Title: Commonwealth v. Don

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11550 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  AMOS DON. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 10, 2019. - December 20, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Medical record, Cross-examination, Expert 
opinion, Third-party culprit, Prior misconduct.  Practice, 
Criminal, Postconviction relief, Assistance of counsel, 
Capital case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 30, 2010. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Christine M. McEvoy, J.; a 
motion for postconviction relief, filed on April 25, 2017, was 
considered by Peter M. Lauriat, J., and a motion for 
reconsideration was considered by Christine M. Roach, J. 
 
 
 
Chauncey B. Wood for the defendant. 
 
Kathryn E. Leary, Assistant District Attorney (Ian 
Polumbaum, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  On August 25, 2009, Erica Field and Shameek 
Garcia were shot in the head at close range as they sat in a 
parked vehicle in a lot in the Dorchester section of Boston.  
 
 
2 
Garcia survived; Field did not.  A jury convicted the defendant, 
Amos Don, of murder in the first degree on the theory of 
deliberate premeditation, and related charges, in connection 
with the shootings.1  Before us is the defendant's consolidated 
appeal from his convictions, from the denial of his motion for a 
new trial, and from the denial of a motion to reconsider the 
denial of his new trial motion.  On appeal, the defendant makes 
three primary claims:  (1) that newly discovered medical records 
warrant a new trial, or at least an evidentiary hearing on the 
defendant's postconviction motions; (2) that trial counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective (on several grounds, discussed 
infra); and (3) that the trial judge committed reversible error 
in admitting evidence of the defendant's prior, failed attempts 
to purchase a firearm.  For the reasons discussed infra, we 
reject the defendant's arguments, we affirm his convictions and 
the denial of his postconviction motions, and we decline to 
grant extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
Background.  1.  Facts.  We summarize the facts the jury 
could have found, reserving certain topics for later discussion.  
In the summer of 2009, the murder victim, Field, was living in 
                     
 
1 In addition to the conviction for Field's murder, the 
defendant was convicted of armed assault with intent to murder 
and aggravated assault and battery by means of a dangerous 
weapon in connection with Garcia's shooting, as well as 
unlicensed possession of a firearm. 
 
 
3 
Lewiston, Maine, with her eleven year old daughter, Monica, and 
her long-term boyfriend, Garcia, who was also known as "JoJo."  
In early August of that year, Field and Garcia met the 
defendant, whom they knew as "Ace," at a house in Lewiston where 
people would go to buy drugs. 
The defendant had traveled to Lewiston from his home in 
Boston in order to sell cocaine and heroin.  Garcia and the 
defendant began to work together, as Garcia knew the Lewiston 
illegal drug market and the defendant did not.  This was mainly 
in connection with the defendant's efforts to sell cocaine, as 
Garcia was less familiar with the market for heroin.  Garcia 
also arranged for the defendant to stay in a spare bedroom in 
the home of Donald and Deann Dyer in Lewiston in exchange for 
cocaine.  The defendant kept his supply of cocaine and heroin in 
his bedroom at the Dyers' home. 
In early August 2009, the defendant attempted to have a 
woman named Christine Gilleland purchase three firearms from a 
gun shop in Poland, Maine.  However, her application to purchase 
the firearms was denied. 
About a week before the murder, the defendant discovered 
that his supply of heroin -- for which he still owed his Boston 
suppliers about $6,000 -- was missing.  The defendant initially 
blamed Samantha Leonard, a heroin user and a friend of Field and 
Garcia.  Leonard had recently spent time with the defendant in 
 
 
4 
his bedroom, and when the two were leaving, she had made a point 
of returning to the room alone to retrieve her cellular 
telephone.  The defendant told Garcia "that if it took him a 
year or two, he'd put that bitch [Leonard] in a box."  The next 
day the defendant confronted Leonard about the missing heroin, 
telling her in a "very scary" tone that he "wanted his shit."  
Leonard told the defendant "he was looking at the wrong person 
that was sitting there smoking his money," referring to Garcia.2 
Around this time, the defendant made a second attempt to 
purchase a firearm, this time from Stephen Waterman.  Waterman 
sold the defendant a .45 caliber semiautomatic with a missing 
clip.  The defendant asked Waterman if he could put a bullet in 
the chamber without the clip; Waterman said no.  Waterman told 
the defendant that a clip had been ordered and was waiting at a 
gun shop, but when the defendant went with Deann Dyer to the gun 
shop to retrieve it, the clip could not be located.  The 
defendant also asked an employee of the gun shop whether a 
bullet could be loaded in the chamber manually, without a clip; 
the employee said it could not. 
                     
 
2 Leonard was frightened about what the defendant might do 
to her, prompting her to tell the police that the defendant had 
threatened her with a gun.  Leonard later admitted that she lied 
about the defendant having a gun because she wanted the police 
to take her report of the threats more seriously. 
 
 
5 
Shortly after that, the defendant and Garcia discussed 
traveling to Boston so that the defendant could refill his 
supply of cocaine and try to get an extension to pay his 
supplier back for the missing heroin.  Garcia borrowed a red 
Ford sedan from an acquaintance in exchange for some cash and 
cocaine.  Because Garcia did not have a valid driver's license, 
Garcia and the defendant decided that Field should accompany 
them. 
On August 25, 2009, the three drove from Lewiston to Boston 
in the red Ford sedan.  Upon arriving in Boston, they went to 
the defendant's home.  The defendant spent some time on the 
telephone trying to contact his suppliers.  A few hours later, 
the defendant said he had "found somebody," and they got in the 
red Ford and began driving to a different location.  Garcia 
drove, with Field in the front passenger seat and the defendant 
in the rear driver's side seat.  The defendant told Garcia where 
to go, and at some point, they began following a silver sedan.  
During this time, Garcia gave the defendant the cash that he had 
brought to spend on the cocaine. 
The two vehicles came to a stop in a lot on Norwell Street.  
The defendant got out of the red vehicle and got into the back 
seat of the silver vehicle.  He stayed in the silver vehicle for 
a few minutes before returning to the red Ford and getting in 
the back seat on the driver's side.  The last thing Garcia 
 
 
6 
remembers is turning to his right toward the back seat and 
asking the defendant if they were "all set." 
People in a nearby house heard three gunshots ("pop, pop," 
then a pause, then "pop") and called the police.  Sergeant 
Detective Sean Doherty responded to a call for shots fired at 
the lot on Norwell Street.  Upon arriving, he observed Garcia 
standing in the doorway of the front driver's side door of the 
red Ford.  Garcia walked around the front of the vehicle to the 
front passenger side and dove head first onto Field's lap.  
Field appeared nonresponsive.  Garcia then fell out of the 
vehicle onto his knees and fell backward onto the ground. 
Doherty asked Garcia, "Who shot you?"  Garcia said, "Ace."  
Doherty then asked what Ace's real name was and where he lived.  
Garcia kept repeating the word, "Ace."  His mouth then began to 
fill with blood.  Doherty stopped asking questions at that point 
because "[he] realized [he] wasn't going to get any different 
response from [Garcia] and based on his condition, there was no 
need to go any further." 
A review of cellular telephone records, including cell site 
location information, confirmed that the defendant traveled from 
Maine to Boston on August 25, and that, once in Boston, he 
traveled from the neighborhood where he lived to the area of the 
crime at the time of the murder.  Fingerprint analysis of the 
red Ford showed two of the defendant's fingerprints on the rear 
 
 
7 
driver's side window.  Ballistics evidence showed that a bullet 
recovered from Field's body and one recovered from the front 
passenger's side door of the red Ford were fired from the same 
firearm. 
The medical examiner, Mindy Hull, testified about Field's 
gunshot wounds.  Wounds to Field's left hand and left nostril 
could have been caused by a single bullet as Field held her left 
hand up to her face.  A second bullet entered Field's head 
behind her left ear, passed through the temporal bone of her 
skull and through the left side of the cerebellum, bisecting her 
brain stem (the bullet fragmented during this time), until the 
major portions of the bullet came to a stop in the right side of 
the cerebellum.  Hull testified that the wounds to Field's nose 
and hand showed "stippling," and that the wound behind Field's 
left ear had "soot deposition," indicating that the firearm was 
shot within two or three feet of the victim.3 
Based on a review of medical records, Hull also discussed 
Garcia's injuries, explaining that Garcia suffered "multiple 
maxilla facial fractures" to the right side of his face and 
"traumatic contusion of the right temporal lobe" of his brain.  
A portion of Garcia's medical records themselves were admitted 
                     
 
3 Hull testified that, with respect to the maximum distance 
for stippling to occur, she always answers "broadly in the sense 
of . . . a couple or a few feet," even though "textbooks will 
say about eighteen inches." 
 
 
8 
in evidence.  Those records describe his injuries as "Principle 
Diagnosis: GSW to face," and "GSW to right face."  The records 
also describe Garcia as having been "shot in the head" with 
"bullet fragments within the sinus and nasal cavities." 
In the days following the murder, the defendant displayed 
consciousness of guilt through his words and actions.  The 
defendant's cellular telephone was on his sister-in-law's 
account.  On August 26, the defendant asked his sister-in-law to 
change his telephone number, telling her that he was being 
harassed by his son's mother, Fabiola Ramponeau.  The day after 
the murder, the defendant visited Ramponeau at work and brought 
her sneakers for their son that he had bought during the trip 
down from Lewiston.  He also stayed with Ramponeau twice during 
the week after the murder. 
When Misty Deschaine, a close friend of Field's, called the 
defendant on the day of the murder to find out what had happened 
to Field and Garcia, the defendant denied knowing who Field and 
Garcia were.  Over the subsequent days, Deschaine continued to 
call the defendant; at one point, she confronted him about the 
murder, and he stated, "you cannot play with someone else's 
money . . . or something bad will happen." 
Separately, when confronted by Gilleland about whether he 
had shot Garcia and Field, the defendant responded, "they would 
have to prove it"; and after Gilleland told him she might be 
 
 
9 
pregnant with his child, he told her that "[she] didn't want to 
have a kid with somebody like him cause [she] knew what type of 
person that he was, and that he could end up doing life in jail" 
and that "he might have to kill innocent people." 
A grand jury indicted the defendant for murder in violation 
of G. L. c. 265, § 1; aggravated assault and battery by means of 
a dangerous weapon, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b); 
armed assault with intent to murder, in violation of G. L. 
c. 265, § 18 (b); and unlicensed possession of a firearm, in 
violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).  Following a jury trial, 
the defendant was convicted on all four indictments.  As to 
Field's killing, the jury convicted the defendant of murder in 
the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation.  The 
judge sentenced the defendant to life in prison for the murder 
and to concurrent sentences of from thirteen to fifteen years 
for the aggravated assault and battery, from fifteen to twenty 
years for the armed assault with intent to murder, and from four 
years to four years and one day for the unlicensed possession of 
a firearm. 
2.  Postconviction proceedings.  The defendant timely 
appealed, and postconviction counsel was appointed.  On April 
27, 2017, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial in this 
court, which was remanded to the Superior Court.  In the motion, 
the defendant argued that his trial counsel provided 
 
 
10 
constitutionally ineffective assistance for three main reasons:  
(1) the failure to utilize evidence that Garcia was an informant 
to rebut the prosecutor's argument that no one other than the 
defendant had a motive to shoot Garcia; (2) the failure to 
challenge the reliability of Garcia's statements to the police 
immediately after being shot in the head; and (3) the failure to 
challenge expert testimony presented by the Commonwealth 
regarding the trajectory of a bullet that became lodged inside 
the front passenger's side door of the vehicle in which the 
victims were seated. 
After filing the motion, postconviction counsel noticed 
that one of the Commonwealth's pretrial discovery notices 
suggested that more medical records existed than those that had 
been produced to the defendant.  Postconviction counsel alerted 
the Commonwealth, which determined that its file contained the 
same, underinclusive set of records that had already been 
produced to the defendant.  Postconviction counsel moved for 
discovery of the additional records.  On October 13, 2017, the 
regional administrative justice ordered production of Garcia's 
outstanding medical records.  Three days later, the case was 
assigned to another Superior Court judge (motion judge) for 
resolution of all postconviction motions. 
On November 13, 2017, the defendant received notice that 
the requested records had arrived in the clerk's office.  On 
 
 
11 
November 29, 2017, the motion judge issued a memorandum and 
order denying the defendant's new trial motion. 
On January 25, 2018, postconviction counsel filed a motion 
for an emergency status hearing and a motion to reconsider the 
motion judge's decision in light of new evidence.  The regional 
administrative justice indicated that she would deem the motion 
timely filed and would hear it, because the motion judge had 
retired. 
In a supplemental brief, the defendant argued that "newly 
discovered" medical records provided material, exculpatory 
evidence undermining the Commonwealth's theory that the 
defendant shot the victims from the back seat of the vehicle in 
which they were seated.  The defendant also bolstered his 
argument that trial counsel had been ineffective in failing to 
establish that third parties had a motive to shoot Garcia, using 
evidence gathered through postconviction interviews. 
The regional administrative justice considered the 
additional evidence offered by the defendant and denied the 
motion to reconsider without granting an evidentiary hearing.  
The defendant appealed.  The defendant's direct appeal was 
consolidated with the appeals from the denial of his motion for 
a new trial and his motion for reconsideration.  On appeal, the 
defendant presses all the claims raised in his postconviction 
motions and further argues that the trial judge committed 
 
 
12 
reversible error in admitting evidence of the defendant's prior, 
failed attempts to purchase firearms that could not have been 
the murder weapon. 
Discussion.  1.  "Newly discovered" medical records.  Prior 
to trial, the Commonwealth issued a subpoena to Boston Medical 
Center (BMC) for "all medical records for Shameek Garcia."  In a 
certification dated November 16, 2009, BMC indicated that it was 
producing over 1,000 pages of records in response to the 
subpoena.  The Commonwealth in turn produced a set of Garcia's 
medical records to the defendant in pretrial discovery.  At the 
time of trial, neither defense counsel nor the prosecution 
noticed any discrepancy between the number of pages produced and 
the number of pages indicated in the certification.  Upon 
reviewing these same materials after trial, postconviction 
counsel noticed that the defendant's trial file contained only 
about 600 pages of medical records from BMC, rather than the 
over 1,000 pages indicated on the certification.  Postconviction 
counsel alerted the Commonwealth, which determined that it had 
the same, underinclusive set of records possessed by the 
defendant.  With court permission, postconviction counsel made a 
new request for discovery from BMC.  This time, BMC produced 
over 2,000 pages of records. 
The defendant argues that the medical records obtained by 
postconviction counsel constitute "newly discovered" evidence 
 
 
13 
warranting a new trial under the standard set forth in 
Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 305–306 (1986).  We 
disagree.  In order to constitute "newly discovered" evidence 
under Grace, the records must have been "unknown to the 
defendant or his counsel and not reasonably discoverable by them 
at the time of trial."  Id. at 306.  This requirement is not 
satisfied where postconviction counsel was alerted to the 
missing records by reviewing the same set of documents that was 
available to trial counsel.  However, as the defendant suggests, 
this merely begs the question whether trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to obtain the additional records.  We 
turn to that question next.4 
2.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  Where a defendant 
has been convicted of murder in the first degree, "we review for 
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice by asking 
whether there was error and, if so, whether the error was likely 
to have influenced the jury's conclusion" (quotations and 
                     
 
4 In any event, for the same reasons discussed infra that we 
conclude that this oversight by trial counsel did not create a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, we also 
conclude that, even if the evidence were deemed "newly 
discovered," the defendant would be unable to satisfy Grace's 
additional requirement that the evidence "cast[] real doubt on 
the justice of the conviction."  Grace, 397 Mass. at 305.  In so 
doing, we do not consider whether Grace's second prong is more 
or less favorable to a defendant than the "substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice" standard under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We merely conclude that on these facts, 
neither standard is satisfied. 
 
 
14 
citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Barnett, 482 Mass. 632, 638 
(2019).  See Commonwealth v. Ayala, 481 Mass. 46, 62 (2018); 
Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 
Mass. 447 (2014).  We apply this standard "even if the action by 
trial counsel does not constitute conduct 'falling measurably 
below that . . . of an ordinary fallible lawyer.'"  Commonwealth 
v. Gonzalez, 443 Mass. 799, 808-809 (2005), quoting Commonwealth 
v. MacKenzie, 413 Mass. 498, 517 (1992).  This standard is more 
favorable to a defendant than the constitutional standard for 
ineffective assistance of counsel under Commonwealth v. 
Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).  See Ayala, supra.  In 
conducting this review, we "accord tactical decisions of trial 
counsel due deference" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Evans, 439 Mass. 184, 195, cert. denied, 540 
U.S. 923 and 540 U.S. 973 (2003).  "Unless such a decision was 
manifestly unreasonable when made, we will not find 
ineffectiveness" (quotation and citation omitted).  Id at 195-
196. 
Here, the defendant's claims of ineffective assistance 
center around the fact that trial counsel did not cross-examine 
the Commonwealth's primary expert witnesses, nor did he offer 
any expert testimony on behalf of the defense.  In his affidavit 
in support of the defendant's motion for a new trial, trial 
 
 
15 
counsel stated that he "believed that the forensic evidence was 
not helpful to the defense so [he] tried to stay away from it." 
Consistent with the standard just described, we do not 
dwell on whether in making this decision, trial counsel's 
performance "[fell] measurably below that . . . of an ordinary 
fallible lawyer" (citation omitted).  Gonzalez, 443 Mass. at 
809.  Rather, for the reasons discussed infra, we conclude that, 
in the circumstances presented here, any error in failing to 
challenge the Commonwealth's expert evidence did not create a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  We address 
each of the defendant's individual claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel in turn. 
a.  Failure to obtain Garcia's complete medical records or 
to present expert testimony that Garcia was shot in the interior 
of the mouth.  In arguing that reversal is warranted based on 
the failure to obtain Garcia's complete medical records, the 
defendant primarily relies on the fact that certain radiology 
reports were omitted from the set of records produced prior to 
trial, which would have supported expert testimony that Garcia 
was shot in the interior of the mouth, not the back of the head 
or the side of the face.  In support of this argument, the 
defendant submitted the affidavit of Edward T. McDonough, III, 
stating that, based on the radiology reports and other records, 
Garcia "suffered a gunshot wound to the head, specifically, 
 
 
16 
entering through the mouth."  McDonough further opined that 
"[a]ssuming [Garcia] was sitting normally in the driver's seat, 
facing forward," it would be "extremely difficult" for a shooter 
sitting "directly behind" the driver to have caused the injuries 
observed.  This proffered testimony, the defendant maintains, 
"disproves" the Commonwealth's theory of the case and warrants a 
new trial, or at least an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's 
motion for a new trial. 
After a thorough review of the medical records available at 
trial and those produced posttrial, we are not persuaded.  
First, the upshot of the information contained in the radiology 
reports produced posttrial -- indicating that Garcia was shot in 
the interior of the mouth -- was also present in the records 
that were available to defense counsel at the time of trial.5  
Second, and perhaps more importantly, it was not essential to 
the Commonwealth's theory of the case that the defendant be 
seated "directly behind" Garcia, with Garcia "facing forward," 
when the shooting occurred.  Testimony at trial indicated that 
                     
 
5 Many of the records refer to the fact that Garcia was shot 
"in," "to," or "through" the "mouth."  One record states that 
the gunshot wound was "to face . . . entry in mouth . . . no 
exit wound"; another notes that Garcia had blood coming from the 
mouth and nose with "no visible entry/exit wound"; and a third 
notes a possible "self-inflicted gunshot wound mouth [sic]."  
Once again, this merely begs the question whether trial counsel 
was ineffective for not consulting an expert based on the 
records available to him prior to trial. 
 
 
17 
the defendant sat in the seat behind the driver's seat on the 
way to the lot where the shooting occurred, that he got out of 
the vehicle for a period of time, and that he reentered the 
vehicle through the rear driver's side door immediately prior to 
the shooting. 
The jury could reasonably have inferred that someone 
entering the back seat of the vehicle with the intention of 
shooting the two people seated in the front seats would position 
himself in the center of the back seat, directly behind the gap 
between the two seats.  Photographs admitted in evidence support 
that such positioning was both reasonable and possible.6  See 
Evans, 439 Mass. at 200, citing Commonwealth v. Marquetty, 416 
Mass. 445, 452 (1993) ("An inference need not be inescapable, 
just reasonable and possible").  Such positioning is consistent 
with Garcia's testimony that he turned to his right, toward the 
back of the vehicle, before he was shot, and it is consistent 
with McDonough's opinion that when Garcia was shot, the bullet 
entered his mouth and "fragment[ed] inside his right facial 
area."  Such positioning is also consistent with evidence that 
                     
 
6 More specifically, one exhibit shows the back seat of the 
red Ford as viewed through the open rear driver's side door.  
Although a shopping bag, toys, and other debris fill the seat 
directly behind the front passenger seat in which Field was 
seated, the photograph shows that no debris was blocking someone 
from sliding from the rear driver's side seat into the center of 
the rear seat, directly behind the gap between the two front 
seats. 
 
 
18 
Field was shot in her left hand and nostril and behind her left 
ear. 
Thus, McDonough's proffered testimony that "[a]ssuming 
[Garcia] was sitting normally in the driver's seat, facing 
forward," it would be "extremely difficult" for a shooter 
sitting "directly behind" the driver to have caused Garcia's 
injuries would have done little to undermine the Commonwealth's 
ultimate theory of the case.7  Moreover, the circumstantial 
evidence against the defendant in this case was overwhelming.  
Cellular telephone records placed the defendant at the scene of 
the crime; he had a strong motive for killing Garcia and Field 
(to repay his suppliers and ensure that someone other than he 
suffered the consequences for the missing heroin); and his 
statements and actions following the murder displayed 
consciousness of guilt.  The strength of this evidence, viewed 
in conjunction with the limitations of McDonough's proffered 
testimony, discussed supra, lead us to conclude that the 
proffered testimony would have been unlikely to have changed the 
jury's conclusion. 
                     
 
7 Similarly, the proffered expert testimony of a ballistics 
expert, discussed infra, identifying another possible, but "less 
likely" possibility -- that the shooter was positioned outside 
the vehicle -- would have been unlikely to have influenced the 
jury's decision. 
 
 
19 
In sum, there was no substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice arising from trial counsel's failure to 
procure largely redundant medical records, or to present expert 
testimony "disproving" a particular factual scenario that was 
not essential to the Commonwealth's theory of the case.  See 
Commonwealth v. Morgan, 449 Mass. 343, 358 (2007) (no 
substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice arising from 
failure to cross-examine Commonwealth's expert or to call 
defense expert where defense expert's testimony "likely would 
not have influenced the jury's ultimate conclusion").  See also 
Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto, 475 Mass. 429, 439-441 (2016) 
(factual basis for defendant's claim that particular evidence 
was "powerfully exculpatory" not borne out by trial record). 
b.  Failure to consult an expert to challenge Garcia's 
ability to respond to police questions.  The defendant next 
claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failure to consult 
an expert to challenge the inference that Garcia's utterance of 
the word "Ace" after being asked "Who shot you?" constituted a 
"reliable answer" to that question.  In support of his motion 
for a new trial, the defendant submitted the affidavit of a 
neurologist, Ryan Darby, who opined that the head injuries 
Garcia suffered "affect decision-making ability" and that 
"answering a question reliably is a form of decision-making."  
Based on Doherty's testimony that Garcia was not responding 
 
 
20 
appropriately to many of his questions, Darby would have 
testified that "it is not clear that [Garcia] was responding at 
all to Sergeant Doherty's first question, 'Who shot you?'"  
Darby would have further opined that "[i]t is possible that as a 
result of perseveration, [Garcia] was simply repeating the last 
word he had spoken prior to being shot and that the statement 
'Ace' had no causal connection to Sergeant Doherty's question." 
The Commonwealth argues that this testimony would have been 
inadmissible, as it would have invaded the province of the jury 
to assess credibility.  Even assuming its admissibility (an 
issue that we do not decide), we conclude that the proffered 
testimony would have been unlikely to influence the jury's 
ultimate conclusion, given that it would have only incrementally 
advanced a defense theory that was already before the jury, and 
given the strength of the circumstantial evidence against the 
defendant.8 
The jury were already presented with testimony about 
Garcia's inability to answer Doherty's questions appropriately 
and with evidence that Garcia had suffered severe injuries to 
his brain.  This testimony enabled defense counsel to argue in 
closing: 
                     
8 Similarly, trial counsel's failure to introduce evidence 
that a police report described Garcia as "mumbling incoherently" 
is unlikely to have altered the jury's conclusion. 
 
 
21 
"[The word 'Ace' is] an answer correctly to one question 
only.  So there is the possibility based on the testimony 
of Sergeant Doherty and based on your review of the medical 
records of Mr. Garcia that you will see and based up[on] 
his testimony and your observations of him that he just 
couldn't remember, just couldn't remember. . . .  So when 
Mr. Garcia answered the word 'Ace' to Sergeant Doherty, he 
really I suggest most respectfully when you look at 
everything you can't rely on what the answer was that Mr. 
Garcia [gave] to that particular series of questions, the 
same one, at that particular time especially now based on 
the testimony of Mr. Garcia that he cannot remember 
anything that happened after Ace got back into the car on 
August 25, 2009."9 
 
While the proffered expert testimony could have strengthened 
this argument incrementally, by providing a medical explanation 
for why "Ace" was not an answer to the question "Who shot you?," 
such testimony ultimately would have been unable to draw the 
sting out of the fact that the defendant's name was the word 
Garcia repeated over and over again moments after he was shot.  
In particular, it would not have diminished (and indeed, it 
might have increased, through the introduction of the concept of 
perseveration) the likelihood that the jury would infer that 
Garcia was repeating the word "Ace" because the last thing he 
saw before he was shot was the defendant pointing a gun in his 
                     
9 On appeal, the defendant makes much of the fact that trial 
counsel "conceded" that Garcia "correctly" answered Doherty's 
first question.  We think it clear that trial counsel did not 
concede this point but was instead urging the jury not to rely 
on that statement.  In context, the word "correctly" only meant 
that the answer could have been considered responsive to the 
question.  The answer could not even have been considered 
responsive to the other questions asked by the officer. 
 
 
22 
face.  Adding to that the other strong circumstantial evidence 
against the defendant, discussed supra, we conclude that trial 
counsel's failure to call a neurological expert did not create a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See Morgan, 
449 Mass. at 358. 
c.  Failure to challenge the Commonwealth's ballistics 
evidence.  The defendant also argues that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to challenge the Commonwealth's 
ballistics evidence, either through cross-examination or through 
countervailing expert testimony.  The Commonwealth's expert, 
Kevin Kosiorek, testified that the bullet recovered from the 
passenger door was traveling at a diagonal angle from the rear 
of the vehicle to the front.  Kosiorek qualified this testimony 
with the observation that his conclusion was approximate, with 
an error rate "usually a plus or minus of [five] degrees."  
Kosiorek also acknowledged that he was unable to say "one way or 
another" whether the bullet might have been deflected before it 
struck the door, and he could not say what the "original path" 
of the bullet might have been. 
The defendant argues that trial counsel should have 
consulted an expert, who could have offered trajectory evidence 
to undermine an inference that the shots were fired from the 
back seat of the vehicle.  More specifically, in support of his 
motion for a new trial, the defendant submitted the affidavit of 
 
 
23 
Gregory A. Danas, who stated that "[i]n [his] opinion, it is 
reasonably possible that the shots fired in this case originated 
from someone standing outside the car.  It is also reasonably 
possible that the shots were fired from two different shooters."  
As to Kosiorek's analysis, Danas merely pointed out the same 
shortcomings that Kosiorek had already acknowledged ("[I]t is my 
opinion that [Kosiorek's] conclusion at trial about trajectory, 
is, as he stated, only an approximation.  It is virtually 
impossible to determine the actual true trajectory of the 
recovered bullet in this case, given the known obstructions and 
unknown changes in [Field's] body position.").  Danas added 
that, given that uncertainty, "there is a reasonable possibility 
that the bullet shot toward [Field] and coming to rest inside 
the door frame was fired from a firearm whose muzzle was located 
at, or partially within, the threshold of the rear driver-side 
window.  While less likely, it is also possible that [Field] was 
shot by someone standing immediately outside the front driver-
side window."10 
                     
 
10 Danas also suggested that gunpowder residue testing could 
have established with more certainty whether the bullets were 
fired from inside or outside the vehicle, but it is mere 
speculation what the results of such testing would have been.  
And in any event, Danas did not address the evidence of 
stippling and soot deposition on Field's wounds, which suggested 
the bullets that injured her were fired at short range. 
 
 
24 
For reasons similar to those discussed supra with respect 
to McDonough's proffered testimony, we are of the view that such 
testimony would have been unlikely to alter the jury's ultimate 
conclusion.  Merely offering the possibility of another 
scenario, based on an incomplete accounting of the evidence, is 
insufficient to meet the defendant's burden to show that the 
proffered evidence "was likely to have influenced the jury's 
conclusion" (citation omitted).  Barnett, 482 Mass. at 638, 640 
(holding that in face of strong circumstantial evidence against 
defendant, defense counsel's failure to engage in "battle of the 
experts" over certain marginally relevant DNA evidence "would 
not have been so significant as to influence the jury's 
verdicts").  Contrast Commonwealth v. Hill, 432 Mass. 704, 719 
(2000) ("Evidence that contradicted the Commonwealth's entire 
theory of the case could have raised a reasonable doubt in the 
jurors' minds").  There was no substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice. 
d.  Failure to utilize evidence that Garcia was an 
informant, or to conduct further investigation, in support a 
third-party culprit defense.  The defendant argues that his 
trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to 
utilize evidence that Garcia was an informant for the Federal 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), or to develop further 
 
 
25 
evidence through witness interviews, in support of a third-party 
culprit defense. 
Before trial, the prosecutor disclosed materials to defense 
counsel revealing Garcia's status as a paid DEA informant.  The 
materials were under a protective order, and defense counsel did 
not move to lift the protective order prior to trial.  During a 
hearing on motions in limine, upon a request by the prosecutor, 
the trial judge instructed that defense counsel should consult 
with him at sidebar in the event defense counsel wanted to admit 
any evidence of Garcia's status as an informant.  Defense 
counsel agreed.  However, the topic was not brought up during 
trial.  In addition, before trial, defense counsel received 
other discovery from the Commonwealth, arguably suggesting a 
potential third-party culprit defense.11  Admittedly, trial 
                     
 
11 James Lee, a Lewiston resident familiar with Garcia, 
testified at the grand jury that he was worried about Garcia 
days before the shooting and that Garcia had said he (Garcia) 
"had to go out of town" and would not be coming back.  A second 
individual, Jalissa Garcia, also stated to police that Amber 
Dyer, another Maine resident, had called Garcia's family in 
Florida days after the shooting looking for Garcia, stating that 
Garcia had told her he was moving to Florida and could be 
reached there.  A third individual, Rodney Jackson, said to 
police that he heard "on the streets" that three young people 
with ties to the Four Corners or Algonquin areas in Maine had 
shot Garcia and Field.  A fourth individual, Jenna Labbe, stated 
to police that Nick Coy, another Maine resident, had claimed to 
her that "one of his boys" had shot the victims.  However, Labbe 
also stated that she did not believe Coy had been telling the 
truth because "he is just a little punk." 
 
 
26 
counsel did not follow up on this information or interview any 
of these individuals.  However, for the reasons discussed infra, 
we conclude that the failure to further develop a more specific 
third-party culprit defense did not create a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.12 
In support of his motion for reconsideration, the defendant 
submitted the affidavit of Jason Angus, detailing an 
investigation performed at the behest of postconviction counsel.  
More specifically, Angus spoke with Rodney Jackson, James Lee, 
and Christine Gilleland.  Jackson and Gilleland said that Garcia 
had a reputation for short-changing his suppliers.  Lee, 
Jackson, and Gilleland also told the investigator that Garcia 
had a specific reputation for being a suspected informant.  They 
also said that it was common knowledge in the Lewiston drug 
community that Garcia planned to drive down to Boston on August 
25, 2009. 
We agree with the motion judge that this evidence falls 
short of meeting the defendant's burden on a motion for a new 
trial to establish that justice has not been done, or to raise a 
substantial issue necessitating an evidentiary hearing. 
                     
 
12 In closing, defense counsel suggested that the shooter 
may have come from the silver sedan, raising the possibility 
that the shooting was the product of a drug deal gone bad. 
 
 
27 
Evidence that a third-party culprit committed the crime is 
admissible "if the judge determine[s] that it ha[s] 'a rational 
tendency to prove the issue the defense raises' and [it is] not 
'too remote or speculative.'"  Commonwealth v. Alcide, 472 Mass. 
150, 161 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 
Mass. 782, 801 (2009).  See Commonwealth v. Holliday, 450 Mass. 
794, 807-811, cert. denied sub nom. Mooltrey v. Massachusetts, 
555 U.S. 947 (2008); Commonwealth v. Murphy, 442 Mass. 485, 507 
(2004); Mass. G. Evid. § 1105 (2019).  To that end, a defendant 
must demonstrate that the acts of another person are "so closely 
connected in point of time and method of operation as to cast 
doubt upon the identification of [the] defendant as the person 
who committed the crime" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Buckman, 461 Mass. 24, 31 (2011), cert. denied, 567 U.S. 920 
(2012).  See Commonwealth v. Conkey, 443 Mass. 60, 66 (2004), 
S.C., 452 Mass. 1022 (2008). 
Here, we agree with the Commonwealth that the proffered 
evidence fails to meet the standard for admissibility of third-
party culprit evidence.  Rather, the investigation performed at 
the behest of postconviction counsel failed to turn up any 
specific individual with more than a generalized motive to harm 
Garcia, and it did not connect any other specific individual to 
the scene of the crime.  See Buckman, 461 Mass. at 31 (proffered 
evidence of tension with neighbor was inadmissible where "the 
 
 
28 
defendant offered and produced no evidence suggesting that the 
neighbor had any opportunity to kill beyond that possessed by 
any neighbor"); id. (proffered evidence that serial killer was 
"on the loose" in area was inadmissible where defendant "could 
not place the serial killer in the vicinity at the time of this 
murder"). 
For similar reasons, even if the evidence were admissible, 
we would conclude that it was not likely to have affected the 
jury's decision to convict.  Here, Garcia had no memory of the 
shooting itself, and the evidence supported an inference that 
there was at least one other person (in addition to the 
defendant and the two victims) at the scene of the crime, 
namely, the driver of the silver sedan.  As noted supra, based 
on this evidence, trial counsel was able to argue in closing 
that the defendant's supplier or "the supplier's muscle" could 
have been in the silver sedan and could have shot Garcia "to 
punish somebody for violating the cardinal rule of drug dealing.  
Do not steal from the supplier."  The addition to this of 
further, cumulative evidence of unidentified third parties with 
a generalized motive to harm the defendant would have been 
unlikely to sway the jury.  See Breese v. Commonwealth, 415 
Mass. 249, 252-253 (1993) (counsel's alleged failure to 
investigate another suspect was not ineffective where defendant 
failed to show that "better work might have accomplished 
 
 
29 
something material for the defense" [citation omitted]).  Under 
these circumstances, the failure of trial counsel to further 
develop a third-party culprit defense did not create a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
3.  Admission of evidence of the defendant's prior attempts 
to purchase a firearm.  Finally, the defendant contends that the 
trial judge committed reversible error by admitting evidence of 
the defendant's prior attempts to obtain firearms other than the 
murder weapon.  The defendant preserved this issue by opposing 
the Commonwealth's motion in limine to introduce the evidence 
and by objecting when the testimony was introduced at trial.  We 
therefore review the issue for prejudicial error. 
Evidence of prior bad acts is generally inadmissible to 
show a defendant's propensity to commit a crime.  See 
Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 478 Mass. 443, 448 (2017); Mass. G. 
Evid. § 404(b)(1).  However, such evidence may be admitted if 
relevant for some other purpose, provided that its probative 
value outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant.  
See Vasquez, supra; Commonwealth v. Bonnett, 472 Mass. 827, 840-
841 (2015); Commonwealth v. McGee, 467 Mass. 141, 157 (2014); 
Commonwealth v. Ridge, 455 Mass. 307, 322–323 (2009); Mass. G. 
Evid. § 404(b)(2). 
Where the proffered evidence concerns a weapon that 
"definitively could not have been used in the commission of the 
 
 
30 
crime, we have generally cautioned against admission of evidence 
related to it," Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 463 Mass. 116, 122 
(2012), recognizing that the "tenuous relevancy" of such 
evidence rarely outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice to the 
defendant, Commonwealth v. Toro, 395 Mass. 354, 358 (1985).  See 
McGee, 467 Mass. at 157; Barbosa, supra.  In cases where we have 
approved of the admission of such evidence, we have often 
required a limiting instruction "to ensure that its probative 
value outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice."  McGee, supra 
at 158, citing Ridge, 455 Mass. at 323, and Holliday, 450 Mass. 
at 816. 
Here, the judge allowed the Commonwealth's motion in limine 
to admit the evidence for the limited purposes of putting the 
defendant's actions into context -- e.g., by demonstrating the 
defendant's motive for waiting until the trip to Boston to carry 
out the shootings, as he had not previously acquired a firearm 
and sought one -- and showing the defendant's familiarity with 
firearms.  These were permissible purposes for admitting the 
evidence, provided that the probative value of the evidence 
outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice.  See Ridge, 455 Mass. 
at 322 (demonstrating "access to" and "familiarity with" 
firearms is permissible purpose); Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b)(2) 
(demonstrating "motive" or "intent" is permissible purpose). 
 
 
31 
When ruling on the motion in limine, the judge stated that 
she would give a limiting instruction when the evidence was 
admitted, but when the time came, she apparently did not do so.13  
However, she did give a limiting instruction in her final 
charge.14  Although the better practice would have been to give a 
                     
 
13 The judge had given a general instruction on propensity 
evidence during the testimony of a prior witness, without 
specifically mentioning firearm evidence, in which she stated: 
 
"Jurors, before I release you for the morning recess, I do 
want to give you an instruction.  You heard a number of 
references through this witness in regard to drug activity 
as it pertains to the witness as well as to the defendant. 
 
"That evidence is admitted for certain limited purposes in 
this case, including to put into context the allegations 
that are presently before the Court.  They are not -- it is 
not being admitted to show any criminal propensity or bad 
character of the defendant or that he would be more likely 
to have committed the crimes that are before the Court." 
 
The judge's remarks during the final charge conference 
indicate that she thought that her prior instruction 
specifically mentioned firearm evidence ("I will give at the 
defendant's request a further instruction in regard to the 
limited use of certain evidence that was presented, specifically 
. . . seeking a firearm . . ."), something she also expressed in 
her final charge to the jury, see note 14, infra. 
 
 
14 The judge instructed the jury as follows: 
 
"A further evidentiary matter, I want to remind you of as 
well is this.  That the defendant is not charged with 
committing any crimes other than those contained in the 
four indictments before the Court.  You have heard mention 
of other acts allegedly done by the defendant, specifically 
I gave you limiting instructions at the time in regard to 
evidence as it pertained to dealing in narcotics or dealing 
drugs, if you will, or seeking -- you heard evidence that 
he was seeking to obtain a firearm, and you also heard 
 
 
32 
more specific contemporaneous limiting instruction in addition 
to a specific limiting instruction in the final charge, in this 
case, we conclude that the general instruction on propensity 
evidence given prior to the admission of the evidence, in 
conjunction with the specific limiting instruction in the final 
charge, provided sufficient guidance to the jury about the 
limited purposes for which the evidence was admitted.  Contrast 
McGee, 467 Mass. at 157-158 (danger of unfair prejudice from 
photograph of defendant holding silver gun that could not have 
been murder weapon outweighed probative value where judge's 
final charge "did not instruct the jury adequately as to the 
proper use of the evidence"). 
Moreover, even if we were to conclude that the evidence was 
improperly admitted, we would conclude that the error was 
                     
evidence in regard to alleged threats.  Again, these are 
allegations, but they were admitted for limited purposes, 
and those limited purposes relate to the government's 
theories in the case, particularly with regard to motive, 
circumstances surrounding the interaction between certain 
individuals and to put certain conduct into context. 
 
"You may not consider any of those acts referred to now 
generally, but I believe I instructed you more 
specifically, as proof that defendant had criminal 
propensity or bad character, or that he committed the 
crimes before this Court.  So for example, even if you were 
to determine that the defendant dealt in drugs, that does 
not mean he is guilty of the indictments before the Court.  
They are part of the evidence.  You can give them what 
weight you feel they are fairly entitled to receive but 
only in accordance with my instruction and for the limited 
purpose for which they are offered." 
 
 
33 
harmless due to the "scant attention" given to the evidence at 
trial, McGee, 467 Mass. at 158, citing Barbosa, 463 Mass. at 
124, and the strength of the other evidence against the 
defendant, discussed supra. 
4.  Review pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Finally, after 
a thorough review of the record, we discern no reason to 
exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to grant a new 
trial or to reduce or set aside the jury's verdict of murder in 
the first degree. 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 
defendant's convictions and the denial of the defendant's 
postconviction motions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.