Title: State v. Taylor

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

109 Ariz. 481 (1973) 512 P.2d 590 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Raymond Teague TAYLOR, Appellant. No. 2374. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Division. July 18, 1973. Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen. by Peter M. Van Orman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. *482 Flynn, Kimerer, Thinnes & Galbraith by John J. Flynn, Tom Galbraith, Phoenix, for appellant. STRUCKMEYER, Justice. The defendant, Raymond Teague Taylor, was tried by jury and convicted of two counts of violating A.R.S. § 13-652, lewd and lascivious acts. From the judgments and sentences thereon, he appeals. The evidence upon which the jury convicted was the uncorroborated testimony of a 12-year-old male, hereinafter called the complaining witness, who testified that defendant committed certain acts of fellatio upon him. By A.R.S. § 13-136, it is provided that a conviction may not be had on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Defendant urges that the complaining witness was an accomplice and, as such, his testimony must be corroborated. The State's position is that the complaining witness was at the time of the commission of the acts a child without knowledge of the wrongfulness of the acts. By A.R.S. § 13-135, children under the age of fourteen years, in the absence of clear proof that at the time of committing an offense they knew of its wrongfulness, are incapable of committing a crime. And it is argued that under the evidence the complaining witness could not be an accomplice whose testimony required corroboration, cf. State v. Howard, 97 Ariz. 339, 400 P.2d 332 (1965). The testimony of the complaining witness, if believed, amply supports the jury's verdict. He testified: Defendant argues that it is absurd to say that the complaining witness did not know that the acts which he described were improper. This argument is more properly addressed to a jury than to an appellate court, the court below having properly instructed the jury as to the weight and credibility to be attached to the witness' testimony. Defendant complains that because there was no corroboration of the complaining witness' testimony, it was error to instruct on the necessity for corroboration of an accomplice's testimony. Defendant's complaint is without merit. At a recess shortly before the conclusion of the trial, the record shows that the following occurred: We hold that the instructions requested in the trial court by a defendant are not thereafter grounds for assignment of error. Defendant complains that the trial court, in instructing the jury in the language of A.R.S. § 13-135, placed the burden upon him to establish by clear proof that the complaining witness knew the wrongfulness of his acts. The short answer to the defendant's complaint is that no objection in this respect was made at the trial or thereafter on motion for a new trial. Errors in instructions to which no objections are made will be considered as waived. State v. Wheeler, 108 Ariz. 338, 340, 498 P.2d 205, 207 (1972); State v. Peats, 106 Ariz. 254, 255, 475 P.2d 238, 239 (1970). Nor do we find that the court's instructions constituted fundamental error. A.R.S. § 13-135 provides: Plainly, the statute provides that children under the age of fourteen are incapable of committing crimes in the absence of clear proof that they knew the wrongfulness of their acts. The Arizona statute A.R.S. § 13-135 is a recognition of the common law rule that infants between seven and fourteen were rebuttably presumed to be incapable of *484 crimes; that is, incapable of entertaining criminal intent. 1 Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure, § 35, at 76-78 (by R. Anderson 1957). In the prosecution of a juvenile, the burden is on the state to show that he is capable of appreciating the nature of his act, Juvenile Court v. State ex rel. Humphrey, 139 Tenn. 549, 556, 201 S.W. 771, 773 (1918). It is therefore plain that the statute has a reasonable basis in that it is designed for the protection of the youthful immature. If, in the instant case, the jury understood the court's instructions to mean that it was the defendant's burden to clearly prove that the complaining witness knew the wrongfulness of his act, nonetheless this would not be a denial of due process of law under the fourteenth amendment. We cannot say that the statute violates generally accepted concepts of basic standards of justice. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S. Ct. 1002, 96 L. Ed. 1302 (1952). However, the foregoing clearly points up the seriousness of defendant's further complaint that he was prejudicially limited in his cross-examination of the complaining witness. The following occurred at the trial: We have repeatedly held that great latitude should be given in cross-examination in a criminal case. We said, for example, in State v. Holden, 88 Ariz. 43, 54, 352 P.2d 705, 713 (1960), that "a party against whom a witness is produced has a right to show everything which may in the slightest degree affect his credibility." The rule is especially applicable where the witness is an accomplice testifying for the state, Holden, supra, 88 Ariz. at 55, 352 P.2d at 714. We think in the light of the court's instructions that a child under the age of fourteen is incapable of committing a crime in the absence of clear proof that he knew of the wrongfulness of his act, the inquiry into the complaining witness' general intelligence and into his religious training were particularly material to establish the possibility that the complaining witness may have known of the wrongfulness of his acts. Thereby, the jury could conclude that the complaining witness was an accomplice whose testimony required corroboration within the meaning of the Arizona statute. We further hold that the defendant was also unreasonably limited in his cross-examination when the trial court sustained an objection as to the time of the complaining witness' sexual activities with another boy. The following occurred during the course of the cross-examination: The trial court's ruling was particularly prejudicial in the light of the State's subsequent argument to the jury. In the opening argument, counsel for the State said: In closing, the State argued, over the defendant's objection: [In point of fact, there was no evidence that the defendant was the first or that he taught the complaining witness.] The trial court further prejudicially limited defendant's cross-examination when it twice sustained objections to attempts by defendant's counsel to determine what, if any, action had been taken by the State against the complaining witness. As counsel for defendant stated at the time of the court's ruling: "I think it's material as to * * * the motive of this witness." Thereafter, the State argued to the jury to the obvious prejudice of the defendant: For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of conviction is reversed with directions that the defendant be granted a new trial. HAYS, C.J., and CAMERON, V.C.J., concur.