Title: State v. Brown

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 113,253 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
QUARTEZ BROWN, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
If a district court makes an appropriate inquiry into a motion to appoint new 
counsel, it is the defendant's burden to show the district court abused its discretion in 
denying the motion. A district court abuses its discretion if its action is (1) arbitrary, 
fanciful, or unreasonable, i.e., no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the 
trial court; (2) based on an error of law, i.e., the discretion is guided by an erroneous legal 
conclusion; or (3) based on an error of fact, i.e., substantial competent evidence does not 
support a factual finding on which a prerequisite conclusion of law or the exercise of 
discretion is based.  
 
2. 
The right to effective counsel for criminal defendants is deeply rooted in American 
jurisprudence and embedded in both the Kansas and United States Constitutions.  
 
3. 
Sometimes a defendant prefers different counsel from the one appointed. But the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not provide an indigent 
defendant a right to compel the district court to appoint the counsel of his or her choice. 
2 
 
 
 
Only if the defendant demonstrates justifiable dissatisfaction with his or her current 
counsel does the Sixth Amendment require a court to appoint new counsel.   
 
4. 
Justifiable dissatisfaction can be shown through a conflict of interest, an 
irreconcilable disagreement, or a complete breakdown in communication. 
 
5. 
Disagreements and lack of communication between a defendant and counsel will 
not always rise to the level of justifiable dissatisfaction. As long as the district court has a 
reasonable basis for believing the attorney-client relationship has not deteriorated to a 
point where appointed counsel can no longer give effective aid in the fair presentation of 
a defense, the court is justified in refusing to appoint new counsel. 
 
6. 
While criminal defendants are in charge of three decisions—(1) what plea to enter; 
(2) whether to waive the right to a jury trial; and (3) whether to testify on their own 
behalf—strategic and tactical decisions are the exclusive province of the lawyer after 
consultation with his or her client. And, even for those strategic and tactical decisions, 
"consultation" does not mean the attorney must ask a defendant's permission—it merely 
implies a general discussion between counsel and the client. 
 
7. 
Should a substantial break in communication between criminal defense counsel 
and client occur, if the district court restores communication or determines 
communication has otherwise been restored, it may be unnecessary to appoint substitute 
counsel. 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; JOHN J. KISNER, JR., judge. Opinion filed October 28, 
2016. Affirmed. 
 
Korey A. Kaul, of Kansas Appellant Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for 
appellant.  
 
Matt J. Maloney, Assistant District Attorney, argued the cause, and Julie A. Koon, Assistant 
District Attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the brief 
for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
LUCKERT, J.:  In this appeal, Quartez Brown again asks us to consider whether he 
should have been given new counsel when he filed a motion for substitute counsel before 
his trial on charges of felony murder, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault. He 
previously persuaded us, in a 2014 appeal, that the district court abused its discretion in 
declining to inquire into Brown's pretrial motion for substitute counsel. State v. Brown, 
300 Kan. 565, 331 P.3d 797 (2014). We remanded for an evidentiary hearing, after which 
the district court concluded Brown had not established a conflict or justifiable 
dissatisfaction with his attorney. Although Brown continues to argue there was a 
complete breakdown in communication with his attorney, we reject his arguments and 
hold the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding there had not been a 
complete breakdown in communication between Brown and his counsel before trial. 
Accordingly, we will affirm. 
 
4 
 
 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In April 2010, Brown and his cousin, both armed, entered an apartment belonging 
to Otis Bolden. They encountered Ashley Green and, pointing their guns at her, asked 
where Bolden could be found. Green saw Brown and his cousin walk into Bolden's 
bedroom and then heard shots. Although Bolden was able to exit the apartment through a 
window, he later died from multiple gunshot wounds.  
 
After a trial, a jury convicted Brown of first-degree felony murder, the alternative 
charge of intentional second-degree murder, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault. 
Brown appealed. We rejected three of his arguments, concluding sufficient evidence 
supported his aggravated burglary, felony murder, and aggravated assault convictions; 
reversible error did not occur when the district court failed to give lesser included offense 
instructions on voluntary manslaughter, reckless second-degree murder, and involuntary 
manslaughter; and the district court did not violate Brown's rights under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution based on Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), by considering his prior 
convictions at sentencing. Brown, 300 Kan. 565. 
 
Nevertheless, based on two remaining issues we reversed and "remand[ed] to the 
district court with instructions to: (1) Conduct a hearing on [Brown's] claim of attorney 
dissatisfaction, at which the defendant is to be represented by conflict-free counsel; and 
(2) correct the journal entry of judgment to reflect that second-degree intentional murder 
is a severity level 1 offense." 300 Kan. at 590.  
 
On remand, the district court corrected the journal entry, and Brown does not 
renew his appellate complaints on that issue. The district court also conducted the hearing 
regarding Brown's claim of attorney dissatisfaction and rejected Brown's arguments. 
5 
 
 
 
Brown appeals from that ruling, and we therefore will confine our discussion to the 
procedural history and facts relevant to Brown's pretrial motion for new counsel. 
 
1. Original Trial Proceedings and First Appeal 
 
In May 2010, approximately 9 months before trial, the district court appointed 
Steven Mank as Brown's attorney. In December 2010, approximately 2 months before 
trial, Brown filed a "Pro se petition for right of Habeas Corpus . . . due to unconstitutional 
conditions of confinement in violation of the 5th and 6th Amendment[s] of the Federal 
Constitution, Ineffective trial counsel." He requested new counsel due to Mank's "lack of 
performance and a complete breakdown of communication." According to Brown, Mank 
"refus[ed] to communicate 'at any level' . . . concerning continuances, upcoming court 
hearings and defen[s]e preparations." Brown also stated he was in the process of filing a 
complaint with the Disciplinary Administrator's office; he asserted that once this 
complaint was filed Mank's continued representation would constitute a conflict of 
interest.  
 
 
The district court scheduled a hearing on Brown's motion, set for January 21, 
2011. A court order dated January 21, 2011, indicated Brown's motion was withdrawn, 
but indicated nothing else—no mention of who withdrew the motion, whether there was a 
hearing, or whether Brown participated. We now know that Mank asked the district court 
to withdraw Brown's motion.  
 
 
Brown's case proceeded to trial, still with Mank as the assigned attorney. At the 
conclusion of the State's case, Mank stated he "[did] not intend to present any evidence. 
I have discussed with my client his right to testify, and I would ask that the Court put it 
on the record that it is his decision not to testify in this matter." The district court advised 
Brown he had the constitutional right to testify or not to testify, and "[t]hat decision rests 
6 
 
 
 
with you, not with your attorney. Obviously it should be done in consultation with your 
attorney, but ultimately the decision is up to you, regardless of what your attorney may 
recommend." Brown gave some conflicting responses but then stated he did not wish to 
testify.  
 
 
As we previously noted, the jury found Brown guilty of first-degree felony 
murder, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault. At the sentencing hearing, Brown 
revealed he had some concerns with the way Mank had handled his case. He referenced 
his December 2010 "motion to fire [his] attorney" and the scheduled January 2011 
hearing. He said Mank came to see him and pleaded not to be fired, but Brown told Mank 
he did not wish to speak with him until the hearing on the motion. But, according to 
Brown, he was never called into the courtroom on his hearing date, and Mank later told 
him the judge had withdrawn his motion. "[S]o this whole time I've been trying to fire 
him." Brown explained he "never got a chance to hear it in front of a judge." The district 
court called Brown's comments "really something" and "outrageous" and countered them 
with something of a panegyric on Mank's behalf. 
 
Mank, for his part, told the court that Brown had not mentioned any of these 
complaints when they had met the previous week to go over the presentence investigation 
report. Brown retorted that he had asked Mank "to take some of my things and to defend 
me," had asked Mank to say things Mank did not say, and had asked Mank to file 
motions that were not filed. The district court informed Brown that he was not a lawyer 
and that it was Mank who had the right to decide trial strategy; it then informed Brown 
that he would have a year after his appeal to file any ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims and proceeded with sentencing.  
 
7 
 
 
 
Brown was ultimately sentenced to 20 years to life imprisonment for the felony 
murder. The court ordered sentences of imprisonment for aggravated burglary and 
aggravated assault, with all sentences to run concurrently. 
 
On Brown's first appeal, we ruled that his pretrial motion for new counsel 
"contained sufficient information to trigger the district court's duty to make further 
inquiry." 300 Kan. at 575. But the record did not reflect the district court "even attempted 
to fulfill that duty," and we described its approach to making a record as "cavalier." 300 
Kan. at 571, 575. We, however, were not in the position to make factual findings about 
whether Mank had any conflict of interest in representing Brown or whether a conflict 
adversely affected Mank's performance. 300 Kan. at 578. Accordingly, we remanded 
with directions to appoint conflict-free counsel and conduct a hearing on Brown's motion. 
300 Kan. at 590. We also directed the district court to "determine whether [Brown] has 
established justifiable dissatisfaction with his counsel and whether that conflict adversely 
affected the adequacy of the attorney's representation." 300 Kan. at 578.  
 
2. Proceedings on Remand 
 
On remand, the district court (presided over by a new judge) held an evidentiary 
hearing. During the hearing Brown and Mank testified about the entire scope of their 
relationship and trial preparation.  
 
Brown testified that before he filed his December 2010 motion for substitute 
counsel he had met with Mank six to eight times, with each meeting lasting about 10 or 
15 minutes. When asked about his impression of Mank, Brown replied, "Well, he's my 
attorney so I looked at it as him being my attorney. That's about it, but as far as getting 
along, just some things that I did disagree with Mr. Mank." The first time Mank visited 
him, they "discussed some of the things that may have happened and where we were 
8 
 
 
 
going, who were witnesses and what my involvement was and who was . . . putting me 
there at the scene of the crime." 
 
When asked to elaborate about his disagreements with Mank, Brown stated:  
 
 
"Like being able to put my input in as far as what people were saying and how I 
could be able to let them know—let the Court know that I—that it's not what it seems it 
was and being able to speak, being able to speak to the Court about that, you know, being 
able to compare notes, things like that."  
 
Brown confirmed he and Mank talked about possible defenses and trial strategy, 
including how to combat witnesses that placed him at the crime scene. They also 
discussed discovery provided by the State. Brown "asked to see about discovery" and 
understood discovery policies, but he "wanted to compare the facts about certain things 
that the discovery might have in there that could help us out."  
 
Brown was particularly concerned about a possible photo array. He never 
participated in one, he explained, and thus was not identified as a participant in the crime 
in that way. But he seems to have believed the police conducted a photo array with other 
people and did not provide this photo array during discovery. He asked Mank to file a 
discovery request for the photo array, but this motion never got filed. This prompted 
Brown to feel he did not have input in the trial strategy. He elaborated:   
 
"I feel like Mr. Mank knew what he was going to do and what I said really didn't matter 
because I come with notes and I tried to make notes. He gave me the opportunity to give 
the notes, but at the same time I don't feel like he used my notes, went over them with me, 
so I didn't feel like I had really too much input in it."  
 
 
Brown summarized that he and Mank were not going over strategies and were not 
able to agree on discovery requests,  Mank did not use Brown's notes, and Mank was not 
9 
 
 
 
able to spend enough time on the case; Brown began to feel like they would not be able to 
put up a very good fight in the courtroom. And so, after Mank's fifth or sixth visit, Brown 
told Mank he would file a motion for substitute counsel and was considering filing an 
ethics complaint. Of note, Brown never actually filed a disciplinary complaint. 
 
Brown remembered his motion was supposed to be heard on January 21, 2011, but 
he was not present for a hearing. He explained: 
 
 
"Whenever I didn't get to have the hearing, I thought just I was—but it was 
withdrawn. I didn't know any better at the time. I didn't know anything about the law. . . . 
So I thought I handled myself with this situation, and I just feel like I'm stuck from then 
on. I thought what was better to do was to just stick with a lawyer that has a law degree 
and knows the law then to go to court by myself and don't know anything about it." 
 
 
After the motion was withdrawn, Brown did not think he and Mank discussed it. 
They did, however, talk about Brown testifying at trial. Brown told Mank he wanted to 
testify on his own behalf, but Mank advised him it would not be in his best interest 
because, according to Brown, "the [district attorney] would try to switch words around." 
But Brown felt that his testimony would have made a difference, and he wanted a chance 
to testify against the three people who were planning to tell the jury that he committed the 
crimes.  
 
 
On cross-examination, Brown confirmed that he saw Mank after the December 
2010 motion for substitute counsel and before the scheduled January 2011 hearing. They 
talked about the criminal case but not about Brown's motion. Mank also visited the night 
before the scheduled hearing, but Brown did not remember how long Mank stayed or 
what they spoke about. Brown flatly disagreed with the State's assertion that when Mank 
left after that visit there was an understanding that the representation would continue—he 
explained again that he went to trial with Mank because he "felt like [he] had to." Brown 
10 
 
 
 
reiterated, on redirect examination, that at the time he filed his December 2010 motion he 
felt there had been a complete breakdown in communication between himself and Mank; 
after the motion was not even heard by the district court he communicated with Mank 
because he felt stuck and did not think there were any other procedural options.  
  
Mank testified he was an experienced criminal defense attorney and kept logs for 
the time he spent on cases, particularly for cases where, as with Brown, he had been 
appointed by the Board of Indigent Defense Services. The State presented an itemization 
of the time spent on Brown's case, as well as jail records indicating Mank made a couple 
of additional jail visits that were not reflected in his notes. Mank testified he visited 
Brown multiple times and decided to go talk to Brown after learning of his motion for 
substitute counsel. He was not alarmed by Brown's expressed intent to file an ethics 
complaint, as this was a normal thing for criminal defendants to assert on occasion.  
 
According to Mank and his notes, he visited Brown 9 or 11 days before the 
January 2011 hearing and also the day before the hearing. He told Brown he was sorry to 
hear that Brown was not happy and told Brown he had a busy trial schedule and "had 
probably not devoted the time to him that I needed to"—but it was now Brown's turn and 
Mank would be more available than previously. Mank then asked Brown what he wanted 
him to do, and Brown "basically asked . . . whether or not [Mank] was going to give him 
[his] full attention." Mank assured Brown he would do so, and Brown said he was fine 
with Mank's continued representation.  
 
Mank explained to the district court that he thought Brown's main concern was 
how many times Mank had visited the jail to talk and go over evidence. He did not recall 
any concerns Brown raised regarding a photo array, but he thought Brown might be 
remembering that one victim could not specifically identify who entered the house and 
fired shots. Mank did not think the victim's inability to identify Brown posed an issue 
11 
 
 
 
because Brown was placed at the scene because a codefendant took a deal and identified 
him, plus there was DNA evidence.  
 
Mank stated he wrote Brown 30 letters and thought Brown "was pretty well-
informed of what was going on, when it was going on." He also met with Brown's mother 
a number of times. Mank felt he was able to communicate effectively with Brown up to 
the filing of his motion. After his meeting with Brown the day before the scheduled 
January 2011 hearing on that motion, he wrote Brown a letter recounting their agreement 
and informing Brown he would continue to plan on representing him at the jury trial. This 
letter was admitted into evidence over Brown's objection that he did not recall receiving 
it. According to Mank, after this letter and up to trial, he heard no complaints from 
Brown regarding the lack of communication. And, again according to Mank, he was able 
to communicate effectively with Brown during trial and Brown was able to assist in his 
own defense. Mank met with Brown after trial and prior to sentencing, but he did not hear 
about any of Brown's concerns until they were brought up during the sentencing hearing. 
 
On cross-examination, Mank stated Brown may have asked him to file a motion 
regarding the alleged photo array, "but based on the facts of this case, [he] probably 
would not have done that" and "would have explained to [Brown] why." Early in the trial 
preparation, Brown sent him a letter indicating he did not understand the trial process; 
Mank responded by sending a letter summarizing the case, what the evidence would be, 
his codefendant's agreement to testify against him, the physical evidence relating to the 
bullets found at the scene; and the source of the DNA evidence. Mank thought he had 
thoroughly answered Brown's questions in the letter and had also sent Brown the 
preliminary hearing transcript, the police reports, the trial date letter, and an additional 
police report—all told, at least five letters indicating the receipt of additional discovery.  
  
12 
 
 
 
Mank confirmed he and Brown had discussed Brown testifying at trial, but he did 
not remember whether this discussion occurred before Brown's December 2010 motion 
for substitute counsel. Mank was not able to testify about the particulars of that 
discussion because the district court concluded it was outside the scope of our remand 
instructions. The district court explained its understanding that it was supposed to 
consider Mank's representation on the date of the January 2011 hearing, when Brown's 
motion was withdrawn, and consider whether the situation as it existed at that point in 
time would have adversely affected Mank's representation or in fact did so.  
 
After considering the above testimony (plus the testimony of the State's attorney in 
Brown's criminal case), the district court stated Brown would more likely than not have 
withdrawn his motion for new counsel at the January 2011 hearing—although the court 
noted it was certainly unusual that Brown was not present before the court when Mank 
withdrew that motion on his behalf. In any event, the district court announced it was 
taking a new look at the motion for new counsel and subsequent proceedings, focusing on 
the issues Brown raised in his motion and viewing the representation issue "primarily as 
it existed at the time the motion was withdrawn, maybe secondarily looking . . . at it with 
hindsight." 
 
The district court found significant and regular communication between Brown 
and Mank via letters and in-person visits. Even if Brown had been able to raise all of his 
claims of dissatisfaction at the scheduled January 2011 hearing—even those not 
originally contained in his motion—the district court found he would not have come very 
close to demonstrating a complete breakdown in communication. After Brown's motion 
was withdrawn, communication between Mank and Brown continued and Brown could 
adequately and effectively help prepare Brown's defense.  
 
13 
 
 
 
The district court thus found the facts did not show communication had 
deteriorated to the point of an unfair presentation of a defense—even though Brown may 
have wanted more communication, there was adequate communication and also adequate 
time spent on the case. The district court also briefly touched on the photo array issue, 
which it described as a matter of strategy and not one for the district court to second-
guess. There was also no reason to think Brown did not get all the discovery information 
that was fundamental and necessary to his communication with Mank. Further, it was 
clear Brown had input in the case:  Testimony established the two had conversations on a 
regular basis. The district court ultimately ruled that, had it heard the hearing evidence at 
the time of Brown's motion, it would have denied Brown's motion for substitute counsel; 
there was nothing it had learned about Mank's representation afterwards that changed its 
view. Accordingly, Brown did not establish justifiable dissatisfaction with Mank and 
there was no conflict adversely affecting the adequacy of Mank's representation.  
 
The district court entered a corresponding journal entry which stated: 
 
"2. 
In his Motion for Substituted Counsel, Defendant alleged that he was filing a 
disciplinary action against Mr. Mank. No such action was filed, therefore there 
was no conflict of interest based on this claim; 
"3. 
Defendant failed to show an irreconcilable disagreement with his appointed 
defense counsel . . . . Evidence was presented and the court finds that defendant's 
claim of attorney dissatisfaction was sufficiently resolved on the evening of 
January 20, 2011 which prompted the withdrawal of Defendant's Motion for 
Substituted Counsel on January 21, 2011; 
"4. 
Defendant failed to show a complete breakdown in communication with his 
appointed defense counsel. The Court finds that Defendant was able to 
communicate with his attorney throughout the proceedings and participate in his 
defense; 
"5. 
Because [Brown] did not present sufficient evidence to show 1) a conflict of 
interest, 2) an irreconcilable disagreement, or 3) a complete breakdown in 
14 
 
 
 
communications, he failed to [show] justifiable dissatisfaction with his appointed 
defense counsel and therefore his request for substituted counsel is without merit; 
"6. 
[Brown] had adequate representation throughout the proceedings and was not 
prejudiced by the withdrawal of his motion for substituted counsel." 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
The record shows that, on remand, the district court fully inquired into the alleged 
conflict between Mank and Brown. When, as here, the district court makes "an 
appropriate inquiry" into a motion to appoint new counsel and denies the motion, the 
defendant's burden on appeal is to show that the district court abused its discretion in 
denying the motion. State v. Stovall, 298 Kan. 362, 370, 312 P.3d 1271 (2013); see State 
v. Bryant, 285 Kan. 970, 986, 179 P.3d 1122 (2008); State v. Sappington, 285 Kan. 176, 
196, 169 P.3d 1107 (2007); see also State v. Vann, 280 Kan. 782, Syl. ¶ 1, 127 P.3d 307 
(2006) (explaining a district court necessarily abuses its discretion when it makes no 
inquiry into a conflict).  
 
A district court abuses its discretion if its action is 
 
"(1) arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, i.e., no reasonable person would take the view 
adopted by the trial court; (2) based on an error of law, i.e., the discretion is guided by an 
erroneous legal conclusion; or (3) based on an error of fact, i.e., substantial competent 
evidence does not support a factual finding on which a prerequisite conclusion of law or 
the exercise of discretion is based." Stovall, 298 Kan. at 370. 
 
Brown recognizes our abuse of discretion standard of review and contends that no 
reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the district court in this case. 
See Bryant, 285 Kan. at 986. After examining the applicable law and considering the 
facts of this case, we reject his argument.  
 
15 
 
 
 
Applicable Law 
 
The right to effective counsel for criminal defendants is deeply rooted in American 
jurisprudence and embedded in both the Kansas and United States Constitutions. Gideon 
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963); State v. Brown, 
300 Kan. 565, 574-75, 331 P.3d 797 (2014). See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984) (to succeed in an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show that an attorney's performance was 
constitutionally deficient and that the errors were grave enough to deprive the defendant 
of a fair trial).  
 
Sometimes a defendant prefers different counsel from the one appointed. But the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not provide an indigent 
defendant a right to "compel the district court to appoint the counsel of [his or her] 
choice." State v. Burnett, 300 Kan. 419, 449, 329 P.3d 1169 (2014); see State v. Banks, 
216 Kan. 390, 393, 532 P.2d 1058 (1975) (asserting a defendant "does not have a right to 
be represented by a particular lawyer"). Only if the defendant demonstrates justifiable 
dissatisfaction with his or her current counsel does the Sixth Amendment require a court 
to appoint new counsel. Banks, 216 Kan. at 393-94.  
 
Justifiable dissatisfaction can be shown through a conflict of interest, an 
irreconcilable disagreement, or a complete breakdown in communication. Burnett, 300 
Kan. at 449; Brown, 300 Kan. at 575. Brown argues there was a complete breakdown of 
communication between himself and Mank, a state of affairs which established justifiable 
dissatisfaction with Mank and entitled Brown to different counsel.  
 
But disagreements or a lack of communication between a defendant and counsel 
will not always rise to the level of justifiable dissatisfaction. See, e.g., Bryant, 285 Kan. 
16 
 
 
 
at 991-93; State v. McGee, 280 Kan. 890, 897, 126 P.3d 1110 (2006); cf. State v. 
Ferguson, 254 Kan. 62, 71, 864 P.2d 693 (1993) ("[L]ack of cooperation or 
communication between defendant and trial counsel does not in and of itself constitute a 
violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel."). "'"[A]s long as the trial court has a 
reasonable basis for believing the attorney-client relation has not deteriorated to a point 
where appointed counsel can no longer give effective aid in the fair presentation of a 
defense, the court is justified in refusing to appoint new counsel."'" Bryant, 285 Kan. at 
986-87 (quoting Ferguson, 254 Kan. at 70). 
 
Thus, on remand, the district court had to determine whether Brown's relationship 
with Mank had deteriorated to the point that counsel can no longer provide effective aid 
toward a fair presentation of a defense—not whether Mank was willing to present the 
exact defense requested by Brown. See Bryant, 285 Kan. at 986-87. While criminal 
defendants are in charge of three decisions—(1) what plea to enter; (2) whether to waive 
the right to a jury trial; and (3) whether to testify on their own behalf—"'strategic and 
tactical decisions are the exclusive province of the lawyer after consultation with his 
client.'" Banks, 216 Kan. at 395 (quoting Winter v. State, 210 Kan. 597, Syl. ¶ 2, 502 P.2d 
733 [1972]); see State v. Rivera, 277 Kan. 109, 116-17, 83 P.3d 169 (2004). And, even 
for those strategic and tactical decisions, "consultation" does not mean the attorney must 
ask a defendant's permission—it merely "implies a general discussion between counsel 
and the client." State v. Bafford, 255 Kan. 888, 895, 879 P.2d 613 (1994); see Rivera, 277 
Kan. at 117. 
 
Finally, even should a substantial break in communication occur, if the district 
court "restore[s] communication between defense counsel and client" or determines that 
communication has otherwise been restored, it may be "unnecessary to appoint substitute 
counsel." State v. Cromwell, 253 Kan. 495, 504, 856 P.2d 1299 (1993). 
 
17 
 
 
 
No Abuse of Discretion in Denying Brown's Dissatisfaction Claims 
 
Although Brown's original motion for substitute counsel could be fairly read to 
touch on all three areas of justifiable dissatisfaction—conflict of interest, irreconcilable 
disagreement, and complete breakdown in communication—on appeal he limits his 
argument to an alleged complete breakdown in communication. He does not, for 
example, challenge the district court's conclusion that a threat of a disciplinary complaint 
did not create a conflict of interest because no such complaint was ever filed. See State v. 
Robertson, 30 Kan. App. 2d 639, 642-49, 44 P.3d 1283 (2002). Nor does he presently 
allege any irreconcilable disagreements. He also makes no further mention of any 
particular issue with discovery requests. We will not disturb the district court's rulings 
which Brown has not continued to challenge. See State v. Williams, 298 Kan. 1075, 1083, 
319 P.3d 528 (2014) ("When a litigant fails to adequately brief an issue it is deemed 
abandoned."). 
 
As to the arguments he does present, we conclude the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in determining Brown did not establish justifiable dissatisfaction with 
Mank. Brown testified he met with Mank at least six times prior to filing his motion, and 
he explained he just looked at Mank as being his attorney. He indicated there were "some 
things that I did disagree with Mr. Mank" but, when asked to elaborate, only explained 
that he did not feel Mank properly considered his input. These complaints amount to 
disagreements with Mank's trial strategy, the "'exclusive province of the lawyer.'" Banks, 
216 Kan. at 395 (quoting Winter, 210 Kan. 597, Syl. ¶ 2). Brown acknowledged he and 
Mank spoke about the case and trial strategy (and Mank testified he sent Brown 30 letters 
keeping him advised of the case and what trial strategy might look like), and Mank's legal 
decision to pursue what he believed was the best strategy does not show a complete 
breakdown in communication. See Bafford, 255 Kan. at 895 (explaining an attorney has a 
duty to have a general discussion with the client about strategy and tactics). Brown does 
18 
 
 
 
not demonstrate Mank "shut down" his attempts at assistance; in fact, the record 
affirmatively indicates Mank consulted with Brown before making certain strategic 
decisions. The record certainly does not support Brown's allegation that Mank refused to 
communicate "'at any level.'"  
 
We acknowledge that Brown disputes both the amount of communication and 
whether the communication was meaningful and allowed him to participate in his own 
defense, but the record simply does not corroborate his contentions. Even after Brown 
filed his motion for substitute counsel, he and Mank spoke about the case—as Brown 
himself acknowledged at the post-remand hearing. Mank, for his part, testified he met 
with Brown prior to the scheduled hearing on his motion for substitute counsel, at which 
point Brown told him that he was fine with Mank's representation if Mank could give his 
case full attention. See Cromwell, 253 Kan. at 504 (stating that if communication 
between a defendant and counsel is restored, it may be unnecessary to appoint substitute 
counsel); see also McGee, 280 Kan. at 897 (asserting that disagreement about the time 
spent on a case does not rise to the level of a conflict of interest). We are unconvinced by 
Brown's argument that his relationship with Mank at this point was irrelevant because he 
was convinced he had no other options. Brown was not entitled to counsel of his 
choosing. See Banks, 216 Kan. at 393. And the district court had a reasonable basis upon 
which to conclude that Brown had not shown justifiable dissatisfaction, there had not 
been a complete breakdown in communication, and Mank was still able to give effective 
aid in the fair presentation of a defense. See Bryant, 285 Kan. at 986. 
 
Under different facts, we would be troubled by Brown's veiled contention 
regarding his right to testify in his own defense. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also U.S. 
Const. amend. V. A criminal defendant's decision whether to testify must not be left up to 
the lawyer; it is not a matter of mere trial strategy. See Rivera, 277 Kan. at 116-17. But 
we do not understand Brown's present argument to be that he was actually denied his 
19 
 
 
 
right to testify. See Taylor v. State, 252 Kan. 98, 103-04, 843 P.2d 682 (1992) (discussing 
a habeas petitioner's contention that he was "denied his constitutional right to testify in 
his own behalf through ineffective assistance of counsel"). Instead, Brown seems to be 
arguing that he listened to Mank about the wisdom of not testifying because he felt stuck 
with him—a contention which, as we outlined above, is not supported in the record. 
Brown was afforded an unambiguous opportunity to exert his right to testify, and the 
district court fully and carefully explained the decision to testify was a decision Brown—
not his attorney—controlled. After this discussion, Brown declined to testify. As we 
explained above, there is a reasonable basis for the district court's decision that there had 
not been a complete breakdown in communication, and so Brown's subjective feelings 
about Mank did not amount to justifiable dissatisfaction. Indeed, Brown never stated 
Mank refused to let him exercise his right to testify; he only intimated Mank advised him 
it was probably not in his best interest—advice which Brown knew he was free to 
disregard because he was told as much by the district court. 
 
In conclusion, we hold the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining 
that Brown did not carry his burden to show justifiable dissatisfaction with Mank. See 
Stovall, 298 Kan. at 370. The court had a reasonable basis for believing the attorney–
client relationship had not deteriorated to a point where Mank could no longer effectively 
assist Brown in the fair presentation of a defense.  
 
The district court's decision regarding Brown's motion is affirmed. This means we 
have now rejected all of Brown's attacks on his convictions and sentence made on direct 
appeal, and his convictions and sentences are now affirmed.  
 
 
Affirmed.