Title: Hubbard v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
GREGORY HUBBARD,
Defendant Below-
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
Plaintiff Below-
Appellee.
§
§
§  No. 248/364, 2000
§
§
§  Court Below—Superior Court
§  of the State of Delaware,
§  in and for New Castle County
§  Cr.A. Nos. VN94-12-1414-01 
§  and IN99-06-0418 through -0420
§ 
Submitted: June 28, 2001
  Decided:   September 5, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, and HOLLAND, Justices
O R D E R
This 5th day of September 2001, upon consideration of the briefs on
appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1)
The defendant-appellant, Gregory Hubbard, filed these consolidated
appeals from his convictions for first degree robbery, second degree robbery,
and possession of drug paraphernalia and from his conviction for a violation of
probation (VOP).  Hubbard had been serving a probationary sentence associated
with a 1995 robbery conviction when he was charged with violation of probation
as a result of the new criminal charges.  Although Hubbard was represented by
counsel at both his criminal trial and the VOP proceedings below, he was
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permitted following a hearing to waive his right to counsel and to represent
himself on appeal. After careful consideration of the parties’ briefs, including
Hubbard’s amended opening brief, we find no merit to these consolidated
appeals. Accordingly, we affirm Hubbard’s convictions and sentences as well
as his VOP adjudication and sentence. 
(2)
The evidence presented at trial established the following:  Two
robberies occurred in New Castle County, Delaware–the first on May 24, 1999
at the Sun National Bank on Market Street in Wilmington and the second on
May 26, 1999 at the Sun National Bank at the Crossroads Shopping Center on
New Castle Avenue.  John McMillan, a teller at the Market Street Sun National
Bank, testified that he placed a “teller closed, next teller” sign at his station at
about 9:00 a.m. on May 24th so he could count the money contained in a number
of church deposit bags.  He noticed an African-American man wearing a blue
sweat suit standing in front of his station.  The man handed McMillan a note
telling him to remain calm and place all of his money into four envelopes.  The
note also stated that the man had a gun.  McMillan placed the money in four
envelopes and handed them to the man, who then left the bank.  At trial,
McMillan was not able to identify Hubbard as the robber.
-3-
(3)
Claudia Pennington, another teller at the Market Street Sun
National Bank, testified that she was in the station next to McMillan’s on May
24th when she saw a man approach McMillan’s station.  She asked the man if
she could help him, but he did not respond.  As the man left the bank, McMillan
told Pennington that he had been robbed.  As Pennington looked over at the man,
he looked at her and ran out of the bank. Several days after the robbery,
Pennington testified that she was shown a photographic array. She testified that
she did not recall specifically identifying the photo of Hubbard.  She stated that
she may have identified one or two possible perpetrators. At trial, however,
Pennington unequivocally identified Hubbard as the man who robbed the bank.
(4)
Kimberly Novello, a teller at the New Castle Avenue Sun National
Bank, testified that she was processing night deposit bags on May 26, 1999
when a man approached her station.  The man handed Novello a note stating this
was a robbery, he wanted the money placed in four separate envelopes, and he
had a gun.  Novello placed the money in the envelopes and handed them to the
man, who left the bank.  Novello testified she had a good view of the man who
robbed her.  She identified Hubbard both in a photo array and in court as the
man who robbed her.
-4-
(5)
Special Agent Scott Duffey of the FBI testified that he provided
assistance to the local authorities in their investigation of the May 24th robbery.
On June 8, 1999, he went to the Sun National Bank on Market Street and spoke
to Claudia Pennington.  He showed her an array of six photographs, one of
which was of Hubbard.  According to Duffey, Pennington specifically identified
Hubbard’s photograph as that of the perpetrator of the robbery.    
(6)
Detective Mark Hawk of the Delaware State Police testified that
he was assigned to the investigation of the May 26th robbery.  He obtained the
surveillance tapes taken during the robbery and found an identifiable image of
the perpetrator.  Detective Hawk had a print made of the image and had the print
placed in the Wilmington News Journal on May 27, 1999.    
(7)
Detective David Simmons of the Wilmington Police Department
was the detective assigned to the May 24th robbery.  He testified that all leads
in the case had been exhausted when he received a phone call from Special
Agent Duffey about the May 26th robbery.  There were obvious similarities
between the two robberies and the images on the bank surveillance photos.  In
addition, the photos from the May 26th robbery showed the perpetrator wearing
a shirt with what appeared to be the words “City of Wilmington” on the front.
(8)
Detective Simmons further testified that Detective Liam Sullivan
-5-
of the Wilmington Police Department phoned him on May 27, 1999 and told him
that Angela Benson, a friend of Hubbard, might have information on the
robberies.  The connection to Benson was made by a confidential informant
whose identity the State declined to reveal.  Detective Simmons contacted
Benson, who identified Hubbard as the possible perpetrator.  The police then
obtained a search warrant to obtain a current photograph of Hubbard and went
looking for him.  Hubbard was found in Wilmington, he was taken to the police
station and his photograph was taken.  The photograph was used in the photo
array shown to the witnesses.  The police also obtained a warrant to search
Hubbard’s residence, where they located a shirt with the words “City of
Wilmington” on it.  
(9)
Detective Liam Sullivan of the Wilmington Police Department
testified that during the course of his duties with an FBI joint task force he came
across some information which led him to Angela Benson as someone with
knowledge of the robberies.  He gave Benson’s name to Detective Simmons and
Detective Hawk.  Detective Sullivan testified that he was also involved in
locating Hubbard in order to take his photograph.  He spotted Hubbard at 24th
and Heald Streets in the City of Wilmington and told him to stop.  He then saw
Hubbard reach for something in his pocket.  Detective Sullivan testified that he
-6-
grabbed Hubbard’s hand and, in so doing, was able to identify the object in
Hubbard’s pocket as a crack pipe.    
(10)
Angela Benson, a former friend of Hubbard’s, testified that, at the
time of the robberies, she lived in Hubbard’s neighborhood.  At the end of May,
during a period when she was socializing often with Hubbard, she saw a
surveillance photograph of the bank robber in the Wilmington News Journal.
She was aware of gossip in the neighborhood that Hubbard had committed the
robberies.  Later that day, when they were smoking crack cocaine together,
Hubbard told her he was the robber and that it was his photograph in the
newspaper.  Benson then told Hubbard she was no longer interested in
associating with him and did not see him again until his trial.  
(11)
Eric Hubbard, the defendant’s brother, also testified as a reluctant
prosecution witness.  He stated that he drove with his brother to a shopping
center on May 26, 1999 and that he had given a statement to the police about
that.  On cross-examination by the defense, Eric Hubbard testified that he was
not aware a robbery had occurred at the shopping center on May 26th until he
was so informed by the police.   
(12)
Detective Hawk testified that he interviewed Eric Hubbard at the
Wilmington Police Station when his brother was taken into custody, but that the
1Although Hubbard’s “supplemental” opening brief was not requested by the Court,
and therefore could be stricken as a nonconforming document, we consider the issues raised
therein, in the interests of justice, because Hubbard is acting as his own counsel in this direct
appeal.
-7-
interview was not recorded.  He testified that a second interview with Eric
Hubbard took place in Agent Duffey’s vehicle while they were transporting him
home.  That interview was recorded, but Hubbard’s voice was inaudible.
Detective Hawk further testified that Eric Hubbard told him he drove with his
brother to the location of the Crossroads Shopping Center on May 26, 1999 and
waited in the car until his brother returned.  While Eric Hubbard initially had a
strong reaction to a bank surveillance photo of the robber that was shown to him
in Agent Duffey’s vehicle, suggesting he recognized his brother, he then
equivocated and refused to positively identify the man in the photo as his
brother. 
(13)
Hubbard did not testify at trial and presented no witnesses in his
defense. The jury convicted him of first degree robbery, second degree robbery,
and possession of drug paraphernalia.
(14)
On appeal, Hubbard has raised nine claims--seven claims in his
opening brief and two additional claims in his amended opening brief.1 In the
order presented by him in his briefing and not in the order in which we discuss
-8-
them, Hubbard’s claims are: (a) his arrest for possession of drug paraphernalia
was illegal; (b) there was no probable cause for the warrant permitting his
photograph to be taken and shown in a photo array; (c) the warrant permitting
a nighttime search of his residence was based on demonstrably false information;
(d) the prosecution failed to disclose information in discovery that could have
been used to impeach one of its witnesses at trial; (e) he was denied the right to
counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings when his attorney was not present
during a photographic lineup; (f) two of the three photographic lineups were
lacking the required procedural safeguards; (g) his VOP adjudication and
sentence were improper because he never received adequate notice; (h) the trial
court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence the prior out of court
statements of Eric Hubbard; and (i) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct. We
will address the claims relating to Hubbard’s robbery and possession convictions
first and then address the probation violation issues.
(15)
The first two issues we consider are Hubbard’s challenges to the
two search warrants police obtained in this case. The purpose of the first warrant
was to secure a recent photograph of Hubbard in order to conduct a
photographic lineup. The second warrant allowed police to conduct a nighttime
search of Hubbard’s residence. Prior to trial, Hubbard filed a motion to suppress
2Woody v. State, Del. Supr., 765 A.2d 1257, 1261 (2001).
3Tatman v. State, 494 A.2d 1249, 1251 (1985) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
233 (1983)); Thompson v. State, Del.  Supr., 539 A.2d 1052, 1059 (1988).
4Gardner v. State, Del.  Supr., 567 A.2d 404, 409 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1067
(1990).  
5Tatman v. State, 494 A.2d at 1251-52.  
-9-
evidence seized as a result of the execution of the warrants. The Superior Court
denied the motion to suppress. We review that ruling for abuse of discretion.2
(16)
The record reflects that the probable cause to obtain the warrant to
secure Hubbard’s photograph was established through the use of information
provided by a confidential informant. In reviewing whether probable cause to
obtain a search warrant existed, this Court has adopted a "totality of the
circumstances" test.3  This Court has "eschewed a hypertechnical approach to
the evaluation of the search warrant affidavit in favor of a common-sense
interpretation, bearing in mind that the court reviewing the search warrant owes
a certain degree of deference to the issuing magistrate."4  In measuring the
totality of the circumstances when an informant's tip is involved, this Court has
considered such issues as the reliability of the informant, the details contained
in the informant's tip and the degree to which the tip is corroborated by
independent police surveillance and information.5  If the informant's tip is
6Id. at 1251.
-10-
sufficiently corroborated, the tip may form the basis for probable cause even
though "nothing is known about the informant's credibility."6
(17)
In this case, Detective Sullivan had received information from an
informant he identified as “past proven reliable.” The informant told Sullivan on
the basis of personal knowledge that Hubbard had been bragging about “doing
some bank jobs, and apparently buying some new clothes and flashing some
cash around.” The informant also provided a physical description of Hubbard
and told Sullivan that Hubbard was from New Jersey but now resided in the
Riverside area of Wilmington. Police ran a computer check and were able to
corroborate this background information. Applying a totality of the
circumstances test, we find that the information supplied by the informant, some
of which the police were able to corroborate, was detailed and specific enough,
within the four corners of the affidavit, to support a finding of probable cause to
seize Hubbard to obtain his photograph .  Accordingly, we find Hubbard’s
challenge to the first warrant to be without merit.
(18)
As for the second search warrant, which authorized a nighttime
search of Hubbard’s residence, Hubbard contends that the warrant was based on
false information, and if the false information were excluded from the search
7See Franks v. State, Del. Supr., 398 A.2d 783, 785-86 (1979).
8392 U.S. 1 (1968).
-11-
warrant affidavit, probable cause to search did not exist within the four corners
of the affidavit. The allegedly false information in the affidavit was a statement
that Hubbard had confirmed his address to Detective Simmons.  Hubbard alleges
that he did not speak with Detective Simmons. Even assuming that Hubbard is
correct, he does not challenge the accuracy of the address set forth in the
affidavit. We find the source of the address to be irrelevant. Therefore, even
assuming that Hubbard did not confirm his address for Detective Simmons and
excluding the source of the information from the search warrant, we nonetheless
find that probable cause to search was established within the four corners of the
affidavit.7 Accordingly, Hubbard’s challenge to this warrant also is without
merit.
(19)
We next consider Hubbard’s claim that his arrest for possession of
drug paraphernalia was illegal. Hubbard asserts that his Fourth Amendment
rights were violated when Detective Sullivan illegally searched his person and
seized a crack pipe from his pocket. According to Hubbard, police lacked
reasonable suspicion, under Terry v. Ohio8, to stop and frisk him.  We find,
9See Mosley v. State, Del. Supr., No. 451, 1998, Veasey, C.J. (Feb. 29, 2000)
(ORDER) (citing Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 376-77 (1993) (noting that the
identity of contraband can be determined by an object's contour or mass)).
(continued...)
-12-
however, that the reasonable suspicion standard of Terry v. Ohio does not apply
under the circumstances of this case. 
(20)
The record reflects that the basis for Detective Sullivan’s stop of
Hubbard was the warrant that police had obtained to secure a recent photograph
of Hubbard for purposes of conducting a photographic lineup. We already have
concluded that the warrant was valid. Based on the valid warrant, police clearly
had probable cause to stop Hubbard.  Detective Sullivan testified that when
officers tried to stop Hubbard he immediately shoved his hand into his pants
pockets. Detective Sullivan, fearing for his own safety, conducted a pat down
search of Hubbard’s person for weapons.  In conducting the pat down, Detective
Sullivan felt an object in Hubbard’s pocket. He testified that, based on his many
years of experience in narcotics investigations, he was able to identify the object
based on his touch as an illegal pipe for smoking crack. This Court has
recognized that a police officer may seize non-threatening contraband detected
during a pat down search if the identity of that contraband is immediately
apparent from plain sight or plain touch.9 Accordingly, Detective Sullivan’s
9(...continued)
 
10See Van Arsdall v. State, Del. Supr., 524 A.2d 3, 6-7 (1987).
-13-
seizure of the crack pipe in this case was entirely proper under the plain touch
doctrine.
(21)
Hubbard next alleges that the State violated discovery rules by
failing to provide him with important impeachment evidence concerning Angela
Benson, a key prosecution witness. Hubbard contends that the State failed to
disclose that Angela Benson “had been forced to cooperate with the police or be
charged with possession of drug paraphernalia which would have caused her to
lose her home and children.” Hubbard points to no credible evidence to
substantiate this conclusory assertion. Furthermore, the record reflects that
defense counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine Angela Benson fully on
the issue of her cooperation with police and on any other aspect of potential
bias.10 Accordingly, we find no merit to this claim.
(22)
Hubbard’s next two claims challenge two photographic lineups that
resulted in two of the three eyewitnesses, Claudia Pennington and Kimberly
Novello, identifying Hubbard as the perpetrator in each of the respective
robberies. First, Hubbard contends that he was denied his sixth amendment right
11Snowden v. State, Del. Supr., No. 416, 1994, Walsh, J. (Aug. 10, 1995) (ORDER)
(citing United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973)).
12United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. at 311-17.
-14-
to counsel when FBI Agent Duffey presented a photographic array to Claudia
Pennington on the day following Hubbard’s preliminary hearing without
Hubbard’s counsel present.  Second, Hubbard contends that his due process
rights were violated because the State failed to employ appropriate safeguards
at the photographic lineups presented to Pennington and Novello.
(23)
Hubbard’s claim that he was entitled to counsel at the photographic
lineup presented to Pennington is without merit.  The Sixth Amendment does not
grant the right to counsel at photographic displays conducted by the prosecution
for the purpose of allowing a witness to attempt an identification of the
offender.11  Hubbard’s attempt to recast his argument as a denial of the right to
counsel at “a critical stage of the prosecution” simply fails. The United States
Supreme Court has flatly rejected the argument that a pretrial photographic
display constitutes a “critical stage” of the prosecution.12  Accordingly,
Hubbard’s claim is without merit.
(24)
As for Hubbard’s due process claim, Hubbard filed a pretrial
motion to suppress the photographic array on the ground that the array was
-15-
unduly suggestive. After reviewing the array and the procedures used during the
displays presented to the witnesses, the Superior Court concluded that the
photographic array was not unnecessarily suggestive, and there was no
likelihood of misidentification. Hubbard does not challenge that ruling on appeal.
Instead, Hubbard points to testimony presented at trial to support his claim that
the procedures utilized in the photographic arrays presented to both Pennington
and Novello were unduly suggestive. As to Pennington, Hubbard contends that
the conflicting testimony presented by Agent Duffey and Pennington about what
occurred at the display supports the inference that the photographic array was
unduly suggestive. As to Novello, Hubbard asserts that police officers
improperly told Novello that she had “made the right choice,” thereby tainting
Novello’s pretrial and in-court identification of Hubbard. 
(25)
Neither of Hubbard’s assertions have merit. First, the conflicting
testimony presented by Agent Duffey and Claudia Pennington at trial about what
occurred when Agent Duffey presented the photographic array to Pennington
was explored fully and challenged by defense counsel at trial. Pennington’s in-
court identification of Hubbard was unequivocal. If Pennington was uncertain as
13Gillis v. State, Del. Supr., Nos. 278, 279, and 280, 1986, Walsh, J. (July 9, 1987)
(ORDER); see also Vouras v. State, Del. Supr., 452 A.2d 1165, 1168 (1982).
14Richardson v. State, Del. Supr., 673 A.2d 144, 147 (1996).
-16-
to her pretrial identification, that lack of certainty goes to the weight of the
evidence not to its admissibility.13 
(26)
Similarly, Novello’s statement at trial that police officers informed
her some time after the photographic lineup that she had successfully identified
the perpetrator does not, as Hubbard argues, support an inference that the
procedures used during the photographic array itself were impermissibly
suggestive. The Superior Court reviewed the pretrial identification procedures
and concluded that the procedures utilized did not “suggest” the outcome. We
find no abuse of discretion in the Superior Court’s ruling.14 Any alleged
statements made by police after the photographic array did not undermine the
validity of Novello’s pretrial identification. Accordingly, because we find
nothing improper about Novello’s pretrial identification, we reject Hubbard’s
argument that Novello’s in-court identification, which was unequivocal, was
impermissibly tainted by the suggestive pretrial identification. 
(27)
Hubbard’s next two claims relate to the testimony of his brother,
Eric. First, Hubbard asserts that the trial court erred by allowing Detective Hawk
15Probst v. State, Del. Supr., 547 A.2d 114, 119 (1988); Supr. Ct. R. 8.
16Dutton v. State, Del. Supr., 452 A.2d 127, 146 (1982).
-17-
to testify to out of court statements made by Eric without first determining that
those out of court statements had been made voluntarily. Second, Hubbard
asserts that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by improperly referring in her
opening statement to Eric Hubbard’s out of court statements when those
statements had not yet been deemed admissible.  Hubbard did not raise a pretrial
challenge to the voluntariness, and thus the admissibility, of his brother’s out of
court statements. Nor did Hubbard object to the prosecutor’s reference in her
opening statement to Eric’s out of court statements. Accordingly, we review
these claims for plain error.15  Under a plain error standard of review, the error
complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize
the fairness and integrity of the trial.16
(28)
The record reflects that the State called Eric as a prosecution
witness. During the course of direct examination, the prosecutor questioned Eric
about what happened on May 26, 1999. Although Eric offered vague details of
the events of May 26, 1999, he stated that he did not specifically recall going
with his brother to Crossroads Shopping Center. Moreover, Eric denied that he
ever told police that he had gone to Crossroads Shopping Center with his brother
1711 Del. C. § 3507(a) provides, “In a criminal prosecution, the voluntary out-of-court
prior statement of a witness who is present and subject to cross-examination may be used as
affirmative evidence with substantive independent testimonial value.”
-18-
on May 26, 1999. Immediately after this testimony, the prosecutor requested a
sidebar conference to discuss Eric’s prior criminal record. During the course of
that sidebar, the trial judge, sua sponte, questioned whether the State intended
to introduced Eric’s prior out of court statements pursuant to 11 Del. C. §
3507.17 
(29)
In continuing with direct examination, the prosecutor questioned
Eric about whether his two conversations with police were voluntary, to which
Eric responded, “Somewhat...[w]ell, they threatened me with incarceration.”
Following this exchange, another sidebar conference was held. Although defense
counsel raised a generalized concern about whether Eric’s prior out of court
statements might have become involuntary at some point during the second
interrogation, defense counsel did not at that time raise a formal objection to the
admission of Eric’s prior of court statements or request voir dire on the issue of
voluntariness under Section 3507. Immediately thereafter, the prosecution,
through the testimony of Detective Hawk, presented Eric’s prior statements
concerning accompanying his brother on May 26, 1999 to the Crossroads
Shopping Center at or near the time of the bank robbery. During cross-
18Hatcher v. State, Del. Supr., 337 A.2d 30, 32 (1975).
-19-
examination of Detective Hawk, defense counsel for the first time raised an
objection concerning the voluntariness of Eric’s prior statements. The Superior
Court, applying a totality of the circumstances test, explicitly ruled that Eric’s
prior out of court statements were voluntarily made.
(30)
On this record, we find no merit to Hubbard’s claim that the
Superior Court erred by failing to rule on the voluntariness of Eric’s prior
statements before admitting them into evidence. Hubbard is correct that this
Court has held that a party who properly contests the voluntariness of a Section
3507 statement is entitled to a clear cut determination that the statement was
voluntarily given prior to its admission.18 In this case, however, the State laid the
foundation for the admission of Eric’s statements and Hubbard did not raise an
objection. Only after Eric’s statements were admitted into evidence through the
testimony of Detective Hawk did defense counsel question the voluntariness of
Eric’s statements. At that time, the Superior Court explicitly ruled that Eric’s
prior statements were made voluntarily. Because Hubbard did not properly
challenge the voluntariness of Eric’s statements prior to their admission, we find
no plain error in the procedure employed by the Superior Court.  Moreover, we
19Probst v. State, 547 A.2d at 119.
-20-
find the Superior Court’s ruling on the issue of voluntariness to be supported by
the record.
(31)
Consequently, because we find that Eric’s prior out of court
statements were properly admitted into evidence, we find no merit to Hubbard’s
contention that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by referring  to Eric’s prior
out of court statements in her opening statement.
(32)
Finally, we address Hubbard’s claim that he was not provided with
adequate notice of the violation of probation (VOP) proceedings. Hubbard did
not raise this claim below; therefore, we review it for plain error.19  The record
reflects that Hubbard pled guilty to first degree robbery in 1995 and was serving
out the probationary portion of that sentence when he was arrested in 1999 for
two robberies and possession of drug paraphernalia. It is clear from the
transcript of the suppression hearing on the 1999 charges, which was held on
March 31, 2000, that Hubbard and his counsel had notice of the contested VOP
hearing and discussed the scheduling of the hearing on the record following the
suppression hearing. The record further reflects that a subpoena for the VOP
hearing scheduled on April 24, 2000 was issued to Hubbard on April 17, 2000.
Defense counsel appeared on Hubbard’s behalf at the April 27, 2000 VOP
-21-
hearing and raised no objection to hearing on the ground of improper notice.
Accordingly, we find Hubbard’s claim of inadequate notice to be unsupported
by the record.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgments of the
Superior Court are hereby AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
   s/Joseph T. Walsh
Justice