Title: Matter of Desotell

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matter of Desotell1989 WY 20767 P.2d 998Case Number: 88-105Decided: 01/20/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE 
MATTER OF THE INJURY TO DENNY G. DESOTELL, DECEASED, EMPLOYEE. GAIL A. DESOTELL, 
APPELLANT (CLAIMANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE OF 
WYOMING, EX REL. WYOMING WORKER'S 
COMPENSATION DIVISION, APPELLEE (OBJECTOR-DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal from 
the District Court, Big HornCounty, James N. Wolfe, 
J.

 
 
Michael S. 
Messenger and Wendy L. Press of Messenger & Jurovich, Thermopolis, for appellant.

 
 
Joseph B. 
Meyer, Atty. Gen., Josephine T. Porter, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Ron Arnold, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

 
 
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     On June 30, 1985, Denny 
G. Desotell died of a heart attack while driving a tractor-trailer near 
Elk Mountain, Wyoming. Gail Desotell, his widow, filed a 
claim for death benefits under the worker's compensation statutes. The Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Division (Division) filed an objection to her claim, which 
was ultimately denied after a trial. On appeal, Gail Desotell argues that the 
trial court did not properly apply the plain language of W.S. 27-12-603 (June 
1983 Repl.),1 to the facts of this 
case.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     In June 1985, Mr. 
Desotell was employed as a truck driver by Chancey Yenny of Greybull, Wyoming. On June 23, 
1985, Mr. Desotell and his wife left Greybull, 
Wyoming, to haul a variety of cargoes between 
the states of Wyoming, California, Washington 
and Colorado. 
The trip progressed normally between Wyoming 
and Vancouver, Washington.

 
 

[¶4.]     Mr. Desotell and his 
wife arrived in Vancouver on June 28, 1985, expecting to pick 
up a trailer loaded with steel beams. The paper work for the load was supposed 
to have been completed so that Mr. Desotell could hook onto the trailer and 
leave. When they arrived in Vancouver, however, they found an improperly 
balanced load, no paperwork, and defective lights and brakes on the 
trailer.

 
 

[¶5.]     With his wife's help, 
Mr. Desotell tried to reposition the beams, but to no avail. Eventually he was 
able to use a forklift to move the beams. Once the beams were repositioned, Mr. 
Desotell spent some time securing the load with chains and "binders." While 
tightening a binder with a "cheater bar," he suffered a medical condition known 
as an ischemic attack or temporary loss of oxygen to the heart. The attack 
rendered him momentarily short of breath and caused him to drop to his knees. 
These symptoms were not recognized as a heart problem by either Mr. Desotell or 
his wife, and after the symptoms subsided, they finished securing the load. Mr. 
Desotell also had to reset the trailer brakes and rewire the lights. These tasks 
completed, the couple spent some time driving around Vancouver to acquire the remaining paperwork necessary for 
the trip to Colorado. They finally arrived in Ontario, Oregon, around midnight.

 
 

[¶6.]     The couple arose around 
5:30 a.m. on June 29, 1985, and Mr. Desotell drove to Little America, Wyoming. At trial, Mrs. Desotell recalled that 
during this part of the trip her husband was lethargic and quieter than usual, 
was perspiring, and appeared pale. She also recalled seeing him rubbing his 
chest area. They spent the night at Little 
America. On June 30, 1985, while driving near Elk Mountain, Wyoming, Mr. Desotell became pale, his speech 
slurred, and he called for help on his C.B. radio. He told his wife how to shut 
down the truck and then suddenly went into cardiac arrest. An ambulance was 
summoned from Laramie, 
Wyoming, and several attempts to 
revive him in the meantime were unsuccessful. By the time the ambulance pulled 
into IvinsonHospital in Laramie, Mr. Desotell was 
dead.

 
 

[¶7.]     By stipulation of the 
parties, expert medical testimony was introduced at trial through depositions. 
Gail Desotell relied upon the expert testimony of Glen L. Loveday, M.D., a 
doctor of internal medicine. Dr. Loveday testified that Mr. Desotell suffered an 
ischemic attack on June 28, 1985, in Vancouver. His opinion was that the physical 
and emotional stress Mr. Desotell experienced while tightening the load of steel 
beams on that day caused the ischemic attack. He described an ischemic attack as 
a condition in which the heart muscle does not receive an adequate blood supply, 
causing it momentarily to malfunction. Dr. Loveday then explained that the 
symptoms Mr. Desotell experienced after the ischemic attack were signs that his 
heart was unstable and susceptible to a "severe cardiac event." In Dr. Loveday's 
expert opinion, Mr. Desotell died on June 30, 1985, of sudden cardiac death. The 
cause of death listed on the death certificate was a condition called a 
myocardial infarction (heart attack), which can lead to sudden cardiac 
death.

 
 

[¶8.]     On cross examination, 
Dr. Loveday agreed with the autopsy findings of Linda Yost, M.D., an expert 
medical witness for the state. Dr. Yost concluded that Mr. Desotell had suffered 
from long-term narrowing of the coronary arteries, or atherosclerosis, when he 
died. This narrowing eventually led to blockage of blood flow to Mr. Desotell's 
heart muscle, causing it to stop beating. Dr. Loveday testified that such 
narrowing can be the result of numerous physiological and emotional factors the 
effect of which are combined over a period of years. He also agreed that a 
person suffering from atherosclerosis would not necessarily have to be working 
to have a heart attack; in fact, an atherosclerotic person could suffer a sudden 
heart attack while at rest or asleep. Dr. Loveday found no evidence in Mr. 
Desotell's medical history before June 28, 1985, that he had ever suffered a 
heart attack. When questioned about the nature of Mr. Desotell's ischemic attack 
in Vancouver, 
Dr. Loveday would not speculate whether Mr. Desotell's ischemic attack resulted 
in any permanent heart muscle 
damage.

 
 

[¶9.]     This testimony was 
consistent with Dr. Yost's findings in the autopsy report, which showed no 
microscopic muscle cell death associated with the ischemic attack. Dr. Loveday 
testified instead that the ischemic attack was the first outward indication of 
the unstable nature of Mr. Desotell's heart. After the ischemic attack, Mr. 
Desotell's heart became noticeably unstable and he should have been 
hospitalized.

 
 

[¶10.]  Mrs. Desotell filed her claim for death 
benefits on July 25, 1985. The Division informed her of its objection to an 
award of death benefits on August 28, 1985, eventually filing a formal objection 
on July 23, 1986. After discovery and other pretrial maneuvering, the case was 
set for trial on February 5, 1988. On March 1, 1988, the trial court entered its 
order denying death benefits to Mrs. Desotell. This appeal 
followed.

 
 

[¶11.]  Mrs. Desotell's first issue is based on 
W.S. 27-12-603(b) (June 1983 Repl.), which, at the time of Mr. Desotell's death, 
provided:

 
 
     Benefits for 
employment-related coronary conditions except those directly and solely caused 
by an injury or disease are not payable unless the employee establishes by 
competent medical authority that there is a direct causal connection between the 
condition under which the work was performed and the cardiac condition, and then 
only if the causative exertion occurs during the actual period of employment 
stress clearly unusual to, or abnormal for, employees in that particular 
employment, and further that the acute symptoms of the cardiac condition are 
clearly manifested not later than four (4) hours after the alleged causative 
exertion.

 
 
She argues 
that, in denying her award, the trial court applied this statute in 
contravention of recent case law from this court involving similar fact 
situations. Specifically, she asserts that Yost v. Wyoming State Treasurer, ex 
rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, 654 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1982), and 
Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division v. 
Schwilke, 649 P.2d 218 (Wyo. 1982), control the outcome of this case. As we 
shall show, her reliance on those two decisions is understandable but, 
regrettably for her, misplaced.

 
 

[¶12.]  In Schwilke we affirmed the district 
court's award of widow-and-children's benefits. According to expert testimony, 
Mr. Schwilke, the deceased truck driver, had suffered a heart attack within the 
twenty-four hour period before his death; he suffered a second heart attack 
while at work and died instantly. His work immediately before the fatal heart 
attack involved the usual and normal activity of loading oilfield equipment onto 
his truck. The trial court's award of benefits was affirmed under statutory 
language identical to that set out above.2 649 P.2d  at 223. This court 
reasoned that our previous holding of Mor, Inc. v. Haverlock, 566 P.2d 219, 222 
(Wyo. 1977), 
required the application of a subjective test to determine whether Mr. 
Schwilke's activities at work on the day he died were unusual or abnormal under 
the statute. This court opined that, under the subjective test applied in Mor, 
Mr. Schwilke's once normal and usual workday activity of loading his truck 
metamorphosed into very abnormal and unusual workday activity based on medical 
testimony proving heart damage caused by his earlier heart 
attack.

 
 

[¶13.]  This application of the subjective test 
was incorrect. For purposes of deciding the Schwilkes' claim, the applicable 
Wyoming 
statutory provision was the one amended in 1977, which plainly imposed an 
objective, not a subjective, test to determine the character of the period of 
work related stress in question. That statute is the same one quoted above in 
this case, and it reads in pertinent part: "only if the causative exertion 
occurs during the actual period of employment stress clearly unusual to, or 
abnormal for, employees in that 
particular employment * * *." (Emphasis added.) Contrast that statutory 
language with the language of W.S. 27-361(b), 1957, C. 1967 (Cum.Supp. 1975),3 which controlled the outcome of 
Mor, and which provided in pertinent part: "only if the causative exertion 
occurs during the actual period of employment stress clearly unusual to, or 
abnormal for, the individual employee, in 
that particular employment * * *." Id. at 221. (Emphasis added.) Obviously, this 
court upheld the award of benefits in Schwilke by misapplying the subjective 
test mandated by W.S. 27-316(b) 1957, C. 1967 (Cum.Supp. 1975), and followed in 
Mor, when it should have reversed the award by adhering to the express objective 
test required under W.S. 27-12-603(b) (1977). See 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 142, 
§ 27-361. See also Comment, The Compensability of Cardiac Conditions Under 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation: Health Insurance or Worker's Compensation? XX 
Land & Water L.Rev. 607, 614-15 (1985).

 
 

[¶14.]  The state's reaction to Schwilke was 
predictable: it drove Yost into court as the "vehicle with which to overrule" 
Schwilke and establish an application of the objective test required by amended 
statutory language. Yost, 654 P.2d  at 139. In Yost the deceased truck driver, 
according to medical testimony, had suffered an earlier heart attack within two 
to fourteen days before suffering his second fatal heart attack at work. As in 
Schwilke, Mr. Yost had been performing his usual and normal work activities when 
he suffered fatal arrhythmia as a complication of the first attack. Although the 
applicable statute, W.S. 27-12-603(b) (1977), had been codified as amended in 
1977 for nearly five years, this court again misapplied the subjective test 
first recognized in Mor and incorrectly followed in Schwilke. On that basis, the 
district court's denial of death benefits based on the plain language of the 
1977 statute was reversed.

 
 

[¶15.]  This court erred in Schwilke and Yost by 
misreading the clear 1977 legislative mandate requiring claimants to prove "an 
actual period of employment stress" based on an objective standard and by 
applying the superseded subjective test used in Mor. We shall not perpetuate 
that error here.

 
 

[¶16.]  Another problem with this court's 
application of W.S. 27-12-603(b) (1977), in Schwilke and Yost was our failure to 
keep the four requirements set out by the statute distinct and in the proper 
logical order of proof. Given the way the statute is phrased, the claimant must 
first prove that the injured employee experienced an "actual period of 
employment stress clearly unusual to, 
or abnormal for, employees in that particular employment * * *." Next, and only 
after proof of the first requirement, the claimant must establish legal 
causation, by proving a "causative exertion" during the proven period of actual 
unusual or abnormal stress. Then, the claimant must establish medical causation, 
by introducing competent medical testimony evidencing a direct causal connection 
between the causative exertion and the coronary condition. Last, the claimant 
must introduce evidence showing that the acute symptoms of that coronary 
condition were manifested within four hours of the causative exertion. State, ex 
rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division v. Van Buskirk, 721 P.2d 570, 572 
(Wyo. 1986) first analyzed as a four-part test in Claim of McCarley, 590 P.2d 1333, 1335-336 (Wyo. 1979).

 
 

[¶17.]  This court, without explanation, has 
repeatedly lumped the first two elements of proof together, thereby misreading 
the legislative distinction between "an actual period of employment stress" and 
a "causative exertion." See, e.g., Kaan v. State, ex rel. Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Division, 689 P.2d 1387, 1389 (Wyo. 1984); Creek v. Town of Hulett, 
657 P.2d 353, 356 (Wyo. 1983), Yost, 654 P.2d  at 140; Schwilke, 649 P.2d  at 220. 
Compare Van Buskirk, 721 P.2d  at 573; and Yost, 654 P.2d  at 143 (Rooney, J., 
dissenting, in which Raper, J., joined).

 
 

[¶18.]  It is fundamental when reading an 
unambiguous statute to give every word a meaning so that no word is superfluous. 
See Sanchez v. State, 751 P.2d 1300, 1305 (Wyo. 1988). A plain reading of the statute 
reveals that the claimant must establish "a direct causal connection between the 
condition under which the work was performed and the cardiac condition and then 
only if the causative exertion occurs 
during the actual period of employment stress * * *." The 
statute sets out the "period of employment stress" and "causative exertion" as 
distinct requirements and phrases them so that the period of stress must be 
proven under the objective standard discussed above, before the causative exertion alleged to 
have occurred during the period of stress can be identified as legal causation. 
Cf. Claim of McCarley, 590 P.2d  at 1336.

 
 

[¶19.]  Our analysis of this court's past 
misapplication of W.S. 27-12-603(b) (1977), culminates in a rule that is true to 
the plain language of the statute. Although we recognize that the compensation 
act should be liberally construed in favor of an award, we also must recognize 
"such a policy does not give us carte blanche authority to ignore clear 
statutory provisions and under the guise of construction extend the beneficent 
purpose of the law to a disease or injury that does not fall reasonably within 
the reach of legislative language." Olson v. Federal American Partners, 567 P.2d 710, 714 (Wyo. 
1977). For a claimant to receive benefits under W.S. 27-12-603(b) (June 1983 
Repl.), he must first prove, under the statutorily imposed objective standard, 
that the injured employee experienced an "actual period of employment stress 
clearly unusual to, or abnormal for, employees in that particular employment * * 
*" "[T]hen only if the causative exertion occurs during * * *" the proven period 
of employment stress, can the claimant proceed to prove medical causation and 
the four hour requirement. We must read the statute this way to give the 
requirement of a "period of stress" and a "causative exertion" each plain and 
distinct meaning.

 
 

[¶20.]  We follow that approach in this case. 
Mrs. Desotell argues that Mr. Desotell experienced a period of employment 
stress, when they were in Vancouver trying to pick up the load of steel 
beams, that was unusual or abnormal for employees in his occupation. She asserts 
that the combination of the emotional and physical stress Mr. Desotell 
experienced (1) when he arrived in Vancouver and found an improperly balanced 
load, no paperwork, and a trailer lacking proper brakes and lights, and (2) when 
he repositioned and tightened the load established the required period of 
unusual stress. The trial court heard this argument, but concluded that the 
events in Vancouver, when viewed objectively, could not 
be viewed as creating a period of stress unusual to, or abnormal for, other 
"employees" who drive tractor-trailer rigs. Our standard for reviewing the 
sufficiency of the evidence underlying such a trial court finding involves 
examining only the evidence in the record that is favorable to the prevailing 
party, giving that evidence every favorable inference. In the Matter of Bagshaw, 
753 P.2d 1044, 1045 (Wyo. 1988). Although we do not question the 
assertion that Mr. Desotell experienced some stress as a result of the problems 
he encountered in Vancouver, we hold the trial 
court was correct when, under the objective standard, it found the period of 
stress Mr. Desotell experienced in Vancouver was not unusual to, or abnormal for, 
"employees" who drive tractor-trailer rigs. Under the applicable standard of 
review the record supports that finding and we must defer to it. The trial court 
properly denied Mrs. Desotell's claim for death benefits under W.S. 27-12-603(b) 
(June 1983 Repl.).

 
 

[¶21.]  The second issue asserted by Mrs. 
Desotell is that she "could" be entitled to benefits under W.S. 27-12-603(a) 
(June 1983 Repl.). That statute provides:

 
 
(a) The 
burden of proof in contested cases involving injuries which occur over a 
substantial period of time is on the employee to make proper proof of his claim 
by a preponderance of the evidence, and to also prove by competent medical 
authority that his claim arose out of and in the course of his employment, by 
showing by a preponderance of evidence that:

 
 
(i) There 
is a direct causal connection between the condition or circumstances under which 
the work is performed and the injury; 

 
 
(ii) The 
injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work as a 
result of the employment;

 
 
(iii) The 
injury can fairly be traced to the employment as a proximate 
cause;

 
 
(iv) The 
injury does not come from a hazard to which employees would have been equally 
exposed outside of the employment; and

 
 
(v) The 
injury is incidental to the character of the business and not independent of the 
relation of employer and employee.

 
 
Her second 
argument is a novel one. She essentially argues that if her husband could not 
recover under W.S. 27-12-603(b) (June 1983 Repl.), then his death was somehow 
"unexplainable" and must be covered under W.S. 27-12-603(a) (June 1983 Repl.), 
because Mr. Desotell died while working.

 
 

[¶22.]  The plain language of W.S. 27-12-603(a) 
(June 1983 Repl.), does not support that theory of recovery; further, the trial 
court did not find facts capable of supporting a claim under that statute. To 
meet the requirements quoted above, Mrs. Desotell had to show that something 
other than slowly developing atherosclerosis was the proximate cause of Mr. 
Desotell's June 30, 1985, heart attack. She failed to do so at trial. The trial 
court found that Mr. Desotell died of an initial heart attack on June 30, 1988, 
while performing his usual and normal work activities. At trial, the state 
elicited competent medical evidence attributing Mr. Desotell's heart attack to 
years of atherosclerotic build-up in his coronary arteries. Mrs. Desotell, on 
the other hand, could not show a direct causal connection between Mr. Desotell's 
work activities and his heart attack. The trial court found in favor of the 
state. The applicable standard of appellate review requires that we defer to the 
trial court's findings, and, in doing so, we must agree with the trial court 
that Mrs. Desotell was not entitled to death benefits under W.S. 27-12-603(a) 
(June 1983 Repl.).

 
 

[¶23.]  The trial court correctly denied benefits 
to Mrs. Desotell under both W.S. 27-12-603(b) (June 1983 Repl.) and W.S. 
27-12-603(a) (June 1983 Repl.). Affirmed.

 
 

THOMAS, J., filed 
a specially concurring opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Gail Desotell's claim 
arose under W.S. 27-12-101 through 27-12-805 (June 1983 Repl.). That chapter was 
repealed and amended effective July 1, 1987. It is now codified as W.S. 
27-14-101 through 27-14-804 (June 1987 Repl.).

 
 

2 This case arises 
under W.S. 27-12-603(b) (June 1983 Repl.), and Schwilke and Yost arose under 
W.S. 27-12-603(b) (1977); the language of the 1977 and 1983 codifications of the 
statute is identical.

 
 

3 See 1969 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 200, 
§ 15.

 
 

THOMAS, Justice, 
specially concurring.

 
 

[¶24.]  I agree with the result reached by the 
majority opinion in this case. I agree because I think that result is 
predictable whether the objective test now adopted by the court pertains, or 
whether the subjective test from existing case precedent 
pertains.

 
 

[¶25.]  I am concerned, however, because I 
interpret the majority opinion as saying that it is correcting an error of the 
court from prior cases. This approach is a departure from the usual application 
of the doctrine of stare decisis, and I cannot agree with it. Existing precedent 
stands as a rule of law, and if no longer acceptable, it should be 
overruled.

 
 

[¶26.]  The thesis of the majority is, adopting 
the law from Comment, The Compensability of Cardiac Conditions under Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation: Health Insurance or Worker's Compensation?, XX Land & 
Water L.Rev. 607 (1985), that prior decisions of the court were in error because 
they did not apply the objective test clearly manifested by the amendment to the 
statute in 1977. The law journal article draws that conclusion only from the 
language of the statute. That may be an appropriate opinion, but the Supreme 
Court of Wyoming had a contrary opinion which became the court's judgment. In 
essence, the cases decided after the amendment of the statute consider the 
language "employees in that particular employment" as the substantial equivalent 
of "the individual employee in that particular employment." SeeWyomingState Treasurer ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division v. Schwilke, 649 P.2d 218 (Wyo. 1982); Yost v. WyomingState 
Treasurer ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Division, 654 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1982); Creek v. 
Town of Hulett, 657 P.2d 353 (Wyo. 1983). That view was 
articulated as early as 1982, and yet the legislature did not choose to make any 
further change in the statute.

 
 

[¶27.]  The majority here then cannot be engaged 
in correcting an error of law made by this court previously like the court would 
do with respect to a prior decision of an inferior court. Instead, if the 
doctrine of stare decisis has significance, it is clear that the court now is 
changing the law. Certainly, the court can do that. I would object strenuously, 
however, if it appeared to me that the appellant would be entitled to relief 
under the prior rule because this is a change in substantive law which should be 
prospective only.

 
 

[¶28.]  This latter feature may be of some import 
with respect to claims which arose prior to the promulgation of this 
decision.