Title: New Jersey v. Hagans

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

SYLLABUS

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the
interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)

                                   State v. Malcom C. Hagans (A-37-16) (078014)

Argued January 16, 2018 -- Decided April 23, 2018

TIMPONE, J., writing for the Court.

         In this case, the Court considers the validity of a driver’s consent to search her automobile after she initially
denied a police officer’s request to search it.

           In March 2012, New Jersey State Trooper John Faust pulled over a 2002 Mercury Sable with a damaged
taillight on Interstate 295 in Burlington County. The driver, Shonsheray Chandler, had changed lanes without
signaling. There were passengers in Chandler’s car: her six-year-old daughter, who was in the back seat, and
defendant Malcolm Hagans, sitting in the front passenger seat. Faust approached the passenger side of the vehicle
and smelled the odor of burnt marijuana in the vehicle. Faust asked defendant to step out of the vehicle, arrested
him, handcuffed him, called for back-up, and administered Miranda warnings. Faust then asked Chandler to step out
of the vehicle, administered Miranda warnings, and questioned her about the presence of marijuana in the vehicle.
Faust handcuffed Chandler and placed her in the backseat of his police vehicle. Chandler denied knowing defendant
had marijuana on him and denied that she had been smoking marijuana in the car.

         Faust requested Chandler consent to a search of her vehicle. Before reading the consent form to her, Faust
told Chandler that “it would be a lot easier if you would just make things easy.” Faust read the consent form aloud.
He advised Chandler of her right to refuse consent and that if she refused, barring any other reason to detain her, she
could leave. He also explained if she consented, she had a right to be present during the search and could withdraw
her consent at any time. Faust asked whether she would give consent, and Chandler responded “no.”

         Faust then discussed his next steps. “I know, but at this time . . . we are going to apply for a search
warrant, okay, and that is kinda going to prolong the inevitable. I would just like it to be easier.” Chandler replied,
“Go ahead.” Faust then inquired, “What’s that ma’am?,” to which Chandler repeated “Go ahead.” Faust asked,
“Are you sure?” Chandler answered, “Yeah.” Faust countered, “So you’re saying yes?” Chandler responded,
“Yes.” To confirm Chandler’s decision, Faust re-read her the consent-to-search form in its entirety. Faust then
again asked Chandler if she consented to the search of her vehicle; she responded “yes.” Faust repeated for the
Mobile Video Recorder (MVR) in the police vehicle that Chandler had initially denied consent but changed her
mind and consented because she “did not want to wait any longer.” The search produced a bag of marijuana and a
loaded .22 caliber pistol.

         Defendant admitted to ownership of the marijuana and the pistol. He was charged with unlawful
possession of a weapon, fourth-degree child abuse, and a disorderly persons offense for possession of marijuana. At
a suppression hearing, the trial court found that Faust had probable cause to pull the vehicle over and for a search.
Although the court found that several of the factors set forth in State v. King, 
44 N.J. 346, 352-53 (1965), militated
against a finding of Chandler’s voluntary consent, it determined the totality of the circumstances indicated that the
consent to search was valid and not coerced. The Appellate Division affirmed based on the totality of the evidence.

         The Court granted certification, limited to the issue of whether Chandler’s “consent to search the motor
vehicle was freely and voluntarily given.” 
229 N.J. 161 (2017).

HELD: Because the trial court’s determination that the driver ultimately knowingly and voluntarily gave consent to
search is supported by sufficient credible evidence, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress the
evidence seized during the search.

                                                            1
1. In reviewing the grant or denial of a motion to suppress, an appellate court will uphold the trial court’s factual
findings underlying that decision so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.
Video-recorded evidence is reviewed under the same standard. State v. S.S., 
229 N.J. 360, 381 (2017). The panel’s
decision here predated the Court’s opinion in S.S. and included findings based on the panel’s own de novo review of
the MVR. The Court adheres to the principle enunciated in S.S. (pp. 7-8)

2. Consent to search is a long-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Consent searches of motor vehicles
that are pulled over by police are valid only if: (1) there is a reasonable and articulable basis beyond the initial valid
motor vehicle stop to continue the detention after completion of the valid traffic stop; and (2) the consent is given
knowingly and voluntarily. (pp. 8-10)

3. In State v. King, the Court delineated factors for use in considering the voluntariness of consent. 
44 N.J. at 352-53.
Factors potentially indicating coerced consent include: “(1) that consent was made by an individual already arrested;
(2) that consent was obtained despite a denial of guilt; (3) that consent was obtained only after the accused had refused
initial requests for consent to search; (4) that consent was given where the subsequent search resulted in a seizure of
contraband which the accused must have known would be discovered; [and] (5) that consent was given while the
defendant was handcuffed.” Ibid. Factors potentially indicating voluntariness of consent include: “(1) that consent
was given where the accused had reason to believe that the police would find no contraband; (2) that the defendant
admitted his guilt before consent; [and] (3) that the defendant affirmatively assisted the police officers.” Id. at 353.
The Court emphasized that those factors were not commandments, but “guideposts to aid a trial judge in arriving at his
conclusion.” Ibid. Voluntariness depends on “the totality of the particular circumstances of the case” with each case
“necessarily depend[ing] upon its own facts.” Ibid. (pp. 10-11)

4. After determining the automobile stop was valid, the trial court acknowledged and evaluated the King factors but
found that Chandler consented to the search voluntarily even though a majority of those factors cut against a finding
of voluntariness. Notably, the court stressed the officer’s lack of insistence, the short period between the initial
refusal and the consent, the officer’s non-aggressive request for clarification, and Chandler’s repeated affirmations
that she did, in fact, give her consent to search. In the trial court’s view, the video evidence was more compelling
than the results suggested by a mechanical application of the King factors to the facts of the case. Over fifty years
ago, when King was decided, MVRs did not exist. Because of rapid developments in technology, MVRs are
increasingly mounted in police vehicles, having become another important tool with the capacity to aid in the search
for the truth. The MVR aided the trial court here because it permitted visual and audial evaluation of the police and
driver’s interaction on the issue of consent. Specifically, the MVR footage helped the trial court determine that
Chandler voluntarily consented to the search of her vehicle. Sufficient credible evidence supports that
determination. (pp. 11-13)

5. Defendant contends that Faust’s statement—“We are going to apply for a search warrant, okay, and that is just
kinda going to prolong the inevitable”—coerced Chandler’s consent. Although the use of the term “inevitable” was
somewhat anticipatory as to what might follow, the manner in which it was used here was not coercive. As a best
practice, police officers should tell a suspect only the measures they intend to take—apply for a search warrant—and
should not offer a prediction about whether a warrant will issue. Here, Faust had probable cause to support the
issuance of a search warrant given the odor of burnt marijuana. Faust’s statement was a candid assessment of the
likelihood that a judge would grant his application for a search warrant. (p. 14)

6. Sufficient credible evidence supports the trial court’s determination that Chandler’s consent was voluntary under
the totality of the circumstances, despite the presence of several of the potentially coercive King factors. Here,
technological advancements permitted the trial court to better evaluate the manner in which Faust obtained consent.
Such possibilities—which are increasingly common today—are precisely why the King Court factors are guideposts
rather than rigid absolute authority. (p. 15)

         The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED.

       CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-
VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’s opinion.

                                                            2
                                      SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                        A-
37 September Term 2016
                                                 078014

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

    Plaintiff-Respondent,

         v.

MALCOLM C. HAGANS,

    Defendant-Appellant.

         Argued January 16, 2018 – Decided April 23, 2018

         On certification to the Superior Court,
         Appellate Division.

         Rebecca Gindi, Assistant Deputy Public
         Defender, argued the cause for appellant
         (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender,
         attorney; Rebecca Gindi, of counsel, and
         Susan Brody, Deputy Public Defender, on the
         briefs).

         Jane C. Schuster, Deputy Attorney General,
         argued the cause for respondent (Christopher
         S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Jane
         C. Schuster, of counsel and on the briefs).

    JUSTICE TIMPONE delivered the opinion of the Court.

    In this case, the Court considers the validity of a

driver’s consent to search her automobile after she initially

denied a police officer’s request to search it.    Because the

trial court’s determination that the driver ultimately knowingly

and voluntarily gave consent to search is supported by

sufficient credible evidence, we find that the trial court

                                1
properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence

seized during the search.

                                   I.

    We garner these undisputed facts from the record, including

the dash-cam videos taken at the scene by the Mobile Video

Recorder (MVR) in the police vehicle.       The parties stipulated to

the admission of the MVR recording and agreed it contained

sufficient facts for a hearing on defendant’s motion to

suppress.   No witnesses testified, and the parties agreed to rely

solely on the MVR recording to support their arguments.       We have

reviewed that video.

    In March 2012, New Jersey State Trooper John Faust pulled

over a 2002 Mercury Sable with a damaged taillight on Interstate

295 in Burlington County.   The driver, Shonsheray Chandler, had

changed lanes without signaling.       There were passengers in

Chandler’s car:   her six-year-old daughter, who was in the back

seat, and defendant Malcolm Hagans, sitting in the front

passenger seat.   Faust approached the passenger side of the

vehicle and asked Chandler for her driving documents.

    While waiting, Faust smelled the odor of burnt marijuana in

the vehicle.    He asked defendant, who was on his cell phone, to

hang up.    When defendant objected, Faust asked him to step out

of the vehicle, arrested him, handcuffed him, called for back-

                                   2
up, and administered Miranda warnings.    Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966).

    Faust then asked Chandler to step out of the vehicle,

administered Miranda warnings, and questioned her about the

presence of marijuana in the vehicle.    Faust handcuffed Chandler

and placed her in the backseat of his police vehicle.     Chandler

denied knowing defendant had marijuana on him and denied that

she had been smoking marijuana in the car.    Upon request, Faust

brought Chandler’s daughter to the police car to be with her

mother.    Officers at the scene placed defendant in another

police vehicle.

    Faust requested Chandler consent to a search of her

vehicle.   Before reading the consent form to her, Faust told

Chandler that “it would be a lot easier if you would just make

things easy.”

    Faust read the consent form aloud.     He advised Chandler of

her right to refuse consent and that if she refused, barring any

other reason to detain her, she could leave.     He also explained

if she consented, she had a right to be present during the

search and could withdraw her consent at any time.    Faust asked

whether she would give consent, and Chandler responded “no.”

    Faust then discussed his next steps.     “I know, but at this

time . . . we are going to apply for a search warrant, okay, and

that is kinda going to prolong the inevitable.    I would just

                                  3
like it to be easier.”     Chandler replied, “Go ahead.”   Faust

then inquired, “What’s that ma’am?,” to which Chandler repeated

“Go ahead.”    Faust asked, “Are you sure?”   Chandler answered,

“Yeah.”   Faust countered, “So you’re saying yes?”    Chandler

responded, “Yes.”

    To confirm Chandler’s decision, Faust re-read her the

consent-to-search form in its entirety.    Faust then again asked

Chandler if she consented to the search of her vehicle; she

responded “yes.”     Faust repeated for the MVR that Chandler had

initially denied consent but changed her mind and consented

because she “did not want to wait any longer.”

    The search produced a bag of marijuana and a loaded .22

caliber pistol.     Chandler denied knowledge of the pistol, which

police found behind the front passenger seat, near Chandler’s

daughter.     Faust explained to Chandler that the Division of

Youth and Family Services -- now the Division of Child

Protection and Permanency -- would be notified given the

proximity of the pistol to her young daughter.

    Defendant ultimately admitted to ownership of the marijuana

and the pistol.     He was charged with unlawful possession of a

weapon, in violation of 
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b), fourth-degree child

abuse, in violation of 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-1, and a disorderly persons

offense for possession of marijuana.    Chandler was not charged.

                                   4
    At a suppression hearing, the trial court found that Faust

had probable cause to pull the vehicle over for changing lanes

without a signal and probable cause for a search upon smelling

burnt marijuana.   Although the court found that several of the

factors set forth in State v. King, 
44 N.J. 346, 352-53 (1965),

militated against a finding of Chandler’s voluntary consent, it

determined the totality of the circumstances indicated that the

consent to search was valid and not coerced.    The court found no

taint in Chandler’s consent, determining Faust did not badger

her or attempt to further persuade her to consent.

    Defendant pleaded guilty to gun possession, preserving his

right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress.    The

remaining charges against him were dismissed.   The trial court

sentenced defendant to a five-year term of imprisonment with a

one-year period of parole ineligibility.

    The Appellate Division affirmed based on the totality of

the evidence, finding that the initial stop was justified by

Faust’s reasonable suspicion of a motor vehicle infraction and

found valid the subsequent search because the driver’s consent

to search was not coerced.

    This Court granted certification, limited to the issue of

whether Chandler’s “consent to search the motor vehicle was

freely and voluntarily given.”   
229 N.J. 161 (2017).

                                 5
                                  II.

                                  A.

     Defendant urges this Court to reverse the Appellate

Division’s finding that Chandler voluntarily consented to the

search of her vehicle.

     Defendant insists the circumstances surrounding Chandler’s

consent were steeped in coercion leading to her involuntarily

consenting to the search.   Defendant maintains the Appellate

Division misapplied the five factors delineated by the Court in

King.   Defendant argues the following circumstances establish

Chandler’s coerced consent:   (1) Chandler consented while under

arrest; (2) Faust had physically restrained Chandler by

handcuffing and placing her in a police vehicle; (3) Chandler

denied knowledge of contraband in the car and knew that a search

would result in the discovery of marijuana; and (4) Faust

attempted to persuade Chandler to consent after she initially

refused.

     Lastly, defendant contends that Faust’s statement

concerning the inevitability of a search warrant rendered

Chandler’s consent involuntary.    Defendant asserts that the

circumstances facing Chandler were substantially more coercive

than those facing the defendant in State v. Cancel, in which an

officer made a similar statement but the court nevertheless

                                  6
found the consent voluntary.   
256 N.J. Super. 430, 433-34 (App.

Div. 1992).

                                B.

    The State argues that Chandler’s consent was knowing and

voluntary under the totality of the circumstances and urges this

Court to affirm the Appellate Division.     The State asserts the

MVR conveyed Faust’s professionalism in dealing with Chandler

throughout their exchanges.

    The State also notes that the factors in King merely guide

the voluntariness analysis and are not dispositive.     Concerning

Faust’s statement about the inevitability of a search warrant,

the State argues the Appellate Division correctly applied

Cancel, holding that police may constitutionally provide a fair

prediction of events to follow a denial of consent.

                               III.

                                 A.

    In reviewing the grant or denial of a motion to suppress,

we uphold the trial court’s factual findings underlying that

decision “so long as those findings are supported by sufficient

credible evidence in the record.”     State v. Gamble, 
218 N.J.
 412, 424 (2014) (citing State v. Elders, 
192 N.J. 224, 243

(2007)).   We “reverse only when the trial court’s determination

is 'so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand

                                 7
intervention and correction.’”    Id. at 425 (quoting Elders, 
192 N.J. at 244).

       Video-recorded evidence is reviewed under the same

standard.   State v. S.S., 
229 N.J. 360, 381 (2017) (concluding

that a trial court’s fact-finding based solely on a video

recording is disturbed only “when factual findings are so

clearly mistaken -- so wide of the mark -- that the interests of

justice demand intervention”).

       The panel’s decision here predated our opinion in S.S. and

included findings based on the panel’s own de novo review of the

MVR.    We adhere to the principles we enunciated in S.S.

       We review the legal determinations of the trial court de

novo.   Gamble, 
218 N.J. at 425 (citing State v. Gandhi, 
201 N.J.
 161, 176 (2010)).    Those determinations are not entitled to any

special deference.    Ibid. (citing Gandhi, 
201 N.J. at 176).

       Defendant has automatic standing to challenge the

automobile search because the marijuana and gun recovered as a

result of the search constitute essential elements of the crime

with which he was charged.    State v. Lamb, 
218 N.J. 300, 313

(2014) (citing Jones v. United States, 
362 U.S. 257 (1960),

overruled by United States v. Salvucci, 
448 U.S. 83 (1980)).

                                 B.

       The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and

Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution prohibit

                                  8
“'unreasonable searches and seizures’ by government officials.”

State v. Watts, 
223 N.J. 503, 513 (2015).   “'Warrantless

searches are presumptively unreasonable,’” and “the State bears

the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence not

only that the [warrantless] search or seizure was premised on

probable cause, but also that it 'f[ell] within one of the few

well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.’”     State

v. Bryant, 
227 N.J. 60, 69-70 (2016) (third alteration in

original) (quoting State v. Johnson, 
193 N.J. 528, 552 (2008)).

Consent to search is a “long-recognized” exception to the

warrant requirement.   State v. Coles, 
218 N.J. 322, 337 (2014).

    Consent searches of motor vehicles that are pulled over by

police are valid only if:   (1) “there is a reasonable and

articulable basis beyond the initial valid motor vehicle stop to

continue the detention after completion of the valid traffic

stop,” State v. Carty, 
170 N.J. 632, 647 (2002); and (2) the

consent is “given knowingly and voluntarily,” id. at 639.      The

lynchpin to voluntary consent “is whether a person has knowingly

waived [her] right to refuse to consent to the search.”      State

v. Domicz, 
188 N.J. 285, 308 (2006) (citing State v. Johnson, 
68 N.J. 349, 353-54 (1975)).   The burden is on the State to prove

“that the individual giving consent knew that he or she 'had a

choice in the matter.’”   Carty, 
170 N.J. at 639 (quoting

Johnson, 
68 N.J. at 354).   Specifically, the consenting

                                9
individual must have been aware of her right to refuse, before

giving consent.   Johnson, 
68 N.J. at 354.

    In the 1965 case of State v. King, this Court delineated

factors for use by our courts in considering the voluntariness

of consent.   
44 N.J. at 352-53.    Factors potentially indicating

coerced consent include:

         (1) that consent was made by an individual
         already arrested; (2) that consent was
         obtained despite a denial of guilt; (3) that
         consent was obtained only after the accused
         had refused initial requests for consent to
         search; (4) that consent was given where the
         subsequent search resulted in a seizure of
         contraband which the accused must have known
         would be discovered; [and] (5) that consent
         was given while the defendant was handcuffed.

         [Ibid. (citations omitted).]

Factors potentially indicating voluntariness of consent include:

         (1) that consent was given where the accused
         had reason to believe that the police would
         find no contraband; (2) that the defendant
         admitted his guilt before consent; [and] (3)
         that the defendant affirmatively assisted the
         police officers.

         [Id. at 353 (citations omitted).]

    The Court emphasized that those factors were not

commandments, but “guideposts to aid a trial judge in arriving

at his conclusion.”   Ibid.   The Court cautioned that “the

existence or absence of one or more of the factors mentioned

above may be of great significance in the circumstances of one

case, yet be of slight significance in another.”     Ibid.    Indeed,

                                   10
the Court explained, “many decisions have sustained a finding

that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was

obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused

had been arrested.”   Ibid.   Voluntariness depends on “the

totality of the particular circumstances of the case” with each

case “necessarily depend[ing] upon its own facts.”    Ibid.

                                 C.

    Against that backdrop, we now consider driver Chandler’s

consent to the search of her motor vehicle.

    The heart of our voluntariness analysis hinges on whether

an individual has knowingly waived his or her right to refuse

consent.

    After determining the automobile stop was valid, the trial

court acknowledged and evaluated the King factors but found that

Chandler consented to the search voluntarily even though a

majority of those factors cut against a finding of

voluntariness.   Notably, the court stressed the officer’s lack

of insistence, the short period between the initial refusal and

the consent, the officer’s non-aggressive request for

clarification, and Chandler’s repeated affirmations that she

did, in fact, give her consent to search.     In the trial court’s

view, the video evidence was more compelling than the results

suggested by a mechanical application of the King factors to the

facts of the case.

                                 11
    Over fifty years ago, when King was decided, MVRs did not

exist.   Because of rapid developments in technology, MVRs are

increasingly mounted in police vehicles, having become another

important tool with the capacity to aid in the search for the

truth.   As we recently noted in North Jersey Media Group, Inc.

v. Township of Lyndhurst, “[MVR] recordings, made while an event

unfolds, protect the public and police alike in that the videos

can expose misconduct and debunk false accusations.”     
229 N.J.
 541, 575-76 (2017).

    The MVR aided the trial court here because it permitted

visual and audial evaluation of the police and driver’s

interaction on the issue of consent.    Specifically, the MVR

footage helped the trial court determine that Chandler

voluntarily consented to the search of her vehicle.    We find

sufficient credible evidence supports that determination.

    After Trooper Faust read driver Chandler the consent form,

she initially refused to consent.    Trooper Faust told Chandler

that his next step would be to obtain a search warrant and that

she was simply postponing the “inevitable.”    Chandler told him

to “Go ahead.”   Faust then asked several different questions to

ensure she understood and consented, to which Chandler responded

affirmatively.   He re-read the entire consent form aloud to her,

reminding her of the right to refuse consent, to depart after

refusing if there existed no other reason to detain her, to

                                12
withdraw consent at any time, and to be present during the

search.   Faust even repeated for the MVR that Chandler initially

denied consent but had subsequently changed her mind.

    Observing the time frame of the stop, the trial court

concluded “[t]his is not a situation where you have an officer

badgering . . . the driver trying to get consent.     The officer

made one statement [and had] no further discussions with the

driver.   The driver voluntarily without any type of coercion or

taint did give consent.”

    Based on its own review, the Appellate Division observed

that Chandler appeared at ease throughout the entire interaction

and listened to and calmly considered her options.     Faust’s

actions, in the panel’s view, were not menacing, harassing, or

deceptive.   The panel’s observations underscored those of the

trial court.

    Defendant points to the King guideposts as dispositive in

finding Chandler to have been coerced.      We disagree.   The

objective of a court undertaking a voluntariness analysis is to

scrutinize “the totality of the particular circumstances of the

case.”    King, 
44 N.J. at 353 (emphasis added).   And, in S.S. we

stressed the capacity of video to bring clarity to a challenged

proceeding, stating that “reading a cold transcript is no

substitute for viewing the video in evaluating the circumstances

of an interrogation.”    
229 N.J. at 385.

                                 13
    Defendant further contends that Faust’s statement -- “We

are going to apply for a search warrant, okay, and that is just

kinda going to prolong the inevitable” -- coerced Chandler’s

consent.    Although the use of the term “inevitable” was somewhat

anticipatory as to what might follow, the manner in which it was

used here was not coercive.

    An officer’s comment regarding the inevitability of a

search warrant does not indicate coercion if it is “a fair

prediction of events that would follow” rather than “a deceptive

threat made to deprive [an individual] of the ability to make an

informed consent.”    Cancel, 
256 N.J. Super. at 434.   As a best

practice, police officers should tell a suspect only the

measures they intend to take –- apply for a search warrant -–

and should not offer a prediction about whether a warrant will

issue.   Here, Faust had probable cause to support the issuance

of a search warrant given the odor of burnt marijuana.     State v.

Walker, 
213 N.J. 281, 290 (2013) (“New Jersey courts have

recognized that the smell of marijuana itself constitutes

probable cause that a criminal offense ha[s] been committed and

that additional contraband might be present.”    (alteration in

original) (quoting State v. Nishina, 
175 N.J. 502, 516-17

(2003))).   Faust’s statement was nothing more than a candid

assessment of the likelihood that a judge would grant his

application for a search warrant.

                                 14
    In sum, we find sufficient credible evidence supports the

trial court’s determination that Chandler’s consent was

voluntary under the totality of the circumstances, despite the

presence of several of the potentially coercive King factors.

Here, technological advancements permitted the trial court to

better evaluate the manner in which Faust obtained consent.

Such possibilities -- which are increasingly common today -- are

precisely why the King Court factors are guideposts rather than

rigid absolute authority.

     We find sufficient evidentiary support for the trial

court’s conclusion that Chandler knowingly and voluntarily

consented to Faust’s search of her vehicle.   We hold that the

trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress.

                               IV.

    We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division upholding

the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress.

     CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN,
PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’s
opinion.

                               15