Title: DRAKE v. McCULLOH

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DRAKE v. McCULLOH2002 WY 5043 P.3d 578Case Number: 00-295Decided: 04/04/2002

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

                                                                                                            

 

JOHN 
DRAKE, 

Appellant(Defendant/Respondent),

 

v.

 

GERRI  McCULLOH, f/k/a

GERRI 
DRAKE, 

Appellee(Plaintiff/Petitioner).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Sheridan County

The 
Honorable Dan Spangler, Retired, Judge 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Ann M. 
Rochelle* of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, Wyoming, and 
John D. Ward* of Sheridan, Wyoming; C. M. Steve Aron of Aron and Hennig, 
Laramie, Wyoming.

 Representing 
Appellee:

C. John 
Cotton, Gillette, Wyoming; Vanessa Summerfield of the Wyoming Coalition for the 
Prevention of Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault, Laramie, 
Wyoming.

 

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ. 

* Orders 
allowing withdrawal of counsel entered on July 19, 
2001.

  

GOLDEN, 
Justice. 

[¶1]           
Appellant 
John Drake (Father) and Appellee Gerri McCulloh (Mother) appeared before the 
district court each seeking primary custody of their son.  In its initial child custody order, the 
district court awarded primary custody of the child to Father which gave him 
decision-making authority, but determined that the parents should share physical 
custody of the child.   The 
district court determined that the then five-year-old child should rotate his 
residency with each parent every five days.  Soon afterwards, Mother petitioned for 
modification of custody to make her the primary caretaker with visitation for 
Father, and Father filed a counterclaim motion to make him primary 
custodian.  Following a two-day 
trial, the district court determined that a substantial change of circumstances 
had occurred and it was in the child's best interests to grant Mother primary 
custody and award Father visitation.  

 

[¶2]           
We 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

 

[¶3]           
Father 
presents these issues for our review:

 

 

A.  Did the trial court err in awarding 
custody of [the child] to his Mother, Gerri McCulloh, based on an alleged 
preference by [the child] for his Mother when:

1.  There was no actual testimony by [the 
child] that he preferred his Mother.

2.  The alleged hearsay statements allegedly 
made by [the child] to his Mother allegedly stating a preference to live with 
his Mother were at best equivocal and were without any 
basis.

3.  [The child] was only age five at the 
time of the alleged stated preference. The trial judge made no attempt to 
determine the intelligence and maturity level of [the 
child].

4.  [The child's] answers to questions by 
the Department of Family Services (DFS) caseworkers showed that his Mother had 
coached him to say certain things.

5.  Martha Schilling, the court-appointed 
independent evaluator, had warned against directly asking [the child] his 
preference.  Despite this, Jill 
Stubbs, Wife's expert, did so.  In 
response to one question by Stubbs, [the child] stated that he preferred to live 
with his Mother.  This response came 
after Stubbs had spent one hour questioning McCulloh in [the child's] presence, 
and during that one hour session, McCulloh had been making continuous negative 
statements about [the child's] Dad.

6. The 
trial court improperly disallowed expert testimony by Ray Leugers, a licensed 
psychologist, as to the inappropriateness of questioning of [the child] about a 
preference. Leugers had been McCulloh's initial counselor but she had discarded 
him when he suggested she needed further psychiatric evaluation.  Leugers had numerous contacts with [the 
child] where Stubbs spent only one hour with [the child] and that was after [the 
child] had heard his Mother denigrate his Father to 
Stubbs.

 

B.  Were the issues of attention, 
aggression, toilet training and sex previously raised by McCulloh and thus not a 
change in circumstances? Was McCulloh's perception of these supposed new issues 
the only new circumstance?  Were 
those changes material and substantial changes?  Was the placement of [the child] in his 
mother's care in [the child's] best interest?

 

C.  Did Judge Spangler make improper 
evidentiary rulings?

 

D. Did 
McCulloh misuse the judicial process by judge-shopping; Guardian ad Litem 
shopping; and then failing to cooperate with the new Guardian ad 
Litem?

 

Mother 
states that the issues are:

 

1.  Was there sufficient evidence to support 
the order granting Mother's petition for modification?

 

2.  Did the trial court commit reversible 
error in connection with evidentiary rulings?

 

3.  Is appellee entitled to attorney fees 
and costs on appeal?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]           
We have 
already addressed other issues arising from the decree of divorce in this case 
in McCulloh v. Drake, 2001 WY 56, 24 P.3d 1162 (Wyo. 2001).   As that decision stated, the 
parties were married on March 5, 1994.  
The wife had one son from a prior marriage, and the couple had another 
son, the focus of this dispute, in October of 1994.  The wife filed for divorce on December 
31, 1997, and, from July 26, 1999, through July 30, 1999, the trial court heard 
evidence pertaining to child custody, child support, property division, alimony, 
attorney and guardian ad litem fees, tort claims, and punitive damages.  Id. at ¶¶4, 
5.

 

[¶5]           
Following 
an extensive independent child custody evaluation, psychologist Martha 
Schilling, Ph.D., specifically recommended against joint custody, meaning joint 
decision-making, because neither parent was willing to put the best interests of 
the child above their own interests.  
Finding that neither parent could separate parenting from the divorce or 
their own needs from the child's, the parents could not communicate effectively 
with each other, could not be flexible about the child's arrangements or 
negotiate differences in good faith, Dr. Schilling determined that the parents 
were not good prospects for joint decision-making at that time.  She recommended that Father be granted 
primary custody with ultimate decision-making responsibility for the child; 
however, she recommended that the child share residency with each parent for 
shorter but more frequent periods of four days. That evaluation noted that the 
child indirectly indicated a preference to live with his Dad. 

  

[¶6]      The district 
court awarded shared physical custody of the child and gave to Father primary 
decision-making power regarding medical and educational issues.  It also awarded $1,200 per month to the 
wife for child support.   
Id. at ¶6.  Mother 
appealed that decision, asserting that the district court erred when it ordered 
shared physical custody and that Father have primary decision-making 
authority.  Father responded that 
the district court properly applied the best-interests-of-the-child 
standard.  Id. at ¶11.  After the parties' oral arguments in 
this Court, the wife filed with the trial court a "Petition for Modification of 
Decree of Divorce to Place Primary Custody With Petitioner [Mother] as Child's 
Historic Primary Care Provider."  
The district court found that the circumstances since the entry of the 
Decree of Divorce had substantially changed and ordered custody of the parties' 
son to be changed to Mother.  Id. 
at ¶12.  Father appealed from 
that order.  Because the 
circumstances surrounding this issue had changed so significantly and because 
the district court's order which pertained to the most recent facts had been 
appealed since the case at bar was heard, we decided to reserve our discussion 
on this issue.  
Id.

 

[¶7]           
The 
"shared residency" of the couple's five-year-old son on a rotating five-day 
schedule was ordered by the district court in October of 1999.  On January 5, 2000, a pediatrician filed 
a neglect complaint against Father with the Department of Family Services 
(DFS).  On January 26, 2000, Mother 
petitioned for modification of the child custody arrangement.  Father answered and filed a 
counterclaim, seeking primary custody of the child.  Declaring that it would be harmful to 
the child, Dr. Schilling refused to participate in another evaluation of the 
child.  Mother hired Jill Stubbs, MS 
LPC, to conduct an evaluation, and Stubbs filed a behavioral assessment on March 
3, 2000.  On March 17, 2000, 
Father's licensed psychologist, Dr. Ray Leugers, reported the results of his 
counseling with Father and the child since November of 1999.  On March 24, 2000, DFS found the neglect 
allegations were unsubstantiated.  

 

[¶8]           
Mother 
had taken steps to disqualify the trial judge from the first order and to remove 
the guardian ad litem (GAL).  Citing 
Mother's unfounded accusations and somewhat bizarre threats1 against him, the GAL requested that 
he be removed and Mother ordered to pay the fees that she had not yet paid.  The district court judge recused 
himself, and the newly assigned judge removed the GAL, and a CASA representative 
was ordered to serve as interim GAL.  
The district court accepted Dr. Schilling's refusal to serve as an 
independent evaluator, but refused to assign one and, instead, determined that 
the parties could present the child's behavioral evaluations through expert 
witnesses. 

 

[¶9]           
The 
district court held a two-day hearing in May of 2000, where numerous witnesses 
testified regarding the child's level of behavioral problems since the parents 
began sharing physical custody.  A 
decision letter issued on June 5, 2000, and a final order was filed on July 24, 
2000, ordering that Mother receive primary custody.  In pertinent part, the trial court's 
decision letter states:

 

Since 
the divorce the child has exhibited increased problems with attention, 
aggression, toilet training, and sex.  
The anger between the parents, in the context of the present custody 
schedule, has contributed to these behavior problems.  The child needs greater stability in his 
home life.  This is particularly 
important now, as he will enter kindergarten this fall.  He appears to get along somewhat better 
while in the custody of his mother and to have a preference for being with 
her.

I 
find that it would be in the child's best interest to be placed in the custody 
of [Mother] with reasonable visitation rights for [Father] . . . 
."

 

This 
appeal followed.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶10]       
The many 
issues presented primarily dispute the facts, requiring that we determine 
whether the district court erred in finding that a change of circumstances 
existed and the evidence supports its order that the child's best interests 
required that Mother be granted primary custody.

 

 

Change of Circumstances

 

[¶11]       
We use 
an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a district court's decision to 
modify child custody arrangements.  
Gurney v. Gurney, 899 P.2d 52, 54 (Wyo 
1995).

 

                        
            
The party seeking modification of the child custody provisions of a court 
decree has the burden of showing that a change in circumstances affecting the 
child's welfare has occurred after the entry of the initial decree, that the 
change warrants modification of the decree and that the modification will be in 
the best interests of the children. In order to resolve the issue of whether 
there was a showing of material and substantial change in circumstances, we 
examine the record to determine whether the trial court could reasonably 
conclude from the evidence that there was such a change.

 

Ready v. 
Ready, 906 P.2d 382, 384-85 (Wyo. 1995) (citations omitted).  

 

[¶12]       
In this 
case, both parties sought primary custody.  
We have previously recognized that the distinctive features between a 
primary custody order and a joint custody order may justify reopening the 
order.  Gurney, 899 P.2d  at 
54.  

 

One 
such distinctive feature concerns child placement stability.  An order awarding custody to one parent 
fixes that parent as the primary nurturer of the child and the one with whom the 
child shall reside.  Once such an 
order is entered, considerations of stability in child placement become of 
central importance.  In our case 
law, we have shown a strong bias against reopening the order because a child is 
almost always harmed by a transfer from one parent to the 
other.

            
When the reopening of a joint custody order is before the court, however, 
the stability-of-placement consideration that is central to our strict reopening 
standards in the primary custodial context appears to be of minimal importance 
because the joint custody order has not fixed one parent as the primary 
nurturer.  We recognize a measure of 
instability is inherent in a joint custody order because it requires two 
parents, who are not residing together, to share custodial rights and 
responsibilities and resolve the logistics of caring for the child.  

            
A second distinctive feature suggests a joint custody order should be 
more readily opened.  The premise of 
the joint custody order is the parents' ability to resolve between themselves 
the custodial details.  There can be 
little question that joint custody requires sincere dedication on the part of 
each parent to safeguard the security and stability vital to a child's best 
interest.  When the parents are 
unable to make this cooperative arrangement work, a change of circumstances 
justifying judicial reexamination of the original joint custody order is 
demonstrated.  

 

Id. at 
54-55 (citations omitted).

 

[¶13]       
Similar 
to Gurney, the parents here sought modification very soon after joint 
physical custody was ordered.  
Through psychologists and medical doctors, Mother provided experts to 
testify that Father neglected the child's hygiene and the child was having 
increased behavioral problems, and Father presented evidence that Mother was 
actively seeking to alienate the child from him.  From this evidence the district court 
concluded that a substantial change of circumstances since the entry of the 
decree of divorce had occurred including the child having increased problems 
with attention, aggression, toilet training and acting out in an inappropriate 
manner.  However, this evidence also 
showed that the parents' anger and bitterness toward each other manifested in 
their treatment of their son.  
Neither demonstrated an intent to cooperate with the other nor showed 
much effort to safeguard their son's security and stability.  As an example, Mother refused to take 
the child to the preschool selected by Father.  Their efforts to prove their allegations 
were extreme and, unfortunately, were assisted by various members of the medical 
community.  The child was subjected 
to a four-day hospitalization to monitor his bowel movements; numerous visits to 
medical doctors regarding his toileting habits; and interviews and psychological 
tests by DFS personnel, psychologists, and social workers.  At one extreme, experts testified that 
the child was neglected, exhibited signs of sexual abuse, was exposed to 
pornography, tried to choke his mother, and engaged in inappropriate sexual 
activity.  At the other extreme, 
Father's expert testified that the five-year-old child's behavior had not 
changed at all since the joint custody arrangement went into effect.   

 

[¶14]       
In 
accordance with Gurney, a reopening of a joint custody order is 
appropriate when both parties demonstrate that they are not providing the 
stability and cooperation required for this type of shared arrangement.  In light of the parents' behavior 
towards each other and their son, we find that the district court did not err in 
finding that the child needed greater stability and that the circumstances 
warranted a modification of the joint custody arrangement.

 

 

Evidentiary Support of 
Decision

 

[¶15]       
Father 
objects to the following:  the 
district court's decision to exclude some evidence; the district court's 
statement that the child expressed a preference for his mother; and its decision 
that it is in the child's best interests to be in Mother's primary care.  Our careful review of the record in the 
light of the written and oral arguments of the parties discloses that these 
arguments do not warrant extensive discussion in this 
opinion.

 

[¶16]       
Decisions 
concerning the admissibility of evidence are within the sound discretion of the 
trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.  Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145, 
150 (Wyo. 1998).  Father contends 
that the trial court had no basis for excluding evidence by Father's 
psychologist that would have established the number of visits with Father and 
son, and that son's feelings toward Father had not changed; and for disallowing 
questioning of Mother's psychologist as to her knowledge of when the child 
started masturbating and how often he was masturbating before entry of the 
original custody order.  Father 
argues that because the trial court believed Mother's expert instead of his and 
found an increase in sexual activity, it was prejudicial to exclude this 
evidence.  The amount of time at 
trial devoted to experts' analyses of this child and analysis of this child's 
"sexual activity" was extensive.  
Our review of the record indicates that the evidence presented on the 
subject was so much more than adequate that had the trial court excluded far 
more than it did, we would not find any prejudice to Father.  

 

Custody, 
visitation, child support, and alimony are all committed to the sound discretion 
of the district court.  It has been 
our consistent principle that in custody matters, the welfare and needs of the 
children are to be given paramount consideration.  The determination of the best interests 
of the child is a question for the trier of fact.  We do not overturn the decision of the 
trial court unless we are persuaded of an abuse of discretion or the presence of 
a violation of some legal principle. 

 

Reavis 
v. Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 431 (Wyo. 1998) (citations omitted).  Judicial discretion is defined as 
being "a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously."  Watt v. Watt, 
971 P.2d 608, 613 (Wyo. 1999).  

 

[¶17]       
Our 
review entails evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
district court's decision, and we afford to the prevailing party every favorable 
inference while omitting any consideration of evidence presented by the 
unsuccessful party.  Findings of 
fact not supported by the evidence, contrary to the evidence, or against the 
great weight of the evidence cannot be sustained.  Similarly, an abuse of discretion is 
present when a material factor deserving significant weight is ignored.  Reavis, 955 P.2d  at 
431.

 

[¶18]       
Although 
Father points to testimony contradicting evidence of factual issues, we cannot 
retry this case on appeal.  
Deference must be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge 
the credibility of the witnesses, and a reviewing court will not set aside the 
court's findings merely because it might have reached a different result.  The trial judge is in the best position 
to assess the credibility of witnesses and weigh their testimony, and, thus, 
this Court accords considerable deference to the trial judge's findings. 
Clark v. Clark, 980 P.2d 821, 823 (Wyo. 1999).  

 

[¶19]       
We have 
previously stated that a district court can acknowledge a young child's 
preference as a relevant factor although it may not be the sole factor for 
determination of custody.  In Re 
MS, 9 P.3d 984, 986 (Wyo. 2000).  
A district court is not required to place consideration of relevant 
factors on the record; however, every case requires careful weighing of relevant 
factors, looking to the unique and individual family relationships, in order to 
reach a resolution in the best interests of the children in that family.  Stability in a child's environment is of 
utmost importance to the child's well-being.  Id.   

 

[¶20]       
The 
parents invite us to look at the massive amount of information each side 
collected concerning the impact of either the shared custody arrangement or 
parental alienation attempts on this little boy.  Each parent grievously used their son to 
prove their point against the other in disturbing ways.  That said, we see that although much of 
this child's behavior is consistent with a healthy little boy who has reacted to 
being caught up in the war between his parents, various experts reached the 
different conclusion that the child's unstable home life was causing him to act 
out in seriously inappropriate ways.  
Some experts were inclined to believe that the child's behavioral changes 
indicated emotional or sexual abuse.  
Presented with this contradictory evidence regarding the implications of 
changes in him, the record does establish that the child's behavior had 
changed.  In its order, the district 
court stated the changes in behavior that it believed had occurred; our review 
of the record indicates that the trial court did not place undue weight on any 
one expert's testimony in this case, and we find that the record supports the 
district court's findings of how the child's behavior had changed.    

 

[¶21]       
In Dr. 
Schilling's evaluation of the child for the first custody ruling, she noted that 
the child indirectly indicated that he preferred to live with his father.  In her evaluation, Ms. Stubbs stated 
that the child expressed a desire to live with his mother.  In its decision letter, the district 
court stated:  "He appears to get 
along somewhat better while in the custody of his mother and to have a 
preference for being with her. . . ."  
Father contends that the district court improperly based its decision on 
the child's preference and that is reversible error.  The district court, however, did not 
base its entire decision on the child's stated preference for his mother.  Father does not challenge the first part 
of the court's statement that the child appears to get along somewhat better 
while in Mother's custody.  The 
record supports the determination that the child gets along somewhat better 
while in the custody of Mother.  
Nearly all witnesses, whether presented by Mother or Father, testified 
that the child needed to be with one parent for a longer period of time than 
that provided by the five-day rotation arrangement.  The evidence showed that the child's 
time with Mother was more structured and the child's problems tended to increase 
with Father and then subside after returning to Mother's care.  Although the parties devote their 
discussion to arguing whether it is reversible error for a trial court to base 
its decision on a five-year-old's stated preference, and whether that preference 
was spontaneous or the result of coaching, the record shows that the trial court 
did not base its decision on the child's preference, but permissibly noted the 
child's perceptions of his living arrangement.

 

[¶22]       
The 
initial custody ruling was based on a determination that the child's best 
interests required that the parents share in his care.  The parents failed to do so, and their 
failure to care for their son in the way that was in his best interest required 
the court to determine which parent should be selected as the primary 
caretaker.  In such a situation, 
where the record shows that Drake's and McCulloh's anger and bitterness towards 
each other interfere with their son's best interests, the district court 
properly focused on evidence of stability and the child's perception of 
stability.  Its determination that 
granting primary custody to Mother with liberal visitation for Father would 
provide the child with the greatest stability, and would not be upsetting to the 
child, is supported by sufficient facts, and we affirm.

 

[¶23]       
Finally, 
Father requests that we find that Mother committed abuse of the judicial process 
because of her efforts to disqualify a judge who did recuse himself, remove the 
GAL, and her refusal to cooperate with the GAL.  After filing her petition for 
modification, Mother filed a motion stating that the modification was a new 
proceeding entitling her to a preemptory disqualification under W.R.C.P. 
40(b)(1). Father objected on grounds that Mother was judge shopping.  The trial judge filed a grievance 
against an attorney of record and did recuse himself.  Mother also filed a motion for removal 
of the GAL contending that the GAL's recent employment with the Sheridan County 
Attorney's Office presented a conflict of interest.  That motion also contended that the GAL 
had acted improperly.  The GAL 
responded to the accusations as unfounded and, contending that Mother had made 
unfounded accusations and threats, requested removal.  A new GAL was appointed, and Father 
contends that Mother did not cooperate with that investigation. Father did not 
raise the issue of abuse of process below with the trial court.  Wyoming recognizes the tort of abuse of 
process, and its elements are "(1) an ulterior purpose; and (2) a willful act in 
the use of the process which is not proper in the regular conduct of the legal 
proceeding."  Cosner v. Ridinger, 
882 P.2d 1243, 1249 (Wyo. 1994).   
Assuming without deciding that abuse of process could result in reversal 
of this decision, we see that although we have many allegations, no record 
supports finding that abuse of process caused the judge to recuse himself or the 
GAL to remove himself.  On this 
record, we decline to address the abuse of process issue.  

 

[¶24]       
Mother 
requests attorney fees and costs for this appeal.  W.R.A.P. 10.05 
provides:

 

If the 
judgment or appealable order is affirmed in a civil case, appellee shall recover 
the cost for publication of the brief with the cost to be computed at the rate 
allowed by law for making the transcript of the evidence.  If the court certifies there was no 
reasonable cause for the appeal, a reasonable amount for attorneys' fees and 
damages to the appellee shall be fixed by the appellate court and taxed as part 
of the costs in the case.  The 
amount for attorneys' fees shall not be less than one hundred dollars ($100.00) 
nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000.00).  The amount for damages to the appellee 
shall not exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000.00).  

 

Imposing 
fees and costs under this rule is a sanction imposed for failure to have 
reasonable cause for the appeal.  We 
are generally reluctant to impose sanctions and will do so "only in those rare 
circumstances where an appeal lacks cogent argument, where there is an absence 
of pertinent authority to support the claims of error, and/or when there is a 
failure to adequately cite to the record."  
Stone v. Stone, 7 P.3d 887, 891 (Wyo. 2000).  

 

[¶25]       
Mother 
provides us with no cogent argument or pertinent authority that Father did not 
have reasonable cause to appeal.  
Her request is denied, and the district court is affirmed.  

 

 

FOOTNOTES

1The record shows that Mother 
contacted DFS on one occasion and slandered the GAL, and in a separate incident, 
Mother falsely reported to DFS that the child's safety while at his father's was 
in jeopardy requiring the GAL to write her attorney and request that both 
parents refrain from involving the child in their vendettas against each other.