Title: Clark v. US Plywood

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

605 P.2d 265 (1980)
288 Or. 255
In the matter of the Compensation of the Beneficiaries of George CLARK, Deceased, Petitioner,
v.
U.S. PLYWOOD, Respondent.
No. 76-6736; CA 10832; SC 26109.

Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc.
Argued and Submitted October 1, 1979.
Decided January 2, 1980.
*266 Benton Flaxel, North Bend, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Flaxel, Todd & Nylander, North Bend.
Keith D. Skelton, Portland, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
PETERSON, Justice.
This case involves a widow's claim for Workers' Compensation benefits. Her husband, George Clark, was killed while retrieving his lunch, which he had left to be warmed atop a hot glue press. The referee denied compensation. The Workers' Compensation Board reversed and ordered acceptance of the claim. The Court of Appeals reversed and denied recovery,[1] and we granted review to consider the extent to which personal comfort activities of a worker will be deemed to arise out of and within the course of employment. ORS 656.005(8)(a).
Clark was employed at a Gold Beach plywood manufacturing plant. He worked a shift which began at 11 p.m. and ended at 7 a.m. During this shift Clark was paid for two 10-minute breaks and a 20-minute *267 lunch period. The lunchrooms provided by the employer contained a table and vending machines, but no facilities for heating food brought by the employees.
On the night of Clark's death, he had brought a lunch which needed to be warmed. About two hours before his lunch break, he approached the assistant operator of a hot glue press and asked him to place Clark's food container on the top of the press to be warmed. The assistant press operator had done this before for Clark, and testified that two or three times a week he placed food on the press for other employees. The hot glue press was about 100 feet from Clark's work station. Judge Joseph described the hot glue press in the Court of Appeals opinion.[2]
Normally the press operator would himself remove a safety chain blocking the three-foot alley between the press and charger, climb the face of the charger, and place the food on a hot ledge on the top of the press. The chain was connected to an electrical switch, and its removal prevented the charger from moving toward the hot press. A sign stating "DANGER, KEEP AWAY" hung from the chain. On this occasion, however, the assistant press operator was eating, and suggested that Clark could climb up the charger as easily as he could. The operator testified that he told Clark to drop the chain and the charger would not move. Clark did so, climbed the face of the charger, and placed his food on the ledge.
When Clark returned to retrieve his lunch, the charger had just been loaded and the press operator and his assistant were getting ready to move the load into the press. The assistant press operator noticed that Clark was standing at the foot of a ladder which led to the top of the charger and heard him mention something about retrieving his lunch. The assistant press operator testified that he "didn't pay that much attention" to Clark because he had to go around to the back of the press to straighten panels. Nor could the press operator see Clark, because his control panel was on the opposite side of the charger. Clark possibly climbed the ladder, intending to ride the carriage over to the hot press whereupon he would reach over and retrieve his lunch. The press operator activated the charger and Clark was killed when the charger moved across the top of the carriage, crushing Clark between the charger and a stationary cross beam on the front of the carriage.
A "compensable injury," under ORS 656.005(8)(a), is "an accidental injury * * * arising out of and in the course of employment * * * resulting in disability *268 or death * * * whether or not due to accidental means." Contributory fault or contributory negligence is no defense to a claim for compensation benefits, unless due to "the deliberate intention of the worker." ORS 656.156(1). All that a claimant must prove is that the injury arose "out of and in the course of employment." The worker has the burden of proving that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment. Ballou v. Industrial Accident Com., 214 Or. 123, 328 P.2d 137 (1958); Butts v. State Ind. Acc. Comm., 193 Or. 417, 239 P.2d 238 (1951).[3]
The compensation act provides broad coverage, the boundaries of which are determined by the meaning of "arising out of and in the course of employment." As with most difficult questions, the delineation of the limits of the coverage is anything but knife-edge clear. But as in all difficult cases (this being one such case) the delineation must be made.
The Court of Appeals correctly characterized the issue as being "* * * whether the employee's death arose out of and in the course of his employment, as required by ORS 656.005(8)(a)."[4]
The words "in the course of employment" have been repeatedly defined as relating "to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place."[5] The words "arising out of" normally refer to the requirement of a "causal connection between the employment and the accident."[6]
The following example will illustrate the difference: A machinist working at a lathe has an attack of appendicitis. The attack occurred in the course of his employment since it occurred while he was on the job performing his normal activities. On the other hand, it did not arise out of his employment. There was no causal connection between the work and the attack.[7]
Most claims for on-premises injuries[8] fall within one of two general categories:
Category 1. Injuries sustained while performing one's appointed task;
Category 2. Injuries sustained while engaged in other incidental activities not directly involved with the performance of the appointed task, such as preparing for work, going to or from the area of work, eating, rest periods, going to the bathroom, or getting fresh air or a drink of water.
Injuries sustained by a worker in doing the appointed task are normally compensable, absent self-inflicted injury. Contributory fault of the employee is no defense. Even when a worker is performing an appointed task in a prohibited manner, injuries are normally compensable. If a worker operates a machine with the guard removed, or fails to stop a machine before reaching into it, or oils machinery while it is running, injuries so sustained are normally compensable even though the specific act causing the injury was prohibited. 1A A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 31.21 (1979).
*269 Many premises-related injuries are also normally compensable even though the worker is not engaged in the appointed task. A worker who trips over a step while walking to the bathroom on the employer's premises, or who falls on the way to the company locker room to change clothes, or who trips while going to get a breath of fresh air to escape the heat of working quarters  all normally are entitled to compensation. See 1A A. Larson, supra, §§ 21.10 to 21.84.
Most courts allow recovery for injuries sustained while engaged in recreational activities during lunch hours or rest periods, if the activity is a normal or accepted one. As to such claims, Professor Larson states:
Lunchtime injuries are normally compensable, if they occur on the premises and arise from premises hazards such as building collapse, tripping on a hole in the floor, or falling on slippery steps. 1A A. Larson, supra, § 21.20.
In Lamm v. Silver Falls Tbr. Co., 133 Or. 468, 277 P. 91, 286 P. 527, 291 P. 375 (1930), we held that a lumber camp worker returning from a holiday in Silverton was covered by the Workmen's Compensation law when he sustained injury while riding on the company-owned train back to the logging camp. We quoted from Cudahy Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 423-424, 44 S. Ct. 153, 68 L. Ed. 366, 30 A.L.R. 532 (1923) as follows:
Respecting the quotation from Cudahy, we stated (133 Or. at 496-498, 277 P. 91):
In the case at bar, claimant asserts:
We have never had occasion to definitively discuss the bases for the compensability of injuries received during personal comfort activities. As Judge Joseph observed, the Court of Appeals has several times held that "injuries incurred in `personal comfort' activities incidental to employment may be compensable."[9] But the Court of Appeals denied recovery, stating:
*271 The Court of Appeals' holding that compensability is determined by the reasonableness of the worker's conduct has no foundation in the Workers' Compensation statutes or in Oregon case law. The rule is generally to the contrary: If an act is within the course and scope of employment, and arises therefrom, reasonableness of the employee conduct is irrelevant.
However, as Professor Larson points out, some jurisdictions have held that personal comfort injuries are not compensable if the method chosen is unusual, unreasonable, or abnormal. 1A A. Larson, supra, § 21.80. But Larson admits that the test of reasonableness is at best a "rubbery yardstick," and he argues for the substitution of a "somewhat more manageable concept of implied prohibition as the test applicable to borderline situations such as personal comfort * * *, going and coming, recreation, acts outside regular duties and other categories in which active performance of work is not involved."[10]
We reject the "reasonableness" test because it is at variance with the purpose of the Workers' Compensation Law  to provide compensation for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, irrespective of worker fault.
Examining other cases in this area has not been productive. Many courts have ceased to try to articulate a rule for compensability when the worker is engaged in an incidental activity as described in category 2, above, saying that "each case must be decided on its own particular facts" or that "argument by analogy is valueless."[11] We reject this approach, as well.
Larson opts for a rule that if the injury occurs in a category of activity other than the performance of the task the worker is employed to perform, the injury is compensable unless (1) the employer would have prohibited the method had the subject been addressed, and (2) the employee either knew or should have known of the implied prohibition.[12]
We question Professor Larson's "implied prohibition" test for these reasons. First, there is too great an element of hindsight involved. After the accident, the employer will certainly say, in many injury cases, "If Clark had asked or had I known, I would have prohibited him from using the press to heat his lunch."
Second, the difficulty of proving an implied state of mind of the worker which is in turn dependent upon the implied state of mind of the employer creates more than a semantic problem.
Benefits are payable for some on-premises injuries during the lunch hour, even though the ingestion of food may be no less valuable if consumed at home, because (1) the injuries normally result from some kind of on-premises hazard, and (2) the employee is within the time and space limits of the employment as set by the employer, i.e., the employer has expressly or impliedly allowed the conduct in question.
We believe that the compensability of on-premises injuries sustained while engaged in activities for the personal comfort of the employee can best be determined by a test which asks: Was the conduct expressly or impliedly allowed by the employer?
Clearly, conduct which an employer expressly authorizes and which leads to the injury of an employee should be compensated whether it occurs in a directly related work activity or in conduct incidental to the employment. Similarly, where an employer impliedly allows conduct, compensation *272 should be provided for injuries sustained in that activity. For example, where an employer acquiesces in a course of on-premises conduct, compensation is payable for injuries which might be sustained from that activity. Acquiescence could be shown by showing common practice or custom in the work place.
This test squares with the well established requirement that compensation lies for all activities related to the employment if it carries out the employer's purposes or advances the employer's interests directly or indirectly. Lamm, supra 133 Or. at 497-498, 277 P. 91 and 1A A. Larson supra, § 20. Such a rule is related to the employment environment and the customs and practices of the particular employment and arises from conditions of the employment.
Our statement of the test is in positive terms, rather than in the negative terms of the implied prohibition test suggested by Larson. Although the result in many cases would be the same under either test, we do not intend to necessarily restrict compensability to that which would exist under the implied prohibition test. However, the other prerequisite to recovery must be shown, that is, that the injury arises out of the course of employment.
Neither the Workers' Compensation Board nor the Court of Appeals considered the facts of this case in the light of the rule we have adopted in this opinion. We have previously decided that this court does not review workers' compensation cases de novo. Sahnow v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. 260 Or. 564, 491 P.2d 997 (1971).[13]
Unless there is no dispute in the evidence, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that the employer expressly or impliedly allowed the conduct which led to Clark's death. The Court of Appeals said in its opinion that the evidence would not permit a finding that the employer's supervisory personnel knew that employees had continued to use the press to heat lunches after the addition of the charger. 38 Or. App. at 387, 590 P.2d 281. Our review of the record convinces us that there was a conflict of evidence on that issue and that there is a question of fact whether the employer impliedly allowed the use of the press by employees for that purpose.
We conclude that we cannot say, as a matter of law, whether the claimant should or should not recover. We therefore remand to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We leave to the Court of Appeals the decision whether to decide the case or to remand to the Board. Russell v. SAIF, 281 Or. 353, 574 P.2d 653 (1978).
Reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals.
HOLMAN, Justice, concurring.
It is my conclusion that the rule of implied authorization set forth in the majority opinion is nothing more than the reverse side of the coin of Professor Larson's rule of implied prohibition and that, in truth, the two rules are the same. I prefer the positive way of stating the rule used in the opinion, rather than Professor Larson's negative way of stating it, but that does not make the rule any different. Indicative of the identity of the rules is that the proof used to prove claimant's case would be identical in each instance. The plaintiff would prove that it was usual for workmen to do as the injured person did at the time of his injury, that the circumstances were such that the activity must have been known to management, and that there was no order prohibiting it. The plaintiff could also prove that related or similar activities were engaged in, were probably known to management and were not prohibited. The proof would be the same and would be subjected to the same evaluation regardless of whether the rule is stated in a positive or negative manner.
[1]  38 Or. App. 381, 590 P.2d 281 (1979).
[2]  38 Or. App. 383 at n. 1, 590 P.2d 282 at n. 1.
[3]  Overruled in part on other grounds, Woody v. Waibel, 276 Or. 189, 192 n. 3, 554 P.2d 492 (1976).
[4]  38 Or. App. at 383, 590 P.2d  at 282.
[5]  Stuhr v. State Ind. Acc. Com'n, 186 Or. 629, 634, 208 P.2d 450, 452 (1949) (quoting Brady v. Oregon Lumber Co., 117 Or. 188, 243 P. 96 (1926)); Larsen v. State Ind. Acc. Com., 135 Or. 137, 139, 295 P. 195 (1931); Lamm v. Silver Falls Tbr. Co., 133 Or. 468, 482-483, 277 P. 91, 286 P. 527, 291 P. 375 (1930).
[6]  See cases cited in the previous footnote. Also see Ramseth v. Maycock, 209 Or. 66, 71, 304 P.2d 415 (1956).

Further, see discussion in Stark v. State Industrial Acc. Com., 103 Or. 80, 88, 204 P. 151 (1922).
[7]  This example is drawn from Oregon State Bar, Workmen's Compensation § 11.3 (1975).
[8]  By "on-premises" injuries we mean injuries sustained by a worker on the employer's premises.
[9]  38 Or. App. at 384, 590 P.2d  at 283, citing Benafel v. SAIF, 33 Or. App. 597, 577 P.2d 99 (1978); Olsen v. SAIF, 29 Or. App. 235, 562 P.2d 1234, rev. den. 280 Or. 1 (1977); Casper v. SAIF, 13 Or. App. 464, 511 P.2d 451 (1973); Jordan v. Western Electric, 1 Or. App. 441, 463 P.2d 598 (1970).
[10]  1A A. Larson, supra, § 21.84, page 5-67.
[11]  Adams v. Compensation Department, 249 Or. 530, 533, 439 P.2d 628 (1968); Ramseth v. Maycock, 209 Or. 66, 70, 304 P.2d 415 (1956); Munson v. State Ind. Acc. Comm., 142 Or. 252, 256, 20 P.2d 229 (1933).
[12]  1A A. Larson, supra, § 21.84, page 5-67.
[13]  See also Hutcheson v. Weyerhaeuser, 288 Or. 51, 602 P.2d 268 (1979); Russell v. SAIF, 281 Or. 353, 359, 574 P.2d 653 (1978).