Title: Friedline v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Carrico,1 S.J. 
 
PAUL A. FRIEDLINE 
 
v.  Record No. 021621 
OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
February 28, 2003 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 
Herman A. Whisenant, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we address issues involving a circuit 
court's dismissal of a habeas corpus petition alleging 
ineffective assistance of counsel without conducting an 
evidentiary hearing or receiving an affidavit from trial 
counsel. 
 
The petitioner, Paul A. Friedline, was indicted for 
robbery, in violation of Code § 18.2-58; for "carjacking," in 
violation of Code § 18.2-58.1; and for two counts of use of a 
firearm in the commission of a felony, in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-53.1.  He was convicted of these offenses following a 
jury trial. 
 
Friedline appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals, 
which affirmed the circuit court's judgment in an unpublished 
opinion.  Friedline v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0113-99-4 (April 
4, 2000).  This Court refused Friedline's petition for appeal. 
                     
 
1 Chief Justice Carrico presided and participated in the 
hearing and decision of this case prior to the effective date of 
his retirement on January 31, 2003. 
 
Friedline later filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in the circuit court.  He asserted that his trial 
counsel's performance was deficient and caused him substantial 
prejudice.  Friedline contended, among other things, that trial 
counsel failed to conduct an adequate voir dire, did not object 
to evidence of another crime, failed to object to other 
testimony and evidence, and did not correct the prosecutor's 
"false argument" at the sentencing proceeding.  Friedline 
included with his petition two affidavits from local attorneys 
who stated that trial counsel's performance during voir dire 
amounted to "ineffective representation" and was "below the 
standard of competence one finds of the criminal defense bar in 
the Northern Virginia Area." 
 
The Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss Friedline's 
petition.  The motion asserted, among other things, that 
Friedline failed to sustain his burden under Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), of establishing that trial 
counsel's performance was deficient and prejudiced the outcome 
of his trial.  The Commonwealth did not include with its motion 
an affidavit from trial counsel explaining the disputed 
decisions made at trial. 
 
Friedline asked the circuit court to grant his petition or, 
alternatively, to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issues 
raised in his petition.  The circuit court declined to hold an 
 
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evidentiary hearing and, based on the trial record, dismissed 
Friedline's petition "for the reasons stated in the 
[Commonwealth's] motion to dismiss."  Friedline appeals. 
 
We will state verbatim Friedline's assignments of error in 
this appeal: 
 I. It was error for the lower court to deny the 
habeas corpus petitioner relief when the trial 
attorney had not denied his ineffectiveness and 
the uncontradicted record established prejudicial 
ineffective representation. 
 
II. It was error for the lower court to ignore this 
Court's holdings in Mu'Min v. Commonwealth and 
Frye v. Commonwealth by deciding habeas corpus 
claims of ineffective representation without 
having heard from the attorney. 
 
III. It was error for the lower court to presume that 
a trial attorney's numerous failures during trial 
were actually the product of informed tactical 
choices when the attorney has not denied the 
allegations of uninformed, ineffective 
representation. 
 
IV. It was error for the lower court to ignore 
uncontradicted affidavits from experienced local 
practitioners that trial counsel's conduct fell 
below the accepted level of competency and to 
presume, without hearing from trial counsel, that 
his decisions were informed tactical choices. 
 
 V. It was error for the lower court to make an 
unprecedented new rule of law that there is an 
irrebuttable presumption that a trial attorney's 
actions are informed tactical choices. 
 
 
Friedline argues on appeal that the circuit court erred in 
dismissing his habeas corpus petition without conducting an 
evidentiary hearing in the absence of affirmative evidence that 
 
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trial counsel's acts and omissions were the result of informed 
tactical decisions.  He contends that an evidentiary hearing was 
required by our decisions in Mu'Min v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 
433, 389 S.E.2d 886 (1990), aff'd, 500 U.S. 415 (1991), and Frye 
v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 370, 345 S.E.2d 267 (1986).  He also 
asserts that the circuit court erroneously presumed that trial 
counsel's actions were the result of such tactical decisions 
and, thus, imposed an "irrebuttable presumption" that counsel's 
decisions were informed tactical choices.  We disagree with 
Friedline's arguments. 
 
These issues arise in the context of the holdings in 
Strickland v. Washington, which govern the resolution of claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel.  To prevail on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner ordinarily must 
satisfy both parts of the two-part test established in 
Strickland.  466 U.S. at 687; Sheikh v. Buckingham Corr. Ctr., 
264 Va. 558, 564, 570 S.E.2d 785, 788 (2002); Hedrick v. Warden, 
264 Va. 486, 496, 570 S.E.2d 840, 847 (2002).  First, the 
petitioner must show that trial "counsel's representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness."  Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 688.  Second, if trial counsel's performance was 
deficient, the petitioner also must establish that "there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
 
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errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."  
Id. at 694. 
 
A circuit court's decision whether to hold an evidentiary 
hearing in a habeas corpus proceeding depends chiefly on the 
adequacy of the trial record.  Code § 8.01-654(B)(4) addresses 
this issue and provides direction for the court's determination: 
In the event the allegations of illegality of the 
petitioner's detention can be fully determined on the 
basis of recorded matters, the court may make its 
determination whether such writ should issue on the 
basis of the record. 
 
See also Yeatts v. Murray, 249 Va. 285, 289, 455 S.E.2d 18, 21 
(1995); Walker v. Mitchell, 224 Va. 568, 571, 299 S.E.2d 698, 
699 (1983); Superintendent v. Barnes, 221 Va. 780, 785, 273 
S.E.2d 558, 561 (1981). 
 
The language of Code § 8.01-654(B)(4) does not require a 
circuit court to hold an evidentiary hearing in every case in 
which trial counsel has not submitted an affidavit explaining 
his conduct at trial.  When a trial record provides a sufficient 
basis to determine the merits of a habeas corpus petition, a 
circuit court may refuse either party's request for an 
evidentiary hearing.2  Because each trial record is different, 
                     
 
 
2 However, even when a trial record appears sufficient to 
permit a determination of a petition's merits, Code § 8.01-
654(B)(4) does not preclude a court from holding a hearing or 
requiring additional evidence when the court determines that 
 
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such determinations are not subject to fixed rules but must 
proceed on a case-by-case basis. 
 
Our decisions in Mu'Min and Frye do not support the 
contrary result urged by Friedline.  In those cases, we decided 
that certain allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
raised when former Code § 19.2-317.1 permitted such claims to be 
advanced on direct appeal, could not be resolved without 
consideration of counsel's explanations for certain decisions 
made at trial.  See Mu'Min, 239 Va. at 452-53, 389 S.E.2d at 
898; Frye, 231 Va. at 400, 345 S.E.2d at 288.  These holdings 
were limited to the particular records before us and did not 
purport to require a circuit court in a habeas corpus proceeding 
to obtain an explanation from trial counsel before determining 
the merits of a petition.  Moreover, the plain language of Code 
§ 8.01-654(B)(4) would not permit imposition of such a mandatory 
requirement. 
 
Friedline argues in his brief, nevertheless, that the 
circuit court erred in failing to require evidence from trial 
counsel because the trial record was inadequate to support entry 
of judgment in favor of the Commonwealth.  This argument 
substantively challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in 
support of the circuit court's judgment.  Thus, we must first 
                                                                  
additional evidence would assist the court's resolution of the 
case. 
 
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consider the threshold issue whether Friedline's assignments of 
error raise a question of the sufficiency of the evidence for 
our consideration. 
 
In making this determination, we initially observe that 
assignments of error serve several distinct and important 
functions.  Their chief function is to identify those errors 
made by a circuit court with reasonable certainty so that this 
Court and opposing counsel can consider the points on which an 
appellant seeks a reversal of a judgment.  Kirby v. 
Commonwealth, 264 Va. 440, 444-45, 570 S.E.2d 832, 834 (2002); 
Chesapeake Hosp. Auth. v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 551, 557, 554 
S.E.2d 55, 57 (2001); Yeatts, 249 Va. at 290, 455 S.E.2d at 21. 
 
In addition, assignments of error also enable an appellee 
to prepare an effective brief in opposition to the granting of 
an appeal, to determine which portions of the trial record 
should be included in the parties' joint appendix, and to 
determine whether any cross-error should be assigned.  Id.; 
Harlow v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 269, 271-72, 77 S.E.2d 851, 853 
(1953).  Therefore, in presenting an assignment of error to this 
Court, appellant's counsel must "lay his finger on the error" in 
the trial record.  Kirby, 264 Va. at 445, 570 S.E.2d at 834 
(quoting First Nat'l Bank of Richmond v. William R. Trigg Co., 
106 Va. 327, 342, 56 S.E. 158, 163 (1907)). 
 
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In his assignments of error, Friedline has asserted that 
evidence from trial counsel was required because the record 
established "prejudicial ineffective representation."  However, 
Friedline has not pointed in his assignments of error to any 
conduct by trial counsel that would constitute deficient 
performance under Strickland and provide this Court a basis for 
concluding that the circuit court erred in reaching a contrary 
determination.  Thus, we hold that Friedline's assignments of 
error fail to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in 
support of the circuit court's holding that trial counsel's 
performance was not deficient. 
 
Under Strickland, this determination by the circuit court 
is sufficient to support the court's dismissal of Friedline's 
petition because, as stated above, a petitioner can prevail on 
an ineffective assistance claim only upon proving both deficient 
performance of trial counsel and resulting prejudice.  466 U.S. 
at 687.  Therefore, we do not reach the issue whether the record 
supports the court's alternative conclusion that Friedline did 
not suffer any prejudice as a result of his counsel's 
performance.  Sheikh, 264 Va. at 566-67, 570 S.E.2d at 790; Curo 
v. Becker, 254 Va. 486, 493, 493 S.E.2d 368, 371 (1997); see 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
 
Finally, we find no merit in Friedline's argument that the 
circuit court presumed that trial counsel's conduct resulted 
 
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from informed tactical decisions, which erroneously established 
an "irrebuttable presumption" concerning counsel's conduct.  The 
record does not show that the circuit court applied a 
presumption of this nature or that the court's holdings reflect 
such a presumption. 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the circuit court's 
judgment. 
Affirmed.
 
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