Title: City of Cheyenne v. Huitt

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

City of Cheyenne v. Huitt1993 WY 7844 P.2d 1102Case Number: 91-259Decided: 01/12/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
 

The CITY OF 
CHEYENNE, a Municipal 
Corporation, Charles H. Garey, an Individual,

Petitioners 
(Defendants),

v.

In the Matter of Patricia 
E. HUITT and Douglas G. Madison, as Personal Representatives for the Estate of 
Steven L. Huitt, deceased, and on behalf of Patricia Huitt, individually, Ericka 
Stephenson, individually, Joseph Huitt, individually, Wayne Huitt, and Sheila 
Huitt, individually,

Respondents 
(Plaintiffs).

 
 

Appeal from First 
Judicial District Court, Laramie 
County 

Rebecca A. Lewis 
of Hirst & Applegate, Cheyenne, for petitioners.

Rhonda S. 
Woodard of Burke, Woodard & Bishop, Cheyenne, for respondents.

Before URBIGKIT, C.J., 
THOMAS, CARDINE and GOLDEN, JJ., and ROONEY, J., (Retired).

ROONEY, Justice 
(Retired).

[¶1]      A Writ of 
Certiorari was issued by this court to the First Judicial District Court, 
Laramie 
County, upon petition of the 
City of Cheyenne and Charles Gary (City) 
for the purpose of reviewing the following issue:

"Is a city fire 
department a `public utility and service' within the meaning of Wyoming Statute 
Section 1-39-108 such that it is exempted from the immunity granted by Wyoming 
Statute Section 1-39-104?"

The district 
court had previously denied petitioners' Motion for a Summary Judgment, which 
motion was premised upon a claim of immunity, and it had previously denied 
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Summary Judgment and Entry 
of Judgment, which was premised upon the same claim.

[¶2]      Respondents 
contend the City did not enjoy immunity under Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-104 (1988) 
because that immunity was exempted by Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-108 or Wyo. Stat. § 
1-39-106.1 We find to the contrary and reverse 
the actions of the district court with reference to a summary judgment, and we 
remand this matter with direction to enter a summary judgment in favor of the 
City.

[¶3]      Steven Huitt, an 
Airman stationed at F.E. Warren Air Force Base, was assigned as a firefighter to 
the Base Fire Department. On April 
21, 1988, he was involved, along 
with other firefighters from the United States Air Force and the City, in a 
joint firefighter training exercise on the Base. The exercise involved the 
burning of a building on the Base. During the exercise, Steven Huitt entered the 
building, where he died. Respondents are his relatives and the personal 
representative for his estate. They brought this action alleging negligence on 
the part of the City.2 Since a denial of a Motion for 
Summary Judgment without more is not normally an appealable final order, the 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari was filed.

[¶4]      Wyo. Stat. § 
1-39-104 (part of the Governmental Claims Act, Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-101 et seq.) 
provides immunity to governmental entities and to employees thereof acting in 
the scope of their employment for any tort except those specifically waived by 
the Act. It is a "close ended tort claims act." City of 
Laramie v. Facer, 814 P.2d 268 
(Wyo. 1991); Gibson v. State 
Through Department of Revenue and Taxation, 811 P.2d 726 
(Wyo. 1991).

Wyo. Stat. § 
1-39-108

[¶5]      Respondents 
contend that the waiver of immunity contained in Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-108(a) exists 
in this case. That section provides:

"A governmental entity is 
liable for damages resulting from bodily injury, wrongful death or property 
damage caused by the negligence of public employees while acting within the 
scope of their duties in the operation of public utilities and services 
including gas, electricity, water, solid or liquid waste collection or disposal, 
heating and ground transportation."

[¶6]      The City contends 
that firefighting is not an "operation of public utilities and services 
including gas, electricity, water, solid or liquid waste collection or disposal, 
heating and ground transportation" and is, therefore, not within the waiver of 
immunity contained in Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-108. Respondents contend that, although 
not specified in the statute, firefighting is a public utility and service for 
which immunity is waived by the statute.

[¶7]      Wyo. Stat. § 
1-39-108 is "clear and unambiguous." Gibson, 811 P.2d  at 728. Therefore, we will 
not resort to rules of statutory construction and the words of the statute will 
be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Soles v. State, 809 P.2d 772 
(Wyo. 1991); 
Campbell v. State, 709 P.2d 425 
(Wyo. 1985); State Board of 
Equalization v. Tenneco Oil Co., 694 P.2d 97 (Wyo. 1985); Wallis v. Bosler, 
70 Wyo. 129, 246 P.2d 771 
(1952). We "will not enlarge, stretch, expand or extend a statute to matters not 
falling within its express provisions." Lo Sasso v. Braun, 386 P.2d 630, 632 
(Wyo. 1963). Where a statute 
enumerates the subjects or things on which it is to operate, or the persons 
affected, or forbids certain things, it is to be construed as excluding from its 
effect all those not expressly mentioned under the rule of expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius. Town of Pine Bluffs v. State Board of 
Equalization, 79 Wyo. 262, 333 P.2d 700 
(1958).

[¶8]      In Gibson, 811 P.2d 726 and Worden v. Village Homes, 821 P.2d 1291 
(Wyo. 1991), we held that the 
immunity waived by Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-108 is for the services enumerated in the 
statute.

[¶9]      If we would 
accept respondents' contention that firefighting is included among the 
governmental operations for which immunity is waived by Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-108, 
although not so specified therein, the same could also be true for all other 
governmental operations. The legislature, then, would have done a useless thing 
in specifying certain operations in the statute for which immunity is waived. 
Further, should we accept such contention, the legislature would also have done 
a useless thing in providing exceptions to immunity in other statutes contained 
in the Act, e.g., uses of motor vehicles, aircraft and watercraft in Wyo. Stat. 
1-39-105 (1988); for operation of a building, recreation area or public park in 
Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-106; or for peace officers in Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-112 
(1988).

[¶10]   We have a duty to make sense out of 
the statutes if at all possible. Mauler v. Titus, 697 P.2d 303 
(Wyo. 1985). They should not 
be construed to be meaningless but should be given a reasonable and practical 
construction. Id.; State Board of 
Equalization v. Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc., 611 P.2d 805 
(Wyo. 1980). The meaning of a 
statute should be ascertained as nearly as possible in the language of the 
statute itself. Department of Revenue and Taxation of State of 
Wyoming v. 
Hamilton, 743 P.2d 877 
(Wyo. 1987); In re Adoption of 
MM, 652 P.2d 974 (Wyo. 1982); Department of 
Revenue and Taxation v. Irvine, 589 P.2d 1295 
(Wyo. 1979); Johnson v. 
Safeway Stores, Inc., 568 P.2d 908 (Wyo. 1977).

[¶11]   Accordingly, since the negligence 
of firefighters is not specified in Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-108 as that for which 
immunity is waived, the defense of immunity under that section is valid in this 
action.

Wyo. Stat. § 
1-39-106

[¶12]   Respondents contend that the waiver 
of immunity contained in Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-106 exists in this case. That section 
provides:

"A governmental entity is 
liable for damages resulting from bodily injury, wrongful death or property 
damage caused by the negligence of public employees while acting within the 
scope of their duties in the operation or maintenance of any building, 
recreation area or public park."

[¶13]   The plain and ordinary meaning of 
the words "operation or maintenance of any building" does not encompass the 
deliberate destruction of it. In the context of the Act, the operation of a 
building is not the same as an operation on a building, and while the 
maintenance of a building is that done on or to a building, that done under 
maintenance is just the opposite of the destruction of it.

[¶14]   The circumstances here, with 
reference to the building, were obviously not those for which the legislature 
intended to waive immunity in enacting Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-106. The defense of 
immunity under that section is valid in this action.

[¶15]   Reversed and remanded with 
instructions.

CARDINE, J., files a dissenting 
opinion.

CARDINE, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶16]   I would affirm the denial of 
summary judgment. A building was here maintained for the purpose of training 
firefighters. In the usual course of using a building for training, the building 
will be set afire, the fire put out, the building set afire again, the fire 
extinguished, and on and on. Here the building was destroyed. But that should 
make no difference in the outcome. I would hold that the application of W.S. 
1-39-106 results in a waiver of immunity and would affirm the trial court's 
denial of summary judgment.

 

Footnotes

 

 1 Although 
certiorari was requested and granted only with reference to the applicability of 
Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-108, that of Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-106 was argued and acted upon 
in the district court (decided favorable to the City), and it was briefed by the 
parties in this court. Under the circumstances of this case, we will address it 
in a summary fashion.

2 The record does not 
reflect an effort by either party to join the Air Force in this 
action.