Title: Jackson v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Valentino Maurice Jackson v. State of Maryland 
No. 96, September Term, 2000
Headnote:  
We hold that the trial court’s comments at sentencing exceeded the outer limit
of a judge’s broad discretion in sentencing and therefore amounted to the use
of impermissible sentencing criteria.  The sentencing judge gave the impression
that he based petitioner’s sentence, in part at least, on his belief  that petitioner
was from Baltimore City.  In other words, he considered petitioner’s origin in
formulating the sentence.  This would clearly be an improper factor upon which
to base a sentencing and gives, at the least, an inference of a lack of impartiality.
Additionally, his statements could give rise to an inference that race was
inappropriately considered in sentencing.   Accordingly, we reverse the decision
of the Court of Special Appeals and remand the case to that court with
instructions to vacate the sentence of the Circuit Court for Howard County and
remand the case to that court for re-sentencing before a different judge.  
Circuit Court for Howard County
Case # 13-K-98-037053
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 96
September Term, 2000
VALENTINO MAURICE JACKSON
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C. J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
           Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
Filed:     May 11, 2001
1  The Court of Special Appeals also addressed whether the sentencing court erred in
imposing separate sentences for reckless endangerment and second degree assault, offenses
that merge into a conviction for first degree assault.  That court held that the sentencing court
did err and that a sentence should have been imposed only on the first degree assault
conviction.  As a result, the convictions for reckless endangerment and second degree assault
were vacated.     
2  We denied two other petitions for writ of certiorari relating to the case sub judice:
(1) the pro se petition filed by Valentino Maurice Jackson; and (2) the conditional cross
petition filed by the State.  We will therefore only address the issue presented to us by the
Appellate Division of the Public Defender’s Office.
This case calls into question the appropriateness of comments made by a trial judge
during the sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding.  On May 5, 1999, following a jury trial
in the Circuit Court for Howard County, Valentino Maurice Jackson, petitioner, was convicted
of first degree assault, second degree assault, reckless endangerment, and unlawful possession
of a short-barreled shotgun.  On August 16, 1999, the trial judge imposed a total sentence of
eighteen years in the Division of Corrections.  In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special
Appeals affirmed the judgment.1  Pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-303, petitioner presented one
issue for which we granted certiorari:  
Did the trial court’s comments at sentencing that people moved to
Howard County to get away from people like Petitioner, who come to Howard
County from Baltimore City and act like they are animals living in the jungle,
exceed the outer limit of the judge’s broad discretion in sentencing and amount
to impermissible sentencing criteria?[2]   
We answer petitioner’s question in the affirmative.  We hold that the trial court’s comments
at sentencing exceeded the outer limit of a judge’s broad discretion in sentencing and therefore
amounted to the application of impermissible sentencing criteria.  Accordingly, we reverse the
decision of the Court of Special Appeals and remand the case to that court with instructions
3 At the time of trial, Mr. Woods was serving a one-year sentence for CDS possession
with intent to distribute in the Howard County Detention Center.
-2-
to vacate the sentence of the Circuit Court for Howard County and to remand the case to that
court for resentencing before a different judge.       
Facts
The victim of the assault in the underlying case is named Mitchell Woods (Woods).
He is a self-confessed drug dealer who both resides and conducts his illicit business in Howard
County.  Apparently, petitioner or members of his family were among Woods’s  customers.
Woods testified that at approximately 1:00 a.m. on July 12, 1998, petitioner came to Woods’
townhouse at 5593 Cedar Lane in Columbia, Maryland3 to purchase cocaine.  Woods refused
to sell petitioner any drugs because he alleged that petitioner owed him money, apparently
from previous drug sales.  Petitioner became angry, and a brief verbal altercation took place
between the two men after which petitioner left Woods’ townhouse.
According to Woods’ testimony, approximately two hours later, at 3:30 a.m., he and his
friend, Corey Drain, were standing in the parking area in front of his townhouse when petitioner
drove up in an automobile and called out Woods’ name.  Petitioner then exited the vehicle and
confronted Woods with a short-barreled shotgun.  When petitioner pointed the shotgun at him,
Woods stopped walking towards the car and tried to convince petitioner to put the shotgun
down by telling him that there were police in the area.  Woods further testified that at this time,
the police came upon the incident and arrested petitioner.  
Officer Daniel Boehler of the Howard County Police Department testified that he was
4  The sentencing judge imposed separate concurrent sentences for each count: eighteen
years for first degree assault; eight years for second degree assault; three years for reckless
endangerment; and three years for possession of a short-barreled shotgun.  The Court of
Special Appeals vacated the sentences for reckless endangerment and second degree assault.
See, supra, footnote 1.
5  Apparently, “the city” is referring to Baltimore City.
-3-
in the area responding to a domestic call when he noticed petitioner standing in the parking lot
pointing a shotgun at Woods.  The officer drew his weapon on petitioner and ordered him to
place the weapon on the ground, back away from it, and keep his hands where the officer could
see them.  Petitioner followed the officer’s orders and was subsequently arrested.  The shotgun
was confiscated and upon inspection was found to have been loaded with two rounds. 
On May 5, 1999, following a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Howard County,
petitioner was convicted of first degree assault, second degree assault, reckless endangerment,
and unlawful possession of a short-barreled shotgun.  On August 16, 1999, the trial judge
imposed a total sentence of eighteen years imprisonment.4  In imposing  sentence, the judge
stated:
THE COURT:  Well, this case was very well prepared and very well
presented by both sides.  Mr. Tauber did his very best.  Convinced the jury that
Mr. Jackson was not carrying a weapon openly with intent to injure.  He was
found not guilty of that charge.  He was found guilty of first degree assault,
second degree assault, reckless endangerment and possessing an unlawful short-
barreled shotgun.  And I agree that Mr. Woods is no bargain.  Now,
unfortunately, a number of communities in the lovely city of Columbia have
attracted a large number of rotten apples.  Unfortunately, most of them came
from the city.[5]  And they live and act like they’re living in a ghetto
somewhere.  And [t]hey weren’t invited out here to [behave] like animals.
Drugs and guns and drugs and guns.  It’s nonsensical.  Other people don’t want
that.  Other people don’t tolerate that.  And the problem here, of course, is that
although Mr. Jackson has a drug problem, none of these people talk about drug
-4-
problems.  This is the great Valentino Jackson.  So he’s great part of the day and
he’s goofy the other part of the day.  With guns and drugs.  So he turns it on and
turns it off at will.  And it’s admirable that he’s able to deal effectively with his
superiors in the military as well as the civilian employees at Toby’s Dinner
Theater.  But roaming around the streets at 3:30 in the morning, going to a
WaWa, uh, going to somebody — going out of the way to go to somebody
else’s house and confront people with sawed-off shotguns is what they do in
the city.  That’s why people moved out here.  To get away from people like
Mr. Jackson.  Not to associate with them and have them follow them out here
and act like this was a jungle of some kind.  So.  It’s not.  And our only
chance to preserve it is to protect it.  The other thing that’s discouraging, of
course, is that Mr. Jackson was placed on supervised probation on two previous
occasions and he not only didn’t do well on probation, he failed miserably.  And
the reason he failed miserably was because he made no effort while under
supervision to take advantage of the opportunity to address the very problems
that he was well aware of.  So it’s simply a question of warehousing him, to tell
you the truth.  All right.  Do you have anything further to say, Mr. Jackson?  I’ll
give you a chance now that you’ve had an opportunity to recover.   
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.  Your Honor, I was never trying to hurt anyone.
But my families was, uh, my family was attacked and all I was trying to do was
help and do something.  To stop it from going to where it went.  And now my
brother’s away recovering, thank God.  Like you said, (unintelligible) for a year.
And I’m the one looking at the time.  I was the middle person.  (Unintelligible)
I mean —  
THE COURT:  Well, you worked hard to be a bad person and you
accomplished it.  Civilized people are not on the roads at 3:30 in the
morning, confronting other people with sawed-off shotguns.  Civilized
people don’t own sawed-off shotguns.  Only criminals.  Only criminals looking
for no good, that’s why a sawed-off shotgun.  So, I mean, what can I say?
[Emphasis added.] 
In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed petitioner’s sentence for first
degree assault and possession of a short-barreled shotgun.  That court concluded:
We have reviewed the entire transcript of the sentencing hearing and find
no indication, from the remarks made by the sentencing court or from any
information supplied by counsel, that the court was under the impression that
appellant [now petitioner] was not from Howard County.  As the excerpt we have
6  The excerpt the Court of Special Appeals quoted is substantially the same excerpt that
we have quoted supra in the case sub judice.
-5-
quoted reveals,[6] the court made general comments about people moving to
Columbia from other places, many from Baltimore City, and about how some
of those people brought with them a culture of drugs and guns that has harmed
the communities to which they have moved.  Those comments were not directed
to the “otherness” or outsider status of the people moving into Columbia from
Baltimore City or elsewhere.  Rather, they were a commentary about how many
of the problems most often associated with the poorest urban areas of Baltimore
City are now cropping up in suburban towns like Columbia.  The court did not
appear concerned about where appellant [now petitioner] had come from — or
whether he was an outsider to Howard County at all.  It seemed concerned about
the nature of the conduct in which he had been engaging, and his recalcitrance
to changing his behavior.  Those were not impermissible considerations for the
court to make during sentencing.
We granted certiorari to address whether the trial court’s comments at sentencing exceed the
outer limit of the judge’s broad discretion in sentencing and amount to impermissible
sentencing criteria.   
Discussion
It is well settled that “[a] judge is vested with very broad discretion in sentencing
criminal defendants.”  Poe v. State, 341 Md. 523, 531, 671 A.2d 501, 505 (1996); Gary v.
State, 341 Md. 513, 516, 671 A.2d 495, 496 (1996); Jennings v. State, 339 Md. 675, 683,
664 A.2d 903, 907 (1995); Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 265, 647 A.2d 1204, 1209 (1994);
Logan v. State, 289 Md. 460, 480, 425 A.2d 632, 642 (1981).  However, “[a] judge should
fashion a sentence based upon the facts and circumstances of the crime committed and the
background of the defendant, including his or her reputation, prior offenses, health, habits,
mental and moral propensities, and social background.”  Poe, 341 Md. at 532, 671 A.2d at 505
-6-
(internal citation omitted).  “The judge is accorded this broad latitude to best accomplish the
objectives of sentencing — punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation.” State v. Dopkowski,
325 Md. 671, 679, 602 A.2d 1185, 1189 (1992), citing Johnson v. State, 274 Md. 536, 540,
336 A.2d 113, 115 (1975).  It is also well settled that “[o]nly three grounds for appellate
review of sentences are recognized in this [S]tate: (1) whether the sentence constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment or violates other constitutional requirements; (2) whether the
sentencing judge was motivated by ill-will, prejudice or other impermissible
considerations; and (3) whether the sentence is within statutory limits.”  Gary, 341 Md. at
516, 671 A.2d at 496 (emphasis added), citing Teasley v. State, 298 Md. 364, 370, 470 A.2d
337, 340 (1984); see Reid v. State, 302 Md. 811, 820, 490 A.2d 1289, 1294 (1985).  The first
and third grounds are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of case at bar; however, the
issue before us involves the second ground — whether the sentencing judge was motivated by
ill-will, prejudice or other impermissible considerations. 
In United States v. Diamond, 561 F.2d 557 (4th Cir. 1977), the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered comments made by a sentencing judge that are
similar to the comments made by the sentencing judge in the case at bar.  In that case, two
defendants, originally from New York, were convicted of theft of an interstate shipment of
goods in Virginia.  In sentencing, the trial judge said:
I don’t know that — I suppose you have a constitutional right to commit a crime
wherever you want to commit it.  But the Court takes a dim view of people
coming down from New York to commit their crimes in Virginia.
Now, I suppose that that is grounds for appeal, but I will state it right for the
7  The evidence presented in the record and in petitioner’s pre-sentence report indicates
that petitioner was born in the borough of Brooklyn in New York City.  He had lived in the
Columbia in Howard County for the past thirteen years, since he was approximately nineteen
(continued...)
-7-
record.  If they want to live and have their being in the State of New York, then
let them have their source of a livelihood in the State of New York.  
If that livelihood is crime, then commit it up there . . . .
   
Id. at 559.  That appellate court affirmed the convictions but vacated the sentences.  In its
holding the court said:
From our examination of the record, we are persuaded that the district
judge exhibited no bias during defendants’ jury trial, but we conclude that the
quoted comments ineluctably reflect bias in sentencing.  The inference that the
district judge considered as a factor in sentencing the fact that defendants who
committed a crime within the district in which he presided were nonresidents
is inescapable.  We cannot permit a district judge who is an officer of a national
judicial system and who is enforcing a national criminal code to be moved by
such considerations of parochialism in imposing sentences.  We therefore
vacate the sentences and remand the cases with directions that defendants be
resentenced before a different district judge of the district.
    
Id.  
Similarly, the sentencing judge in the case sub judice, gave the impression that he
based his sentence, at least in part, on something beyond the facts and circumstances of the
crime and the background of petitioner — specifically, that the sentencing judge based his
sentence, at least in part, on a belief that petitioner was from Baltimore City.  This is clearly
an improper factor to base sentencing upon and gives the impression that the sentence imposed
on petitioner by this judge may have been more severe based on the judge’s belief that
petitioner was from Baltimore City.7  Simply stated, it is not permissible to base the severity
7(...continued)
years of age.  We have no indication why the sentencing judge believed, if he did, that
petitioner had been a resident of Baltimore City. 
-8-
of sentencing on where people live, have lived, or where they were raised. 
Additionally, the fact that the sentencing judge, who is Caucasian, uses words such as
“ghetto,” “jungle,” “animals,” and “people like Mr. Jackson” who come “from the city” in
describing an African-American defendant, has called into question, whether his comments
might also have constituted racial bias, or the appearance of racial bias.  In his brief, petitioner
states:
Imagine that you are an African-American . . . .  You are standing before
a judge, a Caucasian gentleman, who is about to sentence you for your crimes.
Before imposing a sentence of eighteen years’ imprisonment, the judge
addresses you as follows: [There follows relevant portions of the trial judge’s
comments we have before mentioned.]  Undoubtedly, you, as would any
reasonable person, would conclude from these comments that the sentence
imposed was based, to some degree, on racial prejudice.  And, even if the
statements do not reflect actual racial prejudice on the part of the sentencer, the
highly charged words used here plainly give an appearance of such prejudice
. . . .
While we cannot determine on the basis of this record whether the sentencing judge’s
comments were actually based on race, and thus whether petitioner was also improperly
sentenced by the sentencing judge in part because of his being an African-American, we
recognize that the language used by the sentencing judge when sentencing petitioner could lead
a reasonable person to draw such an inference.  The constitutional guarantee of due process
of law forbids a court from imposing a sentence based in any part on inappropriate
considerations, including improper considerations relating to race.  As we discussed, supra,
-9-
although we cannot determine whether the sentencing judge’s comments were actually based
on race, the sentencing judge clearly was not alert to avoid comments that may be so perceived.
We have previously had the opportunity to consider improper appeals to racial
prejudice, albeit by a prosecutor.  In Contee v. State, 223 Md. 575, 165 A.2d 889 (1960), an
African-American male was being tried for the rape of a Caucasian woman.  The prosecutor
made repeated remarks designed to emphasize the racial distinctions between the victim and
the accused.  We noted that a “[trial] court should not countenance or permit unwarranted and
improper appeals to racial prejudice to be made or go unnoticed.”  Id. at 583, 165 A.2d at 894.
While we note that the racial overtones of the prosecutor’s remarks in Contee were blatant
when compared to the statements of the sentencing judge in the case sub judice, the potential
for a racially biased result remains the same.  
Other jurisdictions are in accord with our holdings that matters of race and matters of
a defendant’s place of residence or origins are inappropriate sentencing considerations.  In
United States v. Leung, 40 F.3d 577 (2d Cir. 1994), when sentencing a woman of Chinese
descent for conspiracy to possess and distribute a controlled dangerous substance the judge
said:
We have enough home-grown criminals in the United States without importing
them. . . . 
The purpose of my sentence here is to punish the defendant and to
generally deter others, particularly others in the Asiatic community because this
case received a certain amount of publicity in the Asiatic community, and I want
the word to go out from this courtroom that we don’t permit dealing in heroin
and it is against [precedent] law, it is against the customs of the United States,
and if people want to come to the United States they had better abide by our
-10-
laws.  That’s the reason for the sentence, punishment and general deterrence. 
Id. at 585.  In vacating Leung’s sentence, that appellate court concluded that:
In this case, we are confident that the able and experienced trial judge in
fact harbored no bias against Leung because of her ethnic origin, her alien status,
or any other categorical factor.  Nevertheless, since “‘justice must satisfy the
appearance of justice,’” even the appearance that the sentence reflects a
defendant’s race or nationality will ordinarily require a remand for sentencing.
We think that there is a sufficient risk that a reasonable observer, hearing or
reading the quoted remarks, might infer, however incorrectly, that Leung’s
ethnicity and alien status played a role in determining her sentence.  
Id. at 586-87 (internal citations omitted); see United States v. Edwardo-Franco, 885 F.2d
1002, 1005 (2d Cir. 1989) (sentencing judge’s comments concerning defendant’s nationality
as a Columbian “infected the judicial process”); United States v. McKendrick, 481 F.2d 152,
156 (2d Cir. 1973) (prosecutor’s remarks concerning “the colored race” introduced racial
prejudice into the trial and violated defendant’s right to due process of law); United States v.
Lopez, 974 F.2d 50, 52 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that a judge informing a defendant of Mexican
descent during sentencing that after he served his prison term and was inevitably deported that
he should stay out of the judge’s jurisdiction “was inappropriate in style and content”); United
States v. Gomez, 797 F.2d 417, 419 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that although there was no
sentencing error in this case, the court noted that sentencing a defendant more harshly because
of his nationality “obviously would be unconstitutional”); United States v. Vue, 13 F.3d 1206,
1213 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that the making of prosecutorial arguments associating
members of a particular ethnicity and from a particular geographic region with the commission
of drug related offenses violated the defendant’s constitutional rights); United States v.
Borrero-Isaza, 887 F.2d 1349, 1355 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the judge’s comments
-11-
during sentencing for a drug possession and distribution conviction that defendant was from
the drug source country of Columbia and that the judge intended to send a message to source
countries led the court to vacate the sentence and order a re-sentencing because it believed that
the defendant “was penalized because of his national origin, and not because he trafficked in
drugs that emanated from a source country”); Fontanello v. United States, 19 F.2d 921, 921
(9th Cir. 1927) (prosecutor’s comments during closing argument that: “These men are Italians.
We welcome them to our country.  They should obey our laws.  It is a matter of everyday
knowledge that the majority of people in King county running stills are of the same nationality;
that whenever we have a still case in this court in a great many cases we find the last name
similar to these: Fontanello, Rocco, and Pinola.” constituted prejudicial error, which required
reversal);United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16, 24-25 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that evidence
presented by prosecutors that the drug trade in Washington, D.C., was being controlled by
people of Jamaican descent, like the defendants, was an improper appeal to racial prejudices);
People v. Wardell, 230 Ill. App. 3d 1093, 1103, 595 N.E. 2d 1148, 1155 (1992) (“As the
judge at trial must shield the jury from considering racially prejudicial remarks by the
participants during trial, so also must the judge at sentencing safeguard against racial
considerations.”); Martinez v. State, 114 Nev. 735, 738, 961 P.2d 143, 145 (1998) (“A trial
judge may not . . . consider a defendant’s nationality or ethnicity in its sentencing
determination . . . .”).
The United States Supreme Court and federal courts of appeals have emphasized
repeatedly that not only must justice be done, it also must appear to be done. In the oft-quoted
-12-
statement of Justice Frankfurter, “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.” Offutt v.
United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S. Ct. 11, 13, 99 L. Ed. 11 (1954); see also Liljeberg v.
Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864, 108 S. Ct. 2194, 2205, 100 L. Ed. 2d
855 (1988); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242-43, 100 S. Ct. 1610, 1613, 64 L. Ed.
2d 182 (1980); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465, 91 S. Ct. 499, 504-05, 27 L.
Ed. 2d 532 (1971); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S. Ct. 623, 625, 99 L. Ed. 942
(1955); United States v. Diaz, 797 F.2d 99, 100 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 818,
109 S. Ct. 57, 102 L. Ed. 2d 35 (1988).  These same Courts have adhered steadfastly to the
proposition that race and nationality should play no role in the administration of justice.  See,
e.g., Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 587, 106 S. Ct. 3101, 3111, 92 L. Ed. 2d 460 (1986)
(Stevens, J., concurring); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69
(1986); Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35-38, 106 S. Ct. 1683, 1687-89, 90 L. Ed. 2d 27
(1986);Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214, 227-28 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052,
109 S. Ct. 1311, 103 L. Ed. 2d 580 (1989).  Nor should the fact of where a criminal defendant
lives, or has lived, play any role in the sentencing of a defendant. 
In its brief to this Court, the State relies heavily on Poe v. State, 341 Md. 523, 671
A.2d 501 (1996), a case in which we held that a judge’s comments concerning his religious and
philosophical beliefs did not demonstrate that the sentencing judge was motivated by ill-will
or prejudice.  In Poe, before announcing the sentence to be imposed, the trial judge remarked:
“That’s what irritates me today with this liberal philosophy.  I guess I’m a
dinosaur.  I’m still old-fashioned.  Maybe my time is gone, maybe.  I still believe
in good old-fashioned law and order, the Bible, and a lot of things that people
-13-
say I shouldn’t believe anymore.  Perhaps I am a dinosaur sitting here, but I’m
not going to change.  Maybe one day they will say you should not sit here any
more because you are too much of a dinosaur.  You are too conservative in
criminal law.  You believe too much in the Bible and law and order.”
Id. at 533, 671 A.2d at 505-06.  In our holding, we commented that while we did not express
approval of the remarks made by the sentencing judge, we nonetheless found that the sentence
imposed on Poe was not motivated by ill-will, prejudice, or other impermissible
considerations.  Id. at 534, 671 A.2d at 506.  Poe, however, is distinguishable from the case
at bar.  In Poe, the sentencing judge’s comments concerned his personal beliefs as to a general
philosophy — his comments were not directed at any particular type of person, or directed at
any geographical consideration, or at the defendant in that case.  This is a far different situation
than the one presented in the case at bar.       
As we have indicated, supra, we cannot determine whether the sentencing judge was
motivated by ill-will or prejudice based upon his belief that petitioner was “from the city” or
because he was an African-American, or both, or neither.  We shall assume that he was not
motivated by prejudice towards African-Americans.  Either consideration, however, is
impermissible.  “A defendant in a criminal case has a right to a fair trial.  It is well settled in
Maryland that fundamental to a defendant’s right to a fair trial is an impartial and disinterested
judge.”  Jefferson-El v. State, 330 Md. 99, 105, 622 A.2d 737, 740 (1993) (internal citations
omitted).  This fundamental right of fairness extends to the sentencing phase of a trial.
Furthermore, a defendant “has a right to a trial in which the judge is not only impartial and
disinterested, but who also has the appearance of being impartial and disinterested.”  Chapman
-14-
v. State, 115 Md. App. 626, 631, 694 A.2d 480, 482 (1997).  “[O]ur system of law has always
endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.”  Crawford v. State, 285 Md. 431,
452, 404 A.2d 244, 254 (1979), quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S. Ct. 623,
625, 99 L. Ed. 942 (1955).  As the United States Supreme Court recognized in Young v.
United States, 481 U.S. 787, 811, 107 S. Ct. 2124, 2140, 95 L. Ed. 2d 740 (1987), “what is
at stake is the public perception of the integrity of our criminal justice system.”  The
sentencing judge’s comments during petitioner’s sentencing phase calls the fairness of the
sentence into question.  Again, we note, it is not that we can affirmatively say that the
sentencing judge was motivated by impermissible considerations reflecting ill-will or
prejudice, but it is a fact that his comments might lead a reasonable person to infer that he
might have been motivated by ill-will or prejudice, especially as it relates to persons from “the
city.”  “If a judge’s comments during sentencing could cause a reasonable person to question
the impartiality of the judge, then the defendant has been deprived of due process and the judge
has abused his or her discretion.”  State v. Pattno, 254 Neb. 733, 743, 579 N.W.2d 503, 509
(1998).
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has noted:
Sentencing is an occasion for decorous and solemn reflection.  A judge
imposing sentence represents the sovereignty of the United States [or individual
State].  Although he may impress the defendant with the gravity of the criminal
law and the seriousness of the offense, he should make every effort to suppress
his idiosyncrasies.  It is the Rule of Law, the court as custodian of
governmental power, and not the judge-as-citizen, that speaks from the
bench.  A judge is transient but the court must speak for an enduring polity.  No
judge can eliminate the “I” in sentencing, but each must try.  Although the judge
has a duty station, he acts for the Nation [or State] . . . .  
   
-15-
Lopez, 974 F.2d at 52 (emphasis added).  At best, the comments of the trial court during
sentencing of petitioner give the appearance of bias towards persons who are raised in an urban
environment — at worst, the comments demonstrate actual prejudice in the sentencing process
towards residents of cities or, even still worse, towards persons based upon their racial
background.  In final analysis, all such considerations are, of course, wrong. 
Conclusion
We hold that the trial court’s comments at sentencing exceeded the outer limit of a
judge’s broad discretion in sentencing and therefore amounted to impermissible sentencing
criteria.  The sentencing judge gave the impression that he based petitioner’s sentence, at least
in part, on the improper presumption that petitioner was from Baltimore City, or from a city,
rather than Howard County.  In other words, he considered petitioner’s origins in formulating
the sentence.  This would clearly be an improper factor upon which to base a defendant’s
sentence and gives, at least, an inference of a lack of impartiality.  Additionally, his statements
could give rise to an inference that race was inappropriately considered at sentencing.
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Special Appeals in respect to the
sentences it did not vacate and remand the case to that court with instructions to vacate the
remaining sentences of the Circuit Court for Howard County and to remand the case to that
court for re-sentencing before a different judge.
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
COURT 
OF 
SPECIAL
APPEALS IN REFERENCE TO THE REMAINING
SENTENCES IS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO
THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO VACATE
THE SENTENCES OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
-16-
HOWARD COUNTY AND TO REMAND THIS CASE
TO THAT COURT FOR RE-SENTENCING BEFORE
A DIFFERENT JUDGE; COSTS TO BE PAID IN THIS
COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS BY HOWARD COUNTY.