Title: In Re Interrogatories Propounded by Senate, Etc.

State: colorado

Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court

Document:

536 P.2d 308 (1975) In re INTERROGATORIES PROPOUNDED BY the SENATE CONCERNING HOUSE BILL 1078. No. 26790. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. May 29, 1975. Rehearing Denied June 23, 1975. *311 David J. Hahn, Douglas G. Brown, Michael T. Risner, Denver, for proponents of Amendment No. 6. John R. Bermingham, Moran, Reidy & Voorhees, Denver, for proponents of Amendment No. 9. J. D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., Jean E. Dubofsky, Deputy Atty. Gen., Edward G. Donovan, Sol. Gen., Mary J. Mullarkey, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver. PRINGLE, Chief Justice, and GROVES, Justice: At the general election in Colorado, held on November 5, 1974, among other propositions on the ballot were No. 6 and No. 9, being proposed constitutional amendments relating to reapportionment. Amendment No. 6 was addressed to several other subjects, while Amendment No. 9 was solely concerned with reapportionment. Amendment No. 6, referred by the General Assembly, received 386,284 affirmative votes; and there were 386,725 votes for Amendment No. 9, which had been initiated by petition. Thus, No. 9 received 441 more votes than did No. 6. House Bill 1078, which if adopted would amend the boundary lines of certain state representative districts, is now pending in the First Regular Session of the Fiftieth General Assembly of Colorado. It has passed in the House of Representatives. After being passed upon second reading in the Senate, that body adopted Senate Resolution No. 17, being interrogatories which are contained in the appendix to this opinion.[1] Our affirmative or negative answers follow each interrogatory in the appendix. On and prior to November 5, 1974, Colo.Const. Art. V, §§ 46, 47 and 48 read as follows: Portions of Amendment No. 6 read as follows: In part Amendment No. 9 may be paraphrased as follows: That Section 46 be amended to allow for no more than 5% deviation between the most populous and the least populous district in each House; that Section 47 be amended so that there are additional requirements in the creation of legislative districts (such as ethnic, cultural, economic and demographic factors); that Section 48 be repealed and reenacted to establish a reapportionment commission consisting of eleven members to be appointed and having specified qualifications; and that such commission shall adopt a plan fixing boundaries of senatorial and representative districts after each federal census of the United States. Amendment No. 9 continues as follows: H.B. 1078 provides for the amendment of boundary lines in Representative Districts 40, 64 and 65. In submitting the interrogatories the Senate's principal purpose is to obtain an opinion as to the constitutionality of H.B. 1078. We have considered four alternatives: We adopt the second alternative. All those appearing before us in this matter are in agreement that the answer to Interrogatory No. 1 should be in the negative and that the answer to Interrogatory No. 2 should be in the affirmative. We concur. Interrogatory No. 1 poses the question as to whether Amendment No. 9 became invalid because its ballot title and submission clause were not published in advance of the time that a qualified elector must file a motion for a change of wording and a hearing thereon. Section 1-40-102(3), C. R.S.1973.[2] Interrogatory No. 2 inquired as to whether Amendment No. 9 was valid even though there were minor differences between the text as submitted to the Secretary of State and the text contained in the petitions which were circulated. We address ourselves to the question as to whether the two amendments are in conflict. In doing so, we are fully mindful that it is our duty, whenever possible, to give effect to the expression of the will of the people contained in constitutional amendments adopted by them. We have concluded that the two amendments are in conflict. The test for the existence of a conflict is: Does one authorize what the other forbids or forbid what the other authorizes? Ray v. City and County of Denver, 109 Colo. 74, 121 P.2d 886. The first direct, material conflict comes from the designation of the entity which acts with respect to reapportionment. Amendment No. 6, in what was advertised *314 as a housekeeping amendment, among many other things, provides that "the General Assembly shall establish . . . the boundaries of senatorial and representative districts . . . ." Amendment No. 9, on the other hand, deals exclusively with reapportionment, and under it a commission promulgates a plan of reapportionment, which this court either approves or, in effect, orders modified as required by the court. The second direct, substantial conflict is that under No. 9 there may be up to a 5% deviation between the most populous and the least populous district in each House, while under No. 6, providing for 5% deviation from the mean, the allowable deviation between the districts is 10%. In both instances, one forbids what the other permits and the differences are irreconcilable. We now reach the principal proposition of whether Section 1-40-113, C.R.S.1973, is applicable when two constitutional amendments adopted simultaneously are in material, direct conflict. Colo. Const. Art. V, § 1 provides in part: In enacting section 1-40-113, which provides that "in case of adoption of conflicting provisions, the one which receives the greatest number of affirmative votes shall prevail," the Colorado legislature, anticipating the precise situation present here, acted to insure that the will of the people would be manifested. We recall the wisdom of Chief Justice John Marshall that "we must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406, 4 L. Ed. 547. There he pointed out that the legislative branch can and should give flesh and body to a constitutional provision. And while the Colorado Constitution certainly guarantees the right of initiative and referendum to the people, the legislature may, so long as it does not diminish these rights, enact provisions regarding their exercise. It is a fundamental principal of constitutional law that "Every presumption in favor of the validity of questioned legislation is indulged in by courts in testing its constitutionality." Allardice v. Adams County, 173 Colo. 133, 476 P.2d 982, 990. We have the view that the statute enhances rather than limits the right of the people to amend our constitution. In Colorado Project Common Cause v. Anderson, 178 Colo. 1, 495 P.2d 220, this court struck down a statute restricting the right to circulate and sign petitions for initiative. We there stated: See also Yenter v. Baker, 126 Colo. 232, 248 P.2d 311. If this statute is not permitted to operate in this case, the people will be left without either amendment to the constitution. On the other hand, if the statute is allowed to operate as the legislature intended, Amendment No. 9, the recipient of the greatest popular support, will be given effect as the expression of the predominant will of the people. Viewed in this perspective, there is no question that this statute enhances rather than restricts the right of the people to amend the constitution. This interpretation is not only consistent with the legislative mandate and in furtherance of the principles of initiative and referendum, it is the only interpretation *315 that is consistent with Article IV, Section 4 of the United States Constitution. That section, which guarantees "to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government," must, at the very least, mean that the "supreme power resides in the body of the people." Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 457, 1 L. Ed. 440. Therefore, since popular sovereignty and concepts of republicanism are inextricably bound together, and, since Amendment No. 9 is the clearest expression of the former, it must, consistent with the most fundamental principles of the federal constitution, prevail. We find no relevance to the argument made by the proponents of Amendment No. 6 that the provisions of Colo.Const. Art. V, § 1 contain the phrase "that it shall be in all respects self-executing." This merely means that the power of initiative and referendum rests with the people whether or not the legislature implements the power. It does not prevent the legislature from enacting legislation which will strengthen that power. As we view it, even if the legislature had not passed such legislation, or did not have authority to do so, we would feel bound to hold that in order to carry out the meaning and purpose of Art. V, § 1, the one of two inconsistent amendments which received the most votes must prevail. That, in our view, is what the "republican" form of government means with respect to the right of the people to amend the constitution. We recognize that several courts have made statements as dicta as in Opinion to the Governor, 78 R.I. 144, 80 A.2d 165, where it was said: There the court finally concluded that the amendments being construed were not in conflict. See also State ex rel. Nelson v. Jordan, 104 Ariz. 193, 450 P.2d 383; Utter v. Moseley, 16 Idaho 274, 100 P. 1058; McBee v. Brady, 15 Idaho 761, 100 P. 97; In re Senate File No. 31, 25 Neb. 864, 41 N.W. 981. We find significance in the fact that neither counsel nor we have been able to find an instance in which the court actually struck down both amendments. In the light of our views already expressed, we reject the dicta. We now reach the contention advanced by the proponents of Amendment No. 6 that Amendment No. 9 is in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers and that this separation is guaranteed to the states by U.S.Const. Art. IV, § 4. The effect of Amendment No. 9 is to place significant power of reapportionment in this court, in that it provides that any reapportionment plan must be submitted by the commission to this court, which can either approve or in effect order modifications. It is argued that this is not a judicial function, and that Amendment No. 9 is invalid because it constitutes a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Under our state constitution there is no such violation. Article III thereof provides: Amendment No. 9 expressly directs and permits this action by this court. Therefore, if there is a constitutional doctrine of separation of powers which will defeat Amendment No. 9, it must be *316 found in the United States Constitution. The latter document contains no express provision requiring that the doctrine of separation of powers be applied to the states. It does provide: We hold that the doctrine of separation of powers does not prevent the judicial branch from acting as is provided in Amendment No. 9. The Proponents of Amendment No. 9 have listed eight states which have injected the judicial or executive branches of government into the reapportionment function: "Alaska Const. Art. VI . . . Arkansas Const. Art. VIII. . . Hawaii Const. Art. III . . . Illinois Const.S.H.A., Art. IV . . . Missouri Const. Art. III . . . New Jersey Const. Art. IX, Sec. V . . . Oklahoma Const. Art. V, Sec. 11 . . . Oregon Const. Art. IV, Sec. 6 . . . ." The commission created by Amendment No. 9 is to be composed of four legislators or their designees, three members appointed by the Governor, and four members appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The Commission is to draw up a plan of reapportionment which is to be reviewed by the Colorado Supreme Court for the purpose of determining whether it complies with the state and federal constitutional requirements. The proponents of Amendment No. 6 view the involvement of the judiciary in what they deem an inherently legislative function as contravening the federal constitution. First, it cannot be grounds for objection that the Colorado Supreme Court exercises ultimate review of the apportionment plan to determine whether it comports with the United States Constitution, or the Colorado Constitution, since such review is, and has always been, a judicial function. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L. Ed. 60. Secondly, although reapportionment is normally a legislative function, since it has been handled in other ways by other state constitutions and has been upheld, this scheme cannot be objected to on the ground that the Chief Justice appoints four members to the commission. See Wade v. Nolan, 414 P.2d 689 (Alaska); Faubus v. Kinney, 239 Ark. 443, 389 S.W.2d 887; Baum v. Newbry, 200 Or. 576, 267 P.2d 220. Even if it were conceded that the involvement of the judiciary in the reapportionment commission encroached upon an inherently legislative function, such an encroachment would in no way violate any federally protected right. It is true that the doctrine of the separation of powers is extremely important and fundamental to both our federal and state governments, (i. e., Colo.Const. Art. III), but we cannot agree with the proponents of Amendment No. 6 that the doctrine is guaranteed to the states by U.S.Const. Art. IV, § 4. Article IV, Section 4, in relevant part, states: The crucial question, therefore, is whether the concept of a republican form of government embodies within it the doctrine of the separation of powers. Relevant United States Supreme Court cases indicate that the Guaranty Clause does not require a particular distribution of power within a state. While not specifically referring to Article IV, Section 4, the first Mr. Justice Harlan in Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84, 23 S. Ct. 28, 32, 47 L. Ed. 79, 84 stated: See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 77 S. Ct. 1203, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1311; International Brotherhood v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 70 S. Ct. 773, 94 L. Ed. 995. In Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 57 S. Ct. 549, 81 L. Ed. 835, the Supreme Court, per Mr. Justice Cardozo, had occasion to confront directly the question of whether Article IV, Section 4 embodies within it a guarantee of a particular distribution of power. Rejecting such a notion, the court stated: The thrust of these casesthat Article IV, Section 4 does not embody within it a guarantee of a particular distribution of power within a stateis fully supported by review of the debates at the constitutional convention, and by the various commentators on the constitution. We point out that not once during the constitutional debates surrounding the adoption of Article IV, Section 4 was the doctrine of separation of powers mentioned. In fact, the main concern of the framers in adopting this section was expressed by Governor Randolph, as set out in Yates' Minutes for June 11, 1787: Another concern of the framers was expressed by Mr. Wilson as set out in Madison's Minutes for July 18, 1787: Thus, the framers did not tie Article IV, Section 4 into the doctrine of separation of powers. Neither does the novel view urged by the proponents of Amendment No. 6 find any support in The Federalist. In No. 39 Madison poses the question: "What then, are the distinctive characters of the republican form?" The answer which we have herein set forth in full, nowhere indicates that the separation of powers is included. Madison states: *318 Furthermore, in referring specifically to the Guaranty Clause in No. 43, Madison went on to state: Finally, in The Federalist No. 47, where Madison specifically dealt with the separation of powers doctrine, he noted that every state constitution then in existence had, to some extent, overlapped the functions of the three branches of government. Furthermore, the entire thrust of No. 47 was Madison's belief that a relaxation of a rigid separation of powers, and an overlapping of the various functions, was indeed necessary for a workable governmental scheme. This view was reaffirmed almost half a century later by Story in his commentary on the Constitution. Commenting on the meaning of the separation of powers, he stated: From the foregoing, one would be hard pressed to conclude that the separation of powers doctrine and the concept of republicanism are inextricably united. Proponents of Amendment No. 6 rely heavily on the Kansas case of Van Sickle v. Shanahan, 212 Kan. 426, 511 P.2d 223, which they contend holds that the doctrine of separation of powers is an inherent and integral element of the republican form of government expressly guaranteed by Article IV, Section 4. In fact, Shanahan is supportive and directly in point with the result we reach here. For there, the Kansas Supreme Court held that while the constitutional amendment in question indeed vests some legislative powers in the Governor, it did not do so to the extent that it vested the whole power of the legislature in the Governor. It held therefore that the amendment was constitutional and did not violate the separation of powers doctrine. If Shanahan were an opinion of the United States Supreme Court, it would direct this court to make the very conclusion that we reach here. Nevertheless, in order not to mislead, we wish to reiterate what we have expressed on countless occasions from the bench: the separation of powers concept is extremely important, and fundamental to our free system of government. We are unalterably opposed to any attempt by one branch of the government to assume the power of another. But when the people speak through the amendment of their constitution and assign one branch or the other some duties which are not normally considered to be that of the branch assigned, then because of our devotion to the republican scheme of government, we are compelled to accept their decision. The Attorney General would have separate reapportionment plans made by the General Assembly (under Amendment *319 No. 6) and the commission (under Amendment No. 9); and then have this court act with respect to both plans as provided in No. 9. We think such a holding on our part would constitute judicial legislation and judicial amendment of the constitution. We, therefore, do not accept this argument. We now address ourselves as to the validity of H.B. 1078. It must be born in mind that Amendment No. 9 provides, "The Constitution of the State of Colorado is hereby amended and shall read as follows:" There follows a complete rewording of Colo.Const. Art. V, §§ 46, 47 and 48. The provisions of the former sections with these numbers have been superseded and are no longer in existence. The only authority, therefore, under which the General Assembly could enact H.B. 1078 must be found in the new sections 46, 47 and 48. Such authority not only is not there, but the provisions negate any such power in the General Assembly. Further, Amendment No. 9 sets forth clearly the will of the people that there be no reapportionment between the lives of commissions created after each federal census. Under its provision a commission ceases to exist following the filing of its approved reapportionment plan, and a successor commission does not come into an existence until after the next federal census. The people directed that there be no intervening reapportionment. It follows that H.B. 1078, if enacted, would be unconstitutional. We wish to make clear that Amendment No. 6 related to many subjects other than Colo.Const. Art. V, §§ 46 and 48. Each of the subjects appear to be severable. In any event, the propositions with respect to §§ 46 and 48 are severable from the remainder of Amendment No. 6. Expressly, we do not pass upon any other portions of Amendment No. 6. We believe that the foregoing gives sufficiently complete answers to all of the Interrogatories. 1. Section 1-40-102(3), Colorado Revised Statutes 1973, permits any qualified elector who is not satisfied with the titles and submission clauses of proposed initiated measures to file a motion with the secretary of state, within forty days after such titles and submission clauses are fixed, for a rehearing on the wording of any such title or submission clause. If there is no public notice or publication apprising the public that a title and submission clause has been fixed, whereby the qualified electors may know of and, if desired, to object to the same within such forty days and ask for a rehearing on the wording thereof, does the lack of such notice or publication invalidate the initiated measure? Answer to Interrogatory No. 1: No. 2. Is Amendment No. 9 valid even though the text thereof, as submitted to the Secretary of State, differed from the text thereof contained in the petitions circulated therefor? In the former, the amendment to Section 47(2) of Article V of the state constitution reads, in part, as follows: Certified copies of said filing and said petitions are attached as an appendix to this Resolution. Answer to Interrogatory 2: Yes. 3. Do the provisions of Section 1-40-113, Colorado Revised Statutes 1973, providing that in case of conflicting measures the one receiving the greatest number of affirmative votes shall prevail, control the construction of conflicting amendments to the state constitution? Answer to Interrogatory 3: Yes. 4. Do the provisions of Amendment No. 9 amending Section 48 of Article V of the state constitution, providing for apportionment of members of the General Assembly by a Colorado reapportionment commission, conflict with the provisions of Amendment No. 6, amending the same section to provide guidelines for the apportionment of such members by the General Assembly? Answer to Interrogatory 4: Yes. 5. If the answer to question number 4 is in the affirmative, do the provisions of said Amendment No. 9 control over those of Amendment No. 6 amending the same section? Answer to Interrogatory 5: Yes. 6. Do the provisions of Amendment No. 9, amending Section 46 of Article V of the state constitution to provide a maximum population deviation of five percent between the most populous and the least populous legislative districts, conflict with the provisions of Amendment No. 6, amending the same section to provide for a maximum deviation of five percent from the mean? Answer to Interrogatory 6: Yes. 7. If the answer to question number 6 is in the affirmative, do the provisions of said Amendment No. 9 control over those of Amendment No. 6 amending the same section? Answer to Interrogatory 7: Yes. 8. If Amendment No. 9 is valid and the provisions thereof control over the provisions of Amendment No. 6, where in conflict, may the General Assembly constitutionally enact House Bill No. 1078, amending the current apportionment statute prior to the establishment and operation of a Colorado reapportionment commission after the next federal census, pursuant to the provisions of Amendment No. 9? Answer to Interrogatory 8: No. [1] The interrogatories were submitted under the provisions of Colo.Const. Art. VI, § 3. [2] In Colorado Project-Common Cause v. Anderson, 177 Colo. 402, 495 P.2d 218, other provisions of this statute were held unconstitutional.