Title: Gary A. Soutullo et al. v. Mobile County, Alabama

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 09/17/10
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2010
_________________________
1090041
_________________________
Gary A. Soutullo and Janet L. Soutullo
v.
Mobile County
_________________________
1090622
_________________________
Gary A. Soutullo and Janet L. Soutullo
v.
Mobile County
_________________________
1090932
_________________________
2
Gary A. Soutullo and Janet L. Soutullo
v.
Mobile County
Appeals from Mobile Circuit Court
(CV-06-3919)
WOODALL, Justice.
Arising out of an action commenced by Gary A. Soutullo
and Janet L. Soutullo against Mobile County ("the County")
seeking, among other things, compensation for storm-water
damage, these three appeals involve the Soutullos' challenges
to a judgment on the merits for the County as a matter of law
("JML")(case no. 1090041), and to two orders disposing of
motions filed by the Soutullos (case no. 1090622) and the
County (case no. 1090932) seeking fees or costs in the
litigation.  We affirm the judgment and the orders in all
three cases.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Between September 23, 2002, and April 16, 2003, the
County 
constructed 
a 
public-improvement 
drainage 
project 
known
as the "Heid Place Storm Water Drainage System" ("the
project").  Since the project was constructed, the Soutullos'
property has experienced flooding, which they attribute to the
1090041; 1090622; 1090932
3
County's construction or maintenance of the project.  On
October 15, 2005, Gary Soutullo wrote a letter to the County's
engineering department complaining that his property was being
repeatedly flooded by "drainage from [Heid Place]."  On
November 13, 2006, the Soutullos sent the County a "statement
of claim," claiming damage from flood events occurring on
August 8, 2006, and November 6, 2006.
On November 29, 2006, the Soutullos sued the County.  The
complaint stated that the County had "adopted standards or
regulations" 
for 
storm-water-drainage 
systems 
in 
Mobile 
County
and alleged that it had negligently "fail[ed] to maintain an
adequately designed" system.  (Emphasis added.)  More
specifically, the complaint alleged:
"3. In establishing such systems, which are
applicable to the property owned by the [Soutullos],
and in establishing standards for the maintenance of
said storm water and surface water systems, the
[County] has been negligent as the standards adopted
for the capacity of such drains and the outfall of
such drains owned and maintained by the County to
handle storm water and surface water runoff are too
low; the storm water and surface water drainage
systems are inadequate; the maintenance of such
system is negligently performed or negligently
omitted.
"4. 
The 
[County] 
has 
been 
negligent 
in
maintaining such systems as the storm water and
surface water drainage systems is allowed to flood
private property and to damage private property.
1090041; 1090622; 1090932
4
The [County] has been further negligent in failing
to maintain the storm water and surface water
drainage systems in the area of the [Soutullos']
real property, to include underground piping and
adequate outfall lines and drains, which negligence
has existed in the past and continues to exist as of
this date.  The [County] has been further negligent
in failing to maintain said storm water and surface
water drainage systems by allowing flooding of and
damage to private property at the outfall."
(Emphasis added.)  
The complaint contained counts alleging negligence,
trespass, and nuisance.  It sought compensatory damages and an
injunction abating the alleged nuisance.  Between November 29,
2006, and August 20, 2009, the complaint was amended
approximately 82 times to add allegations of successive
instances of flooding.
The 
Soutullos 
employed 
Kenneth 
D. 
Underwood, 
a
"consulting civil engineer," to serve as an expert witness.
On November 2, 2007, the County filed a notice of the taking
of Underwood's deposition.  He was deposed on November 9,
2007.  On December 8, 2008, Underwood sent the County's
counsel a statement reflecting his fees for deposition
preparation and requested payment in the amount of $1,239.28
By June 16, 2009, the fees had not been paid and the
1090041; 1090622; 1090932
5
Soutullos' counsel wrote a letter to the County's counsel
requesting payment.  The request was denied or ignored. 
Trial of the case began before an advisory jury on August
24, 2009.  At the close of all the evidence, the County moved
for a JML, which the trial court granted from the bench,
citing Mitchell v. Mackin, 376 So. 2d 684 (Ala. 1979).  A few
weeks later, on September 17, 2009, the trial court entered a
judgment "as to all counts and all causes of action for [the
County]."  In that judgment, the court stated, in pertinent
part:
"The 
[Soutullos], 
who 
are 
husband 
and 
wife,
purchased their real property, which lies ...
several miles outside of the Mobile city limits.
"....
"[The] project took surface water from Heid
Place to the existing roadside drainage ditch. [The
Soutullos] asserted that it was this project which
caused surface storm drainage to flood their real
property.  They assert that improvements in the
drainage system, including a box culvert and the
paving of the drainage ditch, as well as negligent
maintenance caused or contributed to this flooding.
"The [County] asserted ... that the only effect
this project had was to increase the speed of the
water in the Heid Place ditch but would not have
caused the [Soutullos'] real property to flood.
"Notwithstanding the above, the [Soutullos]
urged the court to analyze this case under the
standards set by the Alabama appellate courts in
1090041; 1090622; 1090932
6
Lott v. City of Daphne, 539 So. 2d 241 (Ala. 1989),
and [Lott v. City of Daphne], 624 So. 2d 544 (Ala.
1993).  In other words, the [Soutullos] argued that
the court should apply the law on water regarding
incorporated municipalities and the undertaking to
construct and maintain a drainage system rather than
the law of water flow from upper land owners to the
lower land owner in unincorporated areas.
"The case of Mitchell v. Mackin, 376 So. 2d 684
(Ala. [1979]) contains a good historical discussion
on the differences between the development of the
two schools of thought.
"....
"While the court, in announcing its judgment
from the bench, advised that it was employing the
unincorporated/incorporated 
analysis, 
further 
review
of the caselaw from Reichert v. City of Mobile, 776
So. 2d 761 (Ala. 2000), and from Byrd v. City of
Citronelle, 937 So. 2d 515 (Ala. 2006), holds for
the proposition that the nuisance claimed by the
[Soutullos] was ... non-abatable and thus it is also
the court's opinion that even had this case taken
place within an incorporated municipality, that the
statute of limitations would have ... expired."
(Emphasis added.)  The appeal in case no. 1090041 is from that
judgment. 
On September 9, 2009, the Soutullos filed a "petition to
assess costs," seeking, pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(C)(i), Ala.
R. Civ. P., an "order requiring [the County] to pay [their]
expert [witness] a reasonable fee for time spent in submitting
to the [County's] deposition."  On November 24, 2009, trial
court denied the Soutullos' petition.  On December 3, 2009,
1090041; 1090622; 1090932
7
the Soutullos filed a motion, based on Rule 59(e), Ala. R.
Civ. P., to "alter or amend" the order denying their fee
request.  Included in that motion was a request for a hearing.
On January 6, 2010, the trial court denied that motion without
the requested hearing.  The Soutullos filed their notice of
appeal from that denial on February 4, 2010.  Case no. 1090622
represents that appeal.  
Meanwhile, on September 22, 2009, the County filed a
"motion to tax costs," seeking, pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, §
12-21-144, and Rule 54(d), Ala. R. Civ. P., an order requiring
the Soutullos to pay, among other things, the cost to the
County of taking depositions.  The next day, the Soutullos
filed an answer to the County's motion to tax costs.  In that
answer, they stated, among other things: "The [County] has
provided no proof of any costs, nor has the [County]
previously 
submitted 
any 
proof 
of 
any 
costs 
to 
the
[Soutullos]."  (Emphasis added.)  On December 18, 2009, the
County filed a statement of its claimed expenses. The
statement was supported by the affidavit of its counsel, who
attested that, "[i]n order to adequately evaluate, prepare and
defend [the County's] case and present evidence at trial," the
County had incurred expenses in taking the depositions of Gary
1090041; 1090622; 1090932
Donald Rowe was the owner of an engineering firm hired
1
by the County to design the project.
8
Soutullo, Janet Soutullo, Kenneth Underwood, and Donald Rowe,1
in the amounts of $1,385.15, $591.20, $575.90, and $107.70,
respectively, along with $2,420.07 in "copying expenses,"
totaling $5,080.02.  Subsequently, on December 21, 2009, the
Soutullos filed a second answer to the County's motion to tax
costs.  The answer stated, in pertinent part:
"1.
The deposition of Gary Soutullo was not 'used
at trial.'
"2.
The deposition of Janet Soutullo was not 'used
at trial.'
 
"3.
The deposition of Kenneth Underwood was not
'used at trial.'
"....
"6.
Copying 
expenses 
are 
neither 
'depositions 
or
exhibits used at the trial,' and are not segregated
or itemized or verified.
"7.
The expenses claimed by the [County] should be
denied.
"8.
When the court's judgment in favor of the [County]
is reversed on appeal, the [County] is unlikely to
reimburse the [Soutullos]."
On February 23, 2010, the trial court awarded the County
$5,080.02 in costs for depositions and copying.  Case no.
1090041; 1090622; 1090932
9
1090932 represents the Soutullos' timely appeal from that
judgment.
II. Discussion
We will address first the appeal from the JML (case no.
1090041); second, the appeal from the award of deposition
costs (case no. 1090932); and finally, the appeal from the
denial of the Soutullos' petition for the fees of their expert
witness (case no. 1090622).
A. Case No. 1090041
On appeal, the parties join issue as to only one of the
two grounds referenced in the trial court's judgment, namely,
whether this case should turn on the fact that the alleged
damage occurred in an unincorporated -- as opposed to an
incorporated -- area of Mobile County.  The Soutullos contend
that we should overrule Mitchell v. Mackin, 376 So. 2d 684
(Ala. 1979), and apply the rule set forth in Lott v. City of
Daphne, 539 So. 2d 241 (Ala. 1989).  However, the County
argues that, in any case, the judgment is supportable on the
other ground referenced in the judgment, namely, that this
action is barred by the statute of limitations.  The County's
brief, at 32.  For their part, the Soutullos entirely ignore
1090041; 1090622; 1090932
10
the statute-of-limitations ground in their briefs to this
Court. 
In order to secure a reversal, "the appellant has an
affirmative duty of showing error upon the record."  Tucker v.
Nichols, 431 So. 2d 1263, 1264 (Ala. 1983).  It is a familiar
principle of law: 
"When an appellant confronts an issue below that the
appellee contends warrants a judgment in its favor
and the trial court's order does not specify a basis
for its ruling, the omission of any argument on
appeal as to that issue in the appellant's principal
brief constitutes a waiver with respect to the
issue."
  
Fogarty v. Southworth, 953 So. 2d 1225, 1232 (Ala. 2006)
(footnote omitted) (emphasis added).  This waiver, namely, the
failure of the appellant to discuss in the opening brief an
issue on which the trial court might have relied as a basis
for its judgment, results in an affirmance of that judgment.
Id.  That is so, because "this court will not presume such
error on the part of the trial court."  Roberson v. C.P. Allen
Constr. Co., [Ms. 2080537, May 7, 2010] ___ So. 3d ___, ___
(Ala. Civ. App. 2010) (emphasis added).  See also Young v.
Southern Life & Health Ins. Co., 495 So. 2d 601 (Ala. 1986).
If an appellant defaults on his or her duty to show error by
failing to argue in an opening brief an unstated ground that
1090041; 1090622; 1090932
11
was placed in issue below, then, a fortiori, a challenge to
the judgment is waived where, as here, the trial court
actually states two grounds for its judgment, both grounds are
championed by the appellee, and the appellant simply declines
to mention one of the two grounds.  Because the Soutullos have
pretermitted discussion of one of the two grounds forming the
basis for the JML, we pretermit discussion of the other
ground, and we affirm the judgment.
B. Case No. 1090932
In case no. 1090932, the Soutullos appeal from the
judgment taxing to the Soutullos, as the losing parties,
$5,080.02 in costs for the depositions of Gary Soutullo; Janet
Soutullo; Kenneth Underwood, the Soutullos' expert witness;
and Donald Rowe, as well as copying expenses.  They contend
that recovery of these expenses was not authorized by § 12-21-
144, Rule 54(d), or relevant caselaw.  We disagree.  
Section 12-21-144 provides: 
"The costs of any deposition introduced, in
whole or in part, into evidence at the trial by the
party taking it shall be taxed as costs in the case
upon the certificate of the person before whom the
deposition was taken; the costs of depositions in
other cases shall be taxed as costs in the case only
if the court so directs."
1090041; 1090622; 1090932
12
Rule 54(d) provides, in pertinent part: "Except when express
provision therefor is made in a statute, costs shall be
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court
otherwise directs ...."  "[T]axation of costs under the
statute and the rule rests in the discretion of the trial
judge, whose decision will not be reversed unless clear abuse
is shown."  Vulcan Oil Co. v. Gorman, 434 So. 2d 760, 762
(Ala. 1983).
The Soutullos do not argue that the trial court exceeded
its discretion in entering the judgment.  Instead, they insist
that the taxation of costs was erroneous as a matter of law,
because, they contend, none of these depositions was used at
trial in any material manner.  It is well settled, however,
that "a trial court may, in its discretion, tax all of the
costs of any deposition taken in a case, regardless of whether
the deposition was used at trial, if the deposition was
reasonably necessary."  Bundrick v. McAllister, 882 So. 2d
864, 866 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003)(citing Ex parte Strickland, 401
So. 2d 33 (Ala. 1981)).  "The trial judge, who was present
during the trial and witnessed the parties' presentations and
arguments, is ... in a far better position to determine the
reasonable necessity of a particular deposition than an
1090041; 1090622; 1090932
13
appellate court ...."  882 So. 2d at 867.  Because the
Soutullos have demonstrated neither an error of law nor that
the 
trial 
court 
exceeded 
its 
discretion, 
they 
have
demonstrated no error requiring reversal.
They also insist that the trial court erred, because,
they say, the "County filed no documentary evidence, nor any
invoice, nor any cancelled check, nor any proof, whatsoever,"
for its claims.  The Soutullos' brief, at 17.  This argument
ignores the affidavit of its counsel submitted by the County
on December 18, 2009.  Thus, they essentially argue, we
suppose, that an affidavit does not properly substantiate the
costs and that some other evidence was needed.  However, this
argument is made for the first time on appeal.  To be sure,
the Soutullos pointed out the absence of proof in their
September 23, 2009, answer to the County's motion to tax
costs.  Nevertheless, after December 18, 2009, when the County
filed its statement of costs and supporting affidavit -- when
the issue should have been raised in the trial court -- no
such argument was made.
"It is well known that 'we cannot reverse the judgment of
the trial court based on an argument not made below and urged
for the first time on appeal.'"  White Sands Group, L.L.C. v.
1090041; 1090622; 1090932
14
PRS II, LLC, 998 So. 2d 1042, 1057 (Ala. 2008) (quoting
Singleton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 928 So. 2d 280, 285
(Ala. 2005)).  For these reasons, the order of the trial court
in case no. 1090932 is affirmed.
C. Case No. 1090622
In case no. 1090622, the Soutullos challenge the trial
court's denial of their petition to recover from the County
$1,239.28 in fees attributable to the time spent by their
expert witness in submitting to a deposition conducted by the
County.  According to the Soutullos, recovery of these fees is
mandated by Rule 26(b)(4)(C)(i), Ala. R. Civ. P.  As their
result of amendments effective February 1, 2010, the
subsections of Rule 26(b) have been renumbered;  the relevant
subsection is now subsection (5), rather than subsection (4).
Subsection (5)(C) states, in pertinent part: "Unless manifest
injustice would result, (i) the court shall require that the
party seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for
time spent in responding to discovery under subdivisions
(b)(5)(A)(ii) and (b)(5)(B) of this rule."  
Rule 26(b)(5)(A)(ii) provides: "Upon motion, the court
may order further discovery by other means, subject to such
restrictions as to scope and such provisions, pursuant to
1090041; 1090622; 1090932
Because Rule 26(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., differs materially
2
from its Alabama counterpart, cases from federal courts
construing that federal rule are inapposite.
15
subdivision (b)(5)(C) of this rule, concerning fees and
expenses as the court may deem appropriate."  (Emphasis
added.)  Rule 26(b)(5)(B) states, in pertinent part: "A party
may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has
been retained, specially employed or assigned by another party
in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who
is not expected to be called as a witness at trial."
(Emphasis added.) 
It is not entirely clear which of these two subsections
of Rule 26(b) the Soutullos attempt to invoke as a basis for
recovery of fees for their expert witness.  Subsection (5)(B)
clearly does not apply; it refers to a person "who is not
expected to be called as a witness at trial."  Underwood
testified extensively at the trial of this case.  Subsection
(5)(A)(ii), by its express terms, is triggered only by a court
order in response to a motion, in contrast to its federal
counterpart.  There was no such order in this case.  Indeed,
the Soutullos have identified no Alabama authority  for the
2
proposition that fees attributable to the time spent by an
1090041; 1090622; 1090932
16
expert witness in preparing for, and giving, a discovery
deposition are chargeable to the deposing party without an
agreement to that effect.
Finally, the Soutullos contend that the order awarding
the County costs must be reversed because the trial court
ignored their request for a hearing in denying their motion to
alter or amend the judgment.  We disagree.  It is true that
"[a] trial court commits error when it fails to conduct a
hearing requested by a party on a Rule 59 ... postjudgment
motion."  J.H.F. v. P.S.F., 835 So. 2d 1024, 1031 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2002).  See Rule 59(g), Ala. R. Civ. P. (such motions
"shall not be ruled upon until the parties have had
opportunity to be heard thereon").  However, the failure to
hold a hearing is "not necessarily reversible error."  835 So.
2d at 1031 (emphasis added).  See Rule 45, Ala. R. App. P.
("Error Without Injury").  
"Harmless error occurs, within the context of a Rule
59(g) motion, where there is either no probable
merit in the grounds asserted in the motion, or
where the appellate court resolves the issues
presented therein, as a matter of law, adversely to
the movant, by application of the same objective
standard of review as that applied in the trial
court."
Greene v. Thompson, 554 So. 2d 376, 381 (Ala. 1989).
1090041; 1090622; 1090932
17
Because the Soutullos have failed to cite apposite
authority for the contention that they are entitled to fees
attributable to the time spent by Underwood in preparing for,
and submitting to, a deposition conducted by the County
without a court order, they have failed to demonstrate that
their contention has any "probable merit."  Consequently, the
error in denying the Soutullos' motion without a hearing does
not warrant reversal.
III. Conclusion
In summary, the judgments and orders appealed from in
case no. 1090041, case no.  1090622, and case no. 1090932 are
affirmed.
1090041 -- AFFIRMED.
1090622 -- AFFIRMED.
1090932 -- AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and Smith, Parker, and Shaw, JJ., concur.