Title: People ex rel. Graf v. Village of Lake Bluff

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 91715-Agenda 24-January 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. N. DAVID 
GRAF et al., Appellees, v. THE VILLAGE OF LAKE BLUFF, 
 								Illinois, a Municipal Corporation, Appellant.
Opinion filed June 19, 2003.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	In this case, we decide whether a trial court's finding that a
parcel of land is contiguous to the annexing municipality in a
proceeding initiated under section 7-1-2 of the Illinois Municipal
Code (Code) (65 ILCS 5/7-1-2 (West 2000)) is subject to a
collateral attack in a quo warranto action.
	 The circuit court of Lake County denied plaintiffs' motion for
leave to file a complaint in quo warranto seeking to challenge the
annexation of a parcel of land on the basis that it was not
contiguous to the annexing village. The appellate court reversed,
holding that the existence of contiguity was a jurisdictional
condition precedent to the filing of a court-controlled annexation
proceeding under section 7-1-2 of the Code and that contiguity
could be raised collaterally in a quo warranto proceeding. 321 Ill.
App. 3d 897, 906. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the
judgment of the appellate court.

I. BACKGROUND
	On October 10, 1980, two owners of parcels of land in an 8.3-acre tract, commonly referred to as " the Triangle," filed a petition
pursuant to section 7-1-2 of the Illinois Municipal Code (Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1979, ch. 24, par. 7-1-2 (now codified at 65 ILCS 5/7-1-2
(West 2000))), seeking to annex the Triangle to the Village of
Lake Bluff (Village). The petitioners alleged that they were a
majority of the land owners in the Triangle and that the Triangle
was contiguous to the Village. No objections were filed. After a
hearing, the court found that the petition conformed to section
7-1-4 of the Code (65 ILCS 5/7-1-4 (West 2000)) and ordered
that the question of annexation be submitted to the corporate
authorities of the Village.
	The annexation was completed by an ordinance adopted
November 24, 1980. As part of this process, the Village also
annexed a portion of railroad right-of-way 1,000 feet long and 100
feet wide abutting a portion of the Triangle and also abutting the
border of the Village. No appeal was ever taken from the court
order approving the annexation, nor did any party ever seek post-judgment relief.
	In 1998, the Village annexed a different tract of land known
as "the Sanctuary," again using the court procedures created by
sections 7-1-2, 7-1-3, 7-1-4 and 7-1-7 of the Code (65 ILCS
5/7-1-2, 7-1-3, 7-1-4, 7-1-7 (West 2000)). The Village initiated
the process by an ordinance adopted August 10, 1998, and filed
with the circuit court in accordance with section 7-1-2. On
September 2, 1998, the court conducted a hearing under section
7-1-4 and found: (1) the Sanctuary was contiguous to the Village;
(2) the ordinance was lawfully adopted and in compliance with the
requirements of section 7-1-2; and (3) there were no valid
objections to the annexation. The court then directed the issue to
be submitted to a referendum of the electors residing in the
Sanctuary, pursuant to section 7-1-7. The annexation was
approved by a majority of the electors and, under the terms of the
court's order, the Sanctuary became a part of the Village. The
Sanctuary abutted a portion of the Triangle, but did not touch any
other boundary of the Village. No appeal was taken from the
judgment approving the Sanctuary annexation, nor did any party
request post-judgment relief in the trial court.
	On June 2, 1999, plaintiffs filed their motion for leave to file
a complaint in quo warranto to challenge the annexations.
Plaintiffs alleged that contiguity in the Triangle annexation existed
neither in fact nor in law. Further, they claimed that the subsequent
Sanctuary annexation was invalid because it was dependent on the
Triangle's defective annexation. Therefore, the Sanctuary
annexation also failed for want of contiguity and was void.
	The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion, finding that it was an
impermissible collateral attack on the final orders entered in two
annexation proceedings. The court further found that none of the
plaintiffs had standing to assert a challenge to the annexations
because their pleadings did not describe a special interest or
private right infringed by the annexations. Plaintiffs appealed.
	The appellate court affirmed the trial court's order on the
standing of plaintiffs Graf, Price and Surkamer, who resided in the
Village. The court found that plaintiffs' allegation, concerning
Village tax revenues being diverted to pay for government services
to the Sanctuary property, was speculative and insufficient. 321 Ill.
App. 3d at 901. Therefore, plaintiffs did not show the requisite
interest in the case to establish standing. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 901.
The court, however, partially reversed the trial court as to plaintiff
Gottschalk, a Sanctuary resident, finding that Gottschalk's
averments were sufficient to confer standing. 321 Ill. App. 3d at
902.
	The appellate court further held that the existence of
contiguity is a jurisdictional condition precedent to annexation,
and its absence can be raised in a quo warranto action. 321 Ill.
App. 3d at 906. The appellate court believed the provisions of
section 7-1-46 of the Code (65 ILCS 5/7-1-46 (West 2000)),
imposing a one-year statute of limitations on annexation
challenges, showed the legislature's intent that contiguity be a
jurisdictional prerequisite. We granted leave to appeal to the
Village. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.

II. ANALYSIS
	Quo warranto is an extraordinary remedy. It was originally a
writ of right for the crown against one who claimed or usurped any
office, franchise or liberty, to challenge the authority underlying
that assertion of the right. People ex rel. Hansen v. Phelan, 158 Ill. 2d 445, 448 (1994). Quo warranto proceedings are now codified
(735 ILCS 5/18-101 et seq. (West 2000)) and may be brought by
private parties under special circumstances. They may do so,
however, only by leave of court. 735 ILCS 5/18-102 (West 2000).
The decision to grant or deny a petition for leave to file a quo
warranto action is a matter within the trial court's sound
discretion. Phelan, 158 Ill. 2d  at 449. Where discretion has been
vested in the trial court, only a clear abuse of discretion or an
application of impermissible legal criteria justifies reversal.
Boatmen's National Bank of Belleville v. Martin, 155 Ill. 2d 305,
314 (1993).

A. Standing
	We first address the Village's argument that the appellate
court erred in holding that plaintiff Gottschalk had standing to
bring a quo warranto action. Gottschalk alleged that, as a result of
the annexation, he must: (1) purchase vehicle stickers from the
Village; (2) pay Village property taxes; and (3) pay for garbage-collection service regardless of whether he chooses to use it. The
appellate court held that these allegations are sufficient to assert
the kind of special interest necessary to maintain an action in quo
warranto. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 902.
	The Village argues here that Gottschalk's allegations do not
describe a substantial adverse impact and that any new costs are
outweighed by the benefits and services provided to residents of
the Village. We disagree.
	The Village cites no authority applying a balancing test of
adverse impact versus new benefits and services. Nonetheless, it
argues that a balancing test is consistent with the reasoning in
People ex rel. Durst v. Village of Germantown Hills, 51 Ill. App.
3d 969 (1977). There, a township asserted standing to challenge an
annexation because it would lose motor fuel tax revenues as a
result of the reduction in the total number of miles under its
jurisdiction. The court observed that although annexation results
in a township's loss of road jurisdiction, it also eliminates its
responsibility for road maintenance. Durst, 51 Ill. App. 3d at 971.
	In the case before us, the only new benefit described in the
record is garbage collection, a service unwanted by Gottschalk.
Gottschalk's payments for garbage service, mandatory vehicle
stickers, and Village property taxes significantly impact his private
interests and are not outweighed by any benefits or services
described in the Village's pleading. Thus, Durst is inapplicable
here. Moreover, we agree with the appellate court that the
increased financial burdens to Gottschalk resulting from the
assessment of Village property taxes and the requirement that he
purchase vehicle stickers from the Village are substantial. 321 Ill.
App. 3d at 902.
	In holding that taxpayers could challenge in quo warranto the
right of a drainage district to continue to levy taxes, this court
observed:
			"Moreover, the interest of a citizen in the taxes to be
collected from him is obviously distinct, for many
purposes, from a general public interest in the
enforcement of the law. It is a personal and substantial
interest, and it does not become the less so because other
citizens have a similar interest." People ex rel. McCarthy
v. Firek, 5 Ill. 2d 317, 324 (1955).
	Therefore, we believe that Gottschalk has sufficiently alleged
a special interest to confer standing to bring an action in quo
warranto. The appellate court's reasoning on that issue was
correct and needs no further explication here.

B. The Contiguity Challenge
	 In denying plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a quo warranto
action in this case, the trial court construed section 7-1-2 of the
Code and determined that the jurisdictional prerequisites to the
filing of a court-approved annexation proceeding were set out in
that section. Contiguity is not mentioned in that section and, thus,
is not a jurisdictional prerequisite. Section 7-1-4 of the Code
requires the trial court to find that contiguity exists between the
municipality and the parcel to be annexed. 65 ILCS 5/7-1-4 (West
2000). Since that issue is a question of fact that the court in the
annexation proceeding was empowered to decide, the trial court
denied plaintiffs' motion, finding that a collateral attack on a final
order is not authorized under such circumstances.
	The appellate court reached a contrary conclusion, finding that
according to the plain language of section 7-1-4, the legislature
intended contiguity to be a jurisdictional prerequisite to an
annexation. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 904-06. In its analysis, the court did
not refer to section 7-1-2 of the Code, nor did it cite any case
where the use of quo warranto was approved as a means of
challenging a court-ordered annexation due to a lack of contiguity.
Since we must construe the subject statutes to determine whether
the trial court applied the correct legal criteria in the exercise of its
discretion, a question of law is presented, and our review is de
novo. In re Estate of Andernovics, 197 Ill. 2d 500, 507 (2001).
	Gottschalk argues, and the appellate court held, that the
existence of contiguity is a jurisdictional condition precedent to
annexation because section 7-1-4 of the Code requires the trial
court to determine whether the petition or ordinance filed under
section 7-1-2 is valid or invalid. The use of those terms, the
appellate court reasoned, suggests that a petition not meeting the
requirements of section 7-1-4 is without any legal force or effect
and that an action based upon a petition that fails to meet those
statutory requirements is void ab initio. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 904.
	Section 7-1-4 requires the court to dismiss the petition or
ordinance if it finds that: (1) the annexation petition is not signed
by the requisite number of electors or property owners of record;
(2) the described property is not contiguous to the annexing
municipality; (3) the description is materially defective; or (4) the
petition or ordinance is otherwise invalid. 65 ILCS 5/7-1-4 (West
2000). The appellate court observed that the signature requirement
has been held to be a jurisdictional condition precedent and that
the contiguity requirement appears in the same sentence of the
statute as the signature requirement. Thus, nothing warrants
interpreting contiguity as a factual matter and signatures as a
jurisdictional matter. According to the appellate court, the
inclusion of both requirements in the same portion of the statute
is a manifestation of the legislature's intention that both serve the
same function. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 903-05, citing People ex rel.
Jordan Co. v. Village of Forest View, 21 Ill. 2d 384, 390 (1961);
People ex rel. Brzica v. Village of Lake Barrington, 268 Ill. App.
3d 420, 423 (1994).
	The Village argues that the conditions precedent to the
exercise of the court's jurisdiction are established not in section
7-1-4 of the Code, but in section 7-1-2. That section provides as
follows:
			"(a) A written petition signed by a majority of the
owners of record of land in the territory and also by a
majority of the electors, if any, residing in the territory
shall be filed with the circuit court clerk of the county in
which the territory is located, or the corporate authorities
of a municipality may initiate the proceeding by enacting
an ordinance expressing their desire to annex the
described territory. *** The petition or ordinance, as the
case may be, shall request the annexation of the territory
to a specified municipality and also shall request that the
circuit court of the specified county submit the question
of the annexation to the corporate authorities of the
annexing municipality or to the electors of the
unincorporated territory, as the case may be." 65 ILCS
5/7-1-2(a) (West 2000).
	Section 7-1-2 does not require the petition to allege the
contiguity of the territory to be annexed to the municipality. The
Village argues that we must look to section 7-1-2, rather than
section 7-1-4, to determine the applicable conditions precedent
because the filing of the petition enables the court to exercise its
subject matter jurisdiction. Section 7-1-4, by its own terms,
describes the findings the court must make to determine whether
the petition is valid. Obviously, the court cannot make findings
unless it has jurisdiction. The Village contends that since a
sufficient petition, as prescribed by the legislature, was presented
to the court, it was empowered to determine the question of
contiguity.
	In the case before us, the petition to annex the Triangle
property alleged that it was signed by a majority of the owners of
record and alleged that it was contiguous to the Village. It was
supported by the petitioners' verification under oath. Thus, it
conformed to the requirements of section 7-1-2 of the Code (65
ILCS 5/7-1-2 (West 2000)). The trial court subsequently found
that the petition also conformed to the requirements of section
7-1-4 and referred the question of annexation to Village
authorities as provided by statute. In making its finding, the court
implicitly determined that the Triangle territory was contiguous to
the Village. Any errors in the trial court's final order could have
been directly appealed under section 7-1-4 (65 ILCS 5/7-1-4
(West 2000)).
	In August 1998, the Village enacted an ordinance to initiate
the annexation of the Sanctuary property. The ordinance contained
a legal description of the property to be annexed and averments
that it was not within any other municipality and was contiguous
to the Village. It also requested that the court find the ordinance to
be valid and in conformity with the Code. The trial court entered
an agreed order resolving the issues raised by the objectors,
finding the territory contiguous to the Village and the ordinance
lawfully adopted and in conformity with the requirements of
section 7-1-2 and directing that the question of annexation be
submitted to a referendum vote pursuant to section 7-1-7 of the
Code. The agreed order was not appealed. The trial court's
determination that the Sanctuary property was contiguous to the
Village could only have been based on its contiguity to the
previously annexed Triangle property. Thus, the court in the 1998
proceeding relied on the validity of the unchallenged 1980 court
order.
	In challenging the prior trial court orders, plaintiffs' quo
warranto petition is an independent action, not filed in either of
the annexation proceedings. Therefore, it is a collateral attack on
the two judgments that had previously found contiguity. City of
Des Plaines v. Boeckenhauer, 383 Ill. 475, 480 (1943). Plaintiffs
argue that a collateral attack is authorized under the holding in
Jordan, 21 Ill. 2d 384. In that case, this court reviewed the finding
that the requisite number of eligible electors had signed an
annexation petition and reasoned:
		"Plaintiffs do not purport to review the determination of
the county court. Rather, their claim is that the county
court lacked jurisdiction to make any determination,
because the failure of the petition to comply with the
statutory requirements rendered it insufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the county court. The statutory
requirements of the petition are jurisdictional, and the
lack of jurisdiction on the part of the county court can be
asserted in a quo warranto proceeding." Jordan, 21 Ill. 2d 
at 389-90.
	In light of our holding in Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325 (2002), Jordan has no
continued viability. Jordan was decided in 1961, prior to the
amendment of the judicial article to our state constitution (Ill.
Const. 1870, art. VI (1964), §9). Thus, its precedential value is
limited to the constitutional context existing before the judicial
amendment radically changed the legislature's role in determining
the jurisdiction of the circuit court. Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d 
at 337.
	Jordan suggests that the statutory requirements of an
annexation petition are nonwaivable conditions precedent to the
exercise of the court's jurisdiction. Jordan, 21 Ill 2d at 390.
However, as we explained in construing the limitations period
contained in the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act (815 ILCS 710/14
(West 2000)):
		"The legislature may create new justiciable matters by
enacting legislation that creates rights and duties that have
no counterpart at common law or in equity. [Citation.]
Through the legislature's adoption of the Act in 1979, the
legislature created a new justiciable matter. The
legislature's creation of a new justiciable matter, however,
does not mean that the legislature thereby confers
jurisdiction on the circuit court. Article VI is clear that,
except in the area of administrative review, the
jurisdiction of the circuit court flows from the
constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §9. The General
Assembly, of course, has no power to enact legislation
that would contravene article VI. [Citation.]
			Some case law, however, suggests that the legislature,
in defining a justiciable matter, may impose 'conditions
precedent' to the court's exercise of jurisdiction that
cannot be waived. [Citations.] We necessarily reject this
view because it is contrary to article VI. Characterizing
the requirements of a statutory cause of action as
nonwaivable conditions precedent to a court's exercise of
jurisdiction is merely another way of saying that the
circuit court may only exercise that jurisdiction which the
legislature allows. We, reiterate, however, that the
jurisdiction of the circuit court is conferred by the
constitution, not the legislature. Only in the area of
administrative review is the court's power to adjudicate
controlled by the legislature." (Emphasis in original.)
Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d  at 335-36.
	The reasoning in Belleville Toyota applies with equal force to
the case before us. There is no common law authority for a
municipality to initiate annexation procedures. It is well
established that the legislature alone has the authority to allow or
require the alteration of municipal boundaries. In re Petition to
Annex Certain Territory to the Village of North Barrington, 144 Ill. 2d 353, 361 (1991). The legislature, therefore, created a
justiciable controversy when it enacted the court-ordered
annexation statute. When the trial court in this case was presented
with a petition and an annexation ordinance, it had jurisdiction to
hear and determine the matter because the court's constitutionally
granted original jurisdiction extends to the general class of cases
arising under the statute. Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d  at 340. As
we said in that case:
		"Even if plaintiff's complaint defectively stated its claim
under the Act, the circuit court would not have been
deprived of subject matter jurisdiction. Subject matter
jurisdiction does not depend upon the legal sufficiency of
the pleadings." Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d  at 340.
	Applying these principles to the matter before us, it is apparent
that the legislature has empowered the court to make findings and
orders in annexation cases if presented with a petition or ordinance
requesting judicial approval. Once a justiciable matter is properly
submitted, a court has the power to decide rightly or wrongly the
issues properly before it. As we observed in Steinbrecher v.
Steinbrecher:
		"Yet, jurisdiction is not affected by an incorrect judgment:
'jurisdiction or power to render a particular judgment does
not mean that the judgment rendered must be the one that
should have been rendered, for the power to decide carries
with it the power to decide wrong as well as to decide
right.' [Citation.]" Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514, 532 (2001).
The form and content of an annexation petition or ordinance are
prescribed by section 7-1-2 of the Code. Plaintiffs do not contend
that either the petition in the Triangle annexation or the ordinance
in the Sanctuary annexation failed to conform to the requirements
of section 7-1-2. Nor do they contend that the court in either the
Triangle or the Sanctuary annexation did not comply with the
procedural requirements of section 7-1-4 of the Code. Instead,
they argue that contiguity does not exist, either as a matter of fact
or law. That issue was, however, determined by two courts having
jurisdiction of the subject matter. Thus, if the Village were
required to establish its authority to annex the territories in
question, it could justifiably rely on the lawful orders of the circuit
court approving those procedures. See People ex rel. Town of
Richwoods v. City of Peoria, 80 Ill. App. 2d 359, 366 (1967).
Nonetheless, this rationale has not been consistently applied by our
appellate court.
	For instance, in Richwoods, petitioners challenged the
annexation of territory to the City of Peoria on various grounds
alleged to be jurisdictional, including the absence of contiguity. In
answering the quo warranto petition, the City raised the defense
of justification, asserting that its right to annex the territory in
dispute was derived from court orders in an annexation proceeding
initiated under section 7-1-2 of the Code. The trial court granted
summary judgment for the City, and on appeal, the court
considered the issue of whether the validity of the annexation was
open to attack in quo warranto. Richwoods, 80 Ill. App. 2d at 362.
The Third District of the appellate court held that it was not and
observed:
		"To require the city in this proceeding to go behind the
adjudications in cause No. 64 Z 2103, and to prove again
here the issues it has already proved there, would require
us to ignore the express language of the statute [citation]
that adjudications made in proceedings such as those in
64 Z 2103 are to be final and appealable, and in effect
would allow, by a collateral proceeding, a de novo review
of another adjudication. We are satisfied that quo
warranto is not appropriate for that purpose ***."
Richwoods, 80 Ill. App. 2d at 366.
	 The First District of the appellate court reached a similar
conclusion in People ex rel. O'Malley v. Village of Ford Heights,
261 Ill. App. 3d 571, 574 (1994). That court sustained the
dismissal of two counts of an intervenor's petition in quo
warranto challenging a court-ordered annexation, holding that quo
warranto was not the proper means of challenging findings made
in an earlier action. To allow the quo warranto petition to proceed
would allow the improper de novo review of findings in a
collateral proceeding. O'Malley, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 574. The court
also rejected the intervenor's argument that the condemnation
order was void because the legal description of the annexed
property was materially defective. The court held that the
legislature had empowered circuit courts to determine whether
legal descriptions are materially defective and therefore an order
making that determination was not void. Thus, the appropriate
method to challenge the ruling was a direct appeal or a motion to
vacate under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735
ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2000)). O'Malley, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 574-75.
	Conversely, the Second District of the appellate court rejected
the reasoning in Richwoods and O'Malley in Brzca, 268 Ill. App.
3d 420. That court reversed the trial court's dismissal of a quo
warranto petition challenging an annexation because the petition
initiating the proceeding did not contain signatures of a majority
of property owners, as required by section 7-1-2 of the Code.
Relying on Jordan, the court held that a section 7-1-2 petition
must meet certain statutory requirements in order for the court to
act and grant the requested relief. Affixation of the signatures of
a majority of landowners in the territory to be annexed is
mandatory. Therefore, the court reasoned that this deficiency is a
jurisdictional defect and may be raised at any time, even
collaterally in a quo warranto proceeding. Brzica, 268 Ill. App. 3d
at 425.
	For the reasons we have discussed, the holding in Brzca is in
error. Jordan has no viability in the present constitutional context.
Further, Richwoods and O'Malley are more pertinent to the facts
in the case before us. Here, we are not presented with any claim
that the petition in the Triangle annexation lacked the requisite
signatures or that the Sanctuary ordinance was in any way
defective. Nor is there any claim of fraud or lack of notice.
Plaintiffs argue only that contiguity did not exist in fact or in law
when the Triangle was annexed. Nonetheless, the legislature
expressly authorized the trial court to make that determination in
a hearing under section 7-1-4 of the Code. The trial court clearly
made a contiguity finding. There is no basis, therefore, to allow
another court to revisit that same issue in a quo warranto
proceeding when the correctness of the original ruling could have
been challenged by direct appeal or by a timely petition for post-judgment relief.
	In reversing the trial court, the appellate court also considered
whether plaintiffs' right to challenge the annexations is impacted
by the statute of limitations in section 7-1-46 of the Code (65
ILCS 5/7-1-46 (West 2000)). The appellate court concluded that
contiguity must be a jurisdictional prerequisite because it is
exempted from the one-year limitations statute in the Code. 321
Ill. App. 3d at 905. That section provides:
		"The limitation set forth in this section shall apply to any
annexation, even where the judge, body or officer
annexing the territory did not at the time of such
annexation have jurisdiction of the subject matter, and
irrespective of whether such annexation may otherwise be
defective or void, except that the limitation of this section
shall not apply to annexations of territory which was not
contiguous at the time of annexation and is not
contiguous at the time an action is brought to contest such
annexation." 65 ILCS 5/7-1-46 (West 2000).
	The appellate court reasoned that since contiguity is treated in
the same portion of a statute that deals with jurisdictional matters
and since contiguity provides the only exception to the application
of the statute of limitations, the legislature considered the lack of
contiguity to be a "very basic defect." 321 Ill. App. 3d at 905. This
may be true, but for the reasons we have discussed, the lack of
contiguity does not impact the subject matter jurisdiction of the
court. The trial court properly entered final judgments,
unchallenged on direct appeal or by petition for post-judgment
relief. The issues determined by those judgments may not be
relitigated in a collateral proceeding 20 years later.
	The Village has never contended that Gottschalk's contiguity
challenge is time-barred. Instead, it argues that the challenge is
foreclosed by the preclusive effect of the affirmative contiguity
findings in two final judgments. We agree. Under these
circumstances, the remedy of quo warranto will not lie because
the validity of the annexation process has already been given final
judicial approval. Thus, the lack of a time-bar to that remedy is
irrelevant.
 
III. CONCLUSION
	Although plaintiff Gottschalk has sufficiently alleged the
special interest necessary to confer standing to bring an action in
quo warranto, nevertheless we hold that the plain language of the
statutory scheme allowing court-approved annexations does not
permit a collateral, quo warranto challenge to the final legal or
factual determinations in such cases.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.


	JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting:


	I must respectfully dissent from the court's opinion because
I believe the circuit court incorrectly denied plaintiff's motion for
leave to file their complaint in quo warranto.
	In reaching its conclusion that the lack of contiguity does not
impact on the subject matter jurisdiction of the court (slip op. at
13), the court relies heavily on the analyses contained in Belleville
Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325
(2002), and Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514 (2001).
I dissented in Belleville, 199 Ill. 2d  at 365 (Freeman, J., dissenting,
joined by McMorrow, J.), and in Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d  at 533
(Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow and Kilbride, JJ.),
and am compelled to again register my disagreement with the
court's position in this area.
	As it did in Belleville, the court today insists that the 1970
constitution changed the concept of jurisdiction in Illinois. While
I agree that the changes made to the judicial article in both 1964
and 1970 affected jurisdiction, I do not believe the changes
lessened the legislature's power to define the statutory causes of
action that it creates. Contrary to the suggestion in both Belleville
and Steinbrecher that this court has overlooked the changes made
to the judicial article (see Belleville, 199 Ill. 2d at 335-36;
Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d at 529-30), this court has consistently
recognized that the "jurisdiction" of our circuit courts is conferred
by our constitution. In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 65 (1993). In my
view, the court today, as it did in Belleville and Steinbrecher, has
placed too much emphasis on the changes to the judicial article.
Prior to the amendment, article VI read as follows:
			"The circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
causes in law and equity, and such appellate jurisdiction
as is or may be provided by law ***." Ill. Const. 1870, art.
VI, §12.
To be sure, the Judicial Article of 1962, effective January 1, 1964,
changed the language of the article VI:
			"The circuit court shall have unlimited original
jurisdiction of all justiciable matters, and such powers of
review of administrative action as may be provided by
law." Ill. Const. 1870, art. VI (1964), §9.
However, the word "unlimited" was eliminated from the article in
the Constitution of 1970, and it currently reads as follows:
			"Circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
justiciable matters except when the Supreme Court has
original and exclusive jurisdiction relating to redistricting
of the General Assembly and to the ability of the
Governor to serve or resume office. Circuit courts shall
have the power to review administrative action as
provided by law." Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §9.
In my view, the biggest change resulting from the 1964
amendment was the elimination of the distinction between courts
of law and equity, which means that our circuit courts have the
power to hear all justiciable matters, whether the causes of action
arose from common law, in equity or by statute in derogation of
the common law. This change, however, did not alter the fact that
a court cannot act in excess of its authority. Nor did it change the
way we are to view statutory conditions precedent.
	In Belleville, this court identified three cases as being
illustrative of the case law which recognized the view that "the
legislature, in defining a justiciable matter, may impose
'conditions precedent' to the court's exercise of jurisdiction that
cannot be waived." Belleville, 199 Ill. 2d  at 335 (citing In re
Marriage of Fields, 288 Ill. App. 3d 1053 (1997), People ex rel.
Brzica v. Village of Lake Barrington, 268 Ill. App. 3d 420 (1994),
and In re Estate of Mears, 110 Ill. App. 3d 1133 (1982)). The
court rejected the viewpoint espoused in those cases because "it is
contrary to article VI" of the 1970 constitution. Belleville, 199 Ill. 2d  at 336. The court stated that "[c]haracterizing the requirements
of a statutory cause of action as nonwaivable conditions precedent
to a court's exercise of jurisdiction is merely another way of
saying that the circuit court may only exercise that jurisdiction
which the legislature allows. We reiterate, however, that the
jurisdiction of the circuit court is conferred by the constitution, not
the legislature. Only in the area of administrative review is the
court's power to adjudicate controlled by the legislature."
Belleville, 199 Ill. 2d  at 336.
	Notwithstanding the rejection of cases like Mears, the court
in Belleville nevertheless went on to cite Mears, among other
authorities, as support for its proposition that the 1964
amendments to the judicial article "radically changed the
legislature's role in determining the jurisdiction of the circuit
court." Belleville, 199 Ill. 2d  at 337, citing In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 74 (1993) (Miller, C.J., concurring, joined by Bilandic, J.);
Mears, 110 Ill. App. 3d at 1137. Indeed, the court pointed to that
portion of the Mears analysis that traced the development of
jurisdiction from the 1818 constitution to the 1970 constitution.
The court concluded that "[i]n light of these changes, the
precedential value of case law which examines a court's
jurisdiction under the pre-1964 judicial system is necessarily
limited to the constitutional context in which those cases arose."
Belleville, 199 Ill. 2d  at 337. The point made in Belleville, and
reiterated today, is that the 1970 concept of jurisdiction changed
the way in which we are to regard statutory conditions precedent
and the consequences of a failure to comply with them.
	One of the problems, in my view, with the
Steinbrecher/Belleville analysis is that this court runs the risk of
improperly legislating in the area of statutory causes of action. For
example, in Belleville, the court addressed whether the time
limitations contained in the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act
constituted an "ordinary" limitations period, i.e., an affirmative
defense, as opposed to a condition precedent to suit. A majority of
the court concluded that the limitations period was not "a
jurisdictional prerequisite to suit." Belleville, 199 Ill. 2d  at 342.
Having so concluded, the court proceeded to construe the statute
as an ordinary statute of limitations that provides a technical
defense which may be waived. Belleville, 199 Ill. 2d  at 344-45. As
a result, the failure to fulfill a statutory condition precedent has no
effect on the validity of any order rendered by the circuit court.
Belleville, 199 Ill. 2d  at 340-41. Such an analysis, which allows
this court to transform an element of a plaintiff's statutory cause
of action into an affirmative matter that must be pleaded and
proved by the defendant, raises, in my mind, serious questions
regarding the separation of powers.
	My research has found no legal authority that supports the
court's view that the changes to the judicial article made in both
1964 and again in 1970 eliminated the legislature's ability to
establish conditions precedent to statutory causes of action it
creates. Indeed, the authorities that do speak to the jurisdictional
"revolution" the court so strongly embraces do so while
acknowledging the continued ability of the legislature to establish
nonwaivable conditions precedent to statutory cases of action. An
example, of course, is Mears. As I have noted, the court in
Belleville cited to Mears with approval for the proposition that the
1970 constitution changed the way in which we are to view the
term "jurisdiction." However, the court rejected key portions of
the analysis in Mears that spoke to the precise issue of the
legislature's ability to define statutory causes of action. A review
of the case illustrates this.
	At issue in Mears was the last will and testament of Frances
Mears. Mears, 110 Ill. App. 3d at 1133. The principal beneficiary
of Mears' will was Illinois Wesleyan University, which was to
receive all of the residue of the estate after several monetary
legacies had been paid out. Mears, 110 Ill. App. 3d at 1133.
Mears, a widow, died childless, and her heirs were 53 known
nieces and nephews and various other collateral descendants.
Mears, 110 Ill. App. 3d at 1133-34. One of the heirs, within the
time provided by law, petitioned to contest the validity of the will.
The petition named as respondents all the heirs and legatees, but
did not name the executor of the will. Mears, 110 Ill. App. 3d at
1134. The executor filed a special and limited appearance for the
purpose of contesting the jurisdiction of the circuit court. Mears,
110 Ill. App. 3d at 1134. He successfully argued that the failure to
name him as a party respondent was fatal and that the time to file
a proper petition had expired. Mears, 110 Ill. App. 3d at 1134. The
appellate court reversed. After noting the history of article VI of
our constitution, the court stated that its inquiry in light of the
1970 constitution was "whether there exists a justiciable
controversy, and if so, are there any statutory conditions
precedent to judicial intervention." (Emphasis added.) Mears, 110
Ill. App. 3d at 1138. The court went on to hold that the "only
condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction is that [the
petition] be filed within the time limited by statute after the
admission of the will to probate. [Citation.] It is uncontroverted
that the petition was filed within the statutory period in the instant
case. The circuit court then had jurisdiction." Mears, 110 Ill. App.
3d at 1138.
	Like this court today and in Belleville, the appellate court in
Mears cited the changes wrought by the 1970 constitution in
concluding that the concept of "jurisdiction" had changed over
time. However, the court in Mears, unlike this court, nevertheless
continued to recognize the power of the General Assembly to
impose conditions to relief in the statutory causes of action it
creates. Indeed, the court in Mears acknowledged that even in light
of the 1970 constitution:
		"[T]he legislature may still impose substantive conditions
precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. While this may
sometimes erroneously be called a lack of jurisdiction, it
is in reality an inability to exercise jurisdiction because
the court cannot waive the condition." (Emphases added.)
Mears, 110 Ill. App. 3d at 1138.
Contrary to the view expressed in Belleville, it is clear to me that
this statement in Mears was not "merely another way of saying
that the circuit court may only exercise that jurisdiction which the
legislature allows." Belleville, 199 Ill. 2d  at 336. The court was
expressing the view that notwithstanding the "revolutionized"
concept of jurisdiction, a court cannot act beyond its statutory
authority. A similar view was also espoused in published legal
commentary following the judicial article amendment in 1964. See
H. Fins, Re-Examination of "Jurisdiction" in Light of New Illinois
Judicial Article, 53 Ill. B.J. 8 (1964). I also note that in the
concurring opinion in M.M., to which the court in Belleville also
cited for support of the effect of the changes to the judicial article,
the concurring justices cited, with approval, to the portion of
Mears that recognized the continued viability of statutory
conditions precedent. In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d  at 75 (Miller, C.J.,
concurring, joined by Bilandic, J.).
	In light of the above, I do not agree that the conclusion
reached in Belleville was "firmly rooted in our constitution."
Belleville, 199 Ill. 2d  at 341. As I review our case law in this
regard in order to address the issues raised in present case, I can
find no authority for linking the changes to the judicial article with
the notion that statutory conditions precedent are somehow
incompatible with article VI. In fact, the authority that the court
points to as hailing the revolutionary constitutional changes to
jurisdiction is the same authority the court is willing to "reject" in
the context of statutory conditions precedent. The court's use of
only selective portions of the very case law it relies on diminishes
the persuasiveness of its legal analysis.
	In addition, I am compelled to point out another matter that
deserves comment. The court today echoes Belleville's rejection
of applying pre-1964 case law to the question of a circuit court's
jurisdiction. Slip op. at 8-9. In Belleville, the court pointedly
criticized the fact that "pre-1964 rules of law continue to be cited
by Illinois courts, without qualification, creating confusion and
imprecision in the case law" (Belleville, 199 Ill. 2d at 338) when
addressing whether the circuit court had jurisdiction under the
1970 constitution. Nevertheless, this court committed the very
same infraction in Reichert v. Court of Claims, 203 Ill. 2d 257,
261-62 (2003) in which the court, citing to a 1908 case, held that
the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over a certiorari petition. The
court in Reichert made no attempt to harmonize its holding with
the doctrine espoused in Belleville and Steinbrecher, nor is
Reichert in harmony with today's opinion. The court's inability to
apply the principles it announced in these cases in a consistent
fashion reinforces my belief that continued debate on the question
is necessary. It also convinces me that this court has not charted an
entirely clear course in this area of our jurisprudence. Therefore,
I continue to be of the view that when a court's power to act in a
particular manner is controlled by statute, the defects that arise
from the court's acting beyond its power cannot be waived. Mears,
110 Ill. App. 3d at 1137-38. Thus, in exercising jurisdiction over
matters made justiciable by statute and having no counterpart in
common law or equity, courts must proceed within the strictures
of the statute. Stated differently, a court may not exceed its
statutory authority. In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 64-66 (1993). We
recently reaffirmed, in the criminal context, that orders entered by
a court without legal authority have been viewed as void and can
be subject to collateral attack. See People ex rel. Ryan v. Roe, 201 Ill. 2d 552 (2002); People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995). I
can see no principled distinction between criminal cases and civil
cases in this matter.
	As I pointed out in my dissent in Steinbrecher, this court had,
until then, recognized that a " 'judgment or decree may be void
where a court has exceeded its authority.' " Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d  at 549 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow and
Kilbride, JJ.), quoting People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149, 156
(1993), citing Armstrong v. Obucino, 300 Ill. 140, 142-43 (1921).
It appears to me that a majority of this court is uncomfortable with
the notion of leaving open to collateral attack judgments made by
a court acting beyond or in excess of its authority. Indeed, the
court said as much as in Belleville. After concluding that the
limitations period was not a condition precedent, the court
observed:
			"Our conclusion, while firmly rooted in our
constitution, is also consistent with the trend of modern
authority favoring finality of judgments over alleged
defects in validity. See In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 175-77 (1998), citing Restatement (Second) of
Judgments §12 (1982); see also Fields, 288 Ill. App. 3d at
1060, citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments §12
(1982). Labeling the requirements contained in statutory
causes of action 'jurisdictional' would permit an
unwarranted and dangerous expansion of the situations
where a final judgment may be set aside on a collateral
attack. [Citation.] Even if the statutory requirement is
considered a nonwaivable condition, the same concern
over the finality of judgments arises. Once a statutory
requirement is deemed 'nonwaivable,' it is on equal
footing with the only other nonwaivable conditions that
would cause a judgment to be void, and thus subject to
collateral attack-a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or
a lack of personal jurisdiction. [Citation.] As our
appellate court has observed, '[b]ecause of the disastrous
consequences which follow when orders and judgments
are allowed to be collaterally attacked, orders should be
characterized as void only when no other alternative is
possible.' In re Marriage of Vernon, 253 Ill. App. 3d 783,
788 (1993) ***." (Emphasis added.) Belleville, 199 Ill. 2d 
at 341.
The emphasized language demonstrates that the court's concern in
this area is primarily with preserving the finality of judgments.
However, as Mears demonstrates, nothing in our constitution
prevents the legislature from imposing nonwaivable conditions
precedent to the statutory causes of action that it creates.
	The fact that members of this court are concerned about the
finality of judgments is not objectionable, in and of itself-the
excess-of-authority approach has received criticism. See 1B
Moore, Federal Practice 648 n.41 (2d ed. 1948); H. Cox, The
Void Order and the Duty to Obey, 16 U. Chi. L. Rev. 86, 90-92
(1948). As one court has put it, the application of the rule
"necessarily require[s] the drawing of distinctions between subject
matter jurisdiction, excess of jurisdiction, and mere error. These
distinctions have often proved difficult to draw." Hartt v. Hartt,
121 R.I. 220, 226, 397 A.2d 518, 522 (1979). This court has
chosen to resolve this problem by holding that the changes in the
judicial article of our constitution narrowed the definition of
"jurisdiction." However, as I have demonstrated, the changes to
the judicial article cited by the court do not support the view that
orders made by a court in excess of its authority are shielded from
collateral review. The amendments did not speak to whether
jurisdiction includes the power of a court to act in excess of its
authority. The court errs in its reliance on those amendments in
support of its policy decision to uphold the finality of judgments.
In so doing, the court has created confusion-rejecting the
legislature's ability to create conditions precedent in some cases
(see Belleville, 199 Ill. 2d at 341), but reaffirming the legislature's
prerogative of imposing limitations and conditions on the
availability of relief in statutory causes of action in other cases (see
In re Marriage of Kates, 198 Ill. 2d 156 (2001)). See also
Belleville, 199 Ill. 2d  at 371 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by
McMorrow, J.) (noting inconsistencies in this area).
	I am not unsympathetic to the concerns of finality cited by the
court. Nonetheless, I believe the better approach is to acknowledge
the problem and attempt to balance what I consider to be the two
competing policy concerns that are in tension in this area, i.e.,
"insuring that judgments are rendered only by courts having the
power to do so (the policy of validity) and enforcing a termination
point for litigation after the opportunity for full and fair litigation
(the policy of finality)." K. Moore, Collateral Attack on Subject
Matter Jurisdiction: A Critique of the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 534 (1981). In my view, the court's
solution to the problem is overly broad and fraught with
inconsistencies. See, e.g., Steinbrecher 197 Ill. 2d  at 547
(Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow and Kilbride, JJ.)
(noting different application in the context of criminal
proceedings). I need not, for purposes of this case, delve further
into this matter because (i) it does not matter whether contiguity
is classified as jurisdictional and (ii) the issue of finality with
respect to contiguity has been definitively addressed by our
legislature in the Municipal Code.
	Section 7-1-46 of the Code specifically addresses actions
contesting completed annexations. The statute provides that
			"Neither the People of the State of Illinois nor any
person, firm or corporation, public or private, nor any
association of persons shall commence an action
contesting either directly or indirectly the annexation of
any territory to a municipality unless initiated within one
year after the date such annexation becomes final ***.
The limitation set forth in this section shall apply to any
annexation, even where the judge, body or officer
annexing the territory did not at the time of such
annexation have jurisdiction of the subject matter, and
irrespective of whether such annexation may otherwise be
defective or void, except that the limitation of this Section
shall not apply to annexations of territory which was not
contiguous at the time of annexation and is not
contiguous at the time an action is brought to contest
such annexation." (Emphasis added.) 65 ILCS 5/7-1-46
(West 2000).
In my view, this section obviates the court's concerns for finality
in this area. The plain language of the statute indicates that
contiguity, whether it be considered "jurisdictional" or not, is not
subject to a time bar. That is to say, the legislature has allowed an
unqualified right to attack a completed annexation on contiguity
grounds. I note that the court dismisses the statute as "irrelevant"
to the issue because defendant did not raise the time bar (slip op.
at 14). I agree that defendant did not raise the issue of timeliness,
but the statute nevertheless contradicts the court's view that
contiguity challenges cannot be made in quo warranto actions.
The court states that
		"the legislature expressly authorized the trial court to
make that determination [contiguity] in a hearing under
section 7-1-4 of the Code. The trial court clearly made a
contiguity finding. There is no basis, therefore, to allow
another court to revisit that same issue in a quo warranto
proceeding when the correctness of the original ruling
could have been challenged by direct appeal or by a
timely petition for post-judgment relief." Slip op. at 12-13.
This ruling overlooks the fact that the legislature has expressly
provided for such challenges in section 7-1-46. There is no
question that quo warranto is the only proper means of
challenging a completed annexation. In re Petition of the Village
of Kildeer to Annex Certain Territory, 124 Ill. 2d 533 (1988). If,
as the court holds, quo warranto will not lie to contest contiguity
in an annexation process that has been given final judicial
approval, then by what legal means can a party raise the contiguity
challenge left available by the legislature in section 7-1-46?
	In my view, the court's holding today does an end run around
section 7-1-46 and renders it meaningless. One of the
fundamental principles of statutory construction is to view all
provisions of an enactment as a whole. Michigan Avenue National
Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493 (2000). A court is not at
liberty to depart from the plain language of a statute by reading in
exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not
express. Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d 455 (2000). I remind my
colleagues that annexations were not recognized at common law,
and the legislature alone has the authority to allow or require the
alteration of municipal boundaries by annexation or otherwise. In
re Petition to Annex Certain Territory to the Village of North
Barrington, 144 Ill. 2d 353, 361 (1991). Section 7-1-1 of the
Municipal Code allows for annexation as provided by statute. 65
ILCS 5/7-1-1 (West 2000). I note that annexations are governed
strictly by statute. The policy considerations that attend to whether
an annexation may be collaterally challenged on contiguity
grounds years after the fact have been answered by our General
Assembly, which has seen fit to allow such challenges to be made.
That we, as members of this court, may disagree is of no
consequence. In any event, the quo warranto remedy is subject to
defenses such as laches or acquiescence (see People ex rel. Brzica
v. Village of Lake Barrington, 268 Ill. App. 3d 420, 425-26
(1994); People ex rel. Freeport Fire Protection District v. City of
Freeport, 58 Ill. App. 3d 314 (1978)), thereby alleviating some of
the concerns that attend to allowing annexations to be challenged
years after the fact.
	In light of the foregoing, I believe the circuit court erred in
denying plaintiffs' leave to file their amended complaint.
	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW joins in this dissent.