Title: FRAN GILLETT V. MICHAEL WHITE and PAMELA WHITE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

FRAN GILLETT V. MICHAEL WHITE and PAMELA WHITE2007 WY 44153 P.3d 911Case Number: 06-144Decided: 03/14/2007
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
FRAN 
GILLETT,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
MICHAEL 
WHITE and PAMELA WHITE,

 
 
Appellees

(Plaintiffs).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofAlbanyCounty

The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Tony S. Lopez, Laramie, Wyoming. 

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

            
Mason F. Skiles of Skiles & Associates, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 

KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]  Fran Gillett appeals from an order 
granting summary judgment to Michael and Pamela White on their complaint to have 
title to a strip of land quieted in them on the basis of adverse 
possession.  Ms. Gillett claims 
summary judgment was improper because a genuine issue of material fact existed 
as to whether the fence separating the strip of land from her property was a 
fence of convenience; the requisite ten year period for adverse possession was 
not met; and adverse possession can be used only as an affirmative defense, not 
an affirmative claim as the Whites used it.  We conclude no genuine issue of material 
fact existed; therefore, summary judgment was proper.             
 

            

ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      The issue for our 
determination is whether the district court properly granted summary judgment 
quieting title to the strip of land in the Whites. 

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]  Morris and Vivian Stille owned land in 
Albany County, Wyoming.  
In 1983, the Stilles sold the north half of the property to Marion and 
Constance Confer.  The boundary 
between the two properties was marked by a barbed wire fence.  

 
 
[¶4]  In 1988, the Whites purchased the 
Confers' property.  At the time of 
purchase, the Whites understood from the Confers that the barbed wire fence 
marked the southern boundary of their property.  In 1997, Ms. Gillett and her then 
husband purchased the Stilles' property.  
The Gilletts divorced in 2001, and ownership of the property was conveyed 
to Ms. Gillett by quitclaim deed.  

 
 
[¶5] Ms. 
Gillett had her land surveyed in 2004 and discovered that approximately one acre 
of her property was enclosed inside the barbed wire fence on the Whites' side of 
the boundary.  She informed the 
Whites that she intended to move the fence to the legal boundary and in 2005 the 
Whites filed their complaint seeking to have title to the strip of land quieted 
in them.  While conceding Ms. 
Gillett held legal title to the strip of land, the Whites claimed they had 
maintained actual, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous and hostile possession 
of the strip since purchasing their property in 1988.  They further claimed the strip had been 
on their side of the fence and constantly and uninterruptedly used by them and 
the previous owners since 1983.  
They asked the district court to grant exclusive ownership of the strip 
to them and order the execution of a warranty deed naming them as the 
owner.   

 
 
[¶6]  After Ms. Gillett answered the 
complaint, the Whites filed a motion for summary judgment.  With the motion, they filed an affidavit 
in which they stated that the barbed wire fence on the south side of the 
property had constituted the boundary line between the two properties since 1983 
and had never changed.  They also 
stated they had maintained actual, open, exclusive and continuous possession of 
the strip on their side of the fence under a claim of right since 1988 and had 
used the strip as an integral part of their ranch operation since that 
time.

 
 
[¶7]  Ms. Gillett responded to the summary 
judgment claiming the Stilles erected the fence as a matter of convenience. Ms. 
Gillett further asserted that when the Stilles sold the north half of the 
property to the Confers, the parties agreed as a matter of convenience to 
maintain the fence in its existing location rather than go to the expense of 
moving it onto the actual legal boundary between the two properties.  Ms. Gillett also claimed the ten year 
period for claiming adverse possession stopped when she and her husband 
purchased the parcel in 1997.  
Finally, she argued under Wyoming law adverse possession is to be 
utilized as a shield, not as a sword; thus, it is available only as an 
affirmative defense, not an affirmative cause of action as the Whites were 
attempting to use it.   

 
 
[¶8]  After a hearing, the district court 
granted the motion for summary judgment.  
The court concluded the Whites used the disputed strip of land in a 
manner sufficient to put Ms. Gillett on notice of adverse use.  More specifically, the court concluded 
the Whites used the strip of land for over ten years and their use was open, 
notorious, visible, exclusive and hostile. The district court entered an order 
consistent with its decision.         

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶9]  When reviewing an order granting summary 
judgment, we consider the record de 
novo.  Hincks v. Walton Ranch Co., 2007 WY 12, 
¶ 7, 150 P.3d 669, 670 (Wyo. 2007).  
Our review of orders granting summary judgment is governed by W.R.C.P. 
56(c), which provides in pertinent part:  

 
 
The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.

 
 
When 
reviewing a summary judgment, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the party opposing the motion and give that party the benefit of all 
favorable inferences which may be fairly drawn from the record.  Hincks, ¶ 8, 150 P.3d  at 670.  A genuine issue of material fact exists 
when a disputed fact, if proven, would have the effect of establishing or 
refuting an essential element of an asserted cause of action or defense.   Id.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶10]  Ms. Gillett claims summary judgment was 
not proper because  1) the question 
of whether the fence was a boundary fence or a fence of convenience was one of 
fact and she presented evidence showing the fence was one of convenience to 
rebut the claim of adverse possession; 2) the Whites did not establish that Ms. 
Gillett had notice of the adverse claim until 1997 at the earliest, meaning the 
ten year period was not satisfied when they filed their complaint in 2005; 3) 
the Whites could not claim adverse possession because under Wyoming law adverse 
possession may only be used as a shield, that is, an affirmative defense, and 
not as a sword, or an affirmative cause of action.  

 
 
[¶11]  The Whites respond that they satisfied 
the requirements of adverse possession by their continuous use of the property 
since 1988 and Ms. Gillett is too late to rely on the ten year statute of 
limitations.  They also claim the 
fence clearly is not one of convenience because there is nothing on the terrain 
that would require the fence to vary from the true boundary. Finally they argue 
the district court properly granted summary judgment because Ms. Gillett did not 
present evidence showing the existence of a genuine issue of material 
fact.

 
 
[¶12]  We consider first Ms. Gillett's claim 
that adverse possession is available only as an affirmative defense and not as 
an affirmative cause of action.  On 
that basis, she argues, the Whites could not bring a claim for title to the 
strip of land by adverse possession.  
In support of her claim, she cites Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United 
States, 277 F.2d 615, (10th Cir. 
1960).

 
 
[¶13]  Ms. Gillett misunderstands Northern Pacific.  In that case, the United States 
brought a quiet title action claiming title to property on the basis of a deed 
and adverse possession.  In its 
complaint, the United States 
also asserted the defendant was barred from claiming title to the disputed 
property by the Wyoming statutes of limitation, which required 
claims for recovery of property to be brought within ten years after the cause 
of action accrued and by the doctrine of laches.  The court of appeals held the 
United 
States, as plaintiff, could not plead the 
statutes of limitation or laches.  
The court cited the general rule that statutes of limitation and laches 
are available only as a defense to affirmative relief and cannot be invoked by a 
plaintiff to bar defenses asserted by a defendant.  The court of appeals did not hold 
adverse possession was unavailable as an affirmative claim for relief.  

 
 
[¶14]  Wyoming has long recognized that a claim of 
adverse possession is available to either party in a quiet title action.  Bamforth v. Ihmsen, 28 Wyo. 282, 205 P. 1004-1006 (Wyo. 1922).  This Court has considered affirmative 
claims of adverse possession in numerous cases.  See, for example, Murdock v. Zier, 2006 WY 80, 137 P.3d 147 (Wyo. 2006) and Davis v. 
Chadwick, 2002 WY 157, 55 P.3d 1267 (Wyo. 2002).   Ms. Gillett's claim that adverse 
possession was not available to the Whites as an affirmative claim for relief 
has no merit.

 
 
[¶15]  We consider next Ms. Gillett's claim 
that the fence separating the properties was one of convenience.  We begin our discussion by reviewing the 
factors necessary to establish adverse possession. 

 
 
            
In order to establish adverse possession, the claiming party must show 
actual, open, notorious, exclusive and continuous possession of another's 
property which is hostile and under claim of right or color of title.  Possession must be for the statutory 
period, ten years.  When there is no 
clear showing to the contrary, a person who has occupied the land for the 
statutory period, in a manner plainly indicating that he has acted as the owner 
thereof, is entitled to a presumption of adverse possession; and the burden 
shifts to the opposing party to explain such possession.  However, if a claimant's use of the 
property is shown to be permissive, then he cannot acquire title by adverse 
possession.

 
 

Hovendick 
v. Ruby, 10 P.3d 1119, 1122 (Wyo. 2000) (citation omitted).  In some circumstances, enclosing land 
within a fence is sufficient to "raise the flag" of adverse possession.  Id. 
at 1123.  However, a fence kept 
simply for convenience has no effect upon the true boundary between tracts of 
land because, unlike a boundary fence, a fence of convenience gives rise to 
permissive use and permissive use will not support a claim for adverse 
possession.  Id.  
Ordinarily, the question of whether a fence is one of convenience or 
delineates a boundary is one of fact.   Davis, ¶ 17, 55 P.3d  
at 1274.     

 
 
[¶16]  The Whites presented evidence that the 
fence separating their property from Ms. Gillett's property was in place in its 
present location when they purchased the property from the Confers in 1988, 
seventeen years before they filed their quiet title action, and when the Confers 
purchased the property from the Stilles in 1983, twenty-two years before they 
filed their quite title action.  The 
Whites also provided Mr. Confer's affidavit stating that when he and his wife 
purchased the property, they and the Stilles agreed the fence line represented 
the boundary between the two parcels.1  The Whites attested that they have 
cultivated, seeded, harrowed and used the strip of land for grazing since they 
purchased the land in 1988.  It is 
undisputed the strip of land lies inside the fence line on the Whites' side of 
the fence as it has since at least 1983.  
By presentation of this evidence, the Whites established a presumption of 
adverse possession, and the burden shifted to Ms. Gillett to present evidence 
showing the Whites' possession was not actual, open, notorious, exclusive, 
continuous for ten years, hostile or under color of title.

 
 
[¶17]  In opposition to the Whites' motion, Ms. 
Gillett argued the fence was a fence of convenience, meaning the Whites' use of 
the strip of land was permissive and their claim to ownership of the land by 
adverse possession must fail.  In 
support of her argument, she filed an affidavit in which she 
stated:

 
 
9.         
I believe that the original owner of the property, Stilles, had placed 
the fence there as a matter of convenience for his own 
use.

 
 
10.       I further 
believe that the Confers and Stiles did not move the fence to the legal boundary 
as neither party wanted to pay for the expense of moving it and left it as a 
matter of economy.

    

[¶18]  Other than these statements of her 
unsubstantiated beliefs, Ms. Gillett presented no evidence supporting her claim 
that the fence was one of convenience.  
She presented no evidence showing she had personal knowledge of the 
Stilles' reason for placing the fence where it is or the Confers' and the 
Stilles' rationale for leaving it in that location.  Although Ms. Gillett mentioned the 
possibility that the fence was placed where it was to accommodate an easement 
allowing the county access to a gravel pit, she provided no affidavits 
confirming that possibility and the documentation she provided showing the 
existence of the easement does not establish any connection between the location 
of the fence and the easement.  Ms. 
Gillett presented no other affidavits or evidence to substantiate her belief 
that the fence was one of convenience.  
Statements of unsubstantiated belief do not create a genuine issue of 
material fact precluding summary judgment.  
Ahearn v. Anderson-Bishop 
Partnership, 946 P.2d 417, 425 (Wyo. 1997).  Ms. Gillett failed to present sufficient 
evidence showing the fence was one of convenience to rebut the presumption of 
adverse possession. 

 
 
[¶19]  Ms. Gillett also claims she did not have 
notice of the Whites' adverse use of the land until she and her former husband 
purchased the land in 1997.  She 
claims the requisite ten year period began, at the earliest, when they purchased 
the property; therefore, when the Whites filed their complaint in 2005, they had 
not adversely possessed the land for the statutory period.  Ms. Gillett's argument is without 
merit.  

 
 
[¶20]  The Whites showed they purchased the 
property in 1988 and used the portion inside the fence actually, openly, 
notoriously, exclusively and continuously from that point on.  The Whites also showed that prior to 
their purchase of the property, the Confers used the strip of land actually, 
openly, notoriously, exclusively and continuously beginning in 1983.  Under the doctrine of "tacking," when 
there is privity between persons successively and continuously in possession 
holding adversely to the true title, the successive periods of occupation may be 
united to make up the time prescribed by statute.  Murdock, ¶ 14, 137 P.3d  at 151.  Tacking the Whites' period of adverse 
possession with that of their immediate predecessors in interest, the evidence 
established the disputed strip of land was used adversely from 1983.  Thus, the ten year period was satisfied 
in 1993. 

 
 
[¶21]  The district court's order granting 
summary judgment for and quieting title in the Whites on their claim for adverse 
possession is affirmed.      

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The Whites 
admitted in their complaint that Ms. Gillett held legal title to the disputed 
acre located on their side of the fence. Thus, the Stilles and the Confers were 
apparently mistaken in their belief that the fence represented the true boundary 
between their properties. Under Wyoming law, however, a mistaken belief as to 
the true boundary does not change the presumption of adverse possession that 
arises with presentation of the required evidence. As this Court has said:    

 
 
It is a 
reasonable rule that, when a man has occupied a piece of ground, though under a 
mistaken belief as to the true boundary, for the period prescribed by law, 
openly, notoriously, exclusively, and in a manner plainly indicating that he 
acted as owner thereof, the presumption should be, in the absence of explanatory 
circumstances showing the contrary, that he occupied the land adversely and 
under a claim of right, casting the burden of explaining such possession upon 
the person who disputes his right.  

 
 
Shores v. 
Lindsey, 
591 P.2d 895, 902 (Wyo. 1979).