Title: Commonwealth v. Jones

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Carrico, S.J. 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 030942 
SENIOR JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO 
 
 
 
March 5, 2004 
JAMES SYLVESTER JONES 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
The question for decision in this appeal is whether the 
Court of Appeals erred in holding that the doctrine of 
inevitable discovery was inapplicable to support the trial 
court’s refusal to suppress evidence seized in a search 
purportedly lacking in probable cause.  Finding the Court of 
Appeals’ holding erroneous, we will reverse. 
 
The question stems from indictments charging James 
Sylvester Jones (Jones) with attempted possession of cocaine 
and possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a 
felony.  In a bench trial, the court found Jones guilty of 
both offenses and sentenced him to serve a total of eight 
years in the penitentiary, with five and one-half years 
suspended. 
 
In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed 
the weapons conviction but reversed the cocaine conviction.  
We granted the Commonwealth an appeal from the reversal of the 
cocaine conviction.1 
 
The evidence shows that about 10:30 p.m. on July 23, 
2000, Officer Brian O’Donnell of the Charlottesville Police 
Department and two fellow officers were on patrol in response 
to numerous complaints of drug sales occurring at a residence 
located at 321 Sixth Street, S.W., in Charlottesville.  The 
officers approached the residence through the backyards of 
other homes and observed a group of men standing on the 
sidewalk in front of the residence. 
 
When the officers came into view, the men ran.  Officer 
O’Donnell flashed his light on Jones and saw that he had a gun 
in his right hand.  O’Donnell yelled “[g]un” and ordered Jones 
to “[g]et on the ground.”  O’Donnell then wrestled Jones to 
the ground and heard Jones’ gun hit the pavement “right beside 
[a] minivan.”  O’Donnell called to one of his fellow officers 
to “[g]et the gun, he put it under the van.”  O’Donnell placed 
Jones under investigative detention, handcuffed him, and began 
to search him.  While O’Donnell was conducting the search, the 
other officer recovered Jones’ gun, a revolver that appeared 
to be in operating condition. 
                     
 
2
 
1 In a separate petition, Jones appealed the Court of 
Appeals affirmance of his weapons conviction, but this Court 
refused his petition. (Record No. 031019, Sept. 9, 2003.)  
 
 In the search, O’Donnell found in Jones’ right rear 
pants pocket a “knotted plastic bag containing nine off-white, 
rock-like substances.”  At that point, O’Donnell arrested 
Jones for possession of drugs and transported him to the 
police station.  There, after Jones had been advised of his 
Miranda2 rights, he said that the rocks were cocaine worth 
approximately $120.00 and that he mixed the cocaine with 
marijuana.3 
 
Upon arrival at the police station but before 
interviewing Jones, Officer O’Donnell ran “a criminal history” 
on Jones, which, O’Donnell testified, he “would do in the 
normal ordinary course of business when [he finds] somebody in 
the possession of a firearm.”4  Jones’ criminal history 
disclosed he had been found guilty as a juvenile of an offense 
that would be a felony if committed by an adult.  He was then 
charged with the firearms offense. 
 
In considering Jones’ motion to suppress, the trial court 
stated that Officer O’Donnell’s detention of Jones was 
reasonable as a valid pat-down stop under Terry 5 but that 
O’Donnell did not have probable cause to search Jones.  Yet, 
                     
 
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
3 Upon analysis, the rocks were determined to be aspirin. 
 
4 Officer O’Donnell testified he did not conduct a record 
check with respect to the firearm at the time of arrest 
because he “was going to bring [Jones] to the police 
department and [he] didn’t have time to check.” 
 
3
 
5 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
the court continued, the discovery of the drugs would have 
been inevitable and, on this basis, the court denied Jones’ 
motion to dismiss. 
 
Jones concedes that his “initial detention was valid 
based on the officer observing him running away from the area 
with a firearm in hand,” and the Commonwealth does not 
question the trial court’s ruling that Officer O’Donnell did 
not have probable cause to search Jones.  Jones argues that 
once the trial court found the search was without probable 
cause, it should have excluded the evidence concerning the 
drugs and held the doctrine of inevitable discovery 
inapplicable.  The Commonwealth argues the trial court 
properly held that the doctrine was applicable. 
 
Ordinarily, evidence obtained as the result of an 
unlawful search is subject to suppression under the 
exclusionary rule.  Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 
(1914); Hart v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 283, 287, 269 S.E.2d 
806, 809 (1980).  However, not all illegally obtained evidence 
is subject to suppression.  Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963). 
 
One of the exceptions to the exclusionary rule is the 
doctrine of inevitable discovery.  This Court recognized the 
exception in Warlick v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 263, 266, 208 
S.E.2d 746, 748 (1974), and Keeter v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 
 
4
134, 140 n.2, 278 S.E.2d 841, 845 n.2, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 
1053 (1981).  Later, the Supreme Court of the United States 
recognized the exception in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 
(1984), the Court holding that evidence obtained by unlawful 
means is nonetheless admissible “[i]f the prosecution can 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
information ultimately or inevitably would have been 
discovered by lawful means.”  Id. at 444. 
 
In reversing the trial court on the ground that the 
doctrine of inevitable discovery was inapplicable in Jones’ 
case, the Court of Appeals cited its earlier decision in Walls 
v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 639, 656, 347 S.E.2d 175, 185 
(1986).  In turn, Walls cited and embraced United States v. 
Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 
1056 (1987).  In Cherry, the Fifth Circuit recognized the 
inevitable discovery rule enunciated by the Supreme Court in 
Nix but said the Supreme Court had failed to state what must 
be shown to establish that the discovery of evidence in a 
particular case is inevitable. 759 F.2d at 1204.  Filling this 
purported void and only citing one of its own decisions, 
United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037, 1042 n.2 (5th Cir. 
1980), the Fifth Circuit held that the prosecution must show: 
(1) a reasonable probability that the evidence in 
question would have been discovered by lawful means but 
for the police misconduct, (2) that the leads making the 
discovery inevitable were possessed by the police at the 
 
5
time of the misconduct, and (3) that the police also 
prior to the misconduct were actively pursuing the 
alternative line of investigation. 
 
Cherry, 759 F.2d at 1204; see also United States v. Hernandez-
Cano, 808 F.2d 779, 784 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 
918 (1987). 
 
The Court of Appeals found that the Commonwealth failed 
to satisfy items (2) and (3) of the Cherry test, and Jones 
cites this same failure on appeal.  With respect to item (2), 
the Court of Appeals said “[t]here was no specific complaint 
concerning Jones, so there were no leads for the police to 
follow prior to the police misconduct.”  While neither Cherry 
nor Walls specifies what is necessary to satisfy item (2), 
nothing in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Nix or our opinions 
in Warlick and Keeter suggests that, to be sufficient, a lead 
must relate to the specific offense with which the suspect is 
ultimately charged. 
 
Here, Officer O’Donnell had a lead sufficient to satisfy 
item (2).   After observing Jones fleeing the scene with a gun 
in hand, Officer O’Donnell, “pursuant to normal police 
practices,” United States v. Seals, 987 F.2d 1102,1108 (5th 
Cir. 1993), would have run “a criminal history” and discovered 
Jones’ prior adjudication of guilt for an offense equivalent 
to a felony, would have arrested Jones for the weapons 
offense, and then would have found the drugs on Jones’ person 
 
6
as a result of a search incident to arrest or pursuant to 
normal booking procedures. 
 
With respect to item (3) of the Cherry test, the Court of 
Appeals held the item was not satisfied because Officer 
O’Donnell “was not actively pursuing any alternative line of 
investigation.”  The Commonwealth urges us to reject item (3) 
because the test it creates is “unnecessarily rigid.”  Jones 
responds that the test is not unnecessarily rigid and that we 
should reject the Commonwealth’s proposal. 
 
Again, we find nothing in the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Nix or our opinions in Warlick and Keeter requiring a showing 
that the police were actively pursuing an alternative line of 
investigation.  And the precedential value of Cherry, upon 
which the Court of Appeals relied in Walls, is now suspect.  
Without mentioning its decision in Cherry or the requirement 
of an alternative line of investigation, the Fifth Circuit in 
United States v. Seals, supra, applied the inevitable 
discovery rule to uphold the challenged seizure of a vehicle 
following a search without a warrant.  The court stated that 
police procedures required an inventory of impounded vehicles, 
and the questioned evidence would have been inevitably 
discovered “during the normal inventory procedures” of the 
police department.  Id. at 1108. 
 
7
 
Other federal circuits have disapproved the requirement 
for an alternative line of investigation.  United States v. 
Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 745-46 (1st Cir. 1986); United States 
v. Thomas, 955 F.2d 207, 210 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Kennedy, 61 F.3d 494, 499-500 (6th Cir. 1995); United States 
v. Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F.2d 1392, 1399 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 
The Court of Appeals opined in Walls that the requirement 
for an alternative line of investigation is necessary to 
ensure “that the inevitable discovery exception will be 
applied consistently with the overall purpose of the 
exclusionary rule, which is to deter police misconduct.”  
2 Va. App. at 656, 347 S.E.2d at 185.  The court also said 
that a “ ‘contrary result would cause the inevitable discovery 
exception to swallow the [exclusionary] rule by allowing 
evidence otherwise tainted to be admitted merely because the 
police could have chosen to act differently and obtain the 
evidence by legal means.’ ”  Id.  (quoting Cherry, 759 F.2d at 
1205). 
 
However, as noted in Nix, while the prosecution should 
not be put “in a better position than it would have been in if 
no illegality had transpired,” 467 U.S. at 443, neither should 
the prosecution be “put in a worse position simply because of 
some earlier police error or misconduct” when the evidence 
would inevitably have been discovered.  Id.  The requirement 
 
8
 
9
for an alternative discovery line of investigation would tip 
the scales against the prosecution and put it in a worse 
position than it would have been in had no illegality 
transpired.  And, if the requirement is allowed to stand, 
rather than having the exception swallow the rule, the 
requirement would swallow the exception.  Eliminating the 
requirement would level the playing field. 
 
It is clear, at least ”by a preponderance of the 
evidence,” Nix, 467 U.S. at 444, that the drugs “ultimately 
and inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.”  
Id.  The trial court did not err, therefore, in admitting the 
evidence related to drugs under the doctrine of inevitable 
discovery.  Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals, reinstate the judgment of conviction, and 
enter final judgment in favor of the Commonwealth. 
Reversed and final judgment.