Title: Velos v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Velos v. State1988 WY 48752 P.2d 411Case Number: 87-256Decided: 03/30/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
MICHAEL VELOS, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, SheridanCounty, Harold Joffe, J., 
(Retired).

Wyoming Public Defender Program: 
Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, Julie D. Naylor, Appellate Counsel, 
Cheyenne, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Shirley Kingston, Asst. Atty. 
Gen., Cheyenne, for 
appellee.

Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

BROWN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Michael Velos 
was convicted of first degree sexual assault, a violation of § 6-2-302(a)(i), 
W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement). He raises the following 
issue:

[¶2.]     "Whether or not the 
trial court erred in granting the State's Motion in 
Limine."

[¶3.]     We 
affirm.

[¶4.]     Appellant and a group 
of friends got together on July 21, 1987, to have a party. In addition to 
appellant, the group consisted of Tom Hutchinson, Shaun Guillams, Eric 
Vredenburg, Lenny Eubanks and the victim. The group assembled first at the 
Coast-to-Coast store in Sheridan, but later 
settled on Hutchinson's sister's apartment as the venue 
for the party. When they arrived at the apartment someone set up a drinking game 
called "quarters."

[¶5.]     The victim was a 
seventeen year-old high school senior at the time of the assault. She was a 
friend of both Hutchinson and appellant. She had driven to Sheridan from Gillette to 
be at the party after having worked until 4:00 a.m. on July 21. She also 
testified that on the night of the party she had not eaten much. Her first 
encounter with appellant occurred early that evening. She was in one of the 
bedrooms of the apartment looking out a window when appellant came up behind 
her. He pressed himself against her and she turned around and kissed him. He 
then lifted up her shirt, looked at her breasts and touched her. They both heard 
footsteps coming toward the room and stopped what they were 
doing.

[¶6.]     The victim then went 
into a small room off the bathroom and had a wine cooler. Her testimony was that 
she drank between two and three wine coolers and some gulps of beer that 
evening. Shortly after her last wine cooler, she became ill and vomitted. She 
stopped drinking and two of the boys at the party found a mattress and laid it 
down for her in the bedroom. She laid down on it and went to sleep. The bedroom 
was closed so she could sleep.

[¶7.]     Eventually, the party 
started to break up as some younger participants decided to go home. Soon only 
appellant, Vredenburg, Guillams and Hutchinson remained. The foursome decided to 
go to Perkins restaurant for some food. Hutchinson woke the victim briefly to see if 
she wanted to go along, but she declined. The four boys left the kitchen light 
and one hall light on as they left, locking the door behind them. When they 
arrived at the restaurant parking lot they met some friends, including Steve 
Laughery. They all talked for a few minutes and then appellant stated that he 
was tired and had to work the next day. He got into his car and 
left.

[¶8.]     There were conflicting 
versions of what appellant did after he left the restaurant parking lot. The 
victim testified, however, that when she woke up in the apartment there was a 
man on top of her kissing and touching her body. The man spoke to her and she 
recognized the voice as appellant's. The victim screamed for Hutchinson, but he was not 
in the apartment. Appellant then rolled the victim to her stomach and tried to 
pull her pants down. She struggled and he punched her in the head three times. 
She stopped struggling and screamed again. Appellant put his hands around her 
neck and tried to choke her. She told him she would stop screaming and he told 
her "Shut up, bitch, or I'll kill you." Appellant pulled the victim's pants off 
and pulled her panties down halfway. He tried to tie her wrists together with a 
towel, but was unsuccessful. Then appellant pulled the victim's panties off 
completely.

[¶9.]     Appellant next asked 
the victim if she was a virgin. She said she was not but later told him she was. 
Appellant tried to enter her anally and then vaginally. Appellant next performed 
oral sex on her. After some verbal taunting he tried to penetrate the victim 
vaginally. He was not able to penetrate her completely. About this time 
appellant and the victim heard Hutchinson, Vredenburg, Guillams and Laughery 
pull up outside. Appellant got up and ran out of the room. The victim testified 
that by that time she had seen appellant's face once and recognized 
it.

[¶10.]  When the four boys pulled up outside, 
Hutchinson and 
Guillams, who were in the same vehicle, noticed that appellant's car was parked 
outside and that all of the lights were off in the apartment. Hutchinson and Laughery 
went into the front of the building, but before they got inside they heard the 
back screen door slam. They ran to the back door while Guillams went up the 
front stairs. When they all got into the apartment they found the victim huddled 
in the bedroom, leaning against the wall crying. She told them appellant had 
tried to rape her. Hutchinson then took her to the police station 
where she was interviewed.

[¶11.]  Meanwhile, Laughery found appellant 
outside headed towards his car. Laughery walked up behind appellant and asked 
him, "Why did you do it?" Appellant did not answer the question directly. The 
two talked briefly before Guillams arrived. Appellant testified that he spoke 
with Guillams about what was happening and at one point told Guillams, "I think 
I screwed up, man."

[¶12.]  The police arrived shortly thereafter 
accompanied by Hutchinson. They read appellant his rights and 
took him to the police station for questioning. They also searched the apartment 
finding a towel ripped into strips by the kitchen and by the mattress. A pair of 
woman's panties were found in the bedroom.

[¶13.]  At the police station, appellant was 
questioned but refused to make a statement until he spoke with an attorney. The 
police arrested and booked him that night. He was searched and placed in a cell 
for the evening. The next day the court appointed defense counsel. Three days 
after his arrest a search warrant was issued and the police did various tests 
for evidence on appellant.

[¶14.]  Appellant waived his preliminary hearing. 
An information was filed in district court on August 19, 1987, and he was 
arraigned on that same day. Trial by jury was set for September 14 through 16, 
1987.

[¶15.]  The matter came to trial before a jury on 
the scheduled dates and the jury found appellant guilty of sexual assault in the 
first degree. After a presentence investigation, appellant was sentenced to 
eight to fifteen years in the state penitentiary. The sentence was later amended 
to run concurrently with a burglary sentence appellant had been serving by 
probation at the time of the rape. This appeal followed.

[¶16.]  The sole issue in this case originates 
from a motion in limine filed by the state on September 10, 1987. The motion 
asked that the defense be barred

"* * * from attempting to 
elicit evidence concerning prior sexual conduct of the victim not involving the 
Defendant, particularly testimony concerning a conversation had between the 
Defendant and the victim several hours prior to the alleged sexual assault 
regarding the victim having performed oral sex upon another individual at a 
previous party. * * *"

[¶17.]  The state based the motion on three 
grounds including: (1) that defense counsel had not made an offer of proof in 
writing that it intended to use evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct at 
trial under § 6-2-312(a), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement);1 (2) that the evidence was 
irrelevant under the defendant's theory of the case; and, (3) that if the 
evidence was somehow relevant it was unduly prejudicial. The trial court heard 
arguments on the motion in chambers before trial. At that time the defense 
argued that evidence that the victim had discussed performing fellatio on 
another individual at another time was relevant and necessary to its case for 
several reasons. It was argued that such testimony could show that appellant's 
version of the touching and kissing between appellant and the victim earlier in 
the evening was more accurate, and hence, his entire explanation of the rape 
more credible. The defense also argued that the prosecution would be able to 
elicit sympathy from the jury because all they would know about the victim 
otherwise was that she was a virgin. In this argument, defense counsel suggested 
there was a difference between a "[V]irgin in the technical sense, the classical 
sense, * * *" and a woman who had experienced a different sexual encounter. 
After argument the trial court granted the motion and proceeded with the 
trial.

[¶18.]  Appellant now argues that even though the 
defense did not comply with § 6-2-312(a), he should have been able to question 
the victim about her earlier conversation. He argues that the purpose of the 
statute is to put the prosecution on notice of what the defense is planning to 
prove in trial, and that the state had such notice in this 
case.

[¶19.]  The purpose of § 6-2-312(a) is to allow 
the trial court to see a written motion and affidavits so it can decide whether 
a hearing is necessary. The trial court can then hold the hearing, hear from the 
victim, and decide on the motion. The statute means what it says and should be 
complied with. See Stogner v. State, Wyo., 674 P.2d 1298, 1300 
(1984).

[¶20.]  In this case the trial court held a 
hearing, despite appellant's noncompliance with § 6-2-312(a), before granting 
the motion. Consequently, the next question before us is whether the trial court 
abused its discretion when it granted the state's motion in limine. We have 
stated that:

"Judicial discretion is a 
composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. [Citation.]" 
Martin v. State, Wyo., 720 P.2d 894, 897 
(1986).

We will not 
upset a trial court's discretionary ruling on the admissibility of evidence 
unless the appellant carries his burden to show a clear abuse of that 
discretion. Amin v. State, Wyo., 695 P.2d 1021, 1027 
(1985).

[¶21.]  The trial court appears to have granted 
the state's motion in limine because evidence of the victim's alleged past oral 
sexual behavior was irrelevant under Rule 401, Wyoming Rules of Evidence.2 We agree and affirm that ruling. 
Appellant's theory of the case stressed mistaken identity. He did not defend on 
the basis of consent. The evidence excluded under the state's motion had nothing 
to do with the identity of the rapist.

[¶22.]  Further, if appellant's aim in eliciting 
such testimony from the victim was to attack her credibility, it was not proper 
under Rule 608(b), W.R.E.,3 as we construed that rule in Weddle 
v. State, Wyo., 621 P.2d 231, 238 (1980). The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion when it granted the state's motion in limine.

[¶23.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 The statute provides in 
pertinent part:

"(a) In any prosecution 
under W.S. 6-2-302 through 6-2-305 or for any lesser included offense, if 
evidence of the prior sexual conduct of the victim, reputation evidence or 
opinion evidence as to the character of the victim is to be offered the 
following procedure shall be used:

"(i) A written motion 
shall be made by the defendant to the court at least ten (10) days prior to the 
trial stating that the defense has an offer of proof of the relevancy of 
evidence of the sexual conduct of the victim and its relevancy to the 
defense;

"(ii) The written motion 
shall be accompanied by affidavits in which the offer of proof is 
stated;

"(iii) If the court finds 
the offer of proof sufficient, the court shall order a hearing in chambers, and 
at the hearing allow the questioning of the victim regarding the offer of proof 
made by the defendant and other pertinent evidence;

"(iv) At the conclusion 
of the hearing, if the court finds that the probative value of the evidence 
substantially outweighs the probability that its admission will create 
prejudice, the evidence shall be admissible pursuant to this section. The court 
may make an order stating what evidence may be introduced by the defendant, 
which order may include the nature of the questions to be 
permitted."

2 Rule 401, Wyoming Rules 
of Evidence, provides:

"`Relevant evidence' 
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence."

3 Rule 608(b), W.R.E., 
provides:

"(b) Specific instances of conduct. - 
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or 
supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 
609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the 
discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be 
inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his character 
for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the 
witness being cross-examined has testified.

The giving of testimony, 
whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not operate as a waiver of 
his privilege against selfincrimination when examined with respect to matters 
which relate only to credibility."