Title: Grosvenor v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JAMAH K. GROSVENOR, 
  
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 47, 2004 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID 0008020754  
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: March 24, 2004 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: May 12, 2004 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER, and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
This 12th day of May 2004, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief, the State’s motion to affirm, and the record below, it appears 
to the Court that: 
 
1) 
The defendant-appellant, Jamah Grosvenor, filed this appeal 
from the Superior Court’s denial of his first motion for postconviction relief.  
The State has moved to affirm the judgment of the Superior Court on the 
ground that it is manifest on the face of Grosvenor’s opening brief that the 
appeal is without merit.1  We agree and affirm the Superior Court’s 
judgment. 
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
 
2
2) 
Grosvenor was arrested in the early morning of August 28, 
2000 after a Wilmington resident called police to say that a naked man had 
broken into her porch.  When police arrived, they found Grosvenor inside 
the enclosed porch throwing patio furniture. When the police tried to subdue 
him, Grosvenor struck an officer with an object.  Other officers arrived and 
took Grosvenor into custody.  While escorting him to the police vehicle, 
Grosvenor broke free and was captured a few moments later.   
3) 
Grosvenor was indicted on charges of Burglary in the Second 
Degree, Criminal Mischief, Assault in the Second Degree, and Resisting 
Arrest.  He pled guilty in December 2000 to one count of Burglary in the 
Third Degree and one count of Assault in the Third Degree.  Grosvenor’s 
sentence of incarceration was suspended for two and a half years of 
supervised probation. 
4) 
In August 2002, Grosvenor was sentenced to incarceration 
following a violation of probation proceeding.  He did not file an appeal.  
Grosvenor did file motion for sentence reduction in October 2002, which the 
Superior Court denied.  Thereafter, he filed a motion for postconviction 
relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  In his petition for 
postconviction relief, Grosvenor asserted that the indictment against him 
was invalid.  He also alleged that his trial counsel was constitutionally 
 
3
ineffective in several respects.  The Superior Court addressed each of 
Grosvenor’s claims in detail and denied the petition.  This appeal ensued. 
5) 
In his opening brief, Grosvenor appears to assert two claims.  
First, Grosvenor alleges that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to accept 
his guilty plea to the burglary count because the facts did not support such a 
charge.  Second, Grosvenor asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective in 
several respects and that his counsel’s ineffectiveness caused him to enter a 
guilty plea.   
6) 
Grosvenor asserts that his counsel was ineffective for waiving 
his preliminary hearing, for failing to investigate his intoxication as a 
defense to the burglary charge, for failing to file a motion to dismiss the 
burglary charge on the grounds that he lacked the necessary intent and 
because the porch was not a “dwelling,”2 and for failing to advise him that 
the charges to which he pled guilty were felonies. 
7) 
Although framed as a challenge to the Superior Court’s subject 
matter jurisdiction, Grosvenor’s first claim—that the facts do not support a 
charge of burglary—clearly is a challenge to the Grand Jury’s indictment.  
As the Superior Court properly noted, however, Criminal Rule 61(i)(3) bars 
                                                 
2 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 825(1) (1995 & Supp. 2000) (providing that a 
person is guilty of second degree burglary when the person knowingly enters a dwelling 
with intent to commit a crime). 
 
4
this claim because it was not raised in the proceedings leading to the 
judgment of conviction, unless Grosvenor can show cause and prejudice.  In 
this case, Grosvenor asserts his attorney’s ineffective assistance as the cause 
for his failure to raise the claim in a timely manner. 
8) 
To support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
Grosvenor must demonstrate that (a) his counsel’s conduct fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness; and (b) there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for his counsel’s errors, he would not have pled guilty 
but would have insisted on going to trial.3  A defendant asserting a claim of 
ineffective assistance is required to make concrete allegations of cause and 
actual prejudice to substantiate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to 
avoid summary dismissal.4  Although not insurmountable, there is a strong 
presumption that counsel’s representation was professionally reasonable.5 
Even if we assume without deciding that Grosvenor’s claims satisfy the 
“cause” prong of the Strickland test,6 it is clear that Grosvenor has failed to 
establish any prejudice.   
                                                 
3 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). 
4 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990). 
5 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988). 
6 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). 
 
5
9) 
To the extent Grosvenor asserts that the burglary charge would 
have been dismissed following a preliminary hearing, there is nothing in the 
record to substantiate such a contention.  Grosvenor informed his counsel 
that he could not remember the events leading to his arrest.  Consequently, 
trial counsel’s waiver of the preliminary hearing provided a material benefit 
to Grosvenor because the State provided the defense with a copy of the 
police report in exchange for the waiver.   
10) 
Grosvenor also challenges his trial counsel’s alleged failure to 
file a motion to dismiss the burglary charge.  According to Grosvenor, his 
trial counsel could have established involuntary intoxication as a defense to 
the charge.7  Although he claims that he unwittingly was fed marijuana-
laced brownies that triggered a chemical imbalance in his brain, Grosvenor 
does not dispute that he was unable to provide his trial counsel with any 
details about the individuals who provided him the brownies.  In the absence 
of any corroborating evidence, a partial motion to dismiss the burglary 
charge on the ground of involuntary intoxication would have been 
unsuccessful.   
11) 
Grosvenor contends that the enclosed porch, which was 
attached to the victim’s house, was not a “dwelling” for purposes of the 
                                                 
7 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 423. 
 
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burglary statute.  That issue has been considered and rejected in other 
jurisdictions.8 Accordingly, if Grosvenor had not pled guilty but had insisted 
on going to trial, the overwhelming evidence of his guilt would have led to 
his convictions and likely a more severe sentence than the supervised 
probation that resulted from his guilty plea. 
12) 
Grosvenor asserts that his trial counsel failed to inform him that 
he was pleading guilty to two felonies.  The record does not support his 
contention.  During the guilty plea colloquy, Grosvenor expressed his 
understanding of the charges to which he was pleading and the maximum 
penalties for each charge.  There is nothing to suggest that Grosvenor was 
operating under any misapprehension about the felonious nature of the 
crimes.  The record reflects that Grosvenor’s guilty plea was knowing and 
voluntary. 9  
13) 
Having carefully considered the parties’ respective positions, 
we find it manifest that the judgment of the Superior Court should be 
affirmed.  The Superior Court’s conclusion that Grosvenor’s claims lacked 
merit is supported by the record and the product of an orderly deductive 
                                                 
8 See Weber v. State, 776 So.2d 1001, 1003-04 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); 
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 105, 106 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994). 
9 See Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997). 
 
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process.  It was a proper exercise of discretion for the Superior Court to 
decide Grosvenor’s petition without holding a hearing.10   
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                                 
10 See Maxion v. State, 686 A.2d 148, 151 (Del. 1996).