Title: Dorn v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ROBERT DORN, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 317, 2003 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr.A. Nos. VK93-07-0148 thru 
§  -0155, and VK93-07-0157 thru 
§  -0163 
§  Cr. ID 93K03608DI 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: July 23, 2003 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: September 24, 2003 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and BERGER, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 24th day of September 2003, upon consideration of the 
appellant’s opening brief and the State’s motion to affirm, it appears to the 
Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Robert Dorn, filed this appeal from 
the Superior Court’s denial of his motion for correction of sentence.  The 
State of Delaware has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the 
ground that it is manifest on the face of Dorn’s opening brief that his appeal 
is without merit.  We agree and affirm. 
(2) 
The record reflects that, following his guilty plea, the Superior 
Court sentenced Dorn in March 1994 on 28 counts of aggravated 
 
2 
harassment. In October 2002, Dorn was charged with his second violation of 
probation by engaging in further acts of harassment, which resulted in Dorn 
pleading guilty in Pennsylvania.  On January 24, 2003, the Superior Court 
held a hearing and found Dorn in violation of his probation.  The Superior 
Court resentenced Dorn on 18 of the underlying charges to a total period of 
three years at Level V incarceration followed by four and a half years of 
probation.   
(3) 
Dorn did not file an appeal from his VOP sentence.  Instead, in 
April 2003, Dorn filed a motion for correction of sentence.  In his motion, 
Dorn asserted that: (i) the Superior Court failed to give him credit for 63 
days for time previously served; (ii) the Superior Court failed to specify 
beginning and ending dates for each of his VOP sentences; and (iii) the 
sentencing order incorrectly reflected a four and a half year term of 
probation when, in fact, the Superior Court at the VOP hearing only imposed 
three years of probation.  The Superior Court rejected Dorn’s latter two 
contentions but modified the January 2003 sentencing order to credit Dorn 
for 63 days previously served at Level V incarceration.  This appeal 
followed. 
(4) 
Dorn’s first argument on appeal is that his VOP sentences are 
illegal because the Superior Court failed to specify beginning and ending 
 
3 
dates as required by statute.1  This Court, however, has held that a sentence 
of imprisonment is not illegal for failing to specify beginning and ending 
dates as long as the sentencing order sets a fixed term of imprisonment 
expressed in days, months, and/or years.2  Accordingly, the Superior Court 
properly denied Dorn’s motion for correction of sentence on this basis. 
(5) 
Dorn’s second argument on appeal is that the written sentencing 
order did not accurately reflect the sentence that the Superior Court judge 
orally pronounced following the VOP hearing. We first note that Dorn never 
filed a direct appeal from the Superior Court’s VOP sentence in order raise 
this alleged error.  More importantly, Dorn failed to request transcript of the 
VOP hearing in order to support his allegations of error in the present 
appeal.  It is the appellant’s burden to produce such portions of the transcript 
as are necessary to support any allegations of error.3  In the absence of any 
record evidence to the contrary, we accept the Superior Court’s ruling that 
the sentencing order accurately reflected the sentence pronounced following 
the VOP hearing.  Accordingly, we find no error in the Superior Court’s 
denial of Dorn’s motion for correction of sentence. 
                                                 
1 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3901(a) (2001).  Section 3901(a) provides, in 
part:  “When imprisonment is a part of the sentence, the term shall be fixed, and the time 
of its commencement and ending specified.” 
2 See Faircloth v. State, 522 A.2d 1268, 1270-71 (Del. 1987). 
3 Tricoche v. State, 525 A.2d 151, 154 (Del. 1987). 
 
4 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice