Title: Commonwealth v. Rand

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13047 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ROY RAND. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     March 1, 2021. - July 6, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Constitutional Law, Confrontation of witnesses.  Practice, 
Criminal, Confrontation of witnesses, Hearsay.  Evidence, 
Hearsay, Testimonial statement, Spontaneous utterance. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 13, 2015. 
 
The cases were tried before Raymond J. Brassard, J. 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
Geraldine C. Griffin for the defendant. 
Meagen K. Monahan, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  On July 25, 2015, the victim called 911 and 
reported that her boyfriend, the defendant Roy Rand, had "just 
beat [her] up," "knocked [her] out a couple of times," and 
"tried to kill [her]."  She stated that the defendant had left 
2 
 
her apartment "like two minutes ago."  When officers arrived at 
the apartment minutes later, she was still on the telephone with 
the 911 dispatcher.  She was so distraught that she appeared not 
even to register that police had arrived.  Officers then spoke 
to her before she subsequently left in an ambulance. 
 
The victim did not testify at the defendant's trial.  
Instead, the key evidence at trial was a recording of the 
victim's 911 call, and the responding officers' recounting of 
the victim's statements.  The defendant was convicted of assault 
and battery, G. L. c. 265, § 13A; and strangulation, G. L. 
c. 265, § 15D.1  The defendant appealed, arguing that admitting 
the victim's statements violated his right to confrontation 
under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  The Appeals 
Court reversed his convictions, holding that his confrontation 
rights were violated.  Commonwealth v. Rand, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 
758, 759 (2020).  We granted further appellate review. 
We hold that most of the admitted statements were not made 
with the primary purpose of creating a substitute for trial 
testimony.  See Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011).  
 
1 The jury found the defendant not guilty of attempted 
murder, G. L. c. 265, § 16; and a second count of strangulation, 
G. L. c. 265, § 15D.  The jury could not reach a verdict on a 
second count of assault and battery, and the Commonwealth filed 
a nolle prosequi. 
3 
 
Thus, they were nontestimonial and did not violate the 
defendant's confrontation rights.  To the extent that the 
victim's statements evolved into being testimonial just prior to 
the victim entering the ambulance, that statement was 
duplicative of other evidence and its admission was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Thus, we affirm the defendant's 
convictions. 
Background.  Prior to the incident that precipitated this 
case, the defendant and the victim had dated on-again and off-
again for approximately five years.  They had a child together, 
and the defendant visited regularly. 
On July 25, 2015, at approximately 12:45 A.M., the victim 
called 911.2  She was sobbing and began the call by saying, "I 
need somebody to come to my house," and "My boyfriend just beat 
me up."  When the dispatcher asked whether the boyfriend was 
 
2 The recording of the 911 call was offered in evidence, 
although no transcript was provided.  On appeal to the Appeals 
Court, the Commonwealth provided a transcript in its brief, 
which the Appeals Court included as an Appendix, as do we.  The 
defendant agrees with the transcript, with one exception:  where 
the Appeals Court transcribed that the victim stated the 
defendant had left "two minutes ago," the defendant maintains 
that she said "ten minutes ago."  While the number of minutes is 
difficult to hear, given the context we agree with the Appeals 
Court that it is more likely the victim said "two."  When the 
dispatcher again asked the victim, "How long ago did he leave 
your house?" the victim stated, "Since I called, since I was 
able to get my phone."  The context implies that the defendant 
left a very short time before, and thus it is more likely that 
it was two minutes. 
4 
 
still present, the victim replied that he had left with her 
sister "like two minutes ago, since I called you guys."  The 
dispatcher asked, "What exactly happened tonight?" and the 
victim stated that her sister had been "causing trouble" and the 
boyfriend took the sister's side and then "knocked [the victim] 
out a couple of times."  She indicated that her boyfriend had 
punched her in the face and "tried to kill [her]." 
 
Approximately four minutes and thirty seconds into the 
call, Sergeant Phillip Yee and Officer John Connolly of the 
Braintree police department arrived at the victim's house.  She 
was still on the telephone with the dispatcher.  Yee had to 
contact the dispatcher over the police radio and ask her to tell 
the victim to hang up the telephone so that the victim could 
speak with the officers.  Yee and Connolly testified that the 
victim was "very upset," "heav[ing]," "in tears, sobbing, [and] 
kind of hysterical." 
Yee and Connolly asked the victim to tell them what 
happened, and she recounted that her boyfriend, whom she called 
Roy, had beaten her.  She said that he "punched her several 
times in the head, [and] at one point he choked her and he used 
his knees to put on her throat."  This had caused her to lose 
consciousness.  When she woke up, he started hitting her again, 
and then choked her again, this time with his hands.  As a 
result of losing consciousness, she had urinated on herself.  
5 
 
She also stated that her sister had "slapped her in the face 
with an open hand two or three times."  Because the victim was 
complaining of pain in the back of her head, Yee called an 
ambulance.  The officers also observed that the victim's eyes 
were "bloodshot and veiny . . . like there was . . . blood in 
them" and that her cheek and jawline were swollen and bruised.  
Yee and Connolly spoke to the victim for approximately five 
minutes when they first entered the apartment before the 
ambulance arrived.  The victim's three year old daughter was 
also present in the apartment. 
 
When the ambulance arrived, medics evaluated the victim.  
Yee and Connolly were still in the apartment, but spoke to the 
victim only "intermittently" so as not to interrupt the medical 
examination.  The medics recommended that the victim be 
transported to a hospital.  At first, she was reluctant to go 
and appeared to be scared.  Yee directed Connolly to accompany 
the victim to the hospital and assured the victim that they 
would keep her safe.  Yee told the victim that they would bring 
her daughter to the hospital as well to ensure the daughter's 
safety.  As the officers were persuading the victim to go to the 
hospital, she indicated that she was still scared of the person 
who attacked her.  She again named that person as the defendant.  
In total, Yee and Connolly were at the victim's apartment for 
ten to twenty minutes before she got into the ambulance. 
6 
 
Connolly then accompanied the victim in the ambulance to 
the hospital, where Yee eventually met both.  At the hospital, 
Yee photographed the victim's injuries. 
Shortly after the defendant was arraigned on the charges in 
this case, the victim stopped cooperating with the Commonwealth.  
Anticipating that she would not testify at trial, the 
Commonwealth filed two motions in limine:  one to admit a 
recording of the victim's 911 call, and the other to admit 
statements that the victim had made to Yee and Connolly.  The 
defendant opposed both motions.  After two hearings in which the 
judge listened to the 911 call and conducted a voir dire of Yee 
and Connolly, the judge granted the Commonwealth's motion to 
admit the 911 call and granted in part the motion to admit the 
victim's statements to Yee and Connolly.  The judge ruled that 
the victim's statements to Yee and Connolly were admissible up 
until the point that the victim left in an ambulance to go to 
the hospital. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  "We accept the 
judge's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous but 
independently apply constitutional principles to the facts 
found" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Beatrice, 460 Mass. 
255, 259 (2011).  When a judge's findings are based on 
documentary evidence, such as a 911 call recording, we review 
those findings de novo.  Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480 Mass. 
7 
 
645, 654-655 (2018).  Where the defendant objected, "we evaluate 
the admission of constitutionally proscribed evidence to 
determine whether it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."  
Commonwealth v. Wardsworth, 482 Mass. 454, 458 (2019), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Nardi, 452 Mass. 379, 394 (2008).  "If the 
defendant's constitutional objection was not preserved, we still 
review the claim to determine whether there was a substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice."  Commonwealth v. Galicia, 447 
Mass. 737, 746 (2006). 
2.  Confrontation clause.  Out-of-court statements offered 
for the truth of the matter and asserted by a declarant who does 
not testify at trial must pass two "distinct but symbiotic" 
tests to be admitted.  United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 60 
(1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 926 (2006).  "First, the 
statement must be admissible under our common-law rules of 
evidence as an exception [or exemption] to the hearsay rule."  
Beatrice, 460 Mass. at 258.  "Second, the statement must be 
nontestimonial for purposes of the confrontation clause of the 
Sixth Amendment."  Id.  See Commonwealth v. Caruso, 476 Mass. 
275, 295 n.15 (2017).3  Here, the defendant concedes the 
statements at issue arguably fit within the spontaneous 
 
3 Testimonial hearsay is only admissible if the out-of-court 
declarant has been previously subject to cross-examination and 
is "unavailable" as a matter of law.  Commonwealth v. Caruso, 
476 Mass. 275, 295 n.15 (2017). 
8 
 
utterance exception to the rule against hearsay.  See Mass. G. 
Evid. § 803(2) (2021).  Thus, the sole issue on appeal is 
whether the statements were testimonial. 
"Testimonial statements are those made with the primary 
purpose of 'creating an out-of-court substitute for trial 
testimony.'"  Commonwealth v. McGann, 484 Mass. 312, 316 (2020), 
quoting Wardsworth, 482 Mass. at 464.  See Commonwealth v. 
Imbert, 479 Mass. 575, 580 (2018), citing Bryant, 562 U.S. at 
358; Commonwealth v. Middlemiss, 465 Mass. 627, 634 (2013).  See 
also Wardsworth, supra at 464 n.18 ("the appropriate method of 
analysis is the 'primary purpose' test").  In essence, the 
inquiry looks at whether the out-of-court declarant's statement 
is the equivalent of bearing witness because "[a]n accuser who 
makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony 
in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an 
acquaintance does not."  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 
(2004).  Thus, "[t]he question is whether, in light of all the 
circumstances, viewed objectively, the 'primary purpose' of the 
conversation was to 'creat[e] an out-of-court substitute for 
trial testimony.'"  McGann, supra at 317, quoting Ohio v. Clark, 
576 U.S. 237, 245 (2015). 
 
Over time, the United States Supreme Court has refined the 
test to determine whether a statement is testimonial.  When the 
Court reinvigorated the confrontation clause in Crawford, 541 
9 
 
U.S. at 51-52, it declined to set out a definition of 
"testimonial," although it cited to various examples that would 
be either testimonial or nontestimonial.  Next, in Davis v. 
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006), the Court debuted the 
primary purpose test, stating that "[s]tatements are 
nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation 
under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary 
purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to 
meet an ongoing emergency."4  In Davis, the Court used the 
following factors to distinguish the nontestimonial statements 
there from the testimonial statements present in Crawford:  "(1) 
whether the declarant was speaking about events as they were 
'actually happening, rather than describ[ing] past events'; (2) 
whether any reasonable listener would recognize that the 
declarant was facing an 'ongoing emergency'; (3) whether what 
was asked and answered was necessary to resolve the present 
emergency rather than simply to learn what had happened in the 
past; and (4) the level of formality of the interview."  
Middlemiss, 465 Mass. at 633-634, quoting Davis, supra at 827. 
 
4 "While a discussion with a 911 telephone operator is not 
generally characterized as police interrogation, the United 
States Supreme Court has included 911 telephone calls within the 
rubric of 'interrogation,' regardless of whether the declarant's 
statements were in response to an operator's questions."  
Commonwealth v. Beatrice, 460 Mass. 255, 259 n.6 (2011), citing 
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822-823 & n.2 (2006). 
10 
 
 
Five years later, in Bryant, 562 U.S. at 366, the Supreme 
Court further honed the primary purpose test.  The Court 
clarified that although in Davis the inquiry had centered around 
whether there had been an ongoing emergency, "there may be other 
circumstances, aside from ongoing emergencies, when a statement 
is not procured with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-
court substitute for trial testimony."  Id. at 358.  The Court 
stated that "whether an ongoing emergency exists is simply one 
factor -- albeit an important factor -- that informs the 
ultimate inquiry regarding the 'primary purpose' of an 
interrogation."5  Id. at 366.  See Middlemiss, 465 Mass. at 634.  
The Court noted that in addition to whether there is an ongoing 
emergency, other factors to consider when deciding whether a 
statement is testimonial included "(1) the formality of the 
statements, and (2) the nature of 'the statements and actions of 
 
5 The defendant argues that the existence of an ongoing 
emergency is a necessary factor for a statement to be 
nontestimonial.  This is incorrect.  It is true that in 
Beatrice, 460 Mass. at 259, we stated that "for a statement to 
be nontestimonial, there must be an ongoing emergency, and the 
primary purpose of the interrogation must be to meet that 
emergency."  Yet our subsequent decisions make clear that "the 
existence of an ongoing emergency is 'simply one factor -- 
albeit an important [one].'"  Commonwealth v. Middlemiss, 465 
Mass. 627, 634 (2013), quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 
366 (2011).  Cf. Commonwealth v. DeOliveira, 447 Mass. 56, 57 
n.1 (2006) ("the protection provided by art. 12 is coextensive 
with the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment"). 
11 
 
both the declarant and interrogators.'"  Middlemiss, supra, 
quoting Bryant, supra at 366-367. 
The Bryant Court also clarified that the test is objective, 
and thus "the relevant inquiry is not the subjective or actual 
purpose of the individuals involved in a particular encounter, 
but rather the purpose that reasonable participants would have 
had, as ascertained from the individuals' statements and actions 
and the circumstances in which the encounter occurred."  Bryant, 
562 U.S. at 360.  It is not the interrogator's motive that 
ultimately matters.  Rather, it is what a reasonable person in 
the victim's shoes would have intended that matters.  However, 
what an interrogator says is not irrelevant.  The content and 
tenor of the interrogator's questions can help to "illuminate 
the 'primary purpose of the interrogation.'"  Id. at 369, citing 
id. at 382 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 
An ongoing emergency is not necessary for a statement to be 
nontestimonial, yet when one is present it takes a central place 
in our analysis.  Middlemiss, 465 Mass. at 634 ("the Bryant 
Court nevertheless stressed the centrality of the ongoing 
emergency factor in the primary purpose analysis").  The reason 
for this is straightforward:  when preoccupied by an ongoing 
emergency, a victim is unlikely to have the presence of mind to 
create a substitute for trial testimony.  See Bryant, 562 U.S. 
at 361.  "Factors bearing on the existence of an ongoing 
12 
 
emergency include (1) whether an armed assailant poses a 
continued threat to the victim or the public at large, (2) the 
type of weapon that has been employed, and (3) the severity of 
the victim's injuries or medical condition."  Middlemiss, supra, 
citing Bryant, supra at 364. 
Although the factors from Bryant guide the analysis, they 
are nonexclusive, and determining whether a statement is 
testimonial is a "highly context-dependent inquiry."  
Middlemiss, 465 Mass. at 634, quoting Bryant, 562 U.S. at 363.  
For example, in Clark, 576 U.S. at 249, the Court focused on the 
victim's age and the fact that the statements were made to the 
victim's teacher, and noted that statements made to persons 
other than law enforcement "are significantly less likely to be 
testimonial."  Even though the victim's age and the identity of 
the interrogator were not strictly included in the Bryant 
factors, the Court stressed the need to consider "all of the 
relevant circumstances."  Id. at 244, quoting Bryant, supra at 
369. 
Finally, we note that interrogations that begin as 
nontestimonial can "evolve into testimonial" interrogations.  
Bryant, 562 U.S. at 365, quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 828.  "This 
evolution may occur if, for example, a declarant provides police 
with information that makes clear that what appeared to be an 
emergency is not or is no longer an emergency or that what 
13 
 
appeared to be a public threat is actually a private dispute."  
Bryant, supra.  "Trial courts can determine in the first 
instance when any transition from nontestimonial to testimonial 
occurs . . . ."  Id.  While an interrogation often reaches a 
point where statements shift from one mode to the other, it is 
unlikely to toggle back and forth.  Given that the ultimate 
focus of the inquiry is to determine the primary purpose of the 
statements, one's purpose generally does not fluctuate multiple 
times in a single conversation. 
 
With this framework in mind, we turn to the facts of this 
case.  We first analyze the statements the victim made to the 
911 operator, and then the statements she made immediately 
afterward to responding officers. 
3.  911 call.  The defendant does not dispute that the 
portion of the 911 call up until the victim said her boyfriend 
had left is admissible.  Thus, our analysis pertains solely to 
the remainder of the call.  We hold that the entirety of the 911 
call was nontestimonial. 
The most important indication that the victim did not 
objectively intend to bear witness and create a substitute for 
trial testimony is how she reacted when the police responded to 
her apartment.  On the 911 call, the victim sounded frenzied and 
emotional.  When officers arrived, the victim appeared not to 
have realized who they were, and the dispatcher had to tell her 
14 
 
to hang up.  Thus, not only was the 911 call highly informal, 
see Davis, 547 U.S. at 827 (victim's "frantic answers were 
provided over the phone, in an environment that was not 
tranquil, or even [as far as any reasonable 911 operator could 
make out] safe"); Middlemiss, 465 Mass. at 636 (911 call 
"plainly distinguishable from the formal station-house 
interrogation" [quotation and citation omitted]); Beatrice, 460 
Mass. at 263 (911 call "informal and very brief"), but given 
that the victim did not even realize the police were at her 
house, a reasonable person in the victim's shoes would be 
unlikely to have any testimonial intent at all. 
The fact that very little time had elapsed between the 
alleged assault and the 911 call adds context to the victim's 
statements.  The victim stated to the dispatcher that the 
defendant had left "like two minutes ago, since I called you 
guys."  Compare Commonwealth v. Lao, 450 Mass. 215, 226 (2007), 
S.C., 460 Mass. 12 (2011) (911 call likely testimonial because, 
between alleged assault and 911 call, victim had conversation 
with her daughter, called her mother, and spoke with defendant 
by telephone at least once). 
The statements of the dispatcher also inform the primary 
purpose of the conversation.  See Bryant, 562 U.S. at 367.  The 
dispatcher's questions aimed to assess the situation -- whether 
the victim was injured, the extent of her injuries, and whether 
15 
 
the defendant was still on the scene.  As in Middlemiss, 465 
Mass. at 636, "the 911 operator's questions and the victim's 
answers were concerned primarily with assessing the victim's 
medical condition and collecting as much information as possible 
to prepare first responders for what they would soon encounter."  
See Bryant, supra at 376 ("The questions they asked -- 'what had 
happened, who had shot him, and where the shooting had 
occurred,' -- were the exact type of questions necessary to 
allow the police to assess the situation, the threat to their 
own safety, and possible danger to the potential victim and to 
the public, including to allow them to ascertain whether they 
would be encountering a violent felon" [quotations and citations 
omitted]).  In other words, the primary purpose of these 
questions was objectively to provide Yee and Connolly with the 
information they needed to respond to the call, not to be a 
substitute for trial testimony. 
None of this ignores the fact that interrogators have mixed 
motives.  "Police officers in our society function as both first 
responders and criminal investigators.  Their dual 
responsibilities may mean that they act with different motives 
simultaneously or in quick succession."6  Bryant, 562 U.S. at 
368.  Thus, when the dispatcher asked, "What exactly happened 
 
6 Victims, too, are likely to have mixed motives.  See 
Bryant, 562 U.S. at 368. 
16 
 
tonight?" she elicited a statement describing how the 
altercation began.  Yet while one motive may well have been to 
gather information about a potential crime, the more urgent 
motive was likely to gauge the precarious and potentially 
dangerous situation into which the responding officers soon 
would be entering.  Again, the test asks what the "primary" 
purpose of the questions was, not whether there was only one 
purpose behind them. 
Next, we look to whether, based on what the parties knew at 
the time, there was an ongoing emergency.  Although the 
existence of an ongoing emergency is "highly context-dependent," 
in Bryant, 562 U.S. at 363, the Court discussed three 
nonexclusive factors bearing on the existence of an emergency.  
Applying those factors here, even though the defendant was not 
armed and there was no indication that he posed a threat to the 
public at large, the dispatcher had to ask questions to 
ascertain whether there was any continued threat to the victim -
- either because of her medical condition or because the 
defendant could return. 
With respect to the victim's medical condition, when the 
dispatcher asked, "What exactly happened tonight?" that elicited 
the statement that the defendant had "knocked [the victim] out a 
couple of times."  In turn, that statement prompted the 
dispatcher to ask whether the victim needed an ambulance, and 
17 
 
subsequently to order one.  At other points in the call, the 
victim stated that the defendant had "beat [her] up," "punched 
[her] in the face," and "tried to kill [her]." 
The fact that the dispatcher had decided to call an 
ambulance does not render any continued probing into the 
victim's medical condition improper.  Where the victim had lost 
consciousness, it was reasonable to ask follow-up questions both 
to keep the victim awake and talking, as well as to ascertain 
any further details to relay to medical personnel in the case 
that she lost consciousness again.  The dispatcher's statements 
-- "I want to make sure that everything's okay.  All right?  But 
I'm going to have you stay on the phone with me until I have 
officers that get there, okay?" -- reflect the dispatcher's 
continuing concern for the victim's medical condition. 
With respect to whether the defendant planned to return, 
the fact that there was no direct indication that he would 
definitely return is not dispositive.  Instead, because he had 
left "like two minutes" before the victim called the dispatcher, 
it was unclear how far away he was and how long he would remain 
away.7  Moreover, he left with the victim's sister -- who had 
 
7 The defendant compares the 911 call here to the 
unchallenged portion of the 911 call in Davis, which occurred 
after the defendant had driven away from the premises.  The 
Davis Court noted that it could be maintained that those 
statements were testimonial.  Davis, 547 U.S. at 828-829. 
 
18 
 
also been involved in the altercation -- in tow.  Whether they 
had left by foot or by car, and whether they had left the 
apartment, the building, or the larger area were all open 
questions.  Contrast Davis, 547 U.S. at 830 (in Hammon v. 
Indiana, domestic violence case decided alongside Davis, no 
ongoing emergency where defendant was supervised by officer in 
separate room).  Given these uncertainties, the dispatcher's 
questions, "How long ago did he leave?"; "How long ago did he 
leave your house?"; and "Okay, so he left a little while ago?" 
were primarily aimed at determining whether the defendant would 
return.  Corroborating this concern is the fact that at the end 
of the call, the victim asked the dispatcher, "Now where did he 
go?" which shows that a reasonable person in her shoes would be 
concerned about the possibility that the defendant would return. 
In an attempt to distinguish this situation, the defendant 
contrasts this case with Beatrice, 460 Mass. at 261, and argues 
that an ongoing emergency only existed there because the 
defendant remained on the scene.  In Beatrice, the victim called 
 
Although the defendant here acknowledges that this portion 
of Davis is dicta, he does not acknowledge that in Bryant, the 
Court called this dicta into question.  See Bryant, 562 U.S. at 
363 ("The Michigan Supreme Court erroneously read Davis as 
deciding that 'the statements made after the defendant stopped 
assaulting the victim and left the premises did not occur during 
an "ongoing emergency"'" [citation omitted]).  Thus, there is no 
per se rule that once a defendant has left the scene an ongoing 
emergency necessarily dissipates. 
19 
 
911 from a neighbor's apartment and reported that her boyfriend 
had assaulted her.  Id. at 257.  The victim urged police to 
arrive on the scene "now, before he leaves."8  Id.  Further, she 
stated that the defendant was "packing his stuff now," 
indicating that he remained in their shared apartment.  Id.  We 
acknowledge that the emergency in Beatrice may have been more 
pronounced than the one here given the certainty that the 
defendant remained on the scene.  But that does not change the 
fact that the interrogation here was aimed at determining the 
likelihood of the defendant's return.  As in Beatrice, the 
defendant could have been "[lying] in wait . . . in an attempt 
to do further harm."  Id. at 262.  It was simply unclear where 
the defendant had gone just moments earlier and whether he would 
return.  Thus, we hold that the primary purpose of the 911 call 
was not to create a substitute for trial testimony.  The court 
did not err by admitting it. 
4.  Statements to responding officers.  Next, we turn to 
the statements the victim made to Yee and Connolly after they 
arrived at her apartment.  The trial judge ruled that any 
statements the victim made after she left the apartment in an 
ambulance were testimonial and therefore inadmissible.  
 
8 Here, similarly, the victim urged police to come to her 
home.  She began the 911 call saying, "I need somebody to come 
to my house." 
20 
 
Therefore, our analysis pertains to the statements she made to 
Yee and Connolly in her apartment before departing in an 
ambulance.  The majority of the conversation with Yee and 
Connolly took place during the first five minutes after they 
arrived in the apartment.  It continued only intermittently 
after the medics arrived and began evaluating the victim.  
Because the conversation with Yee and Connolly immediately 
followed the 911 call, many of the circumstances are the same.  
Nevertheless, we address the conversation with Yee and Connolly 
separately to home in on additional details the officers 
observed that bear on the primary purpose analysis.  We hold 
that while the bulk of the victim's statements were 
nontestimonial, one statement as she was poised to enter the 
ambulance evolved into being testimonial. 
First, looking to the formality of the statements, we have 
a sense of the victim's demeanor from the 911 call.  As stated, 
the fact that the victim did not even register that the police 
had arrived gives us an indication of the ability of a 
reasonable person in her shoes to have any testimonial intent at 
all.  Indeed, Yee testified that when they arrived, the victim 
was "very, very upset," and refused to hang up the telephone 
with the dispatcher.  To get her to hang up, he told the 
dispatcher over the police radio to ask the victim to hang up 
the telephone so she could speak to the officers.  Moreover, the 
21 
 
conversation occurred immediately after the officers arrived, 
which was approximately seven minutes after the assault 
occurred.9  Compare Davis, 547 U.S. at 830 (in Hammond case, 
statements testimonial where they "took place some time after 
the events described were over," husband was forcibly prevented 
from participating in interrogation, and statements 
"deliberately recounted . . . how potentially criminal past 
events began and progressed"). 
Next, the statements and actions of the victim and the 
officers also show that the primary purpose was not to create a 
substitute for trial testimony.  Like the dispatcher, Yee and 
Connolly asked questions aimed at assessing the situation and 
ascertaining the extent of the victim's injuries.  See Bryant, 
562 U.S. at 376 ("The questions they asked -- 'what had 
happened, who had shot him, and where the shooting had 
occurred,' -- were the exact type of questions necessary to 
allow the police to assess the situation, the threat to their 
own safety, and possible danger to the potential victim and to 
the public" [quotation and citations omitted]).  Indeed, this is 
consistent with Yee's and Connolly's statements during voir 
dire.  Connolly stated that when he spoke to the victim, "It was 
 
9 On the 911 call, the victim stated that the defendant had 
left "like two minutes ago."  The 911 call is approximately five 
minutes and twenty seconds long, and Yee and Connolly arrived at 
the end of it. 
22 
 
definitely because of medical purposes because she was 
presenting with obvious injuries, and also because she didn't 
know where her alleged attacker was."  Similarly, Yee stated his 
purpose was "to find out if she was hurt and why we were there, 
basically." 
Again, we are not blind to the fact that responding 
officers often have mixed motives.  Yee's testimony at voir dire 
encapsulates this: 
"I mean, obviously, when we first arrived, she's crying, 
she's upset, she looks like she's injured.  I mean, I 
wanted to get her treatment, to get her help.  Okay?  At 
the same time, I also wanted to figure out who had done 
this to her, how this had happened and who had done this to 
her.  So we were trying to gather as much information as we 
can at the time." 
 
Yet the mere fact that officers have mixed motives does not 
automatically render an out-of-court declarant's statement 
testimonial.  See Bryant, 562 U.S. at 368.  Rather, it is one 
more piece of information to consider when trying to discern the 
primary purpose behind the out-of-court declarant's statements. 
Finally, we look to whether there was an ongoing emergency.  
Like the dispatcher, when Yee and Connolly arrived on the scene, 
they were trying to ascertain whether there was any continued 
danger to the victim.  Indeed, the fact that Yee looked through 
the rest of the apartment to secure the scene corroborates the 
fact that officers could not be sure whether the defendant had 
left, even though the victim was under the impression that he 
23 
 
had.10  As stated supra, given that the defendant had left only 
minutes before, he had gone with the victim's sister, and it was 
not clear whether they had departed in a vehicle, there was no 
assurance that they would not return imminently.  Contrast 
Davis, 547 U.S. at 830 (no ongoing emergency where defendant was 
supervised by officer in separate room).  Indeed, this is 
corroborated by the victim's reaction at the hospital when Yee 
mistakenly told her that the defendant had been arrested.11  
Connolly testified that "there was minimal change [in her 
visibly upset demeanor] up until we mistakenly told her that 
[the defendant] was in custody."12  Yee testified that after 
hearing the defendant had been arrested, the victim "seemed like 
she was relieved."  In other words, a reasonable person in the 
 
10 The defendant argues that the fact that this sweep did 
not take place until after the ambulance arrived meant that 
officers could not have perceived any safety threat upon their 
arrival.  Yet just because the officers first spoke with the 
victim before sweeping the apartment does not mean that there 
were no objective indications that a safety threat remained. 
 
11 Information about the victim's reaction came out at voir 
dire but not at trial. 
 
12 The mistake occurred because while Yee and Connolly were 
at the hospital with the victim, they received a call that 
someone was trying to get into the victim's apartment.  Yee 
overhead someone on the police radio say, "We have him in 
custody."  He assumed this referred to the defendant.  In truth, 
only the victim's sister was in custody.  Once Yee found that 
out, he returned to the victim to inform her he had been 
mistaken.  Upon hearing that the defendant had not been 
arrested, the victim was upset. 
24 
 
victim's shoes would have been concerned about the defendant's 
return.  See Beatrice, 460 Mass. at 262 ("even if the assailant 
is not armed, a reasonable person would recognize that an 
enraged boy friend might . . . lie in wait . . . in an attempt 
to do her further harm"). 
More importantly, the victim's medical condition bears on 
both whether there was an ongoing medical emergency and whether 
she would have been able to have "any purpose at all in 
responding to police questions."  Bryant, 562 U.S. at 365.  In 
Bryant, the Court stated that it had "not previously considered, 
much less ruled out, the relevance of a victim's severe injuries 
to the primary purpose inquiry."  Id. at 364.  A victim's 
medical condition "sheds light on the ability of the victim to 
have any purpose at all in responding to police questions and on 
the likelihood that any purpose formed would necessarily be a 
testimonial one" as well as provides context on "the existence 
and magnitude of a continuing threat to the victim."  Id. at 
365. 
Here, when Yee and Connolly arrived, they observed 
"swelling and bruising on and around [the victim's] face, along 
her jawline and cheeks and neck area," and that her eyes were 
red.  She recounted to them that she had been "punched in the 
face, elbowed in the face and strangled several times," and that 
the defendant had strangled her "[w]ith his knee and also with a 
25 
 
grip with his hands around her neck."  Moreover, the 
strangulation caused her to lose consciousness twice and urinate 
in her pants.  The severity of the victim's injuries -- 
especially the fact that she had recently lost consciousness -- 
makes her ability to have any testimonial intent unlikely.  See 
Bryant, 562 U.S. at 364. 
The defendant argues that as soon as officers were aware 
that an ambulance was en route, further questioning could not 
have been for the purpose of determining whether medical 
attention was necessary; they had already decided it was.13  
While that may be factually correct, it mischaracterizes the 
 
13 On the 911 call, the dispatcher can be heard telling 
responding officers that an "X-ray's en route."  Connolly 
testified at trial that the officers believed an ambulance was 
en route to the home before they arrived. 
 
Separately, officers also called for an ambulance after 
they had arrived at the victim's house.  From the record, it is 
not clear how long into Yee and Connolly's conversation with the 
victim that they made that call.  Connolly testified at voir 
dire that Yee called an ambulance as soon as they encountered 
the victim because she was "presenting with obvious injuries."  
On the other hand, Yee testified at voir dire and trial that he 
called for the ambulance only after the victim stated she had 
been strangled and complained of pain to her head. 
 
The defendant points out that even if officers had not been 
aware that an ambulance had been sent by dispatch, they also 
called an ambulance as soon as they arrived and saw the victim's 
injuries.  After that call, they continued to question the 
victim about her injuries. 
 
26 
 
ongoing emergency analysis.14  Just because an ambulance has been 
called does not mean that any potential medical emergency has 
dissolved.  On the contrary, strangulation injuries can be quite 
serious, and if they go "unrecognized and untreated, delayed 
life-threatening airway obstruction or long term vocal 
dysfunction may result."  Funk & Schuppel, Strangulation 
Injuries, 102 Wisc. Med. J., no. 3, 2003, at 42.  Contrast 
Beatrice, 460 Mass. at 260 ("no suggestion that [the victim's] 
injuries were serious or life threatening").  In this scenario, 
it was prudent for the police officers to continue collecting 
medical information from the victim in case they needed to relay 
it to paramedics upon their arrival. 
Thus, given the victim's injuries and the uncertainty about 
whether the defendant would return, there was initially an 
ongoing emergency.  That changed, however, once the victim was 
poised to leave for the hospital.  Although an ongoing emergency 
 
14 This confusion likely has roots in the "testimonial per 
se" discussion in Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 445 Mass. 1, 3 
(2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 926 (2006), which has since been 
abrogated.  See Commonwealth v. Wardsworth, 482 Mass. 454, 464 
n.18 (2019).  In Gonsalves, supra, we held that "statements made 
in response to questioning by law enforcement agents are per se 
testimonial, except when the questioning is meant to secure a 
volatile scene or to establish the need for or provide medical 
care."  Yet as Wardsworth, supra, makes clear, the test in 
Gonsalves is no longer the law after Bryant, 562 U.S. at 358.  
Thus, the proper focus is now on the primary purpose of the 
statement, not only on whether it is aimed at establishing the 
need for medical care or securing a volatile scene. 
27 
 
is not a necessary condition for a statement to be 
nontestimonial, given the context-dependent nature of the 
inquiry, instances will arise where the dissipation of the 
emergency does cause the primary purpose to evolve.  See Bryant, 
562 U.S. at 365.  This is such a case. 
After an evaluation, the medics encouraged the victim to go 
to the hospital.  She was initially too scared to go, but Yee 
and Connolly persuaded her to, assuring her that Connolly would 
go with her to keep her safe.  Yee told the victim they would 
bring her daughter, too, to ensure her safety as well.  During 
this conversation, Yee asked the victim what she was still 
scared of, and she indicated the person who attacked her.  She 
again named her attacker as the defendant. 
At this point, the ongoing emergency had dissipated.  
Although the defendant's whereabouts were still unknown, the 
victim was about to go to the hospital, where the defendant 
would be unlikely to find her, and she would be accompanied by a 
police officer to boot.  Thus, the defendant was no longer a 
continuing threat at the time.  See Bryant, 562 U.S. at 365.  
The diffusion of the ongoing emergency, and the fact that the 
victim was then about to leave the scene in the company of a 
police officer, caused the primary purpose of the interrogation 
to evolve from nontestimonial to testimonial.  That the victim 
was still upset and the conversation continued to be informal 
28 
 
does not mandate a different conclusion.  The primary purpose 
analysis is delicate and highly fact dependent, Bryant, 562 U.S. 
at 363, so a single change in circumstance such as this can be 
enough to cause statements to evolve into being testimonial.  
Thus, it was error to allow Yee to testify that during this 
final moment in the apartment, the victim named her attacker as 
the defendant.15 
This evidence, however, was harmless because it was 
duplicative of the properly admitted evidence.  The victim had 
already identified her attacker as the defendant on the 911 
call, as well as to Yee and Connolly multiple times during the 
initial interrogation.  We are confident that the error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Wardsworth, 482 Mass. 
at 458, citing Nardi, 452 Mass. at 394.16 
 
15 The concurrence argues that the judge did not err by 
admitting this statement, stating that in her view the ongoing 
emergency had not yet dissipated.  We disagree, but note that 
the divergence of views shows how fact intensive the inquiry is, 
and the importance of trial judges "determin[ing] in the first 
instance when any transition from nontestimonial to testimonial 
occurs."  Bryant, 562 U.S. at 365. 
 
16 The defendant and the Commonwealth disagree about whether 
the admission of the victim's statements to Yee and Connolly 
were properly objected to, and therefore what standard of review 
applies.  We need not address this issue, because even under the 
standard more favorable to the defendant, we hold that the 
admission of this cumulative testimony was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
29 
 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's 
convictions are affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.
 
CYPHER, J. (concurring).  I concur. I write separately 
because I do not think that the judge erred in admitting the 
statements made by the victim just before she entered the 
ambulance.1  To distinguish nontestimonial statements from 
testimonial statements, we consider the primary purpose of the 
interrogation.  See Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 360 
(2011).  As the court notes, the United States Supreme Court has 
concluded that "[a]n objective analysis of the circumstances of 
 
1 As I read the record, it is not clear to me that the 
victim identified the defendant just before she entered the 
ambulance.  My reading of the transcript shows that, during 
redirect examination, the prosecutor asked a series of questions 
about the victim's fear of going to the hospital.  The officer 
testified that he assured the victim that he would keep her and 
her daughter safe.  The prosecutor asked, "Safe from what?"  The 
defendant objected, and the judge overruled the objection.  The 
officer answered, "Safe from whoever attacked her."  The 
prosecutor then asked, "And who did she say attacked her?"  The 
officer answered, "Mr. Rand."  As the court notes, the victim 
had identified the defendant as her assailant in her initial 
statements.  Defense counsel, who had objected as necessary, did 
not object in this instance, further indicating that this 
question and answer did not implicate additional potentially 
testimonial evidence.  I also do not think that the issue 
regarding this statement is adequately raised in the defendant's 
brief.  See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in 481 
Mass. 1628 (2019).  In fact, the only portion of the transcript 
referenced in the defendant's brief to support what could be 
interpreted as this argument concerns cross-examination.  
Defense counsel asked the officer, "According to [the victim], 
Mr. Rand . . . arrived home at 12:00 o'clock, right?"  The 
officer answered, "Approximately."  Not only was this testimony 
given on cross-examination, but there was also no indication as 
to when the victim made this statement to the officer or if she 
named the defendant when she said what time he arrived home.  
Nevertheless, I analyze this issue in accord with the way the 
court reads the transcript. 
2 
 
an encounter and the statements and actions of the parties to it 
provides the most accurate assessment of the primary purpose of 
the interrogation" (quotation omitted).  Id.  In determining the 
primary purpose of the interrogation, we consider whether police 
are responding to an ongoing emergency and whether there are 
other circumstances present that suggest the "statement is not 
procured with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court 
substitute for trial testimony."  Id. at 358.  In addition to 
considering whether there is an ongoing emergency, we consider 
factors such as "the medical condition of the victim," the level 
of formality of the interview, and "the statements and actions 
of both the declarant and interrogators."  Id. at 364-367.  
These factors, however, are not exhaustive, see id. at 357, and 
we must consider "all of the relevant circumstances," id. at 
369.  See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). 
 
When these factors are balanced, and we consider all the 
relevant circumstances, it appears to me that the victim's 
statements just before she entered the ambulance were 
admissible.  Although the victim was no longer being attacked, 
the attack had occurred very recently.  It is readily apparent, 
given the victim's physical and emotional condition, that she 
was in crisis and "facing an 'ongoing emergency.'"  Commonwealth 
v. Middlemiss, 465 Mass. 627, 633 (2013), quoting Davis, 547 
U.S. at 827.  Finally, there was no formality to the interview.  
3 
 
See Middlemiss, supra, citing Bryant, 562 U.S. at 366.  The 
statements she made at this time were "not procured with a 
primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial 
testimony."  Bryant, supra at 358. 
 
I recognize that the excited utterance and testimonial 
hearsay inquiries are separate, but related.  "While both 
inquiries look to the surrounding circumstances to make 
determinations about the declarant's mindset at the time of the 
statement, their focal points are different.  The excited 
utterance inquiry focuses on whether the declarant was under the 
stress of a startling event.  The testimonial hearsay inquiry 
focuses on whether a reasonable declarant, similarly situated 
(that is, excited by the stress of a startling event), would 
have had the capacity to appreciate the legal ramifications of 
her statement."  United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 61 (1st 
Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 926 (2006).  The focus under 
either approach, however, is on the declarant. 
 
Here, the analysis of the victim's statements by the court 
applies equally to the statement that the court states is 
inadmissible.  The victim initially was too scared to go with 
the medics in the ambulance to the hospital.  As the court 
notes, Yee and Connolly convinced her to go and told her that 
Connolly would accompany her to keep her safe and that her 
daughter could go with her for her daughter's safety.  The 
4 
 
officers asked the victim what she was still scared of.  She 
answered that she was afraid of her attacker. 
 
"[T]he relevant inquiry is not the subjective or actual 
purpose of the individuals involved in a particular encounter, 
but rather the purpose that reasonable participants would have 
had, as ascertained from the individuals' statements and actions 
and the circumstances in which the encounter occurred."  Bryant, 
562 U.S. at 360.  It does not appear to me, even under the 
objective standard, that a reasonable person in the victim's 
shoes would have had "the capacity to appreciate the legal 
ramifications of her statement."  Brito, 427 F.3d at 61. 
Appendix. 
 
 
 
The text of the 911 call is set forth below.  Remarks to 
"aside" are to responding the police officers or ambulance. 
 
The victim:  "Hello?" 
 
The dispatcher:  "Braintree police dispatcher Wood, this 
call is recorded." 
 
The victim:  "Yes, I need somebody to come to my house." 
 
The dispatcher:  "Okay, where are you?" 
 
The victim:  "[street address]." 
 
The dispatcher:  "All right, hold on, I need you to take a 
deep breath for me, okay?  What's your address?" 
 
The victim:  "[street address]." 
 
The dispatcher:  "[street address]?  What's going on 
there?" 
 
The victim:  "My boyfriend just beat me up." 
 
The dispatcher:  [Aside] "A-7, [street address], female 
just got beat up by her boyfriend." 
 
The dispatcher:  "Are you there right now with him?" 
 
The victim:  "No, he left." 
 
The dispatcher:  "Okay, just stay on the phone with me, 
okay?  I've got units headed your way.  What's your name, 
honey?" 
 
The victim:  "[victim's name]." 
 
The dispatcher:  "What's your boyfriend's name?" 
 
The victim:  "Roy Rand." 
 
The dispatcher:  "All right, hold on, I'm going to have to 
go –- go a little slow.  What's his first name?" 
 
2 
 
The victim:  "Roy." 
 
The dispatcher:  "Roy, R-O-Y?" 
 
The victim:  "Yes." 
 
The dispatcher:  "And spell his last name for me." 
 
The victim:  "R-A-N-D." 
 
The dispatcher:  "Okay." 
 
The victim:  "He's from Brockton." 
 
The dispatcher:  "He's from Brockton?  What kind of car, 
what kind of car does he have?" 
 
The victim:  "I don't know." 
 
The dispatcher:  "All right, hold on one second, okay?  
What exactly happened tonight?" 
 
The victim:  "He came home at twelve, and then, my sister 
was here and she was causing trouble and stuff like that.  And I 
blamed, will you take her out of this house because we can't 
have her here.  And then he was just taking sides with her and 
stuff like that and then I talked about it and he knocked me out 
a couple of times." 
 
The dispatcher:  [Aside] "[street address].  Boyfriend's no 
longer on scene.  He fled in an unknown vehicle." 
 
The victim:  "And then he punched me in the face." 
 
The dispatcher:  "He punched you in the face?" 
 
The victim:  "Yes." 
 
The dispatcher:  "Okay.  Do you need an ambulance, honey?" 
 
The victim:  "I don't know." 
 
The dispatcher:  "Are you bleeding?" 
 
The victim:  "No.  But my face is swollen." 
 
The dispatcher:  "All right, hold on one second, okay?" 
3 
 
 
The victim:  "Yeah." 
 
The dispatcher:  [Aside] "[Inaudible] [street address] in 
Braintree, for a domestic assault and battery." 
 
The dispatcher:  "Okay, what I'm going to have to do is 
have an ambulance come, just so they can check you out, okay?  I 
want to make sure that everything's okay.  All right?  But I'm 
going to have you stay on the phone with me until I have 
officers that get there, okay?" 
 
The victim:  "Yeah, and my sister left, too, with him." 
 
The dispatcher:  "Your sister left with him?" 
 
The victim:  "Yes." 
 
The dispatcher:  "Okay." 
 
The victim:  "After he beat me up and stuff." 
 
The dispatcher:  "How long ago did he leave?" 
 
The victim:  "Like two minutes ago, since I called you 
guys." 
 
The dispatcher:  "How long ago did he leave your house?" 
 
The victim:  "Since I called, since I was able to get my 
phone." 
 
The dispatcher:  "Okay, so he left a little while ago?  Is 
there an apartment number, or is it a single-family home?" 
 
The victim:  "Three-family." 
 
The dispatcher:  "Okay, what apartment are you in?" 
 
The victim:  "Uh, one.  [Inaudible].  They both left 
together." 
 
The dispatcher:  "What apartment do you live in, honey?" 
 
The victim:  "One." 
 
The dispatcher:  "You live in apartment one?" 
4 
 
 
The victim:  "Yeah." 
 
The dispatcher:  "Okay, hold on one second." 
 
The dispatcher:  [Aside] "Units to [street address], the 
female's going to be in apartment one.  She's by herself." 
 
The victim:  "He tried to kill me." 
 
The dispatcher:  [Aside] "Roger." 
 
The dispatcher:  "All right.  Can you go to your door and 
see the police officers?" 
 
The victim:  "Yeah." 
 
The dispatcher:  "Can you go let them in?" 
 
The victim:  "I'm in here." 
 
The dispatcher:  "Okay.  Do you see the police cars?" 
 
The victim:  "Yes, I see lights." 
 
The dispatcher:  "You see lights?  Can you yell to them so 
they know where you are?" 
 
The victim:  "Yeah, I see them." 
 
The dispatcher:  "Are you with them?" 
 
The victim:  "Yeah." 
 
The dispatcher:  [Aside] "A-1-7, were you able to find her?  
Roger, an X-ray's en route." 
 
The dispatcher:  "All right, go talk to them, okay, honey?" 
 
The victim:  "Now where did he go?" 
 
The dispatcher:  "Go talk to the police officers, okay?" 
 
The victim:  "Okay." 
 
The dispatcher:  "All right.  Bye-bye."