Title: Turner v. CertainTeed Corp.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Turner v. CertainTeed Corp., Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-3869.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-3869 
TURNER, APPELLEE, ET AL., v. CERTAINTEED CORPORATION ET AL.; UNION 
CARBIDE CORPORATION, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Turner v. CertainTeed Corp., Slip Opinion No.  
2018-Ohio-3869.] 
Asbestos claims—Court of appeals’ judgment affirming trial court’s denial of 
manufacturer’s motion for administrative dismissal reversed and cause 
remanded for trial court to determine whether manufacturer put application 
of R.C. 2307.92(C)(1) at issue by submitting “written report of a competent 
medical authority” specifying that plaintiff had “smoked the equivalent of 
one-pack year * * * during the last fifteen years” under R.C. 2307.91(DD). 
(No. 2017-0004—Submitted February 13, 2018—Decided September 27, 2018.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
No. 103475, 2016-Ohio-7776. 
_________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
FISCHER, J. 
{¶ 1} When a plaintiff is a “smoker” who alleges that he or she suffers from 
lung cancer as a result of asbestos exposure, the plaintiff must make a prima facie 
showing that satisfies the requirements listed in R.C. 2307.92(C)(1), including a 
“diagnosis by a competent medical authority that the [plaintiff] has primary lung 
cancer and that exposure to asbestos is a substantial contributing factor to that 
cancer,” R.C. 2307.92(C)(1)(a).  A plaintiff who is not a “smoker” need not satisfy 
those requirements.  This case presents the question of how to determine whether a 
plaintiff is a “smoker.” 
{¶ 2} In the instant case, plaintiff-appellee, Bobby Turner, did not attempt 
to make the prima facie showing required under R.C. 2307.92(C)(1).  Relying on 
the definition of “smoker” provided in R.C. 2307.91(DD), defendant-appellant, 
Union Carbide Corporation argued that medical records demonstrate that Turner 
has a history of smoking and, therefore, should be required to prove that he is a 
nonsmoker by means of a written medical report.  The court of appeals rejected 
Union Carbide’s argument and held that whether someone is a “smoker” is a 
question of fact, as opposed to a medical determination. 
{¶ 3} We reverse the court of appeals’ judgment affirming the trial court’s 
denial of the motion for administrative dismissal filed by Union Carbide and 
remand the case to the trial court for it to determine whether Union Carbide put the 
application of R.C. 2307.92(C)(1) at issue by submitting “the written report of a 
competent medical authority” that “specified” that Turner had “smoked the 
equivalent of one-pack year * * * during the last fifteen years,” R.C. 2307.91(DD). 
I.  Background 
A.  Trial-Court Proceedings 
{¶ 4} Turner was diagnosed with lung cancer in 2013.  He filed a complaint 
alleging that his cancer was caused by exposure to asbestos while he worked as a 
drywall finisher between approximately 1962 and 1978.  Union Carbide, which 
January Term, 2018 
 
3
manufactured an asbestos product found in joint compounds that Turner used 
during that time frame, was named as a defendant. 
{¶ 5} Union Carbide moved to dismiss Turner’s lawsuit, arguing that he is 
a “smoker” and that he had not made the prima facie showing under R.C. 
2307.92(C)(1) that is required of a person who is a “smoker.”  Turner filed an 
affidavit and attached some of his medical records.  He claimed that he was a 
nonsmoker but added that he had smoked some cigars several years prior to his 
exposures to asbestos.  The medical reports supported Turner’s assertion that he 
was a nonsmoker.  Shortly thereafter, Union Carbide withdrew its motion to dismiss 
the complaint. 
{¶ 6} After discovery had progressed for nearly a year and a half, Union 
Carbide filed a second motion to dismiss Turner’s suit.  Union Carbide again 
alleged that Turner is a “smoker” as defined in R.C. 2307.91(DD) and that Turner 
had failed to meet his burden to make the prima facie showing required under R.C. 
2307.92(C)(1).  Union Carbide argued that medical records that became available 
during discovery demonstrated that Turner is a “smoker.”  Union Carbide added 
that the deposition testimony of Turner’s physician also showed that Turner is a 
“smoker.” 
{¶ 7} Turner responded by submitting affidavits and citing testimony from 
several people, including family members, who averred that they had never seen 
him smoke.  Turner also noted that the evidence of his smoking history contained 
in some medical records was inconsistent with other medical records identifying 
him as a nonsmoker.  In addition, Turner argued that the “pack year” referred to in 
R.C. 2307.91(DD)’s definition of “smoker” does not encompass cigar smoking. 
{¶ 8} The trial court rejected Turner’s argument that R.C. 2307.91(DD) 
applied only to cigarette smokers, acknowledged that some of the medical records 
indicated that Turner had a history of smoking but discounted those notations as 
likely mistakes, and concluded that Union Carbide had “failed to prove that Mr. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4
Turner is a smoker, as defined in R.C. 2307.91(DD).”  The trial court therefore 
denied Union Carbide’s motion to dismiss. 
B.  Appellate Proceedings 
{¶ 9} Union Carbide appealed and argued that Turner needed to submit a 
“written report of a competent medical authority” stating that he was a nonsmoker.  
The court of appeals framed the issue as follows: “[W]hen there is conflicting 
evidence of [a] plaintiff’s smoking status, does the plaintiff need to present a written 
report of competent medical authority to withstand his burden of proving he is a 
nonsmoker.”  2016-Ohio-7776, 66 N.E.3d 802, ¶ 9.  To a limited extent, the court 
of appeals adopted Union Carbide’s position when it determined that the trial court 
had improperly placed the burden of proving that Turner is a “smoker” on Union 
Carbide.  The court of appeals also determined that whether a person is a “smoker” 
is a question of fact and not a medical issue.  Relying on its precedent, the court 
held that a report by a competent medical authority is required only after a person 
has been determined to be a “smoker.”  See Farnsworth v. Allied Glove Corp., 8th 
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91731, 2009-Ohio-3890, ¶ 30.  The court of appeals ultimately 
affirmed the trial court’s judgment and concluded that the trial court’s 
determination that Turner is not a “smoker” “was not against the manifest weight 
of the evidence.”  2016-Ohio-7776, 66 N.E.3d 802, at ¶ 35. 
{¶ 10} Union Carbide filed a discretionary appeal to this court, and we 
accepted that appeal on a single proposition of law: 
 
In an asbestos tort action alleging lung cancer, when there is 
evidence that a plaintiff has smoked in the past fifteen years, the 
General Assembly’s express statutory language requires a plaintiff 
to prove, through a “written report of a competent medical 
authority,” that he is not a “smoker” as defined in R.C. 
2307.91(DD).  A reviewing court must strictly enforce, and may not 
January Term, 2018 
 
5
simply ignore, the General Assembly’s inclusion of the express 
“competent medical authority” requirement in the statute. 
 
See 150 Ohio St.3d 1429, 2017-Ohio-7567, 81 N.E.3d 1271. 
II.  Analysis 
A.  Standard of Review 
{¶ 11} The standard of review for questions of statutory interpretation is de 
novo.  Ceccarelli v. Levin, 127 Ohio St.3d 231, 2010-Ohio-5681, 938 N.E.2d 342, 
¶ 8.  Our main objective is to determine and give effect to the legislative intent.  
State ex rel. Solomon v. Police & Firemen’s Disability & Pension Fund Bd. of 
Trustees, 72 Ohio St.3d 62, 65, 647 N.E.2d 486 (1995).  We owe no deference to 
the lower court’s decision, nor are we limited to choosing between the different 
interpretations of the statute presented by the parties. 
{¶ 12} When a statute is plain and unambiguous, we apply the statute as 
written.  Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Akron, 109 Ohio St.3d 106, 2006-Ohio-
954, 846 N.E.2d 478, ¶ 52, citing State ex rel. Savarese v. Buckeye Local School 
Dist. Bd. of Edn., 74 Ohio St.3d 543, 545, 660 N.E.2d 463 (1996).  When a statute 
is unclear and relates to the same subject matter as another statute, we construe the 
two statutes in pari materia “to discover and carry out legislative intent.”  Sheet 
Metal Workers’ Internatl. Assn., Local Union No. 33 v. Gene’s Refrig., Heating & 
Air Conditioning, Inc., 122 Ohio St.3d 248, 2009-Ohio-2747, 910 N.E.2d 444,  
¶ 38, citing State ex rel. Ellis Super Valu, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 115 Ohio St.3d 224, 
2007-Ohio-4920, 874 N.E.2d 780, ¶ 13. 
B.  The Statutory Definition Applies to Cigar Smoking 
{¶ 13} Turner tries to defend the judgment of the court of appeals by 
repeating his argument that R.C. 2307.91(DD)’s definition of “smoker” does not 
include cigar smokers and that therefore, he need not make the prima facie showing 
required under R.C. 2307.92(C)(1). 
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{¶ 14} The definition of “smoker’ provided in R.C. 2307.91(DD) is: “a 
person who has smoked the equivalent of one-pack year, as specified in the written 
report of a competent medical authority pursuant to sections 2307.92 and 2307.93 
of the Revised Code, during the last fifteen years.”  Turner rests his argument on 
the National Cancer Institute’s definition of “pack year” in terms of cigarette 
smoking: “A way to measure the amount a person has smoked over a long period 
of time.  It is calculated by multiplying the number of packs of cigarettes smoked 
per 
day 
by 
the 
number 
of 
years 
the 
person 
has 
smoked,” 
https://www.cancer.gov/publications/dictionaries/cancer-terms/def/pack-year 
(accessed July 19, 2018).  We reject Turner’s argument that the reference to “pack 
year” in R.C. 2307.91(DD) refers exclusively to cigarettes.  R.C. 2307.91(DD), by 
its plain text, does not distinguish between different types of smoking.  The statute 
provides the level of consumption necessary for a person to be designated a 
“smoker” but does not provide any limitation on the vehicle for that consumption. 
C.  The Statutory Scheme 
{¶ 15} Under R.C. 2307.92(C)(1), a “smoker” who is suffering from lung 
cancer must, for purposes of presenting a prima facie case to support a tort claim 
involving asbestos exposure, meet all the requirements listed in R.C. 
2307.92(C)(1)(a) and (C)(1)(b) as well as one of the two requirements listed in R.C. 
2307.92(C)(1)(c).  The plain text of the statute dictates that only a “smoker” has the 
burden to meet those requirements. 
{¶ 16} R.C. 2307.91(DD) defines “smoker” as “a person who has smoked 
the equivalent of one-pack year, as specified in the written report of a competent 
medical authority pursuant to sections 2307.92 and 2307.93 of the Revised Code, 
during the last fifteen years.”  (Emphasis added.)  Pursuant to the plain text of the 
statute, unless there is a written report of a competent medical authority that 
specifies that the person has smoked the equivalent of one pack year during the last 
15 years, then that person is not a “smoker” for purposes of the relevant statutes.  
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Additionally, there is no statutory mechanism that permits the person who is 
specified to be a “smoker” in the written report of a competent medical authority 
to rebut that report.  See R.C. 2307.91 through 2307.93.  “A” means “any.”  State 
v. Ladd, 56 Ohio St.2d 197, 205, 383 N.E.2d 579 (1978) (William B. Brown, J., 
dissenting).  Thus, pursuant to the plain text of R.C. 2307.91(DD), once any 
competent medical authority has specified in a written report that the plaintiff is a 
“smoker,” that plaintiff has the burden to present the relevant prima facie evidence 
required under R.C. 2307.92(C)(1); however, when there is not a written report of 
a competent medical authority that specifies that the plaintiff is a “smoker,” that 
plaintiff does not have to meet the R.C. 2307.92(C)(1) requirements. 
{¶ 17} Turner argues that it is “nonsensical” to require a smoker to make a 
prima facie showing that includes a report of a competent medical authority and 
have the same report be the reason that such a prima facie showing is necessary.  
According to Turner, “to satisfy the requirements of the written report under [R.C.] 
2307.92(C)(1)(a), the medical authority must discuss disease attribution in relation 
to the amount of pack-years smoked, but only after it is determined by the court 
that the statute applies to the ‘exposed person who is a smoker.’ ” (Emphasis sic.)  
In other words, Turner argues that the competent medical authority prepares a 
report only if the plaintiff has already been determined to be a “smoker.” 
{¶ 18} Turner’s argument is similar to the reasoning used by the Eighth 
District Court of Appeals in its decision in Farnsworth, 2009-Ohio-3890.  There, 
the court asked: “[W]hat comes first, the smoker or the written report; the smoker 
or competent medical authority?”  Id. at ¶ 23.  The court concluded that “the smoker 
must come first—since the written report, which will include the diagnosis from a 
competent medical authority, is not required until after it has been determined that 
the person is a smoker.”  Id. at ¶ 24. 
{¶ 19} The problem with Turner’s reading of the statute is that it ignores the 
plain language of the statutory definition of “smoker.”  It cannot be true that the 
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report of a competent medical authority is required only after one is designated a 
“smoker” but that one can be designated a “smoker” only if it is specified in the 
same report.  The statutory scheme plainly provides that the starting point is 
determining whether a person is a “smoker.”  Only after it has been established that 
a person is a “smoker”—that is, that a person smoked the equivalent of one pack 
year in the past 15 years, as specified in the written report of a competent medical 
authority—is there any need for the plaintiff to make a prima facie showing under 
R.C. 2307.92(C)(1). 
{¶ 20} Turner also argues that whether and how much someone has smoked 
is a factual question best left to a factfinder rather than a medical professional.  This 
is an argument for the legislature, not this court.  We must determine what 
procedures are set forth within the statute, not what procedures are the most wise.  
A person is a “smoker” only if that designation is “specified in the written report of 
a competent medical authority,” R.C. 2307.91(DD).  If there is not a written report 
from a competent medical authority specifying that the person is a “smoker,” the 
person is not a “smoker” and, therefore, need not make the prima facie showing 
described in R.C. 2307.92(C)(1). 
{¶ 21} Based on R.C. 2307.91(DD)’s definition of “smoker,” Union 
Carbide maintains that Turner must submit a written report from a competent 
medical authority that establishes that he is not a “smoker” as defined in the statute. 
{¶ 22} One insurmountable problem with Union Carbide’s reading is that it 
ignores that neither the definition of “smoker” in R.C. 2307.91(DD) nor any other 
provision within the statutory scheme creates the requirement that Turner prove 
that he is not a “smoker.” 
{¶ 23} R.C. 2307.91(Z) sets forth the requirements for a physician to be 
considered a “competent medical authority” for purposes of presenting prima facie 
evidence:  “ ‘Competent medical authority’ means a medical doctor who is 
providing a diagnosis for purposes of constituting prima-facie evidence of an 
January Term, 2018 
 
9
exposed person’s physical impairment that meets the requirements specified in 
section 2307.92 of the Revised Code * * *.”  R.C. 2307.91(Z) contains four 
additional criteria that the party must meet before the court can consider the 
physician a “competent medical authority” for purposes of presenting prima facie 
evidence.  Under R.C. 2307.91(Z), the physician must have certain qualifications, 
R.C. 2307.91(Z)(1), must not have relied on certain types of reports or opinions in 
preparing his or her own report, R.C. 2307.91(Z)(3), must not exceed a certain 
percentage of his or her practice hours providing expert testimony, R.C. 
2307.91(Z)(4), and must be treating or have treated and have or have had a doctor-
patient relationship with the person who is the subject of the report, R.C. 
2307.91(Z)(2).  Renfrow v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 140 Ohio St.3d 371, 2014-Ohio-
3666, 18 N.E.3d 1173, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 24} In Renfrow, we determined that the medical report submitted by the 
plaintiff was not a report of a “competent medical authority” because the physician 
who prepared it did not meet the requirements set forth in R.C. 2307.91(Z)(2).  We 
did not address whether R.C. 2307.93(A)(1) has any effect on the definition of 
“competent medical authority” or whether R.C. 2307.91(Z)(2) is applicable when 
it is the defendant who submits a physician’s report. 
{¶ 25} Pursuant to R.C. 2307.93(A)(1), the defendant must be given a 
reasonable opportunity to challenge the adequacy of the plaintiff’s prima facie 
evidence of a physical impairment and, when the defendant presents a written report 
for the purpose of challenging the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s prima facie 
evidence, the physician who prepared that report will be considered a “competent 
medical authority” if that physician meets only the requirements of R.C. 
2307.91(Z)(1), (3), and (4).  There is no need for that physician to be treating or 
have treated the person who is the subject of the report, nor is there a need for the 
physician to have or previously have had a doctor-patient relationship with the 
person who is the subject of the report, as is required under R.C. 2307.91(Z)(2). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 26} It is worth noting that “physical impairment” is defined in R.C. 
2307.91(V).  That definition provides: “ ‘Physical impairment’ means * * * lung 
cancer of an exposed person who is a smoker that meets the minimum requirements 
specified in division (C) of section 2307.92 of the Revised Code * * *.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Id.  Thus, when the defendant challenges the adequacy of the plaintiff’s 
prima facie evidence of a physical impairment, whether the plaintiff is a “smoker” 
will, in certain cases, be part of such a challenge. 
{¶ 27} While the statutory scheme is not a model of clarity, each provision 
of the statutory scheme is unambiguous.  The way that the provisions interact, 
however, is best understood when each provision within the scheme is read in 
conjunction with the other provisions.  When the various provisions within the 
statutory scheme are given effect in light of the way the provisions interact, the 
process for determining whether a plaintiff must meet the requirements of R.C. 
2307.92(C)(1) is straightforward. 
{¶ 28} Step one: Pursuant to R.C. 2307.93(A)(1), the plaintiff must submit, 
within the specified time frame, “a written report and supporting test results 
constituting prima-facie evidence of the exposed person’s physical impairment that 
meets the minimum requirements specified in [R.C. 2307.92(C)(1)].”  If the 
plaintiff is a smoker, he or she must meet the prima facie-evidence requirements of 
R.C. 2307.92(C)(1) by submitting a written report from a physician who satisfies 
the requirements to be considered a “competent medical authority” listed in R.C. 
2307.91(Z)(1) through (4).  That report must satisfy the requirements listed in R.C. 
2307.92(C)(1)(a).  The plaintiff must also present evidence to meet the 
requirements of R.C. 2307.92(C)(1)(b) and (c).  In cases like the instant case, the 
plaintiff will not submit a written report or address the other requirements of R.C. 
2307.92(C)(1) because the plaintiff will have asserted, at least implicitly, that 
division (C) of the statute is inapplicable. 
January Term, 2018 
 
11 
{¶ 29} Step two: Pursuant to R.C. 2307.93(A)(1), the defendant may, “upon 
the defendant’s motion, * * * challenge the adequacy of the proffered prima-facie 
evidence of the physical impairment for failure to comply with the minimum 
requirements specified in [R.C. 2307.92(C)(1)].”  If the defendant wishes to 
challenge the plaintiff’s assertion that R.C. 2307.92(C)(1) is inapplicable, the 
defendant must file a motion within the specified time frame and submit a written 
report from a physician that meets the requirements listed in R.C. 2307.91(Z)(1), 
(3), and (4).1  See R.C. 2307.93(A)(1).  That report must specify that the plaintiff 
has smoked the equivalent of one pack year during the last 15 years and is therefore 
a “smoker” as defined in R.C. 2307.91(DD).  By submitting such a report, the 
defendant would challenge the adequacy of the prima facie evidence submitted by 
the plaintiff because the defendant would be arguing that the plaintiff’s evidence 
did not meet certain requirements listed in R.C. 2307.92(C)(1).  Moreover, the 
defendant’s opportunity to submit such a report constitutes a “reasonable 
opportunity” for the defendant to challenge the adequacy of the prima facie 
evidence submitted by the plaintiff and, thus, gives effect to the relevant language 
of R.C. 2307.93(A)(1). 
{¶ 30} Step three: Pursuant to R.C. 2307.93(B), the trial court considers the 
evidence submitted by the parties to determine whether “a competent medical 
authority” has specified that the plaintiff is a “smoker” as defined in R.C. 
2307.91(DD).  The trial court applies “the standard for resolving a motion for 
summary judgment” and determines whether the proffered prima facie evidence 
meets the requirements listed in R.C. 2307.92(C)(1). 
                                                 
1 Turner did not argue below, and has not argued here, that Union Carbide’s motion for 
administrative dismissal was untimely.  Therefore, whether Union Carbide’s motion was timely is 
not an issue that is before this court.  We take no position on whether Union Carbide could 
successfully argue that the motion was filed prior to the expiration of the statutory deadline or 
whether the trial court may extend the statutory deadline. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 31} Step four: Pursuant to R.C. 2307.93(C), if the court determines that 
the plaintiff has been properly designated a “smoker” but has not met the 
requirements listed in R.C. 2307.92(C)(1), the court shall administratively dismiss 
the action without prejudice but shall retain jurisdiction.  The plaintiff may then 
move to reinstate the action by making a prima facie showing that meets the 
minimum requirements specified in R.C. 2307.92(C)(1). 
{¶ 32} The process explained above gives effect to the plain text of the 
relevant provisions of the statutory scheme.  By interpreting the provisions in this 
way, we give effect to the words contained in the relevant statutory provisions and 
the legislative intent behind the scheme. 
D.  Disposition of the Proposition of Law 
{¶ 33} We conclude that in an asbestos tort action alleging lung cancer, the 
express statutory language does not require a plaintiff to prove, through a “written 
report of a competent medical authority,” that he or she is not a “smoker” as defined 
in R.C. 2307.91(DD).  The plaintiff must satisfy the requirements set forth in R.C. 
2307.92(C)(1) only when the plaintiff has been designated a “smoker” in a written 
report of a competent medical authority pursuant to R.C. 2307.91(DD). 
E.  Issues of Fairness 
{¶ 34} The General Assembly’s decision to provide no mechanism by 
which the plaintiff may challenge a written report submitted by the defendant’s 
physician specifying that the plaintiff is a “smoker” is not unfair.  The plaintiff has 
additional burdens as a result of this written report, but those additional burdens 
consist only of submitting three types of evidence.  First, the plaintiff must submit 
a written report, which is irrebuttable for purposes of presenting the prima facie 
case, that is prepared by the plaintiff’s own competent medical authority and that 
asserts that the plaintiff has lung cancer and that “exposure to asbestos is a 
substantial contributing factor to that cancer.”  R.C. 2307.92(C)(1)(a).  Second, the 
plaintiff must submit “[e]vidence that is sufficient to demonstrate that at least ten 
January Term, 2018 
 
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years have elapsed from the date of the exposed person’s first exposure to asbestos 
until the date of diagnosis of the exposed person’s primary lung cancer.  The ten-
year latency period described in this division is a rebuttable presumption, and the 
plaintiff has the burden of proof to rebut the presumption.”  R.C. 2307.92(C)(1)(b).  
And third, the plaintiff must submit either “[e]vidence of the exposed person’s 
substantial occupational exposure to asbestos” or “[e]vidence of the exposed 
person’s exposure to asbestos at least equal to 25 fiber per cc years as determined 
to a reasonable degree of scientific probability by a scientifically valid retrospective 
exposure reconstruction conducted by a certified industrial hygienist or certified 
safety professional based upon all reasonably available quantitative air monitoring 
data and all other reasonably available information about the exposed person’s 
occupational history and history of exposure to asbestos.”  R.C. 2307.92(C)(1)(c)(i) 
and (ii). 
{¶ 35} In essence, the requirements listed in R.C. 2307.92(C)(1) must be 
satisfied for the plaintiff to be successful at trial.  To win at trial, the plaintiff will 
need to demonstrate that he or she was exposed to a sufficient amount of asbestos 
to cause lung cancer, that the dates of the plaintiff’s exposure to asbestos are 
consistent with the development of the lung cancer, and that the lung cancer was, 
in fact, caused in significant part by the asbestos exposure.  If the plaintiff were to 
fail to offer such proof at trial, the plaintiff would probably have failed to 
demonstrate that the lung cancer was caused by the asbestos exposure.  Thus, the 
requirement to present additional evidence in order to make a prima facie showing 
under R.C. 2307.92(C)(1) is a de minimis additional burden.  The plaintiff may be 
required to present evidence sooner than would otherwise be necessary, and 
perhaps in a different form, but the plaintiff is not required to present a substantial 
amount of evidence that would otherwise not need to be presented.  Moreover, 
should the plaintiff fail to produce the prima facie evidence and the case were to be 
administratively dismissed, the plaintiff would have the opportunity to submit the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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necessary prima facie evidence and move the trial court to reinstate the action 
pursuant to R.C. 2307.93(C). 
{¶ 36} The second issue of fairness that should be addressed is the threat of 
a surprise report submitted by the defendant after the plaintiff has rested his or her 
case.  The statutory scheme precludes this tactic.  Under R.C. 2307.93(A)(1), any 
challenge to the prima facie case must be submitted by motion within 120 days after 
the prima facie evidence is proffered, which is required to be presented by the 
plaintiff within 30 days of filing the complaint.  Given the practical realities of 
asbestos litigation, it is unrealistic to believe that a trial will have commenced 
within 120 days after the prima facie evidence is proffered or the deadline to proffer 
such evidence has passed.  Moreover, courts generally set a dispositive-motion 
deadline within the case schedule for each case, and that deadline is prior to the 
beginning of any trial.  See, e.g., Loc.R. 53 of the Court of Common Pleas of 
Franklin County, General Division; Loc.R. 15(A) of the Court of Common Pleas 
of Hamilton County, General Division.  Thus, the challenge will generally be made 
by pretrial motion or the challenge will be untimely.  Moreover, the surprise tactic 
would be of little benefit to the defendant given that the plaintiff can have the action 
reinstated by making a prima facie showing under R.C. 2307.93(C). 
{¶ 37} We stress that the reports submitted by the competent medical 
authorities are irrebuttable for purposes of the prima face case only.  There is no 
provision in R.C. 2307.91 through 2307.93 that precludes the defendant from 
arguing to the trier of fact that smoking, not asbestos, was the cause of the plaintiff’s 
lung cancer.  Further, there is no provision in R.C. 2307.91 through 2307.93 that 
precludes the plaintiff from arguing to the trier of fact that smoking could not have 
been the cause of the lung cancer because the plaintiff is not a “smoker.”  Thus, 
these arguments could be made regardless of whether R.C. 2307.92(C)(1) was at 
issue before trial. 
 
 
January Term, 2018 
 
15 
F.  Application of the Statutory Scheme to this Case 
{¶ 38} In support of its motion for administrative dismissal, Union Carbide 
submitted medical records and highlighted deposition testimony supporting the 
assertion that the smoking habits of Turner were sufficient to meet the “one-pack 
year” threshold required for designating a person a “smoker” pursuant to R.C. 
2703.91(DD).  Union Carbide also submitted the affidavit of Eric R. Pacht, M.D., 
who stated, “As a pulmonologist, I would consider Bobby Turner to be a smoker 
* * *.”  The trial court stated in a footnote that “the affidavit of Dr. Pacht does not 
meet the requirements of R.C. 2307.93(A)(1).”  The trial court did not, however, 
plainly state whether, under R.C. 2307.91(DD), Dr. Pacht’s affidavit—or any other 
submission by Union Carbide—can be considered a “written report of a competent 
medical authority” that specifies that Turner is a “smoker” because he “smoked the 
equivalent of one-pack year * * * during the last fifteen years.” 
{¶ 39} It may or may not be proper for the trial court to deny Union 
Carbide’s motion for administrative dismissal, but the trial court cannot do so 
without first following the procedures set forth in R.C. 2307.93(B) to determine 
whether Union Carbide’s presentation of Dr. Pacht’s affidavit—or some other 
“written report of a competent medical authority”—was sufficient to meet its 
burden to put R.C. 2307.92(C)(1) at issue.  If, after following the procedures set 
forth in R.C. 2307.93(B), the court finds that Union Carbide did establish that 
Turner is a “smoker” as defined in R.C. 2307.91(DD), the trial court must determine 
whether Turner satisfied the requirements set forth in R.C. 2307.92(C)(1). 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 40} The plain reading of the statutory scheme provides that the defendant 
can require the plaintiff to make a prima facie case that satisfies the requirements 
listed in R.C. 2307.92(C)(1) only by submitting a written report from a “competent 
medical authority” that specifies that the plaintiff has smoked the equivalent of one-
pack year during the last 15 years, R.C. 2307.91(DD).  Accordingly, we reverse the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to the trial court to determine 
whether Union Carbide submitted such a report and for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
FRENCH and DEGENARO, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs in judgment only. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion joined by 
O’DONNELL, J. 
DEWINE, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 41} I concur in judgment only. 
{¶ 42} When a plaintiff brings an asbestos claim for lung cancer without 
submitting the prima facie evidence required of a “smoker” pursuant to R.C. 
2307.92(C)(1) within 30 days after filing the complaint or other initial pleading and 
discovery reveals that the plaintiff has a history of using smoking tobacco in the 
preceding 15 years, who has the burden to prove that the plaintiff was or was not 
required to submit that prima facie evidence? 
{¶ 43} This is not the question we accepted for review, but the lead opinion 
raises it nonetheless.  And in seeking to answer it, the justices joining the lead 
opinion fall victim to what the late Justice Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner 
have described as “[t]he false notion that when a situation is not quite covered by a 
statute, the court should reconstruct what the legislature would have done had it 
confronted the issue.”  (Boldface omitted.)  Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 349 (2012).  Then, in the guise of statutory 
construction, the lead opinion fashions a four-step process to fill the gaps it sees in 
the statutory scheme, taking a statute that permits the defendant to challenge only 
January Term, 2018 
 
17 
the prima facie evidence proffered by the plaintiff and applying it to require the 
defendant to challenge the plaintiff’s failure to proffer that evidence. 
{¶ 44} Adopting the analysis of the lead opinion would subvert the General 
Assembly’s purposes in enacting Am.Sub.H.B. No. 292, 150 Ohio Laws Part III, 
3970 (“H.B. 292”), in two ways.  First, by shifting the burden to the defendant to 
establish that the plaintiff is a “smoker,” the lead opinion would vitiate the 
legislature’s intent to give priority only to those plaintiffs who can demonstrate at 
the outset of litigation that asbestos exposure caused the plaintiff’s lung cancer.  
Second, the lead opinion devises an illusory mechanism to afford defendants a 
chance to prove that the plaintiff is a “smoker,” yet the defendant lacks the evidence 
needed to make this showing without access to the plaintiff’s smoking history.  Its 
four-step process therefore disregards the restrictive language of the statute and 
would render it a dead-letter law for all practical purposes—no plaintiff would be 
required to comply with it, and no defendant could compel him or her to do so. 
{¶ 45} However, as Justice Scalia and Garner explained, “In truth, many 
casus incogitati [circumstances not contemplated by the statute’s drafters] are fully 
covered by a statute: Although the legislators did not consider a particular 
circumstance, the text plainly applies or does not apply by its very words.”  Scalia 
& Garner at 350. 
{¶ 46} The actual words that the General Assembly enacted answer the 
question propounded by the lead opinion without the need to resort to a judicial 
interpretation that adds and deletes words in order to “give effect” to the statutory 
scheme, lead opinion at ¶ 32.  It is the plaintiff who bears the burden of proving 
that he or she is not a “smoker.”  R.C. 2307.92(C)(1) prohibits anyone from 
“bring[ing] or maintain[ing]” an asbestos claim for lung cancer unless one of two 
preconditions is met: (1) the plaintiff is not a “smoker” or (2) within 30 days after 
filing the complaint or other initial pleading, the plaintiff submits prima facie 
evidence showing that exposure to asbestos was a “substantial contributing factor” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
to the lung cancer.  Importantly, only the plaintiff can comply with the timing and 
evidentiary requirements for establishing the right to bring an asbestos claim for 
lung cancer.  The plaintiff is the only party who has access to his or her medical 
records and smoking history within 30 days after commencing the action, and the 
sole criterion for determining whether the plaintiff is a “smoker”—the report of a 
competent medical authority—can be supplied only by the plaintiff’s own treating 
physician. 
{¶ 47} Therefore, when the plaintiff files an asbestos claim for lung cancer 
without timely submitting the prima facie evidence required by R.C. 2307.92(C)(1) 
and discovery reveals evidence that the plaintiff used smoking tobacco in the 
preceding 15-year period, the plaintiff can avoid an administrative dismissal of the 
complaint only by submitting a written report of a competent medical authority 
opining that the plaintiff’s use of smoking tobacco is less than “the equivalent of 
one-pack year,” R.C. 2307.91(DD). 
{¶ 48} After his smoking history came to light in discovery, appellee, 
Bobby Turner, failed to provide a report of a competent medical authority showing 
that he is not a “smoker.”  Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the court 
of appeals and would order that the complaint be administratively dismissed 
without prejudice. 
The Intention of the General Assembly in Enacting H.B. 292 
{¶ 49} In 2004, the General Assembly confronted a growing crisis.  Ohio 
had become “a haven for asbestos claims”; tens of thousands of asbestos actions 
had been filed in Ohio’s courts, and most of those had been filed by claimants who 
were not sick at the time.  150 Ohio Laws, Part III, at 3989-3990.  At the same time, 
the cost of compensating claimants who were not sick had bankrupted numerous 
companies, jeopardized compensation for people with serious asbestos-related 
diseases, and threatened Ohio’s economy and the savings, retirement benefits, and 
jobs of current and retired employees.  Id. at 3989-3991.  Seeking to stem “an 
January Term, 2018 
 
19 
unending flood of asbestos cases brought by claimants who are not sick,” id. at 
3990, the General Assembly passed H.B. 292 with the purposes to  
 
(1) give priority to those asbestos claimants who can demonstrate 
actual physical harm or illness caused by exposure to asbestos; (2) 
fully preserve the rights of claimants who were exposed to asbestos 
to pursue compensation should those claimants become impaired in 
the future as a result of such exposure; (3) enhance the ability of the 
state’s judicial systems and federal judicial systems to supervise and 
control litigation and asbestos-related bankruptcy proceedings; and 
(4) conserve the scarce resources of the defendants to allow 
compensation of cancer victims and others who are physically 
impaired by exposure to asbestos while securing the right to similar 
compensation for those who may suffer physical impairment in the 
future. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Id. at 3991. 
{¶ 50} As part of that effort, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 
2307.92(C)(1), which limits when a “smoker” may “bring or maintain” an asbestos 
claim to recover for lung cancer.  Recognizing that smoking causes lung cancer, the 
statute requires a “smoker” to submit prima facie evidence supporting the asbestos 
claim, including “[a] diagnosis by a competent medical authority that the exposed 
person has primary lung cancer and that exposure to asbestos is a substantial 
contributing factor to that cancer.”  R.C. 2307.92(C)(1)(a).  The prima facie 
evidence must be submitted within 30 days after the filing of the complaint or other 
initial pleading, and “[t]he defendant has one hundred twenty days from the date 
the specified type of prima-facie evidence is proffered to challenge the adequacy of 
that prima-facie evidence.”  R.C. 2307.93(A)(1). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
{¶ 51} In turn, R.C. 2307.91(DD) defines “smoker” as “a person who has 
smoked the equivalent of one-pack year, as specified in the written report of a 
competent medical authority pursuant to sections 2307.92 and 2307.93 of the 
Revised Code, during the last fifteen years.”  Therefore, a user of smoking tobacco 
who smoked less than “the equivalent of one-pack year” during that period is not a 
“smoker.” 
{¶ 52} Moreover, the General Assembly established specific criteria for 
when a medical doctor is a “competent medical authority” for purposes of R.C. 
2307.91(DD).  Those criteria include the requirement that “[t]he medical doctor is 
actually treating or has treated the exposed person and has or had a doctor-patient 
relationship with the person,” R.C. 2307.91(Z)(2). 
{¶ 53} When a “smoker” fails to make the required prima facie showing, 
R.C. 2307.93(C) directs the court to administratively dismiss the complaint without 
prejudice and to retain jurisdiction over the case.  The plaintiff may move to 
reinstate the case when he or she is able to make the prima facie showing required 
by the statute. 
The Lead Opinion’s Flawed Analysis 
{¶ 54} The lead opinion states that “the express statutory language does not 
require a plaintiff to prove, through a ‘written report of a competent medical 
authority,’ that he or she is not a ‘smoker’ as defined in R.C. 2307.91(DD).”  
(Emphasis sic.)  Lead opinion at ¶ 33.  It then concludes that “the defendant can 
require the plaintiff to make a prima facie case that satisfies the requirements listed 
in R.C. 2307.92(C)(1) only by submitting a written report from a ‘competent 
medical authority’ that specifies that the plaintiff has smoked the equivalent of one-
pack year during the last 15 years, R.C. 2307.91(DD).”  Id. at ¶ 40.  And the jurists 
joining the lead opinion would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 
remand the matter to the trial court “to determine whether [appellant,] Union 
Carbide [Corporation,] submitted such a report,” id., raising, but not deciding, the 
January Term, 2018 
 
21 
issue whether Union Carbide’s motion for administrative dismissal was timely, id. 
at ¶ 29, fn. 1. 
{¶ 55} If adopted, this analysis would thwart the General Assembly’s 
purposes in enacting H.B. 292 to prioritize claims of plaintiffs who can demonstrate 
at the outset of the litigation that asbestos exposure caused the injury in order to 
limit the impact of asbestos ligation on courts and conserve the scarce resources of 
defendants.  First, the lead opinion would erroneously shift the burden to the 
defendant to prove that the exposed person is a “smoker.”  Second, the opportunity 
to prove that the plaintiff is a “smoker” is illusory, because the defendant lacks 
access prior to discovery to the plaintiff’s medical records and smoking history and 
therefore cannot obtain the report of a competent medical authority within the time 
limits that the lead opinion would impose. 
The Burden of Proof 
{¶ 56} The court of appeals in this case correctly held that the plaintiff  
“ ‘has the ultimate burden to prove that the exposed person is not a smoker.’ ”  
2016-Ohio-7776, 66 N.E.3d 802, ¶ 10, quoting Farnsworth v. Allied Glove Corp., 
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91731, 2009-Ohio-3890, ¶ 32.  Despite the fact that Turner 
has not challenged that holding, the lead opinion takes the opportunity to 
disapprove of it. 
{¶ 57} However, the plaintiff carries the ultimate burden of proof on an 
asbestos claim at trial.  Schwartz v. Honeywell Internatl., Inc., 153 Ohio St.3d 175, 
2018-Ohio-474, 102 N.E.3d 477, ¶ 13.  This is in keeping with the General 
Assembly’s express intention to give priority only to “those asbestos claimants who 
can demonstrate” that exposure to asbestos caused lung cancer, 150 Ohio Laws, 
Part III, at 3991. 
{¶ 58} For this reason, the legislature provided in R.C. 2307.92(C)(1) that 
“[n]o person shall bring or maintain a tort action alleging an asbestos claim based 
upon lung cancer of an exposed person who is a smoker, in the absence of a prima-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
facie showing” as specified by the statute.  (Emphasis added.)  The statute imposes 
a bar that expressly conditions the right to file and maintain lung-cancer-related 
asbestos claims on the plaintiff’s either establishing that he or she is not a “smoker” 
or submitting the prima facie evidence required by R.C. 2307.92(C)(1) within 30 
days after filing the complaint or other initial pleading. 
{¶ 59} Moreover, the evidence needed to prove whether or not the plaintiff 
is required to make the prima facie showing is uniquely in the possession of the 
plaintiff.  The plaintiff has access to his or her own medical records and smoking 
history, and the “competent medical authority” who must opine on whether or not 
the plaintiff is a “smoker” is “[t]he medical doctor [who] is actually treating or has 
treated the exposed person and has or had a doctor-patient relationship with the 
person,” R.C. 2307.91(Z)(2).  The legislature’s public-policy preference to place 
the burden of proof on the plaintiff therefore appreciates the reality that he or she 
will already have or can readily obtain all the evidence necessary to provide a report 
of a competent medical authority that the plaintiff has not smoked at least “the 
equivalent of one-pack year” of tobacco over the prior 15 years.  This explains why 
the General Assembly provided a strict time limit of 30 days after the filing of the 
complaint or other initial pleading to make this showing, ensuring that only those 
cases that are brought by nonsmokers or are supported by prima facie evidence can 
be maintained beyond the initial stages of litigation. 
{¶ 60} The plaintiff’s burden to prove that the prima-facie-case requirement 
of R.C. 2307.92(C)(1) does not apply is not a heavy one.  If the defendant 
challenges the plaintiff’s failure to submit prima facie evidence and if it is true that 
the plaintiff has not used smoking tobacco in the preceding 15 years, then his or her 
treating physician can submit the appropriate written report.  If, however, as here, 
the plaintiff’s medical records reveal use of smoking tobacco within the preceding 
15 years, then only his or her treating physician can issue a written report opining 
whether or not that use rises to the threshold level of “one-pack year” pursuant to 
January Term, 2018 
 
23 
the definition of “smoker” in R.C. 2307.91(DD).  If the use of smoking tobacco 
falls below the “one-pack year” threshold, then the plaintiff is not required to 
submit prima facie evidence pursuant to R.C. 2307.92(C)(1).  The burden to make 
a prima facie case becomes more onerous only when the medical records and 
smoking history indicate that the exposed person has, in fact, smoked at least “the 
equivalent of one-pack year” and therefore is a “smoker” and is required to submit 
the prima facie evidence.  But that was the General Assembly’s express intention, 
because it sought to give priority to asbestos claims related to lung cancer brought 
by nonsmokers and by smokers who can demonstrate early on in litigation that that 
asbestos exposure, not smoking, caused lung cancer. 
{¶ 61} The lead opinion’s reasoning fails to appreciate that the defendant 
will not be able to discover the plaintiff’s smoking history and have a competent 
medical authority prepare a report opining that the plaintiff is a “smoker” within 
the strict time limits established by the statute.  Further, when the defendant does 
not obtain evidence related to the plaintiff’s use of smoking tobacco until the late 
stages of litigation, the legislative intent to prioritize claims of plaintiffs who can 
demonstrate actual injury caused by asbestos exposure and to conserve the 
resources of the courts and defendants has been defeated. 
{¶ 62} Importantly, the failure of a “smoker” to submit prima facie evidence 
does not terminate the claim but only delays it.  R.C. 2307.93(C) directs the trial 
court to administratively dismiss the complaint without prejudice when a “smoker” 
fails to make the required prima facie showing.  R.C. 2307.93(C) also requires the 
court to retain jurisdiction over the case, providing that the plaintiff may move to 
reinstate it when he or she is able to make the prima facie showing.  The statute 
does not eliminate any potentially meritorious claims of smokers but, rather, 
requires that the plaintiff make a sufficient showing that exposure to asbestos 
caused his or her lung cancer in order to maintain the action. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
Challenge to the Prima Facie Evidence 
{¶ 63} The lead opinion also misconstrues the plain language of R.C. 
2307.93(B) when it concludes that the defendant is required to submit the report of 
a competent medical professional to prove that the plaintiff is a “smoker.”  R.C. 
2307.93(A)(1) and (B) permit the defendant to challenge only the adequacy of the 
plaintiff’s proffer of prima facie evidence of the exposed person’s “physical 
impairment” within 120 days from the date of the proffer.  “Physical impairment” 
is defined by R.C. 2307.91(V) to include “lung cancer of an exposed person who is 
a smoker that meets the minimum requirements specified in division (C) of section 
2307.92 of the Revised Code.”  The defendant may challenge the plaintiff’s prima 
facie evidence that the smoker’s exposure to asbestos is a substantial contributing 
factor to his or her lung cancer, but challenging the sufficiency of the evidence of 
impairment is not the same thing as challenging the sufficiency of evidence that the 
exposed person is not a “smoker.” 
{¶ 64} This conclusion is consistent with the language of the statute, which 
states, “The defendant has one hundred twenty days from the date the specified type 
of prima-facie evidence is proffered to challenge the adequacy of that prima-facie 
evidence [emphasis added],” R.C. 2307.93(A)(1).  The word “proffer” means “[t]o 
offer or tender (something, esp. evidence) for immediate acceptance.”  Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1403 (10th Ed.2014).  Because the General Assembly has used the 
present tense, it provided that a challenge to prima facie evidence would lie only 
after the plaintiff has actually submitted it to the court.  But not only would the lead 
opinion require the defendant to challenge the plaintiff’s failure to proffer prima 
facie evidence, it also would impose a strict time limit on when the defendant may 
make that challenge.  Importantly, under the lead opinion’s analysis, that time limit 
would likely expire before the defendant has had the opportunity to obtain full 
discovery of the medical records and other evidence necessary to determine 
whether the plaintiff has smoked at least “the equivalent of one-pack year” within 
January Term, 2018 
 
25 
the preceding 15 years.  When discovery calls into question the plaintiff’s proffered 
opinion that he or she is not a “smoker,” it is the plaintiff who should be required 
to show entitlement to maintain the action in the absence of a prima facie case. 
{¶ 65} The lead opinion’s reasoning not only runs counter to the plain 
language of the statute but also undermines the General Assembly’s expressed 
intent to prioritize the claims of plaintiffs who can demonstrate at the outset of the 
litigation that exposure to asbestos caused injury and to “conserve the scarce 
resources of the defendants,” 150 Ohio Laws, Part III, at 3991.  Nothing in the 
language enacted by the General Assembly indicates that it intended to allow a 
“smoker” to avoid the carefully balanced procedural requirements for filing an 
asbestos claim simply by remaining silent. 
{¶ 66} Accordingly, when the plaintiff alleges that exposure to asbestos 
caused lung cancer and when evidence reveals that the plaintiff has used smoking 
tobacco in the preceding 15 years, the plaintiff may maintain the claim without 
having timely submitted prima evidence only if the plaintiff submits a written report 
by a competent medical authority that that use is less than “the equivalent of one-
pack year,” R.C. 2307.91(DD).  If the plaintiff fails to do so, the complaint must be 
administratively dismissed. 
The Definition of “Smoker” 
{¶ 67} The lead opinion’s overreach is all the more glaring because we 
accepted a single question for review: when a plaintiff files a claim alleging that 
exposure to asbestos caused lung cancer without proffering the prima facie 
evidence required by R.C. 2307.92(C)(1) and when evidence is subsequently 
produced in discovery revealing that the plaintiff has a history of using smoking 
tobacco in the preceding 15-year period, is the written report of a competent 
medical authority the exclusive means of proving that the plaintiff is not a “smoker” 
as defined by R.C. 2307.91(DD)?  The answer is “yes.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26 
{¶ 68} Resolving this narrow question begins in a familiar place: statutory 
construction.  Our duty in construing a statute is to determine and give effect to the 
intent of the General Assembly as expressed in the language it enacted.  Griffith v. 
Aultman Hosp., 146 Ohio St.3d 196, 2016-Ohio-1138, 54 N.E.3d 1196, ¶ 18; Fisher 
v. Hasenjager, 116 Ohio St.3d 53, 2007-Ohio-5589, 876 N.E.2d 546, ¶ 20.  R.C. 
1.42 guides our analysis; that statute provides that “[w]ords and phrases shall be 
read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common 
usage.” And as we explained in Symmes Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Smyth, “[w]hen the 
language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite 
meaning, there is no need for this court to apply the rules of statutory 
interpretation.”  87 Ohio St.3d 549, 553, 721 N.E.2d 1057 (2000).  Rather, “[a]n 
unambiguous statute is to be applied, not interpreted.”  Sears v. Weimer, 143 Ohio 
St. 312, 55 N.E.2d 413 (1944), paragraph five of the syllabus. 
{¶ 69} The statutory scheme establishes only one criterion for determining 
whether the exposed person is or is not a “smoker” for purposes of bringing or 
maintaining an action alleging that asbestos exposure caused lung cancer.  A 
“smoker” is a person who has smoked at least “the equivalent of one-pack year” 
during the 15 years preceding commencement of the action as specified in the 
written report of a competent medical authority.  R.C. 2307.91(DD).  The statute 
is plain and unambiguous and represents a public-policy choice by the General 
Assembly that only medical evidence from the plaintiff’s own treating physician 
can determine the exposed person’s smoking status.  Because the legislature has 
differentiated between using tobacco and being a “smoker,” any form of evidence 
relating to the amount and duration of prior tobacco use other than the report of a 
competent medical authority is not sufficient to prove that the exposed person is or 
is not a “smoker.” 
{¶ 70} The jurists joining the lead opinion agree with this conclusion and 
reject Turner’s argument “that whether and how much someone has smoked is a 
January Term, 2018 
 
27 
factual question best left to a factfinder rather than a medical professional,” because 
“[t]his is an argument for the legislature, not this court.”  Lead opinion at ¶ 20.  
Answering the only question of law presented by the parties should end the 
analysis. 
{¶ 71} The legislature provided that in establishing whether the exposed 
person is or is not a “smoker,” the report of a competent medical authority pursuant 
to R.C. 2307.91(DD) is determinative, and that report must be prepared by a 
medical doctor who “is actually treating or has treated the exposed person and has 
or had a doctor-patient relationship with the person,” R.C. 2307.91(Z)(2).  The 
testimony of the exposed person or his or her friends and relatives about the 
exposed person’s use of smoking tobacco is not relevant on the question. 
{¶ 72} Here, Turner sought to recover for lung cancer allegedly caused by 
asbestos exposure, and his complaint did not give any notice that he had used 
smoking tobacco in the preceding 15 years.  In response to Union Carbide’s motion 
to administratively dismiss his complaint for failing to submit prima facie evidence 
of his impairment, Turner submitted his own affidavit averring that he had not used 
tobacco products since 1956 and supported that assertion with a selection of his 
medical records reflecting a lack of use of tobacco in the social-history portion of 
the records.  Based on that evidence, Union Carbide withdrew its motion while 
expressly reserving its right to renew it, and Turner did not object.  Only after Union 
Carbide acquired Turner’s medical records and deposed Turner’s treating physician 
did Union Carbide come to realize that Turner’s medical records and treating 
physician’s deposition indicated use of smoking tobacco in the preceding 15 years.  
Union Carbide also obtained the expert opinion of a pulmonologist who reviewed 
Turner’s medical records, symptoms, and history and averred that “[a]s a 
pulmonologist, [he] would consider Bobby Turner to be a smoker.”  It then renewed 
its motion to administratively dismiss the complaint on the basis that Turner had 
not made a prima facie case pursuant to R.C. 2307.92(C)(1). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
28 
{¶ 73} Because the 30-day period the General Assembly afforded for 
making a prima facie case had expired, the only way Turner could “maintain” his 
asbestos action was by proving that the prima-facie-case requirement of R.C. 
2307.92(C)(1) did not apply to him, and he could prove that only through a written 
report of a competent medical authority indicating that his use of smoking tobacco 
was less than “the equivalent of one-pack year,” R.C. 2307.91(DD).  Because of 
the language of the relevant statutory provisions, Turner could not rest on any 
express or implied allegations of the complaint nor could he rely on any other 
evidence relating to past use of smoking tobacco to show that he was not required 
to submit prima facie evidence.  Turner failed to submit the report of a competent 
medical authority opining that his use of smoking tobacco was less than “the 
equivalent of one-pack year” and that he was therefore not a “smoker,” and his 
complaint should have been administratively dismissed without prejudice (allowing 
him to move to reinstate it if and when he can prove that he is not a “smoker”). 
{¶ 74} The negative consequences that would result from adopting the lead 
opinion’s position cannot be overstated.  Rather than interpreting and applying the 
plain language of the statutory scheme, the lead opinion would eviscerate it.  
According to the lead opinion, the plaintiff does not have the burden to prove that 
the prima-facie-case requirement does not apply to his or her case.  In shifting the 
burden to the defendant, the lead opinion would give defendants only an illusory 
opportunity to prove that the plaintiff’s use of smoking tobacco is at least “the 
equivalent of one-pack year,” R.C. 2307.91(DD).  Applying today’s lead opinion 
would therefore cripple the legislature’s effort to stem the “unending flood of 
asbestos cases” brought by plaintiffs who cannot prove that their exposure to 
asbestos actually caused their lung cancer, 150 Ohio Laws, Part III, at 3990.  The 
General Assembly therefore must act swiftly to clarify its intent in enacting H.B. 
292 or risk returning Ohio to the days of being “a haven for asbestos claims” that 
clog our courts, threaten our economy, adversely affect our communities, and 
January Term, 2018 
 
29 
jeopardize the compensation of those actually injured by exposure to asbestos, id. 
at 3989-3991. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 75} When discovery reveals evidence that the plaintiff used smoking 
tobacco in the 15 years preceding commencement of the action, the only means the 
plaintiff has of demonstrating that he or she was not required to make a prima facie 
case within 30 days after commencing the action is for the plaintiff to prove that 
his or her use of smoking tobacco is less than “the equivalent of one-pack year” 
through a written report of a competent medical authority, R.C. 2307.91(DD).  
Turner failed to meet that burden.  Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of 
the court of appeals and order that the complaint be administratively dismissed 
without prejudice. 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
DEWINE, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 76} The lead opinion answers a question not asked by either party and in 
answering the question, creates a new scheme not enacted by the legislature.  
Because I believe we should confine ourselves to the question posed by the parties 
and to the statutory scheme enacted by the legislature, I write separately. 
{¶ 77} The question presented in this appeal is how to determine whether a 
plaintiff who alleges that he suffers from lung cancer as a result of asbestos 
exposure is a smoker or a nonsmoker.  Bobby Turner maintains that the court of 
appeals correctly held that the determination is a question of fact.  Union Carbide 
Corporation counters that Turner, who had a history of smoking, needs to prove by 
means of a written report from a competent medical authority that he is not a smoker 
as defined by statute, R.C. 2307.91(DD).  I find the statutory definition of “smoker” 
dispositive and conclude that when in dispute, a person’s smoking status must be 
determined based on the written report of a competent medical authority.  I would 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
30 
therefore reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand the case to the trial 
court to determine whether Turner is a smoker according to the statute’s definition. 
The Lead Opinion’s Shaky Path to an Unasked Question 
{¶ 78} The lead opinion starts in the right place.  It notes that the case before 
us “presents the question of how to determine whether a plaintiff is a ‘smoker.’ ”  
Lead opinion at ¶ 1.  And it locates the answer to that question in the definition of 
“smoker” provided in R.C. 2307.91(DD).  But then, it turns to a different question: 
whether Union Carbide met its burden to establish that Turner is a smoker, thus 
requiring Turner to make the prima facie showing required by R.C. 2307.92(C)(1).  
In doing so, the lead opinion invents a question never raised by the parties or the 
courts below. 
{¶ 79} Until now, everyone had agreed that the burden is on the plaintiff to 
establish that he is not a smoker so that he need not make a prima facie showing.  
As the court of appeals put it in its opinion, “Union Carbide acknowledges, and we 
agree, that the trial court erroneously concluded that Union Carbide was required 
to prove Turner is a smoker.  The law is clear that the plaintiff bears this burden.”  
2016-Ohio-7776, 66 N.E.3d 802, ¶ 8, fn. 2.  Turner has not challenged this 
conclusion.  Indeed, the dispute between the parties—the question that we agreed 
to answer—is how the plaintiff must meet his burden to prove that he is not a 
smoker. 
{¶ 80} It has long been the policy of this court not to address issues not 
raised by the parties.  F. Ents., Inc. v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp., 47 Ohio St.2d 
154, 163, 351 N.E.2d 121 (1976).  We follow this rule not only out of respect for 
the adversarial process but also because it leads to better decision-making: 
“[J]ustice is far better served when it has the benefit of briefing, arguing, and lower 
court consideration before making a final determination.”  Sizemore v. Smith, 6 
Ohio St.3d 330, 333, 453 N.E.2d 632 (1983), fn. 2. 
January Term, 2018 
 
31 
{¶ 81} Nonetheless, the lead opinion pulls its new question out of thin air 
and then sets about answering it by creating a new four-step scheme only tenuously 
tethered to the statutes enacted by the legislature—a scheme that has not been 
suggested by either party or employed by any court. 
The Lead Opinion’s Creation of a New Scheme to Answer the Unasked 
Question 
{¶ 82} The lead opinion advertises that its four-step approach “gives effect 
to the plain text of the relevant provisions of the statutory scheme.”  Lead opinion 
at ¶ 32.  But that is not the case.  In truth, the four-step approach is predicated upon 
ignoring large swaths of the statutory text and inserting requirements found 
nowhere in the statute. 
The lead opinion’s four-step approach lacks statutory support 
{¶ 83} The statutory scheme, as written, sets forth prima facie requirements 
that must be met for certain categories of plaintiffs, including smokers.  The natural 
reading of the statutory text requires determining first whether the plaintiff is a 
smoker and then, if so, whether the prima facie requirements have been met.  The 
lead opinion, however, melds together the determination of smoking status and the 
establishment of the prima facie case.  To understand the departures the lead 
opinion takes from the statutory language, it is helpful to go through its approach 
in some detail. 
{¶ 84} The lead opinion’s step one:  The lead opinion begins by noting that 
a plaintiff who claims that his lung cancer was caused by asbestos exposure must 
file prima facie evidence of his physical impairment that comprises a written report 
and supporting results that meet the requirements of R.C. 2307.92(C)(1).  It then 
says that a plaintiff who does not proffer prima facie evidence is implicitly asserting 
that he is not a smoker (and thus does not need to provide prima facie evidence). 
{¶ 85} The lead opinion’s step two:  The lead opinion next turns to R.C. 
2307.93(A)(1), which allows the defendant “to challenge the adequacy of the 
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32 
proffered prima-facie evidence of the physical impairment.”  Relying upon R.C. 
2307.93(A)(1), the opinion says, “If the defendant wishes to challenge the 
plaintiff’s [implicit] assertion that [the plaintiff is not a smoker], the defendant must 
file a motion within the specified time frame and submit a written report from a 
physician that meets the requirements listed in R.C. 2307.91(Z)(1), (3) and (4).”  
Lead opinion at ¶ 29.  The opinion further prescribes that the report specify that the 
plaintiff has smoked the equivalent of one pack year during the last 15 years. 
{¶ 86} This is pulled from nowhere: by its plain terms, R.C. 2307.93(A)(1) 
simply does not provide for what the lead opinion says it does.  The provision 
applies only to the defendant’s challenge to the plaintiff’s prima facie showing of 
physical impairment under R.C. 2307.92(C)(1): 
 
The plaintiff in any tort action who alleges an asbestos claim 
shall file, within thirty days after filing the complaint or other initial 
pleading, a written report and supporting test results constituting 
prima-facie evidence of the exposed person’s physical impairment 
that meets the minimum requirements specified in division (B), (C), 
or (D) of section 2307.92 of the Revised Code, whichever is 
applicable.  The defendant in the case shall be afforded a reasonable 
opportunity, upon the defendant’s motion, to challenge the 
adequacy of the proffered prima-facie evidence of the physical 
impairment for failure to comply with the minimum requirements 
specified in division (B), (C), or (D) of section 2307.92 of the 
Revised Code.  The defendant has one hundred twenty days from the 
date the specified type of prima-facie evidence is proffered to 
challenge the adequacy of that prima-facie evidence.  If the 
defendant makes that challenge and uses a physician to do so, the 
January Term, 2018 
 
33 
physician must meet the requirements specified in divisions (Z)(1), 
(3), and (4) of section 2307.91 of the Revised Code. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  R.C. 2307.93(A)(1).  Thus, R.C. 2307.93(A)(1) provides for 
challenges only to the adequacy of “the proffered prima-facie evidence of the 
physical impairment.”  Plainly, the report on smoking status that the lead opinion 
would have the defendant submit at this stage is not a challenge to “the adequacy 
of the proffered prima-facie evidence of the physical impairment.”  In a case like 
this one, no prima facie evidence has been proffered by the plaintiff because the 
plaintiff claims that he is not a smoker.  So the defendant is not challenging the 
“proffered prima-facie evidence.”  There is no evidence to consider the “adequacy 
of.” 
{¶ 87} Moreover, a defendant challenging a plaintiff’s status as a 
nonsmoker is not challenging evidence “of the physical impairment.”  The statutory 
definition of “physical impairment” makes this crystal clear: 
 
“Physical impairment” means a nonmalignant condition that 
meets the minimum requirements specified in division (B) of section 
2307.92 of the Revised Code, lung cancer of an exposed person who 
is a smoker that meets the minimum requirements specified in 
division (C) of section 2307.92 of the Revised Code, or a condition 
of a deceased exposed person that meets the minimum requirements 
specified in division (D) of section 2307.92 of the Revised Code. 
 
R.C. 2307.91(V).  Recognizing the incongruence of its approach with the statutory 
language, the lead opinion notes that the definition of “physical impairment” refers 
to “an exposed person who is a smoker,” R.C. 2307.91(V).  From this, it surmises 
that “when the defendant challenges the adequacy of the plaintiff’s prima facie 
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34 
evidence of a physical impairment, whether the plaintiff is a ‘smoker’ will, in 
certain cases, be part of such a challenge.”  Lead opinion at ¶ 26.  But by definition, 
“physical impairment” refers to the required prima facie showing set forth in R.C. 
2307.92(C)(1), not to the threshold question whether a plaintiff is a smoker. 
{¶ 88} In short, nothing in R.C. 2307.93(A)(1) allows for the challenge to 
the plaintiff’s smoking status imagined by the lead opinion. 
{¶ 89} The lead opinion’s step three:  In another departure from the 
language of the statute, the lead opinion says, “Pursuant to R.C. 2307.93(B), the 
trial court considers the evidence submitted by the parties to determine whether ‘a 
competent medical authority’ has specified that the plaintiff is a ‘smoker’ as defined 
in R.C. 2307.91(DD),” lead opinion at ¶ 30.  But R.C. 2307.93(B) deals only with 
challenges to the plaintiff’s prima facie evidence of physical impairment under R.C. 
2307.92(C)(1): 
  
If the defendant in an action challenges the adequacy of the 
prima-facie evidence of the exposed person’s physical impairment 
as provided in division (A)(1) of this section, the court shall 
determine from all of the evidence submitted whether the proffered 
prima-facie evidence meets the minimum requirements specified in 
division (B), (C), or (D) of section 2307.92 of the Revised Code.  
The court shall resolve the issue of whether the plaintiff has made 
the prima-facie showing required by division (B), (C), or (D) of 
section 2307.92 of the Revised Code by applying the standard for 
resolving a motion for summary judgment. 
 
(Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 90} This provision is wholly inapplicable here: the issue that the lead 
opinion would resolve is not whether the plaintiff has made the prima facie showing 
January Term, 2018 
 
35 
required by R.C. 2307.92(C)(1) but, rather, whether the plaintiff is a smoker as 
defined by R.C. 2307.91(DD). 
{¶ 91} The lead opinion’s step four:  The lead opinion says that if a smoker 
fails to meet the prima facie requirements, the court shall administratively dismiss 
the case.  Of course, this is correct—it is what the statute says.  The problem is the 
extra-statutory route that the lead opinion takes to determine whether a plaintiff is 
a smoker.  By their plain terms, the statutory provisions cited in the lead opinion’s 
steps two and three apply only to challenges to a plaintiff’s prima facie evidence of 
impairment.  And for lung-cancer plaintiffs, this prima facie evidence is proffered 
only after the plaintiff is determined to be a smoker. 
{¶ 92} Only after unveiling its new regime does the lead opinion get around 
to the question we agreed to answer.  It concludes that a plaintiff is not required “to 
prove, through a ‘written report of a competent medical authority,’ that he or she is 
not a ‘smoker’ as defined in R.C. 2307.91(DD).”  Lead opinion at ¶ 33.  The opinion 
goes on to explain that “[t]he plaintiff must satisfy the requirements set forth in 
R.C. 2307.92(C)(1) only when the plaintiff has been designated a ‘smoker’ in a 
written report of a competent medical authority pursuant to R.C. 2307.91(DD).”  
Lead opinion at ¶ 33.  And under the scheme that the lead opinion would create, the 
burden to “designate” the plaintiff a smoker would fall on the defendant. 
{¶ 93} Under the lead opinion’s freshly contrived approach, only the 
defendant would be permitted to submit evidence as to the plaintiff’s smoking 
status.  It admits that under its construction, there is “no mechanism by which the 
plaintiff may challenge a written report submitted by the defendant’s physician 
specifying that the plaintiff is a ‘smoker.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 34.  So a plaintiff proffers no 
evidence as to smoking status, the defendant responds to nonproffered evidence, 
and the plaintiff has no opportunity to respond once something tangible is actually 
filed?  There is no statutory support for such a regime, and contrary to the lead 
opinion’s assurances, it is neither fair nor workable. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
36 
The lead opinion would shift the burden and offers a novel interpretation of 
“competent medical authority” 
{¶ 94} Perhaps the most novel part of the lead opinion’s contrivance is its 
determination that it is the defendant’s burden to demonstrate that the plaintiff is a 
smoker.  It reaches this result by making two major revisions to the statutory text.  
First, as explained above, it conflates the plaintiff’s establishment of his 
nonsmoking status with the showing that a defendant must make to challenge the 
plaintiff’s prima facie evidence of physical impairment.  Second, as explained 
below, it rewrites the definition of “competent medical authority.” 
{¶ 95} Recall the definition of “smoker”: “a person who has smoked the 
equivalent of one-pack year, as specified in the written report of a competent 
medical authority pursuant to sections 2307.92 and 2307.93 of the Revised Code, 
during the last fifteen years.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 2307.91(DD).  By 
definition, a “competent medical authority” is required to be a “medical doctor 
[who] is actually treating or has treated the exposed person and has or had a doctor-
patient relationship with the person.”  R.C. 2307.91(Z)(2); see also Renfrow v. 
Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 140 Ohio St.3d 371, 2014-Ohio-3666, 18 N.E.3d 1173, 
paragraph two of the syllabus (“Competent medical authority, as defined in R.C. 
2307.91(Z), requires that a medical doctor must * * * actually be treating or have 
treated and have or had a doctor-patient relationship with the exposed person”). 
{¶ 96} The statutory requirement that the report used to determine the 
plaintiff’s smoking status come from the plaintiff’s own doctor makes sense: the 
plaintiff’s treating physician is clearly in a better position than a nontreating defense 
expert to attest to the plaintiff’s smoking history.  And the requirement comports 
with placing the burden to establish nonsmoking status on the plaintiff, who will be 
in the best position to obtain a report from his treating physician. 
{¶ 97} But under the lead opinion’s four-step approach, it is the defendant 
who must submit the report from the “competent medical authority.”  To achieve 
January Term, 2018 
 
37 
this result, the lead opinion needs to get around the statutory requirement that the 
“competent medical authority” be someone who is or has been in a doctor-patient 
relationship with the plaintiff.  It does this by simply deleting the doctor-patient 
requirement from the definition.  The lead opinion states, “[P]ursuant to R.C. 
2307.93(A)(1), * * * when the defendant presents a written report for the purpose 
of challenging the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s prima facie evidence, the physician 
who prepared that report will be considered a ‘competent medical authority’ if that 
physician meets only the requirements of R.C. 2307.91(Z)(1), (3), and (4).”  Lead 
opinion at ¶ 25.  The problem is that R.C. 2307.93(A)(1) says no such thing.  R.C. 
2307.93(A)(1) does allow a defendant to use a doctor who is not a treating physician 
(and thus not a competent medical authority) to challenge “the plaintiff’s prima 
facie evidence.”  But nothing in R.C. 2307.93(A)(1) makes such a doctor a 
“competent medical authority.” 
{¶ 98} In short, the result envisioned by the lead opinion rests upon yet 
another statutory revision.  The lead opinion’s approach rewrites the definition of 
“competent medical authority,” excising from the statute the requirement of a 
doctor-patient relationship.  Further, it would overrule our holding in Renfrow, 
without even acknowledging that it’s doing so. 
{¶ 99} No question, the scheme that the legislature drafted is complicated.  
The lead opinion apparently is convinced that by tweaking and revising the 
statutory language it can work an improvement—one that lends itself to a simple 
four-step approach.  But our role is to apply the law as it exists to cases that have 
been presented to us.  It is not to draft new statutory provisions, nor is it to answer 
questions that have not been presented through the adversarial process.  The lead 
opinion’s legislative craftsmanship would foist an entirely new regime on litigants 
and trial courts without the checks on improvident decision-making that our 
adversarial system ordinarily provides through layers of appellate review and 
briefing.  And it would take the court well outside its adjudicative role, ignoring the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
38 
scheme that the legislature has drafted and trampling upon the legislative process 
that created it. 
The Statutory Definition Disposes of the Question We Agreed to Review 
{¶ 100} When we confine ourselves to the question asked by the parties—
that is, how is a plaintiff’s smoking status to be proved—we return to the point 
where the lead opinion started its analysis: R.C. 2307.91(DD)’s definition of 
“smoker.” 
{¶ 101} Union Carbide maintains that under a straightforward reading of 
the statute, Turner needed to establish that he is not a smoker as defined in R.C. 
2307.91(DD) by means of a written report from a competent medical authority. 
{¶ 102} Turner counters that despite the statute’s reference to a written 
report from a competent medical authority, he need not provide such a report to 
prove that he is not a smoker.  In his view (and the view of the court of appeals), 
first, one is determined to be smoker and then, a competent medical authority 
prepares a report. 
{¶ 103} The problem with Turner’s reading is that it would make the entire 
definition of “smoker” unnecessary.  If the definition applied only when a prima 
facie showing is required, there would be no need to resort to the definition: a 
person’s status as a smoker would already have been determined.  A more 
reasonable reading of the statute is that the starting point must be determining a 
person’s smoking status.  Only after it is established whether a person is a smoker—
that is, whether he smoked the equivalent of one pack year in the past 15 years, 
based on the report of a competent medical authority—can the need for a prima 
facie showing be determined. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 104} Unlike the lead opinion, I would stick to the statutory scheme that 
the legislature gave us.  I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 
January Term, 2018 
 
39 
remand the case to the trial court to determine whether Turner is a smoker under 
R.C. 2307.91(DD). 
_________________ 
 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., Richard D. Schuster, Perry W. 
Doran II, Daniel E. Shuey, and Damien C. Kitte, for appellant. 
 
McDermott & Hickey, L.L.C., Kevin E. McDermott, and Christopher J. 
Hickey; and Levy Konigsberg, L.L.P., and Donald P. Blydenburgh, for appellee. 
 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Anne Marie Sferra, and Kara Herrnstein, urging 
reversal for amici curiae, Ohio Manufacturers’ Association, Ohio Alliance for Civil 
Justice, and Ohio Council of Retail Merchants. 
___________________