Title: Idaho v. Daly

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 44383 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
       Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
JAMES GREER DALY, 
 
       Defendant-Appellant. 
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Boise, February 2017 Term 
 
2017 Opinion No. 31 
 
Filed: April 12, 2017 
 
Stephen Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Deborah A. Bail, District Judge. 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP, Boise, for appellant. Dennis A. 
Benjamin argued.  
 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 
Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.  
_____________________ 
 
BRODY, Justice 
This case reviews a district court’s denial of a defendant’s motions to substitute counsel 
and to continue his sentencing.  
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In May 2012, James Greer Daly was charged with six felony counts of Lewd and 
Lascivious Conduct with a Minor Under Sixteen.  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Daly pleaded 
guilty to one count. At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, Daly moved to substitute 
counsel. The district court denied the motion.  Daly then moved to continue the hearing, so that 
new counsel could be present for sentencing. The district court also denied this motion, 
indicating “[w]e have already continued the sentencing in this case for a month to get an 
additional mental health evaluation, and I don’t think that would be a sensible course of action.”  
The district court then sentenced Daly to twenty years, with three years fixed, and retained 
jurisdiction.  
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Daly filed a timely notice of appeal. In February 2013, his appeal was dismissed for 
failure to pay the required $100 fee. In November 2013, Daly initiated post-conviction 
proceedings, asserting, among other things, ineffective assistance of counsel. Nearly all of Daly’s 
claims were dismissed with prejudice. The district court did find that counsel was ineffective in 
failing to notify Daly of the $100 appeal fee, and on that claim only, granted post-conviction 
relief. To enable Daly to appeal his conviction, instead of amending the judgment, the district 
court re-entered judgment nunc pro tunc. Daly again filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case 
was assigned to the Court of Appeals.  
The Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that: (1) it had jurisdiction over Daly’s 
claims under the nunc pro tunc judgment because it related back to the original judgment and 
enabled Daly to appeal any issues in the original judgment; and (2) Daly did not receive the “full 
and fair” hearing he should have received on his motion to substitute counsel. Accordingly, the 
Court of Appeals remanded for a hearing on the motion to substitute counsel and the motion for 
a continuance. The State petitioned this Court for review of the Court of Appeals decision, 
specifically on the question of whether the duty to inquire into the reasons for requesting 
substitute counsel applies to retained counsel. This Court granted the State’s petition for review.  
Prior to hearing before this Court, Daly moved to dismiss his appeal and vacate the Court of 
Appeals decision because he had been granted parole. The State concurred in the motion, 
provided the Court of Appeals decision was vacated in the dismissal. This Court denied the 
motion and heard oral argument. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear Daly’s appeal. 
2. Whether the district court erred in denying Daly’s motion to substitute counsel and his 
motion to continue the sentencing hearing so he could retain different counsel. 
III. 
 STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“When reviewing a case on petition for review from the Court of Appeals this Court 
gives due consideration to the decision reached by the Court of Appeals, but directly reviews the 
decision of the trial court.” State v. Schmierer, 159 Idaho 768, 770, 367 P.3d 163, 165 (2016).  
“Constitutional issues are pure questions of law over which this Court exercises free review.”  
Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 561, 149 P.3d 833, 836 (2006). A trial court’s decision to grant 
or deny a motion to substitute counsel is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  State v. Nath, 137 
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Idaho 712, 714–15, 52 P.3d 857, 860–61 (2002). Similarly,“[t]he decision to grant or deny a 
continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.”  State v. Tapia, 127 Idaho 249, 
255, 899 P.2d 959, 965 (1995). Abuse of discretion review entails a three-part inquiry: “(1) 
whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court 
acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards 
applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason.” Schwan’s Sales Enters., Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dept., 142 Idaho 826, 831, 136 P.3d 297, 
302 (2006).  
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. This Court’s jurisdiction is proper.  
The State asserts that this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this case because the 
relevant Notice of Appeal was not filed within 42 days of the original judgment as required by 
Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a), but only within 42 days of the re-entered judgment. According to the 
State, because the errors alleged by Daly related to matters underlying the original judgment, 
timeliness as to the re-entered judgment was insufficient. However, the State also acknowledged 
(in a footnote) that “if Daly prevailed in a post-conviction action, and if the remedy ordered in 
that case was restoration of appeal rights through re-entry of judgment” then this Court’s 
jurisdiction over his claims is proper. As noted above, in the post-conviction proceeding, the 
district court held that Daly’s counsel had been ineffective in allowing his timely appeal to be 
dismissed and re-entered judgment nunc pro tunc with the express purpose of allowing Daly to 
appeal from the original judgment. Thus, given the State’s acknowledgement of this Court’s 
jurisdiction under the circumstances stated, this contention is deemed waived.   
B. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Daly’s motion to substitute 
counsel and the subsequent motion to continue. 
 
1. 
The district court’s denial of Daly’s motion to substitute counsel did not 
infringe upon his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice.  
 
Daly’s chief contention is that the district court erroneously denied his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel of choice when it denied his motion for substitute counsel and the connected 
motion to continue. Because this is a constitutional question, this Court exercises free review.  
State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 417, 348 P.3d 1, 32 (2015).  
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The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence.” In Idaho, this right is also protected by Article I, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution.  
For indigent defendants, the right to counsel includes the right to appointed counsel. Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 606 P.2d 1000 (1980). It also 
includes the effective assistance of that counsel.  Clayton, 100 Idaho at 897, 606 P.2d at 1001.  If 
a defendant is dissatisfied with appointed counsel, he may move for substitute counsel. Upon 
such a motion, the trial court must “afford defendant a full and fair opportunity to present the 
facts and reasons in support of his motion for substitution of counsel.” Id. at 898, 606 P.2d at 
1002. The decision to grant or deny the motion is then within the discretion of the trial court. Id. 
at 897, 606 P.2d at 1001. 
Another element of the right to counsel “is the right of a defendant who does not require 
appointed counsel to choose who will represent him.” U.S. v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144 
(2006). Indeed, “the right to counsel of choice does not extend to defendants who require counsel 
to be appointed for them.” Id. at 151. Instead, when the defendant can afford to pay his own 
attorney, the right to counsel “commands . . . that the accused be defended by the counsel he 
believes to be the best.” Id. at 146.  However, this right is not unlimited. Wheat v. U.S., 486 U.S. 
153, 159 (1988) (“The Sixth Amendment right to choose one’s own counsel is circumscribed in 
several important respects. . . . an advocate who is not a member of the bar may not represent 
clients (other than himself) in court. Similarly, a defendant may not insist on representation by an 
attorney he cannot afford or who for other reasons declines to represent the defendant.”). The 
United States Supreme Court has also recognized “a trial court’s wide latitude in balancing the 
right to counsel of choice against the needs of fairness . . . and against the demands of its 
calendar.” Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 152 (internal citations omitted).   
Here, Daly exercised his right to choice of counsel by retaining his attorney. His motion 
for substitution of counsel at the sentencing hearing was the first intimation of dissatisfaction 
with his representation. In fact, in the colloquy with the district court prior to its acceptance of 
his guilty plea, Daly indicated that he understood the terms of his plea, that he had had enough 
time to discuss them with his attorney, and that there was nothing that he wanted his attorney to 
do that had not been done. This exchange, when viewed together with the fact that Daly’s 
sentencing hearing had previously been delayed for a month at his request, strongly suggests that 
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Daly’s request for substitute counsel evinced a desire to delay sentencing rather than 
dissatisfaction with counsel. Regardless of the actual motive for the motion to substitute counsel, 
the district court acted within the boundaries of its discretion in denying the request. The court’s 
response to the request—“I’m not going to let counsel be shifted at this stage,”— indicates that 
the court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary. Further, although Daly claims his motion 
was summarily denied, the court (as explained below) was not required to inquire into his 
reasons for wishing to replace his retained counsel. The district court’s reasoning was further 
explained after Daly’s connected motion to continue when the court indicated that the hearing 
had already been delayed for a month at defendant’s request and that further delay would not be 
sensible. The decision to grant or deny this motion was within the district court’s discretion.  
Daly’s guilty plea was accepted by the Court on August 2nd. Sentencing was originally 
scheduled on September 17th, but was continued to October 15th. At any time during the two 
months between when the plea was entered and sentencing was undertaken, Daly could have 
moved to substitute counsel. Instead, he waited until the beginning of the sentencing hearing to 
communicate his dissatisfaction with counsel. The court acted well within its discretion in 
deciding the motion, including appropriate consideration of the needs of fairness and the 
demands of its calendar. Thus, the district court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion, 
applied correct legal standards to the choices before it and acted within the boundaries of its 
discretion. There was no abuse of discretion.  
2. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Daly’s motion to 
continue.  
 
After denial of his motion to substitute counsel, Daly immediately moved to continue the 
hearing so alternative counsel could represent him. The court also denied this motion, indicating 
that further delay would not be sensible.  
As a general rule, “broad discretion [is] granted [to] trial courts on matters of 
continuances; only an unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of 
justifiable request for delay violates the right to assistance of counsel.” Morris v. Slappy, 461 
U.S. 1, 11–12 (1983) (internal quotations omitted). In Idaho, “[t]he motion for continuance is 
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the action of the court will be upheld 
unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Laws, 94 Idaho 200, 202, 485 P.2d 
144, 146 (1971).   
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Daly did not indicate other counsel he preferred to retain nor did he indicate any steps he 
had taken in the time between trial and sentencing to retain new counsel. In short, he did not 
have other counsel ready to proceed. Thus, the district court acted well within its discretion in 
denying the motion.   
C. The district court was not required to conduct a hearing on Daly’s motion to substitute 
counsel. 
 
Daly argues that the district court should have inquired into his reasons for seeking new 
counsel, as required by Clayton. The State responds that a defendant is entitled to a hearing on a 
motion to substitute court-appointed counsel because he must show “good cause” before 
substitute counsel can be appointed, and that extending this requirement to retained counsel 
would be a “blatant infringement” on the defendant’s right to counsel of choice. We agree. 
Clayton and Nath require that the defendant have a “full and fair” opportunity to discuss 
with the court reasons for wanting to substitute appointed counsel.  Clayton, 100 Idaho at 898, 
606 P.2d at 1002; Nath, 137 Idaho at 715, 52 P.3d at 860. But because Daly had retained 
counsel, he was free to substitute counsel at any time during the proceedings, so long as the 
change did not substantially interfere with the efficient administration of justice and the need for 
fairness to all parties. The court does not have a duty to inquire into a defendant’s reasons for 
wishing to substitute retained counsel. Daly was free to offer the reasons for his motion, but did 
not take that opportunity. The court was available to listen to any reasoning Daly wished to put 
forth. It did not cut him off or interrupt. Daly had the opportunity—at the time of the motion—to 
set forth his reasoning, if he wished to do so. But the court was not under a duty to inquire into 
his reasons for terminating retained counsel. Requiring inquiry or a separate hearing with 
sufficient reasoning before a motion to substitute retained counsel was granted would infringe 
upon Daly’s constitutional right to counsel of choice.  
We see good reason to differentiate between retained and appointed counsel in motions to 
substitute counsel. Appointed counsel is employed at public expense and should not be dismissed 
for reasons that would serve little purpose but to add to taxpayer cost. Retained counsel, on the 
other hand, is employed at the defendant’s expense. The defendant is thus free to dispense with 
retained counsel at any time and for any reason, so long as the change does not substantially 
interfere with the efficient administration of justice and the need for fairness to all parties.  
Requiring courts to inquire into a defendant’s reasons for wishing to substitute retained counsel 
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would constitute an unconstitutional infringement on defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel of choice.     
V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence of the 
district court. 
 
 
Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices EISMANN, JONES and HORTON CONCUR.