Title: Wright v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DONALD WRIGHT, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§   No. 114, 2009 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   Court Below – Superior Court 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for New Castle County 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§   Cr. I.D. No. 0803024468 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§  
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
    Submitted:  August 19, 2009 
 
 
 
 
       Decided:  August 28, 2009 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Nicole M. Walker, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, 
Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant. 
 
 
Elizabeth R. McFarlan, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
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The defendant-appellant, Donald Wright (“Wright”), appeals from the 
Superior Court’s final judgments of conviction of Rape in the First Degree 
(eight counts), Rape in the Second Degree, First Degree Unlawful Sexual 
Contact, and Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child.  Wright argues that the 
Superior Court erred by not, sua sponte, declaring a mistrial, issuing a 
curative instruction, or striking the introduction of certain allegedly 
irrelevant and prejudicial evidence.  Wright did not raise any objections in 
the Superior Court.  
 
The record reflects that Wright’s defense counsel made a tactical 
decision to not object.  Accordingly, Wright has waived his right to appellate 
review in this direct appeal. Therefore, the judgments of the Superior Court 
must be affirmed. 
Facts 
 
Donald and Jada Wright were married on June 1, 2002.  Jada Wright 
(“Jada”) had three children from a previous relationship: a thirteen-year-old-
son and nine-year-old girl and boy twins.  The family moved to Middletown, 
Delaware, in April of 2006.  At that time, Jada’s daughter Z.H. was twelve 
years old and in the sixth grade. 
 
Wright and Jada worked different schedules and Wright frequently 
was alone with Z.H. after school.  Z.H. testified that shortly after moving to 
 
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Middletown, Wright went into Z.H.’s bedroom and forced his penis into her 
mouth, rubbed her breasts, and touched her vagina with his fingers.  Wright 
repeated that behavior the following week.  Both times Wright told Z.H. not 
to tell anyone.  Wright did not touch Z.H. again until the following school 
year, after her older brother had moved out of the house.  At some point 
during that year, Z.H. contracted strep throat and had to stay home from 
school for three days.  Z.H. testified that during those three days, Wright put 
his penis in her mouth and vagina twice each day. 
 
In August of 2007, Jada was hospitalized, and, according to Z.H., 
Wright engaged in oral and vaginal sex with her.  Over the next few months, 
Z.H. testified that Wright forced her to have sex with him on several 
occasions.  In November of 2007, Wright was scheduled to leave the country 
to begin working in Iraq.  The day before he left, he threatened to kill Z.H. if 
she told anyone about the sexual abuse. 
 
In late December 2007, Z.H. told her aunt that Wright had been 
abusing her.  Z.H.’s aunt told her to write down what had happened to her.  
Z.H. wrote her aunt a note describing the abuse.  On January 2, 2008, Z.H.’s 
aunt spoke with Jada and told her that Z.H. was being sexually abused by 
Wright.   
 
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The next day, Jada took Z.H. to Christiana Hospital and a forensic 
nurse administered a rape kit.  The following week, Z.H. was interviewed by 
specialists at the Children’s Advocacy Center (“CAC”) at the A.I. DuPont 
Children’s Hospital.  Around that time, Z.H. began keeping a journal 
describing her feelings about the abuse. 
 
On March 25, 2008, Wright was arrested.  On May 16, 2008, he was 
indicted on thirty-six counts of Rape in the First Degree, Rape in the Second 
Degree, Unlawful Sexual Contact in the First Degree, and Continuous 
Sexual Abuse of a Child.  On December 9, 2008, the State entered a nolle 
prosequi on eighteen counts of First Degree Rape and the case proceeded to 
trial.   
At trial, the State’s evidence included multiple witnesses, videotapes 
of the CAC interview, and Z.H.’s journal.  During the first day of trial, the 
prosecutor, without objection, asked Z.H. to read excerpts of her journal into 
evidence.  The excerpts Z.H. read generally conveyed that she was in a great 
deal of pain, wished that she could commit suicide, and cried frequently.  
Z.H. inaccurately read one portion of her journal into evidence.  The journal 
entry stated: 
That’s one thing I got to change because if I don’t . . . I want to 
go away because I tired of being abused by certain people in my 
family but their going to get theirs soon whatever goes around 
comes around [sic]. 
 
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When the prosecutor asked Z.H. to read that portion of the journal to 
the jury, however, Z.H. testified: 
That’s one thing I got to change.  I want to go away, because 
I’m tired of being abused by certain people, especially my 
mom’s husband. 
 
Wright’s attorney did not object to the journal’s admission into 
evidence or to Z.H.’s inaccurate reading of the above quoted entry.  After 
the prosecutor finished the direct examination of Z.H., the trial judge 
dismissed the jury for the day.  At that point, Wright’s defense counsel told 
the judge that Z.H. had not read her journal entries accurately, but still did 
not raise any objection.   
The next day, when the trial resumed and after Wright’s attorney had 
the entire evening to consider his options, Wright’s attorney did not: raise 
any objections, ask for a curative instruction or move for a mistrial.  Instead, 
he proceeded to cross-examine Z.H. about her journal and her inaccurate 
direct testimony.  During cross-examination, Z.H. admitted that she did not 
start writing in her journal until after she had told her aunt that Wright was 
abusing her.  Wright’s counsel asked Z.H. questions about the contents of 
her journal, and explored the discrepancies between her testimony and her 
written words.   
 
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Defense counsel produced a copy of the journal entry Z.H. had read 
aloud the previous day, and asked about the absence of any reference to 
Wright.  Z.H. admitted that she used the phrase, “especially my mom’s 
husband,” in her testimony the previous day, and suggested that the copy of 
the journal entry that defense counsel was showing her was inaccurate.  
Defense counsel produced the State’s exhibit (shown to Z.H. the previous 
day) and Z.H. admitted that the two were identical.  Wright’s attorney 
attempted to question Z.H. further, but Z.H. claimed she did not remember 
the previous day’s testimony. 
 
After a recess, Wright’s counsel called Z.H. as a defense witness.  By 
that time, defense counsel had obtained a transcript of the previous day’s 
testimony.  He confronted Z.H. about the discrepancies between her 
testimony and the journal entry that she was asked to read.  Z.H. tried to 
explain the difference, but ultimately claimed that the court reporter 
incorrectly transcribed her testimony.   
 
Later in the trial, Wright testified in his own defense.  He denied 
engaging in vaginal intercourse with Z.H., but admitted that he engaged in 
oral sex with Z.H. four times, had ejaculated on her stomach, touched her 
breasts, rubbed his penis on the outside of her vagina, and placed his fingers 
in her vagina. 
 
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During his closing statement, Wright’s attorney presented a credibility 
argument to the jury.  He noted that the many charges before the jury 
embodied Z.H.’s allegations and that, although Wright admitted to four 
incidents of sexual contact with Z.H., he denied the remaining counts.  
Wright’s counsel challenged Z.H.’s credibility based on her incorrect 
reading of her journal entries.  Defense counsel characterized Z.H. as 
“someone who clearly was prone to exaggeration in number and in type of 
whatever happened to her” and that she was “someone who [was] capable of 
here, in the courtroom, after being instructed, to just read what you wrote, 
and she changes it in front of you here, and then when confronted with the 
transcript, showing what she says, she can’t remember.”   
 
The jury convicted Wright of Rape in the First Degree (eight counts), 
Rape in the Second Degree, Unlawful Sexual Contact in the First Degree, 
and Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child.  The jury “hung” on the remaining 
charges.  On February 13, 2009, Wright was sentenced to a total of 151 
years of Level V incarceration, suspended after 140 years for decreasing 
levels of supervision.  
Parties’ Contentions 
 
 
In this direct appeal, Wright raises two principal arguments.  First, 
Wright argues that the journal evidence was inadmissible because it was 
 
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immaterial and unfairly prejudicial.  Wright contends that the journal 
evidence was immaterial and that the journal evidence was unfairly 
prejudicial, because it conveyed Z.H.’s pain and suffering in a manner 
intended to inflame the passions of the jury.  Second, Wright argues that 
Z.H. purposefully misread one of her journal entries to sway the jury and 
affect the outcome of the trial.  According to Wright, those errors were so 
egregious, even in the absence of an objection from defense counsel, that the 
trial judge was required to take curative action sua sponte. 
 
The State submits that Wright’s defense counsel made a tactical 
decision to waive any objection to the journal evidence in order to: first, 
argue that the journal evidence was self-serving, because Z.H. did not start 
writing in the journal until after she had told her aunt about the abuse; and 
second, use the inconsistency between Z.H.’s testimony and her journal 
entry to impeach her credibility.  Because Wright’s counsel did not object, 
the State argues that Wright waived any right to appellate review of the 
admissibility of the journal evidence and Z.H.’s testimony about the journal.   
Standard of Review 
 
 
Generally, the failure to raise a contemporaneous objection to 
allegedly inadmissible evidence constitutes a waiver of a defendant’s right to 
 
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raise that issue on appeal, unless the error is plain.1  Twenty years ago, this 
Court stated:  “Our rules of evidence are clear.  A party who fails to raise 
timely objections to evidence in the trial court [risks] losing the right to raise 
evidentiary issues on appeal, in the absence of plain error affecting 
substantial rights.”2   
 
The plain error standard of appellate review is predicated upon the 
assumption of oversight.3  Therefore, defense counsel’s failure to object to 
the admission of improper evidence through oversight does not bar plain 
error review.  The plain error standard places the burden on the defendant of 
demonstrating that trial counsel’s oversight resulted in an error that was “so 
clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and 
integrity of the trial process.”4   
 
However, if the record reflects that the decision not to object at trial 
was a “deliberate tactical maneuver by” defense counsel and did not result 
from oversight, then that action constitutes a true waiver.5  The United States 
Supreme Court has stated “no procedural principle is more familiar to this 
Court than a constitutional right” or a right of any other sort “may be 
                                 
 
1 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 
2 Tucker v. State, 564 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1989). 
3 Id. 
4 Baker v. State, 906 A.2d 139, 150 (Del. 2006). 
5 Czech v. State, 945 A.2d 1088 (Del. 2008). 
 
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forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely 
assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.”6  
Although there have only been a few cases, this Court has consistently held 
that a conscious decision to refrain from objecting at trial as a tactical matter 
is a waiver that will negate plain error appellate review.7   
Trial Strategy NOT Plain Error 
 
 
In this case, the State argues that the tactical decision of Wright’s trial 
counsel not to object constitutes a waiver that precludes plain error review.  
We agree.  The record supports the State’s assertion that Wright’s counsel 
did not object to the admission of the journal evidence for tactical reasons.  
Wright admitted to four instances of sexual contact with Z.H. and his 
defense counsel knew about those admissions before trial.  Accordingly, the 
issue before the jury was the degree of Wright’s guilt—i.e., on how many of 
the various charges they should convict—not whether to convict Wright at 
all.   
 
Because Wright had conceded guilt on some of the charges, the record 
reflects that defense counsel’s only viable strategy was to argue that Z.H. 
                                 
 
6 Yakus v. United states, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 
(1993). 
7 Czech v. State, 945 A.2d 1088 (Del. 2008); Tucker v. State, 945 A.2d 1088 (Del. 2008); 
Crawley v. State, 2007 WL 1491448; Baker v. State, 1993 WL 557951. 
 
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exaggerated the extent of her sexual abuse.  Accordingly, Wright’s attorney 
challenged Z.H. on the timing of writing the journal, establishing that Z.H. 
did not begin writing in it until after she had come forward with her claims 
of abuse, thus implying that any information in the journal was self-serving.8  
In his closing remarks, Wright’s defense counsel also emphasized the fact 
that Z.H. inaccurately read her journal entries to the jury, and used that 
inconsistency to argue that Z.H. had a tendency to exaggerate.9   
The record supports the State’s assertion that Wright’s failure to 
object to the admission of the journal into evidence and Z.H.’s testimony 
was a tactical decision.  Wright’s counsel used the journal evidence to 
undermine Z.H.’s credibility and to challenge the magnitude of the 
prosecution’s overall case.10  Accordingly, we hold that by making a tactical 
decision not to object at trial, Wright has waived appellate review of any 
arguable claim of error in this direct appeal.11 
Conclusion 
 
The judgments of the Superior Court are affirmed. 
                                 
 
8 Czech v. State, 945 A.2d 1088 (Del. 2008); Tucker v. State, 945 A.2d 1088 (Del. 2008). 
9 Czech v. State, 945 A.2d 1088 (Del. 2008). 
10 Id. 
11 Id.