Title: Ex Parte Poole

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

497 So. 2d 537 (1986)
Ex parte Bennie Steve POOLE.
(Re Bennie Steve Poole v. State of Alabama).
84-1274.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 15, 1986.
W. Clint Brown, Jr. of Brown-Willman, Decatur, for petitioner.
James S. Ward of Corley, Moncus, Bynum & DeBuys, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
MADDOX, Justice.
While petitioner, a law enforcement officer, was responding to a call for help, his vehicle collided with another vehicle. Two persons were killed. He was convicted of manslaughter and was sentenced to a term of three years' imprisonment. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, which affirmed his conviction and sentence. Poole v. State, 497 So. 2d 530 (Ala.Crim. App.1985).
Petitioner asked this Court to grant certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals on the following grounds:
This Court granted certiorari to review each of these grounds raised by the petitioner. After considering the briefs and arguments of counsel, we agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that the trial court did not err in denying petitioner's motion for a judgment of acquittal based on an insufficiency of the evidence. Nevertheless, we find that the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial, because of the Court of Criminal Appeals' error in dealing with the failure of two persons on the venire to make a proper disclosure in response to questions propounded to them by petitioner's counsel at voir dire examination.
We first address petitioner's claim that he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal. In addition to the arguments which he made in the Court of Criminal Appeals, he states the following in his brief in this Court:
We have permitted the parties to brief in this Court the application of Code 1975, § 13A-3-22, and, although the Court of Criminal Appeals did not make specific reference to the statute in its opinion, we are of the opinion that it is implicit in its opinion that the Court of Criminal Appeals considered the legal effect of § 13A-3-22 and considered that it was inapplicable under the facts of the instant case, because the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded:
After reviewing the applicable law as set out in the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals, and under the facts of this case, we are of the opinion that the Court of Criminal Appeals did not err in holding that the petitioner was not entitled to a judgment of acquittal, because we are of the opinion that a jury question was presented as to whether the petitioner was acting in the "reasonable exercise of his official powers, duties or functions." (Emphasis added.)
We now address petitioner's second argument, that is, that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in failing to find that the service on the jury by two persons who had failed to respond to voir dire questions was prejudicial to him.
We set out extensively that portion of the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals which deals with this legal issue:
"At the motion for new trial hearing, the trial judge heard the testimony of the two jurors who had failed to respond to the questions during the voir dire examination. In denying the appellant's motion he found the following:
"The appellant relies on the cases of Ex parte Ledbetter, 404 So. 2d 731 (Ala. 1981), and Warrick v. State, 460 So. 2d 320 (Ala.Cr.App.1984), wherein the Alabama Supreme Court and this Court held that the trial court erred in not granting a new trial. In these decisions the Supreme Court noted that `on the issue of whether the petitioner was prejudiced by a juror's failure to respond to a question *542 during voir dire, the test is whether the petitioner might have been, not whether he actually was prejudiced.' See Burroughs Corp. v. Hall Affiliates, Inc., 423 So. 2d 1348 (Ala.1982), and Ex parte Ledbetter, supra."
We agree with the petitioner that the failure of these two jurors to respond to the questions set out in the opinion constituted prejudicial error, and we find that the Court of Criminal Appeals failed to follow the principles of law set out in this Court's case of Ex parte Ledbetter, 404 So. 2d 731 (Ala.1981). In that case, this Court granted certiorari and held that a juror's failure to disclose an incident during which gunshots were fired at his home five months prior to trial was prejudicial.
At the time of the voir dire examination in the present case, the prospective jurors were questioned whether they had "ever had any problems or conflicts with any law enforcement officer." Those questions should have elicited a response by both of the jurors.
The State contends that the questions asked in this case were so "vague, ambiguous and incoherent" that a failure to respond to them was not improper and did not result in probable prejudice to the petitioner. Although the questions are not overly specific, they were specific enough, in our opinion, that the jurors should have responded to them, under the doctrine of Ledbetter.
With regard to juror Marty Russell, petitioner raises another point. In his motion for a new trial, petitioner included as a ground of his motion the following:
As is apparent from the order entered by the trial judge with regard to petitioner's claim, the trial court was of the opinion that juror Russell was under no duty to disclose his prior convictions. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed. The State contends that the trial court correctly applied the law, and that the Court of Criminal Appeals did not err in affirming petitioner's conviction. The State argues, as the Court of Criminal Appeals held, that juror Russell was not subject to challenge for cause; that even if he was, the petitioner waived his right to challenge him on the ground stated; and that even if defendant did not waive his right to challenge Russell for cause, the petitioner did not show, as he must in order to be entitled to a new trial, that he was prejudiced by the juror's service.
We agree with the State that juror Russell was not disqualified for cause. We need not, therefore, address the State's arguments on the waiver issue.
The statutory scheme in effect at the time of Poole's trial clearly establishes that a disqualification occurs, not for the conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude, but when one's right to vote is lost by conviction for such a crime. Code 1975, § 12-16-60, provides:
Section 12-16-60 concerns only a prospective juror's initial qualifications that entitle him to have his name "placed in the trial court jury box." Code 1975, § 12-16-60(b)(1). The purpose of this section is "`to insure at least a reasonable approximation to the requirements that jury venires include all qualified persons, and, hence, represent a cross-section of the community.'" State ex rel. Gregg v. Maples, 286 Ala. 274, 279, 239 So. 2d 198 (1970) (quoting Mitchell v. Johnson, 250 F. Supp. 117 (N.D.Ala.1966)). The code section that specifically addresses challenges for cause is § 12-16-150. This statute, however, is merely illustrative, Nettles v. State, 435 So. 2d 151, 153 (Ala.1983), and a juror may still be challenged for cause on a ground not specifically enumerated in § 12-16-150 but recognized at common law. Nobis v. State, 401 So. 2d 191, 197 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 401 So. 2d 204 (Ala.1981):
This Court has recognized that the qualifications of jurors set forth in § 12-16-60 may constitute a ground for a valid challenge for cause under the common law if the juror does not possess those qualifications. Cf. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. McKinney, 456 So. 2d 1069 (Ala. 1984) (juror who could not read and write and was partially deaf). Hence, a juror disqualified under § 12-16-60 may properly be challenged for cause; that is, a juror's disqualification under § 12-16-60 may also render him subject to challenge for cause. We do not find here, however, that juror Russell could have been challenged for cause under § 12-16-60(a)(4). In Beasley v. State, 39 Ala.App. 182, 96 So. 2d 693 (1957), decided prior to our present statutory scheme, the Court held that adultery was a crime involving moral turpitude, and, therefore:
Thus, conviction of a crime of moral turpitude can be a ground for disqualification under § 12-16-60(a)(4) if a person has lost his right to vote. Under § 12-16-150(5), it is a good challenge for cause if the juror "has been convicted of a felony." (Emphasis added.)
The trial judge found, and we agree, that conviction of the offense of issuing a worthless check is a crime involving moral turpitude in Alabama, Irvin v. State, 44 Ala.App. 101, 203 So. 2d 283 (1967); but juror Marty Russell was not due to be automatically struck for cause from this jury venire solely because of his prior conviction, because a juror convicted of an offense less than a felony involving moral turpitude is not subject to a challenge for cause unless he also has lost the right to vote:
Petitioner's jury was struck, and his trial began, on May 16, 1984. On April 10, 1984, in Underwood v. Hunter, 730 F.2d 614 (11th Cir.1984), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit had invalidated "on account of race" a portion of § 182 of the Alabama Constitution (1901). 730 F.2d  at 621. Section 182 of the Constitution concerns disfranchisement and provides:
The Court held that "section 182 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 violates on account of race the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to those convicted of crimes not punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary." Underwood, supra, at 621. (Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs in Underwood were, inter alia, persons who had been denied the right to vote based on § 182 because of their conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, specifically, issuing a worthless check. Thus, after Underwood, persons in Alabama could no longer be disfranchised merely because they had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, unless the crime was punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the 11th Circuit's opinion and judgment on April 16, 1985. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 105 S. Ct. 1916, 85 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1985). Because of the principle announced in Underwood, juror Russell was not disfranchised at the time of petitioner's trial because of his convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude, as would have been the case under prior law.
The predecessor of § 12-16-60 was § 12-16-43, and it provided:
The first mention of the right to vote in the jury qualification statute appears in § 12-16-60, enacted by the legislature in 1978. Ala. Acts 1978, Act No. 594, § 6(4). The addition of the "right to vote" language in the statute evidences a legislative intent to restrict the category of persons disqualified from jury service by reason of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude to only those persons who by reason of such conviction have also been disfranchised.
Previously, "[b]eing an elector or not being an elector [was] irrelevant to a man's being a juror in Alabama," Sanders v. State, 42 Ala.App. 419, 426, 167 So. 2d 174, 180 (1964), but the legislature, in enacting Code 1975, § 12-16-60(a)(4), intended to make disfranchisement a focal, and relevant, consideration in determining a person's qualification for jury duty if, of course, a person's conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude was the cause of the denial of this right to vote.
For the foregoing reasons, we have concluded that the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is due to be reversed, and that this cause must be remanded to that court with directions to order a new trial.
Our opinion today should not be construed as holding that a party may not make inquiry about prior convictions of crimes involving moral turpitude that do not result in a loss of the right to vote. We only hold that convictions of these crimes do not result in disqualifying a juror for cause. As we have already pointed out, the questions propounded to the prospective jurors were specific enough, in our opinion, under the doctrine of Ledbetter, to warrant a response.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
ALMON, SHORES, BEATTY, ADAMS and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.
TORBERT, C.J., and HOUSTON, J., concur in the result.
JONES, J., concurs, in part; dissents, in part.
JONES, Justice (concurring, in part; and dissenting, in part.)
I agree that the conviction must be reversed for the reasons stated in the opinion; but I would go further and hold that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction for manslaughter. I would uphold a civil verdict against Poole on this evidence, but not a criminal conviction. Operators of emergency vehicles, in order to carry out their legitimate role in society, must be given every benefit of the doubt in testing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a charge of criminal misconduct.