Title: PEOPLE OF MI V STEVE CARBIN

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED APRIL 3, 2001  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 
114799  
STEVE CARBIN,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
CORRIGAN, C.J.  
We granted leave to consider defendant’s claim that he  
was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel.  The  
trial court, acting as trier of fact, found defendant guilty  
of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b; MSA  
28.788(2), and sentenced him to a five to fifteen year term of  
 
 
 
imprisonment.  After a Ginther hearing1 ordered by the Court  
of Appeals, the trial court denied defendant’s motion for a  
new trial.  The Court of Appeals then affirmed defendant’s  
conviction in an unpublished opinion.2  We affirm the judgment  
of the Court of Appeals.  Defendant was not denied the  
effective assistance of trial counsel.  
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND  
The victim, a woman in her mid-thirties, worked at a  
private recreation center in Detroit.  On the evening of  
February 11, 1994, she stayed at work to close the facility.  
Sometime shortly after 9:00 p.m., when she believed that she  
was alone, she was attacked by two men who remained inside the  
building.  One of those men forcibly raped her. At trial, the  
victim identified defendant as the man who raped her. She  
could not identify her other attacker.  Defendant’s trial  
counsel argued that the victim identified the wrong man and  
that defendant could not have committed the crime because he  
had been locked inside the Detroit Psychiatric Institute at  
the time the crime occurred.  
The victim testified that she saw defendant’s face in the  
light for one minute when the attack began and then again for  
1 
 See People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922  
(1973).  
2  Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued January 22, 
1999, reh den March 25, 1999 (Docket No. 198969).  
2  
 
 
five or ten minutes during the rape itself.  She recognized  
defendant as one of the members of the recreation center.  
Although she did not know his name, she explained that she had  
seen him around the center before the rape:  
Q.  How is it that you know [defendant] from  
the past?  
A.  Because he’s a member at the center. He  
came upstairs when we had the floor exercise, and I 
had to get the supervisor one time to ask him to 
leave.
 And he left and stayed gone for awhile. 
Then he came back to the center, he came back up 
again the night of the floor exercise, and the 
exercise instructor she came back to the ceramics  
table 
and 
she 
said 
that 
the 
ladies 
were  
uncomfortable and could I have the young man to 
leave. And I went and told [the supervisor] again 
that he was upstairs and the ladies wanted him to 
leave.  
The victim also explained that defendant frequently came to  
the recreation center to swim hours before the pool was  
scheduled to open and waited outside or in the lobby.  When  
the pool opened, defendant entered, but stayed at the shallow  
end.  
The police did not immediately locate defendant because  
the recreation center did not have a picture of him.  After  
the February assault, the victim did not return to work at the  
recreation center until May.  She did not see defendant at the  
recreation center until September 1994.  When she first saw  
defendant at the recreation center after the rape, she  
immediately panicked and left the building. By the time she  
3  
 
called the police from her house, the center had already  
closed for the evening.  The next day, defendant once again  
came to the recreation center.
 This time, staff members  
alerted the police and defendant was arrested.  
In addition to the victim’s testimony, the prosecutor  
presented the testimony of the victim’s friend, who arrived at  
the recreation center shortly after the rape and called the  
police, and two police officers who responded to the initial  
call.  One of the police officers testified that they got the  
run at 9:35 p.m. and that they arrived at 9:40 p.m.  The  
victim, who appeared shaken, told the officers that she had  
been assaulted by two men, one of whom she knew.  
Defendant’s only witness at trial was Yvonne Bond,  
director of medical records at the Detroit Psychiatric  
Institute.  Bond testified that the institute’s medical  
records indicated that defendant had been involuntarily  
hospitalized at the institute on the day of the crime.  The  
records showed that defendant was present at 5:55 p.m. and  
10:30 p.m. on that day and that he was “locked up” and  
“couldn’t get out” during the interim hours.  
On cross-examination, Bond admitted that patients had  
escaped from the Detroit Psychiatric Institute in the past.  
She also explained that patients were not locked in their  
individual rooms.  Thus, she admitted, it was “conceivable”  
4  
 
 
 
that a patient could leave the sixth-floor psychiatric unit by  
making it past one set of locked doors to a hallway and a  
stairway leading down to the first floor exit.  In addition to  
the stairway, a locked elevator could be accessed if the door  
happened to open while the elevator was in use.3  
Regarding the medical records, Bond explained that  
detailed notes reflected defendant’s activities at the  
institute between the hours of 7:00 a.m. and 3:30 p.m. on the  
day of the crime.  These particular notes ceased at 3:30 p.m.,  
which was the end of a shift.  She also explained that the  
10:30 p.m. notation indicated that a nurse had given defendant  
a certificate in his room.  While she was never asked to  
explain her assertion that defendant was present at 5:55 p.m.,  
Bond did testify that a record showed that a doctor had seen  
defendant at 5:10 p.m.  
In making its findings of fact and conclusions of law,  
the trial court initially recounted the victim’s testimony in  
detail.  The judge explained that he believed the victim’s  
testimony “just from listening to her.”  Her identification  
testimony was credible because she was familiar with  
defendant’s face from previous observations.  Finally, the  
3  Bond did not clearly testify (1) whether the locked 
elevator was located outside the set of locked doors leading 
to the psychiatric unit, or (2) whether the stairway itself 
was also locked.  
5  
 
trial court explained that the victim displayed no bias  
against the defendant that would have prompted her to falsify  
the story.  
In rejecting defendant’s alibi defense, the court opined  
that 
the 
detailed 
notes 
regarding 
defendant’s 
whereabouts 
from  
7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. on the day of the crime established an  
“ironclad alibi” only for that specific period of time.  In  
contrast, defendant had presented no records to establish  
conclusively his presence at the institute when the crime was  
committed. Regarding the institute’s security measures, the  
trial court found that it was “not a lock down facility like  
the Wayne County Jail where there are guards and the like.”  
Accordingly, the trial court reasoned that it was “just  
speculation” that defendant could not have left the facility  
to commit the crime.  The trial court thus concluded that the  
prosecution had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that  
defendant was guilty of the crime of first-degree criminal  
sexual conduct.  
After trial, while defendant’s claim of appeal was  
pending, defendant’s first appellate counsel moved for  
defendant’s release on bond pending appeal.  In response to  
the bond motion, the trial court took testimony for purposes  
of assessing the substantiality of defendant’s grounds of  
appeal.
 Barbara Pettibone, a clinical social worker at  
6  
 
Detroit Psychiatric Institute, testified at the bond hearing  
that defendant, whom she recognized, had been involuntarily  
admitted to the institute at 1:30 p.m. on February 11, 1994,  
the day of the crime, and discharged on March 14, 1994. She  
explained that the institute was a “locked facility,” which  
meant that a person attempting to enter from the outside would  
ordinarily have to pass through either three locked doors or  
one keyed elevator and one locked door—except during visiting  
hours from 6:30 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. when the doors were not  
locked.  Pettibone also testified that she could not remember  
if she had previously been contacted by any other lawyer.  
On cross-examination, Pettibone explained that the staff  
routinely conducted a bed check each night “around” 11:00  
p.m., but that she was not positive regarding the exact time  
this was usually done.  She also acknowledged that no one  
could conclude with certainty whether a new patient such as  
defendant, who may not have been well-known to the staff after  
the afternoon shift change, “left or stayed” during the  
visiting hours.  Finally, Pettibone noted that maintenance  
workers were present at the facility with keys to the locked  
doors. After hearing Pettibone’s testimony, the trial court  
granted defendant’s motion and set bond in the amount of  
$25,000.4  
4 
 The prosecutor informs that, despite the Court of 
Appeals affirmance of his conviction, defendant remains on 
(continued...)  
7  
The Court of Appeals thereafter granted defendant’s  
motion to remand to the trial court for a Ginther hearing.  
The trial court once again took testimony from Pettibone  
regarding the security measures in place at the Detroit  
Psychiatric 
Institute.  In response to direct questioning from  
defendant’s 
second 
appellate 
counsel, 
Pettibone 
testified 
that  
she recalled seeing defendant at the institute on the day he  
was admitted.  In contrast to her testimony at the bond  
hearing that defendant had been admitted at 1:30 p.m. on  
February 11, 1994, Pettibone explained that the nursing notes  
indicated that defendant came to the facility at 7:00 a.m. on  
that day and was present through at least 3:00 p.m.  She also  
stated, more conclusively than in her testimony at the bond  
hearing, that a bed check had occurred at 11:00 p.m.  
With respect to the institute’s security, Pettibone  
explained that defendant would have been kept in a locked  
ward, behind at least two locked doors. While acknowledging  
that patients have escaped in the past, she opined that it  
would be “very difficult,” but “not impossible,” for a person  
to escape, and “impossible” to get back in through the “two or  
three locked doors” without a key or “having the door opened  
for them.”  Pettibone also explained that the front door would  
be locked from the outside after hours, that security guards  
4(...continued) 
bond pending appeal.  Consistent with this opinion, that bond  
may be revoked.  
8  
 
are sometimes present at the front door, and that maintenance  
persons have keys to the locked doors.  
On 
cross-examination, 
Pettibone 
conceded 
that, 
apart 
from  
her notes, she had no independent memory of seeing defendant  
on the day of the crime. Although she remembered defendant,  
she did not remember seeing him on that specific day.  She  
also testified that patients had escaped from the psychiatric  
unit in the past.  Finally, Pettibone admitted that her notes  
did not account for defendant’s whereabouts at 9:00 p.m. on  
the day of the crime.  
Defendant next called Dr. Kalappurakal Joseph, a  
psychiatrist at the institute. Joseph testified that he had  
only a vague memory of defendant and that, as a general  
matter, it would be very difficult for a patient to escape and  
return to the facility.  Defendant’s last witness was his  
first appellate counsel, Ben Gonek.  Gonek testified that  
defendant passed a polygraph examination conducted by the  
Detroit Police Department after the trial.5  He also testified  
that defendant had consistently maintained his innocence.  
Defendant was unable to call his trial counsel to testify  
5 
 Defendant makes no claim of ineffective assistance on  
the basis of the polygraph examination. Instead, he asserts 
without 
further 
explanation 
that 
it 
buttressed 
the 
credibility 
of Pettibone and Joseph.  The prosecutor has suggested that 
the polygraph test results may have been unreliable, given the 
state of defendant’s mental health.  
9  
 
because she died before the hearing.  
The trial court denied defendant’s motion for new trial.  
First, the testimony at the Ginther hearing had been  
essentially cumulative of Yvonne Bond’s medical records  
testimony at trial.  Especially noteworthy was that, like  
Bond’s trial testimony, nothing at the Ginther hearing  
verified defendant’s whereabouts between approximately 6:00  
p.m. and 10:30 p.m. on the day of the crime. Because of the  
cumulative nature of the testimony at the Ginther hearing, the  
trial court reasoned that defense counsel’s performance had  
fallen “below that which would be expected of an attorney of  
ordinary training and skill in criminal law” only if she had  
presented “no testimony at all” regarding defendant’s alibi.6  
The trial court then noted that the victim’s trial  
testimony had been especially compelling. In particular, it  
explained that the victim’s memorable prior contacts with  
defendant “enhanced her credibility in making an accurate and  
reliable identification.”  The court also observed that the  
victim had a good opportunity to observe defendant accurately  
at the time of the crime, and that she immediately told the  
police that she had been raped by a man whom she knew.  The  
6 In making this determination, the trial court relied on 
the standard set forth in People v Garcia, 398 Mich 250; 247 
NW2d 547 (1976).  That standard was rendered obsolete by  
People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298; 521 NW2d 797 (1994).  
10  
 
trial judge then stated that he had been impressed by the  
victim’s credibility while sitting as the trier of fact:  
Appellate counsel for [defendant], Mr. Gonek 
and Mr. Cripps, none of them have had occasion to 
look this complainant in the eye, judge her  
credibility, judge any motive to lie, judge to 
determine if she was making a mistake. I had that  
luxury and I remember her and she was a very 
believable witness.  There’s no doubt in her mind  
that this was the man who committed the rape.  
For these reasons, the trial court concluded that defendant  
had not been denied the effective assistance of counsel.  The  
trial court reached this conclusion without expressly stating  
whether it believed that defendant’s case had been prejudiced  
by trial counsel’s failure to call Pettibone and Joseph as  
witnesses.  
The 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
then 
affirmed 
defendant’s 
conviction  
in an unpublished per curiam opinion. 
In response to  
defendant’s argument that he had been denied the effective  
assistance of counsel, the panel concluded that defendant  
failed to overcome the presumption that his counsel had been  
effective under the constitutional standard.  The Court of  
Appeals reasoned that the Ginther hearing testimony did no  
more than the trial testimony to establish that defendant was  
locked in a mental institution on the night of the crime.  
Because 
both 
the 
trial testimony and Ginther 
hearing testimony  
tended to show that it would have been difficult, but not  
impossible, for defendant to escape and return without being  
11  
 
  
noticed, the Court of Appeals concluded that defendant failed  
to demonstrate that defense counsel’s decision to call Bond,  
rather than Pettibone and Joseph, was anything more than trial  
strategy. The panel also concluded that defendant failed to  
demonstrate the existence of a reasonable probability that,  
but for counsel’s failure to present these witnesses, he would  
have been acquitted.  
This Court initially denied defendant’s application for  
leave to appeal.  461 Mich 946 (2000).  On reconsideration, we  
vacated the denial order and granted defendant’s application  
for leave to appeal, limited to the question whether defendant  
was denied the effective assistance of counsel.  462 Mich 918  
(2000).  
II. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL  
A defendant seeking a new trial on the ground that trial  
counsel was ineffective bears a heavy burden.  To justify  
reversal under either the federal or state constitutions,7 a  
convicted 
defendant 
must 
satisfy 
the 
two-part 
test 
articulated  
by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v Washington,  
7 US Const, Am VI provides that the accused in a criminal 
prosecution “shall enjoy the right . . . to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” This requirement is 
made 
applicable 
to 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment 
due process clause.  Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335, 342; 83  
S Ct 792; 9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963).  Likewise, Const 1963, art 1, 
§ 20 provides that the accused in a criminal prosecution 
“shall have the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel 
for his . . . defense.”  
12  
 
 
 
  
 
466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984).  See People  
v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 302-303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994).  
“First, 
the 
defendant must show that counsel’s performance was  
deficient.  This requires showing that counsel made errors so  
serious that counsel was not performing as the ‘counsel’  
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, supra at 687.  
In so doing, the defendant must overcome a strong presumption  
that counsel’s performance constituted sound trial strategy.  
Id. at 690. 
“Second, the defendant must show that the  
deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687.  
To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show the  
existence of a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s  
error, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  
Id. at 694. 
“A reasonable probability is a probability  
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Id.  
Because the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating both  
deficient 
performance 
and 
prejudice, 
the 
defendant 
necessarily  
bears the burden of establishing the factual predicate for his  
claim.  See People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999).  
In this case, defendant argues that he was denied the  
effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel (1)  
failed to interview Pettibone and Joseph before the trial, and  
(2) failed to call Pettibone and Joseph to testify at  
defendant’s bench trial.  Defendant characterizes defense  
13  
counsel’s failure to call Pettibone and Joseph as a failure to  
present an alibi defense.  We agree with the Court of Appeals  
conclusion that defendant’s claim fails with respect to both  
parts of the Strickland test.  
Initially, we reject defendant’s argument that trial  
counsel’s performance was deficient in failing to interview  
Pettibone and Joseph before trial.  Nothing in the record  
establishes that trial counsel failed to investigate either  
Pettibone or Joseph before trial.  Although trial counsel was  
deceased, and thus could not testify regarding the extent of  
her efforts to investigate defendant’s alibi, neither  
Pettibone nor Joseph offered any helpful testimony regarding  
their contact or lack of contact with trial counsel in  
preparation for trial.  Pettibone testified only that she  
could not remember whether she had contact with a lawyer;  
Joseph provided no testimony on the subject of defense  
counsel’s 
pretrial 
preparation.  The fact that defense counsel  
called Bond to testify at trial demonstrates that she had  
conducted a pretrial investigation regarding defendant’s  
presence at the Detroit Psychiatric Institute on the day of  
the crime.  Absent any evidence regarding the extent of trial  
counsel’s pretrial investigation, especially with respect to  
the potential testimony of Pettibone and Joseph, we conclude  
that defendant failed to establish a necessary factual  
14  
predicate of this part of his ineffective assistance of  
counsel claim. See Hoag, supra at 6.  
Defendant’s ineffective assistance claim is thus reduced  
to 
an 
assertion 
that 
trial counsel’s performance was deficient  
because she failed to call Pettibone and Joseph to testify at  
trial.  As such, defendant cannot overcome the strong  
presumption that trial counsel’s failure to call these  
witnesses was strategic.  Contrary to defendant’s argument,  
counsel’s apparent decision not to present the testimony of  
the witnesses in question did not deprive defendant of an  
alibi defense. Bond testified at trial that medical records  
showed defendant to be present at the Detroit Psychiatric  
Institute at 5:55 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. and that he was “locked  
up” and “couldn’t get out” between those times.  Accordingly,  
defense counsel did present an alibi defense at trial.  
The testimony at the Ginther hearing did nothing more  
than Bond’s testimony to account specifically for defendant’s  
presence between 5:55 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. on the day of the  
crime.  If anything, this additional testimony only could have  
affected the quality of defendant’s alibi defense.  Viewed  
objectively, it is not at all clear that the quality of  
defendant’s alibi defense would have been improved with the  
addition of testimony from Pettibone and Joseph.  Joseph’s  
generalized testimony was vague and conclusory. As such, it  
15  
 
 
 
would have added nothing of substance to defendant’s alibi  
defense.  Although Pettibone’s testimony included more detail  
than Bond’s testimony regarding (1) the precise number of  
locked doors that defendant would have had to have traversed  
and (2) the obstacles defendant would have faced attempting to  
reenter the facility, she also was not an expert on the  
security measures employed at the Detroit Psychiatric  
Institute.  More importantly, Pettibone’s posttrial testimony  
included 
two 
new 
and 
important pieces of information favorable  
to the prosecution that were not part of Bond’s trial  
testimony.  First, contrary to Bond’s definite statement that  
defendant was “locked” in the facility between 5:55 p.m. and  
10:30 p.m., Pettibone testified that the supposedly “locked”  
doors were actually unlocked during visiting hours from 6:30  
p.m. to 8:00 p.m. on the day of the crime.8  Second, Pettibone  
acknowledged 
that 
maintenance 
workers 
were 
present 
after 
hours  
with keys to the locked doors.  
Although the failure to present cumulative testimony can  
amount to ineffective assistance of counsel under some  
circumstances, see People v Johnson, 451 Mich 115; 545 NW2d  
8  It seems likely that the shift in focus in the 
posttrial testimony from defendant’s likelihood of escaping 
from the Detroit Psychiatric Institute to defendant’s  
likelihood 
of 
reentering 
the 
facility 
was 
largely 
necessitated 
by Pettibone’s damaging testimony suggesting the ease with 
which a patient could “escape” during visiting hours.  
16  
637 (1996), this is not such a case. In Johnson, this Court  
held that the defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective in  
failing to call additional defense witnesses to give  
favorable, cumulative testimony.  The defendant was convicted  
of second-degree murder for shooting a man during an affray in  
a Pontiac tavern.  The tavern owner and defendant’s father  
testified that defendant did not shoot the victim.  A  
prosecution witness testified that defendant was the shooter.  
Defendant presented evidence that his trial counsel was aware  
of at least four other witnesses who would have testified that  
defendant did not shoot a gun during the affray.  Defense  
counsel’s testimony at the Ginther hearing did not suggest a  
strategic reason for his failure to call the cumulative  
witnesses.  Acknowledging that a trial is “not simply a  
balance scale,” this Court nevertheless found the exculpatory  
evidence to be so substantial that it could have changed the  
outcome of the trial.  Id. at 122. 
In contrast to the  
shooting at issue in Johnson, an alibi defense based on the  
extent of security measures taken at a mental hospital does  
not 
necessarily 
benefit 
from 
a 
number 
of 
different  
perspectives from different witnesses.  
While there is no obvious reason why one person generally  
familiar with the subject would be less persuasive than three,  
the presentation of only one witness has the advantage of  
17  
eliminating the possibility of distracting inconsistencies.  
Here, 
for 
example, 
Pettibone’s 
testimony 
regarding 
the 
precise  
times defendant was allegedly present in the facility (based  
on the medical records) differed somewhat from Bond’s. Most  
notably, Bond gleaned from the records that defendant was  
present in the unit at 10:30 p.m., less than one hour after  
the police responded to the crime. Pettibone testified only  
that a bed check took place at 11:00 p.m.  Given the problems  
with Pettibone’s and Joseph’s testimony, and the absence of  
any evidence that defense counsel’s decision to present only  
Bond’s 
testimony 
was 
not strategic, we conclude that defendant  
was not denied the effective assistance of counsel.  His claim  
fails the “performance” part of the Strickland test.  
For many of the same reasons, defendant’s claim also  
fails the “prejudice” part of the Strickland test. 
On the  
basis of the trial court’s findings of fact at trial, and its  
statements made in denying defendant’s motion for new trial,  
it is clear that (1) the marginal differences in the alibi  
testimony of Pettibone and Joseph would not have had a  
significantly greater effect on the trier of fact than did the  
testimony of Bond, and (2) the trier of fact was especially  
impressed with victim’s inherently credible trial testimony.  
Although the trial court did not expressly rule that the  
outcome at trial would have been the same had Pettibone and  
18  
 
 
 
 
Joseph been called to testify, it did state that their  
additional testimony was “for the most part, cumulative” and  
that the victim’s testimony that defendant was one of her  
attackers was “very believable.” Accordingly, on this record  
we cannot say that a reasonable probability exists that, but  
for counsel’s failure to call Pettibone and Joseph to testify  
at trial, the result of the proceeding would have been  
different.  Rather, we are confident that the result would  
have been precisely the same.  
Affirmed.  
CAVANAGH, WEAVER, KELLY, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred with CORRIGAN, C.J.  
19