Title: Le Francois v. Goel

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 6/9/05 (reposted 6/10/05 to correct clerical error showing Kennard, J. as concurring in maj. opn.) 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
PHILIP LE FRANCOIS et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
) 
 
 
) 
S126630 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 6 H025213 
PRABHU GOEL et al., 
) 
 
) 
Santa Clara County 
 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
Super. Ct. No. CV787632 
___________________________________ ) 
 
In this lawsuit, defendants moved for summary judgment.  The trial court 
denied the motion.  More than a year later, some of the defendants again moved 
for summary judgment on the same grounds.  The court granted the second 
motion.  We must decide whether the court had authority to consider the new 
motion even though it was not based on either new facts or new law.  Code of 
Civil Procedure sections 437c, subdivision (f)(2), and 1008 seemingly prohibit a 
party from making such a new motion.1  The Court of Appeal held that the trial 
court had inherent power derived from the California Constitution to consider the 
second motion notwithstanding any statutory limitation. 
We conclude that sections 437c, subdivision (f)(2), and 1008 prohibit a 
party from making renewed motions not based on new facts or law, but do not 
limit a court’s ability to reconsider its previous interim orders on its own motion, 
                                              
1  
All further statutory citations are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 
 
2
as long as it gives the parties notice that it may do so and a reasonable opportunity 
to litigate the question.  So interpreted, the statutes are constitutional. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Plaintiffs Philip Le Francois and Eric Herald sued their former employer, 
Duet Technologies, Inc., and three officers of that company, claiming that the 
officers had made certain injurious misrepresentations and false promises.  All 
defendants moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary 
adjudication (hereafter simply summary judgment).  The trial court denied the 
motion, ruling that plaintiffs had raised a triable issue of material fact.  Over a year 
later, the individual defendants filed a new motion for summary judgment based 
on the same grounds as the first motion.  Plaintiffs opposed the motion on 
substantially the same basis that they opposed the first motion.  They also objected 
that the second motion was impermissible under section 437c, subdivision (f)(2).  
The second motion was originally scheduled to be heard by the judge who had 
heard the first motion, but, without objection, it was transferred to another judge.  
The second judge granted the new motion and later entered judgment in favor of 
the individual defendants.2 
Plaintiffs appealed.  The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment.  It 
concluded that because the second motion was based on the same law and 
evidence as the first motion, the motion violated sections 437c, subdivision (f)(2), 
and 1008.  It also concluded, however, that the trial court had “inherent power to 
rule upon the second motion even if it was not based upon new facts or law,” and 
this “inherent power does not depend on statute, nor may a statute confine it.”  
                                              
2  
The Court of Appeal held that because the motion was transferred without 
objection, plaintiffs could not challenge the propriety of that transfer on appeal.  
This issue is not before us on review, and we express no opinion on when and 
under what circumstances one judge may revisit a ruling of another judge. 
 
3
Accordingly, it held “that notwithstanding either section 1008 or section 437c 
(f)(2), [the second judge] had inherent power to exercise his ‘constitutionally 
derived authority to reconsider the prior interim ruling and correct an error of law 
on a dispositive issue.’ ”  (Quoting Scott Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
Ins. Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 197, 212.) 
We granted plaintiffs’ petition for review to decide whether the trial court 
had authority to consider and grant the individual defendants’ second motion for 
summary judgment. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Background 
Two statutes are relevant here:  sections 437c, subdivision (f)(2), and 1008.  
Section 437c contains detailed procedures governing motions for summary 
judgment.  Subdivision (f)(2) is merely a small part of that section.  As relevant, 
that subdivision provides that “a party may not move for summary judgment based 
on issues asserted in a prior motion for summary adjudication and denied by the 
court, unless that party establishes to the satisfaction of the court, newly 
discovered facts or circumstances or a change of law supporting the issues 
reasserted in the summary judgment motion.”  This language was added in 1990, 
effective January 1, 1991, “to make the summary judgment process more efficient 
and to reduce the opportunities for abuses of the procedure.”  (Bagley v. TRW, Inc. 
(1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1096, fn. 3, citing Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. 
Floor Analyses, rev. of Sen. Bill No. 2594 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.), Aug. 23, 1990; 
see Stats. 1990, ch. 1561, § 2, p. 7332.) 
Section 1008 more generally states procedures for applications to 
reconsider any previous interim court order.  It “applies to all applications for 
interim orders” (§ 1008, subd. (g)) and provides time limits and other requirements 
 
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for such applications.  It contains several provisions relevant here.  It generally 
requires that any motion for reconsideration be based “upon new or different facts, 
circumstances, or law . . . .”  (§ 1008, subds. (a), (b).)  It also provides:  “If a court 
at any time determines that there has been a change of law that warrants it to 
reconsider a prior order it entered, it may do so on its own motion and enter a 
different order.”  (§ 1008, subd. (c).)  Finally, it provides:  “This section specifies 
the court’s jurisdiction with regard to applications for reconsideration of its orders 
and renewals of previous motions, and applies to all applications to reconsider any 
order of a judge or court, or for the renewal of a previous motion, whether the 
order deciding the previous matter or motion is interim or final.  No application to 
reconsider any order or for the renewal of a previous motion may be considered 
by any judge or court unless made according to this section.”  (§ 1008, subd. (e), 
italics added.) 
Subdivisions (c) and (e) of section 1008 were added in 1992, effective 
January 1, 1993.  (Stats. 1992, ch. 460, § 4, pp. 1832-1833.)  Legislative findings 
state that the 1992 amendment was intended to clarify that no motion to reconsider 
may be heard unless it is based on new or different facts, circumstances, or law, 
and that the Legislature found it desirable “to reduce the number of motions to 
reconsider and renewals of previous motions heard by judges in this state.”  (Stats. 
1992, ch. 460, § 1, p. 1831; see Garcia v. Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674, 
688; Morite of California v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 485, 491-492.)  
Before these changes, section 1008 “purported to be neither jurisdictional nor 
exclusive.”  (Kollander Construction, Inc. v. Superior Court (2002) 98 
Cal.App.4th 304, 310, and cases cited therein.) 
One court has said that cases involving repeated summary judgment 
motions “must be decided by the specific requirements of the summary judgment 
statute [section 437c], not the general provisions of the reconsideration statute 
 
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[section 1008].”  (Bagley v. TRW, Inc., supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 1096, fn. 3; see 
also Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 726, 738.)  This 
conclusion certainly seems logical.  But for present purposes it does not 
particularly matter, for the two statutes say essentially the same thing:  A repeated 
motion or motion for reconsideration must be based on new facts or law.  As we 
discuss further in part II. C., post, any language differences between the statutes 
do not warrant different treatment of the issue before us. 
The Court of Appeal found that the second summary judgment motion at 
issue here was based on the same law and evidence as the first motion and hence 
violated sections 437c and 1008.  We did not grant review on this question and, 
accordingly, we accept the Court of Appeal’s finding in this regard.  (See People 
v. Weiss (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1073, 1076-1077.)  The question we must decide is the 
significance of this finding.  Specifically, we must decide whether the trial court 
had authority to consider, and then grant, the second summary judgment motion 
notwithstanding the provisions of sections 437c and 1008. 
At first, the cases interpreting these statutes as amended in the 1990’s 
generally held that a trial court has no authority or, as some of the cases phrased it, 
jurisdiction to consider a motion that violated section 437c or 1008.  (Bagley v. 
TRW, Inc., supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1096-1097 [§ 437c]; Pazderka v. 
Caballeros Dimas Alang, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 658, 669-670 [§ 1008]; 
Baldwin v. Home Savings of America (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1195-1201 
[§ 1008]; Garcia v. Hejmadi, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at pp. 690-691 [§ 1008]; 
Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1498-1502 [§ 1008]; Morite of 
California v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at pp. 490-493 [§ 1008]; but 
see Bernstein v. Consolidated American Ins. Co. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 763, 774 
[finding the requirements of § 437c were met, but also noting that the court was 
merely “correcting an erroneous ruling on its own motion”].)  Only the most 
 
6
recent of these cases considered whether separation of powers principles prevent 
the Legislature from imposing this limitation, and that case summarily rejected 
that conclusion.  (Bagley v. TRW, Inc., supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 1097, fn. 5 [“a 
court does not have the inherent power to act in a manner that is prohibited by 
statute”].) 
One of these decisions recognized problems with its conclusion that the 
trial court could not correct its mistakes, but felt powerless to rule otherwise.  “We 
are not unmindful of the awkward consequences likely to flow from this holding, 
which will in some instances bar trial judges from correcting rulings belatedly 
shown to be erroneous.  Judicial inefficiencies may also result from the need for 
an appeal that would not have been required if correction could have been made 
by a trial court willing to do so.  These problems stem not from our holding, 
however, but by the 1992 amendment to section 1008, which solved one set of 
problems by possibly creating another.  Given the jurisdictional nature of the 
present statute, these new problems are not amenable to a judicial solution.  The 
answer, if there is one, will have to come from the Legislature.”  (Baldwin v. 
Home Savings of America, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 1200, fn. 10.) 
More recent cases have taken different approaches and concluded that, to 
some extent at least, sections 437c and 1008 violate separation of powers 
principles, or would do so if interpreted to limit the trial court’s power to act.  
These cases generally are of two types. 
One line of cases concluded that the statutes limit only the parties’ ability to 
bring renewed motions, and they do not limit the court’s power to reconsider its 
rulings on its own motion.  Typical is Darling, Hall & Rae v. Kritt (1999) 75 
Cal.App.4th 1148, which found the “line of cases holding Code of Civil Procedure 
section 1008 is jurisdictional to be inapplicable because section 1008 does not 
govern the court’s ability, on its own motion, to reevaluate its own interim rulings.  
 
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[Citation.]  Instead, the trial court retains the inherent authority to change its 
decision at any time prior to the entry of judgment.  [Citation.]  Section 1008 is 
designed to conserve the court’s resources by constraining litigants who would 
attempt to bring the same motion over and over.  On the other hand, these same 
judicial resources would be wasted if the court could not, on its own motion, 
review and change its interim rulings.”  (Id. at pp. 1156-1157; to similar effect see 
also Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc., supra, 126 Cal.App.4th 726; Abassi v. Welke 
(2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1359-1360; Kerns v. CSE Ins. Group (2003) 106 
Cal.App.4th 368, 380-391; Case v. Lazben Financial Co. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 
172, 178-189; People v. Castello (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1248-1250 [dicta].) 
Another line of cases rejected the distinction between a party’s motion and 
the court’s ability to act on its own motion.  These cases concluded that a trial 
court has inherent power to reconsider its prior interim orders, either on its own 
motion or on motion of a party, and the statutes violate separation of power 
principles to the extent they limit this power.  The first of these cases was Remsen 
v. Lavacot (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 421, which found that whether the court acted 
sua sponte or in response to a litigant’s motion “to be a distinction without a 
difference.  Whether the trial judge has an unprovoked flash of understanding in 
the middle of the night or is prompted to rethink an issue by the stimulus of a 
motion is ‘constitutionally immaterial’ to the limitation on the power of the 
Legislature to regulate the judiciary.”  (Id. at p. 427.)  Some of the most recent 
decisions have followed this reasoning.  (Scott Co. v. United States Fidelity & 
Guaranty Ins. Co., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at pp. 205-212; Wozniak v. Lucutz 
(2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1041-1042; Kollander Construction, Inc. v. 
Superior Court, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at pp. 310-314; Blake v. Ecker (2001) 93 
Cal.App.4th 728, 739, fn. 10.)  The Court of Appeal here agreed with these cases. 
 
8
Thus the questions are squarely presented:  May a trial court reconsider 
interim orders it has already made in the absence of new facts or new law?  If so, 
may it do so only on its own motion, or may a party move for reconsideration?  
Because separation of power principles are pertinent to the question, we next 
discuss the relevant principles as they have developed in California.  Then, with 
these principles in mind, we will turn to the correct interpretation and application 
of sections 437c and 1008. 
B.  Separation of powers principles 
In recent years, this court has had several occasions to consider principles 
of separation of powers as they relate to the relationship between the legislative 
and judicial branches.  (E.g., People v. Bunn (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1, 14-17; Obrien v. 
Jones (2000) 23 Cal.4th 40, 47-49; Superior Court v. County of Mendocino (1996) 
13 Cal.4th 45, 52-59 (County of Mendocino).)  The case most instructive here is 
County of Mendocino, supra, 13 Cal.4th 45.  There, the question was whether the 
Legislature had impermissibly infringed on judicial powers when it enacted 
legislation authorizing counties to designate unpaid furlough days on which the 
courts must be closed.  (Id. at p. 48.)  We concluded the Legislature acted within 
its power.  Largely from this case, but also from the others, we can distill the basic 
principles we must consider in deciding whether the Legislature impermissibly 
infringed on judicial powers when it amended sections 437c and 1008 in the 
1990’s. 
“From its inception, the California Constitution has contained an explicit 
provision embodying the separation of powers doctrine.”  (County of Mendocino, 
supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 52.)  That Constitution apportions the powers of state 
government among the three branches familiar to all students of government in 
this country—legislative, executive, and judicial—and states that “[p]ersons 
 
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charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others 
except as permitted by this Constitution.”  (Cal. Const., art. III, § 3.)  Despite the 
apparent sharp division of powers among the governmental branches that the 
California Constitution provides, in reality the branches are mutually dependent in 
many respects, and the actions of one branch may significantly affect another 
branch.  (County of Mendocino, supra, at p. 52.)  “Indeed, upon brief reflection, 
the substantial interrelatedness of the three branches’ actions is apparent and 
commonplace:  the judiciary passes upon the constitutional validity of legislative 
and executive actions, the Legislature enacts statutes that govern the procedures 
and evidentiary rules applicable in judicial and executive proceedings, and the 
Governor appoints judges and participates in the legislative process through the 
veto power.  Such interrelationship, of course, lies at the heart of the constitutional 
theory of ‘checks and balances’ that the separation of powers doctrine is intended 
to serve.”  (Id. at pp. 52-53, italics added.) 
“At the same time, this doctrine unquestionably places limits upon the 
actions of each branch with respect to the other branches.”  (County of Mendocino, 
supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 53.)  The Constitution “vest[s] each branch with certain 
‘core’ [citation] or ‘essential’ [citation] functions that may not be usurped by 
another branch.”  (People v. Bunn, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 14.)  In County of 
Mendocino, we discussed several earlier cases “that addressed the subject of 
‘inherent judicial power’ and the validity of legislative actions relating to the 
judicial branch.”  (County of Mendocino, supra, at p. 53.)  We quoted especially 
pertinent language from one of those cases:  “ ‘Of necessity, the judicial 
department as well as the executive must in most matters yield to the power of 
statutory enactments.  [Citations.]  The power of the legislature to regulate 
criminal and civil proceedings and appeals is undisputed.’ ”  (County of 
Mendocino, supra, at p. 54, quoting Brydonjack v. State Bar (1929) 208 Cal. 439, 
 
10
442-443, italics added.)  But this power has limitations.  “ ‘The sum total of this 
matter is that the legislature may put reasonable restrictions upon constitutional 
functions of the courts provided they do not defeat or materially impair the 
exercise of those functions.  This power has been described as follows:  “ . . . [T]he 
mere procedure by which jurisdiction is to be exercised may be prescribed by the 
Legislature, unless, indeed, such regulations should be found to substantially 
impair the constitutional powers of the courts, or practically defeat their exercise.”  
[Citations.]’ ”  (County of Mendocino, supra, at p. 54, quoting Brydonjack v. State 
Bar, supra, at p. 444, italics added in County of Mendocino.) 
After reviewing these earlier decisions, we stated the basic test:  “[T]he 
Legislature generally may adopt reasonable regulations affecting a court’s inherent 
powers or functions, so long as the legislation does not ‘defeat’ or ‘materially 
impair’ a court’s exercise of its constitutional power or the fulfillment of its 
constitutional function.”  (County of Mendocino, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 58-59; 
see also People v. Bunn, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 16.)3  One of the core judicial 
functions that the Legislature may regulate but not usurp is “the essential power of 
the judiciary to resolve ‘specific controversies’ between parties.”  (People v. Bunn, 
supra, at p. 15; see also id. at p. 22.) 
                                              
3  
In County of Mendocino, we also noted that one of the earlier cases, 
Millholen v. Riley (1930) 211 Cal. 29, 34, had said that the Legislature may 
regulate the courts’ operation “so long as their efficiency is not thereby impaired.”  
(County of Mendocino, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 59, fn. 6; see also Walker v. 
Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 267 [quoting the same language from 
Millholen].)  We explained, however, that this language did not mean that a statute 
is unconstitutional whenever “it increases a court’s burden or makes the court less 
‘efficient.’ ”  (County of Mendocino, supra, at p. 59, fn. 6.)  Instead, “[w]hen the 
decisions discussed above are read as a whole, it is readily apparent that the 
standard they have embraced is one that looks to whether the legislation ‘defeats’ 
or ‘materially impairs’ a court’s ability to perform its constitutional functions.”  
(Ibid.) 
 
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In sum, the separation of powers test applicable here can be stated quite 
simply:  The Legislature may regulate the courts’ inherent power to resolve 
specific controversies between parties, but it may not defeat or materially impair 
the courts’ exercise of that power.  With this test in mind, we next consider how to 
interpret and apply sections 437c and 1008 in this case. 
C.  Interpretation and application of sections 437c and 1008 
Plaintiffs urge us to adopt the line of cases represented by Kerns v. CSE Ins. 
Group, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th 368, which holds that sections 437c and 1008 
validly limit the parties’ ability to make repetitive motions but do not limit the 
court’s authority to act on its own motion.  They argue that this line of cases 
“strikes the right balance between permissible legislation affecting court 
procedures and protection of the inherent power of the court to revisit a prior 
interim ruling on its own.”  Defendants urge us to adopt the view of the Court of 
Appeal here and the cases it relies on, which hold that notwithstanding sections 
437c and 1008, a trial court has the inherent authority to revisit its previous orders, 
whether the court acts on its own motion or on motion of a party.  They argue that 
“the line plaintiffs draw between impermissible action by a court on a party’s 
initiative and permissible action by a court on its own makes no constitutional 
sense.  What is determinative is whether there is error to correct, not who discerns 
the error’s existence.”  We agree with plaintiffs. 
Sections 437c and 1008 clearly limit the parties’ ability to file repetitive 
motions.  To the extent they only do that, they come within the Legislature’s 
authority to enact statutes affecting the judicial branch.  As one recent case noted, 
“one need only peruse the Code of Civil Procedure to be reminded that numerous 
statutes govern the procedures litigants must follow in the courts of this state.”  
(Case v. Lazben Financial Co., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 184.)  The separation 
 
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of powers limitation on the Legislature’s power to regulate procedure is narrow.  
Chaos could ensue if courts were generally able to pick and choose which 
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to follow and which to disregard as 
infringing on their inherent powers.  The same concern applies to the Evidence 
Code, which, after all, generally limits a court’s ability to consider evidence.  In 
most matters, the judicial branch must necessarily yield to the legislative power to 
enact statutes.  (County of Mendocino, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 54, citing 
Brydonjack v. State Bar, supra, 208 Cal. at pp. 442-443.)  Only if a legislative 
regulation truly defeats or materially impairs the courts’ core functions, including, 
as relevant here, their ability to resolve controversies, may a court declare it 
invalid. 
We agree with the court in Kerns v. CSE Ins. Group, supra, 106 
Cal.App.4th at page 389, that “by eliminating the distinction between a trial 
court’s action taken sua sponte and that made in response to a litigant’s motion, 
the more recent cases such as Remsen and Wosniak go too far toward eviscerating 
the clear jurisdictional language of section 1008, essentially rendering the 
provisions of the statute meaningless.”  This discussion would also apply to 
section 437c.  These statutes serve a purpose.  They are “designed to conserve the 
court’s resources by constraining litigants who would attempt to bring the same 
motion over and over.”  (Darling, Hall & Rae v. Kritt, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 
1157.)  Limiting the parties’ ability to file repetitive motions does not defeat, or 
even materially impair, the court’s power to resolve specific controversies 
between parties.  Indeed, such a limitation might increase the courts’ efficiency.  
Accordingly, we uphold the statutes to the extent they apply to motions filed by 
the parties. 
Whether these statutes can validly limit the court’s authority to act on its 
own motion to correct its own errors presents quite a different question.  Such a 
 
13
limitation might go too far.  If interpreted to limit the court’s ability to reconsider 
its own rulings, these statutes might, as one court concluded, “emasculate the 
judiciary’s core power to decide controversies between parties.  The legislative 
restriction of a court’s ability to sua sponte reconsider its own rulings is not merely 
a reasonable regulation on judicial functions.  Instead, such a restriction would 
directly and materially impair and defeat the court’s most basic functions, 
exercising its discretion to rule upon controversies between the parties and 
ensuring the orderly administration of justice.  Courts are empowered to decide 
controversies, a power derived from the state constitution.  We are hard pressed to 
conceive of a restriction that goes more directly to the heart of a court’s 
constitutionally mandated functions.  Under [a strict] reading, if a court realizes it 
has misunderstood or misapplied the law, it is prohibited from revisiting its ruling, 
whether it realizes its mistake 10 minutes or 10 days later, and no matter how 
obvious its error or how draconian the effects of its misstep.  ‘A court could not 
operate successfully under the requirement of infallibility in its interim rulings.  
Miscarriage of justice results where a court is unable to correct its own perceived 
legal errors . . . .’ ”  (Case v. Lazben Financial Co., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 
185.) 
But we need not decide this constitutional question.  Consistent with our 
common practice of construing statutes, when reasonable, to avoid difficult 
constitutional questions (see Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. (2002) 28 
Cal.4th 828, 846-847), we interpret the statutes the way many Courts of Appeal 
have done—as imposing a limitation on the parties’ ability to file repetitive 
motions, but not on the court’s authority to reconsider its prior interim rulings on 
its own motion.4  Section 437c, subdivision (f)(2), can easily be so interpreted.  On 
                                              
4  
What we say about the court’s ability to reconsider interim orders does not 
necessarily apply to final orders, which present quite different concerns. 
 
14
its face, that subdivision merely says that “a party may not” make a motion that 
violates its provisions.  (Italics added.)  It says nothing limiting the court’s ability 
to act. 
The question is a bit more complex regarding section 1008.  In two ways 
that statute and its legislative history suggest that it has a broader meaning and 
does restrict the court’s authority to act on its own.  (See Case v. Lazben Financial 
Co., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 188.)  First, section 1008, subdivision (c), added 
at the same time as subdivision (e), states that a court may reconsider a prior order 
on its own motion if it determines the law has changed.  This subdivision contains 
a negative implication that the court may not reconsider such an order absent a 
change in the law.  (See Clark v. Burleigh (1992) 4 Cal.4th 474, 489.)  “The 
expression of some things in a statute necessarily means the exclusion of other 
things not expressed.”  (Gikas v. Zolin (1993) 6 Cal.4th 841, 852.)  Second, at one 
stage of the legislative process, the bill was amended in the Senate to expressly 
provide that section 1008 “shall not be construed to limit in any manner the right 
of a judge to exercise his or her own discretion in reconsidering any order he or 
she may have issued.”  (Sen. Amend. to Sen. Bill No. 1805 (1991-1992 Reg. 
Sess.) Apr. 21, 1992.) This amendment was later deleted in the Assembly, 
suggesting the Legislature may have wanted to limit the right of judges to act on 
their own. (Assem. Amend. to Sen. Bill No. 1805 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) July 9, 
1992.) 
But these circumstances are not conclusive.  The deletion of the amendment 
in the Assembly may have implied an intent to limit the court’s authority, but it 
may instead merely have reflected “an assessment that the discretionary language 
was superfluous.”  (People v. Castello, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1249-1250, 
fn. 7.)  Moreover, if subdivision (c) of section 1008 contains a negative 
implication, so, too, does subdivision (e) of that section, but one that points in the 
 
15
opposite direction as subdivision (c).  Subdivision (e), the only part of section 
1008 that expressly limits the court’s jurisdiction, speaks only of the court’s 
reconsideration of a party’s motion and does not mention the court’s ability to act 
on its own.  Thus, its negative implication is that the Legislature did not intend any 
greater limitation on the court’s jurisdiction.  The maxim that the expression of 
some things necessarily means the exclusion of things not expressed is not 
immutable.  (People v. Anzalone (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1074, 1078-1079.)  Here, we 
cannot give effect to both contradictory negative implications.  Subdivision (e), 
the one dealing with the scope of the court’s jurisdiction, supports a narrow 
interpretation of the statute more strongly than subdivision (c) supports a broad 
interpretation.  As one court noted, “[t]he plain language of section 1008 
consistently refers to ‘applications’ for reconsideration and ‘renewals’ of previous 
motions.”  (Case v. Lazben Financial Co., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 186.)  
“Clearly, trial courts do not make applications, motions, or renewals of motions to 
themselves.”  (Id. at p. 187.) 
Moreover, we see no hint that the Legislature wanted to hinder the courts’ 
ability to act rather than merely protect them from repetitive motions, or that it 
intended, as one court phrased it, to “solve[] one set of problems by possibly 
creating another.”  (Baldwin v. Home Savings of America, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 1200, fn. 10.)  “[T]he stated legislative purpose behind the 1992 amendment 
to section 1008 was to conserve judicial resources. . . .  This legislative purpose is 
advanced if section 1008 is understood to apply to the actions of the parties, not to 
a court’s sua sponte reconsideration of its own interim order.  When the court rules 
upon a party’s motion, it is to be expected that the losing party will often feel the 
court has erred, and therefore may be inclined to seek reconsideration if such a 
procedure is readily available.  Thus, absent section 1008, trial courts might find 
themselves inundated with reconsideration motions requiring that they rehash 
 
16
issues upon which they have already ruled and about which they have no doubt.  
Section 1008, properly construed, protects trial courts from being forced to 
squander judicial time in this fashion. We think it would be a much less common 
occurrence, however, that a trial court would sua sponte conclude that its prior 
ruling was erroneous and seek to modify it.  Forcing the parties to proceed where 
there is recognized error in the case would result in an enormous waste of the 
court’s and the parties’ resources.”  (Case v. Lazben Financial Co., supra, 99 
Cal.App.4th at p. 187.) 
This construction of the statutes also reconciles the earlier cases that had 
interpreted them as limiting the courts’ jurisdiction.  “Significantly, all of these 
cases involved situations in which the disputed reconsideration, modification or 
reversal of a prior interim order was brought about upon the motion of a party 
litigant, and not by the trial court acting on its own motion.  [Citations.]  None of 
these cases addressed the specific question of whether and to what extent section 
1008 may impair a trial court’s inherent constitutional power sua sponte to 
reconsider, correct and change its own interim decisions.”  (Kerns v. CSE Ins. 
Group, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at pp. 390-391, fn. omitted.) 
For these reasons, we distinguish, but do not disapprove, the early cases, 
beginning with Morite of California v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th 485, 
that held that sections 437c and 1008 limit the court’s power (or jurisdiction) to 
reconsider motions by the parties.  We agree with the later line of cases, beginning 
with Darling, Hall & Rae v. Kritt, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th 1148 (and, in dicta, 
People v. Costello, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th 1242), that interpreted the statutes as 
limiting the parties’ power to file repetitive motions but not the court’s authority to 
reconsider interim rulings on its own motion.  Finally, we disapprove, to the extent 
they are inconsistent with this opinion, the line of cases that found the statutes 
unconstitutional even to the extent they limit the parties’ ability to file repetitive 
 
17
motions.5  We hold that sections 437c and 1008 limit the parties’ ability to file 
repetitive motions but do not limit the court’s ability, on its own motion, to 
reconsider its prior interim orders so it may correct its own errors. 
One court found the distinction between a court’s acting on its own motion 
and its acting in response to a litigant’s motion “to be a distinction without a 
difference.”  (Remsen v. Lavacot, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 427.)  One of the 
commentaries is more specific:  “This may be a distinction without a difference 
because what if the losing party simply asks the court (e.g., at a status conference) 
to reconsider the matter?”  (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide:  Civil Procedure 
Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2004) § 9:327.8, p. 9(1)-107.)  This concern is 
legitimate.  If all that results from this distinction is that parties merely change the 
name of their motion from, as in this case, a motion for summary judgment to 
something like, “motion for the court to reconsider on its own motion its previous 
order denying summary judgment,” and the matter is otherwise litigated in routine 
fashion, then nothing of substance will be accomplished, and sections 437c, 
subdivision (f)(2), and 1008 will be rendered essentially meaningless.  We believe, 
however, that the Legislature intended this to be a distinction with a difference. 
We cannot prevent a party from communicating the view to a court that it 
should reconsider a prior ruling (although any such communication should never 
be ex parte).  We agree that it should not matter whether the “judge has an 
unprovoked flash of understanding in the middle of the night” (Remsen v. Lavacot, 
supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 427) or acts in response to a party’s suggestion.  If a 
court believes one of its prior interim orders was erroneous, it should be able to 
                                              
5  
Accordingly, we disapprove to this extent Scott Co. v. United States 
Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Co., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th 197; Wozniak v. Lucutz, 
supra, 102 Cal.App.4th 1031; Kollander Construction, Inc. v. Superior Court, 
supra, 98 Cal.App.4th 304; Blake v. Ecker, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th 728; and 
Remsen v. Lavacot, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th 421. 
 
18
correct that error no matter how it came to acquire that belief.  For example, 
nothing would prevent the losing party from asking the court at a status conference 
to reconsider a ruling.  (See Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide:  Civil Procedure 
Before Trial, supra, § 9:327.8, p. 9(1)-107.)  But a party may not file a written 
motion to reconsider that has procedural significance if it does not satisfy the 
requirements of section 437c, subdivision (f)(2), or 1008.  The court need not rule 
on any suggestion that it should reconsider a previous ruling and, without more, 
another party would not be expected to respond to such a suggestion.  As one court 
explained, “were a party to suggest that the court reconsider a motion, the court 
would have every right to do so, even if that required the party to bring a new 
motion.  In that circumstance, the responding party would not bear the burden of 
preparing opposition unless the court indicated an interest in reconsideration.”  
(Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc., supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 739.) 
Unless the requirements of section 437c, subdivision (f)(2), or 1008 are 
satisfied, any action to reconsider a prior interim order must formally begin with 
the court on its own motion.  To be fair to the parties, if the court is seriously 
concerned that one of its prior interim rulings might have been erroneous, and thus 
that it might want to reconsider that ruling on its own motion—something we 
think will happen rather rarely—it should inform the parties of this concern, solicit 
briefing, and hold a hearing.  (See Abassi v. Welke, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 
1360 [“The trial court invited Welke to file a second summary judgment motion 
indicating it wanted to reassess its prior ruling . . . .  The parties had an 
opportunity to brief the issue, and a hearing was held.”]; Schachter v. Citigroup, 
Inc., supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 739.)  Then, and only then, would a party be 
expected to respond to another party’s suggestion that the court should reconsider 
a previous ruling.  This procedure provides a reasonable balance between the 
 
19
conflicting goals of limiting repetitive litigation and permitting a court to correct 
its own erroneous interim orders. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
In this case, the individual defendants filed a new motion for summary 
judgment that did not satisfy the requirements of section 437c, subdivision (f)(2), 
which they were not permitted to do.  The trial court erred in granting that motion.  
Plaintiffs argue that this circumstance means that we must order that the case go to 
trial.  We disagree.  We merely hold that the court erred in granting an 
impermissible motion.  On remand, nothing prohibits the court from reconsidering 
its previous ruling on its own motion, a point on which we express no opinion.6 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand the matter for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
CHIN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C.J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
                                              
6  
Justice Kennard argues that we should affirm the judgment on the basis of 
harmless error.  However, defendants have made no such harmless error argument, 
and thus plaintiffs have had no chance to argue against it.  Moreover, the trial 
court did not inform the parties that it might change its previous ruling on its own 
motion and give them an opportunity to be heard, as it should have done.  We do 
not know what would have occurred if it had done so.  Under the circumstances, 
we think it best to remand the matter for the court and parties to follow proper 
procedure. 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY KENNARD, J. 
 
 
I agree with the majority’s holding that Code of Civil Procedure sections 
437c, subdivision (f)(2), and 1008 prohibit only a party from renewing a motion or 
moving for reconsideration without new facts or law, and that these provisions do 
not limit a court’s ability to reconsider and correct error in a prior interim order.  I 
also agree generally with the majority’s analysis in support of that holding. 
But I do not agree with the majority’s disposition reversing the Court of 
Appeal’s judgment, which in turn had affirmed the trial court’s summary 
judgment.  As the majority holds, a trial court may properly reconsider an earlier 
ruling denying summary judgment and make a new ruling granting summary 
judgment.  Although the trial court here erred insofar as it purported to act on a 
party’s motion rather than on its own motion, this procedural error does not affect 
the judgment’s validity.  A legally correct ruling will not be reversed on appeal 
merely because the trial court erred in its reasoning (People v. Smithey (1999) 20 
Cal.4th 936, 972; D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 
19), and a trial court’s judgment may not be set aside for procedural error unless 
the error has resulted in a miscarriage of justice (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13).  
Because no miscarriage of justice has been demonstrated here, I would affirm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion LeFrancois v. Goel 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 119 Cal.App.4th 425 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S126630 
Date Filed: June 9, 2005 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Supreme 
County: Santa Clara 
Judge: Robert A. Baines 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Robinson & Wood, Jon B. Zimmerman, Helen E. Williams and Joanna L. Mishler for Plaintiffs and 
Appellants. 
 
Thomas M. Eells as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Reed Smith, Paul D. Fogel; Law Offices of Philip R. McCowan, Philip R. McCowan and John M. Ingle for 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, Raoul D. Kennedy, Davidson M. Pattiz, Douglas B. Adler and 
Seth M. Schwartz for Citigroup, Inc., and Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Jon B. Zimmerman 
Robinson & Wood 
227 North First Street 
San Jose, CA  95113 
(408) 298-7120 
 
Paul D. Fogel 
Reed Smith 
Two Embarcadero Center, Suite 2000 
San Francisco, CA  94111 
(415) 543-8700