Title: Perez v. Dep't of State Police

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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SJC-13245 
 
NATHANAEL PEREZ  vs.  DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     October 3, 2022. - March 16, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
State Police.  Police, Suspension, Compensation.  Public 
Employment, Police, Suspension.  Damages, Back pay.  
Statute, Construction. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
January 30, 2020. 
 
The case was heard by Christopher K. Barry-Smith, J., on 
motions for summary judgment, and motions to vacate the judgment 
and for reconsideration were considered by him. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
David M. Bae for the plaintiff. 
Daniel Brunelli for the defendant. 
 
 
 
GEORGES, J.  General Laws c. 30, § 59 (Perry Law), allows 
the suspension without pay of a State employee who has been 
indicted on criminal charges due to job-related misconduct, but 
2 
 
mandates back pay for the period of the suspension if the 
charges subsequently are "terminated without a finding or 
verdict of guilty."  In this case, we are asked to decide 
whether the remedy set forth in G. L. c. 30, § 59, must be 
applied to a trooper who had been suspended from his position 
without pay pursuant to article 6.2 of the State police rules 
and regulations (art. 6.2), a regulation that applies 
specifically to members of the State police. 
 
The plaintiff, Nathanael Perez, is a State police trooper 
who was suspended from his position pursuant to art. 6.2 after 
he was indicted on charges relating to his performance in his 
former position as a Springfield police officer.  After the 
charges against Perez were dismissed, he requested back pay 
under the Perry Law.  Perez contends that the Perry Law applies 
to all State employees who have been suspended without pay 
because of a criminal indictment stemming from job-related 
misconduct.  The State police maintain that the Perry Law is 
discretionary; because the colonel of the State police (colonel) 
suspended Perez pursuant to art. 6.2, which details disciplinary 
proceedings for indicted troopers, but is silent with respect to 
back pay, they argue that Perez is not entitled to compensation 
for his period of suspension. 
 
We conclude that when the colonel decided to suspend Perez, 
he had discretion to choose whether to invoke the Perry Law, 
3 
 
which applies to civil servants, or to proceed under art. 6.2, 
which is unique to the State police.  Because the colonel opted 
to suspend Perez in accordance with art. 6.2, Perez was not 
entitled to back pay or other relief under the terms of the 
Perry Law.  Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court judge's 
order allowing the State police's motion for summary judgment 
and denying Perez's cross motion. 
 
1.  Background.  On March 27, 2019, Perez was indicted by a 
grand jury on charges of perjury, misleading a police officer, 
and filing a false report, in connection with actions he took on 
April 8, 2015, in his then role as a Springfield police officer.  
On that day, Perez had responded to reports of physical 
altercations at two separate locations in Springfield.  Both 
incidents involved off-duty police officers.  Perez drafted two 
reports concerning the April 8 incidents, which mentioned the 
presence of the off-duty officers at the first incident but 
contained no mention of the off-duty officers' involvement in 
the second altercation.  The charges against Perez were based on 
the contention that he knew off-duty police officers had been 
involved in the second altercation, but intentionally had 
omitted any mention of this from his report. 
 
In the interim between the incidents in Springfield and the 
indictments, Perez had been sworn in as a State police trooper.  
As a result of Perez's indictment, State police Lieutenant 
4 
 
Colonel Philip R. Dowd notified Perez that the State police 
would be conducting a duty status hearing1 to assess his fitness 
for duty as a trooper, pursuant to art. 6.2.1.2  At the hearing 
on March 29, 2019, the duty status board concluded that Perez 
should be suspended without pay, see art. 6.2.2; the suspension 
took effect the same day. 
 
On January 3, 2020, Perez's motion to dismiss the 
indictments was allowed.  The motion judge concluded that the 
grand jury were not presented with sufficient evidence to 
establish probable cause that Perez had filed a false report.  
Three days later, on January 6, 2020, Perez received notice of a 
second duty status hearing.  At that hearing, Perez was 
reinstated to full duty, effective immediately, because of the 
dismissal of the indictments. 
 
Shortly thereafter, Perez sent an e-mail message to the 
chief legal counsel of the State police, requesting that the 
 
 
1 The employment disposition for a uniformed member of the 
State police is referred to as the trooper's "duty status"; 
reviews of duty statuses are conducted at duty status hearings 
by a duty status board, pursuant to art. 6.  The duty status 
board is charged with reviewing the facts presented at the 
hearing, making findings, and making recommendations to the 
colonel or to the superintendent of the State police, pursuant 
to art. 6.2.4.  Under art. 6.2.4, the duty status board has 
discretion to recommend that a trooper be continued on full 
duty, placed on restricted duty, suspended with pay, or 
suspended without pay. 
 
 
2 See note 7, infra. 
5 
 
State police compensate him for the approximately ten months 
that he was suspended and also that the period of suspension be 
counted toward his retirement service, seniority, vacation time, 
and other benefits.3  The State police rejected Perez's requests 
on the asserted ground that the Perry Law does not apply to 
suspensions under art. 6.2.  In their reply, the State police 
asserted that the Perry Law is "permissive," in that an employer 
may, but is not required to, suspend an indicted employee 
pursuant to the Perry Law.  They also argued that they had not 
invoked the Perry Law when they suspended Perez, because they 
had suspended him from active duty pursuant to art. 6.2; nothing 
in the language of art. 6.2 requires that a suspended trooper 
receive compensation if the trooper subsequently is vindicated. 
 
Perez then commenced an action in the Superior Court, 
seeking a judgment declaring that, pursuant to the Perry Law, he 
was entitled to payment of past wages by the State police, and 
to his lost seniority, for the period during which he had been 
suspended without pay.  The parties filed cross motions for 
 
 
3 In his initial correspondence with the State police, 
Perez's attorney cited G. L. c. 268A, § 25, a complementary 
statute that applies to county, municipal, and school or 
planning district employees, as the purported basis for 
reinstatement of Perez's back pay.  The State police noted in 
response that the applicable statute for State employees is 
G. L. c. 30, § 59, the Perry Law, rather than G. L. c. 268A, 
§ 25.  Since then, Perez has maintained that he is owed back pay 
under the Perry Law. 
6 
 
summary judgment.  Concluding that Perez was not entitled to 
past compensation because he had been suspended under the State 
police rules and regulations, and not under the Perry Law, a 
Superior Court judge allowed the State police's motion for 
summary judgment and entered a judgment declaring that Perez was 
not entitled to compensation or to any other relief under G. L. 
c. 30, § 59.  Perez sought reconsideration of the judge's ruling 
on the cross motions for summary judgment and to vacate the 
entry of judgment.  Both motions were denied.  Perez appealed 
from the denials to the Appeals Court, and we transferred the 
case to this court on our own motion. 
 
2.  Statutory provisions.  The issue before us involves the 
interplay between the Perry Law, G. L. c. 30, § 59, and the 
State police regulatory scheme for personnel administration. 
 
a.  Perry Law.  General Laws c. 30, § 59, the Perry Law, 
provides that the "appointing authority" of a State employee may 
suspend the employee "during any period such . . . employee is 
under indictment" for misconduct related to the employee's then-
current State employment or to any prior public office.4  G. L. 
 
 
4 General Laws c. 30, § 59, provides: 
 
"An officer or employee of the commonwealth, or of any 
department, board, commission or agency thereof, or of any 
authority created by the general court, may, during any 
period such officer or employee is under indictment for 
misconduct in such office or employment or for misconduct 
 
7 
 
 
in any elective or appointive public office, trust or 
employment at any time held by him, if he was appointed by 
the governor, be suspended by the governor, whether or not 
such appointment was subject to the advice and consent of 
the council or, if he was appointed by some other 
appointing authority, be suspended by such authority, 
whether or not such appointment was subject to approval in 
any manner.  Notice of said suspension shall be given in 
writing and delivered in hand to said person or his 
attorney, or sent by registered mail to said person at his 
residence, his place of business, or the office or place of 
employment from which he is being suspended.  Such notice 
so given and delivered or sent shall automatically suspend 
the authority of said person to perform the duties of his 
office or employment until he is notified in like manner 
that his suspension is removed. . . . 
 
"Any person so suspended shall not receive any compensation 
or salary during the period of such suspension, nor shall 
the period of his suspension be counted in computing his 
sick leave or vacation benefits or seniority rights, nor 
shall any person who retires from service while under such 
suspension be entitled to any pension or retirement 
benefits, notwithstanding any contrary provisions of law, 
but all contributions paid by him into a retirement fund, 
if any, shall be returned to him, subject to [G. L. c. 32, 
§ 15]. . . . 
 
"A suspension under this section shall not, in any way, be 
used to prejudice the rights of the suspended person either 
civilly or criminally.  During the period of any such 
suspension, the appointing authority may fill the position 
of the suspended officer or employee on a temporary basis, 
and the temporary officer or employee shall have all the 
powers and duties of the officer or employee suspended. 
 
". . . 
 
"If the criminal proceedings against the person suspended 
are terminated without a finding or verdict of guilty on 
any of the charges on which he was indicted, his suspension 
shall be forthwith removed, and he shall receive all 
compensation or salary due him for the period of his 
suspension, and the time of his suspension shall count in 
determining sick leave, vacation, seniority and other 
 
8 
 
c. 30, § 59, first par.  See St. 1962, c. 798.  An employee "so 
suspended" under the Perry Law "shall not receive any 
compensation or salary" during "such suspension."  G. L. c. 30, 
§ 59, second par.  If the criminal proceedings are terminated 
without a guilty finding or verdict, the employee's suspension 
"shall be forthwith removed" and the employee "shall receive" 
back pay for the period of the suspension.  G. L. c. 30, § 59, 
fifth par.  The Perry Law requires that the employee receive 
written notice of the suspension, which automatically is in 
effect by the employee's receipt of the notice.  G. L. c. 30, 
§ 59, first par.  A copy of the notice also must be filed with 
the Secretary of the Commonwealth.  Id. 
 
The Perry Law has had minor amendments since its enactment, 
namely in 1963, see St. 1963, c. 829, when the written notice 
requirement was added; in 1964, see St. 1964, c. 528, when the 
Legislature broadened the types of indictments that permitted 
suspension; and in 2004, see St. 2004, c. 149, § 63, when a 
requirement was added that the employer notify the retirement 
system of the suspension.  Other than these amendments, the 
Perry Law has remained unchanged since its enactment vis-à-vis 
the authority it grants State employers to suspend employees who 
 
rights, and shall be counted as creditable service for 
purposes of retirement." 
9 
 
are indicted for job-related misconduct, and the relief it 
requires if those employees are not convicted. 
 
In 1972, the Legislature enacted G. L. c. 268A, § 25, which 
is essentially identical in its operative language to the Perry 
Law, and applies to county, municipal, and school or planning 
district employees.  See St. 1972, c. 257; Springfield v. 
Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 398 Mass. 786, 788 
(1986).  Since their enactments, both the Perry Law and G. L. 
c. 268A, § 25, have been invoked on a consistent basis to 
suspend public employees who have been indicted for job-related 
misconduct in the Commonwealth.  See, e.g., Benoit v. Boston, 
477 Mass. 117, 119-120 (2017) (suspension of emergency medical 
technician under G. L. c. 268A, § 25); Letteney v. Commissioner 
of Commerce & Dev., 358 Mass. 10, 10-11 (1970) (director of 
division of urban and industrial renewal of State Housing Board 
was suspended under G. L. c. 30, § 59). 
 
b.  Article 6.2 and G. L. c. 22C.  State police troopers 
are exempt from the provisions of the civil service statute.  
See G. L. c. 22C, § 10 (appointment of State police troopers is 
exempt from requirements of G. L. c. 31).  Instead, they are 
governed by the State police statute, G. L. c. 22C, which 
incorporates specific aspects of the civil service statute into 
the governance of the State police.  Under G. L. c. 22C, § 3, 
the colonel has authority to promulgate rules and regulations 
10 
 
for the "government of the department" and the discipline of its 
employees.  See St. 1991, c. 412, § 22.  The head of the State 
police has wielded this authority in some fashion since 1922.  
See O'Hara v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 367 Mass. 376, 380 
(1975) (original rules and regulations were adopted from Manual 
of Courts Martial of United States Army).  Currently, the 
colonel is authorized to "make rules and regulations for the 
force, including matters pertaining to the discipline, 
organization, government, training, compensation, equipment, 
rank structure, and means of swift transportation."  G. L. 
c. 22C, § 10.  Any member of the State police who violates these 
rules and regulations "shall be subject to discipline and 
discharge in accordance with said rules and regulations."  Id. 
 
"[A] properly promulgated regulation has the force of 
law . . . and must be accorded all the deference due to a 
statute."  Borden, Inc. v. Commissioner of Pub. Health, 388 
Mass. 707, 723, cert. denied sub nom. Formaldehyde Inst., Inc. 
v. Frechette, 464 U.S. 936 (1983). 
 
Here, there is no dispute that art. 6.2 has been 
promulgated properly pursuant to the colonel's "broad grant of 
authority" under G. L. c. 22C, which provides the colonel "a 
wide range of discretion in establishing the parameters" of his 
power to impose disciplinary policies on the State police force.  
See Provencal v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth., 456 
11 
 
Mass. 506, 514 (2010), quoting Levy v. Board of Registration & 
Discipline in Med., 378 Mass. 519, 525 (1979).  The Legislature 
has recognized that the colonel has a need for such wide 
discretion in ensuring that the State police are able to 
accomplish their mission, based on their status as 
"traditionally an elite force subject to more arduous duties 
than other [police officers] and to quasi military disciplinary 
regulations."  O'Hara, 367 Mass. at 380.  "The primary function 
of the Uniformed Branch of the Massachusetts State Police is to 
protect persons and property and maintain law and order. . . .  
'[S]ervice in this branch is, or can be, arduous'" (citation 
omitted).  Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 
307, 310 (1976).  As a result, the Legislature has acted to 
accommodate the need for self-administering systems of 
discipline for State police troopers, in conjunction with, but 
separate from, the general civil service laws.  See G. L. 
c. 22C, §§ 3, 10.  While the State police rules and regulations 
have changed over the past century, this court consistently has 
recognized their validity as a distinct substantive and 
procedural system for day-to-day governance of the State police.5 
 
 
5 See, e.g., Commissioner of Pub. Safety v. Treadway, 368 
Mass. 155, 160-161 (1975) (upholding finding of State police 
trial board that charge against uniformed member who received 
stolen goods was supported by evidence); O'Hara, 367 Mass. at 
377, 384 (upholding as "appropriate" State police rules invoked 
 
12 
 
 
Article 6, which contains regulations establishing 
disciplinary procedures and temporary relief from duty for 
uniformed members of the State police, details the procedures by 
which such members6 may be investigated, and their misconduct 
adjudicated.7  Article 6.2 authorizes a division commander, with 
 
in suspending without pay trooper who became candidate for, and 
then was elected to, local office); Concannon v. Commissioner of 
Pub. Safety, 324 Mass. 503, 507 (1949) (petitioner's rights were 
not prejudiced where plaintiff was discharged in compliance with 
State police rules and regulations); Cournoyer v. Department of 
State Police, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 90, 93 (2018) (deferring to 
colonel's discretion in penalizing failure to meet State police 
training requirements); Fisher v. Lint, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 360, 
367-368 (2007) ("the State police trial board possesses the 
authority and provides the procedural protections that 
differentiates a quasi judicial board from one that merely 
performs an administrative function"). 
 
 
6 Article 6 applies to "members," who are defined in art. 1 
as "uniformed members."  General Laws c. 22C, § 13 (b), also 
explicitly references uniformed members.  Uniformed members are 
defined as members of the State police appointed pursuant to 
G. L. c. 22C, § 10.  For clarity, we refer to the uniformed 
members of the State police as "troopers." 
 
 
7 Article 6.2.1 provides, in pertinent part: 
 
"A Division Commander, with the approval of the 
Colonel/Superintendent, may convene a duty status hearing 
relative to the member's duty status if: 
 
"[t]he member is the subject of a criminal investigation, 
is arrested or indicted or, if a criminal complaint or 
warrant is issued against the member; or 
 
"[t]he member is the subject of an internal investigation; 
or . . . 
 
"[e]xceptional circumstances exist which warrant such duty 
status hearing." 
13 
 
the approval of the colonel, to convene a duty status hearing 
for a uniformed member of the State police if the trooper is 
arrested or indicted.  At that hearing, the trooper may respond 
to the allegations.  See art. 6.2.2.  Following the hearing, the 
duty status board  may recommend that the trooper either be 
continued on full duty, placed on restricted duty, suspended 
with pay, or suspended without pay.  See art. 6.2.4.  The duty 
status board also may refer the trooper to the State police 
surgeon for an evaluation of the trooper's fitness for duty, or 
to the employee assistance unit for further intervention.  All 
duty status recommendations are subject to the colonel's 
approval.  See art. 6.2.5.  Article 6.2 is silent regarding 
whether members who have been suspended without pay are entitled 
to receive back pay if the suspension is lifted. 
 
At the time that Perez was suspended, a trooper whose 
conduct had been adjudicated by a duty status hearing had the 
right to appeal from the colonel's decision regarding the 
trooper's duty status to the Superior Court; there was no 
statutory exception granting troopers such as Perez rights of 
appeal from duty status hearings to the Civil Service 
Commission, as there are rights of appeal from trial board 
hearings.  See G. L. c. 22C, § 13, as amended by St. 2002, 
14 
 
c. 43.8  General Laws c. 22C, § 43, provides that "[a]ny person 
affected by an order of the [State police]" may "appeal to the 
colonel," who shall then grant a hearing and may "amend, suspend 
or revoke such order."  Any person "aggrieved by an order 
approved by the colonel may appeal to the [S]uperior [C]ourt" 
within fifteen days of the order.  Id.  See Doherty v. Civil 
Serv. Comm'n, 486 Mass. 487, 495 (2020) (G. L. c. 22C, § 43, 
expressly creates "internal appellate right[]" to hearing before 
colonel that "provide[s] State police troopers protection 
against less significant forms of discipline"). 
 
3.  Discussion.  We review questions of statutory 
interpretation de novo.  Hovagimian v. Concert Blue Hill, LLC, 
488 Mass. 237, 240 (2021). 
 
"A fundamental principle of statutory interpretation 'is 
that a statute must be interpreted according to the intent of 
 
 
8 The 2020 criminal justice act amended G. L. c. 22C, § 13, 
by codifying the duty status hearing procedure in G. L. c. 22C, 
§ 13 (b).  Currently, G. L. c. 22C, § 13 (b), explicitly 
provides that administrative suspension without pay from a duty 
status hearing "shall not be appealable under [G. L. c. 31 
§§ 41-45,]" of the civil service statute.  The suspension may be 
appealed to the Superior Court, as provided in G. L. c. 22C, 
§ 43.  In addition, a suspended member may seek further review 
by the colonel one year from the date of the administrative 
suspension, and every year after, or sooner if there is a 
material change in circumstances.  Moreover, the colonel's 
review of the original order ultimately may be appealed under 
the civil service statute.  Compare G. L. c. 22C, § 13 (b), as 
amended by St. 2002, c. 43, with G. L. c. 22C, § 13 (b), as 
amended through St. 2020, c. 253, § 54. 
15 
 
the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the 
ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in 
connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or 
imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be 
accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be 
effectuated.'"  Mahan v. Boston Retirement Bd., 490 Mass. 604, 
613 (2022), quoting Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows 
of Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 749 (2006).  "[W]e begin with 
the canon of statutory construction that the primary source of 
insight into the intent of the Legislature is the language of 
the statute."  Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Fitchburg 
Capital, LLC, 471 Mass. 248, 253 (2015), quoting International 
Fid. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 387 Mass. 841, 853 (1983).  If the 
language is clear and unambiguous, it is conclusive as to 
legislative intent.  Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., supra. 
 
The first paragraph of the Perry Law provides, in relevant 
part, that a State employee "may . . . be suspended" by the 
employer "during any period" in which the employee is "under 
indictment" for misconduct related to the employee's then-
current State employment or to any prior public office.  See 
G. L. c. 30, § 59.  Perez argues that the use of the word "may" 
in the first paragraph of the Perry Law means that the colonel 
has discretion only in deciding whether to suspend a trooper who 
has been indicted for job-related misconduct.  Perez contends 
16 
 
that, once a trooper has been suspended without pay for 
suspected criminal misconduct related to the trooper's position, 
the trooper falls within the scope of the Perry Law, which 
requires the State police to reimburse the trooper for the 
compensation the trooper did not receive while suspended.9 
 
Conversely, the State police construe the term "may" in the 
first paragraph of the Perry Law as an indication that the 
colonel is permitted, but is not required, to invoke the Perry 
Law in order to suspend a trooper who has been indicted for 
misconduct related to the trooper's position or a prior public 
 
 
9 None of the cases Perez cites addresses the issue we 
confront here:  whether the requirements of the Perry Law are 
mandatory where State employees charged with job-related 
misconduct are suspended pursuant to other statutory or 
regulatory provisions concerning employee discipline.  For 
example, some of the cases upon which Perez relies are 
inapposite because the State employees actually had been 
suspended pursuant to the Perry Law, and thus the requirements 
did apply.  See, e.g., Madden v. Secretary of Pub. Safety, 412 
Mass. 1010, 1010 (1992) ("suspension was based on G. L. c. 30, 
§ 59"); Bessette v. Commissioner of Pub. Works, 348 Mass. 605, 
606 (1965) ("The Commissioner acted under G. L. c. 30, § 59"); 
Indorato v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 20 Mass. App. 
Ct. 935, 936 (1985) ("plaintiff's superannuation retirement 
benefits were correctly denied under § 59"). 
 
 
In other cases, the remedy of back pay set forth in the 
Perry Law was held not to apply to the facts of the suspension.  
See, e.g., Brittle v. Boston, 439 Mass. 580, 589 (2003) 
(employee's criminal proceedings were not considered terminated 
for purposes of G. L. c. 268A, § 25).  In addition, Perez cites 
a number of trial court cases that are not binding precedent. 
17 
 
office;10 only if the colonel chooses to invoke the Perry Law 
must the State police follow its mandates, including awarding 
back pay.  We agree. 
 
This court consistently has interpreted statutory language 
using the word "may" as "generally permissive, reflecting the 
Legislature's intent to grant discretion or permission to . . . 
authorize an act."  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dalton, 467 Mass. 
555, 558 (2014), citing School Comm. of Greenfield v. Greenfield 
Educ. Ass'n, 385 Mass. 70, 81 (1982) ("the word 'may' does not 
impose a mandate but simply authorizes an act").  See also 
Commonwealth v. Chamberlin, 473 Mass. 653, 660 (2016) ("By using 
the word 'may' here, the Legislature indicated no more than that 
the government may, but need not, [take action] by using this 
[statutory] tool").  Specifically, we have interpreted the word 
"may" to be "permissive," in that actors are permitted to invoke 
the legal authority, but are free to invoke and follow the 
requirements of another authority if it is available to them.  
See id. 
 
In Fernandes v. Attleboro Hous. Auth., 470 Mass. 117, 123-
124 (2014), for example, this court concluded that although the 
 
 
10 That the State police properly could have used the Perry 
Law to suspend Perez due to his indictment stemming from conduct 
as a municipal police officer is not disputed; the issue is 
whether the State police were required to apply the Perry Law in 
imposing the suspension. 
18 
 
general civil service act, G. L. c. 31, §§ 41-45, and the Wage 
Act, G. L. c. 149, §§ 148, 148A, 150, both involve the rights of 
tenured employees, neither statute mandates that it is the only 
path by which an aggrieved employee may seek redress.  We 
observed that the "language [in the civil service law] stating 
that an aggrieved employee 'may' file a complaint with the 
[Civil Service Commission] strongly suggests that the 
Legislature has not granted exclusive authority over all 
challenged employment actions to the commission" (emphasis in 
original).  Id. at 124.  In reaching this conclusion, we relied 
upon the determination that the two statutes "have distinct 
purposes and, as a consequence, provide different remedies for 
the violation of their statutory mandates."  Id. at 126.  The 
language of the statutes at issue demonstrated "no intent on the 
part of the Legislature" to preclude a suspension under a 
different legal authority with different procedures and 
remedies.  Id. at 127. 
 
In a similar vein, our case law interpreting G. L. c. 268A, 
§ 25, which authorizes district, local, and municipal employers 
to suspend employees who are indicted due to job-related 
misconduct, further supports our interpretation that the Perry 
Law is a permissive statute.  The Appeals Court has examined the 
interaction of G. L. c. 268A, § 25, which governs the suspension 
of "district" employees such as school districts and regional 
19 
 
planning districts, and the provisions of G. L. c. 71, § 42D 
(school district suspension statute).  The school district 
suspension statute provides that a superintendent "may, for good 
cause, require the immediate suspension of any employee" for a 
period of up to one month.  The Appeals Court repeatedly has 
determined that the existence of neither G. L. c. 268A, § 25, 
nor the school district suspension statute precludes application 
of one over the other. 
 
In Dupree v. School Comm. of Boston, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 535, 
540 (1983), for instance, the Appeals Court concluded that "the 
remedy in [the school district suspension statute] does not 
preclude the application of G. L. c. 268A, § 25."  The court 
reasoned that G. L. c. 268A, § 25, "provides a sensible 
supplement by the Legislature to the provisions" of the chapter 
of the General Laws concerning public school administration.  
Id.  Otherwise, "the only remedy available to remove a teacher 
indicted for a drug felony from the payroll, or perhaps even 
from the classroom, . . . would be dismissal under G. L. c. 71, 
§ 42."  Id.  Accord Perryman v. School Comm. of Boston, 17 Mass. 
App. Ct. 346, 350 n.7 (1983) ("where a teacher is suspended for 
grounds set out in an indictment, the cause for the 
suspension . . . will nearly always continue beyond the limited 
suspension period contained in § 42D").  General Laws c. 268A, 
§ 25, permits school district employers to suspend employees who 
20 
 
have been indicted for job-related misconduct, but, like the 
Perry Law, it does not preclude school districts from choosing 
to employ a different tool, the school district suspension 
statute, which the Legislature also has afforded them for 
disciplining their employees.  See Serrazina v. Springfield Pub. 
Sch., 80 Mass. App. Ct. 617, 618 n.4 (2011) (school district has 
choice of which suspension statute to invoke). 
 
We similarly understand the Legislature's use of the word 
"may" in the Perry Law as permitting, but not requiring, that 
the State police suspend a trooper who has been indicted for 
misconduct in office consistent with the terms of the Perry 
21 
 
Law.11  If a State agency has a different power of suspension,12 
independent of the Perry law, such as the power the State police 
possess under art. 6.2, the State agency may choose to employ 
that power and any procedural requirements thereunder. 
 
The permissive use of the term "may" in the first sentence 
of the Perry Law stands in contrast to the Legislature's use of 
the word "shall" in the remainder of the provision.  For 
 
 
11 Responding to a request for guidance on the proper 
interpretation of the Perry Law in the years after it was 
adopted, the Attorney General noted: 
 
"Suspension of an employee [under the Perry Law] is only 
permissive.  The statute says 'may . . . suspend.'  The use 
of the word 'may' in a statute commonly imports 
discretion. . . .  I recognize that in most situations 
where an officer or employee of the Commonwealth is 
indicted for misconduct in connection with his office or 
employment an appointing authority will wish to avail 
itself of G. L. c. 30, § 59[,] and suspend the officer or 
employee.  Nonetheless, in exceptional circumstances an 
appointing authority may have sound reasons for continuing 
the employment of the indicted officer or employee.  I find 
nothing in the statute that requires a different 
construction." 
 
Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. No. 12, at 164 (1967). 
 
 
12 Absent any legal authority granting a State agency a 
specific procedure for suspending employees, the general civil 
service statute would be applicable.  See G. L. c. 31, §§ 41-45.  
To suspend a tenured employee covered by the civil service laws 
for more than five days, the employee must be given written 
notice and a full hearing in front of the appointing authority.  
See G. L. c. 31, § 41.  Such suspension decisions are appealable 
to the Civil Service Commission, G. L. c. 31, § 43, and the 
commission's decision is reviewable by the Superior Court, see 
G. L. c. 31, § 44; Bessette, 348 Mass. at 608 (noting that Perry 
Law "was applicable to permit the suspension of the petitioner 
without compliance with [the civil service hearing procedure]"). 
22 
 
example, notice of the suspension "shall" be delivered in 
writing and "shall" be filed with the Secretary of the 
Commonwealth.  G. L. c. 30, § 59, first par.  Delivery of the 
notice "shall automatically suspend" the employee.  Id.  The 
suspended employee "shall" not receive compensation, G. L. 
c. 30, § 59, second par., but "shall" be returned to the 
position, and "shall" receive back pay, if the criminal 
proceedings do not result in a guilty verdict or finding, G. L. 
c. 30, § 59, fifth par.  "It is axiomatic in statutory 
construction that the word 'shall' is an imperative . . . ."  
School Comm. of Greenfield, 385 Mass. at 81. 
 
The Legislature's use of "shall" in the Perry Law 
establishes procedural and remedial requirements to which State 
employers (including the State police) must adhere only once 
they have chosen to invoke the Perry Law in suspending an 
employee.  If a different legal authority is invoked when 
suspending an employee, the provisions of the Perry Law are not 
applicable. 
 
"[I]t is our task, to the extent possible, to construe the 
rule and the statute to constitute a harmonious whole consistent 
with the legislative purposes disclosed, and to give reasonable 
effect to both."  Boston Police Patrolmen's Ass'n v. Boston, 367 
Mass. 368, 373 (1975).  In light of its plain language, we 
conclude that the Perry Law does not preclude other, properly 
23 
 
promulgated legal authorities that authorize State employers to 
suspend their employees, nor are the back pay provisions of the 
Perry Law implicated where those employers invoke other legal 
authorities when suspending their employees.  See Boston Police 
Patrolmen's Ass'n, supra. 
 
The fundamental "purpose of [the Perry Law] is to remedy 
the untenable situation which arises when a person who has been 
indicted for misconduct in office continues to perform his 
public duties while awaiting trial."  Massachusetts Bay Transp. 
Auth. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. Retirement Bd., 397 
Mass. 734, 739 (1986), citing Reynolds v. Commissioner of 
Commerce & Dev., 350 Mass. 193, 194, cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1001 
(1966), and Bessette v. Commissioner of Pub. Works, 348 Mass. 
605, 609 (1965).  Prior to the enactment of the Perry Law, an 
appointing authority "had no power to suspend an indicted 
employee save for the lengthy process of removal and suspension" 
under the general civil service law.  See Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. 
No. 12, at 174 (1963).  See also G. L. c. 31, §§ 41-45 
(detailing procedural requirements in civil service law for 
disciplining employees).  The Perry Law "addresse[d] this 
problem by allowing for the temporary removal of such employees 
from office, and by precluding the payment of compensation and 
the awarding of retirement benefits during the period of their 
suspension."  Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., supra. 
24 
 
 
Otherwise put, the Perry Law "protects the public interest 
by preventing State officials from engaging in their duties of 
office while under the cloud of indictment.  At the same time, 
it protects the rights and interests of such officials by 
providing for automatic reinstatement to their positions and 
restoration of employment benefits upon vindication."  Indorato 
v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 20 Mass. App. Ct. 935, 
936 (1985).  The distinct processes of the Perry Law accord with 
its distinct purpose:  that of a new tool that allowed State 
officials to respond swiftly when their employees were indicted 
for job-related misconduct, but that left employers liable for 
compensation of their vindicated employees, and afforded those 
employees recompense in lieu of more involved presuspension 
procedures.  See Reynolds, 350 Mass. at 195 ("In effect, with 
respect to indicted officials . . . , [the Perry Law] merely 
substitutes for the procedures of [G. L. c. 31, § 43 (a)], other 
procedures affording due process of law to the suspended 
official").  The initial expediency gained by an employer using 
the Perry Law is balanced by the chance that a vindicated 
employee will have to be made whole after termination of the 
suspension. 
 
By the same token, art. 6.2 allows the colonel to respond 
swiftly to instances of a trooper who has been indicted for 
misconduct in office, but its provisions for a hearing, the 
25 
 
multiple authorities involved, and the appeals process allow for 
more deliberation before any final action is taken against the 
trooper.  Article 6.2 protects the interests of the trooper as a 
member of a quasi military agency charged with ensuring law and 
order in the Commonwealth, while also ensuring the colonel's 
ability as head of that agency to discipline employees.  Thus, 
the Perry Law and art. 6.2 "have distinct purposes and, as a 
consequence, provide different remedies" that balance the rights 
and duties of employers and employees differently, yet 
sufficiently.  See Fernandes, 470 Mass. at 126. 
 
Here, Perez is not entitled to back pay for the period of 
his suspension, because he was suspended pursuant to art. 6.2, 
not the Perry Law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.