Title: Office of Child Support Enforcem't v. Ragland

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT v. Jimmy
Clyde RAGLAND

96-888                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered October 16, 1997


1.   Divorce -- alimony -- award is continuing general decree --
     chancery court has continuing personal jurisdiction over
     parties regarding certain alimony-support matters. -- An
     alimony award is a continuing general decree against the
     obligor that endures until modified by a change in the
     condition of the parties; accordingly, the chancery court has
     continuing personal jurisdiction over the parties to a divorce
     with respect to certain support-alimony matters; in order to
     collect on this continuing general decree, there is a need to
     periodically ascertain arrearages and render a decree for the
     amount due; for these purposes the parties to the suit
     continue to be parties and, being parties already, it is not
     necessary to get personal service upon them to carry out and
     enforce a continuing decree when an attempt is made to reduce
     the decree to a definite and certain amount, dependent upon
     whether there should be delinquencies in the payment of the
     monthly alimony allowed.

2.   Civil procedure -- service of process -- rules that govern. --
     Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 4 expressly governs the
     service of the complaint and summons, while Rule 5 governs the
     service of "every pleading and every other paper" filed after
     the complaint; Rule 5(a) requires that pleadings asserting any
     new or additional claims for relief against a party in default
     be served in the manner provided for service of summons under
     Rule 4.

3.   Civil procedure -- action to reduce past-due arrearages not
     new cause of action -- Ark. R. Civ. P. 5(a) governs service. -
     - Appellant's action to reduce past-due arrearages to an
     executable judgment was not a new cause of action, but instead
     flowed from the original divorce decree; as such, personal
     jurisdiction over the parties continued without the need for
     additional service of process; appellant, as the ex-wife's
     contractual assignee, possessed her entitlement to support; an
     obligee's attempt to reduce past-due arrearages to judgment
     where the chancery court has continuing personal jurisdiction
     over the obligor is not a new or additional claim for relief
     necessitating new personal service of process; service of
     appellant's Motion for Judgment was governed by Rule 5(b),
     rather than  Rule 4(d)(8)(A).

4.   Civil procedure -- service of process -- final judgment --
     court retains continuing jurisdiction -- proper service. -- 
     Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b) generally requires
     service upon a party's attorney; however, service upon a
     party's attorney is insufficient in a case where there is a
     final judgment but the court has continuing jurisdiction; in
     such cases, service is required to be made to the party and
     may be made by mailing a copy of the pleading or paper to the
     party at his last known address; service by mail is
     presumptively complete upon mailing.

5.   Civil procedure -- motion properly served upon appellee --
     trial court abused discretion in setting aside default
     judgment. -- Where the certificate of service contained within
     appellant's motion showed that it was mailed to appellee via
     certified mail on a date certain to his current mailing
     address and that appellee's wife signed for the article in the
     box designated "Signature -- Agent" and because service of
     appellant's "Motion for Judgment" was presumptively complete
     upon mailing, the trial court abused its discretion in setting
     aside the default judgment due to insufficient service.
     

     Appeal from Searcy Chancery Court; Charles E. Clawson,
Chancellor; reversed.
     Lori Hoggard, for appellant.
     The Blagg Law Firm, by:  Mel Jackson, for appellee.

     Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice.
     At issue in this case is whether service of process under
Ark. R. Civ. P. 4 is necessary to obtain a valid default judgment
against an obligor for child-support arrearages.  The trial court
held that the service on the obligor was defective and set aside
a default judgment obtained against him.  We reverse and hold
that personal service of process under Rule 4 was not necessary
because the chancery court had continuing personal jurisdiction
over the obligor and the obligee asserted no new or additional
claims for relief.  
     Sara Jane Ragland and Jimmy Clyde Ragland were divorced
pursuant to a decree entered by the Searcy County Chancery Court
on March 16, 1978.  Sara Jane was awarded custody of their minor
children, and Jimmy Clyde was ordered to pay $200 monthly in
child support through the office of the Chancery Clerk.  In a
contract dated August 15, 1977, and filed on May 22, 1978, Sara
Jane assigned her right to child support to the Division of
Social Services in consideration for public assistance.
     On July 21, 1986, the Child Support Enforcement Unit, in its
capacity as assignee, filed a "Motion for Judgment" requesting a
judgment in the amount of $14,000 for arrearages unpaid by Jimmy
Ragland.  OCSE obtained a default judgment in the amount of
$14,000 on October 8, 1986.  Among other things, the judgment
provided that "[Jimmy Ragland's] agent was duly served with a
copy of the motion for judgment on 22nd day of July 1986, and no
response has been filed herein and [Jimmy Ragland] stands wholly
in default."
     On October 30, 1995, Jimmy Ragland moved to set aside the
default judgment following the institution of income withholding
against him.  Ragland alleged that the default judgment was "void
because of insufficiency of service of process."  Ragland also
moved to stay OCSE income withholding and attached an affidavit
from the Searcy County Circuit Clerk who reviewed the underlying
case file and did not find a "`green card'. . .nor. . . any proof
of service upon the Defendant, Jimmy Ragland."  In response, OCSE
asserted that the service of its "Motion for Judgment" was valid
because it was sent to Ragland via certified mail, return receipt
requested.  OCSE attached the "green card" which showed a July
22, 1986, delivery date, and bore the signature of Sandy Ragland
on the "Signature -- Agent" line. 
     On February 20, 1996, the trial court entered an order
setting aside the default judgment because of insufficient
service of process under Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(8)(A).  According
to the trial court, OCSE did not comply with the rule's
additional requirements that Ragland be served by restricted
delivery, and that the record contain the "green card" before
entry of the default judgment.  OCSE brings the present appeal. 
The Court of Appeals certified the case to us as involving an
interpretation of Rules 4(d)(8)(A) and 5(b) of the Arkansas Rules
of Civil Procedure.
     For its sole argument on appeal, OCSE argues that the trial
court had continuing personal jurisdiction over Ragland, and thus
no new service of process under Ark. R. Civ. P. 4 was necessary
to obtain a valid default judgment on the past-due arrearages. 
Because the trial court granted Ragland's motion to set aside the
default judgment, we review this ruling for an abuse of
discretion.  See, e.g., Tharp v. Smith, 326 Ark. 260, 930 S.W.2d 350 (1996); M. v. Clark, 316 Ark. 439, 872 S.W.2d 410 (1994).
     One of the earliest Arkansas cases addressing the trial
court's continuing personal jurisdiction over the parties in a
divorce action is Jones v. Jones, 204 Ark. 654, 163 S.W.2d 528
(1942).  In Jones the chancery court awarded the obligee a
monthly amount of alimony.  The obligor later moved to Florida
and fell behind on payments, and the obligee sought a decree for
the amount in arrears.  While the chancery court recognized that
the obligor was delinquent on the payments, it nonetheless
refused to render a decree for the arrearage because the entire
arrearage had accumulated while the obligor resided in Florida,
and no additional personal service of process had been obtained
on him.
     This court reversed the trial court's determination that
additional personal service of process was necessary,
characterizing the alimony award as a "continuing general decree"
against the obligor that would endure until modified by a change
in the condition of the parties.  Id.  Accordingly, the alimony
award was not a final determination of the parties' respective
rights, and the decree for future payments was not "a final
decree upon which an execution might be issued or which might
become a lien upon real estate."  Id.  In order to collect on
this continuing general decree, the Jones court recognized the
need to periodically ascertain arrearages and render a decree for
the amount due:
For these purposes the parties to the suit continue to
be parties and, being parties already, it would not be
necessary to get personal service upon them to carry
out and enforce a continuing decree when an attempt is
made to reduce the decree to a definite and certain
amount, dependent upon whether there should be
delinquencies in the payment of the monthly alimony
allowed.

Id.  Thus, the trial court was clearly erroneous in refusing to
issue a "decree certain" for the alimony arrearage for lack of
additional personal service of process on the obligor.  Id.
     Subsequent to Jones, a number of cases have reinforced this
court's position that the chancery court has continuing personal
jurisdiction over the parties to a divorce with respect to
certain support/alimony matters.  See, e.g., Rice v. Rice, 213
Ark. 981, 214 S.W.2d 235 (1948) (no additional service of process
is necessary to collect alimony arrearage under a separate
maintenance decree); Schley v. Dodge, 206 Ark. 1151, 178 S.W.2d 851 (1944) (actual notice given to a nonresident alimony obligee
was sufficient where the obligor petitioned to modify an award
arising out of an Arkansas decree rendered when both parties
resided in Arkansas.).
     Turning to an analysis under the modern rules of civil
procedure, Rule 4 expressly governs the service of the complaint
and summons, while Rule 5 governs the service of "every pleading
and every other paper" filed after the complaint.  Rule 5(a) does
require that pleadings asserting any new or additional claims for
relief against a party in default be served in the manner
provided for service of summons under Rule 4.  The crucial
inquiry in the present case is which service rule governs OCSE's
"Motion for Judgment" filed on July 21, 1986.
     The answer to this question turns on the characterization of
OCSE's cause of action, and whether it is a new, original cause
of action being asserted against Ragland.  Jones and its progeny
suggest that an action to reduce past-due arrearages to an
executable judgment is not a "new" cause of action, but instead
flows from the original divorce decree.  As such, personal
jurisdiction over the parties continues without the need for
additional service of process.  
     Ragland attempts to distinguish the Jones line of cases by
arguing that OCSE was not an original party to the action, and
thus that "continuing jurisdiction applies only to parties
contemplated within the decree."  This distinction is not
persuasive.  OCSE stands in Sara Ragland's shoes as the
contractual assignee of her entitlement to support. Indeed, OCSE
submitted to the trial court's personal jurisdiction by
instituting the proceedings to obtain a judgment.  Ragland cites
to no authority for the proposition that the assignment of the
obligee's rights creates a meaningful difference insofar as the
chancery court's continuing personal jurisdiction over him as
obligor.  Rather, Jones suggests that an obligee's attempt to
reduce past-due arrearages to judgment where the chancery court
has continuing personal jurisdiction over the obligor is not a
new or additional claim for relief necessitating new personal
service of process.  Accordingly, service of OCSE's "Motion for
Judgment" was governed by Rule 5(b), rather than  Rule
4(d)(8)(A).
     The next question is whether service of OCSE's "Motion for
Judgment" was properly made under Rule 5.  Rule 5(b) generally
requires service upon a party's attorney.  However, contemplating
the very issue presented in this case, Rule 5(b) adds that
service upon a party's attorney is insufficient "in a case where
there is a final judgment but the court has continuing
jurisdiction."  In such cases, service is required to be made
to the party.  Service upon a party may be made by mailing a copy
of the pleading or paper to the party at his last known address,
and "service by mail is presumptively complete upon mailing."
     In the present case, the certificate of service contained
within OCSE's "Motion for Judgment" shows that it was mailed to
Jim Ragland on July 18, 1986, at P.O. Box 728, Marshall, AR
72650.  Moreover, the green card later attached to OCSE's
response to Ragland's motion to set aside shows that the article
was delivered via certified mail to "Jim Ragland P.O. Box 728,
Marshall, AR 72650," on July 22, 1986.  Sandy Ragland signed for
the article in the box designated "Signature -- Agent."  Because
service of OCSE's "Motion for Judgment" was presumptively
complete upon mailing, the trial court abused its discretion in
setting aside the default judgment due to insufficient service.
     Reversed.