Title: Milwaukee Police Ass’n v. City of Milwaukee

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2018 WI 86 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP2375 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Milwaukee Police Association and Michael 
Crivello, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
Milwaukee Professional Fire Fighters 
Association, Local 215 and David R. Seager, Jr., 
          Intervenors-Plaintiffs-Co-Appellants- 
          Petitioners, 
     v. 
City of Milwaukee, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 375 Wis. 2d 326, 897 N.W.2d 67 
(2017 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 6, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 14, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Timothy G. Dugan 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
R.G. BRADLEY, J., concurs, joined by GABLEMAN, 
J. (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J., dissents, joined by A.W. BRADLEY 
J. (opinion filed). 
KELLY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs filed by Jonathan Cermele and Cermele & Matthews, S.C., 
Milwaukee.  There was an oral argument by Jonathan Cermele. 
 
For 
the 
intervenors-plaintiffs-co-appellants-petitioners, 
there were briefs filed by Christopher J. MacGillis, Sean E. 
Lees, and MacGillis Wiemer, LLC, Wauwatosa. There was an oral 
argument by Christopher J. MacGillis. 
 
 
2 
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Stuart S. Mukamal, assistant city attorney; Grant F. Langley, 
city attorney; and Miriam R. Horwitz, deputy city attorney.  
There was an oral argument by Stuart S. Mukamal. 
 
 
2018 WI 86
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP2375 
(L.C. No. 
2014CV8688) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Milwaukee Police Association and Michael 
Crivello, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
Milwaukee Professional Fire Fighters 
Association, Local 215 and David R. Seager, 
Jr., 
 
          Intervenors-Plaintiffs-Co-Appellants-
 
Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Milwaukee, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 6, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   When the Employee 
Retirement System (ERS) was created for the City of Milwaukee 
(the City) in 1937, the State granted each employee-member of 
the ERS the right to vote for the election of three employees to 
serve on the ERS Annuity and Pension Board (the Board) comprised 
of seven members.  In 1947, the State granted all first class 
No. 
2015AP2375   
 
2 
 
cities the opportunity to manage the ERS pursuant to the 
exercise of home rule powers.  However, the State also protected 
individual rights of those persons who were members of an ERS 
because the State precluded amendment or alteration that 
modified "the annuities, benefits or other rights of any persons 
who are members of the system prior to the effective date of 
such amendment."  § 31(1), ch. 441, Laws of 1947. 
¶2 
In 1967, the City exercised its home rule over the 
ERS, consistent with the State's protections of individual 
member rights.  However, in 2013, the City amended its charter 
ordinance and reduced the voting rights of employees.  Each 
employee-member was permitted to vote for only one employee to 
serve on the Board, rather than three, and employees could no 
longer vote for the employees of their choice.  The City also 
gave the mayor three appointments, thereby increasing the size 
of the Board to eleven members.   
¶3 
Milwaukee 
Police 
Association 
(MPA) 
members 
and 
Milwaukee Professional Fire Fighters Association (MPFFA) members 
challenged the 2013 amendment, saying that it altered the "other 
rights" of employee-members of the ERS who were members prior to 
the amendment in violation of State law.   
¶4 
Upon 
review, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
City's 
2013 
amendment to its charter ordinance that reduced each individual 
employee-member's right to vote for three employees of his or 
her choice to serve on the Board, while diluting employees' 
voice on the Board, modified "other rights" and therefore, is 
contrary to State law.  Accordingly, for the reasons stated more 
No. 
2015AP2375   
 
3 
 
fully below, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and 
restore the right of employee-members to vote for three 
employees of their choice to serve as employee-members of the 
Board.  We also return the Board's size to its size prior to 
2013.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶5 
In 1937, the State established the ERS and its 
administrative powers and responsibilities for cities of the 
first class.  Ch. 396, Laws of 1937.  The "administration and 
responsibility for the proper operation of the retirement 
system" were "vested" in the Board.  Id., § 7(1).  The 1937 Law 
established classifications for Board positions and the right of 
employees to elect three employees to serve as Board members.  
Relevant to our discussion of MPA's and MPFFA's challenge, the 
Law provided: 
(2) MEMBERSHIP.  The membership of the board 
shall consist of the following: 
(a) Three members to be appointed by the chairman 
of the common council or other governing body (subject 
to the confirmation by such common council or other 
governing body), for a term of three years, 
(b) The city comptroller ex-officio, 
(c) Three employe[e] members who shall be members 
of the retirement system and who shall be elected by 
the members of the retirement system for a term of 
three years according to such rules and regulations as 
the board shall adopt to govern such election.  The 
initial terms of the first three members so elected 
shall expire at the end of one, two and three years, 
respectively.  Following the completion of the initial 
terms, the terms of the office of such members shall 
be three years. 
No. 
2015AP2375   
 
4 
 
§ 7(2), ch. 396, Laws of 1937.  
¶6 
If a vacancy occurred "in the office of a board 
member," the 1937 Law provided that "the vacancy shall be filled 
for the unexpired term in the same manner as the office was 
previously filled."  Id., § 7(3).  Each Board member had one 
vote.  "Four votes shall be necessary for a decision by the 
members of the board at any meeting of the board."  Id., § 7(5).   
¶7 
The 1937 Law also provided that it is the Board's 
responsibility to "establish rules and regulations for the 
administration of the funds created by this act and for the 
transaction of its business."  Id., § 7(6).  The Board members 
were "trustees of the several funds of the system," and given 
the "full power [and] sole discretion to invest and re-invest."  
Id., § 9(1).    
¶8 
In 1947, in order to give all first class cities such 
as Milwaukee "the largest measure of self-government with 
respect to pension annuity and retirement systems," the State 
amended its 1937 ERS enactment and granted the City the 
opportunity to assume responsibility for the ERS, whereby the 
City could "amend or alter the provisions" of the ERS "in the 
manner prescribed by section 66.01 of the statutes."  § 31(1), 
ch. 441, Laws of 1947.  However, in so doing, the legislation 
did not give the City carte blanche to amend the ERS as it 
pleased.  Rather, the law explicitly limited the City's power, 
providing that "no such amendment or alteration [to the ERS] 
shall modify the annuities, benefits or other rights of any 
No. 
2015AP2375   
 
5 
 
persons who are members of the system prior to the effective 
date of such amendment or alteration."  Id. 
¶9 
In 1967, the City, by charter ordinance, exercised 
home rule over the ERS.  The City adopted the language from 
§ 31(1) of the 1947 Law nearly verbatim.  The City's home rule 
as it appears in its charter ordinance states: 
For the purpose of giving to cities of the first class 
the largest measure of self-government with respect to 
pension, annuity and retirement systems compatible 
with the constitution and general law, it is hereby 
declared to be the legislative policy that all future 
amendments and alterations to this act are matters of 
local affair and government and shall not be construed 
as an enactment of statewide concern.  Cities of the 
first class are hereby empowered to amend or alter the 
provisions of this act in the manner prescribed by 
s. 66.0101, 
Wis. 
Stats., 
provided 
that 
no 
such 
amendment or alteration shall modify the annuities, 
benefits or other rights of any persons who are 
members of the system prior to the effective date of 
such amendment or alteration. 
Milw., Wis., Charter Ord. § 36-14 (emphasis added).  Following 
the City exercising its home rule power, the voting rights of 
ERS members who were employees remained the same as that 
provided by statute when the ERS was created.  That is, 
employees continued to have the right to vote for three 
employees to serve as members to the Board.  Milw., Wis., 
Charter Ord. § 36-18-2. 
¶10 In 1972, the City amended its charter ordinance, 
changing the composition of the Board.  The amendment added a 
retired employee as a member of the Board, elected by other 
retired employees.  Milw., Wis., Charter Ord. § 36-15-2(d).  
This change did not limit the voting rights of employee-members, 
No. 
2015AP2375   
 
6 
 
who continued to have the right to elect three employees of 
their choice to serve as members of the Board.  Id. 
¶11 In 2013, the City again amended its charter ordinance.  
The 2013 amendment significantly reduced the voting rights of 
employees to select employees as members of the Board.  MPA 
members were limited to electing only one Board member, and that 
person had to be a police officer.  Milw., Wis., Charter Ord. 
§ 36-15-(2)(c).  MPFFA employees voting rights were similarly 
reduced so that they too could elect only one Board member and 
they could select only a firefighter.  Id.  And finally, the 
City limited the voting rights of all other employee-members of 
the ERS such that they could vote for only one Board member who 
could be neither a police officer nor a firefighter.  Id. 
¶12 The 2013 amendment also increased the size of the 
Board to eleven members.  While the chairman of the common 
council continued to appoint three Board members, pursuant to 
the amendment, the mayor was given power to appoint three 
additional Board members.  Id., § 36-15-(2)(a-3). 
¶13 MPA challenged the 2013 changes to the ERS in circuit 
court, seeking declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction.  
In so doing, MPA alleged that the 2013 amendment infringed on 
the rights of police officers to vote for three employees to 
serve as ERS Board members, and to participate in a Board of 
similar size to that provided in the State's 1947 delegation to 
the City.   The circuit court allowed MPFFA, who sought the same 
relief, to intervene. 
No. 
2015AP2375   
 
7 
 
¶14 The City and MPA filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment, and the circuit court ruled in favor of the City, 
concluding that the modifications of the ERS were lawful.1  In 
its oral ruling, the circuit court concluded that "under the 
circumstances[,] the other rights provisions of the statute and 
the charter do not include a specific right to the makeup of the 
board," and "the city's modification of the makeup of the board 
does not affect any of the rights of the members."  The circuit 
court did not address the curtailment of individual employee's 
right to vote to elect three employees to serve as Board 
members.   
¶15 On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit 
court, relying in large part on Stoker v. Milwaukee Cty., 2014 
WI 130, 359 Wis. 2d 347, 857 N.W.2d 102.  The court of appeals 
concluded that there were no vested rights to the size, 
composition, and manner of election of the Board and that "the 
City is entitled to amend, on a prospective basis" these matters 
"because the members of the retirement system do not have any 
rights 
in 
those 
matters." 
 
Milwaukee 
Police 
Ass'n, 
No. 2015AP2375, unpublished slip op., ¶21 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 
23, 2017).  As with the circuit court, the court of appeals 
ignored individual employee's right to vote to elect three 
employees to serve as Board members.  The court of appeals did 
so by shifting the focus of its discussion to the Board's "size, 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Timothy G. Dugan of Milwaukee County 
presided.   
No. 
2015AP2375   
 
8 
 
composition, and manner of elections," rather than considering 
individual employee's statutory right to vote or whether they 
had a meaningful voice in Board decisions.  Id., ¶17.    
¶16 MPA and MPFAA sought review of the court of appeals' 
decision; we granted review.  For the reasons set forth below, 
we reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶17 This case is before us on summary judgment granted to 
the City.  We review summary judgments independently.  Grygiel 
v. Monches Fish & Game Club, Inc., 2010 WI 93, ¶12, 328 Wis. 2d 
436, 787 N.W.2d 6.  Here, summary judgment turns on statutory 
interpretation 
that 
we 
also 
address 
independently, 
while 
benefitting from the discussions of the court of appeals and the 
circuit court.  Voces De La Frontera v. Clarke, 2017 WI 16, ¶12, 
373 Wis. 2d 348, 891 N.W.2d 803.   
¶18 Furthermore, we independently decide, as a matter of 
law, whether a matter is primarily of statewide concern, Black 
v. City of Milwaukee, 2016 WI 47, ¶30, 369 Wis. 2d 272, 882 
N.W.2d 333.    
B.  Statute/Ordinance Interaction 
¶19 Municipal corporations have only those powers that 
were 
specifically 
conferred 
on 
them 
and 
those 
that 
are 
necessarily implied by the powers conferred.  Van Gilder v. City 
of Madison, 222 Wis. 58, 73, 268 N.W. 108 (1936); Butler v. City 
of Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 546 (*493), 550 (*497) (1862).   
No. 
2015AP2375   
 
9 
 
¶20 The City, through statutory delegation from the State 
and its enactment of charter ordinance pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0101 (2015-16),2 has home rule powers permitted by Article 
XI, § 3(1) of the Wisconsin Constitution, some of which bear on 
the ERS.3  Black, 369 Wis. 2d 272, ¶4.      
¶21 In the case before us, the State permitted the City to 
exercise home rule over many ERS provisions.  Ch. 441, Laws of 
1947.  The City began to exercise those powers in 1967.  
However, notwithstanding the City's home rule powers, certain 
aspects of the ERS continued to be matters of statewide concern.  
See e.g., Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 2014 WI 99, ¶95, 358 
Wis. 2d 1, 851 N.W.2d 337 (concluding that Wis. Stat. § 62.623 
(2011–12), which prohibited the City from paying employees' 
shares of ERS contributions, was a matter of statewide concern 
and therefore, § 62.623 superseded the City's home rule powers).  
Furthermore, the delegation of authority to the City in regard 
to the ERS was specifically limited by the legislature's 1947 
enactment.  The City was given no power to "modify the 
annuities, benefits or other rights of persons who are members 
of the system."   
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 Cities and villages organized pursuant to state law may 
determine their local affairs and government, subject to the 
Wisconsin Constitution and to such enactments of the legislature 
of statewide concern as with uniformity shall affect every city 
or village.  The method of such determination shall be 
prescribed by the legislature.  Wis. Const. art. XI, § 3(1).    
No. 
2015AP2375   
 
10 
 
1.  "Other rights" 
¶22 The City's management of the ERS arises through 
legislative delegation as a "matter[] of local affair[s] and 
government."  § 31(1), ch. 441, Laws of 1947.  Through this 
delegation, the City was given the power to "amend or alter" the 
ERS to best suit the needs of the system.  However, an important 
limitation was placed on the City; it was precluded from 
modifying "the annuities, benefits or other rights of any 
persons who are members of the system . . . ."  Id. (emphasis 
added).   
¶23 At oral argument all parties seemed to agree that 
neither the employees' right to vote for three employees to 
serve as members of the Board nor the size of the Board comes 
within "annuities" or "benefits."  The City did not contest that 
employees are "persons who are members of the system."   
¶24 Where the disagreement lies is with the meaning of 
"other rights."  That disagreement is two-fold:  (a) whether 
each employee-member has the right to vote to elect three 
employees to serve as Board members, and (b) whether the Board 
must remain of a similar size to that originally established 
under the 1947 Law, wherein the State specifically limited the 
City's management powers over the ERS.  We address each 
contention in turn. 
a.  Employee voting rights 
¶25 The ERS was created by the legislature to provide 
benefits for City employees at their retirement and to pay 
benefits to the widows and children of deceased employees.  
No. 
2015AP2375   
 
11 
 
Ch. 396, Laws of 1937.  The Board was charged with the 
responsibility to establish rules and regulations for conducting 
Board business.  Id., § 7(6).  Board members were "trustees" of 
the funds they managed, in which the Board had "full power in 
its sole discretion to invest and re-invest."  Id., § 9(1).   
¶26 In 1937, each employee who was an ERS member was 
granted voting rights sufficient to elect three employees of his 
or her choice to become Board members.  Id., § 7(2)(c).  Those 
employee voting rights assured that the interests of employees, 
for whom the ERS was created, would have a meaningful voice in 
Board decisions.  Stated more fully, employee-elected Board 
members were positioned to have oversight of the ERS so that its 
funds would not be wasted and employees left without income 
after years of work.  
¶27 In 
1947, 
when 
the 
State 
granted 
the 
City 
the 
opportunity to manage the ERS through enactment of a home rule 
charter ordinance, the State limited the City's ability to amend 
or alter the ERS.  The State specifically protected employees by 
providing that the City could not "modify the annuities, 
benefits or other rights of any persons who are members of the 
system prior to the effective date of such amendment or 
alteration."  § 31(1), ch. 441, Laws of 1947 (emphasis added).   
¶28 "Other rights" is not a legislatively defined term.  
Accordingly, we interpret "other rights" to give meaning to the 
legislative mandate by which the State limited the City's power 
to amend or alter the ERS.  State ex rel Kalal v. Circuit Court 
for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.   
No. 
2015AP2375   
 
12 
 
¶29 The purpose of a statute informs our interpretation of 
statutory terms.  McNeil v. Hansen, 2007 WI 56, ¶16, 300 Wis. 2d 
358, 731 N.W.2d 273 (citing Klein v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. 
Wis. Sys., 2003 WI App 118, ¶13, 265 Wis. 2d 543, 666 N.W.2d 67 
(concluding that statutory interpretation that contravenes the 
purpose of a statute is disfavored)).  If a statute is capable 
of a reasonable construction that carries out the manifest 
purpose of the enactment, that construction should be given.  
Westmas v. Creekside Tree Serv., Inc., 2018 WI 12, ¶19, 379 
Wis. 2d 471, 907 N.W.2d 68.  Statutory terms are interpreted in 
the context in which they occur, not in isolation.  State ex rel 
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  Ejusdem generis4 is a canon of 
statutory construction that is sometimes employed to arrive at 
the meaning of a term from the context in which the term 
appears.  Milwaukee Journal Sentinel v. DOA, 2009 WI 79, ¶44, 
319 Wis. 2d 439, 768 N.W.2d 700. 
¶30 That annuities and benefits are rights of employees, 
is not contested by the City.  Furthermore, a plain reading of 
the statute where annuities and benefits precede "other rights" 
in the same sentence implies that "other rights" are of the same 
type, i.e., ERS rights belonging to employees, Auto-Owners Ins. 
                                                 
4 Ejusdem generis is "A canon of construction holding that 
when a general word or phrase follows a list of specifics, the 
general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only items 
of the same class as those listed."  Ejusdem Generis, Black's 
Law Dictionary 631 (10th ed. 2014).  It literally means "of the 
same kind."  Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. City of Appleton, 2017 WI 
App 62, ¶17, 378 Wis. 2d 155, 902 N.W.2d 532. 
No. 
2015AP2375   
 
13 
 
Co. v. City of Appleton, 2017 WI App 62, ¶17, 378 Wis. 2d 155, 
902 N.W.2d 532, as contrasted with ERS rights belonging to the 
City.   
¶31 "Annuity" is a defined term that focuses on financial 
payments for the welfare of ERS members and their families. 
§ 1(6), ch. 396, Laws of 1937.  However, although ch. 441, Laws 
of 1947 did not define "other rights," the 1947 legislation did 
explain that the "purpose of safeguarding the stability of 
pension systems" was an important concern.  § 31(2), ch. 441, 
Laws of 1947.  Safeguarding ERS stability is promoted by 
employee-participation in the Board because it is employees, 
current and past, for whom stability of the ERS is critical.  
Preamble to ch. 396, Laws of 1937.   
¶32 With that clearly stated purpose in mind, the phrase, 
"other rights" easily encompasses employee voting rights because 
employee members of the Board are in a unique position to 
oversee the Board's use of funds and thereby safeguard the 
financial stability of the ERS.  Employees have the most to gain 
from a financially stable ERS because the ERS directly impacts 
their financial security upon retirement.  In addition, it is 
employees who will suffer most if ERS funds are lent to a cause 
that returns a worthless promissory note in exchange for the 
funds that the Board manages, as has occurred in other states.5   
                                                 
5 See Illinois Pension Problem:  Coming to a State Near You, 
USA Today, July 12, 2017; Rachel Greszler, How Big Is Your 
State's Share of $6 Trillion in Unfunded Pension Liabilities?, 
The Daily Signal, Dec. 20, 2017.   
No. 
2015AP2375   
 
14 
 
¶33 And finally, the term, "other rights," occurs in a 
series of financially related terms, e.g., annuities and 
benefits that affect employees.  It is reasonable to conclude 
that § 31(1) of the 1947 enactment meant the phrase "or other 
rights" to include employee ERS rights bearing on financial 
matters in addition to annuities and benefits.  This context 
assists 
in 
interpreting 
the 
meaning 
of 
"other 
rights."  
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 319 Wis. 2d 439, ¶44.   
¶34 We conclude that the term, "other rights," includes 
the right of each individual employee-member of the ERS to vote 
for three employees of his or her choice to become members of 
the Board and thereby oversee the continued financial stability 
of the ERS.  Stated otherwise, it was these other financially-
related rights of individual employee-members that the State 
required the City not amend or alter.  As we have explained 
above, the right of each employee to vote to elect three 
employee members to serve on the ERS Board promotes financial 
stability for the ERS.  
b.  Board size 
¶35 When the Board was established in 1937, it had seven 
members, three of whom were current City employees, three of 
whom were political appointees.  § 7(2), ch. 396, Laws of 1937.  
Each Board member had one vote, and a Board decision required 
four votes.  Id., § 7(5).  The Board size remained the same in 
1947 when the State granted the City the opportunity to assume 
responsibility for the ERS and in 1967 when the City enacted its 
charter ordinance, availing itself of that opportunity.   
No. 
2015AP2375   
 
15 
 
¶36 In 1972, the City amended its charter ordinance to 
increase the Board's size to eight.  Milw., Wis., Charter Ord. 
§ 36-15-2(d).  A Board position for a retired employee, who was 
elected by retired employees, was added.  Id.  This decision did 
not dilute the employees' opportunity to oversee financial 
decisions of the Board.  Financial stability of the Board was 
paramount for retired employees too. 
¶37 In 2013, the City gave the mayor the power to appoint 
three Board members, thereby increasing the Board size to 
eleven.  Milw., Wis., Charter Ord. § 36-15-2(a-3).  Thereafter, 
six of the eleven Board members were political appointees.  This 
increase in board size with political appointees diluted the 
employees' ability to have the Board address concerns they may 
have about ERS's financial stability. 
¶38 In the matter before us, the Board was given the 
administrative responsibility for the operation of the ERS.  
§ 7(6), ch. 396, Laws of 1937.  For example, the Board was given 
the responsibility to "establish rules and regulations for the 
administration of the funds."  Id.  Board members were 
denominated, "trustees," of the assets under their care.  Id., 
9(1).  Although this change in the size of the Board did not 
affect the Board's purpose or its obligations, it did affect the 
employees' voice in regard to Board decisions.  With three 
appointments made by the chairman of the common council and 
three appointments made by the mayor, political appointees could 
control all Board decisions, including those affecting the 
financial stability of ERS.   
No. 
2015AP2375   
 
16 
 
¶39 We conclude that having a meaningful voice on the 
Board is among the "other rights" of employees that the City was 
not free to alter or modify under its home rule authority.  
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals conclusion that 
increasing the size of the Board to eleven members did not 
conflict with State law.     
2.  Statewide concern 
¶40 We next consider whether promoting financial stability 
of the ERS is a matter primarily of statewide concern, primarily 
of local concern or a combination of the two.  Madison Teachers, 
358 Wis. 2d 1, ¶96.  When there is a conflict between a home 
rule ordinance and countervailing state legislation, if the 
matter 
is 
exclusively 
of 
statewide 
concern, 
the 
statute 
controls.  Id., ¶116; see also DeRosso Landfill Co. v. City of 
Oak Creek, 200 Wis. 2d 642, 647, 547 N.W.2d 770 (1996).    
¶41 Furthermore, when a law concerns a policy matter 
primarily 
of 
statewide 
concern, 
home 
rule 
powers 
are 
insufficient to permit municipal regulation of the matter.  
Madison Teachers, 358 Wis. 2d 1, ¶97 (citing Van Gilder, 222 
Wis. at 84.)  If a matter is primarily of local concern, the 
State nevertheless may regulate the matter so long as the State 
does so with uniformity.  Id., ¶99.   
¶42 It is within the purview of the legislature to enact 
statutes that regulate for the benefit of public health, safety 
and welfare.  Black, 369 Wis. 2d 272, ¶5.  Stability of the ERS 
was a concern of the legislature in 1947 when it created the 
opportunity for home rule management.  § 31(2), ch. 441, Laws of 
No. 
2015AP2375   
 
17 
 
1947.  The financial stability of the ERS affects the welfare of 
present and past ERS members and their families.   
¶43 Legislative protection of retirement benefits for 
employees, as well as for widows and children of deceased 
employees, is a matter of public welfare, and therefore, 
primarily of statewide concern.  Madison Teachers, 358 Wis. 2d 
1, ¶97.  A financially stable ERS is promoted by the 
legislature's grant of the right to each employee-member to 
elect three employees to serve on the Board where their number 
gives a meaningful voice to employees' concern for financial 
stability of the ERS.  Stated otherwise, through their right to 
vote to elect employees who will have Board participation with a 
meaningful voice, employees can assure that present and future 
financial stability of the ERS remain paramount.  Accordingly, 
the voting rights of individual employees for membership on a 
Board that does not unduly dilute their participation supports 
and is intertwined with a matter of statewide concern. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶44 We conclude that the City's 2013 amendment to its 
charter ordinance that reduced each individual employee-member's 
right to vote for three employees of his or her choice to serve 
on the Board while diluting employees' voice on the Board 
modified "other rights" and therefore is contrary to State law.  
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals in 
this regard and restore the right of employee-members to vote 
for three employees of their choice to serve as employee-members 
No. 
2015AP2375   
 
18 
 
of the Board.  We also return the Board's size to its size prior 
to 2013.     
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No.  2015AP2375.rgb 
1 
 
¶45 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
majority opinion but write separately to respond to the 
dissents. 
 
One 
dissent 
accuses 
the 
majority 
of 
having 
"manufactured" a right for the employee members of the Employee 
Retirement System of Milwaukee because the statutes do not 
define what "other rights" the Wisconsin legislature prohibits 
the City from modifying.  Justice Kelly's dissent, ¶103.  But 
when the legislature does not define a term, it is up to the 
judiciary to identify and declare its meaning, something neither 
dissent 
attempts. 
Another 
dissent 
says 
the 
majority's 
recognition of employee voting rights "borders on the absurd."  
Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶55.  However, the logical 
extension of the dissents' position would be to allow the City 
to disband the Employee Retirement System (ERS) Annuity and 
Pension Board (Board) altogether, thereby eliminating the entire 
administrative structure of the ERS.1   
¶46 The legislature "vested" "[t]he general administration 
and responsibility for the proper operation of the retirement 
system . . . in an annuity and pension board."  § 7(1), ch. 396, 
Laws of 1937.  The legislature also "vested" in the Board the 
responsibility "for making effective the provisions of this 
                                                 
1 The City, in fact, contends it has the right to completely 
eliminate the Board.  Justice Kelly’s dissent mischaracterizes 
my application of the Presumption Against Ineffectiveness 
principle (see Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:  
The Interpretation of Legal Texts 63 (2012)) and infra, ¶¶2, 3, 
5, as a "fear that the City will act recklessly."  Justice 
Kelly's dissent, ¶119.  My judgments are based on the law, not 
on emotion or value judgments about parties' actions, and 
Justice Kelly’s dissent is unable to identify any language in my 
concurrence to the contrary.  
No.  2015AP2375.rgb 
2 
 
act."  Id.  Accepting the dissents' construction of these laws 
would render both provisions utterly ineffective:  A retirement 
system would exist for the payment of benefits to employees but 
there would be no entity to administer or operate it.  No entity 
would exist to "mak[e] effective the provisions" of the law. 
¶47 "[T]he purpose of statutory interpretation is to 
determine what the statute means so that it may be given its 
full, proper, and intended effect."  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110.  "A textually permissible interpretation that 
furthers rather than obstructs the document's purpose should be 
favored."  Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:  The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 63 (2012).  "This canon follows 
inevitably from the facts that (1) interpretation always depends 
on context, (2) context always includes evident purpose, and (3) 
evident purpose always includes effectiveness."  Id.  "[W]e read 
the language of a specific statutory section in the context of 
the entire statute.  Thus, we interpret a statute in light of 
its textually manifest scope, context, and purpose."  Bosco v. 
LIRC, 2004 WI 77, ¶23, 272 Wis. 2d 586, 681 N.W.2d 157 (citing 
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶6, 48 n.8). 
¶48 In this case, we interpret the word "rights" in the 
context of the session laws, which gave the City "the largest 
measure of self-government with respect to" the ERS, including 
the right to amend and alter their provisions, except that the 
City is prohibited from modifying "annuities, benefits or other 
rights" of ERS members.  Because the non-technical word "rights" 
is not defined in the session laws, we ascertain and apply its 
No.  2015AP2375.rgb 
3 
 
ordinary meaning.  Town of Lafayette v. City of Chippewa Falls, 
70 Wis. 2d 610, 619, 235 N.W.2d 435 (1975).  A dictionary 
definition may guide our interpretation of a non-technical word 
the session laws do not define.  Spiegelberg v. State, 2006 WI 
75, ¶19, 291 Wis. 2d 601, 717 N.W.2d 641.  "It has come to be 
well understood that there is no more ambiguous word in legal 
and juristic literature than the word 'right.'"  Roscoe Pound, 
The Ideal Element in Law 110 (Stephen Presser ed., Liberty Fund 
2002) (1958).  Black's Law Dictionary includes among its 
definitions of "right" the following:  "Something that is due to 
a person by just claim, legal guarantee, or moral principle" and 
"[a] power, privilege, or immunity secured to a person by law."  
Right, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  Under the 1937 
law, Board membership "shall consist of the following:" three 
members appointed by the chairman of the common council, the 
city comptroller, and three members appointed by ERS members.  
§ 7(2), ch. 396, Laws of 1937.  In the context of the session 
laws 
we 
construe, 
the 
mandatory 
structure 
of 
the 
Board 
constitutes a statutory right——something due to city employees 
under the law.  One dissent concludes that after the 2013 
Amendment, the employees still have three representatives on the 
Board, so there is no violation.  Justice Kelly's dissent, 
¶¶109-10.  But this conclusion fails to give effect to the 
textual requirement of membership consisting of seven members——
no more and no less.  Because the 2013 Amendment adds three 
No.  2015AP2375.rgb 
4 
 
members appointed by the mayor, it violated the session law's 
mandate.2 
¶49 The dissents eschew the court's interpretation of 
"rights" under the session laws but both dissenters decline to 
interpret the word or give it any meaning whatsoever.  "It is, 
of course, a solemn obligation of the judiciary to faithfully 
give effect to the laws enacted by the legislature, and to do so 
requires a determination of statutory meaning."  Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶44 (emphasis added).  In accordance with this 
judicial duty, the court applies an interpretation that furthers 
the purpose of the session laws——ensuring the security of 
retirement and death benefits——by preserving the legislature's 
mandate of a Board to administer and operate the ERS.  The 
dissents' interpretation would obstruct this express legislative 
purpose by allowing the elimination of the Board, leaving the 
ERS without any entity to administer or operate it.  "An 
interpretation that contravenes the manifest purpose" of a law 
"is unreasonable."  State v. Dinkins, 2012 WI 24, ¶29, 339 
Wis. 2d 78, 810 N.W.2d 787. 
                                                 
2 Justice Abrahamson's dissent questions whether the court's 
decision in this case means that the 1972 amendment, which added 
the retiree position to the Board (thereby expanding its 
membership to eight), is also invalid.  Justice Abrahamson's 
dissent, ¶99.  That issue is not before us, no one apparently 
contested the 1972 amendment, and our decision in this case has 
no 
impact 
on 
that 
amendment. 
 
Justice 
Kelly's 
dissent 
misunderstands this statement as a validation of the 1972 
amendment adding a retiree member to the Board.  Justice Kelly's 
dissent, ¶¶125-26.  Again, the court does not decide whether the 
1972 amendment conforms with the Session Laws; no party 
presented that issue to us.    
No.  2015AP2375.rgb 
5 
 
¶50 The dissents maintain that the statutorily-prescribed 
Board composition is not a right of ERS members without any  
attempt to give meaning to this pivotal word.  But "[w]ithout 
some indication to the contrary, general words . . . are to be 
accorded their full and fair scope.  They are not to be 
arbitrarily limited."  Scalia & Garner, supra ¶3, at 101.  The 
dissents apparently "think that when courts confront generally 
worded provisions, they should infer exceptions for situations 
that the drafters never contemplated and did not intend their 
general 
language 
to 
resolve." 
 
Id. 
 
But 
"[t]raditional 
principles of interpretation reject this distinction because the 
presumed point of using general words is to produce general 
coverage——not to leave room for courts to recognize ad hoc 
exceptions."  Id.  Our interpretive task is, of course, easier 
when the legislature uses specific or defined terms, but when 
the legislature speaks broadly using general terms, "they must 
be given general effect."  Id.   
¶51 While the state legislature precluded the City from 
changing the composition of the Board, the legislature itself 
retains this power.3  The ERS, as well as the Board, are 
                                                 
3 Justice Kelly's dissent classifies my analysis as a 
"petitio principii error."  Justice Kelly's dissent, ¶129.  In 
plainer terms, he means it begs the question.  This argument 
distorts my analysis of the "other rights" clause.  I agree with 
Justice Kelly that this clause "is not a source of rights, it 
only protects rights that already exist elsewhere."  Id.  
Justice Kelly and I simply disagree as to whether Board 
composition is a right.  Justice Kelly also misrepresents my 
analysis by claiming that I "acknowledge the legislature can 
change the Board's composition without impacting any of the ERS 
members' rights."  Id., ¶28.  This concurrence says no such 
thing.  While Board composition is a right, it is statutory, not 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP2375.rgb 
6 
 
statutory creations.  Accordingly, they remain within the 
authority of the legislature to alter.  And while the state 
legislature delegated a broad measure of self-governance to the 
City 
with 
respect 
to 
the 
ERS, 
the 
people's 
elected 
representatives exempted from that transfer of authority any 
changes to city employees' benefits, annuities, and other 
rights.  What the legislature gives, it may take away——excluding 
any vested benefits.  Stoker v. Milwaukee Cty., 2014 WI 130, 
¶24, 359 Wis. 2d 347, 857 N.W.2d 102 ("[A] right that is 
unvested, by definition, can be taken away.").   
¶52 One dissent accuses the court of "roam[ing] the state 
looking for good ideas to enact" and legislating instead of 
adjudicating.  Justice Kelly's dissent, ¶¶103, 115.  Whether a 
smaller Board is a better idea than a larger Board is irrelevant 
to me.  Discerning the meaning of a law is the essence of the 
judicial function.  It requires the application of canons of 
interpretation, which serve as "guides to solving the puzzle of 
textual meaning, and as in any good mystery, different clues 
often point in different directions."  Scalia & Garner, supra 
                                                                                                                                                             
constitutional.  Accordingly, the legislature may change it, and 
that would certainly impact members' rights.  Because Board 
composition is an "other right" the City may not modify it; the 
legislature withheld this power from the City in its otherwise 
broad delegation of authority to the City.  This is not 
"illogic"; it is fundamental law. See Relyea v. Tomahawk Paper & 
Pulp Co., 102 Wis. 301, 304, 78 N.W. 412 (1899) ("[M]ere 
statutory rights may be conferred upon such conditions as in the 
wisdom of the legislature may seem best, and the conditions may 
be changed from time to time, even as to existing rights, or 
such rights may be taken away entirely, at the legislative 
will."). 
No.  2015AP2375.rgb 
7 
 
¶3, at 59.  While the principles of statutory interpretation are 
stable, it is not "always clear what results the principles 
produce."  Id. at 61.  Reaching a different result does not 
equate to legislating.  Judges "may arrive at differing 
reasonable readings because the legislature used imprecise 
terms."  Daniel R. Suhr, Interpreting Wisconsin Statutes, 100 
Marq. L. Rev. 969, 985 (citing Landis v. Physicians Ins. Co. of 
Wis., 2001 WI 86, ¶26, 245 Wis. 2d 1, 628 N.W.2d 893).4  
Statutory 
"provisions 
are 
neither 
to 
be 
restricted 
into 
insignificance, nor extended to objects not comprehended in 
them."  Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 332 (1827).  
The dissents' interpretation would render insignificant, if not 
altogether eliminate, the word "rights" from the text of the 
session laws.   I reject such a "'viperine' construction that 
kills the text."  Scalia & Garner, supra ¶3, at 40.  I therefore 
join the court in upholding the statutory right of City 
                                                 
4 Apparently because the legislature did not define the word 
"right" to encompass Board composition, Justice Kelly's dissent 
would remove Board composition from its scope.  Justice Kelly's 
dissent, ¶124.  Of course, the legislature did not define 
"right" at all.  As this concurrence explains, the legislature's 
linguistic imprecision does not relieve us of our obligation to 
interpret the language the legislature did use.  I agree that 
"[o]ur job in this case was not to delve into the [Session Laws] 
to discover all of the other rights they might confer on the ERS 
members . . . ." 
 
Justice 
Kelly's 
dissent, 
¶127. 
 
Our 
responsibility was to interpret the word "rights" and determine 
whether Board composition is among them.  The dissents do not 
interpret the word but merely disagree with the majority's 
analysis of it. 
No.  2015AP2375.rgb 
8 
 
employees to the legislatively-mandated5 composition of the ERS 
Board.6 
¶53 I am authorized to state that Justice MICHAEL J. 
GABLEMAN joins this concurrence. 
 
 
                                                 
5 Justice Kelly's dissent misrepresents the scope of my 
analysis.  Justice Kelly's dissent, ¶123.  It is not the fact 
that the Session Laws mandate the composition of the Board that 
removes the Board structure from the otherwise broad grant of 
authority of the City.  That mandate, like any other in the 
Session Laws, must be read in conjunction with the pivotal 
language that constrains the City's ability to modify the 
provisions governing the ERS under the "other rights" clause. 
Not every "legislative specification" constitutes a "right" of 
ERS members that the City may not disturb.   
6 Justice Kelly's dissent criticizes my opinion for being 
"short——to the point of nonexistence——on sources of law for its 
conclusion."  Justice Kelly's dissent, ¶119.  We both analyze 
the Session Laws, although we reach differing interpretations.  
I rely on nine cases and four secondary sources, including 
Black's Law Dictionary and Justice Antonin Scalia's renowned 
treatise on textual interpretation, to support my eight-page 
opinion.  Justice Kelly cites two cases in his sixteen-page 
opinion, and no precedent or authorities whatsoever in the seven 
pages he devotes to attacking my concurrence. 
No.  2015AP2375.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶54 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (dissenting).  The statute 
delegating authority to first class cities to administer their 
own retirement systems explicitly states that the statute's 
purpose is to allow all first class cities "the largest measure 
of 
self-government 
with 
respect 
to 
pension 
annuity 
and 
retirement systems[.]"  § 31, ch. 441, Laws of 1947.  How can 
this statutory statement of purpose be squared with the 
majority's interpretation of the 1947 Law?  It can't.   
¶55 The idea espoused by the majority that the legislature 
intended to afford cities "the largest measure of self-
government with respect to pension annuity and retirement 
systems" but did not intend to allow cities to change the 
composition of their municipal pension boards (essentially the 
governing bodies of their municipal retirement systems) borders 
on the absurd. 
¶56 In contrast to the majority, I would affirm the court 
of appeals.  I conclude that the size, composition, or manner of 
election of the Pension Board set forth in the 1947 Law and 
section 36-14 of the City Charter may be amended, altered, or 
modified.  Members of the Retirement System have the right to 
have their benefit commitments fulfilled, but they do not have a 
right to determine exactly how those benefit commitments are 
fulfilled.  Thus, I conclude that the 2013 Milwaukee Charter 
Amendment did not violate the 1947 Law or Section 36-14 of the 
City Charter by modifying the "annuities, benefits or other 
rights" of any persons who were members of the Retirement System 
prior to the effective date of the Amendment. 
No.  2015AP2375.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶57 Rather than provide a detailed critique of the 
majority opinion, I set forth below the opinion I think should 
have been written by the court. 
* * * * 
¶58 This is a review of an unpublished per curiam decision 
of the court of appeals affirming a judgment of the Circuit 
Court for Milwaukee County, Timothy G. Dugan, Judge.1  The 
circuit court granted the motion of the City of Milwaukee, the 
defendant, for summary judgment and denied the cross-motion for 
summary judgment2 of one of the plaintiffs, the Milwaukee Police 
Association.3  The circuit court entered judgment in favor of the 
City dismissing the Unions' complaints.  The Unions appealed. 
¶59 On the Unions' appeal, the court of appeals affirmed 
the circuit court judgment in favor of the City.  The court of 
appeals concluded that the City did not violate the rights of 
members of the City of Milwaukee Employes' Retirement System 
when it amended section 36-15-2 of the City Charter to change 
                                                 
1 Milwaukee 
Police 
Ass'n 
v. 
City 
of 
Milwaukee, 
No. 
2015AP2375, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2017). 
2 For a discussion of cross-motions for summary judgment, 
see Ziegler Co., Inc. v. Rexnord, Inc., 139 Wis. 2d 593, 595 
n.1, 407 N.W.2d 873 (1987). 
3 The plaintiffs are the Milwaukee Police Association and 
its president, Michael Crivello (together referred to as "the 
Milwaukee Police Association"), and the Milwaukee Professional 
Fire Fighters Association, Local 215 and its president, David R. 
Seager, Jr. (together referred to as "Local 215").  All four 
plaintiffs will collectively be referred to as "the Unions." 
No.  2015AP2375.ssa 
 
3 
 
the size, composition, and manner of election of the Annuity and 
Pension Board ("the Pension Board") of the Retirement System.4  
¶60 The instant case presents a single issue:  whether the 
City's enactment of Common Council File No. 131162 ("the 2013 
Milwaukee Charter Amendment") amending section 36-15-2 of the 
City Charter to alter the size, composition, and manner of 
election of the Pension Board amends, alters, or modifies the 
"annuities, benefits or other rights of any persons who are 
                                                 
4 This opinion sometimes uses the word "employe" rather than 
"employee."  The court of appeals in Richland School District v. 
Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations, Equal Rights 
Division, 166 Wis. 2d 262, 271 n.1, 479 N.W.2d 579 (Ct. App. 
1991), explained why "employe" is sometimes used in opinions 
instead of the significantly more common "employee" as follows: 
In a letter to the author, Professor Walter B. 
Raushenbush of the University of Wisconsin Law School 
explains why chapters 101 through 108, Stats., refer 
to "employe" when many well-meaning lawyers and judges 
refer to "employee": 
My father, Paul A. Raushenbush, drafted most 
of the original legislation [for ch. 108] in 
1930-31, and most of the amendments through 
the 
mid-1960's. 
 
He 
was 
director 
of 
Wisconsin's 
Unemployment 
Compensation 
Department 
(under 
the 
then 
Industrial 
Commission) from roughly 1934 to 1967.  I 
well remember being aware that he strongly 
favored the spelling with "e"——"employe."  
And I recall asking him why, when "employee" 
was surely the more common spelling.  His 
answer was that the statutes must avoid 
confusion 
between 
worker 
and 
employer.  
Since "e" and "r" are right next to each 
other on the typewriter keyboard, there's a 
real risk that "employer" might be typed 
"employee," and vice-versa.  The confusion 
which 
this 
might 
cause 
could 
best 
be 
avoided, he said, by using "employe." 
No.  2015AP2375.ssa 
 
4 
 
members of the system prior to the effective date of such 
amendment or alteration."5   
¶61 The size, composition and manner of election of the 
Pension Board were first detailed by the state legislature in 
1937.  See § 7, ch. 397, Laws of 1937.  In 1947, the state 
legislature granted all first class cities, including the City 
of Milwaukee, the authority to amend the 1937 Law as applied to 
their retirement systems, except that "no such amendment or 
alteration shall modify the annuities, benefits or other rights 
                                                 
5 The Milwaukee Police Association sets forth four issues in 
its petition for review: 
1. Whether a Municipality May Lawfully Disregard 
Specific Requirements the Legislature Has Placed on 
the Municipality, by Simply Passing an Ordinance at 
Odds with the Law? 
2. Whether Home Rule Allows the City to Avoid the 
Mandates Identified by the Legislature in the Session 
Laws of 1937 and 1947? 
3. Whether the Session Laws of 1937 and 1947 Vested 
ERS Members with the Right to Vote for and Seat ERS 
Board Members? 
4. Whether the Decision below Is in Conflict with the 
Decisions of this Court in Van Gilder v. City of 
Madison and Johnston v. City of Sheboygan? 
The Milwaukee Professional Fire Fighters Association, Local 
215, sets forth a single issue in its petition for review: 
1. Whether a Municipality May Ignore the Legislature's 
Specific Mandates Regarding the Size and Composition 
of the Pension Board Simply by Passing its Own 
Ordinance? 
The single issue I present in effect addresses the issues 
set forth in both petitions for review and is dispositive. 
No.  2015AP2375.ssa 
 
5 
 
of any persons who are members of the system prior to the 
effective date of such amendment or alteration."  See § 31, ch. 
441, Laws of 1947 (emphasis added). 
¶62 I conclude that the 2013 Milwaukee Charter Amendment 
altering the size, composition, and manner of election of the 
Pension Board is valid.  Neither the size, composition, nor 
manner of election of the Pension Board is an annuity, benefit, 
or other right of the members of the Retirement System.  Thus, 
the 2013 Milwaukee Charter Amendment does not modify "annuities, 
benefits or other rights" of any persons who are members of the 
Retirement System prior to the effective date of the amendment, 
alteration, or modification.     
¶63 Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the court 
of appeals. 
I 
¶64 The facts are brief and undisputed.  In 2013, the City 
of Milwaukee amended section 36-15-2 of the Milwaukee City 
Charter.  This 2013 Milwaukee Charter Amendment provision sets 
forth the membership of the Pension Board; it changed the size 
and composition of the Pension Board and the manner in which 
Pension Board members were elected. 
¶65 Prior to 2013, the Pension Board, which had been 
changed from its original size and composition by a 1972 
amendment to the City Charter, was made up of eight members:  
three actively employed city employees elected to the Pension 
Board by actively employed city employees; one retiree elected 
No.  2015AP2375.ssa 
 
6 
 
by retirees; three appointed by the President of the Common 
Council; and the City's elected Comptroller, ex officio. 
¶66 The 2013 Milwaukee Charter Amendment added three 
mayoral appointments to the Pension Board for a total of eleven 
members.  The 2013 Milwaukee Charter Amendment also dictated 
that of the three actively employed city employees on the 
Pension Board, one must be an active employee of the police 
department, one must be an active employee of the fire 
department, and the remaining member must be an active employee 
of a non-public safety department.  Only active police officers 
may vote to elect the required Pension Board member from the 
police department.  Only active fire fighters may vote to elect 
the required Pension Board member from the fire department.  
Finally, only active general (i.e., non-public safety) city 
employees may vote to elect the required Pension Board member 
from a non-public safety department. 
¶67 The Milwaukee Police Association commenced the instant 
lawsuit, seeking a declaratory judgment that the 2013 Milwaukee 
Charter Amendment violated the Retirement System members' vested 
rights in the size and composition of the Pension Board and the 
Retirement System members' vested right to elect members to the 
Pension Board without being limited to voting only for members 
in their same employment classification.6  Local 215 of the 
Milwaukee Professional Fire Fighters Association was allowed to 
                                                 
6 The Unions sometimes refer to their purported right as the 
right to proportional representation on the Pension Board.   
No.  2015AP2375.ssa 
 
7 
 
intervene, and its position is essentially the same as that of 
the Milwaukee Police Association. 
¶68 The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the City and denied the Milwaukee Police Association's cross-
motion for summary judgment.  The circuit court concluded that 
the members of the Retirement System did not have "a specific 
right to the makeup of the [Pension Board]" and that the 2013 
Milwaukee Charter Amendment modifying "the makeup of the 
[Pension Board] does not affect any of the rights of the 
members . . . ."  The circuit court entered judgment in favor of 
the City.  The Unions appealed to the court of appeals. 
¶69 The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the 
circuit court.  It "conclude[d] that the City is entitled to 
amend, on a prospective basis, matters related to the size, 
composition, and manner of election of the pension board[] 
because the members of the retirement system do not have any 
rights in those matters."7 
¶70 The court granted the Unions' petition to review the 
decision of the court of appeals.  For the reasons set forth, I 
would affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
II 
¶71 The court is asked to determine the meaning and 
validity of the 2013 Milwaukee Charter Amendment.  These are 
questions of law that this court decides independently of the 
                                                 
7 Milwaukee 
Police 
Ass'n 
v. 
City 
of 
Milwaukee, 
No. 
2015AP2375, unpublished slip op., ¶42 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 
2017). 
No.  2015AP2375.ssa 
 
8 
 
circuit court and court of appeals, benefiting from the analyses 
of the latter two courts.  Megal Dev. Corp. v. Shadof, 2005 WI 
151, ¶8, 286 Wis. 2d 105, 705 N.W.2d 645. 
III 
¶72 To respond to the questions of law presented, I begin 
by examining the relevant 1937 and 1947 Laws the legislature 
enacted and the City's history of amending its Charter regarding 
the composition and election of members of the Pension Board. 
¶73 In 1937, the legislature created the Pension Board and 
granted it administrative authority over the operation of the 
Retirement System.8  The 1937 Law detailed the membership of the 
Pension Board as follows: 
(2) MEMBERSHIP.  The membership of the board shall 
consist of the following: 
(a) Three members to be appointed by the chairman of 
the common council or other governing body (subject to 
the confirmation by such common council or other 
governing body), for a term of three years, 
(b) The city comptroller ex-officio, 
(c) Three employe members who shall be members of the 
retirement system and who shall be elected by the 
members of the retirement system for a term of three 
years according to such rules and regulations as the 
board shall adopt to govern such election.  The 
initial terms of the first three members so elected 
shall expire at the end of one, two and three years, 
                                                 
8 § 7, ch. 396, Laws of 1937.  Section 7(1) states:  "The 
general 
administration 
and 
responsibility 
for 
the 
proper 
operation of the retirement system and for making effective the 
provisions of this act are hereby vested in an annuity and 
pension board which shall be organized immediately after the 
first four members provided for in this section have qualified 
and taken the oath of office."  § 7(1), ch. 396, Laws of 1937. 
No.  2015AP2375.ssa 
 
9 
 
respectively.  Following the completion of the initial 
terms, the terms of the office of such members shall 
be three years. 
§ 7(2), ch. 396, Laws of 1937. 
¶74 To 
allow 
cities 
"the 
largest 
measure 
of 
self-
government with respect to pension annuity and retirement 
systems," in 1947, the legislature empowered "cities of the 
first class," including the City of Milwaukee, as follows:  
to amend or alter the provisions of [the 1937 Law] in 
the 
manner 
prescribed 
by 
section 
66.01 
of 
the 
statutes; 
provided 
that 
no 
such 
amendment 
or 
alteration shall modify the annuities, benefits or 
other rights of any persons who are members of the 
system prior to the effective date of such amendment 
or alteration.9   
¶75 The 1947 Law explicitly granted employees "a vested 
right" to the "annuities and other benefits" offered by the 
Retirement System and declared that these rights "shall not be 
diminished or impaired by subsequent legislation or by any other 
means without [members'] consent."  See § 30(2)(a), ch. 441, 
Laws of 1947.   
¶76 The City codified the pertinent part of the 1947 Law 
in section 36-14 of its Charter as follows: 
36-14. Home Rule. For the purposes of giving to cities 
of the first class the largest measure of self-
government with respect to pension, annuity and 
retirement systems compatible with the constitution 
and general law, it is hereby declared to be the 
legislative policy that all future amendments and 
alterations to this act are matters of local affair 
and government and shall not be construed as an 
enactment of statewide concern.  Cities of the first 
class are hereby empowered to amend or alter the 
                                                 
9 § 31, ch. 441, Laws of 1947 (emphasis added). 
No.  2015AP2375.ssa 
 
10 
 
provisions of this act in the manner prescribed by s. 
66.0101, Wis. Stats., provided that no such amendment 
or alteration shall modify the annuities, benefits or 
other rights of any persons who are members of the 
system prior to the effective date of such amendment 
or alteration. 
Milwaukee Charter § 36-14 (emphasis added).  
¶77 Since 
the 
enactment 
of 
the 
1947 
Law 
and 
the 
codification of pertinent parts in section 36-14 of the City 
Charter, the City has amended the size, composition, and manner 
of election of the members of the Pension Board.  For example, 
in 1967, the City Charter was amended to delete obsolete 
provisions and to revise language pertaining to elected active-
employee members of the Pension Board who reach compulsory 
retirement age during their respective terms.  In 1972, a new 
position on the Pension Board was created to be filled by a 
retired city employee elected by other retired city employees.  
In 1980, the term of Pension Board members was extended from 
three to four years except for the City Comptroller, whose term 
remained ex officio.  In 1996, the term of the three Pension 
Board members appointed by the President of the Common Council 
was reduced from four to two years. 
¶78 The instant case centers around the 2013 Milwaukee 
Charter Amendment altering the size, composition, and manner of 
election of the members of the Pension Board.  The 2013 
Milwaukee Charter Amendment added three mayoral appointments to 
the Pension Board for a total of eleven members.  It also 
directed that of the three actively employed city employees on 
the Pension Board, one must be an active employee of the police 
department, one must be an active employee of the fire 
No.  2015AP2375.ssa 
 
11 
 
department, and the remaining member must be an active employee 
of a non-public safety department.  Only active police officers 
may vote to elect the required Pension Board member from the 
police department.  Only active fire fighters may vote to elect 
the required Pension Board member from the fire department.  
Finally, only active general (i.e., non-public safety) city 
employees may vote to elect the required Pension Board member 
from a non-public safety department. 
IV 
¶79 This court must determine whether the 2013 Milwaukee 
Charter Amendment altering the size, composition, and manner of 
election of the members of the Pension Board violates the 1947 
Law and section 36-14 of the City Charter. 
¶80 I begin with the texts of the 1947 Law and section 36-
14 of the City Charter.  The 1947 Law and section 36-14 of the 
City Charter discussed above contain identical language.  They 
both acknowledge a grant of authority to first class cities to 
amend, alter, or modify the City Charter, with one exception:  
"[N]o such amendment or alteration shall modify the annuities, 
benefits or other rights of any persons who are members of the 
system prior to the effective date of such amendment or 
alteration."10 
¶81 Everyone seems to agree that voting for election of 
members of the Pension Board does not fall within "annuities or 
benefits" under the 1947 Law.  The questions presented are 
                                                 
10 § 31, ch. 441, Laws of 1947; Milwaukee City Charter § 36-
14 (emphasis added). 
No.  2015AP2375.ssa 
 
12 
 
whether voting for election of members of the Pension Board and 
retaining a Pension Board of a particular size and composition 
fall within the phrase "other rights" in the 1947 Law. 
¶82 The Unions argue that one of their "other rights" 
protected from amendment or alteration under the 1947 Law and 
section 36-14 of the City Charter is the right to a Pension 
Board that is of a particular size and composition and whose 
members are voted for in a particular manner.   
¶83 Resolving the meaning of the legislative phrase "other 
rights" may be aided by applying the ejusdem generis canon of 
statutory interpretation.  This canon of interpretation "uses 
context to elicit meaning from statutory language" and provides 
that "when general words follow specific words in the statutory 
text, the general words should be construed in light of the 
specific words listed."  Milwaukee Journal Sentinel v. DOA, 2009 
WI 79, ¶44, 319 Wis. 2d 439, 768 N.W.2d 700 (quoting State v. 
Quintana, 2008 WI 33, ¶27, 308 Wis. 2d 615, 748 N.W.2d 447). 
¶84 The specific words "annuities" and "benefits" may thus 
guide the meaning of the phrase "other rights."  Adhering to the 
canon of ejusdem generis and construing general words in light 
of the specific words in the same list, I conclude that the 
general words "other rights" in the 1947 Law and section 36-14 
of the City Charter refer, as do the words "annuities" and 
"benefits," to members' financial or monetary advantages or 
services rendered to members.  Accordingly, under the language 
of the 1947 Law and section 36-14 of the City Charter, first 
class cities are authorized to amend the 1937 Law, but no such 
No.  2015AP2375.ssa 
 
13 
 
amendments may alter any members' annuities, benefits, or 
members' rights to financial or monetary advantages or services 
to which they have become entitled prior to the effective date 
of the amendment. 
¶85 The Unions' claimed right to a Pension Board of a 
particular 
size, 
composition, 
and 
manner 
of 
election 
is 
inconsistent with my interpretation of "other rights" under the 
1947 Law and section 36-14 of the City Charter.11  The Unions' 
claimed right is unlike an annuity or a retirement benefit, 
which contemplate the payment of money or delivery of a service 
to a beneficiary.   
¶86 My conclusion that the Unions do not have a right to a 
Pension Board of a particular size, composition, and manner of 
election is supported by the case law.   
¶87 In Wisconsin Professional Police Ass'n, Inc. v. 
Lightbourn, 2001 WI 59, 243 Wis. 2d 512, 627 N.W.2d 807, the 
plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of a statute making 
numerous changes to the Wisconsin state retirement system.  The 
statute's changes were "relat[ed] to:  benefit improvements, 
                                                 
11 The Unions also argue that their right in the size, 
composition, and manner of election of the Pension Board is 
established in their collective bargaining agreements.  The 
collective bargaining agreements state:  "The City agrees not to 
diminish any contractual pension and annuity rights presently 
vested in any employee including any rights enumerated herein."  
I 
reject 
the 
Unions' 
interpretation 
of 
their 
collective 
bargaining agreements for the same reason I reject their 
interpretations of the 1947 Law and section 36-14 of the City 
Charter.  The reference to "pension and annuity rights" does not 
refer to a right to determine how those benefit obligations are 
fulfilled. 
No.  2015AP2375.ssa 
 
14 
 
interest 
crediting, 
variable 
annuity 
option, 
contribution 
credits for employers, death benefits, credit for legislative 
service, recognition of income and capital gains and losses in 
the fixed retirement investment trust and affecting certain 
actuarial 
assumption 
and 
liabilities 
under 
the 
Wisconsin 
retirement system."  Lightbourn, 243 Wis. 2d 512, ¶39.  The 
court rejected the plaintiffs' argument in Lightbourn that these 
changes amounted to an unconstitutional taking, explaining that 
participants in the Wisconsin retirement system have a right to 
have their benefit commitments fulfilled, but they do not have a 
"right to determine exactly how employers fulfill their benefit 
commitments."  Lightbourn, 243 Wis. 2d 512, ¶179. 
¶88 In Bilda v. Milwaukee County, 2006 WI App 57, 292 
Wis. 2d 212, 713 N.W.2d 661, the plaintiffs brought a class 
action lawsuit against Milwaukee County alleging that changes to 
the 
Milwaukee 
County 
Ordinances 
governing 
the 
county's 
retirement system constituted an unconstitutional taking.  The 
challenged ordinance changed the way in which administrative 
expenses are paid.   
¶89 Discussing and applying Lightbourn, the Bilda court of 
appeals rejected the plaintiffs' challenge, concluding that "the 
system participants do not have a right to dictate how, within 
the requirements and limitations imposed by law, the system is 
administered and funded on a day-to-day or year-to-year basis."  
Bilda, 292 Wis. 2d 212, ¶14. 
¶90 The Unions' claimed right to the size, composition, 
and manner of election of the members of the Pension Board is 
No.  2015AP2375.ssa 
 
15 
 
akin to asserting the rights the Bilda court rejected, namely 
the rights to dictate how employers fulfill their benefit 
commitments and how the system is administered on a day-to-day 
basis.   
¶91 Moreover, the Unions' analyses of statutory and 
constitutional home rule are misguided.  Under a statutory home 
rule analysis, a four-factor test is used to determine whether a 
statute preempts a local ordinance.  "A municipal ordinance is 
preempted if (1) the legislature has expressly withdrawn the 
power of municipalities to act; (2) it logically conflicts with 
state 
legislation; 
(3) 
it 
defeats 
the 
purpose 
of 
state 
legislation; 
or 
(4) 
it 
violates 
the 
spirit 
of 
state 
legislation."  DeRosso Landfill Co. Inc. v. City of Oak Creek, 
200 Wis. 2d 642, 651-52, 547 N.W.2d 770 (1996) (footnotes 
omitted).  The instant case does not involve these situations. 
¶92 First, the legislature has not expressly withdrawn the 
power of municipalities to act regarding the 1937 Law.  Instead, 
the 1947 Law granted first class cities like the City of 
Milwaukee the power to amend the 1937 Law as it applies to the 
retirement system except that "no such amendment or alteration 
shall modify the annuities, benefits or other rights of any 
persons who are members of the system prior to the effective 
date of such amendment or alteration."  As I explained above, 
the 2013 Milwaukee Charter Amendment does not modify "the 
annuities, benefits or other rights" of any persons who were 
members of the Retirement System prior to the effective date of 
the amendment or alteration. 
No.  2015AP2375.ssa 
 
16 
 
¶93 Second, the 2013 Milwaukee Charter Amendment does not 
logically conflict with the 1947 Law.12  The 2013 Milwaukee 
Charter Amendment does not contradict the directive in the 1947 
Law that a municipality may not alter, amend, or modify the 
annuities, benefits, or other rights of any persons who are 
members of the system prior to the effective date of the 
amendment. 
¶94 Third, the 2013 Milwaukee Charter Amendment does not 
defeat the purpose of the 1947 Law.  An ordinance may be invalid 
if it frustrates the purpose of a legislative enactment.13   
¶95 The purpose of the 1947 Law was to allow cities "the 
largest measure of self-government with respect to pension 
annuity and retirement systems" while protecting against an 
amendment or alteration that modifies the annuities, benefits, 
or other rights of persons who were members of the retirement 
system prior to the effective date of an amendment.14  The 2013 
                                                 
12 See 
Wisconsin's 
Envt'l 
Decade, 
Inc. 
v. 
DNR, 
85 
Wis. 2d 518, 534-35, 271 N.W.2d 69 (1978) (a city ordinance 
preventing 
chemical 
treatment 
in 
Madison 
lakes 
logically 
conflicted with the DNR's statutory power to "supervise chemical 
treatment of waters"). 
13 In Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc. v. Department 
of Natural Resources, 85 Wis. 2d 518, 535-36, 271 N.W.2d 69 
(1978), for example, the court stated that even assuming that 
the 
ordinance 
and 
statute 
at 
issue 
are 
not 
"logically 
conflicting," the ordinance was nevertheless invalid because it 
frustrated the state program of water resource management and of 
vesting authority over the state's navigable waters in the 
Department of Natural Resources. 
14 See § 31(1), ch. 441, Laws of 1947 (emphasis added): 
For the purpose of giving to cities of the first class 
the largest measure of self-government with respect to 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP2375.ssa 
 
17 
 
Milwaukee Charter Amendment is a lawful exercise of the 
authority granted to first class cities under the 1947 Law, 
fulfills the purpose of the 1947 Law, and does not make any 
prohibited amendment, alteration, or modification to members' 
annuities, benefits, or other rights. 
¶96 Fourth and finally, nothing in the 2013 Milwaukee 
Charter Amendment supports the Unions' argument that changes to 
the size, composition, and manner of election of the Pension 
Board violate the spirit of the 1947 Law.15  Rather, the 2013 
Milwaukee Charter Amendment comports with the spirit of the 1947 
Law:  The 1947 Law allows cities the largest extent of self-
government 
possible 
while 
protecting 
against 
amendment, 
alteration, or modification of members' annuities, benefits, or 
other rights. 
                                                                                                                                                             
pension annuity and retirement systems compatible with 
the constitution and general law, it is hereby 
declared to be the legislative policy that all future 
amendments and alterations to this act are matters of 
local affair and government and shall not be construed 
as an enactment of statewide concern.  Cities of the 
first class are hereby empowered to amend or alter the 
provisions of this act in the manner prescribed by 
section 66.01 of the statutes; provided that no such 
amendment or alteration shall modify the annuities, 
benefits or other rights of any persons who are 
members of the system prior to the effective date of 
such amendment or alteration. 
15 In Anchor Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Equal Opportunities 
Commission, 120 Wis. 2d 391, 397-99, 402, 355 N.W.2d 234 (1984), 
the court concluded that the legislature had "adopted a complex 
and comprehensive statutory structure" regulating credit and 
lending, 
as 
well 
as 
a 
"complete, 
all-encompassing 
plan" 
regulating savings and loan associations, rendering the Madison 
ordinance at issue void as "contrary to the spirit" of the 
legislation.  
No.  2015AP2375.ssa 
 
18 
 
¶97 The Unions' constitutional home rule argument fares no 
better.  The Home Rule Amendment to the Wisconsin Constitution 
reads:  "Cities and villages organized pursuant to state law may 
determine their local affairs and government, subject only to 
this constitution and to such enactments of the legislature of 
statewide concern as with uniformity shall affect every city or 
every village.  The method of such determination shall be 
prescribed by the legislature."  Wis. Const. art. XI, § 3(1). 
¶98 The 
Unions 
argue 
that 
although 
the 
legislature 
declared that any future modifications to the Retirement System 
would be a matter of local concern, it specifically excepted 
from that grant of authority the ability to modify rights that 
had already accrued.  However, as I explained above, members of 
the Retirement System do not have a right in a Pension Board of 
a particular size, composition, or manner of election.   
¶99 Before 
concluding, 
I 
pause 
to 
acknowledge 
the 
implications of the Unions' asserted right in the instant case.  
Recognizing 
the 
Unions' 
claimed 
right 
to 
proportional 
representation on the Pension Board or to a Pension Board of a 
particular size, composition, and manner of election would limit 
to a breathtaking extent the City's authority to amend the 1937 
Law.  If members are vested with the right to a Pension Board of 
a particular size, composition, and manner of election based 
upon the date at which the member joined the Retirement System, 
must the City create new pension boards that administer the 
Retirement System for different classes of members?  If the 2013 
Milwaukee Charter Amendment is invalid, is the 1972 amendment, 
No.  2015AP2375.ssa 
 
19 
 
which added the retiree position on the Pension Board, invalid 
for the same reasons?  On what possible basis would adding a 
seat in 1972 be valid, but adding three seats in 2013 be 
invalid?  Multiple boards of various sizes and compositions 
administering the Retirement System to numerous classes of 
Retirement System members would be an unworkable system.  
V 
¶100 The size, composition, or manner of election of the 
Pension Board set forth in the 1947 Law and section 36-14 of the 
City Charter may be amended, altered, or modified.  Members of 
the Retirement System have the right to have their benefit 
commitments fulfilled, but they do not have a right to determine 
exactly how those benefit commitments are fulfilled.  Thus, I 
conclude that the 2013 Milwaukee Charter Amendment did not 
violate the 1947 Law or section 36-14 of the City Charter.  The 
2013 Milwaukee Charter Amendment did not "modify the annuities, 
benefits or other rights" of any persons who were members of the 
Retirement System prior to the effective date of the 2013 
Milwaukee Charter Amendment. 
* * * * 
 
¶101 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
 
¶102 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2015AP2375.dk 
 
1 
 
¶103 DANIEL KELLY, J.   (dissenting).  Well, this is surely 
curious.  Today, the court manufactured and conferred on the 
employee members of the Employee Retirement System of Milwaukee 
("ERS") a right to proportional representation on the ERS 
Annuity and Pension Board (the "Board").  We also manufactured 
and conferred on them the right to conduct at-large (as opposed 
to class-based) elections for their representatives.  These 
rights don't actually exist anywhere in the constitution, 
statutes, regulations, or common-law, so we had to create them 
ex nihilo.  They may be good and salutary rights for the 
employee members to have, but this is a question not given to 
the judiciary to answer.  We have no mandate to roam the state 
looking for good ideas to enact.  We exhaust our commission when 
we pronounce the law as applied to the case before us, and we 
should be content with that.  We were definitely not content 
with that role today.   
¶104 The court found the employee members' right to elect 
no fewer than 3/8's of the Board's members (after accounting for 
the retired employees' representative added in 1972), and the 
right to an undivided franchise, in this distinctly pedestrian 
language: 
The membership of the board shall consist of the 
following: 
(a) Three members to be appointed by the chairman of 
the common council or other governing body (subject to 
the confirmation by such common council or other 
governing body), for a term of three years, 
(b) The city comptroller ex-officio, 
No.  2015AP2375.dk 
 
2 
 
(c) Three employe members who shall be members of the 
retirement system and who shall be elected by the 
members of the retirement system for a term of three 
years according to such rules and regulations as the 
board shall adopt to govern such election. . . .  
§ 7(2), ch. 396, Laws of 1937 (the "1937 Law"). 
¶105 If, as the court says, the employees' rights come from 
this statute, we ought to be able to find them there.  This 
presents a simple matter of statutory construction.  Typically, 
when we set out to discover the meaning of a statute, we start 
with its language.  See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for 
Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
("[S]tatutory interpretation 'begins with the language of the 
statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily 
stop the inquiry.'" (citation omitted)).   
¶106 Here, however, this method hits an immediate dead-end.  
The 1937 Law does not say the employees have a right to a 
minimum percentage of board seats.  Nor does it so much as imply 
the employees have a right to elect their representatives at 
large, rather than by class.  To the extent this statutory 
provision mentions the employees at all, it simply says the 
Board will contain three employee representatives, and those 
representatives will be elected by the employees.  Our standard 
method of statutory construction tells us to stop here and tell 
the members of the Milwaukee Police Association ("MPA") and 
members of the Milwaukee Professional Fire Fighters Association 
("MPFFA") that the rights they seek are not there.   
¶107 But perhaps this is one of those instances in which 
the claimed statutory rights are not immediately apparent, and 
No.  2015AP2375.dk 
 
3 
 
fluoresce only in the presence of the violation.  The court said 
the City trespassed on the employees' rights when, in a 2013 
city charter amendment ("2013 Amendment"), it added three 
mayoral appointees to the Board and established voting classes.  
See majority op., ¶4.  With respect to the latter revision, the 
amendment provides that members of the MPA would vote for one of 
their own to represent them on the Board, members of the MPFFA 
would do the same, and the remaining employees would vote for a 
third representative.  See Milw., Wis., Charter Ord. § 36-15-
2(a-3)(c). 
¶108 So let's compare the results of the 2013 Amendment to 
the provisions of the 1937 Law.  Before the amendment, the 
employees had three representatives on the Board.  After the 
amendment, the employees had three representatives on the Board.1  
Before the amendment, the employee representatives were "elected 
by the members of the retirement system."  See § 7(2)(c), ch. 
396, Laws of 1937.  After the amendment, the employee 
representatives were "elected by the members of the retirement 
system."  See Milw., Wis., Charter Ord. § 36-15-2(a-3)(c).  
True, they were elected by classes, but each class is composed 
exclusively of members of the retirement system.  Therefore, 
because no one but a member of the retirement system voted for 
any of the employee representatives, it is necessarily true that 
                                                 
1 The employees also gained an ally when, in 1972, the City 
added a representative of retired employees to the Board.  
Nothing in the 2013 amendment affected that position.  See 
Milw., Wis., Charter Ord. § 36-15-2(d). 
No.  2015AP2375.dk 
 
4 
 
they were each "elected by the members of the retirement 
system."  So the alleged violation fluoresces nothing.   
¶109 It is, however, entirely understandable that the MPA 
and the MPFFA would not favor the 2013 Amendment——it reduced the 
employee members' influence on the board from 3/8's to 3/11's.  
And voting by class means the MPA and the MPFFA cannot elect 
more than one of their members to the Board.  But the question 
we are to answer is not whether the 2013 Amendment is good for 
the MPA or MPFFA; it is whether the City had the authority to 
enact it.   
¶110 The authority to alter the administration of the ERS 
came from a 1947 statute——the same statute, ironically, that the 
court says restricts the City's authority to do what it did: 
For the purpose of giving to cities of the first class 
the largest measure of self-government with respect to 
pension annuity and retirement systems compatible with 
the constitution and general law . . . [c]ities of the 
first class are hereby empowered to amend or alter the 
provisions of this act in the manner prescribed by 
section 66.01 of the statutes; provided that no such 
amendment or alteration shall modify the annuities, 
benefits or other rights of any persons who are 
members of the system prior to the effective date of 
such amendment or alteration. 
§ 31(1), ch. 441, Laws of 1947 ("1947 Law").  The legislature 
decided that the City is to have the "largest measure of self-
government," with respect to the ERS, that is "compatible with 
the constitution and general law."   
¶111 To accomplish that purpose, the 1947 Law explicitly 
and 
unambiguously 
authorized 
"[c]ities 
of 
the 
first 
class . . . to amend or alter the provisions of this act," which 
includes the size of the board and the manner of its elections.  
No.  2015AP2375.dk 
 
5 
 
Id.  This broad delegation of authority to the City is subject 
only to the restriction that, as relevant here, it may not 
"modify 
the . . . other 
rights" 
of 
the 
ERS's 
members.  
Consequently, unless the employee members can identify a 
specific right the 2013 Amendment violated, this statute 
unquestionably says the City may do what it did. 
¶112 The court started its analysis on the weakest possible 
footing.  It acknowledges, as it must, that "other rights" has 
no statutory definition and that there is no actual language in 
either the 1937 Law or the 1947 Law that creates the rights it 
discovers today.  See majority op., ¶28.  If we followed our 
standard method of statutory construction, we would have quit 
the field and informed the MPA and MPFFA that the rights they 
sought cannot be found in any applicable source of authority.  
But we didn't quit. 
¶113 With no text upon which to rely, we thought to peer 
behind the legislative curtain in hopes of discovering what 
rights the legislature meant to confer, but forgot to put in the 
act they actually adopted.  So the court turned to the purpose 
of the 1947 Law.  Majority op., ¶29.  Assessing the purpose of a 
statute can be helpful in discerning its plain meaning, but we 
refer to the purpose to explain the text, not create substantive 
rights.  "Statutory purpose is important in discerning the plain 
meaning of a statute."  Westmas v. Creekside Tree Serv., Inc., 
2018 WI 12, ¶19, 379 Wis. 2d 471, 907 N.W.2d 68 (citing Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶48). 
No.  2015AP2375.dk 
 
6 
 
¶114 The court fared no better questing after a legislative 
purpose than it did with finding textual support for its desired 
result.  The best it could do was an observation that the 
"'purpose of safeguarding the stability of pension systems' was 
an important concern" for the legislature.  Majority op., ¶31 
(quoting § 31(2), ch. 441, Laws of 1947).  The court quoted only 
a sentence fragment because the sentence has nothing to do with 
the court's project.  The sentence actually refers to the 
importance of a pension study committee:  "For the further 
purpose of safeguarding the stability of pension systems in 
cities of the first class, the governing body shall appoint a 
pension study commission which shall have jurisdiction over all 
proposed amendments, alterations and modifications to existing 
pension, annuity, or retirement systems."  See § 31(2), ch. 441, 
Laws of 1947.   
¶115 It's anyone's guess how the importance of a pension 
study commission relates to proportional voting rights or at-
large elections.  Nonetheless, the court immediately divined 
from this that what the legislature was really saying is that 
"[s]afeguarding 
ERS 
stability 
is 
promoted 
by 
employee-
participation in the Board because it is employees, current and 
past, for whom stability of the ERS is critical.  Preamble to 
ch. 396, Laws of 1937."  Majority op., ¶31.  It certainly 
couldn't have found support for that proposition in the Preamble 
it cited, because the Preamble merely says, in full:  "An Act 
relating to the establishment and administration of retirement 
systems in cities of the first class for the payment of benefits 
No.  2015AP2375.dk 
 
7 
 
to the employes of such cities, and to the widows and children 
of such employes."  Preamble to ch. 396, Laws of 1937.2 
                                                 
2 Even as legislative analysis, the court errs.  It says: 
Employees have the most to gain from a financially 
stable ERS because the ERS directly impacts their 
financial security upon retirement.  In addition, it 
is employees who will suffer most if ERS funds are 
lent to a cause that returns a worthless promissory 
note in exchange for the funds that the Board manages, 
as has occurred in other states. 
Majority op., ¶32 (footnote omitted). 
 
But this just isn't so.  The ERS's financial stability has 
no 
effect 
on 
the 
employees' 
financial 
security 
at 
all.  
Liability for retirement benefits belongs to the City, and the 
City must pay them regardless of whether the ERS has any funds 
to manage: 
[T]he payment of all pensions, annuities, retirement 
allowances, refunds, and other benefits granted under 
the provisions of this act and all expenses in 
connection with the administration and operation of 
the retirement system are hereby made obligations of 
the city and city agencies. 
§ 27, ch. 441, Laws of 1947.  And these obligations are due to 
the employees as vested contractual rights that cannot be 
reduced without their consent: 
The annuities and all other benefits in the amounts 
and upon the terms and conditions and in all other 
respects as provided in the law under which the system 
was established as such law is amended and in effect 
on the effective date of this act shall be obligations 
of such benefit contract on the part of the city and 
of the board administering the system and each member 
and beneficiary having such a benefit contract shall 
have a vested right to such annuities and other 
benefits and they shall not be diminished or impaired 
by subsequent legislation or by any other means 
without his consent. 
§ 30(2)(a), ch. 441, Laws of 1947. 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP2375.dk 
 
8 
 
¶116 Et voilà, the sum total of the law's purpose:  A 
declaration that a pension study commission would be important 
to the stability of the retirement system, and a Preamble that 
states the obvious.  Somehow, however, the court transmuted this 
into the right to proportional representation on the Board and 
at-large elections.  And it said its discovery was supported not 
by some vague musings, but by the legislature's clear purpose:  
"With that clearly stated purpose in mind, the phrase, 'other 
rights' easily encompasses employee voting rights because 
employee members of the Board are in a unique position to 
oversee the Board's use of funds and thereby safeguard the 
financial stability of the ERS."  Majority op., ¶32.  If there 
is hidden somewhere in there a legislatively-expressed purpose 
having anything at all to do with voting rights, it is quite 
obviously not clear.  But let's be frank.  It's not really there 
at all. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
Actually, the people with the most interest in the ERS's 
financial stability are not the employees, but the taxpayers of 
the City of Milwaukee, who are ultimately liable for the ERS's 
financial obligations through the imposition of additional 
taxes: 
In order to meet the requirements of this act, the 
common council or other governing body or city agency 
is authorized to levy a tax annually, which tax shall 
be in addition to all other taxes such common council 
or other governing body or city agency has been 
authorized to levy upon all taxable property, real and 
personal. 
§ 23(b), ch. 441, Laws of 1947. 
No.  2015AP2375.dk 
 
9 
 
¶117 We are not giving voice to the legislature's purpose.  
We are defying it.  The legislature said, in the text it 
actually adopted, that the City has the authority to amend the 
act, the very act that establishes the Board's composition and 
describes the elections of its members.  Upon the City's 
exercise of its legislatively-granted authority, however, we 
imposed our will, our veto.  Using the catch-all "other rights" 
provision 
as 
a 
window 
into 
the 
hidden 
depths 
of 
the 
legislature's very soul, we purportedly saw its "clear purpose" 
to create and preserve a right to proportional representation 
and at-large elections, rights so critical to the preservation 
of the retirement system that the legislature made no mention of 
them at all.  What we should have seen were red flags sprouting 
up all around us as we privileged judicially-intuited ephemera 
over the text the people's representatives actually adopted. 
¶118 If we were sitting as a legislature, the "purposes" 
the court attributed to the legislature might be enough to 
conclude we should grant the employees the voting rights they 
seek.  But as a court, our task is different.  We are trying to 
decide whether the legislature, in fact, did grant those rights.  
On that question, the court's opinion provides no analysis or 
information.  It ticks off all the prudential reasons the 
employees ought to have proportionate representation and at-
large elections, but it never guides its analysis back to actual 
legislative text.  So the court offers no non-legislative 
justification for the court's decision. 
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¶119 Neither does the concurring opinion, which is long on 
general rules of statutory construction, and short——to the point 
of nonexistence——on sources of law for its conclusion.  Its 
analysis rests on three propositions.  The first relates to the 
author's fear that the City will act recklessly:  "[T]he logical 
extension of the dissents' position would be to allow the City to 
disband the Employee Retirement System (ERS) Annuity and Pension 
Board 
(Board) 
altogether, 
thereby 
eliminating 
the 
entire 
administrative structure of the ERS."  Concurrence, ¶1.  The second 
proposition is that what the legislature provides, only the 
legislature may take away.  Specifically, it says allowing the City 
to change the Board's composition would ignore the "textual 
requirement of membership consisting of seven members——no more 
and no less."  Id., ¶4.  And the third is that we must give the 
"other rights" provision something to do to save it from 
surplusage.  None of these propositions support the rights the 
court creates today. 
¶120 The concurrence's first proposition is none of our 
concern.  Yes, it is theoretically possible the City would 
eliminate the Board.  But the legislature could do the same 
thing, and the concurrence knows it.  See id., ¶7.  Would we 
tell the legislature the composition of the Board is now frozen 
for all time because we are worried it might recklessly fiddle 
with it, or even dispense with it altogether?  If not, where do 
we get the authority to say that to the City?  Yes, the City may 
act imprudently, something cities have always had the authority 
to do.  We have never had a shepherd's crook with which to steer 
No.  2015AP2375.dk 
 
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governmental entities away from unwise decisions, and we should 
not be yearning after one. 
¶121 Further, if the City chose to eliminate the Board, why 
should that be a matter of any interest to us?  The concurrence 
says this would "leav[e] the ERS without any entity to 
administer or operate it."  Id., ¶5.  That presumes an awful 
lot.  Perhaps the City would choose to replace the Board with a 
managerial staff.  Such an arrangement would still allow the 
system to operate.  But let's assume the City really does want 
to sabotage the retirement system, and that it will do so by 
eliminating the Board and leaving the management space entirely 
void.  If that decision had the effect of altering or modifying 
the members' annuities or benefits (by, for instance, making it 
impossible to collect them), then we would have something to 
say.  But only because the 1947 Law prohibits the City from 
altering or modifying the members' annuities or benefits.  See § 
31(1), ch. 441, Laws of 1947 (providing that no "amendment or 
alteration shall modify the annuities, benefits or other rights 
of any persons who are members of the system prior to the 
effective date of such amendment or alteration."). 
¶122 So the concurrence's first proposition expresses not a 
legal concern, but a distrust in either the City's good faith or 
its ability to avoid self-destructive decisions.  Either way, 
this is not a matter for judicial attention.  
¶123 The 
concurrence's 
second 
proposition——what 
the 
legislature gives, only the legislature may take——proves far, 
far too much.  It proves so much, in fact, that it contradicts 
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the legislature's express grant of authority to the City.  The 
concurrence says it sees in the 1937 Law a "textual requirement 
of membership [in the Board] consisting of seven members——no 
more and no less."  Concurrence, ¶4.  The legislature didn't say 
the Board would never be larger or smaller than seven members, 
of course.  It simply specified its composition.  But if the 
concurrence 
is 
right 
about 
the 
effect 
of 
legislative 
specifications, then the transfer of authority over the ERS to 
the City completely failed.  Together, the 1937 Law and the 1947 
Law specify all of the particulars of the ERS.  So if the City 
cannot change the Board's composition because it was specified 
by the legislature, then the City may not change any part of the 
ERS because the entirety of the program was established through 
legislative specification.  That, however, would mean the 
legislature's directive that "[c]ities of the first class are 
hereby empowered to amend or alter the provisions of this act," 
§ 31(1), ch. 441, Laws of 1947, has no meaning.   
¶124 But the legislature's directive does have meaning.  It 
means what it so obviously says——the City may change any part of 
the act (all of which are legislative specifications) so long as 
it does not alter or modify annuities, benefits, or other 
rights.  The concurrence identified nothing about the Board's 
composition 
that 
made 
it 
more 
special 
than 
any 
other 
specification in the act.  And the legislature didn't breathe so 
much as a word about the members having a right to a Board with 
an unchanging composition.  Therefore, the City may change it as 
readily as it may change any other legislative specification in 
No.  2015AP2375.dk 
 
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the act.  And that means the concurrence's central rationale 
directly contradicts what the legislature actually said.   
¶125 Beyond that, the concurrence contradicts itself on 
this very point.  Apparently, under certain circumstances the 
concurrence does not identify, the City does have the authority 
to change the composition of the Board.  Within two sentences of 
saying the Board must have seven members ("no more and no 
less"), it said the court's decision will not affect the City's 
decision to increase the Board to eight members:   
Justice Abrahamson's dissent questions whether 
the court's decision in this case means that the 1972 
amendment, which added the retiree position to the 
Board (thereby expanding its membership to eight), is 
also invalid. That issue is not before us, no one 
apparently contested the 1972 amendment, and our 
decision in this case has no impact on that amendment. 
Concurrence, ¶4 n.2 (citation omitted).   
¶126 If the legislature's specification of the Board's 
composition means the City may not change it, then increasing 
the Board's membership to eight was self-evidently beyond the 
City's authority.  If that is not so, then why may the City add 
one member to the Board, but it cannot add three?  Either the 
concurrence is wrong, or the eighth seat must be removed as well 
as the three added by the 2013 Amendment.  The concurrence 
cannot have it both ways. 
¶127 Finally, there is the third proposition——the concern 
that we must define the full reach and scope of the "other 
rights" provision.  With respect to this clause, the concurrence 
said that "when the legislature does not define a term, it is up 
to the judiciary to identify and declare its meaning, something 
No.  2015AP2375.dk 
 
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neither dissent attempts."  Id., ¶1.  The concurrence fears 
that, unless we find something to put in the "other rights" 
category, it might remain forever empty, a provision with no 
work to do.  Our job in this case was not to delve the 1937 Law 
and the 1947 Law to discover all of the other rights they might 
confer on the ERS members (if any).  The MPA and the MPFFA came 
to us claiming they had a right to a board of a certain size, 
and a franchise of a particular composition.  Our job was simply 
to look into the 1937 Law and the 1947 Law to see if those 
rights were there.  If we don't find them, our commission is at 
an end.   
¶128 That doesn't mean the "other rights" provision has no 
meaning.  There might be any number of rights in the 1937 Law or 
the 1947 Law that this provision protects.  But we don't need to 
know that to resolve this case.  We just need to know whether 
the petitioners' claimed rights exist in those acts.  Anything 
more is a pointless advisory opinion. 
¶129 Ultimately, 
the 
concurrence 
is 
just 
a 
petitio 
principii error, in which it assumed its conclusion as part of 
its argument.  It expressed the error most succinctly when it 
said that "[w]hile the state legislature precluded the City from 
changing the composition of the Board, the legislature itself 
retains this power."  Id., ¶7.   The first part of the sentence 
contains the hidden assumption that the "other rights" clause 
can turn a legislative specification into a right.  Because that 
assumption is the sole motive force for the concurrence's entire 
argument, the rationale rises or falls with its vitality.  But 
No.  2015AP2375.dk 
 
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the "other rights" clause cannot accomplish what the concurrence 
assumes it can.  It is not a source of rights, it only protects 
rights that already exist elsewhere.  For it to have any 
operative effect, therefore, the concurrence must identify an 
already-existing right that the "other rights" clause can then 
protect.    
¶130 The concurrence did not identify a right to a specific 
Board size, or a right to at-large elections; all it identified 
were legislative specifications.  Consequently, it identified 
nothing for the "other rights" clause to protect.  In fact, it 
admitted the rights claimed by the MPA and MPFFA do not exist 
(apart from the "other rights" clause) when it acknowledged the 
legislature can change the Board's composition without impacting 
any of the ERS members' rights.  See id.  So if the legislature 
can change the Board without violating a right, why can the City 
not do the same?  Because of the "other rights" provision, the 
concurrence says.  And that completes the petitio principii 
error.  If the members have no right to a specific Board 
composition as against the legislature, but they do have such a 
right as against the City, it can only be because the "other 
rights" clause created a right out of something that was not 
otherwise a right.  How does the clause accomplish such a feat?  
The concurrence did not say because it simply assumed it could, 
and it baked that assumption into its conclusion.  Classic.  We 
should avoid such illogic. 
* 
No.  2015AP2375.dk 
 
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¶131 Perhaps there is some gnosis to which I have not been 
initiated that can explain what the court has done here, but I 
don't see it.  I respectfully dissent. 
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