Title: Commonwealth v. Garner

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-13103 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  EARL GARNER. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     September 10, 2021. - June 24, 2022. 
 
Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Firearms.  Constitutional Law, Stop and frisk, Reasonable 
suspicion.  Search and Seizure, Protective frisk, 
Reasonable suspicion.  Practice, Criminal, Motion to 
suppress, Interlocutory appeal, Findings by judge. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 29, 2017. 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Thomas 
F. McGuire, Jr., J., and a motion for reconsideration was 
considered by him. 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Kafker, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court 
for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by him to 
the Appeals Court.  After review by the Appeals Court, the 
Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate 
review. 
 
 
David B. Mark, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
Brian A. Kelley for the defendant. 
Rebecca Kiley & David Rassoul Rangaviz, Committee for 
Public Counsel Services, Katharine Naples-Mitchell, Chauncey B. 
2 
 
Wood, & Radha Natarajan, for Charles Hamilton Houston Institute 
for Race and Justice & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
BUDD, C.J.  The defendant, Earl Garner, was charged with 
two firearm offenses as the result of a traffic stop.  After an 
evidentiary hearing, a judge in the Superior Court granted the 
defendant's motion to suppress, having concluded that the 
firearm was discovered during an unlawful patfrisk.1  The Appeals 
Court thereafter reversed the judge's decision in response to an 
interlocutory appeal by the Commonwealth.  We granted the 
defendant's petition for further appellate review and now affirm 
the motion judge's order granting the motion to suppress.2 
Background.  We summarize the facts as found by the motion 
judge, leaving some details for later discussion.  Three State 
police troopers were on patrol one night in Taunton when they 
observed a motor vehicle with tinted windows make two abrupt 
turns.  The troopers activated the cruiser's blue lights, and 
the motor vehicle stopped. 
 
1 In the motion judge's initial memorandum of decision and 
order, he ruled that the traffic stop was improper and that all 
evidence resulting from the stop must be suppressed.  Upon the 
Commonwealth's motion for reconsideration, the motion judge 
concluded that the traffic stop was proper based on a civil 
motor vehicle infraction.  That ruling is not before us on 
appeal. 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Charles 
Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice, Committee for 
Public Counsel Services, Massachusetts Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers, and New England Innocence Project. 
3 
 
As the officers approached the car, the defendant and one 
of the troopers, Paul Dunderdale, recognized one another.  This 
stop was the fifth time Dunderdale had stopped the defendant 
over the course of several years;3 as a result of the first of 
those stops, the defendant was arrested for possession of a 
firearm.  Moreover, Dunderdale was aware that the defendant had 
been convicted twice of unlawful possession of a firearm.  
During the encounter, one of the defendant's legs was shaking, 
and he was trying to call someone with a cell phone as he spoke 
to Dunderdale. 
In response to questions from the trooper, the defendant 
stated that he was on his way to buy marijuana from a friend but 
had become lost.  The defendant repeated several times, "Come 
on, Dunderdale."  The trooper asked if the defendant "'messed' 
with firearms anymore?"  The defendant said, "No," and then 
said, "Take a look if you want."  When the defendant indicated 
that he did not mind getting out of the vehicle, Dunderdale 
responded, "Okay.  Hop out." 
 
 
3 The four previous encounters all stemmed from traffic 
stops.  The first, in 2011, resulted in the recovery of a 
firearm and a conviction in 2012 of possession of a firearm, 
subsequent offense.  The second stop, which occurred 
approximately one week after the defendant was released from 
prison in 2014, resulted in a charge for operating with a 
suspended license.  Trooper Paul Dunderdale did not issue a 
ticket or make an arrest during the latter two stops, and the 
interactions were "friendly" on those occasions. 
4 
 
The defendant emerged from the vehicle and took two or 
three steps away from Dunderdale.  As he did so, a second 
trooper positioned himself behind the defendant and instructed 
the defendant to move toward the rear of the vehicle.  The 
defendant called out for someone to come out of a nearby home 
but received no response.4  The second trooper then grabbed the 
defendant, pat frisked him, and found a gun in his waistband. 
Discussion.  Under the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights, individuals are protected from unreasonable searches 
and seizures at the hands of the government.  Because a 
patfrisk, i.e., a "carefully limited search of the outer 
clothing of a person to discover weapons for safety purposes," 
is a "serious intrusion on the sanctity of the person," it "is 
not to be undertaken lightly" (alterations omitted).  See 
Commonwealth v. Torres-Pagan, 484 Mass. 34, 36 (2020), quoting 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968), and Commonwealth v. 
Almeida, 373 Mass. 266, 270-271 (1977), S.C., 381 Mass. 420 
(1980). 
A patfrisk is permissible only where an officer has a 
"reasonable suspicion," based on specific articulable facts, 
"that the suspect is [both] armed and dangerous."  Torres-Pagan, 
 
4 The defendant called out, "Yo, L.T.  Yo, L.T.  Come 
outside." 
5 
 
484 Mass. at 36, citing Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326-
327 (2009), and Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.  The Commonwealth has the 
burden to show that the patfrisk "was within constitutional 
limits."  Commonwealth v. DePeiza, 449 Mass. 367, 369 (2007).  
The Commonwealth argues that the defendant's prior criminal 
record, together with his behavior during the stop, created 
reasonable suspicion that the defendant was armed and dangerous. 
1.  The defendant's criminal record.  The defendant had 
been convicted twice of unlawful possession of a firearm, and 
Dunderdale was aware of the defendant's record.  Knowledge that 
a suspect's criminal record includes weapons-related offenses 
may factor into the reasonable suspicion calculus.  See 
Commonwealth v. Gomes, 453 Mass. 506, 512-513 (2009), citing 
Commonwealth v. Dasilva, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 556, 561 (2006).  
However, here, Dunderdale was familiar with the defendant, and 
in fact had arrested the defendant on a prior occasion for 
firearm possession without incident.  Further, Dunderdale 
testified that he believed he and the defendant had a "really 
good rapport."  In these circumstances, the defendant's somewhat 
stale criminal record5 carries little weight.  Contrast 
Commonwealth v. Nutile, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 614, 617-618 (1991) 
(patfrisk upheld where officers knew of defendant's prior 
 
5 The defendant's most recent conviction at that point, in 
2011, was six years prior to the stop at issue here. 
6 
 
firearm convictions, witnessed driver enter car with firearm, 
and observed defendant "hurling object out his window" during 
police chase). 
2.  The defendant's behavior.  At any rate, a suspect's 
criminal record alone will not justify a patfrisk.  See 
Commonwealth v. Cordero, 477 Mass. 237, 246 (2017).  The 
Commonwealth argues that the most salient factor in the 
reasonable suspicion calculus was the defendant's behavior 
during the stop.  Specifically, the Commonwealth contends that 
the defendant's behavior was unusual and suspicious and that he 
was preparing to flee the scene. 
To support its position, the Commonwealth includes details 
drawn from portions of the troopers' testimony that are not 
included in the judge's findings of fact.  Ordinarily, "[w]hen 
reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we accept the 
judge's findings of fact and will not disturb them absent clear 
error."  Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 460 Mass. 199, 205 (2011).  
However, here the Commonwealth suggests that we may consider the 
additional testimony culled from the hearing because the judge 
indicated in his June 11, 2018, memorandum of decision that 
"[t]he court credits the testimony of the troopers, except where 
they speculate about the defendant's thoughts." 
Relying upon Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 448 Mass. 334, 337 
(2007), S.C., 450 Mass. 818 (2008), which states in part that 
7 
 
"[a]ppellate courts may supplement a judge's finding of facts if 
the evidence is uncontroverted and undisputed and where the 
judge explicitly or implicitly credited the witness's 
testimony," the Commonwealth contends that the judge's statement 
allows for the presumption that the judge adopted the entirety 
of the troopers' testimony, including portions omitted from his 
findings of fact.6  This argument is misplaced. 
The Commonwealth accurately quotes the decision; however, 
Isaiah I. goes on to cite Commonwealth v. Butler, 423 Mass. 517, 
526 n.10 (1996), for the proposition that any additions to the 
findings of fact may "fill out the narrative" but may not 
contradict the motion judge's findings.  Isaiah I., 448 Mass. at 
337.  Later, in Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 
431 (2015), we emphasized more directly that "[a]lthough an 
appellate court may supplement a motion judge's subsidiary 
findings with evidence from the record that is uncontroverted 
and undisputed and where the judge explicitly or implicitly 
credited the witness's testimony, . . . it may do so only so 
long as the supplemented facts do not detract from the judge's 
ultimate findings" (emphasis added; quotations and citations 
omitted). 
 
6 The Commonwealth interprets the statement to mean that the 
judge did not accept the troopers' inference that the defendant 
actually intended to flee, but he credited their representations 
that they thought the defendant was going to flee. 
8 
 
In a hearing on a motion to suppress, the judge is the fact 
finder.  Because the judge observes the witnesses as they 
testify, appellate courts rely upon his or her determination of 
the credibility of each witness, as well as the amount of weight 
to give the testimony.  See Commonwealth v. Scott, 440 Mass. 
642, 646 (2004); Commonwealth v. Yesilciman, 406 Mass. 736, 743 
(1990).  "[A] finding of fact is the judge's declaration that it 
is a fact."  Isaiah I., supra at 338-339, quoting J.J. George, 
Judicial Opinion Writing 134 (4th ed. 2000).  "Findings of fact 
are factual deductions from the evidence, essential to the 
judgment in the case. . . .  Such findings should be stated 
clearly, concisely[,] and unequivocally, and be worded so that 
they are not susceptible of more than one interpretation."  
Isaiah I., supra at 339, citing George, supra at 110, 133-134, 
144. 
A statement generally crediting witness testimony is not 
the same as making factual deductions based on the evidence 
presented.  Further, such a statement is susceptible of more 
than one interpretation.  That is, if a motion judge indicates 
that he or she credits a witness's testimony, that could mean 
that the judge has accepted everything a witness said as true, 
including the witness's characterization of the evidence.  
Alternatively, it could signify a belief that the witness told 
the truth to the best of his or her knowledge, but not 
9 
 
necessarily that the judge accepted wholesale the witness's 
version of the facts.  Thus, we do not agree that a general 
statement crediting witness testimony means that every statement 
the witness makes on the stand is automatically a fact found by 
the motion judge. 
Moreover, the judge's findings of fact paint a very 
different picture of the stop from the Commonwealth's version.  
For example, based on Dunderdale's testimony, the Commonwealth 
describes the defendant's demeanor as "excessively nervous,"7 his 
explanation for being in the area as suspicious,8 and his offer 
to allow a search of his vehicle as insincere.9  To demonstrate 
that the defendant was in "fight or flight mode," the 
Commonwealth points to Dunderdale's testimony that when the 
defendant got out of the vehicle, he was "kind of blading away" 
from Dunderdale, and that he "start[ed] walking backwards across 
 
7 Dunderdale testified that, in his view, the defendant's 
nervousness was unusual because, based on previous motor vehicle 
stops, Dunderdale believed that he and the defendant had a good 
rapport. 
 
8 Dunderdale testified that his "sense of level of safety" 
rose after the defendant said he was there to buy marijuana from 
a friend but had gotten lost, and the defendant continued to 
plead, "Come on, Dunderdale," although Dunderdale did not 
believe that the defendant had a reason to plead with him, and 
that, at the time of the stop, all of the houses on the street 
were dark. 
 
9 Dunderdale testified that the defendant's offer, "Take a 
look if you want," was "sudden" and "[a]lmost as if . . . [the 
defendant did not] really want [Dunderdale] to take a look." 
10 
 
the street," and looked around in "a panicked manner."  The 
Commonwealth also notes that both Dunderdale and a second 
trooper testified that the defendant backed away in a manner 
that, in their experience, suggested he was about to flee. 
In contrast, although the judge found that the defendant 
was "possibly" nervous, he did not find the defendant to have 
been excessively so.10  Further, the judge did not characterize 
the defendant's answers to Dunderdale's questions as suspicious, 
nor did he find the defendant's offer to allow the troopers to 
search the vehicle to be disingenuous.  Instead, the judge found 
that the defendant was "not confrontational or belligerent" and 
that he "made no threats."  The judge further found that the 
defendant "made no furtive gestures" and did not "reach for 
anything" at any point during the encounter.  As for the 
defendant's behavior once he got out of his car, the judge made 
no finding that the defendant was "panicked," was "kind of 
blading away" from Dunderdale, or was attempting to flee.  
Rather, the judge found that, "[g]iven the narrowness of the 
area between the vehicle and the edge of the street, the 
 
10 Dunderdale's opinion regarding the defendant's state of 
mind notwithstanding, the judge noted that "nervousness in 
dealing with police is 'common' and does not indicate a threat."  
See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 459 Mass. 459, 468 (2011). 
11 
 
defendant could not have moved very far" and that he "could not 
have taken more than two or three steps, at most."11 
Finally, the judge did not credit the troopers' testimony 
"where they speculate[d] about the defendant's thoughts."  Both 
troopers testified that they believed that the defendant was in 
"flight or fight mode."  Testimony concerning what the defendant 
may have been thinking, the judge found, added nothing to the 
analysis because the troopers did not articulate a factual basis 
to support the conclusion. 
Given the stark difference between the Commonwealth's 
version of the encounter and the judge's own findings, the facts 
the Commonwealth seeks to add plainly are not "uncontroverted 
and undisputed."  See Isaiah I., 448 Mass. at 337.  In fact, the 
Commonwealth's supplemental facts tip the reasonable suspicion 
calculus in the opposite direction.  See Jones-Pannell, 472 
Mass. at 431 ("supplemented facts [may] not detract from the 
judge's ultimate findings" [quotation and citation omitted]).  
That is, had the judge made the findings suggested by the 
Commonwealth, he likely would have concluded that the officers' 
suspicion that the defendant was armed and dangerous was 
reasonable. 
 
11 The judge also made a specific finding that the defendant 
"did not run." 
12 
 
"[A]s our long-standing jurisprudence makes plain, in no 
event is it proper for an appellate court to engage in what 
amounts to independent fact finding in order to reach a 
conclusion of law that is contrary to that of a motion judge who 
has seen and heard the witnesses, and made determinations 
regarding the weight and credibility of their testimony."  
Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. at 438.  We therefore decline to 
supplement the findings made by the judge with the additional 
facts that the Commonwealth would have us consider. 
Relying solely upon the judge's findings, including that 
the defendant "was not confrontational or belligerent," "made no 
furtive gestures" or "threats," and was "known to the police, 
[had] a 'really good rapport' with the police and [had] never 
engaged in or threatened violence against the police," we agree 
with the judge that the defendant's behavior did not create 
reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous. 
Our recent decision in Commonwealth v. Sweeting-Bailey, 488 
Mass. 741 (2021), does not compel a different result.  In 
Sweeting-Bailey, a divided court upheld the judge's 
determination that the police officers had reasonably inferred 
from the circumstances that the front seat passenger intended to 
divert attention from the vehicle,12 and concluded that the 
 
12 Those circumstances included, inter alia, the front seat 
passenger's "erratic, uncharacteristic behavior, combined with 
13 
 
police officers therefore were justified in pat frisking the 
defendant, a rear seat passenger.  Id. at 742, 755-756.  The 
dissenters believed that the officers used an unreasonable and 
speculative inference concerning the front seat passenger's 
behavior to establish reasonable suspicion to pat frisk the 
defendant, who sat quietly in the rear seat, id. at 772-773 
(Gaziano, J., with whom Georges, J., joined, dissenting), and 
that the risk of accepting an unwarranted inference is that it 
"invites officers to pat frisk first and invent explanations 
later," id. at 770 (Budd, C.J., dissenting). 
Here, however, we unanimously agree with the judge's 
conclusion that the defendant's seemingly uncharacteristic 
behavior did not raise a reasonable inference that he was armed 
and dangerous.  The judge did not credit the troopers' 
"speculat[ive]" testimony "about the defendant's thoughts" and 
flatly rejected as unreasonable the proffered inference that the 
defendant might take "flight or fight" where it was unsupported 
by objective facts. 
 
the officers' knowledge of the three male passengers' prior 
involvement with firearms, their gang affiliations, and the high 
crime area in which the traffic stop occurred, and the fact that 
the officers were in jeopardy of losing control of the scene."  
Sweeting-Bailey, 488 Mass. at 755. 
14 
 
Because the defendant's reactions to the traffic stop did 
not justify the subsequent patfrisk, we affirm the judge's 
decision to allow the motion to suppress. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.