Title: Idaho v. Osborn

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 46389 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
     Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
CHRISTOPHER NEAL OSBORN, 
 
     Defendant-Respondent. 
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Boise, June 2019 Term 
 
Filed: September 11, 2019 
 
Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Kootenai County. Cynthia K.C. Meyer, District Judge. 
 
The decision of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for appellant. Kenneth K. 
Jorgensen argued. 
 
Anne Taylor, Kootenai County Public Defender’s Office, Coeur d’Alene, for 
respondent. Amanda R. Montalvo argued. 
_____________________ 
BRODY, Justice. 
This case involves the vexing question of the proper amount of credit for time served to 
which Christopher Osborn is entitled under Idaho Code section 19-2603, the statute governing 
rearrest for a probation violation. Osborn violated a no contact order twice, pleaded guilty to the 
misdemeanor charges, and was given consecutive sentences of 365 days in jail on each count. 
Both sentences were suspended and he was placed on probation for two years on each count to 
be served concurrently. He was later arrested for, and admitted to, violating the terms of his 
probation; he served 106 days in jail from the date of his arrest before admitting the violations. 
The magistrate court granted Osborn 106 days credit for time served against the first of his 
consecutive sentences. Osborn then filed a Rule 35 motion seeking credit for time served against 
both consecutive sentences. The magistrate court denied Osborn’s motion. Osborn appealed to 
the district court, and it reversed the magistrate court’s denial and granted Osborn credit for time 
served against both sentences. We affirm the district court’s decision.   
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I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
After a domestic violence incident, Christopher Osborn was ordered to have no direct or 
indirect contact with his girlfriend. Osborn ignored this order and went to his girlfriend’s home a 
month later, taking property, making death threats, and throwing items at her. After police 
extracted Osborn from a hiding place in the garage, he was charged with two misdemeanor 
counts of violating the no contact order. Osborn pleaded guilty to both counts and was given 
consecutive sentences of 365 days jail on each count, the maximum sentences available for those 
offenses. After giving Osborn credit against each count for time served prior to judgment, the 
magistrate court suspended 278 days of each sentence and placed Osborn on supervised 
probation for two years on each count to be served concurrently.  
Osborn absconded immediately upon his release from jail. The State filed a motion to 
revoke probation, alleging Osborn violated the terms of his probation by failing to report to the 
probation department within three business days of his release and was evading supervision. The 
State requested that a bench warrant be issued. The State’s request was granted and a bench 
warrant was issued.  
A few months later, Osborn was arrested after he was found hiding between a mattress 
and a box-spring in his girlfriend’s home. He had pulled her into the home by her hair and 
threatened to kill her. Osborn’s girlfriend was eventually found unharmed but terrified, hiding 
amongst insulation in the home’s attic. Police charged Osborn with violating the no contact order 
again, and with kidnapping, and with obstructing an officer. Once in custody on the new charges, 
Osborn was served with the outstanding bench warrant issued in this case for his alleged 
probation violations. The State also filed an amended motion to revoke probation which added 
the allegation that Osborn violated the terms of his probation by committing new offenses.   
A little over three months after he was arrested on the new charges, Osborn admitted to 
violating the terms of his probation in this case. The magistrate court revoked his probation and 
imposed his previously-suspended consecutive sentences. The magistrate court credited Osborn 
with 106 days spent in jail from service of the bench warrant until he admitted the probation 
violations. The magistrate court credited the time against the first count alone, reasoning that the 
time served was post-sentencing on consecutive counts. Osborn filed a Rule 35 motion asking 
for additional credit for time served, arguing that he was owed 106 days credit against his second 
count as well, irrespective of the fact that it was a consecutive sentence. After a hearing on the 
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matter, the magistrate court denied the motion, stating: 
. . . [M]y interpretation of [State v.] Owens and [Idaho Code section 19-2603] is 
that after sentencing is imposed—and to the extent it’s structured consecutively as 
it was here—[Osborn is] no longer entitled to having credit on each of the various 
counts because now the sentences have been structured consecutively, which it 
was, and he got credit for the time that he was in towards that structured sentence. 
He doesn’t get it twice . . . 
Osborn appealed the magistrate court’s denial of his Rule 35 motion to the district court.  
 
Upon review, the district court reversed the magistrate court’s decision and credited 
Osborn with 106 days against the sentences for each of the two counts, rather than just the first. 
The district court determined that the plain language of Idaho Code section 19-2603 and existing 
case law mandated that “if [a] bench warrant includes more than one offense, then a defendant is 
entitled to credit served on each offense.” It then explained that Osborn’s consecutive sentences 
did not change the analysis: 
 
In the present case, [Osborn] was taken into custody under a bench 
warrant based on a probation violation that applied to both charges. The fact that 
[Osborn’s] sentences were imposed to run consecutively is of no moment, 
because he violated the terms of his probation on both charges. Thus, under the 
plain language of Idaho Code § 19-2603, [Osborn] is entitled to credit for 106 
days against each count, for total credit of 346 days. 
The State timely appealed to this Court. We affirm the decision of the district court.  
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“The question of whether a sentencing court has properly awarded credit for time served 
to the facts of a particular case is a question of law, which is subject to free review by the 
appellate courts.” State v. Gonzalez, No. 44534, 2019 WL 693765, at *2 (Idaho Feb. 20, 2019) 
(internal citation omitted). Additionally, “the interpretation of a statute is a question of law over 
which this Court exercises free review.” City of Idaho Falls v. H-K Contractors, Inc., 163 Idaho 
579, 581, 416 P.3d 951, 953 (2018). 
Our objective when interpreting a statute is “to derive the intent of the legislative 
body that adopted the act.” Id. (quoting State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866, 264 
P.3d 970, 973 (2011)). Statutory interpretation begins with the statute’s plain 
language. State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 361, 313 P.3d 1, 17 (2013). This Court 
considers the statute as a whole, and gives words their plain, usual, and ordinary 
meanings. Id. When the statute’s language is unambiguous, the legislature’s 
clearly expressed intent must be given effect, and we do not need to go beyond 
the statute’s plain language to consider other rules of statutory construction. Id. at 
361–62, 313 P.3d at 17–18. 
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State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 3, 343 P.3d 30, 32 (2015). 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
The State contends the district court erred in granting Osborn credit for time served 
against both of his consecutive sentences. Section 19-2603, the statute at issue, provides in part: 
The defendant shall receive credit for time served from the date of service of a 
bench warrant issued by the court after a finding of probable cause to believe the 
defendant has violated a condition of probation . . . .  
  
I.C. § 19-2603 (emphasis added). The State asserts this language is plain and unambiguous. Its 
argument is: “By granting consecutive credit for time served against the consecutive sentences 
the magistrate granted ‘credit for time served from the date of service of a bench warrant.’ Not 
giving concurrent credit against the consecutive sentences in no way deprived Osborn of ‘credit 
for time served from the date of service of a bench warrant.’ Osborn was serving his consecutive 
sentences from the moment of his arrest, and was given full credit for that service.” (emphasis 
added). We disagree with the State’s analysis.  
It is well understood that statutory interpretation begins with the literal language of the 
statute. State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866, 264 P.3d 970, 973 (2011) (citation omitted). A 
statute must be considered as a whole, and words should be given their plain, usual, and ordinary 
meanings. Id. When the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the 
legislative body must be given effect. Id. “If a statute is unsound or the policy behind it unwise, 
the power to correct the statute rests with the Legislature, not the judiciary.” State v. 
Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40, 44, 408 P.3d 38, 42 (2017). 
Section 19-2603 is the statute that governs the pronouncement and execution of judgment 
after a probation violation. The statute states: 
When the court finds that the defendant has violated the terms and conditions of 
probation, it may, if judgment has been withheld, pronounce any judgment which 
it could originally have pronounced, or, if judgment was originally pronounced 
but suspended, revoke probation. The time such person shall have been at large 
under such suspended sentence shall not be counted as a part of the term of his 
sentence. The defendant shall receive credit for time served from the date of 
service of a bench warrant issued by the court after a finding of probable cause to 
believe the defendant has violated a condition of probation, for any time served 
following an arrest of the defendant pursuant to section 20-227, Idaho Code, and 
for any time served as a condition of probation under the withheld judgment or 
suspended sentence.  
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I.C. § 19-2603 (emphasis added). The emphasized language demonstrates that this statute is 
written in the singular—“suspended sentence”. When applied to a case involving multiple 
suspended sentences, this language requires consideration of each suspended sentence 
independently of any other suspended sentence. In this case, even though the charges and 
sentences mirrored each other, Osborn pled guilty to two separate crimes, received two separate 
sentences, and was serving two separate terms of probation. The district court correctly 
recognized that the State filed a motion to revoke probation without making any distinction 
between the two suspended sentences and that Osborn was served with a bench warrant for 
alleged probation violations associated with each of his sentences. Under the plain language of 
19-2603, the district court had to grant credit for time served against each suspended sentence 
regardless of whether the result was unwise or gave Osborn what the dissent calls a windfall. 
There simply is no language in the statute allowing the district court to carve out special 
consideration for the fact that the sentences were to be served consecutively. 
The State argues against this result by asserting that Osborn began serving the first of his 
consecutive sentences at the time of his arrest and that he has been given all the credit he is due. 
We disagree with the State’s premise. Section 20-222 of the Idaho Code authorizes the rearrest 
of a probationer for an alleged probation violation. The statute makes it clear that after a hearing 
the trial court can revoke probation and order the execution of the sentence that was originally 
imposed: 
At any time during probation or suspension of sentence, the court may 
issue a warrant for violating any of the conditions of probation or suspension of 
sentence and cause the defendant to be arrested. Thereupon, the court, after 
summary hearing may revoke the probation and suspension of sentence and cause 
the sentence imposed to be executed, or may cause the defendant to be brought 
before it and may continue or revoke the probation, or may impose any sentence 
which originally might have been imposed at the time of conviction.”  
I.C. § 20-222. Importantly, under this statute, a suspended sentence is not executed until the 
court has determined that a probation violation has occurred. Simply stated, Osborn did not begin 
serving his first suspended sentence when he was rearrested for the alleged probation violations. 
He did not begin serving his underlying sentences until he admitted the probation violations and 
the magistrate court revoked probation and imposed the sentences that had been suspended. That 
occurred 106 days after he was served with the bench warrant. The district court properly 
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credited Osborn with time served against both of his sentences under the plain and unambiguous 
terms of the statute.  
The dissent argues that statutory construction should avoid palpably absurd results, a 
principle endorsed by some courts to avoid injustice.  See, e.g., Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 
U.S. 122, 202–03 (1819). However, legal absurdity is not equivalent to undesirable 
consequences from applying the plain language of a statute.  
But if, in any case, the plain meaning of a provision, not contradicted by any other 
provision in the same instrument, is to be disregarded, because we believe the 
framers of that instrument could not intend what they say, it must be one in which 
the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to the case, would be so 
monstrous, that all mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the 
application.  
Id. Importantly, this Court has never revised or voided an unambiguous statute on the grounds it 
was patently absurd, nor do we delve into statutory revisions to avoid uncomfortable results. 
Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 895-96, 265 P.3d 502, 508-09 (2011).   
If this Court were to conclude that an unambiguous statute was palpably absurd, 
how could we construe it to mean something that it did not say? Doing so would 
simply constitute revising the statute, but we do not have the authority to do that. 
The legislative power is vested in the senate and house of representatives, Idaho 
Const. art. III, § 1, not in this Court. As we said in Berry v. Koehler, 84 Idaho 
170, 177, 369 P.2d 1010, 1013 (1962), “The wisdom, justice, policy, or 
expediency of a statute are questions for the legislature alone.” 
Id. Even in the cases cited to by the dissent, this Court rejected the absurd readings of statutes in 
favor of their plain interpretation; neither statute was ambiguous or subject to court revision, nor 
did the Court’s plain reading create absurd results. See The David & Marvel Benton Tr. v. 
McCarty, 161 Idaho 145, 151, 384 P.3d 392, 398 (2016); State v. McKie, 163 Idaho 675, 678, 
417 P.3d 1001, 1004 (Ct. App. 2018), review denied (May 23, 2018). 
The dissent also argues that our decision today ignores language in Idaho Code section 
20-222(2) which states in part that a trial court: “may impose any sentence which originally 
might have been imposed at the time of conviction.” The dissent argues the magistrate court had 
the authority to sentence Osborn to two consecutive 365-day sentences, with 106 days 
suspended, leaving 624 days to serve, and therefore, its calculation of credit for time served was 
within the boundaries of its discretion. We disagree with the dissent’s analysis. 
The calculation of credit for time served is not a discretionary matter. When Osborn 
originally pled guilty to two counts of violating the no contact order, the magistrate court 
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sentenced him to the maximum sentence of one year in jail on each count. When Osborn 
admitted violating the terms of probation associated with each conviction, the magistrate court 
did not re-fashion the sentences. Instead, the magistrate court imposed the sentences that were 
originally pronounced and gave Osborn credit for time served. The magistrate court’s reading of 
the credit for time served statute was erroneous as a matter of law and the district court corrected 
the error. The language in section 20-222(2) which the dissent relies upon cannot be used to turn 
the calculation of credit for time served which is a legal matter into a discretionary one.    
 
On the surface, calculating credit for time served seems like it should be a simple 
exercise of counting days on a calendar. Its true complexity manifests in the statutory provisions 
and diverse circumstances presented to the district and magistrate courts on a case-by-case basis. 
In fact, since our decision in State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 343 P.3d 30 (2015), this Court has 
addressed numerous issues arising from statutes concerning credit for time served. See Interest of 
Doe, 165 Idaho 72, 438 P.3d 769, 776 (2019) (whether Idaho Code sections 18-309 and 19-2603 
entitled juveniles sentenced under the Juvenile Corrections Act to credit for time served on the 
offense at issue when there was an arrest on a probation violation); State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 
95, 439 P.3d 1267, 1272 (2019), reh’g denied (May 17, 2019) (whether a defendant preserved 
the issue of credit for time served for appeal); State v. Barrett, 163 Idaho 449, 452–54, 414 P.3d 
1188, 1191–93 (2018) (whether a hold notice service request was equivalent to an arrest warrant 
for an inmate already incarcerated on an unrelated matter); State v. Brand, 162 Idaho 189, 192, 
395 P.3d 809, 812 (2017) (whether a party may receive credit for presentence incarceration 
where that party was already incarcerated due to a prior, unrelated offense); State v. Young, 162 
Idaho 856, 859, 406 P.3d 868, 871 (2017) (whether section 18-309 authorizes credit for 
prejudgment time served on each sentence for each count when defendant’s sentencing was 
finalized prior to Owens); State v. Leary, 160 Idaho 349, 352, 372 P.3d 404, 407 (2016) (whether 
the amended credit statutes were retroactive); State v. Taylor, 160 Idaho 381, 385, 373 P.3d 699, 
703 (2016) (whether a defendant was entitled to credit for his incarceration during his 
participation in drug court).  
While today we point to the Legislature’s constitutional responsibility for crafting 
statutes related to credit for time served, the various circumstances that arise when sentencing 
defendants is difficult to fully contemplate and the task of crafting a comprehensive statute that 
eliminates all cries of injustice is a tall order. Nevertheless, the statute here lacks language 
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allowing the district court to carve out special consideration for the fact that Osborn’s suspended 
sentences were to be served consecutively. The plain reading of the statute leads us to only one 
conclusion: Osborne was entitled credit for time served against each suspended sentence. The 
fact that we may dislike the result is of no moment. We will not interpret the plain language of a 
statute simply to reach a more desirable result.  
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, the decision of the district court is affirmed. 
 
 
Chief Justice BURDICK and Justice STEGNER CONCUR. 
 
MOELLER, Justice, dissenting. 
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s well-reasoned opinion. Although I concede that 
its conclusions are based on a careful and thoughtful reading of the statutes involved, the 
resulting outcome is far from what I believe the legislature intended and will lead to absurd and 
potentially dangerous results that I cannot support. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
Osborn was originally sentenced to two consecutive 365-day terms for twice violating a 
no-contact order issued against him. The victim was the same in both cases. The consecutive 
sentences not only reveal the magistrate judge’s determination to punish Osborn for twice 
violating a no-contact order, but also demonstrate the judge’s desire to protect the victim and the 
public in general. Nevertheless, the judge suspended the sentences and placed Osborn on 
probation, with two years of jail time hanging over his head. Unfortunately, Osborn immediately 
absconded, spending months on the lam. He was eventually apprehended while hiding under a 
bed in the home of the same victim the original no-contact order had intended to protect, but only 
after he had brutalized and terrorized her. He was charged with kidnapping, violating the no-
contact order, and obstructing an officer. 
Although there was an unusually lengthy delay from the time of his arrest to disposition 
of the probation violations (106 days), this was certainly the result of Osborn not wishing to 
admit the violations while additional criminal charges were pending related to his new offenses 
against the victim. Given the severe consequences a defendant may face if convicted of new 
crimes while serving probation for previous offenses, postponing an admission to a probation 
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violation is a common and reasonable tactic by defense attorneys in order to preserve their 
clients’ legal options and constitutional rights. After Osborn admitted the probation violations, he 
was sentenced to serve the two consecutive 365-day sentences that had been suspended with full 
credit for the 106 days he had spent in custody. In other words, Osborn received the same 
sentence the judge told him he would receive if he failed to successfully complete probation.   
II. 
ANALYSIS 
Notwithstanding this troubling history, the majority’s reading of the statutes in question 
now results in an undeserved windfall for Osborn, granting him double credit for his time served 
while he was deciding whether to admit the violations and waiting for disposition. In essence, the 
majority’s ruling grants Osborn double credit (212 days) for the time he actually served (only 
106 days)—a result that I believe is neither required by the law nor intended by the legislature. 
The majority’s interpretation further leads to the inescapable conclusion that, had Osborn waited 
365 days to admit the violations, his two-year sentence would have been completed after serving 
only one-half of his original sentence. 
A. 
The statutes at issue do not compel the majority’s outcome. 
We begin with the undisputed premise that Idaho Code section 19-2603 requires that a 
defendant on probation receive full credit for the time they served in custody: 
The defendant shall receive credit for time served from the date of service of a 
bench warrant issued by the court after a finding of probable cause to believe the 
defendant has violated a condition of probation, for any time served following an 
arrest of the defendant pursuant to section 20-227, Idaho Code, and for any time 
served as a condition of probation under the withheld judgment or suspended 
sentence. 
(Emphasis added). The majority reads this language as granting a defendant credit for time 
served on each count, even if the sentence was made consecutive by the sentencing judge. 
Unlike the majority, I read the plain language of section 19-2603 as only awarding credit for the 
time the defendant actually served in custody; it does not appear to support any inference that a 
defendant should receive additional credit on a consecutive sentence for hypothetical time not 
actually served.  
The source of the confusion in this case is rooted in Idaho Code section 20-222(2). This 
statute sets forth the options a sentencing judge has if the defendant admits to or is found to have 
violated the terms of probation: 
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At any time during probation or suspension of sentence, the court may issue a 
warrant for violating any of the conditions of probation or suspension of sentence 
and cause the defendant to be arrested. Thereupon the court, after summary 
hearing may revoke the probation and suspension of sentence and cause the 
sentence imposed to be executed, or may cause the defendant to be brought before 
it and may continue or revoke the probation, or may impose any sentence which 
originally might have been imposed at the time of conviction. In making a 
determination to continue or revoke probation and suspension of sentence, the 
court shall consider the defendant’s risks and needs and options for treatment in 
the community. 
I.C. § 20-222(2) (emphasis added). The majority focuses its analysis on the italicized language 
cited above, stopping its analysis at the phrase: “and cause the sentence imposed to be executed.” 
However, it does not read it in concert with the underscored phrase, “or may impose any 
sentence which originally might have been imposed at the time of conviction.” The majority 
further concludes that “a suspended sentence is not executed until the court has determined that a 
probation violation has occurred.”1 Therefore, the majority reasons that Osborn should receive 
credit for time served on both charges cumulatively pursuant to section 20-222(2), thereby 
effectively turning Osborn’s 106 days in custody into 212 days.  
My concern with such a reading of these statutes is that it essentially disregards the trial 
judge’s original sentence and permits the defendant to alter the time he must serve based on how 
long he waits to admit a probation violation. In other words, every day that Osborn remained in 
custody he would essentially be doubling his credit for time served. Of similar concern is that 
this interpretation leaves it to a prosecuting attorney (perhaps unwittingly) to determine the time 
a defendant will actually serve based on the manner in which the probation violation is filed. For 
example, under the majority’s analysis, had the State only charged Osborn with a probation 
violation on the first case of violating the no-contact order, waited for an admission and 
disposition, and then charged Osborn with a second probation violation for the second case of 
violating the no-contact order, the Court would have been free to credit Osborn with only 106 
days. Under this scenario, Osborn would only be entitled to additional credit for whatever actual 
time he served between the second probation violation being filed and its disposition. Such a 
procedure would not only be burdensome on the legal resources of the court, the State, and the 
defense—essentially doubling the number of court appearances necessary to adjudicate the 
                                                 
1 Under the majority’s logic, even an admission to a probation violation may not result in an “executed” sentence 
because the sentencing judge still has the option to again suspend the sentence and return the defendant to probation. 
11 
 
probation violations—it is clearly inconsistent with the intent of the legislature. Also problematic 
is that this interpretation potentially empowers the State to dictate the amount of credit a 
defendant receives for violating probation based on the manner and timing of the filing of the 
probation violations, usurping what has historically and constitutionally been the province of the 
sentencing judge.  
The majority’s reading of these statutes also fails to place sufficient weight on the 
underscored portion of the quote from section 20-222(2), supra, which reads: “or may impose 
any sentence which originally might have been imposed at the time of conviction.”2 This phrase 
has existed in section 20-222 and its earlier incarnations dating back to 1947. I believe this 
phrase is important because it permits the sentencing judge to adjust the sentence following a 
probation violation, consistent with the statutory discretion the judge had at the time of 
sentencing. I do not read this to mean that the sentencing judge may arbitrarily increase a 
defendant’s sentence after a probation violation. Of course, that is not what occurred here. 
Rather, at the probation disposition hearing, the magistrate judge imposed Osborn’s original 
sentence of two consecutive 365-day sentences and ordered that Osborn be given credit for the 
time he had already served—106 days. Such a sentence was consistent with the magistrate 
judge’s discretion at the original sentencing. Therefore, the sentence Osborn actually received as 
a result of his probation violation is completely consistent with the sentence that “might have 
been imposed at the time of conviction,” i.e., two consecutive 365-day sentences, with 106 days 
suspended, leaving 624 days to serve.3  
B. 
  Legislative intent supports a different outcome.   
In interpreting Idaho Code sections 19-2603 and 20-222(2), the majority has taken a 
textualist approach and applied the plain meaning it infers from the statutes as written. I concede 
that this is typically the proper and preferred method of statutory construction—and one to which 
I regularly adhere. However, when the plain meaning of a statute is (1) not clear from the text, 
(2) conflicts with other related provisions in the code, (3) renders a result that makes no sense, or 
                                                 
2 I am mindful that section 19-2603 contains similar language but limits its application to cases where an order 
withholding judgment has been granted: “if judgment has been withheld, pronounce any judgment which it could 
originally have pronounced.”  
3 Although our decision in State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 4, 343 P.3d 30, 33 (2015), might suggest that credit for time 
served should be applied to each count, Owens concerned Idaho code section 18–309, which expressly applies to 
time served “prior to entry of judgment.” This is a reasonable distinction given that prior to judgment it would not 
have been determined which sentences a defendant would be convicted of, or whether the defendant’s sentence 
would be concurrent or consecutive. 
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(4) is unconstitutional, it is proper to look at the legislative purpose behind the statute in order to 
fully understand its meaning. These statutes suffer from all four problems noted above.  
We have previously recognized that the rules for interpreting an ambiguous statute go 
beyond strict textualism. As we recently explained: 
If the statutory language is unambiguous, we merely apply the statute as written. 
If the statute is ambiguous, then we seek to determine the legislative intent.  When 
doing so, we may examine the language used, the reasonableness of proposed 
interpretations, and the policy behind the statute. Interpretation begins with the 
literal language of a statute. 
Moser v. Rosauers Supermarkets, Inc., 443 P.3d 147, 150 (Idaho 2019) (citations omitted). “[A] 
statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable construction.” 
State v. Amstad, 164 Idaho 403, 405, 431 P.3d 238, 240 (2018). Additionally, when statutes 
relate to the same subject, they are considered in pari materia. See Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. 
Ctr. v. Elmore Cty., 158 Idaho 648, 653, 350 P.3d 1025, 1030 (2015).  
Such statutes are taken together and construed as one system, and the object is to 
carry into effect the intention. It is to be inferred that a code of statutes relating to 
one subject was governed by one spirit and policy, and was intended to be 
consistent and harmonious in its several parts and provisions.  
Meyers v. City of Idaho Falls, 52 Idaho 81, 11 P.2d 626, 629 (1932). 
Even if the majority’s interpretation of these statutes were deemed a “reasonable 
construction,” the literal language of the statutes still creates an ambiguity in the meanings of 
sections 19-2603 and 20-222 because neither statute addresses consecutive sentences. 
Furthermore, the Majority does not address the residual authority granted to the sentencing judge 
to impose any sentence that could have originally been imposed, effectively rendering this 
provision meaningless. Additionally, as explained earlier, the majority’s reading of these statutes 
could result in a violation of separations of powers principles by allowing a prosecutor to usurp 
the sentencing judge’s discretion by altering the ultimate sentence based on the timing and 
manner in which the probation violations are charged.4 “Where a statute is capable of two 
interpretations, one of which would make it constitutional and the other unconstitutional, it is 
well established in this jurisdiction that the court should adopt that construction which upholds 
                                                 
4 We have previously held that it is a violation of the separation of powers doctrine to permit a prosecutor to veto a 
sentencing option post-judgment. See generally State v. Easley, 156 Idaho 214, 221, 322 P.3d 296, 303 (2014) 
(“Whatever authority prosecutors have as ‘judicial officers,’ that authority does not extend to determining 
sentencing when a defendant has been adjudicated guilty of a violation. That is the court's authority.”) 
13 
 
the validity of the act.” Cowles Pub. Co. v. Magistrate Court of the First Judicial Dist. of State, 
Cty. of Kootenai, 118 Idaho 753, 759, 800 P.2d 640, 646 (1990). 
An examination of the legislative history behind section 19-2603 further demonstrates 
that the majority reaches a result neither intended nor foreseen by the legislature. In 2015, 
section 19-2603 was amended for the first time since its enactment in 1915. 2015 Idaho Laws, 
Ch. 99 (H.B. 0064). The Statement of Purpose behind this amendment states:  
This bill provides that such a defendant would receive credit for the time served 
as a condition of probation, ensuring that the total time of incarceration served by 
a defendant does not exceed the sentence imposed by the court. The bill would 
also clarify that a defendant who is served with a bench warrant or arrested on a 
probation violation charge receives credit for time served in jail following the 
service of the warrant of the arrest. 
Statement of Purpose, RS 23413, H.B. 0064 (2015). The express intent of the legislation was to 
ensure that defendants receive full credit for their time in custody so that their period of 
incarceration “does not exceed the sentence imposed by the court.” Id. It is not reasonable to 
presume that the legislature intended to achieve this goal by granting defendants with 
consecutive sentences additional credit for fictitious time not actually served, thereby shortening 
the judge’s sentence. Read in the full context of the amendments, the legislature’s stated concern 
for properly enforcing “the sentence imposed by the court” should reasonably be interpreted to 
mean that a defendant should serve no more and no less time than the sentence originally 
imposed by the court. Nothing in the legislation or its history addresses granting extra credit for 
consecutive sentences. Inasmuch as consecutive sentences, by definition, are typically only given 
to repeat offenders, it makes no sense to read these statutes as intending to grant greater leniency 
to the most serious offenders. In fact, the unavoidable consequence of the majority’s 
interpretation is that such offenders may now unilaterally reduce the length of their overall 
sentence by delaying the admission of their probation violations in order to get double credit for 
time served.5 
It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction to avoid reading ambiguous statutes in a 
manner that leads to an irrational result. Indeed, we have held that “[t]his Court will not read a 
statute to create an absurd result.” The David & Marvel Benton Tr. v. McCarty, 161 Idaho 145, 
                                                 
5 Under the majority’s reading of the statutes in question, a defendant facing probation violations on three charges 
with consecutive sentences would receive credit for triple the time actually served. Given the varying number of 
consecutive sentences possible, even a lengthy sentence could be served in a fraction of the time contemplated by 
the sentencing judge. 
14 
 
151, 384 P.3d 392, 398 (2016); see also Moser, 443 P.3d at 150 (Idaho 2019); State v. 
Chambers, No. 45608, 2019 WL 1891005, at *2 (Idaho Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2019); Rome v. State, 
164 Idaho 407, 413, 431 P.3d 242, 248 (2018). “Constructions of an ambiguous statute that 
would lead to an absurd result are disfavored.” State v. McKie, 163 Idaho 675, 678, 417 P.3d 
1001, 1004 (Ct. App. 2018), review denied (May 23, 2018). Therefore, in sum, I believe 
interpreting these ambiguous statutes in a manner that awards Osborn credit for twice the time he 
actually served on his consecutive sentences leads to an absurd result and is contrary to the 
legislature’s intent. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the majority has diligently applied the law as they read it to this difficult case, I 
must dissent because the potential for abuse here is high and concerning. Aside from the obvious 
risks to the victim and the public posed by Osborn, other defendants facing consecutive 
sentences may now have a perverse incentive to delay admitting probation violations as long as 
possible in order to get double credit (or more) for the time they actually served. I take no solace 
in simply leaving resolution of this untenable situation to the mere hope that prosecutors will 
charge probation violations more strategically in the future, and that the legislature may someday 
clarify the statutes in question. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
Justice BEVAN CONCURS.