Title: Cathy Strozinsky v. School District of Brown Deer

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2000 WI 97 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-0454 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Cathy Strozinsky,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
School District of Brown Deer,  
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  228 Wis. 2d 509, 597 N.W.2d 773 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 12, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
March 2, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Christopher R. Foley 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there 
were briefs by M. Elizabeth O’Neill, and Whyte Hirschboeck Dudek, 
S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by M. Elizabeth O’Neill. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief by 
Alan C. Olson, Robert M. Mihelich and Alan C. Olson & Associates, 
S.C., New Berlin, and oral argument by Alan C. Olson. 
 
2000 WI 97 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No.  98-0454 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Cathy Strozinsky,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
School District of Brown Deer,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   The School District of Brown 
Deer (the District) seeks review of an unpublished decision of 
the court of appeals.1  The court of appeals reversed a decision 
of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, John F. Foley, Judge. 
 The circuit court granted summary judgment to the District, 
holding that the wrongful discharge claim of Cathy Strozinsky 
(Strozinsky) was not actionable because Strozinsky did not 
satisfy the public policy exception to the employment-at-will 
doctrine.  The circuit court, however, urged Strozinsky to 
proceed on an alternative theory, constructive discharge. 
                     
1 Strozinsky v. School Dist. of Brown Deer, No. 98-0454, 
unpublished slip opinion (Wis. Ct. App. May 18, 1999) (per 
curiam).  
FILED 
 
JUL 12, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
2 
¶2 
Strozinsky resigned from her position as payroll clerk 
in the District's central office after she and her supervisors 
disagreed about the tax withholdings from a bonus check.  
Strozinsky filed a wrongful discharge claim, contending that the 
District had forced her to resign because of her efforts to 
comply with the public policy reflected in Wis. Stat. § 943.392 
and federal tax laws. 
¶3 
After the circuit court granted summary judgment to 
the District, Strozinsky submitted a motion for reconsideration. 
 The circuit court, Christopher R. Foley, Judge, denied the 
motion for the wrongful discharge claim.  The court also found 
that Strozinsky could not pursue a constructive discharge claim 
because constructive discharge is not actionable as a distinct 
cause of 
action and offers 
relief 
only 
when 
raised in 
conjunction with an underlying theory of recovery.  The court 
therefore granted the District's motion to dismiss the case. 
 
¶4 
The court of appeals reversed.  The court did not 
expressly address whether the constructive discharge doctrine 
applies to common-law claims filed under the narrow public 
policy exception to the rule of employment-at-will established 
in Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 
834 (1983).  The court applied the doctrine, holding that a jury 
should 
decide 
the 
question 
"whether 
the 
conditions 
at 
Strozinsky's workplace were so intolerable that a reasonable 
                     
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1993-
94 volumes unless indicated otherwise.  
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
3 
person would be forced to resign."  Strozinsky v. School Dist. 
of Brown Deer, No. 98-0454, unpublished slip opinion at 8 (Wis. 
Ct. App. May 18, 1999) (per curiam).  The court also found that 
Strozinsky set forth questions of fact about whether her 
attempts to comply with the Internal Revenue Code created 
intolerable working conditions that triggered a discharge in 
violation of public policy.  Id.   
¶5 
We frame two issues in this case.  First, we address 
whether Strozinsky identified a fundamental and well defined 
public policy sufficient to meet the narrow cause of action for 
wrongful discharge under the public policy exception to the 
general rule of employment-at-will first recognized by this 
court in Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d 561.  Second, we consider 
whether the constructive discharge doctrine applies to a common-
law claim for wrongful discharge under the same exception. 
 
¶6 
We 
hold 
that 
the 
wrongful 
discharge 
claim 
is 
actionable under the narrow public policy exception to the 
employment-at-will doctrine because Strozinsky identified a 
fundamental and well defined public policy in the provisions of 
Wis. Stat. § 943.39(1) and 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101, 3102, and 6672(a). 
 The granting of the District's summary judgment motion was 
therefore inappropriate.  Our approach to this first issue 
differs from that of the court of appeals because we conclude 
that whether a plaintiff identifies a public policy is a 
question of law to be decided by the court, not a jury.  For the 
second issue, we agree with the circuit court inasmuch as the 
constructive discharge doctrine does not present an independent 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
4 
cause of action.  We hold, however, that the doctrine of 
constructive discharge can be applied as a defense in a common-
law claim under the public policy exception because some 
resignations are, in fact, involuntary.  In this case a question 
of fact exists under the constructive discharge standard, namely 
whether Strozinsky's working conditions were so intolerable that 
a reasonable person in her position would have been compelled to 
resign.  We agree with the court of appeals that this question 
requires resolution by a jury, and hence, we conclude that the 
District's motion to dismiss the case should not have been 
granted.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court for trial for 
determination 
whether 
Strozinsky's 
resignation 
was 
a 
constructive discharge and, if so, whether the discharge 
violated public policy. 
FACTS 
 
¶7 
Strozinsky 
presented 
the 
following 
facts.3 
 
The 
District 
employed 
Strozinsky 
as 
a 
payroll 
clerk 
from 
approximately January 11, 1988, until September 30, 1995.  
Strozinsky was responsible for bookkeeping and payroll duties, 
                     
3 In a review of a summary judgment motion, this court 
interprets the facts, and all reasonable inferences drawn from 
those facts, in favor of the nonmoving party.  See Grams v. 
Boss, 97 Wis.2d 332, 338-39, 294 N.W.2d 473 (1980).  When 
reviewing a motion to dismiss, we assume that the facts as set 
forth in the complaint are true.  Hausman v. St. Croix Care 
Ctr., 214 Wis. 2d 655, 662, 571 N.W.2d 393 (1997); Wandry v. 
Bull's Eye Credit Union, 129 Wis. 2d 37, 39, 384 N.W.2d 325 
(1986). 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
5 
and she determined the federal and state tax withholdings for 
all payroll checks issued to District employees.  Among the 
employees for whom Strozinsky computed withholding tax was the 
District Superintendent, Kenneth Moe (Moe).  Strozinsky reported 
directly to the District's Business Manager, Donald Amundson 
(Amundson), an immediate subordinate of Moe.  
 
¶8 
Under his employment contract with the District, Moe 
received an annual bonus equal to 10 percent of his salary.  The 
check was issued directly into a tax-sheltered annuity account 
that Moe selected.  Before 1993, the District had paid the bonus 
to the annuity account without withholding any Social Security 
or Medicare taxes from the gross amount.  Strozinsky did not 
recall whether she or someone else prepared those checks; 
issuance of the bonuses had not always been within her area of 
responsibility.  
¶9 
Strozinsky did remember the bonus check paid to Moe in 
July 1994.  No taxes were withheld from that check, and Amundson 
instructed Strozinsky not to make any adjustments to offset the 
difference 
in 
the 
two 
regular 
paychecks 
issued 
to 
Moe 
subsequently that month.  Strozinsky recalled Amundson telling 
her "not [to] tax Mr. Moe that high."  Although Strozinsky was 
not comfortable, she prepared the paycheck as Amundson directed 
and did nothing to verify whether her actions were legal or not. 
 Id.   
¶10 Strozinsky described an atmosphere at the District's 
business office in which the payroll staff was ill at ease with 
procedures that were not "legally correct."  A previous 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
6 
bookkeeper, for instance, refused to sign off on federal tax 
forms she issued because they were not truthful.  The bookkeeper 
feared she might be held personally liable for falsified 
information.  Id.  Another employee also refused to sign tax 
documents, testifying that the materials accompanying Moe's tax-
sheltered annuity were fraudulent.  Strozinsky herself had 
learned from her membership in the American Payroll Association 
that she could be held liable for errors in payroll checks.  
 
¶11 The following year, Strozinsky issued Moe's annual 
bonus check on July 7, 1995.  She drew the $9,149 bonus from the 
District's accounts payable checking account and submitted it to 
Moe's annuity account.  Since issuing the 1994 paycheck without 
the withholdings, Strozinsky had become more informed about 
taxation procedures from the American Payroll Association and 
seminars she attended.  She therefore believed tax should be 
withheld from the bonus check, but she was unable to deduct the 
amount because the District's computer software was not equipped 
to execute the withholding from the accounts payable account.  
Strozinsky therefore made an adjustment to offset the necessary 
withholding in Moe's next regular payroll check.  She did not 
give Moe any advanced explanation that he would be receiving a 
reduced net amount on the paycheck.  After Strozinsky deducted 
this additional amount, Moe's payroll check was about $500 less 
than he expected.  
 
¶12 Moe received this reduced paycheck on July 20, 1995, 
and that same day he confronted Strozinsky about the large 
deductions.  Strozinsky explained that she "was going to tax it 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
7 
properly" and wanted it "done correctly in regards to taxes and 
with Wisconsin Retirement."  She said the tax laws required her 
to make withholdings from the bonus check, and she therefore had 
deducted the required amount from the regular paycheck.  Moe 
allegedly told her that he "didn't care" and instructed 
Strozinsky that he did not want his payroll check to reflect any 
withholding to compensate for the annual bonus payment.  During 
this 
conversation, 
Strozinsky 
found 
Moe 
assertive 
and 
"threatening in his demeanor."  She testified at her deposition 
that Moe threw the check across the desk at Strozinsky and 
demanded that she change it.  Strozinsky felt as if she were 
"being chastised like a child gets yelled at."  
 
¶13 After 
this 
conversation, 
Strozinsky 
called 
the 
Internal 
Revenue 
Service 
(IRS) 
for 
advice. 
 
The 
IRS 
representative confirmed that tax should be withheld from the 
bonus payment, explaining that the deduction Strozinsky made was 
withheld properly from Moe's next regular paycheck.  Strozinsky 
testified that the representative suggested that Moe himself 
should contact the IRS directly rather than arguing with 
Strozinsky about the withholding.  The IRS allegedly told 
Strozinsky that she personally could be liable for the amount 
owed as well as a penalty and compounded interest.  
 
¶14 Strozinsky conveyed the information she had received 
from the IRS to her supervisor, Amundson.  She explained that 
she faced personal liability for any unpaid taxes, plus 
penalties 
and 
interest. 
 
Amundson 
nonetheless 
directed 
Strozinsky to re-issue a new payroll check to Moe, this time 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
8 
without any tax withholdings deducted, neither for the bonus nor 
the regular payroll amount.  Amundson remarked, "This only 
happens once a year, just do it and get it over with and 
eventually he will make it up."  
¶15 Strozinsky agreed to prepare the check if Amundson 
signed a written statement releasing her from liability in the 
event the IRS challenged the non-reporting.  Strozinsky recalled 
that Amundson told her that he would take full responsibility, 
and he signed the statement.  Strozinsky voided the check with 
the proper withholdings and prepared a new payroll check that 
withheld no taxes.   
 
¶16 Moe received the replacement check, but Amundson 
returned it to Strozinsky.  He informed Strozinsky that without 
any tax withheld, Moe thought the error may look too obvious and 
explained that Moe wanted her to issue a third check, this time 
with partial withholdings.  When Strozinsky told Amundson that 
the District computer software prevented her from manipulating 
the software to change the withholding percentages, Amundson 
told her "to find a way to do it in the system."  Strozinsky 
made repeated, unsuccessful attempts to issue the check.  
 
¶17 As Strozinsky and Amundson struggled with the computer 
software, Moe approached Amundson and Strozinsky and conceded 
that he was required to pay the taxes that Strozinsky originally 
had withheld.  Moe, however, addressed Strozinsky's decision to 
ask Amundson to sign the statement insulating her from potential 
liability, stating, "I'm offended by this memo [that you] 
documented something, and that you [ ] impl[ied] that I'm doing 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
9 
something illegal here when I'm not."  Moe screamed as his veins 
bulged and spittle came out of his mouth.  Strozinsky stated 
that Moe leaned over the desk red-faced, pointed to the door, 
and warned that if Strozinsky engaged in similar behavior in the 
future, she would be "out of here."  Strozinsky attempted to 
justify 
her 
conduct; 
Moe 
told 
her, 
"It 
was 
your 
responsibilityIt's your responsibility to advise me about tax." 
 During this exchange, Amundson told Strozinsky to be quiet and 
not say anything else to Moe.  Strozinsky conceded that before 
July 
1995, 
she 
and 
Moe 
had 
had 
"a 
very 
good 
working 
relationship."  
 
¶18 Strozinsky explained that this incident left her 
shaken.  She cried, hyperventilated, and vomited.  She told 
Amundson, "I cannot do this anymore.  I cannot work here 
anymore."  Amundson told Strozinsky to calm down and that she 
should then issue yet another payroll check, this time again 
with the full amount deducted as an adjustment for the 
withholding amount required from the bonus check.  Strozinsky 
testified at her deposition that Amundson said, "what happened 
to [you] was terrible and it shouldn't have happened, but you 
know that he's not going to apologize to you.  You know he'll 
never admit he's wrong."  Amundson urged her not to quit.   
¶19 Strozinsky nonetheless feared she would lose her job 
and decided that "nobody was worth breaking the law for."  She 
submitted a written complaint to Karen Rutt, the District's 
Human Resources Manager, asserting that Moe's treatment was 
demeaning, upsetting, and amounted to a "form of harassment."  
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
10
She provided a copy of the complaint to Amundson, who inquired, 
"Are you sure you want to do this?  You know what he gets like. 
 You're talking about the superintendent here."  Amundson 
instructed Rutt to take no immediate action on the complaint 
until after Strozinsky took a pre-planned family vacation 
scheduled for the following week.   
¶20 When Strozinsky returned to work on August 2, 1995, 
Amundson handed the written complaint back to her, explaining 
that he would "pretend [he had] never s[een] it."  Strozinsky 
told Amundson that whenever she saw Moe, her "stomach flipp[ed]" 
and she grew shaky.  Amundson wrote this off to "a typical 
reaction that females have."  
¶21 Moe, Amundson, and Strozinsky met the next day.  Moe 
underscored that he and Amundson were Strozinsky's bosses, and 
that as a "payroll clerk," she had no authority or power.  
Strozinsky told the men she had tried to fulfill her job duties 
lawfully, following the advice she had received from the IRS and 
the information she had learned from the American Payroll 
Association.  Moreover, she explained that she had asked 
Amundson to sign the written release because she did not trust 
Moe or Amundson to "back her up" in any dispute with the IRS.  
Moe replied that he and Amundson were the parties responsible, 
adding that "if [we] get caught that's why [the District] [has] 
errors and omissions insurance."  Moe stated that if Strozinsky 
did not trust him, she should not work for him.   
 
¶22 After August 3, Amundson and Moe excluded Strozinsky 
from job duties in which she regularly participated previously, 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
11
such as work on short-term borrowing projects and attending the 
orientation designed to introduce and explain payroll benefits 
to new District teachers.  Amundson ceased working with 
Strozinsky as he had in the past.  She sensed that Moe and 
Amundson stopped communicating with her, reprimanded her without 
cause, and pressured her with rushed deadlines.  Strozinsky felt 
threatened and believed that Moe was presenting her with "an 
ultimatum."  
 
¶23 On September 13, 1995, Strozinsky spoke with Amundson 
about the workplace pressures.  Amundson suggested Moe was the 
source of her unease and remarked "if this is what you think 
pressure is, you're working for the wrong guy, and perhaps you 
shouldn't be working here."  Later that day, Strozinsky 
submitted a written resignation stating that she would terminate 
her employment effective September 29, 1995.  
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
¶24 After 
her 
resignation, 
Strozinsky 
filed 
for 
unemployment compensation benefits, and the District challenged 
her application.  After a three-day hearing conducted early in 
1996, an administrative law judge found "good cause attributable 
to the employer" as the source of Strozinsky's departure.  The 
tribunal found it irrelevant whether Strozinsky was correct in 
her interpretation of the payroll tax laws.  The judge reasoned 
that 
the 
cumulative 
effect 
of 
the 
facts 
suggested 
that 
Strozinsky was subjected to unreasonable treatment.   
¶25 The District appealed the decision to the Labor and 
Industry Review Commission (LIRC), and that commission affirmed 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
12
the decision of the administrative law judge.  LIRC concluded 
that Strozinsky "presented testimony that the pressure of the 
workplace became so severe that she was forced to quit."  LIRC 
reasoned that "requesting, suggesting, or directing an employe 
to violate Federal or State law is good cause" to quit.  
 
¶26 Strozinsky filed a complaint against the District in 
Milwaukee County Court on June 12, 1996, alleging wrongful 
discharge in violation of the public policy mandate articulated 
in Wis. Stat. § 943.39 (1993-94).4  The District moved for 
summary judgment on the grounds that Strozinsky failed to 
present any evidence that the District had violated a public 
                     
4  Wisconsin Stat. § 943.39 provides: 
 
Fraudulent writings.  Whoever, with intent to injure 
or defraud, does any of the following is guilty of a 
Class D felony: 
 
(1) Being a director, officer, manager, agent or 
employee of any corporation or limited liability 
company falsifies any record, account or other 
document belonging to that corporation or limited 
liability company by alteration, false entry or 
omission, or makes, circulates or publishes any 
written statement regarding the corporation or 
limited liability company which he or she knows 
is false. 
 
The District argues that, "The public policy exception embodied 
in this statute is only arguably applicable to the present case 
because the District is neither a 'corporation' nor a 'limited 
liability company,' as those terms are defined in the Wisconsin 
statutes."  Petitioner's Brief at 29 n.1.  In paragraph 2 of her 
complaint, 
Strozinsky 
alleged 
that 
the 
District 
"is 
a 
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State 
of Wisconsin."  In its answer, the District admitted to this 
allegation.  
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
13
policy, failed to allege that she refused to violate a public 
policy, and resigned from her position voluntarily.  In 
addition, the District argued that even if a claim for wrongful 
discharge could be based on constructive discharge, Strozinsky 
could not demonstrate that her working conditions were so 
intolerable 
that 
a 
reasonable 
person 
faced 
with 
similar 
circumstances would be compelled to resign.   
 
¶27 On May 21, 1997, the circuit court entered an order 
granting summary judgment to the District on the wrongful 
discharge claim.  The court found that Strozinsky had not 
demonstrated that her case satisfied any of the public policy 
exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine.  The court's 
order, 
however, 
permitted 
Strozinsky 
to 
proceed 
on 
an 
alternative theory, constructive discharge.  The court reasoned:  
 
It's my view that there is certainly an issue of fact 
with regard to the constructive discharge.  If that 
hasn't been raised, you ought to do that.  Because I 
really think that what she says is true, conditions 
were intolerable.  It's beyond the administration of 
the school district acting like that.  Who the hell 
does this guy think he is anyway?  I think the issue 
here is a matter of foregoing the constructive 
discharge.  But the motion for summary judgment is 
granted. 
¶28 Strozinsky filed a motion for reconsideration of the 
summary judgment order on June 6, 1997, seeking reversal of the 
court's decision about the wrongful discharge claim.  The motion 
sought clarification about the constructive discharge claim, 
noting that Wisconsin law recognizes no such cause of action.  
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
14
 
¶29 The circuit court denied Strozinsky's motion for 
reconsideration of the wrongful discharge claim.  The District 
then 
moved 
to 
dismiss 
the 
remaining 
cause 
of 
action, 
constructive discharge.  The District argued that constructive 
discharge presents a basis for recovery only when set forth in 
conjunction with an underlying cause of action.  Strozinsky 
agreed that she would be unable to proceed on a free-standing 
claim of constructive discharge without the reinstatement of her 
original cause of action, wrongful discharge.  The court 
therefore dismissed the constructive discharge claim without 
prejudice.   
¶30 Strozinsky appealed.  The court of appeals held that 
summary judgment was inappropriate because Strozinsky presented 
genuine issues of material fact about whether she had been 
constructively discharged.  The court of appeals applied the 
doctrine of constructive discharge without expressly deciding 
whether Wisconsin recognizes the doctrine in common-law, as 
opposed to statutory, claims.  The court concluded that a jury 
should determine whether Strozinsky's working conditions were so 
intolerable that a reasonable person in her position would have 
resigned.  In addition, the court reasoned that material facts 
were in dispute about whether the "discharge" violated public 
policy.  
PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION 
¶31 The first issue in this case, whether the claim 
identified 
a 
fundamental 
and 
well 
defined 
public 
policy 
sufficient to meet the narrow cause of action for wrongful 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
15
discharge under the public policy exception to the doctrine of 
employment-at-will, presents a question of law that we review 
independently.  Kempfer v. Automated Finishing Inc., 211 Wis. 2d 
100, 107-08, 564 N.W.2d 692 (1997). 
¶32 This issue also requires us to review the decision of 
the circuit court to grant the District's summary judgment 
motion.  This court analyzes summary judgment motions de novo, 
applying the same methodology as the circuit court.  Tatge v. 
Chambers & Owen, 219 Wis. 2d 99, 110, 579 N.W.2d 217 (1998).  
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine 
facts in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law.  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  In its review of a 
summary judgment motion, this court construes the facts and all 
reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor.  Grams v. 
Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 338-39, 294 N.W.2d 473 (1980).   
¶33 We begin by setting forth our established approach to 
employment relationships.  Wisconsin, like many states, adheres 
to the doctrine of employment-at-will.  The doctrine provides 
that when the terms of employment are indefinite, the "employer 
may discharge an employee 'for good cause, for no cause, or even 
for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal 
wrong.'"  Tatge, 219 Wis. 2d at 112-13 (quoting Brockmeyer, 113 
Wis. 2d at 567).   Generally, at-will employees cannot pursue 
legal claims stemming from routine dissatisfactions with the 
terms and conditions of employment or an employer's unjustified 
decision to terminate the employment relationship.  Brockmeyer, 
113 Wis. 2d at 574.  Courts will not second guess employment or 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
16
business decisions, even when those decisions appear ill-advised 
or unfortunate.  This common-law doctrine has been a stable 
fixture of our law since 1871.  Tatge, 219 Wis. 2d at 112.   
¶34 Over 
time, 
federal 
and 
state 
laws 
refined 
the 
complexion 
of 
the 
common-law 
doctrine. 
 
These 
statutory 
modifications to the rule of employment-at-will targeted the 
potentially harsh application of the doctrine by allowing 
employees to seek relief for certain types of terminations.  
Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 567-68.  For instance, Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 19645and the Wisconsin Fair Employment 
Act (WFEA)6prohibit employers from using discriminatory factors 
such as race, color, religion, sex, or national origin as the 
basis for discharging an employee.  Other statutes make it 
unlawful 
for 
employers 
to 
terminate 
workers 
because 
of 
participation 
in union 
activities, 
jury service, military 
service, or testifying at an occupational, safety, and health 
proceeding.  Id. 
 
¶35 Although modifications to the doctrine most often are 
the product of legislative enactments, occasionally courts also 
adopt exceptions to the rule of employment-at-will.7  In 1983, 
the Brockmeyer court observed that statutory modifications do 
not always protect wrongfully discharged employees.  Id. at 568. 
                     
5 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2 (1976). 
6 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 111.31-111.395.  
7 See Michael D. Moberly & Carolann E. Doran, The Nose of 
the Camel:  Extending the Public Policy Exception Beyond the 
Wrongful Discharge Context, 13 Lab. Law. 371, 371-74 (1997).  
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
17
 Some employees, for instance, lack the safeguards of collective 
bargaining agreements and civil service regulations.  Id.  We 
therefore formulated a narrow exception to the employment-at-
will doctrine, recognizing that certain terminations are unjust. 
 Hausman v. St. Croix Care Ctr., 214 Wis. 2d 655, 663, 571 
N.W.2d 393 (1997). 
¶36 The Brockmeyer court recognized a narrow public policy 
exception that allows a cause of action "for wrongful discharge 
when the discharge is contrary to a fundamental and well defined 
public policy as evidenced by existing law."  Brockmeyer, 113 
Wis. 2d at 572-73.8  This exception properly balances the need to 
protect employees from terminations that contradict public 
policy with the employer's historical discretion to discharge 
employees under the freedom to contract embodied in the at-will 
doctrine.  Bushko v. Miller Brewing Co., 134 Wis. 2d 136, 148, 
396 N.W.2d 167 (1986) (Abrahamson, J., concurring).  Our 
acceptance of this public policy exception mirrored the approach 
taken by sister courts in other states.9 
 
¶37 Plaintiffs seeking relief under this narrow exception 
must: (1) first identify a fundamental and well defined public 
                     
8 In Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 575-
76, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983), we also concluded that causes of 
action arising from wrongful discharges sound in contract, not 
tort:  "The contract action is essentially predicated on the 
breach of an implied provision that an employer will not 
discharge an employee for refusing to perform an act that 
violates a clear mandate of public policy." 
9 See Wandry, 129 Wis. 2d at 40 n.2. 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
18
policy in their complaint sufficient to trigger the exception to 
the employment-at-will doctrine; and (2) then demonstrate that 
the discharge violated that fundamental and well defined public 
policy.10  Winkelman v. Beloit Mem'l Hosp., 168 Wis. 2d 12, 24, 
                     
10 The Brockmeyer decision articulated four guidelines that 
gauge whether a discharge violates public policy: 
1. An employer is liable for wrongful discharge if it 
discharges an employee for refusing to violate a 
constitutional or statutory provision.  Employers 
will be held liable for those terminations that 
effectuate an unlawful end. 
 
2. The discharge must clearly contravene the public 
welfare and gravely violate paramount requirements 
of public interest. 
 
3. An employer is liable for wrongful discharge if the 
employer discharges an employee for conduct that is 
"consistent with a clear and compelling public 
policy." 
 
4. An employer is not liable for wrongful discharge 
merely because the employee's conduct precipitating 
the discharge was praiseworthy or the public 
derived some benefit from it. 
 
Wandry, 129 Wis. 2d at 42-43 (citing Brockmeyer, 113 
Wis. 2d at 573-74). 
Over time, the first of the Brockmeyer guidelines emerged 
as the key factor in the termination analysis.  Current case law 
requires discharged employees to show that the termination 
resulted from a refusal to violate public policy as established 
by existing law.  Tatge v. Chambers & Owen, Inc., 219 Wis. 2d 
99, 113-14, 579 N.W.2d 217 (1998); Hausman, 214 Wis. 2d at 664-
65; Kempfer v. Automated Finishing, Inc., 211 Wis. 2d 100, 109, 
564 N.W.2d 692 (1997); Bushko v. Miller Brewing Co., 134 Wis. 2d 
136, 142, 396 N.W.2d 167 (1986); but see Schultz v. Production 
Stamping Corp., 148 Wis. 2d 17, 28, 434 N.W.2d 780 (1989) 
(Abrahamson, J., concurring); Bushko, 134 Wis. 2d at 147-151 
(Abrahamson, J., concurring). 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
19
483 N.W.2d 211 (1992); Wandry v. Bull's Eye Credit Union, 129 
Wis. 2d 37, 41-42, 384 N.W.2d 325 (1986).  Once the plaintiff 
satisfies these first two steps, the burden shifts to the 
employer to show that the discharge actually was sparked by just 
cause.  Winkelman, 168 Wis. 2d at 24. 
 
¶38 In the years since deciding Brockmeyer, this court has 
emphasized that the public policy factors that give rise to an 
actionable claim under the exception remain very narrow.  See 
Tatge, 219 Wis. 2d at 115 (collecting cases).  Public policy 
considerations invariably are vague and beg judicial caution.  
Wandry, 129 Wis. 2d at 42 (citing Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 
                                                                  
Because our decision today does not require us to determine 
whether Strozinsky's discharge violated fundamental and well 
defined public policy, we do not add to this standing analysis 
except to note that courts generally find wrongful discharge 
when an employer terminates an employee for refusing to commit 
an illegal act.  See Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 570 n.10 
(collecting cases); see also Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 
1280, 1281-82 (Utah 1992) (employee terminated for refusing to 
falsify tax and customs documents); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. 
Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380 (Ark. 1988) (collecting cases); Smith v. 
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 196 Cal. App. 3d 503 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1987) (employee refused to continue to participate in 
illegal handling and pricing at liquor store); Bowman v. State 
Bank of Keysville, 331 S.E.2d 797 (Va. 1985) (employee refused 
to violate securities and corporation laws); Tameny v. Atlantic 
Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1337 (Cal. 1980) (employee refused 
to participate in illegal price fixing; court held that "an 
employer's authority over its employees does not include the 
right to demand that the employee commit a criminal act to 
further its interests"); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in 
Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978) (employee refused to 
violate federal and state consumer protection laws); Eric W. 
Schulze, Constructive Discharge of School Employees, 118 Ed. Law 
Rep. 805 (1997); Thomas L. Cluff, Jr., Comment, In Defense of a 
Narrow Public Policy Exception of the Employment at Will Rule, 
16 Miss. C. L. Rev. 437, 449-50 (1996). 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
20
573).  We therefore have been careful to require "discharged 
employees [to] allege a clear expression of public policy."  Id. 
(quoting Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 574). 
¶39 The clear public policy at issue must be "evidenced by 
existing law."  Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 572-73.  Under 
Brockmeyer, we originally limited the applicable "existing law" 
to constitutional or statutory provisions.  Id. at 576.  
Subsequently, 
we 
observed 
that 
some, 
although 
not 
all, 
administrative rules evidence a fundamental and well defined 
public policy.  Winkelman, 168 Wis. 2d at 24.  Despite our 
extension of the public policy exception to some administrative 
rules, we warned that not every statutory, constitutional, or 
administrative provision invariably sets forth a clear mandate 
of public policy.  Kempfer, 211 Wis. 2d at 112.  We therefore do 
not restrict public policy determinations "to the literal 
language" of the provision or the circumstances it describes.  
Bushko, 134 Wis. 2d at 148 (Abrahamson, J., concurring) (citing 
Wandry, 129 Wis. 2d at 42).  Instead, we look to the content of 
the particular provision to determine whether it implicates a 
fundamental and well defined public policy.  Winkelman, 168 
Wis. 2d at 24.  Under this approach, we examine whether the 
employer invoked the power to discharge to contravene the 
"spirit as well as the letter" of a constitutional, statutory, 
or administrative provision.  Id. at 21 (citing Wandry, 129 
Wis. 2d at 49); see also Hausman, 214 Wis. 2d at 664; Tatge 219 
Wis. 2d  at 113.   
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
21
¶40 Several cases illustrate how we recognize a provision 
that articulates a clear mandate of public policy.  In Hausman, 
214 Wis. 2d at 667-68, this court discerned a well defined 
public policy of protecting nursing home residents and applied 
the public policy exception to at-will employees who are 
discharged after they report abuse or neglect.11  We modified the 
Brockmeyer exception only after concluding that Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.295(3) imposes an affirmative, legal obligation to report 
abuse or neglect.  Id. at 667.  The statute also subjects those 
who do not comply with this obligation to criminal penalties.  
Id.  We recognized that strict adherence to employment-at-will 
would produce an unjustly harsh result.  Without the public 
policy exception, employees would carry "the onerous burden of 
choosing between equally destructive alternatives: report and be 
terminated, or fail to report and be prosecuted."  Id. at 669.   
¶41 Similarly, in Kempfer, 211 Wis. 2d at 106, this court 
found that a truck driver who refused his employer's command to 
operate his vehicle without a valid drivers' license alleged a 
fundamental and well defined public policy.  The statutory 
provision that sets forth the requirements for operating a 
commercial vehicle, Wis. Stat. § 343.05(2)(a), obligates drivers 
to hold a valid license.  Id. at 113 n.2.  Moreover, Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.245 exposes both the driver and the employer to fines or 
incarceration 
for 
failing 
to 
comply 
with 
the 
licensing 
                     
11 In Hausman, 214 Wis. 2d at 667, this court explicitly 
declined to adopt a more sweeping "whistle-blower exception."  
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
22
requirements.  Id. at 113-14.  These statutes, we reasoned, 
reflect the fundamental and well defined public policy of 
promoting highway safety.  Id. at 114.  Not unlike the Hausman 
case, the Kempfer decision implicitly showed that the truck 
driver confronted 
the 
equally destructive 
alternatives of 
termination or statutory penalties. 
¶42 In 
Winkelman, 
168 
Wis. 2d 
12, 
we 
held 
that 
a 
discharged nurse identified a well defined public policy, namely 
protecting patients from negligent nurses, in an administrative 
rule that prohibits nurses from performing services for which 
they are not qualified.  The Winkelman plaintiff resigned after 
she declined to obey the employer hospital's instruction that 
she "float" from her regular duties on the maternity ward to a 
department for which she lacked training.  Id. at 16-18.  This 
court observed that Wis. Admin. Code § N 7.03(1) establishes a 
policy that only qualified nurses should render services.  Id. 
at 23-25.  Moreover, the provision made it negligent for a nurse 
to "[e]xecut[e] an order which the registrant or licensee knew 
or should have known would harm or present the likelihood of 
harm to a patient."  Id. at 18 n.2.  In effect, Winkelman also 
illustrated how the employee faced the dilemma of choosing 
between termination for refusing to "float" or facing civil 
liability in a negligence claim. 
¶43 The 
Wandry 
decision, 
129 
Wis. 2d 
at 
46-47, 
demonstrated that a discharge can violate the spirit, if not the 
exact letter, of a statutory provision.  See also Bushko, 134 
Wis. 2d at 144.  A credit union terminated the Wandry employee 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
23
after she refused to reimburse the employer for the losses 
resulting from a forged check.  Wandry, 129 Wis. 2d at 39.  As 
part of her wrongful discharge claim, the employee identified 
Wis. Stat. § 103.455 (1983-84) as a well defined public policy.12 
 Id. at 43.  Although this court noted that the statute "does 
not specifically prohibit an employer from seeking reimbursement 
from an employee for a work-related loss," id. at 44, we 
reasoned that the provision implicitly aims to prevent employers 
from invoking their coercive economic powers "to shift the 
burden of a work related loss from the employer to the employee" 
when the loss occurs through no fault of the employee.  Id. at 
45-46.  Even though the statute did not threaten the discharged 
employee with any criminal or civil penalties, we nonetheless 
concluded that a provision designed to "proscrib[e] economic 
coercion" evidences a fundamental and well defined public policy 
within the meaning of the Brockmeyer exception.  Id. at 47. 
¶44 Other cases reveal which terminations do not implicate 
a fundamental and well defined public policy.  The termination 
of an employee for failure to sign a nondisclosure and 
noncompete agreement does not give rise to a cause of action for 
wrongful discharge under the public policy exception.  Tatge, 
219 Wis. 2d at 115-16.  In Tatge, we reasoned that the statutory 
provision that addresses noncompete agreements, Wis. Stat. 
                     
12 Section "103.445 prohibits an employer from deducting 
certain work-related losses from an employee's wages without 
following certain procedures to establish the responsibility for 
the loss."  Wandry, 129 Wis. 2d at 44. 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
24
§ 103.465 (1991-92), safeguards employees "from compliance with 
the terms of an 'unreasonable' restrictive covenant."  Id. at 
116.  The statute cannot convey a clear mandate of public policy 
because the "reasonableness" of particular agreements varies 
from case to case.  Id. at 116-17. 
¶45 In Schultz v. Production Stamping Corp., 148 Wis. 2d 
17, 23, 434 N.W.2d 780 (1989), we held that no fundamental and 
well defined public policy obligates employers to disclose the 
details of a simplified employment pension plan before requiring 
at-will employees to join the plan as a condition of employment. 
 We 
reasoned 
that 
neither 
federal 
nor 
state 
provisions 
explicitly 
or 
implicitly 
require 
employers 
to 
make 
such 
disclosures.  Id. at 25-26.  On the contrary, a federal statute 
indicated that employers need not provide the information until 
after an employee's participation in the pension plan began.  
Id. at 24. 
¶46 In Bushko, 134 Wis. 2d at 138-39, an at-will employee 
alleged that he was terminated because he behaved in a manner 
that promoted the public interest, namely, complaining about 
plant safety, hazardous waste disposal procedures, and record 
falsification.  The Bushko court held that conduct merely 
consistent with public policy provides no basis for a wrongful 
discharge cause of action.  Id. at 142.  Rather, to sustain a 
claim under the exception, the plaintiff must show that the 
employer required him or her to violate a constitutional or 
statutory provision.  Id. at 142-43.   
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
25
¶47 To sum up, then, the case law of this state recognizes 
that constitutional, statutory, and administrative provisions 
can articulate a fundamental and well defined public policy.  
Statutes rarely state the public policy underlying them in 
express terms.  Wandry, 129 Wis. 2d at 42.  Expressions of 
public policy can be implicit, and this court looks at the 
content of the provision to determine whether the spirit, if not 
the letter, speaks to a clear mandate of public interest.  
Hausman, 214 Wis. 2d at 664; Bushko, 134 Wis. 2d at 143-44.   
¶48 In this case our inquiry therefore focuses on whether 
Strozinsky has identified a fundamental and well defined public 
policy in the spirit or the letter of constitutional, statutory, 
or administrative provisions sufficient to trigger the exception 
to the employment-at-will doctrine.  Consistent with our 
precedent, this court interprets public policies narrowly.  We 
do not deviate from the general tenets of the employment-at-will 
doctrine, and we do not apply public policy to diminish employer 
discretion in terminating at-will employees. 
¶49 In her complaint, Strozinsky identified Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.39 as the source of the well defined public policy, and 
she referred to her refusal to falsify payroll documentation and 
defraud "taxing authorities" as the reasons why the District 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
26
forced her to terminate her employment.13  This court construes 
the complaint liberally.  Wandry, 129 Wis. 2d at 47. 
¶50 Wisconsin Stat. § 943.39 provides: 
 
Fraudulent writings.  Whoever, with intent to injure 
or defraud, does any of the following is guilty of a 
Class D felony: 
 
(1) Being a director, officer, manager, agent or 
employee of any corporation or limited liability 
company 
falsifies 
any 
record, 
account 
or 
other 
document belonging to that corporation or limited 
liability 
company 
by 
alteration, 
false 
entry or 
omission, 
or 
makes, 
circulates or 
publishes any 
written statement regarding the corporation or limited 
liability company which he or she knows is false. 
The District argues that this statute has no force or effect 
"upon a mere clerical employee" and is "merely punitive in 
nature."  Petitioner's Brief at 24, 27.  We disagree.  Section 
943.39(1) prohibits the employees of corporations and limited 
liability companies from falsifying records, accounts, and 
documents.  The statute is part of the Criminal Code, and it 
exposes violators to a criminal penalty.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 939.50(3)(d) explains that a Class D felony is punishable by a 
                     
13 Strozinsky alleged in her complaint that Moe and Amundson 
ordered her to falsify Moe's "payroll documentation in an 
attempt to defraud the taxing authorities in violation of sec. 
943.39, stats."  Furthermore, she contended that she "was forced 
to terminate her employment . . . as a direct result of her 
refusal to violate the public policies established by sec. 
943.39, stats., her refusal to falsify payroll documentation, 
and her refusal to defraud the taxing authorities."  The 
complaint stated that the District wrongfully discharged her "in 
violation of the fundamental and well-defined mandates of public 
policy found at sec. 943.39, stats., which prohibit fraud 
through enforcement of criminal sanctions."  
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
27
fine not to exceed $10,000, or imprisonment not to exceed five 
years, or both. 
 
¶51 The public policy of proscribing false reporting in 
business dealings is fundamental and well defined.  Section 
943.39(1), both in letter and in spirit, deters fraud by threat 
of punishment.  The statute expressly assigns a criminal penalty 
for falsifying records.  The Criminal Code itself manifestly 
serves the public interest by seeking to eradicate criminal 
activity.  Under this first step of the analysis, a showing that 
Strozinsky herself "intend[ed] to injure or defraud," contrary 
to Wis. Stat. § 943.39(1), is not necessary to identify a 
fundamental and well defined public policy.  It is enough to 
demonstrate that the statutory provision evidences a fundamental 
and well defined public policy.   
 
¶52 Strozinsky also identified her refusal to falsify 
records to federal tax authorities in her complaint.  In her 
brief, affidavits, and submissions of evidence in opposition to 
the District's motion for summary judgment, Strozinsky explained 
that Moe and Amundson's instructions exposed her to penalties 
under the Internal Revenue Code, namely 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101, 3102, 
and 6672(a) (1994).  
¶53 Whether the public policy articulated in federal 
statutes applies to this state's narrow public policy exception 
to the employment-at-will doctrine is a question of first 
impression.  State courts in other jurisdictions identify 
fundamental and well defined public policies in various federal 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
28
laws.14  Those courts recognize that federal laws often speak to 
the "honest administration of public affairs."  Peterson v. 
Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1283 (Utah 1992) (quotation omitted) 
(public policy exception applied to employee who refused to 
violate state tax law and federal customs regulations); see also 
Russ v. Pension Consultants Co., 538 N.E.2d 693 (Ill. App. 1989) 
(public policy favoring obedience to federal law extended to 
employee who refused to falsify federal tax records). 
¶54 Substantial public policy interests can reside in 
certain federal statutory provisions.  Compliance with tax 
regulations is fundamental to the operation of local, state, and 
federal government.  Statutes governing taxation are national in 
scope and "strike at the heart of a citizen's social rights, 
duties and responsibilities."  Russ, 538 N.E.2d at 697 (quoting 
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878-79 
(Ill. 1981)); see also Chism v. Mid-South Milling Co., 762 
S.W.2d 552, 556 (Tenn. 1988).  Like other states, Wisconsin has 
an interest in compliance with federal tax laws.  Falsification 
of federal tax records can result in underpayment of state taxes 
                     
14 Peterson, 832 P.2d 1280 (employee refused to falsify 
federal tax and customs documents); Martin Marietta Corp. v. 
Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992) (public policy exception 
extended to employee who refused to violate federal statute that 
applied criminal sanctions for falsification of reports to 
federal agencies); Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 
733 (Tex. 1985) (employee refused to violate federal water 
pollution laws); Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 
1330 (federal price fixing laws); Harless, 246 S.E.2d 270 (state 
and federal consumer protection laws). 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
29
because the Internal Revenue Code serves as the starting point 
for computing state income tax for both corporations and 
individuals.  Wis. Stat. §§ 71.26(2) and 71.01(13); Russ, 538 
N.E.2d at 697 (citations omitted).  Moreover, "[t]he effect on 
the employee of having to choose between keeping his [or her] 
job or following the law . . . is the same regardless of the 
origin of the law."  Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1283. 
 
¶55 Section 3101 of the Internal Revenue Code establishes 
the rate of tax individuals must pay, based on the percentage of 
wages.  Section 3102(a) provides that, "The tax imposed by 
section 3101 shall be collected by the employer of the taxpayer, 
by deducting the amount of the tax from the wages as and when 
paid."  Section 3102(b) imposes liability for failure to 
withhold payroll taxes: 
 
Indemnification of employer.Every employer required 
so to deduct the [social security] tax shall be liable 
for the payment of such tax, and shall be indemnified 
against the claims and demands of any person for the 
amount of any such payment made by such employer. 
The enforcement provisions of 26 U.S.C. § 6672(a) hold others 
liable for failure to withhold as well: 
 
General 
rule.Any 
person 
required 
to 
collect, 
truthfully account for, and pay over any tax imposed 
by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, 
or truthfully account for and pay over such tax, or 
willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat 
any such tax or the payment thereof, shall, in 
addition to other penalties provided by law, be liable 
to a penalty equal to the total amount of tax evaded, 
or not collected, or not accounted for and paid over. 
 No penalty shall be imposed under section 6653 or 
part II or subchapter A or chapter 68 for any offense 
to which this section is applicable. 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
30
This statute exposes the person responsible, as well as the 
employer, to its penalties.  The District contends that 
§ 6672(a) did not subject Strozinsky to sanctions because she 
was not a "responsible person" subject to personal liability 
under the statute:  "Strozinsky merely typed the check.  She did 
not sign it; she had no authority to set or change the amount of 
wages paid to any employee."  Petitioner's Brief at 27-28. 
¶56 Federal law treats the person with effective power to 
pay the tax as the "responsible person."  Howard v. United 
States, 711 F.2d 729, 734 (5th Cir. 1983).  Courts read the term 
"responsible person" expansively.  O'Callaghan v. United States, 
943 F. Supp. 320, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citations omitted).  An 
"employee with the power and authority . . . to direct the 
payment of the taxes is a responsible person within the meaning 
of section 6672."  Feist v. United States, 607 F.2d 954, 960 
(Ct. Cl. 1979).   
¶57 In the responsible person analysis, the answer often 
pivots on whether the person had power to make tax payments in 
light of the enterprise's financial organization and decision-
making structure.  O'Connor v. United States, 956 F.2d 48, 51 
(4th Cir. 1992).  This is a fact-intensive inquiry; in some 
instances, employees who perform the clerical functions of 
collecting and paying taxes are not responsible persons.  Feist, 
607 F.2d at 957, 960.  Nonetheless, responsibility does not turn 
on one's role as an officer or employer but rather on "knowledge 
of the tax delinquency and authority over the decision to pay or 
not to pay the taxes which is at issue."  Mueller v. Nixon, 470 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
31
F.2d 1348, 1350 (6th Cir. 1972).  Thus, one can be a responsible 
person if he or she is in a position within the business to 
prevent the default from occurring.  United States v. Kim, 111 
F.3d 1351, 1362 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting Bowlen v. United 
States, 956 F.2d 723, 728 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
¶58 Furthermore, 
an 
individual 
who 
is 
otherwise 
a 
responsible person will not avoid liability if he or she only 
follows a supervisor's instructions.  Howard, 711 F.2d at 733-
34.  An employee will be liable for the tax even if his or her 
superior 
demands 
noncompliance 
with 
the 
tax 
laws 
as 
a 
contingency for not being terminated.  Id.   
¶59 Wisconsin, like the federal courts, reads the term 
"responsible person" broadly.  The person need not be an officer 
or other key employee because this state's penalty provision, 
Wis. Stat. § 71.83(1)(b)2, refers expansively to officers, 
employees, and "other responsible person[s]."  Although the 
legislature has not defined "other responsible person," the Tax 
Appeals Commission gauges responsibility by examining whether 
the person had the actual or de facto authority to withhold, 
account for, or pay the taxes, the duty to pay the taxes, and 
whether the person intentionally breached that duty.  Noard v. 
DOR, Wis. Tax. Rptr. (CCH) P. 400-401 (W.T.A.C. Dec. 18, 1998). 
 Thus, an office manager who filed tax returns and made some 
payments could be held personally liable because she was fully 
apprised of the company's tax problems.  Green v. DOR, Wis. Tax 
Rptr. (CCH) P. 400-378 (W.T.A.C. July 3, 1998). 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
32
¶60 In this case, Strozinsky was more than a mere clerical 
employee.  She was responsible for preparing the District's 
payroll at its central office.  Among her other duties, she 
computed and made the federal and state tax withholdings for all 
payroll checks issued to the District's employees.  Strozinsky 
submitted payments to the IRS; she was in a position to prevent 
any default from occurring.  She had knowledge of the tax 
delinquency and the authority to pay or not pay the withholding 
tax.  At her deposition, Strozinsky testified that she knew the 
withholding tax was due from Moe's bonus check, and the IRS 
advised her that she should pay the tax.   
¶61 Based on the advice from the IRS and her membership in 
the American 
Payroll Association, 
Strozinsky 
believed she 
personally could be held liable for any taxes that she did not 
withhold properly from Moe's check.  Although Superintendent Moe 
told Strozinsky she was just a payroll clerk without power or 
authority, he stated that it was her responsibility to handle 
the taxes and provide advice.  Strozinsky's expert witness 
recognized 
that accountants 
and bookkeepers, 
persons 
with 
authority to withhold and remit taxes, can be penalized as 
responsible persons if they fail to withhold payroll tax.  The 
expert, citing Howard, 711 F.2d 729, suggested that it is 
difficult 
to 
persuade 
the 
IRS 
that 
a 
person 
was 
not 
"responsible," even if he or she were functioning under the 
direction and control of a supervisor.  
¶62 The District maintains that 26 U.S.C. §§ 3102(b) and 
6672(a) merely establish rules and do not evince a broader 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
33
policy for the public good.  The District argues that Strozinsky 
identifies no fundamental and well defined public policy 
because, unlike the nursing home employee in Hausman, 214 
Wis. 2d at 667-68, she was under no statutory, affirmative duty 
to report the alleged violations committed by Moe and Amundson. 
 The District misreads Hausman.  Our decision in Hausman 
recognized a narrow public policy exception for the statute 
requiring the reporting of nursing home abuse and neglect.  
Hausman does not require parties to identify an affirmative duty 
within a public policy; on the contrary, Hausman expressly 
rejected a generalized "whistle-blower" exception.  214 Wis. 2d 
at 667.  As Brockmeyer and its progeny illustrate, fundamental 
and well defined public policies can reside in constitutional, 
statutory, 
and 
administrative 
provisions 
that 
express 
no 
affirmative duties. 
¶63 Applying a narrow exception to the employment-at-will 
doctrine, we hold that Strozinsky has identified a fundamental 
and well defined public policy.  The spirit and the letter of 
the tax laws are designed to ensure that parties file accurate 
tax information.   
¶64 To date, this court has not departed from a narrow 
interpretation of the public policy exception to the employment-
at-will doctrine, and we do not deviate from this accepted 
approach today.  This conclusion opens no Pandora's Box for 
employment litigation.  We do not believe that the legislature 
intended 
the 
employment-at-will 
doctrine 
to 
cloak 
the 
fundamental and well defined public policies evinced in criminal 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
34
statutes or in the federal income tax laws.  Moreover, we cannot 
presume that the legislature intended to condone the Hobson's 
choice of choosing between being fired or being exposed to 
criminal sanctions.  In holding that Strozinsky's complaint 
adequately identified a fundamental and well defined public 
policy, this court preserves both the letter and the spirit of 
the statute and the federal tax code.  We thereby maintain the 
legislative goal of balancing the public interest and the 
private interests of employers and employees.15 
CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE 
 
¶65 Having 
concluded 
that 
Strozinsky 
identified 
a 
fundamental and well defined public policy exception to the 
employment-at-will 
doctrine, 
we 
next 
consider 
whether 
Strozinsky's claim can proceed under the second step of the 
public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.  
Usually, this second step requires a plaintiff to demonstrate 
that the termination violated a fundamental public policy.  This 
presents a question of fact for the jury.  Kempfer, 211 Wis. 2d 
at 114.  That question, however, is not before the court.  
Rather, this case presents a threshold issue.  The public policy 
exception 
to 
the 
employment-at-will 
doctrine 
requires 
a 
"discharge."  Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 573.  Therefore, we 
must decide whether a cause arising from a resignation can be 
                     
15 See 
Cluff, 
In Defense 
of 
a 
Narrow 
Public 
Policy 
Exception, at 449-50. 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
35
actionable as a wrongful discharge within the context of that 
narrow exception.   
¶66 The District contends that a constructive discharge 
claim is not actionable because Strozinsky resigned voluntarily. 
 Although 
Strozinsky 
conceded 
to 
the 
circuit 
court 
that 
constructive discharge does not constitute a distinct cause of 
action, she now asks this court to apply the constructive 
discharge doctrine to the element of "discharge" in a claim 
arising under the narrow public policy exception to the 
employment-at-will rule. 
¶67 This second issue requires us to review the decision 
of the circuit court to dismiss the constructive discharge 
claim.  This court reviews the dismissal of claims de novo.  
Hausman, 214 Wis. 2d at 662.  We construe the complaint 
liberally and accept the facts presented as true.  Id.  Under 
this methodology, this court will uphold the dismissal of a 
claim "only if it is 'quite clear that under no conditions can 
the plaintiff recover.'"  Id. at 663 (quotation omitted).  
Whether a claim is actionable also is a question of law that we 
review de novo.  Tatge, 219 Wis. 2d at 105.  Because this is an 
issue of first impression,16 we turn to the persuasive authority 
from other jurisdictions in the course of this analysis. 
                     
16 In Winkelman v. Beloit Memorial Hospital, 168 Wis. 2d 12, 
18, 27, 483 N.W.2d 211 (1992), the employer hospital contended 
no discharge occurred because the nurse resigned.  The jury 
found that the nurse's termination was not voluntary.  The 
hospital did not challenge the jury's finding on appeal, and we 
therefore did not address it in our review of the case. 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
36
 
¶68 The doctrine of constructive discharge recognizes that 
some resignations are coerced, tantamount to a termination.17  
Usually, employers do not "discharge" employees who resign:  An 
employee can leave an at-will position at any timefor any 
reason or no reason at alljust as an employer can terminate an 
at-will employee at its discretion.  An employee who departs 
from the workplace generally cannot pursue a claim against the 
employer for wrongful discharge.  Nonetheless, many courts 
reason that employers should not escape liability simply because 
the employer forced a resignation:18 
 
Actual 
discharge 
carries 
significant 
legal 
consequences 
for 
employers, 
including 
possible 
liability for wrongful discharge.  In an attempt to 
avoid liability, an employer may refrain from actually 
firing an employee, preferring instead to engage in 
conduct causing him or her to quit.  The doctrine of 
constructive 
discharge 
addresses 
such 
employer-
attempted "end runs" around wrongful discharge and 
other claims requiring employer-initiated terminations 
of employment. 
Balmer v. Hawkeye Steel, 604 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Iowa 2000) 
(quoting Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022, 1025 
                     
17 Lex 
K. 
Larson, 
Unjust 
Dismissal, 
§ 6.06[2] 
(1999) 
(quoting Smith v. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 241 Cal. Rptr. 
916, 920 (1987)); William J. Holloway & Michael J. Leech, 
Employment Termination Rights and Remedies 142 (1993).  See 
generally Schulze, Constructive Discharge of School Employees, 
118 Ed. Law Rep. 805. 
18 Larson, Unjust Dismissal, § 6.06[2].  Stated otherwise, 
"[t]his approach invites employers to engage in subterfuge as a 
means of evading the law prohibiting retaliatory discharge."  
William J. Holloway & Michael J. Leech, Employment Termination 
Rights and Remedies at 142. 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
37
(Cal. 1994), criticized on other grounds, Romano v. Rockwell 
Int'l, Inc., 926 P.2d 1114 (Cal. 1996)).  Constructive discharge 
exposes "what is ostensibly a resignation [as] a discharge."  
Turner, 876 P.2d at 1030.  The doctrine operates "to discard 
form for substance, to reject sham for reality" and recognizes 
that certain resignations are, in fact, actual firings.  Beye v. 
Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, 477 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1984); see generally Marten Transport Ltd. v. DIHLR, 176 Wis. 2d 
1012, 1021-1025 (1993). 
 
¶69 We agree with the decision of the circuit court that 
constructive discharge is not a generic, free-flowing cause of 
action. 
 
Other 
jurisdictions 
recognize 
that 
constructive 
discharge is not actionable by itself.  Turner, 876 P.2d at 
1030.  Rather, the doctrine is ancillary to an underlying claim 
in which an express discharge otherwise would be actionable.19  
Balmer, 604 N.W.2d at 643; Slack v. Kanawha County Hous. & 
Redev. Auth., 423 S.E.2d 547, 555 (W. Va. 1992).  Constructive 
discharge joins the actionable claim and operates as a defense 
against 
an 
employer's 
contention 
that 
the 
employee 
quit 
voluntarily.20  An employee who relies on a constructive 
                     
19 In Tennyson v. School Dist. of Menomonie Area, 232 
Wis. 2d 267, 606 N.W.2d 594 (Ct. App. 1999), for instance, the 
court of appeals analyzed constructive discharge in the context 
of a breach of contract claim.  
20 Balmer v. Hawkeye Steel, 604 N.W.2d 639, 643 (Ia. 2000); 
Jacobson v. Parda Fed. Credit Union, 577 N.W.2d 881, 882 (Mich. 
1998); Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 223, 
231, 876 P.2d 1022, 1030 (Cal. 1994); Vagts v. Perry Drug 
Stores, Inc., 516 N.W.2d 102, 104 (Mich. App. 1994); Seery v. 
Yale-New Haven Hosp., 554 A.2d 757, 761 (Conn. 1989). 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
38
discharge defense in a public policy exception case still must 
identify a fundamental and well defined public policy and then 
prove that the discharge, whether constructive or express, 
violated that policy.  See Seery v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., 554 
A.2d 757, 761 (Conn. 1989).  We therefore must determine whether 
the doctrine of constructive discharge can attach to a common-
law claim based on the narrow public policy exception to the 
general rule of employment-at-will. 
 
¶70 The concept of constructive discharge first arose in 
federal statutory claims brought under the National Labor 
Relations Act.  See Balmer, 604 N.W.2d at 641-42; Turner, 876 
P.2d at 1026.  In Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984), 
the United States Supreme Court addressed the discrimination 
some 
employers 
exerted 
against 
workers 
engaged 
in 
labor 
organizations. 
 
The 
Court 
observed 
that 
an 
employer 
discriminates "not only when . . . it directly dismisses an 
employee, 
but 
also 
when 
it 
purposefully 
creates 
working 
conditions so intolerable that the employee has no option but to 
resigna so-called 'constructive discharge.'"  Id. at 894. 
Federal courts allowed the constructive discharge defense in 
discrimination actions launched under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967, and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.  See 
Marten, 176 Wis. 2d at 1021 (citing Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 
881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989), rev'd in part on other grounds, 
Saxton v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
39
1993)); Turner, 876 P.2d at 1026; Miranda v. Wisconsin Power & 
Light Co., 91 F.3d 1011 (7th Cir. 1996). 
¶71 Outside the context of statutory claims, many courts 
now permit the constructive discharge defense in causes of 
action based on the public policy exception to the at-will 
employment doctrine and in other common-law claims.21  Stated 
otherwise, these jurisdictions recognize that the concept of 
"constructive wrongful discharges" can arise in these claims.  
See e.g., Turner, 876 P.2d at 1030-31. 
                     
21 Balmer, 604 N.W.2d at 642  (citing Reihmann v. Foerstner, 
375 N.W.2d 677, 683-84 (Iowa 1995)); Collier v. Insignia Fin. 
Group, 981 P.2d 321, 323 (Ok. 1999) (citing Burk v. K-Mart 
Corp., 770 P.2d 24 (Ok. 1989); GTE Products Corp. v. Stewart, 
653 N.E.2d 161, 168-70 (Mass. 1995); Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, 
Inc., 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 223, 876 P.2d 1022 (Cal. 1994); Dalby v. 
Sisters of Providence in Oregon, 865 P.2d 391, 394-95 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1993); Slack v. Kanawha County Hous. & Redev. Auth., 423 
S.E.2d 547, 558 (W. Va. 1992); Sterling Drug, 743 S.W.2d 380; 
Morris v. Hartford Courant Co., 513 A.2d 66 (Conn. 1986); Beye 
v. Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, 477 A.2d 1197, 1202-03 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1984); Hunter v. Port Auth., 419 A.2d 631 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1980).  But see Bell v. Dynamite Foods, 969 S.W.2d 847, 851-
52 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (declining to address applicability of 
public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine after 
finding no discharge, actual or constructive); Stroud v. VBFSB 
Holding Corp., 917 S.W.2d 75, 80-81 (Tex. App. 1996) (not 
reaching plaintiff's wrongful termination cause of action, 
although based on the public policy exception and alleging 
constructive discharge, because statute of limitations barred 
the claim); Hinthorn v. Roland's of Bloomington, 519 N.E.2d 909 
(Ill. 1988) (expressly declining to rule on the viability of the 
constructive discharge theory because plaintiff alleged that she 
was actually, not constructively, discharged); Grey v. First 
Nat'l Bank, 523 N.E.2d 1138 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (finding no 
actionable constructive discharge in a retaliatory discharge 
tort claimnot a claim under the public policy exception to the 
employment-at-will doctrineand reasoning that the facts did not 
indicate employee was told to resign).  See generally Larson, 
Unjust Dismissal, § 6.06[2].  
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
40
 
¶72 Although this court has not considered constructive 
discharge under the public policy exception to the employment-
at-will doctrine, we have allowed parties to raise constructive 
discharge in termination proceedings brought under our civil 
service statute.  Watkins v. Milwaukee County Civil Serv. 
Comm'n, 88 Wis. 2d 411, 276 N.W.2d 775 (1979); see also 
Patterson v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. System, 119 
Wis. 2d 570, 587, 350 N.W.2d 612 (1984). This court recognized 
over 20 years ago that, "Resignation obtained by coercion poses 
serious possibilities of abuse.  'A separation by reason of a 
coerced resignation is, in substance, a discharge.'"  Watkins, 
88 Wis. 2d at 420 (citations omitted); see also Patterson, 119 
Wis. 2d at 587; Patterson v. Portch, 853 F.2d 1399, 1406 (7th 
Cir. 1988).  Ultimately, whether a resignation was voluntary is 
a question of fact reserved for the fact-finder.  See Watkins, 
88 Wis. 2d at 421. 
¶73 Subsequently, 
this 
court 
acknowledged 
that 
constructive 
discharge 
can 
play 
a 
role 
in 
statutory 
discrimination claims, and we analyzed the doctrine alongside 
the WFEA, Wisconsin's counterpart to Title VII.  Marten, 176 
Wis. 2d at 1021-25.  The rule in Wisconsin is "that an employee 
who voluntarily quits a position must show a constructive 
discharge to recover back pay and reinstatement under the WFEA." 
 Id. at 1025.  This approach implies a narrow application of the 
doctrine and treats constructive discharge exclusively as a 
defense in other claims. 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
41
 
¶74 Although Marten addressed constructive discharge, that 
case did not present the forum in which to address what an 
employee must prove to show constructive discharge.22  Other 
jurisdictions have adopted tests that echo the language of the 
United States Supreme Court in Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 894:  
Federal courts agree that the trier of fact must be satisfied 
that "the employer made the working conditions so intolerable as 
to force a reasonable employee to leave."  Miranda v. Wisconsin 
Power & Light Co., 91 F.3d at 1017; Alicea Rosado v. Garcia 
Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 119 (1st Cir. 1977).  This standard 
requires the employee to show that the employer knew or should 
have known about the intolerable conditions but permitted them 
to persist without remedy.  Turner, 876 P.2d at 1027-28 
(collecting cases).  The requirement of knowledge minimizes the 
potential for uncontrolled litigation by ensuring that an 
employer implements corrective measures before the employee 
launches a lawsuit.  Id. at 1028.  The employee, however, is not 
obligated to prove that the employer intended to force a 
                     
22 In Marten Transport Ltd. v. DILHR, 176 Wis. 2d 1012, 501 
N.W.2d 391, 394 n.5 (1993), we declined to "define the test for 
determining whether an employer has constructively discharged an 
employee" because we accepted the finding in that case that the 
plaintiff 
quit 
voluntarily 
without 
being 
actually 
or 
constructively discharged.  Recently, the court of appeals 
explored the theory of constructive discharge in the context of 
breach of contract.  See Tennyson, 232 Wis. 2d 267.  The 
Tennyson court applied the test from other jurisdictions, 
finding that the "law of constructive discharge [ ] recognizes 
that an employer may make working conditions so intolerable that 
an employee may reasonably feel compelled to resign."  Id. at 
281. 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
42
resignation.  Id.; see generally Ralph H. Baxter, Jr. & John M. 
Farrell, Constructive DischargeWhen Quitting Means Getting 
Fired, 7 Empl. Rel. L. J. 346, 348-52 (1981). 
¶75 This court already has decided that it is appropriate 
to turn to federal case law when analyzing the theory of 
constructive discharge.  Marten, 176 Wis. 2d at 1020.  Other 
state courts have done the same and uniformly apply the standard 
set 
forth 
in 
federal 
decisions.23 
 
We 
join 
the 
other 
jurisdictions 
and 
decide 
that 
to 
raise 
the 
constructive 
discharge defense, the employee must establish conditions so 
intolerable that he or she felt compelled to resign.  If the 
plaintiff cannot show that conditions so intolerable, the claim 
does not proceed.  Slack, 423 S.E.2d at 556 (citations omitted). 
¶76 We therefore must discern what conditions rise to this 
level of intolerability.  A constructive discharge analysis 
implicates an objective inquiry, recognizing that employees 
cannot be overly sensitive to a working environment.  Brooms, 
881 F.2d at 423 (citing Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 
                     
23 "There appears to be no disagreement [in the cases] that 
one of the essential elements of any constructive discharge 
claim is that the adverse working conditions must be so 
intolerable that any reasonable employee would resign rather 
than endure such conditions."  Turner, 876 P.2d at 1027 (quoting 
Slack, 423 S.E.2d at 556).  See also Balmer, 604 N.W.2d at 642; 
Bell, 969 S.W.2d at 851; GTE Products, 653 N.E.2d at 168-69; 
Sterling Drug, 743 S.W.2d at 385 (following Brockmeyer, 113 
Wis. 2d 561, for its adoption of the public policy exception and 
then recognizing constructive discharge in a claim brought under 
the exception); Seery, 554 A.2d at 761; Beye, 477 A.2d at 1201-
02 
(collecting 
cases); 
see 
Larson, 
Unjust 
Dismissal 
at 
§ 6.06[2]; see also Tennyson, 232 Wis. 2d at 281 (citing Turner, 
876 P.2d at 1025). 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
43
1250, 1256 (8th Cir. 1981)).24  The question hinges on whether a 
reasonable person in the position of the plaintiff would feel 
forced to quit.  Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 868 F.2d 
943, 950 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 497 
U.S. 62 (1990).  Stressful "disappointments, and possibly some 
injustices" are not actionable.  Id.  Similarly, employees will 
not prevail in claims charging only that managers were heavy-
handed, critical, or unpleasant.  Phaup v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. 
Bottlers, 761 F. Supp. 555, 571 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Stetson v. 
NYNEX Serv. Co., 995 F.2d 355, 360 (2d Cir. 1993).  Inferior 
work assignments, transfers to less favorable job duties, and 
substandard performance reviews alone generally do not create 
intolerable conditions.  Id.; Marten, 176 Wis. 2d at 1022 
(citing Alicea Rosado, 562 F.2d 114); Large v. Acme Eng'g & Mfg. 
Corp., 790 P.2d 1086, 1089 (Ok. 1990).  Rather, the situation 
must be unusually aggravating and surpass "[s]ingle, trivial, or 
isolated" incidents of misconduct.  Turner, 876 P.2d at 1027 
(quotation omitted). 
¶77 Criminal 
activity 
sometimes 
leads 
to 
intolerable 
conditions.  The mere presence of illegal conduct at the 
workplace does not render the environment intolerable.  Id. at 
1032.  Intolerable conditions can arise, however, when the 
employer requests or requires an employee to engage in illegal 
                     
24 See also Collier v. Insignia Fin. Group, 981 P.2d 321, 
324 (Ok. 1999); GTE Prods., 653 N.E.2d at 168-70; Turner, 876 
P.2d at 1027; Slack, 423 S.E.2d at 556; Beye, 477 A.2d at 1202 
(collecting cases). 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
44
acts.  Smith v. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 241 Cal. Rptr. 
916 (1987); Turner, 876 P.2d at 1032.  In particular, requests 
that an employee participate in an unlawful enterprise, or 
repeated instances of illegality, may compel a reasonable person 
to resign.  Turner, 876 P.2d at 1032.  For instance, a 
constructive discharge defense is viable if an employee, who 
repeatedly violated federal and state liquor laws at the 
employer's instruction, subsequently refuses to participate 
further in the crimes and resigns.  Smith, 241 Cal. Rptr. 916; 
see also Jacobs v. Universal Development Corp., 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
446, 451 (Ca. Ct. App. 1997).  In this reasonability calculus, 
trial courts turn to the totality of the circumstances, taking 
into account the frequency of the conduct, its severity, and the 
remoteness of the illegal acts from the actual date of 
resignation.  Turner, 876 P.2d at 1032; Collier v. Insignia Fin. 
Group, 981 P.2d 321, 324 (Ok. 1999); GTE Prods. Corp. v. 
Stewart, 653 N.E.2d 161, 168-70 (Mass. 1995).  Thus, a 
resignation tendered five years after the illegality transpired 
is too remote to be actionable.  Turner, 876 P.2d at 1032. 
¶78 Constructive discharge ultimately presents a question 
of fact for the jury.25  Strozinsky's departure may have been a 
termination, not a resignation.  A jury could conclude that a 
reasonable person in the position of Strozinsky would be forced 
                     
25 Miranda v. Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 91 F.3d 1011, 
1017-18 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Watkins v. Milwaukee County 
Civil Serv., 88 Wis. 2d 411, 421, 276 N.W.2d 775 (1979) (noting 
that coerced resignation is a question of fact); Sterling Drug, 
743 S.W.2d at 386. 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
45
to resign because of intolerable conditions.  We therefore find 
that it is not "quite clear that under no conditions can the 
plaintiff recover."  Hausman, 214 Wis. 2d at 663 (quotation 
omitted). 
 
¶79 There are facts indicating Strozinsky may have been 
forced to resign because of intolerable conditions.  Moe and 
Amundson suggested Strozinsky might lose her job.  Moe warned 
that she would be "out of here" and Amundson observed that 
"perhaps [Strozinsky] shouldn't be working here."  Strozinsky 
summed up her reasons for leaving:   
 
I had been excluded and not talked to since I got back 
from my vacation.  I had been told by Mr. Moe that if 
I didn't trust him I shouldn't work for them.  And Mr. 
Amundson was telling me I was working for the wrong 
guy and suggested, perhaps, I work someplace else.  
And I was also threatened by Mr. Moe that I'd be out 
of there the next time I would do anything that would 
upset him.  So, yes, I guess I did agree, and I didn't 
feel I had a choice. 
¶80 Strozinsky 
presented 
testimony 
that 
Moe 
verbally 
abused her after she made the tax withholding from his regular 
paycheck.  She explained that he appeared hostile, threatening, 
and verbally abusive.  She became physically sick after the 
confrontation with Moe.  Following the August 3, 1995, meeting 
with 
Moe 
and 
Amundson, 
Strozinsky's 
work 
responsibilities 
diminished and Amundson and others ceased communicating with 
her.  She contacted the IRS to confirm that the shortcomings in 
Moe's tax withholdings did not comply with federal law.  She had 
learned from the IRS and American Payroll Association that she 
personally 
could 
be 
held 
liable 
for 
breaking 
tax 
laws.  
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
46
Strozinsky did not wait five years before departing; she 
resigned on September 13, 1995, approximately seven weeks after 
the July 20 incident. 
¶81 A jury also could find that the District knew, or 
should have known, about Strozinsky's work conditions and failed 
to implement remedies.  When Strozinsky submitted a written 
complaint to the human resources department, Amundson held it 
back and later stated that he would pretend he never saw it.  
¶82 Taken 
together, 
the 
cumulative 
effect 
of 
these 
circumstances present a factual question about the nature of 
Strozinsky's discharge.  We therefore hold that a jury should 
determine whether Strozinsky's resignation was voluntary or 
whether it constituted a constructive discharge. 
¶83 This holding recognizes that employers cannot escape 
liability by coercing a resignation instead of formally uttering 
the words "you're fired."  Were we to prohibit this cause of 
action because the employer forced a resignation instead of 
expressly discharging the employee, we would elevate form over 
substance and eviscerate the essence of Brockmeyer and its 
progeny.  Nonetheless, we emphasize that a plaintiff's burden to 
prove constructive discharge is stringent.  The plaintiff must 
prevail 
under 
an 
objective 
standard, 
establishing 
that 
conditions 
were 
so 
intolerable 
that 
a 
reasonable 
person 
confronted with same circumstances would have been compelled to 
resign. 
 
The 
level 
of 
intolerability 
must 
be 
unusually 
aggravating and surpass 
isolated 
incidents 
of 
misconduct, 
injustice, or disappointment. 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
47
¶84 We caution that today's rule in no way broadens the 
narrow 
public 
policy 
exception 
to 
the 
employment-at-will 
doctrine.  Our decision does not permit as expansive an 
application of the constructive discharge doctrine as allowed by 
some federal courts for statutory claims.26  This court expressly 
declines 
to sanction a 
generic, 
free-flowing 
constructive 
discharge cause of action.  All we hold is that plaintiffs can 
raise an ancillary constructive discharge defense in those 
causes of action under the public policy exception to the 
employment-at-will 
doctrine 
in 
which 
the employer alleges 
voluntary resignation.  An employee who invokes the constructive 
discharge defense still must identify a fundamental and well 
defined public policy and then must prove that the discharge 
violated that policy. 
 
¶85 We do not, and need not, address the second step of 
the 
analysis 
under 
the 
public 
policy 
exception 
to 
the 
employment-at-will doctrine, namely whether Strozinsky sustained 
her burden to prove that, if there was a discharge, the 
discharge violated fundamental and well defined public policy.  
Like 
the 
threshold 
issue 
that 
asks 
if 
the 
resignation 
                     
26 Downey v Southern Natural Gas Co., 649 F.2d 302 (5th Cir. 
1981) ("[e]ssentially, the test is whether a reasonable person 
in the employee's position would have felt compelled to resign. 
 [The employee] asserts that his superior specifically advised 
him that he might be discharged, with a consequent loss of 
benefits. . . . A reasonable person might well feel compelled to 
resign in the face of such a statement."); see also Slack, 423 
S.E.2d at 558; Christensen v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of 
the U.S., 767 F.2d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 1985). 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
48
constituted a legal termination, resolution of this second step 
requires an answer from a fact-finder, not an appellate court. 
CONCLUSION 
¶86 We conclude that the decision of the circuit court 
should 
be 
reversed 
for 
two 
reasons. 
 
First, 
Strozinsky 
identified a fundamental and well defined public policy in her 
complaint, and therefore the District was not entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law.  Second, dismissal of the 
complaint is inappropriate in this case because the doctrine of 
constructive discharge in certain circumstances can satisfy the 
element of "wrongful discharge" in claims arising under the 
public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.  
¶87 Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed, and the matter is remanded to the circuit court for 
trial for a determination whether Strozinsky's resignation 
constituted a constructive discharge, and if so, whether the 
discharge violated fundamental and well defined public policy. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No. 
98-0454  
 
 
1