Title: High Point Bank & Trust Co. v. Highmark Props., LLC

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

NO. COA13-471 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 17 December 2013 
 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Durham County 
No. 11 CRS 052430 
RANDY BENJAMIN BARTLETT 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by the State from order entered 22 February 2013 by 
Judge Orlando F. Hudson, Jr. in Durham County Superior Court.  
Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 September 2013. 
 
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General 
Joseph L. Hyde, for the State. 
 
Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate 
Defender David W. Andrews, for Defendant. 
 
 
DILLON, Judge. 
 
 
The State appeals from the trial court’s order granting 
Defendant’s motion to suppress, contending the Honorable Orlando 
Hudson did not have the authority to sign the order entered on 13 
February 2013, because the hearing was before the Honorable Abraham 
Jones on 18 December 2012.  Because Judge Jones’ ruling from the 
bench on 18 December 2012 was sufficient, in this case, to enter 
the trial court’s order allowing Defendant’s motion to suppress, 
we conclude the State’s argument is without merit.   
-2- 
 
 
The evidence of record tends to show the following:  On 25 
March 2011 at approximately 1:00 A.M., Officer Howard Henry of the 
Durham County Police Department saw Randy Benjamin Bartlett 
(“Defendant”) allegedly speeding on I-40.  Officer Henry believed 
he was “racing” or attempting to race a Corvette.  Officer Henry 
estimated that Defendant was driving 80 mph in a 65 mph zone.  
Officer Henry pulled Defendant and, upon approaching the driver’s 
side of the vehicle, detected a strong odor of alcohol.  
Defendant’s wife, Ms. Jamie Jones, was a passenger in the vehicle.  
When Officer Henry asked Defendant if he had been drinking, 
Defendant replied that he had had two beers.  After performing a 
series of field sobriety tests, Officer Henry arrested Defendant 
for speeding and driving while impaired.  
 
On 17 February 2012, Defendant filed a motion to suppress the 
evidence gathered after his arrest based on the lack of probable 
cause to arrest Defendant.  A probable cause hearing was held 
before Judge Jones on 18 December 2012.  Officer Henry, Ms. Jones, 
and Mr. Julian Douglas Scott (“Mr. Scott”) testified at the 
hearing.   
Officer Henry testified that he executed a series of field 
sobriety tests to determine that probable cause existed to arrest 
Defendant on the basis of driving while impaired.  First, Officer 
-3- 
 
 
Henry performed the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (“HGN”) field 
sobriety test, and he stated that “[t]he first part of the HGN is 
to check his pupils to make sure that they’re of normal size, which 
his were.”  Officer Henry stated, however, that Defendant’s eyes 
lacked “smooth pursuit,” and Defendant had “sustained nystagmus at 
a maximum deviation in both eyes.”  Defendant did not exhibit “the 
onset of nystagmus prior to 45 degrees[.]”  Officer Henry also 
executed the “walk and turn” field sobriety test, which Officer 
Henry admitted, “he was able to do” it.  In the next portion of 
the field sobriety test, Defendant was asked to take nine steps, 
heal to toe, on an imaginary line, then turn around and take nine 
additional steps on the same imaginary line.  Defendant stepped 
off the imaginary line once.  Defendant was also asked to perform 
“the one-leg stand” field sobriety test, which entailed “rais[ing] 
the foot . . . six inches from the ground, keeping the foot parallel 
to the ground and the leg straight, and then keeping his hands 
down to his side[,]” while he was “to count one thousand one, one 
thousand two, and to keep counting until [Officer Henry told] him 
to stop.”  Defendant passed this test.  Lastly, Defendant was asked 
to do a “preliminary breath test,” which Officer Henry performed 
twice, and which gave a positive result both times, indicating 
that Defendant had some alcohol in his system.   
-4- 
 
 
Mr. Scott was qualified as an expert1 at the hearing in this 
matter and testified for Defendant that, on the undisputed evidence 
presented concerning this particular stop, he would not have “been 
comfortable” making the arrest. 
 
At the end of the hearing, Judge Jones stated, “I may be 
wrong, but I think the guy substantially passed the test. . . .  
So on the basis of that, I’ll grant the motion.  You draw up the 
order, get it to me.”   
 
Subsequently, Judge Hudson signed an order drafted by the 
parties, making findings of fact and conclusions of law based on 
the evidence presented at the hearing before Judge Jones, and 
granting Defendant’s motion to suppress.  From this written order, 
the State appeals.   
I: Authority of Superior Court Judges 
 
In the State’s sole argument on appeal, it contends Judge 
Hudson had no authority to sign the order prepared for Judge Jones, 
based upon evidence presented at a hearing before Judge Jones.  We 
find it unnecessary to reach this question. 
                     
1 Mr. Scott had formerly been employed as a police officer and had 
taken the “standardized field sobriety testing student course” and 
the “detection and standardized field sobriety testing instructor 
training course.”  He had also completed his certification 
requirements and become “the first drug recognition expert in North 
Carolina.”  He then founded the State’s “drug recognition expert 
training program” and coordinated the program for three years.   
-5- 
 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-977(f) (2011), requires that “[t]he 
judge must set forth in the record his findings of facts and 
conclusions of law.”  Id.  However, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-977(f), 
has been interpreted as “mandating a written order unless (1) the 
trial court provides its rationale from the bench, and (2) there 
are no material conflicts in the evidence at the suppression 
hearing.”  State v. Williams, 195 N.C. App. 554, 555, 673 S.E.2d 
394, 395 (2009) (citation omitted).  “If these two criteria are 
met, the necessary findings of fact are implied from the denial of 
the motion to suppress.”  Id.   
“[A] material conflict in the evidence exists when evidence 
presented by one party controverts evidence presented by an 
opposing party such that the outcome of the matter to be decided 
is likely to be affected.”  State v. Morgan, __ N.C. App. __, __, 
741 S.E.2d 422, 425 (2013). 
In this case, there was no material conflict in the evidence 
presented at the suppression hearing.  Officer Henry was the only 
witness who supplied testimony concerning Defendant’s performance 
in the field sobriety tests.  Compare, Morgan, __ N.C. App. at __, 
741 S.E.2d at 426 (stating that the defendant and the detective’s 
recitations of the facts were contradictory, and concluding that 
there was a material conflict in the evidence, when the defendant 
-6- 
 
 
stated, but the detective denied, that the detective “indicated he 
could help defendant get probation” if the defendant signed a 
waiver, and when the defendant also stated that he was “‘highly 
under the influence’ of the controlled substances” but the 
detective opined that the “defendant did not appear to be under 
the influence of any ‘impairing-type substance’”); State v. 
Williams, __ N.C. App. __, __, 715 S.E.2d 553, 558 (2011) (holding 
that, under the circumstances, even though the defendant’s 
testimony conflicted with the detective’s testimony, the conflict 
was not material, because the conflict was not “such that the 
outcome of the matter to be decided [was] likely to be affected”).   
In the present case, there were differing opinions regarding 
whether the evidence presented by Officer Henry concerning 
Defendant’s performance during the field sobriety tests supported 
Officer Henry’s decision that there was probable cause to believe 
that Defendant was appreciably impaired.  However, the actual 
evidence concerning Defendant’s performance in the field sobriety 
tests was undisputed.  For this reason – because the evidence in 
this case was not materially conflicting and because Judge Jones 
supplied the rationale for his ruling from the bench – we conclude 
that the order granting Defendant’s motion to suppress was 
effectively entered on 18 December 2012 in open court.  Therefore, 
-7- 
 
 
Judge Hudson’s 22 February 2013 written order, containing findings 
of facts and conclusions of law based on the evidence received at 
the 18 December 2012 hearing, was unnecessary.  State v. Oates, 
366 N.C. 264, 268, 732 S.E.2d 571, 574 (2012) (stating that 
“[w]hile 
a 
written 
determination 
is 
the 
best 
practice, 
nevertheless the statute does not require that these findings and 
conclusions be in writing”) (citing State v. Horner, 310 N.C. 274, 
279, 311 S.E.2d 281, 285 (1984)).  
AFFIRMED. 
Judge McGEE and Judge McCULLOUGH concur.