Title: Quatannens v. Tyrrell

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
STEPHEN D. QUATANNENS, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 032562 
   OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
September 17, 2004 
ROBERT E. TYRRELL, JR., ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA 
J. Howe Brown, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider the evidentiary requirement 
to sustain a claim of adverse possession in a dispute over a 
narrow strip of land between adjoining landowners. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
Stephen D. Quatannens and Eileen A. Quatannens ("the 
Quatannens") reside at 217 S. Alfred Street in Alexandria, 
Virginia.  Robert E. Tyrrell, Jr. and his wife, Jeanne M. 
Hauch, ("the Tyrrells") reside at 219 S. Alfred Street, 
Alexandria, Virginia.  In dispute is the ownership of a strip 
of land 100 feet long and ranging from approximately eight to 
20 inches wide, running the length of the adjoining parcels of 
property.  The strip of land contains a small portion of a 
room of the Quatannens' house, part of a brick walkway, part 
of a paved parking area, and one side of a brick arch over the 
walkway at the front of the Quatannens' house, all of which 
have existed since at least 1976.  The remainder of the strip 
appears to contain some vegetation. 
 
2
 
The Quatannens purchased their property in October, 1995.  
Eileen Quatannens testified that the Quatannens had not 
intended to possess any property that they did not own and 
were unaware of any boundary issues until the fall of 2001 
when the Tyrrells asserted their claim. Although the 
Quatannens had been given a plat of the property at the time 
of purchase, they testified that they had not reviewed it.  
The Quatannens filed a bill of complaint for injunctive relief 
and to quiet title in the Circuit Court. 
 
At a bench trial, two previous owners of 217 S. Alfred 
Street testified that they presumed that the strip belonged to 
them and carried out such activities as gardening, storage, 
handball, and walking on the disputed land.  A prior owner of 
219 S. Alfred Street, the Tyrrells' property, testified in a 
deposition that he believed that his property ended at the 
wall of the home at 219 S. Alfred Street and that the property 
at 217 S. Alfred Street encompassed the strip of land in 
dispute. 
 
Jeanne Hauch was the sole witness for the Tyrrells.  She 
testified that she and her husband had "bought the plat" at 
219 S. Alfred Street.  She admitted that she had not asserted 
any claims toward the disputed property before October 2001. 
 
The trial court found that the Quatannens "had not 
established that their possession was 'hostile,' as the 
 
3
possession had been by mistake for the majority of the period" 
and stated that it further found for the Tyrrells "for the 
reasons stated [in the Tyrrells’] closing argument," which 
were that "i) the acts of Plaintiffs in using the disputed 
land had been insufficient to establish possession, ii) that 
there had not been actual notice to the Defendants and their 
predecessors, and iii) that adverse possession could not be by 
mistake."  The trial court denied the Quatannens' motion to 
reconsider. 
II.  Analysis 
 
On appeal, the Quatannens contend that the trial court 
erred in denying their claim of adverse possession on three 
grounds: 
a) that "the trial court erred in not finding for 
plaintiffs as to adverse possession due to lack of 
actual notice to defendants and their predecessors;" 
b) that "the trial court erred in finding that the acts 
of plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest were 
not sufficient to establish possession;" and, 
c) that "the trial court erred in finding that the 
plaintiffs could not adversely possess because they 
did not have a hostile intent to take the land in 
dispute from another." 
 
4
 
The trial court's opinion and the arguments of the 
Tyrrells appear to conflate all the elements of adverse 
possession into hostile intent.  The facts of the case are 
largely undisputed.  In determining the proper application of 
the law of adverse possession to the facts of this case, we 
review the trial court's decision de novo.  Turner v. Caplan, 
268 Va. 122, 125, 596 S.E.2d 525, 527 (2004) (questions of law 
subject to de novo review); Barter Found. v. Widener, 267 Va. 
80, 90, 592 S.E.2d 56, 60 (2003) (regarding mixed questions of 
law and fact, a trial court's application of law is subject to 
de novo review); see also Carmody v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 234 
Va. 198, 201, 361 S.E.2d 128, 130 (1987). 
A.  Prior Cases 
 
The doctrine of adverse possession in Virginia has a long 
history.  Many cases are fact-specific and their resolution 
may turn on only one or two of the elements of adverse 
possession. 
 
In Taylor v. Burnsides, 42 Va. (1 Gratt.) 165, 190 
(1844), the Court held that "the elements of an adversary 
possession . . . consist of an exclusive, actual, continued 
possession, under a colourable claim of title."  The Court 
emphasized that possession must be exclusive and viewed it as 
a necessity that "when the rightful owner is in actual 
possession, that he should be disseised or ousted, and 
 
5
continually thereafter kept out by the hostile claimant."  
When the rightful owner is not in actual possession and the 
land appears vacant, the Court opined, "[S]till it is 
indispensable that [possession] should be not the less 
exclusive in its commencement and continuance.  Though the 
adverse claimant cannot in such case turn out, he must shut 
out the rightful owner."  Id. at 190. 
 
This Court in Taylor also emphasized the "actual" nature 
of the possession.  The opinion states that, actual possession 
is "absolute dominion and enjoyment of the property."  Id.  We 
noted that actual possession might be accomplished "by 
residence, cultivation, improvement, or other open, notorious 
and habitual acts of ownership."  Id. at 192. 
 
In Turpin v. Saunders, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 27 (1879), an 
appeal of an action of ejectment, the plaintiffs to the 
ejectment claimed adverse possession of the subject land.  The 
defendants claimed that their predecessor in interest had 
leased the land in question to a tenant.  The plaintiffs 
claimed that the same tenant had a prior lease for the same 
land from the plaintiffs' predecessor in interest.  The lease 
between the defendants' predecessor and the tenant was reduced 
to writing while the lease between the plaintiffs' predecessor 
and the tenant was not written and had not been widely 
publicized.  In fact, the tenant had concealed the prior lease 
 
6
from the defendants' predecessor.  Id. at 31-33.  We held that 
the tenant's lease with the plaintiff's predecessor could not 
be used to establish adverse possession because "possession 
must be not only with claim of title, but it must be visible 
and notorious, and not secret and clandestine . . . the 
occupation must be of that nature and notoriety that the owner 
may be presumed to know the adverse possession."  Id. at 34.  
As we said in Turpin, 
the plaintiff's claim of possession is lacking 
in one of the most essential elements to render 
it adversary in its character.  Simpkins, 
although in the actual occupation of the 
premises, did not claim title in himself or in 
Saunders.  On the contrary, he accepted a lease 
from Cecil, and claimed to hold under him. 
Id. at 35. 
 
In Christian v. Bulbeck, 120 Va. 74, 90 S.E. 661 (1916), 
we undertook to clarify the law on the subject of adverse 
possession by mistake.  After extensive review of earlier 
Virginia cases and cases from other jurisdictions, we 
concluded that:  
[T]he correct rule, and the rule in Virginia, 
[is that] where the proof is that the location 
of the line in question was caused in the first 
instance by a mistake as to the true boundary, 
the other facts and circumstances in the case 
must negative by a preponderance of evidence 
the inference which will otherwise arise that 
there was no definite and fixed intention on 
the part of the possessor to occupy, use and 
claim as his own[,] the land up to a particular 
and definite line on the ground.  That is to 
 
7
say, on the whole proof a case must be 
presented in which the preponderance of 
evidence as to the character of the possession, 
how held, how evidenced on the ground, how 
regarded by the adjoining land owner, etc., 
etc., supplies the proof that the definite and 
positive intention on the part of the possessor 
to occupy, use and claim as his own the land up 
to a particular and definite line on the ground 
existed, coupled with the requisite possession, 
for the statutory period, in order to ripen 
title under the statute.  Whether the positive 
and definite intention to claim as one's own 
the land up to a particular and definite line 
on the ground existed, is the practical test in 
such cases. 
Id. at 110-111, 90 S.E. at 672.  We further explained: 
The collateral question whether the possessor 
would have claimed title, claimed the land as 
his own, had he believed the land involved did 
not belong to him, but to another, that is, had 
he not been mistaken as to the true boundary 
line called for in his chain of title, is not 
the proximate but an antecedent question, which 
is irrelevant and serves only to confuse ideas. 
Id. at 111, 90 S.E. at 672.  Citing an earlier case with 
approval, we then stated that "[i]n Virginia, proof of an 
expressed intention to claim title is not necessary."  Id. at 
107, 90 S.E. at 671 (citing Haney v. Breeden, 100 Va. 781, 
783-84, 42 S.E. 916, 917 (1902)). 
 
In LaDue v. Currell, 201 Va. 200, 110 S.E.2d 217 (1959), 
we examined the types of acts sufficient to establish adverse 
possession.  In a dispute between neighboring landowners in 
Centreville, Virginia, the Court explained that "[t]he usual 
kind of actual possession relied upon is occupancy, use or 
 
8
residence upon the premises for the statutory period of time, 
evidenced by cultivation, enclosure, or erection of 
improvements, or other plainly visible, continuous and 
notorious manifestation or exclusive possession in keeping 
with the character and adaptability of the land."  Id. at 207, 
110 S.E.2d at 222.  We held that:  
No precise rule of general application can 
be laid down . . . acts of dominion over 
the land must, to be effective as against 
the true owner, be so open, notorious, and 
hostile as to put an ordinarily prudent 
person on notice of the fact that his 
lands are in the adverse possession of 
another.  A mere temporary use of the 
property by a trespasser at intervals, 
whether such intervals are remote or 
frequent, is not enough. 
Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).  Applying 
this broad rule, we held that on an unenclosed, unimproved 
area of land, "periodical or occasional cultivation and mowing 
of the grass . . . for the purpose of appearance" was not 
enough to establish adverse possession.  Id. 
 
A concise restatement of the rule and an explanation of 
each element of adverse possession were provided in Grappo v. 
Blanks, 241 Va. 58, 400 S.E.2d 168 (1991).  We held: 
To establish title to real property by adverse 
possession, a claimant must prove actual, 
hostile, exclusive, visible, and continuous 
possession, under a claim of right, for the 
statutory period of 15 years.  A claimant has 
the burden of proving all the elements of 
 
9
adverse possession by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
Use and occupation of property, evidenced by 
fencing the property, constitutes proof of 
actual possession.  One is in hostile 
possession if his possession is under a claim 
of right and adverse to the right of the true 
owner.  One's possession is exclusive when it 
is not in common with others.  Possession is 
visible when it is so obvious that the true 
owner may be presumed to know about it.  
Possession is continuous only if it exists 
without interruption for the statutory period. 
Id. at 61-62, 400 S.E.2d at 170-71 (citations omitted).  In 
Grappo, we also defined the terms "claim of right," "claim of 
title," and "claim of ownership" as synonyms meaning 
a possessor's intention to appropriate and use 
the land as his own to the exclusion of all 
others.  That intention need not be expressed 
but may be implied by a claimant's conduct.  
Actual occupation, use, and improvement of the 
property by the claimant, as if he were in fact 
the owner, is conduct that can prove a claim of 
right. 
Id. at 62, 400 S.E.2d at 171.  Where a landowner enclosed 
three acres of his neighbor's land in addition to his own in a 
fence, and "zealously examined his boundary fence for damage" 
the landowner was found to have earned title to the fenced 
land by adverse possession.  Id. at 62-63, 400 S.E.2d at 171. 
 
We had occasion to consider the relationship between 
permissive use and adverse possession in Mary Moody Northen, 
Inc. v. Bailey, 244 Va. 118, 418 S.E.2d 882 (1992).  In that 
case, Jim Bailey, the father of the plaintiffs claiming 
 
10
adverse possession, lived in a log cabin situated on the land 
of a charitable foundation for 36 years.  All parties agreed 
that Bailey had lived on the land openly and continuously and 
that the legal titleholders knew of Bailey's occupancy.  Id. 
at 120, 418 S.E.2d at 883-84.  However, during the time of 
Bailey's occupancy, Bailey communicated with the owners "on a 
number of occasions" and even "acquiesced in the request of 
the foundation that he get firewood from fallen trees rather 
than by chopping down trees."  Id. at 121, 418 S.E.2d at 884.  
The Court held that "[w]here, as here, the legal title holder 
is operating on the assumption that one living on its land is 
doing so with its permission, and does not interfere with that 
occupancy, it would be manifestly unjust to allow that 
occupancy to ripen into an ownership interest through the 
silence or inaction of the occupant."  Id. at 122, 418 S.E.2d 
at 885.  The protestations of Bailey against the erection of a 
fence by the foundation, which interfered with access to his 
home, could not "be characterized fairly as an affirmative 
statement of an adverse claim" sufficient to provide notice to 
the owner that Bailey now claimed ownership of the land.  
Instead, the Court held "it is more indicative of occupancy by 
permission."  Id.  His protestations expressed "need for his 
family" not a claim of right.  Id. at 123, 418 S.E.2d at 885. 
 
11
 
In Chaney v. Haynes, 250 Va. 155, 458 S.E.2d 451 (1995), 
we revisited the subject of mistake as it relates to the 
establishment of a prescriptive easement.  The plaintiffs, 
Haynes and others, had been granted an express easement for 
access over land that had been subdivided.  The easement 
actually ran over land owned by Josephine Erwin, but the 
grantees had been using a path over land owned by Chaney at 
the time of the suit, under the mistaken belief that it was 
the path described in the express easement.  Id. at 156-58, 
458 S.E.2d at 452-53.  We held: 
The essence of an adverse use is the 
intentional assertion of a claim hostile to the 
ownership right of another.  Use of property, 
under the mistaken belief of a recorded right, 
cannot be adverse as long as such mistake 
continues.  The present record shows that the 
plaintiffs based their use of Chaney's land 
solely on their mistaken belief that it was the 
land described in their express easement.  
Thus, the plaintiffs have failed to prove that 
a prescriptive easement was established. 
Id. at 159, 458 S.E.2d at 453-54 (citations omitted).  We 
distinguished Chaney from other prescriptive easement cases 
because, in other cases, "prescriptive easements had been 
established when the evidence showed, among other things, that 
both of the easement claimants held a general belief [that] 
they had the right to use the ways at issue."  Id. at 160, 458 
S.E.2d at 454.  The claimants in other cases did not assert 
that their "right derived from an express easement."  Id. 
 
12
 
Three years later, we considered another case involving 
"the effect of a mistake as to the location of an actual 
boundary line upon the intent to hold disputed land 
adversely."  Hollander v. World Mission Church, 255 Va. 440, 
441, 498 S.E.2d 419, 420 (1998).  In Hollander, a church and 
its adjoining property owners both claimed possession of a 
strip of land between their properties.  The trial court found 
that the adjoining owners had established all elements of 
adverse possession except "adverse or hostile possession."  
Id. at 441, 498 S.E.2d at 420.  According to the evidence, 
"the claimants intended to claim title to the land extending 
to [a tree line] as a part of the property they thought was 
conveyed to them."  Id. at 442, 498 S.E.2d at 420.  Relying on 
Christian v. Bulbeck, the Hollander court specifically 
distinguished Chaney on the ground that "the claimants in this 
case based their claim not only on the deed descriptions, but 
also on their belief that their property line ran to the line 
of woods."  Id. at 443, 498 S.E.2d at 421.  Consequently, we 
reversed the judgment of the trial court and held "that the 
claimants' possession was accompanied by the requisite adverse 
or hostile intent."  Id. 
 
Finally, in Kim v. Douval Corp., 259 Va. 752, 529 S.E.2d 
92 (2000), we once again addressed the issue of possession by 
permission.  Kim was a landowner's suit to eject a car wash 
 
13
business from a parcel of land.  The car wash's use of the 
land began in the 1960s and included the installation of 
lighting, asphalt, signage, fencing, and vacuums on the land.  
Id. at 754-55, 529 S.E.2d at 93-94.  The only "genuinely 
disputed [issue] at trial" was "whether Douval's possession 
was 'hostile' under a claim of right."  Id. at 757, 529 S.E.2d 
at 95.  We quoted from Grappo for the definition of "hostile," 
and defined "claim of right" as referring "to the intent of a 
claimant to use land as the claimant's own to the exclusion of 
all others."  Id. at 757, 529 S.E.2d at 95 (quoting Grappo, 
241 Va. at 62, 400 S.E.2d at 171).  We explained, "[W]here the 
original entry on another's land was by agreement or 
permission, possession regardless of its duration 
presumptively continues as it began, in the absence of an 
explicit disclaimer."  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
We observed that the evidence and permissible inferences from 
the evidence were in dispute as to the nature of possession 
and use at the beginning of the car wash's occupancy.  Because 
the jury had resolved the inferences favorably to the owner, 
we held that the trial court "erred in setting aside the jury 
verdict."  Id. at 758, 529 S.E.2d at 96. 
B.  Application 
 
14
 
As stated in the cases discussed above, in Virginia, 
adverse possession requires proof, by clear and convincing 
evidence, of possession that is: 
 
1) actual, 
 
2) hostile or adverse, 
 
3) exclusive, 
 
4) visible or open and notorious, 
 
5) continuous for a period of 15 years,* and 
 
6) under a claim of right. 
A single act or piece of evidence may tend to prove more than 
one element of adverse possession.  For example, "occupation, 
use and improvement of the property . . . can prove a claim of 
right," Grappo, 241 Va. at 62, 400 S.E.2d at 171.  
"[O]ccupation, use and improvement" may also prove actual 
possession.  Taylor, 42 Va. at 192; LaDue, 201 Va. at 207, 110 
S.E.2d at 222.  Similarly, occupation, use, and improvement 
may also be used to establish exclusivity and visibility. 
1.  Hostile Possession 
 
In dispute in this case is the hostility of the 
Quatannens' possession of the land to the legal title of the 
Tyrrells.  In Taylor, 42 Va. at 190, it is clear that actual, 
exclusive, and visible possession without permission 
necessarily meant that the claimant's interest was hostile to 
 
15
that of the legal titleholder.  More recently, in Grappo, 241 
Va. at 62, 400 S.E.2d at 171, we defined hostile possession as 
possession "under a claim of right and adverse to the right of 
the true owner."  In other words, the possessor must profess, 
through words or actions, a belief that he is entitled to use 
the land and prevent others from using it in a manner that 
precludes the legal owner from exercising his rights over the 
property.  If possession is hostile, the legal owner and the 
possessor cannot simultaneously exercise control over the 
land.  Thus, permission negates hostile possession.  See Mary 
Moody Northen, 244 Va. at 122, 418 S.E.2d at 885.  In narrow 
circumstances, mistake may also negate hostile possession.  
Where a mistake occurs in determining the location of a 
boundary line described in a deed and the claimant has not 
proved "the definite and positive intention . . . to occupy, 
use and claim as his own the land up to a particular and 
definite line on the ground," then the claimant cannot 
establish adverse possession.  See Christian, 120 Va. at 110-
111, 90 S.E. at 672.  See also Chaney, 250 Va. at 159, 458 
S.E.2d at 453-54.  However, when a claimant mistakenly 
believes that a particular "line on the ground" represents the 
extent of his or her own land and treats all the land within 
the line on the ground as his or her own in a manner that 
                                                                
* Code § 8.01-236. 
 
16
satisfies the other requirements of adverse possession − 
particularly actual, exclusive, and visible possession − then 
the hostility requirement is generally satisfied. 
 
The Quatannens have provided clear and convincing proof 
that they possessed "the positive and definite intention to 
claim as [their] own the land up to a particular and definite 
line on the ground."  Christian, 120 Va. at 111, 90 S.E. at 
672.  They provided evidence that previous owners of 219 S. 
Alfred Street had believed that the disputed land belonged to 
the owners of 217 S. Alfred Street.  The Quatannens and two 
previous owners of 217 S. Alfred Street testified that they 
believed that their property included the disputed land.  They 
proceeded to use the land in a manner consistent with 
ownership, including gating the land, building a structure on 
the land, and making other improvements to the land.  Neither 
the Tyrrells nor any predecessor in title ever made any claims 
to the land before October 2001, despite the Quatannens' 
actual, open, and exclusive use of the land. 
The testimony of Eileen Quatannens that the Quatannens 
had not intended to possess any property that they did not own 
is irrelevant because, "[t]he collateral question whether the 
possessor would have claimed title, claimed the land as his 
own, had he believed the land involved did not belong to him, 
but to another, that is, had he not been mistaken as to the 
 
17
true boundary line called for in his chain of title, is not 
the proximate but an antecedent question, which is irrelevant 
and serves only to confuse ideas."  Christian, 120 Va. at 111, 
90 S.E. at 672.  All of the other evidence at trial proves 
that the Quatannens and their predecessors had a definite and 
positive intention to occupy, use, and claim the land − so much 
so that the true legal owners believed that the possessors 
owned the land.  Therefore, the hostile character of the 
Quatannens' possession has not been undercut by the fact that 
they mistakenly believed the land was theirs.  To the extent 
that the trial court concluded otherwise, it erred. 
The Tyrrells maintain that the Quatannens did not prove 
that the original use of the disputed land by previous owners 
of 217 S. Alfred Street was not by permission.  According to 
the Tyrrells, the Quatannens had to prove that none of their 
predecessors had used the strip of land by permission in order 
to claim adverse possession.  This interpretation and 
application of the law of adverse possession is incorrect. 
Permission is properly viewed as a defense to a claim of 
adverse possession.  As such, the defendant to the claim has 
the burden of proof.  In Mary Moody Northen, the defendant 
produced the testimony of its employees to show that the 
claimants' possession began and continued by permission.  244 
Va. at 121, 418 S.E.2d at 884.  The defendant also produced 
 
18
evidence that both it and the claimants' father behaved toward 
the land and each other in a manner consistent with the fact 
that the father's possession of the land was by permission.  
Id. at 121-22, 418 S.E.2d at 884-85. 
The Tyrrells also cited Kim for the proposition that a 
presumption of permission exists wherever "the record does not 
indicate the circumstances under which . . . possession of the 
disputed strip . . . began."  259 Va. at 757, 529 S.E.2d at 
95.  In that appeal from a jury verdict, we reviewed the 
evidence and held that "conflicting inferences [could] be 
drawn from the evidence" as to whether possession began with 
permission or not.  Id. at 758, 529 S.E.2d at 96.  Thus, Kim 
applies very narrowly to its own facts. 
In this case, there was no evidence that the possession 
of the disputed land by the owners of 217 S. Alfred Street 
began with permission from the owners of 219 S. Alfred Street.  
The owners of 219 S. Alfred Street, including the Tyrrells 
before 2001, were not "operating on the assumption that" the 
owners of 217 S. Alfred Street were using the land with 
permission.  Mary Moody Northen, 244 Va. at 122, 418 S.E.2d at 
885.  A claimant cannot be expected to prove the non-existence 
of permission by evidence in most cases.  It was up to the 
Tyrrells to produce evidence of permission, which they failed 
to do.  Therefore, to the extent that the trial court premised 
 
19
its finding that the Quatannens' possession of the land was 
not hostile on the fact that the Quatannens failed to prove 
that the possession did not begin with permission, the trial 
court erred. 
2.  Actual Notice 
 
"Actual" notice of possession to the legal titleholder, 
in the sense of oral or written communications, is not 
required in order to establish ownership by adverse 
possession.  What must be "actual" is the possession itself.  
See, e.g., Taylor, 42 Va. at 190, 192. 
 
An owner is presumed to be on notice when the possessor's 
acts of dominion over the land are open and notorious, 
visible, and hostile.  LaDue, 201 Va. at 207, 110 S.E.2d at 
222; Grappo, 241 Va. at 62, 400 S.E.2d at 171.  A possessor is 
not required to explicitly state to an owner that it is in 
possession of the owner's land.  See, e.g., Turpin, 73 Va. at 
34. 
 
The Quatannens' actions were open and notorious, visible, 
and hostile.  Certainly, the construction of a room of the 
house, a brick archway, and a walkway could not be more 
obvious.  Enclosure and improvement of these types are acts 
that are clearly open, notorious, and hostile.  See LaDue, 201 
Va. at 207, 110 S.E.2d at 222.  Therefore, the Tyrrells and 
their predecessors had adequate notice of the Quatannens' 
 
20
possession and the trial court erred in finding that the 
Tyrrells were entitled to "actual" notice in some written or 
oral form. 
3.  Sufficiency of the Quatannens' Acts 
 
The uses made of the disputed land by the Quatannens and 
their predecessors were sufficient to establish adverse 
possession.  The Quatannens' uses of the land are consistent 
with the uses that have been found sufficient to establish 
adverse possession in other cases.   
 
The Quatannens and their predecessors clearly had actual 
possession of the land.  They demonstrated their "absolute 
dominion and enjoyment of the property" by making significant 
improvements to it including the room, the brick arch, the 
walkway, and the parking area.  They and their predecessors 
have also cultivated vegetation on the land and used the land 
for recreational activities.  These types of uses have 
repeatedly been found sufficient to show actual possession.  
See, e.g., Taylor, 42 Va. at 192; LaDue, 201 Va. at 207, 110 
S.E.2d at 222; Grappo, 241 Va. at 62-63, 400 S.E.2d at 171. 
 
In order to have exclusive possession, a claimant must 
"shut out the rightful owner."  Taylor, 42 Va. at 190.  In 
this case, the room built on the disputed land clearly shuts 
out the Tyrrells.  The gate under the brick arch is used for 
the same purpose.  That these structures do not exclude the 
 
21
Tyrrells from the entirety of the disputed land does not 
destroy the Quatannens' claim of adverse possession.  
"Possession may be more manifest to a part, than as to the 
rest; but in reference to the whole, possession of part is 
possession of the entire tract or parcel."  Id. at 190-91.  
The Quatannens' evidence satisfied the element of exclusive 
possession. 
 
According to the evidence presented at trial, the room, 
the brick arch, and the brick walkway on the disputed strip of 
land have all existed for at least 28 years.  This evidence 
more than satisfies the requirement that the possession be 
continuous for a period of 15 years.  During this time, the 
Quatannens and their predecessors, through the actions 
repeatedly described, occupied, used, and improved the land as 
if they owned it, satisfying the requirement that they possess 
the land "under a claim of right."  Grappo, 241 Va. at 61-62, 
400 S.E.2d at 170-71. 
 
The Tyrrells argue that because one of the Quatannens' 
predecessors leased the property at 217 S. Alfred Street and 
none of the tenants testified, that the Quatannens could not 
establish possession for the statutory period.  This argument 
is without merit because, irrespective of the tenants' 
actions, the room of the house, the brick arch, and the brick 
walkway existed throughout that time.  The actions of the 
 
22
Quatannens and their predecessors have satisfied all the 
elements necessary to establish ownership through adverse 
possession. 
III.  Conclusion 
 
The trial court erred in concluding that the Quatannens 
failed to establish ownership of the disputed land by adverse 
possession.  We will reverse the judgment of the trial court 
and remand for entry of judgment for the Quatannens and such 
other action necessary to establish their title. 
Reversed and remanded.