Title: Beckerman v. Conant

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
 2024 ME 36 
Docket: 
Ken-23-307 
Argued: 
March 6, 2024 
Decided: 
 May 14, 2024 
 
Panel: 
 STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ. 
 
 
PETER M. BECKERMAN 
 
v. 
 
RICKY CONANT et al. 
 
DOUGLAS, J. 
 
[¶1]  Ricky and Monica Conant appeal from a judgment entered by the 
Superior Court  (Kennebec County, Cashman, J.) finding them in contempt and 
directing them to pay Peter M. Beckerman’s attorney fees for violating an order 
that enjoined them from “blocking, impeding or in any way interfering with” 
Beckerman’s deeded right-of-way over their driveway.  We affirm the 
judgment.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  This is the third time that these parties have come before us in 
connection with their ongoing dispute over Beckerman’s use of a deeded 
right-of-way over the Conants’ property.  While more details may be found in 
our earlier opinions, see Beckerman v. Pooler, 2015 ME 80, 119 A.3d 74 
(Beckerman I); Beckerman v. Conant, 2017 ME 142, 166 A.3d 1006 
 
2 
(Beckerman II), the following summarizes the facts pertinent to the instant 
appeal. 
[¶3]  Beckerman and the Conants own abutting waterfront properties on 
Great Pond in Rome, Maine.  Beckerman I, 2015 ME 80, ¶ 2, 119 A.3d 74.  Ricky 
Conant owns a second property—formerly known as the Bruce Pooler lot—
which abuts both the Beckerman lot and the Conant lot.  Id.  The Bruce Pooler 
lot is located between the Beckerman lot and South Crane Lane, a private access 
road leading from a public road to these properties.  Id.  The Beckerman lot, the 
Conant lot, and the Bruce Pooler lot are connected to South Crane Lane by a 
horseshoe-shaped driveway that runs across all three properties as roughly 
shown in Figure 1.1 
 
          Figure 1 
 
1  Figure 1 is offered for illustrative purposes only and is not part of the record in this case. 
 
3 
[¶4]  At one time, the land that now constitutes the three lots was owned 
by the Pooler family.  Beckerman II, 2017 ME 142, ¶ 3, 166 A.3d 1006.  Before 
1975, Nettie and Edwin Pooler owned the property encompassing what is now 
the Beckerman lot, the Conant lot, and the Bruce Pooler lot.  Id.  In 1975, they 
conveyed the Bruce Pooler lot to Bruce and Cynthia Pooler.  Id.  Three years 
later, in 1978, Nettie Pooler conveyed what is now the Beckerman lot to Willard 
and Elizabeth Haskell.  Id.  Because the lot conveyed to the Haskells did not have 
access to South Crane Lane, the 1978 Pooler-to-Haskell deed included the 
following language:  
Together with a right-of-way as now used and laid out, in common 
with others, to pass and repass to said premises, and subject to the 
obligation of the Grantees herein, along with other cottage owners 
in the area, to share in seasonal road maintenance. 
 
Id. (emphasis added.)  The Haskells conveyed the lot to Beckerman in 1988.  Id. 
¶ 4.  The Conants purchased their lot in 2005 from Rodney Pooler (who had 
previously acquired the property from Nettie Pooler in 1998).  Id.  Ricky Conant 
acquired the Bruce Pooler lot in 2010 from Bruce and Cynthia Pooler, and 
leased it back to them.  Id.    
[¶5]  In March 2000, before the Conants purchased any property in the 
area, Beckerman filed an action in Kennebec Superior Court against Bruce, 
Cynthia, and Rodney Pooler (who at the time collectively owned the other two 
 
4 
lots) to establish the location of the common boundaries of the three lots.  
Beckerman I, 2015 ME 80, ¶ 3, 119 A.3d 74.  The parties settled the action at 
mediation, resulting in the issuance of a consent order in 2002 that established 
the current boundaries of the three properties.  Id. ¶ 4.  As part of the 
settlement, Beckerman secured a right-of-way over the driveway on the Bruce 
Pooler lot in order to access South Crane Lane. Id.  As significant here, the 
consent order provided that “[t]his conveyance shall not in any way limit the 
deeded right-of-way in favor of the Beckerman lot” across what is now the 
Conants’ lot.  Id.  
[¶6]  In July 2012, Beckerman filed a post-judgment motion for contempt 
in the 2000 Pooler action, alleging that the Conants—Rodney Pooler’s 
successors-in-interest in the Conant lot—were in contempt of the 2002 consent 
judgment by impeding his use of the right-of-way over the Conant lot.  Id. ¶ 5.  
At the same time, Beckerman filed a separate action seeking “a declaratory 
judgment that he has a right-of-way over the Conant lot” and “an injunction 
preventing the Conants from interfering with his right-of-way.”  Beckerman II, 
2017 ME 142, ¶ 6, 166 A.3d 1006.   
[¶7]  The court (Kennebec County, Wheeler, J.) denied Beckerman’s 
motion for contempt because “the language of the consent order was 
ambiguous and was not clearly intended to recognize an easement in favor of 
 
5 
Beckerman over the Conants’ driveway.”  Beckerman I, 2015 ME 80, ¶ 8, 119 
A.3d 74.  Beckerman appealed.  Id. ¶ 6.  We affirmed the court’s denial of the 
contempt because the consent order “did not intend to affirmatively recognize 
that Beckerman had an enforceable easement over the Conants’ lot.”  Id. ¶ 9.  
However, we concluded that the court “erred by reaching beyond the consent 
order to address the separate question of whether Beckerman had an easement 
by deed” and vacated that portion of the court’s determination, “leaving that 
issue to be resolved in the separate declaratory judgment action.”  Id. ¶¶ 11, 15. 
 
[¶8]  On remand, after a three-day bench trial in the declaratory judgment 
action, the court entered a judgment on May 12, 2016, declaring that 
Beckerman has a deeded right-of-way over the Conants’ “paved driveway” and 
enjoining the Conants from interfering with that right-of-way.  Beckerman II, 
2017 ME 142, ¶ 8, 166 A.3d 1006.  The judgment provided, in relevant part, as 
follows: 
Judgment is entered in favor of plaintiff Peter M. Beckerman and 
against defendant Ricky Conant and Monica Conant on plaintiff’s 
complaint.  Plaintiff Peter M. Beckerman has a deeded right of way 
over the entire paved drive located on defendants’ property . . . for 
ingress to plaintiff’s property . . . and egress from plaintiff’s property 
to South Crane Lane.  
 
Defendants Ricky Conant and Monica Conant, and their heirs, 
successors, and assigns, are permanently enjoined from blocking, 
impeding, or in any way interfering with the right of plaintiff, and his 
 
6 
heirs, successors, and assigns, to use the right of way described in 
the preceding paragraph.  
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
 
[¶9]  Following the judgment, the parties filed several post-judgment 
motions, including a motion for a stay filed by the Conants and a motion for 
contempt filed by Beckerman.  The contempt motion, filed in August 2016, 
alleged that the Conants had violated the injunction by impeding and 
interfering with Beckerman’s use of the right-of-way.  To support his claim, he 
submitted eight photographs depicting vehicles and other items parked in the 
Conants’ driveway.   
 
[¶10]  The court entered an order on September 22, 2016, addressing the 
post-judgment motions.  Specifically with respect to the parties’ respective 
motions for contempt and a stay, the court ruled: “While [the other 
post-judgment] motions were under consideration, Mr. Beckerman filed a 
motion for contempt and the Conants filed a motion for a stay.  Beckerman’s 
motion is premature and the Conants’ request for a stay is denied.”   
 
[¶11]  In February 2019, Beckerman filed a third contempt motion 
against the Conants—the motion that gave rise to this appeal.  The February 
2019 contempt motion alleged that the Conants have been “willfully and 
intentionally blocking, impeding and/or interfering with [Beckerman’s] use of 
 
7 
. . . [the] right of way.”  The Conants moved to dismiss the February 2019 
contempt motion.  They argued, among other things, that the doctrine of 
res judicata—and specifically claim preclusion—barred the motion because it 
was based on the same conduct as the 2016 contempt motion, which had been 
previously addressed.  On October 31, 2022, the court (Cashman, J.)2 denied the 
Conants’ motion to dismiss the February 2019 contempt motion.    
[¶12]  After a January 24, 2023, evidentiary hearing on the motion for 
contempt, the court issued a final order granting the motion on March 10, 2023, 
and finding the following facts: 
• In June 2016, soon after the May 2016 Order, Beckerman attempted to 
access his property “only to find [the Conants’] vehicle, a trailer, and a 
portion of the removable dock system in the driveway, preventing his use 
of the right of way to enter with his boat and boat trailer.” 
 
• “Throughout the summer of 2016” the Conants “acted in a manner as to 
interrupt [Beckerman’s] ingress and/or egress[,] partially or fully 
disrupting his access to his property.” 
 
• “Similar events occurred during the summer of 2017, although the level 
of obstruction was less intrusive than in 2016.  [The Conants] continued 
to park vehicles on both sides of the driveway, on the paved portion of 
the driveway, in a manner which diminished the viable area of passage.” 
 
• “During the off-season of 2017, [the Conants] stored portions of the dock 
on the driveway[,] which prevented service vehicles, hired by 
[Beckerman] to perform work on his property after a storm, from using 
the driveway for ingress and egress.” 
 
2  Justice Cashman took over the case after Justice Wheeler retired, and the case was further 
delayed by the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.   
 
8 
 
• The Conants’ “method of parking vehicles on both sides of the paved 
driveway, thus being within the driveway, continued into the summer of 
2018, 2019, 2020, 2021 and 2022.” 
 
 
[¶13]  Ultimately, the court found that the Conants had parked vehicles 
and stored items on the paved driveway in a manner that “impedes 
[Beckerman’s] right of way and makes it difficult if not impossible for him to 
pass at times,” and the Conants “need not completely block the right of way to 
be in contempt of the order.”  Moreover, the court found that the Conants have 
the ability to comply with the terms of the 2016 judgment because they “have 
sufficient land and space to park their vehicles (and store items such as the dock 
pieces) [in] places other than on the deeded right of way.”  The court found the 
Conants in contempt of the 2016 judgment and imposed as a remedial sanction 
“reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred by [Beckerman] arising out of or 
in connection with this motion for contempt.”   
 
[¶14]  The Conants timely filed a notice of appeal.  See M.R. App. P. 
2B(c)(1).  
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶15]  The Conants press four issues on appeal.  First, they contend that 
the Superior Court erred in determining that the terms of the 2016 judgment 
were sufficiently definite to hold them in contempt.  Second, they argue that the 
 
9 
Superior Court’s interpretation of the judgment deprives them, as owners of 
the servient estate, of the reasonable use of their own driveway and that their 
use, as a matter of law, cannot constitute a violation of the injunction.  Third, 
they maintain that it was error for the court to consider evidence previously 
presented in connection with an earlier contempt motion because the doctrine 
of res judicata bars relitigation of factual matters previously litigated.  Finally, 
they challenge the Superior Court’s authority under M.R. Civ. P. 66(d)(3)(C) in 
awarding attorney fees in this case.3   
A. 
Specificity of the 2016 Judgment 
[¶16]  For a person to be held in contempt for violating a court order, the 
order must “inform the person in definite terms what duties the order imposes 
upon him.”  Lewin v. Skehan, 2012 ME 31, ¶ 19, 39 A.3d 58.  An order must 
clearly describe the conduct it seeks to prohibit, but it need not list every 
possible way or method of committing the prohibited conduct.  See Banker 
v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 507 A.2d 602, 605 (Me. 1986); see also Hornbeck 
Offshore Serv., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 713 F.3d 787, 792 (5th Cir. 2013) (“The order 
 
3  Beckerman filed a motion with this Court asking us to impose sanctions against the Conants 
pursuant to M.R. App. P. 13(f).  We decline to do so and deny the motion.  Although we conclude the 
Conants’ arguments are unpersuasive, we do not find their arguments to be “frivolous, contumacious, 
or instituted primarily for the purpose of delay,” M.R. App. P. 13(f), and therefore a sanction is not 
warranted.  See Hazzard v. Dodge, 454 A.2d 838, 841 (Me. 1983) (“Generally, a claim is considered 
frivolous and intended for delay only when the claim is totally devoid of merit.”). 
 
10 
must state its terms specifically; and describe in reasonable detail the act or 
acts restrained or required . . ., but . . . [the] court is entitled to a degree of 
flexibility in vindicating its authority against actions that, while not expressly 
prohibited, nonetheless violate the reasonably understood terms of the order.” 
(citation, alteration, and quotation marks omitted)); State ex rel. Girard v. 
Percich, 557 S.W.2d 25, 40 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).  
[¶17]  We review a trial court’s civil contempt order for abuse of 
discretion.  Wrenn v. Lewis, 2003 ME 29, ¶ 13, 818 A.2d 1005.  The Conants urge 
us first to make a de novo determination that the language of the injunction in 
the 2016 judgment is too indefinite to support a finding of contempt by clear 
and convincing evidence.  Contrary to their arguments, we conclude that the 
language is clear, and the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in finding 
the Conants in contempt. 
[¶18]  The 2016 judgment enjoins the Conants “from blocking, impeding, 
or in any way interfering with” Beckerman’s right to use “the entire paved 
drive[way] located on [the Conants’] property” for ingress to and egress from 
his property.  That language is straightforward, clear, and specific.  The Conants 
nonetheless argue that the “critical and fatal flaw” in the court’s contempt 
finding is that the 2016 judgment does not “precisely forbid [them] from 
temporarily parking or placing objects on the easement”; and, thus, they claim, 
 
11 
the court erred “when it held the Conants in contempt for engaging in that 
conduct.”  We disagree.   
[¶19]  The court did not find the Conants in contempt because they 
temporarily parked their vehicles in, or placed an item on, the driveway.  
Rather, the court found the Conants in contempt because they parked their 
vehicles or stored items on the driveway “in a manner that imped[ed] . . . and 
ma[de] it difficult if not impossible for [Beckerman] to pass at times,” which the 
judgment clearly prohibits and the evidence at the hearing supported.   
B. 
Use of the Servient Estate 
 
[¶20]  The Conants challenge the court’s interpretation of the 2016 
injunction to mean that the Conants “need not completely block the right of way 
to be in contempt of the order.”  They contend that this interpretation 
effectively grants Beckerman “the right to exclude the Conants from all 
reasonable use of their driveway, including use that does not actually impede 
Beckerman’s limited right of ingress and egress.”  This, they contend, violates 
their rights as servient estate owners to make reasonable use of their property 
and “falls outside the bounds of Maine law concerning easements.”   
 
[¶21]  Servient estate holders have the right to use their land in any 
manner as long as the use does not “materially impair” or “unreasonably 
interfere” with the dominant estate holder’s use of the easement for its 
 
12 
intended purpose.  Flaherty v. Muther, 2011 ME 32, ¶ 63, 17 A.3d 640 (quotation 
marks omitted).  An easement that is expressed “in general terms is limited to 
a use as little burdensome to the servient estate as possible for the use 
contemplated.”  Mill Pond Condo. Ass’n v. Manalio, 2006 ME 135, ¶ 6, 910 A.2d 
392 (quotation marks and alternation omitted).  However, “[i]f the grant of an 
easement expressly details its specific boundaries . . . , the owner of the right of 
way is entitled to use the entire granted area, and is not limited to what is 
necessary or convenient.”  Id; see also Kinderhaus North LLC v. Nicolas, 2024 ME 
34, ¶¶ 32-34, --- A.3d ---.  
[¶22]  The 1978 deed from Nettie Pooler to Willard and Elizabeth Haskell, 
Beckerman’s predecessor-in-title, included a “right-of-way as now used and 
laid out” over what is now the Conant lot to allow the Haskells “to pass and 
repass” to their land.  Beckerman II, 2017 ME 142, ¶ 3-4, 166 A.3d 1006.  The 
2016 judgment declared—and we affirmed—that the easement over the 
Conants’ property established in the 1978 Pooler-to-Haskell deed was a 
“deeded right of way over the entire paved drive[way] located on [the Conants’] 
property . . . for ingress to . . . and egress from [Beckerman’s] property to South 
Crane Road.”  See id. ¶¶ 19, 26.  Thus, the court did not err in concluding, 
consistent with the plain language of the 2016 judgment, that Beckerman may 
use “the entire paved driveway” as needed to access his property.   
 
13 
[¶23]  At the same time, “the holder of an easement may only exercise the 
rights granted in a reasonable manner, and cannot do more.”  Mill Pond Condo. 
Ass’n, 2006 ME 135,  ¶ 6, 910 A.2d 392.  Such rights are those that are “incidental 
or necessary to the reasonable and proper enjoyment of the easement.”  Id. 
(quotation marks omitted).  Thus, even though Beckerman enjoys the right to 
use any portion of the “entire paved drive” for ingress and egress to and from 
his property, he does not have the right to preclude the Conants from 
reasonable use of their driveway, including using it to park vehicles that do not 
block passage—and the Superior Court did not hold otherwise.  In fact, the 
court expressly acknowledged that the Conants “are not necessarily in violation 
of the 2016 judgment every time they park a car in the driveway.”  What the 
2016 judgment enjoined was the use of the driveway in any manner—for 
parking, storage, or otherwise—that “block[s], imped[es], or in any way 
interfer[es] with” Beckerman’s right to use the driveway for ordinary ingress 
to or egress from his property.4   
 
4  The Conants posit a number of hypothetical scenarios that could be problematic unless their 
obligations under the 2016 judgment are defined more specifically.  For example: What if they are 
forced to call an ambulance to their property and in doing so block the driveway?  Or, what if a 
delivery truck parks temporarily in the driveway to unload items?  It is unlikely that the Conants 
would be found in contempt under these scenarios, but more importantly, these facts are not before 
us.  Common sense and reasonable cooperation between neighbors would go a long way in avoiding 
future conflict. 
 
14 
[¶24]  This is consistent with our law governing easements, and the court 
did not err. 
C. 
Evidence of 2016 Conduct 
[¶25]  The Conants contend that the court erred by considering eight 
photographs previously submitted in connection with Beckerman’s August 
2016 motion for contempt as well as related testimony because, they claim, that 
evidence was barred by the doctrine of res judicata, specifically the doctrine of 
claim preclusion.  The doctrine of claim preclusion “bars the relitigation of 
claims if[] (1) the same parties or their privies are involved in both actions; 
(2) a valid final judgment was entered in the prior action; and (3) the matters 
presented for decision in the second action were, or might have been, litigated 
in the first action.”  U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Tannenbaum, 2015 ME 141, ¶ 6, 126 A.3d 
734 (quotation marks omitted).   
 
[¶26]  Here, there was no valid final judgment entered with respect to 
Beckerman’s August 2016 motion for contempt; nor was there even an 
adjudication on the merits of the motion.  Rather, the court expressly 
determined the motion was “premature,” effectively dismissing it without 
prejudice.  The doctrine of claim preclusion simply does not apply in this 
instance.  See Penkul v. Matarazzo, 2009 ME 113, ¶ 8, 983 A.2d 375 (stating that 
claim preclusion applies only when there is a decision on the merits in a prior 
 
15 
action); Norton v. Town of Long Island, 2005 ME 109, ¶ 18, 883 A.3d 889; 
see also O’Connor v. N. Okaloosa Med. Ctr., 152 So.3d 843, 845 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2014) (holding that “where there is an absence of a prior final adjudication on 
the merits, [claim preclusion] does not apply”). 
D. 
Attorney Fees under Rule 66(d)(3)(C) 
[¶27]  The Conants’ final contention is that the court abused its discretion 
in awarding Beckerman attorney fees as a remedial sanction pursuant to 
Rule 66(d)(3)(C) of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure.  They argue that 
Rule 66(d)(3)(C) authorizes an award of attorney fees only when there has 
been a showing of loss or injury that is compensable by fine, “for a sum of 
money sufficient to indemnify the aggrieved party.” 
 
[¶28] Rule 66(d)(3)(C) provides:  
In addition to, or as an alternative to, sanctions imposed under 
subparagraph (A) or (B) of this paragraph,[5] if loss or injury to a 
party in an action or proceeding has been caused by the contempt, 
the court may enter judgment in favor of the person aggrieved for a 
sum of money sufficient to indemnify the aggrieved party and to 
satisfy the costs and disbursements, including reasonable attorney 
fees, of the aggrieved party. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  By the Rule’s plain terms, a court has discretion to enter 
judgment where a party has suffered a “loss or injury.”  An “injury" in this 
 
5  Subparagraphs (A) and (B) refer to “coercive imprisonment” and “coercive fine,” respectively.  
M.R. Civ. P. 66(d)(3)(A)-(B).  
 
16 
context does not require a compensable, monetary loss.  It can consist of a 
“violation of another’s legal right, for which the law provides a remedy; a wrong 
or injustice.”  Injury, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); see also Lewis v. 
Lewis, 2003 ME 26, ¶ 12, 817 A.2d 867 (“The words ‘loss or injury’ [in Rule 
66(d)(3)(C)] refer to any loss or injury suffered by the moving party at the 
hands of the contemnor.”). 
[¶29]  We have previously read Rule 66(d)(3)(C) as authorizing an award 
of attorney fees as a remedial sanction and we do so again here.  See Lewis, 2003 
ME 26, ¶ 12, 817 A..2d 867 (stating that “[w]e do not read Rule 66(d)(3)(C) so 
narrowly” and accordingly construe the rule to authorize an award of attorney 
fees as a remedial sanction without a showing of compensable loss); cf. Hamlin 
v. Cavagnaro, 2016 ME 8, ¶¶ 16-17, 131 A.3d 365 (holding that Rule 66(d)(3) 
“permit[s] the court to award attorney fees in place of imposing punitive 
sanctions”).  This is consistent with the purpose of Rule 66.  See M.R. Civ. P. 66 
Advisory Committee’s Notes June 2, 1997 (stating that the purpose of 
Rule 66(d) is to “either . . . coerce obedience to an order of the court or to 
compensate a party injured by disobedience”).   
[¶30]  Here, Beckerman suffered “injury”—the interference with his 
deeded easement rights—as a result of the Conants’ contempt.  In vindicating 
 
17 
his rights, Beckerman incurred attorney fees.  The Superior Court was well 
within its discretion to award him attorney fees under M.R. Civ. P. 66(d)(3)(C).  
The entry is: 
 
Judgment affirmed.  Peter M. Beckerman’s 
motion for sanctions is denied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nolan L. Reichl, Esq. (orally), and Julia B. MacDonald, Esq., Pierce Atwood LLP, 
Portland, for appellants Ricky Conant and Monica Conant 
 
Alton C. Stevens, Esq., Kennebunk, and Peter B. Bickerman, Esq. (orally), 
Readmield, for appellee Peter M. Beckerman 
 
 
Kennebec County Superior Court docket number RE-2012-63 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY