Title: Mottner v. Town of Mercer Island

State: washington

Issuer: Washington Supreme Court

Document:

75 Wn.2d 575 (1969) 452 P.2d 750 ROBERT L. MOTTNER et al., Appellants, v. TOWN OF MERCER ISLAND, Respondent.[*] No. 39490. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department One. March 27, 1969. Allen, DeGarmo & Leedy and Seth W. Morrison, for appellants. Monheimer, Schermer, Van Fredenberg & Smith and David D. Hoff, for respondent. McGOVERN, J. May 1966, the Town of Mercer Island caused an "Advertisement for Bids" to be published in its official newspaper. The stated purpose of the publication *576 was the solicitation of bids for the construction of a public sewer. Included within that advertisement were the following provisions: Contained within the plans and specifications referred to in the advertisement was an instruction for bidders that stated: In response to that published advertisement, plaintiffs and others submitted their bids within the prescribed period of time. They were publicly opened at the time designated in the advertisement and plaintiffs' bid of $34,897 was the lowest of those submitted. *577 Subsequently, at about 4 p.m. on the same day, the town mayor went to the Mercer Island Post Office and picked up an envelope containing a bid by Eerkes Contracting, Inc., in the sum of $31,948.70. It had been mailed from Mount Vernon on the preceding day and received at the Mercer Island Post Office about noon on the day in question. June 6, 1966, at a regular meeting, with plaintiffs and their attorney in attendance and participating, the city council of the Town of Mercer Island considered all bids as submitted and thereafter made the following findings: The Eerkes Contracting, Inc. bid was then accepted as the lowest bid for the project. Plaintiffs thereupon initiated this lawsuit, contending: (1) that the city's advertisement constituted an offer to contract; (2) that the offer was accepted by them; (3) that the city failed to perform as required by that contract; and (4) that plaintiffs were thereby damaged. The sole prayer for relief was for damages in the sum of $13,000 plus interest. The defendant city's answer was in the form of a general denial. It also affirmatively alleged that the plaintiffs were without standing to bring the action and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which the requested relief could be granted. Interrogatories and their answers, requests for admissions and responses thereto, affidavits and briefs were all filed and considered by the trial court when the defendant city moved for a summary judgment. This appeal was taken from the order granting that motion. We affirm. The complaint failed to state a cause of action for which damages may be awarded. *578 First, plaintiffs contend that the published advertisement constituted an offer to contract and that their low bid, meeting the time requirements and other essentials, amounted to an acceptance of that offer. They argue that they are, therefore, merely seeking damages for breach of that contract. [1] We are satisfied that the published advertisement was not an offer to contract, but was, instead, the solicitation of an offer. In fact, the terms of the advertisement make it perfectly clear that the defendant was only seeking offers. The invitation expressly stated that "[t]he right is reserved [by the town] to reject any and all bids"; it further advised that the town retained the right "to waive informalities in the bidding"; and it said that the town withheld the right to give particular attention to the qualifications of bidders when considering the award. Each such reservation was a material part of the invitation, inconsistent with plaintiffs' theory that the advertisement was an offer, and requires us to reject the assignment of claimed error. Generally, as here, it is the acceptance of a bid for public work which constitutes the contract, not the tender. Plaintiffs argue that they should have the right to recover damages because the statute controlling the call for the bids in question, RCW 35.23.352, expressly states, in part, that "[t]he city council or commission of the city or town shall let the contract to the lowest responsible bidder or shall have power by resolution to reject any or all bids...." They argue that theirs was the lowest responsible bid made within the required time and that since all bids were not rejected, then theirs had to be accepted. Because it was not accepted they ask for damages. [2] Plaintiffs misinterpret the purpose of that statute. Its mantle of protection was not intended to benefit the unsuccessful contractor seeking a public work contract, but rather the tax paying public from arbitrary, capricious, fraudulent conduct on the part of public officials who would favor, without legitimate cause, someone other than the low bidder. The statute, therefore, affords plaintiffs no remedy in damages. *579 Nor does it support a claim for reimbursement of the costs involved in preparing the bid, a recovery sometimes allowed in cases of extreme bad faith or fraud practiced by the public officials. See Heyer Prods. Co. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. (Ct. Cl. 1956). Plaintiffs here make no claim of fraud and no evidence of such appears in the record. [3] Plaintiffs' bid may only be considered as an offer to contract and, since it was not accepted, cannot then be the legal basis for a claim to damages. Even the motive for rejection is not a consideration when damages are sought. We still adhere to the principle adopted by this court in Bellingham American Pub. Co. v. Bellingham Pub. Co., 145 Wash. 25, 29, 258 Pac. 836 (1927), wherein we said: [4] In Times Pub. Co. v. Everett, 9 Wash. 518, 37 Pac. 695 (1894), we announced what we considered to be an appropriate remedy for the bidder on a public work contract who feels aggrieved by the action of the government. We reaffirmed the rule in Bellingham American Pub. Co. v. Bellingham Pub. Co., supra, at 29, and we now reiterate: The plaintiffs did not in this action seek injunctive relief. Instead they sought a remedy that is not available to them, that is monetary damages. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. FINLEY, WEAVER, and ROSELLINI, JJ., and POYHONEN, J. Pro Tem., concur. [*] Reported in 452 P.2d 750.