Title: Commonwealth v. Camacho

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11138 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JESSE CAMACHO. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     May 8, 2015. - September 8, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Cordy, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Assault and Battery by Means of a 
Dangerous Weapon.  Armed Assault with Intent to Murder.  
Defense of Others.  Evidence, Prior violent conduct, 
Relevancy and materiality, Hearsay, Flight, Disclosure of 
evidence, Exculpatory.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, 
Discovery, Disclosure of evidence, Instructions to jury, 
Assistance of counsel, Argument by prosecutor. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 2, 2008. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Patrick F. Brady, J.; a motion 
for discovery and for a new trial, filed on January 11, 2013, 
was heard by him; and a motion for reconsideration was 
considered by him. 
 
 
 
Elizabeth A. Billowitz for the defendant. 
 
Zachary Hillman, Assistant District Attorney (Patrick M. 
Haggan, Assistant District Attorney, with him) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CORDY, J.  In the early morning hours of January, 24, 2008, 
Jeffrey Santiago was shot and killed at a night club in Chelsea.  
2 
 
Surveillance footage and multiple eyewitnesses identified the 
defendant, Jesse Camacho, as the shooter.  The defendant was 
charged with murder in the first degree, unlawfully carrying a 
firearm, assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, and 
armed assault with intent to murder.  At trial, the Commonwealth 
proceeded with respect to the murder charge on theories of 
deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity and cruelty.  The 
defendant contended that he acted in defense of another.  A jury 
found the defendant guilty on all charges. 
 
On appeal, the defendant claims several errors, including 
error in the trial judge's rulings excluding both so-called 
Adjutant evidence of prior violent acts of the victim and his 
friends, see Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 443 Mass. 649 (2005), and 
statements the defendant made to his girl friend.1  We find no 
reversible error arising from the defendant's claims.  Further, 
we conclude that there is no basis for exercising our authority 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the verdict of murder to a 
lesser degree of guilt or order a new trial.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the defendant's convictions. 
 
Background.  We recite the facts in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving certain details for our 
                     
 
1 The defendant also raises claims related to the judge's 
jury instruction, claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel, 
and errors in the denial of his postconviction motions for 
discovery. 
 
3 
 
analysis of the issues raised on appeal.  On the evening of 
January 23, 2008, the victim went to a nightclub (club) in 
Chelsea with his friends Toulou Thach and Gabriel Rodriguez.  
Once there, they met up with Edward Vozzella and Kevin Reis.  
The defendant went to the same club that night, arriving with 
his friend Mario Sunsin and meeting up with Marcelo Miranda, who 
had arrived with his friends Danny Diaz and another man. 
 
The defendant, Sunsin, and Miranda were members of the Tiny 
Rascals Gang (TRG).  TRG had prior problems with the Bloods, a 
rival gang, of which Rodriguez was a member.  Sunsin and Miranda 
were familiar with Rodriguez, as Rodriguez and Miranda had 
previously been in a fight that resulted in Miranda's 
hospitalization.  More recently, Sunsin and Miranda had thrown 
Rodriguez out of a hotel room, forcing him to walk home in the 
cold in his underwear. 
 
On Miranda's arrival at the club earlier that night, he saw 
Rodriguez and asked him if there was going to be any trouble.  
Rodriguez replied, "No."  Diaz testified that he had had a 
confrontation at the door of the club with a man he later 
identified as the victim.  Eventually, the defendant and his 
group sat down to watch the club's dancers perform, while 
members of the victim's group congregated by the bar.  At this 
point, the victim wandered toward the club's stage and stood 
4 
 
against a wall behind the defendant, conversing with a bouncer 
and watching the dancers. 
 
Subsequently, the victim's group left the bar area and came 
over to stand behind the defendant and his group of friends.  
The victim conversed with his friends for a few moments before 
moving away from them towards the dancers' entrance to the 
stage.  Meanwhile, Rodriguez sat down next to Miranda, and the 
two conversed for a few minutes before Rodriguez went back to 
his group of friends.  Miranda told the defendant's group to 
keep their heads up because "something could happen."  Almost 
immediately after Rodriguez left the seat next to Miranda, 
Rodriguez threw a beer bottle at Sunsin's head.2  Sunsin then 
tackled Rodriguez, the two men fell to the ground, and some of 
the victim's group jumped on top of Sunsin and started to hit 
him. 
 
As Sunsin tackled Rodriguez, the defendant jumped up from 
his seat, took out a firearm, "rack[ed]" it, and started firing 
at the victim's group.  While the victim, Vozzella, and Joseph 
Upton (a bouncer) were attempting to flee from the gunfire, 
shots struck them.3  The victim subsequently fell to the ground.  
                     
 
2 Mario Sunsin testified that the bottle hit him in the 
head, but there was conflicting evidence from at least one 
witness as to whether the bottle actually hit him. 
 
 
3 Sunsin may also have been hit by the defendant's gunfire. 
 
5 
 
As the defendant chased the fleeing group out of the club, he 
approached the victim, who remained lying on the floor, and shot 
him two more times from less than two feet away.4  The defendant 
then left the bar, attempting to shoot others as they ran.  He 
fled Massachusetts days after the shooting and was apprehended 
in Mexico nine months later. 
 
Procedural history.  In April, 2008, a grand jury returned 
indictments charging the defendant with murder in the first 
degree, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 1; unlawfully carrying a 
firearm, in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); two counts of 
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, in violation 
of G. L. c. 265, § 15A; and two counts of armed assault with 
intent to murder, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b).  The 
jury rejected the defendant's claim of defense of another and 
convicted him on all the indictments, including murder in the 
first degree under theories of deliberate premeditation and 
extreme atrocity and cruelty. 
 
The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder 
in the first degree; from four to five years for unlawfully 
carrying a firearm, concurrent with his sentence for murder; 
from ten to twelve years for armed assault with intent to murder 
Upton, consecutive to his sentence for murder; and from ten to 
                     
 
4 The medical examiner testified that these two gunshot 
wounds to the victim's chest were fatal. 
 
6 
 
twelve years for armed assault with intent to murder Vozzella, 
consecutive to his sentence for armed assault with intent to 
murder Upton.5  The defendant's convictions of assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon were placed on file.  The 
defendant filed a notice of appeal. 
 
In January, 2013, the defendant filed a motion for 
postconviction discovery of gang-related evidence and a motion 
for a new trial.  He subsequently filed an amended motion for a 
new trial, presenting an additional issue of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. On June 28, 2013, the trial judge denied 
the defendant's discovery motion and partially denied the 
defendant's amended motion for a new trial, ordering an 
evidentiary hearing solely on the issue of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel.  In January, 2014, the judge denied 
the remainder of the defendant's amended motion for a new trial, 
as well as a motion to reconsider the denial of his discovery 
motion.  The defendant appealed both of these rulings. 
 
The defendant subsequently filed a motion to reconsider the 
denial of his amended motion for a new trial, which was denied.6  
The present case represents the defendant's consolidated appeal 
                     
 
5 The defendant's sentences for assault with intent to 
murder were later changed to run concurrently with each other. 
 
 
6 The defendant also filed a further amendment to his motion 
for a new trial, which was subsequently declared moot. 
 
7 
 
from his convictions as well as the denials of his motions for a 
new trial and for postconviction discovery. 
 
Discussion.  "When this court reviews a defendant's appeal 
from the denial of a motion for a new trial in conjunction with 
his direct appeal from an underlying conviction of murder 
. . . , we review both under G. L. c. 278, § 33E."  Commonwealth 
v. Burgos, 462 Mass. 53, 59, cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 796 
(2012).  In so doing, "[w]e first inquire if the denial of the 
motion was based on an error of law or an abuse of discretion. 
. . . If so, we then must determine whether such error create[d] 
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Leng, 463 Mass. 779, 781 (2012).  "We 
extend special deference to factual determinations made by a 
motion judge who was also the trial judge, as here" (citation 
omitted).  Id. 
 
1.  Adjutant evidence.  At the time of trial, the law of 
this Commonwealth, as delineated in Adjutant, 443 Mass. at 664, 
was, "where the identity of the first aggressor is in dispute 
and the victim has a history of violence, . . . the trial judge 
has the discretion to admit evidence of specific acts of prior 
violent conduct that the victim is reasonably alleged to have 
initiated, to support the defendant's claim of self-defense" 
(emphasis added).  Such evidence "may be admitted as tending to 
prove that the victim and not the defendant was likely to have 
8 
 
been the 'first aggressor'" because it may show "that the victim 
acted in conformance with his character for violence."  
Adjutant, 443 Mass. at 654.  This evidence has "substantial 
probative value," id. at 656, when used exclusively for this 
"limited purpose."  Id. at 660. 
 
Nearly three years after the defendant's convictions, we 
decided Commonwealth v. Chambers, 465 Mass. 520, 527-530 (2013), 
which clarified the breadth of admissible prior violent acts 
under Adjutant.  In Chambers, we held that the definition of 
"first aggressor" included not only the person who initiated the 
confrontation, but also the person who initiated the use or 
threat of deadly force, as "resolution of both issues may assist 
the jury in deciding whether the prosecution has met its burden 
of proving that the defendant did not act in self-defense."  Id. 
at 529-530. 
 
At trial, the defendant's principal defense was that he 
reasonably used force to defend Sunsin against assault.  On 
appeal, he argues that the judge erred, under Adjutant, in 
barring him from introducing evidence of the past violent crimes 
of the victim, Rodriguez, and Reis.  Conceding that there was no 
dispute as to who was the first aggressor, the defendant 
nonetheless submits that such evidence was admissible because 
the victim, Rodriguez, and Reis were among the group that jumped 
on Sunsin.  Accordingly, he contends that evidence of their 
9 
 
violent pasts would better contextualize any conflicting 
evidence of the events and better assist the jury in determining 
whether the Commonwealth met its burden of proving that the 
defendant did not act in defense of another. 
 
The defendant further contends that this evidence is 
admissible under Chambers because, although it was undisputed at 
trial that Rodriguez was the original first aggressor, it was 
disputed whether Rodriguez or the defendant escalated the 
altercation by initiating deadly force.  As the defendant 
objected to the exclusion of the proffered evidence at trial, we 
review for prejudicial error.7  See Commonwealth v. Morales, 464 
Mass. 302, 313 n.19 (2013). 
                     
 
7 The Commonwealth acknowledges that the defendant objected 
to the judge's interpretation of Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 443 
Mass. 649 (2005), but argues, for the first time on appeal, that 
the defendant substantively relies on the decision of this court 
in Commonwealth v. Chambers, 465 Mass. 520, 527-530 (2013).  
Accordingly, the Commonwealth submits that the defendant's claim 
should now be reviewed under the standard of a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Chambers was published 
in June, 2013, approximately six months after the defendant 
filed his original motion for a new trial (but prior to the 
filing of his amended motions).  We agree with the defendant 
that the Commonwealth's position is an excessively narrow 
interpretation of issue preservation.  On appeal, the defendant 
does not object to the exclusion of the proffered evidence on 
grounds wholly distinct from Adjutant, but rather cites to 
Chambers to the extent that Chambers offers a straightforward 
clarification of key language in Adjutant.  The record reflects 
that the primary thrust of the defendant's Adjutant argument has 
remained consistent throughout the evolution of this case.  
Therefore, because the defendant's trial objection "sufficiently 
apprised the judge of the grounds on which it was based," and he 
continues to object to the exclusion of the evidence on these 
10 
 
 
The defendant's claim that the judge erroneously excluded 
the proffered evidence under Adjutant, and as later clarified by 
Chambers, is meritless, as both cases are inapplicable here.  It 
was undisputed at trial that Rodriguez was the first aggressor 
who started the chain of events that resulted in the victim's 
death.  Accordingly, when assessed exclusively through the lens 
of Adjutant, the judge correctly determined that evidence of the 
victim's, Rodriguez's, and Reis's prior violent acts was 
irrelevant to prove who acted as the first aggressor.8  See 
Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 71, 75 (2008) (no 
error in excluding proposed Adjutant evidence where identity of 
first aggressor not in dispute). 
                                                                  
same grounds (supplemented only by a case that further 
interprets these grounds), his argument was sufficiently 
preserved.  Commonwealth v. Cancel, 394 Mass. 567, 574 (1985).  
See Commonwealth v. Mullane, 445 Mass. 702, 717 n.9 (2006) 
(issue preserved where defendant only objected to breadth of 
term's definition at trial and argued for specific definition of 
same term on appeal). 
 
 
8 When the judge made his initial ruling on this issue, he 
was correct to rely on the narrow definition of "first 
aggressor" as delineated in Adjutant, rather than the broader 
definition subsequently announced by Chambers.  In Chambers, we 
even acknowledged that, under prior precedent, a judge 
reasonably could have believed that Adjutant evidence was 
inadmissible where it was undisputed who initiated the first 
confrontation.  Chambers, 465 Mass. at 527-528.  However, as 
detailed infra, Chambers also does not support the proffered 
evidence's admission, and therefore the judge's ruling was 
proper under either understanding of "first aggressor." 
 
11 
 
 
Our conclusion remains unchanged even in the wake of 
Chambers.  Chambers merely expanded Adjutant to hold that 
"[w]here a victim's prior act or acts of violence demonstrate a 
propensity for violence, . . . Adjutant evidence is as relevant 
to the issue of who initiated the use or threat of deadly force 
as it is to the issue of who initiated an earlier nondeadly 
assault, and such evidence may be admitted to assist the jury 
where either issue is in dispute" (emphasis added; other 
emphasis omitted).  Chambers, 465 Mass. at 529-530.  
Essentially, Chambers clarified the reach of the term "first 
aggressor," but did nothing to disturb our ruling that the 
identity of this person must remain in dispute.  Id. 
 
In Morales, 464 Mass. at 307, we explained the rationale 
underlying Adjutant:  "[T]here was a greater danger that the 
exclusion of the evidence concerning the victim's violent acts 
could prejudice the defendant because the evidence might offer 
the only way for a jury to assess the validity or likelihood of 
the defendant's account of what happened" (emphasis added).  
Moreover, in Adjutant, 443 Mass. at 651, we explicitly noted 
that where "[t]here was conflicting testimony as to when the 
defendant and the victim armed themselves for their fatal 
confrontation," Adjutant evidence "may be the jury's only means 
of assessing the likelihood of the defendant's account of the 
incident."  Id. at 650 n.1. 
12 
 
 
In contrast to cases in which Adjutant evidence was 
admitted to assist the jury in assessing conflicting evidence 
regarding the identity of the first aggressor, see, e.g., 
Chambers, 465 Mass. at 525-526 (circumstances of deadly 
altercation in dispute); Commonwealth v. Pring-Wilson, 448 Mass. 
718, 723-724 (2007) (defendant's version of fight "differed 
markedly" from that of witnesses), here the significant events 
that occurred prior to the defendant shooting the victim are not 
in dispute such that the proposed evidence fits into "the narrow 
framework . . . that Adjutant posits."  Morales, 464 Mass. at 
310 n.13.  Surveillance footage and independent witness 
testimony alike establish that Rodriguez began the fight by 
throwing a bottle at Sunsin,9 Sunsin tackled Rodriguez, Sunsin 
and Rodriguez fell to the ground, a melee ensued where 
individuals from the victim's group jumped on Sunsin and started 
to hit him, and the defendant began firing a gun into the crowd. 
 
Given this largely undisputed evidence, the primary 
question for the jury was not who began the altercation or 
escalated it to deadly force, but rather whether the defendant 
was legally entitled to use the force that he did in defense of 
another.  We recognize that there may be a question as to which 
                     
 
9 The defendant also suggests that Kevin Reis threw a chair 
in concert with Gabriel Rodriguez's attack on Sunsin, but the 
evidence in the record suggests that Reis did this in an effort 
to escape after the defendant began shooting. 
 
13 
 
act, the bottle throwing or the gun firing, escalated the fight 
into a deadly confrontation,10 but that is a wholly distinct 
question from which individual initiated each such act.  Neither 
the identity of the person who threw the bottle nor the identity 
of the person who fired shots is in dispute, and the limited 
sweep of Adjutant and Chambers does not authorize the 
introduction of evidence to shed light on any other question.  
See Gaynor, 73 Mass. App. Ct. at 75 (evidence of victim's prior 
violent acts "immaterial" where contested issues had nothing to 
do with identity of first aggressor).  Accordingly, we cannot 
say that the judge erred in excluding the proffered Adjutant 
evidence. 
 
The specific facts of this case render Adjutant and 
Chambers inapplicable for another important reason:  such 
evidence is admissible only where the victim is involved in the 
altercation that leads to his death.  See Adjutant, 443 Mass. at 
650; Chambers, 465 Mass. at 529.  Here, there is simply no 
credible evidence that the victim was involved in any of the 
events that unfolded between the time when Rodriguez threw the 
bottle and the defendant fired his weapon.  No witness testified 
that the victim was involved in the melee or that the victim 
                     
 
10 In addition to the bottle and the gun, a box cutter was 
found in the area where the fight occurred and there was 
testimony that Sunsin suffered an injury that may have come from 
a knife, but there is no evidence that this weapon was seen or 
used during the melee. 
14 
 
physically assaulted or threatened to assault Sunsin or any 
member of the defendant's group.  Although the defendant 
suggests that Diaz's testimony places the victim as one of the 
men involved in the fray, a careful reading of his testimony 
does not support this.  Diaz never said that the victim was 
among the men who jumped on Sunsin.  Rather, the most Diaz's 
testimony offers is that the victim was friends with the people 
fighting and that the victim ran from the area in which the 
fight was taking place when the defendant began firing a weapon. 
 
Additionally, the surveillance footage reveals that the 
victim was not with either group during the skirmish.  Rather, 
the victim moved toward the back of the stage and out of the 
screen almost two and one-half minutes before Rodriguez threw 
the bottle at Sunsin; he remained there until after the 
defendant began shooting, and he reentered the screen while 
attempting to flee gunfire.  As there was no evidence that the 
victim played any role in the brawl or posed any threat to the 
defendant or the defendant's group, evidence of his prior 
violent conduct is not probative of why the defendant shot him.  
See Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 461 Mass. 100, 111 (2011) (judge 
correctly excluded evidence of victim's prior violence where no 
evidence to support defendant's claim of self-defense). 
 
The defendant also argues that the judge erred in denying 
Adjutant evidence regarding Rodriguez and Reis, as they acted in 
15 
 
concert with the victim's group in the melee.  The defendant 
cites to Pring-Wilson, 448 Mass. at 737, for the proposition 
that where there are multiple aggressors, Adjutant permits the 
admission of a third party's violent acts.  The defendant's 
argument misses the mark.  Pring-Wilson, 448 Mass. at 737, makes 
clear that Adjutant evidence is only admissible against a third 
party on the determination that "in the light most favorable to 
the defendant, the third party was acting in concert with or to 
assist the victim" (emphasis added).  Accordingly, although it 
is true that "nothing in Adjutant precludes a judge from 
admitting evidence of prior acts of violent conduct of a 
victim's cohort," Pring-Wilson still involved a victim who was 
very much involved in the altercation that led to his death.11  
Id.  Where a defendant claims self-defense against a victim, who 
with the assistance of a third party cohort may have started the 
fight that led to the victim's death, evidence of past violence 
on the part of the victim's associate understandably may be 
probative of assessing whether the defendant had grounds to use 
deadly force against the victim.  See id. at 737.  Here, 
however, there was no evidence that the victim was a source of 
                     
 
11 Moreover, in Commonwealth v. Pring-Wilson, 448 Mass. 718, 
721-725 (2007), there was no video footage available and the 
jury had heard only conflicting testimony as to whether the 
victim or his friend had initiated the fight (or whether they 
had done so jointly). 
 
16 
 
provocation or played any role in the events leading to his 
death, and therefore Rodriguez and Reis cannot be considered his 
"cohorts" such that evidence of their past violent conduct would 
assist the jury in evaluating why the defendant shot the victim.  
Accordingly, we conclude that there was no error in the 
exclusion of the proffered Adjutant evidence.12 
 
2.  Girl friend's testimony.  At trial, defense counsel 
asked the defendant's girl friend, Evelyn Chaboudt, whether the 
defendant had explained to her why he fled Massachusetts after 
the shooting.  At sidebar, the defense counsel proffered that, 
based on a previous statement, Chaboudt would testify that the 
defendant was a member of TRG; "the other kids involved were the 
Latin Kings" and "[t]hat is why [the defendant] had an issue 
with them"; and that is why the defendant fled.  Defense counsel 
made no proffer for the basis of Chaboudt's knowledge of these 
facts and subsequently acknowledged that evidence regarding the 
reasons for the defendant's flight could only come from the 
                     
 
12 Additionally, "[o]ur decision in the Adjutant case is 
specifically limited to situations where the defendant claims 
self-defense."  Commonwealth v. Benoit, 452 Mass. 212, 228 
(2008).  See Chambers, 465 Mass. at 527-528.  Here, the 
defendant has not argued self-defense, and we decline to extend 
the Adjutant doctrine to cases involving defense of another in 
this case. 
 
17 
 
defendant.13  Accordingly, the judge held that these statements 
were inadmissible hearsay.  On appeal, the defendant argues that 
the judge improperly excluded Chaboudt's proposed testimony, as 
it was admissible to show his state of mind when fleeing. 
 
Evidence of flight is generally admissible as some evidence 
of consciousness of guilt, see Commonwealth v. Stuckich, 450 
Mass. 449, 453 (2008), and "consciousness of guilt, together 
with other evidence, may establish guilt."  Commonwealth v. 
Epsom, 399 Mass. 254, 259 (1987).  When the Commonwealth 
introduces consciousness of guilt evidence, a defendant is 
entitled to rebut it.  See Commonwealth v. Hicks, 375 Mass. 274, 
277-278 (1978).  In order to rebut the Commonwealth's contention 
that the defendant fled due to consciousness of guilt, evidence 
that the defendant believed the victim's group was affiliated 
with a rival gang may have been admissible to show that he did 
so out of a fear of retribution. 
 
Here, defense counsel did not explicitly argue state of 
mind at trial, but rather consistently stressed that the thrust 
of this line of questioning was to show "the fact that 
[Chaboudt] suffered some repercussions from [the defendant's] 
being on the run" and "whether or not [Chaboudt] had trouble 
                     
 
13 However, defense counsel also stated at sidebar, "I don't 
know whether all of [Chaboudt's] information came from [the 
defendant] or not." 
 
18 
 
because of [the defendant]."  Read in its proper context, 
defense counsel appears to have offered this evidence precisely 
for the truth of what it asserts, namely, that the defendant and 
the victim's group truly were affiliates of rival gangs.  
Accordingly, on this record, we agree that the defendant's 
statements to Chaboudt were inadmissible hearsay and, as 
evidentiary rulings "are matters entrusted to the trial judge's 
broad discretion and are not disturbed absent palpable error," 
Commonwealth v. Simpson, 434 Mass. 570, 578-579 (2001), we see 
no reason to disturb the judge's ruling.  See Commonwealth v. 
Fitzpatrick, 463 Mass. 581, 602-603 (2012).  To the extent that 
the defendant now argues that these statements reflected his 
state of mind, we find no substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice in their exclusion.  See Commonwealth v. 
Fowler, 431 Mass. 30, 41 n.19 (2000) (issue not properly 
preserved where defendant objected on different grounds from 
those pursued on appeal). 
 
Defense counsel also tried to elicit from Chaboudt that "a 
few Latin Kings gave [her] trouble after the incident," but the 
judge ruled that this statement was irrelevant.  The judge was 
well within his discretion to exclude this testimony, as it was 
not probative of any material issue in this case.  It does not 
shed light on the defendant's state of mind at the time of the 
shooting, see Fitzpatrick, 463 Mass. at 603, and absent 
19 
 
admissible evidence that the defendant knew he had wronged 
members of the Latin Kings prior to his flight, it does not 
explain why he fled. 
 
Even if it was an abuse of discretion to exclude any of the 
aforementioned statements, there is no indication that exclusion 
prejudiced the defendant.  "[D]eclarations out of court may be 
admissible to prove the state of mind or intent of a person when 
it is a material issue" (emphasis added).  Commonwealth v. Bins, 
465 Mass. 348, 365 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Magraw, 426 
Mass. 589, 594 (1998).  Defense counsel sought all of the 
proffered testimony in response to an inquiry as to whether the 
defendant relayed his explanation for fleeing.  Although the 
Commonwealth mentioned the defendant's flight at trial, 
consciousness of guilt was not a material issue in this case, as 
it was undisputed that the defendant shot the victim.  As such, 
the exclusion of this evidence was not prejudicial.  See 
Commonwealth v. Garrey, 436 Mass. 422, 440-441 (2002) 
(improperly admitted evidence not prejudicial where only 
impacted undisputed point). 
 
3.  Posttrial discovery motion.  The defendant also 
contends that the judge erred in denying his postconviction 
motion for discovery of gang-related evidence.  Denial of a 
defendant's motion for posttrial discovery under Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 30 (c), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), is reviewed 
20 
 
for abuse of discretion.  See generally Commonwealth v. 
Martinez, 437 Mass. 84, 97-98 (2002). 
 
The Commonwealth has a duty to disclose favorable evidence 
that it has in its possession, which could materially aid the 
defendant.  See Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. 401, 404-405 
(1992); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  The 
Commonwealth's failure to disclose such exculpatory evidence may 
warrant a new trial, Commonwealth v. Murray, 461 Mass. 10, 19 
(2011), and where specifically requested favorable evidence is 
not disclosed the defendant "need only demonstrate that a 
substantial basis exists for claiming prejudice."  Commonwealth 
v. Daniels, 445 Mass. 392, 404-405 (2005), quoting Tucceri, 412 
Mass. at 412. 
 
In order to prevail on a posttrial discovery motion, a 
defendant must demonstrate that it is reasonably likely that 
such discovery will lead to evidence possibly warranting a new 
trial.  See Daniels, 445 Mass. at 407.  Additionally, the 
defendant must make a prima facie showing that the evidence 
sought would have materially benefited the defense and would 
have factored into the jury's deliberations.  Id., quoting 
Tucceri, 412 Mass. at 405, 414. 
 
The defendant claims that evidence that the victim and his 
associates were gang members (requested both before and after 
trial) would have bolstered his defense of another claim and 
21 
 
factored into the jury's deliberations.  In support, he relies 
on Murray, 461 Mass. at 10-11, in which the grant of a motion 
for a new trial and postconviction discovery based on gang-
related evidence was affirmed.  There, we noted that gang-
related evidence may be used to "support [a defendant's] 
contention that he was fearful for his life" and to impeach a 
witness for bias.  Id. at 19-20. 
 
However, the facts of Murray are markedly different from 
the facts of this case.  There, more than two years after trial, 
twenty members of the Kendall Street Thugs (KST) were indicted 
on State and Federal drug charges, and a police lieutenant 
submitted an affidavit in Federal court characterizing the group 
as a violent drug trafficking gang.  Id. at 17.  The affidavit 
specifically mentioned that the victim was a member of the gang, 
id., despite the fact that several members of KST had testified 
at trial that KST was not a gang, but rather just a group of 
friends who had grown up together.  Id. at 15-18. 
 
The defendant claims that the Commonwealth withheld similar 
gang-related evidence during his trial.  Although the 
Commonwealth provided the defendant with all of the evidence 
that was requested by the defendant's pretrial discovery 
motion,14 the defendant nevertheless contends that a statement 
                     
 
14 The defendant's pretrial motion for discovery requested 
reports from the Chelsea, Revere, and State police departments 
22 
 
made by the prosecutor at the new trial hearing15 and a summary 
of the shooting provided to the Department of Correction16 
demonstrated that other gang-related evidence existed and that 
the prosecution knew of, and failed to disclose, this evidence. 
 
The defendant has failed to make the necessary showing that 
he was entitled to postconviction discovery, as he has not 
demonstrated sufficiently that other gang-related evidence 
actually existed.  First, at trial, Sunsin explicitly testified 
that other than Rodriguez, no rival gang members were present on 
                                                                  
pertaining to any gang-related activities of Rodriguez, Reis, 
and the victim.  In response, the Commonwealth provided the 
defendant with several Chelsea police department reports 
concerning these individuals.  Defense counsel acknowledged that 
the Commonwealth had provided all of the information that was 
requested, to the extent that it was able to do so.  Moreover, 
at defense counsel's request, the Commonwealth prepared an 
indexed list of every document that it had in its possession to 
ensure that defense counsel received each item. 
 
 
15 When asked to summarize the factual background of the 
case at the hearing on the defendant's motion for a new trial, 
the prosecutor stated: 
 
"Although it didn't come out at the trial itself, there was 
some underlying gang motivation where allegedly the 
defendant . . . and his friends were members of a gang 
known as TRG, which is an acronym for Tiny Rascals Gang.  I 
believe Mr. Gabriel Rodriguez and his friends were more 
affiliated with the Bloods.  So there was some bad blood, 
so to speak, between the two groups.  There were some prior 
instances of violence between Mr. Rodriguez and Mr. 
Suns[i]n." 
 
 
16 The report stated, "A verbal altercation began between 
friends of [the defendant] and a group of men affiliated with a 
rival gang.  This rival group included the deceased victim 
. . . ." 
23 
 
the night of the shooting.  Moreover, the prosecutor's statement 
at the new trial hearing was made during a lengthy recitation of 
the case's factual background and corroborates what was revealed 
at trial:  the defendant and his friends were gang affiliated 
and Rodriguez was affiliated with a rival gang.  His statement 
that Rodriguez's friends were "more affiliated with the Bloods" 
is not evidence that the victim was in fact in a rival gang, but 
only suggests that the victim was "more affiliated" with 
Rodriguez than he was with the defendant's gang.  Although the 
prosecutor definitively stated that the defendant and his 
friends were "members" of a gang, he made no such statement 
about the victim.  Finally, the Department of Correction report 
cannot be attributed to the prosecutor.17 
 
The defendant's argument that the Commonwealth was required 
to turn over gang-related evidence hypothetically possessed by 
other law enforcement agencies is equally unavailing.  Although 
the Commonwealth has a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence, 
that duty "only applies to information in the possession of the 
prosecutor and information in the possession of persons 
sufficiently subject to the prosecutor's control" (quotation and 
citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Beal, 429 Mass. 530, 531 
(1999).  If such gang-related evidence existed, which the 
                     
 
17 This report also is inconsistent with several of the 
Commonwealth's filed pleadings. 
24 
 
defendant has failed to demonstrate, the Commonwealth was not 
obligated to search other law enforcement agencies for it.18  See 
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 451 Mass. 451, 454-455 (2008) 
(information possessed by State Police colonel and registry of 
motor vehicles not within prosecutor's control; therefore, 
prosecutor not required to turn over).  See also Commonwealth v. 
Daye, 411 Mass. 719, 733-734 (1992) (prosecution not required to 
produce potentially exculpatory police reports because reports 
not within prosecution's control). 
 
Based on the record before us, the defendant has not 
demonstrated sufficiently that postconviction discovery would 
have led to additional evidence warranting a new trial.  Without 
a showing that other gang-related evidence actually existed, and 
that the Commonwealth withheld such evidence, we cannot say that 
it was an abuse of discretion for the judge to deny the 
defendant's motion.  See Daniels, 445 Mass. at 407. 
 
Moreover, even if such evidence did exist, the defendant 
has failed to show that it would have materially aided his 
defense or factored into the jury's deliberations.  The 
defendant has not demonstrated that he had actual knowledge, on 
                     
 
 
18 In response to the defendant's pretrial discovery request 
for gang-related evidence, the Commonwealth informed the 
defendant that he would have to file a motion under Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 17, 378 Mass. 885 (1979), to receive information from 
other law enforcement agencies.  The defendant agreed with this 
assessment. 
25 
 
the night of January 23, 2008, that anyone in the victim's group 
(besides Rodriguez) was affiliated with a gang.  Without such a 
showing, the defendant would be unable to introduce gang-related 
evidence to bolster his contention that he reasonably feared for 
Sunsin's life.  See Murray, 461 Mass. at 19-20 (defendant must 
possess prior knowledge of victim's violent tendencies when 
attempting to admit such evidence to prove defendant's state of 
mind). 
 
Similarly, despite what the defendant claims, it is 
unlikely that any evidence of gang affiliation would have 
provided substantial impeachment value (e.g., to demonstrate 
witness bias).  See Murray, 461 Mass. at 20.  On the record 
before us, there is no evidence that gang affiliation even 
existed, much less served as motivation for witnesses associated 
with the victim to testify falsely.  See id.  This is not a case 
in which members of the victim's group repeatedly denied being 
affiliated with a gang.  Contrast id. at 20 & n.9 (evidence of 
group's gang affiliation could be used to impeach witnesses who 
testified that group not gang and that victim not member).  
Rather, none of the testifying witnesses associated with the 
victim was even asked, much less denied, whether they or the 
victim were affiliated with a gang.  Thus, the gang-related 
evidence would have carried little, if any, impeachment value 
26 
 
and it is unlikely that it would have factored into the jury's 
deliberations. 
 
4.  Provocation.  At trial, the judge instructed the jury 
on manslaughter based on excessive force in defense of another, 
but determined that the defendant was not entitled to a 
manslaughter instruction on theories of reasonable provocation 
and sudden combat.19  The defendant objected to the judge's 
ruling and we therefore review for prejudicial error.  See 
Commonwealth v. Kelly, 470 Mass. 682, 687-688 (2015). 
 
"Voluntary manslaughter is an unlawful killing 'arising not 
from malice, but from . . . sudden [heat of] passion induced by 
reasonable provocation, sudden combat, or [the use of] excessive 
force in self-defense" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 465 Mass. 672, 686 (2013).  Reasonable 
provocation is "provocation that would have been likely to 
produce in an ordinary person such a state of passion, anger, 
fear, fright, or nervous excitement as would eclipse his 
capacity for reflection or restraint" (quotation and citation 
                     
 
19 The Commonwealth's brief incorrectly states that the 
defendant does not claim that the judge erred in refusing to 
instruct the jury on sudden combat.  The defendant raised this 
theory in his opening brief, noting that he was incorporating it 
within his discussion of provocation.  In any event, we address 
these two theories under the singular caption of "provocation," 
as much of our case law treats them indistinguishably and 
"[s]udden combat is among those circumstances constituting 
reasonable provocation."  Commonwealth v. Walczak, 463 Mass. 
808, 820 (2012) (Lenk, J., concurring).  See Commonwealth v. 
Morales, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 526, 530-532 (2007). 
27 
 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 446 Mass. 435, 443 (2006).  
"A jury instruction on reasonable provocation is warranted if 
there is evidence of provocation deemed adequate in law to cause 
the accused to lose his self-control in the heat of passion, and 
if the killing followed the provocation before sufficient time 
had elapsed for the accused's temper to cool" (quotations and 
citations omitted).  Id.  Additionally, "[a] jury must be able 
to infer that a reasonable person would have become sufficiently 
provoked, and that the defendant was in fact provoked."  
Commonwealth v. Pierce, 419 Mass. 28, 31 (1994).  "Insults and 
quarreling alone cannot provide a reasonable provocation" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Callahan, 401 
Mass. 627, 632 (1988).  Although "[a]ll reasonable inferences 
are drawn in favor of the defendant in deciding whether a 
manslaughter instruction was supported by the evidence,"  
Commonwealth v. Nichypor, 419 Mass. 209, 216 (1994), it is error 
to give a manslaughter instruction without some supporting 
evidence of that crime.  Commonwealth v. Walden, 380 Mass. 724, 
727 (1980). 
 
Critically, "[i]t is well established that 'provocation 
must come from the victim'" (emphasis added).  Acevedo, 446 
Mass. at 444, quoting Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 442 Mass. 826, 838-
839 (2004).  See generally Commonwealth v. Nelson, 468 Mass. 1, 
14 (2014); Commonwealth v. LeClair, 445 Mass. 734, 740 (2006) 
28 
 
(reaffirming "well-established rule that evidence of provocation 
by a third party, rather than the victim of a homicide, is 
insufficient to warrant a voluntary manslaughter instruction").  
We see no reason to depart from this rule.  The evidence is 
insufficient to conclude that the victim was one of the 
aggressors in the fray or did anything to reasonably provoke the 
actions that led to his death.  See Commonwealth v. Benson, 453 
Mass. 90, 95 (2009) (no provocation instruction where 
insufficient evidence for jury reasonably to infer that "an 
action of the victim trigger[ed] a sudden loss of self-control 
in the defendant").  Neither the surveillance footage nor 
witness testimony demonstrates that the victim assaulted Sunsin.  
Although the defendant continues to rely heavily on Diaz's 
testimony, where Diaz never identified the victim as being 
involved in the actual physical altercation, such an inference 
would be nothing more than speculation.  See Commonwealth v. 
Masello, 428 Mass. 446, 450 (1998) (no instruction warranted 
where only "scant evidence that the victim had attacked the 
defendant or struck any blows"); Gonzalez, 465 Mass. at 686 (no 
provocation instruction where defendant physically struggled 
with family and friends of victim, but contention that victim 
took part in altercation was "mere speculation"). 
 
The defendant alternatively contends in a footnote that 
even if the victim was not involved in the fray, the jury could 
29 
 
have found him guilty of manslaughter if he accidentally shot 
the victim while attempting to shoot Rodriguez or another melee 
participant.  He grounds this argument in a footnote in LeClair, 
445 Mass. at 743 n.3, citing W.R. LaFave & A.W. Scott, Jr., 
Criminal Law § 76, at 582 (1972), in which we stated that 
"[c]ommentators also observe that, in circumstances where one 
(A) who is reasonably and actually provoked by another person 
(B) into a passion to kill B, shoots at B but accidentally hits 
and kills an innocent bystander, A's crime is voluntary 
manslaughter."  Although we agree with this general proposition, 
it has no applicability to the present case.  Here, the 
defendant inflicted two fatal shots on the victim not 
accidentally during the melee, but intentionally after it ended, 
while the victim lay on the floor, wounded and unarmed.  The 
judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to give the 
requested instructions. 
 
5.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  The defendant also 
contends that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by 
misapprehending the strength of the Commonwealth's case.  
Specifically, he argues that defense counsel mistakenly advised 
him against accepting a plea to murder in the second degree as a 
direct result of defense counsel's insufficient review of 
certain items provided in discovery. 
30 
 
 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim a 
defendant must demonstrate "serious incompetency of counsel 
(behavior falling measurably below that which might be expected 
from an ordinary fallible lawyer) and prejudice that, in this 
context, means a 'reasonable probability' that 'but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.'"  Commonwealth v. Mahar, 442 Mass. 
11, 15 (2004), quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
694 (1984).  To demonstrate that ineffective assistance of 
counsel caused prejudice in the context of a plea deal, a 
defendant "must show the outcome of the plea process would have 
been different with competent advice."  Lafler v. Cooper, 132 
S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012).  Moreover, G. L. c. 278, § 33E, 
provides a "standard . . . that is more favorable to a defendant 
than is the constitutional standard for determining 
ineffectiveness of counsel" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Britto, 433 Mass. 596, 601-602 (2001). 
 
The defendant first claims that defense counsel 
underestimated the Commonwealth's case by failing to review the 
club's surveillance footage before closing argument.  At the 
hearing on the motion for a new trial, defense counsel answered 
affirmatively when asked if he "essentially" saw the 
surveillance footage for the "first time" during closing 
argument.  However, defense counsel also explained, "I had not 
31 
 
seen some of the things that [the prosecutor] pointed out while 
doing his closing argument.  He used the video and I [had] seen 
the video twice, but I did not see what he was pointing out 
prior to his doing so."20 
 
Additionally, at trial, when the still images of the 
surveillance footage were entered as exhibits, defense counsel 
explicitly stated several times that he had seen all of them.  
Specifically, he said, "Yes, I did look at [the still 
photographs] this morning and I've seen them before . . . .  
Like I say, I've seen them all before."  Further, he stated, 
"I've seen all of these photos and I've seen the videos . . . ."  
Therefore, it appears that defense counsel did not mean to 
suggest that he literally had not viewed the footage prior to 
closing argument but, rather, that only then did he see how the 
Commonwealth intended to use it in support of its position. 
 
The defendant next claims that defense counsel failed to 
review Diaz's video statement taken on the night of the shooting 
meaningfully.  At trial, defense counsel stated that he did not 
view this statement until the night before Diaz's cross-
examination.21  Although defense counsel certainly should have 
                     
 
20 Even the judge noted that there was something "powerfully 
persuasive about the manner in which [the prosecutor] 
interspersed his oral argument with scenes from the video." 
 
 
21 The record suggests that defense counsel most likely 
received the video on a disk from the Commonwealth, but either 
32 
 
reviewed Diaz's statement in a more timely fashion, any delay 
was mitigated by the fact that he did view it and was therefore 
able to adequately prepare and conduct an effective cross-
examination.  See Commonwealth v. Wadlington, 467 Mass. 192, 201 
(2014) (failure to review witness's video statement until eve of 
trial not ineffective assistance as counsel effectively used 
prior inconsistency contained in video statement during cross-
examination).  Indeed, before Diaz's cross-examination began 
defense counsel stated, "As a matter of fact [Diaz] sa[id] 
already what I thought and what I had hoped that he would say. 
. . ."  Moreover, Diaz's video statement was largely consistent 
with his grand jury testimony, which defense counsel had 
reviewed.22  Therefore, it is unlikely that viewing the video any 
earlier would have altered defense counsel's strategy. 
 
Ultimately, the defendant contends that had defense counsel 
properly reviewed all of the evidence, he would have realized a 
murder in the first degree conviction was likely and therefore 
would have advised the defendant to accept the plea deal.  In 
                                                                  
misplaced it or was unable to view it.  Nevertheless, the judge 
acknowledged this issue and ensured that defense counsel would 
have an opportunity to view the video and adequately prepare for 
cross-examination. 
 
 
22 The defendant does not assert that Diaz's grand jury 
testimony differed significantly from his video statement, but 
stresses that the video had the "impact" of showing Diaz on the 
night of the murder. 
 
33 
 
ruling on the defendant's motion for a new trial, the judge 
concluded that defense counsel's "advice to reject the 
Commonwealth's offer of a second-degree murder plea bargain was 
not unreasonable," and we agree with this assessment.23  Diaz's 
testimony was essential to convict the defendant of murder in 
the first degree, as he was the only person who testified to 
seeing the defendant shoot the victim twice while the victim lay 
on the floor.  At the time defense counsel advised the defendant 
not to accept the Commonwealth's plea deal, it was uncertain 
whether Diaz (who had fled to another country) would testify, 
and, if so, whether he would cooperate24 and whether he would be 
credible.  Indeed, the day before the trial began the 
Commonwealth moved for a continuance because the extradition 
process, which was not then complete, could have taken up to two 
                     
 
23 As the judge who heard the motion for a new trial was 
also the trial judge, his findings "are entitled to substantial 
deference," as he observed counsel's effectiveness first-hand.  
See Commonwealth v. Britto, 433 Mass. 596, 608 (2001).  See 
Commonwealth v. DeVincent, 421 Mass. 64, 69 (1995). 
 
 
24 Diaz fled to Spain because of an unrelated drug 
trafficking charge, and it took what the Commonwealth described 
as a "Herculean effort" (including the involvement of the State 
Police, the United States Justice Department, and the United 
States Marshals) to get him back to Massachusetts to testify.  
Once Diaz was back, it was still uncertain whether he would 
cooperate.  The Commonwealth stated at the new trial hearing: 
 
"[Diaz] arrived and even on his arrival, I wasn't sure what 
we were going to get. . . .  I didn't expect him to be a 
cooperative witness.  So there was always the very strong 
possibility that we were not going to get Danny Diaz in." 
 
34 
 
additional months.  Accordingly, on the record before us, 
defense counsel's inability to recognize fully the strength of 
the Commonwealth's case until after Diaz testified was 
understandable25 and his advice to reject the murder in the 
second degree plea, when it was available,26 was not ineffective.  
See Mahar, 442 Mass. at 17, quoting In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th 
924, 937 (1992) ("defense attorney's simple misjudgment as to 
the strength of the prosecution's case . . . will not, without 
more, give rise to a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel"). 
 
6.  Closing argument.  Last, the defendant argues that the 
Commonwealth's closing argument improperly appealed to the 
sympathies of the jury.  Specifically, he contends that the 
                     
 
25 The defendant also argues that defense counsel should 
have advised him to accept the plea deal once it was clear (on 
the seventh day of the trial) that Diaz was going to testify.  
However, as previously mentioned, at that point it was still far 
from obvious that Diaz would be a cooperative witness.  In fact, 
when ruling on the defendant's motion for a new trial, the judge 
stated, "Diaz was . . . a problematic witness for the 
government.  It was highly uncertain that he would ever appear; 
and that, if he did, he would be willing to testify." 
 
 
Moreover, at the time Diaz was to testify, he faced a 
fifteen year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment on charges 
of drug trafficking.  Defense counsel aggressively cross-
examined Diaz on the agreement he had with the district 
attorney's office with respect to reducing those charges and any 
prospective sentence. 
 
 
26 After Diaz testified, the Commonwealth no longer offered 
the defendant an option to plead guilty to murder in the second 
degree. 
 
35 
 
Commonwealth used hyperbolic language to urge the jury to 
convict, excessively referred to the shooting as an "execution," 
improperly invited the jury into the victim's position in an 
attempt to arouse sympathy, and included unnecessary references 
to the scene's gore.27  As the defendant did not object to these 
statements at trial, we review for a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Scott, 470 Mass. 
320, 333-334 (2014).  Additionally, "[w]e review the 
prosecutor's remarks in the context of his entire closing 
argument, the judge's instructions to the jury, and the evidence 
produced at trial."  Commonwealth v. Lyons, 426 Mass. 466, 471 
(1998). 
 
The Commonwealth tried this case on a theory of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty.  Therefore, in contrast to what the 
defendant submits, the degree of the defendant's guilt was not 
the only issue at trial, and the Commonwealth was entitled to 
focus the jury "both on the defendant's actions, in terms of the 
manner and means of inflicting death, and on the resulting 
effect on the victim" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
                     
 
27 For example, the Commonwealth stated in closing:  "That 
bump on the ground is the body of twenty-eight-year-old Jeffrey 
Santiago lying face down on beer-stained, dirty barroom floor, 
seconds or minutes left to live.  Dying in pain and dying in 
agony.  And there is his cowardly killer, just steps away, happy 
in the deed he had just performed, dispensing of [the victim's] 
life with the ease and convenience of dispensing of a piece of 
garbage on the floor." 
 
36 
 
Barros, 425 Mass. 572, 581 (1997).  The Commonwealth was 
permitted to call the jury's attention to the "defendant's 
awareness of, but indifference to, or pleasure in, the victim's 
suffering," id., as "[w]here a charge of murder in the first 
degree is based on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty 
. . . the jurors serve as the conscience of the community in 
determining whether the killing merits that description."  
Commonwealth v. Torres, 437 Mass. 460, 465 (2002).  In such 
circumstances, the Commonwealth may "illustrate the magnitude of 
the crime" by discussing the details of the victim's death, as 
well as the elements of gore and pain that are not inherent in 
every death.  See Commonwealth v. Siny Van Tran, 460 Mass. 535, 
554 (2011).  See also Commonwealth v. Wilson, 427 Mass. 336, 351 
(1998) (prosecutor's references to gruesomeness of crimes not 
improper because relevant to issue whether defendant's actions 
constituted extreme atrocity or cruelty).  Moreover, 
"enthusiastic rhetoric, strong advocacy, and excusable hyperbole 
are not grounds for reversal" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Wilson, 427 Mass. at 350. 
 
Still, although it was permissible for the Commonwealth to 
call the jury's attention to the circumstances of the victim's 
death, namely that he lay bleeding on a dirty barroom floor 
while the man who fatally shot him ran away, laughing, we agree 
that some of the Commonwealth's closing remarks overstepped the 
37 
 
bounds of appropriate rhetoric.  For example, the Commonwealth 
offered the following description of the crime scene: 
"[T]here was another scent at that crime scene.  The smell 
of blood.  The smell of three people's blood, all at his 
hand.  A blood pool, a puddle of blood . . . seeping out of 
[the victim's] body as his life seeped out of his body 
. . . [the victim's] life literally drained from his body." 
 
Additionally, the Commonwealth implored the jury: 
"Think about landing face down on that dirty, beer-stained 
barroom floor.  You are completely helpless . . . you're 
laying there bleeding, in pain, in terror. . . .  Think 
about the last moments of [the victim's] life, whether he 
lived for seconds, as the doctor told you, or lived for 
minutes, it was a horrible, brutal, vicious death. . . .  
The pain, the suffering." 
 
These remarks, attempting to arouse sympathy and invite the jury 
into the victim's position, were improper.  See Commonwealth v. 
Olmande, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 231, 234 (2013). 
 
The defendant also properly takes issue with the 
Commonwealth's reference to the shooting as an execution no 
fewer than eleven times.  To be sure, the Commonwealth could, 
given the evidence, permissibly label the victim's shooting an 
execution.  See Commonwealth v. Francis, 450 Mass. 132, 141 
(2007) (phrase "execution-style" described shooting 
appropriately given that victim was shot several times in back).  
However, rather than making just a "few passing references," see 
Wilson, 427 Mass. at 351, the Commonwealth appears to have 
dwelled gratuitously on the circumstances of the murder in order 
to appeal to the jury's sympathy.  See Commonwealth v. Santiago, 
38 
 
425 Mass. 491, 494-495 (1997), S.C., 427 Mass. 298, and S.C., 
428 Mass. 39, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1003 (1998) (prosecutor 
acted improperly when, in closing, stated seven times that 
victim of fatal shooting was pregnant and four times that her 
birthday was day after shooting). 
 
However, given that the Commonwealth charged the defendant 
with extreme atrocity and cruelty, and in the context of the 
entire summation, the evidence at trial, and the jury 
instructions, see Commonwealth v. Viriyahiranpaiboon, 412 Mass. 
224, 231 (1992), these errors did not create a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See Wilson, 427 Mass. 
at 351.  First, the prosecutor explicitly stated that the reason 
for dwelling on the manner of death was to explain that the 
murder was conducted with extreme atrocity or cruelty.28  In 
addition, the lack of objection by defense counsel, although not 
dispositive, is indicative that the tone and manner of the 
remarks were not unfairly prejudicial.  Sanchez, 405 Mass. at 
375.  Moreover, "[a]ny adverse impact . . . resulting from the 
                     
 
28 The Commonwealth even explained to the jury in closing, 
"I don't tell you all this to shock you.  I don't tell you this 
to upset you.  I tell you this because it's important.  It's 
important to know how [the victim] died.  It's important to know 
how much callousness and indifference was executed by the man 
who killed him on that barroom floor.  It's important to know 
that [the victim] suffered, because as you'll soon know from 
[the judge's] instructions, his suffering, the way he was 
killed, it screams a concept called extreme atrocity.  It 
screams cruelty." 
 
39 
 
summation would have been cured by the judge's charge to the 
jury."  Commonwealth v. Costa, 414 Mass. 618, 629 (1993).  
Although none of the errors was addressed specifically, the 
judge instructed the jury that closing arguments are not 
evidence and that the jury were not to be swayed by emotion, 
sentiment, sympathy, or prejudice.29  "The jury have the ability 
to discount hyperbole and other improper statements, . . . and 
trial judge's instructions are generally adequate [to] cure 
errors in the arguments" (citation omitted).  Santiago, 425 
Mass. at 495. 
 
7.  Review pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have 
reviewed the entire record of the defendant's trial pursuant to 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and find no reason to exercise our 
authority to reduce the jury's verdict of murder to a lesser 
degree of guilt or order a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
 
                     
 
29 Specifically, the judge explained:  (1) "[y]ou must be 
completely impartial.  You are not to be swayed by any emotion, 
sentiment, sympathy or prejudice"; (2) "[f]inal arguments of 
counsel . . . [a]re not evidence"; and (3) personal views of the 
attorneys, "as such views may have come through when they 
presented their final arguments" are not relevant.