Title: Len Barnette Yates v. State of Arkansas

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION PER CURIAM DECEMBER 6, 2001 LEN BARNETTE YATES Appellant v. STATE OF ARKANSAS Appellee CR00-711 APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PULASKI COUNTY, NO. CR 97-1882 HONORABLE JOHN B. PLEGGE JUDGE AFFIRMED Appellant was convicted of rape and introduction of a controlled substance into the body of another. He was sentenced to thirty-five years' and ten years' imprisonment to be served concurrently. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions in an unpublished opinion. Yates v. State, CA CR 98-620 (Ark. App. June 30, 1999). Appellant filed a timely petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37, raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and denial of due process of law. The circuit court denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. We find no error and affirm. The Supreme Court enunciated the standard for assessing the effectiveness of counsel in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984): A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires a showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Id. at 687. Thus, a defendant must first show that counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," id. at 688, and second, that the errors "actually had an adverse effect on the defense." Id. at 693. In reviewing a denial of relief under Rule 37, we must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the range of reasonable professional assistance. Noel v. State, 342 Ark. 35, 38, 26 S.W.3d 123, 125 (2000). To rebut this presumption, appellant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt in that the decision reached would have been different absent the errors. Id. A reasonable probability is one that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id. Appellant's first claim of ineffectiveness is that trial counsel failed to object to Dr. Kim Light's opinion testimony that the victims were under the influence of the drug Rohypnol. According to appellant, by allowing this testimony, the court in effect allowed Dr. Light to testify that each woman was telling the truth regarding the drugging and subsequent assault. Appellant claims that Dr. Light's testimony is impermissible credibility testimony to which trial counsel should have objected. It is important to note that appellant is not objecting to Dr. Light's testimony regarding the characteristics of Rohypnol and its effects on the body. Ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be established by a mere showing of error by counsel or by revealing that counsel's failure to object prevented an issue from being addressed on appeal. Thomas v. State, 330 Ark. 442, 448, 954 S.W.2d 255, 258 (1997) (citing Huls v. State, 301 Ark. 572, 785 S.W.2d 467 (1990)). We must consider the totality of the evidence before the factfinder, and we will not reverse the denial of postconviction relief unless the lower court's findings are clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Noel, supra, at 38, 26 S.W.3d at 125. The circuit court found that an expert was necessary to testify about the effects of Rohypnol. Further, the circuit court found that Dr. Light's testimony, which was based upon the symptoms described by the three witnesses, amounted to his opinion of whether or not the witnesses' symptoms were consistent with a person who had ingested Rohypnol. According to the circuit court, Dr. Light's testimony was admissible to establish that ingestion of Rohypnol would cause a person to become physically helpless, a critical element of the State's case. Trial counsel did object to this testimony prior to trial in the form of a motion in limine. A hearing was held, and trial counsel argued that Dr. Light could not testify that the three women had been drugged or that appellant was responsible. The circuit court agreed, and the State was not allowed to ask such conclusory questions. At trial, Dr. Light, an expert pharmacologist, testified for the State that within a reasonable degree of medical certainly three women, other than the victim, who testified that they had been given drinks by appellant, had been drugged with Rohypnol or a Rohypnol-like drug. These three women testified that they, like the victim, were each given a drink prepared by appellant and shortly thereafter became impaired. Each woman believed the impairment to be unlike the symptoms of ingesting too much alcohol. Further, each woman testified that during this impaired state, appellant either tried to attack them sexually or they woke up disoriented and did not remember how they got where they were. Dr. Light did not give his opinion on whether or not the women had been raped. Dr. Light'stestimony was used to aid the jury in understanding the drug Rohypnol and its physical effects, which is permissible under Sera v. State, 341 Ark. 415, 17 S.W.3d 61 (2000) and Unif. R. Evid. 702, which provides that an expert's testimony is admissible if the testimony will aid the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact issue. Dr. Light opined that the three women's symptoms were consistent with someone who had ingested Rohypnol. From this, appellant makes the leap that this testimony was impermissible because Dr. Light was testifying to the truthfulness of these women. We disagree. Once presented with Dr. Light's testimony and that of the three women, the jury was permitted to draw its own conclusions. It was necessary that the jurors be presented with testimony regarding Rohypnol and how a person might behave if under the influence of the drug, as such information is not within the common knowledge of most lay people. In sum, this court concluded in Sera, supra, that an expert pharmacologist's opinion that the victim's testimony was consistent with ingestion of Rohypnol was admissible because the expert had knowledge of the subject beyond that of ordinary knowledge. Because an objection to Dr. Light's testimony on the ground that appellant alleges would have been meritless, his attorneys were not ineffective for failing to make it. e.g. Monts v. State, 312 Ark. 547, 549, 851 S.W.2d 432, 434 (1993). In addition to the foregoing, we further note that an abundance of evidence was introduced to convict the defendant. Besides the testimony of the three women, the victim testified that she too was given a drink prepared by appellant and that after ingesting the drink, she became impaired in a way that was unlike ingesting too much alcohol. The victim also testified that appellant had intercourse with her without her consent while she was impaired, and when she woke up the next morning at appellant's home, she felt "fuzzy." She asked appellant to take her home, and he refused. The victim then decided to walk home, a distance of ten miles, which took her five hoursto complete given her impaired state. After she arrived home, she looked in the mirror and discovered that she had bruises on her body and knots on her head that she did not have before being alone with appellant, and that she did not sustain the injuries on her walk home. In addition, the results of a vaginal swab indicated that appellant was the source of the semen found in the victim. Testing of the victim's blood also revealed that she had ingested Rohypnol during the time she was with appellant. Dr. Light testified that Rohypnol is an odorless, colorless, and tasteless drug that takes effect relatively quickly after being ingested and its effects include antegrade amnesia (the inability to remember events occurring after ingestion), sleepiness, unconsciousness, disorientation, confusion, and dizziness. Because there was sufficient evidence introduced at trial to convict appellant, he cannot show that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to object to Dr. Light's testimony, as appellant cannot show that the outcome of the trial would have been different. See Strickland, supra. Appellant's second claim is that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call an expert to rebut the testimony of Dr. Light. However, appellant's Rule 37 petition neither identified a particular expert nor stated the substance of that expert's testimony, other than an explanation of the effects of Rohypnol. The circuit court properly rejected appellant's claim for this reason. A bare allegation that a witness could be called on the petitioner's behalf will not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Nelson v. State, 344 Ark. 407, 412, 39 S.W.3d 791, 795 (2001). It was not until appellant filed a "supplement" to his petition that the affidavit of Dr. Marvin Wilson was introduced. Rule 37 provides that a petition for postconviction relief can be amended only "with leave of court." Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(e) (2000). Nothing in the record suggests appellant sought leave in order for him to supplement his petition. Moreover, it does not appear that the courtconsidered this supplement nor that the appellant requested the court to rule on this issue. We have repeatedly said that failure to obtain a ruling on an issue at the trial court level, including a constitutional issue, precludes review on appeal. Jackson v. State, 334 Ark. 406, 412, 976 S.W.2d 370, 373 (1998). Therefore, because the issue was not ruled upon by the circuit court, we will not consider it on appeal. For his third claim, appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to investigate and object to the chain of custody of the blood sample taken from the victim. The victim's blood sample indicated that she had ingested Rohypnol on the night the appellant gave her the drink and raped her. Appellant claims that because the sample was taken on August 31, 1996, and not presented to the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory until March 18, 1997, trial counsel should have objected to the chain of custody and to the fact that in March 1997 there was only a small amount of blood available for testing. All appellant offers in support of this claim is that "something was wrong, " implying that there was wrongdoing on the part of the State in collecting the blood sample, to which trial counsel should have objected. However, the unsubstantiated allegation that "something was wrong" does not establish that a chain-of-custody objection by appellant's counsel would have had merit. See Dansby v. State, 338 Ark. 697, 1 S.W.3d 403 (1999). In addition, there is no evidence presented that an objection to the chain of custody would have changed the outcome of the trial. An allegation which is general in nature with no showing of actual prejudice to the defense is not deserving of postconviction relief. Isom v. State, 284 Ark. 426, 430, 682 S.W.2d 755, 758 (1985). Counsel is presumed effective and allegations without substantiation are insufficient to overcome the presumption. Jeffers v. State, 280 Ark. 458, 460, 658 S.W.2d 869, 871-72 (1993). Appellant's final claim is that he was denied due process because he was unable to conductan independent test on the blood of the victim. The Arkansas State Crime Laboratory used the entire blood sample during its testing, leaving no blood for appellant to test independently. The circuit court denied this claim because appellant did not show bad faith by the State or broken links in the chain of custody. Nevertheless, this issue should not have been addressed by the trial court as it is not cognizable under Rule 37. This Court has held that Rule 37 does not provide a remedy when an issue could have been raised in the trial court or argued on direct appeal, unless the issue represents a question so fundamental that the judgment of conviction is rendered absolutely void. Malone v. State, 294 Ark. 127, 131, 741 S.W.2d 246, 249 (1987). The issue is not one sufficient to render the judgment absolutely void; accordingly, we will not consider the merits of appellant's argument on this point. As part of this point, appellant also claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the blood sample and the alleged chain-of-custody issues, including possible destruction of evidence. According to Lee v. State, 327 Ark. 692, 700-01, 942 S.W.2d 231, 235, cert. denied, 22 U.S. 1002 (1997), in order to succeed on a due process claim concerning destruction of evidence, appellant must show that the sample had exculpatory value which was apparent before it was destroyed and that the State acted in bad faith. Appellant alleges no facts that would suggest bad faith on the part of the State. Therefore, appellant makes no showing that trial counsel was deficient for having not investigated issues regarding the blood sample since no facts existed to support a due process argument that the sample had any exculpatory value or that the State acted in bad faith. See Lee, supra. Appellant cannot show that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had counsel raised this issue. See Strickland, supra. As to the rest of appellant's claims of ineffectiveness, they are merely conclusory allegations, which cannot be the basis for postconviction relief. Sasser v. State, 338 Ark. 375, 395, 993 S.W.2d 901, 912 (1999). Petitions that state only a conclusion are patently deficient in that there can be no showing of actual prejudice to the petitioner without factual support for the allegation made by him. A showing of actual prejudice is necessary to warrant relief under Rule 37. Wainwright v. State, 307 Ark. 569, 823 S.W.2d 449 (1992); Spivey v. State, 299 Ark. 412, 773 S.W.2d 446 (1989). Affirmed. Imber, J., not participating.