Title: Foote v. Simmonds Precision Products

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 90-182


 Fletcher E. Foote                            Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Addison Superior Court

 Simmonds Precision Products Co.,             November Term, 1991
 Inc., Robert Morris, Paul Brace
 and Anthony Panella


 David A. Jenkins, J.

 Thomas Z. Carlson of Langrock, Sperry & Wool, Burlington, for plaintiff-
   appellee

 Craig Weatherly of Gravel and Shea, Burlington, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ., Peck, J. (Ret.),
      Specially Assigned



      JOHNSON, J.   The primary issue before us is whether the doctrine of
 promissory estoppel may modify an employment contract that is otherwise
 terminable at will.  We hold that it may and affirm.
      This is an appeal from a jury verdict for plaintiff, Fletcher Foote,
 against his former employer, Simmonds Precision Products Co., Inc.
 Plaintiff was discharged from his employment as a computer operator after
 approximately twenty years of service.  Defendant claimed that plaintiff was
 fired for falsifying his time card.  Plaintiff alleged that his discharge
 was the result of his efforts to use the grievance procedure published in
 the company's employee handbook.  The procedure assured employees that
 "[i]f you follow these steps, you cannot be criticized or penalized in any
 way."  Plaintiff claimed that he relied on this promise of nonretaliation.
 Defendant pointed to another passage in the employee handbook, which stated
 that "[t]he employment relationship between the company and you may be
 terminated by either party at any time."  On that basis, it contended that
 plaintiff was an at-will employee and it was entitled to discharge him.
      The evidence showed that, prior to his use of the grievance procedure,
 plaintiff had an excellent work history as a senior computer operator at
 Simmonds.  His periodic evaluations were consistently very good to
 outstanding.  In the late summer of 1986, he and other operators became
 concerned about the hiring of a supervisor whom they considered unqualified,
 and about changes in pay and benefit practices.  Although plaintiff wanted
 to pursue these problems through defendant's grievance process, he was
 concerned about losing his job.   He consulted an employee relations manager
 about how to pursue grievances within the company's policy.  The manager
 referred him to the "Problem-Solving Procedure" in the Employee Handbook,
 containing the language that employees could not be criticized or penalized
 in any way if they complied with the procedures.  Defendant's personnel
 manager testified that the company intended that employees rely on the
 statement.
      Plaintiff attempted to follow the procedure, but was met with
 increasing irritation by his supervisors.  In December 1986, plaintiff
 suffered a poor work evaluation, which he claimed was unjustified.  Three
 months later, he was discharged.  According to defendant, plaintiff recorded
 hours on his time card that he had not actually worked.  Plaintiff contended
 he was relying on a policy that allowed computer operators to leave before
 the end of their shifts.  Defendant claimed it had discontinued the policy
 and specifically notified plaintiff.
      The jury believed plaintiff's side of the story.  Although plaintiff
 proceeded on express and implied contract theories, as well as promissory
 estoppel, the jury based its verdict solely on promissory estoppel.  Its
 verdict was reflected in a series of interrogatories.  The relevant inter-
 rogatories and answers were:
         1.  At the time of termination of employment of Fletcher
         Foote, was there an employment contract that could be
         terminated at will by the employer?  Yes.

         2.  At the time of termination of employment, was there
         an employment contract that required good cause for
         termination of employment by the employer?  No.

         3.  Did Simmonds Precision Products Co., Inc. breach a
         contract of employment when Fletcher Foote was term-
         inated from employment?  No.

         4.  Was Fletcher Foote terminated from employment by
         Simmonds Precision Products Co., Inc. for good cause?
         No.

         5.  Were Fletcher Foote's grievances the real reason
         leading to termination and the real reason for term-
         ination was not any false time card and the employer
         should be estopped from saying he was properly
         terminated?  Yes.

         7.  What damages do you find, if any, for breach of
         contract?  $150,000.00.

 After the jury returned its verdict, an additional interrogatory was
 submitted and answered, as follows:
         Is the damage amount of $150,000.00 for damages
         proximately caused by the promissory estoppel answer of
         question #5.  Yes.

     On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying its
 motions for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
 Although variously phrased, defendant's arguments boil down to three  --
 promissory estoppel should not have been charged as an independent cause of
 action that may modify an at-will employment contract, the jury's answers to
 the interrogatories are legally inconsistent, and alternatively, that the
 evidence was insufficient to prove the elements of promissory estoppel. (FN1)
      The legal question raised by motions for directed verdict and for
 judgment notwithstanding the verdict under V.R.C.P. 50 is the same.  The
 question is whether the result reached by the jury is sound in law on the
 evidence produced.  Kinzer v. Degler Corp., 145 Vt. 410, 412,