Title: Sixto Cotto v. State of Indiana

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

APPELLANT PRO SE 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Sixto Cotto 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Steve Carter 
Pendleton, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ellen H. Meilaender 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 74S05-0506-CR-288 
 
SIXTO COTTO, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Spencer Circuit Court, No. 74C01-0302-FA-44 
The Honorable Wayne A. Roell, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 74A05-0403-CR-131 
_________________________________ 
 
June 23, 2005 
 
Rucker, Justice. 
 
Defendant Sixto Cotto challenges the fifty-year sentence he received after being 
convicted for possession of methamphetamine as a Class A felony.  Finding the mitigating 
circumstances in balance with the aggravating circumstances, we revise Cotto’s sentence to 
thirty years. 
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
 
Armed with an arrest warrant for Cotto and a female companion, Indiana State Police 
officers went to Cotto’s home on January 24, 2003.  The home was near an elementary school.  
Several people were present, including the female companion and three of Cotto’s minor 
children.  While executing the warrant, the officers seized a white powdery substance later 
identified as twenty-nine grams of methamphetamine.  The officers also seized a green leafy 
substance, later identified as marijuana, and an assortment of drug paraphernalia.  Cotto was 
arrested and charged in a multi-count information with dealing in methamphetamine, a Class A 
felony; possession of methamphetamine within 1000 feet of a school, a Class A felony; 
possession of a controlled substance, a Class C felony; maintaining a common nuisance, a Class 
D felony; possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; reckless possession of paraphernalia, 
a Class A misdemeanor; and three separate counts of neglect of a dependent as Class D felonies.   
 
 
Trial was scheduled for September 29, 2003.  Three days before trial the State filed a 
motion to dismiss some of the counts.  Specifically the State moved to dismiss all charges 
against Cotto with the exception of possession of methamphetamine, a Class A felony,1 and 
reckless possession of paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor.  As grounds for the dismissal, the 
State asserted the “motion is made in the interests of simplifying the case for the jury and judicial 
economy to speed the resolution of the charges.”  Appellant’s App. at 181.  The trial court 
granted the motion on the morning of trial.  After the trial court addressed a few additional 
preliminary matters, and shortly before the trial court summoned the potential jurors into the 
courtroom, Cotto expressed his desire to plead guilty to the pending charges.  After making 
                                                 
1 See Indiana Code section 35-48-4-6 which provides in relevant part: 
 
(a) A person who . . . knowingly or intentionally possesses . . . methamphetamine (pure or 
adulterated) commits possession of . . . methamphetamine, a Class D felony, except as 
provided in subsection (b). 
(b) The offense is  . . . 
(3)  a Class A felony if the person possesses the . . . methamphetamine in an amount 
(pure or adulterated) weighing at least three (3) grams . . . 
(B)  in, on, or within one thousand (1,000) feet of: 
(i)  school property . . . . 
 
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inquiry and advising Cotto of his constitutional rights, the trial court accepted Cotto’s guilty plea, 
found him guilty as charged, and scheduled a sentencing hearing.  There was no plea agreement.   
 
 
At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing the trial court sentenced Cotto to a term of 
fifty years for the methamphetamine conviction and one year for the paraphernalia conviction.  
On direct appeal, Cotto challenged only his methamphetamine sentence contending it was 
excessive.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence in an unpublished memorandum 
decision.  Cotto v. State, 74A05-0403-CR-131 (Ind. Ct. App. July 19, 2004).  Cotto has 
petitioned to transfer, which we now grant.  
 
Discussion 
 
The Indiana Constitution provides, “The Supreme Court shall have, in all appeals of 
criminal cases, the power to review all questions of law and to review and revise the sentence 
imposed.”  Ind. Const. art. VII, § 4.  Our rules authorize revision of a sentence “if, after due 
consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in 
light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.”  Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B).   
 
 
Cotto seeks revision of his sentence contending it is excessive because the trial court 
improperly found certain aggravating circumstances and failed to find any mitigating 
circumstances.  In general, sentencing determinations are within the trial court’s discretion.  
Wooley v. State, 716 N.E.2d 919, 929 (Ind. 1999).  If the trial court relies on aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances to enhance or reduce the presumptive sentence, it must (1) identify all 
significant mitigating and aggravating circumstances; (2) state the specific reason why each 
circumstance is determined to be mitigating or aggravating; and (3) articulate the court’s 
evaluation and balancing of the circumstances.  Id.  
 
 
The Legislature has prescribed standard or “presumptive” sentences for each crime, 
allowing the sentencing court limited discretion to enhance a sentence to reflect aggravating 
circumstances or reduce it to reflect mitigating circumstances.  In this case, the applicable statute 
reads, “A person who commits a Class A felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of thirty 
 
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(30) years, with not more than twenty (20) years added for aggravating circumstances or not 
more than ten (10) years subtracted for mitigating circumstances . . . .”  Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4.2  
In this case the trial court enhanced Cotto’s sentence from the presumptive term of thirty years to 
the maximum term of fifty years based on five aggravating circumstances: (1) Cotto’s criminal 
history, (2) his likelihood of reoffending based on his history of arrests, (3) the circumstances of 
the crime suggested Cotto was involved in a substantial drug operation, (4) a reduced sentence 
would depreciate the seriousness of the crime, and (5) his need of rehabilitative treatment would 
be best provided by a penal facility.   
 
The State concedes that the trial court improperly relied on the aggravator that the 
“reduced sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the crime.”  This factor serves only to 
support a refusal to impose less than the presumptive sentence and does not serve as a valid 
aggravating factor supporting an enhanced sentence.  Pickens v. State, 767 N.E.2d 530, 533 (Ind. 
2002).  Here there is no indication that the trial court ever considered giving Cotto less than the 
presumptive sentence.  Therefore, the consideration of this factor was improper.  See id. at 533 
(holding that the trial court’s consideration of this factor was incorrect where there was nothing 
in the record to indicate that the trial court was considering less than the presumptive sentence).  
The State also concedes that the “need of rehabilitative treatment” as an aggravating 
circumstance is not applicable in this case because the trial court failed to explain why Cotto is in 
need of rehabilitative treatment that can best be provided by a penal facility.  Every executed 
sentence involves incarceration.  Wooley, 716 N.E.2d at 930.  As a result there must be a specific 
and individualized statement explaining why extended incarceration is appropriate.  Id.  See also 
Hollins v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1305, 1308 (Ind. 1997) (holding that trial court must provide 
specific or individualized statement of the reasons justifying a sentence in excess of the 
                                                 
2 Two significant events have occurred since the parties filed their initial briefs in this case.  On June 24, 
2004, the United States Supreme Court decided Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.___, 124 S.Ct. 2531 
(2004), which held that facts supporting an enhanced sentence must be admitted by the defendant or 
found by a jury.  Although challenging his sentence, Cotto has made no Blakely claim either before the 
Court of Appeals by way of subsequent pleadings or before this Court on transfer.  Thus, any such claim 
is waived.  See Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679 (Ind. 2005).  Subsequent to Blakely, the Legislature 
amended Indiana’s sentencing statutes, including Indiana Code section 35-50-2-4.  Among other things, 
the amendment eliminated presumptive sentences and fixed terms in favor of an advisory sentencing 
scheme.  See 2005 Ind. Legis. Serv. P.L. 71-2005 (declared an emergency and effective April 25, 2005).  
Because we revise Cotto’s sentence to the presumptive term, we do not address whether the amended 
statute applies to criminal sentences imposed before the effective date.   
 
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presumptive term); Robey v. State, 555 N.E.2d 145, 150-51 (Ind. 1990) (discussing requirement 
of a specific and individualized statement of the reasons supporting an enhanced sentenced).  
Here, the trial court did not provide such a statement and consequently the use of this 
aggravating circumstance was improper.  The Court of Appeals recognized the State’s 
concession and did not consider these two aggravators in its analysis of Cotto’s sentence. 
 
When one or more aggravating circumstances cited by the trial court are invalid, the court 
on appeal must decide whether the remaining circumstance or circumstances are sufficient to 
support the sentence imposed.  Merlington v. State, 814 N.E.2d 269, 273 (Ind. 2004).  Where we 
find an irregularity in a trial court’s sentencing decision, we have the option to remand to the trial 
court for a clarification or new sentencing determination, to affirm the sentence if the error is 
harmless, or to reweigh the proper aggravating and mitigating circumstances independently at 
the appellate level.  Id.  We elect the last option here. 
 
In imposing Cotto’s sentence the trial court declared, “The Court has reviewed all of the 
mitigating circumstances, statutory and otherwise, and could find none that apply.” Appellant’s 
App. at 8.  The finding of mitigating factors is within the discretion of the trial court.  Fugate v. 
State, 608 N.E.2d 1370, 1374 (Ind. 1993).  It is true that a trial court is not obligated to weigh or 
credit the mitigating factors in the manner a defendant suggests they should be weighed or 
credited.  Georgopulos v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1138, 1145 (Ind. 2000); Shields v. State, 699 N.E.2d 
636, 639 (Ind. 1998).  However, when a trial court fails to find a mitigator that the record clearly 
supports, a reasonable belief arises that the mitigator was improperly overlooked.  Shields, 699 
N.E.2d at 640.  
 
Our courts have long held that a defendant who pleads guilty deserves to have some 
mitigating weight extended to the guilty plea in return.  Widener v. State, 659 N.E.2d 529, 534 
(Ind. 1995); Hardebeck v. State, 656 N.E.2d 486, 493 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied.  See 
also Duvall v. State, 540 N.E.2d 34, 35 (Ind. 1989); Lang v. State, 461 N.E.2d 1110, 1112-13 
(Ind. 1984); Singer v. State, 674 N.E.2d 11, 14 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).  A guilty plea demonstrates 
a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility for the crime and at least partially confirms the 
mitigating evidence regarding his character.  Scheckel v. State, 655 N.E.2d 506, 511 (Ind. 1995); 
 
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see also Williams v. State, 430 N.E.2d 759, 764 (Ind. 1982) (“[A] defendant who willingly enters 
a plea of guilty has extended a substantial benefit to the state and deserves to have a substantial 
benefit extended to him in return.”). 
 
In this case the Court of Appeals discounted Cotto’s guilty plea on the ground that he 
“pled guilty to one Class A felony and one Class A misdemeanor, and the State dismissed the 
other charges.”  Slip op. at 7.  Thus, Cotto “had already received some benefit from his guilty 
plea.”  Id.  The inference here is that the State dismissed several charges against Cotto in 
exchange for his plea of guilty.  However the record presents a different picture.  The State’s 
decision to dismiss apparently was done for its own benefit and not for the benefit of Cotto.  As 
the State explained, its motion was made “in the interests of simplifying the case for the jury and 
judicial economy to speed the resolution of the charges.”  Appellant’s App. at 181.  Thus Cotto 
actually obtained no benefit from pleading guilty.  Of course we have frequently observed that a 
plea is not necessarily a significant mitigating factor.  Sensback v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1160, 1165 
(Ind. 1999).  However in this case the trial court did not identify Cotto’s plea as a mitigating 
factor at all.  This was error.  Cotto’s guilty plea is a mitigating factor entitled to some weight. 
 
The record also shows Cotto crafted a four-page handwritten letter that was introduced 
and read into the record at the sentencing hearing.  Among other things, Cotto acknowledged that 
he was addicted to drugs, expressed remorse for his actions, said that he was sorry for what he 
had done, and asked the court for mercy.  Appellant’s App. at 241-43.  Our courts have 
recognized remorse as a valid mitigating circumstance.  Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235, 238 
(Ind. 2004) (holding that because defendant pleaded guilty in the early stages of the proceedings, 
demonstrated remorse, and apologized for his actions, the weight attributable to defendant’s plea 
of guilty was in the high range); Rose v. State, 810 N.E.2d 361, 367 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) 
(holding that trial court correctly found defendant’s remorse as shown by his plea of guilty was a 
mitigating circumstance); Cloum v. State, 779 N.E.2d 84, 90 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (concluding 
the trial court abused its discretion in not assigning mitigating weight to defendant’s decision to 
plead guilty when the guilty plea substantially benefited the State and defendant presented 
positive character evidence indicating the plea truly represented remorse and an acceptance of 
responsibility).  In this case we assign mitigating weight to Cotto’s expression of remorse.  
 
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The valid aggravating circumstances found by the trial court were (1) Cotto’s criminal 
history, (2) his likelihood to reoffend based on his history of arrests, and (3) the circumstances of 
the crime suggested Cotto was involved in a substantial drug operation.  As for Cotto’s criminal 
history, although Cotto has a lengthy arrest record, he has only been convicted of five alcohol-
related misdemeanors.  These include operating while intoxicated, public intoxication, disorderly 
conduct, and an “obstruction” conviction in the State of Florida, the details of which are not 
revealed by the record.  Tr. at 14-18.  
 
A record of arrest, without more, does not establish the historical fact that a defendant 
committed a criminal offense and may not be properly considered as evidence of criminal 
history.  Scheckel v. State, 620 N.E.2d 681, 683 (Ind. 1993).  However, a record of arrest, 
particularly a lengthy one, may reveal that a defendant has not been deterred even after having 
been subject to the police authority of the State.  Id.  Such information may be relevant to the 
trial court’s assessment of the defendant’s character in terms of the risk that he will commit 
another crime.  Id.  Here, the trial court properly considered Cotto’s arrest record as an indication 
that Cotto will likely reoffend.  But we conclude that the alcohol-related misdemeanor 
convictions are only marginally significant as aggravating factors in considering a sentence for a 
Class A felony.  The “[s]ignificance varies based on the gravity, nature and number of prior 
offenses as they relate to the current offense.”  Wooley, 716 N.E.2d at 929 n.4.  See also Neale v. 
State, 826 N.E.2d 635, 639 (Ind. 2005) (concluding that the aggravating weight of defendant’s 
extensive criminal history of mostly alcohol-related misdemeanors not sufficient to justify 
maximum sentence for Class A felony); Ruiz v. State, 818 N.E.2d 927, 929 (Ind. 2004) 
(concluding that four alcohol-related offenses were marginally significant as aggravating factors 
for a Class B felony).  
 
 
We agree that the three remaining aggravating factors are valid.  However we do not 
believe that their collective weight is greater than the mitigating effect of Cotto’s plea of guilty 
and his expression of remorse.  We therefore conclude that the presumptive sentence of thirty 
years is the appropriate sentence in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the 
offender. 
 
 
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Conclusion 
 
 
We affirm Cotto’s conviction for possession of methamphetamine in excess of three 
grams within 1000 feet of a school.  We remand this cause to the trial court with instructions to 
impose a sentence of thirty years.  
 
Shepard, C.J., and Sullivan, J., concur. 
 
Dickson, J., dissents, believing that the trial court was in the best position to determine whether 
mitigating consideration should be given to Cotto’s eventual guilty plea at the commencement of 
his trial and to his claim of remorse, and believing that the trial court’s consideration of Cotto’s 
involvement in a substantial drug operation is sufficient in itself to warrant the sentence imposed 
by the trial court.  Boehm, J., joins. 
 
 
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