Title: Andrew v. State

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Andrew v. State  (95-301); 165 Vt 252; 682 A.2d 1387

[Opinion Filed 28-Jun-1996)

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 No. 95-301


Florin and Juanita Andrew                         Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            Windham Superior Court

State of Vermont                                  March Term, 1996


Robert Grussing III, J.

       Jesse M. Corum IV of Gale, Corum & Stern, and Thomas W. Costello and
  Joel T. Faxon of Costello & Mabie, Brattleboro, for plaintiffs-appellants

       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Timothy B. Tomasi, Assistant
  Attorney General, Montpelier, for defendant-appellee


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


       ALLEN, C.J.   In this appeal we consider whether the State is immune
  from a tort suit claiming damages for injuries resulting from an allegedly
  negligent inspection of a private workplace pursuant to the Vermont
  Occupational Safety and Health Act (VOSHA), 21 V.S.A. §§ 201-264.  We
  conclude that the State is immune from the suit because plaintiffs, an
  injured employee and his wife, have failed to show that a private analog
  exists for the State's regulatory enforcement activities.  Accordingly, we
  affirm the superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
  State.

       We view the facts as alleged by plaintiffs.  See Peters v. Mindell,
  159 Vt. 424, 426, 620 A.2d 1268, 1269 (1992) (if supported by affidavits or
  other evidence, all allegations made in opposition to summary judgment are
  regarded as true).  On February 26, 1992, Florin Andrew, an employee of
  Fulflex of Vermont, Inc., was injured while working on a calendar machine
  at his workplace.  The calendar machine is designed to flatten raw, hot
  rubber into a wide, thin layer by running it through a series of calendar
  rolls.  Andrew was injured when his arm was

 

  pulled into an unguarded nip point on one of the rolls.

       Two other employees, one in 1983 and the other in 1989, had been
  injured at the same nip point while working on the same machine.  VOSHA
  inspections took place at Fulflex on December 5, 1984 and July 20-21, 1987. 
  During the latter inspection, the state inspector examined every machine,
  including the calendar machine on which Andrew was injured.  The inspector
  issued two citations for VOSHA violations with respect to that machine, but
  did not issue a citation for the unguarded nip point, a conspicuous hazard
  that violated an OSHA regulation.

       In November 1992, Andrew and his wife filed suit against (1) the
  State, for undertaking and negligently performing the safety inspections;
  (2) the company that modified and assembled the calendar machine, for
  breach of warranty, negligence, and failure to warn of an unreasonably
  dangerous condition; (3) Andrew's employer and his employer's insurer, for
  failing to discover and remedy the machine's safety hazards; and (4) two of
  Andrew's co-workers, for negligence in failing to reduce or eliminate the
  unreasonable risk of harm posed by the machine. By agreement of the
  parties, the claims against all of the defendants except the State were
  dismissed.  The State moved for summary judgment on the ground that the
  suit was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  The superior court
  granted the motion, rejecting plaintiffs' contention that the State was
  liable under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1965) for its
  allegedly negligent inspection of Andrew's workplace.  The court ruled that
  Restatement § 324A was inapplicable because, by conducting regulatory VOSHA
  inspections, the State did not assume Fulflex's duty of providing a safe
  workplace.

                                I.

       On appeal, plaintiffs argue that there is a genuine issue of material
  fact as to (1) whether the State undertook to render services to Fulflex or
  Andrew by conducting the inspections, and (2) whether Fulflex or Andrew
  relied on that undertaking.  In their reply brief, plaintiffs contend that
  it would be inappropriate for this Court to consider the issue of sovereign
  immunity because

 

  the superior court did not address that issue.  They request that we remand
  the matter for the superior court to consider the issue in light of our
  recent decision in Sabia v. State, ___ Vt. ___, ___, 669 A.2d 1187, 1197
  (1995), where we found a private analog for the State's statutory duty to
  render assistance in response to particularized and substantiated claims of
  child abuse.

                               A.

       At the outset, we reject plaintiffs' request that we remand this
  matter for the superior court to determine whether the State has waived
  sovereign immunity.  One of the grounds for the State's request for summary
  judgment was that the State had not waived its immunity under 12 V.S.A. §
  5601(a) because the Good Samaritan Doctrine, as set forth in Restatement §
  324A, does not provide a private analog for VOSHA inspections.  Indeed,
  this was the central issue contested before the superior court, though the
  court did not frame its decision in terms of sovereign immunity.  The
  court's implicit ruling, however, was that the State had not waived
  sovereign immunity and thus was entitled to summary judgment because there
  is no private analog for plaintiffs' claims.  Further, assuming Sabia is
  relevant to this case, we need only review the superior court's ruling in
  light of Sabia rather than remand the matter for the court to reexamine the
  legal issue anew.

                                B.

       We now turn to the substantive issue at hand.  Under 12 V.S.A. §
  5601(a), the State is liable for injuries caused by the negligent conduct
  of its employees acting within the scope of their employment "under the
  same circumstances, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
  person would be liable."  Thus, the State retains its immunity "for
  governmental functions for which no private analog exists," LaShay v.
  Department of Social & Rehabilitation Servs., 160 Vt. 60, 68,