Title: Commonwealth v. Taylor

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11398 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  RODRICK JAMES TAYLOR. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 5, 2013. - August 29, 2014. 
 
Present:  Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, 
& Lenk, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Speedy trial.  Practice, 
Criminal, Dismissal, Speedy trial, Discovery, Waiver, 
Argument by prosecutor. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on July 28, 2006. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial was heard by 
Stephen E. Neel, J., and the case was tried before him; a motion 
for postconviction relief, filed on April 28, 2011, was heard by 
Diane M. Kottmyer, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Chauncey B. Wood (John Swomley with him) for the defendant. 
 
Sarah H. Montgomery & Kathleen Celio, Assistant District 
Attorneys (Edmond J. Zabin, Assistant District Attorney, with 
them) for the Commonwealth. 
                                                          
 
 
1 Chief Justice Ireland participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his retirement. 
2 
 
Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
for Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
William M. Jay, of the District of Columbia, Paul F. Ware, 
Jr., Joshua M. Daniels, & Kevin P. Martin, for Boston Bar 
Association, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  The defendant appeals from his conviction of 
murder in the second degree.  He maintains both that a Superior 
Court judge erred in denying his motion to dismiss for lack of a 
speedy trial pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b), as amended, 
422 Mass. 1503 (1996), and that errors in the prosecutor's 
closing argument require reversal. 
 
As to the speedy trial claim, the judge did not abuse his 
discretion in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss under 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 36, 378 Mass. 909 (1979) (rule 36).  A total 
of 614 calendar days had elapsed between the defendant's 
arraignment and the filing of his motion to dismiss, which 
tolled the running of time in which the defendant's trial must 
have commenced.  See Barry v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 285, 294 
(1983).  However, the Commonwealth met its burden of showing 
that at least 249 days were excludable from the speedy trial 
calculation, and that the defendant accordingly had been brought 
to trial within the requisite one-year period under rule 36.2  
                                                          
 
 
2 Although Mass. R. Crim. P. 36, 378 Mass. 909 (1979) 
(rule 36), is primarily a rule of case management, see Turner v. 
Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 1013, 1013 (1996); Commonwealth v. 
 
3 
Because the defendant acquiesced in certain delays, failed to 
object to every continuance sought by the Commonwealth, did not 
press a motion under Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (1) (C), as 
appearing in 442 Mass. 1518 (2004), to compel production of 
mandatory discovery, and otherwise engaged in ordinary motion 
practice, we discern no error in the judge's decision to deny 
the defendant's motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. 
 
That being said, we nonetheless take this occasion to 
examine the difficulties presented when, as here, the 
Commonwealth fails timely to comply with its obligations under 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 14, as appearing in 442 Mass. 1518 (2004) 
(rule 14), to produce mandatory discovery.  A defendant must 
decide in those circumstances whether to press a motion to 
compel production of the requisite discovery, aware that, under 
extant case law, doing so automatically will stop the running of 
the speedy trial clock, notwithstanding the time it may take to 
resolve such a motion.  Otherwise put, a defendant who has not 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Lauria, 411 Mass. 63, 67 (1991), it was also designed to 
"quantify the time limits beyond which a defendant's speedy 
trial rights shall be deemed to have been denied," and thus to 
facilitate defendants' constitutional right to a speedy trial.  
See Reporter's Notes to Rule 36, Massachusetts Rules of Court, 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 235 (Thomson Reuters 2014).  See 
also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 523 (1972).  The defendant 
does not allege any violation of his constitutional right to a 
speedy trial. 
4 
timely received mandatory discovery must choose between 
preserving his or her speedy trial rights and receiving the 
mandatory discovery to which he or she is also entitled.  We 
address this untenable situation by concluding that the time it 
takes to resolve a rule 14 motion brought to compel mandatory 
discovery should not, as at present, automatically be excluded 
from the speedy trial calculus.  Instead, the judge who hears 
such a motion must determine on a case-by-case basis whether 
delays resulting from its resolution fairly should count towards 
the Commonwealth's twelve-month timeline. 
 
Regarding the prosecutor's closing argument, we conclude, 
separately, that the defendant is not entitled to a new trial.  
Although certain of the prosecutor's remarks were improper, they 
did not, viewed in context, constitute reversible error. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Overview.  On July 28, 2006, a Suffolk 
County grand jury returned an indictment charging the defendant 
with murder in the first degree, G. L. c. 265, § 1; the 
defendant was arraigned on August 3, 2006.  Six hundred and 
fourteen days later, on April 7, 2008, the defendant filed a 
"motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial," which the 
Commonwealth opposed.  After a nonevidentiary hearing, the 
Superior Court judge who later presided at the defendant's trial 
denied the motion on May 12, 2008, and issued a written decision 
explaining the reasons for that denial on June 27.  Trial began 
5 
on May 14, 2008, and the case went to the jury on June 26, 2008. 
After six days of deliberation, the jury found the defendant 
guilty of murder in the second degree; the defendant timely 
appealed. 
 
Several years later, the defendant filed a motion for a new 
trial, alleging that the trial judge erred in failing to 
instruct the jury sua sponte on the relevance of the defendant's 
intoxication on the night of the crime and that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to request such an instruction.3  A 
different judge denied that motion, and the defendant timely 
appealed.  After consolidating his direct appeal with the appeal 
from the denial of his new trial motion, a panel of the Appeals 
Court affirmed the defendant's conviction.  See Commonwealth v. 
Taylor, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 1106 (2013).  We granted the 
defendant's application for further appellate review, which 
asked that we consider only his direct appeal. 
 
b.  Facts.  i.  The Commonwealth's case.  The Commonwealth 
argued at trial that the defendant strangled the victim, a young 
woman named Dominique Samuels, early on Friday, April 28, 2006, 
then burned her body in a nearby park early on Sunday, April 30, 
2006. 
                                                          
 
 
3 See note 2, supra. 
 
6 
 
The victim lived on Woodbine Street in the Roxbury section 
of Boston.  Also residing there were brothers Martin and Brian 
McCray;4 Martin's cousin, Danielle Taylor;5 and a friend of 
Martin.  The landlord and her family lived on the first floor.  
On the evening of Thursday, April 27, 2006, the defendant and 
Martin were drinking alcohol and playing video games in Martin's 
room.  Just before 10 P.M., Martin left and spent the night at 
the home of his girl friend, while the defendant remained in 
Martin's room.  Later that night, the daughter of the landlord, 
whose bedroom was directly beneath Martin's, heard screaming and 
loud noises from Martin's room, as did Danielle. 
 
The following morning, the defendant told Martin that he 
had "killed her, the girl upstairs, Dominique" by strangling and 
choking her.  The defendant showed Martin scratches on his arms 
and neck that he claimed Dominique had inflicted on him, and 
told Martin that the victim's body was in her room at the 
Woodbine Street apartment.  Between that afternoon, Friday, 
April 28, 2006, and the early morning of Sunday, April 30, 2006, 
Martin and the defendant had several telephone conversations.  
According to Martin, the defendant said that he needed a vehicle 
                                                          
 
 
4 We refer to Martin McCray by his first name. 
 
 
5 Danielle Taylor is not related to the defendant; we refer 
to her by her first name. 
 
7 
so he could dispose of the victim's body.  The defendant told 
Martin that he was going to burn the victim's fingertips because 
her nails had his skin beneath them.  At 5:30 A.M. on Sunday, 
April 30, the defendant telephoned Martin and told him, "It's 
done." 
 
The victim's body was discovered in Franklin Park at 
approximately 6 A.M. on the morning of April 30, her face and 
hands heavily burned.  A search of Martin's bedroom produced two 
bloodstains, one consisting of the victim's blood and the other 
with a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) profile consistent with that 
of the defendant.  Martin informed police investigators that the 
defendant had confessed to killing the victim, and after 
interviewing the defendant,6 who denied involvement in the 
victim's death, police arrested the defendant for murder. 
 
ii.  The defendant's theory of the case.  The defendant's 
central argument was that Martin, not the defendant, had killed 
the victim and burned her body, and that Martin was lying about 
the defendant's confession.  Defense counsel maintained that 
cellular telephone records provided an alibi for the defendant 
at the time the victim's body was burned. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Speedy trial rights.  The time between 
the defendant's arraignment and his motion to dismiss for lack 
                                                          
 
 
6 The jury heard a recording of this interview. 
8 
of a speedy trial was 614 days, 249 days longer than rule 36 
provides.  Because the resolution of the defendant's speedy 
trial claim relies in substantial part on delays occasioned by 
the Commonwealth's failure to provide mandatory discovery 
pursuant to rule 14, we first examine the relationship between 
rule 36 and rule 14. 
 
Rule 36 ensures that defendants are brought to trial within 
a reasonable time, requiring that a defendant "shall be tried 
within twelve months after the return day[7] in the court in 
which the case is awaiting trial."  Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 36 (b) (1) (C).  If the defendant is not brought to trial 
within one year, "he shall be entitled upon motion to a 
dismissal of the charges."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (1).  The 
twelve-month period may be tolled, however, during those periods 
enumerated by Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (2), or where the 
defendant acquiesced in the delay, Commonwealth v. Jones, 6 
Mass. App. Ct. 750, 752-753 (1978), was responsible for the 
delay, Commonwealth v. Loftis, 361 Mass. 545, 549-550 (1972), or 
benefited from the delay.  Commonwealth v. Alexander, 371 Mass. 
726, 728-729 (1977).  See Commonwealth v. Look, 379 Mass. 893, 
                                                          
 
 
7 The return day is "the day upon which a defendant is 
ordered by summons to first appear or, if under arrest, does 
first appear before a court to answer to the charges against 
him, whichever is earlier."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 2 (b) (15), 378 
Mass. 846 (1979).  Here, the return date was August 3, 2006, 
when the defendant was arraigned. 
9 
898 n.2 (1980); Reporter's Notes to Rule 36 (b) (2), 
Massachusetts Rules of Court, Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 
236 (Thomson Reuters 2014).  The Commonwealth bears the burden 
of demonstrating that any period of time should be excluded from 
the calculation.  See Barry v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 285, 291 
(1983); Commonwealth v. Look, supra. 
 
Rule  14 (a) (1) (A) of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, as amended, 442 Mass. 1518 (2004), requires the 
Commonwealth to produce to the defense, at or before the 
pretrial conference, various relevant items in the 
Commonwealth's possession, custody, or control.8  See 
Commonwealth v. Frith, 458 Mass. 434, 439 (2010), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Green, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 903, 903 n.1 (2008) 
(mandatory discovery "promote[s] judicial efficiency" and 
                                                          
 
 
8 Rule  14 (a) (1) (A) of the Massachusetts Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, as amended, 442 Mass. 1518 (2004), provides, 
in relevant part: 
 
 
"The prosecution shall disclose to the defense, and 
permit the defense to discover, inspect and copy, each of 
the following items and information at or prior to the 
pretrial conference, provided it is relevant to the case 
and is in the possession, custody or control of the 
prosecutor, persons under the prosecutor's direction and 
control, or persons who have participated in investigating 
or evaluating the case and either regularly report to the 
prosecutor's office or have done so in the case . . . ."  
 
The rule then lists nine categories of items that constitute 
mandatory discovery. 
 
10 
"encourage[s] full pretrial discovery").  Because rule 14 was 
intended to facilitate the automatic production of mandatory 
discovery "without the need for motions or argument," Reporter's 
Notes (Revised, 2004) to Rule 14, Massachusetts Rules of Court, 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 179 (Thomson Reuters 2014), and 
because the Commonwealth's obligation to produce is ongoing, see 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (1), the defendant need not request any 
mandatory discovery items.9  Rule 14 "shall have the force and 
effect of a court order" such that "failure to provide discovery 
pursuant [thereto] may result in application of . . . 
sanctions."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (1) (C). 
 
i.  Denial of defendant's motion to dismiss.  A.  Pretrial 
continuances and discovery motions.  The pretrial proceedings 
                                                          
 
 
9 The text of Mass. R. Crim. P. 14, as appearing in 442 
Mass. 1518 (2004) (rule 14), does not address the steps a 
defendant may take to compel production of mandatory discovery 
that the Commonwealth has failed to produce, as required, at or 
before the pretrial conference.  Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (c), which 
addresses the sanctions available in the event of untimely 
production, states only that the judge may make discovery 
orders, grant a continuance, or grant other relief appropriate 
under the circumstances.  The Reporter's Notes make clear, 
however, that where the Commonwealth has not produced certain 
mandatory discovery items enumerated in rule 14 (a) (1) (A), a 
defendant's "proper response is to file a motion to compel 
discovery or, in an appropriate case, a motion for sanctions 
under (a) (1) (C)."  Reporter's Notes to Rule 14, Massachusetts 
Rules of Court, Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 184 (Thomson 
Reuters 2014). 
 
11 
here10 occurred between August 3, 2006, when the defendant was 
arraigned, and April 7, 2008,11 when he filed his motion to 
dismiss for lack of a speedy trial pursuant to rule 36 (b).  
Over the course of those nearly two years, the case was 
continued twenty-three times, as detailed below. 
 
The defendant's pretrial conference occurred on 
September 7, 2006.  At that point, the Commonwealth had not 
produced all mandatory discovery as required by rule 
14 (a) (1) (A).  The defendant thus filed several motions 
concerning mandatory discovery in October and November, 2006. 
Although in that period he filed a motion to compel all 
mandatory discovery pursuant to rule 14 (a), the docket 
indicates that the defendant requested the court to reserve this 
motion "for a later hearing if necessary."  However, the 
defendant did not thereafter request such a hearing, nor did he 
press his motion in any other way, and the motion was never 
                                                          
 
 
10 The regional administrative justice presided over each 
hearing in this case, excepting only two dates in July, 2007, 
until the point at which the defendant filed his motion to 
dismiss.  The judge who presided over the defendant's trial also 
had decided his rule 36 motion to dismiss and his motion for 
sanctions pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (c), as appearing in 
442 Mass. 1518 (2004). 
 
 
11 In December, 2007, the assistant district attorney who 
had been prosecuting the case left the Suffolk County district 
attorney's office and was succeeded by a different assistant 
district attorney, who prosecuted the case throughout trial. 
 
12 
decided.  The defendant did not avail himself of any other 
remedies pursuant to rule 14 until he filed his motion for 
sanctions on April 28, 2008.12  Rather, he made two specific 
mandatory discovery requests pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 14 (a) (1) (A), seeking to procure, first, all statements 
made by Martin and, second, all videotape recordings produced or 
obtained in connection with the investigation.  The judge 
granted the two requests and set deadlines for the 
Commonwealth's compliance. 
 
Between the September 7, 2006, pretrial conference and May 
17, 2007, the judge conducted hearings as to the status of 
mandatory discovery.  On most of those occasions, the 
Commonwealth indicated that it had yet fully to comply with its 
rule 14 obligations, and requested additional time to do so. 
Defense counsel agreed to each requested continuance, but also 
repeatedly stated that he was not waiving his client's rule 36 
rights. 
 
At a hearing on May 17, 2007, the judge ordered full 
compliance with mandatory discovery by June 5, 2007.  The judge 
then considered a joint motion filed by the prosecutor seeking 
to reschedule the presumptive trial date.  Defense counsel 
                                                          
 
 
12 In denying the defendant's rule 36 motion to dismiss, the 
judge noted, inter alia, the defendant's failure to take action 
under rule 14. 
13 
agreed to the change in the presumptive date from August 27, 
2007, to February 7, 2008, but stated that he did not intend to 
"treat[] [the motion to reschedule] as a [r]ule 36 waiver." 
 
Between May 17 and December 4, 2007, further hearings were 
conducted as to the status of mandatory discovery.  The 
Commonwealth again requested additional time to provide the 
required items.  At a hearing on December 4, 2007, the 
prosecutor represented to defense counsel that he had complied 
with all mandatory discovery.  Defense counsel requested 
additional time to review the "voluminous" package, which he had 
received on that day, again indicating that he "ha[d] never 
waived any [r]ule 36 time."  At a December 27, 2007, status 
hearing, defense counsel notified the judge that, because the 
prosecutor had yet to provide all mandatory discovery,13 he would 
not be prepared for the February 7, 2008, trial date.  The 
Commonwealth then filed a motion requesting that the trial date 
be continued to May 2, 2008, which the judge allowed. 
 
On April 7, 2008, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss 
for lack of a speedy trial pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and art. 11 of the Massachusetts 
                                                          
 
 
13 Between December 19, 2006, and April 1, 2008, defense 
counsel sent seven letters to the prosecutors, each listing 
items of mandatory discovery that he asserted were still 
outstanding. 
 
14 
Declaration of Rights, as well as rule 36.  He subsequently 
filed a motion seeking sanctions against the Commonwealth for 
its failure timely to produce all mandatory discovery pursuant 
to Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (c), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1518 
(2004).  After nonevidentiary hearings, at which time the 
Commonwealth had yet to file the certificate of compliance 
required by Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (3), as appearing in 442 
Mass. 1518 (2004),14 the judge denied both motions.  On May 9, 
during jury selection, the Commonwealth filed its certificate of 
compliance, and trial began on May 14. 
 
B.  Ruling on the defendant's motion.  Because 614 calendar 
days had elapsed between the day of the defendant's arraignment 
on August 3, 2006, and the day he filed his motion to dismiss 
for lack of a speedy trial on April 7, 2008,15 it was the 
Commonwealth's burden to show that, of these 614 days, 249 were 
                                                          
 
 
14 Rule 14 (a) (3) of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, as appearing in 442 Mass. 1518 (2004), requires that 
the Commonwealth "file with the court a Certificate of 
Compliance," indicating a good faith inquiry into relevant 
discovery items and the complete production thereof.  See 
Commonwealth v. Frith, 458 Mass. 434, 440-441 (2010). 
 
 
15 The twelve-month period began to run on the day after the 
defendant's arraignment, see note 7, supra, which was the event 
that caused this "period of time to begin to run."  Mass. R. 
Crim P. 36 (b) (3).  See Commonwealth v. Bourdon, 71 Mass. App. 
Ct. 420, 424 n.6 (2008).  The filing of a motion to dismiss 
tolls the relevant time period.  Commonwealth v. Sigman, 41 
Mass. App. Ct. 574, 575 n.1 (1996), citing Commonwealth v. 
Barry, 390 Mass. 285, 294 (1983). 
15 
excludable.  See Commonwealth v. Mattos, 404 Mass. 672, 674 
(1989).  On appeal, we consider whether the judge abused his 
discretion in assessing the defendant's speedy trial claims.  
See Commonwealth v. Fling, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 232, 236 n.9 
(2006). 
 
The defendant maintains that the judge abused his 
discretion in denying the motion to dismiss because the 
defendant did not acquiesce in or benefit from the delays caused 
by the Commonwealth's protracted failure to produce mandatory 
discovery, and the defendant pointedly and repeatedly indicated 
that he was not waiving his rule 36 rights by virtue of such 
delay.  Although the defendant did not "essentially waive[] his 
right to a speedy trial by failing to object to any of the 
delay," Commonwealth v. Amidon, 428 Mass. 1005, 1008 (1998), he 
did not take adequate steps to preserve his rule 36 rights.  
Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the denial of 
his motion to dismiss. 
 
The judge correctly concluded that defense counsel cannot 
preserve a defendant's rule 36 rights simply by stating that 
those rights are not waived.  A defendant must instead 
explicitly and formally object, on the record, to each and every 
proposed continuance or delay.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Bourdon, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 420, 426 (2008) ("formalized 
objection . . . serves the vital purpose of notifying both the 
16 
prosecutor and the court that attendant delays may not be 
excluded from the operation of the rule"); Commonwealth v. 
Fling, supra at 236, citing Commonwealth v. Fleenor, 39 Mass. 
App. Ct. 25, 28 n.4 (1995) ("an objection to a specific 
continuance [must be] timely noted" and should be made on record 
or filed in writing). 
 
We discern no error in the judge's determination that the 
defendant failed to satisfy these stringent requirements.  Of 
the twenty-three continuances in his case, sixteen were "by 
agreement"; at one hearing, defense counsel agreed to reschedule 
the presumptive trial date from August 27, 2007, to February 7, 
2008.  The defendant invoked rule 36 on just six occasions and 
lodged only one formal objection.  Indeed, defense counsel 
conceded at the hearing on the rule 36 motion that he "didn't 
[object] every single time" the Commonwealth requested a 
continuance.  The defendant nevertheless contends that he 
sufficiently preserved his speedy trial rights by informing the 
prosecutor and the court that his agreement to various 
continuances did not constitute a waiver of rule 36.  Our 
jurisprudence does not support this construction of the rule.  A 
defendant may not simultaneously agree to a continuance and 
assert his rule 36 rights, even if he or she states, as counsel 
did here, that such agreement is not a waiver.  See Commonwealth 
v. Sigman, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 574, 579 (1996) ("defendant is 
17 
bound by his agreement to the continuances").  In light of the 
defendant's failure to object to each requested continuance, the 
judge properly concluded that counsel's efforts to avoid having 
acquiesced in any delay amounted to an impermissible "blanket 
objection."  See Commonwealth v. Fling, supra at 236 n.9. 
 
Moreover, although the defendant did not benefit from the 
Commonwealth's noncompliance with rule 14, the judge found that 
the delays occasioned by missing mandatory discovery worked, in 
certain respects, to the defendant's advantage.  See 
Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 523, 527 (2002).  On 
at least eight different dates between late 2006 and the eve of 
trial, the defendant filed motions for summonses to obtain 
third-party records, many concerning certain telephone calls 
made by Martin and of cellular telephone tower coverage maps for 
several towns in the Boston area.  In March, 2007, the defendant 
filed a motion for summonses of business records from the Boston 
office of the registry of motor vehicles.  Previously, he had 
requested that the Commonwealth perform DNA testing on certain 
items that were to be introduced in evidence.  Each of these 
motions and requests yielded evidence useful to the defendant's 
trial preparation, and would have tolled the speedy trial clock 
irrespective of the Commonwealth's untimely production.  "Having 
benefited from the delay, the defendant cannot now claim that 
18 
the delays are chargeable to the Commonwealth."  Commonwealth v. 
Sigman, supra at 578-579. 
 
Finally, the defendant has not shown that the Commonwealth 
was solely responsible for the belated trial date.  The 
defendant did not avail himself of any remedies pursuant to 
rule 14 in the face of the Commonwealth's delayed production of 
mandatory discovery.  As discussed below, and as the judge 
noted, it is incumbent on defense counsel to combat rule 14 
violations by filing a rule 14 (c) motion for sanctions or to 
compel the production of missing discovery items.  Although the 
defendant filed such a motion at the outset of his pretrial 
proceedings, he never pressed that motion or requested an 
attendant hearing.  "Such casual steps do not suffice" where 
rule 36 is concerned.  Commonwealth v. Bourdon, supra at 428.  
More is required of a defendant in order to sound the rule 36 
"crisis call" and fulfil his or her obligations under the rule.  
Id. 
 
Given these considerations, the judge ultimately concluded 
that the defendant acquiesced in or benefited from at least 388 
days of delay, which exceeded the 249 days the Commonwealth had 
the burden to justify.  This ruling was not error. 
 
ii.  Impact of rule 14 violations on rule 36 speedy trial 
calculus.  Despite our conclusion that the judge did not abuse 
his discretion in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss, we 
19 
take this opportunity to address certain problems that may arise 
when the Commonwealth does not timely produce all the mandatory 
discovery a defendant is due pursuant to rule 14.  In this 
situation, a defendant is "placed snugly between a rock and a 
hard place,"  United States v. Hastings, 847 F.2d 920, 923 (1st 
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 925 (1988), and may be forced to 
choose between preserving his speedy trial rights and receiving 
all mandatory discovery well prior to trial.  If a defendant 
moves to compel the missing discovery or agrees to a continuance 
requested by the Commonwealth, current case law dictates that he 
has stopped the speedy trial clock.16  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Murphy, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 332, 333 (2002).  But if a defendant, 
to preserve his rule 36 rights, objects to any requested 
continuance or declines to file a motion to compel, he runs the 
risk that he will not receive all of the discovery he is owed 
before the trial date arrives.  See United States v. Hastings, 
supra at 923 (defendant faced with absence of mandatory 
discovery "could either forgo discovery to which he was entitled 
                                                          
 
 
16 Delay occasioned by noncompliance with rule 14 would be 
excludable either under Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (2) (A) (v), 
which notes that "delay resulting from hearings on pretrial 
motions" shall be excluded, or Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (2) (F), 
which provides in part that where a judge grants a continuance 
with the defendant's consent, time spent thereon shall be 
excluded. 
20 
or he could file a motion to obtain it, thus stopping the speedy 
trial clock"). 
 
Rule 14 and rule 36 need not be in such tension.  A 
defendant should not be required to choose between the right to 
mandatory discovery and the right to a speedy trial.  A 
defendant is entitled to both, and his efforts to obtain the one 
should not stymie his ability to preserve the other.  However, 
we are mindful of a defendant's unquestionable "obligation to 
press [his] case through the criminal justice system," Barry v. 
Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 285, 296-297 (1983), and that a 
defendant may not "sit by passively," then later invoke rule 36.  
Commonwealth v. Bourdon, supra at 426, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Fling, supra at 236.  A defendant yet to receive all mandatory 
discovery must accordingly take proactive steps to alert the 
court and the prosecution that certain items have not been 
timely produced, and the vehicle for doing so is a motion for 
sanctions or to compel pursuant to rule 14 (a) (1) (C). 
 
For this reason, we now revisit the established principle 
that discovery motions filed by a defendant automatically toll 
the speedy trial clock.  Although this standard is appropriate 
where the defendant seeks to obtain discretionary discovery 
under rule 14 (a) (2), it makes little sense when a defendant 
moves to compel production of discovery he indisputably is owed.  
A defendant forced by the Commonwealth's untimely production to 
21 
file a rule 14 motion to compel does not "cause" delay in the 
same manner as a defendant who files a motion seeking items to 
which he is not automatically entitled.  Nor can a defendant who 
agrees to a continuance fairly be said to have "acquiesced" in 
delay, where that continuance was necessary only in light of the 
Commonwealth's noncompliance with rule 14. 
 
Where the Commonwealth fails to produce all mandatory 
discovery at or before the pretrial conference, therefore, a 
defendant should avail himself of the remedies outlined in 
rule 14.  Specifically, a defendant seeking both to preserve his 
speedy trial rights and to obtain items of missing mandatory 
discovery must file a motion for sanctions or to compel pursuant 
to rule 14 (a) (1) (C).17  In order that a defendant freely may 
pursue the discovery he is due without thereby sacrificing his 
rule 36 rights, the time it takes to resolve the 
rule 14 (a) (1) (c) motion shall not be excluded automatically 
from the ultimate speedy trial calculation.  This framework 
ensures both that a defendant will not sit on his hands and then 
later attempt to invoke rule 36, and also that he need not 
                                                          
 
 
17 We note, as did the judge hearing the rule 36 motion, 
that the defendant in this case never pressed any remedies 
pursuant to rule 14 in an effort to address the missing 
mandatory discovery.  Even under the rule we announce today, 
therefore, the defendant's motion to dismiss on speedy trial 
grounds would not have been successful. 
22 
choose between two procedural rights to which he is equally 
entitled. 
 
A rule 14 (a) (1) (c) motion judge is responsible for 
determining whether any delay occasioned by the resolution of 
that motion should, in fact, toll the speedy trial clock.  As 
outlined by Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (2) (F), the judge is to 
assess whether "the ends of justice served" by exclusion of time 
spent on a rule 14 (a) (1) (c) motion brought to compel 
mandatory discovery "outweigh[] the best interests of the public 
and the defendant in a speedy trial."  This analysis and the 
result in each case will depend on a number of factors.  Where 
there is no reasonable dispute that the discovery in question 
is, in fact, mandatory pursuant to rule 14 (a) (1), and where 
the Commonwealth cannot justify its delayed production, the 
speedy trial clock ordinarily should continue to run while the 
motion is resolved.  See Commonwealth v. Amidon, 428 Mass. 1005, 
1010 (1998) (delay caused by Commonwealth's unjustified untimely 
production not excludable as beneficial to defendant); 
Commonwealth v. Wysocki, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 45, 49-50 (1989) 
(time sought by Commonwealth to comply with routine discovery 
requests not excludable). 
 
Nevertheless, there may well be circumstances where it is 
appropriate for the speedy trial clock to be tolled.  Where, for 
example, there is a good faith dispute that the parties have 
23 
been unable to resolve as to whether the requested discovery is, 
in fact, mandatory under the rule, fairness may dictate that 
some or all of the time be excluded from the speedy trial 
calculus.  The same result might obtain where the Commonwealth 
demonstrates that its delayed production was not due to wilful 
noncompliance or a lack of due diligence.  In each case, "[w]hat 
needs to be done is a careful analysis of how each of the 
parties with obligations to help manage the case under rule 36 
dealt with, or responded to, the problem causing the delay."  
Commonwealth v. Lauria, 411 Mass. 63, 70 (1991). 
 
b.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  We turn to the 
prosecutor's closing argument, which, the defendant maintains, 
warrants a new trial.  We assess the prosecutor's remarks "in 
light of the entire argument, as well as in light of the judge's 
instructions to the jury and the evidence at trial."  
Commonwealth v. Burgos, 462 Mass. 53, 71 (2012), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 437 Mass. 554, 565 (2002).  "A 
certain measure of jury sophistication in sorting out excessive 
claims on both sides fairly may be assumed."  Commonwealth v. 
Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 517 (1987). 
24 
 
The defendant primarily takes issue with two remarks.18  The 
prosecutor first characterized defense counsel's theory that 
Martin, not the defendant, was the killer as a "bald-face lie."  
He went on to suggest that, given the jury's obligation to 
decide the case only on the evidence before them and the absence 
of any evidence that Martin had killed the victim, it would be a 
violation of the jurors' oath were they to think Martin the 
killer and, on that basis, to disbelieve his testimony 
inculpating the defendant.  Both statements were ill-advised and 
should not have been made.  As to the phrase "bald-face lie," a 
prosecutor treads on dangerous ground when he can be seen as 
accusing defense counsel of engaging in fabrication.  See 
Commonwealth v. Lewis, 465 Mass. 119, 128-129, 132 (2013) 
(prosecutor erred in suggesting entire defense theory was "a 
sham" and implying defense counsel had lied to jury).  
Similarly, the second comment, while addressing itself to 
specific evidence that the prosecutor immediately went on to 
discuss at length, in other settings could have been 
misunderstood by the jury to mean that they were not permitted 
to take a different view of the evidence or credit a theory of 
                                                          
 
 
18 The defendant also objects to what he terms the 
prosecutor's improper reference to his personal opinion, his 
comment allegedly regarding the defendant's decision not to take 
the stand, and his disparagement of defense counsel.  As to 
these statements, we agree with the panel of the Appeals Court 
that there was no error. 
25 
Martin's guilt without violating their oaths.  Prudence counsels 
against an invocation of the jurors' oath in this fashion.  That 
being said, in the circumstances here, we are satisfied that the 
prosecutor's isolated if unfortunate remarks did not constitute 
prejudicial error requiring a new trial. 
 
Whether prosecutorial error warrants reversal will depend 
on a number of factors, including whether the defendant 
seasonably objected, whether the error was limited to collateral 
issues, whether curative instructions were given, and whether 
the error may have made a difference in the jury's conclusions.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kozec, supra at 518.  Here, the judge 
offered two curative instructions, one contemporaneous in 
response to the defendant's objection and one in his final 
charge to the jury, both directing the jury to reach their 
decision based on the evidence before it.  Together, these 
instructions sufficed to "mitigate any prejudice in the final 
argument."  See id. at 517; Commonwealth v. Burgos, supra at 72 
n.24. 
 
Moreover, throughout this nearly eight-week trial, the 
Commonwealth presented a substantial case against the defendant, 
including forensic evidence corroborating his presence at the 
site of the victim's death and testimony that he had confessed 
to strangling the victim.  See Commonwealth v. Degro, 432 Mass. 
319, 329 (2000) (prosecutor's erroneous statement not 
26 
prejudicial given "very strong" evidence against defendant).  In 
light of the Commonwealth's strong case and the judge's curative 
instructions, the prosecutor's "fleeting" comments cannot 
reasonably be thought to have affected the jury's careful 
deliberations.  Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 Mass. 216, 223-224 
(1983).  After considering the extensive evidence before them 
for six days, the jury eventually returned a verdict of murder 
in the second degree despite the Commonwealth's strenuous 
arguments for a conviction of guilty of murder in the first 
degree.  See Commonwealth v. Grandison, 433 Mass. 135, 143 
(2001) (defendant's acquittal on one charge indicated "jury were 
able to sort out any hyperbole"). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.