Title: Reeder v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
KENNY F. REEDER, JR., 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 273, 2005 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr. ID No. 9901009851A 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: February 10, 2006 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: May 3, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 3rd day of May 2006, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal 
and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Kenny F. Reeder, Jr., filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s May 26, 2005 order denying his motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  We find 
no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
 
(2) 
Following a Superior Court jury trial, Reeder was found guilty 
of 14 counts of Burglary in the Second Degree, 3 counts of Senior Theft, 9 
counts of Theft of a Firearm, 1 count of Possession of Burglar’s Tools, 4 
counts of Felony Theft, 1 count of Conspiracy in the Second Degree, 7 
 
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counts of Misdemeanor Theft, and 11 counts of Misdemeanor Criminal 
Mischief.  The State moved to have Reeder declared a habitual offender.1 
The Superior Court granted the State’s motion, but sentenced Reeder to a 
total of 32 years of Level V incarceration on only 4 of the 14 triggering 
convictions.  The State then filed a motion for correction of Reeder’s 
sentence, requesting that Reeder be sentenced as a habitual offender on all 
14 of his burglary convictions.  On May 3, 2000, the Superior Court granted 
the motion and imposed a total of 112 years of Level V incarceration.  On 
direct appeal, this Court affirmed Reeder’s convictions and sentences.2   
 
(3) 
In this appeal, Reeder claims that: a) the Superior Court abused 
its discretion by denying his motion for postconviction relief on the ground 
that his claims of perjured testimony by a witness for the State, subornation 
of perjury by the prosecutor and abuse of discretion by the trial judge were 
procedurally barred; and b) his counsel provided ineffective assistance at 
trial and on appeal. 
 
(4) 
Before considering the merits of a motion for postconviction 
relief, the Superior Court must first consider the procedural requirements of 
Rule 61.3  Rule 61(i) (4) provides that “any ground for relief that was 
                                                 
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4214(a). 
2 Reeder v. State, Del. Supr., Nos. 552, 1999; 583, 1999, C.J. Steele (Mar. 26, 2001). 
3 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
 
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formerly adjudicated, whether in the proceedings leading to the judgment of 
conviction, in an appeal, in a postconviction proceeding, or in a federal 
habeas corpus proceeding, is thereafter barred, unless reconsideration of the 
claim is warranted in the interest of justice.” 
 
(5) 
In his motion for postconviction relief filed in the Superior 
Court, Reeder argued that Detective Conaway, a witness for the State at trial, 
committed perjury four times: first, when he testified that he got a 
description of stolen silverware cases from the victim during a telephone 
conversation; second, when he testified that he drove the stolen items to the 
victim’s house for identification; third, when he testified that he compared 
Reeder’s boots to boot prints left at the crime scenes; and, fourth, when he 
testified that a witness told him he had seen a black Mustang at one of the  
crime scenes.  Reeder also argued that the prosecutor suborned perjury and 
that the Superior Court judge abused his discretion when he refused to 
permit the court reporter to read certain testimony to the jury during its 
deliberations.     
 
(6) 
The record reflects that, in Reeder’s direct appeal, he 
unsuccessfully claimed that Detective Conaway presented inconsistent 
testimony at the suppression hearing and at trial concerning the description 
of the stolen silverware cases.  As such, that claim is barred as formerly 
 
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adjudicated.4  Moreover, we do not find reconsideration of that claim to be 
warranted in the interest of justice.5   
 
(7) 
Rule 61(i) (3) provides that “[a]ny ground for relief that was not 
asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction . . . is 
thereafter barred, unless the movant shows . . . [c]ause for relief and 
prejudice . . . .”  Reeder’s other three claims of “perjury” on the part of 
Detective Conaway and his claims of subornation of perjury on the part of 
the prosecutor and abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge, which he 
raises for the first time in this proceeding, are barred as procedurally 
defaulted unless he can demonstrate cause for the procedural default and 
prejudice from a violation of his rights.6  We do not find that Reeder has 
sustained that burden.  Nor do we find any miscarriage of justice that would 
excuse the procedural default.7  As such, there is no merit to Reeder’s claims 
of error and abuse of discretion on the part of the Superior Court. 
 
(8) 
Reeder’s second claim is that his counsel provided ineffective 
assistance at trial and on appeal.  In order to prevail on his claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, Reeder must show that his counsel’s 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, 
                                                 
4 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (4). 
5 Id. 
6 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (3) (A) and (B). 
7 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (5). 
 
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but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that 
the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.8  Although not 
insurmountable, the Strickland standard is highly demanding and leads to a 
“strong presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable.”9  
This Court consistently has held that a defendant must set forth concrete 
allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them, or risk summary 
dismissal.10     
 
(9) 
In support of his claim of ineffective assistance, Reeder alleges 
that his counsel failed to: interview a potential defense witness; object to 
Detective Conaway’s perjured testimony at the suppression hearing; renew 
the motion to suppress after a witness at trial contradicted Detective 
Conaway’s testimony; cross-examine Detective Conaway about his perjured 
testimony; call Mrs. Conaway as a witness at the suppression hearing; obtain 
certain exculpatory evidence from the State; argue insufficient probable 
cause due to the perjured testimony; file a reply brief; and argue to the judge 
and jury that the trial was unfair due to the perjured testimony.  To the extent 
Reeder has failed to present arguments previously made in his 
                                                 
8 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
9 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990). 
10 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d at 555-56. 
 
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postconviction motion, those arguments are deemed abandoned and will not 
be addressed in this appeal.11 
 
(10) The bulk of Reeder’s claims of ineffective assistance are based 
upon his assertion that Detective Conaway committed perjury.  However, 
merely because Detective Conaway gave inconsistent testimony which was 
inconsistent with the testimony of other witnesses does not establish that he 
committed perjury.  To the extent that Reeder’s claims of ineffective 
assistance are based upon this unsupported assertion, we find them to be 
without merit.  As for Reeder’s remaining claims of ineffective assistance, 
we find that none of the alleged errors by his counsel resulted in prejudice to 
Reeder.  These remaining claims are, therefore, also without merit.   
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993).  In his motion for postconviction 
relief, Reeder also argued that the sentences imposed by the Superior Court were 
improper.