Title: RONNIE L. COOK V. DANIEL L. SWIRES

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RONNIE L. COOK V. DANIEL L. SWIRES2009 WY 21202 P.3d 397Case Number: S-08-0075Decided: 02/19/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
RONNIE 
L. COOK,Appellant(Defendant),v.DANIEL L. 
SWIRES,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Albany County

The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

William 
D. Bagley, Frontier Law Center, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

M. 
Gregory Weisz, Pence and MacMillan, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]      The district 
court confirmed the execution sale of Mr. Cook's Albany County real property to 
satisfy two Colorado judgments.  On 
appeal, Mr. Cook claims that the filing of the foreign judgments was 
insufficient pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, the 
property was not available for execution, the district court did not allow him 
the proper redemption period and he is entitled to seek contribution from his 
co-judgment debtors, including Mr. Swires.  
Mr. Swires contests Mr. Cook's assertions and also argues that the Court 
does not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider the sufficiency of the 
foreign judgments filing because Mr. Cook did not appeal an earlier district 
court ruling on the issue.  We 
conclude that we do not have jurisdiction over Mr. Cook's claim that the foreign 
judgments were improperly filed, but affirm as to the remainder of the 
issues.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Cook presents 
the following issues on appeal:

            

1. 
        
Was the incorrect filing of the Colorado judgment in Wyoming sufficient 
to support Wyoming enforcement?

 
 

2.            
Was 
the property still available for execution after the debt was discharged in 
bankruptcy and the foreign judgment lien filed February 2, 2000 expired because 
of the one year limitation in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-17-336?

 
 

3.            
Had 
the judgment been properly entered and had the enforcement been timely, was 
Ronnie L. Cook entitled to a twelve month period for 
redemption?

 
 

4.            
Is 
Ronnie L. Cook entitled to contribution from the plaintiff and his wife Susan 
Swires who are also judgment debtors in the assigned Colorado 
judgment?

 
 
Mr. 
Swires presents similar issues but also raises two additional 
issues:

 
 
1.         
Does the Court have subject matter jurisdiction to hear Appellant Cook's 
appeal as to a challenge of the execution sale based on the alleged invalidity 
of the underlying judgment when Cook failed to take a timely appeal of an 
appealable district court order?

 
 

2.            
Does 
Cook, who filed for bankruptcy protection, have

standing 
to pursue contribution against Appellee Swires when Swires also had an allowed 
unsecured claim in Cook's bankruptcy?  

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Mr. Cook and Mr. 
Swires were the sole members of a Wyoming limited liability company called 
Adventure Stone, LLC.  John Claus 
loaned funds to the limited liability company and payment of the loan was 
guarantied by Mr. Cook, Mr. Swires and his wife Susan Swires.  The company defaulted on the loan and 
Mr. Claus brought an action in Colorado against the company and the 
guarantors.  On December 14, 1999, a 
Colorado court entered a default judgment against Mr. and Mrs. Swires and the 
company.  Shortly thereafter, the 
same court entered a summary judgment against Mr. Cook concluding it was 
undisputed that the company had defaulted on its debt to Mr. Claus and Mr. Cook 
had guarantied payment.  The two 
judgments indicated the defendants were jointly and severally liable.    

 
 
[¶4]      In early 2000, 
Mr. Claus filed both Colorado judgments in Albany County pursuant to the Uniform 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-17-701 through 
1-17-707 (LexisNexis 2007) (UEFJA).  The filings were identified as F.J. 
357 by the district court.  Mr. 
Claus also recorded the judgments in the county clerk's office to attach real 
property belonging to Mr. Cook.    

 
 
[¶5]      In July 2001, Mr. 
Claus assigned his judgments to Mr. Swires.  On November 9, 2001, Mr. Swires applied 
for and obtained a writ of execution.  
A few days later, Mr. Cook declared bankruptcy.  Mr. Swires' claim based upon the 
assigned judgments was considered to be a secured claim by the bankruptcy court 
because of the 2000 filing of the judgments in Albany County.  The bankruptcy court ruled that Mr. 
Cook's real property remained subject to a mortgage and Mr. Swires' 
judgments.   

  

[¶6]      Mr. Swires filed 
the instant action in the district court to foreclose the judgments.  He named Mr. Cook, the limited liability 
company and the mortgage holder as defendants.  Mr. Cook answered the complaint and 
filed a cross-claim against the company on the basis that it was the primary 
obligor on the debt.  He also filed 
a counter claim against Mr. Swires and a third-party complaint against Mrs. 
Swires seeking an offset from them as co-judgment debtors.     

 
 
[¶7]      On February 28, 
2005, Mr. Cook filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Swires' complaint.  He claimed Mr. Claus had not properly 
filed the underlying judgments pursuant to the UEFJA because he failed to file 
an affidavit setting forth the names and last known addresses of the judgment 
creditor and the judgment debtors as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. §1-17-704.1  Mr. Swires responded that Mr. Claus had 
otherwise complied with the statute by filing a certificate of mailing.  In May 2005, the district court denied 
Mr. Cook's motion to dismiss.     

 
 
[¶8]      In the summer of 
2007, Mr. Swires obtained writs of execution against the limited liability 
company's and Mr. Cook's property.  
Mr. Cook filed a petition for injunction to stop the execution against 
his property.  He again argued that 
the filing of the Colorado judgments was invalid for failure to file an 
affidavit with the names and addresses of the parties.  The district court denied Mr. Cook's 
request for an injunction.    

 
 
[¶9]      The sheriff held 
an execution sale on October 17, 2007.  
Mr. Cook challenged the sale, claiming that the execution was improper 
under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-17-336 (LexisNexis 2007) because the judgment lien 
expired when it was not levied upon within one year after the foreign judgments 
were entered.  Mr. Swires responded 
and requested issuance of a sheriff's deed.  Mr. Cook claimed that he had one year in 
which to redeem the property.  The 
district court concluded that Mr. Cook's property was available for execution 
and he was entitled to a three month redemption period.  Because he had not redeemed the property 
during the redemption period, the district court granted Mr. Swires' request for 
a sheriff's deed.  Mr. Cook appealed 
from the order denying his motion to dismiss, the order denying his petition for 
an injunction and the order granting Mr. Swires a sheriff's deed.    

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

1.            
Jurisdiction

 
 
[¶10]   We start with Mr. Swires' claim 
that Mr. Cook did not file a timely notice of appeal of the district court's 
determination that the Colorado judgments were filed correctly under the 
UEFJA.  The failure to file a timely 
notice of appeal from a final, appealable order deprives this Court of 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal.  Yeager v. Forbes, 2003 WY 134, ¶ 14, 78 P.3d 241, 247 (Wyo. 2003).  See also, W.R.A.P. 1.03 and 2.01.  
Furthermore, when a party fails to timely appeal an appealable 
order, he cannot raise the issues decided in the order in a subsequent 
appeal.  See, e.g., Yeager, ¶ 14, 78 P.3d at 246-47; Scott v. Sutphin, 2005 WY 38, ¶ 3, 109 P.3d 520 (Wyo. 2005).  The existence of subject matter jurisdiction 
involves a question of law that may be raised at any time.  See, e.g., Routh v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers Comp. 
Div., 952 P.2d 1108, 1114 (Wyo. 1998).  
Thus, if Mr. Swires' assertion is correct, we would not have 
jurisdiction to consider Mr. Cook's first issue.  

 
 
[¶11]   Mr. Cook challenged the validity of 
Mr. Claus' filing of the underlying foreign judgments in his petition to enjoin 
the execution sale.  Mr. Swires 
argues the district court's October 17, 2007, order denying Mr. Cook's petition 
for an injunction was appealable and, since he did not appeal within 30 days of 
entry of the order as required by W.R.A.P. 2.01, we do not have jurisdiction to 
decide whether Mr. Claus properly filed the foreign judgments.  This Court ruled long ago that an order 
granting or refusing an injunction is a final appealable order as a petition for 
injunctive relief invokes a "special proceeding."  Anderson v. Englehart, 18 Wyo. 196, 105 P. 571 (Wyo. 1909).  Presently, 
W.R.A.P. 1.05(b) defines an appealable order as including "an order affecting a 
substantial right made in a special proceeding."  It follows, therefore, that the denial 
of Mr. Cook's petition for an injunction was appealable under Rule 1.05 and, 
since he did not appeal it within 30 days after entry, we do not have 
jurisdiction to consider the district court's ruling on the validity of the 
foreign judgment filing.  

 
 
[¶12]   Moreover, Mr. Swires argues that Lurie v. Blackwell, 2002 WY 110, 51 P.3d 846 (Wyo. 2002) supports his argument that the district court's order denying 
Mr. Cook's petition for an injunction was appealable.  In Lurie, the judgment debtor's wife filed 
a petition to quash execution against property she claimed belonged to the 
couple as tenants by the entirety.  
We considered her appeal from the district court's order denying the 
petition to quash.  Although the 
issue was not raised there, we treated the denial of the petition to quash as a 
final appealable order.  Id., ¶ 6, 51 P.3d  at 848.  See also, Steffens v. Smith, 477 P.2d 119 (Wyo. 
1970) and Lawer Auto Supply Co.  v. Teton Auto Co., 284 P. 1001 (Wyo. 
1930) (deciding appeals from denials of motions to quash writs of 
execution).  Arguably, Mr. Cook's 
petition for an injunction to stop the execution sale was analogous to a motion 
to quash and the district court's denial was, consequently, a final appealable 
order.  We conclude, therefore, the 
order denying the injunction was appealable, and, because Mr. Cook failed to 
file a timely notice of appeal from the district court's order, we do not have 
jurisdiction to review the district court's decision on the validity of Mr. 
Claus' filings under the UEFJA.

 
 
[¶13]   What is more, the petition for 
injunctive relief was the second time the issue had been raised and decided in 
the district court.  Earlier, Mr. 
Cook had filed a motion to dismiss the foreclosure complaint, arguing the 2000 
filing of the judgments was inadequate because of Mr. Claus' failure to file an 
affidavit setting forth the judgment creditor's and debtors' names and last 
known addresses.  The district court 
denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that Mr. Claus had substantially complied 
with the statute by filing the certificate of mailing.     

 
 
[¶14]   Typically, a denial of a motion to 
dismiss is not appealable.  See, e.g., Gooden v. State, 711 P.2d 405 (Wyo. 
1985).  However, in Hill v. Value Recovery Group, L.P., 964 P.2d 1256 (Wyo. 1998), this Court reviewed the district court's denial of the 
judgment debtor's motion to dismiss and set aside a foreign judgment.  There was no argument or discussion in 
Hill indicating the court's order 
denying the motion to dismiss was not an appealable order.  Thus, Hill indicates that such an order is 
appealable.

 
 
[¶15]   Under the circumstances presented 
here, we conclude that Mr. Cook had ample opportunity to litigate the validity 
of Mr. Claus' filing of the Colorado judgments in his motion to dismiss and 
petition for an injunction.  He did 
not appeal the district court's determination on that issue until after the 
execution sale.  Because Mr. Cook 
failed on one and perhaps two occasions to timely appeal from a final appealable 
order deciding the issue, he lost his opportunity to do so.  We conclude, therefore, that we do not 
have jurisdiction to consider his claim regarding the improper filing of the 
foreign judgments.  

 
 

2.            
Expiration 
of Lien Under Section 1-17-336

 
 
[¶16]   Mr. Cook claims that his real 
property was not available for execution by Mr. Swires because, pursuant to § 
1-17-336, the judgment lien expired one year after Mr. Claus' 2000 filing of the 
Colorado judgments.  Section 
1-17-336 states:

 
 
A 
judgment on which execution is not levied before the expiration of one (1) year 
after its rendition shall not operate as a lien on the estate of a debtor.  When judgment is rendered in the 
district or supreme court and a special mandate is awarded to the district court 
to carry the same into execution, the lien of the judgment creditor shall 
continue for one (1) year after the mandate is filed with the county clerk.  The special mandate shall be entered on 
the journal of the district court before being filed with the county clerk.  In computing the period of one (1) year, 
the time covered by an appeal of the case, by an injunction against the 
execution, by a vacancy in the office of sheriff or by the inability of the 
officer, shall be excluded.

 
 
[¶17]   We interpret statutes to effectuate 
the legislature's intent.  If the 
wording is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain language of the 
statute.  We apply rules of 
statutory construction only if the statutory language is ambiguous or subject to 
varying interpretations.  Statutory 
interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo.  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 
2007 WY 43, ¶¶ 9-10, 13, 154 P.3d 331, 334-35 (Wyo. 2007); Powder River 
Coal Co. v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization, 2002 WY 5, ¶ 6, 38 P.3d 423, 
426 (Wyo. 2002).  We discussed § 
1-17-336 in Dev-Tech Corp. v. Wilson, 
Miller, Barton & Peek, Inc., 2004 WY 163, ¶ 25, 102 P.3d 880, 887 (Wyo. 
2004):

 
 
[T]his 
statute addresses the time in which a filed judgment operates as a lien.  Section 1-17-336 does not state that the 
judgment creditor's rights to execute on the debtor's property expire.  Instead, it states that, if there is no 
execution within a year, the judgment ceases to operate as a lien.  This may affect priority, but it does 
not affect the property available for execution.  Wyo. Stat.  Ann. § 1-17-301 governs the property 
available for execution, and it states:  
"Except for property exempt by law, all property of the judgment debtor, 
both real and personal or any legal or equitable interest therein including any 
interest of the judgment debtor in mortgaged property or property being sold 
under an executory land contract, is subject to execution."   As such, even if their lien had 
expired, the appellees could still execute on the Trails End 
Ranch.

 
 
This 
Court clearly ruled in Dev-Tech that, 
even though a judgment lien expires after one year and a judgment creditor may 
lose his priority under § 1-17-336, the property still remains available for 
execution pursuant to § 1-17-301.  
Thus, § 1-17-336 did not prevent Mr. Swires from executing against Mr. 
Cook's Wyoming property.

 
 
[¶18]   Although his argument is not 
entirely clear, Mr. Cook also seems to assert that the loss of the judgment lien 
under § 1-17-336 meant that Mr. Swires no longer had a secured interest in the 
real property and execution against the Wyoming property violated the terms of 
Mr. Cook's bankruptcy stay and discharge.  
Mr. Claus filed the foreign judgments in Wyoming in early 2000.  Mr. Cook filed for bankruptcy in 
November 2001, which was more than a year after the foreign judgments were 
filed.  The bankruptcy court 
determined that Mr. Swires had a secured interest in Mr. Cook's real property 
pursuant to the assigned foreign judgments.  As the district court recognized, there 
is no indication in the record that Mr. Cook challenged the legitimacy of Mr. 
Swires' secured claim in the bankruptcy court even though more than one year had 
passed since the foreign judgments were filed in Wyoming.  Consequently, the district court 
properly gave effect to the bankruptcy court's determination that the debt was 
secured and concluded that Mr. Cook's property was available for 
execution.

 
 

3.            
Redemption 
Period

 
 
[¶19]   Mr. Cook argues that the district 
court erred by granting a sheriff's deed to Mr. Swires because he was entitled 
to 12 months to redeem the property.  
Mr. Cook maintains that Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-18-102 and 103 (LexisNexis 
2007) provided him a twelve month redemption period.  Section 1-18-102 states, in pertinent 
part:

 
 
When 
real property is sold by virtue of an execution, order of sale, decree of 
foreclosure or foreclosure by advertisement and sale, the sheriff or other 
officer, instead of executing a deed to the premises sold, shall give to the 
purchaser of the lands a certificate in writing describing the property 
purchased and the sum paid therefor, or if purchased by the plaintiff in 
execution or by the mortgagee, the amount of his bid.  The certificate shall state that the 
purchaser is entitled to a deed for the property at the expiration of the period 
of redemption, unless the property is redeemed prior to that date as provided by 
law.  

 
 
Section 
1-18-103 states:

 
 
(a) 
Except as provided with respect to agricultural real estate, it is lawful for 
any person, his heirs, executors, administrators, assigns or guarantors whose 
real property has been sold by virtue of an execution, decree of foreclosure, or 
foreclosure by advertisement and sale within three (3) months from the date of 
sale, to redeem the real estate by paying to the purchaser, his heirs, 
executors, administrators or assigns, or to the sheriff or other officer who 
sold the property, for the benefit of the purchaser, the amount of the purchase 
price or the amount given or bid if purchased by the execution creditor or by 
the mortgagee under a mortgage, together with interest at the rate of ten 
percent (10%) per annum from the date of sale plus the amount of any assessments 
or taxes and the amount due on any prior lien which the purchaser paid after the 
purchase, with interest.  On payment 
of this amount the sale and certificate granted are void.

 
 
            
(b) In the case of any mortgage upon one (1) or more parcels of real 
estate any or all of which were agricultural real estate on the date of 
execution of the mortgage as stated in the mortgage, the period within which the 
owner, his heirs, executors, administrators, assigns or guarantors may redeem 
the premises sold is twelve (12) months from the date of the 
sale.

 
 
            
(c) The term "agricultural real estate" means any parcel of land in 
excess of twenty (20) acres lying outside the exterior boundaries of any 
incorporated city, town or recorded subdivision.  If the mortgage recites that the real 
estate involved is agricultural real estate, it is presumed the parties to the 
mortgage, their heirs, executors, administrators, assigns, guarantors or 
successors in interest have agreed to and are bound by all the provisions of law 
relative to the right of redemption.

 
 
[¶20]   The district court ruled that Mr. 
Cook was entitled to a three month redemption period under subsection (a) 
instead of a 12 month redemption period under subsection (b).  The court explained that, although the 
property arguably fell within subsection (c)'s definition of "agricultural real 
estate," under subsection (b) the 12 month period only applies to mortgaged 
agricultural property.  Because the 
execution sale in this case involved foreclosure of a judgment rather than a 
mortgage, subsection (a) applied and provided only a three month redemption 
period.   

 
 
[¶21]   "The right to redeem is purely 
statutory; therefore, redemption may only occur in strict compliance with the 
statutes that govern it."  Jessen v. Jessen, 2002 WY 33, ¶ 12, 41 P.3d 543, 546 (Wyo. 2002).  As we 
explained earlier in this decision, our goal in interpreting statutes is to 
effectuate the legislature's intent.  
We give effect to the clear and unambiguous language of the statute.  Rules of statutory construction are 
applied only if the statutory language is ambiguous or subject to varying 
interpretations.  Statutory 
interpretation is a question of law we review de novo.  Chevron, ¶¶ 10, 13, 154 P.3d at 334-35; 
Powder River, ¶ 6, 38 P.3d  at 
426.

 
 
[¶22]   Subsection (a) states that 
"[e]xcept as provided with respect to agricultural real estate, it is lawful for 
any person . . . whose real property has been sold by virtue of an execution, 
decree of foreclosure, or foreclosure by advertisement and sale within three (3) 
months from the date of sale, to redeem the real estate . . ."  Thus, the legislature clearly stated in 
subsection (a) that, with the exception of specific provisions for agricultural 
property, the redemption period  is 
three months.  

 
 
[¶23]   In delineating the 12 month 
redemption period in subsection (b), the legislature referenced only mortgaged 
agricultural property.  We have said 
that "omission of words from a statute is considered to be an intentional act by 
the legislature, and this court will not read words into a statute when the 
legislature has chosen not to include them".  Stutzman v. Office of Wyo. State Eng'r, 
2006 WY 30 ¶ 16, 130 P.3d 470, 475 (Wyo. 2006).  By referring exclusively to mortgaged 
property, the legislature clearly intended to omit other agricultural property 
from the reach of subsection (b).  
We conclude, as did the district court, that, although Mr. Cook's 
property may fall within the definition of agricultural real estate set out in § 
1-18-103(c), the 12 month redemption period in subsection (b) was limited to 
mortgaged agricultural property.  
Thus, the district court correctly ruled that the general three month 
redemption period in subsection (a) governed in this case.  

 
 

4.            
Contribution

 
 
[¶24]   Mr. Cook argues that he is entitled 
to contribution from Mr. and Mrs. Swires as they were also judgment debtors on 
the assigned Colorado judgments.  We 
are somewhat perplexed by this argument because, as far as we can discern from 
the record, the district court ruled in Mr. Cook's favor on this issue.  

 
 
[¶25]   After Mr. Swires filed his 
complaint to foreclose on the judgment, Mr. Cook counterclaimed against Mr. 
Swires and brought a third party complaint against Mrs. Swires, seeking an 
"offset" because they were equally liable for the Claus debt.  Mrs. Swires moved to dismiss Mr. Cook's 
third party complaint against her.  
The district court noted that Mr. Cook's counterclaim and third party 
complaint sought contribution from Mr. and Mrs. Swires.  The district court further found that 
the judgments held Adventure Stone, Mr. Cook, Mr. Swires and Mrs. Swires jointly 
and severally liable and that, to the extent Mr. Cook was required to pay more 
than his proportionate share of the judgment, he was entitled to 
contribution.    

 
 
[¶26]   The parties do not direct us to, 
and we have not located, anything in the record indicating the district court 
expressly reversed its ruling.  In 
fact, in a supplementary order issued February 11, 2008, the district court 
directed the parties to its earlier decision on the contribution issue.  Thus, under the current status of the 
record, Mr. Cook is entitled to contribution from Mr. Swires and Mrs. Swires if 
he has paid more than his proportionate share of the judgment 
debt.

 
 
[¶27]   Mr. Swires argues on appeal that 
Mr. Cook does not have standing to assert a claim for contribution and his claim 
is moot because the contribution claim actually belongs to the bankruptcy estate 
and his creditors, including Mr. Swires, would benefit from any contribution he 
received.  We believe Mr. Swires' 
argument is not really a standing or justiciability argument, but rather an 
argument that Mr. Cook is not the real party in interest.  A claim that a party is not the real 
party in interest is subject to waiver by failing to object in the district 
court.  See, Shepard v. Beck, 2007 WY 53, ¶ 10, 154 P.3d 982, 986 (Wyo. 2007).  Mr. 
Swires does not direct us to any place where he specifically argued to the 
district court that Mr. Cook was not the real party in interest on the 
contribution claim; consequently, he cannot raise that argument on appeal.  We will leave to the bankruptcy court 
the question of whether the bankruptcy estate may be reopened to recover any 
contribution Mr. Cook receives.  

 
 
[¶28]   Dismissed in part and affirmed in 
part.

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Section 1-17-704 states:

 
 
At the time of filing a foreign judgment, the judgment creditor or his 
attorney shall file with the clerk of court an affidavit setting forth the name 
and last known mailing address of the judgment debtor, and the judgment 
creditor.  The clerk shall promptly 
mail notice of the filing of the foreign judgment to the judgment debtor at the 
address given and shall make a note of the mailing in the docket.  The notice shall include the name and 
mailing address of the judgment creditor and the judgment creditor's attorney, 
if any, in this state.  The judgment 
creditor may mail a notice of the filing of the judgment to the judgment debtor 
and may file proof of mailing with the clerk.  Lack of notice of filing by the clerk 
shall not affect the enforcement proceedings if proof of mailing by the judgment 
creditor has been filed.  An 
execution or other process for enforcement of a foreign judgment shall not issue 
until five (5) days after the date the judgment is 
filed.