Title: Nowotny v. L & B Contract Industries, Inc.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Nowotny v. L & B Contract Industries, Inc.1997 WY 39933 P.2d 452Case Number: 96-62Decided: 03/07/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

GARY R. NOWOTNY and CARLA NOWOTNY,  

Appellants(Plaintiffs), 

 

v. 

 

L & B CONTRACT INDUSTRIES, INC., formerly L & 
B Products, Inc., a New York corporation,  

Appellee(Defendant).

 

Appeal 
from The District Court, Sweetwater County, 

The 
Honorable Jere Ryckman, Judge

 

Representing Appellants: 

Frederick J. Harrison of Harrison & Massey, LLC, 
Rawlins.

 

Representing Appellee: 

Curtis B. Buchhammer of Orr, Buchhammer & Kehl, 
PC, Cheyenne.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

 

THOMAS, Justice. 

[¶1]      The main issue to 
be addressed in this case is whether we should expand the discovery rule for 
triggering the statute of limitations for personal injuries to include knowledge 
of the identity of the tort-feasor. This issue presents a conflict between a 
policy of providing a means of redress to an injured person and the policy of 
adoption of a statute of limitations, which frees the judicial system from 
litigation of stale claims and spares other parties from the defense of claims 
when memories have faded, witnesses have become unavailable, and evidence has 
been lost. Collateral issues are presented with respect to the application of 
the tolling statute and its possible unconstitutionality; the relation back of 
amendments to the complaint under WYO.R.CIV.P. Rule 15(c); abuse of discretion 
on the part of the trial court in setting aside a default entered in favor of 
the plaintiffs, Gary R. Nowotny and Carla Nowotny (Nowotnys); and denying the 
Nowotnys' motion to hold summary judgment proceedings in abeyance pending 
further discovery. The Nowotnys sought recovery for personal injuries sustained 
by Gary R. Nowotny when an allegedly defective restaurant bench seat collapsed. 
A Summary Judgment was entered in favor of L & B Contract Industries, Inc. 
(L & B) because the action was not commenced as to L & B before the 
statute of limitations had run. The Nowotnys ask this court to expand our 
discovery rule pertaining to the statute of limitations so that it is not 
triggered until the identity of the tort-feasor is known. L & B contends 
that the statute commenced to run when the injury was discovered or in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence should have been discovered. We hold that the 
discovery of Nowotny's injury occurred at the time the restaurant seat broke 
causing his injuries, and reject the argument that discovery did not occur until 
the identity of the manufacturer of the seat was known. The Order Granting 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is affirmed.

 

[¶2]      The Nowotnys 
frame the issues in this way, in the Brief of Appellants:

I. Whether the District Court erred in determining 
that the cause of action accrued on the date of injury, when Appellants did not 
discover who caused the injury until later.

II. Whether the District Court erred 
in concluding that the tolling statute did not apply.
III. Whether the District Court erred in concluding 
that the third amended complaint did not relate back.

IV. Whether the District Court abused its discretion 
and erred in setting aside the entry of default under Wyo. R.Civ.P. 
55(c).

V. Whether the District Court erred in denying 
Appellants' motion to hold summary judgment in abeyance.

In its Brief of Appellee, L 
& B states these issues:

I. Did the trial court properly determine that 
Appellants' cause of action accrued on January 17, 1991, and that the statute of 
limitations for their claims against L & B Contract Industries, Inc. ran on 
January 17, 1995?

II. Did the trial court properly determine that the 
statute of limitations for appellants' claims was not tolled by W.S. § 
1-3-116?

III. Does W.S. § 1-3-116 violate the United States 
Constitution's commerce clause, Art. 1, § 8, CL.3?

IV. Did the trial court properly determine that 
appellants' third amended complaint did not relate back under the provisions of 
Rule 15(c), W.R.C.P.?

V. Did the trial court properly exercise its 
discretionary power in setting aside the default entered against L & B 
Contract Industries, Inc.?

VI. Did the trial court act properly in denying 
Appellants' motion to hold summary judgment in abeyance?

 

[¶3]      More than a 
decade ago we summarized our standard of review for summary judgment cases in Thomas by Thomas v. South Cheyenne Water 
and Sewer Dist., 702 P.2d 1303, 1304 (Wyo. 1985):

 

We have frequently reiterated our standard of review 
of summary judgments.

"`When a motion for summary judgment is before the 
supreme court, we have exactly the same duty as the district judge; and, if 
there is a complete record before us, we have exactly the same material as did 
he. We must follow the same standards. The propriety of granting a motion for 
summary judgment depends upon the correctness of a court's dual findings that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the prevailing party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This court looks at the record from 
the viewpoint most favorable to the party opposing the motion, giving to him all 
favorable inferences to be drawn from the facts contained in affidavits, 
depositions and other proper material appearing in the record.' Reno Livestock Corporation v. Sun Oil 
Company (Delaware), Wyo., 638 P.2d 147, 150 (1981). See also, Blackmore v. Davis Oil Company, Wyo., 
671 P.2d 334, 336 (1983).

 

"A summary judgment should only be granted where it 
is clear that there are no issues of material facts involved and that an inquiry 
into the facts is unnecessary to clarify the application of law. Johnson v. Soulis, Wyo., 542 P.2d 867 
(1975). A material fact is one which has legal significance. Johnson v. Soulis, supra. It is a fact 
which would establish a defense. Wood v. 
Trenchard, Wyo., 550 P.2d 490 (1976). After the movant establishes a prima 
facie case the burden of proof shifts to the opposing party who must show a 
genuine issue of material fact, Gennings 
v. First Nat'l Bank of Thermopolis, Wyo., 654 P.2d 154 (1982), or come 
forward with competent evidence of specific facts countering the facts presented 
by the movant. Matter of Estate of 
Brosius, Wyo., 683 P.2d 663 (1984). The burden is then on the nonmoving 
party to show specific facts as opposed to general allegations. 10 Wright & 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2727, p. 538. The material 
presented must be admissible evidence at trial. Conclusory statements are not 
admissible. Bancroft v. Jagusch, 
Wyo., 611 P.2d 819 (1980). We give the party defending the motion the benefit of 
any reasonable doubt." Roth v. First 
Security Bank of Rock Springs, Wyoming, Wyo., 684 P.2d 93, 95 
(1984).

The same standard is in 
vogue today. E.g., Martin v. Alley 
Const., Inc., 904 P.2d 828, 831 (Wyo. 1995); Duncan v. Town of Jackson, 903 P.2d 548, 
551 (Wyo. 1995).

 

[¶4]      We are persuaded 
that there is no genuine issue as to these material facts. On January 17, 1991, 
Gary Nowotny sustained severe injuries when an allegedly defective restaurant 
bench seat located at the Golden Corral Restaurant in Rock Springs collapsed 
under him. No identifying marks were found on the bench that disclosed where or 
by whom it had been manufactured. The Nowotnys filed a complaint on January 27, 
1994, in which the owners of the Golden Corral were named as defendants. The 
owners settled the claims against them, and the action was dismissed with 
prejudice as to them on August 24, 1995.

 

[¶5]      In the meantime, 
the Nowotnys filed an amended complaint on September 30, 1994, which added L 
& B Products, Inc., an Illinois corporation, as a defendant. A second 
amended complaint was filed on October 28, 1994, which added a claim arising out 
of the doctrine of strict liability in the cause of action against L & B 
Products, Inc. The Nowotnys attempted on numerous occasions to obtain service 
upon L & B Products, Inc., the Illinois corporation, but neither of these 
amended complaints ever was served on the Illinois corporation. Later the 
Nowotnys determined that corporation was not the manufacturer of the bench 
seat.

 

[¶6]      On February 22, 
1995, more than four years after Gary Nowotny was injured, the Nowotnys were 
advised by the owners of the Golden Corral that the corporate offices for L 
& B Products, Inc., the company that manufactured the bench, were located in 
New York. Further investigation by the Nowotnys developed the fact that the 
manufacturing corporation's name had been changed to L & B Contract 
Industries, Inc., a New York corporation. On February 24, 1995, the owners of 
the Golden Corral sent a claim for indemnification to L & B Contract 
Industries, Inc. using certified mail, for which the return receipt was signed, 
dated February 28, 1995.

 

[¶7]      A third amended 
complaint was filed by the Nowotnys on April 12, 1995 which changed the named 
corporate defendant from L & B Products, Inc. to L & B Contract 
Industries, Inc., a New York corporation. By then, the Nowotnys had concluded 
that L & B Products, Inc., an Illinois corporation, had not manufactured the 
restaurant bench seat. The third amended complaint was served on L & B 
Contract Industries, Inc. on May 4, 1995. On June 8, 1995, entry of default was 
made against L & B Contract Industries, Inc., but the trial court set aside 
the entry of default on January 2, 1996.

 

[¶8]      L & B then 
filed a motion for summary judgment based upon the expiration of the statute of 
limitations prior to the commencement of the action against it, and on January 
2, 1996 the trial court granted that motion for summary judgment. The trial 
court ruled that there were no genuine issues of material fact concerning the 
running of the statute of limitations; that L & B had not been served until 
May 4, 1995, while the four year statute of limitations had run on January 17, 
1995; that the requirements of WYO. R.CIV.P. had not been satisfied so the 
amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint; and L & B 
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

 

[¶9]      In Wyoming a four 
year period of limitations is specified for actions for personal injury by WYO. 
STAT. § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) (1988), which states:

(iv) Within four (4) years, an action 
for:

* 
* * * * *

(C) An injury to the rights of the 
plaintiff, not arising on contract and not herein enumerated[.]
 

In the 
usual case, the four year period begins to run from the date of the injury 
because that is when the cause of action accrues.
 

[¶10]   We have said quite 
recently:

Wyoming is a discovery state in which the statute of 
limitations is triggered when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the 
existence of a cause of action. Mills v. 
Garlow, 768 P.2d 554 (Wyo. 1989). That rule with respect to statutes of 
limitations for tort theories was articulated in Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, reh'g denied, 590 P.2d 1340 (Wyo. 1979), 
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 863, 100 S. Ct. 132, 62 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1979), and it has been consistently followed. E.g., Anderson v. Bauer, 681 P.2d 1316 
(Wyo. 1984); Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor 
Co., 716 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1986).

Barlage v. Key Bank of Wyoming, 892 P.2d 124, 126 (Wyo. 1995). The acceptance of 
the discovery rule in Wyoming is attributed to Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 
1979), although, in that case, the actual statute of limitations was borrowed 
from another jurisdiction.

 

[¶11]   Under the discovery rule as adopted 
in Wyoming, the statute of limitations will typically run from the date of the 
incident. The discovery rule can have the effect, however, of delaying the 
accrual of the cause of action in cases in which the injury or damage is not 
immediately apparent. We have said specifically that, "a tort is not complete 
and actionable until all the elements, duty, breach, proximate cause, and 
damage, are present." Davis v. City of 
Casper, 710 P.2d 827, 829 (Wyo. 1985). This serves to balance the equities 
in latent injury cases when the injured party would be barred from bringing an 
action only because that person was unaware of the injury.

 

[¶12]   The discovery rule was first 
applied in a products liability action in Olson v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 696 P.2d 1294 (Wyo. 1985). In that case the latent injury was caused by an intrauterine 
contraceptive device. We there held that "[a] claim does not accrue until the 
injury is discovered or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should be 
discovered." Olson, 696 P.2d  at 
1297.

 

[¶13]   The Nowotnys do not contend that 
their case involved a latent injury. They recognize that Gary Nowotny's injury 
was known to him almost instantaneously. Instead, the Nowotnys seek to have us 
expand the discovery rule and hold that a cause of action does not accrue for 
personal injury until the injured party knows the identity of the person or firm 
responsible for the injury.

 

[¶14]   Asserting what they perceive as the 
majority rule, the Nowotnys urge the proposed expansion of the discovery rule in 
Wyoming as appropriate and just.1 The courts in the jurisdictions 
upon which the Nowotnys rely have held that the cause of the action does not 
accrue until the injured party knows or with reasonable diligence should have 
known the identity of the manufacturer. The courts in those jurisdictions have 
weighed public policy considerations and have concluded that the right of the 
plaintiff to seek redress outweighs the defendant's exposure to liability and 
any prejudice that might be attributable to delay. Lawhon v. L.B.J. Institutional Supply, 
Inc., 159 Ariz. 179, 765 P.2d 1003 (App. 1988); Orear v. International Paint Co., 59 Wn. App. 249, 796 P.2d 759 (1990), review 
denied, 116 Wn.2d 1024, 812 P.2d 103 (1991); Martin v. Patent Scaffolding, 37 Wn. App. 37, 678 P.2d 362 (1984); Hickman v. 
Grover, 178 W. Va. 249, 358 S.E.2d 810 (1987); and Spitler v. Dean, 148 Wis.2d 630, 436 N.W.2d 308 (1989).

 

[¶15]   Other jurisdictions have refused to 
expand the discovery rule so that it would include the identity of the 
tort-feasor, in this case the manufacturer. The courts in those jurisdictions 
apply the statute of limitations more strictly and hold that a cause of action 
accrues at the time the injury becomes known, not at the time that the injured 
party knows the identity of the tort-feasor. Staiano v. Johns Manville Corporation, 
304 Pa. Super. 280, 450 A.2d 681 (1982) is illustrative of this reasoning. In Staiano the injury was asbestosis, a 
latent injury that is caused by the inhalation of asbestos dust. The court there 
upheld a summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the ground that the 
action was barred by the statute of limitations. In rejecting an argument that 
the cause of action should not accrue until the identity of the defendant is 
known, the court stated:

"[O]nce [a plaintiff] possesses the salient facts 
concerning the occurrence of his injury and who or what caused it, he has the ability to 
investigate and pursue his claim." Here, it is enough that appellant - husband 
knew that his asbestosis was caused by the inhalation of asbestos dust emanating 
from asbestos products on the work site. We find no reason to postpone the 
commencement of the statute until a plaintiff has in addition discovered who 
manufactured the products that he knows have injured him. Indeed, to do so would 
"nullify the justifiable rationale of the statute of limitations and permit the 
prosecution of stale claims."

Staiano, 
450 A.2d  at 685 (citation omitted).

 

[¶16]   In our view the Pennsylvania court 
articulated the proper rule. We reaffirmed our policy posture in Olson, 696 P.2d  at 1297, quoting 
language from Duke v. Housen:

Statutes of limitation have long been a part of the 
jurisprudence of the United States, all its states and the State of Wyoming. 
They are pragmatic devices to save courts from stale claim litigation and spare 
citizens from having to defend when memories have faded, witnesses are 
unavailable by death or disappearance and evidence is lost. Statutes of 
limitation are arbitrary by their very nature and do not discriminate between 
the just and unjust claim. They are not judicially made but represent 
legislative and public policy controlling the right to litigate. The statutes 
operate against even the most meritorious of claims and courts have no right to 
deny their application. When considering the statute of limitations, the nature 
of injury, its extent, the amount of money damages involved, social 
considerations, and the emotional appeal the facts may have must pass to the 
background. The circumstances are only 
significant in the bearing they may have on where the cause of action arose, 
when it arose and when the time expired for pursing the applicable judicial 
remedy.

Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 340 (Wyo. 1979) (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted). This philosophical approach most closely matches that 
articulated in California, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Texas. Jolly v. EliLilly & Co., 44 Cal. 3d 1103, 751 P.2d 923, 245 Cal. Rptr. 658 (Cal. 1988); Guebard v. Jabaay, 65 Ill. App.3d 255, 
381 N.E.2d 1164, 21 Ill. Dec. 620 (1978); Staiano; and Matthews Trucking Co., Inc. v. Smith, 
682 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. 1984). Indeed this view was not totally eschewed by the 
West Virginia court in Hickman v. 
Grover, 178 W. Va. 249, 358 S.E.2d 810 (1987), when the court noted that in 
traumatic injury cases as distinguished from a progressive or creeping disease 
or injury, the statute will almost always begin to run from the time of the 
injury.

 

[¶17]   The circumstances of this case are 
illustrative of the propriety of adhering to our traditional rule with respect 
to the accrual of a claim for purposes of the statute of limitations. The 
Nowotnys were aware of Gary Nowotny's injury and what caused it on January 17, 
1991. They had four years from that point in time to identify the manufacturer 
of the restaurant bench seat. They identified and made service upon L & B by 
May 4, 1995. That date was less than eight months after the Nowotnys initially 
named a corporate defendant in their first amended complaint, which was filed 
September 30, 1994. It is apparent that had the Nowotnys instituted an 
investigation to identify the manufacturer at some earlier point in time, 
service upon L & B could have been made within the period of the statute of 
limitations.

 

[¶18]   This is not a case in which the 
invocation of an expanded discovery rule would be appropriate. To permit the 
Nowotnys to fail to pursue their cause of action by not identifying and serving 
L & B, and then extending the discovery rule to avoid the expiration of the 
statute of limitations, clearly would contravene our policy of the disallowance 
of stale claims as justifying the statute of limitations. The Nowotnys are 
chargeable with notice that they were required to commence their action within 
four years from January 17, 1991, or the claim would be barred. We do not choose 
to expand the discovery rule to encompass a requirement that the identity of the 
tort-feasor must be known. We hold that the trial court correctly ruled that the 
Nowotnys' claim against L & B was barred by the statute of 
limitations.

 

[¶19]   As an alternative argument, the 
Nowotnys rely upon WYO. STAT. § 1-3-116 (1988), which 
provides:

If a cause of action accrues against a person when he 
is out of the state, or has absconded or concealed himself, the period limited 
for the commencement of the action does not begin to run until he comes into the 
state or while he is so absconded or concealed. If after the cause of action 
accrues he departs from the state or absconds or conceals himself, the time of 
his absence or concealment is not computed as a part of the period within which 
the action shall be brought.

Relying upon Stanbury v. Larsen, 803 P.2d 349 (Wyo. 
1990); Greenwood v. Wierdsma, 741 P.2d 1079 (Wyo. 1987); as well as persuasive authority from sister 
jurisdictions, and distinguishing Tarter 
v. Insco, 550 P.2d 905 (Wyo. 1976), the Nowotnys contend that this situation 
is substantially the same as one in which a defendant has left the state or 
concealed himself. They urge that since there was no identifying mark on the 
restaurant bench seat and they had difficulty identifying the manufacturer, the 
situation should be treated as one of concealment until they discovered the 
identify of the manufacturer. In our view, the rationale of Tarter clearly extends to and includes 
this situation. The tolling statute is not applicable because of the fact that 
there were alternative methods of service available to the Nowotnys. These 
alternative methods were not efficacious because the Nowotnys had not discovered 
the identity of the manufacturer, but as we have pointed out previously, that 
was simply due to the failure of the Nowotnys to pursue their investigation. We 
are satisfied that this is not a case in which the legislature intended to toll 
the statute of limitations for a defendant who is out of the state or has 
absconded or concealed himself. The tolling statute has no 
application.

 

[¶20]   The next alternative position 
espoused by the Nowotnys is that the third amended complaint relates back in 
time to the filing of the second amended complaint, and thus their claim against 
L & B was timely brought within the statute of limitations. This is a 
sophisticated argument, but it must fail. Rule 15(c), WYO.R.CIV.P. was amended 
in 1993 by modeling it after the federal rule. The only provision in WYO. 
R.CIV.P. 15(c) which could apply here is found in the portion regarding changing 
a party or, as in this case, adding a party. The rule provides in relevant 
part:

(c) Relation back of amendments. - An amendment of a 
pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading 
when:

* 
* * * * *

(3) 
The amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a claim 
is asserted if the foregoing provision (2) is satisfied and, within 120 days 
after the filing of the complaint, 
the party to be brought in by amendment (A) has received such notice of the 
institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a 
defense on the merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake 
concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought 
against the party.

WYO.R.CIV.P. 15(c) (emphasis 
added).

 

[¶21]   Rule 15(c)(3), FED.R.CIV.P. was 
amended in 1991 to change the result articulated in Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 106 S. Ct. 2379, 91 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1986), with respect to misnaming of a defendant. 
Under this amendment to the federal rule, an intended defendant who is notified 
of an action within the period allowed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m) for service of a 
summons and complaint cannot, under the amended rule, defeat the action because 
of a defect in the pleading with respect to the defendant's name, provided that 
the requirements of clauses (A) and (B) have been met. If the notice requirement 
is satisfied within the 120 day period provided by Rule 4(m), the complaint may 
be amended at any time to correct a formal defect such as a misnomer or 
misidentification.

 

[¶22]   In the amendment to WYO.R.CIV.P. 
15(c), the federal rule is faithfully followed except that instead of a 
reference to the period of time provided in Rule 4(m), which does not exist in 
the Wyoming rules, the period of time is specified as 120 days. The obvious 
intention of the amendment to the federal rule was to permit relation back as 
long as the notification to the defendant occurred within the 120 days permitted 
for service of process. Since Rule 3(b), WYO.R.CIV.P. provides for relation back 
of service to the date of filing, if service is made within 60 days, it would 
appear that a further amendment of our Rule 15(c)(3) to provide for 60 days 
instead of 120 days would be appropriate. In any event, the only situation in 
which WYO. R.CIV.P. 15(c)(3) can extend the statute of limitations, is a case in 
which, even though the statute of limitations has expired, the defendant is 
served within 60 days of the filing of the complaint, resulting in the action 
being deemed commenced as to that defendant as of the date it was filed. 

 

[¶23]   It is clear from the language of 
the rule that the relation back of amendments under WYO.R.CIV.P. 15(c)(3) 
permits the amended pleading to relate back only to the original pleading, and 
not, as the Nowotnys argue, to an amendment of the original pleading. The 
Nowotnys' complaint was filed January 27, 1994. Under the prior version of WYO. 
R.CIV.P. 15(c), any amendment would relate back and toll the statute of 
limitations only if the defendant actually had or should have had notice of the 
claim against it. Northern Utilities Div. 
of KN Energy, Inc. v. Town of Evansville, 822 P.2d 829, 843 (Wyo. 1991). The 
amendment to WYO.R.CIV.P. 15(c) offers a period of 120 days from the time of 
filing the original complaint in which the opposing party must have notice. The 
federal sources upon which we are entitled to rely, because our rule is modeled 
after the federal rule, make it clear that the proposed defendant must have 
received notice of the institution of the action and also must have either known 
or should have known that but for a mistake concerning the identity of the 
proper party, the action would have been brought against that 
defendant.

 

[¶24]   The Nowotnys cannot set aside the 
requirements of WYO.R.CIV.P. 15(c)(3), as amended. L & B did not have notice 
of the action within the 120 day period following the filing of the original 
complaint. The facts in the record demonstrate that the first possible notice L 
& B could have received that might have informed them they were intended to 
be a defendant was on February 28, 1995, when they received the letter demanding 
indemnity from the owners of the Rock Springs Golden Corral. If, for purposes of 
dialogue, we assume that this constituted proper notice, that occurred after the 
statute of limitations had run on January 17, 1995, and it also occurred beyond 
the 120 day period after the filing of the original complaint on January 27, 
1994. The third amended complaint cannot relate back so as to extend the period 
of limitations on behalf of the Nowotnys.

 

[¶25]   Our holding that the statute of 
limitations had, in fact, expired justifies the exercise of discretion by the 
trial court in setting aside the entry of default under WYO. R.CIV.P. 55(c). The 
grant or denial of a motion to set aside the entry of default is an exercise of 
wide judicial discretion on the part of the trial court, and the exercise of 
that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless it was abused. As we said 
in Claassen v. Nord, 756 P.2d 189, 
193 (Wyo. 1988):

 

Rules 55(c) and 60(b), W.R.C.P., are remedial and are 
intended to promote decisions on the merits when possible. A trial court has 
wide judicial discretion to grant or deny a defendant's motion under these 
rules. Ryan v. Lowe, Wyo., 753 P.2d 580, 582 (1988); and Annis v. Beebe & 
Runyan Furniture Company, supra [685 P.2d 678 (Wyo. 1984)]. We will not disturb 
the exercise of that discretion unless appellant demonstrates that the trial 
court abused it and was clearly wrong. Ryan v. Lowe, supra. See also Martin v. 
State, Wyo., 720 P.2d 894, 897 (1986) (defining judicial 
discretion).

 

Because the district court 
has wide discretion, we define abuse of discretion for this purpose 
as:

 

Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, 
among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound 
judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and 
without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.

 

Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986), quoted in Vanasse v. Ramsay, 847 P.2d 993, 996 
(Wyo. 1993).

 

[¶26]   We summarized our review process in First Southwestern Financial Services v. 
Laird, 882 P.2d 1211, 1215 (Wyo. 1994), in which we 
said:

Even had the defaults been correctly entered, the 
district court acted properly in setting aside the entry of default because the 
Lairds showed good cause under W.R.C.P. 55(c). A district court has wide 
discretion to set aside an entry of default. Vanasse, 847 P.2d  at 996. The 
district court's discretion will not be disturbed on appeal "`unless appellant 
demonstrates that the [district] court abused it and was clearly wrong.'" Id. 
(quoting Claassen v. Nord, 756 P.2d 189, 193 (Wyo. 1988)).

 

[¶27]   As we stated in Vanasse, the three factors which are 
applied to determine whether a motion made under W.R.C.P. 60(b) should be 
granted may also be applied to determine whether the "good cause" standard of 
W.R.C.P. 55(c) has been met. Vanasse, 847 P.2d  at 998, 6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., 
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 55.10[2] (1985). Under the three-factor test, we 
consider:

"`1. Whether the plaintiff will be prejudiced; 2. 
Whether the defendant has a meritorious defense; and 3. Whether culpable conduct 
of the defendant led to the default.'"

Carlson [v. Carlson], 836 P.2d [297], 301-02 [(Wyo. 1992)] (quoting Amernational Indus., Inc. v. 
Action-Tungsram, Inc., 925 F.2d 970, 976 (6th Cir. 1991)). 847 P.2d  at 
998.

We have equated prejudice 
with reliance upon the entry of default by the plaintiff to its detriment. First Southwestern Financial Services, 
882 P.2d  at 1215.

 

[¶28]   There is no indication in this 
record that the Nowotnys relied upon the entry of default to their detriment. 
The defense of the statute of limitations obviously is meritorious. We cannot 
discern any culpable conduct on the part of L & B that led to the entry of 
default. There was no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in 
setting aside the entry of default in this case.

 

[¶29]   Similarly, the trial court has 
broad discretion in controlling discovery. Global Shipping & Trading, Ltd. v. 
Verkhnesaldincky Metallurgic Co., 892 P.2d 143, 145 (Wyo. 1995); Spitzer v. Spitzer, 777 P.2d 587, 591 
(Wyo. 1989); Farrell v. Hursh Agency, 
Inc., 713 P.2d 1174 (Wyo. 1986); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276 (Wyo. 1983); Mauch v. Stanley 
Structures, Inc., 641 P.2d 1247 (Wyo. 1982). Under the circumstances of this 
case, it would have been fruitless to hold L & B's motion for summary 
judgment in abeyance pending further discovery. No additional facts could have 
been discovered that would have changed the fact that the statute of limitations 
had run. We conclude that there was no abuse of discretion by the district court 
in making this ruling.

 

[¶30]   The Nowotnys have failed to justify 
a tolling of the statute of limitations under our discovery rule or WYO. STAT. § 
1-3-116. Furthermore, the rules with respect to relation back found in 
WYO.R.CIV.P. 15(c) are not helpful to them in this instance. The trial court 
properly exercised its discretion in setting aside the entry of default and 
refusing to hold the Motion for Summary Judgment in abeyance until further 
discovery was completed. The Order Granting Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default 
and the Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Hold Summary Judgment in Abeyance 
are affirmed. The Order Granting Summary Judgment entered in the district court 
is affirmed.

 

Footnotes

1 The authorities relied upon by the 
Nowotnys include Lawhon v. L.B.J. 
Institutional Supply, Inc., 159 Ariz. 179, 765 P.2d 1003 (App. 1988); Shortess v. Touro Infirmary, 520 So. 2d 389 (La. 1988); Meyers v. 
Larreategui, 31 Ohio App.3d 161, 509 N.E.2d 971 (1986); Duyak v. Tualatin Valley Irr. Dist., 304 
Or. 151, 742 P.2d 1176 (1987); Foster v. 
Harris, 633 S.W.2d 304 (Tenn. 1982); Orear v. International Paint Co., 59 Wn. App. 249, 796 P.2d 759 (1990), review 
denied, 116 Wn.2d 1024, 812 P.2d 103 (1991); Martin v. Patent Scaffolding, 37 Wn. App. 37, 678 P.2d 362 (1984); Hickman v. 
Grover, 178 W. Va. 249, 358 S.E.2d 810 (1987); and Spitler v. Dean, 148 Wis.2d 630, 436 N.W.2d 308 (1989).