Title: STATE v SEITZINGER

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 13901
{DN TE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OF MONTANA

1978

‘HE STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
SOCK RONALD SETTZINGER,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Juticial District,
Honorable Jack Green, Judge presiding.

Counsel of Record
For Appellant:

smith, Connor, Varvalkenbury & Larrivee, Missoula, Montana
Fred R, Varvalkenburg argued, Missoula, Nontana

For Reszondent:
Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Denny Moreen argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana

Pobert Deschanps III, County Attorney, Missoula, Montana
BA McLean argued, deputy County Attorney, Missoula, Montana

Submitted: Septenber 13, 1978
decided: YA 2 > 1979

 

Filed: ir
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opinion of the
court.

Defendant appeals from a jury verdict and conviction of
criminal mischief, section 94-6-102, R.C.M. 1947 and the
increased sentence imposed, section 95-1506, R.C.M. 1947, by
Missoula County District Court.

‘the facts are reconstructed from testimony adduced at
trial.

At about 2:15 a.m. on January 7, 1977, Patrick Gordon
was awakened by sone loud banging. He went outside and
found that it was coming from a trailer across the street.
He called the police and during the two minutes it took
officer France to arrive, listened to glass breaking inter-
mittently. His wife also watched and listened from their
bathroom window. Officer France drove slowly by and parked
his vehicle twenty-five to thirty yards from the trailer. Fe

heard loud thumping noises, gl

 

breaking and saw the
silhouette of a person moving inside the trailer. He watched
the figure kick the trailer door open, walk over to an

idling car, open the passenger door, crawl over something
and start to drive slowly avay. Officer France pulled the
car over. upon questioning a cooperative Jack Seitzinger he
was told that Seitzinger was trying to catch two cats inside

the trailer, resulting in all the noise and breaking glasi

 

France testified that inside the trailer were broken

windows, screens and cabinet doors. He observed that there

 

were two cats in the trailer and that Seitzinger was unable

to catch them. France also testified that Seitzinger had

 

speculated that Kathy Tullier, who last occupied the prem
may have done the damage. Seitzinger later testified that

Kathy might know who did the damage.

 
‘The defendant testified that he had lived in the
trailer from May 1976 until October 1976 with Kathy Tullier,
his daughter and her son. On January 5, 1977, he took

them to the airport and put them on a plane to Louisiana

where she and the children were to live with parents. At

that time, the trailer was in fine condition according to
defendant.

‘The testimony of defendant and his fiancé, Diane Phelps,
was that the same night, along with some friends, they
returned to the trailer to get some of his belongings and
let Patty Fredricks look at the cats left behind. tater
Patty left, followed by defendant who left the trailer unlocked
in case Patty returned for a cat.

The owner of the trailer testified that he had been
to the trailer the next night, January 6, 1977, at about

8:15 p.m. to either collect rent or see if it was vacant.

 

He found it unoccupied with the door unlocked and the lights
on. He saw nothing unusual about the trailer's condition
at that time.

Both defendant and Ms. Phelps testified to the following

course of event:

 

on the eve of January 6, 1977, they had
been to a bar and stayed until closing time. while there
defendant consumed at most seven beers. After closing tine
they got something to eat and defendant said he had better
get the cats out of the trailer. Thus, in the early morning

hours (

  

0 to 3:00 a.m.) of January 7, 1977, they went to the
trailer. They entered together and found it a mess. For

a period of fifteen to twenty-five minutes they tried to
catch the cats, running into each other and making alot of
noise. Defendant told Ms. Phelps to wait in the car and
continued to search hurriedly for the cats. He lifted and
Groped a couch, ran into walls and accidently knocked

flowerpot through a window. "Plustered," he tried to leave

 
and having difficulty opening the door: he kicked it
open. Seitzinger testified that he got into the driver's
side of the idling car and proceeded until stopped by

cfficer France. Upon returning to the trailer with France,
Ms. Phelps observed that its condition was no different

when they first arrived.

Jack Seitzinger was charged with criminal mischief,
section 94-6-102(1) (a), R.C.M. 1947, to which he pleaded not
guilty on February 14, 1977. Notice of State's intent to
seek increased punishment was served March 2, 1977 and trial
commenced March 14, 1977. Voir dire of jurors, opening
statements and closing argunents of counsel were not recorded,
apparently a customary practice in this locality unless
specifically requested. Following a verdict of guilty and
a hearing on designation of defendant as a persistent felony
offender, he was sentenced to fifteen years in prison and
designated a repeated felony offender for purposes of parole
eligibility.

Defendant raises six issues which we address:

(2) whether the District Court erred in denying
defendant's motion to dismiss at the close of the State's

case for failure to formally identify defendant as the

 

accused.

(2) Whether there was sufficient evidence to support
the verdict.

(3) Whether the mental state required for conviction
of criminal mischief denied defendant due process is uncon-
stitutionally vague or overly broad. Section 94-6-102(1) (a),
R.c.M. 1947.

(4) Whether the District Court erred in failing to
keep a verbatim record of the voir dire of jurors, opening

statements and closing arguments of counsel.

 
(5) Whether there was an inadequate search for truth
in the instant case necessitating a new trial.

(6) Whether the prosecution's invocation of the
increased punishnent statute denied defendant due process of
law or whether it was timely served. Section 95-1506,
R.c.M. 1947.

During presentation of the State's case-in-chief the
only specific reference made to the defendant as the accused

was by Officer France who identified him as "Mr. Seitzinger’

 

Defendant contends the court erred in refusing to dismiss
for the State's failure to sufficiently identify him. No
authority is cited. He merely asserts that "normally"
witnesses identify a defendant by pointing at him in open
court as the person referred to. There is no statutory
requirement that defendant be formally identified in this
fashion. to danger of mistaken identity appears in the
context of this case. while the ritual of pointing at
defendant and announcing for the record to whom the witness
points may add more than drama to a criminal trial, it is
not a requisite element of the State's case and the District
court did not err in refusing to dismiss on defendant's
notion.

Defendant's argunents concerning the sufficiency of
evidence to support the verdict oscillate between two
explanations for the damage to the trailer: that he did it
accidentally trying to catch two cats, and that somebody
else did most of the damage before he arrived on the scene.

Given the first explanation, defendant cites state
v. Fitzpatrick (1973), 163 Mont. 220, 516 P.22 605, as
holding that to support a criminal conviction the evidence

must not only be consistent with defendant's guilt but also

 
inconsistent with his innocence. Defendant

 

reading of the
case is not quite complete. In Fitzpatrick, the Court went
on to say that the jury is the fact-finding body in our

legal system and is free to pick and choose the evidence it
wishes to believe. State v. Fitzpatrick, supra at 226, 516

P.2a at 609. Under defendant's.

 

scond explanation, he cites
section 93-401-1, R.C.M. 1947, and State v. McGuire (1938),
107 Mont. 341, 88 P.24 35, as declaring the “rule of un-

contradicted evidence

 

* allegedly violated by the jury in
disregarding defendant's and Ms. Phelps’ testimony that the

trailer was damaged when they arrived. In State v. McGuiri

 

supra, a shortage of state funds in defendant's possession
was held insufficient to sustain a conviction of grand
larceny where explained by defendant consistent with his
innocence. The Court explained at the outset "the record is
barren of any testimony that the defendant appropriated the
money in question to his own use with the intent to deprive
the state of its property". State v. McGuire, supra at 345,

88 P.2a at 35. In the instant cas

 

testimony of Officer
France and the neighbors’ clearly tend to incriminate
defendant and the evidence was not, therefore, uncontradicted.
See State v. Swazio (1977), ___ Mont. _, 568 P.2d 124,
127, 34 St.Rep. 676, 661. The jury vas at liberty not to
believe the testimony of defendant and his fiance and find
from credible evidence that defendant committed the offense.

Defendant contends his conviction of criminal mischief
for "knowingly" causing damage to the property of another,
section 94-6-102(1) (a), offends due process as either
unconstitutionally vague or overly broad. As to overbreadth,
he argues the offense fails to give an ordinary person fair
notice that his contemplated conduct is statutorily forbidden.
one of the declared purposes of our Criminal Code is "to

 
give fair warning of the nature of the conduct declared to
constitute an offense." Section 94-1-103(1) (c), R.C.M.
1947. As to vagueness, defendant maintains conduct resulting
in accidental damage cannot be criminally punished without
a showing of criminal intent. In State v. Sharbono (1977),

Mont. + 563 P.2d 61, 34 St.Rep. 196, this Court
stated:

‘What the legislature did, in enacting the

Montana Criminal Code 1973, was to reduce

the difficulty in this area by articulating

general principles that shall apply when|

the definitions of a particular offense are

ambiguous. The culpability requirements

adhere to familiar concepts, purposely,

Knowingly. Upon the whole it is the person

who means to do the thing that constitutes

a crime, knows he is doing it, and knows that

there is a substantial and unjustifiable

risk in doing it, whose conduct warrants

condemnation of the kind from which conviction

results." State v. Sharbono, supra,563 P.2d

at 72, 34 St.Rep. at 211.
Acting knowingly as defined by section 94-2-101(27), R.C.M.
1947, is not acting accidentally. Defendant is not, there-
fore, being held criminally liable for accidental conduct.

A court reporter was not present to make a record of
the voir dire of jurors or the opening statements or closing
arguments of counsel. Apparently this is a customary practice
in Missoula County and the Fourth Judicial District, unless
a court record is specifically requested. Counsel other
than trial counsel was appointed by the District Court to
handle this appeal. In his brief to this Court, counsel
asserts he is advised by the defendant that improper references
to his prior criminal record were made during these un
recorded portions of the proceedings. In questioning during
oral arguments counsel admitted he had consulted with trial
counsel who was unable to remember any such reference.
Nonetheless, counsel seeks reversal on the ground that the

absence of a record denied the defendant due process of

 
law. He relies on a series of civil cases which held it
reversible error for a court of record to fail to keep a
verbatim stenographic record of the testimony at trial, In
Re Gullette (1977), ___ Mont. _, $66 P.24 396, 34
St.Rep. 277; State v. Geary (1977), ___ Mont. _, 562
P.2a 821, 34 St.Rep. 218; State ex rel. Stimatz v. District
court (1937), 105 Mont. 510, 74 P.24 8, In each of these
cases the absence of any court record rendered the pro-
ceedings below effectively unreviewable on appeal.

Here, we have a record of the evidentiary portion of
the trial, but not of the voir dire or the opening and final
arguments. It is impossible however, for this Court to
reach defendant's specification of error upon vague and
unsubstantiated statements of counsel.

We do not perceive this as necessarily stemming from
the absence of a stenographic record but as a failure of
counsel to properly raise the issue on appeal. For example,
in State v. Musgrove (1978), ___ Mont. _, 582 P.2d 1246,
35 St.Rep. 1179, this Court was faced with the allegation of
improprieties occurring during an unrecorded jury view of
premises. For the purposes of appellate review, affidavits
of trial counsel, defense and state, provided a sufficient

basis upon which to decide the issue. We

 

this was not attempted here, if in fact improper statements
concerning defendants’ prior record were made.
We question the propriety of automatically dispensing

with a record of voir dire, opening and closing argunent

 

They are not, as argued by the State, “ancilliary" to the
trial. For protection of the record, a trial court should
order its court reporter to record the voir dire examination,
the opening statements, and the final arguments. Moreover,

diligent defense coun

 

1 should demand that these proceedings
be recorded. Under the facts presented in this case however,
we cannot hold that defendant was denied due process of law.

Defendant next contends the State's failure to call
certain potential witnesses constituted an inadequate search
for truth and under State v. Mickelson (1977), ___ Mont.

, 965 P.24 308, 34 St.Rep. 475, remand is appropriate.
Defendant's reliance on State v. Mickelson, supra, is misplaced.
There, conflicting and biased testimony upon which defendant's
conviction rested would have been readily clarified by
obtaining certain witnesses who were not called nor their
absence explained. the defendant here does nct explain how
the absence of Kathy Tullier's testimony or that of the
members of the January 5, 1977 party would have added to his
case or detracted from the State's. No obstacle prevented
his calling these persons on his behalf. an adequate search

for truth was undertaken by the State in this case and

 

Substantial credible evidence supported the jury's verdict.
Finally, defendant contends the prosecution's invocation
of the persistent felony offender statute, section 95-1506,
R.C.M. 1947, denied him due process of law or, alternatively,
that notice thereof was not timely given. Notice of intent
to rely on the increased punishment provision was served
March 2, 1977. ‘Twelve days later, on March 14, 1977, the

case came to trial. This Court has recently ruled notice

 

given at any time prior to trial is sufficient for purposes
of section 95-1506. state v. gohnaon (1978), __ Mont.
__+ 585 P.24 1328, 1333, 35 St.Rep. 1596, 1602. Absent
a detailed showing that the provision was used "in an
attempt to coerce defendant into waiving his right to a jury
trial," state v. Sather (1977), ___ Mont. __, 564 P.2a
1306, 1310, 34 St.Rep. 462, 467. We find the manner and

timing of the State's invocation adequately conformed with

 

statute and due process.
‘The judgment and sentence imposed are affirmed.

~9-