Title: State v. Corbett

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-18 
No. 73A20 
Filed 12 March 2021 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
v. 
MOLLY MARTENS CORBETT and THOMAS MICHAEL MARTENS 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of 
the Court of Appeals, 269 N.C. App. 509 (2020), reversing judgments entered on 9 
August 2017 by Judge W. David Lee in Superior Court, Davidson County, and 
remanding for a new trial. Heard in the Supreme Court on 11 January 2021. 
 
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Jonathan P. Babb and L. Michael Dodd, 
Special Deputy Attorneys General, for the State-appellant. 
 
Tharrington Smith, L.L.P., by Douglas E. Kingsbery, for defendant-appellee 
Molly Martens Corbett. 
 
Dudley A. Witt, David B. Freedman, and Jones P. Byrd, Jr. for defendant-
appellee Thomas Michael Martens. 
 
 
EARLS, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
In the early morning hours of 2 August 2015, a Davidson County 911 operator 
received a call regarding an incident at 160 Panther Creek Court. The caller, Thomas 
Martens (Tom), reported that his son-in-law, Jason Corbett (Jason), “got in a fight” 
with his daughter, Molly Martens Corbett (Molly), and that he had found Jason 
“choking my daughter. He said, ‘I’m going to kill her.’ ” Tom told the dispatcher that 
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he had hit Jason in the head with a baseball bat. Jason was “in bad shape. We need 
help. . . . He, he’s bleeding all over, and I, I may have killed him.” The 911 operator 
instructed Tom and Molly to perform CPR while emergency medical technicians 
(EMTs) were dispatched to the home. When they got there, the EMTs found Molly 
performing chest compressions on Jason in the master bedroom, but Jason did not 
survive. Law enforcement officers who arrived shortly thereafter found Molly “very 
obviously in shock.” She told the officers she had been choked.  
¶ 2 
 
Subsequently, Molly and Tom were charged with and ultimately convicted of 
second-degree murder for the homicide of Jason. From their first call to 911 through 
the trial, Molly and Tom did not deny that they had killed Jason. Instead, they 
maintained that they had lawfully used deadly force to defend themselves while 
under the reasonable apprehension that they were facing an imminent threat of 
deadly harm during a violent altercation initiated by Jason. On appeal, a divided 
panel of the Court of Appeals vacated Molly’s and Tom’s convictions and ordered a 
new trial. State v. Corbett, 269 N.C. App. 509, 512, writ allowed, 373 N.C. 580, and 
writ dismissed, 375 N.C. 276 (2020).  
¶ 3 
 
The jury in this case did not have to determine who killed Jason.  Instead, they 
had to decide to believe either Tom’s testimony that Jason was threatening to kill 
Molly and was in the process of choking her to death, or to believe the State’s theory 
that Tom and Molly were the aggressors in the altercation and killed Jason without 
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justification.  After careful review, we agree with the majority below that the trial 
court committed prejudicial error in excluding evidence that went to the heart of 
defendants’ self-defense claims. The trial court’s errors in excluding certain evidence 
deprived defendants of the full opportunity to put the jury in their position at the 
time they used deadly force. In turn, this deprived the jury of evidence necessary to 
fairly determine whether Tom and Molly used deadly force at a moment when they 
were actually and reasonably fearful for their lives. Accordingly, we affirm the 
decision of the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for a new trial. 
I. 
Background 
¶ 4 
 
Jason was a citizen and resident of the Republic of Ireland. He had two 
children, Jack and Sarah, with his first wife, Margaret. Margaret died unexpectedly 
in 2006, from what the Irish authorities determined to be complications of an asthma 
attack, just eleven weeks after giving birth to Sarah. In late 2007 or early 2008, Jason 
hired Molly to work as an au pair in his home in Ireland. The two later began a 
romantic relationship. In 2011, Jason, Molly, Jack, and Sarah moved to Davidson 
County, North Carolina, after Jason transferred to an office his employer had recently 
opened in the United States. Jason and Molly married that same year.  
A. The Altercation 
¶ 5 
 
At around 8:30 p.m. on 1 August 2015, Molly’s parents, Tom and Sharon 
Martens, who lived in Tennessee, arrived at the Corbett’s home in Davidson County 
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for a visit. Tom—a retired FBI agent and former attorney—brought an aluminum 
baseball bat and a tennis racket as gifts for Jack. According to Tom’s testimony, Jason 
had been drinking beer with his neighbor but was pleasant and social during the 
evening. Jack, who had been at a party at a friend’s house, returned home around 
11:00 p.m. Because it was late, Tom decided to wait until the following morning to 
give Jack the bat and tennis racket. Tom and Sharon went to sleep in the guest 
bedroom, located on the floor below the master bedroom where Jason and Molly 
typically slept.  
¶ 6 
 
Tom testified that in the middle of the night, he was awakened by the sound of 
thumping on the floor above him, followed by “a scream and loud voices.” He thought 
“it sounded bad . . . like a matter of urgency.” He grabbed the baseball bat and ran 
upstairs toward the source of the noises, which he determined was the master 
bedroom. Inside the bedroom, Tom encountered Jason and Molly facing each other. 
Jason’s hands were around Molly’s neck. Tom testified that he told Jason to let Molly 
go, to which Jason replied, “I’m going to kill her.” Tom again asked Jason to let Molly 
go, to which Jason again replied, “I’m going to kill her.” Jason then “reversed himself 
so that he had [Molly’s] neck in the crook of his right arm” and started dragging Molly 
toward the bathroom.  
¶ 7 
 
According to Tom, he feared that if Jason reached the bathroom with Molly, 
Jason would close the door and kill her. In an effort to impede Jason, Tom swung the 
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baseball bat at “the back of the two of them glued together.” However, the initial blow 
apparently had no effect on Jason. From Tom’s perspective, it only “further enraged” 
him. Tom continued striking Jason “to distract him because he now had Molly in a 
very tight chokehold” and “she was no longer wiggling.” Tom was unable to prevent 
Jason from reaching the bathroom. However, after following Jason into the bathroom, 
Tom struck Jason in the head with the bat. In response, Jason charged out of the 
bathroom and back toward the master bedroom, pushing Molly in front of him. Tom 
continued to swing the baseball bat at Jason to try to separate him from Molly. 
Eventually, Molly slipped out of Jason’s arms, but Jason was able to wrestle the bat 
out of Tom’s grasp. Tom, who had lost his glasses and was pushed to the floor in the 
struggle, testified that he heard Molly yell “[d]on’t hurt my dad,” although this 
portion of his testimony was stricken upon the State’s objection. In a written 
statement admitted into evidence at the trial, Molly maintained that at some point 
after Jason took the bat from Tom, she “tried to hit [Jason] with a brick (garden décor) 
I had on my nightstand.”  
¶ 8 
 
When Tom regained his footing, he saw Molly trapped between Jason and the 
bedroom wall. He claimed that he was physically weakened and in fear for both his 
daughter’s life and his own. Jason was twenty-six years younger than Tom and 
outweighed him by more than 100 pounds. Tom testified the following: 
A. . . . I’m on the other side of the room at the end of 
the bed. And things look pretty bleak. He’s got the bat. He’s 
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in a . . . good athletic position. He has his weight down on 
the balls of his feet. He’s kind of looking between me and 
Molly. And so I decided . . . to rush him and try to get ahold 
of the bat.  
. . . .  
A. . . . [A]s desperate as it seemed, it seemed like the 
only thing to do. And so I rush him and I do get both hands 
on the bat (demonstrating). Now there are four hands on 
the bat. And we are struggling over control of the bat. And 
this is not—this is not good for me. He’s bigger and stronger 
and younger.  
. . . . 
A. . . . I try to hit him this way with the end of the 
bat. I try to hit him with this end of the bat. I don’t know. 
I’m trying to hit him with anything I can (demonstrating) 
and I win. I get control of the bat. He loses his grip. And I 
hit him. And— 
Q. Why did you hit him? 
A. Because I don’t want him to take the bat away 
from me and kill me. I mean—just because he lost control 
of the bat doesn’t mean this is over. This was far from over. 
And so I still think that, you know, he has the advantage 
even though—‘cause I know what I’m feeling like. I’m 
shaking. I’m not doing good now. And so I hit him. And I 
hit him until he goes down. And then I step away.  
Q. Do you know how many times you hit him?  
A. I don’t.  
Q. And why did you continue to hit him after the first 
hit?  
A. I hit him until I thought that he could not kill me. 
I thought that he was—I mean, he said he was going to kill 
Molly. I certainly felt he would kill me. I felt both of our 
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lives were in danger. I did the best I could.  
Tom gathered his thoughts and told Molly “we need to call 911.” Both Tom and Molly 
were themselves “in pretty bad shape,” but Molly eventually brought Tom a phone, 
and they called 911.  
B. The Investigation 
¶ 9 
 
The first EMT to arrive at the scene found Jason on the floor of the master 
bedroom. He noticed a baseball bat and a brick paver near Jason’s body. There was 
“blood all over the floor and the walls.” The EMT could not locate a pulse. When the 
EMT tried to lift Jason’s chin for intubation, the fingers on the EMT’s left hand “went 
inside [Jason’s] skull,” and he realized that “there was severe heavy trauma to the 
back of the head.” Other EMTs who attempted to revive Jason testified that his body 
“felt cool” when they arrived and that they observed dried blood. The forensic 
pathologist who conducted Jason’s autopsy concluded that he had died from “multiple 
blunt force injuries” which included “ten different areas of impact on the head, at 
least two of which had features suggesting repeated blows indicating a minimum of 
12 different blows to the head.” According to the forensic pathologist, the “degree of 
skull fractures . . . are the types of injuries that we may see in falls from great heights 
or in car crashes under other circumstances.”  
¶ 10 
 
Corporal Clayton Stewart Daggenhart of the Davidson County Sheriff’s Office 
arrived at the scene at 3:16 a.m. At trial, he testified that he found a naked white 
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male lying on his back in the master bedroom with “several areas of blood next to him 
that appeared to be puddled.” There were significant amounts of blood on the bedroom 
wall. Corporal Daggenhart also observed a “brick stone or paving stone and a baseball 
bat” near the body. A photograph of the brick paver revealed hair “scattered 
throughout” the markings on its surface. After exiting the bedroom, Corporal 
Daggenhart encountered Tom and Molly. He did not notice anything “remarkable” 
about either defendant, other than that Molly had blood on the top of her head. He 
asked Tom and Molly to exit the house, and then went to Jack’s and Sarah’s bedrooms 
to wake the children and escort them outside.  
¶ 11 
 
Deputy David Dillard of the Davidson County Sheriff’s Office was tasked with 
observing Molly while law enforcement officers were investigating inside the home. 
He testified that he noticed dried blood on her forehead and face but no obvious 
injuries. According to Deputy Dillard, Molly “was making crying noises but I didn’t 
see any visible tears. She was also rubbing her neck.” Another officer who 
photographed Molly in order to document her physical condition testified that she 
was “continually tugg[ing] and pull[ing] on her neck with her hand.” At some point, 
EMTs who came to check on Molly found her curled up in a fetal position on the grass. 
They noticed that her neck was red.  
¶ 12 
 
When ruling on whether to admit the children’s statements at issue in this 
case, Molly’s interview from early that morning at the Davidson County Sheriff’s 
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Office was before the trial court. In the videotaped interview, Molly told the 
investigators that Jason had been experiencing anger issues which, in recent months, 
had gotten progressively worse. She stated that Jason had been verbally and 
physically abusive toward her on numerous occasions and that his outbursts were 
often triggered by seemingly trivial matters.1 Molly told investigators that earlier 
that evening, Jason had become angry at her after being awakened by his daughter, 
Sarah, who had entered their bedroom after becoming frightened by the designs on 
her bedsheets. Molly alleged that when she tried to defend Sarah’s behavior by 
pointing out that she was only seven years old, Jason told Molly to “shut up” and 
began choking her.  
¶ 13 
 
Also before the trial court was the fact that at the urgent request of the 
Davidson County Sheriff’s Office, a social worker from the Union County Department 
of Social Services (DSS) had interviewed Jack, Sarah, and Molly on the day after 
Jason’s death, 3 August 2015. The social worker’s arrival was unannounced. Molly 
was not home when the social worker separately interviewed Jack and Sarah. The 
social worker’s notes reflect that Jack disclosed that “[Jason] gets mad at [Molly] for 
no good reason” and that “[Jason] curses [Molly].” He also disclosed that “[Jason’s 
anger] can be for anything, such as leaving a light on.” Sarah disclosed that “[Jason] 
                                            
1 Jason’s medical records, which were unsealed and admitted as evidence at trial, 
revealed that a couple of weeks prior to his death, Jason had complained to his doctor about 
feeling “angry lately for no reason.”  
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is angry on a regular basis,” that “seemingly innocuous things . . . set him off,” and 
that “she has seen Jason pull Molly’s hair.” After Molly returned home, she told the 
social worker that Jason frequently became angry at both her and the children and 
that the children would “lie [to Jason] almost daily trying to protect her for fear of 
what their father may do.”  
¶ 14 
 
Three days later, on 6 August 2015, Davidson County DSS and the Davidson 
County Sheriff’s Office arranged for Jack and Sarah to complete a child medical 
evaluation at Dragonfly House, an accredited child advocacy center in Mocksville, 
North Carolina. The purpose of the child medical evaluation was to determine 
whether Jack and Sarah had witnessed domestic violence or experienced child abuse 
and, if necessary, to diagnose the children as victims of child abuse and develop an 
appropriate treatment plan. Molly’s mother, Sharon, drove Jack and Sarah to 
Dragonfly House immediately following Jason’s funeral. At Dragonfly House, Jack 
and Sarah were seen by a child advocate, a forensic interviewer, and a pediatrician. 
Jack told the forensic interviewer that his parents “didn’t get along very well. . . . My 
dad got mad about bills, leaving lights on, um, and it he (sic) just got very mad at 
simple things.” He stated that Jason “physically and verbally hurt my mom,” that he 
had witnessed Jason “punching, hitting, [and] pushing” Molly “[o]nce or twice,” and 
that he had noticed Jason “[g]etting madder . . . he’s been cussing and screaming a 
lot more, getting a lot angrier” over the preceding months. Jack told the interviewer 
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that in the event of a really bad emergency, which he defined as “[h]itting or cussing 
that would be going on and on and on without stopping for an hour or two, maybe 
more,” the kids knew to call their maternal grandparents and say a “key word” which 
would summon the grandparents to their home and then hang up the phone. Jack’s 
“key word” was “Galaxy.” Sarah’s was “Peacock.” In response to a question asked at 
the request of law enforcement, Jack explained that the reason the décor paver was 
in his parents’ bedroom was because “we were going to paint it so it would look pretty, 
and that—it was in my mom’s room, because it was raining earlier, and we already—
we were going to paint it. We didn’t want it getting all wet. So we brought it inside, 
and my mom put it at her desk.”  
¶ 15 
 
During her forensic interview, Sarah also stated that she knew to call her 
grandma in the event of an emergency and “just say Peacock and hang up the phone, 
and she would come over to our house.” She told the interviewer that Jason “gets 
really angry” at Molly “for like ridiculous reasons.” She described how she would “go 
downstairs to my parents’ bedroom” if she woke up after having a nightmare, but that 
whenever she went to get Molly, she “tried to go [into the bedroom] as quiet as 
possible, because my dad—I do not want my dad to wake up, because that’s not a good 
thing. Because he just gets very, very, angry.” She further explained that “what 
caused my dad being really mad” the night of the altercation was that “my mom kept 
on coming upstairs because I—like I have fairies on my bed, and I really got scared 
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of those things, because they look like there are spiders and lizards on my bed. So 
that’s why my mom had to keep on coming up [to my room]. I couldn’t fall asleep until 
my mom put another sheet on my bed, and then my dad got mad.  
¶ 16 
 
Jack and Sarah were both diagnosed as victims of child abuse and 
recommended to receive treatment and mental health services. By court order in a 
separate contested custody proceeding, Jack and Sarah were subsequently placed in 
the custody of Jason’s sister and her husband (Mr. and Mrs. Lynch) in Ireland. 
C. The Trial 
¶ 17 
 
On 18 December 2015, Tom and Molly were indicted for second-degree murder 
and voluntary manslaughter. Both defendants pleaded not guilty. Because Jack and 
Sarah were residing in Ireland and unavailable to testify at trial, Molly filed a pre-
trial motion seeking to admit the children’s statements to the DSS social worker and 
their statements at Dragonfly House into evidence. The State objected and moved to 
have all of the children’s statements excluded. During a pre-trial hearing, the State 
submitted to the trial court a video and transcript of Jack being interviewed via Skype 
from Mr. and Mrs. Lynch’s home in Ireland and various unauthenticated materials 
the children had purportedly written after returning to Ireland. The interview was 
conducted on 27 May 2016 by an assistant district attorney (ADA) from the Davidson 
County District Attorney’s Office. During the interview, Jack told the ADA that “I 
didn’t tell the truth at Dragonfly” or when he spoke with DSS. He claimed that Molly 
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coerced the children into lying by telling them that Mr. and Mrs. Lynch would obtain 
custody and take them back to Ireland, where she would never see them again, unless 
they told investigators “that our dad was abusive and . . . that he was very mean to 
Molly.” Jack also claimed that Molly had physically abused him. When the ADA asked 
why he was “telling the truth today” after lying previously, Jack replied “[b]ecause I 
just want the truth. And I found out what happened to my dad, and I want justice to 
be served.” The trial court ruled that Jack’s and Sarah’s statements to the DSS social 
worker and at Dragonfly House were inadmissible hearsay and denied defendants’ 
motion to admit the children’s statements into evidence.  
¶ 18 
 
Tom and Molly were tried jointly in the Superior Court, Davidson County. The 
State’s case centered on the forensic evidence—which established that Jason had 
been killed by repeated blows to the head from either the aluminum baseball bat or 
the brick paver—and testimony from the EMTs and law enforcement officers who 
were present at the home on the night of Jason’s death. In addition, the State 
presented expert testimony from Stuart H. James, an expert in bloodstain pattern 
analysis. James testified that based on his review of the photographs and videos 
taken at the scene of the crime, as well as the physical evidence collected by law 
enforcement, the bloodstain patterns he examined were “consistent with impacts to 
the head of [Jason] as he was descending to the floor with his head contacting the 
south wall in the areas of the impact.” According to James, small blood spatters on 
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the boxer shorts Tom was wearing during the altercation were “impact spatters . . . 
consistent with the wearer of these boxer shorts in proximity to the victim Jason 
Corbett when blows were struck to his head” and that blood spatters found on the 
underside of Tom’s boxer shorts “were consistent with the wearer of the shorts close 
to and above the source of the spattered blood.” He also testified that blood spatters 
on Molly’s pajama bottoms indicated that she was near Jason when his head was 
struck as he was descending to the floor.  
¶ 19 
 
Tom and Molly claimed self-defense. Molly did not testify or present evidence. 
With defendants’ consent, the State introduced into evidence the written statement 
that Molly gave to law enforcement officers in the hours after Jason’s death. Tom took 
the stand and called one character witness. During his testimony, Tom shared his 
version of the altercation leading to Jason’s death, as recounted above. The trial court 
sustained the State’s objection to the portion of Tom’s testimony in which he recalled 
hearing Molly yell “[d]on’t hurt my dad.” Tom admitted that he had previously made 
disparaging comments about Jason to a coworker after an incident involving a party 
Jason attended at Tom’s home.  
¶ 20 
 
On 9 August 2017, the jury returned verdicts finding both defendants guilty of 
second-degree murder. The defendants were each sentenced to a term of 240 to 300 
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months imprisonment. They gave oral notice of appeal in open court.2  
D. The Court of Appeals’ Decision 
¶ 21 
 
Although defendants raised thirteen issues on appeal, the Court of Appeals 
described the ultimate question at trial as “deceptively simple, boiling down to 
whether Defendants lawfully used deadly force to defend themselves and each other 
during the tragic altercation with Jason.” Corbett, 269 N.C. App. at 512. Relevant for 
the purposes of our review, defendants challenged (1) the trial court’s exclusion of 
Jack’s and Sarah’s statements to DSS and at Dragonfly House, (2) the trial court’s 
admission of a portion of James’s expert testimony based upon his examination of the 
blood spatters found on Tom’s boxer shorts and Molly’s pajama bottoms; and (3) the 
trial court’s exclusion of Tom’s testimony that he heard Molly yell “[d]on’t hurt my 
dad.” Id. at 582. A majority of the Court of Appeals concluded that (1) Jack’s and 
Sarah’s statements were admissible hearsay under both N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 803(4) 
and Rule 803(24); (2) James’s testimony regarding the boxer shorts and pajama 
bottoms was inadmissible expert testimony because it did not meet the requirements 
of N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 702(a); and (3) Tom’s stricken testimony that he heard Molly 
                                            
2 Defendants also filed a Motion for Appropriate Relief (MAR) on 16 August 2017 and 
a supplemental MAR on 25 August 2017 alleging juror misconduct and other violations of 
their constitutional rights. The trial court denied the MARs without conducting an 
evidentiary hearing, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Corbett, 269 N.C. App. 509, 
521 (2020). Those issues are not before us because they were not a basis for the dissenting 
opinion below.  See N.C. R. App. P., Rule 16(b).  
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say “[d]on’t hurt my dad” was “either non-hearsay, or alternatively, admissible 
hearsay.” Id. at 560. Judge Collins concurred in part and dissented in part with 
regard to the majority’s resolution of the defendants’ evidentiary challenges, arguing 
that the trial court did not prejudicially err.3 Upon close examination of the record, 
we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
II. 
Evidentiary Errors 
A. Jack’s and Sarah’s Statements 
¶ 22 
 
At trial, parties are generally permitted to present evidence to the jury that is 
relevant and admissible, subject to the limitations of N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 403. See, 
e.g., State v. McElrath, 322 N.C. 1, 13 (1988) (“Relevant evidence, as a general matter, 
is considered to be admissible.”). “Evidence is relevant if it has any logical tendency 
to prove a fact in issue.” State v. Goodson, 313 N.C. 318, 320 (1985). Portions of Jack’s 
and Sarah’s statements to the DSS investigator and at Dragonfly House were plainly 
relevant to defendants’ case for at least three reasons. First, Jack’s and Sarah’s 
disclosures regarding the nature of their parents’ relationship presented 
circumstantial evidence tending to support defendants’ account of the altercation 
which resulted in Jason’s death. Second, Jack’s statement to the forensic investigator 
providing an innocent explanation for the presence of the brick paver tended to 
                                            
3 The Court of Appeals also held that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury 
on the aggressor doctrine with regard to Tom. Because we agree with the Court of Appeals 
that the trial court’s evidentiary errors were prejudicial, we do not need to reach the question 
of whether the trial court erred by giving the aggressor-doctrine instruction. 
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corroborate Molly’s written statement, introduced by the State and admitted into 
evidence, that she “tried to hit [Jason] with a brick (garden décor) I had on my 
nightstand.” Conversely, it tended to detract from the State’s argument that Molly’s 
account was not credible because, as the prosecutor argued, “there is nothing else 
having to do with landscaping or gardening or building walls inside that bedroom.” 
Third, Sarah’s statement explaining her nightmare tended to support Molly’s claim 
that Sarah’s arrival in the master bedroom angered Jason and precipitated the 
altercation. 
¶ 23 
 
Although relevant, Jack’s and Sarah’s statements were out-of-court 
statements offered for the truth of their content, making them hearsay. N.C.G.S. 
§ 8C-1, Rule 801(c) (2019). (“ ‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted.”), “Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by statute or 
the Rules of Evidence.” State v. Hinnant, 351 N.C. 277, 283 (2000). The Court of 
Appeals held that the trial court erred by failing to admit Jack’s and Sarah’s 
statements at Dragonfly House pursuant to Rule 803(4)—the medical diagnosis or 
treatment exception—and their statements at Dragonfly House and to DSS pursuant 
to Rule 803(24)—the residual exception. After careful consideration, we substantially 
agree with the reasoning and conclusions of the majority below concerning Rule 
803(4) with regard to the statements given at Dragonfly House and concerning Rule 
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803(24) with regard to their statements to the social worker at their uncle’s house. 
We first address the exception to the hearsay rule for statements made for the 
purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment.4 
1. The Medical Diagnosis or Treatment Exception 
¶ 24 
 
Defendants argue that Jack’s and Sarah’s statements at Dragonfly House were 
admissible under Rule 803(4) because they were made for the purpose of diagnosing 
the children as victims of child abuse. Pursuant to Rule 803(4), “[s]tatements made 
for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past 
or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the 
cause or external source thereof” are admissible as hearsay “insofar as [the 
statements are] reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 
803(4) (2019). We have interpreted Rule 803(4) to “require[ ] a two-part inquiry: (1) 
whether the declarant’s statements were made for purposes of medical diagnosis or 
treatment; and (2) whether the declarant’s statements were reasonably pertinent to 
diagnosis or treatment.” Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 284.5 A trial court’s determination that 
                                            
4 The trial court’s written order refers only to Rule 803, but the defendants moved for 
admission of the statements under both Rule 803 and Rule 804.   
5 The majority below reversed the trial court’s order finding that the statements were 
not pertinent to medical diagnosis or treatment, but the dissenting judge expressly declined 
to address this holding. Before this Court, the State does not argue that the statements Jack 
or Sarah made at Dragonfly House are inadmissible under the second prong of the Hinnant 
test. Accordingly, the State has abandoned any argument that Jack’s and Sarah’s statements 
should be excluded as not reasonably pertinent to their medical diagnosis or treatment. See 
N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6); State v. Augustine, 359 N.C. 709, 738 (2005) (“Because defendant 
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an out-of-court statement is inadmissible under Rule 803(4) is reviewed de novo. State 
v. Norman, 196 N.C. App. 779, 783 (2009) (citing Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 284).6 
¶ 25 
 
The conceptual foundation of Rule 803(4) is “the rationale that statements 
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment are inherently trustworthy and 
reliable because of the patient’s strong motivation to be truthful.” Hinnant, 351 N.C. 
at 284. At its core, the exception is predicated on the presumptive trustworthiness of 
a declarant who “is motivated to describe accurately his or her symptoms and their 
source” in order to obtain a proper diagnosis and appropriate treatment. Id. at 285, 
(quoting R.S. v. Knighton, 125 N.J. 79, 85 (1991)). However, in some circumstances, 
the subjective motivation of a declarant may be difficult to ascertain. In Hinnant, we 
noted “the difficulty of determining whether a [child] declarant understood the 
                                            
presents no argument and cites no authority in support of these contentions, they are deemed 
abandoned.”). 
6 In disputing the appropriateness of reviewing the trial court’s admissibility 
determination de novo, the dissent claims that because our case law regarding this issue is 
“non-existent, we can look to the federal rules for guidance.” In fact, we do have case law on 
point regarding this issue that we should follow or expressly overrule for good cause, not 
ignore.  Although this Court has not previously explicitly elaborated at length the standard 
of review which governs a challenge to a trial court’s determination regarding the 
admissibility of hearsay under Rule 803(4), our numerous opinions interpreting Rule 803(4) 
establish that the Court has routinely reviewed these decisions de novo without affording 
deference to the trial court’s determination. See, e.g., Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 285; State v. Jones, 
339 N.C. 114, 146 (1994); State v. Stafford, 317 N.C. 568, 571 (1986). In addition, although 
decisions of the Court of Appeals are not binding on this Court, the fact that the Court of 
Appeals has interpreted our precedents as making clear that the admissibility of hearsay 
under Rule 803(4) is reviewed de novo further confirms that there exists settled precedent in 
the State of North Carolina, notwithstanding decisions of the federal courts which may have 
arrived at different conclusions. 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
purpose of his or her statements.” Id. at 287. Even in a setting where it would be 
obvious to an adult declarant, a child declarant may be confused or unclear about 
precisely why certain questions are being asked. In contrast to an adult, a child is 
unlikely to be able to independently and affirmatively seek out medical treatment or 
even know when medical treatment may be necessary. In addition, professionals who 
are responsible for the well-being of children may, understandably, tailor their 
approach to eliciting sensitive health information to account for a child’s unique 
perceptions and vulnerabilities.  
¶ 26 
 
Given these challenges, some jurisdictions have been reluctant to apply Rule 
803(4) to admit hearsay statements given by child declarants. North Carolina has 
charted a different course. This Court has instead sought to adhere to “the common 
law rationale underlying Rule 803(4)” in cases involving child declarants by closely 
analyzing the “objective record evidence to determine whether the declarant had the 
proper treatment motive.” Id.; see also State v. Stafford, 317 N.C. 568, 574 (1986). 
Rather than a bright-line rule, we have instructed trial courts to “consider all 
objective circumstances of record surrounding [the] declarant’s statements in 
determining whether he or she possessed the requisite intent under Rule 803(4).” 
Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 288. Accordingly, in determining the admissibility of Jack’s and 
Sarah’s statements, we look primarily to “objective circumstances” in deciding 
whether or not the children possessed the requisite “motivation to provide truthful 
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information” which assures the reliability of otherwise inadmissible hearsay. Id. at 
288 (quoting United States v. Barrett, 8 F.3d 1296, 1300 (8th Cir. 1993)). 
¶ 27 
 
The first prong of the Hinnant test requires us to examine the specific context 
in which Jack’s and Sarah’s statements were made. As the majority below correctly 
noted, our analysis is not limited to any one specific factor, and no specific factor is 
dispositive. Corbett, 269 N.C. App. at 530–31. However, we find the following three 
factors articulated in Hinnant to be most probative in determining the reliability of 
the children’s statements: (1) whether “some adult explained to the child the need for 
treatment and the importance of truthfulness”; (2) “with whom, and under what 
circumstances, the declarant was speaking”; and (3) “the surrounding circumstances, 
including the setting of the interview and the nature of the questioning.” Hinnant, 
351 N.C. at 287–88. In the present case, our analysis of each of these three factors 
strongly supports admitting the statements Jack and Sarah made during their 
interviews at Dragonfly House.  
¶ 28 
 
First, the intake procedure at Dragonfly House included a thorough, age-
appropriate explanation of the overarching medical purpose of the children’s visit. 
Unlike in Hinnant, where neither the interviewer “[n]or anyone else explained to [the 
child] the medical purpose of the interview or the importance of truthful answers,” 
both were explained in significant detail to Jack and Sarah. Id. at 289–90. When the 
children arrived at Dragonfly House, a child advocate explained the child medical 
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evaluation process “at their level” to “make[ ] sure that they understand and . . . know 
what to expect” during their “forensic interview and medical exam.” The children 
were informed that while they are being interviewed by a forensic interviewer, their 
“caregiver will be talking with our doctor. Our doctor will be asking questions about 
your health throughout your whole life.” The forensic interviewer then provided Jack 
and Sarah with examples of the types of questions they would be expected to answer 
and a detailed description of the medical examination they would undergo 
immediately after the interview. The forensic interviewer testified that before 
beginning any interview, she articulates the following three ground rules that the 
children must understand and adhere to, each of which emphasizes the importance 
of truthfulness: 
[The] rules are to—do you know the difference between a 
truth and a lie? We get them to establish they know the 
difference. The second rule is if I make a mistake, you can 
correct me to let them know while I’m an adult, you can tell 
me I’m wrong. If I ask you a question that you don’t know 
the answer to, it’s okay to say you don’t know. We don’t 
want you to guess at anything.  
To reinforce the importance of telling the truth, the child advocate will “show them 
the cameras and show them the rules and tell them where they are being recorded” 
before they “start the actual interview process.” The intake procedure and the 
structure of the children’s entire visit to Dragonfly House are designed to help the 
treating physician “find out the truth regardless of what that is,” in order to help the 
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organization fulfill its “primary purpose” of serving “the physical and mental 
wellbeing of the child.” The reliability of the children’s testimony is enhanced by 
Dragonfly House’s adherence to procedures that experts in child psychology rely upon 
to determine if children can distinguish between truth and fiction and provide 
truthful statements. See State v. Thornton, 158 N.C. App. 645, 650 (2003) (finding the 
fact that “[t]he Center [for Child and Family Health in Durham] utilizes a team 
approach to the diagnosis and treatment of sexually abused children” supported 
admissibility). 
¶ 29 
 
Second, the children were interviewed by a trained professional specifically 
employed to elicit truthful information from children suspected to have recently 
experienced child abuse. Although it is true that Jack and Sarah did not make the 
statements at issue directly to a medical doctor, statements “need not have been made 
to a physician” to be admitted under Rule 803(4). State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 84 
(1985) (quoting the official commentary to Rule 803(4)). Instead, we examine the role 
of the person to whom the child declarant makes the statements, that person’s 
relationship (if any) to the child’s treating physician, and the way in which that 
person’s function has been communicated to the child in order to ascertain whether 
the statements are “inherently trustworthy and reliable” based upon the declarant’s 
“interest in telling or relaying to medical personnel as accurately as possible the cause 
for the patient’s condition.” Id.  
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¶ 30 
 
The objective circumstances of Jack’s and Sarah’s interviews demonstrate they 
likely understood that the information they provided would be used for their 
diagnosis and treatment. Prior to Jack’s and Sarah’s forensic interviews, the child 
advocate made clear to the children that the forensic interview and medical 
examination were both necessary components of the child medical evaluation. The 
interviewer told the children that their interviews were being recorded and that other 
members of Dragonfly House’s “multi-disciplinary team”—which includes a 
physician—might review them. Immediately after finishing the interviews, the 
forensic interviewer “discuss[ed] that information that [she] had gathered” with the 
treating physician, for the purpose of “aid[ing] [the physician] in her physical exam 
of the children . . . so she can perform that physical exam best for that child.” Further, 
the physician’s anticipated, customary, and actual use of the information gleaned 
from the forensic interviews in diagnosing and treating Jack and Sarah is an objective 
indicator of the reliability of their statements.  
¶ 31 
 
In addition, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the “child-friendly 
atmosphere and the separation of the examination rooms do not indicate that the 
children’s statements during the interviews were not intended for medical purposes.” 
Corbett, 269 N.C. App. at 534. The reason Dragonfly House utilizes a child-friendly 
approach in conducting child medical evaluations is because research demonstrates 
that it is the best way to obtain reliable information from children who may have 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
recently experienced abuse.7 With an adult patient, it is reasonable to expect that a 
medical professional would elicit the kind of substantive information Jack and Sarah 
provided to the forensic interviewer. An adult would typically complete a form in the 
waiting room or disclose the information directly to a nurse or physician in the 
examination room. But Dragonfly House, in accordance with state policy and national 
best practices, has determined that such an approach would be ill-suited to the 
sensitive task of obtaining this information from children. Indeed, the stated purpose 
of relying upon a forensic interviewer is to ensure that the interview is “done by 
someone who is trained to talk to children in a non-leading manner in a format that 
is approved on a national level while being recorded.” Dragonfly House needs reliable 
information in order to serve its primary purpose of serving the well-being of children. 
They utilize this method of evaluating children to increase the likelihood that the 
information the physician receives will be reliable. Based on existing best practices 
developed by medical professionals treating child abuse victims, their approach 
supports, rather than detracts from, the reliability of Jack’s and Sarah’s statements. 
                                            
7 The executive director of Dragonfly House testified that they conduct child medical 
evaluations while utilizing procedures approved by the North Carolina Department of Health 
and Human Services, based on a program established by the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill. In addition, as an accredited children’s advocacy center, Dragonfly House must 
“meet the accreditation standards and guidelines set forth by the National Children’s 
Alliance,” a national professional membership organization which develops best practices to 
“support child abuse victims” by “help[ing] children and families heal in a comprehensive, 
seamless way so no future is out of reach.” See National Children’s Alliance, Our Story, 
https://www.nationalchildrensalliance.org/our-story (last visited Feb. 28, 2021).  
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See State v. Shore, 258 N.C. App. 660, 676 (2018) (statements obtained by forensic 
examiner at child advocacy center deploying best practices in interviewing children 
sufficiently reliable to form basis of expert witness’s testimony). 
¶ 32 
 
Finally, the “setting” of Jack’s and Sarah’s interviews and the “nature of the 
questioning” by the forensic interviewer both support defendants’ argument that the 
children’s statements were reliable and therefore admissible as an exception to the 
hearsay rule under Rule 803(4). The forensic interview took place “one room down 
and across the hall” from the room where the children were physically examined by 
the treating physician. The physical examination immediately followed the forensic 
interview. Thus, the interview was both spatially and temporally proximate to Jack’s 
and Sarah’s interactions with the physician—the children were told in advance to 
expect, and did indeed experience, “a seamless transition from the forensic interview 
into the physical exam.” This is a strong objective indicator that the children 
understood the forensic interview and the physical examination as two aspects of a 
single, integrated process—their child medical evaluations—rather than discrete, 
unrelated events. See State v. Lewis, 172 N.C. App. 97, 104 (2005) (finding probative 
of reliability the fact that “[t]he interviews took place . . . immediately prior to an 
examination by a doctor.”); Thornton, 158 N.C. App. at 650 (finding probative of 
reliability the fact that “[b]oth the physical examination and the initial interview 
were conducted on [the same day]”).  
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¶ 33 
 
In addition, the protocol used by the forensic interviewer, which is based on a 
“national model” that “all [forensic interviewers] have to follow,” prohibits the kind 
of questioning that might give cause to doubt the reliability of the children’s answers. 
The interviewer is not permitted to “ask leading questions or suggest answers or 
suggest topics to the children” and instead relies upon “open-ended” questions 
designed to allow the children to freely share their own narrative. This style of 
interview stands in stark contrast to the circumstances in Hinnant, where this Court 
held inadmissible statements obtained through an “entire interview [which] consisted 
of a series of leading questions, whereby [the interviewer] systematically pointed to 
the anatomically correct dolls and asked whether anyone had or had not performed 
various acts with [the child].” Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 290. Cf. Thornton, 158 N.C. App. 
at 651 (concluding that statements elicited by an interviewer who asked the child 
“very general questions about her home life, and ‘very general and nonleading’ 
questions about any touching that may have occurred” were admissible). 
¶ 34 
 
The State does not meaningfully dispute that the objective circumstances of 
Jack’s and Sarah’s interviews at Dragonfly House “indicate that the children 
understood that the purpose of the interviews was to obtain medical diagnosis or 
treatment.” Corbett, 269 N.C. App. at 532. In its brief, the State assures this Court 
that, as a general matter, it believes that statements made during interviews 
conducted at a child advocacy center like Dragonfly House should be admitted under 
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Rule 803(4). The State expressly disclaims the argument that “there was any error 
with the questions asked by [Dragonfly House] or the procedures used in the [ ] 
interviews in this case, all of which was proper.” Instead, the State argues that this 
case is different because when asked by the interviewer to “[t]ell me why you’re here,” 
Sarah responded “[b]ecause my dad died,” and Jack responded, “my dad died, and 
people are trying—my aunt and uncle from my dad’s side are trying to take away—
take me away from my mom.” In the State’s view, those answers explicitly 
demonstrate that the children did not understand their interviews to be for the 
purpose of medical diagnosis, and therefore, the rationale that statements made for 
the purpose of medical diagnosis are likely to be reliable does not apply. 
¶ 35 
 
The problem with this argument is that the standard under Rule 803(4), 
developed in our case law and interpreted in the context of assessing statements 
made by child patients, does not look to whether the child has explained the purpose 
of the interview to the interviewer in any particular manner. Instead, we ask whether 
the interviewer explained to the child the importance of being truthful and whether 
the interview occurred in circumstances which indicate that “the child understood the 
[witness’] 
role 
in 
order 
to 
trigger 
the 
motivation 
to 
provide 
truthful 
information.” Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 288 (alteration in original) (quoting Barrett, 8 
F.3d at 1300). Indeed, the children’s own statements at other points in the interview 
dispel the notion that that they failed to grasp the importance of being truthful. Sarah 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
told the forensic interviewer that “everybody’s like just say what’s the truth. . . . And 
my mom just says, tell the truth, Sarah. That’s all she says.” Jack told the interviewer 
that when he learned he was being taken to Dragonfly House, he was “nervous at 
first, but then . . . my grandma and mom said everything’s going to be fine. You’re 
just going to ask me some questions, and they wanted me to tell the truth.” The 
State’s narrow argument otherwise stands in significant tension with its typical 
position when litigating criminal prosecutions which rely on child declarants. See 
Corbett, 269 N.C. App. at 537 (“Most often it is the State seeking [the] admission” of 
“this type of evidence in cases involving children”). As one law enforcement officer 
testified at trial, he had brought “[o]ver 500” children to Dragonfly House for 
treatment since it opened in 2010, and he agreed that these types of forensic 
interviews were extremely helpful in the prosecution of individuals.  
¶ 36 
 
Here, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that Jack’s and Sarah’s 
statements in response to the question asking why they were at Dragonfly House do 
not change the outcome of the analysis under the first prong of the Hinnant test. 
Jack’s and Sarah’s answers were not inconsistent with an understanding of the 
overarching medical purpose of their visit to Dragonfly House and the need for them 
to be truthful. In their answers, Jack and Sarah properly identified the event which 
triggered their referral to Dragonfly House to be treated for possible physical and 
psychological trauma. If the event triggering Jack and Sarah’s visit to Dragonfly 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
House had been a car accident and they had responded to the question “why are you 
here” with the statement “I am here because I was in a car accident,” this answer 
would not be proof that the children did not understand that they were receiving 
medical treatment. It would prove only that they had a basic understanding of cause 
and effect. The same is true here. The violent death of their father at the hands of the 
people they considered their mother and grandfather was relevant to their need for 
medical evaluation. Their diagnosis and treatment for the condition of experiencing 
child abuse illustrate that for Jack and Sarah, the circumstances of their father’s 
death and their medical needs were intertwined. Similarly, Jack’s awareness that the 
outcome of his medical examination might have implications for his custody 
situation—a proposition which is likely true anytime a child is examined at Dragonfly 
House—is not evidence that he did not understand the medical purpose of his visit or 
the need to be truthful.  
¶ 37 
 
As described above, the basic premise of Hinnant is that given the inherent 
difficulties in ascertaining a child declarant’s subjective motivations—and the child’s 
comparative lack of agency in seeking out medical treatment and lack of 
understanding of when medical treatment is necessary relative to an adult—a trial 
court “should consider all objective circumstances of record surrounding [a] 
declarant’s statements in determining whether he or she possessed the requisite 
intent under Rule 803(4).” Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 288 (emphasis added). As the Court 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
of Appeals correctly held in an earlier case, it is highly probative of Jack’s and Sarah’s 
motivations for truthfulness that they were interviewed in private, that they 
discussed sensitive topics in a “comfortable and ‘safe’ environment,” and that the 
interviewer “did not use leading questions” or “ask [the child] many specific 
questions” while “ ‘adher[ing] to the protocol’ established by . . . a ‘licensed and 
accredited child advocacy center.’ ” In re M.A.E., 242 N.C. App. 312, 321–22 (2015). 
The objective circumstances of the interview at Dragonfly House indicate that Jack’s 
and Sarah’s statements were made for the purpose of obtaining medical diagnosis or 
treatment and were reliable.  
¶ 38 
 
It would turn Hinnant on its head to disregard the “objective circumstances of 
record,” which overwhelmingly point toward admitting the children’s statements, and 
instead base our decision on a child’s single response of ambiguous significance to a 
question posed early in the interview process. We hold that defendants have met their 
burden of “affirmatively establish[ing] that the declarant[s] had the requisite intent 
by demonstrating that the declarant made the statements understanding that they 
would lead to medical diagnosis or treatment.” Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 287. Accordingly, 
we affirm the Court of Appeals’ holding that the trial court erred by ruling that Jack’s 
and Sarah’s statements regarding Jason and Molly’s relationship and the children’s 
statements regarding their own relationships with Jason and Molly were 
inadmissible.  
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2. Residual Hearsay Exception 
¶ 39 
 
In addition to challenging the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Jack’s and 
Sarah’s statements at Dragonfly House were admissible under Rule 803(4), the State 
argues that the majority below erred in holding that the children’s statements to the 
DSS social worker and at Dragonfly House were both admissible under Rule 803(24). 
Because we agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court erroneously excluded 
the children’s statements at Dragonfly House under the medical diagnosis or 
treatment exception, we now consider whether the children’s statements to the DSS 
social worker were admissible under Rule 803(24).8 We hold that the trial court 
abused its discretion in failing to admit Jack’s and Sarah’s statements to the DSS 
social worker under the residual exception to the hearsay rule because the trial 
court’s conclusions of law rested on unsupported factual findings and because those 
conclusions cannot otherwise be supported by the record evidence. 
¶ 40 
 
The “residual exception” provides that a hearsay statement “not specifically 
covered by any of the” other enumerated exceptions is admissible if it possesses 
“equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 
803(24) (2019). A statement possesses “circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” 
                                            
8 Because Rule 803(24), the residual hearsay exception, applies only if a hearsay 
statement is not specifically covered by another exception to the hearsay rule, there is no 
need to consider whether the children’s statements made at Dragonfly House are also 
admissible under this exception. See N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 803(24) (2019). 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
if 
the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as 
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more 
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other 
evidence which the proponent can procure through 
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these 
rules and the interests of justice will best be served by 
admission of the statement into evidence. 
Id. A trial court’s determination as to the admissibility of hearsay statements 
pursuant to Rule 803(24) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State v. Smith, 315 
N.C. 76, 97 (1985).  
¶ 41 
 
In order to facilitate effective judicial review of a decision to admit or exclude 
statements under the residual exception, a trial court must “make adequate findings 
of fact and conclusions of law sufficient to allow a reviewing court to determine 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in making its ruling.” State v. Sargeant, 
365 N.C. 58, 65 (2011). These findings must address  
(1) whether proper notice has been given, (2) whether the 
hearsay is not specifically covered elsewhere, (3) whether 
the statement is trustworthy, (4) whether the statement is 
material, (5) whether the statement is more probative on 
the issue than any other evidence which the proponent can 
procure through reasonable efforts, and (6) whether the 
interests of justice will be best served by admission. 
State v. Valentine, 357 N.C. 512, 518 (2003). We have deemed the third factor, the 
trustworthiness of the statement, to be the “most significant requirement.” Smith, 
315 N.C. at 93. When assessing trustworthiness, a trial court considers the following, 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
non-exhaustive set of factors: “(1) assurances of the declarant’s personal knowledge 
of the underlying events, (2) the declarant’s motivation to speak the truth or 
otherwise, (3) whether the declarant has ever recanted the statement, and (4) the 
practical availability of the declarant at trial for meaningful cross-examination.” 
State v. Triplett, 316 N.C. 1, 10–11 (1986).9  
¶ 42 
 
In the present case, the trial court made findings of fact which track all four of 
these factors before concluding that “[t]he proffered statements do not have 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.” However, upon close examination of 
the record, we agree with the Court of Appeals that these findings were 
fundamentally flawed. “If the trial court . . . makes erroneous findings, we review the 
record in its entirety to determine whether that record supports the trial court’s 
conclusion concerning the admissibility of a statement under a residual hearsay 
exception.” Sargeant, 365 N.C. at 65. Thus, after identifying the trial court’s 
erroneous findings, we independently examine the record to determine if the trial 
court’s ultimate conclusion regarding the admissibility of evidence under the residual 
exception can be supported. We hold that the trial court’s conclusion that the 
statements lacked trustworthiness is not and cannot be supported by the evidence in 
the record. 
                                            
9 There is no dispute regarding the fourth factor of the Triplett test, the “practical 
availability” of the children at trial, as the children were living with their paternal aunt and 
uncle in Ireland and had not returned to the United States to testify. 
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¶ 43 
 
First, the trial court determined that it was “not assured of the personal 
knowledge of the declarants as to the underlying events described” based on its 
factual finding that “both children identified the source of their knowledge being 
nothing more than statements of [Molly] and [Molly’s] mother. The declarations 
contain no reference to seeing, hearing or perceiving anything about the events 
described except these statements of others.” This conclusion is not supported by the 
text of the DSS social worker’s record of the interviews with Jack and Sarah.  At least 
some of the relevant and material statements proffered by defendants were based on 
the children’s firsthand knowledge of incidents they contemporaneously saw, heard, 
or perceived. For example, Jack told the DSS social worker that “his dad curses his 
mom; he stated that he has seen his dad a few times hit his mom with his fist 
anywhere on her body that he can.” He stated that both he and his sister “tried to 
stop the fighting by yelling at his parents asking them to stop and by trying to push 
them apart.” Sarah told the DSS social worker that her “dad fights her mom” and 
“she gets in trouble because her dad gets angry at her for saying [to] stop [fighting]” 
but that “she doesn’t say stop to her mom because her mom is not doing anything 
wrong she is just [standing] up for herself.” She stated that “her dad is angry on a 
regular basis . . . if you leave a light on he gets angry, or if you leave a door open or 
do not walk the dog her father gets angry and . . . they (her mother and father) go 
into their room.” She stated that “she saw her dad smack her mom across the face 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
with an open hand,” so she “ran into the bathroom [with Jack] and brushed [her] 
teeth and pretended that [she] did not see it.”  
¶ 44 
 
To be sure, in response to some questions, Jack and Sarah disclosed that the 
information they were conveying was communicated to them by Molly. The trial 
court’s conclusion that the children’s statements lacked trustworthiness also rested 
on its unsupported determination that it was “not assured of the children’s motivation 
to speak the truth, but instead finds the children were motivated, in the near 
immediate aftermath of the death of their father, to preserve a custody environment 
with the only mother-figure they could remember having known during their lives.” 
In assessing a declarant’s motivation for truthfulness, “the issue is not whether [the 
declarant’s] statement is objectively accurate; the determinative question is whether 
[the declarant] was motivated to speak truthfully when” the statement was made. 
Sargeant, 365 N.C. at 66. The inquiry does not require defendants to prove that every 
statement made by Jack and Sarah was truthful. Instead, it requires the trial court 
to determine if the declarants had “reason to lie” or “would have benefitted from 
altering the[ir] story.” Valentine, 357 N.C. at 519. 
¶ 45 
 
In lieu of direct evidence, the State emphasizes that Jack and Sarah desired to 
remain in Molly’s care and were aware that their custody may be at issue in the 
aftermath of their father’s death. In essence, the State asks us to presume Jack’s and 
Sarah’s motivations to lie because they expressed a desire to remain with their sole 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
surviving caregiver and perceived that their family circumstances might change in 
the aftermath of a violent altercation which resulted in the death of their only then-
living biological parent.  We have never held that only children who do not like their 
parents or who are blind to the potential consequences of a destabilizing family crisis 
possess a motivation for truthfulness, and we reject the invitation to do so here.  
¶ 46 
 
Of course, a trial court does not abuse its discretion when in an exercise of that 
discretion it assigns different weight to different pieces of evidence in arriving at a 
determinative legal conclusion. When examining the trial court’s order, we do not 
“reweigh the evidence and make our own factual findings on appeal, a task for which 
an appellate court like this one is not well suited.” State v. Rodriguez, 371 N.C. 295, 
319 (2018). Even if the record contains significant evidence that the children 
possessed a motivation for truthfulness, we would be compelled to affirm the trial 
court’s order if there were evidence in the record “tending to support a contrary 
determination.” Id. In this case, however, the record is bereft of evidence supporting 
the trial court’s conclusion that the children lacked a motivation for truthfulness.  
¶ 47 
 
Finally, we conclude that the trial court’s finding that Jack’s and Sarah’s 
statements “were specifically recanted and disavowed” is unsupported by the record. 
The children’s subsequent statements calling into question the reliability of their 
statements to the DSS social worker and at Dragonfly House are not evidence that 
all of their statements lacked trustworthiness. The primary basis for the trial court’s 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
finding that the statements were recanted was the Skype interview with Jack 
conducted by the ADA, during which Jack stated that he “told the person who was 
interviewing [him (the DSS social worker and Dragonfly House forensic interviewer)] 
exactly what [Molly] told me to say.” In addition, the trial court found that Sarah 
“recanted her statements in diary entries made after her return to Ireland.” We do 
not dispute the trial court’s authority to rely upon these sources of evidence in making 
a threshold determination as to the admissibility of Jack’s and Sarah’s statements 
under the residual exception.10 However, this evidence in no way calls into question 
all of the statements the children made which were relevant and probative to 
defendants’ self-defense claims. 
¶ 48 
 
In his Skype interview, Jack stated that while in the car on the way to 
Dragonfly House, Molly “started making up little stories about my dad, saying that 
                                            
10 In justifying its conclusion that the trial court erred by failing to admit Jack’s and 
Sarah’s statements under the residual exception, the majority below stated that “it is unclear 
from finding of fact #22 why the trial court deemed the ‘diary entries’ or the circumstances of 
Jack’s Skype interview with a member of the district attorney’s office to be more trustworthy 
than either of the objective and impartial interviews at issue here.” Corbett, 269 N.C. App. at 
545. There may have been valid reasons for questioning the reliability of Jack’s and Sarah’s 
post-trial recantations. Notably, Jack’s statement contained allegations that were internally 
inconsistent or flatly contradicted by the evidentiary record, and Sarah’s diary entries were 
not authenticated. In addition, Jack explicitly stated that the reason he was recanting his 
prior statements was because he “found out what happened to my dad” after having begun 
living with Jason’s sister in Ireland. Nevertheless, we agree with the State that the trial court 
was entitled to consider Jack’s Skype interview and Sarah’s diary entries, regardless of 
whether either would ultimately have been deemed admissible evidence, in making a 
preliminary determination regarding the admissibility of the Dragonfly House interview and 
DSS interview. See N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 104(a). 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
he was abusive. And then she started crying, and she said if you don’t tell the truth, 
we’ll never, ever see you again. If you don’t tell this, we’ll never see you again.” When 
the ADA asked Jack to clarify what he meant by “this,” Jack responded “[l]ike what 
she was telling us to say. She was telling us to say that our dad was abusive and 
saying that he was very mean to Molly.” When asked if he could share “any more of 
the stories [Molly] told you to tell,” Jack replied, “[n]o.” There is some reason to doubt 
that this exchange occurred as Jack recalled it, given that the testimony of the staff 
at Dragonfly House establishes that Molly did not accompany Jack and Sarah to that 
interview. Regardless, even if this exchange did occur, it occurred after Jack and 
Sarah were interviewed by the DSS social worker on 3 August 2015. Notably, the 
DSS social worker’s visit was unannounced and Molly was not present at the time.  
Jack’s recantation was limited in nature—at most, he recanted his previous claims 
that Jason was abusive toward Molly and the children—not a specific disavowal of 
every statement he had made during his DSS interview. Accordingly, the record 
cannot support the trial court’s conclusion that Jack and Sarah “specifically recanted 
and disavowed” all of the relevant, probative statements they made to the DSS social 
worker.  
¶ 49 
 
The trial court’s ultimate conclusion that Jack’s and Sarah’s statements to the 
DSS social worker were not trustworthy was “made on the basis of inaccurate and 
incomplete findings of fact used to reach unsupported conclusions of law.” Sargeant, 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
365 N.C. at 67. After close examination of the record, it is apparent that this 
conclusion is “not supported by competent evidence in the record.” Id. at 65. Having 
determined that defendants have met their threshold requirement of proving the 
trustworthiness of the proffered statements, we conclude that the other factors 
enumerated in Valentine also support admitting Jack’s and Sarah’s statements under 
the residual exception. The proponents gave proper notice. The substance of Jack’s 
and Sarah’s statements were not adequately covered by any other source of evidence. 
For reasons more fully explained in the section of this opinion examining prejudice, 
Jack’s and Sarah’s statements were material and probative and their admission 
serves the interests of justice by enabling Tom and Molly to present an adequate 
defense. Accordingly, we conclude that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court 
to exclude the statements that Jack and Sarah made in their interviews with the DSS 
social worker under the residual exception to the hearsay rule contained in Rule 
803(24). 
3. The Expert’s Bloodstain Pattern Analysis 
¶ 50 
 
During its case-in-chief, the State presented testimony from Stuart H. James, 
qualified as an expert in bloodstain pattern analysis, who offered his opinion about 
the location of Tom, Molly, and Jason at various points during the altercation. Most 
significantly, James testified that in his opinion the bloodstain patterns located on 
Tom’s and Molly’s clothing suggested that one or both of them struck Jason in the 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
head as he was descending toward the floor and struck Jason from above while his 
head was near the floor. The trial court determined that James’s testimony was 
admissible under Rule 702(a). The Court of Appeals reversed, and the State appealed. 
¶ 51 
 
To admit expert opinion testimony under Rule 702(a), a trial court must 
conduct a three-step inquiry to determine (1) whether the expert is qualified, (2) 
whether the testimony is relevant, and (3) whether the testimony is reliable. State v. 
McGrady, 368 N.C. 880, 892 (2016). As defined by Rule 702(a), expert opinion 
testimony is reliable 
if all of the following apply: (1) The testimony is based upon 
sufficient facts or data. (2) The testimony is the product of 
reliable principles and methods. (3) The witness has 
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of 
the case. 
 
N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 702(a) (2019).  In assessing reliability, the trial court considers 
the five non-exhaustive factors articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), as well as “other factors that may help 
assess reliability given ‘the nature of the issue, the expert’s particular expertise, and 
the subject of his testimony.’ ” McGrady, 368 N.C. at 891 (quoting Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999)). A trial court’s ruling as to the admissibility of 
proffered expert testimony “will not be reversed on appeal absent a showing of abuse 
of discretion.” SciGrip, Inc. v. Osae, 373 N.C. 409, 418 (2020) (citing McGrady, 368 
N.C. at 893). 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
¶ 52 
 
Before this Court, the parties’ sole dispute centers on one portion of James’s 
testimony: his testimony that was based upon purported blood spatters found on the 
underside of Tom’s boxer shorts and at the bottom of Molly’s pajama pants. The 
majority below held that because these purported blood spatters were never tested to 
confirm that they were in fact Jason’s blood, in violation of the protocol set out in a 
“peer-reviewed treatise” that James himself co-authored, Corbett, 269 N.C. App. at 
554, James’s conclusions based on these particular spatters were “based upon 
insufficient facts and data, and accordingly, could not have been the product of 
reliable principles and methods applied reliably to the facts of this case,” id. at 558. 
By contrast, the dissenting judge would have held that defendants waived their 
challenge to James’s testimony regarding the untested blood spatters by “fail[ing] to 
object to the testimony when it was elicited by the State at trial.” Id. at 609 (Collins, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
¶ 53 
 
The dissenting judge did not address the majority’s conclusions that (1) 
admission of the disputed testimony was erroneous and (2) the trial court’s erroneous 
admission of this testimony prejudiced defendants. Corbett, 269 N.C. App. at 609 (“As 
Defendants did not object when the State elicited the testimony before the jury, 
Defendants failed to preserve the alleged error for appellate review.”). Nor did the 
State seek discretionary review of these issues. Accordingly, we must restrict our 
review of the decision below to the sole issue that divided the majority and the 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
dissent, whether or not defendants preserved their challenge to James’s testimony. 
See State v. Rankin, 371 N.C. 885, 895 (2018) (when a case “is before this Court based 
on a dissent in the Court of Appeals . . . the scope of review is limited to those 
questions on which there was division in the intermediate appellate court, and this 
Court’s review is properly limited to the single issue addressed in the [Court of 
Appeals] dissent” (cleaned up) (alteration in original)). 
¶ 54 
 
“In order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must have 
presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion.” N.C. R. App. P. 
10(a)(1). “To be timely, an objection to the admission of evidence must be made at the 
time it is actually introduced at trial.” State v. Ray, 364 N.C. 272, 277 (2010) (cleaned 
up). It is correct that although defendants objected to the introduction of the portion 
of James’s expert report addressing the untested blood spatters, defendants failed to 
again object11 when James testified at trial that  
[w]ith respect to the small spatters on the front underside 
of the left leg of the [boxer] shorts, these were consistent 
with the wearer of the shorts close to and above the source 
of the spattered blood. To what extent, I can’t really say. In 
order for the stains to get to that location on the inside of 
the leg, they would have to be traveling, you know, at least 
                                            
11 There is no indication in the record that defendants’ counsel ever requested a 
continuing objection to the testimony at issue, which is one way that a party may preserve 
an objection for appellate review.  See, e.g., State v. Crawford, 344 N.C. 65, 76 (1996) 
(“Defense counsel then asked the trial court to permit a ‘continuing objection to any of the 
testimony here offered.’ The trial court granted defendant’s continuing objection to all of the 
victim’s hearsay statements.” (citing N.C.G.S. § 15A-1446(d)(10) (1993); Duke Power Co. v. 
Winebarger, 300 N.C. 57 (1980) (authorizing the use of a continuing objection to a line of 
questions on the same subject to preserve the objection)). 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
somewhat upward in order to do that. My conclusion there 
was the source of the impact spatters is most likely the 
head of Jason Corbett while it was close to the floor in the 
bedroom.  
However, we agree with the Court of Appeals that defendants did not waive their 
objection to the admissibility of James’s testimony regarding these blood spatters. 
The record establishes that “[d]efendants did, in fact, timely object, and did so on 
multiple occasions before the jury throughout James's testimony.” Corbett, 269 N.C. 
App. at 551. They “immediately objected when the State proffered James's 
‘Supplementary Report of Bloodstain Pattern Analysis’ containing his comments and 
conclusions concerning, inter alia, Tom's boxer shorts and Molly's pajamas, which 
were the subject of Defendants’ objections during voir dire.” Id. The defendants then 
renewed their objections prior to James’s second day of direct examination. Id. Thus, 
we are persuaded that “[d]efendants properly objected and preserved this issue for 
appeal.” Id. 
¶ 55 
 
Regardless, we would also hold that defendants’ objection to the admissibility 
of this evidence was preserved by operation of law. “In N.C.G.S. § 15A-1446(d) (2017), 
the General Assembly enumerated a list of issues it deems appealable without 
preservation in the trial court.” State v. Meadows, 371 N.C. 742, 747–48 (2018). 
Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1446(d)(10), notwithstanding a party’s failure to object 
to the admission of evidence at some point at trial, a party may challenge 
“[s]ubsequent admission of evidence involving a specified line of questioning when 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
there has been an improperly overruled objection to the admission of evidence 
involving that line of questioning.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-1446(d)(10) (2019).12 Defendants 
objected to testimony based on the purported blood spatters on Tom’s boxer shorts 
and Molly’s pajama pants on numerous occasions. Because the dissenting judge did 
not dispute the majority’s conclusion that the blood spatter evidence was erroneously 
admitted into evidence and because the State did not seek discretionary review of 
this issue which was not set forth in the opinion of the dissenting judge, the law of 
the case is that the trial court improperly overruled defendants’ objection to this 
portion of the blood spatter testimony. See Lanning v. Fieldcrest-Cannon, Inc., 352 
N.C. 98, 105 (2000) (when “defendant did not seek, and this Court did not grant, 
discretionary review of . . . two issues . . . those issues are not before this Court; and 
the determination of the Court of Appeals becomes the law of the case as to those 
issues”). Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ holding that the objection was 
preserved at trial and further by operation of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1446(d)(10), the only 
                                            
12 In prior cases, we have held some subsections of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1446(d) 
unconstitutional as violating this Court’s exclusive rulemaking authority. See State v. 
Meadows, 371 N.C. 742, 748 n.2 (2018) (describing cases holding N.C.G.S. § 15A-1446(d)(5), 
(6), and (13) unconstitutional). However, we have never held N.C.G.S. § 15A-1446(d)(10) 
unconstitutional. Because the provision does not “conflict[ ] with specific provisions of our 
appellate rules rather than the general rule stated in Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(a),” it 
“operates as a ‘rule or law’ under Rule 10(a)(1), which permits review of this issue.” State v. 
Mumford, 364 N.C. 394, 403 (2010) 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
issue that is properly before this Court.13 
4. Tom’s Testimony Regarding Molly’s Statement “Don’t Hurt My Dad” 
¶ 56 
 
At trial, Tom testified that after he had been shoved to the ground in the midst 
of the altercation with Jason, he heard Molly yell “[d]on’t hurt my dad.” The State 
objected to this testimony. The trial court sustained the objection, told the jury to 
disregard it, and struck this portion of Tom’s testimony from the record. On appeal, 
the majority below concluded that “[t]he trial court erroneously sustained the State’s 
objection to Tom’s testimony because Molly’s out-of-court statement was either non-
hearsay, or alternatively, admissible hearsay.” Corbett, 269 N.C. App. at 560. We 
agree with the Court of Appeals that Molly’s statement was admissible because it was 
relevant non-hearsay.  
¶ 57 
 
As explained above, an out-of-court statement introduced to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted is only admissible if it falls within an enumerated hearsay 
exception. However, “[a]s has been stated by this Court on numerous occasions . . . , 
whenever an extrajudicial statement is offered for a purpose other than proving the 
truth of the matter asserted, it is not hearsay.” State v. Maynard, 311 N.C. 1, 15 
(1984); see also State v. Kirkman, 293 N.C. 447, 455 (1977) (“The Hearsay Rule does 
                                            
13 The dissent claims that our consideration of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1446(d)(10) is 
inappropriate because the parties did not directly argue that their objection to the bloodstain 
analysis was preserved by operation of the statute. To the extent that the briefing before this 
Court is deficient on this point, it is possibly because the State failed to argue that defendants 
had not preserved their objection to the bloodstain analysis at the Court of Appeals.  
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
not preclude a witness from testifying as to a statement made by another person when 
the purpose of the evidence is not to show the truth of such statement . . . .”). Read in 
context, it is clear that Tom testified about Molly’s statement not to prove that Jason 
was actually about to harm him but to support his contention that he was, at that 
moment, subjectively fearful for his and his daughter’s lives. His perception of Molly’s 
statement was relevant regardless of the statement’s actual “truth or falsity.” 
Valentine, 357 N.C. at 524.14 It was relevant because Tom testified that he heard 
Molly speak it, which tended to support his claim that he “reasonably believe[d]” that 
his use of deadly force was “necessary to defend himself . . . or another against 
[another’s] imminent use of unlawful force” which he reasonably believed would have 
resulted in “imminent death or great bodily harm to himself . . . or another.” N.C.G.S. 
§ 14-51.3(a) (2019).  
¶ 58 
 
Tom’s testimony bolstered his claim that he was subjectively fearful and that 
his fear was reasonable, based in part upon his hearing of Molly’s statement. Thus, 
                                            
14 In fact, Tom’s testimony was relevant regardless of whether or not Molly actually 
made this statement or any statement. What matters for the purpose of assessing Tom’s 
subjective mental state is what Tom thought he heard.  It would not matter if Molly had 
actually said “[d]on’t look so sad.”  If what Tom heard in that moment was that he was about 
to be hurt, it is relevant to whether he “believed it was necessary to kill the deceased in order 
to save [him]self from death or great bodily harm, and if defendant’s belief was reasonable in 
that the circumstances as they appeared to [Tom] at the time were sufficient to create such a 
belief in the mind of a person of ordinary firmness.” State v. Norris, 303 N.C. 526, 530 (1981) 
(emphasis added). Thus, neither what Molly said nor whether she actually said anything 
matters for the purpose of this testimony. Rather, Tom is entitled to testify to his subjective 
belief at the time and what circumstances led him to have that belief. 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
his testimony was admissible for the appropriate non-hearsay purpose of 
“establish[ing] the state of mind of another person hearing the statement” or to “show 
the presence . . . of an emotion which would naturally result from hearing the 
statement.” State v. Grier, 51 N.C. App. 209, 214 (1981). While this portion of Tom’s 
testimony may have been self-serving, it was for the jury to decide “[t]he weight . . . 
to give the[ ] statement[ ] in deciding the issue of defendant’s guilt or innocence 
depend[ing] upon” their assessment of Tom’s credibility. Valentine, 357 N.C. at 524–
25. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ holding that the trial court erred by 
sustaining the State’s objection to this portion of Tom’s testimony.15 
III. 
Prejudice 
¶ 59 
 
Having concluded that the trial court erred by excluding Jack’s and Sarah’s 
statements, by striking a portion of Tom’s testimony, and by admitting certain expert 
witness testimony concerning alleged blood spatters on Tom’s and Molly’s clothing, 
we must determine whether defendants were prejudiced thereby. “To establish 
prejudice based on evidentiary rulings, defendant bears the burden of showing that 
a reasonable possibility exists that, absent the error, a different result would have 
been reached.” State v. Lynch, 340 N.C. 435, 458 (1995); see also N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443 
                                            
15 In the alternative, we agree with defendants that the statement, if hearsay, fell 
within the “excited utterance” exception to the hearsay rule, which provides that “[a] 
statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the 
stress of excitement caused by the event or condition” is admissible. N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 
803(2) (2019). 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
(2019). An evidentiary error may be prejudicial on its own, but “should this Court 
conclude that no single error identified [at trial] was prejudicial, the cumulative effect 
of the errors nevertheless [may be] sufficiently prejudicial to require a new trial.” 
State v. Wilkerson, 363 N.C. 382, 426 (2009). A new trial is warranted if the errors, 
either individually or “taken as a whole, deprived defendant of his due process right 
to a fair trial free from prejudicial error.” State v. Canady, 355 N.C. 242, 254 (2002). 
Thus, even if we conclude that one evidentiary error, standing alone, is not itself 
prejudicial, we are still required to consider whether that error contributed to 
prejudice in the aggregate. 
¶ 60 
 
Here, the trial court’s erroneous exclusion of Jack’s and Sarah’s testimony 
meaningfully deprived defendants of the opportunity to support their self-defense 
claim in several ways. This error was prejudicial for three reasons.  
¶ 61 
 
First, Jack’s statement explaining the presence of the brick paver would have 
provided a non-culpable justification for why one of the defendants possessed one of 
the alleged murder weapons. We agree with the majority below that the State 
“benefited from the unexplained presence of one of two potential murder weapons in 
the master bedroom, and in fact, raised this very question during its opening 
statement.” Corbett, 269 N.C. App. at 577 (emphasis omitted). Absent explanation, 
Molly’s possession of the alleged murder weapon at the scene of the killing—a place 
where her possession of the murder weapon would otherwise have been highly 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
unusual—naturally gave rise to the inference that Molly did not act in self-defense.  
¶ 62 
 
Second, Sarah’s statement describing her nightmare and her entry into the 
master bedroom provided compelling firsthand evidence supporting defendants’ 
account of how the altercation began. Her statement confirmed that the altercation 
had a precipitating cause besides the actions of either defendant and that Jason was 
angry when the altercation began.  
¶ 63 
 
Third, we agree with the Court of Appeals that Jack’s and Sarah’s statements 
regarding Jason’s worsening anger and their characterization of Jason and Molly’s 
relationship “would have corroborated and provided significant context for the 
written statement that Molly provided at the Davidson County Sheriff’s Office on 2 
August 2015.” Corbett, 269 N.C. App. at 578. The jury would have been presented 
with evidence which filled crucial gaps in Molly’s statement, most notably why she 
had a brick paver within arm’s reach in her bedroom and why she felt the need to use 
it under the circumstances as she perceived them. 
¶ 64 
 
Without evidence supporting their account of the circumstances leading up to 
the tragic events of 2 August 2015, it was easier for the jury to conclude that Tom 
and Molly had invented their story in an effort to cover up their crime and falsely 
assert that they acted in self-defense. There is a reasonable possibility that the 
outcome would have been different if the jury had been presented with admissible 
evidence providing a non-culpable justification for Molly’s possession of a possible 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
murder weapon, the brick paver; offering a corroborative description of why the 
altercation began, because Jason was angry at being awoken by Sarah, which placed 
Molly in the position of a victim from the outset and evidence of important relevant 
information about the nature of Jason and Molly’s relationship in the weeks and 
months leading up to this incident. Indeed, as the Court of Appeals recounted, the 
jury foreman explained that “how and why the paver made it into the home was the 
#1 question that was talked about when deliberations started.’ ” Corbett, 269 N.C. 
App. at 578 (cleaned up) (emphasis omitted). Further, Jack’s and Sarah’s testimony 
also would have corroborated Jason’s medical records, which contained his admission 
that he had been feeling “more stressed and angry lately for no reason.” This 
corroborative evidence would have provided important context to the jury as it 
considered how the altercation began, what state of mind Molly possessed during the 
altercation, and whether that state of mind is reasonable. A different outcome might 
reasonably have occurred at trial had the jury been provided with evidence tending 
to show that Jason was frequently angry and experiencing increased anger over 
recent months and that Jason and Molly had been awakened that night in a manner 
known previously to have caused discord in their relationship. 
¶ 65 
 
On the other hand, the trial court’s erroneous exclusion of Tom’s testimony 
regarding his perception of Molly’s statement “[d]on’t hurt my dad” was not by itself 
sufficiently prejudicial to either Tom or Molly as to warrant a new trial. This 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
testimony undoubtedly supported defendants’ self-defense claim, in that it tended to 
corroborate Tom’s testimony that he was subjectively fearful during the altercation 
and that his fear was reasonable. However, in this case, the prejudicial impact of 
excluding Tom’s testimony was limited because this testimony was largely 
duplicative of other testimony that was admitted into evidence tending to establish 
his state of mind. Apart from the stricken testimony, Tom was permitted to testify at 
length and in significant detail about the circumstances of the altercation. Just before 
the stricken testimony, he stated “if I can get any more afraid, that was it. I can’t see 
[Jason]. It’s dark in the bedroom. I’m thinking the next thing is going to be a bat in 
the back of the head.” He also testified that around the time he heard Molly yell, 
Jason shoved him to the ground, he lost his glasses, and he saw Molly trapped 
between Jason and the wall with Jason appearing poised to strike Molly with the 
baseball bat. This testimony amply supported Tom’s claim that he was fearful and 
that his fear was reasonable. Although we cannot say the trial court’s exclusion of his 
testimony had no effect on the jury’s deliberations, this error standing alone was not 
significant enough to establish prejudice sufficient to warrant a new trial. However, 
we still consider this error in combination with other evidentiary errors that occurred 
during the trial to determine if the errors, in the aggregate, were prejudicial. 
¶ 66 
 
In that regard, it is significant that the trial court’s errors in excluding 
evidence offered by defendants limited defendants in their ability to counter the 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
State’s contention that they did not act in self-defense. In order to convict a defendant 
of second-degree murder in the presence of evidence of heat of passion or self-defense, 
“the [S]tate must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not act in heat 
of passion and in self-defense in order to prove the existence of malice and 
unlawfulness, respectively.” State v. Marley, 321 N.C. 415, 420 (1988). Evidence 
which tended to show that defendants both subjectively feared imminent death or 
substantial bodily harm and that their fear was reasonable at the time they used 
deadly force was extremely salient to the resolution of this question. See, e.g., State 
v. Williams, 342 N.C. 869, 872–73 (1996) (describing the subjective and objective 
components of the defense of perfect self-defense). In addition, as the Court of Appeals 
explained, the erroneous admission of the blood-spatter testimony also undercut 
defendants’ self-defense argument by “bolstering the State’s claim that Jason was 
struck after and while he was down and defenseless.” Corbett, 269 N.C. App. at 559.16 
In the present case, these errors together imposed a significant constraint on 
defendants’ efforts to establish a crucial fact: namely, their state of mind at the time 
of the events in question based on all of the circumstances known to them.  
¶ 67 
 
We have long held that when a defendant has claimed self-defense, “a jury 
                                            
16 Additionally, because the only issue before us on the issue of the expert’s bloodstain 
testimony was whether the objection was properly preserved, and by statute we necessarily 
must conclude that it was, the Court of Appeals ruling that the testimony was improperly 
admitted and prejudicial stands as an alternative ground requiring a new trial. 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
should, as far as is possible, be placed in defendant’s situation and possess the same 
knowledge of danger and the same necessity for action, in order to decide if defendant 
acted under reasonable apprehension of danger to his person or his life.” State v. 
Johnson, 270 N.C. 215, 219 (1967). In this case, “[i]f defendant[s] had been able to 
present the excluded testimony, [they] might have been able to convince the jury that 
[they used deadly force] while under a reasonable belief that it was necessary to do 
so in order to save [themselves] from death or great bodily harm.” State v. Webster, 
324 N.C. 385, 393 (1989). “Thus, there is a reasonable possibility that, had the error 
not been committed, a different result would have been reached at trial.” Id. 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals concluding that the trial 
court committed prejudicial evidentiary errors.  
IV. 
Conclusion 
¶ 68 
 
The events of 2 August 2015 which led to Jason Corbett’s untimely death were 
tragic.  Our system of laws assigns to the jury in this case the onerous responsibility 
of examining the evidence and determining if Tom Martens and Molly Corbett were 
guilty of second-degree murder or if the homicide was justified self-defense necessary 
to save them from serious bodily harm or death. However, it is the responsibility of 
the courts, including this Court, to ensure that both the State and criminal 
defendants are afforded the opportunity to fully and fairly present their cases. Here, 
Tom’s and Molly’s sole defense to the charges levelled against them was that their 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
use of deadly force was legally justified. By erroneously excluding admissible 
testimony which was relevant to the central question presented to the jury, the trial 
court impermissibly constrained defendants’ ability to mount their defense. On these 
facts, we conclude that “[a]s a matter of fundamental fairness, the exclusion of [Jack’s 
and Sarah’s] statement[s] deprived the jury of evidence that was relevant and 
material to its role as finder of fact.” Sargeant, 365 N.C. at 68. Similarly, the jury was 
erroneously instructed to disregard testimony supporting the conclusion that Tom 
was fearful of being seriously injured or killed.  Therefore, we agree with the majority 
below that “this is the rare case in which certain evidentiary errors, alone and in the 
aggregate, were so prejudicial as to inhibit Defendants’ ability to present a full and 
meaningful defense.” Corbett, 269 N.C. App. at 512. Accordingly, we affirm. 
AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
Justice BERGER dissenting. 
 
¶ 69 
 
The analysis by the majority contains three fundamental flaws.  Concerning 
preservation, the majority creates an argument for defendants.  In addition, 
throughout the opinion, the majority reweighs the evidence.  Finally, and perhaps 
most remarkably, the majority engages in a de novo analysis of issues which should 
be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Because defendants “receive[d] ‘a fair trial, 
free of prejudicial error,’ ” State v. Malachi, 371 N.C. 719, 733, 821 S.E.2d 407, 418 
(2018) (quoting State v. Ligon, 332 N.C. 224, 243, 420 S.E.2d 136, 147 (1992)), the 
trial court’s judgments should be affirmed.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
V. 
Preservation 
¶ 70 
 
Rules concerning preservation not only establish a framework for appellate 
review but also provide parties and trial courts with the opportunity to clarify 
arguments, frame issues, and correct errors at trial.  As a matter of judicial economy, 
the trial court can ask for additional arguments from the parties, sustain objections, 
and give necessary curative instructions during trial, allowing for a better 
understanding of the arguments and issues presented in the case.  See State v. Oliver, 
309 N.C. 326, 334, 307 S.E.2d 304, 311 (1983) (“Rule 10 functions as an important 
vehicle to insure that errors are not ‘built into’ the record, thereby causing 
unnecessary appellate review.”).  This allows trial courts to correct errors on the front 
end, rather than engaging in needless after-the-fact appeals.  See generally State v. 
 
  
STATE V. CORBETT 
2021-NCSC-18 
Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
Bursell, 372 N.C. 196, 199, 827 S.E.2d 302, 305 (2019) (“[Rule 10] prevents 
unnecessary retrials by calling possible error to the attention of the trial court so that 
the presiding judge may take corrective action if it is required.”).   
¶ 71 
 
“In order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must have 
presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion . . . .”  N.C. R. App. 
P. Rule 10(a)(1).  “To be timely, an objection to the admission of evidence must be 
made ‘at the time it is actually introduced at trial.’ ”  State v. Ray, 364 N.C. 272, 277, 
697 S.E.2d 319, 322 (2010) (quoting State v. Thibodeaux, 352 N.C. 570, 581, 532 
S.E.2d 797, 806 (2000)).  “[T]he Rules of Appellate Procedure must be consistently 
applied; otherwise, the Rules become meaningless, and an appellee is left without 
notice of the basis upon which an appellate court might rule.”  Viar v. N.C. Dep’t of 
Transp., 359 N.C. 400, 402, 610 S.E.2d 360, 361 (2005).   
¶ 72 
 
Defendants’ argument regarding the evidence of the blood stain on defendant 
Martens’s boxer shorts was not preserved.  The parties did not argue in their briefs 
or at oral argument that N.C.G.S. § 15A-1446(d)(10) was the vehicle through which 
this issue was preserved.  Moreover, neither the Court of Appeals majority, nor the 
dissent, referenced this statute.  However, the majority finds preservation by 
operation of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1446(d)(10).   
¶ 73 
 
It is troubling that the majority impermissibly creates an argument for 
defendants given the lack of briefing and argument by the parties.  It is particularly 
STATE V. CORBETT 
2021-NCSC-18 
Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
troubling that the majority does so utilizing a statute that this Court has, in part, 
declared unconstitutional where it conflicts with our appellate rules.  See State v. 
Mumford, 364 N.C. 394, 403, 699 S.E.2d 911, 917 (2010) (stating that provisions of 
subsection 15A–1446(d) have been declared unconstitutional where those provisions 
“conflicted with specific provisions of our appellate rules rather than the general rule 
stated in Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(a)”). 
¶ 74 
 
During voir dire, defendants objected to the reliability of the conclusion of the 
State’s blood spatter expert, Stuart James, that the stains on defendant Martens’s 
boxer shorts were impact blood spatter arising from blunt force strikes to Jason’s 
head while he was on the ground.  The trial court overruled defendants’ objections.  
¶ 75 
 
At trial, Stuart James testified without objection as follows:  
With respect to the small spatters on the front underside 
of the left leg of the shorts, these were consistent with the 
wearer of the shorts close to and above the source of the 
spattered blood. To what extent, I can’t really say. In order 
for the stains to get to that location on the inside of the leg, 
they would have to be traveling, you know, at least 
somewhat upward in order to do that. My conclusion there 
was the source of the impact spatters is most likely the 
head of Jason Corbett while it was close to the floor in the 
bedroom. 
¶ 76 
 
Defendants failed to renew their objections to this testimony at trial, and the 
majority acknowledges that “[t]here is no indication in the record that defendants’ 
counsel ever requested a continuing objection to the testimony at issue . . . .”  As 
defendants did not object when the State elicited the testimony before the jury, 
STATE V. CORBETT 
2021-NCSC-18 
Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
defendants failed to preserve the alleged error for appellate review.  See State v. 
Snead, 368 N.C. 811, 816, 783 S.E.2d 733, 737 (2016) (“An objection made ‘only during 
a hearing out of the jury’s presence prior to the actual introduction of the testimony’ 
is insufficient.” (quoting Ray, 364 N.C. at 277, 697 S.E.2d at 322)).  
¶ 77 
 
In relying on N.C.G.S. § 15A-1446(d)(10), the majority impermissibly creates 
an avenue for preservation that was not addressed, briefed, or argued.  The majority’s 
argument is a departure from our Rule 10 jurisprudence, and rests on questionable 
constitutional grounds.  
¶ 78 
 
Moreover, defendants were not prejudiced by the admission of testimony 
concerning one drop of untested blood due to the extensive amount of blood and blood 
spatter evidence that was admitted without objection.  The State introduced without 
objection additional blood spatter evidence that Jason was struck when his head was 
close to the ground.  Regarding the blood stains on the walls, Stuart James testified 
without objection that “the[ ] patterns are consistent with impacts to the head of 
[Jason] as he was descending to the floor[,]” that some of the impacts were “24 to 28 
inches above the floor . . . [i]t went from five feet down to 24 to 28 inches[,]” and that 
the other impacts were “[a]pproximately 5 to 16 inches [from the floor] . . . [s]o that’s 
what I meant by descending succession of impacts.”  Stuart James further testified 
that there were “impact spatters on the underside of the folded-back quilt” on the 
bottom of the bed in the master bedroom.  
STATE V. CORBETT 
2021-NCSC-18 
Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
¶ 79 
 
Additionally, defendant Martens testified, “[a]nd so I hit [Jason]. And I hit him 
until he goes down. And then I step away. . . . I hit him until I thought that he could 
not kill me.”  To this point, Stuart James’s testimony corroborates defendant 
Martens’s testimony when he stated, “[a]nd if you would take those [untested stains] 
away, it really doesn’t change much of my opinion.  It is still impact spatter with the 
wearer of the shorts in proximity with the source of the blood.”   
¶ 80 
 
Defendants’ failure to object may have been a trial strategy.  Defendants may 
not have wanted to draw additional attention to the overwhelming amount of blood 
and blood-related evidence associated with Jason’s brutal death.  Whatever their 
reason, given the admission of other blood evidence showing that Jason was struck 
while close to or near the ground, defendants certainly were not prejudiced by the 
admission of the blood spatter testimony relating to defendant Martens’s boxer 
shorts.  
VI. 
Hearsay Statements 
¶ 81 
 
This Court has recognized that, “[t]he competency, admissibility, and 
sufficiency of the evidence is a matter for the [trial] court to determine.”  In re Lucks, 
369 N.C. 222, 228, 794 S.E.2d 501, 506 (2016) (second alteration in original) (quoting 
Queen City Coach Co. v. Lee, 218 N.C. 320, 323, 11 S.E.2d 341, 343 (1940)).  Because 
our case law regarding the standard of review applicable to a ruling on whether 
evidence is admissible under Rule 803(4) is nonexistent, we can look to the federal 
STATE V. CORBETT 
2021-NCSC-18 
Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
rules for guidance.  See State v. Wilson, 322 N.C. 117, 132, 367 S.E.2d 589, 598 (1988) 
(“Since the case law concerning collateral statements under this rule of evidence in 
this State is negligible, we shall look to the federal courts for guidance on this point 
in interpreting its federal counterpart.”).1  Rule 803(4) of the North Carolina Rules of 
Evidence is similar to its federal counterpart.  Compare N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 803(4) 
(2019), with Fed. R. Evid. 803(4).  See Roberts v. Hollocher, 664 F.2d 200, 204 (8th 
                                            
1 Federal courts also recognize that evidentiary rules and those regarding hearsay are 
typically reviewed for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Earth, 984 F.3d 1289, 
1294 (8th Cir. 2021) (“We review a district court’s rulings regarding the admission of hearsay 
evidence for an abuse of discretion.”); United States v. Lovato, 950 F.3d 1337, 1341 (10th Cir. 
2020) (“We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, 
considering the record as a whole. Because hearsay determinations are particularly fact and 
case specific, we afford heightened deference to the district court when evaluating hearsay 
objections.”(citations omitted)); United States v. Slatten, 865 F.3d 767, 805 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 
(“Ordinarily, the Court reviews the exclusion of a hearsay statement under the abuse of 
discretion standard.”); United States v. Ferrell, 816 F.3d 433, 438 (7th Cir. 2015) (“To reverse 
a district court’s decision on the admissibility of hearsay statements, we must conclude that 
the district court abused its discretion.”); United States v. Amador-Huggins, 799 F.3d 124, 
132 (1st Cir. 2015) (“The parties agree that our review of how the district court applied the 
hearsay rules to these facts is for abuse of discretion.”); United States v. Cole, 631 F.3d 146, 
153 (4th Cir. 2011) (“We review a trial court’s rulings on the admissibility of evidence for 
abuse of discretion, and we will only overturn an evidentiary ruling that is ‘arbitrary and 
irrational.’ ”); United States v. Santos, 589 F.3d 759, 763 (5th Cir. 2009) (“We review 
evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.”); United States v. Price, 458 F.3d 202, 205 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (“Whether a statement is hearsay is a legal question subject to plenary review. If 
the district court correctly classifies a statement as hearsay, its application of the relevant 
hearsay exceptions is subject to review for abuse of discretion.” (citations omitted)); United 
States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1359 (11th Cir. 2006) (“We review a district court’s hearsay 
ruling for abuse of discretion.”); United States v. Wright, 343 F.3d 849, 865 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(“All evidentiary rulings, including hearsay, are reviewed for abuse of discretion.”); United 
States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 981 (9th Cir. 2003) (“We review for an abuse of discretion 
the district court’s evidentiary rulings during trial, including the exclusion of evidence under 
the hearsay rule.”); United States v. Forrester, 60 F.3d 52, 59 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[A]n application 
of the rules concerning hearsay is reviewed for the abuse of discretion.”). 
 
STATE V. CORBETT 
2021-NCSC-18 
Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
Cir. 1981) (Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) excepts from the hearsay rule 
“[s]tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing 
medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or 
general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably 
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment”).  
¶ 82 
 
The majority relies on State v. Norman, 196 N.C. App. 779, 783, 675 S.E.2d 
395, 399 (2009), for the proposition that a ruling on whether evidence is admissible 
under Rule 803(4) is reviewed de novo.  However, Norman is not binding precedent 
on this Court.  See N. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Lacy J. Miller Mach. Co., 311 N.C. 62, 76, 
316 S.E.2d 256, 265 (1984) (“This Court is not bound by precedents established by the 
Court of Appeals.”).  The Norman decision rests on a questionable interpretation of 
the standard of review utilized by this Court in Hinnant.  A review of Hinnant shows 
that this Court did not state the standard it used to review the Rule 803(4) issues 
before it.  Because this Court has never expressly established a standard of review 
under Rule 803(4), the plethora of federal hearsay jurisprudence is more persuasive 
than a single statement in Norman.2  Accordingly, review of the admissibility of 
evidence under Rule 803(4) should be for an abuse of discretion.   
                                            
2 The majority further cites to State v. Jones, 339 N.C. 114, 146 (1994) and State v. 
Stafford, 317 N.C. 568, 571 (1986) for the proposition that this Court routinely reviews Rule 
803(4) determinations de novo.  This Court has never expressly stated the standard of review 
used to analyze Rule 803(4) issues.  The majority acknowledges that this Court has never 
STATE V. CORBETT 
2021-NCSC-18 
Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
¶ 83 
 
Rule 803(4) excepts from the general rule against hearsay 
 
[s]tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or 
treatment and describing medical history, or past or 
present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or 
general character of the cause or external source thereof 
insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.  
 
N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 803(4).  “This exception to the hearsay doctrine was created 
because of a ‘patient’s strong motivation to be truthful’ when making statements for 
the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.”  State v. Lewis, 172 N.C. App. 97, 
103, 616 S.E.2d 1, 4–5 (2005) (citing N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 803(4) official commentary 
(2003)). 
Rule 803(4) requires a two-part inquiry: (1) whether the 
declarant’s statements were made for purposes of medical 
diagnosis or treatment; and (2) whether the declarant’s 
statements were reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or 
treatment.  
 
Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 284, 523 S.E.2d at 667.  “[T]he proponent of Rule 803(4) 
testimony must affirmatively establish that the declarant had the requisite intent by 
demonstrating that the declarant made the statements understanding that they 
would lead to medical diagnosis or treatment.” Id. at 287, 523 S.E.2d at 669.  To 
determine whether a child’s statements are admissible under this exception, “the trial 
court should consider all objective circumstances of record surrounding [the] 
                                            
“explicitly elaborated at length” our standard of review under 803(4).  After review of the 
cases cited by the majority, it cannot be said that “our opinions interpreting Rule 803(4) 
establish that the Court has routinely reviewed these decisions de novo . . . .”   
STATE V. CORBETT 
2021-NCSC-18 
Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
declarant’s statements in determining whether he or she possessed the requisite 
intent under Rule 803(4).”  Id. at 288, 523 S.E.2d at 670. 
¶ 84 
 
At trial, Brandi Reagan, executive director of the Dragonfly House, explained 
that when a child arrives at the Dragonfly House for an appointment, the child is met 
by a child advocate who “talks with th[e] nonoffending caregiver and the child about 
. . . people they are going to meet, every service they are going to receive[,] and what 
would happen at the end of the appointment.”  Heydy Day, the child advocate in this 
case, testified, “I start off talking to the child and the caregiver saying, ‘you will be 
talking with one of my friends today,’ whether that’s our interviewer Kim or 
interviewer Brandi, you will be talking to that lady.”  She testified that she would tell 
the children, “Once you finish talking with Miss Kim or Miss Brandi and the doctor 
finishes talking with the caregiver, then the doctor will call you back to do a head to 
toe check-up of you.”  Additionally, Reagan testified that interviews at the Dragonfly 
House took place in bedrooms to create a “child-friendly” interview room, rather than 
in the medical examination room.   
¶ 85 
 
When asked if he knew why he was at the Dragonfly House, Jack responded 
that he was there because “people are trying” to take him away from his mom.  When 
asked who told him that, he responded “[m]y mom.” When Sarah was asked if she 
knew why she was at the Dragonfly House, she responded, “[b]ecause my dad died.”   
STATE V. CORBETT 
2021-NCSC-18 
Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
¶ 86 
 
The trial court determined the statements at issue did not qualify as 
statements for the purposes of the medical diagnosis or treatment exception because 
the trial court found that the children thought the interview was about custody.  The 
trial court made appropriate findings of fact and weighed factors when it determined 
that the circumstances surrounding the interviews did not indicate that either child 
understood that the interviews were for the purpose of medical diagnosis or 
treatment.  The declarants stated that they were present at the Dragonfly House 
either because their dad died or because of some issue relating to custody.  The 
children did not respond with an answer focusing on their physical or emotional well-
being.  Based on these statements, the trial court reasonably concluded that the 
statements were not made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment.  See 
Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 284, 523 S.E.2d at 667–68. 
¶ 87 
 
 It is important to acknowledge that the trial court could have admitted the 
children’s statements into evidence.  While reasonable minds can differ on the 
admissibility of this evidence, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion.  
“The purpose of standards of review is to focus reviewing courts upon their proper 
role when passing on the conduct of other decision-makers.  Standards of review are 
thus an elemental expression of judicial restraint, which, in their deferential 
varieties, safeguard the superior vantage points of those entrusted with primary 
decisional responsibility.”  Evans v. Eaton Corp. Long Term Disability Plan, 514 F.3d 
STATE V. CORBETT 
2021-NCSC-18 
Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
315, 320–21 (4th Cir. 2008).  The majority’s de novo review does away with the 
fundamental safeguards that are available to all litigants when the primary 
decisional responsibility of the trial court is respected and maintained.  See United 
States v. Charboneau, 914 F.3d 906, 912 (4th Cir. 2019).  Our inquiry should be 
limited to whether the trial court’s decision to exclude the statements was “manifestly 
unsupported by reason.”  White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 
(1985).  Based upon the record in this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
when it excluded the children’s statements under Rule 803(4).   
¶ 88 
 
Similarly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that 
the children’s statements did not meet the requirements of the residual hearsay 
exception.   
¶ 89 
 
The residual hearsay exception is disfavored and should be invoked “very 
rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.”  State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 91 n.4, 
337 S.E.2d 833, 844 n.4 (1985) (citation omitted).  A trial court’s determination of 
whether to admit statements under Rule 803(24) is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion.  Id. at 97, 337 S.E.2d at 847.  As stated above, “[a] trial court may be 
reversed for abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its actions are manifestly 
unsupported by reason.”  White, 312 N.C. at 777, 324 S.E.2d at 833.   
¶ 90 
 
The trial court “must enter appropriate statements, rationale, or findings of 
fact and conclusions of law . . . in the record to support [its] discretionary decision[,]”  
STATE V. CORBETT 
2021-NCSC-18 
Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
Smith, 315 N.C. at 97, 337 S.E.2d at 847, to allow “a reviewing court to determine 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in making its ruling,” State v. Sargeant, 
365 N.C. 58, 65, 707 S.E.2d 192, 196 (2011).  Moreover, “evidence proffered for 
admission pursuant to . . . Rule 803(24) . . . must be carefully scrutinized by the trial 
judge within the framework of the rule’s requirements.”  Smith, 315 N.C. at 92, 337 
S.E.2d at 844.   
Under either of the two residual exceptions to the hearsay 
rule, the trial court must determine the following: (1) 
whether proper notice has been given, (2) whether the 
hearsay is not specifically covered elsewhere, (3) whether 
the statement is trustworthy, (4) whether the statement is 
material, (5) whether the statement is more probative on 
the issue than any other evidence which the proponent can 
procure through reasonable efforts, and (6) whether the 
interests of justice will be best served by admission.  
State v. Valentine, 357 N.C. 512, 518, 591 S.E.2d 846, 852 (2003) (citation omitted).  
The sole issue here concerns whether the children’s statements were trustworthy.   
¶ 91 
 
In determining whether a statement under Rule 803(24) is “trustworthy,” this 
Court has identified the following factors to consider:  
(1) assurance of personal knowledge of the declarant of the 
underlying event; (2) the declarant’s motivation to speak 
the truth or otherwise; (3) whether the declarant ever 
recanted the testimony; and (4) the practical availability of 
the declarant at trial for meaningful cross-examination. 
Smith, 315 N.C. at 93–94, 337 S.E.2d at 845 (citations omitted).  “[I]f the trial judge 
examines the circumstances and determines that the proffered testimony does not 
STATE V. CORBETT 
2021-NCSC-18 
Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
meet the trustworthiness requirement, his inquiry must cease upon his entry into the 
record of his findings and conclusions, and the testimony may not be admitted 
pursuant to Rule 803(24).”  Id. at 94, 337 S.E.2d at 845.  
¶ 92 
 
The trial court made the following relevant findings of fact relating to the 
children’s statements: 
15.  
The children’s statements did not describe actual 
knowledge of the events surrounding the homicide of Jason 
Corbett. Jack identified the source of the information in his 
statements by saying “my mom told me” and “she 
(defendant Molly Corbett) told us.” Sarah similarly 
described the source of her knowledge, saying the [sic] her 
grandmother “told [me] first and then her mother [told 
me].” When speaking of her “grandmother,” Sarah was 
referring to the mother of defendant Molly Corbett and the 
wife of defendant Thomas Martens.  
. . . . 
20.  
The statements of the children which the defense 
proffers were not made out of the personal knowledge of 
the declarant children but are instead double hearsay[3] 
declarations of the defendant Molly Corbett and her 
mother.  
21.  
These same statements were not made at a time 
when the children were motivated to speak the truth but 
were 
rather 
motivated 
to 
affect 
future 
custody 
                                            
3 The majority does not address the issue of double hearsay.  In addition, the majority 
gives no direction to the trial court on which statements are admissible and which are not.  
Furthermore, the majority does not address the trial court’s discretion to exclude this 
evidence under Rule 403 regardless of its admissibility under Rule 803(24).  See N.C.G.S. § 
8C-1, Rule 403 (2019) (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence.”).  
STATE V. CORBETT 
2021-NCSC-18 
Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
arrangements—specifically the children feared that they 
were going to be “taken away from their mother” and 
removed to another country by their father’s relatives.  
22.  
The statements of the children that are offered by 
the defense as pertinent to the relationship between Molly 
Corbett and Jason Corbett have been specifically recanted. 
Sarah Corbett, the younger of the two children, recanted 
her statements in diary entries made after her return to 
Ireland. Jack Corbett recanted his statements in diary 
entries and during a recorded interview with members of 
the District Attorney’s Office.  
¶ 93 
 
With regard to finding of fact 15, that the statements did not describe the 
homicide, there is no evidence that the children witnessed the homicide of Jason.  
Jack was asleep that night and did not wake up until law enforcement came into his 
room, and Sarah was documented saying that “at night she was sleeping and an 
officer came upstairs around 4 AM and took her downstairs to her grandma.”  Her 
mom told her that someone got hurt and later told her that her dad died.    
¶ 94 
 
As to finding of fact 20, that the statements were not made with personal 
knowledge, the Dragonfly House’s Medical Services Log for Sarah states that “Sarah 
does not disclose witnessing [domestic violence].”  When asked if Sarah saw Jason 
hurt Molly, Sarah said, “No, not really ever, but one time I saw him step on her foot.”  
Reagan followed up by asking, “So when you said that he would fight with her and he 
would hurt her, you said you didn’t really see it, how would you know about it?”  Sarah 
responded, “Because, um, my mom told me.”  Further, the DSS social worker’s notes 
STATE V. CORBETT 
2021-NCSC-18 
Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
stated, “Sarah states her father screams and yells and states when her mom and dad 
goes into the room her dad hurts her mom. She stated her mom told her.”   
¶ 95 
 
When Reagan asked Jack, “How did your dad die?” Jack responded:  
Okay. Well, my sister had a nightmare about insect 
crawling—she had fairy blankets and insects all over her 
bed. That was a nightmare, though. And my dad got very 
mad, and he was screaming at our mom, and my mom 
screamed, and my grandpa came up and started to hit him 
with a bat. And then my dad grabbed hold of the bat—
grabbed—held the bat and hit my grandpa with the bat, 
until my mom put a—put—we were going to paint a brick 
that was in there, like a cinder block, and it hit his temple, 
right here, and he died.  
When Reagan asked, “now you said your sister had a nightmare. How did you know 
that?”  Jack responded, “My parents—my mom told me.”  When asked to recount 
details about Jason’s behavior, Jack admitted he “[didn’t] actually remember[,]” or 
stated that he knew because his mom or grandma told him.  Lastly, Reagan asked, 
“[a]nd just to make sure I understand, how did you find out that your mom hit [your 
dad] with a brick and your grandpa hit him with a bat?”  Jack responded, “She told 
me.”   
¶ 96 
 
The record demonstrates that there was evidence to support the trial court’s 
findings of fact 15 and 20 because the children’s statements were not made with 
“actual knowledge of the events surrounding the homicide of Jason” and “were not 
made out of the personal knowledge of the declarant children.”  Moreover, finding of 
fact 21 was supported by Sarah’s exchange at Dragonfly House.  When Sarah was 
STATE V. CORBETT 
2021-NCSC-18 
Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
asked, “Tell me why you’re here today[,]” she responded, “Because my dad died.”  
Sarah stated, “I actually heard people talk about my aunt trying to come get us, trying 
to come get me and my brother.  Like, and she (indiscernible) right now and 
(indiscernible).  And that’s why at the funeral, I had to (indiscernible) my mother—
my mom’s hand the whole time.”  In addition, Jack stated, “my dad died, and people 
are trying—my aunt and uncle from my dad’s side are trying to take away—take me 
away from my mom.  And—that’s why I’m here.  My mom’s trying to get custody over 
us.”   
¶ 97 
 
Further, finding of fact 22, that the statements were recanted, is supported by 
Jack’s Skype interview from Ireland and copies of diary entries written by Sarah and 
Jack.  Jack recanted his earlier statements and stated, “I didn’t tell the truth at 
Dragonfly. I didn’t tell the truth [during the DSS Interview].”  Sarah’s diary entries 
include statements that defendant Corbett had instructed the children to say that 
Jason hit and yelled at defendant Corbett and that defendant Corbett told Sarah that 
Jason had killed Sarah’s mom by putting a pillow over her mouth.  This evidence 
supports the trial court’s determination that the children’s statements concerning the 
relationship between defendant Corbett and Jason had “been specifically recanted.”   
¶ 98 
 
Given the findings of fact, the trial court’s conclusion that “[t]he proffered 
statements do not have circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” was not an 
abuse of discretion.  In addition, under Rule 104(a) the trial court was entitled to 
STATE V. CORBETT 
2021-NCSC-18 
Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
consider the children’s recantations in determining whether to admit the children’s 
statements into evidence under the residual hearsay exception.  See N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, 
Rule 104(a) (2019) (“Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to 
be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be 
determined by the court . . . .”).  Further, the majority acknowledged the trial court’s 
gatekeeping function stating, “the trial court was entitled to consider Jack’s Skype 
interview and Sarah’s diary entries, regardless of whether either would ultimately 
have been deemed admissible evidence, in making a preliminary determination 
regarding the admissibility of the Dragonfly House interview and DSS interviews.”  
Here, the trial court entered “appropriate statements, rationale, or findings of fact 
and conclusions of law [ ] in the record to support his discretionary decision[.]”  Smith, 
315 N.C. at 97, 337 S.E.2d at 847.   
¶ 99 
 
There is support in the record for the trial court’s determination that the 
statements “were not made at a time when the children were motivated to speak the 
truth but were rather motivated to affect future custody arrangements.”  Therefore, 
the trial court’s determination that the children’s statements were not admissible 
under the residual exception was not “manifestly unsupported by reason.”  White, 312 
N.C. at 777, 324 S.E.2d at 833.  
¶ 100 
 
Even if we assume the trial court erred when it excluded the children’s 
statements, defendants have not shown that they were prejudiced.  It is 
STATE V. CORBETT 
2021-NCSC-18 
Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
uncontroverted that defendants killed Jason.  The question for the jury was whether 
defendants’ killing of Jason was justified.   
¶ 101 
 
The autopsy report stated that Jason died of blunt force trauma to the head.  
Jason sustained “[e]xtensive skull fractures” from “multiple blunt force impact sites 
of the head.”  According to the medical examiner, Jason’s injuries “included ten 
different areas of impact on the head, at least two of which had features suggesting 
repeated blows indicating a minimum of 12 different blows to the head.”  The medical 
examiner testified that an injury on the right side of Jason’s head was caused by an 
object with a sharp edge not consistent with a baseball bat.  In addition, Jason had a 
broken nose and blunt force injuries to his torso, left hand, and legs.   
¶ 102 
 
Defendant Martens testified that he first “hit [Jason] in the head, the back of 
the head with the baseball bat,” but the blow did not stop Jason.  Defendant Martens 
then “tried to hit [Jason] as many times as [he] could to distract [Jason]” in the 
hallway.  According to defendant Martens, he had struck Jason at least two times in 
the back of the head with the aluminum baseball bat at this point in the altercation.  
After coming back down the hallway, Jason and defendant Martens struggled over 
the bat.  Jason obtained control of the bat and pushed defendant Martens over the 
bed and onto the floor.  Defendant Martens eventually regained control of the bat and 
struck Jason again.  Defendant Martens then testified, “just because [Jason] lost 
control of the bat doesn’t mean this is over.  This was far from over. . . . And so I still 
STATE V. CORBETT 
2021-NCSC-18 
Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
think that, you know, he has the advantage even though—‘cause I know what I’m 
feeling like.  I’m shaking.  I’m not doing good now.  And so I hit him.  And I hit him 
until he goes down.”  Defendant Martens admitted that he beat Jason with the 
aluminum bat until he was no longer moving.   
¶ 103 
 
Defendant Martens gave a statement to authorities and testified that he had 
no knowledge of the brick paver or that the brick paver was used to kill Jason.  
However, the State’s evidence showed that defendant Corbett provided a statement 
to detectives admitting that she struck Jason with the brick paver.  The brick paver 
had hair fragments and blood stains which were consistent with multiple impacts to 
Jason’s head.  Based on defendant Martens’s testimony and defendant Corbett’s 
statement to law enforcement, defendant Corbett could not have struck Jason with 
the brick paver until after she broke away from his initial assault. 
¶ 104 
 
The jury heard this evidence, and defendants had the opportunity to argue this 
evidence and the issue of self-defense to the jury.  Even assuming the children’s 
statements were admissible, defendants have failed to show how these statements 
have any bearing on whether they were justified in killing Jason.  While the children’s 
statements highlight past incidents of alleged domestic abuse, the jury heard 
defendant Martens’s testimony that Jason was abusing defendant Corbett that night 
in the bedroom.  The jury was also able to consider defendant Corbett’s statement to 
STATE V. CORBETT 
2021-NCSC-18 
Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
law enforcement that Jason was choking her before defendant Martens hit Jason with 
the aluminum baseball bat. 
¶ 105 
 
At the same time, the jury heard evidence that Jason’s body “felt cool” and 
there was “dry blood on him” indicating he had been there for some time before 
paramedics arrived.  The jury also heard evidence that the blood spatter indicated 
that Jason was struck at or near the ground; that defendant Martens “hit [Jason] 
until he went down”; and that neither defendant had any visible injuries.  Further, 
an aggressor instruction was given as to defendant Martens.  The jury had the 
opportunity to compare defendants’ statements, and the testimony of defendant 
Martens, with the physical evidence surrounding Jason’s death.  See State v. 
Patterson, 335 N.C. 437, 451, 439 S.E.2d 578, 586 (1994) (finding that despite the 
defendant’s contention that he killed the victim accidentally, “[f]rom [the physical] 
evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that defendant intentionally pointed the 
shotgun at [the victim] at close range and intentionally pulled the trigger”).  Any 
purported errors relating to the trial court’s decision to exclude the children’s 
statements as evidence did not deprive defendants of a fair hearing on the issue of 
self-defense. 
¶ 106 
 
Moreover, the children’s statements and subsequent recantations were not 
relevant to defendant Martens’s state of mind.  See State v. Smith, 337 N.C. 658, 447 
S.E.2d 376 (1994) (finding evidence of prior violence not admissible because there was 
STATE V. CORBETT 
2021-NCSC-18 
Berger, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
no evidence defendant had knowledge of prior violent behavior).  Defendant Martens 
testified that he was unaware of any acts of violence between Jason and defendant 
Corbett.  
¶ 107 
 
The evidence against defendants in this case was overwhelming.  Each 
defendant had the opportunity to argue and present their arguments of self-defense 
to the jury.  Neither defendant has established the possibility of a different result. 
See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a) (2019) (“A defendant is prejudiced . . . when there is a 
reasonable possibility that, had the error in question not been committed, a different 
result would have been reached . . . .”).  Therefore, the decision of the trial court should 
be affirmed.   
Chief Justice NEWBY and Justice BARRINGER join in this dissenting 
opinion.