Title: Becker v. Dane County

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2022 WI 63 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Jeffrey Becker, Andrea Klein and  
A Leap Above Dance, LLC, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
     v. 
Dane County, Janel Heinrich and  
Public Health of Madison & Dane County, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 8, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 8, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Jacob B. Frost   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court with 
respect to ¶¶1-28 and 44-45, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, 
and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to ¶¶29-
43, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and DALLET, JJ., joined. 
HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring opinion. REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., 
and ROGGENSACK, J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants, there were briefs filed by 
Rick Esenberg, Luke N. Berg, Anthony F. LoCoco, Daniel P. 
Lennington and Wisconsin Institute for Law & Liberty, Milwaukee. 
There was an oral argument by Luke N. Berg.  
 
For the defendants-respondents, there were briefs filed by 
Remzy D. Bitar, Sadie R. Zurfluh, and Municipal Law and 
 
 
2 
Litigation Group, S.C., Waukesha. There was an oral argument by 
Remzy D. Bitar.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Daniel R. Suhr and 
Liberty Justice Center, Chicago, for Liberty Justice Center.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Terman Spencer, city 
attorney, Gregory P. Kruse, assistant city attorney, Claire 
Silverman, and Maria Davis for The City of Milwaukee and League 
of Wisconsin Municipalities.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Jessica L. Thompson, 
Matthew Fernholz, and Pacific Legal Foundation, Arlington, and 
Cramer, Multhauf & Hammes, LLP, Racine, for the Pacific Legal 
Foundation and National Federation of Independent Business Small 
Business Legal Center.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Brian P. Keenan, 
assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was Joshua L. 
Kaul, attorney general, for Governor Tony Evers and Attorney 
General Josh Kaul.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by patricia Epstein 
Putney, Melita M. Mullen, Jeffrey B. Dubner, Jessica Anne 
Morton, and Bell, Moore & Richter, S.C., Madison, and Democracy 
Forward Foundation, Washington, D.C., for the American Medical 
Association and Wisconsin Medical Society.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Allison W. Boldt and 
the University of Wisconsin Law School State Democracy Research 
Initiative, Madison, for Legal Scholars.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Jeffrey A. Mandell, 
Douglas M. Poland, Colin T. Roth, Daniel Lenz, Elizabeth B. 
 
 
3 
Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod, Brian R. Frazelle, Miriam Becker-Cohen, 
and Stafford Rosenbaum LLP, Madison, Law Forward, Inc., Madison, 
and Constitutional Accountability Center, Washington, D.C., for 
Julian Davis Mortenson, Professor of Constitutional History.  
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 63 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382 
(L.C. No. 
2021CV143) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Jeffrey Becker, Andrea Klein and  
 
A Leap Above Dance, LLC, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Dane County, Janel Heinrich and  
 
Public Health of Madison & Dane County, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
FILED 
 
JUL 8, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court with 
respect to ¶¶1-28 and 44-45, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, 
and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to ¶¶29-
43, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and DALLET, JJ., joined. 
HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring opinion. REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., 
and ROGGENSACK, J., joined. 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the Circuit Court 
for Dane County, Jacob B. Frost, Judge.  Affirmed and cause 
remanded. 
 
¶1 
JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.   We resolve whether local health 
officers may lawfully issue public health orders.  This suit 
Nos. 2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382 
 
2 
arises from a challenge to a local health officer's issuance of 
public health orders to prevent, suppress, and control a 
communicable 
coronavirus 
disease 
commonly 
referred 
to 
as 
COVID-19.  The case before us does not challenge the wisdom or 
legality of any particular measure taken in these orders.  The 
challenge 
instead 
raises 
more 
general 
statutory 
and 
constitutional questions about the local health officer's 
authority to issue an order at all, regardless of the measures 
it 
promulgates. 
 
Specifically, 
we 
address 
three 
issues:  
(1) whether Wis. Stat. § 252.03 (2019-20)1 authorizes local 
health officers to issue public health orders; (2) whether Dane 
County Ordinance § 46.40 (December 2020),2 which makes such 
public health orders enforceable by a civil citation, is 
preempted by state law; and (3) whether either of these 
provisions 
constitute 
an 
unconstitutional 
delegation 
of 
legislative power. 
¶2 
On the statutory question, we hold that Wis. Stat. 
§ 252.03 grants local health officers the authority to issue 
orders.  As for preemption, we hold that no state law preempts 
Dane County Ordinance § 46.40.  Finally, on the constitutional 
question, we hold that a local health officer's authority to 
issue enforceable public health orders pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 252.03 and Dane County Ordinance § 46.40 does not run afoul of 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 All subsequent references to Chapter 46 of the Dane County 
Ordinances are to the December 2020 version. 
Nos. 2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382 
 
3 
our constitutional separation of powers.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the circuit court's judgment and order and remand to the circuit 
court for further proceedings. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
Since March 2020, Wisconsin's state and local public 
health officials have issued public health orders aimed at 
curbing the spread of the communicable COVID-19 disease caused 
by the SARS-CoV-2 virus and its variants.  This includes Janel 
Heinrich, the local health officer and director of Public Health 
Madison & Dane County ("Health Department"), a joint health 
department created by an intergovernmental agreement between the 
governing bodies of Dane County (the "County") and the City of 
Madison (the "City").  Per their agreement, the local health 
officer is jointly appointed by both local governments' elected 
chief executive officers (the County's executive and the City's 
mayor), subject to confirmation by both local governments' 
elected legislative bodies (the County's board and the City's 
common council).  The agreement charges the Health Department 
and its director with the duty to implement public health 
policies 
adopted 
by 
the 
County 
and 
City 
through 
local 
ordinances, budgets, and the agreement itself.  The agreement 
also establishes the Board of Health for Madison and Dane County 
("Board of Health"), comprising of one County board supervisor, 
one City common council member, three County residents, and 
three City residents.  Under the agreement, the Board of Health 
governs the Health Department's administration and supervises 
its director. 
Nos. 2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382 
 
4 
¶4 
Heinrich 
responded 
to 
the 
appearance 
of 
the 
communicable COVID-19 disease in her territory by issuing a 
series of orders from May 2020 until March 2022 that implemented 
measures to prevent, suppress, and control the disease's spread.  
She did so pursuant to her authority under state law that 
directs a local health officer to "promptly take all measures 
necessary 
to 
prevent, 
suppress 
and 
control 
communicable 
diseases," "do what is reasonable and necessary for the 
prevention and suppression of disease," and "forbid public 
gatherings when deemed necessary to control outbreaks or 
epidemics."  Wis. Stat. § 252.03(1)-(2).  Because COVID-19 
spreads predominantly via respiratory droplets——released when an 
infected person breaths, coughs, sneezes, sings, or talks——that 
then contact the mouth, nose, or eyes of nearby persons, 
Heinrich's orders implemented measures that 
affected many 
aspects of daily life where people come in close proximity with 
others.  These measures included requiring face coverings, 
limiting 
or 
forbidding 
gatherings, 
requiring 
sanitation 
protocols for particular facilities, limiting or forbidding 
certain sport activities, limiting businesses' allowable indoor 
capacity, and requiring physical distancing between individuals. 
¶5 
Around the time of Heinrich's fourth such public 
health order in June 2020, the County duly enacted Dane County 
Ordinance § 46.40 regarding the prevention, suppression, and 
control of communicable diseases.  Relevant here, Dane County 
Ordinance § 46.40(2) makes it "a violation of [Dane County 
Ordinance ch. 46] to refuse to obey an Order of the Director of 
Nos. 2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382 
 
5 
Public Health Madison and Dane County entered to prevent, 
suppress or control communicable disease pursuant to Wis. Stat 
s. 252.03."  A violation of ch. 46 could result in a civil 
forfeiture of between $50 and $200 "for each day that a 
violation exists."  Dane County Ordinance § 46.27(1).3 
¶6 
Jeffrey Becker and Andrea Klein are two County 
residents impacted by the Health Department's COVID-19-related 
orders.  In January 2021, they filed this lawsuit against the 
County as well as the Health Department and its director, 
Heinrich, challenging their legal authority to issue and enforce 
such orders.  Several days later, the Health Department 
separately filed an enforcement action against A Leap Above 
Dance, LLC ("A Leap Above") alleging that A Leap Above disobeyed 
a public health order.  Raising similar challenges as Becker and 
Klein against the Health Department's enforcement authority, A 
Leap Above joined Becker and Klein's suit as the third plaintiff 
(collectively 
"Plaintiffs"). 
 
The 
Health 
Department 
then 
dismissed its separate enforcement action, re-filing it as 
counterclaims in this suit. 
¶7 
Plaintiffs moved the circuit court to temporarily 
enjoin any enforcement of current and future public health 
orders while the case was pending.4  The circuit court declined 
to grant the temporary injunction.  Because its rationale for 
                                                 
3 Separately, one's failure to pay an assessed civil 
forfeiture could result in up to 30 days in county jail.  Dane 
County Ordinance § 46.27(3). 
4 The Honorable Jacob B. Frost of the Dane County Circuit 
Court presiding. 
Nos. 2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382 
 
6 
denying 
Plaintiffs' 
motion 
included 
a 
determination 
that 
Plaintiffs' arguments lacked a likelihood of success on the 
merits, Plaintiffs asked the circuit court to enter summary 
judgment against them so they could appeal.  The circuit court 
granted Plaintiffs' request and entered summary judgment against 
their claims but acknowledged that the Health Department's 
counterclaims against A Leap Above remain unresolved. 
¶8 
Plaintiffs appealed the summary-judgment decision; 
Becker and Klein as of right and A Leap Above with the court of 
appeals' permission.5  Following consolidation of the appeals and 
completion of the briefing, Plaintiffs petitioned to bypass the 
court of appeals.  We granted Plaintiffs' bypass petition and 
further ordered supplemental briefing on our jurisprudence 
regarding the delegation of constitutional powers. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
¶9 
This 
case 
requires 
us 
to 
interpret 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 252.03, determine whether state law preempts Dane County 
Ordinance § 46.40, and assess both provisions' constitutionality 
with respect to separation-of-powers principles.  Each presents 
a question of law that we review de novo.  See, e.g., Legue v. 
City of Racine, 2014 WI 92, ¶60, 357 Wis. 2d 250, 849 N.W.2d 837 
(statutory interpretation); DeRosso Landfill Co. v. City of Oak 
Creek, 200 Wis. 2d 642, 652, 547 N.W.2d 770 (1996) (preemption); 
                                                 
5 Because the Health Department's counterclaims against A 
Leap Above remain pending despite the summary-judgment decision, 
A Leap Above required the court of appeals' leave to file its 
appeal.  See Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1)-(2). 
Nos. 2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382 
 
7 
State v. Horn, 226 Wis. 2d 637, 642, 594 N.W.2d 772 (1999) (a 
law's constitutionality). 
A.  Wisconsin Stat. § 252.03 
¶10 The first two subsections of Wis. Stat. § 252.03 
empower local health officers to take certain actions in 
specific circumstances: 
(1) Every local health officer, upon the appearance of 
any communicable disease in his or her territory, 
shall immediately investigate all the circumstances 
and make a full report to the appropriate governing 
body and also to the department.  The local health 
officer shall promptly take all measures necessary to 
prevent, suppress and control communicable diseases, 
and shall report to the appropriate governing body the 
progress of the communicable diseases and the measures 
used against them, as needed to keep the appropriate 
governing body fully informed, or at such intervals as 
the secretary may direct.  The local health officer 
may inspect schools and other public buildings within 
his or her jurisdiction as needed to determine whether 
the buildings are kept in a sanitary condition. 
(2) Local health officers may do what is reasonable 
and necessary for the prevention and suppression of 
disease; may forbid public gatherings when deemed 
necessary to control outbreaks or epidemics and shall 
advise the department of measures taken.[6] 
We conclude the authority granted by these provisions includes 
the authority to act via order.  We reach that conclusion based 
                                                 
6 Subsections (3) and (4) do not provide any additional 
authority.  They instead direct the Department of Health 
Services (DHS) to "take charge" if "the local authorities fail 
to enforce the communicable disease statutes and rules" and 
prohibit 
persons 
from 
"interfere[ing] 
with 
an 
investigation . . . of any place or its occupants by local 
health officers or their assistants," respectively.  As such, 
those subsections are not at issue here. 
Nos. 2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382 
 
8 
on the common and approved meaning of the operative language, 
the context in which it appears, and the statutory history. 
¶11 We 
begin 
by 
examining 
the 
words 
in 
these 
two 
subsections.  Because Plaintiffs challenge not the measures 
taken but rather the form in which those measures were 
promulgated, our interpretive focus is on the operative verbs 
"take," "do," and "forbid."  At the top, we accept Plaintiffs 
concession that the local health officer's authority to "forbid 
public gatherings" must include the authority to do so by order.  
Indeed, how else would a local health officer forbid a public 
gathering if not through an order?  Thus, to give any effect to 
this provision of § 252.03(2), we must read it to authorize 
action by order.  See, e.g., Legue, 357 Wis. 2d 250, ¶61 
(explaining that we interpret statutes "to give effect to every 
word and to avoid surplusage"). 
¶12 Notwithstanding this concession, Plaintiffs maintain 
the clauses in § 252.03 using the verbs "take" or "do" fail to 
grant the authority to act by order.  We observe that the 
"common and approved" meaning of the language used in these 
clauses——"take all measures necessary to prevent, suppress and 
control communicable diseases" and "do what is reasonable and 
necessary for the prevention and suppression of disease"—— 
plainly support acting by order.  See Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1) 
(instructing that words neither technical nor statutorily 
defined "shall be construed according to common and approved 
usage"); see also Legue, 357 Wis. 2d 250, ¶61.  That is to say 
the common and approved meanings of "take" and "do" prescribe no 
Nos. 2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382 
 
9 
particular mechanism by which to act; they do not exclude acting 
by order.7  Therefore, the legislature's words alone would grant 
sufficiently broad authority for a local health officer to act 
via an order. 
¶13 Despite this ordinary reading of § 252.03(1)-(2), 
Plaintiffs contend that the language in surrounding and closely 
related statutes indicates that § 252.03 does not authorize 
action by order.  According to Plaintiffs, that is because these 
other statutes explicitly reference the authority to "issue 
                                                 
7 Dictionary definitions confirm this common reading of 
"take" and "do."  See, e.g., Stroede v. Soc'y Ins., 2021 WI 43, 
¶12, 397 Wis. 2d 17, 959 N.W.2d 305 ("[W]e often consult a 
dictionary in order to guide our interpretation of the common, 
ordinary meanings of words.").  As it is used here, "take" 
broadly entails "[t]o make, do, perform (an act, action, 
movement, etc.); to carry out."  Take, Oxford English Dictionary 
(3d ed. 2014).  The verb "do" is similarly broad, commonly 
meaning "[t]o perform, execute, achieve, carry out, effect, [or] 
bring to pass."  Do, Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 2014). 
Nos. 2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382 
 
10 
orders" or to "order" specific measures.8  Because § 252.03 lacks 
similar language, the argument goes, § 252.03 does not authorize 
local health officers to issue orders. 
¶14 While we agree with Plaintiffs that context is 
important, see, e.g., Legue, 357 Wis. 2d 250, ¶61 & n.30, 
Plaintiffs' contextual evidence provides an incomplete picture.  
A fuller examination of the contextual evidence undermines 
Plaintiffs' interpretation.  As Plaintiffs acknowledged in 
briefing and at oral argument, the legislature uses language 
other than "issue orders" or "order" that nonetheless authorizes 
local health officers to act via order.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 252.06(1), for example, authorizes a local health officer to 
"require" isolation of a person, quarantines, and disinfections, 
which would require an order.  The next subsection, § 252.06(2), 
authorizes local health officers "to quarantine, isolate, 
                                                 
8 See Wis. Stat. § 252.02(4) (authorizing the Department of 
Health Services (DHS) to "issue orders" for the prevention of or 
the control and suppression of communicable disease, among other 
actions, and to "issue orders for any city, village or county by 
service upon the local health officer"); Wis. Stat. § 323.14 
(authorizing a local government's governing body——or chief 
executive under certain conditions——"to order, by ordinance or 
resolution, whatever is necessary and expedient for the health, 
safety, protection, and welfare of persons and property within" 
its jurisdiction during an emergency); Wis. Stat. § 252.25 
(penalizing 
the 
willful 
violation 
or 
obstruction 
of 
a 
"departmental [DHS] order" relating to public health); Wis. 
Stat. § 251.06 (authorizing a local health officer to "[e]nforce 
state public health statutes and rules," "any regulations" 
adopted by the local board of health, and "any ordinances" 
enacted by the relevant local government, but not referencing a 
local health officer's order); Wis. Stat. § 254.59 (authorizing 
the local health officer to "order the abatement or removal" of 
a human health hazard on private property and providing civil 
enforcement mechanisms). 
Nos. 2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382 
 
11 
require restrictions or take other communicable disease control 
measures" under specified circumstances, all of which would 
require an order.  A related subsection, § 252.06(5), confirms 
that the local health officer has the power to take these 
measures by order.  Subsection (5) permits the local health 
officer to both "employ as many persons as are necessary to 
execute his or her orders" and "use all necessary means to 
enforce" not only state laws and DHS orders but also "the 
orders . . . of . . . any local health officer."  § 252.06(5) 
(emphases added).  Even within the statute at issue here, 
§ 252.03, 
Plaintiffs 
concede 
the 
language 
"forbid 
public 
gatherings" authorizes local health officers to issue orders.  
Given the additional contextual evidence, we are not persuaded 
that the power to act via an order depends solely on the words 
"issue orders" or "order." 
¶15 Finally, 
statutory 
history 
further 
supports 
the 
conclusion that § 252.03 grants local health officials the 
authority 
to 
issue 
orders. 
 
See, 
e.g., 
Legue, 
357 
Wis. 2d 250, ¶61 & n.36.  Dating back to Wisconsin's territorial 
days, public health laws authorized local officials to issue 
enforceable public health orders using language such as "[t]o 
take 
such 
measures." 
 
Specifically, 
the 
territorial 
law 
authorized "the local board of health of any city, town or 
village" "[t]o take such measures as they may deem effectual for 
the preservation of the public health in said city, town, 
village or township," among other powers.  See Statutes of the 
Territory of Wisconsin, Passed by the Legislative Assembly 
Nos. 2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382 
 
12 
Thereof, at a Session Commencing in November 1838, at 125 
(1839).  Critically, none of the listed powers used the language 
"issue orders" or "order"; yet the statute still criminalized 
the violation of "any order, or rule, or regulation, made in 
pursuance of the powers granted to said board of health."  See 
id. (emphasis added). 
¶16 Similarly, Wisconsin's first state legislature granted 
the local power to "take" measures "deem[ed] most effectual for 
the preservation of the public health."  Importantly, this law 
distinguished the power to "take such measures" for the 
preservation of public health from the power to "make such rules 
and regulations" for the same purpose.  See Wis. Stat. ch. 26, 
§ 2 (1849).  That distinction indicates that "take such 
measures" included action not by rule or regulation but by 
order, as subsequent sections of that same law recognized.  See 
Wis. Stat. ch. 26, §§ 3-4 (1849) (differentiating between an 
"order" and a "regulation"). 
¶17 Later, following the 1918 Spanish Flu, Wisconsin's 
legislature enacted a local public health law that read: 
The local board of health . . . shall have power to 
establish quarantine and to order and execute what is 
reasonable and necessary for the prevention and 
suppression of disease; to forbid public gatherings 
when deemed necessary to control epidemics . . . . 
§ 1, ch. 159, Laws of 1919 (emphasis added).  A few years later, 
the legislature revised the public health laws including the 
provision related to a local board of health's authority, which 
then read: 
Nos. 2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382 
 
13 
Local boards of health may do what is reasonable and 
necessary for the prevention and suppression of 
disease; may forbid public gatherings when deemed 
necessary to control epidemics . . . . 
§ 2, ch. 448, Laws of 1922 (emphasis added).  The interpretive 
question raised by this revision is whether the switch from "to 
order and execute" to "do" effectuated a substantive change in a 
local board of health's power. 
¶18 The legislature instructs that we understand the 
revised statute "in the same sense as the original unless the 
change in language indicates a different meaning so clearly as 
to preclude judicial construction."  Wis. Stat. § 990.001(7).  
We conclude that the change in language here does not "so 
clearly" indicate a different meaning that precludes issuing 
orders for two reasons.  First, as explained previously, nothing 
about the common and approved meaning of "do" precludes acting 
via order; its broad definition prescribes no particular 
mechanism by which a local health officer might act.  Do, Oxford 
English Dictionary (3d ed., 2014) ("To perform, execute, 
achieve, carry out, effect, [or] bring to pass").  It is 
therefore natural to read "may do what is reasonable and 
necessary for the prevention and suppression of disease" as 
granting permission to order private action deemed reasonable 
and necessary for the prevention and suppression of disease.  In 
short, "do" is not at all inconsistent with acting via order. 
¶19 Second, contemporaneous interpretations of the revised 
"may do what is reasonable and necessary" language understood it 
to continue to authorize action by order.  A 1923 attorney 
Nos. 2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382 
 
14 
general opinion concluded that the 1922 revisions continued to 
authorize the same powers the prior version of the public health 
statutes provided.  12 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 646 (1923).  Two 
years later, another attorney general opinion concluded that, 
under the "may do what is reasonable and necessary" provision, 
"the local health department may issue an order to all employers 
of labor prohibiting such employers from continuing in their 
employment persons who are unvaccinated or who fail to show a 
certificate 
of 
recent 
vaccination." 
 
14 
Wis. 
Op. 
Att'y 
Gen. 300-01 (1925) (emphasis added).  Far from "so clearly" 
indicating 
a 
different 
meaning, 
these 
contemporaneous 
interpretations of "may do what is reasonable and necessary" and 
that language's common and approved meaning lead us to follow 
§ 990.001(7)'s directive and read the revised "do" in the "same 
sense as the original," which was "to order and execute." 
¶20 The same interpretation of "do" holds for the 1981 
amendment of this law.  That amendment made two changes relevant 
here:  (1) it shifted the authority to "do what is reasonable 
and necessary for the prevention and suppression of disease" 
from "local boards of health" to "local health officers"; and 
(2) it authorized local health officers to "take all measures 
necessary 
to 
prevent, 
suppress 
and 
control 
communicable 
diseases."  See § 23, ch. 291, Laws of 1981.  The first change 
retained the same "may do what is reasonable and necessary for 
the prevention and suppression of disease" language and thus 
shifted to local health officers the same authority to act by 
order. 
Nos. 2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382 
 
15 
¶21 As for the second change, the language "take all 
measures necessary to prevent, suppress and control communicable 
diseases" also authorized action via public health order.  As 
set out above, the verb "take," a synonym of the verb "do" in 
this context, is broad and contains no definitional proscription 
against acting via order.  See Take, Oxford English Dictionary 
(3d ed. 2014) ("To make, do, perform (an act, action, movement, 
etc.); to carry out." (emphasis added)).  Moreover, the "take 
all measures" language chosen for this added authority harkens 
back to the earliest local public health statutes that, as 
explained above, used the same language to authorize action via 
order.  See supra, ¶¶15-16.  As such, the most reasonable 
reading of "take all measures necessary" includes taking 
necessary public health measures by order. 
¶22 In light of the broad common and approved meaning of 
§ 252.03's language, the full context in which it appears, and 
that provision's statutory history, we hold that the authority 
to "do what is reasonable and necessary for the prevention and 
suppression of disease" and "take all measures necessary to 
prevent, suppress and control communicable diseases" both 
authorize acting via order. 
B.  Preemption 
¶23 We next address whether state law preempts Dane County 
Ordinance § 46.40.  State law preempts a local ordinance 
when:  (1) the state legislature has expressly withdrawn the 
power of municipalities to act; (2) the ordinance logically 
conflicts with state legislation; (3) the ordinance defeats the 
Nos. 2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382 
 
16 
purpose of state legislation; or (4) the ordinance violates the 
spirit of state legislation.  See, e.g., DeRosso Landfill, 200 
Wis. 2d at 651-52.  Absent these circumstances, the County may 
enact ordinances in the same field and on the same subject as 
that covered by state legislation.  See id. at 651 (citing Fox 
v. Racine, 225 Wis. 542, 546, 275 N.W. 513 (1937)); Wis. Stat. 
§ 59.03(2)(a) (providing that a county board "is vested with all 
powers of a local, legislative and administrative character" 
including on the subject matter of "health"). 
¶24 Dane County Ordinance § 46.40, in relevant part, 
provides: 
(1) Duty of Director, Public Health Madison and Dane 
County.  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. ss. 252.03(1) & (2) 
the Director of Public Health Madison and Dane County 
shall promptly take all measures necessary to prevent, 
suppress and control communicable diseases within Dane 
County, including forbidding public gatherings when 
deemed necessary to control outbreaks or epidemics. 
(2) Public Health Orders.  It shall be a violation of 
this chapter to refuse to obey an Order of the 
Director of Public Health Madison and Dane County 
entered to prevent, suppress or control communicable 
disease pursuant to Wis. Stat s. 252.03. 
Dane County Ordinance § 46.40(1)-(2).  Plaintiffs argue that the 
ordinance may not lawfully authorize the local health officer to 
either issue orders or enforce those orders because such 
authority is "intentionally withheld" by state law.  As for the 
power to act via order, Plaintiffs rely on the same argument 
addressed above——that Wis. Stat. § 252.03 does not authorize a 
local health officer to issue orders because the statute lacks 
the exact "issue orders" or "order" language used in related 
Nos. 2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382 
 
17 
statutes such as Wis. Stat. §§ 252.02 and 323.14.  Again, we 
disagree that Wis. Stat. § 252.03 "intentionally withheld" the 
power to act via order.  Accordingly, Dane County Ordinance § 
46.40(1) is not preempted because the ordinance permissibly 
grants authority redundant to that already authorized by state 
statute.  See Wis. Stat. § 59.03(2)(a); DeRosso Landfill, 200 
Wis. 2d at 651. 
¶25 As for the enforcement authority, Plaintiffs cite 
three state laws that touch on enforcement of public health 
measures.  The first state law is a catchall penalty provision 
that 
makes 
the 
willful 
violation 
or 
obstruction 
of 
a 
"departmental [DHS] order" relating to public health punishable 
by "imprison[ment] for not more than 30 days" or a "fine[] not 
more than $500 or both."  See Wis. Stat. § 252.25.  This 
provision contains no express withdrawal of municipal authority.  
Moreover, an ordinance allowing civil citations for violations 
of local health orders presents no logical conflict with DHS's 
public health orders also carrying penalties.  Finally, the fact 
that Wis. Stat. § 252.25 creates a strong enforcement mechanism 
for public health orders confirms that Dane County Ordinance 
§ 46.40(2)'s civil penalties are entirely in line with the 
purpose and spirit of the state's public health laws. 
¶26 The second law regarding enforcement that Plaintiffs 
rely on requires a local health officer to "[e]nforce state 
public health statutes and rules," "any regulations" adopted by 
the local board of health, and "any ordinances" enacted by the 
relevant local government.  Wis. Stat. § 251.06(3).  This 
Nos. 2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382 
 
18 
statutory list of a local health officer's mandatory enforcement 
duties tell us little about a county's authority to permit its 
health department to enforce public health orders by civil 
citation.  It certainly does not expressly withdraw that 
authority.  Nor do Plaintiffs identify how the enforcement of 
local public health orders would conflict with the duty to 
similarly enforce state statutes and rules as well as local 
regulations and ordinances.  Again, the fact that state law 
recognizes a local health officer's duty to secure public health 
via 
enforcement 
measures 
indicates 
that 
the 
enforcement 
mechanism supplied by Dane County Ordinance § 46.40(2) comports 
with our state public health laws' purpose and spirit. 
¶27 Finally, Plaintiffs contend Dane County Ordinance 
§ 46.40(2) exceeds the County's statutory authority under Wis. 
Stat. § 66.0113.  Section 66.0113(1)(a) permits a county to 
adopt an ordinance that authorizes the issuance of civil 
citations for "violations of ordinances, including ordinances 
for which a statutory counterpart exists."  According to 
Plaintiffs, 
Dane 
County 
Ordinance 
§ 46.40(2) 
authorizes 
citations for violations not of an ordinance but of a public 
health order, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 66.0113(1)(a). 
¶28 We disagree.  Dane County Ordinance § 46.40(2) says 
that refusal to obey a local public health order is "a violation 
of this chapter," meaning Chapter 46 of the Dane County 
Ordinances.  See also Dane County Ordinance § 46.25(1) (making 
it "a violation of this chapter" to "neglect to obey any lawful 
order" of the Health Department).  Any order issued pursuant to 
Nos. 2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382 
 
19 
Dane County Ordinance § 46.40 is legally rooted in that 
ordinance's grant of authority.  Accordingly, disobeying the 
order is a violation of the underlying ordinance.  As a result, 
Dane County Ordinance § 46.40(2) operates consistently with the 
County's authority under Wis. Stat. § 66.0113(1)(a).  There is, 
therefore, 
no 
conflict——express, 
implicit, 
logically, 
or 
otherwise——between Dane County Ordinance § 46.40 and any state 
law.  See DeRosso Landfill, 200 Wis. 2d at 651-52. 
C.  Constitutional Separation of Powers 
¶29 Finally, we turn to whether a local health officer's 
authority to issue public health orders under Wis. Stat. 
§ 252.03——either by itself or in tandem with the enforcement 
mechanism supplied by Dane County Ordinance § 46.40(2)——is an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.  Before 
reaching that question, though, Plaintiffs ask that we revisit 
our jurisprudence on the constitutional bounds of permissible 
legislative grants of authority.  We therefore begin by 
addressing the proper framework in which to assess a legislative 
grant of power to local officials and then apply that framework 
to Wis. Stat. § 252.03 and Dane County Ordinance § 46.40. 
¶30 Article IV, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
declares that the "legislative power shall be vested in a senate 
and assembly."  This court has never interpreted these words in 
a literal sense to bar the delegation of any legislative power 
outside the senate and assembly.  See Klisurich v. DHSS, 98 
Wis. 2d 274, 
279, 
296 
N.W.2d 
742 
(1980) 
("The 
Wisconsin 
Constitution does not require that the legislative power be 
Nos. 2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382 
 
20 
exclusively vested in a bicameral legislature.").  Still, we 
have inferred from our constitution's tripartite structure that 
none of the three governmental powers——executive, legislative, 
or judicial——can be entirely delegated away from the branch to 
which the constitution vests it.  See In re Constitutionality of 
§ 251.18, Wis. Statutes, 204 Wis. 501, 503, 236 N.W. 717 (1931) 
("[N]o one of the three branches of government can effectively 
delegate any of the powers which peculiarly and intrinsically 
belong to that branch."). 
¶31 In 
determining 
whether 
a 
legislative 
grant 
of 
authority transgresses this inferred constitutional limitation, 
our cases examine both the substantive nature of the granted 
power and the adequacy of attending procedural safeguards 
against arbitrary exercise of that power.  See Klisurich, 98 
Wis. 2d at 279–80.  So long as the legislative grant contains an 
"ascertainable" purpose and "procedural safeguards" exist to 
ensure conformity with that legislative purpose, the grant of 
authority is constitutional.  Id. at 280.  The greater the 
procedural safeguards, the less critical we are toward the 
substantive nature of the granted power.  See Panzer v. Doyle, 
2004 WI 52, ¶55, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 680 N.W.2d 666, abrogated in 
other respects by Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 
WI 107, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408. 
¶32 Plaintiffs suggest our current jurisprudence regarding 
the delegation of legislative authority has lost touch with the 
original understanding of the constitution's separation of 
powers.  Plaintiffs advocate greater emphasis on the substantive 
Nos. 2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382 
 
21 
nature of the authority granted, regardless of the procedural 
safeguards present.  They argue that the grant of power to 
formulate generally applicable rules of private conduct is 
constitutional only if the legislature has "laid down the 
fundamentals of the law," leaving the recipient of the power to 
merely "fill up the details."  See State v. Whitman, 196 
Wis. 472, 505-06, 220 N.W. 929 (1928).  Accordingly, they invite 
us to overrule our precedent in favor of their proffered 
interpretation of the constitution. 
¶33 We decline Plaintiffs' invitation.  This case presents 
the 
wrong 
vehicle 
to 
revisit 
our 
separation-of-powers 
jurisprudence.  As an initial matter, the principles regarding 
state-level delegations differ from the principles regarding 
local delegations.  After all, the constitution defines the 
state legislature's relationship with the other two state-level 
branches 
differently 
than 
both 
the 
state 
legislature's 
relationship to local governments and a local legislative body's 
relationship with its local executive and judicial counterparts.  
Case in point, the state legislature constitutionally may——and 
does——delegate to local municipalities complete legislative 
authority over local affairs, subject only to the constitution 
and preemptive state statutes.9  Consequently, the constitution 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Wis. Const. art. IV, § 22 (permitting the state 
legislature to delegate to county boards "powers of a local, 
legislative and administrative character" (emphasis added)); 
Wis. Const. art. IV, § 23; Wis. Const. art. XI, § 3(1); Wis. 
Stat. § 59.03(2) (vesting county boards "with all powers of a 
local, 
legislative 
and 
administrative 
character" 
(emphasis 
added)). 
Nos. 2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382 
 
22 
applies differently with respect to state-level delegations than 
to local delegations. 
¶34 That said, we need not define what those different 
principles are here.  That is because both Wis. Stat. § 252.03 
and Dane County Ordinance § 46.40 would pass constitutional 
muster even if we assume that:  (1) state-level principles apply 
to local governments; and (2) Plaintiffs' proposed analysis 
emphasizing the substantive nature of the granted authority was 
the correct framework.  Applying, then, Plaintiffs' proposed 
analysis, Wis. Stat. § 252.03 and Dane County Ordinance § 46.40 
are sufficient in terms of both their substantive nature and 
their procedural safeguards, and we address each in turn. 
1.  Substantive Nature 
¶35 We begin by assessing whether the laws at issue 
contain an ascertainable purpose.  As is often the case with 
legal interpretation, context can provide even seemingly broad 
enabling 
language 
meaningful 
content. 
 
See 
Legue, 
357 
Wis. 2d 250, ¶61 & n.30; see also Am. Power & Light Co. v. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 329 U.S. 90, 104 (1946) (explaining that 
enabling language derives "much meaningful content" from its 
"factual background and the [legal] context in which [it] 
appear[s]").  That is certainly true for Wis. Stat. § 252.03 and 
Dane County Ordinance § 46.40. 
¶36 Importantly, 
these 
provisions 
"la[y] 
down 
the 
fundamentals of the law"——the who, what, when, where, why, and 
how.  See Whitman, 196 Wis. at 505-06.  The who is the local 
health officer.  The what is the power to "take all measures 
Nos. 2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382 
 
23 
necessary," to "do what is reasonable and necessary," and to 
"forbid public gatherings."  The when is "upon the appearance of 
any communicable disease."  The where is within the local health 
officer's "territory" or "jurisdiction."  The why is "to 
prevent, suppress and control communicable disease," "the 
prevention and suppression of disease," or "to control outbreaks 
or epidemics."  And the how is via actions including orders.  
See supra, ¶22.  Moreover, each law appears in its respective 
code's public health chapter. 
¶37 These textual limitations, read in their public health 
context, establish an ascertainable "general policy":  disrupt 
the transmission pathways of contagious diseases.  See Olson v. 
State Conservation Comm'n, 235 Wis. 473, 482, 293 N.W. 262 
(1940).  These textual limitations also substantively restrict a 
local health officer's pursuit of that general policy, allowing 
only public health measures reasonable and necessary to hinder 
the particular disease's transmission.  See id.; Am. Power & 
Light, 329 U.S. at 105.  In other words, all that remains for 
the local health officer is to "fill up the details" with the 
particular public health measures that will be responsive to the 
unique features of the particular contagious disease.  See 
Whitman, 196 Wis. at 505-06. 
¶38 Bolstering our conclusion that the substantive nature 
of Wis. Stat. § 252.03 and Dane County Ordinance § 46.40 do not 
upset our constitutional separation of powers is founding-era 
grants of similar public health authority to local governments.  
Wisconsin's first state legislature saw no conflict between the 
Nos. 2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382 
 
24 
constitution's separation of powers and the grant of broad 
public health authority to local governments.  The first state 
code enacted just months after our constitution's ratification 
authorized local boards of health the authority to "take such 
measures, and make such rules and regulations, as they may deem 
most effectual for the preservation of the public health."  Wis. 
Stat. ch. 26, § 2 (1849).  A violation of board of health "order 
or regulation" constituted a criminal misdemeanor punishable by 
up to $100 (over $3,000 in 2022 dollars) or three months in 
prison.  Wis. Stat. ch. 26, § 3 (1849). 
¶39 We see two upshots from this original grant of public 
health authority to local governments.  First, the original 
understanding of our constitution's separation of powers was 
that the constitution allows grants of broad public health 
authority to local governments substantively similar to that 
delineated 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 252.03. 
 
And 
second, 
our 
constitution's separation of powers also allows public health 
orders enforceable by criminal penalties that far exceed the 
civil citations authorized by Dane County Ordinance § 46.40.10  
As such, Wis. Stat. § 252.03 and Dane County Ordinance § 46.40 
do not substantively offend our constitution's separation of 
powers. 
                                                 
10 Because Dane County Ordinance § 46.40 does not impose 
criminal penalties, we do not address in this case the potential 
tension between these historical grants of public health 
authority and our decision in Wisconsin Legislature v. Palm, 
which did not analyze this historical evidence.  2020 WI 42, 
¶¶36-40, 391 Wis. 2d 497, 942 N.W.2d 900. 
Nos. 2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382 
 
25 
2.  Procedural Safeguards 
¶40 The procedural safeguards attendant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 252.03 and Dane County Ordinance § 46.40 are particularly 
strong.  That is because a local health officer's discretion is 
subject to both state and local controls.  As with any 
legislative authority, the state legislature may curb exercises 
of granted power it deems excessive by amending Wis. Stat. 
§ 252.03 or repealing the statute entirely.  As Plaintiffs 
acknowledge, our state legislature can react much more quickly 
to perceived excesses than the federal Congress, making this 
safeguard more robust than it might be for federal legislation.  
Moreover, state courts may review an order issued pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 252.03 and Dane County Ordinance § 46.40 and ensure 
its measures conform to the laws' substantive limitations.  For 
example, the subject of an enforcement action could argue the 
measure at issue is either not reasonable or not necessary for 
preventing the spread of a contagious disease, as Wis. Stat. 
§ 252.03(2) requires. 
¶41 On top of those state-level procedural safeguards are 
several local controls.  First, the Health Board can exert its 
supervisory and policy-making control over the local health 
officer.  See Wis. Stat. § 251.04(1)-(3).  Second, elected 
officials in both the County and the City possess the power to 
remove 
the 
local 
health 
officer. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 17.10 & 17.12(c); see also Wis. Stat. § 17.13(1) (removal of 
village and town appointive officers).  The removal powers 
entrusted to local elected officials is a strong procedural 
Nos. 2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382 
 
26 
safeguard because such officials are often more knowledgeable 
about and responsive to local preferences.11  Local officials can 
act decisively if a local health officer acts contrary to the 
preferred public health policy of the constituency.  And third, 
the County's board and the City's common council control the 
Health 
Department's 
annual 
budget 
and 
thus 
may 
leverage 
appropriations to affect a local health officer's actions.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 251.11. 
¶42 In sum, the ascertainable purpose evident in both Wis. 
Stat. § 252.03 and Dane County Ordinance § 46.40's text and 
surrounding context, the history of substantively similar grants 
dating back to Wisconsin's first legislative code, and the 
substantial state and local procedural safeguards against 
arbitrary 
exercises 
of 
a 
local 
health 
officer's 
granted 
authority all lead us to conclude Wis. Stat. § 252.03 and Dane 
County Ordinance § 46.40 constitute constitutional grants of 
authority. 
*** 
¶43 Before concluding, we stress three critical points.  
First, our holding addresses only a public health officer's 
authority to issue public health orders; the validity of 
specific measures appearing in those orders is not before us.  
Second, nothing in this opinion should be read as departing from 
our existing precedent on separation-of-power principles.  It 
                                                 
11 See 
Lawrence 
Rosenthal, 
Romer 
v. 
Evans 
As 
the 
Transformation of Local Government Law, 31 Urb. Law. 257, 274-75 
(1999). 
Nos. 2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382 
 
27 
remains the law that courts must review "the nature of delegated 
power and the presence of adequate procedural safeguards, giving 
less emphasis to the former when the latter is present," Panzer, 
271 Wis. 2d 295, ¶55, and we break no new ground regarding the 
limitations on delegations to or within local governments. 
¶44 Finally, and most importantly, the dissent's resort to 
disparaging a public servant——who has no opportunity to defend 
herself——is a poor substitute for legal argument.  Such personal 
aspersions have no place in a judicial opinion.  While the 
direct and implied contentions that a local health official is a 
tyrant, an autocrat, a dictator, and a despot are fantastical, 
they do real damage to the public's perception of this court's 
work.  We must aspire to be better models of respectful dialogue 
to preserve the public's confidence on which this court's 
legitimacy relies. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶45 Wisconsin Stat. § 252.03 grants local health officers 
the authority to issue public health orders.  Dane County 
Ordinance § 46.40, which makes such orders enforceable by civil 
citations, is not preempted by state law.  And neither laws' 
grant of authority runs afoul of our constitution's separation 
of powers.  Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants.  Though this 
resolves 
all 
of 
Becker 
and 
Klein's 
claims, 
the 
Health 
Department's counterclaims against A Leap Above remain pending.  
Therefore, we remand back to the circuit court to resolve the 
remaining counterclaims. 
Nos. 2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382 
 
28 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed, 
and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
No.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.bh 
 
1 
 
¶46 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (concurring).  In response to the 
COVID-19 pandemic, some local health officers, including Dane 
County's Janel Heinrich, issued various orders to combat the 
spread of COVID-19.  The petitioners in this case do not 
challenge the legality of any specific order Heinrich issued.  
Such orders can be challenged on statutory or constitutional 
grounds; indeed, we previously concluded one order Heinrich 
issued 
was 
partially 
invalid 
for 
both 
statutory 
and 
constitutional reasons.1  Rather, this case presents a challenge 
to local health officers' ability to issue any orders——without 
care for any particular order's content or effect.  The 
arguments the petitioners bring apply equally to orders issued 
during the present pandemic, as well as to future health scares 
large and small.  So while litigants could raise challenges to 
specific orders issued during the COVID-19 pandemic, today's 
case does not. 
¶47 The 
majority/lead 
opinion 
aptly 
addresses 
the 
petitioners' statutory arguments.2  I write separately to discuss 
the petitioners' request that we revisit our precedents and 
revitalize a more robust, judicially-enforced nondelegation 
doctrine at both the state and local levels.  Rooted in our 
constitution's separation of powers, the basic idea behind the 
nondelegation doctrine is that the assignment of distinct powers 
into separate branches——legislative, executive, and judicial——
                                                 
1 See James v. Heinrich, 2021 WI 58, 397 Wis. 2d 517, 960 
N.W.2d 350. 
2 I join ¶¶1-28 and 44-45 of the majority/lead opinion. 
No.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.bh 
 
2 
 
means the branch of government assigned certain powers may not 
delegate its core powers to another.3  This case asks whether the 
legislature impermissibly delegated legislative power to local 
health officers across the state and whether the Board of 
Supervisors impermissibly delegated legislative power to Dane 
County's local health officer. 
¶48 Properly analyzing these claims requires a resort to 
first principles.  When interpreting the Wisconsin Constitution, 
our obligation is to discern the meaning of the words adopted by 
the people and faithfully apply them to the facts before us.4  
The constitution is a written document with terms that had 
specific meaning when adopted.  The Wisconsin Constitution 
"means what it says, not what federal cases say, and not what we 
might want it to say."5  Faithful constitutional interpretation 
requires that "we focus on the language of the adopted text" as 
that language was originally understood.6  Part of this analysis 
may require resort to "historical evidence including 'the 
practices at the time the constitution was adopted, debates over 
adoption 
of 
a 
given 
provision, 
and 
early 
legislative 
                                                 
3 Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Loc. 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶31-
35, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35. 
4 State v. Halverson, 2021 WI 7, ¶22, 395 Wis. 2d 385, 953 
N.W.2d 847; 
James, 
397 
Wis. 2d 517, 
¶61 
(Hagedorn, 
J., 
concurring). 
5 James, 397 Wis. 2d 517, ¶61 (Hagedorn, J., concurring). 
6 Halverson, 395 Wis. 2d 385, ¶22; see also James, 397 
Wis. 2d 517, ¶62 (Hagedorn, J., concurring). 
No.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.bh 
 
3 
 
interpretation as evidenced by the first laws passed following 
the adoption.'"7 
¶49 Unfortunately, however, the petitioners in this case 
do not offer this type of evidence or analysis.  Instead, they 
largely 
recite 
general 
theories 
of 
government 
power 
and 
selective quotes from federal and state cases.  Certainly 
Montesquieu and Madison inform the meaning of Wisconsin's 
constitution, but they cannot serve as substitutes for a 
faithful originalist analysis of our constitution's text and 
history.  They are helpful, but not sufficient.  Where we are 
asked to disavow nearly 100 years of precedent and institute 
something 
new, 
an 
honest 
examination 
of 
the 
original 
understanding of the Wisconsin Constitution is never more 
necessary. 
¶50 The constitutional claims raised by the petitioners do 
not succeed because the historical evidence weighs against the 
petitioners' arguments under the unique facts of this case.  
Alternative evidence of the original understanding may exist for 
this type of claim, but if it does, the petitioners have failed 
to present it.  I remain open to more broadly reconsidering our 
approach to the nondelegation doctrine in future cases.  But we 
should 
begin 
with 
a 
careful 
analysis 
of 
the 
original 
understanding of the Wisconsin Constitution.  As it does here, a 
text-and-history inquiry may resolve many nondelegation claims 
without resort to a judicially-designed implementing doctrine. 
                                                 
7 Halverson, 
395 
Wis. 2d 385, 
¶22 
(quoting 
Vos, 
393 
Wis. 2d 38, ¶28 n.10). 
No.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.bh 
 
4 
 
I.  LEGAL PRINCIPLES 
¶51 Before discussing the merits of the petitioners' 
nondelegation claims, we must first address the legal principles 
and methodology that guide our analysis of such challenges. 
¶52 Like the federal Constitution, our state constitution 
separates government power into three branches:  legislative, 
executive, and judicial.8  Then it "vests" discrete powers in 
each corresponding branch——legislative power, executive power, 
and judicial power.9  Although these powers overlap to a limited 
extent, they are in most respects separate and distinct from one 
another.10 
 
Accordingly, 
since 
the 
constitution 
says 
the 
legislature is vested with legislative power, the inference is 
that core legislative power may not be placed elsewhere, by the 
legislature or otherwise.11  The same goes for the other branches 
of government.  This principle is easy enough to understand in 
concept, but it is far more difficult to apply in practice. 
¶53 For nearly 100 years, this court has mostly taken a 
hands-off approach to claims of impermissible delegation of 
legislative 
power.12 
 
We 
have 
upheld 
laws 
that 
assign 
                                                 
8 Vos, 393 Wis. 2d 38, ¶31. 
9 Wis. Const. art. IV, § 1; id. art. V, § 1; id. art. VII, 
§ 2; see also Vos, 393 Wis. 2d 38, ¶31. 
10 Vos, 393 Wis. 2d 38, ¶¶32-34. 
11 In re Constitutionality of Section 251.18, Wis. Statutes, 
204 Wis. 501, 503, 236 N.W. 717 (1931). 
12 State ex rel. Wis. Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, 196 
Wis. 472, 504-06, 220 N.W. 929 (1928); Watchmaking Examining Bd. 
v. Husar, 49 Wis. 2d 526, 533-34, 182 N.W.2d 257 (1971); 
Westring v. James, 71 Wis. 2d 462, 468, 238 N.W.2d 695 (1976). 
No.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.bh 
 
5 
 
policymaking to executive bodies based primarily on whether the 
law contains sufficient procedural protections to curb abuses of 
delegated power.13  While not without some substantive limits, we 
have generally looked the other way if procedural protections 
"will 
adequately 
assure 
that 
discretionary 
power 
is 
not 
exercised unnecessarily or indiscriminately."14 
¶54 This has not always been our practice.15  Between 1896 
and 1927, we were more exacting regarding the substance of 
delegated authority.16  During that time, we said certain policy 
decisions could not be farmed out to the executive branch.  
Although agencies could be left to fill up rather technical 
details, the overall policy choices needed to come directly from 
                                                 
13 Panzer v. Doyle, 2004 WI 52, ¶55, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 680 
N.W.2d 666, abrogated on other grounds by Dairyland Greyhound 
Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408. 
14 Id. (noting that the nondelegation doctrine "is now 
primarily 
concerned 
with 
the 
presence 
of 
procedural 
safeguards"); id., ¶79 n.29 (but observing that "there may be 
certain powers that are so fundamentally 'legislative' that the 
legislature may never transfer those powers to another branch of 
government"). 
15 See generally Joseph A. Ranney, Trusting Nothing to 
Providence:  A History of Wisconsin's Legal System 377-88 (1999) 
(surveying the development of the nondelegation doctrine in 
Wisconsin). 
16 See Dowling v. Lancashire Ins. Co., 92 Wis. 63, 70-72, 65 
N.W.2d 738 (1896); State ex rel. Adams v. Burdge, 95 Wis. 390, 
401-04, 70 N.W. 347 (1897); see also Joseph A. Ranney, Wisconsin 
and the Shaping of American Law 82 (2017) (explaining that the 
court took a "new tack" in Dowling and Adams).  But see State ex 
rel. Baltzell v. Stewart, 74 Wis. 620, 631-32, 43 N.W. 947 
(1889) (upholding a statute that empowered a commission to 
create and define drainage districts in Dane County). 
No.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.bh 
 
6 
 
the legislature.17  We closed this chapter, however, and have 
since 
declined 
to 
fastidiously 
police 
the 
line 
between 
permissible legislative grants of power and impermissible 
delegations of legislative power.18 
¶55 The petitioners urge us to return to a more robust 
judicial enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine akin to our 
1896-1927 
decisions, 
asking 
that 
we 
articulate 
general 
principles to govern nondelegation challenges.  Specifically, 
relying on the separate writings of two United States Supreme 
Court justices proposing tests under the federal Constitution, 
                                                 
17 Burdge, 95 Wis. at 402 ("[T]here must first be some 
substantive provision of law to be administered and carried into 
effect.").  Even during this era, however, state agencies were 
permitted 
some 
hand 
in 
state 
government 
decision-making.  
Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm'n 
of Wis., 136 Wis. 146, 116 N.W. 905 (1908) (upholding a law that 
directed the Railroad Commission to set railroad rates); State 
ex rel. Buell v. Frear, 146 Wis. 291, 306, 131 N.W. 832 (1911) 
(upholding a civil service law on the grounds that it simply 
directed the agency to "ascertain the facts and to apply the 
rules 
of 
law 
thereto 
under 
the 
prescribed 
terms 
and 
conditions"); State v. Lange Canning Co., 164 Wis. 228, 241, 160 
N.W. 57 (1916) (upholding a labor law that directed the 
Industrial Commission to determine "what class or classes of 
employment are dangerous or prejudicial to the life, health, 
safety, or welfare of females" and regulate "the time which 
females may labor therein"). 
18 See Whitman, 196 Wis. at 505-06.  Yet, it has not been 
unfettered deference.  We have continued to strike down laws 
that delegate too much authority to executive officials.  E.g., 
Gibson Auto Co. v. Finnegan, 217 Wis. 401, 407, 259 N.W. 420 
(1935) (striking down a depression era recovery act that 
authorized the governor to establish fair competition codes, 
noting it was "difficult to conceive of a more complete 
abdication of legislative power than is involved in this act"); 
State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Dammann, 229 Wis. 570, 575-76, 283 
N.W. 52 (1938) (striking down a law that delegated to an 
emergency board the power to appropriate money). 
No.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.bh 
 
7 
 
they advance a two-question framework that asks (1) whether the 
delegated 
power 
involves 
"the 
formulation 
of 
generally 
applicable rules of private conduct,"19 and (2) whether the 
executive branch, rather than the legislature, is left to make 
policy judgments.20  The petitioners also urge us to maintain the 
current requirement for procedural safeguards. 
¶56 The major difficulty with the petitioners' plea is 
they make little effort to ground either their claims or their 
proposed 
framework 
in 
the 
original 
understanding 
of 
the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  Instead, they point to language in our 
1896-1927 cases and offer theories about nondelegation under the 
federal Constitution.  But an originalist analysis of the 
Wisconsin Constitution requires examining how the nondelegation 
doctrine was understood in 1848 when our constitution was 
ratified.21 
¶57 The petitioners' effort to compose a new, broadly 
applicable legal test misses the key point in the analysis.  We 
must begin with constitutional text and history, and measure any 
proposed test against that.  "A proper legal test must implement 
and effectuate" the original understanding of the law; that is, 
it "must be a faithful extension of the lines ascertainable in 
                                                 
19 See Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.R.s, 575 U.S. 43, 
70 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Gundy v. United 
States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2133 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
20 See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2136, 2141 (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting). 
21 James, 397 Wis. 2d 517, ¶62 (Hagedorn, J., concurring). 
No.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.bh 
 
8 
 
the provision's text and history."22  In that light, the 
questions proposed by petitioners are less helpful to this 
nascent inquiry into the how the separation of powers should be 
enforced by the judiciary today.  A better approach is first to 
examine the allegedly improper delegation based on what the text 
and history reveal.23 
II.  APPLICATION 
¶58 The petitioners in this case offer two distinct 
nondelegation claims.  First, they contend that Wis. Stat. 
§ 252.03 impermissibly delegates legislative power to local 
health officers.  Second, the petitioners assert that Dane 
County 
Ordinance 
§ 46.40(2) 
unlawfully 
transfers 
local 
                                                 
22 State v. Roundtree, 2021 WI 1, ¶116, 395 Wis. 2d 94, 952 
N.W.2d 765 (Hagedorn, J., dissenting). 
23 The United States Supreme Court recently endorsed a 
similar approach in two federal constitutional contexts.  The 
proper analytical framework for Second Amendment questions has 
lingered in lower courts for over a decade.  The Court has now 
answered that question, at least preliminarily.  It articulated 
a test that "requires courts to assess whether modern firearms 
regulations are consistent with the Second Amendment's text and 
historical understanding."  New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, 
Inc. v. Bruen,     S. Ct.    , 2022 WL 2251305, at *12 (2022).  
The Court explicitly rejected a generally applicable tiers of 
scrutiny framework.  Id. at *9.  Similarly, the Court recently 
instructed 
the 
"that 
the 
Establishment 
Clause 
must 
be 
interpreted 
by 
reference 
to 
historical 
practices 
and 
understandings." 
 
Kennedy 
v. 
Bremerton 
Sch. 
Dist.,     S. Ct.    , 2022 WL 2295034, at *3 (2022) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  These cases are instructive of the 
type of analysis that can inform the meaning of the Wisconsin 
Constitution as well. 
No.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.bh 
 
9 
 
legislative authority to Dane County's local health officer.  
Both claims fall short, though for different reasons. 
A.  Wisconsin Stat. § 252.03 
¶59 In the challenged statute, the legislature directs 
local health officers to "take all measures necessary to 
prevent, 
suppress 
and 
control 
communicable 
diseases" 
and 
instructs that they "may do what is reasonable and necessary for 
the prevention and suppression of disease," including forbidding 
public gatherings.24  The petitioners contend that in enacting 
this 
law, 
the 
legislature 
violated 
the 
constitution 
by 
impermissibly delegating legislative power to local health 
officers. 
¶60 This claim rests upon the constitutional vesting of 
legislative power "in a senate and assembly."25  While this 
textual grant informs our analysis, we must conduct a historical 
inquiry to determine how this was understood in practice, 
keeping our eye out for on-point historical analogues. 
¶61 We applied this approach recently in State ex rel. 
Kaul v. Prehn.26  There, we analyzed the available historical 
evidence to determine whether the original understanding of the 
Wisconsin Constitution conferred broad removal powers on the 
governor.27  Looking to the historical record, we rejected the 
                                                 
24 Wis. Stat. § 252.03(1) & (2). 
25 Wis. Const. art. IV, § 1. 
26 2022 WI 50, ¶42-51,     Wis. 2d    ,     N.W.2d    . 
27 Id. 
No.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.bh 
 
10 
 
attorney general's argument, rooted in political theory and 
federal law, that this sort of control over appointment and 
removal was a core executive power.28  Instead, our research 
revealed that the original understanding of the removal power in 
Wisconsin was different, and suggested that the legislature was 
understood to have more of these powers under Wisconsin's 
constitutional design.29  That form of analysis——looking to 
history 
to 
illuminate 
the 
understanding 
of 
imprecise 
constitutional text——is appropriate in this case as well. 
¶62 Our earliest statutes provide particularly important 
evidence of how the Wisconsin Constitution was originally 
understood.30  The Revised Statutes of 1849 were written and 
adopted by legislators who observed or participated in the 
constitutional convention first hand.31  Shortly after it 
convened, Wisconsin's first state legislature quickly created a 
commission to assist in drafting our first statutes.32  The 
commission's task was to compile and recommend an initial set of 
laws based upon territorial rules and practice, omitting those 
                                                 
28 Id., ¶¶43, 44-50. 
29 Id., ¶45. 
30 See Vos, 393 Wis. 2d 38, ¶64 ("Early enactments following 
the adoption of the constitution are appropriately given special 
weight."); see also NLRB v. Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 572 (2014) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("Of course, where a governmental 
practice has been open, widespread, and unchallenged since the 
early days of the Republic, the practice should guide our 
interpretation of an ambiguous constitutional provision."). 
31 See Ranney, supra n.17, at 76.   
32 Id. 
No.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.bh 
 
11 
 
that were obsolete, as well as those repugnant to the newly 
drafted constitution.33  The commission's recommendations were 
then debated and voted on by the legislature, ultimately 
creating the Revised Statutes of 1849.34 
¶63 These laws therefore have unique relevance to an 
analysis 
focused 
on 
the 
original 
understanding 
of 
the 
constitutional text.35  This is particularly true when we find 
laws on the books today that either descended from these early 
statutes or do similar things.  When the constitutionality of 
such a law is challenged, the historical context provided by 
those early laws must weigh heavily in the analysis.  Does this 
mean these 1849 laws represent the final word on a statute's 
constitutionality?  No.  But unquestionably, they provide very 
strong evidence of the constitution's original understanding.36 
                                                 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 76-77. 
35 State v. Beno, 116 Wis. 2d 122, 138, 341 N.W.2d 668 
(1984) ("[B]ecause the Revised Statutes of 1849 are the first of 
our statutes to be enacted following the constitution, it is 
reasonable to rely on those statutes as reflecting the practice 
when the constitution was adopted to assist our interpretation 
of a word used by the authors of the constitution in 1848." 
(quoting another source)). 
36 We have long employed this interpretive technique in 
constitution interpretation.  See State ex rel. Pluntz v. 
Johnson, 176 Wis. 107, 114-15, 186 N.W. 729 (1922) (noting that 
a statute "first appeared in the . . . Revised Statutes of 1849" 
and concluding that it "amounts to contemporaneous legislative 
construction 
of 
this 
constitutional 
provision, 
which 
construction is entitled to great deference"); Payne v. City of 
Racine, 217 Wis. 550, 558, 259 N.W. 437 (1935) (same); Buse v. 
Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 572, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976) (noting the 
persuasive force of "the contemporaneous construction evidenced" 
a provision of the "Revised statutes of 1849"). 
No.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.bh 
 
12 
 
¶64 One such 1849 statute is especially on-point in this 
case.  Chapter 26 in the Revised Statutes of 1849 was entitled 
"Of the Preservation of the Public Health."37  That statute is 
significant for our purposes because it established local boards 
of health and gave them duties and responsibilities quite 
similar to the statutes challenged in this case.38  In relevant 
part, the statute provided:  "Every board of health may take 
such measures, and make such rules and regulations, as they may 
deem most effectual for the preservation of the public health."39  
It then provided that "every person who shall violate any order 
or regulation, made by any board of health . . . shall be deemed 
guilty of a misdemeanor, and punished by a fine not exceeding 
one hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail not 
exceeding three months."40  In other words, not only did 
Wisconsin's first state government authorize local health 
authorities to issue orders, it criminalized the failure to 
follow those orders. 
¶65 These 1849 statutes offer significant evidence of 
original understanding in this case.  When the Wisconsin 
Constitution 
was 
ratified, 
those 
participating 
in 
state 
government did not appear to understand the constitution to 
forbid giving local officials charged with protecting public 
                                                 
37 Wis. Stat. ch. 26 (1849). 
38 Id. 
39 Wis. Stat. ch. 26, § 2 (1849). 
40 Wis. Stat. ch. 26, § 3 (1849). 
No.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.bh 
 
13 
 
health the authority to issue at least some orders of 
indeterminate 
character. 
 
Nor 
was 
it 
understood 
to 
be 
problematic if those orders were enforceable.  That same general 
statutory authority has been amended and modified many times, 
but it continues in today's Wis. Stat. § 252.03.41  If this 
arrangement on its face did not run afoul of the constitutional 
separation of powers in 1849, it is hard to see why it would 
today.  Whatever theoretical nondelegation framework may be 
found in the Wisconsin Constitution, this kind of empowerment of 
local health officials does not appear to violate it. 
¶66 I stress that this conclusion does not mean that 
orders 
issued 
by 
local 
health 
officers 
are 
immune 
from 
challenge.  In State ex rel. Adams v. Burdge, for example, 
following a challenge by an affected parent, this court struck 
down a rule adopted by the state board of health mandating 
smallpox vaccines as a condition of attending school.42  The 
court found this to be in conflict with the law mandating school 
attendance, and explained that permitting the state board of 
health to adopt this type of rule would be an impermissible 
delegation of legislative power.43  The court further concluded 
the rule would be "void as unreasonable and unnecessary," 
                                                 
41 See Wis. Stat. ch. 26, §§ 2, 3 (1849); Wis. Stat. ch. 32 
§§ 2, 3 (1858); Wis. Stat. ch. 57, §§ 1412, 1413 (1878); Wis. 
Stat. ch. 76e § 1412 (1921); Wis. Stat. § 143.03 (1923-24); Wis. 
Stat. § 252.03 (1993-94). 
42 95 Wis. 390; see also James, 397 Wis. 2d 517. 
43 Burdge, 95 Wis. at 399-404. 
No.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.bh 
 
14 
 
calling it "a sweeping and far–reaching exercise of the power."44  
But Burdge itself affirmed that the legislature could authorize 
health officials to issue orders in some circumstances: 
It cannot be doubted but that, under appropriate 
general 
provisions 
of 
law 
in 
relation 
to 
the 
prevention and suppression of dangerous and contagious 
diseases, 
authority 
may 
be 
conferred 
by 
the 
legislature upon the state board of health or local 
boards to make reasonable rules and regulations for 
carrying into effect such general provisions, which 
will be valid, and may be enforced accordingly.[45] 
Unlike in Burdge, the question in this case is not whether a 
particular order was out of bounds, but whether the statute may 
authorize public health orders at all.  Justice Pinney's opinion 
in Burdge supports the conclusion that the authority to issue 
local health orders may be conferred by the legislature on local 
health officials, but specific orders may be challenged on 
constitutional grounds or on the basis that they are not 
reasonable and necessary, among other claims.46 
¶67 Perhaps historical evidence specific to the Wisconsin 
Constitution weighs the other way, but it has not been presented 
to us nor has my research uncovered it.  My conclusion is based 
                                                 
44 Id. at 405. 
45 Id. at 401. 
46 The 
dissent 
misses 
this 
point 
in 
our 
cases 
and 
misunderstands the claim before us.  It spends considerable time 
criticizing the fines levied against A Leap Above Dance, LLC; 
the decision to classify a dance class as a high risk sport; the 
multiple orders it describes as "oppressive"; and the banning of 
gatherings in private homes before Thanksgiving.  But again, 
whether 
those 
particular 
choices 
were 
unlawful 
or 
unconstitutional is not before this court; the petitioners 
challenged only whether any orders can be issued at all. 
No.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.bh 
 
15 
 
on the historical evidence available to me and the unique claims 
before us.47  And because this claim can be resolved on the basis 
of this historical evidence, it is unnecessary at this time to 
adopt a new nondelegation framework to analyze future claims. 
B.  Dane County Ordinance § 46.40(2) 
¶68 The 
petitioners' 
second 
nondelegation 
claim 
is 
different.  They contend Dane County Ordinance § 46.40(2) 
unlawfully delegates local legislative power vested in the 
county board to the local health officer.  The challenged 
ordinance provides:  "It shall be a violation of this chapter to 
refuse to obey an Order of the Director of Public Health Madison 
and Dane County entered to prevent, suppress or control 
communicable disease pursuant to Wis. Stat. [§] 252.03."48  The 
penalty for noncompliance is a forfeiture "not less than $50 nor 
more than $200 for each day that a violation exists."49  Refusal 
to pay the forfeiture, when one has the ability to pay, may 
result in confinement not to exceed 30 days.50 
¶69 The dissent contains a thorough overview of the cases 
interpreting 
Article 
IV, 
Section 
22 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, on which the petitioners' claim is based.  But we 
                                                 
47 Prehn,     Wis. 2d    , ¶44 (explaining that it falls to 
the parties to "construct a historical record in support of" 
their constitutional claims). 
48 Dane County Ordinance § 46.40(2). 
49 Dane County Ordinance § 46.27(1). 
50 Dane County Ordinance § 46.27(3). 
No.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.bh 
 
16 
 
need not analyze that provision because Dane County Ordinance 
§ 46.40(2) does not even trigger it.  The ordinance is limited.  
It penalizes those who refuse to obey an order issued "pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. [§] 252.03."  The authority to issue an order 
punishable under this ordinance is therefore confined to the 
powers conferred by § 252.03.  The ordinance on its face simply 
does not give the county's legislative power to the local health 
officer; it does not independently authorize local health 
officers to issue orders at all.  The legislature——not the 
county board——granted that power to local health officers in 
§ 252.03, which is all the ordinance appeals to.  The ordinance 
makes it a violation subject to penalty to disobey a lawful 
order authorized by § 252.03.51  Just as the legislature can, and 
does, penalize the violation of lawful public health orders,52 I 
see no reason why a duly enacted county ordinance making it a 
violation to disobey lawful local public health orders would be 
considered an impermissible delegation of power. 
¶70 The petitioners offer no meaningful counterargument 
for this understanding of what the ordinance does, asserting 
only that if the power to issue orders comes from Wis. Stat. 
§ 252.03 
rather 
than 
the 
ordinance, 
"it 
just 
means 
the 
nondelegation problem lies in § 252.03."  But as we have 
explained, § 252.03 does authorize local health officers to 
issue orders, and it does not violate the nondelegation 
doctrine.  Nothing in the text of Dane County Ordinance 
                                                 
51 See also Wis. Stat. § 66.0113. 
52 See Wis. Stat. § 252.25. 
No.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.bh 
 
17 
 
§ 46.40(2) suggests it separately authorizes local health 
orders.  Without that, there is no plausible delegation of 
legislative power to evaluate. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶71 The petitioners bring us two nondelegation claims 
supported by a proposal for how we should analyze nondelegation 
questions 
going 
forward. 
 
I 
do 
not 
endorse 
a 
broader 
nondelegation framework at this time because doing so is 
unnecessary to resolve the claims before us.  Based on the 
historical 
record, 
I 
conclude 
the 
legislature 
did 
not 
impermissibly 
delegate 
legislative 
power 
to 
local 
health 
officers by authorizing them to issue orders under Wis. Stat. 
§ 252.03.  I also conclude the petitioners' claim that Dane 
County 
Ordinance 
§ 46.40(2) 
violates 
local 
nondelegation 
principles fails because the ordinance does not delegate, or 
redelegate as the dissent frames it, legislative power at all. 
¶72 I close with a word to litigants.  Regardless of 
judicial philosophy, every member of this court is interested in 
what the text says and what the historical evidence reveals 
about the text.53  Therefore, parties who come to us advancing 
legal theories grounded in the Wisconsin Constitution should 
make every effort to present arguments focused on the original 
understanding of our constitution.54  While such briefing is 
                                                 
53 See majority/lead op., ¶¶38-39 (relying on historical 
evidence from Wisconsin's founding era). 
54 See Halverson, 395 Wis. 2d 385, ¶¶22, 24. 
No.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.bh 
 
18 
 
always welcome, arguments of this type are especially helpful 
when analyzing novel claims or considering challenges to our 
precedent.  This is not a new invitation; it is made in 
earnest.55 
                                                 
55 James, 397 Wis. 2d 517, ¶62 (Hagedorn, J., concurring). 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶73 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).   
"'Law is the ultimate science,'" Paul quoted.  "Thus 
it reads above the Emperor's door.  I propose to show 
him law."   
Frank Herbert, Dune 284 (Penguin Books 2016) (1965).   
¶74 Our republic and our state were founded on the 
fundamental idea that the people possess inherent rights, they 
form governments for the primary purpose of protecting those 
rights, and governments may exercise only those powers the 
people consent to give them.1  Under our state constitution, the 
people of Wisconsin authorized particular elected officials to 
exercise power over them.  But the people never consented to 
that power being given away.  
¶75 This case involves the power to make the rules by 
which the people will be bound, a power the people have 
entrusted 
to 
state 
and 
local 
legislatures 
alone. 
 
Not 
surprisingly, when the people consented to submitting to the 
rules that will govern society, they carefully confined the 
exercise of such awesome power to those whom they elect.  Should 
others attempt to rule over the people, their actions are beyond 
the law, even if they bear the imprimatur of a legislative body.  
Legislators have no power to anoint legislators; only the people 
do. 
                                                 
1 Echoing the Declaration of Independence, the people of 
Wisconsin enshrined these first principles in the first section 
of the first article of our state constitution:  "All people are 
born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent 
rights; among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness; to secure these rights, governments are instituted, 
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."  
Wis. Const. art. I, § 1. 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
2 
 
The legislative cannot transfer the power of making 
laws to any other hands:  for it being but a delegated 
power from the people, they who have it cannot pass it 
over to others. . . .  And when the people have said, 
We will submit to rules, and be governed by laws made 
by such men, and in such forms, no body else can say 
other men shall make laws for them; nor can the people 
be bound by any laws, but such as are enacted by those 
whom they have chosen, and authorized to make laws for 
them.  The power of the legislative, being derived 
from the people by a positive voluntary grant and 
institution, can be no other than what that positive 
grant conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not 
to make legislators, the legislative can have no power 
to transfer their authority of making laws, and place 
it in other hands. 
. . . . 
The legislative neither must nor can transfer the 
power of making laws to any body else, or place it any 
where, but where the people have. 
John Locke, Second Treatise of Government §§ 141–42 (C.B. 
McPherson ed. 1980) (1690).   
¶76 The 
majority 
misunderstands 
first 
principles 
and 
ignores the plaintiffs' principal and most persuasive argument.  
In Article IV, Section 22 of the Wisconsin Constitution, a 
section the majority/lead opinion2 and the concurrence both cite 
but once in passing references,3 the people of Wisconsin 
                                                 
2 Wis. 
Sup. 
Ct. 
IOP 
III.G.5 
("If . . . the 
opinion 
originally circulated as the majority opinion does not garner 
the vote of a majority of the court, it shall be referred to in 
separate writings as the 'lead opinion[.]'"). 
3 The plaintiffs' main brief cites Article IV, Section 22 of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
so 
many 
times, 
the 
table 
of 
authorities does not provide specific page numbers for each 
instance in which it is cited, instead using the phrase, 
"passim."  The majority/lead opinion instead focuses on Article 
IV, Section 1 (which vests all legislative power in the senate 
and assembly).  The plaintiffs' main brief cites that clause on 
a single page.  Justice Brian Hagedorn complains the petitioners 
do not analyze the original meaning of this provision but he 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
3 
 
authorized the state legislature to delegate certain powers to 
county boards.  That section states, "[t]he legislature may 
confer upon the boards of supervisors of the several counties of 
the state such powers of a local, legislative and administrative 
character as they shall from time to time prescribe."  Wis. 
Const. art. IV, § 22.  The original public meaning of this text, 
as confirmed by the historical record, reflects the founders' 
recognition of the non-delegation principle, on which the 
constitutional framers' vesting of separate powers in each 
branch was based.  Because the people decide who may create the 
laws that will bind them, those to whom power has been delegated 
may not give it away.  The people adopted an exception 
permitting the legislature to delegate lawmaking power to county 
boards (the members of which are elected), but those local 
governmental entities may not give the power to anyone else.  
See infra Part II.   
¶77 This court has long held the Wisconsin Constitution 
does not permit county boards of supervisors to subdelegate 
lawmaking power.  Although Article IV, Section 22 authorizes the 
initial delegation from the legislature to the county boards, 
the 
constitution 
does 
not 
authorize 
any 
subdelegation.  
Accordingly, this court has declared unconstitutional a statute 
enacted by the legislature authorizing "a county board to 
delegate to the electors of the county a power by the 
Constitution expressly delegated to the county board itself."  
                                                                                                                                                             
fails to undertake the analysis at all.  Discerning original 
meaning requires hard work but is an essential element of our 
job as justices. 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
4 
 
See Marshall v. Dane Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 236 Wis. 57, 59, 
294 N.W. 496 (1940).  The constitution does not give the Dane 
County Board of Supervisors any authority to empower a single, 
unelected bureaucrat to restrict the liberty of the people of 
Dane County.4   
 
¶78 Dane County Ordinance § 46.40 (Dec. 2020) violates the 
Wisconsin Constitution because it transfers lawmaking power 
delegated to the Dane County Board of Supervisors.  Enforcing 
the non-delegation principle is vital to the maintenance of free 
government but the majority eviscerates it.  Violating its oath 
to uphold the Wisconsin Constitution, the majority disturbs the 
people's constitutional choices of who may exercise power over 
them, eroding the people's fundamental freedoms.  I dissent. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Dane County Ordinance § 46.40 
¶79 The outbreak of COVID-19 spawned an unprecedented 
exercise of extraordinary power over the people by many 
governmental entities.  See generally Samuel Alito, United 
States Supreme Court Justice, Address at the Federalist Society 
National Convention (Nov. 12, 2020) ("The pandemic has resulted 
in 
previously 
unimaginable 
restrictions 
on 
individual 
liberty.").  This case concerns the actions of one particular 
official, Janel Heinrich, the Public Health Officer and Director 
of Public Health of Madison and Dane County ("PHMDC"). 
                                                 
4 As explained in Part II, a county board of supervisors can 
pass an ordinance that takes effect only if it is approved by a 
vote of the people; however, it cannot make referendum votes to 
pass ordinances by direct democracy binding on itself. 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
5 
 
¶80 For nearly two years, Heinrich has been creating law, 
interpreting it, and then enforcing it against the people of 
Dane County.  In late May 2020, the Dane County Board of 
Supervisors passed Dane County Ordinance § 46.40, purportedly 
granting Heinrich unilateral rulemaking authority effectively 
identical (although on a smaller geographical scale) to the very 
powers this court held only weeks earlier could not be lawfully 
exercised by a state official.  See generally Wis. Legislature 
v. Palm, 2020 WI 42, 391 Wis. 2d 497, 942 N.W.2d 900; Wis. Cnty. 
Ass'n, 
Guidance 
in 
Implementing 
Regulations 
Surrounding 
Communicable Diseases 37 (2020) ("Even though the decision 
applied only to [the Department of Health Services ('DHS')], the 
Palm Court's reasoning suggests that legislative body oversight 
may be a prerequisite to an unelected official's (e.g., a local 
health officer) authority to enforce a public health order 
applicable to the public at large without raising significant 
constitutional concerns surrounding separation of powers.").   
¶81 Dane County Ordinance § 46.40 provides, in relevant 
part: 
(1) 
Duty of Director, Public Health Madison and Dane 
County.  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. ss. 252.03(1) & (2) 
the Director of Public Health Madison and Dane 
County shall promptly take all measures necessary 
to prevent, suppress and control communicable 
diseases within Dane County, including forbidding 
public gatherings when deemed necessary to control 
outbreaks or epidemics. 
(2) 
Public Health Orders.  It shall be a violation of 
this chapter to refuse to obey an Order of the 
Director of Public Health Madison and Dane County 
entered 
to 
prevent, 
suppress 
or 
control 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
6 
 
communicable 
diseases 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
s. 252.03. 
§ 46.40(1)–(2).  A violation of an "order" issued pursuant to 
this ordinance exposes a person to a civil forfeiture of $50 to 
$200 for each day the violation exists.  Dane County Ordinance 
§ 46.27(1).  If a person does not pay, the person can be jailed.  
§ 46.27(3) ("Any person who has the ability to pay any 
forfeiture against him or her under this chapter but who refuses 
to do so may be confined in the county jail until such 
forfeiture is paid, but in no event to exceed thirty (30) 
days."). 
 
¶82 The ordinance creates an enforcement mechanism non-
existent in Wisconsin statutes.  For context, Wis. Stat. 
§ 252.25 (2019–20)5 states: 
Any person who willfully violates or obstructs the 
execution of any state statute or rule, county, city 
or village ordinance or [DHS] order under this chapter 
and relating to the public health, for which no other 
penalty is prescribed, shall be imprisoned for not 
more than 30 days or fined not more than $500 or both. 
While § 252.25 declares a violation of a DHS order punishable by 
jail and a fine, it does not provide a penalty or other 
enforcement mechanism for "orders" issued by local health 
officers.  See Wis. Cnty. Ass'n, Guidance in Implementing 
Regulations, at 32 ("Neither the statutes nor the administrative 
code provide for a detailed enforcement mechanism of a local 
health officer's general order.  It is important to understand 
that a local health officer's order, standing alone, may not be 
                                                 
5 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019–20 version unless otherwise indicated. 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
7 
 
'enforced' – make a violator subject to civil forfeiture – 
absent a local ordinance allowing for such enforcement.").  Dane 
County's prayer for relief effectively concedes this point, 
citing Dane County Ordinance § 46.27(1)——not any statute——as a 
justification for the fine. 
 
¶83 The question in this case is not whether any statute 
has 
delegated 
lawmaking 
power 
to 
Heinrich 
(lawfully 
or 
otherwise) but whether the county ordinance has lawfully 
delegated this power to her.  See Dane County Ordinance 
§ 46.40(2) ("It shall be a violation of this chapter . . . .").  
Because the county board empowered Heinrich to define what 
constitutes a violation of the ordinance, and only a violation 
of the ordinance can trigger a penalty, the issue in this case 
does not rest on any statute purporting to directly grant her 
authority.  To the extent the majority suggests otherwise, it 
misdirects the analysis. 
B.  Heinrich's Tyranny 
¶84 Heinrich has exercised dictatorial powers for nearly 
two years, in contrast with her peers in other counties.6  In 
this very case, Dane County fully admits Heinrich issued an 
                                                 
6 Dane County's COVID-19 response is atypical.  According to 
the complaint, "[o]nly three counties that plaintiffs are aware 
of (Dane, Door, and Pierce) have adopted ordinances preemptively 
making any order of the local health officer enforceable without 
limits or oversight by the county board."  Additionally, "only 
Dane County's local health officer has issued orders in reliance 
on such an ordinance, that Plaintiffs are aware of."  The 
majority insinuates the mandates imposed by Heinrich's orders 
were necessary, but the COVID-19 response by the remaining 71 
counties in the state belies the majority's misperception of 
reality.  See Majority/lead op., ¶4. 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
8 
 
"emergency order."  PHMDC then posted "guidance" on its website 
explaining how Heinrich defined certain key terms in that order.  
PHMDC later filed an enforcement action against A Leap Above 
Dance, LLC ("Dance Studio") seeking nearly $24,000 in fines.7 
¶85 According to Dane County, around Christmas 2020 
(nearly a year after the outbreak of COVID-19), the Dance Studio 
held a performance of the Nutcracker ballet.  Dane County 
mislabeled this performance a "high risk sport" as defined on 
its webpage——not in Heinrich's order.8  For the apparent purpose 
of maximizing penalties, it declared that each of the eight 
segments of the ballet constituted a different event.  The Dance 
Studio pointed out that the order's terms permitted "unregulated 
youth programs," an undefined phrase in the order.  In its 
Orwellian doublethink,9 Dane County absurdly says ballet is a 
sport and not a youth program.   
¶86 After the Dance Studio joined this lawsuit, PHMDC 
dismissed the enforcement action and filed two counterclaims in 
                                                 
7 Although Dane County uses the term civil forfeiture, a 
$24,000 penalty could cripple a small business. 
8 Shockingly, Dane County's second counterclaim begins, 
"[g]roup dance was classified as a COVID-19 high risk sport in 
Sports Guidance issued by the PHMDC[.]" 
9 "To know and not to know, to be conscious of complete 
truthfulness while telling carefully constructed lies, to hold 
simultaneously two opinions which cancelled out, knowing them to 
be contradictory and believing in both of them, to use logic 
against logic, to repudiate morality while laying claim to it, 
to believe that democracy was impossible and that the Party was 
the guardian of democracy . . . .  Even to understand the word 
'doublethink' involved the use of doublethink."  George Orwell, 
Nineteen Eight-Four 36 (Plume | Harcourt Brace Book 2003) 
(1949). 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
9 
 
this case.  Although Dane County now seeks less than $24,000, it 
still alleges sixteen separate violations——eight for each 
counterclaim——for a single ballet performance.  Specifically, 
Dane County asserts the Dance Studio committed eight separate 
violations of the "mass gathering" prohibition declared in 
Heinrich's emergency order.  In a second counterclaim, Dane 
County 
asserts 
eight 
separate 
violations 
of 
a 
"physical 
distancing" mandate declared in an amendment to the order. 
¶87 At oral argument, plaintiffs' counsel claimed Heinrich 
had issued twenty-three different emergency orders.  I take 
judicial notice that PHMDC's website confirms the accuracy of 
this statement.10  For the better part of two years, the people 
of Dane County have been subjected to a constantly shifting 
regulatory regime, rendering compliance illusory and objections 
futile.  As even the majority acknowledges, Heinrich's orders 
have "requir[ed] face coverings, limit[ed] or forbid[den] 
gatherings, require[ed] sanitation protocols for particular 
facilities, limit[ed] or forbid[den] certain sport activities, 
limit[ed] businesses' allowable indoor capacity, and requir[ed] 
physical distancing between individuals."11  In abstract terms, 
these measures may not seem particularly burdensome; in reality 
they were oppressive.  As but one representative example, 
Heinrich 
banned 
small 
gatherings 
in 
private 
homes 
over 
                                                 
10 Current Orders, PHMDC (last visited June 2, 2022), 
https://publichealthmdc.com/coronavirus/current-order. 
11 Majority/lead op., ¶4. 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
10 
 
Thanksgiving, giving a mere week's notice of this diktat.12  She 
threatened $1000 fines for violations. 
¶88 Rather than respond to any of the legal analysis in 
this dissent, the majority instead castigates its author for 
characterizing 
Heinrich's 
actions 
in 
terms 
of 
tyranny, 
autocracy, dictatorship, and despotism.  There are no more 
fitting words to describe the arrogation of power Heinrich 
wields.  James Madison forewarned that "[t]he accumulation of 
all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same 
hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, 
self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very 
definition of tyranny."  The Federalist No. 47, at 373–74 (James 
Madison) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1882) (emphasis added).   
¶89 Because his legal analysis of the non-delegation 
doctrine collapses under the weight of founding principles and 
more than 100 years of Wisconsin precedent applying them, 
Justice Brian Hagedorn attempts to marginalize this opinion as 
                                                 
12 Demonstrating that judicial review is an inadequate 
procedural safeguard, this court denied an original action 
challenging this particular order brought by two of the 
plaintiffs in the present case, over the strong dissent of three 
justices. 
 
Gymfinity 
v. 
Dane 
County, 
No. 2020AP1927-OA, 
unpublished order, at 3 (Wis. Dec. 21, 2020) (Roggensack, C.J., 
dissenting) ("While this court has recently received a barrage 
of petitions to commence original actions, when it is presented 
to us that fundamental personal liberty is suppressed by an 
unelected official, we must act.  Waiting until the matter 
proceeds through a circuit court and the court of appeals will 
be justice denied.").  The petition was filed on November 23, 
2020——this court did not act until December 21 of that year, by 
which time, the Thanksgiving turkey was definitely cold.  The 
plaintiffs inform us they waited four months for a temporary 
injunction decision from the circuit court. 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
11 
 
"miss[ing] 
th[e] 
point" 
by 
spending 
"considerable 
time" 
"criticizing" 
Heinrich's 
"choices."13 
 
It 
is, 
of 
course, 
customary for any judicial opinion to relay the facts of the 
case; this 55-page opinion spends four paragraphs reciting them 
while the remaining 72 paragraphs expound the law.  Justice 
Hagedorn simultaneously suggests the facts are irrelevant to the 
legal issues before us while rejecting "the petitioners' 
arguments under the unique facts of this case."14  The facts 
illustrate the raison d'être for the non-delegation principle:  
protecting the people from governmental encroachments on their 
liberty.  Like the Wizard of Oz, Justice Hagedorn says, "[p]ay 
no attention to that man behind the curtain!"  The Wizard of Oz 
(1939).  But the public has a "right to know" the truth.  See 
Hawkins 
v. 
Wis. 
Elections 
Comm'n, 
2020 
WI 75, 
¶14, 
393 
Wis. 2d 629, 948 N.W.2d 877 (Roggensack, C.J., dissenting). 
¶90 A "public servant" who exceeded her lawful authority 
has no ground to argue she was "merely doing her job[.]"15  As a 
government official, Heinrich has an obligation to perform her 
duties within constitutional confines even if a majority of this 
court is not willing to enforce those boundaries.  History is 
replete with examples of abuses by public officials who 
rationalized their actions as "just doing their jobs."   
                                                 
13 Concurrence, ¶66 n.46. 
14 Id., ¶50 (emphasis added). 
15 Teigen v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2022 WI __, ¶247 n.17, 
__ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __ (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., dissenting). 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
12 
 
¶91 Heinrich is a powerful government official, not a 
powerless victim who has been dragged to court, as the majority 
insinuates.  Heinrich is a named party in this case——she has had 
every "opportunity to defend herself"16 (and to prosecute her own 
counterclaims, for that matter).  In contrast, defending 
government overreach is difficult, as evidenced by the majority 
glossing over the facts of this case and refusing to apply 
governing law.   
¶92 Instead of defending liberty, the majority tries to 
conceal tyranny with benevolent motives.  "[T]he greatest 
threats to our system of constitutional liberties may arise when 
the ends are laudable, and the intent is good——especially in an 
emergency."  County of Butler v. Wolf, 486 F. Supp. 883, 890 
(W.D. Penn. 2020).  However well-intentioned, a government 
official who employs her powers to prohibit families from 
enjoying Thanksgiving dinner together and who threatens hefty 
financial sanctions for noncompliance has become the people's 
master rather than their servant.  "Thomas  Jefferson advised 
against being 'deluded by the integrity of' governmental actors' 
'purposes' and cautioned against 'conclud[ing] that these 
unlimited powers will never be abused' merely because current 
office holders 'are not  disposed to abuse them.'"  Palm, 391 
Wis. 2d 497, ¶82 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring) 
(quoting Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia.  
Edited by William Peden.  Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and 
                                                 
16 Majority/lead op., ¶44. 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
13 
 
Culture, 
Williamsburg, 
Virginia, 
1954. 
 
The 
Founders' 
Constitution, Volume 1, Chapter 10, Document 9, http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch10s9.html. 
 
The 
University of Chicago Press) (modification in the original).  
"Jefferson 
forewarned 
that 
'[t]he 
time 
to 
guard 
against 
corruption and tyranny, is before they shall have gotten hold on 
us.  It is better to keep the wolf out of the fold, than to 
trust to drawing his teeth and talons after he shall have 
entered.'"  Id. (quoting Jefferson, Notes on the State of 
Virginia).  The majority stands by while unlimited powers are 
abused, and does nothing to guard against the tyranny that has 
already gotten hold of the people of Dane County. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  The Non-Delegation Principle 
¶93 Evidence of the non-delegation principle underlying 
the separation of powers in the Wisconsin Constitution has been 
well-documented by Wisconsin's seminal source for originalist 
constitutional interpretation:  
In the formation of a state constitution it would be 
well to keep in view the principles upon which 
republican governments profess to be established.  All 
legitimate power proceeds from the people.  This could 
not be denied, even among men who wished to frame a 
monarchy. . . .  [W]e sometimes find men, nominally 
liberal, practical tyrants.  The governed should 
beware of transferring too much authority into the 
hands of rulers; for, forgetting that they are 
servants, they too often become masters of the people.  
Individuals are more ambitious and more tenacious of 
power than the mass, and all history has proved that 
in times of peace and quiet the former are apt to make 
inroads and aggressions upon the latter. . . .  Under 
the head of implied and constructive powers, tyranny 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
14 
 
may find a plausible pretext to stamp his foot, rough-
shod, upon the neck of the American eagle. 
A Convention Editorial (1846), reprinted in The Movement for 
Statehood, 1845–46, at 309, 310–11 (Milo M. Quaife ed., Wis. 
Hist. Soc'y 1918). 
 
¶94 The people of Wisconsin are the ultimate sovereign.  
Id. at 312 ("The persons that constitute the nation are the 
source of all delegated power."); Taxation——Borrowing Money 
(1846), reprinted in The Movement for Statehood, 1845–46, at 
177, 179 ("There is no sovereign and independent power except in 
the people.").  "All people are born equally free and 
independent, and have certain inherent rights; among these are 
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; to secure these 
rights, governments are instituted, deriving their just powers 
from the consent of the governed."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 1.  
"Under the Wisconsin Constitution, government officials, whether 
elected or appointed, are servants of the citizens, not their 
masters."  Palm, 391 Wis. 2d 497, ¶68. 
 
¶95 The people have delegated to state government, subject 
to limits specified in the state constitution, powers they would 
otherwise inherently retain.  In a sense, each branch of 
government is an "agent" of the people, capable of legitimately 
exercising only those powers the people have delegated to them.  
Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? 377 (2014); 
see also Taxation——Borrowing Money, at 179 ("The members of the 
legislature are the agents of the people.  They act for the 
people 
by 
power 
of 
attorney."). 
 
Embodying 
this 
agency 
relationship, the constitution commands that "'[a]ll laws' 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
15 
 
enacted pursuant to the Wisconsin Constitution begin with the 
phrase, '[t]he people of the state of Wisconsin, represented in 
the senate and assembly, do enact as follows.'"  In re Amending 
Wis. Stat. §§ 48.299 & 938.299 Regulating the Use of Restraints 
on Child. in Juv. Ct. (Juv. Ct.), 2022 WI 26, ¶55 n.11, __ 
Wis. 2d __, 
__ 
N.W.2d __ 
(Rebecca 
Grassl 
Bradley, 
J., 
dissenting) (quoting Wis. Const. art. IV, § 17(1)).  As our 
state's founders understood, "'[l]aw is an expression of the 
legislative will'——that is, an embodiment of the people's 
wishes, expressed by delegated authority."  Legal Absurdities——
Pleadings (1846), reprinted in The Movement for Statehood, 1845–
46, at 467, 470 (quoting the Livingston Code). 
 
¶96 Under the common law of agency, "the agent ordinarily 
cannot subdelegate the power to a sub-agent, as this runs 
counter to the apparent intent of the principal."  Koschkee v. 
Taylor, 2019 WI 76, ¶54 n.5, 387 Wis. 2d 552, 929 N.W.2d 600 
(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring) (quoting Hamburger, Is 
Administrative Law Unlawful?, at 380); see also Lang v. Lions 
Club of Cudahy Wis., Inc., 2020 WI 25, ¶40, 390 Wis. 2d 627, 939 
N.W.2d 582 (lead op.) ("An agent may appoint a subagent only if 
the agent has actual or apparent authority to do so."  (quoting 
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.15(2))).  "In individual 
circumstances, this is a matter of personal freedom; in 
politics, it is a foundation of constitutional liberty."  
Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful?, at 380.  Delegata 
potestas non potest delegari:  no delegated powers can be 
further delegated.  The non-delegation principle ensures only 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
16 
 
the entity the people chose to entrust with power may exercise 
it, subject to limitations specified by the people.  
 
¶97 The non-delegation principle traces its origins to 
English law.  See Jarkesy v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 34 F.4th 446, 
460 n.12 (5th Cir. 2022) ("Principles of non-delegation had even 
taken hold in England before the American Founding."  (citing 
Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful?, at 381)).  Even the 
king of England, following the rise of popular sovereignty, was 
not permitted to transfer certain powers vested in him by 
Parliament.  Sir Edward Coke explained:  
That the prosecution and execution of any penal 
statute cannot be granted to any, for that the act 
being made by the policy and wisdom of the parliament 
for the general good of the whole realm, and of trust 
committed to the King as to the head of the justice 
and of the weal public, the same cannot by law be 
transferred to any subject. 
Penal Statutes (1605), Coke, Reports, 7:36b–37a; see also 
Hamburger, 
Is 
Administrative 
Law 
Unlawful?, 
at 
381 
("[P]arliamentary subdelegations were widely understood to be 
unlawful.  Englishmen of whiggish views tended to argue that 
legislative power came from the people and that the legislature 
therefore could not subdelegate its power to others.").  
 
¶98 The United States adopted from England a similar 
understanding of the non-transferability of the people's grant 
of legislative power.  Recent scholarship has explored this 
concept in detail.  See Ilan Wurman, Nondelegation at the 
Founding, 
130 
Yale 
L.J. 1490 
(2021); 
Philip 
Hamburger, 
Delegating or Divesting?, 115 Nw. U. L. Rev. Online 88 (2020).  
But see Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121 Colum. 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
17 
 
L. Rev. 277 (2021).  The early nineteenth century debates and 
proceedings in the Congress of the United States document 
Congress' understanding of the non-delegation principle as a 
limit on transferring their authority:   
 1808:  "[T]o suspend or repeal a law is a Legislative 
act, and we cannot transfer the power of legislating from 
ourselves to the President."  18 Annals of Cong. 2125 
(1808). 
 1810:  "It seems to me with equal constitutionality we 
might refer to the President the authority of declaring 
war, levying taxes, or of doing everything which the 
Constitution points out as the duty of Congress.  All 
legislative power is by the Constitution vested in 
Congress.  They cannot transfer it."  21 Annals of 
Cong. 2022 (1810). 
 1818: 
 
"Legislative 
power, 
when 
granted, 
is 
not 
transferable; nor can it be exercised by substitute; nor 
in any other manner than according to the constitution 
granting it."  31 Annals of Cong. 1144 (1818). 
 
¶99 Wisconsin's founders adopted a system of government 
similar in structure to the government designed under the United 
States Constitution.  "Like its federal counterpart, '[o]ur 
state constitution . . . created three branches of government, 
each with distinct functions and powers,' and '[t]he separation 
of powers . . . is implicit in this tripartite division.'"  
Gabler v. Crime Victims Rts. Bd., 2017 WI 67, ¶11, 376 
Wis. 2d 147, 897 N.W.2d 384 (quoted source omitted; alternations 
in original).  "Three clauses of the Wisconsin Constitution 
embody 
this 
separation: 
 
Article 
IV, 
Section 
1 
('[t]he 
legislative power shall be vested in a senate and assembly'); 
Article V, Section 1 ('[t]he executive power shall be vested in 
a governor'); and Article VII, Section 2 ('[t]he judicial 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
18 
 
power . . . shall be vested in a unified court system')."  Id. 
(citation omitted).  As a general rule, "[o]ur constitutional 
structure confers no authority on any branch to subdelegate any 
powers the sovereign people themselves delegated to particular 
government actors."  Fabick v. Evers, 2021 WI 28, ¶56, 396 
Wis. 2d 231, 
956 
N.W.2d 856 
(Rebecca 
Grassl 
Bradley, 
J., 
concurring).  "A strict accountability from public officers will 
be required, and the will of the people be the great governing 
voice . . . .  [The people] will not permit their popular 
sovereignty to be delegated to others who now, because dressed 
'in a little brief authority' arrogate to themselves the 
authority of being thinkers for the people, and 'the tongues o' 
the common mouth.'  To us such considerations are more weighty 
than gold."  State Government——No. 1, reprinted in The Movement 
for Statehood, 1845–46, at 372, 375–76. 
 
¶100 As is self-evident from the three vesting clauses, 
"[t]he people vested the [lawmaking] power in the legislature——
not the executive and certainly not the judiciary."  Johnson v. 
Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2021 WI 87, ¶69, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 967 
N.W.2d 469 (citing Fabick, 396 Wis. 2d 231, ¶55).  This power 
includes the authority to:  (1) "declare whether or not there 
shall be a law"; (2) "determine the general purpose or policy to 
be achieved by the law"; and (3) "fix the limits within which 
the law shall operate."  Koschkee, 387 Wis. 2d 552, ¶11 
(majority op.) (quoting Schmidt v. Dep't of Res. Dev., 39 
Wis. 2d 46, 59, 158 N.W.2d 306 (1968)). 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
19 
 
 
¶101 "The legislative power is 'the supreme power' because 
of its extraordinary reach[.]"  Juv. Ct., __ Wis. 2d __, ¶44 
(quoting 
Locke, 
Second 
Treatise 
of 
Government, 
§ 134).  
Therefore, "[l]aw-making is the platonic ideal of a '[c]ore 
power[],' which is 'not for sharing.'"  Id., ¶46 (quoting 
Fabick, 396 Wis. 2d 231, ¶58).  The people granted the lawmaking 
power to the legislature subject to many conditions designed to 
inhibit most ideas from ever becoming law.  "Bicameralism and 
presentment are the crucible bills must overcome to become law.  
By design, it is much more difficult than rule by dictatorship."  
Id., ¶55 n.11; see also Gundy v. United States, 585 U.S. __, 139 
S. Ct. 2116, 2134 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) ("An 'excess 
of law-making' was, in [the framers'] words, one of 'the 
diseases to which our governments are most liable.'  To address 
that tendency, the framers went to great lengths to make 
lawmaking difficult."17  (quoting The Federalist No. 62, at 378 
                                                 
17 Justice Hagedorn discounts "Montesquieu and Madison" as 
"helpful, but not sufficient" in construing the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  Concurrence, ¶49.  Our constitution was modeled 
after the United States Constitution——Wisconsin's founders were 
not working from a blank slate.  The early debates at the time 
of Wisconsin's founding rely explicitly on The Federalist.  
E.g., An Abolitionist Subscriber's View (1847), reprinted in The 
Struggle over Ratification, at 639, 642 (Milo M. Quaife ed., 
Wis. Hist. Soc'y 1920) (citing The Federalist No. 39 (James 
Madison)).  Our early decisions followed suit.  E.g., Walker v. 
Rogan, 1 Wis. 511 (*597), 527 (*616) (1853).  Evidencing the 
enduring recognition of the Framers' influence over the writing 
of our state constitution, over the last 50 years The Federalist 
has been cited in nearly 50 Wisconsin appellate opinions.  The 
father 
of 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution 
and 
those 
who 
influenced the founders' views on governance obviously "inform 
our understanding of the separation of powers under the 
Wisconsin Constitution."  Gabler v. Crime Victims Rts. Bd., 2017 
WI 67, ¶11, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 897 N.W.2d 384. 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
20 
 
(Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961))).  "Because the 
people gave the legislature its power to make laws, the 
legislature alone must exercise it."  Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 
¶69 (quoting Fabick, 396 Wis. 2d 231, ¶56).  "Safeguarding" the 
legislature's exclusive domain "is particularly important in 
light of its awesome sweep."  Id. (quoting Fabick, 396 
Wis. 2d 231, ¶55). 
 
¶102 "In the early years of Wisconsin's statehood, this 
court understood that the three branches of government could not 
delegate their vested powers, imposing substantive limitations 
on the legislature's assignment of authority to the executive to 
carry out the legislature's policies."  Fabick, 396 Wis. 2d 231, 
¶64; see also Joseph A. Ranney, Trusting Nothing to Providence:  
A History of Wisconsin's Legal System 377 (1999) ("Beginning 
with the controversy over municipal financing of railroads in 
the 1850s, the issue of what powers the legislature could confer 
on subordinate units of government arose regularly in Wisconsin.  
The Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted the . . . doctrine followed 
in most American states as a partial answer to the problem.  The 
doctrine stated in essence that the legislature could grant 
power to subordinate units to implement its policies but not to 
make their own.").  For example, in Dowling v. Lancashire Ins. 
Co., this court held "a law must be complete, in all its terms 
and provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of the 
government, and nothing must be left to the judgment of the 
electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature."  92 
Wis. 63, 74, 65 N.W. 738 (1896) (emphasis added). 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
21 
 
 
¶103 The majority/lead opinion dedicates much ink to 
statutory history in an effort to establish the legitimacy of 
delegations in the context of boards of health; however, it 
ignores one of this court's leading cases, State v. Burdge, 
(which was cited by the plaintiffs).  95 Wis. 390, 70 N.W. 347 
(1897).  In that case, this court examined a statute authorizing 
the state board of health "to make such rules and regulations 
and to take such measures as may, in its judgment, be necessary 
for the protection of the people from Asiatic cholera, or other 
dangerous disease[s]."  Id. at 398.  The act noted it was to "be 
construed and understood" to cover "such diseases as the state 
board of health shall designate as contagious and dangerous to 
the public health."  Id. at 401.  Purporting to act in accord 
with these statutes, the state board of health implemented a 
vaccination requirement in schools in response to Smallpox 
cases.  Id. at 405.  Through a "single stroke of the pen" and 
without any input from the legislature, the board of health 
"excluded from the common schools" "every child of school age, 
throughout the entire state, that had not been vaccinated."  Id.  
No statute explicitly permitted the exclusion of students based 
on vaccination status.  Id. at 399. 
 
¶104 After discussing Dowling, this court noted, "[t]he 
provisions of the statute import and include an absolute 
delegation of the legislative power over the entire subject here 
involved[.]"  Id. at 401.  The court recognized, however, that 
the board was a mere "administrative body[.]"  Id. at 400.  It 
had no "legislative power" and "no part of the legislative power 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
22 
 
c[ould] be delegated by the legislature to [it]" or "any other 
department or body[.]"  Id.   
 
¶105 For the state board of health to act upon its 
administrative 
powers, 
it 
had 
to 
act 
pursuant 
to 
"some 
substantive provision of law to be administered and carried into 
effect."  Id. at 402.  Because no law explicitly permitted the 
exclusion of unvaccinated students, this court held the state 
board of health acted without authority notwithstanding its 
ostensible statutory powers "to take such measures as may, in 
its judgment, be necessary."  Id. at 403.  That statute was 
"quite general" and therefore not a source of rulemaking 
authority.  Id. at 400.  Extending its holding to both the 
"state board of health" and "local boards," the court emphasized 
that rulemaking by such bodies could be done only if the 
authorizing statute was sufficiently complete in and of itself 
that rulemaking did not "involve[] a discretion as to what [the 
law] shall be" but merely "discretion as to its execution[.]"18  
Id. at 401–02. 
                                                 
18 The majority seems to believe the ultimate sources of the 
constitution's original meaning are early statutory enactments.  
Not so.  Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2022 WI 14, ¶256 
n.64, 400 Wis. 2d 626, 971 N.W.2d 402 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, 
J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Wis. Legislature v. Wis. 
Elections Comm'n, 595 U.S. __, 142 S. Ct. 1245 (2022) (per 
curiam) ("The Legislative and Executive branches cannot, through 
tacit understanding, change the constitutional allocation of 
powers."  (citing Bartlett v. Evers, 2020 WI 68, ¶210, 393 
Wis. 2d 172, 
945 
N.W.2d 685 
(Kelly, 
J., 
concurring/dissenting))). 
"We may look to 'three primary sources in determining the 
meaning of a constitution provision:  [1] the plain meaning, [2] 
the constitutional debates and practices of the time, and [3] 
the 
earliest 
interpretations 
of 
the 
provision 
by 
the 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
23 
 
 
¶106 Justice Hagedorn trivializes Burdge because the case 
was decided in 1897, a few decades after the state's founding.  
Concurrence, ¶11 ("The major difficulty with the petitioners' 
plea is they make little effort to ground either their claims or 
their proposed framework in the original understanding of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  Instead, they point to our 1896–1927 
cases and offer theories about nondelegation under the federal 
constitution.").   
                                                                                                                                                             
legislature, as manifested through the first legislative action 
following adoption.'"  Black v. City of Milwaukee, 2016 WI 47, 
¶54, 369 Wis. 2d 272, 882 N.W.2d 333 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, 
J., concurring) (quoting Diaryland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. 
Doyle, 
2006 
WI 107, 
¶19, 
295 
Wis. 2d 1, 
719 
N.W.2d 408) 
(modifications in the original).  The ordering of these sources 
reflect their legal weight, i.e., plain meaning is most 
important while early statutory enactments are least indicative.  
Id. & n.2.  "In the performance of assigned constitutional 
duties each branch of the Government must initially interpret 
the Constitution, and the interpretation of its powers by any 
branch is due great respect from the others. . . .  Many 
decisions of this Court, however, have unequivocally reaffirmed 
the holding of Marbury v. Madison that '(i)t is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law 
is.'"  Id., ¶54 n.2 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 
U.S. 683, 703 (1974) (modification in the original)). 
As the United States Supreme Court recently reiterated, 
"post-ratification adoption or acceptance of laws that are 
inconsistent with the original meaning of the constitutional 
text obviously cannot overcome or alter that text."  N.Y. State 
Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. __, No. 20-843, 
slip op. at 27–28 (June 23, 2022) (quoting District of Columbia 
v. Heller, 670 F.3d 1244, 1274 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, 
J., dissenting)).  Under the majority's logic, the Alien & 
Sedition Acts are proof positive of the First Amendment's 
meaning. 
 
Legislatures 
often 
adopt 
laws 
without 
a 
full 
appreciation 
of 
the 
relevant 
constitutional 
implications; 
judicial review exists for a reason. 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
24 
 
 
¶107 Burdge undoubtedly stands as evidence of original 
meaning.  The opinion was authored by Justice Silas U. Pinney, 
who was born in 1833.  Former Justices:  Justice Silas U. 
Pinney, 
Wis. 
Ct. 
Sys. 
(last 
visited 
June 
27, 
2022), 
https://www.wicourts.gov/courts/supreme/justices/retired/pinney.
htm.  "Upon his death in 1899, it was believed that he had 
argued more cases before the Wisconsin Supreme Court than any 
other lawyer in the state.  In the 100 volumes of the Wisconsin 
Reports printed by the time of his death, his name appeared as 
either counsel or justice in all but the first two volumes."  
Id.  Justice Pinney was also one of this state's first judicial 
opinion reporters.  "In 1872, [Justice] Pinney gathered the 
opinions of the territorial Supreme Court and the original state 
Supreme Court and published them in three volumes called 
Pinney's Wisconsin Reports.  The first volume includes [Justice] 
Pinney's written history of the Wisconsin Territory."  Id.  He 
also served as a state legislator and the mayor of Madison prior 
to his election to the state supreme court.  Id.  A respected 
jurist, Justice Pinney wrote a unanimous decision in Burdge, and 
given his background, the fact that he wrote it in 1897 instead 
of 1857 (or whatever arbitrary date Justice Hagedorn has in 
mind) does not impair its persuasive value. 
 
¶108 On 
the 
merits, 
Justice 
Hagedorn 
fundamentally 
mischaracterizes Burdge, block quoting a single sentence from 
the opinion completely out of context in order to suggest Burdge 
says the exact opposite of its actual holding.  Justice Hagedorn 
truncates Burdge to the following passage: 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
25 
 
It cannot be doubted but that under appropriate 
general 
provisions 
of 
law, 
in 
relation 
to 
the 
prevention and suppression of dangerous and contagious 
diseases, 
authority 
may 
be 
conferred 
by 
the 
legislature upon the state board of health or local 
boards to make reasonable rules and regulations for 
carrying into effect such general provisions, which 
will be valid, and may be enforced accordingly. 
In the sentences immediately following, Burdge goes on to 
explain the authority the legislature may confer on local boards 
(not unelected bureaucrats) to make "reasonable rules and 
regulations" does not include discretionary decisions about what 
the law itself may be; rather, the authority conferred is 
limited to how the law may be executed: 
The making of such rules and regulations is an 
administrative function, and not a legislative power, 
but there must first be some substantive provision of 
law to be administered and carried into effect.  The 
true test and distinction whether a power is strictly 
legislative, or whether it is administrative, and 
merely relates to the execution of the statute law, 
'is between the delegation of power to make the law, 
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it 
shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to 
its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance 
of the law.' The first cannot be done.  To the latter, 
no valid objection can be made. . . .  Where an act is 
clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete in 
and of itself, it may be provided that it shall become 
operative only upon some certain act or event, or, in 
like manner, that its operation shall be suspended; 
and the fact of such act or event, in either case, may 
be made to depend upon the ascertainment of it by some 
other 
department, 
body, 
or 
officer, 
which 
is 
essentially an administrative act. 
95. Wis. at 401-02 (emphasis added).  Applying these principles, 
the court in Burdge concluded "the rule under consideration 
could be made operative only as an act of legislative power, 
and it does not come within the domain of the power to make 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
26 
 
rules and regulations in aid or execution of some general 
statutory provision."  Id. at 403.   
¶109 Justice Hagedorn also misconstrues Burdge as endorsing 
the legislature's authority to delegate its lawmaking powers to 
local health officials.  It doesn't say that.  The case 
considered only whether "authority may be conferred by the 
legislature upon the state board of health or local boards."  
Id. at 401.  The court emphasized "the importance and necessity 
of a strict adherence to the constitutional rule, that the power 
to make the law cannot be delegated to any board or body not 
directly responsible to the people."  Id. at 404 (emphasis 
added).  If, as Burdge concluded, the power to make the law 
cannot be delegated to a state or local board of health, it 
certainly may not be delegated to a local health officer who is 
undisputedly "not directly responsible to the people."  Burdge's 
conclusion faithfully follows the Wisconsin Constitution, under 
which 
"[t]he 
legislature 
may 
confer 
upon 
the 
boards 
of 
supervisors of the several counties of the state such powers of 
a local, legislative and administrative character as they shall 
from time to time prescribe."  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 22 
(emphasis added).  Justice Hagedorn's conclusion does not.    
 
¶110 "[I]n the wake of the Progressive era, this court 
began 
to 
uproot 
substantive 
limits 
on 
the 
legislature's 
delegation of its constitutionally-conferred powers, thereby 
damaging the 'foundation of American representative government' 
that is the separation of powers."  Fabick, 396 Wis. 2d 231, ¶64 
(quoting Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 Va. L. 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
27 
 
Rev. 327, 332 (2002)); see also Ranney, Trusting Nothing to 
Providence, at 377 ("The line between making and implementing 
policy blurred substantially during the Progressive era as large 
administrative agencies came into operation for the first time.  
During the 1920s and 1930s, the supreme court, urged on by Chief 
Justice Rosenberry, was one of the first in the nation to 
acknowledge that the traditional delegation doctrine was dead 
and that henceforth, administrative agencies must effectively be 
treated as a separate branch of government."). 
 
¶111 Although on paper this court claims to require some 
substantive limits on delegated legislative power, it has 
heavily 
preferred 
"procedural 
safeguards." 
 
Fabick, 
396 
Wis. 2d 231, 
¶66 
("More 
accurately, 
the 
constitution's 
substantive limitations on delegating authority are all but 
dead.  In their place survives judicial complacence with 
transfers of legislative power, '[s]o long as there are adequate 
procedural safeguards' in place to limit executive overreach."  
(quoting Gilbert v. State, Med. Examining Bd., 119 Wis. 2d 168, 
186, 349 N.W.2d 68 (1984))).  Such complacence does not comport 
with the original meaning of the vesting clauses, which the 
court has an obligation to restore.  Id., ¶68. 
B.  The Non-Re-Delegation Doctrine 
¶112 The history of the non-delegation doctrine provides 
helpful context for understanding the illegitimacy of delegating 
already-delegated 
legislative 
power. 
 
County 
boards 
of 
supervisors have no inherent power.19  Town of Vernon v. Waukesha 
                                                 
19 Unlike municipalities, counties lack constitutional home 
rule.  See Wis. Const. art. XI, § 3(1) ("Cities and villages 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
28 
 
County, 102 Wis. 2d 686, 689, 307 N.W.2d 227 (1981) ("[A] county 
board has only such powers as are expressly conferred upon it or 
necessarily implied from the powers expressly given or from the 
nature of the grant of power.").  They have only those powers 
the legislature decides to confer upon them.  This is a 
subdelegation of power actually authorized by the people under 
Article IV, Section 22 of the Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶113 Absent the people's express consent to confer on 
county boards of supervisors some limited lawmaking power, the 
non-delegation 
principle 
would 
otherwise 
prohibit 
the 
legislature from transferring even a small portion of its power 
to any other entity.  Under Article IV, Section 1 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, "[t]he legislative power shall be vested 
in a senate and assembly."  This vesting clause prohibits the 
legislature from giving away its lawmaking power.  Fabick, 396 
Wis. 2d 231, 
¶55. 
 
It 
was 
based 
on 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution's legislative vesting clause, in which "the 'people 
had vested the power to prescribe rules limiting their liberties 
in Congress alone'——not the executive."  Id. (quoting Gundy, 139 
S. Ct. at 2133).  Article IV, Section 22 was created as a carve 
out to this rule.  As one scholar noted, Section 22 "seems 
puzzling" if it was not "drafted to forestall an objection based 
on the non-delegation doctrine."  Michael E. Libonati, "Neither 
                                                                                                                                                             
organized pursuant to state law may determine their local 
affairs and government, subject only to this constitution and to 
such enactments of the legislature of statewide concern as with 
uniformity shall affect every city or every village.  The method 
of such determination shall be prescribed by the legislature."). 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
29 
 
Peace Nor Uniformity":  Local Government in the Wisconsin 
Constitution, 90 Marq. L. Rev. 596, 598 (2007). 
¶114 The history of Article IV, Section 22 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution confirms it creates an exception to the non-
delegation principle.  The language of this section was taken 
from the 1846 New York Constitution.  Id.; see also The 
Constitution——No. 6 (1847), reprinted in The Struggle over 
Ratification, at 474, 482 (Milo M. Quaife ed., Wis. Hist. Soc'y 
1920) ("The nearer home all legislation is brought, the better 
and safer it is:  that problem was well settled by the admirable 
town governments in New England.").  The New York representative 
who 
introduced 
the 
language 
at 
that 
state's 
convention 
explained: 
Sir, the first section of the article to which this is 
offered as an amendment, provides that the entire 
legislative power of the state shall be vested in the 
Senate and Assembly.  It is therefore my opinion that 
powers of local legislation cannot be conferred upon 
the 
several 
boards 
of 
supervisors, 
without 
a 
constitutional 
section 
permitting 
the 
state 
legislature to delegate such power. 
Report of the Debates and Proceedings of the Convention for the 
Revision of the Constitution of the State of New-York 1070 
(1846) (statement of R. Campbell, Jr.). 
 
¶115 Article IV, Section 22 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
was an "experiment" and this state's founders accordingly 
proceeded with great caution.  The Constitution——No. 6, at 482.  
In theory, "[i]f each state can legislate better for itself than 
Congress could, each county in the state can for itself better 
than can the state at large[.]"  Id.  Nevertheless, local 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
30 
 
legislative control needed to be cabined because it was 
"untried, and the details full of difficulty."  Id.  The author 
of The Constitution——No. 6, a source for the original meaning of 
Article IV, Section 22, explained that "it will take some time 
and some experience to settle well and finally the bounds of 
local 
legislation. 
 
Accordingly 
this 
constitution 
simply 
provides 
that 
the 
legislature 
shall 
establish . . . county 
government and may confer upon the county boards of supervisors 
such powers of local legislation and administration as they 
shall from time to time prescribe."  Id.  The author predicted 
"the seed is sown, and the harvest will ripen in due time and 
after due development."  Id.  Article IV, Section 22 has never 
been amended.  The founders' "experiment," reflecting a cautious 
view of delegated county power, continues in its original form.  
Our 
founders 
did 
not 
envision 
this 
"experiment" 
with 
subdelegation being corrupted by further levels of delegation to 
which the people never consented. 
 
¶116 Article IV, Section 22 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
would be pure surplusage, its historical purpose contravened, 
and its existence utterly unnecessary if county boards of 
supervisors could subdelegate their lawmaking power.  See 
Appling v. Walker, 2014 WI 96, ¶23, 358 Wis. 2d 132, 853 
N.W.2d 888 (explaining constitutional language should be read to 
"give reasonable effect to every word," so as to "avoid 
surplusage"  (quoting C. Coakley Relocation Sys. Inc. v. City of 
Milwaukee, 2008 WI 68, ¶17, 310 Wis. 2d 456, 750 N.W.2d 900)); 
see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:  The 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
31 
 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 174 (2012) ("If possible, every 
word and every provision is to be given effect (verba cum 
effectu sunt accipienda).  None should be ignored.  None should 
needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it to 
duplicate another provision or to have no consequence.").  
Because an express grant of authority was necessary for the 
legislature to delegate its power to the county boards of 
supervisors for the purpose of experimentation, the absence of 
an equally express authorization of subdelegation confirms the 
people withheld their consent to subdelegations by the county 
boards.  Nothing in the constitutional text, its structure, or 
its history establishes any exception, nor does an emergency 
such as the COVID-19 pandemic.  See Palm, 391 Wis. 2d 497, ¶53 
(majority op.) ("There is no pandemic exception . . . to the 
fundamental liberties the Constitution safeguards."  (citation 
omitted) (ellipsis in the original)); Fabick, 396 Wis. 2d 231, 
¶50 ("Even in a pandemic, the government 'cannot be allowed to 
obscure the limitations of the authority to delegate, if our 
constitutional system is to be maintained.'"  (quoting A.L.A. 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 530 
(1935))). 
¶117 More than a century of precedent uniformly preserved 
the non-re-delegation principle as applied to county boards of 
supervisors.  Consistent with the original meaning of Article 
IV, Section 22, the Wisconsin Supreme Court invariably enforced 
the 
prohibition 
on 
re-delegation 
of 
the 
supreme 
power——
irrespective of substantive or procedural safeguards.  Although 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
32 
 
this court has corrupted the non-delegation principle, its non-
re-delegation jurisprudence faithfully followed the constitution 
until its debasement in this case.20 
 
¶118 In French v. Dunn County, the Dunn County Board of 
Supervisors decided to purchase land for a "poor-farm"21 via a 
committee of three supervisors.  58 Wis. 402, 404, 17 N.W. 1 
(1883).  This court determined "[t]here can be no just claim 
that the committee did not act strictly within the scope of the 
authority conferred by the resolution."  Id. at 405.  For this 
reason, it upheld the purchase, which the court emphasized was 
not an act of lawmaking power.  Id. at 408.  Its holding was 
limited:  "There are, doubtless, powers vested in the county 
board which could not be delegated to any committee.  Powers 
which are legislative in their character . . . must be exercised 
under the immediate authority of the board."  Id. at 406. 
¶119 The next relevant case chronologically remains the 
seminal decision interpreting Article IV, Section 22 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  See Meade v. Dane County, 155 Wis. 632, 
145 N.W. 239 (1914).  The Dane County Board of Supervisors 
                                                 
20 Justice Hagedorn conflates the non-delegation principle 
with the non-re-delegation doctrine.  Regardless, he too 
acknowledges that in regard to the former, this court long ago 
"closed this chapter" and has "declined to fastidiously police 
the line between a permissible legislative grant of power and an 
impermissible delegation of legislative power."  Concurrence, 
¶54. 
 
Just 
because 
prior 
courts 
failed 
to 
uphold 
our 
constitution does not give this court license to perpetuate its 
dereliction of duty.  
 
21 See 
generally 
poor 
farm, 
Shorter 
Oxford 
English 
Dictionary (6th ed. 2007) ("A farm run at public expense to 
house and support the poor."). 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
33 
 
approved the purchase of farmland for $24,200 and directed the 
chairman of the board, the county clerk, and the district 
attorney to complete the purchase.  Importantly, the board 
intended to add the land to the existing county poor farm. 
¶120 This 
proposed 
purchase 
generated 
significant 
controversy.  Dane County residents filed three petitions under 
Wis. Stat. § 39j (1911) challenging the plan.  That statute 
stated, in relevant part: 
(1) . . . [N]o ordinance or resolution of any county 
board shall go into effect within twenty days from 
the time of its passage[.] . . .  
(2) An emergency ordinance or resolution shall be any 
ordinance 
or 
resolution . . . making 
any 
appropriation 
for 
maintaining 
the . . . county 
government or maintaining or aiding any public 
institution. . . .   
(3) If within twenty days after the passage and 
publication of any ordinance or resolution, a 
petition, signed by qualified electors of the city 
or county equal in number to at least twenty per 
cent. of all the votes cast for Governor in 
such . . . county at the last preceding regular 
election, shall be filed with the . . . county 
clerk and certified by him to the . . . county 
board, 
praying 
that 
the 
operation 
of 
such 
ordinance 
or 
resolution 
be 
suspended, 
the 
operation of such ordinance or resolution, unless 
the same shall be an emergency ordinance or 
resolution, shall be suspended.  At its next 
regular 
meeting, . . . the . . . county 
board 
shall consider such ordinance or resolution, and 
either repeal it or submit it to the electors of 
the . . . county at the next regular election or 
at a special election, to be called for that 
purpose . . . . 
 
If 
any 
such 
ordinance 
or 
resolution shall be approved by a majority of the 
electors voting thereon, it shall take effect and 
be in force from and after twenty days from the 
date of the election. 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
34 
 
(4) An emergency ordinance or resolution shall remain 
in force notwithstanding any petition filed upon 
it, but such ordinance or resolution shall stand 
repealed from and after twenty days after being 
rejected by a majority of the qualified electors 
voting thereon. 
§ 39j.  When the petitions were presented to the Dane County 
Board of Supervisors, it refused to act.  It neither repealed 
its plan nor provided for its submission to a vote of the 
people, as purportedly required by § 39j.  Instead, the board 
proceeded to pay $1000 of the $24,200 but was enjoined from 
paying the remainder following the filing of a lawsuit by a Dane 
County resident and taxpayer.  The circuit court ruled in favor 
of the plaintiff. 
 
¶121 On appeal, this court reversed and remanded with 
directions to dismiss the complaint.  Meade, Wis. at 645.  When 
a county board of supervisors enacts ordinances and resolutions, 
the court recognized "the county acts by delegated authority, 
and the state Constitution (section 22, art. 4) expressly 
authorizes the Legislature to confer upon the boards of 
supervisors of the several counties 'such powers of a local, 
legislative, and administrative character.'"  Id. at 642–43.  It 
then noted the plan of the Dane County Board of Supervisors was 
an "emergency order or resolution" because it was intended to 
benefit the poor farm.  Id. at 643.  Accordingly, "by 
subdivision 4 [of Wis. Stat. § 39j] the action of the county 
board [wa]s not merely to go into effect upon the contingency 
that a majority of the electors declare[d] it, but, on the 
contrary, t[ook] effect from the time of its passage[.]"  Id.  
The statute purported to authorize the voters not just to 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
35 
 
approve a law before it went into effect but to "repeal[]" a law 
already in effect.  Id.  This court concluded the legislature 
could not create a statute "delegating to the electors the 
legislative power of repeal" because such a statute "vest[ed] in 
the electors of the county the powers which the Constitution 
says may be vested in the county board."  Id.  "The Constitution 
provides for and authorizes a delegation of such powers to a 
specified body.  Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.  In that 
section 39j conflicts with the Constitution."  Id. 
¶122 This court held Wis. Stat. § 39j conflicted with the 
Constitution in at least two respects:  "(1) Because it violates 
section 22 of article 4 in attempting to delegate to the 
electors powers which that section, interpreted by the regular 
rules 
of 
interpretation . . . requires 
to 
be 
otherwise 
delegated.  (2) Because, as regards emergency resolutions there 
defined, which includes the resolutions in question here, the 
statute is an attempted delegation of the legislative power of 
repeal."  Id. at 644.  This court rebuked the enactment of 
statute with decidedly strong language:  "The statute in 
question seems to have been framed in entire unconsciousness of 
fundamental principles, and we have no reasonable doubt of its 
invalidity."  Id. at 645.  It reiterated its concern multiple 
times, even declaring ordinances in force pending possible 
repeal unconstitutional.  Id. at 644 ("As to all ordinances, and 
as to those resolutions which are in effect ordinances, declared 
by said section to be in force and effect until repealed by the 
electors, this is a delegation of legislative power and 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
36 
 
forbidden by constitutional law."); id. at 645 ("As to all other 
resolutions of the county board, this is a delegation of 
administrative power, and this class of powers the Constitution 
(Section 22, art. 4) permits to be delegated only to the county 
board."). 
¶123 Meade was followed a few months later by State ex rel. 
Carey v. Ballard, 158 Wis. 251, 148 N.W. 1090 (1914).  In that 
case, this court reviewed the constitutionality of a statute 
delegating the legislative power "to levy a tax" to a group of 
freeholders within a county.  Id. at 256.  While that case 
concerned whether the statute violated the legislative vesting 
clause, 
not 
Article 
IV, 
Section 
22 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, its reasoning is nevertheless relevant.  This 
court 
recognized 
then 
(as 
it 
should 
now) 
"[u]nder 
our 
constitutional 
form 
of 
government 
the 
Legislature 
cannot 
delegate legislative power to any officer or to any body of 
persons, individual or corporate, aside from the power to confer 
local legislative and administrative powers on county boards and 
municipal corporations."  Id. at 257 (citations omitted); see 
also In re Village of N. Milwaukee, 93 Wis. 616, 621, 67 
N.W. 1033 
(1896) 
("[T]he 
legislature 
may 
delegate 
local 
legislative and administrative powers to county boards of 
supervisors, and to no other officer or body, save in so far as 
it may delegate powers of local self-government to municipal 
corporations."  (emphasis added)); 1 County Government in 
Wisconsin 7 (Univ. of Wis. & Wis. Hist. Soc'y 1942) ("At its 
first 
session, 
the 
State 
Legislature 
provided 
for 
the 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
37 
 
establishment 
in 
each 
county 
of 
a 
board 
of 
supervisors, . . . which was to be the only body competent to 
exercise the powers of the county as a body politic.").  "In 
conferring the taxing power on these local governments the 
legislature must provide for its exercise by the proper 
legislative authority of the local government."  Carey, 158 
Wis. at 257 (citation omitted).  The court explained that local 
legislative power had to be "exerted . . . either directly [by 
the senate and assembly] or through the officers of a political 
subdivision 
who 
act 
in 
their 
capacity 
of 
legislative 
representatives of the people[.]"  Id. at 258.  It declared the 
statute unconstitutional because "the Legislature acted in 
excess of its power in attempting to vest authority for the 
imposition of a tax for improving highways in a body of 
freeholders who are not elected by the people as their 
representatives, nor in any way responsible to them on account 
of the tax burdens they imposed."  Id. at 260.  Again, this 
court 
used 
unequivocal 
language: 
 
"[The 
statute] 
delegates . . . power to a group of persons in their individual 
capacity, which is condemned as contrary to the principles of 
representative government under our Constitution."  Id. at 261. 
 
¶124 Two years later, this court decided State ex rel. 
Nehbass v. Harper, 162 Wis. 589, 156 N.W. 961 (1916).  That case 
examined subdelegation by a village board, not a county board of 
supervisors, and therefore did not directly concern Article IV, 
Section 22 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Nonetheless, it 
elucidates the non-re-delegation principle, specifically as 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
38 
 
applied to local governments, analogizing to decisions such as 
Ballard involving county boards.  See id. at 593 (citing 
Ballard, 158 Wis. at 257).   
 
¶125 In Nehbass, the City of Milwaukee enacted an ordinance 
that required a person desiring to erect, remodel, or maintain 
certain types of buildings to first obtain "the written consent 
of two-thirds of all the real estate owners within three hundred 
feet of the space[.]"  Id. at 590.  This court struck the 
ordinance as a violation of the non-re-delegation principle.  In 
supporting 
its 
decision, 
the 
court 
summarized 
its 
prior 
holdings: 
 "A 
legislative 
body 
cannot 
delegate 
to 
a 
mere 
administrative officer power to make a law . . . .  In the 
present cast the ordinance by its terms gives power to the 
president to decide arbitrarily and in the exercise of his 
own discretion when a saloon shall close.  This is an 
attempt to vest legislative discretion in him, and cannot 
be sustained."22  Id. at 593 (quoting Village of Little 
Chute v. Van Camp, 136 Wis. 526, 527, 117 N.W. 1012 
(1908)).  
 "A county board cannot delegate to one not a member of the 
board the power and authority to act as a member of the 
committee of the board."  Id. (citing Forest County v. 
Shaw, 150 Wis. 294, 136 N.W. 642 (1912)).23 
 "Under 
our 
constitutional 
form 
of 
government 
the 
Legislature cannot delegate legislative powers to any 
officer or to any body of persons, individual or corporate, 
aside from the power to confer local legislative and 
                                                 
22 The ordinance read:  "All saloons in said village shall 
be closed at 11 o'clock p. m. each day and remain closed until 5 
o'clock on the following morning, unless by special permission 
of the president." 
23 Shaw appears to have been grounded in statutory law more 
than constitutional principles. 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
39 
 
administrative powers on county boards and municipal 
corporations."  Id. (quoting Ballard, 158 Wis. at 257). 
 "[In State v. O'Neill a statute] provided that a certain 
act should be void unless accepted by a majority of the 
legal voters of the city of Milwaukee . . . .  This was 
held 
not 
to 
be 
a 
delegation 
of 
legislative 
power 
[because] the law was . . . '[a] complete enactment in 
itself; contains an entire and perfect declaration of 
legislative will; requires nothing to perfect it as a law; 
while it is only left to the people to be affected by it to 
determine whether they will avail themselves of its 
provisions."  Id. at 594 (quoting O'Neill, 24 Wis. 149 
(1869)). 
Synthesizing these authorities, the court reasoned, "[i]f the 
state [by statute] cannot delegate [lawmaking power] certainly a 
common council cannot redelegate legislative power properly 
delegated to it."  Id. at 593.  Critically, "[t]he ordinance in 
question 
[unlike 
O'Neill] 
[wa]s 
not 
one 
left 
to 
take 
effect . . . upon 
the 
ascertainment 
of 
some 
prescribed 
fact . . . but attempt[ed] to delegate to property owners the 
right to say how a particular person shall use a particular 
piece of property[.]"  Id.  "[I]t is plain that the question of 
whether or not a garage shall be erected in a particular place 
is determined, not by the common council, but by the property 
owners."  Id. at 594. 
 
¶126 A few decades later, Marshall v. Dane County Board of 
Supervisors rehashed Meade.  See 236 Wis. 57.  The case 
considered a different, but analogous referendum statute.  A 
petition was presented to the Dane County Board of Supervisors 
demanding 
the 
adoption 
of 
"a 
complete 
civil 
service 
ordinance[.]"  Id. at 58.  The relevant statute purported to 
require a county board presented with such a petition to pass 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
40 
 
the proposed ordinance or submit it to a vote of the people.  
Id.  As in Meade, the board refused to act; it neither voted to 
adopt an ordinance nor submitted it for a vote.  Id. 
 
¶127 This court concluded the case was governed by Meade.  
It reiterated the statute in Meade "was held unconstitutional by 
the court because the legislature could not empower a county 
board to delegate to the electors of the county a power by the 
Constitution expressly delegated to the county board itself."  
Id. at 59.  The statute required county boards of supervisors 
presented with a proper petition to:  (1) repeal the ordinance; 
or (2) submit the question of repeal to the people.  That choice 
could not be forced upon the boards; the constitution prohibits 
boards from transferring their lawmaking power, even to the 
people, if the boards were unwilling to repeal the ordinance. 
 
¶128 After summarizing Meade, this court held "[t]he power 
to enact such an ordinance must, under the constitutional 
provision cited, be vested by the legislature in the county 
board itself; the legislature cannot authorize the county board 
to delegate the power to enact an ordinance of such a character 
to the electors."  Id. at 59.  The decision was unanimous.  If 
the lawmakers may not re-delegate their delegated power even to 
the people, it is logically impossible for county boards to 
redelegate their delegated power to an unelected bureaucrat. 
¶129 Multiple Wisconsin Attorney General opinions interpret 
Article IV, Section 22 of the Wisconsin Constitution in 
accordance with this court's understanding of the text.  On at 
least five occasions, the attorney general has concluded the 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
41 
 
legislative powers of county boards of supervisors cannot be 
exercised by the electors of the county without violating the 
non-re-delegation principle.24    
                                                 
24 27 Wis. Att'y Gen. 161, 161 (1938) ("[D]irect legislation 
in 
counties 
by 
the 
electors 
is 
not 
permitted 
by 
the 
constitution. . . .  [A]rt. IV, sec. 22[] . . . empower[s] the 
legislature to confer upon the county boards the legislative 
power for the county and . . . therefore a statute providing for 
direct legislation in counties [i]s unconstitutional because it 
attempt[s] to confer legislative power upon the electors."); 22 
Wis. Att'y Gen. 785, 785–86 (1933) ("The determination by a 
referendum vote to build a new courthouse would constitute 
direct 
legislation. 
 
This 
department 
in 
a 
previous 
opinion . . . .  held that sec. 59.02 was unconstitutional in so 
far 
as 
it 
authorized 
referendum 
on 
legislative 
and 
administrative matters in counties. . . .  Since the question of 
building a new courthouse rests with the county board, its clerk 
has no authority to call a special meeting of the county board 
or file presentation of a referendum petition."); 21 Wis. Att'y 
Gen. 207, 208 (1932) ("The board must decide the question and 
such decision cannot be delegated to the electors."); 11 Wis. 
Att'y Gen. 106, 106–07 (1922) ("The case seems to me to fall 
within the language of the supreme court in Meade . . . where a 
similar referendum law was said to apply to any and every kind 
of action that might be taken by a county board.  The supreme 
court also held, however, in the Meade case that a statute of 
this kind is unconstitutional as applied to counties, for the 
reason that it violates sec. 22, art. IV . . . .  There is no 
question in my mind but that sec. 59.02, in so far as it 
provides for a referendum, is subject to all the infirmities 
pointed out by the supreme court in the statute involved in the 
Meade case.  I, therefore, conclude . . . that the question of 
employing a county agent cannot be lawfully determined by a 
referendum among the voters of the county."); 9 Wis. Att'y 
Gen. 66, 67–68 (1920) ("If the constitution does not permit 
direct legislation of the voters of the county on purchasing a 
poor farm, it does not permit such legislation on the subject of 
public schools. . . .  It seems to me that the decision in the 
Meade case completely rules this question. . . .  The Meade case 
was an effort to kill a resolution by having it referred to the 
electors.  This case is an effort to defeat an ordinance by 
enacting a repealing ordinance.  If one is legislation, so is 
the other, and legislation by direct action of the electors of 
counties is declared to be prohibited by the constitution and 
beyond the power of the legislature to confer."). 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
42 
 
¶130 In 
at 
least 
one 
opinion, 
the 
attorney 
general 
concluded county boards of supervisors could not delegate 
lawmaking power to committees of the board.  In 1972, the 
corporation counsel for Dane County requested an opinion on 
"whether a county board can delegate to a committee of the board 
the 
authority 
to 
make 
all 
appointments 
to 
county 
board 
committees created under sec. 59.06, Stats., without necessity 
of further action or confirmation by the board."  61 Wis. Att'y 
Gen. 214, 215 (1972).  The attorney general responded, "[i]t is 
my opinion that the board is without such authority[.]"  Id.  
Referencing 
Article 
IV, 
Section 
22 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, he reasoned, "[t]he board can exercise the 
legislative and administrative powers delegated to it by the 
legislature as a collective body."  Id. (emphasis added).  
Because "[t]he power to create a committee and to provide for 
its scope and purposes is legislative in nature," he concluded 
it "could not be delegated to a committee."  Id. at 216. 
¶131  Treatises on municipal law similarly describe the 
non-re-delegation 
principle 
and 
acknowledge 
its 
present 
vitality.  Constitutionally-ensconced since ratification and 
upheld by this court for nearly 140 years, it is black-letter 
law.  See 2 Local Government Law § 13:13 (updated May 2022) 
("[T]he doctrine that a legislative body cannot delegate its 
legislative powers applies to local governments."); 2A McQuillin 
Mun. Corp. § 10:45 (3d ed. updated Sept. 2021) ("So far as the 
powers of a municipal corporation are legislative they rest in 
the discretion and judgment of the municipal body entrusted with 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
43 
 
them, and the general rule is that that body cannot delegate or 
refer the exercise of such powers to the judgment of a committee 
of the council, or to an administrative board or officer of the 
city, 
or 
to 
arbitrators 
under 
an 
agreement 
for 
binding 
arbitration.  If the legislature confers powers on a municipal 
corporation, the exercise of discretion by the governing body of 
the municipality cannot be delegated to a municipal officer or 
other person of body."). 
¶132 The collective thrust of these binding decisions is 
relatively straightforward:  (1) Article IV, Section 22 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution does not allow the legislature to vest 
lawmaking power in a municipal officer or body other than the 
county 
boards 
of 
supervisors; 
(2) 
the 
non-re-delegation 
principle prohibits a county board of supervisors from giving 
any of its delegated lawmaking power to any person or other 
body——the 
power 
must 
be 
exercised 
by 
the 
whole 
board, 
collectively; (3) lawmaking means discretionary decisions that 
bind the public with the force of law; and (4) for an ordinance 
to be constitutionally valid, it must be complete and whole, 
requiring no further discretionary decisions of a substantive 
nature to carry its purpose into effect.  This court has 
consistently 
struck 
down 
subdelegations 
that 
caused 
substantially 
less 
intrusive 
infringements 
on 
fundamental 
liberties, e.g., invalidating a village ordinance that granted 
the village president the power to allow saloons to stay open 
late on a case-by-case basis.  Van Camp, 136 Wis. at 527.  The 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
44 
 
majority refuses to apply Article IV, Section 22, but there is 
no statutory end-run around the constitution.  
C.  The Unconstitutionality of Dane County's Ordinance & 
Heinrich's Orders 
 
¶133 Having 
sworn 
oaths 
to 
support 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, this court must assiduously protect the people's 
prerogative to decide who may govern them by enforcing the 
constitutional limitations on the exercise of power the people 
gave to particular public servants.  Although Justice Hagedorn 
dismisses this principle as nothing more than "general theories 
of government power,"25 "[p]reserving the perimeters of power 
constitutionally conferred on each branch of government is 
essential for securing the liberty of the people."  Palm, 391 
Wis. 2d 900, ¶70 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring).  This 
duty becomes imperative when governmental actors conspire to 
collapse the carefully calibrated separation of powers among 
three branches in favor of consolidating power in a single, 
unelected bureaucrat.   
¶134 "The 
accumulation 
of 
all 
powers, 
legislative, 
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a 
few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or 
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of 
tyranny."  The Federalist No. 47, at 373–74.  The Dane County 
Board 
bestowed 
on 
Heinrich 
"the 
three 
great 
powers 
of 
government," even though our constitutional order is founded on 
the axiom that they should be "ever . . . kept separate and 
distinct."  Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, 
                                                 
25 Concurrence, ¶49. 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
45 
 
¶87, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35 (Kelly, J., majority op.) 
(quoting 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the 
United States § 519, at 2–3 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 
1833)).  "Although consolidation of power in one person may be 
tempting in times of exigency, for purposes of expeditiously 
producing an efficient and effective response to emergencies 
like a pandemic, history informs of the perils of the 
consolidation of power, and not merely through the exhortations 
of the Founders and philosophers.  Regrettably, we have tangible 
examples 
of 
judicial 
acquiescence 
to 
unconstitutional 
governmental actions considered——at the time——to inure to the 
benefit of society, but later acknowledged to be vehicles of 
oppression."  Palm, 391 Wis. 2d 900, ¶70.  "Careful judicial 
scrutiny is especially important in times of stress, when 
Americans may find themselves 'at the mercy of wicked rulers, or 
the clamor of an excited people.'"  Id., ¶72 (quoting Stephen 
Dycus, Requiem for Korematsu, 10 J. Nat'l Sec. L. & Pol'y 237, 
246 (2019)). 
 
¶135 The facts of this case demonstrate the danger.  
Heinrich prosecuted a local business for allegedly violating her 
vague order.  The County Board unlawfully gave her powers that 
no elected official in this state possesses:  the power to write 
the rules, interpret their meaning, and impose punishments of 
her choosing for violations only she may declare.  The ordinance 
by which the Board created this autocrat contains no legitimate 
limiting directives, instead incorporating by reference statutes 
similarly lacking any meaningful substantive constraints on her 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
46 
 
power.  See Wis. Stat. § 252.03(1) ("The local health officer 
shall promptly take all measures necessary to prevent, suppress 
and control communicable diseases, and shall report to the 
appropriate governing body the progress of the communicable 
diseases and the measures used against them, as needed to keep 
the appropriate governing body fully informed, or at such 
intervals as the secretary may direct.").   
 
¶136 As interpreted by the majority, this statute violates 
the constitution as interpreted in Ballard, which held:  "Under 
our constitutional form of government the Legislature cannot 
delegate legislative powers to any officer or to any body of 
persons, individual or corporate, aside from the power to confer 
local legislative and administrative powers on county boards and 
municipal 
corporations." 
 
158 
Wis. 
at 
257. 
 
It 
is 
a 
substantially more open-ended grant of power than those this 
court has struck in previous cases, e.g., the grant in Van Camp.  
It mirrors the "take such measures as may, in its judgment, be 
necessary" language construed in Burdge, which this court held 
granted no rulemaking authority at all.  See 95 Wis. at 398.  It 
is also indistinguishable from the power this court held a state 
official could not exercise in Wisconsin Legislature v. Palm, 
391 Wis. 2d 497 (majority op.).  The majority silently overrules 
Palm, a decision from which three members of the majority in 
this case sharply dissented.  Only a change in court membership 
enables the current majority to discard this quite recent 
precedent. 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
47 
 
 
¶137 Such a broad grant, particularly without procedural 
safeguards, is patently unconstitutional.  Id., ¶¶79–80 (Rebecca 
Grassl Bradley, J., concurring).  Heinrich has been permitted to 
exercise "the supreme [lawmaking] power," with no pre-issuance 
procedural safeguards to limit the power from being applied 
arbitrarily and capaciously.  See Juv. Ct., __ Wis. 2d __, ¶55 
n.11 (quoting Locke, Second Treatise of Government, § 134); 
Palm, 
391 
Wis. 2d 497, 
¶35 
(majority 
op.) 
(explaining 
a 
procedural safeguard is inadequate if it can be applied only to 
undo an unlawful rule).  Renouncing multiple precedents spanning 
more than a century, the majority accedes to Heinrich's 
arrogation of breathtaking power. 
¶138 The 
majority's 
decimation 
of 
the 
non-delegation 
principle 
ignores 
controlling 
precedent 
on 
"procedural 
safeguards."  Tellingly, in the majority/lead opinion's three 
paragraphs discussing procedural safeguards, it does not cite a 
single case; the precedent overlooked by the majority explicitly 
rebuts the majority's analysis.  E.g., compare majority/lead 
op., ¶40 ("[S]tate courts may review an order issued pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 252.03 and Dane County Ordinance § 46.40 and ensure 
its measures conform to the laws' substantive limitations."), 
with Palm, 391 Wis. 2d 497, ¶35 ("Palm cannot point to any 
procedural safeguards on the power she claims.  At oral 
argument, she continuously referenced judicial review; but 
judicial review takes place after an allegation is made that an 
individual's 
rights 
have 
been 
violated. . . .  
Rulemaking 
provides the ascertainable standards that hinder arbitrary or 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
48 
 
oppressive conduct by an agency.  Judicial review does not 
prevent oppressive conduct from initially occurring.").  In 
Palm, this court held procedural safeguards must resemble 
chapter 227's rulemaking procedures; nothing comparable inhibits 
Heinrich's exercise of unilateral power.  Palm, 391 Wis. 2d 497, 
¶34 ("Procedural safeguards, generally, are those requirements 
imposed by the Administrative Procedures Act, codified at ch. 
227."  (citation omitted)). 
¶139 The majority claims it is merely applying existing 
precedent on the non-delegation principle; if the majority is 
sincere, 
its 
efforts 
betray 
a 
startling 
ignorance 
of 
a 
fundamental first principle.  While ignoring the non-re-
delegation principle entirely, the majority implicitly abrogates 
the non-delegation principle, facilitating unlimited future acts 
of tyranny akin to Heinrich's.  The majority/lead opinion says, 
"[a]s with any legislative authority, the state legislature may 
curb exercises of granted power it deems excessive[.]"26  The 
legislature always has such power (as even the majority 
acknowledges).  The majority entirely misses the rationale 
underlying the non-delegation principle:  if the people did not 
authorize the legislature to give its power away, its exercise 
by anyone other than the legislature is unlawful, and the 
legislature's 
ability 
to 
"curb" 
excess 
cannot 
cure 
the 
subdelegation's constitutional infirmity. 
¶140 The Dane County Board of Supervisors exceeded its 
constitutional authority by assigning Heinrich such far-reaching 
                                                 
26 Majority/lead op., ¶40. 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
49 
 
powers.  This subdelegation was substantively defective, even 
under a liberal reading of the long line of governing precedent.  
The Board's re-delegation imposed no meaningful procedural 
restraints on Heinrich's power.  By judicial fiat, the majority 
endorses executive fiat, and the people's liberty languishes. 
¶141 "Frequently an issue of this sort will come before the 
Court clad, so to speak, in sheep's clothing:  the potential of 
the asserted principle to effect important change in the 
equilibrium of power is not immediately evident, and must be 
discerned by a careful and perceptive analysis.  But this wolf 
comes as a wolf."  Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
III.  THE MAJORITY/LEAD OPINION'S FLAWED STATUTORY ANALYSIS  
¶142 In James v. Heinrich——a recent case challenging the 
exercise of power over the people by the same Dane County health 
officer named in this case——this court held that "if 'the 
legislature did not specifically confer a power,' the exercise 
of that power is not authorized."  2021 WI 58, ¶18, 397 
Wis. 2d 516, 960 N.W.2d 350 (quoting State ex rel. Harris v. 
Larson, 64 Wis. 2d 521, 527, 219 N.W.2d 335 (1974)); see also 
Ala. Ass'n of Realtors v. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 594 
U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 2485 (2021) (per curiam) ("We expect 
Congress to speak clearly when authorizing an agency to exercise 
powers of vast economic and political significance."  (citation 
omitted)).  This court held Wis. Stat. § 252.03's "reasonable 
and necessary" provisions did not grant Heinrich the power to 
"close 
schools." 
 
Among 
other 
reasons, 
such 
a 
generic 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
50 
 
authorization "cannot be reasonably read to encompass anything 
and everything"; otherwise, it would swallow the rest of the 
statute, 
creating 
substantial 
redundancy. 
 
James, 
397 
Wis. 2d 516, 
¶¶22–23. 
 
Additionally, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 252.02 
specifically authorized DHS to "close schools," while a similar 
grant of authority was conspicuously absent from § 252.03.  Id., 
¶¶19–20. 
¶143 Ignoring James allows the majority to avoid grappling 
with a fundamental flaw in its reasoning.  Conspicuously absent 
from Wis. Stat. § 252.03 is any language granting local health 
officers the power to issue orders, a power Wis. Stat. § 252.02 
explicitly grants to DHS.  Under James, "if 'the legislature did 
not specifically confer a power,' the exercise of that power is 
not authorized."  Id., ¶18 (quoting Harris, 64 Wis. 2d at 527). 
¶144 Similarly, in Palm (another case ignored by the 
majority), this court held Wis. Stat. § 252.02's authorization 
to take "all emergency measures necessary" did not permit DHS to 
"confin[e] people to their homes, forbid[] travel [or] clos[e] 
businesses."  391 Wis. 2d 497, ¶¶45–59.  "We cannot expansively 
read statutes with imprecise terminology that purport to 
delegate lawmaking authority to an administrative agency."  Id., 
¶55; 
see 
also 
id., 
¶24 
(noting 
skepticism 
toward 
an 
interpretation of a statute that would allow a single "unelected 
official[ to] create law applicable to all people during the 
course of COVID-19 and subject people to imprisonment when they 
disobeyed her order"). 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
51 
 
¶145 The majority's conclusions in this case cannot be 
reconciled with James or Palm, so the majority ignores those 
cases.  Wisconsin Stat. § 252.03 cannot be read to give local 
health officers greater power to rule over the people than their 
state counterpart possesses.  And a statute cannot override the 
constitutional constraints on the delegation of lawmaking 
power.27   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶146 [L]ocal assemblies of citizens constitute the 
strength of free nations.  Town-meetings are to 
liberty what primary schools are to science; they 
bring it within the people's reach, they teach man how 
to use and how to enjoy it.  A nation may establish a 
system of free government, but without the spirit of 
municipal institutions it cannot have the spirit of 
liberty. 
1 Alexis Tocqueville, Democracy in America ch. V, Part I (1835).   
 
¶147 Today's majority insulates local government from the 
oversight of the town hall meeting——a beacon of representative 
democracy——subjecting 
the 
people 
to 
the 
whims 
of 
an 
unaccountable 
overlord. 
 
The 
majority 
displaces 
the 
constitutional design for the exercise of lawmaking power with a 
"technocracy"28 the majority favors.  As Justice Patience Drake 
                                                 
27 Justice Hagedorn apparently believes statutes take 
precedence over the constitution.  Ignoring the glaring absence 
of 
any 
constitutional 
authority, 
Justice 
Hagedorn 
says 
penalizing the people for disobeying any order decreed by "local 
health authorities" is perfectly acceptable if the legislature 
says so, even though the people never consented.  Concurrence, 
¶64. 
28 Technocracy, The American Heritage Dictionary (5th ed. 
2011) ("A government or social system controlled by technicians, 
especially scientists and technical experts."). 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
52 
 
Roggensack 
described 
during 
oral 
argument 
in 
this 
case:  
"Counsel, I give you that a dictatorship which is what Heinrich 
exercised for about two years is the most efficient manner of 
handling a problem you're focusing on, but it is not necessarily 
a democratic manner."  Efficiency bears a heavy price.  A 
"technocratic" approach to government "drains public discourse 
of 
substantive 
moral 
argument 
and 
treats 
ideologically 
contestable questions as if they were matters of economic 
efficiency, the province of experts."  See Michael J. Sandel, 
The Tyranny of Merit:  What's Become of the Common Good 20 
(2020).  It tells the common citizen he has no right to 
participate in government, for he is not a "technical expert" 
and the complexities of modern life are "beyond the reach" of 
his 
feeble 
understanding. 
 
Id. 
 
"This 
narrow[ing]" 
of 
"democratic government" "hollow[s] out the terms of public 
discourse, and produce[s] a growing sense of disempowerment."  
Id.  
¶148 In declaring independence from the crown, the Founders 
sought to escape despotism:  "when a long train of abuses and 
usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a 
design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their 
right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to 
provide new Guards for their future security."  The Declaration 
of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).  Not only is it our 
constitutional duty to apply the original meaning of the 
Wisconsin Constitution's structural safeguards, it is essential 
to preventing the collapse of representative democracy.  The 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
53 
 
people of this state constitutionally constrained the exercise 
of power over them, but the majority refuses to enforce those 
limits, opting instead to "look[] the other way"29 as unelected 
bureaucrats run roughshod over the people's liberty.  For two 
years, "[s]eas would rise when [Heinrich] gave the word"; she 
"held the key" to power.  ColdPlay, Viva La Vida (2008).  
Lacking any constitutional foundation, her usurped authority 
"stand[s] upon pillars of salt and pillars of sand" and nothing 
the majority says can fortify it.  Id.  The majority abandons 
its station as a bulwark of liberty.  I dissent.  
¶149 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and Justice PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join 
this dissent. 
 
                                                 
29 Concurrence, ¶53. 
Nos.  2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.rgb 
 
 
 
1