Title: EDWARD ELLIOTT v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

EDWARD ELLIOTT v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 32Case Number: No. S-10-0074Decided: 02/24/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 

EDWARD 
ELLIOTT,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff).

 
 
W.R.A.P. 
11 Certification from the District Court of Converse 
County

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

R. 
Michael Vang of Fleener & Vang, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Leda M. 
Pojman, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Pojman.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      This matter comes 
before the Court as a question certified to us by the district court for 
resolution under W.R.A.P. 11.  The 
Appellant is Edward Elliot and the Appellee is the State of Wyoming (State). 
 As rephrased by this Court, the 
question to be decided is:

 
 
Does 
collateral estoppel apply to an Office of Administrative Hearing [examiner's] 
ruling that found an officer lacked probable cause to arrest a defendant under 
Wyoming's implied consent statute, for the same incidents resulting in the 
defendant's conditional plea for DWUI?1

 
 

[¶2]      We answer the 
certified question in the 
negative and remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In accordance 
with W.R.A.P. 11.03(b), the district court provided this statement of all facts 
relevant to the question certified:

 
 
On 
January 17, 2009, Edward Elliot, the Defendant/Licensee/Appellant was arrested 
by Officer Curtis Bennett of the Douglas Police Department for driving while 
under the influence (DWUI) in Converse County Wyoming in violation of Wyoming 
Statute §31-5-233.  [Elliott] 
appeared through counsel at his implied consent hearing, which was held on April 
1, 2009.  WYDOT appeared and 
presented evidence through the Officer's 
Signed Statement and certified record, and [Elliott] appeared via telephone 
with his attorney. 

            
During the implied consent hearing the OAH allowed [Elliott] to 
supplement the record with a copy of a DVD of the stop and arrest that [Elliott] 
had received from the Converse County attorney's Office thorough criminal 
discovery, as well as allowing [him] to file a Motion to Vacate Proposed Suspension.  

            
On April 30, 2009, OAH entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
Decision and Order Rescinding Per Se Suspension.  

            
On May 18, 2009, [Elliott] mailed to the Clerk of Converse County Circuit 
Court a Motion to Dismiss Based on 
Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata.  The State responded to this motion 
on May 29, 2009 with State's Response to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Based on Collateral Estoppel and Res 
Judicata[.]  The Circuit Court 
denied [Elliott's] motion and allowed a conditional plea and appeal to resolve 
the certified question in this case.  

            
The parties have stipulated that the following facts apply to all of the 
proceedings:

(1)  
The 
hearing examiner determined that there was no probable cause to arrest [Elliott] 
pursuant to Wyoming Statute § 31-6-102(a)(i)(A);

(2)  
Probable 
cause is an element in both the implied consent hearing and the underlying DWUI 
charge;

(3)  
The 
officer in every case was required to fill out an Officer's Signed Statement  under penalty of perjury, which is the 
certified record and only evidence the officer is required to file to support a 
proposed suspension under Wyoming's Implied Consent Law[.] (citations 
omitted);

(4)  
The 
Officer's Signed Statement contains a 
place at the very bottom of the form right below the officer's signature line 
that states in bold print that:  "I 
request to be subpoenaed to an administrative hearing (OAH) if one is 
requested.  __ initials."  

(5)  
When 
an officer initials in the box requesting to be subpoenaed to an OAH implied 
consent hearing, the officer is generally subpoenaed by the Wyoming Attorney 
General's Office, which will appear and participate with the officer in the OAH 
implied consent hearing.

(6)  
When 
an officer does not initial the Officer's 
Signed Statement requesting to be subpoenaed, which is the situation in Mr. 
Elliot's case and all of the cases currently pending in District Court in Albany 
County, then the arresting officer is not subpoenaed.  Under these circumstances, neither the 
arresting officer, nor the Wyoming Attorney General's Office participates in the 
hearing, which is what happened in the present appeal.

(7)  
[Elliott] 
and his attorney were the only participants in any of the implied consent 
hearings resulting in the findings of no probable cause to arrest for DWUI that 
[Elliott] is attempting to use as collateral estoppel and res judicata as a 
basis to dismiss the underlying DWUI charge that was the basis of the 
conditional plea and if the issue is resolved in favor of [Elliott] it is a 
dispositive issue that will result in dismissal.  

(8)  
[Elliott] 
preserved the issue of application of collateral estoppel and res judicata 
within his Motion to Dismiss Based on 
Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata[.]

(9)  
[Elliott] 
entered a conditional plea preserving his right to appeal the proposed certified 
question. 

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶4]      Elliot contends 
that the State is collaterally estopped from pursuing a misdemeanor driving 
under the influence prosecution against him because the Office of Administrative 
Hearings (OAH), in proceedings contesting a Wyoming Department of Transportation 
(WYDOT) driver's license suspension, found that the arresting officer lacked 
probable cause to arrest him for driving under the 
influence.

 
 
[¶5]      The preclusion 
doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata apply in the administrative 
context.  However, this Court has 
stated that the issue preclusion associated with collateral estoppel is more 
appropriate in an administrative setting than the claim preclusion doctrine of 
res judicata.  Jacobs v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2009 WY 118, ¶ 12, 216 P.3d 1128, 1132 (Wyo. 2009); 
Slavens v. Board of County Comm'rs for 
Uinta County, 854 P.2d 683, 
685-86 (Wyo. 1993).

 
 
[¶6]      The factors 
considered in determining whether collateral estoppel applies are as 
follows:

(1) 
Whether the issue decided in the prior adjudication was identical with the issue 
presented in the present action; (2) whether the prior adjudication resulted in 
a judgment on the merits; (3) whether the party against whom the collateral 
estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the 
prior adjudication; and (4) whether the party against whom collateral 
estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate 
the issue in the prior proceeding.

 
 

R.C.R., 
Inc. v. Deline, 
2008 WY 96, ¶ 17, 190 P.3d 140, 153 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
[¶7]      Even if the 
elements of collateral estoppel are met, several exceptions may 
apply:

 
 

Although 
an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and 
the determination is essential to the judgment, relitigation of the issue in a 
subsequent action between the parties is not precluded in the following 
circumstances:

 
 

(1)  The 
party against whom preclusion is sought could not, as a matter of law, have 
obtained review of the judgment in the initial action; or

 
 

(2)  The 
issue is one of law and (a) the two actions involve claims that are 
substantially unrelated, or (b) a new determination is warranted in order to 
take account of an intervening change in the applicable legal context or 
otherwise to avoid inequitable administration of the laws; or

 
 
(3)  A 
new determination of the issue is warranted by differences in the quality or 
extensiveness of the procedures followed in the two courts or by factors 
relating to the allocation of jurisdiction between them; 
or

 
 

(4)  The 
party against whom preclusion is sought had a significantly heavier burden of 
persuasion with respect to the issue in the initial action than in the 
subsequent action; the burden has shifted to his adversary; or the adversary has 
a significantly heavier burden than he had in the first action; or

 
 
(5)  There 
is a clear and convincing need for a new determination of the issue (a) because 
of the potential adverse impact of the determination on the public interest or 
the interests of persons not themselves parties in the initial action, (b) 
because it was not sufficiently foreseeable at the time of the initial action 
that the issue would arise in the context of a subsequent action, or (c) because 
the party sought to be precluded, as a result of the conduct of his adversary or 
other special circumstances, did not have an adequate opportunity or incentive 
to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the initial 
action.

 
 
Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments § 28 (1980).

 
 
[¶8]      To understand why 
we are answering the district court's certified question in the negative, we 
begin by analyzing the elements of collateral estoppel in light of the present 
case.  The first two elements are 
met but the last two elements are not.  
We disagree with Elliot's argument that privity exists here because the 
relationship between the governmental agencies in this case is similar to that 
addressed in State v. Eleven Thousand 
Three Hundred Forty-Six Dollars & No Cents in United States Currency, 
777 P.2d 65 (Wyo. 1989). There, this Court found privity to exist because 
the deputy county attorney who handled the criminal prosecution was appointed as 
a special assistant attorney general to initiate and conduct the subsequent 
forfeiture hearing.  Here, we 
disagree that privity similarly exists between WYDOT and the offices of the 
county and district attorneys involved.  
"Privity is not established  from the mere fact that persons may happen 
to be interested in the same question or in proving or disproving the same state 
of facts." 47 Am.Jur. 2d, Judgments § 
589.  Here, WYDOT is only granted 
the authority to suspend a driver's license after an arrest and to thereafter 
defend that suspension in an administrative context.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 16-3-103, 
16-3-104, 16-3-112; 31-5-233; 31-6-102, 31-6-103 (LexisNexis 2009).  On the other hand, the county and 
district attorneys are responsible for prosecuting, investigating, and 
representing the State of Wyoming in all criminal matters.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 9-1-801, 
9-1-804; 18-3-301, 18-3-302 (LexisNexis 2009).  No privity exists between WYDOT and the 
county and district attorneys.

 
 

[¶9]      Moving on to the 
fourth and final element of collateral estoppel, the full and fair opportunity 
to litigate, we are persuaded that county and district attorneys, because of the 
nature of their offices, are denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate any 
issue in an administrative hearing.  
Although we have not formally held that collateral estoppel does not 
prevent the State from litigating issues at a criminal trial that were 
previously decided in an administrative setting, we see the point of doing so 
due to the differing purposes and policies behind the two types of 
proceedings.  When 
applying collateral estoppel to an issue raised in a civil action, which issue 
was previously litigated in a criminal action, we have said that criminal 
proceedings present a defendant with a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 
issues because a criminal defendant has strong incentives to defend vigorously 
the charges against him. Worman v. Carver, 2002 WY 59, ¶ 21, 44 P.3d 82, 87-88 (Wyo. 2002).  We have generally 
acknowledged, however, the purpose of maintaining the separate proceedings.  In fact, in the very recent case, Bowen v. State, 2011 WY 1, 245 P.3d 827, 
(Wyo. 2011), the criminal proceedings afforded the appellant a full 
evidentiary hearing wherein he offered evidence, examined witnesses, and made 
arguments.  We concluded that the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the appellant from re-litigating the 
question of whether his breath test results were legally obtained.  Bowen, ¶ 12, 245 P.3d  at 831.  Taking that into account, we note, 
as did the Bowen court, that 
"courts have addressed the applicability of collateral estoppel under 
other circumstances involving criminal and administrative cases." Id., ¶ 11 n.3, 245 P.3d. at 
831.  See Huelsman v. Kansas Dep't of 
Revenue, 980 P.2d 1022, 1025-27 (Kan. 1999) (suppression of evidence 
in DUI prosecution based on lack of probable cause did not collaterally estop 
state from arguing in license suspension proceeding that officer had "reasonable 
grounds" to request a breath test pursuant to the implied consent law); State 
v. Young, 530 N.W.2d 269, 273-77 (Neb. App. 1995) (holding that collateral 
estoppel does not require a criminal court to accept as binding an 
administrative proceeding's license revocation determination); In re 
Mehrer, 273 N.W.2d 194, 194, 197 (S.D. 1979) (no collateral estoppel in license revocation 
proceedings despite dismissal of DUI charge against defendant in criminal case 
because different elements must be proven to show DUI versus violation of 
implied consent laws).

 
 
[¶10]   Further illustrating the foregoing 
point, we cite to People v. Hackman, 
567 N.E.2d 1109, 1110-11 (Ill. App. 1 Dist. 1991), wherein the court held it 
would not apply collateral estoppel in a criminal prosecution to a prior 
determination made in a hearing to rescind a driver's summary license 
suspension:

 
 

Our 
supreme court 
in People v. Moore (1990), 138 Ill. 2d 162, recently decided the issue of 
whether determinations made in a summary suspension hearing may be used to 
collaterally estop the litigation of a question at a later criminal trial. Prior 
to this decision, the majority of the districts of the Illinois Appellate Court 
found that collateral estoppel could not be used to preclude re-litigation of an 
issue that had previously been decided at a rescission hearing. (See People v. 
Flynn (1990), 
197 Ill. App. 3d 13; People v. 
Filitti (1989), 
190 Ill. App. 3d 884; People v. 
Stice (1988), 
168 Ill. App. 3d 662.) The appellate court in People v. Moore 
(1989), 184 Ill. App. 3d 102, was the only panel that had reached a contrary decision.

 
 

Our 
supreme court, in reversing the Moore appellate court decision, first 
acknowledged that although the distinction between the functions of a suspension 
hearing in a driving-under-the-influence case and a preliminary criminal hearing 
was 
slight, there was still a difference in the two procedures. Moore, 138 Ill. 2d  at 169.

 
 
The 
court explained that the legislative purpose of license suspension hearings was 
to provide an expeditious means of having a defendant's case heard in the 
context of an extremely limited scope. (People v. Moore (1990), 138 Ill. 2d 162, 169.) In finding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not 
preclude the litigation of certain issues previously decided at the defendant's 
suspension hearing, the court stated: 

 
 

"[I]f 
these proceedings were given preclusive effect, it would render meaningless this 
legislative purpose. That is, the practical effect would be that the State could 
not rely on the sworn police report at these proceedings but, rather, would be 
required to have the arresting officer, and other witnesses, testify. The goal 
of conducting swift hearings for the sole purpose of determining whether a court 
has sufficient reason to rescind summary 
suspension of a motorist's driving privileges will be thwarted. Given this 
probable result, and the fact that no injustice will be done to either party by 
declining to give preclusive effect to these license suspension hearings, we 
decline to do so." Moore, 138 Ill. 2d  at 169.

 
 

Id., 657 N.E.2d  at 1111 (citations omitted).  We agree 
with the reasoning that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply so as 
to preclude the State from litigating the issues at defendant's criminal trial, 
that had been previously decided at an administrative 
hearing.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶11]   We answer the certified question in 
the negative.  Collateral estoppel does not apply to an Office of 
Administrative Hearing [examiner's] ruling that found an officer lacked probable 
cause to arrest a defendant under Wyoming's implied consent statute, for the 
same incidents resulting in the defendant's conditional plea for 
DWUI.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 
Although 
Elliot included in his issue the companion argument of res judicata, he conceded 
in his reply brief that res judicata does not apply in this situation.  We agree.  The proper doctrine for our 
consideration here is, instead, collateral estoppel.  While res judicata bars the 
re-litigation of previously litigated claims or causes of action, the prior 
adjudication we attend to in this case determined that the officer did not have 
probable cause to arrest Elliot, hence the consideration of "issue 
preclusion."