Title: State ex rel. King v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Elections

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. King v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-3613.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-3613 
THE STATE EX REL. KING, MAYOR, v. CUYAHOGA COUNTY BOARD OF 
ELECTIONS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. King v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip 
Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-3613.] 
Mandamus—Writ sought to compel board of election to remove a recall election 
from the ballot—East Cleveland City Charter—Mandamus is proper when 
relator seeks to compel board of elections to perform an affirmative act—
Laches—Board of elections has no authority under city’s charter to assess 
the validity of a recall election—Motion to intervene denied—Writ denied. 
(No. 2022-1128—Submitted October 5, 2022—Decided October 11, 2022.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
_________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Per Curiam. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
{¶ 1} In this expedited election case, relator, Brandon L. King, mayor of 
East Cleveland, seeks a writ of mandamus to compel respondent, the Cuyahoga 
County Board of Elections, to remove a recall election against him from the 
November 8, 2022 ballot.  On October 3, 2022, Darryl Moore filed a motion for 
leave to intervene.  For the reasons set forth herein, we deny the motion for leave 
to intervene and deny the writ of mandamus. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. Statutory provisions governing recall petitions 
{¶ 2} East Cleveland’s city charter establishes procedures for a recall 
against a municipal officeholder.  The charter requires the clerk of the city council 
to keep a supply of blank recall petition forms on hand.  East Cleveland City 
Charter, Section 50.  The clerk must issue blank forms upon receipt of an affidavit 
“stating the name of the member or members of the Council whose removal is 
sought.”1  Id.  From the time the affidavit is filed, the petition circulators have 30 
days to gather signatures and file the part-petitions with the clerk.  Id., Section 52. 
{¶ 3} The recall process is formally initiated by the filing of the petition, 
signed by a sufficient number of electors, with the clerk.  Id., Section 49.  The clerk 
must then “certify * * * whether the signature of electors [on the petition] amount 
in number to at least twenty-five (25) percent of the voters voting at the last regular 
municipal election of officers.”  Id., Section 53.  If the petition contains enough 
signatures, the clerk must “serve notice of that fact upon” the officeholder 
designated in the recall petition and deliver a copy of the petition to “the election 
 
1. The language of East Cleveland City Charter, Section 50 could be read to mean that a recall may 
be held only against a member of city council and not against the mayor.  However, Section 50 must 
be read in conjunction with Section 49, which establishes the procedures “to effect the removal of 
any elected officer of the city.”  (Emphasis added.) 
January Term, 2022 
 
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authorities” along with the certification regarding the percentage of voters who cast 
ballots at the last municipal election.  Id., Section 54. 
{¶ 4} The officeholder designated in the recall petition may resign within 
five days of the clerk’s certification.  Id., Section 54.  If the designated officeholder 
does not resign within that five-day period, “the election authorities shall forthwith 
order and fix a day for holding a recall election,” with the fixed day being no later 
than 90 days after the expiration of the five-day resignation period.  Id. 
{¶ 5} Provisions in the Revised Code also address the recall of a municipal 
officeholder.  R.C. 705.92(A) provides that a recall petition “shall contain a general 
statement in not more than two hundred words of the grounds upon which the 
removal of the person is sought.”  East Cleveland’s city charter does not require a 
general statement, nor does it require that the affidavit contain reasons for seeking 
the removal of the officeholder. 
B. Background 
{¶ 6} In July 2022, Charles N. Holmes Sr. delivered an affidavit to the clerk 
of the East Cleveland city council seeking to recall King from office.  Holmes’s 
affidavit listed the following reasons to recall King: 
 
(1)  The Mayor does not reside in the City of East Cleveland 
as the charter requires. 
(2)  The Mayor has spent money not appropriated by 
Council.  This has been confirmed by the Fiscal Oversight 
Commission. 
(3)  The Mayor has used City contractors for personal work 
(demolition of the home he received from the land bank) which he 
should have returned to the city when he did not rehab it. 
(4) The Mayor’s spending is keeping the City of East 
Cleveland in debt.  King’s administration has given away $1.4 
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million in real estate to his friends with no payments to the City of 
East Cleveland.  How is the City supposed to prosper and come out 
of debt?  He doesn’t care. 
(5)  In a letter to State Representative Cupp and State Senator 
Hoffman, the State Auditor stated that he doesn’t see East Cleveland 
coming out of fiscal distress within the near future. 
(6)  Mayor King appointed Willa Hemmons as Law Director 
and Charles Iyahen as Finance Director, but has not brought them in 
front of City Council for approval as is required by the charter. 
(7)  Mayor King has not been transparent and refuses to 
provide all contracts and related information to Council for storage 
in the Council office as is required by the Charter. 
(8)  Mayor King forbids Mr. Iyahen, alleged Finance 
Director, to meet with Council members or other citizens except in 
Council meetings. 
(9)  The Mayor is not transparent with regard to City finances 
and refuses to provide information requested by Council members. 
(10)  The Mayor was given a grant application to obtain 
millions of dollars from the State of Ohio which would benefit the 
citizens of East Cleveland.  King never submitted the application 
because it didn’t fit into “his plans” and “what he wanted to do.”  He 
doesn’t care. 
 
The clerk issued blank recall petitions to Holmes. 
{¶ 7} On August 9, the clerk certified to the board that Holmes had 
submitted 34 part-petitions containing 531 signatures to her office.  The board then 
reviewed the part-petitions and certified 322 signatures as valid.  On August 12, the 
clerk notified King that the petition contained enough valid signatures to qualify 
January Term, 2022 
 
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for the ballot.  The clerk informed him that he had the option to resign within five 
days and that if he chose not to do so, a recall election would be held. 
{¶ 8} On August 17, King wrote that he had “NO INTENTION of 
resigning.”  (Capitalization sic.)  King requested that a special election be held on 
October 25, 2022.  Upon receipt of King’s answer, the clerk ordered the board to 
fix a day for the recall election. 
{¶ 9} At the board’s regular meeting on August 22, King renewed his 
request to hold the recall at a special election in October.  Instead, the board ordered 
the recall election to appear on the November 8 general-election ballot. 
{¶ 10} On September 2, King submitted a written challenge against the 
petition to the board.  In his protest letter, King asserted: “ORC 705.92 prohibits 
more than 200 words in the General Statement on the Petition Affidavit.  However, 
the General Statement purporting to set forth the grounds for my Recall numbered 
more than 500 words.” 
{¶ 11} In response to King’s protest, the board’s staff requested a legal 
opinion from East Cleveland Law Director Willa Hemmons whether R.C. 705.92 
applies to a recall initiated under the city charter.  On September 2, Hemmons 
provided her legal opinion, observing that “there is nothing in the City’s Charter 
that addresses word limitations in a Recall petition’s General Statement of grounds.  
It is silent on the issue.”  Citing the legal rule that when a charter is silent on a 
matter, state law applies, Hemmons concluded that R.C. 705.92, limiting the 
number of words to 200, controls.  “Hence, a 500 word General Statement on a 
Recall petition violates the process and thus nullifies the subject Recall petitions.” 
{¶ 12} The board considered Hemmons’s opinion at its September 12 
meeting.  However, the board took no action to decertify the recall petition.  The 
board concluded that the city charter places the duty to certify the validity of the 
petition on the city clerk and following that certification, the board’s duties are 
purely ministerial.  In addition, at least one board member concluded that because 
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the city charter does not expressly incorporate R.C. 705.92 or limit the number of 
words in the general statement, there is no such limitation. 
{¶ 13} At the same meeting, the board declined to place on the ballot a recall 
election against a different officeholder, Councilperson Korean Stevenson.  With 
respect to the Stevenson recall petition, the board found that Moore, who had 
circulated some of the part-petitions against her, had been convicted of securities 
fraud and other federal offenses.  An assistant county prosecutor informed the board 
that under Ohio law, a person convicted of a state or federal criminal offense is 
barred from circulating petitions and that Ohio law restores that right after certain 
state-law convictions but not after federal convictions.  Based on that advice, the 
board disqualified 50 signatures on part-petitions circulated by Moore, which left 
the recall petition against Stevenson without the requisite number of valid 
signatures to qualify for the ballot. 
{¶ 14} King filed his complaint for a writ of mandamus against the board 
on September 13.  On September 20, he filed a motion for a peremptory writ of 
prohibition, arguing that he would suffer irreparable harm and that his claim would 
be rendered moot if early voting began with the recall election still on the ballot.  
This court denied the motion.  167 Ohio St.3d 1524, 2022-Ohio-3361, __ N.E.3d 
__.  The parties filed briefs and evidence.  On October 3, after the close of briefing, 
Moore filed a motion for leave to intervene in support of King, which the board has 
opposed. 
C. The motion for leave to intervene 
{¶ 15} In his motion for leave to intervene, Moore alleges a significant 
interest in the outcome of this case because the board’s decision to invalidate the 
part-petitions he had circulated against Stevenson violated his constitutional rights.  
According to Moore, because the board erred as a matter of law when it invalidated 
the Stevenson part-petitions that Moore had circulated, this court should not only 
grant King’s writ of mandamus, but it should also reverse the board’s decision to 
January Term, 2022 
 
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set aside Moore’s circulated part-petitions for the recall of Stevenson and recognize 
Moore’s right to circulate electoral petitions.  We deny the motion for leave. 
{¶ 16} Moore’s motion did not specify whether he was seeking intervention 
as of right under Civ.R. 24(A)(2) or permissive intervention under Civ.R. 24(B)(2).  
Under Civ.R. 24(A)(2), when intervention is timely sought and disposition of the 
action may impair the applicant’s ability to protect its interest, intervention must be 
granted unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by an existing 
party.  State ex rel. Bohlen v. Halliday, 164 Ohio St.3d 121, 2021-Ohio-194, 172 
N.E.3d 114, ¶ 8.  Civ.R. 24(B) allows a court to permit an applicant’s intervention 
based on a showing that the applicant’s claim or defense has a question of law or 
fact in common with the main action.  But in exercising its discretion, a court must 
consider whether intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the 
rights of the original parties.  State ex rel. Greene Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. O’Diam, 
156 Ohio St.3d 458, 2019-Ohio-1676, 129 N.E.3d 393, ¶ 10. 
{¶ 17} Generally, we construe Civ.R. 24 liberally to permit intervention.  
State ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio Dept. of Natural Resources, 130 Ohio St.3d 30, 2011-
Ohio-4612, 955 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 41.  But in this case, we deny the motion under both 
Civ.R. 24(A) and (B), for at least three reasons.  First and foremost, Moore has not 
alleged a protectable interest that may be impaired (the standard for intervention of 
right), nor has he identified a claim or defense that shares a question of law or fact 
with the issues in this case (the standard for permissive intervention).  Moore seeks 
an adjudication of his status as a reinfranchised elector and a determination that the 
Stevenson recall part-petitions that he circulated are valid.  Neither question is 
relevant to the case before the court.  In other words, Moore does not explain why 
he has an interest in the status of the King recall petition or have a legal argument 
to present that is relevant to whether the King recall election should appear on the 
ballot. 
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{¶ 18} Second, Moore has not sought timely intervention.  This expedited 
election case had been pending for three weeks and was fully briefed when Moore 
filed his motion, and early absentee voting starts next week (October 12). 
{¶ 19} Finally, Civ.R. 24(C) requires that a motion to intervene be 
accompanied by a pleading setting forth the claim or defense to be asserted.  Moore 
did not attach a proposed pleading; this failure alone is reason to deny the motion.  
State ex rel. Sawicki v. Lucas Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 121 Ohio St.3d 507, 
2009-Ohio-1523, 905 N.E.2d 1192, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 20} For these reasons, we deny Moore’s motion for leave to intervene. 
D. Merits 
1. Standard of review 
{¶ 21} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, King must establish by clear 
and convincing evidence that (1) he has a clear legal right to the requested relief, 
(2) the board has a clear legal duty to provide that relief, and (3) he does not have 
an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Linnabary v. 
Husted, 138 Ohio St.3d 535, 2014-Ohio-1417, 8 N.E.3d 940, ¶ 13.  As to the third 
element, King lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law due to 
the proximity of the election, which is less than five weeks away.  See State ex rel. 
West v. LaRose, 161 Ohio St.3d 192, 2020-Ohio-4380, 161 N.E.3d 631, ¶ 15. 
{¶ 22} The first two elements require us to determine whether the board 
engaged in fraud, corruption, or abuse of discretion or acted in clear disregard of 
applicable law.  Whitman v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 97 Ohio St.3d 216, 
2002-Ohio-5923, 778 N.E.2d 32, ¶ 11.  King has not alleged fraud or corruption.  
An abuse of discretion “connotes an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable 
attitude.”  State ex rel. Grady v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 78 Ohio St.3d 181, 183, 
677 N.E.2d 343 (1997). 
 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
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2. The board challenges this court’s jurisdiction 
{¶ 23} As a preliminary matter, we address the board’s contention that this 
court lacks jurisdiction to reach the merits of this case because King is actually 
seeking a declaratory judgment and a prohibitory injunction, although he has 
framed the case as a mandamus claim.  Specifically, the board contends that King 
is seeking a declaratory judgment that Hemmons’s legal opinion is correct and an 
injunction to prevent his recall election from appearing on the ballot. 
{¶ 24} This court has original jurisdiction in mandamus actions.  Ohio 
Constitution, Article IV, Section 2(B)(1)(b).  However, if the allegations of a 
complaint indicate that the real objects sought are a declaratory judgment and a 
prohibitory injunction, then the complaint does not state a claim in mandamus and 
must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.  State ex rel. Grendell v. Davidson, 86 
Ohio St.3d 629, 634, 716 N.E.2d 704 (1999). 
{¶ 25} “What distinguishes a proper mandamus complaint from an 
improper one is not whether the relator is seeking declaratory judgment as part of 
the complaint but whether the complaint seeks to prevent or compel official action.”  
(Emphasis sic.)  State ex rel. Ethics First–You Decide Ohio Political Action Commt. 
v. DeWine, 147 Ohio St.3d 373, 2016-Ohio-3144, 66 N.E.3d 689, ¶ 10.  When 
“declaratory judgment would not be a complete remedy unless coupled with 
ancillary extraordinary relief in the nature of a mandatory injunction, the 
availability of declaratory judgment does not preclude a writ of mandamus.”  
(Emphasis added.)  State ex rel. Arnett v. Winemiller, 80 Ohio St.3d 255, 259, 685 
N.E.2d 1219 (1997).  The court “examin[es] the complaint to determine whether it 
actually seeks to prevent, rather than compel, official action.”  State ex rel. Evans 
v. Blackwell, 111 Ohio St.3d 437, 2006-Ohio-5439, 857 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 20; see also 
State ex rel. Smith v. Indus. Comm., 139 Ohio St. 303, 306, 39 N.E.2d 838 (1942) 
(“The functions of an injunction are ordinarily to restrain motion and enforce 
inaction, while those of mandamus are to set in motion and compel action”). 
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{¶ 26} King’s complaint states a claim for relief that would compel the 
board to perform an affirmative act: the prayer for relief demands a writ of 
mandamus “to compel [the board] to decertify the Recall Petitions.”  The complaint 
does not seek a prohibitory injunction.  “[T]he difference between a request for a 
writ of mandamus in the nature of a mandatory injunction (over which this court 
has original jurisdiction) and a request for a writ of mandamus in the nature of a 
prohibitory injunction (over which it does not) is temporal.”  State ex rel. Gadell-
Newton v. Husted, 153 Ohio St.3d 225, 2018-Ohio-1854, 103 N.E.3d 809, ¶ 13.  A 
prohibitory injunction seeks to prevent an injury that has not yet occurred.  Id.; see 
also State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 117 Ohio St.3d 480, 2008-
Ohio-1593, 884 N.E.2d 1075, ¶ 12 (“a prohibitory injunction is used to prevent a 
future injury, but a mandatory injunction is used to remedy past injuries”). 
{¶ 27} The injury in this case has already occurred: the board placed the 
recall election on the ballot.  King is seeking to compel an affirmative act to remedy 
that injury, not to prevent an act in the future.  The relief he seeks is therefore a 
mandatory injunction, also known as a writ of mandamus, which this court has 
original jurisdiction to grant. 
3. Laches 
{¶ 28} The board contends that King’s mandamus claim is barred by laches.  
In election cases, a relator must act with the utmost diligence.  State ex rel. Syx v. 
Stow City Council, 161 Ohio St.3d 201, 2020-Ohio-4393, 161 N.E.3d 639, ¶ 11.  
Laches may bar relief in an election-related matter if the person seeking relief fails 
to act with the requisite diligence.  State ex rel. Monroe v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of 
Elections, 137 Ohio St.3d 62, 2013-Ohio-4490, 997 N.E.2d 524, ¶ 30.  The 
elements of laches are (1) unreasonable delay or lapse of time in asserting a right, 
(2) absence of an excuse for the delay, (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the 
injury or wrong, and (4) prejudice to the other party.  State ex rel. Carrier v. Hilliard 
City Council, 144 Ohio St.3d 592, 2016-Ohio-155, 45 N.E.3d 1006, ¶ 8. 
January Term, 2022 
 
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{¶ 29} The board argues that King failed to exercise reasonable diligence 
by waiting until September 2022 to file his mandamus complaint.  According to the 
board, King should have sought judicial review of his R.C. 705.92 claim in August 
when the board ordered that the election should appear on the November ballot, in 
July when the clerk permitted Holmes to circulate a petition, or even in 2015 when 
King was the subject of another affidavit in support of a recall petition that 
exceeded 200 words. 
{¶ 30} However, “a party asserting a laches defense must demonstrate that 
it has been prejudiced by the other party’s delay.”  State ex rel. Davis v. Summit 
Cty. Bd. of Elections, 137 Ohio St.3d 222, 2013-Ohio-4616, 998 N.E.2d 1093,  
¶ 10.  The prejudice “must be material before laches will bar relief.”  Pennington v. 
Bivens, 166 Ohio St.3d 241, 2021-Ohio-3134, 185 N.E.3d 41, ¶ 26.  In this case, 
the board has not alleged any prejudice resulting from King’s delay.  We therefore 
reject the board’s laches defense.  See State ex rel. Halstead v. Jackson, ___ Ohio 
St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-3205, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 19 (rejecting a laches defense 
because the respondents failed to prove prejudice). 
4. The mandamus claim 
{¶ 31} The board declined to decertify the King recall petition primarily 
because it believed that it lacked the authority to do so.  King argues that the board 
was wrong, because R.C. 3501.11(K)(1) provides that a board of elections shall 
“[r]eview, examine, and certify the sufficiency and validity of petitions.”  
(Emphasis added.)  The board responds that the city charter governs the recall 
process, and the charter gives the board only ministerial duties. 
{¶ 32} The board is correct that it has no authority to assess the validity of 
a recall petition.  Rather, under the charter, “the Clerk of the Council shall certify 
upon such petition whether the signature of electors thereto amount in number to 
at least twenty-five (25) percent of the voters voting at the last regular municipal 
election of officers.”  (Emphasis added.)  East Cleveland City Charter, Section 53.  
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By using the term “electors” in Section 53, the charter requires the clerk to certify 
the number of valid signatures, not simply to report the gross number of signatures 
on the petition.  And once the clerk provides her certification, the charter gives the 
board no discretion: the board “shall forthwith order and fix a day for holding a 
recall election.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id., Section 54. 
{¶ 33} The board had no authority under the charter to decertify the King 
recall petition; therefore, whether the board acted inconsistently when it invalidated 
part-petition signatures on the Stevenson recall petition is not relevant. 
{¶ 34} Given our holding, we will not address the question whether the 200-
word limitation in R.C. 705.92(A) applies to recall petitions under the East 
Cleveland City Charter.  Because the board had no authority to decertify the recall 
petition, any statement we might offer as to whether the board would have been 
correct to apply the statute in this matter would be an advisory opinion.  And we 
have “recogniz[ed] the ‘cardinal principle of judicial restraint—if it is not necessary 
to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.’ ”  State ex rel. LetOhioVote.org 
v. Brunner, 123 Ohio St.3d 322, 2009-Ohio-4900, 916 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 51, quoting 
PDK Laboratories, Inc. v. United States Drug Enforcement Administration, 362 
F.3d 786, 799 (C.A.D.C.2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). 
III. CONCLUSION 
{¶ 35} For the reasons discussed herein, we deny the motion for leave to 
intervene and we deny the writ of mandamus. 
Writ denied. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and DEWINE, DONNELLY, and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, FISCHER, and BRUNNER, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
_________________ 
Willa M. Hemmons, East Cleveland Law Director, for relator. 
January Term, 2022 
 
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Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mark 
R. Musson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent. 
_________________