Title: LORENZO S. MONTEZ V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

LORENZO S. MONTEZ V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 17201 P.3d 434Case Number: S-08-0089Decided: 02/12/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
LORENZO 
S. MONTEZ,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Albany County

The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Michael 
H. Reese, Contract Appellate Counsel, of Michael Henry Reese, P.C., Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Craig.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 

[¶1]      
Appellant 
was convicted by a jury of one count of unlawful possession of marijuana and two 
counts of taking immodest, immoral, or indecent liberties with a minor.  He now appeals those convictions, making 
multiple accusations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  Concluding to the contrary, we 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      We will re-state 
and re-order the issues as follows:

 
 
           
1.   Did trial counsel 
provide ineffective assistance by failing to move to dismiss the immodest, 
immoral, or indecent liberties with a minor charges on the ground that the 
statute had been repealed?

 
 
           
2.   Did trial counsel 
provide ineffective assistance by failing to move to dismiss the immodest, 
immoral, or indecent liberties with a minor charges on the ground that the 
statute was unconstitutional?

 
 
           
3.   Did trial counsel 
provide ineffective assistance by failing to raise a hearsay objection to 
certain testimony by the victims' mother?

 
 
           
4.   Did trial counsel 
provide ineffective assistance by failing to move for a mistrial based upon 
certain testimony by the victims' mother?

 
 
           
5.   Did trial counsel 
provide ineffective assistance by failing to move for a judgment of 
acquittal?

 
 
           
6.   Did trial counsel 
provide ineffective assistance by failing to object to the district court's 
rejection of a proposed instruction defining the word "knowingly" as an element 
of the crime of taking immodest, immoral, or indecent liberties with a 
minor?

 
 
           
7.   Did trial counsel 
provide ineffective assistance by failing to object to portions of law 
enforcement officers' testimony on the ground that such was expert testimony 
that was inadmissible under Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993)?

 
 
           
8.   Do the foregoing 
alleged deficiencies constitute cumulative error?

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶3]      Claims of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, brought for the first time on appeal, 
require this Court to conduct "a de 
novo review of the facts pertinent to the claim of ineffective 
assistance."  Pendleton v. State, 2008 WY 36, ¶ 9, 180 P.3d 212, 215 (Wyo. 2008) (citing Barker 
v. State, 2006 WY 104, ¶ 16, 141 P.3d 106, 113 (Wyo. 2006)).  In meeting his burden of proving 
ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant must prove that counsel's 
performance was deficient and that Appellant was prejudiced by that deficient 
performance.  Id. at ¶ 20, 180 P.3d  at 218-19 (citing 
Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 145 
(Wyo. 1986)).  Deficient performance 
means "that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 
the counsel' guaranteed [appellant] by the Sixth Amendment."  Id.  To show prejudice, Appellant must prove 
that "counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive [appellant] of a fair 
trial, a trial whose result is reliable."  
Id.  Stated differently, prejudice means 
that there is "a reasonable probability that, absent the deficiency in counsel's 
performance, the result of the proceedings would have been different."  Id. at ¶ 21, 180 P.3d  at 
219.

 
 
            
We examine the conduct of defense counsel in light of all the 
circumstances in determining whether the identified acts or omissions fall 
outside the ambit of professionally competent assistance, bearing in mind the 
function of counsel is to make the adversarial testing process work in every 
case.  We do not evaluate the 
efforts of counsel from a perspective of hindsight but, rather, we endeavor to 
reconstruct the circumstances surrounding counsel's challenged conduct and 
evaluate the professional efforts from the perspective of counsel at the 
time.  We invoke a strong 
presumption that counsel rendered adequate and reasonable assistance making all 
decisions within the bounds of reasonable professional judgment.  The burden is upon the defendant to 
overcome this presumption that, in light of the circumstances, the challenged 
action or failure of the attorney might be considered sound trial 
strategy.

 
 

Bloomquist 
v. State, 
914 P.2d 812, 820 (Wyo. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      The two minor 
children [the children] who were the victims in this case lived in an apartment 
with their mother [Mother] and her boyfriend [Boyfriend].  On March 10, 2007, Boyfriend and 
Appellant spent the afternoon and evening consuming alcohol and smoking 
marijuana.  At about 8:30 p.m., 
Mother put the children to bed in the bottom bed of a bunk bed, with one child 
at each end of the bed.  She dimmed 
the overhead light, left the door ajar, and went back into the living room, 
where Boyfriend and Appellant were located.

 
 
[¶5]      Shortly after 
Mother entered the living room, she and Boyfriend began arguing because Mother 
thought he should not drink any more alcohol that evening.  They ended the argument by agreeing that 
Mother would drive Boyfriend to his parents' house.  Mother informed Appellant of this plan 
and told him she "would be right back."  
When Mother and Boyfriend left, Appellant was fully 
clothed.

 
 
[¶6]      As she left the 
apartment, Mother left the front door open a foot or two, and left the living 
room lights on.  As she started to 
drive away, she saw the living room lights turn off.  Mother and Boyfriend had driven only a 
few blocks when Boyfriend said Mother "shouldn't leave the kids alone with 
[Appellant] because he's a rapist."  
In response, Mother turned around and drove back to the 
apartment.

 
 
[¶7]      Mother and 
Boyfriend returned to the apartment within five to ten minutes after they 
left.  Upon their return, Mother had 
to unlock the front door, using her key in the deadbolt lock.  Mother entered the apartment and noticed 
immediately that Appellant's shoes were on the floor in front of the couch, but 
Appellant was not there.  Mother and 
Boyfriend proceeded to the children's bedroom, where they noticed the light had 
been turned off.  Mother turned the 
light on and saw Appellant in bed with the children, naked from the waist down, 
and with an erect penis.  Mother 
instinctively picked up a small foam-rubber bat and began beating Appellant with 
it.  Boyfriend pulled Appellant from 
the bed, and began beating him with his fists while dragging him toward the 
living room.

 
 
[¶8]      Mother placed a 
911 call and police officers soon arrived.  
The officers separated Appellant and Boyfriend.  Appellant, whose face was badly beaten, 
was taken to the hospital for treatment.  
There, he was found to be in possession of marijuana.  Shortly thereafter, an Amended Felony 
Information was filed, charging Appellant with one count of unlawful possession 
of marijuana, and two counts of taking immodest, immoral, or indecent liberties 
with a minor.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Did 
trial counsel provide ineffective assistance by failing to move to dismiss the 
immodest, immoral, or indecent liberties with a minor charges on the ground that 
the statute had been repealed?

 
 
[¶9]      The two counts of 
taking immodest, immoral, or indecent liberties with a child were charged under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105(a) (LexisNexis 2005).  That statute was repealed effective July 
1, 2007.  Act of July 1, 2007, ch. 
159, 2007 Wyo. Laws 393.  The 
charged crimes in this case occurred on March 10, 2007.  The jury trial took place on August 
29-30, 2007.  Appellant was 
sentenced on November 19, 2007.

 
 
[¶10]   We will deal with this issue rather 
perfunctorily, with two observations:  
first, Appellant's argument, being completely devoid of legal support, 
can be characterized as little short of bizarre; and second, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
8-1-107 (LexisNexis 2007) specifically provides that the repeal of a statute 
"does not affect pending actions, prosecutions or proceedings, civil or 
criminal."1  Trial counsel did not provide 
ineffective assistance by failing to raise this baseless 
argument.

 
 
Did 
trial counsel provide ineffective assistance by failing to move to dismiss the 
immodest, immoral, or indecent liberties with a minor charges on the ground that 
the statute was unconstitutional?

 
 
[¶11]   This Court has repeatedly held that 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105 is not facially unconstitutional.  Rabuck v. State, 2006 WY 25, ¶ 15, 129 P.3d 861, 864-65 (Wyo. 2006).  See also Moe v. State, 2005 WY 58, ¶ 10, 110 P.3d 1206, 1210 (Wyo. 2005); Giles v. 
State, 2004 WY 101, ¶ 19, 96 P.3d 1027, 1033 (Wyo. 2004); Schmidt v. State, 2001 WY 73, ¶ 28, 29 P.3d 76, 85 (Wyo. 2001); Misenheimer v. 
State, 2001 WY 65, ¶ 15, 27 P.3d 273, 281 (Wyo. 2001); Pierson v. State, 956 P.2d 1119, 1123-24 
(Wyo. 1998); Moore v. State, 912 P.2d 1113, 1116 (Wyo. 1996); Lovato v. 
State, 901 P.2d 408, 412 (Wyo. 1995); Ochoa v. State, 848 P.2d 1359, 1363 
(Wyo. 1993); Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973, 976 (Wyo. 1988); Britt v. 
State, 752 P.2d 426, 428 (Wyo. 1988); Sorenson v. State, 604 P.2d 1031, 
1034-35 (Wyo. 1979).  In addition, 
this Court has also determined on several occasions that the statute is not 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to particular cases.  Sanderson v. State, 2007 WY 127, ¶ 35, 
165 P.3d 83, 93 (Wyo. 2007); Stokes v. 
State, 2006 WY 134, ¶ 11, 144 P.3d 421, 424 (Wyo. 2006); Ruby v. State, 2006 WY 133, ¶ 7, 144 P.3d 425, 430 (Wyo. 2006); Rabuck, 
2006 WY 25, ¶ 32, 129 P.3d  at 869; Giles, 2004 WY 101, ¶ 31, 96 P.3d  at 
1039.

 
 
[¶12]   While one might conclude that 
Appellant's argument is that the statute is vague on its face because the word 
"knowingly" is not defined, Appellant limits himself to an "as applied" 
challenge.  He relies upon United States v. Santos, __ U.S. __, __, 
128 S. Ct. 2020, 2024-26, 170 L. Ed. 2d 912 (2008), for the proposition that the 
word "knowingly" is so ambiguous that the rule of lenity requires the law to be 
interpreted in favor of Appellant.  In Santos, the United States Supreme Court 
determined that the word "proceeds" in the federal money laundering statute was 
ambiguous, and then applied the rule of lenity to conclude that the word meant 
"profits" rather than "receipts."  Santos, __ U.S. at __, 128 S. Ct.  at 
2025.

 
 
[¶13]   We are unable to discern how Santos has any bearing on Appellant's 
constitutional argument.  Santos is a statutory construction case, 
not a constitutional case.  
Appellant tries to apply Santos 
to the instant case by claiming that the word "knowingly" in Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 14-3-105 is ambiguous and should, therefore, be interpreted in his favor.  His logic then leaps to the conclusion 
that it was error for the district court not to give an instruction defining the 
word "knowingly."  He provides no 
analysis, however, of how the failure to define the word "knowingly" made the 
statute unconstitutionally vague as applied to his conduct.  The gist of such an argument should be 
that the statute provides insufficient notice to a person of ordinary 
intelligence that his specific conduct was illegal.  Sanderson, 2007 WY 127, ¶ 30, 165 P.3d  
at 92.  Such analysis is totally 
lacking in Appellant's Brief.  
Furthermore, this Court has already determined that no instruction on the 
meaning of "knowingly" need be given in cases brought under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 14-3-105 because the term "knowingly" as used in the statute does not 
have a "technical meaning under the law, which is different from its ordinary 
meaning."  Schmidt, 2001 WY 73, ¶ 24, 29 P.3d  at 
83.  Given the clear status of the 
law, trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to raise a 
constitutional challenge to the statute.

 
 
Did 
trial counsel provide ineffective assistance by failing to raise a hearsay 
objection to certain testimony by the victims' mother?

 
 
[¶14]   This argument is based upon the 
fact that Appellant's trial counsel did not object to the following exchange 
during Mother's direct testimony:

 
 
Q.   So you get in the car with 
[Boyfriend] to take him to his parents's [sic] house after the argument.  How far did you and [Boyfriend] make it 
with respect to taking him to his parents's [sic] house?

 
 
A.   A few blocks.

 
 
Q.   Then what 
happened?

 
 

A.   [Boyfriend] 
said that I shouldn't leave the kids alone with [Appellant] because he's a 
rapist.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  Appellant argues that trial 
counsel should have objected to the emphasized answer, on the ground that such 
was hearsay, and that the failure to do so constituted ineffective assistance of 
counsel.

 
 
[¶15]   W.R.E. 801(c) defines "hearsay" as 
"a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial 
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."  In turn, W.R.E. 802 declares hearsay to 
be inadmissible, except as provided by court rules.  The declarant in the instant situation 
was Boyfriend.  Clearly, his 
statement to Mother was an out-of-court statement.  To that extent, Appellant has met his 
burden of proving the first element of the hearsay definition.  But Appellant has not shown that the 
statement was introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted, that being 
that Appellant is a rapist.  
Instead, the full context of the testimony shows that the statement was 
introduced to show why Mother almost immediately returned to the apartment, 
instead of taking Boyfriend to his parents' house:

 
 
Q.   So you get in the car with 
[Boyfriend] to take him to his parents's [sic] house after the argument.  How far did you and [Boyfriend] make it 
with respect to taking him to his parents's [sic] house?

 
 
A.   A few blocks.

 
 
Q.   Then what 
happened?

 
 
A.   [Boyfriend] said that I shouldn't 
leave the kids alone with [Appellant] because he's a 
rapist.

 
 
Q.   What did you think when [Boyfriend] 
told you that [you] shouldn't leave the kids with the defendant because he's a 
rapist?

 
 
A.   I thought, because he was 
intoxicated, he was just making an excuse to stay home.

 
 
Q.   You thought that [Boyfriend] was 
making an excuse so he would go back home with you?

 
 
A.   Yeah.

 
 
Q.   And so thinking that he was making 
an excuse, what did you go ahead and do?

 
 
A.   I turned 
around.

 
 
Q.   Why?

 
 
A.   They're my 
children.

 
 
Q.   So you just did a U-turn and right 
back?

 
 
A.   Yeah.

 
 
[¶16]   An out-of-court statement 
introduced to show its effect upon the person hearing it is not hearsay.  Kenyon v. State, 986 P.2d 849, 853 (Wyo. 
1999) (citing Armstrong v. State, 826 P.2d 1106, 1119 (Wyo. 1992)).  
Perhaps that is why trial counsel did not object to this particular 
statement.  Given the context of the 
statement, we surely cannot say that counsel's performance was deficient in that 
regard.  Beyond that, even if we 
were to conclude that trial counsel should have objected to admission of the 
statement, we would not find ineffective assistance of counsel because Appellant 
was not prejudiced thereby.  During 
his own direct testimony, Appellant stated that "I just did ten years in the 
state penitentiary because of rape," and his attorney asked him if he believed 
he had learned anything from being sent to prison for second-degree sexual 
assault.  Furthermore, a portion of 
the transcript from the change-of-plea hearing in that case was read to the jury 
"for the limited purpose of proving knowledge, motive, intent, absence of 
mistake or accident, or preparation with respect to the charges at issue."  Thus the jury was well aware of 
Appellant's prior sexual assault conviction.  Counsel did not provide ineffective 
assistance by failing to object to the alleged hearsay 
statement.

 
 
Did 
trial counsel provide ineffective assistance by failing to move for a mistrial 
based upon certain testimony by the victims' mother?

 
 
[¶17]   This issue is directed toward the 
same statement made by Boyfriend to Mother just discussed in the preceding 
section.  Here, Appellant contends 
that, in addition to objecting to admission of the statement, trial counsel 
should have moved for a mistrial.  
However, "[g]ranting a mistrial is an extreme and drastic remedy that 
should be resorted to only in the face of an error so prejudicial that justice 
could not be served by proceeding with trial."  Teniente v. State, 2007 WY 165, ¶ 27, 
169 P.3d 512, 524 (Wyo. 2007) (quoting Allen v. State, 2002 WY 48, ¶ 75, 43 P.3d 551, 575 (Wyo. 2002)).  Having 
determined that Boyfriend's statement to Mother was neither hearsay, nor 
unfairly prejudicial, we logically must also conclude that a motion for mistrial 
would not have been granted.  
"Counsel is not ineffective for failing to [make] a motion that would not 
have been granted."  Harlow v. State, 2005 WY 12, ¶ 53, 105 P.3d 1049, 1071 (Wyo. 2005) (citing Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 58, 43 P.3d 80, 102 (Wyo. 2002)).

 
 
Did 
trial counsel provide ineffective assistance by failing to move for a judgment 
of acquittal?

 
 
[¶18]   The salient portion of W.R.Cr.P. 
29(a) reads as follows:

 
 
The 
court on motion of a defendant or of its own motion shall order the entry of 
judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment, 
information or citation after the evidence on either side is closed if the 
evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or 
offenses.

 
 
It 
goes without saying that the test to be applied in granting or denying a motion 
for judgment of acquittal is sufficiency of the evidence.  See, e.g., Mattern v. State, 2007 WY 24, ¶ 28, 151 P.3d 1116, 1129 (Wyo. 2007); Dover v. 
State, 664 P.2d 536, 537 (Wyo. 1983); Chavez v. State, 601 P.2d 166, 168 (Wyo. 
1979); Montez v. State, 527 P.2d 1330, 1331 (Wyo. 1974).  Upon review 
of the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, this Court performs the 
same test.  Cloman v. State, 574 P.2d 410, 416 (Wyo. 
1978).

 
 
[¶19]   We will not further pursue this 
issue because Appellant presents no analysis of the evidence and no cogent 
argument as to why this Court should reverse his conviction due to trial 
counsel's failure to move to acquit.  
In fact, Appellant admits in his Brief that, "[g]iven the evidence as 
presented, counsel may have not been able to prevail on a Rule 29 motion . . . 
."  Once again, we can only surmise 
that trial counsel did not move for a judgment of acquittal because sufficient 
evidence clearly had been admitted upon which the jury could find guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Appellant has 
failed to prove ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file a 
W.R.Cr.P. 29 motion.

 
 
Did 
trial counsel provide ineffective assistance by failing to object to the 
district court's rejection of a proposed instruction defining the word 
"knowingly" as an element of the crime of taking immodest, immoral, or indecent 
liberties with a minor?

 
 
[¶20]   The relevant portion of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 14-3-105, the "indecent liberties" statute under which Appellant was 
charged, read as follows at the time of Appellant's trial:  ". . . any person knowingly taking 
immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any child . . . is guilty of a 
felony."  Appellant submitted a 
proposed jury instruction defining the word "knowingly":

 
 
Knowing 
(knowingly) means to have or show awareness or understanding of (an action), to 
be well informed, and/or a deliberate; conscious (act).

 
 
The 
State objected to the giving of this instruction, arguing that the proposed 
definition, in effect, changed the offense from a general intent crime to a 
specific intent crime.  After 
lengthy discussions, the district court agreed with the State and refused the 
instruction.

 
 
[¶21]   Appellant phrases this issue as one 
of ineffective assistance of counsel for having failed to object to the district 
court's refusal to give the instruction.  
He then asserts that plain error review is required.2  However, because trial counsel offered 
and vigorously argued in favor of the instruction, we are not convinced that 
either plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel is the appropriate 
review.  Rather, it seems that this 
should be analyzed under our well-established standard for the review of jury 
instructions:

 
 
Jury 
instructions should inform the jurors concerning the applicable law so that they 
can apply that law to their findings with respect to the material facts, 
instructions should be written with the particular facts and legal theories of 
each case in mind and often differ from case to case since any one of several 
instructional options may be legally correct, a failure to give an instruction 
on an essential element of a criminal offense is fundamental error, as is a 
confusing or misleading instruction, and the test of whether a jury has been 
properly instructed on the necessary elements of a crime is whether the 
instructions leave no doubt as to the circumstances under which the crime can be 
found to have been committed.

 
 

Janpol 
v. State, 
2008 WY 21, ¶ 7, 178 P.3d 396, 400 (Wyo. 2008) (quoting Mueller v. State, 2001 WY 134, ¶ 9, 36 P.3d 1151, 1155 (Wyo. 2001)).

 
 
[¶22]   We find no error.  Both the elements instructions and the 
verdict form required the jury to find Appellant's acts to have been done 
"knowingly."  And while the district 
court did not define the word "knowingly," this Court has long held that, in the 
context of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105, the word "has no technical meaning under 
the law, which is different from its ordinary meaning, and the trial court [is] 
not required to define it."  Schmidt, 2001 WY 73, ¶ 24, 29 P.3d  at 
83; see also Butz v. State, 2007 WY 
152, ¶¶ 20-21, 167 P.3d 650, 655 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
Did 
trial counsel provide ineffective assistance by failing to object to portions of 
law enforcement officers' testimony on the ground that such was expert testimony 
that was inadmissible under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 
(1993)?

 
 
[¶23]   Appellant contends that trial 
counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to portions of the 
direct testimony of two law enforcement officers.  First, he argues that trial counsel 
should have objected to the following colloquy:

 
 
Q.   And as an officer, do you have 
training and education and even some personal experience with respect to 
identifying controlled substances?

 
 
A.   I do.

 
 
Q.   Based upon that training and 
experience, what was your initial belief as to the contents of the 
bag?

 
 
A.   I believed it to be 
marijuana.

 
 
[¶24]   Appellant contends that this was, 
in effect, an expert opinion, and it should have been tested under the criteria 
of Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 
(1993).  The State argues in 
response that this was no more than a lay opinion and was not, therefore, 
subject to scrutiny as expert testimony.  
We find this debate meaningless in light of the fact that the parties 
stipulated that the substance was, indeed, marijuana.  Appellant could not possibly have been 
prejudiced by the officer's belief.3

 
 
[¶25]   Appellant next contends that trial 
counsel should have objected to the following questions and answers during the 
direct examination of another officer:

 
 
Q.   As a police officer, I assume you 
have received training with respect to the detection of an individual who is 
under, say, under the influence of alcohol or other controlled 
substances?

 
 
A.   Yes.

 
 
Q.   And based upon your training, 
experience, and education as a police officer, at the time that you met the 
defendant on [sic] 21 hours later after the events had occurred, what was your 
opinion as to the defendant's being under the present influence of drug or 
alcohol?

 
 
A.   He did not appear to be under the 
influence of alcohol.

 
 
[¶26]   Appellant's contention that trial 
counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to this exchange on 
the ground that it was untested expert opinion evidence is not well founded, for 
several reasons.  First, the passage 
describes an interview that occurred twenty-one hours after the alleged 
incident, so there is little materiality in regard to the question of 
Appellant's state of intoxication at the time of the alleged incident.  Second, self-induced intoxication is not 
a defense to the charge of taking immodest, immoral, or indecent liberties with 
a minor, as the jury was correctly instructed, so the opinion was not 
relevant.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-1-202(a) (LexisNexis 2007); Britt, 
752 P.2d  at 430.  And third, this 
Court has recognized that the question of whether a person is intoxicated "is 
open to the observation of all persons without the necessity of peculiar 
scientific knowledge."  Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 23, 49 P.3d 975, 985 (Wyo. 2002).  Thus, 
the officer's opinion was a lay opinion, not subject to Daubert-type analysis.4

 
 
Do 
the foregoing alleged deficiencies constitute cumulative 
error?

 
 
[¶27]   Not having found ineffective 
assistance of counsel, or other error, we cannot find cumulative 
error.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶28]   Appellant has failed to prove 
either deficient performance by trial counsel or resultant prejudice, and has, 
therefore, failed to prove ineffective assistance of 
counsel.

 
 
[¶29]   We affirm.

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Appellant's 
argument is summarized as follows in his Brief:

 
 
Three 
immediate questions arise:  (1) the 
first being is whether the statute claimed to have been violated remains valid 
after its repeal and during trial; (2) the second is that the penalty provisions 
of W.S. § 14-3-105 are more generous to the defendant, i.e. a maximum of ten 
years versus a maximum of 15 years, so why upset the apple cart so to speak; and 
(3) the third is whether a merger occurred merging a violation of W.S. § 
14-3-105 into a violation of W.S. § 6-2-316.

 
 

2Where 
there has been no objection below, we review for plain error, which requires an 
appellant to prove (1) the record clearly reflects the alleged error; (2) there 
was a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and (3) the violation 
adversely affected a substantial right resulting in material prejudice.  Pendleton v. State, 2008 WY 36, ¶ 8, 180 P.3d 212, 215 (Wyo. 2008) (citing Cazier 
v. State, 2006 WY 153, ¶ 10, 148 P.3d 23, 28 (Wyo. 
2006)).

 
 

3See 
W.R.Cr.P. 52(a) and W.R.A.P. 9.04 regarding harmless 
error.

 
 

4Appellant 
makes some additional somewhat amorphous complaints about this officer's 
testimony, both in regard to expert opinion and hearsay, but such are not 
sufficiently developed to require analysis, especially inasmuch as Appellant 
makes no presentation or even suggestion of prejudice resulting 
therefrom.