Title: MICHAEL HOPKINS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

State: kentucky

Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court

Document:

IMPORTANTNOTICE NOTTO BEPZIBLLSHED-- OPINION THIS OPINIONISDESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATEDBY THE SUPREME COURT , CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL ATOTBE CITED OR USED ASAUTHORITYINANY OTHER CASE INANY COURT OF THIS STA TE. V ~$uyrnnr d1ourf ofA APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE ANTHONY FROHLICH, JUDGE 03-CR-0134 MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING RENDERED : JANUARY 19, 2006 NOT,TCLSER4JBL.L~HE0- 2005-SC-000259-TG MICHAEL HOPKINS APPELLANT COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE Appellant, Michael Hopkins, pled guilty to Wanton Murder. Four days later, he sought to withdraw his plea, claiming that his attorney had misinformed him as to his parole eligibility . The trial judge refused to allow Appellant to withdraw his guilty plea . Appellant now claims that the trial judge's refusal was an abuse of discretion . We disagree and affirm the trial court . On April 15, 2003, Appellant was indicted on one count of Murder for the March 13, 2003 killing of Crystal Smith, the mother of his three children . Soon after the indictment, Appellant's attorney raised concerns that Appellant might not be competent to stand trial . Appellant was subsequently examined at the Kentucky Corrections Psychiatric Center (KCPC) . The report KCPC submitted to the trial court indicated that Appellant was competent but that he "present[ed] several bona fide problems." The report also noted Appellant's two prior psychiatric commitments, family history of psychiatric problems, physical abuse as a child, 7th grade education, 7th grade reading ability, 3rd grade spelling ability, and full-scale IQ of 75 . The trial court held a competency hearing during which this evidence was introduced and Appellant was found to be competent . On August 19, 2004, in exchange for the Commonwealth's recommendation of the minimum sentence of twenty years, Appellant entered a guilty plea to the amended charge of Wanton Murder. The plea agreement, signed by Appellant, his attorney, the prosecutor, and members of the victim's family, indicated that the Commonwealth would oppose all forms of early release, and that Appellant and his attorney understood that Appellant would have to serve at least 85% of his sentence before he would be eligible for parole . Before accepting Appellant's plea, the trial judge engaged him in the full Boykin colloquy, wherein Appellant acknowledged that he was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol ; that he understood why he was in court ; that he understood that he was waiving his rights to a jury trial, silence, and to appeal ; that no one had threatened him or made any promises to induce his plea ; and that he had had time to discuss his plea with his attorneys . On August 23, 2004, Appellant contacted the trial judge and claimed that when he had entered the guilty plea, he had not understood the amount of time he would be required to serve on his twenty-year sentence . The trial judge had Appellant brought from the jail to appear in open court with his attorneys, David Steele and Rhonda Lause . The prosecutor was also present . Appellant then claimed that prior to entering his guilty plea, David Steele had told him he would have to serve at least thirteen years before being released, but that after entering his guilty plea, Rhonda Lause told him he would have to serve seventeen and a half years before even becoming eligible for parole . The prosecutor responded by stating that on the evening before the guilty pleas, she had heard David Steele tell Appellant that he would have to serve fifteen to sixteen years, with his jail time credit, before becoming parole eligible. Appellant then stated that Steele had brought some paperwork to the jail after the plea and told Appellant, "I though you were only going to have to do thirteen years." Appellant claimed that he then told Steele, "That's what I thought, but I talked to Rhonda [on] Friday and she told me different ." After hearing this discussion, the trial judge, based in large part on the Boykin colloquy he had conducted with Appellant only a few days before, stated, "I'm very satisfied that you knew what you were doing ." The judge then concluded that Appellant's plea had been entered freely and voluntarily, and refused to allow Appellant to withdraw his guilty plea . The judge, in order to make a complete record, then took sworn testimony from Appellant's attorneys regarding what they told Appellant about his sentence and parole eligibility . The exchange between the judge and Appellant's attorney was as follows : Judge: Ms. Lause, you've been sworn . Could you please tell me your version of any comments-and I don't want to know about the whole process-but was there any representation to Mr . Hopkins that he would get-be eligible for parole as little as thirteen years? Ms . Lause : No, your honor . I-not in my presence, while I specifically talked with Michael, Mr . Steele was also there. I have it written on a sheet of notebook paper that the parole eligibility of a twenty year sentence is seventeen years . If he were to do a serve out, it would be seventeen and a half . Mr . Hopkins indicated that he had somewhere around two years worth of jail time . We did tell him that he would get credit for every day that he had spent in jail . So, he would be looking in the vicinity of fifteen years before he were paroled . Judge : Mr. Steele, you've been sworn, do you have any comments to add on that same subject? Mr . Steele : Judge, that's exactly what happened . Now, I did meet with Mr. Hopkins Thursday night, just as he said . He's 3 not misrepresenting that to the Court . I still explained to him the seventeen year parole eligibility. I explained to him he would get credit for his jail time . He informed me of two years jail credit . I told him he would probably be around the fifteen year mark . Maybe fifteen years, you know, if it was over two years . He would get credit for every day . Judge : And there was no mention of thirteen or fourteen, but fifteen possibly or above? Mr . Steele : Not on my part, Judge . The judge then allowed Appellant to respond. They engaged in the following discussion : Judge : Mr . Hopkins, you don't have to say anything at this time . You can remain silent, but if you wanted to add anything to this, I would ask you to be sworn, raise your hand and be sworn, but you don't have to say anything if you don't want to but you can . Mr . Hopkins: Sir, what I'm saying is there was somebody standing right there . He's over at the jail Judge : Raise your right hand and be sworn . Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr . Hopkins : Yes, sir . Judge : Now, you said that somebody was standing right there, meaning what sir? Mr . Hopkins : The sergeant was standing right there when he told me this. And he told me to tell you that you can call him if you like . Judge : Well, I'm not really in the business of calling witnesses on the telephone . That's not my role . If the sergeant wants to come forward, I will be very glad to receive any testimony he has at the appropriate time . But do you have anything to ask these two people concerning what they have just testified to? Mr . Hopkins: No, sir . The trial court subsequently sentenced Appellant to twenty years in prison . Appellant now appeals to this Court as a matter of right . Ky . Const . § 110(2)(b) . RCr 8.10 allows that "[a]t any time before judgment the court may permit the plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill, to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted ." If the plea was involuntary, the motion to withdraw must be granted . Rodriquez v. Commonwealth , 87 S.W.3d 8, 10 (Ky . 2002). If the plea was voluntary, however, the decision to allow the withdrawal is within the trial court's discretion. Id . Appellant claims that he was misinformed about his parole eligibility and that, as a result, he presented the trial court with a sufficient "fair and just reason" to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea so that the trial court's refusal of his request was an abuse of discretion . Appellant also claims his low intelligence kept him from understanding the impact of the 85% rule on his parole eligibility, and that there was evidence that his plea was involuntary . However, the testimony from both of Appellant's attorneys establishes that he was informed correctly about his parole eligibility . More specifically, their testimony establishes that he was told the number of years he would have to serve . Appellant presented only his own testimony that he had been told he would be parole eligible in as little as 13 years . It is clear that the trial court believed the testimony of Appellant's attorneys instead . Given Appellant's self-interested motive in withdrawing his guilty plea, however misguided it may have been, this was a perfectly reasonable course of action by the trial court . The trial court found that Appellant's plea was freely and voluntarily entered and that he had failed to show a reason sufficient to allow withdrawal of the guilty plea . We agree with the trial court in both respects-Appellant has shown no compelling reason for us to second-guess the trial court's decision . The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Appellant to withdraw his guilty plea . Appellant makes the alternative argument that this matter should at least be remanded for an evidentiary hearing . But, as recounted above, an evidentiary hearing on the issue, though ad hoc and narrow in scope, was held . The trial court heard sworn testimony from the attorneys and from Appellant himself . Furthermore, the trial court gave Appellant leave to present further evidence in the future . Though Appellant claimed that a guard at the jail would testify to hearing the 13-year parole eligibility figure, it appears that Appellant chose not to take the judge up on his offer . Another evidentiary hearing in this matter is unnecessary. Appellant also complains that the trial court ruled on the request to withdraw the guilty plea before hearing . the sworn testimony . This may seem unusual, but it simply means that the trial court gave Appellant an opportunity to show that the initial ruling was incorrect . Appellant failed to do so . Had the trial judge not heard the sworn testimony, Appellant's claim might have more weight . But since Appellant was given an opportunity to be heard, we are not convinced that his rights were infringed . For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Boone Circuit Court is affirmed . All concur . COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT : Donna L. Boyce Appellate Branch Manager Department of Public Advocacy 100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302 Frankfort, Kentucky 40601 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE : Gregory D. Stumbo Attorney General Kenneth Wayne Riggs Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, Kentucky 40601