Title: People v. McCallister

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 85426-Agenda 5-November 1999.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
								MAYNARD McCALLISTER, JR., Appellant.


Opinion filed July 6, 2000.
	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a jury trial in the circuit court of St. Clair County,
the defendant, Maynard McCallister, Jr., was convicted of three
counts of first degree murder. The same jury found defendant
eligible for the death penalty. Following a hearing in aggravation
and mitigation, the jury found that there were no factors sufficient
to preclude imposition of the death penalty and sentenced
defendant to death. Defendant's death sentence has been stayed
pending direct review by this court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(b);
134 Ill. 2d Rs. 603, 609(a). For the reasons that follow, we affirm
defendant's convictions and sentence.
BACKGROUND
	The following facts were established at trial. On December 11,
1995, the bodies of Stanley Williams, Sr., his girlfriend, Ernestine
McCoy, and Ernestine's adult son, Orlando McCoy, were
discovered in Williams' mobile home trailer in Washington Park,
Illinois. Williams' body was found lying in the kitchen, located in
the front end of the trailer. A small pocket knife was on the floor
near Williams' partially pulled-out pants pocket. Williams' wallet,
which contained no money, was found on the kitchen table. A
revolver was found in a plastic bag, inside a closed cabinet
underneath the kitchen sink. Laboratory tests revealed that this gun
was inoperable.
	Ernestine McCoy's body was discovered in the living room.
The living room was separated from the kitchen by a waist-high
counter that ran approximately half-way from one long side of the
trailer to the other. Ernestine's body was on the floor, directly in
front of a couch placed with its back against this counter.
	Orlando McCoy's body was found near the front door to the
trailer. The front door was located on one of the long sides of the
trailer, and opened into the area left unobstructed by the counter
separating the kitchen and living room. Orlando's body was lying
a few feet from the door and was parallel to it. A large pool of
blood abutted the doorsill. Drag marks in the blood indicated that
Orlando's body originally was against, or very near, the front door
and was moved to its final position. A large, kitchen carving knife
was found under Orlando's body. Several spent .22-caliber shell
casings were found on the floor near the front door. Other than the
victims' bodies, there were no signs of violence or struggle in the
trailer.
	Autopsies revealed that all three victims died from gunshot
wounds. Both Stanley Williams and Orlando McCoy were shot in
the right and left temples. Ernestine McCoy was shot once in the
back of the neck. Analysis of the victims' gunshot wounds
indicated that the shots which killed the victims were probably fired
from a distance of more than 1½ feet. Bullets were recovered from
the bodies of all the victims. The two bullets recovered from
Williams' head, the bullet recovered from Ernestine's neck, and
one of the bullets recovered from Orlando's head were fired from
the same gun. A second bullet recovered from Orlando's head was
unsuitable for comparison. No murder weapon was introduced into
evidence.
	The bodies of the three victims were first discovered around
noon on December 11, 1995, by Williams' son, Stanley Williams,
Jr. At trial, Stanley acknowledged that his father sold drugs at his
trailer and that he kept a gun, which was inoperable, in a cabinet
near where he normally sat in the kitchen. Stanley also stated that
he had never seen Orlando or Ernestine with the knife that was
found under Orlando's body.
	James Williams, who was not related to the Stanley Williams
family, testified at trial for the State. James stated that he was 26
years old and that he had known defendant for approximately 10
years. James acknowledged that he had prior convictions for two
burglaries, two thefts, and two drug offenses.
	James testified that in December 1995, he, his wife, Becky,
and defendant were all living in a trailer owned by Jamie Kincannon
in State Park, Illinois. On the evening of December 10, 1995,
defendant moved his belongings from Kincannon's trailer to the
home of his girlfriend, Dawn Daubach, in Collinsville, Illinois.
Later, during the night of December 10, defendant, Daubach,
James and Becky all smoked crack cocaine.
	On the morning of December 11, defendant, Daubach, James
and Becky decided, as a group, to purchase cocaine from Stanley
Williams. The four got into Daubach's car and headed to Williams'
trailer in Washington Park. James drove, defendant sat in the front
passenger seat, and Daubach and Becky sat in the rear seat. At the
time, defendant was wearing a trench coat, a shirt, blue jeans and
brown work boots. On the way to Williams' trailer, defendant
asked the group to stop at Kincannon's trailer in State Park.
Defendant told the group that he wanted to retrieve a rifle which
he had left there, and that he was afraid the rifle would be stolen by
people who were then living in Kincannon's trailer. After arriving
at Kincannon's trailer, defendant went inside. About a minute later,
according to James, defendant returned to the car with the rifle
wrapped in clothing. Defendant then placed the rifle under the seat
of Daubach's car. At trial, James described defendant's rifle as a
.22-caliber weapon with a sawed-off barrel. James stated that he
saw defendant cut the barrel off the rifle some three to four weeks
prior to December 11. James estimated that, with the sawed-off
barrel, the rifle was about 14 to 16 inches long.
	After leaving Kincannon's trailer, defendant, James, Becky and
Daubach drove directly to Williams' trailer. When they arrived,
James parked the car near the front end of the trailer. James and
defendant then entered the trailer while the two women waited in
the car. James stated that he did not see defendant bring his rifle
into the trailer, and, at the time, he assumed that the rifle was still
under the seat in Daubach's car.
	Once inside the trailer, defendant and James went into the
kitchen. Photographs of the interior of the trailer, which were
published to the jury and which are part of the record on appeal,
show that the kitchen was a square area. One side of the kitchen
was bounded by the counter separating the kitchen from the living
room. A second side, which was part of the same long side of the
trailer that contained the front door, held the refrigerator. A third
side of the kitchen held a window and made up the short, front end
of the trailer. The final side of the kitchen, the side opposite the
refrigerator, held the stove, cabinets and the kitchen sink.
	James testified that he and Williams sat at the kitchen table
while defendant remained standing. The table was roughly half-way
between the sink and the refrigerator, and was almost against the
window. James sat at the side of the table nearest the refrigerator.
Williams sat opposite James at the side of the table nearest the
kitchen sink. Defendant stood to Williams' right, between Williams
and the counter separating the kitchen and the living room.
Ernestine was sitting on the couch in the living room, with her back
to the kitchen. Orlando was sitting at the end of the couch closest
to the front door, or on a folding chair placed next to the couch
near the front door.
	According to James, Williams was the first person to speak
after defendant and James entered the trailer. Williams was upset
with defendant and James because they had left people waiting
outside in their car. Williams was also upset because he had seen
another car driving slowly around his trailer. James stated that
Williams was afraid that defendant and James had brought the
police with them. James also stated that, while Williams was upset,
he was not yelling. James described Williams' language as
"griping." Eventually, Williams asked defendant and James what
they wanted. James told Williams that they wanted to buy drugs.
Williams replied, "Alright." Then, according to James, as Williams
reached into his shirt pocket with his left hand, defendant pulled his
rifle out from under his trench coat and shot Williams in the right
temple.
	James testified that it was his impression that when Williams
was shot, he was reaching into his shirt pocket to retrieve a packet
of cocaine. James did not believe that Williams' pocket could have
contained a weapon. When Williams reached into his shirt pocket,
he was not angry, and he did not say anything. Before he was shot,
Williams did not get up from the kitchen table, nor did he reach
toward anything other than his shirt pocket. James felt no threat
from Williams at the time Williams was shot.
	James testified that he heard three shots fired rapidly, "as fast
as you could pull the trigger." He saw defendant turn as he fired
the second and third shots. James stated that the second and third
shots struck Ernestine and Orlando. However, James did not
actually see these shots hit Ernestine and Orlando, as he was still
looking at Williams' body when the shots were fired.
	After the third shot was fired, James got up to leave. He tried
to open the front door but could not, because Orlando's body was
up against the door. He asked defendant to help him move the
body away from the door. Defendant did not respond but, instead,
shot Williams, who was lying on the kitchen floor, again.
Defendant then walked over to Orlando and shot him a second
time. Defendant then moved Orlando's body away from the door.
According to James, defendant was standing directly over Williams
and Orlando when he shot them for the second time.
	As James left the trailer he became physically ill. He stood
outside the front door and began choking and spitting up. He then
got into Daubach's car and told the women that defendant had shot
the people inside the trailer. According to James, the women
started "panicking." James stated that he was afraid defendant
would come out of the trailer and kill the three of them, so he told
the women to calm down. After two to three minutes had passed
and defendant had not come out of the trailer, Daubach asked
James to go back inside and get him. James got out of the car and
looked into the trailer through the front door. Defendant was
standing in the trailer, looking at the bodies of the victims. James
did not see defendant move anything in the trailer. After another
minute or so, defendant came out of the trailer and got into
Daubach's car.
	Once they were all in the car, defendant told James to drive
away and told the two women to "shut up." James stated that he
saw no injuries on defendant when defendant entered the car, but
did notice blood on his pants and on his boots. James did not see
defendant come out of the trailer with any money or drugs.
	When the group arrived back at Daubach's house, defendant
told James that he was going to "take care of" Daubach and Becky
because they might tell someone about the murders. However,
James was able to persuade defendant not to do anything to the
two women. Defendant also took James' clothes and tennis shoes,
and some of his own clothes, and put them in a bag. Defendant
burned his own boots in the fireplace. James stated that he and
defendant then dumped the bag of clothes and the rifle in a
Dumpster behind a store.
	James testified that he never saw the knife which was found
under Orlando's body, and that he never saw a gun while in the
trailer. James recalled a conversation with defendant in which
defendant said that he had been "shorted" some drugs by Williams,
but stated that defendant did not seem worried about it. James also
testified that he did not call the police to report the murders
because he was afraid that defendant would kill him if he did so.
	On cross-examination, James acknowledged that, in December
1995, he was addicted to crack cocaine and that, for the month or
two prior to December 11, 1995, he had purchased drugs from
Williams almost every day. James also acknowledged that he had
not slept for two days before December 11 and that, during this
period, he was on a cocaine high or binge. James admitted that
there were some things that he could not remember about the night
of December 10 and early morning of December 11. He could not
recall, for example, whether he smoked cocaine during the early
hours of December 11 or how Dawn Daubach, who was working
during the night of December 10 and early morning of December
11, was picked up from work. James stated, however, that he was
able to recall what happened during the shootings. James also told
the jury that he had not been held as a suspect in the case and that
no deal had been made for his testimony against defendant. When
asked, James denied shooting any of the three victims.
	Becky Williams, James' wife, testified that on the morning of
December 11, 1995, she, her husband, defendant and Dawn
Daubach left Daubach's house and, at defendant's request, drove
to Kincannon's trailer in State Park. Defendant went into
Kincannon's trailer alone, and emerged carrying a shirt. The group
then drove to Williams' trailer in Washington Park to purchase
crack cocaine. Becky stated that it was defendant's idea to go to
Williams' trailer to buy the drugs because Williams "owed him
something."
	After the group arrived at Williams' trailer, James and
defendant went inside, while Becky and Daubach remained in the
car. Shortly thereafter, Becky heard what sounded like a cap gun
being fired. She heard three "pows," then a 30- to 40-second
pause, and then two more "pows." Becky then saw James come
out of the trailer, pale and doubled over. When James got to the
car, he told Becky and Daubach to be quiet. James then left the car
and returned to the trailer door. He called to defendant to come
out. Defendant, who was wearing a long trench coat, exited the
trailer. Defendant did not look injured or upset, and he did not
have anything in his hands.
	Becky stated that defendant approached the car and, through
the driver's side window, threw a wad of money on Becky's lap.
Defendant then went back into the trailer. When defendant came
back out of the trailer and got into the car, Becky threw the wad
of money back to him. According to Becky, defendant did not have
this money when he entered Williams' trailer. Becky also stated
that when defendant got into the car, she saw that he had a $50
"rock" of crack cocaine in his hand.
	Becky testified that as the group was heading back to Dawn
Daubach's house, she and Daubach tried to ask what had
happened. Defendant, however, told Becky and Daubach to "shut
up." When the group arrived at Daubach's house, defendant put his
bloody clothes and boots in a bag, and placed the bag outside,
behind a woodpile. Later, defendant retrieved the bag and burned
his clothes in the fireplace.
	On cross-examination, Becky acknowledged that she was
frequently using crack cocaine during December 1995. She stated,
however, that on the night of December 10 and morning of
December 11, she did not smoke crack cocaine. Becky further
acknowledged that, in a statement which she gave to police on
January 2, 1996, she indicated that she heard three or four "pops"
while waiting outside Williams' trailer, instead of five. However,
at trial, Becky said that she was certain that she had heard three
"pops" in quick succession, followed by a pause, and then two
more "pops." Becky testified that, while she and James did not talk
about the shootings at length on December 11, sometime on that
day James told her that defendant had shot the three victims. Becky
also stated that she and her husband had not talked about her
testimony in preparation for trial.
	Dawn Daubach testified that she had prior convictions for
felony theft and drug possession, and that, in 1995, she was a crack
cocaine addict. Daubach also stated that she and defendant were
romantically involved for a period of time in late 1995.
	Daubach testified that on the morning of December 11, 1995,
she, defendant, James and Becky all left Daubach's house to buy
crack cocaine from Stanley Williams. On the way to Williams'
trailer, the group stopped at Kincannon's trailer in State Park, at
defendant's request. According to Daubach, defendant said he
wanted to pick up a gun which he had left there and which he
feared would be stolen. The group then drove to Williams' trailer.
	Daubach stated that defendant and James entered Williams'
trailer, while she and Becky stayed in the car. Shortly after
defendant and James entered the trailer, Daubach heard three
gunshots, then a short silence, then two more shots. James then
came out of the trailer holding his head and walking in circles.
James walked over to the car and told Daubach and Becky that
defendant "just did all three of them." Daubach then saw defendant
walk out of the trailer, go back in, and then come back out. When
defendant came out of the trailer, he did not appear to be injured.
Daubach stated that, after defendant got into the car, he threw a
wad of money onto Becky's lap, and that Becky then threw it back.
	Daubach testified that when the group arrived at her house,
she noticed that defendant had some crack cocaine. She had not
seen the cocaine when she was in the car. Daubach stated that she
smoked this cocaine with defendant. Daubach also stated that she
saw defendant burn his clothes in the fireplace. According to
Daubach, defendant later explained the shootings to her by saying
"that's what happens when someone disrespects me."
	On cross-examination, Daubach acknowledged that she
smoked crack cocaine twice on the morning of December 11, and
that she had been awake for over 24 hours by the time the
shootings occurred.
	Dana Ganninger testified that she was addicted to crack
cocaine in December 1995, and that she had six prior felony
convictions, including convictions for forgery, taking marijuana
into a penal institution, and theft of a motorcycle. She also stated
that, in 1995, she was defendant's girlfriend.
	Ganninger testified that, in December 1995, she was staying
on and off at Dawn Daubach's house in Collinsville. On the
morning of December 11, Daubach and Becky Williams picked
Ganninger up at Kincannon's trailer in State Park and drove back
to Daubach's house. When they arrived there, Ganninger went to
sleep. Defendant, Daubach, James and Becky then left the house in
Daubach's car. When the group returned to the house around
noon, Ganninger woke up. She noticed that defendant appeared
"shook up" and angry, and that James appeared "devastated." The
women also appeared "shook up" and scared. Ganninger also
noticed that defendant had blood on his clothes. Ganninger stated
that she saw defendant and James burning clothing and defendant's
boots in the fireplace. Defendant, James and Daubach then smoked
crack cocaine.
	Ganninger testified that later, on December 11, she was in a
car with defendant at a gas station when they saw some friends.
The friends asked defendant and Ganninger if they had heard that
Williams had been killed. Defendant did not reply, but as defendant
and Ganninger drove away, defendant said, "You know I did that."
Defendant also told Ganninger that he "couldn't believe how quick
he was," and that "they didn't even have time to think." According
to Ganninger, defendant also said, "Stan and his old lady and the
kid-bam, bam, bam." Defendant did not mention James Williams
when describing the murders to Ganninger except to say that James
"couldn't even believe how fast he did it, and that Jimmy got sick."
Later, defendant explained Williams' murder to Ganninger by
saying, "That's what he gets for being disrespectful." Ganninger
also stated that defendant threatened to kill her if she told anyone
about the murders.
	Ganninger further testified that in November 1995, when
defendant met Stanley Williams for the first time, defendant told
Ganninger that Williams had an attitude problem and "was going
to get it." Ganninger stated that two weeks before the shooting,
defendant purchased a rifle with crack cocaine. Defendant and
James then sawed off the barrel of the rifle. Ganninger also stated
that shortly before Christmas 1995, she accompanied defendant to
his mother's house in Missouri. There, at defendant's request, she
gave the rifle to his brother. Ganninger stated that she never saw
the rifle again.
	On cross-examination, Ganninger testified that, while she was
addicted to crack cocaine in December 1995, she was certain that
she did not smoke cocaine on the morning of December 11.
Ganninger also stated that she was sure defendant had explained
the murders by saying Williams had "disrespected" him, even
though that explanation did not appear in a statement that
Ganninger had given police on December 30, 1995. Ganninger
denied speaking with Dawn Daubach or Becky Williams about her
testimony in preparation for trial.
	Ganninger, Daubach, James and Becky all testified to an
incident that occurred shortly before Christmas 1995. At that time,
defendant threatened to shoot and kill them all, including himself,
with the same rifle used on December 11, 1995, at Williams'
trailer.
	Defendant testified at trial in his own behalf. Defendant told
the jury that he was 35 years old and that he had prior convictions
for aggravated battery and theft.
	Defendant stated that, in the fall of 1995, he was living in
Kincannon's trailer in State Park. James and Becky Williams,
whom he had known for 10 or 12 years, were also living there.
Defendant testified that he was addicted to crack cocaine in the fall
of 1995 and that he purchased cocaine from Stanley Williams on
several occasions during this time. Defendant stated that on trips
to Williams' trailer, he was usually accompanied by James
Williams. Only "very seldom" did defendant go to Stanley
Williams' trailer by himself.
	Defendant testified that, on December 10, 1995, he and James
and Becky Williams moved to Dawn Daubach's house in
Collinsville. In the early evening of December 10, defendant and
James drove Daubach to work in her car. Defendant and James
then returned to Daubach's house where they "got high and drunk"
until the following morning. Around six or seven in the morning on
December 11, defendant and James picked Daubach up from work.
The three then drove to East St. Louis so that Daubach could buy
some cocaine. Defendant, James and Daubach then returned to
Daubach's house, where, along with Becky, they ingested the
cocaine. At approximately 10:30 a.m. on December 11, the group
decided to buy more cocaine. According to defendant, James
Williams suggested that they buy the cocaine from Stanley
Williams.
	Defendant stated that, on the way to Stanley Williams' trailer,
he suggested that the group stop at Kincannon's trailer in State
Park so that he could pick up some clothes and a .22-caliber rifle
that he had acquired with James Williams during a previous drug
deal. Once inside the trailer, defendant collected his clothes and
stuck the rifle inside the long, black overcoat that he was wearing.
Defendant then left the trailer and threw his clothes into the back
of the car. Defendant kept the rifle inside his jacket. Defendant
stated that he did not show the gun to James, Becky or Daubach
when he returned to the car.
	Defendant testified that the group then drove to Stanley
Williams' trailer. When they arrived, defendant and James entered
the trailer, intending to purchase $250 of cocaine. Inside the trailer,
Ernestine McCoy, whom defendant did not know, was seated on
the living room couch. Orlando McCoy, whom defendant also did
not know, was standing near the front door. Stanley Williams was
seated at the kitchen table.
	Defendant stated that he entered the kitchen and stood close
to the sink, while James stood near the refrigerator. After they
entered the kitchen, Williams asked defendant who was outside in
the car. Defendant replied, "My girlfriend." Hearing this, Williams
became upset. Defendant stated that, for about a minute, Williams
"rambl[ed] on," yelling at defendant for bringing other people to
his trailer. Williams kept standing up, looking out the kitchen
window, and then sitting down. According to defendant, Williams
also talked about a second car that was driving by the trailer or that
was pulling in the driveway. Williams also repeatedly told
defendant that he had to leave.
	Defendant stated that he tried to calm Williams down. He
asked Williams if he and James could "just buy what we want."
Williams, however, told defendant that he was not going to sell him
any cocaine. When defendant protested, Williams said that if
defendant did not leave, he would "shoot your ass." Williams,
while seated, then turned and reached for a cabinet under the sink.
Defendant stated that he thought that Williams was going to grab
a gun from the cabinet and shoot him, so he pulled out his rifle and
shot Williams. Defendant testified that, while he did not see
Williams' gun on the day of the shooting, he knew that Williams
kept one inside the cabinet. Defendant explained that he saw the
gun on a previous occasion when he went to Williams' trailer
without James. On that occasion, Williams showed the gun to
defendant and told him that he would "get hurt" if he came to the
trailer without James again.
	After firing one shot at Williams, defendant stated, he saw
Orlando McCoy, who had pulled something out of his pants,
yelling and coming directly toward him from the front door.
Defendant did not know what Orlando had pulled from his pants.
Without aiming for any particular spot, defendant fired one shot at
Orlando.
	Defendant stated that, after shooting the two men, he "just
kind of stood there for a minute." Then, according to defendant,
James ran over, told defendant they had to go, and grabbed the
rifle. James then turned and shot Ernestine McCoy, who was sitting
on the living room couch, screaming. James again told defendant
they had to leave the trailer. James then walked over to Orlando,
who was by the front door, and shot him. James then shot Stanley
Williams, who was lying on the kitchen floor. After firing the three
shots, James yelled at defendant to "come on" and then left the
trailer. Defendant stated that he remained in the trailer, scared, and
not knowing what to do. James came back in, grabbed defendant
by the arm, and said they had to leave.
	When defendant got back to Daubach's car, he realized that
the rifle was inside his coat. Defendant did not remember how the
rifle got there, but guessed that James must have given it to him
after the shootings. Inside the car, Daubach and Becky Williams
were discussing what happened in the trailer. Defendant told them
to "shut up."	
	Defendant testified that, after the group arrived at Daubach's
house, he removed his clothes and took a shower. When he got out
of the shower, defendant saw James putting his clothes into the
fireplace. Defendant placed his own T-shirt in the fireplace and
helped James set the clothes on fire. Defendant stated that he did
not place his boots in the fire. Defendant also denied disposing of
the rifle. According to defendant, Dana Ganninger took the rifle
and "put [it] up" someplace. Defendant further denied taking any
money, drugs or other items from Williams' trailer. Defendant also
stated that he did not discuss the shootings with anyone and denied
telling Ganninger that he had killed the people in the trailer.
	Defendant continued to live at Daubach's house until a few
days before Christmas 1995. At that time, according to defendant,
he and Ganninger were preparing to visit defendant's mother in
Missouri for the holidays. Before leaving, however, defendant and
James argued about the shootings at Williams' trailer. Defendant
told Ganninger to get the .22-caliber rifle that had been used in the
shooting and to put it in the car. Defendant stated that he did not
threaten anyone at that time, or tell anyone that he was going to
shoot them or himself. Defendant, Ganninger, and Ganninger's two
children then drove to defendant's mother's home in Missouri.
Defendant stated that, as they crossed the Mississippi River bridge,
he threw the rifle into the river because he "wanted no more to do
with it."
	After his arrest, defendant gave a statement to the police that
was written down by Illinois State Police Officer Donald Stalcup.
Defendant testified that he did not read the statement before he
signed it because he trusted Officer Stalcup.
	At trial, defendant recounted an incident that was included in
the statement he had given to the police. Defendant stated that in
November 1995, he and James went to Stanley Williams' trailer to
buy some drugs. At the trailer were Williams and two other
individuals, Art and Boo. When defendant was told that it would
take an hour to get the drugs he wanted, he reached for his money
and tried to leave. However, Boo, who was standing by a pistol
that was lying on the counter, said he was taking defendant's
money. Williams told Boo that defendant and James were "cool,"
but Boo told defendant and James to leave. After talking with
James, defendant left. Defendant stated that, although he had been
robbed in Williams' trailer, he held no grudge against Williams.
Defendant explained that Williams later tried to make up for the
incident by giving defendant extra cocaine.
	Defendant told the jurors that when he entered Williams'
trailer on December 11, 1995, he did not intend to shoot Williams
or Orlando McCoy. Defendant stated that he shot Williams because
he was afraid, and because he thought Williams was going to shoot
him.
	On cross-examination, defendant denied being with Dana
Ganninger when he met Stanley Williams for the first time, and
denied telling Ganninger that Williams had an attitude problem and
"was going to get it." Defendant also denied sawing off the barrel
of the rifle so that he could conceal the weapon. According to
defendant, he and James sawed off the barrel one day because they
had "nothing better to do." Defendant testified that he did not take
the rifle into Williams' trailer with the intent to shoot the victims,
and stated that it was a coincidence that he stopped to pick up his
rifle at Kincannon's trailer in State Park on the same day the
victims were killed.
	Defendant further testified, on cross-examination, that
Williams was seated and had not yet opened the cabinet door at the
time he was shot. When asked why he did not threaten Williams
with his rifle, or hold the rifle on Williams, instead of shooting him,
defendant again stated that he was afraid. Defendant acknowledged
that he did not usually go to Williams' trailer to buy drugs without
James and that the only time Williams had threatened defendant,
prior to the day of the shooting, James had not been present.
Defendant also admitted that, while he had testified on direct
examination that Williams said he was going to "shoot your ass,"
that threat was not in the signed statement defendant gave to the
police at the time of his arrest. Defendant explained the
inconsistency by saying that he did not review the statement he
gave to the police when he signed it because he trusted the officer
who wrote it down. Defendant further acknowledged that, after
Williams told him to leave the trailer on December 11, 1995, he
was tired of hearing people tell him to leave the drug house
without letting him buy any drugs.
	Defendant also testified that, when Orlando McCoy came
toward him, he approached face-forward. Defendant was asked
how, in light of this fact, Orlando received bullet wounds on both
sides of his head. Defendant stated that he had "no idea."
Defendant was also asked whether, given the pool of blood found
by the front door, defendant was able "to shoot [Orlando] in the
head, and he actually got over to the door several feet away before
he dropped." Defendant replied, "I guess that's true." Defendant
stated that he was "panicked" and "scared" when he shot Williams
and Orlando, but also acknowledged that each victim was shot in
the same part of the head. Defendant stated that the similar
placement of shots was "just a coincidence."
	Defendant's testimony regarding the shooting of Ernestine
McCoy was impeached with the statement he gave to police at the
time of his arrest. In the statement, defendant told police that after
Williams and Orlando were shot, Ernestine was on the floor in the
living room, trying to get under a table. According to the
statement, James then walked about five feet from Ernestine and
shot her. This description of Ernestine's murder was at odds with
defendant's direct testimony, in which he stated that Ernestine was
sitting on the living room couch, screaming, when James grabbed
the .22-caliber rifle from defendant, turned, and shot. On cross-examination, defendant testified that he did not remember telling
police that Ernestine was trying to get under a table when she was
shot. Defendant stated that he did not know why, after Williams
and Orlando were shot, James decided to grab the rifle and shoot
Ernestine.
	The defense also called St. Clair County Sheriff's Drug Unit
Officer Kelly Oliver, who testified that he had conducted hundreds
of drug investigations. Officer Oliver stated that a drug transaction
at a "crack house" can be a dangerous situation, and that people
have been shot while purchasing drugs at crack houses.
	In the State's rebuttal, Illinois State Police Officer Donald
Stalcup testified that defendant read the statement he gave to
police at the time of his arrest before he signed it.
	After closing arguments, the jury returned verdicts finding
defendant guilty of the intentional or knowing murder (720 ILCS
5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1996)) of Stanley Williams, Ernestine
McCoy and Orlando McCoy. The jury also returned separate
verdicts finding defendant guilty of the felony murder (720 ILCS
5/9-1(a)(3) (West 1996)) of the three victims for having killed the
victims during an armed robbery.
	No testimony was presented at the eligibility phase of
defendant's capital sentencing hearing. After arguments, the jury
found the defendant eligible for the death penalty based upon two
statutory aggravating factors: (1) murder in the course of another
felony (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1996)); and (2) murder of two
or more individuals (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1996)).
	At the aggravation-mitigation phase of the sentencing hearing,
Stanley Williams' sister read a victim impact statement in which
she described the immeasurable loss of her brother and stated that
Williams was a "human being who did not deserve to be brutally
murdered."
	State Police Officer Donald Stalcup also testified in
aggravation. Stalcup stated that defendant told him he kept the .22-
caliber rifle after the December 11, 1995, shootings because he was
looking for, and wished to kill, Boo, the individual who had taken
his money at Williams' trailer in November 1995.
	Ken Herbert, a sergeant with the St. Clair County's sheriff's
department, testified that defendant was involved in a fight with
other inmates while incarcerated at the county jail. Herbert also
testified that defendant admitted that he had punched a fellow jail
detainee in the nose in a separate incident.
	Philip Syks testified that in July 1990, he was a bouncer at a
bar in Madison County that defendant had frequented on several
occasions. On July 28, 1990, Syks encountered defendant at a fast
food restaurant after another bouncer had kicked defendant out of
the Madison County bar. Syks was in a car in the restaurant's drive
through lane when defendant tried to hit him through the car
window with a beer bottle. Later in the evening, as Syks left a
friend's house, he was attacked by defendant, defendant's nephew,
and a third man. Defendant's nephew struck Syks in the head with
a baseball bat. Defendant, saying that he was going to kill Syks,
slashed Syks repeatedly with a machete, cutting off three of Syks'
fingers. As a result of the attack, Syks was hospitalized for eight
days. Syks required 2,500 stitches and surgery to reattach his
fingers. Defendant pled guilty to aggravated battery for attacking
Syks and was sentenced to three years in prison.
	Jennifer Maness, a special agent with the Illinois State Police,
testified that defendant had been charged with a fourth murder that
occurred on December 11, 1999. Maness stated that, on the
afternoon of that day, defendant fatally stabbed Robert Willis
following a dispute during a drug transaction. Another individual,
Dwayne McLemore, was stabbed during the same incident, but
survived. James Williams was present during the attacks on Willis
and McLemore and testified about the attacks before the jury.
	Jennifer Maness also testified that on December 23, 1995,
defendant murdered 62-year-old James Greer in a dispute over
possession of Greer's car. According to Maness, while Greer and
defendant were riding in Greer's car, defendant hit Greer about the
head, then pulled out a knife and stabbed him repeatedly in the
throat. After killing Greer, defendant weighed Greer's body down
with a sand bag and left the body in a creek.
	Dana Ganninger, who was present during the murder of Greer,
testified before the jury. Ganninger stated that she picked up Greer
at a tavern on December 23 and brought him back to Dawn
Daubach's house in Greer's car. At Daubach's house, defendant
asked for a ride from Ganninger and Greer. Later, after an
argument in the car, defendant murdered Greer. Ganninger
admitted that she helped burn Greer's car, and that she fled to
Missouri after the murder. Following this testimony, the State
rested in aggravation.
	In mitigation, the defense presented the testimony of Dr.
Michael Gelbort, a neuropsychologist. Gelbort testified that he
interviewed defendant on June 28, 1997, and July 19, 1997, and
administered psychological tests to him. Gelbort stated that
defendant was deprived of oxygen at birth and that this type of
trauma is known to be a major cause of brain injury. Gelbort
further noted that defendant has epilepsy and, consistent with a
history of brain dysfunction, that defendant attended learning
disability classes while in school.
	Gelbort described defendant's nervous system as "irritable"
and stated that he "acts before he thinks" because "that's the way
his nervous system works." Gelbort stated that neuropsychological
testing revealed that defendant had trouble inhibiting inappropriate
behavior. According to Gelbort, the use of drugs, such as cocaine,
exacerbates this condition. Gelbort diagnosed defendant as
suffering from organic brain syndrome, organic personality
syndrome, and a seizure disorder. Gelbort described defendant's
condition as being treatable with medication.
	St. Clair County jail correctional officer Lawrence Kaffer
testified that he was in contact with defendant at the county jail for
1½ to 2 years. Kaffer stated that he had no problems with
defendant and did not think he was a threat to anyone at the jail.
According to Kaffer, defendant had "leader tendencies" and had
been a positive influence to other inmates.
	Defendant's mother, Virginia McCallister, testified that she
was married at the age of 15 and never attended school. Defendant
was the second youngest of her seven children. McCallister stated
that defendant was hospitalized shortly after birth, suffering from
pneumonia. At the age of two, defendant began having fits and
spasms. Defendant was diagnosed with epilepsy, from which his
father also suffered. McCallister described defendant as a clumsy
child who often fell, and stated that defendant sniffed gasoline and
spray paint fumes with other children. Defendant was placed in
special classes for slow learners in grade school and ultimately left
school in the ninth grade.
	McCallister testified that her family showed defendant a lot of
love and that he was never abandoned or abused. McCallister told
the jurors that defendant regularly sent her pictures and letters from
jail. She also told the jurors that defendant had three children, aged
18, 6 and 4, and that he was a good father. The trial court
prohibited McCallister from telling the jurors that she wanted
defendant to live.
	Jean Mitchell stated that she was a volunteer with the Red
Cross and that she tutored at the St. Clair County jail one hour a
week. For 14 to 15 months, Mitchell tutored defendant one-on-one, in weekly sessions. Mitchell found defendant to be a nice
person who showed concern for other inmates. Mitchell
acknowledged that defendant had a temper and could be moody,
but stated that she never felt threatened or frightened by him.
Following this testimony, the defense rested in mitigation.
		In rebuttal, the State called forensic psychiatrist John
Rabun. Rabun interviewed defendant and conducted a standard
psychiatric examination. Rabun testified that defendant told him he
suffered from one or two seizures a year. When these seizures
occurred, defendant did not fall on the floor and shake. Instead, the
seizures caused thought interruptions that lasted for a couple of
minutes. After these thought interruptions, defendant would regain
his senses. Rabun stated that defendant clearly suffered from a
seizure disorder. However, Rabun concluded that defendant did
not have a serious mental condition based upon the seizures alone.
	Rabun testified that defendant was taking the antidepressant
drug Elavil, to help with insomnia, and Atavin, to relieve anxiety.
Rabun stated that, according to the nurse at the St. Clair County
jail, defendant had refused to take his antiseizure medication,
Dilantin, in January 1997, and, as far as the nurse was aware, he
had not taken it since then. Although he had no documented
seizures while in jail, defendant told Rabun that he did have a
seizure there, after which he woke up with urine on his jumpsuit.
	Following arguments, the jury returned a verdict finding that
there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the
imposition of the death penalty. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
Trial Counsel's Failure to Request an Accomplice Witness
Instruction
	The Illinois pattern "accomplice witness" instruction provides:
			"When a witness says he was involved in the
commission of a crime with the defendant, the testimony
of that witness is subject to suspicion and should be
considered by you with caution. It should be carefully
examined in light of the other evidence in the case."
Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.17 (3d
ed. 1992).
Defendant alleges that his trial counsel was constitutionally
ineffective for failing to request this instruction with respect to the
testimony of James Williams.
	To establish a violation of the constitutional right to the
effective assistance of trial counsel, a criminal defendant must show
both deficient performance and prejudice resulting from counsel's
error. To establish prejudice, a defendant must show that " 'there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' "
People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 525 (1984), quoting
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674,
698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068 (1984). "A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at
2068.
	Defendant notes that the accomplice witness instruction should
be given at the defendant's request if the totality of the evidence
and the reasonable inferences therefrom establish probable cause
to believe that the witness participated in the crime, either as a
principal or under a theory of accountability. People v. Henderson,
142 Ill. 2d 258, 314-15 (1990). Further, if the probable cause test
is satisfied, the accomplice witness instruction must be given, even
if the witness himself denies involvement in the crime. Henderson,
142 Ill. 2d  at 315; People v. Carreon, 162 Ill. App. 3d 990, 993-94
(1987). Defendant maintains that the totality of the evidence
presented at trial was sufficient to establish probable cause that
James Williams participated in the murders of Stanley Williams,
Ernestine McCoy and Orlando McCoy either as a principal or
under a theory of accountability. Defendant, therefore, contends
that he was entitled to the accomplice witness instruction and that
his trial counsel was deficient for failing to tender the instruction.
	Defendant also contends that, because of the nature of the
evidence presented at trial, he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's
failure to tender the accomplice witness instruction. Defendant
maintains that the trial was essentially a credibility contest between
himself and James Williams. Defendant contends that if the jurors
had been instructed on the suspect nature of James Williams'
testimony, they would likely have rejected that testimony. And,
according to defendant, if the jurors had rejected James' testimony,
they would have either acquitted defendant of all charges, based on
a finding that he shot Stanley Williams and Orlando McCoy in self-defense (720 ILCS 5/7-1 (West 1996)), or, at most, convicted him
of the second degree murder of Williams and Orlando for the
unreasonable use of deadly force in self-defense (720 ILCS
5/9-2(a)(2) (West 1996)). Thus, defendant maintains that trial
counsel's performance was both deficient and prejudicial and,
therefore, that he was denied the effective assistance of trial
counsel.
	We disagree. Even if we assume that trial counsel's failure to
request the accomplice witness instruction amounted to deficient
performance, we conclude that defendant has failed to establish a
reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been
different had the instruction been given. We base this conclusion on
the inherent weaknesses of defendant's own testimony, the strength
of the evidence offered against defendant apart from James
Williams' testimony, and the instructions actually received by the
jury.
	Defendant's testimony regarding the events that took place
inside Stanley Williams' trailer on December 11, 1995, was, in
many respects, not credible. Defendant admitted, in the first
instance, that he entered Williams' trailer with a loaded, sawed-off,
.22-caliber rifle concealed within his trench coat. Defendant further
admitted that he shot Williams in the head even though Williams
was unarmed, was seated, had made no physical attack on
defendant, and had not yet opened the kitchen cabinet in which he
kept his inoperable gun. To justify this shooting, i.e., to establish
that he acted in reasonable or unreasonable self-defense, defendant
testified to the existence of two facts, both of which were
problematic. First, defendant stated that Williams had previously
threatened him with the gun which he kept in the kitchen cabinet.
However, that threat occurred, in defendant's words, on one of the
"very seldom" occasions when defendant went to Williams' trailer
by himself. Because of this, defendant was unable to offer any
evidence at trial to corroborate his self-serving testimony regarding
the existence of the prior threat. Second, defendant claimed that,
just before he reached for the kitchen cabinet, Williams said he was
going to "shoot [defendant's] ass." However, this threat was not
mentioned in the signed statement that defendant gave to police at
the time of his arrest. Thus, significant doubt was cast on the
existence of a fact which was critical to establishing that defendant
had a reason to fear Williams.
	Further, defendant stated that he was afraid and panicking
when he shot Williams, and that, when he shot Williams, he did not
aim for any particular spot on Williams' body. Yet, the forensic
evidence showed that, despite his panic, defendant managed to fire
a single shot into Williams' temple. As the State pointed out at
trial, a murder committed with a single shot to the head is
frequently described by law enforcement officers as an "execution
style" murder. Defendant's explanation for the location of the shot
was that it was simply a "coincidence."
	Defendant's testimony regarding the shooting of Orlando
McCoy also lacked credibility. Defendant stated that, as Orlando
attacked, he pulled "something" out of his pants that was,
presumably, a weapon. That Orlando was armed with a weapon
was, again, crucial for establishing defendant's contention that he
shot Orlando in self-defense. However, the weapon that was
discovered under Orlando's body was not a switchblade, or a
handgun, or other small weapon that might typically be carried in
one's pants, but rather a large, kitchen carving knife. As the State
argued to the jury, this fact suggested that defendant found the
knife in the kitchen after the murders occurred and placed it under
Orlando's body.
	More importantly, defendant's testimony regarding Orlando's
murder was at odds with the physical evidence. Defendant testified
that Orlando was moving toward the kitchen when he was shot.
Yet, the pool of blood abutting the front door of the trailer, and the
drag marks in the blood leading to Orlando's body, established
that, after Orlando was shot, his head landed on the floor next to
the front door. When asked, defendant agreed that Orlando must
therefore have walked the "several feet" from the kitchen to the
front door after being shot in the head. As the State noted at trial,
defendant's testimony was incredible, as it is highly unlikely that
Orlando could have walked several feet after being shot directly in
the temple.
	Defendant also testified that Orlando was facing him straight
on when he attacked. However, the forensic evidence showed that
Orlando was shot in the side of the head, not in the front. When
defendant was asked how Orlando could have been shot in the side
of the head if he was attacking defendant face-forward, defendant
said only that he had "no idea." As with the shooting of Williams,
defendant stated that he was panicking and afraid when Orlando
was approaching. Yet, as with Williams, defendant managed to fire
a single shot, execution style, into Orlando's head. Again,
defendant's explanation for the placement of the shot was that it
was a "coincidence."
	Defendant's testimony was also weak with respect to the
shooting of Ernestine McCoy. According to the forensic evidence
presented at trial, Ernestine was shot once in the back of the neck.
The bullet that entered Ernestine's neck traveled forward and
downward. This evidence was consistent with defendant's
testimony that James, while standing with defendant in the kitchen,
grabbed the rifle from defendant and then shot Ernestine from
behind as she sat on the couch. However, defendant also testified
that Ernestine was screaming when she was shot. Thus, according
to defendant's version of events, Ernestine must at least have been
aware that shots had been fired, if not the fact that Williams and
Orlando had each just been shot in the head. Yet, according to
defendant's testimony, Ernestine was not trying to flee the trailer
or protect herself when she was shot but, instead, was sitting on
the couch with her back to the people doing the shooting. Further,
as the State pointed out at trial, if defendant had, in fact, shot
Williams and Orlando in self-defense, there would have been no
need to shoot Ernestine, who posed no threat to defendant or
James. At trial, defendant offered no explanation for why James
grabbed the rifle and, without deliberation, shot a woman who
posed no threat to them.
	Equally important, defendant's testimony regarding
Ernestine's murder was impeached with the statement he gave the
police at the time of his arrest. In that statement, defendant said
that Ernestine was not on the couch, but was on the floor of the
living room, trying to get under a table, when she was shot by
James Williams from about five feet away. Because of this
impeachment, doubt was again cast on a critical portion of
defendant's testimony.
	Furthermore, defendant's statement to police describing
Ernestine's murder was, itself, not credible. The living room in
Williams' trailer contained a coffee table, set in the middle of the
room, and a small end table, set against the wall opposite the front
door. Pictures taken of the trailer show that none of the numerous
items on the tables, including vases with flowers, a purse, a cup,
and other miscellaneous items, were disturbed. As the State argued
to the jury, if Ernestine had tried to protect herself from her
attackers by hiding under one of the tables, she would surely have
knocked over, or disturbed in some way, the items on top of the
table. Further, there was no blood on either of the tables, a fact at
odds with the assertion that Ernestine was shot while hiding under
one of them. Moreover, the position of Ernestine's body was
inconsistent with defendant's statement. Ernestine's body was not
found under one of the tables, but was found directly in front of the
living room couch.
	Defendant's testimony regarding the events that took place
inside Williams' trailer may not have been so incredible as to be
completely unworthy of belief, but, considered solely on its own
terms, it was problematic. As the State argued at length before the
jury, the most critical portions of defendant's testimony were
uncorroborated, were impeached, or were inconsistent with the
physical evidence. Clearly, the outcome of defendant's trial
depended as much upon whether the jury believed defendant as it
did upon whether they believed James Williams. Equally as clear,
in finding defendant guilty of the murders of Stanley Williams,
Orlando McCoy and Ernestine McCoy, the jurors, in fact, rejected
defendant's testimony. If the accomplice witness instruction had
been given, it would have done nothing to cure the inherent
weaknesses of defendant's testimony and nothing to increase the
likelihood of its acceptance by the jury.
	If given, the accomplice witness instruction would also have
had no effect on the jury's assessment of the witnesses, other than
James Williams, presented by the State. Dawn Daubach, Becky
Williams and Dana Ganninger testified at trial against defendant.
Daubach and Becky both testified that, while waiting outside
Williams' trailer, they heard three shots fired in quick succession,
followed by a short pause, and then two more shots. This sequence
of shots corroborated James Williams' testimony regarding how
the shootings took place. In addition, Daubach and Becky both
testified that, when James exited the trailer, he was shocked and
physically ill. Again, as the State argued to the jury, this tended to
corroborate James's testimony that he did not expect the shootings
or participate in them. Dana Ganninger's testimony further
corroborated James Williams' version of the shootings. Ganninger
testified that, in November 1995, defendant told her that Stanley
Williams had an attitude problem and was "going to get it." She
also stated that, on the afternoon of December 11, 1995, defendant
confessed to killing the three victims.
	Defendant notes that the testimony of Becky, Daubach and
Ganninger was not entirely credible. Both Daubach and Ganninger
had prior felony convictions, and all three witnesses admitted being
addicted to, or frequently using, cocaine around the time of the
murders. However, the testimony of Becky, Daubach and
Ganninger was not discredited to the extent that defendant's
testimony was. Moreover, the testimony of each of these witnesses
was consistent with the others' in all important respects. As the
State noted at trial, this tended to reduce the likelihood that the
witnesses had fabricated their testimony. The combined strength of
Becky's, Daubach's and Ganninger's testimony was considerable.
The accomplice witness instruction, if given, would have had done
nothing to diminish the weight of this testimony.
	Lastly, we note that the jury in the case at bar received the
general, pattern instruction on witness credibility. See Illinois
Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 1.02 (3d ed. 1992). This
instruction tells the jurors that "[i]n considering the testimony of
any witness, [they] may take into account *** any interest, bias, or
prejudice he may have." Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal,
No. 1.02 (3d ed. 1992). Thus, while the jury in this case did not
receive the accomplice witness instruction with respect to James
Williams, it did consider, in general terms, any "interest, bias or
prejudice" that James Williams had in testifying as he did.
	Defendant argues, however, that the general instruction on
witness credibility that was given to the jury did not cure the
omission of the accomplice witness instruction. Defendant
maintains that the general instruction speaks only in neutral terms
while, in contrast, the accomplice witness instruction pointedly tells
the jurors to view the testimony of the accomplice with "suspicion"
and "caution." According to defendant, the general instruction is
distinct from, and cannot function as a substitute for, the
accomplice witness instruction.
	We agree that the general instruction on witness credibility
may not, by itself, be enough to cure an errant omission of an
accomplice witness instruction. Otherwise, the accomplice witness
instruction would be rendered essentially meaningless, since the
general instruction on witness credibility is given in most criminal
cases. In this case, however, we believe that the fact that the jury
was told to consider, in general, the bias, interest or prejudice of
the witnesses may be considered as one factor, among others,
which establishes that defendant was not prejudiced by his trial
counsel's failure to tender the accomplice witness instruction.
	Defendant also argues that the facts of this case are analogous
to those in People v. Campbell, 275 Ill. App. 3d 993 (1995), in
which the appellate court concluded that a defendant's trial counsel
was constitutionally ineffective for failing to request an accomplice
witness instruction. Defendant urges us to follow the reasoning of
the Campbell decision.
	In Campbell, the defendant was convicted of burglary and
criminal damage to property for breaking into a church and
spraying the interior with a fire extinguisher. Two other individuals
who were charged in the offense testified for the State at trial. The
two State witnesses acknowledged at trial that their testimony was
given in exchange for receiving a lesser sentence or for the
dismissal of charges relating to the damage done to the church. The
two witnesses also testified that the defendant had entered the
church and sprayed the interior of the church with the fire
extinguisher. The two witnesses denied, however, doing any
damage to the church themselves. Defendant, in turn, testified that
he did not enter the church and that the two State witnesses were
the ones who sprayed the church with the fire extinguisher. Neither
the defendant's testimony nor the accomplices' testimony was at
odds with the physical evidence, or was impeached with prior
inconsistent statements. Campbell, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 995. On
these facts, the appellate court concluded that the evidence in
defendant's case was closely balanced and that trial counsel's
failure to tender the accomplice witness instruction with respect to
the two witnesses denied the defendant the right to effective
assistance of counsel. Campbell, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 999.
	We find Campbell readily distinguishable from the present
case because the facts in Campbell were more closely balanced
than those in the case at bar. Unlike the defendant's testimony in
Campbell, defendant's testimony in this case was replete with
objectively discernable weaknesses, including prior inconsistent
statements, critical facts that were uncorroborated, and assertions
that were at odds with the physical evidence. In addition, the two
State witnesses in Campbell admitted that their testimony was
offered in exchange for leniency from the State for the same
incident in which the defendant was charged. None of the witnesses
in the case at bar testified to a similar situation. Further, in
Campbell, the only witnesses who testified that the defendant
damaged the church were the two, accomplice witnesses. In the
case at bar, three witnesses who were not accomplices, Becky
Williams, Dawn Daubach and Dana Ganninger, testified to facts
that established defendant shot and robbed the victims. For these
reasons, we do not find Campbell persuasive authority in this
appeal.
	The facts in the case at bar are not so closely balanced that we
can say our "confidence in the outcome" (Strickland, 466 U.S.  at
694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068) has been undermined
by trial counsel's failure to request the accomplice witness
instruction. The inherent weaknesses in defendant's testimony, the
evidence aligned against defendant apart from James Williams'
testimony, and the fact that the jury did consider James' bias,
interest and prejudice in general terms together establish that there
is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would
have been different had the accomplice witness instruction been
given. Accordingly, we hold that trial counsel was not
constitutionally ineffective for failing to request the accomplice
witness instruction with respect to the testimony of James
Williams.
Exclusion of Statement Against Penal Interest
	At the close of the State's case in chief, the defense sought to
introduce, through defendant's sister, Sharon Lee, a hearsay
statement made by James Williams. In an offer of proof, defense
counsel asserted that Lee would testify that, on December 15,
1995, four days after the murders, she received a phone call from
James Williams. According to Lee, James identified himself and
asked to speak with Julie Santin, a former girlfriend of defendant.
James asked Lee if she were Santin and Lee falsely answered "yes."
James then told Lee, whom he thought was Julie Santin, that he
and defendant were "in trouble." James said, "Maynard shot two
people and I had to get rid of the witnesses. We need to see you
right away."
	The trial court sustained the State's objection to Lee's
testimony. The court noted that the hearsay statement was against
James' penal interest and that James was available to testify.
However, in the court's view, the statement was not made
spontaneously to a close acquaintance and was not corroborated
by other evidence. Under these circumstances, the court ruled that,
pursuant to Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297, 313, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 1049 (1973), James' purported
statement did not meet the criteria for admission under the
statement-against-penal-interest exception to the hearsay rule.
Defendant now maintains that the trial court's ruling was in error
and impaired defendant's fundamental constitutional right to
present a defense.
	The State initially maintains that this claim is procedurally
defaulted because it was not included in defendant's post-trial
motion. We will consider the claim, however, because it concerns
defendant's due process right to present a defense and because the
claim was raised by the defense at trial. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 190 (1988) (exception to the requirement that issues
must be preserved in a post-trial motion exists for "constitutional
issues which have properly been raised at trial and which can be
raised later in a post-conviction hearing petition").
	In general, a declarant's unsworn, out-of-court statement that
he committed the crime for which a defendant is charged is
inadmissible hearsay, even though the statement is against the
declarant's penal interest. People v. Tate, 87 Ill. 2d 134, 143
(1981). However, such a statement may be admitted under the
statement-against-penal-interest exception to the hearsay rule if the
statement contains sufficient indicia of reliability and if justice so
requires. People v. Bowel, 111 Ill. 2d 58, 66 (1986), citing
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297,
313, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 1049 (1973) ("the hearsay rule may not be
applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice"). To
determine whether a statement contains sufficient indicia of
reliability, courts look foremost to whether the statement is self-incriminating and against the declarant's interest. People v. Keene,
169 Ill. 2d 1, 29 (1995). Courts also look to whether the statement
was made spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly after the
crime occurred; whether the statement was corroborated by other
evidence; and whether there was adequate opportunity for cross-examination of the declarant. These latter factors are not "hard and
fast requirements" for admissibility but, instead, are simply
"indicia" of trustworthiness. People v. House, 141 Ill. 2d 323, 390
(1990), citing Bowel, 111 Ill. 2d  at 67; Keene, 169 Ill. 2d  at 29. In
every case, the ultimate question in deciding the admissibility of the
hearsay declaration is whether it was "made under circumstances
which provide 'considerable assurance' of its reliability by objective
indicia of trustworthiness." Bowel, 111 Ill. 2d  at 67, quoting
Chambers, 410 U.S.  at 300-01, 35 L. Ed. 2d  at 311-12, 93 S. Ct. 
at 1048-49. Whether a statement is admissible under the statement-against-penal-interest exception to the hearsay rule rests within the
sound discretion of the trial court. Bowel, 111 Ill. 2d  at 68.
	Defendant concedes that the hearsay statement purportedly
made by James Williams was not made to a close acquaintance.
Defendant maintains, however, that the statement was against
James Williams' penal interest, that it was made spontaneously, and
that it was corroborated by other evidence. The State concedes
that the statement was against James' interest, and that James was
available to testify, but challenges whether the statement was made
spontaneously and whether it was corroborated by other evidence.
We believe that, because of a lack of corroborative evidence, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the hearsay
statement.
	The hearsay statement at issue in this case is a single, unsworn,
oral declaration purportedly made to defendant's sister by James
Williams. At the time defendant's trial counsel moved to have the
hearsay statement admitted, James Williams had completed his
sworn testimony for the State. In that testimony, James admitted
that he was present at Williams' trailer at the time of the shootings
and that he fled the trailer with defendant. As defendant points out,
these facts tend to corroborate the hearsay statement. See, e.g., 2
J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence §319(e), at 328-29 (5th ed.
1999) (presence of declarant at crime scene corroborative).
However, in his testimony, James denied knowing that defendant
had taken a rifle into the trailer, denied knowing that the shootings
were going to take place, and specifically denied shooting or killing
anyone in the trailer. This testimony was subsequently
corroborated by three State witnesses, Becky Williams, Dawn
Daubach and Dana Ganninger, all of whom offered testimony that
pointed only to defendant as the killer of the three victims. Thus,
at the time defendant moved to have the hearsay declaration
admitted, evidence had been introduced which established that
James was present at the trailer during the murders. However, no
evidence put James in possession of the .22-caliber rifle and no
evidence pointed to James as the murderer. Further, in contrast to
the evidence that defendant said Williams had an "attitude
problem" and was "going to get it," no evidence had been
introduced for why James would shoot the victims.
	Given the foregoing facts, we must conclude that the
circumstances known to the trial court at the time defense counsel
moved to have the hearsay statement admitted did not provide
" 'considerable assurance' " (Bowel, 111 Ill. 2d  at 67, quoting
Chambers, 410 U.S.  at 300-01, 35 L. Ed. 2d  at 311-12, 93 S. Ct.
at 1048-49) of the statement's reliability (cf. Chambers, 410 U.S. 284, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297, 93 S. Ct. 1038 (hearsay statements in which
the declarant confessed to a murder were reliable where, inter alia
the declarant signed a sworn, written confession to the murder that
was repudiated before trial, eyewitness testimony indicated that the
declarant committed the murder, and other evidence corroborated
the statements)). Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion in excluding the hearsay statement, or that the
statement's exclusion "defeat[ed] the ends of justice." Chambers,
410 U.S.  at 302, 35 L. Ed. 2d  at 313, 93 S. Ct.  at 1049.
	Defendant argues, however, that the motion to admit the
hearsay statement should have been renewed at the close of
defendant's case. Defendant maintains that, after he testified,
overwhelming corroboration existed, via his own testimony, to
allow the admission of the hearsay statement. Therefore, defendant
argues, trial counsel was ineffective for not renewing the motion at
the conclusion of his testimony.
	We disagree. To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, defendant must show that trial counsel's failure to renew
the motion was professionally deficient and that there is a
reasonable probability that the trial court would have granted the
motion to allow the hearsay statement had the motion been
renewed at the conclusion of defendant's testimony. We have
previously noted the many "objective indicia" (Bowel, 111 Ill. 2d 
at 67, citing Chambers, 410 U.S.  at 300-01, 35 L. Ed. 2d  at 311-12, 93 S. Ct. at 1048-49) of weaknesses in defendant's testimony.
These objective weaknesses undermine the corroborative value that
the trial court might have given defendant's testimony. We note
too that, even if defendant's testimony is accepted as completely
credible, it does not, as defendant suggests, fully establish the
trustworthiness of the hearsay statement. In the hearsay
declaration, James Williams allegedly said that he had to "get rid of
the witnesses" after defendant "shot two people." A criminal, of
course, speaks of getting "rid of the witnesses" when covering up
some nefarious activity. Defendant testified, however, that
Williams and Orlando threatened and attacked him, and that he
shot them only in self-defense. The assertion that James said he had
to "get rid of the witnesses" therefore makes little sense, as,
according to defendant's own testimony, there was no illegal
activity that had to be concealed.
	Furthermore, before defendant took the stand, defense counsel
called James Williams to testify. During his brief testimony, James
was specifically asked about defendant's sister, Sharon Lee, and
defendant's former girlfriend, Julie Santin. James testified that he
never spoke with Lee and that he never attempted to contact
Santin. This testimony further underscored the lack of
corroborating circumstances before the trial court at the conclusion
of defendant's testimony. Cf. People v. Swaggirt, 282 Ill. App. 3d
692 (1996) (declarant's hearsay statements confessing to attack
corroborated where declarant did not testify as to whether he made
the statements, and where multiple defenses witnesses testified that
the declarant was present at the crime scene with the weapon used
in the attack, one witness saw someone who looked like the
declarant strike the victim, and the declarant had a motive for the
attack).
	In light of the foregoing, we conclude that there is no
reasonable probability that, had defense counsel renewed the
motion to allow the admission of the hearsay statement at the
conclusion of defendant's testimony, the trial court would have
reversed its prior ruling and allowed the motion. Consequently, we
hold that defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to renew
the motion.
Error in Death-Eligibility Verdict Forms
	Defendant was found death eligible based on two statutory
aggravating factors: (1) murder in the course of another felony
(720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1996)); and (2) murder of two or
more individuals (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1996)). Defendant
contends that the verdicts returned by the jury on these two factors
were legally insufficient because they omitted the mental state
necessary to support a finding of death eligibility.
	The felony-murder aggravating factor requires, as an element
of death eligibility, that the defendant "acted with the intent to kill
the murdered individual or with the knowledge that his acts created
a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered
individual or another." 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6)(b) (West 1994).
Similarly, the multiple-murder aggravating factor provides for
death eligibility where, inter alia, "the deaths were the result of
either an intent to kill more than one person or of separate acts
which the defendant knew would cause death or create a strong
probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered
individual or another." 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1994).
	In the case at bar, the eligibility verdict forms returned by the
jury omitted the necessary finding regarding defendant's mental
state. The felony-murder verdict states:
			"We the jury unanimously find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant, Maynard McCallister, Jr., is
eligible for a death sentence under the law. We
unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that:
			(1) the defendant was 18 years or older at the time of
the murders for which he was convicted in this case; and
			(2) the following statutory aggravating factor exists:
			The murdered person(s) was killed in the course of
another felony, Armed Robbery."
The multiple-murder eligibility verdict is identical, except that the
last line reads: "The defendant has been convicted of killing two or
more persons." Defendant maintains that, pursuant to People v.
Mack, 167 Ill. 2d 525 (1995), these verdict forms were legally
insufficient. As a result, according to defendant, there has been no
finding that defendant is eligible for the death penalty under Illinois
law.
	Defendant concedes that no objection was made to the verdict
forms at trial. Defendant argues, however, that the use of the
defective verdict forms constituted plain error and that, in addition,
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the verdict
forms.
	We agree that pursuant to Mack and its progeny (see, e.g.,
People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 223-25 (1999); People v.
Macri,185 Ill. 2d 1, 58 (1998); People v. Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d 30,
68 (1998)), the death eligibility verdicts were deficient. We do not
believe, however, that under the facts of this case, the use of the
forms constituted plain error or that trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to object to those forms.
	In Mack, the defendant was convicted of murder in a bench
trial. The sentencing hearing was conducted before a jury. At the
conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the jury returned a felony-murder eligibility verdict that omitted the required mens rea.
Examining the validity of the jury's eligibility verdict, we noted the
critical importance of the mental state finding to establishing a valid
death-eligibility verdict. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 533. We also noted
that the process of interpreting a jury's verdict "should not become
a speculative attempt to reconstruct the jury's deliberations and
divine its unexpressed conclusions." Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 536-37.
Because the jury in Mack never expressed a conclusion as to
whether the defendant possessed the required mental state, the
eligibility verdict was legally insufficient. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 538.
	We further noted, in Mack, the unavailability of harmless error
analysis to cure the eligibility verdict (Mack, 167 Ill. 2d at 539).
Subsequent cases have established the inappropriateness, under the
due process clause, of this court independently making a
determination that a defendant is death eligible. People v. Shaw,
186 Ill. 2d 301, 344 (1998) (under the Illinois death penalty
statute, if a defendant elects to have a jury perform the sentencing
function, the defendant has a protected liberty interest in having the
jury determine death eligibility); People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418,
445-46 (1999) (same).
	In the case at bar, unlike in Mack, the same jury which found
defendant death eligible also heard the guilt-innocence phase of
defendant's trial. And, at the conclusion of the guilt-innocence
phase, the jury returned verdicts finding defendant guilty of the
intentional or knowing murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2)
(West 1996)) of Stanley Williams, Ernestine McCoy and Orlando
McCoy. Thus, the principal concerns animating our decision in
Mack are not present in the case at bar. We need not speculate as
to whether the jury found that defendant acted with the requisite
mens rea because the jury did, in fact, make that determination at
the guilt-innocence phase of trial. Nor do we need to substitute our
judgment for that of the jury to find the defendant death eligible
because, again, the jury made the requisite finding regarding
defendant's mens rea. Consequently, although the omission of the
mental state from the eligibility verdicts was error, we cannot say
that the omission was so fundamental a defect that it amounted to
plain error. People v. Childress, 158 Ill. 2d 275 (1994) (omission
of mental state from felony-murder eligibility verdict not reversible
error where same jury returned finding at guilt phase that defendant
was guilty of knowing or intentional murder).
	Defendant argues, however, that under the eighth amendment
and the Illinois death penalty statute, capital defendants are entitled
to have the jury make the necessary findings to support death
eligibility at the sentencing hearing, regardless of what findings are
made at trial. Otherwise, defendant argues, eligibility hearings
would be rendered meaningless and unnecessary in many cases. For
example, according to defendant, no eligibility hearing would be
necessary for a defendant convicted at trial of the intentional or
knowing murder of more than one person, because those trial
findings are all that are needed to establish death eligibility under
the multiple-murder aggravating factor (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3)
(West 1994)).
	The Illinois death penalty statute requires eligibility hearings
in every capital case. We do not hold, in this case, that eligibility
hearings are ever unnecessary. Instead, our holding is simply that,
in this case, because the same jury heard both the guilt-innocence
phase and sentencing phase of trial, and because that jury returned
an unequivocal finding of the requisite mens rea at the guilt-innocence phase of trial, the omission of that mens rea from the
eligibility verdict is not so fundamental a defect that it constitutes
plain error. We also hold that, because the jury did, in fact, find the
necessary mental state to sustain defendant's death eligibility, there
is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the eligibility
hearing would have been different had trial counsel objected to the
verdict forms. Accordingly, we hold that trial counsel was not
constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to the eligibility
verdict forms.
Trial Court's Failure to Sua Sponte Order an Inquiry Into
Defendant's Fitness to Stand Trial or Be Sentenced
	Prior to trial, defense counsel asserted that defendant was
receiving psychotropic medication and that he had a history of head
injuries and seizures that could affect his fitness to stand trial.
Counsel averred that he had a bona fide doubt as to defendant's
fitness to stand trial and requested that the issue be decided by a
jury. The trial court granted the request and set the matter for
hearing. Experts were appointed to examine defendant.
	On August 29 and 30, 1996, a jury fitness hearing was held.
The sole witness for the State, clinical psychologist Dr. Daniel
Cuneo, testified that defendant had a history of headaches
beginning at age 5, and a history of seizures beginning at age 12.
Cuneo estimated that defendant's IQ was in the "dull normal"
range. Cuneo also noted defendant's chronic abuse of drugs and his
history of blackouts. Cuneo concluded that defendant suffered
from poly-substance dependence, a personality disorder "not
otherwise specified," a seizure disorder, and an antisocial
personality disorder.
	Cuneo also testified that at the St. Clair County jail, defendant
was being given the antidepressant drug Elavil and the
anticonvulsive drug Dilantin. During Cuneo's cross-examination,
the following exchange took place.
			"[Assistant Public Defender:] Last area of inquiry I'd
like to ask you about, Doctor, is you testified to this jury
in your opinion you thought that [defendant] was fit, and
I'd like to ask you specifically whether because of the
history of seizures, the Elavil and the Dilantin that he's
taking on a daily basis, whether or not he's a type of
individual that would be more appropriately fit with
special provisions?
			[Dr. Cuneo:] He's going to have to remain on the
Dilantin. The issue there is you may wish to have a
medical doctor make that decision, and I state that you
may want to have a neurologist come in, and I state that
because he has been seizure free, according to [defendant],
for three to four years.
			At the same time, he's been on the Dilantin. If he didn't
take his Dilantin, he would suffer seizures. If he suffered
seizures, he would be unable to continue with the trial. He
would also, I don't know, seizure [sic] he'd be unable to
recall what's going on at that time.
			So, he would need to be on the medication, but I would
think that the best individual to make that decision would
be a physician.
			Q. Well, Doctor, are you saying that you don't have
enough information to render an opinion in that regard?
You don't feel you're well qualified in that area or that
there would have to be further testing done?
			A. I'm stating that he's fit on the medication he is on. I
would strongly recommend that he continue with the
Dilantin.
			Q. What if he were taken off the medication?
			[Assistant State's Attorney:] Objection, your Honor.
That's irrelevant.
			THE COURT: Sustained."
	At the conclusion of defendant's fitness hearing, the jurors
found defendant fit to stand trial. Defendant's murder trial and
capital sentencing hearing subsequently took place in late July
1997, 11 months after his fitness hearing. On July 29, during the
State's rebuttal aggravation, Dr. John Rabun, a forensic
psychiatrist, testified that the nurse at the St. Clair County jail
informed him that defendant refused to take his Dilantin in January
1997, and that, as far as the nurse was aware, defendant had not
taken the medication since then. Rabun also testified that defendant
told him he had suffered a seizure while at the county jail.
	Defendant now maintains that Cuneo's testimony at the fitness
hearing established that defendant was fit to stand trial only
because he was taking his prescribed antiseizure medication,
Dilantin, and that defendant would remain fit only if he continued
to take the medication. Defendant further maintains that Rabun's
testimony established that, for six months prior to his trial and
sentencing hearing, defendant had not been given the medication
that was a prerequisite to his remaining fit. Defendant also
observes that, when Rabun testified regarding the nurse's statement
that defendant had not been taking his Dilantin, neither the trial
court nor defense counsel took any steps to ensure that defendant
had not been rendered unfit during his trial and death penalty
hearing. Defendant maintains that this failure deprived defendant
of his right to due process of law. Defendant also contends that,
because there was testimony that, without the Dilantin, defendant
could suffer a type of seizure such that others would not know he
had lost awareness of what was going on around him, the failure to
sua sponte inquire into his fitness violated his right to be present at
trial and sentencing.
	A defendant is presumed fit to stand trial. 725 ILCS 5/104-10
(West 1994). A defendant is entitled to a fitness hearing only when
a bona fide doubt of his fitness to stand trial or be sentenced is
raised. People v. Johnson, 183 Ill. 2d 176, 193 (1998). The bona
fide doubt inquiry is focused primarily on whether the defendant is
able to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings and
to assist in his defense. Johnson, 183 Ill. 2d  at 193. Because it is a
violation of due process to convict a defendant who is mentally
unfit to stand trial, a judge has a duty to order a fitness hearing sua
sponte once facts are brought to the judge's attention that raise a
bona fide doubt of the accused's fitness to stand trial or be
sentenced. People v. Murphy, 72 Ill. 2d 421, 430 (1978).
	In this case, defendant's sole basis for contending that an
inquiry should have been made into his fitness following Rabun's
testimony is that defendant had not been taking a prescribed
antiseizure medication, Dilantin, between January 1997 and late
July 1997. This assertion is not supported by the record. On seven
separate occasions, from January 2, 1997, through July 21, 1997,
during various court appearances, defendant was questioned by the
trial court regarding his ability to understand the court proceedings
and assist his trial counsel. On at least four of these occasions,
January 22, July 2, July 18 and July 21, defendant stated that he
was taking Dilantin for his seizures. Typical of the colloquies which
occurred on these occasions is the following exchange that took
place on July 18, 1997:
			"THE COURT: And we've gone through this before,
but you read, write, and understand the English language?
			THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
			THE COURT: You're not under the influence of any
drugs or alcohol today that would prevent you from
understanding what's going on?
			THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
			THE COURT: Are you taking any medication?
			THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Dilantin.
			THE COURT: That's for seizures?
			THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
			THE COURT: For mood swings and so forth?
			DEFENDANT: Yeah.
			THE COURT: But that doesn't affect your ability to
communicate with your lawyer or understand what's
going on, does it?
			DEFENDANT: No, sir."
	The record thus indicates that defendant told the trial court
that he was taking Dilantin during the very time that defendant now
asserts that he was not taking the medication. The only evidence
offered by defendant to support his contention that he was not
taking Dilantin is the hearsay statement from the jail nurse. There
are no medical reports in the record that indicate defendant was not
taking Dilantin, and defendant points to no other facts in the record
that suggest a bona fide doubt as to his fitness to stand trial or
sentencing.
	From January 1997 through July 1997, the trial court
repeatedly and scrupulously questioned the defendant regarding the
medications he was ingesting, his awareness of the court
proceedings and his ability to assist his trial counsel. During this
time, defendant expressly informed the trial court that he was
taking Dilantin. On this record, therefore, we cannot say that the
trial court erred when it did not sua sponte inquire into defendant's
fitness following Rabun's testimony.
Mitigation Testimony of Defendant's Mother
	Defendant's mother, Virginia McCallister, testified on behalf
of defendant during the aggravation-mitigation phase of
sentencing. Near the conclusion of McCallister's direct
examination by defense counsel, the following exchange occurred:
			"Q. Mrs. McCallister, do you love your son?
			A. Yes I do sir. I love all my children.
			Q. And you sat here, and you've heard what just-what
this jury has convicted him of. Has that changed your love
for him?
			A. God knows it don't. I'm a little more-I always
showed Maynard a little more attention than I did the rest
of the children because Maynard always had a problem,
and I knew it.
			Q. Mrs. McCallister, do you want your son to live?
			[Assistant State's Attorney:] Objection, Your Honor.
That is irrelevant. That has-
			A. With all my heart.
			THE COURT: Sustained.
			A. With all my heart. Please do not because I've lost his
father. I've lost a-
			[Assistant Public Defender:] Mrs. McCallister.
			[Assistant State's Attorney:] That's a violation of the
Court Order.
			THE COURT: I sustain the objection."
	Defendant argues that the trial court's ruling excluding
McCallister's testimony violated defendant's rights under the
eighth and fourteenth amendments to a fair and reliable death
penalty hearing. Defendant concedes that this court has held that
"a witness' opinion that a defendant should not be sentenced to
death is not admissible at a capital sentencing hearing." People v.
Howard, 147 Ill. 2d 103, 162 (1991). Defendant maintains,
however, that there is a difference between a witness' opinion
about what sentence a defendant deserves, and a witness' personal
feeling that she wants the defendant to live. The former, according
to defendant, is an inadmissible expression of opinion on the
ultimate question for the sentencer. The latter, defendant argues,
is an expression of the witness' feeling that she does not want her
relationship with the defendant severed by his death, and
constitutes relevant mitigating evidence of the defendant's
character. Thus, according to defendant, McCallister should have
been allowed to testify that she wanted defendant to live.
	Assuming, without deciding, that defendant's rationale is
correct, and that it was error to exclude McCallister's testimony,
we find any such error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The
aggravating evidence introduced against defendant during the
sentencing hearing was overwhelming. That evidence showed,
inter alia, that defendant was involved in an incident in which he
attacked a man with a machete; that on the same day defendant
murdered the three victims in this case, he attacked one man and
murdered another during a drug dispute; and that, approximately
two weeks after defendant murdered the three victims in this case,
he murdered another man following an argument over his car.
Furthermore, it cannot be seriously argued that the jury in this case
was unaware that McCallister, defendant's mother, wanted
defendant to live. Given these facts, we hold that, even assuming
it was error to exclude McCallister's testimony, such error could
not have contributed to the imposition of the death sentence and
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Wilkerson,
87 Ill. 2d 151, 157 (1981) (setting forth the approaches for
measuring whether error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
Constitutionality of the Death Penalty Statute
	Defendant asserts that the Illinois death penalty statute is
unconstitutional because it places a burden of proof on the
defendant that precludes meaningful consideration of mitigation;
that the statute is unconstitutional because it allows the sentencer
to weigh a vague aggravating factor; that the statute is
unconstitutional because it fails to sufficiently minimize the risk
that death sentences will be arbitrarily imposed; and that the statute
is unconstitutional because of the inevitability that the death
penalty will be applied to innocent persons. Each of these
contentions has been rejected by this court, and we decline to
revisit our holdings on these issues. People v. Taylor, 166 Ill. 2d 414, 439-40 (1995) (and cases cited therein); People v. Munson,
171 Ill. 2d 158, 203-06 (1996); People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179,
211-20 (1998).
CONCLUSION
		For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit
court of St Clair County is affirmed. The clerk of this court is
directed to enter an order setting Thursday, November 30, 2000,
as the date on which the sentence of death entered in the circuit
court is to be carried out. Defendant shall be executed in the
manner provided by law. 725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1996). The
clerk of this court shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this
case to the Director of Corrections, to the warden of Tamms
Correctional Center, and to the warden of the institution where
defendant is now confined.
	Judgment affirmed.
	JUSTICE BILANDIC, specially concurring:
	Defendant contends that, pursuant to People v. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d 525 (1995), his death-eligibility verdict forms were legally
insufficient. I reject this argument for the reasons explained below.
	Mack is distinguishable from this case. In Mack, the defendant
was found guilty of murder and armed robbery at a bench trial. A
jury was empaneled for the death penalty hearing. The jury was
properly instructed to determine whether the defendant was eligible
for the death penalty solely on the basis of the statutory
aggravating factor of murder in the course of another felony (see
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6)). The jury returned a
verdict finding the defendant eligible for the death penalty. The
eligibility verdict form read: " 'We, the jury, unanimously find
beyond a reasonable doubt that the following aggravating factor
exists in relation to this Murder: Larry Mack killed Joseph Kolar
in the course of an Armed Robbery.' " Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 529-30.
The defendant alleged in his post-conviction petition that appellate
counsel was ineffective for not raising on direct appeal that the
death-eligibility verdict was legally insufficient. The defendant
argued that the jury failed to find that the statutory aggravating
factor was proven given that the eligibility verdict form omitted the
culpable mental state required to establish murder in the course of
a felony. The trial court found appellate counsel ineffective and
vacated the defendant's death sentence.
	A majority of this court affirmed and held that appellate
counsel was ineffective for failure to seek reversal of the
defendant's death sentence on the basis of the defective eligibility
verdict. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 533-38. In so holding, we found
appellate counsel's performance to be deficient for failing to
recognize the fundamental importance of a legally sufficient
eligibility verdict, which must include a finding on all essential
elements of the statutory aggravating factor at issue. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 533. In support, we pointed out that a culpable mental state
of intent to kill or knowledge of a strong probability of death or
great bodily harm is an essential element of the particular statutory
aggravating factor upon which the defendant's eligibility for the
death penalty was based, namely, murder in the course of a felony.
Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 533. Next, we found that, had appellate
counsel raised the issue of the defective eligibility verdict, there is
a reasonable probability that the defendant's death sentence would
have been reversed. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 533-38. We based this
finding on a determination that the meaning of the jury's eligibility
verdict could not be determined clearly and without speculation
from the record, which included a discrepancy between the jury
instructions and the verdict form at the eligibility phase. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 535-37. This court therefore concluded that appellate
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on direct appeal the issue
that the death-eligibility verdict was legally insufficient because the
jury had not found the mental state necessary for finding the
defendant eligible for the death penalty. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 538.
	Here, as in Mack, the State relied on the section 9-1(b)(6)
statutory aggravating factor of murder in the course of a felony to
establish defendant's eligibility for the death penalty. To be eligible
for the death penalty under section 9-1(b)(6), a defendant must
have "acted with the intent to kill the murdered individual or with
the knowledge that his acts created a strong probability of death or
great bodily harm to the murdered individual or another." 720
ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1996). In addition, the State here relied
on the section 9-1(b)(3) statutory aggravating factor of murder of
two or more individuals to establish defendant's eligibility for the
death penalty. To be death eligible under section 9-1(b)(3), the
deaths must have been the result of "either an intent to kill more
than one person or of separate acts which the defendant knew
would cause death or create a strong probability of death or great
bodily harm to the murdered individual or another." 720 ILCS
5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1996). Also, as in Mack, the jury in this case
was properly instructed at the eligibility phase as to the grounds for
finding defendant eligible for the death penalty under sections
9-1(b)(6) and 9-1(b)(3), including the aforementioned mental
states. The verdict returned by the jury as to defendant's eligibility
for the death penalty under section 9-1(b)(6) stated:
			"We, the jury, unanimously find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant, Maynard McCallister, Jr., is
eligible for a death sentence under the law. We
unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that:
			(1) the defendant was 18 years old or older at the time
of the murders for which he was convicted in this case;
and
			(2) the following statutory aggravating factor exists: the
murdered person(s) was killed in the course of another
felony, armed robbery."
The section 9-1(b)(3) eligibility verdict is identical, but with the
last line stating: "The defendant has been convicted of killing two
or more persons."
	Although these death-eligibility verdict forms are similar to the
death-eligibility verdict form found deficient in Mack, there are
significant differences in the circumstances surrounding the
respective jury verdict forms. As noted, in Mack, the defendant
was found guilty at a bench trial but was found eligible for the
death penalty by a jury. Consequently, the sentencing jury in Mack
had not made a determination at the guilt phase of the trial
regarding the defendant's mental state while committing the
murder. Thus, the jury's decision as to whether the State proved
the defendant's mental state for purposes of finding the defendant
eligible for the death penalty under the murder in the course of a
felony aggravating factor could not be ascertained from the record.
See Mack, 167 Ill. 2d  at 537 (explaining that all parts of the record
will be searched and interpreted together in determining the
meaning of a verdict).
	In the case at bar, however, the same jury that found defendant
eligible for the death penalty had previously found defendant guilty
at trial of the intentional or knowing murders of Stanley Williams,
Ernestine McCoy and Orlando McCoy. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1),
(a)(2) (West 1996). Given that the jury returned these guilty
verdicts indicating defendant's mental state at the time of the
murders, there can be no doubt that the jury found that defendant
acted with the mental state required under sections 9-1(b)(6) and
9-1(b)(3). I note too that, at the eligibility phase, the jury in this
case was properly instructed as to the mental states required for
finding defendant eligible for the death penalty under sections
9-1(b)(6) and 9-1(b)(3). Therefore, under these circumstances, I
would hold that the jury's eligibility verdicts were sufficient to
affirm defendant's eligibility for the death penalty under sections
9-1(b)(6) and 9-1(b)(3).
	Parenthetically, I would also affirm a jury's eligibility verdict
where the jury had been properly instructed during the guilt phase
of trial on intentional, knowing and felony murder; the jury
returned a general verdict finding defendant guilty of the offense
of first degree murder; and the jury was properly instructed at the
eligibility phase as to the culpable mental state required under
section 9-1(b)(6), as was the case in People v. Williams, No.
82807 (July 6, 2000) (Bilandic, J., specially concurring). As noted
in my special concurrence in Williams, a general verdict raises the
presumption that the jury found that defendant committed the most
serious crime alleged, there, that being intentional murder. See
Williams, slip op. at 42 (Bilandic, J., specially concurring); People
v. Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d 130, 151-52 (1998); see also People v.
Cardona, 158 Ill. 2d 403, 411 (1994); People v. Johnson, 149 Ill. 2d 118, 157 (1992). Consequently, when that presumption is
considered along with the fact that the jury received the proper
instructions as to the requisite mental state at both the guilt phase
and the eligibility phase, there is no speculation that the jury found
that the defendant possessed the requisite mental state.
	As to the case at bar, the meaning of the eligibility verdicts and
the intention of the jury is clear, and also requires no speculation
on the part of this court. Therefore, the death-eligibility findings by
the sentencing jury are valid. This case should not turn on the mere
fact that the jury here returned specific verdicts, rather than general
verdicts, at the guilt phase of the trial.
	I join the majority opinion in all other respects.
	JUSTICE MILLER joins in this special concurrence.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
	Under People v. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d 525 (1995), the death
penalty eligibility verdict form used in this case is legally
insufficient. Contrary to the majority's present view, the holding in
Mack is not limited to situations where the jury which found the
defendant death eligible was not the trier of fact at the guilt-innocence phase of the trial. Mack announced a bright-line rule
which our court has followed even where the same jury heard both
the guilt-innocence and death-eligibility phases of the trial. See
People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144 (1999). McCallister should
therefore be granted a new sentencing hearing.
	McCallister's death sentence should be set aside for a second
and more fundamental reason as well. As set forth in my partial
concurrence and partial dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179
(1998), the Illinois death penalty law violates the eighth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S.
Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). It is therefore void and
unenforceable. Accordingly, McCallister's sentence of death should
be vacated, and he should be sentenced to a term of imprisonment.
720 ILCS 5/9-1(j) (West 1994).