Title: Shanor v. Engineering, Inc. of Wyoming

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Shanor v. Engineering, Inc. of Wyoming1985 WY 136705 P.2d 858Case Number: 85-33Decided: 09/11/1985RICHARD E. SHANOR, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

ENGINEERING, INC. OF WYOMING, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
RICHARD E. SHANOR, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

ENGINEERING, INC. OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, SheridanCounty, Leonard McEwan, 
J.

 
 
Henry F. Bailey, 
Jr., and Todd S. Welch of Loomis, Lazear, Wilson & Pickett, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Virgil G. 
Kinnaird, Sheridan, for 
appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal arises from 
a judgment in favor of appellee Engineering, Inc. of Wyoming in an action by 
appellee to collect on a promissory note owed by appellant Shanor. After the 
trial court denied appellant's motion for a continuance, trial was had to the 
court resulting in a judgment for appellee.

[¶2.]     Appellant raises the 
following issues:

"1. Whether the court's 
judgment entered herein is clearly erroneous and unsupported by the evidence 
offered and received at trial.

"2. Whether the court 
erred in denying defendant's motion for continuance."

[¶3.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶4.]     The case arose out of 
the design and construction of a dam to build Horseshoe Reservoir on a 
residential subdivision known as the Country Club of the Big Horns on property 
belonging to appellant near Dayton, Wyoming. Appellee prepared maps, topographic 
surveys, and made application to the state engineer for a permit to build the 
reservoir. As compensation for such work, appellant signed a promissory note on 
September 22, 1983, for $60,860.07, together with interest at the annual rate of 
15 percent. When appellant failed to make any payments on the note, appellee 
filed suit on June 26, 1984. Appellant answered pro se.

[¶5.]     Appellant admitted 
partial liability on the note, but counterclaimed, alleging that the amount owed 
should be offset by damages resulting from appellee's negligence in failing to 
properly supervise the construction of the dam and reservoir. The matter was set 
for trial before the court to be held on December 18, 
1984.

[¶6.]     On November 29, 1984, 
appellant, having retained counsel, filed a motion for continuance. The motion 
was denied and trial was held as scheduled. Since appellant admitted partial 
liability on the note, the only matter to be tried was appellant's counterclaim 
against appellee in which he alleged negligence in appellee's supervision of the 
construction of the dam and reservoir. The court found for appellee on 
appellant's counterclaim and rendered judgment, finding:

"1. That Plaintiff [EIW] 
is entitled to Judgment against Defendant on Defendant's Counterclaim, and that 
the Horseshoe Reservoir was not improperly designed and constructed, the 
Horseshoe Dam does not leak, there was no negligence in designing or 
constructing the dam and reservoir, and the location of the reservoir basin was 
not unsuitable.

"2. That the Defendant 
has admitted owing to Plaintiff the sum of $60,860.07 together with interest at 
the rate of 15% per annum, and Defendant admits execution of the Promissory Note 
upon which the debt is based, having executed said Promissory Note and delivered 
it to Plaintiff on the 22nd day of September, 1983, and that Plaintiff is 
entitled to Judgment thereon.

"3. That the Plaintiff is 
entitled to Judgment against Defendant on the Promissory Note executed on 
September 22, 1983 and delivered to Plaintiff by Defendant for $60,860.07 
together with interest at 15% per annum from September 22, 1983 to December 19, 
1984 for the total sum of $72,165.04 and interest at the legal rate from the 
date hereof until satisfied.

"IT IS, THEREFORE, HEREBY 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that:

"1. The Plaintiff shall 
have Judgment against the Defendant on Defendant's Counterclaim and Defendant 
shall take nothing on the Counterclaim.

"2. The Plaintiff shall 
have Judgment against the Defendant in the amount of $72,165.04, representing 
principal and interest upon the Promissory Note admitted by Defendant and merged 
with this Judgment, together with interest thereon at the legal rate from the 
date hereof until satisfied."

I

[¶7.]     In appellant's first 
issue, he asks whether the court's judgment is clearly erroneous and unsupported 
by the evidence produced at trial. We have oft stated our applicable standards 
of review. On appeal, we accept the evidence of the prevailing party as true, 
leaving out entirely the consideration of evidence presented by the unsuccessful 
party in conflict therewith, giving every favorable inference which may fairly 
and reasonably be drawn from the evidence of the prevailing party. Matter of Abas, Wyo., 701 P.2d 1153 (1985); Stockton v. Sowerwine, Wyo., 690 P.2d 1202 (1984); City of Rock Springs v. Police Protection Association, 
Wyo., 610 P.2d 975 (1980). The trial court's findings of fact are presumed to be correct, and 
we will not disturb those findings unless inconsistent with the evidence, 
clearly erroneous or contrary to the great weight of the evidence. Doenz v. Garber, Wyo., 665 P.2d 932 (1983); and Seeley v. Estate of Seeley, Wyo., 
627 P.2d 1357 (1981).

[¶8.]     When those principles 
are applied to this case, we find there was ample evidence presented by 
appellee, as the prevailing party, which supports the district court's decision. 
While the evidence shows that appellee worked for appellant by preparing maps 
and topographic surveys and making application to the state engineer for a 
reservoir construction permit, it is clear that appellee did none of the actual 
construction work on the dam and reservoir. Nor did appellee supervise such 
construction. Appellant contracted with a third-party to build the dam and 
reservoir. This was done without consulting appellee. Appellee then performed 
compaction tests on the fill material used to build the dam. Nothing unusual was 
noted from the results of such tests, nor did appellant allege improper 
compaction testing by appellee.

[¶9.]     When water began 
surfacing below the dam, appellant claimed the dam was leaking. However, again 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to appellee as the prevailing 
party, there is no compelling evidence which proves the water appeared as a 
result of a leak in the dam. The water which surfaced was clear, containing no 
particulates as would likely be the case if the water were coming from the dam. 
The water did not appear until topsoil was removed extensively during 
construction of a golf course. Even if appellant were successful in proving with 
compelling evidence that the dam leaked, it would still be difficult to find any 
negligence on the part of appellee as causing such leak when appellee was not in 
charge of the supervision or construction of such dam. Appellant's own 
supervisor, Francis Smith, testified that he, not appellee, was in charge of 
construction supervision.

[¶10.]  Therefore, considering the overwhelming 
evidence in favor of the appellee, we conclude, as did the trial court, that 
there is no persuasive evidence to support appellant's counterclaim that 
appellee was negligent in any way. We find no error in the court's factual 
determination and are therefore obliged to uphold it.

II

[¶11.]  In appellant's second issue, he claims 
the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for continuance. Appellant 
based such motion on the following grounds:

"1. Defendant is unable 
without representation of counsel to adequately and completely protect his 
rights in the above captioned case.

"2. Defendant contacted 
Henry F. Bailey, Jr. on November 21, 1984, for purposes of representation, 
however, counsel has not yet had an opportunity to review pleadings on file or 
documents pertaining to the case, nor has counsel had an opportunity to contact 
witnesses in the case.

"3. In order to fully 
protect Defendant's rights and to adequately prepare for trial, counsel for 
Defendant needs additional time to prepare for trial and would request the 
Court's indulgence in granting such additional time."

[¶12.]  As the motion indicates, appellant moved 
for a continuance claiming he needed more time to prepare for trial. However, 
the trial date (December 18, 1984) was set on October 12, 1984. And as noted 
above, appellant did not contact his trial counsel until November 21, 1984. 
Appellant waited over a month after the trial date was set to obtain trial 
counsel.

[¶13.]  The granting of a continuance is a matter 
within the sound discretion of the trial court to be considered given the 
circumstances unique to each case. Tomash 
v. Evans, 704 P.2d 1296 No. 85-13, slip. op. (Wyo., 1985); and Bacon v. Carey Company, Wyo., 669 P.2d 533 
(1983). A party moving for a continuance must show good cause for doing so. § 
1-9-102, W.S. 1977. However, a trial court may not grant a continuance based on 
the mere whim, request or convenience of counsel without substantial factual or 
legal reason for doing so. Tomash v. 
Evans, supra; and Hays v. State, 
Wyo., 522 P.2d 1004 (1974).

[¶14.]  In this case, it is unfortunate that 
appellant did not contact his counsel sooner; nevertheless, a continuance is not 
to be granted based upon the mere inconvenience of counsel. Appellant's dilatory 
tactics ought not be rewarded. We find no error in the trial court's denial of 
appellant's motion for continuance.

[¶15.]  Affirmed.

.