Title: JAMES THOMAS MOULTON v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JAMES THOMAS MOULTON v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 152148 P.3d 38Case Number: No. 05-244Decided: 12/15/2006
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
JAMES 
THOMAS MOULTON,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofPlatteCounty

The 
Honorable John C. Brooks, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Ken 
Koski, State Public Defender, PDP; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Diane 
Courselle, Faculty Director, DAP; Michael Irvin, Student Intern; Kathryn 
Hogarty, Student Intern. Argument by Ms. Hogarty.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; James Michael Causey, Assistant 
Attorney General.      
Argument by Mr. Causey.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 

KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]  James Moulton was charged with one count 
of manufacturing psilocyn,1 a felony, in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2005).  Prior to trial, he filed a motion to 
suppress evidence seized from his residence pursuant to a search warrant 
obtained by deputies after they entered and searched the residence without a 
warrant.  The district court 
concluded the emergency assistance exception to the warrant requirement applied, 
upheld the search and denied the motion.  
Mr. Moulton changed his initial plea of not guilty to guilty, reserving 
his right pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(ii) to appeal the district court's order 
denying his suppression motion.  We 
affirm the denial. 

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]  Mr. Moulton presents the following issue 
for our review:

 
 
Did the 
trial court err in declaring that the search of Mr. Moulton's residence was 
proper under the emergency assistance exception to the warrant requirement of 
Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution and of the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution?

 
 
The 
State rephrases the issue as follows:

 
 
Did the 
district court err in denying appellant's motion to 
suppress?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]  On August 20, 2004, at 4:30 a.m., Deputy 
Bill Motley of the Platte County Sheriff's Office received a telephone call at 
his home in Wheatland, 
Wyoming from a dispatcher 
indicating she had received a garbled radio transmission which concerned her. 
 Deputy Motley went to the dispatch 
office to listen to the recording of the transmission.  He heard a female voice saying the words 
"Med Tech 3" but could not understand the rest of the transmission.  The dispatcher informed Deputy Motley she 
had determined through some telephone calls that "Med Tech 3" was Crystal 
Moulton, an emergency medical technician (EMT) who lived in Glendo with her 
husband and children.  The 
dispatcher also indicated she had obtained telephone numbers for Ms. Moulton, 
tried those numbers and received no answer. 

 
 
[¶4]  The fact that an EMT had attempted to 
contact dispatch by radio transmission at 4:30 in the morning concerned the 
dispatcher and Deputy Motley.  
Therefore, Deputy Motley decided to drive to Glendo and see if he could 
locate Ms. Moulton.  Accompanied by 
Deputy Samantha Klier, Deputy Motley traveled to Glendo and arrived at the 
Moulton residence between 5:00 and 5:30 a.m.  Deputy Motley knocked on the door of the 
mobile home but there was no response.  
He tried the door, found it unlocked, and opened it.  From outside the door, he announced that 
he was with the sheriff's department.  
There was no response and he and Deputy Klier entered the mobile 
home.

 
 
[¶5]  Inside, in what appeared to be the 
living room, the deputies saw no one.  
Using their flashlights because the residence was dark, they proceeded to 
a closed door to the right of the living room.  Deputy Motley knocked and announced that 
he was with the sheriff's department.  
No one answered and Deputy Motley opened the door.  Inside, he saw two teenage girls who 
appeared to be asleep.  He awakened 
them and identified himself.  The 
girls identified themselves as James and Crystal Moulton's daughters.  At the suppression hearing, Deputy 
Motley testified he asked one of them if she knew where her mother was and she 
responded, "[I]f she wasn't home, she was down by the lake with her dad."  The daughter testified the deputy asked 
if her parents were home and she said, "No, sir, they're not."  She testified the deputy then asked if 
she knew where they were and she responded, "[Y]es, they would be at the 
river."  

 
 
[¶6]  The deputies left the girls in the 
bedroom and continued through the home, opening doors as they came to them.  The last room they came to appeared to 
be the master bedroom.  The deputies 
stepped into the room and Deputy Motley observed a clear plastic piece of PVC 
tubing approximately two to three feet long sitting on the lid of a bucket 
outside the closet.  The closet was 
open and Deputy Motley looked inside.  
He saw a vaporizer on the top shelf and a box with a covered jar 
containing an unknown substance on the floor of the closet.  Next to the box he observed a 
fluorescent light.  On a dresser 
outside the closet, Deputy Motley observed a glass jar covered on top with tin 
foil poked with tiny holes.  Inside 
the jar was a tan and gray substance resembling a vermiculite and brown rice 
mixture, commonly used for growing mushrooms.  He noticed another jar of the same 
appearance elsewhere in the room.  

 
 
[¶7]  Having determined Ms. Moulton was not 
present in the home, the deputies left the house to search for her around 
GlendoLake where the daughter 
said she might be.  After searching 
for several hours, they were unable to locate her.  Deputy Motley suggested they check the 
residence again and, if Ms. Moulton had not returned, inform the sheriff and 
search and rescue.  Upon returning 
to the residence, the deputies found Ms. Moulton. She told them her vehicle had 
gotten stuck down by the lake and she had called dispatch for help.   

 
 
[¶8]  Having determined Ms. Moulton was safe 
and not in need of assistance, the deputies left the residence and returned to 
Wheatland.  Later that afternoon, 
Deputy Motley spoke to the sheriff and the county attorney about what he had 
seen inside the Moulton residence.  
He submitted an application for a search warrant to the magistrate based 
upon his observations.  The 
magistrate issued a search warrant and deputies searched the residence and found 
evidence related to the possession and manufacture of a controlled substance. 

 
 
[¶9]  Initially, the State filed three charges 
against Mr. Moulton: possession of a controlled substance, marijuana, a felony, 
in violation of § 35-7-1031(c)(iii);  
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, a misdemeanor, in 
violation of § 35-7-1031(c)(i)(C); and endangering children, controlled 
substances, a felony, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-405(b) (LexisNexis 
2003).  In a separate proceeding, 
the State filed a fourth charge against Mr. Moulton: manufacture of a controlled 
substance, psilocyn, a felony, in violation of § 35-7-1031(a)(ii).  The prosecution moved to join the 
proceedings in one action, which motion was granted.  Mr. Moulton pled not guilty to all of 
the charges and the district court set the case for trial.     

 
 
[¶10]  Mr. Moulton filed a motion to suppress 
the evidence seized during the search of his residence.  At the hearing on the motion, the 
district court listened to the taped radio transmission and heard testimony from 
Deputy Motley, Deputy Klier and one of the Moultons' daughters.  Based upon the evidence presented, the 
district court made the following findings of fact relevant to the issue 
presented for our review:

 
 

-         
There 
was a call to the Platte County Sheriff's Office by Ms. Moulton in her capacity 
as a medic;

 
 

-         
The 
district court listened to the tape and there did appear to be some urgency in 
the voice of the caller; 

 
 

-         
The 
Sheriff's Office was concerned Ms. Moulton was either in trouble herself or had 
found someone in trouble;

 
 

-         
The 
deputies proceeded to Glendo and arrived at the Moulton residence at 
approximately 5:30 a.m. They walked around the outside of the residence. Deputy 
Motley knocked loudly on the door and received no response. He tried the door, 
found it was unlocked, opened the door and announced his presence. The deputies 
went into the trailer and saw no one in the living room or 
kitchen;

 
 

-         
They 
then went to a bedroom door, knocked and announced their presence. The door was 
opened and two teen-age girls were discovered asleep in their beds. Deputy 
Motley woke up one of the girls and asked her if she knew where her mother was. 
She responded that if she wasn't at home, she was down at the lake "or river" 
with their dad;

 
 

-         
The 
deputies went to the bedroom at the far end of the hallway. In the room they saw 
in plain sight evidence of some type of drug operation, including a vaporizer, a 
cooler, PVC pipe and some jars with material in them. Both deputies very quickly 
concluded it looked like some type of system for growing mushrooms; 
and

 
 

-         
All of 
the drug growing equipment was in plain sight in the bedroom and there was no 
intentional search of the residence for drug 
paraphernalia.

 
 
[¶11]   The district court reached the 
following conclusions of law:

 
 
-   Based on the call, the Platte 
County Sheriff's Office had a reasonable basis to believe that Ms. Moulton was 
either in trouble herself or had encountered trouble;

 
 

-         
It was 
reasonable for the Platte County Sheriff's Office to use their best efforts to 
find Ms. Moulton;

 
 

-         
It 
should have been an expectation of Ms. Moulton's that once she identified 
herself as a medic to the Platte County Sheriff's Office at 4:30 in the morning 
the Sheriff's Office would try to find her;

 
 

-         
The 
Sheriff's Department had a reasonable basis to believe there was some type of 
emergency that needed to be responded to;

 
 

-         
The 
Deputies then reasonably went to the Moulton residence for the purpose of 
finding Ms. Moulton;

 
 

-         
Given 
the likely emergency, it was reasonable to enter the Moulton residence to 
determine if Ms. Moulton was present;

 
 

-         
It was 
during this attempt to aid Ms. Moulton that the drug paraphernalia was 
discovered; 

 
 

-         
There 
was no search of closed containers but rather simply a search for the person of 
Ms. Moulton. The drug paraphernalia was in plain sight in the bedroom; 
and

 
 

-         
The 
search of the Moulton residence for Ms. Moulton was not illegal or improper, but 
rather fell appropriately with the emergency assistance exception to obtaining a 
search warrant.

 
 
The 
district court entered an order denying the motion to suppress. 

 
 
[¶12]  After the district court's ruling, Mr. 
Moulton changed his plea to guilty on the charge of manufacturing psilocyn 
conditioned upon his right to appeal the order denying his suppression 
motion.  In exchange for his guilty 
plea to the one count, the State dismissed the other three charges filed against 
Mr. Moulton.  The district court 
sentenced Mr. Moulton to forty-eight to seventy-two months imprisonment and 
suspended execution of the sentence pending completion of twelve months 
incarceration in the Platte County Jail and three years supervised 
probation.  Mr. Moulton appealed the 
district court's order denying his motion to suppress.         

    

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶13]  The question of whether an unreasonable 
search or seizure occurred in violation of constitutional rights presents a 
question of law and is reviewed de 
novo. O'Boyle v. State, 2005 WY 
83, ¶ 18, 117 P.3d 401, 407 (Wyo. 2005).  
We reverse a district court's factual findings on a motion to suppress 
only when they are clearly erroneous.  
Id.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶14]  Mr. Moulton claims the district court 
erred in ruling the search of his residence was proper under the emergency 
assistance exception to the warrant requirement of Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Citing People v. Allison, 86 P.3d 421 
(Colo. 2004), 
Mr. Moulton asserts for a search to be reasonable under the emergency assistance 
exception law enforcement officials must have a reasonable basis approximating 
probable cause that associates the emergency with the area searched.  He argues the garbled radio transmission 
did not provide deputies a reasonable basis associating an emergency with the 
Moulton residence.  He claims the 
radio transmission may have given them a reasonable basis for going to the 
residence but it did not provide a reasonable basis for searching the residence. 
 He characterizes the radio 
transmission as giving rise to a theoretical possibility that an emergency 
existed at the residence, not the required reasonable basis associating an 
emergency with the residence. 

 
 
[¶15]  Citing Pena v. State, 2004 WY 115, ¶ 29, 98 P.3d 857, 870 (Wyo. 2004), the State asserts the emergency assistance exception 
applies when law enforcement officials have a reasonable basis for believing a 
person's life, safety or property is in danger.  In such cases, the State argues, 
officers may enter and search an area to render assistance but not to look for 
evidence.  Because the deputies in 
this case entered the residence to look for Ms. Moulton and provide assistance 
in response to her radio transmission and because their search of the residence 
was limited to looking for her, the State contends the search was proper under 
the emergency assistance exception.

 
 
[¶16]  The substantive law governing searches 
is well established.  Unreasonable 
searches and seizures are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.  Searches and seizures conducted without 
a warrant are per se unreasonable under both constitutions unless they are 
justified by probable cause and established exceptions.  Pena, ¶ 29, 98 P.3d  at 870.  Consent is one exception to the warrant 
requirement.  Id.  Other exceptions include a search:  1) of an arrested suspect and the area 
within his control; 2) conducted while in pursuit of a fleeing suspect; 3) to 
prevent the imminent destruction of evidence; 4) of an automobile upon probable 
cause; 5) which results when an object is inadvertently in the plain view of 
police officers while they are where they have a right to be; and 6) which 
results from an entry into a dwelling in order to prevent loss of life or 
property (also referred to as the emergency assistance exception).   Id.  The question of whether an exception 
applies to support a search without a warrant is dependent upon all of the facts 
and circumstances viewed in their entirety.  Id.  When a defendant properly objects to or 
moves for suppression of evidence seized, the State bears the burden of proving 
that one of the exceptions applies.  
Id.

 
 
[¶17]  This Court has considered the 
applicability of the emergency assistance exception to the warrant requirement 
in two prior cases.  In Pena, law enforcement received a 911 
report that two people had been shot in a mobile home.  Deputy Doyle initially entered the 
mobile home to determine who was inside and whether anyone needed medical 
attention.  He found two dead bodies 
and no one else inside, left the mobile home and called for an 
investigator.  The investigator 
arrived and entered the home to inspect the scene.   He observed rifle caliber shell 
casings on the floor and two dead bodies.  
Law enforcement later obtained a search warrant.

 
 
[¶18]  Addressing the defendant's claim that 
the searches were unconstitutional, we held the searches were justified without 
a warrant by exigent circumstances and were constitutional.  Specifically, we concluded the searches 
fell within two of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement:  a search resulting from entry into a 
dwelling to prevent loss of life and a search to prevent the imminent 
destruction of evidence.  We 
said:

 
 
The 
emergency assistance exception applies when police have a reasonable basis for 
believing that another's life or safety is in danger.  In that case, they may search the area 
to render assistance, but not to search for evidence. To prevent loss of life or 
property, an officer may walk through a home to determine if anyone else is 
present when officers have a reasonable belief that the area harbors an 
individual posing a danger to those present.  Further, in previous decisions, we have 
upheld warrantless searches to prevent the imminent destruction of 
evidence.  

 
 
 . . . [T]he evidence supports finding 
that the warrantless entries by the law enforcement officers onto the crime 
scene were justified under these exceptions.  Deputy Doyle testified that he did not 
know that anyone inside was deceased and entered to see if anyone needed medical 
attention.  The deputy had a 
reasonable basis for believing emergency aid was required, and his initial entry 
was justified.  Immediately after 
determining that no one inside the home was alive and the suspect was not 
inside, Deputy Doyle left the home because he was concerned that the killer 
might return to it and waited outside for other law enforcement to 
arrive.

 
 
            
 Deputy Doyle's search was 
limited to the emergency assistance exception.  He only checked on the health and safety 
of persons in the home.  Pena, 
however, was still at large and reportedly armed.  Officer safety concerns, as well as 
evidence preservation, support the second entry by the more highly trained 
investigator.  Investigator Thompson 
arrived and spent three to four minutes inside the home assessing the crime 
scene.  He observed the presence and 
location of the two bodies and rifle shell casings.  [The 911 report indicated] use of a 
shotgun.  Because the shell casings 
were from a rifle, Deputy Doyle immediately advised other officers who were 
still looking for Pena that Pena was armed with a rifle, a longer-range 
weapon.

 
 

Pena, ¶¶ 
31-33, 98 P.3d  at 871.    

 
 
[¶19]  In Ortega v. State, 669 P.2d 935 
(Wyo. 1983), 
law enforcement officials arrested the defendant outside his home after he 
called and reported shooting his wife.  
Upon arresting the defendant, one of the officers went inside the home to 
check on the condition of the victim.  
We held the officer's entry into the home was proper under the emergency 
assistance exception.  Id. at 941.  We further held once inside the home the 
police officer was authorized to take cognizance of items within plain 
view.  He was entitled, we said, to 
see what came into his field of vision while he was where he had a right to 
be.  So long as the initial 
intrusion was justified, "the police while within the legitimate scope of their 
entry may search the premises with their eyes."  Id.

 
 
[¶20]  In Pena and Ortega, officers entered private 
residences without a warrant in response to reported shootings.  Like these Wyoming cases, the 
majority of cases in which other courts have applied the emergency assistance 
exception to uphold a warrantless search have involved reports of violence where 
the victims were thought to be seriously injured.  The general rule is that application of 
the emergency assistance exception is strictly limited to situations involving 
specific, clearly described emergencies occurring inside the residence from 
which officers perceived an immediate need to respond in order to protect life 
or limb.  See State v. Ryon, 108 P.3d 1032 (NM 
2005)(containing an instructive discussion of the exception).  In cases involving generalized, 
non-specific information that someone might be inside the residence and might be 
injured, courts typically have not applied the emergency assistance exception to 
uphold a warrantless search.  
Id.  

 
 
[¶21] 
Mr. Moulton's case does not involve a specific, clearly described report of an 
emergency occurring inside the Moulton residence from which the deputies 
perceived an immediate need to respond in order to protect life or limb.  Rather, it involved a garbled radio 
transmission received at 4:30 a.m. from an EMT from which the sheriff's office 
could discern very little.  Neither 
the parties' briefs nor our research has produced any cases involving facts 
similar to those presented in this case in which courts have considered the 
emergency assistance exception.  
Having carefully considered in their entirety the facts and circumstances 
presented, we hold the search was constitutional based upon the emergency 
assistance exception to the warrant requirement.   

 
 
[¶22]  The radio transmission received by 
dispatch was from an EMT.  Deputy 
Klier testified the dispatcher who received the transmission was very upset 
because she was afraid someone was in danger but could not determine who or what 
kind of danger.  Deputy Klier 
testified:  "[Danger] is inherent in 
our line of work.  We don't get 
called on the 911 or on a radio transmission, unless something is wrong."  Deputy Klier further testified when 
Deputy Motley picked her up to drive to Glendo he said, "We have a broken radio 
transmission.  We think somebody is 
in trouble."  Deputy Motley 
testified he was concerned Ms. Moulton had come upon an accident or was involved 
in an accident and needed help.  The 
district court listened to the tape and found there was some urgency in the 
caller's voice.  

 
 
[¶23]  Given these circumstances -- the urgent 
4:30 a.m. radio transmission from an EMT using a portable radio -- the sheriff's 
office had no real choice but to respond.  
Ignoring the call was not a reasonable option.  Law enforcement had a reasonable basis 
to believe that an emergency existed to which an immediate response was 
required.  Efforts to reach Ms. 
Moulton by telephone were unsuccessful.  
The only other information the sheriff's office had to make contact with 
her was her home address.  Under 
these circumstances, it was reasonable for the deputies to attempt to locate her 
and to proceed to her residence in an effort to do so. 

 
 
[¶24]  Upon arriving at the residence and 
receiving no response to their efforts to make their presence known, it was 
reasonable given the urgent sounding early morning radio transmission from an 
EMT for the deputies to enter the home to look for Ms. Moulton. Even after 
talking with the daughter, it was reasonable for the deputies to look for Ms. 
Moulton in other areas of the house, including the master bedroom.  Once inside the bedroom, the deputies 
were authorized to see what was in plain view.  All of the evidence indicated the drug 
growing paraphernalia was in plain view.  
No evidence was presented to suggest the deputies had intentions, other 
than to locate Ms. Moulton, when they looked inside the home.  After discovering the items in the 
master bedroom, Deputy Motley said to Deputy Klier, "[W]e are not here for 
this.  We have got a possible 
emergency.  We are here to find Ms. 
Mouton and make sure she is all right."  
Once they determined Ms. Moulton was not there, the deputies left the 
residence.  They were inside the 
house for about seven minutes.  
Under these circumstances, the district court correctly concluded the 
search of the Moulton residence for Ms. Moulton was not illegal or improper, but 
rather fell appropriately with the emergency assistance exception to obtaining a 
search warrant.   

 
 
[¶25]  Mr. Moulton cites Allison as supporting his argument that 
the radio transmission was not enough to avoid the warrant requirement.  In Allison, police were dispatched to a 
residence after a 911 hang-up call.  
A woman answered the door, revealed that a domestic dispute had 
occurred, and eventually let an officer inside.  The officer removed the individuals 
involved in the altercation from the residence and then reentered the residence 
without a search warrant.  The trial 
court found, and no party disputed, that the initial entry was either consensual 
or justified by an emergency.  Allison, 86 P.3d  at 423.  The question was whether the re-entry 
was valid without a search warrant based upon the emergency assistance 
exception.  

 
 
[¶26]  The Colorado Supreme Court held the 
emergency aid exception did not support the officer's re-entry into the home 
after arresting and removing the offenders.  The Court concluded no emergency existed 
at the time the officer re-entered the home because the domestic incident was 
over, the individuals involved had been removed from the premises and there was 
no indication anyone else was involved in the incident.  Therefore, the officer had no reasonable 
basis to believe an emergency continued to exist requiring his assistance.  Additionally the Court found the 
evidence demonstrated the officer entered the residence the second time to 
conduct a criminal investigation, rather than to render emergency assistance. 
The Court affirmed the trial court's order suppressing the evidence.  We cited Allison in Pena for the principle that when police 
have a reasonable basis for believing another's life or safety is in danger, 
they may search the area to render assistance but not for 
evidence.

 
 
[¶27]  Mr. Moulton's case is distinguishable 
from Allison in important ways.  In Allison, the officer re-entered the home 
without a warrant after the emergency was over with no reasonable basis for 
believing at that point anyone was in danger.  Here, the deputies entered the home 
knowing only that the resident of the home, an emergency medical technician, 
placed an urgent sounding call to dispatch at 4:30 that morning, circumstances 
we have concluded created a reasonable basis for believing Ms. Moulton was in 
need of emergency assistance.  
Unlike in Allison, the 
emergency justifying the initial entry into the Moulton residence remained 
unresolved.  It was not clear until 
the deputies inspected the home that it was secure.  At that point, the party whom the 
deputies reasonably believed needed emergency assistance had not been 
found.  Thus, the emergency giving 
rise to the initial entry still existed and the deputies were justified in 
looking through the home. 

 
 
[¶28]  Additionally, there was no evidence 
presented in Mr. Moulton's case that the deputies entered the home for any 
purpose other than to locate Ms. Moulton.  
In fact, the evidence was that even after observing the drug growing 
paraphernalia, the deputies continued their search for Ms. Moulton outside the 
residence for two more hours.  
Unlike the situation in Allison, the totality of the 
circumstances at the time the decision was made to look for Ms. Moulton inside 
the residence demonstrated that the deputies had a reasonable basis to believe 
an emergency existed requiring their assistance. 

 
 
[¶29]  Mr. Moulton emphasizes his daughter's 
testimony that she told Deputy Motley her parents were not home and were down by 
the lake.  He argues that once the 
deputies were told Ms. Moulton was not in the residence, their reason for being 
there was no longer viable and they were not authorized to continue looking 
through the home.  Our response to 
this contention is twofold.  

 
 
[¶30] 
First, the district court heard the testimony of both Deputy Motley and Mr. 
Moulton's daughter.  After weighing 
their testimony, the district court entered a finding of fact in accordance with 
Deputy Motley's testimony.  Although 
our review of the constitutionality of the search is de novo, we review the district's court 
factual findings pursuant to the clearly erroneous standard.  We do not find the district court's 
factual finding on the disputed testimony clearly erroneous. 

 
 
[¶31]  Second, regardless of whose testimony 
was believed, the deputies had a reasonable basis even after talking with the 
daughter to continue looking for Ms. Moulton inside the residence.  Based on Ms. Moulton's urgent, early 
morning radio transmission identifying herself as an EMT, the deputies 
reasonably believed she needed assistance.  
Whether or not they were told by the just awakened teenage daughter that 
her mother was not there, it was reasonable under the circumstances for them to 
finish looking inside the residence before continuing their search 
elsewhere.              

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶32] 
Considering the totality of the circumstances in this case, we conclude the 
officers were acting reasonably when they investigated the possible emergency 
and properly limited their efforts to determining whether anyone was in need of 
assistance rather than investigating a crime.  The emergency assistance exception 
applies in these circumstances and the deputies' entry into and search of the 
Moulton residence was constitutional.   Affirmed.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Psilocyn is 
not defined in the Wyoming Statutes. Psilocyn, like psilocybin, is a chemical 
obtained from certain mushrooms found in Central America and Mexico; it is a 
Schedule 1 hallucinogenic substance classified chemically as a tryptamine. 

http://www.dea.gov/concern/psilocybin.html