Title: State ex rel. Reynolds v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Reynolds v. Indus. Comm., 97 Ohio St.3d 53, 2002-Ohio-5352.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. REYNOLDS, APPELLEE, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
OHIO, APPELLANT, ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Reynolds v. Indus. Comm., 97 Ohio St.3d 53, 2002-Ohio-
5352.] 
Workers’ compensation — Industrial Commission denies further temporary total 
disability compensation after claimant voluntarily leaves his former 
position of employment — Motion for reconsideration denied by 
commission — Writ of mandamus granted ordering Industrial 
Commission to consider claimant’s eligibility for temporary total 
disability compensation benefits in light of Baker II. 
(No. 2001-2044 — Submitted July 24, 2002 — Decided October 16, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 01AP-51. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
Appellee-claimant, Clyde L. Reynolds, was hurt while working for 
Thrift Stores of Ohio, Inc.  Claimant quit his job on March 25, 1999, and 
appellant Industrial Commission of Ohio denied further temporary total disability 
compensation (“TTC”), finding that claimant had voluntarily left his former 
position of employment, following State ex rel. Baker v. Indus. Comm. (2000), 87 
Ohio St.3d 561, 722 N.E.2d 67 (“Baker I”). 
{¶2} 
Within days of the commission’s decision, State ex rel. Baker v. 
Indus. Comm. (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 376, 732 N.E.2d 355 (“Baker II”), was 
decided.  That case, on reconsideration, vacated the prior decision, which had 
prohibited TTC for anyone who voluntarily left the former position of 
employment.  Baker II instead stated that a claimant who leaves a former position 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
of employment for another job becomes eligible again for TTC if the industrial 
injury removes the claimant from the later job. 
{¶3} 
Citing Baker II, claimant immediately—and unsuccessfully—
moved for reconsideration.  The Court of Appeals for Franklin County, on 
claimant’s petition in mandamus, ordered the commission to reconsider the claim.  
It did not, however, order further proceedings pursuant to Baker II.  It instead 
directed the commission to reconsider the issue of voluntariness—a finding 
claimant had not contested before the court. 
{¶4} 
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
{¶5} 
Before Baker II, all claimants who voluntarily left their former 
jobs forever forfeited eligibility for TTC.  Today, permanent forfeiture is limited 
to those whose decision to leave the former position of employment ultimately 
translates into a voluntary departure from the entire work force.  State ex rel. 
Wagers v. Indus. Comm. (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 218, 754 N.E.2d 777.  For those 
who leave for different employment, renewed eligibility hinges on a single 
element: Was the claimant removed from later employment by the industrial 
injury? 
{¶6} 
Because Baker II was issued just days after the commission’s 
present order denying  TTC, claimant’s request for reconsideration was neither 
unexpected nor inappropriate.  Two things, however, were: (1) the commission’s 
denial of reconsideration and (2) the court of appeals’ reason ordering the 
commission to vacate that denial. 
{¶7} 
The commission asserts that reconsideration was inappropriate 
because claimant never alleged subsequent employment at the administrative 
hearing.  This begs the question of why he would.  Before Baker II, subsequent 
employment was irrelevant.  Once voluntary departure was ascertained, inquiry 
ended. 
January Term, 2002 
3 
{¶8} 
The court of appeals did not discount the commission’s reasoning 
and did not feel that an order to consider the question of subsequent employment 
was necessary.  It did, however, order further consideration of the voluntary 
character of claimant’s departure.  This was neither necessary nor appropriate. 
{¶9} 
Administratively, the claimant did raise the issue of voluntariness.  
The commission, in turn, concluded that departure was indeed voluntary.  
Claimant sought reconsideration of the denial of TTC that accompanied that 
finding, and his motion is the best evidence that the assessment of voluntariness 
was not being further contested.  That motion listed Baker II as the sole basis for 
requesting reconsideration.  Moreover, claimant’s repeated assertion of Baker II 
as controlling was valid only if separation from employment was voluntary.  A 
finding otherwise rendered Baker II inapplicable. 
{¶10} We therefore agree with the court of appeals that reconsideration 
by the commission is necessary, but for the aforementioned reasons.  In light of 
Baker II, exploration is necessary as to whether claimant’s injury removed him 
from later employment.  The matter of voluntariness is deemed final.  We 
therefore vacate the judgment of the court of appeals and grant a writ ordering the 
commission to consider claimant’s eligibility in light of Baker II. 
Writ granted. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
JJ., concur. 
 
RESNICK and PFEIFER, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
Gibson & Robbins-Penniman and J. Miles Gibson, for appellee. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Jeffrey B. Hartranft, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellant. 
__________________