Title: State v. Ninham

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2011 WI 33 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP1139 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Omer Ninham, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2009 WI App 64 
Reported at: 316 Wis. 2d 776, 767 N.W.2d 326 
(Ct. App. 2009-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 20, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 5, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Brown   
 
JUDGE: 
John D. McKay 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Frank M. Tuerkheimer of Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., and Bryan 
Stevenson of Equal Justice Initiative, and oral argument by 
Bryan Stevenson. 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Sally 
L. Wellman, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
Amicus curiae briefs were filed on behalf of Legal 
Assistance to Institutionalized Persons Project by Byron C. 
Lichstein and the Frank J. Remington Center, Madison, Counsel 
for Wisconsin Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Robert 
R. Henak, Jake L. Remington and Henak Law Office, S.C., 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin Psychiatric Association and the Wisconsin 
Psychological Association by G. Michael Halfenger, Linda M. 
Annoye, Kellen C. Kasper and Foley & Lardner, LLP, Milwaukee, 
and Wisconsin Council on Children and Families by Sarah A. Huck, 
 
 
2
Christopher R. Bub and Reinhart Boerner Van Deuren, S.C., 
Milwaukee. 
 
 
 
2011 WI 33
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2008AP1139 
(L.C. No. 
1999CF523) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Omer Ninham, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 20, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals, State v. Ninham, 
2009 WI App 64, 316 Wis. 2d 776, 767 N.W.2d 326, which affirmed 
an order of the Brown County Circuit Court1 denying the 
defendant's post-conviction motion for sentencing relief under 
Wis. Stat. § 974.06 (2007-08).2   
¶2 
A jury convicted the defendant Omer Ninham (Ninham) of 
first-degree intentional homicide and physical abuse of a child 
                                                 
1 The Honorable John D. McKay presided. 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
2 
 
for the death of 13-year-old Zong Vang (Vang).  Ninham was 14 
years old at the time of the offense.  The circuit court 
sentenced Ninham to life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole.3   
¶3 
Ninham mounts a categorical constitutional challenge, 
arguing that sentencing a 14-year-old to life imprisonment 
without parole is cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 6 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  In the alternative, 
Ninham seeks sentence modification on the grounds that (1) his 
sentence is unduly harsh and excessive; (2) new scientific 
research regarding adolescent brain development constitutes a 
new factor that frustrates the purpose of the sentence; and (3) 
the circuit court relied on an improper factor when imposing the 
sentence.  We disagree with Ninham on all four grounds, and 
accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
¶4 
First, we hold that sentencing a 14-year-old to life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole for committing 
intentional homicide is not categorically unconstitutional.  We 
arrive at our holding by applying the two-step approach employed 
by the United States Supreme Court, most recently in Graham v. 
                                                 
3 On March 24, 2000, a jury found Ninham guilty of first-
degree intentional homicide and physical abuse of a child.  The 
crimes were committed on September 24, 1998, when Ninham was 14 
years and 10 months old.  Ninham was 16 years and 4 months old 
when he was convicted of the crimes.  On June 29, 2000, when 
Ninham was sentenced for his conviction, he was 16 years and 7 
months old. 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
3 
 
Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).  First, we conclude that Ninham 
has failed to demonstrate that there is a national consensus 
against sentencing a 14-year-old to life imprisonment without 
parole when the crime is intentional homicide.  Second, we 
conclude in the exercise of our own independent judgment that 
the punishment is not categorically unconstitutional. 
¶5 
In regard to Ninham's second argument, we conclude 
that his sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility 
of parole is not unduly harsh and excessive.  Under the 
circumstances of this case, Ninham's punishment is severe, but 
it is not disproportionately so. 
¶6 
Third, we conclude that Ninham has not demonstrated by 
clear and convincing evidence that the scientific research on 
adolescent brain development to which he refers constitutes a 
"new factor."  While the studies themselves may not have been in 
existence at the time of Ninham's sentencing, the conclusions 
they reached were widely reported. 
¶7 
Fourth, we conclude that Ninham has not demonstrated 
by clear and convincing evidence that the circuit court actually 
relied upon the religious beliefs of Vang's family when imposing 
Ninham's sentence.   
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶8 
We 
describe 
the 
facts 
of 
this 
case 
with 
an 
understanding that this horrific and senseless crime cannot 
adequately be reduced into words.  The terror experienced by the 
victim and the hurt suffered by his family and friends is, in a 
word, unimaginable. 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
4 
 
¶9 
On September 24, 1998, around dusk, 13-year-old Vang 
was bicycling home along Webster Avenue in Green Bay, Wisconsin.  
Vang's older brother had sent Vang to the grocery store for 
tomatoes.  Vang was returning home on his bicycle, carrying a 
plastic grocery bag filled with tomatoes, when he was approached 
by five juveniles: 14-year-old Ninham, 13-year-old Richard 
Crapeau (Crapeau), 13-year-old Jeffrey P., 14-year-old Amanda 
G., and 14-year-old Christin J. 
¶10 Ninham and the other four juveniles did not know or 
recognize Vang.  Moreover, by all accounts, Vang never said or 
did anything to provoke the five juveniles.  Rather, at the 
time, Crapeau was upset with his mother and "wanted to fight or 
see a fight."  Consequently, Crapeau said to Ninham, "Let's mess 
with this kid," and Ninham responded, "'I got your back,' 
meaning he would back [Crapeau] up in a fight." 
¶11 Ninham and Crapeau began by verbally taunting Vang, 
while the other three juveniles "egg[ed]" them on.  Ninham and 
Crapeau's assaults escalated into physical attacks.  Crapeau 
bumped into Vang's shoulder and yanked his bicycle away from 
him.  Crapeau also grabbed Vang's grocery bag out of his hands 
and threw it in the direction of St. Vincent's Hospital, located 
along the same street.  When Vang asked for his bicycle back, 
Ninham punched Vang, knocking him down.  
¶12 Vang got up and started running towards the nearby St. 
Vincent's Hospital parking ramp.  All five juveniles chased 
after Vang, eventually catching up to him on the top, or fifth 
floor, of the parking ramp.  When they caught up to him, Crapeau 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
5 
 
punched Vang in the face.  Vang repeatedly asked why they were 
trying to hurt him and pleaded with them to leave him alone.  
Instead, Ninham and Crapeau began pushing Vang back and forth 
between them, in a game Jeffrey P. referred to as "chicken."  
Ninham punched Vang in the chest as he pushed him back and 
forth.  
¶13 Ninham then pinned Vang by his wrists against the 
parking ramp's concrete wall.  While Vang squirmed to get out of 
Ninham's grasp, Crapeau again punched Vang in the face.  
According to Crapeau, Vang was crying and screaming, "'Let me 
go.'"   
¶14 With Ninham still holding Vang by his wrists, Crapeau 
grabbed Vang's ankles.  Ninham and Crapeau then began swinging 
Vang back and forth out over the parking ramp's concrete wall——a 
drop that measured nearly 45 feet to the ground.  Vang was 
crying and screaming, begging Ninham and Crapeau not to drop 
him.  While swinging Vang out over the wall, Crapeau let go of 
Vang's feet and told Ninham to "[d]rop him."  Ninham let go of 
Vang's wrists, and in Crapeau's words, Vang "just sailed out 
over the wall." 
¶15 At the same time, approximately 8:00 p.m., bystander 
Steven Heraly was in his vehicle exiting the St. Vincent's 
Hospital parking ramp when he heard what sounded like a "bag of 
wet cement hitting the pavement." 
¶16 Vang landed on his back on the parking ramp's paved 
exit lane, 12 feet from the base of the ramp.   
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
6 
 
¶17 Rescue personnel, dispatched at 8:03 p.m., detected a 
faint pulse from Vang.  Vang was transported to St. Vincent's 
Hospital where physicians were unable to revive him. 
¶18 An autopsy revealed that Vang suffered a blunt impact 
to his head and trunk and died from craniocerebral trauma due to 
a fall from height. 
¶19 Ninham and the other four juveniles never checked on 
Vang's condition and instead ran from the scene.  Still, the 
Green Bay Police Department was able to focus its investigation 
on the five juveniles after some of them, in particular, Jeffrey 
P. and Amanda G., indicated to relatives and police that they 
knew who was responsible for Vang's death.   
¶20 In his statement to police, Jeffrey P. described how 
Ninham stood for several seconds looking over the edge of the 
wall at Vang below.  Ninham then looked at Jeffrey P. and said, 
"Don't say nothing.  Better not say shit." 
II. PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶21 On June 14, 1999, Ninham was charged with first-degree 
intentional homicide in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.01(1) 
(1997-98) and physical abuse of a child contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.03(2)(b) (1997-98), both as a party to a crime under Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.05 
(1997-98).4 
 
The 
charge 
of 
first-degree 
                                                 
4 The State charged Crapeau with the same offenses, but he 
was tried separately.  Crapeau's case is not before us. 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
7 
 
intentional homicide subjected Ninham to the jurisdiction of 
criminal court.  See Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1)(am) (1997-98).5 
¶22 On 
October 
13, 
1999, 
prior 
to 
trial 
on 
the 
aforementioned charges, the State charged Ninham with one count 
of threat to a judge in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.203(2) 
(1999-00) and three counts of intimidation of a witness in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.43(3) (1999-00).  The complaint 
alleged that while Ninham was detained in Brown County's 
juvenile detention facility, he threatened the life of Judge 
Richard J. Dietz, the circuit court judge then presiding over 
Ninham's case.  The complaint further alleged that upon learning 
of the other juveniles' statements to police, Ninham threatened 
to conduct a "drive by" of Jeffrey P.'s house, to "rape and 
kill" Amanda G., and to arrange for the killing of Crapeau's 
sister. 
¶23 On the initial charges of first-degree intentional 
homicide and physical abuse of a child, Ninham's case proceeded 
to a four-day jury trial.  At trial, Ninham's defense was that 
he was not there on the parking ramp on the evening of September 
24, 1998, and even if he was, he did not intend to drop Vang 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 938.183(1)(am) (1997-98) provides, in 
relevant part, that "courts of criminal jurisdiction have 
exclusive original jurisdiction over . . . (am) [a] juvenile who 
is alleged to have attempted or committed a violation of 
s. 940.01 . . . on or after the juvenile's 10th birthday, but 
before the juvenile's 15th birthday." 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
8 
 
from the edge.6  On March 24, 2000, the jury convicted Ninham of 
both first-degree intentional homicide and physical abuse of a 
child. 
                                                 
6 Ninham provided varying statements to police regarding his 
involvement with and knowledge of Vang's death.  Ninham first 
claimed that he and Vang were friends and had been "hoody-
hopping," or stealing hood ornaments, together on the parking 
ramp when two people in a Cadillac chased them, thinking Ninham 
and Vang stole their hood ornament.  Ninham told police that 
those two people might have killed Vang.  Ninham later retracted 
that statement, admitting it was not true.  Ninham then told 
police that he was in the area of St. Vincent's Hospital on 
September 24, 1998, because he wanted to visit his brother's 
baby.  Ninham claimed, however, that he never made it inside the 
hospital and instead went over to his sister's house, where he 
drank heavily and was picked up for underage drinking and put 
into "detox."  Ultimately, Ninham denied being anywhere near the 
St. Vincent's Hospital parking ramp on September 24, 1998. 
In his closing argument, however, Ninham's counsel did not 
deny that Ninham was on the parking ramp with Vang and actually 
conceded the charge of physical abuse of a child:  
[I]n terms of the abuse of a child, I'm not going to 
argue that.  I think obviously there was some pushing 
back and forth, some punching going on.  I don't know 
specifically when.  There's been a little bit of 
disagreement as to who hit who and so forth, but I 
think that's a given.  I think he helped in that.  I 
think Omer participated in that.   
But the question, and the tough question, is 
whether or not Omer Ninham formed the intent at age 14 
to, in fact——in fact, kill Zong Vang.  And it is our 
position, and I can't state it more strongly, that he 
did not, in fact, form that intent.  Whether Ricky 
Crapeau did or not is not necessary, but he did not.  
Nor did he know what Ricky Crapeau was going to do.   
Bad judgment?  Bad juvenile?  Bad a lot of 
things.  But I don't think you can saddle Omer Ninham 
at this point from the facts and evidence on this 
record with intentional homicide. 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
9 
 
¶24 The circuit court conducted a sentencing hearing on 
June 29, 2000.  At the outset of the hearing, the State moved to 
dismiss the single count of threat to a judge and three counts 
of intimidation of a witness but asked that all four charges be 
read in.7  The circuit court granted the State's motion. 
¶25 The pre-sentence investigation (PSI) revealed that 
Ninham, by then 16 years old, continued to deny any involvement 
in Vang's homicide.  Furthermore, the PSI explained that "[b]y 
all accounts, [] Ninham emanates from an extremely dysfunctional 
family structure," in which both of his parents and several of 
his siblings engage in severe substance abuse and domestic 
violence.  The PSI described Ninham as a "serious substance 
abuser" who snorted cocaine on a weekly basis and, since grade 
school, drank alcohol every day, often alone, and usually to the 
point of unconsciousness.  The PSI also revealed that Ninham, a 
member of the Menominee Indian Tribe, claimed to have a newfound 
interest in Native American spirituality. 
¶26 In addition, the PSI described the Vang family as 
devastated by the loss of their son and brother.  Vang's parents 
indicated that they fled Laos and Thailand because they believed 
that the United States would be a safer and more prosperous 
                                                 
7 See Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1g)(b) (1999-00):  
"Read–in crime" means any crime that is uncharged 
or that is dismissed as part of a plea agreement, that 
the defendant agrees to be considered by the court at 
the time of sentencing and that the court considers at 
the time of sentencing the defendant for the crime for 
which the defendant was convicted. 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
10 
 
country to raise their children; however, according to the 
Vangs, they fled evil only to discover it in a different place.  
Vang's parents further expressed that they had lost faith in the 
basic goodness of people and that their remaining children are 
fearful of leaving the safety of their home. 
¶27 Relevant to this case, at the sentencing hearing, 
Vang's brother, Seng Say Vang (Seng Say), gave a statement on 
behalf of Vang's family and friends.  Seng Say asked the circuit 
court to impose on Ninham the maximum sentence of life 
imprisonment without parole, "the same brutal and merciless 
ultimatum as [Ninham] had given to Zong on September 24th, 
1998."  Seng Say then articulated to the circuit court a belief 
held by his family's Hmong culture:  
In our Hmong culture we believe that the spirit 
of a murdered person cannot be set free to go in peace 
until 
the 
perpetrators 
be 
brought 
to 
justice.  
Therefore, we ask the Court, who is the only one to 
have the power to set free the spirit of our beloved 
son, brother, and friend, Zong, to go in peace by 
bringing Omer Ninham and his accomplices to justice. 
¶28 Ninham also spoke at sentencing.  He told the circuit 
court that he was sorry about Vang's death, but "[t]here wasn't 
nothing I could do.  I wasn't there.  I'm going to keep saying 
that until the day I die.  I was not there, and that's the 
honest truth." 
¶29 As to the count of first-degree intentional homicide, 
the circuit court sentenced Ninham to life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole.  For the count of physical abuse of a 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
11 
 
child, the circuit court sentenced Ninham to five years 
imprisonment, consecutive to the life sentence.   
¶30 In imposing Ninham's sentence, the circuit court 
considered three primary factors: the gravity of the offense, 
the character of the offender, and the need to protect the 
public.  First, the circuit court regarded the gravity of the 
offense as "beyond description" and indisputably "horrific."  
The 
circuit 
court 
noted 
that 
the 
offense 
has 
had 
an 
indescribable impact on Vang's family and friends and on the 
Green Bay community.  Second, concerning the character of the 
offender, the circuit court "concede[d] for the sake of 
discussion that Omer Ninham is a child" but nevertheless 
described Ninham as "a frightening young man." The circuit court 
acknowledged that Ninham derives from a dysfunctional family but 
refused to let that excuse Ninham's conduct, explaining that 
Ninham is "a child of the street who knew what he was 
doing . . . ."  Third, the circuit court reasoned that the 
community needs to be protected from Ninham: "Society needs to 
know, and especially this community needs to know, that you can 
send your child to the grocery store and expect to see him 
again."   
¶31 In addition, the circuit court expressed amazement at 
the fact that Ninham continued to deny even being there on the 
evening of Vang's death.  The circuit court recognized that 
alcohol was nearly a daily part of Ninham's existence but 
declined to view that as an excuse for his behavior, finding 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
12 
 
that Ninham chose not to take advantage of the opportunities he 
had to turn away from negative influences. 
¶32 Finally, the circuit court commented on what it deemed 
"an interesting clash of cultures":  
I find it incredibly interesting and somewhat 
significant that not only am I being asked to impose a 
sentence in this matter, which is my obligation and my 
responsibility, but I'm being asked to release a soul.  
I 
have 
to 
comment 
on 
that 
because 
that's 
an 
interesting clash of cultures, and it's what we're all 
about as a people.  We have to deal with those 
cultures and those clashes as positively as we can.   
And everything I know about you, Omer, and 
everything I've gleaned about you from your——from the 
information that's been provided to me, you dealt with 
those things [o]ppositionally.  You weren't willing to 
let 
those 
cultures 
and 
those 
different 
ideas 
intermingle.  It had to be your way or no way at all.  
That's too bad.  And it's that attitude that you're 
going to have to change. . . .   
I would hope that you[] turn to spirituality.  
Native American spirituality gives you something to 
build on in that regard.  It had better because I can 
tell 
you 
right 
now 
if 
your 
attitude 
and 
your 
ruthlessness and the perception that you have of your 
relationship to the community in which you are going 
to find yourself continues as it is, you're in for a 
real tough ride. 
¶33 On November 16, 2000, Ninham filed an initial motion 
for post-conviction relief, the substance of which is not 
relevant here.  The circuit court denied Ninham's motion, and in 
an unpublished decision, the court of appeals affirmed.  See 
State v. Ninham, No. 2001AP716-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2001). 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
13 
 
¶34 On March 1, 2005, the United States Supreme Court 
decided Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), concluding that 
"[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the 
death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when 
their crimes were committed."  Id. at 578. 
¶35 Following the decision in Roper, on October 18, 2007, 
Ninham filed a motion for sentencing relief under Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.06, arguing that his sentence of life imprisonment without 
parole violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 6 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  In the alternative, on three other 
grounds, Ninham asked the circuit court to modify his sentence 
to make him eligible for parole.  Ninham argued that (1) new 
scientific evidence relating to adolescent brain development 
constitutes a new factor that is relevant to the sentence 
imposed; (2) his sentence is unduly harsh and excessive; and (3) 
when sentencing Ninham, the circuit court improperly considered 
the religious beliefs of the victim's family.8 
¶36 The circuit court denied Ninham's motion, declining to 
modify his sentence.  With respect to the constitutionality of 
sentencing a 14-year-old to life imprisonment without parole, 
the circuit court stated that it was bound to uphold the law as 
it currently stands.  The circuit court determined that the 
                                                 
8 Ninham's 
2007 
post-conviction 
motion 
also 
included 
arguments 
that 
his 
initial 
post-conviction 
counsel 
was 
ineffective and that he is entitled to a new trial in the 
interest of justice.  However, Ninham did not pursue those 
arguments on appeal, and accordingly, we do not address them. 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
14 
 
holding in Roper, which concerns the constitutionality of 
subjecting a juvenile to capital punishment, is inapposite to 
Ninham's case.9   
¶37 The 
circuit 
court 
similarly 
rejected 
Ninham's 
alternative arguments for sentence modification.  In regard to 
Ninham's claimed new factor, the circuit court failed to 
perceive 
any 
significant 
distinctions 
between 
the 
"new" 
scientific evidence cited by Ninham and the psychological 
evidence on adolescents cited by the Supreme Court in Thompson 
v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality opinion), 12 years 
before Ninham was sentenced.  In addition, the circuit court 
concluded that Ninham's sentence of life imprisonment without 
                                                 
9 Alternatively, the circuit court denied Ninham's motion on 
the grounds that Ninham was procedurally barred from raising his 
constitutional challenge for the first time in a subsequent 
post-conviction 
motion 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 974.06. 
 
See 
§ 974.06(4); State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 181-82, 
517 N.W.2d 157 (1994) ("[I]f the defendant's grounds for relief 
have been finally adjudicated, waived or not raised in a prior 
postconviction motion, they may not become the basis for a 
sec. 974.06 motion.  The language of subsection (4) does not 
exempt a constitutional issue from this limitation, unless the 
court ascertains that a 'sufficient reason' exists for either 
the failure to allege or to adequately raise the issue in the 
original, supplemental or amended motion.").  The circuit court 
noted that Ninham's § 974.06 motion neither addressed the 
procedural bar under § 974.06(4) nor provided any reasons as to 
why he failed to raise the constitutional challenge in his prior 
post-conviction motion. 
The court of appeals did not address whether Ninham's 
constitutional challenge was procedurally barred under Escalona-
Naranjo.  Likewise, given the significance of the constitutional 
question before us, we choose not to resolve the issue on 
procedural grounds and instead proceed to the merits. 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
15 
 
parole, while severe, was not unduly so, given the gravity of 
the crime and Ninham's aggravating conduct while awaiting 
sentencing.  Finally, the circuit court determined that it did 
not improperly rely on the spiritual beliefs of Vang's family 
when sentencing Ninham; rather, according to the circuit court, 
it merely noted and appropriately considered the particular loss 
experienced by Vang's family and friends. 
¶38 On March 3, 2009, the court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court's order denying Ninham's post-conviction motion 
for sentencing relief.  Ninham, 316 Wis. 2d 776.  Like the 
circuit court, the court of appeals concluded that the Supreme 
Court's decision in Roper does not support Ninham's argument 
that sentencing a 14-year-old to life imprisonment without 
parole is unconstitutional.  Id., ¶4.  Moreover, the court of 
appeals rejected Ninham's argument that his sentence was 
"unusual" under the Eighth Amendment, finding unhelpful the 
statistics Ninham provided of other juveniles arrested for 
homicide: "Ninham's crime was unusual for its senseless and 
extreme brutality. . . .  The statistics Ninham provides do not 
establish that life without parole is a rare sentence for a 
juvenile whose crimes and character are comparable to his own."  
Id., ¶5. 
¶39 The court of appeals also rejected Ninham's three 
alternative arguments for sentence modification.  The court of 
appeals concluded that "[t]he brutality of Ninham's crime and 
the additional offenses he committed after his arrest defeat the 
argument" that his sentence is unduly harsh and excessive.  Id., 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
16 
 
¶8.  In addition, the court of appeals denied that Ninham had 
established a new factor to support sentence modification, 
concluding that at the time of sentencing, the circuit court was 
aware of the differences between juvenile and adult offenders, 
and a new physiological explanation for those differences is 
irrelevant to the sentence imposed.  Id., ¶9.  Finally, the 
court of appeals rejected Ninham's argument that the circuit 
court relied on an improper factor when sentencing Ninham, 
finding that the religious reference was merely a comment on 
Ninham's intolerance.  Id., ¶10. 
¶40 Ninham petitioned this court for review.  We stayed 
Ninham's petition for review pending the Supreme Court's 
decision in Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011.  In Graham, the Supreme 
Court held that the Eighth Amendment "prohibits the imposition 
of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did 
not commit homicide."  Id. at 2034.  On September 13, 2010, we 
granted Ninham's petition for review. 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶41 Ninham seeks sentence modification to allow for the 
possibility of parole.  Ninham argues that sentencing a 14-year-
old to life imprisonment without parole is categorically 
violative 
of 
the 
Eighth 
Amendment 
of 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution 
and 
Article 
I, 
Section 
6 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  Alternatively, Ninham argues that his sentence 
should be modified because (1) his sentence is unduly harsh and 
excessive; (2) new scientific research regarding adolescent 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
17 
 
brain development constitutes a new factor that frustrates the 
purpose of the sentence; and (3) the circuit court relied on an 
improper factor when imposing the sentence.  We first address 
Ninham's 
categorical 
challenge, 
followed 
by 
his 
three 
alternative arguments. 
A. Whether Sentencing a 14-Year-Old to Life Imprisonment 
Without Parole for Committing Intentional Homicide 
is Categorically Unconstitutional 
¶42 The 
Wisconsin legislature has determined that a 
juvenile who commits first-degree intentional homicide on or 
after the juvenile's tenth birthday is subject to the criminal 
penalties 
provided 
for 
that 
crime. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.183(1)(am), (1m) (1997-98).  A person who commits first-
degree intentional homicide is guilty of a Class A felony, Wis. 
Stat. § 940.01(1) (1997-98), the penalty for which is life 
imprisonment, Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(a) (1997-98).  When a court 
sentences a person to life imprisonment for a crime committed on 
or after July 1, 1988, but before December 31, 1999, the court 
must make a parole eligibility determination.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.014(1) (1997-98).  If the crime was committed on or after 
August 31, 1995, but before December 31, 1999, the court may 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
18 
 
choose the option of no parole eligibility.  § 973.014(1)(c) 
(1997-98).10   
¶43 In this case, Ninham was adjudged guilty of committing 
the crime of first-degree intentional homicide on September 24, 
1998, when he was 14 years old.  Applying those circumstances to 
the above statutory scheme, there is no question that the 
                                                 
10 On December 31, 1999, 1997 Wis. Act 283, commonly 
referred to as Truth-in-Sentencing I (TIS-I), went into effect.  
State v. Crochiere, 2004 WI 78, ¶5, 273 Wis. 2d 57, 681 
N.W.2d 524.  TIS-I abolished parole and established instead a 
determinate sentencing structure.  Michael B. Brennan & Donald 
V. 
Latorraca, 
Truth-in-Sentencing, Wis. Lawyer, May 2000, 
available 
at 
http://www.wisbar.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Wisconsin_Lawyer&t
emplate=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&contentid=49911 
[hereinafter 
Brennan, TIS].  Pursuant to TIS-I, an offender who commits a 
felony on or after December 31, 1999, is subject to a bifurcated 
sentence: (1) an initial term of confinement in prison of at 
least one year; and (2) a term of extended supervision in the 
community, subject to conditions established by the court and 
the Department of Corrections.  Wis. Stat. § 973.01(1), (2)(b) 
(1997-98); see also Brennan, TIS.  The offender must serve the 
entire initial term of confinement in prison.  § 973.01(4), (6) 
(1997-98); see also Brennan, TIS.   
However, the bifurcated sentence structure under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.01 is not applicable to an offender who commits a felony 
punishable by life imprisonment.  Wis. Stat. § 973.01(3) (1997-
98).  "[W]hen a court sentences a person to life imprisonment 
for a crime committed on or after December 31, 1999, the court 
shall 
make 
an 
extended 
supervision 
eligibility 
date 
determination regarding the person," in which one of the options 
available to the sentencing court is no eligibility for release 
to extended supervision.  Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1g)(a)3. (1997-
98).  
In 2001, the legislature modified TIS-I with the enactment 
of 2001 Wis. Act 109, or Truth-in-Sentencing II (TIS-II).  TIS-
II went into effect on February 1, 2003.  Crochiere, 273 
Wis. 2d 57, ¶5. 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
19 
 
circuit court was within its statutory authority to sentence 
Ninham to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  
Notwithstanding the statutory basis for his punishment, Ninham 
argues that sentencing a 14-year-old to life imprisonment 
without parole is cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 6 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Stated otherwise, 
Ninham argues that the above statutory scheme is categorically 
unconstitutional when the crime was committed by a 14-year-old.11 
                                                 
11 The dissent contends that this case does not involve an 
attack on the constitutionality of the abovementioned statutory 
scheme, which authorizes a sentence of life imprisonment without 
parole for a 14-year-old convicted of first-degree intentional 
homicide. 
 
Dissent, 
¶107. 
 
The 
dissent's 
contention 
is 
contradicted by the dissent itself, which later "conclude[s] 
that the Wisconsin statute allowing the imposition of a death-
in-prison sentence for a homicide committed when a juvenile is 
14 years old violates the constitutional prohibition of cruel 
and unusual punishment."  Id., ¶133. 
Citing this court's decision in Tammy W-G v. Jacob T., 2011 
WI 30, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __, the dissent further argues 
that we erroneously rely on the statutory scheme's presumption 
of constitutionality.  See dissent, ¶111.  We agree with the 
dissent that "an as-applied challenge contains no presumption in 
regard to whether the statute was applied in a constitutionally 
sufficient manner."  Tammy W-G, 2011 WI 30, ¶49.  However, 
Ninham's constitutional argument does not present an as-applied 
challenge.  Rather, Ninham's constitutional argument presents a 
categorical challenge; specifically, Ninham argues that it is 
unconstitutional 
to 
sentence 
any 
14-year-old 
to 
life 
imprisonment without parole.  In contrast, in an as-applied 
challenge, the court considers whether a statute can be 
constitutionally 
applied 
to 
the 
facts 
of 
the 
particular 
defendant's case, "not hypothetical facts in other situations."  
See State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, ¶43, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 
N.W.2d 785. 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
20 
 
¶44 The constitutionality of a statutory scheme is a 
question of law that we review de novo.  State v. Radke, 2003 WI 
7, ¶11, 259 Wis. 2d 13, 657 N.W.2d 66.  Every legislative 
enactment is presumed constitutional.  Id.  As such, we will 
"'indulge[] every presumption to sustain the law if at all 
possible, 
and 
if 
any 
doubt 
exists 
about 
a 
statute's 
constitutionality, we must resolve that doubt in favor of 
constitutionality.'"  State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶11, 264 
Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328 (quoting Aicher v. Wis. Patients 
Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶18, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849).  
Accordingly, the party challenging a statute's constitutionality 
faces a heavy burden.  Id.  The challenger must demonstrate that 
the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  
State v. McGuire, 2010 WI 91, ¶25, 328 Wis. 2d 289, 786 
N.W.2d 227.  In this case, Ninham faces the heavy burden of 
demonstrating that a punishment approved by the Wisconsin 
legislature, and thus presumably valid, is cruel and unusual in 
violation 
of 
the 
Eighth 
Amendment 
of 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution 
and 
Article 
I, 
Section 
6 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976) 
("[I]n assessing a punishment selected by a democratically 
                                                                                                                                                             
Contrary to the dissent's belief, see dissent, ¶112, a 
presumption of constitutionality is deeply relevant in this 
case.  As the Supreme Court made clear in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153, 175 (1976), the court must "presume" the validity of 
"a punishment selected by a democratically elected legislature," 
and "a heavy burden rests on those who would attack the judgment 
of the representatives of the people." 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
21 
 
elected legislature against the constitutional measure, we 
presume its validity.  We may not require the legislature to 
select the least severe penalty possible so long as the penalty 
selected is not cruelly inhumane or disproportionate to the 
crime involved.  And a heavy burden rests on those who would 
attack the judgment of the representatives of the people."). 
¶45 The 
Eighth 
Amendment 
of 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment,12 guarantees individuals protection against excessive 
sanctions: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."  
U.S. Const. amend. VIII; see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 560; Atkins 
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 
818-19 & n.1.  Article I, Section 6 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution 
contains 
substantively 
identical 
language: 
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor shall excessive fines 
be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."  
Generally, we interpret provisions of the Wisconsin Constitution 
                                                 
12 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962); 
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947) 
(plurality opinion).  The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in 
relevant part:  
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.   
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
22 
 
consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of parallel 
provisions of the federal constitution.  State v. Arias, 2008 WI 
84, ¶19, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748.  That is particularly 
true where, as here, the text of the provision in our state 
constitution is virtually identical to its federal counterpart, 
and no intended difference can be discerned.  See State v. 
Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶39, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142 
(citing 
State 
v. 
Agnello, 
226 
Wis. 2d 164, 
180-81, 
593 
N.W.2d 427 (1999)).  Thus, our analysis in this case is largely 
guided by the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and 
in particular, the cases concerning juvenile offenders. 
¶46 The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and 
unusual punishments" flows from the basic "'precept of justice 
that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned 
to [the] offense.'"  Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311 (quoting Weems v. 
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)).  According to the 
Supreme Court, the drafters of the Eighth Amendment did not 
attempt to define the contours of that proportionality, leaving 
to future generations of judges the task of "'discern[ing] how 
the framers' values, defined in the context of the world they 
knew, apply to the world we know.'"  See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 
821 & n.4 (quoting Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 995-96 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J., concurring)).  As such, the 
Supreme Court has determined that a punishment is "cruel and 
unusual" in violation of the Eighth Amendment if it falls within 
one of two categories: (1) "those modes or acts of punishment 
that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time that the 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
23 
 
Bill of Rights was adopted" in 1791; or (2) punishment 
inconsistent with "'evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.'"  See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 
U.S. 399, 405-06 (1986) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 
101 (1958) (plurality opinion)). 
1. Whether sentencing a 14-year-old to life imprisonment 
without parole was considered cruel and unusual at the 
time the Bill of Rights was adopted 
¶47 Ninham does not argue that sentencing a 14-year-old to 
life imprisonment without parole was considered cruel and 
unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted.  At common 
law, children ages seven and older were subjected to the same 
arrest, trial, and punishment as adult offenders, In re Gault, 
387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967), which means that, theoretically, even the 
death penalty could have been imposed for a crime committed by a 
child as young as seven years old, see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 
U.S. 361, 368 (1989), overruled by Roper, 543 U.S. at 574; see 
also Thompson, 487 U.S. at 828 n.27 (reporting that a 10-year-
old child was hanged in Louisiana in 1855 and another in 
Arkansas in 1885).  Notably, once a child turned 14 years old, 
he or she no longer benefitted from the presumption of 
incapacity to commit a capital, or any other, felony.  Stanford, 
492 U.S. at 368 (citing 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *23-
24); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 864 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
¶48 Given the common law understanding that 14-year-olds 
were not immune from capital punishment, it is clear that Ninham 
cannot 
establish 
that 
sentencing 
a 
14-year-old 
to 
life 
imprisonment without parole was considered cruel and unusual at 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
24 
 
the time the Bill of Rights was adopted.  Therefore, in order to 
prevail on his constitutional challenge, he must demonstrate 
that sentencing a 14-year-old to life imprisonment without 
parole for committing intentional homicide is contrary to 
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society."  See Trop, 356 U.S. at 101. 
2. Whether sentencing a 14-year-old to life imprisonment 
without parole for committing intentional homicide is 
inconsistent with evolving standards of decency 
¶49 In order to determine whether a punishment is cruel 
and unusual, the Supreme Court "look[s] beyond historical 
conceptions to the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society."  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021 
(internal quotations omitted); see also Trop, 356 U.S. at 100 
("The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing 
less than the dignity of man.  While the State has the power to 
punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be 
exercised 
within 
the 
limits 
of 
civilized 
standards.").  
Accordingly, while the standard of "cruel and unusual" remains 
the same, "'its applicability must change as the basic mores of 
society change.'"  Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 
(2008) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 382 (1972) 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting)). 
¶50 In cases, like this one, which implicate categorical 
Eighth Amendment rules, the Supreme Court engages in a two-step 
analysis.  First, the Supreme Court considers "'objective 
indicia of society's standards, as expressed in legislative 
enactments and state practice' to determine whether there is a 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
25 
 
national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue."  
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 572).  
Second, notwithstanding the objective evidence of society's 
standards, the Supreme Court "determine[s] in the exercise of 
its own independent judgment whether the punishment in question 
violates the Constitution."  Id.  In this second step, guided by 
precedent and its own interpretation of the text, history, 
meaning, and purpose of the Eighth Amendment, id., the Supreme 
Court "ask[s] whether there is reason to disagree with the 
judgment reached by the citizenry and its legislators," Atkins, 
536 U.S. at 313. 
a. Whether there is a national consensus against sentencing 
a 14-year-old to life imprisonment without parole for 
committing intentional homicide 
¶51 The 
determination 
of 
whether 
a 
punishment 
is 
proportionate to the offense under evolving standards of decency 
is best informed by "objective evidence of how our society views 
a particular punishment today."  Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 
331 (1989), overruled by Atkins, 536 U.S. 304; see also Atkins, 
536 U.S. at 312 (providing that the evolving standards of 
decency "should be informed by objective factors to the maximum 
possible extent" (internal quotations omitted)).  The Supreme 
Court 
regards 
the 
legislation 
enacted 
by 
the 
nation's 
legislatures as the "'clearest and most reliable objective 
evidence of contemporary values.'"  Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 
(quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 331).  However, to better inform its 
national consensus inquiry, the Supreme Court has looked beyond 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
26 
 
legislation to actual sentencing practices.  See Graham, 130 S. 
Ct. at 2023. 
¶52 For example, in Roper, in concluding that there is a 
national consensus against imposing the death penalty upon 
juvenile offenders, the Supreme Court noted that 30 of the 50 
states prohibit the punishment: 12 states reject the death 
penalty altogether, and 18 states——while otherwise maintaining 
the death penalty——exclude juveniles from its reach.  543 U.S. 
at 564.  In addition, the Supreme Court emphasized that "even in 
the 20 States without a formal prohibition on executing 
juveniles, the practice is infrequent."  Id.  In the ten years 
preceding Roper, only three states had executed prisoners for 
crimes committed as juveniles.  Id. at 565. 
¶53 More recently, in Graham, the Supreme Court determined 
that a national consensus has developed against the practice of 
sentencing a juvenile offender to life imprisonment without 
parole for committing a nonhomicide crime.  130 S. Ct. at 2026.  
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the majority of states, 37 
and the District of Columbia, permit sentences of life without 
parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders.  See id. at 2023, 
2034-35.  Nevertheless, the Court maintained that "'[t]here are 
measures of consensus other than legislation,'" id. at 2023 
(quoting Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 433), and that an examination of 
actual sentencing practices in those 37 states reveals a 
consensus against the punishment, id.  Specifically, the Supreme 
Court noted that just 11 of the 37 states in fact impose life 
without parole sentences upon juvenile nonhomicide offenders, 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
27 
 
and nationwide, only 123 juvenile offenders are serving life 
without parole sentences for nonhomicide crimes.  Id. at 2024.  
Thus, according to the Graham Court, the fact that most states 
permit the punishment does not justify a conclusion that most 
states deem the punishment appropriate:  
[T]he many States that allow life without parole for 
juvenile nonhomicide offenders but do not impose the 
punishment should not be treated as if they have 
expressed the view that the sentence is appropriate.  
The sentencing practice now under consideration is 
exceedingly rare.  And "it is fair to say that a 
national consensus has developed against it." 
Id. at 2026 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316). 
¶54 Turning to the case now before us, we must determine 
whether there is a national consensus against sentencing a 14-
year-old to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole 
for committing intentional homicide.  Given these facts, the 
Supreme Court's decision in Graham is instructive but not 
determinative.  See id. at 2023 (clarifying that the national 
consensus established in Graham "concerns only those juvenile 
offenders sentenced to life without parole solely for a 
nonhomicide offense").  Importantly, the State does not have to 
establish a national consensus approving life without parole 
sentences for 14-year-olds who commit intentional homicide; 
rather, Ninham bears the heavy burden of establishing a national 
consensus against the punishment.  See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 
373.  We conclude that Ninham has failed to meet that burden. 
¶55 Ninham concedes that the vast majority of states 
permit 14-year-olds to be sentenced to life without parole for 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
28 
 
homicide crimes.  Regarding juvenile offenders generally, 44 
states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government 
permit life without parole sentences for homicide crimes.  See 
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034-36.  By our calculation, 36 of those 
44 states permit life without parole sentences for offenders who 
were 14 years old or younger at the time of the offense.13  See 
Amnesty International & Human Rights Watch, The Rest of Their 
Lives: Life without Parole for Child Offenders in the United 
States, 
18 
(Oct. 
11, 
2005), 
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/11578/section/4;14 Miller v. Alabama, 
No. CR-06-0741, 2010 Ala. Crim. App. Lexis 77, at *15 (Ala. 
Crim. App. Aug. 27, 2010).  Notably, seven states that generally 
except juvenile offenders from life without parole sentences 
still permit the sentence to be imposed upon juveniles who 
commit homicide.  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023, 2035.  Thus, 
according to the "'clearest and most reliable objective evidence 
of contemporary values,'" Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (quoting 
                                                 
13 In response to a question posed at oral argument, 
Ninham's 
counsel 
advised 
the 
court 
that 
"about 
30 
states . . . have transfer statutes that expose children, some 
as young as 6 years of age, to sentences like life imprisonment 
without parole." 
14 The statistics compiled by Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch include Colorado and exclude Alabama in the 
list of states that, as of 2005, permit life without parole 
sentences for offenders who were 14 years old or younger at the 
time of the offense.  However, according to our research, 
Alabama should be included in that list, see Miller v. Alabama, 
No. CR-06-0741, 2010 Ala. Crim. App. Lexis 77, at *11-12, 26 
(Ala. Crim. App. Aug. 27, 2010), and Colorado should be 
excluded, see Colo. Rev. Stat. § 17-22.5-104(IV) (2010). 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
29 
 
Penry, 492 U.S. at 331), we simply cannot say that a national 
consensus has developed against the practice of sentencing a 14-
year-old to life imprisonment without parole for committing 
intentional homicide.  See Roper, 543 U.S. at 609 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) ("Words have no meaning if the views of less than 
50% of [] States can constitute a national consensus.").   
¶56 As Ninham points out, however, our analysis cannot end 
there; pursuant to Graham, it is possible that "an examination 
of actual sentencing practices in jurisdictions where the 
sentence in question is permitted by statute discloses a 
consensus against its use."  130 S. Ct. at 2023.  Here, Ninham 
argues that the rarity with which sentences of life without 
parole are imposed upon 14-year-olds demonstrates a national 
consensus against such sentences.  Ninham informs us that he is 
currently the only person in Wisconsin serving a sentence of 
life without parole for a crime committed at the age of 14, and 
furthermore, nationwide, only 73 juveniles age 14 or younger, 
deriving from just 18 states, have been sentenced to life 
without parole.   
¶57 We appreciate the fact that 14-year-olds are rarely 
sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.  However, we 
disagree with Ninham that the rarity with which the sentence is 
imposed is necessarily demonstrative of a national consensus 
against the sentence.  Rather, it is equally likely that 14-
year-olds are rarely sentenced to life without parole because 
they rarely commit homicide and, more to the point, rarely 
commit homicide in the same horrific and senseless fashion as 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
30 
 
Ninham.  Ninham does not point to any data which would lead us 
to 
believe otherwise.  In short, Ninham has failed to 
demonstrate 
that 
there 
is 
a 
national 
consensus 
against 
sentencing a 14-year-old to life imprisonment without parole for 
committing intentional homicide. 
¶58 Our conclusion that no such national consensus exists, 
"while 'entitled to great weight,' is not itself determinative" 
of the constitutional question before us.  Id. at 2026 (quoting 
Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 434).15  Because the task of interpreting 
the Eighth Amendment remains the court's responsibility, see 
id., we must now exercise our own independent judgment to 
determine whether it is constitutional to impose a life without 
parole sentence upon a 14-year-old for committing intentional 
homicide. 
b. The 
court's 
independent 
judgment 
regarding 
the 
constitutionality of sentencing a 14-year-old to life 
imprisonment without parole for committing intentional 
homicide 
¶59 "The 
judicial 
exercise 
of 
independent 
judgment 
requires consideration of the culpability of the offenders at 
issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along with 
the severity of the punishment in question."  Id.  In addition, 
                                                 
15 See also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 434 (2008) 
("As we have said in other Eighth Amendment cases, objective 
evidence of contemporary values as it relates to punishment for 
child rape is entitled to great weight, but it does not end our 
inquiry.  'The Constitution contemplates that in the end our own 
judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the 
acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.'" 
(quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality 
opinion))). 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
31 
 
the Supreme Court "considers whether the challenged sentencing 
practice serves legitimate penological goals."  Id. 
¶60 For example, in its 1988 Thompson decision, in 
concluding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of 
a person who was under 16 years of age at the time of the 
offense, a plurality of the Supreme Court determined, first, 
that "less culpability should attach to a crime committed by a 
juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult," 487 
U.S. at 835, and second, that the application of the death 
penalty to offenders 15 years old and younger does not 
measurably contribute to the goals that capital punishment is 
intended to achieve, id. at 838.  The Supreme Court observed 
that the death penalty is intended to serve two principal social 
purposes: retribution and deterrence.  Id. at 836.  "Given the 
lesser culpability of the juvenile offender, the teenager's 
capacity for growth, and society's fiduciary obligations to its 
children," the Supreme Court concluded that the retribution 
rationale is "simply inapplicable to the execution of a 15-year-
old offender."  Id. at 836-37.  Moreover, concerning the 
deterrent value of the death penalty, the Court determined that 
"[t]he likelihood that the teenage offender has made the kind of 
cost-benefit 
analysis 
that 
attaches 
any 
weight 
to 
the 
possibility of execution is so remote as to be virtually 
nonexistent."  Id. at 837. 
¶61 Seventeen years later, in Roper, the Supreme Court 
extended its reasoning from Thompson to hold that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits the imposition of the death penalty upon all 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
32 
 
juvenile offenders under the age of 18.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 570-
71.  In so holding, the Supreme Court articulated three general 
differences between juvenile and adult offenders: (1) juveniles 
possess a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility, 
qualities which often result in impulsive 
actions and decisions; (2) juveniles are more vulnerable or 
susceptible to negative influences and peer pressure; and (3) a 
juvenile's character is not as well formed as that of an adult.  
Id. at 569-70.  Those three differences, the Court concluded, 
"demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be 
classified 
among 
the 
worst 
offenders" 
for 
which 
capital 
punishment is reserved.  Id. at 569.  The Court then echoed its 
determination in Thompson that, given the lesser culpability of 
juvenile offenders, the case for retribution and deterrence is 
simply not as strong with a minor as with an adult.  Id. at 571-
72.  Of significance to this case, the Supreme Court observed: 
"To the extent the juvenile death penalty might have residual 
deterrent effect, it is worth noting that the punishment of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole is itself a 
severe sanction, in particular for a young person."  Id. at 572.  
The Supreme Court then affirmed the Missouri Supreme Court's 
decision to vacate the 17-year-old defendant's death sentence 
and resentence him to life imprisonment without eligibility for 
parole.  See id. at 560, 578-79. 
¶62 Last year, in Graham, finding no reason to reconsider 
its observations in Roper regarding juveniles, see Graham, 130 
S. 
Ct. 
at 
2026, 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
held 
that 
it 
is 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
33 
 
unconstitutional to impose a life without parole sentence upon a 
juvenile offender who did not commit homicide, id. at 2034.  
¶63 Regarding the culpability of juvenile offenders, the 
Graham Court noted that "developments in psychology and brain 
science 
continue 
to 
show 
fundamental 
differences 
between 
juvenile and adult minds."  Id. at 2026.  Furthermore, the Court 
explicitly recognized that "defendants who do not kill, intend 
to kill, or foresee that life will be taken are categorically 
less deserving of the most serious forms of punishment than are 
murderers."  Id. at 2027.  Considering (1) the diminished 
culpability of juvenile offenders in general and (2) the 
diminished culpability of defendants who commit nonhomicide 
crimes, the Supreme Court reasoned that "when compared to an 
adult murderer, a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend 
to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability."  Id. 
¶64 Regarding the severity of the punishment, the Graham 
Court remarked on the similarities between life without parole 
sentences and death sentences, noting that the comparison is 
especially 
apparent 
when 
the 
sentences 
are 
imposed 
upon 
juveniles.  See id. at 2027-28 ("Life without parole is an 
especially harsh punishment for a juvenile. . . .  A 16-year-old 
and a 75-year-old each sentenced to life without parole receive 
the same punishment in name only.").   
¶65 Finally, the Graham Court concluded that the four 
principal penological justifications for life without parole——
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation——are 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
34 
 
inadequate to justify imposing the sentence upon juvenile 
nonhomicide offenders.  See id. at 2028-30.   
¶66 First, while acknowledging that retribution is a 
legitimate reason to punish, the Court explained that "'the 
heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence 
must be directly related to the personal culpability of the 
criminal offender.'"  Id. at 2028 (quoting Tison v. Arizona, 481 
U.S. 137, 149 (1987)).  Reiterating that juvenile offenders who 
did not commit homicide have twice diminished moral culpability, 
the Court concluded that "retribution does not justify imposing 
the second most severe penalty on the less culpable juvenile 
nonhomicide offender."  Id. 
¶67 Second, the Graham Court reaffirmed its determination 
in Roper that juveniles are less susceptible to deterrence 
because 
of 
their 
immaturity 
and 
underdeveloped 
sense 
of 
responsibility.  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028.  Moreover, 
according to the Supreme Court, any limited deterrent effect 
provided by life without parole is outweighed by the diminished 
moral responsibility of juveniles who commit nonhomicide crimes.  
Id. at 2029. 
¶68 Third, the Court concluded that incapacitation, or the 
imprisonment 
of 
dangerous 
criminals 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
preventing recidivism, is inadequate to justify the punishment 
of life without parole for juveniles who did not commit 
homicide.  Id.  The Court reasoned that the penological theory 
behind incapacitation requires the sentencer to make a judgment 
that the defendant is incorrigible, or incapable of reform, but 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
35 
 
"[t]he 
characteristics 
of 
juveniles 
make 
that 
judgment 
questionable."  Id.  Furthermore, even if the state's judgment 
that a juvenile is incorrigible is later confirmed by the 
juvenile's misbehavior in prison, the Court ruled that the 
sentence of life without parole would still be disproportionate 
because the judgment was made at the outset, before the juvenile 
has a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate maturity.  Id. 
¶69 Fourth, and finally, the Court determined that the 
penological goal of rehabilitation is inconsistent with a 
sentence of life imprisonment without parole, especially when 
imposed upon a juvenile nonhomicide offender who possesses the 
capacity for change and diminished moral culpability.  Id. at 
2029-30. 
¶70 In summary, (1) the limited culpability of juvenile 
nonhomicide offenders; (2) the severity of life without parole 
sentences; and (3) the Court's determination that penological 
theory is inadequate to justify the punishment all led to the 
Graham Court's conclusion that it is cruel and unusual to impose 
a life without parole sentence upon a juvenile offender who did 
not commit homicide.  Id. at 2030. 
¶71 Turning to the case now before this court, we must 
determine, in the exercise of our own independent judgment, 
whether it is categorically unconstitutional to impose a life 
without parole sentence upon a 14-year-old for committing 
intentional homicide.  Stated otherwise, we must determine 
whether the Eighth Amendment and Article I, Section 6 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution prohibit a sentencing court from ever 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
36 
 
concluding that a 14-year-old who commits intentional homicide 
is deserving of life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole.  We conclude that the answer is no. 
¶72 Following the approach set forth in Graham, see id. at 
2026, we first consider the culpability of 14-year-olds who 
commit 
intentional 
homicide 
and 
the 
severity 
of 
life 
imprisonment 
without 
parole. 
 
We 
then 
consider 
whether 
sentencing a 14-year-old to life imprisonment without parole for 
committing intentional homicide serves legitimate penological 
goals. 
i. The culpability of 14-year-olds who commit intentional 
homicide and the severity of life imprisonment without 
parole 
¶73 Ninham argues that the characteristics of juveniles 
articulated in Roper and reiterated in Graham apply with even 
greater force to juveniles age 14 and younger.  As Ninham points 
out, 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
held 
that 
these 
general 
characteristics "demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with 
reliability be classified among the worst offenders" for which 
the most severe punishment is reserved.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 569; 
see also Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 ("Roper established that 
because juveniles have lessened culpability they are less 
deserving of the most severe punishments.").  It follows, Ninham 
argues, that 14-year-olds cannot reliably be classified among 
the 
worst 
offenders 
for 
which 
this 
state 
reserves 
life 
imprisonment without parole.   
¶74 We do not disagree that, typically, juvenile offenders 
are less culpable than adult offenders and are therefore 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
37 
 
generally less deserving of the most severe punishments.  See 
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70).  
Furthermore, we do not dispute Ninham's argument that, on 
average, the younger the juvenile offender, the more his or her 
culpability diminishes.  However, the constitutional question 
before us does not concern only the typical 14-year-old 
offender.  Rather, the question before us concerns all 14-year-
old offenders, typical or atypical, who commit intentional 
homicide.  Given these facts, we disagree with Ninham that Roper 
and Graham lead to the conclusion that 14-year-olds who commit 
intentional homicide are categorically less deserving of life 
imprisonment without parole.   
¶75 In Roper, recognizing that capital punishment, the 
most severe penalty recognized by law, must be limited to a 
narrow class of offenders who commit only the most serious 
crimes and "whose extreme culpability makes them 'the most 
deserving of execution,'" 543 U.S. at 568 (quoting Atkins, 536 
U.S. at 319), the Supreme Court concluded that the diminished 
culpability of juvenile offenders renders them categorically 
less deserving of the death penalty.  Id. at 569-71.  Roper does 
not, however, stand for the proposition that the diminished 
culpability of juvenile offenders renders them categorically 
less 
deserving 
of 
the 
second 
most 
severe 
penalty, 
life 
imprisonment without parole.  Indeed, the Roper Court affirmed 
the Missouri Supreme Court's decision to modify the 17-year-old 
defendant's 
death 
sentence 
to 
life 
imprisonment 
without 
eligibility for parole.  Id. at 560, 578-79. 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
38 
 
¶76 In Graham, the Supreme Court concluded that the "twice 
diminished moral culpability" of (1) juvenile offenders who (2) 
do not commit homicide renders that particular class of 
offenders categorically less deserving of life imprisonment 
without parole.  130 S. Ct. at 2027.  Graham does not, however, 
support the argument that juvenile offenders who commit homicide 
are categorically less deserving of life imprisonment without 
parole.  This is because juvenile offenders who commit homicide 
lack the second layer of diminished moral culpability on which 
the Graham Court based its conclusion.  Simply stated, "[t]here 
is a line between homicide and other serious violent offenses 
against the individual. . . .  Although an offense like robbery 
or rape is a serious crime deserving serious punishment, those 
crimes differ from homicide crimes in a moral sense."  Id. 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). 
¶77 It follows, therefore, that neither Roper nor Graham 
foreclose a sentencing court from concluding that a juvenile who 
commits homicide is sufficiently culpable to deserve life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.   
¶78 Furthermore, contrary to Ninham's contention, we are 
not convinced that juveniles 14 years old and younger are a 
distinct group of juveniles such that a different constitutional 
analysis applies.  Ninham directs us to developments in 
psychology and brain science tending to show that 14-year-olds, 
in comparison to older teenagers, are generally less capable of 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
39 
 
responsible decision-making,16 generally possess a heightened 
vulnerability to risk-taking and peer pressure,17 and generally 
have a less mature sense of self and a decreased ability to 
imagine their futures.18  Even assuming that such psychological 
and 
scientific 
research is constitutionally relevant, the 
generalizations concluded therein are insufficient to support a 
determination that 14-year-olds who commit homicide are never 
culpable enough to deserve life imprisonment without parole.  
Case in point, in other contexts, psychologists have promoted 
scientific evidence that arrives at the precise opposite 
conclusions about 14-year-olds, namely, that they understand 
social rules and laws and possess the ability to take moral 
responsibility for their actions.  See Roper, 543 U.S. at 617-18 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that in an amicus brief 
filed in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990), the American 
Psychological Association cited numerous psychological treatises 
and studies tending to demonstrate that 14 and 15-year-old 
juveniles are mature enough to decide whether to obtain an 
                                                 
16 See, e.g., B. Luna, The Maturation of Cognitive Control 
and the Adolescent Brain, in From Attention to Goal-Directed 
Behavior 249, 252-56 (F. Aboitiz & D. Cosmelli eds., 2009). 
17 See, e.g., Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and 
Juvenile Justice, 5 Ann. Rev. Clinical Psychol. 459, 466 (2009); 
Laurence Steinberg, Risk-Taking in Adolescence: New Perspectives 
from Brain and Behavioral Science, 16 Current Directions in 
Psychol. Sci. 55, 56-58 (2007). 
18 See, e.g., Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, 
Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence, 20 L. & Human Behav. 249, 
255 (1996). 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
40 
 
abortion without parental involvement).  In summary, Ninham has 
failed to demonstrate that 14-year-olds who commit intentional 
homicide cannot reliably be classified among those offenders 
deserving of life imprisonment without parole. 
ii. Whether sentencing a 14-year-old to life imprisonment 
without parole for committing intentional homicide 
serves legitimate penological goals 
¶79 Relying in large part on the Supreme Court's analysis 
in Graham, Ninham maintains that none of the four generally 
recognized penological justifications are adequate to justify 
imposing life without parole upon a 14-year-old.  However, as 
previously described, much of the Graham Court's analysis on 
penological theory was based upon the twice diminished moral 
culpability of juvenile offenders who commit nonhomicide crimes.  
See, e.g., 130 S. Ct. at 2028 ("The case [for retribution] 
becomes even weaker with respect to a juvenile who did not 
commit homicide."); id. at 2029 ("[I]n light of juvenile 
nonhomicide offenders' diminished moral responsibility, any 
limited deterrent effect provided by life without parole is not 
enough to justify the sentence.").  As we just explained, we are 
not convinced that 14-year-olds who commit homicide have the 
same diminished moral culpability as those juvenile offenders 
who do not commit homicide.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
sentencing a 14-year-old to life imprisonment without parole for 
committing 
intentional 
homicide 
serves 
the 
legitimate 
penological 
goals 
of 
retribution, 
deterrence, 
and 
incapacitation.  See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
41 
 
(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[T]he Eighth Amendment does 
not mandate adoption of any one penological theory."). 
¶80 First, retribution, as "'an expression of society's 
moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct,'" Thompson, 487 
U.S. at 836 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183), is a legitimate 
penological justification for imposing a sentence of life 
without parole upon a 14-year-old who commits intentional 
homicide.  "'The heart of the retribution rationale is that a 
criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal 
culpability of the criminal offender.'"  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 
2028 (quoting Tison, 481 U.S. at 149).  While juvenile offenders 
are generally less culpable than adult offenders and therefore 
generally less deserving of the most severe punishments, id. at 
2026, the case for retribution increases with respect to 
imposing a life without parole sentence upon a juvenile who 
intentionally takes the life of another, see id. at 2028. 
¶81 Second, as the Supreme Court recognized in Roper, "the 
punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole is itself a severe sanction, in particular for a young 
person" and thus serves as an adequate deterrent to potential 
juvenile homicide offenders.  543 U.S. at 572. 
¶82 Third, and finally, we conclude that incapacitation 
adequately justifies imposing the punishment of life without 
parole 
upon 
14-year-old 
juveniles 
who 
commit 
intentional 
homicide.  We recognize that incapacitation requires the 
sentencing court to make a judgment that the defendant is 
incorrigible, and the nature of juveniles generally make that 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
42 
 
judgment a difficult one.  See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029.  
Nevertheless, we cannot preclude sentencing courts from ever 
making a judgment that a 14-year-old who commits intentional 
homicide is forever dangerous.  As recognized by the Supreme 
Court, while many juveniles commit crimes that "reflect[] 
unfortunate yet transient immaturity," the rare juvenile is 
capable of committing a crime that "reflects irreparable 
corruption."  Roper, 543 U.S. at 573.  In the case of those rare 
juveniles, a sentence of life imprisonment without parole 
measurably contributes to the legitimate goal of incapacitation. 
¶83 In summary, in the exercise of our own independent 
judgment, we conclude that sentencing a 14-year-old to life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole for committing 
intentional homicide is not categorically unconstitutional.  We 
therefore confirm what objective evidence already informs us: 
contemporary society views the punishment as proportionate to 
the offense. 
B. Whether Ninham's Sentence is Unduly Harsh and Excessive 
¶84 Ninham argues that even if we conclude that it is not 
categorically unconstitutional to sentence a 14-year-old to life 
imprisonment without parole for committing intentional homicide, 
he is still entitled to sentence modification on the grounds 
that his particular punishment is cruel and unusual in violation 
of the Eighth Amendment and Article I, Section 6 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  Specifically, Ninham argues that his 
sentence of life imprisonment without parole is unduly harsh and 
excessive because his culpability was diminished, both by the 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
43 
 
fact that he was just 14 years old at the time of the offense 
and by the fact that extreme abuse and alcohol dependence 
resulted in his underdevelopment. 
¶85 The standard for determining whether a punishment is 
cruel and unusual in a particular case is the same under both 
federal and Wisconsin law.  See State v. Pratt, 36 Wis. 2d 312, 
321-23, 153 N.W.2d 18 (1967).  "'[W]hat constitutes adequate 
punishment is ordinarily left to the discretion of the trial 
judge.  If the sentence is within the statutory limit, appellate 
courts will not interfere unless clearly cruel and unusual.'"  
Id. at 322 (quoting Hayes v. United States, 238 F.2d 318, 322 
(10th Cir. 1956)); see also State v. Taylor, 2006 WI 22, ¶19, 
289 Wis. 2d 34, 710 N.W.2d 466.  A sentence is clearly cruel and 
unusual only if the sentence is "so 'excessive and unusual, and 
so disproportionate to the offense committed, as to shock public 
sentiment 
and 
violate 
the 
judgment 
of 
reasonable 
people 
concerning what is right and proper under the circumstances.'"  
State v. Paske, 163 Wis. 2d 52, 69, 471 N.W.2d 55 (1991) 
(quoting Pratt, 36 Wis. 2d at 322). 
¶86 Under these circumstances, we simply cannot say that 
Ninham's sentence of life imprisonment without parole is so 
disproportionate to the crime he committed "'as to shock public 
sentiment 
and 
violate 
the 
judgment 
of 
reasonable 
people 
concerning what is right and proper.'"  Id. (quoting Pratt, 36 
Wis. 2d at 322).  There is no question that Ninham's punishment 
is severe, but it is not disproportionately so.  The manner in 
which Ninham took Vang's life was horrific and senseless.  The 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
44 
 
severity of the homicide was only compounded by the fact that 
Ninham refused to take any responsibility and in fact threatened 
the lives of the other juveniles who did.  That Ninham was just 
14 years old at the time of the offense and suffered an 
indisputably difficult childhood does not, as he contends, 
automatically remove his punishment out of the realm of 
proportionate.  The circuit court was well within its statutory 
authority to sentence Ninham to life imprisonment without 
parole, and we will not interfere with its exercise of 
discretion. 
C. Whether a New Factor Warrants Sentence Modification 
¶87 Ninham also argues that he is entitled to sentence 
modification on the grounds that new scientific research 
regarding adolescent brain development constitutes a new factor 
that frustrates the purpose of his sentence.  Specifically, 
Ninham directs us to magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) studies, 
apparently unavailable at the time Ninham was sentenced, which 
tend to show that the brain is not fully developed early in 
childhood and that making impulsive decisions and engaging in 
risky behavior is an inevitable part of adolescence.19  The 
studies further explain, according to Ninham, that as the brain 
matures, adolescents almost universally grow out of their 
impulsive and risky behavior.  In addition, Ninham informs us 
                                                 
19 See, e.g., L.P. Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-
Related Behavioral Manifestations, 24 Neurosci. & Biobehav. Rev. 
417, 421 (2000); N. Dickon Reppucci, Adolescent Development and 
Juvenile Justice, 27 Am. J. Community Psychol. 307, 319 (1999). 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
45 
 
that a growing body of research suggests that alcohol causes 
more damage to developing teenage brains than previously 
thought.20  According to Ninham, this new scientific research on 
adolescent brain development undermines the circuit court's 
findings regarding Ninham's culpability and recidivism. 
¶88 In order to prevent the continuation of unjust 
sentences, the circuit court has inherent authority to modify a 
sentence.  State v. Trujillo, 2005 WI 45, ¶10, 279 Wis. 2d 712, 
694 N.W.2d 933.  "However, a circuit court's inherent authority 
to modify a sentence is a discretionary power that is exercised 
within defined parameters."  State v. Crochiere, 2004 WI 78, 
¶12, 273 Wis. 2d 57, 681 N.W.2d 524.  Included within those 
defined parameters is the circuit court's inherent authority to 
modify a sentence based upon the showing of a new factor.  Id.  
In Rosado v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 280, 288, 234 N.W.2d 69 (1975), 
this court defined what constitutes a "new factor":  
[T]he phrase "new factor" refers to a fact or set of 
facts highly relevant to the imposition of sentence, 
but not known to the trial judge at the time of 
original sentencing, either because it was not then in 
existence or because, even though it was then in 
existence, it was unknowingly overlooked by all of the 
parties. 
¶89 The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating by 
clear and convincing evidence that a new factor exists.  State 
v. Franklin, 148 Wis. 2d 1, 9-10, 434 N.W.2d 609 (1989).  
However, the existence of a new factor does not necessarily 
                                                 
20 See, e.g., Katy Butler, The Grim Neurology of Teenage 
Drinking, N.Y. Times, July 4, 2006, at F1. 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
46 
 
entitle the defendant to sentence modification.  Trujillo, 279 
Wis. 2d 712, ¶11.  Rather, whether sentence modification is 
warranted is left to the sound discretion of the circuit court.  
Id.  In determining whether to exercise its discretion to modify 
a sentence on the basis of a new factor, the circuit court may, 
but is not required to, consider whether the new factor 
frustrates the purpose of the original sentence.  See State v. 
Harbor, 2011 WI 28, ¶¶48-52, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __. 
¶90 Whether a new factor exists is a question of law that 
this court reviews independently.  Trujillo, 279 Wis. 2d 712, 
¶11.  However, even if we determine that a new factor exists, we 
will not overrule a circuit court's decision regarding sentence 
modification unless the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion.  Id. 
¶91 In this case, we conclude that Ninham has not 
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that a new factor 
exists.  Assuming that the MRI studies themselves were not in 
existence at the time Ninham was sentenced, we agree with the 
circuit court that the studies still do not constitute "a fact 
or set of facts highly relevant to the imposition of sentence, 
but not known to the trial judge at the time of the original 
sentencing," Rosado, 70 Wis. 2d at 288, because the conclusions 
reached by the studies were already in existence and well 
reported by the time Ninham was sentenced in 2000.   
¶92 This point is best made by considering the same 
Supreme Court jurisprudence we have followed throughout this 
opinion.  In Thompson, a 1988 decision, the Supreme Court 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
47 
 
referred to a 1978 report by a task force on sentencing young 
offenders to make clear that "the Court ha[d] already endorsed" 
the proposition that juvenile offenders under the age of 16 are 
less culpable than adult offenders:  
The basis for this conclusion is too obvious to 
require extended explanation.  Inexperience, less 
education, and less intelligence make the teenager 
less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her 
conduct while at the same time he or she is much more 
apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure 
than is an adult.   
487 U.S. at 834-35.  In Roper, the Supreme Court adopted that 
reasoning of the Thompson Court and applied it to all juvenile 
offenders under the age of 18.  See Roper, 543 U.S. at 570-71.  
Finally, and of most relevance to the "new factor" issue before 
us, in Graham, a 2010 decision, the Supreme Court observed that 
"[n]o recent data provide reason to reconsider the Court's 
observations 
in 
Roper 
about 
the 
nature 
of 
juveniles. . . . [D]evelopments in psychology and brain science 
continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and 
adult minds."  130 S. Ct. at 2026 (emphasis added).  Thus, as 
plainly recognized by the Graham Court, the "new" scientific 
research regarding adolescent brain development to which Ninham 
refers only confirms the conclusions about juvenile offenders 
that the Supreme Court had "already endorsed" as of 1988.  See 
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835. 
¶93 Moreover, even assuming that the conclusions reached 
by these MRI studies were not known to the circuit court at the 
time of Ninham's sentencing, Ninham still has not shown by clear 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
48 
 
and convincing evidence that the conclusions reached by the 
studies are "highly relevant to the imposition of [Ninham's] 
sentence," see Rosado, 70 Wis. 2d at 288 (emphasis added), and 
in particular, the circuit court's findings regarding Ninham's 
culpability and recidivism.  As previously explained, see Part 
III.A.2.b.i. supra, the generalizations concluded within these 
scientific studies are insufficient to support a determination 
about the culpability of a particular 14-year-old who commits 
intentional homicide, in this case, Ninham.  Likewise, the 
studies' conclusion that adolescents "almost universally" grow 
out of their impulsive and risky behavior tells us virtually 
nothing about Ninham's likelihood to relapse into criminal 
behavior.  This point is made clear by the fact that the studies 
to which Ninham refers do not concern the development of 
incarcerated juveniles in particular.21  In short, Ninham has 
failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that this 
scientific 
research 
regarding 
adolescent 
brain 
development 
constitutes a new factor for purposes of modifying Ninham's 
particular sentence. 
D. Whether the Circuit Court Relied on an Improper Factor 
When Imposing Ninham's Sentence 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., Barry Holman & Jason Ziedenberg, The Dangers 
of Detention: The Impact of Incarcerating Youth in Detention and 
Other 
Secure 
Facilities, 
2-3 
(Nov. 
28, 
2006), 
http://www.justicepolicy.org/research/1978 ("[T]here is credible 
and significant research that suggests that the experience of 
detention may make it more likely that youth will continue to 
engage in delinquent behavior, and that the detention experience 
may increase the odds that youth will recidivate, further 
compromising public safety."). 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
49 
 
¶94 Finally, Ninham seeks sentence modification on the 
grounds that the circuit court relied on an improper factor when 
imposing his sentence.  Specifically, Ninham argues that the 
circuit 
court 
improperly 
based 
Ninham's 
sentence 
on 
the 
religious views of Vang's family.  Ninham directs us to the 
point in the sentencing transcript in which the circuit court 
noted, 
"I 
find 
it 
incredibly 
interesting 
and 
somewhat 
significant that not only am I being asked to impose a sentence 
in this matter, which is my obligation and my responsibility, 
but I'm being asked to release a soul."  
¶95 Our review of a sentencing determination is limited to 
whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion.  
State v. Harris, 2010 WI 79, ¶30, 326 Wis. 2d 685, 786 
N.W.2d 409. 
 
A 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
exercises 
its 
discretion when it "imposes its sentence based on or in actual 
reliance upon clearly irrelevant or improper factors."  Id.  The 
defendant bears the burden of demonstrating by clear and 
convincing evidence that the circuit court actually relied upon 
an improper factor when imposing the defendant's sentence.  Id., 
¶34. 
¶96 We agree with Ninham that a circuit court may not base 
its sentencing decision upon the defendant's or the victim's 
religion.  However, in this case, Ninham has failed to 
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the circuit 
court actually relied upon the religious views of Vang's family 
when imposing Ninham's sentence.  There is no doubt that the 
circuit court's comment on "being asked to release a soul" was a 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
50 
 
reference to the statement provided by Vang's brother, Seng Say, 
in which he informed the court that "[i]n our Hmong culture we 
believe that the spirit of a murdered person cannot be set free 
to go in peace until the perpetrators be brought to justice."  
However, other than pointing out the link between the circuit 
court's comment and Seng Say's statement, Ninham offers no 
argument to support the circuit court's actual reliance upon the 
Vangs' Hmong beliefs.  Rather, when the circuit court's comment 
is considered in context, it is clear that the circuit court was 
not actually relying upon the Vangs' religious beliefs but 
instead was merely commenting on Ninham's character, namely, his 
intolerance of other cultures and his negative attitude:  
I'm being asked to release a soul.  I have to comment 
on that because that's an interesting clash of 
cultures, 
and 
it's 
what 
we're 
all 
about 
as 
a 
people. . . .    
And everything I know about you, Omer, and 
everything I've gleaned about you from your——from the 
information that's been provided to me, you dealt with 
those things [o]ppositionally.  You weren't willing to 
let 
those 
cultures 
and 
those 
different 
ideas 
intermingle.  It had to be your way or no way at all.   
The character of the offender is among the primary factors that 
a circuit court must consider when imposing a sentence.  Paske, 
163 Wis. 2d at 62.  In addition, to the extent that the circuit 
court commented on the unique and particularized impact felt by 
Seng 
Say 
and 
his 
family, 
that 
too 
was 
an 
appropriate 
consideration: "'A statement from the victims about how the 
crime 
affected 
their 
lives 
is 
relevant 
to 
one 
of 
the 
considerations 
that 
a 
judge 
must 
take 
into 
account 
at 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
51 
 
sentencing——the gravity of the crime.'"  State v. Gallion, 2004 
WI 42, ¶65, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197 (quoting State v. 
Voss, 205 Wis. 2d 586, 595, 556 N.W.2d 433 (Ct. App. 1996)). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶97 First, we hold that sentencing a 14-year-old to life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole for committing 
intentional homicide is not categorically unconstitutional.  We 
arrive at our holding by applying the two-step approach employed 
by the United States Supreme Court, most recently in Graham, 130 
S. Ct. 2011.  First, we conclude that Ninham has failed to 
demonstrate 
that 
there 
is 
a 
national 
consensus 
against 
sentencing a 14-year-old to life imprisonment without parole 
when the crime is intentional homicide.  Second, we conclude in 
the exercise of our own independent judgment that the punishment 
is not categorically unconstitutional. 
¶98 In regard to Ninham's second argument, we conclude 
that his sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility 
of parole is not unduly harsh and excessive.  Under the 
circumstances of this case, Ninham's punishment is severe, but 
it is not disproportionately so. 
¶99 Third, we conclude that Ninham has not demonstrated by 
clear and convincing evidence that the scientific research on 
adolescent brain development to which he refers constitutes a 
"new factor."  While the studies themselves may not have been in 
existence at the time of Ninham's sentencing, the conclusions 
they reached were widely reported. 
No. 
2008AP1139   
 
52 
 
¶100 Fourth, we conclude that Ninham has not demonstrated 
by clear and convincing evidence that the circuit court actually 
relied upon the religious beliefs of Vang's family when imposing 
Ninham's sentence. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2008AP1139.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶101 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment issue before this 
court is easy to state and difficult to decide.  The question 
before the court is the constitutionality of imposing a death-
in-prison sentence on a 14-year-old juvenile boy who committed 
an intentional, brutal, senseless, grotesque, reprehensible 
murder of a 13-year-old innocent stranger.   
¶102 In Wisconsin, both the adult offender and the juvenile 
offender (10 years old or older) who have committed first degree 
intentional homicide are treated the same: the maximum penalty 
is a death-in-prison sentence, that is, life in prison without 
the possibility of parole.  The circuit court need not impose 
this maximum sentence.  It did in the present case. 
¶103 A death-in-prison sentence is the most severe penalty 
authorized in Wisconsin.  This penalty means that "whatever the 
future might hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the young 
juvenile], he will remain in prison for the rest of his days."1  
A death-in-prison sentence is an especially severe punishment, 
made harsher for a young juvenile 14 years old or younger 
because of the increased time and proportion of life that the 
juvenile will serve in prison.2             
¶104 I conclude, as has the United States Supreme Court, 
that the differences between juveniles and adults mean that 
juvenile offenders "cannot with reliability be classified among 
                                                 
1 Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 944 (Nev. 1989). 
2 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027-28 (2010). 
No.  2008AP1139.ssa 
 
2 
 
the worst offenders."  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 
(2005); see also Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 
(2010).3  Retribution is a legitimate penological goal, but 
retribution 
"must 
be 
directly 
related 
to 
the 
personal 
culpability of the criminal offender."  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 
2028.  "[T]he case for retribution is not as strong with a minor 
as with an adult."  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028 (quoting Roper, 
543 U.S. at 569-70).  Accordingly, I conclude, as the nonparty 
brief of the Wisconsin Council on Children and Families urges, 
that the United States Supreme Court's analysis in Roper and 
Graham supports the holding that a juvenile cannot be sentenced 
to life without parole for a homicide committed when 14 years 
old or younger. 
¶105 I discuss first the presumption of constitutionality 
and second the constitutional issue presented.   
I 
¶106 The majority opinion relies heavily on the presumption 
of constitutionality.  I conclude that no presumption of 
constitutionality applies in the present case.   
¶107 This case does not involve, as the majority opinion 
claims, an attack on the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.183(1)(am), 
which 
provides 
that 
courts 
of 
criminal 
                                                 
3 The three general differences are: (1) juveniles have a 
lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility  
resulting in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions; 
(2) juveniles are more susceptible to negative influences and 
outside pressures; and (3) the character of a juvenile is not as 
well formed as that of an adult.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551, 569-70 (2005).   
No.  2008AP1139.ssa 
 
3 
 
jurisdiction have original jurisdiction over "a juvenile who is 
alleged to have attempted or committed a violation of s. 
940.01 . . . on or after the juvenile's 10th birthday."  Nor 
does this case involve an attack on the constitutionality of the 
first-degree homicide statute, Wis. Stat. § 940.01, or the 
penalties that apply to that statute.    
¶108 Instead, this case involves a challenge to the 
application of those statutes to a category of individuals, 
namely a challenge to a death-in-prison sentence for a juvenile 
who committed an intentional homicide when 14 years old or 
younger.  
¶109 A "categorical challenge" is, in my opinion, an "as 
applied" challenge.  Stating the challenge as a categorical 
challenge is just a different way of stating an "as applied" 
challenge.  In other words, the present case can be denominated 
a "categorical challenge" or can be denominated an "as applied" 
challenge.  They are the same in the present case.  The former 
challenge is stated as a challenge to the application of the 
statutes to all 14-year-olds who commit intentional homicide.  
The latter challenge is stated as a challenge to the application 
of the statutes to Ninham solely because he was 14 years old 
when he committed intentional homicide.  Of course, a decision 
saying that the statutes cannot be applied to Ninham solely 
because he is 14 years old would apply to all other 14-year-olds 
who commit intentional homicide.   
¶110 According to Tammy W.-G. v. Jacob T., 2011 WI 30, ¶49, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (in which I join Justice 
No.  2008AP1139.ssa 
 
4 
 
Bradley's 
dissent), 
"no 
presumption 
[of 
constitutionality 
exists] in regard to whether the statute was applied in a 
constitutionally sufficient manner." (emphasis added).  Rather, 
the constitutional analysis to be applied, according to Tammy 
W.-G., to "an as-applied challenge" "differs from case to case, 
depending on the constitutional right at issue." 
¶111 The majority's reliance (¶44) on a strong presumption 
of constitutionality of the statute is therefore contrary to 
Tammy W.-G. 2011 WI 30, ¶49, and Roper 543 U.S. at 563.  On the 
basis of Tammy W.-G., the majority should be holding that no 
presumption of constitutionality applies in the present case. 
¶112 Moreover, a presumption of constitutionality is not 
relevant in the present case, in which the constitutional right 
at issue is the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment.  In cases involving categorical challenges 
under 
the 
Eighth 
Amendment, 
a 
court 
exercises 
its 
own 
independent 
judgment, 
considering 
the 
culpability 
of 
the 
offender and the nature of the offense, the relationship of the 
challenged 
sentencing 
practice 
to 
penological 
goals, 
and 
society's evolving standards of decency.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 
563-64; Graham v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 
(2010).  How can there be a presumption of constitutionality 
when the court is not only exercising its own independent 
judgment but doing so on the basis of, inter alia, evolving 
standards of decency?   
¶113 Thus, in contrast to the majority, I conclude that no 
presumption of constitutionality applies in the present case.   
No.  2008AP1139.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶114 I turn now to the constitutional issue presented. 
II 
¶115 The Eighth Amendment, applicable to the States through 
the Fourteenth Amendment, provides:  "Excessive bail shall not 
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted."      
¶116 The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment is amorphous.  Cruel and unusual punishment 
is not defined or delineated in the federal Constitution.  
Rather, the United States Supreme Court has declared that what 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment changes with society's 
views:  The Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and 
unusual punishment "draw[s] its meaning from the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society."4  Thus the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishment is not a constant.  The prohibition is 
constantly evolving, reflecting the changes in society.        
¶117 Over the last decade, the United States Supreme Court 
has been developing the "evolving standards of decency" central 
to the analysis of the Eighth Amendment for juveniles and those 
whose intellectual capacity is not that of an adult.   
¶118 The United States Supreme Court has categorically 
prohibited a death penalty sentence for individuals whose 
intellectual functioning is in a low range.  Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304 (2002).   
                                                 
4 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality 
opinion). 
No.  2008AP1139.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶119 The United States Supreme Court has categorically 
prohibited a death penalty sentence for juveniles who committed 
their crimes before the age of 18.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551 (2005).5  
¶120 The United States Supreme Court has categorically 
prohibited a death-in-prison sentence for juveniles (under 18 
years) who committed non-homicide crimes.  Graham v. Florida, 
130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).    
¶121 A next logical question is whether a death-in-prison 
sentence for a juvenile who committed an intentional homicide 
crime is categorically prohibited.6  The United State Supreme 
Court has yet to take up the following issue: whether a death-
in-prison sentence for a juvenile 14 years old or younger who 
committed an intentional homicide is categorically prohibited. 
¶122 The United States Supreme Court has recognized that 
juvenile offenders are less culpable than adult offenders and 
generally the younger the juvenile offender, the more his or her 
culpability diminishes.7  See also majority op., ¶74.   
¶123 The task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains 
the court's task.  "The judicial exercise of independent 
judgment requires consideration of the culpability of the 
                                                 
5 See also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) 
(categorically prohibiting the death penalty for a crime 
committed by a juvenile while under the age of 16). 
6 See Adam Liptak & Lisa Faye Petak, Juvenile Killers in 
Jail for Life Seek a Reprieve, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 2011, at 
A13. 
7 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.  
No.  2008AP1139.ssa 
 
7 
 
offenders at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, 
along with the severity of the punishment in question.  In this 
inquiry 
the 
Court 
also 
considers 
whether 
the 
challenged 
sentencing practice serves legitimate penological goals."8  
¶124 Recognizing that juveniles have less culpability than 
adults and so are less deserving of the most severe punishments, 
the United States Supreme Court has declared unconstitutional 
under 
the 
Eighth 
Amendment 
severe 
penalties 
imposed 
on 
juveniles.9  "The juvenile should not be deprived of the 
opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and self-recognition 
of human worth and potential."  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032.        
¶125 Case law and the research on which case law is based 
teach that there are marked differences between juvenile 
offenders and adult offenders in their cognitive abilities.10  
"The difference in mental development between a child and an 
adult . . . is a major premise of the United States Supreme 
Court's decisions in Roper and in Graham . . . ."11  Juveniles, 
and especially young juveniles, categorically have lessened 
                                                 
8 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (citations omitted).  The 
penological goals are retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, 
and rehabilitation.  None justifies a death-in-prison sentence 
for a 14-year-old child. 
9 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569. 
10 This accepted distinction has led to a continued trend in 
recent years of trying fewer teenage defendants in adult courts.  
See Mosi Secret, States Try Fewer Teenage Defendants in Adult 
Courts, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 2011, at A1. 
11 Missouri v. Andrews, 329 S.W.3d 369, 379 (Mo. 2010) 
(Wolff, J., dissenting). 
No.  2008AP1139.ssa 
 
8 
 
culpability.12  The nonparty brief of the Wisconsin Psychiatric 
and the Wisconsin Psychological Associations, recognizing this 
marked and well understood difference, advises that "[w]ell 
accepted psychology and psychiatry studies, including those upon 
which Roper and Graham relied in holding that juveniles cannot 
be deprived of their liberty irretrievably, require that the 
judgment sentencing Omer Ninham to life imprisonment without 
parole be vacated."   
¶126 Wisconsin law has similarly recognized that young 
juveniles under the age of 15 are unprepared for adult 
responsibilities and should be treated as a distinct group of 
juveniles in need of protection.13   
¶127 The case law and the research on which the cases are 
based teach that caution should be used in allowing a judge to 
decide at sentencing that a young juvenile is incorrigible or 
has an "irretrievably depraved character."14  "'[I]ncorrigibility 
is inconsistent with youth.'"15  A ruling that a juvenile who 
                                                 
12 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032; Roper, 543 U.S. at 572-73. 
13 Juveniles under 15 years of age may be held in secure 
custody only in a juvenile detention center or the juvenile 
portion 
of 
a 
county 
jail. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 302.18(7), 
938.138(1m)(a). 
Fourteen-year-olds are incapable of consenting to sexual 
activity.  Wis. Stat. §§ 948.01, 948.02, & 948.09.  Fourteen-
year-old crime victims also receive extra protections under 
certain sexual offense statutes.  Wis. Stat. §§ 948.02, 948.09, 
948.075, 967.04. 
14 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026. 
15 Graham, 
130 
S. 
Ct. 
at 
2029 
(quoting 
Workman 
v. 
Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. 1968)). 
No.  2008AP1139.ssa 
 
9 
 
committed a homicide at the age of 14 does not have the capacity 
to ever mature and reform or be reincorporated in society is 
categorically untrustworthy.  "If trained psychiatrists with the 
advantage of clinical testing and observation refrain, despite 
diagnostic expertise, from assessing any juvenile under 18 as 
having antisocial personality disorder, we conclude that States 
should refrain from asking jurors to issue a far graver 
condemnation . . . ."16  More complete and accurate information 
is needed about the child (and the adult that he or she may 
become) because "[e]xperience has taught us to be cautious when 
reaching high consequence conclusions about human nature that 
seem to be intuitively correct at the moment."  State v. 
Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶36, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197.     
¶128 In addition to the culpability of juveniles, a court 
must consider the "objective indicia of society's standards, as 
expressed in legislative enactments and state practice."17  The 
majority opinion concludes that no national consensus exists 
against sentencing a 14-year-old or younger juvenile to death in 
prison for intentional homicide.  Majority op., ¶57.  I examine 
the data and come to the opposite conclusion.     
¶129 That 36 states allow a juvenile 14 years old or 
younger to be sentenced to death in prison for the crime of 
homicide does not undermine a national consensus against the 
practice.  Three states have now moved away from death-in-prison 
                                                 
16 Roper, 543 U.S. at 573. 
17 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 
572). 
No.  2008AP1139.ssa 
 
10 
 
sentences for juveniles.18  However, the absence of legislation 
prohibiting a particular sentence is not conclusive evidence of 
society's 
current 
standard 
of 
decency. 
 
In 
addition 
to 
legislation, "[a]ctual sentencing practices are an important 
part of the inquiry into consensus."  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 
2023.      
¶130 The extreme infrequency with which death-in-prison 
sentences are imposed on children for homicides committed when 
14 years old or younger demonstrates that there is a national 
consensus against such sentences.  Only 73 juveniles in 18 
states are serving a death-in-prison sentence for homicide 
committed when 14 years old or younger.  Majority op., ¶56.  
Sixteen states have a sentencing statute that results in 
mandatory death-in-prison sentences for juveniles that commit 
intentional homicide.19  In contrast, according to statistics 
supplied by the defendant's brief based on data from the 
Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance, since 1995 1,153 
juveniles were arrested in Wisconsin for murder, and only Omer 
Ninham has been sentenced to life in prison without parole for a 
homicide committed when 14 years old or younger.  
¶131 The national data on sentencing practices analyzed in 
the instant case are significantly similar to the data in Graham 
regarding the imposition of sentences of life without parole for 
                                                 
18 California (In re Nunez, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 242 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2009)); Colorado (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 17-22.5-104(IV)); 
Texas (Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.31(b)(1)). 
19 Andrews, 329 S.W.3d at 383 (Wolff, J., dissenting). 
No.  2008AP1139.ssa 
 
11 
 
juveniles who committed non-homicide crimes.  In Graham, 123 
juveniles 
in 
11 
states 
were 
serving 
life-without-parole 
sentences for non-homicide cases, Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2011, 
and the United States Supreme Court found a national consensus 
that a sentence of death in prison for non-homicide cases was 
cruel and unusual punishment.20   
¶132 Just as the United States Supreme Court determined in 
Graham that there was a national consensus against juveniles 
being sentenced to life without parole for non-homicide crimes, 
I conclude on the basis of the infrequency with which death-in-
prison 
sentences 
are 
imposed 
for 
homicides 
committed 
by 
juveniles under 15 that there is a national consensus against 
death-in-prison sentences for homicide crimes committed when a 
juvenile is 14 years old or younger.  The national consensus 
against such sentences strongly supports the conclusion that 
such sentences are cruel and unusual. 
¶133 Applying the rationale used by the United States 
Supreme Court in Eighth Amendment cases, I conclude that the 
Wisconsin statute allowing the imposition of a death-in-prison 
sentence for a homicide committed when a juvenile is 14 years 
old violates the constitutional prohibition of cruel and unusual 
punishment.  This case lies on the boundaries of an evolving 
standard of decency that underlies the analysis of Eighth 
                                                 
20 Similarly, as asserted by Ninham, the absolute numbers of 
the sentence before this court are substantially comparable to 
the pertinent number of sentences in Roper (72) and in Atkins 
(71).  See Brief of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner Omer Ninham 
at 24-25.   
No.  2008AP1139.ssa 
 
12 
 
Amendment rights.  Applying the analyses the Supreme Court 
applied in Graham and Roper, consistent with the analysis the 
Court applied in Atkins21 and Thompson,22 and the historic 
recognition under Wisconsin law of the vulnerability of young 
juveniles, I conclude that a death-in-prison sentence for an 
intentional homicide committed when a juvenile is 14 years old 
or younger is unconstitutional.   
¶134 My conclusion is buttressed by the same kind of 
research-based evidence that the United States Supreme Court has 
relied upon to declare:  (1) juveniles categorically have 
lessened culpability; (2) juveniles are more capable of change 
than adults and their actions are less likely to evidence 
"irretrievably depraved character" such that a decision at 
sentencing 
could 
be 
made 
that 
they 
are 
incapable 
of 
reconciliation with society; (3) penological justifications do 
not support a sentence that denies all hope for reconciliation 
with society; and (4) the sentence of death in prison is 
especially harsh on young juveniles.    
¶135 Just as society's standards of decency categorically 
do not allow a juvenile to be sentenced to death, juveniles 14 
years old or younger should not be sentenced to death in prison. 
¶136 Omer Ninham's sentence guarantees he will die in 
prison without any meaningful opportunity to obtain release, no 
matter what he might do to demonstrate that the heinous act he 
committed as a 14-year-old is not representative of his true 
                                                 
21 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
22 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
No.  2008AP1139.ssa 
 
13 
 
character.23  I conclude the death-in-prison sentence subjecting 
the 
14-year-old 
to 
"hopeless, 
lifelong 
punishment 
and 
segregation is not a usual or acceptable response to childhood 
criminality, even when the criminality amounts to murder."24 
¶137 For the reasons set forth, I dissent.   
¶138 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent.         
 
                                                 
23 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027; Naovarath, 779 P.2d at 944. 
24 Naovarath, 779 P.2d at 947. 
No.  2008AP1139.ssa 
 
 
 
1