Title: Boorman v. Nevada Mem'l Cremation Society

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

126 Nev., Advance Opinion 24

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA.

IDENISE BOORMAN, AN INDIVIDUAL
|AND AS THE PERSONAL.
REPRESENTATIVE OF RICHARD
LESLIE FRANCIS BOORMAN; BILLY
CHRISTIAN BOORMAN, A MINOR;
IDEAN ALFRED BOORMAN; RITA VAN
INGEN; DIANE GOODWIN; AND.
GEMMA BARKER,
Appellants,

vs,
NEVADA MEMORIAL CREMATION
JSOCIETY, INC., A NEVADA
CORPORATION FORMERLY
IDENTIFIED AS NEVADA FUNERAL
SERVICE; STEVE ALLEN; CLARK
COUNTY; CLARK COUNTY
CORONER'S OF FICE; AND MONIQUE
BEVERLEY,
Respondents,

      
   
   
   
   
     
   
   
       
     
     
     
   
   
 
  
 
   
 
   
  
  
 
   
 

No, 62492

FILED

JUL 2.9 2010

ee

Certified questions under NRAP 6 relating to the alleged
Inogligent handling of a deceased person's remains. United States District
[Court for the District of Nevada, Philip M. Pro, Judge.

Questions answered,

John S. Rogers, Las Vegas; Capp & Marsh and Jonathan C. Capp,

Oceanside, California,
for Appellants,

David Roger, District Attorney, and Laura C. Rehfeldt, Deputy District
Attorney, Clark County,

for Respondents Clark County, Clark County Coroner's Office, and
(Monique Beverley.

Freeman Law Firm and Robert W. Freeman Jr., Henderson,
for Respondents Nevada Memorial Cremation Society and Steve Allen.

fo -/95 be

 
BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.

OPINION

By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, C..:
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada
certified ten questions relating to causes of action for the alleged negligent

handling of a deceased person's remains.! The first three questions

 

 

'The ten certified questions were presented to us as follows:

1. What relationship must a plaintiff have to a
deceased person to assert a cognizable emotional
distress claim related to the alleged mishandling
of the deceased person's remains?

2, In asserting such a claim, must the plaintiff
demonstrate physical impact or serious emotional
distress causing physical injury or illness?

3, In asserting such a claim, must the plaintiff
observe or have some sensory perception of the act
causing insult to their loved one’s remains?

4, Does a county coroner's office owe a duty to the
family members of a deceased individual not to
lose, misplace, or misappropriate the deceased
person's organs such that the county coroner's
office could be liable for emotional distress claims?
5. If the answer to question four is yes, to what
class of persons is such a duty owed?

6. Does a county coroner's office owe a fiduciary
duty to the family members of a deceased
individual not to lose, misplace, or misappropriate
the deceased person's organs, or to inform the
family members about the whereabouts of such
organs?

continued on next page .

 

 
generally ask us to decide who may assert a cognizable emotional distress
claim for the alleged negligent handling of a deceased person's remains
and to determine the necessary requirements to assert such a claim,
without distinguishing between the defendant actors involved in this
action. Because our answer necessarily depends upon identifying the
alleged negligent actor, we must re-eraft those questions to focus on the
two actors involved—a mortuary and the county coroner. As a result of
this re-crafting, we do not view it necessary to separately answer the
questions relating to a county coroner's duty not to lose, misplace, or
misappropriate the deceased person's organs. In our view, the question of
whether a county coroner owes duty not to lose, misplace, or
misappropriate a deceased person’s organs is consumed within the
question of whether the county coroner owes a duty not to negligently

handle a deceased person's remains.

~ continued

7. If the answer to question six is yes, to what
class of persons is such a duty owed?

8. Does a claim for conversion of a deceased
human body or its parts exist under Nevada law?
9. If the answer to question eight is yes, what
class of persons may bring such a claim?

10. If the answer to question eight is yes, may
such a plaintiff recover emotional distress
damages arising out of the conversion of the
human remains?

 

 
om

 

We therefore rephrase the ten certified questions to focus on
three primary inquires? See, e.g., Palmer v, Pioneer Inn Assocs,, Ltd., 118
Nev. 943, 945, 59 P.3d 1237, 1238 (2002) (rephrasing certified questions
under NRAP 6).

‘The first primary inquiry focuses on the mortuary.
Specifically, what relationship must a plaintiff have to a deceased person
to assert a cognizable emotional distress claim related to the alleged

 

mishandling of the deceased person's remains by a mortuary? Must the
plaintiff observe or have some sensory perception of the act causing insult
to their loved one’s remains? And must the plaintiff demonstrate physical
impact or serious emotional distress causing physical injury or illness?
‘The second primary inquiry is much like the first but focuses
on the county coroner. Specifically, what relationship must a plaintiff
have to a deceased person to assert a cognizable emotional distress claim
related to the alleged mishandling of the deceased person's remains by a
county coroner? Must the plaintiff observe or have some sensory
And
must the plaintiff demonstrate physical impact or serious emotional
distres

 

perception of the act causing insult, to their loved one’s remains?

 

causing physical injury or illness?
‘The third primary inquiry is whether a claim for conversion of
a deceased human body or its parts exist under Nevada law.

4In its certification order, the federal district court noted that it did
“not intend its framing of the questions to limit [this court's) consideration
of the issues.”

 
 

We answer these three questions as follows. First, close
family members who were aware of the death of a loved one and to whom
mortuary services were being provided may assert an emotional distress
claim for the negligent handling of a deceased person's remains against a
mortuary. Those persons do not need to observe or have any sensory
perception of the offensive conduct, and do not need to present evidence of
any physical manifestation of emotional distress. Second, the only person
who may assert an emotional distress claim against a county coroner for
the negligent handling of a deceased person's remains is the person with
the superior right to dispose of the decedent's body. That person does not
need to observe or have any sensory perception of the offensive conduet,
and does not need to present evidence of any physical manifestation of
emotional distress. Third, a claim for conversion of a deceased human
body or its parts does not exist under Nevada law.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

‘These certified questions arise from a federal district court
action brought by appellants Denise Boorman (Richard Boorman’s mother)
and other family members (collectively, Boorman) against respondents
Nevada Memorial Cremation Society (the mortuary), Clark County, and
the employees of both entities, for returning Richard Boorman's (Richard)
body to England without its internal organs,

Richard, a 29-year-old from London, England, died from what
appeared to be an excessive consumption of alcohol and drugs while he
was vacationing in Las Vegas for a bachelor party, Following his death,
his body was transported to the Clark County Coroner for an autopsy,
where the county coroner removed the internal organs for examination,
‘The county coroner contends that the organs were then placed in a plastic
bag between Richard's legs, and that after the autopsy was complete,
Richard’s body and its internal organs were sent to the mortuary, After

5

 
4

 

the mortuary embalmed Richard’s body, it sent his remains back to
England.

Upon receipt of his body, Boorman contends that the English
authorities opened up Richard’s body cavity to discover that all the
internal organs had been removed and replaced with a rolled up cloth
sheet. To date, Richard's organs have not been located.

Based upon these facts, Boorman filed an action in United
States District Court for the District of Nevada alleging, among other
things, that respondents were liable for claims of emotional distress,
breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion for the negligent handling of
Richard's body. The federal district court concluded that no controlling
Nevada authority existed with regard to Boorman’s claims and certified
ten questions for this court to answer, which we accepted?

DISCUSSION
Inquiry related to the mortuary

Boorman argues that close family members who are aware
that mortuary services are being performed should have standing to assert
an emotional distress claim for the alleged negligent handling of a

deceased person's remai

 

8. Boorman further argues that those persons
need not observe the offonding acts or demonstrate any physical
manifestation to succeed on such a claim, We agree.

‘This court has never had the opportunity to address the
specific factual scenario raised in appellants’ federal complaint. While we
have recognized that an individual may have a cause of action for

emotional distress in other contexts, see, ¢.g., Barmettler v, Reno Air, Inc.,

8We note that respondents Nevada Memorial Cremation Society and
its employees have failed to participate in this matter.

 

 
114 Nev, 441, 447-48, 956 P.2d 1382, 1386-87 (1998) (concluding that
direct victims of negligent conduct may bring a claim for emotional
distress); Grotts v. Zahner, 115 Nev. 339, 340, 989 P.2d 415, 416 (1999)

 

(recognizing witness-bystander claims for emotional distress), we have
never been presented with the opportunity to discuss the scope of an
emotional distress claim resulting from the alleged negligent handling of a
deceased person's remains.

Although we have not addressed this issue in Nevada, the
negligent handling of a deceased person's remains is a commonly
recognized tort. For example, the California Supreme Court addressed
this issue in Christensen v. Superior Court, which is helpful to our
discussion. 820 P.2d 181 (Cal. 1991).

In Christensen, friends and relatives of the decedent brought

 

an emotional distress cause of action against a mortuary and crematory
for negligently and intentionally mishandling the deceased's remains. See
id. at 184-85 (alleging that mortuary and crematory defendants harvested
decedent's body parts and organs). In determining the class of persons
who may assert such a claim, the California Supreme Court rejected the
limitation that only those persons who have the statutory right to control
the disposition of the body and who contract for its disposition may assert

an emotional distre:

 

claim, Id, at 183. ‘That class of persons “is not a

reliable indicator of the family members who may suffer the greatest

emotional distress if the decedent's remains are mishandled.” Id, at 191.
Instead, the Court reasoned that “[o]ne of several children of

the decedent may arrange for the services on behalf of all siblings, as well

as a surviving spouse or parent of the decedent [and, i]f 0, the crematory

 

 
or mortuary assumes a duty to all of these family members.”* Id. at 191.
By undertaking such a duty, mortuary and crematory operators “create[ ]
a special relationship obligating them to perform [funeral] services in the
dignified and respectful manner the bereaved expect...” Id. at 193.
‘Therefore, the Court concluded that such a defendant owes a duty to “close
family members who were aware that funeral and/or crematory services
were being performed, and on whose behalf or for whose benefit the
Ad. at 183.

 

services were renderei

We are persuaded by the California Supreme Court's

 

reasoning in Christensen as it relates to what class of person may assert
an emotional distress claim against a mortuary.

Unlike the duty of a county coroner, which we discuss in the
next section, a mortuary voluntarily undertakes a duty to competently

prepare the decedent's body for the benefit of the bereaved. See

 

Christensen, 820 P.2d at 193. While we must limit liability at some point,

 

and thus conclude that a mortuary’s duty does not run to all persons

potentially affected by the decedent's passing, such as close friends and

 

“The Court further stated that

[there is no reason to assume that a person who
makes the arrangements is any more susceptible
to emotional distress if the services are not
competently performed than are the other family
members. Indeed, in light of the emotional impact,
of the death of a close family member of the
bereaved, it may be the relative least affected who
is chosen by the family to represent them in
arranging for funeral and related services.

Id. at 191.

 

 
 

distant relatives, we cannot conclude that a mortuary only owes a duty to
the person with the right to dispose of the body.

Limiting recovery for emotional distress damages to the
person with the right to dispose of the body would be an arbitrary
delineation.

   

191. Certainly, in some instances the person with
the right to dispose of the body would arguably suffer emotional distress
upon learning about the negligent treatment of a loved one’s body.
However, in many other instances, a close family member who is not the
person with the right to dispose of the body may be more affected by such
negligent conduct. Therefore, we conclude that close family members who
are aware of both the death of a loved one and that mortuary services were
being performed may bring an action for emotional distress resulting from
the negligent handling of the deceased's remains,

We further conclude that persons who may assert such a claim
do not need to observe or perceive the negligent conduct, or demonstrate
any physical manifestation of emotional distress. Requiring a potential
plaintiff to observe or perceive the negligent conduct would essentially
grant immunity to persons who negligently handle a deceased's remains in
many instances because the activities of a mortuary mostly occur behind
closed doors, See Controraz v, Michelotti-Sawyers, 896 P.2d 1118, 1122
(Mont. 1995) (requiring a potential plaintiff to be present or observe the
offending act “is an unreasonable and arbitrary limitation” and
“{ulpholding such a rule would create an immunity that could protect
mortuaries from their egregious conduct while barring recovery to those
persons possibly suffering the greatest harm’)

Also, our historical concern that emotional distress must be
demonstrated by some physical manifestation of emotional distress is not
implicated in this context. We need not question the trustworthiness of an

individual’s emotional anguish in cases involving desecration of a loved

9

 
one’s remains. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law
of Torts § 54, at 362 (th ed. 1984) (‘[A group of cases eliminating the
physical manifestation requirement] has involved the negligent
mishandling of corpses... . [because there is] ... an especial likelihood of
genuine and serious mental distress, ... which serves as a guarantee that
the claim is not spurious.”); Allen v, Jones, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445, 450 (Ct.
App. 1980) (concluding that “damages are recoverable . .. without physical

injury for negligent mishandling of a corpse"); Brown v. Matthews

 

‘Mortuary, Inc, 801 P.2d 37, 44 (Idaho 1990) (exempting the physical
manifestation of emotional distress requirement in cases involving the
negligent handling of a deceased person's remains).

‘Therefore, while a plaintiff must allege some emotional
disturbance resulting from the defendant's negligent conduct, there is no
need to demonstrate any physical manifestation of that emotional distress,
Ultimately, the determination of whether a close family member should be
able to recover any damages in such an action is a question for the trier of
fact.®

°Similar to our resolution of this issue, the American Law Institute

is drafting a new section in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for
Physical and Emotional Harm addressing this situation, which currently
reads:

An actor whose negligent conduct causes
serious emotional disturbance to another is subject
to liability to the other if the conduct:

(b) occurs in the course of specified
categories of activities, undertakings, or
relationships in which negligent conduct is
especially likely to cause serious emotional
disturbance.

continued on next page...

 

 
ome

 

Inquiry related to the county coroner

Despite our conclusion in the previous section, we cannot
conclude that the duty of a county coroner is as expansive as the duty of a
mortuary. Unlike a mortuary, which voluntarily undertakes a duty to
perform funeral services on behalf of the bereaved, a county coroner is
obligated by law to perform its services. See NRS 259.050(1) (requiring
the coroner to “make an appropriate investigation” when there are
“reasonable ground{s] to suspect that [a] death has been occasioned by
unnatural means’). ‘The county coroner does not create a special
relationship nor does he or she undertake any particular duty to the
bereaved to prepare the deceased's body for funeral services.’ Rather, the

county coroner's duty is to investigate the cause of death and, so

 

continued

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm §
46 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007). The tentative draft Restatement limits
recovery under this tort to a class of persons “in the relationship or those
for whom the undertaking or activity was being performed ....” Id. § 46
emt. b, The tentative draft does not mention any requirement that the
person bringing the claim must observe or perceive the negligent conduct.
‘This rule is not limited to cases in which there are physical
manifestations; the only requirement is that the potential plaintiff
demonstrate serious emotional distress. See id. § 46 cmt. g.

"Because a county coroner does not create a special relationship with
family members of the deceased, we answer the question of whether a
county coroner owes a fiduciary duty not to lose, misplace, or
misappropriate a deceased person's organs, or to inform family members
of the organs’ whereabouts, in the negative.

un

 
on

 

performing its duty, there may be instances where a county coroner needs
to examine the body or its parts.?

Nevertheless, a county coroner is not completely absolved from
any liability. A county coroner has a narrow limited duty to account for a
deceased person's remains and may be held liable for emotional distress to
the person with the right to dispose of the deceased’s body for negligently
handling a deceased person's remains.

We find the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision in Morton v.
Maricopa County, 865 P.2d 808 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998), particularly helpful
to our decision. In Morton, the court recognized that a county coroner
owed a duty not to negligently prevent the proper interment or cremation
of a deceased's body but that the duty was only owed to the person with
the right to dispose of the deceased's body. Id. at $12. Th

 

forton court
quoted section 868 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in recognizing
that a county coroner could be held liable:

“One who intentionally, recklessly or negligently
removes, withholds, mutilates or operates upon
the body of a dead person or prevents its proper
interment or cremation is subject to liability to a
member of the family of the deceased who is
‘entitled to the disposition of the body.”

Morton, 865 P.2d at 812 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 868
(1979)). ‘The Morton court further acknowledged that “[tJhere is no need

 

to show physical consequences of the mental distress.

 

id. at 812 n.2

(quoting the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 868 cmt. a),
"For example, a coroner may need to dissect a deceased's organs and
dispose of body parts after the investigation. While a bereaved may be
‘emotionally upset that the deceased body is not returned with all of its
organs, the county coroner cannot be held liable for carrying out the duties
of his or her job.

12

 
We agree with Morton and the Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 868 that the only person who can assert an emotional distress
claim against a county coroner in this context is the person with the right
to dispose of the body. While the only person who may assert this claim is
the person with the right to dispose of the body, the remaining elements
required to prevail on this claim are the same as those relating to an
emotional distress claim against a mortuary—the person need not
perceive the offending act or demonstrate any physical manifestations of
emotional distress.

‘Does a claim for conversion of a deceased human body or its parts exist
under Nevada law?

A dim for conversion of a deceased human body or its parts
does not exist under Nevada law.

Conversion is defined as “a distinct act of dominion wrongfully
exerted over another's personal property in denial of, or inconsistent with
his title or rights therein or in derogation, exclusion, or defiance of such
title or rights.” Evans v, Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc,, 116 Nev. 598, 606, 5
P.3d 1043, 1048 (2000) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, the essential
question before us is whether a deceased human body or its parts is
“personal property” in order to support a claim for conversion.

Consistent with the majority of jurisdictions that have
addressed this issue, we cannot conclude that there is a property right in a
deceased human body or its remains. See, eg. Shults v. U.S,, 995 F.
Supp, 1270, 1275-76 (D. Kan. 1998) (construing that Mississippi law did
not support a claim for conversion and noting that “the partial remains of
a human body[] has no compensable value”); Culpepper v. Pearl Street
Bldg., Inc., 87 P.2d 877, 882 (Colo. 1994) (We formally reject the fictional
theory that a property right exists in a dead body that would support an
action for conversion.”); Walser v. Resthaven, 633 A.2d 466, 477 (Md. Ct.

13

 

 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
    
  
  
   
 
  

Spec. App. 1993). Concluding otherwise may create morbid consequences,
setting up an incentive for the person with the right to the disposition of
the body to sell his or her loved one's remains for profit. We therefore
answer this question in the negative and conclude that Nevada law does
not recognize a claim for conversion of a deceased human body or its parts.
We therefore answer the certified questions as set forth above.

Ca,
Parraguirre
We concur:

tMartot,

Hardesty

Sail

Gibbons

L J.
Pickering

"While some jurisdictions have adopted the theory that a person has
“quasi-property” right to a deceased human body or its remains for
burial purposes, most of those jurisdictions have refused to apply that
theory to support a claim for conversion of a deceased human body or its
parts. See, ¢.g., Colavito v. New York Organ Donor Network, Inc., 356 F.
Supp. 2d 237, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Bauer v, North Fulton Medical Center,
527 S.E.2d 240, 244 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).