Title: RICHARD E. ASHERMAN V. ROBYN R. ASHERMAN

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RICHARD E. ASHERMAN V. ROBYN R. ASHERMAN2009 WY 141221 P.3d 302Case Number: S-09-0050Decided: 11/17/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 

RICHARD 
E. ASHERMAN,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.ROBYN R. 
ASHERMAN,Appellee(Defendant).

 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Park County

The 
Honorable Steven R. Cranfill, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Michael 
A. LaBazzo of Law Offices of Michael A. LaBazzo, LLC, Cody, Wyoming. 

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Jill 
Deann LaRance of LaRance & Syth, P.C., Billings, 
Montana.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

            

[¶1]      In 2007, the 
district court entered a divorce decree, incorporating the parties' Child 
Custody and Property Settlement Agreement.  
Later, Robyn Asherman (Wife) filed a motion asking the court to have 
funds from the sale of a property disbursed in accordance with the 
agreement.  Specifically, she stated 
that three debts, including the remaining balance on a $155,000 debt on her 
residence, were to be paid from the proceeds of the sale, after which any 
remaining funds were to be split equally between the parties.  Richard Asherman (Husband) countered 
that the settlement agreement required that the debt on Wife's residence be paid 
solely out of her share of the sale proceeds.  The district court agreed with Wife and 
entered an order in her favor.  
Husband appeals, claiming the district court erred in interpreting the 
settlement agreement.   

 
 
[¶2]      We affirm.   

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶3]      Husband presents 
the following issue, phrased as a statement, on appeal:

 
 
            
The decision of the trial court that the settlement agreement was clear 
and unambiguous and should be interpreted as asserted by Appellee was an error 
of law. 

            

Wife 
restates the issue as:

 
 
            
Was the trial court correct in concluding that the Child Custody and 
Property Settlement Agreement, dated July 3, 2007, and incorporated in the July 
7, 2007 Divorce Decree, clearly and unambiguously set forth the manner in which 
the parties were to divide the proceeds from the sale of their Logan Mountain 
property?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      In resolving 
the issues in their divorce proceedings, Husband and Wife executed the 
settlement agreement.  When they 
entered into the agreement, they owned real property including:  the Logan Mountain property, which the 
parties had placed for sale; the Chugwater Drive property, Husband's residence; 
and the Alpine Avenue property, Wife's residence.  Husband had borrowed $155,000 to allow 
Wife to purchase the Alpine Avenue residence.  The relevant provisions of the 
settlement agreement set over the Chugwater Drive property to Husband and the 
Alpine Avenue property to Wife.  
With regard to the Logan Mountain property, they 
agreed:

 
 
            
The Logan Mountain property has been listed for sale . . . at a price of 
$699,500.00 and the parties agree to sell the property at a reasonable price 
mutually agreed upon.  Following 
payments of debt as provided herein, each party is entitled to one-half of 
remaining net proceeds.

 
 
[¶5]      Under the "Debts" 
heading in Paragraph 22 of the settlement agreement, the parties 
agreed:

 
 

A.   [Husband] 
agrees to assume and hereby agrees to pay the following indebtedness and any 
indebtedness he has incurred since the parties' separation and he further agrees 
to save and hold [Wife] harmless from any of said debts and to indemnify her 
against any sums which she may be required to pay by any such 
creditors:

 
 

1.    
[Husband's] 
residence located at . . . Chugwater Dr.

 
 

2.    
Any 
loans and lines of credit in his name . . ., including any loans on the Logan 
Mountain Property, subject to the provisions herein.

 
 

B.   [Wife] 
agrees to assume and hereby agrees to pay the following indebtedness and any 
indebtedness she has incurred since the parties' separation and she further 
agrees to save and hold [Husband] harmless from any of said debts and to 
indemnify him against any sums which he may be required to pay by any such 
creditors:

 
 

1.    
All 
indebtedness on her residence located at . . . Alpine [Avenue] . . . other than 
the $155,000 [Husband] borrowed to allow [Wife] to purchase the 
residence.

 
 

C.   Debt 
Repayment  
The Logan Mountain property has been listed for sale . . . at a price of 
$699,500.00 and the parties agree to sell the property at a reasonable price 
mutually agreed upon. [Husband] has provided financing to [Wife] in the total 
amount of $155,000 to allow her to purchase the residence she now owns at . . . 
Alpine in Cody.  From the proceeds 
of a sale of either a portion of or all of Logan Mountain and/or [another 
property] the parties agree to pay the following debts:

 
 

1.    
The 
mortgage on Logan Mountain as of separation . . .; 

 
 

2.    
The 
amount that was remaining on [a line of credit]; 

 
 

3.    
The 
balance due on the $155,000 that [Husband] borrowed for [Wife] to allow her to 
purchase her residence.

 
 
Only 
after the three debts as set forth in this paragraph are paid, any remaining net 
proceeds from the sale of Logan Mountain and/or [another property], will be 
split equally between [Husband] and [Wife].  Out of [Wife's] share [Husband] will be 
immediately reimbursed for all payments he has paid on the $155,000 borrowed for 
[Wife's] house, including principal and interest.

 
 
If 
[Wife] decides to sell her residence located at . . . Alpine . . . prior to the 
$155,000.00 being paid in full, the proceeds from the sale of [Wife's] residence 
will b[e] used to pay the remaining owed on the $155,000.00.  

 
 
[¶6]      When the 
Logan Mountain property sold, the parties disagreed over how the proceeds should 
be distributed.  Wife argued that 
the balance due on the $155,000 debt on her Alpine Avenue residence, together 
with the other debts listed in Paragraph 22C, should be paid from the sale 
proceeds and then the remainder should be divided equally between the 
parties.  Husband maintained that 
the debt on the Alpine Avenue property should be paid solely from Wife's share 
of the sale proceeds.    

 
 
[¶7]      The district 
court agreed with Wife.  It declared 
that the settlement agreement was clear and unambiguously required the Alpine 
Avenue debt to be paid from the joint sale proceeds prior to splitting the 
remainder between the parties, rather than solely from Wife's share.  Husband appealed.    

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 
[¶8]      In order to 
resolve this case, we must interpret the settlement agreement incorporated into 
the divorce decree.  This Court 
applies our standard contract interpretation principles to construe divorce 
property settlement agreements.  Wunsch v. Pickering, 2008 WY 131, ¶ 16, 
195 P.3d 1032, 1039 (Wyo. 2008); Lipps v. 
Loyd, 967 P.2d 558, 560-61 (Wyo. 1998).  Our basic purpose is to discern the 
intention of the parties.  We start 
with the determination of whether the contractual language is clear or 
ambiguous.  That determination is a 
question of law and, accordingly, we do not defer to the district court's 
decision.  Id.  
See also, Examination Mgmt. Servs. v. Kirschbaum, 927 P.2d 686, 689 
(Wyo. 1996).  "An ambiguous contract 
is an agreement which is obscure in its meaning, because of indefiniteness of 
expression, or because a double meaning is present.'"  Brockway v. Brockway, 921 P.2d 1104, 
1106 (Wyo. 1996), quoting Amoco Prod. Co. 
v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 612 P.2d 463, 465 (Wyo. 1980).  However, a contract is not rendered 
ambiguous simply because the parties do not agree on the proper interpretation 
of its terms.  Brockway, 921 P.2d  at 1107.  If the writing is clear and unambiguous, 
we determine the parties' intention from the words of the contract as a matter 
of law.  The contract is considered 
as a whole, reading each part in light of all other parts.  Brockway, 921 P.2d  at 1106.   

 
 
[¶9]      Several 
provisions of the settlement agreement address payment of the $155,000 debt 
resulting from the purchase of the Alpine Avenue property.  Paragraph 22C provided that three debts 
would be paid from the sale of the Logan Mountain property:  1) the mortgage on Logan Mountain as of 
separation; 2) the amount that was remaining on a line of credit; and 3) the 
"balance due on the $155,000 that [Husband] borrowed for [Wife] to allow her to 
purchase her residence."  That 
paragraph continued:  "Only after 
the three debts as set forth in this paragraph are paid, any remaining net 
proceeds from the sale of Logan Mountain and/or [another property], will be 
split equally between [Husband] and [Wife]."  Other provisions provided that "[f]ollowing payments of debt as provided 
herein, each party is entitled to one-half of remaining net proceeds" and Wife 
agreed to pay "all indebtedness on her residence located at . . . Alpine 
. . . other than the $155,000 [Husband] borrowed to allow [Wife] to purchase the 
residence."  These provisions very clearly establish 
that the Alpine Avenue debt was to be paid out of the proceeds from the sale of 
the Logan Mountain property before the remainder was split equally between the 
parties.    

 
 
[¶10]   Nevertheless, Husband argues that 
the settlement agreement is ambiguous concerning how the Alpine Avenue debt was 
to be repaid.  He argues that the 
overall intent of the agreement was to divide the parties' assets "according to 
their origin and the relative contributions" by the parties.  Husband maintains that the correct 
interpretation of the settlement agreement is that Wife was required to 
reimburse him for the $155,000 loan out of her share of the Logan Mountain 
proceeds rather than the debt being paid out of the joint proceeds because he 
used his credit, i.e., separate funds, to obtain the loan to purchase the Alpine 
Avenue property.  

 
 
[¶11]   We have recognized in other divorce 
cases that, when the parties execute a detailed property settlement agreement, 
we will enforce the plain language of the agreement even if an argument can be 
made that a particular provision of the agreement is not necessarily consistent 
with one of the parties' interests.  
For example, in Brockway, 921 P.2d  at 1106-07, the husband argued that the provision of the property 
settlement agreement which stated: "[t]he [wife] shall receive one half (1/2) of 
the [husband's] Air Force retirement" was ambiguous.  He claimed that he intended that his 
wife receive only one-half of the retirement he earned while they were 
married.  We concluded that the 
language was not ambiguous and plainly stated that the wife was entitled to one 
half of his total retirement, stating "if the husband wanted to limit payment of 
his retirement to that earned during the marriage, he could have, and should 
have, said that in the property settlement agreement[.]"  Id.  
at 1107.  

 
 
[¶12]   In Wunsch, ¶¶ 18-24, 195 P.3d  at 1040-41, 
the parties entered into an agreement splitting their joint business interests. 
 One of the contractual provisions 
stated that if husband replaced any of the joint client accounts, the parties 
would share equally the fees on the replaced accounts "until such time as [wife] 
ha[d] received in fees an amount equal to two times the annual earnings on the amount 
replaced" (emphasis added).  Id.  Arguing that the overall intent of the 
agreement was to split the business assets equally, husband insisted the 
provision meant her earnings, not 
the total earnings.  We rejected his 
interpretation as it defied the plain language of the provision which expressly 
included the terminology "the earnings" rather than "her earnings."  Id.      

 
 
[¶13]   Like in Brockway and Wunsch, we conclude the plain language 
of the agreement controls here.  The 
settlement agreement in this case was very detailed, addressing the parties' 
assets and liabilities separately and with obvious care.  Its plain language established that the 
Alpine Avenue debt would be paid from the Logan Mountain sale proceeds prior to 
the split of the remainder of the proceeds between the parties.  The language was not obscure and did not 
present a double meaning.  If 
Husband had wanted to require that the Alpine Avenue debt be paid out of Wife's 
proceeds from the sale, rather than joint proceeds, he could have, and should 
have, had such a provision expressly incorporated in the agreement.  We will not ignore the plain meaning of 
the debt repayment provisions in favor of an unstated overall intent espoused by 
the Husband at this late date.  

 
 
[¶14]   Husband also argues the district 
court disregarded the part of Paragraph 22C which stated:  "Out of [Wife's] share [Husband] will be 
immediately reimbursed for all payments he has paid on the $155,000 borrowed for 
[Wife's] house, including principal and interest."  He states that, under this sentence, he 
could have paid off the loan prior to the closing on the Logan Mountain property 
sale and then required Wife to pay the entire amount out of her share.  Husband apparently claims that an 
ambiguity exists in the agreement because the timing of the payoff determined 
whether the debt would be paid out of joint proceeds or only out of Wife's 
proceeds.  

 
 
[¶15]   We agree with Husband's 
interpretation of the quoted sentence from Paragraph 22C, but we fail to see how 
that contractual option renders ambiguous the other provisions of the agreement 
that required payment of the Alpine Avenue debt out of the joint proceeds of the 
Logan Mountain property sale.  There 
were simply two different procedures set out in the agreement.  Husband could either make arrangements 
to pay off the debt out of his separate funds and obtain payment from Wife out 
of her separate funds, or he could retain the debt, or a part of it, until the 
sale of the Logan Mountain property, in which case the remaining debt would be 
paid out of the joint proceeds of the sale.  While, in hindsight, those two 
provisions may seem inconsistent with regard to the effect on Husband's 
finances, that inconsistency does not render the agreement ambiguous.  Moreover, the provisions were not 
mutually exclusive.  The record 
indicates that Wife reimbursed Husband, out of her share of the sale proceeds, 
for payments he had made on the Alpine Avenue debt prior to the Logan Mountain 
property sale.    

 
 
[¶16]   In conclusion, the settlement 
agreement clearly stated that the outstanding balance on the $155,000 debt 
resulting from the purchase of Wife's Alpine Avenue property would be paid out 
of the joint proceeds of the sale of the Logan Mountain property.   

 
 
[¶17]   Affirmed.