Title: Commonwealth v. Juares

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
v.  Record No. 070479 
 
 
OPINION BY SENIOR JUSTICE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    November 2, 2007 
ADHAN MALDONADO JUARES1 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
Adhan Maldonado Juares was convicted of aggravated sexual 
battery, a violation of Code § 18.2-67.3, in the Circuit Court 
of Loudoun County.  In this appeal we consider whether an ex 
parte contact between court personnel and the jury during jury 
deliberations required the trial court to declare a mistrial 
or set aside the jury verdict. 
The following facts are relevant to the issue presented 
in this appeal.  After his arrest, Juares was interviewed by 
Investigator Howard Craig and Deputy Jose A. Giron.  Juares, a 
Mexican national, had a limited command of the English 
language and Deputy Giron, who spoke Spanish fluently, acted 
as an interpreter during the interview.  With Juares’ 
permission, a portion of the interview was tape-recorded. 
The Commonwealth played the tape-recording during Deputy 
Giron’s testimony at trial.  Deputy Giron testified that his 
                     
1 Although this case came to this Court captioned 
“Commonwealth of Virginia v. Adhan Maldonado,” the record 
reflects that the defendant’s full name is Adhan Maldonado 
Juares.  We use this name in the disposition of this case. 
 
2
translation recited on the tape was “90, 95 percent word for 
word.”  Juares, however, contended that the translation was 
not entirely complete or accurate.  Juares asked the court to 
have a court-certified interpreter listen to the tape and 
translate the Spanish portions for the jury.  The trial court 
agreed and a certified court interpreter provided an oral 
translation of the Spanish-language portions of the tape to 
the jury. 
During its deliberations, the jury asked court personnel2 
if it could have an interpreter.  The court personnel did not 
bring the jury’s inquiry to the attention of the trial judge 
or the parties, but told the jury that an interpreter “[w]ould 
not be provided.”  The jury returned a guilty verdict. 
Juares learned of the jury’s inquiry prior to sentencing 
and moved to have the verdict set aside and for a mistrial 
based on the ex parte contact between the jury and court 
personnel.  The trial court, after hearing arguments from the 
parties, denied Juares’ motion.  Examining the content of the 
communication, the trial court held that the denial of a 
request for an interpreter did not interject any substantive 
information into the jury’s determinations.  The trial court 
observed that there was no objection to the introduction of 
                     
2 The identity of the specific employee who responded to 
the jury’s inquiry was not established at trial. 
 
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the tape-recording into evidence or providing it to the jury, 
and the jurors were told they could take notes during the 
testimony but that no written transcript would be available 
during their deliberations nor would any testimony be read 
back to them during their deliberations.  The trial court 
stated that the response by court personnel “simply stated and 
reaffirmed the Court’s prior instruction that they would not 
have testimony read back to them.”  Observing that the jury 
could not have a new interpretation or an interpretation 
different than that produced during the trial, the trial court 
stated that “under no circumstances would there ever be an 
interpreter, . . . where we would send an interpreter back.”  
Thus the trial court concluded that the ex parte contact did 
not prejudice Juares. 
 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, applying Remmer v. 
United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954), held that the ex parte 
contact was presumptively prejudicial and that the 
Commonwealth did not carry its burden to show that the ex 
parte contact was harmless.  The Court of Appeals reversed the 
conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.  We awarded 
the Commonwealth an appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
 
Generally, a party seeking a mistrial carries the burden 
of establishing that he suffered prejudice by the complained 
 
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of acts, Riner v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 296, 318, 601 S.E.2d 
555, 567 (2004); however, 
any private communication, contact, or tampering, 
directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial 
about the matter pending before the jury is, for 
obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial, 
if not made in pursuance of known rules of the court 
and the instructions and directions of the court 
made during the trial, with full knowledge of the 
parties. 
 
Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229.  The presumption of prejudice can be 
rebutted if, after notice and hearing, the government 
establishes that the “contact with the juror was harmless to 
the defendant.”  Id. 
 
In this case the substance of the response of the court 
personnel was a private communication with a juror made 
without the full knowledge of the parties.  Nevertheless, the 
presumption of prejudice arises only if the private 
communication is “about the matter pending before the jury.” 
Id.  The issue before us in this case is whether the court 
personnel’s response concerned a matter pending before the 
jury.  This is an issue of law which we review de novo.  See 
Bristol v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 568, 573, 636 S.E.2d 460, 463 
(2006). 
 
We have previously held that ex parte contacts between a 
juror and a judge regarding a juror’s attention to the 
proceeding was “administrative in nature.”  Ellis v. 
 
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Commonwealth, 227 Va. 419, 423, 317 S.E.2d 479, 481 (1984).  
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court determined that a 
communication between the judge and a juror regarding a 
question raised in voir dire did not relate to any “fact in 
controversy or any law applicable to the case.”  Rushen v. 
Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 121 (1983).  
 
The statement at issue in this case, like those in Ellis 
and Rushen, did not convey any additional facts or opinions 
regarding the guilt or innocence of Juares nor did it contain 
any comment on the law, the evidence or the testimony 
presented during the trial.  As noted by the trial court, the 
communication to the jury was only a response to a question 
regarding a procedural aspect of jury deliberation.  To be 
sure, a proper translation of Juares’ taped interview was a 
crucial part of the evidence in determining the issue of guilt 
or innocence.  But the issue before us is not whether there 
was error in failing to provide such an interpreter but 
whether the response itself related to the issue of guilt or 
innocence.3  Accordingly, we hold that the response of court 
personnel, that no interpreter would be provided to the jury, 
                     
3 Juares asserts that the trial court erred in concluding 
that the jury would not have been permitted the interpreter.  
However, Juares did not assign error to this holding when 
appealing the denial of his motion to set aside the verdict or 
for a mistrial and that issue is not before us in this appeal. 
 
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did not address any matter pending before the jury, and 
therefore the presumption of prejudice did not arise.  
 
In the absence of a presumption of prejudice, the burden 
remained on Juares to establish that he was prejudiced by the 
ex parte communication.  He has failed to show that the 
response of the court personnel affected the jury’s 
deliberations in a manner that was prejudicial to him.4 
 
In summary, the trial court did not err in denying 
Juares’ motions for a mistrial and to set aside the verdict 
based on the ex parte communication between the jury and court 
personnel.  The ex parte communication was not presumptively 
prejudicial as a matter of law because it did not concern 
matters pending before the jury and Juares failed to establish 
that he was prejudiced by the communication.  Accordingly, we 
will reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 
reinstate the conviction. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
                     
4 Juares’ assertions that the response could be 
interpreted as “a comment that the tape’s English translation 
was sufficiently accurate to satisfy the Court” is without 
merit.