Title: In re A.M.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In 
re A.M., Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-5102.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-5102 
IN RE A.M. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as In re A.M., Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-5102.] 
R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) does not require a juvenile court to make specific findings 
regarding each best-interest factor listed in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) or to 
include in its decision or judgment entry a written discussion of each of 
those factors. 
(No. 2019-0923—Submitted June 2, 2020—Decided November 3, 2020.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-190027,  
2019-Ohio-2028. 
_______________________ 
 
FRENCH, J. 
{¶ 1} This appeal asks us to consider the contours of the statutory 
requirement that juvenile courts consider the factors set out in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) 
for determining a child’s best interest before granting a motion filed by a public 
children-services agency or private child-placing agency for permanent custody of 
that child. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
{¶ 2} The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the 
Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, which granted 
permanent custody of A.M. to appellee, the Hamilton County Department of Job 
and Family Services.  Appellant—A.M.’s mother, Brianna D.—contends that the 
juvenile court did not comply with the requirement in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) that it 
consider all the enumerated factors for determining whether an award of permanent 
custody to the department was in A.M.’s best interest. 
{¶ 3} Because we conclude that the juvenile court complied with R.C. 
2151.414(D)(1), we affirm the First District’s judgment. 
Facts and procedural background 
{¶ 4} Brianna was 16 years old and living in a foster home, in the 
department’s custody, when A.M. was born, in November 2015. 
{¶ 5} The department first sought temporary custody of A.M. in December 
2016, shortly after A.M.’s first birthday, because Brianna was having trouble 
attending school, was having outbursts in her foster home, and had tested positive 
for marijuana.  Based on stipulations between Brianna and the department, the 
magistrate modified the department’s motion to a motion for interim protective 
orders, which the magistrate granted. 
{¶ 6} The magistrate adjudicated A.M. dependent on February 10, 2017, 
and granted the department protective supervision of A.M.  The magistrate 
incorporated into her decision a report from A.M.’s guardian ad litem that indicated 
that A.M. appeared to be emotionally attached to Brianna.  But the magistrate also 
found clear and convincing evidence of Brianna’s “out of control behaviors,” which 
had led to police involvement, property damage, and Brianna’s suspension and 
expulsion from school.  She also found that in October 2016, Brianna left her foster 
home with A.M. without permission and met with A.M.’s father, who allegedly 
assaulted Brianna. 
January Term, 2020 
 
3
{¶ 7} Under the department’s protective supervision, A.M. remained with 
Brianna in her foster home.  The magistrate ordered Brianna to undergo mental-
health, chemical-dependency, and domestic-violence assessments and to follow all 
resulting recommendations.  She further ordered Brianna to attend school, to not be 
tardy or disruptive in school or in her foster home, to submit to random toxicology 
screens, and to successfully complete parenting classes.  While many of these 
orders were directed toward both of A.M.’s parents, we are concerned here only 
with Brianna. 
{¶ 8} In June 2017, the department filed a complaint, affidavit, and motion 
for interim temporary custody of A.M. and for an order authorizing removal of 
A.M. from the foster home.  The department alleged that since February 2017, 
Brianna had repeatedly failed to attend school or had been turned away from school 
due to tardiness, had occasionally failed to make her whereabouts known to her 
foster family while leaving A.M. in the foster mother’s care, and had continued to 
test positive for marijuana.  The agency also alleged one instance in which Brianna 
had become upset and stated that she wanted to sign away her parental rights to 
A.M.  Based on stipulations by the parties, the magistrate granted the department’s 
motion for interim temporary custody on June 15, concluding that it would be 
contrary to A.M.’s best interest and welfare to remain in the foster home with 
Brianna. 
{¶ 9} In a decision issued September 20, 2017, the magistrate terminated 
the June 2017 interim orders and granted the department temporary custody of 
A.M.  The magistrate’s findings repeat, nearly verbatim, the allegations from the 
department’s June 2017 complaint.  The magistrate again ordered Brianna to 
participate in the services offered under her case plan.  In addition to repeating its 
previous orders regarding mental-health, chemical-dependency, and domestic-
violence assessments, parenting classes, and toxicology screens, the magistrate 
ordered Brianna to obtain and maintain sobriety, to not test positive for opiates, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4
alcohol, or other illegal or nonprescribed substances, and to complete high school 
or obtain a GED.  The magistrate ordered Brianna to obtain and maintain a stable 
income and housing if she were to become emancipated. 
{¶ 10} Brianna was emancipated in October 2017, shortly after her 18th 
birthday, upon her request.  As a result of her emancipation, Brianna’s medical 
insurance lapsed.  At that point, she was unable to reengage with Ohio Mentor, 
which had previously supervised her visitations with A.M., or to continue her 
therapy sessions. 
{¶ 11} On March 22, 2018, the department filed a motion to modify its 
temporary custody of A.M. to permanent custody.  The department alleged that 
Brianna had not engaged in mental-health services since November 2017, had not 
participated in a substance-abuse program, and had admitted to continued 
marijuana use.  A.M.’s guardian ad litem supported the department’s motion and 
stated that a grant of permanent custody was in A.M’s best interest due to Brianna’s 
lack of participation in case-plan services, continued use of marijuana, inconsistent 
visitation with A.M., and general lack of progress with respect to the case plan. 
{¶ 12} The magistrate conducted a two-day evidentiary hearing in 
September 2018.  Chris Graham, the caseworker assigned to Brianna and A.M., 
testified to the “really good relationship,” the bond, and the love between Brianna 
and A.M.  But she also testified that Brianna had not completed any of her court-
ordered case-plan services.  Brianna admitted that despite consistent court orders, 
she had not fully completed any of her case-plan services.  She testified, however, 
that she had matured and that given more time, she would follow through with those 
services. 
{¶ 13} The magistrate issued a decision on September 17, 2018, granting 
the department’s motion for permanent custody.  The magistrate found by clear and 
convincing evidence that A.M. should not, and could not within a reasonable time, 
January Term, 2020 
 
5
be placed with either parent and that an award of permanent custody to the 
department was in A.M.’s best interest. 
{¶ 14} Brianna filed a timely objection, in which she stated only that the 
magistrate’s decision was against the weight of the evidence and contrary to law.  
Although Brianna’s filing noted that she reserved the right to amend her objection 
upon receipt of a hearing transcript, she did not do so.  The juvenile court heard 
oral argument on Brianna’s objection, during which Brianna’s counsel challenged 
only the magistrate’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) that A.M. could not be 
placed with Brianna within a reasonable time.  Brianna’s counsel did state, “[T]he 
child is very bonded to [her] mother,” and she urged the court to give Brianna “an 
opportunity to try to do what she needs to do to reunify with her child.” 
{¶ 15} The juvenile court overruled Brianna’s objection and adopted the 
magistrate’s decision.  The judgment entry states that the court reviewed the 
transcript, heard oral arguments, and conducted an independent review of the 
objected-to matters and that the court found by clear and convincing evidence that 
the magistrate had properly granted the department’s motion for permanent 
custody.  The court independently found that “considering all relevant factors, 
including but not limited to those found in R.C. 2151.414(D), clear and convincing 
evidence established that it [was] in [A.M.’s] best interest to be placed in the 
permanent custody of [the department].” 
{¶ 16} On appeal to the First District, Brianna shifted her argument.  There, 
with new counsel, she argued that the juvenile court’s determination that a grant of 
permanent custody was in A.M.’s best interest was not supported by sufficient 
evidence and was against the weight of the evidence.  The court of appeals 
disagreed and affirmed the juvenile court’s judgment in a split decision.  It 
subsequently denied Brianna’s requests for en banc consideration and to certify a 
conflict. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6
{¶ 17} We initially denied Brianna’s discretionary appeal, 157 Ohio St.3d 
1406, 2019-Ohio-3731, 131 N.E.3d 77, but on reconsideration, we accepted 
jurisdiction to address a single proposition of law concerning a juvenile court’s 
consideration of the factors listed in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) for determining the best 
interest of a child, 157 Ohio St.3d 1520, 2019-Ohio-5289, 136 N.E.3d 526. 
Analysis 
The statutory framework 
{¶ 18} R.C. 2151.414 sets out specific findings a juvenile court must make 
before granting an agency’s motion for permanent custody of a child.  In re C.F., 
113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104, 862 N.E.2d 816, ¶ 22.  As relevant here, the 
court must find by clear and convincing evidence (1) that one or more of the 
conditions in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (e) applies and (2) that a grant of 
permanent custody is in the child’s best interest.  R.C. 2151.414(B)(1).  In this 
appeal, Brianna has not challenged the juvenile court’s determination that under 
R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), A.M. should not, and could not within a reasonable time, 
be placed with either parent.  We are therefore concerned only with the juvenile 
court’s determination that a grant of permanent custody to the department was in 
A.M.’s best interest. 
{¶ 19} An agency that seeks permanent custody of a child bears the burden 
of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the grant of permanent custody is 
in the child’s best interest.  In re B.C., 141 Ohio St.3d 55, 2014-Ohio-4558, 21 
N.E.3d 308, ¶ 26.  R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) sets out a nonexhaustive list of factors the 
court must consider: 
 
In determining the best interest of a child * * *, the court 
shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the 
following: 
January Term, 2020 
 
7
(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with 
the child’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-
home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect 
the child;  
(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the 
child or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for 
the maturity of the child;  
(c) The custodial history of the child * * *;  
(d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent 
placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved 
without a grant of permanent custody to the agency;  
(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of 
this section apply in relation to the parents and child. 
 
The factors in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) through (11), which are referred to in R.C. 
2151.414(D)(1)(e), involve a parent’s having been convicted of or pleaded guilty 
to specific criminal offenses against the child, the child’s sibling or another child 
who lived in the parent’s household; a parent’s withholding medical treatment or 
food from the child; a parent’s repeatedly placing the child at substantial risk of 
harm because of alcohol or drug abuse; a parent’s abandoning the child; and a 
parent’s having had parental rights as to the child’s sibling involuntarily terminated. 
{¶ 20} The parties here essentially dispute what a juvenile court must do to 
comply with, or to demonstrate its compliance with, R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). 
The parties’ positions 
{¶ 21} Brianna asks this court to hold that a juvenile court must show how 
it considered each of the best-interest factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e) 
by fully analyzing and discussing each factor.  She asks us to determine that the 
statute requires juvenile courts to provide a written discussion of the statutory best-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
interest factors that reflects what evidence the court relied on in its consideration of 
those factors.  Brianna’s position is consistent with the dissenting opinion from the 
First District, which found error based, in part, on the lack of express factual 
findings in the magistrate’s decision or juvenile court’s judgment entry relating 
directly to some of the statutory factors.  See 2019-Ohio-2028, ¶ 47 (Bergeron, J., 
dissenting). 
{¶ 22} The department, on the other hand, argues that a juvenile court need 
only consider the statutory factors and that it need not specifically discuss each 
factor to comply with R.C. 2151.414(D)(1).  A.M.’s attorney/guardian ad litem 
similarly argues that the statutory requirement to consider the best-interest factors 
does not equate to a statutory requirement to discuss them.  The department and 
A.M.’s attorney/guardian ad litem agree, however, that the record must demonstrate 
that the trial court did, in fact, consider those factors. 
R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) does not require written discussion or factual findings 
with respect to each best-interest factor 
{¶ 23} As we do with any issue of statutory interpretation, we begin by 
examining the language of the statute.  See In re T.R., 120 Ohio St.3d 136, 2008-
Ohio-5219, 896 N.E.2d 1003, ¶ 8.  We must give effect to the plain meaning of the 
words the General Assembly has used, and we may not modify an unambiguous 
statute by adding or deleting words.  State v. Steele, 138 Ohio St.3d 1, 2013-Ohio-
2470, 3 N.E.3d 135, ¶ 17.  If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we 
must apply it as written.  In re T.R. at ¶ 8.  Here, the unambiguous statutory language 
in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) resolves the proposition before us. 
{¶ 24} As we mentioned above, before granting an agency’s motion for 
permanent custody under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), a juvenile court must make two 
findings, one of which is that a grant of permanent custody is in the best interest of 
the child.  And R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) requires that a juvenile court, in determining 
whether a grant of permanent custody is in the best interest of the child, “consider” 
January Term, 2020 
 
9
all relevant factors, including the five factors listed in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) 
through (e).  The parties are essentially arguing about the meaning of the word 
“consider.” 
{¶ 25} R.C. Chapter 2151 does not define “consider,” so we accord that 
term its common, everyday meaning.  See Am. Fiber Sys., Inc. v. Levin, 125 Ohio 
St.3d 374, 2010-Ohio-1468, 928 N.E.2d 695, ¶ 24.  We have previously stated that 
“consider” means “ ‘to reflect on: think about with a degree of care or caution.’ ”  
State v. Thompson, 92 Ohio St.3d 584, 588, 752 N.E.2d 276 (2001), fn. 1, quoting 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1986) 483.  This common, 
everyday meaning of “consider” does not encompass a requirement of a written 
discussion or factual findings. 
{¶ 26} In other contexts, this court has held that a requirement to consider 
enumerated factors does not constitute a requirement that a court explicitly address 
those factors or that it make specific factual findings.  See, e.g., State v. Douglas, 
20 Ohio St.3d 34, 485 N.E.2d 711 (1985).  Douglas addressed the interplay between 
former R.C. 2151.26(A)(3) and former Juv.R. 30(E).  At the time, R.C. 
2151.26(A)(3) required a juvenile court to determine that a juvenile offender was 
not amenable to care or rehabilitation in the juvenile system before binding the 
juvenile over for prosecution in adult court and Juv.R. 30(E) required the court to 
consider five factors in making that determination.  See Douglas at 35-36.  We held 
that neither R.C. 2151.26(A)(3) nor Juv.R. 30(E) required the juvenile court to 
make written findings: “The rule simply requires the court to consider these factors 
in making its determination on the amenability issue.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Douglas at 
36.  We stated, “[A]s long as sufficient, credible evidence pertaining to each factor 
existed in the record before the court, the bind-over order should not be reversed in 
the absence of an abuse of discretion.”  Id. 
{¶ 27} We employed similar reasoning with respect to former R.C. 
2950.09(B)(2), which required courts to consider ten specific factors, as well as all 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
other relevant factors, in determining whether to classify a defendant as a sexual 
predator.  See State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 700 N.E.2d 570 (1998).  In Cook, 
we held that the statute did “not require the court to list the criteria, but only to 
‘consider all relevant factors, including’ the criteria in R.C. 2950.09(B)(2) in 
making [its] findings.”  Id. at 426. 
{¶ 28} We have not previously addressed this question with respect to R.C. 
2151.414(D)(1), and the caselaw from the courts of appeals regarding that statute 
is inconsistent.  In the case before us, the majority of the First District panel relied 
on that court’s prior decision that had “ ‘strongly encourage[d]’ ” juvenile courts to 
discuss each of the best-interest factors under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) but that had 
refused to find error based on a court’s failure to do so when the record otherwise 
indicated that the court considered all the required factors.  2019-Ohio-2028, at  
¶ 26, quoting In re K.T. 1, 2018-Ohio-4312, 121 N.E.3d 847, ¶ 46, (1st Dist.).  See 
also In re W. Children, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-180620, 2019-Ohio-690, ¶ 51 
(record must indicate that court considered all best-interest factors, but court need 
not “specifically discuss” each factor). 
{¶ 29} Most other Ohio appellate districts have likewise held that R.C. 
2151.414(D)(1) does not require a juvenile court to list or discuss the statutory 
factors in a best-interest determination.  See In re D.F., 7th Dist. Noble No. 16 NO 
0439, 2017-Ohio-2711, ¶ 38; In re A.H., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 13CA10454, 2014-
Ohio-552, ¶ 11; In re M.R., 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-12-18, 2013-Ohio-1302, ¶ 78; 
In re K.S., 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-09-008, 2009-Ohio-3622, ¶ 21; In re Allbery, 
4th Dist. Hocking No. 05CA12, 2005-Ohio-6529, ¶ 13; In re I.M., 8th Dist. 
Cuyahoga Nos. 82669 and 82695, 2003-Ohio-7069, ¶ 27; In re Fouty, 5th Dist. 
Guernsey No. 00CA36, 2001 WL 227672, *3 (Mar. 7, 2001). 
{¶ 30} Other appellate districts, however, have held the opposite.  The 
Eleventh District Court of Appeals, for example, has held that a “trial court must 
discuss, in its judgment entry, each of the R.C. 2151.414(D) factors when reaching 
January Term, 2020 
 
11 
a determination concerning the best interest of the child” and that “the failure to do 
so constitutes prejudicial error.”  (Emphasis sic.)  In re B.D., 11th Dist. Lake Nos. 
2009-L-003 and 2009-L-007, 2009-Ohio-2299, ¶ 104, citing In re Bentley, 11th 
Dist. Ashtabula No. 2004-A-0075, 2005-Ohio-1257.  It stated, “The factors must 
* * * be given due consideration and carefully discussed in relation to the evidence 
submitted” to enable full and meaningful appellate review.  Id. at ¶ 114.  And the 
Tenth District Court of Appeals, despite its recognition that “a trial court is not 
required to specifically enumerate each factor under R.C. 2151.414(D) in its 
decision,” In re Heyman, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 96APF02-194, 1996 WL 465238, 
*2 (Aug. 13, 1996), has reversed and remanded a permanent-custody judgment for 
the juvenile court to “issue findings addressing the factors under R.C. 
2151.414(D),” In re Strong, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 01AP-1418 and 01AP-1419, 
2002-Ohio-2247, ¶ 49.  The Twelfth District also requires juvenile courts to include 
findings related to the R.C. 2151.414(D) factors in their decisions.  In re A.F., 12th 
Dist. Brown No. CA2006-09-012, 2007-Ohio-1646, ¶ 30.  The approach taken by 
the Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Districts, however, improperly extends R.C. 
2151.414(D)(1) beyond its plain meaning. 
{¶ 31} Based on the plain and unambiguous statutory language, and 
consistently with our treatment of the word “consider” in other contexts, we hold 
that R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) does not require a juvenile court to expressly discuss each 
of the best-interest factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e).  Consideration is 
all the statute requires.  Although a reviewing court must be able to discern from 
the magistrate’s or juvenile court’s decision and the court’s judgment entry that the 
court satisfied the statutory requirement that it consider the enumerated factors, we 
may not graft onto the statute a requirement that the court include in its decision a 
written discussion of or express findings regarding each of the best-interest factors. 
{¶ 32} That is not to say, nor do we suggest, that juvenile courts should not 
address the statutory best-interest factors.  Several Ohio appellate districts already 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
12 
encourage the juvenile courts in their districts to do so.  See In re K.T. 1, 2018-
Ohio-4312, 121 N.E.3d 847 (1st Dist.), at ¶ 46; In re D.F., 7th Dist. Noble No. 16 
NO 0439, 2017-Ohio-2711, at ¶ 38; In re M.R., 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-12-18, 
2013-Ohio-1302, at ¶ 77, citing In re D.H., 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-06-57, 2007-
Ohio-1762, ¶ 20.  We likewise strongly encourage juvenile courts to do so.  As we 
have done when addressing other statutes that require a court to consider specific 
factors, we emphasize that the best practice is for the juvenile court to specifically 
address each factor.  See Douglas, 20 Ohio St.3d at 36, 485 N.E.2d 711; State v. 
Eppinger, 91 Ohio St.3d 158, 166, 743 N.E.2d 881 (2001) (suggesting that a model 
sexual-offender-classification hearing should include an on-the-record discussion 
of the statutory factors under former R.C. 2950.09).  Discussion of the statutory 
factors, we reasoned in Eppinger, aids appellate review and ensures that the 
offender receives a fair and complete hearing.  Id. at 167.  Discussion of the 
statutory best-interest factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) would similarly facilitate 
appellate review of permanent-custody judgments.  See In re M.B., 9th Dist. 
Summit No. 21760, 2004-Ohio-597, ¶ 11 (although a trial court may not be 
statutorily required to provide detailed reasoning, an appellate court “needs 
sufficient information to ‘review’ the trial court’s decision, else we are put in the 
position of speculating as to the evidence supporting the trial court’s decision, 
making our own factual findings, and even judging the credibility of the 
witnesses”).  A juvenile court’s including a discussion of the best-interest factors 
in its decision granting permanent custody of a child to an agency is also likely to 
increase public confidence in the judicial process in this most important area of 
parental rights. 
The magistrate’s decision and juvenile court’s judgment entry  
indicate consideration of the statutory best-interest factors 
{¶ 33} Having determined that R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) does not require a 
juvenile court to make specific findings regarding each best-interest factor listed in 
January Term, 2020 
 
13 
R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) or to include in its decision or judgment entry a written 
discussion of each of those factors, we are left with the question whether the 
magistrate’s decision and the juvenile court’s judgment entry in this case establish 
that the juvenile court complied with its duty to consider the statutory best-interest 
factors.  We conclude that the magistrate’s decision and the juvenile court’s 
judgment entry demonstrate that the court complied with R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). 
{¶ 34} We first look to the magistrate’s decision.  The magistrate expressly 
concluded that it was in A.M.’s best interest to award permanent custody to the 
department.  She also individually cited each of the factors set out in R.C. 
2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e), albeit in generic language not tailored to the facts 
of this case. 
{¶ 35} The magistrate’s consideration of certain of the factors in R.C. 
2151.414(D)(1) is obvious.  Regarding the wishes of the child, as expressed either 
by the child or by the child’s guardian ad litem, under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b), the 
magistrate noted the guardian ad litem’s determination that an award of permanent 
custody, which would allow A.M. to be adopted, was in A.M.’s best interest.  The 
magistrate also stated that she had consulted A.M. in an age-appropriate manner 
regarding the request for permanent custody.  Regarding A.M.’s custodial history, 
under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c), the magistrate found that A.M. had been in the 
temporary custody of the department since June 2017 and had previously been 
under the agency’s protective supervision beginning in December 2016.  And with 
respect to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d), which requires the court to consider the child’s 
need for a legally secure placement and whether that type of placement can be 
achieved without a grant of permanent custody, the magistrate reiterated the length 
of time A.M. had been under the department’s protective supervision or in its 
temporary custody, having already noted the guardian ad litem’s determination that 
permanent custody was in A.M.’s best interest because it would allow her to be 
adopted, thus creating a legally secure placement.  Additional findings regarding 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14 
Brianna’s failure to follow through with her mental-health treatment, continued use 
of marijuana, noncompliance with toxicology screens, failure to complete parenting 
classes, failure to complete high school, and failure to follow through with 
domestic-violence-prevention services all support a finding that establishing a 
legally secure placement for A.M. required a grant of permanent custody to the 
department. 
{¶ 36} The 
magistrate’s 
consideration 
of 
the 
remaining 
R.C. 
2151.414(D)(1) factors is less obvious.  The magistrate noted the requirement in 
R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e) that she consider whether R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) through 
(11) apply, but she made no specific finding in that regard.  Instead, she stated, 
“Mother has a history of sporadic visitation.  Mother complained that her 8:45 AM 
visits between April and June were too early for her.  Mother missed visits and it 
ha[d] an adverse effect on the child.”  Those statements may be true—and they are 
supported by the record—but they do not relate to the factors listed in R.C. 
2151.414(E)(7) through (11).  Nevertheless, the record here contains no evidence 
that any of the factors in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) through (11) apply, and no party has 
argued otherwise.  See In re K.H., 9th Dist. Summit No. 27952, 2016-Ohio-1330, 
¶ 14 (“Because no evidence was presented to the trial court that any of the factors 
set forth in Sections 2151.414(E)(7) through (11) applied, * * * the trial court was 
not required to discuss or make findings under” R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e)).  Given 
the magistrate’s acknowledgment of R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e) as a consideration in 
her best-interest analysis and the inapplicability of R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) through 
(11), we conclude that neither the absence of a factual finding that R.C. 
2151.414(E)(7) through (11) are inapplicable nor the magistrate’s statement of 
findings unrelated to (E)(7) through (11) demonstrates prejudicial error. 
{¶ 37} That leaves R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a), which is where Brianna 
primarily focuses her argument.  She argues that the magistrate’s decision is 
insufficient because it does not include analysis, discussion or a conclusion 
January Term, 2020 
 
15 
regarding her interaction and interrelationship with A.M.  Brianna points 
particularly to the absence of any discussion of trial testimony given by the 
caseworker and A.M.’s guardian ad litem regarding the bond between A.M. and 
Brianna and Brianna’s recent visitation history.  The record undoubtedly contains 
testimony of a loving relationship between Brianna and A.M.  But the absence of 
discussion of that evidence by the magistrate does not mean that the magistrate did 
not take it into account when considering R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a). 
{¶ 38} The magistrate specifically indicated that she considered R.C. 
2151.414(D)(1)(a) by concluding that the interaction and interrelationship between 
A.M. and Brianna “cause[d]” A.M.’s best interest to be served by an award of 
permanent custody.  But looking beyond that conclusory statement, findings 
elsewhere in the decision demonstrate that the magistrate considered evidence 
regarding the interaction and interrelationship between A.M. and Brianna.  The 
magistrate noted the instance when Brianna became upset and stated that she 
wanted to sign away her parental rights to A.M.  She also noted Brianna’s history 
of sporadic visitation with A.M. and the adverse effects that Brianna’s missed visits 
had on A.M.  Finally, the magistrate found that Brianna demonstrated a lack of 
commitment toward A.M.  Although they are scattered throughout her decision, 
those findings nevertheless demonstrate that the magistrate appropriately 
considered the interrelation between Brianna and A.M., as R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) 
requires, in determining the best interest of the child. 
{¶ 39} We now turn to the juvenile court’s judgment entry overruling 
Brianna’s objection and adopting the magistrate’s decision.  Pursuant to Juv.R. 
40(D)(4)(d), if timely objections to a magistrate’s decision are filed, the juvenile 
court must “undertake an independent review as to the objected matters to ascertain 
that the magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and appropriately 
applied the law.”  The fact that a court does not cite any specific portion of a 
transcript or record does not demonstrate that the court failed to conduct an 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
independent review of the matters objected to.  Giovanni v. Bailey, 9th Dist. 
Summit Nos. 28631 and 28676, 2018-Ohio-369, ¶ 21 (applying the analogous 
Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d)). 
{¶ 40} Here, the juvenile court noted its obligation to independently review 
the matters objected to.  The court stated that it had independently reviewed the 
record, including the trial transcripts, heard oral argument on Brianna’s objection, 
and considered all relevant factors, including those R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) requires, 
in its determination of A.M.’s best interest.  Although the juvenile court did not 
restate factual findings from the magistrate’s decision, it did hold that the magistrate 
properly determined the factual issues after viewing the witnesses’ demeanors and 
judging their credibility, and it adopted the magistrate’s decision as its own.  And 
the court independently held, “[C]onsidering all relevant factors, including but not 
limited to those found in R.C. 2151.414(D), clear and convincing evidence 
established that it is in the child’s best interest to be placed in the permanent custody 
of [the department].”  When the record indicates that a juvenile court, in response 
to timely filed objections, has undertaken an independent review of the evidence, 
has acknowledged the applicable statutory framework, has adopted the magistrate’s 
findings of fact, and has made the required conclusions upon clear and convincing 
evidence, we can only conclude that the court has satisfied its obligation under 
Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(d). 
{¶ 41} In short, the magistrate’s decision and juvenile court’s judgment 
entry demonstrate that the court satisfied its statutory duty to consider the best-
interest factors set out in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e). 
Conclusion 
{¶ 42} R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) requires a juvenile court to consider all 
relevant factors, including but not limited to the five factors set out in R.C. 
2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e), in determining the best interest of a child in a 
permanent-custody case.  In applying that statute, it is preferable for a juvenile court 
January Term, 2020 
 
17 
to provide some discussion or analysis of the best-interest factors to aid in appellate 
review and to increase confidence in its decision, but the statute itself requires only 
that the court consider those factors, and we may not impose additional 
requirements beyond the statutory language.  Because the record here demonstrates 
that the magistrate and the juvenile court did consider the statutory factors, we 
affirm the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
KENNEDY, FISCHER, DEWINE, and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
DONNELLY, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by O’CONNOR, C.J. 
_________________ 
DONNELLY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 43} The majority may be correct in holding that a juvenile court’s 
statutory obligation to “consider” the best-interest factors of R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) 
does not include a requirement that the court explain its factual findings and 
reasoning for every individual factor contained in the statute.  But the majority’s 
holding does not solve the problem presented in this appeal; it only rejects a 
proposed solution.  The problem remains: when a trial court does not provide 
adequate information or analysis to support its decision, an appellate court is put in 
the position of reverse-engineering the decision in order to review the trial court’s 
presumed reasoning.  Such reverse-engineering is problematic because it does not 
necessarily comply with the applicable standard of appellate review, it is not 
necessarily accurate, and as Judge Bergeron aptly noted in his opinion dissenting 
from the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals, “it places the appealing 
party at a substantial disadvantage because he or she lacks guidance on what to 
address on appeal, often rendering the appeal a hollow exercise,” 2019-Ohio-2028, 
¶ 41 (Bergeron, J., dissenting).  Because the magistrate and juvenile court did not 
provide an adequate basis for meaningful appellate review in this case, I would 
reverse the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
{¶ 44} As the majority has thoroughly explained, the record contains many 
details regarding A.M.’s history and the relationship between A.M. and her mother, 
appellant, Brianna D., for the magistrate to consider and carefully weigh in 
determining whether granting permanent custody of A.M. to appellee, the Hamilton 
County Department of Job and Family Services, would be in A.M.’s best interest.  
But you would not know that from reading the magistrate’s decision. 
{¶ 45} In contrast to the majority’s generous description of the magistrate’s 
decision, I would describe the decision as a patchwork quilt of language taken from 
the September 20, 2017 adjudication-and-dispositional entry and from a generic 
template for permanent-custody decisions.  In some places, A.M.’s name is inserted 
in the template in all capital letters, and in many places, the decision merely refers 
to the “child/ren.”  Some of the boilerplate language is completely irrelevant, some 
of it is relevant but not accompanied by any case-specific information, and some of 
it is accompanied by case-specific information that is not relevant to the boilerplate 
language.  For example, in the portion of the decision addressing the wishes of the 
child pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b), the magistrate stated the following: 
 
Ohio revised code section 2151.414(D)(1)(b) considers the wishes 
of the child/ren as expressed directly by the child/ren or through the 
child/ren’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the 
child/ren in determining whether a termination of parental rights is 
in the child/ren’s best interest.  O.R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b).  The 
Guardian ad Litem agrees that Permanent Custody is in the best 
interest of the child so that the child may be adopted. 
 
{¶ 46} One cannot reasonably read the foregoing language as a description 
of the magistrate’s personal interaction with A.M. and assessment of A.M.’s 
wishes.  Even assuming that the final sentence is not boilerplate language from a 
January Term, 2020 
 
19 
template, repeating a guardian ad litem’s (“GAL’s”) best-interest recommendation 
does not tell us anything about the personal wishes of A.M.; it reflects the 
professional opinion of the GAL.  In a custody proceeding, the determination by a 
GAL of what is in the child’s best interest and what the child wants are two distinct 
facts, and sometimes, the two are in direct opposition to one another.  See In re 
Baby Girl Baxter, 17 Ohio St.3d 229, 232, 479 N.E.2d 257 (1985).  The majority 
opinion weaves in the observation that the magistrate at one point “stated that she 
had consulted A.M. in an age-appropriate manner,” majority opinion at ¶ 35, but 
the statement the majority is referring to does not indicate whether A.M. expressed 
any wishes; at the end of the magistrate’s decision, after terminating the mother’s 
parental rights and granting permanent custody to the agency, and after describing 
the agency’s efforts to finalize permanent placement of A.M. with a new family, 
the magistrate included what appears to be a boilerplate sentence—with A.M.’s 
name inserted in all capital letters—that states: “The Court consulted [A.M.], in an 
age-appropriate manner, regarding the proposed permanency plan.” 
{¶ 47} My objective here is not to quibble over what the magistrate did or 
did not state at every point in her decision but to point out how much effort the 
majority of this court had to expend in extracting and assembling enough 
information to justify upholding the magistrate’s decision.  As another example, in 
the portion of the decision purportedly addressing the relationship between Brianna 
and A.M. pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a), the magistrate stated the following: 
 
The interaction and interrelationship of the child/ren with their 
parent(s), sibling(s), relative(s), foster parent(s) and out-of-home 
provider(s) causes the child/ren’s best interest to be served by the 
termination of parental rights. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
Again, one cannot reasonably consider the foregoing boilerplate language to be 
evidence of the magistrate’s individualized consideration of the relationship 
between A.M. and her mother.  But the majority portrays the sentence as the 
magistrate’s “concluding that the interaction and interrelationship between A.M. 
and Brianna ‘cause[d]’ A.M.’s best interest to be served by an award of permanent 
custody.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 38.  The majority points to certain observations 
about Brianna’s negative behaviors elsewhere in the magistrate’s decision, but how 
are we to know that those negative behaviors are what led the magistrate to the 
ever-so-personalized conclusion about the relationship between the “parent(s)” and 
“child/ren?”  We do not know whether the magistrate weighed these negative 
factors against positive ones, such as the unquestionable loving bond between 
Brianna and A.M., because such positive factors are nowhere to be found in the 
magistrate’s decision.  Did the magistrate ignore them altogether?  Did she find that 
they carried less weight because of a credibility problem?  Or did the magistrate 
carefully consider the positive factors and decide that they were outweighed by the 
teenage mother’s failure to get her young, traumatized life together quickly 
enough? 
{¶ 48} It is entirely possible that the last of these conjectures is the correct 
one and that the majority is right in assuming as much.  Indeed, a majority of this 
court and a majority of the First District Court of Appeals set forth many facts and 
considerations that very well could have validly supported the magistrate’s decision 
regarding A.M.’s best interest.  But by doing so, the First District and this court 
created a decision on the juvenile court’s behalf rather than reviewing the one that 
was made. 
{¶ 49} Even if the magistrate was not required to provide a thorough 
explanation of the facts and analysis that applied to each separate best-interest 
factor under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), the magistrate needed to provide an adequate 
basis for meaningful appellate arguments and meaningful appellate review.  The 
January Term, 2020 
 
21 
magistrate did not do so in this case, leaving Brianna to punch at the air and leaving 
the First District Court of Appeals to do “the work of the lower court[] * * * 
(without the benefit of the ability to judge credibility),” 2019-Ohio-2028 at ¶ 41 
(Bergeron, J., dissenting).  Rather than guiding Ohio’s appellate courts away from 
the problematic practice reflected in the First District’s analysis, the majority 
reinforces the problem by repeating it. 
{¶ 50} Accordingly, I dissent and would reverse the judgment of the First 
District Court of Appeals. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
 
Cynthia S. Daugherty, for appellant. 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Nicholas C. 
Varney, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Treleven and Klingensmith Law, L.L.C., and Celia Klug Weingartner, 
attorney/guardian ad litem, for A.M. 
_________________