Title: Charles J. Donnelly, Inc. v. Donnelly Bros., Inc.

State: rhode-island

Issuer: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Document:

198 A.2d 41 (1964) CHARLES J. DONNELLY, INC. v. DONNELLY BROS., INC. (Donnelly, Inc.) and Thomas C. P. Donnelly. Eq. No. 3119. Supreme Court of Rhode Island. March 2, 1964. *42 Coffey, Ward, McGovern & Novogroski, Matthew E. Ward, for complainant. John A. Varone, for respondent. POWERS, Justice. This cause is before us on the respondent's appeal from a final decree of the superior court modifying a final decree from which an appeal was taken to and decided by this court in Charles J. Donnelly, Inc. v. Donnelly Bros., Inc., 96 R.I. 255, 191 A.2d 143, to which reference is hereby made for further details. Suffice it to observe that after the original cause was heard in the superior court a final decree was entered ordering: The respondent appealed therefrom to this court and in our decision thereon we stated at pages 264 of 96 R.I. and 148 of 191 A.2d: We concluded thereby that respondent was entitled to use his surname "Donnelly" provided he did not enlarge thereon by resorting to a styling which would tend to identify him with complainant beyond the limits of that which is unavoidable. Having so held, we affirmed the decree in all remaining particulars but remanded the cause to the superior court for entry of a new decree so modified as to comply with our decision. Thereafter, on July 2, 1963, over respondent's objection, a decree was entered ordering: From the final decree as thus modified, respondent appealed to this court. He contends that it does not afford him the relief to which, by the decision of this court, he was entitled. Indeed, he argues that the modified decree is one in name only and is not significantly distinguishable from that which motivated him to appeal to this court in the first instance. In our judgment there is merit in his complaint. Consistent with Harson v. Halkyard, 22 R.I. 102, we were and are of the opinion that respondent may not be enjoined from the unadorned use of the name "Donnelly." This court flatly stated at page 104 of 22 R.I., at page 271 of 46 A.: The complainant further argues, however, that Harson was decided at the turn of the century when advertising practices and sales methods were not greatly influenced by the public's dependence on the telephone. He urges, by reason of this circumstance, coupled with the fact that telephone listings do not permit of distinctive styling, that this court should not follow the reasoning adopted in Harson. We are not so persuaded. The complainant does not make an unembellished use of his family name in connection with his business. Indeed he brought this suit to enjoin respondent because, as he alleged and proved, he spent great sums in familiarizing the public with the trade name "Donnelly's" distinctively styled, and they became so familiarized. The respondent has been enjoined from any styling of his surname other than in the specific manner set forth in the decree. Moreover, we are not convinced that the shopping public, walking their fingers through the yellow pages of a telephone directory, will so fail to distinguish between "Donnelly's" at a stated address or addresses, and "Donnelly" at a different address or addresses, as to be confused. The trial justice in reaching his decision concluded that this court intended to limit *44 the respondent to the combined use of his christian and surname. He commented that, by statute, the state required the registering of a surname with the christian name which, in the instant cause, would result in Thomas C.P. Donnelly d.b.a. "Donnelly." With this we are not concerned, since such registration is not required to be stated in full when the name under which the business is conducted is advertised. The respondent's appeal is sustained, the decree appealed from is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the superior court for entry of a new decree in accordance with this opinion. PAOLINO, J., not participating.