Title: BAC v. BLM

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BAC v. BLM2001 WY 8330 P.3d 573Case Number: C-00-7Decided: 09/06/2001

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2001

BAC, 

Appellant(Respondent),

 

v.

 

BLM, 

Appellee(Respondent).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Ronald G. Pretty, Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. Pretty. 

 Representing 
Appellee:

Anthony 
F. Ross of Ross, Ross & Santini, L.L.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. Ross. 

 

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J.; GOLDEN and KITE, JJ.; and DAN SPANGLER, D.J., 
Ret.

 
            
LEHMAN, Chief Justice.

 [¶1]      This case 
requires that we determine whether procedures used by the district court 
com­missioner and the district court satisfy constitutional and statutory 
requirements.  We decide 
spe­cifically whether the commissioner acted beyond his statutory authority 
when he did not allow Appellant BAC (Mother) to introduce certain evidence at 
the custody hearing.  Having 
de­termined that the actions of the commissioner and the district court were 
violative of consti­tutional and statutory requirements, we reverse and 
remand.

 

 

ISSUE

 

[¶2]      Mother presents 
this statement of the issue: 

 

Did the Court Commissioner err when it did not allow 
the intro­duction of certain evidence[?]

 

Appellee BLM restates the 
issue:

 

Did the procedures utilized by the District Court and 
the Court Commissioner, in this case, satisfy constitutional and statutory 
requirements?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      This case began 
in August of 1997 with the Department of Family Services (DFS) filing a petition 
to establish paternity and support for the parties' minor child, MJC, and 
seeking reimbursement for public assistance funds expended on the child's 
behalf.  Genetic tests subsequently 
filed by the State indicated that BLM (Father) was the biological father of 
MJC.  After several continuances, an 
informal hearing was set before the commissioner on June 8, 1998, at which the 
parties stipulated to paternity, a change in the child's birth certifi­cate, 
and the State's judgment against Father in the sum of $4,199.56 for 
reimbursement, costs, and fees.  
Following this development, no representative of the State participated 
fur­ther in the case or attended any hearing.  Nor is the State a party to this appeal. 

 

[¶4]      A subsequent 
hearing to determine the contested issues of custody, visitation, and child 
support was set for October 12, 1998.  
On October 6, 1998, Mother filed a motion to transfer the case from the 
commissioner to the district court.  
Father filed an objection to the motion, claiming it was brought only for 
purposes of delaying the proceeding.  
The record is silent on any further action or hearing on the motion, but 
the custody hearing was ultimately held in front of the commissioner on October 
12.  The hearing began with Father's 
case in chief but was not completed on that date and was once again continued 
until December 8, 1998.  Mother's 
counsel filed a motion requesting that Father's tape-recorded testimony be 
transcribed by the court reporter for purposes of cross-examination at the next 
hearing.  The record does not 
contain a transcript of this testimony.  
On November 4, 1998, Mother filed a motion requesting that the district 
court, pursuant to W.R.C.P. 35, order both her and Father to undergo blood and 
urine tests for illegal drugs on the grounds that it was alleged at the hearing 
that she was a user of illegal drugs and Father had admitted under oath that he 
was a user of illegal drugs.  Father 
objected to the motion.  Mother's 
counsel asked for a fifteen-minute hearing on the motion which was scheduled in 
front of the commissioner on March 17, 1999.  On December 8, 1998, the parties, their 
respective counsel, and witnesses ap­peared to continue the hearing begun on 
October 12.  At the time, Mother was 
incarcerated for motor vehicle offenses and had granted temporary custody of MJC 
to her sister.  At the close of the 
day's hearing, the commissioner made findings and recommended that Father have 
temporary custody of MJC pending completion of the custody hearing, which was 
once again continued until August 10, 1999.  The district court entered its order 
granting tempo­rary custody to Father on December 9, 1998.  

 

[¶5]      The parties, 
counsel, and witnesses appeared on August 10, 1999; however, due to lack of 
time, the hearing was again continued until October 12, 1999, one full year from 
the initial hearing.  The final 
hearing was held on that date, and all testimony was completed.  The following day, Mother filed an 
affidavit from Dr. Melissa Thompson stating that she had treated Mother in 
August of 1998 for an allergic reaction to spider bites which, in her 
opin­ion, was consistent with the lesions which had formed on Mother's upper 
extremities.1  On October 14, 1999, the commissioner 
filed his report, proposed findings of fact, and recom­mendation that Father 
be granted sole custody of MJC.  On 
October 26, 1999, Mother filed an affidavit from Dr. Karen Phillips stating that 
she had reviewed urinalysis test results from Mother dated August 5, 1999, taken 
in the course of Mother's employment and this test was negative for illegal 
narcotics.  Mother filed her 
objections and supplemental objections to the commissioner's report and 
recommendation on November 2, 1999.  
Father responded on November 16.  
No hearing was held by the district court on the objections.  Instead, the dis­trict court issued 
its decision letter on December 8, 1999, in which it summarily rejected the 
objections and adopted the commissioner's recommendation.  Its order establishing paternity, 
custody, visitation, and child support was filed on the same date.  This timely appeal 
fol­lowed.

 

[¶6]      The record in 
this case is primarily comprised of seven unlabeled audiotapes of the hearings 
before the commissioner, one of which is blank,2 and a transcription of two tape 
re­cordings of the August 10, 1999, hearing.  The transcript illustrating evidentiary 
rulings made by the commissioner was prepared for purposes of this 
appeal.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶7]      In this opinion, 
we do not address the case before us on its merits.  Consequently, we will not make any 
judgment as to whether the custody arrangement ordered by the district court 
ultimately is in the best interests of the minor child.  Rather, we address whether the 
procedures used by the commissioner and the district court in making its 
determination satis­fied certain constitutional and statutory requirements 
and whether due process was afforded to the parties involved.  We conclude that the procedures utilized 
were inadequate and thus reverse and remand to the district 
court.

 

[¶8]      This court has 
examined the procedures used by the commissioner and the district court in 
Laramie County in several cases.  See Harris v. Harris, 948 P.2d 405 
(Wyo. 1997); May v. May, 945 P.2d 1189 (Wyo. 1997); Gaines v. Doby, 
773 P.2d 442 (Wyo. 1989); K.C. v. State, 771 P.2d 774 (Wyo. 1989); 
Foster v. Foster, 768 P.2d 1038 (Wyo. 1989).  In each of these cases, we have 
emphasized that our statutory and constitutional system recognizes only a 
limited role for a commissioner appointed by the district court.  As early as 1912, this court recognized 
the limited nature of a court commissioner's powers:  "The commissioner as to matters pending 
in the court is a subordinate officer of the court.  He is not a District Judge who alone 
possesses the power to preside over a District Court.  There can be no such court in the 
absence of a qualified judge de facto or de jure.  The Court Commissioner is 
neither."  Huhn v. Quinn, 21 
Wyo. 51, 60-61, 128 P. 514, 516 (1912); see also May, 945 P.2d  at 
1192.  

 

Evidentiary Rulings

 

[¶9]      Applying this 
reasoning to evidentiary rulings by the commissioner, we held in May 
that, while Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-3-307(a)(v) is clear and unambiguous in 
authorizing a commissioner to "take evidence and make findings, 
and report the same to the district court," the statutory subsection does not 
confer upon the commissioner the authority to exclude evidence or to make legal 
rulings determining the admissibility of evidence.  Id. at 1192.  We expressly held that the authority to 
make legal rulings on the evidence is vested solely in the district court. 

 

[¶10]   
In hearing the instant case, the commissioner made multiple evidentiary 
rulings limit­ing or excluding the admission of testimony of Mother and 
Mother's witnesses on various grounds throughout the proceedings in clear 
contravention of our holding in May.  We reem­phasize that, when acting 
under the authority granted by § 5-3-307(a)(v), a commissioner does not have the 
power to exclude evidence or make evidentiary rulings determining the 
admissibility of evidence.  "The 
differentiation is between adjunct fact finding and plenary judicial 
responsibility."  Id. 
(quoting Foster, 768 P.2d  at 1042 (Urbigkit, J., specially 
con­curring)).

 

[¶11]   
We conclude that the applicable subsection contemplates that a hearing 
before the com­missioner more closely resembles a deposition procedurally 
rather than a trial in regard to the admissibility of evidence.  A party may make evidentiary objections, 
but the commis­sioner may not exclude the offered evidence from the 
hearing.  Unquestionably, the 
district court is the ultimate fact finder and therefore must be able to 
independently review all evi­dence and findings in making its decision, with 
such review being indicated on the record.  
In this case, the commissioner clearly exceeded his authority by making 
evidentiary rulings.

 

[¶12]   
A further rationale for the remand in May came as a result of the 
district court's order stating that its findings were made based upon "the 
Commissioner's summary of evidence and the proposed findings and 
recommendations, the basis for such proposed findings and recommendations, the 
objections of the parties, if any, [and] the pertinent parts of the 
evi­dence."  
Id.  We found this 
review inadequate because, while the commissioner's report was factually 
detailed, it failed to inform the district court that certain evidence had been 
ex­cluded from consideration.  
Id.  Likewise, in the 
case before us, the district court's order uses the exact same language 
indicating its findings were made upon an identical basis, and once again the 
commissioner's report fails to disclose his evidentiary 
rulings.

 

[¶13]   
We concluded in May that we were unable to discern whether the 
district court relied upon the commissioner's determination that the father's 
evidence was inadmissible or whether it reviewed the excluded evidence and made 
an independent ruling on its admissi­bility.  We thus remanded the case to the 
district court to make those determinations.  In this case, the district court's 
decision letter appears to broadly imply that it has reviewed the commissioner's 
evidentiary rulings.3  However, when the commissioner exceeds 
his statutory and constitutional authority by making evidentiary rulings in the 
first instance, we cannot say that a cursory review by the district court 
without analysis or reference to any specific evi­dentiary ruling is enough 
to ratify the commissioner's acts as its own.

 

Nondelegable Duties/Due 
Process

 

[¶14]   
Of greater import than our holdings on the evidentiary issues associated 
with the use of the commissioner in domestic relations cases are this court's 
express holdings that a dis­trict court's powers to hear, try, or determine 
a case are nondelegable to a commissioner.  
K.C., 771 P.2d  at 778; Foster, 768 P.2d 1038; Huhn, 
21 Wyo. 51, 128 P. 514; see also Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157, 166 
(Utah App. 1992); C. C. C. v. District Court for Fourth Judicial Dist., 
535 P.2d 1117 (Colo. 1975); State ex rel. Smith v. Starke Circuit Court, 
417 N.E.2d 1115, 1121-23 (Ind. 1981).  As the Utah Appellate Court noted in 
Holm:

 

Commissioners have no accountability to the public, 
but only to the judges for whom they work.  
The people have a right to have their cases and controversies ultimately 
decided by . . . judges who have been vested with judicial power by the 
constitution.  Anything less is a 
clear violation of the Utah constitution and Utah law.

 

840 P.2d  at 168.

 

[¶15]   
This statement is equally applicable under Wyoming law, and to that end 
this court has often stated that the district court must review the evidence and 
findings and make its de­cision based upon the basis of that review.  Further, the record must clearly 
indicate to this court that the district court independently 
reviewed the evidence and findings to reach its in­formed decision.  This requirement is especially necessary 
in child custody cases because "[t]he right to associate with one's immediate 
family is a fundamental liberty protected by the state and federal 
constitutions."  Hall v. 
Hall, 708 P.2d 416, 421 (Wyo. 1985) (quoting DS v. Department of Public 
Assistance and Social Services, 607 P.2d 911, 918 (Wyo. 1980)).  It is firmly established in our 
jurisprudence that "[r]esolution of which parent shall have custody necessarily 
implicates the fundamental right of family association.  Accordingly, a court must afford a 
parent notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before it can deny the 
parent custody of his or her children."  
Id.  While this court 
has reluctantly allowed the use of a commissioner in some domestic relations 
matters, we herein reiterate that district courts in Wyoming have no authority 
to abdicate their decision-making responsibilities on these fundamental issues 
to others.

 

[¶16]   
Therefore, we again expressly hold that, if the district court does not 
conduct the ini­tial hearing of a child custody case on its merits, at an 
absolute minimum, full, complete, and independent review of the entire record by 
the district court is mandated and must be demon­strated on the record.  This result is necessary both to 
vindicate a parent's rights to associate with his or her children and to ensure 
that a district judge ultimately determines those custody arrangements that are 
in the best interests of our state's minor children.

 

[¶17]   
In the instant case, we cannot conclude on the record before us that 
Mother received a meaningful opportunity to be heard by the district court on 
the issues of child custody and visitation, nor can we determine that the 
district court independently determined that the custody 
arrangement recommended by the commissioner was in the best interests of the 
mi­nor child.  The district 
court's decision letter is strongly indicative of an appellate-type re­view 
of the parties' objections to the commissioner's report, findings, and 
evidentiary rulings rather than the requisite full review and first-instance 
determination of the custody arrange­ment in the best interests of MJC.  It is not a sufficient fulfillment of 
the district court's non­delegable duties for it merely to determine that a 
party's objections to a commissioner's rec­ommendation lack merit.  Due process requires that the district 
court go further and affirma­tively determine the custody decision on its 
merits using the factors outlined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201 (LexisNexis 
2001) and then that its independent decision-making and ra­tionale be made 
clear to this court on the record.

 

[¶18]   
We have stated that in most instances the district court will require a 
transcript of the evidentiary hearing in order to conduct a meaningful review of 
the case.  Foster, 768 P.2d  
at 1042; Gaines, 773 P.2d  at 445.  
We note that none was provided here.  Although we are reluctant to require 
parents, some of whom are impoverished, to incur transcription costs simply to 
ensure their custody case is decided by the district court in their judicial 
district, we cannot say that untranscribed audiotapes and a commissioner's 
report, no matter how factu­ally detailed, are an adequate substitute.4  Our comparison of the commissioner's 
report to the transcript indicates that the report often strips testimony of its 
necessary context and ex­act phraseology and may thus give a false 
impression of events.  To 
illustrate: in the case be­fore us, Mother's mother, when questioned by 
counsel regarding Mother's housekeeping abilities, described an incident that 
occurred once when she was visiting her daughter.  She testified that, although bowls were 
present on the table, MJC had taken his dry cereal out of the bowl and was 
lining the pieces up on the table and eating them individually.  When asked why the cereal was not in a 
bowl, MJC stated in typical child-like fashion, "I didn't want it in a 
bowl."  In reporting this testimony, 
the commissioner synthesized the incident as "[o]ne time she saw [MJC] eating 
dry cereal off the table at natural mother's."  Although perhaps technically accurate, 
this is but one example of the manner in which evidence filtered through the 
commissioner is perhaps not as objectively neutral as a transcript of the 
pro­ceedings would be.  
Statements in the district court's decision letter and order, coupled 
with the lack of a written transcript of the hearings, and the state of the 
audiotapes leave this court with a significant concern that the district court 
may have unduly relied upon the commis­sioner's report in adopting his 
recommendation.

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶19]   
We have determined that the commissioner exceeded his authority in making 
eviden­tiary rulings that were not adequately ratified by the district 
court's review.  We have further 
held that, for all the foregoing reasons, the procedures utilized by the 
commissioner and the district court were insufficient to afford Mother due 
process.  Therefore, we reverse and 
re­mand to the district court to review the complete record in this case, 
conduct a hearing, at a minimum, on the parties' objections, and ultimately 
determine and place on the record the custody arrangement in the best interests 
of the minor child, MJC.5  Over three years have elapsed since this 
custody proceeding began.  Although 
this court is fully cognizant of the demands on the district courts' dockets, we 
direct that this matter be given priority treatment and the judicial process no 
longer be allowed to withhold from this child the certainty and security of a 
final proper custody order.

 

FOOTNOTES

1Multiple witnesses' testimony at each 
hearing concerned these lesions.  
The implication put forward through Father and his witnesses was that 
they were caused by the use of illegal narcotics. 

 

2Audiotape "DCC 
113".

 

3The district court in its decision 
letter stated that there is no evidence in the record that the commissioner 
improperly admitted or excluded any evidence.  We have already determined that the 
commissioner has no authority to exclude evidence.  Further, after reviewing the transcripts 
and portions of the tape recordings, we question many of the commissioner's 
specific evidentiary rulings.

 

4We are concerned that a transcript 
requirement may raise issues relative to an indigent party's right to equal 
access to the courts.

 

5We also note that it appears from the 
record that no guardian ad litem was appointed for MJC as seems required by Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-2-107 (LexisNexis 2001) on these facts.  We presume upon remand that this 
oversight will be remedied.