Title: Bowlerama, Inc. v. Woodside Realty Co.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Bowlerama, Inc. v. Woodside Realty Co.1988 WY 53752 P.2d 1377Case Number: 86-317Decided: 04/06/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
BOWLERAMA, INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION, APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

v.

WOODSIDE REALTY COMPANY, ACOLORADO 
CORPORATION; AND RONALD M. SWEARINGEN, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Joseph F. Maier, 
J.

Don W. Riske, 
Cheyenne, for appellant.

Timothy G. 
Williams of Guy, Williams, White & Argeris, Cheyenne, for appellees.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Donna Rice McCrea, Asst. Atty. Gen., for amicus curiae Wyoming Real Estate 
Com'n.

Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Sadly, this case is 
illustrative of the changing mores of a society that, with increasing frequency, 
feels no obligation to honor its agreements. Greg Anderson and Daniel Graeber, 
owners of all of the stock of Bowlerama, Inc., seek here to renege on their 
promise and recover back an agreed commission paid upon the sale of their 
bowling alley. 

[¶2.]     Appellant sued Woodside 
Realty and Ronald M. Swearingen to recover a real estate commission in the sum 
of $61,000, claiming technical violation of the Wyoming Real Estate License Act 
of 1971, Section 33-28-114(b), W.S. 1977. This appeal is from summary judgment 
in favor of Woodside Realty and Swearingen.

[¶3.]     Appellant states the 
issues as:

"I. Whether the district 
court erred in denying appellant's motion for summary 
judgment.

"A. Whether appellees 
violated the Wyoming Real Estate License Act, W.S. § 33-28-101 et. 
seq.

"B. Whether appellant is 
barred from recovery on equitable grounds.

"II. Whether the district 
court erred in granting appellees' motion for summary 
judgment."

[¶4.]     We 
affirm.

FACTS

[¶5.]     Greg Anderson and Dan 
Graeber had been trying, without success, for more than three years to sell 
their bowling alley located in Cheyenne, Wyoming. Anderson and Graeber contacted a 
close friend, Bud Shafter of Denver, Colorado, who was the general manager of four 
bowling alleys and knowledgeable in the bowling alley business, to seek help in 
selling their bowling alley. Shafter suggested a Colorado realtor, Ronald 
Swearingen, who had been active in offering Colorado bowling alleys for sale and 
who had been dealing with several prospective purchasers. The four men met on 
April 15, 1983, in Ft. 
Collins, Colorado and 
discussed the potential sale. Swearingen informed appellant that he was not 
licensed in Wyoming and would have to associate 
with a Wyoming 
broker. Following the meeting, Swearingen contacted Eileen Proffit of Uinta 
Realty in Evanston, 
Wyoming who, with the approval of 
her broker, agreed to associate as resident broker. On April 18, 1983, Anderson and Swearingen met in Denver, and an interim 
agreement was prepared and sent to Graeber. Swearingen then prepared a listing 
agreement on a Wyoming exclusive listing form, 
circulated it to the co-owners and their Cheyenne attorney, then mailed it to Uinta 
Realty for execution. Proffit and her broker executed the agreement on June 1, 
1983. Graeber initially denied that he was aware that a Wyoming broker, Uinta 
Realty, had been associated. He conceded, however, at the end of his deposition, 
that he knew of the Wyoming broker's association, 
stating:

"In my own mind, after 
seeing all the documents and going through all this testimony, I think that 
Uinta Realty was probably typed on the first initial agreement that I 
signed."

The listing 
agreement provided for a broker's fee of 8% of the selling price with a referral 
fee of 90% of the total commission to be paid to Swearingen and Woodside 
Realty.

[¶6.]     After the listing 
agreement was executed, Swearingen contacted John Mason, a prospective purchaser 
with whom he had been working and who was interested in purchasing a bowling 
alley, and advised him concerning the availability of Bowlerama. Mason asked to 
deal directly with the sellers and was assured that would be alright. 
Thereafter, negotiations for the sale were had between Mason, appellants, their 
Cheyenne 
attorney, and their accountants. Swearingen was in contact with the parties by 
phone from his Colorado office and visited 
Wyoming a 
couple of times concerning the sale.

[¶7.]     Within three months the 
parties concluded an agreement for the sale and purchase of Bowlerama and 
delivered an earnest money check in the amount of $10,000 to Swearingen's 
Denver office. 
Uinta Realty was advised of the transaction. Swearingen came to Cheyenne for the closing at the request of appellant's 
Cheyenne 
attorney. He prepared settlement sheets for the closing, renegotiated his 
commission, reducing it from $108,000 to $61,000, and received from Mr. Graeber 
a commission check in the amount of $61,000. Swearingen deposited the check and 
forwarded $4,000 to Uinta Realty as its share of the commission. The sale was 
concluded. The parties were satisfied. Each received what they bargained for. 
There was no claim of fraud, dishonesty, deceit or overreaching. Almost two and 
one-half years after the sale was concluded, Graeber was informed by a lady who 
worked for the Wyoming Real Estate Commission that he might be able to recover 
back the commission he had paid and that he should talk to attorney Riske, who, 
six months later, filed this lawsuit to recover back the commission paid. There 
was no factual dispute. The trial court denied recovery back of the commission, 
granting Swearingen and Woodside Realty summary judgment.

[¶8.]     Summary judgment is 
only appropriate on a dual finding that there is no genuine issue of material 
fact and that the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Hurst v. State, Wyo., 698 P.2d 1130 (1985). The record on 
appeal must be viewed most favorably to the party opposing the motion, giving to 
him all favorable inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the record. Olson 
v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., Wyo., 696 P.2d 1294 (1985). Summary judgment 
is not appropriate when material issues of fact exist. Siebken v. Town of Wheatland, Wyo., 700 P.2d 1236 (1985). A fact is material 
if it would establish or refute one of the essential elements of a cause of 
action or defense asserted by either party. Schepps v. Howe, Wyo., 665 P.2d 504 
(1983).

[¶9.]     The Wyoming Real Estate 
License Act of 1971, as amended in 1983, governs disposition of this case. The 
act provides that persons engaged in the business of a real estate broker, 
associate broker or salesman must be licensed. Section 33-28-101, W.S. 1977. Any 
person performing any part of a real estate transaction for consideration is 
deemed a broker, associate broker or salesman. Section 33-28-104, W.S. 1977. The 
statute defines a "broker" as

"an individual, other 
than a salesman, or associate broker who, for another and for 
compensation:

* * * * * 
*

"(C) Negotiates, offers, 
attempts or agrees to negotiate the sale, exchange, purchase, rental or leasing 
of real estate;

* * * * * 
*

"(K) Assists or directs 
in the procuring of prospects calculated to result in the sale, exchange, lease 
or rental of real estate; or

"(M) Assists or directs 
in the negotiation of any transaction calculated or intended to result in the 
sale, exchange, lease or rental of real estate." Section 33-28-102(a)(iii), W.S. 
1977.

Clearly, 
Swearingen, acting as a broker in procuring prospects and being licensed in the 
state of Colorado, was a nonresident 
broker.

[¶10.]  With respect to a nonresident broker 
licensed in another state, as was Swearingen in this case, § 33-28-110(a), W.S. 
1977, provides that

"[i]t is unlawful for any 
licensed broker to compensate any person who is not a licensed broker, associate 
broker or salesman for performing any of the acts regulated by this act [§§ 
33-28-101 through 33-28-206]; provided, however, that a licensed broker may pay a commission to a 
licensed broker of another state if the nonresident broker does not conduct in 
this state any of the negotiations for which a commission is paid." 
(Emphasis added.)

[¶11.]  With respect to civil liability, § 
33-28-114(b), W.S. 1977, provides:

"If any person receives 
any money or the equivalent thereof as a fee, commission, compensation or profit 
by or in consequence of a violation of any provision of this act [§§ 33-28-101 
through 33-28-206], he shall, in addition, be liable to a penalty of not less 
than the amount of the sum of money so received and not more than three (3) 
times the sum so received as may be determined by the court, which penalty may 
be recovered in a court of competent jurisdiction by any person aggrieved." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶12.]  Although not raised by the parties, it 
seems to us that any claim for recovery of the share of the commission paid 
reposes with the aggrieved person, who in this case must be the licensed 
Wyoming broker 
(Uinta Realty). If the nonresident broker (Ronald Swearingen) conducted 
negotiations in the state of Wyoming, he may not have been entitled to 
receive a share of the commission. But Uinta Realty, the aggrieved person, does 
not assert that claim. It does not seem that appellant, under the provisions of 
§ 33-28-114(b), W.S. 1977, is an aggrieved person who can recover the penalty 
provided. The listing agreement was with a Wyoming broker. A nonresident broker was 
involved. A buyer was produced, the bowling alley was sold, the services were 
rendered, and appellant became obligated to pay the agreed commission. Appellant 
received what it bargained for. Appellant paid for the services of the real 
estate broker and, under the statute, may not qualify as an aggrieved 
person.

[¶13.]  Appellant nevertheless asserts that it is 
an aggrieved person under the statute, that appellee Swearingen violated the 
Wyoming statute by conducting negotiations in 
Wyoming without being licensed in Wyoming and, as a result, 
appellant should recover back the $61,000 commission already paid. Even if we 
assume that appellant was an aggrieved person under the statute, we conclude 
that the trial court, nevertheless, was correct in denying appellant's claim to 
recover the commission.

[¶14.]  Section 33-28-110(a), W.S. 1977, permits 
a broker licensed in another state to associate with a Wyoming broker in order 
to receive a commission, provided (1) he is licensed in another state, and (2) 
he does not conduct negotiations in Wyoming. It is undisputed that Swearingen 
was licensed in Colorado, that he affiliated 
himself with a Wyoming broker, and that the 
Wyoming broker 
executed the exclusive listing agreement.

[¶15.]  The critical question then becomes 
whether Swearingen conducted negotiations in Wyoming. The trial court found that he did 
not. Swearingen said he did not. And Graeber, testifying in his deposition, said 
Swearingen was not involved in the negotiations. He was 
asked:

"Q. Do you have any 
complaints about his [Swearingen's] handling of this matter other than the fact 
that he wasn't a licensed Wyoming broker?

"A. Just the fact that I 
- he didn't really handle the sale, I did, and buyers did.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. Okay. What are the 
other reasons?

"A. The other reasons 
were that all the negotiations that took 
place he wasn't instrumental in any of them, other than the first meeting in 
Ft. Collins, one meeting with the buyers and the - the closing. That's the only 
input that he had.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. Well, what other 
things didn't he do other than help you with Exhibit 
Eight?

"A. He didn't do 
anything. He brought me a buyer and showed up at the closing. That was about 
it." (Emphasis added.)

And Graeber was 
asked:

"Do you feel that Mr. 
Swearingen could have assisted you in some way in getting a higher 
figure?

"A. Yes, 
sir.

"Q. And how would he have 
done that?

"A. Just been involved in the negotiations." 
(Emphasis added.)

And 
again:

"Q. And after two or 
three years, you had found a buyer?

"A. Yes, 
sir.

"Q. And you had negotiated terms that you could live 
with?

"A. Yes, sir." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶16.]  The parties asked that they themselves be 
allowed to conduct the negotiations. Swearingen agreed. The parties conducted 
the negotiations which were concluded with an agreement. Appellant asserts that 
it is an aggrieved person because 
Swearingen did not conduct the negotiations; then, to the contrary, it asserts 
that it should recover the penalty from Swearingen because he did conduct 
negotiations in Wyoming. Appellant cannot have it both ways. A 
party ought to be bound by his own testimony. Graeber said repeatedly that 
Swearingen was not involved in the negotiations. We agree. He did not solicit 
business in Wyoming but was contacted by the 
owners in Colorado. Negotiations concerning the listing 
occurred in Colorado. Swearingen conferred with the buyer 
and sellers and put the parties together by phone from Colorado. Advising a 
potential purchaser of the availability for purchase of the bowling alley may 
have been acting as a broker, but it was not negotiations. Swearingen was 
allowed by statute to act as a broker except with respect to conducting 
negotiations in Wyoming. The term "negotiate" requires conduct 
that places one in the position of bargaining with a party to settle the terms 
of a real estate agreement. Loyd v. Saffa, Okla. 
App., 719 P.2d 844 (1986). Appellant contends Swearingen did not participate in 
negotiations that culminated in the sale. The parties themselves negotiated the 
purchase and sale. There was no error by the trial court in concluding that 
Swearingen did not conduct negotiations in Wyoming.

[¶17.]  Finally, the equities in this case do not 
favor appellant. Its owners had been trying to sell their bowling business over 
a period of three years. They then contracted with Swearingen, who sold it in 
three months. Appellant agreed to pay a commission of $108,000, then 
renegotiated the commission to an agreed $61,000 - $47,000 less than originally 
agreed. Everyone was satisfied. Now, three years later, appellant seeks to 
recover back the commission paid.

[¶18.]  Appellant conceded that appellees did not 
take unfair advantage and that it was not harmed by appellees' actions. 
Appellant admitted it was not concerned about where Swearingen was licensed. 
Appellant accepted the benefit of appellees' efforts in selling the bowling 
alley and now comes, in equity, asking the court to help the corporation avoid 
the obligation it voluntarily assumed by contract.

[¶19.]  The purpose of the Real Estate License 
Act of 1971 is to protect the public. Battlefield, Inc. v. Neely, Wyo., 656 P.2d 1154 (1983); Hagar v. Mobley, Wyo., 638 P.2d 127 (1981). That purpose was 
served here. There was a resident broker associated who was within this 
jurisdiction and subject to discipline by the Wyoming Real Estate Commission, if 
that was appropriate. The Wyoming broker is not complaining. The Real 
Estate Commission has taken no action. Even the seller has no complaints, except 
that now that the bowling alley is sold, "who needs a real estate broker." He 
would like his money back. Thus, seller Graeber testified:

"Q. Isn't the primary 
thing that a broker does for you is to produce a buyer that eventually buys your 
properties?

"A. The primary thing, 
yes.

"Q. And to that extent, 
Mr. Swearingen got that much done?

"A. Yes, 
sir.

"Q. To that extent, he 
had benefited both you and Mr. Anderson?

"A. Yes, 
sir,"

and

"Q. He didn't receive 
more as a commission than what he was entitled to under the agreement, did 
he?

"A. No, 
sir.

"Q. He didn't steal any 
of your properties or your money, did he?

"A. No, 
sir.

"Q. He didn't 
misrepresent anything to you that caused you any financial damage, did he, other 
than the commission problem?

"A. No, 
sir."

[¶20.]  The purpose of protecting the public is 
not violated when a broker, licensed in another state, cooperates with a broker 
licensed in the state where the sale occurs in procuring a purchaser. Howell v. 
Steffey, D.C.App., 204 A.2d 695 (1964).

"The obvious purpose of the Act in question was to protect the public from being 
forced to deal with dishonest or unscrupulous real estate operators, rather than to permit one party to gain an 
unconscionable advantage by avoiding a just obligation which he has contracted 
to pay." (Emphasis added.) Bell v. United 
Farm 
Agency, Okla., 296 P.2d 149, 152 
(1956).

[¶21.]  The dissent suggests that, if the facts 
were reversed, the sale was of Colorado real 
estate, and a Wyoming broker had associated 
with a Colorado broker, the Wyoming broker would suffer at the hands of a Colorado court. The cases 
cited by the dissent are simply irrelevant and do not support that statement. 
Thus, in Lemler v. Real Estate Commission, 38 Colo. App. 489, 558 P.2d 591 (1976), the sole 
issue before the court was

"whether payment may be 
obtained from the Colorado Real Estate Recovery Fund to satisfy a judgment 
entered against a corporation and its president as the result of fraud committed 
in connection with a contract to erect a residence upon the property of the 
plaintiffs."

And Broughall v. 
Black Forest Development Co., 196 Colo. 503, 593 P.2d 314 (1978), was a suit by 
an individual (not a broker) to recover a finder's fee for sale of a radio 
station. Brakhage v. Georgetown Associates, 33 Colo. App. 385, 523 P.2d 145 (1974), was a 
suit to recover a finder's fee. Fields v. MacNab, 70 Or. App. 154, 688 P.2d 409 
(1984), was a suit under a statute similar to § 33-28-114 W.S. 1977, by a 
nonresident broker against the resident broker to recover his share of a 
commission. If anything, it supports our prior suggestion that the aggrieved 
party is the resident broker, not the seller.

[¶22.]  Contrary to the claim in the dissent, 
there is no requirement that the Wyoming broker be actively involved in the 
sale. The negotiations and sale can be concluded by the parties themselves 
precisely as in this case. And it makes no difference that the property is in 
Wyoming; the buyer is in Wyoming; the seller is in Wyoming; the sales document was prepared in Wyoming; and the sale was closed in Wyoming in the presence 
of the out-of-state unlicensed broker. If the out-of-state broker did not 
conduct negotiations in Wyoming, there can be no 
recovery.

[¶23.]  The dissent refuses to recognize that 
this was a case in which a nonresident real estate broker associated with a 
resident real estate broker for the purpose of selling a bowling alley located 
in the state of Wyoming. The effect of this arrangement was 
that:

(a) The nonresident 
broker was a licensed real estate broker; thus, all of the finders fee cases 
brought by unlicensed persons previously cited supra are irrelevant. Also 
irrelevant are Rosenberg v. Rosenblum, 72 Wyo. 91, 261 P.2d 41 (1953), a case in 
which a real estate agent, licensed in Wyoming, recovered a commission; Owens v. 
Capri, 65 Wyo. 325, 202 P.2d 174 (1949); and Dixon v. Ringsby, Wyo., 405 P.2d 271 (1965); and

(b) The nonresident 
broker could do everything a licensed real estate broker could do in the sale of 
this real estate except "conduct negotiations in the state of Wyoming." This means that 
the balance of cases cited by the dissent are not in 
point.

[¶24.]  It is also stated in the 
dissent:

"We need go no further 
than the definitive analysis of Federal District Judge Ewing Kerr, defining the 
appropriate answer in Doran v. Imeson Aviation, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 586, 588 
(D.Wyo. 1976):

"`Since Doran was not a 
licensed real estate broker in the State of Wyoming, the contract between Doran and Imeson was void 
and any actions taken by Doran to sell the business were unlawful and Doran is 
prevented from bringing this action for his commission under the laws of 
Wyoming.'"

Judge Kerr 
stated in Doran, supra at 587, that "in November, 1975 Doran produced a buyer," 
and "[h]is activities in producing a purchaser * * * constitute sufficient 
grounds for holding that he was acting as 
[a] real estate broker." (Emphasis added.) Then he held the contract of the 
parties void. The case cited obviously has no relevance. Swearingen was acting 
as a broker, but it was proper for him to do so. His contract was not void. He 
was not suing to recover a commission. It had been paid. He was not suing to 
enforce an illegal contract.

[¶25.]  Established law differentiates between a 
broker or individual suing to collect a commission and a seller suing to get it 
back years after it has been paid. Cases generally hold that one who has paid 
money to an unlicensed person for performance of a contract is not entitled to 
recover the money back upon a number of grounds, some of which are that equity 
and principles of restitution do not require that the money be paid back, the 
payment was voluntary, it was a mistake of law by which the payor is bound, 
there is no equitable reason for making restitution to a plaintiff who gets what 
he expected, and the parties to an illegal contract which has become executed 
cannot in equity and principles of restitution require that money be paid back. 
Annot., Recovery Back of Money Paid to Unlicensed Person Required by Law to Have 
Occupational or Business License or Permit to Make Contract, 74 A.L.R.3d 637 
(1976). It may have been an unusual, fortuitous circumstance that these parties 
wished to and did negotiate themselves. That may not happen often. But the fact 
that it did happen here means that Swearingen did not violate the statute 
because he did not conduct negotiations. That must be the reason appellant paid 
the brokerage commission at the closing, for as Graeber 
testified:

"If I hadn't felt that 
the fee was owed, I would have never made him a check out in the first 
place."

[¶26.]  As this court aptly stated in a similar 
case:

"It seems appropriate 
here to call attention to the fact that no member of the public has been 
adversely affected by anything that Ms. Neely did. The only one complaining is 
the corporation who hired her knowing she was not a licensed real estate agent, 
and now, after she has performed for her employer, it seeks to play little 
statutory interpretation games in an effort to avoid paying her the commissions 
it promised and the commissions she has earned. We are supportive of the trial 
judge's comments when, denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict, he 
said:

"`The evidence further 
indicates that there were sales and there was benefit that accrued to 
Battlefield, Inc. and to the Defendants in this action. The Court does not 
believe that it is or ought to be the policy of Wyoming law that under those 
types of facts and circumstances, an owner of land, of Wyoming land, which is to 
be subdivided, can take advantage of a person not holding a real estate sales 
license, obtain the benefits when he doesn't care whether they are licensed or 
not, obtain the benefits of such a transaction and then utilize and manipulate 
the Wyoming law to his own advantage to avoid that for which he bargained.'" 
Battlefield, Inc. v. Neely, supra 656 P.2d  at 1158.

"Courts do not like to 
aid litigants in avoiding their contractual obligations by joining in their 
games of hide-and-seek behind statutory technicalities - especially is this so 
where the other party has performed and the party looking to avoid the contract 
has reaped all the benefits of the performance. We will not aid and abet such 
efforts if we can possibly avoid it." Id. at 1157.

Appellant's plea 
for equity finds no support in this record.

[¶27.]  Affirmed.

THOMAS and URBIGKIT, JJ., each filed separate 
dissenting opinions.

THOMAS, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶28.]  I cannot agree with the result espoused 
by the majority in this case. I am satisfied that the question which we resolve 
is whether the Real Estate License Act of 1971, §§ 33-28-101 through 33-28-206, 
W.S. 1977, adopted by the Wyoming legislature, has any efficacy. I 
recognize that in Battlefield, Inc. v. Neely, Wyo., 656 P.2d 1154 (1983), we did say that we 
will not assist litigants in avoiding their contractual obligations if we 
possibly can avoid it. This case is distinguishable from Battlefield, Inc. v. 
Neely, supra, because, in that case, we were not sterilizing the statute, and 
there, the party primarily responsible for the statutory infringement lost the 
case. I am dissatisfied with the result in this case because I am persuaded that 
Battlefield, Inc. v. Neely, supra, has been extended to justify a conclusion 
that we will not aid and abet efforts to avoid contractual obligations even if 
we must ignore statutory provisions that should be 
enforced.

[¶29.]  The majority examines the equities of 
this situation at length. I do not disagree with the proposition that appellant 
bargained for the result. As the majority say: 

"Clearly, Swearingen, 
acting as a broker in procuring prospects and being licensed in the state of 
Colorado, was 
a nonresident broker." Ante at 1380.

The thrust of 
the Wyoming 
statutes regulating brokers is that Swearingen was not permitted to contract 
with Bowlerama, Inc. to accomplish this transaction as it actually developed. He 
was the professional who should have known that. Consequently, I am not 
persuaded that the equities, if they are material, are as heavily weighted in 
favor of Swearingen as the majority claim.

[¶30.]  Placing some of the majority language in 
juxtaposition demonstrates the lengths to which the majority go and makes my 
concern painfully clear. I quote:

"* * * Swearingen then 
prepared a listing agreement on a Wyoming exclusive listing form, circulated it 
to the co-owners and their Cheyenne attorney, then mailed it to Uinta Realty for 
execution." Ante at 1379.

* * * * * 
*

"* * * Swearingen was in 
contact with the parties by phone from his Colorado office and visited Wyoming a couple of times 
concerning the sale." Ante at 1379.

* * * * * 
*

"* * * Swearingen came to 
Cheyenne for the closing at the request of 
appellant's Cheyenne attorney. He prepared settlement 
sheets for the closing, renegotiated his commission, reducing it from $108,000 
to $61,000 * * *." Ante at 1379. (Emphasis added.)

* * * * * 
*

"* * * The term 
`negotiate' requires conduct that places one in the position of bargaining with 
a party to settle the terms of a real estate agreement. * * * There was no error 
by the trial court in concluding that Swearingen did not conduct negotiations in 
Wyoming." Ante 
at 1382.

[¶31.]  The majority opinion is inconsistent 
internally, both specifically and generally. This court held in Hopkinson v. 
State, Wyo., 632 P.2d 79 (1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463 (1982), that one could be guilty of first-degree murder by making 
arrangements from out of state to commit a homicide in Wyoming. I have no 
equivocation in saying that if one can commit murder in Wyoming without presence in the state, a result with which 
I agreed in that case, it is well within the realm of possibility to negotiate 
for the sale of a business in Wyoming without presence in the state. 
Obviously, that is precisely what Swearingen did.

[¶32.]  The majority quotes from § 33-28-104, 
W.S. 1977, which defines a "broker" by describing activities. The majority then 
recognizes that Swearingen did those things. Section 33-28-114(b), W.S. 1977, 
encompasses a sanction for violation of the statute by providing liability for a 
penalty "which penalty may be recovered * * * by any person aggrieved." The 
majority suggests that the licensed Wyoming broker, Uinta Realty Company, not 
Bowlerama, Inc., might be the aggrieved party. In substantially the same breath, 
however, the majority note that it is unlawful for Uinta Realty to compensate 
Swearingen for performing any of the acts regulated by the statute except that 
it may pay a commission to Swearingen if Swearingen did not conduct in this 
state any other negotiations for which a commission is paid. Section 
33-28-110(a), W.S. 1977. In the posture in which this case comes to us, the only 
way that Uinta Realty could be an aggrieved party is if it did not violate the 
statute because Swearingen paid compensation to Uinta Realty rather than Uinta 
Realty paying compensation to Swearingen. I suppose that really is what happened 
in this instance. Nevertheless, I am satisfied that there does exist, at the 
very least, a substantial and genuine question of fact as to whether Swearingen 
did these things in violation of the Wyoming statute. Summary judgment was not 
appropriate.

[¶33.]  In sum, I disagree with the majority's 
view in this case, and I would reverse the summary judgment entered against 
Bowlerama, Inc. I understand that it got what it bargained for in its 
arrangement with Swearingen. That arrangement was possible only because 
Swearingen violated the Wyoming statutes regulating real estate 
brokers. He was the one in a position to know that he was violating the law, 
and, consequently, he should not be protected in those activities which infringe 
upon the Wyoming statutes. I perceive a very clear 
question of fact for the jury as to whether actions of Swearingen constituted 
negotiations in Wyoming for which the commission was paid. I 
believe that a finder of fact could conclude that such negotiations occurred in 
Wyoming, and 
there would be sufficient evidence to sustain that finding. A case such as this 
does not lend itself to summary judgment. As the majority 
acknowledge:

"* * * The record on 
appeal must be viewed most favorably to the party opposing the motion, giving to 
him all favorable inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the record." Ante 
at 1380.

[¶34.]  I also have a very real concern as to 
whether the Wyoming Real Estate Commission can accomplish any effective 
regulation if this court is willing to overlook the cavalier approach Swearingen 
adopted in this case. If one were to design a textbook example of conduct 
pursued for the purpose of evading the Wyoming Real Estate License Act of 1971, 
no better illustration could be found than the facts of this case. Under the 
circumstances, the policy of enforcing the state statute should override the 
concern that Bowlerama, Inc. does not come to court with clean hands. Perhaps it 
does not, but it does come demonstrating a clear violation of the statute. The 
summary judgment should have been reversed, and I would so 
hold.

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶35.]  I am unimpressed with the subterfuge 
displayed in this record where an unauthorized and unlicensed out-of-state 
(Colorado) real estate broker employed an Evanston, Wyoming (350 miles away) 
licensed broker as window dressing for a sale of Wyoming property in Cheyenne to 
a Wyoming customer, for which a real estate commission was paid in Wyoming. It 
is singularly inappropriate to sustain this summary-judgment decimation of the 
Wyoming 
regulatory system. Compared to the operational Wyoming real estate brokerage law 
as now to have a disingenuous standard, the question of who gets or keeps this 
controverted real estate commission is relatively 
unimportant.

[¶36.]  Likewise, it is difficult to define 
factually or legally why the Wyoming Real Estate Commission is incorrect in 
record summarization in its amicus curiae brief:

"* * * The fact that the 
interim listing agreement was drafted and signed in Colorado by one Wyoming 
property owner does not mean `negotiations' were conducted in Colorado. The 
subsequent listing agreement was prepared in Colorado on a Wyoming Association of Realtors form and 
mailed to the Wyoming broker. This fact does not establish 
that `negotiations' were conducted in Colorado. After listing the property, appellee 
telephoned the ultimate buyer in Laramie, 
Wyoming and told him about the Cheyenne property. 
Appellee phoned the owners in Cheyenne and 
Pennsylvania 
and told them about the prospective buyer. He obtained and prepared detailed 
information about the Wyoming property and 
relayed the information to the Wyoming buyer. The purchase offer was drafted 
in Wyoming by Attorney Tom Long of Hirst and 
Applegate, Cheyenne. Since Appellee was the agent for the 
seller, the purchase offer reflects the terms he had negotiated with the 
Wyoming buyer. 
Appellee prepared part of the settlement sheet in Wyoming, attended the closing in Wyoming and received his commission check in Wyoming.

"An examination 
of W.S. 33-28-102 will show that negotiations took place in Wyoming.

"`(a) As used in this 
act:

"`(iii) "Broker" means an 
individual, other than a salesman, or associate broker who, for another and for 
compensation:

"`(C) Negotiates, offers, 
attempts or agrees to negotiate the sale, exchange, purchase, rental or leasing 
of real estate; 

"`(K) Assists or directs 
in the procuring of prospects calculated to result in the sale, exchange, lease 
or rental of real estate; or

"`(M) Assists or directs 
in the negotiation of any transaction calculated or intended to result in the 
sale, exchange, lease or rental of real estate.'

"Certainly Appellee's 
actions constitute activities which should have been conducted by a Wyoming licensee or someone in association with a 
Wyoming 
licensee as required by statute."

[¶37.]  If we apply the modern concept followed 
in conflict-of-law rules as the analysis of facts and factors, 16 Am.Jur.2d, 
Conflict of Laws § 101, for a methodology to determine application of this 
transaction to Wyoming, about the only thing not included is a properly licensed 
Wyoming broker actively involved in the transaction. The property is in 
Wyoming; the buyer is in Wyoming; the seller is in Wyoming; the sales document was prepared in Wyoming; and the sale was closed in Wyoming in the presence 
of the out-of-state unlicensed broker. The fact that some intermediate 
discussion took place in Fort Collins, across the 
state line in Colorado, is neither convincing 
nor controlling as far as a requirement that a Wyoming broker be actually involved in addition to selling 
his name and staying in Evanston.

[¶38.]  Surely Wyoming law cannot (or should not) 
be construed to imply that the only required function of the qualified 
residential broker is to sign a listing agreement and then otherwise distance 
himself from the transaction except as some modest fee may be paid to him for 
the name-use function by the out-of-state, unqualified real estate salesman. The 
course of telephone calls was part of the negotiating process, but not more 
completely definitive than attendance at and participation in the final draft of 
the sales documents, closing and immediate collection of the commission from the 
real estate proceeds paid in Cheyenne.

[¶39.]  Reason and precedent reflect that if 
everything had been reversed between states, in the state from which Mr. 
Swearingen came to Wyoming to involve himself in this real estate sale, as 
applied in Colorado, both a criminal penalty and a disallowance of commission 
would have been engendered. Lemler v. Real Estate Commission, 38 Colo. App. 489, 
558 P.2d 591 (1976) (Colorado statute is penal, § 12-61-119, C.R.S. 1973); 
Benham v. Heyde, 122 Colo. 233, 221 P.2d 1078 (1950); Broughall v. Black Forest 
Development Company, 196 Colo. 503, 593 P.2d 314 (1978); Brakhage v. Georgetown 
Associates, Inc., 33 Colo. App. 385, 523 P.2d 145 (1974); Cary v. Borden Co., 
153 Colo. 344, 386 P.2d 585 (1963). Disallowance on an even more closely 
identified factual situation is found in Ladner v. Harsh, 239 Miss. 46, 120 So. 2d 562 
(1960), and Fields v. Macnab, 70 Or. App. 154, 688 P.2d 409 (1984). See also, 
Annot., 74 A.L.R.3d 637, Recovery Back of Money Paid to Unlicensed Person 
Required by Law to Have Occupation or Business License or Permit to Make 
Contract; Sullivan v. PRC Oil & Gas Co., 148 Mich. App. 427, 383 N.W.2d 641 
(1986); Watts v. Andrews, 98 N.M. 404, 649 P.2d 472 
(1982).

[¶40.]  This decision poorly serves the purpose 
for which the real estate broker and salesman chapter was enacted to protect 
"the public in the handling of important and valuable transactions relating to 
real property." Toavs v. State by and through Real Estate Commission, Wyo., 635 P.2d 1172, 1174 (1981); Mapes v. Foster, 38 
Wyo. 244, 266 P. 109 (1928). The question is how to get to that desired regulation for this 
transaction involved with Wyoming participants 
and Wyoming 
property, differentiated only by the out-of-state unlicensed broker. Wyoming has clearly 
followed the rule that one of the ways is to deny collection of the commission 
when unlicensed. Dixon v. Ringsby, Wyo., 405 P.2d 271 (1965); Rosenberg v. Rosenblum, 72 Wyo. 91, 261 P.2d 41 (1953); Owens v. Capri, 65 Wyo. 325, 202 P.2d 174 
(1949).

"But under a statute 
enacted in exercise of the police power of the state expressly making unlawful a 
single isolated act of an unlicensed real estate broker in negotiating a sale, 
selling, or buying real estate, the decisions appear to be practically unanimous 
in holding that no compensation can be recovered under such circumstances by an 
unlicensed person." 202 P.2d  at 177.

[¶41.]  A trial evaluation of the Wyoming activities of 
Ronald N. Swearingen in consideration of the statutory criterion of "any 
negotiation" would be demonstrably appropriate. The summary-judgment disposition 
is not supported by this factual record for the decision on the controversial 
facts as a matter of law, and should not be affirmed by the apparent creation of 
a strange rule of real estate brokerage law. Cordova v. Gosar, Wyo., 719 P.2d 625 (1986). We need go no 
further than the definitive analysis of Federal District Judge Kerr, defining 
the appropriate answer in Doran v. Imeson Aviation, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 586, 588 
(D.Wyo. 1976):

"Since Doran was not a 
licensed real estate broker in the State of Wyoming, the contract between Doran and Imeson was void 
and any actions taken by Doran to sell the business were unlawful and Doran is 
prevented from bringing this action for his commission under the laws of 
Wyoming."

[¶42.]  The majority completely misrepresent the 
essential purpose and function of the residential broker when the unqualified 
out-of-state salesman (journeyman peddler in colloquial terminology) involves 
himself with a Wyoming sale of Wyoming real estate. It 
is a fundamental principle of the real estate industry that the licensed 
in-state broker is required in order to afford protection to the public against 
the uncontrolled conduct of the nonresident. This "captain of the ship" or 
responsible-licensee status is emplaced in the law to maintain a 
state-certificated entity with operational and financial responsibility for the 
transaction. Merely co-execution of the listing agreement will not legitimatize 
the nonperformance of the regulatory requirements implicit and explicit in 
Wyoming 
statutes, § 33-28-101, W.S. 1977, and the regulations adopted in accordance 
therewith by the Wyoming Real Estate Commission. Swearingen's recognition of the 
responsible Wyoming broker principle is 
demonstrated by his nominal compliance in associating with the Wyoming broker. 
Unfortunately, as the record re-flects, that relationship, in operation, was 
only nominal.

"Real estate brokers and 
salesmen are licensed by the State of Wyoming and required to meet high standards of 
honesty, integrity, trustworthiness and competency. Theirs is a regulated 
profession. Failure to satisfy those standards is ground for suspension or 
revocation of a real estate broker's or salesperson's license. An act licensing 
real estate agents must be construed in the light of an obvious purpose of 
protecting the public in the handling of important and valuable transactions 
relating to real property." Hagar v. Mobley, Wyo., 
638 P.2d 127, 136 (1981).

[¶43.]  What is evidenced here is the conduct of 
the Wyoming 
real estate business by an unlicensed person situated and resident out of the 
state. Contrary to what the majority suggest, the reciprocal arrangement is not 
permitted in any other state where the legislature has provided a real estate 
salesperson licensing act. See, for example, C.R.S. 1973, Art. 61, and 
particularly § 12-61-107 providing for a nonresident license with defined 
conditions including irrevocable consent to service of 
process.

[¶44.]  I respectfully 
dissent.