Title: State v. Sherwood

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Sherwood (2000-500); 174 Vt. 27; 800 A.2d 463

[Filed 19-Apr-2002]

[Motion for Reargument and Petition for Extraordinary and Injunctive Relief 
Denied 21-May-2002]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of  Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                No. 2000-500


State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 2, Addison Circuit

Mark K. Sherwood	                         October Term, 2001


Edward J. Cashman, J.

John T. Quinn, Addison County State's Attorney, Middlebury, for 
  Plaintiff-Appellee.

Robert Appel, Defender General, William A. Nelson, Appellate Attorney, and 
  Lori Lustberg (On the Brief), Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.


PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.


       AMESTOY, C.J.   In this appeal from defendant's conditional nolo
  contendere plea for  driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor
  ("DUI") we are asked to decide whether the State's  videotaping of
  defendant's telephone conversation with his attorney violates the statutory
  right to  counsel under 23 V.S.A. § 1202(c) warranting dismissal of the
  charges or suppression of defendant's  refusal to submit to a breath test. 
  Because we agree with the district court's determination that  defendant
  failed to demonstrate that the videotaping affected his consultation with
  his attorney, or  that the State made any use of the recording or
  information contained therein to defendant's  prejudice, we affirm.

 

       The undisputed facts establish that a state trooper observed
  defendant's vehicle speeding on  Route 7 in Salisbury, Vermont in the late
  evening of March 14, 2000.  The trooper pursued  defendant with his siren
  on and blue lights flashing.  After about a mile, defendant stopped his
  car,  and his passenger jumped out and fled.  The trooper drew his weapon
  and ordered defendant to  remain in the car fearing he might also attempt
  to flee.  During his initial conversation with  defendant, the trooper
  noted signs of intoxication.  The trooper thereafter administered roadside 
  dexterity tests and a preliminary breath test, which led the trooper to
  take defendant into custody to  process him for DUI at the state police
  barracks.  

       While the trooper went through the standard DUI processing procedure
  at the barracks,  defendant was handcuffed, although he was cooperative. 
  Defendant's handcuffs were removed  while he spoke to his attorney by
  telephone, and he was allowed to walk around the processing room  during
  the conversation.  The trooper moved about on the other side of the one
  open door to the  processing room, but did not monitor or overhear any of
  defendant's conversation.  The second door  to the processing room remained
  closed.  Another trooper was also in the building at the time and  passed
  by the open door; but like her colleague, she did not show any interest in
  defendant's  telephone conversation.  After consulting with counsel,
  defendant refused to provide an evidentiary  sample of his breath.

       Defendant's entire conversation with his attorney, like the entire
  processing, was videotaped.  The system also captured the sound, but
  defendant was unaware of that fact at the time.  The taping  comported with
  the trooper's standard practice of recording the whole processing event to
  eliminate  any possibility that a defendant could claim the State tampered
  with the tape.  Taping was also  generally done for security reasons.  In
  addition to the tape, the processing was televised on a 

 

  monitor in the sergeant's office, but no voices could be heard over the
  monitor because the sound  had been turned down.  No one in the barracks
  that evening watched the monitor during defendant's  conversation with his
  lawyer, however.

       After defendant learned of the existence of the videotape, which
  included a recording of the  conversation he had with his lawyer, he moved
  to dismiss the charges against him on the grounds  that the secret taping
  violated his right to a private consultation with a lawyer under 23 V.S.A.
  §  1202(c). (FN1)  In the alternative, defendant requested that the court
  suppress his refusal to supply a  breath sample.  The court denied both
  requests.  It found that although the State did not have a  legitimate
  security concern, defendant failed to show he was prejudiced by the
  trooper's surreptitious  taping.  The court found, based on defendant's
  testimony, that defendant thought his consultation  with counsel was
  meaningful and that he was not inhibited during the conversation.  The
  court also  found that defendant did not show that either the police or the
  prosecution made any use of the  recorded conversation to defendant's
  detriment.  The court noted its disapproval of the practice, but  concluded
  that neither dismissal nor suppression was justified under established
  precedent in the  absence of 

 

  some showing of prejudice.  Consequently, defendant entered a conditional
  plea of nolo contendere  and appealed the issue to this Court.

       We have had several occasions to define the scope of a person's right
  to counsel under 23  V.S.A. § 1202(c), including the standard by which to
  evaluate whether the State has violated that  right.  The statute mandates
  that a law enforcement officer permit a person from whom the officer  has
  requested a breath sample an opportunity to consult with a lawyer prior to
  deciding whether to  provide the sample.  23 V.S.A. § 1202(c); State v.
  Lombard, 146 Vt. 411, 415,