Title: Gonzalez v. State of Oregon

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: April 27, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
JOSE LUIS VEGA GONZALEZ,
Respondent on Review,
v.
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 01-2018; CA A115934; SC S51309)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted November 9, 2004.
Brendan C. Dunn, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review.  With him
on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
James N. Varner, Newberg, argued the cause and filed the
brief for respondent on review.
Marc Sussman, Portland, filed the brief for amici curiae
Miles McLeod, American Association of Immigration Lawyers, and
Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyers Association. 
Before Carson, Chief Justice,** and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz,*** Balmer, and Kistler, Justices.
KISTLER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
*Appeal from Tillamook County Circuit Court, Berkely A. Smith, Judge. 191 Or App 587, 83 P3d 921 (2004).
** Chief Justice when case was argued.
*** Chief Justice when decision was made.
KISTLER, J.
The question in this case is whether petitioner's
defense counsel provided constitutionally adequate assistance
when he advised petitioner that the federal government may deport
him if he pleaded guilty.  The Court of Appeals held that counsel
failed to provide adequate assistance because he did not tell
petitioner that, unless the Attorney General or his designee
chose not to pursue deportation proceedings, petitioner would be
deported.  Gonzalez v. State of Oregon, 191 Or App 587, 593-94,
83 P3d 921 (2004).  We reverse the Court of Appeals decision.
Petitioner is a citizen of Mexico.  He entered the
United States illegally in 1987 and has lived in Oregon since
1989.  In 1995, petitioner received a work permit from the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) (1) and began an
effort to become a legal resident of this country.  Towards that
end, petitioner retained an immigration lawyer in California to
represent him in a then-pending INS hearing.
Before the INS hearing occurred, the State of Oregon
charged petitioner with five counts of possessing, manufacturing,
and delivering a controlled substance.  The state also sought to
forfeit approximately $70,000 that petitioner held in his bank
account.  In March 2000, petitioner retained a lawyer to
represent him on the criminal charges.  Petitioner faced a
substantial period of incarceration if the state proved the
charged crimes, and his defense lawyer spent much of his time
negotiating a plea agreement with the district attorney's office. 
Eventually, the district attorney's office agreed that, if
petitioner would plead guilty to one count of possession and one
count of distribution, the state would recommend that the trial
court sentence petitioner to 90 days in jail with credit for time
served and 36 months probation.
In discussing the plea offer with petitioner, his trial
counsel reviewed the constitutional rights that petitioner would
give up if he pleaded guilty.  Counsel also advised petitioner of
the maximum sentence and fine that the trial court could impose
if he were found guilty of the charged crimes.  Finally, counsel
advised him that pleading guilty "may cause [his] deportation"
from the United States, as well as denial of naturalization and
future readmission to the United States.  Petitioner did not ask
his counsel to predict the likelihood of deportation with greater
specificity, and his counsel did not do so.  Rather, in advising
petitioner about the risks of deportation, his counsel followed
the terms of a preprinted plea petition.
Relying on his counsel's advice, petitioner pleaded
guilty on February 1, 2001, to one count of possessing and one
count of distributing a controlled substance.  The state
dismissed the other three charges, and the trial court imposed
the recommended sentence.  After petitioner had served his 90-day
jail term, the INS initiated deportation proceedings.  Petitioner
then filed a post-conviction petition, alleging that his
counsel's failure to tell him that he would be deported if he
pleaded guilty violated his right to the adequate assistance of
counsel guaranteed by the state constitution. (2)  The post-conviction court agreed with petitioner, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed.
The Court of Appeals noted that, under Lyons v. Pearce,
298 Or 554, 694 P2d 969 (1985), defense counsel have a state
constitutional obligation to advise clients who are not United
States citizens and who are considering a guilty plea of the
risks of deportation.  Gonzalez, 191 Or App at 591-92.  The Court
of Appeals recognized that Lyons had held that counsel satisfied
that obligation by telling their clients that a conviction "may
result" in deportation but concluded that the likelihood of
deportation is greater now than when this court decided Lyons. 
Id. at 591-94.  Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that
"petitioner's trial counsel was obligated to tell
petitioner that he was pleading guilty to an aggravated
felony and that, unless the United States Attorney
General or his designee chose not to pursue deportation
proceedings against him, he would be deported as a
result of his guilty plea."
Id. at 594.  Because petitioner's counsel had told him only that
a plea "may result" in deportation, the Court of Appeals held
that the petitioner's counsel had not provided constitutionally
adequate assistance.  It therefore affirmed the judgment of the
post-conviction court.
On review, the state acknowledges that one of the
charges to which petitioner pleaded was an "aggravated
felony." (3)  It argues, however, that counsel's use of "may"
is still accurate because the Attorney General retains inherent
prosecutorial discretion not to initiate deportation proceedings
for persons convicted of an aggravated felony, see Carranza v.
INS, 277 F3d 65, 72 (1st Cir 2002) (recognizing proposition), and
that, even when the Attorney General chooses to initiate
deportation proceedings, exceptions to deportation remain
available, see 8 USC § 1231(b)(3)(A) (withholding of removal);
Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F3d 130, 141 (2d Cir 2003) (recognizing
that person convicted of aggravated felony can avoid deportation
when deportation would be contrary to Convention Against
Torture).
In his brief on the merits, petitioner does not dispute
that the Attorney General may exercise his inherent discretion
not to initiate deportation proceedings and that exceptions
remain available even for persons convicted of aggravated
felonies. (4)  He contends, however, that his defense counsel
should have identified each exception to deportation that might
apply to him and that his counsel then should have explained the
likelihood that each exception would apply.  Alternatively,
petitioner argues that his counsel should have given him the more
general advice that the Court of Appeals stated:  Unless the
Attorney General chose not to deport him, he would be deported. 
Before considering those arguments, we first set out the
principles that guide our inquiry.
In pleading guilty, a defendant admits in open court
that he or she committed the acts charged in the indictment, and
that admission forms the basis for determining his or her guilt. 
See State v. Harris, 339 Or 157, 172-73, 118 P3d 236 (2005)
(recognizing proposition).  Often a defendant pleads guilty as
part of a plea bargain; that is, in return for the defendant's
admission of guilt on some of or all the charged offenses, the
state agrees either to dismiss some of the charges or to
recommend a reduced sentence.  "For a defendant who sees slight
possibility of acquittal, the advantages of pleading guilty and
limiting the probable penalty are obvious -- his exposure is
reduced, the correctional processes can begin immediately, and
the practical burdens of a trial are eliminated."  Brady v.
United States, 397 US 742, 752, 90 S Ct 1463, 25 L Ed 2d 747
(1970).
Counsel plays an integral role in guiding his or her
client through this process.  Of foremost importance is counsel's
role in advising his or her client of the likelihood of
conviction if the client chooses to go to trial.  See id. at 756
(recognizing significance of that factor).  That consideration
often will be pivotal in deciding whether to accept a plea offer
with the prospect of a reduced sentence or whether to require the
state to prove its case with the attendant risk of a more onerous
sanction.  Because the potential penalty is also important to an
informed plea decision, counsel must advise a defendant of the
direct consequences of a criminal conviction -- that is, the
maximum possible sentence that he or she could receive if
convicted, as well as the "possibility of a minimum sentence." 
See Hartzog v. Keeney, 304 Or 57, 64, 742 P2d 600 (1987) (minimum
sentence); cf. ORS 135.385(2)(b)(maximum sentence); United States
v. Day, 969 F2d 39, 44 (3d Cir 1992) (recognizing that, for
defendant contemplating guilty plea, knowledge of comparative
sentence exposure often will be crucial).
A criminal conviction can result in collateral
consequences as well as direct ones.  A conviction can lead,
among other things, to deportation, the loss of a license to
practice a profession, the termination of parental rights, and
the loss of the right to receive federal benefits.  See Gabriel
J. Chin and Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of
Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 Cornell L Rev
697, 699-700 (2002).  As a general rule, the courts have not
required defense counsel to advise their clients of the
collateral consequences of a conviction as a matter of providing
constitutionally adequate assistance.  Id. at 700-01.  Oregon,
however, has joined a minority of states that require, as a
matter of state constitutional law, that defense counsel advise
clients who are not United States citizens that a criminal
conviction "may result" in deportation.  See Lyons, 298 Or at
557, 567 (so holding); cf. ORS 135.385(2)(d) (requiring trial
courts to tell noncitizen defendants who plead guilty that
"conviction of a crime may result, under the laws of the United
States, in deportation, exclusion from admission to the United
States or denial of naturalization").
Neither Lyons nor ORS 135.385(2)(d) requires counsel or
the court to specify the likelihood that a particular defendant
will be deported.  Rather, both require only that defendants be
aware of the maximum consequence -- deportation -- that can
result from a conviction.  In that respect, Lyons and ORS
135.385(2)(d) are no different from ORS 135.385(2)(b), which
requires the courts to advise defendants of the maximum sentence
that they can receive, not the likelihood that the court will
impose that sentence.  Similarly, in Hartzog, the court held
that, to provide minimally adequate assistance, a defense counsel
must advise his or her client of "the possibility of a minimum
sentence."  304 Or at 64 (emphasis added).  In short, the focus
has been on the possible consequence of a plea, not an estimate
of the likelihood that the consequence will occur.
With that background in mind, we turn to petitioner's
arguments.  Petitioner correctly observes that, since this
court's decision in Lyons, changes in federal law have increased
the likelihood of deportation.  Congress has expanded the class
of crimes that will result in deportation, and it also has
narrowed the exceptions previously available to persons subject
to deportation.  See Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
St. Cyr, 533 US 289, 294-98, 121 S Ct 2271, 150 L Ed 2d 347
(2001) (describing changes to immigration laws).  Petitioner
reasons that, in light of those changes, Lyons is no longer good
law.  He argues that defense counsel must do more than advise
their clients that a conviction "may result" in deportation.  In
his view, the state constitution now requires defense counsel to
identify each potential exception to deportation that may apply
and quantify the likelihood of each exception's application.
The level of specificity that petitioner would impose
on defense counsel goes far beyond what this court has required
as an incident of constitutionally adequate assistance.  As
noted, in determining what counsel must tell their clients about
the direct consequences of a guilty plea, the courts have held
that a defense counsel must advise his or her client of the
maximum penalty that the trial court can impose as well as the
possibility of a minimum sentence.  The court has not held that
the Oregon Constitution requires counsel to attempt to specify
the likelihood that the trial court might impose either the
maximum sentence or a minimum sentence.  If the constitution does
not require that level of specificity concerning the direct
consequences of a criminal conviction, we see no constitutional
warrant for requiring that level of specificity concerning a
collateral consequence of a conviction.  Petitioner's counsel did
not "fai[l] to exercise reasonable skill and judgment" when he
advised petitioner of the maximum collateral sanction available 
-- deportation -- if he pleaded guilty.  See Lichau v. Baldwin,
333 Or 350, 359, 39 P3d 851 (2002) (stating standard for
inadequate assistance under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon
Constitution). (5)
We recognize that it may be better practice for defense
counsel to provide, to the extent possible, more specific advice
about the likelihood of deportation than petitioner's counsel
provided.  The question, however, is not whether petitioner's
defense counsel could have provided better advice.  Rather, the
question is whether counsel's advice fell below the minimum that
the state constitution requires.  We cannot say that it did.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
1. In 2002, Congress abolished the INS and transferred its
responsibilities to the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration
Services.  116 Stat 2135 (2002).  Additionally, Congress now
refers to deportation as removal.  See 8 USC § 1229 (2000)
(changing terminology).  Because some of the events at issue here
occurred before those changes took place, we refer to the agency
as the INS and to proceedings to return an alien to his or her
country of origin as deportation proceedings.
2. Petitioner's post-conviction petition contained two
claims for relief.  In his first claim for relief, petitioner
alleged that his trial counsel had failed to provide adequate
assistance in violation of the state and federal constitutions
because he had failed to advise petitioner that the INS would
deport him if he pleaded guilty.  In his second claim for relief,
petitioner alleged that the trial court had violated the Sixth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause because it had accepted his
guilty plea without informing him that the INS would deport him. 
On review, petitioner does not pursue his second claim for
relief, and he pursues only the state constitutional inadequate
assistance claim alleged in his first claim for relief.
3. Under federal law, a person who is convicted of an
"aggravated felony" has fewer grounds for avoiding deportation
than a person who is convicted of a felony.  See Attila Bogdan,
Guilty Pleas by Non-Citizens in Illinois: Immigration
Consequences Reconsidered, 53 DePaul L Rev 19, 20 (2003)
(summarizing immigration statutes).
4. We note that petitioner did not offer any evidence that
reveals the likelihood that the Attorney General will or will not
choose to pursue deportation proceedings -- either generally or
in particular classes of cases.  There is also no evidence
whether Oregon reports every alien who is convicted of an
aggravated felony to the INS. 
5. Our conclusion also resolves petitioner's argument that
his counsel should have provided him with the advice that the
Court of Appeals would require.