Title: Pamela K. Joerger Stephen v. Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd. Legal malpractice

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 36322 
 
 
PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN, 
 
       Plaintiff/Respondent/Cross-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD., DENNIS 
SALLAZ and SCOTT GATEWOOD, 
 
       Defendants/Appellants/Cross-   
       Respondents. 
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Boise, February 2011 Term 
 
2011 Opinion No. 26 
 
Filed: March 17, 2011 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, Ada County. Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin, District Judge. 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Gary L. Quigley, Meridian, for appellants. 
 
Clark & Associates, Boise, for respondent. Eric R. Clark argued. 
_____________________ 
 
J. JONES, Justice. 
 
This is an appeal from a legal malpractice judgment entered against attorney Scott 
Gatewood and the law firm of Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd. Appellants argue the district court erred 
in finding that professional malpractice had occurred. Both parties appeal the denial of their 
respective requests for attorney fees. We affirm. 
I. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
This case arises from a malpractice action brought by Pamela Joerger Stephen (“Pamela”) 
against the law firm of Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., Scott Gatewood (“Gatewood”) and Dennis 
Sallaz (“Sallaz”) (all three of the defendants are herein collectively referred to as “Appellants”). 
Pamela’s ex-husband, Gary Stephen (“Stephen”), filed for divorce in May of 2003. During the 
divorce proceedings, Stephen retained attorney Ann Shepard to represent him, and Pamela 
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retained Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd. Pamela claims the Appellants committed malpractice by 
failing to make inquiries into her mental status during the divorce proceedings and by failing to 
properly investigate, inform, and advise her regarding the fair market value of real property that 
was part of the settlement agreement, which resulted in her receiving less than her equitable 
share of the community property.  
The district court found that Gatewood was liable for malpractice in his representation of 
Pamela for (1) failing to inquire into Pamela’s mental status prior to trial or for failing to seek a 
continuance, and (2) failing to investigate, inform, and advise her with respect to the value of the 
couple’s Crescent Rim property. The court determined that Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., was also 
liable for the malpractice judgment.  
With regard to the first finding, the district court noted that Gatewood had many 
indications of Pamela’s alleged mental incapacity. Specifically, Pamela disclosed to Gatewood 
during a June 2003 meeting that she suffered from bi-polar disorder, that she had attempted 
suicide on two separate occasions, and that she was taking medications for her condition. The 
court also noted that Pamela was living in an unstable environment at the time of the divorce 
proceedings because she was residing in the couple’s Crescent Rim property with another man 
while Stephen made payments on the property. Pamela was also receiving income from the 
couple’s rental property at the time, but failed to make mortgage payments or pay other expenses 
on the rental property. Gatewood was also aware that Pamela had been involuntarily hospitalized 
approximately one week before the trial was scheduled to begin but “did not inquire of [Pamela] 
where she had been hospitalized, for what reason or by what doctor.” Stephen’s attorney also 
advised Gatewood that Pamela was using methamphetamine. Finally, the court noted that 
Gatewood had to personally visit Pamela’s residence on several occasions in an effort to speak to 
her. Gatewood even filed a motion to withdraw as Pamela’s attorney in July of 2004, identifying 
a “total communication breakdown” as the basis for the motion. Although the motion was 
ultimately withdrawn, Pamela testified that she received very little correspondence, court 
pleadings or discovery information from Gatewood during the divorce proceedings.  
On the second issue, the district court found that because Pamela was never informed of 
Stephen’s valuation of the couple’s Crescent Rim property, she undervalued the property for 
purposes of settlement. The parties exchanged discovery requests in September of 2003, 
including interrogatories seeking, among other things, the other’s valuation of the Crescent Rim 
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property. Stephen was the first to respond, and he disclosed the property value to be $500,000. 
Pamela testified that Gatewood never informed her of this valuation and Gatewood testified he 
could not recall if he had. Pamela subsequently valued the property at only $385,500. This final 
valuation was used in the couple’s final settlement agreement. There was also evidence that a 
judgment lien against the Crescent Rim property had been paid prior to trial, but the amount of 
the lien was nonetheless credited to Stephen in the settlement.  
On the first day of the divorce trial, the parties informed the district court that they had 
reached a proposed settlement agreement. When the court asked Pamela if she understood the 
agreement, Pamela responded that she was in agreement “as far as I know.” However, Gatewood 
testified that Pamela was “clear in her thoughts and understanding” at the time of the 
proceedings and that he “did not believe that she was impaired as a result of methamphetamine 
use and/or mental health issues.”  
In the subsequent malpractice action against Appellants, the court found that Gatewood 
breached duties owed to Pamela and imposed liability in the amount of $27,435.00 against 
Gatewood, personally, as well as against Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd. However, the district court 
declined to assess any personal liability against Sallaz because the court found that he had never 
provided any legal services to Pamela, nor had he acted in a supervisory capacity over 
Gatewood. The court made this finding despite Sallaz being named as an attorney in documents 
filed with the court during the divorce proceedings and despite Sallaz’s affiliation with Sallaz & 
Gatewood, Chtd.1 The court also awarded Pamela $5,359.49 in costs, but refused to award 
discretionary costs pertaining to the appointment of a guardian ad litem during the course of the 
malpractice action. Pamela and Sallaz both sought an award of attorney fees, but both requests 
were denied.  
On appeal, Appellants argue that the district court erred in its determination of the duties 
owed to Pamela, and contend that there was no evidence establishing a breach of any duties. 
They also argue that Pamela’s malpractice claim is barred by judicial estoppel and judgmental 
immunity, and that liability cannot be imposed upon a law firm. Pamela argues that the final 
damage award is in error, and that Sallaz should be personally liable for the malpractice 
                                                 
1 Pamela executed a fee agreement with Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd. on June 16, 2003, but the firm was not 
incorporated until September 9, 2003. Therefore, it is likely that Sallaz and Gatewood were operating as a general 
partnership at the time of entering into this agreement. 
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judgment. Both Sallaz and Pamela argue that the court erred in denying their request for attorney 
fees, and Pamela argues the court erred in denying her request for discretionary costs.  
II. 
Issues on Appeal 
I. 
Is the malpractice judgment against Gatewood supported by substantial evidence? 
 
II. 
Are Pamela’s incapacity claims barred by the doctrines of judicial estoppel and 
judgmental immunity? 
 
 
III. 
Can liability be imposed against Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd.? 
 
IV. 
Did the district court err in determining Sallaz was not personally liable? 
 
V. 
Did the district court err in calculating the damage award to Pamela?  
 
VI. 
Did the district court err in denying attorney fees to either Sallaz or Pamela? 
 
III. 
Analysis 
A. Standard of Review 
When reviewing a district court’s conclusions following a bench trial, this Court “is 
limited to ascertaining whether the evidence supports the findings of fact, and whether the 
findings of fact support the conclusions of law.” Borah v. McCandless, 147 Idaho 73, 77, 205 
P.3d 1209, 1213 (2009). This Court liberally construes the facts in favor of the district court’s 
decision because it is the province of the district court to weigh the evidence and determine the 
credibility of the witnesses. Id. Findings of fact will not be overturned if supported by 
substantial, albeit conflicting, evidence. Id. 
B. The District Court’s Finding that Gatewood Committed Legal Malpractice is 
Supported by Substantial Evidence. 
 
Appellants contend the district court erred in finding that Gatewood committed legal 
malpractice in his representation of Pamela. Specifically, they argue that the district court 
misapprehended the duty owed to Pamela as a client with a diminished capacity, and that there 
was no evidence to support the finding of breach in that regard. Additionally, they argue that 
Gatewood had no duty to investigate the value of the Crescent Rim property because there was 
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not a significant difference in the values provided by the parties, and because attorneys are 
permitted to rely on the valuations provided by their clients.2  
Pamela argues that Gatewood breached the duties he owed to her by failing to properly 
investigate, inform, and advise her as to the value of the Crescent Rim property, separate and 
apart from his breach for failing to investigate her diminished capacity. She argues that 
Gatewood never told her about the $500,000 valuation made by Stephen and that no competent 
attorney would have knowingly advised a client to provide a substantially lower valuation. 
Pamela also argues there was sufficient evidence to support the malpractice finding regarding her 
diminished capacity.  
The district court found that Gatewood breached duties he owed to Pamela by failing to 
investigate, inform, and advise her regarding the value of the Crescent Rim property when such a 
disparity existed between the valuations provided by the parties. The court found that 
Gatewood’s failure to inquire into Pamela’s mental state and to take appropriate protective 
measures also breached the duties he owed her. 
We affirm the district court’s finding that Gatewood committed legal malpractice by 
failing to investigate, inform, and advise Pamela regarding the value of the Crescent Rim 
property. Therefore, it is unnecessary to address the district court’s finding that Gatewood 
committed malpractice by failing to adequately inquire into Pamela’s alleged diminished 
capacity. For this reason, we also decline to address Appellants’ judicial estoppel and judgmental 
immunity arguments. 
A legal malpractice action is based on a combination of tort and contract theories. The 
attorney-client relationship is generally based on contract principles, while the negligence 
standard is based on tort principles. See Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 136, 90 P.3d 884, 
886 (2004).  
                                                 
2 Appellants also argue that Pamela cannot challenge a single aspect of her settlement agreement, specifically the 
valuation of the Crescent Rim property, without violating the rule of McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 551, 559, 82 
P.3d 833, 841 (2003). In that case, after a settlement agreement was stipulated to in court, the ex-wife learned that 
the judgment was void for lack of jurisdiction and sought to invalidate only the distribution of the railroad retirement 
pension pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4). Id. However, the Court ruled that to allow this would “permit her to unilaterally 
craft the division of the community property and debts. . . . She could not, however, affirm the decree with respect to 
the items awarded to her and seek only to set aside an item awarded to Paul.” Id. This case is distinguishable from 
McGrew because Pamela is not seeking to invalidate the settlement agreement, and is certainly not invoking Rule 
60(b)(4). Rather, she is using the undervaluation of the Crescent Rim property as a basis for a separate malpractice 
action against her attorney, which has no effect on the settlement agreement with her ex-husband. Therefore, 
McGrew is inapplicable to this case. 
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The elements of a legal malpractice action are: (a) the existence of an attorney-
client relationship; (b) the existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer; (c) failure 
to perform the duty; and (d) the negligence of the lawyer must have been a 
proximate cause of the damage to the client. 
 
Id. The burden of proving that the attorney failed to act with “proper skill and that damages 
resulted therefrom is on the plaintiff client and likewise, the burden is on the plaintiff to show 
that the negligence of the attorney was a proximate cause of the client’s damage.” Id. (internal 
citation omitted). 
“The existence of a duty of care is a question of law over which this Court exercises free 
review.” Jones v. Starnes, 150 Idaho 257, 260, 245 P.3d 1009, 1012 (2011). “An attorney’s duty 
arises out of the contract between the attorney and his or her client.” Harrigfeld, 140 Idaho at 
137, 90 P.3d at 887. In this case, Pamela retained Gatewood’s firm “to represent [her] interests in 
connection with a divorce and related matters.” A requisite component of a divorce action is the 
valuation of property making up the community estate. See generally McGrew, 139 Idaho at 559, 
82 P.3d at 841. Therefore, because Pamela retained the firm for assistance with her divorce 
proceedings, this representation implicitly included assistance with the valuation of the Crescent 
Rim home.  
In providing such assistance, Gatewood owed Pamela the duties of competent and 
diligent representation, as well as adequate communication. See Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct (I.R.P.C.) 1.1, 1.3, 1.4.3 See also Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232, 238, 178 P.3d 597, 
603 (2008). In order to provide competent representation, an attorney must use the “legal 
knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” 
I.R.P.C. 1.1 (emphasis added). To be adequately prepared and thorough, the attorney must make 
“inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem . . . .” Id., cmt. 5. 
Additionally, an attorney must be diligent in providing representation, and zealously pursue the 
client’s objectives as defined by the scope of the representation. See I.R.P.C. 1.3. Finally, in 
terms of communication, an attorney must keep the client informed about the matter for which 
the attorney was retained, and must also explain the matter to the client so that the client can 
make informed decisions. I.R.P.C. 1.4.  
                                                 
3 While the rules of professional conduct cannot be used as a basis to impose civil liability, see I.R.C.P., Scope, ¶ 20, 
they are informative of the standard of care that an attorney owes to his or her client. See Johnson v. Jones, 103 
Idaho 702, 705, 652 P.2d 650, 653 (1982) (using professional responsibility rules to identify the standard of care 
owed by an attorney acting under a conflict of interest). 
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There is substantial evidence in the record that Gatewood violated these duties in regard 
to the Crescent Rim property. Pamela testified, and Gatewood was unable to rebut, that she was 
never informed of Stephen’s initial $500,000 valuation of the property. Without this information, 
Pamela relied on an “old appraisal” to make her estimation of the property’s value, and 
ultimately provided a value that was over one-hundred-thousand dollars less than Stephen’s 
valuation. This does not appear to be an informed decision on Pamela’s behalf, as there is no 
rational explanation for allowing Pamela to undercut the value of the couple’s most valuable real 
property community asset, when Stephen had previously provided a higher valuation. Indeed, the 
discovery response containing the $500,000 valuation was submitted upon Stephen’s oath, 
making it difficult for him to later assert a lesser value. While it is ordinarily true that an attorney 
can accept the client’s valuation of property without performing an independent investigation 
thereof, an attorney in a divorce proceeding must also pursue the most equitable division of 
community assets for his or her client. Accepting Stephen’s proposed value, or making a 
minimal investigation into the value of the Crescent Rim property because Pamela provided him 
a substantially lower value, would have demonstrated the diligence and competence that is 
expected of an attorney in Gatewood’s position. At the very least, Gatewood was obligated to 
advise Pamela of Stephen’s higher valuation and discuss the legal implications of her proposing 
a lesser value. Instead, Gatewood failed to provide Pamela with information that was critical for 
her to make an informed decision.  
There is also evidence that Stephen was credited for a $28,000 judgment lien against the 
Crescent Rim property, when it had been paid off nearly two months before the settlement. 
Gatewood testified that he had no knowledge that the debt had been paid prior to settlement and 
further testified that, even if he had known, it would not have changed the settlement agreement 
because he believed Pamela was receiving adequate temporary maintenance. This justification 
does not embody the type of zealous representation that is expected of an attorney in reaching the 
most equitable property distribution in a divorce case, nor does it embody the type of 
thoroughness and investigation that would be expected of a competent attorney in Gatewood’s 
position.  
Because the district court’s finding that Gatewood breached his duties to Pamela by 
failing to investigate, inform, and advise her regarding the value of the Crescent Rim property is 
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supported by substantial, albeit conflicting, evidence, we affirm the district court’s holding that 
Gatewood committed legal malpractice in his representation of Pamela.  
C. Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., is Liable for Gatewood’s Malpractice. 
 
Appellants argue that Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., cannot be held liable for Gatewood’s 
malpractice because the entity is not licensed to practice law, as is “required” by I.C. § 5-219. 
They point to language stating that “professional malpractice,” as used in the statute, “refers to 
wrongful acts or omissions in the performance of professional services by any person, firm, 
association, entity or corporation licensed to perform such services under the law of the state of 
Idaho.” I.C. § 5-219(4). On the other hand, Pamela argues that liability is appropriate based on 
the plain language of I.C. § 30-1306. The district court determined that Gatewood had committed 
malpractice and that the firm of Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., in addition to Gatewood individually, 
was liable to Pamela in the amount of $27,435.00. 
In support of their argument that I.C. § 5-219 negates a claim for professional malpractice 
against an entity that is not licensed to perform the services in question, Appellants cite Owyhee 
County v. Rife, 100 Idaho 91, 593 P.2d 995 (1979). In that case, the Court considered whether 
the two-year statute of limitations in I.C. § 5-219(4) applied to accountants who were not at that 
time required to be licensed. Id. at 96, 593 P.2d at 1000. The Court determined that the statute 
did not apply to the accountants because they were unlicensed. Id. That did not mean, however, 
that they were not subject to a malpractice suit. It only meant that the longer four-year statute of 
limitations in either I.C. § 5-217 or I.C. § 5-224 applied. Id. Nothing in I.C. § 5-219 or in Rife 
immunizes a person or entity carrying on a profession from being sued for malpractice, just 
because the applicable professional standards do not require the particular person or entity to 
have a license. Statutes of limitation do not have a bearing on professional malpractice claims, 
other than to establish the time in which they must be brought. 
Idaho’s corporate code applies here and it is clear that a corporation is liable for the 
negligent or wrongful act of employees acting on behalf of the corporation. I.C. § 30-1304 
provides that a group of licensed individuals rendering the same professional service may 
organize for the purpose of forming a professional service corporation. I.C. § 30-1306 further 
provides that the corporation will be liable for the wrongful acts of its agents. “The corporation 
shall be liable up to the full value of its property for any negligent or wrongful acts or 
misconduct committed by any of its officers, shareholders, agents or employees while they are 
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engaged on behalf of the corporation in the rendering of professional services.” I.C. § 30-1306. 
Therefore, the district court correctly ruled that Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., is liable for 
Gatewood’s malpractice.4  
D. Pamela’s Argument Concerning Sallaz’s Personal Liability is Moot. 
Pamela argues on cross-appeal that the district court erred by failing to impose personal 
liability against Sallaz because the firm had not yet incorporated at the time Pamela executed the 
fee agreement and that, as a general partnership, Sallaz would be jointly liable for Gatewood’s 
malpractice. Appellants argue there is no basis to impose personal liability against Sallaz because 
he never formed an attorney-client relationship with Pamela. The district court determined that 
Pamela’s professional malpractice claim did not arise until after Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., had 
incorporated and, therefore, Sallaz was shielded from any personal liability. 
It was disclosed in the record, and confirmed in oral argument, that Pamela has already 
been paid the full amount of the judgment. Therefore, any ruling on this issue would have no 
practical effect. Thus, the issue is moot. Additionally, such a determination would require 
evidence of the law firm’s status at the time of executing the fee agreement and during the course 
of its subsequent representation of Pamela, including in particular whether or not the corporation 
assumed the obligations of the partnership, none of which is in the record. Therefore, this Court 
declines to address the issue. 
This Court may dismiss an appeal when it appears that the case involves only a 
moot question. A case becomes moot when the issues presented are no longer live 
or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. A case is moot if it 
presents no justiciable controversy and a judicial determination will have no 
practical effect upon the outcome.  
 
Goodson v. Nez Perce County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 133 Idaho 851, 853, 993 P.2d 614, 
616 (2000) (internal citations omitted). The same applies to a discrete issue in an appeal. The 
Court may nonetheless rule on a moot issue “(1) when there is the possibility of collateral legal 
consequences imposed on the person raising the issue; (2) when the challenged conduct is likely 
to evade judicial review and thus is capable of repetition; and (3) when an otherwise moot issue 
                                                 
4 There is insufficient evidence before this Court to determine whether Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., was acting in its 
partnership capacity, or in its corporate capacity, when entering into the fee agreement with, and subsequently 
providing representation for, Pamela. However, even if the firm was acting as a partnership, the firm would still be 
liable for Gatewood’s malpractice. See I.C. § 53-3-305(a). 
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raises concerns of substantial public interest.” Idaho Dep’t of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 150 
Idaho 103, 108, 244 P.3d 247, 252 (Ct. App. 2010) (internal citations omitted). 
In this case, a determination that Sallaz, in addition to Gatewood, is personally liable for 
the malpractice judgment would have “no practical effect upon the outcome” because the 
judgment has already been paid and satisfied. Therefore, there is no risk that Gatewood, or the 
firm, would not be able to pay the judgment. Additionally, there is no risk of repetition of harm 
and there are no public policy concerns at play that would warrant the application of the 
mootness exceptions. Indeed, the only effect of a determination of whether or not Sallaz is liable 
would be upon the district court’s denial of a fee award to Sallaz, i.e. if he is liable, denial of the 
fee was proper but, if he is not liable, the reverse may be the case. However, because we hold 
that neither party is entitled to attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3), there is no need to address 
the issue.  
E. The District Court Did Not Commit Error in its Assessment of Damages. 
Pamela also argues on cross-appeal that the court erred by reducing her $41,500 
malpractice damage award by $14,065. In the divorce proceedings, using the values employed in 
the property settlement agreement, Pamela was to receive $33,935 as her half of the net value of 
the community estate. Stephen did not have the funds to pay that amount in a lump sum at the 
time of settlement, so it was agreed that he would pay in monthly installments over a period of 
24 months. In exchange for allowing him to pay on a deferred basis, it was agreed that Stephen 
would pay $2,000 per month—a premium, presumably for loss of use of the money. Pamela 
claims her damages should include the premium amount for which she bargained, which 
represents the $14,065 reduction by the district court in the malpractice award.   
This Court reviews a district court’s determination of damages pursuant to a clearly 
erroneous standard. See I.R.C.P. 52(a). See also Young v. Scott, 108 Idaho 506, 510, 700 P.2d 
128, 132 (Ct. App. 1985). In this case, the district court determined that Gatewood’s negligence 
caused Pamela to value the Crescent Rim property at $385,000, when the actual fair market 
value was $440,000—a difference of $55,000. Additionally, the district court found that 
Gatewood’s failure to take into account the payoff of the $28,000 judgment lien against the 
property increased the value of the community estate by an additional $28,000. Therefore, 
Gatewood’s breach caused $83,000 in total damages, entitling Pamela to recover $41,500 (one-
half of the community’s increased net value). However, the court determined that Pamela had 
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already been paid $14,065 pursuant to the stipulated settlement agreement, such that her 
malpractice award must be reduced to avoid double payment. The district court reasoned that 
such payments exceeded her portion of the net value of the community estate by $14,065 and, 
therefore, reduced her malpractice damages to $27,435.  
The court declined to grant Pamela the premium she negotiated on the amount Stephen 
owed her in the divorce settlement. However, the court did award pre-judgment interest on the 
additional amount that it determined Pamela should have received in the divorce. This 
determination of damages is not clearly erroneous and, therefore, the district court’s award is 
affirmed. 
F. Neither Party is Entitled to Attorney Fees Under I.C. § 12-120(3). 
Sallaz argues the district court erred in denying him attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-
120(3) because attorney malpractice cases have been determined to be commercial transactions 
within the meaning of the statute,5 and because the district court erred in not holding him to be 
the prevailing party. Pamela argues that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Sallaz’s request because she was the overall prevailing party. We hold that neither party is 
entitled to attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) because neither party made an appropriate fee 
request under that statute in the district court. 
It is oft repeated by this Court that, “If the party is claiming that a statute provides 
authority for an award of attorney fees, the party must cite to the statute and, if applicable, the 
specific subsection of the statute upon which the party relies.” Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 
364, 369, 79 P.3d 723, 728 (2003). We continued: 
For example, if the party seeks an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code §12-
120(3) on the ground that the case is an action to recover in a commercial 
transaction, the party should, to the extent necessary, provide facts, authority, and 
argument supporting the claim that the case involves a “commercial transaction” 
and that such transaction is the gravamen of the lawsuit. 
 
Id. at 369-70, 79 P.3d at 728-29 (2003). Neither party paid heed to this holding in district court. 
                                                 
5 In connection with this argument, Sallaz cites City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629 (2009) 
wherein we held that, “The commercial transaction ground in I.C. § 12-120(3) neither prohibits a fee award for a 
commercial transaction that involves tortious conduct, nor does it require that there be a contract.” Id. at 665, 201 
P.3d at 638. That case involved a professional malpractice claim arising out of what appeared to be a commercial 
transaction. We noted that a fee award might be appropriate in such a case. Id. However, we need not determine 
whether this case involved a commercial transaction, nor whether the judge erred by failing to find Sallaz to be the 
prevailing party. A requisite for obtaining a fee award is to make a proper request therefore, which did not happen in 
this case.  
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Pamela failed to request attorney fees pursuant to any provision of I.C. § 12-120. 
Therefore, she was not entitled to a fee award under that section. In his fee request, Sallaz got a 
little closer to the mark but did not go far enough. In his motion for an award of fees, he cited 
I.C. §§ 12-120 and 12-121. He did not appeal the denial of fees under I.C. § 12-121 and did not 
identify the specific provision of I.C. § 12-120 pursuant to which he sought fees. In his 
memorandum of costs and fees, he identified I.C. § 12-121, I.C. § 12-123, and several civil 
procedure rules in support of his fee request. He did hint at I.C. § 12-120(3), stating “[p]ursuant 
to Rule 54(e)(3), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as Idaho Code § 12-120(3), I hereby 
state that the total amount of attorney’s fees incurred by Defendant . . .” However, the document 
does not disclose whether he purports to seek fees based on a contract or on the commercial 
transaction ground. Thus, the fee request was deficient and the district court properly denied his 
fee request, albeit for other reasons.  
G. Pamela is Not Entitled to Discretionary Costs. 
Pamela argues the district court erred in failing to award her discretionary costs relating 
to the appointment of a guardian ad litem in the malpractice case. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(d)(1)(D) provides that a court may award discretionary costs where they are demonstrated to 
be “necessary and exceptional.” However, all requests for costs must be supported by an 
itemized memorandum filed no later than 14 days after the entry of judgment. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5). 
The judgment was entered in this case on December 1, 2008, and as of February 9, 2009, 
Pamela’s request for discretionary costs was not supported by an itemization of such costs. 
Although Pamela claims to have subsequently filed such an itemization, in order to meet the 
timeline set forth in the rule, this itemization had to be filed no later than December 15, 2008—
14 days after the December 1, 2008, judgment—in order to be timely. Because Pamela’s claim 
for discretionary costs was not timely made, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying her request.   
H. Attorney Fees on Appeal. 
Both parties request an award of attorney fees on appeal. However, neither party can be 
characterized as the prevailing party in this case, both parties having prevailed and lost in about 
equal proportions.  
 
 
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IV. 
Conclusion 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. We decline to award costs and attorney 
fees to any of the parties on appeal.  
 
 
Chief Justice EISMANN, and Justices BURDICK, W. JONES and HORTON CONCUR.