Title: State v. Christen

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2021 WI 39 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP1767-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Mitchell L. Christen, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 391 Wis. 2d 650,943 N.W.2d 357 
(2020 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 4, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 21, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit    
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Nicholas McNamara   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ROGGENSACK, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, JJ., 
joined.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring opinion.  REBECCA 
GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Steven Roy, Sun Prairie. There was an oral argument by 
Steven Roy.  
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Nicholas S. DeSantis, assistant attorney general; with whom on 
the brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an 
oral argument by Nicholas S. DeSantis. 
 
 
2021 WI 39 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2019AP1767-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2018CM1998) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,   
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent,   
 
 
v. 
 
Mitchell L. Christen,   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
FILED 
 
MAY 4, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ROGGENSACK, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, JJ., 
joined.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring opinion.  REBECCA 
GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   This is a review of 
an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State v. 
Christen, No. 2019AP1767-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
Mar. 17, 2020), affirming the Dane County circuit court's1 
judgment convicting Mitchell Christen of operating or going 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Nicholas J. McNamara presided.  
No. 
2019AP1767-CR   
 
2 
 
armed with a firearm while intoxicated, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 941.20(1)(b) (2017-18).2   
¶2 
Christen challenges his conviction arguing that Wis. 
Stat. § 941.20(1)(b) is unconstitutional as applied to him.  He 
does not raise a facial challenge to the statute.  Specifically, 
Christen claims that the statute violates his fundamental Second 
Amendment right to armed self-defense as held in District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).3  In Heller, the United 
States Supreme Court recognized that the core of the Second 
Amendment is the right to possess or carry a firearm for self-
defense.  Id. at 635. 
¶3 
However, as to Christen's as-applied challenge, we 
conclude Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1)(b) does not strike at the core 
right of the Second Amendment because he did not act in self-
defense.  Moreover, we conclude that § 941.20(1)(b) does not 
severely burden his Second Amendment right.  Accordingly, we 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 We note that the United States Supreme Court in District 
of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), stated this right in 
a variety of ways: "the individual right to possess and carry 
weapons in case of confrontation," id. at 592; "an individual 
right to use arms for self-defense," id. at 603; and "the right 
of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of 
hearth and home," id. at 635.  Each of these formulations makes 
clear that the Second Amendment protects the right of an 
individual to possess and carry weapons for self-defense.  See 
State v. Roundtree, 2021 WI 1, ¶35, 395 Wis. 2d 94, 952 
N.W.2d 765 (identifying the core Second Amendment right detailed 
in Heller as "the right of a law-abiding, responsible citizen to 
possess and carry a weapon for self-defense"). 
No. 
2019AP1767-CR   
 
3 
 
apply intermediate scrutiny to Christen's as-applied challenge.  
Because § 941.20(1)(b) is substantially related to the important 
government objective of protecting public safety, it survives 
intermediate scrutiny as applied to Christen.  
¶4 
Accordingly, we conclude that Christen's as-applied 
challenge to Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1)(b) fails.  Therefore, we 
affirm.  
 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶5 
This case involves somewhat conflicting testimony 
about Christen arming himself in self-defense.  Christen, his 
roommates, and his roommates' friends had been drinking alcohol 
on the evening of February 2, 2018.  There was conflicting 
testimony about how much and to what extent there was arguing 
and 
pushing 
among 
them. 
 
However, 
the 
testimony 
was 
uncontroverted that Christen did arm himself.  The jury was 
called upon to weigh and consider the evidence and determined 
that Christen went armed, was intoxicated, and did not act in 
self-defense. 
¶6 
The jury heard that Christen and his two roommates, 
B.H. 
and 
C.R., 
had 
a 
rocky 
relationship. 
 
This 
rocky 
relationship came to a head on the night that gave rise to this 
case, February 2, 2018.  On that night, Christen and B.H. got in 
an argument, which C.R. and a friend, K.L, overheard.  Prior to 
the argument, all of the men had been drinking alcohol.  At the 
conclusion of the initial argument, Christen went back to his 
room, and C.R., B.H., and K.L. left to go to a bar.  B.H. 
No. 
2019AP1767-CR   
 
4 
 
testified that before they went to the bar that night Christen 
said "something aggressive" and had called C.R.'s mother a 
"piece of trash drunk." 
¶7 
Some point later in the night, C.R., B.H., and K.L. 
returned to the apartment.  Another friend of the men, M.A., 
joined them after they returned.  Christen opened the door for 
M.A. and said, "Here's the asshole roommates you were looking 
for . . . ."   
¶8 
The jury also heard that Christen, C.R., and M.A were 
in an argument.  Christen had insulted C.R.'s mother, and M.A. 
intervened.  Christen testified that M.A. pushed Christen with 
his chest up against Christen's doorframe.  Christen testified 
that, as a response to M.A.'s intervention, he said, "[he] 
wasn't going to be a victim and [he] had a weapon and [he] 
wasn't afraid to use it."  He testified that he then pointed to 
his handgun.  He continued his testimony, stating, "I just 
turned and pointed that it was where I had kept it on my 
nightstand and I said I feel intimidated.  I'm into my bedroom, 
which is small.  I have nowhere else to go.  I was presenting 
the weapon as a deterrent."  Upon Christen pointing to the 
handgun, the argument ended, and Christen closed his bedroom 
door.  
¶9 
At some point, M.A. stopped in front of Christen's 
room, and they exchanged words.  M.A. testified that he knew 
Christen was upset so he followed Christen to his room and said, 
"hey, just take it easy, have fun with us."  M.A. stated that 
Christen responded by picking up his firearm and saying, "get 
No. 
2019AP1767-CR   
 
5 
 
out of here or I will shoot you."  M.A. testified that he shut 
the door and returned to the others.  C.R. similarly testified 
that he watched M.A. stop in front of Christen's room and saw a 
"gun come up between [M.A.] and [Christen]."  He confirmed that 
M.A. shut the door, returned to the others, and said "[your] 
fucking roommate just pulled a gun on me.  What the fuck."  
Christen characterized the incident differently.  He stated that 
after M.A. opened the door, he picked up his handgun, "held it 
sideways towards the wall away from [M.A.]," and told M.A. to 
leave, which M.A. did.  
¶10 Christen 
began 
recording 
the 
situation 
on 
his 
cellphone after this second interaction with M.A.  The jury 
viewed the video at trial; it began with Christen saying that 
"[i]f someone comes through this door [he] will shoot them."  He 
further told M.A., who was standing in front of his door, that 
M.A. "should get the fuck out of here."  In response, M.A. 
threatened to call 911.  Christen stated that he didn't "give a 
fuck" and that M.A. needed to leave.  M.A. responded, 
"Seriously.  Be nice, be nice man, be nice."  Christen can later 
be heard saying on the video the following: 
They're not listening; I've asked them to leave.  I'm 
within my right.  I said go away, get away from my 
house, away from my room.  They should leave it would 
just be smart for them. 
¶11 Not long after that, Christen said that he was going 
to the kitchen with his handgun because he did not "trust 
anybody in this house."  Christen came out of his room in 
underwear displaying a handgun tucked in his waistband.  The 
No. 
2019AP1767-CR   
 
6 
 
video then becomes jostled.  The testimony revealed that M.A. 
disarmed him, and Christen returned to his room.  C.R. testified 
that he heard Christen cock his shotgun, which the video 
confirms.  K.L. disassembled the handgun and placed the 
disassembled handgun in the cabinets. 
¶12 After he returned to his room, Christen stopped the 
recording on his phone and called 911.  The 911 recording was 
also played for the jury.  Christen told the 911 operator that 
M.A. stole his handgun.  He also stated that "[i]f someone comes 
through [his] door, they're getting a fucking face full of 
lead."  Over the course of the nearly 20-minute 911 phone call, 
Christen denied threatening M.A.  Further, when the 911 
dispatcher asked Christen whether M.A. attacked him before he 
left with his handgun, Christen said "not physically." 
¶13 The police arrived in response to Christen's 911 call.  
Christen's two roommates and their two friends exited the 
apartment 
and 
reported 
to 
the 
police 
that 
Christen 
was 
intoxicated and had threatened them with his firearms.  Christen 
remained in the apartment for approximately 30 minutes before 
exiting the apartment unarmed.  One of the officers who 
interacted with Christen after he exited the apartment testified 
that as he spoke to Christen he "observed an odor of intoxicants 
coming from [Christen's] breath and mouth [and] his eyes [were] 
glassy and bloodshot."  Other members of law enforcement 
testified that Christen appeared "worked up" and "paranoid." 
No. 
2019AP1767-CR   
 
7 
 
¶14 The police arrested Christen and brought him to the 
booking area of the jail.  While in the booking area, Christen 
claimed he armed himself in self-defense.  
¶15 On February 4, 2018, the circuit court found probable 
cause that Christen did commit a crime.  Two days later, the 
State filed a criminal complaint in the circuit court charging 
Christen with three counts:  Count 1, pointing a firearm at 
another, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1)(c), a Class A 
Misdemeanor; Count 2, operating or going armed with a firearm 
while intoxicated, contrary to § 941.20(1)(b), a Class A 
Misdemeanor; and Count 3, disorderly conduct, contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 947.01(1), a Class B Misdemeanor.  Christen made his 
initial appearance the same day.   
¶16 On March 21, 2018, Christen filed a motion to dismiss 
Count 2, operating or going armed with a firearm while 
intoxicated, arguing that it violated his Second Amendment 
right.  The circuit court held a hearing on this motion to 
dismiss on July 13, 2018.  The court concluded that Wis. Stat. 
§ 941.20(1)(b), the statute that Christen challenged, "is 
focused narrowly enough to withstand [the] constitutional 
challenge that's been raised" and denied Christen's motion.   
¶17 On October 17, 2018, Christen's jury trial began.  
During the trial, the jury heard testimony from Christen, the 
individuals in the apartment, and the officers who arrived on 
the scene.  After both sides rested their arguments, the court 
instructed the jury.   
No. 
2019AP1767-CR   
 
8 
 
¶18 As part of the jury instructions, the circuit court 
read a self-defense instruction on each count.  The circuit 
court informed the jury that it could find Christen guilty of 
operating or going armed with a firearm while intoxicated only 
if 
it 
was 
"satisfied 
beyond 
a 
reasonable 
doubt 
that . . . [Christen] did not act lawfully in self-defense."  
The parties then made closing arguments, and the court submitted 
the case to the jury.   
¶19 After deliberating, the jury returned a verdict of not 
guilty on Count 1, pointing a firearm at another, and guilty on 
Counts 2 and 3, operating or going armed with a firearm while 
intoxicated and disorderly conduct, respectively.  Thus, the 
jury concluded affirmatively that the State proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Christen did not operate or go armed with 
a firearm nor engaged in disorderly conduct in self-defense.  
The following day, the circuit court sentenced Christen to four 
months in the Dane County jail for Count 2 and two months in the 
Dane County jail for Count 3, to run concurrently.  The circuit 
court subsequently held the sentence in abeyance pending appeal.  
¶20 On 
September 
13, 
2019, 
Christen 
appealed 
his 
conviction of operating or going armed with a firearm while 
intoxicated, 
arguing 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 941.20(1)(b) 
was 
unconstitutional as applied to him.  The State did not file a 
response to this appeal.   
No. 
2019AP1767-CR   
 
9 
 
¶21 The court of appeals4 affirmed the judgment of 
conviction.  Christen, No. 2019AP1767-CR, ¶1.  The court of 
appeals determined that Christen failed to develop his as-
applied challenge based on the facts of his particular case.  
Id., ¶7.  The court of appeals held that this failure to apply 
the law to his particular facts was "so complete that [the court 
did] not need to address the standard of review or other points 
referenced in his brief" and affirmed Christen's judgment of 
conviction.  Id. 
¶22 On April 16, 2020, Christen petitioned this court for 
review; we granted his petition.   
 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶23 Christen 
asks 
us 
to 
review 
whether 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 941.20(1)(b) 
is 
unconstitutional 
as 
applied 
to 
him.  
"Examining the constitutional application of a statute presents 
a question of law that this court reviews independently of the 
determinations rendered by the circuit court or court of 
appeals."  State v. Roundtree, 2021 WI 1, ¶12, 395 Wis. 2d 94, 
952 N.W.2d 765.   
¶24 This 
case 
also 
requires 
us 
to 
determine 
the 
appropriate level of scrutiny to guide our analysis.  "This 
issue likewise presents a question of law that we determine 
independently."  Id., ¶13.  
 
                                                 
4 Because Christen was appealing a misdemeanor conviction, 
one court of appeals judge, the Honorable Brian W. Blanchard, 
heard his appeal.  See Wis. Stat. § 752.31(2)(f), (3).  
No. 
2019AP1767-CR   
 
10 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶25 The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides:  "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the 
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and 
bear Arms, shall not be infringed."5  The right to keep and bear 
arms is an individual "core" right protected and is a "right of 
law abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of 
hearth and home."  Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.  However, "[l]ike 
most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not 
unlimited."  Id. at 626.  Historically, "the right was not a 
right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner 
whatsoever and for whatever purpose."  Id.  The Heller Court 
explained: 
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt 
on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of 
firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws 
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive 
places such as schools and government buildings, or 
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the 
commercial sale of arms. 
Id. at 626-27.  The Court described these regulations and 
prohibitions as "presumptively lawful."  Id. at 627 n.26.  Two 
years after Heller, the Court held that the Second Amendment was 
                                                 
5 Similarly, Article I, section 25 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution provides:  "The people have the right to keep and 
bear arms for security, defense, hunting, recreation or any 
other lawful purpose."  However, Christen exclusively focuses 
his arguments on the Second Amendment, so we will exclusively 
focus our analysis on the Second Amendment as well.  See 
Roundtree, 394 Wis. 2d 94 (focusing exclusively on the Second 
Amendment in a similar challenge).   
No. 
2019AP1767-CR   
 
11 
 
incorporated against the States.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 
561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010).  This means that the Second 
Amendment's protections "apply identically to the States and the 
Federal Government."  Id. at 766 n.14.   
¶26 Christen was convicted of possession of a firearm 
while intoxicated contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1)(b), which 
provides that a person who "[o]perates or goes armed with a 
firearm while he or she is under the influence of an intoxicant" 
"is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor."   
¶27 Wisconsin Stat. § 941.20(1)(b) bars the use of a 
firearm when the individual is intoxicated.  This statute does 
not completely dispossess a lawful firearm owner from ownership.  
It merely limits the circumstances under which the lawful 
firearm owner may use or carry the firearm, specifically while 
intoxicated. 
 
Further, 
a 
lawful 
firearm 
owner, 
even 
if 
intoxicated, cannot be convicted under § 941.20(1)(b) if he or 
she acts in self-defense.  
¶28 Christen argues that Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1)(b) is 
unconstitutional as applied to him because it burdens his Second 
Amendment right to armed self-defense recognized in Heller.  He 
frames the issue in terms of whether the consumption of a legal 
intoxicant voids the Second Amendment's guarantee of the right 
to carry a firearm in self-defense.  He argues that his 
possession of his firearms is within the scope of the Second 
Amendment because he carried his firearms in his home for the 
purpose of self-defense.  Specifically, Christen asserts that he 
was armed in response to an ongoing situation in which he was 
No. 
2019AP1767-CR   
 
12 
 
afraid he may need to resort to self-defense, despite the jury's 
conclusion that he did not act in self-defense.  He requests 
that this court ignore the two-step approach that has become the 
consensus 
framework 
for 
analyzing 
such 
Second 
Amendment 
challenges6 and that this court applied in Roundtree.  394 
Wis. 2d 94, ¶¶39-40.   
¶29 While this two-step approach has been widely adopted, 
courts are divided on which level of scrutiny to apply if a law 
substantially burdens the core Second Amendment right.7  Christen 
asserts that, if we continue to utilize the two-step approach, 
we should apply strict scrutiny to his case because the right to 
bear arms is fundamental and the statute burdens the core of the 
Second Amendment.  He contends that Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1)(b) 
cannot survive strict scrutiny review and that, even if this 
court were to apply intermediate scrutiny, the law is still 
unconstitutional as applied to him.   
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 668 (1st Cir. 
2018) (collecting cases that applied the two-step approach from 
the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, 
and D.C. Circuits); GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng'rs, 788 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2015) (applying the two-
step approach); see also State v. Weber, No. 2019-0544, 2020 WL 
7635472, at ¶13 (Ohio Dec. 23, 2020) (same); People v. Burns, 79 
N.E.3d 159, ¶38 (Ill. 2015) (same); Hertz v. Bennett, 751 S.E.2d 
90, 93 (Ga. 2013) (same). 
7 Compare Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1115 (9th 
Cir. 2020) (applying strict scrutiny to "laws that both 
implicate a core Second Amendment right and place a substantial 
burden on that right" while applying intermediate scrutiny in 
any other context) cert. denied, No. 20-819, 2021 WL 1602649 
(mem.) (U.S. Apr. 26, 2021), with Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 
F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011) (applying intermediate scrutiny on 
a sliding scale).   
No. 
2019AP1767-CR   
 
13 
 
¶30 We 
begin 
our 
analysis 
by 
discussing 
as-applied 
challenges generally.  We then apply the established two-step 
approach to Second Amendment challenges that we set forth and 
applied in Roundtree, to Christen's challenge to Wis. Stat. 
§ 941.20(1)(b).    
A.  As-Applied Challenges Generally 
¶31 As we have repeatedly stated, there is a distinction 
between a facial and as-applied challenge.  See, e.g., Waupaca 
Cnty. v. K.E.K., 2021 WI 9, ¶¶14-15, 395 Wis. 2d 460, 954 
N.W.2d 366.  "Under a facial challenge, the challenger must show 
that the law cannot be enforced under any circumstances."  Id., 
¶14 (quoting Winnebago Cnty. v. C.S., 2020 WI 33, ¶14, 391 
Wis. 2d 35, 940 N.W.2d 875).   
¶32 "In contrast, in an as-applied challenge, we assess 
the merits of the challenge by considering the facts of the 
particular case in front of us 'not hypothetical facts in other 
situations.'"  Id., ¶15 (quoting League of Women Voters of Wis. 
Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, 2014 WI 97, ¶13, 357 Wis. 2d 360, 
851 N.W.2d 302).  As we recently explained in Roundtree: 
For an as-applied challenge to succeed, the challenger 
must demonstrate that the challenger's constitutional 
rights were actually violated.  If such a violation 
occurred, the operation of the law is void as to the 
facts presented for the party asserting the claim.   
We presume that the statute is constitutional, and the 
party raising a constitutional challenge must prove 
that the challenged statute has been applied in an 
unconstitutional manner beyond a reasonable doubt. 
395 Wis. 2d 94, ¶18 (citations omitted).   
 
No. 
2019AP1767-CR   
 
14 
 
B.  Wisconsin Stat. § 941.20(1)(b) Survives  
Christen's Challenge. 
¶33 Christen argues in his as-applied challenge that Wis. 
Stat. § 941.20(1)(b) interfered with his fundamental right to 
bear firearms in self-defense, which the Second Amendment 
guarantees to him.  Christen asserts that, despite his ingestion 
of alcoholic intoxicants, he was carrying his firearms for self-
defense, ignoring that the jury concluded that he did not act in 
self-defense.  As this is an as-applied challenge, he must 
demonstrate that under these facts, his constitutional rights 
were violated.  He does not assert that the statute is 
unconstitutional in all applications.  
¶34 As 
explained 
in 
Roundtree, 
"[g]enerally, 
Second 
Amendment challenges require this court to undertake a two-step 
approach."  395 Wis. 2d 94, ¶39.  Under this two-step approach, 
"[w]e ask first 'whether the challenged law imposes a burden on 
conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment's 
guarantee.'"  Id. (quoting State v. Herrmann, 2015 WI App 97, 
¶9, 366 Wis. 2d 312, 873 N.W.2d 257).  "If the answer is no, 
then the inquiry ends."  Id.  "If the first inquiry is answered 
in the affirmative, then the court proceeds to inquire into 'the 
strength of the government's justification for restricting or 
regulating the exercise of Second Amendment rights.'"  Id., ¶40 
(quoting Herrmann, 366 Wis. 2d 312, ¶9).  We conduct this second 
inquiry through a means-end analysis and application of a 
heightened level of scrutiny.  See, e.g., id., ¶¶38, 41 
No. 
2019AP1767-CR   
 
15 
 
(applying intermediate scrutiny to a challenge to a felon-in-
possession law).   
¶35 Christen raises a Second Amendment challenge arguing 
that we should apply a "categorical approach" despite the fact 
that we have adopted a two-step approach.  See id., ¶¶26-40.  We 
continue to reject a categorical approach and apply the same 
two-step approach we adopted in Roundtree.   
1.  Step one:  Does Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1)(b) 
 impose a burden on conduct falling within 
 the Second Amendment's scope? 
¶36 The first step in the inquiry is to consider "whether 
the regulated activity falls within the scope of the Second 
Amendment."  Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 2019) 
(quoted source omitted).  "This is a textual and historical 
inquiry; if the government can establish that the challenged law 
regulates activity falling outside the scope of the right as 
originally 
understood, 
then 
'the 
regulated 
activity 
is 
categorically unprotected, and the law is not subject to further 
Second Amendment review.'"  Id. (quoted source omitted).  Thus, 
we must determine whether the regulated activity here, operating 
or going armed while intoxicated, falls outside the scope of the 
Second Amendment as historically understood.  If it does fall 
outside the scope, the inquiry ends, and the challenged statute 
does not conflict with the Second Amendment.   
¶37 We recognize that Wisconsin has a long tradition of 
criminalizing 
the 
use 
and 
carrying 
of 
a 
firearm 
while 
intoxicated.  § 3, ch. 329, Laws of 1883.  A similar tradition 
No. 
2019AP1767-CR   
 
16 
 
of laws regulating firearms and alcohol also existed in some 
form at the time of the founding.  See State v. Weber, No.  
2019-0544, 2020 WL 7635472, at ¶103 (Ohio Dec. 23, 2020) 
(DeWine, J., concurring in judgment) (collecting colonial 
statutes 
that 
criminalize 
the 
use 
of 
a 
firearm 
while 
intoxicated).  Such statutes continued to proliferate and expand 
throughout the United States during the 19th and 20th centuries.  
See id., at ¶20 (collecting statutes criminalizing the use or 
carrying of a firearm while intoxicated enacted during the 19th 
and 20th centuries).  
¶38 While these statutes provide a relevant, perhaps even 
persuasive backdrop that shows a long history of criminalizing 
the use and carrying of firearms while intoxicated, it is 
debatable whether these statutes show that the use and carrying 
of firearms in such circumstances is categorically unprotected.  
Compare People v. Deroche, 829 N.W.2d 891, 896 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2013) (concluding that the historical evidence demonstrates that 
the use and carrying of a firearm while intoxicated was within 
the scope of the Second Amendment) and Dissent, infra (same) 
with Weber, 2020 WL 7635472, at ¶108 (DeWine, J., concurring in 
judgment) (concluding that the historical evidence demonstrates 
that the use and carrying of a firearm while intoxicated was 
outside the scope of the Second Amendment) and Concurrence, 
infra (same).  
¶39 However, we need not resolve this case on step one 
because, as we explain below, Christen's challenge fails under 
step two.  As such, we assume, without deciding, that Wis. Stat. 
No. 
2019AP1767-CR   
 
17 
 
§ 941.20(1)(b) regulates conduct that falls within the scope of 
the Second Amendment.8  See Weber, 2020 WL 7635472, at ¶22 
(assuming step one is answered affirmatively and collecting 
cases where the court assumed arguendo step one).  
2.  Step two:  Is Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1)(b) 
unconstitutional as applied to Christen based on the 
appropriate means-end analysis? 
¶40 In considering step two, Heller dictates that we apply 
some form of heightened scrutiny, Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27, 
so we first must determine what level of heightened scrutiny to 
apply to Christen's challenge.  We then must apply that level of 
scrutiny.   
a.  Level of scrutiny 
¶41 Christen and the State disagree as to the level of 
scrutiny that we should employ in this case.  It is clear that 
we cannot use the rational basis level of scrutiny to review 
statutes that are alleged to burden core Second Amendment 
rights.  Id. ("If all that was required to overcome the right to 
keep and bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment 
would be redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions 
on irrational laws, and would have no effect.").  So, we must 
determine whether intermediate or strict scrutiny applies to 
Christen's as-applied challenge.  
¶42 In 
Roundtree, 
we 
adopted 
the 
Seventh 
Circuit's 
approach from Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 
                                                 
8 We leave further analysis of step one for another case.  
No inferences should be drawn from our assumption and preference 
to decide these issues based upon our analysis in step two.  
No. 
2019AP1767-CR   
 
18 
 
2011), which indicates that "the rigor of . . . judicial review 
will depend on how close the law comes to the core of the Second 
Amendment right and the severity of the law's burden on that 
right."  Roundtree, 395 Wis. 2d 94, ¶¶26, 34 (quoting Ezell, 651 
F.3d at 703).  "[T]he core right identified in Heller is 'the 
right of a law-abiding, responsible citizen to possess and carry 
a weapon for self-defense . . . .'"  Id., ¶35 (quoting United 
States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010)).  Because 
Christen's 
as-applied 
challenge 
argues 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 941.20(1)(b) burdens this core right that Heller identified, 
we do not need to conclusively determine the entire scope of the 
Second Amendment to resolve this case.  See id., ¶36; Serv. Emp. 
Int'l Union, Loc. 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶24, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 
N.W.2d 35 ("We do not step out of our neutral role to develop or 
construct arguments for parties; it is up to them to make their 
case.").  Accordingly, this case requires us to determine how 
close § 941.20(1)(b) comes to Christen's right to possess and 
carry a weapon for self-defense and the severity of the burden 
§ 941.20(1)(b) imposes on that right. 
i.  Wisconsin Stat. § 941.20(1)(b) does not strike at 
the core of the Second Amendment. 
¶43 Christen argues that Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1)(b) strikes 
at the core of the Second Amendment.  He asserts that he has a 
core fundamental Second Amendment right to possess and bear his 
firearms in anticipation of the need for self-defense, whether 
intoxicated or not, so as to necessitate the highest tier of  
scrutiny——strict scrutiny.  While he does have the right to 
No. 
2019AP1767-CR   
 
19 
 
"possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation," "the right 
secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited."  Heller, 554 
U.S. at 592, 626.  As such, we must consider how close to the 
Second Amendment core right that § 941.20(1)(b) strikes.   
¶44 Although at trial Christen successfully raised9 the 
issue of self-defense, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Christen did not act in self-defense.  Wisconsin has 
codified the privilege of self-defense.  § 939.48(1) ("A person 
is privileged to threaten or intentionally use force against 
another for the purpose of preventing or terminating what the 
person reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference with 
his or her person by such other person.").  This self-defense 
privilege extends further in the context of the home where the 
privilege may include the presumptive right to use deadly force.  
See § 939.48(1m)(ar).  When a defendant successfully raises the 
self-defense privilege, the State has the burden to disprove 
self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.  State v. Head, 
2002 WI 99, ¶106, 255 Wis. 2d 194, 648 N.W.2d 413.  If the State 
cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial that the 
defendant did not act in self-defense, then the self-defense 
privilege serves as "a defense to prosecution for any crime 
based on that conduct."  § 939.45.  
                                                 
9 "'Successfully' putting self-defense at issue means the 
defendant has satisfied the burden of production."  State v. 
Austin, 2013 WI App 96, ¶12 n.5, 349 Wis. 2d 744, 836 
N.W.2d 833.  
No. 
2019AP1767-CR   
 
20 
 
¶45 Throughout his brief, Christen continually asserts 
that he went armed for self-defense.  However, the jury was 
instructed on self-defense and concluded that Christen did not 
act 
in 
self-defense. 
 
As 
Christen 
raises 
an 
as-applied 
challenge, his challenge must rest upon these facts.  The jury 
heard competing testimony and witnesses and was instructed to 
consider whether Christen was armed in self-defense.  Given that 
the jury concluded that Christen did not act in self-defense, it 
would 
be 
irreconcilable 
to 
conclude 
that 
his 
right 
to 
self-defense was somehow infringed.  See Head, 255 Wis. 2d 194, 
¶106.10  As such, the facts of this case, upon which Christen 
must rely for his as-applied challenge, are that he was not 
operating or going armed with a firearm in self-defense.   
¶46 Christen also seems to infer that his consuming 
intoxicants in his own home is a relevant fact that makes Wis. 
Stat. § 941.20(1)(b) unconstitutional as applied to him.  By 
this assertion, he could mean various things.  His argument is 
less than cogent.  However, if he were to possess his firearm in 
his home and not ingest any intoxicants, this statute would not 
                                                 
10 Christen does not assert that the self-defense jury 
instruction was flawed.  Furthermore, Christen does not assert 
that the scope of the self-defense jury instruction contradicts 
the scope of self-defense that the Second Amendment protects.  
As such, we will not develop this argument for him.  See Serv. 
Emp. Int'l Union, Loc. 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶24, 393 Wis. 2d 
38, 946 N.W.2d 35 ("We do not step out of our neutral role to 
develop or construct arguments for parties; it is up to them to 
make their case.").  Accordingly, we assume, without deciding, 
that 
the 
scope 
of 
the 
self-defense 
jury 
instruction 
is 
commensurate with the scope of self-defense that the Second 
Amendment protects.   
No. 
2019AP1767-CR   
 
21 
 
be implicated.  If he were ingesting intoxicants, in his home, 
and possessing his firearm, that is not prohibited under the 
statute unless he reaches the point of intoxication.  If he were 
to possess his firearm in self-defense, even if intoxicated, he 
would have a defense under Wis. Stat. § 939.48.  Here, the jury 
concluded 
that 
he 
possessed 
his 
firearm, 
while 
he 
was 
intoxicated, and that he was not acting in self-defense.  That 
is in fact a violation of § 941.20(1)(b).  
¶47 As a general rule, it is not illegal to possess a 
firearm.  Similarly, it is generally not illegal to be 
intoxicated in one's own home.  Furthermore, the right to self-
defense is "most acute" in the home.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 628.  
However, Christen's assertion that the Second Amendment allows 
him to possess a firearm in his own home even though he is at 
the point of intoxication, regardless of whether he is acting in 
self-defense, misses the mark.   
¶48 Here, the jury had to conclude that Christen was not 
merely consuming intoxicants in his own home——the jury had to 
conclude that Christen was instead intoxicated, which means 
"under the influence of an intoxicant."  "Under the influence of 
an intoxicant" is a legal term in Wisconsin law that requires, 
as the jury concluded, that "the defendant's ability to handle a 
firearm was materially impaired because of the consumption of an 
alcoholic beverage."  Wis. JI——Criminal 1321, at 1 (2019).  For 
the jury to find that someone was "under the influence," the 
State must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that "the person 
[had] consumed a sufficient amount of alcohol to cause the 
No. 
2019AP1767-CR   
 
22 
 
person to be less able to exercise the clear judgment and steady 
hand necessary to handle a firearm."  Id. at 2.  Because the 
jury here found Christen guilty of operating or going armed with 
a firearm while intoxicated, the jury had to conclude that he 
was intoxicated and "less able to exercise the clear judgment 
and steady hand necessary to handle a firearm."  Id. 
¶49 Moreover, this case does not present a factual 
scenario wherein a person was drinking intoxicants in his or her 
own home, alone, and possessing a gun.  The facts of this as-
applied challenge indeed reflect that Christen was not merely in 
his home ingesting alcoholic beverages and possessing his 
firearm.  The facts of this case are that Christen was in a 
shared apartment with his two cohabitants and two other guests.  
The circumstances were such that the jury concluded that 
Christen was disorderly, and that he operated or went armed with 
a firearm while he was intoxicated and that he was not acting in 
self-defense. 
¶50 Consequently, we are not persuaded that Wis. Stat. 
§ 941.20(1)(b) strikes at Christen's fundamental core Second 
Amendment right to possess or carry a weapon for self-defense, 
pursuant to the Second Amendment.  This militates against 
applying strict scrutiny. 
ii.  Wisconsin Stat. § 941.20(1)(b) does not impose  
a severe burden on Christen's core  
Second Amendment right. 
¶51 Furthermore, Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1)(b) has limited 
application.  The statute does not strip the intoxicated 
No. 
2019AP1767-CR   
 
23 
 
individual of the right to self-defense——the statute does not 
strip firearm owners of the right to own and possess the 
firearm.  Section 941.20(1)(b) also does not prohibit a firearm 
from being in a home or provide that the gun be rendered 
inoperable if someone in the home is intoxicated.  Rather, it 
limits the circumstances under which the lawful firearm owner 
may use or carry the firearm, specifically while intoxicated.  
But this restriction is even more limited, as it does not apply 
when the intoxicated individual uses or carries the firearm in 
self-defense.  Section 941.20(1)(b) sets forth a limited 
restriction that imposes a slight burden on the core right of 
the Second Amendment.  See Weber, 2020 WL 7635472, at ¶30 
(concluding that the burden on Second Amendment rights by an 
intoxicated use of a firearm statute was "very slight").  Such a 
slight burden counsels us to apply intermediate scrutiny to 
Christen's challenge as well.11  
¶52 Because Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1)(b) does not strike at 
the core right of the Second Amendment, due to the jury's 
determination that Christen did not act in self-defense, and any 
                                                 
11 We 
note 
that 
numerous 
other 
courts 
have 
applied 
intermediate scrutiny in challenges to regulations on firearms 
far more restrictive than the restriction that Wis. Stat. 
§ 941.20(1)(b) may impose.  See, e.g., Roundtree, 395 Wis. 2d 94 
(applying intermediate scrutiny to a complete prohibition on 
firearm possession by convicted felons); Stimmel v. Sessions, 
879 F.3d 198, 206 (6th Cir. 2018) (applying intermediate 
scrutiny to a complete prohibition on firearm possession by 
individuals previously convicted of a misdemeanor crime of 
domestic violence); Mai, 952 F.3d at 1115 (applying intermediate 
scrutiny to a complete prohibition on firearm possession by 
mentally ill individuals). 
No. 
2019AP1767-CR   
 
24 
 
burden it does impose on that core right is slight in this case, 
we 
conclude 
that 
Christen's 
as-applied 
challenge 
to 
§ 941.20(1)(b) 
requires 
the 
application 
of 
intermediate 
scrutiny.12   
b.  Application of intermediate scrutiny 
¶53 "Pursuant to an intermediate scrutiny analysis, we ask 
whether 
a 
law 
is 
substantially 
related 
to 
an 
important 
governmental objective."  Roundtree, 395 Wis. 2d 94, ¶28.   
¶54 "[W]e 
recognize 
public 
safety 
generally, 
and 
preventing gun violence specifically, as important governmental 
objectives.  Indeed, '[p]ublic safety and the protection of 
human life is a state interest of the highest order.'"  Id., ¶43 
(quoting State v. Miller, 196 Wis. 2d 238, 249, 538 N.W.2d 573 
(Ct. App. 1995)) (citations omitted).  Even more relevant to 
this case, the State has a legitimate interest "in protecting 
people from harm from the combination of firearms and alcohol."  
Weber, 2020 WL 7635472, at ¶32; see also People v. Wilder, 861 
N.W.2d 645, 653 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014) ("The extreme danger posed 
                                                 
12 The determination that intermediate scrutiny is the 
appropriate level of scrutiny is consistent with other courts 
that 
have 
addressed 
a 
statute 
similar 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 941.20(1)(b).  See, e.g., Weber, 2020 WL 7635472, at ¶31; 
People v. Deroche, 829 N.W.2d 891, 897 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013).  
Our conclusion does not, however, exclude the possibility that 
another level of scrutiny could apply to a different statute or 
under different facts.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27 
(leaving 
open 
the 
question 
of 
the 
appropriate 
level 
of 
heightened scrutiny); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 
96 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that strict scrutiny may apply to a 
Second 
Amendment 
challenge 
depending 
on 
the 
facts 
and 
circumstances of the challenge).   
No. 
2019AP1767-CR   
 
25 
 
by a drunken person with a gun is real and cannot be over 
emphasized.").  
¶55 Christen argues that Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1)(b) is not 
substantially related to these important governmental interests 
because the statute criminalizes going armed while intoxicated 
which does not impact public safety.  Specifically, he asserts 
that the statute "does not require the defendant [to] pull the 
trigger, or cause injury of any sort, or even create a dangerous 
situation for another."  Beyond these general arguments, 
Christen explains that he was not engaged in any unlawful or 
uncommon behaviors.  Rather, "he merely had a few drinks over 
the course of an evening" and was defending himself, despite the 
jury's conclusion that he did not act in self-defense.  As such, 
he claims that, based on the facts of his case, § 941.20(1)(b) 
is not substantially related to the important governmental 
objectives identified. 
¶56 We disagree.  Wisconsin Stat. § 941.20(1)(b) is 
substantially related to the important interest of "protecting 
people from harm from the combination of firearms and alcohol." 
Weber, 2020 WL 7635472, at ¶32. 
¶57 The statute criminalizes operating or going armed with 
a firearm only while the individual is "under the influence of 
an intoxicant."  Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1)(b).  The phrase "under 
the influence of an intoxicant" is satisfied only when "the 
defendant's ability to handle a firearm was materially impaired 
because of consumption of an alcoholic beverage."  Wis. JI——
Criminal 1321, at 1 (2019).  As the Ohio Supreme Court aptly 
No. 
2019AP1767-CR   
 
26 
 
explained, "[w]hen an intoxicated person carries or uses a gun, 
either at home or outside the home, the impairment of cognitive 
functions and motor skills can result in harm to anyone around 
the intoxicated person and even to the intoxicated person 
himself or herself."  Weber, 2020 WL 7635472, at ¶33.  Even in 
the event that the firearm is unloaded, there is still a danger 
that the individual will harm the public.  See id., at ¶¶43-44 
(explaining the danger that an unloaded firearm may cause in the 
hands 
of 
an 
intoxicated 
individual). 
 
Accordingly, 
§ 941.20(1)(b) furthers the important governmental interest of 
protecting the public.  
¶58 The State points to cases from foreign jurisdictions 
to support its argument that Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1)(b) is 
substantially related to public safety.  Of those cases, we find 
State v. Weber from Ohio the most persuasive.13  As the Ohio 
Supreme Court recognized, "[r]esearch shows that 'people who 
abuse alcohol or illicit drugs are at an increased risk of 
committing acts of violence.'"  Id., ¶36 (quoting Webster & 
Vernick, Keeping Firearms from Drug and Alcohol Abusers, 15 
                                                 
13 Although the State cites to the Court of Appeals of 
Ohio's decision in Weber, the Ohio Supreme Court subsequently 
reviewed the Court of Appeals of Ohio's decision.  Weber, 2020 
WL 7635472, at ¶1.  The Ohio Supreme Court's decision was 
announced after briefing was completed in this case.  As such, 
we look to the analysis and reasoning of the Ohio Supreme Court 
because the data in that case are general and assist our inquiry 
in this case.  Cf. Roundtree, 395 Wis. 2d 94, ¶50 (citing 
studies from Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 449 (7th Cir. 2019), 
to support its conclusion that the statute at issue was 
substantially related to an important governmental interest). 
No. 
2019AP1767-CR   
 
27 
 
Injury Prevention 425 (2009)).14  Beyond even a general risk of 
violence, "[s]tudies show that there is a strong correlation 
between heavy drinking and self-inflicted injury, including 
suicide, from a firearm."  Id. (citing Branas, Han & Wiebe, 
Alcohol Use and Firearm Violence, 38 Epidemiologic Reviews 32, 
36 (2016)).  Horrifically, "[f]or men, deaths from alcohol-
related firearm violence equal those from alcohol-related motor 
vehicle crashes."  Id. (quoting Garen Wintemute, Alcohol Misuse, 
Firearm Violence Perpetration, and Public Policy in the United 
States, 79 Preventive Medicine 15 (2015)).  These data support a 
substantial relationship between intoxicated use of firearms and 
public safety, preventing gun violence, and the protection of 
human life.    
¶59 Our case law provides examples of the dangerous 
combination of alcohol and firearms.  See, e.g., Larson v. 
                                                 
14 The Ohio Supreme Court expounded on this statement: 
The victims of such violence are often a gun owner's 
family members or the gun owner himself.  For example, 
"[d]rug and alcohol use by domestic abusers has been 
strongly linked with the perpetration of fatal and 
non-fatal domestic violence."  [Webster & Vernick, 
Keeping Firearms from Drug and Alcohol Abusers, 15 
Injury Prevention 425 (2009).]  "[A]n overwhelming 
proportion 
(70%) 
of 
[intimate-partner] 
homicide 
perpetrators were under the influence of substances 
when the crime occurred, . . . and the use of alcohol 
is a strong predictor of intimate terrorism of women."  
Darryl 
W. 
Roberts, 
Intimate 
Partner 
Homicide: 
Relationships 
to 
Alcohol 
and 
Firearms, 
25 
J.Contemp.Crim.Just. 67, 70 (2009). 
Weber, 2020 WL 7635472, at ¶36.  
No. 
2019AP1767-CR   
 
28 
 
State, 86 Wis. 2d 187, 271 N.W.2d 647 (1978) (addressing a case 
of homicide while intoxicated); Jones v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 41, 
233 
N.W.2d 430 
(1975) 
(same); 
State 
v. 
Witkowski, 
143 
Wis. 2d 216, 420 N.W.2d 420 (Ct. App. 1988) (addressing a case 
of 
armed 
robbery 
while 
the 
defendant 
"appeared 
to 
be 
intoxicated").    
¶60 Therefore, 
the 
State 
has 
important 
governmental 
interests in public safety, preventing gun violence, protecting 
human life, and protecting people from the harm the combination 
of firearms and alcohol causes.  The means the legislature chose 
to 
further 
these 
important 
objectives, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 941.20(1)(b), is substantially related to the important 
governmental 
objectives. 
 
Indeed, 
"[i]t 
is 
difficult 
to 
understand how the government could have attempted to further 
that interest in any other viable manner."  Weber, 2002 WL 
7635472, at ¶39. 
¶61 The specific facts of Christen's case do not cast 
doubt upon this conclusion.  As we discussed above, the jury 
rejected Christen's claim that he was acting in self-defense.  
Christen does not supply or allege any other facts that would 
call into question the constitutionality of the statute as 
applied to him.  The specific facts of Christen's case 
demonstrate why Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1)(b) is substantially 
related to public safety and preventing gun violence.  The jury 
found that Christen was so intoxicated that he was "less able to 
exercise the clear judgment and steady hand necessary to handle 
a firearm."  See Wis. JI——Criminal 1321, at 2 (2019).  Christen 
No. 
2019AP1767-CR   
 
29 
 
threatened his roommates and their guests numerous times.  As he 
stated on the 911 call, "[i]f someone comes through [his] door, 
they're getting a fucking face full of lead."  The studies and 
data noted above demonstrate that there was a real risk that the 
combination of Christen's intoxication and his firearms would 
cause harm to those around him.  Thus, the facts of this case 
demonstrate why § 941.20(1)(b) is substantially related to 
public safety, preventing gun violence, protecting human life, 
and protecting people from the harm the combination of firearms 
and alcohol causes.  
¶62 Accordingly, we conclude that Christen's as-applied 
challenge to Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1)(b) fails.  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶63 As to Christen's as-applied challenge, we conclude 
Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1)(b) does not strike at the core right of 
the Second Amendment because he did not act in self-defense.  
Moreover, we conclude that § 941.20(1)(b) does not severely 
burden his Second Amendment right.  Accordingly, we apply 
intermediate 
scrutiny 
to 
Christen's 
as-applied 
challenge.  
Because § 941.20(1)(b) is substantially related to the important 
government objective of protecting public safety, it survives 
intermediate scrutiny as applied to Christen.  
¶64 Accordingly, we conclude that Christen's as-applied 
challenge to Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1)(b) fails.  Therefore, we 
affirm.  
No. 
2019AP1767-CR   
 
30 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
No.  2019AP1767-CR.bh 
 
1 
 
¶65 BRIAN 
HAGEDORN, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
The 
Second 
Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the 
individual right to keep and bear arms.  This right is broad, 
but it does not always prohibit the state from taking focused, 
prophylactic measures to protect against gun-related violence.  
Earlier this term, I concluded in dissent that the state did not 
meet its burden to prove a substantial relationship between 
dispossessing a felon convicted of failing to pay child support 
for 180 days and preventing gun-related violence.  See State v. 
Roundtree, 2021 WI 1, ¶¶105-71, 395 Wis. 2d 94, 952 N.W.2d 765 
(Hagedorn, 
J., 
dissenting). 
 
This 
case 
provides 
another 
opportunity for this court to explore the contours of the rights 
protected by the Second Amendment.  The court concludes——and I 
agree——that Mitchell Christen's conviction for operating or 
going armed with a firearm while intoxicated does not violate 
the Second Amendment.  However, in my view, the majority's 
analysis is insufficiently rooted in the original public meaning 
of the Second Amendment.  Therefore, I reach the same underlying 
conclusion, but rest instead on the history of the Second 
Amendment right as understood when adopted and incorporated 
against the states. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶66 Christen's conviction stems from events that took 
place during the early-morning hours of February 3, 2018, in a 
Madison apartment he shared with two roommates.  Christen 
estimated that, over the course of the evening, he consumed four 
No.  2019AP1767-CR.bh 
 
2 
 
beers and one shot.  After returning to his apartment, Christen 
argued with one of his roommates and one of his roommate's 
friends.  At one point, Christen, who was in his bedroom, picked 
up a gun and "held it sideways towards the wall away from" his 
roommate's friend, prompting the friend to shut Christen's 
bedroom door. 
¶67 After that exchange, Christen began recording a video 
with his cell phone.  He announced that he was going to the 
kitchen and bringing a gun with him because he did not "trust 
anybody in this house."  Christen emerged from his bedroom with 
a handgun tucked into his waistband and went to the kitchen.  
The friend Christen previously threatened disarmed him and 
another friend disassembled the gun.  Christen retreated to his 
bedroom, where he retrieved a shotgun and cocked it.  From his 
bedroom, Christen dialed 911 to report a stolen firearm; police 
responded, and Christen was arrested.  The responding officer 
noted that Christen bore several indicators of intoxication. 
¶68 Christen was charged with pointing a firearm at 
another, 
operating 
or 
going 
armed 
with 
a 
firearm 
while 
intoxicated, and disorderly conduct.  Christen moved the circuit 
court1 to dismiss the second charge, arguing that a conviction 
under Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1)(b) (2017-18)2 would violate his 
right to bear arms within his home.  The circuit court denied 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Nicholas J. McNamara of the Dane County 
Circuit Court presided. 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version. 
No.  2019AP1767-CR.bh 
 
3 
 
that motion, and a jury convicted him of disorderly conduct and 
operating or going armed with a firearm while intoxicated under 
§ 941.20(1)(b).  Christen appealed the circuit court's denial of 
his motion to dismiss, which the court of appeals affirmed.  
State v. Christen, No. 2019AP1767-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2020).  This court granted Christen's petition 
for review. 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶69 Wisconsin Stat. § 941.20(1)(b) provides that a person 
who "[o]perates or goes armed with a firearm while he or she is 
under the influence of an intoxicant" is guilty of a Class A 
misdemeanor.  Put simply, § 941.20(1)(b) criminalizes armed 
intoxication.  Christen challenges the constitutionality of this 
provision as applied to him.  Therefore, we look to the specific 
facts of his case, not to hypothetical or different facts.  See 
State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, ¶43, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 
N.W.2d 785. 
 
When 
analyzing 
an 
as-applied 
challenge, 
it 
generally does not matter whether the statute might have some 
applications that are contrary to the Constitution if the 
defendant's own conviction lacks a constitutional defect.  See 
State v. Wood, 2010 WI 17, ¶13, 323 Wis. 2d 321, 780 N.W.2d 63.  
An as-applied challenge therefore attacks the application of the 
statute——a conviction in this case——rather than the statute 
itself.  See Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Loc. 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, 
¶37, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35. 
No.  2019AP1767-CR.bh 
 
4 
 
¶70 In my dissenting opinion in Roundtree, 395 Wis. 2d 94, 
¶¶105-71 (Hagedorn, J., dissenting), I explained that the 
original public meaning of the Second Amendment should guide the 
constitutional analysis, and why the historical record is of 
particular import to this inquiry.  I begin with a brief summary 
of these principles, then review the historical record, and 
finally, apply this to the facts of Christen's case. 
 
A.  Principles of Interpretation 
¶71 Under our Constitution, the people declared that the 
government has no power to regulate in certain areas, and 
therefore it may not criminalize conduct in those areas.  See 
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1971); Roundtree, 395 
Wis. 2d 94, ¶109 (Hagedorn, J., dissenting).  Many of these 
limits are found in the federal Constitution's Bill of Rights——
among them, the Second Amendment's protection of the right "to 
keep and bear Arms."  U.S. Const. amend. II; McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010). 
¶72 The 
primary 
interpretive 
tool 
in 
constitutional 
analysis is the constitutional text, informed by its context and 
structure.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576-77 
(2008); Vos, 393 Wis. 2d 38, ¶28.  The Second Amendment says, "A 
well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a 
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall 
not be infringed."  U.S. Const. amend. II.  The text's reference 
to "the right of the people" recognizes that the Second 
Amendment "codified a pre-existing right" to keep and bear arms, 
No.  2019AP1767-CR.bh 
 
5 
 
one already held by the people when the Second Amendment was 
adopted.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 592.  The Second Amendment 
therefore referenced a right with a preexisting scope and 
substance, and gave it protection in our fundamental law.  Id. 
¶73 The scope and substance of a constitutional right 
articulated in the text may be informed by the historical 
record.  Vos, 393 Wis. 2d 38, ¶28 n.10.  In the Second Amendment 
context, it is not immediately apparent, more than two centuries 
removed from its enactment, precisely what fell within the full 
reach of "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms," nor 
whether and when the government may enact laws touching upon 
firearm 
possession, 
carrying, 
and 
use. 
 
Young 
v. 
State,     F.3d    , 2021 WL 1114180, at *13 (9th Cir. 2021) (en 
banc); 
Roundtree, 
395 
Wis. 2d 94, 
¶122 
(Hagedorn, 
J., 
dissenting).  Nevertheless, by looking to the historical record, 
"we can discern the principal themes" that inform what the 
public understood the provision to mean when it was adopted.  
Young,     F.3d    , at *13; Roundtree, 395 Wis. 2d 94, ¶114 
(Hagedorn, J., dissenting).  "The meaning of the text as 
enlightened by the historical record is no less binding because 
the historical inquiry is still directed toward discovering what 
the words were understood to convey when written."  Roundtree, 
395 Wis. 2d 94, ¶114 (Hagedorn, J., dissenting).  Therefore, our 
task in this case is to study the historical record to learn 
whether the right protected by the Second Amendment protects 
armed intoxication. 
 
No.  2019AP1767-CR.bh 
 
6 
 
B.  Armed Intoxication 
¶74 The 
Second 
Amendment 
protects 
the 
longstanding, 
natural 
right 
to 
self-defense, 
but 
even 
as 
originally 
understood, this core right was not unlimited in scope; some 
regulation was permitted.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 595; Roundtree, 
395 Wis. 2d 94, ¶¶125, 129 (Hagedorn, J., dissenting).  When the 
Second Amendment was adopted, and later incorporated against the 
states,3 laws restricting the right to keep and bear arms were 
rare, but did exist.  See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 770-77.  "Those 
that existed were largely aimed at persons or classes of people 
who might violently take up arms against the government in 
rebellion, or at persons who posed a more immediate danger to 
the public."  Roundtree, 395 Wis. 2d 94, ¶129 (Hagedorn, J., 
dissenting). 
¶75 It 
appears 
that 
no 
jurisdiction 
had 
a 
law 
criminalizing armed intoxication on its books when the Second 
Amendment 
was 
adopted 
in 
1791. 
 
See 
State 
v. 
Weber,     N.E.3d    , ¶85, 2020 WL 7635472 (Ohio 2020) (DeWine, 
J., concurring) ("It seems clear that laws identical to R.C. 
                                                 
3 "Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they 
were understood to have when the people adopted them."  District 
of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634-35 (2008).  The Second 
Amendment was ratified in 1791, but when analyzing the Second 
Amendment's meaning as incorporated against the states under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, "the focus of the original-meaning inquiry 
is carried forward in time; the Second Amendment's scope as a 
limitation on the States depends on how the right was understood 
when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified."  Ezell v. City of 
Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 702 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing McDonald v. 
City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 770-77 (2010)).  Therefore, our 
study of the Second Amendment's historical record includes both 
the Founding and Reconstruction Eras. 
No.  2019AP1767-CR.bh 
 
7 
 
2923.15 [criminalizing armed intoxication] did not exist at the 
time of the founding.").  However, the historical record 
suggests states could permissibly curtail the reckless handling 
of 
firearms 
and 
recognized 
the 
aggravating 
nature 
of 
intoxication, particularly when paired with weapons. 
¶76 One set of laws along these lines prohibited firing a 
gun under circumstances where doing so would be reckless.  A 
1655 Virginia law required anyone who fired a gun while 
intoxicated to forfeit 100 pounds of tobacco.4  A New York law 
from the same era prohibited firing guns on New Year's and May 
Days, recognizing the "deplorable accidents such as wounding" 
caused by the drunken handling of weapons on those days.5  A 1774 
Pennsylvania law similarly prohibited firing a gun without 
reason around New Year's.6  And a 1785 New York law did the same 
for "the eve of the last day of December, and the first and 
second days of January."7   
¶77 In addition, stretching back to 1840, states have in 
various ways forbidden the reckless brandishing of a weapon when 
                                                 
4 Act of March 10, 1655, 1655 Va. Laws 401-02. 
5 Ordinance of The Director General and Council of New 
Netherland to Prevent Firing Of Guns, Planting May Poles and 
Other Irregularities Within This Province, 1665 N.Y. Laws 205. 
6 An Act to Suppress the Disorderly Practice of Firing Guns, 
etc., on the Times Therein Mentioned, 1759-1776 Pa. Acts 421, 
§ 1. 
7 An Act to Prevent the Firing of Guns and other Fire Arms 
within this State on Certain Days Therein Mentioned, 1784-1785 
N.Y. Laws 152. 
No.  2019AP1767-CR.bh 
 
8 
 
not necessary for self-defense.  An 1840 Mississippi law 
provided: 
If any person having or carrying any dirk, dirk knife, 
Bowie knife, sword, sword cane, or other deadly 
weapon, shall, in the presence of three or more 
persons, exhibit the same in a rude, angry and 
threatening manner, not in necessary self-defense, or 
shall in any manner unlawfully use the same in any 
fight or quarrel, the person or persons so offending, 
upon conviction thereof in the circuit or criminal 
court of the proper county, shall be fined in a sum 
not exceeding five hundred dollars, and be imprisoned 
not exceeding three months.[8] 
An 1854 Washington law followed suit, making it a crime to "in a 
rude, angry, or threatening manner, in a crowd of two or more 
persons, exhibit any pistol, bowie knife, or other dangerous 
weapon."9  And an 1855 California law similarly made it illegal 
to "draw or exhibit any of said deadly weapons in a rude, angry 
and threatening manner, not in necessary self-defense . . . in 
any fight or quarrel."10  During the 1860s and 70s, several more 
states adopted similar laws criminalizing brandishing a weapon 
when not necessary for self-defense, including:  Idaho in 1864, 
                                                 
8 Volney Erskine Howard, The Statutes of the State of 
Mississippi 
of 
a 
Public 
and 
General 
Nature, 
with 
the 
Constitutions of the United States and of this State:  And an 
Appendix Containing Acts of Congress Affecting Land Titles, 
Naturalization, and a Manual for Clerks, Sheriffs and Justices 
of the Peace 676 (1840).   
9 An Act Relative to Crimes and Punishments, and Proceedings 
in Criminal Cases, 1854 Wash. Sess. Law 80, ch. 2, § 30.   
10 William H.R. Wood, Digest of the Laws of California:  
Containing All Laws of a General Character Which were in Force 
on the First Day of January, 1858 334 (1861).   
No.  2019AP1767-CR.bh 
 
9 
 
Texas in 1866, Arizona in 1867, Arkansas in 1868, Nevada in 
1873, and Indiana in 1875.11 
¶78 It is also clear that founding-era governments had 
broad power to regulate intoxication, even when doing so might 
impinge 
on 
certain 
fundamental 
rights. 
 
One 
early 
Ohio 
territorial statute provided that if "any person by being 
intoxicated, shall be found making or exciting any noise, 
contention or disturbance, at any tavern, court, election, or 
other meeting" that person could be fined or imprisoned until 
"such court, election or meeting is over."12  Another law, an 
1811 Maryland statute, forbade selling "spirituous or fermented 
liquors" on election days.  Cearfoss v. State, 42 Md. 403, 406 
(1875).  "Simply because the right to vote and the right to 
assemble were considered fundamental rights did not mean that 
                                                 
11 An Act Concerning Crimes and Punishments, 1864 Id. Sess. 
Laws 304, § 40; George Washington Paschal, 2 A Digest of the 
Laws of Texas:  Containing Laws in Force, and the Repealed Laws 
on Which Rights Rest 1321 (1873); An Act to Prevent the Improper 
Use of Deadly Weapons and the Indiscriminate Use of Fire Arms in 
the Towns and Villages of the Territory, 1867 Ariz. Sess. Laws 
21-22, § 1; 1868 Ark. Acts 218, §§ 12-13; An Act to Amend an Act 
Entitled "An Act Concerning Crimes and Punishments," 1873 Nev. 
Stat. 118, ch. 62, § 1; An Act Defining Certain Misdemeanors, 
and Prescribing Penalties Therefore, 1875 Ind. Acts 62, § 1. 
These and other relevant laws can be accessed via the 
Repository of Historical Gun Laws at the Duke Center for 
Firearms Law.  https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/repository/search-
the-repository/. 
12 Salmon P. Chase, Statutes of Ohio and of the Northwestern 
Territory, Adopted or Enacted from 1788 to 1833 Inclusive:  
Together with the Ordinance of 1787; the Constitutions of Ohio 
and of the United States, and Various Public Instruments and 
Acts of Congress 503 (1833).   
No.  2019AP1767-CR.bh 
 
10 
 
the government could not restrain someone from exercising those 
rights while they were intoxicated."  Weber,     N.E.3d    , 
¶107 (DeWine, J., concurring).  So too, it seems, with the 
fundamental right protected under the Second Amendment. 
¶79 The Reconstruction Era presents the most direct 
evidence 
that 
laws 
prohibiting 
armed 
intoxication 
are 
permissible under the Second Amendment.  In 1868, the same year 
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, Kansas adopted the 
following law: 
Any person who is not engaged in any legitimate 
business, 
any 
person 
under 
the 
influence 
of 
intoxicating drink, and any person who has ever borne 
arms against the government of the United States, who 
shall be found within the limits of this state 
carrying on his person a pistol, bowie-knife, dirk, or 
other deadly weapon, shall be subject to arrest upon 
charge of misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be 
fined a sum not exceeding one hundred dollars, or by 
imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding three 
months, or both, at the discretion of the court.[13] 
This law prohibits carrying a firearm while "under the influence 
of intoxicating drink"——precisely the conduct criminalized under 
Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1)(b).  The temporal connection between this 
prohibition on armed intoxication and the Fourteenth Amendment's 
ratification is strong evidence that the Second Amendment, 
particularly as incorporated against the states, was not 
originally understood to preclude states from criminalizing 
armed intoxication. 
¶80 An 1878 Mississippi law is also insightful: 
                                                 
13 2 General Statutes of the State of Kansas 353 (1897) 
(emphasis added).   
No.  2019AP1767-CR.bh 
 
11 
 
It shall not be lawful for any person to sell to any 
minor or person intoxicated, knowing him to be a minor 
or in a state of intoxication, any weapon of the kind 
or description in the first section of this Act 
described [which included pistols], or any pistol 
cartridge, on any conviction shall be punished by a 
fine not exceeding two hundred dollars, and if the 
fine and costs are not paid, be condemned to hard 
labor under the direction of the board of supervisors 
or of the court, not exceeding six months.[14] 
This law attempted to limit the reckless handling of firearms by 
forbidding the sale of firearms to minors or intoxicated 
individuals.  If states could criminalize selling arms to 
intoxicated individuals, the same rationale would support the 
conclusion 
that 
states 
could 
also 
temporarily 
prohibit 
intoxicated individuals from handling guns. 
¶81 Viewing this evidence as a whole, the right to keep 
and bear arms has never prevented governments from enacting 
reasonable regulations to curtail the reckless handling of 
firearms, such as prohibitions on firing in a crowded area or 
brandishing a firearm in ways dangerous to others and not in 
self-defense.  And the unique danger of intoxication when 
combined 
with 
potentially 
deadly 
force 
has 
long 
been 
acknowledged.  Moreover, the founding-era historical record 
suggests, and the reconstruction-era evidence confirms, that one 
way the government could curtail the reckless handling of 
firearms was by criminalizing armed intoxication.  Therefore, at 
least as a general matter, laws forbidding armed intoxication do 
not violate the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. 
                                                 
14 An Act to Prevent the Carrying of Concealed Weapons and 
for Other Purposes, 1878 Miss. Laws 175, § 2.   
No.  2019AP1767-CR.bh 
 
12 
 
¶82 In view of this historical evidence, we need not 
employ an additional implementing doctrine such as intermediate 
or 
strict 
scrutiny 
to 
conclude 
that 
the 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 941.20(1)(b) is not contrary to the Second Amendment's 
original public meaning in this context.  This type of law fits 
comfortably within the historical record, and therefore no 
additional layer of legal analysis is necessary.15 
 
C.  Application 
¶83 With this backdrop, resolution of the case before us 
is straightforward.  The Second Amendment, while protecting the 
right to carry a firearm generally, does not protect armed 
intoxication——at least not under the facts of this case.   
¶84 A more nuanced analysis may be required if Christen 
was truly acting in self-defense.  This is so because whatever 
else the Second Amendment means, it "surely elevates above all 
other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens 
to use arms in defense of hearth and home."  Heller, 554 U.S. at 
                                                 
15 The majority concludes intermediate scrutiny governs this 
constitutional inquiry, but it conspicuously declines to examine 
whether the Second Amendment's original understanding supports 
application of that framework in this context.  See majority 
op., ¶¶38-39, 52.  As the Ninth Circuit unanimously agreed, this 
approach runs contrary to Heller's explicit direction that the 
Second Amendment be interpreted in light of its historical 
record.  Young v. State,     F.3d    , 2021 WL 1114180, at *12 
(9th Cir. 2021) (en banc) ("We do not think we can avoid the 
historical record.  Heller relied heavily on history, and we do 
not think that it exhausted all subsequent need to confront our 
history in resolving challenges to other firearm regulations."); 
id. at *50-62 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting) (following "Heller's 
historical 
imperative" 
to 
analyze 
the 
Second 
Amendment's 
historical record). 
No.  2019AP1767-CR.bh 
 
13 
 
635.  Christen invokes self-defense, but the facts simply do not 
support it.  None of the four people in the apartment when 
Christen took up arms threatened to physically harm him.  It 
seems that it is Christen who was the source of most of the 
discord that occurred that evening.  Moreover, the jury rejected 
the statutory self-defense argument proffered by Christen.16  In 
short, Christen's right to defend himself was not implicated.  
Under these facts, the Second Amendment does not protect 
Christen's 
right 
to 
take 
up 
arms 
notwithstanding 
his 
intoxication. 
¶85 Therefore, Christen's conviction under Wis. Stat. 
§ 941.20(1)(b) is consistent with the Second Amendment and his 
as-applied challenge fails.  For these reasons, I respectfully 
concur. 
 
                                                 
16 The jury was instructed on the statutory privilege of 
self-defense and returned a guilty verdict.  This means the jury 
did not believe Christen satisfied the statutory prerequisites 
for self-defense codified in Wis. Stat. § 939.48.  As the 
dissent points out, the Second Amendment right to self-defense 
is more expansive than the statutory privilege.  Even so, the 
facts of this case do not lead us to those waters. 
No.  2019AP1767-CR.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶86 REBECCA 
GRASSL 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
majority persists in ignoring the text and history of the Second 
Amendment, flouting controlling United States Supreme Court 
precedent——District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)——
by doing exactly what Heller renounced.  Although Heller 
"expressly rejected the argument that the scope of the Second 
Amendment right should be determined by judicial interest 
balancing," McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 785 
(2010) (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 633-35), the majority 
nevertheless concludes that "important governmental interests" 
override 
one 
of 
America's 
most 
cherished 
rights.  
"Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were 
understood to have when the people adopted them, whether or not 
future legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that scope 
too broad."  Heller, 554 U.S. at 634-35. 
¶87 The majority also misapprehends the difference between 
operating a firearm in self-defense and going armed in case of 
confrontation.  The fact that Christen did not act in self-
defense has nothing to do with his Second Amendment right to go 
armed in case of confrontation.  While many readers may not be 
troubled by the outcome of this case in light of Christen's 
threatening behavior toward his roommates and their guests, the 
majority's decision erodes a fundamental freedom, the "true 
palladium of liberty" for all Americans.  St. George Tucker, 
Blackstone's Commentaries 143 (1803). 
¶88 Examining "both text and history" of the Second 
Amendment is necessary to understand the original public meaning 
No.  2019AP1767-CR.rgb 
 
2 
 
of the "individual right to keep and bear arms."  Heller, 554 
U.S. at 595.  The majority neglects to review either.  
Textually, 
the 
individual 
right 
to 
keep 
and 
bear 
arms 
"guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and carry weapons 
in case of confrontation."  Id. at 592.  Historically, 
legislatures did not limit the ability of individuals to carry 
firearms while under the influence of an intoxicant.  Because 
"'the need for defense of self, family, and property is most 
acute' in the home[,]" McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767  (quoting 
Heller, 554 U.S. at 628), a law prohibiting individuals from 
going armed while intoxicated cannot constitutionally be applied 
to an individual who goes armed in his own home.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 941.20(1)(b) violated Christen's right to carry a 
firearm 
in 
his 
own 
home 
in 
case 
of 
confrontation, 
notwithstanding his intoxication.  I respectfully dissent. 
I. 
The Majority Applies an Incorrect Analytical 
Framework. 
A. Heller's Holding and Analytical Framework 
¶89 The Second Amendment provides: 
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the 
security of a free State, the right of the people to 
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. 
U.S. Const. amend. II.  Over a decade ago, the United States 
Supreme Court issued a decision in a "landmark case on the 
meaning of the Second Amendment," "writ[ing] on a slate that was 
almost clean" considering the dearth of Second Amendment 
jurisprudence from our nation's highest court.  Lawrence B. 
Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 Nw. 
No.  2019AP1767-CR.rgb 
 
3 
 
U. L. Rev. 923, 925, 980 (2009).  In Heller, the Court held, "on 
the basis of both text and history, that the Second Amendment 
conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms"——a right 
which "belongs to all Americans."  Heller, 554 U.S. at 581, 595.  
In 
doing 
so, 
the 
Court 
"dispelled 
the 
prevalent, 
but 
historically ignorant notion that the Second Amendment protects 
merely a collective, militia member's right."  State v. 
Roundtree, 2021 WI 1, ¶65, 395 Wis. 2d 94, 952 N.W.2d 765 
(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting).  Although the Court 
wrote that the Second Amendment "conferred" the right, the Court 
clarified that "[t]he very text of the Second Amendment 
implicitly recognizes the pre-existence of the right and 
declares only that it 'shall not be infringed.'"  Heller, 594 
U.S. at 592 (emphasis added).  Like other rights protected by 
the Constitution, the right to keep and bear arms "is not a 
right granted by the Constitution.  Neither is it in any manner 
dependent upon that instrument for its existence."  Id. (quoted 
source omitted).  Instead, the Framers "codified a pre-existing 
right"——one that "elevates above all other interests the right 
of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of 
hearth and home."  Id. at 635. 
¶90 But Heller did more than just confirm that the right 
to keep and bear arms is retained individually.  It also set 
forth the proper analytical framework for courts to consider 
Second Amendment inquiries.  In particular, the Heller Court 
arrived at its seminal holding by substantively analyzing the 
"text and history" of the Second Amendment's "operative clause":  
No.  2019AP1767-CR.rgb 
 
4 
 
"the right of the people to keep and bears Arms."1  Id. at 595 
(emphasis added). 
¶91 The Court determined that the phrase "the people"——as 
used in the First Amendment, the Second Amendment, the Fourth 
Amendment, and elsewhere in the Constitution——"unambiguously 
refers to all members of the political community, not an 
unspecified subset."  Id. at 580.  After ascertaining the holder 
of the right——"the people"——the Court turned to its substance.  
The phrase "to keep [arms]" most reasonably means to "to have 
weapons" and the phrase "to bear arms" means "to carry arms."  
Id. at 581-84.  "The 18th-century meaning [of these phrases] is 
no different from the meaning today."  Id. at 581.  Drawing upon 
a wealth of 18th century dictionaries and authorities (e.g., 
William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England), the 
Court declared these clauses "guarantee the individual right to 
possess 
and 
carry 
weapons 
in 
case 
of 
confrontation"——a 
conclusion "strongly confirmed by the historical background of 
the Second Amendment."  Id. at 592 (emphasis added). 
¶92 The Court then explored how the scope of the Second 
Amendment was understood during the founding era.  The Court 
first 
examined 
constitutions 
of 
four 
states——Pennsylvania, 
Vermont, North Carolina, and Massachusetts——that predated the 
federal Constitution.  Each state adopted language analogous to 
                                                 
1 Drawing upon founding-era sources, the Court also analyzed 
the Second Amendment's "prefatory clause," which provides:  "A 
well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a 
free State."  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595-
98 (2008). 
No.  2019AP1767-CR.rgb 
 
5 
 
the 
Second 
Amendment 
regarding 
the 
right 
to 
bear 
arms.  
According to the Court, "the most likely reading of all four of 
these pre-Second Amendment state constitutional provisions is 
that they secured an individual right to bear arms for defensive 
purposes."  Id. at 602.  Post-ratification commentary supports 
this conclusion.  Similar to William Blackstone, St. George 
Tucker understood the right to bear arms as "the palladium of 
liberty."  Id. at 606 (citing 2 St. George Tucker, Blackstone's 
Commentaries 143 (1803)).  Tucker declared "[t]he right to self 
defence is the first law of nature:  in most governments it has 
been the study of rulers to confine the right within the 
narrowest limits possible.  Wherever standing armies are kept 
up, and the right of the people to keep and bear arms is, under 
any colour or pretext whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if not 
already annihilated, is on the brink of destruction."  Id. 
(citing Tucker, infra, at 300).  Other prominent scholars during 
the founding era——from William Rawle to Joseph Story to 
preeminent abolitionists——understood the Second Amendment in a 
similar light.  Id. at 606-10.  With only a single exception, 
all 
post-ratification 
commentators 
construed 
the 
Second 
Amendment "to protect an individual right unconnected with 
militia services," particularly in regard to confrontation and 
self-defense.  Id. at 605-10.2 
                                                 
2 The Court also extensively examined pre-civil war cases, 
post-civil war legislation, and post-civil war commentary to 
document the historical foundation for the Second Amendment.  
Heller, 554 U.S. at 610-19. 
No.  2019AP1767-CR.rgb 
 
6 
 
¶93 The Court then applied its textual interpretation and 
historical study to the particular restriction before the Court:  
the District of Columbia's ban on firearms, which the Court 
concluded 
was 
unconstitutional. 
 
Specifically, 
the 
Court 
determined that "the District's ban on handgun possession in the 
home violates the Second Amendment, as does its prohibition 
against rendering any lawful firearm in the home operable for 
the purpose of immediate self-defense."  Id. at 635.  "Assuming 
that Heller is not disqualified from the exercise of Second 
Amendment rights," concluded the Court, "the District must 
permit him to register his handgun and issue him a license to 
carry it in the home."  Id. 
¶94 The Heller Court was exhaustive in its historical 
research into the meaning of the Second Amendment.  In 
considering the District of Columbia's firearm ban, at no point 
did the Court weigh the interests of the government against the 
Constitution's 
clear 
language, 
nor 
did 
it 
undertake 
the 
judicially-invented intermediate or strict scrutiny analysis 
preferred by many lower courts.  Instead, it examined the text 
and history of the Second Amendment, asking whether the statute 
violated the original public meaning of the right to keep and 
bear arms.  In doing so, the Court prescribed the proper method 
of interpretation for resolving challenges under the Second 
Amendment. 
¶95 In 
employing 
this 
framework, 
the 
Heller 
Court 
decidedly rejected the sort of interest-balancing tests the 
majority applies in this case.  As the Court explained, the 
No.  2019AP1767-CR.rgb 
 
7 
 
Second Amendment is "the very product of an interest balancing 
by the people."  Id. at 635 (emphasis added).  Just two years 
later, the Court reiterated this point, noting that Heller 
"expressly rejected the argument that the scope of the Second 
Amendment right should be determined by judicial interest 
balancing[.]"  McDonald, 561 U.S. at 785 (citing Heller, 554 
U.S. at 633-35).  "The very enumeration of the right takes out 
of the hands of government——even the Third Branch of Government—
—the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right 
is really worth insisting upon.  A constitutional guarantee 
subject to future judges' assessments of its usefulness is no 
constitutional guarantee at all."  Heller, 554 U.S. at 634. 
¶96 Heller unequivocally superseded judicial balancing 
tests with an analysis of whether the original public meaning of 
the Second Amendment text, in the context of the history and 
tradition enveloping the right, would support the regulation or 
restriction challenged in a particular case.  As then-Judge 
Brett Kavanaugh confirmed, "Heller and McDonald leave little 
doubt that courts are to assess gun bans and regulations based 
on text, history, and tradition, not by a balancing test such as 
strict or intermediate scrutiny."  Heller v. District of 
Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., 
dissenting).  And for good reason:  "the Heller test [is] more 
determinate and 'much less subjective'  because 'it depends upon 
a body of evidence susceptible of reasoned analysis rather than 
a variety of vague ethico-political First Principles whose 
combined conclusion can be found to point in any direction the 
No.  2019AP1767-CR.rgb 
 
8 
 
judges favor.'"  Id. at 1275 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) 
(quoting McDonald, 561 U.S. at 804 (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
¶97 While conducting this "historical analysis can be 
difficult," "it is the best means available in an imperfect 
world" 
and 
avoids 
"intrud[ing] . . . upon 
the 
democratic 
process."  McDonald, 561 U.S. at 804 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(emphasis in original).  The Court "based [Heller] on the scope 
of the right to keep and bear arms as it was understood at the 
time of the adoption of the Second Amendment."  New York State 
Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, New York, ___ 
U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1540 (2020) (Alito, J., joined by 
Thomas and Gorsuch, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis added).  "Because 
history provided no support for laws like the District [of 
Columbia's]," the law at issue in Heller violated the individual 
right protected by the Second Amendment.  Id. (Alito, J., joined 
by Thomas and Gorsuch, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
B. The Majority Eschews Heller's Framework. 
¶98 Troublingly, although the United States Supreme Court 
has established a Second Amendment analytical framework rooted 
in text, history, and tradition, "many courts have resisted [the 
Court's] decisions in Heller and McDonald."  Rogers v. Grewal, 
___ U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 1865, 1866 (2020) (denying petition for 
writ of certiorari) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  "Instead of 
following 
the 
guidance 
provided 
in 
Heller, 
these 
courts 
minimized that decision's framework.  They then 'filled' the 
self-created 'analytical vacuum' with a 'two-step inquiry' that 
incorporates tiers of scrutiny on a sliding scale."  Id. 
No.  2019AP1767-CR.rgb 
 
9 
 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted).  "Under this test, courts first ask 'whether the 
challenged 
law 
burdens 
conduct 
protected 
by 
the 
Second 
Amendment.  If so, courts proceed to the second step——
determining the appropriate level of scrutiny," applying either 
intermediate or strict scrutiny.  Id. at 1867 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting).  
¶99 This is precisely the two-step process the majority of 
this court erroneously follows in the case before us.  See 
majority op., ¶34.  This "two-step inquiry" leads the majority 
to conclude that Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1)(b)——Wisconsin's law 
prohibiting individuals from going armed while intoxicated——may 
be constitutionally  applied to Christen in his own home.  Using 
this "entirely made up" judicial balancing test contravenes 
Heller and McDonald.  Rogers, 140 S. Ct. at 1867 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
¶100 "The critical tool of constitutional interpretation in 
this area is examination of a variety of legal and other sources 
to determine the public understanding of a legal text in the 
period after its enactment or ratification."  Binderup v. Att'y 
Gen. United States of Am., 836 F.3d 336, 362 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(Hardiman, J., concurring) (emphasis in original) (internal 
quotations omitted).  The two-step test applied by the majority 
in this case never takes up the "critical tools" of Heller's 
originalist and textualist approach, favoring Justice Stephen 
Breyer's outcome-oriented dissent in Heller instead.  Rather 
than ascertaining the original public meaning of the Second 
No.  2019AP1767-CR.rgb 
 
10 
 
Amendment, Justice Breyer advocated "simply adopt[ing] . . . an 
interest-balancing inquiry explicitly," which would ask "whether 
[a] statute burdens a protected interest in a way or to an 
extent that is out of proportion to the statute's salutary 
effects upon other important governmental interests."  Heller, 
554 U.S. at 689-90 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  The fact that both 
federal and state courts, including our own, have embraced 
Heller's dissent does not make it lawful.  See, e.g., Kanter v. 
Barr, 919 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2019); State v. Weber, 2020-Ohio-
6832, ___ N.E.3d ___.  Not only does the two-step test run afoul 
of the law pronounced by the United States Supreme Court, it is 
antithetical to our duty to protect the people's rights as 
"established by a constitutional history formed by democratic 
decisions."  McDonald, 561 U.S. at 805 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
The people should be alarmed that their constitutionally-
guaranteed rights may be infringed whenever a majority of judges 
on a reviewing court quite subjectively decides the "salutary 
effects" of a regulation outweigh them, as the majority does in 
this case. 
No.  2019AP1767-CR.rgb 
 
11 
 
¶101 The majority's two-step approach is not only wrong,3 
its application in this case is decidedly haphazard.  The 
majority conducts a meager review of the first step——that is, 
whether Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1)(b) burdens conduct protected by 
the Second Amendment.  Confusingly, the majority concludes the 
statute "does not strike at the core right of the Second 
Amendment" but in the next sentence contradicts itself, saying 
the statute "does not severely burden [that] right."  Majority 
op., ¶¶3, 63.  Logically, if a right is not even implicated, it 
cannot 
be 
burdened. 
 
Rather 
than 
engaging 
in 
what 
it 
acknowledges should be "a textual and historical inquiry" the 
majority 
instead 
skips 
to 
the 
second 
step, 
employing 
intermediate 
scrutiny 
in 
order 
to 
elevate 
"important 
governmental objectives" over a fundamental individual right.  
See majority op., ¶¶36, 39, 60.  It selects the wrong test and 
then applies only part of it.  The majority's decision to employ 
means-end scrutiny——abandoning any meaningful inquiry into the 
protections afforded to the people under the Second Amendment 
because, in its mind, the historical record is "debatable"——
                                                 
3 The right to keep and bear arms is a "species of right we 
denominate as fundamental."  State v. Roundtree, 2021 WI 1, ¶72, 
395 Wis. 2d 94, 952 N.W.2d 765 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Wisconsin Carry, Inc. v. City of Madison, 
2017 WI 19, ¶9, 373 Wis. 2d 543, 892 N.W.2d 233).  If a statute 
restricts a fundamental right, this court applies strict 
scrutiny review.  Id., ¶73 (citing Mayo v. Wisconsin Injured 
Patients & Families Comp. Fund, 2018 WI 78, ¶28, 383 Wis. 2d 1, 
914 N.W.2d 678).  Accordingly, if this court insists on applying 
a judicial balancing test in reviewing a statute restricting the 
right to keep and bear arms (notwithstanding Heller's contrary 
direction), the intermediate scrutiny the majority applies in 
Christen's case is in error. 
No.  2019AP1767-CR.rgb 
 
12 
 
lends the majority a license to declare the meaning of the 
Constitution's "list of protected rights" as "whatever [it] 
wish[es] it to be."  McDonald, 561 U.S. at 805 (Scalia, J., 
concurring).  Under the majority's approach, Second Amendment 
analysis becomes a "system in which . . . judges always get 
their way":  if the court's "balancing" weighs in favor of 
stripping individuals of protected rights, then so it shall be.  
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).  Ungrounded in text or history, 
the majority's approach subjects a fundamental constitutional 
right to the will, rather than the judgment, of the judiciary. 
¶102 Using a balancing test in Second Amendment cases 
facilitates judicial contortions utterly untethered to the 
original meaning of the Constitution.  The majority's reliance 
upon social science research to buoy its means-end analysis 
illuminates the problem.  To support the State's proffered 
"substantial interest" in prohibiting intoxicated individuals 
from carrying firearms, the majority cites "studies show[ing] 
that there is a strong correlation between heavy drinking and 
self-inflicted injury" due to a firearm.  See majority op., ¶58 
(quoted source omitted).  Because the results of social science 
studies are unavoidably imbued with the biases of their authors 
and 
their 
interpretation 
subject 
to 
society's 
evolving 
sensitivities, courts should never "consult social science 
research to interpret the Constitution."  State v. Roberson, 
2019 WI 102, ¶84, 389 Wis. 2d 190, 935 N.W.2d 813 (Rebecca 
Grassl Bradley, J., concurring); see Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 
U.S. 70, 119-20 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).  "Only the 
No.  2019AP1767-CR.rgb 
 
13 
 
Constitution can serve as a reliable bulwark of the rights and 
liberty of the people."  Roberson, 389 Wis. 2d 190, ¶86 (Rebecca 
Grassl Bradley, J., concurring).  In the majority's estimation, 
if social science dictates that the State's interest in 
regulating firearms is "substantial," then it may circumscribe 
constitutional rights in conformance with the research of the 
day. 
¶103 Constitutional 
rights 
rest 
on 
perilously 
fragile 
footing if they may be curtailed by subjective judicial 
predilections.  Only the text and history of the Second 
Amendment should inform the analysis of whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 941.20(1)(b)——Wisconsin's 
law 
prohibiting 
an 
intoxicated 
individual from going armed with a firearm in his own home——may 
be constitutionally applied to Christen.  Text and history show 
it may not. 
II. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 941.20(1)(b) As Applied to Christen 
¶104 In full, Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1)(b) reads: 
(1) 
Whoever does any of the following is guilty of a 
Class A misdemeanor: 
. . .  
(b) Operates or goes armed with a firearm while 
he 
or 
she 
is 
under 
the 
influence 
of 
an 
intoxicant. 
(Emphasis added.)  This statute criminalizes going armed with a 
firearm while intoxicated, even within the confines of one's 
home.  The State charged Christen for going armed with a firearm 
while intoxicated in violation of § 941.20(1)(b) and the jury 
convicted him. 
No.  2019AP1767-CR.rgb 
 
14 
 
¶105 Christen challenges the constitutionality of Wis. 
Stat. § 941.20(1)(b) as applied to him.  The record shows that 
Christen did not operate a firearm while under the influence of 
an intoxicant.  Instead, Christen went armed with (carried) a 
firearm while under the influence of an intoxicant.  "[I]n an 
as-applied challenge, we assess the merits of the challenge by 
considering the facts of the particular case in front of us, 
'not hypothetical facts in other situations.'"  League of Women 
Voters of Wisconsin Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, 2014 WI 97, 
¶13, 357 Wis. 2d 360, 851 N.W.2d 302.  Accordingly, the analysis 
is limited to Christen's right to "go[] armed with a firearm"——
not his ability to "operate" one. 
¶106 A review of the text and history of the Second 
Amendment 
establishes 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 941.20(1)(b) 
is 
unconstitutional as applied to Christen.  The Second Amendment 
does not countenance restricting Christen's fundamental right to 
go armed in his own home, even while under the influence of an 
intoxicant.  Historically, legislatures did not limit the 
ability of individuals to carry firearms while under the 
influence of an intoxicant, and the Second Amendment affords 
heightened protections of the right as exercised in the home.  
Accordingly, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 941.20(1)(b) 
unconstitutionally 
infringed Christen's right to bear arms within his own home. 
 
A. Legislatures did not historically limit an individual's 
right to bear arms while under the influence of an 
intoxicant. 
¶107 Contrary to the majority's mode of analysis, "Heller 
signals that courts should approach challenges to statutes 
No.  2019AP1767-CR.rgb 
 
15 
 
infringing the Second Amendment right with a rigorous review of 
history, rather than the inherently subjective consideration of 
whether the government's interest in curtailing the right 
outweighs 
the 
individual's 
interest 
in 
exercising 
it."  
Roundtree, 395 Wis. 2d 94, ¶75 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added).  From before the enactment of the 
Second Amendment through the late-18th and early-19th centuries, 
legislatures did not limit the individual right to bear arms 
while under the influence of an intoxicant.  Indeed, few 
colonial-era laws even regulated the use of firearms while 
consuming 
alcohol, 
and 
none 
dealt 
with 
carrying 
while 
intoxicated. 
 
See 
Mark 
Frassetto, 
Firearms 
and 
Weapons 
Legislation up to the Early 20th Century (January 15, 2013).4  
For example, in 1655 Virginia passed a law stating:  "What 
persons or persons soever shall, after publication hereof, shoot 
any guns at drinking (marriages and funerals only excepted) that 
such person or persons so offending shall forfeit 100 lb. of 
tobacco . . . ."  1655 Va. Acts 401, Acts of March 10, 1655, Act 
XII (emphasis added).  This law had nothing to do with bearing a 
firearm while drinking; instead, it prohibited shooting while 
drinking, although shooting guns while celebrating a marriage or 
mourning a death was completely lawful. 
¶108 Other 
states 
regulated 
the 
firing 
of 
guns 
on 
particular occasions.  A 1665 New York law, for example, stated:  
"Whereas experience hath demonstrated and taught that . . . much 
                                                 
4 This 
source 
is 
readily 
available 
at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2200991. 
No.  2019AP1767-CR.rgb 
 
16 
 
Drunkenness and other insolence prevail on New Year's and May 
Days, by firing of guns, . . . [which leads] to deplorable 
accidents 
such 
as 
wounding, . . . the 
director 
General . . . expressly forbids from this time forth all firing 
of Guns."  Ordinance of the Director General and Council of New 
Netherland to Prevent Firing of Guns, 1665 N.Y. Laws 205.  New 
York did not prohibit the carrying of weapons while consuming 
alcohol, but forbade the firing of guns on only two days out of 
the year——New Years and May Day——due to the "Drunkenness and 
insolence prevail[ing]" on those holidays.  Even the shooting of 
firearms while under the influence of intoxicants remained 
lawful the other 363 days of the year, while the act of carrying 
guns was lawful every day. 
¶109 Other laws closely predating ratification of the 
Second Amendment also indicate that early Americans regulated 
only the shooting or operation of guns but not the act of 
bearing them.  In 1769, New York passed a law prohibiting "any 
person" from "fir[ing] and discharg[ing] any guns . . . in any 
street, lane, or alley, garden, or other inclosure, or from any 
house, or in any other place where persons frequently walk."  An 
Act for the More Effectual Prevention of Fires in the City of 
New York, 1761-1775 N.Y. Laws 548 (1769).  Likewise, in 1771 New 
Jersey passed a law prohibiting "any person . . . to set any 
loaded gun in such manner as that the same shall be intended to 
go off or discharge itself."  An Act to Prevent Trespassing with 
Guns, 1763-1775 N.J. Laws 346, ch. 539, § 10.  Neither of these 
No.  2019AP1767-CR.rgb 
 
17 
 
laws restricted the carrying of a firearm, regardless of a 
person's state of sobriety or level of intoxication. 
¶110 Influencing colonial regulation of shooting——whether 
intoxicated or sober——was a concern for the wasteful expenditure 
of gunpowder and the potential for its unsafe storage.  See Saul 
Cornell & Nathan DeNino, A Well-Regulated Right:  The Early 
American Origins of Gun Control, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 487, 510-11 
(2004).  Indeed, an array of 18th century statutes in the 
founding era "provide[d] for the safe storage and transport of 
gunpowder" and set "[l]imits on the amount of gunpowder a person 
could possess."  Id. at 510 n.159, 511 (collecting statutes).  
Early 
17th 
century 
laws 
also 
reflected 
this 
concern 
by 
proscribing the expenditure of gunpowder while drinking.  In 
1632, for example, Virginia passed a law prohibiting the 
"commander 
of 
any 
plantation" 
from 
"spend[ing] 
powder 
unnecessarily, that is to say in drinking or entertainment."  
1632 Va. Acts 178, Acts of September 4th, 1632, Act XLIV 
(emphasis added).  Laws criminalizing the carrying of a weapon 
while consuming alcohol are non-existent in the historical 
record predating and surrounding ratification of the Second 
Amendment. 
¶111 The realities of life in early America explain why 
individuals under the influence of an intoxicant were able to 
carry arms with no legal impediment.  "In early America, 
drinking alcohol was an accepted part of everyday life at a time 
when water was suspect[.]"  Bruce I. Bustard, Alcohol's Evolving 
Role in U.S. History, Spirited Republic, Winter 2014, at 15, 15.  
No.  2019AP1767-CR.rgb 
 
18 
 
"Farmers took cider, beer, or whiskey into their fields," and 
ale would often accompany supper for many early Americans.  Id.  
From the late-18th century until the mid-19th century, annual 
alcohol consumption was on average much higher than present day.  
Id.; see Bradley J. Nicholson, Courts-Martial in the Legion 
Army:  American Military in the Early Republic, 1792-1796, 144 
Mil. L. Rev. 77, 93 n.69 ("Heavy alcohol consumption was common 
in early America.") (citation omitted).  In 1790, the average 
early American consumed approximately 5.8 gallons of alcohol 
annually, a figure which rose to 7.1 gallons by 1830.  Bustard, 
supra, at 15.  Contrast this to contemporary times, during which 
the average American consumes only 2.3 gallons per year.  Id. 
¶112 Coinciding with early America's culture of alcohol 
consumption was the widespread ownership of arms.  "Gun owning 
was so common in colonial America (especially in comparison with 
other commonly owned items) that any claim that 18th-century 
America did not have a 'gun culture' is implausible, just as one 
could not plausibly claim that early Americans did not have a 
culture of reading or wearing clothes."  James Lindgren & Justin 
L. Heather Counting Guns in Early America, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 
1777, 1840-41 (2002).  Guns were held by many Americans and were 
often passed down from generation to generation.  See id. 1800-
01, 1811 ("Guns were common in 1774 estates, even in admittedly 
incomplete probate records.").  Accordingly, while founding-era 
lawmakers may have limited an individual's ability to shoot guns 
while drinking, prohibiting the carrying of firearms while 
No.  2019AP1767-CR.rgb 
 
19 
 
drinking did not square with the prevalence of early-American 
alcohol consumption and the carrying of firearms. 
¶113 The right to bear arms was not unlimited, even in the 
founding 
era. 
 
During 
that 
time 
period, 
legislatures 
"disqualified categories of people from the right to bear 
arms . . . when they judged that doing so was necessary to 
protect the public safety."  Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 451 
(7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting).  In particular, early 
Americans restricted the possession of firearms by individuals 
who were "dangerous to society," such as violent felons.  See 
Roundtree, 395 Wis. 2d 94, ¶75 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., 
dissenting).  However, there is no evidence in the historical 
record indicating that individuals under the influence of 
intoxicants were understood to present a "danger" to society 
much less temporarily disqualified from using firearms.  To the 
contrary, the common law restricted firearm possession by those 
who committed "very serious, very dangerous offenses such as 
murder, rape, arson, and robbery."  Don B. Kates & Clayton E. 
Cramer, Second 
Amendment 
Limitations 
and 
Criminological 
Considerations, 
60 
Hastings 
L.J. 
1339, 
1362 
(2009).  
Additionally, "colonial legislatures passed statutes disarming 
Native Americans and slaves, purportedly out of fear of their 
armed 'revolt' or other threats to 'public safety.'"  Roundtree, 
395 Wis. 2d 94, ¶89 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) 
(citing Kanter, 919 F.3d at 458 (Barrett, J., dissenting) 
(citing Joyce Lee Malcolm, To Keep and Bear Arms 122 (1994))).  
Reflecting English parliament's fear of Catholic "revolt, 
No.  2019AP1767-CR.rgb 
 
20 
 
massacre, 
and 
counter-revolution," 
American 
colonists 
also 
dispossessed Catholics of their firearms.  Kanter, 919 F.3d at 
457 (Barrett, J., dissenting).  Individuals temporarily under 
the influence of an intoxicant simply did not fall under any 
categorical 
exclusions 
from 
firearm 
possession, 
even 
temporarily, as confirmed by the lack of any founding-era laws 
imposing such restrictions.5 
¶114 Founding-era history supports the conclusion that the 
Second Amendment protects the individual right to bear arms, 
notwithstanding the concurrent consumption of alcohol, but 
resolving Christen's as-applied challenge rests on a more 
fundamental foundation of the Second Amendment:  an individual's 
right to bear arms within the home. 
 
B. The Second Amendment provides heightened  
protections in the home.  
¶115 The Second Amendment's protection of the individual 
right to bear arms is most heightened in the home——where the 
State alleged Christen violated Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1)(b).  As 
recognized by the United States Supreme Court, "'the need for 
defense of self, family, and property is most acute' in the 
home."  McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 
                                                 
5 Heller's language stating that the opinion should not be 
read to "cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill" is of no 
relevance 
in 
assessing 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
laws 
criminalizing the intoxicated bearing of firearms.  Heller, 554 
U.S. at 626.  Heller decided the constitutionality of a ban on 
handguns in the home and the Court unequivocally ruled that 
challenges to other restrictions on the Second Amendment right 
must be resolved based upon its text, history, and tradition. 
No.  2019AP1767-CR.rgb 
 
21 
 
628).  For this reason, the Second Amendment "elevates above all 
other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens 
to use arms in defense of hearth and home."  Heller, 554 U.S. at 
635. 
¶116 Unlike the majority's conclusions in this case, the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court's 
holdings 
are 
grounded 
in 
constitutional history.  In colonial times, many able-bodied men 
were 
"not 
simply 
allowed 
to 
keep 
their 
own 
arms, 
but 
affirmatively required to do so."  Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun 
Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 
Mich. L. Rev. 204, 214-15 (1983).  This duty was deeply rooted 
in the English tradition, under which individuals had "arms 
readily available in their homes, . . . prepared at all times to 
chase down felons in response to the hue and cry, or to assemble 
together . . . in case of foreign invasion."  Id. at 215 (citing 
F. Maitland, The Constitutional History of England 276 (Fisher 
ed., 1961)).  In keeping with this tradition, "the [early 
American] duty to keep arms applied to every household, not just 
to those containing persons subject to militia services."  Id.  
In this manner, colonial settlers provided "for the defense of 
their homes from criminals and foreign enemies."  Id. (citing 
The Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts 42 (M. Farrard ed., 
1929, reprinted from the 1648 ed.)). 
¶117 Many founding-era scholars, who either influenced the 
Framers or interpreted the Constitution shortly after its 
adoption, understood the importance of keeping firearms in the 
home.  William Blackstone, for example, described the right to 
No.  2019AP1767-CR.rgb 
 
22 
 
keep and bear arms in the home as an "absolute right of 
individuals," explaining that "having arms for . . . defence" is 
a "natural right of resistance and self-preservation."  William 
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 144 (John 
Murray, ed., 1857).  St. George Tucker, a prominent anti-
federalist, described the right to bear arms as the "true 
palladium 
of 
liberty" 
and 
cautioned 
against 
gradual 
encroachments on this right as witnessed in England.  St. George 
Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries 143 (1803).  Tucker feared the 
State's "specious pretext[s]" for disarmament where "not one man 
in five hundred can keep a gun in his house without being 
subject to a penalty."  Id.  Both Blackstone's and Tucker's 
conceptions of the Second Amendment were deeply rooted in the 
writings of Sir Edward Coke, who likewise influenced the 
Framers.  Coke adamantly affirmed the existence of the right to 
possess arms for home defense.  See 3 Sir Edward Coke, The Third 
Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England 161 (5th ed., 
1671).  "For a mans house is his castle," wrote Coke, and "for 
where shall a man be safe, if it be not in his house?"  Id. 
¶118 "At the time of the founding, as now, 'to bear' meant 
to 'carry'"——a term which some understood, among other things, 
to reflect "the natural right of defense 'of one's person or 
house.'"  Heller, 554 U.S. at 584 (citing 2 Collected Works of 
James Wilson (K. Hall & M. Hall eds., 2007)).  Similarly, "arms" 
were understood to mean "weapons of offence, or armour of 
defence"——a right which unsurprisingly would retain paramount 
significance in the home.  Id. at 581 (citing Samuel Johnson, 1 
No.  2019AP1767-CR.rgb 
 
23 
 
Dictionary of the English Language (1773)).  Given the original 
meaning of the "right to bear arms," the Heller Court naturally 
determined 
that 
the 
Second 
Amendment 
"guarantee[s] 
the 
individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of 
confrontation," particularly in "defense of hearth and home."6  
Heller, 554 U.S. at 592, 635 (emphasis added). 
 
C. Wisconsin Stat. § 941.20(1)(b) as applied to Christen's 
right to bear arms in case of confrontation in his home 
¶119 The Second Amendment's protection of the individual 
right to bear arms in the home in case of confrontation renders 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 941.20(1)(b) 
unconstitutional 
as 
applied 
to 
Christen.  On the night in question, Christen consumed alcohol 
to a point of intoxication.  He went armed in case of 
confrontation with his roommates or their guests.  Importantly, 
all of this conduct occurred within the confines of his own 
home.  The Second Amendment most assuredly protects "carrying a 
gun from the bedroom to the kitchen" in one's home, yet 
§ 941.20(1)(b) criminally penalized Christen for exercising this 
fundamental right.  Rogers, 140 S. Ct. at 1868 (Thomas, J., 
                                                 
6 This is not to say that the Second Amendment does not 
apply with full force outside the home.  Far from it.  "It would 
take serious linguistic gymnastics——and a repudiation of [the] 
Court's decisions in Heller——to claim that the phrase 'bear 
arms' does not extend the Second Amendment beyond the home."  
Rogers v. Grewal, ___ U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 1865, 1869 (2020) 
(denying 
petition 
for 
writ 
of 
certiorari) 
(Thomas, 
J., 
dissenting).  Indeed, "the full context . . . [of Heller] shows 
that the Second Amendment" is not "confined to the 'defense of 
hearth and home.'"  State v. Roundtree, 2021 WI 1, ¶92, 395 
Wis. 2d 94, 
952 
N.W.2d 765 
(Rebecca 
Grassl 
Bradley, 
J., 
dissenting). 
No.  2019AP1767-CR.rgb 
 
24 
 
dissenting) (quoted source omitted).  The Second Amendment does 
not countenance such a restriction on the fundamental individual 
right to bear arms in case of confrontation in the home. 
¶120 The fact that Christen was intoxicated does not 
justify the State's encroachment on this fundamental right.  
During the founding era, legislatures did not restrict the 
individual right to bear arms to periods of sobriety, even 
outside the home.  Within the home, the right to bear arms is 
"most acute."  McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767 (quoting Heller, 554 
U.S. at 628). 
¶121 While the majority acknowledges that "[a] lawful 
firearm owner, even if intoxicated, cannot be convicted under 
§ 941.20(1)(b) if he or she acts in self-defense," majority op., 
¶27 (emphasis added), the majority fails to understand the 
difference between acting in self-defense and going armed in 
case of confrontation.  In Wisconsin, "[a] person is privileged 
to threaten or intentionally use force against another for the 
purpose of preventing or terminating what the person reasonably 
believes to be an unlawful interference with his or her person 
by such other person."  Wis. Stat. § 939.48(1).  In this case, 
because a jury concluded that Christen did not act in self-
defense, the majority leaps to the conclusion that he was 
properly convicted.  See majority op., ¶46.  But in rejecting 
Christen's self-defense argument, the jury concluded only that 
Christen was not privileged to threaten or use force against his 
roommates or their guests.  In upholding Christen's conviction, 
the majority conflates carrying a gun with actions taken in 
No.  2019AP1767-CR.rgb 
 
25 
 
self-defense——the threat or intentional use of force.  The 
majority never addresses Christen's argument that the Second 
Amendment guarantees the right to bear arms in the home in case 
of confrontation, whether intoxicated or sober.  It does. 
¶122 
As the constitutional text and the historical record 
establish, criminalizing the intoxicated carrying of firearms in 
the home violates the original meaning of the Second Amendment, 
which "guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and carry 
weapons in case of confrontation."  Heller, 554 U.S. at 592.  
This exercise of the right to bear arms retains heightened 
protections in the home, "where the need for defense of self, 
family, and property is most acute."   Id. at 628.  Because Wis. 
Stat. § 941.20(1)(b) criminalized the right to bear arms in case 
of confrontation in the home, the statute violated Christen's 
Second Amendment right to bear arms. 
* * * 
A 
blind 
enforcement 
of 
every 
act 
of 
the 
legislature, might relieve the court from the trouble 
and responsibility of deciding on the consistency of 
the legislative acts with the constitution; but the 
court 
would 
not 
be 
thereby 
released 
from 
its 
obligations to obey the mandates of the constitution, 
and 
maintain 
the 
paramount 
authority 
of 
that 
instrument[.] 
Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner, The Founders' Constitution, 
Vol. V, p. 213 (1987) (quoting Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Little 
90 (Ky. 1822)).  The majority reflexively defers to the 
legislature's encroachment of fundamental constitutional rights, 
in derogation of the "paramount authority" of the Constitution.  
In doing so, the majority embraces the policy-laden notion that 
No.  2019AP1767-CR.rgb 
 
26 
 
the Second Amendment protects something the majority deems too 
dangerous and perhaps dislikes.  The majority's disdain for the 
"pre-existing right" of "citizens to use arms in defense of 
hearth and home," Heller, 554 U.S. at 635, is evident in its 
unconstitutional recasting of this fundamental right as a mere 
"privilege" bestowed by the State, as the majority sees it.  See 
majority op., ¶44.  This case represents the latest example of 
judges "decid[ing] on a case-by-case basis whether the right is 
really worth insisting upon."  Heller, 554 U.S. at 634.  As the 
United States Supreme Court recognized in Heller, that decision 
was made by the American people at the time the Second Amendment 
was adopted.  In this decision, the majority overrides the will 
of the people by circumscribing the fundamental constitutional 
right to bear arms in case of confrontation in the home.  I 
respectfully dissent. 
 
No.  2019AP1767-CR.rgb 
 
1