Title: Hawke v. U.S. Centrifuge Systems, LLC

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: 6/20/13

   
    

 

 

meets of Southern Reporter. Readers “ify the Reporter of Decisions,

  

 

 

 

     

 

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013
1120296

Ex parte U.S. Innovations Group, Inc., et al.
(In re: Judy A. Hawke, as administratrix and personal

representative of the estate of James R. Hawke. Jr..
deceased

   

U.0. Centrifuge Cystems, LEC, et al.)

1120297

Ex parte U.S. Innovations Group, Inc., et al.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

(In re: Carolyn Grimes, individually, as administratrix and
personal representative of the estate of Jerry A. Grimes,

deceased, and as a dependent survivor of Jerry A. Grimes,
deceased

 

Amtec Corporation et al.)
(iadison Cirenit Court, CV-12-900234 and cV-11-901678)
On Applications for Rehearing
BRYAN, Justice.
U.S. Innovations Group, Inc., Scott Behrens, Jack
Dombroski, Mike Evans, and John Emmert (collectively "the USIG
defendants") have petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus

dirceting the Madicen Cirouit Court ("

 

he oirouit court") to
dismiss the claims filed against them in separate actions by
Judy A. Hawke and Carolyn Grimes. The USIG defendants argue
that because the claims arose on Redstone Arsenal, which is a
federal enclave! subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction,
the circuit court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction
over the claims. We deny the petitions.

Facts and Procedural History

‘A “federal enclave" is "[t]erritory or land that a state
hae ceded to the United Statce." Blackte Law Dictionary 606
(9th ed. 2009).

 
1120296, 1120297
In 1943, the State of Alabama ceded property in Madison
County to the government of the United States, pursuant to
Art. I, § 8, clause 17, of the United States Constitution,”
and other relevant federal and State statutes. The deed for
the ceded property, which included land for Redstone Arsenal,
was aigned by then Governor Chauncey Oparke and provided,
among other things, that the United States has “exclusive
jurisdiction" over the land included in that deed. ‘The deed
provided further "[t]hat the jurisdiction so ceded shall not
prevent the execution upon suck lands of any process, civil or
criminal, issued under the authority of this State, except as
such process might affect the property of the United states
thereon" and
"[t}hat the State of Alabama expressly reserves the
right to tax all persons, firms, corporations, or
associations now or hereafter residing or located
upon said land; to tax the exercise by any person,
firm, corporation, or association of any kind and
all ‘rights, privileges, and franchises upon said

land; and to tax property of all persons, firms,
corporations, or associations situated upon said

’article I, § 8, clause 17, gives Congress power "[t]o
exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over
[the District of Columbia], and to exercise like Authority
over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of
the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of
Forte, Magasines, Arcenale, dock-Yarde, and ether needful
Buildings."
1120296, 1120297
land. The jurisdiction ceded is for the purposes of

the cession, and none other, and shall continue

during the time the United States shall be or remain

the owner thereof and shall use such lend fox the

purposes of the cession, and the State of Alabama

expressly reserves the right to exercise over or
upon any such land any and all rights, privileges,
powers, or jurisdiction which may now’ or hereafter

be released or receded by the United States to the

State."

In 2010, Jerry A. Grimes and James R. Hawke, Jr., were
injured in an explosion while working on a project at Redstone
Aseual. BULK men died as @ seoull uf Ueis injuries. Ti
December 2011, Grimes's widow, Carolyn Grimes, in her
individual capacity, as administratrix and personal
representative of Jerry Grimes's estate, and as a dependent
survivor of Jerry Grimes, filed a wrongful-death action
against the USIG defendants, anong others.’ In February 2012,
Hawke's widow, Judy A. Hawke, in her capacity as

administratrix and personal representative of James Mawke's

estate, also filed a wrongful-death action against the USIG

 

defendants, among others.

'Grimes's complaint, as amended, also sought worker's
compensation benefits and included claims alleaing breach of
express and implied warranties.

‘Hawke's complaint also asserted claims under the Alabama
Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine and claime of

breach of express and implied warranties.

4
1120296, 1120297

The wrongful-death actions were filed in the circuit
court but were removed separately to federal court. The cases
were remanded to the circuit court on the ground that the
removals did not comply with the procedural requirenents of 28
U.S.C. § 1446. Two subsequent attempts were made to remove
the cases to federal court on the basis of exclusive federal
court jurisdiction, but each time the federal courts refused
the cases, finding that the circuit court had concurrent
jurisdiction over the clains.

In October 2012, the circuit court consolidated the two
cases. Just prior to the consolidation, the USIG defendants
moved the circuit court to dismiss the claims in each case,
again arguing that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction

over claims arising on federal enclaves. The circuit court

 

denied the motions and ordered production of certain requested
discovery.

The USIG defendants filed, as to each case, a petition
fur Ube WELl Uf matdamus dieeetiuy Le ClicuLL couLL Lo
dismiss the claims against ther and declaring void the circuit
court's discovery orders. Those petitions were denied by

separate orders of this Court. The USIG defendants applied for
1120296, 1120297
a rehearing in both cases, and those applications were
granted. The petitions for the writ of mandamus were
consolidated for the purpose of issuing one opinion.
Issue

The USIG defendants argue that this Court should grant
their petitions for mandamus relic€ because, they argue, the
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising
on Redstone Arsenal and because "(t]he [circuit] court erred
and abused its discretion, by granting [Grimes's and Hawke's]
respective Motions to Compel discovery where it had no
jurisdiction to do so." Petitions, at 5-6.

Anelyois
"A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy,

and is appropriate when the petitioner can show (1)

a clear legal right to the order sought; (2) an

imperative duty upon the respondent to perform,

accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of

another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly

invoked jurisdiction of the court.”
Ex parte BOC Grp., Inc., 823 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001)
(quoting Bx parte tuveruess Cuusir. Cus, 779 su. 20 193, 196
(Ala. 2000).

The USIG defendants argue that they have a clear legal

right to have the claims against them dismissed because, they
1120296, 1120297

argue, "the deed of cession for [Redstone] Arsenal
unequivocally grants exclusive jurisdiction to the federal
government” and, therefore, "nc Alabama court has jurisdiction
over the matter." Petitions, at 6. The USIG defendants go on
to argue that "the U.S. government enjoys exclusive
jurisdiction over ‘all cases whotscever’ which arise on art.
I federal enclaves." Petitions, at 7.

In Surplus Trading Co. v. Sook, 281 U.S. 647, 652 (1930),

the Supreme Court of the United States stated:

"(Article I, § 8, clause 17] savs that Congress
shall have power to exerc:se ‘exclusive legislation
in all cases whatsoever’ over a place so purchased
. ‘Exclusive legislation’ is consistent only
with eaclusive jurisdiction, It can have no other
meaning as to the seat of government, and what it
means as to that it also means as to forts,
magazines, arsenals, dockyards, etc. That no
divided ‘jurisdiction respecting the seat of
government is intended is not only shown by the
terms employed, but is a matter of public history.
Why as to forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards,
etc., is the power given nade to depend on purchase
with the consent of the Legislature of the state if
the jurisdiction of the United States is not to be
exclusive and that of the state excluded?

 

"The question is not an open one. It long has
been settled that, where lands for such a purpose
are purchased bv the United States with the consent
of the state Legislature, the jurisdiction
theretofore residing in the state passes, in virtue
of the constitutional provision, to the United
1120296, 1120297

States, thereby making the jurisdiction of the
latter the sole jurisdiction."

The USIG defendants argue that “exclusive legislation" or
"sole jurisdiction," as discussed in Surplus Trading Co.,
necessarily includes exclusive adjudicative jurisdiction.
They go on to argue that "[t]he language of the Constitution
grants Congress ‘like Authority’ to the authority granted to
Congress over the District of Columbia. Thus, the authority

veded by Ule Stale uf Alabama ‘eH

 

vmpasses Ue £ul2 autlusity
of government, and thus, necessarily, the Executive and
Judicial powers as well as the Legislative.‘ Petitions, at 9-
10 (quoting Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50, 76 (1982)).

However, “[e]xclusive ‘legislation’ has been construed to

mean exclusive ‘jurisdiction’ in the sense of exclusive

 

sovereignty." Matex ley, 200 F.2d 123, 123 (Sth cir.

 

1952) (citing Surplus Trading Co., 281 U.S. at 652). In Gulf
Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 481-82 (1981),

 

the Supreme Court stated:
"Nothing inherent in exclusive federal sovereiantv
over 2 territory precludes a state court from
entertaining a personal injury suit concerning

events occurring in the serritory and governed by
Tederal law. Olio River Guuliacl CU. v. Guidou, 244
1120296, 1120297

U.S. 68 (1917). See 16 U.S.C. § 457 (personal
injury and wrongful-death actions involving events
occurring ‘within a national park or other place
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States, within the extericr boundaries of any State’
shall be maintained as if the place were under the
jurisdiction of the State). Cf. Evans v. Cornman,
398 U.S. 419, 424 (1970) (residents of an area of
exclusive federal jurisdiction within a State are
"subject to the process and jurisdiction of state
courts"). "The judiciary power of every government
looks beyond its own local or municipal laws, and in
civil cases lays hold of all subjects of litigation
between parties within its jurisdiction, though the
causes of dispute are relative to the laws of the
must Uislaul part uf Uke ylube.* The Federalist Nu.
82, p. 514 (H. Lodge ed. 1908) (Hamilton), quoted in
Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. [130], at 138 ((1876)].
State courts routinely exercise subject-matter
jurisdiction over civil cases arising from events in
ther States and governed by the other States’ laws.
See, e.g., Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U.S. 11
(1001). Cf. Allstate Tas. cy. v. Hague, 449 0.3. 202
(1981). That the location of the event giving rise
to the suit is an area of exclusive federal
jurisdiction rather than another State, does not
introduce any new limitation on the forum State's
subject-matter jurisdiction.”

 

(Bmphasis added.)
In Gulf Offshore Co., the Supreme Court addressed
“whether federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over suits

under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 67 Stat. 462, as

 

amended, 43 U.S.C. $ 1331 et sea. (1976 ed. and Supp. III)
("OCSLA"). 453 U.S, at 475. "OCSLA declares the Outer

Continental shelf Lu Le al aiea Uf ‘eaclusive federal
1120296, 1120297
jurisdiction.'" 453 U.S. at 479 (quoting 43 U.S.C. §
1333(a) (1)). ‘The petitioner in that case argued that "the
assertion of exclusive political jurisdiction over the Shelf
evinces a congressional intent that federal courts exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over controversies arising from
operations on the Shelf." 453 U.S. at 400. The Supreme Court
rejected that argument, stating: "It is black letter law,
however, that the mere grant of jurisdiction to a federal

court does not operate to oust a state court from concurrent

 

jurisdiction over the cause of action." 453 U.S. at 479.

The Supreme Court went on to conclude that "nothing in
the language, structure, legislative history, o: underlying
policies of OCSLA suggests tiat Congress intended federal
courts to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over personal injury
actions arising under OCSLA." 453 U.S. at 484. Thus, a grant
of exclusive federal jurisdiction or sovereignty over the
Outer Continental shelf did not, by itself, indicate an

AMLeHLIOn Lo ULveSst SLale COuLLS Uf CoMLULreNL Jurisdiction

 

over claims arising on such lands. See Charles Dowd Box C
¥. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1962) ("We start with the

premise that nothing in the concept of our federal system

10
1120296, 1120297
prevents state courts from enforcing rights created by federal
law. Concurrent jurisdiction has been a common phenomenon in
our judicial history, and exclusive federal court jurisdiction
over cases arising under federal law has been the exception
rather than the rule. ... 'The general question, whether State
courts can exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal
courts in cases arising under the Constitution, laws, and
treaties of the United States, nas been elaborately discussed,
both on the bench and in published treatises ... (and) the

result of these discussions has, in our judament, been ... to

 

affirm the jurisdiction, where it is not excluded by express
provision, ox by incompatibility in its exercise arising from
the nature of the particular case.'" (quoting Claflin v,
Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876) (footnote omitted))).
Like OCSLA, the deed for Redstone Arsenal granted the
united States “exclusive jurisdiction" over the property
included in the deed. However, nothing in the deed or in any
othe: ducumeNL LeouylL Le Us CouLL's atLention Ludivales
that the State intended its grant of exclusive federal
jurisdiction or sovereignty over Redstone Arsenal to create

exclusive federal-court jurisdiction or to oust the State

nu
1120296, 1120297
courts of subject-matter jurisdiction of claims arising on
that land. As noted previously, a grant of “exclusive federal
jurisdiction" over land does not, by itself, indicate an
intention to create exclusive federal-court jurisdiction of
claims arising on that land. See Gulf Offshore Co., supra.
Gee alse Mater, 200 F.2d at 129 ("The Cupreme Court has held
that an action for personal injuries suffered on a reservation
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States ... may

be maintained in a state court vhich has personal jurisdiction

 

of the defendant." (citing Ohio River Contract Co. v. Gordon,
244 U.S. 68, 72 (1917) ("[A]n action for personal injuries
being in ite nature transitory and susceptible of being
brought in any jurisdiction in which the defendant may be
impleaded, there is no foundation for the contention that the
[state] court had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of

the suit."))).

 

The USIG defendants argue that the Supreme Court's
fatlonale 1m Sule Offswuse co, sluuld Hut apply Lu Lily case
because Gulf Offshore Co. did not involve claims arising on a
federal enclave. However, the Supreme Court noted in Gulf

Offshore Co. that

 

ongress rejected the Department [of

2
1120296, 1120297
Justice's} premise that the Shelf is ‘not comparable to
federally owned areas within a State.' Section 1333(a) (1)
rather provides that the federal laws apply to the Shelf 'to

the same extent as if the outer Continental Shelf were an area

 

of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a state.
452 U.0. at 409 n.9 (citations omitted). Thus, the analysis
in Gulf Offshore Co. is apposite here.

The USIG defendants cite Surplus Trading Co., supra,
United states v. Unzeuta, 261 U.S. 138 (1930), and Fort
Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885), in support of
their argument that the “jurisdiction of the federal
government is exclusive of all state authority, which 1s
completely ousted." Petitions, at 10. However, neither
Surplus Trading Co. nor Lowe addresses the jurisdiction of
state courts over claims arising on federal enclaves.
Instead, those cases address a state's authority to assess and
collect taxes on property located within a federal enclave.
Tuuse Cases addiess Limllatius un slate leylsiative
jurisdiction rather than state-court —_adjudicative

jurisdiction.

B
1120296, 1120297

The USIG defendants' reliance on Unzeuta is similarly
misplaced because that case involves criminal charges brought
against a defendant for a murder that allegedly took place on
a right-of-way owned by a private company but located within
a federal enclave. Congress has provided that in criminal
matters "[t]he district courts of the United States shall have
original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States,
of all offenses against the laws of the United States." 18
U.S.C. § 3231. No criminal matters are at issue in this case.
Thus, the Supreme Court's decision in Unzeuta is inapposite
here.

The OIG defendants cite Hebb v. J.G. White Engines in
Corp., 204 Ala. 429, 85 So. 729 (1920), Pound v. Gaulding, 237

Ala. 387, 187 So. 468 (1939), and State v. Blair, 238 Ala.

 

377, 191 So. 237 (1939), for the proposition that Alabama

 

courts have declined jurisdiction over claims arising on
federal enclaves in the past. However, the question at issue
Lin WELD was “wheter CunyLess lad assumed Jurisdiction over
said territory and legislated so as to exclude plaintiff from

a remedy under the state statutes, or given him instead a

remedy for his alleged injuries and wrongs on which the suit

rT)
1120296, 1120297
may be maintained in a federal forum." Webb, 204 Ala. at 431,
85 So. at 730. This Court determined that the claims in that
case, which had arisen on a federal enclave, were within the
purview of the federal Employees’ Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 751 et seq., which provided an administrative remedy through
the Employees" Compensation Conmission. Therefore, this Court
concluded, the State circuit court did not have jurisdiction
to address those claims.

From all that appears, however, no comparable federal
administrative remedy has been created for the claims at issue

in this case. Instead, Congress has provided:

 

nthe case of the death of any person by the
neglect or wrongful act of another within a national
park or other place subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Un:ted States, within the
exterior boundaries of any State, such right of
action shall exist as though the place were under
the jurisdiction of the State within whose exterior
boundaries such place may bey and in any action
brought to recover on account of injuries sustained
in any such place the rights of the parties shall be
governed by the laws of the State within the
exterior boundaries of which it may be

 

16 U.S.C. § 457. Webb is distinguishable in that regard.
Neither Pound nor Blair supports the USIG defendants*
requests for mandamus relief because this Court did not hold

in either case, either expressly ui by implicatiuu, Wat Lhe

15
1120296, 1120297
State courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the
claims raised in those cases. Instead, this Court affirmed
the judgments of the respective State circuit court in each
case as to the underlying claims. See Pound, supra (affirming
the Calhoun Circuit Court's judgment based on a jury verdict
in faver of a carpenter and against hic employer for injuries
suffered while doing work at Fort McClellan); and Blair, supra
(affirming the Montgomery Circuit Court's judgment holding
that the appellee owed no state taxes on gasoline stored on
Maxwell Air Force Base).

Finally, the USIG defendants cite Lord v. Local Union No

 

2000, International Drvtheshood of Blectyicel Workers, ALI
(10, 646 F.2d 1057 (Sth Cir. 1981), and Corley v. Long-Lewis,

Inc., 688 F. Supp. 2d 1315 (N.D. Ala. 2010), for the

 

proposition that federal-couct jurisdiction is exclusive
unless the deed by which the land is ceded to the United
States provides to the contrary. The USIG defendants also
atyue Liat Ue SlaLe Auew uw LO LeseLve state~couEl
jurisdiction when ceding land to the United States but that it
did not do so in the deed for Redstone Arsenal. However, Lord

and Corley involve issues related to the scope of exclusive

16
1120296, 1120297
federal legislative jurisdiction. Neither case provides,
either implicitly or expressly, for exclusive federal-court
jurisdiction over claims arising on federal enclaves. As
noted previously, exclusive legislative or political
jurisdiction is not synonymous with exclusive adjudicative
juriediction, cee Gulf Offshore Cos, 152 Lc. at 402
("Nothing inherent in exclusive federal sovereignty over a
territory precludes a state court from entertaining a personal
injury suit concerning events occurring in the territory and
governed by federal law.").
Conclusion

The U9IG defendants have not dewunstrated that the
circuit court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the
claims alleged against them by Hawke and Grimes or that they
have a clear legal right to have those claims dismissed. our
decision in this regard is dispositive of the USIG defendants’
request for mandamus relief fron the circuit court's discovery
viders, whel Lie USzG Uefendauls argue were vuld Levause Lie
court did not have jurisdiction over the wrongful-death
actions. Therefore, we deny the petitions for the writ of

mandamus in these cases.

vv
1120296, 1120297
1120296 -- PETITION DENIED.

1120297 -- PETITION DENIED.
Moore, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, Murdock, Shaw, Main, and

Wise, JJ., concur.

18