Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE DEATH OF BRYAN

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE DEATH OF BRYAN  IN THE MATTER OF THE DEATH OF BRYAN 2003 OK 70 76 P.3d 653 Case Number: 98286 Decided: 07/08/2003 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA In the Matter of the Death of: MICHAEL DEAN BRYAN, Deceased, KRISTY JO JOHNSON, ALIX COY BRYAN, and MICHAELA BRYAN, Petitioners, v. BECKY A. BRYAN, KENDRA MARIE GRAHAM, and DERICK ANTHONY GRAHAM, and THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT, Respondents, MASLONKA & ASSOCIATES, INC., and WAUSAU INSURANCE COMPANY, Employer and Insurance Carrier. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION II Honorable Jim D. Filosa, Workers' Compensation Judge ¶0 After Michael Dean Bryan [employee] was killed in a work related accident, Becky A. Bryan [spouse], filed a claim for death benefits in the workers' compensation court. She asserted that she was the employee's wife and that the employee's two stepchildren were dependant upon him for support at the time of death. Kristy Jo Johnson [companion] also filed a claim for death benefits, asserting that she was the employee's wife and that he was survived by his two natural children. The trial judge, Honorable Jim Filosa, awarded death benefits to the spouse and the stepchildren, and to the employee's natural children, but denied the companion's claim for benefits. The Court of Civil Appeals vacated and remanded. We hold that the evidence supports the trial court's determination that the employee's surviving spouse and stepchildren are entitled to workers' compensation death benefits, and that the trial court's award of death benefits to the employee's natural children should remain undisturbed. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED. Brandon J. Burton, T.R. Banks, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Petitioners, W.E. Sparks, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Respondents. KAUGER, J: ¶1 The question presented is whether the trial court erred in awarding workers' compensation death benefits to the employee's surviving spouse and stepchildren who were not living with the employee at the time of his death. We hold that the evidence supports the trial court's determination that the employee's surviving spouse and stepchildren are entitled to workers' compensation death benefits, and that the trial court's award of death benefits to the employee's natural children should remain undisturbed. FACTS ¶2 On November 12, 2001, Michael Dean Bryan [employee] was killed in a work related accident while working for Maslonka and Associates, Inc. [employer] in Valliant, Oklahoma. The employee died instantly when a wire on an electrical pole touched his chest, electrocuting him. ¶3 Becky A. Bryan [spouse] filed a notice of death and claim for compensation in the workers' compensation court on December 3, 2001, seeking death benefits as the employee's wife. She also asserted that her two minor children [stepchildren] relied upon the employee for support. On March 18, 2002, Kristy Jo Johnson [companion] also filed a notice of death and claim for compensation, seeking death benefits as the employee's wife. She alleged that the employee was also survived by their minor child, and an unborn child [natural children]. ¶4 A hearing on the claims for death benefits was held on September 7, 2002. At the hearing, it was undisputed that the employee was covered by the Workers' Compensation Act ¶5 The spouse testified that she had two minor children from a previous marriage when she married the employee on May 6, 1996. She stated that, even though she received child support from the children's biological father, the employee supported her and the stepchildren. ¶6 The companion did not personally appear at the hearing, but her deposition testimony was admitted into evidence. In the deposition, she admitted that she had never been married. ¶7 In an order filed September 12, 2002, the trial judge, Honorable Jim Filosa, ordered death benefits to the spouse and the stepchildren and to the natural children, but denied benefits to the companion. The companion appealed on September 23, 2002, and on March 25, 2003, the Court of Civil Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, vacated a portion of the trial court's order and remanded the cause with instructions. It determined that the spouse and the stepchildren were not entitled to any death benefits. We granted certiorari on May 29, 2003. ¶8 THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT THE EMPLOYEE'S SURVIVING SPOUSE AND STEPCHILDREN ARE ENTITLED TO WORKERS' COMPENSATION DEATH BENEFITS, AND THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF DEATH BENEFITS TO THE EMPLOYEE'S NATURAL CHILDREN SHOULD REMAIN UNDISTURBED. ¶9 We note at the outset that: 1) neither party disputes that the employee's natural child born prior to the employee's death is entitled to death benefits; and 2) although the spouse argues in her petition for certiorari that the trial court erred in awarding benefits to the natural child born after the employee died, the issue was not presented in the petition in error, the reply to the petition in error, in either parties' briefs on appeal, nor was it addressed by the Court of Civil Appeals. Non-jurisdictional issues, which are raised for the first time on rehearing or certiorari are generally unfit for review. ¶10 The companion argues that neither the spouse nor the stepchildren are entitled to workers' compensation death benefits because: 1) the spouse does not qualify as a surviving spouse pursuant to ¶11 The spouse counters that she meets the definition of surviving spouse under 85 O.S. 2001 §3.1, ¶12 Title ¶13 Under a. a surviving spouse as defined in this section; b. a child as defined in this section; or c. any other person dependent in fact upon the employee and refers only to a person who receives one-half (½) or more of his support from the employee ¶14 The companion relies on our decision in Tatum v. Tatum, ¶15 After the worker was accidently killed on the job, the first woman sought death benefits for herself as a "deserted" spouse. The second woman sought death benefits for herself as the decedent's widow and for her children as the decedent's stepchildren. The Tatum Court held that the first woman was entitled to death benefits, and that neither the second woman or her children were entitled to any benefits because they did not fall within any statutorily cognizable class of authorized claimants. ¶16 In Tatum, the Court recognized that three categories of persons are statutorily "actually dependent," in the eligibility sense, to receive death benefits. The three categories are: 1) a surviving spouse; 2) a child or children; and 3) other persons who are in fact dependent upon the employee. However, because the compensation schedules in §22 refer to dependants such as parents, brothers, sisters, grandparents and grandchildren, the Court determined that §3.1 does not create a general class of authorized claimants for persons who are actually dependant on the decedent worker for support contributions, but do not fall into any of the three recognized categories. Nevertheless, the Court also recognized that, although no such evidence was present, a person's status as a deserted spouse might be lost if the spouse who was deserted took affirmative acts to end the relationship such as suing for divorce or separate maintenance, active resistance to reconciliation efforts or other acts which were indicative of a changed character in the spousal relationship or a legal change in the relationship. ¶17 Implicit in the Tatum holding is a determination that the language in §3.1 which requires a showing of dependent persons to have been receiving one-half of their support from the worker applies only to persons enumerated in §22 such as parents, brothers, sisters, grandparents, etc; who allege that they were dependent on the employee for support, rather than surviving spouses and children. The spouse, who was legally married to the employee at the time of the employee's death, was only required to show that she met the statutory definition of a surviving spouse and that the stepchildren were dependant on the employee ----- she was not required to show that she or the stepchildren received one-half or more of their support from the employee. ¶18 When reviewing resolutions of fact on nonjurisdictional issues from the workers' compensation court, we do not re-weigh the evidence, but instead look for any competent evidence to support the trial court's findings. CONCLUSION ¶19 The death benefit provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act are given a broad and liberal construction in determining the question of dependancy. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED. WATT, C.J., OPALA, V.C.J., HODGES, LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, KAUGER, SUMMERS, WINCHESTER, JJ., concur. BOUDREAU, J., dissents. FOOT