Title: P. v. Brendlin

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 11/24/08; on remand 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S123133 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 3 C040754 
BRUCE EDWARD BRENDLIN, 
) 
 
) 
Sacramento County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. CRF012703 
___________________________________ ) 
 
The issue presented in this case is whether evidence seized in a search 
incident to a lawful arrest based upon a valid outstanding warrant nonetheless 
must be suppressed because the discovery of the warrant occurred during an 
unlawful traffic stop.  Case law from other state and federal courts uniformly holds 
that the discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant prior to a search incident to 
arrest constitutes an intervening circumstance that may—and, in the absence of 
purposeful or flagrant police misconduct, will—attenuate the taint of the 
antecedent unlawful traffic stop.  We join this chorus of cases and reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal, which had ordered suppression of the evidence 
seized from defendant’s person and from the vehicle in which he was a passenger 
on the sole ground that the outstanding warrant would not have been discovered 
“[b]ut for the unlawful vehicle stop.”       
 
 
2 
BACKGROUND 
Around 1:40 a.m. on November 27, 2001, Sutter County Sheriff’s Deputy 
Robert Charles Brokenbrough effected a traffic stop of a brown 1993 Buick Regal 
with expired registration tabs on Franklin Avenue in Yuba City.  Prior to the stop, 
Deputy Brokenbrough confirmed through dispatch that the car’s registration had 
expired two months earlier but that a renewal application was “in process.”  
Although Deputy Brokenbrough observed prior to the stop that a temporary 
operating permit with the number “11” (indicating an expiration date at the end of 
November) had been taped to the rear window, he could not determine from his 
vantage point whether the permit matched the vehicle.  He decided to stop the 
Buick to investigate further.    
Deputy Brokenbrough approached the driver’s side of the Buick and asked 
the driver, Karen Simeroth, for her driver’s license.  He also asked defendant, the 
passenger, to identify himself, since he recognized defendant as one of the 
Brendlin brothers, Scott or Bruce, and recalled that one of them had absconded 
from parole supervision.  During the inquiry, Deputy Brokenbrough observed 
receptacles in the car containing substances used in the production of 
methamphetamine.  In response to the deputy’s inquiry, defendant identified 
himself.  The deputy returned to his patrol vehicle and verified that defendant was 
a parolee at large and had an outstanding no-bail warrant for his arrest.  (See Pen. 
Code, §§ 3000, subd. (b)(8), 3060.)   
After backup arrived, Deputy Brokenbrough ordered defendant out of the 
car at gunpoint and placed him under arrest for the parole violation.  The entire 
episode, from the time Deputy Brokenbrough asked Simeroth for her driver’s 
license to his discovery that defendant had an outstanding warrant, lasted a couple 
of minutes.     
3 
Police found an orange syringe cap on defendant’s person during a search 
incident to arrest.  They found two hypodermic needles (one of which was missing 
a syringe cap), two baggies containing a total of 12.43 grams of marijuana, and a 
baggie containing 0.46 grams of methamphetamine on Simeroth’s person during a 
patsearch and a subsequent search incident to her arrest.  Materials used in 
manufacturing methamphetamine were found in the back seat of the Buick.   
After a hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress, the superior court held 
that defendant had not been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution until Deputy Brokenbrough ordered him out of 
the car at gunpoint and placed him under arrest and that, even if he had been 
seized at the inception of the traffic stop, the stop was lawful.  Defendant then 
pleaded guilty to manufacturing methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code,  
§ 11379.6, subd. (a)) and admitted a prior prison term enhancement (Pen. Code,  
§ 667.5, subd. (b)).  He was sentenced to four years in prison.         
The Court of Appeal reversed in a published opinion.  It held that a traffic 
stop necessarily results in a detention (and, hence, a seizure) (People v. Glaser 
(1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 363) of both the driver and any passengers.  The Court of 
Appeal further found that the seizure was unlawful in that Deputy Brokenbrough, 
who knew that the vehicle’s application to renew its registration was in process 
and who had seen the temporary permit in the rear window, had “at most a hunch” 
that “the temporary operating permit displayed in the window might not belong to 
the car and, thus, it was being unlawfully operated as an unregistered vehicle.”    
The court ruled that the evidence seized from defendant as well as from the Buick 
should have been suppressed on the ground that the evidence would not have been 
discovered “[b]ut for the unlawful vehicle stop.”   
This court, in a four-to-three decision, reversed the Court of Appeal and 
held that a passenger in a vehicle subject to a traffic stop is not seized within the 
4 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment in the absence of additional circumstances that 
would indicate to a reasonable person that he or she was the subject of the peace 
officer’s investigation or show of authority.  (People v. Brendlin (2006) 38 Cal.4th 
1107, 1111.)  The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Corrigan, argued that a 
traffic stop entails the seizure of a passenger even when the driver is the sole target 
of police investigation.  (Id. at p. 1125.)   
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed in a 
unanimous opinion, holding that a traffic stop subjects a passenger, as well as a 
driver, to a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  (Brendlin v. 
California (2007) 551 U.S. ___ [127 S.Ct. 2400].)  The high court remanded the 
matter to enable “the state courts to consider in the first instance whether 
suppression turns on any other issue.”  (Id. at p. ___ [127 S.Ct. at p. 2410].)  
On remand, we granted the Attorney General’s request that the parties be 
directed to file supplemental briefing as to whether the existence of defendant’s 
outstanding arrest warrant—which was discovered after the unlawful traffic stop 
but before the search of his person or the vehicle—dissipated the taint of the 
illegal seizure and rendered suppression of the evidence seized unnecessary.1 
                                              
1  
We reject at the outset defendant’s objection, raised for the first time at oral 
argument, that the People forfeited this justification by failing to assert it at the 
suppression hearing.  Although the People may not then have asserted that the 
discovery of the outstanding warrant was an intervening circumstance justifying 
the search, they did introduce evidence of the outstanding warrant at the 
suppression hearing and did argue that the search was authorized by the deputy’s 
discovery that defendant was a parolee.  Accordingly, defendant had sufficient 
opportunity to respond to the claim of attenuation in the trial court, and he does 
not claim that he was prejudiced in any way by the People’s shift from a claim of 
attenuation based on his parole status to a claim of attenuation based on his 
outstanding parole warrant.  (People v. Green (1985) 40 Cal.3d 126, 138.)  There 
is thus no bar to our consideration of the claim of attenuation for the first time on 
appeal where, as here, the record is sufficient to support such a finding.  (People v. 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
5 
DISCUSSION 
“In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court must find the historical 
facts, select the rule of law, and apply it to the facts in order to determine whether 
the law as applied has been violated.  (People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 279 
[99 Cal.Rptr.2d 532, 6 P.3d 193].)  We review the court’s resolution of the factual 
inquiry under the deferential substantial evidence standard.  The ruling on whether 
the applicable law applies to the facts is a mixed question of law and fact that is 
subject to independent review.  (Ibid.)”  (People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 
505.)  In evaluating whether the fruits of a search or seizure should have been 
suppressed, we consider only the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 
1141.) 
The People concede that the traffic stop of the vehicle in which defendant 
was traveling was not supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and 
it is clear from the high court’s opinion that the stop effected a seizure of 
defendant.  It is thus undisputed that defendant was unlawfully seized at the time 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 449; accord, People v. Foskey (Ill. 1990) 554 N.E.2d 
192, 202; State v. Martin (Kan. 2008) 179 P.3d 457, 463; Cox v. State (Md. 2007) 
916 A.2d 311, 313, 318 & fn. 4.)  
 
Defendant also contends that the People failed to preserve the issue of 
attenuation in the Court of Appeal or present it in their petition for review.  We 
find that the People adequately presented the issue to the Court of Appeal, to this 
court in their petition for review, and to the United States Supreme Court, before 
requesting permission to brief it here.  Even if the People had failed to preserve the 
issue in those courts, however, we would not deem it forfeited, inasmuch as “the 
issues the Attorney General raised have sufficient statewide importance to warrant 
an opinion from this court,” and “this case presents those issues.”  (People v. 
Braxton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 798, 809.)             
6 
of the traffic stop.  Further, the Court of Appeal was correct in finding that but for 
the unlawful traffic stop, Deputy Brokenbrough would not have discovered the 
outstanding warrant for defendant’s arrest and would not then have conducted the 
search incident to arrest that revealed the contraband.  This does not mean, 
however, that the fruits of the search incident to that arrest must be suppressed.  
“[E]xclusion may not be premised on the mere fact that a constitutional violation 
was a ‘but-for’ cause of obtaining evidence.”  (Hudson v. Michigan (2006) 547 
U.S. 586, 592.)  “ ‘[N]ot . . . all evidence is “fruit of the poisonous tree” simply 
because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police.  
Rather, the more apt question in such a case is “whether, granting establishment of 
the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been 
come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently 
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” ’ ”  (People v. Sims (1993) 5 
Cal.4th 405, 445, quoting Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 487-
488.)  “[B]ut-for cause, or ‘causation in the logical sense alone,’ [citation] can be 
too attenuated to justify exclusion . . . .”  (Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. at p. 592; 
see also Brown v. Illinois (1975) 422 U.S. 590, 603 (Brown).)    
Although the significance of an arrest warrant in attenuating the taint of an 
antecedent unlawful traffic stop is an issue of first impression for this court, the 
general framework for analyzing a claim of attenuation under the Fourth 
Amendment is well settled.  (People v. Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 448.)  “[T]he 
question before the court is whether the chain of causation proceeding from the 
unlawful conduct has become so attenuated or has been interrupted by some 
intervening circumstance so as to remove the ‘taint’ imposed upon that evidence 
by the original illegality.”  (U.S. v. Crews (1980) 445 U.S. 463, 471.)  “Relevant 
factors in this ‘attenuation’ analysis include the temporal proximity of the Fourth 
Amendment violation to the procurement of the challenged evidence, the presence 
7 
of intervening circumstances, and the flagrancy of the official misconduct.”  
(Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 448, citing Brown, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 603-604.) 
Where, as here, the issue is whether the discovery of an outstanding arrest 
warrant has attenuated the taint of an antecedent unlawful seizure, other state and 
federal courts have likewise invoked the three Brown factors—i.e., the temporal 
proximity of the unlawful seizure to the subsequent search of the defendant’s 
person or vehicle, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the flagrancy of 
the official misconduct in effecting the unlawful seizure.  (U.S. v. Simpson (8th 
Cir. 2006) 439 F.3d 490, 495; U.S. v. Green (7th Cir. 1997) 111 F.3d 515, 521; 
McBath v. State (Alaska Ct.App. 2005) 108 P.3d 241, 248; State v. Frierson (Fla. 
2006) 926 So.2d 1139, 1143; State v. Page (Idaho 2004) 103 P.3d 454, 459; 
People v. Mitchell (Ill.App.Ct. 2005) 824 N.E.2d 642, 649; State v. Martin, supra,  
179 P.3d at p. 463; Birch v. Com. (Ky.Ct.App. 2006) 203 S.W.3d 156, 159; State 
v. Hill (La. 1998) 725 So.2d 1282, 1284; Myers v. State (Md. 2006) 909 A.2d 
1048, 1062; State v. Thompson (Neb. 1989) 438 N.W.2d 131, 137; State v. Soto 
(N.M.Ct.App. 2008) 179 P.3d 1238, 1244-1245, cert. granted (N.M. 2008) 180 
P.3d 674; Jacobs v. State (Okla.Crim.App. 2006) 128 P.3d 1085, 1087; Reed v. 
State (Tex.App. 1991) 809 S.W.2d 940, 946; see also People v. Hillyard (Colo. 
1979) 589 P.2d 939, 940-941 [declining to suppress evidence where the discovery 
of the outstanding warrant was preceded by an invalid stop, but without explicitly 
invoking each of the above factors]; Ruffin v. State (Ga.Ct.App. 1991) 412 S.E.2d 
850, 852-853 [same]; State v. Lamaster (Mo.Ct.App. 1983) 652 S.W.2d 885, 887 
[same]; State v. Allen (Or.Ct.App. 2008) 191 P.3d 762, 765-767 [same]; State v. 
Rothenberger (Wn. 1968) 440 P.2d 184, 186-187 [same].)  Indeed, “[t]hese factors 
have been applied in virtually every federal and state case involving a search 
following an alleged unlawful traffic stop.”  (People v. Rodriguez (2006) 143 
Cal.App.4th 1137, 1143.)  
8 
We find these authorities, which are consistent with our own case law 
concerning attenuation generally (see People v. Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 
448), persuasive.  Applying the Brown factors to the circumstances here, we 
conclude that the outstanding warrant, which was discovered prior to any search of 
defendant’s person or of the vehicle, sufficiently attenuated the taint of the 
unlawful traffic stop. 
As to the first Brown factor, we note that only a few minutes elapsed 
between the unlawful traffic stop and the search incident to arrest that uncovered 
the challenged evidence.  This is the typical scenario “in essentially every case in 
this area.”  (McBath v. State, supra, 108 P.3d at p. 248; see U.S. v. Green, supra, 
111 F.3d at p. 521 [about five minutes]; State v. Frierson, supra, 926 So.2d at p. 
1152 (dis. opn. of Pariente, C.J.) [“no more than a few minutes”]; State v. Page, 
supra, 103 P.3d at p. 459 [“a minimal lapse of time”]; State v. Martin, supra, 179 
P.3d at p. 463 [“short amount of time”]; State v. Hill, supra, 725 So.2d at p. 1284 
[“any time lapse was negligible”]; Cox v. State, supra, 916 A.2d at p. 322 [two 
minutes].)  We note as well that the close temporal proximity of an unlawful arrest 
and a confession worked against a finding of attenuation in Brown itself (Brown, 
supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 604-605) and in other cases where the alleged intervening 
factor between the illegal police conduct and the challenged evidence was a 
volitional act by the defendant, such as resisting arrest or flight.  (See U.S. v. 
Green, supra, 111 F.3d at p. 522.)  In those situations, though, the temporal 
proximity between the illegal police conduct and the defendant’s response has a 
logical connection in that the closer these two events are in time, the more likely 
the defendant’s response was influenced by the illegality or that the illegality was 
exploited.  (Ibid.)  Conversely, where the intervening circumstance is a lawful 
arrest under an outstanding arrest warrant, the defendant’s conduct is irrelevant, 
9 
and the police cannot be said to have exploited the illegal seizure that preceded the 
discovery of the outstanding warrant.  (Ibid.) 
Accordingly, some courts have held that the first Brown factor is not 
relevant to the attenuation of the taint of an antecedent illegal seizure where the 
intervening circumstance is an outstanding arrest warrant.  (E.g., U.S. v. Simpson, 
supra, 439 F.3d at p. 495 [the attenuation analysis “need not focus on the first 
Brown factor”]; Reed v. State, supra, 809 S.W.2d at pp. 946-947 [the first Brown 
factor “does not bear on attenuation”].)  Other courts have reasoned that the first 
Brown factor is nonetheless relevant (and tends to favor suppression of the 
evidence) but is not dispositive.  (U.S. v. Green, supra, 111 F.3d at p. 521; State v. 
Frierson, supra, 926 So.2d at p. 1144; State v. Martin, supra, 179 P.3d at p. 463; 
State v. Hill, supra, 725 So.2d at p. 1284; Cox v. State, supra, 916 A.2d at p. 322 
[the factor is “ambiguous”]; see generally Brown, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 603 [“No 
single fact is dispositive”].)  We need not decide which line of authority is correct 
because even the courts in the latter category “have all but unanimously concluded 
that, in this kind of situation, this first Brown factor is outweighed by the others.”  
(McBath v. State, supra, 108 P.3d at p. 248.) 
As to the second Brown factor, the case law uniformly holds that an arrest 
under a valid outstanding warrant—and a search incident to that arrest—is an 
intervening circumstance that tends to dissipate the taint caused by an illegal 
traffic stop.  A warrant is not reasonably subject to interpretation or abuse (see 
Hudson v. Michigan, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 595; U.S. v. Green, supra, 111 F.3d at 
p. 522), and the no-bail warrant here supplied legal authorization to arrest 
defendant that was completely independent of the circumstances that led the 
officer to initiate the traffic stop.  (State v. Thompson, supra, 438 N.W.2d at p. 
137.)  Moreover, no search of defendant’s person or of the vehicle was undertaken 
until Deputy Brokenbrough had confirmed the existence of the outstanding 
10 
warrant.  (U.S. v. Green, supra, 111 F.3d at p. 523; State v. Lamaster, supra, 652 
S.W.2d at p. 887.)  The challenged evidence was thus the fruit of the outstanding 
warrant, and was not obtained through exploitation of the unlawful traffic stop.  
(Reed v. State, supra, 809 S.W.2d at p. 947.) 
The third Brown factor, the flagrancy and purposefulness of the police 
misconduct, is generally regarded as the most important because “it is directly tied 
to the purpose of the exclusionary rule—deterring police misconduct.”  (U.S. v. 
Simpson, supra, 439 F.3d at p. 496; see generally Brown, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 604 
[deeming this factor “particularly” relevant].)  Defendant contends that the 
illegality here was flagrant in that Deputy Brokenbrough “had no reasonable 
suspicion that any occupant of the vehicle had violated the law when he made the 
traffic stop” and that he had at most “a hunch” the driver was operating an 
unregistered vehicle.  But a mere “mistake” with respect to the enforcement of our 
traffic laws does not establish that the traffic stop was pretextual or in bad faith.  
(State v. Frierson, supra, 926 So.2d at p. 1144; see also Cox v. State, supra, 916 
A.2d at p. 321.)  Deputy Brokenbrough testified that he ordered the traffic stop in 
order to investigate the vehicle’s registration, that he did see the temporary sticker 
in the rear window prior to the stop, but that (in his experience) the sticker 
sometimes belonged to a different vehicle or had been falsified.  Although the 
People have conceded that this was insufficient to justify a temporary detention to 
permit further investigation, the insufficiency was not so obvious as to make one 
question Deputy Brokenbrough’s good faith in pursuing an investigation of what 
he believed to be a suspicious registration, nor does the record show that he had a 
design and purpose to effect the stop “in the hope that something [else] might turn 
up.”  (Brown, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 605; see also U.S. v. Simpson, supra, 439 F.3d 
at p. 496; McBath v. State, supra, 108 P.3d at p. 250 [no indication that the police 
“knowingly overstepped their authority or that their conduct was an egregious 
11 
misuse of authority”]; State v. Page, supra, 103 P.3d at p. 459 [no evidence that 
the illegal seizure was flagrant or for an improper purpose]; State v. Hill, supra, 
725 So.2d at p. 1287 [the illegal seizure “was not particularly egregious and did 
not amount to a flagrant abuse of police power”].)  In particular, there is no 
evidence at all that the deputy “invented a justification for the traffic stop in order 
to have an excuse to run [a] warrant check[]” (People v. Rodriguez, supra, 143 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1143) or that a search of the vehicle or its occupants was the 
“ultimate goal” of the initial unlawful detention.  (State v. Martin, supra, 179 P.3d 
at p. 463; see also Myers v. State, supra, 909 A.2d at p. 1067; Reed v. State, supra, 
809 S.W.2d at p. 948.)    
Defendant contends that suppression is necessary to deter the police from 
randomly stopping citizens for the purpose of running warrant checks, but we are 
not persuaded.  Where the seizure is flagrantly or knowingly unconstitutional or is 
otherwise undertaken as a fishing expedition, the third Brown factor will make it 
unlikely that the People would be able to demonstrate an attenuation of the taint of 
the initial unlawful seizure.  (People v. Mitchell, supra, 824 N.E.2d at p. 650 
[suppressing the evidence where “the sole apparent purpose of the detention is to 
check for a warrant”].)  But “a chance discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant” 
in the course of a seizure that is later determined to be invalid is an intervening 
circumstance that does not trigger the same concerns.  (Myers v. State, supra, 909 
A.2d at p. 1067; accord, Jacobs v. State, supra, 128 P.3d at pp. 1088-1089; 
Fletcher v. State (Tex.Ct.App. 2002) 90 S.W.3d 419, 421.)  “It is only in the 
unusual case where the police, after a questionable stop, discover that an occupant 
is wanted on an arrest warrant that the intervening circumstances exception will 
apply.”  (U.S. v. Green, supra, 111 F.3d at p. 523.)  Those are precisely the facts 
here. 
12 
Thus, despite the unlawfulness of the initial traffic stop, the facts of this 
encounter demonstrate that the drug paraphernalia found on defendant’s person 
and in the car was not the fruit of the unlawful seizure.  The police searched 
defendant’s person and the vehicle only after they discovered a valid outstanding 
warrant for his arrest.  In connection with that arrest, the police were authorized to 
conduct a search incident to it.2  Under these circumstances, the outstanding 
warrant sufficiently attenuated the connection between the unlawful traffic stop 
and the subsequent discovery of the drug paraphernalia. 
Finally, defendant is mistaken in contending that, despite the foregoing, 
suppression is required under our decisions in People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 
318 and In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128.  In those cases, we held that a 
search cannot be validated by the discovery, after the fact, that the defendant was 
subject to a probation or parole search condition.  (Jaime P., supra, 40 Cal.4th at 
p. 133.)  “This is so, we reasoned, because ‘whether a search is reasonable must be 
determined based upon the circumstances known to the officer when the search is 
conducted.’ ”  (Ibid., quoting Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 332, 334; see also 
In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 96 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.) [“that a search 
may not be justified by a parole search condition of which the searching officer is 
unaware, should be dispositive of this case”].)  Here, however, Deputy 
Brokenbrough never relied on any search condition, and no search in fact occurred 
until the deputy discovered an outstanding warrant for defendant’s arrest.  Thus, 
Sanders and Jaime P. are distinguishable and do not aid defendant.  (See McBath 
v. State, supra, 108 P.3d at pp. 247-248; State v. Page, supra, 103 P.3d at p. 460; 
State v. Hill, supra, 725 So.2d at pp. 1285-1286, fn. 6.)            
                                              
2  
The United States Supreme Court will revisit the scope of this doctrine in 
Arizona v. Gant, No. 07-542, certiorari granted February 25, 2008.  
13 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Brendlin 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted XXX 38 Cal.4th 1107; on remand from U.S. Supreme Court 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S123133 
Date Filed: November 24, 2008 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Sacramento 
Judge: Christopher R. Chandler 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Elizabeth Campbell, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and James F. Johnson, under appointment 
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, 
Donald E. de Nicola, Deputy State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson and Dane R. Gillette, Chief 
Assistant Attorneys General, Mary Jo Graves and Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorneys General, John G. 
McLean, Janet E. Neeley, Michael A. Canzoneri and Clifford E. Zall, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Elizabeth Campbell 
1215 K Street, 17th Floor 
Sacramento, CA  95814 
(916) 444-8538 
 
Clifford E. Zall 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 324-5281