Title: Allan Nott Ents., Inc. v. Nicholas Starr Auto, L.L.C.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Allan Nott Ents., Inc. v. Nicholas Starr Auto, L.L.C., 110 Ohio St.3d 112, 2006-Ohio-
3819.] 
 
 
ALLAN NOTT ENTERPRISES, INC., APPELLANT, v. NICHOLAS STARR AUTO, 
L.L.C., D.B.A. 1ST CHOICE AUTO, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Allan Nott Ents., Inc. v. Nicholas Starr Auto, L.L.C.,  
110 Ohio St.3d 112, 2006-Ohio-3819.] 
Certificate of Motor Vehicle Title Act — R.C. Chapter 4505 — Stolen vehicles — 
Thief cannot convey good title to bona fide purchaser for value without 
notice, although certificate of title appears valid — For purposes of Title 
Act, “stolen vehicle” includes vehicles stolen by fraud or deception — 
R.C. 4505.04 determines who has valid title to vehicle when thief acquires 
vehicle using counterfeit check and sells it to innocent purchaser for value. 
(No. 2005-0756 — Submitted February 7, 2006 — Decided August 9, 2006.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Allen County,  
No. 1-04-81, 2005-Ohio-1419. 
_________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  Under the provisions of the Ohio Certificate of Motor Vehicle Title Act, absent 
any question of estoppel arising from an act of the owner, a thief cannot 
convey valid title to a stolen motor vehicle to a bona fide purchaser for 
value without notice, although the certificate used in the purported transfer 
appears valid on its face.  (Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Gall (1968), 15 
Ohio St.2d 261, 44 O.O.2d 448, 240 N.E.2d 502, followed.) 
2.  For purposes of the Ohio Certificate of Motor Vehicle Title Act, “stolen motor 
vehicle” includes motor vehicles that are stolen by fraud or deception.  
(Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Gall (1968), 15 Ohio St.2d 261, 44 O.O.2d 
448, 240 N.E.2d 502, explained.) 
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3. When an individual acquires a motor vehicle using a counterfeit check and sells 
the vehicle to a purchaser, R.C. 4505.04 determines who possesses valid 
title to the motor vehicle. 
__________________ 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
I. Introduction 
{¶ 1} In this case, a thief acquired a motor vehicle by using a counterfeit 
check and then sold the vehicle.  The underlying legal issue we must answer is 
whether the wrongdoer can pass a valid title to that vehicle to a good-faith 
purchaser for value.  The court of appeals held that because using a counterfeit 
check to acquire the vehicle was a “transaction of purchase” under R.C. 1302.44, 
the wrongdoer was able to pass valid title to a good-faith purchaser for value.  We 
reverse and hold that under R.C. Chapter 4505, Ohio’s Certificate of Motor 
Vehicle Title Act, and Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Gall (1968), 15 Ohio St.2d 
261, 44 O.O.2d 448, 240 N.E.2d 502, the vehicle was stolen, and a thief cannot 
convey valid title to a stolen motor vehicle to a bona fide purchaser for value 
without notice, even when the certificate of title used in the purported transfer 
appears valid on its face. 
II. Facts 
{¶ 2} Edward L. Raifsnider provided John and Debra Stone with a check 
to purchase the Stones’ Honda Accord.  In exchange, the Stones assigned the 
Missouri title to the Accord to Raifsnider. 
{¶ 3} Raifsnider transferred title on the Accord in Ohio, obtaining an 
Ohio certificate of title.  The bank on which Raifsnider’s check had purportedly 
been drawn contacted the Stones and informed them that the check was 
counterfeit.  The Stones reported the incident to Missouri police, who located the 
Accord in Ohio and contacted Columbus police and the Ohio Bureau of Motor 
Vehicles (“OBMV”). 
January Term, 2006 
3 
{¶ 4} In the meantime, Raifsnider sold the Accord to appellee, Nicholas 
Starr Auto, d.b.a. 1st Choice Auto (“Starr Auto”).  Starr Auto then sold the Accord 
to appellant, Allan Nott Enterprises, Inc. (“Nott”).  Nott in turn sold the Accord to 
a customer, Bradie Rice.  There is no contention that either Nott or Starr Auto 
purchased the Accord in bad faith. 
{¶ 5} After the Ohio Registrar of Motor Vehicles determined that the 
Accord was stolen, pursuant to R.C. 4505.17, he cancelled the titles, and Nott 
returned the Accord to the Stones.  Nott voluntarily provided Rice with a 
replacement vehicle and requested Starr Auto to reimburse it for the cost of the 
Accord.  Starr Auto refused, and Nott filed suit against Starr Auto seeking to 
recover the cost of the Accord. 
 
{¶ 6} The trial court granted summary judgment to Starr Auto, finding 
that Raifsnider was able to pass valid title to the Accord to Starr Auto, which in 
turn sold the Accord to Nott.  The court found that Raifsnider had taken 
possession of the Accord as part of a “transaction of purchase” within the 
meaning of R.C. 1302.44(A).  Thus, Starr Auto could not be held liable for the 
sale, and Nott’s complaint against Starr Auto was dismissed. 
{¶ 7} On appeal, Nott argued that Raifsnider was a thief and, therefore, 
could not pass valid title of the Accord to Starr Auto, citing Hardware Mut. Cas. 
Co. v. Gall, 15 Ohio St.2d 261, 44 O.O.2d 448, 240 N.E.2d 502. 
{¶ 8} However, the court of appeals found that Gall did not apply in this 
case, stating: 
{¶ 9} “After reading Gall, we conclude that case stands for the 
proposition that when a car is stolen, i.e. no transaction of purchase is present, 
‘[under] the provisions of the Ohio Certificate of Motor Vehicle Title Act, absent 
any question of estoppel arising from an act of the owner, a thief cannot convey 
valid title to a stolen motor vehicle to a bona fide purchaser for value without 
notice.’ Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus. 
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{¶ 10} “The motor vehicles in Gall were stolen from their owners; 
however, in the instant case, the motor vehicle was obtained by a transaction of 
purchase between the Stones and Raifsnider.  Accordingly, the events of this case 
fall squarely within R.C. 1302.44(A) and not within the holding enunciated in 
Gall.”  (Emphasis sic.)  2005-Ohio-1419, fn. 1. 
{¶ 11} The court of appeals concluded that because Raifsnider acquired 
the Accord from the Stones pursuant to a “transaction of purchase” under R.C. 
1302.44, he acquired voidable title to the Accord.  Id. at ¶ 11.  The court of 
appeals further determined that because Starr Auto was a bona fide purchaser for 
value without notice, it acquired valid title from Raifsnider.  Id.  Similarly, it 
determined that Nott was also a good-faith purchaser for value without notice, and 
therefore Nott acquired valid title from Starr Auto.  Id.  Thus, the court of appeals 
affirmed the judgment of the trial court, finding that Nott could not recover the 
purchase price from Starr Auto, because under R.C. 1302.44, Starr Auto had valid 
title and was not liable to Nott for the sale.    
{¶ 12} This cause is now before this court pursuant to the acceptance of 
Nott’s discretionary appeal. 
III. Analysis 
{¶ 13} We begin by briefly comparing R.C. 1302.44, which contains the 
“voidable title” doctrine applied by the court of appeals, to R.C. 4505.04 and 
4505.17 of Ohio’s Certificate of Motor Vehicle Title Act. 
{¶ 14} Under R.C. 1302.44, an individual with voidable title may pass 
title by a “transaction of purchase” to a good-faith purchaser for value even 
though the goods were procured though fraud or via a check that was later 
dishonored.1  The Revised Code does not define “transaction of purchase.” 
                                                          
 
1. 
{¶ a} 
R.C. 1302.44(A) provides:  
{¶ b} 
“A purchaser of goods acquires all title which the transferor had or had power to 
transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of the 
interest purchased.  A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith 
January Term, 2006 
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{¶ 15} R.C. 4505.04 provides that a person must possess a certificate of 
title to claim ownership of a motor vehicle.2  R.C. 4505.17 provides that upon 
determining that a vehicle is stolen, the Registrar of Motor Vehicles must cancel 
any certificate of title to that vehicle “if, upon investigation, it appears that such 
certificate of title was improperly issued.”3 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered under a transaction of purchase, the 
purchaser has such power even though: 
{¶ c} 
“(1) The transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or  
{¶ d} 
“(2) The delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored, or  
{¶ e} 
“(3) It was agreed that the transaction was to be a 'cash sale,' or 
{¶ f} 
“(4) The delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under 
the criminal law.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
2.  
{¶ a} 
R.C. 4505.04 provides:  
{¶ b} 
“(A) No person acquiring a motor vehicle from its owner, whether the owner is 
a manufacturer, importer, dealer, or any other person, shall acquire any right, title, claim, or 
interest in or to the motor vehicle until there is issued to the person a certificate of title to the 
motor vehicle, or there is delivered to the person a manufacturer's or importer's certificate for it, or 
a certificate of title to it is assigned as authorized by section 4505.032 of the Revised Code; and no 
waiver or estoppel operates in favor of such person against a person having possession of the 
certificate of title to, or manufacturer's or importer's certificate for, the motor vehicle, for a 
valuable consideration. 
{¶ c} 
“(B) Subject to division (C) of this section, no court shall recognize the right, 
title, claim, or interest of any person in or to any motor vehicle sold or disposed of, or mortgaged 
or encumbered, unless evidenced: 
{¶ d} 
“(1) By a certificate of title, an assignment of a certificate of title made under 
section 4505.032 of the Revised Code, a manufacturer's or importer's certificate, or a certified 
receipt of title cancellation to an exported motor vehicle issued in accordance with sections 
4505.01 to 4505.21 of the Revised Code; 
{¶ e} 
“(2) By admission in the pleadings or stipulation of the parties; 
{¶ f} 
“(3) In an action by a secured party to enforce a security interest perfected under 
Chapter 1309. of the Revised Code in accordance with division (A) of section 4505.13 of the 
Revised Code, by an instrument showing a valid security interest.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
3. 
{¶a} 
R.C. 4505.17 provides:  
{¶ b} 
“(A) Every sheriff, chief of police, constable, state highway patrol trooper, 
employee of the state highway patrol, and designated officer of the department of public safety, 
having knowledge of a stolen motor vehicle, immediately shall furnish the registrar of motor 
vehicles with full information concerning such theft. 
{¶ c} 
“Whenever the registrar receives a report of the theft or conversion of a motor 
vehicle, whether the same has been registered or not and whether owned in this or any other state, 
the registrar shall make a distinctive record thereof, including the make of the stolen vehicle and 
its manufacturer's vehicle identification number. The registrar shall prepare a report listing motor 
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A. Ohio’s Certificate of Motor Vehicle Title Act, R.C. Chapter 4505 
{¶ 16} “Ohio’s Certificate of Motor Vehicle Title Act grants a unique 
status to an individual who has in his possession a certificate of origin.”  
Executive Coach Builders v. Bush Cook Leasing, Inc. (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 
808, 612 N.E.2d 408, citing Fuqua Homes, Inc. v. Evanston Bldg. Loan Co. 
(1977), 52 Ohio App.2d 399, 6 O.O.3d 440, 370 N.E.2d 780.  Yet “the rights it 
creates in a holder of such a certificate are not absolute and the holder does not 
prevail against all the world under any and all circumstances.”  Id., citing Fuqua 
Homes, 52 Ohio App.2d at 402, 6 O.O.3d 440, 370 N.E.2d 780.  Gall defines an 
exception to the rule that the holder of a title will prevail against others who claim 
ownership of a vehicle.  Gall holds that absent a claim of estoppel by the vehicle’s 
owner, a thief cannot pass valid title of a stolen vehicle to even a good-faith 
purchaser for value.  Gall, 15 Ohio St.2d 261, 44 O.O.2d 448, 240 N.E.2d 502, at 
paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶ 17} The court of appeals in this case held that within the meaning of 
Gall, “stolen vehicle” means only those vehicles that are physically stolen from 
the owner by force or stealth.  In order to better explain why Gall’s use of the 
phrase “stolen vehicle” also includes vehicles stolen by fraud or deception, we 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
vehicles stolen and recovered as disclosed by the reports submitted to the registrar, to be 
distributed as the registrar determines advisable. 
{¶ d} 
“In the event of the receipt from any clerk of the court of common pleas of a 
copy of a certificate of title to such a motor vehicle, the registrar immediately shall notify the 
rightful owner thereof and the clerk who issued such certificate of title, and if, upon investigation, 
it appears that such certificate of title was improperly issued, the registrar immediately shall cancel 
the certificate. 
{¶ e} 
“In the event of the recovery of a stolen or converted motor vehicle, the owner 
immediately shall notify the registrar, who shall remove the record of the theft or conversion from 
the registrar's file. 
{¶ f} 
“(B) Whoever violates this section shall be fined not more than two hundred 
dollars, imprisoned not more than ninety days, or both.” 
 
 
January Term, 2006 
7 
review this court’s history of interpreting Ohio’s Certificate of Motor Vehicle 
Title Act. 
{¶ 18} We begin with Atlantic Fin. Co. v. Fisher (1962), 173 Ohio St. 
387, 19 O.O.2d 384, 183 N.E.2d 135, in which a thief stole a motor vehicle 
located and titled in Illinois.  Atlantic Finance Company was the holder of the 
first lien on the stolen vehicle. 
{¶ 19} The thief fraudulently acquired an Ohio title to the stolen motor 
vehicle, which indicated that the vehicle was free of any liens.  The thief then sold 
the vehicle to Fisher, a bona fide Ohio purchaser for value without notice. 
{¶ 20} When the original owner defaulted, Atlantic Finance filed a 
replevin action against Fisher, relying on the Illinois title.  The trial court ordered 
Fisher to return the vehicle to Atlantic Finance, but the court of appeals reversed. 
{¶ 21} This court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and held 
that admitting the Illinois title to prove ownership of the vehicle promoted an 
express purpose of the Certificate of Title Act, i.e., preventing the importation of 
stolen motor vehicles.  Fisher, 173 Ohio St. at 390, 19 O.O.2d 384, 183 N.E.2d 
135. 
{¶ 22} Fisher also recognized that the Certificate of Title Act requires that 
ownership of a vehicle must be evidenced by a title.  Id., citing R.C. 4505.04.  
However, the court also stated that “the certificate contemplated by this section 
must be one which is valid at its inception.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id.  Fisher 
reasoned that “[i]t is well settled that a thief can not pass title to a stolen chattel, 
and a bona fide purchaser for value without notice from a thief obtains no better 
title than the thief.”  Id. at 391, 19 O.O.2d 384, 183 N.E.2d 135.  Thus, Fisher 
held that “[u]nder the provisions of the Ohio Certificate of Motor Vehicle Title 
Act, a thief can not convey valid title to a stolen motor vehicle to a bona fide 
purchaser for value without notice, although the certificate of title used in the 
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purported transfer appears valid on its face.”  Id. at paragraph three of the 
syllabus. 
{¶ 23} Applying this principle, the court held that pursuant to its Illinois 
title, Atlantic Finance retained valid title to the vehicle, and, therefore, Atlantic 
Finance was entitled to recover the vehicle from Fisher.   
{¶ 24} However, Fisher was followed by Commercial Credit Corp. v. 
Pottmeyer (1964), 176 Ohio St. 1, 26 O.O.2d 286, 197 N.E.2d 343.  In Pottmeyer, 
Betty Williams purchased a vehicle pursuant to a conditional contract.  The 
contract was assigned to Commercial Credit Corporation (“CCC”), which held a 
lien on the vehicle.  Williams obtained a West Virginia title naming Hess Buick 
(“Hess”) as the title holder.  The certificate reflected Hess’s false statement that it 
had received title directly from the manufacturer.  Furthermore, CCC’s lien was 
not noted on the certificate.  Hess sold the vehicle to Pottmeyer Auto Sales, an 
Ohio car dealer.  Using the West Virginia certificate of title, Pottmeyer acquired 
an Ohio title that also failed to reflect any liens. 
{¶ 25} CCC filed a replevin action against Pottmeyer.  The trial court 
ordered Pottmeyer to return the car to CCC.  The court of appeals affirmed. 
{¶ 26} Reversing the judgment of the court of appeals, this court 
overruled Fisher and held that “[o]ne who claims a right, title or interest in or to a 
motor vehicle but whose claim is not noted upon any Ohio certificate of title 
cannot prevail in an action in replevin against a purchaser in Ohio of such motor 
vehicle, who acquired possession in Ohio of such vehicle together with an 
apparently valid Ohio certificate of title therefor in good faith and without notice 
of any right, title or interest in such vehicle not set forth in his certificate of title.”  
Pottmeyer, 176 Ohio St. 1, 26 O.O.2d 286, 197 N.E.2d 343, at paragraph three of 
the syllabus.  The court reasoned that a principal purpose of the Certificate of 
Title Act was to protect Ohio bona fide purchasers. Id. at 11, 26 O.O.2d 286, 197 
N.E.2d 343.  The court also found that “the clear words of the Certificate of Title 
January Term, 2006 
9 
Act impart negotiability to an automobile in the possession of one having an Ohio 
certificate of title showing him as the owner.” Id at 10, 26 O.O.2d 286, 197 
N.E.2d 343. 
{¶ 27} Thus, the court held that because Pottmeyer was a bona fide 
purchaser for value without notice and possessed an apparently valid Ohio title, 
he was the owner of the vehicle. 
{¶ 28} Four years later, this court again examined the Certificate of Title 
Act in Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Gall, 15 Ohio St.2d 261, 44 O.O.2d 448, 240 
N.E.2d 502.  Gall involved two cases.  In the first case, a thief stole a vehicle 
located and titled in Michigan.  The thief sold the vehicle to Arthur Gall, a bona 
fide purchaser, who acquired an Ohio title.  The original owner’s insurer, 
Hardware Mutual, paid the owner for its loss, acquired both a Michigan and an 
Ohio certificate of title, and filed suit to recover the vehicle from Gall.  The court 
denied Hardware Mutual relief, but the court of appeals reversed, granting 
Hardware Mutual ownership of the vehicle. 
{¶ 29} In the second case, a thief stole a vehicle.  Thereafter, another 
individual obtained a Michigan title and sold the vehicle to the Cashner Brothers 
in Ohio, a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.  That company acquired 
an Ohio title and sold the vehicle to a customer, who in turn acquired an Ohio 
title. 
{¶ 30} Republic-Franklin Insurance Company (“Republic”), the original 
owner’s insurer, held the Michigan title to the stolen vehicle, having paid the 
owner for his loss.  Republic acquired an Ohio title and then filed an action for 
conversion against Cashner Brothers and its customer.  The trial court ruled for 
the defendants.  The court of appeals affirmed, relying on Pottmeyer, 176 Ohio St. 
1, 26 O.O.2d 286, 197 N.E.2d 343.  Finding its decision in conflict with the first 
case, the court of appeals in Cashner certified the record to this court. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 31} This court’s decision in Gall overruled Pottmeyer in part and 
distinguished it in part.  The court in Gall stated: “Before we confront once more 
the principal issue at bar, we apparently must again dispel the erroneous notion 
that whoever first obtains an apparently valid Ohio certificate of title will be 
entitled to retain possession of the automobile regardless of whether he is the real 
owner or a bona fide purchaser without notice, whose title derives from a thief.”  
15 Ohio St.2d at 264, 44 O.O.2d 448, 240 N.E.2d 502.  The court noted that the 
origin of this erroneous proposition was Pottmeyer.  Thus, the court in Gall 
overruled paragraphs three and four of the syllabus in Pottmeyer and held that 
“[u]nder the provisions of the Ohio Certificate of Motor Vehicle Title Act, absent 
any question of estoppel arising from an act of the owner, a thief cannot convey 
valid title to a stolen motor vehicle to a bona fide purchaser for value without 
notice, although the certificate of title used in the purported transfer appears valid 
on its face.”  Gall, paragraph three of the syllabus.  In other words, under Gall, 
the original owner prevails over a good-faith purchaser who purchases from the 
thief. 
{¶ 32} Repudiating Pottmeyer, Gall found that the Certificate of Title Act 
contains no words of negotiability.  Id. at 266, 44 O.O.2d 448, 240 N.E.2d 502.  
Gall also recognized that under R.C. 4505.17, when the registrar receives a copy 
of a certificate of title to a stolen vehicle that appears to have been improperly 
issued, the registrar must cancel the title.  This requirement indicates the 
legislature’s intent to protect the true owner against subsequent purchasers.  Id. at 
267-268, 44 O.O.2d 448, 240 N.E.2d 502. 
{¶ 33} Gall also distinguished Pottmeyer: “[W]e are concerned here not 
with a theft of the certificate, but of the vehicle which it represents.  [Pottmeyer], 
therefore, must be limited to its facts.”  Gall, 15 Ohio St.2d at 266-267, 44 O.O.2d 
448, 240 N.E.2d 502.  We believe that the court of appeals in the instant case 
relied on this language in holding that Gall applies only to physical thefts of 
January Term, 2006 
11 
automobiles and not to thefts by fraud or deception.  We disagree with that 
interpretation. 
B. Purpose of the Certificate of Motor Vehicle Title Act 
{¶ 34} Although Gall factually distinguished itself from Pottmeyer, it 
provided no express instruction that cases involving theft by fraud should be 
treated any differently than those involving physical theft.  We have recognized 
that the purpose of Ohio’s Certificate of Title Act is “ ‘[t]o prevent the 
importation of stolen motor vehicles and thefts and frauds in the transfer of title to 
motor vehicles.’ ”  (Emphasis added.)  Kelley Kar Co. v. Finkler (1951), 155 Ohio 
St. 541, 545, 44 O.O. 494, 99 N.E.2d 665, quoting the title of 1937 Am.Sub.H.B. 
No. 514, enacting Ohio’s first Certificate of Motor Vehicle Title Act, 117 Ohio 
Laws 373.  To hold that Gall applies to physical thefts only would permit a thief 
to pass title of a vehicle stolen by fraud, which subverts the purpose of the Act. 
C. The Registrar Must Cancel Title to a Stolen Motor Vehicle 
{¶ 35} As Gall recognized, R.C. 4505.17(A) requires the registrar to make 
a record of any “stolen” or converted vehicle and to cancel any copy of a 
certificate of title to that vehicle.  Gall, 15 Ohio St.2d at 268, 44 O.O.2d 448, 240 
N.E.2d 502.  R.C. 4505.17 does not define “stolen.”  Black’s Law Dictionary (8th 
Ed.2004) defines “steal” as “[t]o take (personal property) illegally with the intent 
to keep it unlawfully” and “[t]o take (something) by larceny, embezzlement, or 
false pretenses.”  Id. at 1453.  Thus, according to its common usage, “stolen” in 
R.C. 4505.17 contemplates all types of theft, irrespective of the method employed 
to accomplish the crime.  Even if we were to construe “stolen” as having 
“acquired a technical or particular meaning,” our interpretation would not change.  
The criminal offense of theft includes theft by deception.  R.C. 2913.02(A)(3). 
{¶ 36} Furthermore, R.C. 4505.17(A) requires the registrar to cancel title 
to any converted vehicle.  Conversion is “the wrongful exercise of dominion over 
property to the exclusion of the rights of the owner, or withholding it from his 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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possession under a claim inconsistent with his rights.”  Joyce v. Gen. Motors 
Corp. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 93, 96, 551 N.E.2d 172. 
{¶ 37} Thus, we find that the registrar has broad authority to cancel an 
“improperly issued” title, i.e., where the vehicle is stolen or converted from its 
true owner, which bolsters our interpretation that a thief cannot pass title valid to 
even a good-faith purchaser and that Gall applies to physical thefts as well as to 
thefts by fraud or deception.   
{¶ 38} Accordingly, we hold that under Gall “stolen vehicle” includes 
those vehicles stolen by fraud or deception.  See Loudon Motors, Inc. v. United 
Fire & Cas. Co., Stark App. Nos. 2003-CA-00220 and 2003-CA-00234, 2004-
Ohio-2228. 
D. R.C. 1302.44 
{¶ 39} However, our analysis is not at an end.  As the court of appeals 
recognized, Raifsnider’s acquisition of the Accord using a counterfeit check could 
qualify as a “transaction of purchase” within the meaning of R.C. 1302.44(A), the 
“voidable title” statute.  Under the voidable-title doctrine, an individual who 
procures goods by larcenous conduct acquires a voidable title to the goods and 
therefore may pass valid title to those goods in a “transaction of purchase” to a 
bona fide purchaser for value without notice.  R.C. 1302.44(A)(4).  Title in the 
thief is voidable “because the true owner is entitled to rescind the transaction and 
recover the goods from that individual.  The right of rescission is cut off, 
however, by a transaction to a good faith purchaser.”  Creggin Group, Ltd. v. 
Crown Diversified Industries Corp. (1996), 113 Ohio App.3d 853, 859, 682 
N.E.2d 692.  Thus, once title to the goods has passed to the good-faith purchaser 
by a transaction of purchase, the original owner has no recourse to recover said 
goods.  Id.  This conflicts with Gall to the extent that Gall holds that a thief 
cannot pass title to a stolen vehicle and, absent an act of estoppel by the vehicle’s 
January Term, 2006 
13 
owner, the owner retains valid title to that vehicle even where the thief sold the 
vehicle to a good-faith purchaser. 
{¶ 40} Where statutes conflict, the more specific provision controls over 
the more general provision.  R.C. 1.51.  R.C. 1302.44 applies to goods.  But R.C. 
4505.04 applies to motor vehicles only.  Therefore, we hold that when an 
individual acquires a motor vehicle using a counterfeit check and sells the vehicle 
to a purchaser, R.C. 4505.04 defines who possesses valid title to the motor 
vehicle.  See Saturn of Kings Automall, Inc. v. Mike Albert Leasing, Inc. (2001), 
92 Ohio St.3d 513, 751 N.E.2d 1019 (In determining competing claims of 
ownership of a motor vehicle, R.C. 4505.04(A) controls over R.C. Chapter 1302). 
IV. Conclusion 
{¶ 41} In summary, we reaffirm our holding in Gall that a thief cannot 
convey valid title to a stolen motor vehicle to a bona fide purchaser for value 
without notice, even if the certificate used in the purported transfer appears valid 
on its face.  We further hold that for purposes of the Certificate of Title Act, 
“stolen motor vehicle” includes motor vehicles that are stolen by fraud or 
deception. 
{¶ 42} Applying our holding, we find that Raifsnider’s use of the 
counterfeit check to acquire the Accord was a theft and that the Accord was a 
stolen vehicle.  Therefore, Raifsnider could not pass title to Starr Auto.  We find 
no allegations that the Stones acted in a manner that would estop them from 
retaining valid title to the Accord.4  Consequently, the Stones retained ownership 
of the Accord.  Because valid title to the Accord remained with the Stones, Nott’s 
complaint seeking to recover the purchase price of the Accord from Starr Auto 
has merit.  Although it will likely prove fruitless, Starr Auto’s recourse, were it to 
                                                          
 
4. 
Starr Auto did not file a merit brief and did not participate in oral argument.   
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
pursue one, is against Raifsnider.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the 
court of appeals. 
Judgment reversed. 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, 
JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Siferd & McCluskey, L.P.A., Richard E. Siferd, and N. Shannon Bartels, 
for appellant. 
 
Cory, Meredith, Witter, Rumer Cheney, L.P.A., and Victoria U. Maisch, 
for appellee. 
______________________