Title: BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF FREMONT COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT #25 V. BM

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF FREMONT COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT #25 V. BM2006 WY 23129 P.3d 317Case Number: C-05-6Decided: 03/07/2006
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
BOARD OF 
TRUSTEES OF FREMONT

COUNTY 
SCHOOL DISTRICT 
#25,

 
 
Appellant

(Respondent),

 
 
v.

 
 
BM,

 
 
Appellee

(Petitioner).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofFremontCounty

The 
Honorable Norman E. Young, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
Joel M. 
Vincent of Vincent & Vincent, Riverton, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
R. 
Daniel Fleck and Emily R. Rankin of The Spence Law Firm, LLC, Jackson, Wyoming

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ., and STEBNER, D.J., 
Retired.

 
 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      BM was expelled 
from Riverton High School by the Board of Trustees of Fremont County School 
District #25 for violations of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 21-4-305(a)1 and 21-4-306(a)(v)2 (LexisNexis 2005).  The expulsion order was suspended 
subject to a ten-day "in school suspension" and a requirement that he sign and 
abide by a "Behavior Contract."  BM 
filed a petition of review with the district court, which was reversed.  The district court concluded that the 
Board had failed to comply with the statutory procedural requirements of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-107(b)(iv)3 (LexisNexis 2005), and that there 
was insufficient evidence to support the Board's determination that BM's conduct 
constituted a violation of the cited statutes.  The Board appeals the district court's 
judgment.  Since the commencement of 
these proceedings, BM has served his sentence of suspension, complied with the 
terms of the "Behavior Contract," and graduated from high school.  Accordingly, we conclude that the 
proceedings are moot and dismiss the appeal.

 
 

ISSUE

[¶2]      The determinative 
issue on appeal is whether BM's compliance with the terms of his punishment and 
subsequent graduation from high school has rendered the matter 
moot.

 
 

DISCUSSION

[¶3]      We will dismiss 
any appeal where we have notice of facts that have the effect of making any 
determination of a question unnecessary or which would render any judgment we 
made ineffectual.  Penny v. State ex rel. Wyoming Mental Health 
Professions Licensing Board, 2005 WY 117, ¶2, 120 P.3d 152, 156-57 (Wyo. 
2005) (quoting Department of Revenue and 
Taxation, Motor Vehicle Division v. Andrews, 671 P.2d 1239, 1244 (Wyo. 
1983)).  We have previously noted 
that when a student's expulsion period has expired, the question regarding its 
propriety is moot.  In the Interest of RM, 2004 WY 162, ¶8, 
102 P.3d 868, 871 (Wyo. 2004).  
There are exceptions to the mootness doctrine: when a question presents 
an issue of great public importance or if the controversy is capable of 
repetition yet evading review.  Id. at ¶¶8-9, 102 P.2d  at 871; see also Walker v. Board of County Commissioners of 
Albany County, 644 P.2d 772, 774 (Wyo. 1982); and Board of County Commissioners v. Exxon Mobil 
Corporation, 2002 WY 151, ¶18, 55 P.3d 714, 720 (Wyo. 2002).  We applied both exceptions in RM where the issue presented was a 
reserved constitutional question asking whether a school district was required 
to provide an education to a lawfully expelled student.  This case does not present any 
constitutional question for resolution.  
Furthermore, this matter is moot only because of its proximity to BM's 
graduation.  Similar controversies 
will not necessarily evade review.  
Therefore, we conclude that neither of the exceptions to the mootness 
doctrine is applicable here.

 
 
[¶4]      
Dismissed.

FOOTNOTES

  1§ 21-4-305. Suspension or expulsion; 
authority; procedure.

(a)     
The board of 
trustees of any school district may delegate authority to disciplinarians chosen 
from the administrative and supervisory staff to suspend any student from school 
for a period not to exceed ten (10) school days.  In addition, the board of trustees shall, 
subject to the case-by-case modification permitted by this subsection, require 
the district superintendent to expel from school for a period of one (1) year 
any student determined to possess, use, transfer, carry or sell a deadly weapon 
as defined under W.S. 6-1-104(a)(iv) within any school bus as defined by W.S. 
31-7-102(a)(xl) or within the boundaries of real property used by the district 
primarily for the education of students in grades kindergarten through twelve 
(12).  The superintendent with the 
approval of the board of trustees may modify the period of expulsion on a 
case-by-case basis based upon the circumstances of the violation.  Upon a violation of this subsection and 
following notice and hearing requirements of this section, the superintendent 
shall notify the district attorney of the violation together with the specific 
act in violation of this subsection and the name of the student violating this 
subsection.  Nothing in this 
subsection prohibits a district from providing educational services to the 
expelled student in an alternative setting.

 
 
  2§ 21-4-306. Suspension or expulsion; 
grounds.

(a)     
The 
following shall be grounds for suspension or expulsion of a child from a public 
school during the school year:

. . . 
.

            
(v) Possession, use, transfer, carrying or selling a deadly weapon as 
defined under W.S. 6-1-104(a)(iv) within any school bus as defined by W.S. 
31-7-102(a)(xl) or within the boundaries of real property used by the district 
primarily for the education of students in grades kindergarten through twelve 
(12).

 
 
  3§ 16-3-107. Contested cases; general 
procedure.

(a)     
In any 
contested case, all parties shall be afforded an opportunity for hearing after 
reasonable notice served personally or by mail.  . . .

(b)     
The notice 
shall include a statement of:

. . . 
.

(iv) A short and plain 
statement of the matters asserted. If the agency or other party is unable to 
state the matters in detail at the time the notice is served, the initial notice 
may be limited to a statement of the issues involved, and thereafter upon 
application a more definite and detailed statement shall be 
furnished.