Title: Hutchins v. Talbert

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and Millette, JJ., 
and Carrico and Russell, S.JJ. 
 
 
DEBRA A. HUTCHINS, M.D., ET AL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     OPINION BY 
v. 
Record No. 081632 
 
 
  JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
          
 
  November 5, 2009 
RITA TALBERT 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA 
Lisa Bondareff Kemler, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal we consider whether an order denying a 
motion to set aside the verdict is a final judgment for 
purposes of appeal when the trial judge has rendered final 
judgment in a separate, previously entered order, which is not 
vacated, suspended, or modified by the order ruling upon the 
motion to set aside the verdict. 
 
Rita S. Talbert filed a complaint against Debra A. 
Hutchins, M.D. and Alexandria Surgery, Ltd. (collectively 
“Hutchins”), along with other defendants, for medical 
malpractice.  The jury subsequently awarded Talbert a verdict 
in the amount of $4 million.  The amount of the verdict was 
reduced by the circuit court to $885,000, taking into account 
Talbert’s earlier settlement with the other defendants and the 
application of the statutory limit on medical malpractice 
damages.  Code §§ 8.01-35.1 and -581.15. 
 
On April 25, 2008, the circuit court entered an order 
entitled “Final Order.”  The final order renders judgment in 
favor of Talbert against Hutchins in the amount of $885,000 
plus post-judgment interest, and it concludes:  “AND THIS CAUSE 
IS ENDED.” 
On that same date, the circuit court also entered a 
separate “Suspending Order.”  The suspending order states: 
It is ORDERED that the final Order be suspended for 
fourteen (14) days from this date.  This tolls the 
running of the twenty-one (21) day provision in Rule 
1:1, thus allowing a total of thirty-five (35) days 
for entry of an Amended Final Order.  
 
Subsequently, Hutchins filed a motion to set aside the 
verdict.  On May 28, 2008, the circuit court entered an order 
denying the motion to set aside the verdict.  This May 28, 2008 
order addresses only the motion to set aside the verdict; it 
does not refer to the final order in any manner.  The circuit 
court entered no other orders in the case thereafter.  Hutchins 
filed a notice of appeal on June 19, 2008. 
Talbert has filed a motion to dismiss Hutchins’ appeal.  
Talbert asserts that the suspension of the circuit court’s 
final judgment order ended on May 9, 2008.  Talbert contends 
that because the final judgment for Talbert was not thereafter 
modified, vacated, or suspended, Hutchins was required, 
pursuant to Rule 5:9, to file a notice of appeal within thirty 
days of May 9, 2008.  Talbert claims that Hutchins’ notice of 
appeal, filed on June 19, 2008, was not timely, and that 
Hutchins’ appeal should be dismissed as a result thereof. 
 
 
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Hutchins claims that their notice of appeal was timely 
filed.  Hutchins concedes that if Hutchins had not filed a 
timely post-trial motion, or if a timely motion was filed but 
not ruled upon while the circuit court retained jurisdiction, 
the April 25, 2008 final order would have been the circuit 
court’s final judgment for purposes of appeal.  However, 
Hutchins asserts that, because they filed a post-trial motion 
and the circuit court denied that motion in a written order 
while the circuit court still had jurisdiction, the circuit 
court’s May 28, 2008 order denying the motion for a new trial 
is the final judgment of the circuit court for purposes of Rule 
5:9.  Noting that they filed their notice of appeal on June 19, 
2008, which was within thirty days of May 28, 2008, Hutchins 
asserts that their notice of appeal was timely.  
Rule 5:9(a) states as follows: 
No appeal shall be allowed unless, within 30 days 
after the entry of final judgment or other appealable 
order or decree, or within any specified extension 
thereof granted by this Court pursuant to Rule 5:5(a), 
counsel for the appellant files with the clerk of the 
trial court a notice of appeal and at the same time 
mails or delivers a copy of such notice to all 
opposing counsel. 
 
Rule 5:9(a). 
 
Rule 5:5(a) states that the time prescribed for filing a 
notice of appeal is mandatory.  The Rule further states:  
The time period for filing the notice of appeal is 
not extended by the filing of a motion for a new 
 
 
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trial, a petition for rehearing, or a like pleading 
unless the final judgment is modified, vacated, or 
suspended by the trial court pursuant to Rule 1:1 
. . . .  In any such case the time for filing shall 
be computed from the date of final judgment entered 
following such modification, vacation, or suspension 
. . . . 
 
Rule 5:5(a). 
 
Rule 1:1 provides:  
All final judgments, orders, and decrees, irrespective 
of terms of court, shall remain under the control of 
the trial court and subject to be modified, vacated, 
or suspended for twenty-one days after the date of 
entry, and no longer. . . . The date of entry of any 
final judgment, order, or decree shall be the date the 
judgment, order, or decree is signed by the judge. 
 
Rule 1:1. 
 
 
The circuit court entered final judgment for Talbert on 
April 25, 2008.  Also on April 25, 2008, the circuit court 
entered an order suspending the final judgment order for 
fourteen days.  The date of entry of any final judgment, order, 
or decree is the date the judgment, order, or decree is signed 
by the judge.  Rule 1:1.  However, in this case, as allowed by 
Rule 1:1, the circuit court suspended the entry of the final 
order for fourteen days. 
 
The fourteen day time period set forth in the suspending 
order of April 25 was self-executing, expiring by the terms of 
the order on May 9, 2008.  When the suspension expired on May 
9, 2008, the final order took effect.  See Wagner v. Shird, 257 
Va. 584, 587, 514 S.E.2d 613, 614-15 (1999).  The twenty-one 
 
 
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day time period under Rule 1:1 during which the court could 
modify, vacate, or suspend the final judgment, and the thirty 
day time period under Rule 5:9 for filing a notice of appeal, 
began to run on that date.  
 
Hutchins filed a motion to set aside the verdict.   The 
circuit court entered an order on May 28, 2008, denying the 
motion to set aside the verdict.  Rule 5:5(a) clearly states 
that the time period for filing the notice of appeal is not 
extended by the filing of a motion for a new trial, a petition 
for rehearing, or a like pleading unless the final judgment is 
modified, vacated, or suspended by the circuit court pursuant 
to Rule 1:1.  Thus, the motion to set aside the verdict did not 
extend the period for filing the notice of appeal.  Also, 
because the court’s May 28, 2008 order denying the motion to 
set aside the verdict did not modify, vacate, or suspend the 
final judgment, the order denying the motion to set aside the 
verdict also failed to extend the time for filing a notice of 
appeal. 
 
Because the final judgment, which took effect on May 9, 
2008, was not modified, vacated, or suspended by the circuit 
court pursuant to Rule 1:1, Hutchins had thirty days from May 9 
to file a notice of appeal.  Therefore, pursuant to Rule 5:9, 
Hutchins’ notice of appeal needed to have been filed on or 
 
 
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before June 9, 2008.∗  The notice of appeal filed by Hutchins on 
June 19, 2008, is untimely. The time prescribed for filing the 
notice of appeal is mandatory.  Rule 5:5(a). 
 
Accordingly, Talbert’s motion to dismiss Hutchins’ appeal 
is granted.  Hutchins’ appeal in this case will be dismissed. 
Dismissed. 
                     
∗ June 8, 2008, was a Sunday.  Pursuant to Code § 1-210, 
the last day to file would have been Monday, June 9, 2008. 
 
 
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