Title: State v. Glenn

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Glenn, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-3369.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2021-OHIO-3369 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. GLENN, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Glenn, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-3369.] 
Criminal 
law—R.C. 
2505.02—Crim.R. 
16—Discovery—Final, 
appealable 
orders—Trial court’s order for defense counsel to prepare and disclose 
summaries of defense-witness statements did not satisfy the requirements of 
R.C. 2505.02(B)(4) for being a final, appealable order—Court of appeals’ 
judgment affirmed. 
(No. 2020-0338—Submitted April 13, 2021—Decided September 28, 2021.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, No. 28736. 
_______________________ 
DEWINE, J. 
{¶ 1} This case is about the timing of an appeal.  Samuel Glenn is set to be 
tried on a sexual-battery charge.  He claims to have an alibi—and the judge 
presiding over the case has ordered Glenn’s attorney to provide information to the 
prosecution about what Glenn’s alibi witnesses intend to say at trial.  Glenn asserts 
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that the judge has made a mistake; he contends that he shouldn’t have to turn over 
the information because it is protected from disclosure by the attorney-work-
product doctrine.  The question before us is when can Glenn challenge the trial 
judge’s decision: can he appeal now, or does he need to wait until the end of his 
case?  For reasons that we will explain, we conclude that Glenn must wait until the 
end of his case. 
I.  The trial court’s discovery order 
{¶ 2} Glenn is a high-school teacher.  He was indicted on allegations that 
he had engaged in sexual conduct with one of his students at his apartment.  During 
the pretrial phase of the case, Glenn’s attorney filed a notice of alibi and provided 
a list of defense witnesses to the prosecution.  As later amended, the notice listed 
three locations where Glenn claimed to have been at the time that the incident was 
alleged to have occurred and identified ten people who he says were with him at 
one point or another that night.  The state filed a motion to compel discovery, asking 
the trial court to order defense counsel to produce witness statements and 
investigative reports regarding the expected testimony of Glenn’s witnesses.  In 
response, Glenn’s attorney said that he did not have any written or recorded witness 
statements. 
{¶ 3} The state later filed a supplemental motion to compel discovery, again 
requesting “[w]itness statements and/or reports summarizing proposed testimony 
of defense witnesses.”  The state was most interested in finding out the expected 
testimony of Glenn’s ex-girlfriend, one of the alibi witnesses.  The motion 
explained that defense counsel had informed the prosecutor that Glenn’s ex-
girlfriend would testify that she had been with Glenn for the entire night of the 
alleged crime.  The state contended that this testimony would directly conflict with 
that of the victim, who claimed to have been assaulted by Glenn at his apartment 
the same night. 
January Term, 2021 
 
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{¶ 4} According to the state, a detective attempted to contact Glenn’s ex-
girlfriend, but she retained an attorney and refused to talk to any representative of 
the state or provide a written witness statement.  She did, however, speak to Glenn’s 
attorney and a defense investigator.  The state acknowledged that defense counsel 
had “verbally relayed the content of those conversations to prosecutors,” but it 
asked the court to order defense counsel to provide written summaries of the 
expected testimony of Glenn’s ex-girlfriend and other defense witnesses, asserting 
that the defense had “provided nothing to the State that would allow the prosecution 
to conduct an effective cross-examination.” 
{¶ 5} Following a hearing, the trial court issued an order granting the state’s 
motion to compel.  The trial court determined that Crim.R. 16 mandates disclosure 
of written summaries of oral conversations with witnesses and that the defense has 
a reciprocal duty to disclose to the prosecution any evidence that tends to support 
an alibi.  The trial court further noted that even if Crim.R. 16 does not mandate such 
disclosure, the Second District Court of Appeals has held that the local rules of the 
Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas require reciprocal discovery of all 
statements made by witnesses.  See State v. Rohde, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 
26087, 2014-Ohio-5580, ¶ 34-35. 
{¶ 6} The trial court rejected Glenn’s argument that its order would 
erroneously compel the production of protected attorney work product.  The court 
concluded that disclosures mandated under the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure 
supersede the work-product protection.  It further noted that such statements are 
subject to disclosure only to the extent that they do not contain “internal 
communication of impressions, conclusions, strategy, or opinions.”  The trial court 
also made clear that its disclosure order does not apply to information that would 
incriminate Glenn or statements intended to be used solely as impeachment 
evidence.  With those caveats, the trial court ordered defense counsel “to provide 
the State with written summaries of the statements made to defense counsel and the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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defense investigator by the witnesses [the] defense intends to call regarding 
[Glenn’s] alibi.”  And the court warned that the failure to comply with the order 
would result in the exclusion of the witnesses’ testimony. 
{¶ 7} Glenn appealed the trial court’s discovery order to the Second District 
Court of Appeals, and the state moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of a final, 
appealable order.  Glenn’s attorney responded that the order was immediately 
appealable, because it required him to create written summaries of his oral 
conversations with witnesses, which he contended were protected as attorney work 
product. 
{¶ 8} The Second District granted the state’s motion to dismiss.  The court 
held that Glenn had not made a sufficient showing that he “would not be afforded 
a meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment,” as 
required by R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(b) for the order to be final and appealable.  2d Dist. 
Montgomery No. 28736, ¶ 11. 
{¶ 9} Glenn appealed the Second District’s judgment to this court, and we 
accepted the case.  See 159 Ohio St.3d 1434, 2020-Ohio-3634, 148 N.E.3d 592.  
Glenn asserts that an order requiring an attorney to create and turn over to the 
prosecution summaries of conversations that the attorney has had with potential 
witnesses is a final, appealable order.  He further contends that an order that 
compels the disclosure of attorney work product in a criminal case should always 
be treated as a final, appealable order. 
II.  Elements of a final order 
{¶ 10} The Ohio Constitution grants the courts of appeals “such jurisdiction 
as may be provided by law” to review “final orders” rendered by inferior courts.  
Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 3(B)(2).  R.C. 2505.02 helps fill in the 
“provided by law” part of that jurisdictional grant by setting forth a definition of 
what constitutes a final order.  The general rule is that all orders in a case must be 
reviewed in a single appeal after final judgment.  See Anderson v. Richards, 173 
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5
Ohio St. 50, 55, 179 N.E.2d 918 (1962) (acknowledging “the principle that there 
should be only one appeal in the cause itself wherein all errors can be urged 
simultaneously”);  Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868, 
114 S.Ct. 1992, 128 L.Ed.2d 842 (1994) (the “general rule [is] that a party is entitled 
to a single appeal, to be deferred until final judgment has been entered, in which 
claims of [trial] court error at any stage of the litigation may be ventilated”).  But 
R.C. 2505.02 provides a limited exception by including within the definition of a 
final order certain types of interlocutory decisions of a trial court. 
{¶ 11} Relevant here is the provision addressing orders granting or denying 
a “provisional remedy.”  Under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4), an appellate court has 
jurisdiction to review, affirm, modify, or reverse an “order that grants or denies a 
provisional remedy” when both of the following circumstances are satisfied: 
 
 
(a) The order in effect determines the action with respect to 
the provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in 
favor of the appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy. 
 
(b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful 
or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all 
proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the action. 
 
This provision guides our analysis and resolution of this case. 
A.  The order grants a provisional remedy 
{¶ 12} The threshold requirement for an order to be appealable under R.C. 
2505.02(B)(4) is that the order must grant or deny a provisional remedy.  A 
provisional remedy is “a proceeding ancillary to an action” and includes a 
proceeding for “discovery of privileged matter.”  R.C. 2505.02(A)(3).  This court 
has held that a discovery order compelling the disclosure of attorney work product 
falls within the rubric of “discovery of a privileged matter” and is therefore a 
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provisional remedy.  Smith v. Chen, 142 Ohio St.3d 411, 2015-Ohio-1480, 31 
N.E.3d 633, ¶ 5-6; see also Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P. v. Givaudan 
Flavors Corp., 127 Ohio St.3d 161, 2010-Ohio-4469, 937 N.E.2d 533, ¶ 55. 
{¶ 13} Still, that leaves something of a chicken/egg quandary: the state 
disputes that the order requires the disclosure of attorney work product.  But at this 
juncture, we need not resolve the question whether the trial court’s order 
definitively compels the disclosure of protected attorney work product.  “To impose 
such a requirement would force an appellate court ‘to decide the merits of an appeal 
in order to decide whether it has the power to hear and decide the merits of an 
appeal.’ ”  Byrd v. U.S. Xpress, Inc., 2014-Ohio-5733, 26 N.E.3d 858, ¶ 12 (1st 
Dist.), quoting Bennett v. Martin, 186 Ohio App.3d 412, 2009-Ohio-6195, 928 
N.E.2d 763, ¶ 35 (10th Dist.).  Rather, to determine whether the order satisfies the 
provisional-remedy requirement for appealability, we need review only whether 
Glenn has made a colorable claim that the order directs him to disclose information 
that might be protected attorney work product.  Id. 
{¶ 14} The trial court ordered Glenn’s attorney to create summaries of his 
conversations with defense witnesses.  Yet the scope of the order is somewhat 
circumscribed: it suggests that in creating those summaries, Glenn is not required 
to disclose any “internal communication of impressions, conclusions, strategy, or 
opinions,” nor must Glenn provide the prosecution with any incriminating 
information or statements that the defense intends to use only for impeachment. 
{¶ 15} Our discovery rules encourage the disclosure of “information 
necessary for a full and fair adjudication of the facts.”  Crim.R. 16(A).  Indeed, we 
have long said that the overall objective of our criminal rules “ ‘ “is to remove the 
element of gamesmanship from a trial.” ’ ”  State v. Darmond, 135 Ohio St.3d 343, 
2013-Ohio-966, 986 N.E.2d 971, ¶ 19, quoting Lakewood v. Papadelis, 32 Ohio 
St.3d 1, 3, 511 N.E.2d 1138 (1987), quoting State v. Howard, 56 Ohio St.2d 328, 
333, 383 N.E.2d 912 (1978).  And we have recognized that our discovery rules 
January Term, 2021 
 
7
were designed to “ ‘prevent surprise and the secreting of evidence favorable to one 
party.’ ”  Id., quoting Lakewood at 3.  Thus, with limited exceptions, Crim.R. 16 
imposes a reciprocal duty on the defense and the prosecution to disclose material 
information to the opposing party.  Crim.R. 16(A) and (H). 
{¶ 16} Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that 
certain aspects of an attorney’s efforts on behalf of his client—reflected in 
“interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, 
personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible ways”—may be 
protected from disclosure as attorney work product.  Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 
495, 511, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947).  Hickman arose out of an appeal from 
a contempt citation by an attorney who had refused to disclose certain materials 
prepared by the attorney in preparation for possible litigation.  Id. at 500-501.  The 
court explained that the disclosure of memoranda summarizing an attorney’s oral 
interviews with witnesses is “particularly disfavored because it tends to reveal the 
attorney’s mental processes,” Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 399, 101 
S.Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981), citing Hickman at 513 (noting that such 
summaries would reflect “what [the attorney] saw fit to write down regarding 
witnesses’ remarks”), and Hickman at 516-517 (Jackson, J., concurring) 
(explaining that “the statement would be [the attorney’s] language permeated with 
his inferences”).  We have recognized the work-product doctrine, noting that it 
emanates from the Hickman decision.  See Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P., 127 
Ohio St.3d 161, 2010-Ohio-4469, 937 N.E.2d 533, at ¶ 54. 
{¶ 17} The United States Supreme Court has also held that the attorney-
work-product doctrine applies in criminal cases.  United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 
225, 236, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975).  And Ohio’s Crim.R. 16(J) 
explicitly protects “[m]aterials subject to the work product protection” from 
disclosure in criminal cases.  By its plain terms, the criminal rule incorporates the 
work-product doctrine. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 18} The protection for attorney work product is not absolute.  Squire, 
Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P. at ¶ 55, citing Nobles at 239.  The protection can be 
overcome in appropriate circumstances by showing a particularized need for the 
information.  Hickman at 511; 8 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, 
Section 2025 (3d Ed.1999).  And the doctrine is generally understood as providing 
a much greater level of protection to opinion work product that reveals an attorney’s 
thought processes than to mere fact work product, such as witness statements, that 
reveal underlying facts without disclosing an attorney’s mental impressions.  See, 
e.g., In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 163-164 (6th Cir.1986); In re Grand 
Jury Subpoena, 870 F.3d 312, 316 (4th Cir.2017).  The former is often said to 
require “ ‘an exceptional showing of need’ ” before it can be disclosed, while the 
latter has been said to require only a showing of “ ‘good cause.’ ”  Grace v. 
Mastruserio, 182 Ohio App.3d 243, 2007-Ohio-3942, 912 N.E.2d 608, ¶ 31-32 (1st 
Dist.), quoting Jerome v. A-Best Prods. Co., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 79139, 
79140, 79141, and 79142, 2002-Ohio-1824, ¶ 20-21; see also Baker v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 209 F.3d 1051, 1054 (8th Cir.2000). 
{¶ 19} As the Hickman court acknowledged, “Where relevant and non-
privileged facts remain hidden in an attorney’s file and where production of those 
facts is essential to the preparation of one’s case, discovery may properly be had.”  
Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451.  Thus, although a “lawyer’s 
recordation of mental impressions, personal beliefs, trial strategy, legal 
conclusions, or anything else that could not be fairly said to be the witness’ own 
statement” is entitled to significant work-product protection, Goldberg v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 94, 106, 96 S.Ct. 1338, 47 L.Ed.2d 603 (1976) (cleaned up), “it is 
possible to [require production of] ‘statements’ taken down by an attorney, and still 
preserve the sanctity of the attorney’s work product,” Saunders v. United States, 
316 F.2d 346, 349-350 (D.C.Cir.1963); see also id. at 350 (if an attorney has made 
“a substantially verbatim record of his interview, * * * his notes constitute a 
January Term, 2021 
 
9
‘statement’ and include no protected material flowing from the attorney’s mental 
processes”). 
{¶ 20} For our purposes, though, we need not determine whether Glenn is 
correct that compliance with the trial court’s order will improperly require him to 
disclose protected work-product information; we need only decide whether he has 
made a colorable claim that it will.  We conclude (and the state concedes) that he 
has.  Glenn has set forth at least a plausible theory that compliance with the court’s 
order will require him to disclose materials that are protected by the attorney-work-
product doctrine. 
B.  The order determines the attorney-work-product issue and prevents a 
judgment in Glenn’s favor with respect to that issue 
{¶ 21} There can be little question that the trial court’s discovery order 
meets the second requirement of R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(a): “[t]he order in effect 
determines the action with respect to the provisional remedy and prevents a 
judgment in the action in favor of the appealing party with respect to the provisional 
remedy.”  The order directs defense counsel to create “written summaries of the 
statements made to defense counsel and the defense investigator by the witnesses 
[the] defense intends to call regarding [Glenn’s] alibi,” and it provides that the 
witnesses will be barred from testifying if defense counsel fails to comply.  As this 
court has previously explained, “[I]t would be impossible to later obtain a judgment 
denying [a] motion to compel disclosure if the party has already disclosed the 
materials.”  Burnham v. Cleveland Clinic, 151 Ohio St.3d 356, 2016-Ohio-8000, 
89 N.E.3d 536, ¶ 21 (lead opinion).  Thus, the order plainly “determines the 
[attorney-work-product] issue and prevents a judgment” in Glenn’s favor 
“regarding that issue,” id. at ¶ 20.  Indeed, the state concedes that this requirement 
also has been satisfied. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
C.  Glenn has failed to show that any harm caused by the discovery order cannot 
be effectively remedied by an appeal after final judgment 
{¶ 22} We now turn to the third requirement for an order granting a 
provisional remedy to be immediately appealable—and the crux of the parties’ 
dispute—that the “appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or effective 
remedy by an appeal following final judgment.”  R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(b).  The 
burden of establishing the appellate court’s jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal 
“falls on the party who knocks on the courthouse doors asking for interlocutory 
relief.”  Smith, 142 Ohio St.3d 411, 2015-Ohio-1480, 31 N.E.3d 633, at ¶ 8.  To 
meet this burden, Glenn must establish not only that he has a colorable claim that 
the order compels the disclosure of attorney work product but also that any harm 
from its disclosure could not be remedied on appeal from a final judgment.  Id. at 
¶ 5; Burnham at ¶ 20. 
{¶ 23} Glenn has failed to make such a showing.  In his response to the 
state’s motion to dismiss his appeal in the Second District, Glenn offered a single 
conclusory statement regarding the effective-remedy requirement, asserting that 
“[o]nce the information is released the privilege is violated.”  And Glenn’s 
arguments in this court are similarly sparse.  Echoing concerns discussed in 
Hickman, 329 U.S. at 513, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451, Glenn suggests that by 
creating summaries of witness statements to comply with the court’s order, defense 
counsel might subject himself to being called to testify against Glenn’s witnesses 
should their testimony deviate from defense counsel’s recollections.  He addresses 
the effective-remedy question by claiming, “Arguably, forcing an attorney into 
such a situation is not something that can be rectified on direct appeal and likely 
would lead to the consequences foreseen in Hickman.” 
{¶ 24} Although we acknowledge those concerns, there is no reason that 
such a situation could not be rectified in an appeal following final judgment.  If that 
scenario comes to fruition and the appellate court determines that the trial court’s 
January Term, 2021 
 
11 
discovery order was improper, then it may grant Glenn a new trial and order the 
exclusion of the improperly disclosed statements.  In fact, when pressed on the 
effective-remedy question during oral argument, the only concrete reasons that 
counsel for Glenn set forth to explain why a postjudgment appeal would not be 
effective was that Glenn might have to face a second trial and possible additional 
pretrial incarceration.  But the possibility of retrial does not render the appeal 
mechanism ineffective.  Those concerns are present in virtually every criminal 
appeal; that doesn’t mean they are sufficient to convert every interlocutory order 
into a final, appealable order. 
{¶ 25} Glenn insists that this case compels a different result because the 
order requires him to create summaries of the expected witness testimony.  But the 
fact that the summaries must be created and disclosed does not establish that any 
harm resulting from the order cannot be effectively remedied in a postjudgment 
appeal.  And in this situation, should Glenn’s attorney choose to comply with the 
order, he will have the benefit of knowing in advance that the documents will be 
viewed by the prosecution and the ability to prepare them accordingly, which is not 
the case when an attorney is simply taking interview notes for his own use.  We 
therefore fail to understand the dissent’s worries that defense counsel’s providing 
summations of alibi-witness information to the state “inevitably” would amount to 
the disclosure of counsel’s “mental impressions regarding the witnesses’ 
statements,” his “trial strategy,” or his “evaluation of the credibility of witnesses,” 
such that Glenn will be irreparably harmed in the absence of an immediate appeal.  
Dissenting opinion at ¶ 32, 38. 
{¶ 26} Moreover, it is not clear at this juncture exactly what information the 
trial court would deem sufficient to comply with its order.  The state sought “reports 
summarizing proposed testimony of defense witnesses.”  Although the trial court 
issued a broad directive for defense counsel to provide “written summaries of the 
statements” made by the witnesses, it also appears to have excluded from its order 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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any disclosure of “internal communication of impressions, conclusions, strategy, or 
opinions,” incriminating information, and statements intended to be used only for 
impeachment.  It is possible that summaries providing a greater measure of 
specificity regarding the basic timing and location details of the alibi evidence that 
each witness is expected to offer would suffice to comply with the court’s directive.  
In short, the uncertainty surrounding what the trial court would consider 
satisfactory compliance with its order suggests that the order would be better 
reviewed after the situation has fully unfolded. 
{¶ 27} Glenn also contends that an order compelling disclosure of attorney 
work product in a criminal case should be immediately appealable, even if a similar 
order in a civil case would not be.  Glenn maintains that his counsel is being 
compelled “to aid in the conviction of [his] own client” and thus the order warrants 
immediate review.  But he does not explain how providing summaries of expected 
alibi testimony to the state—while withholding any potentially incriminating 
information—would necessarily aid in his conviction.  Rather, the bulk of the 
arguments and supporting caselaw that he presents on that claim relate to his 
contention that the order fails to comply with the discovery rules as outlined in 
Crim.R. 16 and undermines the adversarial nature of the trial system.  But those 
arguments go to the merits of the order.  Because we conclude that the appellate 
court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the order at this time, 
we expressly do not offer any view as to whether the trial court’s order was proper.  
The appropriateness of the order is a question for a later appeal. 
{¶ 28} We agree with Glenn that the specifics of a discovery order 
challenged on appeal should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.  And we do not 
hold that a trial court’s order compelling the disclosure of attorney work product 
may never form the basis of an interlocutory appeal.  But R.C. 2505.02(B)(4) is 
clear that such an order is not immediately appealable unless the appealing party 
would be denied an effective remedy in an appeal following the final judgment.  In 
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13 
view of the nature of the order in this case, which involves defense counsel’s 
creation and disclosure of summaries of the expected testimony of alibi witnesses, 
we cannot conclude that Glenn would lack a meaningful remedy through an appeal 
following final judgment. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 29} Glenn has failed to establish that the discovery order at issue in this 
case satisfies the requirements of R.C. 2505.02(B)(4) for being a final order.  We 
therefore affirm the judgment of the Second District Court of Appeals dismissing 
the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and we remand the case to the trial court for 
further proceedings. 
Judgment affirmed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FISCHER, DONNELLY, STEWART, and BRUNNER, JJ., 
concur. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 30} I agree with the majority that “a discovery order compelling the 
disclosure of attorney work product falls within the rubric of ‘discovery of a 
privileged matter’ and is therefore a provisional remedy” within the meaning of 
R.C. 2505.02(A)(3).  Majority opinion at ¶ 12, quoting R.C. 2505.02(A)(3); see 
also Smith v. Chen, 142 Ohio St.3d 411, 2015-Ohio-1480, 31 N.E.3d 633, ¶ 11 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).  I also agree with the majority that appellant, Samuel 
Glenn, has made a sufficient showing that the trial court’s order requiring his 
defense counsel to create and disclose written summaries of the oral statements of 
defense witnesses may be prohibited by the work-product doctrine. 
{¶ 31} However, I part ways with the majority because an appeal following 
final judgment in this case would not afford Glenn a meaningful or effective remedy 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14 
and the trial court’s discovery order is therefore a final, appealable order pursuant 
to R.C. 2505.02(B)(4).  For those reasons, I dissent and would reverse the judgment 
of the Second District Court of Appeals and remand this matter to that court for it 
to address the merits of Glenn’s appeal. 
{¶ 32} This case is not about requiring defense counsel to disclose an 
existing written statement of a witness or a recording of a witness’s oral statement.  
Instead, we are faced with an order requiring defense counsel to create and disclose 
written summaries of witnesses’ oral statements.  This will inevitably require 
defense counsel to provide his mental impressions regarding the witnesses’ 
statements, which is attorney work product that is entitled to special protection, see 
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 401, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 
(1981), and would potentially force counsel to become a witness against Glenn, see 
Hickmann v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 512-513, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947). 
{¶ 33} In this matter, Glenn’s defense counsel has been ordered by the trial 
court “to provide the State with written summaries of the statements made by the 
witnesses [the] defense intends to call regarding defendant’s alibi during defense 
counsel’s (and the defense investigator’s) conversations with such individuals.”  
Glenn maintains that the only way to comply with that order is for defense counsel 
to create the written summaries using counsel’s “own memory and/or notes, 
investigative recall, mental process, recall of conversations with witness[es] or even 
[Glenn].”  He argues that requiring defense counsel to create and disclose privileged 
materials violates the public policies acknowledged in Hickman.  And Glenn 
submits that because the summaries necessarily would “be produced from the 
mind” of defense counsel and inaccuracies with respect to the witnesses’ statements 
might result, counsel could potentially be called as a witness at trial against Glenn 
if the state uses the statements to impeach the defense witnesses.  Therefore, he 
argues, the harm that would be caused by the trial court’s discovery order could not 
January Term, 2021 
 
15 
be undone through an appeal, and the order is therefore a final, appealable order 
pursuant to R.C. 2505.02.  I agree. 
{¶ 34} R.C. 2505.02(B)(4) provides that an appellate court has jurisdiction 
to review, affirm, modify or reverse “[a]n order that grants or denies a provisional 
remedy” when both of the following are satisfied: 
 
(a) The order in effect determines the action with respect to 
the provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in 
favor of the appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy. 
(b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful 
or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all 
proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the action. 
 
{¶ 35} A provisional remedy is “a proceeding ancillary to an action,” 
including a proceeding involving “discovery of privileged matter.”  R.C. 
2505.02(A)(3).  A discovery order compelling the production of attorney work 
product constitutes discovery of privileged matter and is therefore a provisional 
remedy within the meaning of R.C. 2505.02(A)(3).  Smith, 142 Ohio St.3d 411, 
2015-Ohio-1480, 31 N.E.3d 633, at ¶ 5-6. 
{¶ 36} A discovery order that compels defense counsel to reconstruct and 
disclose defense witnesses’ statements relating to the accused’s alibi is a classic 
example of the proverbial bell that cannot be unrung, and the damage that would 
be caused to the accused’s defense by such an error cannot be remedied on appeal.  
See State v. Muncie, 91 Ohio St.3d 440, 451, 746 N.E.2d 1092 (2001).  The premise 
of the work-product doctrine’s protection of an attorney’s mental processes is that 
in effectively representing the client’s interests, “it is essential that a lawyer work 
with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing 
parties and their counsel.”  Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
As the United States Supreme Court explained in Hickman, “[p]roper preparation 
of a client’s case demands that he assemble information, sift what he considers to 
be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his 
strategy without undue and needless interference.”  Id. at 511.  Were it to be 
otherwise, the court explained, “[a]n attorney’s thoughts, heretofore inviolate, 
would not be his own,” id., resulting in inefficiency, gamesmanship, and unfairness 
that would inevitably harm the client’s right to the effective assistance of counsel, 
see id. 
{¶ 37} This is even more true regarding the representation of a person 
accused of a crime, whose interest in liberty hangs in the balance.  Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that the role of the work-product doctrine “in 
assuring the proper functioning of the criminal justice system is even more vital” 
than its role in civil litigation.  United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238, 95 S.Ct. 
2160, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975).  The court has explained that “[t]he interests of 
society and the accused in obtaining a fair and accurate resolution of the question 
of guilt or innocence demand that adequate safeguards assure the thorough 
preparation and presentation of each side of the case.”  Id. 
{¶ 38} Requiring an accused’s defense counsel to write down and disclose 
the oral statements of defense witnesses—particularly alibi witnesses—is 
inherently harmful to the accused’s case.  This is true even if an appellate court, on 
direct appeal from a judgment of conviction, reverses the conviction and remands 
for a new trial at which the statements may not be used by the prosecution.  The 
Supreme Court has recognized that when attorney work product based on 
witnesses’ oral statements is produced in discovery, it reveals either 
communications protected by the attorney-client privilege or “the attorneys’ mental 
processes in evaluating the communications.”  Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 401, 101 
S.Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584.  Short of replacing the prosecuting attorney with a 
special prosecutor and a court’s issuing an order restricting access by the new 
January Term, 2021 
 
17 
prosecutor to any material that could divulge the mental impressions of defense 
counsel, there is no way to assure that the state will not use any information relating 
to defense counsel’s mental processes against the accused, such as defense 
counsel’s trial strategy or evaluation of the credibility of witnesses.  Defense 
counsel could also be forced to adopt a different trial strategy, including calling 
different witnesses or abandoning an alibi defense altogether, due to the state’s 
having had access to counsel’s mental processes and impressions about the case.  
And once the state has knowledge of any weaknesses of the defense witnesses, 
nothing would preclude the state from seeking additional damaging evidence that 
would be, in essence, the fruit of the poisonous tree.  In the end, it is impossible to 
gauge whether the state will be able to use what it has learned—knowingly or 
passively—to the detriment of the accused at the new trial. 
{¶ 39} Moreover, the disclosure of defense counsel’s mental processes 
involves harms other than the loss of confidentiality.  The use of defense counsel’s 
written recollection of defense witnesses’ oral statements would, in effect, turn 
counsel into a witness against his client and potentially cause him to contribute to 
his client’s conviction if the written recollection is used to impeach a defense 
witness.  And if there were to be a key inconsistency between the witness’s 
testimony and counsel’s recollection of what the witness had previously said, there 
“would [be] a substantial risk that the lawyer would have to testify,” Nobles at 252 
(White, J., concurring), and defense counsel would be forced to destroy the 
credibility of the accused’s witnesses.  These concerns and corresponding 
difficulties were eloquently addressed by Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion 
in Hickman: 
 
I can conceive of no practice more demoralizing to the Bar than to 
require a lawyer to write out and deliver to his adversary an account 
of what witnesses have told him.  Even if his recollection were 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
perfect, the statement would be his language permeated with his 
inferences.  Everyone who has tried it knows that it is almost 
impossible so fairly to record the expressions and emphasis of a 
witness that when he testifies in the environment of the court and 
under the influence of the leading question there will not be 
departures in some respects.  Whenever the testimony of the witness 
would differ from the “exact” statement the lawyer had delivered, 
the lawyer’s statement would be whipped out to impeach the 
witness.  Counsel producing his adversary’s “inexact” statement 
could lose nothing by saying, “Here is a contradiction, gentlemen of 
the jury.  I do not know whether it is my adversary or his witness 
who is not telling the truth, but one is not.”  Of course, if this practice 
were adopted, that scene would be repeated over and over again.  
The lawyer who delivers such statements often would find himself 
branded a deceiver afraid to take the stand to support his own 
version of the witness’s conversation with him, or else he will have 
to go on the stand to defend his own credibility—perhaps against 
that of his chief witness, or possibly even his client. 
 
329 U.S. at 516-517, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
{¶ 40} Further, Prof.Cond.R. 3.7(a) generally prohibits an attorney from 
serving as counsel at a trial in which he is likely to be called as a witness.  As 
Comment 1 to that rule explains, “[c]ombining the roles of advocate and witness 
can prejudice the tribunal and the opposing party and can also involve a conflict of 
interest between the lawyer and client.”  Requiring defense counsel to provide a 
written recollection of defense witnesses’ oral statements could therefore 
necessitate defense counsel’s withdrawal from representation and even deny the 
accused his counsel of choice—which is a fundamental constitutional right, see 
January Term, 2021 
 
19 
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147-148, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 2563, 165 
L.Ed.2d 409 (2006). 
{¶ 41} Compelling counsel to reconstruct oral witness statements from 
memory therefore places counsel in a position that is adversarial to his client and 
brings counsel’s loyalty into question, causing a breakdown in the attorney-client 
relationship that leaves the accused in an untenable position.  And although a new 
trial may theoretically provide the opportunity for a fair trial free of the error of 
improper disclosure, it cannot remedy these substantial harms. 
{¶ 42} Because it can never be said with certainty that the harms caused by 
compelling defense counsel to reconstruct and disclose oral statements of defense 
witnesses from memory could be remedied by a new trial following an appeal, I 
would hold that such a discovery order is final and appealable under R.C. 2505.02, 
without any further showing of prejudice to the accused. 
{¶ 43} Glenn has shown that any harm caused by the discovery order 
compelling the disclosure of attorney work product may not be effectively remedied 
by an appeal after final judgment.  See R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(b).  I would reverse the 
judgment of the court of appeals and remand to that court for it to consider the 
merits of Glenn’s appeal.  Because the majority does not, I dissent. 
_________________ 
Mathias H. Heck Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Andrew T. French, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Anthony Comunale, for appellant. 
_________________