Title: Idaho Transportation Board v. HI Boise, LLC

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 38344 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO 
TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
 
       Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
HI BOISE, LLC, a Delaware limited liability 
company, 
 
       Defendant-Appellant, 
 
and 
 
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC 
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. a 
Delaware corporation, 
 
        Defendant. 
_______________________________________ 
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Boise, June 2012 Term 
 
2012 Opinion No. 103 
 
Filed:  June 29, 2012 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, Ada County.  Hon. Ronald J. Wilper, District Judge. 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Greener Burke Shoemaker, P.A., Boise, for appellant.  Thomas J. Lloyd argued. 
 
Holland & Hart, LLP, Boise, for respondent.  Mary V. York argued.   
_____________________ 
 
J. JONES, Justice. 
This appeal arises from a condemnation action brought by the State of Idaho, Idaho 
Transportation Board (ITD) against HI Boise, LLC to acquire a strip of land as part of a project to 
improve the I-84/Vista Avenue Interchange in Boise.  ITD offered HI Boise the condemned 
property’s appraised value of $38,177, but HI Boise filed a counterclaim for inverse condemnation, 
claiming damages of $7.5 million for additional lost rights of access and visibility.  HI Boise now 
appeals from the district court’s summary dismissal of those claims.  Because we find that neither 
2  
 
claim involves a compensable taking, we affirm.   
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This dispute was sparked by an ITD project known as the “Interstate 84/Vista Interchange 
Project.”  In response to increased traffic demands at the intersection of I-84 and Vista Avenue in 
Boise, ITD initiated the $30 million project to replace the existing interchange, add lanes to I-84, 
widen and lengthen on- and off-ramps to and from the Interstate, and widen and improve the Vista 
Avenue overpass extending across I-84.  The interchange was replaced with a Single Point Urban 
Interchange (SPUI) with a single traffic light at the center controlling north-south traffic and 
converging on- and off-ramp traffic via protected left-hand turns in each direction.  The project 
was completed in the fall of 2010.       
HI Boise owns a 9.15-acre piece of real property located at the northeast corner of the I-
84/Vista Avenue intersection, where it owned and operated a Holiday Inn during the proceeding 
below.1  The main access to the property before the project was an approximately 40-foot wide, 
full-movement driveway2 from Vista Avenue on the property’s west edge.  The property also has 
two full-movement driveways from Sunrise Rim Road along the north edge of the property, one of 
which it shares with a convenience store. 
 
In order to widen and raise a section of Vista Avenue to meet the new overpass, ITD 
condemned a narrow strip along the west edge of the HI Boise property, on which it constructed a 
new bike lane and sidewalk.  The strip of condemned property is approximately 7 feet wide and 
133 feet long, totaling approximately 960 square feet.3  The alterations to Vista also required ITD 
to alter HI Boise’s main access from Vista.  ITD constructed a new driveway in substantially the 
same location, moving the driveway’s approach 2.055 feet south and 4.480 feet east and increasing 
its grade.4  The width of the driveway was not changed by the reconstruction.  Other than the 
alteration to the approach, the driveway remains in the same place it was before.     
The Vista access was granted by ITD’s predecessor in interest to HI Boise’s predecessors 
in interest by two 1967 deeds, each reserving “access to Vista Avenue Northeasterly from Station 
24+53.01 of said Vista Avenue Survey.”  HI Boise alleges that the specific location, dimension, 
                                                          
 
1 According to HI Boise’s briefing, the Holiday Inn franchise has since moved out of the property. 
2 A full-movement driveway allows unrestricted right and left turns into and out of the property. 
3 ITD points out that the condemned land equates to 0.24% of HI Boise’s 398,574-square-foot property. 
4 One of the affidavits in support of HI Boise’s position contrarily alleged that the approach was moved 7 feet east.   
3  
 
and size of the driveway was “apparently authorized and/or permitted by ITD’s predecessor,” but 
its only support for that assertion is the 1967 deeds.  ITD asserts that a review of its records 
reveals no permit or evidence of the original location of the driveway when the original Vista 
Interchange and Holiday Inn were built in 1967.  ITD’s records also indicate that the driveway’s 
location was moved at least one other time, in 1972, and that the road striping on Vista Avenue 
limited the driveway to right-in, right-out turns until the early 1990s. 
It is undisputed that the alterations to the stretch of Vista Avenue bordering HI Boise’s 
property did not involve adding lanes, medians, restrictive signals or signage, restrictive striping, or 
other traffic control measure.  Before and after the project, Vista Avenue consisted of five lanes—
two northbound, two southbound, and one center turn lane.  In addition, it is undisputed that none 
of the driveways to the HI Boise property have been physically closed or affirmatively restricted 
by the project alterations, as all remain full-movement driveways.  Following the project, the 
entirety of the Vista driveway remains northeasterly of Station 24+53.01, as provided in the 1967 
deeds. 
To complete the project, ITD also acquired two temporary construction easements on HI 
Boise’s property—one 2,483-square-foot easement for reconstruction of the Vista driveway and 
one 3,136-square-foot easement for construction of a 20-foot sound wall.  The sound wall was 
constructed entirely on ITD’s right-of-way—not on HI Boise’s property.  HI Boise points to this 
and other aspects of the project that allegedly limit its property’s visibility to passing motorists.  In 
addition to the sound wall—which apparently blocks visibility of the hotel’s billboard from the 
freeway—the project involved (1) reconfiguring the exit point for westbound traffic approximately 
260 feet further east, thereby preventing motorists from seeing the hotel in time to exit at Vista 
Avenue; and (2) increasing the height of the overpass by as much as approximately 14 feet5 and 
widening it, thereby decreasing visibility of two of the hotel’s other signs.  It is undisputed that 
none of these aspects of the project were constructed on HI Boise’s property.   
 
An MAI-certified appraiser determined the fair market value of the property taken and 
impacts on the remaining property to be $38,177, and ITD initially offered that amount to HI 
Boise.  When negotiations were unsuccessful, ITD initiated this action on February 19, 2009, 
seeking condemnation.  HI Boise counterclaimed for inverse condemnation and submitted a 
                                                          
 
5 The record contains varying engineer measurements of the height increase to the overpass, the largest being around 
14 feet.  
4  
 
business damages claim under I.C. § 7-711(2)(b), estimating losses between $7.1 and $7.5 million.  
HI Boise alleged that in addition to the 960-square-foot strip of land, ITD also effectively 
condemned (1) its primary access to the property from Vista Avenue and (2) its ability to be seen 
by passing motorists.  It also claimed damages for increased noise resulting from the project but 
later abandoned that claim.  HI Boise’s access claims were threefold.  First, it argued that the 
movement of the Vista driveway from its original location constituted a taking of the access right 
reserved in the 1967 deeds.  Second, it argued that the new driveway exceeded minimum grade 
standards, making it unsafe to accommodate busses, trucks, and emergency vehicles.  Third, it 
argued that aspects of the overall project would produce backed-up traffic at the Vista driveway,6  
effectively restricting the driveway to a right-in/right-out access rather than a full-movement access 
and requiring motorists to use its other, more circuitous driveways (the circuity claim).  
A bifurcated trial was set—a bench trial to determine the scope of the taking and a jury trial 
to determine HI Boise’s damages.  ITD made two motions for partial summary judgment, arguing 
that: (1) the slight movement of the driveway did not amount to a taking because the new driveway 
remains within the easement described by the 1967 deeds and HI Boise did not “perfect” its right 
to the driveway’s specific location by obtaining a permit;7 (2) the facts show that the new driveway 
meets all necessary safety requirements and, in fact, was approved by the City of Boise; and (3) a 
property owner does not have a compensable property right in continued patterns of traffic flow 
under Idaho law.   
The district court denied summary judgment on the first two questions, finding genuine 
issues of fact whether HI Boise had somehow established a right to the driveway’s location and 
whether the new driveway met safety requirements.  However, the court granted summary 
judgment on the circuity claim, citing State ex rel. Moore v. Bastian, 97 Idaho 444, 546 P.2d 399 
                                                          
 
6 HI Boise alleged, “Northbound traffic on Vista Avenue turning left onto Elder Street will exceed the capacity of 
the traffic control devices in place and the planned turn lanes, meaning that traffic will back up at the Vista/Elder 
intersection beyond HI Boise’s access approach on Vista Avenue.” 
7 The parties both cite another recent district court case, State v. Bradley B., LLC and Dillon Limited Partnership, 
No. CV OC 08185194 (Dec. 17, 2009), for this notion of perfection by permit.  In that case, Dillon, the condemnee, 
had a similarly indefinitely-described right of access, reserving “access to Orchard Street Northerly from Station 
6+05.64 of said Orchard Street Survey.”  The driveway constructed pursuant to that deed was removed by ITD and 
reconstructed 110 feet north, but still within the area described by the deed.  Dillon claimed the reconstruction was a 
compensable taking, and Judge Deborah Bail agreed, finding that although the deed did not fix a specific location 
for the easement, it became fixed when ITD issued Dillon a permit to construct the driveway at that particular 
location.  See 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements § 72 (“Where the grant or reservation of an easement is general in its terms, 
an exercise of the right, with the acquiescence and consent of both parties in a particular course or manner, fixes the 
right and limits it to that particular course or manner.”). We express no opinion on that holding.  
5  
 
(1976), for the proposition that damages due to mere changes in traffic flow to property—such as 
those caused by traffic control devices—are non-compensable.  The court also granted summary 
judgment to ITD on HI Boise’s visibility claim, finding no right to continued visibility of the 
property under Idaho law.   
The district court denied HI Boise’s motion for reconsideration on the circuity claim and, 
although it had reserved questions for trial, approved―and we granted―HI Boise’s motion for 
permissive appeal of the circuity and visibility claims under I.R.C.P. 12 and issued judgments on 
those claims.  HI Boise timely appealed.  
II. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. 
Did the district court err in dismissing HI Boise’s claim for increased circuity of 
travel? 
II. 
Did the district court err in dismissing HI Boise’s claim for diminished visibility? 
III. 
DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment pursuant to the same standards as the 
district court.  Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 145 Idaho 408, 410, 179 P.3d 1064, 
1066 (2008).  Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  I.R.C.P. 
56(c).  This Court reviews questions of law de novo.  Martin v. Camas County ex rel. Bd. of 
Comm’rs, 150 Idaho 508, 511, 248 P.3d 1243, 1246 (2011).  The issues of the nature of the 
property interest alleged to have been taken and whether a taking has occurred are questions of 
law.  Moon v. North Idaho Farmers Ass’n, 140 Idaho 536, 542, 96 P.3d 637, 643 (2004). 
B. 
The district court correctly dismissed HI Boise’s circuity claim because its 
right of access does not include a right to continued traffic flow under Idaho 
law. 
HI Boise’s circuity claim below was based on the allegation that the overall project would 
cause a “de facto median” due to backed-up traffic.  Because of this, HI Boise alleged: 
The main entrance will become “right in/right out” only. Southbound traffic on 
Vista Avenue, which is the primary access for Boise-area meeting, convention and 
business traffic, will be disabled from turning left into the existing primary 
driveway fronting on Vista Avenue and will be required to either anticipate the 
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requirement of turning left on Sunrise Rim Road, and entering the Hotel site on one 
or two inferior and essentially “back door” curb-cuts, or will be required that 
southbound traffic to cross the 1-84 overpass and do a “U-turn” and come back to 
the Hotel. 
   
Although the district court expressly reserved for trial the question of whether the physical 
reconstruction of the Vista driveway constituted a compensable taking, it held: “Based on Bastian, 
HI Boise’s argument that the traffic flow on Vista which may make it difficult to turn left into or 
out of HI Boise is a compensable taking fails.  The Court finds that HI Boise has reasonable access 
on Vista Avenue and on Sunrise Rim Road.”  On appeal, however, HI Boise still seems to focus on 
the driveway reconstruction, attempting to link its circuity claim to that “physical taking” as well 
as the taking of its 960-square-foot strip of land.  HI Boise then asserts that Bastian is limited to 
“regulatory takings” cases, whereas this case of “physical taking” is governed by State ex rel. Rich 
v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269, 328 P.2d 60 (1958), which defines severance damages as “all 
inconveniences resulting to the owner’s remaining land” from a partial taking.  ITD points out that 
HI Boise misplaces its focus on appeal, that Bastian squarely applies to bar the circuity claim, and 
that the language cited in Fonburg is merely dicta that does not support HI Boise’s case.8     
The Idaho Constitution provides: “Private property may be taken for public use, but not 
until a just compensation, to be ascertained in the manner prescribed by law, shall be paid 
therefor.”  Idaho Const. art. I, § 14.  In a partial taking case, in addition to the value of the property 
right sought to be condemned, a court is also tasked with determining “the damages which will 
accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned, by reason of its severance from the portion 
sought to be condemned.”  I.C. § 7-711(2)(b).  We have long held that access to an adjacent public 
way—even in the absence of an expressly deeded right—is one of the incidents of land ownership, 
the taking of which may require compensation.  Johnston v. Boise City, 87 Idaho 44, 51, 390 P.2d 
291, 294 (1964).  However, “This right of access . . . may be regulated, for it is subservient to the 
                                                          
 
8 Perhaps in response to HI Boise’s focus on the driveway reconstruction to support its claim, ITD also spends a 
significant portion of its briefing arguing that HI Boise failed to demonstrate that it had perfected a property right in 
the particular location of the original driveway.  Indeed, the 1967 deeds only provide a general area for the access 
easement, and HI Boise submitted no more than bare assertions at summary judgment that it had obtained a permit 
fixing a more specific location.  HI Boise now emphasizes on appeal that the location was fixed by historical use, 
which is somewhat contrary to ITD’s documentary evidence that the driveway had been moved at least once since 
its construction.  Still, however tenuous HI Boise’s position on this issue, it is not properly on appeal to this Court 
because summary judgment was denied and the district judge expressly reserved it for further fact finding at trial.  
See Hunter v. State, Dep’t of Corrections, Div. of Probation & Parole, 138 Idaho 44, 47, 57 P.3d 755, 758 (2002) 
(“An order denying a motion for summary judgment is not an appealable order itself . . . .”).  
7  
 
primary rights of the public to the free use of the streets for travel and incidental purposes.”  Id.  
Accordingly, not all government impairments of an access right are compensable.  State ex rel. 
Moore v. Bastian, 97 Idaho 444, 447, 546 P.2d 399, 402 (1976).  Specifically, no compensable 
taking occurs where the right is not destroyed or substantially impaired and the remaining access is 
reasonable.  Id.; Merritt v. State, 113 Idaho 142, 145, 742 P.2d 397, 400 (1987).  Further, we have 
held as a matter of law that a right of access “does not encompass a right to any particular pattern 
of traffic flow.”  Brown v. City of Twin Falls, 124 Idaho 39, 43, 855 P.2d 876, 880 (1993).  Thus, 
state action that merely results in a change in traffic flow requiring traffic to reach property by a 
more circuitous route does not amount to a taking as a matter of law.  Id. at 44, 855 P.2d at 881.   
Here, HI Boise first argues that the district court applied the wrong standard to its circuity 
claim by analyzing it as a “regulatory taking” under Bastian rather than a “physical taking” under 
Fonburg.  As indicated above, it bases its characterization of the taking as “physical” on the fact 
that ITD also took a strip of HI Boise’s land for the project, as well as its argument that the 
driveway reconstruction constituted a physical taking.  However, even assuming that the driveway 
reconstruction constitutes a physical taking—a question not before this Court—the district court 
was correct that Bastian squarely precludes compensation for changes in traffic patterns caused by 
other aspects of the project.  
In Bastian’s familiar set of facts, the State condemned a portion of the defendant’s physical 
property along two of its bordering streets as part of a project to widen and add lanes to the streets.  
97 Idaho at 446, 546 P.2d at 401.  In addition, the State constructed a raised center median on one 
of the streets, prohibiting motorists from turning left into and out of the defendants’ former access 
point.  Id.  The median forced some motorists to drive “one-half to two blocks around the 
property” to access the property.  Id.  The trial court allowed the defendants to present evidence of 
damages caused by the median, but we reversed, holding: 
While it is true that defendants have a property interest in access to public streets . . 
. nevertheless not all impairments of that right by the State are compensable or per 
se unreasonable.  That right of access does not encompass a right to any particular 
pattern of traffic flow or a right of direct access to or from both directions of traffic 
and we find no compensable impairment of access here.  All who wish to reach 
defendants’ property could do so with relatively minor inconvenience. 
   
Id. at 447, 546 P.2d at 402.  We also explained that the contemporaneous physical taking did not 
affect our analysis, stating:  
8  
 
The taking of defendants’ property through the process of eminent domain and the 
consequent damage to the remaining property had no necessary relationship to the 
median construction.  The placement of the medians and any consequent injury 
such might cause are the results of an exercise of the State’s police power rather 
than a taking under its power of eminent domain.  
 
Id. (emphasis added).9    
 
We reaffirmed the Bastian rule in Brown, another case in which property owners sought 
compensation for newly constructed medians restricting their property’s access point to right-
in/right-out turns.  Brown, 124 Idaho at 42–43, 855 P.2d at 879–80.  Unlike Bastian, Brown did not 
involve a contemporaneous condemnation of physical property, but we still found it 
“indistinguishable” from Bastian, holding that the property owners did “not have a property right 
in the way traffic flows on the streets abutting their property.”  Id. at 43, 855 P.2d at 880.  In 
deciding Brown, we also relied on Merritt, a case illustrating that this Court applies a similar rule 
whether the alleged taking of an access right appears to be physical or regulatory in nature.  113 
Idaho at 145, 742 P.2d at 400.  In Merritt, the alleged taking involved actual elimination of a curb 
cut, preventing access to the subject property at that point, as well as construction of a fence across 
an alley—another prior access point.  Id.  However, because the property owner still had direct 
access to his property via two other curb cuts and indirect access via the other entrance of the alley, 
the Court found: 
In the instant case, there having been no destruction of vehicular access to the 
Merritt property, and the remaining vehicular access being reasonable, there was no 
taking of the Merritt’s property which would entitle him to compensation. 
 
* * * * 
 
The remaining opening to the alley might require a car that would have used the 
alley . . . to drive an extra block to reach the Freeport Street entrance to the Merritt 
property.  However, the requirement of merely a more circuitous route to reach 
property is merely a by-product of regulation, and does not constitute a taking.   
 
Id. 
                                                          
 
9 For that proposition, the Court cited a similar Indiana Supreme Court case, State v. Ensley, which stated: 
 
 
The widening of the highway followed by its subsequent transformation into a highway with a 
divider strip in the center, though contemporaneous with and part of the same construction 
program, are separate improvements with respect to the appropriation of appellee’s property. 
 
164 N.E.2d 432, 349 (Ind. 1960). 
9  
 
Indeed, it is only where a previously existing access right is destroyed or at least 
substantially impaired, leaving no reasonable alternative, that we have recognized a compensable 
taking of access.  See Fonburg, 80 Idaho at 280, 328 P.2d at 65–66; State ex rel. Symms v. Nelson 
Sand & Gravel, Inc., 93 Idaho 574, 583, 468 P.2d 306, 315 (1970).  In Fonburg, the State 
condemned 12.76 acres of Fonburg’s land for construction of a new highway running from east to 
west and spanning the entire width of his land.  Id. at 274, 328 P.2d at 61–62.  The State also 
closed the old highway running along the west edge of Fonburg’s property, where he had formerly 
enjoyed direct access, and denied him access to the new highway from his land.  Id.  This also 
prevented direct access to the railroad line running east to west through Fonburg’s property just 
north of the new highway.  Id.  Although it is unclear from the opinion precisely what alternative 
access remained—and the Court mentions one “circuitous” route remaining to the railroad—it is 
clear that all access to the highway and reasonable access to the railroad were destroyed.  Id. at 
274–75, 328 P.2d at 61–62.  Indeed, the district court in that case found, “There is also condemned 
and taken herein all rights of access to and from all properties abutting upon the above described 
parcel . . . and such rights of access, if any, existing heretofore are extinguished and the usage of 
any such access is hereby prohibited.”  Id.  Based on this, we held that Fonburg was entitled to 
present evidence to the jury of damages arising from severance of those rights.  Id. at 280, 328 P.2d 
at 65–66.     
 Contrary to HI Boise’s claim in the present case, the distinguishing factor in Fonburg was 
not merely that a contemporaneous physical taking occurred, but that the taking also involved a 
near complete destruction of Fonburg’s access rights.  Further, the physical taking in that case 
directly caused the destruction of access rather than incidentally occurring alongside it.  And 
finally, the Fonburg language on which HI Boise heavily relies—that severance damages include 
damages for “all inconveniences”—is simply a loose and somewhat misleading translation of I.C. 
§ 7-711(2)(b).  Id. at 278, 328 P.2d at 64.10  Severance damages are only triggered upon a finding 
                                                          
 
10 In all, we stated: 
 
Where a part of the owner’s contiguous land is taken in a condemnation proceeding, all 
inconveniences resulting to the owner’s remaining land, including an easement or access to a road 
or right of way formerly enjoyed, which decrease the value of the land retained by the owner, are 
elements of severance damage for which compensation should be paid.   
 
Id. 
10  
 
as a matter of law that a property right—such as a right of access—has indeed been severed.    See 
Bastian, 97 Idaho at 402, 546 P.2d at 447.  Our jurisprudence—as demonstrated by Bastian, 
Brown, and Merritt—dictates that no severance occurs where the court finds as a matter of law that 
an access right has merely been regulated by an exercise of police power rather than taken by 
eminent domain.  Id.  Although HI Boise strenuously argues otherwise, Fonburg does not 
contradict nor alter that analysis.11 
The only potential difference between this case and the Bastian line of cases cited above is 
in the fact that HI Boise has a deeded right of access to a specific area of Vista Avenue rather than 
the incidental right of access referred to in Johnston or some similarly undefined right.  Johnston, 
87 Idaho at 51, 390 P.2d at 294.  However, although that may entitle HI Boise to the access 
described in the deeds, it does not bar the application of Bastian to preclude the circuity claim at 
issue here.  While the deeds provide HI Boise access “to Vista Avenue,” they do not specify a right 
to a full-movement driveway to Vista and, moreover, do not entitle HI Boise to any particular 
traffic flow from Vista.  It is undisputed that no traffic control devices have been installed at the 
driveway’s approach and that no lanes have been added or removed from Vista.  It is also 
undisputed that motorists still have free access to and from the property via right-hand turns, and 
access to and from the property via left-hand turns has only been inhibited—if at all—by additional 
traffic resulting from other incidental traffic control aspects of the project.  Under Bastian, such 
traffic control is merely an exercise of state police power rather than the substantial interference 
contemplated by Fonburg and Nelson Sand & Gravel.  Indeed, the regulation in this case is even 
less restrictive than in Bastian and Brown, where actual medians—rather than the “de facto 
median” alleged here—were constructed.  
Further, as in Bastian, although there was at least one physical property right—possession 
of the strip of land—contemporaneously taken in this case, the alleged circuity damages do not 
flow from that taking.  Indeed, HI Boise does not even attempt to establish that causal connection.  
                                                          
 
11 Other cases cited by HI Boise are similarly distinguishable. For example, in Nelson Sand & Gravel, construction 
of an interstate highway obstructed access between two parcels of land, requiring an extra four and a half miles of 
travel to access one from the other.  93 Idaho at 583, 468 P.2d at 315.  We held: “Even though circuity of travel as 
distinct from a total destruction of access, may not be compensable, this court has held that substantial impairment 
of an access which decreases the market value of land remaining after condemnation is compensable.”  Id. (citing 
Mabe v. State ex rel. Rich, 83 Idaho 222, 360 P.2d 799 (1961) and Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269, 328 P.2d 60).  Like 
Fonburg, Nelson Sand & Gravel involved more than a mere traffic diversion, but rather a four-and-a-half-mile 
“substantial impairment” of access constituting severance of a property right.  Id.  Further, the change in access was 
a direct result of the physical taking rather than an incident of some accompanying regulatory action.  Id.   
11  
 
HI Boise merely argues on appeal that the reconstruction and slight movement of the driveway 
constituted a physical taking, but understandably does not argue that that slight movement itself 
somehow inhibited traffic flow.  This fact, too, places the present case far from Fonburg and 
Nelson Sand & Gravel, where the physical takings themselves caused the limitation of access.  
Accordingly, even if it is ultimately determined that the reconstruction constitutes a taking, HI 
Boise’s damages for that taking may not include the limitation of access to that driveway caused by 
changes in Vista traffic flow.  The district court was correct in dismissing HI Boise’s circuity claim 
as a matter of law. 
C. 
The district court correctly dismissed HI Boise’s visibility claim on summary 
judgment because it has no compensable property right in continued visibility 
under Idaho law. 
HI Boise also sought severance damages for loss of visibility of its property by motorists 
on I-84, arguing that various aspects of the project—such as the sound wall, alterations to I-84 
exits, and the widening and raising of the Vista overpass—have effectively left its property in a 
“hole.”  On summary judgment, the district court held: 
The existence of a “right of visibility” has not yet been expressly recognized as a 
property right in Idaho.  Neither the legislature nor any Idaho cases have expressly 
recognized a compensable property interest in “visibility” or a right “to be seen” 
from a roadway.  Nor have any Idaho cases held that “loss of visibility” from a 
roadway is compensable in direct or inverse condemnation proceedings. 
 
The court also looked to other jurisdictions and was persuaded by significant case law rejecting 
such claims.   
On appeal, HI Boise relies on out-of-state case law purportedly recognizing a right to 
continued visibility, as well as I.C. § 7-711(2)(b) itself.  At oral argument, HI Boise conceded that 
it could not base its visibility claim on the construction of the sound wall because that 
improvement was unrelated to the physical taking of its property.  Still, it maintained its 
entitlement to damages for the changes to the Vista overpass and I-84 exits, arguing that the taking 
of its 960-square-foot strip of property was essential to completion of those improvements and the 
project as a whole.  ITD responds that the Idaho case law on circuity supports a corresponding bar 
to visibility claims, out-of-state case law recognizing loss of visibility requires that the alleged 
obstructions be located on condemned property, and I.C. § 7-711(2)(b) itself does not support a 
claim of damage for such loss. 
 
Indeed, as ITD argues, neither the Legislature nor this Court has previously recognized a 
12  
 
right to continued visibility of property, and HI Boise offers no convincing argument that it should 
do so now.  First, ITD is correct that the circuity case law discussed above is persuasive in this 
regard.  If, as the Bastian line of cases dictates, a property owner does not have a property right in 
traffic flow around his property, it directly follows that he cannot assert a property right in that 
same traffic’s ability to see his property.  See, e.g., Bastian, 97 Idaho at 447, 546 P.2d at 402.  As 
ITD points out, “Based on these principles, ITD could re-route Interstate 84 entirely so that no 
traffic went past the HI Boise property at all.”  This would certainly be permissible—assuming no 
access rights were unconstitutionally usurped in the process—and have the same effect on 
visibility as erecting the obstructions on which HI Boise now bases its claim.   
There is significant support for this proposition in out-of-state case law.  E.g. Dep’t of 
Transp. v. Marilyn Hickey Ministries, 159 P.3d 111, 113 (Colo. 2007) (“We hold that because a 
landowner has no continued right to traffic passing its property, the landowner likewise has no 
right in the continued motorist visibility of its property.”); State v. Schmidt, 867 S.W.2d 769, 774 
(Tex. 1993) (“Just as a landowner has no vested interest in the volume or route of passersby, he has 
no right to insist that his premises be visible to them.”); State ex rel. Missouri Hwy. & Transp. 
Comm’n v. Dooley, 738 S.W.2d 457, 468–69 (Mo. App. 1987) (holding, in a partial takings case, 
that “any claim as to damages for ‘public view’ or visibility is ‘inextricably related’ to a property 
right in the traffic, [and] the decisions have consistently refused to ‘accord to property owners any 
right in the continuation of traffic”).  See also 4A Nichols on Eminent Domain § 14A.03[4] 
(Sackman & Van Brunt eds., 3d ed. Rev. 1997) (“Generally, this right is denied, principally upon 
the theory that one has no control over his neighbor’s property and therefore could not prevent his 
neighbor, under most principles of real property law, from erecting barriers to prevent his right to 
be seen.  Therefore a taking by a public authority takes nothing from him.”) 
While a few courts have approved severance damages for lost visibility, almost all refuse to 
do so when none of the alleged obstructions are actually constructed on the owner’s condemned 
property.  E.g. State v. Weiswasser, 693 A.2d 864, 873 (N.J. 1997) (“[L]oss of visibility as an 
element of severance damages may be related to a loss of access and the basis for the 
compensability for such damages would be whether the loss is attributable to the taking of the 
property itself or off-site conditions.”); People v. Wasserman, 50 Cal. Rptr. 95, 105 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1966) (Wasserman could not recover for alleged loss of visibility “since the improvement causing 
such loss of view[, t]he freeway itself, was not located on the property taken from these 
13  
 
defendants.”).  These cases turn on the fact that the lost visibility was a direct result of the 
severance of a legally cognizable property right—the physical property itself—rather than a 
severance of some stand-alone right to visibility. Idaho Code § 7-711(2)(b) provides a similar rule, 
allowing only “damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned, by reason of 
its severance from the portion sought to be condemned.”   
Here, it is undisputed that none of the improvements alleged to obstruct visibility of the HI 
Boise property are located on its severed strip of land or on its allegedly condemned Vista 
driveway.  Although at oral argument HI Boise attempted to link the alterations of the Vista 
overpass and exits to the taking of the 960-square-foot strip, any such link is too tenuous to satisfy 
Idaho Code § 7-711(2)(b).  Indeed, in conceding that it could not base its claim on the construction 
of the sound wall, HI Boise seems to recognize the statute’s rule that the damage asserted must 
arise from the taking itself rather than other aspects of the project.  Here, it does not.  Because we 
do not recognize visibility as a compensable property right in and of itself and HI Boise has not 
demonstrated that any visibility was lost “by reason of” a compensable taking, I.C. § 7-711(2)(b) 
does not allow compensation for its lost visibility.  Thus, the district court was correct in 
dismissing HI Boise’s visibility claim as a matter of law. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
 
In sum, the district court was correct that HI Boise’s circuity and visibility claims do not 
involve compensable takings.  Therefore, we affirm the district court’s holdings.  Costs to ITD. 
 
 
Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices EISMANN, W. JONES and HORTON CONCUR.