Title: In re Howser

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed:  October 7, 1999

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In Re:

Complaint as to the Conduct of

THOMAS C. HOWSER,

					Accused.

(OSB 95-252; SC S37691)

	En Banc

	On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.

	Argued and submitted May 7, 1999.

	Michael Jewett, of Jacobson, Jewett, Thierolf & Dickey,
Medford, argued the cause and filed the briefs for the accused.

	Lia Saroyan, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Oregon State
Bar, Lake Oswego, argued the cause and filed the brief for the
Oregon State Bar.

	PER CURIAM

	The accused is reprimanded. 

	PER CURIAM

	In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, the Oregon
State Bar (Bar) charged the accused in one cause of complaint
with violating Code of Professional Responsibility Rules (DRs) 5-105(C) 
(former client conflict) and 2-110(B)(2) (failing promptly
to withdraw from representation after learning of conflict).  A
trial panel of the Disciplinary Board found that the accused had
violated both rules and determined that he should receive a
public reprimand.  The accused sought review.  ORS 9.536(1);
Rules of Procedure (BRs) 10.1 and 10.3.  Our review is de novo. 
ORS 9.536(3); BR 10.6.  On that review, we find that the accused
violated both rules and impose a public reprimand.

	Although most of the pertinent facts are not in
dispute, their legal consequences are.  We find the following
facts by clear and convincing evidence.

	The accused, a long-time member of the Bar, was a
partner of Glenn H. Munsell in a law firm in Ashland.  In October
1989 and again in April 1993, Munsell prepared wills for Betty
Cassidy.  In the 1989 will, Cassidy bequeathed an interest in a
restaurant known as Loli's to Delores Foshee.  In the 1993 will,
Cassidy bequeathed nothing to Foshee but left a ring and $2,000
to Foshee's son, John King.  Copies of both the Cassidy wills
were kept in the accused's office, and a record of the wills was
made in a will index card file.  At that time, the will index
card file was not incorporated into the firm's general conflict
index file.

	In February 1993, King sued his mother, Foshee.  The
accused represented Foshee.  In April 1994, Cassidy, who was
represented at that time by lawyer Matthew Sutton, sued Foshee,
alleging that Foshee had defaulted on a $60,000 loan.  The
accused also represented Foshee in that case.  In the course of
the Cassidy/Foshee litigation, the accused filed a third-party
complaint against King.  That complaint alleged that the loan
actually was to be used for King's benefit and that King and
Cassidy were conspiring to force Foshee to pay a debt actually
owed by King.

	At the time when he filed the third-party complaint
against King, the accused did not actually know that Munsell had
prepared the two wills for Cassidy.(1)  Sutton brought that fact to
the accused's attention in a December 14, 1994, letter that asked
the accused to withdraw from his representation of Foshee. 
Sutton's letter specifically advised the accused that Cassidy did
not consent to the accused's representation of Foshee and that
Cassidy felt that she had revealed confidential information to
Munsell that would be relevant to the ongoing litigation and
would be harmful to her interests.  The accused did not withdraw
from the case, but he did advise Sutton that he would review the
matter.  The accused then discussed the matter with Munsell and
reviewed the copies of the two Cassidy wills that were maintained
in his office.

	To preserve the status quo, the parties to the
litigation entered into a stipulation and order for continuance
of the case.  The accused then sought advice from the Oregon
State Bar concerning whether a conflict existed.  The Bar's
response, from an Assistant General Counsel, did not purport to
be a formal ruling on the accused's question, but it did state
that the accused's continuing representation of Foshee could
violate DR 5-105(C) in two different ways.  

	After he received the Bar's comments, the accused
continued to represent Foshee.  The accused sought an additional
continuance of the trial of the Cassidy/Foshee litigation.  The
accused finally withdrew as Foshee's counsel on August 27, 1996 
-- over a year and a half after the alleged conflict first was
called to his attention.  The precise disposition of the
litigation is unclear, but it is clear that Foshee ultimately
filed for bankruptcy and that no one gained anything directly
from the litigation.

	In addition to the foregoing facts, testimony by
Cassidy and the accused at the hearing before the trial panel was
important to the case.  Cassidy testified that she had loaned
approximately $61,000 to Foshee and that approximately $10,000
had been repaid.  She further testified that, in her 1989 will,
she had left her entire interest in Loli's to Foshee.  She
removed Foshee as a beneficiary in her 1993 will.  Cassidy stated
that she had not given permission to the accused or Munsell to
discuss her will with anyone else and that she considered the
contents of the wills to be personal and private.

	The accused testified that he might not have used the
wills as evidence of a conspiracy between Cassidy and King,
because he believed that he had sufficient evidence from other
sources to support his theory.  With respect to the use that he
could have made of the contents of the wills, the accused
acknowledged that the wills contained "some evidence" to support
the conspiracy theory that he had advanced in the third-party
complaint that he had filed for Foshee.  Asked to explain what he
meant by "some evidence," the accused said:  "Well, on their
face, if you didn't know anything else, that would confirm the
conspiracy theory, at least as far as the 1993 will."  The
accused further testified that, in his opinion, Cassidy had
waived any claim of confidentiality by telling several people
about the contents of the wills.  

	As noted, the Bar charged the accused with violating DR
5-105(C) and DR 2-110(B)(2).  We begin by examining the charge
that the accused violated DR 5-105(C), which provides:

		"Except as permitted by DR 5-105(D), a lawyer who
has represented a client in a matter shall not
subsequently represent another client in the same or a
significantly related matter when the interests of the
current and former clients are in actual or likely
conflict."(2)

The rule defines "a significantly related matter" as one in which
the subsequent representation "would, or would likely, inflict
injury or damage upon the former client in the course of the
subsequent matter" through the use of confidences or secrets
obtained from the former client.  DR 5-105(C)(2).  A "confidence"
is "information protected by the attorney-client privilege under
applicable law,"(3) DR 4-101(A), and a "secret" is "other
information gained in a * * * former professional relationship
that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure
of which * * * would be likely to be detrimental to the client." 
Id.

	Three factors are required to establish a conflict
under DR 5-105(C):  (1) the accused lawyer had a lawyer-client
relationship with the adverse party; (2) the present
representation places the lawyer in a position adverse to the
former client; and (3) the present matter is significantly
related to a matter in which the lawyer represented the former
client.  In re Brandsness, 299 Or 420, 426-27, 702 P2d 1098
(1985).  In this case, the accused disputes only the existence of
the third factor, viz., that there is a significant relationship
between Munsell's representation of Cassidy and the accused's
representation of Foshee and there is a possible detrimental
effect on Cassidy from that latter representation of Foshee.

	The accused first argues that the two wills were in
fact beneficial, not detrimental, to Cassidy in her litigation
with Foshee.  He explains that, because Cassidy left King only
$2,000 and a ring, the second will contradicted his theory that
Cassidy and King were in collusion ­- a theory that was supported
by other evidence that the accused says would show that Cassidy
had planned to "leave everything" to King.  Therefore, the
accused asserts, his knowledge of Cassidy's wills could not have
"inflict[ed] injury or damage" on Cassidy.  The accused also
argues that, because Cassidy had told others that she in fact had
left her entire estate to King, she had waived any confidence
concerning the content of her wills.

	The Bar contends that Cassidy intended both wills to
remain secret and that she never had given Munsell permission to
disclose their contents.  The Bar also points to Cassidy's
testimony that, other than telling King that he would receive the
ring, she never had revealed the contents of her will to anyone. 
Under the circumstances, in the Bar's view, the conversations
between Cassidy and Munsell, together with the two wills, were
confidences under DR 4-101(A) and OEC 503(1)(b).  The Bar further
contends that, by the accused's own admission, confidential
information in Munsell's file provided him with documentary
evidence of his theory of collusion between Cassidy and King and,
therefore, would have benefitted Foshee to Cassidy's detriment. 
It follows, in the Bar's view, that the accused had an
"information-specific, former client conflict" under DR 5-105(C)
that obligated him to withdraw as Foshee's lawyer.

	The Bar's argument is well taken.  In Brandsness, this
court explained:

	"[T]he principle embodied in the concept of
'significantly related' matters [in DR 5-105] consists
of two sub-tests:

	"a.  Matter Specific.

		"Representation of the present client in the
subsequent matter would, or would likely, inflict
injury or damage upon the former client in any matter
in which the lawyer previously represented the former
client; or

	"b.  Information Specific.

		"Representation of the former client provided the
lawyer with confidential information the use of which
would, or would likely, inflict injury or damage upon
the former client in the subsequent matter."

Id. 299 Or at 430-31.

		This proceeding involves an "information-specific"
conflict.  Even the accused acknowledged in his testimony at the
hearing before the trial panel that information in the Cassidy
wills supported his theory of a conspiracy between Cassidy and
King.  By definition, therefore, the accused was in a position to
use information gained through representation of a former client
and harmful to that former client to aid a present client.  The
accused violated DR 5-105(C).

		The accused argues that Cassidy had waived any
confidentiality interest in the contents of her wills by
discussing their contents with others.  Assuming that a waiver in
that form could relieve a lawyer of the lawyer's obligations
under DR 5-105(C), the evidence in this record on which the
accused relies does not support his argument.  It does appear to
be true that the accused's client, Foshee, told the accused that
she had heard Cassidy acknowledge on numerous occasions that King
eventually would get "everything," but any such statements ­- and
the record is very vague as to when the statements were made and
what exactly the statements were ­- appear to have been general
ones, not necessarily statements concerning the existence (or the
contents) of Cassidy's wills.  We are unpersuaded by that
argument.

		We turn to the question whether the accused violated DR
2-110(B), which provides, in part:

		"(B) Mandatory Withdrawal

		"A lawyer representing a client before a tribunal,
with its permission if required by its rules, shall
withdraw from employment, and a lawyer representing a
client in other matters shall withdraw from employment,
if:

		"* * * * *

		"(2) The lawyer knows or it is obvious that the
lawyer's continued employment will result in violation
of a Disciplinary Rule."

Here, the accused eventually did withdraw as Foshee's counsel,
but he did not do so until August 1996, nearly a year and a half
after he had reviewed Cassidy's two wills.  The accused asserts
that his legal duty to Foshee precluded his withdrawal until he
could be satisfied that he indeed had a conflict and could ensure
that Foshee obtained legal help that she required.  See DR 2-110(A)(2) 
(lawyer shall not withdraw from representation until
the lawyer has taken "reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable
prejudice to the rights of the lawyer's client").  The Bar
responds that the accused was required to withdraw in January
1995, when he learned the contents of Cassidy's wills and had
been advised by Sutton that Cassidy did not consent to the
accused's continued representation of Foshee.

		We need not decide precisely when the accused became
obligated to withdraw from representing Foshee because, whenever
that point was reached, it was long before the accused finally
withdrew.  The accused appears to have been motivated in
significant part by the fact that his client had no funds to
retain other counsel, but the fact of the pressing financial
needs of his present client cannot excuse the accused from
observing his obligations to his former client which, by virtue
of the rule, were primary in this context.  The accused had to
withdraw from his representation of Foshee within a reasonable
time.  He did not.  We find that the accused violated DR 2-110(B).

		We turn to the issue of the appropriate sanction.  In
assessing a sanction, this court utilizes the American Bar
Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991)
(amended 1992) (ABA Standards).  In re Huffman, 328 Or 567, 587,
___ P2d ___ (1999).  Under those standards, the court considers
(1) the duty violated; (2) the accused lawyer's mental state; and
(3) the actual or potential injury caused by the accused's
conduct.  ABA Standard 3.0; Huffman, 328 Or at 587-88.  The court
also considers aggravating and mitigating circumstances, as well
as Oregon case law in determining the appropriate sanction.  In
re Martin, 328 Or 177, 191, 970 P2d 638 (1998) (taking that
approach).

		We first consider the duty violated.  We find that the
accused violated his duty to Cassidy, his former client, to avoid
conflicts of interest and his duty to the profession by failing
timely to withdraw from his representation of Foshee.

		We next consider the issue of the accused's mental
state.  The trial panel found that the accused acted negligently.
We disagree.  It is clear to us that the accused acted knowingly,
i.e., that he acted with a conscious awareness of the facts and
the applicable rules.  ABA Standards at 17.  Indeed, the accused
had contacted the Bar to clarify which rules, if any, applied. 
The accused characterizes the Bar's response as "equivocal" but,
at the least, it pointed the accused directly to those
disciplinary rules that bore on his situation and placed him in a
position to evaluate for himself whether he was in jeopardy of
violating them.

		Turning to the question of the harm caused by the
accused's conduct, we can say with certainty only that it
unnecessarily prolonged the Cassidy/Foshee litigation.  We agree
with the trial panel, however, that the record does not show that
Cassidy lost anything of value as a result of that delay.  

		The ABA Standards provide that, absent aggravating or
mitigating factors, a suspension is the appropriate sanction when
a lawyer knows of a conflict of interest.  ABA Standard 4.32. 
The commentary explains:

	"[S]uspension is appropriate when a lawyer knows or
should know that the interests of a client are
materially adverse to the interests of a former client
in a substantially related matter, and causes injury or
potential injury to the former or the subsequent
client."

ABA Standards at 31.  We turn to an examination of pertinent
aggravating and mitigating factors.

		Aggravating factors include the accused's substantial
experience in the practice of law, ABA Standard 9.22(i), and his
continued refusal ­- persisting even through the present
proceeding ­- to acknowledge the wrongfulness of his conduct, ABA
Standard 9.22(g).  Mitigating circumstances include the accused's
long and exemplary record of service to the Bar, ABA Standard
9.32(g); his lack of any other disciplinary record, ABA Standard
9.32(a), and the fact (which we find by clear and convincing
evidence) that the accused acted without a selfish or dishonest
motive, ABA Standard 9.32(b).  

		The mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating factors
in this case.  We previously have imposed a reprimand in
factually similar cases.  See, e.g., In re Cohen, 316 Or 657,
664, 853 P2d 286 (1993) (imposing reprimand in knowing conflict
case when mitigating factors outweighed aggravating factors); In
re Trukositz, 312 Or 621, 634, 825 P2d 1369 (1992) (imposing
reprimand under facts which, although not labeled as such, necessarily 
involved knowing violation).  We conclude that a
public reprimand is the appropriate sanction.

	The accused is reprimanded. 

1. 	However, DR 5-105(B) provides:

		"For purposes of determining a lawyer's knowledge
of the existence of a conflict of interest, all facts
which the lawyer knew, or by the exercise of reasonable
care should have known, will be attributed to the
lawyer."

2. 	
	DR 5-105(D) provides:

		"A lawyer may represent a client in instances
otherwise prohibited by DR 5-105(C) when both the
current client and the former client consent to the
representation after full disclosure."

Consent is not involved in this case.

3. 	
	Under OEC 503(1)(b), a confidential communication in
the lawyer-client context is one 

	"not intended to be disclosed to third persons other
than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the
rendition of professional legal services to the client
or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of
the communication."