Title: City of Cincinnati v. Ilg

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Cincinnati v. Ilg, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-4258.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-4258 
THE CITY OF CINCINNATI, APPELLANT, v. ILG, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Cincinnati v. Ilg, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-4258.] 
Criminal 
procedure—Discovery—Subpoenaed 
data 
from 
breath-analyzer 
machine. 
(No. 2013-1102—Submitted June 11, 2014—Decided October 1, 2014.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, 
No. C-120667, 2013-Ohio-2191. 
____________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
The approval of a breath-analyzer machine by the director of the Ohio 
Department of Health as a device to test breath-alcohol concentration does 
not preclude an accused from challenging the accuracy, competence, 
admissibility, relevance, authenticity, or credibility of specific test results 
or whether the specific machine used to test the accused operated properly 
at the time of the test. 
____________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} The city of Cincinnati appeals from a judgment of the First District 
Court of Appeals that affirmed a trial court order to exclude evidence obtained 
from an Intoxilyzer 8000 breath-analyzer machine as a sanction for its failure to 
comply with a discovery order directing the Ohio Department of Health (“ODH”) 
to provide Daniel Ilg with its computerized online breath archives data, also 
known as “COBRA data,” consisting of information transmitted by the machine 
to ODH for each breath test it performed. 
{¶ 2} In accordance with R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(b), ODH approved the 
Intoxilyzer 8000 as a reliable testing device for determining the breath-alcohol 
concentration of an individual suspected of driving while under the influence of 
alcohol. In State v. Vega, 12 Ohio St.3d 185, 465 N.E.2d 1303 (1984), we 
precluded an accused from presenting expert testimony attacking the general 
scientific reliability of breath-alcohol tests that have been conducted in 
accordance with methods approved by the director of ODH. 
{¶ 3} In this case, Ilg sought COBRA data from the specific Intoxilyzer 
8000 machine that tested his breath in order to challenge whether it operated 
properly on the day of his arrest in an effort to establish that the test results in his 
case were inaccurate—not to question the scientific reliability of Intoxilyzer 8000 
machines in general. 
{¶ 4} Every person accused of an offense involving an Intoxilyzer 8000 
machine may challenge the accuracy and credibility of a breath test by showing 
that the breath-analyzer machine failed to operate properly at the time of testing 
or that the results had not been analyzed in accordance with methods approved by 
the director of ODH.  In this case, Ilg sought discovery of relevant, admissible 
evidence, and the trial court ordered the city to produce it, but because neither the 
city nor ODH complied with the order to produce, the trial court excluded the 
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results of his breath test, and the court of appeals upheld that decision.  Here, the 
sanction is warranted, and we affirm the judgment of the appellate court. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 5} In the early morning hours of October 22, 2011, Daniel Ilg lost 
control of his vehicle while driving on Beekman Street in Cincinnati, Ohio, and 
struck a fence, a sign, and a pole.  Officer Terry Jacobs, who investigated the 
accident, arrested Ilg for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol.  At the police station, Ilg submitted to a breath-alcohol test.  An 
Intoxilyzer 8000 machine, serial number 80-004052, measured his breath-alcohol 
concentration at 0.143 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath, beyond the 
amount permitted by law of 0.08 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
{¶ 6} As a result of the Intoxilyzer 8000 results, the city charged Ilg with 
operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in violation of R.C. 
4511.19(A)(1)(a), operating a vehicle with a prohibited level of alcohol in his 
breath in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(d), and failing to maintain control of his 
vehicle in violation of R.C. 4511.202. 
{¶ 7} Ilg entered a plea of not guilty in the Hamilton County Municipal 
Court and moved to suppress the results of his breath test.  He also sought 
discovery of the subject test and instrument-check printouts and forms, diagnostic 
and calibration checks, maintenance, service, and repair records, radio frequency 
interference test records, and any computerized or downloaded information or 
data from the specific Intoxilyzer 8000 machine used to test him.  He also sought 
data from that machine not only as it related to his test, but also for three years 
prior to his arrest and for three months following it. 
{¶ 8} When the city did not produce these records, he subpoenaed Mary 
Martin, the program administrator for alcohol and drug testing at ODH.  The 
subpoena requested that Martin produce “[a] copy of any and all records 
maintained by the Ohio Dept. of Health and the Ohio Depart. of [Public] Safety 
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relating to the Intoxilyzer 8000, serial number 80-004052, * * * including but not 
limited to: a. Any and all computerized online breath archives data, also known as 
‘COBRA’ data.”  “COBRA data” refers to a database maintained by ODH that 
records information transmitted from each breath-analyzer machine for each 
breath test performed in the field, and it also includes personal information of 
other individuals the machine had tested. 
{¶ 9} Ilg also subpoenaed records related to the machine’s log-in history, 
repair and maintenance, radio frequency interference certification, and software 
changes or modifications, as well as any communications regarding the 
Intoxilyzer 8000 between ODH and the city of Cincinnati, the Ohio Department 
of Public Safety, and the manufacturer of the breath-analyzer machine.  None of 
the parties—the city, ODH, or Martin—responded to the subpoena. 
{¶ 10} Ilg then moved for sanctions and sought to exclude the results of 
his breath test because of the failure to comply with his discovery request and the 
subpoena he had issued.  At a hearing held on August 27, 2012, Martin testified 
that the COBRA data is stored in read-only format and cannot be released without 
redacting the personal information of other test subjects.  She asserted that ODH 
lacked the personnel and ability to copy the database and stated, “[A]t this time 
we don’t have the ability to give the database out.” 
{¶ 11} As a result of that hearing, the court ordered ODH to disclose the 
records requested in the subpoena and advised the city that it would grant the 
motion for sanctions if it failed to produce the evidence. 
{¶ 12} After the court’s deadline for compliance had passed, Ilg again 
moved for sanctions, arguing that the city had not obeyed the court’s order to 
disclose, and he requested the exclusion of the breath-test results as a sanction.  At 
another hearing held on September 25, 2012, Martin admitted that she had not 
provided the COBRA data, claiming that ODH lacked the personnel and 
technology to copy the database, that it would require an additional employee and 
January Term, 2014 
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approximately $100,000 to produce a copy that could be released, and that even 
with those additional resources, the COBRA data would be technologically 
difficult to produce. 
{¶ 13} The trial court found that Ilg had the right to challenge the 
reliability of his breath test but could not without the COBRA data generated by 
the Intoxilyzer 8000 that tested him.  The trial court therefore excluded the breath-
test results from evidence. 
{¶ 14} On the city’s interlocutory appeal, the appellate court determined 
that the court had not abused its discretion in ordering COBRA data to be 
produced, because Ilg needed it for trial preparation and had requested it in good 
faith, and the court found that it was relevant and that Ilg could not have obtained 
it without ODH cooperation.  The appellate court further determined that Ilg had 
not sought to challenge the scientific reliability of all Intoxilyzer 8000s, but rather 
sought to discredit only the particular breath analyzer that Cincinnati Police used 
to test his breath-alcohol concentration.  It also noted that a city is an 
instrumentality of the state and thus rejected the argument that the city could not 
be sanctioned for a discovery violation attributable to ODH.  It concluded that 
exclusion of the breath-test result was reasonably calculated to protect Ilg’s right 
to a fair trial. 
{¶ 15} We accepted the city’s discretionary appeal on one proposition of 
law: “State v. Vega prohibits defendants in OVI cases from making attacks on the 
reliability of breath testing instruments, thus a defendant cannot compel any party 
to produce information that is to be used for the purpose of attacking the 
reliability of the breath testing instrument.” 
Claims of the Parties 
{¶ 16} The city maintains that COBRA data is not discoverable in a 
criminal case, because it does not fall within the types of items that Crim.R. 16 
requires the prosecution to produce.  It asserts that the COBRA data is not 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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material to guilt or punishment and that there is no reasonable probability that 
producing it would alter the outcome of Ilg’s trial, because pursuant to State v. 
Vega, 12 Ohio St.3d 185, 186, 465 N.E.2d 1303, this type of evidence is 
inadmissible for purposes of making a general attack on the reliability of a breath-
testing machine.  According to the city, the documents sought in discovery are not 
relevant to challenging the validity of Ilg’s breath test, but rather relate to every 
person who had taken a breath test on that particular Intoxilyzer 8000 machine, 
and it urges that he has not demonstrated how data from other tests affect the 
validity of the results of his test. 
{¶ 17} The city also contends that because evidence relevant to attacking 
the reliability of a breath-analyzer machine is not discoverable pursuant to 
Crim.R. 16, it cannot be the subject of a subpoena intended to provide additional 
discovery beyond that permitted by Crim.R. 16.  And it maintains that compliance 
with the subpoena was impossible for ODH, and in any case, COBRA data is not 
relevant and Ilg could prepare for trial without it, as he sought only to engage in 
“a fishing expedition.” 
{¶ 18} Ilg contends that the city has failed to preserve for appeal any 
argument that the COBRA data was not discoverable pursuant to Crim.R. 16, that 
the data is inadmissible as not material to guilt or innocence, or that he abused 
Crim.R. 17 by issuing a subpoena to expand the scope of discovery.  He maintains 
that COBRA data is discoverable pursuant to Crim.R. 16(B) because it is a 
relevant document, a tangible item, or the result of a scientific test.  And it is not 
inadmissible pursuant to State v. Vega, Ilg argues, because he sought the COBRA 
data to challenge the reliability of the machine that tested him, not the general 
scientific reliability of all Intoxilyzer 8000s. 
{¶ 19} Ilg further asserts that he has not abused Crim.R. 17 to expand the 
scope of discovery, but only issued the subpoena after the city failed to comply 
with his demand for discovery.  And he urges that compliance with the subpoena 
January Term, 2014 
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was not oppressive, because there is no evidence supporting the claim that it 
would be too costly to produce the COBRA data and ODH’s online database 
shows that this machine has tested only 53 individuals, with more than 10 percent 
tested twice due to various errors. 
{¶ 20} Accordingly, this case presents one narrow issue: whether an 
accused defending a charge that he operated a motor vehicle with a prohibited 
level of alcohol in his breath is precluded from attacking the reliability of the 
specific breath-testing machine that measured his blood-alcohol concentration. 
Relevant Statutes 
{¶ 21} R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(b) governs the admissibility of alcohol-test 
results and provides in relevant part: 
 
In any criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding for 
a violation of division (A) or (B) of this section or for an 
equivalent offense that is vehicle-related, the court may admit 
evidence on the concentration of alcohol, drugs of abuse, 
controlled substances, metabolites of a controlled substance, or a 
combination of them in the defendant’s whole blood, blood serum 
or plasma, breath, urine, or other bodily substance at the time of 
the alleged violation as shown by chemical analysis of the 
substance withdrawn within three hours of the time of the alleged 
violation. * * *  
The bodily substance withdrawn under division (D)(1)(b) 
of this section shall be analyzed in accordance with methods 
approved by the director of health by an individual possessing a 
valid permit issued by the director pursuant to section 3701.143 of 
the Revised Code. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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In turn, R.C. 3701.143 provides that the director of ODH  
 
shall determine, or cause to be determined, techniques or methods 
for chemically analyzing a person’s whole blood, blood serum or 
plasma, urine, breath, or other bodily substance in order to 
ascertain the amount of alcohol, a drug of abuse, controlled 
substance, metabolite of a controlled substance, or combination of 
them in the person’s whole blood, blood serum or plasma, urine, 
breath, or other bodily substance. The director shall approve 
satisfactory techniques or methods, ascertain the qualifications of 
individuals to conduct such analyses, and issue permits to qualified 
persons authorizing them to perform such analyses. 
 
{¶ 22} Pursuant to this authority, ODH promulgated Ohio Adm.Code 
3701-53-02(A)(3), approving the Intoxilyzer 8000 as an evidential breath-testing 
instrument for use in determining the concentration of alcohol in a person’s breath 
for purposes of R.C. 4511.19. 
{¶ 23} Construing substantively similar former versions of these statutes 
in State v. Vega, 12 Ohio St.3d 185, 188, 465 N.E.2d 1303, we noted that the 
General Assembly had “legislatively resolved the questions of the reliability and 
relevancy of intoxilyzer tests.”  The court explained:  
 
“[The judiciary must recognize] the necessary legislative 
determination that breath tests, properly conducted, are reliable 
irrespective that not all experts wholly agree and that the common 
law foundational evidence  has, for admissibility, been replaced by 
statute and rule; and that the legislative delegation was to the 
Director of Health, not the court, [of] the discretionary authority 
January Term, 2014 
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for adoption of appropriate tests and procedures, including breath 
test devices.” 
 
(First bracketed insertion sic.)  Id. at 188-189, quoting State v. Brockway, 2 Ohio 
App.3d 227, 232, 441 N.E.2d 602 (1981).  Because the legislature provided for 
the admissibility of intoxilyzer tests if analyzed in accordance with methods 
approved by the director of ODH, an accused may not present expert testimony 
attacking the general scientific reliability of approved test instruments. Id. at 189.  
But we also noted that Vega did not assert any claim of abuse of discretion by the 
director of ODH.  Id. at 187, fn. 2. 
{¶ 24} Nonetheless, in State v. Tanner, 15 Ohio St.3d 1, 6, 472 N.E.2d 
689 (1984), we recognized that although an accused may not challenge the 
general accuracy and scientific reliability of the test procedure selected by ODH, 
the accused “may still challenge the accuracy of his specific test results.”  Tanner 
concerned the constitutionality of a former version of R.C. 4511.19(A)(2) that 
established a per se offense for driving with a prohibited blood-alcohol 
concentration.  The court upheld the statute and explained that it did not impose a 
conclusive presumption of guilt, because the accused could challenge the 
accuracy of his test results and “[t]he jury may consider those specific test results, 
and all other relevant evidence, in ascertaining whether the state has shown 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has violated the statute.”  Id. 
{¶ 25} Similarly, in Columbus v. Taylor, 39 Ohio St.3d 162, 163, 529 
N.E.2d 1382 (1988), we noted that “[i]t is well-established that a defendant may 
challenge the accuracy of his specific test results.”  (Emphasis sic.)  There, we 
concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion by excluding an expert 
report giving the results of simulated testing of the accused using a different BAC 
Verifier machine from the one police used to test his breath.  But in doing so, we 
emphasized that the expert had been allowed to testify that breath-alcohol 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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concentration test results can be inaccurate due to burping that contaminates the 
breath sample.  Id. at 164-165. 
{¶ 26} Our decision in State v. French, 72 Ohio St.3d 446, 650 N.E.2d 
887 (1995), concerned the procedure for attacking the admissibility of a breath-
test result based on the failure to substantially comply with Ohio Department of 
Health regulations on chemical testing.  The court held that the failure to 
“challenge the admissibility of the chemical test results through a pretrial motion 
to suppress waives the requirement on the state to lay a foundation for the 
admissibility of the test results at trial.”   Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.  In 
those circumstances, we explained, “[t]he chemical test result is admissible at trial 
without the state’s demonstrating that the bodily substance was withdrawn within 
two hours of the time of the alleged violation, that the bodily substance was 
analyzed in accordance with methods approved by the Director of Health, and that 
the analysis was conducted by a qualified individual.”  Id. Nonetheless, we stated 
that this waiver “does not mean, however, that the defendant may not challenge 
the chemical test results at trial under the Rules of Evidence. Evidentiary 
objections challenging the competency, admissibility, relevancy, authenticity, and 
credibility of the chemical test results may still be raised.”  Id. at 452. 
{¶ 27} We reaffirmed our holding in French in State v. Edwards, 107 
Ohio St.3d 169, 2005-Ohio-6180, 837 N.E.2d 752, noting that an accused may 
move to suppress an alcohol-content test based on noncompliance with 
regulations governing the maintenance and operation of testing devices. Id. at 
¶ 11, citing French at 449.  And we further indicated that “a defendant at trial may 
challenge breath-test results on grounds other than that the results were illegally 
obtained because they were obtained in noncompliance with the director’s rules. 
For example a defendant may argue at trial that the particular device failed to 
operate properly at the time of testing.”  Id. at ¶ 19. 
January Term, 2014 
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{¶ 28} As these cases demonstrate, the General Assembly has delegated to 
the director of ODH the authority to adopt appropriate tests and procedures to 
chemically analyze specified bodily substances to ascertain the concentration of 
alcohol, drug, controlled substance, or combination thereof in those bodily 
substance and issue permits to qualified persons to perform those analyses.  As we 
indicated in State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 
71, ¶ 32, “the General Assembly instructed the Director of Health—and not the 
judiciary—to ensure the reliability of alcohol-test results by promulgating 
regulations precisely because the former possesses the scientific expertise that the 
latter does not.”  (Emphasis sic.) The director has decided that Intoxilyzer 8000s, 
when used in accordance with department regulations, are capable of accurately 
measuring breath-alcohol concentrations, Ohio Adm.Code 3701-53-02(A)(3), and 
an accused therefore may not attack the general scientific reliability of that 
machine test,  Vega, 12 Ohio St.3d at 186, 465 N.E.2d 1303. 
{¶ 29} But although the court announced in Vega that “an accused may 
not make a general attack upon the reliability and validity of the breath testing 
instrument,” id. at 190, the director’s approval of the Intoxilyzer 8000 does not 
preclude an accused from challenging the accuracy, competence, admissibility, 
relevance, authenticity, or credibility of specific tests results at issue in a pending 
case.  We have recognized that an accused may seek to suppress the results of his 
breath test if the sample was not given within two hours of the time of the alleged 
violation and if it was not analyzed in accordance with regulations governing the 
maintenance and operation of testing devices.  French, 72 Ohio St.3d 446, 630 
N.E.2d 887, at paragraph one of the syllabus; Edwards at ¶ 11.  And in Edwards, 
we noted that an accused may attack the breath-test results by attempting to prove 
that “the particular device failed to operate properly at the time of testing.”  
Edwards at ¶ 19.  Nothing in either the relevant statutes or our caselaw precludes 
an accused from attacking the accuracy, competence, admissibility, relevance, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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authenticity, or credibility of the specific breath-test result rendered by an 
Intoxilyzer 8000. 
{¶ 30} In this case, the COBRA data that Ilg sought in the subpoena 
expressly targeted evidence related solely to the Intoxilyzer 8000 that the city 
used to perform his breath test.  Ilg’s expert, Alfred E. Staubus, Pharm.D, Ph.D., 
provided the only evidence in the record on that issue and averred that “[i]n order 
to be able to evaluate the reliability of the test, this particular Intoxilyzer 8000 
machine, and the testing procedures in this case, all of the documents requested of 
the State and ODH are necessary.”  No one from ODH gave any testimony 
suggesting that the COBRA data is not, in fact, relevant to demonstrating the 
inaccuracy of Ilg’s breath test on the night of his arrest.  Thus, the record supports 
the trial court’s finding that Ilg could not challenge the reliability of his breath test 
without the COBRA data generated by the Intoxilyzer 8000. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 31} By enacting R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(b), the General Assembly 
delegated to the Ohio Department of Health the responsibility of determining 
which breath-test procedures and devices reliably determine the breath-alcohol 
concentration of an individual suspected of driving while under the influence of 
alcohol.  Relying on this delegation of authority, State v. Vega, 12 Ohio St.3d 185, 
465 N.E.2d 1303, precluded an accused from presenting expert testimony to 
attack the general scientific reliability of breath-alcohol tests conducted in 
accordance with methods approved by the director of the Ohio Department of 
Health.  However, the approval of a breath-analyzer machine by the director of 
the Ohio Department of Health as a device to test breath-alcohol concentration 
does not preclude an accused from challenging the accuracy, competence, 
admissibility, relevance, authenticity, or credibility of specific test results or 
whether the specific machine used to test the accused operated properly at the 
time of the test. 
January Term, 2014 
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{¶ 32} Thus, an accused may challenge the accuracy of specific test 
results rendered by a breath-analyzer machine.  Here, neither the statute nor our 
caselaw precludes Ilg from showing that the Intoxilyzer 8000 that tested his 
breath provided an inaccurate result, and he is entitled to discovery of relevant 
evidence to support his claim that the Intoxilyzer 8000 machine used to test him 
failed to operate properly. 
{¶ 33} Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, and FRENCH, JJ., 
concur. 
O’NEILL, J., concurs in judgment only. 
____________________ 
 
Terrance A. Nestor, Acting City Solicitor, Charles A. Rubenstein, City 
Prosecutor, and Jennifer Bishop and Emily Woerner, Assistant City Prosecutors, 
for appellant. 
 
The Law Office of Steven R. Adams, Steven R. Adams, and Marguerite 
Slagle, for appellee. 
 
Michael Dewine, Attorney General, Eric E. Murphy, State Solicitor, and 
Jeffrey Jarosch, Deputy Solicitor, urging reversal for amicus curiae state of Ohio. 
 
Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney, and David E. 
Romaker Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal for amicus curiae 
Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association. 
 
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Evy M. Jarrett, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal for amicus curiae Lucas County 
Prosecuting Attorney Julia R. Bates. 
 
Mark Kitrick, urging reversal for amicus curiae Mothers Against Drunk 
Driving (MADD). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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D. Timothy Huey; Kura, Wilford & Schregardus Co., L.P.A., and Sarah 
M. Schregardus; and Patricia J. Smith, urging affirmance for amicus curiae 
National College for DUI Defense. 
 
Daniel J. Sabol and Jessica G. Fallon, urging affirmance for amicus curiae 
Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
__________________________