Title: LEVI WILLIAM JOHNSON V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

LEVI WILLIAM JOHNSON v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 104214 P.3d 983Case Number: No. S-09-0029Decided: 08/21/2009
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
LEVI 
WILLIAM JOHNSON,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
DeCock of Plains Law Offices, LLP, Gillette, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Levi 
William Johnson, entered a conditional plea of guilty to conspiracy to deliver 
marijuana, reserving the right to challenge the denial of his motion to 
suppress.  In this appeal, Johnson 
challenges, as he did below, the legality of the search of his residence under 
both the Wyoming and United States Constitutions.  Finding that the district court's 
suppression ruling is insufficient to permit adequate appellate review, we 
remand the case to the district court for the limited purpose of supplementing 
the record with written findings consistent with this 
opinion.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Johnson states 
the issues as follows:

 
 
A.        Was 
law enforcement's entry into the Appellant's residence a violation of the 
Appellant's Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure 
as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States?

 
 

B.        Was 
law enforcement's entry into the Appellant's residence a violation of the 
Appellant's right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure as guaranteed by 
Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution?

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On February 21, 
2008, Officer Vogt of the Gillette Police Department and members of the Campbell 
County Fire Department responded to a vehicle fire.  The vehicle was located four to five 
feet in front of a mobile home, which was the residence of Johnson and his 
girlfriend, Brittany Kuhnel.  
Because smoke had engulfed the mobile home, firefighters asked Ms. 
Kuhnel, who had arrived at the scene, for permission to enter the home to 
conduct a safety check.  Although 
Ms. Kuhnel was reluctant to consent, she eventually unlocked and opened the 
front door for the firefighters.  
The ensuing safety check revealed no smoke or damage, but disclosed a 
flag with a marijuana leaf on the wall and a large sum of money on a coffee 
table.  

 
 
[¶4]      After learning 
about the flag and the money, Officer Vogt spoke with Ms. Kuhnel about her 
hesitancy to allow the firefighters in the home.  Ms. Kuhnel indicated there were some 
items in the home she was not supposed to have.  When Officer Vogt inquired about the 
presence of drugs, specifically marijuana, Ms. Kuhnel refused to answer the 
officer's question, stating, "That would be a confession.  I plead the fifth."  Officer Vogt then contacted narcotics 
detective Chad Trebby, who came to the scene.  

 
 
[¶5]      The facts of what 
transpired thereafter are in conflict.  
According to the testimony of Officer Vogt, he was briefing Detective 
Trebby about the incident when they noticed Ms. Kuhnel and Johnson walking 
toward the door of the mobile home.  
Officer Vogt testified Detective Trebby intercepted them, explained what 
he had learned from Officer Vogt, and requested consent to search the 
residence.  Both Ms. Kuhnel and 
Johnson then asked what would happen if consent was not granted.  According to Officer Vogt, Detective 
Trebby explained he would apply for a search warrant based on the information he 
had and, if a warrant was granted, the home would be searched.  Officer Vogt also testified that 
Detective Trebby further informed them that if they consented to the search, he 
and Officer Vogt would conduct the search; whereas if he obtained a search 
warrant, a canine unit would be brought to the scene, resulting in a more 
intrusive search.  Officer Vogt 
testified that Ms. Kuhnel and Johnson expressed concerns about their pet dog and 
the potential damage to their house if a warrant was obtained and ultimately 
consented to the search.1  

 
 
[¶6]      According to the 
testimony of Detective Trebby, he intercepted Ms. Kuhnel as she was approaching 
the door of the mobile home and talked to her about the information he had 
received from Officer Vogt.  During 
that conversation, Ms. Kuhnel indicated there might be a small amount of 
marijuana in the mobile home.  The 
detective then asked for permission to go into the residence and retrieve the 
marijuana.  Detective Trebby 
testified that Ms. Kuhnel "said yes, but she wanted to speak with 
[Johnson]."  They then walked over 
to where Johnson was standing by the smoldering vehicle.  Detective Trebby asked Johnson for 
permission to enter the mobile home to retrieve the marijuana Ms. Kuhnel had 
mentioned.  Johnson inquired what 
would happen if he refused consent, to which Detective Trebby responded he would 
apply for a search warrant and, if one was granted, he would return and search 
the home.  Detective Trebby also 
explained to Johnson that if he "obtained a search warrant, due to the amount of 
time it took to obtain a search warrant and manpower that we needed to secure 
the scene, it would likely occur that . . . Officer Vogt would be released from 
the scene and I would request the assistance of my counterparts with the police 
department and possibly an agent with the DCI to assist and secure and search 
the residence," and that they would conduct a "thorough and systematic" search 
of his house.  Detective Trebby 
testified that Johnson then agreed to allow them into the residence to retrieve 
the marijuana:  "he did make a 
statement that said -- he indicated to me that he would allow us to go inside 
with him and get [the marijuana], then he began walking towards the front door 
with us following."  

 
 
[¶7]      Richard Pfeil, a 
friend of Johnson who was inside the mobile home at the time the officers 
entered with Johnson and Ms. Kuhnel, offered a different account of the 
events.  Pfeil testified about a 
conversation he overheard between Detective Trebby and Johnson that occurred in 
front of the residence, in which the detective asked for permission to enter the 
house and Johnson inquired about the consequences of his refusal to grant 
permission.  According to Pfeil, 
Detective Trebby told Johnson that "if he allowed him in the house now, they 
would just do a visual walk-through; and if he refused . . . he would go get a 
search warrant and his team and tear the place apart."  

 
 
[¶8]      Ultimately, 
Johnson, Ms. Kuhnel, and the officers entered the mobile home.  Once inside, Johnson gave Detective 
Trebby a small baggie of marijuana and some glass pipes.  Thereafter, Johnson and Ms. Kuhnel 
consented to a further search of the home, but withdrew their consent a few 
minutes later.  Based in part on the 
items found in the home, Detective Trebby sought and obtained a search 
warrant.  When the warrant was 
executed, officers found, among other things, additional marijuana, drug 
paraphernalia, and money.  

 
 
[¶9]      The State charged 
Johnson with possession of marijuana with intent to deliver in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2009) and conspiracy to deliver 
marijuana in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-7-1031(a)(ii) and 35-7-1042 
(LexisNexis 2009).  Johnson filed a 
motion to suppress the marijuana evidence as fruit of an unlawful search under 
both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 4 
of the Wyoming Constitution.  
Johnson argued his consent for the officers' initial entry into the home 
was coerced and involuntary.  In 
particular, he claimed consent was the product of his ignorance and fear about 
the consequences of resisting  specifically, the fear of a more intrusive 
search and damage to the home as a result of numerous officers and a drug dog 
executing a search warrant.  Johnson 
argued that any evidence obtained as a result of that initial entry, including 
the evidence recovered during the execution of the search warrant, was tainted 
and should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.  The State maintained the officers did 
not use coercive tactics to gain entry into the mobile home and that, given the 
totality of the circumstances, Johnson's consent was voluntary.  

 
 
[¶10]   At the conclusion of the 
suppression hearing, the district court summarily denied Johnson's motion to 
suppress stating:

 
 
[B]ased 
on my examination of the totality of the evidence, I find the State's position 
is correct; that, in fact, the motion to suppress should be denied.  

 
 
The 
written order denying the motion to suppress reflected the district court's 
conclusion that Johnson "voluntarily consented to the search of his 
residence."  

 

[¶11]   Thereafter, pursuant to a plea 
agreement, Johnson pled guilty to the conspiracy charge, reserving the right to 
appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.  In exchange for his guilty plea, the 
State dismissed the possession with intent to deliver charge.  The district court imposed a 
three-to-six-year prison sentence, which it suspended in favor of five years 
supervised probation under specified terms and conditions. This appeal 
followed.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶12]   This Court explicates our standard 
of review in every appeal that comes before us.  This is not a frivolous exercise.  The standard by which we review an 
appeal drives our analysis and, ultimately, our final determination.  In almost every case, we are called upon 
to review both findings of facts and issues of law.  For instance, as applies to the present 
appeal, this Court reviews a district court's ruling on a motion to suppress to 
determine if factual determinations are clearly erroneous.  As always, we review legal conclusions 
de novo.  Kunselman v. State, 2008 WY 85, ¶ 9, 
188 P.3d 567, 569 (Wyo. 2008); Hembree v. 
State, 2006 WY 127, ¶ 7, 143 P.3d 905, 907 (Wyo. 2006). 

 
 
[¶13]   The key word is "review."  Implicit in the term is that there are 
findings from a trial court to be reviewed.  On the factual side, fact-finding is a 
basic responsibility of a trial court.  
Trial courts are therefore required to state their essential findings of 
fact on the record.  W.R.Cr.P. 12(f) 
("[w]here factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall 
state its essential findings on the record").  Without such findings, this Court must 
engage in a de novo review.  
Certainly, there have been occasions where we reluctantly have done just 
that under the theory that we can affirm on any ground supported by the 
record.  Cohen v. State, 2008 WY 78, ¶ 22, 191 P.3d 956, 961 (Wyo. 2008); State v. 
Williams, 2004 WY 53, ¶ 12, 90 P.3d 85, 88 (Wyo. 2004); Innis v. State, 2003 WY 66, ¶ 13, 69 P.3d 413, 418 (Wyo. 2003).  We have 
never, however, analyzed when such leniency might be granted, or even if it is 
ever appropriate under the language of Rule 12(f).  We take this opportunity to do 
so.

 
 
[¶14]   In construing Wyoming rules of 
procedure, where Wyoming and federal rules of procedure are similar, we have 
repeatedly looked to federal cases construing the federal rule as persuasive 
authority.  See Bird v. State, 901 P.2d 1123, 1129 
(Wyo. 1995) ("[i]n our interpretation of our [Wyoming Rules of Criminal 
Procedure] having their source in the federal rules, we afford great persuasive 
weight to federal precedent").  See also Smith v. State, 2008 WY 98, ¶ 9, 190 P.3d 522, 525 (Wyo. 2008); Hoos v. 
State, 2003 WY 101, ¶ 10, 75 P.3d 609, 611 (Wyo. 2003); Brock v. State, 981 P.2d 465, 469 (Wyo. 
1999).  The coinciding federal rule 
at issue is F.R.Cr.P. 12(d).  In pertinent part, the federal rule 
mirrors the language of W.R.Cr.P. 12(f) and reads: "When factual issues are 
involved in deciding a motion, the court must state its essential findings on 
the record."

 
 
[¶15]   There are at least two federal 
circuits  the Sixth and the Ninth  that have followed the plain language of 
Rule 12(d).  Since the rule mandates 
findings of essential facts, these circuits summarily remand cases for 
supplemental findings when a trial court fails to make such findings on the 
record.  Both circuits consider it 
especially important that findings of fact are made on the record in suppression 
hearings:

 
 
"Suppression 
hearings are often as important as the trial itself." Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46, 
104 S. Ct. 2210, 81 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1984) (citing concurring opinions in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 
397, 99 S. Ct. 2898, 61 L. Ed. 2d 608 (1979). "The government's case may turn 
upon the confession or other evidence that the defendant seeks to suppress, and 
the trial court's ruling on such evidence may determine the outcome of the 
case." Gannett, 443 U.S.  at 397 n.1, 
99 S. Ct.  at 2914 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring). "In many cases, the suppression 
hearing [is] the only trial, because 
the defendants thereafter plead[] guilty pursuant to a plea bargain." Waller, 467 U.S.  at 47, 104 S. Ct.  at 
2216 (emphasis in original).   

 
 

United 
States v. Prieto-Villa, 
910 F.2d 601, 609-10 (9th Cir. 1990).  
The Sixth Circuit has followed the Ninth Circuit's lead: "as noted by the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Prieto-Villa, a suppression motion is of 
utmost importance. Likewise, we conclude that compliance with Rule 12(e) 
[renumbered 12(d)] is a mandatory obligation."  United States v. Moore, 936 F.2d 287, 
289 (6th Cir. 1991).

 
 
[¶16]   At least one federal circuit takes 
the opposite approach and allows complete non-compliance with Rule 12(d).  The Fifth Circuit will independently 
review the record to determine whether any reasonable view of the evidence 
supports the trial court's decision even in the absence of factual findings or 
indication of the legal theory underlying the trial court's decision.  See United States v. Schinnell, 80 F.3d 1064, 1067 (5th Cir. 1996).

 
 
[¶17]   Most other circuits are somewhere 
in between.  A summary of the 
majority application of Rule 12(d) is found in Moore's Federal Practice and 
Procedure: 

 
 

Appellate 
Review of Motions to Suppress 

 
 
* 
* * *

 
 

[4] 
Appellate Court Must Accept District 
Court's Factual Findings Unless Clearly Erroneous

 
 
            
In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, an appellate court must 
accept the district court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous 
or influenced by an incorrect view of the law.  It is inappropriate, therefore, for an 
appellate court to attempt to resolve disputed factual questions or to search 
the record for support for the prevailing party. The proper procedure is to 
remand with directions that the district court make express 
findings.

 
 
27 
James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal 
Practice & Procedure § 641.195[4] (3d ed. 2006).  

 
 
[¶18]   This approach is further detailed 
in United States v. Williams, 951 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1991):

 
 
            
When a district court's ruling on a pretrial motion involves factual 
issues, Rule 12(e) [renumbered as 12(d)] of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure commands the court to "state its essential findings on the record." 
The rule serves several functions. Findings on the record inform the parties and 
other interested persons of the grounds of the ruling, add discipline to the 
process of judicial decision-making and enable appellate courts properly to 
perform their reviewing function. If the district court not only fails to make 
"essential findings on the record," but also expresses nothing in the way of 
legal reasoning, if it simply announces a result, it may frustrate these 
objectives. We say "may" because there are cases in which the facts are so 
certain, and the legal consequences so apparent, that little guesswork is needed 
to determine the grounds for the ruling. 

 
 

Id. 
at 
1288.  In Williams, multiple factual and legal 
issues were presented by a motion to suppress.  The facts were not certain and the legal 
consequences were not obvious.  The 
district court made no findings but rather simply denied the motion.  The summary denial presented the Williams Court with two problems in its 
attempt at appellate review: "We do not know which facts the district court 
considered essential' to its ruling and we do not know what principle of Fourth 
Amendment law the court believed supported its ruling."  Id. at 1289. 

 
 
[¶19]   Before remanding for further 
findings, the Williams Court reviewed 
the law regarding affirmation upon any grounds supported by the 
record:

 
 
            
Our only hesitation in remanding stems from United States v. Caballero, 936 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1061, 112 S. Ct. 943, 117 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1991), and several earlier 
decisions, which indicate that we will sustain a district court's denial of a 
motion to suppress, despite the court's failure to comply with Rule 12(e) 
[renumbered as 12(d)], "if there is any reasonable view of the evidence that 
will support it." Scarbeck v. United 
States, 317 F.2d 546, 562 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 856, 83 S. Ct. 1897, 10 L. Ed. 2d 1077 (1963), cited in Caballero, 936 F.2d  at 1296. The stated 
rationale is that Rule 12(e) [renumbered as 12(d)] confers on the litigants a 
personal "right" to have factual findings made, and that "failure to object" to 
a lack of findings "results in waiver." Caballero, 936 F.2d  at 1296. This has 
the effect of denying defendants (and the government if it should appeal the 
granting of a suppression motion) a windfall when the trial court omits a 
finding apparent on the face of the record, see, e.g., United States v. Williams, 822 F.2d 1174, 1177 & n.39, 1179 & n.61 (D.C. Cir. 1987), or when, under any 
possible view of the record, the district court could have reached but one 
result. See, e.g., United States v. Lindsay, 506 F.2d 166, 
170-74 (D.C. Cir. 1974).            
One might wonder why, when there has been such a "waiver," it should 
follow that we will uphold the district court's decision if "any reasonable view 
of the evidence" supports it, Scarbeck, 317 F.2d  at 562. The idea, at 
least as Caballero expresses it, is 
that the district court, in reaching its legal conclusion, presumably made 
whatever factual findings were needed to support the conclusion. Denying a 
remand because of "waiver," then, means we review facts we infer were actually, 
albeit silently, found. Our practice of using the 
"any-reasonable-view-of-the-evidence" standard means that we review those 
implicit findings under what may be, for all practical purposes, the equivalent 
of the "clearly erroneous" test we apply to "essential findings" explicitly made 
in compliance with Rule 12(e) [renumbered 12(d)]. Caballero and its antecedents thus rest 
on two assumptions. One, that the district court asked the right legal questions 
in making its ruling; two, that it actually weighed the evidence bearing on the 
facts needed to answer them. When, in a particular case, there is reason to 
doubt the validity of either or both those assumptions, the court may dispense 
with what Caballero seemingly 
requires, and remand the case to the district court. See United States v. Jordan, 951 F.2d 1278 
(D.C. Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Prieto-Villa, 910 F.2d 601, 606-10 (9th Cir. 1990); United 
States v. Castrillon, 716 F.2d 1279, 1282-83 (9th Cir. 
1983). 

            
If we knew the district court's legal reasoning in this case, we might 
have little difficulty in ascertaining the pertinent but unstated findings 
underlying it, as did the Caballero 
court. If we knew what facts the district court considered "essential" to its 
ruling (Rule 12(e)) [renumbered as 12(d)], we might be able to piece together 
the unstated legal grounds for its decision. But we have neither essential 
findings nor legal reasoning. As Chief Justice Hughes wrote, "it is always 
desirable that an appellate court should be adequately advised of the basis of 
the determination of the court below . . . ." Public Service Comm'n v. Wisconsin Tel. 
Co., 289 U.S. 67, 69-70, 53 S. Ct. 514, 515, 77 L. Ed. 1036, (1933).  Here the "desirable" is the necessary. 

 
 

Id. 
at 1290-91.  

 
 
[¶20]   This approach has been followed by 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.  
In supporting its remand for further findings in United States v. Ramstad, 219 F.3d 1263 
(10th Cir. 2000), the court stated:

 
 
            
We note that where the district court makes no express factual findings, 
we normally uphold the district court's ruling if any reasonable view of the 
evidence supports it. United States v. 
Broomfield, 201 F.3d 1270, 1273 (10th Cir. 2000). Here, however, the 
district court summarily denied Defendant's motion to suppress, providing no 
findings of fact and failing to explain the basis for its decision.  

 
 

Id. 
at 1265 n.2.

 
 
[¶21]   We decline to follow either of the 
extreme federal constructions.  
Certainly W.R.Cr.P. 12(f) should not be completely ignored.  Neither should it be strictly applied 
according to its plain language, requiring automatic remand if Rule 12(f) 
findings are not made.  This would 
amount to a waste of judicial resources.  
Instead, we generally agree with the majority federal construction that 
the reasonable understanding of the rule should follow its purpose.  Rule 12(f) is meant to create a record 
that allows for proper appellate review.  
If appropriate appellate review is possible, then, although we are loath 
to do so, we will proceed with our review even in the face of a violation of 
Rule 12(f).

 
 
[¶22]   In accepting the majority 
construction of F.R.Cr.P. 12(d) in principle, we are by no means condoning any 
failure to comply with the mandate of W.R.Cr.P. 12(f).  Failure to comply with Rule 12(f) puts 
this Court in the unenviable position of making findings of fact de novo.  Our decisions then must be based on 
written words in a cold record without the benefit of seeing and hearing any 
live witnesses testify or assessing their credibility and weight of the 
testimony.  This is not a task in 
which an appellate court should engage.  
It is a vital function of trial courts to make findings of fact based on 
evidence it believes credible.

 
 
[¶23]   Because fact finding is an 
essential function of trial courts, the limit we cautiously accept to the 
application of Rule 12(f) is very narrow.  
The absence of Rule 12(f) findings will be overlooked only when the 
circumstances of the record make just one conclusion possible, or leave no doubt 
as to the trial court's assessment of credibility.   

 
 
[¶24]   In the instant case, the record on 
appeal does not allow for application of this narrow exception.  The issue is whether Johnson's consent 
for law enforcement officers to search his premises was voluntary.  "The existence and voluntariness of a 
consent to search is a question of fact to be decided by the trial judge in the 
light of all attendant circumstances."  
Stamper v. State, 662 P.2d 82, 
87 (Wyo. 1983) (quoting Parkhurst v. 
State, 628 P.2d 1369, 1378 (Wyo. 1981)).  See also Amin v. State, 695 P.2d 1021, 1024-25 
(Wyo. 1985); Nixon v. State, 2001 WY 
15, ¶ 16, 18 P.3d 631, 636 (Wyo. 2001).  
Thus, the case before this Court is a fact-driven case where the legal 
principles at issue turn almost solely on the district court's interpretation of 
the facts.  

 
 
[¶25]   The district court was presented 
with conflicting evidence regarding the circumstances surrounding Johnson's 
consent.  Despite the contradictory 
stories surrounding those circumstances the district court did not make any 
credibility determinations or expressly resolve any factual disputes.  The district court was presented also 
with legal argument under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution, yet the district 
court likewise failed to announce the legal principles on which it was 
relying.  Given the dual lack of 
findings, this Court lacks any basis for review.  Remand is thus 
required.

 
 
[¶26]   Upon remand, the district court 
must make specific findings of fact.  
The district court must then determine based on the totality of those 
facts whether, in light of the mandates of both the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution, 
Johnson's consent to the officers' entry into the mobile home was 
voluntary.  The district court 
should consider all relevant factors bearing on the question of voluntariness, 
including, but not limited to, the officers' demeanor; Johnson's mental 
capacity; the detective's statements about the search warrant and associated 
search; deception, trickery or threats; and the presence of other coercive 
factors.  See Latta v. State, 2009 WY 35, ¶ 12, 202 P.3d 1069, 1071-72 (Wyo. 2009); Seymour 
v. State, 2008 WY 61, ¶ 19, 185 P.3d 671, 677 (Wyo. 2008); O'Boyle v. State, 2005 WY 83, ¶¶ 40-42, 
61, 117 P.3d 401, 413, 418 (Wyo. 2005); Grant v. State, 2004 WY 45, ¶ 22, 88 P.3d 1016, 1021 (Wyo. 2004); 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 8.2 (4th ed. 2004).

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶27]   In this case, effective review is 
impossible because of the complete lack of factual findings and legal reasoning 
given by the district court for its denial of Johnson's motion to suppress.  The record is remanded for the limited 
purpose of the entry of a supplemental order including the factual findings 
required by Rule 12(f) as well as a statement by the district court of the 
conclusions of law it has reached on those findings. We retain jurisdiction and 
will determine if rebriefing is warranted after the new order is entered in the 
record.  The district court shall 
have ninety (90) days in which to enter its supplemental order and return the 
record to this Court.  

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Although Officer Vogt testified that the discussion about the canine unit 
and the more intrusive search occurred before the initial consent was obtained, 
he later stated on redirect that he could not recall if it occurred outside or 
inside the mobile home.