3d 
891, 893, 896-97 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (concluding that the 
defendant “acquiesced” to alleged errors in jury instructions, 
thereby prohibiting reversal under the invited-error doctrine, where 
“defendant specifically agreed to the instructions and stated he had 
no objections to them as proposed [at the charge conference] and as 
read [to the jury]”).  To be clear, acquiescing to an incorrect 
instruction constitutes a failure of preservation that does not 
preclude fundamental-error review.  See Crain v. State, 894 So. 2d 
59, 68 (Fla. 2004) (holding that the defendant failed to preserve his 
challenge to a jury instruction for appeal where “trial counsel did 
not object to the instruction when presented with a packet of 
corrected jury instructions before closing arguments”); Suarez v. 
Dugger, 527 So. 2d 190, 193 (Fla. 1988) (“Because trial counsel 
failed to object to the absence of [certain jury] instructions the 
matter was not properly preserved . . . .”).  In contrast, 
unreviewable, invited error occurs when a party either proposes 
(i.e., requests) an instruction and therefore cannot argue against its 
correctness on appeal, or when a party is aware a standard 
instruction or an instruction proposed by another party is incorrect 
but agrees to its use anyway and as a result of having affirmatively 
agreed to the instruction cannot argue against its correctness on 
appeal.  See Lowe, 259 So. 3d at 50. 
 
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with the State on the merits that the trial court’s erroneous 
inclusion of the guilt-phase instruction at issue did not violate 
Caldwell or amount to fundamental error.   
In Caldwell, a plurality of the Supreme Court ruled that “it is 
constitutionally impermissible [under the Eighth Amendment] to 
rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who 
has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the 
appropriateness of the defendant’s death rests elsewhere.”  
Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 328-29.  Applying this rule, the Supreme 
Court vacated the defendant’s death sentence after finding that his 
jury was “led to believe that responsibility for determining the 
appropriateness of a death sentence rest[ed] not with the jury but 
with the appellate court which later reviews the case.”  Id. at 323.  
Since Caldwell, the Supreme Court has explained that, as a result 
of precedent governing its plurality decisions, it “read[s] Caldwell as 
‘relevant only to certain types of comment--those that mislead the 
jury as to its role in the sentencing process in a way that allows the 
jury to feel less responsible than it should for the sentencing 
decision.’ ”  Romano, 512 U.S. at 9 (quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 
477 U.S. 168, 184 n.15 (1986)).  
 
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In addressing Caldwell’s application to Florida’s capital 
sentencing scheme, this Court has explained that “[i]n Caldwell, the 
United States Supreme Court was considering the application of the 
Mississippi death penalty procedure which is dissimilar to that 
utilized by Florida” because “[t]he Florida procedure does not 
empower the jury with the final sentencing decision; rather, the 
trial judge imposes the sentence.”  Combs v. State, 525 So. 2d 853, 
856 (Fla. 1988).  More recently, in Davis v. State, 136 So. 3d 1169, 
1201 (Fla. 2014), this Court rejected the argument that the same 
guilt-phase jury instruction that Allen challenges here violates 
Caldwell.  See also id. (rejecting the related claim that the 
prosecutor “improperly disparaged the role of the jury” in violation 
of Caldwell by referencing the jury’s “recommendation” as 
“advisory” and stating that “the final [sentencing] decision rests 
with [the trial court]”).   
We recognize that, since Combs and Davis, Florida’s capital 
sentencing scheme has changed in light of the mandate of Hurst v. 
Florida, 577 U.S. 92, 102-03 (2016), that the Sixth Amendment 
requires a jury to unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt the 
fact that renders the defendant eligible for imposition of the death 
 
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sentence—i.e., the existence of a statutory aggravating 
circumstance, State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487, 501-03 (Fla. 2020); 
see § 921.141(2)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. (2018).  Also, Florida’s capital 
sentencing scheme has since been amended in additional ways, 
including requiring the jury’s recommendation for death to be 
unanimous, see § 921.141(2)(c), and precluding the trial court from 
imposing a sentence of death if the jury recommends a sentence of 
life without the possibility of parole, see § 921.141(3)(a)1.  Despite 
these changes and the fact that the guilt-phase instruction in 
Allen’s case was an incomplete statement of Florida law, Florida’s 
statutory scheme remains a hybrid sentencing scheme that does 
not place the ultimate responsibility for sentencing the defendant 
on the jury.  See § 921.141(2)-(4). 
Moreover, in analyzing whether the “remarks to the jury 
improperly described the role assigned to the jury by local law” so 
as to violate Caldwell’s mandate against “mislead[ing] the jury as to 
its role in the sentencing process in a way that allows the jury to 
feel less responsible than it should for the sentencing decision,” 
Romano, 512 U.S. at 9 (quoting Dugger, 489 U.S. at 407, and then 
Darden, 477 U.S. at 184 n.15), we cannot myopically focus on a 
 
- 25 - 
single statement or instruction.  Rather, Caldwell claims are 
properly evaluated by “look[ing] to the ‘total trial scene,’ including 
jury selection, the guilt phase of the trial, and the sentencing 
hearing, examining both the court’s instructions and counsel’s 
arguments to the jury.”  Barrientes v. Johnson, 221 F.3d 741, 777 
(5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Montoya v. Scott, 65 F.3d 405, 420 (5th Cir. 
1995)).  
In Allen’s case, despite the guilt-phase instructional error, the 
record establishes that the jury was properly informed as to its role 
in Allen’s sentencing, including that if the jury found Allen guilty of 
first-degree premeditated murder, a separate penalty-phase trial 
would occur in which the jury’s role would be to determine Allen’s 
eligibility for the death penalty and recommend the appropriate 
sentence.  Large portions of jury selection were devoted to 
addressing the jury’s role should the case proceed to a penalty 
phase, including the death qualification of the jury, and the trial 
court properly instructed the jury regarding its role during the 
penalty phase.  Thus, no Caldwell violation occurred. 
Nor did the guilt-phase instructional error amount to 
fundamental error in light of the correct penalty-phase jury 
 
- 26 - 
instructions and accurate descriptions of the jury’s role in 
sentencing that otherwise permeated Allen’s trial.  See Bush v. 
State, 295 So. 3d 179, 212 (Fla. 2020) (explaining that where, as 
here, the claim of fundamental error relates to the death sentence, 
“fundamental error” is error that “reaches down into the validity of 
the trial itself to the extent that a . . . jury recommendation of death 
could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged 
error”) (quoting Card v. State, 803 So. 2d 613, 622 (Fla. 2001)).  
Accordingly, we deny relief as to this claim.  
(3) Fifth Amendment 
 
Next, Allen argues that the State’s introduction of his 
statements through Dr. Prichard’s rebuttal testimony during the 
Spencer hearing violated his Fifth Amendment right against 
compelled self-incrimination and that the error was fundamental.  
We review this legal issue de novo.  See Smith, 241 So. 3d at 55. 
 
Compelling the mental health examination of a defendant 
during the penalty phase of a capital trial potentially implicates the 
Fifth Amendment protection against any person being “compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”  U.S. Const. 
amend. V; see Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468 (1981) (“A 
 
- 27 - 
criminal defendant, who neither initiates a psychiatric evaluation 
nor attempts to introduce any psychiatric evidence, may not be 
compelled to respond to a psychiatrist if his statements can be used 
against him at a capital sentencing proceeding.”); see also generally 
Burns v. State, 699 So. 2d 646, 651 (Fla. 1997) (“[T]he Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination, made applicable to the 
States through the Fourteenth Amendment, continues through the 
sentencing phase of a capital murder trial.”).  
However, permitting the State’s mental health expert to 
examine a capital defendant in order to rebut the defense’s penalty 
phase mental health expert testimony does not violate the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination.  Davis v. State, 698 So. 
2d 1182, 1191 (Fla. 1997); see also Philmore v. State, 820 So. 2d 
919, 932-33 (Fla. 2002) (rejecting capital defendant’s argument that 
“a compelled mental health evaluation under Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.202 impermissibly requires the defendant to 
forego either his constitutional right to present mitigating evidence 
or forego his constitutional right not to be a witness against 
himself” and “conclud[ing] that there is no error, let alone 
fundamental error, in allowing the State to subject the defendant to 
 
- 28 - 
a mental health examination after the defendant decides to present 
mitigation”); Dillbeck v. State, 643 So. 2d 1027, 1030 (Fla. 1994) 
(holding trial court did not abuse discretion “in striving to level the 
playing field by ordering Dillbeck to submit to a prepenalty phase 
interview with the State’s expert” where “Dillbeck planned to, and 
ultimately did, present extensive mitigating evidence in the penalty 
phase through defense mental health experts who had interviewed 
him”). 
Allen’s case presents facts that do not neatly fit within this 
Court’s precedent or the text of rule 3.202, which establishes the 
procedure by which the State’s mental health expert may examine a 
defendant who has been convicted of capital murder with respect to 
the “mitigating circumstances the defendant expects to establish 
through expert testimony” and provides consequences for the 
defendant’s refusal to cooperate.  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.202(d)-(e).  
Here, Allen declined to present any mitigation to the penalty-phase 
jury or to the trial court during the Spencer hearing.  However, the 
trial court exercised its discretion to appoint amicus counsel to 
develop and present mitigation during the Spencer hearing.  Thus, it 
was the trial court’s decision, not Allen’s, that mitigation should be 
 
- 29 - 
presented on Allen’s behalf.  Consequently, it was the trial court’s 
decision, not Allen’s, that resulted in Allen’s evaluation by amicus 
counsel’s mental health expert, Dr. Falb, which in turn resulted in 
the trial court compelling Allen’s examination by the State’s rebuttal 
mental health expert, Dr. Prichard, and the subsequent 
introduction of Allen’s compelled statements through both experts.  
These facts suggest the making of a Fifth Amendment 
quandary.5  But, there is more.  Allen does not challenge his 
compelled evaluation by amicus counsel’s expert, Dr. Falb.  On the 
contrary, in the pro se sentencing memorandum that Allen filed in 
the trial court, he adopted amicus counsel’s mitigation 
presentation.  Moreover, in this appeal, to remedy the alleged Fifth 
Amendment violation, Allen seeks to retain the benefit of the mental 
 
5.  As the State’s brief suggests, allowing the trial court to 
force a mitigation presentation upon an unwilling, competent 
defendant in order to avoid a potential Eighth Amendment problem, 
see generally Muhammad v. State, 782 So. 2d 343, 363-64 (Fla. 
2001), that no United States Supreme Court decision says exists 
also potentially implicates the conformity clause of the Florida 
Constitution, see art. I, § 17, and the right to self-representation 
under both the United States and Florida Constitutions.  However, 
these issues were not raised below, and it is unnecessary to 
consider them to resolve the Fifth Amendment claim that Allen 
raises on appeal.  
 
- 30 - 
health mitigation established through Dr. Falb’s testimony but 
strike the rebuttal mental health testimony that the State presented 
through Dr. Prichard.   
We hold that by making the mental health mitigation 
presented by amicus counsel his own, Allen has forfeited his claim.  
The Fifth Amendment is a shield, not a sword or a scalpel, cf. 
Kansas v. Cheever, 571 U.S. 87, 94 (2013) (“[W]hen a defendant 
chooses to testify in a criminal case, the Fifth Amendment does not 
allow him to refuse to answer related questions on cross-
examination.”), and it does not provide cover for unrebutted mental 
health mitigation, cf. Philmore, 820 So. 2d at 932-33 (“[T]here is no 
error, let alone fundamental error, in allowing the State to subject 
the defendant to a mental health examination after the defendant 
decides to present mitigation.”); see also Estelle, 451 U.S. at 468 
(limiting availability of Fifth Amendment claim to “[a] criminal 
defendant, who neither initiates a psychiatric evaluation nor 
attempts to introduce any psychiatric evidence”). 
However, even if we were to accept Allen’s argument that the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Estelle requires us to conclude that a 
Fifth Amendment violation occurred, he still would not be entitled 
 
- 31 - 
to relief.  Any Fifth Amendment error in admitting Allen’s compelled 
statements through Dr. Prichard would not satisfy the applicable 
standard of fundamental error that applies to our review of Allen’s 
unpreserved Fifth Amendment claim.  See Smith, 241 So. 3d at 55.  
The first-degree murder at issue was substantially aggravated and 
included three of the qualitatively weightiest aggravators in Florida’s 
capital sentencing scheme: CCP, HAC, and prior violent felony.  See 
Damas v. State, 260 So. 3d 200, 216 (Fla. 2018).  The mitigation, 
which included the trial court’s crediting of Dr. Falb’s PTSD 
diagnosis over Dr. Prichard’s rebuttal testimony that Allen does not 
have PTSD, was comparatively minimal.  Moreover, the record is 
clear that Allen’s statements to Dr. Prichard were used for purposes 
of rebutting mitigation, not to establish aggravation that would have 
rendered Allen eligible for the death penalty.  Any error in admitting 
Allen’s statements through the rebuttal testimony of Dr. Prichard 
during the Spencer hearing did not “reach[] down into the validity of 
the trial itself to the extent that [the sentence of death] could not 
have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.”  
Bush, 295 So. 3d at 212.  Accordingly, any error was not 
fundamental.  Id. 
 
- 32 - 
Therefore, we deny relief as to this claim. 
(4) Penalty-Phase Jury Instructions 
In the last issue Allen raises on appeal, he argues that the trial 
court fundamentally erred by failing to instruct the jury that it must 
determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether the aggravating 
factors were sufficient to justify the death penalty and whether 
those factors outweighed the mitigating circumstances.  We have 
repeatedly held that “these determinations are not subject to the 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof.”  Newberry v. State, 
288 So. 3d 1040, 1047 (Fla. 2019) (citing Rogers v. State, 285 So. 
3d 872, 878-79 (Fla. 2019)); see also Rogers, 285 So. 3d at 886 
(holding that “the sufficiency and weight of the aggravating factors 
and the final recommendation of death” are not elements and “are 
not subject to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof”).  
Although Allen urges us to reconsider our precedent, he fails to 
demonstrate that it is “clearly erroneous.”  Poole, 297 So. 3d at 507.  
Accordingly, because the trial court did not err, let alone 
fundamentally so, in instructing the penalty-phase jury, we deny 
relief as to this claim.  
 
- 33 - 
(5) Sufficiency 
 
“In appeals where the death penalty has been imposed,” 
regardless of whether the defendant raises the sufficiency of the 
evidence as an issue on appeal, this Court “independently reviews 
the record to confirm that the jury’s verdict is supported by 
competent, substantial evidence.”  Davis v. State, 2 So. 3d 952, 
966-67 (Fla. 2008); see also Fla. R. App. P. 9.142(a)(5).  “In 
determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the question is whether, 
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a 
rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the elements 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Bradley v. State, 787 So. 
2d 732, 738 (Fla. 2001).  
Sufficient evidence supports Allen’s conviction for first-degree 
murder under the theory that the murder was premeditated.  See 
Glover v. State, 226 So. 3d 795, 804 (Fla. 2017) (explaining that to 
prove first-degree premeditated murder, the State must establish 
that (1) the victim is dead, (2) the victim’s death was premeditated, 
and (3) the victim’s death resulted from the criminal act of the 
defendant).  Allen confessed multiple times to planning the victim’s 
killing and to strangling the victim to death.  DNA evidence 
 
- 34 - 
collected from the shirt around the victim’s neck and from under 
the victim’s fingernails and testimony from the medical examiner 
corroborate Allen’s confessions.  Accordingly, the evidence is 
sufficient to support Allen’s conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Allen’s conviction for first-
degree murder and his sentence of death. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, COURIEL, and 
GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. 
LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
LABARGA, J., concurring in result. 
 
Although the trial court failed to renew the offer of counsel 
before Allen’s penalty phase began, the trial court subsequently 
conducted multiple inquiries during which Allen maintained his 
decision to represent himself.  Because Allen’s repeated refusals of 
counsel throughout the trial proceedings corroborate his belated 
waiver, I agree that he is not entitled to relief. 
 
- 35 - 
 
However, I adhere to the view expressed in my dissenting 
opinion in Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020) (receding 
from proportionality review requirement in death penalty direct 
appeal cases), and consequently, I can only concur in the result. 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Wakulla County, 
Ronald Wallace Flury, Judge –652018CF000203CFAXMX 
 
Jessica Yeary, Public Defender, and Barbara J. Busharis, Assistant 
Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Michael T. Kennett, Assistant 
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee