Title: Walker v. Bd. of Trustees of N.C. Local Gov't Employees Ret. Sys.#+#

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 482PA97
FILED: 3 APRIL 1998
JAMES E. WALKER, Individually and as Administrator of the ESTATE
OF SARAH S. PARKER, 
Petitioner
v.
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE NORTH CAROLINA LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL
EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM, 
Respondent
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of
a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 127 N.C. App. 156,
487 S.E.2d 839 (1997), reversing an order entered by Gray, J., at
the 29 January 1996 Civil Session of Superior Court, Mecklenburg
County, that reversed a final agency decision and remanded for
reinstatement of the Administrative Law Judge's recommended
decision.  Heard in the Supreme Court 10 March 1998.
Ferguson, Stein, Wallas, Adkins, Gresham & Sumter,
P.A., by John W. Gresham, for petitioner-appellant.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Alexander McC.
Peters, Special Deputy Attorney General, for
respondent-appellee.
WHICHARD, Justice.
On 5 October 1993 James E. Walker, petitioner, filed a
petition for a contested case hearing with the Office of
Administrative Hearings.  Petitioner challenged a decision of the
Board of Trustees of the North Carolina Local Governmental
Employees' Retirement System (the Board) denying petitioner a
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benefit based upon the death of his wife while in local
government service.  
Petitioner's wife began work for Mecklenburg County in
December 1977.  Thirteen years later she was diagnosed with
cancer.  She last worked for Mecklenburg County on 1 June 1990. 
On that date she went on paid sick leave.  On 12 March 1991 with
.23 of a day of paid sick leave remaining, petitioner's wife went
on medical leave without pay.  
On 17 June 1991 petitioner's wife applied for
disability retirement; this application was approved effective 1
August 1991.  Petitioner's wife received a final compensation
payment, including compensation for .23 of a day of paid sick
leave, on 31 July 1991.  She died 18 October 1991.  Petitioner
sought a statutory death benefit under N.C.G.S. § 128-27(l)
following his wife's death.  The Board denied this benefit. 
Petitioner challenged this decision.
After a hearing, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Brenda
Becton recommended that respondent Board award the death benefit
to petitioner.  The Board rejected the recommendation and entered
a final agency decision in its favor.  Petitioner sought judicial
review of the Board's decision in the Superior Court, Mecklenburg
County.  Judge Marvin K. Gray entered an order reversing the
final agency decision and remanding the matter for reinstatement
of the ALJ's recommended decision.  The Court of Appeals reversed
that order.  Walker v. Board of Trustees of the N.C. Local
Governmental Employees' Retirement Sys., 127 N.C. App. 156, 487
S.E.2d 839 (1997).  The Court of Appeals concluded that although
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the trial court properly interpreted N.C.G.S. § 128-27(l), the
statutory death benefit plan for county employees, such that
retirement did not "terminate" employment within the meaning of
the statute, the court improperly calculated decedent's "last day
of actual service" under the statute.  Thus, the Court of Appeals
held that no death benefit was due to petitioner under N.C.G.S. §
128-27(l).  Id. at 161, 487 S.E.2d at 842.  This Court granted
petitioner's petition for discretionary review. 
Article 4 of chapter 150B of the North Carolina General
Statutes governs judicial review of the Board's administrative
decisions and provides that courts may review an agency's
decision when that decision is "[a]ffected by . . . error of
law."  N.C.G.S. § 150B-51(b)(4) (1995).  When the issue on appeal
is whether a state agency erred in interpreting a statutory term,
an error of law is asserted, and an appellate court may employ de
novo review.  In re Appeal of N.C. Savings & Loan League, 302
N.C. 458, 465, 276 S.E.2d 404, 410 (1981).  Here, we address two
such issues of statutory interpretation.  First, does retirement
"terminate" employment under N.C.G.S. § 128-27(l)?  Second, when
was decedent's "last day of actual service" under N.C.G.S. § 128-
27(l)(2)?
N.C.G.S. § 128-27(l) details the terms of the "Death
Benefit Plan" available to employees of counties within North
Carolina.  This legislation permits payment of a death benefit to
the beneficiary of a member of the Death Benefit Plan who dies
"within 180 days from the last day of [the member's] actual
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    There are later versions of this statute.  This is the
1
version that was in effect at the time of petitioner's decedent's
death and is thus the controlling one.
service."  N.C.G.S. § 128-27(l) (1991).   The "[l]ast day of
1
actual service shall be:  a.  When employment has been
terminated, the last day the member actually worked[; or] b. 
When employment has not been terminated, the date on which an
absent member's sick and annual leave expire."  N.C.G.S. § 128-
27(l)(2).  
Petitioner contends that his wife's retirement did not
terminate her employment and that her last day of actual service
was 31 July 1991, the date on which her sick and annual leave
expired under N.C.G.S. § 128-27(l)(2)(b).  The Board asserts that
the decedent's retirement terminated her employment and that her
last day of actual service was 1 June 1990, the last day she
actually worked under N.C.G.S. § 128-27(l)(2)(a).  We agree with
the Board.
"In resolving issues of statutory construction, we look
first to the language of the statute itself."  Hieb v. Lowery,
344 N.C. 403, 409, 474 S.E.2d 323, 327 (1996).  It is a well-
established rule of statutory construction that "'[w]here the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room
for judicial construction[,] and the courts must give [the
statute] its plain and definite meaning, and are without power to
interpolate, or superimpose, provisions and limitations not
contained therein.'"  State v. Camp, 286 N.C. 148, 152, 209
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S.E.2d 754, 756 (1974) (quoting 7 Strong's North Carolina Index
2d Statutes § 5 (1968)).
The word "terminate" is undefined in chapter 128 of the
North Carolina General Statutes.  As this word is unambiguous,
however, we accord it its plain meaning.  Poole v. Miller, 342
N.C. 349, 352, 464 S.E.2d 409, 411 (1995).  Terminate means "[t]o
put an end to; to make to cease; to end."  Black's Law Dictionary
1471 (6th ed. 1990).  When "employment has been terminated" under
N.C.G.S. § 128-27(l)(2)(a), employment has ended.  Likewise, when
"employment has not been terminated" under N.C.G.S. § 128-
27(l)(2)(b), employment has not ended.
Retirement ends employment.  See Pritchett v. Clapp,
288 N.C. 329, 337, 218 S.E.2d 406, 411 (1975) (recognizing that
"any cessation of employment . . . includ[ing] resignation,
discharge, disability and service retirement" constitutes a
"termination from service" as an employee).  Retirees do not
actively serve their employers.  They maintain no employment
responsibilities.  Rather, they "withdraw[] from active service,"
N.C.G.S. § 128-21(19) (1991), and terminate their employment
obligations.  
Thus, under the plain meaning of N.C.G.S. § 128-
27(l)(2)(a), when an employee retires, that employee's
"employment has been terminated."  As such, the retired
employee's last day of actual service is "the last day the
[employee] actually worked."  N.C.G.S. § 128-27(l)(2)(a). 
Here, petitioner's decedent terminated her employment
within the meaning and intent of N.C.G.S. § 128-27(l)(2)(a) when
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she went on disability retirement effective 1 August 1991.  
Because decedent's "employment had been terminated" at the time
of her death on 18 October 1991, petitioner could receive the
statutory death benefit only if his decedent died within 180 days
from 1 June 1990, "the last day [decedent] actually worked." 
N.C.G.S. § 128-27(l)(2)(a).  Well over 180 days expired between 1
June 1990, the last day decedent actually worked, and 18 October
1991, the date decedent died.  Thus, although we disagree with
the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, for the reasons stated
herein, we affirm its conclusion that petitioner cannot recover a
death benefit under N.C.G.S. § 128-27(l).
AFFIRMED.