Title: Judith Cambria v. DeForest B. Soaries

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). PORITZ, C.J., writing for a unanimous Court. This appeal arises from an effort by the Legislature to have placed on the general election ballot for November 2000 a resolution to amend the New Jersey Constitution to dedicate certain revenue streams for use in the construction and repair of the State's transportation system. The issue before the Court is whether the resolution as framed violates Article IX, Paragraph 5 of the Constitution, referred to as the separate vote requirement, which provides that the Legislature must present more than one amendment to the voters separately and distinctly. The proposed amendment to Article VII, Section 2, Paragraph 4 addressed by the resolution at issue, Concurrent Resolution No. 1 (the Resolution), provided for the dedication of two new revenue sources to the Transportation Trust Fund (Fund): specified amounts from the gross receipts tax on the sale of petroleum products and specified amounts from Sales and Use Tax receipts. As with a 0.025 cents per gallon tax on the sale of motor fuels already constitutionally dedicated to the Fund, the new revenue streams would be used only for activities related to the construction or repair of New Jersey's transportation system. Plaintiffs, the League of Woman Voters and its Director of Fiscal Policy (the League), challenged the Resolution as unconstitutional, being of the view that by combining the two proposed changes to the Constitution (dedication of two new revenue streams) in one ballot question, the Legislature was depriving voters of their constitutional right to approve one change and reject another. The League filed suit in the Superior Court, Law Division seeking a declaratory judgment that the Resolution violated Article IX, Paragraph 5 and a permanent injunction against placing the Resolution on the November 2000 ballot. The Secretary of State and the Attorney General moved to dismiss the League's Verified Complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The trial court denied the League's request for injunctive relief and granted the motion to dismiss the complaint on August 4, 2000. The League appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the judgment below on October 10, 2000. The League then filed a notice of appeal as of right with the Supreme Court pursuant to R. 2:2-1(a)(1). After hearing oral argument, the Court, by Order filed October 25, 2000, affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division. No opinion was filed at that time due to the proximity of the general election. The Resolution was submitted to and approved by the voters on November 2, 2000. Held: Concurrent Resolution No. 1 and the constitutional amendment it proposes do not violate the separate vote requirement or the single object test of the New Jersey Constitution because the two proposed changes to the Constitution are closely related to each other and serve the same purpose. 1. Article IX, Paragraph 5 of the Constitution is subject to multiple, reasonable interpretations; therefore, it is appropriate to consider other related provisions of the Constitution and other sources to ascertain the intent of the framers of the Constitution. In this case, the single object rule, located in Article IV, Section 7, Paragraph 4 and Article VIII, Section 2, Paragraph 3, is looked to. That constitutional rule is intended to ensure relatedness among the components of legislative acts. The parties and the courts in this case agree that the Resolution meets the single object test because only one provision of the Constitution is affected and the changes within that provision further the same purpose: increasing the future stability of the Fund by dedicating additional monies to it. (pp. 8-14) 2. The history of Article IX reveals evidence of the framers' intent in respect of whether the provision at issue requires more than the relatedness test of the single object rule. That evidence suggests that the framers did not intend so narrow a reading as urged by the League. ( pp. 15-17) 3. At least twenty-nine other states have separate vote requirements to amend their constitutions and although there are wide variances in the way state courts have interpreted those requirements and single object requirements, there is a general recognition that the primary goal underlying such requirements is the prevention of logrolling. Logrolling is the legislative practice of combining unrelated popular and unpopular proposals because voters will approve the entire proposal in order to have the portion of the proposal they favor pass. These requirements also may prevent the submission of misleading or confusing amendments. (pp. 17-23) 4. The Court favors and adopts the approach of the Oregon Supreme Court on the amendment issue because it comports with the constitutional history of Article IX, Paragraph 5 in that it incorporates the single object test and because it recognizes the seriousness of amending a constitution by requiring closer scrutiny of the relationship between the parts of a proposed amendment than does the single object test. (pp. 24-25) 5. The separate vote requirement of the New Jersey Constitution requires that any proposed amendment must not make two or more changes to the Constitution unless they are closely related to one another. The amendment as structured and proposed by the Resolution constitutes a reasonably integrated whole in which the parts are closely related to one another. (pp. 25-26) The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA and ZAZZALI join in CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ's opinion. JUDITH CAMBRIA and THE LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF NEW JERSEY, INC., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DeFOREST B. SOARIES, Secretary of State of the State of New Jersey and JOHN J. FARMER, JR., Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, Defendants-Respondents. Argued October 23, 2000 -- Decided October 25, 2000 -- Opinion Filed July 19, 2001 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 334 N.J. Super. 437 (2000). Douglas S. Eakeley argued the cause for appellants (Lowenstein Sandler, attorneys; Deborah A. Silodor on the briefs). Patrick DeAlmeida, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondents (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Nancy Kaplen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel). The opinion of the Court was delivered by PORITZ, C.J. In addition to the 0.025 cents per gallon tax on the sale of motor fuels already constitutionally dedicated to the Transportation Trust Fund under Article VIII, Section 2, Paragraph 4, for use in the construction and repair of the State's transportation system, the amendment proposed the dedication of two new revenue streams for the same purpose: a minimum of $100,000 from the gross receipts tax on the sale of petroleum products in the first year, to be increased to $200,000 in every year thereafter; and a minimum of $80,000 from Sales and Use Tax receipts in the first year, to be increased to $140,000 in the second year, and to $200,000 in every year thereafter. According to the Interpretive Statement to the Resolution, the amount taken from Sales and Use Tax receipts would reflect approximately one-third of the tax collected from the sale of new motor vehicles. Prior to the final approval of the Resolution by the Assembly, Sandra L. Matsen, President of the League of Women Voters of New Jersey, Inc. (League), and Judith Cambria, the League's Director of Fiscal Policy, wrote to and testified before the Assembly Appropriations Committee, expressing their belief that the Resolution was unconstitutional. They argued that by combining the proposed changes in one question, the Resolution deprived voters of their right under Article IX, Paragrah 5 of the Constitution to approve one change and reject another. On July 24, 2000, plaintiffs filed a Verified Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs and an Order to Show Cause with Temporary Restraints in the Law Division. Plaintiffs sought both a declaratory judgment that the Resolution violated Article IX, Paragraph 5, and a permanent injunction enjoining Secretary of State Soaries and Attorney General John J. Farmer, Jr. (defendants) from taking action as necessary to have the Resolution placed on the November 2000 general election ballot.See footnote 11 Defendants responded on July 31, 2000 with a Notice of Cross- Motion to Dismiss the Verified Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. By decision dated August 4, 2000, the trial court denied plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief and granted defendants' motion to dismiss. Cambria v. Soaries, 334 N.J. Super. 488 (Law Div. 2000). The Appellate Division affirmed on October 10, 2000,See footnote 22 Cambria v. Soaries, 334 N.J. Super. 437 (2000). On October 11, 2000, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal as of right with this Court. R. 2:2-1(a)(1). After hearing oral argument on October 24, 2000, we issued an order affirming the Appellate Division without opinion because of the need for an immediate response in light of the imminent general election. The Resolution was submitted to the voters on November 2, 2000, and was approved. In this opinion we now explain the basis for our earlier order of affirmance. If more than one amendment be submitted, they shall be submitted in such manner and form that the people may vote for or against each amendment separately and distinctly. That Article IX, Paragrah 5 is subject to multiple, reasonable interpretations is evident from the opinions below. On initial review, the trial court held that the provision imposes a procedural requirement only on the amendment process. Cambria, supra, 334 N.J. Super. at 498. According to that court, the Constitution forbids the submission of multiple proposed amendments in the form of a single amendment; however, if only one amendment is proposed by the Legislature, the content of that amendment cannot be questioned by the courts. Id. at 500. Put another way, once the Legislature chooses to vote on the proposal as one amendment, adherence to the separation of powers doctrine requires the court to stay its hand. Ibid. The Appellate Division agreed that the proposal as framed is valid, but disagreed that the separate and distinct language is procedural in nature. In the view of the appellate court, the Legislature may submit an amendment containing multiple parts whenever it makes an overall change to a provision of the Constitution. Cambria, supra, 334 N.J. Super. at 441. The panel observed that because Article IX, Paragraph 5 does not even impose a single object standard upon proposed amendments, which is easily satisfied by this amendment, see New Jersey Association on Correction v. Lan, 80 N.J. 199 (1979), the proposed amendment stands as formulated by the Legislature and may be submitted to the people for their vote. The parties also disagree about the meaning of Article IX, Paragraph 5, although they concur with the Appellate Division's conclusion that the single object language found elsewhere in the Constitution is not equivalent to the separate vote requirement of Paragraph 5. We turn first, then, to the single object rule so as to determine at the outset whether that rule is helpful to our consideration of Article IX, Paragraph 5. 'All that is required is that the act should not include legislation so incongruous that it could not, by any fair intendment, be considered germane to one general subject. The subject may be as comprehensive as the legislature chooses to make it, provided it constitutes, in the constitutional sense, a single subject, and not several. The connection or relationship of several matters, such as will render them germane to one subject and to each other, can be of various kinds, as, for example, of means to ends, of different subdivisions of the same subject, or that all are designed for the same purpose, or that both are designated by the same term. Neither is it necessary that the connection or relationship should be logical; it is enough that the matters are connected with and related to a single subject, in popular signification.' [Id. at 215 (quoting Johnson v. Harrison, 50 N.W. 923, 924 (Minn. 1891)).] See also Bucino v. Malone, 12 N.J. 330, 343-44 (1953) (holding that single object rule of Article IV, Section 7, Paragraph 4 is not violated when act's title embrace[s] but one general purpose and [a]ll provisions of the act are in furtherance of this purpose ). The single object rule, we stated, is designed to protect against the extreme, the 'pernicious,' the incongruous; the manifestly repugnant; the palpable contravention of the constitutional command; fraud or overreaching or misleading of the people; the inadvertent; the 'discordant;' or 'the intermixing in one and the same act [of] such things as have no proper relation to each other;' or matters which are 'uncertain, misleading or deceptive.' [Lan, supra, 80 N.J. at 212 (citations omitted).] See also Behnke v. New Jersey Highway Auth., 13 N.J. 14, 32 (1953) (stating that purpose of single object clause in Article VIII, Section 2, Paragraph 3 is to ensure that money thus provided cannot be expended for one purpose under the guise of another . . . for the protection of the State's revenue and credit as well as for an understanding appraisement of the project by the electorate ). In sum, to survive a challenge based on the single object rule, the State need show only that the individual parts of a statute or of a bond issue meet the relatedness test. We concluded that the bond proposal in Lan was constitutional because its purpose was to build facilities for those who were in custody or other circumstances [and so had] need for State care, protection and rehabilitation, all of which were related through that purpose. Lan, supra, 80 N.J. at 216. See also Parking Auth. of Atlantic City v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 180 N.J. Super. 282, 300 (Law Div. 1981) (sustaining act establishing public agency to implement public transportation system and ordering dissolution of pre-existing municipal parking authorities under Article IV, Section 7, Paragraph 4 one object requirement because component parts of act served common purpose to create one agency with powers that do not overlap those of other agencies); State v. Churchdale Leasing, Inc., 115 N.J. 83, 111 (1989) (holding New Jersey Transportation Trust Fund Authority Act constitutional under Article IV, Section 7, Paragraph 4 because [a]lthough diverse, the Act's provisions further its express purpose: the preservation of a sound, balanced transportation system through the provision of a stable source of funding ). Mr. Ryerson moved to amend by adding that each amendment submitted, should embrace but one subject. The legislature might submit a popular amendment, and connect it with an unpopular one; and both might be voted down in consequence. Mr. R. S. Kennedy thought the object of the mover was already reached by the language of the report. If the legislature should disobey that, they might disobey the restrictions proposed by Mr. R. . . . . Mr. Vroom proposed a modification of Mr. Ryerson's motion, which that gentleman accepted. The amendment was not agreed to. [Proceedings of the N.J. State Constitutional Convention of 1844 at 56 (emphasis added).] We take from the quoted exchange that the framers expected Article IX to encompass the requirements of the single object provisions. There is also documentary evidence from the Constitutional Convention of 1947 suggesting that the separate vote requirement is not as narrow as plaintiffs claim it to be. As noted above, plaintiffs argue that the framers intended the word amendment in Article IX to mean change, such that the Legislature cannot propose more than one change to the Constitution unless each change is submitted separately to the public. During the proceedings in 1947, however, a letter was sent to the Committee on Rights, Privileges, Amendments, and Miscellaneous Provisions proposing, among other things, that Article IX explicitly refer to change rather than amendment. 3 Proceedings of the State of New Jersey Constitutional Convention of 1947 at 313-15. The writer apparently believed his proposed version of Article IX would ensure that the Legislature could not usurp the power of the people to amend the Constitution. Ibid. Since his suggestion was not accepted, it is reasonable to conclude that the convention members did not intend the separate vote requirement to be read quite so narrowly. the different changes contained in the proposed amendment [did not] all cover matters necessary to be dealt with in some manner, in order that the Constitution, as amended, shall constitute a consistent and workable whole on the general topic embraced in that part which is amended, and if, logically speaking, they should stand or fall as a whole, then there is but one amendment submitted. Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court invalidated a proposal to give wartime emergency powers to the legislature that would provide for the temporary succession of the powers and duties of public officers and allow the legislature to ignore provisions of the constitution, because one part was not dependent on [the other nor] . . . necessary to ensure the workability of the other, . . . [nor presented in such way that] if the electorate were given a choice, it might have approved . . . [o]ne, and disapproved the other. Lee v. State, 367 P.2d 861, 864 (Utah 1962). See also Farris v. Munro, 662 P.2d 821, 825 (Wash. 1983) (en banc) (holding that proposed amendment relating to state lottery did not constitute multiple amendments, even though it kept intact pre-existing restrictions on divorce, because it did not relate to more than one subject [or have] . . . two distinct and separate purposes not dependent upon or connected with each other ) (internal citations omitted). More recently, in Armatta v. Kitzhaber, the Oregon Supreme Court decided that the state constitution's separate-vote requirement, [which] applies only to constitutional amendments, . . . imposes a narrower requirement than does the single-subject requirement. 959 P.2d 49, 63 (Or. 1998). The court stated that [s]uch a reading . . . makes sense, because the act of amending the constitution is significantly different from enacting or amending legislation, id. at 63, concluding: Indeed, because the separate-vote requirement is concerned only with a change to the fundamental law, the notion that the people should be able to vote separately upon each separate amendment should come as no surprise. In short, the requirement serves as a safeguard that is fundamental to the concept of a constitution. In order to determine whether the proposal before it violated the separate-vote requirement, the court asked whether, if adopted, the proposal would make two or more changes to the constitution that are substantive and that are not closely related. If the proposal would effect two or more changes that are substantive and not closely related, the proposal violates the separate vote requirement. In essence, because of the heightened importance attached to modifications of organic law, the Oregon court adopted a somewhat more restrictive version of the single object test. Under that test, the court rejected a proposal that dealt with crime victims' rights, six different individual rights, and juror qualifications, as having too many disparate and unrelated parts. Id. at 68. See also Marshall v. State, 975 P.2d 325, 331 (Mont. 1999) (citing with approval Armatta, supra, 959 P. 2d at 63-64).See footnote 88 NO. A-24 JUDITH CAMBRIA and THE LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF NEW JERSEY, INC., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DeFOREST B. SOARIES, Secretary of State of the State of New Jersey and JOHN J. FARMER, JR., Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, Defendants-Respondents. DECIDED October 25, 2000 OPINION FILED July 19, 2001 Chief Justice Poritz