Title: State v. Wargo

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Wargo  (97-246); 168 Vt. 231; 719 A.2d 407

[Filed 28-Aug-1998]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                            No. 97-246

State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
    v.                                       District Court of Vermont,
                                             Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

Louis J. Wargo, III                          June Term, 1998

Ronald F. Kilburn, J.

       William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and Susan R. Harritt, Assistant
  Attorney General, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

       Charles S. Martin and Monica Litzelman of Martin & Associates, Barre,
  for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       JOHNSON, J.  Defendant appeals from an order of the Chittenden
  District Court determining that it lacked jurisdiction to consider
  defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court thereafter
  granted defendant's motion for permission to bring this appeal pursuant to
  V.R.A.P. 5.1.  The district court certified the following question for our
  review:  "Where defendant pled guilty to an offense, received a fully
  suspended one-to-five year sentence, and was placed on probation on
  September 13, 1996, does the District Court have jurisdiction to consider
  defendant's January 2, 1997 motion to withdraw his plea, pursuant to
  V.R.Cr.P. 32(d)?"  The certified question is answered in the negative.  We
  conclude that the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain
  defendant's motion and affirm.

       Defendant pled not guilty to one count of aggravated sexual assault of
  a child, 13 V.S.A. § 3253(a)(8), and to one count of lewd and lascivious
  conduct, 13 V.S.A. § 2601.  Defendant and the State reached a plea
  agreement whereby the sexual assault charge was dismissed and

 

  defendant pled guilty to the charge of lewd and lascivious conduct.  The
  court thereafter accepted defendant's guilty plea and on September 13,
  1996, sentenced defendant to one to five years all suspended and placed him
  on probation.  One of the conditions of defendant's probation was that he
  complete sex offender counseling.

       On December 3, 1996, defendant's probation officer filed a probation
  violation complaint alleging that defendant was rejected from sex offender
  counseling because of his denial of the alleged offense.  On January 2,
  1997, defendant filed a motion with the court seeking to withdraw his
  guilty plea pursuant to V.R.Cr.P. 32(d).  The court orally granted the
  motion on February 10, 1997.  The State moved for reconsideration, and the
  court reversed its prior decision, determining that it lacked jurisdiction
  to consider defendant's motion because he was "in custody under sentence."

       V.R.Cr.P. 32(d) provides in relevant part:

     A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty . . . may be made only by
     a defendant who is not in custody under sentence.  The motion
     must be made prior to or within 30 days after the date of entry of
     judgment, except that a defendant whose sentence does not include
     a term of imprisonment may make the motion at any time. . . . If
     the motion is made after sentence, the court may set aside the
     judgment of conviction and permit withdrawal of the plea only to
     correct manifest injustice.

  (Emphasis added.)  Defendant argues that a person placed on probation
  pursuant to a suspended sentence is not "in custody under sentence" for
  purposes of Rule 32(d).  The State responds that such a defendant is "in
  custody under sentence" and, therefore, may challenge his conviction only
  by filing a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) pursuant to 13 V.S.A.
  § 7131.

       Defendant first argues that Rule 32(d) is a remedial measure and as
  such should be construed broadly to permit a defendant to withdraw his
  guilty plea even when the defendant may seek relief under the PCR statute. 
  In support of this argument, defendant compares V.R.Cr.P. 32(d) to
  Vermont's wrongful death statute, a remedial measure that is to be
  liberally construed.  See e.g., Clymer v. Webster, 156 Vt. 614, 596 A.2d 905 (1991).  The wrongful

 

  death statute was "designed to allay the harsh common law rule denying
  liability due to the death of the victim . . . ."  State v. Oliver, 151 Vt.
  626,629, 563 A.2d 1002, 1004 (1989).  Rule 32(d), by contrast, is a rule of
  criminal procedure, not a remedial statute, and therefore does not merit a
  liberal construction.

       Defendant further argues that our case law defining "custody" for
  purposes of the PCR statute is not dispositive of the meaning of "in
  custody under sentence" for purposes of Rule 32(d).  We disagree.  Both
  Rule 32(d) and the PCR statute employ the identical phrase, "in custody
  under sentence," precisely for the purpose of establishing exclusive
  remedies.  Thus, logic dictates that the same meaning must be attributed to
  the term in both contexts.

       We addressed the relationship between Rule 32(d) motions and PCR
  petitions in State v. Cooley, 135 Vt. 409,