Title: Mikelson v. United Services Automobile Association

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

‘+*#P0R PUBLICATION*+*
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

 

000:

 

MATHEW S. MIKELSON, Plaintiff-Appellee

 

UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Defendant-Appel lant
and
JOHN DOES 1-25; JANE DOES 1-25; DOE CORPORATIONS 1-25;
DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-25; and DOE GOVERNMENTAL
ENTITIES 1-25, Defendants
wo, 25217

REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS
(CIV. NO. 99-1856)

SEPTEMBER 26, 2005

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, JJ.,
AND CIRCUIT JUDGE WONG, ASSIGNED BY’ REASON’ OF VACANCY

OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA, J.

Plaintiff-Appellee Matthew S. Mikelson (Mikelson) filed
@ request for attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to Hawai't
Revised Statutes (HRS) § 431:10-242 (1993). Defendant-Appellant
United Services Automobile Association (USAA) filed a memorandum
in opposition. On the grounds set forth herein, Mikelson’s
request for fees is denied and his request for costs is granted.

I.

on June 9, 2005, Mikelson filed his request. Mikelson

asserts he is “entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs”

pursuant to HRS § 431:10-242, see infra Part II, and Hawai'i

 
‘**FOR PUBLICATION*#*

 

Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 39 because “this Court
affirmed the trial court's judgnent in (his] favor... ,
ordering USRA to confer benefits promised by the policy.”
Mikelson maintains (1) that “attorney's fees and costs are
mandatory when the insurer erroneously denies coverage and is
ordered to confer benefits” and (2) that he is “entitled to a
lodestar fee.” On June 15, 2005, Mikelson filed an errata

request for fees and costs and an errata memorandum in support of

 

the request for attorney’s fees and costs under HRS $431:10-242
and HRAP Rule 39. On July 22, 2005, Mikelson filed 2 Supplement
to the request for fees and costs.

on June 22, 2005, USAA filed a memorandum in opposition
to Mikelson’'s request for fees and costs. USAA contends that HRS
$ 431:10-242 is inapplicable because the trial court “never
ordered that [USAA] was ordered ‘to pay’ (underinsured motorist
(IM) } benefits” and “(Mikelson’s} counsel admitted that USAA was

not being ordered to pay benefits.”

 

USAA''s memorandum in opposition was not timely filed
under HRAP Rule 39(d) (3) (2005) which states that

lolbjections to requests for fees and costs must be filed
with the appellate clerk, with proc of service, within 10
Gays after service on the party against whom the fees and
Geate are to be taxed unless the tine is extended by the
appellate court

 

   

USAA was served w:

 

Mikelson’s request for attorney's fees and
costs on June 9 but did not file its objection until June 22,
more than ten days after the date of service, Although USAA’s

objection was not timely filed, attorneys’ fees cannot be awarded
‘***FOR PUBLICATION®**

 

to Mikelson because USAA was not ordered to pay benefits under
the insurance policy within the meaning of HRS § 431:10-242.
m.

With respect to an award of attorneys’ fees, “in the
absence of contract or statute @ litigant has no inherent right
to have his attorney's fees paid by his opponent.” Larsen ve
Pacesetter Sve. Inc., 74 Haw. 1, 51, 637 P.2d 1273, 1297 (1992).
Mikelson asserts that he is entitled to an award of attorneys’
fees pursuant to HRS § 431:10-242 which provides in pertinent
part:

linere an insurer has contested ite Iiability under 2 policy
fan is ordered by tne courts to pay benefits under the
policy, the policyholder, the beneficiary under a policy, or
Che person who has acquived rights of the policyholder of
beneficiary under the policy shall be awarded reascnable
attorney's fees and the costs of suit, in addition to the
Benefits under the policy

(Enphasis added.)

USAA argues that HRS § 431:10-242 is inapplicable as
the circuit court of the first circuit (the court) has not
ordered it to “pay benefits." It directs attention to the fact
that the court ordered that Mikelson “is entitled to UIM coverage
under the Policy for injuries and damages resulting from the
January 17, 1999 accident, including but not limited to whatever
UIM payments are determined to be due at arbitration pursuant to
the Policy.” (Emphases added.) USAA thus argues that the court
has not ordered payment of such benefits as the amount is yet to

be determined through arbitration.

 

‘The Honorable R. Mark Erowning preeided:
‘***FOR PUBLICATION*+*
qr.

The fundamental question with respect to the issue of
awarding attorney's fees is whether USAA has in fact been ordered
to pay benefits within the meaning of HRS § 431:10-242. USAA
urges a literal interpretation of the phrase “ordered to pay
benefits.” In contrast, Mikelson argues that HRS § 431:10-242 is
2 renedial statute and should therefore be construed liberally
such that the court's order entitling Mikelson to UIM coverage
under the policy be equated with an order to pay benefits.

“(T]he starting point for interpreting a statute is the
language of the statute itself.” State v. Moniz, 69 Haw. 370,
374, 742 P.2a 373, 376 (1987) (citations omitted). Furthermore,
“where the language of the law in question is plain and
unambiguous” courts must “give effect to the law according to its
plain and obvious meaning.” Hubbell v. Iseke, 6 Haw. App. 485,
489, 727 P.2d 1131, 1134 (1986) (citations omitted). Since HRS
§ 431:10-242 does not define the phrase “pay benefits” the plain

and obvious meaning of that phrase must be considered. In Ranger

 

Ins. Co. v. Hinshaw, this court held that the insured was not
entitied to attorney's fees under HRS § 431:10-242 when the

insurance company contested its liability under a policy because
“it was not ordered by the court to pay any benefits thereunder.”

103 Hawai'i 26, 34, 19 P.3d 129, 127 (2003).

Rangsr emphasized the language in HRS § 431:10-242 as

 

follows: “iiJhere an insurer has contested its liability under @

ed by the cou efits under

 

icy and

 

4
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policy, the policyholder . . . shall be awarded reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs of the suit.” Id. (emphasis in

original). This court then concluded that HRS § 43

 

0-242 was
“inapplicable” where the insurer “contested its liability under
the policy” but “was not ordered by the court to pay any benefits
thereunder.” Ide

Similarly, in the instant case, USAA has not been
ordered to pay benefits to Mikelson. The trial court instead
ordered that Mikelson “is entitled to UIM coverage.” It appears
that sufficient attention was devoted to the specific wording of
this order as transcripts of proceedings held on July 13, 2001
show that Mikelson’s counsel, in response to USAA’s objection
regarding Mikelson’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law filed on May 15, 2001, agreed to have the court's order read
that Mikelson “is entitled to UIM coverage” rather than “UIM
benefits”? Thus, Mikelson’s counsel, in a letter to the court
dated July 16, 2001, stated that the order should be changed to
read that Mikelson “is entitled to UIM coverage” rather than “UIM
benefits.”

The final order of the court entered on July 16, 2001

did indeed reflect this change, as it acknowledged Mikelson's

Plaintitt's attorney stated

In our findings of fact, conclusions of lax, Your Honor, the

   
      

 

only cbjection that we believe is well taken in [USAA’s)
Writing was chat the order does very end
[wathes Mikeleon] i¢ entitled to One be the
policy.» I'm quite willing £0 say that [Mathew Mikelson)

  
  
   

Te entitied - tochave the (Hatnew mixelson) is
policy, including but net
tes to whatever Benefits, if any, are aerded at

stration pursuant to the policy.

 

 

 

 

5
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SSS

entitlesent to coverage but made no mention of Mikelson being
entitled to the payment of benefits. The fact that the court and
the participants in this case appear to have given due
consideration to the language in the order that entitles Mikelson
to coverage rather than benefits, suggests an intent by the court
to refrain from ordering that benefits be paid to Mikelson, as
such payment issue will be decided via arbitration. Under the
circumstances, Mikelson’s request for attorney’s fees is denied.
Ww.

Wikelson also requested compensation of $61.60 for
copying costs incurred in this appeal. USA did not object te
Mikelson’s request for costs. MRAP Rule 39(a) (2003) states that
“if @ judgment is affirmed or a petition denied, costs shall be
taxed against the appellant or petitioner unless otherwise
ordered.” Given this court's affirmation of the court's
judgnent, Mikelson should be awarded his request for costs
Pursuant to HRAP Rule 39.

HRAP Rule 39(c) (4) defines costs in the appellate court
as including “the cost of printing or otherwise producing
necessary copies of briefs and appendices, provided that copying
costs shall not exceed 20¢ per page.” With respect to the number
of copies required for sutmission, the HRAP states that two
copies of the answering brief must be submitted to the appellate
clerk at the time of filing,? two copies must be served on each

WRAP Rule 32,2(a) provides in relevant part thé
jepening, answering, ang reply Briefs, “[t]ws copies are rel

   

with respect to
‘es when filing.”

     

é
‘***FOR PUBLICATION***
party to the appeal (in this case there is one party for a total

of two parties),* and an additional number of copies (usually
three or four) may be directed by the appellate clerk,* for a
total of approximately eight copies. The sum of $61.60 in costs
for seven copies requested by Mikelson should thus be awarded in
full as this sum represents costs authorized under HRAP Rule
39(c) (4) associated with printing the requisite nunber of
answering briefs as directed under HRAP Rules 32.1 and 28.
v.

For the foregoing reasons, Mikelson’s request for

attorney's fees is denied but his request for costs in the amount

of $61.60 from USAA is granted.

Alan Van Eten and Gi

Tred R. Eyerly (Damon Key

Leong Kupchak Hastert) LP Lana

on the request for
plaintiff-appellee.

Terrence M. Revere,
Jacqueline E. Thurston,

and Jason P. Healey

(Notocka Yamamoto &

Revere), in opposition

for defendant-appellant.

 

< BRAP Rule 28 (a) provides in relevar

conform with Rule
each pa

 

part that “(a)i] briefs shall
‘and be Secompanied by proof Of service of two copies on
'y £0 the eppeal.”

 

 

 

5 BRAP Rule 32.1(c) provides in relevant part
the appellate clerk may direct’ that a specific nunber of adh
furnished en or before a specified gate.”

Yt [In ali cases,
onal copies be