Title: In re Worker's Compensation Claim of Cochran

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

In re Worker's Compensation Claim of Cochran1999 WY 182993 P.2d 320Case Number: 98-195Decided: 12/29/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming

IN 
THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF JOHN R. COCHRAN, AN

 

EMPLOYEE OF REIMAN CORPORATION: JOHN R. COCHRAN, 
Appellant (Petitioner),

 

v.

 

STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY 
AND COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellee (Respondent).

 

                                

W.R.A.P. 12.09(b) Certification  from the District Court 
of

Laramie County: The Honorable Edward L. Grant, 
Judge.

  

    George Santini of Ross, Ross 
& Santini, L.L.C., Cheyenne, WY.  Argument presented by Mr. Santini, 
representing appellant.

     
Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General; and Bernard P. Haggerty, Senior Assistant Attorney General. 
Argument presented by Mr. Haggerty, representing 
appellee.

 

    Before LEHMAN, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, JJ.

 

    LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

   
[¶1]      Appellant John Cochran appeals the 
denial of permanent partial disability benefits, contending that 80 percent of a 
pre-injury wage is not a "comparable wage" for purposes of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-405(h) (Lexis 1999). Relying on our recent decision in Adams v. State, ex 
rel. Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 975 P.2d 17 (Wyo. 1999), we conclude the hearing 
officer erred in determining that Cochran was earning a comparable wage and, 
therefore, reverse.

 

                               
ISSUES

 

  [¶2]      Cochran presents the following issues 
for review:

 

            1. Did the Office 
of Administrative Hearings err as a matter of law in determining that Cochran 
was not eligible for permanent 
partial disability benefits pursuant to § 27-14-405(h), W.S. 1977 (1995 
Repl.) because he had returned to 
work earning 80% of his pre-injury wage?

 

        
                
A. Is 80% of a pre-injury wage a "comparable wage" for purposes of § 
27-14-405(h), W.S. 1977 (1995 
Repl.)?

 

B. 
Should fringe benefits be included in comparable wage calculations for purposes 
of determining entitlement to permanent partial disability 
benefits?

 

C. 
Are the rules and regulations of the Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation 
Division defining a "comparable wage" as being 80% or more of pre-injury wages, 
arbitrary, capricious or in excess of the Division's 
authority?

 

  Appellee Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Division (Division) phrases the issue:

 

        
    The Employee 
returned to work at his pre-injury wage. The Employer laid him off eight months 
later, and he found another job 
paying eighty percent of his pre-injury wage.

 

        
                
A. Was the denial of permanent partial disability benefits in accordance 
with law?

 

                                
FACTS

 

  [¶3]      In April 1996, Cochran injured his left 
hand in a table saw accident while working as a carpenter for the Reiman 
Corporation (Reiman). Following his injury, Cochran returned to work doing light 
duty, earning his previous wage of ten dollars an hour with family health 
insurance and a pension plan. Approximately six months later, Cochran was released from light duty 
but retained permanent restrictions instructing him to avoid operating heavy 
equipment, tasks requiring the use of fine motor skills, or tasks involving 
excessive repetitive motions. Shortly thereafter, he was laid off when Reiman 
underwent a reduction in force.

 

  [¶4]      Because his injury caused permanent 
damage to his left hand, Cochran was unable to return to work as a carpenter. 
Currently Cochran is employed as a warehouse manager with Arrow Moving and 
Storage. His present position pays eight dollars an hour and provides for single 
health insurance, without a pension plan.

 

  [¶5]      Following an award of 14 percent 
permanent partial physical impairment, Cochran applied for permanent partial 
disability benefits. The Division rejected Cochran's request, stating that since 
he had returned to work earning a wage comparable to his pre-injury wage, he was 
not entitled to benefits. Cochran objected, and the matter was referred for a contested 
case hearing. At the hearing, the parties stipulated that the only contested 
issue was whether Cochran is, "because of the injury, unable to return to 
employment at a comparable or higher wage than the wage [he] was earning at the 
time of injury." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(h)(i).

  

  [¶6]      In February 1998, the Office of 
Administrative Hearings (OAH) held a hearing and ultimately denied Cochran's 
request for benefits, stating that Cochran was ineligible since he returned to 
work earning 80 percent of his pre-injury wage, a comparable amount. When 
determining Cochran's benefit eligibility, the hearing examiner did not include 
Cochran's fringe benefits, stating that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-403(j) (Michie 
1995 Cum.Supp.) indicates that fringe 
benefits are not to be used in the calculation. The examiner further reasoned 
that, even assuming it was proper to consider fringe benefits, Cochran failed to 
provide evidence of the value of these benefits and, thus, it was inappropriate 
to consider them. Cochran appealed this decision to the district court, which, 
on its own motion, certified the appeal to this court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
12.09.

 

                         
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

  [¶7]      We do not defer to an agency's 
conclusions of law, but will defer to the agency's findings of fact, if 
supported by the evidence. Nelson v. Sheridan Manor, 939 P.2d 252, 255 (Wyo. 
1997). "The interpretation and correct application of the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act is a question of law which is accorded plenary review. The agency's conclusion[s] of law can 
only be affirmed if they are in accordance with the law." Poll v. State, ex rel. 
Dep't of Employment, Div. of Workers' Safety & Compensation, 963 P.2d 977, 
980 (Wyo. 1998) (citations omitted); State, ex rel. Workers' Compensation Div. 
v. Gerdes, 951 P.2d 1170, 1173 (Wyo. 1997). Whether a post-injury wage is 
comparable to a pre-injury wage is a question of law. See Adams v. State, ex 
rel. Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 975 P.2d 17, 19-20 (Wyo. 
1999).

 

                             
DISCUSSION

 

  [¶8]      Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(h) 
(Lexis 1999), an injured employee who has been awarded permanent partial 
impairment benefits may apply for a permanent partial disability award 
if:

 

(i) The injured employee is because of the injury, 
unable to return to employment at a comparable or higher wage than the wage the 
employee was earning at the time of injury;

 

(ii) An application for permanent partial disability 
is filed not before three (3) months after the date of ascertainable loss or 
three (3) months before the last scheduled impairment payment, whichever occurs 
later, but in no event later than one (1) year following the later date; 
and

 

(iii) The employee has actively sought suitable work, 
considering the employee's health, education, training and 
experience.

 

  [¶9]      Initially, it is important to note that 
nowhere in the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act (Act) is the term "comparable 
wage" defined. However, we recently addressed what constitutes a comparable wage 
in Adams v. State, ex rel. Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 975 P.2d 17. 
There, the hearing examiner denied the 
employee's request for permanent partial disability benefits, finding that 
because the employee's post-injury wage was 89 percent of his pre-injury wage, 
the employee had returned to work at a comparable wage and, thus, failed to meet 
the requirements of § 27-14-405(h)(i). Id. at 18. In construing the meaning of 
the term "comparable," we reviewed the legislature's use of the term 
"comparable" in seventy-seven statutes, and held that the legislature intended 
that term to mean "substantially equal" or "equivalent." Adams, at 20. Applying 
this rule, we held that Adams' post-injury wage, which was 89 percent of his 
pre-injury wage, was not comparable. Id.

 

  [¶10] 
  Cochran's case, however, 
goes beyond Adams because the Division has subsequently adopted Wyoming Workers' 
Safety and Compensation Rules, Regulations and Fee Schedules, ch. 1, § 4(s) 
(Aug. 1997), which defines a comparable 
wage as "a wage of at least eighty percent (80%) of the wages paid for the 
worker's regular employment at the time of injury." Prior to his injury, Cochran 
earned ten dollars an hour; following injury, Cochran earned eight dollars an 
hour, or 80 percent of his former pay. In denying Cochran's request for 
benefits, the hearing examiner relied on this rule to find that Cochran was 
currently earning a wage comparable to 
what he earned prior to his injury.

 

  [¶11] 
  While the Division 
possesses the requisite authority to adopt rules and regulations to aid in the 
administration of the Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-802(a) (Michie 1995 
Cum.Supp.), that authority is naturally limited, and the Division lacks the 
power to legislate or to amend the Act. An agency's authority is restricted "by the often stated principle that an 
agency enjoys only those powers which the legislature has expressly conferred 
and the corollary rule of construction that statutes under which an agency 
purports to exercise a doubtful power must be strictly construed against the 
exercise of that power." Jackson v. State, ex rel. Workers' Compensation Div., 786 P.2d 874, 878 
(Wyo. 1990) (citing Hupp v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 715 P.2d 223, 225 (Wyo. 
1986); Tri-County Electric Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Gillette, 525 P.2d 3, 8-9 
(Wyo. 1974)). In accordance with our statutory interpretation in Adams, we hold 
that the Division's rule setting 80 
percent as a threshold of comparability is an improper attempt to amend § 
27-14-405(h)(i) and it, therefore, is without effect.

 

  [¶12] 
  Alternatively, the Division 
contends that since Cochran returned to work at Reiman after he was injured, 
earning his pre-injury wage, that he is capable of procuring employment earning 
a comparable wage. Cochran returned to work with permanent restrictions until he 
was terminated approximately six months later. Although the hearing examiner 
failed to make a finding whether Cochran's inability to return at a comparable 
wage was "because of the injury," the 
record reveals to our satisfaction that Cochran's injury prevents him from 
returning to employment at a comparable wage. Cochran injured his left hand in a 
table saw accident wherein his hand was drug across the top of the saw blade. As 
a result of the injury, Cochran mainly has use of only the last two fingers on 
his hand, has lost flexibility, and suffers from 50 percent loss of strength. 
According to the record, Cochran conducted an extensive job search following his 
termination from Reiman, including seeking employment from Reiman. Cochran's 
permanent physical limitations, however, prevent him from obtaining a job paying 
a wage comparable to his wage at Reiman.

 

                  
Consideration of Fringe Benefits

 

  [¶13] 
  Cochran argues that the 
OAH's decision should be vacated because the hearing examiner failed to include 
a comparison of his fringe benefits in the determination of the comparability of 
his wage. In light of our holding that Cochran's post-injury and pre-injury 
wages are not comparable, this is not the proper case to decide the propriety of including fringe benefits 
in the determination of whether an injured employee is able to return to 
employment at a comparable wage.

 

                             
CONCLUSION

 

  [¶14] 
  Adams makes clear that 
Cochran's post-injury wage, which is 80 percent of his pre-injury wage, is not 
comparable as a matter of law. Cochran, therefore, is entitled to benefits under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(h) (Lexis 1999). The hearing examiner's order 
denying benefits is reversed and remanded for determination of an appropriate award.