Title: MANUEL MASIAS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MANUEL MASIAS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 81Case Number: S-09-0131Decided: 06/23/2010NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
MANUEL 
MASIAS,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Michael K. Davis, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Kerin.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny Lynn Craig, Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. 
Craig.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
Appellant, 
Manuel Masias, was charged with one count of first degree sexual assault and 
three counts of battery.  The jury 
found Appellant guilty of first degree sexual assault and one count of 
battery.1  He challenges only the conviction of 
first degree sexual assault, asserting that the State did not present sufficient 
evidence to prove all of the elements of the crime.  He also claims the district court erred 
in its response to a jury question.  
We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]      
Appellant 
presents the following issues:

 

1.    
Was 
there insufficient evidence of the elements of "submission" and the "actual 
application of physical force and/or forcible confinement" to support the jury's 
conviction for first degree sexual assault?

 
 

2.    
Did 
the district court commit plain error in its response to the jury's 
note?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
Appellant 
and the victim, K.C., began a dating relationship in July of 2006.  The relationship progressed and by 
October of 2007 they were living together.  
According to K.C., it was during this time frame that Appellant became 
abusive.  K.C. testified that 
Appellant was jealous, possessive, and controlling.  He listened in on phone conversations 
and limited the amount of time K.C. spent with her family.  K.C. testified to several incidents of 
physical abuse that occurred in late October. 

 
 

[¶4]        
The 
incident that led to the sexual assault charge occurred on October 29, 
2007.  That evening, K.C. testified, 
she and Appellant had been drinking and arguing.  K.C. went to bed.  Appellant came into the bedroom and 
started "harassing" her over "wanting to have sex."  When she refused, Appellant accused her 
of having an affair.  He then got 
into the bed, forced her legs apart, and shoved his fist in her vagina.  K.C. tried to resist, but Appellant's 
"force" held her down, and she was unable to get away.  K.C. got out of bed after the assault and 
discovered she was bleeding.  K.C. 
cleaned herself up and returned to bed, but remained fearful that Appellant 
would assault her again.  

 
 

[¶5]        
The 
next day, Appellant stayed home.  He 
was apologetic for his behavior, but K.C. testified that she feared that he 
would hurt her again.  On October 
31st, after Appellant went to work, K.C. reported the incident to a 
neighbor.  The neighbor contacted 
law enforcement and K.C. was transported to the hospital.  A sexual assault nurse (SANE nurse) 
noted bruises on K.C.'s chest and arms.  
She observed that K.C. had two serious lacerations to her vaginal 
area.  According to the nurse, the 
injuries were caused by blunt force trauma.

 
 

[¶6]        
Appellant 
was subsequently arrested and charged with one count of first degree sexual 
assault, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2007) and 
three counts of battery, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501(b).2  Appellant testified that the sexual 
contact was consensual.  According 
to Appellant, when the two went to bed the night of October 29th, K.C. told him 
that she "want[ed] to make love" and asked if he "could give her some 
foreplay."  Appellant said they 
engaged in foreplay which included Appellant inserting his finger into K.C.'s 
vagina.  At that point, Appellant 
claims that K.C., who had a history of seizures, started having 
convulsions.  Appellant testified 
that he removed his hand when he realized K.C. was seizing and held her down for 
three to four minutes until the seizure stopped.  

 
 

[¶7]        
The 
jury found Appellant guilty of first degree sexual assault and one count of 
battery.  Appellant was sentenced to 
a term of incarceration of six to ten years for the sexual assault, and a 
concurrent term of six months for the battery.  He filed a timely appeal of the first 
degree sexual assault conviction.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Sufficiency 
of the Evidence

 
 

[¶8]        
When 
an appellant presents a claim of insufficient evidence we apply the following 
standard of review:

 
 
When 
reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim in a criminal case, we must 
determine whether a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of 
the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  We do not consider conflicting evidence 
presented by the unsuccessful party, and afford every favorable inference which 
may be reasonably and fairly drawn from the successful party's evidence.  We have consistently held that it is the 
jury's responsibility to resolve conflicts in the evidence.  We will not substitute our judgment for 
that of the jury,  our only duty is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable 
and rational individuals would, or even could, have come to the same result as 
the jury actually did.

 
 

Lewis 
v. State, 
2006 WY 81, ¶ 7, 137 P.3d 909, 911 (Wyo. 2006) (internal citations and 
quotations marks omitted).

 
 

[¶9]        
Appellant 
asserts that the State did not present sufficient evidence of each element of 
first degree sexual assault.  
Specifically, he contends a jury could not find that he caused 
"submission" of K.C., or that he caused submission by both "physical force" and 
"forcible confinement."  To 
facilitate the discussion, we repeat the elements of first degree sexual 
assault:

 
 

(a)  
Any 
actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits a sexual assault in the 
first degree if:

 
 

(i)    
The 
actor causes submission of the victim through the actual application, reasonably 
calculated to cause submission of the victim, of physical force or forcible 
confinement.

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302(a)(i).  At the 
conclusion of the trial, the jury received the following instruction with 
respect to the first degree sexual assault charge:

 
 
      The elements of 
the crime of Sexual Assault in the First Degree, as charged in this case under 
Count I are:

 
 

1.    
On 
or about the 29th day of October, 2007;

2.    
In 
Laramie County, Wyoming;

3.    
The 
Defendant, MANUEL MASIAS;

4.    
Inflicted 
sexual intrusion on [K.C.]; and

5.    
The 
Defendant caused submission of [K.C.];

6.    
Through 
the actual application of physical force and/or forcible 
confinement;

7.    
Which 
the Defendant reasonably calculated would cause submission of 
[K.C.].

 
 
      If you find from 
your consideration of all the evidence that each of these elements has been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the Defendant 
guilty.

 
 
      If, on the other 
hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these 
elements has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the 
Defendant not guilty.

 
 

[¶10]     
Part 
6 of the instruction was presented to the jury with the alternatives "physical 
force and/or forcible confinement."  
Because the instruction provides alternative bases for conviction and a 
general verdict form was used, we must determine if there was sufficient 
evidence to support a finding that Appellant caused submission of K.C. through 
application of physical force and 
through application of forcible confinement.  Lewis, ¶ 10, 137 P.3d  at 912.  "The verdict 
must be set aside in cases where the verdict is supportable on one ground, but 
not on another, and it is impossible to tell which ground the jury 
selected."  Bush v. State, 908 P.2d 963, 966 (Wyo. 
1995) (internal quotation marks omitted); Tanner v. State, 2002 WY 170, ¶ 8, 57 P.3d 1242, 1244 (Wyo. 2002).  The 
State maintains there was sufficient evidence of both "physical force" and 
"forcible confinement" to support the guilty verdict.

 
 

[¶11]     
Viewing 
the facts in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence reflected that, 
after a night of drinking and fighting, Appellant asked K.C. for sex and she 
refused.  Appellant then got into 
bed, forced K.C.'s legs apart, and jammed his fist into K.C.'s vagina.  K.C. tried to fight off Appellant but he 
held her down with "his force," and she was unable to escape.  She did not report the incident the next 
day because Appellant stayed home and she was fearful of his reaction.  On the following day, after Appellant 
left for work, K.C. reported the incident to a neighbor and law enforcement was 
contacted.  K.C. was taken to the 
hospital for a medical exam, where the SANE nurse documented two serious 
injuries to her vaginal area.

 
 

[¶12]     
K.C. 
testified about the incident as follows:

 
 
[Prosecutor]: 
Okay.  So as you were lying there 
then tell me exactly in detail what happened.

 
 
[K.C.]: 
Um, I was laying on my back in the bed.  
And he was angry with me because I wouldn't have sex with him.  I wasn't in the mood.  So then he started accusing me of having 
an affair and that I was seeing somebody else, all of this which was not 
true.  And he stuck his hand up me, 
inside of me, hurt me; I mean, he hurt me.

 
 
[Q]: 
Did he hold you down in any way?

 
 
[A]: 
Well, he's bigger than I am.  I 
didn't really have much of a choice.  
He didn't hold me down, no.  
He justhis force held me down. 

 
 


 
 
[Q]: 
And when this happened did you resist him in any way or try to fight 
[Appellant]?

 
 
[A]: 
Yes.

 
 
[Q]: 
And were you ableyou weren't able to fight him off?

 
 
[A]: 
No. 

 
 


 
 
[Q]: 
And so your legs were together as you were lying on the bed with 
[Appellant].  So he had to force 
your legs apart to get his hands into your private area?

 
 
[A]: 
Yes.

 
 
[Q]: 
You didn't voluntarily open your legs, did you?

 
 
[A]: 
No. 

 
 


 
 
[Q]: 
And after [Appellant] forced your legs apart and he put his hand in your private 
area, how did you feel immediately?  What did you feel?

 
 
[A]: 
It hurt.

 
 
[Q]: 
Had you ever had that kind of hurt before?

 
 
[A]: 
No.

 
 
[Q]: 
Would you have ever consented to [Appellant] doing that?

 
 
[A]: 
No. 

 
 

[¶13]     
The 
SANE nurse testified that K.C.'s vaginal injuries were caused by blunt force 
trauma.  She also stated that of the 
approximately 200 exams she had performed during her career, K.C.'s injuries 
were the most serious she had seen.  There is sufficient evidence that 
Appellant caused the "submission" of K.C. by "physical force."  

 
 

[¶14]     
We 
must also determine if the evidence supports a finding that Appellant "forcibly 
confined" K.C.  Appellant contends 
that K.C. "was not forcibly confined' as that term should be reasonably 
understood."  He cites to the 
definitions of "forcible" and "confinement" in Black's Law Dictionary for the 
meaning of the terms.  According to 
that source, "forcible" means "[e]ffected by force or threat of force against 
opposition or resistance."3  Black's Law Dictionary 674 (8th ed. 2004).  "Confinement" is defined as "[t]he act of 
imprisoning or restraining someone; the state of being imprisoned or 
restrained."  Id. at 318.  Appellant maintains "[t]here was no 
testimony to show that [he] held her down, kept her in place, did not permit her 
to leave the bed, or in any other way forcibly confined' her."  We disagree.

 
 

[¶15]     
K.C. 
testified that Appellant held her down with "his force," and she tried to get 
away but could not.  The difference 
in physical size between the two supports K.C.'s testimony.  Appellant is taller and heavier than 
K.C., who stands five foot four and weighs a little more than one hundred 
pounds.4  K.C. also described the sexual assault 
to the SANE nurse stating, "I was laying in bed. He wanted sex.  I told him no.  He got mad and jammed his fist into my 
vagina, his whole fist inside.  He's 
not a small man."

 
 

[¶16]     
Appellant's 
testimony also supports a finding that he restrained K.C. that night.  He admitted that he "put [his] arm over 
her chest and one on her leg to hold her down" for three to four minutes.  Although Appellant testified that his 
purpose in holding her down was to prevent her from hurting herself while she 
was having a seizure, the jury could reasonably determine that his explanation 
for holding K.C. down was not credible.  
Under the dictionary definition of "forcible confinement" supplied by 
Appellant, there is sufficient evidence that K.C. was "restrained by force" 
during the attack.5

 
 

[¶17]     
Additionally, 
we have previously recognized that in determining whether "forcible confinement" 
was established, a jury may appropriately consider the dynamics of the 
relationship of the assailant and the victim.  In Lewis, ¶ 12, 137 P.3d  at 912, where the 
victim was a four-year-old girl and the assailant was her step-father, we found 
sufficient evidence of "forcible confinement" by considering the discrepancy in 
size and strength, and the dynamics of the parent-child relationship.  

 
 

[¶18]     
The 
evidence regarding the dynamics of the relationship between Appellant and K.C. 
reflected prior physical abuse.  
K.C. once resisted Appellant by slapping him, but testified that she 
immediately regretted it because she was afraid of his retaliation.  She also testified that she did not 
immediately call the police because Appellant was still in the house and she 
feared his reaction if he found out that she had reported the incident.  The jury could reasonably use these 
facts in determining whether Appellant's actions were likely to restrain K.C. 
and cause her submission.  There is 
sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict.

 
 

Jury 
Question 

 
 

[¶19]     
Appellant 
also asserts that the district court erred in its response to a jury 
question.  During deliberations, the 
jury sent a note which read: 

 
 
Are 
we allowed to have a dictionary to look up the definition of "submission" for # 
5 of count 1? 

 
 
The 
court conferred with counsel for both sides and all agreed that the jury should 
not be provided a dictionary.  The 
district court returned the note to the jury with the answer: "No.  You must rely on the instructions you 
have." 

 
 

[¶20]     
When 
no objection to the district court's response to a jury question is made, we 
will review for plain error.  Snow v. State, 2009 WY 117, ¶ 26, 216 P.3d 505, 513 (Wyo. 2009).  To 
establish plain error, the appellant must show 1) the record clearly reflects 
the incident urged as error; 2) a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of 
law; and 3) that he was materially prejudiced by the denial of a substantial 
right.  Causey 
v. State, 2009 WY 111, ¶ 18, 215 P.3d 287, 293 (Wyo. 2009).  Under the 
plain error standard of review, we reverse a district court's decision only if 
it is so plainly erroneous that the judge should have noticed and corrected the 
mistake even though the parties failed to raise the issue.  Id., ¶ 19, 215 P.3d  at 293.  

 
 

[¶21]     
When 
reviewing jury instructions, we also apply the following principles.  "The trial court has the duty to instruct 
the jury on the general principles applicable in the case and is given wide 
latitude to do so."  Crabtree v. State, 2005 WY 62, ¶ 9, 112 P.3d 618, 620 (Wyo. 2005).  
"The 
trial court's ruling on an instruction must be prejudicial to constitute 
reversible error.  Since the 
function of jury instructions is to give guidance regarding the applicable law, 
prejudice results when the instructions confused or misled the jury with respect 
to the proper principles of law."  McGuire v. Solis, 2005 WY 129, ¶ 23, 120 P.3d 1020, 1026 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 

[¶22]     
The 
jury's question and the district court's response appear in the record 
satisfying the first prong of plain error review.  However, Appellant fails to establish a 
violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law.  To the contrary, our case law indicates 
that providing the jury with a dictionary is not appropriate.  In Rocky Mountain Trucking Co. v. Taylor, 
335 P.2d 448, 457 (Wyo. 1959), a bailiff provided a dictionary to the jury. 
 We called it "highly improper," but 
found the error was harmless because the verdict was supported by sufficient 
evidence.  In Zanetti Bus Lines, Inc. v. Logan, 400 P.2d 482 (Wyo. 1965), a bailiff again supplied the jury with a dictionary.  We held that giving the jury a 
dictionary was improper, but reviewed the definitions the jury likely 
considered, and determined that the error did not affect the outcome of the 
trial.  Id. at 488.  The district court did not err when it 
did not allow the jury to have a dictionary.

 
 

[¶23]     
Appellant 
urges us to interpret the jury's note, not as a simple request for a dictionary, 
but as a request for a definition of the word "submission."  Appellant asserts that "[t]here is a 
reasonable probability, given the acquittal on one count, the length of time the 
jury deliberated, and the credibility issues with the victim, as well as the 
paucity of evidence of submission,' that the jury would have reached a 
different verdict than it did" had it received a definition of "submission." 

 
 

[¶24]     
Appellant 
did not offer an instruction defining "submission" in response to the jury's 
request for a dictionary, or in his proposed jury instructions.  He claims plain error occurred when the 
court did not provide a definition, but provides no support for this 
assertion.  We can identify no 
violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law.

 
 

[¶25]     
"Submission" 
is not defined in the statute, suggesting the legislature did not mean for it to 
have a specialized meaning.  See Ewing v. State, 2007 WY 78, ¶ 10, 157 P.3d 943, 946 (Wyo. 2007).  A 
district court is not required to define a statutory term unless the term has a 
technical or legal meaning different than its common meaning.  Id., ¶ 9, 157 P.3d  at 946.  Appellant offers no legal or technical 
definition of the word "submission" that is different from its common 
meaning.  Appellant has 
not established the likelihood of a more favorable verdict had the word 
"submission" been defined.  There 
was no plain error. 

 
 

[¶26]     
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1During trial, the 
State voluntarily withdrew one of the battery charges and Appellant was found 
not guilty on the remaining charge.  

 
 

2Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-302(a)(i) provides:

 
 

(a)   Any 
actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits a sexual assault in the 
first degree if:

 
 

(i)     
The 
actor causes submission of the victim through the actual application, reasonably 
calculated to cause submission of the victim, of physical force or forcible 
confinement.

 
 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-501(b) provides:

 
 
(b)  A person is guilty of battery if he 
unlawfully touches another in a rude, insolent or angry manner or intentionally, 
knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another.

3"Force" is defined as 
"[p]ower, violence, or pressure directed against a person or thing."  Black's Law Dictionary 673 (8th ed. 2004).

 
 

4According to 
Appellant's pre-sentence investigation, he is five foot eight and weighs one 
hundred eighty-three pounds.  Both 
Appellant and K.C. testified at trial, allowing the jury to determine the size 
difference between K.C. and Appellant.

 
 

5Appellant does not 
challenge the elements of the jury instruction.  He did not request a definition of any 
of the terms in the instruction.

 
 
The State notes that 
in the "kidnapping" context, evidence of additional confinement, other than that 
incidental to the commission of other felonies, is necessary because of the 
greater penalties provided by the kidnapping statutes:

 
 
            
In order to confine another person in violation of Iowa Code section 
710.1 [the kidnapping statute], the confinement must exceed what is inherently 
incident in the underlying felony.  
This is called the incidental rule.  
No minimum period of confinement is required to convict a defendant of 
kidnapping.  The confinement must 
however be significantly independent of the confinement incident to the 
commission of the underlying crime.  
Confinement reaches the level required for section 710.1 if it 
substantially increases the risk of harm to the victim, significantly lessens 
the risk of detection, or significantly facilitates escape following the 
commission of the underlying offense.  
If the defendant merely seizes the victim during the commission of the 
crime, this does not rise to the level of confinement required for 
kidnapping.

 
 
            
The policy behind the incidental rule is that confinement against the 
victim's will is often an attendant circumstance in the commission of many of 
the underlying crimes in section 710.1.  
We have said the legislature did not intend to afford prosecutors the 
option of bootstrapping convictions for kidnapping, carrying life sentences, 
onto charges for crimes for which the legislature provides much less severe 
penalties.

 
 

State v. 
Griffin, 564 N.W.2d 370, 373 
(Iowa 1997) (internal citations and punctuation omitted).

 
 
            
In this case, Appellant was not charged with kidnapping and is not 
subject to any additional statutory penalty if convicted of first degree sexual 
assault on the basis of "physical force" or "forcible confinement" or 
both.