Title: Commonwealth v. Sylvester

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11966  
 
 
 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  WILLIAM JOSEPH SYLVESTER. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     April 4, 2016. - November 9, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ.1 
 
 
 
Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act. 
Community Parole Supervision for Life.  Constitutional Law, 
Sex offender, Plea, Assistance of counsel.  Practice, 
Criminal, Plea, Assistance of counsel. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Quincy Division of 
the District Court Department on July 11, 2002.  
 
 
A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, filed on July 25, 
2013, was heard by Mary A. Orfanello, J.  
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review.  
 
 
 
Jeffrey Harris for the defendant. 
 
Susanne M. O'Neil, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Merritt Schnipper, for Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
                     
 
1 Justices Spina, Cordy, and Duffly participated in the 
deliberation on this case prior to their retirements. 
2 
 
 
HINES, J.  The issue in this appeal is whether plea counsel 
was constitutionally ineffective under the right to counsel 
guaranties of the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution or art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights when counsel advised the defendant in 2002 that he would 
need to "register" if he decided to plead guilty to indecent 
assault and battery, a sex offense under G. L. c. 6, § 178C, 
without explaining the consequences of sex offender 
registration.  We conclude that plea counsel was not 
constitutionally ineffective in rendering this advice in 2002, 
although we leave for another day the question whether such 
advice would be constitutionally ineffective based on the 
current statutory scheme for sex offender registration.  We 
affirm the decision of the District Court judge denying the 
defendant's motion to vacate his guilty plea.2   
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the material facts in the 
record, reserving certain details for later discussion.3  On July 
                     
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services.   
 
 
3 The facts of the underlying crime are taken from the 
police report.  The facts are disputed insofar as the defendant 
averred that he would not have pleaded guilty if not for plea 
counsel's failure to properly advise him and appellate counsel 
argues that it "can be inferred" from this assertion that the 
defendant "either disputed the facts in the police report or may 
have had a defense to the crime, such as arguing consent or that 
 
3 
 
9, 2002, the defendant, then twenty-three years of age, 
approached a fifteen year old female from behind as she was 
standing with four teenage friends in a subway station in 
Quincy.  The defendant placed his hands on the female's buttocks 
and began to "massage" them.  He also tried to prevent her 
retreat by running in front of her, grabbing her front pockets, 
and pulling her close to him.   
 
The defendant walked away, but returned several minutes 
later and robbed the one male in the group.  He first took 
thirty dollars from a sweater the male was holding and later 
removed a silver chain from the male's neck.  The teenagers 
asked someone in the subway station to call the police.  
 
The teenagers described the defendant, including a tattoo 
on his hand, to police.  The next day, the police drove the two 
victims to the subway station in an unmarked vehicle.  
Approximately one and one-half hours later, both victims 
simultaneously identified the defendant when he walked into 
their view.  They both identified the silver chain that the 
defendant was wearing as that belonging to the male victim.  The 
defendant was charged and in November, 2002, pleaded guilty to 
the indecent assault and battery charge and two counts of 
larceny from a person.  Insofar as relevant here, the plea judge 
                                                                  
he was actually trying to steal from [the female victim]'s back 
pockets, and not fondle her."  
4 
 
imposed a sentence of eighteen months in a house of correction, 
six months to be served and the balance suspended, with 
probation for two years on the indecent assault and battery 
charge.   
 
In February, 2003, a notice of probation violation was 
issued to the defendant for committing a new offense, 
shoplifting, and failing to register as a sex offender with the 
Sex Offender Registry Board.  The defendant was found to be in 
violation of his probation and was sentenced to serve the 
remainder of his suspended sentence.  Thereafter, the defendant 
was convicted for a host of other charges between 2004 and 2013, 
including the failure to register as a sex offender in 2004, 
2007, and 2012.  In 2008, the defendant pleaded guilty to the 
2008 failure to register charge and a Superior Court judge 
sentenced the defendant to probation for three years and imposed 
community parole supervision for life.4  
                     
 
4 In 2006, the Legislature made community parole supervision 
for life (CPSL) a mandatory component of the sentence for a sex 
offender who had been convicted of certain sex offenses and was 
later convicted of failure to register.  St. 2006, c. 139, 
§§ 26, 27, amending G. L. c. 6, § 178H.  In Commonwealth v. 
Cole, 468 Mass. 294, 308 (2014), we held CPSL unconstitutional 
because it "constitutes an impermissible delegation to the 
executive branch of the core judicial function of imposing 
sentences, and therefore violates the mandate of art. 30 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights."  
 
5 
 
 
In July, 2013, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his 
2002 guilty plea or for a new trial under Mass. R. Crim. P. 
30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), concerning the 
indecent assault and battery charge, arguing that his plea 
counsel was constitutionally ineffective and his plea was 
therefore involuntary because he did not fully appreciate the 
consequences of pleading guilty to a sex offense.  Specifically, 
the defendant asserted the following in an affidavit:  (1) plea 
counsel "did not explain to me that the consequences of pleading 
guilty to indecent assault and battery meant that I would become 
a sex offender and that I might have to register with the police 
indefinitely"; (2) on the day of the plea hearing, counsel 
advised that "I would 'have to register' but did not explain 
what this meant.  I had no idea that this meant that I had to 
report as a sex offender"5; and (3) "[h]ad I fully understood 
that 'registering' meant that I would be a sex offender and that 
I would have to register as a sex offender and someday be 
subject to lifetime community parole, I would not have pleaded 
guilty to a sex offense."6  The defendant did not present an 
                     
 
5 The defendant asserted that he and plea counsel had this 
discussion at the court house.  The defendant was incarcerated 
after the complaint issued, presumably limiting counsel's 
options in meeting with the defendant.   
 
 
6 For purposes of our analysis in this case, we accept as 
true the defendant's assertion that plea counsel advised him 
 
6 
 
affidavit from plea counsel.  His motion counsel averred that 
plea counsel had told him that plea counsel did not "remember 
anything from that time" and did not respond to repeated 
attempts to obtain an affidavit.  
 
The defendant supported his motion with materials from a 
disciplinary investigation against plea counsel.  In 2007, the 
Board of Bar Overseers (board) filed a petition of discipline 
against plea counsel alleging that he intentionally misused 
client funds from April through September, 2002, and failed to 
make full restitution.7  In mitigation, plea counsel testified at 
an evidentiary hearing before the board that he was abusing 
cocaine at the time that he misused funds and did not have the 
financial resources to complete restitution because of his drug 
abuse.  He testified that "life was nothing but a blur" when he 
was misusing the funds because he was "using cocaine every day."  
The board found that drugs "distorted [counsel's] judgment" and 
considered his remorse, rehabilitation, and good works in 
mitigation of the wrongdoing.  In 2008, plea counsel was 
indefinitely suspended from the practice of law for the misuse 
of and failure to repay client funds.   
                                                                  
that he would need to "register" but did not explain the 
consequences of registration. 
   
 
7 The record reflects that plea counsel filed several 
appropriate motions on the defendant's behalf before the guilty 
plea.   
7 
 
 
The motion judge, who was also the plea judge, denied the 
defendant's motion after concluding, for several reasons, that 
he had failed to establish that plea counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective.  First, the judge noted that CPSL 
did not become law until four years after the defendant entered 
his plea and that counsel was "not required to be clairvoyant."  
Second, relying on Commonwealth v. Shindell, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 
503, 506 (2005), the judge concluded that failure to warn of sex 
offender registration consequences could not be grounds to 
vacate a plea on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel 
because it is a collateral consequence of conviction.  Third, 
the judge found that it was "clear" that the defendant was 
warned of the need to register because the defendant admitted as 
much in his affidavit, the docket reflected the receipt of such 
warnings, and it was her "custom and practice" to do so during 
the plea colloquy.  Fourth, there was no evidence that counsel 
was impaired at the time of the plea or that any asserted 
impairment negatively affected representation.  And fifth, the 
defendant did not demonstrate any prejudice because he had no 
practical defense and could not credibly suggest that a more 
favorable plea could have been negotiated considering the 
strength of the Commonwealth's case against him and the 
defendant's significant and lengthy criminal record. 
8 
 
   
The defendant appealed.  We allowed his application for 
direct appellate review.  
 
2.  Standard of review.  "A motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea is treated as a motion for a new trial pursuant to Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 30 (b)."  Commonwealth v. Lavrinenko, 473 Mass. 42, 47 
(2015), quoting Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 468 Mass. 174, 178 
(2014).  We review the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea to "determine whether there has been a significant error of 
law or other abuse of discretion."  Lavrinenko, supra, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 307 (1986).  "A judge may 
make the ruling based solely on the affidavits and must hold an 
evidentiary hearing only if the affidavits or the motion itself 
raises a 'substantial issue' that is supported by a 'substantial 
evidentiary showing.'"  Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336, 
344 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Stewart, 383 Mass. 253, 260 
(1981).  "Particular deference is to be paid to the rulings of a 
motion judge who served as the [plea] judge in the same case." 
Scott, supra, citing Commonwealth v. Leavitt, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 
84, 85 (1985). 
 
3.  Discussion.  "Generally, under Massachusetts law, 
defense counsel's failure to inform a defendant of collateral or 
contingent consequences of a plea does not render a plea 
involuntary."  Commonwealth v. Roberts, 472 Mass. 355, 362 
(2015), quoting Shindell, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 505.  In the 
9 
 
Shindell case, the Appeals Court concluded, on this basis, that 
defense counsel is not constitutionally required to warn of sex 
offender registration consequences.  See Shindell, supra at 508, 
citing Commonwealth v. Fraire, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 916, 918 
(2002).  The defendant argues, however, that the United States 
Supreme Court, in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364-366 & 
n.8 (2010), abrogated the distinction between direct and 
collateral consequences and created a new framework for 
determining whether a consequence of conviction has a uniquely 
"close connection" to the criminal process to require warnings 
under the right to counsel guaranties of the Sixth Amendment.  
Under that framework, the defendant asserts that, to provide 
constitutionally effective assistance, counsel must warn clients 
about consequences of sex offender registration when they are 
considering whether to plead guilty to a "sex offense" as 
defined in G. L. c. 6, § 178C.   
 
In the Padilla case, the Supreme Court considered for the 
first time whether the Sixth Amendment applied to advice about 
deportation, which was not a component of a criminal sentence 
but a "collateral consequence[]" of a conviction.  See Chaidez 
v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1111-1112 (2013).  Noting 
that Kentucky and many other State and lower Federal courts had 
concluded that deportation, as a "collateral" consequence, was 
outside of the scope of the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel, 
10 
 
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365 & n.9, the Supreme Court determined 
that the distinction between direct and collateral consequences 
was not appropriate for deportation analysis because deportation 
is "uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a 
collateral consequence."8  Id. at 366.  Specifically, the Court 
concluded that the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment 
applies to deportation because of its uniquely "close 
connection" to the criminal process, on account of two factors:  
its "nearly . . . automatic result for a broad class" of 
offenders, and "particularly severe" penalty.  Id. at 365, 366.   
 
We have interpreted the Padilla case not as an abrogation 
of the direct and collateral consequence distinction, as the 
defendant suggests, but simply as clarification that deportation 
is not "'collateral' to the criminal justice process" because of 
the court's "deep appreciation of the 'seriousness of 
deportation' for noncitizen defendants."  Commonwealth v. 
Marinho, 464 Mass. 115, 124 (2013), quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 
374.  See Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 466 Mass. 422, 431 n.13 
                     
 
8 The United States Supreme Court noted that it had "never 
applied a distinction between direct and collateral consequences 
to define the scope of 'reasonably professional assistance,'" 
under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984), see 
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010), and that lower 
courts disagree about how to apply the distinction.   Id. at 
364-365 & n.8.  Any such disagreement, however, had no "bearing 
on the disposition" of the case because of the unique nature of 
deportation.  Id. at 364 n.8. 
11 
 
(2013), S.C., 473 Mass. 832 (2016), quoting Marinho, supra at 
125 n.14 ("We have recently underscored that 'characterizations 
of immigration consequences as 'collateral' are no longer good 
law").  See Roberts, 472 Mass. at 363 n.10 ("it is clear that 
the Court's holding [in the Padilla case] was limited to the 
context of deportation").  This interpretation is supported by 
the Supreme Court in the Chaidez case, wherein the Court noted 
that it "did not eschew the direct-collateral divide across the 
board" in the Padilla case, but rather concluded that the 
distinction was "ill-suited" for deportation consequences.  
Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1112, quoting Padilla, supra at 366.  In 
that regard, we reiterate our conclusion that the only mandate 
stemming from the Padilla case is that deportation may not be 
treated as a collateral consequence outside the scope of the 
Sixth Amendment.   
 
Although not required, the framework used in the Padilla 
case -- to determine whether deportation was sufficiently close 
to the criminal process to be within the scope of the Sixth 
Amendment -- can be applied here.  Other jurisdictions have 
applied the factors discussed in the Padilla case to sex 
offender registration consequences with mixed results.9  Applying 
                     
 
9 Compare State v. Trotter, 330 P.3d 1267, 1274-1275 (Utah 
2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 944 (2015) (sex offender 
registration not within scope of Sixth Amendment where "onerous" 
 
12 
 
the Padilla factors to this case, we reject the defendant's 
contention that the sex offender registry scheme as it existed 
in 2002 had a uniquely close connection to the criminal process 
such that it should be included within the scope of 
constitutionally required warnings under the Sixth Amendment.  
Even though we agree that consequences of the sex offender 
registry statutes are "practically inevitable," Padilla, 559 
U.S. at 364, after a defendant pleads guilty to a "sex offense" 
as defined therein, we conclude that the accompanying penalties, 
as they existed in 2002, were not so severe as to require 
defense counsel to advise clients about consequences of 
registration as a constitutional matter.   
 
a.  Likelihood of consequences.  In Padilla, 559 U.S. at 
363-364, the Supreme Court observed that deportation became 
"practically inevitable" after the effective date of the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
which amended the Immigration and Nationality Act.  See 
                                                                  
burdens do not "rise to the same level of severity as 
deportation"), with Taylor v. State, 304 Ga. App. 878, 882-884 
(2010) (defense counsel must advise of sex offender registration 
because penalties such as public dissemination of registration 
information are particularly severe), and People v. Fonville, 
291 Mich. App. 363, 391-392 (2011) (same; penalties included 
residency restrictions).  See United States v. Riley, 72 M.J. 
115, 120-122 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (in military justice system, where 
standards for plea colloquy are stricter and judge's guide 
commands sex offender registration warnings before accepting a 
plea, sex offender registration no longer collateral consequence 
to plea). 
13 
 
Commonwealth v. Clarke, 460 Mass. 30, 45 (2011), citing Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (eff. Apr. 1, 1997).  See also 
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 292 
(2001).  This act, which eliminated the Attorney General's 
authority to grant discretionary relief that had been exercised 
in more than 10,000 cases in the prior five years, followed 
several changes in immigration law that reduced avenues 
available for discretionary relief from deportation.  Padilla, 
559 U.S. at 363.  Although the Court noted that the Attorney 
General retained the possibility to "exercise . . . limited 
remnants of equitable discretion . . . to cancel removal for 
noncitizens convicted of particular classes of offenses," this 
relief was generally not available with respect to the offense 
for which the defendant had pleaded guilty.10  Id. at 364, citing 
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(B), 1228, 1229b.     
                     
 
10 As a matter of Massachusetts law, the holding in the 
Padilla case applies retroactively to the date on which 
deportation became "nearly an automatic result" of specific 
convictions for certain offenders, see Commonwealth v. Clarke, 
460 Mass. 30, 45 (2011), quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366, i.e., 
the effective date of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 
Stat. 3009-546, Apr. 1, 1997.  See Commonwealth v. Mercado, 474 
Mass. 80, 81-82 (2016), in which this court concluded that the 
holding in the Padilla case applies retroactively to the 
effective date of another 1996 amendment to the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (eff. Apr. 24, 1996), 
for convictions of certain controlled substances charges.  See 
also Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 
 
14 
 
 
In Roberts, 472 Mass. at 363, the issue was whether civil 
confinement as a sexually dangerous person was "practically 
inevitable" such that notification of such consequences was 
required by the Sixth Amendment.  In that case, neither the 
judge nor defense counsel warned the defendant of this 
possibility before he pleaded guilty to sex offenses that could 
serve as a predicate to civil commitment.  Id. at 356.  Although 
the defendant claimed ineffective assistance of counsel in his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the motion judge had not 
ruled on the issue and it was not before the court.  Id. at 363 
n.10.  We considered the judge's failure to give such warnings 
as a matter of due process.  Id. at 362.  We concluded that 
civil confinement was a collateral consequence of conviction 
because it was not "virtually mandatory" and, thus, the omission 
of such warnings did not rise to the level of constitutional 
error.  Id. at 363-364.  Specifically, we reasoned that, unlike 
deportation, the government has discretion whether to initiate 
civil confinement proceedings and, even if initiated, the 
government has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
                                                                  
289, 292 (2001).  Conversely, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
holding in the Padilla case does not apply retroactively to 
collateral challenges under Federal law.  Chaidez v. United 
States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1105, 1111 (2013).  We affirmed 
retroactive application of Padilla to collateral challenges 
under Massachusetts law after the Chaidez case.  Commonwealth v. 
Sylvain, 466 Mass. 422, 424 (2013), S.C., 473 Mass. 832 (2016). 
 
15 
 
person is sexually dangerous, a result that includes more 
elements than the underlying conviction.  Id. at 363.  
 
The duty to register, however, does not require a separate 
step by a different authority before it attaches.  Under our sex 
offender registry scheme, G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C-178Q, "there is a 
presumption that sex offenders must register."  Commonwealth v. 
Ronald R., 450 Mass. 262, 264 (2007).  The duty to register 
"commences with the conviction of a sex offense."  Commonwealth 
v. Domino, 465 Mass. 569, 581 (2013).  It is only after 
conviction and the associated duty to register has attached that 
a sex offender may obtain relief from registration.  Id.  Two 
statutory procedures provide relief in limited circumstances, 
but a defendant who receives a committed sentence, such as here, 
is unlikely to benefit from such relief.  See G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178E (e) (procedure for relief from registration by motion of 
Commonwealth); G. L. c. 6, § 178E (f) (relief from registration 
after discretionary findings by sentencing judge where sex 
offender "has not been sentenced to immediate confinement").  A 
sex offender is entitled to a hearing to determine his or her 
classification level, but that classification does not trigger 
the duty to register, it "simply defines the scope of the 
requirement already imposed upon conviction of an enumerated sex 
offense" (footnote omitted).  Domino, supra.  Accordingly, the 
duty to register as a sex offender is a "practically certain" 
16 
 
effect of a conviction for a sex offense as defined in G. L. 
c. 6, § 178C.   
 
b.  Impact and recognition of consequences.  Under the 
second factor, the Supreme Court reviewed the "seriousness" of 
the consequence and States' statutory recognition of the 
"critical" need to provide warnings about such consequences.  
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 373-374 & n.15.   
 
i.  Severity of penalty.  The Court recognized that 
deportation is a "particularly severe" penalty, because it is 
"the equivalent of banishment or exile."  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 
365, 373, quoting Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 390-
391 (1947).  In that regard, the Court recognized that 
"[p]reserving the client's right to remain in the United States 
may be more important to the client than any potential jail 
sentence."  Padilla, supra at 368, quoting Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. at 322.   
 
The defendant argues that the continuing nature of sex 
offender registration and its limitations on a sex offender's 
liberty make the penalty of registration "particularly severe," 
such that it, too, is within the scope of the Sixth Amendment.  
The defendant focuses on certain aspects of the sex offender 
registry scheme:  Internet dissemination of personal 
information, the requirement for homeless persons to register 
17 
 
every thirty days, and the previously enforced CPSL provision.11  
These penalties, however, were first enacted or became more 
severe after the defendant pleaded guilty in 2002.   
 
Specifically, the Legislature enacted an amendment 
requiring Internet dissemination of sex offender registration 
information in 2003 and it was then only applicable to sex 
offenders classified as level three, the highest risk category.12  
St. 2003, c. 140, § 5.  The requirement for homeless sex 
offenders to update their registration every thirty days was 
enacted in 2010, at the same time that the Legislature required 
                     
 
11 The defendant also argues that ancillary effects of 
reduced employment opportunities and residency restrictions 
increase the severity of the penalty.  These effects would not 
be readily discernable and add little to the analysis.  Although 
we recognize that convicted sex offenders face considerable 
obstacles in securing employment, Commonwealth v. Canadyan, 458 
Mass. 574, 577 n.8 (2010), this obstacle is not unique to those 
convicted of sex offenses.  See Commonwealth v. Pon, 469 Mass. 
296, 307 (2014) (recognizing that "criminal records have a 
deleterious effect on access to employment").  Moreover, the 
defendant has not alerted us to any residency restrictions that 
were in effect in 2002 and only cites to Doe v. Lynn, 472 Mass. 
521, 522 (2015), wherein we upheld the invalidation of a 
residency restriction enacted in 2011.  We certainly agree that 
residential segregation of sex offenders is a very harsh 
penalty, but the defendant has presented no evidence that these 
type of restrictions were in effect at the time that counsel was 
advising the defendant about the consequences of his plea.   
 
 
12 In 2013, the Legislature expanded Internet dissemination 
to include sex offenders classified as level two.  St. 2013, 
c. 38, §§ 7, 9.  We limited this amendment to prospective 
application.  Moe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 467 Mass. 598, 
616 (2014).    
 
18 
 
homeless sex offenders to wear a global positioning system 
device.  St. 2010, c. 256, §§ 40, 42.  In 2002, the applicable 
timeframe was a less burdensome ninety days.13  G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178F, inserted by St. 1999 c. 74, § 2.  Additionally, CPSL was 
not intertwined with the sex offender registry statute until 
2006, when the Legislature amended G. L. c. 6, § 178H, to make 
CPSL a mandatory component of the sentence for a sex offender 
who had been convicted of certain sex offenses and was later 
convicted of failure to register.  St. 2006, c. 139, §§ 26, 27.  
In sum, sex offender registration now has "consequences . . . 
that are far greater than was [previously] the case."14  See Doe, 
Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316 v. Sex Offender Registry 
Bd., 473 Mass. 297, 300 (2015); id. at 304-309 (describing 
increased requirements, penalties, and deleterious effects of 
sex offender registration that occurred between 1998, when Doe, 
Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 972 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 
428 Mass. 90 [1998], was decided, and 2015).   
                     
 
13 Moreover, the statutorily imposed sentence of 
imprisonment for first and second convictions of failure to 
register was less for homeless offenders than for other sex 
offenders in 2002.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178H, inserted by St. 
1999, c. 74, § 2. 
 
 
14 The amount of information that a sex offender was 
required to submit in 2002 also was not as extensive as it is 
today.  St. 2003, c. 77 (names and addresses of institutions of 
higher education); St. 2006, c. 139, §§ 5-25 (secondary 
residences).   
 
19 
 
 
ii.  Recognition of need for warnings.  When analyzing 
whether the penalty for deportation was "particularly severe," 
the Supreme Court also considered whether States had recognized 
a "critical" need for warnings.  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 373-374.  
The Court found it "significant" that the plea form used in 
Kentucky since 200315 (and statutory provisions in Massachusetts 
and other States) required judges to notify a defendant of 
possible immigration consequences.  Id. at 373-374 & n.15.   
 
We address three relevant statutes and court guidelines 
regarding sex offender registration warnings that guide our 
analysis of whether the courts and Legislature in Massachusetts 
recognized a "critical" need to advise defendants of the 
consequences of sex offender registration in 2002.   
 
First, G. L. c. 6, § 178E (d), which was inserted by St. 
1999, c. 74, § 2, and has been unchanged since that time, 
requires a judge to notify a defendant pleading guilty to an 
enumerated sex offense "that such plea may result in such sex 
offender being subject to the provisions of sections 178C to 
178P, inclusive" and to require the defendant to acknowledge 
receipt of such warning in writing.  The statute provides, 
however, that noncompliance with this provision "shall not be 
                     
 
15 Final judgment on the guilty plea at issue in Padilla 
entered in 2002.  Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 
(Ky. 2008). 
 
20 
 
grounds to vacate or invalidate the plea."  Id.  The Appeals 
Court recognized that "it may appear anomalous to require such a 
warning but to provide that no consequence follows if the 
requirement is not met," but concluded that the court was 
"constrained by the wording of the statute" when rejecting a 
defendant's motion to withdraw her guilty plea on the basis of 
not having been advised by the judge or defense counsel that she 
could be required to register as a sex offender.  Shindell, 63 
Mass. App. Ct. at 506.  Accordingly, this statute does recognize 
some benefit to advising a defendant about sex offender 
registration, but does not appear to recognize a "critical" need 
to do so on account of the Legislature explicitly stating that 
there is no consequence for noncompliance.16 
                     
 
16 We recognize that the Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, as noted in its amicus brief and by the defendant, has 
required defense counsel to "advise the client of the 
consequences of conviction, including . . . Sex Offender 
Registration Act [G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C et seq.,] . . . 
requirements."  This is certainly a best practice for defense 
attorneys, but it is not determinative of whether the Sixth 
Amendment applies.  The analytical framework by the Supreme 
Court supports this approach.  In Padilla, 559 U.S. at 367, the 
Supreme Court recognized that the "weight of prevailing 
professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise 
her client regarding the risk of deportation."  The Supreme 
Court, however, had already determined that deportation was 
within the scope of the Sixth Amendment when it considered 
relevant professional norms about the scope of advice that 
should be given.  See Padilla, supra at 364-367 (analyzing Sixth 
Amendment applicability in part two and first prong of 
ineffective assistance of counsel analysis in part three).  See 
also Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1112  (reasoning related to direct 
 
21 
 
 
Second, Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 describes the procedure for 
entering a guilty plea.  At the time the defendant pleaded 
guilty, a judge was not required to include any warnings about 
sex offender registration.  Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (c) (3) (B), as 
appearing in 378 Mass. 866 (1979).  The rule was revised in 2004 
to include, if applicable, a notification that a defendant may 
be "required to register as a sex offender."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 
12 (c) (3) (B), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1511 (2004), and 
Reporters' Note to Rule 12, Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, at 1448-1451 (LexisNexis 2015-2016).  
This revision modifies judicial practice and indicates a 
recognition that the need to provide warnings to defendants 
became more critical after the Legislature amended the sex 
offender statutes in 2003 by requiring Internet dissemination of 
registration information.  St. 2003, c. 140, § 5.  In Roberts, 
472 Mass. at 364, we concluded that a defendant may withdraw a 
guilty plea on the basis of a judge's omission under rule 12 so 
long as he or she can demonstrate prejudice.  We recognized that 
the enumerated warning in rule 12 did not transform a collateral 
consequence of conviction into a direct one for constitutional 
purposes, but we provided an avenue by which a defendant who did 
                                                                  
and collateral distinction "came before we conducted a 
Strickland analysis [by examining professional norms and so 
forth]").   
22 
 
not receive warnings that are enumerated under rule 12 may 
obtain relief.17   Id. at 362, 364. 
 
Third, the District Court "tender of plea" form contains a 
"waiver of rights" section where a defendant is asked to 
acknowledge, by signature, that he or she has been warned of the 
consequences of a guilty plea.  Defense counsel must also 
acknowledge that he or she has explained the consequences of 
waiving such rights to the defendant.  At the time of the 
defendant's plea, the form contained a warning about deportation 
but not about sex offender registration.  The current form 
requires a notification about the sex offender registry statute.  
                     
 
17 The defendant here could not prevail on a claim based on 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (c) (3) (B), as appearing in 378 Mass. 866 
(1979), because the rule did not contain notifications about sex 
offender registration at the time of his plea. In any event, the 
judge properly found, based on a notation on the docket and her 
custom and practice at the time of the plea, that the defendant 
had received notifications about sex offender registration 
during the plea colloquy.  The defendant filed the underlying 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, under Mass. R. Crim. P. 
30 (b), approximately eleven years after he pleaded guilty.  The 
record reflects that the court does not have a tape or 
transcript of the plea colloquy.  Where, as here, a defendant 
challenges a guilty plea under rule 30 "after court records have 
been destroyed lawfully pursuant to court rules, the defendant 
bears the burden of proof."  Commonwealth v. Grannum, 457 Mass. 
128, 133 (2010), citing Commonwealth v. Lopez, 426 Mass. 657, 
661-662, 664-665 (1998).  "In such cases, the defendant must 
present evidence sufficient to rebut a presumption that the plea 
proceeding was conducted correctly."  Grannum, supra.  The "plea 
judge's statement of customary practice can be necessary and 
probative."  Commonwealth v. Tokarev, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 819, 821 
(2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Diaz, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 347, 351 
(2009). 
 
23 
 
Although we have recognized that statutory warnings and 
notification on a printed tender of plea form are "not an 
adequate substitute" where defense counsel has a professional 
obligation to provide advice on the subject, Clarke, 460 Mass. 
at 48 n.20, such mandates are relevant to a determination of how 
critical the need is to advise clients of certain consequences.  
See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 373-374 & n.15.   
 
4.  Conclusion.  We are not presented with the occasion to 
consider whether the sex offender registry scheme as it exists 
today would fall within the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel.  We conclude only that the sex offender statutory 
scheme as it existed in 2002 did not.  Accordingly, the judge 
did not abuse her discretion in denying the defendant's motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea.18,19  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
                     
 
18 In some cases, we have interpreted the rights under art. 
12 to be more expansive than those guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment.  See Commonwealth v. Mavredakis, 430 Mass. 848, 858 
(2000), citing Commonwealth v. Hodge, 386 Mass. 165, 169 (1982).  
The defendant presents no compelling reason we should do so 
here.   
 
 
19 Because we conclude that advice regarding sex offender 
registration requirements under G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C-178Q, was 
not within the scope of a defendant's constitutional right to 
counsel, we do not analyze the merits of the defendant's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.