Title: The Natural Parents of J.B. v. Florida Department of Children & Family Services

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida
 
____________
No. SC96171
____________
THE NATURAL PARENTS OF J.B.,
Petitioners,
vs.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
etc.,
Respondent.
[February 22, 2001]
QUINCE, J.
We have for review a decision on the following question certified by the
Fourth District Court of Appeal to be of great public importance:
IS SECTION 39.467(4), NOW SECTION 39.809(4),
FLORIDA STATUTES (SUPP. 1998), REQUIRING A
MANDATORY CLOSURE OF ALL HEARINGS IN
TPR PROCEEDINGS VALID UNDER THE UNITED
STATES AND FLORIDA CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS RESPECTING ACCESS OF THE
PUBLIC AND MEDIA TO JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS?
1
Section 39.507(2), Florida Statutes (1999), provides:
     (2)    All hearings, except as provided in this section, shall be open to
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Department of Children & Family Services v. Natural Parents of J.B., 736 So. 2d
111 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).  We have jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
For the reasons expressed in this opinion, we conclude that section
39.467(4), Florida Statutes (1997), now section 39.809(4), Florida Statutes (2000),
requiring mandatory closure of all hearings in termination of parental rights (TPR)
proceedings is valid under the United States and Florida constitutional provisions
respecting access of the public and media to judicial proceedings.  Accordingly, we
answer the certified question in the affirmative.
FACTS
The Department of Children and Family Services initially brought an action
seeking a declaration that J.B., a minor child, was dependent and in need of care. 
The State alleged that the mother of the child suffers from Munchausen-by-Proxy
Syndrome and intentionally caused her minor child to become so ill that she
required numerous hospitalizations.  Under section 39.507, Florida Statutes (1999),
the adjudicatory hearing on a State’s petition for dependency is required to be open
to the public unless the judge orders the hearing closed upon determining that the
public interest or the welfare of the child is best served by so doing.1  The 
the public, and a person may not be excluded except on special order of
the judge, who may close any hearing to the public upon determining that
the public interest or the welfare of the child is best served by so doing.
The parents or legal custodians shall be allowed to obtain discovery
pursuant to the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, provided such
discovery does not violate the provisions of s. 39.202.  Hearings involving
more than one child may be held simultaneously when the children
involved are related to each other or were involved in the same case.  The
child and the parents, caregivers, or legal custodians of the child may be
examined separately and apart from each other.
2
See § 39.809(4), Fla. Stat. (2000).
3
Section 39.809(4), Florida Statutes (1999), provides:
     (4) All hearings involving termination of parental rights are confidential
and closed to the public.  Hearings involving more than one child may be
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parents moved to close the dependency proceedings and to enjoin all concerned 
from releasing information about the proceeding to anyone, arguing that it was
against the child’s best interests to be exposed to the press and media.  The
parents also filed a motion to impose a “gag” order to prohibit the release of any
information.  The trial court eventually denied the motions but without prejudice to
the parents to move to close any further proceedings.
At some point, the State moved to permanently terminate parental rights. 
Because the character of the proceedings changed to a TPR proceeding, the
requirements of section 39.467, Florida Statutes (1997),2 became controlling.
This statute provides in part: “All hearings involving termination of parental rights
are confidential and closed to the public.”3  The parents then changed their position
held simultaneously when the children involved are related to each other
or were involved in the same case.  The child and the parents may be
examined separately and apart from each other.
4
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a  . . . public trial . . . .”
U.S. Const. amend. VI.   “In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall, upon demand . . . have a . . .
public trial . . . .”  Art. I, § 16(a), Fla. Const.
-4-
and alleged that the mandatory closure required by the TPR statute is
unconstitutional and violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.  They allege here that the statute violates both the United States
and Florida Constitutions.4  
The trial court declared section 39.467(4) facially overbroad and
unconstitutional.  The trial court reasoned that TPR proceedings should be treated
like criminal prosecutions since the parents in a TPR proceeding face grave
consequences.  The trial court noted that the dependency proceedings were open
as required by the dependency statute, and there had already been extensive media
coverage.  
The State filed a petition for certiorari, and the Fourth District quashed the
trial court’s order.  The Fourth District began its analysis with the following “well-
worn principles of constitutional adjudication”:  
Statutes are presumed to be valid and not
unconstitutional. Courts are required to concede every
presumption in favor of the validity of a statute.  One
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who challenges the constitutionality of a statute has the
burden of demonstrating its invalidity.  Only a clear and
demonstrated usurpation of power will authorize judicial
interference with legislative action.  It is therefore the duty
of an appellate court to uphold the validity of a statute in
all cases where that result can be lawfully reached.  
Department of Children & Family Services v. Natural Parents of J.B., 736 So. 2d at
113-14 (citations omitted).  With those initial guidelines, the Fourth District held that
the parents failed to meet their heavy burden of demonstrating the invalidity of this
statutory provision.  The Fourth District focused primarily on the Sixth Amendment
and rejected the trial court and parents’ criminal model for TPR proceedings.  In so
doing, the Fourth District refused to extend Sixth Amendment rights of the
criminally accused, including the right to a public trial, to parents in TPR
proceedings.  The Fourth District added further that the Legislature has set the
public policy of the state by including the mandatory closure language in the statute,
that mandatory closure of TPR proceedings is consistent with other proceedings
involving juveniles, and that mandatory closure falls within the exceptions to the
general policy of openness enunciated in Barron v. Florida Freedom Newspapers,
Inc., 531 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1988).  We agree with the decision and rationale of the
Fourth District.
Closed Court Presumption in Juvenile Proceedings
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Petitioners advocate that a presumption of openness should be extended to
TPR proceedings which, they argue, can only be overcome if the court determines
on a case-by-case basis that the best interest of the child outweighs the public’s
right of access to the proceedings and that any such order of closure should be
narrowly tailored to that end.   “[I]n determining whether a particular proceeding is
presumptively open, the Court examines whether the place and process have
historically been open to the press and public and whether public access plays a
significant role in the functioning of the process.”  In re N.H.B. 769 P.2d 844, 847
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1
(1986)).  Petitioners present the lengthy history and rationale of the open court
presumption in criminal cases.  We agree with petitioners that criminal matters are
traditionally open proceedings.  However, we do not agree that the presumption of
openness in criminal proceedings is or should be extended to juvenile proceedings. 
The foundation of the juvenile system is to “‘preserv[e] and promot[e] the
welfare of the child,’ which makes a juvenile proceeding fundamentally different
from an adult criminal trial.”  Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984) (citation
omitted).  Although juvenile proceedings are civil proceedings, Ostrum v.
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 663 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 4th DCA
1995), and although the presumption of openness has generally been extended to
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civil proceedings, juvenile proceedings have historically been closed to the public in
furtherance of the overriding interest in, among other things, protecting the child
from stigma, publicity, and embarrassment and promoting rehabilitation.
It is a hallmark of our juvenile justice system in the United States
that virtually from its inception at the end of the last century its
proceedings have been conducted outside of the public's full gaze and
the youths brought before our juvenile courts have been shielded from
publicity. See H. Lou, Juvenile Courts in the United States 131-133
(1927); Geis, Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings, 30 Rocky
Mt.L.Rev. 101, 102, 116 (1958). 
Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 107 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
All fifty states have some form of shield law to limit public access to proceedings
involving juveniles.  Id. at 99.  We have found no case that holds that the
presumption of openness is a constitutional requirement in the context of juvenile
proceedings.  Indeed, the history of the juvenile justice system indicates the
contrary, that it is in the best interest of the child to protect the child from publicity
in certain proceedings and that this protection outweighs the public’s right to
access.  We do not agree with petitioners that in TPR proceedings a presumption
of openness is constitutionally required.  A presumption that juvenile proceedings
be closed to the public is consistent with the history and tradition of the juvenile
justice system and furthers the sound and practical purposes of that system.
Mandatory Closure
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Petitioners argue that closing court proceedings to the public is constitutional
only if there is a compelling government interest to do so and only if closure is
narrowly tailored to further that interest.  While petitioners do not dispute the
compelling government interest in confidential juvenile proceedings, they do argue
that mandatory or per se closure of juvenile proceedings is not narrowly tailored.
Only in those proceedings found to be presumptively open, however, is it
necessary for the court to make specific findings “demonstrating that ‘closure is
essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.’” 
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1986) (quoting Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)).  Thus, where there is
no presumption of openness, there is no need for specific findings demonstrating
that closure is essential and narrowly tailored.  Because there is no presumption of
openness in TPR proceedings, a mandatory closure requirement does not
unconstitutionally limit the public’s right of access to the proceedings.  Thus,
mandatory closure of proceedings that have no presumption of openness is
constitutionally valid.
Petitioners rely heavily on Barron v. Florida Freedom Newspapers, 531 So.
2d 113 (Fla. 1988).   In Barron, we held that there is a strong presumption of
openness in both criminal and civil proceedings and we relied in part upon
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Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 n.17 (1980), wherein
Chief Justice Burger stated:  “[H]istorically both civil and criminal trials have been
presumptively open.”  As we do herein, in Barron we considered the history and
tradition of open proceedings in the civil context.  In so doing, we recognized
certain exceptions to the presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.  We set
forth certain factors to be considered by courts before closing certain civil
proceedings, and held that closure of certain proceedings should occur when
necessary 
(a)  to comply with established public policy set forth in the constitution,
statutes, rules or case law; (b) to protect trade secrets; (c) to protect a
compelling governmental interest [e.g., national security; confidential
informants]; (d) to obtain evidence to properly determine legal issues in a
case; (e) to avoid substantial injury to innocent third parties [e.g., to protect
young witnesses from offensive testimony; to protect children in a divorce];
or (f) to avoid substantial injury to a party by disclosure of matters protected
by a common law or privacy right not generally inherent in the specific type
of civil proceeding sought to be closed.
Barron, 531 So. 2d at 118.  Most importantly, however, in Barron, we recognized
that the Florida Legislature expressly made certain proceedings confidential by
statute as a matter of public policy, id. at 119, and we specifically excepted such
proceedings from the presumption of openness.  By the time this Court decided
Barron in 1988, we had already upheld the constitutionality of the mandatory
closure statute in adoption proceedings.  In re Adoption of H.Y.T.,  458 So. 2d
5
This list is not exhaustive.
-10-
1127 (Fla. 1984).  Our decision today is consistent with our decision in Barron. 
Approving the Fourth District and upholding the constitutionality of section
39.809(4) complies with established public policy set forth in the statutes and case
law and is consistent with the historical and traditional presumption of closed
juvenile proceedings.
TPR proceedings are not the only proceedings the Florida Legislature has
required by statute to be closed as a matter of public policy.  Adoptions (section
63.162, Florida Statutes (1999)), actions establishing parental status in situations of
gestational surrogacy (section 742.16, Florida Statutes (1999)), and hearings for
appointment of a guardian ad litem (section 29.827, Florida Statutes (1999)), are
also required to be closed proceedings.5  There are other situations where the court
is given discretion to close the proceedings, such as in the case of paternity actions
(section 742.031, Florida Statutes (1999)).  As stated above, this Court upheld the
constitutionality of mandatory closure for adoption proceedings in In re Adoption
of H.Y.T.
In H.Y.T., the press, like the parents in this case, challenged the mandatory
closure of adoption proceedings, arguing that the mandatory nature of the closure
was overbroad and a violation of the First Amendment right to public access.  We
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held that the best interest of the child and the public policy of protecting the
parties’ privacy in adoption proceedings outweighed the interest the public might
have in having access to the proceedings.  We further noted that in such
proceedings, the court itself takes an interest in the case and serves to protect the
best interest of the child.  This is a departure from the court’s typical disinterested
position.  The Second District followed the rationale of H.Y.T., when it declared a
similar statute mandating the closure of certain dependency proceedings to be
constitutional.  See Mayer v. State, 523 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).
Petitioners argue that adoptions differ from TPR proceedings because TPR
proceedings are adversarial in nature whereas adoptions are not.  While the parents
in a TPR proceeding may perceive the dissolution of their parental rights as a
sanction, the purpose of the TPR proceeding is not to punish the parents.  The
paramount concern of the Court and the Legislature is the health and safety of the
child or children involved.  See § 39.001(1)(b)(1), Fla. Stat. (1999).  Because of
this overriding concern, the mandatory closure of certain proceedings involving
children is not an unconstitutional limitation on First Amendment freedoms.
Consistency with Other Statutes
Petitioners argue that the statute’s intended purpose is undermined by the
fact that there is no mandatory closure provision in the statute providing the
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procedure for adjudication of dependency actions.   Petitioners argue that most
TPR proceedings are initiated as dependency cases.  If there is no closure order at
the dependency phase, there may already have been significant publicity by the time
TPR proceedings are instituted.  Petitioners argue that the better view would be a
presumptively open proceeding that is only closed after a particularized showing is
made that such closure is justified.  This argument was asserted in H.Y.T.  We did
not find this argument compelling then, and do not find this argument compelling
now.  We do not believe the Legislature intended that the child bear the burden of
proving the need for confidentiality in TPR proceedings, which is why the
Legislature removed the discretion from the court.  As we held in H.Y.T.,
petitioners’ argument “attempts to lay on the shoulders of the child the burden of
proving a need for the protection the people of the state, through the legislature,
have attempted to afford parties to an adoption.”  H.Y.T., 458 So. 2d at 1129.  
Inconsistent though the dependency and TPR statutes may be, neither is
unconstitutional.  
Where a statute does not violate the federal or state
Constitution, the legislative will is supreme, and its policy
is not subject to judicial review.  The courts have no veto
power, and do not assume to regulate state policy; but
they recognize and enforce the policy of the law as
expressed in valid enactments, and decline to enforce
statutes only when to do so would violate organic law.
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City of Jacksonville v. Bowden, 64 So. 769, 772 (Fla. 1914). 
Conclusion
We approve the decision of the Fourth District and answer the certified
question in the affirmative.  Section 39.467(4), now section 39.809(4), Florida
Statutes (2000), requiring mandatory closure of all hearings in TPR proceedings, is
valid under the United States and Florida constitutional provisions respecting
access of the public and media to judicial proceedings. There is no constitutional
requirement that juvenile proceedings be presumptively open to the public.  The
Legislature has validly declared that the public policy of the State requires the
mandatory closure of TPR proceedings.  Because there is no presumption of
openness in juvenile proceedings, and because none is constitutionally required,
there is no requirement that an order of closure be made only after a case-by-case
determination.  Petitioners have failed to meet their heavy burden to overcome the
presumption in favor of the validity of the statute and have failed to demonstrate
that the statute clearly and unconstitutionally usurps the public’s right of access to
TPR proceedings.  
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
ANSTEAD, J., dissents with an opinion, in which PARIENTE, J., concurs.
PARIENTE, J., dissents with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, J., concurs.
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
ANSTEAD, J, dissenting.  
While I agree with the majority that the press and public do not have a
qualified right of access to termination proceedings, I cannot agree to approving a
provision for mandatory closure for all such proceedings without conducting a full
constitutional analysis.  I believe the better approach would be to take the statute as
creating a presumption in favor of closure but permitting the trial court to consider
all relevant circumstances, and then balance the competing interests in such cases
before closure may be ordered.
The majority begins its analysis by finding that juvenile proceedings have
been historically closed to the public, and therefore no qualified right of access
exists for the termination of parental rights proceedings.  However, the majority
then makes a giant leap in concluding that a mandatory closure of termination
proceedings is constitutionally valid:
[W]here there is no presumption of openness, there is no
need for specific findings demonstrating that closure is
essential and narrowly tailored.  Because there is no
presumption of openness in TPR proceedings, a
mandatory closure requirement does not
unconstitutionally limit the public’s right of access to the
proceedings.  Thus, mandatory closure of proceedings
that have no presumption of openness is constitutionally
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valid.
Majority Opinion at 8-9.  In my view, such a summary analysis is incomplete.  In
other words, just because juvenile proceedings focusing on the dependency or
delinquency of the juvenile have been historically closed does not automatically
permit the mandatory denial of public access to other, distinct court proceedings
where the conduct of adult parents is the focus and the rights of those parents are
being adjudicated on a permanent basis.  
In fact, other states have considered this precise issue and concluded that a
mandatory rule cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny even when applied to
juvenile proceedings.  For example, in Florida Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 322
S.E.2d 233 (Ga. 1984), the Georgia Supreme Court held that mandatory closure of
juvenile delinquency proceedings was unconstitutional.  See id. at 238.  There, the
issue before the court was whether a statute which required that all juvenile court
hearings be closed to the public was constitutional.  See id. at 235.  Like the
majority opinion in this case, the Georgia Supreme Court found that juvenile
proceedings have historically been presumptively subject to closure.  However, the
Georgia Supreme Court declined to conclude that mandatory closure was
constitutional:
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The holdings [of the United States Supreme Court]
create a presumption that criminal trials will be open to
the public.  As we have previously stated, part of the
rationale of these holdings is that, at English common law
and in Colonial America, trials have been open to the
public for reasons which, throughout history, have
fostered and continue to foster a role for the judiciary
appropriate to our scheme of constitutional government.
However, in their relatively brief history, it would
appear that juvenile proceedings have been closed to the
public.  Therefore, we are unable to conclude that there is
any historically-based constitutional presumption of
openness applicable to juvenile-court proceedings.  This,
however, does not mean that the absolute closure of
juvenile-court hearings passes constitutional muster.
From the various cited cases, we conclude that,
consistent with the Constitution, the state may create a
rule that delinquency, deprivation, and unruliness hearings
in juvenile court are presumed closed to the public (and
press).  However, for constitutional reasons, this
presumption cannot be conclusive.  The public and/or
press must be given an opportunity to show that the
state's or juveniles' interest in a closed hearing is not
"overriding" or "compelling." 
. . . . 
We, therefore, hold that where a member of the
public or press institutes a judicial proceeding to require
the opening of a juvenile hearing, the court must in an
expeditious manner give the public or press an
opportunity to present evidence and argument to show
that the state's or juveniles' interest in a closed hearing is
overridden by the public's interest in a public hearing. 
Id. at 237-38 (emphasis added); see also In re N.H.B., 769 P.2d 844, 852 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989) (holding that the presumption of closure of juvenile proceedings is not
6Other courts have fashioned standards to be applied by trial courts when determining whether to
admit the press and public in juvenile proceedings.  See, e.g., San Bernardino County Dep’t of Pub. Soc.
Servs. v. Superior Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 332, 345 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that the press should be
allowed access to juvenile proceedings unless there is a reasonable likelihood that access would be harmful
to the child’s best interest); In re T.R., 556 N.E.2d 439, 451 (Ohio 1990) (finding that the trial court must
determine that there is a reasonable and substantial belief that the child will be harmed, and that the harm
outweighs the benefits of public access before closing a juvenile proceeding).  The Ohio Supreme Court
has recognized that “[a] proper standard is one which gives due deference to both the limitations of our
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irrebutable because of constitutional considerations). 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has held that although juvenile
proceedings are presumed closed, it does not “equate with a mandatory rule” of
closure:
The compelling state interest in protecting victims
of child abuse from the embarrassment of testifying in an
open courtroom, with the attendant possibility of media
coverage, justifies a presumption that [child neglect and
abuse] proceedings initiated under Title 30 or Title 9 will
be closed to the public.  The presumption of closure
does not, however, equate with a mandatory rule. 
Members of the public, including the press, must be free
to make application to the trial court to be permitted to
attend [these] proceedings.  Under those circumstances,
the court must balance the public’s right of access to
judicial proceedings against the State’s interest in
protecting children from the possible detrimental effects
of revealing to the public allegations and evidence relating
to parental neglect and abuse.  
New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. J.B., 576 A.2d 261, 269 (N.J. 1990)
(emphasis added).6  I believe that the balancing test developed by these courts and
ability to predict harmful consequences which may result from public access and the public’s interest in
learning about and scrutinizing the working of the juvenile court.”  In re T.R., 556 N.E.2d at 451.  
7In so holding, this Court noted that the Florida Legislature had expressly made adoptions, paternity
and juvenile proceedings confidential.  See id. at 119.
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others is the better approach for evaluating the closure issue presented here
consistent with the United States Supreme Court precedent on this issue.  
Indeed, this Court has recognized and applied a similar balancing approach
in evaluating the closure of judicial proceedings.  In Barron v. Florida Freedom
Newspapers, Inc., 531 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1988), for example, in the domestic
litigation context, we stated that “a strong presumption of openness exists for all
court proceedings.”  Id. at 118 (emphasis added).  We stressed that before
ordering closure, “the trial court shall determine that no reasonable alternative is
available to accomplish the desired result, and, if none exists, the trial court must
use the least restrictive closure necessary to accomplish its purpose.”  Id.7  Barron
provides a basic framework for analysis that can be applied here.
It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutionality of a statute which
mandated closure of adoption proceedings.  See In re Adoption of H.Y.T., 458
So. 2d 1127, 1129 (Fla. 1984).  While this Court in H.Y.T. did not articulate a
definitive balancing test in our opinion, it is apparent that in our analysis and
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resolution of the case we clearly weighed the press’s right of access to the courts
against the state’s interest in protecting the child.  We reasoned that adoption
proceedings are “qualitatively different from other judicial proceedings” because
the court’s primary duty is to protect the best interests of the child.  See id. at
1128.  We further found that the media’s freedom was only minimally impaired, and
that the impairment only affected matters of limited newsworthiness rather than
matters of genuine public concern.  See id. at 1129. 
The majority opinion here recognizes that in H.Y.T. we weighed the best
interests of the child against the public interest in adoption proceedings, yet the
majority fails to include in its analysis a consideration of the parents’ or the public’s
interest in these termination proceedings.  Rather, without so much as a mention of
the parents’ or the public’s right of access to the courts, or the fact that other
proceedings involving the same issues may be open, the majority simply concludes
that the state’s interest in protecting the child is an “overriding concern” and thus
mandatory closure “is not an unconstitutional limitation on First Amendment
freedoms.”  Majority Opinion at 11.  To hold as the majority does without at least
considering the competing interests and other relevant circumstances ignores our
constitutional precedent. 
We cannot ignore that there are strong policy concerns which support open
8Despite this acknowledgment, the California Court of Appeal held that the First Amendment right
of access to the courts does not extend to juvenile proceedings.  See id. at 343.  Nevertheless, the court
left to the trial court’s discretion the decision of whether to allow public access to juvenile  proceedings.
See id. at 345.  In making this determination, the trial court must weigh the social values gained from public
access against the best interests of the minor child.  See id.  After weighing these factors, the court held that
the trial court should allow public access “unless there is a reasonable likelihood that such access will be
harmful to the child’s or children’s best interest” in the case.  Id.   
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proceedings and that Florida public policy and law has traditionally favored open
proceedings.  One valid factor to be considered here would be the extent to which
the proceedings and the evidence to be produced have already been disclosed to
the public.  In addition, the severity and finality of the relief sought by the State
against the parents is obviously a valid factor to be considered and weighed. 
“[P]arental termination decrees are among the most severe forms of state action.” 
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 128 (1996).  In this regard, some courts recognize
that public access to termination proceedings may logically be invoked as a check
against abuse of judicial and governmental power.  See San Bernardino County
Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs., 283 Cal. Rptr. at 341 (“Public access does serve as a
check against judicial and governmental abuse or misuse of power which might
result in unnecessary and unjust interference with [a parent’s constitutional right to
raise and educate his or her child].”)8; In re N.H.B., 769 P.2d at 849.  The parents
contend that it is patently unjust and an appearance of unfairness to take a parent’s
child away forever in secret proceedings.  Indeed, some contend that without
9Thus, it is not surprising that some courts have recognized that public access to the courts may play
a significant role in the functioning of the juvenile system.  See San Bernardino County Dep’t of Pub. Soc.
Servs., 283 Cal. Rptr. at 342; see also Trasen, supra, at 381 (noting that public access can serve an
important function by raising community awareness and involvement in the juvenile courts).  The California
Court of Appeal acknowledged that to the extent that open proceedings lead to more accurate fact finding,
public access serves a vital and beneficial role in juvenile proceedings.  See San Bernardino County Dep’t
of Pub. Soc. Servs., 283 Cal. Rptr. at 341. 
10Further, some have claimed that without public scrutiny, parents of low means, especially, may
have little chance of protecting their rights against mistaken allegations and the power of the State.  In fact,
some parents have looked to the media in an effort to even the playing field.  See generally Trasen, supra,
at 378 (citing Ernst v. Children & Youth Servs., 1993 WL 343375 (E.D. Pa. 1993, aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 108 F.3d 486 (3d Cir. 1997), where the grandmother sought media attention in an effort to expose
the shortcomings of the child welfare agency and the judicial process).  Trasen also points to In re T.R.,
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openness, even traditional juvenile proceedings “have the potential to become ‘little
more than kangaroo courts, where judges rubber-stamp agency requests.’”  Jan L.
Trasen, Privacy v. Public Access to Juvenile Court Proceedings: Do Closed
Hearings Protect the Child or the System?, 15 B.C. Third World L.J. 359, 362
(1995) (quoting Sandy Bauers, Fighting to Lift Veil on Child Welfare, Philadelphia
Inquirer, Aug. 15, 1993, at E1).9  
Finally, Trasen suggests that without public scrutiny, neither parents nor the
public would have recourse against incompetence or carelessness of caseworkers. 
See id. at 381-83.  Hence, without some protection during the course of the juvenile
proceedings, including the benefit of public scrutiny, the action of the State may go
uncorrected.  In other words, if such proceedings are mandatorily closed, there will
be little or no check on caseworkers or their decisions.10  See generally In re
where the mother turned to the media in an effort to protect her children because she lacked the money,
power, and position to litigate against the agency.  See Trasen, supra, at 378. 
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N.H.B., 769 P.2d at 849 (acknowledging that publicity of juvenile court system
would “promote public involvement in the governmental processes and might deter
inappropriate actions on the part of some participants”).  
While I recognize that public access to termination proceedings must be
carefully considered due to the sensitive nature of the dispute, the potential harm to
the children in any given case is almost always complex and difficult to analyze and
predict.  Further, while closure may frequently result, the interests of the parents
and the public should, at a minimum, be considered before any decision is made on
whether the proceedings should be closed.  Based on the policy and constitutional
considerations set out above, I conclude that the statute at issue here should not be
construed to provide mandatory closure merely because juvenile proceedings have
been historically closed to the public.  Rather, in my view the sounder approach
would be to construe the closure statute as creating a presumption in favor of
closure, while still permitting courts to determine access on a case-by-case basis. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs.
PARIENTE, J., dissenting.
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I concur with Justice Anstead's view that a mandatory closure requirement in
termination of parental rights proceedings, under the circumstances of this case in
particular, may be constitutionally infirm.  As we underscored in Barron, "the court
must balance the rights and interests of the parties to the litigation with those of the
public and press."  Barron v. Florida Freedom Newspapers, 531 So. 2d 113, 118
(Fla. 1988).  Further, although termination of parental rights ("TPR") proceedings
are not criminal proceedings, TPR proceedings constitute state-initiated actions that
implicate fundamental liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
See generally M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745 (1982).
Under the present statutory scheme, there is a presumption of openness that
governs dependency proceedings.  Only when the focus shifts to the permanent
and irrevocable termination of the parents' constitutionally protected rights does the
mandatory closure provision apply, raising a question of the logic and fairness of
the current statutory scheme.  The result is that every TPR proceeding is closed,
without a requirement of a weighing of the interests involved. 
If statutorily mandated closure is prompted by the best interest of the child,
then it does not appear logical for the closure to become mandatory only after the
dependency proceeding--when the focus shifts to whether the parents' rights should
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be terminated.  As the trial court in this case noted, some dependency proceedings
are open to the public, and often involve "much of the same information" as TPR
proceedings.  Department of Children & Family Servs. v. Natural Parents of J.B.,
736 So. 2d 111, 113 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).  I do not then understand how the best
interests of the child are served by closing the proceedings only after the focus of
the proceedings turns to the termination of the parents' rights.
I also question the assumption underlying the majority opinion that all juvenile
proceedings in this State historically have been closed to the public.  See majority
op. at 7.  The term "juvenile proceedings" broadly encompasses both juvenile
dependency and juvenile delinquency proceedings.  See generally Fla. R. Juv. P., Pt
I (Delinquency Proceedings); Pt II (Dependency and Termination of Parental
Rights Proceedings).
Only fifty years ago, the Legislature enacted chapter 39, Florida Statutes
(1951), generally known as the Juvenile Court Act.  See ch. 26880, Laws of Fla.
(1951).  At that time, this legislation made no distinction between dependency
proceedings and TPR proceedings.  Section 39.09, which applied to all juvenile
proceedings, provided in part: 
Only the child involved in the case, the parents or legal custodians of
the child, their attorneys, and such other persons as they may request
or the judge may direct, shall be permitted to be present.
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§ 39.09(2), Fla. Stat. (1951) (emphasis added).  Although section 39.09 underwent
a series of legislative changes over the years, I find it significant from a historical
perspective that, at least fifty years ago, there was no mandatory closure of chapter
39 proceedings in this State and that instead, the judge determined the extent of the
closure.  
Moreover, the majority acknowledges that even at the present time not all
juvenile proceedings under chapter 39 are closed.  See majority op. at 12.  
Significantly, there is a statutory presumption of openness in dependency
proceedings subject to a judicial decision to "close any hearing to the public upon
determining that the public interest or the welfare of the child is best served by so
doing."  § 39.507(2), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1998) (formerly section 39.408(2)(c))
(emphasis added).  Dependency proceedings are the necessary predicate to TPR
proceedings.  However, section 39.809(4), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1998) (formerly
section 39.467(4)), provides for mandatory closure of all hearings involving the
termination of parental rights--without regard to whether the preceding dependency
action was open or closed.
This case highlights the fallacy of the bifurcated statutory scheme in its
present form, in which dependency proceedings are presumptively open, yet TPR
proceedings are mandatorily closed.  Because the dependency portion of the
11Ironically, the trial court opened the dependency proceeding against the wishes of the parents,
who sought to have the dependency proceeding closed for fear of "leaks and gossip."  Parents of J.B., 736
So. 2d at 112.
12Apparently there were also criminal proceedings involving the same allegations that were also
open to the public.
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proceeding in this case was open to the public, extensive media attention already
existed.11  See id. at 113.  The trial court found that the TPR proceedings should
be open in this case.  The trial court "specifically took notice of the extensive media
attention to which this case has already been subjected and concluded that the prior
media scrutiny 'severely undermines any privacy interests the state or the minor
child might have.'"  Id.   
Because of the extensive publicity that already occurred due to the open
dependency proceedings,12 it is difficult to envision how mandatory closure at this
stage of the proceedings would promote the best interests of the child.  Further, the
parents, whose rights were being terminated, affirmatively requested that the TPR
proceedings remain open. 
  
For all these reasons, in order to pass constitutional muster under our
decision in Barron, the decision to close TPR proceedings should be vested in the
sound discretion of the trial court on a case-by-case basis, just as it is in
dependency proceedings.  An appropriate balance must be struck among the many
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interests to be considered--the potential harm to the child, the rights of the parents,
the right of public access and the promotion of fairness and public confidence in
the judicial system. 
ANSTEAD, J., concurs.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Certified Great Public Importance
Fourth District - Case No. 4D98-2255 
(Broward County)
Bruce Rogow and Beverly A. Pohl of Bruce S. Rogow, P.A., Fort Lauderdale,
Florida,
for Petitioners
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Charles M. Fahlbusch, Assistant
Attorney General, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
for Respondent