Title: State v. Lassen

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

99 Ariz. 161 (1965) 407 P.2d 747 The STATE of Arizona ex rel. ARIZONA HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT, Petitioner, v. Obed M. LASSEN, Commissioner, State Land Department, Respondent. No. 8620. Supreme Court of Arizona. En Banc. November 12, 1965. Rehearing Denied December 14, 1965. Darrell F. Smith, Atty. Gen., Robert W. Pickrell, former Atty. Gen., Gary K. Nelson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner. Dale R. Shumway, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent. Rex E. Lee, Jennings, Strouss, Salmon & Trask, Phoenix, for Salt River Project Agri. Improvement Dist. Rawlins, Ellis, Burrus & Kiewit, Phoenix, for Electrical Dists. Nos. 3 & 4, Pinal County. A. Van Wagenen, Jr., Phoenix, for Electrical Dists. Nos. 2 & 5, Pinal County. *162 E. Leigh Larson, County Atty., Santa Cruz County, Westover, Copple, Keddie & Choules, Yuma, for Welton Mohawk Irrigation & Drainage Dist. Richard J. Riley, County Atty. for Cochise County, amici curiae. McFARLAND, Justice. For over fifty years the state and county highway departments of Arizona have obtained rights of way and material sites without compensation over and on lands granted to the State of Arizona by the federal government pursuant to the Enabling Act of Arizona, June 20, 1910, c. 310, 36 U.S. Stat. 557, 568-579. On December 14, 1964, the State Land Commissioner, hereinafter designated as Land Commissioner or respondent, after giving notice of a proposal to change the rules and regulations governing the rights of way and material sites over these lands, and holding a hearing at which petitioner appeared and filed an objection thereto, adopted the following rule designated as Rule No. 12 of the State Land Department, to-wit: Objections were overruled. On the same day, the State Highway Department, hereinafter designated as the Department or petitioner, filed this writ of prohibition to prevent respondent from enforcing this rule. An alternative writ of prohibition was granted by this court. The question presented in this case is whether the Land Commissioner has the authority to adopt the rule as set forth which, in effect, provides for the payment for rights of way and material sites over these trust lands by the petitioner. The lands were granted to the State of Arizona by the federal government pursuant to the Enabling Act of Arizona, June 20, 1910. Under Sec. 24 of this act, the State was granted "in trust," certain sections of every township for the support of common schools, with the opportunity to make indemnity selections where any of the sections were lost for one or more reasons. Congress further provided, in Sec. 25 of the Enabling Act, twelve specific grants for the following purposes: university; legislative, executive and judicial, public buildings; penitentiaries; insane asylum; school and asylum for deaf, dumb and blind; miners' hospital; normal schools; state *163 charitable, penal and reformatory institutions; agricultural and mechanical colleges; school of mines; military institutions; and county bonds. By Sec. 1, Art. 10, of the Constitution of Arizona, A.R.S., the people of Arizona accepted the terms of the Enabling Act. Respondent claims it has this authority under Section 28 of the Enabling Act, which sets forth the rules for the administration and disposition of the "trust lands" confirmed to the State of Arizona under Sec. 24 and Sec. 25. Section 28 provides, in part: It is the contention of the respondent that, under the terms of these rules, it is a breach of trust to allow the petitioner to use the "trust lands" without compensating the trust fund for the use thereof. This question has been before this court on two prior occasions the case of Grossetta v. Choate, 51 Ariz. 248, 75 P.2d 1031, and the case of State ex rel. Conway v. State Land Department, 62 Ariz. 248, 156 P.2d 901. In Murphy v. State, 65 Ariz. 338, 181 P.2d 336, the late Justice LaPrade set forth an able and scholarly history of the Enabling Act. We see no reason for trying to add to the history of this act. In the case of State ex rel. Conway v. State Land Department, supra, we said: The Land Commissioner, in his brief, contends that this court should follow the decision of the Supreme Court of New Mexico in the case of State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Walker, 61 N.M. 374, 301 P.2d 317, rather than our own decisions, for the reason that the Enabling Acts for each state were identical. We are of the opinion that the holdings in the case of State ex rel. Conway v. State Land Department, supra, and Grossetta v. Choate, supra, are sound, and see no reason for departing from these decisions. The respective rights of way for these highways take less than a fee estate, and there is no disposition of the trust areas, and the trust and its beneficiaries are not deprived of anything of value. It is well known that good highways throughout a state increase the value of the lands. These lands are located throughout the state. The Land Commissioner, in his memorandum, sets forth what he stated to be a fair value for these rights of way. He does not give the basis of the value, nor was it based upon evidence submitted in the case. Certainly, if the highways had not been established the values of these lands would have been much less. Nor does he state whether the values estimated are those when the easements were first granted or as of the present time, after the values have been enhanced by the building of a highway system throughout this state. This court, in the State Land case (Conway), supra, made two fundamental determinations: 1. It was held that as a matter of law the grant of nonrental rights of way for the purpose of constructing the kind of roads involved in that case resulted in an over-all benefit to school trust lands. 2. It was held that where there is such a benefit the State Land Department must grant the requested rights of way free of charge. We certainly agree that, in making a determination as to whether the proposed construction would result in an over-all benefit to trust lands, such determination must be made upon all of the trust lands as a whole, rather than taking them parcel by parcel. The Land Commissioner, in his memorandum, asked the question: If highway construction by states and counties improves the lands that the highways cross, why, then, is it ever necessary for compensation to be paid to a private land owner when his land is taken? Private lands are in a different category from these trust lands. Private lands are in relatively small tracts, and the value of the right of way to the owner is frequently out of proportion to the benefit to him, while, as we have held, the determination of benefit upon trust lands is made upon the basis of whether *167 the proposed benefit results in an overall benefit to the trust lands as a whole. The value of these large tracts of trust lands is greatly enhanced by the building of a highway system through and to the same. The two situations are not analogous. The Land Commissioner contends that the material sites damage the land upon which they are located. Our statutes at the time under which the State v. State Land, supra, decision was made was substantially the same as at the present time. In that case we held: There was no evidence presented in the case in regard to these material sites. It is plain that both the granting of the rights of way and the material sites enable the building of highways, and are of material benefit to the trust lands as a whole, and enhance the value thereof. For the reasons as set forth, we hold that it is the duty of the Land Commissioner to grant, without compensation, material sites on, and easements for rights of way over state lands held in trust by virtue of the Enabling Act of Arizona. We, therefore, order that the writ of prohibition be made permanent. LOCKWOOD, C.J., STRUCKMEYER, V.C.J., BERNSTEIN, J., and HOWARD F. THOMPSON, Judge, concurring. (Justice JESSE A. UDALL having disqualified himself, Judge HOWARD F. THOMPSON sat in his stead.)