Title: Steven Thomas v. Clinton L. Mallett

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 129 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP1528 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Steven Thomas, a Minor, by his Guardian  
ad Litem, Susan M. Gramling,  
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Clinton L. Mallett, Billie R. Mallett,  
and Germantown Mutual Insurance Co.,  
          Defendants, 
American Cyanamid Co., Atlantic Richfield  
Co., E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co., NL  
Industries, Inc., SCM Chemicals, Inc.,  
Sherwin-Williams Co., ConAgra Grocery  
Products Co.,  
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2004 WI App 131 
Reported at:  275 Wis. 2d 377, 685 N.W.2d 791 
(Ct. App. 2004-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 15, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 1, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Timothy G. Dugan   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
WILCOX, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
PROSSER, J., joins dissent. 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
WILCOX, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Peter G. Earle and Law Offices of Peter Earle, Milwaukee; and 
Robert J. McConnell, Fidelma Fitzpatrick and Motley Rice, LLC, 
Providence, RI, and oral argument by Peter G. Earle and Robert 
J. McConnell. 
 
 
 
2
For the defendants-respondents, Atlantic Richfield Company, 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Con-Agra Grocery Products 
Company, NL Industries, Inc., American Cyanamid Co., and 
Millennium Inorganic Chemicals, Inc. (f/k/a SCM Chemicals, Inc.) 
there was a brief by Philip H. Curtis, Bruce R. Kelly and Arnold 
& Porter, New York, NY, David G. Peterson, Michael B. Apfeld and 
Godfrey & Kahn, Milwaukee (on behalf of Atlantic Richfield 
Company); William H. King, Jr., Steven R. Williams, Joy C. Fuhr 
and McGuire Woods LLP, Richmond, VA, M. Christine Cowles and 
Quarles & Brady LLP, Milwaukee (on behalf of E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours Co.); James P. Fitzgerald, John J. Schirger and McGrath, 
North, Mullin & Kratz, Omaha, NE, Paul Benson and Michael Best & 
Friedrich, Milwaukee (on behalf of Con-Agra Grocery Products 
Company); Susan McGuire and Kirland & Ellis, Washington, D.C., 
Donald E. Scott, Jennifer Heisinger, Elizabeth L. Thompson and 
Bartlit Beck Herman Palenchar & Scott, Denver, CO, David G. 
Peterson, Michael B. Apfeld and Godfrey & Kahn, Milwaukee (on 
behalf of NL Industries, Inc.); Richard W. Mark, Elyse Echtman 
and Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, New York, NY, David G. 
Peterson, Michael B. Apfeld and Godfrey & Kahn, Milwaukee (on 
behalf of American Cyanamid Co.); and Michael T. Nilan, Cortney 
G. Sylvester and Halleland Lewis Nilan Sipkins & Johnson, 
Minneapolis, MN, James R. Clark, Trevor J. Will and Foley & 
Lardner, Milwaukee (on behalf of Millennium Inorganic Chemicals 
Inc. (f/k/a SCM Chemicals, Inc.) and oral argument by Bruce 
Kelly (on behalf of American Cyanamid Co., et al.). 
 
For the Sherwin-Williams Company there was a brief by Frank 
J. Daily, David B. Bartel, Jeffrey K. Spoerk, Daniel I. 
Hanrahan, and Quarles & Brady LLP, Milwaukee; and Paul Michael 
Pohl, Charles H. Moellenberg, Jennifer B. Flannery and Jones 
Day, 
Pittsburgh, 
PA, 
and 
oral 
argument 
by 
Charles 
H. 
Moellenberg, Jr. 
  
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Anne Berleman Kearney, 
Joseph D. Kearney and Appellate Consulting Group, Milwaukee, on 
behalf of Civil Trial Counsel of Wisconsin. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by James A. Buchen, 
Madison, on behalf of Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Gerardo H. Gonzalez, 
Richard H. Porter, Chris J. Trebatoski and Gonzalez, Saggio & 
Harlan, L.L.P., Milwaukee, on behalf of the African-American 
Chamber of Commerce, Inc. and the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce 
of Wisconsin, Inc. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Lynn M. Novotnak and 
First, Blondis, Albrecht & Novotnak, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf 
of 
Service 
Employees 
International 
Union-Wisconsin 
State 
 
 
3
Council, Wisconsin Commission on Occupational Safety and Health, 
Repairers of the Breach, Wisconsin Citizen Action, American 
Federation 
of 
Teachers, 
Local 
212, 
and 
Sixteenth 
Street 
Community Health Center. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Mark S. Olson and 
Oppenheimer Wolff & Donnelly LLP, Minneapolis, MN; James M. Beck 
and Dechert LLP, Philadelphia, PA; Hugh F. Young, Jr., Reston, 
VA, on behalf of Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. 
 
 
 
 
 
2005 WI 129 
 NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP1528  
(L.C. No. 
99 CV 6411) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Steven Thomas, a Minor, by his Guardian  
ad Litem, Susan M. Gramling,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Clinton L. Mallett, Billie R. Mallett,  
and Germantown Mutual Insurance Co.,  
 
          Defendants, 
 
American Cyanamid Co., Atlantic Richfield  
Co., E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co., NL  
Industries, Inc., SCM Chemicals, Inc.,  
Sherwin-Williams Co., ConAgra Grocery  
Products Co.,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 15, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part and reversed in part.     
 
¶1 
LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   Steven Thomas, by his 
guardian ad litem, seeks review of a published court of appeals 
decision1 that declined to extend the risk-contribution theory 
                                                 
1 Thomas v. Mallett, 2004 WI App 131, 275 Wis. 2d 377, 685 
N.W.2d 791. 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
2 
 
announced in Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 
N.W.2d 37 (1984), to the defendant-respondent lead pigment 
manufacturers, American Cyanamid Co., Atlantic Richfield Co., 
ConAgra Grocery Products Co., E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Comp., 
NL Industries, Inc., SCM Chemicals, Inc., and Sherwin-Williams 
Co. (collectively "Pigment Manufacturers").  The court of 
appeals concluded that because Thomas had a remedy against his 
landlords for their negligence in failing to abate lead paint 
hazards in his prior residences, there was no reason to extend 
Collins' risk-contribution theory.  The court of appeals also 
concluded that Thomas could not proceed on his claims of civil 
conspiracy and enterprise liability.  
¶2 
Thomas argues this court should reverse the court of 
appeals' decision because (1) although he received a remedy from 
his landlords for their negligence, Article I, Section 9 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution does not foreclose his seeking a remedy 
for the Pigment Manufacturers separate wrong for producing and 
promoting toxic lead pigments; (2) Collins' risk-contribution 
theory should be recognized for white lead carbonate claims; and 
(3) he has presented sufficient material facts to warrant a 
trial on his alternative theories of liability of civil 
conspiracy and enterprise liability. 
 ¶3 We agree with Thomas that Article I, Section 9 does 
not insulate wrongdoers from liability simply because recovery 
has been obtained from an altogether different wrongdoer for an 
altogether different wrong.  We also conclude that the white 
lead carbonate claims at issue in this case are factually 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
3 
 
similar enough to Collins to warrant extension of the risk-
contribution theory.  However, we do not agree that Thomas has 
presented sufficient material facts to warrant a trial on his 
civil conspiracy and enterprise liability claims.  Therefore, we 
affirm in part and reverse in part the court of appeals' 
decision.2 
I 
¶4 
Because this case is before us on summary judgment, we 
construe all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, which in this case is Thomas.3  
See Strozinsky v. Sch. Dist. of Brown Deer, 2000 WI 97, ¶32, 237 
Wis. 2d 19, 614 N.W.2d 443. 
¶5 
Thomas was born on June 23, 1990.  He claims that he 
sustained lead poisoning by ingesting lead paint from accessible 
painted surfaces, paint chips, and paint flakes and dust at two 
different houses he lived in during the early 1990's.   
¶6 
In August 1991, while living at 2652 North 37th 
Street, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 14-month-old Thomas exhibited an 
early onset of childhood lead poisoning, with his blood lead 
                                                 
2 Pigment Manufacturers also argue that (1) they did not 
have a duty to warn; and (2) Thomas cannot prove that a failure 
to warn caused his injury.  These arguments were not reached 
below, therefore we do not address them. 
3 We 
acknowledge that 
there are 
competing 
facts and 
inferences that could be drawn from the material facts.  Because 
we construe the facts and all reasonable inferences in Thomas's 
favor, those competing facts and inferences are not relevant to 
our inquiry.  To the extent the dissent, Wilcox, J., dissenting, 
relies on out-of-state cases to establish what Thomas can or 
cannot prove, we refer to our standard of review. 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
4 
 
levels (BPb) at 18 µg/dl.  Thomas's cognitive skills were 
tested, which 
identified 
cognitive 
deficits 
in 
perceptual 
organization, visual motor integration, expressive language, 
academic and fine motor skills coupled with an attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder.  Eight months later, at the end of April 
1992, his BPb increased to 40 µg/dl.   
¶7 
Thomas continued to live at 2652 North 37th Street 
until January 1993.  This house was built in 1905.  City of 
Milwaukee Health Department documented lead-based violations at 
this home on July 29, 1992.  
¶8 
Thomas's next known phase of lead poisoning occurred 
while he was living at 2654 North 25th Street, Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin.  That house was built in 1900.  Lead-based paint 
violations were documented at this residence on August 12, 1993.   
¶9 
While Thomas's BPb decreased by January 1993 to 27 
µg/dl, it rose to 49 µg/dl by July 1993.  Thomas was admitted to 
Children's Hospital of Wisconsin for five days of chelation 
treatment.   
¶10 From mid-August 1993 to early September 1993, Thomas's 
BPb rose from 13 µg/dl to 33-40 µg/dl.  From August 1993 until 
November 
1993, 
Thomas 
lived 
at 
4736 
North 
37th 
Street, 
Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin. 
 
Thereafter, 
Thomas's 
BPb 
steadily 
declined but was still in the BPb range for lead poisoning.  
¶11 According to Dr. John F. Rosen, a professor of 
pediatrics and head of the Division of Environmental Sciences at 
the Children's Hospital at Montefiore of the Albert Einstein 
College 
of 
Medicine, 
Thomas's 
cognitive 
deficits 
are 
a 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
5 
 
"signature or constellation of cognitive effects" that are 
typical of lead poisoning.  In Thomas's case, Rosen states that 
these deficits are permanent.  In addition, due to Thomas's 
elevated BPb over the extended period of time, Thomas will 
require lifetime medical monitoring-surveillance for physical 
disorders, as he is now at a high risk for developing future 
medical complications, including kidney disease, peripheral 
neuropathy, hypertension, and cardiovascular disease.  Rosen 
opines that Thomas's high lead levels are exclusively derived 
from ingesting lead based pigments in paint.4   
                                                 
4  In their summary judgment motion below, the Pigment 
Manufacturers did not seek summary judgment "on the issues of 
whether Steven Thomas can prove that he was injured by lead 
ingestion or that his source of lead ingestion was lead paint.  
These issues are in dispute in this case.  But it is precisely 
because they are in dispute that [Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 
Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984)] should be held inapplicable."  
In their court of appeals' brief, the Pigment Manufacturers 
reiterated that "[t]heir motion assumed for purposes of analysis 
that Thomas could present a prima facie case demonstrating that 
the Manufacturers sold lead pigment without adequate warnings; 
it further assumed that he could present enough evidence to 
create a jury question on whether his claimed injuries were 
caused by lead."   
The Pigment Manufacturers premise one of their arguments 
against recognizing Collins for lead pigment claims on the fact 
that lead poisoning could occur from one of any number of 
sources (since lead is ubiquitous).  We set forth the material 
facts that Thomas claims prove that he ingested a lead pigment 
manufactured by the Pigment Manufacturers, white lead carbonate. 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
6 
 
¶12 Thomas subjected various paint samples from his prior 
residences to chemical analysis.  Robert Dragen, an electron 
microscopist, analyzed the various paint layers contained in the 
samples and provided the elemental composition for each layer.  
According to that analysis, none of the paint layers contained 
detectable levels of sulfur or chromium.  Thus, according to Dr. 
Paul Mushak, a toxicologist and human health risk assessment 
specialist, this analysis conclusively rules out lead sulfate or 
lead chromate pigments.  These pigments along with white lead 
carbonate pigments were the essential lead pigments used for 
residences.  White lead carbonate was the principal pigment 
used, however.  Because lead sulfate and lead chromate could be 
empirically excluded, Mushak opines to a reasonable degree of 
scientific and technological certainty that the houses contain 
lead paint made with white lead carbonate pigment.5 
                                                                                                                                                             
The dissent complains that Thomas's facts are insufficient 
to establish that his injuries were caused by white lead 
carbonate pigment.  Wilcox, J., dissenting, ¶¶223-36.  Unlike 
the dissent, we do not reach this issue for three reasons.  
First, for purposes of the Pigment Manufacturers' summary 
judgment motion, they assumed that Thomas could prove he 
ingested and was poisoned by lead paint.  Thomas's claim of lead 
poisoning was premised on his ingestion of white lead carbonate 
pigment.  The Pigment Manufacturers assumed that Thomas could 
create a jury question with regard to his lead poisoning.  
Second, the trial court did not pass on this issue.  Third, the 
issue was not fully briefed or argued. 
Although we do not address the merits of the issue, we 
note, infra, that Thomas bears the burden of proving that white 
lead carbonate caused his injuries.  See infra IV.C.2. 
5 Mushak also is of the opinion that: 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
7 
 
¶13 As noted, the houses where Thomas alleges he ingested 
lead paint were built in 1900 and 1905.  During that period, use 
of lead paint for residences was common.  Lead paint contained 
up to 50 percent lead pigment and maintained widespread use 
through the 1940s.  The use and manufacturing of interior lead-
based paints declined during the 1950s, and, in 1955, the lead 
industry voluntarily adopted a standard of the American National 
Standards Institute that limited lead content to a maximum of 
                                                                                                                                                             
While 
lead 
exposure 
may 
qualitatively 
and 
potentially arise from various sources of the toxic 
element, the qualitative and quantitative nature of 
the lead source at issue in this case, lead paint, is 
such that (i) it dwarfs other lead sources in terms of 
lead concentration and intensity of lead exposure and 
(ii) it comprises the lead source most actively 
providing lead exposure and lead poisoning in the 
exposure settings at issue here:  lead paint present 
in properties occupied or visited by Steven Thomas. 
Lead paint is the principal source of lead for 
childhood lead exposure and associated lead poisoning 
in high-density, urban areas with old housing that 
contains old lead paint with relatively high lead 
content and in varying states of deterioration. 
. . . . 
Lead paint exposures of urban children living in 
deteriorated old housing in typical central-city areas 
is also much more relevant to the case at issue here 
than lead in other media—water, air, diet, etc. 
. . . . 
One obvious reason why lead paint produces the 
most intense lead poisoning in children is the 
relatively high lead content in that medium.  A 50% 
lead content in the early lead paints was not 
uncommon. 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
8 
 
one percent in paints intended for children's toys, furniture, 
and interior surfaces.  However, lead paint for interiors 
continued to be available until the 1970s.   
¶14 As of December 31, 1972, lead paint for interior and 
exterior household use containing more than 0.5 percent lead of 
its total weight was banned from interstate commerce.  16 
C.F.R. § 1500.17(a)(6)(i)(B) (2005).  In 1978, the ban was 
expanded to residential use of paint containing more than 0.06 
percent lead by weight.  16 C.F.R. § 1303.2(2) (2005); 16 
C.F.R. § 1303.4 (2005).  In 1980, Wisconsin banned the use of 
lead paint.  Wis. Stat. § 254.12 (2003-04);6 Antwaun A. v. 
Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 228 Wis. 2d 44, 61, 596 N.W.2d 456 
(1999).   
¶15 On December 4, 1996, prior to commencing the action 
that is the subject of this appeal, Thomas settled with Fire 
Insurance Exchange, the insurer for the landlord of 2652 North 
37th Street, on a Pierringer7 basis for $62,652.55.  On September 
10, 1999, Thomas commenced the underlying action against his 
remaining two landlords and their insurers and the Pigment 
Manufacturers for the injuries he received from lead poisoning.  
As to his landlords, Thomas alleged that they negligently 
maintained the premises with respect to lead paint.  As to the 
Pigment Manufacturers, Thomas alleged that they were liable for 
                                                 
6 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise indicated. 
7 Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106 
(1963).   
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
9 
 
his injuries on the basis of, among other claims, strict 
liability, 
negligence, 
civil 
conspiracy, 
and 
enterprise 
liability. 
¶16 On June 26, 2000, the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, 
Honorable Patricia D. McMahon, dismissed State Farm Insurance 
Co., the insurer for the landlord at 4736 North 37th Street, 
based on a pollution exclusion in its policy.8  Thomas 
subsequently abandoned his claims against that landlord.  On 
August 8, 2002, Thomas settled his claim with Germantown Mutual 
Insurance, the insurer for the landlord of 2654 North 25th 
Street, on a Pierringer basis for $261,520.  Thus, the only 
remaining defendants were the Pigment Manufacturers. 
¶17 Although all of the Pigment Manufacturers or their 
predecessors-in-interests9 manufactured white lead carbonate at 
                                                 
8 See Peace v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 228 Wis. 2d 106, 
130, 596 N.W.2d 429 (1999) (pollution exclusion clause bars 
coverage for bodily injury stemming from ingestion of lead 
paint).   
9 As 
alleged 
in 
Thomas's 
complaint, 
the 
Pigment 
Manufacturers predecessors-in-interest are as follows: 
American Cyanamid is the successor-in-interest to the John 
R. MacGregor Co. and the MacGregor Lead Company. 
Atlantic Richfield Company is the successor-in-interest to 
International Smelting and Refining Company and Anaconda Lead 
Products Company. 
E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Company has no predecessor-in-
interest. 
Congra Grocery Products Company is a successor-in-interest 
to W.P. Fuller Company, the W.P. Fuller Paint Company and WPF, 
Inc. 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
10 
 
various times during the existence of Thomas's prior residences, 
Thomas conceded that he cannot identify the specific pigment 
manufacturer that produced the white lead carbonate he ingested.  
The Pigment Manufacturers moved for summary judgment, arguing, 
as relevant here, that Thomas could not prove causation in fact 
or proximate cause; Collins should not be extended as Thomas 
already obtained a remedy from his landlords; Collins should not 
be 
extended 
outside 
the 
unique 
circumstances 
of 
diethylstilbestrol (DES); and that Thomas's civil conspiracy and 
enterprise liability claims were deficient.  The Milwaukee 
County Circuit Court, Honorable Timothy G. Dugan, granted the 
motion. 
¶18 The 
circuit 
court 
concluded 
that 
the 
DES 
fact 
situation in Collins was too different from the circumstances of 
Thomas's lead paint claims.  First, the circuit court concluded 
that unlike the situation in Collins, where the plaintiff was 
remediless without the risk-contribution theory, Thomas had a 
remedy against the negligent landlords.  Second, the circuit 
court noted that Collins concerned a nine-month window during 
which an expectant mother consumed DES, whereas here, since the 
houses Thomas lived in were constructed in 1900 and 1905, the 
lead paint could have been applied anytime during what was 
approaching a one hundred year time span.  The court concluded 
                                                                                                                                                             
NL Industries, Inc. was formerly known as the National Lead 
Company. 
SCM Chemicals is the successor-in-interest to The Glidden 
Company. 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
11 
 
the Pigment Manufacturers had no real defense, unlike in 
Collins.  Third, the circuit court determined that DES produced 
a rare form of cancer, whereas lead poisoning could be caused by 
any number of lead products and thus did not produce a 
"signature injury."  Fourth, the circuit court concluded that 
all DES was identical, whereas there were different forms of 
lead pigments that were used in varying amounts by paint 
manufacturers.  Fifth, unlike DES manufacturers, the circuit 
court noted that the Pigment Manufacturers were not in exclusive 
control of the risks involved as they did not make the finished 
paint product or ensure that the product was properly maintained 
in homes.  
¶19 The circuit court then concluded that Thomas's civil 
conspiracy claim failed because he could not prove an underlying 
tort.  Further, the circuit court determined that Thomas did not 
present clear evidence of an agreement between the Pigment 
Manufacturers to accomplish an unlawful purpose.  Finally, the 
circuit court also determined that the enterprise liability was 
not available, as there was no industry standard for white lead 
carbonate pigment.   
¶20 Thomas appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed.  
Thomas v. Mallett, 2004 WI App 131, ¶7, 275 Wis. 2d 377, 685 
N.W.2d 791.   
¶21 The court of appeals agreed with Thomas that his case 
had many characteristics in common with Collins, writing: 
As 
Thomas 
points 
out 
in 
his 
extensive 
submissions, and, for the purposes of this appeal, 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
12 
 
assuming their verity, this case and Collins share, 
for many of the same reasons, the inability of the 
plaintiff to identify those who made and sold the 
specific substance alleged to have caused injury.  
Thus, in both Collins and here the substances produced 
or sold by one company are, as material to the 
possibility of tracing the manufacturer or seller, 
essentially the same as that produced or sold by the 
others. . . .  
Additionally, 
both 
the 
diethylstilbestrol 
alleged 
to 
have 
caused 
the 
plaintiff's vaginal cancer in Collins, and the white 
lead 
carbonate 
alleged 
to 
have 
caused 
Thomas's 
neurological disorders were made and sold by many 
companies long before the injury, making it impossible 
to trace specific manufacturers or sellers to the 
particular injury-causing product. 
Id., ¶4. 
 
¶22 These 
similarities 
aside, 
however, 
the 
court of 
appeals read Collins as fashioning the risk-contribution theory 
for 
situations 
where 
a 
plaintiff 
is 
without 
any 
remedy 
whatsoever.  Id., ¶5.  Because Thomas already had an existing 
right against his landlords, the court of appeals determined 
that recognizing Collins' risk-contribution theory for white 
lead carbonate was unnecessary.  Id., ¶7.   
 
¶23 Regarding Thomas's civil conspiracy claim, the court 
of appeals agreed that he presented sufficient evidence to 
create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the 
Pigment Manufacturers acted in concert to at least minimize the 
dangers of white lead carbonate.  Id., ¶9.  However, the court 
of appeals determined that Thomas did not establish that the 
concerted action was a substantial factor in producing his 
injuries.  Id., ¶¶9-13.  Specifically, the court of appeals 
concluded that Thomas had not shown that the conspiracy was a 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
13 
 
substantial factor that contributed to either the use of lead-
based paint or its faulty maintenance.  Id., ¶13.  
 
¶24 Finally, 
the court 
of appeals rejected Thomas's 
enterprise liability theory for two reasons:  first, Thomas did 
not produce any evidence that white lead carbonate either was 
negligently made or dangerously defective if the lead paint was 
properly applied and maintained, id., ¶17; and second, there was 
no need to allow Thomas to sue on an enterprise liability theory 
as he already had a remedy at law for his injuries against the 
landlords, id., ¶18. 
 
¶25 Thomas seeks review. 
II 
¶26 As noted, this case is before us on summary judgment.  
We review summary judgments independently, applying the same 
methodology as the circuit courts.  Mayberry v. Volkswagen of 
Am., Inc., 2005 WI 13, ¶15, 278 Wis. 2d 39, 692 N.W.2d 226; 
Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 315, 401 N.W.2d 
816 (1987).  Summary judgment must be entered "if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. Stat. § 
802.08(2).  All reasonable inferences drawn from the underlying 
facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party.  Grams v. Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 338-39, 294 N.W.2d 
473 (1980).   
 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
14 
 
III 
 
¶27 A problem facing Thomas, who alleges that he was 
injured by white lead carbonate pigment, is that he is unable to 
identify the precise producer of the white lead carbonate 
pigment he ingested at his prior residences due to the generic 
nature of the pigment, the number of producers, the lack of 
pertinent records, and the passage of time.  See Collins, 116 
Wis. 2d at 177.  Some courts have simply denied extension of 
market-share liability under these circumstances and thus denied 
lead pigment plaintiffs recovery.10  However, the question 
presented is whether Collins' risk-contribution theory should be 
extended to white lead carbonate claims.  We agree that it 
should. 
¶28 The following backdrop provides the relevant context 
for determining whether Collins' risk-contribution theory should 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Santiago v. Sherwin Williams Co., 3 F.3d 546, 
550-51 (1st Cir. 1993) (declining to extend market-share 
liability because plaintiff could not establish the market; 
pigment manufacturers may not have been in the market during the 
relevant time; plaintiff could not establish that portion of 
damages which is represented by the pigment manufacturers); 
Brenner v. American Cyanamid Co., 699 N.Y.S.2d 848, 852-53 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1999) (declining to extend market-share liability 
because plaintiffs could not establish the national market or 
when the paint was applied; white lead carbonate was not 
fungible as it was not chemically identical or uniformly mixed 
in paints and did not produce a signature injury; pigment 
manufacturers not in exclusive control of risk); Skipworth v. 
Lead Industries Ass'n, Inc., 690 A.2d 169, 173 (Pa. 1996) 
(declining to extend market-share liability because plaintiff 
could not pinpoint when during the house's 100-year-period lead 
paint was applied and because uncontroverted evidence in record 
showed it was not fungible).  
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
15 
 
be recognized for white lead carbonate claims.11  It is by no 
means a complete discussion of the history of white lead 
carbonate, but rather is assembled pursuant to our standard of 
review that the facts are to be construed in the light most 
favorable to Thomas as the nonmoving party.12  See Grams, 97 
Wis. 2d at 339. 
A.  The Problem of Lead Poisoning from Lead-Based Paints.   
¶29 According 
to 
the 
Center 
for 
Disease 
Control's 
("CDC's") Preventing Lead Poisoning in Young Children, 1 (Oct. 
1991) (hereinafter "Preventing Lead Poisoning"), it is well-
recognized that given children's rapidly developing nervous 
systems, "[c]hildren are particularly susceptible to lead's 
toxic 
effects." 
 
Id. 
 
Because 
the 
human 
body 
cannot 
differentiate between lead and calcium, after lead has remained 
in the bloodstream for a few weeks, it is then absorbed into 
bones, where it can collect for a lifetime.  EPA, Lead In Your 
Home: A Parent's Reference Guide, 4 (June 1998).  Once lead 
enters the child's system, more lead is absorbed than would be 
in adults.  Preventing Lead Poisoning, 11. 
                                                 
11 This factual background is presented to illuminate the 
magnitude of the risk of injury created by the Pigment 
Manufacturers or their predecessors in interests.  Creation of 
the risk of injury was one of the central policies relied upon 
by Collins for fashioning Wisconsin's risk-contribution theory.  
See Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 191. 
12 As previously noted, we once again recognize that there 
are competing facts and inferences that could be drawn with 
respect to the Pigment Manufacturers' culpability regarding the 
manufacture and promotion of white lead carbonate. 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
16 
 
¶30 Children "are more exposed to lead than older groups 
because their normal hand-to-mouth activities may introduce many 
nonfood items into their gastrointestinal tract."  Id.  The CDC 
noted 
that 
"[p]ica, 
the 
repeated 
ingestion 
of 
nonfood 
substances, has been implicated in cases of lead poisoning; 
however, a child does not have to eat paint chips to become 
poisoned."  Id., 18.  It is more common for children to ingest 
dust and soil contaminated with lead from paint that either has 
flaked or chalked as it aged or has been otherwise disturbed 
during home maintenance or renovation.  Id., 18.  "This lead-
contaminated house dust, ingested via normal repetitive hand-to-
mouth activity, is now recognized as a major contributor to the 
total body burden of lead in children."  Id., 18.  Thus, 
"[b]ecause of the critical role of dust as an exposure pathway, 
children living in sub-standard housing and in homes undergoing 
renovation are at particular risk for lead poisoning."  Id., 18. 
¶31 The consequences of child lead poisoning are well 
documented.  According to the CDC: 
Very severe lead exposure in children (blood lead 
levels >80 µg/dL) can cause coma, convulsions, and 
even death.  Lower levels cause adverse effects on the 
central nervous system, kidney, and hematopoietic 
system.  Blood lead levels as low as 10µg/dL, which do 
not cause distinctive symptoms, are associated with 
decreased intelligence and impaired neurobehavioral 
developments. 
Id., 9.  The CDC also states that "the weight of the evidence 
clearly supports the hypothesis that decrements in children's 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
17 
 
cognition are evident at blood lead levels well below 25 µg/dL."  
Id. 
¶32 Although 
lead can 
originate 
from 
many 
different 
materials, such as food, soil, water, or air, lead paint is the 
primary culprit.  The CDC concluded that "[l]ead-based paint is 
the most common source of high-dose lead poisoning."  Id., 65.  
"Numerous studies have established that the risk of lead 
poisoning is related to the presence of lead-based paint and to 
the condition of such paint."  Id., 18.  As the United States 
Department 
of 
Health 
and 
Human 
Services 
determined 
in 
Toxicological Profile for Lead, 407 (July 1999): 
[T]he most common source of lead exposure for children 
is lead-based paint that has deteriorated into paint 
chips and lead dusts and that the most common sources 
of lead exposure for adults are occupational.  
Similarly, in 1990, the Food and Drug Administration estimated 
that "toddlers (2-year-olds) received 16% of their total lead 
exposure from food  . . . 1% from soil, 7% from water, and 75% 
from dust."  Id. at 415.  
¶33 Lead 
poisoning 
disproportionately 
affects 
lower-
income, inner-city populations.  The National Health and 
Nutrition 
Examination Survey 
(NHANES 
III) 
(conducted 
from 
October 1991 to September 1994) indicated that BPb levels among 
children aged 1-5 years "were more likely to be elevated among 
those who were poor, non-Hispanic, black, living in large 
metropolitan areas, or living in older housing (with potential 
exposure to lead from lead-based paint)."  Id.  The differences 
in housing conditions and exposures to lead-containing house 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
18 
 
dust "appear to contribute to the racial differences in urban 
children's [BPb] levels."  Id., 417.   
 
¶34 Approximately 3 million tons of lead remain in an 
estimated 57 million occupied private housing units built before 
1980.  Preventing Lead Poisoning, 18.  Of those units, 3.8 
million contain children and deteriorated lead paint.  Id.  
Although lead paint is typically found on kitchen and bathroom 
walls, it is also commonly found on doors, windows, and wood 
trim in pre-1950s homes.  Id., 19.   
¶35 As mentioned, the risk of lead poisoning is increased 
when the paint itself, or underlying surface on which it is 
painted, has deteriorated.  Id.  Lead paint on windows is 
particularly concerning "because it is abraded into dust by the 
repeated opening and closing of these windows."  Id.  However, 
even if it is intact, the risk of lead poisoning is greater if 
the lead paint is located on surfaces accessible to children.  
Id.   
B.  Lead Paint and White Lead Carbonate Pigment. 
¶36 Paint is comprised of two major components:  the 
pigment, which provides hiding power and protects the surface, 
and the vehicle, which allows the pigment to be spread and 
adhered to a surface.  In the first part of the 20th century, 
there were many different types of pigment, lead and non-lead 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
19 
 
based.13  Generally, paint manufacturers decided what pigments 
and amounts of pigments to use when formulating their paints.  
Many of the Pigment Manufacturers also produced ready-mixed 
lead-based paint. 
¶37 The predominant lead pigment that was manufactured and 
integrated into paint was white lead carbonate.  White lead 
carbonate was the first chemical produced commercially in this 
country.  That pigment was initially favored because when used 
alone it was the most durable and easy to apply.  It was also 
believed to be a mildewcide.14  All of the Pigment Manufacturers, 
or their predecessors-in-interests, produced this pigment at 
varying times since the houses in which Thomas resided were 
constructed in 1900 and 1905. 
¶38 White lead carbonate could be comprised of any of 
three different chemical compounds.  Basic lead carbonate had 
two chemical compositions, 4PbCO32Pb(OH)2PbO and 2PbCO3Pb(OH)2.  
Free normal lead carbonate's chemical composition was PbCO3.  
Basic lead carbonate was the overwhelming form of lead pigment 
used in paint. 
¶39 In addition to having different chemical compositions, 
the physical properties of white lead carbonate varied.  These 
                                                 
13 Examples of other lead pigments include basic lead 
sulfate, red lead, chrome yellow, blue lead, lead chromates, 
leaded zinc oxides, lead silicates, lead titanates, litharge and 
molybdate orange.  Examples of non-lead pigments include 
lithopone, titanium dioxide, latex, water-based and alkyd resin. 
14 Painters also apparently believed that there was no 
substitute for white lead carbonate. 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
20 
 
variances included different specific gravity,15 bulking values, 
oil absorption, hiding power, and particle size and shape.16  
Pigment Manufacturers also distinguished between grades of lead 
carbonate and apparently promoted each for different purposes.  
¶40 Thomas's toxicologist expert, Mushak, opines that the 
toxicological effects of white lead carbonate remain the same 
notwithstanding the formulary differences between the white lead 
carbonate pigments.  Mushak states that there is little 
relationship 
between 
chemical 
diversity 
and 
the 
"bioavailability" of the lead, which refers to the lead uptake 
or lead absorption into the human body.   Mushak explains that 
"[t]he reasons why one cannot automatically equate differences 
in chemical composition with differences in bioavailability is 
because bioavailability operates via a set of biological, 
biochemical and physico-chemical processes that will often 
render starting forms of lead in pigments indistinguishable in 
toxicokinetic terms."17  Based on observational evidence (which 
                                                 
15 According to the Lead Industry Association's (LIA) 
publication Lead In Modern Industry, the specific gravity for 
lead carbonate is 6.6, for basic lead carbonate is 6.14.    Also 
according to that publication, the molecular weight of lead 
carbonate is 267.22, while the weight of basic lead carbonate 
2PbCO3Pb(OH)2 is 775.67 and of 4PbCO32Pb(OH)2PbO is 1774.55.    
According to that publication, only basic lead carbonate 
4PbCO3Pb(OH)2PbO was used for paint pigment.   
16  Generally, normal lead carbonate particle size was 
usually larger than the basic lead carbonate particles.   
17 According to Mushak, "toxicokinetics" describes processes 
of uptake of lead, distribution of absorbed lead within the 
body, retention of some fraction of that lead, and subsequent 
excretion of that lead.  
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
21 
 
Mushak 
characterizes 
as 
"the 
huge 
body 
of 
toxicological 
literature showing that lead paint poisoning is pervasive and 
rather uniformly intense as to the severity of exposures") and 
laboratory evidence, Mushak concludes that there is no basis to 
conclude that formulary changes among white lead carbonates 
affect the bioavailability of the lead. 
C.  Knowledge of the Toxicity of Lead Pigments 
¶41 In 
1848, 
Samuel 
L. 
Dana, 
an 
American 
doctor, 
translated the first complete clinical description of lead 
poisoning based on over 1,000 cases, written by Tanquerel des 
Planches of France in 1839.  Planches' work obtained preeminent 
status and was a leading authority on the dangers of lead 
through at least the 1920s.  That treatise recognized the 
dangers of repeated inhalation of small quantities of lead. 
¶42 By the turn of the 20th century, it was well-
recognized that controlling lead dust could significantly reduce 
lead poisoning, although the recognition was initially limited 
to industrial settings.  European countries had acknowledged the 
harm of lead dust, and by 1910, Germany, England, and France 
were already regulating lead industries to protect their workers 
from lead dust and fumes.  That same year, in the United States 
at a meeting of the Superintendents of the National Lead 
Company, Dr. Alice Hamilton, M.D., the founder of industrial 
hygiene, applauded these countries' efforts and detailed the 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
22 
 
advanced protections European workers enjoyed.18  Given the 
dwindling numbers of lead poisoning in those European countries 
that passed regulatory legislation, Hamilton called on American 
industries to reform their practices to mimic their European 
counterparts.  Above all, she argued, the first step was to 
abolish, or at least reduce to the greatest extent possible, 
lead dust. 
¶43 Consistent with Hamilton's assessment, National Lead 
reported to its stockholders in 1912 that "[i]n the manufacture 
of the various products of Lead, there are two sources of danger 
to the health of workmen therein employed; viz., the fumes 
arising from the smelting or melting of metallic lead, and the 
dust arising in the process of making white lead and lead 
oxides." Seven years later, in 1919, the Chairman of National 
Lead Company's Manufacturing Committee described that "[t]he 
prime object" for safely handling white lead and other lead dust 
was "to keep lead dust out of the nose and mouth of the worker." 
¶44 Other than manufacturing, Hamilton also monitored trade 
painters.  In 1913, at the International Congress of Master 
Painters, Hamilton suggested that painters not use white lead 
paints for interior work.19  Her suggestion was not generally 
                                                 
18 Dr. Hamilton specialized in safety issues involving the 
lead industries and believed that much improvement needed to be 
made.   
19 In 1909, France banned the use of lead paint for interior 
or exterior painting after July 20, 1914.  Also in 1909, Belgium 
prohibited the sale and use of dry white lead, and Austria 
prohibited the use of white lead for interior use in houses. 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
23 
 
followed, and, in 1919, she lamented that painting was "the most 
notorious of the lead trades" as "painters make up the large 
majority of the cases of lead poisoning."  Aside from smeared 
paint present on the painters' hands that could be carried to 
the mouth, Hamilton noted that paint dust, caused primarily by 
rubbing old or new paint with sandpaper, "is universally 
recognized as the most dangerous part of the painters' trade."  
Hamilton's concerns were not unfounded.  In 1910, a bill was 
introduced in Congress, in the House of Representatives, that 
would 
have 
required 
"[t]hat 
the 
introduction 
into 
any state . . . of any white lead or mixed paint containing 
white lead which is not labeled with a skull and crossbones and 
the words 'Poison; white lead' is hereby prohibited."   That 
bill was defeated.  Although protective regulatory legislation 
would have likely yielded beneficial results, "[t]he total 
prohibition of lead paint for use in interior work would do more 
than anything else to improve conditions in the painting trade," 
Hamilton stated. 
¶45 The appreciation of the dangers lead paint posed 
inside the home to the residents was also emerging during this 
time.  In July 1904, in its monthly publication The S.W.P., 
Sherwin-Williams publicized the hazards of white lead paint.  
Under the bold headline, "DANGERS OF WHITE LEAD," Sherwin-
Williams reported that a committee in France had been appointed 
to investigate the use of white lead and other lead mixtures for 
painting houses.  Sherwin-Williams noted that one of the 
committee's experts indicated that lead paints were "poisonous 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
24 
 
in a large degree, both for the workmen and for the inhabitants 
of a house painted with lead colors."  Sherwin-Williams also 
noted that the expert was of the opinion "that the absolute 
disuse of white lead has become an imperative necessity."  
Nevertheless, six years later, in 1910, Sherwin-Williams began 
manufacturing white lead carbonate after it acquired a white 
lead processing plant.  Moreover, in 1917, during the First 
World War, Sherwin-Williams advised the War Department that 
government specifications for 50 percent white lead carbonate 
paint for war helmets should be replaced with its lead-free 
lithopone pigment.  Sherwin-Williams stated that the advantage 
of switching to its lithopone pigment was that the danger from 
lead poisoning was entirely eliminated. 
¶46 In 1914, the director of the scientific section of the 
Paint Manufacturers' Association of the United States, Henry A. 
Gardner, also warned of the hazards lead paint posed to 
residents.  After detailing the efforts made to prevent workers 
from the hazards of lead dust in factories, Gardner asked why 
similar care was not being used to guard against lead dust in 
public buildings.  Gardner observed that many tons of white 
leaded paint had been applied to the inside of schools and 
hospitals.  And with white lead carbonate dust resulting from 
the gradual disintegration of this paint, Gardner noted that 
just as was the case with industrial workers, the presence of 
such dust in the room's atmosphere was very dangerous. 
¶47 In 1919, the International Labour Organization held a 
meeting in Washington to enlist U.S. support in regulating white 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
25 
 
lead.  Following this meeting was a conference in Geneva in 
1921, under the auspices of the League of Nations, which was 
attended by 400 delegates from 40 countries.20  That conference 
resulted 
in 
a 
recommendation 
that 
lead 
paint 
be 
banned 
altogether for interior uses.21  Industry press reviews in the 
United States viewed the recommendation as a sinister plot by 
labor interests.  The industry press reviews happily reported 
that there was little danger of any bans on lead paint in the 
United States. 
¶48 In 1939, the National Paint Varnish and Lacquer 
Association (NPVLA) confidentially warned its members——which 
included National Lead, Sherwin Williams, Glidden, and W.P. 
Fuller——that white lead pigments were toxic.  This letter, 
marked "CONFIDENTIAL Not for Publication," stated: 
[T]he vital factor concerning toxic materials is to 
intelligently safeguard the public.  People may feel 
safer in buying materials whose danger they know 
rather than materials unknown to them. 
. . . .  
The following pigments may be considered toxic if they 
find their way into the stomach.  . . .  
. . . . 
                                                 
20  In attendance at this meeting was John R. MacGregor, 
later founder of the John R. MacGregor Lead Corporation, the 
predecessor to American Cyanamid. 
21  After the conference, many countries enacted bans or 
restrictions on white lead for interior painting, including 
Belgium (which then banned white lead altogether for interior 
use), Tunisia, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Great Britain, Hungary, 
Sweden, Belgium, Poland, Spain, Yugoslavia, and Cuba. 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
26 
 
Lead Compounds.  White lead, red lead, litharge, lead 
chromates (chrome yellow, chrome green), or other lead 
pigments. 
The letter proceeds to explain that the NPVLA expected that 
manufacturers 
would 
apply 
"every 
precautionary 
measure in 
manufacturing, in selling and in use where toxic materials are 
likely to or do enter a product."  The letter noted that 
"children's toys, equipment, furniture, etc. are not the only 
consideration."  It also contained the following notification of 
legal duties to warn of a dangerous product: 
1.  A manufacturer who puts out a dangerous article or 
substance without accompanying it with a warning as to 
its dangerous properties is ordinarily liable for any 
damage which results from such failure to warn. 
. . . .  
9.  The manufacturer . . . must know the qualities of 
his product and cannot escape liability on the ground 
that he did not know it to be dangerous. 
10.  The general rule that a manufacturer is not 
liable to those not in privity of contract with him 
does not apply when his product is imminently or 
inherently dangerous. 
¶49 Nevertheless, the NPVLA fought to weaken states' 
proposals that required paint to contain warning labels and 
particularly objected to the American Medical Association's 
proposal that would have required lead paint to be labeled as 
"poisonous." 
¶50 By 1942, the National Safety Council determined that 
"the most obvious method of preventing lead poisoning is to 
substitute for lead and its compounds other materials that are 
non-toxic."  By the early 1920s, there were safe alternatives to 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
27 
 
white lead paint.  During that time, Anaconda, Glidden, and 
Sherwin-Williams produced zinc-based paints, while National Lead 
pioneered the development of titanium pigments.  These pigments 
were being manufactured and marketed particularly because of the 
appreciation of lead's toxicity.22   
¶51 As noted above, during World War I, Sherwin-Williams 
advised the War Department to switch its order for helmets with 
50 percent lead carbonate paint to Sherwin-Williams' lead-free 
lithopone paint in order to eliminate the prospect of lead 
poisoning.  Glidden promoted its lead-free paints by claiming:  
"Lead Paints are banned in Europe because of the danger of Lead 
Poisoning.  [Titan-O-Zinc] is lead-free, consequently, non-
poisonous.  Not only is it ideal for residence painting and 
every other exterior surface, but the attention of the farmer is 
especially 
called 
to 
this 
product 
as 
it 
eliminates 
all 
possibility of lead poisoning of livestock characteristically 
known as 'cribbers.'" 
¶52 Although various manufacturers of zinc-based paints 
published ads attacking lead paints as poisonous, National Lead 
silenced those advertisements by reaching an agreement with zinc 
pigment manufacturers to refrain from attack ads sometime 
between 1905 and 1918.  By 1928, National Lead was one of the 
leaders in the production of titanium pigments.  After the 
Second World War, even though National Lead was producing lead-
                                                 
22 They were also apparently cheaper to produce.   
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
28 
 
free paints, it advised its salespeople to push the sale of 
leaded paints "at every opportunity." 
D.  Knowledge of Childhood Lead Poisoning 
 
¶53 Parallel with the emerging knowledge of the dangers 
caused by lead in industrial and residential settings grew the 
awareness of childhood lead poisoning.  During the mid-1800s, 
child lead poisoning was already linked to mouthing lead-painted 
toys.  Australia was at the forefront of identifying and 
examining childhood lead poisoning.  Following the first well-
documented study of childhood lead poisoning from paint in 1908, 
Australian researchers went so far as to call for prohibiting 
the use of lead paint within the reach of children.  They found: 
Two conditions of painted surfaces would be more than 
usually liable to induce poisoning, viz., (a) freshly 
painted or at least sticky surfaces; (b) painted 
surfaces which have either been exposed to the sun and 
air, and whose paint has lost its oil and become a dry 
easily detachable powder, or which though not exposed 
have lost some of their oil and gloss, and which when 
rubbed yield a powdery substance to the touch and 
possibly distribute it to the dust of rooms. 
¶54 During that same year, Australian researchers also 
connected paint powder stuck to children's fingers, which were 
then bit or sucked, with lead poisoning.  Those researchers also 
recommended refraining from using lead paint on surfaces 
accessible to children. 
¶55 In 
the 
early 
1900s, 
children's 
particular 
susceptibility to lead poisoning was also gaining recognition.  
In Great Britain, the dangers of lead exposure to fetuses were 
identified, and women were later removed from working in the 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
29 
 
lead industries.  In the United States, in 1908, Dr. Hamilton 
noted that "lead is a most potent producer of abortion, and it 
is very rare that a woman lead worker bears a healthy child at 
term."  And, in 1912, researchers in the United States 
acknowledged that young people were more vulnerable to lead 
poisoning than adults.  In its 1912 annual report, National Lead 
noted that it did not employ women in its factories, except as 
occasional messengers or other similar jobs, or boys. 
¶56 In 1914, a physician from John Hopkins Hospital who 
was also professor at the John Hopkins Medical School, Dr. 
Kenneth D. Blackfan, chronicled a case of a five-year-old boy 
from Baltimore who died of lead poisoning from white lead paint 
bitten from his crib's railing.  Blackfan concluded that lead 
poisoning in children "appears to have a special effect on the 
meninges and the central nervous system and that it may not 
infrequently be the unsuspected cause of so-called serious 
meningitis."  In 1917, Blackfan wrote another article that 
detailed lead poisoning cases from a home in Baltimore.  After 
noting that children were particularly vulnerable to lead 
poisoning, Blackfan forewarned that a key source of lead 
poisoning for children was gnawing on lead-painted objects, 
specifically white paint on cribs. 
¶57 Despite this growing awareness of child lead poisoning 
and children's susceptibility to lead poisoning, the knowledge 
was not yet mainstream.   For example, between 1911 and 1920, 
the U.S. Bureau of the Census listed only eight reported child 
lead poisoning fatalities.   
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
30 
 
¶58 Consistent with the prior decade's little official 
data and literature on the extent of lead poisoning, some 
medical journal articles in the early 1920s described child lead 
poisoning as rare.  However, in 1924, Dr. John C. Ruddock, M.D., 
wrote that child lead poisoning "may easily be overlooked, 
because the average physician has never had his attention called 
to the fact, and also because the clinical picture is usually 
very different from that in similar poisoning in adults."  The 
following year, another doctor emphasized that most cases of 
lead poisoning in general were missed or otherwise misdiagnosed.  
By 1926, another physician submitted that "[l]ead poisoning is 
of relatively frequent occurrence in children."  As one 
historian concluded, the growing theme during this time was the 
more doctors knew to look for lead poisoning, the more they 
found it.   
¶59 During the mid to late 1920s, the view that children 
were more susceptible to lead poisoning was almost universal.  A 
number of articles appeared in medical journals that linked 
lead-based paint in particular to childhood lead poisoning.  In 
addition to the previously identified dangers of painted crib 
railings (which, by 1926, was identified in 15 medical journals 
in the United States as a risk), windowsills, porch railings, 
children's furniture, and any other painted articles around the 
home that were within the child's reach were identified as 
posing risks to children.  Aside from children's penchant for 
placing items in their mouths to chew, in 1926 researchers also 
recognized that absorption of lead dust, white lead carbonate 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
31 
 
dust in particular, could be rapidly absorbed by children's 
respiratory system.  Merely sleeping in a lead-laden room, with 
little ventilation, was discovered to cause lead poisoning.  As 
Dr. Ruddock warned, "A child lives in a lead world."  Through 
the 
mounting 
evidence, 
the 
rising 
sentiment 
was 
that 
underscoring the dangers of non-industrial sources for lead in 
child lead poisoning cases "cannot be too strongly emphasized."   
¶60 Thomas's 
public 
health 
historians, 
Gerald 
E. 
Markowitz, 
Ph.D., 
and 
David 
Rosner, 
Ph.D. 
(hereinafter 
"Markowitz and Rosner"), opine that by the mid-1920s there was 
"strong and ample convergent evidence of the toxicity of lead 
paint" in general, and the dangers it posed to children in 
particular.  Markowitz and Rosner conclude that given the 
increasing evidence, "the manufacturers of lead pigments should 
have ceased producing it, at the very least for interior use, 
before the mid-1920s." 
¶61 As the number of medical journals increased their 
reporting on child lead poisoning, so too did the official data 
on child lead poisoning fatalities.  Between 1921 and 1930, the 
number of child lead poisoning fatalities documented by the 
Bureau of the Census nearly quadrupled from the past decade, to 
31. 
¶62 The literature on childhood lead poisoning continued 
to grow during the 1930's.  In 1930, physicians asserted that 
lead poisoning from ingesting paint from cribs, woodwork, or 
toys was "proven beyond a doubt."  Some researchers reiterated 
early sentiments that child lead poisoning was chronic and was 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
32 
 
occurring more frequently among infants and children than had 
been supposed, mostly because physicians frequently did not 
recognize the condition.  The conclusions that lead paint was 
the main culprit and that children were especially vulnerable to 
its toxicity were regularly repeated. 
¶63 While it was discovered during the 1930s that lead 
caused permanent neurological disorders, by 1943, Randolph 
Byers, M.D., and Elizabeth Lord, Ph.D. (hereinafter "Byers and 
Lord"), found that lead poisoning had effects on long-term 
intellectual development by retarding mental development.23  As 
seen below, their findings would cause quite a stir in the lead 
industry.  Time magazine summarized Byers and Lord's findings 
under the headline, "Paint Eaters," writing:  "All but one 
child . . . were school failures.  Only five had normal I.Q.s, 
and four of the five were so erratic that they could not learn 
easily."  Building on these findings, research during the 1970s 
demonstrated that lead levels that did not give rise to clinical 
symptoms might nonetheless adversely affect psychological and 
intellectual development. 
 
 
                                                 
23  Between 1940 and 1950, the number of children screened 
for lead poisoning increased fourfold, as did the number of 
cases of diagnosed lead poisoning.  
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
33 
 
E.  The Pigment Manufacturers and the Lead Industries 
Association (LIA)24 
¶64 In 1928, the rising alarms regarding the hazards of 
lead and the need for coordination among lead producers and 
manufacturers led to the formation of the Lead Industries 
Association (LIA).  Although comprised of many lead industries, 
the white lead industry was the most important of the lead 
manufacturing industries in the LIA.   
¶65 Virtually from its inception, the LIA was responding 
to 
what 
it 
termed 
"undesirable 
publicity 
regarding 
lead 
poisoning."  In 1930, the LIA's Secretary, stated that "of late 
we have received much undeserved publicity in newspapers 
damaging to lead products."  By 1939, the LIA acknowledged that 
"the large amount of space given to lead by medical columnists 
in the daily press by the medical profession, by consumer 
organizations 
and 
by 
authors 
of 
scientific 
subjects 
has 
increased the amount of attention that we have had to give to 
[the] subject of lead toxicology in 1939."  That same year, the 
LIA initiated its large-scale "White Lead Promotion Campaign."  
By 1941, the LIA complained that "[l]ead poisoning matters 
continue 
to 
absorb 
a 
large 
amount 
of 
time 
of 
the 
Association . . . ."  In response to this negative publicity, 
the Secretary proposed "a program of vigorously investigating 
each alleged case that arises, taking any remedial steps if 
                                                 
24 The LIA was named as a party defendant.  However, the LIA 
subsequently filed for bankruptcy and was later dismissed as a 
party defendant. 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
34 
 
necessary, encouraging medical research in lead poisoning, and 
publishing literature showing the useful role of lead in 
industry."  Through the end of the 1940s, the LIA determined 
that "the problem of lead hygiene" could be addressed by 
reassuring the public that lead was safe.  Addressing this 
problem was, in the LIA's own estimation, "one of the most 
important activities of the Lead Industries Association as there 
remains an appalling amount of prejudice against the use of lead 
products based on fancied notions of lead toxicity." 
¶66 According to Markowitz and Rosner, the LIA's campaign 
was multi-pronged:  it sought to rebut any research findings or 
other news of lead's toxicity; it sponsored its own research to 
demonstrate that lead was harmless; and it refused to warn the 
public of lead's dangers, even in the face of overwhelming 
evidence from research and clinical findings that many children 
were dying.  All the while, Markowitz and Rosner submit, the LIA 
promoted the use of lead paint and successfully lobbied against 
laws and regulations that would curb its use.  Although the 
Pigment Manufacturers, through the LIA, were not actively hiding 
information 
regarding 
the 
dangers 
of 
lead 
poisoning, 
particularly in children, they were very well aware of the 
information, and they were accumulating it.   
¶67 One of the key voices for the LIA in critiquing the 
growing scientific literature on the toxicity of lead was that 
of Dr. Joseph Aub.   Prior to the LIA, the lead industry was 
organized under the American Institute of Lead Manufacturers.  
The Institute funded medical research on the toxicity of lead at 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
35 
 
Harvard University under the direction of Aub.  The LIA 
continued that research from 1929-45 to help rebut findings of 
lead poisoning.  Aub's research focused on lead metabolism in 
adults from occupational exposures, not on child lead poisoning.  
However, 
in 
1937, 
during 
an 
LIA 
sponsored 
confidential 
conference on lead poisoning for the physicians employed by its 
member companies (including National Lead, Sherwin-Williams, 
Glidden, and Anaconda/IS&R), Aub acknowledged the vulnerability 
of children with respect to lead poisoning.25   
¶68 The LIA attached inestimable importance to Aub's 
research:  "Without the counsel he has given this office and 
active assistance in some of our lead problems, we would indeed 
be at a serious disadvantage."  Aub was called upon to rebut 
treating physicians' reports of lead poisoning deaths by 
providing alternative exculpatory explanations. 
¶69 In contrast to Aub's downplaying lead paint's hazards, 
another prominent industry-sponsored researcher, Dr. Robert 
Kehoe, consistently warned of the hazards lead paint posed to 
children, although such warnings remained largely confined to 
private correspondences.  Kehoe's research was financed by the 
Ethyl Corporation, which produced tetraethyl lead for gasoline. 
                                                 
25  At this confidential conference, there was discussion on 
how to defeat workers' compensation claims by clearing the blood 
of lead poisoning evidence.  Some suggestions included injecting 
the worker with liver in order to "bring him up" even though "it 
doesn't do him any good."  Another suggestion was removing the 
workers' teeth, so that there would be no lead line for anyone 
to see. 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
36 
 
¶70 By the 1930s, Kehoe agreed with the broader medical 
community that toys, cribs, furniture, as well as woodwork and 
any other painted surfaces in children's reach were possible 
sources of child lead poisoning.  In 1933, Kehoe highlighted the 
disparate impact lead poisoning had on children and adults and 
stressed that "strenuous efforts must be devoted to eliminating 
lead from [children's] environment."  In 1935, he again 
expressed his belief that "[t]he occurrence of lead-containing 
commodities and the use of lead paints on furniture, toys, and 
other objects, within the reach of small children is much too 
common to ignore."26   
¶71 In 1944, after Byers and Lord's publication on the 
effects of lead on long-term intellectual development, the LIA 
wrote to Kehoe, acknowledging that if their conclusions were 
correct, "we have indeed a most serious public health hazard."  
Kehoe responded, writing: 
I fear that you will be disappointed by my answer, for 
I am disposed to agree with the conclusions arrived at 
by the authors, and to believe that their evidence, if 
not entirely adequate, is worthy of very serious 
consideration.  Perhaps my own experience prejudices 
me in favor of the acceptance of their findings, for I 
have seen cases of serious mental retardation in 
                                                 
26 In response, the LIA conducted its own "investigation," 
whereby on November 30, 1930, it sent a letter to lead companies 
to "ascertain if any lead paint is being used to paint or 
decorate cribs, children's beds or furniture."  Twelve responses 
were received.  Because the letter asked only about whether the 
companies used "white lead," which was apparently interpreted to 
mean pure white lead, five companies said that they used only 
enamel or lacquer.  However, these were mixed paints that could 
contain large amounts of white lead carbonate.  
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
37 
 
children that have recovered from lead poisoning of 
the encephalopathic type, and among my records is one 
case of permanent feeble mindedness which I attribute 
to a well defined episode of lead encephalopathy in an 
infant.  
. . . . 
You quarrel with the statement about chewing 
paint and say that the manufacturers don't use it on 
cribs and toys.  That may well be true.  My experience 
leads me to accept it as such.  However, the 
householder repaints these articles, and often with 
lead-containing paints.  Please note that the article 
makes point of the fact that the children chewed paint 
"off cribs, window sills or furniture," and also 
refers to the statement of parents that they had 
repainted cribs.  I'm afraid it will do you no good to 
try to combat the significance of the history of 
chewing articles in relation to the problem of lead 
poisoning in children.  The most significant feature 
of 
the 
history 
of 
exposure 
in 
an 
overwhelming 
proportion of the cases of lead poisoning in children 
is just that fact.  "Pica" is at the bottom of most of 
these cases, and unfortunately the environment of 
small children is not sufficiently free of lead for 
their safety.  Have you seen the data on lead 
poisoning in children in Queensland[, Australia]?  
These cases were largely due to chewing the paint off 
the railings of the porches on which the children 
played. 
¶72 With reassurances from Aub, the LIA disagreed with 
Kehoe's assessment, stating: 
[I]t has not been conclusively proven and, the case 
made out by Drs. Byers and Lord that there is a 
connection between retarded mental development in 
later years and lead poisoning itself, is far from 
proven.  As Dr. Aub told me, he felt that children who 
have . . . the disease known as "pica" which caused 
them to chew on inedible articles, were subnormal to 
start with! 
¶73 Despite assurances from the LIA that children's toys 
no longer contained lead paint, the U.S. Children's Bureau 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
38 
 
warned in December 1945 that "[i]t is not safe to take the word 
of the salesman as to whether [a paint] is harmless or not 
because he may not know."  According to Markowitz and Rosner, 
"The LIA did not advocate the use of warning labels, nor did it 
encourage the elimination of interior use of white lead.  Only 
these measures could have served to diminish or eliminate the 
problem.  To the contrary, . . . the LIA and its members 
continued to promote lead paint for interior use."  Sherwin-
Williams and Glidden actually still promoted lead paint for use 
on toys at this time. 
¶74 Also in December 1945, the LIA launched "The Safety 
and Hygiene Program" to undercut the growing medical literature 
regarding the toxicity of lead that it characterized as faulty.  
Recognizing that the lead industry "must be losing a vast amount 
of business each year because of the fact that lead has such 
unpleasant connections in the minds of so many Americans," the 
LIA persisted in complaining about how the lead industry 
"continues to be plagued unfairly by attacks made upon lead 
products because of their toxicity" and indicated it would "meet 
attacks on lead due to its toxic qualities by correcting 
published erroneous statements."  
 
¶75 In 1946, to counter the findings of Byers and Lord, 
the LIA organized a conference on lead poisoning with the 
American Medical Association.  At the conference, the LIA 
strongly rejected claims that lead was dangerous.  The LIA 
Secretary rebuked a doctor's account of how a child's crib was 
traced to three cases of lead poisoning.  According to the 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
39 
 
Secretary, interior white paint no longer contained lead, and 
thus he denied the importance of lead poisoning in children due 
to paint. 
¶76 Kehoe 
still 
disagreed 
with 
the 
LIA 
Secretary's 
assessment, stating: 
More lead poisoning in children has occurred than we 
would like to think about.  The number that are 
actually reported in medical literature have very 
little relationship to the number that actually occur.  
Lead poisoning in a child is a serious disease. 
¶77 Moreover, Markowitz and Rosner also note that the LIA 
and the Pigment Manufacturers continued to promote and sell 
white lead paints for interior use well after the mid 1940s.  In 
addition, in their estimation, "by this date it was abundantly 
clear that hundreds of children were dying of lead poisoning 
each year." 
¶78 Kehoe later reviewed a report written by the LIA 
Secretary that iterated the benign qualities of lead, and Kehoe 
warned the LIA against taking this extreme position.  In 
particular, Kehoe objected to the LIA Secretary's denial of the 
importance of lead poisoning in children due to lead paint, 
stressing that the connection between childhood lead poisoning 
and lead paint was sound.  A few years later, in 1953, Kehoe 
recommended largely eliminating use of lead paints for interiors 
to protect children: 
[The] 
most 
effective 
solution 
of 
this 
problem . . . [is] 
to 
eliminate 
the 
use 
of 
paints . . . of more than very minor lead content for 
all inside decoration in the household and in the 
environment of young children.  If this is not done 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
40 
 
voluntarily by a wise industry concerned to handle its 
own 
business 
properly, 
it 
will 
be 
accomplished 
ineffectually and with irrelevant difficulties and 
disadvantages through legislation. 
The LIA did not accept his proposal. 
 
¶79 By the late 1940's, Markowitz and Rosner submit that 
warning the public of the dangers of lead was still out of the 
question for the LIA.  In 1948, after comparisons between the 
toxicity of lead and zinc products were being published, the LIA 
formalized its informal agreement with the American Zinc 
Industry that prevented the Zinc Industry from advertising the 
toxicity of lead-based paints. 
 
¶80 In 
1955, 
the 
LIA 
characterized 
the 
problem 
of 
childhood lead poisoning as "a major 'headache' and a source of 
much adverse publicity."  The LIA wrote: 
With us, childhood lead poisoning is common enough to 
constitute perhaps my major "headache," this being in 
part due to the very poor prognosis in many such 
cases, and also to the fact that the only real remedy 
lies in educating a relatively ineducable category of 
parents.  It is mainly a slum problem with us, 
estimated by Kehoe to run into four figures annually, 
and [] we have no monopoly on either substandard 
housing or substandard mentalities in the USA. . . . 
 
¶81 Shortly 
thereafter, 
the 
American 
Standards 
Association, a voluntary group comprised of representatives from 
a variety of medical, public health and industry groups 
(including the LIA and NPVLA), developed a standard to minimize 
hazards to children.  This new standard provided that paint used 
for interiors or any surface that children might chew on should 
contain no more than one percent lead by weight.  Prior to that 
time, the LIA indicated it made "[e]very effort . . . to confine 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
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the regulatory measures . . . to the field of warning labels, 
which, as applied to paints, are obviously less detrimental to 
our interests than would be any legislation of a prohibitory 
nature." 
 
¶82 Two years later, in 1957, the LIA finally recognized 
what the literature had supported for nearly half a century:  
lead paint was the major source of childhood lead poisoning.  
The LIA also recognized the problems of lead paint causing lead 
poisoning was going to be a lasting one.  However, the LIA still 
was displacing blame.  This time, the LIA suggested the blame 
fell on the children's parents' shoulders, as it stated:  
As the major source of trouble is the flaking of lead 
paint in the ancient slum dwellings of our older 
cities, the problem of lead poisoning in children will 
be with us for as long as there are slums, and because 
of the high death rate, the frequency of permanent 
brain damage in the survivors, and the intelligence 
level of the slum parents, it seems destined to remain 
as important and as difficult as any with which we 
have to deal. 
 
¶83 In a letter to Kehoe towards the end of 1957, the LIA 
similarly acknowledged the problem yet cast blame elsewhere, 
writing: 
Without fear of successful contravention, I can say: 
1. That 
the 
overwhelming 
major 
source 
of 
lead 
poisoning in children is from structural lead 
paints chewed from painted surfaces, picked up or 
off in the form of flakes, or adhering to bits of 
plaster and subsequently ingested. 
2. That of some, but secondary importance is lead 
paint mistakenly applied by ignorant parents to 
cribs, play pens and other juvenile furniture and 
subsequently chewed off and ingested. 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
42 
 
3. That any poisoning that there may be from lead-
painted 
toys 
is 
of 
quite 
minor 
concern 
in 
comparison with the two above sources. 
4. That childhood lead poisoning is essentially a 
problem of slum dwellings and relatively ignorant 
parents. 
5. That it is almost wholly confined to the older 
cities of the eastern third of the country and is 
practically nonexistent west of Milwaukee, Chicago, 
St. Louis and New Orleans. 
6. That, in all too many cases, the slum child, 
diagnosed, hospitalized and cured, returns to the 
same environment and to another routine of lead 
paint ingestion. 
7. That the importance of the problem lies primarily, 
not in the number of cases, but in the likelihood 
of 
permanent 
brain 
damage 
and 
in 
the 
great 
difficulty 
of 
instituting 
really 
effective 
preventive measures. 
8. That, until we can find means to (a) get rid of our 
slums, and (b) educate the relatively ineducable 
parent, the problem will continue to plague us. 
9. And finally that, if you know the answer to those 
two, you are even more of a genius than I think 
you. 
Perhaps this letter is just another instance of 
"carrying 
coals 
to 
Newcastle," 
but 
the 
misunderstanding of the fundamentals of this problem 
is so widespread, and frequently where one would least 
expect it, that I find myself impelled to sound off in 
this fashion once in so often. 
Although less than unassuming, the lead industry at least 
finally acknowledged what researchers had been confirming for 
decades. 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
43 
 
 
¶84 The LIA still saw the problem as a "headache" and a 
public relations issue, not a public health disaster.  In 1959, 
in its annual report, the LIA wrote: 
The toxicity of lead poses a problem that other 
nonferrous industries generally do not have to face.  
Lead poisoning, or the threat of it, hurts our 
business in several different ways.  While it is 
difficult to count exactly in dollars and cents, it is 
taking money out of your pockets every day. 
In the first place, it means thousands of items 
of 
unfavorable 
publicity 
every 
year. 
 
This 
is 
particularly true since most cases of lead poisoning 
today are in children, and anything sad that happens 
to a child is meat for newspaper editors and is 
gobbled up by the public.  It makes no difference that 
it is essentially a problem of slums, a public welfare 
problem.  Just the same the publicity hits us where it 
hurts. 
Secondly, it means that we are often subjected to 
unnecessarily onerous regulations, either in the use 
of our product or in its labeling.  This may mean 
either an added expense in labeling or in control 
equipment in your or your customers' plants.  It may 
even mean that your product won't be used at all 
because your potential customer doesn't want the 
problems that the use of lead may involve. 
¶85 By 1972, the LIA now characterized the problems of 
childhood lead poisoning as "harrowing."  The LIA recognized 
that childhood lead poisoning was not limited to urban slums but 
also reached "young children in small towns and rural areas."  
Further, the LIA recognized that childhood lead poisoning could 
not be attributed to defective children, as it had earlier 
believed, 
because 
"young 
children . . . will 
often 
taste 
anything that gets into their hands." 
 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
44 
 
F.  Promotion 
¶86 With approximately 85 percent of all sales, National 
Lead dominated the white lead pigment market in 1900.  Through 
its advertisements and promotions, National Lead promoted and 
reinforced the perception that no paint was as good, or as safe, 
as white leaded paint.  Despite numerous articles showing that 
lead was a potent poison by the 1920s, in 1923, one of National 
Lead's ads declared that lead paint helps guard health by 
preventing a resting place for germs.  Although there were 
warnings from the medical communities about the dangers of white 
lead paints in schools and hospitals, National Lead also 
specifically targeted those institutions from the 1920s into the 
1930s.  National Lead repeatedly claimed that its lead paint 
protected 
public 
health, 
as 
it 
was 
a 
deadly 
enemy 
of 
tuberculosis and other germs.  In 1931, National Lead contended 
that its lead paint helped "speed patients' recovery." 
¶87 Between 1910 and 1925, three new major pigment 
manufacturers entered the market:  Sherwin-Williams, Anaconda, 
and Glidden.  National Lead's market share fell to between 60 
and 70 percent during this time.  Sherwin-Williams did not 
manufacture white lead until 1910, when it began operating a 
newly constructed white lead manufacturing plant in Chicago. 
Although Sherwin-Williams recognized the dangers of lead paint 
in a 1904 publication, and cautioned the War Department about 
the dangers of lead poisoning from lead paint in 1917, in 1922 
it advocated using lead-based paint on children's toys.   
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
45 
 
¶88 During the mid-1920s, Sherwin-Williams continued to 
recommend using white-lead based paint (paint which contained 
upwards of 75 percent white lead) on interior surfaces, 
including walls, woodwork, doors, and ceilings.  From 1936 until 
the 1940s, Sherwin-Williams promoted use of its lead based 
paints on toys. 
¶89 Although Sherwin-Williams was specifically warned in 
1937 about the hazards of white lead to children, Sherwin-
Williams sold white lead paint for interior use as late as the 
1950s.  When Sherwin-Williams ceased producing white lead 
carbonate in 1947, it continued to sell white lead carbonate and 
leaded paints by buying the product from National Lead. 
¶90 Atlantic 
Richfield's 
predecessor, 
Anaconda, 
began 
producing white lead in 1919, at a time Markowitz and Rosner 
opine that they knew or should have known of the hazards of 
white lead paint.  In 1940, Anaconda also recommended using 
white lead on interiors. 
¶91 Markowitz and Rosner opine SCM's predecessor, Glidden, 
also knew or should have known of the dangers of white lead when 
it began producing white lead in 1925.  Glidden promoted its 
non-leaded zinc-based paints by arguing that unlike lead paints, 
zinc paints were non-toxic.  In 1942, Glidden asserted that its 
lead-based paints were ideal for nurseries and children's rooms 
as it provided youngsters with "a safe, pleasant place to play."  
Glidden also 
recommended 
lead-based 
paints 
for 
children's 
furniture.  Through the late 1940s, Glidden sponsored its lead-
based paint for interiors.   
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
46 
 
¶92 The LIA also actively promoted white lead.  The 
LIA 
undertook several campaigns to push lead products.  In 1934, 
after identifying a relationship between the use of white lead 
and lumber in construction, the LIA initiated a "Forest 
Products——Better Paint Campaign."  The campaign was funded by 
members, including Sherwin-Williams, W.P. Fuller, IS&R/Anaconda 
and National Lead.   
¶93 In 1938, after recognizing the declining sales of 
white lead, the LIA began its "White Lead Promotion Campaign."  
The LIA characterized the campaign as follows:  "This campaign 
by showing the importance of white lead to industry would help 
offset 
the 
constant 
threat 
of 
anti-lead 
legislation 
and 
propaganda."  The campaign carried on until 1952.  During its 
duration, National Lead, IS&R, W.P. Fuller, and MacGregor all 
contributed to the campaign.  Glidden and Sherwin-Williams 
participated in the campaign in the post-war years.  National 
Lead characterized the campaign as follows: 
[T]h[e] . . . campaign . . . should 
do 
more 
than 
confirm faith  . . . in a time-tested material.  It 
should furnish the incentive to support white-lead 
more vigorously than ever.  It should help pave the 
way for increased profit and prestige for both 
painters and dealers.   . . . [T]his campaign, running 
parallel to national Dutch Boy campaign, doubles the 
amount of advertising ordinarily used in presenting 
white-lead to the public. 
¶94 In 1939, the LIA initiated projects with 4-H clubs to 
promote white lead among farmers and their children.  Those 
projects were expanded in 1940 to include municipal, state, and 
county institutions, which specifically targeted schools and 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
47 
 
health departments.  The campaign was successful.  The LIA 
Secretary reported in 1940 that there was a "growing tendency of 
paint manufacturers to add a product to their line consisting of 
100% prepared white lead paint in colors . . . .  It is also 
noteworthy that attacks on white lead, which was one of the 
reasons 
for 
undertaking 
our 
campaign, 
have 
declined 
greatly . . . ." 
¶95 The LIA was also issuing publications to promote lead 
products.  In 1930, the LIA commenced publishing a quarterly 
magazine entitled Lead to promote varying uses of lead.  The 
next year, the LIA produced book entitled, Useful Information 
About Lead, which suggested that painters use high percentages 
of lead.  "[T]he higher the better," the book stated.  The book 
also promoted "White Lead in Paint" as going hand in hand "with 
improved sanitation."  In the 1941 book entitled Painting Farm 
Buildings and Equipment, the LIA recommended white lead for 
domestic interiors, and particularly dark colored lead paints on 
lower walls so that children's finger marks would be less 
visible.  Similarly in 1942, the LIA published a booklet 
entitled, "What to Expect From White Lead Paint," wherein the 
LIA promoted the use of white lead for both interior and 
exterior surfaces, suggesting that for interior wood, plaster 
and wallboard that 40 pounds of white lead be mixed with lead 
mixing or reducing oil to produce enough paint to cover 1,000 
square feet of surface.  Markowitz and Rosner submit that 
"[m]any LIA advertisements were directed specifically toward 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
48 
 
encouraging the use of lead paint in the interiors of 'low-cost 
homes.'"   
¶96 Just four years later, in 1946, the LIA Secretary 
disputed whether lead poisoning was attributable to lead-based 
paint because he contended that paint for inside uses no longer 
contained lead.  In 1949, the LIA republished Painting Farm 
Buildings and Equipment, and, in 1952, in Lead in Modern 
Industry, the LIA stated: 
[W]hite 
lead . . . has 
practically 
no 
undesirable 
qualities to nullify its advantages . . . . [T]he 
profitable application of white lead is not confined 
to exterior use.  Pure white lead paints can be 
utilized 
to 
advantage 
for 
interior 
decoration, 
particularly 
in 
public 
and 
traditional 
buildings . . . . 
The book further acknowledged that lead poisoning could occur 
from vapors, dusts, or ingestion of lead compounds.  However, 
the book described ingestion posed the least danger, as the book 
asserted that most inside paints contained no lead.  All the 
while, the LIA promoted lead paint for interiors.   
¶97 It was not until December 1952 that the LIA made a 
decision, based solely on economics no less, to discontinue its 
promotion of white lead in house paints.  Instead, the LIA 
diverted those funds to promoting red lead.  Until at least 
1962, however, the LIA continued to distribute Lead In Modern 
Industry, which advocated the use of white lead for interiors.  
The LIA withdrawal from promoting white lead, Markowitz and 
Rosner opine, was a tacit acknowledgment of lead paints' danger 
to children. 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
49 
 
¶98 According 
to 
Markowitz 
and 
Rosner, 
the 
Pigment 
Manufacturers' marketing and ad campaigns created an enduring 
belief among consumers that the best paint was lead paint——as 
National Lead stated, "Remember, also, that the more white-lead 
you use, the better the paint."  They further opine that 
"[n]otwithstanding repeated statements over the years that it no 
longer produced white lead paint for interior use, the industry 
continued to sell white lead paints that were applied on 
interiors." 
IV 
¶99 We begin our analysis with a discussion of Collins.  
In that case, the plaintiff developed adenocarcinoma of the 
vagina and benign adenosis of the vagina in 1975.  Collins, 116 
Wis. 2d at 174.  While she was in utero in 1957, her mother used 
diethylstilbestrol (DES) to prevent miscarriage.  In 1971, 
medical researchers established "a possible statistical link 
between 
fetal 
exposure 
to 
DES 
during 
pregnancy 
and 
the 
development many years later of adenocarcinoma of the vagina."  
Id. at 179.  The plaintiff's mother could not remember where she 
purchased the DES or who manufactured it.  Id. at 174.  By that 
time, many mothers had taken DES during their pregnancies.  Id. 
at 181. 
¶100 After the discovery of the cancer, the plaintiff had 
much of her reproductive system surgically removed and developed 
other complications.  Id. at 174-75.  She sued 12 drug 
companies, all of which produced or marketed DES.  Id. at 175.   
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
50 
 
¶101 The plaintiff was "unable to identify the precise 
producer or marketer of the DES taken by her mother due to the 
generic status of some DES, the number of producers or 
marketers, the lack of pertinent records, and the passage of 
time."  Id. at 177.  Based on common law, the plaintiff had to 
prove not only duty, breach of duty, and injury, but also legal 
causation between a defendant's conduct and a plaintiff's 
injury.  Id. at 182.  This court recognized that the plaintiff 
had to prove a particular drug company produced or marketed the 
DES that her mother took while pregnant in order to recover on 
her claim.  Id.  Obviously, this posed an insurmountable 
obstacle for her.  See id. at 177, 182.     
¶102 Thus, this court was faced "with a choice of either 
fashioning a method of recovery for the DES case27 which will 
deviate from traditional notions of tort law, or permitting 
possibly 
negligent 
defendants 
to 
escape 
liability 
to 
an 
innocent, injured plaintiff."  Id. at 181.  "In the interests of 
justice and fundamental fairness," this court chose the former.  
Id. 
¶103 This court observed that Article I, Section 9 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution conferred on the court the ability to 
create an adequate remedy when one did not exist.  Id. at 182 
                                                 
27 The court also stated that the risk-contribution theory 
it proceeded to adopt could apply "in situations which are 
factually similar to the DES cases."  Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 
191. 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
51 
 
(citing D.H. v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 286, 294, 251 N.W.2d 196 
(1977)).  Similarly, this court noted that: 
[i]nherent in the common law is a dynamic principle 
which allows it to grow and to tailor itself to meet 
changing needs within the doctrine of stare decisis, 
which, if correctly understood, was not static and did 
not 
forever 
prevent 
the 
courts 
from 
reversing 
themselves or from applying principles of common law 
to new situations as the need arose. 
Id. (quoting Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 11, 114 N.W.2d 
105 (1962)).28  Thus, this court adopted the risk-contribution 
theory, which relaxed the plaintiff's burden of proof in 
establishing causation in her negligence and product liability 
claims, for three reasons. 
¶104 First, "[e]ach defendant contributed to the risk of 
injury to the public and, consequently, the risk of injury to 
individual 
plaintiffs. . . . " 
 
Id. 
at 
191 
(emphasis 
in 
original, footnote omitted).  In this sense, each shared some 
measure of culpability in producing or marketing the drug.  Id. 
at 191-92.  Second, because the drug companies were in a better 
position to absorb the cost of the injury (through either 
insurance, incorporation of the damage awards, or by passing the 
cost along to the public as "a cost of doing business," id. at 
192), this court concluded that "it is better to have drug 
companies or consumers share the cost of the injury than to 
                                                 
28  The drug company defendants argued that only the 
legislature could fashion this type of remedy.  This court was 
not persuaded, writing:  "It is the function of this court to 
modify the existing common law if that becomes necessary to 
promote justice under the law."  Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 198 n. 
12.  
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
52 
 
place the burden solely on the innocent plaintiff."  Id.  Third, 
the court recognized that "the cost of damages awards will act 
as an incentive for drug companies to test adequately the drugs 
they place on the market for general medical use."  Id. 
¶105  Under the risk-contribution theory as stated in 
Collins, a plaintiff need commence an action against only one 
defendant,29 but the plaintiff will have to allege the following 
elements and prove each to the satisfaction of the trier of 
fact:   
[T]hat the plaintiff's mother took DES; that DES 
caused the plaintiff's subsequent injuries; that the 
defendant produced or marketed the type of DES taken 
by the plaintiff's mother;[30] and that the defendant's 
conduct in producing or marketing the DES constituted 
a 
breach 
of 
a 
legally 
recognized 
duty 
to 
the 
plaintiff.   
Id. at 193.    It was not fatal to a plaintiff's claim if he or 
she could not identify the type of DES taken by the mother.  The 
Collins court held that "[i]n the situation where the plaintiff 
cannot allege and prove what type of DES the mother took, as to 
the third element the plaintiff need only allege and prove that 
the defendant drug company produced or marketed the drug DES for 
                                                 
29 The onus was on the defendant to implead other culpable 
defendants.  Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 194. 
30 The plaintiff was not required to prove that a defendant 
produced or marketed the precise DES taken by the plaintiff's 
mother, but rather was simply required to show that a defendant 
produced the type of DES taken (by certain identifiable 
characteristics such as color, shape markings, size, etc.).  Id. 
at 194. 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
53 
 
use in preventing miscarriages during pregnancy."  Id. at 194.31  
If these elements could be proven, the plaintiff could recover 
all damages from the named defendant.  Id.   
¶106 This court concluded that the plaintiff could also 
proceed on a strict products liability theory by proving: 
(1) that the DES was defective when it left the 
possession or control of the drug company; (2) that it 
was unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer; 
(3) that the defect was a cause of the plaintiff's 
injuries or damages; (4) that the drug company engaged 
in the business of producing or marketing DES or, put 
negatively, that this is not an isolated or infrequent 
transaction not related to the principal business of 
the drug company; and (5) that the product was one 
which the company expected to reach the user or 
consumer without substantial change in the condition 
it was when sold. 
Id. at 195.    
¶107 However, this court was concerned that only those 
defendant drug companies that "reasonably could have contributed 
in some way to the actual injury" be held accountable.  Id. at 
191 n.10 (emphasis added).  Thus, after the plaintiff made a 
prima facie case under either negligence or strict products 
liability theory, a defendant could escape liability if it 
proved by a preponderance of evidence that the DES it produced 
or marketed could not have reached the plaintiff's mother.  Id. 
                                                 
31 Justice Wilcox's dissent incorrectly construes Collins as 
requiring plaintiffs to prove the type of DES taken by the 
mother, Wilcox, J., dissenting, ¶210, ignoring the fact that in 
Collins, the plaintiff need only allege and prove that the 
defendant drug company produced or marketed the drug if the 
plaintiff could not prove the type of DES the mother took. 
Compare  Wilcox, J., dissenting ¶210, with Collins, 116 Wis. 2d 
at 194. 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
54 
 
at 197-98.  A defendant could accomplish this by establishing 
"that it did not produce or market the subject DES either during 
the time period the plaintiff was exposed to DES or in the 
relevant geographical market area in which the plaintiff's 
mother acquired the DES."   Id. at 198.   
¶108 Providing defendants the ability to prove their way 
out of liability "will result in a pool of defendants which it 
can reasonably be assumed could have caused the plaintiff's 
injuries."  Id.  This procedure, however, was imprecise, as it 
could mean that some of the remaining defendants may still be 
innocent.  Nevertheless, this court accepted that possibility 
"as the price the defendants, and perhaps ultimately society, 
must pay to provide the plaintiff an adequate remedy under the 
law."  Id. at 198. 
¶109 For 
those 
defendants 
that 
could 
not 
exculpate 
themselves, this court concluded that the application of 
comparative negligence "provide[d] the most equitable means to 
assign 
liability 
and 
apportion 
damages 
among 
the 
liable 
defendants."  Id. at 199.  In assigning liability among the 
defendants, this court determined that the jury may consider the 
following nonexhaustive list of factors: 
[W]hether the drug company conducted tests on DES for 
safety and efficacy in use for pregnancies; to what 
degree the company took a role in gaining FDA approval 
of DES for use in pregnancies; whether the company had 
a small or large market share in the relevant area; 
whether the company took the lead or merely followed 
the lead of others in producing or marketing DES; 
whether the company issued warnings about the dangers 
of DES; whether the company produced or marketed DES 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
55 
 
after it knew or should have known of the possible 
hazards DES presented to the public; and whether the 
company took any affirmative steps to reduce the risk 
of injury to the public. 
Id. at 200.  Through the trial court's exercise of discretion, 
the jury could be permitted to consider other relevant factors 
to apportioning liability.  Id. 
A 
 
¶110 At the outset, the parties dispute whether this court 
should recognize the risk-contribution theory for Thomas's 
claim.  The Pigment Manufacturers contend that the Collins court 
was concerned with modifying the common law to ensure that the 
plaintiff had a remedy, for unless existing law was modified, 
the plaintiff in Collins would have had no remedy against 
anyone.  By contrast, the Pigment Manufacturers note that Thomas 
had a remedy for his injuries against his landlords.  Because 
Thomas had a remedy, the Pigment Manufacturers contend that 
there is no need to apply the risk-contribution theory to his 
case.  We do not agree. 
1 
 
¶111 Article I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides: 
Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the 
laws for all injuries, or wrongs which he may receive 
in his person, property, or character; he ought to 
obtain justice freely, and without being obligated to 
purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly 
and without delay, conformably to the laws. 
¶112 The 
Pigment Manufacturers 
would have 
this 
court 
conclude that because Collins relied on Article I, Section 9, 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
56 
 
and because in Collins the plaintiff was without a remedy, it 
follows that Article I, Section 9 applies only when a plaintiff 
is without a remedy.  See Resp't Br. at 36 ("Article I, § 9 was 
material to the analysis in Collins only because the Court 
concluded that Therese Collins was entitled to a remedy at law 
for her injuries, and unless existing law were modified she 
would have no remedy against anyone.").  According to the 
Pigment Manufacturers, "The Court decided Collins to ensure that 
DES claimants had a remedy, not that they could choose, among 
all possible classes of potential defendants from whom they 
would collect their remedy."  Resp't Br. At 41.  The Pigment 
Manufacturers contend that because Thomas had an "an opportunity 
for a judgment against the landlords for the full amount 
demanded if he had litigated his claims," Resp't Br. At 36-37, 
there is no justification for extending Collins.   
¶113 We do not agree with the Pigment Manufacturers' 
reading of Collins, and we do not agree that Article I, Section 
9 is as frail as the Pigment Manufacturers would have us 
believe.   
a 
¶114 The Collins court was concerned with more than just 
ensuring a plaintiff had a remedy against someone for something.  
Instead, the Collins court wrote that Article I, Section 9 had 
been interpreted in a manner that allowed the court to fashion 
an adequate remedy when one did not exist.  Collins, 116 Wis. 2d 
at 182.  In fashioning the particulars of Wisconsin's risk-
contribution theory, the court remained mindful that, in the 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
57 
 
end, the theory would provide the plaintiff with an adequate 
remedy should the plaintiff meet the burden of proof.  Id. at 
194, 198. 
¶115 We 
have 
serious 
concerns 
with 
the 
Pigment 
Manufacturers' attempt to displace all of the blame for lead 
poisoning from its white lead carbonate pigment on landlords and 
what effect that will have on the adequacy of a plaintiff's 
remedy.  Although this court has held that "a duty to test for 
lead paint arises whenever the landlord of a residential 
property constructed before 1978 either knows or in the use of 
ordinary care should know that there is peeling or chipping 
paint on the rental property," Antwaun, 228 Wis. 2d at 62, this 
court has also concluded that a pollution exclusion32 in a 
                                                 
32 The 
pollution 
exclusion 
in 
the 
commercial 
general 
liability insurance policy read: 
This insurance does not apply to: 
. . . . 
f. (1) "Bodily injury" or "property damage" arising 
out of the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, 
dispersal, release or escape of pollutants: 
(a) At or from premises you own, rent or occupy; 
. . . .  
Pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal 
irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, 
fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste.  Waste 
includes materials to be recycled, reconditioned or 
reclaimed. 
Peace, 228 Wis. 2d at 112 n.4. 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
58 
 
commercial general liability insurance policy bars coverage for 
lead poisoning from paint that has chipped, flaked, or broken 
down into dust or fumes.  Peace v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 
228 Wis. 2d 106, 130, 596 N.W.2d 429 (1999).  The result of 
Peace is that many victims of lead poisoning will be deprived 
"of an effective remedy for their harm."  Id. at 151 (Crooks, 
J., dissenting).  
¶116 While Thomas recovered from two of the landlords' 
insurers 
(Fire 
Insurance 
Exchange 
and 
Germantown 
Mutual 
Insurance), the settlement with Fire Insurance Exchange occurred 
three years before Peace was decided,33 and Germantown Mutual 
Insurance Company apparently did not have a pollution exclusion, 
as it never raised one.  After Peace was handed down, however, 
the insurer for State Farm successfully raised its pollution 
exclusion, which contained the same language considered in 
Peace, and was dismissed from the suit.  It is this latter 
occurrence that is troublesome, as it highlights the emerging 
ramifications Peace holds for future victims of lead poisoning.  
Those victims may not share Thomas's chance in being able to 
recover something from their negligent landlords.   
¶117 Also troubling is the fact that landlords can immunize 
themselves from liability for "their acts or omissions related 
to lead poisoning or lead exposure of a person who resides in or 
has visited the dwelling or unit if, at the time that the lead 
                                                 
33 Thomas settled with Fire Insurance Exchange, the insurer 
for the landlord of 2652 North 37th Street, on December 6, 1996.   
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
59 
 
poisoning or lead exposure occurred, a certificate of lead-free 
status or a certificate of lead-safe status was in effect for 
the dwelling or unit."  Wis. Stat. § 254.173(2).34  As Thomas has 
established on his summary judgment record, however, the dangers 
of lead poisoning from lead paint exist notwithstanding a "lead-
safe status."  This court has recognized the same.  See Peace, 
228 Wis. 2d at 130 n.16 (equating lead as a contaminant or 
                                                 
34 Various portions of Wis. Stat. § 254.173 are scheduled to 
be repealed at various times.  1999 Wis. Act 113, § 34 states: 
(1)  IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY FOR LEAD POISONING OR 
LEAD EXPOSURE.  The creation of section 254.173 of the 
statutes first applies to lead poisoning or lead 
exposure that occurs on the effective date of this 
subsection.  
 
1999 Wis. Act 113, § 35 states: 
Effective dates.  This act takes effect on the day 
after publication, except as follows: 
(1c)  The treatment of sections 254.11 (8d), 254.154 
(by SECTION 10), 254.166 (2) (c) and (e), 254.172 and 
901.055 of the statutes, the creation of sections 
254.166 (2) (c) 2. and 3. and 254.173 of the statutes 
and SECTION 34 (1) of this act take effect on the 
first 
day 
of 
the 
16th 
month 
beginning 
after 
publication.  
(2) The repeal of section 254.173 (3) of the statutes 
and the amendment of section 254.154 (by SECTION 10b) 
of the statutes take effect on the first day of the 
64th month beginning after publication. 
(3)  The repeal of section 254.173 (title), (1) and 
(2) of the statutes and the repeal and recreation of 
section 254.154 of the statutes take effect on the 
first 
day 
of 
the 
100th 
month 
beginning 
after 
publication. 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
60 
 
pollutant "in the same way that a loaded pistol is a dangerous 
weapon, even when it is locked up in a gun case, and a mamba is 
a deadly poisonous snake, even when it is confined in a reptile 
house."). 
b 
¶118 Further, the Pigment Manufacturers' reading of the 
importance of Article I, Section 9 to Collins is in error.   
¶119 As noted, the Pigment Manufacturers would have this 
court conclude that because Collins relied on Article I, Section 
9, and because in Collins the plaintiff was without a remedy, it 
follows that Article I, Section 9 applies only when a plaintiff 
is without a remedy.  The only "comparable justification" for 
extending 
the 
risk-contribution 
theory, 
the 
Pigment 
Manufacturers contend, is when a plaintiff is remediless. 
¶120 We do not agree with the assumption of the Pigment 
Manufacturers' argument.  They assume that Article I, Section 9 
becomes operative only when a plaintiff is remediless.  Stated 
in the contrapositive, the Pigment Manufacturers assume that 
when someone has a remedy, Article I, Section 9 is not relevant.  
The import of this argument is that where recovery has been had 
against one tortfeasor, all other tortfeasors are necessarily 
absolved.35   
                                                 
35  See Physicians Plus Ins. Corp. v. Midwest Mut. Ins. Co., 
2001 WI App 148, ¶42, 246 Wis. 2d 933, 632 N.W.2d 59 (discussing 
joint tortfeasors in general; "[T]he fact remains that the 
liability of one defendant does not preclude the liability of 
the others on the present facts."). 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
61 
 
¶121 However, as Judge Brown concluded in his concurring 
opinion below: 
The plain meaning of this section is that every person 
is entitled to a certain remedy for "all injuries or 
wrongs which he may receive in his person."  Notice 
that the wording is in the disjunctive.  The way I 
read this clause, it means that even assuming only one 
injury, if that injury was brought about by separate 
wrongs against the person, that person is entitled to 
a remedy for each "wrong." 
Thomas, 275 Wis. 2d 377, ¶22 (Brown, J., concurring) (emphasis 
in original).  Judge Brown went on to write: 
I have never seen a case that insulates a wrongdoer 
from being exposed to a lawsuit just because there 
exists a remedy against another wrongdoer. 
Id. 
¶122 We agree with Judge Brown's reading and sentiment.  
See Ross v. Ebert, 275 Wis. 523, 526, 82 N.W.2d 315 (1957) (the 
wrongs contemplated by this provision are those resulting from a 
party's legal right).  See also Scholberg v. Itnyre, 264 Wis. 
211, 213, 58 N.W.2d 698 (1953); Menasha Wooden Ware Co. v. 
Winter, 159 Wis. 437, 442, 150 N.W. 526 (1915).  This court has 
previously 
explained 
that 
we 
examine 
three 
sources 
in 
determining a constitutional provision's meaning: "the plain 
meaning of the words in the context used; the constitutional 
debates and the practices in existence at the time of the 
writing of the constitution; and the earliest interpretation of 
the provision by the legislature as manifested in the first law 
passed following adoption."  State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, ¶64 
n. 29, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785 (citation and quotation 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
62 
 
omitted).  As Judge Brown correctly noted, the fact that Thomas 
may have been "wronged" by (and received a remedy from) his 
landlord simply has no bearing on whether Thomas has been 
"wronged" by one or more Pigment Manufacturers.36   
¶123 Although the right to a remedy provision does not 
guarantee the certainty of recovery, Neuhaus v. Clark County, 14 
Wis. 2d 222, 229, 111 N.W.2d 180 (1961), it cannot be turned on 
its head such that it becomes a vehicle to defeat the 
plaintiff's right to recovery for wrongs committed by one simply 
because some recovery has already been had against another.  
Article I, Section 9 is not a shield against liability in this 
sense.  
 
¶124 Thomas claims his injuries were caused by two separate 
wrongs:  first, by the negligence of his landlords; second, by 
the Pigment Manufacturers for negligently manufacturing and 
marketing white lead carbonate as safe.  While we agree with the 
Pigment Manufacturers that landlords are in the best position to 
contain the dangers of lead pigment in paint once the paint has 
                                                 
36 The early interpretations of the practices in existence 
at the time Article I, Section 9 was adopted are set forth 
below.  See IV.A.2. infra.   
Further, Article I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
is not a provision that would have been interpreted by the 
legislature.  Article I, Section 9 is a substantive right to the 
extent that it entitles a litigant to a remedy as it existed at 
common law.  It does not create rights.  The legislature may 
change that common law, but those changes must be reasonable to 
pass scrutiny under Article I, Section 9.   
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
63 
 
been applied, landlords are not to blame for the fact that the 
lead pigment in the paint is poisonous in the first instance.   
2 
¶125 Amicus for Civil Trial Counsel of Wisconsin (Amicus 
Civil Trial Counsel) contends our reading of Article I, Section 
9 is too simplistic.  It states that "there can be no gainsaying 
that over the past decade or so the interpretation and 
application of Article I, Section 9 have caused considerable 
jurisprudential disharmony within the Court."  See e.g. Aicher 
v. Wisconsin Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 
613 N.W.2d 849; Tomczak v. Bailey, 218 Wis. 2d 245, 578 N.W.2d 
166 (1998); Estate of Makos v. Wisconsin Masons Health Care 
Fund, 211 Wis. 2d 41, 564 N.W.2d 662 (1997), overruled by 
Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶6.  Amicus Civil Trial Counsel observes 
that 
these 
cases 
involved 
legislative 
undertakings 
that, 
depending on the particular faction of this court's point of 
view, either unacceptably or acceptably limited or precluded 
judicial remedies.  This is the proper fit for Article I, 
Section, 9, Amicus Civil Trial Counsel contends.   
¶126 Amicus Civil Trial Counsel argues that the purpose and 
tradition of Article I, Section 9 establishes that it is to be 
invoked when the legislature has taken some unreasonable 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
64 
 
action.37  Where the legislature acts reasonably, Amicus Trial 
Counsel submits, this court has deferred to those decisions and 
                                                 
37 See e.g. Hincks v. City of Milwaukee, 46 Wis. 559, 566-
67, 1 N.W. 230 (1879) (statute granting immunity to City of 
Milwaukee alone for personal injuries stemming from sidewalk 
work struck down as it was "an attempt on the part of the 
legislature to grant a privilege or immunity to the city of 
Milwaukee against a general rule of law, while all other 
municipal corporations are left subject to its operation."); 
Durkee v. City of Janesville, 28 Wis. 464, 471 (1871) (statute 
precluding taxation of costs in prevailing party's favor when 
Janesville is a party defendant in tax assessment case held 
unconstitutional); Phelps v. Rooney, 9 Wis. 55, 82 (1859) 
(Dixon, C.J., dissenting) ("If the legislature can take away the 
remedy to [an] unjustifiable and alarming extent, they can 
destroy it entirely, and thus this solemn constitutional 
declaration of the people becomes a dead letter, a mere 
'glittering generality,' without substance or effect."). 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
65 
 
concluded they did not violate Article I, Section 9.38  More to 
the point here, Amicus Trial Counsel contends that Article I, 
Section 9 does not empower this court to mold the common law 
whenever it happens to inconvenience plaintiffs seeking a remedy 
for their injuries.  Amicus notes that this court has previously 
                                                 
38 See e.g. Stanhope v. Brown County, 90 Wis. 2d 823, 844, 
280 
N.W.2d 
711 
(1979) 
($25,000 
limit 
on 
recovery 
from 
governmental tortfeasors was not invalid under Article I, 
Section 9); Wiener v. J. C. Penney Co., 65 Wis. 2d 139, 151-52, 
222 N.W.2d 149 (1974) (statute's prohibition on class actions 
against sellers for failing to refund excess interest does not 
violate Article I, Section 9); Kerner v. Employers Mut. 
Liability Ins. Co., 35 Wis. 2d 391, 151 N.W.2d 72 (1967) 
(worker's compensation scheme does not violate Article I, 
Section 9 as the employee's right to a remedy for a wrong is 
modified by the phrase "conformably to the laws," and the 
legislature has the power to regulate the remedies for wrongs); 
Ocampo v. Racine, 28 Wis. 2d 506, 512-13, 137 N.W.2d 477 (1965) 
(120-day notice of claim statute applied to minor did not 
violate Article I, Section 9 as it was not unreasonable); Brust 
v. First Nat'l Bank, 184 Wis. 15, 23, 198 N.W. 749 (1924) 
(statute that allowed defendant new trial in proper venue when 
action commenced in wrong county did not violate Article I, 
Section 9); Daniels v. Racine, 98 Wis. 649, 652, 74 N.W. 553 
(1898) (law that limited the time for giving notice of injury to 
15 days in cities and villages did not violate Article I, 
Section 9:  "Since the only right of action in the case at bar 
was given by statute, there can be no question but that the 
legislature had the power to wholly take it away by statute."); 
Flanders v. Merrimack, 48 Wis. 567, 574-75, 4 N.W. 741 (1880) 
(statute that allowed taxpayers from Town of Merrimack option of 
paying void taxes for 1877 did not violate Article I, Section 
9); Dodge v. Barden, 33 Wis. 246, 251 (1873) (statute that 
imposed costs as a condition of the change of venue after the 
affidavit is filed did not violate Article I, Section 9 as it 
did not compel the party to purchase justice).   
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
66 
 
declined to utilize Article I, Section 9 to refashion common 
law.39     
¶127 Through all the disagreement, though, Amicus Trial 
Counsel submits that almost all members of this court, in 
various contexts, have cited the following proposition in 
discussing Article I, Section 9: 
That section, though of great importance in our 
jurisprudence, is primarily addressed to the right of 
persons to have access to the courts and to obtain 
justice on the basis of the law as it in fact exists.  
No legal rights are conferred by this portion of the 
Constitution. 
Mulder v. Acme-Cleveland Corp, 95 Wis. 2d 173, 189, 290 N.W.2d 
276 (1980).  Against this backdrop, Amicus Trial Counsel argues 
that Collins was an aberration and its reliance on Article I, 
Section 9 as the foundation for its opinion was error. 
¶128 In Collins, this court noted that Article I, Section 9 
had been interpreted in the following manner:  "When an adequate 
remedy or forum does not exist to resolve disputes or provide 
due process, the courts, under the Wisconsin Constitution, can 
fashion an adequate remedy."  Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 182 
(citation and quotations omitted).  Although this principle 
                                                 
39 See Schwenkhoff v. Farmers Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 6 Wis. 2d 
44, 45-47, 93 N.W.2d 867 (1959) (unemancipated minor cannot 
maintain a negligence action against his or her parent for 
personal injury sustained in an automobile accident); United 
States v. Klebe Tool & Die Co., 5 Wis. 2d 392, 398, 92 N.W.2d 
868 (1958) (Article I, Section 9 does not apply to relieve a 
party from its contractual obligations); Firemen's Ins. Co. v. 
Washburn County, 2 Wis. 2d 214, 224-26, 85 N.W.2d 840 (1957) 
(refusing to abrogate common law governmental immunity for 
negligent maintenance of highways).  
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
67 
 
shows a parallel line of Article I, Section 9 jurisprudence, the 
court in Collins was not outstretched when it stated this 
principle, or at least not as outstretched as Amicus Civil Trial 
Counsel contends.  See D.H., 76 Wis. 2d at 294; Hortonville 
Education Ass'n v. Hortonville Joint School Dist., 66 Wis. 2d 
469, 497, 225 N.W.2d 658 (1975), reversed by 426 U.S. 482 
(1976). 
¶129 Setting aside the wisdom of this proposition for the 
moment, even Amicus Civil Trial Counsel agrees that in McCoy v. 
Kenosha County, 195 Wis. 273, 277, 218 N.W. 348 (1928), this 
court held that the phrase "conformably to the laws" in Article 
I, Section 9 relates to "a recognized, long established system 
of laws existing in the several states adopting the constitution 
as well as in the prior organizations from which the states were 
organized."  That "common law," however, is frequently refined 
by this court, consistent with the dynamic principle that 
"allows it to grow and to tailor itself to meet changing needs 
within the doctrine of stare decisis, which, if correctly 
understood, was not static and did not forever prevent the 
courts from reversing themselves or from applying principles of 
common law to new situations as the need arose."  Bielski, 16 
Wis. 2d at 11 (citation and quotations omitted).  Thus, although 
the Article I, Section 9 provision itself may not create "new 
rights," it does allow for a remedy through the existing common 
law.  As Collins allowed for the recognition of the risk-
contribution theory in factually similar cases, we must assess 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
68 
 
whether 
this 
common 
law 
applies 
to 
Thomas's 
situation.40  
Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 191. 
¶130 Confronting the wisdom of this "adequate remedy" 
proposition, Amicus Civil Trial Counsel's chief criticism is 
that this proposition cannot be maintained in some principled 
way, thereby creating uncertainty in a number of cases.  
Although this criticism carries facial appeal, the goal of 
providing certainty is not necessarily achievable, and that is 
not necessarily a bad thing.41  The common law develops to adapt 
to the changing needs of society.  This is, as it has been 
                                                 
40 The dissent's lamentations on this point are peculiar.  
On the one hand, it "recognize[s] the validity of the risk 
contribution theory . . . under the unique facts of [Collins]." 
Wilcox, J., dissenting, ¶179 (emphasis in dissent).  However, 
the dissent cannot deny that Collins constituted a change on the 
concept of common law causation in certain cases.  And the 
dissent cannot deny that in fashioning this change, Collins 
relied on Article I, Section 9 to do this. 
On the other hand the dissent concludes that we have 
"introduce[d] 
confusion 
into 
our 
Article 
I, 
Section 
9 
jurisprudence by insinuating that this provision requires the 
court to fashion a recovery for Thomas because he has suffered 
two separate wrongs."  Id., ¶201.  The dissent further implies 
that Article I, Section 9 cannot be used to remove common-law 
limitations on recovery in tort, presumably such as causation.  
Id., ¶¶205-08.   
Either the dissent agrees with Collins or it does not.  It 
cannot both embrace Collins and lambaste the court for relying 
on Article I, Section 9 here. 
41 See Eberhardy v. Cir. Ct. for Wood Co, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 
601, 307 N.W.2d 881 (1981) (Callow, J., dissenting) ("Unlike the 
legislature which deals with broad issues of social policy, 
courts deal with individual cases." (footnote omitted)). 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
69 
 
called, its "genius."42  Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co., 
34 Wis. 2d 542, 551, 150 N.W.2d 137 (1967).  Although there are 
those who champion rigid rules with clear delineations, the fact 
is that the "[c]ommon law is law subject to continuing judicial 
development, including abrogation."  State v. Picote, 2003 WI 
42, 261 Wis. 2d 249, ¶19, 661 N.W.2d 381.  Indeed, this process 
of continuing refinement is a vital component of judicial power.  
State v. Esser, 16 Wis. 2d 567, 581, 115 N.W.2d 505 (1962).  If 
in the name of certainty this court simply deferred to the eras 
of days passed, we would "succumb to a rule that a judge should 
let others long dead and unaware of the problems of the age in 
which he [or she] lives, do his thinking for him [or her]."  
Bielski, 16 Wis. 2d at 11. 
B 
 
¶131 Having determined that Article I, Section 9 is not a 
bar to considering whether Thomas's suit is factually similar to 
Collins, we now consider whether Thomas's suit is factually 
similar to that in Collins.  This court in Collins authorized 
the 
expansion 
of 
the 
theory 
in 
other 
factually 
similar 
scenarios.  Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 191.  Although this case is 
                                                 
42 Notwithstanding that the common law is designed to adapt 
to changing needs of society, the dissent declares that 
"[s]imply put, the majority opinion amounts to little more than 
this court dictating social policy to achieve a desired result."  
Wilcox, J., dissenting, ¶181.  Further, the dissent states that 
the "majority cannot hide the fact" that the court's decision is 
"results-oriented."  Id., n.1.  This type of sensationalized 
judicial rhetoric is regrettably becoming all the more common, 
but it does nothing more than obscure the issue to be answered 
in the instant case. 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
70 
 
not identical to Collins, we conclude that it is factually 
similar such that the risk-contribution theory applies.   
¶132 As a prefatory note, as this court did in Collins with 
DES cases, we recognize that cases involving lead poisoning 
stemming from lead pigment pose difficult problems.  See id. at 
190.  The entirely innocent plaintiffs may have been severely 
harmed by a substance they had no control over, and they may 
never know or be able to prove with certainty which manufacturer 
produced or promoted the white lead carbonate that caused the 
injuries.  See id.  The Pigment Manufacturers are faced with 
possible liability for white lead carbonate they may not have 
produced or marketed.  See id.  As this court did in Collins, we 
again conclude "that as between the plaintiff, who probably is 
not at fault, and the defendants, who may have provided the 
product which caused the injury, the interests of justice and 
fundamental fairness demand that the latter should bear the cost 
of injury."  Id. at 191.   
1 
 
¶133  There is no dispute that Thomas is an innocent 
plaintiff who is probably not at fault and will be forced to 
bear a significant cost of his injuries if he is not allowed to 
sue the possibly negligent Pigment Manufacturers.  See id. at 
181, 191.  Further, given the disturbing numbers of victims of 
lead poisoning from ingesting lead paint, and given that white 
lead carbonate was the overwhelming pigment added to that paint, 
it is clear from the summary judgment record that we are not 
dealing with an isolated or unique set of circumstances.  See 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
71 
 
id. at 181.  As far as the summary judgment record reveals, the 
problem of lead poisoning from white lead carbonate is real; it 
is widespread; and it is a public health catastrophe that is 
poised to linger for quite some time. 
2 
 
¶134 The main policy reasons identified by Collins warrant 
extension of the risk-contribution theory here.   
¶135 First, the record makes clear that the Pigment 
Manufacturers "contributed to the risk of injury to the public 
and, consequently, the risk of injury to individual plaintiffs 
such as" Thomas.43  See id. at 191.  Many of the individual 
defendants or their predecessors-in-interest did more than 
simply contribute to a risk; they knew of the harm white lead 
carbonate pigments caused and continued production and promotion 
of 
the 
pigment 
notwithstanding 
that 
knowledge. 
 
Some 
manufacturers, paradoxically, even promoted their nonleaded 
based pigments as alternatives that were safe in that they did 
not pose the risk of lead poisoning.  For those that did not 
have explicit knowledge of the harm they were engendering, given 
the growing medical literature in the early part of the century, 
                                                 
43 Our discussion here is limited to showing how the 
policies implicated in Collins are met in the instant case.  The 
dissent's 
citation 
to 
this 
section 
as 
support 
for 
its 
supposition that we have expanded Collins is simply misplaced.  
Compare Wilcox, J., dissenting, ¶215.  As seen later, we embrace 
Collins' requirement that a plaintiff must prove that the 
defendant 
pigment 
manufacturer 
"reasonably 
could 
have 
contributed in some way to the actual injury."  See Collins, 116 
Wis. 2d at 191 n.10 (emphasis added). 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
72 
 
Thomas's historical experts, Markowitz and Rosner, submit that 
by the 1920s the entire industry knew or should have known of 
the dangers of its products and should have ceased producing the 
lead pigments, including white lead carbonate.  In short, we 
agree with Thomas that the record easily establishes the Pigment 
Manufacturers' culpability for, at a minimum, contributing to 
creating a risk of injury to the public. 
¶136 Second, 
as 
compared 
to 
Thomas, 
the 
Pigment 
Manufacturers are in a better position to absorb the cost of the 
injury.  They can insure themselves against liability, absorb 
the damage award, or pass the cost along to the consuming public 
as a cost of doing business.  See id.  As we concluded in 
Collins, it is better to have the Pigment Manufacturers or 
consumers share the cost of the injury rather than place the 
burden on the innocent plaintiff.44  See id. 
 
                                                 
44 The Collins court identified another policy reason, which 
was providing an incentive for drug companies to test adequately 
the drugs they place on the market for general medical use.   
Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 192.  This policy is not implicated here 
because lead pigment in paint has been banned for some time now.  
Although the Collins court recognized that the "sting" from 
damage awards might spur better research and development for the 
drug companies, it does not seem that this formed a pillar for 
the court's articulation of the risk-contribution theory.   We 
read Collins as establishing that the predominant policy reasons 
undergirding 
the 
risk-contribution 
theory 
were 
that 
the 
defendants contributed to the risk of harm and that the 
defendants were in a better position to absorb the cost. 
We also note an additional policy consideration here that 
was not present in Collins:  deterring knowingly wrongful 
conduct that causes harm.   
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
73 
 
3 
¶137 Thomas 
is 
also 
unable 
to 
identify 
the 
precise 
manufacturer of the white lead carbonate that caused his 
injuries due to the number of manufacturers, the passage of 
time, and the loss or records.  See id. at 177.  Additionally, 
he cannot identify which of the three types of white lead 
carbonate he ingested.45  On this failure of proof,46 the Pigment 
Manufacturers contend, Thomas's claim must fall.  They argue 
that because white lead carbonate was not "fungible" or 
manufactured from a chemically identical formula, Collins' risk-
contribution cannot be applied here.  We disagree. 
a 
¶138 One of the proof problems the Collins court recognized 
the plaintiff had was that she was unable to identify the 
precise producer or marketer of the DES her mother took due to, 
among other things, "the generic status of some DES."  Id. at 
177.  In different terms, this court stated that the plaintiff 
could not identify the drug company that caused her injury 
                                                 
45 As noted above, white lead carbonate was comprised of 
three 
different 
chemical 
formulas: 
 
4PbCO32Pb(OH)2PbO, 
2PbCO3Pb(OH)2, and PbCO3.  Also as noted above, Thomas has 
presented evidence that establishes, for purposes of summary 
judgment at least, that his lead poisoning stemmed from 
ingesting white lead carbonate. 
46 It seems as if everyone is in the dark on this point.  
The Pigment Manufacturers do not establish which type of white 
lead carbonate they produced or promoted.  This is to be 
expected, but as participants in the lead pigment market, 
presumably they have more information or potential access to 
relevant information than does the plaintiff.  See Collins, 116 
Wis. 2d at 193. 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
74 
 
because "DES was, for the most part, produced in a 'generic' 
form which did not contain any clearly identifiable shape, 
color, or markings."  Id. at 180.  This court also observed that 
"DES was a fungible drug produced with a chemically identical 
formula, and often pharmacists would fill DES prescriptions from 
whatever stock they had on hand, whether or not a particular 
brand was specified in the prescription."  Id.   
¶139 There is no denying that Collins involved a situation 
where a chemically identical formula allegedly caused harm.  It 
is also true that white lead carbonate was made from three 
different chemical formulas.  However, Collins did not address 
whether DES was fungible because of its chemical identity, 
because of its interchangeability due to its generic status, or 
because of both.  The question is, does fungibility require 
chemical identity?  We conclude that it does not. 
¶140 Chemical identity was a feature that DES apparently 
shared, and it was that chemical formula that created a 
possibility of causing harm.  Here, although the chemical 
formulas for white lead carbonate are not the same, Thomas's 
toxicologist, Mushak, opines that it is the common denominator 
in the formulas that counts:  lead.  According to Mushak, the 
formulary differences between white lead carbonates do not 
affect the bioavailability of, and hence the consequences caused 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
75 
 
by, the lead pigment.47  Thus, the formulas for both DES and the 
white lead carbonate are in a sense on the same footing as being 
inherently hazardous.  Therefore, it would be imprudent to 
conclude that chemical identity is a touchstone for fungibility 
and, in turn, for the risk-contribution theory.  To prevent the 
triumph of form over substance, we conclude that chemical 
identity is not required. 
b 
¶141 But the question still remains:  what does fungibility 
mean?  It has been noted that "[w]hile 'fungibility' [has] 
become 
an 
obsession 
for 
courts 
discussing 
market 
share 
liability, 
no 
court 
has 
ever 
explained 
thoroughly 
what 
'fungibility' means or why it is important."  Allen Rostron, 
Beyond Market Share Liability:  A Theory of Proportional Share 
Liability for Nonfungible Products, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 151, 163 
(Oct. 2004) [hereafter Beyond Market Share Liability].  Rostron 
                                                 
47 This point, of course, is controverted by the Pigment 
Manufacturers.  The Pigment Manufacturers' expert witness, 
William Banner, M.D., Ph.D., opines that lead in different 
products is not biologically fungible.  He asserts that the 
bioavailability of lead in lead-paint varies, depending on many 
chemical and physical factors, such as the chemical composition 
of the lead used as pigment, the size of the particles of 
pigment 
or 
other 
lead-bearing 
material, 
the 
pigment 
manufacturing process, and the physical and chemical properties 
of the paint film.  
However, on summary judgment, we construe the facts in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party.  Further, we do 
not resolve factual disputes. 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
76 
 
writes that a product can be fungible in at least three 
different senses.48   
¶142 First, 
a 
product 
can 
be 
"functionally 
interchangeable."  Under this meaning, whether a product is 
fungible is a matter of degree and heavily dependent on the 
context of whatever "function" is at issue.  For example, "'for 
signaling New Year's Eve, a blast from an auto horn and one from 
a saxophone may be equivalent as noise, but few would want to 
dance to the former.'"  Id. at 163-64 (quoting Hamilton v. Accu-
Tek, 32 F. Supp. 2d 47, 51 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)).  This type of 
fungibility is significant "because it is a reason why a product 
may pose unusually severe identification problems."  Id. at 164. 
¶143 Second, a product can be fungible in the sense that it 
is "physically indistinguishable."  Id. at 164.  Because 
appearances can be deceiving, the degree of physical similarity 
required, as with functional interchangeability, depends heavily 
                                                 
48 The common understanding of the word "fungible" is:  "1: 
of such a kind or nature that one specimen or part may be used 
in place of another specimen or equal part in the satisfaction 
of an obligation . . .  2. capable of mutual substitution : 
interchangeable."  Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 922 
(unabr. 1986).  "Fungible" is similarly defined in The American 
Heritage Dictionary as meaning "interchangeable.  Something that 
is exchangeable or substitutable."  American Heritage Dictionary 
735 (3d ed. 1992); see also Wheeler v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 11 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 109, 111 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (resorting to 
dictionary and defining "fungible" as "'[o]f such a kind or 
nature that one specimen or part may be used in place of another 
specimen or equal part in the satisfaction of an obligation' or 
'[i]nterchangeable.'" (quoting Webster's New Collegiate Dict., 
338 (7th ed. 1969)); Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 32 F. Supp. 2d 47, 51 
(E.D.N.Y. 1998) (similarly resorting to dictionary definition).   
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
77 
 
on context:  "For example, the difference between two brands of 
a cola drink in their original packaging will be obvious.  After 
being poured from the can or bottle, they might be completely 
indistinguishable in appearance, distinguishable by taste for 
some consumers and not others, and easily distinguishable to 
chemists analyzing them in a laboratory."  Id. at 164.  As with 
functional interchangeability, fungibility in the sense that a 
product is physically indistinguishable is significant because 
it is also a reason why a product may pose identification 
problems.  Id. at 165.   
¶144 Third, a product can be fungible as it presents a 
"uniformity of risk."  Id. at 165.  Under this meaning, "[a]s a 
result of sharing an identical or virtually identical chemical 
formula, each manufacturer's product posed the same amount of 
risk as every other manufacturer's product.  The products 
therefore were 'identically defective,' with none being more or 
less defective than the rest."  Id.  However, "whether a product 
poses a uniform risk can depend on the choice of the unit for 
which risk is measured.  While each milligram of DES presented 
the same amount of risk, each DES pill did not, because the 
pills came in different dosages."  Id. at 166.  Thus, as 
products may contain different concentrations of the hazardous 
substance, there is leeway to conclude that strict chemical 
uniformity does not render all substances fungible.  Id. at 166-
67.  Nevertheless, this was important to market-share liability 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
78 
 
as it defined "the market" by concretely establishing the risk 
undertaken by the manufacturers.49   
¶145 Fungibility, therefore, is not a term that is capable 
of being defined with categorical precision.  Its character will 
depend on the context of the injury, its cause, and the 
particular obstacles encountered in linking the causation to the 
possibly negligent defendants.  See Hamilton, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 
51 ("It is the characteristic relevant to the matter at issue 
that 
determines 
whether 
a 
product 
is 
the 
same 
as 
and 
substitutable for another, and therefore, whether the two are 
interchangeable. . . . ").  The facts presented in this case, 
when construed in the light most favorable to Thomas, however, 
establish that white lead carbonate is fungible under any of the 
above meanings.   
                                                 
49 Under the market-share theory, Rostron agrees that the 
only logical understanding of fungibility is "uniformity of 
risk"——that is, chemical uniformity presumably with similar 
dosages or quantities——because that of itself defined "the 
market."  See Allen Rostron, Beyond Market Share Liability:  A 
Theory of Proportional Share Liability for Nonfungible Products, 
52 UCLA L. Rev. 151, 168 (Oct. 2004).   
However, Rostron notes that Wisconsin's risk-contribution 
theory is not anchored to "the market" as is market-share 
liability.  Id. at 170.  Rostron states that the risk-
contribution theory is akin to "proportional share liability," 
which does not necessarily require products that pose "uniform 
risks."  Id.  Rostron states that "[u]nlike other states 
requiring apportionment [of liability] to be based on market 
share data alone, the Wisconsin court made clear that market 
share data was just one among many factors to be considered."  
Id. at 170 (citing Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 199-200).  This 
approach, to Rostron, "would seem to be flexible enough to 
accommodate situations where products pose varying degrees of 
risk."  Id.  
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
79 
 
¶146 First, 
white 
lead 
carbonate 
was 
functionally 
interchangeable.  All forms of white lead carbonate were lead 
pigments, which constituted one of the two necessary components 
of paint (the other being the "vehicle").  The pigment is what 
provided the hiding power of the paint.  Although there may be 
varying grades of hiding powers based on differing physical 
properties and concentrations of the particular pigments, those 
are differences of degree, not function. 
¶147 Second, based on the summary judgment record, white 
lead carbonates are physically indistinguishable.  As far as 
Thomas has been able to tell, the pigment at issue is white lead 
carbonate pigment.  And as far as Thomas has been able to tell, 
there appears to be no difference between the various white lead 
carbonates.  Although the Pigment Manufacturers contend that 
white lead carbonates were manufactured according to different 
processes, which resulted in white lead carbonates of different 
physical properties, these physical differences are available 
only on the microscopic scale.  Our concern here is whether the 
white lead carbonates are physically indistinguishable in the 
context in which it is used (in paint) and to whom is using it 
(the consumer or injured party).  We acknowledge that the 
physical identity in this case is markedly different from that 
in Collins.  Whereas in Collins, the plaintiff's mother could 
identify certain characteristics about the particular DES pill 
she ingested, that type of analysis is not possible here, as 
pigment in paint by its nature and concentration defy more 
specific identification.  Nevertheless, we conclude the factual 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
80 
 
circumstances of physical interchangeability that are present 
are still sufficiently similar to remain within Collins' 
confines. 
¶148 Third, 
we 
have 
already 
noted 
that 
white 
lead 
carbonates were produced utilizing "virtually identical chemical 
formulas" such that all white lead carbonates were "identically 
defective."  See id. at 165; see also Wheeler v. Raybestos-
Manhattan, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 109, 111 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) 
(concluding 
that 
although 
brake 
pads 
containing 
asbestos 
chrysotile fibers were not all manufactured from one single 
chemical 
formula, 
"they 
are 
fungible . . . by 
virtue 
of 
containing roughly comparable quantities of the single asbestos 
fiber, chrysotile.").   It is the common denominator in the 
various white lead carbonate formulas that matters; namely, 
lead. 
¶149 Therefore, based on the factors identified in Collins, 
we conclude that Thomas's case is factually similar to warrant 
extension of the risk-contribution theory. 
C 
¶150 The Pigment Manufacturers, however, contend that there 
are a number of factual dissimilarities between this case and 
Collins that should preclude recognizing the risk-contribution 
theory here.  While there are dissimilarities between the two, 
we do not agree that these defeat the extension of Collins in 
this case. 
 
 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
81 
 
1 
¶151 First, the Pigment Manufacturers note that the paint 
Thomas allegedly ingested could have been applied at any time 
between construction of the two houses in 1900 and 1905 and the 
ban on lead paint in 1978.  This significant time span greatly 
exceeds the nine-month window during which a plaintiff's mother 
would have taken DES, the Pigment Manufacturers note.  Given 
that Collins attempted to strike a balance between assuring a 
DES plaintiff had a remedy and providing a realistic opportunity 
to each DES pill manufacturer to prove that it could not have 
caused the plaintiff's harm (by establishing its DES could not 
have reached the mother during her pregnancy), the Pigment 
Manufacturers contend that Collins should not be extended given 
that they have no reasonable ability to exculpate themselves.   
¶152 We recognize that the window during which the possible 
injury causing white lead carbonate was placed in a house that 
eventually harmed Thomas is drastically larger than a nine-month 
window for pregnancy.  However, the window will not always be 
potentially as large as appears in this case.  Even if it 
routinely will be, the Pigment Manufacturers' argument must be 
put into perspective:  they are essentially arguing that their 
negligent conduct should be excused because they got away with 
it for too long.  As Thomas says, the Pigment Manufacturers "are 
arguing that they should not be held liable under the risk 
contribution doctrine because of the magnitude of their wrongful 
conduct."   
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
82 
 
¶153 Collins was concerned with providing possibly innocent 
defendants a means to exculpate themselves by establishing their 
product could not have caused the injury.  Collins, 116 Wis. 2d 
191 n.10.  If they could not do so, this court stated that the 
equities "favor placing the consequences on the defendants."  
Id. at 198.  Equity does not support reversing that balance 
simply 
because 
the 
Pigment 
Manufacturers 
benefited 
from 
manufacturing 
and 
marketing 
white 
lead 
carbonate 
for 
a 
significant period of time. 
2 
¶154 Next, the Pigment Manufacturers contend that the risk-
contribution theory should not be extended because Thomas's lead 
poisoning could have been caused from many different sources.  
We agree that the record indicates that lead poisoning can stem 
from the ambient air, many foods, drinking water, soil, and 
dust. 
¶155 Further, the Pigment Manufacturers argue that the 
risk-contribution theory should not be extended because lead 
poisoning does not produce a "signature injury."  As alternate 
explanations for Thomas's 
cognitive 
deficits, 
the Pigment 
Manufacturers have brought forth evidence that genetics, birth 
complications causing damage to the central nervous system, 
severe environmental deprivation, inadequate parenting, parental 
emotional disorders, and child abuse could all, in varying ways, 
cause such impairments.   
¶156 These arguments have no bearing on whether the risk-
contribution theory should be extended to white lead carbonate 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
83 
 
claims.  Harm is harm, whether it be "signature" or otherwise.  
Even under the risk-contribution theory, the plaintiff still 
retains a burden of establishing causation.  To establish a 
negligence claim under the risk-contribution theory, this court 
concluded that the plaintiff nonetheless needed to prove that 
"DES caused the plaintiff's subsequent injuries."  Collins, 116 
Wis. 2d at 193.  Similarly, on a products liability claim, the 
Collins court held that the plaintiff has to prove "that the 
defect was a cause of the plaintiff's injuries or damages."  Id. 
at 196.  On whatever theory the plaintiff chooses to proceed, 
this causation showing must be made by a preponderance of the 
evidence, and ultimately "to the satisfaction of the trier of 
fact."  Id. at 194.  The plaintiff's burden is relaxed only with 
respect to establishing the specific type of DES the plaintiff's 
mother took, which, in this case, translates into the specific 
type of white lead carbonate Thomas ingested.  See id. at 193-
94.   
¶157 While Collins concerned a plaintiff who had injuries 
of a "signature" nature, that merely means that Thomas may have 
a harder case to make to his jury.  Further, while the Pigment 
Manufacturers are correct to argue that Thomas's lead poisoning 
could have come from any number of sources, that is an argument 
to be made before the jury. 
3 
¶158 Finally, the Pigment Manufacturers argue that because 
they were not in exclusive control of the risk their product 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
84 
 
created, the risk-contribution model should not apply to them.  
We again disagree. 
¶159 This was again not a distinction relevant in Collins.  
Further, we see no reason why it should be for at least two 
reasons.  First, as doctors were the ones who prescribed the 
dosage of DES, so too were the paint manufacturers that mixed 
the amount of white lead carbonate in the paint.  However, the 
paint did not alter the toxicity of the white lead carbonate 
anymore than the pharmacist did by filling a prescription.  To 
the contrary, at best, the paint manufacturers actually diluted 
the white lead carbonate's toxicity.  In other words, the 
inherent dangerousness of the white lead carbonate pigment 
existed the moment the Pigment Manufacturers created it.   
¶160 Second, the record is replete with evidence that shows 
the Pigment Manufacturers actually magnified the risk through 
their aggressive promotion of white lead carbonate, even despite 
the awareness of the toxicity of lead.  In either case, whoever 
had "exclusive" control over the white lead carbonate is 
immaterial. 
D 
¶161 Thomas has brought claims for both negligence and 
strict products liability.  Applying the risk-contribution 
theory to Thomas's negligence claim, he will have to prove the 
following elements to the satisfaction of the trier of fact: 
(1) That he ingested white lead carbonate;  
(2) That the white lead carbonate caused his injuries; 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
85 
 
(3) That the Pigment Manufacturers50 produced or 
marketed the type of white lead carbonate he ingested; 
and 
(4) 
That 
the 
Pigment 
Manufacturers' 
conduct 
in 
producing 
or 
marketing 
the white 
lead 
carbonate 
constituted a breach of a legally recognized duty to 
Thomas.   
See id. at 193.  Because Thomas cannot prove the specific type 
of white lead carbonate he ingested, he need only prove that the 
Pigment Manufacturers produced or marketed white lead carbonate 
for use during the relevant time period:  the duration of the 
houses' existence.  See Id. at 194. 
 
¶162 Applying the risk-contribution theory to Thomas's 
strict products liability claim, Thomas will have to prove the 
following elements to the satisfaction of the trier of fact: 
(1) That the white lead carbonate was defective when 
it left the possession or control of the pigment 
manufacturers;  
(2) That it was unreasonably dangerous to the user or 
consumer;  
(3) That the defect was a cause of Thomas's injuries 
or damages;  
(4) That the pigment manufacturer engaged in the 
business 
of 
producing 
or 
marketing 
white 
lead 
carbonate or, put negatively, that this is not an 
isolated or infrequent transaction not related to the 
principal business of the pigment manufacturer; and, 
(5) That the product was one which the company 
expected to reach the user or consumer without 
substantial change in the condition it was when sold. 
                                                 
50 Thomas named several manufacturers and promoters of white 
lead carbonate.  Under Collins, a plaintiff need only name one 
defendant.  Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 193. 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
86 
 
See id. at 195-96.   
¶163 Once Thomas makes a prima facie case under either 
claim, the burden of proof shifts to each defendant to prove by 
a preponderance of the evidence that it did not produce or 
market white lead carbonate either during the relevant time 
period or in the geographical market where the house is located.  
However, if relevant records do not exist that can substantiate 
either defense, "we believe that the equities of [white lead 
carbonate] cases favor placing the consequences on the [Pigment 
Manufacturers]."  Id. at 198.  In addition to these specific 
defenses, and unlike in the DES cases, the Pigment Manufacturers 
here may have ample grounds to attack and eviscerate Thomas's 
prima facie case, with some of those grounds including that lead 
poisoning could stem from any number of substances (since lead 
itself is ubiquitous) and that it is difficult to know whether 
Thomas's injuries stem from lead poisoning as they are not 
signature injuries.51 
¶164 We continue to believe that this procedure will result 
in a pool of defendants which can reasonably be assumed "could 
                                                 
51 As can be easily seen, contrary to the dissent's 
assertions, this court has not created "absolute[] liab[ility]" 
here.  Wilcox, J., dissenting, ¶223.  Instead, we have adopted a 
straight application of this court's burden shifting analysis in 
Collins and applied it to the lead carbonate claims.  See 
Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 197-98.  
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
87 
 
have caused the plaintiff's injuries."52  See id. at 198.  The 
alarmist tone of the dissents aside, our application of Collins 
here achieves Collins' requirement that it be shown that the 
defendant 
pigment 
manufacturer 
"reasonably 
could 
have 
contributed in some way to the actual injury."  Id. at 191 n.10 
(emphasis added).  The procedure is not perfect and could result 
in drawing in some defendants who are actually innocent, 
particularly given the significantly larger time span at issue 
in this particular case.  However, Collins declared that "we 
accept this as the price the defendants, and perhaps ultimately 
society, must pay to provide the plaintiff an adequate remedy 
under the law."  Id. 
E 
 
¶165 The 
Pigment 
Manufacturers 
raise 
constitutional 
challenges to our application of the risk-contribution theory to 
Thomas's claims.  First, they argue it violates principles 
governing retroactive liability by attaching new, severe, and 
unanticipated 
legal 
consequences 
to 
conduct 
previously 
completed.  See Eastern Enters v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998).  
Second, they argue it violates due process by establishing 
evidentiary presumptions that are irrational or do not provide a 
fair opportunity for rebuttal.  See Western & Atlantic R.R. v. 
Henderson, 279 U.S. 639, 642 (1929).  Third, they argue that 
                                                 
52 For those defendants who cannot exculpate themselves, 
Collins concluded that comparative negligence was the proper 
means of assigning relative fault.  Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 197-
200.  We recognize this aspect of Collins, but do not address it 
further because it was not mentioned by any of the parties. 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
88 
 
their due process right to a meaningful opportunity to present a 
defense is violated.  See Huntley v. North Carolina State Bd. of 
Educ., 493 F.2d 1016, 1019 (4th Cir. 1974).   
 
¶166 These constitutional issues are not ripe.53  As this 
case is before us on summary judgment, and as many material 
facts are in dispute, we remand this case for trial.54 
 
                                                 
53 One 
dissent, 
Prosser, 
J., 
dissenting, 
takes 
a 
constitutional 
analysis 
well 
beyond 
what 
the 
Pigment 
Manufacturers have advanced in this court.  That dissent writes 
how our analysis violates substantive as well as procedural due 
process and how it also violates equal protection.  Prosser, J., 
dissenting, ¶¶282-305.  The dissent's detailed due process 
analysis surpasses the Pigment Manufacturers' argument that 
extension of Collins creates due process problems, and the 
dissent's equal protection analysis was not even raised by the 
Pigment Manufacturers.  Although the dissent may have fashioned 
a more in depth constitutional argument than have the Pigment 
Manufacturers, we maintain that the issue is not ripe based on 
the competing facts presented and the posture of this case.  
Accordingly, we do not reach these issues. 
54 A dissent, Prosser, J., dissenting, also discusses 
whether a "public policy" analysis should result in limiting 
liability for the Pigment Manufacturers here.  Prosser, J., 
dissenting, ¶¶306-14.  This argument was also not advanced by 
the Pigment Manufacturers and thus the public policy questions 
have not been fully presented to this court.  Accordingly, as 
with the constitutional arguments, we express no opinion on the 
dissent's analysis, except to acknowledge that this court 
retains the ability to limit liability based on public policy 
factors but rarely invokes this power before a finding of 
negligence has occurred.  See Alvarado v. Sersch, 2003 WI 55, 
262 Wis. 2d 74, 662 N.W.2d 350.  As this court stated in 
Alvarado:  "In most cases, the better practice is to submit the 
case to the jury before determining whether the public policy 
considerations preclude liability.  Only in those cases where 
the facts are simple to ascertain and the public policy 
questions have been fully presented may a court review public 
policy and preclude liability before trial."  Id., ¶18. 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
89 
 
V 
¶167 Thomas also argues that he should be able to present 
alternative theories of liability to the jury:  specifically 
enterprise liability and civil conspiracy.  On this point, we 
agree with the Pigment Manufacturers that the claims cannot be 
pursued. 
A 
¶168 A civil conspiracy is "a combination of two or more 
persons by some concerted action to accomplish some unlawful 
purpose or to accomplish by unlawful means some purpose not in 
itself unlawful."  Onderdonk v. Lamb, 79 Wis. 2d 241, 246, 255 
N.W.2d 507 (1977) (citation and quotations omitted).  "At a 
minimum, to show a conspiracy there must be facts that show some 
agreement, 
explicit 
or 
otherwise, 
between 
the 
alleged 
conspirators on the common end sought and some cooperation 
toward the attainment of that end."  Augustine v. Anti-
Defamation League of B'Nai B'rith, 75 Wis. 2d 207, 216, 249 
N.W.2d 547 (1977).  "To state a cause of action for civil 
conspiracy, the complaint must allege: (1) The formation and 
operation of the conspiracy; (2) the wrongful act or acts done 
pursuant thereto; and (3) the damage resulting from such act or 
acts."  Onderdonk, 79 Wis. 2d at 247. 
¶169 Thomas 
argues 
that 
the 
Pigment 
Manufacturers 
cooperated through the LIA to mislead the public and the 
government to conceal the hazards of white lead carbonate.  In 
doing so, Thomas argues that they furthered their common 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
90 
 
tortious end of selling a product they knew was harmful to 
children, thereby committing civil conspiracy.  We disagree. 
¶170 In Collins, this court declined to recognize a civil 
conspiracy claim for DES manufacturers because the record showed 
only "parallel behavior."  Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 188.   This 
court stated that "[t]here is no indication in the record that 
the defendants either explicitly or tacitly collaborated to gain 
FDA approval so that they could in turn collaborate to 
misrepresent the safety and efficacy of DES for use in 
preventing miscarriages."  Id.  Further, this court said, "this 
theory becomes unworkable when we consider the fact that many 
drug companies entered the DES market well after FDA approval.  
These later entrants should not be charged with participation in 
or knowledge of the alleged 1941 and 1947 conspiracies."  Id. 
¶171 As Sherwin-Williams notes, each Pigment Manufacturer 
had a unique story regarding its participation in the LIA.  
Thomas does not explain when any agreement was reached to commit 
tortious acts, who was involved in this agreement, and when the 
other parties entered into this agreement.  At best, his 
evidence establishes that a trade organization, the LIA, 
aggressively promoted lead products and took, what seems to be, 
any measures possible to ensure that the market for lead 
products remained free and unencumbered.   
¶172 Further, 
the 
Pigment 
Manufacturers, 
either 
individually or as successors-in-interest, all were members of 
the LIA at varying times.  However, "every action by a trade 
association is not concerted action by the association's 
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
91 
 
members."  AD/SAT v. Associated Press, 181 F.3d 216, 233-34 (2d 
Cir. 1999); Edwardson v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 223 
Wis. 2d  754, 762, 589 N.W.2d 436 (Ct. App. 1998) ("[M]ere 
knowledge, 
acquiescence 
or 
approval 
of 
a 
plan, 
without 
cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to make a 
person a party to a conspiracy.").  We conclude that Thomas has 
not presented sufficient material facts to sustain his civil 
conspiracy claim.55 
B 
¶173 Thomas next argues that an enterprise liability theory 
is a viable alternative. "Under the enterprise liability theory, 
it is the industry-wide standard that is the cause of injury, 
and each defendant that participates in perpetuating and using 
the inadequate standard has contributed to and is liable for the 
plaintiff's injury."  Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 186.    As in 
Collins, we conclude that enterprise liability is not available 
here. 
¶174 The crux of Thomas's argument is that the Pigment 
Manufacturers, through the LIA, effectively prevented regulatory 
oversight into the industry through targeted lobbying campaigns 
designed to frustrate conditions and standards for the product.  
                                                 
55 Alternatively, Thomas seems to be asking to be able to 
present the civil conspiracy claim only if he does not have a 
viable claim under the risk-contribution theory.  Thomas writes 
in his brief that the "conspiracy claim is a viable alternative 
claim in the absence of a claim under the risk-contribution 
theory."  Because we agree that Thomas can pursue the risk-
contribution theory, we will construe Thomas as withdrawing his 
civil conspiracy claim.   
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
92 
 
However, while the LIA sought to protect its industry, the 
record 
indicates 
that 
"[t]he 
paint 
industry 
was 
highly 
competitive, with each paint company jealously guarding the 
secrecy of their paint formulas."  Thomas does not explain when 
there ever was a small concentrated "industry" here.  See Hall 
v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 353, 378 
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) (noting doctrine's "special applicability to 
industries composed of a small number of units").  Therefore, we 
decline Thomas's invitation to adopt the enterprise liability 
theory at this time.56 
VI 
 
¶175 In sum, we conclude that Article I, Section 9 is not a 
barrier for seeking to recover against one or more tortfeasors 
when recovery has already been had against another.  We further 
conclude that the risk-contribution theory applies to white lead 
carbonate cases.  Although the Pigment Manufacturers raise 
constitutional challenges to this conclusion, those issues are 
not yet ripe.  We further conclude that Thomas cannot proceed on 
his claims for civil conspiracy and enterprise liability.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
                                                 
56 Alternatively, Thomas seems to argue that as long as his 
action can proceed against the Pigment Manufacturers on the 
basis of Collins, this court need not reach the issue of 
enterprise liability.    
No. 
2003AP1528   
 
93 
 
¶176 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. did not participate.   
 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
1 
 
 
¶177 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (dissenting).  It is often said 
that bad facts make bad law.  Today's decision epitomizes that 
ancient legal axiom.  The end result of the majority opinion is 
that the defendants, lead pigment manufacturers, can be held 
liable for a product they may or may not have produced, which 
may or may not have caused the plaintiff's injuries, based on 
conduct that may have occurred over 100 years ago when some of 
the defendants were not even part of the relevant market.  Even 
though the injury in this case is tragic, the plaintiff cannot 
demonstrate that he was lead poisoned as a result of white lead 
carbonate, much less the type of white lead carbonate produced 
by any of the respective defendants.  More importantly, he 
cannot prove when the supposed white lead carbonate that 
allegedly poisoned him was manufactured or applied to the houses 
in which he was supposedly lead poisoned.  However, none of 
these facts seem to matter to the majority.   
¶178 Subjecting the defendants in this case to liability 
under 
these 
circumstances 
amounts 
to 
an 
unwarranted 
and 
unprecedented relaxation of the traditional rules governing tort 
liability, and raises serious concerns of fundamental fairness, 
as the defendants will be unable to realistically exculpate 
themselves.  The majority opinion not only creates the risk that 
liability may be wholly out of proportion with the culpability 
of each individual defendant; it raises a distinct possibility 
that some defendants may be held liable for an injury they did 
not and could not have caused.  The majority seems content to 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
2 
 
run roughshod over established principles of causation and the 
rights of each defendant to present a defense and be judged 
based on its own actions.  The majority's decision renders 
Wisconsin the only state to apply some form of collective 
liability in lead paint suits under similar facts.   
¶179 While 
I 
recognize 
the 
validity 
of 
the 
risk-
contribution theory of recovery articulated by this court in 
Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984), 
under the unique facts of that case, I wholly disagree with the 
majority's expansion of that theory to cover the present case.  
Because this case is factually distinguishable from Collins on 
several levels, the majority's expansion of Collins to this case 
is 
entirely 
inappropriate. 
 
Further, 
by 
applying 
risk-
contribution theory to the facts of this case, the majority 
essentially 
adopts 
a 
version 
of 
risk-contribution 
theory 
explicitly rejected by the Collins court.   
¶180 A legitimate system of law requires adherence to 
established legal principles, even if such adherence does not 
produce a result deemed desirable by the collective wisdom of 
four members of this court.  Our common law used to require a 
plaintiff to prove four elements in order to recover under a 
theory of negligence:  duty, breach, causation, and damages.  
Throughout the years, this court has essentially eliminated the 
requirement that a plaintiff prove the second element by holding 
that in Wisconsin, everyone owes a duty of reasonable care to 
the entire world.  Alvarado v. Sersch, 2003 WI 55, ¶16, 262 
Wis. 2d 74, 662 N.W.2d 350.  Today, the majority proclaims that 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
3 
 
if a plaintiff is sympathetic enough and the "industry" of which 
a defendant was a part is culpable enough, a plaintiff may 
dispense with proof of the third element and recover against a 
party even though it has not been shown that the party 
reasonably could have contributed in some way to the plaintiff's 
actual injury.  Simply put, the majority opinion amounts to 
little more than this court dictating social policy to achieve a 
desired result.57 
I 
¶181 I begin by discussing the facts in this case.  The 
majority presents the reader with over 50 pages of so-called 
"facts" 
in 
order 
to 
construct 
an 
intricate 
tapestry 
of 
malfeasance and culpability on the part of the lead paint 
industry as a whole.  In doing so, the majority attempts to 
conceal what is utterly lacking in the plaintiff's proof in this 
case:  evidence of a reasonable connection between the conduct 
                                                 
57 Taken as a whole, the majority opinion cannot be said to 
"conduct a fair and neutral evaluation of the merits of the 
parties' 
arguments 
in 
light 
of 
the 
state's 
laws 
and 
constitution."  Ferdon v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2005 WI 125, 
¶15, ___Wis. 2d ___, ___N.W.2d ___.  The majority cannot hide 
the 
fact 
that 
its 
results-oriented 
decision 
is 
simply 
unprecedented and unsupported by Wisconsin case law or any case 
from another jurisdiction.   
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
4 
 
of each defendant and the plaintiff's injuries.58  See Collins, 
116 Wis. 2d at 191 n.10 ("We . . . require it be shown that the 
defendant drug company reasonably could have contributed in some 
way to the actual injury.").  Many of the majority's "facts" are 
simply irrelevant to the question of whether each individual 
defendant 
in 
this 
case 
can 
be said 
to 
have 
reasonably 
contributed to the plaintiff's actual injury.   
¶182 Before discussing what Thomas can and cannot prove, a 
brief discussion of paint and the paint industry is in order.59  
All paints include two basic components:  the pigment and the 
vehicle.  Pigment, such as white lead carbonate, imparts hiding 
power and protects the surface area.  The vehicle allows the 
pigment to be spread and adhere to the surface to which it is 
applied.  The vehicle also includes a drier and thinner.  The 
                                                 
58 Much of the majority's statement of facts implies that 
the defendants should have stopped manufacturing lead-based 
paint at one time or another and switched production to a non-
lead alternative.  See majority op., ¶¶41-52.  However, Thomas's 
claims based on defective design have been dismissed and are not 
before the court.  On July 24, 2000, the circuit court entered 
an order dismissing Thomas's "first and second causes of 
action . . . asserting claims based on strict liability and 
negligence, insofar as those claims are dependent upon a theory 
of design defect."  This order has not been appealed.  The 
claims before this court are predicated on the defendants' 
failure to warn of the dangers of their product.  It is one 
thing to construe all disputed issues of material fact in a 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party on summary judgment; 
it is quite another to attempt to obscure the issues on appeal 
and "hide the ball" by inundating the reader with copious 
amounts of irrelevant factual material in order to shift the 
focus away from the dearth of legal authority supporting the 
opinion.   
59 Many of the following undisputed facts are taken from the 
affidavit of John A. Hetimann. 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
5 
 
industry defendants are being sued in their capacity as 
producers of paint pigment, specifically, white lead carbonate. 
¶183 White lead carbonate was used in the United States 
since colonial times.  Over the years, white lead carbonate was 
produced by no less than six different processes.  As such, 
there was no single formula for white lead carbonate and white 
lead carbonate could be comprised of three different chemical 
compounds.60  These three compounds all differed in chemical 
composition, the amount of lead oxide they contained, and pH 
value.  Even with respect to a given formula, the amount of lead 
could vary by up to ten percent.   
¶184 These 
formulas, 
in 
addition 
to having 
different 
chemical compositions and different concentrations of lead 
oxide, also possessed 
significant 
differences 
in physical 
properties, including differences in:  specific gravity, bulking 
values, oil absorption, hiding power, and particle size and 
shape.  These differences are crucial because:  "[d]epending on 
the hiding power of the pigment used, the amount of lead 
pigment——and thus lead——could vary dramatically between batches 
equally 
capable 
of 
covering 
a 
specified 
surface 
area."  
(Emphasis added.)   
¶185 Further, 
white 
lead 
carbonate 
was 
not 
sold 
generically; the market for white lead carbonate was extremely 
competitive.  Each manufacturer possessed its own distinctive 
                                                 
60 "Basic lead carbonate" could be comprised of one of the 
following 
two 
formulas: 
 
(1) 
4PbCO32Pb(OH)2PbO 
or 
(2) 
2PbCO3Pb(OH)2.  The third formula, referred to as "normal lead 
carbonate," was PbCO3. 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
6 
 
brand and label, and aggressively marketed its own version of 
white lead carbonate.  For instance, "National Lead offered 
'five different white-leads,' stating that '[e]ach of the five 
has 
its 
own 
special 
combination 
of 
paint-making 
characteristics.'"  Importantly, "paints with the same label or 
brand could vary significantly in lead content depending on the 
color or tint of the paint."  (Emphasis added.) 
¶186 We also note that white lead carbonate was not a 
material used exclusively by the paint industry.  White lead 
carbonate was routinely utilized in the ceramics and pottery 
business in the first half of the twentieth century.  Thus, 
several major customers of firms that produced white lead 
carbonate were not involved in paint manufacturing.   
¶187 It is important to emphasize that the industry 
defendants are being sued in their capacity as manufacturers of 
white lead carbonate and not the finished product, paint.  
"Until the late nineteenth century, paint manufacturers and 
dealers did not sell paints——they sold ingredients or 'mixings' 
which the purchasers then mixed to make their own paints.  
Prepared paints were viewed as inferior in quality, particularly 
because the early ready-mixed paints often used inferior 
ingredients."   
¶188 Thus, "painters in the early decades of the 1900s 
often had their own individual formulas or methods for mixing 
the paint that they thought was best, depending on what a 
specific job required."  "Paint manufacturers, of which there 
were over 200 in the Milwaukee area alone between 1910 and 1971, 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
7 
 
decided which pigment types, combinations and amounts to use."  
"Large 
purchasers 
also 
sometimes 
had 
their 
own 
unique 
specifications."  As such, in addition to the varying formulas 
and brands of pigments, "the relative amounts and concentrations 
of the pigments varied in different paint formulations." 
(Emphasis added.)   
¶189 Further, lead paint contained lead from sources other 
than the pigment, as some painters used lead "as a drier or 
catalyst rather than as a pigment."  "Paint formulation was, and 
still is, a highly individual undertaking."  In short, "there 
was no one type of 'white lead paint.'"   
¶190 We note that the record also indicates that the 
manufacturing market for white lead carbonate, in addition to 
being competitive, was quite fluid.  Rather than generically 
referring to the "industry" as a whole, as does the majority, we 
examine each defendant's role in the production of white lead 
carbonate, as the plaintiff in this case is suing individual 
defendants and not an "industry."   
¶191 Sherman-Williams began the production of white lead 
carbonate in 1910 when it opened a plant in Chicago.  In the 
1930s, Sherman-Williams shifted its 
emphasis to 
lithopone 
products.  By 1937, almost none of Sherman-Williams' interior 
paints contained white lead pigments.  Sherman-Williams ceased 
production of white lead carbonate by June of 1947.   
¶192 Atlantic 
Richfield 
is 
successor 
in 
interest 
to 
Anaconda Lead Products Company (ALPC) and International Smelting 
and Refining Company (IS&R).  ALPC began operating in Chicago in 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
8 
 
1919 and began selling lead pigment, including white lead 
carbonate, in 1920.  In 1936, ALPC was dissolved and acquired by 
IS&R.  IS&R operated the Chicago plant until 1946.  Its 
production of white lead carbonate during the war was greatly 
reduced, and it was required to stop making white lead carbonate 
for months at a time.  IS&R sold the Chicago facility to the 
Eagle-Picher Company in 1946.  IS&R merged with ALPC in 1973, 
which was then acquired by Atlantic Richfield in 1977.   
¶193 The DuPont Company began manufacturing paint and paint 
pigments in 1917.  DuPont manufactured and sold white lead 
carbonate from 1917 to 1924, although it did not sell white lead 
pigment to any other manufacturer.  From 1917 onward, DuPont 
sold non-lead paint that competed with white lead pigments, 
including lithopone and titanium dioxide.  DuPont did not have a 
retail store in Milwaukee and "never sold an interior trade 
sales paint that contained white lead pigment."   
¶194 The SCM Corporation is successor in interest to The 
Glidden Company (Old Glidden).  Old Glidden was incorporated in 
1917 and merged with SCM in 1967.  SCM was subsequently acquired 
by another company and sold to a British company.  Old Glidden 
purchased the Euston Company in Scranton, Pennsylvania, and 
began production of white lead carbonate in 1924.  Old Glidden 
produced white lead carbonate until 1958, when it sold the 
Euston facility.  During the 1920s and 1930s, Old Glidden was 
the 
world's 
largest 
supplier 
of 
lithopone 
and 
a 
large 
manufacturer of titanium dioxide.  Although Old Glidden was a 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
9 
 
member of the Lead Industries Association from 1924 until 1958, 
it did not participate in the White Lead Promotion Campaign.61   
¶195 American Cyanamid is being sued both as a successor in 
interest to MacGregor Lead Corporation and based on its own 
production of white lead carbonate after 1971.  MacGregor Lead 
Corporation began producing white lead carbonate in 1937. 
¶196 The dates the aforementioned companies were involved 
in the production of white lead carbonate is particularly 
significant given the time frame at issue in this case.  The two 
residences 
where 
Thomas 
allegedly 
ingested 
lead 
paint, 
supposedly containing white lead carbonate, were built in 1900 
and 1905, respectively.  Majority op., ¶¶7-8.  Lead paint was 
banned by Wisconsin in 1980.  See § 657u, ch. 221, Laws of 1979 
(creating Wis. Stat. § 151.01 (1980)).  Thus, many of the 
defendants in this case were not participants in the white lead 
carbonate market for significant periods during this time frame.  
None of the above companies were manufacturing white lead 
carbonate when the houses in which Thomas resided were built.  
Almost all of the above companies had ceased production of white 
lead carbonate by 1950, approximately 30 years before the use of 
lead paint was banned in Wisconsin.  These facts are of critical 
importance when considered in context of the other facts in this 
case.   
¶197 In his amended complaint, Thomas admitted that he "is 
unable to identify the specific manufacturer, supplier and/or 
                                                 
61 We note that the record establishes that defendant 
ConAgra was never a member of the Lead Industries Association.   
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
10 
 
distributor of the Lead present in the residences in which he 
was exposed."  Moreover, Thomas admitted in his response to the 
defendants' interrogatories that he has no knowledge of when 
lead-based paint was applied to the houses where he allegedly 
ingested the paint, what brand of paint was applied, or who 
applied the paint.  Thomas admits that one of the residences 
contained "18 distinct layers of paint of which 16 contained 
lead pigment.  Only the first and eighth layers did not contain 
lead."  Pet'r Reply Br. at 9.  As will be demonstrated below, 
these facts are of critical importance and render this case 
completely distinguishable from Collins. 
II 
 
¶198 In addition to downplaying the significant facts of 
this case, the majority mischaracterizes the arguments of the 
defendants and engages in an unnecessary discussion of Article 
I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  The majority states 
that with regard to Article I, Section 9, "[t]he import of [the 
Pigment Manufacturers' argument] is that where recovery has been 
had 
against 
one 
tortfeasor, 
all 
other 
tortfeasors 
are 
necessarily absolved."  Majority op., ¶120.  Further, the 
majority states that "[w]e have serious concerns with the 
Pigment Manufacturers' attempt to displace all of the blame for 
lead poisoning from its white lead carbonate pigment on 
landlords and what effect that will have on the adequacy of the 
plaintiff's remedy."  Majority op., ¶115.  This is a seemingly 
inaccurate 
characterization 
of 
the 
defendants' 
argument 
regarding Article I, Section 9, and serves only as a straw man 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
11 
 
for the majority to knock down and open the door to its 
expansive reading of Article I, Section 9.   
 
¶199 Part of the rationale of the Collins court for 
adopting its variant of market share liability was that the 
plaintiff would be left without a remedy absent some theory of 
collective liability.  See Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 182.  The 
defendants 
in 
this 
case, 
contrary 
to 
the 
majority's 
characterization, do not argue that Article I, Section 9 
absolves them from liability.  Rather, they argue "[t]he 'Right 
to Remedy' Clause of the Wisconsin Constitution Does Not Require 
Extension of Collins."  Resp't Br. at 34 (emphasis added).   
Article I, § 9 was material to the analysis in 
Collins only because the Court concluded that Therese 
Collins was entitled to a remedy at law for her 
injuries, and unless existing law were modified she 
would have no remedy against anyone.  This case does 
not present comparable justification for modifying 
existing law, because Thomas had a remedy for his 
injuries against the landlords. 
Resp. Br. at 36 (emphasis added).  Nowhere do the defendants 
argue that this constitutional provision is "a vehicle to defeat 
the plaintiff's right to recovery for wrongs committed by one 
simply because some recovery has already been had against 
another."  Majority op., ¶123.   
¶200 The 
defendants 
simply 
contend 
that 
because 
the 
plaintiff in this case has had a remedy against the landlords, 
Collins' rationale concerning Article I, Section 9 does not 
apply, and thus, there is no comparable justification for this 
court to fashion a remedy to allow Thomas to recover.  The 
defendants do not argue that they should be "absolved" from 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
12 
 
liability because Thomas has recovered from his landlords.  They 
merely state that because he has had such a recovery, the 
rationale of Collins does not apply, and Thomas should have to 
proceed under the normal rules of causation in tort law.  
Seeking to be judged under the normal tort rules of liability 
hardly equates to asking this court to use a constitutional 
provision to shield parties from liability.   
 
¶201 Rather than take the defendant's arguments at face 
value, the majority continues its pattern of rushing to judgment 
and labeling the defendants in this case as wrongdoers by 
mischaracterizing their argument to the level of absurdity.  In 
doing so, it unnecessarily introduces confusion into our Article 
I, Section 9 jurisprudence by insinuating that this provision 
requires the court to fashion a recovery for Thomas because he 
has suffered two separate wrongs.  
 
¶202 Article I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides: 
Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the 
laws for all injuries, or wrongs which he may receive 
in his person, property, or character; he ought to 
obtain justice freely, and without being obliged to 
purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly 
and without delay, conformably to the laws.    
¶203 The majority ignores that in Aicher v. Wisconsin 
Patients Compensation Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶43, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 
N.W.2d 849, this court recognized that although "[i]t is 
possible to mine the pronouncements of Wisconsin courts for 
evidence that art. I, § 9 creates rights, or that it authorizes 
courts to fashion rights[,] . . . this court has stated that 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
13 
 
art. I., § 9 confers no legal rights." (citing Roberta Jo W. v. 
Leroy W., 218 Wis. 2d 225, 238, 578 N.W.2d 185 (1998); Tomczak 
v. Bailey, 218 Wis. 2d 245, 262, 578 N.W.2d 166 (1998); Makos v. 
Wis. Masons Health Care Fund, 211 Wis. 2d 41, 79, 564 N.W.2d 662 
(1997)(Bradley, J., dissenting); Mulder v. Acme-Cleveland Corp., 
95 Wis. 2d 173, 189-90, 290 N.W.2d 276 (1980)(emphasis added)).62  
"Rather, art. I, § 9 applies only when a prospective litigant 
seeks a remedy for an already existing right."  Id.  In other 
words, "[t]he right-to-remedy clause thus preserves the right 
'to obtain justice on the basis of the law as it in fact 
exists.'"  Id. (quoting Mulder, 95 Wis. 2d at 189). 
¶204 This understanding of Article I, Section 9, as 
expressed in Aicher, comports with how the provision has been 
understood since the time of Wisconsin's statehood.  In McCoy v. 
Kenosha County, 195 Wis. 273, 276, 218 N.W. 348 (1928), this 
court rejected the plaintiff's contention that through Article 
I, Section 9 "there is secured by our state constitution to 
persons such as the plaintiff infant and the plaintiff parent, 
absolute rights to recover against any one causing by negligence 
such respective injuries."  Further, we rejected the contention 
that this provision of our constitution 
was a gift of, a creation of, or a recognition of 
rights to a certain remedy for all injuries or wrongs 
to one's person, property, or character instead of 
being merely a solemn assurance that, conformably to 
                                                 
62 To the extent the discussion of Article I, Section 9 in 
Aicher v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶43, 
237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849, is contrary to the discussion of 
that provision in Collins, Aicher is the more recent case and 
therefore should control.    
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
14 
 
the laws, a person should have his remedy for such 
wrongs or injuries as were, at the time of its 
adoption, recognized by the common law, or should 
thereafter be recognized, as permitting recovery in 
actions at law or proceedings in equity. 
Id. at 276-77 (emphasis added). 
 
¶205 The court further recognized that Article I, Section 9 
was not intended to remove the common-law limitations on 
recovery in tort: 
To hold, as now argued by appellants, that there 
is 
shown 
the 
desire 
by 
the 
founders 
of 
this 
commonwealth, 
through 
the 
adoption 
of 
its 
constitution, to sweep away all the old doctrines and 
previously recognized limitations upon the so-called 
natural rights of the individual, as such limitations 
had been found in the old world and in this country, 
prior to its adoption, would indeed effect quite a 
revolution in our present concepts of the rights and 
obligations of individuals to each other . . . .   
Id. at 277.  In other words, to interpret Article I, Section 9 
in such a manner so as to guarantee a right of recovery anytime 
a plaintiff cannot satisfy the elements of his cause of action 
would essentially open the door for the abolition of all 
limitations on tort recovery.   
¶206 Thus, Article I, Section 9 does not compel the court 
to allow recovery in any particular case or require a court to 
disregard traditional common-law limits on recovery in tort: 
We started off in our legislative and judicial history 
with a very definite attitude that neither this 
particular article nor any other of our constitution 
had any such a sweeping away of and radical departure 
from 
many 
common-law 
principles 
and rules, 
many 
important 
ones of 
which . . . were 
more 
or 
less 
denials of or limitations upon what would be within 
the broad and general field embraced in the term 
"natural and proclaimed rights of the individual to 
life, liberty, and security in person, property, and 
character"——such, for instance, as the defense of 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
15 
 
absolute or conditional privilege in slander or libel; 
instances of injury to feelings alone; wrongs between 
parent and child; mere threats; the defenses in 
actions for malicious prosecution; the doctrines of 
contributory negligence in personal injury actions as 
well as in master and servant cases . . . .  In all of 
the above situations, however severe the injuries 
might actually have been to person, property, or 
character, organized society had for a long time and 
has continued to refuse to recognize rights to legal 
redress. 
Id. at 278.   
¶207 The phrase "conformably to the laws" in Article I, 
Section 9 relates only "to a recognized, long established system 
of 
laws 
existing 
in 
the 
several 
states 
adopting 
the 
constitution . . . ."  Id. at 277.  In other words, the phrase 
refers to the law as it exists, rather than "an abstract justice 
as conceived of by the judge . . . ."  Dep't of Agric. v. 
McCarthy, 238 Wis. 258, 270, 299 N.W. 58 (1941).  Simply put, 
this court has repeatedly recognized that Article I, Section 9 
was never intended to allow this court to jettison the common-
law limitations on recovery anytime a particular plaintiff was 
unable to satisfy those requirements.  Interpreting Article I, 
Section 9 in so broad a fashion would render our legal system 
standardless and convert it into an ad hoc system of liability 
where the rules are subject to change in every case.   
¶208 As will be more fully discussed below, by invoking 
Article I, Section 9 to expand Collins well beyond the unique 
circumstances of that case, the majority has "effect[ed] quite a 
revolution in our present concepts of the rights and obligations 
of individuals to each other[,]" McCoy, 195 Wis. at 277, and 
embarked on a "radical departure from many common-law principles 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
16 
 
and rules" that serve as limitations upon a plaintiff's right to 
recover in tort.  Id. at 278.   
III 
 
¶209 The majority concludes that the risk-contribution 
theory of liability adopted in Collins should be extended to 
lead pigment manufacturers, majority op. ¶3; however, there are 
several substantial factual distinctions between this case and 
Collins that render application of this theory completely 
inappropriate.  These distinctions include:  1) a much longer 
time frame for when the product alleged to have caused injury 
may have been manufactured and distributed; 2) the plaintiff's 
inability to prove what product he ingested; 3) the lack of a 
signature injury associated with the product alleged to have 
caused injury; 4) the defendants' lack of exclusive control over 
the risk posed by the product; 5) a raw material utilized in an 
unintended fashion rather than a finished product utilized for 
its intended purpose; and 6) the lack of fungibility between 
variants of the product alleged to have caused injury.  Because 
of these factual distinctions, applying Collins to the facts of 
this case results in a de facto adoption of a theory explicitly 
rejected by Collins and an unjustified and unprecedented 
departure from traditional tort law principles of causation.   
¶210 The Collins court created a unique theory of liability 
for plaintiffs who were injured as a result of exposure to the 
drug DES in utero.  Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 177.  Essentially, 
the theory articulated in Collins relaxed the plaintiff's burden 
of proof in regard to causation; as such, it allowed DES 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
17 
 
plaintiffs to proceed with an underlying tort claim when they 
could not prove that any particular defendant's tortious conduct 
was the proximate cause of their injury.  See id. at 193-94.  
Instead, 
the 
plaintiff 
was 
required 
to 
"establish 
by 
a 
preponderance of the evidence that a defendant produced or 
marketed the type (e.g., color, shape, markings, size, or other 
identifiable characteristics) of DES taken by the plaintiff's 
mother."  Id. at 194.63  However, even under the relaxed 
causation standards it announced, the Collins court still 
required that the plaintiff prove "that the defendant drug 
company reasonably could have contributed in some way to the 
actual injury."  Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 191 n.10.  By applying 
Collins to the facts of this case, the majority virtually 
eliminates this essential requirement.  In light of the 
substantial factual distinctions set forth below, it simply 
cannot be said that the defendants in this case could have 
reasonably contributed to Thomas's injuries.  The majority can 
"embrace" this requirement from Collins all it wants, majority 
                                                 
63  I recognize that the Collins court also stated that 
where the plaintiff could not prove what type of DES the 
plaintiff's mother ingested, "the plaintiff need only allege and 
prove that the defendant drug company produced or marketed the 
drug DES for use in preventing miscarriages during pregnancy."  
Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 193-94, 342 N.W.2d 37 
(1984).  However, the court also explicitly rejected a theory 
that would have based liability solely on the fact that the 
defendants manufactured the drug in question, stating:  "[W]e do 
not agree that this is a sufficient basis in itself for 
liability."  Id. at 191 n.10.  As the court explained:  "We 
still require it be shown that the defendant drug company 
reasonably could have contributed in some way to the actual 
injury."  Id.   
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
18 
 
op., ¶135 n.43, but, in the end, the majority never explains how 
Thomas can prove, under any interpretation of the facts, that 
the white lead carbonate manufacturers could have reasonably 
contributed to his injury.  By applying risk-contribution theory 
to this case, it is clear that the majority opinion greatly 
expands Collins beyond its intended scope and will result in 
absolute liability for manufacturers of raw materials by 
creating an irrebuttable presumption of causation.   
¶211  The Collins court relaxed the plaintiff's burden of 
proof because she was "unable to identify the precise producer 
or marketer of the DES taken by her mother due to the generic 
status of some DES, the number of producers or marketers, the 
lack of pertinent records, and the passage of time."  Id. at 
177.  In particular, the DES plaintiff could not specifically 
locate the manufacturer of the particular DES drug ingested by 
her mother because DES was produced in generic form and DES 
variants were fungible and possessed a chemically identical 
formula.  Id. at 180.  "[O]ften pharmacists would fill DES 
prescriptions from whatever stock they had on hand, whether or 
not a particular brand was specified in the prescription."  Id.  
Furthermore, "as many as three hundred drug companies produced 
or marketed DES during the twenty-four years DES was on the 
market, with different companies entering and leaving the market 
throughout this period," and these companies may not have kept 
or been able to locate the pertinent records at to what type of 
DES they produced.  Id.   
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
19 
 
¶212 Due to this unique factual situation, the Collins 
court "chose to adapt, rather than adopt, the market share 
theory[,]" first approved by the California Supreme Court in 
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).  2 
David G. Owen et al., Madden & Owen on Products Liability 
§ 24:7, at 665 (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter Madden & Owen].64  The 
Collins court formulated a slightly altered theory of market 
share liability, called the risk-contribution theory.  Collins, 
116 Wis. 2d at 191 n.10.   
¶213 Importantly, the Collins court explicitly rejected a 
broader theory of risk contribution that would have held 
manufacturers of DES liable without regard to whether they 
produced the product during the nine months the mothers were 
exposed to it.  See Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 191 n.10.  This 
theory, proposed by Professor Glen O. Robinson, contended that 
"the plaintiff's damages should be apportioned 'among all 
defendants that created unreasonable risks according to the 
                                                 
64 "The Sindell [v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 
1980),] approach of market share liability has been recognized 
favorably in some jurisdictions [but] only for DES cases.  Most 
jurisdictions have rejected it in all cases, including those 
involving DES."  2 David G. Owen et al., Madden & Owen on 
Products Liability § 24:7, at 661 (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter 
Madden & Owen] (citing Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324 
(Ill. 1990); Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 
1986); Sutowski v. Eli Lilly & Co., 696 N.W.2d 187 (Ohio 1998); 
Morton v. Abbott Labs., 538 F. Supp. 593 (M.D. Fla. 1982); Ryan 
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981)).  See also 
Richard E. Kaye, Annotation, "Concert of Activity," "Alternate 
Liability," "Enterprise Liability," or Similar Theory as Basis 
for Imposing Liability Upon One or More Manufacturers of 
Defective Uniform Product, in Absence of Identification of 
Manufacturer of Precise Unit or Batch Causing Injury, 63 A.L.R. 
5th 195, 225-239, 260-74 (1998) (collecting cases).  
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
20 
 
magnitude of the risks they created.'"  Id. (quoting Glen O. 
Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES 
Cases, 68 Va. L. Rev. 713, 755 (1982)).  The Collins court, 
although adopting a form of risk-contribution theory, rejected 
Professor Robinson's broad theory of liability:   
Although we find Robinson's "risk contribution" theory 
sound to the extent it recognizes that all DES drug 
companies contributed in some measure to the risk of 
injury, we do not agree that this is a sufficient 
basis in itself for liability.  We still require it be 
shown that the defendant drug company reasonably could 
have contributed in some way to the actual injury. 
Id. (emphasis added).  In other words, Collins held that it is 
not enough for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant 
contributed to the creation of the risk to the general public; 
the plaintiff must further prove that the defendant reasonably 
could have contributed to the actual injury.65   
¶214 The majority has completely disregarded this limiting 
language of Collins in its analysis of Thomas's case.  See 
majority op., ¶135 ("[T]he record easily establishes the Pigment 
Manufacturers' culpability for, at a minimum, contributing to 
creating a risk of injury to the public.").  In so doing, the 
majority has expanded the Collins theory far beyond its original 
                                                 
65 "Notably, 
in 
Collins, 
the 
Wisconsin 
Supreme 
Court 
explained that it would not adopt a risk contribution theory 
which 
would 
have 
imposed 
liability 
solely 
upon 
the 
DES 
defendants' participation in the creation of the risk of 
injury . . . ."  Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly and Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 
1082 (N.Y. 1989) (Mollen, J., concurring).   
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
21 
 
intent, and its opinion is tantamount to applying the theory of 
risk contribution that Collins explicitly rejected.66   
¶215 The Collins court noted that its "method of recovery 
could apply in situations which are factually similar to the DES 
cases."  Id. at 191.  However, there are several substantial 
factual distinctions between this case and Collins that make the 
majority's extension of Collins a drastic departure from both 
the original theory of liability articulated by this court and 
the great weight of authority in other jurisdictions.  See 
Brenner v. American Cyanamid Co., 263 A.D.2d 165, 169 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1999) (citing the following cases that have also "refused 
to apply the market share theory to lead poisoning cases[:]"  
Jefferson v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 930 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. La. 
1996), aff'd. 106 F.3d 1245 (5th Cir. 1997); Santiago v. Sherwin 
Williams Co., 3 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 1993); City of Philadelphia 
v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 994 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1993); Hurt v. 
Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 806 F. Supp. 515 (E.D. Pa. 1992); 
                                                 
66 Numerous courts in various jurisdictions have disagreed 
with the reasoning of Collins, 116 Wis. 2d 166.  See, e.g., 
Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 333-34 (Ill. 1990); Mulcahy, 386 N.W.2d 67; 
Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1077-78; Gullotta v. Eli Lilly and Co., 
No. Civ. H-82-400 1985, WL 502793 (D. Conn. May 9, 1985) 
(rejecting Collins because "the actual DES producer may not have 
been named as a defendant, [] the defendants have no greater 
knowledge concerning the identity of the manufacturer who 
produced the DES ingested by the plaintiff's mother and [] there 
has been no showing of negligent conduct by each defendant 
towards the plaintiff"); Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 
241 (Mo. 1984); 63 Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 194 
(1996)(noting 
that 
"the 
opportunity 
to 
adopt 
the 
risk 
contribution theory has been declined on the grounds that the 
theory has the potential of producing injustices through delayed 
recoveries and inconsistent results"). 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
22 
 
Skipworth v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 690 A.2d 169 (Pa. 1997)).  See 
also, Richard E. Kaye, Annotation, "Concert of Activity," 
"Alternate Liability," "Enterprise Liability," or Similar Theory 
as Basis for Imposing Liability Upon One or More Manufacturers 
of Defective Uniform Product, in Absence of Identification of 
Manufacturer of Precise Unit or Batch Causing Injury, 63 A.L.R. 
5th 195, 269-74 (1998) (collecting cases).  To invoke risk-
contribution theory under a case so factually distinct from 
Collins is not simply a "straight application" of Collins, 
majority op., ¶163 n.51; rather, in light of the following 
substantial factual distinctions, the majority opinion clearly 
extends Collins beyond the facts of that case.   
¶216 The first major distinction between Collins and this 
case is that the time frame of Collins was dramatically narrower 
than the time frame in this case.  Collins involved a limited 
nine-month time frame between conception and birth when the 
plaintiff's mother took the DES that caused her injury.  
Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 174.  The plaintiff knew when her mother 
ingested the drug and thus when the product was sold.  See id.  
Additionally, DES was produced and marketed for 24 years.  See 
id. at 179.   
¶217 In contrast, this 
case 
concerns 
a 
substantially 
greater time frame of 75 to 80 years.  This time frame runs from 
the years the two houses at issue were built——1900 and 1905——to 
the year Wisconsin banned the use of lead paint——1980.  Each 
defendant participated in the white lead carbonate market during 
different periods of time.  However, Thomas has no idea when the 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
23 
 
alleged injury-causing paint may have been applied to the 
interior of the two houses in which he lived from 1990 to 1994.  
The plaintiff's inability to pinpoint a workable timeframe 
during which the injury causing paint was applied is further 
exacerbated by the fact that one of the houses contained 18 
distinct layers of paint, some of which did not even contain 
lead.  
¶218 As one learned products liability treatise aptly 
notes: "The greater the 
span of 
time within 
which the 
potentially injury-causing product was sold, the less suited 
market share liability will be."  Madden & Owen § 24:7, at 663.  
Likewise, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a factually similar 
case, noted:  
The difficulty in applying market share liability 
where such an expansive relevant time period as one 
hundred years is at issue is that entities who could 
not have been the producers of the lead paint which 
injured [the plaintiff] would almost assuredly be held 
liable.  Over the one hundred year period at issue, 
several of the pigment manufacturers entered and left 
the lead paint market.  Thus, application of the 
market share theory to this situation would virtually 
ensure that certain pigment manufacturers would be 
held liable where they could not have been a potential 
tortfeasor[.] 
Skipworth, 690 A.2d at 173 (emphasis added).   
¶219 In Santiago, 3 F.3d at 550, the First Circuit refused 
to apply market share theory of liability in a lead paint case, 
in part, because of "plaintiff's inability to pinpoint with any 
degree of precision the time the injury-causing paint was 
applied to the house."  The plaintiff brought an action for 
various claims against the "manufacturer[s] and marketer[s of] 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
24 
 
all, or virtually all, of the white lead used in the lead paints 
sold in the United States between 1917 and 1970."  Id. at 547.  
She alleged that she had ingested lead paint applied to the 
interior of her house at various times over this 53-year period.  
Id.  The First Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of 
summary judgment to the defendants, reasoning in part: 
[S]everal of the defendants were not in the white lead 
pigment market at all for significant portions of the 
period between 1917 and 1970, and therefore may well 
not have been market suppliers at the time the injury-
causing paint was applied to the walls of the 
plaintiff's 
home. 
 
This, 
of 
course, 
raises 
a 
substantial possibility that these defendants not only 
could be held liable for more harm than they actually 
caused, but also could be held liable when they did 
not, in fact, cause any harm to plaintiff at all. 
Id. at 551. 
¶220 The reasoning of Skipworth and Santiago is equally 
applicable to this case.  As noted in Section I, many of the 
defendants in this case were not participants in the white lead 
carbonate market for significant periods of time from 1900 to 
1980.  For instance, Sherman-Williams only produced white lead 
carbonate for a period of 37 years and American Cyanamid did not 
produce lead pigment until after 1971, while its predecessor in 
interest, MacGregor Lead Corporation, did not produce white lead 
carbonate until 1937.  Significantly, DuPont manufactured white 
lead carbonate for a total of seven years.   
¶221 If the paint Thomas ingested was applied before the 
1920s, several of the defendants in this case could not have 
possibly produced the lead pigment that allegedly caused his 
injuries.  Likewise, several defendants would have complete 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
25 
 
defenses if the paint Thomas ingested was applied in the latter 
portion of the twentieth century.  However, Thomas has no idea 
when the paint he ingested was applied to his residences.  The 
defendants are in no better position than Thomas to acquire this 
information.  Liability for a company like DuPont, which 
produced the allegedly offending product for a mere fraction of 
the relevant time frame, can be based only on pure speculation 
and conjecture that its product caused Thomas's injury.   
¶222 Thomas's inability to identify a narrow time frame to 
apply the 
Collins 
risk-contribution 
theory 
is 
dispositive 
because without a definitive time frame, the defendants will be 
unable to prove that they did not produce the injury-causing 
product in question.  Collins specifically allowed a defendant 
to exculpate itself by proving "that it did not produce or 
market the subject DES either during the time period the 
plaintiff was exposed to DES or in the relevant geographical 
market area in which the plaintiff's mother acquired the DES."  
Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 198.  Here, the plaintiff cannot limit 
the applicable time frame to any reasonable or workable period 
for the defendants.  In essence, the majority creates an 
irrebuttable presumption of causation in this case and extends 
Collins to a point where every paint pigment manufacturer that 
produced white lead carbonate at one time or another is 
absolutely liable because there is no realistic opportunity for 
these manufacturers to prove that they did not make the product 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
26 
 
that injured the plaintiff.67  In the words of Collins, Thomas 
cannot demonstrate that the paint manufacturers "reasonably 
could have contributed in some way to the actual injury."  Id. 
at 191 n.10.  The majority's opinion is so extreme that it 
essentially revives the broad risk-contribution theory that 
Collins expressly rejected.  See id.   
¶223 A second vital distinction between this case and 
Collins is that Thomas cannot prove that he ingested white lead 
carbonate.68  One of the prerequisites to the utilization of the 
Collins risk-contribution theory was proof "that the plaintiff's 
mother took DES."  Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 193.  This fact alone 
should preclude extension of Collins because Thomas cannot 
demonstrate to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty what 
product allegedly caused his injury.  Thomas is not suing lead 
paint manufacturers; instead, the defendants are being sued for 
manufacturing raw materials, white lead carbonate pigments, 
                                                 
67 See Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1082 (noting that none of the 
jurisdictions 
that 
adopted 
various 
theories 
of 
collective 
liability for DES cases adopted a theory wherein the defendants 
were unable to exculpate themselves, "thereby recognizing that 
to 
preclude 
exculpation 
would 
directly 
and 
unnecessarily 
contravene common-law tort principles of causation") (emphasis 
added) (Mollen, J., concurring).   
68 Contrary to the assertions of the majority opinion, 
majority op., ¶11 n.4, this issue was explicitly addressed by 
the defendants in their submissions to this court.  Resp'ts Br. 
at 27-29.  It is Thomas who has not addressed this issue.  
Further, contrary to the assertion of the majority, majority 
op., ¶11 n.4, regardless of whether the circuit court ruled on 
this issue, it is our duty to sustain the circuit court's 
decision if it was correct and an alternate theory or reasoning 
not adopted by the circuit court supports its decision.  Liberty 
Trucking Co. v. DILHR, 57 Wis. 2d 331, 342, 204 N.W.2d 457 
(1973).   
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
27 
 
later incorporated into paints.  While some defendants also 
produced lead paint, those that did are only being sued in their 
capacity as manufactures of this component product.  In this 
case, Thomas simply cannot prove that white lead carbonate, as 
opposed to some other type of white lead pigment, or other 
leaded ingredient of paint, caused his injuries.  While he may 
be able to prove that he ingested lead paint, he has not 
presented proof sufficient to overcome summary judgment that his 
injuries 
are 
attributable 
to 
the 
product 
for 
which 
the 
defendants are being sued for producing.   
¶224 Ultimately, all Thomas can prove is that he has 
symptoms of lead poisoning and that white lead carbonate was 
used in some types of white lead paint.  Although the defendants 
conceded, for purposes of their summary judgment motion, that 
Thomas "can prove that he was injured by lead ingestion [and] 
that his source of lead ingestion was lead paint[,]" they never 
conceded that Thomas's injuries were caused by white lead 
carbonate pigment.69  To the contrary, they clearly argued that 
Thomas "cannot prove that he ingested white lead carbonate and 
not some other form of lead pigment."  Again, I emphasize that 
the defendants are being sued in their capacity as producers of 
white lead carbonate and not simply manufacturers of lead paint.  
The majority 
conveniently 
ignores 
Thomas's 
own 
admissions 
regarding his lack of proof with regard to the type of lead 
                                                 
69 Thus, the majority is simply wrong to imply that the 
defendants conceded Thomas can prove he was injured by white 
lead carbonate.  See majority op., ¶11 n.4.   
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
28 
 
product that caused his injuries.  For example, in their second 
set of interrogatories, the defendants inquired:  
State 
whether you 
can identify by 
chemical 
formula, name, or composition the particular type or 
types of lead pigment (e.g., white lead carbonate) 
contained in the paint in that building or other 
property, and if you are able to do so, identify each 
particular type or types of lead pigment present in 
that building or other property.   
Thomas answered:  "No."  The defendants further inquired: 
State whether you know the chemical formula, 
name, or composition of the particular type or types 
of lead pigment (e.g., white lead carbonate) contained 
in the paint Steven Thomas is claimed to have ingested 
or inhaled at that building or other property, and if 
you do know, specify each type or types of lead 
pigment you claim he ingested.   
Thomas answered:  "No."   
¶225 The majority relies on the testimony of two of the 
plaintiff's experts:  Robert Dragen, an electron microscopist 
who analyzed paint samples from Thomas's residences; and Dr. 
Mushak, a toxicologist.  Majority op., ¶12.  According to the 
majority, this testimony is sufficient to create an issue of 
fact as to whether Thomas ingested white lead carbonate because 
Mr. Dragen's analysis found no trace of sulfur or chromium in 
the paint samples and lead sulfate, chromate, and carbonate 
"were 
the 
essential 
lead 
pigments 
used 
for 
residences."  
Majority op., ¶12.  The majority notes Dr. Mushak testified that 
based on this evidence and a process of elimination analysis, 
the houses where Thomas lived contained white lead carbonate.  
Id.  
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
29 
 
¶226 Reliance on this testimony is problematic for several 
reasons.  First, Mr. Dragen did not "render any kind of opinion 
regarding any chemical compounds in the paints [he] analyzed[.]"  
Second, Mr. Dragen was not able to offer any opinions as to when 
the paint he analyzed was applied.  Id.   
¶227 Dr. Mushak's testimony is also highly problematic.  
Dr. Mushak's supplementary affidavit concluded, based on Mr. 
Dragen's analysis, that white lead carbonate was "the only 
likely" lead pigment Thomas ingested.  This conclusion was based 
on the following reasoning:  "the absence of detectable sulfur 
and chromium (0.05%) conclusively rules out any use of lead 
sulfate or lead chromate as lead pigments in these layers and 
further rules in basic lead carbonate."  This reasoning was 
based on the assumption that white lead carbonate "was the 
overwhelming form of lead in [interior painting] pigments."   
¶228 However, this final assumption was based on testimony 
concerning the market share of various white lead pigments that 
one Dr. Lawrence White provided in Brenner, 263 A.D.2d 165.  
However, the court in Brenner rejected this form of analysis 
noting:  "Plaintiffs' own expert agreed that white lead 
carbonate accounts for only approximately 80% of the lead in all 
lead pigments used for interior paints between 1926 and 1955.  
The remaining 20% of the lead pigments found in interior paints 
may have been manufactured by defendants not named in this 
litigation."  Id. at 171.   
¶229 Significantly, the record reflects that a variety of 
leaded pigments were used in interior painting.  These included:  
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
30 
 
"basic lead carbonate[,] basic lead sulfate, . . . red lead, 
lead chromates, leaded zinc oxides, lead silicates, lead 
titanates, [and] litharge . . . ."  Further, as previously 
noted, some painters utilized mixtures of paint that contained 
lead-free pigment but contained leaded dyers or thinners.  Thus, 
the possible sources of lead in the paint Mr. Dragen analyzed 
were not limited to lead carbonate, sulfate, or chromate.   
¶230 Dr. Mushak also conceded that Dr. White's market 
studies were limited only to the years 1937-1945.  Here, the 
relevant time period is from the time the houses in which Thomas 
lived were constructed——1900 and 1905——until lead paint was 
banned——1980——roughly 80 years.  Finally, when pressed at his 
deposition, Dr. Mushak admitted that he could not say "whether 
or not any of the lead that was in Steven Thomas was caused by 
some other form of lead other than white lead carbonate[.]"  As 
he explained:  "All I can go with is if ninety-nine percent of 
typical interior paints were basic lead carbonates and Steven 
Thomas shows up eating interior lead paint . . . I would say 
that . . . he probably ingested basic lead carbonate."    
¶231 Numerous courts have held that this type of process of 
elimination theory of causation using generalized statistics is 
not sufficient as a matter of law to create an issue of fact as 
to 
what 
type 
of 
product 
caused 
the 
plaintiff's 
injury, 
especially when the analysis fails to account for other possible 
sources of the injury.  "[G]eneral statistics do not establish 
causation in a specific case."  Doe v. United States, 976 F.2d 
1071, 1087 (7th Cir. 1992).  In Jandrt v. Jerome Foods, Inc., 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
31 
 
227 Wis. 2d 531, 566-67, 597 N.W.2d 744 (1999), this court 
accepted the circuit court's conclusion that a similar process 
of elimination theory of causation "left" exposure to certain 
chemicals as the actual cause of an injury "'simply wrong as a 
matter of science and logic.'"   
¶232 Similarly, in Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 58 N.E.2d 
754 (Mass. 1945), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
held that the plaintiff had failed to create a jury question as 
to the ownership of the bus that injured her by relying on the 
fact that the defendant operated the only bus franchise on the 
street in question: 
While the defendant had the sole franchise for 
operating a bus on Main Street, Winthrop, this did not 
preclude private or chartered buses from using this 
street; the bus in question could very well have been 
one 
operated 
by 
someone 
other 
than 
the 
defendant. . . . [I]t 
is 
'not 
enough 
that 
mathematically 
the 
chances 
somewhat 
favor 
a 
proposition to be proved; for example, the fact that 
colored automobiles made in the current year outnumber 
black ones would not warrant a finding that an 
undescribed automobile of the current year is colored 
and not black, nor would the fact that only a minority 
of men die of cancer warrant a finding that a 
particular man did not die of cancer.'  The most that 
can be said of the evidence in the instant case is 
that perhaps the mathematical chances somewhat favor 
the proposition that a bus of the defendant caused the 
accident.   
Id. at 755 (quoted source omitted)(emphasis added).   
 
¶233 In Diversey Corp. v. Diversey Corp., 742 So.2d 1250, 
1254 (Ala. 1999), the court ruled that "because [the plaintiff's 
expert] could not testify that a specific product caused [the 
plaintiff's] injuries, his testimony was mere conjecture and 
therefore not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
32 
 
fact."  Likewise, here, Mr. Dragen's analysis did not find 
evidence of white lead carbonate; it merely excluded two other 
types of lead pigments.  As noted, the record indicates that 
there were other lead pigments in production for use in interior 
painting other than carbonates, sulfates, chromates, including 
lead silicate, lead titanates, and litharge.  Furthermore, the 
record indicates that individual painters often added leaded 
thinners or dyers to non-leaded pigments.  Thomas's expert's 
statistical process of elimination simply fails to account for 
these other alternative sources of lead in paint.  As such, it 
is mere speculation or conjecture to contend that white lead 
carbonate caused Thomas's injuries.  Id.  ("'"Proof which goes 
no further than to show an injury could have occurred in an 
alleged way, does not warrant the conclusion that it did so 
occur, where from the same proof the injury can with equal 
probability be attributed to some other cause."'") (quoting 
Southern Ry. Co. v. Dickeson, 100 So. 665, 669 (Ala. 1924) 
(quoted source omitted)).   
¶234 Similarly, in Guenther v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 406 
F.2d 1315, 1318 (3d Cir. 1969), the court held that proof that 
the defendant made up to 80 percent of the tires sold in the 
store where the plaintiff worked and was injured was not 
sufficient to establish that the defendant made the tire that 
harmed the plaintiff.  The court ruled:  "[T]here was no 
justification for allowing plaintiff's case on that so-called 
probability hypothesis to go to the jury.  The latter's verdict 
would at best be a guess.  It could not be reasonably 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
33 
 
supported."  Id.  See also 63 Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability 
§ 50 (1996) ("A verdict with respect to proximate causation may 
not be based on mere theory, conjecture, speculation, or 
surmise.  Thus, where the evidence reveals several possible 
causes of the accident, it is improper to allow the jury to 
guess 
which 
cause 
might 
have 
been 
the 
proximate 
cause.")(emphasis added).   
¶235 Thus, the fact that Thomas's expert was able to 
exclude two types of pigment from the paint samples provided to 
him is simply not legally sufficient to establish that white 
lead carbonate was the cause of Thomas's injuries, as there were 
other lead pigments and ingredients used in interior paint that 
could have caused Thomas's injuries and Dr. Mushak testified 
that he could not say whether the lead found in Thomas was from 
some form of lead other than white lead carbonate.  Thomas's 
experts did not find any scientific evidence that the paint at 
his residences contained white lead carbonate, and Thomas 
himself admitted that he is unable to identify white lead 
carbonate as the cause of his injuries in his answers to the 
defendants' interrogatories.   
¶236 As such, unlike Collins, where the plaintiff could not 
establish the identity of the manufacturer of the drug her 
mother had taken, here, Thomas cannot prove the identity of the 
manufacturer or the identity of the product.  That Thomas cannot 
prove he was injured by white lead carbonate is not a trivial 
point; the defendants are being sued in their capacity as 
producers of white lead carbonate.  Collins itself required 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
34 
 
proof "that DES caused the plaintiff's subsequent injuries."  
Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 193.  To hold multiple defendants liable 
for a product they all produced when the plaintiff cannot 
identify which one of them produced the specific product that 
injured him is one thing; it is quite another to hold multiple 
defendants liable for a product they all produced when the 
plaintiff 
cannot 
even 
establish 
that 
product 
caused 
his 
injuries.  
¶237 In 
addition, 
another 
related 
distinction 
exists 
between this case and Collins.  Unlike DES, white lead carbonate 
does not produce a "signature injury."  DES plaintiffs suffered 
from a specific, rare form of cancer strongly associated with 
maternal ingestion of DES.  Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 179.  In 
other words, "the plaintiffs' injuries were uniquely traceable 
to a single product[.]"  Randy S. Parlee, Overcoming the 
Identification Burden in DES Litigation: The Market Share 
Liability Theory, 65 Marq. L. Rev. 609, 635 (1982).   
¶238 In contrast, there is no such signature injury in lead 
poisoning cases.  Thomas's injuries could have occurred as a 
result of the ingestion of lead from a wide variety of sources.  
See Brenner, 263 A.D.2d at 173 ("Plaintiffs allege that [the 
child] sustained injuries to his central nervous system, 
including difficulties with concentration, abstract thinking, 
and comprehension.  But [his] injuries could have been caused by 
some source other than lead, or even by a source of lead other 
than lead-based paint.").   
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
35 
 
¶239 Contrary to the majority's assertion, majority op. 
¶¶155-57, this lack of a signature injury should be dispositive 
because as noted, the second prerequisite for utilization of the 
Collins risk-contribution theory was that the plaintiff had to 
prove "that DES caused the plaintiff's subsequent injuries."  
Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 193.  In this case, Thomas simply cannot 
prove that white lead carbonate, as opposed to another lead 
pigment or another source of lead in paint, caused his injuries.   
¶240 Even assuming, arguendo, that Thomas can prove he was 
injured by white lead carbonate, other important distinctions 
exist between this case and Collins.  For instance, unlike 
Collins, this case does not involve a finished product over 
which the defendants had exclusive control that was utilized for 
its intended purpose.  In Collins, the manufacturers sought FDA 
approval of DES and marketed the drug directly to consumers.  
See id. at 191.  Except for differing doses, the DES did not 
change between the time of manufacture and consumption.  As 
such, the manufacturers had exclusive control over the risk 
their product posed to the public.  In contrast, the "differing 
formulae of lead paint has a direct bearing on how much damage a 
lead paint manufacturer's product would cause."  Skipworth, 690 
A.2d at 173.  As the Brenner court noted: 
[T]he manufacturers of white lead carbonate did not 
have exclusive control of the risk.  The paint 
manufacturers, 
rather 
than 
the 
lead 
pigment 
manufactures, decided which pigments to use and in 
what quantities.  In addition, owners and landlords of 
residences had control of some of the risk posed by 
lead-based paint, which becomes hazardous when it 
peels and flakes and is then ingested or the dust 
inhaled.  Owners and landlords could control such risk 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
36 
 
by proper maintenance of their property.  Furthermore, 
manufacturers of DES intended that their product be 
ingested by pregnant women to prevent miscarriages.  
In contrast, white lead carbonate or lead-based paint 
is not intended for ingestion and obviously was not 
marketed for such a use. 
Brenner, 263 A.D.2d at 172-73.   
¶241 The plaintiff here is suing the manufacturers of an 
ingredient in a finished product that caused injury because it 
was not utilized for its intended purpose.  In Collins, the 
manufacturers made, marketed, and sold the final product to the 
consumer and thus had control over the end product.  White lead 
carbonate manufacturers that did not also manufacture lead paint 
had no control over how much of their pigment was incorporated 
into the final product or whether it would be used for 
residential purposes.  Paint manufacturers made the ultimate 
decision in regard to the types, combinations, and amounts to 
use in the formulation of their final paint product.  Any given 
painter had a unique way of mixing paints depending on the 
purpose for which the paint was to be used.  Further, none of 
these individuals could have controlled whether a child ingested 
paint chips.  The raw material suppliers, therefore, did not 
have exclusive control over the risk of the product that 
allegedly injured Thomas; as such, this case clearly does not 
fall 
within 
the 
theory 
of 
risk 
contribution 
originally 
formulated in Collins.   
¶242 Yet another significant distinction between this case 
and Collins is that unlike DES, white lead carbonate is not 
fungible.  As noted by the majority, majority op., ¶138, an 
important 
justification 
for 
adopting 
the 
risk-contribution 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
37 
 
theory was that "DES was, for the most part, produced in a 
'generic' form."  Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 180.  Furthermore, 
"DES was a fungible drug produced with a chemically identical 
formula."  Id.  As such, it was virtually impossible for the 
plaintiff to determine which DES manufacturer produced the DES 
that her mother ingested.  See id.  This commonality among DES 
forms 
was 
important 
because 
it 
assured 
that 
all 
DES 
manufacturers equally shared responsibility for the risk of 
injury posed by the drug.   
¶243 As described previously, the defendants in this case 
have overwhelmingly demonstrated that lead paints and pigments 
were anything but generic, fungible, or chemically identical.  
To briefly restate, pigment manufacturers utilized different 
formulas for white lead carbonate that varied in terms of 
chemical composition, lead content, particle size, and hiding 
power.  Further, the end product producers, the lead paint 
manufacturers, utilized different types and concentrations of 
white lead carbonate in different paint mixtures, depending upon 
the brand and the purpose for which the paint was to be applied.  
In other words, there was no single, identical formulation of 
white lead carbonate.  These different formulas contained 
different amounts of lead, and hence, different levels of 
toxicity.   
¶244 Thus, even if Thomas could provide scientific evidence 
that he ingested a white lead carbonate pigment, no uniform risk 
was presented among the varieties of white lead carbonate.  As 
the different formulas contained different lead concentrations, 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
38 
 
they posed different risks of harm.  Obviously, a mixture with a 
high lead concentration posed a greater risk than a mixture with 
a low lead concentration.   
¶245 The Brenner court recognized the importance of this 
distinction from the DES cases when it rejected market share 
liability in an action against manufacturers of white lead 
carbonate: 
All 
DES 
manufactured 
had 
an 
identical 
chemical 
composition.  In contrast, lead-based paint is not a 
fungible product; it contains varying amounts of lead 
pigments, including white lead carbonate.  Arguably, 
the white lead carbonate used as a raw material in 
some 
lead-based 
paint 
did 
not 
differ 
between 
manufacturers.  However, paint manufacturers used 
differing amounts of white lead carbonate, or some 
other lead pigment, in their paints.  Some lead-based 
paint contained 10% lead pigment, while other paint 
was more toxic, containing as much as 50% lead 
pigment.  Not only did the amount of lead pigment 
vary, but so did the type of lead pigment used.  Thus, 
unlike DES, the finished product that was used by 
consumers 
here, i.e., 
lead-based 
paint, 
was not 
fungible.   
Brenner, 263 A.D.2d at 172.  See also Skipworth, 690 A.2d at 173 
(noting that unlike DES, which was "manufactured according to an 
identical 
formula 
and 
presented 
an 
identical 
risk 
of 
harm[,] . . . it is undisputed that lead pigments had different 
chemical formulations, contained different amounts of lead, and 
differed in potential toxicity").  Because neither white lead 
carbonate nor the lead-based paint into which these pigments 
were incorporated were generic or fungible, it would be 
inappropriate to apply the Collins risk-contribution theory 
here, as the defendants did not equally share responsibility for 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
39 
 
the risk posed by white lead carbonate, in contrast to the drug 
companies that manufactured and marketed DES. 
¶246 The majority drastically lowers the threshold for 
fungibility articulated in Collins by concluding that all forms 
of white lead carbonate are fungible.  The majority recognizes 
that white lead carbonate was made from three different chemical 
formulas, while DES was made from only one.  Majority op., ¶139.  
Nevertheless, the majority concludes that fungibility does not 
require chemical identity.  Id.  The majority stresses that for 
the purposes of fungibility, it is the "common denominator in 
the formulas that counts:  lead."  Id., ¶140.  The majority goes 
on to state that "the formulas for both DES and the white lead 
carbonate are in a sense on the same footing as being inherently 
hazardous."  Id.  There is simply no basis in Collins or any of 
the cases from other jurisdictions, applying market share 
liability, 
for 
establishing 
such 
a 
low 
threshold 
for 
fungibility. 
¶247 With 
this 
misconceived 
focus 
on 
a 
"common 
denominator," 
and 
an 
"inherently 
hazardous" 
formula, 
the 
majority has drastically expanded the intended parameters of 
Collins.  The majority's reasoning is clearly flawed and 
virtually eliminates the fungibility requirement, as now all 
finished products containing a common raw material are fungible.  
As Sherwin-Williams indicates, under the majority's rationale, 
victims of a shooting who cannot identify a gun manufacturer 
could sue all steel companies, a person injured by a drain 
cleaner could sue all producers of sodium hydroxide, and one who 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
40 
 
is injured in a fire started by matches could sue all producers 
of sulfur.   
¶248 Thus, under the majority's rationale, white lead 
carbonate could be considered fungible with other forms of lead 
pigment, lead sinkers for fishing poles, lead pencils, or lead 
pipes.  Similarly, under the majority's rationale, all types of 
tires are fungible because they all contain rubber.  If all that 
is required is a "common denominator," then a plaintiff could 
sue the manufacturers of all these products because they are 
all, under the majority's rationale, "fungible" for the purposes 
of Collins, as they all contain a common offending ingredient.   
¶249 The majority cites to a California asbestos case, 
Wheeler v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 109 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1992), for support of its conclusion that the common 
denominator is what matters for purposes of fungibility.  
However, the Wheeler case is clearly the minority view:   
[O]ther 
authority 
finds 
market 
share 
liability 
inappropriate where the substance, such as asbestos, 
is not fungible as was DES, and had widely varying 
ranges of toxicity, depending upon its form and use.  
Nonfungibility between and among the several types of 
asbestos has generally precluded application of market 
share 
liability 
to 
claims 
for 
asbestos-related 
personal 
injury, 
although 
California 
courts 
have 
recognized that an exception might exist in asbestos-
containing brake pad litigation.  [See Wheeler, 11 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 109.]  Thus, courts evaluating claims of 
asbestos-related injury have declined to extend market 
share liability because while "all of the asbestos 
products shared an important characteristic in that 
they all contained asbestos fibers, . . . they also 
possessed 
divergent 
characteristics, 
such 
as 
the 
specific type of asbestos fiber incorporated into the 
product; 
the 
physical 
properties 
of the 
product 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
41 
 
itself; and the percentage of asbestos used in the 
product." 
Madden & Owen § 24:7, at 662-63 (quoting Mullen v. Armstrong 
World Indus., Inc., 246 Cal. Rptr. 32, 36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)) 
(footnotes omitted)(emphasis added).70   
¶250 Furthermore, the majority has overstated the holding 
of Wheeler.  As correctly stated by the North Dakota Supreme 
Court:   
Although 
Wheeler 
recognized 
that 
non-identical 
products may give rise to market share liability if 
they contain roughly equivalent quantities of a single 
type of asbestos fiber, the court did not hold that 
all asbestos-containing friction brake products in all 
cases will be considered fungible.  In fact, the court 
in Wheeler indicated that such products must carry a 
nearly equivalent risk of harm to support market share 
liability.  Furthermore, Wheeler was a reversal of a 
nonsuit based upon an offer of proof made by the 
plaintiff.  The court stressed its holding was narrow: 
the plaintiffs had not proven the elements of a market 
share case, but were merely being afforded the 
opportunity to prove it.  Clearly, Wheeler does not 
serve as evidence of fungibility and equivalent risks 
of harm of the products in this case. 
Black v. Abex Corp., 603 N.W.2d 182, 190 (N.D. 1999)(internal 
citations omitted). 
                                                 
70 See Madden & Owen § 24:7, at 662 n.6, for a list of cases 
precluding application of market share liability for asbestos-
related cases because of nonfungibility:  Stevens v. Owens-
Corning Fiberglas Corp., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 525, 540 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1996) (noting "diversity of asbestos products"); Celotex 
Corp. v. 
Copeland, 
471 
So. 
2d 533, 
538-39 
(Fla. 
1985) 
(collecting cases that reject market share theory in asbestos 
cases); Gaulding v. Celotex Corp., 748 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. App. 
1988) (concluding that market share liability, among other 
theories, is not available in Texas for an asbestos-related 
injury; Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line Ry. Co., 533 F. Supp 183 
(S.D. Ga. 1982); Vigiolto v. Johns Manville Corp., 643 F. Supp. 
1454 (W.D. Pa. 1986) (holding that market share liability is not 
appropriate in an action based on an asbestos-related injury). 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
42 
 
¶251 Notably, 
the Wheeler 
court 
reaffirmed 
its 
prior 
decision in Mullen, 246 Cal. Rptr. 32, in which the court 
refused to apply the market share theory of liability to a wide 
range of asbestos products manufactured by the defendants 
because "[w]e noted there that asbestos, unlike DES, was not a 
single product but merely a generic name for an ingredient in a 
variety of products each of which posed a different risk of 
harm."  Wheeler, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111.  The Wheeler court 
distinguished Mullen because the brake pads at issue were 
comprised of a "single type of asbestos fiber, . . . and the 
amount of asbestos by weight in the pads varied within a limited 
range."  Id. at 111.   
¶252 In this case, there was no single type of white lead 
carbonate. 
 
Each 
formulation 
had 
different 
chemical 
compositions, contained different amounts of lead, and differed 
in potential toxicity.  Furthermore, the amount of white lead 
carbonate contained in a particular lead paint varied greatly 
from mixture to mixture.  As such, the rationale of Mullen, 
which focused on asbestos in general, is much more analogous to 
this case than the rationale of Wheeler, which focused on a 
particular asbestos fiber in a limited concentration range.   
¶253 In Black, the North Dakota Supreme Court rejected 
market share liability in a suit against manufacturers of 
asbestos-containing products precisely because the products, 
although all containing asbestos, did not present equivalent 
risks of harm.  Black, 603 N.W.2d at 189.  "Market share 
liability is premised upon the fact that the defendants have 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
43 
 
produced identical (or virtually identical) defective products 
which carry equivalent risks of harm."  Id. (emphasis added).  
The court further stated: 
The rationale underlying market share liability, as 
developed in Sindell, is that it did not matter which 
manufacturer's product the plaintiff's mother actually 
ingested; because all DES was chemically identical, 
the same harm would have occurred.  Thus, any 
individual manufacturer's product would have caused 
the identical injury, and it was through mere fortuity 
that any one manufacturer did not produce the actual 
product ingested.   
Id. at 190.  The court then noted that the asbestos-containing 
"friction products" that the defendants produced contained 
between seven and seventy-five percent asbestos fibers.  Id.  
"It seems obvious that a product which contains seventy-five 
percent asbestos would create a greater risk of harm than one 
which contains only seven percent."  Id. at 191.  Thus, the 
Black court held that the market share theory of liability did 
not apply because the defendants' products did not carry 
equivalent degrees of risk and were not fungible.  Id.   
¶254 Similarly, in Sanderson v. International Flavors and 
Fragrances, Inc., 950 F. Supp 981, 991 (C.D. Cal. 1996), the 
court held that various perfumes and colognes were not fungible 
goods.  "Just as the court of appeal in Mullen held that 
asbestos was not the 'simple equivalent[]' of DES, the fragrance 
products which plaintiff contends caused her injuries are not 
fungible goods made from an identical formula and therefore 
cannot be equated with the DES at issue in Sindell."  Id.  The 
court further observed that "the only difference between DES 
manufactured by Eli Lilly and DES manufactured by Abbott was the 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
44 
 
return address on the package sent by the manufacturer to the 
pharmacy.  Such is not the case here."  Id.  The district court 
then applied the rationale of Mullen to the facts before it and 
concluded that the "defendants' fragrance products all (at least 
allegedly) contain aldehydes, but each contains different types 
of aldehydes, with different physical properties, at different 
levels of concentration.  It would therefore be contrary to 
Mullen to apply the market-share theory in this case."  Id. at 
992.  Furthermore, in its analysis the court determined that 
Wheeler 
was 
"highly 
distinguishable" 
and, 
therefore, 
not 
applicable.  Id. at 992 n.10. 
¶255 Likewise, in Doe v. Cutter Biological, 852 F. Supp 
909, 913 (D. Idaho 1994), the court determined that Factor VIII, 
a clotting agent, was not a fungible drug.  As stated by the 
court:   
Unlike DES, Factor VIII is not a generic, 
fungible drug.  Each processor prepares its Factor 
VIII concentrate by its own proprietary processes 
using plasma collected from its own sources.  Each 
firm's 
Factor 
VIII 
concentrate 
is 
clearly 
distinguishable by brand name, package color, lot 
number, and number of units of Factor VIII per vial; 
each firm's Factor VIII concentrate is separately 
licensed by the Food and Drug Administration.  There 
is no evidence that all Factor VIII products caused or 
were equally capable of causing HIV infection.  Thus, 
the risk posed by the different brands of Factor VIII 
is not identical. 
Id. (quoting Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717, 733 
(Haw. 1991) (Moon, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)).  
Thus, the court refused to apply the market share theory of 
liability against the providers of Factor VIII. 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
45 
 
¶256 Unfortunately for the defendants in this case, it is 
not obvious to the majority that the varieties of lead paint 
containing differing concentrations and compositions of white 
lead carbonate did not create equivalent risks of harm.  
Furthermore, a defendant like DuPont, which manufactured and 
marketed white lead carbonate for only seven years, did not 
create the same risk of harm as a defendant like Sherwin-
Williams, which manufactured and marketed white lead carbonate 
for 37 years.   
¶257 By ignoring or downplaying the significance of these 
factual 
distinctions 
and 
focusing 
solely 
on 
the 
policy 
articulated in Collins of allowing an injured plaintiff to 
recover, the majority casts a wide net that will ensnare 
numerous defendants and have drastic consequences for firms 
doing business in Wisconsin.  Further, applying the Collins 
risk-contribution theory to a case such as this one——where the 
deficiencies in the plaintiff's proof are above and beyond the 
mere inability to identify the precise manufacturer of a 
generic, chemically identifiable, fungible product that was 
produced during a limited time frame——will have a profound 
effect on products liability law.  Under the majority opinion, 
plaintiffs will be encouraged to sue entire industries rather 
than locate the defendant that manufactured the product that 
caused the injury.  An individual defendant will have almost no 
ability to contest causation.  Furthermore, "elimination of a 
causation 
requirement [will] 
render 
every 
manufacturer an 
insurer not only of its own products, but also of all 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
46 
 
generically similar products manufactured by its competitors."  
Wehmeier v. UNR Indus., Inc., 572 N.E.2d 320, 336 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1991) (quoting Blackston v. Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co., 764 
F.2d 1480, 1483 (11th Cir. 1985)).   
¶258 The 
Illinois 
Supreme 
Court 
articulated 
similar 
concerns when it too rejected all variants of market share 
liability in Smith, 560 N.E.2d 324. 
We have not in the past been hesitant to develop new 
tort concepts; however, in this instance we decline to 
do so because of the infirmities in the proposed 
theory.  Furthermore, this is too great a deviation 
from a tort principle which we have found to serve a 
vital 
function 
in 
the 
law, 
causation 
in 
fact, 
especially when market share liability is a flawed 
concept and its application will likely be only to a 
narrow class of defendants. 
Id. at 344-45.   
¶259 For an example of the harsh consequences of the 
majority's decision, one need look no further than to the recent 
decision of Haase v. Badger Mining Corp., 2004 WI 97, 274 
Wis. 2d 143, 682 N.W.2d 389.  In Haase, the plaintiff sued the 
manufacturer that provided silica sand to the foundry where the 
plaintiff worked.  Id., ¶¶3-5.  With the expansion of the 
Collins risk-contribution theory to the facts of this case, 
plaintiffs, such as those in Haase, can now sue the entire raw 
material industry and place the burden on each individual 
defendant to disprove their presumptive liability.  Plaintiffs 
will have no incentive to locate the party that actually caused 
the injury.  The majority's drastic expansion of the risk-
contribution theory clearly distorts the original rationale 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
47 
 
behind the Collins decision and will have drastic consequences 
for business in this state.   
¶260 Collins 
represented 
a 
departure 
from 
traditional 
principles of causation that was justified under the unique 
facts in that case.  As detailed above, other than having a 
plaintiff who cannot identify which manufacturer's product 
injured him, this matter and Collins have little in common.  As 
noted by the Brenner court, 263 A.D.2d at 173, "[t]he inability 
to identify a narrow time period in which to apply the market 
share theory, the absence of a fungible product, and the absence 
of a signature injury are among the reasons that other courts 
have refused to apply the market share theory in lead poisoning 
cases."  Furthermore, the resounding weight of authority does 
not support such a fundamental change from conventional tort law 
principles, in any context outside of the DES scenario.  Indeed, 
"market share liability theory has been rejected in most other 
types of products liability cases including those involving 
asbestos, breast implants, vaccines, lead paint, and gasoline."  
Madden & Owen § 24:7, at 672 (collecting cases).   
¶261 As it is clear that this case is entirely factually 
distinct from Collins, the majority's decision represents a 
radical expansion and not a mere application of Collins.  By 
expanding the scope of Collins to this case, the majority has 
essentially adopted 
a 
version 
of 
risk-contribution 
theory 
explicitly rejected in Collins.  In other words, the majority's 
opinion is unjustified, unprecedented, and unwise. 
 
No.  2003AP1528.jpw 
 
48 
 
IV 
¶262 In sum, the majority opinion disregards the pertinent 
facts of this case, misconstrues our Article I, Section 9 
jurisprudence, and ignores the numerous factual distinctions 
between this case and Collins.  In so doing, the majority 
relaxes the traditional rules of causation beyond what was 
accomplished in Collins and eliminates any possibility that the 
defendants in this case will be able to present a defense.  
Thus, its decision amounts to no less than absolute liability 
for the 
manufacturers 
of 
a 
raw 
material 
that 
is 
later 
incorporated into a finished product that causes injury.  This 
result is neither just, fair, nor grounded in the law.  While it 
is understandable to feel saddened by the injuries suffered by 
the plaintiff, what is also tragic is that in its rush to 
condemn the entire lead paint industry, the majority ignores one 
of the most basics tenants of our justice system——an individual 
determination of wrongdoing.   
¶263 I am authorized to state that Justice DAVID T. PROSSER 
joins this dissent.  
 
 
No.  2003AP1528.dtp 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶264 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  Four years ago 
the City of Milwaukee filed suit against NL Industries, Inc. of 
Dallas, Texas, and Mautz Paint Company of Madison, alleging that 
the companies were responsible for creating a public nuisance in 
the 
City's 
old 
housing 
stock 
by 
marketing 
and 
selling 
substantial quantities of lead pigments and/or lead-based paint.  
City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., Inc., 2005 WI App 7, ¶¶2-4, 278 
Wis. 2d 313, 691 N.W.2d 888. 
¶265 The City asked the two defendants to pay the costs 
associated with its lead abatement program, which it estimated 
to be more than one hundred million dollars.  Id., ¶¶3, 5.  More 
specifically, the City sought (1) compensatory and equitable 
relief for abatement of the toxic lead hazards in Milwaukee 
homes; (2) restitution for amounts expended by the City to abate 
the toxic lead hazards in Milwaukee homes; and (3) punitive 
damages. 
¶266 The circuit court dismissed the City's claim for 
public nuisance, concluding that the City could not show that 
these particular defendants caused their lead-based paint to be 
applied to any of the specific buildings included in the alleged 
public nuisance.  Id., ¶¶1, 14-19.  The court of appeals 
reversed.  The matter is now awaiting a decision by this court 
in the present litigation. 
¶267 In the meantime, Mautz Paint, a long-time Wisconsin 
corporation founded in 1892, sold its business to Ohio-based 
Sherwin-Williams in November 2001.  The company cited financial 
No.  2003AP1528.dtp 
 
2 
 
pressure brought on by Milwaukee's lead paint lawsuit.  All 
Madison-based Mautz manufacturing has ceased. 
¶268 The City of Milwaukee's lead paint lawsuit provides us 
with a window to the future.  When the court issues its decision 
in this case, every person under the age of 20 who claims a lead 
paint injury in Wisconsin will have a cause of action in our 
courts.  Every person in the United States who has a lead paint 
injury that could have come from a Wisconsin-based company and 
can survive the limitations periods in his own state may have a 
cause of action.   Every municipality in this country that has a 
lead abatement program and can make a plausible argument that 
Wisconsin-made lead paint or white lead carbonate injured its 
residents may follow the City of Milwaukee and seek redress in 
this state.  Wisconsin will be the mecca for lead paint suits.  
There is no statute of repose on products liability here, and 
this court has now created a remedy for lead paint poisoning so 
sweeping and draconian that it will be nearly impossible for 
paint companies to defend themselves or, frankly, for plaintiffs 
to lose. 
¶269 Because the majority opinion creates a cause of action 
that violates due process of law, equal protection of the law, 
and nearly every principle of sound public policy in tort cases, 
I dissent. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶270 Steven Thomas, now 15, lived in several houses in 
Milwaukee during his formative years.  These houses include (1) 
2652 North 37th Street; (2) 2654 North 25th Street; and (3) 4736 
No.  2003AP1528.dtp 
 
3 
 
North 37th Street.  The first house at 2652 North 37th Street 
was built in 1905.  The second house at 2654 North 25th Street 
was built in 1900. 
¶271 Thomas claims that he ingested lead paint at all three 
houses as a small child.  The owner of the first house settled 
with him for $62,652.  The owners of the second house settled 
for $261,520.  The insurer of the owner of the third house 
prevailed on a motion for summary judgment. 
¶272 Plaintiff's expert did testing of paint chips at the 
first two houses.  The expert found as many as 21 layers of 
paint on chips at the first house and 18 layers of paint on 
chips at the second house.  Many of these layers contained white 
lead carbonate. 
¶273 For purposes of this discussion, we must accept as 
true that Thomas ingested white lead carbonate from paint chips 
or dust from all three houses.  However, Thomas admits that he 
will not be able to prove which companies among the defendants, 
if any, supplied paint containing white lead carbonate to any of 
the three houses.  The plaintiff will be unable to prove that, 
say, ConAgra Grocery Products, or one of its subsidiaries, ever 
supplied white lead carbonate that ended up in paint at 2652 
North 37th Street, or, if it did, whether the white lead 
carbonate it supplied caused injury to Thomas. 
¶274 The gist of this majority opinion is to create a 
theory of tort liability for paint manufacturers that obviates 
any need for a plaintiff to provide such proof. 
 
No.  2003AP1528.dtp 
 
4 
 
ANALYSIS 
¶275 Normally, if Thomas proceeded on a negligence theory, 
he would have to prove four elements: duty, breach, causation, 
and damages.  If he proceeded on a strict products liability 
theory, he would have to prove five elements: that the product 
was defective and unreasonably dangerous; that the product was 
defective when it left the possession or control of the seller; 
that the defect in the manufacturer's product was a cause 
(substantial factor) of the plaintiff's injury; that the seller 
was engaged in the business of selling such products; and that 
the product was one which the seller expected to and did reach 
the consumer without substantial change. 
¶276 Assessing these elements, it is apparent that Thomas 
could not succeed under existing theories of negligence or 
strict products liability.  Indeed, he acknowledges as much.  
Thomas's admitted inability to prove specific product causation 
would be fatal to his claim.   
¶277 The facts in this case do not fit the law.  So, 
instead of simply applying the settled law, the majority changes 
the law to fit the facts.   
¶278 As to Thomas's negligence cause of action, the 
majority modifies the elements as follows: Thomas must prove (1) 
that he ingested white lead carbonate; (2) that the white lead 
carbonate 
caused 
his 
injuries; 
(3) 
that 
the 
"Pigment 
Manufacturer" defendants produced or marketed the type of white 
lead 
carbonate 
he 
ingested; 
and 
(4) 
that 
a 
Pigment 
Manufacturer's conduct in producing or marketing the white lead 
No.  2003AP1528.dtp 
 
5 
 
carbonate constituted a breach of a legally recognized duty to 
Thomas.  Majority op., ¶161. 
¶279 As to Thomas's strict products liability cause of 
action, the majority has modified the elements to the extent 
that Thomas need prove only that the white lead carbonate was 
(1) defective; and (2) unreasonably dangerous; (3) "that the 
defect[ive product] was a cause of Thomas's injuries or 
damages;" (4) that the manufacturer was engaged in the business 
of selling such products; and (5) that the product was one which 
the seller expected to and did reach the consumer without 
substantial change.  Majority op., ¶162. 
¶280 Thus, the majority has broken the link between 
manufacturer and product.  Under the majority's rule, Thomas 
need prove only that a general type of product caused his 
injury; not that a specific manufacturer's product caused his 
injury.  A manufacturer is virtually powerless to show that its 
specific product did not cause the injury.  To mount a 
successful defense, a manufacturer would have to disprove the 
presumed link that the plaintiff admittedly cannot prove and 
need not prove.  It goes without saying that DNA testing does 
not apply to paint chips or dust. 
¶281 The 
majority's 
modification 
of 
the 
well-settled 
elements of negligence and strict products liability violates 
the defendants' constitutional rights to due process and equal 
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  This deprivation is underscored by the majority's 
departure from longstanding principles of tort liability. 
No.  2003AP1528.dtp 
 
6 
 
DUE PROCESS71 
¶282 The Fourteenth Amendment provides in part that no 
"State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."   
¶283 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "'[d]ue 
process' has never been, and perhaps can never be, precisely 
defined."72  However, both this court and federal courts have 
repeatedly characterized the immutable core of due process as 
"fair play."73  The precepts laid out in the majority opinion are 
                                                 
71 Before reaching the merits of the defendants' due process 
arguments, it is necessary to address the majority's conclusory 
contention that "[t]hese constitutional issues are not ripe."  
Majority op., ¶166.  "[T]he ripeness inquiry focuses on whether 
an injury that has not yet occurred is sufficiently likely to 
happen to justify judicial intervention."  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 
v. Traillour Oil Co., 987 F.2d 1138, 1153-54 (5th Cir. 1993).   
I have no difficulty in concluding that the constitutional 
issues are ripe.  The result the majority reaches in this case 
has immediate and dire consequences for the defendants, and 
impacts other cases awaiting the result of this case. 
For the defendants, the majority opinion means that they 
will effectively be denied the chance to rely on ordinary tort 
theory to defeat the plaintiff's claim.  Parties in other cases 
already filed and in cases yet to be filed will also note the 
majority's receptiveness to claims of this nature, and we may 
see a stampede to file lead paint suits before Congress or the 
Wisconsin Legislature can react.  These issues should be 
addressed now. 
72 See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of Durham 
County, N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981).   
73 See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 
847 (1998); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 46 n.12 (1980); 
Tammie J.C. v. Robert T.R., 2003 WI 61, ¶14, 262 Wis. 2d 217, 
663 N.W.2d 734; Layton Sch. of Art and Design v. WERC, 82 
Wis. 2d 324, 363, 262 N.W.2d 218 (1978). 
No.  2003AP1528.dtp 
 
7 
 
fundamentally unfair and at odds with traditional notions of 
fair play.74 
¶284 The defendants' constitutional arguments could be 
construed as alleging violations of substantive due process or 
procedural due process.  Substantive due process "'protects 
against governmental actions that are arbitrary and wrong 
"regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement 
them."'"75  Procedural due process "addresses the fairness of the 
manner in which a governmental action is implemented."76  The 
majority opinion violates the defendants' constitutional rights 
under both theories. 
 
                                                 
74 It is true enough that, generally, claims of due process 
violations are raised as objections to the operation of 
statutes.  See, e.g., Lujan v. G&G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 532 
U.S. 189 (2001); Matthies v. Positive Safety Mfg. Co., 2001 WI 
82, ¶27, 244 Wis. 2d 720, 628 N.W.2d 842.  In that sense, the 
"State" actor at issue is the state legislature.  Yet courts, 
too, must bow to this constitutional mandate.  Ownbey v. Morgan, 
256 U.S. 94, 111 (1921) (The due process clause "restrains state 
action, whether legislative, executive, or judicial, within 
bounds that are consistent with the fundamentals of individual 
liberty and private property, including the right to be heard 
where liberty or property is at stake in judicial proceedings.") 
(emphasis added).  Accordingly, a higher court is free to 
determine that a lower court's decision violated the due process 
rights of one or more of the parties.  See, e.g., Brinkerhoff-
Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 682 (1930) 
(reversing state court's decision on due process grounds and 
noting "while it is for the state courts to determine the 
adjective as well as the substantive law of the State, they 
must, in so doing, accord the parties due process of law.").   
75 Barbara B. v. Dorian H., 2005 WI 6, ¶18 n.14, 277 
Wis. 2d 378, 690 N.W.2d 849 (citation omitted).   
76 Id.   
No.  2003AP1528.dtp 
 
8 
 
A. 
Procedural Due Process 
¶285 The defendants contend that they will be denied the 
opportunity to present a defense under well-settled tort theory: 
the defense that their products did not cause the plaintiff's 
injury.  This argument is not aggressive or overreaching.  It 
simply demands the right to be heard, implicating the "fairness 
of the procedures" by which liability is determined. 
¶286 What process is due these defendants?  "'Due process 
is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the 
particular situation demands.'"77      
¶287 To 
determine 
the 
process 
due 
in 
a 
particular 
situation, the Supreme Court has often recited a three-factor 
balancing test.78  The Court balances (1) the private interest 
that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's 
interest in the matter, including the governmental function 
involved 
and 
any 
fiscal 
or 
administrative 
burdens 
that 
additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.79  
This tripartite formulation dates back at least as far as 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
                                                 
77 Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997) (citation 
omitted). 
78 Wilkinson v. Austin, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 2384, 2395 
(2005); Homar, 520 U.S. at 931-32. 
79 Id.   
No.  2003AP1528.dtp 
 
9 
 
¶288 The 
majority 
opinion 
sets 
up 
an 
irrebutable 
presumption of causation: if the plaintiff can show that the 
defendant manufactured white lead carbonate sometime between 
1900 and 1978, and that some form of white lead carbonate caused 
the plaintiff's injury, the defendant will be held liable.  The 
defendant has no opportunity to show that its particular product 
did not cause the plaintiff's injury.80  It is faced with no-
fault liability. 
¶289 Given this inequity, the determining factor in the 
Mathews test is the second factor: the risk of erroneous 
liability inherent in the procedure the majority implements 
today.  It completely tips the Mathews balance. 
¶290 The risk of error created by the majority opinion is 
enormous.  Because Thomas cannot prove which of multiple layers 
of paint injured him, the defendants cannot show that they did 
not produce, or more precisely, could not have produced, the 
white lead carbonate in that layer. 
¶291 The plaintiff need not show the evidence that is 
normally most critical in tort cases: that the defendant's 
product injured the plaintiff.  The plaintiff need not show that 
a defendant produced white lead carbonate during a particular 
time span (except a time period (1900-1978) of more than three 
                                                 
80 On several occasions, the United States Supreme Court has 
struck down statutes on the grounds that the statutes created an 
irrebutable presumption in violation of the due process clause.  
See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 
(1974); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 
508 (1973); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 
(1971). 
No.  2003AP1528.dtp 
 
10 
 
quarters of a century), or that the defendant produced a type of 
white lead carbonate with an identical chemical formula to the 
product that injured the plaintiff, or even that a particular 
defendant's products could have injured the plaintiff.   
¶292 This is true even though many of the defendants 
produced white lead carbonate for only a small fraction of the 
78-year 
period 
during 
which 
paint 
containing 
white 
lead 
carbonate could have been applied to the walls of Thomas's three 
residences.  
¶293 To 
illustrate, 
DuPont 
manufactured 
white 
lead 
carbonate for only seven years (1917-24).  SCM manufactured 
white lead carbonate for 34 years (1924-1958).  Sherwin-Williams 
manufactured white lead carbonate for 37 years (1910-47).  Under 
the majority opinion, a plaintiff may just as easily recover 
from a defendant such as DuPont (which made the product for 
seven years) as another defendant that produced it for eleven 
times seven years.  There is no rhyme or reason to such a 
result. 
¶294 DuPont, for example, would have no way to prove that 
it did not manufacture the white lead carbonate that injured the 
plaintiff, because the plaintiff could not prove when the white 
lead carbonate he ingested was used in paint, when that paint 
was applied to his multiple residences, or which of multiple 
layers of paint in three residences (or the dust therefrom) 
allegedly injured him.  These shortcomings in the majority's 
reasoning illustrate why this case is very different from 
Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984), 
No.  2003AP1528.dtp 
 
11 
 
in which the plaintiff could point to a nine-month span in which 
she could have been injured, and in which many similarly 
situated 
plaintiffs 
could 
identify 
distinguishing 
characteristics about the DES pills they took.81 
¶295 These shortcomings are the reason that no other court 
has ever adopted any form of market share liability in lead 
paint cases.  "The public policy reasons favoring the use of 
market share do not control where there is a possibility that 
the defendants did not cause the harm in question."82  The 
shortcomings are the reason that learned commentators advise 
that 
"[t]he greater the 
span of 
time within 
which the 
potentially injury-causing product was sold, the less suited 
market share liability will be."83  They are probably the reason 
why, despite calling Wisconsin the "last hope" for lead paint 
                                                 
81 In Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 198, 342 
N.W.2d 37 (1984), the court noted that innocent defendants could 
exculpate themselves by showing that their products "could not 
have reached the plaintiff's mother."  With respect to DES, this 
could have been done by showing that a particular manufacturer 
did not produce DES pills of a particular color or style.  
Perhaps because its net is so broad, the majority offers no such 
guidance here. 
82 Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 782 F. Supp. 186, 193 
(D. Mass. 1992).  See also City of Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. 
Ass'n, Inc., 994 F.2d 112, 126 (3d Cir. 1993); Lewis v. Lead 
Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 793 N.E. 2d 869, 875 (Ill. Ct. App. 2003) 
(Accepting 
the 
plaintiffs' 
theory 
would 
essentially 
make 
particular defendants "insurers of their industry," and a 
product manufacturer's "duty is not so broad as to extend to 
anyone who uses or might be injured by a like kind product 
supplied by another"); Skipworth v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 690 
A.2d 169, 172-73 (Pa. 1997). 
83 2 David G. Owen, M. Stuart Madden, et al., Madden & Owen 
on Products Liability § 24:7 at 663 (2000). 
No.  2003AP1528.dtp 
 
12 
 
plaintiffs, even a prominent member of the plaintiffs' bar 
commented, "I just don't see it happening," when asked about the 
plaintiff's chance of success in this case.84    
¶296 As another court stated in rejecting an identical 
claim, "application of the market share theory to this situation 
would virtually ensure that certain pigment manufacturers would 
be held liable where they could not possibly have been a 
potential tortfeasor."85   
¶297 The majority opinion raises the very real possibility 
that innocent defendants will be held liable for wrongs they did 
not commit.  To avoid the risk of erroneous verdicts, Thomas 
should 
have 
to 
show 
specific 
product 
causation 
and 
the 
defendants should be allowed a fair chance to show that their 
products did not injure Thomas.  Neither principle is consistent 
with the majority opinion. 
B. 
Substantive Due Process 
 
¶298 The majority's complete disregard for longstanding 
principles of tort liability certainly "shocks the conscience," 
thus violating substantive due process.86   
 
¶299 In effect, the majority opinion imposes ex post facto 
liability on the defendants for activities long past.  In 
this 
                                                 
84 Molly McDonough, Risky Business: Wisconsin Court's Risk 
Analysis May Be Last Hope for Lead Paint Plaintiffs, ABA Journal 
(Feb. 14, 2005). 
85 Skipworth v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 690 A.2d 169, 172 
(Pa. 1997) (emphasis added). 
86 See, e.g., Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 787 (2003) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(collecting cases). 
No.  2003AP1528.dtp 
 
13 
 
regard, the majority opinion is directly contrary to the 
principles expressed in Justice Anthony Kennedy's concurrence in 
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998). 
¶300 In Apfel, the petitioner, a corporation formerly 
engaged in coal mining, challenged the Coal Industry Retiree 
Health Benefit Act of 1992 on the grounds that it violated the 
due 
process 
and 
takings 
clauses 
of 
the 
constitution 
by 
retroactively imposing liability based on the corporation's 
activities between 1946 and 1965.87  A plurality of the Court 
concluded that the law violated the takings clause because it 
"improperly places a severe, disproportionate, and extremely 
retroactive burden on Eastern."88   
¶301 Justice 
Kennedy 
concurred, 
arguing 
that 
"If 
retroactive laws change the legal consequences of transactions 
long closed, the change can destroy the reasonable certainty and 
security which are the very objects of property ownership."89  As 
Justice Kennedy pointed out, "[b]oth stability of investment and 
confidence in the constitutional system . . . are secured by due 
process restrictions against severe retroactive legislation."90  
Accordingly, 
Justice 
Kennedy 
would 
have 
held 
the 
law 
unconstitutional on due process grounds.  Id. at 550 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring). 
                                                 
87 E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 532 (1998). 
88 Id. at 538.   
89 Id. at 548 (Kennedy, J., concurring).   
90 Id. at 549 (Kennedy, J., concurring).   
No.  2003AP1528.dtp 
 
14 
 
¶302 Here, it is not a statute, but the majority's 
decision, that imposes retroactive and severe liability based on 
"transactions long closed."  The principles articulated by 
Justice Kennedy are no less forceful when applied here; and the 
majority's decision, which will have the unerring consequence of 
imposing retroactive liability, is just as unconstitutional as 
if the same action had been taken by the state legislature. 
EQUAL PROTECTION 
 
¶303 The equal protection clause "creates no substantive 
rights," but embodies the general rule that the government "must 
treat like cases alike."91  The majority's rule does not "treat 
like cases alike." 
 
¶304 Assume for a moment that the year is 1960, and 
consider two Wisconsin paint manufacturers.  Under the majority 
opinion, each would be equally culpable, assuming they both 
produced lead-based paint.  Assume further that the first 
company was a small division of a larger company with minimal 
contacts in Wisconsin and sold only a small volume of paint in 
Wisconsin.  Assume that the other company was based in 
Wisconsin, did most of its business here, and operated here for 
the majority of the time in question.   
¶305 Assume now that today, the first company is still in 
business as a large, profitable corporation, and the second 
                                                 
91 Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997).   
No.  2003AP1528.dtp 
 
15 
 
company is defunct.92  Despite the fact that the company that has 
gone out of business was, in this hypothetical, the most 
culpable tortfeasor, it escapes all liability.  The first 
company, on the other hand, will bear a disproportionate share 
of the liability.  This is not "treating like cases alike." 
PUBLIC POLICY 
 
¶306 The majority's disregard for the type of "fair play" 
guaranteed by the due process and equal protection clauses is 
illuminated by a review of the six public policy factors this 
court has identified as tending to preclude liability even when 
negligence exists. 
 
¶307 The six factors are: (1) Whether the injury is too 
remote from the negligence; (2) Whether the injury is wholly out 
of proportion to the culpability of the negligent tortfeasor; 
(3) Whether it appears in retrospect too extraordinary that the 
negligence should have brought about the harm; (4) Whether 
allowance of recovery would place an unreasonable burden on the 
tortfeasor; (5) Whether allowance of recovery would be too 
likely to open the way to fraudulent claims; and (6) Whether 
allowance of recovery would enter a field that has no sensible 
or just stopping point.93   
                                                 
92 As examples of this class, O'Neil Duro Company began 
operation in 1925 and ceased operation in 1988.  Similarly, 
Hager Paint Products began operation in 1925 and ceased 
operation in 1979.  Both were based in Wisconsin. 
93 Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 219 Wis. 2d 250, 264-65, 
580 N.W.2d 233 (1998). 
No.  2003AP1528.dtp 
 
16 
 
 
¶308 Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that Thomas could 
prove causation and thus negligence, all these factors would 
weigh against attaching liability.  First, the alleged injury 
here is too remote from the negligence.  The white lead 
carbonate at issue may have been produced as much as 100 years 
ago.  It is almost impossible to defend against alleged 
negligence that no living person can remember.   
 
¶309 Second, the injury is wholly out of proportion to the 
defendants' culpability.  The recent negligence of a landlord in 
allowing the paint to deteriorate seems greater than the 
negligence of the manufacturer of one of the raw materials used 
to make the paint perhaps a half century ago. 
 
¶310 Third, in retrospect it appears too extraordinary that 
the negligence should have brought about the harm.  It is not 
enough for the majority to allege, in its presentation of the 
facts, some sort of industry-wide knowledge on the part of lead 
paint suppliers.  The plaintiff should have to show that each 
defendant had knowledge of the dangers of white lead carbonate, 
not lead paint.   
 
¶311 Fourth, 
allowance 
of 
recovery 
would 
place 
an 
unreasonable burden on the defendant.  As stated above, it is 
nearly impossible to defend a suit alleging negligence 50 to 100 
years in the past.  Even if a defendant had insurance during the 
entire time it was involved with white lead carbonate, it might 
have changed insurers, none of whom will now be eager to step 
forward with coverage.  How will a defendant prove coverage?  
No.  2003AP1528.dtp 
 
17 
 
Even if coverage could be proved, how will 1930s insurance pay 
for 21st century damages? 
 
¶312 Fifth, allowance of recovery would be too likely to 
open the way to fraudulent claims.  In erasing the causation 
requirement, the majority kicks out one of the legs supporting 
conventional principles of tort liability.  These time-honored 
standards have been designed to ensure that meritorious claims 
are rewarded and fraudulent claims are rejected.  The majority's 
action 
tilts 
the 
balance 
to 
substantially 
increase 
the 
possibility of fraudulent claims. 
 
¶313 Sixth, the principles in the majority opinion have no 
sensible or just stopping point.  As Justice Wilcox's dissent 
(which I wholeheartedly join) points out, the majority discards 
the principle of fungibility underpinning the Collins rationale.  
The reasoning in the majority opinion could be adapted to cover 
other raw materials.  Further, under the majority opinion, 
plaintiffs injured in other states have the option to come to 
our courts and sue Wisconsin raw material manufacturers for harm 
that occurred elsewhere. 
 
¶314 By illustrating the fundamental unfairness worked by 
the majority opinion, these six factors provide additional 
evidence that the majority opinion violates the core due process 
right of "fair play," as well as the defendants' right to equal 
protection of the law.  Given the near-unanimous rejection of 
this theory by other courts, this invasion is as unexpected as 
it is unwarranted. 
 
No.  2003AP1528.dtp 
 
18 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
¶315 The consequences of the majority opinion may be 
staggering for Wisconsin industry and commerce.  When Mautz 
Paint, a home-grown Wisconsin company, faced a similar suit, it 
was forced to sell out to an out-of-state company.  The new 
owner quickly moved all manufacturing jobs out of state.   
¶316 The harmful effects that this decision could visit on 
Wisconsin commerce render the majority decision unwise.  The 
presumptions in the majority opinion that contradict the 
defendants' rights of due process and equal protection render 
the majority decision unconstitutional.   
¶317 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶318 I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX 
joins this opinion. 
 
 
No.  2003AP1528.dtp 
 
 
 
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