Title: JACQUELYN V MAGEE V DAIMLERCHRYSLER

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MARCH 8, 2005 
JACQUELYN V. MAGEE, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 126219 
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
PER CURIAM 
In this case involving the Civil Rights Act, the Court 
of 
Appeals 
held 
that 
plaintiff’s 
claims 
of 
sexual 
harassment, sex and age discrimination, and retaliation 
were timely filed, because the lawsuit was brought within 
three years of the date she resigned her employment with 
defendant.1 
We conclude that plaintiff’s claims were not filed 
within the limitations period because none of the alleged 
discriminatory or retaliatory conduct occurred within the 
1 Unpublished memorandum opinion, issued March 2, 2004
(Docket No. 243847). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
three years that preceded the filing of the complaint. 
We 
therefore reverse that part of the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and remand the matter to the trial court for 
reinstatement of the trial court’s grant of summary 
disposition to defendant. 
I 
Plaintiff Jacquelyn Magee was an hourly production 
employee who began work for defendant DaimlerChrysler in 
1976. 
She went on medical leave for emotional distress on 
September 12, 1998, and, without first returning to work, 
resigned her job on February 2, 1999. 
On February 1, 2002, Magee filed a lawsuit under the 
Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq., claiming that she 
had been unlawfully discriminated against and harassed 
during most of her twenty-two years at DaimlerChrysler. 
Magee’s complaint lists separate counts for sex harassment 
based on hostile work environment, sex harassment based on 
quid pro quo harassment, retaliation, sex discrimination, 
and age discrimination.2 
2 Magee’s complaint also includes a separate count
alleging constructive discharge. The trial court dismissed 
this count, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s ruling. Magee did not appeal, and the dismissal of
that claim is not before this Court. 
2  
 
 
 
In her complaint, Magee alleges that she suffered 
harassment from the 1980s until her last day of work on 
September 12, 1998, and that her supervisors periodically 
retaliated against her during this period as a result of 
her resistance to the harassment. 
Magee alleges that this 
constant harassment caused her to leave her job at 
DaimlerChrysler on September 12, 1998, and that she decided 
to resign on February 2, 1999, because she anticipated that 
the harassment would continue if she returned. 
DaimlerChrysler 
moved 
for 
summary 
disposition, 
asserting that Magee’s February 1, 2002, complaint failed 
to allege any discriminatory acts after September 12, 1998, 
and that the complaint was therefore not filed within the 
three-year period of limitations applicable to Civil Rights 
Act claims, MCL 600.5805(10). 
The trial court initially denied DaimlerChrysler’s 
motion without prejudice, allowing Magee to amend her 
complaint to allege harassment or retaliation occurring up 
to her February 2, 1999, resignation. 
However, because 
Magee’s 
amended 
complaint 
continued 
to 
allege 
only 
harassment and retaliation through September 12, 1998, her 
last day of work, the trial court granted DaimlerChrysler’s 
motion and dismissed Magee’s complaint. 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Magee appealed the trial court’s ruling to the Court 
of Appeals, which relied on this Court’s recent decision in 
Collins v Comerica Bank, 468 Mich 628; 664 NW2d 713 (2003), 
to reverse the lower court’s dismissal of the harassment, 
retaliation, and discrimination claims. 
The Court of 
Appeals concluded that these claims were timely, because 
they were filed within three years of the date of Magee’s 
resignation. 
DaimlerChrysler then sought leave to appeal to this 
Court. 
After hearing oral argument from both parties on 
the application, this Court has now determined that the 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
misapplied 
Collins 
and 
erroneously 
reinstated Magee’s Civil Rights Act claims. 
II 
In the absence of disputed facts, whether a cause of 
action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations 
is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo. 
Boyle v Gen Motors Corp, 468 Mich 226, 229-230; 661 NW2d 
557 (2003). 
Likewise, this Court reviews de novo rulings 
on summary disposition motions. 
Neal v Wilkes, 470 Mich 
661, 664; 685 NW2d 648 (2004). 
III 
In Collins, supra at 633, this Court held that a cause 
of action for discriminatory termination does not accrue 
4  
 
 
 
 
until the date of termination. 
The plaintiff employee, 
Gwendolyn Collins, was suspended pending an investigation; 
when the investigation was completed several weeks later, 
her employment was terminated. 
Within three years of her 
termination, Collins filed a complaint alleging that her 
termination 
was 
the 
result 
of 
race 
and 
gender 
discrimination. 
The Court of Appeals ruled that Collins’s 
suit was not timely under the three-year period of 
limitations because her causes of action accrued on the 
last day that she actually performed employment duties (as 
opposed to her later termination date). 
This Court 
disagreed 
with 
the 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
last-day-worked 
analysis 
and 
reversed, 
holding 
that 
a 
claim 
for 
discriminatory discharge cannot arise until a claimant has 
actually been discharged. Id. 
Relying on Collins, the Court of Appeals in this case 
reasoned that Magee’s claim also accrued on her termination 
date as opposed to her last day of work. 
The Court 
acknowledged that Magee resigned, and was not terminated. 
But it found significant that “her last day of work was 
followed by a period in which she was on a medical leave of 
absence” and that she was employed by DaimlerChrysler while 
on leave. 
Accordingly, it concluded that her causes of 
action, if any, arose on February 2, 1999. 
5  
 
 
 
 
The Court of Appeals reliance on Collins to reinstate 
Magee’s 
claims 
of 
sexual 
harassment, 
sex 
and 
age 
discrimination, and retaliation is misplaced. 
Magee was 
never terminated from her employment and does not allege 
discriminatory termination. She bases her Civil Rights Act 
claims on alleged discriminatory conduct that occurred 
before her leave of absence. 
Indeed, when given a chance 
to amend her complaint to plead claims falling within the 
period of limitations, Magee was unable to do so. Collins, 
a discriminatory termination case, simply does not apply in 
this situation. 
To determine whether Magee’s claims were timely filed, 
we look to MCL 600.5805(10), which establishes that the 
applicable period of limitations is three years from the 
date of injury. 
Because Magee alleged no discriminatory 
conduct occurring after September 12, 1998, the period of 
limitations on Magee’s claims expired, at the latest, three 
years 
from 
that 
date, 
or 
by 
September 
12, 
2001. 
Accordingly, as the trial court held, Magee’s February 1, 
2002, complaint was not timely filed. 
The dissent argues that the defendant violated the 
Civil Rights Act within the three years preceding the 
filing of plaintiff’s claim by failing to “prevent future 
harassment . . . .” Post at 3. This interpretation of the 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
Civil Rights Act amounts to a continuing violations 
doctrine in which an employer is continuously liable from 
the time it or its agent violates the act until the time 
that violation is remedied by the employer. 
Thus, in 
Justice CAVANAGH’s view, a plaintiff subjected to a hostile 
work environment on December 31, 2005, may file a timely 
complaint in December 2030 if the employer has failed to 
remedy the sexual harassment in the ensuing twenty-five 
years. 
This 
theory 
renders 
nugatory 
the 
period 
of 
limitations 
established 
by 
the 
Legislature 
in 
MCL 
600.5805(10). It is therefore a theory we must reject.3 
For these reasons, we reverse the relevant part of the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to 
the Macomb Circuit Court for reinstatement of the order 
granting DaimlerChrysler’s motion for summary disposition. 
Clifford W. Taylor
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
3 Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare Sys, 465 Mich 53, 60; 631 
NW2d 686 (2001). 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
JACQUELYN V. MAGEE, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 126219 
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
WEAVER, J. (concurring). 
I concur in the result of the opinion per curiam that 
reverses the Court of Appeals judgment in part and remands 
the matter to the trial court for reinstatement of the 
trial court’s grant of summary disposition to defendant. 
Under the facts pleaded by plaintiff, the three-year period 
of limitations1 began to run when plaintiff went on medical 
leave on September 12, 1998, for emotional distress. 
Plaintiff’s claims were required to be filed within three 
years of September 12, 1998. 
Because they were not, the 
trial court was correct to grant summary disposition to 
defendant. 
Therefore, I concur in the result of the 
opinion per curiam. 
 
 
 
 
 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
1 MCL 600.5805(10). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
JACQUELYN V. MAGEE, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 126219 
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 
I 
disagree 
with 
the 
majority’s 
contention 
that 
defendant engaged in no discriminatory conduct during the 
three years that preceded the filing of plaintiff’s 
complaint. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent. 
Plaintiff began working for defendant in 1976. 
Over 
the years, plaintiff complained of various incidents of 
harassment. 
Plaintiff complained that her foreman was 
making sexual advances toward her. 
When plaintiff was 
assigned to a different supervisor, her former foreman 
still worked in the same complex and continued to harass 
her. 
Because of the harassment, plaintiff was ordered by 
her psychiatrist to take an approximately four-month 
medical leave. 
When plaintiff returned from her medical 
 
 
 
leave, her former foreman was still working in the same 
complex as plaintiff. 
A subsequent foreman of plaintiff’s also made sexual 
advances 
toward 
her, 
including 
intentionally 
touching 
plaintiff’s breast. 
For an entire year, plaintiff also 
complained to defendant about a sign in the men’s restroom 
that referred to plaintiff in a derogatory and sexually 
suggestive manner. Because of the stress of the harassment 
she continued to suffer, plaintiff was ordered to take 
another medical leave of absence. 
While she was employed by defendant, plaintiff’s union 
steward also made sexually suggestive comments about 
plaintiff’s “ass” and touched her in an inappropriate 
manner. 
Plaintiff’s coworkers made sexually suggestive 
comments about her body and began hitting her with 
cardboard sticks. 
When plaintiff asked her union steward 
to intercede, he just laughed and said, “Yea, hit that 
ass.” 
Plaintiff repeatedly complained to defendant, yet 
nothing was done. When plaintiff requested a transfer, her 
union steward told her that she could transfer if she had 
sex with him. 
Once plaintiff was transferred, the union 
steward told her that she “owed” him and he wanted her to 
have sex with him. 
He later stopped plaintiff from 
training for another position because she was not having 
2  
 
 
 
sex with him. Plaintiff again complained to a foreman, but 
he said there was nothing he could do. 
Because of the 
stress 
plaintiff 
was 
suffering 
as 
a 
result 
of 
the 
harassment, plaintiff was then ordered to take a third 
medical leave. 
Because defendant took no steps to stop the harassment 
while plaintiff was on her third medical leave, she was 
forced 
to 
decide 
not 
to 
return 
to 
the 
harassing 
environment. Defendant’s discriminatory conduct in failing 
to take steps to prevent future harassment continued 
throughout plaintiff’s medical leave. 
Requiring plaintiff 
to return to the harassing setting to work in the unchanged 
environment would be unreasonable and possibly dangerous to 
plaintiff’s health, considering that her doctor had ordered 
three 
medical 
leaves 
because 
of 
the 
stress 
of 
the 
harassment. 
As plaintiff explained, in order to have even 
been considered for a possible transfer to another plant 
after having been out on her third harassment-related 
medical leave, she would have had to return to the plant 
she left and hope for a transfer, despite that her multiple 
complaints had garnered no response before or during her 
medical leave. 
Thus, for plaintiff to be able to try and 
leave the harassing environment, she would have had to 
return to work with the same men who harassed her and whose 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
conduct necessitated that plaintiff take medical leaves in 
the first place, without any assurance that defendant would 
protect her. 
This case presents a unique set of circumstances 
because 
plaintiff’s 
doctor-ordered 
medical 
leave 
was 
directly related to the harassment. 
Plaintiff’s final 
medical leave was actually her third leave related to the 
stress 
of 
the 
harassment 
she 
suffered. 
Defendant 
maintained a hostile work environment despite plaintiff’s 
repeated complaints. 
Defendant’s failure to stop the 
harassment after these complaints is, under the facts of 
this case, discriminatory conduct. 
Because this conduct 
occurred during the three years that preceded the filing of 
plaintiff’s lawsuit, I find that her complaint was timely 
filed. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly 
4