Title: State ex rel. WTOL Television, L.L.C. v. Cedar Fair, L.P.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. WTOL Television, L.L.C. v. Cedar Fair, L.P., Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-4593.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-4593 
THE STATE EX REL. WTOL TELEVISION, L.L.C., ET AL. v. CEDAR FAIR, 
L.P., D.B.A. CEDAR FAIR ENTERTAINMENT COMPANY, ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. WTOL Television, L.L.C. v. Cedar Fair, L.P., Slip 
Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-4593.] 
Mandamus—Public-records requests—Police department that provides security, 
policing, and law-enforcement services at amusement park acts as 
functional equivalent of a public institution and therefore must respond to 
valid public-records requests related to those duties—Respondents failed to 
meet their burden to show that requested documents, to the extent they exist, 
are exempt from disclosure—Writ compelling production of certain 
requested documents granted—Statutory damages and attorney fees denied 
and court costs awarded. 
(No. 2022-0914—Submitted September 12, 2023—Decided December 20, 2023.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
2 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Relators, WTOL Television, L.L.C., WKYC-TV, L.L.C., and 
WBNS-TV, Inc., filed this original action in mandamus seeking a writ to compel 
respondents, Cedar Fair, L.P., d.b.a. Cedar Fair Entertainment Company, and 
Ronald E. Gilson, to provide documents in response to three public-records 
requests.  We grant a writ ordering Cedar Fair and Gilson to produce some, but not 
all, of the requested documents.  We also grant relators’ request for an award of 
court costs but deny their requests for awards of statutory damages and attorney 
fees. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A.  Background 
{¶ 2} Cedar Fair operates amusement parks across the country, including 
Cedar Point in Sandusky.  The Cedar Point Police Department (“CPPD”) provides 
security, policing, and law-enforcement services at Cedar Point.  Gilson is the 
director of security at Cedar Point and the chief of police of the CPPD. 
{¶ 3} Relators are media companies that broadcast news in Ohio.  In August 
2021, a guest at Cedar Point was allegedly injured near the Top Thrill Dragster ride 
and WKYC sent a public-records request to the CPPD asking for records related to 
the incident.  Meanwhile, relators had been investigating sexual assaults that 
allegedly occurred at Cedar Point employee housing beginning in April 2017.  In 
March and June 2022, WTOL and WBNS sent public-records requests to the CPPD 
asking for records related to the alleged assaults.  Relators allege that they have not 
received any of the requested records. 
{¶ 4} Relators filed this mandamus action in July 2022.  They seek a writ 
of mandamus ordering Cedar Fair and Gilson to produce the requested records, and 
they also seek statutory damages, court costs, and attorney fees.  In their answer to 
the complaint, Cedar Fair and Gilson denied that the CPPD is an entity that is 
required to respond to public-records requests.  They also stated that they did not 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
3 
have any responsive documents and that even if they did, the records are exempt 
from disclosure as confidential law-enforcement investigatory records and 
privileged private-security documents. 
{¶ 5} We issued an alternative writ and ordered the parties to brief and 
submit evidence “on whether the Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, applies to 
respondents.”  168 Ohio St.3d 1450, 2022-Ohio-3903, 198 N.E.3d 106.  Relators 
submitted evidence; Cedar Point and Gilson did not submit any evidence.  We 
subsequently issued an order directing the parties “to brief and submit evidence on 
whether the records requested by relators—assuming that the Public Records Act 
applies to respondents—are public records, whether the court should issue a writ of 
mandamus ordering their production, and whether the court should award statutory 
damages, court costs, and attorney fees.”  170 Ohio St.3d 1425, 2023-Ohio-1635, 
209 N.E.3d 707.  The order noted that Cedar Fair and Gilson were permitted to 
submit documents they believed are privileged or constitute confidential law-
enforcement investigatory records under seal for in camera inspection.  Neither 
party submitted additional evidence, and Cedar Fair and Gilson did not file any 
documents under seal. 
B.  WKYC’s public-records request 
{¶ 6} On August 18, 2021, WKYC emailed a request to the CPPD, seeking 
“[a]ll incident and investigative reports from the Cedar Point Police and associated 
Emergency Medical Services personnel regarding an incident Sunday, Aug. 15, 
2021, at Cedar Point Park—specifically an injury sustained by a female guest near 
the Top Thrill Dragster ride.”  In addition, WKYC requested witness statements, 
investigative notes, recordings and video of the incident, and any other documents 
stemming from the incident.  WKYC emailed the request to the CPPD’s general 
email address and copied two other Cedar Point contacts.  On August 19, WKYC 
forwarded the request to Gilson and Tony Clark, another Cedar Point employee.  
Clark responded later that day, stating, “Assuming Cedar Point is required to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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provide such documents, we have no documents responsive to your public records 
request.”  Clark later offered to connect Cedar Point’s legal counsel with WKYC.  
But Cedar Fair and Gilson never provided the requested documents or any further 
response. 
C.  WTOL’s public-records request 
{¶ 7} On March 23 2022, WTOL emailed a public-records request to 
Gilson, seeking “[c]opies of all reports of sexual misconduct filed with, and 
maintained by, the Cedar Point Police Department from April 1, 2017 to March 22, 
2022.”  In addition, WTOL requested “copies and/or recordings of any witness or 
suspect statements, oral or written; investigative notes; recommendations of 
charges, and photos and/or videos associated with the reports provided.”  Gilson 
responded by email on March 25, acknowledging receipt of the request and 
indicating that it had been forwarded to legal counsel for an opinion as to whether 
the Public Records Act applies to Cedar Point.  Gilson wrote: 
 
If Cedar Point is required to respond to the request and there are 
documents responsive to the request—we will provide the 
documents within a reasonable time (30 days).  If our counsel 
believes that we are not required under Ohio law to respond, our 
legal counsel will provide you with the basis for Cedar Point not 
responding. 
 
(Emphasis sic.) 
{¶ 8} WTOL sent a follow-up email to Gilson on March 25 and a follow-
up letter on April 15, seeking compliance with the request.  Cedar Fair and Gilson 
have not communicated with WTOL since Gilson’s initial email message and have 
not provided any documents to WTOL. 
 
 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
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D.  WBNS’s public-records request 
{¶ 9} On June 2, 2022, WBNS emailed a request to Gilson for “[c]opies of 
all reports of sexual misconduct filed with, and maintained by, the Cedar Point 
Police Department from April 1, 2017 to March 22, 2022.”  WBNS also requested 
“copies and/or recordings of any witness or suspect statements, oral or written; 
investigative notes; recommendations of charges, and photos and/or videos 
associated with the reports provided.”  On June 6, 9, and 22 and July 18, WBNS 
sent follow-up emails to Gilson asking about the request.  Cedar Fair and Gilson 
have not produced any documents to WBNS or provided any response to the 
request. 
E.  Evidence regarding the CPPD 
{¶ 10} A Sandusky ordinance provides that the city manager shall appoint 
private police officers when requested by a person or business in Sandusky.  
Sandusky Codified Ordinances 127.04(a).  The private police officers are paid for 
by the person or business requesting them.  Sandusky Codified Ordinances 
127.04(c).  They “shall have the same powers and be subject to the same regulations 
as other police officers” and “shall perform such police duties at such place or 
places within the City limits as the person, firm, or corporation requesting their 
appointment may direct; however, such duties shall not be contrary to or 
inconsistent with the laws or the City ordinances.”  Sandusky Codified Ordinances 
127.04(b).  Private police officers in Sandusky must be qualified as Ohio peace 
officers by the Ohio Peace Officer Training Commission.  Sandusky Codified 
Ordinances 127.04(d). 
{¶ 11} In 2014, Sandusky and Cedar Fair entered into an agreement for the 
appointment of private police pursuant to Sandusky Codified Ordinances 127.04.  
Each officer must be qualified to serve as a law-enforcement officer in Ohio or must 
obtain such qualification within one year of appointment.  Cedar Fair pays for the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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officers’ salary, equipment, and training, and it fully indemnifies the city for any 
liabilities incurred by the officers. 
{¶ 12} The agreement states that the city manager “shall appoint and 
maintain in service at the pleasure of the said City Manager such private police 
officers as may be reasonably necessary to provide law enforcement services and 
police protection in an [sic] about the property owned and/or utilized by Cedar 
[Fair].”  However, the agreement’s provision that the private police officers serve 
at the pleasure of the city manager contradicts a Sandusky ordinance stating that 
private police officers serve at the “pleasure of the person, firm, or corporation 
requesting his appointment,” Sandusky Codified Ordinances 127.04(c).  It is not 
clear from the record whether CPPD officers actually serve at the pleasure of the 
city manager or of Cedar Fair. 
{¶ 13} Pursuant to this agreement, the city manager has commissioned 
members of the CPPD.  Cedar Point police officers swear an oath before the city 
manager to support the laws of the United States, Ohio, and Sandusky and are 
commissioned as private police officers for the city.  The Ohio Peace Officer 
Training Commission lists “Sandusky Police/Cedar Point Division” as a police 
agency.  On social media, the Sandusky Police Department referred to Cedar Point 
police officers as “bonded officers, with full law enforcement authority.” 
{¶ 14} The evidence submitted by relators shows that Cedar Point police 
officers have the power to arrest and investigate claims and that on occasion, they 
exercise these powers.  The CPPD has taken witness statements and submitted 
police incident reports to the Sandusky Police Department.  One of these reports, 
for a sexual assault, states that a CPPD officer served as the approving officer.  In 
at least one civil forfeiture action, the CPPD was the plaintiff acting under the name 
CPPD and identified itself in a court filing as a law-enforcement agency.  In 
response to a public-records request, a Sandusky assistant city manager stated in an 
email that “Sandusky officers generally handle many of the felony type crimes and 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
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[Cedar Point] officers handle most of the misdemeanor type of crimes.”  He also  
stated that “[a]ny arrests made by Cedar Point is [sic] handled in Sandusky 
Municipal Court.” 
{¶ 15} In addition, Cedar Fair and Gilson recognize that at the time of 
relators’ public-records requests, the CPPD was performing policing duties in 
addition to providing security.  In June 2022—several months after WKYC and 
WTOL made their public-records requests—Sandusky and Cedar Point issued a 
joint press release.  The release stated that Cedar Point was evaluating its security 
operation and that Cedar Point and Sandusky would be “entering into a new 
partnership”: 
 
[T]he policing authorities of the Cedar Point Police Department will 
be fully transitioned into the Sandusky Police Department’s 
operation, and the Cedar Point Police Department will focus solely 
on security operations at Cedar Point and its local affiliated 
properties.  Conversely, the Sandusky Police Department will 
assume all policing responsibilities for Cedar Point and its affiliated 
properties. 
 
(Emphasis sic.)  The release states that the transition was expected to be complete 
in 2023. 
{¶ 16} It is not clear from the record how the CPPD was created.  Relators 
argue that Sandusky created the CPPD in that Sandusky’s ordinances state that 
private police officers “shall constitute members of the private police force of the 
City,” Sandusky Codified Ordinances 127.04(a), and Sandusky appointed officers 
to perform law-enforcement services at Cedar Point.  But nothing in either 
Sandusky’s ordinances or the agreement between Sandusky and Cedar Fair creates, 
or authorizes the creation of, a private police department.  Cedar Fair and Gilson 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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state in their brief that the CPPD “was created by Cedar Fair, a private, for-profit 
limited liability partnership, for the purpose of providing security services to Cedar 
Fair,” but it has not timely submitted any evidence in support of this assertion. 
II.  LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A.  Legal standards 
{¶ 17} Mandamus is an appropriate remedy to compel compliance with the 
Public Records Act.  R.C. 149.43(C)(1)(b).  To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, 
relators must establish a clear legal right to the requested relief and a clear legal 
duty on the part of Cedar Fair and Gilson to provide it.  See State ex rel. Waters v. 
Spaeth, 131 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-69, 960 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 6.  Unlike in other 
mandamus cases, “[the] [r]elators in public-records cases need not establish the lack 
of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”  State ex rel. Am. Civ. 
Liberties Union of Ohio, Inc. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 128 Ohio St.3d 
256, 2011-Ohio-625, 943 N.E.2d 553, ¶ 24. 
B.  Evidentiary issues 
{¶ 18} We issued an alternative writ and ordered the parties to submit 
evidence by November 29, 2022.  168 Ohio St.3d 1450, 2022-Ohio-3903, 198 
N.E.3d 106.  Cedar Fair and Gilson did not submit any evidence by that date.  
Instead, they attached two affidavits to their merit brief: one from Cedar Fair’s 
former general counsel and one from Gilson. 
{¶ 19} Relators argue that we should not consider these affidavits.  We 
agree.  S.Ct.Prac.R. 16.02(B)(5) limits what documents may be attached to a merit 
brief filed in this court.  The rule does not allow litigants to attach affidavits—or 
any other type of evidence—to a merit brief.  Thus, we will not rely on either 
untimely affidavit.  See State ex rel. Gil-Llamas v. Hardin, 164 Ohio St.3d 364, 
2021-Ohio-1508, 172 N.E.3d 998, ¶ 14.  Even if we were inclined to rely on these 
affidavits, they are of limited probative value, having been created for different 
litigation predating the instant case. 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
9 
C.  The case is not moot 
{¶ 20} In the final paragraph of their brief, Cedar Fair and Gilson state that 
they have provided relators with the requested documents and that the issues before 
this court are moot.  This assertion is not supported by any evidence.  Relators agree 
that Cedar Fair and Gilson have provided some requested documents, but relators 
contend that Cedar Fair and Gilson may not have provided all requested documents.  
We will not deny a writ petition seeking public records based solely on an 
unsupported assertion by the respondent that it has already produced the responsive 
records.  See State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Dupuis, 98 Ohio St.3d 126, 2002-
Ohio-7041, 781 N.E.2d 163, ¶ 9.  And even if all responsive records had already 
been produced, such a production would not moot relators’ requests for attorney 
fees, costs, or statutory damages.  State ex rel. Martin v. Greene, 156 Ohio St.3d 
482, 2019-Ohio-1827, 129 N.E.3d 419, ¶ 7-8 (court costs and statutory damages); 
State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Ronan, 124 Ohio St.3d 17, 2009-Ohio-5947, 
918 N.E.2d 515, ¶ 10 (attorney fees).  The case is not moot. 
D.  The Cedar Point Police Department is required to respond to public-
records requests 
{¶ 21} A threshold issue in this case is whether the CPPD is required to 
respond to public-records requests.  The Public Records Act requires “public 
office[s]” or “person[s] responsible for public records” to provide public records in 
response to requests.  R.C. 149.43(B).  “ ‘Public office’ includes any state agency, 
public institution, political subdivision, or other organized body, office, agency, 
institution, or entity established by the laws of this state for the exercise of any 
function of government.”  R.C. 149.011(A).  Gilson and Cedar Fair, a private, for-
profit company, deny that the CPPD is a public office required to produce public 
records.  Relators assert two arguments in support of their position that the CPPD 
is required to respond to public-records requests. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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1.  The Cedar Point Police Department was not established pursuant to city and 
state law to serve a core government function 
{¶ 22} Relators first argue that the CPPD is subject to the Public Records 
Act because it was established by the city’s and the state’s enabling laws “to 
perform a core function of government: the exercise of plenary police power by 
sworn, state-certified police officers.”  Citing this court’s precedent in State ex rel. 
Schiffbauer v. Banaszak, 142 Ohio St.3d 535, 2015-Ohio-1854, 33 N.E.3d 52, ¶ 14, 
relators contend that the CPPD is thus a public office required to respond to valid 
public-records requests.  We do not agree. 
{¶ 23} In Schiffbauer, we held that Otterbein University’s police 
department was a public office for purposes of the Public Records Act.  Id. at ¶ 2.  
Otterbein is a private university that established a campus police department 
pursuant to R.C. 1713.50(B).  R.C. 1713.50(B) provides that “[t]he board of trustees 
of a private college or university may establish a campus police department and 
appoint members of the campus police department to act as police officers.”  
Campus police officers are vested by statute with the same powers and authority 
that are vested in police officers of a municipal corporation or county sheriffs.  Id. 
at ¶ 8, citing R.C. 1713.50(C).  We held in Schiffbauer that Otterbein’s police 
department was “an entity ‘established by the laws of this state’ because it exist[ed] 
only through R.C. 1713.50.”  Id. at ¶ 9, quoting R.C. 149.011(A).  “[B]ecause its 
officers are sworn, state-certified police officers who exercise plenary police 
power,” we held, “the Otterbein police department is a public office.”  Id. at ¶ 2. 
{¶ 24} Here, the characteristics of the CPPD officers are similar to those of 
Otterbein’s police officers.  Cedar Point’s police officers are sworn, state-certified 
police officers.  They must complete training approved by the Ohio Peace Officer 
Training Commission.  Pursuant to city ordinance, they “shall have the same 
powers and be subject to the same regulations as other police officers.”  Sandusky 
Codified Ordinances 127.04(b).  Under this authority, they exercise plenary police 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
11 
powers, including the powers to arrest, issue warrants, and enforce criminal laws 
within their jurisdiction, and they cooperate with the Sandusky Police Department 
in doing so.  In addition, they are even more closely connected to Sandusky than 
Otterbein’s police officers were to state or municipal authorities: Cedar Point’s 
police officers are appointed by the city manager, and pursuant to Sandusky’s 
ordinances, they “constitute members of the private police force of the City,” 
Sandusky Codified Ordinances 127.04(a); in contrast, Otterbein’s police officers 
were appointed by Otterbein’s board of trustees.  See Schiffbauer at ¶ 7; see also 
R.C. 1713.50(B). 
{¶ 25} The CPPD exercises a core function of government.  However, it is 
not an “organized body, office, agency, institution, or entity established by the laws 
of this state for the exercise of any function of government,” R.C. 149.011(A).  
Otterbein’s police department was created pursuant to a state statute authorizing 
private universities to “ ‘establish a campus police department.’ ”  Schiffbauer, 142 
Ohio St.3d 535, 2015-Ohio-1854, 33 N.E.3d 52, at ¶ 7, quoting R.C. 1713.50(B).  
In contrast, nothing in either Sandusky’s ordinances or the agreement between 
Sandusky and Cedar Fair creates, or authorizes the creation of, a private police 
department.  Sandusky’s ordinances require the city manager to appoint private 
police officers at the request of a person or business in Sandusky.  Sandusky 
Codified Ordinances 127.04(a).  The agreement between Sandusky and Cedar Fair 
states that the city manager shall appoint private police officers as are reasonably 
necessary to provide law-enforcement services and police protection on Cedar 
Point property.  Neither the ordinance nor the agreement creates a department—or 
any organization at all. 
{¶ 26} The record does not clearly show how the CPPD was created, but 
there is no evidence indicating that it was “established by the laws of this state for 
the exercise of any function of government,” R.C. 149.011(A).  The mere fact that 
it now performs a function of government does not mean that the CPPD was 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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established by law to do so.  Therefore, we reject relators’ first asserted basis for 
arguing that the CPPD is required to respond to public-records requests. 
2.  The Cedar Point Police Department is subject to the Public Records Act as the 
functional equivalent of a public institution 
{¶ 27} As an alternative basis for its position that the CPPD is required to 
respond to public-records requests, relators argue that the CPPD is the functional 
equivalent of a public institution for purposes of the Public Records Act under the 
test established by this court in State ex rel. Oriana House, Inc. v. Montgomery, 
110 Ohio St.3d 456, 2006-Ohio-4854, 854 N.E.2d 193.  We agree with this 
argument. 
{¶ 28} In Oriana House, we held that although private entities generally are 
not subject to the Public Records Act, a private entity is subject to the act if there 
is “a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the private entity is the 
functional equivalent of a public office.”  Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.  
When determining whether a private entity is the equivalent of a public office for 
purposes of the Public Records Act, a court must analyze all relevant factors, 
including (1) whether the entity performs a government function, (2) the level of 
government funding, (3) the extent of government involvement or regulation, and 
(4) whether the entity was created by the government or to avoid the requirements 
of the act.  Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.  Applying the test “requires a case-
by-case analysis, examining all pertinent factors with no single factor being 
dispositive.”  Id. at ¶ 23.  A private entity is subject to the Public Records Act only 
by a showing of clear and convincing evidence that the private entity is the 
functional equivalent of a public office.  Id. at ¶ 26. 
{¶ 29} Here, regarding the first factor, the CPPD performs a government 
function.  Its officers provide law-enforcement services and police protection on 
Cedar Point property.  Enforcement of criminal laws is a core government function.  
Schiffbauer, 142 Ohio St.3d 535, 2015-Ohio-1854, 33 N.E.3d 52, at ¶ 14.  
January Term, 2023 
 
 
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Therefore, the first factor weighs strongly in favor of the CPPD being subject to the 
Public Records Act. 
{¶ 30} As for the second factor, the CPPD receives little or no government 
funding.  Cedar Fair pays the salaries and benefits of the CPPD’s officers and also 
pays for related expenses such as training, equipment, insurance, workers’ 
compensation, and unemployment compensation.  Sandusky may incur some 
limited costs related to the CPPD, but the second factor weighs in favor of our 
concluding that the CPPD is not subject to the Public Records Act. 
{¶ 31} The third factor is the extent of government involvement or 
regulation regarding the entity.  The city regulates and is involved with the CPPD.  
Cedar Point police officers are subject to the “same regulations as other police 
officers.”  Sandusky Codified Ordinances 127.04(b).  They are sworn, state-
certified peace officers who undergo the same certification as other peace officers.  
Sandusky Codified Ordinances 127.04(d).  They are appointed by the city manager.  
And the CPPD works closely with the Sandusky Police Department when 
investigating crimes and performing other law-enforcement duties.  Accordingly, 
the third factor points in favor of the CPPD being subject to the Public Records Act. 
{¶ 32} The fourth factor is whether the entity was created by the 
government or to avoid the requirements of the Public Records Act.  The record is 
unclear regarding how the CPPD was created.  Its officers are appointed by the city 
pursuant to an agreement with Cedar Fair, but there is no evidence indicating that 
the department itself was created by the government.  There is also no evidence that 
the department was created to avoid the requirements of the Public Records Act.  
Therefore, the fourth factor weighs in favor of our concluding that the CPPD is not 
subject to the Public Records Act. 
{¶ 33} Weighing these factors, we conclude that the CPPD is the functional 
equivalent of a public institution.  At the time of the public-records requests, the 
CPPD was serving as the police department for the employees and guests of Cedar 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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Point.  It does much more than just provide security for Cedar Point.  Enforcing 
criminal laws is a core government function.  Schiffbauer, 142 Ohio St.3d 535, 
2015-Ohio-1854, 33 N.E.3d 52, at ¶ 14.  Although Schiffbauer is not directly 
analogous, our observation in that case that organizations made up of “sworn, state-
certified police officers who exercise plenary police power” exercise “one of the 
most fundamental functions of government,” id. at ¶ 2, 13, supports the conclusion 
that on the facts presented here, the CPPD serves as the functional equivalent of a 
public office in regard to its police duties.  When it performs these duties, the CPPD 
acts as the functional equivalent of a public institution and must respond to valid 
public-records requests related to those duties. 
{¶ 34} We recognize that Ohio law has long allowed private entities to hire 
private police officers.  See, e.g., R.C. 4973.17 (allowing banks, railroads, hospitals, 
and other entities to request government appointment of private police officers)1; 
see also New York, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Fieback, 87 Ohio St. 254, 100 
N.E. 889 (1912), paragraph one of the syllabus.  These private police officers are 
generally not considered peace officers.  See State ex rel. Craig v. Scioto Cty. Bd. 
of Elections, 117 Ohio St.3d 158, 2008-Ohio-706, 882 N.E.2d 435, ¶ 22, quoting 
State v. Sinclair, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 04CAA11073, 2005-Ohio-4497, ¶ 12  
(“ ‘Ohio law distinguishes between private police officers such as security guards 
and private detectives, and peace officers employed by governmental entities’ ”).  
This opinion should not be read as implying that all private entities who employ 
private police officers are required to respond to public-records requests regarding 
the activities of such officers.  However, based on a thorough review of the record 
evidence regarding the structure and activities of the CPPD, we conclude that at the 
 
1. R.C. 4973.17(E), as amended by 2005 Sub.H.B. No. 58, also allows large amusement parks to 
request that a municipal-court or county-court judge appoint private police officers for it.  The 
pleadings do not allege, and the record does not show, that Cedar Fair made a request to a judge for 
the appointment of private police officers pursuant to this statute.  Rather, the pleadings and record 
refer to R.C. 737.05 and the Sandusky ordinance as the basis for the appointment of CPPD officers. 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
15 
time of relators’ public-records requests, the CPPD was acting as the functional 
equivalent of a public institution for purposes of the Public Records Act. 
E.  Writ of mandamus 
{¶ 35} Having determined that the CPPD is required to respond to valid 
public-records requests, we next address whether relators are entitled to a writ of 
mandamus ordering Cedar Fair and Gilson to produce records responsive to 
relators’ particular requests. 
{¶ 36} Upon request, a person responsible for public records must promptly 
make the requested public records available.  R.C. 149.43(B)(1).  Relators sent 
public-records requests to Cedar Fair and Gilson.  Cedar Fair and Gilson first 
asserted in their answer that they did not have documents responsive to relators’ 
requests, but they have not filed any evidence supporting this assertion.  Moreover, 
relators produced copies of incident reports they had received from the Sandusky 
Police Department that appear to have originally been created by the CPPD, 
suggesting that the CPPD likely possesses responsive documents.  In addition, after 
the filing of the complaint, Cedar Fair and Gilson produced some documents—
including sexual-assault incident reports—in response to the requests, suggesting 
that they possess at least some responsive documents.  The only relevant evidence 
in the record therefore tends to show that Cedar Fair and Gilson do have records 
responsive to relators’ requests.  In other words, this is not a case in which we 
should deny relief because the evidence is “evenly balanced,” State ex rel. Ware v. 
Giavasis, 163 Ohio St.3d 359, 2020-Ohio-5453, 170 N.E.3d 359, ¶ 32. 
{¶ 37} Initially, Cedar Fair and Gilson also asserted that the requested 
records are protected from disclosure because they are privileged or confidential 
law-enforcement investigatory records, see R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(h).  This assertion is 
unavailing. 
{¶ 38} A records custodian bears the burden “ ‘to plead and prove facts 
clearly establishing the applicability of the [exception].’ ”  (Brackets sic.)  State ex 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
16 
rel. Myers v. Meyers, 169 Ohio St.3d 536, 2022-Ohio-1915, 207 N.E.3d 579, ¶ 30, 
quoting Welsh-Huggins v. Jefferson Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 163 Ohio St.3d 337, 
2020-Ohio-5371, 170 N.E.3d 768, ¶ 27.  Exceptions to public-disclosure 
requirements are strictly construed against the record custodian, and the custodian 
must prove that the requested records fall squarely within the exception.  Id. 
{¶ 39} Here, Cedar Fair and Gilson asserted as affirmative defenses that 
they are not required to release privileged records or confidential law-enforcement 
investigatory records.  But they have not offered any argument explaining how any 
record requested by relators meets the requirements for either of these exceptions 
to apply.  Nor have they submitted any documents for in camera inspection.  Thus, 
Cedar Fair and Gilson have not met their burden to show that these documents, to 
the extent that they exist, are exempt from disclosure.  See State ex rel. Ware v. 
Parikh, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-759, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 12 (concluding that the 
respondent had not met his burden to show the applicability of an exception when 
he had failed to “meaningfully analyz[e]” whether the exception applied). 
{¶ 40} Thus, we order Cedar Fair and Gilson to produce any records 
responsive to relators’ requests that they possess and have not already produced.  
Specifically, Cedar Fair and Gilson must produce copies of reports of sexual 
misconduct filed with the CPPD between April 1, 2017, and March 22, 2022, and 
associated “copies and/or recordings of any witness or suspect statements, oral or 
written; investigative notes; recommendations of charges, and photos and/or videos 
associated with the reports provided.”  They must also produce copies of “[a]ll 
incident and investigative reports from the Cedar Point Police [Department]” 
related to the Top Thrill Dragster incident that allegedly occurred on August 15, 
2021. 
{¶ 41} However, we do not order the production of incident or investigative 
reports created by emergency-medical-services (“EMS”) personnel or related to 
EMS services.  WKYC requested, among other things, incident reports and related 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
17 
records created by EMS personnel during the alleged Top Thrill Dragster incident.  
EMS services are not police services, and there is no evidence in the record 
indicating that the CPPD provides EMS services or employs EMS personnel.  To 
the extent that Cedar Fair provided EMS services related to the alleged Top Thrill 
Dragster incident, relators have produced no evidence showing that these services 
were provided through the CPPD. 
F.  Court costs, statutory damages, and attorney fees 
{¶ 42} Finally, we turn to relators’ requests for court costs, statutory 
damages, and attorney fees.  We award court costs but deny statutory damages and 
attorney fees. 
1.  Court costs 
{¶ 43} An award of court costs is mandatory when “the court orders the 
public office or the person responsible for [a] public record to comply with” R.C. 
149.43(B).  R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(a)(i); accord State ex rel. Hedenberg v. N. Cent. 
Corr. Complex, 162 Ohio St.3d 85, 2020-Ohio-3815, 164 N.E.3d 358, ¶ 13.  
Because we grant a writ ordering Cedar Fair and Gilson to produce responsive 
documents, we also award relators their court costs. 
2.  Statutory damages 
{¶ 44} Statutory damages shall be awarded if a public-records requester 
transmitted a written request by hand delivery, electronic submission, or certified 
mail and the public office or person responsible for the records failed to comply 
with any of its obligations under R.C. 149.43(B).  R.C. 149.43(C)(2).  All of the 
relators submitted their requests by email.  Statutory damages are set at $100 for 
each business day the public office failed to comply with its obligations, starting 
with the day the requester filed the mandamus action, with a maximum award of 
$1,000.  Id.  Here, relators filed their mandamus action on July 26, 2022, so the full 
amount of $1,000 could be awarded to each relator. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
18 
{¶ 45} A court may reduce or not award statutory damages, however, if it 
determines both that (1) based on the law as it existed at the time of the request, a 
well-informed person responsible for the requested public records would have 
reasonably believed that R.C. 149.43(B) did not require their disclosure and (2) a 
well-informed person responsible for the requested public records would have 
reasonably believed that withholding the records would serve the public policy that 
underlies the authority asserted for withholding the records.  R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(a) 
and (b). 
{¶ 46} Although we conclude that the CPPD is the functional equivalent of 
a public institution under Oriana House, 110 Ohio St.3d 456, 2006-Ohio-4854, 854 
N.E.2d 193, two of the four parts of the functional-equivalence test weigh in favor 
of Cedar Fair and Gilson.  See supra at Part II(D)(2).  A well-informed person could 
have reasonably believed that Cedar Point is not the equivalent of a public 
institution subject to the act.  See State ex rel. Harm Reduction Ohio v. OneOhio 
Recovery Found., 172 Ohio St.3d 149, 2023-Ohio-1547, 221 N.E.3d 835, ¶ 38 
(denying statutory damages after determining that a well-informed person 
responsible for a private entity’s records could have reasonably believed that 
private entity was not subject to Public Records Act); see also State ex rel. Fair 
Housing Opportunities of Northwest Ohio v. Ohio Fair Plan, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 
2023-Ohio-2667, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 34 (denying statutory damages in case 
deciding question of first impression regarding whether entity was a public office 
for purposes of Public Records Act).  We therefore decline to award statutory 
damages. 
3.  Attorney fees 
{¶ 47} A court may award attorney fees to a relator if the court orders the 
respondent to comply with its obligations under the Public Records Act.  R.C. 
149.43(C)(3)(b).  An award of such attorney fees is discretionary.  State ex rel. 
Hicks v. Fraley, 166 Ohio St.3d 141, 2021-Ohio-2724, 184 N.E.3d 13, ¶ 26.  
January Term, 2023 
 
 
19 
However, the court shall not award attorney fees if the court determines that (1) 
based on the law as it existed at the time, a well-informed person responsible for 
the requested public records would have reasonably believed that R.C. 149.43(B) 
did not require their disclosure and (2) a well-informed person responsible for the 
requested public records would have reasonably believed that withholding the 
records would serve the public policy that underlies the authority asserted for 
withholding the records.  R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(c)(i) and (ii).  These are the same 
reasons why a court may reduce or not award statutory damages. 
{¶ 48} For the same reasons that we deny statutory damages, we also deny 
attorney fees.  See Harm Reduction Ohio at ¶ 41. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 49} For the foregoing reasons, we issue a writ of mandamus compelling 
Cedar Fair and Gilson to produce all unproduced records responsive to relators’ 
public-records requests except for records created by EMS personnel or related to 
EMS services.  We grant relators’ request for an award of court costs.  And we deny 
relators’ requests for awards of statutory damages and attorney fees. 
Writ granted. 
FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, BRUNNER, and DETERS, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion joined 
by STEWART, J. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 50} I concur in the majority opinion to the extent that it concludes that 
the Cedar Point Police Department (“the Department”) is the functional equivalent 
of a public office and therefore is subject to the Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43.  
I also concur in the majority’s judgment granting a writ of mandamus ordering 
respondents, Cedar Fair, L.P., d.b.a. Cedar Fair Entertainment Company, and 
Ronald Gilson, to produce certain documents requested by relators, WTOL 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
20 
Television, L.L.C, WKYC-TV, L.L.C., and WBNS-TV, Inc., and to grant relators’ 
request for an award of court costs. 
{¶ 51} I part ways with the majority, however, in its denial of awards of 
statutory damages and attorney fees to relators.  Based on the law existing at the 
time of relators’ requests, a well-informed person responsible for the requested 
public records would have reasonably believed that respondents had an obligation 
under the Public Records Act to produce the requested records.  Therefore, relators 
are entitled to statutory damages and this court should award attorney fees. 
I.  Relevant Evidence Regarding the Cedar Point Police Department 
{¶ 52} The majority paints a suitable picture of the facts and evidence in 
this case.  I highlight the following aspects about the Department because they are 
relevant to determining whether this court must award statutory damages and 
should award attorney fees. 
{¶ 53} The Sandusky City Manager, a government official, appoints and 
maintains the Department’s police officers.  These officers contractually serve at 
the pleasure of the city manager.  These officers also must be qualified to serve as 
law-enforcement officers in Ohio, pursuant to both a Sandusky ordinance and the 
agreement between Sandusky and Cedar Fair, and they swear an oath before the 
city manager to uphold the laws of Sandusky, the state of Ohio, and the United 
States.  Further, the Ohio Peace Officer Training Commission lists “Sandusky 
Police/Cedar Point Division” as a police agency. 
{¶ 54} The Department also has, and exercises, police powers.  For 
example, the Department has taken witness statements, submitted police incident 
reports to the Sandusky Police Department, identified itself in court filings as a law-
enforcement agency, handled misdemeanor crimes, and handled arrests in cases 
that are prosecuted in the Sandusky Municipal Court.  Even respondents admit that 
the Department was performing policing duties at the time of relators’ records 
requests. 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
21 
II.  Statutory Damages and Attorney Fees in Public Records Act Cases 
{¶ 55} If a court determines that a public office or a person responsible for 
public records fails to comply with any of their obligations under R.C. 149.43(B), 
an aggrieved requester who sent a request electronically is entitled to statutory 
damages.  R.C. 149.43(C)(2).  In these situations, the court may reduce or not award 
statutory damages only when, based on the law as it existed at the time of the 
request, (1) a well-informed person responsible for the requested public records 
would have reasonably believed that R.C. 149.43(B) did not require that they be 
produced and (2) a well-informed person responsible for the requested public 
records would have reasonably believed that withholding the records would serve 
the public policy that underlies the authority asserted for withholding them.  R.C. 
149.43(C)(2)(a) and (b). 
{¶ 56} A court also has the discretion to award attorney fees to an aggrieved 
requester, R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(b), but a court may not award attorney fees when it 
finds that both factors identified above are met, see R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(c)(i) and (ii).  
In other words, if either of the two factors above is not met, the court must award 
statutory damages and may award attorney fees. 
III.  Relevant Caselaw 
{¶ 57} The following two cases cited by the majority illuminate the fact that 
respondents should have been aware that the Department is subject to the Public 
Records Act and that respondents were therefore required to comply with R.C. 
149.43(B). 
A.  State ex rel. Schiffbauer v. Banaszak 
{¶ 58} In State ex rel. Schiffbauer v. Banaszak, 142 Ohio St.3d 535, 2015-
Ohio-1854, 33 N.E.3d 52, the editor of a student newspaper brought a mandamus 
action against the Otterbein University Police Department seeking to compel the 
department to produce records in response to a public-records request.  This court 
held that the private university’s police department was a public office under the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
22 
Public Records Act and that it therefore was required to produce the requested 
records.  Id. at ¶ 2.  We came to that conclusion because the department had been 
established by the laws of this state and because its sworn, state-certified police 
officers exercised the plenary police power to enforce laws and maintain the peace, 
a function of government.  Id. at ¶ 2, 9. 
B.  State ex rel. Oriana House, Inc. v. Montgomery 
{¶ 59} In State ex rel. Oriana House, Inc. v. Montgomery, 110 Ohio St.3d 
456, 2006-Ohio-4854, 854 N.E.2d 193, this court devised a test to determine 
whether a private entity is the functional equivalent of a public office such that it is 
subject to the Public Records Act.  In determining whether a private entity is the 
functional equivalent of a public office, courts consider the following factors: “(1) 
whether the entity performs a governmental function, (2) the level of government 
funding, (3) the extent of government involvement or regulation, and (4) whether 
the entity was created by the government or to avoid the requirements of the Public 
Records Act.”  Id. at ¶ 25. 
IV.  Relators Are Entitled to Statutory Damages and Should Be Awarded 
Attorney Fees 
{¶ 60} Relators are entitled to statutory damages and this court should 
exercise our discretion to award attorney fees because (1) relators sent their requests 
electronically as permitted by R.C. 149.43(C)(2), (2) respondents failed to comply 
with their public-records obligations, id., and (3) the first factor under both R.C. 
149.43(C)(2)(a) and R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(c)(i) is not met.  In analyzing the 
Department’s characteristics to determine whether it is subject to the Public 
Records Act either as a public office, similar to the Otterbein University Police 
Department in Schiffbauer, or as the functional equivalent of a public office under 
the Oriana House test, the majority highlights an abundance of relevant facts and 
analogous cases that would lead a well-informed person responsible for the 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
23 
requested public records to reasonably believe that respondents had an obligation 
under R.C. 149.43(B) to produce the records. 
{¶ 61} As the majority states, the Department “performs a government 
function.”  Majority opinion, ¶ 29.  The majority goes so far as to say that the 
Department “exercises a core function of government.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 
¶ 25; see Oriana House at ¶ 25.  And the majority recognizes that pursuant to a city 
ordinance, the Department and its officers have the authority to exercise police 
powers and are subject to the same regulations as other police departments and 
state-certified officers.  Majority opinion at ¶ 24; see Schiffbauer, 142 Ohio St.3d 
535, 2015-Ohio-1854, 33 N.E.3d 52, at ¶ 2, 9.  As we said long ago, “[p]olice power 
is the very backbone, heart, and head of all government.”  Froelich v. Cleveland, 
99 Ohio St. 376, 398, 124 N.E. 212 (1919). 
{¶ 62} Even more, the majority recognizes that Sandusky regulates and is 
involved with the Department.  Majority opinion at ¶ 31; see Oriana House, 110 
Ohio St.3d 456, 2006-Ohio-4854, 854 N.E.2d 193, at ¶ 25.  It cannot deny that the 
Department’s sworn, state-certified police officers, see Schiffbauer at ¶ 2, are 
appointed by the city manager, a government official, and that they work closely 
with the Sandusky Police Department.  See majority opinion at ¶ 31. 
{¶ 63} The majority also finds that the Department’s officers are similar to 
the officers in Schiffbauer, whom this court determined were members of a public 
office.  Majority opinion at ¶ 24.  The majority even points out that in Schiffbauer, 
the private university’s board of trustees had appointed the officers, while here, a 
government official appointed the Department’s officers.  Majority opinion at ¶ 24. 
{¶ 64} Even so, in the majority’s eyes, a well-informed person responsible 
for the public records requested by relators could be aware of all this and still have 
reasonably believed that disclosure of the records was not required under the Public 
Records Act.  Although it is not obvious how the Department was created, see 
Oriana House at ¶ 25, and although the Department receives little or no government 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
24 
funding, see id., the Department is inextricably intertwined with the government 
and was fully aware that it has—and exercises—police power, a traditional 
government function.  Therefore, at the time of relators’ requests, under existing 
law emanating from Schiffbauer and Oriana House, a well-informed person 
responsible for the requested public records would have reasonably believed that 
respondents had an obligation under the Public Records Act to produce them.  
Accordingly, relators are entitled to statutory damages and should be awarded 
attorney fees. 
V.  Conclusion 
{¶ 65} I concur in the majority’s judgment granting a writ of mandamus 
ordering that certain records requested by relators be produced and awarding court 
costs.  But because relators sent their requests electronically, respondents failed to 
comply with their obligations under the Public Records Act, and the first factor 
under both R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(a) and R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(c)(i) is not met, this court 
may not reduce or eliminate an award of statutory damages and we should exercise 
our discretion to award attorney fees.  Therefore, I concur in part and dissent in part 
and would award relators statutory damages and attorney fees. 
 
STEWART, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Frost Brown Todd, L.L.C., Ryan W. Goellner, and Kevin T. Shook, for 
relators. 
Reminger Co., L.P.A., Justin D. Harris, and Hannah R. Duschl, for 
respondents. 
_________________