Title: In re Asanah S.

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2018 ME 12 
Docket: 
And-17-360 
Submitted 
On Briefs: January 11, 2018 
Decided: 
January 23, 2018 
 
Panel: 
ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE ASANAH S. 
 
 
PER CURIAM  
 
[¶1]  The father of Asanah S. appeals from a judgment of the District 
Court (Lewiston, Lawrence, J.) terminating his parental rights to Asanah 
pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1) and (B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(iii) (2017).1  He 
alleges that the court impermissibly relied on his imprisonment in finding 
parental unfitness and argues that the court erred by determining that 
terminating his parental rights was in the child’s best interest.  Because the 
evidence supports the court’s findings and discretionary determination, we 
affirm the judgment. 
 
[¶2]  Based on competent evidence in the record, the court found, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that the father is unwilling or unable to protect 
the child from jeopardy and these circumstances are unlikely to change within 
                                         
1  The child’s mother consented to the termination of her parental rights on March 24, 2017, and 
is not a party to this appeal. 
 
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a time which is reasonably calculated to meet her needs, that the father is 
unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the child within a time 
reasonably calculated to meet her needs, and that the father abandoned the 
child.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(iii); In re Cameron B., 2017 ME 18, 
¶ 10, 154 A.3d 1199.  The court also determined that termination of the 
father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest.  See 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(a); In re Cameron B., 2017 ME 18, ¶ 10, 154 A.3d 1199.  The 
court based its findings of parental unfitness and its determination of the 
child’s best interest on the following findings of fact: 
 
[The father] has been incarcerated since October of 2010 
for convictions on charges of Assault and Battery and being an 
Armed Career Criminal.  He believes he will be incarcerated on 
these charges until 2020. . . .  He is now 46 years old and has been 
incarcerated for about 20 years.  The only time that [the father] 
actually has seen [the child] was one time in 2008. . . .  [The father] 
acknowledged that he is unable to care for [the child] because of 
his incarceration. 
 
[The father] is aware that [the child] is living with [her 
maternal grandfather] and he believes it is beneficial for her to be 
living with him. . . .  [He] asks the court to order a permanency 
guardianship with [the grandfather]. 
 
. . . [The child] experienced trauma in the past and exhibited 
symptoms of PTSD and anxiety. . . .  [The child] is grateful for her 
placement with [her grandfather]; she has a greater sense of 
security and stability because she feels safe with him and has no 
concerns that he will hurt her.  [The grandfather’s] boundaries 
 
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and discipline have been appropriate.  For [the child], [the 
grandfather’s] house equals home. 
 
. . . [The child] does not recall ever meeting [the father] . . . . 
 
. . . [The grandfather] testified that he is absolutely ready, 
willing and able to adopt [the child]. 
 
 
[¶3]  The court explained that “[i]ncarceration is an important factor . . . 
to consider in termination proceedings,” but that “it is not dispositive.”  It then 
outlined certain factors that a court should consider in a termination 
proceeding when a parent is incarcerated, including “the parent-child 
relationship before and after incarceration,” the psychological effect of the 
incarceration on the child, and the parent’s ability to fulfill his or her parental 
responsibilities while incarcerated.  See In re Alijah K., 2016 ME 137, ¶ 16, 
147 A.3d 1159.  With these factors in mind, the court found that the father 
“has failed to develop any parent-child relationship” with the child; the father 
“will be serving another three years in prison”; the child “does not know him”; 
and the child “has not had any contact with [the father’s] family or built a 
relationship with them.”  Given these findings, the court found that the father 
was unfit and determined that terminating his parental rights is in the child’s 
best interest. 
 
4 
 
[¶4]  The father relies on our decision in In re Cody T., 2009 ME 95, 
¶¶ 28–31, 979 A.2d 81, to argue that the court impermissibly terminated his 
parental rights by “primarily” relying on his incarceration.  The father also 
contends that the court erred in its best interest determination because “there 
was no evidence presented that [the child] would be harmed by maintaining a 
legal relationship with her Father.”  He argues that the court should have 
awarded a permanent guardianship rather than terminating his parental 
rights. 
[¶5]  The father is correct that “[a] parent’s long-term incarceration, 
standing alone, does not provide grounds for the termination of parental 
rights,” Adoption of Hali D., 2009 ME 70, ¶ 2, 974 A.2d 916, but his arguments 
nonetheless fail in several respects.  First, the court did not base its unfitness 
findings or terminate the father’s parental rights solely upon his incarceration.  
See id. ¶ 3.  The court’s order indicates that it based its findings on a careful 
consideration of the child’s need for stability and permanency and the father’s 
relationship with the child—a relationship affected, at least in part, by the 
father’s incarceration.  The father’s arguments fail to recognize that “neither 
In re Cody T. nor any other authority gives a parent a ‘pass’ on parental 
responsibilities as a result of being incarcerated.”  In re Alijah K., 2016 ME 137, 
 
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¶ 14, 147 A.3d 1159.  “A parent who is unable to fulfill his parental 
responsibilities by virtue of being incarcerated is entitled to no more 
protection from the termination of his parental rights than a parent who is 
unable to fulfill his parental responsibilities as a result of other reasons.”  Id.  
Indeed, “a parent’s incarceration is but one factor to be considered by a court 
faced with a termination petition, but it is a factor—a factor that may, in some 
cases, lead a court to terminate that parent’s rights.”  Id. ¶ 16. 
[¶6]  Here, the father acknowledges that he is incapable of caring for the 
child because of his incarceration.  Additionally, the father only met the child 
once, in 2008—when she was an infant—and has never “provide[d] a 
nurturing parental relationship.”  Adoption of Hali D., 2009 ME 70, ¶ 2, 
974 A.2d 916 (quotation marks omitted).  Since his incarceration in 2010, the 
father has failed to fulfill any of his “responsibilities as a parent,” or establish 
any “longstanding parent-child relationship” with the child.  In re Alijah K., 
2016 ME 137, ¶¶ 16, 18, 147 A.3d 1159 (quotation marks omitted).  Contrary 
to the father’s contentions, the record contains ample evidence to support the 
court’s findings of parental unfitness.  See In re K.M., 2015 ME 79, ¶¶ 9-10, 
118 A.3d 812; 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(iii). 
 
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[¶7]  Second, the court was not required to find that a relationship with 
the father would harm the child before determining that termination of the 
father’s parental rights with a permanency plan of adoption, rather than a 
permanency guardianship, is in the child’s best interest.  See In re Jacob B., 
2008 ME 168, ¶ 17, 959 A.2d 734 (“Such a finding of prospective harm would 
have been difficult in a child abandonment case when there had been no 
parent-child relationship [and] such an affirmative negative finding is not 
necessary . . . .”).  The court carefully considered the child’s needs and 
competent evidence supports its finding that establishing a relationship with 
the father “would impede establishing permanency for [the child].”  Because 
“[a] permanency guardianship in this case would not have ensured certainty 
and stability for the child,” In re David W., 2010 ME 119, ¶ 10, 8 A.3d 673, and 
“instability and impermanency are contrary to the welfare of children,” 
22 M.R.S. § 4050 (2017), the court did not err or abuse its discretion by 
determining that termination of the father’s parental rights, with a 
permanency plan of adoption, is in the child’s best interest.  See In re 
Thomas H., 2005 ME 123, ¶ 16, 889 A.2d 297. 
 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jeffrey S. Dolley, Esq., Lewiston, for appellant father 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of 
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
 
Lewiston District Court docket number PC-2016-60 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY