Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: ABE S. WHEELER v. STATE OF WYOMING ex rel. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: ABE S. WHEELER v. STATE OF WYOMING ex rel. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION2010 WY 161Case Number: No. S-10-0041Decided: 12/10/2010NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 

IN 
THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF:ABE S. 
WHEELER,Appellant (Petitioner),v.STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., 
WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION,Appellee 
(Respondent).

 
 
 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Uinta County

The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Michael 
D. Newman, Hampton & Newman, L.C., Rock Springs, Wyoming; Donna D. Domonkos, 
Cheyenne, Wyoming; George Santini, Ross, Ross & Santini, LLC, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney 
General; James Michael Causey, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kelly 
Roseberry, Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of expedited conference.

 
 
KITE, 
Chief Justice.            

 
 
[¶1]      Mr. Wheeler 
developed post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and major depressive disorder 
(MDD) after two of his fellow volunteer firefighters died in an explosion.  He appeals from the district court's 
order affirming the Office of Administrative Hearing's (OAH) denial of worker's 
compensation benefits for treatment of his PTSD and MDD.  Concluding that the OAH properly applied 
the statutory language which excludes benefits for a mental injury unless it is 
caused by a compensable physical injury, we affirm.      

 
 
 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Wheeler 
presents the following issues on appeal:

 
 
Issue 
I

 
 
            
The overwhelming weight of the evidence is post traumatic stress disorder 
and major depressive disorder are caused by physical changes in the human 
organism and meet the definition of injury in Wyo. Stat. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi).

 
 
Issue 
II

 
 
            
The hearing examiner's decision was arbitrary and capricious and 
otherwise not in accordance with the law.

 
 
Issue 
III

            

            
Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-102[(a)](xi)(J) is unconstitutional as it is vague, 
undefined and inapplicable to the claimant's condition and fails to apply the 
constitutional provision of Article 10 Section 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.

 
 
The 
State ex. rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation and Safety Division (the Division) 
phrases the issues differently:

 
 

I.              
Was 
the Hearing Examiner's decision denying benefits because Wheeler's mental 
injuries were not caused by a compensable physical injury supported by 
substantial evidence?

 
 

II.            
Was 
the Hearing Examiner's decision denying benefits arbitrary, capricious, or 
otherwise not in accordance with Wyoming law?

 
 

III.           
Can 
Wheeler's argument that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(J) is 
unconstitutional be properly raised in an administrative 
proceeding?

 
 
 
 
FACTS

            

[¶3]      The tragic facts 
of this case are not in dispute.  
Mr. Wheeler had been a volunteer firefighter and emergency medical 
technician (EMT) for several years when he responded to a fire call on April 18, 
2005.  The fire was located at an 
apartment complex in Evanston where he and his family lived.   

 
 
[¶4]      Mr. Wheeler 
arrived at the complex and donned his fire fighting gear.  In the meantime, two other firefighters 
entered the burning building because they had received reports there were 
children trapped inside.  While the 
firemen were inside the building, there was a large explosion.  Mr. Wheeler attempted to enter the 
building through the front door, but could not because of the fire.  He also tried a side window, but it also 
was blocked by fire.  Mr. Wheeler 
obtained a hose and finally entered the building from the back.  He initially proceeded down a hallway, 
but then froze in fear until his lieutenant pushed him forward.  As Mr. Wheeler climbed some stairs, his 
breathing apparatus snagged on the stairway railing.  He worked to free the equipment and then 
saw one of the firefighters who had been in the building during the 
explosion.  The firefighter was 
lying on the floor and had been burned beyond recognition.  He also saw the other fireman, who had 
suffered a similar fate.  Both 
firemen died as a result of their injuries.    

 
 
[¶5]      While in the 
building, the alarm on Mr. Wheeler's breathing apparatus activated. He panicked 
and removed the mask from his face, but his lieutenant put it back on and pulled 
him out of the building.  Mr. 
Wheeler suffered burns to his face, back and legs and smoke inhalation.      

 
 
[¶6]      Mr. Wheeler was 
taken to a local hospital and then transferred to Salt Lake City for treatment 
of his injuries.  Those injuries 
eventually healed; however, Mr. Wheeler began to experience emotional problems, 
including sleep difficulties, anger, difficulties with family, work and social 
interaction, and paranoia.  The fire 
department arranged for a counselor to "debrief" the department members in a 
group session, but Mr. Wheeler said he did not benefit from it.     

 
 
[¶7]      Mr. Wheeler 
eventually sought individual treatment and was diagnosed with PTSD and MDD.  He received prescription drug treatment 
and counseling to address the problems.  
At first, the Division paid for his treatment.  In June 2006, the Division referred Mr. 
Wheeler for a permanent partial impairment (PPI) rating for his PTSD.  He saw two different doctors, both of 
whom stated that he had not yet reached maximum medical improvement (MMI), 
although one issued an eight percent PPI rating.  The Division obtained a record review 
from impairment evaluation experts, Brigham & Associates, who confirmed that 
he had not reached MMI, but also stated that he suffered from a mental, rather 
than physical, injury.    

 
 
[¶8]      The Division 
offered Mr. Wheeler an eight percent PPI award, to which he objected.  The Division also issued final 
determinations denying any further claims for treatment of his PTSD on the basis 
that his injury was mental in nature and not compensable under the statutory 
definition of injury, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(J) (LexisNexis 
2009).  Mr. Wheeler objected and the 
matter was referred to the OAH for a hearing.1  After a contested case hearing, the OAH 
issued a decision denying benefits for treatment of his PTSD and MDD.  Mr. Wheeler filed a petition for review, 
the district court affirmed, and he appealed to this Court.      

           

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶9]      On appeal from a 
district court's review of an administrative agency's decision, we give no 
deference to the district court's decision.  We review the case as if it had come 
directly from the administrative agency.  Dutcher v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Safety & Comp. Div., 2010 WY 10, ¶ 9, 223 P.3d 559, 561 (Wyo. 2010); 
Dale 
v. S & S Builders, LLC, 
2008 WY 84, ¶ 8, 188 P.3d 554, 557 (Wyo. 2008). 
 Our review is governed by 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) 
(LexisNexis 2009):

 
 
(c) 
To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing 
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review 
the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be 
taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court 
shall:

         
(i) Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and

         
(ii)  Hold unlawful and set 
aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:

            
(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with law;

            
(B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;

            
(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or 
lacking statutory right;

            
(D) Without observance of procedure required by law; 
or

            
(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record 
of an agency hearing provided by statute.

 
 

[¶10]   We review the agency's findings of 
fact by applying the substantial evidence standard.  Dale, 
¶ 22, 188 P.3d  at 561.  Substantial evidence means "such relevant evidence 
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 
Bush 
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Comp. Div., 
2005 WY 120, ¶ 5, 120 P.3d 176, 179 (Wyo. 2005) 
(citation omitted).  "Findings of 
fact are supported by substantial evidence if, from the evidence 
preserved in the record, we can discern a rational premise for those findings." 
 Id.  "We review an agency's conclusions of 
law de novo, and will affirm only if the 
agency's conclusions are in accordance with the law."  Moss v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Comp. 
Div., 2010 WY 66, ¶ 11, 232 P.3d 1, 4 (Wyo. 2010); Dale, ¶ 22, 188 P.3d  at 561.  

 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
 
 

A.   Mental 
Injury/Physical Injury

 
 
[¶11]   Mr. Wheeler claims that the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence presented at the contested case hearing 
established that his PTSD and MDD conditions were physical injuries and, 
thereby, compensable under the relevant statute.  Section 27-14-102(a)(xi)(J) states in 
relevant part:

 
 

(a)  
As 
used in this act:

            
. . . .

(xi) 
"Injury" means any harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging 
and includes damage to or loss of any artificial replacement and death, arising 
out of and in the course of employment while at work in or about the premises 
occupied, used or controlled by the employer and incurred while at work in 
places where the employer's business requires an employee's presence and which 
subjects the employee to extrahazardous duties incident to the business. 
"Injury" does not include:

                        
            
. . . .

            
(J) Any mental injury unless it is caused by a compensable physical 
injury, it occurs subsequent to or simultaneously with, the physical injury and 
it is established by clear and convincing evidence, which shall include a 
diagnosis by a licensed psychiatrist or licensed clinical psychologist meeting 
criteria established in the most recent edition of the diagnostic and 
statistical manual of mental disorders published by the American Psychiatric 
Association. In no event shall benefits for a compensable mental injury be paid 
for more than six (6) months after an injured employee's physical injury has 
healed to the point that it is not reasonably expected to substantially improve. 
 

 
 
[¶12]   It is important to understand that 
Mr. Wheeler is not claiming that his PTSD and MDD were caused by the smoke 
inhalation or burn injuries he suffered in the fire.  Instead, he is arguing that PTSD and MDD 
are, themselves, physical injuries and therefore compensable under the Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Act.  Mr. 
Wheeler bases his argument that PTSD and MDD are physical injuries on the 
testimony of Dr. Bruce Kahn, a board certified psychiatrist who diagnosed and 
treated Mr. Wheeler.  A 
representative sample of Dr. Kahn's testimony follows:  

 
 
            
Q.        
In that diagnostic manual [Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV)], are there guidelines or other information 
in that manual that either caution or explain or distinguish, however you want 
to say, between a mental disorder versus a condition of physical 
injury?

            
A.        
Yes.  The manual cautions 
against confusing the words "organic mental disorder" with all of the 
diagnosable psychiatric disorders.  
And in DSMIII, the predecessor to DSM-IV, there used to be a set of 
disorders known as organic mental disorders.

There's a 
note in DSMIV which eliminated that entire classification of disorders.  There is no longer a proper diagnosis 
according to DSMIV of organic mental disorders.  There are cautionary notes to the effect 
that that classification of organic mental disorders was eliminated entirely in 
order to avoid confusing or giving the impression that other psychiatric 
disorders did not have an organic basis because we know nowadays scientifically 
that psychiatric disorders have their roots in organic disturbances, i.e., 
physical disturbances of the brain. 

You don't 
need to say "organic" because mental disorders are fundamentally in nature 
organic in origin.  Organic meaning 
that they have a basis biologically in the neurophysiological and 
neuroanatomical substrate of the brain.

            
Q.        And, 
Doctor, could you explain in layman's terms what your opinion is with respect to 
the physical organic basis of a posttraumatic stress disorder 
condition?

            
A.        
Very succinctly.  The brain 
is traumatized physically by the experience of a traumatic event where one's 
life is threatened or one is witnessing another life-threatening or potentially 
life-threatening type of event.

            
And in the experience of that the brain goes into a very heightened state 
of arousal biologically. . . ., the chemistry that subserves that arousal sets 
into motion a cascade of biological events as if dominoes are falling, and they 
affect a number of physical aspects of brain functioning . . . 
.

            
Structurally over time these events can even cause radiographically 
demonstrable changes . . . .  And 
you can actually visualize radiographically changes that have occurred 
structurally in the brain as a result of posttraumatic stress disorder.  

            
Q.        It's 
been brought to my attention, at least through the circumstances of this case, 
that various governmental agencies and perhaps state workers' compensation 
systems use  define posttraumatic stress as a mental disorder.  Is that 
inconsistent?

            
A.        I 
think to define it as a mental disorder can be very misleading because many 
people, especially lay people, assume that if you classify something as a mental 
disorder, that that means it isn't physical in nature.  And that's not the current level of 
scientific understanding of mental disorders. 

 
 
Dr. 
Kahn also testified that Mr. Wheeler's depression "resulted from clear injury to 
[his] brain."  

 
 
[¶13]   Thus, Dr. Kahn testified that PTSD 
and MDD have biological or "organic" roots and to call them strictly mental 
disorders or injuries is scientifically incorrect.  The other evidence on the nature of the 
disorders, including the report from the Division's expert Brigham & 
Associates, confirms that PTSD and MDD are accompanied by, or result from, 
physical changes in the brain.   

 
 
[¶14]   Nevertheless, we must apply the 
facts to the language of the statute.  
Statutory interpretation is a matter of law, with the goal being to 
determine and implement the legislature's intent.2  See, Diamond B Services, Inc. v. Rohde, 2005 
WY 130, ¶ 15, 120 P.3d 1031, 1038-39 (Wyo. 2005).  In doing so, we start with the plain 
language of the statute.  Id.  
Section 27-14-102(a)(xi)(J) generally defines injury as "any harmful change in the human organism," which, 
undoubtedly, PTSD and MDD are.  
However, the statute then specifically exempts a "mental injury unless it 
is caused by a compensable physical injury."  The term "mental injury" is not defined 
in the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Act.  

 
 
[¶15]   In determining whether Mr. 
Wheeler's PTSD and MDD are compensable, we must discern what the legislature 
intended by "mental injury."  Dr. 
Kahn indicated that distinguishing between mental and physical injuries is 
improper because "mental disorders are fundamentally . . . organic in origin," 
with organic meaning that they are biologically based.  However, if we interpret "mental injury" 
as being equivalent to "physical injury," subsection (J) would have no 
application.  Clearly, the 
legislature meant to exempt a certain type of injury from compensability when it 
excluded mental injuries.  See, e.g., Greene v. State ex rel. Wyoming Board of 
Chiropractic Examiners, 2009 WY 42, ¶ 15, 204 P.3d 285, 291 (Wyo. 2009) 
(stating that we give effect to every word, clause and sentence when 
interpreting statutes).  

 
 
[¶16]   Although we have not previously 
addressed the specific issue presented here, we have considered relevant aspects 
of § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(J) in earlier cases.3  Before the legislature amended the 
statute to its current form in 1994, work related mental injuries were 
compensable without an accompanying physical injury.  In Frantz v. Campbell County Mem. Hosp., 
932 P.2d 750, 752-54 (Wyo. 1997), we ruled that the revised statute did not 
violate equal protection by excluding mental injuries from workers' compensation 
coverage.  The rationale behind the 
exclusion includes the steadily growing number of claims for psychological 
disorders, the difficulty with verifying such claims because the claimant's 
description of his condition is often the sole basis for diagnosis and the 
difficulty with determining whether a causal relationship exists between the 
claimant's employment and the mental injury.  Id.  

 
 
[¶17]   In Sechrist v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
 Safety & Comp. Div., 2001 
WY 45, ¶ 11, 23 P.3d 1138, 1141 (Wyo. 2001), we ruled that § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(J) 
is unambiguous and requires the employee to meet the specific proof requirements 
set out in the statute in order to establish compensability, including the 
requirement that the employee show by clear and convincing evidence that he 
"suffered a compensable mental injury caused by a compensable physical 
injury."  Id., ¶ 11, 23 P.3d  at 1141.  This Court again confirmed the 
compensable physical injury requirement in Cook v. Shoshone First Bank, 2006 WY 13, 
¶ 15, 126 P.3d 886, 890-91 (Wyo. 2006), when we stated:  "Under the plain language of the 
statute, claims are not covered where the mental injury . . . [was] not caused 
by a compensable physical injury."  
In Brierley v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2002 WY 121, ¶ 1, 52 P.3d 564, 565 
(Wyo. 2002), we ruled that Mr. Brierley was entitled to benefits because he 
presented clear and convincing evidence that his attempted suicide was the 
result of a mental injury caused by a compensable physical injury.  None of these cases indicated that the 
mental injury or disorder suffered by the claimant should be characterized as a 
physical injury.  

 
 
[¶18]   Based upon the statutory language 
which clearly differentiates between mental and physical injuries, the fact that 
the legislature made a specific change in 1994 to exclude mental injuries that 
were not caused by compensable physical injuries and our case law interpreting 
the statute, we conclude that the requisite "physical 
injury" must be something outside of the biological changes in the brain 
associated with mental disorders.  
While we respect that Dr. Kahn disagrees with the legislature's 
policy choice to disallow mental injuries, we cannot overlook the clear language 
of the statute.    

 
 
[¶19]   Returning to the circumstances at 
issue here, Mr. Wheeler was diagnosed as having PTSD and MDD by reference to the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.  By definition, then, Mr. Wheeler's 
ailments are "mental" in nature.  
Moreover, the Brigham & Associates report stated that PTSD and MDD 
are commonly known as mental injuries and are not typically classified as 
physical injuries, although there are physical changes associated with the 
conditions.  With regard to PTSD, 
the report explained:

 
 
Posttraumatic 
stress disorder is not a physical injury because there are several 
biopsychosocial risk factors that influence whether a person will develop PTSD 
following an experience with a traumatic event.   Posttraumatic stress disorder is 
considered a mental, psychiatric or psychological disorder ("mental injury" 
using the language of the Wyoming Workers' Compensation law) by all United 
States Government agencies engaged in or supporting the biomedical and 
behavioral research of mental illnesses and psychological disorders.  These governmental agencies include the 
Department of Health and Human Services, the National Institute of Mental Health 
and the Center for Disease Control.  
Further, the American Medical Association, the American Psychiatric 
Association, the American Psychological Association, and the National Center of 
PTSD recognize PTSD as a psychological or mental disorder.   

 
 
Brigham 
& Associates' report included a similar discussion regarding MDD.      

 
 
[¶20]   The record contains substantial 
evidence to support the hearing examiner's conclusion that Mr. Wheeler's PTSD 
and MDD were mental injuries rather than physical injuries under § 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(J).  Given Mr. 
Wheeler does not contend that his PTSD and MDD were caused by his compensable 
physical injuries (the burns or smoke inhalation), the hearing examiner properly 
concluded that Mr. Wheeler's mental injuries were not compensable under Wyoming 
law.  

  

 
 
            
B.        
Compensable Physical Injury to 
Another

 
 
[¶21]   Mr. Wheeler asserts that the OAH 
decision was arbitrary and capricious because it did not consider the injuries 
to the two deceased firefighters as the "physical injuries" to establish the 
compensability of his mental injuries.  
In support of his interpretation of the statute, he directs us to an Ohio 
case which allowed, under statutory language similar to Wyoming's, a claim for a 
mental disorder caused by a physical injury to a co-worker.  Bailey v. Republic Engineered Steels, Inc., 
741 N.E.2d 121, 122-24 (Ohio 2001).  
In their respective briefs, Mr. Wheeler and the Division argue over 
whether the circumstances presented here are sufficiently comparable to those in 
Bailey and the effect of the Ohio 
legislature's subsequent amendment to the statute to disallow such claims.  

 
 
[¶22]   We decline to determine whether 
Wyoming's statute allows compensation for mental injuries caused by a 
compensable physical injury to another person because, even if it does, Mr. 
Wheeler has already received all the benefits to which he would be 
entitled.  The relevant portion of § 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(J) states: "In no event shall 
benefits for a compensable mental injury be paid for more than six (6) months 
after an injured employee's physical injury has healed to the point that it is 
not reasonably expected to substantially improve."  The firefighters died at the time of the 
explosion on April 18, 2005.  The 
Division paid for Mr. Wheeler's treatment for his mental injuries for more than 
six months after the firefighters' deaths.  
Thus, he received the maximum amount of benefits allowed under the 
statute.  Any decision by us about 
whether the statute allows benefits for mental injuries caused by physical 
injuries to another would have no effect.  
Consequently, we decline to further address this contention.  See generally, William F. West Ranch, LLC v. Tyrrell, 
2009 WY 62, ¶¶ 11-12, 27, 206 P.3d 722, 727, 731-32 (Wyo. 2009).  

            

            
C.   Constitutionality of the 
Statute

 
 
[¶23]   Mr. Wheeler also challenges the 
constitutionality of § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(J) on a number of bases.  Our case law, however, prohibits 
consideration of the constitutionality of a statute in an administrative 
appeal.  "[T]he correct course is an 
independent action for declaratory judgment."  Torres v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Safety & Comp. Div., 2004 WY 92, ¶ 6, 95 P.3d 794, 795 (Wyo. 2004).  

 
 
[¶24]   Mr. Wheeler asks us to overrule the 
declaratory judgment requirement.  
In Reidel v. Anderson (In re 
Conflicting Lease Applications), 972 P.2d 586, 586-88 (Wyo. 1999) (per 
curiam) and Torres, ¶ 8, 95 P.3d  at 
796, we explained that § 16-3-114 and W.R.A.P. 12.12 work together to delineate 
the proper courses of action for judicial review of agency decisions and 
challenges to the constitutionality of agency statutes.  Mr. Wheeler has not convinced us that 
those decisions were incorrect or provided us with a sufficient legal basis to 
disregard the concept of stare 
decisis.  See generally, Alpine 
Lumber Co. v. Capital West Nat'l Bank, 2010 WY 62, ¶¶ 10-12, 231 P.3d 869, 
872-73 (Wyo. 2010).  We, therefore, 
decline to consider this issue.   

 
 
 [¶25]  Affirmed. 

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The hearing examiner noted that the OAH did not have jurisdiction to 
consider the PPI award, as the Medical Commission has jurisdiction over such 
matters.  Accordingly, the agency 
order at issue here does not directly address the propriety of the PPI 
award.

 
 

2Mr. Wheeler makes a perplexing argument that the hearing examiner acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously when he "went outside the record" and based his 
decision on legislative intent.  
When applying a statute, the decision maker must always be focused on 
determining the legislature's intent.  
In making that determination, the hearing examiner or court may consider 
the statutory language and prior case law interpreting the statute.  There is no legal basis for Mr. 
Wheeler's argument that such an exercise was arbitrary and capricious.  

 
 

3Both 
Mr. Wheeler and the Division discuss cases from other jurisdictions which 
considered the compensability of mental disorders under their respective 
workers' compensation statutory schemes.  
See, e.g., Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Dep't v. 
Mottram, 559 S.E.2d 698 (Va. 2002), in which the claimant's repeated 
exposure to traumatic events at work caused his PTSD, and the court ruled that 
his condition was compensable as an occupational disease under Virginia's 
statutes, and Zach v. Nebraska State 
Patrol, 727 N.W.2d 206 (Neb. 2007), which held that a patrolman's suicide as 
a result of a work related incident was not compensable under Nebraska law.  Because of the vagaries in the statutory 
language, those cases are not particularly helpful to our decision.