Title: NL Industries, Inc. v. Dill

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

NL Industries, Inc. v. Dill1989 WY 57769 P.2d 920Case Number: 88-16Decided: 03/01/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
NL 
INDUSTRIES, INC., APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
JOE E. 
DILL, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from 
the District Court, NatronaCounty, Harry E. Leimback, 
J.

 
 
Kathleen 
Audette Rideout, Casper and William Bruce 
Thompson and Michael S. Smith of Shaw, Spangler & Roth, Denver, Colo., for appellant.

 
 
Donald L. 
Painter, Casper, 
for appellee.

 
 
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

 
 

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1.]     Wyoming oil industry 
retrenchment produced this litigation over employee relocation benefits claimed 
after subsequent termination. The employee succeeded in the trial court and will 
again on appeal as presenting contest of the awarded benefits and resulting 
statutory attorney's fees except for Texas litigative costs.

 
 
[¶2.]     The relocation 
reimbursement expense awarded was $13,050.96 for residence sales costs and 
attorney's fees of $1,769.38 for Wyoming 
counsel in the present proceedings and attorney's fees of $1,308.50 expended by 
a Texas 
attorney to defend an earlier suit brought by NL Industries, Inc. (NL 
Industries). This claim originally resulted when the employee, Joe E. Dill 
(Dill), was transferred from Casper to Powell, Wyoming by his employer, NL Industries. 
Following transfer and management of the Powell facility from June 1985 through 
August 1986, Dill was discharged as part of an apparent company retrenchment 
program. Upon notice of discharge, he submitted a relocation claim for his move 
to Powell for $13,523.96, which centers the litigative activities that followed. 
We are presented with a sufficiency of the evidence question involving rejection 
of the relocation benefit and a legal argument whether those expenses are within 
the character of employment benefits for which attorney's fees are collectible 
upon non-payment under W.S. 27-4-104(b).1

 
 
[¶3.]     This court is provided 
a simplified evidentiary inquiry since a transcript of trial evidence was not 
secured and the statement of the record under W.R.A.P. 4.03 was accomplished by 
trial court adoption of the Dill proposal as successful litigant. Consequently, 
there are no "evidentiary conflicts" and this leaves only a construction of the 
detailed events for present appellate review. Feaster v. Feaster, 721 P.2d 1095 
(Wyo. 1986). 
Furthermore, we are not presented with a situation within this appeal to either 
deny the existence of NL Industries' policy covering an established relocation 
benefit or to contest the amount initially claimed except as the figure was 
estimated at termination and then not totally incurred.

 
 
[¶4.]     The case does present 
the inquiry confined within the facts and circumstances found to exist, whether 
the benefit was due to the ex-employee and, if so, were attorney's fees 
statutorily justified for the collection litigation. NL Industries objects to 
payment since Dill had not sold his Casper home which was the subject of the 
relocation benefit by the time his employment was terminated. It is argued that 
since Dill at the time he incurred the residence sale expense was not an 
employee of NL Industries, he is not entitled to reimbursement from NL 
Industries.

 
 
[¶5.]     Three unquestioned 
facts are injected into this denial argument. First, following divorce preceding 
his move to Powell, Dill had an obligation under the divorce decree to sell the 
Casper house 
without regard for later transfer. Consequently, it is argued that no damage 
resulted since the transfer did not cause the residence to be sold. Second, the 
house was occupied on occasion while Dill was living in Powell by members of his 
family, disproving damage. Third, after termination, he returned to Casper to sell the house, 
which is exactly what he had attempted to do before transfer. At that time, he 
was no longer an employee and his rights, if any, had ended with 
discharge.

 
 
[¶6.]     Certain established 
facts from the settled record are directed to these payment defenses. In 1975, 
Dill had been employed by NL Industries from out-of-state and was paid moving 
expenses to Powell. Thereafter, when transferred to Casper, the relocation 
expenses were again paid. In 1985, while considering a favorable early 
retirement opportunity, a store manager vacancy in Powell developed after the 
unexpected death of the existing manager. After initial acceptance of the 
retirement package on May 23, 1985, Dill was later transferred to Powell to fill 
the vacancy. When Dill was in Powell, he had to rent an apartment and submitted 
none of this expense as part of his relocation claim to NL 
Industries.

 
 
[¶7.]     Singularly significant 
within trial court analysis and for our resolution is Exhibit 23, dated December 
31, 1985, the written memorandum from a company supervisor to the central office 
referencing Joe Dill - relocation, which stated:

 
 
As a 
reminder, Joe Dill, was promised full relocation benefits whenever he disposes 
of the Casper 
home, per NL Relocation Policy of June, 1984. This is in connection with Joe's 
transfer to Powell as District Manager.

 
 
The 
authenticity or the authority of the memorandum was not questioned by either 
record or answered inquiry at oral argument.

 
 
[¶8.]     When sufficiency of the 
evidence is questioned, we analyze the facts giving due preference to the trial 
court.

 
 
     Our rule is that where 
the sufficiency of evidence is an issue we uphold the judgment if there is 
evidence to support it, and in so doing we look only to the evidence submitted 
by the prevailing party and give to it every favorable inference which may be 
drawn therefrom, without considering any contrary 
evidence.

 
 
Hance v. 
Straatsma, 721 P.2d 575, 578 (Wyo. 1986). See also Ruby Drilling Co., Inc. 
v. Title Guar. Co. of Wyoming, Inc., 750 P.2d 674 (Wyo. 1988); Eddy v. First 
Wyoming Bank, N.A.-Lander, 750 P.2d 294 (Wyo. 
1988); and Scott v. Fagan, 684 P.2d 805, 809 (Wyo. 1984).

 
 
[¶9.]     The documentary 
evidence including the Exhibit 23 memorandum is sufficient to support the trial 
court's decision that the claimed benefits were promised to Dill in conjunction 
with his move to Powell and were not thereafter subject to revocation by his 
unexpected employment termination. Dill's rejection of early retirement was 
clearly premised upon continued managerial employment in Powell which was the 
basis for his move. Maintenance of a house in Casper and an apartment in Powell carried 
significant additional expenses. Furthermore, nothing extrapolated from intent 
to sell before moving or actual sale after termination to constitute a justified 
basis for NL Industries to withdraw the agreed benefits.

 
 
[¶10.]  As the trial court accurately found in 
decision letter:

 
 
     The plaintiff worked 
in Powell, Wyoming for an extended period of time and then was 
transferred to Casper, 
Wyoming. On March 27, 1985 the 
defendant sent notice [to] the plaintiff and all other employees similarly 
situated offering early retirement under certain specified conditions. The 
memorandum required acceptance prior to June 15, 1985. The plaintiff met the 
requirements and on May 23, 1985, submitted his application for retirement. 
However, prior to the acceptance by the company a position in Powell[,] 
Wyoming was 
offered to plaintiff, which he accepted. At that time the plaintiff withdrew his 
application for early retirement.

 
 
     As a result of the 
above referenced job acceptance, the plaintiff was relocated in 
Powell.

 
 
     On September 5, 1985, 
the company again offered early retirement to the plaintiff and all other 
employees similarly situated. This offer resembled the earlier proposal except 
that it required acceptance by October 31, 1985. The plaintiff also rejected 
that proposal.

 
 
     In late 1986, the 
defendant was involuntarily terminated as an employee of defendant 
company.

 
 
     DECISION. According to 
the evidence the plaintiff advanced to a grade 10 under the defendant's salary 
grade scale. On September 1, 1980 the company adopted and published a procedure 
entitled "Employee Relocation Assistance" and on May 15, 1984 it adopted an 
amendment to that procedure to cover grade 9 employees and above. The plaintiff 
claims that he is entitled to the full benefit of the employee relocation 
assistance plan and in that respect sues for $13,050.96.

 
 
     The defendant denies 
liability for the payment of the claimed expenses for the reason that the 
president had never intended to pay anything beyond a minimal amount for 
relocation, however, there was nothing in the evidence to illustrate that that 
intent had ever been conveyed to the plaintiff. The company also asserts that 
the move was granted to the employee at his request, and for the further reason 
that plaintiff's residential property had been put on the market prior to the 
move and was actually sold after the move.

 
 
     The Court finds that 
the expenses claimed were in fact expended by the plaintiff; that such expenses 
fall within the scope of the relocation policy; and that the move to Powell was 
at the instance of the company. It is true that the property was listed for sale 
prior to the move but had not been sold at the time of the move. There is little 
doubt but what the move increased the need for the sale of the residence 
particularly in view of the fact that living quarters had to be rented to 
provide housing for the plaintiff in Powell. The Court also finds that the 
company, through the supervisor L.A. Smith, agreed to pay full location benefits 
including the obligation to pay the cost of selling the residential home located 
in Casper. The 
Court finds that the company is indebted to the plaintiff for the sum of 
$13,050.96.

 
 
On a 
sufficiency of the evidence compendium, we affirm the trial court award of the 
relocation expense as made.

 
 
ATTORNEY'S 
FEES

 
 
[¶11.]  Also argued as trial court error was the 
award of attorney's fees on the basis of statutory construction that relocation 
expenses are not a kind of employee benefit to which the Wyoming statute providing 
for employee attorney's fees should be applied. W.S. 27-4-104(b) 
provides:

 
 
Whenever an 
employee who has quit or has been discharged from service has cause to bring 
suit for wages earned and due, and shall establish in court the amount which is 
justly due, the court shall allow to the plaintiff interest on the past due 
wages at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per annum from the date of discharge 
or termination, together with a reasonable attorney fee and all costs of suit. 
Prosecution of a civil action to recover unpaid wages does not preclude 
prosecution under W.S. 27-4-105.

 
 
[¶12.]  This law relates to mandatory termination 
wage benefits and also applies a misdemeanor criminal offense for violation in 
W.S. 27-4-105. However, neither statutory provision provides a definition of 
wages. NL Industries argues that a restrictive definition of wages should be 
applied as defined in W.S. 27-4-201(a)(i) within the minimum wage article, which 
provides that "`[w]age' means compensation due to an employee by reason of his 
employment." Essentially, NL Industries advocates that wages are limited to 
hourly employees. Conversely, Dill argues for a broader definition of wages as 
found in W.S. 27-4-501(a)(ii) and (iii) within the collection of unpaid wages 
article which provides:

 
 
"Employee" 
means any person suffered or permitted to work by an employer; "Wages" means 
compensation, including fringe benefits, for labor or services rendered by an 
employee, whether the amount is determined on a time, task, piece, commission, 
or other basis.

 
 
[¶13.]  NL Industries' reliance on the 
restrictive definition of "wage" in W.S. 27-4-201(a)(i) is misplaced and not 
applicable to this situation. Their argument finds legislative intent to limit 
the statutory "wage" definition from the minimum wage article. We perceive that 
contention is under-inclusive in not assessing the entire statute where a 
general definition of employee is provided. When the definition of excluded 
individuals which are not employees for the minimum wage article in W.S. 
27-4-201(a)(iv)(C) is read in conjunction with its own confined wage definition, 
it is necessary to conclude that any such restrictive definition is inapplicable 
to the broader function of legal fees presented by the present case. W.S. 
27-4-201(a)(iv)(C) provides:

 
 
            
     (a) As 
used in this act [§§ 27-4-201 through 27-4-204]:

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
                        
(iv) "Employee" includes any individual employed by an employer but shall 
not include:

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
                        
(C) Any individual employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or 
professional capacity. [Emphasis added.]

 
 
This court 
in Hurst v. Davis, 
386 P.2d 943, 947 (Wyo. 1963) has interpreted that statutory 
exclusion and held that managers are "employed in a bona fide executive or 
administrative capacity." The record is clear and undisputed that Dill was 
employed as a manager of the Powell store; thus, the narrow definition in W.S. 
27-4-201(a)(i) for minimum wage analysis is inapplicable to unpaid employee 
benefits and attorney's fees.

 
 
[¶14.]  Undeniably, this action was one for the 
collection of unpaid wages. We recognize that historically, the predecessor to 
W.S. 27-4-104 and W.S. 27-4-105 can be traced to initial enactment in 1919 by 
1919 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 73, and the definitional clause in the collection code 
came to be in 1971 from the 1971 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 156 enactment. However, 
reading the present statutes in pari materia to synthesize a common purpose and 
interest, we agree with the cross-reference by annotation, "[a]s to collection 
of unpaid wages generally, see art. 5 of this chapter." W.S. 27-4-104. See also 
Greenwood v. Wierdsma, 741 P.2d 1079, 1083 n. 2 
(Wyo. 
1987).

 
 
[¶15.]  We apply a reasonable legislative intent 
to achieve a consistent effect that the collection definition logically relates 
to the words "wages earned and due" in the attorney's fee statute. The 
collection code provision through definition has a clearly expanded concept and 
scope of compensation including fringe benefits under the wage umbrella for the 
employee. Consequently, in pari materia approach, the term "wages" as used 
within W.S. 27-4-104 is the same as "wages" defined in W.S. 27-4-501(a)(iii), 
and the employee protected by the attorney's fee statute is the employee 
suffered or permitted to work by W.S. 27-4-501(a)(ii).

 
 
[¶16.]  Our attorney's fees inquiry does not yet 
end since NL Industries has two more objections to all or part of the claimed 
attorney's fees of $3,077.88, which amount is not contested and clearly, in any 
regard, not unreasonable. The first objection is that if the definitional 
section of W.S. 27-4-501 does apply to the attorney's fee statute, relocation 
cost reimbursement is not a fringe benefit "whether the amount is determined by 
time, task, piece, commission or other basis" in accord with W.S. 
27-4-501(a)(iii). While the argument provides evidence of thoughtfulness and 
ingenuity, it lacks real world persuasion. Direct compensation is the money paid 
for employment, and fringe benefits are the ancillary considerations of a 
material nature which include medical insurance, retirement programs, stock 
purchase plans, annual and sick leave, good lighting, coffee hours, and all 
other similar results of employment which serve the personal interests of the 
employer and may further include cars, housing, expense accounts and use of 
credit cards. See Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Smith, 637 P.2d 1020, 1025 
(Wyo. 1981), including as "tangible fringe benefits" the following: "a stock 
purchase plan, health insurance, investment credit matching stock ownership 
plan, group life insurance, and a qualified retirement pension plan * * *" and 
Hobbs v. Lewis, 159 F. Supp. 282, 286 (D.D.C. 1958). The Arizona Court of 
Appeals in J.H. Welsh & Son Contracting Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 
4 Ariz. App. 398, 420 P.2d 970, 974 (1966), aff'd. 102 Ariz. 443, 432 P.2d 455 
(1967) simply defined "fringe benefits" in relation to insurance, pension, and 
vacation funds as:

 
 
     "Fringe benefits" are 
payments made to various trust funds in addition to the normal "straight" or 
"conventional" pay that the employee receives in hand on payday, puts into his 
pocket and spends. Since the end of World War II the practice has arisen not 
only in Phoenix but throughout the 
United 
States of adding to these base payments the 
additional fringe payments.

 
 
Another 
definition of "fringe benefits" that is pertinent 
provides:

 
 
Side 
benefits which accompany or are in addition to a person's employment such as 
paid insurance, recreational facilities, profit-sharing plans, paid holidays and 
vacations, etc. Such benefits are in addition to regular salary or wages and are 
a matter of bargaining in union contracts.

 
 
Black's Law 
Dictionary 601 (5th ed. 1979). Reimbursement for relocation expense is, in its 
very nature, within the broad character of employee fringe benefits where 
provided by the employer. See Lull v. C.I.R., 434 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1970), 
employer's reimbursement for relocation expenses is compensation to employees; 
Horizon Corp. v. Weinberg, 23 Ariz. App. 215, 531 P.2d 1153, 1156 (1975); Shelor 
v. Shelor, 683 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Mo. App. 1984), overruled on other grounds sub 
nom. Giedinghagen v. Giedinghagen, 712 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. App. 1986); and 3 
Employment Coordinator (Research Ins. Am.) ¶ B-18,906 (1989). Authority cited to 
the contrary lacks persuasion as unrealistically oppressive for a broad and 
easily utilized definition within general knowledge and common acceptance of 
both industry and labor.

 
 
[¶17.]  The second objection lodged by NL 
Industries is to the payment of $1,308.50 expended by Dill for employment of a 
Texas 
attorney. After Dill's employment was terminated and he filed a relocation 
claim, NL Industries undertook a litigative resolution by filing a Texas declaratory 
judgment action to authenticate non-liability for the relocation claim. Dill 
fought off that confrontation because the Texas court lacked jurisdiction over him. Dill 
then instituted the present proceeding in Wyoming where he lived and NL Industries was 
doing business. Reluctantly, based on statutory provision and stare decisis, we 
agree with NL Industries' objection no matter what the equities might otherwise 
be.

 
 
[¶18.]  The challenged Wyoming statute of W.S. 
27-4-104(b) is clear and specifically stated. W.S. 27-4-104(b) relates to an 
employee who "has cause to bring suit 
* * * [as providing for allowance] to 
the plaintiff * * * [for] a reasonable attorney fee." [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 
[¶19.]  It has been a continuous and firmly 
entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that attorney's fees are awarded only if 
there is either statutory authority or a specific contractual provision. In this 
case, lacking contractual provision, the only opportunity for recovery by the 
employee is pursuant to the beneficial provisions, if any, of a statute. 
Recognizing and honoring the legislative prerogative to establish when 
noncontractual attorney's fees are collectible, we will not stretch the 
provision enacted to include legal fees for defense of a Texas proceeding brought 
as a separate suit where Dill was emplaced as a responding defendant. Lacking a 
cross appeal on malicious prosecution, we reverse for deletion of attorney's 
fees entailed by his defense of the Texas litigation.

 
 
     "It is an established 
proposition that `the intention of the legislature must primarily be determined 
from the language of the statute itself, and not from conjectures aliunde. When 
the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and 
definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory 
interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious 
meaning. This principle is to be adhered to notwithstanding the fact that the 
court may be convinced by extraneous circumstances that the legislature intended 
to enact something very different from that which it did 
enact.'"

 
 
State ex 
rel. Fawcett v. Board of County Com'rs of Albany County, 73 Wyo. 69, 273 P.2d 188, 196-97 (1954) (quoting Farmers-Kissinger Market House Co. v. City of 
Reading, 310 Pa. 493, 165 A. 398, 400 (1933)). The statute is clear, 
unambiguous, and dispositive; thus, we will not interpret the statute through 
rules of construction to seek further legislative intent. See Wyoming Ins. Dept. v. Avemco Ins. Co., 726 P.2d 507 
(Wyo. 1986) and Adobe Oil & Gas Corp. v. 
Getter Trucking, Inc., 676 P.2d 560 (Wyo. 1984).

 
 
[¶20.]  Affirmed, except remanded to delete award 
of Texas 
attorney's fees; costs of appeal which may include attorney's fees are awarded 
to appellee.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 In this Wyoming proceeding (a prior dismissed action was filed by 
NL Industries against Dill in Texas), Dill 
included a claim for malicious prosecution arising out of the Texas activity and for 
retirement benefits. The trial court ruled against the employee in both regards. 
Dill brought a cross appeal on the denial of retirement benefits which was 
dismissed on February 18, 1988 for want of prosecution. W.R.A.P. 
5.11.