Title: Edmonds v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Criminal No. 00 CR 1934
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
September Term, 2002
______________________________________________
No. 20
JEROME MAURICE EDMONDS
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
______________________________________________
Opinion by Raker, J.
______________________________________________
Filed:   December 18, 2002
1Before jury selection, Edmonds elected to be sentenced by the court; therefore, the
court asked no death-qualifying questions during voir dire.  See Maryland Code (1957,
This case involves the exercise of peremptory challenges under Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986).  The principle question
raised in the certiorari petition is whether the trial court erred in creating a remedy after
finding a Batson violation.  Unfortunately, because the trial court failed to make the
necessary findings as to purposeful discrimination required by Batson, we are unable to
answer the question.  We shall therefore remand the case to the trial court to enable the
court to evaluate the credibility of the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations and to
determine whether petitioner carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. 
As a predicate to petitioner’s conclusion that the prosecutor exercised peremptory
challenges in violation of the strictures of Batson, he maintains that a uniform policy of
exercising a peremptory challenge to all jurors with relatives who have been convicted of
a crime, without regard to the particular circumstances of the case, is inherently
discriminatory and violates the rubrics of Batson.  We do not agree. 
I.
Jerome Maurice Edmonds, petitioner, was indicted by the Grand Jury for
Baltimore County for first-degree murder, use of a handgun in the commission of a
felony, use of a handgun in a crime of violence, attempted robbery, and conspiracy to
commit robbery in the shooting death of a Caucasian youth.  The State served Edmonds
with a notice of intent to seek the death penalty.1
1996 Repl. Vol., 2000 Supp.) Article 27, § 413 (current version at Maryland Code (1957,
2002 Repl. Vol.) § 2-303 of the Criminal Law Article).  
2In criminal cases where the defendant is subject to a sentence of death or life
imprisonment, a defendant may exercise twenty peremptory challenges, and the State
may exercise ten.  Maryland Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.) § 8-301 of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article. 
-2-
The trial commenced on February 6, 2001, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
County.  Petitioner is African American.  The trial court conducted voir dire of ninety-
nine potential jurors2 and included in the voir dire the following question: “Is there any
member of the jury panel or any member of your immediate family who has been the
victim of a crime or, conversely, have you or any member of your immediate family been
convicted of a crime?”
At the conclusion of the voir dire, forty-two prospective jurors remained, six of
whom were African American  Five of the six African-American venirepersons
responded to voir dire questions.  Juror number 704 indicated that her brother had been
murdered by a drug dealer in New York City and that she believed the killer had received
leniency because the defendant’s brother was a police officer.  Ms. Ashe, juror number
614, reported that, twenty years ago, her sister had used an alias, and had been convicted
of a drug violation.  Ms. Ashe stated that she could be impartial.  Juror number 56
discussed pressing work obligations.  Ms. Smith, juror number 719, believed her nephew
had been convicted of attempted murder but thought that he had been treated fairly and
that she could be impartial as a juror.  Ms. Nelson, juror number 66, indicated that she
3Petitioner does not challenge the peremptory strike of either juror number 704 or
56; thus those challenges are not at issue on appeal.
4The prosecutor explained: 
“The lady whose name is Ms. . . . Nelson mis-identified the
Defendant up in voir dire and thought she knew him.  Any
prospective juror that would mis-identify someone I plan on
striking.  I point out at this time any prospective juror who has
a relative who has a prior arrest or criminal record, whether he
be white, black, red, yellow, any color, I’m telling the Court
right now the State will strike them.  I plan on doing it no
matter what their color is and if defense thinks it’s a pattern,
so be it, but I’m stating my reason ahead of time.”
-3-
thought she recognized the defendant as someone she knew but then realized she had
been mistaken.
Defense counsel objected to the State’s use of peremptory challenges against five
potential African-American jurors on the grounds that the strikes were racially
discriminatory.3  When the prosecutor exercised his first two peremptory challenges
against African-American women, juror number 56 and Nelson, the defense raised a
Batson challenge.  The prosecutor explained that he had earlier attempted to strike juror
number 56 for cause because of her work obligations and that he challenged Nelson
because she had misidentified the defendant.4 
The next African American, Ashe, was acceptable to both parties and was seated.
The parties agreed to two more jurors, and, with twelve jurors seated, the court asked
whether the jury was acceptable.  The State excused a Caucasian woman, and selection
continued.  When next asked whether the jury was acceptable, defense counsel exercised
5A party may exercise a peremptory challenge any time before the jury is sworn.
Maryland Rule 4-313 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“After the required number of jurors has been called, a party
may exercise any remaining peremptory challenges to which
the party is entitled at any time before the jury is sworn,
except that no challenge to the first 12 jurors shall be
permitted after the first alternate juror is called.”  
See also Parker v. State, 227 Md. 468, 471, 177 A.2d 426, 427 (1962). 
6The State exercised peremptory challenges to strike a Caucasian man whose uncle
had been convicted of stealing from a bank and whose uncle and cousin were in jail and a
Caucasian woman whose husband had been convicted of a “DUI.”  
-4-
additional strikes.5  The prosecutor then raised a Batson challenge on the grounds that
defense counsel had stricken three Caucasian prospective jurors.  The court overruled the
State’s Batson challenge, and defense counsel pointed out that the prosecutor was not
consistently striking jurors with prior criminal records or relatives with criminal records
because the State seated Ashe.  In response, the prosecutor indicated that he would
challenge Ashe later because she wore a religious symbol on her ear and her sister had a
criminal conviction.  The prosecutor pointed out that previously he struck two Caucasian
jurors whose relatives had criminal records.6  The prosecutor reiterated that uniformly he
would strike persons whose relatives had criminal records but that he was not doing so
7The prosecutor remarked:
“I’m going to be uniform, Judge, as to anyone. I don’t look at
people for their race.  They’re going to be struck uniformly,
no matter what, whether their race is African American and
just happen of [sic] the family members convicted.  That’s
just what the facts and stats are for this panel.  But they’re
going to be treated uniformly whether they are red, green or
blue.  That is a neutral reason that every Court has upheld.”
-5-
because of race.7  He assured the court that the jury panel would include African
Americans. 
The jury was acceptable to the State but not to the defense; defense counsel
exercised additional strikes.  The parties reviewed more jurors and exercised additional
peremptory strikes; the State then struck juror number 704, Ashe and Smith.  The jury
was acceptable to the State, but defense counsel objected because it included only one
African American.  The defense argued to the trial court that the State’s use of five strikes
against African-American jurors, in a case with a black defendant and white victim,
constituted a premeditated effort to remove African Americans from the jury.
Significantly, the judge, in response, remarked that he did not “buy the State’s position”
that it was going to strike jurors with relatives convicted of crimes but who stated they
could be impartial.
The trial court asked the prosecutor his reasons for striking five African American
venirepersons.  The following colloquy took place:
“THE COURT: Nelson.  
“PROSECUTOR: Yes.  That was the mis-identification.  She
thought she knew the Defendant, good, bad or indifferent.  
-6-
“THE COURT: Yes.  Bad, indifferent or silly, that’s your
reason.  
“PROSECUTOR: No, my reason is she could have been any
race, creed or color, religion, I’m going to strike with a mis-
identification.  She thought she knew him.  
“THE COURT: First of all, so the record is clear, she did not
misidentify anybody.  She came up here on her own and said
that initially she thought that maybe she knew Mr. Edmonds
but when she got up here she realized that she didn’t know
him, and she was perfectly candid about it.  So you may not
characterize that as a mis-identification because it was not a
misidentification.” 
* 
* 
* 
“THE COURT: . . . . What about Ashe, number 614?  
“PROSECUTOR: Prior criminal record.  
“THE COURT: She didn’t have.  Her family did.  
“PROSECUTOR: Family, criminal record.  
“DEFENSE COUNSEL: Twenty years ago, her sister.  
“PROSECUTOR: Her sister was convicted, had a drug
charge.  
“THE COURT: She thought she had been treated fairly.
What about Smith?  
“PROSECUTOR: Smith.
“DEFENSE COUNSEL: What number is that?  
“PROSECUTOR: For attempted murder.  
“THE COURT: What’s that got to do with the price of eggs?  
-7-
“PROSECUTOR: Are you asking the reason why we struck
her?  
“THE COURT: You say she could not sit because her nephew
is in jail?  
“PROSECUTOR: . . . When asked her to state her – I wrote a
question mark next to her – she said she could but her
demeanor told me otherwise.  I think we have a right to strike
her.  If the question is what she says, we don’t know whether
she is, whether she is telling the truth.  We don’t know if there
is a bias.  Demeanor told me she wasn’t even sure if she could
be unbiased.
“THE COURT: I didn’t notice that.  Her demeanor didn’t tell
me that.”  
Defense counsel then asked the court to seat Smith, but the court did not rule on
that proposal.  Shortly thereafter, defense counsel requested the court to reseat Nelson:
“DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, may I say that I think
Juror Number 66, Ms. Nelson, who was friends with the
County Police, and was the one that [the prosecutor] has
mischaracterized as misidentifying would perhaps be the most
appropriate to reseat.  It was inconceivable to me that she was
stricken . . . . 
“PROSECUTOR: . . . . We have given race neutral reasons
for striking that person.
“THE COURT: But I have to agree with you, you know, that
part of the deal the Judge has to buy, and the race neutral –
“PROSECUTOR: I understand that but more important –
“THE COURT: You mischaracterize why you did it, though,
why you struck her.  She did not mis-identify anybody, and
that was the reason you gave.  I’m having trouble with it
because it’s – it didn’t happen.”
8In order to reseat Nelson, the trial judge required the State to exercise a
peremptory challenge of any juror, except for the sole African American, seated on the
panel. 
-8-
The court reseated Nelson as a juror.8
Before the jury was sworn, defense counsel objected to the jury as impaneled:
“I asked for the specific replacement of Ms. Nelson believing
that it was the most untenable of all the State’s objections but
not giving any credence, with no personal rancor toward [the
prosecutor], not accepting the neutral, the racial neutrality
offered by the State . . . . I believe that the State has
inappropriately created 
a 
pattern 
of 
striking 
African
Americans and that their allegations of neutrality are
insufficient as a matter of law.”
The court ruled as follows:
“Okay.  And so they are who they are.  With regard to the five
of the eight that – I guess nine that the State took, I just refuse
to accept the reason that the State gave for Nelson.  I just
specifically reject that reason as being race neutral on its face.
That’s why when the defense asked that I put her back on
there, I did.”  
The jury was composed of nine Caucasians, two African Americans, and one South Asian
American.
The jury convicted Edmonds of felony murder, attempted armed robbery, and use
of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence.  He was found not guilty of
premeditated first-degree murder.  The court sentenced Edmonds on the felony murder to
life imprisonment, with all but forty-five years suspended, and on the handgun violation,
to a term of incarceration of five years without parole, to be served concurrently. 
-9-
Edmonds noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  Before that court,
he raised the single issue of whether the trial judge erred in fashioning a remedy for the
State’s Batson violation whereby one of the improperly stricken jurors was reseated but
others were not.  The State argued that because the trial court explicitly rejected the
State’s rationale for excluding Nelson, it implicitly accepted the State’s reasoning
respecting the other venirepersons in question.  In response to that argument, the
intermediate appellate court reasoned: “We do not necessarily accept that contention; but
considering the totality of the circumstances, the comments made by the trial judge, and
the remedy that was pursued, the trial judge was correct.”  In an unreported opinion, the
Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial judge did not err in fashioning a
remedy for a Batson violation by reseating Nelson. 
We granted Edmonds’ petition for writ of certiorari to determine whether the trial
court properly exercised its discretion in remedying a Batson violation by reseating one
improperly stricken juror.  We hold that the trial court failed to satisfy the requirements of
Batson.  We shall remand the case to the trial court to make a determination, under
Batson’s step three, of the credibility of the prosecutor’s reasons for striking Ashe and
Smith and therefore whether petitioner carried his burden of proving purposeful
discrimination.
II.
-10-
Petitioner asserts three arguments.  First, he argues that, as a matter of law, the
prosecutor’s policy of striking jurors whose relatives had been convicted of a crime,
without regard to the particular circumstances of the case, is inherently discriminatory
and violates the rubrics of Batson.  Second, assuming arguendo that the State’s policy
was race-neutral, petitioner argues that the trial court found that the reasons given for
striking jurors Ashe and Smith were pretextual under Batson’s step three.  As such, the
trial court’s determination is entitled to deference and therefore is not clearly erroneous.
Finally, petitioner argues that the error in the case lies in the remedy created by the trial
court for the Batson violations.  Because the trial court found three Batson violations, the
reseating of only one juror inadequately remedied the harm.
The State argues, in response, that Edmonds waived his objections to the striking
of Ashe and Smith by requesting the trial court to reseat only juror Nelson.  On the
merits, the State does not dispute the trial court’s finding as to Nelson but argues that the
trial court implicitly found that Ashe and Smith were struck for race-neutral, non-
pretextual reasons, that the court’s finding was not clearly erroneous, and that the trial
court appropriately remedied any harm by seating Nelson.
III.
We turn to the State’s argument that petitioner waived his Batson argument.  The
State contends that because petitioner asked for one remedy and received the relief he
requested—the reseating of Nelson—he cannot now challenge the court’s remedial
-11-
actions.  See Klauenberg v. State, 355 Md. 528, 545, 735 A.2d 1061, 1070 (1999)(holding
there are no grounds to appeal when defendant receives the remedy he requested from the
trial court).
We hold that petitioner did not waive appellate review of his Batson claims.
Petitioner’s comment that Nelson “would perhaps be the most appropriate to reseat” did
not constitute a waiver of his other objections.  Petitioner objected repeatedly to the
State’s exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude African-American venirepersons.
Petitioner also asked the court to reseat Smith, but the court did not comply.
Furthermore, petitioner excepted to the final composition of the jury and sufficiently
pursued the Batson challenges.  See State v. Robinson, 676 A.2d 384, 386-87 (Conn.
1996)(concluding that a party timely raises a Batson objection if the claim is brought to
the attention of the trial court before the jury is sworn).  He did not waive his claims.  See
Gilchrist v. State, 340 Md. 606, 617-18, 667 A.2d 876, 881-82 (1995).
IV.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution forbids the striking of a venireperson on the basis of race.  Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1719, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986); Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310, 25 L. Ed. 664 (1879).  Peremptory challenges cannot
be exercised to exclude members of a cognizable racial group from a jury.  Batson, 476
U.S. at 89, 106 S. Ct. at 1719, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69; Gilchrist v. State, 340 Md. 606, 625, 667
9The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Miller-El v. Johnson, 261
F.3d 445 (5 Cir. 2001), cert. granted sub nom. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 70 U.S.L.W. 3514
(U.S. Feb. 15, 2002)(No. 01-7662).  Miller-El contends that the trial court should have
considered statistical “pattern and practice” evidence, in evaluating whether the
prosecutor’s peremptory strikes in his case were proper, that the Dallas County, Texas,
prosecutor’s office historically and systematically excluded African Americans from jury
service.  
-12-
A.2d 876, 885 (1995).  The underlying purpose of Batson and its progeny is to protect the
defendant’s right to a fair trial, to protect the venireperson’s right not to be excluded on
an impermissible discriminatory basis, and to preserve public confidence in the judicial
system.  Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 404-10, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1367-70, 113 L. Ed. 2d
411 (1991); Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-88, 106 S. Ct. at 1716-18, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69; Jones v.
State, 343 Md. 584, 592-94, 683 A.2d 520, 524-25 (1996); Gilchrist, 340 Md. at 620-21,
667 A.2d at 883.
The United States Supreme Court has outlined a three-step formula for
determining whether a peremptory challenge has been exercised in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.9  See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98, 106 S. Ct. at 1723-24, 90 L. Ed. 69;
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-68, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1770-71, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834
(1995); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-59, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1865-66, 114 L.
Ed. 2d 395 (1991)(plurality opinion); id. at 372, 111 S. Ct. at 1873, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395
(O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment); Parker v. State, 365 Md. 299, 307-08, 778 A.2d
1096, 1100-01 (2001); Gilchrist, 340 Md. at 625, 667 A.2d at 885.  In Whittlesey v. State,
340 Md. 30, 665 A.2d 223 (1995), we discussed Batson and the three-step process a court
must follow in assessing a Batson claim.  We said:  
-13-
“When a criminal defendant raises a Batson claim, the trial
judge must follow a three-step process.  The burden is
initially upon the defendant to make a prima facie showing of
purposeful discrimination [step one].  If the requisite showing
has been made, ‘the burden shifts to the State to come forward
with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors [step
two].’  ‘Finally, the trial court must determine whether the
defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful
discrimination [step three].’” 
Whittlesey, 340 Md. at 46-47, 665 A.2d at 231 (citations omitted).  
Once the claimant establishes a prima facie showing of discrimination, step one,
the burden shifts to the proponent of the strike to proffer a facially valid, race-neutral
explanation, step two.  See Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767-68, 115 S. Ct. at 1770-71, 131 L. Ed.
2d 834.  An explanation must be race-neutral, but it does not have to be persuasive or
plausible.  Id., 115 S. Ct. at 1771, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834.  Any reason offered will be deemed
race-neutral unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the explanation.  Id. at 768, 115
S. Ct. at 1771, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834; Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360, 111 S. Ct. at 1866, 114 L.
Ed. 2d 395.  If the defending party offers a race-neutral reason, the challenging party must
demonstrate that the offered explanation merely is a pretext for a discriminatory intent or
purpose.  
The persuasiveness of the proffered justification becomes relevant at step three
when the trial court evaluates whether the opponent of the strike has met his or her burden
of proving purposeful discrimination.  Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S. Ct. at 1771, 131 L.
Ed. 2d 834.  A discriminatory purpose may be inferred from the totality of the
circumstances and relevant facts.  Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363, 111 S. Ct. at 1868, 114 L.
-14-
Ed. 2d 395.  Among the factors the court may consider to determine whether the
proponent intended to discriminate are: the disparate impact of the prima facie
discriminatory strikes on any one race; the racial make up of the jury; the persuasiveness
of the explanations for the strikes; the demeanor of the attorney exercising the challenge;
and the consistent application of any stated policy for peremptory challenges.  See id. at
363-64, 111 S. Ct. at 1868-69, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395; Harley v. State, 341 Md. 395, 403-04,
671 A.2d 15, 19 (1996).  “[T]he decisive question will be whether counsel’s race-neutral
explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed.”  Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365,
111 S. Ct. at 1869, 14 L. Ed. 2d 395 (plurality opinion).  
The ultimate burden of proving that a peremptory challenge was motivated by race
always remains with the opponent of the challenge.  Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S. Ct.
at 1771, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834; Batson, 476 U.S. at 93, 106 S. Ct. at 1721, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69;
Gilchrist, 340 Md. at 626, 667 A.2d at 886.  The trial judge’s findings in evaluating a
Batson challenge are essentially factual and accorded great deference on appeal.  Harley,
341 Md. at 402, 671 A.2d at 18 (citing Gilchrist, 340 Md. at 627, 667 A.2d at 886).
Whether a reason is race-neutral rests in large part on a credibility assessment of the
attorney exercising the peremptory challenge.  Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364-65, 111 S. Ct.
at 1868-69, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395.  The trial judge is in the best position to assess credibility
and whether a challenger has met his burden.  Accordingly, on appellate review, we “will
not reverse a trial judge's determination as to the sufficiency of the reasons offered unless
it is clearly erroneous.”  Gilchrist, 340 Md. at 627, 667 A.2d at 886.  
-15-
A trial court has “the duty to determine if the [challenger of the peremptory
strikes] has established purposeful discrimination.”  Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 100, 106 S.
Ct. at 1724, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69; accord Parker, 365 Md. at 308, 778 A.2d at 1101 (quoting
Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S. Ct. at 1771, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834).  A trial court may not
rule on a Batson motion without determining whether it credits the strike proponent’s
race-neutral explanation for each challenged strike.  See, e.g., Barnes v. Anderson, 202
F.3d 150, 156, 157 (2d Cir. 1999).  If a trial court determines that a reason given for a
peremptory challenge is a pretext for purposeful discrimination and upholds a Batson
motion, the court has “the discretion to fashion a remedy for a Batson violation that
addresses and resolves the specific harm caused by that violation.”  Jones, 343 Md. at
602-03, 683 A.2d at 529. 
V.
Turning to the merits of petitioner’s Batson challenge, we note first that step one,
whether petitioner has made a prima facie showing that the State’s challenges were
racially motivated, is not at issue in this case.  The issue is moot because the State offered
explanations for its peremptory challenges and the court ruled, in part, on the ultimate
question of intentional discrimination.  See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359,
111 S. Ct. 1859, 1866, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395 (1991)(plurality opinion)(holding that once
prosecutor makes race-neutral explanation for peremptory challenge and trial court rules
-16-
on question of intentional discrimination, issue of prima facie case becomes moot);
Gilchrist v. State, 340 Md. 606, 628, 667 A.2d 876, 886 (1995)(same).
We turn to step two under Batson to consider whether the State’s reasons for
striking jurors Ashe and Smith were inherently discriminatory as a matter of law.  We
hold that the prosecutor offered race-neutral explanations at step two for striking jurors
Ashe and Smith; therefore, the trial court proceeded properly to step three of the analysis. 
A neutral explanation has been defined as “an explanation based on something
other than the race of the juror.  Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the
prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race-neutral.”  Hernandez,
500 U.S. at 360, 111 S. Ct. at 1866, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395 (plurality opinion).  The question
presented is the facial validity of the reasons offered by the State.  Whether a reason is
persuasive is not relevant at this stage of the inquiry.  See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765,
767-68, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1771, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834 (1995).  The prosecutor’s burden of
production under step two is limited.  The State had to produce a race-neutral reason, not
a believable one.  Id. at 768-69, 115 S. Ct. at 1771, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834.  A trial court meets
its obligation under step two by requiring the proponent of the strike to offer a race-
neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge.  
Petitioner contends that the State’s reason for exercising peremptory challenges
against jurors Ashe and Smith is inherently discriminatory and therefore not facially valid
and race-neutral.  The prosecutor challenged jurors Ashe and Smith because they each
10The prosecutor said that he struck Ashe because her sister had been convicted of
a drug offense and that he struck Smith because her nephew had been convicted of
attempted murder. 
-17-
had a relative who had been convicted of a crime.10  On its face, this reason is race-
neutral.  Striking venirepersons who have been convicted of crimes or whose relatives
have been convicted of crimes is not inherently discriminatory.  
Courts throughout the country have accepted as race-neutral reasons the fact that a
venireperson’s relative has been convicted of a crime.  See, e.g., Devoil-El v. Groose, 160
F.3d 1184, 1186-87 (8th Cir. 1998); Gibson v. Bowersox, 78 F.3d 372, 373-74 (8th Cir.
1996); United States v. Johnson, 941 F.2d 1102, 1109 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Bennett, 928 F.2d 1548, 1551 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Valley, 928 F.2d 130, 136
(5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 457 (9th Cir. 1987); United
States ex rel. Rice v. Washington, 987 F. Supp. 659, 660-61 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Ex parte
Dunaway, 746 So.2d 1042, 1046 (Ala. 1999); Lewis v. State, 741 So.2d 452, 456 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1999); Sanford v. State, 962 S.W.2d 335, 344 (Ark. 1998); People v.
Gutierrez, 52 P.3d 572, 596 (Cal. 2002); Davis v. State, 426 S.E.2d 844, 847-48 (Ga.
1993); People v. Hooper, 552 N.E.2d 684, 700 (Ill. 1989); State v. Scott, 493 N.W.2d
546, 549 (Minn. 1992); Magee v. State, 720 So.2d 186, 188-89 (Miss. 1998); People v.
Dabbs, 596 N.Y.S.2d 893, 895 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993); Commonwealth v. Rico, 711 A.2d
990, 993 (Pa. 1998); Buhl v. State, 960 S.W.2d 927, 934-35 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998).
Our research has uncovered no court that has held as inherently discriminatory a
peremptory strike based on a juror having a relative convicted of a crime.  A criminal
-18-
conviction or having a relative convicted of a crime is not a “characteristic” peculiar to
any race.  See Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769, 115 S. Ct. at 1771, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834.  Although
striking jurors whose relatives have criminal records may produce a disparate impact on
one racial group as opposed to another, disparate impact is not conclusive at step two of
the Batson inquiry.  See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 362, 111 S. Ct. at 1867, 114 L. Ed. 2d
395 (plurality opinion)(noting that principle of race neutrality not violated unless the
government intended to cause the discriminatory impact).
In Hernandez, the petitioner argued that the prosecutor’s basis for exercising
peremptory challenges against two bilingual jurors was inherently discriminatory under
Batson’s step two.  Id. at 359-60, 111 S. Ct. at 1866, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395.  The Court held
that the prosecutor’s reason for striking the jurors—that the bilingual jurors might have
difficulty accepting the translator’s rendition of Spanish-language testimony—was race-
neutral.  Id. at 361, 111 S. Ct. at 1867, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395.  In doing so, the Court
reasoned that even though the prosecutor’s criterion might result in the disproportionate
removal of Latino jurors, disproportionate impact on one racial group did not render the
prosecutor’s actions a per se equal protection violation.  Id., 111 S. Ct. at 1867, 114 L.
Ed. 2d 395.  Disparate impact should be weighed at step three when the court assesses
whether the prosecutor acted with discriminatory intent, but disparate impact alone does
not render a reason inherently discriminatory at step two.  Id. at 362, 111 S. Ct. at 1868,
114 L. Ed. 2d 395.
-19-
We find no merit in petitioner’s argument that the timing of the prosecutor’s stated
reasons for his challenges somehow proves that his explanation was inherently
discriminatory.  Petitioner argues that the prosecutor’s policy of striking people whose
relatives had been convicted of a crime exhibits an inherently discriminatory intent
because the prosecutor announced the policy after voir dire and during the jury selection
process, when he was aware that the policy would have a greater impact on African-
American venirepersons.
Unless challenged, a proponent of a peremptory challenge need not offer any
explanation.  See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-21, 85 S. Ct. 824, 831-36, 13 L.
Ed. 2d 759 (1965)(discussing the history of peremptory strikes and strikes for cause).
The prosecutor did not have to proffer any reason for the exercise of the peremptory
challenges until petitioner’s Batson challenge.  Moreover, no explanation was due until
the judge ruled as to whether petitioner made a prima facie showing of intentional
discrimination.  In Hernandez, Justice O’Connor stated:
“Absent intentional discrimination violative of the Equal
Protection Clause, parties should be free to exercise their
peremptory strikes for any reason, or no reason at all.  The
peremptory challenge is, ‘as Blackstone says, an arbitrary and
capricious right; and it must be exercised with full freedom,
or it fails of its full purpose.’”  
500 U.S. at 374, 111 S. Ct. at 1874, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395 (O’Connor, J., concurring)(quoting
Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378, 13 S. Ct. 136, 139, 36 L. Ed. 1011 (1892)).
-20-
The prosecutor’s announcement of his criterion for exercising peremptories after voir dire
was not inappropriate and does not suggest a discriminatory intent.  
Finally under step two, petitioner argues that a uniform policy that does not relate
to the circumstances of the case or the qualifications of the particular juror is
presumptively discriminatory in intent.  We disagree.  
In Harley v. State, 341 Md. 395, 398, 671 A.2d 15, 16 (1996), the prosecutor told
the court that she had a “general rule” of challenging jurors who were single and under
thirty, a policy with no apparent connection to the circumstances of the case or the
individual jurors.  The prosecutor explained that she preferred to seat jurors over thirty
years old and married because she believed that jurors with those characteristics were
more stable and therefore more state-oriented.  See id. at 402, 671 A.2d at 19.  The trial
court found the prosecutor’s explanation race-neutral and non-pretextual.  We affirmed,
holding that we “cannot conclude that the trial judge’s findings were clearly erroneous.”
Id. at 404, 671 A.2d at 19.  
Petitioner relies on United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1992), to
support his argument that uniform policies not tied to the particular circumstances of the
case are inherently discriminatory.  Bishop was indicted on narcotic trafficking charges.
The prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge to strike a black woman based primarily
on her residence in a poor and high-crime community.  He stated that she was “likely to
take the side of those who are having a tough time, aren’t upper middle class, and
probably believes that police in Compton in South Central L.A. pick on black people.”
11Bishop was decided prior to Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 131
L. Ed. 2d 834 (1995). 
12The court said:
“Residence, as it were, often acts as an ethnic badge. As study
after study has showed, residence, especially in urban centers,
can be the most accurate predictor of race—more accurate,
indeed, than social class.”
United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 828 (9th Cir. 1992).
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Id. at 822.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that “the
invocation of residence both reflected and conveyed deeply ingrained and pernicious
stereotypes” and, as such, was used as a surrogate for race in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.  Id. at 825, 826.  The court rejected the prosecutor’s reason as
inherently discriminatory.  The court held that the exercise of the peremptory strike
denied equal protection because it was based on racial stereotypes, not because of any
uniform policy.11  
Contrary to petitioner’s position, Bishop does not stand for the proposition that it is
impermissible to exercise a peremptory challenge based on a uniform policy or general
rule.  Excluding a juror on the basis of a uniform policy is inherently discriminatory and
impermissible if the reason proffered is a surrogate for race.12  The Bishop court, finding
residence to be a surrogate for race, stated: 
“The difference between Hernandez [500 U.S. 352, 111 S. Ct.
1859, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395 (1991)], Mitchell [877 F.2d 294 (4th
Cir. 1989)] and Briscoe [896 F.2d 1476 (7th Cir. 1990)] on
the one hand, and the present case on the other, is the
difference between a reason— whether valid or not—and a
racial stereotype.  It is the difference between a criterion
13Sometimes the record is adequate for a reviewing court to find that the trial judge
implicitly ruled on the pretextuality of a proffered race-neutral reason.  An implicit
finding may be acceptable if it is apparent from the record that the court found the reason
-22-
having a discriminatory racial impact, and one acting as a
discriminatory racial proxy.  It is, in short, the difference
between what the Constitution permits, and what it does not.”
Id. at 826.  A uniform policy may be facially race-neutral as long as it is not a mere proxy
for race.  Excusing a juror who has a relative with a criminal conviction is not a surrogate
for race and thus is not an inherently discriminatory basis for a peremptory challenge.
Concerns regarding the existence or application of a uniform policy for striking jurors
may be relevant to a court’s assessment of credibility under step three, but such
considerations do not render an explanation per se invalid at step two.
We next address step three and petitioner’s argument that because the trial court
found the reasons for striking jurors Nelson, Ashe, and Smith to be pretextual under
Batson’s step three, the trial court failed to remedy the harm by reseating only juror
Nelson.  Petitioner argues that the proper remedy for the Batson violation is a new trial.
The State contends that the trial court implicitly found no Batson violation as to jurors
Ashe and Smith and that the court properly remedied the impermissible removal of
Nelson.  
We have perused the record thoroughly and cannot conclude that the trial judge
properly fulfilled his obligations under Batson.  The trial court made a determination only
as to juror Nelson.  The judge never made a determination, as he was required to do under
step three, with respect to jurors Ashe and Smith.13
to be nondiscriminatory.  See, e.g., State v. Cañez, 42 P.3d 564, 578 (Ariz. 2002)(en
banc)(deferring to trial court’s implicit finding of no Batson violation); State v. Shanks,
809 S.W.2d 413, 415-16 (Miss. Ct. App. 1991)(noting that, even though the trial court
made no express findings, the record was sufficient to evaluate the court’s implicit
finding regarding the neutrality of the proffered explanation); State v. Smith, 791 S.W.2d
744, 750 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)(stating that although the trial judge failed to make explicit
findings in support of denial of defendant’s Batson’s claim, record is sufficient to support
judge’s implicit finding that defendant failed to make a prima facie case and would be
sufficient for a finding of nonpretextuality); People v. Turner, 743 N.Y.S.2d 78, 79 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2002)(holding that the record supports the trial judge’s implicit finding of
nonpretextuality); Broden v. State, 923 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996)(noting that
trial court’s finding of no discrimination may not be overturned unless actual or implicit
finding is clearly wrong).  This case, however, does not present one of those situations.
-23-
The trial court explicitly discredited the State’s explanation for striking Nelson.
The judge rejected the “mis-identification” explanation and seated Nelson as a juror in the
case.  Because of the deference due this factual finding, we hold that the trial court was
not clearly erroneous.
As to jurors Ashe and Smith, we cannot tell from this record whether the trial court
believed the prosecutor’s explanations.  At one point during jury selection the court
stated: “I don’t buy the State’s position that they’re going to strike people who some
distant cousin had been the victim of crime, when they came up here and told me that
they had no problem being fair. I don’t buy it.”  Later, he appeared to find the
prosecutor’s explanation plausible: “It’s not that you couldn’t consider other family [and
their criminal records].  I don’t have any problem with that.  I can understand under some
circumstances where that would be perfectly legitimate.”  Because of the judge’s
14Our holding should not be read as requiring specific words to satisfy Batson.  See
Galarza v. Keane, 252 F.3d 630, 640 n.10 (2d Cir. 2001)(noting that the ruling on appeal
may well have been different if the trial court’s review of the Batson challenges
“culminated in a general crediting of the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations or
possibly even if the trial court had merely stated that it rejected each of Galarza’s Batson 
claims”).  The trial court does need, however, to make an ultimate finding of whether
petitioner has established purposeful discrimination and then to make a final ruling on the
Batson motion.
-24-
inconsistent comments, it is unclear whether the trial court found the prosecutor’s
explanation credible. 
The record is unclear as to what, if anything, the trial judge may have ruled with
respect to jurors Ashe and Smith.  We cannot conclude that the judge implicitly found the
prosecutor’s strikes of those two challenged jurors to be race-neutral.  “The credibility of
an attorney offering a race-neutral explanation is at the very heart of [the Batson]
analysis.”  Barnes v. Anderson, 202 F.3d 150, 157 (2d Cir. 1999).  However difficult it
may be, before ruling on a Batson motion, a trial court has an obligation under Batson’s
step three to evaluate the credibility of the race-neutral reasons offered by the lawyer and
rule on purposeful discrimination for each challenged juror.14  Galarza v. Keane, 252 F.3d
630, 639 (2d Cir. 2001); Jordan v. Lefevre, 206 F.3d 196, 200 (2d Cir. 2000).  Although
some Batson steps are susceptible to resolution by an appellate court, see, for example,
State v. Donaghy, 769 A.2d 10, 12 (Vt. 2000)(step one), Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769, 115 S.
Ct. at 1771, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834 (step two), on this record, we are not prepared to conduct
the important factual analysis required under step three.  Batson’s final step is essentially
a credibility assessment, and the parties are not before this Court to permit us to judge
-25-
their credibility or to explore the validity of any arguments they may advance.  We hold
that the trial court failed to conduct a proper Batson analysis by not making a final
determination regarding the credibility of the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations and
therefore whether petitioner established purposeful discrimination in the strikes of jurors
Ashe and Smith.
We turn next to the remedy.  A trial court Batson error does not ipso facto entitle a
party to a new trial.  Under the circumstances presented in the instant case, remand to the
trial court is the appropriate remedy.  This Court has determined previously that unless it
is impossible to reconstruct the circumstances surrounding the peremptory challenges,
due perhaps to the passage of time or the unavailability of the trial judge, the proper
remedy where the trial court does not satisfy Batson’s requirements is a new Batson
hearing in which the trial court must satisfy the three-step process mandated by that case
and its progeny.  A limited remand was the procedure followed in Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986), Mejia v. State, 328 Md. 522, 616
A.2d 356 (1992), State v. Gorman, 324 Md. 124, 596 A. 2d 629 (1991), and Stanley v.
State, 313 Md. 50, 542 A.2d 1267 (1988).  Although a limited remand may not always be
practical, in this case neither the passage of time nor any other factor appears to limit the
ability of the trial judge to conduct the Batson analysis.
In Mejia, the trial court failed to fulfill its obligations under Batson.  The trial
judge made no specific findings and did not explain his ruling against Mejia.  On appeal,
we found that Mejia had made a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination.  We noted
-26-
that a new trial may be warranted if “there is no reasonable possibility that the
circumstances surrounding the striking [of a juror] can be reconstructed fairly.”  Mejia,
328 Md. at 541, 616 A.2d at 365.  Writing for the Court, Judge Bell, now Chief Judge,
stated that a limited remand to the trial court, following the procedure set out in Stanley,
was the proper remedy under the circumstances.  Mejia, 328 Md. at 541, 616 A.2d at 365.
In Stanley, following the course set out by other courts in the country, we reasoned:
“One possibility, obviously, is to set aside Stanley's
conviction by an arguably tainted jury, and to order a new
trial.  Quite understandably, that is the relief Stanley seeks.
Another possibility is a limited remand under Rule [8-604], to
permit the State to provide, if it can, racially neutral reasons
for its use of peremptories.  A Rule [8-604] remand may be
appropriate ‘to correct procedures subsidiary to the criminal
trial, [but] it can never be utilized to rectify prejudicial errors
committed during the trial itself.’  Here, the peremptory
strikes were exercised before the jury was sworn, and thus
before the beginning of the trial on the merits.  Moreover,
limited remand was the remedy applied in Batson.”
313 Md. at 75-76, 542 A.2d at 1279 (footnote and citations omitted). 
A limited remand ordinarily is the remedy applied by appellate courts throughout
this country when a trial court fails to conduct a proper Batson analysis.  See, e.g., Batson,
476 U.S. at 100, 106 S. Ct. at 1725, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69; Mejia, 328 Md. at 540-41, 616 A.2d
at 364-65; Gorman, 324 Md. at 129-32, 596 A.2d at 631-33; Stanley, 313 Md. at 75-77,
542 A.2d at 1279-80; Galarza, 252 F.3d at 640-41; Jordan, 206 F.3d at 202; Barnes, 202
F.3d at 156-57; Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417, 421-22 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Joe, 928 F.2d 99, 103-04 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Alvarado, 923 F.2d 253, 256
15Maryland Rule 8-604, in relevant part, provides as follows:
“If the Court concludes that the substantial merits of a case
will not be determined by affirming, reversing or modifying
the judgment, or that justice will be served by permitting
further proceedings, the Court may remand the case to a lower
court.  In the order remanding a case, the appellate court shall
state the purpose for the remand.  The order of remand and
the opinion upon which the order is based are conclusive as to
the points decided.  Upon remand, the lower court shall
conduct any further proceedings necessary to determine the
action in accordance with the opinion and order of the
appellate court.”
-27-
(2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Romero-Reyna, 867 F.2d 834, 838 (5th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Hughes, 864 F.2d 78, 80-81 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d
1302, 1314 (10th Cir. 1987); Arnold v. State, 668 So.2d 109, 111 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995);
People v. Trujillo, 15 P.3d 1104, 1106 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Robinson, 676 A.2d
384, 391 (Conn. 1996); State v. Bolton, 23 P.3d 824, 828-29 (Kan. 2001); State v. Givens,
776 So.2d 443, 451 (La. 2001); Donaghy, 769 A.2d at 16-17.
Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 8-604,15 we remand this case to the Circuit Court
for Baltimore County to make a determination whether the prosecutor’s race-neutral
reasons were pretextual and therefore whether petitioner has met his burden of proving
purposeful discrimination as to jurors Ashe and Smith.  If the court cannot effectively do
so, or finds purposeful discrimination, it shall order a new trial. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS VACATED.  CASE REMANDED
TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO
REMAND THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT
-28-
COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY FOR
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT
WITH THIS OPINION.  COSTS IN THIS
COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS TO ABIDE BY THE RESULT.