Title: TERENCE M. REIDY and MAUREEN T. (RIPPLE) REIDY v. STRATTON SHEEP COMPANY

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

TERENCE M. REIDY and MAUREEN T. (RIPPLE) REIDY v. STRATTON SHEEP COMPANY2006 WY 69135 P.3d 598Case Number: No. 05-194Decided: 06/02/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
                                                            

TERENCE 
M. REIDY and MAUREEN T. (RIPPLE) REIDY,

Appellants 
(Petitioners),

 
 
v.

 
 
STRATTON 
SHEEP COMPANY, a Wyoming corporation, 

Appellee 
(Respondent).

 

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCarbonCounty

The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellants:

            
Kermit 
C. Brown of Brown & Hiser, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming. 

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Catherine MacPherson of MacPherson, Kelly & Thompson, LLC, Rawlins, Wyoming. 

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Stratton Sheep 
Company's (Stratton) property in CarbonCounty adjoins a U.S. Forest Service 
road.  Claiming that road was not a 
public road and was not convenient given its proposed use of the property, 
Stratton applied to the Carbon County Board of County Commissioners (the board) 
for a private road across property belonging to Terence and Maureen Reidy (the 
Reidys) pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101 (LexisNexis 2001).  The board ruled Stratton had shown the 
private road was necessary and granted its petition, and the district court 
affirmed.  We conclude the board's 
order is not supported by the record and is inconsistent with Wyoming law.  Consequently, we reverse and remand to 
the district court directing the district court to enter an order reversing the 
order of the board and directing the board to deny the Stratton Sheep 
application for a private road.

 
 
 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      The Reidys 
present a comprehensive list of issues on appeal:

 
 

1.                  
Whether 
access is necessary because respondent Stratton Sheep Company has no legally 
enforceable access.

 
 

A.                 
Whether 
USFS 807 is a public road such that, under W.S. § 24-9-101(a), respondent 
Stratton Sheep Company has an outlet to, or connection with a public 
road.

 
 

B.                 
Whether 
the southern portion of Tract 49 is "surrounded on all sides by land owned by 
another person or persons or a natural or man-made barrier making access 
unreasonably costly."

 
 

2.                  
Whether 
respondent Stratton Sheep Company has satisfied the requirements of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 24-9-101 (LEXIS 2001).

 
 

3.                  
Whether 
the road established by the Carbon County Board of Commissioners in its Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (Appendix B) was necessitated by the 
requirement of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101 (LEXIS 2001) that the viewers and 
appraisers recommend "the most reasonable and convenient 
route[."]

 
 
Stratton 
rephrases the issues as:

 
 

1.                  
Was 
the action of the Carbon County Board of Commissioners which established a 
private road for Stratton Sheep Company across lands belonging to Appellants 
Reidy supported by substantial evidence in the record?

 
 

2.                  
Was 
the action of the Carbon County Board of Commissioners which established a 
private road for Stratton Sheep Company across lands belonging to Appellants 
Reidy in accordance with law?

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The Reidys own a 
dude ranch in CarbonCounty along the Wyoming-Colorado 
border.  Stratton owns a 160-acre 
parcel known as Tract 49, adjacent to the Reidys' property.  Over the years, Stratton has used Tract 
49 to graze its livestock.  In 
approximately 1996, Stratton began constructing corrals in the southern part of 
Tract 49 with plans to use the facility to transport cattle in and out of Tract 
49 by semi-truck and trailer.  Prior 
to that time, Stratton raised sheep and transported them to Tract 49 by pickup 
and stock trailer.  

 
 
[¶4]      Historically, 
Stratton accessed its property by using two different routes.  The route from the north involved 
traveling Wyoming State Highway 70 to a Forest Service road known as FS 807, 
which connects directly to the northern boundary of Tract 49 at a point 
approximately six and one-half to seven miles from Highway 70.  The second route is from the south.  In order to use that route, one must 
travel Colorado Routt County Road 129 to a road traversing the Reidys' private 
property for approximately one and one-quarter miles to the southern boundary of 
Tract 49.  This road passes through 
the Reidys' dude ranch headquarters.  
In the past, the Reidys and their predecessors allowed Stratton to travel 
the road over their private property to access the southern boundary of Tract 
49.  However, in 1997, the Reidys 
revoked permission for Stratton to cross its property.  They objected to Stratton's proposal to 
use semi-trucks to transport its cattle through the Reidys' dude ranch.   

 
 
[¶5]      Although the 
record is not entirely clear, apparently the proposed private road in this case 
will cover only a portion of the one and one-quarter mile long access road 
across the Reidy property. Stratton obtained a prescriptive easement over 
another portion of the road and plans to use the private road procedure in 
Colorado to 
obtain access over the portion of the road located in that state.      

 
 
[¶6]      Pursuant to § 
24-9-101, et. seq., the board held a 
hearing to determine whether Tract 49 was landlocked and a private road over the 
Reidys' property was necessary. The board concluded Stratton had successfully 
established the private road was necessary and appointed viewers and appraisers 
to locate the road and determine the amount of compensation due to the 
Reidys.  After the viewers and 
appraisers returned their recommendations, the board granted Stratton's private 
road petition.  The Reidys filed a 
petition for review with the district court, which affirmed the board's 
decision.   The Reidys filed a 
timely notice of appeal with this Court.    

 
 
 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶7]      The board's 
decision on an application for a private road under § 24-9-101 is subject to 
review under the Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act.   In reviewing the board's decision, 
we stand in the same position as the district court, and our 
review is governed by the considerations specified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2005).  Mayland v. Flitner, 2001 WY 69, ¶ 10, 28 P.3d 838, 843 (Wyo. 2001).  Section 
16-3-114(c) provides, in pertinent part:

 
 
            
(c) To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the 
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret 
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or 
applicability of the terms of an agency action.  In making the following determinations, 
the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party 
and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

 
 
            
* * *

 
 
            
(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions 
found to be:

(A) 
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law;

 
 
* * 
*

 
 
(E) 
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute.  

 
 
Both 
parties presented evidence in this case, and, consequently, we review the 
factual determinations of the board by applying the substantial evidence 
test.  Mayland, ¶ 10, 28 P.3d  at 843.  "Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions.  It is more than a 
scintilla of evidence."  Newman v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
and Comp. Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶ 12, 49 P.3d 163, 168 (Wyo. 2002), quoting State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety and Comp. 
Div. v. Jensen, 2001 WY 51, ¶ 10, 24 P.3d 1133, 1136 (Wyo. 2001).  See also, Elk Horn Ranch, Inc. v. Bd. of County 
Comm'rs, Crook County, 2002 WY 167, 57 P.3d 1218 (Wyo. 2002). 

 
 
[¶8]      The board's 
conclusions of law are not, however, entitled to the same deference as its 
factual findings.  No deference is 
given to its conclusions of law.  
"If the agency has not invoked and properly applied the correct rule of 
law, we are obligated to correct the error."  Mayland, ¶10, 28 P.3d  at 843, quoting Miller v. Bradley, 4 P.3d 882, 886 (Wyo. 
2000).

 
 
[¶9]      To review the 
board's determinations of ultimate fact, we apply the following standard: 

 
 
When an 
agency's determinations involve elements of law and fact, or ultimate facts, we 
do not give them the same deference we reserve for findings of basic fact.  Basin Electric Power Coop., Inc. v. Dep' t 
of Revenue, 970 P.2d 841, 850 (Wyo. 1998).  Instead, we separate the factual 
elements from the legal elements to determine whether the appropriate rule of 
law has been correctly applied to the facts and defer to the agency's ultimate 
factual finding only if there is no error in either stating or applying the 
law.  Id. at 
850-51.  

 
 

Amoco 
Prod. Co. v. State of Wyoming, Dep't of Revenue, 2004 
WY 89, ¶ 6, 94 P.3d 430, ¶ 6 (Wyo. 2004).  

 
 

Wyoming Dep't 
of Revenue v. Guthrie, 2005 WY 
79, 115 P.3d 1086 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
 
 
            

A.        Public Road

 
 
[¶10]   Section 24-9-101, et. seq., sets out the procedure for 
obtaining a private road and provides 
the sole remedy for land-locked landowners.  Ferguson Ranch, Inc. v. Murray, 811 P.2d 287, 290 (Wyo. 1991).  Section 24-9-101 states in relevant 
part:

 
 
(a) 
Any person whose land has no outlet to, nor connection with a public road, may 
file an application in writing with the board of county commissioners in the 
county where his land is located for a private road leading from his land to 
some convenient public road.  The 
application shall contain the following information:

            
(i) The legal description of the land owned by the applicant to which 
access is sought and a statement that the land is located within the 
county;

            
(ii) A specific statement as to why the land has no legally enforceable 
access, other than a waterway, and whether the land is surrounded on all sides 
by land owned by another person or persons or a natural or man-made barrier 
making access unreasonably costly;

            
(iii) A description of the applicant's efforts to purchase a legally 
enforceable access to a public road;

            
(iv) A description sufficient to identify the general location of any 
access routes proposed by the applicant;

            
(v) The legal description and the names and addresses of the affected 
parties of all land over which any proposed access routes would cross.  Affected parties includes the owners of 
record and any lessee, mortgagee or occupant of the land over which any proposed 
road would cross and may include the state of Wyoming;  and

            
(vi) A statement as to whether any actions of the applicant or any person 
with the consent and knowledge of the applicant, caused the applicant's land to 
lose or to not have any legally enforceable access.

 
 
* 
* *

            
(h) If at the completion of the hearing the board finds that the 
applicant has satisfied the requirements of this section and access is necessary 
because the applicant has no legally enforceable access, the board shall appoint 
three (3) disinterested freeholders and electors of the county, as viewers and 
appraisers.  * * *            
   

 
 
[¶11]   The statutory private road 
procedure derives its constitutional authority from Article I, § 32 of the 
Wyoming Constitution which states:  
"Private property shall not be taken for private use unless by consent of 
the owner, except for private ways of necessity . . . nor in any case without 
due compensation."  Thus, the 
threshold inquiry for establishment of a private road under § 24-9-101 is 
necessity.  

 
 
The 
private road statute requires the Board to initially conduct a hearing to 
determine "the necessity of the road" petitioned for by "any person whose land 
has no outlet to, nor connection with a public road."  Wyo. Stat.  Ann. § 24-9-101 (Lexis 1999).  We said in McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278, 1286 
(Wyo. 1980), and affirmed in Reaves v. Riley, 782 P.2d 1136, 1137 
(Wyo. 1989), 
that the "no outlet to, nor connection with" language means "no legally 
enforceable, existing outlet to nor connection with a public road."        

 
 

Voss 
v. AlbanyCountyComm'rs, 2003 
WY 94, ¶ 12, 74 P.3d 714, 719 (Wyo. 2003).   In McGuire, 608 P.2d  at 1286, we held once 
an applicant for a private road has established his land has no legally 
enforceable means of access to a public road, he has demonstrated "necessity, as 
a matter of law."  

 
 
[¶12]   The board concluded Stratton did 
not have legally enforceable access to Tract 49 and a private road over the 
Reidy property was necessary.  While 
the board did not expressly rule on 
whether or not FS 807 is a public road, its findings and conclusions implied it 
did not consider FS 807 to be a public road.     

 
 
[¶13]   McGuire was the first case in which we 
specifically considered the definition of a "public road" for the purposes of § 
24-9-101.  In that case, we considered whether a road across lands 
administered by the United States Bureau of Land Management (BLM) was a "public 
road" under the private road statute.

 
 
            
The statutory section we examine does not define public road. . . .  State statutes pertaining to state and 
county roads and which do contain some definitions are not applicable to roads 
such as the BLM road, the latter being under the jurisdiction of the 
United 
States.  
We cannot adjudicate its status so as to in any fashion bind the 
United 
States. We are limited to generally describing 
it in the light of the statute we have before us.

 
 
            
The statute does not require connection with a public road that is state 
or county controlled.  The evidence 
discloses that the public has traversed the BLM road for many years and a realty 
specialist from BLM testified that any United States citizen may travel 
existing roads or trails on public lands unless specifically closed by BLM and 
there appear to be no plans to close the road.  

 
 
* 
* *

            

We 
must, therefore, define a public road in the general sense, keeping in mind what 
the enacting legislature must have intended at the time of passage of the act, 
when the State was just coming to life.

 
 
            
The status of BLM roads has been considered by at least one other 
court.  In Major v. DouglasCounty, 1971, 6 Or.App. 544, 488 P.2d 808, the court there considered the test to be the right of the public to use 
it.  There, like here, the general 
public had for many years enjoyed the right to use the BLM road; so, therefore, 
it was a public road within Oregon statutory language, "any public road 
within the county."  That holding is 
no different conceptually than the general one used in the absence of an 
applicable statutory definition.  A 
public road is one that the public generally-not merely a portion of the 
public-is privileged to use.  Within 
the facts reflected by the record, then, we must conclude that the BLM road is a 
public road within the terms of § 24-9-101, supra.

            

McGuire, 
608 P.2d  at 1287-88 (footnotes and some citations omitted).  

 
 
[¶14]   In Wagstaff v. SubletteCountyBd. of Commrs, 2002 WY 123, 53 P.3d 79 (Wyo. 2002), we reached a different conclusion about the particular BLM road 
at issue in that case.  We said 
there was no evidence the undeveloped two track road over state and BLM property 
was a "public road."  "[T]he dirt 
tracks located upon the State and BLM property were not maintained at any time, 
were solely passable in the summer months at a slow rate of speed, and were only 
used occasionally by hunters and not the general public."  Wagstaff, ¶ 15, 53 P.3d  at 83.  In reaching the conclusion that the BLM 
road did not meet the statutory definition of a "public road," we distinguished 
McGuire as 
follows:

 
 
We 
also find that the case of McGuire as 
to its ruling regarding public roads is distinguishable from this case.  No evidence was presented to the Board 
concerning GCC's access via this route other than that mentioned above, whereas 
in McGuire, the evidence disclosed 
that the public had traversed the BLM road for many years.  In addition, a realty specialist from 
the BLM testified in McGuire that any 
United 
States citizen may travel existing roads or 
trails on public land unless specifically closed by the BLM and that the BLM had 
no present plans to close the road there involved.  In this case, no evidence was presented 
that the public generally has the privilege to traverse the unimproved dirt 
tracks on the State and BLM land involved.

 
 

Wagstaff, 
¶ 17, 53 P.3d  at 83-84.  

 
 
[¶15]   Returning to the case at bar, we 
note the record contains voluminous testimony and documentary evidence presented 
at the contested case hearing concerning the characteristics of FS 807.  The parties agree FS 807 leads directly 
from Highway 70 to the northwest corner of Tract 49 and it is approximately six 
and one-half to seven miles from Highway 70 to the tract boundary.  The Forest Service designated FS 807 as 
a collector road which according to Forest Service employee, Steve Kerpan, is a 
"pretty major road," which the Forest Service regularly maintains.  The northerly portion is designated by 
the Forest Service as "Level 2" and is accessible by passenger car, while the 
southerly portion of the road is designated "Level 3" and may be traveled by 
higher profile vehicles.  Some 
improvements, including barrow or drain ditches and a signed bridge, have been 
made by the Forest Service to the road.  

 
 
[¶16]   Mr. Kerpan testified FS 807 is open 
to the general public and had been publicly used for more than forty years.  The road is used by tourists, hunters, 
ranchers, farmers, and even motorcyclists.  
Multiple witnesses for both parties testified they used FS 807 and  never asked permission to do so.  Mr. Kerpan stated the Forest Service 
does not plan to close the road and it is highly unlikely it will change public 
access to the road.  Nonetheless, he 
acknowledged the Forest Service could close the road if it was deemed necessary 
for proper resource management.  Mr. 
Kerpan also stated the public's interest in using FS 807 is a privilege, rather 
than a right.  Mr. Kerpan explained, 
however, before FS 807 could be closed the Forest Service would have to comply 
with the process mandated by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 
U.S.C. §§ 4321, et. seq., which would 
include a study of alternatives and an opportunity for public comment.    

 
 
[¶17]   On the basis of Mr. Kerpan's 
testimony that the road could be restricted or closed and use of the road is a 
privilege rather than a right, Stratton argues the road is not a "public road" 
within the statute's meaning.  We 
disagree.  We hold, as a matter of 
law, the fact that a road can potentially be restricted or closed is not 
determinative of  the issue of 
whether it is a public road.  The 
use of any road administered by a public entity is not a guaranteed right and, 
provided the proper procedures are followed, any road may be closed to the 
public.  See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-9-113 
(a)(xvii) (LexisNexis 2005) (municipalities have the authority to close roads 
within their jurisdiction); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-1-106(a) (LexisNexis 2005) 
(department of transportation has power to close or restrict use of state 
highways); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-504 (LexisNexis 2005) (each board of county 
commissioners has authority to establish, alter and discontinue use of roads 
within the county).  Of course, if a 
public road is closed, then an owner landlocked by that closure may be able to 
establish that a private road is "necessary" to provide access.  Thus, Mr. Kerpan's statements to the 
effect that FS 807 could be closed and use of the road is a privilege rather 
than a right were merely acknowledgements of the Forest Service's power to 
administer the roads within its jurisdiction and were not determinative of 
whether or not FS 807 is a public road in the context of our private road 
statutes.  

 
 
[¶18]   In a related argument, Stratton 
contends Wyoming courts cannot declare whether a Forest 
Service road is a public road because they have no jurisdiction over federal 
roads and cannot bind the federal government.  Stratton relies on Yeager v. Forbes, 2003 WY 134, 78 P.3d 241 (Wyo. 2003), for its contention that Wyoming courts cannot bind the federal 
government.  We have no quarrel with 
Stratton's contention in that regard.  
We expressly recognized in McGuire that our determination of 
whether a road is a "public road" under § 24-9-101 is not binding upon the 
federal government.  However, that does not prevent us 
from determining whether the road is a public road for the purposes of § 
24-9-101.  We simply determine the 
nature of the road in light of our private road statute.  McGuire, 608 P.2d  at 1286-87.  

 
 
[¶19]   Through its various agencies, the 
federal government owns over fifty percent of the land in Wyoming.  Wyoming 2005-Just the Facts!, 
http://eadiv.state.wy.us (2005), citing Gov't Services Admin. Office of 
Governmentwide Real Property Policy.  
It goes without saying that many private landowners use roads across 
federal lands to access their private property.  If we were to hold a road across federal 
land could not be considered a public road under our private road statutes, we 
would be imposing an undue burden upon private landowners in Wyoming to provide access 
to their neighbors when, in reality, such access was not necessary.  We do not believe the legislature 
intended that result.  Therefore, we 
hold, as a matter of law, a road over federal lands may be considered a public 
road within the meaning of our private road statutes, provided the 
characteristics of the road indicate it is available to the general public.  

 
 
[¶20]   After a review of the entire 
record, we find no evidence contradicting the assertion that FS 807 is available 
for use by the general public.  
While the board made a finding that the road was "not improved," the 
record does not support that finding. Testimony and photographs contained in the 
record clearly show substantial improvements on the road, including barrow or 
drain ditches and a signed bridge.1  Like the BLM road in McGuire, FS 807 is indisputably open to 
the general public, routinely used to access public and private lands, and is, 
therefore, obviously distinguishable from the road in Wagstaff.   Historically, Stratton has actually used 
the road to access Tract 49.   

 
 
[¶21]   Our conclusion that FS 807 is a 
public road under our private road statute is consistent with Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Federer Dev. Co., 
682 P.2d 1062 (Wyo. 1984),  in 
which we addressed whether a road administered by the United States Forest 
Service could be used to provide the requisite access to a proposed 
subdivision.  We approved the 
district court's rationale that a FS road known as the Blair Road was, in 
fact, a public road.  We quoted the 
district court's decision letter:  

 
 
The 
Blair 
Road was originally constructed with the intention of 
providing permanent use of public access.  
. . . [T]he previous owner of the land in question[] testified that the 
Blair Road was originally given by him to the United States Forest Service for 
easement rhough (sic) his land to Forest Service lands.  It seems incongruous then at this point 
for the County Commissioners to rule that there is no legally enforceable means 
of access to the property when the Blair Road was originally given by the owners 
of that same property to the Forest Service to not only gain permanent public 
access to private lands but to the Forest Service lands as well.  

 
 

Id. 
at 
1064-65.  

 
 
[¶22]   The facts in the instant case 
reveal an important similarity to Federer.  Stratton owns another parcel of land 
near Tract 49 which is an in-holding within the MedicineBowNational 
Forest.2  Although it is not entirely clear in the 
record, Stratton's in-holding is apparently north of Tract 49.  Prior to the controversy in this case, 
Stratton actually granted an easement to the United States to 
allow FS 807 to cross its private in-holding and that easement specifically 
states it is for the benefit of the public.  This fact further confirms our view that 
FS 807 is a public road.  

 
 
[¶23]   Stratton contends FS 807 is not a 
public road because it could be closed at some time in the future, and the 
access provided by the road, therefore, is not "legally enforceable" under the 
statute.  The board's decision 
letter indicates it followed a similar rationale, stating:  "[t]here is no legally enforceable right 
to use the Forest Road 807 by any member of the public according to the 
evidence."  It appears this 
reasoning stems from a misreading of our opinion in Voss to the effect that the right to use 
a public road on federal land must be "legally enforceable."  In Voss, we concluded a personal thirty 
year right-of-way grant/temporary use permit over BLM land was not "legally 
enforceable access" to the public road in questiona county road.   Voss, ¶ 13, 74 P.3d  at 719.  By its terms, the grant terminated after 
thirty years and, although it was renewable at that time, renewal was not 
guaranteed.  Furthermore, the permit 
was personal and did not "pass automatically upon conveyance of the 
property."  Id.  
Instead, the grant was assignable only upon approval by the BLM.  Id.  Because it was obviously a personal 
right-of-way, we did not directly address the issue of whether the access road 
over BLM property in Voss was a 
public road.

 
 
[¶24]   The "legally enforceable" inquiry 
is relevant only in determining whether a person has such a connection with, or 
outlet to, a public road.  See, e.g., McGuire, 608 P.2d  at 1286; Reaves v. Riley, 782 P.2d 1136 
(Wyo. 
1989).  However, if a landowner has 
direct access to a "public road" under our statute, the question of legal 
enforceability is irrelevant and a private road is not necessary.  Although we did not directly address 
this principle in Voss, we did 
recognize the underlying goal of the private road statute is to provide access 
to the public road system.  Voss, ¶ 32, 74 P.3d  at 723-24.   See also, Miller v. Bradley, 4 P.3d 882, 889 (Wyo. 
2000); Dunning v. Ankney, 936 P.2d 61, 64 (Wyo. 
1997).  Because the record in this 
case demonstrates FS 807 is open to, and used by, the general public, it is 
distinguishable from Voss.  No right of way is required to use FS 
807 and, since it is open to the general public, there is no question about 
transferability of the right to use the road.   

 
 
[¶25]   In determining FS 807 could not be 
considered a public road under our case law, the board misinterpreted our 
precedent.  This Court has never 
held a road on federal property cannot be a public road under the private road 
statute.  In fact, we held just the 
opposite in McGuire, which has never 
been overruled.  To be completely clear, we hold, as a 
matter of law, roads over federal lands may be considered public roads under our 
private road statutes.  Of course, 
the individual characteristics of each road will determine its status.  In this case, when the correct rule of 
law is applied to the essentially undisputed facts, it is clear FS 807 is a 
public road.  We conclude the board 
erred when it failed to recognize FS 807 as a public road and ruled that 
Stratton had proven necessity because its access via FS 807 was not "legally 
enforceable."    

            

 
 
B.        
Convenience

 
 
[¶26]   Even if FS 807 qualifies as a 
public road, Stratton maintains it is not convenient for it to use that road 
and, under our case law, it is still entitled to a private road across the 
Reidys' property.  The Reidys argue 
the issue of convenience is not relevant so long as FS 807 is a public road 
which provides Stratton access to its property.  As we noted above, § 24-9-101(a) states:  "Any person whose land has no outlet to, 
nor connection with a public road, may file an application in writing with the 
board of county commissioners in the county where his land is located for a 
private road leading from his land to some convenient public road."  Because the adjective "convenient" is 
not used to modify the term "public road" in the first part of the sentence, one 
could argue the convenience of a road is not a pertinent inquiry until the 
applicant has established he is landlocked and the board of county commissioners 
is considering the alternative routes for establishing a private road.  

 
 
[¶27]   However, we have often recognized 
the legislature intended the private road statute to create a practical and 
efficient method for providing landlocked landowners usable access.  Our jurisprudence on this issue 
indicates convenience should be a consideration in determining the necessity of 
a private road.   In McGuire, we 
stated:

 
 
We 
agree with the district judge that the county commissioners' finding that the 
road was not "necessary" was unsupported by the evidence.  The evidence clearly demands the 
opposite conclusion.  We hold that 
any person whose land is so situated that it has no outlet or legally 
enforceable means by which he can gain access has demonstrated necessity, as a 
matter of law, without there being a further need to show that he lives on that 
land or that it is being, or will be, used for some specific purpose nor was it 
proper to inquire into impact on adjoining owners (other than the owners whose 
land will be taken), financial interest of applicants, use for hunting, fences 
and improvements, or whether permissive access had been denied.  In our view, the word "necessary" in 
the statute refers only to the lack of the type of outlet we have described to a 
"convenient" public road.

 
 
608 P.2d  
at 1286 (emphasis added).  See also, Gold v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Teton 
County, 658 P.2d 690, 694 (Wyo. 1983). 

 
 
[¶28]   Consideration of convenience is 
demonstrated most clearly in Wagstaff.  The facts in Wagstaff were somewhat complicated, but 
they were key to our decision and bear repeating here:  

 
 
            
Grindstone Cattle Company ("GCC") owns a piece of real property which is 
commonly known as "Scott's Place" and another parcel of real estate which is 
north and west of Scott's Place and is separated from Scott's Place by a strip 
of land owned by the State of Wyoming and the Bureau of Land Management 
("BLM").  Wagstaffs own real 
property that adjoins Scott's Place to the south.  A title search established there are no 
easements or rights of way of record evidencing any legally enforceable access 
to Scott's Place.  While State Route 
354 runs through Wagstaffs' property, it does not run through Scott's 
Place.  For over fifty years, GCC 
and its predecessors have had permissive use of a mile long roadway traversing 
Wagstaffs' land to access their property from State Route 
354.

 
 

Wagstaff, 
¶ 
3, 53 P.3d  at 80.  

 
 
The 
Board received evidence of other possible routes to the Scott's Place 
property.  County Road 150, the 
"Pape 
Road," to the east of Scott's place, was deemed not 
to be a viable option because the Green River 
lies between Scott's Place and the Pape Road, and there is no existing access 
without bridging across the river.  
The only other possible means of access would be from the west and north, 
which would require traveling an extra 35 miles on State Route 354, County Road 
112, and County Road 115, and then traversing an additional 15 miles over dirt 
tracks across state and BLM property.

 
 

Id., 
¶ 
8, 53 P.3d  at 81.  On appeal, 
Wagstaff claimed the circuitous route through GCC's other piece of property 
provided the statutory outlet to or connection with a public road.  Id.   
In response to Wagstaff's argument, we stated:

 
 
            
Moreover, even if we were to hold that the unimproved dirt tracks on the 
State and BLM land constituted public roads, such a determination is not 
definitive in the analysis that must be made.  As stated previously, the legislature in 
its enactment of § 24-9-101 intended that the term "outlet" be such that it 
affords the landowner access via a convenient public road and that convenience 
and reason prevail in the establishment of roads.  While Wagstaffs argue that GCC should be 
required to use the route over the State and BLM unimproved dirt tracks because 
GCC could file a petition to require the needed maintenance on County Road 115 
and the unimproved dirt tracks across the State and BLM property and spend 
additional monies to improve the State and BLM unimproved dirt tracks so they 
would be generally passable on a year round basis, requiring GCC to take such 
acts simply does not fall within the legislature's expressed 
intention.

 
 

Id., 
¶ 18, 53 P.3d  at 84.  Affirming the board, 
this Court agreed GCC should not be required to travel an extended route 
amounting to an additional fifty miles over roadways which were impassable for 
part of the year in lieu of establishing a mile long private road over 
Wagstaff's land.  Id., ¶¶ 3, 8, 20, 53 P.3d  at 80-81, 
84.  

 
 
[¶29]   Although the legislature has 
amended other aspects of the statute, it has not done so to change our 
interpretation that convenience of the public road is a factor to be 
considered.  If this Court had 
incorrectly interpreted the legislature's intent, "legislative action to clarify 
the statutes and correct the court's decision would seem a likely result."  Albertson's, Inc. v. City of Sheridan, 
2001 WY 98 ¶ 21, 33 P.3d 161 (Wyo. 2001).  

 
 
[¶30]   The convenience factor must, 
however, be applied judiciously.  
Wyo. 
Const. Art. I, § 32 mandates that in order to constitutionally justify a private 
condemnation of property, there must be necessity.  Consequently, the inconvenience which 
would justify a private taking must be substantial.  In fact, it must be so substantial it is 
functionally equivalent to necessity.  
Our case law bears this out.  
We have never approved a private road simply on the basis that it would 
be more convenient to the applicant than another already existing means of 
access.  Rather, only when the 
record contains evidence showing the alternative access is obviously impractical 
and unreasonable has this Court approved the creation of a private road under 
the statutes.

            
 

[¶31]   Interpreting the statute to allow a 
finding of necessity when an applicant is seriously inconvenienced by an 
alternative route serves the purposes of the private road statute.  The statutory private road procedure 
replaced the common law way of necessity as the means for a landlocked property 
owner to gain access to his property.  
Ferguson, 811 P.2d  at 290.  The legislature enacted the private road 
statutes to ensure a landowner can use his property for "productive purposes" 
while providing compensation to the burdened landowners.  Id. 
at 289, citing 2 Thompson on Real Property §§ 362-368 (1980 Repl).  Stated another way, a private road 
granted pursuant to § 24-9-101, et. 
seq., allows the use and enjoyment of specific property by providing 
access.  Reaves, 782 P.2d  at 1137.  Thus, there is a "public good" 
consideration in granting a private road.  
We explained in Hulse v. First Am. 
Title Co., 2001 WY 95, ¶¶ 30, 33, 33 P.2d 122, 132 (Wyo. 2001) (some 
citations omitted): 

[T]here 
is a public interest in giving access by individuals to the road and highway 
network of the state as a part and an extension thereof for economic reasons and 
the development of land as a resource for the common good, whether residential 
or otherwise.  

* * 
*

Moreover, 
this court has held the right to condemn a way of necessity under constitutional 
and statutory provisions is an expression of public policy against landlocking 
property and rendering it useless.  
As a consequence, the statute provides that any grant of a private road 
under its provisions requires a finding by the board that the property owner 
seeking its creation has no legally enforceable access to a public road and that 
the private road is "necessary" before it may enter its order declaring the 
creation of the private road.    
Wyo. 
Stat.  Ann. §§ 24-9-101, -103.    

 
 
[¶32]   If the purposes of the statute are 
to be served, we must take into account instances of substantial 
inconvenience.  We have recognized 
this concept in choosing between alternative routes when we have refused to 
require a landlocked property owner to choose a "wholly illogical, uneconomic, 
and unproductive road."  Ferguson, 811 P.2d  at 290.  See also, Martens v. Johnson County Bd. of Comm'rs, 
954 P.2d 375, 380 (Wyo. 1998).  Furthermore, we have refused to require 
private road applicants to overcome all obstacles before petitioning for a 
private road, Walton v. Dana, 609 P.2d 461, 463 (Wyo. 1980), or to consider routes in other counties, Lindt v. Murray, 895 P.2d 459, 463 (Wyo. 
1995).  These cases indicate that 
the statute must be interpreted practically and support our holding that a 
showing of substantial inconvenience may satisfy the necessity requirement of 
the private road statute.  See also, Peery v. Hill, 120 S.W.2d 762, 764 (Ky. 
Ct. App. 1938) (holding under the Kentucky private road statute, an applicant 
had proven necessity when he showed practical necessity): See M. DiSabatino, Way of Necessity Over Another's Land, Where 
a Means of Access Does Exist, But is Claimed to be Inadequate, Inconvenient, 
Difficult, or Costly, 10 ALR 4th447 (1981), and cases cited 
therein.    

 
 
[¶33]   Stratton outlines a number of 
obstacles which it claims make FS 807 inconvenient and entitles it to a private 
road across the Reidys' property.  
First, Stratton argues the private road is more convenient because FS 807 
is not plowed in the winter.  
However, the proposed private road, likewise, is not plowed during the 
winter, and Charles Juare, a shareholder and the president of Stratton, 
testified his ranching operation only used Tract 49 in the summer and fall.  Since access in the winter is not 
important to Stratton, the lack of winter accessibility was not evidence of 
substantial inconvenience.  

 
 
[¶34]   Next, Stratton argues the private 
road route is more convenient because the FS 807 route is significantly 
longer.  The board agreed:  "It is the opinion of the Commissioners 
that a road of 1 ¼ miles  . . . is 
considerably more convenient than 6 ½ miles over unimproved dirt road that will 
not meet the requirements of the applicant with the anticipated use of large 
trucks."  However, this finding was 
tainted by the board's incorrect legal conclusion that FS 807 is not a public 
road.  When the Colorado Routt 
County Road access is compared with FS 807, the latter is obviously more 
convenient because it connects directly to Tract 49, while the proposed private 
road access is one and one-quarter miles from a public road.  The primary difference between the 
routes is that using FS 807 requires one to travel approximately five miles 
further on a dirt road.  That fact 
alone does not establish sufficiently substantial inconvenience to constitute 
functional necessity.  Another means 
of comparing the convenience of the two routes is the total distance of 
each.  We employed this method in Wagstaff.  Stratton confirmed there was no 
appreciable difference between the two routes in terms of total distance from 
other parts of its ranch to Tract 49.

  

[¶35]   Further, Stratton contends FS 807 
is inconvenient because it is not conducive to hauling cattle by 
semi-truck.  Mr. Juare testified FS 
807 is narrow and includes sharp curves, making it unsuitable for travel by a 
loaded semi-truck and trailer.  He 
also testified that, in order to transverse FS 807 to Tract 49, one must cross a 
bridge and the weight restrictions on the bridge would prevent a loaded 
semi-truck from crossing.  Stratton 
has, however, used the Forest Service road in the past to haul cattle to Tract 
49 using a pickup and stock trailer, although Mr. Juare indicated it is less 
convenient to haul smaller loads of cattle and their equipment suffers wear and 
tear because the trailer drags on parts of FS 807.     

 
 
[¶36]   The record establishes the proposed 
private road is also steep, and the parties contested whether it was suitable to 
travel with a semi-truck and trailer loaded with cattle.3  Despite a difference of opinion 
concerning the suitability of the proposed private road for semi-truck traffic, 
no dispute existed that, although it may not be as convenient to haul smaller 
loads of cattle, Stratton can use a pickup and trailer to haul its cattle to 
Tract 49 via FS 807.  The cattle 
could also be trailed along FS 807 to Tract 49.  Simply because one landowner would 
prefer to use his or her property in a certain manner and a different access 
would facilitate that preference does not mean a private road is necessary.  Stratton did not establish it was 
substantially inconvenienced, consistent with the legal standard outlined above, 
by being required to use the Forest Service road instead of the proposed private 
road.  

 
 
[¶37]   Finally, Stratton argues it is 
entitled to a private road over the Reidys' property because travel from the 
northern part of Tract 49 to its corrals in the southern part of the tract would 
be unduly burdensome.  Stratton 
argued it would be unreasonably difficult to construct a road, passable by 
semi-truck, from FS 807 to the corrals because it would have to cross an 
irrigation ditch and a small creek located at the bottom of a ravine.  The board's decision letter did not 
directly address this particular argument. 

 
 
[¶38]   Natural and man-made barriers are 
factors considered in determining whether a property is landlocked pursuant to § 
24-9-101(a)(ii).  However, we have 
never considered whether a private road may be established to remedy access 
difficulties related to barriers within the applicant's land,4 and the parties do not provide a 
statutory analysis regarding the applicability of subsection (a)(ii) to this 
issue.  We do not, however, need to 
decide whether § 24-9-101 addresses this situation because Stratton does not 
direct us to specific evidence about the costs or unusual efforts which would be 
required to construct a road through Tract 49.  Furthermore, Mr. Juare admitted his 
corrals could be constructed in the northern part of Tract 49 which would 
alleviate the need to travel by vehicle from the northern to the southern part 
of Tract 49.  Thus, there was no 
factual basis for a finding that the proposed private road is more convenient 
than FS 807 because of the barriers within Tract 49.  

 
 
[¶39]   Wagstaff illustrates the high level of 
inconvenience which must be shown to justify a taking of a neighbor's land for a 
private road.  Any lesser standard 
would violate the constitutional prohibition against taking of private property 
for "private use unless by consent of the owner, except for private ways of 
necessity." Wyo. Const. Art. 1, § 32.  Determining the ultimate fact of whether 
a sufficient level of inconvenience has been shown to establish necessity 
involves elements of law and fact and, is therefore reviewed as a question of 
law.  Guthrie, ¶ 13, 115 P.3d  at 1090-92.  Even giving the board's findings of 
basic fact the deference they deserve, we conclude the record in the instant 
case does not demonstrate, as a matter of law, the high level of inconvenience 
required to establish necessity.  
The board's conclusion to the contrary was legally incorrect.  Because we hold Stratton has not 
satisfied the threshold showing a private road is necessary, we do not need to 
address the remaining issues and arguments presented by the 
Reidys.

 
 

[¶40]   Reversed and remanded 
to the district court directing the district court to enter an order reversing 
the order of the board and directing the board to deny the Stratton Sheep 
application for a private road.

  

FOOTNOTES

1We are not 
obligated to defer to the board's factual finding that FS 807 is an "unimproved 
dirt road" because it is clearly contrary to the great weight of the evidence in 
the record.   As we stated in Voss, ¶ 10, 74 P.3d  at 719, in conducting a 
substantial evidence review of the record, we review:

 
 
"the 
entire record to determine if there is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind 
might accept in support of the agency's decision. . . .  A court will reach a different 
conclusion based on the evidence only in those situations where the agency's 
conclusion is clearly contrary to the weight of the 
evidence."

 
 
Voss 
v. Albany County Comm'rs, 2003 
WY 94, ¶ 10, 74 P.3d 714, 719 (Wyo. 2003), quoting McTiernan v. Scott, 2001 WY 87, ¶ 16, 31 P.3d 749, 756 (Wyo. 2001) (citation and footnote omitted). 

 
 

2The parties 
agree an "in-holding" is a parcel of private land which is completely surrounded 
by lands owned by the government.  

3Mr. 
Reidy testified he used the road to haul hay by semi-truck one year, but his 
efforts were not fully successful as three loads had tipped, dumping some of the 
hay.  Since that experience, truck 
drivers have refused to drive a loaded semi-truck down the road.  Mr. Reidy explained that a load of live 
cattle is even more dangerous to haul than a stationary load because the load 
can shift when the cattle move.  
Stratton 
disputed the Reidys' claim it is too dangerous to drive a semi-truck loaded with 
cattle over the proposed private road.  
Mr. Juare testified he had 
hauled pipe and hay over the road by semi-truck.  He did not, however, testify as to the 
weight of his loads of pipe and hay or explain how those loads would compare to 
a load of cattle.  Mr. Juare did 
acknowledge a cattle truck is longer than the truck he used to haul the pipe to 
Tract 49.  

4This issue has been addressed by other states.  See, e.g., Ex parte Lula Dell Cater, 772 So. 2d 1117 
(Ala. 2000); Annotation, Way of Necessity 
Over Another's Land, Where a Means of Access Does Exist, But is Claimed to be 
Inadequate, Inconvenient, Difficult, or Costly, 10 ALR 4th 447 
(1981), and cases cited therein.