Title: Clark v. Clark

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

191 Kan. 95 (1963)
379 P.2d 240
RAY A. CLARK, Appellant,
v.
MARGARET G. CLARK, Appellee.
No. 43,094

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed March 2, 1963.
Forrest A. Jackson and Eugene C. Riling, both of Lawrence, argued the cause and were on the briefs for the appellant.
Wayne Allphin, Jr., of Lawrence, argued the cause and was on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, C.J.:
This is the aftermath of a divorce action in which a plaintiff father appeals from orders and rulings made by the trial court in connection with the status of the custody order, made in the original proceeding, relating to the minor son of the parties.
Although not in dispute the basic pertinent facts on which the rights of the parties depend are important to a proper understanding and review of the issues involved. For that reason such facts will be stated in accord with our view of their import as briefly as the state of the record permits.
On February 17, 1955, in what was obviously a concerted effort, both parties being residents of Douglas County and each engaged in the lawful practice of medicine in that community, plaintiff, Ray A. Clark, was granted a divorce from defendant, Margaret G. Clark, in the district court of Pottawatomie County on grounds of gross neglect of duty and extreme cruelty. Shortly prior to rendition of the judgment the parties entered into a postnuptial agreement the provisions of which, so far as here pertinent, read:
After hearing the case the district court found, among other things, that the postnuptial property settlement between the parties, which was introduced in evidence, was fair and just and should be approved and confirmed and made a part of the divorce decree, and that the plaintiff should have reasonable right of visiting with the son and have such child with him at reasonable times. Orders were made and included in the journal entry accordingly.
Further portions of the judgment and decree as reflected by the journal entry, which it is to be noted do not fully conform with the last paragraph of the postnuptial agreement, read:
On April 1, 1959, the son, Ray A. Clark, Jr., became twenty-one years of age. All child support payments were made by plaintiff up to and including that date.
On November 16, 1961, the plaintiff filed a motion asking that the court modify and change the order and judgment entered on February 17, 1955, for the reason and upon the ground plaintiff was not liable for any further child support payments for said minor under the judgment after such minor became twenty-one years of age on April 1, 1959. After a hearing on the motion the court, on January 3, 1962, disposed of such motion by an order which, so far as here pertinent, reads:
*98 On February 3, 1962, the plaintiff filed a motion in the district court to set aside the foregoing order. Portions of such motion, material to a disposition of the appellate issues here involved, read:
Thereafter, and on February 20, 1962, after a full and complete hearing on the merits of the last mentioned motion the court made an order. Pertinent portions of that order read:
Thereupon, within the time prescribed by statute, plaintiff gave notice that he was appealing from the orders of January 3, 1962, and February 20, 1962, (describing them). The appeal has been duly perfected and appellant brings the cause to this court under proper specifications of error.
The principal claim advanced by appellant in this appeal, on which all other questions raised by the parties depend, is that the trial court had no jurisdiction to make an order in connection with its February 17, 1955, judgment requiring the appellant to pay appellee any sum whatsoever for the care, support, maintenance and education of their minor child after it became twenty-one years of age on April 1, 1959; hence that portion of the order susceptible of a construction appellant was required to make payments for the care, support and education of such child after he attained majority is void and unenforceable.
It must, of course, be conceded that our statute (G.S. 1949, 60-3009) relating to proceedings for the vacation and modification of judgments provides that "A void judgment may be vacated at any time, on motion of a party or any person affected thereby." And *99 it cannot be denied our decisions universally hold that a judgment rendered by a court which it has no jurisdiction to render is void and may be set aside at any time on motion or other appropriate proceedings (Poorman v. Carlton, 122 Kan. 762, 253 Pac. 424; Penn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Tittel, 153 Kan. 530, 111 P.2d 1116; McFadden v. McFadden, 174 Kan. 533, 539, 257 P.2d 146); that the length of time which has lapsed between the void judgment and the motion to vacate is inconsequential (Cadwallader v. Bennett, 187 Kan. 249, 356 P.2d 862.); and that this court has ample authority to modify a judgment, or any portion thereof, which is void under the provisions of 60-3009, supra. (Hardcastle v. Hardcastle [on rehearing], 131 Kan. 627, 628, 293 Pac. 391; Shriver v. Board of County Commissioners, 189 Kan. 548, 554, 370 P.2d 124.)
At the outset, arguments advanced by the parties make it necessary to determine the nature of the trial court's support order. On the one hand appellee contends the order is based specifically on what the appellant agreed to do by contract in writing, not on his legal obligation as a parent pursuant to G.S. 1959 Supp., 60-1510, now G.S. 1961 Supp., 60-1510, and that there is no ambiguity and conflict existing between the agreement and the judgment of the court. On the other hand appellant contends such order was based on the provisions of the foregoing statute which, so far as here pertinent, read: "When a divorce is granted the court shall make provision for the guardianship, custody, support and education of the minor children of the marriage, ..." (Emphasis supplied.) Let us see. Conceding the court made the contract a part of its decree it becomes obvious, upon resort to the heretofore quoted support paragraphs of the contract and the judgment, that it was making its support order under the statute (60-1510) and not basing such order upon the support clause of the contract. This is fully demonstrated by the fact that the order constitutes an allowance for the proper care, support, maintenance and education of said minor child until otherwise ordered and directed by the court, whereas the contract does not purport to contain those provisions.
Having determined that the order in question is to be construed as a pure and simple support order, made under the provisions of 60-1510, supra, we have no difficulty in concluding that the paramount question, to which we have heretofore referred, has been decided by our decisions, to which we adhere, in accord with appellant's view as to its disposition.
*100 Long ago in Emery v. Emery, 104 Kan. 679, 180 Pac. 451, a case which has been cited with approval in numerous subsequent decisions and which has never been disapproved, we held:
And in the opinion said:
..............
For a more recent decision of like import see Allison v. Allison, 188 Kan. 593, 363 P.2d 795, which holds:
And in the opinion states:
..............
*102 We know of and are cited to no decisions in this jurisdiction holding that under the facts and circumstances of record a support order such as is here involved, if construed to extend beyond the age of majority, can be held to be valid and enforceable. Moreover, what has been heretofore stated, and held in the decisions to which we have referred, compels a conclusion the portion of such support order, subsequently held by the trial court to extend the payments for support of the child of the parties for a period of time after he reached the age of majority, is wholly void and unenforceable. By the same token, it necessarily follows that the trial court erred in its orders of January 3, 1962, and February 20, 1962, wherein, in each order, it held in effect that post majority child support payments, amounting to $3,200.00, were valid and enforceable under the original decree and must be paid to the appellee by either the appellant or the adult child of the parties.
Therefore, and without further ado, the orders and rulings of the trial court, last above mentioned, are reversed and the cause is remanded to the district court with directions to set them aside and modify the original child support order in accord with the views herein expressed.
It is so ordered.