Title: Waggoner v. General Motors Corp.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Waggoner v. General Motors Corp.1989 WY 70771 P.2d 1195Case Number: 87-209Decided: 03/17/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
JAMES 
WAGGONER, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

 
 
v.

 
 
GENERAL 
MOTORS CORPORATION, BURMAN MOTORS, INC., AGENT FOR GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION 
AND BURMAN MOTORS, INC., D/B/A WESTERN RENTALS, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Appeal from 
the District Court, AlbanyCounty, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

 
 
J. Dudley 
Butler of Skiles, Hageman & Butler, Laramie, for appellant.

 
 
Rebecca A. 
Lewis of Hirst & Applegate, Cheyenne, for appellee Gen. Motors 
Corp.

 
 
Paul D. 
Schierer of Pence and MacMillan, Laramie, for appellee Burman Motors, 
Inc.

 
 
Before 
BROWN*, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE**, URBIGKIT, and MACY 
JJ.

 
 

* Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument; retired June 29, 1988.

 
 
** Became 
Chief Justice June 30, 1988.

 
 

MACY, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This is a personal 
injury/products liability case initiated by appellant James Waggoner against 
appellees General Motors Corporation (General Motors) and Burman Motors, Inc. 
(Burman Motors) as the result of an automobile collision. The district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of appellees on appellant's strict liability 
and breach of warranty claims, and the jury reached a verdict adverse to 
appellant's negligence claims.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellant presents 
these issues for our consideration:

 
 
     I. Was the District Court's refusal 
to give the Plaintiff's jury instructions pertaining to bailments and the degree 
of care related thereto prejudicial error?

 
 
     II. Was the District 
Court's admittance of the deposition of Dr. Curnow arbitrary, capricious and an 
abuse of the Court's discretion?

 
 
     III. Was the District 
Court's dismissal by Summary Judgment of the Plaintiff['s], Jim Waggoner's, 
action for Breach of Implied Warranty reversible error?

 
 
     IV. Was the * * * 
District Court's dismissal by Summary Judgment of Plaintiff's tort action based 
on Strict Liability reversible error?

 
 

[¶4.]     In 1982 appellant 
purchased, in New 
Mexico, a new pickup manufactured by General Motors. 
Appellant experienced a variety of problems with the pickup, and, as a result of 
Burman Motors' inability to satisfy appellant's continued complaints, General 
Motors arranged to take the vehicle to Denver for repairs during the fall of 1984. A 
representative of General Motors requested Burman Motors, a Laramie, Wyoming, General Motors dealership, to provide 
appellant with a replacement vehicle, with General Motors allegedly paying the 
rental cost. Appellant delivered his pickup to Burman Motors for transport to 
Denver on 
September 24, 1984.

 
 

[¶5.]     Appellant requested 
Burman Motors to provide him with a four-wheel drive replacement vehicle capable 
of seating four to five adults, as he was expecting out-of-state guests for a 
scheduled hunting trip. Burman Motors, accordingly, provided appellant with a 
Chevrolet Suburban, with the understanding that it had to be returned by October 
11, 1984, since it had been reserved as of that date by another party. Appellant 
returned the Suburban on October 11, although his pickup had yet to be returned 
from Denver. 
Burman Motors offered appellant a Jeep pickup as a further replacement vehicle. 
Appellant declined to accept it, however, due to its lack of adequate seating 
capacity.1 Burman Motors indicated that the only 
vehicle it had available which met appellant's demand was a 1972 Jeep Wagoneer 
that they had recently received in trade. After inspecting the Jeep, appellant 
expressed that it was not satisfactory, but the representative for Burman Motors 
indicated that it was the only vehicle available meeting appellant's needs, and 
he stated something to the effect that appellant could take it or leave it. In a 
deposition, appellant stated that he experienced problems with the brakes on the 
Jeep immediately upon leaving Burman Motors' parking lot and that, when he 
reached home, he called the dealership to complain about the condition of the 
vehicle. Appellant apparently did not request that Burman Motors repair the 
Jeep, and he continued to drive it over the next ten days.

 
 

[¶6.]     On the morning of 
October 21, 1984, appellant was driving his family to church in the Jeep. A 
"skiff" of snow covered the roads. As appellant, who was driving east, 
approached a controlled intersection, a Ford Bronco approached the same 
intersection from the north. The Bronco ran the stop sign, and appellant 
collided broadside with it. The driver of the Bronco, Elizabeth Fiedler, who was 
not made a party to this action, was cited for failure to yield the right of 
way. Appellant allegedly sustained injuries from this 
accident.

 
 

[¶7.]     On February 27, 1986, 
appellant filed a complaint initiating this action against General Motors and 
Burman Motors. In this original complaint, appellant alleged causes of action 
premised on strict liability in tort, negligence, and negligence per se. By 
amended complaint, filed April 13, 1987, appellant added a claim for breach of 
implied warranties. Appellees timely filed answers to the original and amended 
complaints and asserted affirmative defenses. Thereafter, General Motors and 
Burman Motors separately filed motions for summary judgment. The district court 
conducted a hearing on the motions on April 27, 1987. Apparently, as asserted by 
appellees in their briefs, appellant withdrew his claim of negligence per se 
during the motion hearing, although this fact is not verifiable on the limited 
record provided for review which does not include a transcript of the motion 
hearing. In any event, that claim is never mentioned further in the record. In a 
subsequent decision letter and order, the district court granted appellees' 
motions for summary judgment on the claims of strict liability and 
warranty.

 
 

[¶8.]     The case proceeded to 
trial solely on the issue of negligence. A three-day trial commenced June 1, 
1987, and, at its conclusion, the jury returned a verdict in favor of appellees, 
finding that neither appellee was negligent, that appellant was not negligent, 
that Elizabeth Fiedler was 100% negligent, and that the negligence of Fiedler 
was a direct cause of the accident. The jury also found that appellant had 
sustained no compensable damages. Judgment on the verdict was entered on July 
16, 1987, and this appeal followed.2

 
 

[¶9.]     As a preliminary 
matter, we note that General Motors filed a motion in this Court to dismiss this 
appeal or to strike the brief of appellant, citing appellant's failure to comply 
with the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure. Pursuant to W.R.A.P. 4.02, the 
appellant, within ten days of filing his notice of appeal, must "file and serve 
on the appellee a description of the parts of the transcript which he intends to 
include in the record, and, unless the entire transcript is to be included, a 
statement of the issues he intends to present on the appeal." The rule further 
provides that, if the appellee determines a transcript of additional parts of 
the proceedings is necessary, given the appellant's statement of the issues, the 
appellee may arrange for these additions to the record. In the instant case, 
although appellant's counsel arranged for only a limited portion of the 
proceedings to be transcribed and transmitted to this Court, he neither 
designated those portions in accordance with the rule nor provided appellees 
with a statement of the issues within the time provided by the 
rule.

 
 

[¶10.]  Although the failure to comply with 
W.R.A.P. 4.02 is not jurisdictional, see W.R.A.P. 1.02, and although we denied 
General Motors' motion, we observe that, where there is no transcript or an 
insufficient transcript, we accept the findings of the trial court as the only 
basis for deciding issues pertaining to the evidence. Osborn v. PineMountain 
Ranch, 766 P.2d 1165 (Wyo. 1989); Salt River 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Heiner, 663 P.2d 518 (Wyo. 1983). Further, as pointed out by General 
Motors, counsel for appellant failed to include page references to the record in 
the statement of facts in his brief as required by W.R.A.P. 5.01(3). We recently 
cautioned counsel practicing before this Court regarding the importance of 
complying with this rule, V-1 Oil Company v. Ranck, 767 P.2d 612 (Wyo. 1989), 
and we reiterate that admonition here. Although not dispositive in this case, 
the failure of counsel for appellant to comply with the provisions of the 
Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure certainly did not enhance appellant's cause 
before this Court.

 
 

[¶11.]  In his first issue, appellant contends 
that the district court's refusal to give his jury instructions regarding 
bailments, and the degree of care related thereto, constituted prejudicial 
error. We find, however, that we do not have a sufficient record before us with 
which to properly evaluate appellant's contention. We thus must accept the 
findings of the trial court as the only basis for deciding this evidentiary 
issue. Osborn, 766 P.2d 1165.

 
 

[¶12.]  Appellant's refused instructions 
essentially would have instructed the jury on the distinction between a 
gratuitous bailment and a bailment for mutual benefit, on the different duty of 
care applicable in each situation, and that an automobile rental contract 
creates a bailment for mutual benefit. The gravamen of appellant's contention is 
that the district court took from the jury the factual question of the type of 
bailment created in this case - assertedly a bailment for mutual benefit - and 
thereby prejudiced appellant by not allowing his claim against appellees to be 
tested by the higher standard of care associated with bailments for mutual 
benefit.

 
 

[¶13.]  A gratuitous bailment has been defined as 
one in which either the bailor or the bailee is the sole beneficiary of the 
bailment. Rigby v. Suburban Rendco, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 202, 204 (D.Del. 1982); 3 
Am.Law Prod.Liab.3d, Bailments and Leases of Products § 36:5 (1987). In a 
gratuitous bailment the bailor has the minimal duty to warn of defects of which 
he has actual knowledge at the time of the lending and which are likely to cause 
injury. Miller v. Hand Ford Sales, Inc., 216 Or. 567, 340 P.2d 181, 183 (1959); 
Rigby, 548 F. Supp.  at 205; 9 S. Williston, Williston on Contracts § 1039 at 909 
(3d ed. 1967).

 
 

[¶14.]  A bailment for mutual benefit arises when 
both of the parties to the contract receive a benefit. Miller, 340 P.2d  at 184. 
Generally, the bailor must receive compensation or some benefit from the loan of 
the chattel. Rigby, 548 F. Supp.  at 205. A bailment for mutual benefit may 
arise, however, even where it is gratuitous if the lending is incidental to some 
other business transaction between the parties. Global Tank Trailer Sales v. 
Textilana-Nease, Inc., 209 Kan. 314, 496 P.2d 1292, 1295 (1972); Nelson 
v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 20 N.J. Super. 198, 89 A.2d 445, 447, cert. granted 10 
N.J. 346, 91 A.2d 671 (1952), aff'd 11 N.J. 413, 94 A.2d 655 (1953); 9 S. 
Williston, supra, § 1040 at 913. If the bailment is for the mutual benefit of 
the parties, such as a bailment for hire, the duty of care owed by the bailor is 
greater than in a gratuitous bailment. Rigby, 548 F. Supp.  at 205; Miller, 340 P.2d  at 184; 3 Am.Law Prod.Liab.3d, supra at § 36:7. The bailor, in such 
situation, must perform a reasonable inspection before transfer to determine if 
the chattel is fit for the purposes intended and warn of defects discoverable 
with reasonable care or make the article safe for its intended purpose. Rigby, 
548 F. Supp.  at 205; Miller, 340 P.2d  at 184; 3 Am.Law Prod.Liab.3d, supra at § 
36:7.

 
 

[¶15.]  Appellant offered several overlapping 
instructions regarding bailments. The two refused instructions which we perceive 
as being relevant to the issue provided as follows:

 
 
INSTRUCTION 
NO. ____

 
 
     The jury is instructed 
that the relationship between automobile dealers who rent out automobiles and 
people who rent automobiles from dealers [is] that of bailor and bailee and 
though a bailor of an automobile for hire is not an insurer against injuries 
from defects [in the] automobile, he is held to a high degree of care in 
examining the automobile before renting it.

 
 
INSTRUCTION 
NO. ____

 
 
     The jury is instructed 
that the duties of a bailor are generally to be determined according to the 
character of the bailment, that is, whether the bailment is one for mutual 
benefit or gratuitous. If the bailment of a chattel is gratuitous, bailor has 
but a minimum duty toward bailee, that is to warn him of any defects in chattel 
of which he is aware that are likely to cause injury to person or property of 
borrower but if bailment is for mutual benefit of both bailor and bailee such as 
a let for hire agreement, then the general rule is that while the bailor is not 
an absolute insurer against injuries from defective chattel he is charged with 
duty of inspection to determine whether or not chattel is fit for purpose 
intended, and thus if defect was discoverable he becomes liable for injuries to 
bailee arising from the unsafe condition on theory of implied warranty of 
fitness. A bailment for mutual benefit arises whenever it appears that both of 
the parties to the contract receive a benefit from the 
transaction.

 
 
In refusing 
these instructions, the district court stated:

 
 
     The Court refuses to 
give this instruction because the instruction is not clearly adjusted to the 
facts as to whether there was a contract of bailment for the mutual benefit of 
the parties, and the Court has opted instead to use negligence as a standard, 
given the questionable nature of this arrangement in which the plaintiff found 
himself in possession of this vehicle.

 
 
     There are too many 
questions about whether it was a lease agreement, a loan agreement, or rental 
agreement, a third party beneficiary agreement, that the Court believes that the 
proper standard in this case is negligence supplement[e]d by the additional 
burden placed by Instruction 8A that the Court proposes to 
give.

 
 

[¶16.]  The district court gave the jury a 
standard negligence instruction which defined negligence as "the failure to use 
ordinary care. Ordinary care means that degree of care which might reasonably be 
expected from the ordinary careful person under the same or similar 
circumstances." The district court supplemented this general instruction with 
the following instruction:

 
 
     You are instructed 
that the Defendants were under a duty to exercise ordinary care to furnish a 
reasonably safe vehicle to Plaintiff. Though the Defendants are not insurers 
against injuries from defects in the vehicle, Defendants must exercise ordinary 
care in examining the vehicle before furnishing it. Defendants must also 
exercise reasonable care to inspect and repair the vehicle whenever called on to 
do so during the period that the vehicle is furnished.

 
 

[¶17.]  The instructions offered by appellant are 
accurate statements of the law. If indeed the transaction between the parties 
was a bailment for mutual benefit, the instructions given by the district court, 
while delineating a duty to inspect, were deficient in not describing the 
further duty to determine if the chattel is fit for the purposes intended and to 
warn of any defects or make necessary repairs. Our problem, however, is in 
determining whether the evidence elicited at trial was sufficient to warrant an 
instruction on bailment for mutual benefit.

 
 

[¶18.]  Appellant has not provided a transcript 
in the record on appeal of any of the testimony at trial regarding the nature of 
the transaction of the parties. The record does contain a document, designated 
"PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 1," which appears to be a copy of a rental agreement 
between Western Rentals and appellant. There is no indication, however, of 
whether or not this exhibit was admitted into evidence and, if so, what 
testimony was received regarding it. The record on appeal is also devoid of any 
testimony or other evidence of the relationship between Western Rentals and 
Burman Motors. Similarly, there is no testimony or evidence in the record as to 
whether Burman Motors received any consideration from General Motors, or anyone 
else, for appellant's use of the vehicle. The only other evidence in the record 
of the nature of the transaction between the parties is the pretrial deposition 
testimony of appellant and his wife to the effect that the transaction was a 
lease agreement for which General Motors would pay the rental fee. Whether 
similar testimony, or testimony to the contrary, was elicited at trial cannot be 
ascertained.

 
 

[¶19.]  The district court, in its comments upon 
refusing appellant's instructions, indicated that the evidence would not support 
such instructions.3 On the record before us we cannot say 
otherwise. We have stated that a party is entitled to a jury instruction upon 
its theory of the case only if such theory is supported by competent evidence. 
Rivermeadows, Inc. v. Zwaanshoek Holding and Financiering B.V., 761 P.2d 662, 
670 (Wyo. 1988); Short v. Spring Creek Ranch, 
Inc., 731 P.2d 1195, 1199 (Wyo. 1987). The failure to provide a 
transcript of the relevant evidence limits this Court to addressing those 
assertions of error which do not require an inspection of the transcript. 
Id. at 1199; Salt River Enterprises, Inc., 663 P.2d 518 (Wyo. 
1983). On this partial record we simply cannot determine if the refusal to give 
appellant's instructions was error, and we must sustain the district court's 
refusal to give these instructions.

 
 
USE OF 
DEPOSITION AT TRIAL

 
 

[¶20.]  In his second issue, appellant asserts 
that the district court acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner and abused 
its discretion by admitting into evidence the discovery deposition of Dr. 
Curnow, one of appellant's treating physicians. We agree that the admission of 
this deposition testimony was error, but we determine that appellant was not 
prejudiced thereby, and the error was thus harmless.

 
 

[¶21.]  We have consistently held that the 
admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and that 
evidentiary rulings will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Mintle 
v. Mintle, 764 P.2d 255, 257 (Wyo. 1988); 
Lawrence v. Farm Credit System Capital 
Corporation, 761 P.2d 640 (Wyo. 1988). We have defined an abuse of 
discretion as an error of law committed by the court under the circumstances. 
Id. at 653; Martinez v. State, 611 P.2d 831, 838 (Wyo. 1980). We look, 
therefore, to the circumstances under which this deposition testimony was 
admitted to determine if an error of law has occurred.

 
 

[¶22.]  In March of 1987, General Motors took Dr. 
Curnow's deposition for discovery purposes. All parties were represented by 
counsel during the deposition. Appellant unsuccessfully attempted to serve a 
subpoena on Dr. Curnow on May 29, 1987, two days before trial. On the final day 
of trial, both appellees moved for admission of the discovery deposition.4 Counsel for Burman Motors indicated to the 
district court that Burman Motors had been relying to some extent upon 
appellant's subpoena and that, pursuant to contacts with the doctor's office, 
Burman Motors was under the "impression" that the doctor would be available for 
trial testimony. Apparently realizing that a problem existed, counsel for Burman 
Motors attempted to subpoena Dr. Curnow on the second day of the trial for an 
appearance on the following final trial day. The sheriff's office was unable to 
serve the doctor, and counsel for Burman Motors informed the district court 
during the motion conference that the doctor was in surgery on that final day of 
trial. The district court, over the objection of appellant, granted appellees' 
motion for admission of the deposition under the authority of W.R.C.P. 32 but 
limited the deposition testimony to those parts of the direct examination which 
the court felt were adequately tested by cross-examination at the taking of the 
deposition. Thereafter, excerpts from Dr. Curnow's deposition were read to the 
jury and into the record.

 
 

[¶23.]  W.R.C.P. 32 provides in relevant 
part:

 
 
(a) Use of depositions. - At the trial or 
upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of 
a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence applied as though 
the witness were then present and testifying, may be used against any party who 
was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had reasonable 
notice thereof, in accordance with any of the following 
provisions:

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
(3) The 
deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for 
any purpose if the court finds: * * * (D) that the party offering the deposition has 
been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (E) upon application and notice, that such 
exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of 
justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of 
witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be 
used[.]

 
 
(Emphasis 
added).

 
 

[¶24.]  The rule is premised on the principle 
that oral testimony is preferable to a deposition. 8 C. Wright and A. Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2146 (1970). See also Napier v. Bossard, 
102 F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1939) (per Learned Hand, deposition is treated as a 
substitute - second best, not to be used when original is available). A showing 
that due diligence was exercised in attempting to secure the presence of the 
witness is required from the party seeking to introduce the deposition testimony 
of the witness. Sutton v. Shufelberger, 31 Wn. App. 579, 643 P.2d 920, 924-25 
(1982); Palfy v. Rice, 473 P.2d 606 (Alaska 1970). We are not convinced that 
appellees made a sufficient showing to warrant the admission of this deposition 
testimony. The failure of appellees to attempt to subpoena Dr. Curnow until the 
day prior to the need for his testimony and their misplaced reliance on the 
attempted subpoena by appellant and on informal contacts with the doctor's 
office do not demonstrate diligence. These circumstances, in our opinion, do not 
fall within the exceptions contemplated by W.R.C.P. 32(a)(3)(D) and (E) for use 
of depositions in lieu of oral testimony. The admission of Dr. Curnow's 
deposition testimony was an abuse of discretion under the circumstances of this 
case.

 
 

[¶25.]  Although we determine the admission of 
this testimony was error, we conclude that it does not warrant a reversal in 
this instance. W.R.C.P. 61 provides:

 
 
     No error in either the 
admission or the exclusion of evidence * * * is ground for granting a new trial 
or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying or otherwise 
disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to 
the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the 
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not 
affect the substantial rights of the parties.

 
 
W.R.C.P. 61 
applies to cases on appeal. Hall v. Hall, 708 P.2d 416, 422 (Wyo. 1985). The 
deposition testimony of Dr. Curnow admitted at trial went to questions regarding 
appellant's injuries, medical treatment, and prognosis; i.e., damages. The jury, 
by its verdict, found that neither appellee was negligent and that the 
negligence of Elizabeth Fiedler, a nonparty, was the entire proximate cause of 
the accident and any damages allegedly sustained by appellant. The jury, in 
responding to a question on the verdict form submitted to it, found as 
follows:

 
 
21. 
Considering all fault to be 100% fill in below the percentage by which the fault 
of each was a direct cause, of the accident and of the injuries and damages 
allegedly sustained as a result thereof:

 
 
James 
Waggoner 0 % 

 
 
General 
Motors 0 % 

 
 
Burman 
Motors 0 % 

 
 
Western 
Rentals 0 % 

 
 
Elizabeth 
Fiedler 100 %

 
 
Clearly, 
the jury found that the negligence of Elizabeth Fiedler was the entire proximate 
cause of the accident. Thus, given the verdict, any error in admitting testimony 
regarding damages was harmless.

 
 
STRICT 
LIABILITY AND WARRANTY

 
 

[¶26.]  By complaint and amended complaint, 
appellant asserted causes of action against appellees on the basis of strict 
liability in tort and upon the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness 
for a particular purpose.5 The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of appellees on both of these theories of recovery.6 In granting summary judgment on the strict 
liability claims, the district court found that strict liability was applicable 
to lease transactions but that assumption of the risk was a complete and 
absolute defense to a cause of action premised on strict liability and that 
appellant's admitted knowledge of the alleged defect was sufficient to establish 
assumption of the risk. Regarding the implied warranties, the district court 
found that the warranties only attach to a "sale" transaction and they, 
therefore, were inapplicable to the nonsale transaction involved in this 
case.

 
 

[¶27.]  These determinations by the district 
court raise a number of issues of first impression in Wyoming, most of which 
emanate from our recent adoption of strict liability in tort as a valid cause of 
action, Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1986), and 
particularly in relation to the interplay of that doctrine, and actions founded 
on warranty, with Wyoming's comparative negligence statute.7 We are not necessarily convinced that the 
district court properly resolved all of these issues. We conclude, however, that 
we need not reach them in this case and that the summary judgment should be 
affirmed because the findings regarding proximate cause made by the jury in the 
negligence action collaterally estop appellant from relitigating this critical 
question of fact, common to all appellant's theories of recovery, in a 
subsequent proceeding.

 
 

[¶28.]  A similar disposition was reached in the 
case of Hurley v. Beech Aircraft Corporation, 355 F.2d 517 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied 385 U.S. 821, 87 S. Ct. 48, 17 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1966), a case decided under 
Indiana law. 
In that case, the plaintiffs, as personal representatives of decedents killed in 
an airplane crash, brought an action against the aircraft manufacturer premised 
on negligence and breach of implied warranties. The district court dismissed the 
warranty claim for lack of privity of contract. The case was thereafter tried to 
the court solely on negligence, and the court entered judgment for the 
defendant, finding, inter alia, a lack of defect in the airplane. The plaintiffs 
appealed only the judgment dismissing their warranty 
claim.

 
 

[¶29.]  On appeal, the Seventh Circuit noted 
that, subsequent to the district court's ruling on the plaintiffs' warranty 
claim, it had held in another case that privity of contract was not essential to 
an implied warranty claim in Indiana. Thus, the district court's dismissal of 
the plaintiffs' warranty claim was error. The Seventh Circuit further observed, 
however, that proof of defect was essential to both of the plaintiffs' causes of 
action and that the district court had determined that question of fact 
adversely to the plaintiffs in the negligence judgment from which they did not 
appeal. The court held, therefore, that the plaintiffs were barred from 
proceeding under the warranty count under the doctrine of collateral estoppel by 
judgment. The court concluded that, although the dismissal of the warranty claim 
was erroneous, it was not prejudicial to the plaintiffs. Id. at 
522.

 
 

[¶30.]  The Hurley court elaborated on the 
doctrine of estoppel by judgment in the following passage from that 
opinion:

 
 

[¶31.]  Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 
335-336, 77 S. Ct. 1064, 1085-1086, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1356 (1957) is also 
pertinent:

 
 
     "We agree * * * that 
the nonexistence of a fact may be established by a judgment no less than its 
existence; that, in other words, a party may be precluded under the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel from attempting a second time to prove a fact that he sought 
unsuccessfully to prove in a prior action. * * *

 
 
     "* * *. That doctrine 
[collateral estoppel] makes conclusive in subsequent proceedings only 
determinations of fact, and mixed fact and law, that were essential to the 
decision."

 
 
Later in 
the same opinion, the court makes the following statement: "The normal rule is 
that a prior judgment need be given no conclusive effect at all unless it 
establishes one of the ultimate facts in issue in the subsequent proceeding." 
Id. at 338, 77 S. Ct.  at 1087.

 
 
     We have held that even 
if a subsequent action is a different cause of action, a right, question, or 
fact determined in the prior action must, as between the same parties, be taken 
as conclusively established, so long as the judgment in the prior action remains 
unmodified.

 
 

Id. at 
522.

 
 

[¶32.]  In a more recent case, LaVay Corporation 
v. Dominion Federal Savings & Loan Association, 830 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 
1987), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 108 S. Ct. 1027, 98 L. Ed. 2d 991 (1988), the 
Fourth Circuit reached a similar result with respect to one of the issues raised 
by the plaintiffs' cross-appeal in that case. The plaintiffs in LaVay 
Corporation asserted several claims against the defendants, including actual and 
constructive fraud and violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO). The district court dismissed the RICO claim, and the 
fraud claims were resolved in favor of the various defendants by dismissal, jury 
verdict, and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The fraud determinations were 
not appealed by the plaintiffs. One of the plaintiffs did prevail upon a claim 
of breach of fiduciary duty against one of the defendants. In reviewing the 
dismissal of the RICO claim, the Fourth Circuit cited Hurley and said that it 
did not need to reach the issue of whether the dismissal was appropriately 
granted on the ground relied upon by the district court, i.e., that predicate 
acts of mail fraud failed to establish a pattern of racketeering activity, 
because the plaintiffs were now precluded from asserting acts of fraud due to 
their resolution in the district court and, therefore, the plaintiffs' one 
surviving claim, a single breach of fiduciary duty, would not support a RICO 
claim requiring proof of a pattern of racketeering activity. See also Lewis v. 
Baker, 243 Or. 317, 413 P.2d 400 (1966)8 (citing Hurley and holding that trial 
court's withdrawal of warranty issue was not reversible error where an element 
of the warranty claim was resolved against plaintiff by jury verdict on 
negligence claim, which verdict the court therein 
affirmed).

 
 

[¶33.]  In accordance with the aforementioned 
cases, we conclude that the doctrine of collateral estoppel by judgment is an 
appropriate basis upon which to affirm the district court's grant of summary 
judgment on appellant's strict liability and warranty claims. The jury, by its 
verdict in this case, clearly determined that Elizabeth Fiedler's negligent 
running through a stop sign was the entire proximate cause of the accident.9 Proof of proximate cause 
is as necessary under warranty and strict liability causes of action as it is in 
a negligence action. 1 Am.Law Prod.Liab.3d, Proximate Causation § 4:3 (1987). 
Here, the fact question of proximate cause, or more precisely "cause in fact,"10 was determined against appellant in the 
trial of his negligence claim. Although, as opposed to the Hurley case, 
appellant has appealed the negligence determination, we herein have affirmed the 
district court on that claim and that judgment is now just as conclusive as if 
it had not been appealed. Under the circumstances, therefore, we need not 
determine whether or not the district court properly granted summary judgment on 
appellant's warranty and strict liability claims because, even if the grant of 
summary judgment was erroneous, and we do not imply that it was, an essential 
element of those causes of action has been conclusively established adversely to 
appellant, and any error in granting summary judgment was not prejudicial to 
appellant due to the bar of collateral estoppel by 
judgment.

 
 

[¶34.]  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Appellant 
was seeking a greater seating capacity in the replacement vehicle than was 
available in his own pickup.

 
 

2 Burman 
Motors filed a cross-appeal on the issue of whether the district court, in its 
summary judgment decision, correctly found that the doctrine of strict liability 
applies to lease transactions. This Court dismissed the cross-appeal upon its 
own motion, finding that Burman Motors was not an aggrieved party, which is a 
necessary prerequisite for appellate jurisdiction. See Merritt v. Merritt, 586 P.2d 550 (Wyo. 
1978).

 
 

3 The 
instructions conference was transcribed and included in the record on 
appeal.

 
 

4 This 
motion conference was transcribed and included in the record on 
appeal.

 
 

5 See Wyo. 
Stat. §§ 34-21-231 (U.C.C. § 2-314) (merchantability) and 34-21-315 (U.C.C. § 
3-115) (fitness for a particular purpose) (1977).

 
 

6 The strict 
liability and warranty claims against General Motors, apparently premised on 
agency, were tenuous at best. General Motors did not manufacture the Jeep, was 
not a lessor of the vehicle, and had no apparent control over its 
condition.

 
 

7 See, e.g., 
Greenlee and Rochelle, Comparative Negligence and Strict Tort Liability - A 
Marriage of Necessity, 18 Land & Water L.Rev. 643 (1983) (anticipating this 
Court's adoption of strict liability and advocating application of comparative 
negligence principles to strict liability actions).

 
 

8 Partially 
overruled on other grounds by McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation, 270 
Or. 375, 528 P.2d 522 (1974).

 
 

9 It is not 
entirely clear by the verdict form whether or not the jury found that the 
vehicle was defective; i.e., whether or not the brakes failed wholly or 
partially. It is apparent, however, that, even if the jury believed the brakes 
were defective, it did not attribute the cause of the accident to any such 
defect.

 
 

10 See W. 
Prosser and W. Keeton, The Law of Torts § 41 (5th ed. 1984) (causation in 
fact).

 
 

BROWN, J. 
(Retired), files a specially concurring opinion.

 
 

BROWN, Justice 
(Retired), specially concurring.

 
 

[¶35.]  I concur in the result in this case, but 
do not agree with the majority's application of the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel to Waggoner's theories of strict products liability and 
warranty.

 
 

[¶36.]  In disposing of the appellate issues, the 
majority seems to hold that the jury finally decided, as a factual matter, that 
Fiedler's negligence was the sole actual cause of Waggoner's accident. At 1203. 
Stated another way, the majority is holding that when the jury decided Fiedler 
was one hundred percent at fault as the direct cause of Waggoner's accident, the 
jury, as a factual matter, had necessarily excluded any other actual causal 
factor in the accident, i.e., an alleged defect in the 
vehicle.

 
 

[¶37.]  The majority's authority for this 
application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel is Hurley v. Beech Aircraft 
Corporation, 355 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1966), which concerned an airplane that 
crashed after one of its wings separated from its fuselage. That case is 
factually distinguishable from this one; in Hurley, there were specific trial 
court findings of no defect in the airplane. Id. at 520. Based on those specific findings concerning the 
nonexistence of any defect, the 
appellate court was able to conclude that an outstanding action for breach of 
warranty was collaterally estopped, because the factual determination that a defect 
existed was the identical element of 
proof needed to put forth a prima facie case of breach of warranty. The Hurley 
court collaterally estopped one party from relitigating a specific fact issue 
which had been decided in earlier litigation. However, it did invoke the more 
general factual determination that only one of the parties had been 
negligent.1

 
 

[¶38.]  Unlike the situation in Hurley, the 
fact-finder in this case never made a factual finding that any alleged defect 
did not contribute in any way to Waggoner's accident. This is because the jury 
was never instructed to consider that factual issue. The jury instruction which 
led to the finding of one hundred percent fault of Fiedler in this case 
reads:

 
 
     You are instructed 
that the Defendants [General Motors, Burman Motors, and Western Rentals] were 
under a duty to exercise ordinary care and furnish a reasonably safe vehicle to 
Plaintiff [Waggoner]. Though the Defendants are not insurers against injuries 
from defects in the vehicle, Defendants 
must exercise ordinary care in examining the vehicle before furnishing it. 
Defendants must also exercise reasonable care to inspect and repair the vehicle 
whenever called on to do so during the period that the vehicle is 
furnished.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added). This instruction requires the jury to consider whether the defendants 
negligently "inspect[ed] and repair[ed]" the bailed vehicle as an actual cause 
of Waggoner's accident. It does not require the jury to give any consideration 
to the potential presence of a defect in that vehicle that could be an actual 
cause of the accident. The jury was not instructed to consider whether an 
alleged defect contributed to the accident, and consistent with that instruction 
it never made such a finding. Based on this, in applying the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel, the majority must be inferring what the jury would have 
decided on that particular issue of fact had it been so 
instructed.

 
 

[¶39.]  I fear this rather protracted reasoning 
stretches the doctrine of collateral estoppel a bit too far. It can be 
interpreted as implying that a party can be collaterally estopped on an issue of 
fact based on a judicial inference 
drawn from a similar factual determination in previous litigation between the 
parties. We have stated that the doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents 
"relitigation of issues which were involved actually and necessarily in the 
prior action between the same parties." Delgue v. Curutchet, 677 P.2d 208, 214 
(Wyo. 1984). 
Based on the record in this case, we cannot determine whether this jury, as 
instructed, actually and necessarily decided that an alleged 
defect could not have been an actual cause of Waggoner's accident. That 
uncertainty tells me we should avoid gambling with the scope of the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel to affirm these issues.

 
 

[¶40.]  Having made this point, I offer an 
alternate method for affirming the trial court. I believe the real problem here 
was Waggoner's taking his theories of strict liability and warranty as far into 
the litigation as he did. To put either of those theories before a jury, 
Waggoner had to allege some facts showing a defect in the bailed vehicle; he 
never made that showing.

 
 

[¶41.]  This court can affirm the trial court on 
any legal basis appearing in the record. Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of 
Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 706 (Wyo. 1987). I would apply that standard of 
appellate review and hold that Waggoner did not present the trial court with a 
genuine issue of material fact to justify sending his strict liability or 
warranty claims to the jury. See W.R.C.P. 56.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 The other 
cases cited as authority in the majority opinion rely on the holding in Hurley 
and are therefore similarly distinguishable. See LaVay Corporation v. Dominion 
Federal Savings & Loan Association, 830 F.2d 522, 529 (4th Cir. 1987) cited 
at 1203; and Lewis v. Baker, 243 Or. 317, 413 P.2d 400, 404 (1966) cited at 
1204.