Title: State v. Michelle R. Popenhagen

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2008 WI 55 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP1114-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Michelle R. Popenhagen, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2007 WI App 16 
298 Wis. 2d 388, 728 N.W.2d 45 
(Ct. App. 2006-published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 4, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 12, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Oneida   
 
JUDGE: 
Mark A. Mangerson   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
CONCUR & DISSENT: 
ZIEGLER, J., concurs in part, dissents in part 
(opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by James B. Connell and Crooks, Low & Connell, S.C., Wausau, and 
oral argument by James B. Connell. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued by James 
M. Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 55
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
No.  2006AP1114-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2004CF192) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Michelle R. Popenhagen, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 4, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   The defendant, Michelle 
R. Popenhagen, seeks review of a published court of appeals 
decision reversing an order of the Circuit Court for Oneida 
County, Mark Mangerson, Judge.1  The circuit court granted the 
defendant's motion to suppress bank documents that police 
obtained pursuant to a subpoena issued without a showing of 
                                                 
1 State v. Popenhagen, 2007 WI App 16, 298 Wis. 2d 388, 728 
N.W.2d 45.    
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
2 
 
probable cause in violation of Wis. Stat. § 968.135 (2005-06),2 
as well as incriminating statements that the defendant made 
after police confronted her with the unlawfully obtained bank 
documents.  
¶2 
In reversing the circuit court's order, the court of 
appeals concluded that the defendant cannot rely on the federal 
or state constitution for suppression and that Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.135 does not expressly provide that a violation of the 
statute permits suppression as a remedy.   
¶3 
The issue on review is whether the circuit court erred 
in granting the defendant's motion to suppress both the bank 
documents and the defendant's incriminating statements.  The 
defendant raises four arguments in support of the circuit 
court's order.  The defendant contends (1) that police obtained 
her bank documents and incriminating statements in violation of 
her Fourth Amendment3 right to privacy; (2) that police obtained 
her bank documents and incriminating statements in violation of 
her right to privacy under Article I, Section 11 of the 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides in full: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrants 
shall 
issue, 
but 
upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
3 
 
Wisconsin Constitution;4 (3) that the bank documents were 
obtained 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 968.135 
and 
that 
suppression of both the bank documents and the defendant's 
incriminating statements is an appropriate remedy; and (4) that 
the 
circuit 
court 
possessed 
inherent 
authority 
to 
order 
suppression of the contested evidence obtained by the State's 
"misuse of process."   
¶4 
We 
conclude 
that 
suppression 
of 
both 
the 
bank 
documents and the defendant's incriminating statements in the 
present case is an appropriate remedy when the bank documents 
were obtained in violation of Wis. Stat. § 968.135 and when the 
incriminating 
statements were obtained by law enforcement 
officers confronting the defendant with the unlawfully obtained 
bank documents.  Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court 
did not err as a matter of statutory interpretation in granting 
the defendant's motion to suppress the bank documents and the 
defendant's incriminating statements.  We reverse the decision 
of the court of appeals and affirm the circuit court's order to 
suppress evidence of the bank documents and incriminating 
statements at issue.  
                                                 
4 Article I, Section 11 provides in full:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
4 
 
¶5 
The court of appeals addressed the constitutional 
issues.  Because we affirm the circuit court's order on 
statutory grounds, we leave the interpretation of the federal 
and 
state 
constitutional 
provisions 
and 
federal 
statutes 
relating to the obligations of banks that the court of appeals 
addressed 
for 
another 
case 
in 
which 
these 
issues 
are 
determinative.       
I 
¶6 
The relevant facts are not in dispute for purposes of 
this appeal.  The defendant was an employee at Save More Foods, 
a grocery store in Minocqua.  In August 2004, the owner of Save 
More Foods contacted the Minocqua Police Department and alleged 
that the defendant had improperly obtained money from the store.  
The owner specifically alleged that the defendant had cashed 
checks at the store drawn from accounts containing insufficient 
funds and further that the defendant had stolen money from the 
store's automated teller machine.  According to the complaint 
and attached police report, the defendant allegedly stole 
approximately $29,000.      
¶7 
As part of the State's investigation, the district 
attorney's office sought three subpoenas before filing a 
complaint.  Circuit Court Judges Kinney and Mangerson signed the 
subpoenas, ordering the banks to appear before the circuit court 
on a date and time certain and to bring Popenhagen's specified 
bank records or to mail the bank records to the Minocqua Police 
Department.  Although an officer of the Minocqua Police 
Department apparently had filled out an affidavit, neither the 
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
5 
 
police nor the Oneida County District Attorney's Office included 
any affidavit showing probable cause in the application to the 
circuit court for the subpoenas.  The circuit court issued the 
subpoenas without recording a finding of probable cause.   
¶8 
A copy of each subpoena is attached hereto.  Each 
subpoena states that it is issued pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.07.  Section 805.07(1) states that "subpoenas shall be 
issued and served in accordance with ch. 885."5  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 885.01 provides that any judge may sign and issue a subpoena 
to require the "attendance of witnesses and their production of 
lawful instruments of evidence in any action, matter or 
proceeding or to be examined into before any court, magistrate, 
officer . . . or other person authorized to take testimony in 
the state."  Section 972.11(1) provides that the rules of 
practice in civil actions shall be applicable in all criminal 
proceedings unless the context of the section manifestly 
requires a different construction.  Section 972.11 further 
provides 
that 
Chapter 
885 
"shall 
apply 
in 
all 
criminal 
proceedings."       
¶9 
Although the subpoenas on their face are in a form 
substantially 
similar 
to 
the 
forms 
set 
forth 
in 
both 
§§ 805.07(4) and 885.02, the subpoenas do not satisfy either 
                                                 
5 The subpoenas in the present case were issued under Wis. 
Stat. § 885.01, which authorizes subpoenas to be signed and 
issued by a circuit court judge.  Section 805.07 authorizes a 
subpoena to be issued and signed by an attorney of record.  The 
subpoenas in the present case were not signed by an attorney of 
record. 
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
6 
 
Wis. Stat. § 885.01 or § 805.07.  The subpoenas did not require 
the banks, in the words of either statute, to attend an "action, 
matter or proceeding pending or to be examined into before" the 
circuit court.6  For an explanation of why these subpoenas do not 
satisfy Wis. Stat. §§ 885.01 or 805.07, namely because no 
proceeding is pending, see State v. Schaefer, 2008 WI 25, ¶44, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, 746 N.W.2d 457, and Part A of the concurring 
opinion, ¶¶102-125 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).   
¶10 The District Attorney apparently conceded in the 
circuit court that it used the wrong form of subpoena.7  Both the 
District Attorney and the defendant agreed in the circuit court 
that the State should have followed, but did not follow, Wis. 
Stat. § 968.135.  The District Attorney and the defendant 
disagreed in the circuit court whether suppression is the 
appropriate remedy for the error.  The circuit court suppressed 
the bank records and incriminating statements under § 968.135. 
¶11 In the court of appeals the only statute the parties 
briefed relating to the subpoenas was Wis. Stat. § 968.135.  The 
court of appeals ruled on § 968.135, declaring that suppression 
was not available in the present case as a remedy for the 
violation of § 968.135.  
                                                 
6 Wis. Stat. § 885.01(1).  Wisconsin Stat. § 805.07(1) 
similarly provides that a subpoena issued by an attorney in a 
civil 
action 
is to compel attendance of a witness for 
deposition, hearing or trial in an action or special proceeding.  
7 The State's brief before this court asserts that the 
prosecuting attorney conceded at circuit court that the office 
used the wrong form.  State's brief at 5-6. 
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
7 
 
¶12 The defendant's petition for review in this court 
raised the following issue: "Is suppression of evidence a remedy 
for violation of Sec. 968.135 which requires probable cause for 
the issuance of a subpoena for documents?"8  The only statute the 
defendant and the State addressed in this court relating to the 
subpoenas was Wis. Stat. § 968.135.9   
¶13 Having taken this case to address the issue whether 
the remedy of suppression is available when bank records were 
obtained by the district attorney with a subpoena that did not 
                                                 
8 The other three issues relate to the defendant's state 
constitutional right to an expectation of privacy in the bank 
records; 
the 
defendant's 
Fourth 
Amendment 
right 
to 
an 
expectation of privacy in the bank records; and the court's 
inherent power to order suppression of evidence.   
9 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(6) provides that if a 
petition for review is granted, the petitioner cannot raise or 
argue issues not set forth in the petition unless ordered 
otherwise by this court.  The court has not ordered that any 
other issue be argued.  
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
8 
 
comply with the probable cause affidavit requirement of Wis. 
Stat. § 968.135, we address that issue.10         
¶14 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.135 requires "a showing of 
probable cause" before a court may issue a subpoena under that 
section.  The State does not dispute that the subpoenas 
requiring production of the defendant's bank documents were 
issued in violation of Wis. Stat. § 968.135.  The statute 
provides in full as follows:  
Subpoena for documents. Upon the request of the 
attorney general or a district attorney and upon a 
showing of probable cause under s. 968.12, a court 
shall issue a subpoena requiring the production of 
documents, 
as 
specified 
in 
s. 
968.13(2). 
 
The 
documents shall be returnable to the court which 
issued the subpoena.  Motions to the court, including, 
but not limited to, motions to quash or limit the 
subpoena, shall be addressed to the court which issued 
                                                 
10 Justice Prosser's concurrence, ¶¶119, 126, concludes that 
suppression of both the bank documents and the incriminating 
statements was proper because Wis. Stat. § 968.22, governing 
deficiencies in search warrants, affords the circuit court 
discretion to suppress evidence obtained in violation of a 
subpoena statute when such violation is nontechnical or affects 
the 
defendant's 
substantial 
rights. 
Justice 
Ziegler's 
concurrence/dissent, ¶¶133, 136, concludes that suppression of 
the bank documents (but not the incriminating statements) was 
proper because even when the remedy of suppression is not 
authorized by any statute, the circuit court has inherent 
authority to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a defective 
subpoena.  Because we conclude that suppression of both the bank 
documents and the incriminating statements was proper under Wis. 
Stat. § 968.135, we need not address the question whether 
suppression of evidence obtained by a defective subpoena falls 
within Wis. Stat. § 968.22 governing defective search warrants; 
or within the circuit court's inherent authority; or within Wis. 
Stat. § 805.18(1) requiring a court to disregard any error or 
defect in proceedings that does not affect the substantial 
rights of the adverse party. 
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
9 
 
the subpoena.  Any person who unlawfully refuses to 
produce the documents may be compelled to do so as 
provided in ch. 785.  This section does not limit or 
affect any other subpoena authority provided by law. 
¶15 The banks complied with their respective subpoenas, 
delivering bank statements, deposit slips, and cancelled checks 
to the Minocqua Police Department.  Having obtained her bank 
documents, 
police 
officers 
interviewed 
the 
defendant, 
confronting her with her bank documents.  The officers explained 
to the defendant that her bank deposits corresponded in time and 
amount to money reported missing from Save More Foods.  At that 
point, the defendant made several incriminating statements.  No 
transcript of the defendant's remarks is in the record; the 
remarks are recounted in summary fashion in a police report that 
is in the record.   
¶16 The defendant was charged with theft of more than 
$10,000 contrary to Wis. Stat. § 943.20(1)(b) and (3)(c).  In a 
pretrial motion, the defendant moved to suppress both her bank 
documents and the statements she made after being confronted 
with those documents.   
¶17 The circuit court granted the defendant's motion.  The 
circuit court reasoned that the defendant had a right to privacy 
in her bank documents under the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
further 
reasoned 
that 
suppression is an appropriate remedy not only for the State's 
constitutional violations but also for the State's violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 968.135. 
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
10 
 
¶18 The State appealed the circuit court's order, and a 
divided court of appeals reversed the order.  The majority of 
the court of appeals held that the defendant had no right to 
privacy in her bank documents under either the United States or 
the Wisconsin Constitution and that suppression is not a proper 
remedy when evidence is obtained in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.135.   
¶19 The dissenting opinion concluded that Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.135 establishes a person's reasonable expectation of 
privacy 
in 
bank 
documents 
in 
the 
context 
of 
criminal 
proceedings; that the State never explained its failure to 
comply with the statute and therefore committed a flagrant 
violation of the statute; and that the only appropriate remedy 
is the suppression of the bank documents and the tainted 
incriminating statements.  
II 
¶20 The State contends that the circuit court erred in 
suppressing as evidence the bank documents and the incriminating 
statements for the following reasons:  (A) The defendant lacked 
standing to challenge the subpoenas issued to her banks; (B) 
Suppression of the bank documents is not an appropriate remedy 
for violation of Wis. Stat. § 968.135; and (C) Suppression of 
the defendant's incriminating statements as evidence is not an 
appropriate remedy for violation of § 968.135 in obtaining the 
subpoena for the bank statements.  We reject each of these 
arguments, concluding that the defendant had standing to 
challenge the subpoenas issued to her banks and that suppression 
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
11 
 
of the bank documents and incriminating statements as evidence 
is an appropriate remedy for violation of Wis. Stat. § 968.135.   
A 
¶21 We first consider whether the defendant had the 
requisite standing to challenge the subpoenas issued to her 
banks under Wis. Stat. § 968.135.   
¶22 The State asserts that only the banks, as targets of 
the subpoenas, could move to quash or limit the subpoenas for 
lack of probable cause, even though the statute does not 
expressly limit the motions to those made by the target of the 
subpoenas.  The State further argues that the legislative 
history of Wis. Stat. § 968.135 reflects a legislative intent to 
expand the prosecutor's investigative authority to obtain 
information by subpoena from third parties not suspected of 
criminal activity and that giving standing to the person whose 
documents are being sought contravenes the legislative purpose. 
¶23 A determination of standing presents a question of law 
that we decide independently of the circuit court and court of 
appeals but benefiting from their analyses.11   
¶24 A person has standing to seek judicial intervention 
when that person has "a personal stake in the outcome"12 and is 
                                                 
11 Zellner v. Cedarburg Sch. Dist., 2007 WI 53, ¶13, 300 
Wis. 2d 290, 731 N.W.2d 240. 
12 Vill. of Slinger v. City of Hartford, 2002 WI App 187, 
¶9, 256 Wis. 2d 859, 650 N.W.2d 81 (citing City of Madison v. 
Town of Fitchburg, 112 Wis. 2d 224, 228, 332 N.W.2d 782 (1983)).   
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
12 
 
"directly affected by the issues in controversy."13  Under 
Wisconsin law, standing "should not be construed narrowly or 
restrictively," but rather should be construed broadly in favor 
of those seeking access to the courts.14 
¶25 The defendant meets the test for standing.  In 
requiring a showing of probable cause and a court order, Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 968.135 
protects 
the 
interests 
of 
persons 
whose 
documents are sought in addition to protecting the interests of 
the person on whom a subpoena is served.  The statute prevents 
unwarranted fishing expeditions.  
¶26 The State sought the defendant's bank documents in 
contemplation of charging the defendant with a crime and using 
the bank documents against her.  Clearly the defendant had a 
"personal stake" in the question whether the State's subpoenas 
were valid; she would be "directly affected" by the resolution 
of this question. 
¶27 Furthermore, although the State argues that only the 
person or institution who has been subpoenaed to produce 
documents has standing to oppose a subpoena issued under Wis. 
Stat. § 968.135, this position is belied by the language of the 
statute itself.  Section 968.135 provides simply that subpoenas 
issued according to its provisions are subject to "[m]otions to 
the court, including, but not limited to, motions to quash or 
                                                 
13 Vill. of Slinger, 256 Wis. 2d 859, ¶9 (citing Ramme v. 
City of Madison, 37 Wis. 2d 102, 116, 154 N.W.2d 296 (1967)).   
14 Bence v. City of Milwaukee, 107 Wis. 2d 469, 478, 320 
N.W.2d 199 (1982). 
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
13 
 
limit the subpoena."  The statute does not limit the persons who 
may bring such motions.   
¶28 The State's reliance on the legislative history to 
support its argument that the defendant does not have standing 
is unpersuasive.  We agree with the State that a note to an 
early draft of Wis. Stat. § 968.135 acknowledges that the 
legislature intended § 968.135 to give prosecutors new authority 
to 
conduct investigations.  Nevertheless, the legislative 
history does not limit the persons who may make a motion under 
§ 968.135.15   
¶29 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the 
defendant has standing to challenge subpoenas issued to the 
banks under Wis. Stat. § 968.135.  
B 
¶30 The State concedes, and properly so, that contrary to 
the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 968.135 no showing of probable 
cause was made to the circuit court before the circuit court 
issued the subpoenas.  We must therefore consider whether 
suppression of the bank documents is an appropriate remedy for 
the violation of § 968.135.  The term "suppression" appears to 
be employed ordinarily when evidence is inadmissible for having 
been unlawfully obtained; the term "exclusion" ordinarily covers 
                                                 
15 Bill Drafting File on 1979 S.B. 221, available at 
Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau, 1 East Main Street, 
Madison, Wisconsin.  
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
14 
 
a violation of the rules of evidence.16  The terms, however, are 
often used interchangeably inasmuch as suppression and exclusion 
have the same effect:  The evidence cannot be presented in 
court.  
¶31 In the present case, the circuit court ordered 
suppression of the bank documents on undisputed facts on the 
basis of Wis. Stat. § 968.135.  The decision whether to suppress 
evidence, 
when 
based 
on 
application 
of 
a 
constitutional 
provision to undisputed facts on the record, is a question of 
law that we determine independently of the circuit court and 
court of appeals but benefiting from their analyses.17  The 
present case does not involve constitutional interpretation. 
¶32 Statutory interpretation and application of a statute 
to undisputed facts are ordinarily questions of law that this 
court decides independently of the circuit court and court of 
                                                 
16 See State v. Eichman, 155 Wis. 2d 552, 562-63, 570-73, 
456 N.W.2d 143 (1990) (explaining that for purposes of a statute 
governing right of appeal, suppression "generally bars admission 
of evidence at trial as a result of governmental misconduct, 
such as a constitutional violation," while exclusion "generally 
involves only a violation of the rules of evidence") (citations 
omitted); Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) 605, 1481 
(defining 
"exclusion 
of 
evidence" 
as 
"[a] 
trial 
judge's 
determination that an item offered as evidence may not be 
presented to the trier of fact"; defining "suppression of 
evidence" as "[a] trial judge's ruling that evidence offered by 
a party should be excluded because it was illegally acquired").    
17 State v. Drew, 2007 WI App 213, ¶11, 305 Wis. 2d 641, 740 
N.W.2d 404 (in considering a motion to suppress, a reviewing 
court accepts the circuit court's findings of fact unless 
clearly 
erroneous 
and 
independently 
decides 
the 
correct 
application of constitutional principles to those facts).   
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
15 
 
appeals but benefiting from their analyses.18  Accordingly, we 
review the circuit court's decision to suppress evidence under 
Wis. Stat. § 968.135 independently of the circuit court and 
court of appeals but benefiting from their analyses. 
¶33 In deciding to suppress the defendant's bank documents 
as evidence, the circuit court reasoned that failure to suppress 
the bank documents would undermine the statute: 
If we would allow those documents to be subpoenaed, 
and tell the defendant she may have a personal right 
to sue the police department because they violated her 
rights, and then allowed the information that was 
illegally obtained in at the criminal trial, then we 
would 
emasculate 
the 
clear 
directives 
of 
968.135 . . . .   
¶34 The State contends that the circuit court erred as a 
matter of law in interpreting and applying Wis. Stat. § 968.135. 
The State asserts that § 968.135 does not permit a motion to 
suppress documents as a remedy for a violation of the statute.  
The State is correct that the statute is silent about the 
suppression of any evidence.  The statute refers specifically 
only to quashing or limiting the subpoena; it makes no reference 
to suppressing or excluding evidence.      
                                                 
18 Marquette S. v. Bobby G., 2007 WI 77, ¶42, 301 
Wis. 2d 531, 734 N.W.2d 81.  
The decision whether to admit or exclude evidence based on 
a violation of evidentiary rules ordinarily lies within the 
circuit court's discretion.  Leitinger v. DBart, Inc., 2007 WI 
84, ¶18, 302 Wis. 2d 110, 736 N.W.2d 1.  In the instant case, 
the circuit court did not base its decision to suppress and 
exclude evidence on a violation of the evidentiary rules.  The 
circuit court's order we review was based on an interpretation 
of Wis. Stat. § 968.135.    
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
16 
 
¶35 Statutory interpretation begins with the text of the 
statute.  We also interpret statutory language in the context in 
which it is used and in light of the surrounding or closely 
related statutes.  Statutes are interpreted to give effect to 
each word, to avoid surplusage, to fulfill the objectives of  
the statute, and to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.     
¶36 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.135 provides in full: 
Subpoena for documents. Upon the request of the 
attorney general or a district attorney and upon a 
showing of probable cause under s. 968.12, a court 
shall issue a subpoena requiring the production of 
documents, 
as 
specified 
in 
s. 
968.13(2). 
 
The 
documents shall be returnable to the court which 
issued the subpoena.  Motions to the court, including, 
but not limited to, motions to quash or limit the 
subpoena, shall be addressed to the court which issued 
the subpoena.  Any person who unlawfully refuses to 
produce the documents may be compelled to do so as 
provided in ch. 785.  This section does not limit or 
affect any other subpoena authority provided by law. 
¶37 By its plain terms, Wis. Stat. § 968.135 provides that 
subpoenas issued under its terms may be reviewed by the circuit 
court upon "[m]otions to the court, including, but not limited 
to, motions to quash or limit the subpoena." 
¶38 The question presented is the meaning of the statutory 
language "[m]otions to the court, including, but not limited to, 
motions to quash or limit the subpoena."  More specifically, the 
question presented is:  Does the class of motions that may be 
brought in response to a subpoena issued under Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.135 include a motion to suppress documents obtained 
pursuant to a subpoena issued in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.135?  Although the answer to this question is not 
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
17 
 
explicitly set forth in the statute, the answer is evident upon 
close examination of the text of the statute.  
¶39 The word "motions" is used in Wis. Stat. § 968.135 
along with the phrase "including but not limited to" and along 
with the specific enumeration of motions "to quash" and "to 
limit" the subpoena.  These three aspects of the text must be 
examined. 
¶40 The word "motion" is broadly defined in the statutes 
as an application for an order.19  The motion to suppress 
evidence in the present case falls within the definition of the 
word "motion."   
¶41 We next examine the words "motions to the court 
including but not limited to."  In common parlance these words 
plainly provide that the two enumerated motions are not the only 
motions that may be brought in response to a subpoena issued 
under § 968.135.  So too in legislative parlance, the phrase 
"including but not limited to" in a statute is generally given 
an expansive meaning, indicating that the words that follow the 
general phrase are but a part of the whole.20  In contrast, had 
the statute provided that a motion under § 968.135 means a 
                                                 
19 Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 971.30(1). 
20 Wis. Citizens Concerned for Cranes & Doves v. Wis. DNR, 
2004 WI 40, ¶17 n.11, 270 Wis. 2d 318, 677 N.W.2d 612. 
The Wisconsin Bill Drafting Manual 2006-2007 explains that 
using the phrase "but is not limited to" along with the word 
"includes" is redundant.  Wisconsin Bill Drafting Manual 2006-
2007, § 2.01(1)(i) at 39.  
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
18 
 
motion to quash or a motion to limit, the word "means" would 
ordinarily limit any motion to the two enumerated motions.21     
¶42 We are thus led to the statutorily enumerated motions 
to quash or to limit.  The question then becomes whether the 
enumeration of the two motions limits in some way other motions 
that may be brought under Wis. Stat. § 968.135.  Three rules of 
statutory interpretation (sometimes called maxims or canons) 
assist us in answering this question.  The canons are rules of 
statutory interpretation, not rules of law.  Canons of statutory 
interpretation are aids to ascertaining the meaning of a 
statute.  A canon is not a final or exclusive method of 
interpretation.22    
¶43 One 
rule 
to 
be 
used 
in 
interpreting 
the 
word 
"includes" is that the word may be interpreted contrary to its 
ordinary, non-exclusive meaning.  The word "includes" may 
therefore be read as a term of limitation or enumeration, so 
that a statute encompasses only those provisions or exceptions 
specifically listed.  This court has, however, adopted this 
limited reading of "includes" only when there is some textual 
                                                 
21 Wisconsin Bill Drafting Manual 2007-2008, § 2.01(1)(i) at 
39.   
22 State v. Campbell, 102 Wis. 2d 243, 246, 306 N.W.2d 272 
(Ct. App. 1981) (quoting Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 
293 U.S. 84, 89 (1934)). 
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
19 
 
evidence that the legislature intended the word "includes" to be 
interpreted as a term of limitation or enumeration.23   
¶44 This limited reading of the word "includes" is not 
applicable to the present case.  The text of Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
23 State v. James P., 2005 WI 80, ¶26, 281 Wis. 2d 685, 698 
N.W.2d 95; Wis. Citizens Concerned for Cranes & Doves, 270 
Wis. 2d 318, ¶17 n.11. 
This limited meaning of the word "includes" was reached by 
the 
court's 
using 
the 
maxim 
of 
statutory 
interpretation 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius ("the express mention of 
one matter excludes other similar matters not mentioned").  See 
FAS, LLC v. Town of Bass Lake, 2007 WI 73, ¶27, 301 Wis. 2d 321, 
733 N.W.2d 287. 
The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius ordinarily 
applies when a statute lists, for example, persons, things, or 
forms of conduct without any general word preceding or following 
the listing.  According to the maxim, the inference is that all 
omissions from the listing are excluded from application of the 
statute.  2A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes 
and Statutory Construction (7th ed. 2007) § 47:23, at 375-77.   
Although the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius 
does not by its terms apply to Wis. Stat. § 968.135, because the 
statute has only an enumeration, not general language, the 
Wisconsin Bill Drafting Manual explains that our court has 
nevertheless applied the maxim of expressio unius to statutory 
language using the word "includes," when some factual evidence 
exists that the legislature intended to limit application of the 
statute to those items enumerated.  Wisconsin Bill Drafting 
Manual 2006-2007, § 2.01(1)(i) at 39.   
For additional cases considering the maxim expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius, see, e.g., State v. Delaney, 2003 WI 9, 
¶¶22-23, 259 Wis. 2d 77, 658 N.W.2d 416; State ex rel. Harris v. 
Larson, 64 Wis. 2d 521, 527, 219 N.W.2d 335 (1974). 
The cases sometimes refer to this "exclusio" maxim as 
inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.  See, e.g., Koestler v. 
Pollard, 162 Wis. 2d 797, 804 n.4, 471 N.W.2d 7 (1991); Roberts 
v. Sackville Canning Co., 247 Wis. 277, 279, 19 N.W.2d 295 
(1945). 
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
20 
 
§ 968.135 contains no indication that the legislature intended 
the word "includes" as a term of limitation or enumeration or 
that the word "motions" be limited in Wis. Stat. § 968.135 to 
the two enumerated motions.  Nor is there any other evidence of 
such a legislative intent. 
¶45 A second rule to be used in interpreting the word 
"includes" is to give the word its common, broad, non-exclusive 
meaning.24  Applying this rule of interpretation we would 
conclude that the motion to suppress in the present case falls 
within Wis. Stat. § 968.135.  
¶46 A third rule to be used in interpreting the word 
"includes" is ejusdem generis, which literally means "of the 
same kind."  This rule helps determine whether the statutorily 
enumerated motions limit in some way the other motions that may 
be brought under Wis. Stat. § 968.135.  Ejusdem generis applies 
when a general word ("motions" in the present case) is used in a 
                                                 
24 Karl H. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate 
Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be 
Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 405 (1950). 
When it adequately appears that the general words are not 
used in a restricted sense suggested by the rule ejusdem 
generis, the legislature's will that the general words are to be 
given a broad meaning will be given effect.  State v. Campbell, 
102 Wis. 2d 243, 246, 306 N.W.2d 272 (Ct. App. 1981) (quoting 
Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 89 (1934)). 
When no inconsistency exists between specifically named 
particular words and the general statutory language or when the 
enumeration does not suggest a class, the maxim of ejusdem 
generis does not apply.  2A Singer & Singer, supra note 23, 
§ 47:17, at 380, 387-89. 
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
21 
 
statute and is either preceded or followed by specific words in 
a statutory enumeration ("motions to quash or limit" a subpoena 
in the present case).25   
¶47 According to the rule of ejusdem generis, the general 
word is construed to embrace only items similar in nature to the 
enumerated items.  Furthermore, for the rule to apply, the items 
to which the general word is restricted must be germane to the 
objectives of the enactment.26       
¶48 Applying 
the 
ejusdem 
generis 
rule 
of 
statutory 
interpretation, we must determine whether a motion to suppress 
                                                 
25 State v. Engler, 80 Wis. 2d 402, 408, 259 N.W.2d 97 
(1977); 2A Singer & Singer, supra note 23, § 47:17, at 357-80. 
The maxim ejusdem generis is an attempt to reconcile the 
specific and the general by treating the particular words as 
indicating the class and the general words as extending the 
provisions to everything embraced in that class, though not 
specifically named by the particular words.  Ejusdem generis is 
a common drafting technique to avoid spelling out in detail 
every contingency in which the statute could apply.  
For additional cases considering the maxim ejusdem generis, 
see, e.g., State v. Peters, 2003 WI 88, ¶¶16-23, 25, 27-34, 263 
Wis. 2d 475, 665 N.W.2d 171; State v. Campbell, 102 Wis. 2d 243, 
246-47, 306 N.W.2d 272 (Ct. App. 1981).    
The maxim ejusdem generis is a variation of the maxim 
noscitur a sociis.  The maxim noscitur a sociis means that words 
may be defined by accompanying words, that is, that the meaning 
of doubtful words may be determined by reference to their 
relationship with other associated words or phrases.  Wis. 
Citizens Concerned for Cranes & Doves, 270 Wis. 2d 318, ¶40; 2A 
Singer & Singer, supra note 23, § 47:16, at 347-57.  The 
doubtful word in this statute, "motions," would, under this 
doctrine, be defined by reference to its relationship with the 
accompanying enumerated motions. 
26 Engler, 80 Wis. 2d at 409. 
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
22 
 
documents obtained through a subpoena issued in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 968.135 is similar in nature to the enumerated 
motions to quash or to limit the subpoena and is germane to the 
objectives of § 968.135.  We must therefore compare motions to 
quash or limit a subpoena under Wis. Stat. § 968.135 with a 
motion to suppress documents obtained in violation of § 968.135.  
¶49 A motion to quash or a motion to limit a subpoena is 
ordinarily made before the subpoena is complied with.  The 
motion is aimed at preventing the State from obtaining all or 
some documents that the State may want to use as evidence.  If 
the motion to quash the Wis. Stat. § 968.135 subpoena is 
granted, the State gets no documents.  If a motion to limit a 
subpoena under § 968.135 is granted, the State may get only some 
documents.  Each statutorily enumerated motion, if granted, 
prevents the State from obtaining and using as evidence all or 
some of the documents it seeks in a § 968.135 subpoena.  
¶50 A motion to suppress documents obtained by a subpoena 
issued in violation of Wis. Stat. § 968.135, unlike a motion to 
quash or limit the subpoena, is ordinarily made after the 
subpoena is complied with.  In the instant case, the defendant 
used the first opportunity available to her to challenge the 
validity of the subpoena and the State's right to use as 
evidence the documents received as a result of the unlawful 
subpoena.  The defendant did not have the opportunity to bring a 
motion to quash or to limit the subpoena before the banks 
complied with the subpoenas; the defendant did not know that the 
subpoenas had been issued.   
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
23 
 
¶51 A motion to suppress documents obtained by a subpoena 
issued in violation of Wis. Stat. § 968.135, like a motion to 
quash or limit the subpoena, is aimed at preventing the State 
from using as evidence all or some of the documents the State 
has sought through the subpoena.  If the motion to suppress is 
granted, the State would be prevented from using as evidence the 
documents obtained through the subpoena.  A motion to suppress 
documents obtained by a subpoena issued in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 968.135 is thus similar in nature to the motions to 
quash or to limit the subpoena enumerated in § 968.135.   
¶52 Furthermore, a motion to suppress documents obtained 
by a subpoena issued in violation of Wis. Stat. § 968.135 is 
germane to the objectives of Wis. Stat. § 968.135, as are the 
motions to quash and to limit.  The textually evident objectives 
of § 968.135 are to allow the State to acquire and use documents 
while also ensuring that the State meets statutory requirements 
that protect persons affected.  
¶53 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.135 strictly limits a court's 
issuance of a subpoena for the production of documents.  Only 
the attorney general or a district attorney may request a 
subpoena for the production of documents.  The request must be 
ruled upon by the circuit court before the subpoena is issued.  
The circuit court may issue a subpoena for documents only upon a 
showing of probable cause.  Motions to the circuit court to 
challenge the subpoena are expressly permitted by statute, 
including but not limited to motions to quash or to limit.  The 
enumerated motions make clear that when the State fails to 
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
24 
 
comply with § 968.135, the State's subpoena may be quashed or 
limited, removing the State's ability to obtain the documents 
and then use them in evidence.   
¶54 A motion to suppress documents obtained by a subpoena 
issued in violation of Wis. Stat. § 968.135 is germane to these 
objectives of § 968.135.  If the defendant is not given an 
opportunity to move to suppress the bank documents obtained by a 
subpoena issued in violation of the probable cause requirements 
set forth in Wis. Stat. § 968.135, a court would, as the circuit 
court explained, "emasculate the clear directives of § 968.135."  
If this court allowed documents obtained by a subpoena not 
complying with the probable cause requirement set forth in 
§ 968.135 to be admitted in evidence, the safeguards of 
§ 968.135 would be meaningless.  If Wis. Stat. § 968.135 is to 
effect compliance with its requirements, we must interpret the 
statute as encompassing a motion to suppress documents obtained 
in violation of the statute within the word "motions" in the 
statute.   
¶55 Applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis, we conclude 
that a motion to suppress documents obtained in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 968.135 is a motion of like kind to motions to 
quash or limit a subpoena and is germane to the objectives of 
§ 968.135.   
¶56 In applying each of the three rules for interpreting 
the word "includes" we have concluded that under each rule the 
defendant's motion to suppress the documents at issue in the 
present case was properly granted.        
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
25 
 
¶57 The State argues that our interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.135 is foreclosed by Wisconsin precedent.  The State 
argues that Wisconsin cases hold that suppression of evidence is 
not available as a remedy except when evidence has been obtained 
in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights or when a 
statute "expressly" provides for suppression of evidence as a 
remedy.  The State argues that in the present case no 
constitutional violation exists and Wis. Stat. § 968.135 does 
not expressly provide for suppression of evidence as a remedy 
for its violation.  
¶58 The State relies on State ex rel. Arnold v. County 
Court of Rock County, 51 Wis. 2d 434, 439-40, 187 N.W.2d 354 
(1971); State ex rel. Peckham v. Krenke, 229 Wis. 2d 778, 787, 
601 N.W.2d 287 (Ct. App. 1999); and State v. Verkuylen, 120 
Wis. 2d 59, 61, 352 N.W.2d 668 (Ct. App. 1984).  These cases do 
not support the State's proposition of law, and therefore these 
cases are not precedent controlling the outcome of the instant 
case.  
¶59 In 
Arnold, 
the 
Wisconsin 
Electronic 
Surveillance 
Control Law characterized the interceptions at issue in that 
case as "unauthorized" but "not unlawful."27  The Law explicitly 
stated 
that 
the 
information 
obtained 
from 
"unlawfully 
intercepted" communications was inadmissible as evidence at 
                                                 
27 Wis. Stat. § 968.31(2) (1971). 
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
26 
 
trial.28  The Electronic Surveillance Control Law was silent, 
however, 
about 
whether 
the 
information 
obtained 
through 
unauthorized but "not unlawful" interceptions (as at issue in 
Arnold) was admissible in evidence. 
¶60 In the face of this statutory silence, the Arnold 
court inferred that the results from the unauthorized but "not 
unlawful" interceptions at issue in that case were inadmissible.  
The Arnold court drew this inference from the Electronic 
Surveillance Control Law's procedure for court authorization of 
interceptions, as well as the Law's provisions governing 
authorization 
for 
the 
use 
and 
disclosure 
of 
intercepted 
communications.29  The Arnold court declared that the information 
from the "not unlawful" interceptions was inadmissible because 
the interception was not in compliance with the statutory 
procedures for court authorization.  The Arnold court explained 
its decision as follows:  If the results of interceptions that 
were "not unlawful" but nevertheless did not comply with the 
Surveillance Law were admitted in evidence, "it was entirely 
useless to include in the act the careful delineated provisions 
                                                 
28 Wis. Stat. § 968.30(9)(a) (1971).  Section 968.30(9)(a) 
expressly provides for suppression of the results of unlawfully 
intercepted wiretaps (and any information derived therefrom).  
Section 968.30(9) was not even mentioned in the Arnold decision 
because the intercepted communications at issue in Arnold had 
not been intercepted unlawfully.    
29 The dissent in State ex rel. Arnold v. County Court of 
Rock County, 51 Wis. 2d 434, 444-52, 187 N.W.2d 354 (1971) 
(Robert Hansen, J., dissenting), disagreed with drawing this 
inference.  
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
27 
 
under which admissible evidence might be obtained by electronic 
surveillance with court approval.  All the safeguards [of the 
Law] would be for naught . . . ."30         
¶61 This same reasoning applies in the present case.  In 
the present case, as in Arnold, the government did not comply 
with the statutory requirements to obtain the evidence in 
question.  In addition, like in Arnold, we could not allow the 
admission of the evidence in the present case, as we explained 
previously, 
without 
rendering 
meaningless 
the 
safeguards 
established by Wis. Stat. § 968.135 for the issuance of 
subpoenas.   
¶62 Thus 
Arnold, 
correctly 
read, 
stands 
for 
the 
proposition that evidence obtained in violation of a statute (or 
not in accordance with the statute) may be suppressed under the 
statute to achieve the objectives of the statute, even though 
the statute does not expressly provide for the suppression or 
exclusion of the evidence.  This correct reading of Arnold has 
been lost in succeeding cases.  
¶63 As recently as State v. Raflik, 2001 WI 129, ¶15, 248 
Wis. 2d 593, 636 N.W.2d 690, Arnold was cited for the broad 
proposition that "[s]uppression is only required when evidence 
has been obtained in violation of a defendant's constitutional 
rights . . . or if a statute specifically provides for the 
suppression remedy."  See also State v. Popenhagen, 2007 WI App 
16, ¶25, 298 Wis. 2d 388, 728 N.W.2d 45 (quoting Raflik).  
                                                 
30 Arnold, 51 Wis. 2d at 443.    
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
28 
 
Raflik involved a failure to record a telephonic application for 
a  search warrant as required by statute.  Raflik's statement of 
suppression law may be interpreted in at least two ways: 
Suppression 
of 
evidence 
obtained 
in 
violation 
of 
the 
requirements of a statute is permissible at the discretion of 
the circuit court when a statute does not specifically require 
suppression.  Or, a circuit court is prohibited from suppressing 
evidence obtained in violation of the requirements of a statute 
when the statute does not expressly require suppression.  As the 
Arnold decision demonstrates, the first interpretation is the 
correct interpretation.       
¶64 In Peckham, another case upon which the State relies, 
the court's statement of suppression law is somewhat different 
from the court's statement of suppression law in Raflik.  
Peckham involved the Department of Corrections opening the mail 
of an inmate in violation of administrative rules.  In Peckham, 
the court of appeals asserted that "wrongfully or illegally 
obtained evidence is to be suppressed only where the evidence 
was obtained in violation of an individual's constitutional 
rights or in violation of a statute that expressly requires 
suppression as a sanction."31  Peckham's statement of suppression 
                                                 
31 State ex rel. Peckham v. Krenke, 229 Wis. 2d 778, 787, 
601 N.W.2d 287 (Ct. App. 1999) (emphasis added).  The Peckham 
court 
also 
stated 
that 
Wisconsin 
"cases 
stand 
for 
the 
proposition that the exclusionary rule is applicable in civil 
and criminal proceedings only where the evidence sought to be 
excluded was obtained in violation of a constitutional right or 
a statute that specifically requires suppression of wrongfully 
or illegally obtained evidence as a sanction."  229 Wis. 2d at 
787 (citation omitted).  
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
29 
 
law explicitly prohibits a circuit court from suppressing 
evidence obtained in violation of a statute when the statute 
does not expressly require suppression.32    
¶65 The Peckham court's statement of the law about 
violations of a statute and suppression is too broad.  The cases 
the Peckham court cites to support this broad proposition of law 
merely cite to each other.  No case states a rationale for the 
proposition of law.   
¶66 Although in Peckham the court of appeals announced a 
broad rule of law, in examining the regulation at issue in the 
Peckham case, the court of appeals properly applied a narrower 
rule 
of 
law 
consistent 
with 
Arnold 
and 
the 
correct 
interpretation of Raflik, namely that the evidence obtained in 
that case was admissible if it did not "violate any statute or 
administrative rule that expressly or impliedly provided for the 
exclusion of such evidence."33  The word "impliedly" is the 
operative word, and this sentence in Peckham comports with 
Arnold and the correct interpretation of Raflik permitting 
suppression at the discretion of the circuit court in applying a 
statute that does not specifically require suppression. 
¶67 In Verkuylen, a search warrant case upon which the 
State relies, the court of appeals cited Arnold (without a 
                                                 
32 Peckham was so interpreted in State v. Wallace, 2002 WI 
App 61, ¶25, 251 Wis. 2d 625, 642 N.W.2d 549, and State v. 
Jackowski, 
2001 
WI 
App 
187, 
¶17, 
247 
Wis. 2d 430, 
633 
N.W.2d 649.  
33 Peckham v. Krenke, 229 Wis. 2d at 794 (emphasis added). 
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
30 
 
citation to a page number) for the proposition that suppression 
is 
required 
only 
when 
a 
statute 
specifically 
requires 
suppression of unlawfully obtained evidence.34  This statement of 
the law of suppression (like that stated in Raflik, but not like 
that stated in Peckham) implies that suppression may not be 
required but is permissible when a statute does not specifically 
require 
suppression. 
 
In 
keeping 
with 
this 
correct 
interpretation of the law of suppression, the Verkuylen court 
refused to suppress the evidence, not because the statute at 
issue did not specifically require suppression, but because the 
error in the search warrant was a result of judicial oversight 
that was corrected.35    
¶68 Arnold, Raflik, Peckham, and Verkuylen, properly read, 
do not require the legislature expressly to require or allow 
suppression of unlawfully obtained evidence in order for a 
circuit court to grant a motion to suppress.  In other words, 
the legislature need not express its intent to provide a remedy 
of exclusion or suppression of evidence with greater clarity 
than ordinarily required of any legislative enactment.  The 
cases demonstrate that the circuit court has discretion to 
suppress or allow evidence obtained in violation of a statute 
that does not specifically require suppression of evidence 
                                                 
34 State v. Verkuylen, 120 Wis. 2d 59, 61, 352 N.W.2d 668 
(Ct. App. 1984). 
35 Verkuylen, 120 Wis. 2d at 61.   
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
31 
 
obtained contrary to the statute, depending on the facts and 
circumstances of the case and the objectives of the statute.   
¶69 The State cites a number of additional court of 
appeals cases for the proposition of law that suppression is not 
a proper remedy for a statutory violation.  None of these cases 
is apposite.  The court in each case cited by the State referred 
either to Verkuylen or to another case (1) for the ambiguous 
proposition that suppression is required only when a statute 
expressly 
requires 
suppression of the unlawfully obtained 
evidence;36 (2) for the erroneous proposition that suppression is 
barred except when a statute expressly requires suppression;37 or 
(3) for the proposition that in a particular case suppression 
was not an appropriate remedy.38  Not one case in this 
interlocking web of cases provides any reasoning in support of 
                                                 
36 State v. Repenshek, 2004 WI App 229, ¶¶23-24, 277 
Wis. 2d 780, 691 N.W.2d 369; State v. Keith, 2003 WI App 47, ¶8, 
260 
Wis. 2d 592, 
659 
N.W.2d 403; 
State 
v. 
Thompson, 
222 
Wis. 2d 179, 189, 585 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. 
Mieritz, 193 Wis. 2d 571, 574-77, 534 N.W.2d 632 (Ct. App. 
1995).   
37 State v. Cash, 2004 WI App 63, ¶30, 271 Wis. 2d 451, 677 
N.W.2d 709; State v. Wallace, 2002 WI App 61, ¶25, 251 
Wis. 2d 625, 642 N.W.2d 549; State v. Jackowski, 2001 WI App 
187, ¶17, 247 Wis. 2d 430, 633 N.W.2d 649. 
38 See, e.g., State v. Piddington, 2001 WI 24, ¶52, 241 
Wis. 2d 754, 623 N.W.2d 528. 
The State recognizes that in two John Doe cases this court 
indicated that suppression of evidence could be available as a 
remedy for "clear abuse" of the John Doe statutory process.  See 
State v. Noble, 2002 WI 64, ¶¶28-31, 253 Wis. 2d 206, 646 
N.W.2d 38; 
State 
v. 
Cummings, 
199 
Wis. 2d 721, 
746, 
546 
N.W.2d 406 (1996).       
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
32 
 
the proposition that a statute provides for the remedy of 
suppression only when the statute "expressly" provides for that 
remedy.  The proposition appears to originate solely in, and to 
rest solely upon, a mistaken interpretation of Arnold.      
¶70 The proposition of law that wrongfully or illegally 
obtained evidence may not be suppressed except when the evidence 
was obtained in violation of an individual's constitutional 
rights or in violation of a statute that expressly requires 
suppression of evidence as a sanction has been carried expressly 
or impliedly from case to case without any support or reasoning.  
This proposition is an unsupported mistaken statement of the 
law.  Mistaken statements of the law should not constitute 
precedent that binds this court.39  We do more damage to the rule 
of law by refusing to admit error than by correcting an 
erroneous proposition of law.40  The instant case presents an 
opportunity to correct an error of law that has been repeated in 
numerous cases, and we do so.      
¶71 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.135 
encompasses 
a 
motion 
to 
suppress 
documents 
in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 968.135 and that the statute thus 
provides a remedy of suppression.  As we have explained, unless 
the documents were suppressed as evidence in the present case, 
                                                 
39 Cf. State v. Kelty, 2006 WI 101, ¶39, 294 Wis. 2d 62, 716 
N.W.2d 886 (withdrawing "unnecessarily expansive language" from 
prior opinions).   
40 See Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, ¶21, 274 Wis. 2d 220, 
682 
N.W.2d 405 
("We 
are 
not 
required 
to 
adhere 
to 
interpretations of statutes that are objectively wrong."). 
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
33 
 
the safeguards established by Wis. Stat. § 968.135 for the 
issuance 
of 
subpoenas 
would 
be 
rendered 
meaningless.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in 
ordering that the bank documents obtained in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 968.135 be suppressed. 
C 
¶72 We turn lastly to the question whether the circuit 
court erred as a matter of law in granting the defendant's 
motion to suppress the incriminating statements the defendant 
made after police confronted her with the bank documents 
obtained in violation of Wis. Stat. § 968.135.   
¶73 The circuit court explained its decision to suppress 
the defendant's statements in addition to the bank documents as 
follows: 
In regard to the statement of Ms. Popenhagen, I'm 
finding that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine 
does apply here just as it would in a bad search, 
standard search case without a warrant. 
¶74 The circuit court need not have reached beyond Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 968.135 
to 
justify 
suppressing 
the 
incriminating 
statements the defendant made after the police confronted the 
defendant with the unlawfully obtained bank documents.   
¶75 The question whether Wis. Stat. § 968.135 permitted 
the defendant's motion to suppress the incriminating statements 
law enforcement officers obtained by confronting the defendant 
with the unlawfully obtained bank documents is, like the 
question of suppressing the bank documents considered above, a 
question 
of 
statutory 
interpretation 
that 
we 
decide 
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
34 
 
independently of the circuit court and court of appeals but 
benefiting from their analyses.     
¶76 We again apply the three rules to interpret the word 
"includes" in Wis. Stat. § 968.135 as it applies to the 
incriminating statements.  We conclude that under each rule the 
defendant's motion to suppress incriminating statements that law 
enforcement officers obtained by confronting the defendant with 
the unlawfully obtained bank documents is encompassed within the 
class of motions contemplated by Wis. Stat. § 968.135.  We reach 
this conclusion for essentially the same reasons that persuaded 
us that Wis. Stat. § 968.135 encompasses the defendant's motion 
to suppress the unlawfully obtained bank documents. 
¶77 Under the first two rules of statutory interpretation 
of the word "includes," the motion to suppress the incriminating 
statements falls within Wis. Stat. § 968.135 for the reasons 
previously set forth. 
¶78 Under the first rule of statutory interpretation 
applicable to the word "includes," the word "includes" is viewed 
narrowly and contrary to its ordinary, non-exclusive meaning 
only when there is some textual evidence that the legislature 
intended the word "includes" to be interpreted as a term of 
limitation or enumeration.  We have already decided that no 
evidence of such a legislative intent exists and this reading of 
the word "includes" is not applicable to the present case.  See 
¶38 above. 
¶79 Under the second rule of statutory interpretation 
applicable to the word "includes," the word "includes" is given 
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
35 
 
its common, broad, non-exclusive meaning.  Applying this rule of 
interpretation we would conclude that the motion to suppress the 
incriminating statements in the present case is encompassed 
within 
the 
class 
of 
motions 
contemplated 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 968.135.  
¶80 Applying 
the 
rule 
of 
ejusdem 
generis 
to 
the 
defendant's motion to suppress the incriminating statements that 
law enforcement officers obtained by confronting the defendant 
with the unlawfully obtained bank records, we examine whether 
the motion at issue is similar in nature to the statutorily 
enumerated motions to quash or to limit the subpoena and is 
germane to the objectives of Wis. Stat. § 968.135.  See ¶42, 
above.   
¶81 The defendant's motion to suppress the incriminating 
statements in the present case is substantially similar in 
nature to a motion to quash the subpoena.  Both motions prevent 
the State's using evidence derived from the subpoena. The 
documents are derived from the unlawful subpoena and the 
incriminating statements are derived from the documents derived 
from the unlawful subpoena.     
¶82 Had the defendant been able to bring and prevail upon 
a motion to quash the subpoena obtained in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 968.135 before the banks turned over the documents 
demanded by the subpoena, the State would not have been in a 
position to present the bank documents to the defendant during 
questioning or to use them to induce incriminating statements. 
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
36 
 
¶83 We do not know whether the defendant would have made 
incriminating statements had she not been confronted with the 
unlawfully obtained bank documents.41  We do know, however, from 
the record that the defendant made the incriminating statements 
when she was confronted with the unlawfully obtained bank 
documents and that the incriminating statements are therefore 
directly related to the unlawfully obtained bank documents.    
¶84 We next examine whether the motion to suppress the 
incriminating statements that law enforcement officers obtained 
by use of a subpoena issued in violation of Wis. Stat. § 968.135 
is germane to the objectives of Wis. Stat. § 968.135.  As we 
have explained, the objective of § 968.135 is to allow the State 
to acquire and use documents while also ensuring that the State 
meets statutory requirements that protect the privacy interests 
of persons affected by the subpoena.  The objectives of 
§ 968.135 are to limit strictly the conditions under which a 
subpoena may be obtained in order to protect persons whose 
records are being sought.  The enumerated motions in § 968.135 
make clear that when the State fails to comply with the 
statute's strict requirements, the State's subpoena may be 
quashed or limited, removing the State's ability to obtain the 
                                                 
41 Had the defendant merely been told that the police had 
her bank documents, she might have questioned this assertion and 
doubted the police's claim in light of the numerous lengthy 
documents she probably had received (as we all have) from banks 
and other institutions advising that privacy interests are 
protected by law. 
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
37 
 
documents demanded in the subpoena and their use in evidence. 
See ¶¶46-47, above.   
¶85 The defendant's motion to suppress the incriminating 
statements 
in 
the 
instant 
case 
serves 
these 
objectives.  
Suppressing 
incriminating 
statements 
derived 
directly 
from 
documents obtained in violation of Wis. Stat. § 968.135 is 
necessary to protect a person fully from the State's acquiring 
documents without complying with the statute.  Unless the 
defendant's motion to suppress incriminating statements that law 
enforcement officers obtained by use of documents obtained by 
the unlawful subpoena were granted, the safeguards of § 968.135 
would not be given full force and effect and would be 
significantly compromised.     
¶86 If a person were permitted to bring a motion to quash 
the subpoena for bank documents unlawfully obtained but not 
permitted to bring a motion to suppress incriminating statements 
derived directly from the unlawfully obtained bank documents, 
the person would not get the full benefit of the protections of 
the statute, and the underlying objectives of the statute would 
be defeated.     
¶87 When the legislature allows a motion to quash or limit 
a subpoena to prevent the State from enforcing a subpoena issued 
in violation of Wis. Stat. § 968.135, it is absurd and 
unreasonable to allow the State to use incriminating statements 
derived directly from such a subpoena and to gain an advantage 
by violating the statute.  The legislature could not have 
intended that the statute would be interpreted in such a way to 
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
38 
 
allow 
circumvention 
of 
the 
carefully 
drafted 
legislative 
requirements and safeguards for the issuance of a subpoena under 
Wis. Stat. § 968.135.42   
¶88 Applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis, we conclude 
that the motion to suppress these incriminating statements is a 
motion of like kind to motions to quash or limit a subpoena and 
is germane to the objectives of Wis. Stat. § 968.135.   
¶89 In applying each of the three rules for interpreting 
the word "includes," we have concluded that under each rule of 
statutory interpretation, the defendant's motion to suppress the 
statements at issue in the present case was properly granted. 
¶90 As we explained previously, this interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 968.135 is not foreclosed by Wisconsin precedent.  
Wisconsin cases do not hold, as the State urges, that unless a 
statute "expressly" provides for suppression of evidence as a 
remedy, a circuit court may not suppress the evidence. 
¶91 Our conclusion in the present case for suppression of 
both the documents and the incriminating statements is similar 
to the conclusions reached by the United States Supreme Court in 
two 
cases 
involving 
wiretaps 
that 
were 
performed 
in 
contravention of the applicable federal statute governing legal 
wiretaps.  
                                                 
42 See 
Wenke, 
274 
Wis. 2d 220, 
¶42 
("When 
construing 
statutes, courts must presume that the legislature intends for a 
statute to be interpreted in a manner that advances the purposes 
of 
the 
statute, 
not 
defeats 
those 
purposes.") 
(internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
39 
 
¶92 In the first case, Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 
379 (1937), the United States Supreme Court interpreted the 
Communications Act of 1934, which was silent about the Act's 
application to federal agents and which did not explicitly 
provide for suppression as evidence of any communications 
obtained in violation of the Act.  The Court interpreted the Act 
as covering agents of the federal government and as embracing 
suppression of evidence in court of the words obtained through 
the unlawful wiretaps.     
¶93 In a subsequent case, Nardone v. United States, 308 
U.S. 338, 340 (1939), the Court was faced with the question 
whether under the Communications Act of 1934 only the "exact 
words 
heard 
through 
forbidden 
interceptions" 
were 
to 
be 
suppressed as evidence (as decided in the first Nardone case), 
or whether evidence procured through the use of knowledge gained 
from the forbidden conversations should also be suppressed.  The 
Court concluded that in accommodating the concerns of crime 
detection and effective law enforcement and protection of 
individual privacy, "meaning must be given to what Congress has 
written, even if not in explicit language, so as to effectuate 
the policy which Congress has formulated."43  The Court concluded 
that reading the Act to suppress only the exact words heard 
through the forbidden interceptions but at the same time to 
allow the use of evidence derived from the exact words 
intercepted would largely stultify the policy of suppressing the 
                                                 
43 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939). 
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
40 
 
exact words intercepted.  The Court relied on the words of 
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392:  
"The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of 
evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so 
acquired shall not be used before the court, but that it shall 
not be used at all."44  The Court went on to say: "A decent 
respect for the policy of Congress must save us from imputing to 
it a self-defeating, if not disingenuous purpose."45 
¶94 In the Nardone cases, as well as in the present case, 
the law being interpreted is silent about suppression of 
evidence obtained as a result of a statutory violation.  In the 
first Nardone case, the Court suppressed the words obtained by 
wiretaps that violated of the Act.  In the present case we 
suppress the documents obtained by subpoenas that violated the 
statute.  In the second Nardone case, the Court suppressed 
information obtained by use of the words obtained by the 
improper 
wiretaps. 
 
In 
the 
present 
case 
we 
suppress 
incriminating statements obtained by use of the documents 
obtained by improper subpoenas.   
¶95 The Nardone cases support our approach to statutory 
interpretation in the present case.  The instant case, however, 
presents an easier task of statutory interpretation than did the 
Nardone cases.  In the instant case the motions to suppress the 
documents and the incriminating statements are in the very text 
                                                 
44 Id. at 340-41. 
45 Id. at 341. 
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
41 
 
of the statute, that is, the text explicitly provides for 
"motions to the court, including, but not limited to, motions to 
quash or limit the subpoena."  The Act interpreted in the 
Nardone cases had no such similar broadly worded language 
allowing a motion to suppress evidence. 
¶96 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the 
circuit court did not err in suppressing the incriminating 
statements that the defendant made after police confronted her 
with the bank documents obtained in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.135.  Unless the incriminating statements were suppressed 
as evidence in the present case, the safeguards established by 
Wis. Stat. § 968.135 for the issuance of subpoenas would be 
rendered meaningless. 
* * * * 
 
¶97 We 
conclude 
that 
suppression 
of 
both 
the 
bank 
documents and the defendant's incriminating statements in the 
present case is an appropriate remedy when the bank documents 
were obtained in violation of Wis. Stat. § 968.135 and the 
incriminating 
statements were obtained by law enforcement 
officers confronting the defendant with the unlawfully obtained 
bank documents.  Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court 
did not err in granting the defendant's motion to suppress 
evidence of the bank documents and the defendant's incriminating 
statements.  We reverse the decision of the court of appeals and 
affirm the circuit court's order to suppress the bank documents 
and incriminating statements at issue.  Because we affirm the 
circuit court's order on statutory grounds, we need not and do 
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
42 
 
not reach the additional issues presented by the defendant.  We 
leave the interpretation of the federal and state constitutional 
provisions and federal statutes relating to obligations of banks 
that the court of appeals addressed for another case in which 
these issues are determinative.   
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.  The cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.   
 
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
 
 
1 
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
 
 
2 
 
No. 
2006AP1114-CR   
 
 
 
3 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.dtp 
 
 
1 
 
 
¶98 DAVID 
T. 
PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  The State 
obtained the bank records of Michelle Popenhagen from local 
banks after it issued three subpoenas duces tecum, each of which 
was signed by an Oneida County circuit judge.  The process used 
to obtain these subpoenas is not clear.  What is clear, however, 
is that: (1) the State used the wrong subpoena forms; (2) the 
State never submitted evidence of probable cause for the 
subpoenas to the court; (3) the judges made no findings of 
probable cause for the subpoenas; and (4) the documents obtained 
from 
the 
subpoenas 
were 
not 
returned 
to 
the 
court.  
Consequently, after two hearings on Popenhagen's motion to 
suppress her bank records and the incriminating statements she 
made after being confronted by police with her bank records, 
Circuit Judge Mark Mangerson suppressed the records and the 
statements. 
¶99 I concur in this result.  However, because I share 
some of the concerns voiced in Justice Roggensack's dissenting 
opinion, I write separately to explain my position. 
I 
¶100 The owners of Save More Foods in Minocqua terminated 
Michelle Popenhagen, a longtime employee who worked as their 
bookkeeper, because they detected financial irregularities at 
the store.  Several weeks later, the owners complained to the 
Minocqua Police Department that they believed Popenhagen had 
embezzled a substantial amount of money.  In the subsequent 
investigation, Todd Hanson, a detective with the Minocqua Police 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.dtp 
 
 
2 
 
Department, "filled out an affidavit" for the Oneida County 
District Attorney to support subpoenas to local banks to obtain 
Popenhagen's bank records.  In a police report, Hanson stated 
that he faxed a request for subpoenas "to the Oneida DA on 
8/16/04 @ 3:00 p.m." 
¶101 The district attorney's office then prepared three 
subpoenas, two dated August 18, 2004, and one dated August 31, 
2004, to three different banks. 
¶102 All three subpoenas contain the following language in 
bold type: "PURSUANT TO SECTION 805.07 OF THE WISCONSIN 
STATUTES, YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED TO APPEAR IN PERSON AND GIVE 
EVIDENCE".  All three subpoenas give a date and time to appear 
in circuit court.  Two of the subpoenas also state: "In lieu of 
appearing, copies may be mailed to Sergeant Todd Hanson of the 
Minocqua Police Department, P.O. Box 346, Minocqua, Wisconsin 
54548." 
¶103 All three subpoenas were served personally on the 
banks by Todd Hanson.  Thereafter, the banks did not appear in 
court; instead, they turned over the records to the Minocqua 
Police Department.   
¶104 As noted, the subpoenas were issued pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 805.07.  Wisconsin Stat. § 805.07 reads in part as 
follows:  
Subpoena. (1) Issuance and service. Subpoenas 
shall be issued and served in accordance with ch. 885. 
A subpoena may also be issued by any attorney of 
record in a civil action or special proceeding to 
compel attendance of witnesses for deposition, hearing 
or trial in the action or special proceeding.  
No.  2006AP1114-CR.dtp 
 
 
3 
 
(2) Subpoena 
requiring 
the 
production 
of 
material.  (a) A subpoena may command the person to 
whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, 
documents or tangible things designated therein.   
(b) Notice of a 3rd-party subpoena issued for 
discovery purposes shall be provided to all parties at 
least 10 days before the scheduled deposition in order 
to preserve their right to object. If a 3rd-party 
subpoena requests the production of books, papers, 
documents, or tangible things that are within the 
scope 
of 
discovery under s. 804.01(2)(a), those 
objects shall not be provided before the time and date 
specified in the subpoena. The provisions under this 
paragraph apply unless all of the parties otherwise 
agree.  
(3) Protective orders. Upon motion made promptly 
and in any event at or before the time specified in 
the subpoena for compliance therewith, the court may 
(a) quash or modify the subpoena if it is unreasonable 
and oppressive or (b) condition denial of the motion 
upon the advancement by the person in whose behalf the 
subpoena is issued of the reasonable cost of producing 
the books, papers, documents, or tangible things 
designated therein.  (Emphasis added.) 
¶105 Wisconsin Stat. § 805.07(1) refers to "ch. 885."  
Wisconsin Stat. § 885.01 reads in part:   
Subpoenas, who may issue. The subpoena need not 
be sealed, and may be signed and issued as follows:  
(1) By any judge or clerk of a court or court 
commissioner or municipal judge, within the territory 
in which the officer or the court of which he or she 
is the officer has jurisdiction, to require the 
attendance of witnesses and their production of lawful 
instruments of evidence in any action, matter or 
proceeding pending or to be examined into before any 
court, 
magistrate, 
officer, 
arbitrator, 
board, 
committee or other person authorized to take testimony 
in the state. 
(2) By the attorney general or any district 
attorney or person acting in his or her stead, to 
require the attendance of witnesses, in behalf of the 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.dtp 
 
 
4 
 
state, in any court or before any magistrate and from 
any part of the state.  (Emphasis added.) 
¶106 The record shows that the district attorney's office 
executed three subpoenas pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 805.07 and 
885.01(1).  Each subpoena was signed by a judge.  Subpoenas 
issued under these statutes had to be signed by a judge or clerk 
because there was never "a civil action" in which a subpoena 
could have been issued by an attorney of record (Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.07(1)) and because the district attorney was seeking 
"lawful instruments of evidence" (documents), not merely the 
"attendance" of a witness at a hearing (Wis. Stat. § 885.01(2)).  
Nonetheless, the district attorney's office used the wrong 
subpoena forms and followed the wrong procedure, inasmuch as no 
legal action of any kind was pending when the subpoenas were 
issued.  Moreover, the notice that Wis. Stat. § 805.07(2)(b) 
requires be given to a "party" concerning a "3rd-party subpoena 
issued for discovery purposes" was not given to Popenhagen.  In 
addition, Popenhagen alleged that the district attorney's office 
never asked the court to schedule return dates in court because 
the district attorney never wanted or expected witnesses to 
appear in court.  The stated return dates were fictitious, and 
the objects of the subpoena were not brought to court.   
¶107 In sum, the three subpoenas were defective in every 
respect.  The circuit court was not powerless to address 
defective subpoenas issued pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 805.07.  The 
court's authority to quash subpoenas is explicitly provided in 
Wis. Stat. § 805.07(3). 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.dtp 
 
 
5 
 
¶108 Probable cause is not required for a subpoena issued 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 805.07.  The reason is that § 805.07 is 
designed to secure the presence of a witness in a pending 
action, and the statute permits a "party" in that action to seek 
a 
protective 
order 
if 
the 
subpoena 
is 
unreasonable 
and 
oppressive.   
¶109 Here, of course, there was no pending action and thus 
no opposing "party" to serve with notice.  The district attorney 
erred.  Even if the district attorney's office could concoct 
some argument for using subpoenas under § 805.07, it failed to 
comply with the terms of that statute.  A circuit court cannot 
be denied the power to remedy an obvious and undisputed misuse 
of its judicial authority by the district attorney.   
II 
¶110 The parties now appear to agree that the State should 
have sought subpoenas under Wis. Stat. § 968.135, not § 805.07.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 968.135 reads as follows:  
Subpoena for documents. Upon the request of the 
attorney general or a district attorney and upon a 
showing of probable cause under s. 968.12, a court 
shall issue a subpoena requiring the production of 
documents, as specified in s. 968.13(2). The documents 
shall be returnable to the court which issued the 
subpoena. Motions to the court, including, but not 
limited to, motions to quash or limit the subpoena, 
shall be addressed to the court which issued the 
subpoena. Any person who unlawfully refuses to produce 
the documents may be compelled to do so as provided in 
ch. 785. This section does not limit or affect any 
other subpoena authority provided by law.  (Emphasis 
added.) 
¶111 To obtain subpoenas under this statute, a district 
attorney is required to provide the court with "probable cause 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.dtp 
 
 
6 
 
under s. 968.12," meaning that a district attorney is required 
to proceed as though he were requesting a search warrant under 
Wis. Stat. § 968.12.1   
¶112 The 
Oneida 
County 
District 
Attorney 
could 
have 
provided the court with a sworn complaint or affidavit, or sworn 
recorded 
testimony, 
showing 
probable 
cause. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 968.12(2).  The court would then have responded with a 
determination whether probable cause for the subpoenas had been 
shown.  Wis. Stat. § 968.12(3)(c).  None of this happened.  None 
of this happened because the district attorney's office followed 
the wrong procedure by using Wis. Stat. § 805.07. 
¶113 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.135 is not the only subpoena 
statute available to district attorneys.  For instance, Wis. 
Stat. § 885.01 is made applicable in criminal proceedings by 
Wis. Stat. § 972.11.  However, subpoena statutes other than Wis. 
Stat. § 968.135 appear to require some sort of pending action.  
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.12 reads in part as follows: 
Search warrant.  (1) Description and issuance.  A 
search warrant is an order signed by a judge directing 
a law enforcement officer to conduct a search of a 
designated person, a designated object or a designated 
place for the purpose of seizing designated property 
or kinds of property.  A judge shall issue a search 
warrant if probable cause is shown. 
(2) Warrant upon affidavit.  A search warrant 
may be based upon sworn complaint or affidavit, or 
testimony recorded by a phonographic reporter or under 
sub. (3)(d), showing probable cause therefor. The 
complaint, 
affidavit 
or 
testimony 
may 
be 
upon 
information and belief. 
Wis. Stat. § 968.12(1)-(2). 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.dtp 
 
 
7 
 
Wisconsin Stat. § 968.135 does not require a pending action, but 
it does require the district attorney to follow the same 
procedures he would use in obtaining a search warrant under 
§ 968.12.  Wisconsin Stat. § 968.135 provides for subsequent 
motions to the court.  The statute implies that when the 
procedures in the statute are not followed, the court may deal 
with a defective subpoena the same way it would deal with a 
defective search warrant.   
¶114 Judge Mangerson stated that a subpoena under Wis. 
Stat. § 968.135 "is directly analogous to a search warrant."  He 
understood——and I agree——that the remedy for a defective 
subpoena under this statute is analogous to the remedy for a 
defective search warrant under Wis. Stat. § 968.12.  That is why 
I support the court's decision to exclude the specific documents 
obtained from the three subpoenas and the statements Popenhagen 
made after she was confronted with these improperly obtained 
documents. 
¶115 The State is not entitled to utilize incriminating 
statements obtained from Popenhagen after she was confronted 
with her bank records simply because it completely disregarded 
the applicable statute (§ 968.135) to obtain those bank records. 
III 
¶116 This brings us to the question of what authority 
should be employed to suppress Popenhagen's statements without 
altering longstanding Wisconsin law. 
¶117 In State v. Raflik, 2001 WI 129, 248 Wis. 2d 593, 636 
N.W.2d 690, this court stated:   
No.  2006AP1114-CR.dtp 
 
 
8 
 
The 
suppression 
of 
evidence 
is 
not 
a 
constitutional right, but rather it is a judge-made 
rule used to deter misconduct by law enforcement 
officials.  Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976).  
Suppression is only required when evidence has been 
obtained in violation of a defendant's constitutional 
rights, State v. Hochman, 2 Wis. 2d 410, 419, 86 
N.W.2d 446 (1957), or if a statute specifically 
provides for the suppression remedy.  State ex rel. 
Arnold v. County Court of Rock County, 51 Wis. 2d 434, 
439-40, 187 N.W.2d 354 (1971); see also State ex rel. 
Peckham v. Krenke, 229 Wis. 2d 778, 787, 601 N.W.2d 
287 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Verkuylen, 120 Wis. 2d 
59, 61, 352 N.W.2d 668 (Ct. App. 1984). 
Id., ¶15 (emphasis added). 
¶118 The Raflik court went on to explain that there is no 
specific statutory remedy provided for the failure to record a 
telephonic search warrant application under Wis. Stat. § 968.12.  
Id.  "Thus, the only question that remains is whether the 
failure to record the warrant application and the subsequent 
reconstruction of the application violated a constitutional 
right."  Id. 
¶119 In my view, a violation of Wis. Stat. § 968.12 
procedure permits but does not require the remedy of suppression 
in situations where an error by the state does not violate a 
constitutional right.  The decision whether to suppress evidence 
is informed by Wis. Stat. § 968.22, which reads: "Effect of 
technical irregularities.  No evidence seized under a search 
warrant shall be suppressed because of technical irregularities 
not affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." 
¶120 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.22 implies that evidence can be 
suppressed by a court if the court determines that a statutory 
irregularity cannot reasonably be described as "technical" or if 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.dtp 
 
 
9 
 
the statutory irregularity has affected the substantial rights 
of the defendant. 
¶121 This view is supported by the cases.  In State v. Tye, 
2001 WI 124, 248 Wis. 2d 530, 636 N.W.2d 473, the state obtained 
a search warrant for the defendant's residence.  Id., ¶4.  The 
state presented probable cause for the warrant to the court.  
Id., ¶5.  However, the investigator who prepared the affidavit 
to support the warrant failed to sign and swear to the truth of 
the affidavit.  Id.  The circuit court subsequently suppressed 
evidence seized at the residence.  Id., ¶2.  This court 
affirmed, concluding that the failure to sign the affidavit and 
swear to its truthfulness was "a matter of substance, not form, 
and it is an essential component of the Fourth Amendment and 
legal proceedings."  Id., ¶19.  The court's holding stated black 
letter law about the suppression of evidence obtained in 
violation of a defendant's constitutional rights. 
¶122 A different kind of defect was noted in State v. 
Meier, 60 Wis. 2d 452, 210 N.W.2d 685 (1973).  Police executed a 
search warrant for Meier's residence on Wednesday, April 26, 
1972, at 9 p.m.  Id. at 455.  The warrant was "returned" to the 
clerk of court on Monday, May 1, 1972, at 12:06 p.m.  Id.  Meier 
claimed that authorities had violated Wis. Stat. § 968.17 by 
failing to return the warrant "within 48 hours after execution" 
to the clerk designated in the warrant, and that evidence from 
the search had to be suppressed.  See id. at 456.  This court 
disagreed.  In computing time, the trial court excluded the 
weekend——the period from 4:30 p.m. Friday to 8 a.m. Monday——from 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.dtp 
 
 
10 
 
the 48-hour period.  Id. at 459.  The court said: "The trial 
court's construction of sec. 968.17, Stats., is reasonable in 
view of the fact that the time requirement contained therein is 
of a ministerial nature and that there is nothing in the record 
to indicate that the rights of the defendant were in any way 
prejudiced."  Id. at 459-60 (emphasis added). 
¶123 This 
theme 
was 
echoed 
in 
State 
v. 
Elam, 
68 
Wis. 2d 614, 229 N.W.2d 664 (1975), where the defendant moved to 
suppress evidence because a transcript of the search warrant 
testimony was not filed within the time limit——"within 5 days" 
after the execution of the search warrant——prescribed in Wis. 
Stat. § 968.17(2).  Id. at 618-19.  The trial court suppressed 
the evidence because the transcript was not filed until more 
than ten months after the execution of the warrant, even though 
it found the defendant was not prejudiced by the delay.  Id. at 
619.  This court reversed, saying: "[Wisconsin Stat. § 968.22], 
together 
with 
the 
finding 
of 
no 
prejudice 
to 
the 
defendant . . . would dispose of the issue. . . .  The time for 
filing . . . is . . . a ministerial duty, a violation of which 
does not invalidate the search absent prejudice to the rights of 
the defendant."  Id. at 620 (emphasis added). 
¶124 In State v. Nicholson, 174 Wis. 2d 542, 497 N.W.2d 791 
(Ct. App. 1993), police obtained a search warrant for an upper 
east apartment in a two-story, multi-family apartment building 
at 1512 State Street in Racine.  Id. at 544-45.  Although police 
executed the warrant at the correct apartment, the address 
turned out to be 1510 State Street, so that the address in the 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.dtp 
 
 
11 
 
warrant was not correct.  Id. at 545.  The circuit court and 
court of appeals upheld the warrant and refused to suppress 
evidence.  The court of appeals cited Wis. Stat. § 968.22 and 
stated: "The warrant's recital of the 1512 State Street address 
was a technical irregularity under the facts of this case.  We 
agree with the trial court that this irregularity did not affect 
any substantial right of Nicholson."  Id. at 549 (emphasis 
added) (footnote omitted). 
¶125 In the Raflik case, where the government mistakenly 
failed to record the application for a warrant by telephone, the 
circuit court did not suppress the evidence because the search 
warrant was grounded in probable cause, and the search was not 
unreasonable 
because 
the 
court 
promptly 
took 
steps 
to 
reconstruct the application.  Raflik, 248 Wis. 2d 593, ¶¶8-10.  
This court affirmed.  Id., ¶57.  The inadvertent failure to 
record the application did not prejudice the defendant.  See 
id., ¶¶42, 52.  
¶126 These 
cases, together with Wis. Stat. § 968.22, 
suggest that evidence must not be suppressed for a mere 
statutory violation or a technical irregularity of search 
warrant procedure unless the violation or irregularity is 
material or the violation or irregularity has prejudiced the 
defendant 
or 
affected the defendant's substantial rights.  
Conversely, if a statutory violation or statutory irregularity 
of search warrant procedure is material or if the violation or 
irregularity has prejudiced the defendant or affected the 
defendant's substantial rights, the court has implicit, if not 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.dtp 
 
 
12 
 
explicit, statutory authority to suppress the tainted evidence.  
Id.  This is not new ground.  It is a reasonable synthesis of 
prior law. 
¶127 Suppression 
of 
evidence 
is 
a 
drastic 
remedy.  
Suppression is required when evidence has been obtained in 
violation of a defendant's constitutional rights.  Raflik, 248 
Wis. 2d 593, ¶15.  Suppression of evidence obtained in violation 
of a statute is not permitted unless a statute either authorizes 
or requires suppression.  See id.; Verkuylen, 120 Wis. 2d at 61.   
¶128 In evaluating statutory irregularity with respect to a 
search warrant or a Wis. Stat. § 968.135 subpoena, the court 
should weigh the gravity of the statutory violation against the 
strong public interest in the availability of reliable evidence.  
See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 424 (1977) 
(weighing the deterrent effect of suppression against "the 
strong interest under any system of justice of making available 
to the trier of fact all concededly relevant and trustworthy 
evidence" (citation omitted)).  Suppression of evidence is 
intended to deter misconduct.  Raflik, 248 Wis. 2d 568, ¶15.  
The public interest is not served by the suppression of evidence 
resulting from conduct that is inadvertent or unintentional 
unless that conduct results in prejudice to the defendant. 
¶129 In this case, the State's misuse of the subpoena 
statutes was serious and material, not technical.  The State 
used the wrong subpoena forms, pursuant to the wrong statute 
(Wis. Stat. § 805.07), and it failed to accord the protections 
required by that wrong statute.  It could not bootstrap its 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.dtp 
 
 
13 
 
position by trying to bring the subpoenas under the applicable 
subpoena statute (Wis. Stat. § 968.135) because it totally 
disregarded the procedures and protections in that statute.  In 
addition, the defendant was prejudiced by the State's errors 
when she blurted out incriminating statements after being 
confronted with her improperly obtained bank records.  Finally, 
the court's authority was abused.  In this case, then, 
suppression of Popenhagen's statements is a sanction for the 
improper use of the subpoena power by the district attorney's 
office. 
IV 
¶130 The last sentence of Wis. Stat. § 968.135 should not 
be overlooked.  It reads: "This section does not limit or affect 
any other subpoena authority provided by law."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.135. 
¶131 In my view, the State is entitled to use Wis. Stat. 
§ 885.01 
for 
subpoenas 
duces 
tecum 
of 
bank 
records 
at 
Popenhagen's trial.  Popenhagen's bank records are business 
records.  These records can be obtained from the banks by 
following proper procedure.  The owners of Save More Foods and 
their insurer could also obtain Popenhagen's bank records if 
they sued her to recover their damages.  In short, excluding the 
defendant's statements will not permit the defendant to escape 
unscathed. 
V 
¶132 The circuit court's suppression of Popenhagen's bank 
records and incriminating statements was appropriate.  The State 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.dtp 
 
 
14 
 
used the wrong subpoena forms and followed the wrong procedure.  
As a result, its subpoenas were defective.  However, the State's 
subpoena access to these records is not limited to access under 
Wis. Stat. § 968.135.  The State is entitled to use Wis. Stat. 
§ 885.01(1) after it has filed a criminal charge.  The State can 
do over the subpoenas of the bank records.  It cannot do over 
its blunders in obtaining Popenhagen's statements.  Accordingly, 
I respectfully concur. 
 
 
 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
¶133 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).  The majority decision, which suppresses 
both the documents and the statements, proceeds much further 
than necessary.  I agree that the circuit court has authority to 
preclude the documents and to require the State to go through 
the correct process to obtain them for future use.  However, I 
disagree with doing so on a statutory or constitutional basis.  
If there is such authority to preclude the documents, it lies in 
the court's inherent authority to administer justice.  Under the 
facts presented, however, no authority exists for suppressing 
the statements. 
¶134 The majority finds that the statutory language calls 
for suppression as a remedy.  If the language of this statute 
provides for suppression, then almost any statute from this 
point forward does so as well.  That has never been the law.  
Moreover, no authority exists for going even further and 
suppressing the statements based on the statute, the fruit of 
the poisonous tree doctrine, or otherwise.  This is a good 
example of bad facts making bad law.   
¶135 The law is well established that unless the statute 
provides for suppression or unless constitutional protections 
exist, suppression is not a remedy.  The majority decision 
extends the law to unworkable standards and leaves a black hole 
with respect to the suppression of evidence.  Suppression law is 
no longer linked to the language of the statute, nor is it 
tethered to a constitutional right.  No longer is there any 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
stopping point to suppression.  As a result, I cannot join the 
majority and, instead, must concur in part and dissent in part. 
¶136 Under the unique facts of this case, the circuit court 
should have the authority to preclude the documents because the 
subpoena at issue was fatally defective: (1) the district 
attorney used the wrong subpoena (a civil subpoena was used by 
the district attorney in a criminal investigation); (2) the 
district attorney had no authority to obtain documents by using 
the civil statutes; while there is no record that this was done 
in bad faith, using the wrong subpoena and civil procedure were 
more than a scriveners' error; (3) although the record reflects 
that the investigating officer faxed a probable cause affidavit 
to the district attorney, nothing suggests that a probable cause 
affidavit was submitted to the court, and no such document is in 
the 
record; 
(4) 
nothing 
suggests 
that 
a 
probable 
cause 
determination was made by any judicial officer;1 (5) the 
documents sought were not returned through the circuit court but 
instead were returned directly to the State; and (6) all 
safeguards at the circuit court failed.   
                                                 
1 Not only was no probable cause found prior to the 
subpoenas being issued, but no subsequent opportunity existed 
for a judicial officer to correct this problem.  In this case, 
Judge Kinney signed the civil subpoena that produced the bank 
records from F&M Bank and used in eliciting incriminating 
statements from the defendant.  No probable cause affidavit was 
attached to that subpoena.  Judge Mangerson presided over the 
subsequent 
suppression 
hearing. 
 
However, 
because 
Judge 
Mangerson did not sign the subpoena at issue and no probable 
cause affidavit was provided to him, Judge Mangerson could not 
make a finding of probable cause or correct the record as to why 
the subpoena was issued.  There is nothing in the record to 
indicate that the criminal process was utilized.   
No.  2006AP1114-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
I. SUBPOENA POWER IN WISCONSIN 
¶137 In short, the State had no authority to obtain the 
documents by using purely a civil subpoena process in a criminal 
investigation.  When a court realizes that it issued a subpoena 
without any authority, it can and should quash the subpoena 
under its own authority in the administration of justice.2  So 
long as there is no bad faith, the court may then require the 
State to use the correct process to obtain the records by 
subpoena.  From this record, there is no bad faith by any 
person.  The State made mistakes in obtaining the subpoena, and 
the court made mistakes in signing the subpoena under the wrong 
authority and without a probable cause affidavit.   
¶138 The State utilized a civil subpoena statute, Wis. 
Stat. § 805.07, to subpoena the defendant's bank records.  
Nowhere in the subpoena does the State cite the criminal 
statute.  The State may not circumvent the criminal process by 
                                                 
2 Although inherent authority was not utilized by the 
circuit court in this case, we should remand with directions 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
consider 
utilizing 
its 
inherent 
authority. 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.akz 
 
4 
 
using civil subpoena statutes.3  The criminal law has its own 
subpoena statutes, which the State was required to use. 
¶139 The Wisconsin criminal code specifically provides that 
chapter 885, Witnesses and Oral Testimony, "shall apply in all 
criminal proceedings."  Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1).  As a result, 
any attorney, including the district attorney, may secure a 
witness to testify at a hearing.  Wis. Stat. § 885.01.4  By 
                                                 
3 Perhaps the argument in favor of allowing the State to use 
civil subpoena statutes arises out of Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1), 
which makes the rules of civil actions applicable to all 
criminal proceedings.  However, this is impermissible when the 
"context of a section or rule manifestly requires a different 
construction." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 972.11(1). 
 
A 
different 
construction is required in this case.  The criminal law has its 
own subpoena statutes, and therefore, it does not need to rely 
on, nor should it rely on, civil subpoena statutes.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 972.11(1) (stating chapter 885 shall apply to criminal 
proceedings); Wis. Stat. § 885.01 (providing subpoena power); 
Wis. Stat. § 968.135 (providing criminal investigative subpoena 
power). 
4 Section 24.11 of Wisconsin Criminal Practice and Procedure 
states in relevant part: 
The "subpoena power" is the authority to require 
"the attendance of any witness, residing or being in 
any part of this state, to testify in any matter or 
cause pending or triable. . . ."  Compelling a witness 
to appear in a Wisconsin court may be accomplished by 
any attorney practicing before that court.  This 
situation exists because W.S.A. 757.01(1)2 bestows 
subpoena power on all state courts of record, and 
W.S.A. 885.01(1)3 permits issuance of subpoenas by 
"any judge or clerk of a court or court commissioner 
or municipal judge" within that officer's or the 
appropriate court's jurisdiction.  W.S.A. 757.355 then 
provides that the clerk of any court of record may 
deliver blank, pre-signed and sealed process forms to 
any attorney practicing before that court.  Upon 
completion by the attorney, these documents have the 
same force as they would if they were perfected by the 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.akz 
 
5 
 
virtue of Wis. Stat. §§ 885.01 and .02, an attorney, including a 
district attorney, may require a witness to bring documents with 
him or her to a scheduled hearing.   
¶140 The district attorney possesses additional subpoena 
power by virtue of Wis. Stat. § 968.135.5  This subpoena power is 
meant to enhance the investigative powers of law enforcement.  
It can be used before a crime is even charged and no scheduled 
hearing is required.  However, because § 968.135 bestows upon 
the State great power, certain safeguards apply such as a court 
finding probable cause, documents being returned to the court, 
and providing the circuit court the power to completely quash or 
limit the subpoena. 
¶141 The State, in this case, should have used Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.135 rather than Wis. Stat. § 805.07——a civil subpoena 
                                                                                                                                                             
clerk.  Utilizing this procedure, attorneys practicing 
in Wisconsin have subpoena power. 
The 
Wisconsin 
attorney 
general 
and 
district 
attorneys, or persons acting in their stead, may also 
statutorily sign and issue subpoenas to compel the 
appearance of witnesses in any court or before any 
magistrate, from any part of the state, on behalf of 
the state.  Similarly, under the Children's Code, a 
juvenile who is alleged to have performed a delinquent 
act must be informed by the intake worker that the 
juvenile 
has 
a 
"right 
to 
present 
and 
subpoena 
witnesses." 
9 Christine M. Wiseman, Nicholas L. Chiarkas, & Daniel D. 
Blinka, Criminal Practice and Procedure § 24.11 (1996) (internal 
footnotes omitted). 
5 See 9 Wiseman et al., supra, § 24.16. 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.akz 
 
6 
 
statute meant for civil litigants.6  Because the State should 
have used Wis. Stat. § 968.135, the majority looks to that 
statute for a remedy.  However, the record does not support that 
§ 968.135 was ever used.  This was not a mere scriveners' error 
or malfunctioning tape recorder; this was a subpoena, which at 
every juncture of the entire process, was defective. 
II. DEFECTIVE SUBPOENA 
¶142 The 
State's 
subpoena 
was 
fatally 
defective.  
Absolutely nothing was done correctly with respect to this 
subpoena.  The district attorney had no authority to request it, 
and the judge should not have signed it.  If there is a remedy 
for this unusual statutory violation, it lies in the court's 
inherent authority to administer justice since the legislature 
did not provide for suppression as a remedy in the statute and 
the violation did not invoke constitutional protections.  The 
proper remedy in a case like this, where no bad faith exists, is 
to permit the judge——when the error is discovered——to quash the 
subpoena and require the State to subsequently seek the 
documents through a properly enforced subpoena.  In finding that 
Wis. Stat. § 968.135 calls for suppression of the documents——and 
ultimately the statements——the majority weaves a remedy that 
unravels years of precedent.7   
                                                 
6 See 9 Wiseman et al., supra, § 24.11, n.6 (stating that 
"[i]n civil cases, attorneys have subpoena power under Wis. 
Stat. § 805.07"). 
7 See Justice Roggensack's dissent, ¶165. 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.akz 
 
7 
 
¶143 A circuit court judge has the authority to quash a 
subpoena that is defective.8  In this case, the defective 
subpoena was in part due to the circuit court's own errors.  It 
is nonsensical to not allow a circuit court judge to remedy such 
a procedural error.  It is unnecessary to undertake the 
majority's analysis.  In this case, the subpoena was fatally 
defective in a number of ways.  The State may never utilize 
civil subpoena statutes for a criminal investigation.  Probable 
cause is always required when utilizing criminal investigative 
subpoenas.  There is a procedure for which evidence is returned 
to the circuit court.  It is logical that a circuit court should 
be able to use inherent authority to right such a wrong and 
require the State to obtain the documents through the proper 
                                                 
8 See City of Sun Prairie v. Davis, 226 Wis. 2d 738, 749-50, 
595 N.W.2d 635 (1999) (citing to a number of cases and stating 
"the court exercises inherent authority i[n] ensuring that the 
court functions efficiently and effectively to provide the fair 
administration of justice"); State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 
44, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982) (discussing inherent powers, which are 
"those powers which must necessarily be used by the various 
departments of government in order that they may efficiently 
perform the functions imposed upon them by the people").  See, 
e.g., Marth v. Hevier, No. 81-1639, unpublished slip op. at 2 
(Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 1982) (as an example of the trial court 
quashing a subpoena issued under Wis. Stat. § 805.07 because it 
was defective as to form since it was directed to a corporation 
rather than an individual); In re Grand Jury Proceedings of June 
16, 1981, 519 F.Supp. 791, 795 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (exercising the 
"inherent powers th[e] court possesses to supervise the grand 
jury and quash th[e] subpoena"); People v. Hart, 552 N.E.2d 1, 4 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (allowing the trial court to quash a 
subpoena that was defective because it allowed documents to be 
returned directly to the district attorney rather than through 
the court); James v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 206 F.R.D. 15, 
18 (D.D.C. 2002) (allowing trial court to quash service of 
process because the defendant served the wrong person). 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.akz 
 
8 
 
means.  Once the subpoena is quashed, and if no bad faith 
exists, the State may seek the same documents through a proper 
subpoena.   
¶144 The majority eliminates longstanding precedent that 
suppression is required only if the statute specifically 
provides for suppression.  Majority op., ¶¶57-71.  The majority 
questions whether any justification exists for such a rule.  
Majority op., ¶70.  We, however, need not look any further than 
well respected and accepted principles of statutory construction 
and interpretation for justification.  When the legislature 
intends to provide suppression for a statutory remedy, it 
specifically does so,9 and if it does not, this court should not 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 968.30(9)(a).  It provides in 
part:  
Any aggrieved person . . . may move before the 
trial court or the court granting the original warrant 
to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire, 
electronic or oral communication . . . . 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.akz 
 
9 
 
insert words into the statute.10  Rather, when no suppression 
remedy exists in the statute, a statutory violation——and thus 
most likely a procedural violation——should be corrected by 
ordering the violator to repeat the process or procedure in a 
manner 
that 
complies 
with 
the 
statute. 
 
Suppression 
is 
appropriate for constitutional violations, which by their very 
nature are serious violations, and suppression is appropriate 
when the legislature deems a statutory violation so significant 
that permanent exclusion is appropriate. 
¶145 Here, the majority is making new law.  No case has 
ever suppressed evidence without specific statutory authority 
unless there has been a constitutional violation.  With this new 
basis for suppression, is there any stopping point?  Is anything 
attenuated?  If something is suppressed in a case, does that now 
mean that anything obtained thereafter is suppressed?  If not, 
                                                 
10 See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 
2004 WI 58, ¶39, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (citing to the 
United States Supreme Court, Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 
503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992), asserting that "[w]e have stated 
time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says 
in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says 
there"); 2A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and 
Statutory 
Construction (7th ed. 2007) (§ 46.3, "Expressed 
intent," stating "[w]hat a legislature says in the text of a 
statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative 
intent or will"; § 46.6, "Each word given effect," stating "it 
is also the case that every word excluded from a statute must be 
presumed to have been excluded for a purpose"; § 47.23, 
"Expressio unius est exclusio alterius," stating "where a form 
of conduct, . . . there is an inference that all omissions 
should be understood as exclusions"; § 47.38, "Insertion of 
words," stating "[i]n construing a statute, it is always safer 
not to add to or subtract from the language of a statute unless 
imperatively required to make it a rational statute") (internal 
footnotes omitted). 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.akz 
 
10 
 
why not?  What is the standard?  For example, if law enforcement 
obtains a lead in an investigation and that evidence is later 
found to be inadmissible, is all evidence obtained thereafter 
suppressed because officers built a case based upon various 
leads?  Is law enforcement now required to obtain an independent 
basis for the admission of each piece of evidence for fear that 
something earlier may be suppressed? 
¶146 In order to suppress the documents, the majority 
decides that suppression is allowed under Wis. Stat. § 968.135.  
However, § 968.135 was never utilized by the State to subpoena 
the documents or by the court that issued the subpoena.  From 
the record, the State and the court relied solely on the civil 
statute and procedure to subpoena the documents——Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.07.  Instead of deciding the case on the basis that there 
exists no authority to so subpoena the documents civilly, the 
majority contorts this into a criminal subpoena.  It is not.  
The subpoena was fatally defective. 
III. FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE DOCTRINE 
¶147 The majority takes the extra step of suppressing the 
statements 
that 
were 
obtained 
when 
the 
defendant 
was 
subsequently shown the bank documents.  While the majority 
frames its analysis under the auspices of statutory authority, 
it really does so by an unprecedented application of the fruit 
of the poisonous tree doctrine.  In so doing, the majority 
undermines longstanding case law.  There is no legal support for 
the proposition that the court can suppress the statements as 
fruit of the poisonous tree or, as the majority has now done, 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.akz 
 
11 
 
under the language of the statute.  The statute at issue does 
not list suppression as a remedy and the fruit of the poisonous 
tree doctrine has never been extended to a statutory violation.  
Unlike using its inherent authority in the administration of 
justice to quash the improperly issued subpoena, the court's 
inherent authority does not extend to suppressing the attenuated 
statements, especially where there is no bad faith.  In order to 
suppress the statements there must be authority in the statute 
or in constitutional law.  No such authority exists here.   
¶148 We have no reason to believe that law enforcement 
acted in bad faith to obtain the documents.  There is no reason 
to believe that law enforcement used the documents in bad faith.  
The majority suppresses the statements by finding that there was 
a statutory violation in obtaining the documents in the first 
instance; it then suppresses the "fruit" of the "poisonous 
tree"——the statements derived from the use of those documents.  
¶149 The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine has never 
been applied to suppress statements elicited by virtue of a 
defendant being shown documents obtained from a faulty civil 
subpoena.  This doctrine applies to constitutional violations, 
and no constitutional violation has occurred in this case.  
It is true that evidence obtained as a direct result 
of 
a 
violation 
of 
a 
constitutional 
right 
is 
inadmissible and the exclusionary rule applies to 
intangible evidence as well as tangible evidence, such 
as statements following an unlawful arrest or entry.  
Not only evidence obtained by the primary illegality 
is inadmissible but also derivative evidence if such 
evidence 
is 
obtained 
'by 
exploitation 
of 
that 
illegality.' 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.akz 
 
12 
 
State v. Schneidewind, 47 Wis. 2d 110, 118, 176 N.W.2d 303 
(1970).11  However, if the majority were to find a constitutional 
violation, our existing body of case law would be blurred beyond 
recognition.     
¶150 Suppression of derivative evidence does not occur 
every time a procedural mishap occurs with the subpoena process.  
In this case, there is no showing of bad faith on the part of 
law enforcement.  The majority fails to provide any direction to 
our circuit courts, district attorneys, defense lawyers, and law 
enforcement with regard to when a circuit court judge must 
"suppress" derivative evidence or when it simply can quash a 
subpoena that was issued without authority and order compliance 
with the statute at issue.  Surely not all procedural violations 
demand such drastic measures as the court prescribes in this 
case.   
                                                 
11 See also State v. Yang, 2000 WI App 63, ¶20, 233 Wis. 2d 
545, 608 N.W.2d 703 (stating that United States Supreme Court, 
"[i]n Elstad, the Court examined the fruit of the poisonous tree 
doctrine and determined that it only applies to a constitutional 
violation"); State v. Noble, 2002 WI 64, ¶¶7, 13, 29-31, 253 
Wis. 2d 206, 646 N.W.2d 38; but see Muetze v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 
117, 134-35, 243 N.W.2d 393 (1976) (applying the fruit of the 
poisonous tree doctrine to a statutory privilege violation that 
led to obtaining a search warrant without probable cause once 
the privileged information was excluded).  Muetze, however, is 
distinguishable from the case at hand because the statutory 
violation here did not directly lead to a constitutional 
violation. 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.akz 
 
13 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶151 The majority, instead of directly deciding the issue 
at hand, proceeds down a path of "correcting" law that does not 
need correction.  At the fault of both the State and the circuit 
court, a fatally defective subpoena was issued.  The State had 
no authority to use the subpoena, and the court had no authority 
to issue the requested subpoena.  This case does not call upon 
us 
to 
decide 
whether 
our 
current 
case 
law 
needs 
any 
clarification or changing with regard to when suppression is 
permitted.  Because of the majority's decision, the law has been 
contorted to fit an outcome.  Longstanding precedent is called 
into question.  Courts and law enforcement are left with 
uncertainty.  
¶152 The proper remedy in a case such as this is to permit 
the judge——when the error is discovered——to quash the subpoena 
and require the State to subsequently seek the documents through 
a properly enforced subpoena.  The State should be able to 
reissue the subpoena and obtain the documents lawfully, but the 
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine should not be applied under 
the guise of statutory interpretation in order to suppress the 
statements.  In giving proper respect to precedent, there is no 
other authority upon which the documents can be suppressed.  
There is no authority to suppress the statements. 
¶153 While the circuit court did not invoke its inherent 
authority in the case at hand because it had improperly 
suppressed based upon a constitutional expectation of privacy in 
bank records, we should remand to the circuit court with 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.akz 
 
14 
 
instructions that no such expectation of privacy exists12 and the 
proper remedy can be found under its inherent authority as 
articulated throughout this opinion.     
¶154 For the foregoing reasons, I concur in part and 
dissent in part. 
 
                                                 
12 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); State v. 
Swift, 173 Wis. 2d 870, 496 N.W.2d 713 (Ct. App. 1993). 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶155 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (dissenting).   We are 
asked to review a court of appeals decision reversing the 
circuit court's order (1) suppressing bank records that were 
subpoenaed and produced without a finding of probable cause, 
which 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 968.135 
(2005-06)1 
requires, 
and 
(2) 
suppressing 
Michelle 
Popenhagen's 
subsequent 
incriminating 
statements.   
¶156 I dissent from the majority opinion because I conclude 
that controlling precedent, as established more than 20 years 
ago by the appellate courts of this state, precludes suppressing 
Popenhagen's bank records and her subsequent incriminating 
statements.  I reach this conclusion because:  (1) Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.135 does not authorize the suppression of Popenhagen's 
bank records as a remedy for the circuit court's failure to find 
probable cause that the bank records were linked to the 
commission of a crime; and (2) Popenhagen has no privacy right 
in her bank records under either the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution or Article I, Section 11 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  Accordingly, I would affirm the court 
of 
appeals 
decision 
that 
overturned 
the 
circuit 
court's 
suppression of evidence, and I respectfully dissent from the 
majority opinion that upholds suppression of Popenhagen's bank 
records and her subsequent incriminating statements. 
                                                 
1 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
2 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶157 While Popenhagen was an employee of Save-More Foods in 
Minocqua, the owner, Brian Krueger, suspected that she was 
stealing from the store.  Krueger reported to the Minocqua 
Police Department that Popenhagen cashed checks at the store 
that she drew on accounts containing insufficient funds.  
Krueger also alleged that Popenhagen had stolen money from the 
store's automated teller machine.  According to the criminal 
complaint and the attached police reports, it is alleged that 
Popenhagen stole approximately $29,000 from her employer. 
¶158 To further their investigation of the matter, the 
Minocqua Police sought to obtain Popenhagen's bank records 
through criminal subpoenas under Wis. Stat. § 968.135.  To that 
end, in compliance with § 968.135, a police officer completed an 
affidavit showing probable cause that the records sought were 
linked to the commission of a crime.  However, when the requests 
for the subpoenas were made, the affidavit showing probable 
cause apparently was not presented to the two judges who issued 
the subpoenas.2     
¶159 All three banks complied with the subpoenas by 
delivering Popenhagen's bank statements, deposit slips and 
cancelled checks to the Oneida Police Department.  Oneida police 
officers then interviewed Popenhagen.  She initially denied that 
she had stolen money from Save-More, but after the police 
confronted Popenhagen with her bank records, which revealed that 
                                                 
2 Circuit court Judges Robert Kinney and Mark Mangerson of 
Oneida County signed the subpoenas directed to three banks where 
Popenhagen held accounts. 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
3 
 
her deposit amounts closely corresponded to amounts missing from 
Save-More, she made several incriminating statements.3   
¶160 Popenhagen was charged with theft of more than 
$10,000, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 943.20(1)(b) and (3)(c).  In a 
pretrial motion, she moved to suppress both her bank records and 
her incriminating statements.  The circuit court granted her 
motion to suppress, ruling that the State obtained her bank 
records 
in 
violation 
of 
Popenhagen's 
federal 
and 
state 
constitutional right of privacy and in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.135. 
¶161 The State appealed the circuit court's decision, and 
in a two-to-one decision, the court of appeals reversed.  The 
majority concluded that neither the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution nor Article I, Section 11 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution accorded Popenhagen a right of privacy in 
her bank records; and therefore, it was error to suppress them.  
In addition, although the issuance of subpoenas without a 
finding of probable cause conflicts with the provisions of Wis. 
Stat. § 968.135, the court of appeals ruled that suppression was 
not proper because § 968.135 does not authorize suppression as a 
remedy, as Wisconsin precedent requires.   
                                                 
3 There is no transcript in the record of precisely what 
Popenhagen said; her statements are recounted in summary fashion 
in the September 19, 2004 police report prepared by Officer Todd 
G. Hanson and provided in the record.  Officer Hanson states in 
that report that, upon being confronted with her bank records, 
Popenhagen explained that "she didn't know why she did this" and 
that "she always thought she might get caught."  According to 
Officer Hanson's report, Popenhagen further stated that "she 
used some of the money to pay the mortgage and to pay on some 
judgments against her." 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
4 
 
¶162 On review before this court, Popenhagen advances four 
arguments to support her assertion that her bank records and her 
incriminating statements must be suppressed.  First, Popenhagen 
argues that because Wis. Stat. § 968.135 requires a finding of 
probable cause before a subpoena is issued thereunder, she has a 
statutory "expectation of privacy" in her bank records which was 
violated when these subpoenas were issued.  Second, Popenhagen 
contends that the issuance of the subpoenas without a finding of 
probable cause is a misuse of process that necessitates 
suppressing her bank records and incriminating statements.  
Third, she contends that she has a Fourth Amendment right of 
privacy in her bank records because the holding of United States 
v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), is no longer good law.  Fourth, 
she encourages this court to interpret Article I, Section 11 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution independently of Fourth Amendment 
interpretations, and to hold that there is a constitutional 
right 
of 
privacy 
in 
bank 
records 
under 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  The majority opinion reverses the court of 
appeals and upholds the suppression of evidence based on 
Popenhagen's first contention.4 
                                                 
4 Majority op., ¶¶4-5. 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
5 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶163 Resolution 
of 
this 
case 
requires 
the 
court 
to 
interpret Wis. Stat. § 968.135, as well as the federal and state 
constitutions.  We independently review questions of statutory 
interpretation.  State v. Fisher, 2006 WI 44, ¶4, 290 Wis. 2d 
121, 714 N.W.2d 495.  We also review independently questions of 
constitutional interpretation.  Schilling v. Crime Victims 
Rights Bd., 2005 WI 17, ¶12, 278 Wis. 2d 216, 692 N.W.2d 623.  
Whether 
to 
grant 
a 
motion 
to 
suppress 
evidence 
is 
a 
discretionary determination of the circuit court.  State v. 
Keith, 216 Wis. 2d 61, 68, 573 N.W.2d 888 (Ct. App. 1997).  
Therefore, we will overturn an evidentiary decision of the 
circuit court only if that court erroneously exercised its 
discretion.  Id. at 69. 
B. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 968.135 
 
1. 
Suppression precedent 
¶164 Judges 
formulated 
the 
discretionary 
remedy 
of 
suppression to deter unreasonable or bad-faith police conduct 
that resulted in the violation of a defendant's constitutional 
rights.  Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976).  Suppression 
is not automatically accorded as a remedy, even when a 
constitutional right has been impaired; rather, suppression of 
evidence is weighed against "depriving the court or jury of 
relevant evidence, endangering society, and allowing the guilty 
to go free."  State v. Verkuylen, 120 Wis. 2d 59, 60-61, 352 
N.W.2d 668 (Ct. App. 1984).   
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
6 
 
¶165 The majority opinion concludes that Popenhagen is 
entitled to suppression of the bank records and her subsequent 
incriminating statements under Wis. Stat. § 968.135, even though 
there was no unreasonable or bad-faith police conduct and even 
though § 968.135 does not expressly authorize the remedy of 
suppression when a subpoena was issued without a finding of 
probable cause.5  In so concluding, the majority opinion effects 
an enormous change in the law of the state of Wisconsin that 
expands the rights of criminal defendants at the expense of 
effective prosecutions.  It does so by overruling more than 20 
years of precedent of this court and of the court of appeals.6  
This is so because for more than 20 years, suppression could be 
considered as a remedy only when a constitutional right was 
violated or a statute specifically authorized suppression as a 
remedy for the statutory violation.  See, e.g., State v. Noble, 
2002 WI 64, ¶13, 253 Wis. 2d 206, 646 N.W.2d 38 (concluding that 
suppression of Noble's testimony was not required because the 
violation "during the John Doe proceeding did not amount to 
either a constitutional violation or a statutory violation for 
which suppression is provided as a remedy"); State v. Raflik, 
2001 WI 129, ¶15, 248 Wis. 2d 593, 636 N.W.2d 690 (concluding 
                                                 
5 Id., ¶71.  
6 Majority op., ¶¶58–71.  In addition, Popenhagen did not 
request the sweeping change in the law that the majority opinion 
effects.  Nevertheless, the majority opinion uses this case as a 
vehicle to effect an enormous expansion of the rights of 
defendants in criminal cases at the expense of victims of 
crimes, where the failure to follow a statute was simply an 
error of law by a circuit court judge and no police misconduct 
is alleged to have occurred.   
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
7 
 
that "[s]uppression is only required when evidence has been 
obtained in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights 
. . . or if a statute specifically provides for the suppression 
remedy"); State v. Cash, 2004 WI App 63, ¶30, 271 Wis. 2d 451, 
677 N.W.2d 709 (concluding that "[W]rongfully or illegally 
obtained evidence is to be suppressed only where the evidence 
was obtained in violation of an individual's constitutional 
rights or in violation of a statute that expressly requires 
suppression as a sanction") (emphasis in Cash); State v. 
Repenshek, 2004 WI App 229, ¶24, 277 Wis. 2d 780, 691 N.W.2d 369 
(concluding that if suppression is to be available for a 
statutory violation, "the remedy sought for [a] statutory 
violation [must] be expressed in the relevant statute"); State 
v. Keith, 2003 WI App 47, ¶8, 260 Wis. 2d 592, 659 N.W.2d 403 
(concluding that "[s]uppression of evidence is only required 
when evidence has been obtained in violation of a defendant's 
constitutional rights, or if a statute specifically provides for 
the suppression remedy"); State v. Jackowski, 2001 WI App 187, 
¶17, 247 Wis. 2d 430, 633 N.W.2d 649 (concluding that "the 
exclusionary 
rule 
is 
applicable 
in 
civil 
and 
criminal 
proceedings only where the evidence sought to be excluded was 
obtained in violation of a constitutional right or a statute 
that 
specifically 
requires 
suppression 
of 
wrongfully 
or 
illegally obtained evidence as a sanction"); State ex rel. 
Peckham v. Krenke, 229 Wis. 2d 778, 787, 601 N.W.2d 287 (Ct. 
App. 1999) (concluding that "wrongfully or illegally obtained 
evidence is to be suppressed only where the evidence was 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
8 
 
obtained in violation of an individual's constitutional rights 
or in violation of a statute that expressly requires suppression 
as a sanction"); Verkuylen, 120 Wis. 2d at 61 (concluding that 
"[s]uppression is therefore required only upon a showing that 
evidence was obtained in violation of a constitutional right 
. . . or when a statute specifically requires suppression of 
illegally obtained evidence").   
¶166 State ex rel. Arnold v. County Court of Rock County, 
51 Wis. 2d 434, 187 N.W.2d 354 (1971), has been cited repeatedly 
for the proposition that evidence obtained as a result of a 
statutory violation may be suppressed, but only if the statute 
specifically authorizes suppression as a remedy.  See, e.g., 
Raflik, 248 Wis. 2d 593, ¶15; Verkuylen, 120 Wis. 2d at 61; 
State v. King, 142 Wis. 2d 207, 214 n.3, 418 N.W.2d 11 (Ct. App. 
1987).7  The majority opinion concludes that Raflik and Verkuylen 
were in error in citing Arnold for that proposition.8  However, 
as I will explain below, it is the majority opinion that is 
mistaken.  The majority recasts the Arnold opinion to provide 
support for suppression of evidence, when Arnold has correctly 
been cited to preclude suppression.  The courts in Raflik and in 
Verkuylen did not misconstrue Arnold, nor has any other court in 
more than 20 years.   
                                                 
7 State ex rel. Arnold v. County Court of Rock County, 51 
Wis. 2d 434, 187 N.W.2d 354 (1971) has also been cited by 
unpublished opinions for the same proposition.  See, e.g., State 
v. Harris, No. 83-143-CR, unpublished slip op., 1983 WL 161359 
at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 1983).   
8 Majority op., ¶¶58, 63, 67. 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
9 
 
¶167 Arnold arose under the Electronic Surveillance Control 
Law, Wis. Stat. § 968.27-.33, as an original action before this 
court.  Arnold, 51 Wis. 2d at 435.  The question presented was 
whether the Electronic Surveillance Control Law precluded the 
admission of four tape recordings as evidence in Arnold's trial.  
Id.    
¶168 Essential to a full understanding of Arnold is 
recognition that the trial court had denied Arnold's pretrial 
motion to suppress the tape recordings.  Id. at 436.  In denying 
his motion, the trial court explained, "it is not unlawful to 
intercept a wire or oral communication where a person is a party 
to the communication or where one of the parties to the 
communication has given prior consent."  If the wiretap had been 
"unlawful," Arnold apparently would have prevailed on his motion 
to suppress because Wis. Stat. § 968.30(9)(a) provides that 
"[a]ny aggrieved person . . . may move before the trial court 
. . . to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire, 
electronic or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, 
on 
the 
grounds 
that 
the 
communication 
was 
unlawfully 
intercepted."9   
¶169 However, as we relayed in Arnold, the Electronic 
Surveillance Control Law also provides that not all evidence 
that has been lawfully obtained by eavesdropping interceptions 
can be disclosed after it has been obtained.  Arnold, 51 Wis. 2d 
at 442.  As we explained, the Electronic Surveillance Control 
                                                 
9 The same substantive provision was in existence in 1971 
when Arnold was decided, although the form of the statute 
differed slightly.  Wis. Stat. § 968.30(9)(a) (1971-72). 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
10 
 
Law has two steps that must be met before the evidence obtained 
by wiretaps is eligible for admission in court:  (1) it must be 
lawfully obtained; and (2) it must be obtained by a means that 
also qualifies it for disclosure.  Id. at 442-43.  With regard 
to the latter, Wis. Stat. § 968.29(3) sets out parameters that 
must be met when conducting a wiretap before such evidence can 
be disclosed.  Id. at 442.  When evidence is admitted at trial, 
obviously it is "disclosed"; and therefore, only wiretap 
evidence that has been obtained in compliance with the statutory 
parameters described in § 968.29(3) may be admitted at trial.  
Id.  As our opinion relates in State v. Gilmore, 201 Wis. 2d 
820, 549 N.W.2d 401 (1996), "suppression of wire communications 
under [the Electronic Surveillance Control Law] is reserved for 
those 
communications 
illegally 
intercepted. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 968.30(9)(a)."  Id. at 839 (emphasis added).    
¶170 Even though the evidence at issue in Arnold was 
intercepted 
without 
court 
authorization, 
it 
was 
lawfully 
obtained because one of the parties to the conversation 
consented to the interception.  Arnold, 51 Wis. 2d at 442 
(citing Wis. Stat. § 968.31(2)(b)).  However, in considering all 
the relevant portions of the Electronic Surveillance Control 
Law, we concluded that "[i]nterception is one thing; disclosure 
as evidence in court is another."  Id.  We concluded that only 
evidence that is obtained after authorization by a court order 
can be disclosed; and therefore, it is only that evidence that 
may be admitted in court.  Id. at 443.   
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
11 
 
¶171 Because the evidence at issue in Arnold had been 
lawfully obtained, it was not appropriate to analyze whether the 
evidence should have been suppressed, as the trial court 
concluded 
in 
ruling 
on 
Arnold's 
motion 
to 
suppress 
the 
intercepted communications.  Instead, because the evidence in 
Arnold was lawfully obtained, thereby foreclosing Arnold from 
having the evidence suppressed, the relevant question was 
whether the evidence could be disclosed.  We ruled that the 
evidence could not be disclosed.  Id. at 444. 
¶172 Therefore, the majority opinion is revising history 
when it says that "in Arnold, the government did not comply with 
the statutory requirements to obtain the evidence in question."10  
As the trial court found when denying Arnold's suppression 
motion, law enforcement did comply with the statute in obtaining 
the evidence.   
¶173 Consequently, Raflik correctly cited Arnold for the 
proposition that suppression is an available remedy for a 
statutory violation only if the statute so provides, as Wis. 
Stat. § 968.30(9)(a) does when the evidence was not lawfully 
obtained.   
¶174 The majority opinion errs in its use of Arnold.  
Arnold does not support the majority opinion's assertion that 
"Arnold, correctly read, stands for the proposition that 
evidence obtained in violation of a statute (or not in 
accordance with the statute) may be suppressed under the statute 
to achieve the objectives of the statute, even though the 
                                                 
10 Majority op., ¶61. 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
12 
 
statute does not expressly provide for the suppression or 
exclusion of the evidence."11  The majority opinion ignores the 
factual history of Arnold.  As I explained above, Arnold's 
motion to suppress was denied because the evidence was not 
obtained in violation of the law; rather, the evidence was 
obtained in accordance with the statute that regulates the 
lawful means to obtain wiretap evidence.  Therefore, there was 
no statutory violation in obtaining the evidence.  The evidence 
simply did not meet a second statutory requirement, that 
relating to disclosure.  Of course, disclosure would have 
occurred if the evidence had been admitted at trial.  Arnold, 51 
Wis. 2d at 444.   
¶175 Therefore, in order for the decision in this case to 
be consistent with 20 years of prior precedent, including 
Arnold, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 968.135 
must 
expressly 
authorize 
suppression of evidence obtained without a finding of probable 
cause.  Raflik, 248 Wis. 2d 593, ¶15.  Section 968.135 does not 
authorize 
suppression; 
accordingly, 
the 
majority 
errs 
by 
allowing suppression for this statutory violation.  See id. 
¶176 The majority opinion affirms the suppression of two 
types 
of 
evidence: 
 
the 
bank 
records 
and 
Popenhagen's 
incriminating statements.  I begin with a discussion of the bank 
records.   
2. 
Bank records 
¶177 In deciding to exclude Popenhagen's bank records, the 
circuit court reasoned: 
                                                 
11 Id., ¶62. 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
13 
 
But it is clear to me that there is now a 
Federally– and Wisconsin–recognized right to privacy 
in one's personal banking records.  And I'm convinced 
that, obtaining those records over which there is an 
umbrella of privacy by violating 968.135 of the 
statutes, should result in suppression.   
We will not disturb an evidentiary ruling that suppresses 
evidence if the record shows that the circuit court, in making 
its ruling, exercised its discretion in accord with the correct 
legal standards and the facts of record.  State v. Clark, 179 
Wis. 2d 484, 490, 507 N.W.2d 172 (Ct. App. 1993).  The concern 
here is whether the circuit court applied the correct legal 
standard.  
¶178 Furthermore, 
courts 
do 
not 
necessarily 
suppress 
evidence that is obtained in violation of a statute that 
provides for suppression as a remedy.  State v. House, 2007 WI 
79, ¶38, 302 Wis. 2d 1, 734 N.W.2d 140 (concluding that even 
though 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 968.30(9)(a) 
specifically 
authorizes 
suppression 
as 
a 
remedy 
for 
violating 
the 
Electronic 
Surveillance 
Control 
Law, 
whether 
a 
violation 
"requires 
suppression depends upon whether the statutory purpose has been 
achieved despite the violation"); Arthur Best, Wigmore on 
Evidence § 2183a (2007-2 Cumulative Supp. 2008) (concluding that 
not all illegally obtained evidence should be suppressed).  
Therefore, whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion in suppressing Popenhagen's bank records initially 
turns on whether a Wisconsin appellate decision or some 
provision 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. § 968.135 specifically authorizes 
suppression; and if so, whether the circuit court gave a 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
14 
 
reasoned explanation for its decision.  Clark, 179 Wis. 2d at 
490.   
¶179 The first part of the resolution of this question 
rests 
with 
the 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 968.135.  
Statutory interpretation commences with the language of the 
statute, as it is our obligation to determine what the 
legislature meant by the statute it enacted.  State ex rel. 
Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  We assume that the legislative 
meaning is expressed in the words chosen.  Id., ¶44.  The 
context in which the operative language appears is important too 
because a statute's meaning may be affected by the context in 
which the words chosen by the legislature are used.  Id., ¶46.  
If our focus on the statute's language yields a plain, clear 
meaning, then there is no ambiguity, and the statute is applied 
according to its plain terms.  Id.  If the statutory language is 
unambiguous, it is unnecessary to consult extrinsic sources to 
facilitate interpretation.  Id.   
¶180 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.135 provides:  
Subpoena for documents.  Upon the request of the 
attorney general or a district attorney and upon a 
showing of probable cause under s. 968.12, a court 
shall issue a subpoena requiring the production of 
documents, 
as 
specified 
in 
s. 
968.13(2). 
 
The 
documents shall be returnable to the court which 
issued the subpoena.  Motions to the court, including, 
but not limited to, motions to quash or limit the 
subpoena, shall be addressed to the court which issued 
the subpoena.  Any person who unlawfully refuses to 
produce the documents may be compelled to do so as 
provided in ch. 785.  This section does not limit or 
affect any other subpoena authority provided by law. 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
15 
 
¶181 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.135 plainly provides for review 
of subpoenas to produce documents issued under its authority.  
It is silent in regard to verbal statements.  Accordingly, the 
statute does not regulate the production of verbal statements.   
¶182 The statute specifies two particular types of motions:  
to "quash"12 and to "limit."  It also includes the phrase, 
"including, but not limited to," which unambiguously directs 
that motions to quash or to limit do not constitute the universe 
of motions that are appropriately brought under Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.135.  However, that same phrase creates an ambiguity about 
what those unspecified motions may be.13    
¶183 Both specified motions under Wis. Stat. § 968.135 
appear to mean that the target of the subpoena's obligation to 
provide the documents requested may be reduced, prior to their 
production.  For example, a motion to "quash," if granted, will 
remove the obligation of the target of the subpoena to provide 
the documents sought.  A motion to "limit" may narrow the scope 
of the subpoena and thereby limit the target's obligation to 
produce some, but not all, of the documents.   
                                                 
12 Ordinarily, motions to quash must be made before the time 
specified in the subpoena for compliance.  See, e.g., Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 45; see also, 9A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2458 (3d ed. 2008).  
13 Because 
the 
statute is ambiguous, I may turn to 
"interpretive 
resources 
outside 
the 
statutory 
text" 
for 
guidance.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 
2004 WI 58, ¶50, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  It is 
customary to consult legislative history first.  However, the 
legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 968.135 is sparse and of no 
avail in interpreting the statute. 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
16 
 
¶184 Furthermore, Wis. Stat. § 968.135 is silent in regard 
to what should occur if records outside the scope of the 
subpoena are produced, if privileged documents are produced or 
if the subpoena itself is defective, as the circuit court found 
here.  State v. Swift, 173 Wis. 2d 870, 885-86, 496 N.W.2d 713 
(Ct. App. 1993).  Instead, the statute permits pre-compliance 
challenges to the subpoena.  At least one authority has 
instructed that "if the target [here, the banks] misinterprets 
the demands of the subpoena and produces more than what is 
sought, the state is free to inspect the additional documents."  
9 Christine M. Wiseman et al., Wisconsin Practice § 24.16 
(1996). 
¶185 The 
majority opinion observes the two statutory 
examples of motions that may be brought under Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.135 and then presents a lengthy discourse on the doctrine 
of ejusdem generis.14  Thereafter, it concludes, in one sentence, 
that the circuit court properly granted Popenhagen's motion to 
suppress the use of her bank records in the State's theft case 
against her.15   
                                                 
14 Majority op., ¶¶46-55. 
15 Id., ¶56.  The majority opinion does not bother to 
balance the rights of the victim from whom $29,000 was stolen 
with the right it claims Popenhagen has under Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.135.  It does not bother to note that the parties agree 
there was probable cause for the issuance of the subpoena and 
that law enforcement had made an affidavit in that regard before 
the subpoena was issued, but that through inadvertence, it was 
not 
presented 
to 
the 
judge. 
 
Instead, 
it 
automatically 
suppresses the evidence of Popenhagen's crime.  Even when a 
constitutional right has been violated, suppression does not 
automatically follow.  See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446 
(1974). 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
17 
 
¶186 In my view, the majority opinion errs in its statutory 
construction for at least two reasons:  (1) it overlooks the 
language chosen by the legislature in other laws that have 
authorized precluding the use of improperly obtained evidence at 
trial; and (2) it misperceives the nature of a Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.135 subpoena, which does not authorize either a search or 
a seizure.   
¶187 To illustrate the first point, I contrast Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.30(9)(a), the statute at issue in Arnold, with Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.135, the statute at issue here.  In § 968.30(9)(a), the 
legislature specifically authorized suppression as an available 
remedy when wiretap evidence was obtained in violation of the 
Electronic Surveillance Control Law, as we recognized in 
Gilmore.  Gilmore, 201 Wis. 2d at 839.  Section 968.30(9)(a) 
shows that the legislature knew how to authorize suppression 
when it chose to do so.  As is apparent, § 968.30(9)(a) 
specified that an "aggrieved person" may move "to suppress" 
evidence obtained by unlawful means and also to suppress 
"evidence derived" from unlawfully obtained evidence.  In 
addition, the temporal focus of § 968.30(9)(a) is on a time 
period after the State has already obtained the evidence.  By 
contrast, the temporal focus of the motions listed in § 968.135 
is on a time period before the target of the subpoena has 
complied by producing documents.  Stated otherwise, the focus of 
a § 968.135 motion is on limiting what the target of the 
subpoena is obligated to provide, not on the use of the 
documents after the target of the subpoena has provided them.  
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
18 
 
Swift, 173 Wis. 2d at 886 (concluding that "[b]ecause the 
additional bank records were not obtained by state action 
violating Swift's constitutional rights, Swift is not entitled 
to suppression of the additional bank records").   
¶188 Second, Wis. Stat. § 968.135 does not authorize either 
a search or a seizure.  A § 968.135 subpoena is not the 
equivalent of a search warrant.  A § 968.135 subpoena does not 
give law enforcement the authority to go into a place and seize 
things.  Rather, a § 968.135 subpoena is a demand for the 
production of documents that gives the target of the subpoena 
time to contemplate and to object in court to providing the 
things sought.  Id. at 885-86.  No person "seized" Popenhagen's 
bank records.  They were produced by the banks, who could have 
objected to that production.  In contrast, an electronic 
interception, 
for 
which 
the 
legislature 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 968.30(9)(a) has authorized suppression when the interception 
is unlawful, constitutes a search and seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment.  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 
(1967). 
¶189 Moreover, Wis. Stat. § 968.30(9)(a) is not the only 
statute in which the legislature meant to place limits on the 
admission of evidence obtained in violation of a statute.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 938.31(3)(b) also provides that a juvenile's 
statement taken "during a custodial interrogation is not 
admissible in evidence against the juvenile in any court 
proceeding alleging the juvenile to be delinquent," unless the 
juvenile's statement is taken in conformance with the statute's 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
19 
 
provisions.  The underlying concern for the interrogation of a 
juvenile in custody has constitutional roots.  The concern is 
that a juvenile in custody may be compelled to testify against 
himself; and therefore, certain safeguards are required in order 
to preserve his right against compelled self-incrimination.  
State v. Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 105, ¶30, 283 Wis. 2d 145, 699 
N.W.2d 110.  Therefore, in both instances where the legislature 
specifically has authorized the suppression of evidence because 
a statutory directive was not followed, the policy underlying 
the statute is the protection of a constitutional right.  
¶190 Accordingly, I conclude that when the legislature 
intended to authorize suppression as a remedy for non-compliance 
with a statute, it specifically stated that "suppression" was 
the remedy for that statutory violation.  See State v. 
Christensen, 2007 WI App 170, ¶17, 304 Wis. 2d 147, 737 N.W.2d 
38 
(interpreting 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 968.30(9)(a) 
as 
providing 
suppression for communications improperly intercepted).  In 
addition, in the statutes where the legislature authorized such 
a 
remedy, 
constitutional 
rights 
underlie 
the 
statutes.  
Therefore, I conclude that the legislature did not authorize the 
courts to suppress evidence that is obtained in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 968.135.   
¶191 In sum, because more than 20 years of precedent of the 
appellate courts of this state have required that the statute 
specifically authorize suppression as a remedy for a statutory 
violation before suppression may be employed, and because the 
legislature has not done so here, I conclude that the circuit 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
20 
 
court erroneously exercised its discretion when it suppressed 
Popenhagen's bank records based on the circuit court's failure 
to find probable cause to issue the subpoena.  As I have 
explained above, the majority opinion's analysis of the issue is 
not well reasoned; it ignores the procedures that occurred 
before the trial court in Arnold and does not identify any 
compelling interest that is served by overturning more than 20 
years of well established precedent.    
3. 
Incriminating statements 
¶192 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.135 is directed to documents.  
Verbal 
statements 
are 
not 
mentioned 
in 
the 
statute.  
Accordingly, the target of the subpoena has no obligation to 
produce verbal statements.  Therefore, a motion to "quash" and a 
motion to "limit" brought under the provisions of § 968.135 
could not affect a verbal statement.  Those motions affect only 
the scope of the production of documents.  However, the majority 
opinion upholds the circuit court's suppression of Popenhagen's 
incriminating statements, as well as the suppression of her bank 
records.16   
¶193 Because Popenhagen's incriminating statements were 
acquired indirectly as a result of the subpoena for her bank 
records, 
Popenhagen's 
statements 
constitute 
"derivative 
evidence."  State v. Gums, 69 Wis. 2d 513, 515, 230 N.W.2d 813 
(1975).  There is no statutory basis for excluding her 
statements because Wis. Stat. § 968.135, by its unambiguous 
                                                 
16 Majority op., ¶91. 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
21 
 
terms, applies only to "documents."  See Raflik, 248 Wis. 2d 
593, ¶15; see also Swift, 173 Wis. 2d at 886.   
¶194 Popenhagen 
does 
not 
argue 
that 
this 
derivative 
evidence should be suppressed because Wis. Stat. § 968.135 was 
violated.  Rather, she argues that suppression is warranted 
because bank records are protected under the state and federal 
constitutions.  Therefore, in order to have the authority to 
suppress Popenhagen's statements, we would be required to 
engraft the constitutional doctrine, "fruit of the poisonous 
tree," onto a statutory violation. 
¶195 The majority opinion does not address Popenhagen's 
constitutional argument.  Instead, it creates an argument that 
no party made, and then it decides the issue it created by 
concluding 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 968.135 
provides 
for 
the 
suppression of derivative evidence.17  The majority opinion cites 
no precedent for its conclusion.  Indeed, there is no precedent 
for such a decision.  To the contrary, there is 20 years of 
precedent against it, which the majority opinion discards 
without any reasoned discussion of why such a drastic step is 
necessary.  
¶196 To amplify the misguided nature of the majority's 
analysis, it is necessary to provide a brief sketch of the 
standard application of the exclusionary rule. 
¶197 The 
exclusionary 
rule 
may 
operate 
to 
suppress 
derivative evidence, such as Popenhagen's statements, when a 
constitutional 
violation 
has 
occurred 
"under 
certain 
                                                 
17 Id. 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
22 
 
circumstances, via the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, if 
such 
evidence 
is 
obtained 
'by 
exploitation 
of 
. . . 
illegality.'"  State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶24, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 
700 N.W.2d 899 (hereinafter referred to as Knapp II)18 (quoting 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485-88 (1963)).  The 
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is designed to "'deter 
future unlawful police conduct.'"  Id., ¶22 (quoting United 
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974)).  It is not 
employed when there has been no unreasonable and bad-faith 
police conduct.  Powell, 428 U.S. at 482; Knapp II, 285 Wis. 2d 
86, ¶¶74-75.   
¶198 In Knapp II, we excluded certain evidence based on 
police misconduct.  Knapp II, 285 Wis. 2d 86, ¶75.  Our decision 
was driven by law enforcement's intentional violation of Knapp's 
Miranda rights.  Id.  However, Knapp II stands in stark contrast 
with this case.  First, Knapp II is based on a Miranda 
violation, which is a judicially-created doctrine grounded in 
protecting a criminal defendant's constitutional right to remain 
silent.  Here, as I explain below, no constitutionally related 
issue is presented, and the majority opinion has referred to no 
violation of Popenhagen's constitutional rights.  Second, while 
Knapp 
II 
provides 
an 
example 
of 
circumstances 
in 
which 
application of the exclusionary rule furthers the policy of 
                                                 
18 State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 
899 (hereinafter referred to as Knapp II), is a second decision 
by this court, made after remand from the United States Supreme 
Court after it issued United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 
(2004). 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
23 
 
deterring deliberate, illegal police conduct, the case before us 
manifests the absence of any "need for deterrence."  Id., ¶74 
(quoting State v. Knapp, 2003 WI 121, ¶76 n.15, 265 Wis. 2d 278, 
666 N.W.2d 881 (hereinafter referred to as "Knapp I")).  
Instead, the parties agree that the police officers acted in 
accordance with the law and in good faith.  The error here was 
the circuit court's inadvertently failing to ask for the 
affidavit before signing the warrants.  
¶199 Even when a constitutional right has been affected, 
suppression 
of 
derivative 
evidence 
is 
not 
automatically 
accorded.  United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984).  The 
remedy of suppression of evidence "is designed to deter police 
misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and 
magistrates."  Id.   
¶200 No police misconduct is even alleged to have occurred 
here.  Instead, all agree that an officer involved in the 
investigation of the theft from Save-More had prepared a 
probable cause affidavit, but apparently, it did not reach the 
circuit court.  Judge Mangerson expressed surprise and dismay 
that his signature was affixed to a subpoena that did not 
comport with Wisconsin statute.  Courts have been loathe to 
exclude evidence obtained as a result of an error committed by a 
dispassionate jurist.  See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 
14-16 (1995); Leon, 468 U.S. at 916; United States v. Hickman, 
870 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Va. 1994).  Yet, the majority opinion 
does so here, and as a result, effective prosecution of 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
24 
 
Popenhagen for stealing more than $29,000 from her employer will 
be hampered significantly.  
¶201 Accordingly, it is an enormous expansion of the rights 
of a defendant in a criminal case to engraft the fruit of the 
poisonous tree doctrine onto a statutory violation where no 
constitutional right was also at issue and no police misconduct 
caused the violation.  However, that is exactly what the 
majority opinion does.19  The majority opinion is careful not to 
use the terminology associated with suppression of derivative 
evidence that arises from a constitutional violation, "the fruit 
of 
the poisonous 
tree," because it does not address a 
constitutional 
violation. 
 
However, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
achieves an end result that heretofore could be accomplished 
only when a constitutional violation had occurred or a statute 
specifically authorized suppression of derivative evidence, as 
Wis. Stat. § 968.30(9)(a) does.  By not naming the doctrine that 
it is actually applying, the majority opinion reminds me of a 
prior statement of Chief Justice Abrahamson:  "Like any 
illusionist's magical sleight of hand, the majority opinion is 
mystifying and puzzling, but ultimately not what it appears."  
State v. Sykes, 2005 WI 48, ¶48, 279 Wis. 2d 742, 695 N.W.2d 277 
(Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).  
¶202 Moreover, 
the 
inadvertent 
nature 
of 
the 
error 
committed here disposes of another of Popenhagen's arguments.  
She contends the lack of a finding of probable cause constitutes 
an abuse of process that demands suppression of her statements.  
                                                 
19 Majority op., ¶81-91. 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
25 
 
Popenhagen is incorrect.  Judge Mangerson's and Judge Kinney's 
unintentional errors lead to the conclusion that there is 
"nothing in the record to suggest that the judges[s] did not 
abide by [their respective] responsibilities in acting as . . . 
neutral and detached magistrate[s]."  Noble, 253 Wis. 2d 206, 
¶26.  Accordingly, there was no abuse of process that would 
support exclusion of her incriminating statements.  Id., ¶¶26-
27. 
¶203 Therefore, I conclude that Popenhagen's incriminating 
statements made to Oneida police officers after she was 
confronted with her bank records cannot be suppressed under the 
authority granted in Wis. Stat. § 968.135 because:  (1) 
§ 968.135, by its clear, unambiguous terms, applies only to 
documents; it has no application to verbal statements; (2) the 
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine may be applied only to 
constitutional violations; and (3) no abuse of process occurred.     
B. 
United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment 
¶204 One of the legal premises upon which the circuit court 
based 
its 
decision 
to 
suppress 
was 
its 
conclusion 
that 
Popenhagen had a constitutionally protected right of privacy in 
her bank records.  The Fourth Amendment protects persons from 
unreasonable searches of their "persons, houses, papers, and 
effects . . . ."20  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  The United States 
                                                 
20 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides in full:   
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects, 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
26 
 
Supreme Court held in Miller that the Fourth Amendment does not 
afford a right of privacy in a person's bank records.   
¶205 Miller emphasized that bank records are not the type 
of "papers" to which the Fourth Amendment refers.  Miller, 425 
U.S. at 440.  According to Miller, bank records are not "private 
papers" to which an account holder can assert "ownership" or 
"possession"; instead, they are business records belonging to 
the bank.  Id.  Moreover, bank records do not remain in the sole 
custody of the account holder, but rather reside in the custody 
of the financial institution.  Id. at 442.  Indeed, the records 
have been deliberately exposed to the public and "what a person 
knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection."  Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351).  
Furthermore, bank records 
are not confidential communications but [may be] 
negotiable 
instruments to be used in commercial 
transactions.  [Records such as] financial statements 
and 
deposit 
slips[] 
contain 
only 
information 
voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their 
employees in the ordinary course of business.  . . .  
The depositor takes the risk, in revealing [her] 
affairs to another, that the information will be 
conveyed by that person to the Government. 
Id. at 442-43. 
¶206 Popenhagen argues that Miller is not controlling 
because the enactment of the Right to Financial Privacy Act 
(Financial Privacy Act), 12 U.S.C. § 3401, et seq., effectively 
overruled it and, therefore, the Financial Privacy Act entitles 
                                                                                                                                                             
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
27 
 
citizens 
to 
a 
privacy 
interest 
in 
their 
bank 
records.  
Accordingly, Popenhagen argues that operation of the Financial 
Privacy Act mandates that her bank records and her inculpatory 
statements be excluded from evidence.  Popenhagen is mistaken. 
¶207 The Financial Privacy Act was indeed passed in 
response to Miller, but it does not render Miller any less 
robust in the present context.  While the Financial Privacy Act 
prescribes the means by which bank records may be obtained by a 
"Government authority," it defines Government authority as an 
"agency or department of the United States, or any officer, 
employee, or agent thereof."  12 U.S.C. § 3401(3).  Therefore, 
the Financial Privacy Act does not apply to subpoenas issued by 
a state court.  See id.; see also, In re Grand Jury 
Applications, 536 N.Y.S.2d 939, 942-43 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988); 
Nichols v. Council on Judicial Complaints, 615 P.2d 280, 282-83 
(Okla. 1980).   
¶208 Moreover, the remedy of suppression is unavailable 
under the Financial Privacy Act.  See 12 U.S.C. § 3417; see 
also, United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 52 (2d Cir. 1993); 
United States v. Kington, 801 F.2d 733, 737-38 (5th Cir. 1986), 
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1014 (1987); United States v. Frazin, 780 
F.2d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 844 
(1986).  Congress provided for injunctive relief and civil 
penalties for noncompliance, and those remedies are exclusive.  
12 U.S.C. § 3417.  In short, the Financial Privacy Act does not 
undercut the holding of Miller.  Miller rests on the Fourth 
Amendment and, as controlling Fourth Amendment precedent, it 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
28 
 
forecloses suppression of evidence in this case based on the 
United States Constitution. 
C. 
Wisconsin Constitution, Article I, Section 11 
¶209 Popenhagen encourages this court to recognize a right 
of privacy in bank records under the Wisconsin Constitution.  We 
interpret the Wisconsin Constitution in a manner that "give[s] 
effect to the intent of the framers and of the people who 
adopted it."  Schilling, 278 Wis. 2d 216, ¶13 (quoting State v. 
Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶10, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328).  To do 
so, we examine "the plain meaning of the words in the context 
used; the constitutional debates and the practices in existence 
at the time of the writing of the constitution; and the earliest 
interpretation of the provision by the legislature as manifested 
in the first law passed following adoption."  Id., ¶16 (quoting 
Wis. Citizens Concerned for Cranes & Doves v. DNR, 2004 WI 40, 
¶44, 270 Wis. 2d 318, 677 N.W.2d 612). 
¶210 The 
Wisconsin 
Constitution's 
search 
and 
seizure 
provision 
almost 
identically 
mirrors 
its 
federal 
Fourth 
Amendment counterpart.21  Historically, Wisconsin courts have 
"give[n] effect to the intent of the framers" of Article I, 
Section 11 by interpreting it to provide the same protections as 
                                                 
21 Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides:   
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable 
cause, 
supported 
by 
oath 
or 
affirmation, 
and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and 
the persons or things to be seized.   
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
29 
 
the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth 
Amendment as providing.  Id., ¶13 (quoting Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 
520, ¶10); see, e.g., State v. Malone, 2004 WI 108, ¶15, 274 
Wis. 2d 540, 683 N.W.2d 1 (concluding that the interpretation of 
Article I, Section 11 is consistent with the United States 
Supreme Court's jurisprudence construing the Fourth Amendment); 
State v. Guzman, 166 Wis. 2d 577, 586-87, 480 N.W.2d 446 (1992) 
(explaining that "we have consistently and routinely conformed 
the law of search and seizure under the Wisconsin Constitution 
to the law developed by the United States Supreme Court under 
the Fourth Amendment"); State v. Guy, 172 Wis. 2d 86, 93, 492 
N.W.2d 311 (1992) (conforming "Wisconsin's law of search and 
seizure to the law of search and seizure developed by the 
Supreme Court——in part because the text . . . is identical in 
all important respects"). 
¶211 However, 
under 
our 
authority 
to 
interpret 
the 
Wisconsin Constitution independently from the United States 
Constitution, we have not always marched in lockstep with 
federal jurisprudence.  For instance, we recently parted company 
with a plurality of the United States Supreme Court22 to hold 
under Wisconsin's Fifth Amendment analogue contained in Article 
I, Section 8, that evidence obtained as a result of an 
intentional Miranda23 violation must be suppressed.  Knapp II, 
285 Wis. 2d 86, ¶2.  However, Knapp does not stand for the 
proposition that we construe Article I, Section 11 more 
                                                 
22 Patane, 542 U.S. 630. 
23 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
30 
 
expansively than the United States Supreme Court has construed 
the Fourth Amendment.  As explained below, we have done so in 
only one case.  State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 
N.W.2d 625.  
¶212 Popenhagen urges this court to exercise its authority 
to independently interpret the Wisconsin Constitution and to 
construe Article I, Section 11 in a fashion that would depart 
from Miller to hold that the Wisconsin Constitution affords a 
right of privacy in one's bank records.  As support for her 
argument, Popenhagen points out that several states (California, 
Florida, 
Illinois, 
Washington, 
New 
Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, 
Colorado, and Utah) have rejected the holding of Miller and have 
adopted a right of privacy in bank records under their 
respective state constitutions.  A review of these decisions, 
however, reveals that the cases upon which they were based 
differ from this case in many respects.24 
                                                 
24 The California Supreme Court in Burrows v. Superior 
Court, 529 P.2d 590 (Cal. 1974), accorded persons a privacy 
interest in their bank records.  However, Burrows was decided 
two years prior to the United States Supreme Court's deciding 
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), and it was driven 
in part by the Fifth Circuit's soon-to-be-overturned holding in 
Miller that people have a right of privacy in regard to their 
bank 
records. 
 
Further 
distinguishing 
Burrows 
from 
the 
circumstances here is the California Constitution, which also 
contains an express right of privacy that is not present in the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  See Cal. Const. art. 1, § 1.   
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
31 
 
¶213 Utah, Colorado and Pennsylvania remain the only states 
post-Miller to recognize a privacy right in bank records under 
state constitutional provisions nearly identical to the Fourth 
Amendment.  State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991); Charnes 
v. DiGiacomo, 612 P.2d 1117 (Colo. 1980); Commonwealth v. 
DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1979).  Courts in these three states 
have adopted similar reasoning for departing from Miller:  
Customers of financial institutions expect that documents that 
they voluntarily transmit to those institutions will remain 
private; moreover, these courts reason, disclosures of one's 
financial 
affairs 
to 
these 
institutions 
are 
virtually 
unavoidable because the demands of modern society require people 
to maintain a bank account.  See, e.g., DeJohn, 403 A.2d at 1289 
(citing Burrows, 529 P.2d at 593.)    
                                                                                                                                                             
The Florida Supreme Court's decision in Winfield v. 
Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985), is 
similarly distinguishable because it was based primarily on 
Florida's state constitutional privacy provision.  Illinois has 
also seen fit to grant persons a right to privacy in their bank 
records under the state constitution, but under a search and 
seizure provision drafted more expansively than the Fourth 
Amendment.  People v. Jackson, 452 N.E.2d 85 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1983).  The Washington Constitution's search and seizure 
provision 
is 
also 
drafted 
more 
broadly 
than 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment, providing for broader protection of interests not 
provided under the United States Constitution, including a right 
to privacy in bank records.  State v. Miles, 156 P.3d 864 (Wash. 
2007).   
Although the New Jersey Supreme Court expressly held for 
the first time in 2005 that its state constitution provides an 
expectation of privacy in bank records, in so holding, it 
observed that New Jersey courts, like the California Supreme 
Court in Burrows, recognized a privacy interest in bank records 
that pre-dated Miller.  State v. McAllister, 875 A.2d 866 (N.J. 
2005). 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
32 
 
¶214 While we retain the authority to interpret our state 
constitution independently from the United States Constitution, 
I would decline to do so here.  I observe distinctions between 
our Article I, Section 8 jurisprudence and our Article I, 
Section 11 jurisprudence, and I am unpersuaded by Thompson, 
DiGiacomo, and DeJohn. 
¶215 First, our jurisprudence demonstrates that this court 
has construed Article I, Section 11 consistently with the Fourth 
Amendment.  In the nearly 160 years that Article I, Section 11 
has graced our state constitution, I located only one instance 
in which this court has interpreted that provision differently 
from the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.  
That case presented the question of whether, and to what extent, 
Wisconsin should recognize a "good faith" exception to the 
exclusionary rule under the state constitution.  Eason, 245 
Wis. 2d 206.  Otherwise, this court has manifested an unwavering 
commitment to interpreting Article I, Section 11 uniformly with 
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.  
Most pertinently with regard to the case at bar, we recently 
explained that "Article I, § 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
affords individuals no greater privacy expectations than those 
provided under the Fourth Amendment."  State v. Pallone, 2000 WI 
77, ¶81, 236 Wis. 2d 162, 613 N.W.2d 568. 
¶216 Second, I would decline to adopt the reasoning of 
Thompson, 
DiGiacomo, 
and 
DeJohn, 
or 
the 
substantive 
interpretations these courts applied to their respective state 
constitutions.  Those courts declined to follow Miller primarily 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
33 
 
because they found the reasoning of Justice Brennan's Miller 
dissent more persuasive than the reasoning offered by the Miller 
majority.  See, e.g., DeJohn, 403 A.2d at 1290; Miller, 425 U.S. 
at 447-53 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  In Swift, the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals implicitly rejected Justice Brennan's analysis, 
first 
by 
observing 
that 
we 
had 
recently 
reaffirmed 
our 
continuing commitment to interpreting Article I, Section 11 in 
conformity with the Fourth Amendment, and then by concluding 
that the defendant had no privacy interest in his bank records 
under the state constitution.  Swift, 173 Wis. 2d at 882-83.  
Accordingly, I conclude that bank customers have no expectation 
of privacy in their bank records because those records do not 
reside in the sole custody of the bank customer, but rather lie 
in the custody of the financial institution where they are 
expected to be viewed by others.  Miller, 425 U.S. at 442-43. 
¶217 In addition, when the language of the Wisconsin 
Constitution 
closely 
matches 
that 
of 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution, without clear expression from the framers of our 
state constitution indicating an intent to provide greater 
protections 
than 
those 
provided 
under 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution, we normally interpret the state constitution in 
accord with the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the 
federal Constitution.  See, e.g., State v. Agnello, 226 Wis. 2d 
164, 180-81, 593 N.W.2d 427 (1999) (concluding that where "the 
language 
of 
the 
provision 
in 
the 
state 
constitution 
is 
'virtually identical' to that of the federal provision or where 
no difference in intent is discernible, Wisconsin courts have 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
34 
 
normally construed the state constitution consistent with the 
United States Supreme Court's construction of the federal 
[C]onstitution.").  Accordingly, because the language of Article 
I, Section 11 almost identically mirrors the language of the 
Fourth Amendment, and the framers of the Wisconsin Constitution 
declared no intention that Article I, Section 11 should be 
interpreted more broadly than the Fourth Amendment, I would 
continue our practice of interpreting Article I, Section 11 in 
accord with the Fourth Amendment. 
¶218 The 
interests 
of 
consistency, 
uniformity, 
and 
predictability 
are 
well-served by continuing to interpret 
Article I, Section 11 in conformity with the Fourth Amendment.  
Such an approach "reduces to a minimum the confusion and 
uncertainty under which the police must operate."  State v. Fry, 
131 Wis. 2d 153, 175, 388 N.W.2d 565 (1986), cert. denied, 479 
U.S. 989 (1986).  Moreover, continuing to conform Wisconsin 
search and seizure law to federal search and seizure law "is not 
only consistent with the text of Wisconsin's search and seizure 
provision, its constitutional history and its judicial history, 
but it is also in accord with sound public policy."  Id. at 175-
76.  Accordingly, I conclude that Popenhagen does not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in her bank records under the 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
35 
 
Wisconsin Constitution.25  Therefore, the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides no basis for suppression.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶219 I conclude that controlling precedent, as established 
more than 20 years ago by the appellate courts of this state, 
precludes 
suppressing 
Popenhagen's 
bank 
records 
and 
her 
subsequent incriminating statements.  I reach this conclusion 
because:  (1) Wis. Stat. § 968.135 does not authorize the 
suppression of Popenhagen's bank records as a remedy for the 
circuit court's failure to find probable cause that the bank 
records were linked to the commission of a crime; and (2) 
                                                 
25 My conclusion is in accord with eight of the other states 
that have ruled on the issue.  State v. Schultz, 850 P.2d 818 
(Kan. 1993); Norkin v. Hoey, 586 N.Y.S.2d 926 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1992); State v. Klattenhoff, 801 P.2d 548 (Haw. 1990); State v. 
Union State Bank, 267 N.W.2d 777 (N.D. 1978); State v. Fredette, 
411 A.2d 65 (Me. 1979); State v. Melvin, 357 S.E.2d 379 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 1987); Cox v. State, 392 N.E.2d 496 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1979). 
Moreover, though not determinative, it is instructive that 
the Wisconsin Legislature has been aware of Miller's holding for 
31 years and State v. Swift, 173 Wis. 2d 870, 496 N.W.2d 713 
(Ct. App. 1993) for more than 14 years; yet, it has taken no 
action to amend the Wisconsin Constitution.   
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
36 
 
Popenhagen has no privacy right in her bank records under either 
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or 
Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.   
¶220 Accordingly, I would affirm the court of appeals 
decision that overturned the circuit court's suppression of 
evidence, and I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion 
that upholds suppression of Popenhagen's bank records and her 
subsequent incriminating statements.    
 
 
No.  2006AP1114-CR.pdr 
 
1