Title: ELLEN M OSTROTH V WARREN REGENCY GP LLC

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED FEBRUARY 1, 2006 
ELLEN M. OSTROTH and THANE OSTROTH,
Plaintiffs, 
and 
JENNIFER L. HUDOCK and BRIAN D. 
HUDOCK,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
v 
No. 126859 
WARREN REGENCY, G.P., L.L.C., AND
WARREN REGENCY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
Defendants, 
and 
EDWARD SCHULAK, HOBBS & BLACK, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
WEAVER, J.   
This architectural malpractice case poses the issue 
whether MCL 600.5839 is only a statute of repose, in which 
case MCL 600.5805(6) or (10) supplies a shorter limitations 
period, or is itself both a statute of repose and a statute 
of limitations. The Court of Appeals concluded that § 5839 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
is both a statute of repose and a statute of limitations 
and thus the plaintiff’s cause of action is not time­
barred.1  We agree and accordingly affirm that decision and 
remand the matter to the circuit court. 
FACTS 
In April 1998, defendant Edward Schulak, Hobbs & 
Black, Inc., architects and consultants, was the architect 
in a renovation project, designing renovations for office 
spaces at 12222 East Thirteen Mile Road in Warren, 
Michigan. 
Plaintiff Jennifer L. Hudock worked in the 
offices from April 24, 1998, through August 24, 1998. 
Plaintiff alleges that during that time she was exposed to 
environmental hazards such as fungus, mold, bacteria, 
formaldehyde, and carbon dioxide as a result of the 
renovations 
to 
the 
building’s 
heating, 
cooling, 
ventilation, and plumbing systems. 
She claims that she 
sustained personal injuries as a result of environmental 
hazards arising from the renovation of her workplace.2 
1 263 Mich App 1; 687 NW2d 309 (2004). 
2 Plaintiff’s husband’s claim is derivative. The other 
plaintiffs in this case, Ellen M. and Thane Ostroth, and 
two other defendants, Warren Regency, G.P., L.L.C.; and
Warren Regency Limited Partnership, are not parties to this
appeal. 
2  
 
 
  
 
 
 
Plaintiff initiated this action for damages on May 10, 
2000. 
In her first amended complaint filed November 14, 
2000, 
plaintiff 
alleged 
that 
defendant-architect 
negligently exposed plaintiff to a hazardous environment 
that caused injury and increased the risk of injury in the 
future. 
Defendant first moved for summary disposition, 
challenging the merits of plaintiff’s claim. 
The circuit 
court then allowed defendant to amend its affirmative 
defenses to include the claim that plaintiff’s suit was 
time-barred by the two-year limitations period of MCL 
600.5805(6). 
The circuit court granted defendant’s motion for 
summary disposition, holding that the two-year limitations 
period for malpractice claims of MCL 600.5805(6) applied. 
However, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in 
part, and remanded the matter to the circuit court, holding 
that the six-year limitations period of MCL 600.5839(1) 
applies to plaintiff’s action for damages. 
We granted defendant’s application for leave to appeal 
and directed that the parties include among the issues to 
be briefed 
(1) whether MCL 600.5839(1) precludes application
of the statutes of limitations prescribed by MCL
600.5805 and, if not, (2) which statute of 
limitations, MCL 600.5805(6) or MCL 600.5805(10),
is applicable to the claim asserted against 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
defendant Edward Schulak, Hobbs & Black, Inc., in
this case.[3] 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on 
a motion for summary disposition.  Spiek v Dep't of 
Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). 
This case involves a question of statutory interpretation, 
which this Court also reviews de novo. 
Oade v Jackson 
Nat'l Life Ins Co, 465 Mich 244, 250-251; 632 NW2d 126 
(2001). 
ANALYSIS 
A person cannot commence an action for damages for 
injuries to a person or property unless the complaint is 
filed within the periods prescribed by MCL 600.5805. 
Gladych v New Family Homes, Inc, 468 Mich 594, 598; 664 
NW2d 705 (2003). MCL 600.5805(1) provides: 
A person shall not bring or maintain an
action to recover damages for injuries to persons
or property unless, after the claim first accrued
to the plaintiff or to someone through whom the
plaintiff claims, the action is commenced within
the periods of time prescribed by this section. 
The several subsections of MCL 600.5805 define periods of 
limitations for various types of actions to recover damages 
for injuries to persons or property. 
3 472 Mich 898 (2005). 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
Relevant to this case, MCL 600.5805(6) provides for a 
two-year 
period 
of 
limitations 
for 
actions 
charging 
malpractice, MCL 600.5805(10) provides a three-year period 
of limitations for general negligence actions, and MCL 
600.5805(14) addresses the period of limitations for an 
action for damages involving a state-licensed architect and 
an improvement to real property.4  The parties dispute the 
effect and proper interpretation of MCL 600.5805(14) and 
MCL 600.5839(1). 
When interpreting statutes, “we presume that the 
Legislature intended the meaning clearly expressed . . . .” 
DiBenedetto v West Shore Hosp, 461 Mich 394, 402; 605 NW2d 
300 (2000). 
Judicial construction is not required or 
permitted if the text of the statute is unambiguous. Id. 
MCL 600.5805(14) was added to MCL 600.5805 in 1988.5 
Subsection 5805(14) provides: 
The period of limitations for an action 
against a state licensed architect, professional
engineer, land surveyor, or contractor based on
an improvement to real property shall be as 
provided in section 5839. 
4 MCL 600.5805 has been amended several times: the 
current subsection 6 was formerly subsection 4; the
current subsection 10 was formerly subsection 8; and, 
the current subsection 14 was formerly subsection 10. 
5 1988 PA 115. 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
MCL 600.5839(1) in turn specifies a six-year period of 
limitations that begins to run “after the time of occupancy 
of the completed improvement, use, or acceptance of the 
improvement . . . .” 
MCL 600.5839(1) was enacted twenty years before MCL 
600.5805(14).6  MCL 600.5839(1) currently provides in full: 
No person may maintain any action to recover
damages for any injury to property, real or 
personal, or for bodily injury or wrongful death,
arising out of the defective and unsafe condition
of an improvement to real property, nor any
action for contribution or indemnity for damages
sustained as a result of such injury, against any
state licensed architect or professional engineer
performing 
or 
furnishing 
the 
design 
or 
supervision of construction of the improvement,
or against any contractor making the improvement,
more than 6 years after the time of occupancy of
the completed improvement, use, or acceptance of
the improvement, or 1 year after the defect 
is 
discovered 
or 
should 
have 
been 
discovered,
provided 
that 
the 
defect 
constitutes 
the 
proximate cause of the injury or damage for which
the action is brought and is the result of gross
negligence on the part of the contractor or 
licensed 
architect 
or 
professional 
engineer.
However, no such action shall be maintained more
than 10 years after the time of occupancy of the
completed improvement, use, or acceptance of the
improvement. 
6 1967 PA 203. As originally enacted, MCL 600.5839(1)
did not provide a one-year discovery provision or the final
ten-year period for gross negligence claims. 
These 
provisions were added by 1985 PA 188 at the same time the
statute was expressly expanded to include contractors. 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
  
Defendant 
contends 
that 
the 
six-year 
period 
of 
MCL 
600.5839(1) is a statute of repose that operates in 
addition to the shorter periods of limitations in MCL 
600.5805(6) and (10).7
 In other words, defendant claims 
that when an action arises within the six-year period 
specified by MCL 600.5839(1), the periods of limitations in 
MCL 600.5805 still apply. 
The Court of Appeals disagreed, 
however, holding that MCL 600.5839(1) is both a statute of 
limitations and a statute of repose so that an action for 
damages involving architects can be filed at any time 
within six years of the occupancy of the completed 
improvement. 
This Court first addressed MCL 600.5839(1) in O’Brien 
v Hazelet & Erdal, 410 Mich 1; 299 NW2d 336 (1980). 
In 
O’Brien, this Court upheld the constitutionality of MCL 
600.5839(1) 
and 
described 
the 
statute’s 
operation 
as 
follows: 
[T]he 
instant 
statute 
is 
both 
one 
of 
limitation and one of repose. 
For actions which 
accrue within six years from occupancy, use, or 
7 “‘A statute of repose limits the liability of a party
by setting a fixed time after . . . which the party will
not be held liable for  
. . . injury or damage . . . . 
Unlike a statute of limitations, a statute of repose may
bar 
a 
claim 
before 
an 
injury 
or 
damage 
occurs.’” 
Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Marlette Homes, Inc, 456 Mich 511,
513 n 3; 573 NW2d 611 (1998)(citation omitted). 
7  
 
 
 
   
   
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
acceptance of the completed improvement, the 
statute prescribes the time within which such
actions may be brought and thus acts as a statute 
of limitations. 
When more than six years from
such time have elapsed before an injury is 
sustained, the statute prevents a cause of action
from ever accruing.[8] 
Regarding the purpose of the statute, O’Brien stated: “The 
Legislature chose to limit the liability of architects and 
engineers in order to relieve them of the potential burden 
of defending claims brought long after completion of the 
improvement . . . .”9 
Despite O’Brien’s statement10 that MCL 600.5839(1) 
“acts as a statute of limitations” for claims arising 
within “six years from occupancy, use, or acceptance of the 
completed improvement,” defendant argues that the six-year 
period provided by MCL 600.5839(1) is merely a statute of 
repose that does not inhibit the application of the two­
year period of limitations for malpractice claims or the 
three-year period of limitations for negligence actions of 
MCL 600.5805 (6) and (10). 
For this argument, defendant relies on Witherspoon v 
Guilford, 
203 
Mich 
App 
240; 
511 
NW2d 
720 
(1994). 
8 O’Brien, supra at 15.  
9 Id. at 14.  
10 Id. at 15.  
8  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
Witherspoon addressed whether the six-year period under MCL 
600.5839(1) precludes the application of the three-year 
period of limitations of the current MCL 600.5805(10) 
“where the cause of action arises within six years after 
the use or acceptance of the improvement.”11 
Witherspoon 
concluded that subsection 14 was added to MCL 600.5805 
merely to “underscore [the Legislature’s] intent to grant § 
5839 primacy over other arguably applicable periods of 
limitation, running from the time of discovery, whose 
effect would defeat the repose aspect of § 5839.”12 
Witherspoon further concluded that to apply MCL 600.5839(1) 
exclusively of the shorter periods of limitations in MCL 
600.5805 would render portions of MCL 600.5805 nugatory. 
Although Witherspoon13 correctly recognized that the 
current MCL 600.5805(14) and MCL 600.5839 “set forth an 
emphatic 
legislative 
intent 
to 
protect 
architects, 
engineers, and contractors from stale claims,” we find no 
evidence that through the enactment of MCL 600.5805(14) the 
Legislature intended MCL 600.5839(1) to merely serve as a 
statute of repose. 
Regarding which period of limitations 
11 Witherspoon, supra at 246. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 247. 
9  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
applies to renovations to real property and the liability 
of a state-licensed architect who furnished the design for 
the renovations, there is no ambiguity in the language of 
either 
MCL 
600.5805(14) 
or 
MCL 
600.5839(1).14 
 
MCL
 
600.5805(14) unambiguously provides that “[t]he period of 
limitations 
for 
an 
action 
against 
a 
state 
licensed 
architect . . . shall be as provided in section 5839.” 
Because defendant is a state-licensed architect that 
furnished the design for the improvements to the real 
property that allegedly caused plaintiff’s injury, under 
MCL 600.5839(1) the period within which plaintiff can 
“maintain any action to recover damages for . . . bodily 
injury” is six years “after the time of occupancy of the 
completed 
improvement, 
use, 
or 
acceptance 
of 
the 
improvement . . . .” 
14 Cf. Michigan Millers Mut Ins Co v West Detroit Bldg
Co, Inc, 196 Mich App 367; 494 NW2d 1 (1992), concluding
that the effect of MCL 600.5805(14) on MCL 600.5839(1) was
ambiguous on a different question than that presented by
this 
appeal. 
 
Michigan 
Millers 
concluded 
that 
MCL 
600.5805(14) 
was 
ambiguous 
regarding 
whether 
the 
Legislature intended that the six-year period of MCL 
600.5839(1) be applied to all actions based on improvements
to real property, both third-party actions and actions for
professional 
malpractice. 
The 
panel 
examined 
the 
legislative history and held that the Legislature intended
that MCL 600.5839(1) did apply to both types of claims. 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moreover, it does not render any portion of MCL 
600.5805 nugatory to hold that MCL 600.5839(1) is, as it 
plainly appears on its face, both a statute of repose and a 
statute of limitations. 
The periods of limitations of MCL 
600.5805 for malpractice and general negligence actions 
remain applicable to any claim that does not involve “a 
state 
licensed 
architect, 
professional 
engineer, 
land 
surveyor, or contractor” and that is not “based on an 
improvement to real property . . . .” MCL 600.5805(14). 
Finally, our interpretation is not in conflict with 
the policies underlying MCL 600.5839(1) that this Court 
identified in O’Brien, supra at 16: 
By 
enacting 
a 
statute 
which 
grants
architects and engineers complete repose after
six years rather than abrogating the described
causes of action in toto, the Legislature struck 
what it perceived to be a balance between 
eliminating altogether the tort liability of 
these professions and placing no restriction 
other than general statutes of limitations upon
the ability of injured plaintiffs to bring tort
actions against architects and engineers. The 
Legislature could reasonably have concluded that
allowing suits against architects and engineers
to be maintained within six years from the time
of 
occupancy, 
use, 
or 
acceptance 
of 
an 
improvement would allow sufficient time for most
meritorious claims to accrue and would permit
suit against those guilty of the most serious
lapses in their professional endeavors. 
As stated in O’Brien, “[t]he power of the Legislature to 
determine the conditions under which a right may accrue and 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
the period within which a right may be asserted is 
undoubted.” Id. at 14. 
CONCLUSION 
We hold that MCL 600.5805(14) unambiguously directs 
that 
the 
period 
of 
limitations 
for 
actions 
against 
architects is provided by MCL 600.5839(1). 
Moreover, the 
six-year period of MCL 600.5839(1) operates as both a 
statute of limitations and a statute of repose.  Therefore, 
plaintiff’s action for damages, brought well within this 
time period, is not time-barred. 
The Court of Appeals 
decision is affirmed and this case is remanded to the 
circuit court for further proceedings. 
To the extent that 
the Court of Appeals decision in Witherspoon, supra, is 
inconsistent with this opinion, it is overruled.15 
Clifford W. Taylor
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
15 We note that Witherspoon appears to have been the
“first out” under MCR 7.215(J)(1) on the precise question
of 
statutory 
interpretation 
presented 
in 
this 
case. 
However, our decision to overrule Witherspoon to the extent 
that it is inconsistent with our decision resolves any
conflict on the question. 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
ELLEN M. OSTROTH and THANE OSTROTH, 
Plaintiffs, 
and 
JENNIFER L. HUDOCK and 
BRIAN D. HUDOCK, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
No. 126859 
WARREN REGENCY, G.P., L.L.C., and
WARREN REGENCY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 
Defendants, 
and 
EDWARD SCHULAK, HOBBS & BLACK, INC., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
KELLY, J. (concurring). 
I concur with the majority in this case that the 
applicable limitations period is six years as stated in MCL 
600.5839(1). 
I write separately to explain the difference 
between my decision in this case and my concurrence in 
Stanislawski v Calculus Constr Co, Inc, unpublished opinion 
per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued April 7, 1994 
(Docket No. 145467). 
 
 
When I penned my concurrence in Stanislawski I was 
bound by Witherspoon v Guilford, 203 Mich App 240; 511 NW2d 
720 (1994). 
See MCR 7.215(J)(1). 
Now that I am in the 
position to overturn Witherspoon and see the wisdom of 
doing so, I join in the decision reached by the Court in 
this case. 
 
Marilyn Kelly 
2