Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: LARRY MICHAEL JOHNSON, Deceased. KELLIANN JOHNSON V. LARRY M. JOHNSON

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:  LARRY MICHAEL JOHNSON, Deceased. KELLIANN JOHNSON V. LARRY M. JOHNSON2010 WY 63231 P.3d 873Case Number: S-09-0040Decided: 05/18/2010
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:  LARRY 
MICHAEL JOHNSON, Deceased. 

 
KELLIANN 
JOHNSON,

Appellant

(Respondent),

 
 
v.

 
 
LARRY 
M. JOHNSON,

 
 
Appellee

(Petitioner).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Uinta County

The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Matthew 
A. Bartlett of Bartlett & Webster, Riverdale, Utah. 

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

V. 
Anthony Vehar of Vehar Law Offices, P.C., Evanston, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
C.J., delivers the opinion of the Court; HILL, J., files a dissenting opinion, 
in which GOLDEN, J., joins.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from a probate court order denying the petition of a decedent's wife (Wife) to 
revoke the appointment of the decedent's father (Father) as personal 
representative of the decedent for the filing of a wrongful death claim.  Finding procedural error and an abuse of 
discretion in the denial of the petition, we reverse and remand for dismissal of 
the probate proceedings, and for such other and further proceedings that may be 
pursued by the parties.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]      
1.   Does Wife have standing to 
challenge the appointment of Father as personal representative of the decedent 
to file a wrongful death claim?

 
 
            
2.   Does the probate 
code govern appointment of a personal representative under the wrongful death 
act?

 
 
            
3.   If the probate code 
does not govern appointment of a personal representative under the wrongful 
death act, what does govern such appointment?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Larry Johnson 
(the decedent) died on March 10, 2008.  On September 18, 2008, Father petitioned 
the probate court to be appointed as the decedent's personal representative for 
the purpose of filing a wrongful death claim.  The probate court granted Father's 
petition by an order entered on September 22, 2008.  Wife filed a petition seeking revocation 
of that appointment on October 15, 2008.  The probate court heard Wife's petition 
on November 25, 2008, and denied it by an order entered on January 6, 
2009.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Does 
Wife have standing to challenge the appointmentof Father as personal 
representative of the decedentto file a wrongful death 
claim?

 
 
[¶4]      Father did not 
raise below the question of whether Wife has standing to challenge his 
appointment as personal representative.  
Standing, however, is a jurisdictional issue, and it may be raised at any 
time.  Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. 
Gunter, 2007 WY 151, ¶ 10, 
167 P.3d 645, 649 (Wyo. 2007); 
Hicks v. Dowd, 2007 WY 74, ¶ 18, 157 P.3d 914, 918 
(Wyo. 2007).

 
 
            
"Standing" is short for "standing to sue," which requires a "legally 
protectable and tangible interest at stake in the litigation."  Olsten Staffing Servs., Inc. v. D.A. Stinger 
Servs., Inc., 921 P.2d 596, 
599 (Wyo. 1996) (quoting Black's Law 
Dictionary 1405 (6th ed. 1990)).  
The phrase "tangible interest" has been equated with the phrase "personal 
stake in the outcome."  Goshen Irrigation Dist. v. Wyo. State Bd. of 
Control, 926 P.2d 943, 947 
(Wyo. 1996); State ex rel. Bayou Liquors, 
Inc. v. City of Casper, 906 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Wyo. 1995).  
The person alleging standing must show a "perceptible," rather than a 
"speculative" harm from the action; a remote possibility of injury is not 
sufficient to confer standing.  Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Wyo. PSC, 2003 WY 22, ¶ 13, 63 P.3d 887, 894-95 (Wyo. 
2003).

 
 

Halliburton, 
2007 WY 151, ¶ 11, 167 P.3d  at 
649.  The question of standing is a 
legal issue that we review de 
novo.  Northfork Citizens for Responsible Dev. v. 
Park County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2008 WY 88, ¶ 6, 189 P.3d 260, 262 (Wyo. 2008); Halliburton, 2007 WY 151, ¶ 10, 167 P.3d  at 
649.

 
 
[¶5]      Father declares 
that Wife lacks standing to bring this appeal because Wife cannot prove that she 
will suffer any harm from Father's appointment as personal representative.  Although we have said that "perceptible 
harm" is an aspect of the concept of standing, we have also used the phrases 
"personal stake in the outcome" and "tangible interest" in describing 
standing.  Jolley v. State Loan & Inv. Bd., 2002 WY 7, ¶ 6, 38 P.3d 1073, 1076 (Wyo. 
2002).  Under those standards, we 
have no trouble declaring that Wife has standing to challenge Father's 
appointment.  Wife is not only, 
herself, a potential personal representative and claimant under the wrongful 
death act, and in first priority as a probate administratora factor that will 
be discussed in more detail belowbut she is also the mother of the decedent's 
two daughters, who also are likely claimants under the wrongful death act.  Given the complexities of a wrongful 
death action, and given the factalso to be discussed in more detail belowthat 
the personal representative under the wrongful death act acts as a trustee for 
the claimants, Wife certainly has a tangible interest in the determination of 
who will act as personal representative, and she has a personal stake in the 
outcome of the petition contest.

 
 
Does 
the probate code govern appointment of a personal representative under the 
wrongful death act?

 
 
[¶6]      It is necessary 
at the outset of this discussion to identify the statutes that underlie the 
dispute.  Title 2 of the Wyoming 
Statutes is entitled "Wills, Decedents' Estates and Probate Code."  Chapter 4 of Title 2, entitled 
"Intestate Succession," provides the procedures for the administration of the 
estates of those who die without providing for the distribution of their 
property via a will.  Because those 
who die intestate have not "made a will," neither have they named an executor to 
administer their estate.  
Consequently, the legislature has provided a process for the appointment 
of the administrator of an intestate estate.  As part of that process, Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2-4-201(a) (LexisNexis 2009) sets forth the order of preference the probate 
court is to follow in selecting the administrator:

 
 
            
(a)       
Administration of the estate of a person dying intestate shall be granted 
to one (1) or more of the persons mentioned in this section.  The relatives of the deceased are 
entitled to administer only when they are entitled to succeed to his personal 
estate or some portion thereof.  
They are entitled to administer in the following 
order:

 
 
(i)         
The surviving husband or wife, or some competent person whom he or she 
may request to have appointed;

 
 
(ii)        The 
children;

 
 
(iii)       The father 
or mother;

 
 
(iv)       The 
brothers or sisters;

 
 
(v)        
Repealed by Laws 1987, ch. 129, §§ 1, 2;

 
 
(vi)       The 
grandchildren;

 
 
(vii)      The next of kin 
entitled to share in the distribution of the estate;

 
 
(viii)     The 
creditors;

 
 
(ix)       Any person 
legally competent.

 
 
[¶7]      The other 
legislative act that lies at the heart of this dispute is the wrongful death 
act, found not in the probate code, but in the civil code at Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
1-38-101 and 102 (LexisNexis 2009).  
The wrongful death act provides in relevant part as 
follows:

 
 
§ 
1-38-101.  Actions for wrongful 
death which survive; proceedings against executor or administrator of person 
liable.

 
 
            
Whenever the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect or 
default such as would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action to 
recover damages if death had not ensued, the person who would have been liable 
if death had not ensued is liable in an action for damages . . . 
.

 
 
§ 
1-38-102. Action to be brought by personal representative; recovery exempt from 
debts; measure and element of damages; limitation of 
action.

 
 
(a)    Every such action shall be 
brought by and in the name of the personal representative of the deceased 
person.

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
(c)     The court or jury, as 
the case may be, in every such action may award such damages, pecuniary and 
exemplary, as shall be deemed fair and just.  Every person for whose benefit such 
action is brought may prove his respective damages, and the court or jury may 
award such person that amount of damages to which it considers such person 
entitled, including damages for loss of probable future companionship, society 
and comfort.

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
[¶8]      Inasmuch as this 
issue involves the intention of the wrongful death statute, we shall apply our 
customary standard of review:

 
 
In 
interpreting statutes, our primary consideration is to determine the 
legislature's intent.  All statutes 
must be construed in pari materia 
and, in ascertaining the meaning of a given law, all statutes relating to the 
same subject or having the same general purpose must be considered and construed 
in harmony.  Statutory construction 
is a question of law, so our standard of review is de novo.  We endeavor to interpret statutes in 
accordance with the legislature's intent.  
We begin by making an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning 
of the words employed according to their arrangement and connection.  We construe the statute as a whole, 
giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe all parts of 
the statue in pari materia.  When a statute is sufficiently clear and 
unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words and 
do not resort to the rules of statutory construction.  Wyoming Board of Outfitters and Professional 
Guides v. Clark, 2001 WY 78, 
¶ 12, 30 P.3d 36, [41] (Wyo. 
2001); Murphy v. State Canvassing 
Board, 12 P.3d 677, 679 (Wyo. 2000).  
Moreover, we must not give a statute a meaning that will nullify its 
operation if it is susceptible of another interpretation.  Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 413 (Wyo. 1990) 
(citing McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278, 1283 (Wyo. 1980)).

 
 
            
Moreover, we will not enlarge, stretch, expand, or extend a statute to 
matters that do not fall within its express provisions.  Gray v. Stratton Real Estate, 2001 WY 125, ¶ 5, 36 P.3d 1127, [1128] (Wyo. 2001); 
Bowen v. State, Wyoming Real Estate 
Commission, 900 P.2d 1140, 
1143 (Wyo. 1995).

 
 

Loberg 
v. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 
2004 WY 48, ¶ 5, 88 P.3d 1045, [1048] (Wyo. 2004) 
(quoting Board of County Comm'rs of Teton 
County v. Crow, 2003 WY 40, 
¶¶ 40-41, 65 P.3d 720, 
[733-34] (Wyo. 2003)).  Only if we 
determine the language of a statute is ambiguous will we proceed to the next 
step, which involves applying general principles of statutory construction to 
the language of the statute in order to construe any ambiguous language to 
accurately reflect the intent of the legislature.  If this Court determines that the 
language of the statute is not ambiguous, there is no room for further 
construction.  We will apply the 
language of the statute using its ordinary and obvious 
meaning.

 
 

BP 
Am. Prod. Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 
2005 WY 60, ¶ 15, 112 P.3d 596, 604 (Wyo. 
2005).

 
 
[¶9]      The brevity of 
the wrongful death act has left it open over the years to judicial 
interpretation, and that interpretation has not always been entirely 
consistent.  See Grant Harvey Lawson,  Reconciling the Wyoming Wrongful Death Act 
with the Wyoming Probate Code:  The 
Legislature's Wake-up Call for Clarification, 7 Wyo. L. Rev. 409 
(2007).  Contributing to that 
confusion has been the transfer of the wrongful death act back and forth between 
the civil code and the probate code.  
See 1982 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 
54, § 7 [at 94]; 1980 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 54, § 1 [at 370-71]; 1977 Wyo. Sess. 
Laws, ch. 188, § 1 [at 916].  Rather 
than recite all the iterations and reiterations of our jurisprudence in regard 
to this issue, we will simply make some observations about the law that should 
help to show its present status and to illuminate the distinctions between the 
wrongful death act and the intestate succession statutes.

 
 
[¶10]   Of primary significance is that the 
separate purposes of the two statutes are entirely distinct.  Although the following commentary 
relates to statutory intestate descent and distribution priorities, as opposed 
to statutory intestate administrator priorities, the rationale also fits the 
latter:

 
 
            
The purpose of a statute of descent and distribution is to provide for 
the transmission of title to property upon the death of the owner intestate and 
to regulate the division of estates among heirs according to principles of 
equality and equity.  The passing of 
property upon intestacy is pursuant to a statutory will, which determines the 
property passing as well as the identity of the recipients, and which is 
considered to be such a distribution as the intestate presumably would have made 
if he or she had made a will.  The 
general policy is to follow the lead of the natural affections and to consider 
as most worthy the claims of those who stand nearest to the affections of the 
intestate. . . .

 
 
23 
Am. Jur. 2d Descent and Distribution 
§ 4 (2002) (footnotes omitted).  In 
other words, the purpose of an intestate succession statute is to provide for 
distribution of a decedent's estate in a manner that, in all likelihood, 
emulates the distribution that would have been chosen by the 
decedent.

 
 
[¶11]   We have identified an altogether 
different purpose for the legislature's adoption of the wrongful death 
act:

 
 
            
The purpose of the Wrongful Death Act, "commonly known as Lord Campbell's 
Act, was to prescribe limitations and a remedy for a cause of action which did 
not exist at common law, for at common law the cause of action died with the 
death of the claimant."  Gengo v. Mardis, 103 Neb. 164, 170 N.W. 841 (1919).  Wyoming adopted the 
wrongful death act in 1871.  Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, 43 Wyo. 
298, 305, 3 P.2d 105, 106 
(1931).  The act was similar to Lord 
Campbell's Act and was almost an exact copy of West Virginia's wrongful death 
law.  Id.  "In the wrongful death statute, the 
Wyoming legislature has expressed a social policy that favors compensation to 
ameliorate the certain damage to relational interests resulting from the death 
of a family member."  Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell County Joint 
Powers Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171, 1175 (Wyo. 1990).

 
 

Corkill 
v. Knowles, 
955 P.2d 438, 441 (Wyo. 
1998).

 
 
[¶12]   In several cases, this Court has 
revisited the distinction between these two statutory constructs.  For instance, in Jordan v. Delta Drilling Co., 541 P.2d 39, 42 (Wyo. 1975) 
(footnote omitted), overruled on other 
grounds by Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055, 1062 (Wyo. 1984), we 
said the following:

 
 
            
We see no mandate from the legislature that because an administrator is 
appointed [under the wrongful death act] that this means only heirs may be 
beneficiaries to the proceeds derived as a result of the action.  The administrator acts but in the 
capacity of a trustee.  Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, 1931, 43 
Wyo. 298, 3 P.2d 105.  The Wyoming statute authorizing wrongful 
death actions is part of the civil code of this state and not a part of the 
probate code.  The designation of an 
administrator is no more than a statutory device to provide a party for a civil 
action to collect damages and pay them over to the persons entitled.  As said in Ashley v. Read Construction Co., D.C. 
Wyo., 1961, 195 F. Supp. 727, 729, "We must not confuse an administrator acting 
as a personal representative with an administrator of an estate whose 
duties and powers are set out in [the probate code].  * * *"  The amount of recovery does not become a 
part of the decedent's estate.  Tuttle v. Short, 1930, 42 Wyo. 1, 18, 288 P. 524, 529, 70 A.L.R. 106, 
112.  This is true even though the 
administrator or executor must bring the action.  Bircher v. Foster, Wyo. 1963, 378 P.2d 901, 
902.

 
 

See 
also DeHerrera v. Herrera, 
565 P.2d 479, 482 (Wyo. 
1977).

 
 

[¶13]   The central theme of these cases is 
that an intestate estate probate code administrator and a wrongful death action 
civil code personal representative have different functions and different 
duties, and that there is not, and should not be, any necessary connection 
between them.  Unfortunately, in Bircher v. Foster, 378 P.2d 901, 902 (Wyo. 1963), 
while acknowledging that the wrongful death act then in effect "is anomalous in 
some respects and leaves certain unanswered questions," this Court held that 
"the only person who could bring an action for wrongful death was the personal 
representative of the deceased, the 
executor or administrator of decedent's estate."  (Emphasis added.)  We went even further and announced that 
"there is no authority in this State either by statute or decision whereby a 
district court, unless sitting in probate, would be authorized to appoint a 
father as the personal representative of a deceased son for the purposes of a 
death action."  Id. at 903.

 
 
[¶14]   Although Bircher may have been a viable 
construction of the statutes as they stood at that time, it is now clear that a 
wrongful death action is not to be processed under the probate code, but rather 
is to be processed just like any other civil action.  Bircher is overruled prospectively to 
the extent that it requires a wrongful death action to be brought in probate 
court, and to the extent that it requires a wrongful death personal 
representative to be the administrator or executor of the decedent's estate in 
probate.1  In reaching those conclusions, we find 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-38-102(a) to be unambiguous.  The statute, which is part of the civil 
code and which serves a purpose unlike the purposes of the probate code, 
requires wrongful death claims to be brought by one person, called a personal 
representative of the deceased person, rather than by the multitude of persons 
who may be claimants under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-38-102(c).  The logical inference incorporated into 
the statutory language, in order to apply the most reasonable intent to the 
words used, is that the district court, at the outset of a wrongful death 
action, must appoint the personal representative in whose name the complaint 
will be filed.  There is no 
ambiguity within the statute; it is the attempt to incorporate probate code 
concepts into the statute that potentially creates an ambiguity.2

 
 
[¶15]   We must keep in mind the 
appropriate role of this Court in interpreting statutes.  In addition to the general rules of 
statutory construction set forth above (see supra ¶ 8), we note the particular 
admonition that "[w]e will not insert language into the statutes that the 
legislature omitted."  Merrill v. Jansma, 2004 WY 26, ¶ 29, 86 P.3d 270, 285 
(Wyo. 2004).  Long ago, the federal 
district court for the District of Wyoming followed that very precept in holding 
that, inasmuch as Wyoming's wrongful death act does not require the personal 
representative to be a resident of Wyoming, it was not up to the courts to 
insert that requirement.  Ashley v. Read Constr. Co., 195 F. Supp. 727, 729 (Wyo. 1961).  Today, we 
merely expand upon that observation by holding that, inasmuch as Wyoming's 
wrongful death act does not require the personal representative to be the 
probate estate's administrator or executor, it is not up to this Court to insert 
that requirement.  We reiterate, 
perhaps unnecessarily, that a reasonable reading of the wrongful death act does 
not require incorporation of probate code concepts.  A wrongful death action may be 
appropriate even in circumstances where there is no reason whatever to establish 
a probate, testate or intestate.  
There may be no estate to probate, despite the need for a wrongful death 
personal representative.  In that 
situation, it would be absurd to open a probate, and we ascribe to legislation 
reasonable, rather than absurd or futile intent.  Hede v. Gilstrap, 2005 WY 24, ¶ 6, 107 P.3d 158, 163 
(Wyo. 2005); Bd. of County Comm'rs of 
County of Laramie v. City of Cheyenne, 2004 WY 16, ¶ 27, 85 P.3d 999, 1007 (Wyo. 
2004).

 
 
[¶16]   Interestingly enough, the district 
court came to this same conclusionthat the appointment of a wrongful death act 
personal representative had nothing to do with the appointment of an executor or 
administrator under the probate codeand he denied Wife's petition primarily on 
the ground that, with no applicable probate code preference for Wife's 
appointment under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-38-102(a), Father could continue to serve 
as the personal representative.  
Having correctly determined that the wrongful death act appointment of a 
personal representative was not the appointment of a probate code estate 
administrator, the district court should have dismissed this probate code 
action, and should not have allowed Father's appointment to 
stand.

 

If 
the probate code does not govern appointment of a personal representative under 
the wrongful death act, what does govern such 
appointment?

 
 
[¶17]   A significant problem with this 
case as it presently exists is that, after  
"[f]inding no statute or persuasive authority stating exactly whom must 
be appointed to be the personal representative of the decedent for purpose of 
bringing a wrongful death claim on behalf of the wrongful death claimants," the 
district court applied no criteria of any kind to the appointment.  The appointment of a personal 
representative is a discretionary act, which discretion should be informed by a 
review of the purposes of the statute, and by a review of the qualifications of 
the petitioner in relation to those purposes.  In particular, because the personal 
representative will act as a trustee on behalf of the beneficiaries, inquiry 
should be made into the relationship of the petitioner to the 
beneficiaries.  The timeliness of 
the filing of a petition for appointment, or the filing of a petition contesting 
that appointment, should be considered, especially given the relatively short 
period of limitations established within the wrongful death 
act.

 
 
[¶18]   Even though it is not controlling, 
one of the factors the district court should consider, particularly if the 
proposed appointment is contested, is the priority list contained in Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 2-4-201(a).  See Halliburton, 2007 WY 151, ¶ 8 n.2, 167 P.3d  at 
649 n.2.  That statutory list 
reflects legislative policy as to the order of significant human relationships, 
and as such, it is a useful tool in considering suitability to act as personal 
representative.  Because the filing 
of a wrongful death action presupposes that the personal representative intends 
to pursue a civil action against the alleged wrongdoer, the district court 
should also consider the petitioner's financial and physical ability to do so, 
his or her geographic location, his or her intentions in regard to legal 
representation, and his or her stake in the outcome.  Given the potential in a wrongful death 
action that a multitude of claimants may be coupled with a limited damages 
recovery, the issue of family harmony or disharmony may likewise be important in 
the selection of a personal representative.

 
 
[¶19]   In many recent cases, we have 
discussed judicial discretion and its abuse in the following 
terms:

 
 
            
"We recently clarified the definition of abuse of discretion when we said 
the core of our inquiry must reach the question of reasonableness of the choice 
made by the trial court.'  Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998).  Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means 
a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.' Id. (quoting Byerly v. Madsen, 41 Wash. App. 495, 704 P.2d 1236, 1238 (Wash. App. 1985)); Basolo [v. Basolo], 907 P.2d [348,] 353 [(Wyo. 
1995)].  We must ask ourselves 
whether the district court could reasonably conclude as it did and whether any 
facet of its ruling was arbitrary or capricious."

 
 

Cobb 
v. Cobb, 
2 P.3d 578, 579 (Wyo. 2000) 
(quoting Thomas v. Thomas, 983 P.2d 717, 719 (Wyo. 
1999)).

 
 

MAM 
v. State Dep't of Family Servs., 
2004 WY 127, ¶ 10, 99 P.3d 982, 984 (Wyo. 2004).  In exercising its discretion, the 
district court must determine each case on its peculiar facts, and must consider 
all of the circumstances before it.  Shepard v. State, 720 P.2d 904, 905 (Wyo. 1986); Gale v. State, 792 P.2d 570, 601 (Wyo. 1990) 
(Urbigkit, J., dissenting).  A 
failure to consider alternatives is a failure to exercise discretion, and is, 
therefore, an abuse of discretion.  
Carroll v. Law, 2005 WY 44, ¶ 6, 109 P.3d 544, 546 
(Wyo. 2005); Steele v. Steele, 2005 WY 33, ¶ 11, 108 P.3d 844, 848 (Wyo. 2005); Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986).  Therein lies the rub in the instant 
case:  the district court abused its 
discretion by not exercising it.

 
 
[¶20]   The only test of who is appointed 
as personal representative, despite the lack of guidance within the wrongful 
death act, cannot simply be who first gets to the courthouse.  There is some hint in the record that 
just such a race occurred in this case.  
In her petition, Wife alleges that Father did not provide her notice of 
the filing of his petition.  Upon 
remand, the district court should consider that lack of notice, if it is true, 
and the reason for it, as another factor in making the appointment.  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶21]   Wife has standing to contest the 
appointment of Father as personal representative of the decedent under the 
wrongful death act because she has a tangible interest in and a personal stake 
in the outcome of the action.  A 
personal representative under the wrongful death act should be appointed by the 
district court within that action, rather than in a separate probate 
action.  In making that appointment, 
the district court should consider the functions and purposes of the wrongful 
death act in light of the facts and circumstances relating to the petitioner and 
anyone contesting the appointment.

 
 
[¶22]   Reversed and remanded for dismissal 
of the probate code action and for such other and further proceedings that may 
be pursued by the parties.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice, 
dissenting, with whom GOLDEN, 
Justice, 
joins.

 
 
[¶23]   I respectfully dissent.  For so long as the wrongful death 
statute has existed in this state, there can be no legitimate doubt or 
ambiguity, whatsoever, that by its use of the phrase "personal representative," 
the legislature intended that it have the same meaning as that expressed in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 2-4-201:

 
 
§ 
2-4-201. Persons entitled to administer.

 
 
            
(a) Administration of the estate of a person dying intestate 
shall be granted to one (1) or more of the persons mentioned in this 
section.  The relatives of the 
deceased are entitled to administer only when they are entitled to succeed to 
his personal estate or some portion thereof.  They are entitled to administer in 
the following order:

(i) 
The surviving husband or wife, or some competent person whom he or she may 
request to have appointed;

                        
(ii) The children;

                        
(iii) The father or mother;

                        
(iv) The brothers or sisters;

            
(v) Repealed by Laws 1987, ch. 129, §§ 1, 2.

                        
(vi) The grandchildren;

            
(vii) The next of kin entitled to share in the distribution of the 
estate;

                        
(viii) The creditors;

                        
(ix) Any person legally competent.  
[Emphasis added.]

 
 

[¶24]   For 
the first 100 years of its life in the Wyoming Statutes, the wrongful death 
statute used this language:

 
 
Every 
such wrongful death action shall be brought by and in the name of the personal 
representative of the deceased person; and the amount recovered shall be 
distributed to the parties in the proportions provided by law, in relation to 
the distribution of personal estates left by persons dying 
intestate.

 
 
Compiled 
Laws of Wyoming 1876, ch. 39, § 2; Rev. Statutes 1887, § 2364; Rev. 
Statutes 1899, § 3449; 1909 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 3, § 1; Wyoming 
Compiled Statutes 1910, § 4292; Wyoming Compiled Statutes 1920, 
§ 5561; Rev. Statutes 1931, § 89-404; 1939 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 104, 
§ 1; Wyoming Compiled Statutes 1945, § 3-404; 1947 Wyo. Sess. Laws, 
ch. 132 § 1, Wyo. Stat. 1957, § 1-1066; 1973 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 139, § 
1.

 
 
[¶25]   The statutes as they now appear 
first show up in 1977.  1977 Wyo. 
Sess. Laws, ch. 188, § 1 at 916.  
In 1980 those statutes were moved to Title 2 (Probate Code).  Wyo. Stat. §§ 2-14-201 and 202, 
1980 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 54, sub-chapter 14, Article 1 at 370-71.  In 1982, they were removed from the 
Probate Code and put back into the place where they are found today.  1982 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 54, 
§ 7.  The apparent reason for 
that quick about-face is the presence of the statutory provision making the 
award of damages in a wrongful death suit immune from claims of creditors under 
the Probate Code.  Perhaps, the 
above history serves to explain some of the problems and unnecessary 
complexities that have arisen over the years.  Grant Harvey Lawson, Reconciling the Wyoming Wrongful Death Act 
with the Wyoming Probate Code:  The 
Legislature's Wake-up Call for Clarification, 7 Wyo. L. Rev. 409 
(2007).

 
 
[¶26]   However, the mere fact that 
confusion in this regard has been created, where none rightfully exists, does 
not justify applying rules of statutory construction to dilute what the 
legislature clearly intended by "personal representative:"

 
 
Each 
word of a statute is to be afforded meaning, with none rendered 
superfluous.  Jessen v. Burry, 13 P.3d 1118, 1120 (Wyo. 
2000).  Further, the meaning 
afforded to a word should be that word's standard popular meaning unless another 
meaning is clearly intended.  Soles v. State, 809 P.2d 772, 773 (Wyo.1991).  If the meaning of a word is unclear, it 
should be afforded the meaning that best accomplishes the statute's 
purpose.  Radalj v. Union Savings & Loan 
Ass'n, 59 Wyo. 140, 138 P.2d 984, 996 (1943).  

 
 

In 
re MN, 
2007 WY 189, ¶ 4, 171 P.3d 1077, 1080 (Wyo. 
2007).  The phrase "personal 
representative" is used several times in Title 1 of Wyoming Statutes Annotated 
and elsewhere throughout the statutes, as well.  In all instances, except a limited few, 
its meaning can be readily traced to § 2-4-201(a) (see Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 9-1-103, 9-1-207(b), and 17-16-850 for the 
exceptions).

 
 
[¶27]   Instead of accepting the meaning 
that is clearly intended by the governing statute, the majority would turn the 
appointment of the "personal representative," in a wrongful death case, over to 
the broad discretion of the district court, which essentially means that the 
statutory priority generally accorded to a spouse (or spouse's designee) 
disappears.  The rule that I espouse 
in this dissent is the most reasonable and rational resolution available to this 
Court.  In support of that 
proposition, I refer the Court to 22A Am. Jur. 2d Death § 81 (2003):

 
 
            
According to the provisions of many wrongful-death statutes, the persons 
for whose benefit the action may be maintained are divided into classes based on 
their natural dependency on the deceased.  
The right of action inures for the benefit of the first preferred class, 
if there are in existence any beneficiaries belonging to that class, and, if 
there are none, then for the benefit of the class next in line of 
preference.

 
 
            
Generally, the surviving spouse and children are the first preferred, 
then follow the parents and siblings.

 
 
            
The laws of intestacy, as set forth in a probate act, may be the means 
for identifying the class of eligible beneficiaries to wrongful-death 
awards.

 
 
[¶28]   The majority opinion misuses the 
applicable rules of statutory construction so as to perpetuate irrational 
"complexities" and to create new "ambiguities" where none exist.  Of greater significance to the instant 
facts, it deprives the surviving spouse of her "entitlement" to serve as the 
personal representative in this wrongful death action.  I recognize that there may be 
circumstances where the surviving spouse should be disentitled from serving as 
personal representative (e.g., is not mentally competent), but that is a matter 
to be called to the attention of the district court in a timely and appropriate 
manner.  In this case, Father has 
had three opportunities to raise any issues with respect to Wife's "entitlement" 
to serve.  In his initial petition 
he makes no mention of Wife, other than to include her name as fifth in line as 
an heir.  In that same petition, 
Father made no mention of his relationship to the deceased, but apparently that 
was "divined" from sources extraneous to the court record.  In his reply to Wife's petition to be 
substituted for Father as personal representative, Father makes no mention of, 
nor does he state a basis for, Wife's disqualification.  In addition, no ground for disqualifying 
Wife was urged at the hearing into Wife's petition and Father's objections 
thereto.  I can see no reason why 
this Court should allow Father a fourth opportunity to attempt to deprive Wife 
of her statutory entitlement. 

 
 

[¶29]   I would remand this matter to the 
district court, with directions that Wife be substituted for Father as the 
personal representative in the wrongful death action.  Such a substitution would have no effect 
on the applicable statute of limitations. 
See generally Chavez v. Regents of the 
University of New Mexico, 103 N.M. 606, 1985 N.M. Lexis 2088, 711 P.2d 883 (1985) (where wrongful 
death action is filed by a person other than the personal representative within 
the statute of limitations, the failure to appoint a personal representative 
prior to the running of the limitations period does not bar the suit); Nickay 
Bouchard, Necessity of the Personal 
Representative Status in Wrongful Death Actions: Fact or Fiction?, 17 N.M. 
L. Rev. 377 (1987) (better practice is to obtain personal representative's 
appointment before limitations period expires).

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1In 
1963, when Bircher issued, there was 
a connection within the wrongful death act to the intestacy 
statutes:

 
 
            
Every such action shall be brought by, and in the name of, the personal 
representative of such deceased person; and the amount received in every such 
action shall be distributed to the parties and in the proportions provided by 
law, in relation to the distribution of personal estates left by persons dying 
intestate. . . .

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-1066 (Michie 1957).

 
 

2We 
have focused our attention in this case upon concepts of intestate succession 
because the decedent in this case died intestate, and because many of the cases 
that previously have reviewed this statute have applied intestacy concepts to 
the question of who has a right to be a beneficiary under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1-38-102(c).  If probate code 
appointment procedures applied to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-38-102, however, there is 
no reason that those procedures would not also include executors performing in 
testate estates.