Title: In re Parker

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed:  August 17, 2000
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In re Complaint as to the Conduct ofWILLIAM M. PARKER,
Accused.
(OSB 97-184, 98-4, 98-36, 98-45; SC S46496)

	En Banc
	On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
	Argued and submitted November 10, 1999.
	William M. Parker, Kirkland, Washington, argued the cause
and filed the brief in propria persona.
	Jane E. Angus, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Oregon State
Bar, Lake Oswego, argued the cause and filed the brief for the
Oregon State Bar.
	PER CURIAM
	The accused is suspended from the practice of law for a
period of four years, commencing 60 days from the date of filing
of this decision.
	PER CURIAM
	In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, the Oregon
State Bar (Bar) filed an amended complaint against William M.
Parker (the accused), charging him with violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Disciplinary Rule (DR) 1-102(A)(3)
(prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation), DR 1-102(A)(4) (prohibiting conduct
prejudicial to administration of justice), DR 1-103(C) (four
counts) (requiring cooperation with disciplinary investigation),
DR 2-110(A) (prohibiting withdrawal unless lawyer takes steps to
avoid foreseeable prejudice to client), DR 6-101(B) (four counts)
(prohibiting neglect of legal matter), DR 7-101(A)(2) (three 
counts) (prohibiting failure to carry out contract of
employment), and DR 9-101(C)(4) (requiring prompt payment or
delivery of client's property or money). 
	The accused filed no answer and made no other
appearance.  A trial panel of the Disciplinary Board entered an
order of default.  Accordingly, we deem the Bar's allegations to
be true.  See In re Bourcier, 325 Or 429, 431, 939 P2d 604 (1997)
(Bourcier II) (so stating under similar circumstances). 
	Following entry of the order of default, the two-member
trial panel held a hearing on the issue of sanction.  Bar Rule of
Procedure (BR) 5.8(a).  At that hearing, a number of witnesses
testified, including several of the accused's former clients and
a lawyer involved in the investigation of the accused on behalf
of a Local Professional Responsibility Committee (LPRC).  The
trial panel imposed on the accused a five-year suspension from
the practice of law. (1)  In this court, the accused argues for no
more than a two-year suspension.  The Bar argues for a five-year
suspension.  For the reasons that follow, we conclude that a
four-year suspension is the appropriate sanction.
	At the outset, we note that the accused acknowledges
that, with one exception, he committed the charged violations. (2) 
We therefore limit our recitation of the facts to those that
provide a context for our determination of the appropriate
sanction.
	The accused's misconduct arose out of his neglect of
his law practice between February 1997 and May 1998.  Due to his
involvement in an out-of-state business, the accused was absent
from his Portland law office for days and weeks at a time.  He
repeatedly failed to respond to his clients' messages and failed
to take appropriate action on their behalves.  For example, the
accused failed to prepare for trial and to communicate with his
client in a case in which his client was the plaintiff. 
Ultimately, the accused agreed to dismiss the case with prejudice
without consulting his client.  In another case, a client had
retained the accused to pursue a personal injury claim on behalf
of the client's 12-year-old daughter.  Because the accused failed
actively to pursue her case, that client eventually terminated
the accused's employment, after experiencing mental anguish.  She
then retained a new lawyer and asked for her client file, but the
accused did not respond to that request.  In a third case, the
accused's client settled with the opposing party while the case
was pending before the Court of Appeals.  The accused, however, 
failed to execute settlement documents that the opposing lawyer
sent to him for signature.  Ultimately, the opposing lawyer had
to procure an order from the Court of Appeals requiring the
accused to execute the documents.  The order provided that, if
the accused failed to execute the documents, the judgment would
be vacated and the appeal dismissed.  The accused failed to
comply with that order, and the Court of Appeals instructed the
circuit court to dismiss the complaint.  Finally, the accused
failed to respond to several requests from another client that he
modify a trust instrument that he had prepared for the client,
for which trust the accused served as trustee.  Eventually, that
client asked that the accused withdraw as trustee.  The accused
did so, but only after considerable unnecessary correspondence.
	By early 1998, the accused's office telephone was
disconnected, and, because the accused had failed to pay his
office rent, his landlord instituted a successful forcible entry
and detainer action.  The accused never notified his clients of a
forwarding address or new telephone number.  In June 1998, the
Professional Liability Fund (PLF) took possession of all the
accused's files.  Four complaints were filed against the accused
with the Bar regarding his conduct, and the accused failed to
respond to most of the Bar's resulting inquiries.  With respect
to two of the four complaints, the accused eventually responded. 
In one of those responses, the accused misrepresented facts to
the Bar.  When asked for additional information regarding his
responses, he again failed to respond.  Similarly, the accused
failed to respond to many of the inquiries of the LPRC.
	In determining the appropriate sanction for ethical
misconduct, this court looks both to the American Bar
Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991)
(amended 1992) (ABA Standards) and to this court's case law.  In
re Martin, 328 Or 177, 191, 970 P2d 638 (1998).  This court first
considers three factors:  the ethical duty violated, the lawyer's
mental state, and the potential or actual injury caused by the
misconduct.  ABA Standard 3.0; In re Howser, 329 Or 404, 412, 987
P2d 496 (1999).  We then examine any aggravating or mitigating
factors.  ABA Standard 3.0; In re Devers, 328 Or 230, 241, 974
P2d 191 (1999).  Finally, we consider Oregon case law.  Devers,
328 Or at 241.
		The accused violated several ethical duties.  First, he
violated his duty of diligence to his clients when he repeatedly
neglected legal matters that his clients had entrusted to him. 
ABA Standard 4.4.  That duty requires that a lawyer "act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
Id.  Second, the accused violated his duty to the public to
maintain his personal integrity when he misrepresented facts to
the Bar in his responses to the Bar's inquiries.  ABA Standard
5.1.  That duty prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. 
Finally, the accused violated his duty to the profession when he
failed to withdraw promptly and properly from representation. 
ABA Standard 7.0.
		As to the accused's mental state, the Bar argues that
the accused acted either intentionally or knowingly.  The accused
argues that he acted negligently.  "Intent" is "the conscious
objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result."  ABA
Standards at 7.  "Knowledge" is "the conscious awareness of the
nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the
conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular
result."  Id.  "Negligence" is 
"the failure of a lawyer to heed a substantial risk
that circumstances exist or that a result will follow,
which failure is a deviation from the standard of care
that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the
situation."  
Id.  
		We conclude that the accused acted knowingly.  The
record shows that the accused's secretary in his Portland office
sent him all his mail and telephone messages daily.  She
repeatedly reminded him of his obligations.  The accused easily
could have informed his clients that he was unable to represent
them and that they should retain other counsel.  Additionally,
the accused failed to respond to inquiries from the Bar,
notwithstanding numerous requests for information sent to the
accused's office and, on discovery of his out-of-state address,
to that address.  Those facts and the reasonable inferences drawn
from them lead us to conclude that the accused was fully aware of
his obligations to his clients and to the Bar, and that he
knowingly failed to take appropriate action.  See Bourcier II,
325 Or at 434 (finding that accused lawyer acted knowingly when
lawyer failed to respond to client's telephone messages and to
Bar's letters).
		We turn to the injury that the accused's misconduct
caused.  First, by agreeing to dismiss with prejudice a case
without consulting his client, the accused caused that client
actual harm, because the client was precluded from pursuing his
claim against the other party.  Second, the accused caused actual
injury to the client whose personal injury case the accused
failed to pursue actively.  Medical treatment for that client's
daughter and the resolution of the claim were delayed.  Third,
the accused caused actual injury to the legal system when he
failed to respond to orders of the Court of Appeals.  Because the
accused failed to execute timely the settlement documents, the
court unnecessarily expended significant time and resources. 
Finally, the accused caused actual injury to the legal profession
and the public when he failed to respond to the requests for
information from the Bar and the LPRC.  See In re Schaffner, 325
Or 421, 427, 939 P2d 39 (1997) (Schaffner II) (so stating under
similar circumstances).  The accused's failure to respond
hampered the disciplinary process by delaying resolution of the
complaints against the accused.
		In light of the duties violated and the mental state of
the accused, we determine that the accused's misconduct
implicates several ABA Standards.  ABA Standard 4.41(c) provides:
		"Disbarment is generally appropriate when:
		"* * * * * 
		"(c) a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect with
respect to client matters and causes serious or
potentially serious injury to a client."
ABA Standard 4.42 provides:
		"Suspension is generally appropriate when:
		"(a) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services
for a client and causes injury or potential injury to a
client, or 
		"(b) a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect and
causes injury or potential injury to a client." 	
Thus, the ABA Standards suggest in the abstract that disbarment
could be appropriate under the facts of this proceeding.  But
this proceeding is not considered in the abstract; we also
consider this court's case law in determining the proper
sanction.  Before looking to our case law, however, we turn to
the fourth factor, viz., aggravating and mitigating
circumstances.
		The record reveals several aggravating factors,
including a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses over a
substantial period of time, and a failure to respond to or
cooperate with the Bar's investigations.  ABA Standard 9.22(c),
(d), and (e).  The accused also has substantial experience in the
practice of law, having been admitted to the Bar in 1974.  ABA
Standard 9.22(i).  In mitigation, there is no indication in the
record of prior discipline. (3)  ABA Standard 9.32(a). 
Additionally, the accused expresses what appears to be genuine
remorse over his conduct.  ABA Standard 9.32(l).
		We next consider this court's case law.  In Schaffner
II, this court imposed a two-year suspension on a lawyer who
neglected a client matter, failed to deliver client property, and
failed to respond to the Bar's inquiries.  Schaffner II, 325 Or
at 428.  Specifically, the accused lawyer in Schaffner II
promised his client that he would send a demand letter on the
client's behalf.  The client gave several documents concerning
the case to the accused lawyer.  The lawyer never sent the demand
letter.  Over the next ten months, the lawyer failed to
communicate with the client or respond to the client's messages. 
Several aggravating factors were present in Schaffner II,
including a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, substantial
experience in the practice of law, and a prior disciplinary
record.  Id. at 427.
		In In re Sousa, 323 Or 137, 915 P2d 408 (1996), this
court disbarred a lawyer who neglected four client matters,
failed to cooperate with the Bar on those four matters, engaged
in dishonest conduct, collected clearly excessive fees, failed to
carry out his employment contract, and failed to render an
accounting.  Briefly, the lawyer in Sousa failed to file a
certificate of lost title for a client, failed to act on two
clients' traffic charges, failed to respond to a motion to
dismiss filed against another client, and failed to file a brief
in the Court of Appeals on his client's behalf.  The lawyer also
represented to a client that he was licensed to practice law in
Colorado when he was on inactive status there.  Id. at 141. 
Additionally, he collected nonrefundable retainer fees from two
clients, but failed to take action on their matters and failed to
refund any portion of the fees.  Id.  This court determined that
the lawyer in Sousa caused actual injury to three of his clients. 
In particular, one client was ordered to pay $1,141.50 in costs,
because the accused failed to object or respond to a motion for
fees and costs.  Finally, there were four aggravating factors
(pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, substantial experience
in the practice of law, and acting with a dishonest and selfish
motive) and no mitigating factors.  Id. at 146.
	In In re Bourcier, 322 Or 561, 909 P2d 1234 (1996)
(Bourcier I), this court imposed a three-year suspension (the
maximum possible suspension at the time) on a lawyer who
neglected a client matter; engaged in conduct involving
dishonesty, deceit, and misrepresentation; engaged in conduct
prejudicial to justice; knowingly made a false statement of fact;
and failed to cooperate with the Bar and the LPRC.  Id. at 567-68.  In Bourcier I, the accused lawyer represented the defendant
on a criminal appeal.  After filing two motions for extension of
time in the Court of Appeals, the lawyer moved to dismiss the
appeal, stating that he had reviewed the record, had consulted
with his client, and determined that no meritorious issue
existed.  In fact, the lawyer had not consulted with his client
regarding the motion to dismiss.  Moreover, the lawyer failed to
keep his client informed of any of the filings or other
developments in the case.  Thereafter, the lawyer petitioned for
and received attorney fees.  In that petition, the lawyer
represented that he had spoken with his client over the telephone
on several occasions.  That representation was false.  Id. at
567.  A number of aggravating factors were present in Bourcier I,
including a prior disciplinary record for similar misconduct, a
selfish and dishonest motive, and untruthfulness to the court. 
There were no mitigating factors.
	Finally, in In re Recker, 309 Or 633, 789 P2d 663
(1990), this court imposed a two-year suspension on a lawyer who
neglected two client matters, failed to carry out a contract of
employment, engaged in conduct involving misrepresentations, and
failed to cooperate with disciplinary investigations.  Id. at
641.  In the first client matter, the client gave the accused
lawyer her existing will and paid a $100 fee in exchange for the
lawyer's services in drafting a new will.  The lawyer failed to
draft the will and failed to return the client's messages, which
the client left over a four-month period.  Id. at 636.  In the
second client matter, the lawyer represented a defendant in a
criminal case.  That client was released to a supervised release
program.  The lawyer failed to communicate with her client and
failed to notify her client of a court date, despite many
telephone calls from the release program on the client's behalf. 
On the scheduled court date, the client failed to appear.  The
lawyer told the judge that the client had failed to maintain
contact with the lawyer, when the opposite was true.  Id. at 637.
	Schaffner II, Sousa, Bourcier I, and Recker involved
conduct and circumstances similar to the present proceeding:  All
involved neglect of client matters and failure to cooperate with
the Bar. (4)  This proceeding, however, involves conduct more
serious -- quantitatively and qualitatively -- than Schaffner II,
Bourcier I, and Recker.  But, the misconduct here is not as
severe as the conduct in Sousa, as the lawyer in Sousa twice had
collected clearly excessive fees.  The accused in this proceeding
neglected four different client matters.  In one case, the
accused's conduct resulted in his client's case being dismissed
with prejudice.  The accused failed to respond to the Bar's
inquiries in two of those matters, and, as already noted, his
responses to the other two inquiries were few, late, incomplete,
and contained misrepresentations.  In previous cases, this court
has expressed its view that the failure to cooperate with a
disciplinary investigation, standing alone, is a serious ethical
violation.  See, e.g., Bourcier II, 325 Or at 434 (so stating);
In re Miles, 324 Or 218, 222-23, 923 P2d 1219 (1996) (same). 
That failure to cooperate, in addition to the number of clients
whom the accused neglected, suggests that the sanction in this
proceeding should be more severe than the two- to three-year
suspensions imposed in Schaffner II, Bourcier I, and Recker.  The
difference between this proceeding and Sousa, as noted above,
suggests that disbarment is not warranted. (5)
	The trial panel, in deciding on a five-year suspension,
relied heavily on this court's decision in Bourcier II.  That
case, however, is distinguishable from this proceeding.  In
Bourcier II, the accused was disbarred for neglecting a client
matter and failing to cooperate with the resulting disciplinary
investigation.  Id. at 431.  In its analysis of the sanction in
Bourcier II, however, this court deemed significant the prior
disciplinary history of the accused.  In September 1993, the
accused in Bourcier II had received a 60-day suspension for
neglecting a client matter.  In February 1996, this court had
imposed a three-year suspension on the accused for failing to
communicate with and advise his client, and failing to respond to
the Bar's inquiries.  Bourcier I, 322 Or at 571.  Immediately
after this court decided Bourcier I, the Bar requested the
accused's response to another complaint regarding his conduct --
the complaint that eventually became the subject of Bourcier II. 
The accused failed to respond to those requests for information. 
Thus, this court found that the accused's contemporaneous
continuation of misconduct for which he already had been
sanctioned was particularly serious and ordered the accused
disbarred.  Bourcier II, 325 Or at 436-37.
	In the present case, the aggravating factors that exist
are serious, but the pattern of misconduct is not as extreme as
the conduct in Bourcier II.  Additionally, mitigating factors,
absent in Bourcier II, are present here.  Accordingly, the trial
panel's heavy reliance on Bourcier II was misplaced.   
	The purpose of a lawyer disciplinary proceeding is not
to punish the lawyer, but to protect the public and the
administration of justice from lawyers who have not discharged,
will not discharge, or are unlikely to discharge properly their
professional duties to clients, the public, the legal system, and
the profession.  ABA Standard at 7; In re Wittemyer, 328 Or 448,
459, 980 P2d 148 (1999).  After considering all the relevant
factors and this court's case law, we conclude that a four-year
suspension is the appropriate sanction in this proceeding.
	The accused is suspended from the practice of law for a
period of four years, commencing 60 days from the date of filing
of this decision.

1. 	The trial panel, in its written opinion, stated that it
"must recommend that the Accused be suspended for a period of
five years."  (Emphasis added.)  Under the Bar Rules of
Procedure, however, a trial panel has a duty to impose a
sanction.  BR 2.4(i) (imposing on trial panel duty of publishing
written opinion that contains "a disposition"); BR 6.1(a)
(providing that "dispositions or sanctions * * * shall include,"
inter alia, reprimand, suspension, or disbarment).  Properly
stated then, the trial panel in this case imposed a five-year
suspension on the accused.  BR 10.1; see also In re Griffith, 304
Or 575, 577 n 1, 748 P2d 86 (1987) (stating that trial panel
"makes decisions and not recommendations").

2. 	In this court, the accused disputes that he violated DR
1-102(A)(3), which prohibits conduct involving misrepresentation. 
As noted, however, the accused allowed a default to be entered
against him, and we deem true the Bar's allegations. 
Accordingly, we do not consider the accused's argument that he
did not knowingly engage in misrepresentation.

3. 	In its brief, the Bar states that the accused was
admonished in 1990 for violating DR 7-105(A), which prohibits
threatening criminal prosecution to gain advantage in a civil
matter.  The record does not contain a letter of admonition, and,
at oral argument, the parties did not agree on the existence of a
letter.  Additionally, the opinion of the trial panel states that
the accused "has no prior record of discipline."  Accordingly, we
do not consider the Bar's assertion that the accused has a prior
disciplinary record.  See BR 10.6 (requiring this court to
consider discipline cases de novo upon the record).

4. 	In re Schaffner, 323 Or 472, 918 P2d 803 (1996)
(Schaffner I) is yet another proceeding involving neglect of a
client matter and a failure to cooperate.  That case, however, is
distinguishable from the proceeding at bar.  In Schaffner I, the
accused lawyer initially had failed to respond to the Bar's and
the LPRC's inquiries.  Eventually, however, the lawyer responded
to the Bar.  The Bar deposed the lawyer, and the Bar and the
lawyer began settlement negotiations.  As a sanction for those
two violations, this court imposed a 120-day suspension.  The
court specified that a 60-day suspension was appropriate for
knowingly neglecting the accused's clients' case and another 60-day suspension was justified for failing to cooperate with the
Bar.  Id. at 481.
	In the present case, the extent of the accused's
failure to cooperate is more severe than in Schaffner I.  The
lawyer in Schaffner I eventually cooperated with the Bar.  In
this proceeding, the accused's responses were very few,
incomplete, and contained misrepresentations.  The accused's
failure to cooperate with the Bar demonstrates a serious and
sustained disregard for the disciplinary rules.

5. 	The Bar does not seek disbarment in this case.