Title: In re Estate of Robert W. Kerwin

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2020 ME 116 
Docket: 
Kno-19-492 
Argued: 
September 15, 2020 
Decided: 
October 1, 2020 
 
Panel: 
MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, and HORTON, JJ. 
 
 
ESTATE OF ROBERT W. KERWIN 
 
 
MEAD, J. 
[¶1]  Sandra K. Smith appeals from a judgment of the Knox County 
Probate Court (Emery, J.) granting in part her petition for discovery of property 
pursuant to 18-C M.R.S. § 3-110 (2020)1 but limiting the scope of the 
examination of Lorraine C. Kerwin.  Smith asserts that (1) she timely filed her 
notice of appeal and (2) the court erred in limiting the scope of the examination.  
We conclude that the notice of appeal was timely, and we affirm the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  The underlying facts are not contested and are drawn from the 
Probate Court record.  Robert W. Kerwin (the decedent), who had an adult 
daughter, Smith, from a previous marriage, married Kerwin in 2005.  In 2006, 
                                         
1  The Maine Probate Code was repealed and recodified during the course of the action.  See 
P.L. 2017, ch. 402, §§ A-1, A-2; P.L. 2019, ch. 417, § A-103 (establishing effective date of Sept. 1, 2019).  
Although Smith’s petition was filed pursuant to Title 18-A, the petition was decided after Title 18-C 
became effective.  All citations to the Probate Code in this opinion are to the Maine Revised Statutes 
as effective at the time of this opinion, as the relevant provisions were recodified without 
modification. 
 
 
2 
Kerwin and the decedent established a trust through which real estate in Knox 
County was held and for which Kerwin was a trustee.  The decedent’s will 
provided that any of his property not already in the trust would pour over to 
the trust at his death; it provided nothing for Smith. 
[¶3]  After the decedent died in 2018, Kerwin filed in the Probate Court 
an application for informal probate of a will and appointment of a personal 
representative.  Smith filed a claim against the estate concerning the Knox 
County real estate in February 2019.  Kerwin, as the estate’s personal 
representative, disallowed the claim on March 18, 2019.  Two months later, 
Smith filed a petition for discovery of property, pursuant to 18-C M.R.S. § 3-110.  
In that petition, Smith asserted that the transfer of real estate to the trust was 
potentially the result of undue influence or fraud, and she asked the court to 
require Kerwin to appear for examination under oath and produce certain 
documents relating to a coin collection and the decedent’s transfer of the Knox 
County real estate to the trust. 
[¶4]  On September 11, 2019, the Probate Court entered an order 
granting in part Smith’s petition requesting examination about the creation of 
the decedent’s trust.  It set a date for the hearing but limited Smith’s 
examination of Kerwin: 
 
 
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Examination shall not be allowed regarding Ms. Kerwin’s 
knowledge of circumstances relating to decedent’s decision to 
transfer real property into a trust.  One of the few Maine cases 
relating to the predecessor of this section of the law states: 
 
“. . . [an] executor may be held to answer under oath 
respecting the existence of the will, his appointment as 
executor, the nature and value of the estate of which 
the testator died possessed, and any facts relative to 
his administration, and the existence of any munimont 
[sic] touching the estate; but not respecting any 
conveyance of real estate to him in trust, by the 
testator, prior to his decease.”  O’Dee v. McCrate, 
7 Greenl. 467 (1831). 
 
The court was “reluctant to grant the petition because it probe[d] 
circumstances that occurred thirteen (13) years ago” and stated that the Maine 
Rules of Probate Procedure gave it authority to place reasonable limitations on 
the examination. 
[¶5]  On November 20, 2019, the Probate Court held the hearing on 
Smith’s petition, and Kerwin appeared for examination.  At the end of the 
hearing, Smith confirmed with the court that the hearing was the last 
opportunity for her to question Kerwin.  The court entered on the docket, 
“Hearing on 3-110 held.”  Smith filed a notice of appeal, dated 
December 9, 2019, from the “final judgment entered on November 20, 2019, 
and . . . the Court’s interlocutory, procedural order of September 11, 2019.”  We 
issued a show cause order directing Smith to explain whether this appeal was 
 
 
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justiciable given that it was unclear whether the Probate Court had entered an 
order, finding, or judgment on November 20.  After Smith responded, we 
allowed the appeal to proceed, notified the parties that the issue of justiciability 
should be addressed in their briefs, and permitted the Probate Court to act on 
any motion filed to supplement the record or correct the docket. 
[¶6]  Smith subsequently filed a motion in the Probate Court asking it to 
clarify that the November 20 hearing concluded the proceedings.  On 
February 10, 2020, the court granted Smith’s motion and directed the Register 
of Probate to supplement the record and enter on the docket the following: 
“On November 20, 2019, the Court held a hearing and examination of Lorraine 
C. Kerwin on Sandra K. Smith’s Petition for Discovery of Property Pursuant to 
18-A M.R.S. §3-110.  The action under the Petition concluded at the end of said 
hearing and examination and all orders entered in connection therewith 
became final.” 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Timeliness 
[¶7]  First, we must address whether the notice of appeal was timely filed 
from a final judgment.  The parties disagree about what constitutes the final 
judgment: Smith asserts that the judgment was the court’s oral statement on 
 
 
5 
the record at the conclusion of the November 20 hearing, and Kerwin argues 
that the September 11 order was the judgment. 
[¶8]  Generally, litigants must wait until final judgment to appeal a 
decision.  See Taylor v. Walker, 2017 ME 218, ¶ 8, 173 A.3d 539.  We have 
explained that “[a] final judgment . . . is a decision that fully decides and disposes 
of the entire matter pending before the court . . . , leaving no questions for the 
future consideration and judgment of the court.”  Carroll v. Town of Rockport, 
2003 ME 135, ¶ 16, 837 A.2d 148.  Probate proceedings are unique in that each 
petition initiates an independent proceeding, and “an order disposing of the 
matters raised in the petition should be considered a final, appealable order 
even if there are other pending proceedings involving the same estate or if the 
estate has yet to be fully administered.”  Estate of Sheltra, 2020 ME 108, 
¶ 17, --- A.3d --- (quotation marks omitted).  We look beyond the text of the 
docket entry to determine “whether an order to enter judgment reflects an 
adjudication of the dispute before the court” rather than “an opinion or a 
statement of the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.”  Murphy v. 
Maddaus, 2002 ME 24, ¶ 12, 789 A.2d 1281 (alteration omitted) (quotation 
 
 
6 
marks omitted).2  It is “the consummating effect” that “identifies an appealable 
final judgment.”  Id. ¶ 13. 
[¶9]  The case here involves a unique probate discovery proceeding that 
concluded without a typical final order or judgment.  See 18-C M.R.S. § 3-110. 
For appeal purposes, a final judgment is entered whenever the independent 
proceedings initiated by the petition are complete.  See Estate of Sheltra, 
2020 ME 108, ¶ 17, --- A.3d ---.  The September 11 order did not conclude the 
proceedings on the petition because that order anticipated that a hearing would 
take place at a later time.  Rather, the November 20 hearing constituted the final 
conclusion of the independent proceedings.  See Murphy, 2002 ME 24, ¶ 12, 
789 A.2d 1281.  At that time, the Probate Court indicated on the record that no 
further hearings would be held; the docket entry stated, “Hearing on 3-110 
held”; and the February 10 order confirmed that.  Because Smith filed her notice 
of appeal within twenty-one days after November 20, her appeal is timely.  See 
M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1). 
[¶10]  Should there be any remaining ambiguity about the timeliness of 
Smith’s appeal, considering the sui generis nature of the process established by 
section 3-110, Rule 2B of the Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure further 
                                         
2  The opinion in Murphy has two paragraphs designated as twelve, and we cite the first of the two, 
both here and below, see infra ¶ 9. 
 
 
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supports this conclusion.  It provides that “[a] notice of appeal filed after a 
verdict or an order, finding, or judgment of the court, but before entry in the 
docket shall be treated as filed on the date of entry into the docket.”  
M.R. App. P. 2B(a)(1).  Even if the docket entry for the November 20 hearing 
was unclear as to the finality of the proceedings, Smith’s notice of appeal—filed 
after the hearing but before the February 10 order confirming the completion 
of 
the 
proceedings—is 
timely 
pursuant 
to 
Rule 
2B(a)(1). 
 
See 
M.R. App. P. 2B(a)(1), (c)(1). 
B. 
The September 11, 2019, Order 
[¶11]  We now turn to the merits of this appeal.  Smith asserts that the 
Probate Court’s citation to the headnote in O’Dee v. McCrate, 7 Me. 467, 467 
(1831), indicates that the court erroneously believed it was required to exclude 
from the examination questions concerning “any conveyance of real estate to 
[the person] in trust, by the testator, prior to his decease.” 
[¶12]  Smith filed her petition pursuant to 18-C M.R.S. § 3-110, which 
provides,  
Upon petition by [certain persons], anyone suspected of having 
concealed, withheld or conveyed away any property of the 
decedent, of having fraudulently received any such property, or of 
aiding others in so doing, may be cited by the court to appear and 
be examined under oath.  The court may require the person to 
produce for the inspection of the court and parties all documents 
 
 
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within the person’s control relating to the matter under 
examination. 
 
18-C M.R.S. § 3-110(1). 
[¶13]  At the outset, we note that this appeal involves a narrow issue of 
law unique to the probate courts and a statute with its genesis in antiquity.3  
Based on the language of the statute and the relief it affords, it is apparent that 
section 3-110 is a discovery vehicle.  See 18-C M.R.S. § 3-110(1); see also O’Dee, 
7 Me. at 471.  The scope of discovery is always within the discretion of the court, 
and we review the Probate Court’s decision here for abuse of discretion.  See 
Picher v. Roman Cath. Bishop of Portland, 2013 ME 99, ¶ 6, 82 A.3d 101 
(reviewing discovery rulings for abuse of discretion); Selby v. Cumberland 
County, 2002 ME 80, ¶ 12 n.11, 796 A.2d 678 (“Discovery orders are generally 
reviewed for abuse of discretion.”); see also Jacques v. Pioneer Plastics, Inc., 
676 A.2d 504, 509 (Me. 1996) (“A party aggrieved by a discovery order must 
show both that the trial judge committed error in the discovery ruling despite 
the considerable discretion vested in the judge and that the discovery order 
                                         
3  The original enactment of the provision now codified at 18-C M.R.S. § 3-110 (2020) reads: 
“[E]ach Judge of Probate within his county, be, and hereby is authorized and empowered to call 
before him and to examine upon oath, any person suspected by any executor or administrator, heir, 
creditor, legatee or other person having lawful right or claim to the estate of any person deceased, of 
having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away any of the money, goods, or chattels left by the 
testator or intestate, for the discovery of the same.”  P.L. 1821, ch. 51, § 24.  This provision—updated 
to allow for the idea that women could serve as probate judges—has survived numerous revisions to 
the Probate Code. 
 
 
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affected the outcome of the action to his prejudice.” (alteration omitted) 
(quotation marks omitted)). 
[¶14]  Here, the Probate Court referenced O’Dee as support for its 
decision, not as a constraint upon its authority.  Smith’s argument that a court 
must either grant or deny a petition for discovery under 18-C M.R.S. § 3-110, 
without any ability to determine its scope, finds no support in the statute.  The 
statute explicitly gives discretion to the court by stating that it may require a 
person to appear and be examined.  See 18-C M.R.S. § 3-110(1).  In support of 
its decision, the court noted the passage of time between the transactions and 
expressed reluctance to grant the request at all.  It also relied on the authority 
provided to it by the probate rules.  See M.R. Prob. P. 81(f) (“When no procedure 
is specifically prescribed, the court shall proceed in any lawful manner not 
inconsistent with the Constitutions of the United States or the State of Maine, 
these rules, the Probate Code, or any other applicable statute.”).  At no point did 
the Probate Court hold that it was precluded from ordering the requested 
examination.  To the contrary, it recognized that it could grant or deny the 
petition, and that it also had discretion under the statute to place limits on the 
examination—as the Probate Court did in O’Dee in 1831.  See O’Dee, 7 Me. at 
469-73.  It then exercised that discretion in granting the petition with certain 
 
 
10 
restrictions.  We cannot say that this limitation of the discovery was an abuse 
of discretion. 
The entry is: 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Barbara K. Wheaton, Esq., Joshua D. Dunlap, Esq., and T. Griffin Leschefske, Esq. 
(orally), Pierce Atwood LLP, Portland, for appellant Sandra K. Smith 
 
Matthew Warner, Esq. (orally), Preti Flaherty Beliveau & Pachios, LLP, 
Portland, for appellee Lorraine C. Kerwin 
 
 
Knox County Probate Court docket number 2018-0160 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY