Title: Andrew Richard Lukehart v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
________________________ 
 
Nos. SC09-961 & SC09-1788 
________________________ 
 
ANDREW RICHARD LUKEHART,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
________ 
 
ANDREW RICHARD LUKEHART,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
EDWIN G. BUSS, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[June 23, 2011] 
CORRECTED OPINION 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Andrew Richard Lukehart appeals an order of the circuit court denying his 
amended motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.850.  Through his postconviction motion, Lukehart 
challenges his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death.  Lukehart 
2 
 
also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. 
V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  With the single exception noted in the fourth issue 
below concerning a procedural claim, we affirm the postconviction court‘s denial 
of  rule 3.850 relief and we deny habeas relief. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Lukehart appeals the postconviction court‘s denial, after evidentiary 
hearing, of his rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief.  The facts 
underlying the crime are set forth in this Court‘s opinion on direct appeal: 
The victim in this case, five-month-old Gabrielle Hanshaw, was 
killed by Lukehart, who lived in Jacksonville with Gabrielle‘s mother, 
Misty Rhue, along with Rhue‘s other daughter, Ashley, and Rhue‘s 
father and uncle.  On February 25, 1996, Lukehart and Rhue spent 
Sunday afternoon running errands in Rhue‘s car with the two children. 
When the four returned to their house on Epson Lane, Rhue took two-
year-old Ashley, who had been ill, to her bedroom for a nap, and 
Lukehart cared for Gabrielle, the baby, in another room.  At one point, 
Lukehart entered the bedroom and took a clean diaper for the baby.  
At approximately 5 p.m., Rhue heard her car starting in the driveway, 
looked out the window, and saw Lukehart driving away in her white 
Oldsmobile.  Rhue searched the house for the baby and did not find 
her.  Thirty minutes later, Lukehart called from a convenience store 
and told Rhue to call the 911 emergency number because someone in 
a blue Chevrolet Blazer had kidnapped the baby from the house.  
After Rhue called 911, Jacksonville Sheriff‘s Detectives Tim Reddish 
and Phil Kearney went to the Epson Lane house. 
Shortly thereafter, Lukehart appeared without shirt or shoes in 
the front yard of the residence of a Florida Highway Patrol trooper in 
rural Clay County.  At about that same time, the car that Lukehart had 
been driving was discovered about a block away from the trooper‘s 
house.  The car was off the road and had been abandoned with its 
3 
 
engine running.  Law enforcement officers from the Clay County 
Sheriff‘s Office and the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office interviewed 
Lukehart and searched in Clay County for the baby during the ensuing 
eighteen hours.  At about noon on Monday, February 26, Lukehart 
told a lieutenant with the Clay County Sheriff‘s Office that he had 
dropped the baby on her head and then shook the baby and that the 
baby had died at Misty Rhue‘s residence.  Lukehart said that when the 
baby died, he panicked, left Rhue‘s residence, and threw the baby in a 
pond near Normandy Boulevard in Jacksonville.  Law enforcement 
officers searched that area and found the baby‘s body in a pond. 
On March 7, 1996, Lukehart was indicted on one count of first-
degree murder and one count of aggravated child abuse.  The trial was 
held February 26 and February 27, 1997.  During the trial, the State 
put into evidence the testimony of law enforcement officers who were 
involved in the search for the baby and who were with Lukehart 
during the evening of February 25 through the morning of February 
26, 1996.  The State also presented statements made by Lukehart.  
The State presented the testimony of the medical examiner, who 
testified that the baby‘s body revealed bruises on her head and arm 
that occurred close to the time of death and that prior to death the 
baby had received five blows to her head, two of which created 
fractures. 
Lukehart chose to testify in his defense at trial.  Before 
Lukehart testified, the trial court appropriately advised him that he 
had a right not to testify and that if he did testify, he would be subject 
to cross-examination.  In his testimony, Lukehart said that, while he 
was changing the baby‘s diaper on the floor at Rhue‘s residence, the 
baby repeatedly pushed up on her elbows.  He forcefully and 
repeatedly pushed her head and neck onto the floor ―until the last time 
I did it she just stopped moving, she was just completely still.‖  
Lukehart testified to being six-feet one-inch tall and weighing 225 
pounds.  He stated that he used ―quite a bit‖ of force to push the baby 
down.  He testified that he tried mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, and 
when the baby did not revive, he panicked and grabbed the baby and 
drove to a rural area.  He said that when he stopped and was in the 
process of getting out of the car, he accidentally hit the baby‘s head on 
the car door.  Lukehart testified that he threw the baby into the pond 
where her body was found.  He admitted that he had not told law 
4 
 
enforcement officers the truth in his earlier accounts of the incident 
and that, although he did not intend to kill the baby, he was 
responsible for her death.  He said that he eventually told Lieutenant 
Jimm Redmond of the Clay County Sheriff‘s Office that he was 
responsible for the baby‘s death and that he had revealed the location 
of the baby‘s body because ―I felt bad, I felt guilty.‖ 
The jury convicted Lukehart of first-degree murder and 
aggravated child abuse as charged.  At the penalty phase, the State 
established that Lukehart had pleaded guilty to felony child abuse for 
injuring his former girlfriend‘s baby and that Lukehart was on 
probation for that prior felony conviction.  By a vote of nine to three, 
the jury recommended death.  In its sentencing order, the trial court 
found that the following three statutory aggravators had been 
established: (1) that the murder was committed during commission of 
the felony of aggravated child abuse; (2) that the victim was under 
twelve years of age; and (3) that appellant had a prior violent felony 
conviction and was on felony probation (two factors merged). The 
trial court also found and gave some weight to the statutory mitigators 
of Lukehart‘s age (twenty-two) and his substantially impaired 
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law.  The court found and gave 
some weight to the following nonstatutory mitigators: Lukehart‘s 
alcoholic and abusive father; Lukehart‘s drug and alcohol abuse; 
Lukehart‘s being sexually abused and suicidal as a child; and 
Lukehart‘s being employed.  Finding that aggravators outweighed 
mitigators, the court sentenced Lukehart to death for the first-degree 
murder conviction and to fifteen years‘ imprisonment for the 
aggravated child abuse conviction. 
 
Lukehart v. State, 776 So. 2d 906, 910-11 (Fla. 2000).  On direct appeal, Lukehart 
raised twelve claims.1  Id. at 911 n.1.  This Court affirmed Lukehart‘s convictions 
                                          
 
 
1.  Lukehart‘s claims on appeal were: (1) the trial court erred in 
refusing to suppress Lukehart‘s statements; (2) the trial court erred by 
limiting cross-examination; (3) Lukehart‘s convictions of first-degree 
murder and aggravated battery were invalid because of insufficient evidence 
5 
 
and his sentence of death and remanded the case to the trial court for a 
resentencing on the aggravated child abuse conviction and directed the trial court 
to complete the sentencing guidelines scoresheet because the trial court had failed 
to complete the required guidelines scoresheet in imposing Lukehart‘s concurrent 
fifteen-year prison sentence on the aggravated child abuse conviction.  Id. at 927. 
 
Lukehart sought certiorari review before the United States Supreme Court 
alleging that he was in custody for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966), when he was handcuffed by Trooper Richard E. Davis, handcuffed by 
Deputy Jeff Gardner, and detained under the Baker Act.2  On June 25, 2001, the 
                                                                                                                                        
of premeditation and the lack of a felony independent of the homicide; (4) 
the trial court erred in instructing the jury on justifiable or excusable 
homicide; (5) Lukehart‘s death sentence was disproportionate; (6) the trial 
court erred in finding that the murder in the course of a felony aggravator 
had been established; (7) the trial court erred in applying the new aggravator 
of a crime committed while on felony probation; (8) the trial court erred in 
finding both murder in the course of a felony and that the victim was under 
twelve as aggravators (improper doubling); (9) the victim-under-twelve 
aggravator and the standard jury instruction on the aggravator were 
unconstitutional; (10) the trial court erred in allowing a collateral crime 
(found to be a prior violent felony) to be a feature of the penalty phase; (11) 
the prosecutor‘s closing argument comments during the penalty phase were 
fundamental error; and (12) the trial court erred regarding the sentence for 
the noncapital conviction and the restitution orders. 
 
 
2.  The Baker Act, also known as the Florida Mental Health Act, provides in 
part that ―a law enforcement officer shall take a person who appears to meet the 
6 
 
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.  Lukehart v. Florida, 533 U.S. 934 
(2001). 
 
On September 27, 2001, Lukehart filed a shell motion for postconviction 
relief.  The trial court granted the State‘s motion to strike the shell motion as 
improper.   
 
On June 20, 2002, Lukehart filed a motion to vacate judgment of conviction 
and sentence pursuant to rules 3.850 and 3.851.  In his motion, Lukehart raised 
seventeen claims.3  On August 26, 2002, the State filed a response to Lukehart‘s 
                                                                                                                                        
criteria for involuntary examination into custody.‖  § 394.463(2)(a)(2), Fla. Stat. 
(1995). 
 
3.  In his motion, Lukehart raised the following claims:  (1) the trial court 
erred in striking his shell motion; (2) Florida‘s death penalty statute is 
unconstitutional and violates Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), and Apprendi 
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); (3) trial counsel was ineffective during the 
guilt phase and the penalty phase; (4) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object to jury instructions on the ground that they shifted the burden to the 
defendant to prove that a life sentence was appropriate; (5) the ―victim under 
twelve‖ aggravator is unconstitutional; (6) the trial court violated the mandates of 
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), by informing the jury that their 
sentencing recommendation was advisory; (7) a Florida rule of professional 
conduct prohibiting juror interviews is unconstitutional; (8) Florida‘s lethal 
injection protocol constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and violates the ex 
post facto clause; (9) Lukehart‘s execution would violate the dictates of Ford v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); (10) Lukehart‘s death sentence violates Furman 
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and its progeny; (11) Lukehart‘s mental health 
expert was ineffective under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); (12) the 
prosecutor‘s comments violated Lukehart‘s right to a fair trial; (13) Florida‘s 
statute prohibiting the imposition of a sentence of death to be imposed on a 
7 
 
motion for postconviction relief.  There, the State did not oppose an evidentiary 
hearing on the third claim regarding Lukehart‘s numerous ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims.  On July 2, 2003, the trial court issued an order setting a Huff4 
hearing for September 22, 2003. 
Following the Huff hearing, the postconviction court granted an evidentiary 
hearing on Lukehart‘s third claim only, regarding the alleged ineffectiveness of 
counsel during the guilt and penalty phases.  The evidentiary hearing was 
conducted on May 9-10, 2007.  During the evidentiary hearing, Lukehart called the 
following witnesses: (1) Dr. Barry M. Crown, (2) Dr. Jack Daniel, (3) Deputy 
Richard G. Davis, (4) Michael L. Edwards, (5) Amy Grass-Gilmore, (6) Deputy 
Jeff Gardner, (7) Brenda Page (Page), (8) Stephanie Repko (Repko), (9) Melissa 
Smith, (10) Bonnie Lukehart, (11) Randall Lukehart, and (12) Andrew Lukehart.  
The State did not call any witnesses. 
                                                                                                                                        
mentally retarded defendant, section 921.137, Florida Statutes (2001), violates 
substantive due process because the statute does not apply retroactively; (14) the 
imposition of the death penalty on a mentally retarded defendant violates equal 
protection and due process; (15) Lukehart‘s death sentence constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment in violation of Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); (16) 
the trial court failed to consider mitigating evidence in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment and Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415, 419 (Fla. 1990); and (17) 
cumulative error.   
 
4.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
8 
 
 
On March 27, 2009, following the evidentiary hearing for Lukehart‘s third 
claim, the postconviction court entered its order denying Lukehart‘s third claim 
and summarily denying the remaining sixteen claims.  This appeal followed.  On 
appeal, Lukehart raises twelve5 claims in his appeal from the denial of his rule 
3.850 motion and also raises three6 claims in his petition for writ of habeas corpus.   
ANALYSIS 
LUKEHART’S RULE 3.850 CLAIMS 
                                          
 
 
5.  In the instant case, Lukehart argues that the postconviction court erred in 
denying his rule 3.850 motion regarding whether: (1) counsel was ineffective for 
failing to challenge the prior violent felony aggravator during the penalty phase, 
(2) counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to cease Lukehart‘s 
medication and a motion for continuance, (3) counsel was ineffective for failing to 
present Dr. Harry Krop during the guilt phase, (4) Lukehart‘s amended 
postconviction motion should relate back to the filing of his shell motion, (5) 
counsel was ineffective for failing to include an additional argument in the motion 
to suppress, (6) counsel was ineffective for failing to properly argue and object to 
the jury instructions and the State‘s allegedly improper arguments regarding the 
instructions, (7) counsel was ineffective pursuant to Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 
U.S. 320 (1985), (8) counsel was ineffective for failing to present live testimony 
rather than deposition testimony during the penalty phase, (9) counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to allegedly improper prosecutorial comments, (10) 
the rule prohibiting juror interviews is unconstitutional, (11) Florida‘s lethal 
injection protocols are unconstitutional, and (12) cumulative error is present. 
 
6.  In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Lukehart raises the following 
three claims: (1) this Court should revisit its prior proportionality review in light of 
Page‘s uncontroverted testimony at the postconviction evidentiary hearing, (2) 
Florida‘s lethal injection protocol violates that Eighth Amendment, and (3) the 
inclusion of pancuronium bromide in Florida‘s lethal injection protocol violates 
free speech. 
9 
 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Lukehart contends that the postconviction court erred in denying his claims 
that trial counsel was ineffective.  Following the United States Supreme Court‘s 
decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), this Court has held that 
for ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two requirements 
must be satisfied:  
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 
lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
competent performance under prevailing professional standards. 
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.  A court 
considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel need not make a 
specific ruling on the performance component of the test when it is 
clear that the prejudice component is not satisfied. 
Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986) (citations omitted).  
―Where this Court has previously rejected a substantive claim on the merits, 
counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to make a meritless argument.‖  
Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So. 3d 535, 546 (Fla. 2010). 
Standard of Review 
Because both prongs of the Strickland test present mixed questions of law 
and fact, this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the circuit 
court‘s factual findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but 
10 
 
reviewing the circuit court‘s legal conclusions de novo.  See Sochor v. State, 883 
So. 2d 766, 771-72 (Fla. 2004).   
 
There is a strong presumption that trial counsel‘s performance was not 
ineffective.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.  ―A fair assessment of attorney 
performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of 
hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel‘s challenged conduct, and to 
evaluate the conduct from counsel‘s perspective at the time.‖  Id. at 689.  The 
defendant carries the burden to ―overcome the presumption that, under the 
circumstances, the challenged action ‗might be considered sound trial strategy.‘ ‖  
Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).  ―Judicial scrutiny of 
counsel‘s performance must be highly deferential.‖  Id. at 689. We have held that 
―strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative 
courses have been considered and rejected and counsel‘s decision was reasonable 
under the norms of professional conduct.‖  Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 
1048 (Fla. 2000). 
The Prior Violent Felony Aggravator 
 
In his first claim, Lukehart contends the postconviction court erred in 
denying this claim because trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel 
for failing to present the testimony of Page during the penalty phase trial because 
11 
 
her testimony would have mitigated Lukehart‘s prior violent felony aggravator.  
Lukehart also contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel 
for failing to file a rule 3.850 motion to have the prior violent felony vacated or set 
aside.  We disagree. 
 
Lukehart has failed to demonstrate that trial counsel‘s performance was 
deficient.  At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that he discussed the 
prior conviction with Lukehart and was aware that Lukehart denied committing 
that crime.  Trial counsel discussed the prior conviction with the attorney who 
handled that case, who informed trial counsel that she had told Lukehart that he 
had a good chance of acquittal and advised him not to enter a plea.  Trial counsel 
also obtained and read the Public Defender‘s file in the prior conviction case, 
including the psychological report and the lawyer‘s notes.  After reviewing the file 
regarding the prior conviction and discussing the case with the assistant public 
defender who handled the case, trial counsel concluded that Lukehart‘s plea had 
been knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered.  Trial counsel testified that 
there was no basis to set aside the plea and noted that he had an ethical obligation 
not to file frivolous motions.   
 
Moreover, to the extent that Lukehart is really raising a residual or lingering 
doubt claim, Florida does not recognize residual doubt, much less residual doubt as 
12 
 
to the aggravators.  See Williamson v. State, 961 So. 2d 229, 237 (Fla. 2007).  
Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless claim.  
Ferrell v. State, 29 So. 3d 959, 975 (Fla. 2010) (citing Mungin v. State, 932 So. 2d 
986, 997 (Fla. 2006)).   
 
Additionally, it appears that Lukehart is also asserting that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to raise a Johnson7  claim.  Because Lukehart‘s prior violent 
felony conviction for child abuse has not been vacated and is still a valid 
conviction, this is not a cognizable claim.  Again, counsel cannot be deemed 
ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless claim.  Ferrell, 29 So. 3d at 976 (citing 
Mungin, 932 So. 2d at 997).   
 
To the extent that Lukehart argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to 
mitigate the prior violent felony aggravator during the penalty phase, Lukehart‘s 
claim is without merit.  As explained above, trial counsel conducted a reasonable 
investigation into the prior violent felony aggravator.  Trial counsel chose not to 
introduce the testimony that was revealed during the evidentiary hearing because it 
would have opened the door and permitted the prosecution to show that Lukehart 
admitted to the crime and severely injured another infant on a separate occasion.  
                                          
 
 
7.  Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 590 (1988) (holding that 
consideration of a subsequently vacated conviction to support an aggravating 
factor violates the Eighth Amendment). 
13 
 
―Trial counsel is not deficient for failing to present additional testimony that would 
have informed the jury of negative information about the defendant.‖  Windom v. 
State, 886 So. 2d 915, 923 (Fla. 2004) (citing Breedlove v. State, 692 So. 2d 874, 
878 (Fla. 1997)).  Additionally, trial counsel will not be found to have rendered 
deficient performance when trial counsel made a reasonable, strategic decision to 
not present mitigation testimony during the penalty phase that could open the door 
to other damaging testimony.  See Davis v. State, 990 So. 2d 459, 472 (Fla. 2008) 
(quoting Gaskin v. State, 822 So. 2d 1243, 1248 (Fla. 2002).   
 
A comparison of Page‘s 1994 deposition and her subsequent evidentiary 
hearing testimony does not reveal the existence of any evidence that would have 
mitigated the weight of Lukehart‘s prior violent felony aggravator.  Rather, it 
appears that Lukehart wanted to use Page‘s testimony to relitigate the merits of his 
1994 conviction.  We have previously rejected a similar claim.  See Melton v. 
State, 949 So. 2d 994, 1005 (Fla. 2007) (―Melton may not relitigate the Saylor 
murder conviction in these proceedings.‖).   
 
Further, Lukehart cannot demonstrate prejudice.  Prejudice, in the context of 
penalty phase error, is shown where, absent the error, there is a reasonable 
probability that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances would 
have been different or the deficiency substantially impaired or undermined 
14 
 
confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.  See Smithers v. State, 18 So. 3d 460, 
467 (Fla. 2009) (citing Jones v. State, 998 So. 2d 573, 585 (Fla. 2008)).  In the 
instant case, Lukehart has failed to demonstrate any error in trial counsel‘s 
handling of the prior violent felony conviction that would undermine confidence in 
the outcome.  Notwithstanding Page‘s testimony at the evidentiary hearing, 
Lukehart has not provided a reasonable explanation for his decision to plead guilty 
to the prior child abuse charge.  Moreover, J.F., the victim of Lukehart‘s prior child 
abuse charge, was in the exclusive care of Lukehart at the time she sustained her 
head injuries.  Instead, the introduction of Page‘s testimony would likely have 
caused the jury to conclude that Lukehart had a propensity for harming infants.   
Motion to Amend 
 
In his second claim, Lukehart contends that the postconviction court erred in 
denying his motion to amend the pleadings to conform with the evidence.   There, 
Lukehart alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to 
cease Lukehart‘s medication and a motion for a continuance.  Lukehart contends 
that the trial court erred in denying his motion because information that serves as a 
basis for this claim did not surface until the evidentiary hearing.  We disagree. 
 ―The standard of review for a trial court‘s determination regarding a motion 
to amend a rule 3.850 motion is whether there was an abuse of discretion.‖  Huff v. 
15 
 
State, 762 So. 2d 476, 481 (Fla. 2000) (citing McConn v. State, 708 So. 2d 308, 
310 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)).  Because Lukehart‘s motion for postconviction relief is 
governed by rule 3.850, we review the postconviction court‘s denial of Lukehart‘s 
motion to amend for an abuse of discretion. 
Pursuant to rule 3.850(f), evidence revealed after the conclusion of an 
evidentiary hearing is proper in a successive motion for postconviction relief, not 
in a motion to amend the initial motion for postconviction relief.  In his 2007 
motion, Lukehart requested that claim three in his motion for postconviction relief 
be amended to include the additional subclaims that defense counsel was 
ineffective for failing to (1) inform the trial court prior to trial that Lukehart was 
under the influence of prescribed medication, which altered his ability to remember 
accurately, (2) request that Lukehart‘s medication be withheld, and (3) request a 
continuance until such time as the effects of the medication wore off.  Lukehart did 
not raise this claim in his initial or amended rule 3.850 motions.  Rather, Lukehart 
raised this claim in his motion to amend the pleadings to conform with the 
evidence, filed on June 1, 2007.  In its order denying relief, the postconviction 
court acknowledged the existence of Lukehart‘s motion to amend the pleadings to 
conform with the evidence, but did not discuss the substance of the motion.  This 
claim may be properly raised in a successive motion for postconviction relief.  
16 
 
Thus, we conclude that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying this claim.   
Failure to Call Dr. Krop 
 
In his third claim, Lukehart contends that the postconviction court erred in 
finding that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to present the testimony of 
Dr. Krop during Lukehart‘s guilt phase trial.  We disagree. 
At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that he presented Dr. Krop 
during the penalty phase, but that he did not present this testimony during the guilt 
phase.  Trial counsel explained that the prosecutor in this case had a policy not to 
depose mental health experts who testified in the penalty phase; she just read the 
expert‘s reports.  However, trial counsel testified that if he had listed Dr. Krop as a 
guilt phase witness, the prosecutor would have deposed him.  Trial counsel 
testified that he was afraid this would open the door to Lukehart‘s conduct after 
killing the infant and stated that he and Dr. Krop were concerned about revealing 
Lukehart‘s conduct to the jury because his conduct was the most emotional and 
extreme at that point.  To avoid revealing damaging information through Dr. 
Krop‘s testimony, trial counsel testified that he had to walk on eggshells during his 
examination of Dr. Krop at the penalty phase.  After the evidentiary hearing, the 
postconviction court denied Lukehart‘s ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
17 
 
regarding the failure to present Dr. Krop during the guilt phase trial, finding that 
defense counsel‘s decision constituted a reasonable trial strategy.  Thus, there is 
competent, substantial evidence to support the postconviction court‘s finding that 
this decision was a reasonable trial strategy.  Because the decision was reasonable, 
Lukehart‘s trial counsel was not ineffective under Strickland.  See Bowles v. State, 
979 So. 2d 182, 188 (Fla. 2008) (citing Gaskin, 822 So. 2d at 1248 (―Trial counsel 
will not be held to be deficient when she makes a reasonable strategic decision to 
not present mental mitigation testimony during the penalty phase because it could 
open the door to other damaging testimony.‖)).   
Moreover, to the extent Lukehart is raising an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim for trial counsel‘s failure to raise the defense of diminished capacity 
during the guilt phase, we deny relief.  We have repeatedly rejected similar claims.  
See Evans v. State, 946 So. 2d 1, 11 (Fla. 2006) (―[D]efense counsel is not 
ineffective for failing to present the defense of diminished capacity because 
diminished capacity is not a viable defense in Florida.‖); Hodges v. State, 885 So. 
2d 338, 352 n.8 (Fla. 2004) (―This Court has held on numerous occasions that 
evidence of an abnormal mental condition not constituting legal insanity is 
inadmissible to negate specific intent.‖); Spencer v. State, 842 So. 2d 52, 63 (Fla. 
18 
 
2003) (holding that evidence of defendant‘s disassociative state would not have 
been admissible during the guilt phase).   
Motion to Relate Back 
 
In his fourth claim, Lukehart contends that the postconviction court erred in 
denying his amended postconviction motion to relate back to the filing of his shell 
motion.  We agree. 
―[A]ppellate courts apply a de novo standard of review when the 
construction of a procedural rule . . . is at issue.‖  Barco v. School Bd. of Pinellas 
Cnty., 975 So. 2d 1116, 1121 (Fla. 2008). 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(a) provides: 
This rule shall apply to all motions and petitions for any type of 
postconviction or collateral relief brought by a prisoner in state 
custody who has been sentenced to death and whose conviction and 
death sentence have been affirmed on direct appeal.  It shall apply to 
all postconviction motions filed on or after October 1, 2001, by 
prisoners who are under sentence of death.  Motions pending on that 
date are governed by the version of this rule in effect immediately 
prior to that date. 
The record reveals that, on September 27, 2001, Lukehart filed a rule 3.850 
shell motion to vacate judgment and sentence.  On November 28, 2001, the State 
filed a motion to dismiss the shell motion.  The trial court granted the motion to 
dismiss on June 17, 2002, and allowed Lukehart to file, on or before June 25, 2002, 
an amended motion for postconviction relief.  Lukehart was given leave to 
19 
 
supplement the motion with any additional grounds or to further refine existing 
grounds based upon public record disclosures that occurred after June 25, 2002.  
On June 20, 2002, Lukehart filed a motion to vacate judgment of conviction and 
sentence and a memorandum of law with special request for leave to amend, 
raising a total of seventeen claims.   
On September 23, 2003, Lukehart filed a first amended motion to vacate 
judgment of conviction and sentence and a memorandum of law with special 
request for leave to amend and raised a total of seventeen claims.  On October 14, 
2003, the State filed an objection to the motion to amend the postconviction 
motion.  On October 16, 2003, Lukehart filed a response to the State‘s objection to 
the motion to amend the postconviction motion.   
On February 27, 2007, the trial court entertained Lukehart‘s motion for leave 
to amend.  The State filed a second objection to Lukehart‘s motion to amend his 
postconviction motion.  On March 5, 2007, the trial court entered an order granting 
the Lukehart‘s motion for leave to amend.   
In Lukehart‘s first amended motion to vacate judgment and sentence, 
Lukehart requested that the court reinstate his shell motion as it was filed prior to 
October 1, 2001.  In addition, Lukehart requested the postconviction court to allow 
20 
 
his amended motion to relate back to the time of the filing of his shell motion in 
order to expand his time to file for federal habeas relief.   
 
Clearly, Lukehart‘s shell motion was filed September 27, 2001.  
Additionally, as the trial court did not deny his shell motion until June 17, 2002, 
his shell motion was pending on October 1, 2001.  Thus, Lukehart‘s motion for 
postconviction relief is governed by rule 3.850, and the trial court erred in finding 
otherwise.   
Moreover, numerous postconviction cases in Florida refer to a defendant‘s 
shell motion and subsequent filing of an amended motion for postconviction relief.  
See Hartley v. State, 990 So. 2d 1008, 1011 (Fla. 2008) (shell motion filed 
initially, amended motion filed later); Branch v. State, 952 So. 2d 470, 474 (Fla. 
2006) (shell motion filed on May 7, 1998, and second amended motion filed April 
1, 2003); Miller v. State, 926 So. 2d 1243, 1248 (Fla. 2006) (shell motion filed 
September 27, 2001, and amended motion filed March 11, 2002); Knight v. State, 
923 So. 2d 387, 415 (Fla. 2005) (shell motion filed November 7, 2000, and 
amended motion filed August 23, 2002); Howell v. State, 877 So. 2d 697, 700 (Fla. 
2004) (filed a shell motion initially, followed by a amended motion); Finney v. 
State, 831 So. 2d 651, 656 (Fla. 2002) (shell motion filed in 1997 and amended 
motion filed in 1999); Washington v. State, 835 So. 2d 1083, 1085 (Fla. 2002) 
21 
 
(shell motion filed in 1997 and amended motion filed in 1999); Moore v. State, 
820 So. 2d 199, 206 n.7 (Fla. 2002) (shell motion filed March 26, 1999, and 
amended motion filed June 22, 1999). 
In Bryant v. State, 901 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 2005), this Court noted that Florida 
Rule of Civil Procedure 1.190(c)8 applies to postconviction cases and concluded 
that Bryant‘s amended motion would have related back to the date of Bryant‘s 
original filing.  Id. at 818.  Similarly, in Spera v. State, 971 So. 2d 754, 761-62 
(Fla. 2007), this Court relied on Bryant and noted that in Bryant, ―[w]hat we 
disapproved was the court‘s failure, when striking the original motion, to grant 
leave to amend at that time so that the amended motion would relate back to the 
date of the original.‖  Spera, 971 So. 2d at 760-61.  To accomplish this end, this 
Court concluded that it would ―allow all defendants an opportunity to amend 
facially insufficient postconviction claims.‖  Id. at 761.  Accordingly, we reverse 
the postconviction court‘s finding and instead conclude that Lukehart‘s motion for 
postconviction relief is governed by rule 3.850 and his amended motion relates 
back to the date of his original filing. 
                                          
 
 
8.  Rule 1.190(c) provides that ―[w]hen the claim or defense asserted in the 
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or 
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment shall relate back 
to the date of the original pleading.‖ 
 
22 
 
Motion to Suppress 
 
In his fifth claim, Lukehart asserts that the postconviction court erred in 
denying his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to include an additional 
argument in the motion to suppress.  Lukehart contends that trial counsel should 
have argued that law enforcement officers took Lukehart into custody under the 
Baker Act as a pretext to an arrest in violation of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
rights, and thus any statements he made should have been suppressed.  We 
disagree. 
The Florida Mental Health Act, commonly known as the Baker Act, is a 
civil commitment law that provides: 
(1) CRITERIA.—A person may be taken to a receiving facility 
for involuntary examination if there is reason to believe that the 
person has a mental illness and because of his or her mental illness: 
(a) 1. The person has refused voluntary examination after 
conscientious explanation and disclosure of the purpose of the 
examination; or 
2. The person is unable to determine for himself or herself 
whether examination is necessary; and 
(b) 1. Without care or treatment, the person is likely to suffer 
from neglect or refuse to care for himself or herself; such neglect or 
refusal poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to his or her 
well-being; and it is not apparent that such harm may be avoided 
through the help of willing family members or friends or the provision 
of other services; or 
2. There is a substantial likelihood that without care or 
treatment the person will cause serious bodily harm to himself or 
herself or others in the near future, as evidenced by recent behavior. 
 
23 
 
§ 394.463, Fla. Stat. (2010).   
Based on the language of the Baker Act, Lukehart‘s own testimony, and the 
testimony given by law enforcement officers at both the suppression hearing and at 
the evidentiary hearing, it is clear that Lukehart was not taken into custody under 
the Baker Act as a pretext to an arrest for the disappearance of Hanshaw.  The 
record reveals that during his initial encounter with law enforcement officers 
immediately following Hanshaw‘s disappearance, Lukehart informed the officers 
that he had attempted suicide earlier that day.  As a result, Lukehart was detained 
pursuant to the Baker Act.  Lukehart contends that law enforcement‘s failure to 
take him to a receiving facility establishes that the Baker Act detention was 
pretextual and that any statements that he made were obtained in violation of his 
constitutional rights.  One law enforcement officer testified that Lukehart‘s neck 
was red.  Law enforcement also found Lukehart‘s abandoned car, which Lukehart 
ran off of the road.  Further, law enforcement officers testified that he was not even 
a suspect in Hanshaw‘s disappearance until after 10:30 a.m. on February 26, 1996, 
when he told a detective that he knew where Hanshaw‘s body was located.   
On direct appeal, after an extensive review of the suppression hearing 
testimony, this Court concluded that there was competent, substantial evidence to 
support the trial court‘s denial of Lukehart‘s motion to suppress.  Lukehart, 776 
24 
 
So. 2d at 918.  This Court explicitly considered and rejected the notion that 
Lukehart was under arrest when he made the statements he sought to suppress and 
concluded that he intelligently and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights.  
Because Lukehart was not under arrest for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, 
probable cause is not implicated in this case.  Therefore, Lukehart‘s argument that 
he was unlawfully seized because law enforcement lacked probable cause is 
without merit.  See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963) 
(noting that all arrests are unlawful under the Fourth Amendment unless 
accompanied by probable cause).   
Moreover, at the evidentiary hearing, Lukehart had the opportunity to 
present evidence of the local policy governing the Baker Act.  However, Lukehart 
failed to do so.  As a result, it is not clear whether a local policy actually existed or, 
if there was a local policy, whether there was a violation of the local policy.  Thus, 
Lukehart‘s reliance on Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990) (concluding that 
marijuana was properly suppressed because the absence of local policy for the 
inventory search caused it to be insufficiently regulated for Fourth Amendment 
purposes), is misplaced and this claim fails for lack of proof. 
In Jenkins v. State, 978 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 2008), this Court specifically 
addressed the applicability of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for a violation of a 
25 
 
statutory provision.  Id. at 120-21.  There, this Court recognized federal caselaw 
recognizing that whether evidence discovered in violation of a statute is subject to 
suppression depends on the legislative intent.  Id. at 128.  This Court also 
acknowledged Florida caselaw permitting suppression of evidence where the 
legislature clearly and unequivocally announced its intention to suppress the 
evidence for a violation of the statute.  Id. at 129.  Finally, this Court examined the 
specific statute and determined that the legislature did not express a clear and 
unequivocal intent to permit suppression of evidence for a violation of that specific 
statute.  Id. at 130. Thus, this Court concluded that the exclusionary rule was 
inapplicable to remedy violations of the statute.  Id. 
Even if trial counsel had included the local policy to demonstrate that a 
violation occurred, the trial court still would have denied the motion to suppress, 
and its denial would have been affirmed on appeal.  See Fotopoulos v. State, 838 
So. 2d 1122, 1130-31 (Fla. 2002); Engle v. Dugger, 576 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 1991) (a 
court will not label counsel ineffective for failing to raise meritless claims); Card v. 
State, 497 So. 2d 1169 (Fla.1986).   
A review of section 394.453, Florida Statutes (1995), reveals that the 
legislature did not express a clear and unequivocal intent to permit suppression of 
26 
 
evidence for a violation of the Baker Act.  Section 394.453 defines the legislative 
intent of the statute and provides: 
(1)(a) It is the intent of the Legislature to authorize and direct 
the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services to evaluate, 
research, plan, and recommend to the Governor and the Legislature 
programs designed to reduce the occurrence, severity, duration, and 
disabling aspects of mental, emotional, and behavioral disorders.  The 
department is directed to implement and administer mental health 
programs as authorized and approved by the Legislature, based on the 
annual program budget of the department.  It is the further intent of 
the Legislature that programs of the department coordinate the 
development, maintenance, and improvement of receiving and 
community treatment facilities within the programs of the district as 
authorized by the Community Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental 
Health Services Act, part IV of this chapter.  Treatment programs 
shall include, but not be limited to, comprehensive health, social, 
educational, and rehabilitative services to persons requiring intensive 
short-term and continued treatment in order to encourage them to 
assume responsibility for their treatment and recovery.  It is intended 
that patients be provided with emergency service and temporary 
detention for evaluation when required; that patients be admitted to 
treatment facilities on a voluntary basis when extended or continuing 
care is needed and unavailable in the community; that involuntary 
placement be provided only when expert evaluation determines that it 
is necessary; that any involuntary treatment or examination be 
accomplished in a setting which is appropriate, most likely to 
facilitate proper care and treatment that would return the patient to the 
community as soon as possible, and the least restrictive of the 
patient‘s liberty; and that individual dignity and human rights be 
guaranteed to all persons admitted to mental health facilities or being 
detained under s. 394.463.  It is further the intent of the Legislature 
that the least restrictive means of intervention be employed based on 
the individual needs of each patient within the scope of available 
services. 
27 
 
(b) It is the intent of the Legislature that all mental health 
personnel working in public or private mental health programs and 
facilities who have direct contact with unmarried patients under the 
age of 18 years shall be of good moral character. 
(2) The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services shall 
assume the responsibility for designing and distributing appropriate 
materials for the orientation and training of persons actively engaged 
in implementing the provisions of this chapter relating to the 
involuntary placement of persons alleged to be mentally ill.  The 
department is further directed to ensure that no civil patient is 
admitted to a state treatment facility unless previously evaluated and 
found to meet the criteria for admission by a community-based public 
receiving facility or by a community mental health center or clinic in 
cases in which the public receiving facility is not a community mental 
health center or clinic.  Nothing in this act shall be construed to affect 
any policies relating to admission to hospital staff. 
§ 394.453, Fla. Stat. (1995).  The legislative intent has since been amended; 
however, it is still devoid of a clear, unequivocal intent that the exclusionary rule 
operate to suppress any evidence obtained during a violation of the Baker Act.  As 
a result, it appears that the postconviction court correctly found that the 
exclusionary rule is not a remedy for a violation of section 394.453 unless a 
constitutional violation has also occurred.  Therefore, even if trial counsel had 
raised this argument in Lukehart‘s motion to suppress, the motion still would have 
been denied and its denial affirmed on appeal on that basis.  Accordingly, Lukehart 
cannot demonstrate prejudice. 
28 
 
Similarly, Lukehart cannot demonstrate deficient performance.  To establish 
deficient performance, the defendant must establish that ―counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‗counsel‘ guaranteed the defendant 
by the Sixth Amendment.‖  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see also Cherry v. State, 
659 So. 2d 1069, 1072 (Fla.1995).  Below, the postconviction court granted an 
evidentiary hearing on this claim and concluded that the exclusionary rule was 
inapplicable to a violation of local policy under the Baker Act.  Thus, trial counsel 
cannot be deficient for failing to submit evidence of the local policy.  See Harvey 
v. State, 946 So. 2d 937, 945 (Fla. 2006) (concluding that trial counsel was not 
deficient for failing to submit a booking sheet in support of the motion to suppress 
where it was determined that the booking sheet would not have been helpful 
because it established that Harvey signed the booking sheet after he made 
incriminating statements).  Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction court‘s 
denial of relief. 
Improper Jury Instruction 
In his sixth claim, Lukehart contends that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to object to the felony murder instruction because (1) there were confusing 
terms in the standard instruction regarding the specific intent requirement of the 
aggravated battery charge, (2) the State‘s closing remarks regarding the term 
29 
 
―intentional‖ diminished the State‘s responsibility to prove intent, especially after 
the State had agreed in the charge conference that the elements required the term 
―intentional,‖ and (3) counsel should have renewed the defense‘s request for an 
instruction to clarify ―intent‖ to the jury after the State‘s remarks during closing 
argument at the guilt phase.  For the reasons below, this claim is without merit. 
In the instant case, the jury instruction for the aggravated child abuse count 
was consistent with the language contained in the statute.  Further, Florida 
Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal) 16.2 provides the proper instruction for the 
crime of aggravated child abuse.  At trial, the trial court used identical language, 
reciting the Standard Jury Instruction verbatim, when instructing the jury on this 
count.   This Court has stated that it is ―not deficient performance when counsel 
fails to object to a standard instruction that has not been invalidated by this Court.‖  
Griffin v. State, 866 So. 2d 1, 15 (Fla. 2003).  Florida Standard Jury Instruction 
(Criminal) 16.2 has not been invalidated by this Court.  Thus, any objection that 
trial counsel would have made to the jury instruction would have been overruled 
and affirmed on appeal.  As a result, the postconviction court did not err in denying 
this claim because counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to make a 
meritless argument.  See Evans v. State, 975 So. 2d 1035, 1043 (Fla. 2007) (citing 
Melendez v. State, 612 So. 2d 1366, 1369 (Fla. 1992)). 
30 
 
In this case, there was evidence of at least four, possibly five, blows to the 
victim‘s skull.  As a result, Brooks v. State, 918 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 2005) (discussing 
whether one act of child abuse that simultaneously causes death can support a 
felony murder conviction), is inapplicable.  Thus, this claim is without merit. 
 
Second, Lukehart argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object to the following underlined comments by the State because the comments 
diminished the State‘s responsibility to prove intent: 
To find him guilty of aggravated child abuse by committing 
aggravated battery upon the child it is our burden, mine and Miss 
Radi, to prove this defendant committed a battery against Gabrielle 
Hanshaw by intentionally causing bodily harm.  And Mr. Edwards 
wants you to believe that the word intentional is tantamount to 
premeditation or tantamount to some sort of a motive.   
  
. . . . 
But I think Mr. Edwards wants to make us prove motive when 
he tries to say that intentionally means we‘ve got to show that he 
wanted to do her harm.  How do you do that, ladies and gentlemen?  
Because actions speak louder than words.  All of his words about 
loving Gabrielle do not speak nearly as loudly as the fact that he 
picked - - hit her head against something more than four times, 
probably five, and that he threw her in a swamp.  That‘s what you call 
an intentional act causing bodily harm to Gabrielle Hanshaw.  And 
that while doing that, he knowingly did cause her great bodily harm 
and that she was under the age of 18 years.   
 . . . . 
And remember, the state does not have to prove motive either 
for premeditated murder or to show that he intentionally caused the 
harm.  
31 
 
The felony murder statue is absent of any language requiring that the perpetrator 
demonstrate an intent to murder the child.  Rather, the statute explicitly permits a 
person who murders a child during the course of aggravated child abuse to be 
charged with first-degree murder, a capital felony.  The allegedly improper 
comments, when read in context, are not improper and do not diminish the State‘s 
responsibility to prove intent.  Rather, the comments are correct statements of law 
and are used to distinguish premeditated murder and motive from the requirements 
for aggravated child abuse and felony murder.  Any objection to these comments 
would have been overruled and the ruling would have been affirmed on appeal.  
Thus, Lukehart has failed to demonstrate that defense counsel was ineffective for 
failing to object to the State‘s comments regarding the word ―intentional.‖ 
 
Third, Lukehart argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to 
renew the request for an instruction to clarify ―intent‖ to the jury after the State‘s 
guilt phase remarks.  Based on the aforementioned analysis, Lukehart cannot 
demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.  Thus, this claim is without merit.  
Accordingly, we deny relief.  
Lukehart‘s Caldwell Claim 
 
In his seventh claim, Lukehart contends that the postconviction court erred 
in denying his claim that counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object 
32 
 
when the trial court instructed the jury that their penalty phase role and 
recommendation were purely advisory.  We disagree.  This Court has repeatedly 
stated that Caldwell claims are proper on direct appeal and cannot be raised for the 
first time on collateral review.  See Hitchcock v. State, 991 So. 2d 337, 361 (Fla. 
2008); Jones v. State, 928 So. 2d 1178, 1183 n.5 (Fla. 2006); Teffeteller v. Dugger, 
734 So. 2d 1009, 1026 (Fla. 1999).  The record reveals that Lukehart did not raise 
this claim on direct appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction court‘s 
summary denial of Lukehart‘s Caldwell claim. 
Deposition Testimony 
In his eighth claim, Lukehart argues that the postconviction court erred in 
denying his claim that counsel was ineffective for presenting deposition testimony 
rather than live testimony from five witnesses during Lukehart‘s penalty phase 
trial.  We disagree. 
At the evidentiary hearing, Lukehart established that only one of the 
witnesses, Repko, was available for purposes of presenting live testimony and that 
Lukehart could only elicit live testimony from Repko.  ―A defendant cannot 
establish ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel‘s failure to call a 
witness who is unavailable.‖  White v. State, 964 So. 2d 1278, 1286 (Fla. 2007) 
(citing Melton v. State, 949 So. 2d 994, 1004 (Fla. 2006)).  Thus, we decline to 
33 
 
address whether counsel was ineffective for failing to present the live testimony of 
the four other witnesses that Lukehart includes in this claim. 
With regard to counsel‘s presentation of Repko‘s deposition testimony rather 
than live testimony, Lukehart cannot demonstrate ineffective assistance.  Trial 
counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to present testimony from the 
evidentiary hearing that was virtually identical to the testimony presented during 
the penalty phase.  See Pietri v. State, 885 So. 2d 245, 267 (Fla. 2004) (concluding 
that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to present evidence presented 
during the evidentiary hearing that was wholly cumulative to the evidence 
presented during the trial proceedings); Henyard v. State, 883 So. 2d 753, 759, 761 
(Fla. 2004) (concluding that counsel was not ineffective where the evidentiary 
hearing testimony was cumulative of the testimony at the penalty phase).   
Furthermore, the record shows this is not a case where trial counsel failed to 
investigate and present available mitigating evidence.  The trial court‘s findings of 
mitigation directly refute such a claim.  Lukehart does not allege that counsel made 
no attempt to investigate mitigation or that he failed to present something he 
otherwise uncovered.  Further, Lukehart fails to allege that any additional 
mitigating or nonstatutory mitigating factors would have been found or supported 
by Repko‘s testimony.  He also argues that Repko‘s testimony would have 
34 
 
challenged the weight of the aggravators found in this case; however, he fails to 
state with specificity which aggravators would have been affected.  Under these 
circumstances, it appears Lukehart has shown no error in the trial court‘s holding 
that Lukehart failed to demonstrate that counsel was deficient.  See, e.g., Taylor v. 
State, 3 So. 3d 986, 992 (Fla. 2009); Waterhouse v. State, 792 So. 2d 1176, 1182 
(Fla. 2001). 
As revealed by the record, trial counsel travelled to Pennsylvania and 
deposed numerous family members.  Trial counsel obtained mitigating evidence 
regarding Lukehart‘s age and the physical and sexual abuse he suffered as a child, 
as well as evidence that he could not appreciate the criminality of his conduct, that 
his maturity level was below his age, and that he was gainfully employed at the 
time of the murder.  The trial court gave the mitigation some weight.  Trial 
counsel‘s conduct appears to have been reasonable and does not appear to have 
fallen below the norms of professional conduct.  This evidence supported the trial 
court‘s finding of two statutory and four nonstatutory mitigators.  Because the 
additional testimony at the evidentiary hearing was largely cumulative, the failure 
to present the additional testimony does not undermine confidence in the outcome 
―when viewed in the context of the penalty phase evidence and the mitigators and 
aggravators found by the trial court.‖  Hurst v. State, 18 So. 3d 975, 1013 (Fla. 
35 
 
2009).  Thus, to the extent Lukehart alleges trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to properly investigate mitigation evidence, he is not entitled to relief, because he 
cannot demonstrate either deficient performance or prejudice.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the postconviction court‘s denial of this claim. 
Improper Prosecutorial Comments 
 
In his ninth claim, Lukehart contends that the postconviction court erred in 
denying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding trial counsel‘s failure 
to object to allegedly improper prosecutorial comments.  We disagree.   
Florida jurisprudence permits wide latitude in arguing to a jury.  Moore v. 
State, 701 So. 2d 545, 551 (Fla. 1997) (citing Breedlove v. State, 413 So. 2d 1, 8 
(Fla. 1982)).  ―Logical inferences may be drawn, and counsel is allowed to 
advance all legitimate arguments.‖  Thomas v. State, 748 So. 2d 970, 984 (Fla. 
1999) (citing Breedlove, 413 So. 2d at 8).   
First, the postconviction court properly denied this claim as procedurally 
barred because it could have and should have been raised on direct appeal.  See 
Spencer, 842 So. 2d at 60-61 (substantive claims of prosecutorial misconduct could 
and should have been raised on direct appeal and thus were procedurally barred 
from consideration in a postconviction motion). 
36 
 
Second, three of the allegedly improper comments were addressed by this 
Court on direct appeal.  Lukehart, 776 So. 2d at 925, 927.  There, we concluded 
that the claim was procedurally barred because the issue was not preserved by a 
contemporaneous objection.  Id. at 927.  However, on direct appeal we also 
explained that even if the claim had not been procedurally barred, it would have 
been found without merit because the comments did not amount to fundamental 
error.  Id.  ―A fundamental error is defined as an error that ‗reaches down into the 
validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been 
obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.‘ ‖  Spencer, 842 So. 2d at 73  
(quoting Kilgore v. State, 688 So. 2d 895, 898 (Fla. 1996)).  ―[E]ach case must be 
considered upon its own merits and within the circumstances pertaining when the 
questionable statements are made . . . .‖  Darden v. State, 329 So. 2d 287, 291 (Fla. 
1976).  Thus, Lukehart cannot demonstrate prejudice as to those comments. 
Juror Interviews 
In his tenth claim, Lukehart challenges the postconviction court‘s summary 
denial of his constitutional challenge to rule 4-3.5(d)(4) of the Rules Regulating the 
Florida Bar.  We find this claim without merit.  Rule 4-3.5(d)(4) precludes a 
lawyer from initiating communication or causing another to initiate communication 
with any member of the jury ―except to determine whether the verdict may be 
37 
 
subject to legal challenge.‖  As the postconviction court properly found, this claim 
is procedurally barred because it could have and should have been raised on direct 
appeal.  See Reese v. State, 14 So. 3d 913, 919 (Fla. 2009) (holding that 
defendant‘s constitutional challenge to rule 4-3.5(d)(4) was procedurally barred 
because it should have been raised on direct appeal) (citing Israel v. State, 985 So. 
2d 510, 522 (Fla. 2008)).  Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction court‘s denial 
of this claim. 
Florida‘s Lethal Injection Protocols 
In his eleventh claim, Lukehart claims the postconviction court erred in 
summarily denying his challenge to the constitutionality of Florida‘s lethal 
injection protocols.  As Lukehart correctly concedes, this Court has repeatedly 
rejected this claim.  See, e.g., Davis v. State, 26 So. 3d 519, 525 n.3 (Fla. 2009), 
cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 3509 (2010); Reese, 14 So. 3d at 919; Tompkins v. State, 
994 So.2d 1072, 1081 (Fla. 2008).  ―Florida‘s current lethal injection protocol 
passes muster under any of the risk-based standards considered by the Baze Court 
(and would easily satisfy the intent-based standard advocated by justices Thomas 
and Scalia).‖  Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So. 3d 535, 550 (Fla. 2010) (emphasis 
omitted) (quoting Ventura v. State, 2 So. 3d 194, 200 (Fla. 2009)).  Accordingly, 
we affirm the postconviction court‘s denial of this claim.   
38 
 
Cumulative Error 
 
In his twelfth claim, Lukehart contends that the postconviction court erred in 
finding that cumulative error was not present.  This Court has repeatedly held that 
where the alleged errors, when viewed individually, are ―either procedurally barred 
or without merit, the claim of cumulative error also necessarily fails.‖  Israel, 985 
So. 2d at 520 (quoting Parker v. State, 904 So. 2d 370, 380 (Fla. 2005)).  If 
multiple errors are found and deemed harmless individually, this Court has 
recognized that the cumulative effect of such errors may ―deny to defendant the 
fair and impartial trial that is the inalienable right of all litigants.‖  Brooks v. State, 
918 So. 2d 181, 202 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Jackson v. State, 575 So. 2d 181, 189 
(Fla. 1991)).  Where several errors are identified, this Court ―considers the 
cumulative effect of evidentiary errors and ineffective assistance claims together.‖  
Suggs v. State, 923 So. 2d 419, 441 (Fla. 2005) (citing State v. Gunsby, 670 So. 2d 
920, 924 (Fla. 1996)).  In the instant case, only one of the alleged errors has 
merit—Lukehart‘s claim that the trial court erred in finding that Lukehart‘s 
amended motion did not relate back to the date of his original shell motion.  This 
error, standing alone, did not deprive Lukehart of a fair and impartial trial and does 
not warrant reversal.  Thus, Lukehart is not entitled to relief.  Accordingly, we 
39 
 
affirm the postconviction court‘s denial of Lukehart‘s motion for postconviction 
relief. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
Proportionality 
 
Lukehart challenges this Court‘s proportionality determination from the 
direct appeal, and again, is also attempting to relitigate the validity of the 
underlying prior violent felony conviction that was used as an aggravator.  This 
claim is procedurally barred, as it was raised and rejected on direct appeal.  See 
Ferrell v. State, 918 So. 2d 163, 178 (Fla. 2005) (citing Smith v. State, 445 So. 2d 
323, 325 (Fla. 1983) (―Issues which either were or could have been litigated at trial 
and upon direct appeal are not cognizable through collateral attack.‖)); see also 
Allen v. State, 854 So. 2d 1255, 1262 (Fla. 2003) (finding inmate was precluded 
from raising claim relating to proportionality review in habeas petition as claim 
had already been raised and rejected on direct appeal).  Accordingly, we deny 
habeas relief on this claim. 
Florida‘s Lethal Injection Protocol 
Next, Lukehart alleges that this Court should grant habeas relief because 
new scientific evidence makes clear that the existing procedure for lethal injection 
is unconstitutional.  We disagree.  This issue was previously raised in Lukehart‘s 
40 
 
motion for postconviction relief.  The postconviction court summarily denied this 
issue.  Lukehart also contemporaneously raises the eleventh issue of his 
accompanying appeal from the denial of his rule 3.850 motion for postconviction 
relief.  ―Habeas petitions are the proper vehicle to advance claims of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel.  However, claims of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel may not be used to camouflage issues that could and should have 
been presented on direct appeal or in a proper postconviction motion.‖  Davis v. 
State, 928 So. 2d 1089, 1126 (Fla. 2005) (citations omitted) (citing Rutherford v. 
Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 2000)); Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 660 
(Fla. 2000)).  Thus, this claim is procedurally barred.  Accordingly, we deny 
habeas relief on this claim. 
Free Speech 
 
Finally, Lukehart urges this Court to grant his petition for writ of habeas 
corpus and argues that the administration of pancuronium bromide during the 
lethal injection procedure will violate his right to free speech because it will render 
him unable to communicate any feeling of pain that may result if the execution is 
improperly performed.  This Court has considered and repeatedly rejected similar 
claims.  See, e.g., Rolling v. State, 944 So. 2d 176, 180 (Fla. 2006); Rutherford v. 
41 
 
State, 926 So. 2d 1100, 1115 (Fla. 2006).  Thus, we deny habeas relief on this 
claim. 
Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction court‘s denial of rule 3.850 relief 
and we deny habeas relief. 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, LEWIS, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, C.J., concurs in result. 
QUINCE, J., recused. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,  
William Arthur Wilkes, Judge – Case No. 16-1996-CF-2645AX 
 
Michael P. Reiter, Venice, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Assistant 
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent