Title: In the Matter of Edward A. Maron v. Sheldon Silver, as Speaker of the State Assembly

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 16  
In the Matter of Edward A. Maron 
et al., 
            Appellants, 
        v. 
Sheldon Silver, as Speaker of the
State Assembly, et al.,
            Respondents, 
et al., 
            Respondent.
---------------------------------
No. 17  
Hon. Susan Larabee, et al.,
          Respondents-Appellants,
        v.
Governor of the State of New 
York,
          Respondent,
New York State Senate, et al.,
          Appellants-Respondents.
---------------------------------
No. 18  
The Chief Judge of the State of  
New York et al.,
          Appellants-Respondents,
        v.
The Governor of the State of New 
York, et al.,
          Respondents-Appellants.
Case No. 16:
Steven Cohn, for appellants.
Richard H. Dolan, for respondents.
Association of Justices of the Supreme Court of the
State of New York, et al., amici curiae.
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Case No. 17:
Richard H. Dolan, for appellants-respondents and
respondent.
Thomas E. Bezanson, for respondents-appellants.
Association of Justices of the Supreme Court of the
State of New York, et al.; New York County Lawyers' Association;
Atlantic Legal Foundation et al.; Zachary W. Carter; Asian
American Bar Association of New York, et al., amici curiae.
Case No. 18:
Bernard W. Nussbaum, for appellants-respondents.
Richard H. Dolan, for respondents-appellants.
Fund for Modern Courts; Association of Justices of the
Supreme Court of the State of New York, et al., amici curiae.
PIGOTT, J.:
The constitutional arguments raised in these judicial
compensation appeals are premised upon, among other things,
alleged violations of the New York State Constitution's
Compensation Clause and the Separation of Powers Doctrine. 
Because the Separation of Powers doctrine is aimed at preventing
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No. 016; 017; 018
1  For reference, according to the Federal Judicial Center,
more than 90% of the cases filed annually are in state courts,
less than 10% are filed in the federal system.
- 2 -
one branch of government from dominating or interfering with the
functioning of another co-equal branch, we conclude that the
independence of the judiciary is improperly jeopardized by the
current judicial pay crisis and this constitutes a violation of
the Separation of Powers Doctrine. 
I. Factual Background
The compensation of justices and judges of the Unified
Court System, with certain exceptions not applicable here, is
governed by article 7-B of the Judiciary Law (see Judiciary Law
§§ 221 - 221-i).  Article VI, section 25-a of the New York
Constitution, also known as the "Compensation Clause", directs
that the compensation of justices and judges "shall be
established by law and shall not be diminished during the term of
office for which he or she was elected or appointed." 
The last time the Legislature adjusted judicial
compensation was in 1998, through the amendment of Judiciary Law
article 7-B (see L 1998, ch 630 §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1999).  That
adjustment increased the annual salaries of this State's
Judiciary to make them commensurate with the salaries paid their
federal counterparts.1  Now, however, New York State ranks nearly
last of the 50 states in its level of judicial compensation,
adjusting for the cost of living.  It is estimated that, over the
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last eleven years, the real value of judicial salaries has
declined by approximately 25% to 33%. 
At the time the roughly 1300 judges and justices who
comprise the so-called "Article VI judges" (i.e. judges covered
by Article VI of the New York State Constitution) received the
pay raise that was enacted in 1998, they presided over 3.5
million cases.  Ten years later, in 2008, the judges presided
over a staggering 4.5 million cases, 38% of which were criminal
(approximately 1.71 million cases), 42% civil (approximately 1.89
million cases), 17% family court (approximately 765,000 cases)
and 3% surrogates court (approximately 135,000 cases)(see New
York State Unified Court System, Annual Report 1998 and 2008).
In 2006, the Judiciary submitted to Governor Pataki, as
part of its proposed annual budget, a request for $69.5 million
to fund salary adjustments for the approximately 1300 Article VI
judges, retroactive to April 1, 2005.  The intention was to
restore pay parity with federal judicial salaries.  Although made
part of the State budget (see L 2006, ch 51, §2), the Legislature
failed to authorize disbursement of the appropriation, because
the Legislature and the Governor could not agree on a pay
increase for the legislators themselves.
The following year, Governor Spitzer included in his
Executive Budget more than $111 million for judicial pay raises,
retroactive to April 1, 2005, which, if implemented, would have
placed salaries of State Supreme Court justices at an amount
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roughly on a par with federal judicial compensation.  The
Legislature removed that provision from the budget two months
later.
In April 2007, the Senate passed a bill (2007 NY Senate
Bill S5313) increasing judicial compensation, this time
retroactive to January 1, 2007, and calling for the creation of a
commission to review future salary increases for both judges and
legislators.  Governor Spitzer refused to support this
legislation, however, unless the Legislature enacted campaign
finance and ethics reform measures.  Two months later, the
Governor expressed support for a "judges only" pay bill. 
Shortly thereafter, the Senate passed another bill
(2007 NY Senate Bill S6550) providing for an increase in judicial
salaries, this time without any corresponding increase for
legislators.  It also called for the establishment of a
commission to examine future increases in judicial salaries
taking into account the needs of the Judiciary and the State's
ability to pay.  The Assembly refused to act on that bill because
it did not provide for an increase in legislative pay.  
The following year, Governor Paterson and the
Legislature approved a budget for 2008-2009 that included $48
million for judicial salary increases.  Like the 2006-2007
appropriation, this was a so-called "dry appropriation" requiring
further legislation before the salaries could be paid --
legislation that was never enacted.  
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2  The sole claim asserted against the OCA involved judicial
health benefits.  That claim has been severed from this action by
stipulation and is not at issue on this appeal. 
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All parties to this litigation agree that Article VI
justices and judges have earned and deserve a salary increase. 
That is what makes this litigation unique.  Although the parties
have been in accord regarding the need to adjust judicial
compensation, the failure of the Legislature and the Executive to
come to an agreement on legislation effecting a pay increase has
led to the continuing inertia underlying this dispute.  
II. Procedural History
Maron v Silver, et al.
The Maron petitioners -- current and former State
Supreme Court Justices -- commenced this hybrid CPLR article 78
proceeding/declaratory judgment action against respondents
Sheldon Silver, as Speaker of the Assembly, Joseph Bruno, then
Temporary President of the Senate, Eliot Spitzer, then Governor
of New York, Thomas DiNapoli in his capacity as State
Comptroller, the Assembly and Senate and the Office of Court
Administration.2  The article 78 proceeding seeks mandamus relief
compelling the Comptroller to disburse all retroactive sums and
pay the budgeted raises allocated in the 2006-2007 state budget
for judicial salary reform.  The petition also asserts violations
of the Separation of Powers Doctrine, equal protection and the
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3  For ease of reference, all defendants to these
litigations are collectively referred to as "State defendants."  
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state Compensation Clause.  
Supreme Court, Albany County, partially granted
defendants' motion to dismiss the petition for failure to state a
cause of action, leaving intact the separation of powers claim. 
The court further held that Silver, Bruno and Spitzer were immune
from suit because setting judicial salaries is a legislative act,
and concluded that to the extent the petition alleged a
constitutional violation against the Assembly and Senate, those
allegations constituted claims against the State.3 
In a 4-1 decision, the Appellate Division dismissed the
petition, holding, among other things, that the Maron
petitioners' failure "to allege a discriminatory attack on the
judicial branch that has impaired or imminently threatened the
Judiciary's independence and ability to function" was fatal to
their separation of powers claim (Maron v Silver, 58 AD3d 102,
123 [3d Dept 2008]).  
The Maron petitioners appealed to this Court as of
right on the constitutional questions presented.  This Court
retained jurisdiction over the appeal and denied leave to appeal
as unnecessary (see Maron v Silver, 12 NY3d 909 [2009]).
Larabee v Governor, et al.
The Larabee plaintiffs -- members of the New York State
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Judiciary -- commenced this declaratory judgment action against
Eliot Spitzer, in his capacity as Governor, the New York State
Assembly and Senate, and the State, alleging violations of the
state Compensation Clause and the Separation of Powers Doctrine. 
Supreme Court, New York County, granted the State
defendants' motion to dismiss the Compensation Clause cause of
action but, similar to the Supreme Court in Maron, concluded that
the Larabee plaintiffs had sufficiently pleaded a separation of
powers claim (see Larabee v Spitzer, 19 Misc 3d 226, 231-237 [Sup
Ct, New York County 2008]).  Supreme Court dismissed the
complaint in its entirety as against Governor Spitzer, noting
that the Larabee plaintiffs conceded that he was not an
"essential party" to the action, all parties having agreed that
the Assembly, Senate and State were proper parties (see id. at
237-239).   
Supreme Court subsequently granted the Larabee
plaintiffs summary judgment on the separation of powers cause of
action (see Larabee v Governor, 20 Misc 3d 866, 877 [Sup Ct, New
York County 2008]).  The State defendants appealed from that
order and the Larabee plaintiffs cross-appealed from Supreme
Court's order dismissing their Compensation Clause claim. 
The Appellate Division affirmed both orders (Larabee v
Governor, 65 AD3d 74 [1st Dept 2009]).  The Larabee plaintiffs
and State defendants appealed as of right and we retained
jurisdiction. 
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4  The parties have since stipulated to substitute Chief
Judge Jonathan Lippman for former Chief Judge Kaye.
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Chief Judge v Governor, et al.
The Chief Judge plaintiffs -- former Chief Judge Judith
S. Kaye4 and the New York State Unified Court System -- commenced
this declaratory judgment action asserting three causes of action
against David Paterson, Sheldon Silver, Joseph Bruno, all in
their respective official capacities, and the Assembly, Senate
and State.  
The complaint asserts one cause of action premised on a
violation of the state Compensation Clause under a different
theory than that posed by the Maron and Larabee plaintiffs;
namely, that the diminution in judicial salaries has had a
discriminatory effect on the Judiciary, rendering
unconstitutional the salaries codified in Judiciary Law §§ 221
through 221-i.  The two remaining claims are grounded on the
Separation of Powers Doctrine.  One of the claims is similar to
those raised in the Maron and Larabee litigation; the other is
premised on the theory that the Judiciary cannot function as a
co-equal branch if it is not assured of receiving "adequate
compensation," and that the judicial salaries codified in
Judiciary Law §§ 221 - 221-i are constitutionally insufficient. 
The State defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action.  Supreme Court, New York
County, searched the record and granted the Chief Judge
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5   Based on these conclusions, the State defendants'
contention that the Chief Judge plaintiffs' appeal from Supreme
Court should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction is without
merit. 
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plaintiffs summary judgment on the separation of powers claim
that was similar to the one raised in Larabee, but dismissed the
remaining causes of action attacking the constitutionality of
Judiciary Law §§ 221 - 221-i (see Chief Judge v Governor, 25 Misc
3d 268, 271-273 [Sup Ct, New York County [2009]).  As in Larabee,
Supreme Court dismissed the complaint in its entirety as against
the Governor (see id. at 271-272).  The State defendants appealed
to the Appellate Division, which affirmed for the reasons stated
in Larabee (see Chief Judge v Governor, 65 AD3d 898, 898 [1st
Dept 2009]). 
The Chief Judge plaintiffs appealed Supreme Court's
order directly to this Court pursuant to CPLR 5601(b)(2) and we
retained jurisdiction over the appeal.  Because the Chief Judge
plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the judicial
salaries set forth in Judiciary Law §§ 221 - 221-i, the direct
appeal from the order of Supreme Court was proper.5  The State
defendants appealed as of right from the Appellate Division's
affirmance of Supreme Court's order granting the Chief Judge
plaintiffs summary judgment on the separation of powers claim. 
III.  Rule of Necessity
Members of the Court of Appeals are paid via the salary
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schedule delineated in Judiciary Law § 221 and therefore will be
affected by the outcome of these appeals.  Ordinarily, when a
judge has an interest in litigation, recusal is warranted.  But
this case falls within a narrow exception to that rule.  Because
no other judicial body with jurisdiction exists to hear the
constitutional issues raised herein, this Court must hear and
dispose of these issues pursuant to the Rule of Necessity (see
Maresca v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 242, 247 n 1 [1984], appeal dismissed
474 US 802 [1985] [addressing a challenge to the state
Constitution's mandatory retirement age requirements for certain
state judges] citing Matter of Morgenthau v Cooke, 56 NY2d 24, 29
n 3 [1982]). 
IV.
Non-Constitutional Statutory Claim (Maron Petitioners Only)
The Maron petitioners assert that the constitutional
issues raised on these appeals can be avoided should this Court
find that they are entitled to relief in the nature of mandamus
compelling the Comptroller to pay the $69.5 million appropriated
in the 2006-2007 state budget.  As support for this argument,
petitioners focus on chapter 51 of the laws of 2006 addressing
"Judicial Compensation Reform."  That provision contained a $69.5
million budget item "[f]or expenses necessary to fund adjustments
in the compensation of state-paid judges and justices of the
unified court system pursuant to a chapter of the laws of 2006"
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(emphasis supplied).  Petitioners claim that the Comptroller
improperly impounded these funds and should be ordered to release
them to provide for judicial salary increases.   
A CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking mandamus to compel
the performance of a specific duty applies only to acts that are
ministerial in nature and not those that involve the exercise of
discretion (see Gimprich v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 306 NY
401, 406 [1954]; see also Siegel, NY Prac § 558, at 958 [4th
ed]).  Because of the constitutional requirement that judicial
compensation be "established by law" (NY Const, art VI, § 25
[a]), mandamus does not lie in this instance because no
subsequent chapter law was enacted either amending the Judiciary
Law salary schedules or directing the disbursement of the funds.  
The $69.5 million referenced in the Judicial budget was
explicitly made contingent upon the adoption of additional
legislation, i.e. a chapter of the laws of 2006.   Had the
Legislature intended that the judicial compensation appropriation
be self-executing, as petitioners claim, there would have been no
need for the qualifying language.  Moreover, a mere provision
calling for a lump sum payment of $69.5 million without repeal or
revision of the Judiciary Law article 7-B judicial salary
schedules is further evidence that additional legislation was
required before the funds could be disbursed.  We, therefore,
conclude that the Appellate Division properly dismissed
petitioners' cause of action seeking mandamus against the
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Comptroller.  
V.
Constitutional Claims (All Litigants)
A. Equal Protection 
The Judiciary as a "Suspect Class" (Maron Petitioners)
The Maron petitioners are the only litigants in these
appeals who have alleged that the Judiciary constitutes a
"suspect class" that has been denied equal protection under the
law because judicial pay raises have been historically contingent
on or "tied to" salary increases for legislators.  They also
assert that the State defendants' rationale for refusing to
increase judicial salaries fails to pass the "strict scrutiny"
test or the less stringent rational basis test.  For the reasons
set forth in the Appellate Division order, we conclude that
Supreme Court properly dismissed that cause of action (see Maron,
58 AD3d at 123-124).  
B. Compensation Clause 
The Maron petitioners and the Larabee plaintiffs assert
Compensation Clause causes of action that are premised on their
claims that judicial salaries have been unconstitutionally
diminished because of inflation.  The Chief Judge plaintiffs
posit an additional argument, asserting that the Legislature's
act of freezing judicial salaries while increasing the salaries
of 195,000 other state employees amounted to discrimination
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against the Judiciary.  
 
Diminution by "Pure Inflation" (Maron and Larabee)
The state Compensation Clause provides, in relevant
part, that the compensation of members of the Judiciary "shall be
established by law and shall not be diminished during the term of
office for which he or she was elected or appointed" (NY Const,
art VI, § 25 [a]).  The purpose of this "Compensation Clause" is
the same as its federal counterpart:  to promote judicial
independence and ensure that the pay of prospective judges, who
choose to leave their practices or other legal positions for the
bench, will not diminish (see United States v Will, 449 US 200,
221 [1980]).  
The Maron petitioners and Larabee plaintiffs base their
Compensation Clause arguments on an identical theory:  By failing
to increase judicial compensation, the Legislature has allowed
inflation to considerably diminish the "real value" of judicial
salaries, violating the state Compensation Clause's prohibition
against diminution.  They further claim that the state
Compensation Clause's prohibition against diminishment should
include the diminishment of compensation by any cause, including
inflation.  
Since the inception of our State Constitution, this
State has grappled with the issue of how best to establish the
parameters of judicial compensation.  In 1846, the Constitutional
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Convention adopted the phrase "shall not be increased or
diminished"; an 1869 amendment, however, deleted the words,
"increased or," allowing for the increase of compensation, but
not a decrease (see Carter, New York State Constitution: Sources
of Legislative Intent, at 85 [1988]).  The 1894 Constitution
restored the 1846 "shall not be increased or diminished"
language, which was thereafter deleted in its entirety in 1909
and adopted a specific constitutional provision fixing salaries
for certain judges at $10,000 per year (see Matter of Gresser v
O'Brien, 146 Misc 909, 917-918 [Sup Ct, New York County 1933],
affd 263 NY 622 [1934]).  In 1921, a Judiciary Constitutional
Convention was held to consider, among other things, amendments
to the state Constitution concerning judicial compensation (see
Judiciary Constitutional Convention of 1921: Report to
Legislature, at 3 [1/4/22]).  The Convention criticized the 1909
Compensation Clause amendment's inclusion of a salary schedule in
the Constitution, stating that judicial compensation "'should, in
the judgment of the present convention, be left entirely to the
legislature, which after all is the body always directly in touch
with and responsible to the people'" (New York State
Constitutional Convention Committee, Problems Relating to
Judicial Administration and Organization, at 339 [1938], quoting
Judiciary Constitutional Convention of 1921: Report to
Legislature, at 29).  
In recommending removal of the salary schedule, the
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6  That being said, as indicated later in this opinion, we do
not rule out the possibility that a total neglect by the
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Convention considered the deleterious effects of inflation on
judicial compensation and how it could negatively impact the
independence and effectiveness of the Judiciary, ultimately
concluding that the Legislature was in the best position to
address that issue (see Judiciary Constitutional Convention of
1921: Report to Legislature, at 29).  In 1925, the state
Compensation Clause's "shall not be diminished" language was
reinstated and remains unchanged (see Carter, at 85).  It is
evident from the events pre-dating the 1925 amendment that the
concept of diminution of compensation was of paramount concern,
and the final outcome was to authorize the Legislature to remedy
any deficiencies; notably, the Legislature was precluded from
diminishing salaries in recognition of the risk that salary
manipulation might be used as a tool to retaliate for unpopular
judicial decisions.  Although the state Compensation Clause
plainly prohibits the diminution of judicial compensation by
legislative act during a judge's term of office, there is no
evidence in the history of the Clause's enactment or subsequent
amendments that supports a broad interpretation embracing
indirect diminishment by neglect.   Thus, there is no evidence
that the state Compensation Clause's "no diminishment" rule was
intended to affirmatively require that judicial salaries be
adjusted to keep pace with the cost of living.6  
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Legislature to consider or address judicial salaries could never,
depending on the passage of time and changes in the value of
money, cause salaries to dip so low that they fall below a
constitutionally permissible floor.  To choose an extreme
example, if the Legislature had not raised salaries since 1909
when certain judges earned an annual salary of $10,000, a very
different case would be presented.
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In this regard, the state provision is comparable to
the federal Compensation Clause (US Const, art III, § 1) which
also contains the same "shall not be diminished" language.  Like
the drafters of the state Compensation Clause, the Framers of the
federal Constitution were cognizant of the effects of inflation
on judicial compensation, but nonetheless left that determination
to the discretion of the Legislature.  
At least two proposals concerning inflation were
offered at the federal Constitutional Convention.  One suggestion
was that the fluctuations in the value of judicial compensation
could be accounted for "by taking for a standard wheat or some
other thing of permanent value" (2 M. Farrand, The Records of the
Federal Convention of 1787, at 45 [1911]).  The other suggestion
left judicial compensation to the discretion of the Legislature,
which was in a better position to address inflationary concerns
(see Will, 449 US at 219-220, supra; see also Hamilton,
Federalist No. 79 ["It (is) therefore necessary to leave it to
the discretion of the legislature to vary (compensation) in
conformity to the variations in circumstances, yet under such
restrictions as to put it out of the power of that body to change
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the condition of the individual for the worse"]).  The latter
approach carried the day, with the Convention adopting a motion
to allow an increase of judicial compensation by Congress and, as
a result, "accepting a limited risk of external influence in
order to accommodate the need to raise judges' salaries when
times changed" (Will, 449 US at 220). 
Contrary to the contention of the Maron petitioners and
Larabee plaintiffs, federal jurisprudence does not support their
assertion that the state and federal Compensation Clauses
prohibit "indirect" diminution of compensation due to inflation. 
Although the cases cited support the general proposition that
judicial compensation may not be either "directly" or
"indirectly" reduced, none of them stands for the proposition
that the Legislature's failure to adjust compensation to account
for inflation constitutes an indirect attack on judicial
compensation.
In Evans v Gore, a federal judge challenged, on federal
Compensation Clause grounds, Congress's authority to include
sitting federal judges within the scope of a federal income tax
law that the Sixteenth Amendment had authorized years earlier,
claiming that the imposition of such a tax constituted a
diminishment in salary (see 253 US 245, 247 [1920], overruled by
United States v Hatter, 532 US 557 [2001]).  In finding the tax
violative of the federal Compensation Clause, the Evans court
noted that "diminution may be effected in more ways than one. 
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Some may be direct and others indirect and even evasive . . . But
all which by their necessary operation and effect withhold or
take from the judge a part of that which has been promised by law
for his services must be regarded as within the prohibition" (id.
at 254).  
In Miles v Graham, the United States Supreme Court
extended the Evans holding to those judges who assumed office
after the tax had become law (see Miles v Graham, 268 US 501,
508-509 [1925], overruled in part by O'Malley v Woodrough, 307 US
277 [1939]).  The O'Malley court overruled Miles, but left the
core holding of Evans intact (see O'Malley, 307 US at 282-283). 
However, the Supreme Court in United States v Hatter overruled
Evans "insofar as it holds that the Compensation Clause forbids
Congress to apply a generally applicable, nondiscriminatory tax
to the salaries of federal judges, whether or not they were
appointed before enactment of the tax" (Hatter, 532 US at 567). 
The Hatter court agreed with Evans, however, "insofar as it holds
that the Compensation Clause offers protections that extend
beyond a legislative effort directly to diminish a judge's pay,
say, by ordering a lower salary . . .  Otherwise a legislature
could circumvent even the most basic Compensation Clause
protection by enacting a discriminatory tax law, for example,
that precisely but indirectly achieved the forbidden effect" (id.
at 569 [emphasis supplied]).  
The evolution of Supreme Court jurisprudence from Evans
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to Hatter establishes that a nondiscriminatory tax that treats
judges the same as other citizens is permissible, but direct
diminution of compensation or the discriminatory taxation of
judges is not.  In either case, it is the diminishment of salary
by Congress, be it direct or indirect, that is prohibited. 
Here, the Legislature has not enacted legislation that
has directly diminished judicial compensation in violation of the
state Compensation Clause, nor has it enacted discriminatory
legislation that has indirectly resulted in the diminution of
judicial compensation.  The claim is that inflation has had this
effect.  However, at least as far as the federal Compensation
Clause is concerned, the intention of the Framers was that
Congress would serve as the failsafe that prevents inflation from
eating away at the real value of judicial salaries (see Atkins v
United States, 556 F2d 1028, 1048 [US Ct of Claims 1977] cert
denied 434 US 1009 [1978] [addressing inflation]).  
There is no reason for this Court to depart from that
rationale, because it is evident from the history surrounding the
enactment of our state Compensation Clause that, although the
diminution in value of judicial compensation by inflation was a
concern, the drafters decided that the best way to combat the
effects of inflation was to count on the Legislature -- the body
directly accountable to the public -- to assure the fair and
appropriate compensation of the judiciary.  We therefore
determine that the Legislature's failure to address the effects
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of inflation in this case does not equate to a per se violation
of the Compensation Clause.   
Compensation Clause - Discrimination (Chief Judge)
The Chief Judge plaintiffs' Compensation Clause
argument is distinctly different from the claims raised by the
other litigants.  Rather than contending that inflation resulted
in the unconstitutional diminution of judicial salaries, they
assert that by freezing judicial salaries while repeatedly
increasing the salaries of almost all of the remaining 195,000
state employees to keep pace with the cost of living, the State
defendants discriminated against the Judiciary in violation of
the state Compensation Clause. 
This argument is premised exclusively on the Supreme
Court's holding in Hatter (532 US 557, supra), which involved a
Social Security tax law that, at the time of its enactment,
mandated that all newly-hired federal employees participate in
the Social Security program.  The law also offered almost all of
the then-currently employed federal employees (96 percent) the
option to participate without any additional financial
obligation.  But it created an exception for the remaining four
percent of currently employed federal employees, however, which
required members of that class -- who contributed to a "covered"
retirement program -- to participate in the system without any
further additional financial obligation.  The legislation left
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those who did not participate in a "covered" program (i.e., a
group consisting "almost exclusively" of federal judges) without
a choice; their financial obligations and payroll deductions
would increase as a result of the imposition of the new tax (id.
at 562-564). 
In finding the law violative of the federal
Compensation Clause as discriminatory against judges, the Hatter
court noted that the Social Security legislation was "special--in
its manner of singling out judges for disadvantageous treatment,
in its justification as necessary to offset advantages related to
constitutionally protected features of the judicial office, and
in the degree of permissible legislative discretion that would
have to underlie any determination that the legislation has
'equalized' rather than gone too far."  It was these elements
that made the Social Security tax distinctly different from a
nondiscriminatory tax (id. at 576).
According to the Chief Judge plaintiffs, just as the
Social Security tax law in Hatter imposed a discriminatory tax on
the Judiciary, inflation has the same impact on judicial
compensation as a tax and, although the failure to remedy it in
and of itself may not violate the state Compensation Clause, in
this case the Judiciary has been singled out because nearly all
of the other 195,000 state employees have received salary
increases to compensate in part for inflation.  
We are unpersuaded that relief is warranted under the
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Hatter analysis.  First, Hatter involved a legislative enactment
that discriminated against federal judges by reducing the
compensation of judges only; the situation here does not involve
any legislative enactment that directly or indirectly diminishes
judicial compensation.  Second, although other state employees
have received adjustments to account for inflation, judges are
not the only state employees whose salaries have not been
adjusted; the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, members of the
Legislature and other constitutional officers have also not
received salary increases since 1999.  We therefore cannot say
that judges have been disadvantaged in a manner comparable to the
discriminatory treatment in Hatter.  Therefore, Supreme Court
properly dismissed this cause of action.   
C.  Separation of Powers
Speech or Debate Clause Defense (State Defendants)
Before we address plaintiffs' separation of powers
arguments, we consider the legislative defendants' primary
defense that both houses of the Legislature and their leaders are
immune from any such claim under the Speech or Debate Clause. 
The state Speech or Debate Clause provides that "[f]or any speech
or debate in either house of the legislature, the members shall
not be questioned in any other place" (NY Const, art III, § 11). 
The scope of immunity this provision bestows upon members of the
Legislature provides "as much protection as the immunity granted
- 23 -
No. 016; 017; 018
- 23 -
by the comparable provision of the Federal Constitution" (People
v Ohrenstein, 77 NY2d 38, 53 [1990] [citation omitted]), and
"protects against inquiry into acts that occur in the regular
course of the legislative process and into the motivation for
those acts" (United States v Brewster, 408 US 501, 525 [1972]).  
The Appellate Division in Maron dismissed the
separation of powers cause of action because, to the extent the
Legislature failed to either increase judicial compensation due
to inaction or because it tied such increases to "political
wrangling over unrelated issues," such failure constitutes a
legislative function protected by article III, § 11 (Maron, 58
AD3d at 121-123).  The courts in Larabee and Chief Judge,
however, concluded that the Speech or Debate Clause did not bar
review. 
The Speech or Debate Clause applies to only "members"
and to "any speech or debate in either house."  Nowhere does the
Clause state that such immunity applies to either house of the
Legislature as a whole, and therefore, it does not apply to the
Assembly or the Senate.  For the same reason, the State may not
assert this defense.
In any event, all of the parties acknowledge that the
Judiciary is entitled to an increase in compensation, and the
State defendants have made proclamations outside of the
Legislative and Executive Chambers as to why such an increase has
not occurred (see e.g. Ohrenstein, 77 NY2d at 54 [issuance of
- 24 -
No. 016; 017; 018
- 24 -
press releases and newsletters deemed not protected legislative
acts]; see also Rivera v Espada, 98 NY2d 422, 428 [2002] [same];
Hutchinson v Proxmire, 443 US 111 [1979]).  As a result, this
Court need not inquire "into acts that occur in the regular
course of the legislative process" or the Legislature's motives
for such acts (see Brewster, 408 US at 525), eliminating the
danger of the Judiciary intruding upon the independence of the
legislative branch.  
We therefore address the merits of the separation of
powers arguments.  
Failure by Legislature to Independently and Objectively 
Consider Compensation Increases (Maron, Larabee and Chief Judge)
The Maron petitioners and the Larabee and Chief Judge
plaintiffs all make the same separation of powers argument: By
tying judicial compensation to unrelated legislative objectives
and policy initiatives, as opposed to conducting an independent
assessment of judicial compensation, the Legislature has
disregarded the Separation of Powers Doctrine and threatened the
independence of the Judiciary.  
The State defendants counter that there is nothing in
the constitutional text or framework prohibiting the Legislature
from considering judicial compensation along with other
prerogatives.  Furthermore, any declaration condemning that
practice as unconstitutional would itself constitute a separation
of powers violation by the Judiciary through intrusion into
budgetary and appropriations processes. 
- 25 -
No. 016; 017; 018
- 25 -
 
In Maron, the Appellate Division dismissed petitioners'
claim on the ground that their failure "to allege a
discriminatory attack on the judicial branch that has impaired or
imminently threatened the Judiciary's independence and ability to
function" was fatal to the claim (Maron, 58 AD3d at 123).  This
claim met with greater success in Larabee and Chief Judge, where
the Appellate Divisions in each of those cases upheld the Supreme
Court's award of summary judgment to those plaintiffs (see Chief
Judge, 65 AD3d 898, 898 [1st Dept 2009]; Larabee, 65 AD3d at 74). 
The concept of the separation of powers is the bedrock
of the system of government adopted by this state in establishing
three co-ordinate and co-equal branches of government, each
charged with performing particular functions (see generally Under
21, Catholic Home Bur. for Dependent Children v City of New York,
65 NY2d 344, 355-356 [1985]; Oneida County v Berle, 49 NY2d 515,
522 [1980]).  The Constitution's aim "is to regulate, define and
limit the powers of government by assigning to the executive,
legislative and judicial branches distinct and independent
powers," thereby ensuring "an even balance of power [among] the
three" (People ex rel. Burby v Howland, 155 NY 270, 282 [1898]). 
The separation of the three branches is necessary "'for the
preservation of liberty itself,'" and "'[i]t is a fundamental
principle of the organic law that each department should be free
from interference, in the discharge of its peculiar duties, by
either of the others'" (Berle, 49 NY2d at 522 quoting Burby, 155
- 26 -
No. 016; 017; 018
- 26 -
NY at 282).  To accomplish this important goal, Articles III, IV
and VI of the state Constitution address the respective powers
conferred upon, and respective compensation of, the Legislature,
Executive and Judiciary.  
Article III states that "[t]he legislative power of
this state shall be vested in the senate and the assembly" (NY
Const, art III, § 1), and that "[e]ach member of the legislature
shall receive for his or her services a like annual salary, to be
fixed by law . . . [but] the salary of any member . . . may [not]
be increased or diminished during, and with respect to, the term
for which he or she shall have been elected" (NY Const, art III,
§ 6).
Article IV states that "[t]he executive power shall be
vested in the governor, who shall hold office for four years" (NY
Const, art IV, § 1), and who "shall receive for his or her
services an annual salary to be fixed by joint resolution of the
senate and assembly" (NY Const, art IV, § 3).
Article VI states that "[t]here shall be a unified
court system of the state" (NY Const, art VI, § 1) and that the
compensation of judges and justices within that system "shall be
established by law and shall not be diminished during the term of
office for which he or she was elected or appointed" (NY Const,
art VI, § 25 [a]).  
We find it significant that the compensation provisions
for each branch of government are not contained in Article III
- 27 -
No. 016; 017; 018
- 27 -
where the powers of the legislative branch are articulated, but
rather are separately addressed in the article for each
respective branch.  Although a function of the Legislature is to
approve the compensation of each of the three branches, this fact
underscores only the checks and balances of the system; it does
not rebut the fact that the compensation to be paid to members of
each particular branch must be determined separately and
distinctly from the others.  Indeed, whether the Judiciary is
entitled to a compensation increase must be based upon an
objective assessment of the Judiciary's needs if it is to retain
its functional and structural independence.  Simply put, by
failing to consider judicial compensation increases on the
merits, and instead holding it hostage to other legislative
objectives, the Legislature "[w]eaken[s the Judiciary] . . . by
making it unduly dependent" on the Legislature (Burby, 155 NY at
282).  
Separate budgets, separate articles in the
Constitution, and separate provisions concerning compensation are
all testament to the fact that each branch is independent of the
other.  This, of course, does not mean that the branches operate
without concern for the other.  Both the Legislature and the
Governor rely on the good faith of the other and of the Judiciary
for the good of the State.  As members of the two "political"
branches, the Governor and Legislature understandably have the
power to bargain with each other over all sorts of matters
- 28 -
No. 016; 017; 018
- 28 -
including their own compensation.  Judges and justices, on the
other hand, are not afforded that opportunity.  They have no seat
at the bargaining table and, in fact, are precluded from
participating in politics.  The judicial branch therefore depends
on the good faith of the other two branches to provide sufficient
funding to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities.  Given
its unique place in the constitutional scheme, it is imperative
that the legitimate needs of the judicial branch receive the
appropriate respect and attention.  This cannot occur if the
Judiciary is used as a pawn or bargaining chip in order to
achieve ends that are entirely unrelated to the judicial mission. 
For instance, the Constitution prohibits legislators
from increasing or decreasing their own salaries during their
two-year term of office, but there is no such prohibition against
the Legislature addressing judicial compensation at any time. 
Moreover, state legislators are part-time and may supplement
their income through committee assignments, leadership positions
and other outside employment.  Judges are constitutionally
forbidden from engaging in any employment that would interfere
with their judicial responsibilities (see NY Const, art VI, § 2
[b] [4]).  But by failing to consider judicial compensation
independently of legislative compensation, the State defendants
have imposed upon the Judiciary the same restrictions that have
been imposed on the Legislature, and have blurred the line
between the compensation of the two branches, thereby threatening
- 29 -
No. 016; 017; 018
- 29 -
the structural independence of the Judiciary.
The State defendants assert that it is within their
legislative rights to consider judicial compensation not on the
merits but relative to unrelated policy initiatives.  But they
overlook the fact that they are treating judicial compensation --
which falls within the scope of their constitutional duties -- as
if it were merely another government program appropriation as
opposed to compensation for members of a co-equal branch.   
We do not attribute the State defendants' failure to
increase judicial compensation to any nefarious purpose.  Indeed,
it is not necessary to consider, or find, the existence of any
improper motive.  All parties agree that a salary increase is
justified and, yet, those who have the constitutional duty to act
have done nothing to further that objective due to disputes
unrelated to the merits of any proposed increase.  This inaction
not only impairs the structural independence of the Judiciary,
but also deleteriously affects the public at large, which is
entitled to a well-qualified, functioning Judiciary (see
O'Donoghue v United States, 289 US 516, 533 [1933] [prohibition
against diminution is to attract competent people to the bench,
promote independence of the Judiciary, and for the public
interest]). 
It must be remembered that the Separation of Powers
Doctrine "is a structural safeguard rather than a remedy to be
applied only when specific harm, or risk of specific harm, can be
- 30 -
No. 016; 017; 018
- 30 -
identified.  In its major features . . . it is a prophylactic
device, establishing high walls and clear distinctions because
low walls and vague distinctions will not be judicially
defensible in the heat of interbranch conflict" (Plaut v
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 US 211, 239 [1995] [emphasis in
original]).
Here, the allegations by the Maron petitioners are
sufficient to state a separation of powers claim.  As that case
is here before us on a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, our
corrective action is limited to a reinstatement of that cause of
action.  In Larabee and Chief Judge, the procedural posture of
the cases is not so limiting and we may now issue a declaration. 
We hold that under these circumstances, as a matter of law, the
State defendants' failure to consider judicial compensation on
the merits violates the Separation of Powers Doctrine. 
However, when "fashioning specific remedies for
constitutional violations, we must avoid intrusion on the primary
domain of another branch of government" (Campaign for Fiscal
Equity, Inc. v State of New York, 8 NY3d 14, 28 [2006]).  Indeed,
deference to the Legislature -- which possess the constitutional
authority to budget and appropriate -- is necessary because it is 
"in a far better position than the Judiciary to determine funding
needs throughout the state and priorities for the allocation of
the State's resources" (id. at 29).  The Judiciary may intervene
in the state budget "only in the narrowest of instances" (Wein v
- 31 -
No. 016; 017; 018
- 31 -
Carey, 41 NY2d 498, 505 [1977]), and we do not believe that it is
necessary here to order specific injunctive relief.  When this
Court articulates the constitutional standards governing state
action, we presume that the State will act accordingly.  
Failure to Provide Adequate Compensation (Chief Judge)
The Chief Judge plaintiffs make a separation of powers
claim not raised by the Maron petitioners or Larabee plaintiffs: 
The separation of powers doctrine requires that the State
defendants provide the Judiciary with "adequate judicial
compensation" and, because judicial salaries are constitutionally
inadequate, the State defendants have breached their
constitutional duty.  The constitutional inadequacy of judicial
salaries, the Chief Judge plaintiffs posit, threatens to impair
the Judiciary's ability to function as a co-equal branch.  
The Compensation Clause was enacted to preserve
judicial independence, and we agree with the conclusion of high
courts in other jurisdictions that this is dependent, in part, on
judges receiving adequate compensation (see Glancy v Casey, 447
PA 77, 86 [1972] ["it is the constitutional duty and the
obligation of the legislature, in order to insure the
independence of the judicial . . . branch of government, to
provide compensation adequate in amount and commensurate with the
duties and responsibilities of the judges involved"]).  Moreover,
adequate judicial compensation is necessary to ensure that the
- 32 -
No. 016; 017; 018
- 32 -
public will have its matters heard by competent judges (see
Judiciary Constitutional Convention of 1921: Report of the
Legislature, at 29, supra) and that judges will be free to issue
decisions in accordance with the law without fear of retribution
by the other two branches of government.  Therefore, we reject
the State defendants' claim that the Compensation Clause's
language that compensation "shall not be diminished" is the
opposite of an "adequate compensation" guarantee.  Even counsel
for the State defendants in Larabee concede that judicial
compensation "could be so low that it could be constitutionally
objected to."  
The Chief Judge plaintiffs posit that the current
salaries of Judiciary Law article 7-B judges and justices are
inadequate when compared to other legal positions in the public
and private sectors.  This argument is one that is best addressed
in the first instance by the Legislature.  All of the State
defendants have conceded, at one point or another, that judicial
compensation must be increased.  We anticipate that our holding
today will permit them to consider, in good faith, judicial
salary increases on the merits. 
The Legislature might find the record compiled in the
Chief Judge case to be helpful.  There, plaintiffs demonstrate --
without rebuttal from the State -- that, in real value, New York
judges' salaries now rank below judicial salaries in other states
and the federal judiciary, despite the complexity of legal issues
- 33 -
No. 016; 017; 018
- 33 -
presented in New York -- a world economic center -- and the
burgeoning case load faced by New York judges.
The argument for a cost-of-living increase is not that,
in some objective sense, New York Judges do not earn a living
wage.  Judges made no such argument when this litigation
commenced in much better economic times and certainly do not
press such a contention now.  The claim is that, due to the lack
of a cost-of-living increase for more than 11 years, judges no
longer earn salaries that are appropriate given the significance
of their position in our tri-partite form of government and the
role they play in ensuring the rights of all members of society. 
That role has increased substantially since the last compensation
adjustment.  For instance, the Judiciary's workload has increased
by 10% over the past four years alone.  Since 2005, Family
Court's workload has increased 16%, civil filings in Supreme
Court have increased more than 14%, and the caseloads in the New
York City Civil Courts and those city courts outside of New York
City have risen by 13 and 17%, respectively.  Moreover, state
courts handle over 90% of the filings as compared to the less
than 10% handled by our federal courts.
Judicial salaries need not be exorbitant, but they must
be sufficient to attract well-qualified individuals to serve. 
Otherwise, only those with means will be financially able to
assume a judicial post, negatively impacting the diversity of the
Judiciary and discriminating against those who are well qualified
- 34 -
No. 016; 017; 018
- 34 -
and interested in serving, but nonetheless unable to aspire to a
career in the Judiciary because of the financial hardship that
results from stagnant compensation over the years.
IV.  Conclusion
It is unfortunate that this Court has been called upon
to adjudicate constitutional issues relative to an underlying
matter upon which all have agreed; namely, that the Judiciary is
entitled to a compensation adjustment.  By ensuring that any
judicial salary increases will be premised on their merits, this
holding aims to strike the appropriate balance between preserving
the independence of the Judiciary and avoiding encroachment on
the budget-making authority of the Legislature.  Therefore,
judicial compensation, when addressed by the Legislature in
present and future budget deliberations cannot depend on
unrelated policy initiatives or legislative compensation
adjustments.  Of course, whether judicial compensation should be
adjusted, and by how much, is within the province of the
Legislature.  It should keep in mind, however, that whether the
Legislature has met its constitutional obligations in that regard
is within the province of this Court (see Marbury v Madison, 1
Cranch 137, 177 [1803]).  We therefore expect appropriate and
expeditious legislative consideration.
Accordingly, 
In Maron, the order of the Appellate Division should be
modified, without costs, by remitting to Supreme Court for
- 35 -
No. 016; 017; 018
- 35 -
further proceedings in accordance with this opinion, and as so
modified, affirmed.
In Larabee, the order of Appellate Division should be
modified, and in Chief Judge, the judgment of Supreme Court and
the order of the Appellate Division should be modified, without
costs, by granting judgment declaring that under the
circumstances of these cases, as a matter of law, the State
defendants' failure to consider judicial compensation on the
merits violates the Separation of Powers Doctrine, and by
allowing for the remedy discussed in this opinion, and, as
modified, affirmed.  
- 1 -
Matter of Maron v Silver, Larabee v Governor, Chief Judge of the
State of New York v Governor
No. 16, 17, 18
SMITH, J.(dissenting) :
I share my colleagues' dismay at the Legislature's
behavior in dealing with, or rather failing to deal with, judges'
salaries, but I cannot agree that any of its actions or inactions
are unconstitutional. 
The majority holds that the Legislature has violated
the separation of powers by its failure to consider judicial
salaries "based upon an objective assessment of the Judiciary's
needs" (op at 27) or to give "appropriate respect and attention"
to the needs of the judicial branch (op at 28).  Undoubtedly, all
branches of government should evaluate each other's needs
objectively and treat each other with respect, but I know no
warrant for thinking that objectivity and respect are commanded
by the Constitution.  These qualities are so amorphous and
subjective that they can provide no workable standard for
constitutional decision-making. 
- 2 -
No. 16, 17, 18
- 2 -
As the Appellate Division in Maron put it, "nothing in
the NY Constitution forbids the political branches from engaging
in politics when carrying out their political functions" (Maron v
Silver, 58 AD3d 102, 122 [3d Dept 2008]).  Separation of powers
is violated not when one of the three branches acts irresponsibly
-- that happens all the time -- but when one threatens the place
of another in the constitutional scheme.  Thus I might well agree
that separation of powers was violated if the actual or imminent
effect of the Legislature's conduct were to make the recruitment
of competent judges impossible, or to render judges subservient
to the other branches of government.  I need not expand on this
point; it is well explained both in the Appellate Division's
Maron opinion (58 AD3d at 116-23)and in Atkins v United States
(556 F2d 1028, 1054-57 [Ct Cl 1977], cert denied 434 US 1009
[1978]), a federal case involving facts much like those before us
now.
Bad as the present situation is, neither of the
disastrous conditions I have mentioned -- a bench that cannot be
filled with competent people, or one whose financial dependence
makes it the slave of the Legislature -- exists or is close to
existing.  It is a depressing truth that some of our finest
judges have left, or are thinking of leaving, their jobs because
of the Legislature's failure to deal with the salary issue; but
it is also true that there are still plenty of able judges, and
plenty of able people who would willingly become judges, even at
- 3 -
No. 16, 17, 18
- 3 -
today's pay levels.  And I have seen no evidence of judicial
subservience to the Legislature; the problem, if there is one, is
to restrain judges' understandable displeasure with that branch
of our government.
I would affirm the Appellate Division order in Maron,
and would modify the orders in Larabee and Chief Judge to dismiss
all claims in the complaints.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Case No. 16:  Order modified, without costs, by remitting to
Supreme Court, Albany County, for further proceedings in
accordance with the opinion herein.  Opinion by Judge Pigott. 
Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read and Jones concur.  Judge Smith
dissents and votes to affirm in an opinion.  Chief Judge Lippman
took no part.
Case No. 17:  Order modified, without costs, by granting judgment
declaring that, under the circumstances of this case, as a matter
of law, the State defendants' failure to consider judicial
compensation on the merits violates the separation of powers
doctrine, and by allowing for the remedy discussed in the opinion
herein, and, as so modified, affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Pigott. 
Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read and Jones concur.  Judge Smith
dissents in an opinion.  Chief Judge Lippman took no part.
Case No. 18:  On plaintiffs' appeal and defendants' cross appeal,
judgment of Supreme Court and order of the Appellate Division
modified, without costs, by granting judgment declaring that,
under the circumstances of this case, as a matter of law, the
State defendants' failure to consider judicial compensation on
the merits violates the separation of powers doctrine, and by
allowing for the remedy discussed in the opinion herein, and, as
so modified, affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Pigott.  Judges
Ciparick, Graffeo, Read and Jones concur.  Judge Smith dissents
in an opinion.  Chief Judge Lippman took no part.
Decided February 23, 2010