Title: Ex Parte Shaver

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

894 So. 2d 781 (2004)
Ex parte Brian SHAVER.
(In re Brian Shaver
v.
State of Alabama).
1030205.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 11, 2004.
*782 Nathan Johnson, Sheffield, for petitioner.
William H. Pryor, Jr., atty. gen., and Michael B. Billingsley, asst. atty. gen., for respondent.
HARWOOD, Justice.
Brian Shaver petitioned for a writ of certiorari from this Court to review the Court of Criminal Appeals' unpublished memorandum affirming the trial court's judgment convicting him, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, of the unlawful manufacture of a controlled substance in the second degree, a violation of § 13A-12-217, Ala.Code 1975. Shaver v. State, 894 So. 2d 773 (Ala.Crim.App.2003). He was sentenced to three years' imprisonment; that sentence was split pursuant to the Split Sentence Act, § 15-18-8, Ala.Code 1975, and he was ordered to serve six months in jail, followed by three years' supervised probation and to pay all mandatory fines and court costs. At his guilty-plea hearing, Shaver reserved the right to appeal the issues of the propriety of the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress certain evidence and the constitutionality of § 13A-12-217, Ala.Code 1975.
This Court granted Shaver's petition on January 12, 2004, to consider only the issue whether the trial court properly denied Shaver's motion to suppress the following evidence: pseudoephedrine[1] seized from his vehicle pursuant to a warrantless *783 stop and a statement he made to the arresting officer, admitting that he purchased the chemical with the knowledge that it would be used to manufacture the illegal drug methamphetamine. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling based on its conclusion that Shaver's vehicle was properly detained because the officer stopping the vehicle had a "reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity. Judge Shaw dissented from the Court of Criminal Appeals' unpublished memorandum affirmance, and Judge Cobb joined his writing. Shaver v. State, 894 So. 2d  at 773.
The unpublished memorandum describes the facts in the record as follows:
The unpublished memorandum recounts the statement Shaver made after his arrest:
Aaron also gave a statement indicating that the pills might ultimately be used to make "meth."
*784 The dissent supplied more facts, which are substantiated by our review of the record:
894 So. 2d  at 773-75 (citations to the record omitted).
Judge Shaw's dissent points out that Deputy Chris Hargett with the Franklin County Sheriff's Department was the only person to testify at the suppression hearing.
The unpublished memorandum applied the following rationale in concluding that the officers' stop and detention of Shaver's vehicle and its occupants was lawful:
The point made by Judge Shaw's dissent, which we find dispositive, is that the only basis the police had for detaining Shaver's vehicle, established by Deputy Hargett's testimony, was a telephone call from an unknown individual who was purportedly calling from the Wal-Mart discount department store at which the pseudoephedrine had been purchased. The record does not supply any information concerning the telephone call to the police from the Wal-Mart store other than Deputy Hargett's testimony that he heard the Russellville police officers giving information about a telephone call they had received from Wal-Mart. The transcript of the suppression hearing contains no evidence to support the conclusion that the caller was in any way reliable. For example, contrary to the recitations in the unpublished memorandum, there is no evidentiary basis from which to infer that the telephone caller was a Wal-Mart employee, or even that the caller was a "she," or that the caller had any direct knowledge of what Shaver had purchased at Wal-Mart. Deputy Hargett testified to no specifics concerning the information conveyed by the Wal-Mart caller, such as whether the caller supplied any description of Shaver or a member of his party, whether the caller described Shaver's vehicle, or whether the caller supplied any information with respect to the amount of pills containing pseudoephedrine that had been purchased. In addition, Judge Shaw's dissent correctly notes:
894 So. 2d  at 779-80 (citations to the record omitted).
Moreover, for all that is shown in the record, Shaver's vehicle was stopped as the result of a telephone call to the police from the Wal-Mart store without any intervening police investigation; there is no indication in the record that the police did anything to corroborate the information given in the telephone call from Wal-Mart before stopping Shaver's vehicle. It was only after the vehicle had been detained that Deputy Hargett arrived and saw the packages of pills containing pseudoephedrine in "plain view" in the vehicle. We are therefore left to determine whether the evidence in the record concerning the telephone call from the Wal-Mart store where the purchase of pseudoephedrine was made was sufficient to establish the necessary "reasonable suspicion" for law-enforcement officers to stop and detain Shaver's vehicle. As Judge Shaw's dissent notes, the applicable law on the distinction between a tip from a reliable informant and an anonymous tip for the purpose of establishing reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop is discussed in State v. White, 854 So. 2d 636 (Ala.Crim.App.2003):
"Wilsher v. State, 611 So. 2d 1175, 1179 (Ala.Crim.App.1992).
854 So. 2d  at 638-42 (some emphasis original; some emphasis added).
The discussion in Judge Shaw's dissent of State v. Vereb, 643 N.W.2d 342 (Minn.Ct.App.2002); and State v. Bulington, 783 N.E.2d 338 (Ind.Ct.App.2003),[2] also appropriately *791 points out that in each of those cases, the telephone call supporting the finding that there was a reasonable suspicion for a Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), investigatory stop had many more indicia of reliability than are present in this case. This Court discussed such indicia in Ex parte Kelley, 870 So. 2d 711 (Ala.2003), where we concluded that an experienced narcotics officer who observed a "furtive" transaction between the defendant and a known drug dealer at a bar that was known to be a place where drug transactions were common established sufficient reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop of the defendant. Thus, in Kelley reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop was based upon the investigating officer's personal observation of a suspicious transaction by a known drug dealer in an area where drug transactions were common. In this case, the evidence before us shows only that the police received a telephone call from an unidentified person at a Wal-Mart discount store informing them that Shaver and the two women had purchased pills containing pseudoephedrine. Contrary to the view expressed in the unpublished memorandum, "Shaver and Aaron's subsequent statements that the pseudoephedrine would ultimately be used to manufacture methamphetamine," cannot be a factor supporting a finding of reasonable suspicion to make the vehicle stop in the first place.
*792 We conclude, in light of the authority discussed above, that the scant evidence provided by Deputy Hargett concerning the nature of the Wal-Mart telephone call provides insufficient indicia of reliability to establish the requisite "reasonable suspicion" required under Terry for an investigative stop. As explained, no evidence was presented to indicate that any police work preceding the stop in any way corroborated the telephone tip so as to cumulatively provide "reasonable suspicion," as discussed in State v. White. In the absence of the constitutionally required reasonable suspicion to support the initial stop, none of the evidence gained as a result of that stop or the ensuing detention is properly admissible. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it denied Shaver's motion to suppress the evidence, and the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's judgment. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is therefore reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HOUSTON, SEE, LYONS, BROWN, and WOODALL, JJ., concur.
JOHNSTONE, J., concurs specially.
STUART, J., dissents.
JOHNSTONE, Justice (concurring specially).
But for one reservation, I concur in the scholarly main opinion. My one reservation is that, to the extent that the description of Ex parte Kelley, 870 So. 2d 711 (Ala.2003), contained in the main opinion in the case now before us conflicts with my dissent in Ex parte Kelley, I adhere to the content of that dissent and do not agree to the content of the main opinion in the case now before us. This reservation, however, does not detract from my endorsement of the holdings and the judgment in the main opinion in the case now before us, because I agree that this case is starkly distinguishable from Ex parte Kelley.
[1]  Pseudoephedrine is a "precursor chemical" listed in § 20-2-181, Ala.Code 1975, that may be used in the manufacture of the controlled substance methamphetamine.
[2]  "[I]n State v. Vereb, 643 N.W.2d 342 (Minn.Ct.App.2002), the evidence indicated that a Wal-Mart employee had telephoned the police and informed them that two men had purchased a large number of pills containing cold medication and that the men had made several trips into the store to purchase the pills. When the police arrived at the Wal-Mart store, the employee who had telephoned them informed the officer that the men had just left in a vehicle and provided information about the direction in which the vehicle had gone; the employee also rode with the police to locate the vehicle. When the employee spotted the vehicle and the police officer attempted to follow it, the vehicle began to pull away from the police vehicle and reached speeds in excess of 75 miles per hour. Another police officer was able to eventually stop the vehicle and over 30 boxes of cold-medication pills were found in the vehicle. Although the speeding violation was sufficient by itself to establish probable cause to stop the vehicle, the Minnesota Court of Appeals also held that there was reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop of the vehicle based on the information received from the Wal-Mart employee. Compare State v. Bergerson, 659 N.W.2d 791 (Minn.Ct.App.2003)(distinguishing Vereb and holding that a telephone call from an employee of a hardware store where the appellant had purchased rubber tubing and acetone, without more, was not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop of the appellant's vehicle).

"Similarly, in State v. Bulington, 783 N.E.2d 338 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), the evidence indicated that Cassie Oakley, an employee at a Meijer Superstore who had been advised by Meijer's loss-prevention personnel to be aware of activity involving decongestants or other precursor chemicals that could be used in the manufacture of methamphetamine, observed two individuals standing near a display of nasal decongestant. The State presented testimony that a local drug task force had requested to be notified of anyone who purchased, among other things, three or more boxes of cold medicine. The evidence indicated that Dan Majors, Meijer's in-store detective, observed the two individuals select three boxes each of ephedrine, purchase the boxes at different checkout counters, act as if they did not know each other when leaving the store, and then get in the same vehicle and remove the pills from the boxes and put them in shopping bags. Majors telephoned the police and alerted them to the activities, and an officer arrived just as the suspects' vehicle was leaving the parking lot of the store. The officer confirmed, via the dispatcher who was speaking with Majors, which vehicle the suspects were in, and then initiated the stop of the vehicle. Bulington was driving the vehicle and the officer subsequently discovered over 100 pills containing ephedrine in the vehicle. In holding that the trial court had erroneously granted Bulington's motion to suppress, the Indiana Court of Appeals noted specific testimony that had been presented at the suppression hearing, such as the testimony that the local drug task force had requested Meijer employees to provide them with information about activity involving purchases of precursor chemicals, the testimony of both employees from the Meijer Superstore that had been involved, and the officer's rendition of the information that he had been provided by the dispatcher while he was en route to the store and in verifying that he was about to stop the correct vehicle."
Shaver, 894 So. 2d  at 778-79 (Shaw, J., dissenting).