Title: Merrill v. Drazek

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

62 Ill. 2d 1 (1975)
338 N.E.2d 164
BARBARA MERRILL et al., Appellees,
v.
ALLEN DRAZEK, Director of the Department of Personnel, et al.  (The Department of Personnel, Appellant.)
No. 47255.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
Opinion filed November 17, 1975.
*2 William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Chicago (Jerrald B. Abrams, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellant.
Charles Barnhill, Jr., of Chicago (Davis, Miner & Barnhill, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellees Barbara Merrill et al.
Bernard Carey, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Sheldon Gardner, Deputy State's Attorney, Henry A. Hauser, Michael F. Baccash, and Catherine M. Ryan, Assistant State's Attorneys, and Joseph A. Morris (law student), of counsel), for appellee the Cook County Board of Commissioners.
Reversed and remanded.
MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the opinion of the court:
This action was filed in the circuit court of Cook County seeking a declaratory judgment, an injunction and other relief. Of the seven named plaintiffs, two were *3 alleged to be officers of the Illinois Union of Social Service Employees, which represents approximately 4500 employees of the Cook County Department of Public Aid. Five plaintiffs were alleged to be employees of the Cook County Department of Public Aid, who "bring this action on behalf of themselves and all other employees of the Cook County Department of Public Aid." The defendants were Allan Drazek, Director of the Illinois Department of Personnel and the President and members of the Cook County Board of Commissioners.
The relief sought by plaintiffs was a declaration whether as employees of the Cook County Department of Public Aid they were employees of the State of Illinois or the County of Cook, and an injunction enjoining "whichever governmental entity is found to be the employer of plaintiffs from treating plaintiffs any different than its other employees except as permitted by statute."
The circuit court found that plaintiffs were employees of the Illinois Department of Public Aid and that they "are and have been entitled to all job-related benefits of other Illinois Department of Public Aid Employees." The Department of Personnel appealed, the appellate court affirmed (24 Ill. App.3d 29) and we allowed the Department's petition for leave to appeal.
It is not disputed that on January 1, 1974, and thereafter plaintiffs were employees of the State of Illinois, and in issue here is their status prior to that date. The Department of Personnel contends that prior to January 1, 1974, plaintiffs were employees of Cook County. The county contends that plaintiffs were employees of the State and that the judgment should be affirmed. Plaintiffs contend that they were employees of Cook County and ask that the judgment be reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court "for a hearing on damages."
Prior to January 1, 1974, section 12-18.1 of the Illinois Public Aid Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 23, par. *4 12-18.1) provided:
An amendatory act approved August 23, 1973 (Pub. Act 78-363), effective January 1, 1974, continued the foregoing version of section 12-18.1 in effect until January 1, 1974, and provided that:
Sections 12-2 and 12-18.2 to which section 12-18.1 referred provided in substance that the County Department of Public Aid was to serve as the agent of the Illinois Department in the administration of enumerated programs.
Prior to January 1, 1974, the Public Aid Code also provided for appropriation by the County Board of the "actual and necessary administrative expenses" of the County Department and reimbursement by the Illinois Department for those expenses (sec. 12-18.4), adoption by the County Board of rules and regulations for the County Department (sec. 12-18.8) and the keeping and inspection of records (sec. 12-18.9). Effective January 1, 1974, section 12-18.4 was amended to provide that the administrative costs shall be paid from funds appropriated or made available to the Illinois Department. Amendments effective January 1, 1974, provided for changes in the promulgation of rules (sec. 12-18.8) and the keeping and inspection of records (sec. 12-18.9). Also amended was section 12-18.6, which prior to January 1, 1974, had enumerated four general classifications of functions which the County Department "shall" perform. Effective January 1, 1974, concerning those enumerated functions, section 12-18.6 provided:
Also effective January 1, 1974, section 12-18.1 provided:
The parties have briefed and argued the rules governing the construction of statutes and the significance of amendatory action by the General Assembly. Recognizing at all times that "The cardinal rule of statutory construction, to which all other canons and rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent and meaning of the legislature in enacting the law" (Electrical Contractors Association of City of Chicago, Inc. v. Illinois Building Authority, 33 Ill. 2d 587, 591-92), we have held that an amendment of a statute "creates a presumption that it was intended to change the law as it formerly existed [citations], but this presumption is not necessarily controlling and may be overcome by more persuasive considerations." (Scribner v. Sachs, 18 Ill. 2d 400, 411.) Most apposite, here, we have also said "The legislative intent must be gathered from the entire act rather than from one clause, sentence or section thereof, and courts may not confine their attention to the one part or section to be construed. (People v. Giles, 268 Ill. 406; Warner v. King, 267 id. 82.) A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections, *7 hence each part should be construed in connection with every other part or section in order to ascertain the intention of the legislature." Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Ames, 364 Ill. 362, 365-66.
Our examination of the Public Aid Code and the amendments which became effective on January 1, 1974, persuades that although prior to January 1, 1974, the County Department served as agent of the Illinois Department in the administration of its programs and was required to comply with its standards of competence in the selection of its employees, the clearly expressed legislative intent was that its employees be employees of Cook County. In addition to the amendments above enumerated the amendatory act approved August 23, 1973, provided for preservation of pension rights (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 23, par. 12-18.1(b)(3); ch. 108 1/2, par. 9-238), and preservation of union and credit union membership (ch. 23, par. 12-18.1(b)(3)), and reflects a carefully prepared plan to implement the change in status from employees of the county to employees of the State. The fact that the Illinois Department was empowered to prescribe the standards of employee competence and that the State reimbursed the county for expenditures did not suffice to overcome the clearly stated provision that prior to January 1, 1974, these people were employees of the county, and we so hold.
For the reasons set forth the judgments of the appellate and circuit courts are reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court of Cook County for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.
MR. JUSTICE CREBS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.