Title: ANDERSON v BAKER

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

; ; 4 h p s ~ ~UPREL~IE COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA PATSY JEAN ANDERSON, a s Personal k e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e E s t a t e of ?IARIE S A N D E R S , deceased, P l a i n t i f f , Cross-Appellant, and Respondent, LEO B . 3AKERr Defendant, C S O S ~ - A P P ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ , and Respondent. MAR 2 1 1982 - - O R D E R OF SUPREME COURT -- PER CUR1A:II: P a t s y Jean Anderson, a s p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e e s t a t e of Marie Sanders, deceased, t h e p l a i n t i f f , c r o s s - a p p e l l a n t and respondent, has f i l e d h e r e i n a p e t i t i o n f o r r e h e a r i n g . Leo B. Baker, d e f e n d a n t , c r o s s - a p p e l l a n t , and respondent has f i l e d o b j e c t i o n s t h e r e t o . The Court h a s examined and considered t h e same. I T I S ORDERED: 1. The f i n a l paragraph of t h e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n I appearing on page 280 of 39 S t a t e R e p o r t e r , is s t r i c k e n and t h e f o l l o w i n g paragraph s u b s t i t u t e d t h e r e f o r : "Reversed and remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r e n t r y . of judgment f o r p l a i n t i f f and c r o s s - a p p e l l a n t Anderson i n t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 2 6 , 1 8 2 . 3 5 p l u s accrued i n t e r e s t on t h e two c e r t i f i c a t e s of d e p o s i t and s a v i n g s account from J u l y 30, 1978 t o November 30, 1 9 7 8 , t o bo c a l c u l a t e d by t h e D i s t r i c t Court, t o g e t h e r g i t h i n t e r e s t a t t h e s t a t u t o r y r a t e on t h e foregoing t o t a l sum from November 30, 1.978 t o d a t e of judgment, and c o s t s . " 2. A s so modified, t h e p e t i t i o n f o r r e h e a r i n g is a e i l l e d . 3. i'he C?err< 1s clirecteci t o 111ail t r u e c o p y o f t h i s o r d e r t o c o u n s e l o f r e c o r d f o r t h e r e s p e c t i v e p a r t i e s and t o t h e C l e r ~ o f t n e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l Districtl of t h e S t a t e o f Montana, i n and f o r t h e C o u n t y o f Y e l l o w s t o n e . DATED t n i s d a y of March, 1 9 8 2 . 2 4 A d . S k . . d 4 C h i e f J u s t i c e Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n C. Sileehy and Mr. J u s t i c e F r a n k £3. M o r r i s o n , J r . , d o n o t j o i n i n t h i s o r d e r . No. 80-420 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1982 PATSY JEAN ANDERSON, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Marie Sanders, Deceased, Plaintiff, Cross-Appellant and Respondent, -vs- LEO B. BAKER, Defendant, Cross-Appellant and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Yellowst~ne, The Honorable William J. Speare, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Plaintiff, Cross-Appellant and Respondent: Holmstrom, Dunaway & West, Billings, Montana Vicki Dunaway argued, Billings, Montana For Defendant, Cross-Appellant and Respondent: Hauf.and Forsythe, Billings, Montana John Hauf argued, Billings, Montana Submitted: November 30, 1981 ~ecided :fEe j I gpl . . Clerk' M r . Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. H a s w e l l d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . T h i s is an a p p e a l and cross-appeal from a summary judgment i n a claim and d e l i v e r y a c t i o n . The D i s t r i c t Court of Yellowstone County awarded each p a r t y one-half of t.he m n i e s i n a s a v i n g s account and two c e r t i f i c a t e s of d e p o s i t i n a s a v i n g s and l o a n a s s o c i a t i o n . W e r e v e r s e . The u n c o n t r a d i c t e d f a c t s d i s c l o s e t h a t Marie S a n d e r s , who l i v e d on a farm n e a r B a l l a n t i n e , Montana, opened a s a v i n g s a c c o u n t and two c e r t i f i c a t e s of d e p o s i t i n 1972 and 1974 a t S e c u r i t y F e d e r a l S a v i n g s and Loan i n B i l l i n g s , Montana. On October 28, 1975, t h e name of h e r s o n , Leo B. Baker, who was buying t h e farm from S a n d e r s , was added a s a j o i n t tenant. t o t h e t h r e e a c c o u n t s which, by J u l y 30, 1978, ( t h r o u g h v a r i o u s d e p o s i t s and i n t e r e s t a c c u m u l a t i o n ) had come to total $26,182.35. The s i g n a t u r e c a r d s f o r t h e t h r e e a c c o u n t s , signed by Baker and S a n d e r s c o n t a i n e d t h e f o l l o w i n g language: " . . . It is agreed by t h e s i g n a t o r y p a r t i e s w i t h each o t h e r and by t h e p a r t i e s w i t h t h e A s s o c i a t i o n t h a t any funds placed i n o r added to t h e account by any one of t h e p a r t i e s is and s h a l l be c o n c l u s i v e l y intended t o be a g i f t and d e l i v e r y a t t h a t t i m e of such funds t o t h e s i g n a t o r y p a r t y o r p a r t i e s t o t h e extent. of h i s or t h e i r p r o r a t a i n t e r e s t i n t h e a c c o u n t ." The f a c t s i n d i c a t e t h a t Mrs. Sanders d i d n o t intend to g i f t any p o r t i o n of t h e s a v i n g s a c c o u n t s to Baker and t h a t h i s name w a s p l a c e d on t h e account so he could withdraw money f o r h e r e x p e n s e s , i f needed. A l s o , a bank o f f i c e r ' s af f i d a v i t i n d i c a t e d t h a t i n 1978, t h r e e y e a r s a f t e r B a k e r ' s name had been placed on t h e a c c o u n t s , Baker t o l d t.he o f f i c e r t h a t t h e funds i n t h e a c c o u n t s belonged t o h i s mother and were n o t h i s money. I n 1975, Mrs. Sanders gave t h e passbook and c e r t i f i c a t e s t o Baker. In May, 1978, M r s . Sanders was h o s p i t a l i z e d f o r about a week i n B i l l i n g s , Montana, a t which time h e r g r a n d d a u g h t e r , P a t s y J e a n Anderson, came from Arizona to v i s i t h e r . In e a r l y J u n e , a f t e r Mrs. Sanders had been r e l e a s e d from t h e h o s p i t a l she went t o Arizona t o see h e r g r a n d d a u g h t e r . On J u n e 29, 1978, Mrs. Sanders executed h e r w i l l , g i v i n g t h e b u l k of h e r estate to Anderson ( e x c e p t f o r a few c a s h b e q u e s t s ) and named Anderson as h e r p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . On J u l y 7, S a n d e r s , through h e r a t t o r n e y i n B i l l i n g s , made a w r i t t e n demand on Baker f o r t h e r e t u r n of t h e passbook and c e r t i f i c a t e s so s h e could withdraw t h e money. Baker r e f u s e d and on August 3, 1978, Sanders f i l e d t h e i n s t a n t s u i t f o r t h e i r r e t u r n . Thus Marie S a n d e r s commenced t h i s a c t i o n on August 3, 1978, a l l e g i n g t h a t h e r son, Leo Baker, was w r o n g f u l l y r e t a i n i n g t h e two c e r t i f i c a t e s of d e p o s i t and passbook. She asked f o r t h e i r r e t u r n and t h a t B a k e r ' s name be removed therefrom. In t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , s h e asked f o r t h e t o t a l sum of $26,182.35 i n damages, i f t h e c e r t i f i c a t e s of d e p o s i t and passbook were not r e t u r n e d . Baker f i l e d an answer on October 20, a s s e r t i n g t h a t he had t h e r i g h t to r e t a i n t h e c e r t i f i c a t e s of d e p o s i t and passbook and f u r t h e r a l l e g i n g t h a t Sanders was incompetent and a c t i n g under c o e r c i o n and undue i n f l u e n c e . O n November 18, 1978, M r s . Sanders d i e d i n Arizona and on November 30, Baker withdrew a l l t h e money from t h e t h r e e a c c o u n t s . Af t e r S a n d e r s d e a t h t h e p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , P a t s y J e a n Anderson, was s u b s t i t u t e d as p l a i n t i f f . On March 5, 1979, t h e d e f e n d a n t f i l e d an amended answer, r a i s i n g t h e a d d i t i o n a l d e f e n s e s of s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s , l a c h e s and e q u i t a b l e e s t o p p e l . A f t e r a s u b s t i t u t i o n of c o u n s e l f o r d e f e n d a n t , b o t h s i d e s moved f o r summary judgment, each s e e k i n g t h e t o t a l amount on d e p o s i t . On J u l y 10, 1980, t h e D i s t r i c t Court e n t e r e d judgment g r a n t i n g each of t h e p a r t i e s one-half of t h e t o t a l funds on d e p o s i t . Baker now a p p e a l s , c o n t e n d i n g he is e n t i t l e d to a l l of t h e a c c o u n t s as t h e s u r v i v i n g j o i n t t e n a n t . Anderson c r o s s - a p p e a l s , c l a i m i n g t h a t s h e , as r e s i d u a r y l e g a t e e of S a n d e r s , is e n t i t l e d t o t h e f u l l b a l a n c e . The i s s u e s on appeal can be s t a t e d a s follows: 1. Is par01 evidence a d m i s s i b l e t o show t h e funds were n o t intended a s a g i f t by Sanders t o Baker? - 2. Is Sanders' s u i t barred by t h e a p p l i c a b l e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s , l a c h e s , o r e q u i t a b l e e s t o p p e l ? 3. Is t h e p l a i n t i f f e n t i t l e d t o i n t e r e s t c a l c u l a t e d from t h e d a t e Baker withdrew a l l funds from t h e t h r e e bank accounts? W e r e v e r s e t h e t r i a l c o u r t and f i n d t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e should have been granted summary judgment i n her c l a i m and d e l i v e r y a c t i o n . With regard t o t h e f i r s t i s s u e , Baker argues t h a t S t a t e Board of E q u a l i z a t i o n v. Cole (1968), 122 Mont, 9, 195 P.2d 989, and Casagranda v. Donahue ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 178 Mont. 479, 585 P.2d 1286, a r e c o n t r o l l i n g . I n Cole, t h e decedent c r e a t e d f i v e j o i n t bank a c c o u n t s between h e r s e l f and v a r i o u s r e l a t i v e s , a l l w i t h i n t h r e e y e a r s of her d e a t h . A f t e r t h e d e c e d e n t ' s d e a t h , t h e t r i a l c o u r t imposed an i n h e r i t a n c e tax measured by one-half of t h e v a l u e of t h e accounts. The q u e s t i o n s presented on appeal included whether t h e s t a t e was e n t i t l e d t o an i n h e r i t a n c e tax on t h e f u l l amount of t h e j o i n t bank accounts, o r j u s t one-half of t h e accounts, The c o u r t , i n f i n d i n g t h a t t h e h a l f - i n t e r e s t i n t h e bank account which t h e j o i n t t e n a n t s received was t a x a b l e a s a t r a n s f e r i n contemplation of d e a t h , made t h e following s t a t e m e n t s : " O f c o u r s e i f t h e t r a n s f e r by t h e donor t o t h e j o i n t account be regarded a s a g i f t it h a s t o s a t i s f y a l l t h e requirements of a v a l i d g i f t i n t e r vivos. The e s s e n t i a l r e q u i s i t e s of a g i f t i n t e r v i v o s a r e d e l i v e r y , accompanying i n t e n t , and acceptance by t h e donee. ( C i t i n g c a s e s . ) "The f i r s t q u e s t i o n is t h e i n t e n t i o n of t h e par- t i e s making t h e d e p o s i t . ( 5 Michie, Banks & Banking, p. 101, s e c . 46.) Such i n t e n t i o n was d i s c u s s e d i n H i l l v. Badeljy, 107 Cal.App. 598, 605, 290 P. 637, 640, where t h e c o u r t d e c l a r e d , 'The q u e s t i o n involved i n c a s e s of t h i s c h a r a c t e r is t h e i n t e n t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s making t h e d e p o s i t , and where such i n t e n t i o n is evi- denced by a w r i t t e n agreement, a s was done i n t h e c a s e a t b a r , t h i s q u e s t i o n of i n t e n t i o n c e a s e s t o be an i s s u e , and t h e c o u r t s a r e bound by t h e w r i t t e n agreement.' The above q u o t a t i o n was cit.ed and approved by t h i s c o u r t i n Ludwig v . Montana Bank & T r u s t Co., 109 Mont. 477, 502, 98 P.2d 377, 379. "The Montana c o u r t a l s o s a i d , q u o t i n g from 9 C.J.S., Banks & Banking, s e c . 286, 'Where no o t h e r e v i d e n c e of i n t e n t is a v a i l a b l e , t h e form of t h e d e p o s i t may c o n t r o l ; b u t when such i n t e n t is evidenced by a w r i t t e n agreement, t h e q u e s t i o n o f i n t e n t i o n ceases t o be an i s s u e and t h e c o u r t s a r e bound by t h e agreement.' Ludwig v. Montana Bank & T r u s t C o . , s u p r a , a t page 502 of 109 Mont., a t page 389 o f 98 P.2d. " I n t h i s j u r i s d i c t i o n t h e s i g n i n g of t h e signa- t u r e c a r d c o n t a i n i n g an agreement t h a t t h e depo- s i t w a s payable t o e i t h e r of t h e c o - d e p o s i t o r s or t h e s u r v i v o r s e t t l e d t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e d o n a t i v e i n t e n t . of t h e donor to make a g i f t i n j o i n t tenancy. See I n re S u l l i v a n ' s E s t a t e , 1 1 2 Mont. 519, 118 P.2d 383." 122 Mont. a t 14-15, 195 P.2d a t 992. I n Casagranda, s u p r a , t h e d e c e d e n t placed funds i n two s a v i n g s a c c o u n t s , naming himself and t-he d e f e n d a n t as j o i n t t e n a n t s w i t h t h e r i g h t of s u r v i v o r s h i p . A f t e r h i s d e a t h , t h e e x e c u t r i x brought s u i t . t o q u i e t t i t l e i n t h e a c c o u n t s and t h e c o u r t awarded t h e money t o t h e d e f e n d a n t , as t h e s u r v i v i n g j o i n t t e n a n t . The c o u r t e l a b o r a t e d on t h e Cole h o l d i n g w i t h t h e f o l l o w i n g language : "Cole stood f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t , i n Montana, s i g n i n g a s i g n a t u r e c a r d c o n t a i n i n g an agreement t h a t t h e d e p o s i t is payable t.o e i t h e r o f t h e c o - d e p o s i t o r s or t h e s u r v i v o r s e t t l e s t h e q u e s t i o n of d o n a t i v e i n t e n t to make a j o i n t tenancy. Appellant. cites an Arizona d e c i s i o n , O ' H a i r v. O ' H a i r ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 109 A r i z . 236, 508 P.2d 66, wherein it was h e l d t h a t t h e mere form of a bank a c c o u n t is n o t regarded as s u f f i c i e n t to e s t a b l i s h t h e i n t e n t of t h e d e p o s i t o r to g i v e a n o t h e r a j o i n t i n t e r e s t i n or ownership of it. W e f i n d t h e Montana r u l e r e p r e s e n t s a more re1 i a b l e manner f o r d e t e r m i n i n g q u e s t i o n s con- c e r n i n g t h e ownership of j o i n t bank a c c o u n t s . T h i s should n o t be m i s t a k e n l y understood to mean w e have no concern f o r t h e d e p o s i t o r ' s i n t e n t i o n s . I n t e n t - i o n is c l e a r l y expressed on t h e f a c e of t-he s i g n a t u r e c a r d . Addit-ional e v i - dence is unnecessary. . ." 178 Mont. a t 483-484, 585 P.2d a t 1288. However, w e d i s t i n g u i s h t h e i n s t a n t case from C o l e and Casagranda f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g r e a s o n . In n e i t h e r Cole n o r Casagranda was t h e r e any a t t e m p t made d u r i n g t h e l i f e t i m e of t-he donor-depositor, a s t h e r e was h e r e , t o d i v e s t t h e o t h e r j o i n t t e n a n t of h i s o r her i n t e r e s t i n t h e account. I n s p i t e of t h e c o n c l u s o r y g i f t language contained on t h e s i g n a t u r e card signed by Baker and S a n d e r s , t h e uncontroverted evidence h e r e shows t h a t no g i f t was intended, i.e., Baker was named a s a j o i n t t e n a n t f o r convenience purposes only. The l e g a l e f f e c t of Sanders' c l a i m and d e l i v e r y a c t i o n , f i l e d during her l i f e t i m e , was t o e s t a b l i s h j u d i c i a l l y her e x c l u s i v e ownership t o t h e funds i n t h e account c u t t i n g o f f Baker's r i g h t of s u r v i v o r s h i p and t o a l l o w Baker t o t a k e , s o l e l y on t h e b a s i s of t h e language contained on t h e signa- t u r e c a r d , would r e s u l t i n a s u b s t a n t i a l m i s c a r r i a g e of j u s t i c e . W e t h e r e f o r e hold t h a t where, a s h e r e , a d e p o s i t o r during h i s o r her l i f e t i m e r a i s e s t h e i s s u e of ownership of funds i n a j o i n t tenancy account, t h e s t a t e m e n t s on t h e s i g n a t u r e card a r e n o t c o n c l u s i v e and a d d i t i o n a l evidence may be examined t o a s c e r - t a i n t h e t r u e i n t e n t of t h e p a r t i e s . W e a r e e s p e c i a l l y c o g n i z a n t of t h e f a c t t h a t many e l d e r l y people, whose means of t r a n s p o r - t a t i o n is l i m i t e d o r whose p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n is d e t e r i o r a t i n g , e x e c u t e t h e s i g n a t u r e card i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h a younger r e l a t i v e s o t h e younger person may make withdrawals a t t h e o t h e r ' s d i r e c t i o n . W e a r e a l s o mindful t h a t t h e s i g n a t u r e c a r d s a r e forms c o n t a i n i n g language d r a f t e d by t h e d e p o s i t o r y i n s t i t u t i o n . While t h e language t h e r e o n may v e r y well d e s c r i b e t h e agreements bet- ween t h e d e p o s i t o r and t h e d e p o s i t o r y , it can h a r d l y be expected t o a c c u r a t e l y e x p r e s s t h e i n t e n t i o n s and r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t h e j o i n t t e n a n t s about which t h e d e p o s i t o r y t y p i c a l l y h a s l i t t l e , i f any, knowledge. Where t h e donor-depositor, a s i n t h e i n s t a n t s u i t , i n d i c a t e s during her l i f e t i m e t h a t h e r i n t e n t is o t h e r t h a n t h a t revealed on t h e s i g n a t u r e c a r d , w e hold such evi- dence a d m i s s i b l e . Other c o u r t s have s t a t e d t h i s same thought i n a s i m i l a r manner. For example, i n H a r r i n g t o n v. Emmerman (D.C. C i r . 1 9 5 0 ) , 186 F.2d 757, which involved two female j o i n t t e n a n t s , it was s a i d : "To be s u r e , t h e d e p o s i t agreement d e s c r i b e d t h e two women as j o i n t owners ' and provided t h a t e i t h e r might draw on t h e account; b u t t h e agreement was on a p r i n t e d form s u p p l i e d by t h e b u i l d i n g a s s o c i a t i o n , presumably f o r its own purpose and p r o t e c t i o n . Some such form p r o b a b l y would have been r e q u i r e d by it to s a f e g u a r d its own i n t e r e s t s even had Miss Emmerman t h e n s t a t e d t h e arrangement was merely f o r t h e convenience o f Mrs. C a r l i n . The w r i t i n g was c o n c l u s i v e as between t h e two women on t h e one hand and t h e b u i l d i n g a s s o c i a t i o n on t h e o t h e r , b u t was n o t c o n c l u s i v e between t h e i n d i v i d u a l s as to whether a p r e s e n t g i f t had been intended ." 186 F.2d a t 761. The Washington Supreme Court s t a t e d it t h u s : " . . . [TI he s i g n a t u r e card is i n v a r i a b l y i n a form provided by t h e d e p o s i t o r y i n s t i t u t i o n which h a s undoubtedly d r a f t e d it t o p r o t e c t t h e i n s t i t u t i o n r a t h e r t h a n e x p r e s s t h e terms of an agreement between t h e d e p o s i t o r s . " I n r e G u a r d i a n s h i p of Matt ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 75 Wash.2d 123, , 449 P.2d 413, 418. When a d e p o s i t o r opens a s a v i n g s a c c o u n t a t an i n s t i t u - t i o n he must a c c e p t t h e forms d r a f t e d by t h e d e p o s i t o r y and pro- f e r r e d him t o s i g n or go e l s e w h e r e . W e have h e l d i n o t h e r " t a k e - i t - o r - l e a v e - i t " s i t u a t i o n s , where a d h e i s o n c o n t r a c t s are i n v o l v e d , t h a t t h e terms are t o be c o n s t r u e d against. t h e d r a f t e r and any a m b i g u i t i e s a r e t o be r e s o l v e d i n f a v o r of t h e p a r t y h a v i n g no v o i c e i n a r r i v i n g a t t.he document's terms, F i t z g e r a l d v . Aetna I n s . Co. ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 176 Mont. 186, 577 P.2d 370. W e f e e l t h i s r e a s o n i n g a l s o s u p p o r t s o u r c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e language of t h e s i g n a k u r e c a r d s signed by Baker and S a n d e r s should n o t be t h e " o n l y word" on what t h e i r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p was intended by them t o be. F u r t h e r , t h e par01 e v i d e n c e r u l e i n Montana is n o t an o b s t a c l e f o r t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of e v i d e n c e o t h e r than simply t h e s i g n a t u r e card language. S e c t i o n 28-2-90 5, MCA, p r o v i d e s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "When e x t r i n s i c e v i d e n c e c o n c e r n i n g a w r i t t e n agreement -- may b e c o n s i d e r e d . (1) whenever t h e terms of an agreement have been reduced t o w r i t i n g by t h e p a r t i e s , it is to be considered a s c o n t a i n i n g a l l t h o s e terms. T h e r e f o r e , t h e r e c a n be between t h e p a r t i e s and t h e i r represen- t a t i v e s o r s u c c e s s o r s i n i n t e r e s t no evidence of t h e terms of t h e agreement o t h e r t h a n t h e con- t e n t s of t h e w r i t i n g except i n t h e following c a s e s : " ( 2 ) T h i s s e c t i o n -- d o e s n o t exclude o t h e r e v i - dence -- o f t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s under which t h e agreement was made o r t o which it r e l a t e s , a s ---- - d e s c r i b e d i n 1-4-102, o r o t h e r e v i d e n c e t o e x p l a i n a n e x t r i n s i c ambiguity o r t o e s t a b l i s h i l l e g a l i t y o r fraud." (Emphasis added .) S e c t i o n 1-4-102, MCA, i n t u r n provides: " C o n s i d e r a t i o n of c i r c u m s t a n c e s surrounding exe- c u t i o n . For t h e p r o p e r c o n s t r u c t i o n of an i n s t r u m e n t , t h e circumstances under which it was made, i n c l u d i n g t h e s i t u a t i o n of t h e s u b j e c t of t h e instrument and of t h e p a r t i e s t o it, may a l s o be shown so t h a t t h e judge be placed i n t h e p o s i t i o n of t h o s e whose language he is t o i n t e r p r e t . " The circumstances under which t h e s i g n a t u r e c a r d s were executed h e r e shows t h a t no g i f t was intended by Sanders t o Baker when t h e c a r d s were signed. I n a s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n involving unambiguous l i e n waivers, p a r o l evidence was held a d m i s s i b l e t o show t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h e p a r t i e s and t h e i r r e a l purpose i n executing and r e c e i v i n g t h e l i e n waivers. F i l l b a c h v. Inland C o n s t r u c t i o n Corp. ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 178 Mont. 374, 584 P.2d 1274. There a s u b c o n t r a c t o r signed a s e r i e s of l i e n waiver forms i n which he acknowledged r e c e i p t of s p e c i f i e d sums of money i n f u l l payment f o r l a b o r and m a t e r i a l s f u r n i s h e d by him t o a s p e c i f i e d d a t e and waived a l l r i g h t s t o f i l e mechanics l i e n s a g a i n s t t h e premises. Nonetheless we h e l d p a r o l evidence a d m i s s i b l e t o show t h a t t h e l i e n waivers were exe- c u t e d t o enable t h e s u b c o n t r a c t o r t o r e c e i v e money from t h e owner from t i m e t o time and were not intended t o c o n s t i t u t e payment i n f u l l t o t h e s p e c i f i e d d a t e a s s t a t e d i n t h e r e l e a s e . Likewise i n Kussler v. Burlington Northern I n c . ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. , 606 P.2d 520, 37 St.Rep. 240, we adopted p r o s p e c t i v e l y t h e r u l e from Restatement of T o r t s , Second, Sec. 885, and held t h a t i n t h e f u t u r e u n l e s s a g e n e r a l release form s p e c i f i c a l l y states o t h e r w i s e , p a r o l e v i d e n c e is a d m i s s i b l e to show whether t h e p a r t i e s intended t o release o t h e r p a r t i e s o r whether t h e release was a c t u a l l y intended t o c o n s t i t u t e f u l l compensation i n t h e f a c e of unambiguous language t o t h a t e f f e c t i n t h e release form. Other j u r i s d i c t i o n s have s i m i l a r l y endorsed t h e use of p a r o l e v i d e n c e i n j o i n t bank account s i t u a t i o n s . In Matt, s u p r a , t h e c o u r t found t h a t t h e e x e c u t i o n of t h e s i g n a t u r e card r a i s e d a r e b u t t a b l e presumption of j o i n t tenancy and it would make li t-tle s e n s e t o r e f u s e p a r o l e v i d e n c e t.o r e b u t t h e presumption. In Murray v. Gadsden ( D . C . C i r . 1 9 5 2 ) , 197 F.2d 194, 33 ALR2d 554, t h e c o u r t examined t h e p a r o l e v i d e n c e r u l e e x c e p t i o n , which a l l o w s an i n q u i r y i n t o t h e o b j e c t of t h e p a r t i e s i n e x e c u t i n g t h e i n s t r u m e n t , and admitted t h e p a r o l e v i d e n c e . See Annot., Par01 Evidence Rule A s Applied t o D e p o s i t o f Funds i n Name o f D e p o s i t o r and Another ( 1 9 5 4 ) , 3 3 ALR2d 569. The case of H a r r i n g t o n , s u p r a , is similar to t h e case a t b a r . I n H a r r i n g t o n , t h e donor-depositor continued t o treat t h e j o i n t a c c o u n t as h e r own d u r i n g h e r l i f e t i m e and, s u b s e q u e n t t o t h e c r e a t i o n of t h e a c c o u n t , h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f i l e d s u i t because t h e o t h e r j o i n t t e n a n t would n o t s u r r e n d e r t h e passbook. A f t e r an answer had been f i l e d , b u t b e f o r e any f u r t h e r a c t i o n was t a k e n , t h e d e p o s i t o r d i e d . The H a r r i n g t o n c o u r t found t h a t t h e f i l i n g of t h e s u i t by t h e donor-depositor c u t o f f any s u r v i v o r s h i p r i g h t s of t h e o t h e r j o i n t t e n a n t and whatever i n t e r e s t t h e d e p o s i t o r had passed to h e r e x e c u t o r . The case was t h e n remanded f o r t h e s u r v i v o r to t.ry t o prove t.hat t h e d e c e d e n t intended a g i f t of a t least p a r t of t h e account t.o t h e s u r v i v o r . In t-he case a t b a r , however, t h e r e is u n c o n t r a d i c t e d e v i d e n c e a p a r t from t h e s i g n a t u r e card t h a t S a n d e r s never intended a g i f t of any p a r t of t h e a c c o u n t s t o Baker, t h a t Baker was named a s a j o i n t t e n a n t f o r convenience p u r p o s e s o n l y , and t h a t Baker understood t h i s . See a l s o Brennan v. Timrnins ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 104 N.H. 384, 187 A. 2d 793 and Brennen v. Timrnins ( 1 9 6 4 ) , 105 N.H. 464, 202 A.2d 229. I n two cases wherein c o u r t s have c o n s t r u e d language almost. i d e n t i c a l to t h a t a t i s s u e h e r e , a d d i t i o n a l e v i d e n c e w a s allowed. I n Graves v. Graves ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 42 Ill.App.2d 438, 192 N.E.2d 616, t h e c o u r t examined e v i d e n c e o t h e r t h a n merely t h e words i n t h e agreement, f i n d i n g t h a t t h e r e c o r d , i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e agreements, showed t h a t a g i f t was i n t e n d e d . In E s t a t e of Macak ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 14 Ill.App.3d 261, 302 N.E.2d 436, t h e c o u r t s i m i l a r l y looked a t t h e e v i d e n c e on t h e r e c o r d , f i n d i n g no e v i d e n c e to r e b u t t h e presumption i n f a v o r of t h e s u r v i v i n g j o i n t t.enant. It s h o u l d be noted t.hat i n both Graves and Macak t h e r e was e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e d o n o r - d e p o s i t o r intended a g i f t t o t h e o t h e r joint. t e n a n t . I n t h i s case a t b a r , however, t h e e v i d e n c e is e x a c t l y to t h e c o n t r a r y . See Annot., C r e a t i o n o f J o i n t S a v i n g s Account. o r - S a v i n g s C e r t i f i c a t e as G i f t t o S u r v i v o r ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 43 ALR3d 971, 1018. With regard t o t h e second i s s u e , S a n d e r s 1 a c t i o n is not b a r r e d by t h e two-year s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s , s e c t i o n 27-2-207, MCA. T h i s s t a t u t e does n o t b e g i n t o run u n t i l a f t e r t h e r e h a s been a demand and r e f u s a l of d e l i v e r y . I n t e r s t a t e Manufacturing Co. v . I n t e r s t a t e P r o d u c t s Co. ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 146 Mont. 449, 408 P.2d 478. Here, t h e s t a t u t e began t o run a t t h e t i m e Sanders made w r i t t e n demand on Baker f o r t h e r e t u r n of t h e passbook and c e r t i f i c a t e s , i.e. J u l y 7, 1978, and S a n d e r s f i l e d h e r s u i t less t h a n one month l a t e r , w e l l w i t h i n t h e r e q u i r e d t i m e . The d o c t r i n e of l a c h e s h a s no a p p l i c a t i o n to t h e p r e s e n t c a s e . Laches r e q u i r e s n e g l i g e n c e i n t h e a s s e r t i o n of a claim and e x i s t s when t h e r e h a s been an unexplained d e l a y of such d u r a t i o n as t o r e n d e r t h e enforcement of t.he r i g h t i n e q u i t a b l e . Brabender v. K i t Manufacturing Co. ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 174 Mont. 63, 67-68, 568 P.2d 547, 549. There is no e v i d e n c e h e r e t h a t Mrs. Sanders was n e g l i g e n t i n p r o s e c u t i n g h e r claim. A s s t a t e d above, s h e waited l e s s t h a n a month a f t e r her w r i t t e n demand was refused b e f o r e f i l i n g s u i t . S i m i l a r l y , e q u i t a b l e e s t o p p e l does not apply h e r e . T h i s p r i n c i p l e r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e p a r t y claiming it r e l i e d on a repre- s e n t a t i o n o r promise t o h i s d e t r i m e n t , C a r r o c c i a v. Todd (1980), -- Mont. , 615 P.2d 225, 37 St.Rep. 1437. Baker h a s not shown any r e l i a n c e t o h i s p r e j u d i c e , and t h u s cannot have a l e g i t i m a t e d e f e n s e based on e q u i t a b l e e s t o p p e l . With regard t o t h e t h i r d i s s u e , t h e t r i a l c o u r t c o r r e c t l y c a l c u l a t e d i n t e r e s t from t h e d a t e t h a t t h e t h r e e a c c o u n t s were c l o s e d by Leo Baker and t h e proceeds converted t o h i s own u s e , which was November 30, 1978, The a p p l i c a b l e s t a t u t e is s e c t i o n 27-1-320, MCA, which p r o v i d e s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "Conversion o f p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y . (1) The d e t r i m e n t caused by t h e wrongful conversion of p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y is presumed t o be: " ( a ) t h e value of t h e p r o p e r t y a t t h e time of its c o n v e r s i o n with t h e i n t e r e s t from t h a t t i m e , . ." Accord, G a l b r e a t h v. Armstrong (1948), 1 2 1 Mont. 387, 193 P.2d Reversed and remanded t o t h e District Court f o r e n t r y of judgment f o r p l a i n t i f f and c r o s s - a p p e l l a n t Anderson f o r t h e sum of $26,182.35, i n t e r e s t t h e r e o n a t t h e s t a t u t o r y r a t e from November 30, 1978 t o d a t e of judgment, and c o s t s . Chief J u s t i c e W e concur: .............................. Justices Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy, dissenting: I would affirm the decision of the District Court, which gave one-half of the joint deposits to each of the contending parties. I will first summarize my reasons for dissenting to the majority opinion, and then I will support my summary by a more extended discussion of the applicable law. Marie Sanders, by executing the unique depository instruments through a savings institution made a gift to her son, Leo B. Baker, of one-half of the funds deposited. By law, she could not revoke that gift. In addition, by the terms of the same depository instruments, she created a joint tenancy in the remainder of the funds, giving Leo B. Baker a right of survivorship to all of the deposit if she predeceased him. By the creation of the joint tenancy, Marie Sanders gave Leo B. Baker the power to acquire dominion over the entire account by withdrawing the same. Leo B. Baker could have acquired the whole account by withdrawal, or by surviving Marie Sanders while the joint tenancy was in full force and effect. The legal result of the depository instruments was that Baker owned one-half of the deposited funds by gift, and further interest as a joint tenant with right of survivorship in the other half of the deposits. This joint tenancy, like any other, depended upon the coexistence of the four unities of a joint tenancy: title, interest, time, and possession. A joint tenant's right of survivorship is not irrevocably fixed upon the creation of the estate. The survivorship right becomes fixed only if the joint tenant survives, and then only if the four unities of the joint tenancy estate have continued to exist to the moment of survival. Before t h e death of any j o i n t t e n a n t , any a c t i o n by one j o i n t t e n a n t which serves t o sever o r terminate t h e j o i n t tenancy destroys t h e r i g h t of survivorship. Examples a r e : a voluntary conveyance by one p a r t y of h i s j o i n t i n t e r e s t ; a p a r t i t i o n proceedings; o r , a s i n t h i s case, t h e demand o r a c t i o n by Marie Sanders t o terminate t h e t i t l e i n j o i n t tenancy. When a j o i n t tenancy i s severed, t h e p a r t i e s hold t h e property a s t e n a n t s i n common. (A j o i n t tenancy i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from a tenancy by t h e e n t i r e t y by t h e f a c t t h a t a tenancy by t h e e n t i r e t y r e q u i r e s a f i f t h unity, t h a t of person. Husbands and wives only can hold a s t e n a n t s by t h e e n t i r e t y . ) Here, Marie Sanders terminated t h e r i g h t of survivorship a s t o t h e funds r i g h t f u l l y belonging t o her. One-half of t h e funds, belonging t o h e r as a p a r t of her estate, are s u b j e c t t o d i s t r i b u t i o n by h e r w i l l . Thus, Baker i s e n t i t l e d t o one-half of t h e deposited funds by g i f t . H e would be e n t i t l e d t o one-half of t h e remaining h a l f of t h e j o i n t tenancy funds had severance of t h e j o i n t tenancy occurred s i n c e he would then be a t e n a n t i n common. But because t h e j o i n t tenancy w a s terminated, n o t severed, during t h e l i f e t i m e of Marie Sanders, he is n o t e n t i t l e d t o any of t h e remaining h a l f of t h e funds unless he p a r t i c i p a t e s as an h e i r i n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of Marie's e s t a t e . The s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s a p p l i e s a g a i n s t t h e a c t i o n of Marie t o set a s i d e t h e g i f t t o Leo Baker. The s t a t u t e d i d n o t run a g a i n s t her r i g h t t o terminate t h e survivorship i n t h e j o i n t tenancy, s i n c e i n t h i s case a l l t h e funds were hers and she could terminate t h e r i g h t of survivorship a t any t i m e during her l i f e t i m e . That is my summary. Following are my reasons: Marie Sanders made a gift at the time that she executed the signature documents with the savings and loan association. The instrument provides in significant part as follows: "It is agreed by the signatory parties with each other and by the parties with the Association that any funds placed in . . . the account . . . shall be conclusively intended to be a gift and delivery at that time of such funds to the signatory party or parties to the extent of his or their pro rata interest in the account . . ." A gift is a transfer of personal property made voluntarily and without consideration. Section 70-3-101, MCA. A gift, other than a gift in view of death, cannot be revoked by the giver. Section 70-3-103, MCA. The language in the depository agreement above goes much further than is necessary to establish a joint tenancy with right of survivorship. Section 70-1-307, MCA, defines a joint interest as "one owned by several persons in equal shares by a title created by a single will or transfer, when expressly declared in the will or transfer to be a joint tenancy . . ." All that the law requires in a signature agreement establishing a joint tenancy bank account or deposit is an express declaration that the monies are held in joint tenancy. No more is required under section 70-1-307, MCA . I distinguish this depository agreement from what is normally or usually required in the establishment of a joint tenancy account. A sample of sufficient language is found in Nichols, 2 Cyclopedia of Legal Forms, § 2.1422 (1978): "The account listed on reverse side of this signature card is a joint and several account. All funds now or hereafter deposited in account by either or any of depositors shall be the property of depositors jointly with right of survivorship. Each depositor shall have complete and absolute authority over account during joint lives of depositors and may withdraw any part of such funds on checks or other withdrawal orders signed by either or any of depositors and by survivor or survivors in case of death of any thereof." A comparison of the form set out in Nichols and that used by the savings and loan association in the case at bar demonstrates a vast difference: Nichols' form establishes a joint tenancy account; in the case at bar, the form established an absolute gift of one-half of the deposit in this case in addition to creating a joint tenancy. As a matter of legal effect, it is only when one of the joint tenants deposits a disproportionate amount in the account that the signature card here comes into play. If each of two joint tenants contributed equally to a joint tenancy account, the signature card would have no gift application. In State Board of Equalization v. Cole (1948), 122 Mont. 9, 16, 195 P.2d 989, 993, we held that, for inheritance tax purposes, the mere creation of a joint tenancy account constituted a gift to a joint tenant of one-half of the deposit, even though the donor retained the right to exercise control over the deposited funds. The contention was made there that no gift occurred because the donor had not completely divested herself of the title transferred to the donee. This Court held that the creation of the joint tenancy was a completed gift transferring an interest in the deposit to the donee. The form of the depository or signature agreement is not set forth in Cole. The discussion of the court is in general terms with respect to the creation of a joint tenancy. Based on Cole, however, and buttressed by the additional language in the signature agreement which is before us in the case at bar, there can be no doubt that the legal effect of the deposit by Marie Sanders was to make a completed gift of one-half of the deposit to Leo B. Baker. We said: "If the intent was to confer upon the defendant a present right to draw upon the fund, either without limitation or for and to the extent of described purposes, the transfer was valid, notwithstanding the donor retained a right to draw upon the fund at will. She thereby completely divested herself of the title transferred to the defendant. It did not take effect upon her death, and was not enlarged by that event. Such title as the defendant had vested at the time of the entries upon the books. It was a present right and presently enjoyable." Cole, supra, 122 Mont. at 17, 195 P.2d at 993. As to the intent of Marie Sanders, we have no indication in this record that she intended any other thing but the gift and the joint tenancy interest that the signature form created. In Casagranda v. Donahue (1978), 178 Mont. 479, 483-484, 555 P.2d 1286, 1288, we said: "Cole stood for the proposition that, in Montana, signing a signature card containing an agreement that the deposit is payable to either of the co- depositors or the survivor settles the question of donative intent to make a joint tenancy. Appellant cites an Arizona decision, OIHair v. O'Hair (1973), 109 Ariz. 236, 508 P.2d 66, wherein it was held that the mere form of a bank account is not regarded as sufficient to establish the intent of the depositor to give another a joint interest in or ownership of it. We find the Montana rule represents a more reliable manner for determining questions concerning the ownership of joint bank accounts. This should not be mistakenly under- stood to mean we have no concern for the depositor's intentions. Intention is clearly expressed on the face of the signature card. Additional evidence is unnecessary." In Casagranda, supra, we set out the form of the signature card used by that institution. 178 Mont. at 484, 585 P.2d at 1288-1289. It merely established a joint tenancy, and had no language in it respecting the conclusive gift of one-half of the deposit. It is inescapable, therefore, that as to one-half of the deposit made by Marie Sanders, under the signature cards which she executed at the time, she made a conclusive gift of one-half of the deposit to her son, Leo B. Baker. She cannot revoke that gift. Section 70-3-103, MCA. The l e g a l e f f e c t a s t o t h e balance of t h e deposit made by Marie Sanders, above t h e one-half g i f t e d , was t h a t it was deposited s u b j e c t t o a j o i n t tenancy with r i g h t of survivorship between h e r s e l f and Leo Baker. B y t h e s i g n a t u r e card, she gave Baker t h e power t o acquire dominion over t h e e n t i r e account by withdrawing t h e same. He could have a l s o acquired r i g h t t o t h e e n t i r e account i f she had predeceased him because then t h e whole of t h e j o i n t tenancy property would have vested i n him as of t h e moment of her death. I n o r d e r t o determine what should become of t h e one- half of t h e deposited funds under t h e f a c t s of t h i s case, w e should examine t h e i n h e r e n t q u a l i t i e s of a j o i n t tenancy. W e have r e f e r r e d above t o s e c t i o n 70-1-307, MCA, which s t a t e s t h a t a j o i n t i n t e r e s t is one owned by s e v e r a l persons i n equal shares. Our c o u r t has s a i d t h a t t h e e f f e c t of t h a t s t a t u t e i s t o include a l l of t h e i n c i d e n t s of a j o i n t tenancy estate under common l a w . Hennigh v. Hennigh (1957), 131 Mont. 372, 377, 309 P.2d 1022, 1025. The cases r e f l e c t two divergent views as t o t h e e f f e c t of t h e ownership i n t e r e s t of a j o i n t tenant. One view holds t h a t f o r t h e d u r a t i o n of t h e j o i n t tenancy, each p a r t y owns t h e undivided whole of t h e property, and n o t a f r a c t i o n a l p a r t t h e r e o f . See Merrick v. Peterson (1980), 25 Wash.App. 248, 606 P.2d 700, 706. The b e t t e r view i n Montana, i n view of t h e language of s e c t i o n 70-1-307, MCA, i s t h a t each j o i n t t e n a n t owns an undivided equal share of t h e j o i n t tenancy e s t a t e , with a r i g h t t o survive t o t h e whole of t h e j o i n t tenancy property i f he is t h e ultimate survivor. A s was noted i n I n R e E s t a t e s of Carlson (1968), 201 Kan. 635, 443 P.2d 339, 347, a " j o i n t tenancy" e x i s t s where a s i n g l e e s t a t e i n property, real o r personal, is owned by two o r more persons, under one instrument or act of the parties; the grand incident of joint tenancy is the right of survivorship, by which the entire tenancy on decease of any joint tenant remains to the survivors, and at length to the last survivor. Joint bank accounts, however, present a problem because either party can acquire dominion over the whole of the property by simply withdrawing the funds. This was noted in Cole, supra, 122 Mont. at 17-18, 195 P.2d at 993-994, where this Court said: "The California court has declared that the identical California statute created the same estate known as joint tenancy or common law . . . While the joint bank account does differ from other types of joint tenancies it has not been treated differently from other joint ownership . . . For example either co-tenant of a joint tenancy in real property could sever the estate by conveying his interest to a third party and as between the remaining co-tenant and the transferee the new estate became a tenancy in common. The special feature distinguishing joint tenancy from other joint interests was the attribute of survivorship. So long as both co-tenants remained alive any transfer by one co-tenant only resulted in a transfer of half the property. But either joint owner of a joint bank account by virtue of the special contract with the bank can acquire dominion over the entire account by drawing a proper order on the bank. This feature is a special attribute of a joint bank account. Nevertheless a- joint bank account is otherwise subject --- to the same rules - as otherjoint tenancies . . ." (Emphasis added.) Where, as here, the joint owners of a bank account have not acted to withdraw the funds disproportionately, the joint tenancy account is subject to the same rules as any other joint tenancy. The rules of joint tenancy include the common law requirement that four unities are essential to an estate in joint tenancy: unity of interest, unity of time, unity of title, and unity of possession. Tenhet v. Boswell (1976), 133 Cal.Rptr. 10, 554 P.2d 330, 334. If an essential unity is destroyed, the joint tenancy is severed and a tenancy in common results. Tenhet, 331 P.2d at 334. Thus, in First westside Nat. Bank of Gr. Falls v. Llera (1978), 176 Mont. 481, 486, 580 P.2d 100, 103, we held that where one joint tenant in an automobile encumbered his interest in the automobile as security for a loan to the bank, and defaulted, the action of the bank in collecting its security through the automobile created a severance, with the result that the bank and the other joint tenant became the owners of the automobile as tenants in common. In other words, the unity of interest, an essential of a joint tenancy estate, had been destroyed. A joint tenant can terminate the joint tenancy by any act which is inconsistent with its continued existence. Shackelton v. Sherrard (Okla. 19631, 385 P.2d 598, 902. Ordinarily the inconsistent act will result in a destruction of one of the four unities of a joint tenancy and a tenancy in common results. Here, however, Marie Sanders moved to end the joint tenancy because all of the funds which were in the joint tenancy portion of the deposit were hers. In other words, she moved to end the right of survivorship which was enjoyed at that time by Leo B. Baker. Her effort was more than a severance, it was a termination of the joint tenancy by a party having a right to terminate because she was the true owner of the funds. Baker by his action recognized the her right to do so in his statements to the savings and loan association officers, and in not appearing to contest her deposition in Arizona. The legal effect therefore was to terminate the one-half portion of the deposit that was subject to the joint tenancy rules. As for the statute of limitations, it, of course, applies to the gift which was made by virtue of the execution of the signature agreements. Her gift could only be set aside for fraud or mistake, or incapacity, none of which appear here. Even so, the limitation on those grounds is two years under section 27-2-203, MCA. The statute was not tolled by section 27-2-301, relating to the accrual of an action, until she made demand. Her right, if any, to demand to set aside the gift portion accrued immediately upon the execution of the signature forms and the statute of limitations ran from the moment of the execution of those instruments. With respect to the joint tenancy portion of the deposit, however, the statute of limitations did not run or her action did not accrue until she made demand under section 27-2-301, MCA. Therefore, that portion of her claim is not outlawed. The action of the majority in resorting to parole evidence to set aside a written instrument is a good example of why courts should be chary in allowing extrinsic evidence to overcome the legal effect of a writing. Assuming that parole evidence should be allowed here, it would present a question of fact to intent. Yet the majority decides Marie Sander's intent as a matter of law, purportedly upon "uncontroverted" evidence. Marie Sanders' deposition, taken in Arizona in July 1978, is the only evidence available as & V I ~ * Z , to her - . She seems to be saying that the signature cards were never signed by her: "Q. Have you ever authorized him to appear on the savings certificates as a joint tenant with you? A. No. "Q. If the bank signature cards for these savings certificates shows your signature on there, would it be your position that those signatures would be forgeries? A. I don't know. I'd have to see it, look into them first. "Q. Am I correct, though, that you have no knowledge whatsoever of making him your joint tenant? Let me ask the question again. "Mrs. Sanders, am I correct that you have never authorized him to sign on those certificates? A. No, I have never. "Q. Have you ever given Leo B. Baker your general power of attorney? A. No." It is a better practice for appellate courts to leave the resolution of fact questions to the district courts. In my view of the case, however, it is not necessary to decide questions of fact at this level. The legal position of the parties is determined, as I have said, by the language of the signature cards, and by Marie Sander's action to terminate the joint tenancy. For the foregoing reasons I would hold that, in this case, Leo B. Baker is entitled to summary judgment as to one-half of the deposited funds; Patsy Jean Anderson is entitled to the remaining one-half of the funds as the Personal Representative of the estate of Marie Sanders. Again, for those reasons, I would affirm the ~istrict Court. Mr. J u s t i c e Frank B. Morrison c o n c u r r i n g : I c o n c u r i n t h e dissent. n