Title: LEONARD D. CLOUSE v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

LEONARD D. CLOUSE v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1989 WY 140776 P.2d 1011Case Number: 88-298Decided: 06/27/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
LEONARD D. CLOUSE, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty, Timothy J. Judson, 
J.

Public Defender 
Program: Mike Cornia, Appellate Counsel, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Gerald P. Luckhaupt, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Leonard B. Clouse, 
charged with two counts of first degree sexual assault and two counts of armed 
robbery, entered into a plea bargain in which he pleaded guilty to one count of 
each of those crimes in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges. 
Sentenced to a minimum of sixty years and a maximum of seventy-five years with 
credit for time served, he appeals and seeks remand for resentencing. He 
contends the sentencing court abused its discretion, violated his right to due 
process, violated his right against self-incrimination and erroneously failed to 
indicate whether or not it had relied on disputed information contained in the 
presentence investigation report.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3.]     Clouse states the 
issues as:

I. Whether the sentence 
imposed on the Appellant was an abuse of discretion which resulted in a failure 
of justice and a violation of Article 1, Section 15 of the Wyoming 
Constitution?

II. Whether the 
Appellant's right to due process was violated by the court's reliance on 
unfounded assumptions and assertions of prior criminal 
activity?

III. Whether the 
defendant's right against self incrimination was violated by the consideration 
of statements concerning prior criminal activity in determining 
sentence?

IV. Whether the trial 
court's failure to indicate whether it had relied on disputed information in the 
presentence report requires that the case be remanded for 
resentencing?

The state frames 
the issues as:

I. Were the sentences 
imposed on appellant by the district court an abuse of discretion or a failure 
of justice?

II. Did the district 
court err in considering the presentence investigation and were the court's 
findings without support in the record?

III. Was information 
compelled in violation of appellant's Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination considered by the district court?

IV. Is reversal for 
procedural errors at sentencing proper, absent a showing of 
prejudice?

FACTS

[¶4.]     Four months after 
completing a six-year prison sentence for armed robbery, Clouse was arrested 
around 10:30 p.m. on October 9, 1987, on suspicion of armed robbery of a 
convenience store and two acts of first degree sexual assault on the store's 
clerk. The arrest took place at the scene of the crimes near Gillette, Wyoming.

[¶5.]     According to the 
presentence investigation report, Clouse committed the convenience store crimes 
in this way. At about 10:15 p.m. he entered the store when the clerk was alone. 
He walked behind the counter, showed the clerk a loaded handgun, ordered the 
clerk to open the cash register, which she did, and reached in and took out all 
the bills. Next, he ordered the clerk to open a second cash register, but it 
could not be opened. A customer entered the store; instead of leaving the store, 
Clouse ordered the clerk to accompany him to a bathroom in the rear of the 
store. Inside that room, pointing the loaded gun at the clerk, he ordered her to 
remove her clothing and perform oral sex on him. As he kept the gun pointed at 
her, she began gagging and could not breathe. Clouse then ordered her to lay on 
the floor; he laid on top of her and raped her. After raping her, he pointed the 
gun at her and told her the police better not be outside. Fortunately, an 
on-duty Gillette policeman passing by in his patrol car had seen Clouse standing 
behind the store counter. Knowing that a male should not be working at this 
particular store and realizing that the person he saw matched the description of 
a person wanted for an October 2, 1987, robbery of a Gillette Common Cents 
Store, the policeman pulled his car into the store's parking area. Entering the 
store and positioning the customer out of harm's way, the policeman arrested 
Clouse as he was leaving the bathroom. Frightened, the victim had remained in 
the bathroom where she was found by officers.

[¶6.]     Clouse did not deny or 
dispute this rendition of the crime. The presentence investigation also includes 
an account of the tragic effect Clouse's criminal episode has had on the store 
clerk.

[¶7.]     Clouse entered initial 
pleas of not guilty, not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency and 
not triable by reason of mental illness or deficiency. After mental evaluations, 
Clouse changed his plea pursuant to a plea bargain. In exchange for the state's 
dismissing the Common Cents Food Store armed robbery charge and one of the two 
sexual assault charges arising from the convenience store armed robbery, Clouse 
pleaded guilty to that armed robbery and the remaining charge of first degree 
sexual assault.

[¶8.]     After taking Clouse's 
change of plea, the sentencing court ordered a presentence investigation report. 
The sentencing court told Clouse that he was to cooperate fully with the 
probation officer, so his report could be completed in a timely fashion. The 
sentencing court also told Clouse that he would receive a copy of that report 
and would have an opportunity to make any additions or corrections that he 
believed were necessary.

[¶9.]     At the sentencing 
proceeding, Clouse told the sentencing court that he had received and had a 
chance to review a copy of the presentence investigation report. Responding to 
the sentencing court's question whether Clouse had any additions or corrections 
to make to that eleven-page report, Clouse's attorney told the sentencing court 
of four additions or corrections:

1. He reminded the court 
that, as page six of the report showed, Clouse had spent 357 days in jail since 
his arrest.

2. He referred the court 
to the probation officer's statement at the bottom of page seven of the report 
that Clouse voluntarily and without coercion had admitted to the probation 
officer that he (Clouse) had committed two armed robberies in Cody and Powell, 
but that the police departments in those towns reported they had no contact with 
Clouse. Clouse's attorney asked the sentencing court to disregard "those pending 
charges and that statement," because when Clouse made that statement he was in 
custody; the probation officer was acting as an agent for the police; the 
probation officer had not informed Clouse of his Miranda rights; and the 
sentencing court had told Clouse at his change of plea proceeding to answer all 
of the probation officer's questions.

3. He referred the court 
to the probation officer's statement at the top of page ten of the report, in 
which that officer expressed his impression that Clouse believed he had somehow 
been treated unjustly. Clouse's attorney explained to the court that Clouse felt 
the court's denials of his earlier motions were unfair, since he felt the 
motions had merit.

4. He referred the court 
to the probation officer's statement on page eleven of the report, in which the 
officer expressed his strong impression that Clouse's only remorse was that he 
had been caught. Clouse's attorney took exception to the officer's impression, 
telling the court that Clouse felt remorse and his guilty plea was evidence of 
that remorse.

[¶10.]  After hearing from Clouse's attorney on 
these foregoing matters, the sentencing court determined that neither the state 
nor Clouse had any evidence to present. The sentencing court then received the 
state's recommendation that Clouse be punished to the fullest extent of the law 
and Clouse's request for a concurrent sentence. After hearing from Clouse that 
he apologized to the victim for what he had done and he had pleaded guilty to 
spare everyone "the hassle and emotional trauma of bringing all that stuff up 
again," the sentencing court carefully identified and fully explained the many 
factors it had considered in arriving at the sentences to be imposed on Clouse 
for his crimes. In its exhaustive list of sentencing factors, the sentencing 
court made no mention of the alleged two armed robberies in Cody and Powell. The 
factors considered were:

- Probation: 
circumstances do not warrant probation as an alternative.

- Seriousness of the 
crimes: as serious as any that could be committed, short of 
murder.

- Previous crimes: served 
prison term of six years for armed robbery, during which time there were 
numerous infractions, both at the penitentiary and the state 
hospital.

- The convenience store 
armed robbery and sexual assault was committed a few months after defendant's 
release from his six-year prison term.

- A substantial juvenile 
record.

- ABA Standards on 
criminal justice dealing with sentencing. No mitigating factors, but several 
aggravating factors were found:

(1) The victim was 
treated with particular cruelty;

(2) The offense involved 
injury or threatened violence to others and was committed to gratify Clouse's 
desire for pleasure or excitement;

(3) The degree of harm 
was substantially greater than average;

(4) The victim was 
particularly vulnerable;

(5) Defendant was the 
leader of the criminal enterprise.

- Correctional treatment: 
most effectively provided at the penitentiary.

- Punishment: deserved, 
given the serious nature of the offenses.

- Past record: recidivism 
likely in light of defendant's continued criminal activity, despite less harsh 
sanctions applied for past crimes, and if a lesser sentence is imposed the risk 
is high that defendant would continue to commit criminal 
offenses.

- Deterrence: the 
punishment should be substantial to deter others from committing similar 
crimes.

- Rehabilitation: a slim 
possibility.

- Isolation of defendant 
would benefit society.

- Defendant represented 
well by counsel (initially charged with four major felonies), noting a jury 
trial would have resulted in a sentence twice as severe.

- Society's need for 
retribution, protection and punishment.

Clouse did not 
respond to these stated reasons at that time or to the sentences 
imposed.

DISCUSSION

1. Abuse of 
Discretion

[¶11.]  Clouse argues that his sixty-year minimum 
to seventy-five-year maximum sentence precludes any hope of his rehabilitation 
and is based only on retribution and perhaps prevention, but not on the humane 
principles of reformation and prevention as required by the Wyo. Const. art. 1, 
§ 15. He contends the sentencing court failed to consider his background of 
being a victim of child abuse and his demonstration of remorse for having 
committed the crimes to which he pleaded guilty. He concludes that the 
sentencing court's failure to realistically consider rehabilitation, Clouse's 
child abuse background and his remorse constituted an abuse of sentencing 
discretion.

[¶12.]  This argument is without merit. In the 
absence of a demonstration of an abuse of discretion, this court will not set 
aside a sentence which is within the legislatively mandated minimum and maximum 
terms. Roose v. State, 753 P.2d 574, 579 (Wyo. 1988).

[S]entences within the 
statutory limit authorized by the legislature are reviewable for an abuse of 
discretion.

* * * * * 
*

Judicial discretion is a 
composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.

Martin v. State, 
720 P.2d 894, 896-97 (Wyo. 1986). The sentencing court imposed 
sentences within the legislatively prescribed limits. Carefully reviewing the 
record and the factors identified and explained by the sentencing court in 
support of the sentences it imposed on Clouse, we hold the sentencing court did 
not reach an arbitrary or capricious conclusion under the circumstances. 
Id., at 
896-97.

2. Due Process

[¶13.]  Relying on the principle that he has a 
due process right to be sentenced only on accurate information, United States v. 
Jones, 640 F.2d 284, 286 (10th Cir. 1981), Clouse claims the sentencing court 
violated that right by sentencing him on inaccurate information and unproven 
allegations of prior criminal activity. He identifies the inaccurate information 
to have been: the victim was particularly vulnerable; Clouse was the leader of 
the criminal enterprise; and the degree of harm caused was substantially greater 
than average. He identifies the unproven allegations of prior criminal activity 
to have been his substantial juvenile record and the two felony charges which 
the state dismissed under the plea bargain.

[¶14.]  This claim of error is similarly without 
merit. We have carefully examined the record, particularly the presentence 
investigation report. Not only do we find substantial support for the questioned 
information and allegations, but we also find that neither Clouse nor his 
attorney objected to that information or those allegations during the sentencing 
proceeding. None of the four matters contained in the presentence investigation 
report, which Clouse's attorney brought to the sentencing court's attention, 
concern the information and allegations now questioned by Clouse for the first 
time. Lacking Clouse's denial of or attempt to disprove the information 
contained in the presentence investigation report he now complains of, the 
sentencing court properly considered that evidence. Christy v. State, 731 P.2d 1204, 1207-08 (Wyo. 1987).

3. Self-Incrimination

[¶15.]  The record shows the sentencing court did 
not consider for sentencing purposes Clouse's admissions to the probation 
officer to having committed the armed robberies in Cody and Powell. Despite 
this, Clouse baldly asserts that the sentencing court did consider these 
matters. He makes no effort to prove that bald assertion. Because Clouse has 
failed to make the attempt of establishing a factual basis for his claim of 
error, we will not further consider this issue. See Smallwood v. State, 771 P.2d 798 (Wyo. 
1989).

4. Reliance on Disputed Information in the 
Presentence Investigation Report

[¶16.]  In his final issue, Clouse argues that 
the sentencing court erred in failing to indicate whether his admission of the 
armed robberies in Cody and Powell and the probation officer's impression of 
Clouse's lack of remorse for the convenience store crimes either were accurate 
or would be used in determining sentence. He asks this court to apply the 
provisions of F.R. Cr.P. 32(c)(3)(D), which require a federal sentencing court 
to make a written record of its findings of accuracy of disputed presentence 
investigation report information or of its determination that no finding is 
necessary because it will not consider the disputed information for sentencing 
purposes.

[¶17.]  What this court said in Christy, 731 P.2d  
at 1206, applies here: "We are guided, and the sentencing process is controlled 
by, Rule 33, W.R.Cr.P. (Similar to Rule 32, F.R.Cr.P., except that the 1983 
amendments have not been adopted in Wyoming.)" (Emphasis added). The provisions 
of the federal counterpart are part of the 1983 amendments not adopted in 
Wyoming. It is 
not the practice of this court to adopt, amend or disregard rules by opinion 
changes. Nor does Clouse's argument persuade us to adopt and apply them now. We 
are satisfied that the provisions of W.R.Cr.P. 33 as presently constituted serve 
well. Our rule addresses both the sentencing court's need to have all available 
information with which to make an intelligent evaluation and informed decision 
in the proper exercise of discretion, and the convicted individual's need to 
exercise the right of allocution and to deny, dispute, or disprove presentence 
investigation data. Christy, 731 P.2d  at 1207-08. Our standard of review 
continues to be: "A sentence will not be disturbed because of sentencing 
procedures unless the defendant can show an abuse of discretion, procedural 
conduct prejudicial to him, and circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness 
and injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of fair play." Coletti 
v. State, 769 P.2d 361, 363 (Wyo. 1989).

[¶18.]  Since Clouse has failed to show any of 
these elements, this court will not disturb his sentence.

[¶19.]  Affirmed in all 
respects.

URBIGKIT, J., filed a specially 
concurring opinion. 

URBIGKIT, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶20.]  I concur in the decision and generally 
concur in the opinion by specific agreement that this court should not adopt, 
amend or disregard its rules in individual case decisions.

[¶21.]  Within the continued obligation to 
improve operation of the court system, I cannot agree that this court's 
attention should ignore progressive changes to adopt reasoned improvements found 
in modernized federal practice and procedural rules. A call to review and 
continued attention by the statutory rules committee and this court should 
always exist. The purpose of the change now found in F.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(3)(D) was 
to have the trial court make a finding as to the accuracy of the challenged 
factual proposition or to determine that no reliance would be placed on that 
proposition at the time of sentencing. The rule requires the trial court to 
record what was factually considered for the sentencing 
decision.

[¶22.]  Certainty in documented decisions deters 
or simplistically resolves subsequent appeals, while doubt and conjecture cause 
or magnify. Additionally, standardization supplies a firmer practice foundation 
with the composite authority which is created. The assurances of nationally 
based precedent benefit the practicing lawyer, the trial judge and surely the 
appellate jurist. Believing that anything created by man can be improved, I 
leave comparisons of our present W.R.Cr.P. 33 and the 1983 amendments which were 
made to the federal rule as found in F.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(3)(D) for challenged 
analysis and review as a continuing judicial responsibility for recommendation 
of the rules committee and supervision by this court within its justice delivery 
system responsibilities as required by Wyo. Const. art. 5, § 2. In this case, 
the trial court accurately and adequately complied with the present 
rule.