Title: Wilson v. State

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

484 S.W.2d 82 (1972) Ivory Lee WILSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. No. 5707. Supreme Court of Arkansas. September 4, 1972. Ray Thornton, Atty. Gen., by Milton Lueken, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee. JONES, Justice. Ivory Lee Wilson was convicted by a Pulaski County Circuit Court jury and was sentenced to life imprisonment for the *83 crime of first degree rape. On appeal to this court he designates five points upon which he relies for reversal, but since we must reverse on the fifth point we need not discuss the others. Satterfield v. State, 245 Ark. 337, 432 S.W.2d 472; Simmons v. State, 233 Ark. 616, 346 S.W.2d 197. After electing to testify in his defense at the trial, the appellant admitted sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix at the time and place alleged in the information and as testified by her, but he testified that it was with her acquiescence and consent. The prosecutrix testified that the act was accomplished under the persuading blade of an open pocketknife and the jury apparently believed her. The sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction is not questioned on this appeal, so we discuss it no further. Under the appellant's fifth point he contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial because of inflammatory and prejudicial remarks by the prosecuting attorney in his closing argument to the jury. The argument complained of and the objection thereto appears in the record as follows: (Emphasis added). It is apparent from the record that sometime prior to trial the prosecuting attorney and the appellant's attorney had carried on some discussions in the nature of "plea bargaining" and that the prosecutrix had been consulted in connection therewith. As already stated, the appellant admitted the act of sexual intercourse but maintained that it was a voluntary act on the part of the prosecutrix. The appellant also steadfastly denied that he had confessed his guilt to a police officer as was testified by the officer. There is no evidence in the record whatever that the appellant ever offered to enter a plea of guilty in exchange for a suspended sentence. The only evidence in the record pertaining to such plea is contained in the testimony of the prosecutrix as first brought out on cross-examination as follows: On redirect examination the prosecutrix testified on this point as follows: The above testimony elicited from the prosecuting witness is the only evidence in the entire record pertaining to a plea of guilty by the defendant. If any inference is to be drawn from this testimony, it would appear that the appellant refused to plead guilty rather than offered to do so in exchange for a suspended sentence. *85 In Simmons v. State, supra, we pointed out that one of the fundamental rules of trial practice in this state is that closing arguments of counsel must be confined to the question in issue, the evidence introduced at the trial, and all reasonable inferences and deductions which can be drawn therefrom. There is no evidence in the record that the appellant ever offered or intended to plead guilty but certainly the jury could have logically inferred from the prosecuting attorney's statement in his closing argument that the appellant had offered to plead guilty but had failed to do so only because his demands for an outright acquittal, or at least some treatment more favorable to him than a suspended sentence, were not met or agreed to. Plea bargaining has become a recognized and approved procedure in the practice of criminal law. The primary purpose of plea bargaining is to save the time and expense of jury trials in those cases where the accused is guilty and knows it, but where he might be inclined to save the state the time and expense of proving his guilt in exchange for a lesser penalty than he might reasonably expect at the hands of a jury. Plea bargaining is alien to jury trials and many reasons should be obvious why offers and counteroffers in plea bargaining have no place whatever in the evidence at jury trials. We cannot say that the appellant was not prejudiced by the prosecuting attorney's statement in his closing argument in this case. We can say, however, that the trial court's admonition was not sufficient to remove whatever prejudice the statement may have incurred. Simmons v. State, supra. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. Reversed and remanded. HARRIS, C. J., not participating.