Title: State v. Walker

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

STATE OF MARYLAND v. LAWRENCE JOSEPH WALKER
NO. 23, SEPTEMBER TERM, 1996
Residual exception to hearsay rule — exceptional circumstances
required as condition of admissibility — exercise of spousal
privilege not to testify under Courts article § 9-106 ordinarily
does not constitute exceptional circumstance.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
                  
No. 23
                  
September Term, 1996
__________________________________
                 
STATE OF MARYLAND
                 v.
                 
LAWRENCE JOSEPH WALKER
__________________________________
        Bell, C.J.
        Eldridge
        Rodowsky
        Chasanow
        Karwacki
        Raker
        Wilner,
                 JJ.
__________________________________
Opinion by Wilner, J.
  Chasanow, J., dissents.
__________________________________
        Filed:  April 10, 1997
Respondent, Larry Walker, was convicted in the Circuit Court
for Montgomery County of robbery with a deadly weapon, for which he
was sentenced to 15 years in prison.  The Court of Special Appeals
reversed that judgment on the ground that certain out-of-court
statements made by respondent's wife, Robin Walker, and testimony
by two detectives regarding those statements should not have been
admitted into evidence.
The statements at issue were concededly hearsay and were not
admissible under any of the categorical exceptions to the hearsay
rule set forth in Maryland Rules 5-803 or 5-804.  When Ms. Walker,
summoned as a State's witness, exercised her privilege under
Maryland Code, § 9-106 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
article, not to testify against her husband, the court found her to
be "unavailable" and admitted her extra-judicial statements and the
detectives' testimony regarding them under the residual exception
set forth in Rule 5-804(b)(5).  We granted certiorari to consider
whether the statements were wrongfully admitted.  We hold that they
were and therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Special
Appeals.
I. BACKGROUND
The incident giving rise to the charges against respondent
occurred around 4:00 a.m. on June 10, 1994.  The victim, Jose
Iraheta, was riding his bicycle to work when a man accosted him,
threw him off his bike, stuck a knife to his stomach, and demanded
money.  Iraheta gave his wallet to the robber, who took $60 and
- 2 -
fled.  Iraheta provided the police with a description of the
robber, noting that he was a black male and was wearing a green
hooded "sweater."  Mr. Iraheta later identified respondent in court
as the man who robbed him.
A few days after the robbery, Ms. Walker contacted county
police officer Ivan Langford with some information about the
robbery.  Ms. Walker was not then married to respondent but was his
girlfriend and the mother of his children.  After speaking with her
at a shelter where she was staying, Langford consulted with
Detective Klarko who, along with Detective Bauers, interviewed Ms.
Walker at her father's home on June 15, 1994.
Ms. Walker told the detectives that on June 11 — the day after
the robbery — she and respondent were walking along Twinbrook
Parkway; as a police car passed by, respondent attempted to hide
his face.  When she questioned him about that, he admitted to her
that he had committed a robbery the previous day.  Specifically, he
said that he had robbed an Hispanic man of $60, that he was wearing
a hooded green sweatshirt at the time with the hood pulled over his
face, and that he had thrown the sweatshirt away.  The next day —
June 12 — they were together again in front of the Halpine View
apartment complex.  Respondent said that he needed to retrieve the
sweatshirt he was wearing during the robbery.  He went behind the
complex, returned with a green sweatshirt, and threw it into a
dumpster on Twinbrook Parkway.
The detectives, separately, made notes of Ms. Walker's
- 3 -
      That part of the statement, along with parts dealing with
1
other robberies to which respondent admitted, was redacted from
the version admitted into evidence and given to the jury.  It is
in the full version of the statement signed by Ms. Walker and was
placed in the record as an exhibit offered for identification
only.
statement, and she later signed both versions.  According to
Detective Klarko, Ms. Walker said that she had lived with
respondent for a while but "couldn't handle it so she moved out."
As recorded in his notes, she said that she had known respondent
since 1989, that they had lived together intermittently since then,
that in the past month he had been "doing more crack cocaine than
usual," and that in March she moved from the apartment they had
been sharing because she could no longer handle his drug use — it
"was a bad influence on the kids."   
1
On September 1, 1994, Ms. Walker and respondent were married.
Before trial commenced on January 12, 1995, Ms. Walker informed the
State, which had summoned her as a witness, that she intended to
invoke her privilege under Cts. & Jud. Proc. article, § 9-106 and
refuse to testify against her husband.  The State then moved, in
limine, to have her signed statements to Detectives Klarko and
Bauers admitted.  At the in limine hearing, defense counsel noted
his understanding that Ms. Walker made her statement to the police
"because she wanted [respondent] to get some help for his drug
problem," to which the prosecutor replied, "I believe that is
- 4 -
      There is nothing in the record to indicate why Ms. Walker
2
made the statements.  During her brief testimony at the in limine
proceeding, she was not asked and did not volunteer the reason. 
Detectives Klarko and Bauers were asked whether she had given
such a reason, and they both said that they could not recall. 
Ms. Walker and respondent had been living apart for over three
months when she contacted Officer Langford and made the
statements, although according to her statement to Detective
Klarko, they still saw each other regularly.  On what basis
counsel developed the notion that she made the statements to get
respondent help for his drug problem is not clear.
accurate." 2
 Respondent objected to the statements on the ground that they
were hearsay, that they did not fall within any of the exceptions
to the hearsay rule set forth in Md. Rules 5-803, 5-804, or 5-805,
and that general reliability was not an adequate basis upon which
to justify their admission.  He pointed out that the statements
were actually written by the detectives and did not purport to be
a verbatim repetition of what Ms. Walker may have said and that,
if, indeed, they were given in desperation in order to get him
help, they were not necessarily reliable.
The court concluded that the statements were admissible under
the holding of the Court of Special Appeals in Metz v. State, 9 Md.
App. 15, 262 A.2d 331 (1970), and under Rule 5-804(b)(5).  With
respect to the rule, the court first found that, by exercising her
privilege not to testify against her husband, Ms. Walker was
unavailable to the State as a witness and that the situation was
"unique."  It held that the statements were being offered as
evidence of a material fact and that they were more probative of
- 5 -
      The court stated, "In this case as I understand the
3
proffer from the State, the victim in this case is more likely
than not unable to identify his assailant in this case."  There
is no evidence in the record before us of any such proffer by the
State at or prior to the in limine hearing.
In his opening statement to the jury, the prosecutor said
that he did not know whether Mr. Iraheta "is going to be able to
identify Mr. Walker as the person who robbed him . . . ."  In
fact, as we indicated, the prosecutor asked Mr. Iraheta whether
he could identify his assailant and he did so, without
equivocation.  We do note, however, that, despite that positive
identification, Mr. Iraheta acknowledged on cross examination
that he did not see the face of the person who robbed him.  He
apparently had told the investigating officer that the assailant
had a hood pulled tightly over his head, for that is asserted in
the Statement of Charges filed by the police.  
that fact than any other evidence that the State was able to
procure through reasonable efforts.  Based on a proffer from the
State, which is not in the record and which, in any event, turned
out to be inaccurate, the court assumed that the victim would be
unable to identify the assailant.   It further found that the
3
general purpose of the rules and the interest of justice would best
be served by admission of the statements and that the statements
appeared to be reliable.  That last finding was premised on the
assumption that Ms. Walker implicated appellant in order to get him
help for his drug problem.
Mr. Iraheta was the first witness.  As noted, he identified
respondent as the robber.  When Officer Langford and Detectives
Klarko and Bauers were then called and began to testify about Ms.
Walker's statements, respondent objected and received a continuing
objection to that line of inquiry.  The testimony was allowed, and
redacted versions of the two statements written by the detectives
- 6 -
and signed by Ms. Walker were admitted into evidence.
In his initial brief filed in the Court of Special Appeals,
respondent argued that the statements were inadmissible under Md.
Rule 5-804(b)(5) because they did not fall within the "rare and
exceptional circumstances contemplated by the rule" and because
they did not have "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness."
In a reply brief, he added, for the first time, the contention
that, because the crime occurred before the July 1, 1994 effective
date of the new rules of evidence, Rule 5-804(b)(5) was
inapplicable and the statements should have been excluded under
previous Maryland common law.  That argument was based on the
provision in this Court's order formally adopting the Title 5 rules
of evidence that those rules were to 
"take effect July 1, 1994 and shall apply in
all trials and hearings commenced on or after
that date; provided, however, that . . . no
evidence shall be admitted against a defendant
in a criminal action in proof of a crime
committed prior to July 1, 1994, unless that
evidence would have been admissible under the
law and Rules in effect on June 30, 1994
. . . ."
The Court of Special Appeals concluded, in the first instance,
that, because the trial commenced after July 1, 1994, Rule 5-
804(b)(5) was applicable.  It determined that, as a result, the
initial inquiry was whether the evidence was admissible under that
rule.  If the evidence was admissible under the rule, a second
inquiry was necessitated by the conditional language in our order,
namely, whether the evidence also would have been admissible under
- 7 -
preexisting common law.  Walker v. State, 107 Md. App. 502, 522-23,
668 A.2d 990, 999-1000 (1995).
With that framework, the appellate court held that the trial
court erred in admitting the evidence under Rule 5-804(b)(5)
because it failed (1) to make a clear finding that an exceptional
circumstance existed and (2) to consider all of the factors bearing
on whether the statements possessed circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness, both of which, it held, were required by the rule.
Id. at 526.  In the first regard, the Court noted that, unlike its
Federal counterpart, Md. Rule 5-804(b)(5) allows admission only
under "exceptional circumstances," and it held that, upon finding
such circumstances, the trial court is bound to "state on the
record the factual findings supporting his [or her] conclusion."
Id. at 527.  No such explicit findings were made in this case.
With 
respect 
to 
the 
circumstantial 
guarantees 
of
trustworthiness, the Court looked to the factors enunciated in
Simmons v. State, 333 Md. 547, 636 A.2d 463, recons. denied (Mar.
4, 1994), cert. denied, Maryland v. Simmons, 513 U.S. 815, 115 S.
Ct. 70 (1994), and Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co.,
286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961) as those necessary to consider.  From
Simmons, the Court extracted three factors — (1) the age,
education, experience, and condition of the declarant, (2) the
spontaneity of the statement, and (3) the motive of the declarant.
From Dallas County, the Court drew another three factors — whether
(1) the circumstances are such that a sincere and accurate
- 8 -
statement would naturally be uttered and no plan of fabrication
would be formed, (2) even if a desire to falsify might be present,
other considerations, such as the danger of easy detection or fear
of punishment would probably counteract its force, and (3) the
statement was made under such conditions of publicity that an
error, if it had occurred, would probably have been detected and
corrected.  Walker, supra, 107 Md. App. at 529-30, 668 A.2d at
1003-04.
Having recited those factors, the Court observed that
reliability was supported by counsel's understanding (for which, as
we have observed, there was no evidence in the record) that Ms.
Walker gave the statement because she wanted respondent to get help
for his drug problem, that the spontaneity of the statement was
indicated by the fact that she initiated the interview and gave the
statement in a non-hostile environment, and that, because she was
not a suspect, she had no motive to lie to mitigate her involvement
or overstate that of her then-boyfriend.  It noted, however, that
there were other factors bearing on reliability that the court
should have considered as well — the fact that Ms. Walker waited
four days to call the police, which detracted from the supposed
spontaneity of the statement, and the possibility that her personal
problems with respondent may have motivated her to fabricate a
story out of anger or for some other purpose.  Id. at 530-31.
The trial court was directed, on remand, to make specific
findings as to each conditional element in Rule 5-804(b)(5) and if,
- 9 -
after doing so, it were to conclude that the statement is
admissible under the rule, to consider whether the statement also
would have been admissible under common law, as it existed prior to
July 1, 1994.  Because that issue — the secondary inquiry — had not
been clearly raised or decided in the circuit court, the Court of
Special Appeals made no ruling on it.  Citing Foster v. State, 297
Md. 191, 464 A.2d 986 (1983), recons. denied, 297 Md. 230 (1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073, 104 S. Ct. 985 (1984), Brown v. State,
317 Md. 417, 564 A.2d 772 (1989), and a number of treatises and
commentaries, the Court of Special Appeals observed that this Court
had, in at least two circumstances, approved the admission of
hearsay statements not falling within any of the recognized
categorical exceptions, but it expressed no view on whether Ms.
Walker's statement would be admissible under any common law non-
categorical exception.
In this Court, the State urges that 
"[w]here Walker denied the State direct access
at trial to his extrajudicial admissions by
marrying the hearer of those admissions, and
where 
there 
were 
other 
circumstances
indicating the reliability of the admissions
as reported by the hearer to the police, the
trial court properly admitted the report of
the admissions under the residual hearsay
exception."
In support of that argument, the State takes issue with the
Court of Special Appeals' conclusion that it is incumbent on the
trial court to articulate on the record its reasoning process and
its findings on each constituent element in Rule 5-804(b)(5).  In
- 10 -
that regard, the State posits, alternatively, that, if we decide to
review the trial court's decision on a de novo basis, as a pure
question of law, the trial court's reasoning process and findings
become irrelevant and that, even if we were to review that decision
as a discretionary one, we should apply the presumption that the
court properly performed its duties and not insist that its thought
process be laid out on the record.  In particular, the State notes
that a specific finding of exceptional circumstances is not
required and that, even if it were, the record indicates such a
finding by the trial court.
On the merits, the State urges that Ms. Walker's statement was
admissible under the residual exception — that the recent marriage
of Ms. Walker and respondent created an exceptional circumstance
and that her statement did have equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness.  With minimal analysis, it adds that
the statement would have been admissible under Maryland common law
as well, citing Tyler v. State, 342 Md. 766, 679 A.2d 1127 (1996)
for that proposition.
Not surprisingly, respondent has a different view.  He
contends that an explicit finding of exceptional circumstance is
necessary and that, not only was no such finding made but no such
circumstance existed — that "[t]here is nothing `exceptional' about
a wife refusing to testify against her husband or about a woman
falsely accusing her husband or boyfriend of criminal behavior out
of anger."  For essentially the same reason, he argues that the
- 11 -
statements possessed no equivalent circumstantial guarantee of
trustworthiness — that "[a] statement to the police by a girlfriend
claiming that her boyfriend has confessed a crime to her is not
inherently reliable."  Even if the statements were admissible under
the rule, he continues, they would not have been admissible under
preexisting common law because, in his opinion, this Court had not
adopted an equivalent residual exception as a matter of common law.
II.  DISCUSSION
A.  Metz v. State
As we observed, at trial the State argued that Ms. Walker's
statements were admissible under the ruling of the Court of Special
Appeals in Metz v. State, supra, 9 Md. App. 15, 262 A.2d 331, and
the trial court found that to be the case, using Metz as an
alternative basis for admissibility.  That ruling was neither
challenged by respondent nor offered by the State as an alternative
basis for affirmance in the Court of Special Appeals.  None of the
briefs even cited Metz, and, not surprisingly, it was not mentioned
in the appellate court's opinion.
Neither party has cited Metz in this Court.  We mention it
simply because, at the State's urging, it was relied upon by the
trial court.  Metz did not involve a residual exception, although
it did present a partially analogous fact situation.  Mr. Metz was
charged with, and convicted of, assaulting his wife.  When the case
came to trial, Mrs. Metz exercised her privilege under the then-
- 12 -
current version of § 9-106 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
article and declined to testify against her husband.  The court
then allowed the police officer who was called to the scene to
recount what he saw upon arrival — Mrs. Metz with a knot on her
head and a mutilated arm and a shotgun on the floor with a spent
shell — and Mrs. Metz's statement that "she didn't do it."  Id. at
18.
On appeal, Metz argued that his wife's statement was
inadmissible under the statute, as it was covered by the privilege,
and that, in any event, it was inadmissible as hearsay.  The Court
of Special Appeals held that the statute simply precluded a spouse
from being compelled to "testify," that Mrs. Metz had not been so
compelled, and that the Legislature did not intend "to exclude
statements, otherwise admissible, voluntarily made by one spouse to
police officers, simply because that spouse refuses to testify
against the other."  Id. at 19-20 (emphasis added).  Because the
hearsay issue had not been decided by the lower court, the Court of
Special Appeals held that it was not preserved for appellate
review, although the Court did, as dicta, express its view that the
statement "was part of the res gestae."
Apart from the fact that that aspect of Metz was mere dicta,
both this Court and the Court of Special Appeals have, since Metz
was decided, abandoned the once-popular notion of a res gestae
exception to the hearsay rule, which, accordingly, is no longer
- 13 -
part of our law of evidence.  B & K Rentals v. Universal Leaf, 324
Md. 147, 596 A.2d 640 (1991); Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 536
A.2d 666, cert. denied, 312 Md. 602, 541 A.2d 965 (1988).  Metz
does not, therefore, support the admission of a non-testifying
spouse's out-of-court statements against a hearsay objection, and
certainly not under a residual exception.
B. Md. Rule 5-804(b)(5) And Its History
(1) Maryland Common Law
Prior to 1994, this Court, though on rare occasion allowing
hearsay statements that did not fall within any of the recognized
categorical exceptions to be admitted, had never formally or
directly recognized a general residual exception to the hearsay
rule, much less defined the scope or contour of such an exception.
See Cain v. State, 63 Md. App. 227, 492 A.2d 652 (1985), cert.
denied, 304 Md. 300, 498 A.2d 1186 (1985); Cassidy v. State, supra.
Because it has been suggested that we may have done so, or come
close to doing so, in Foster v. State, supra, 297 Md. 191, 464 A.2d
986, and Brown v. State, supra, 317 Md. 417, 564 A.2d 772, and
because, as noted, the State, citing Tyler v. State, supra, 342 Md.
766, 679 A.2d 1127, contends that we did, in fact, recognize such
an exception equivalent in scope to Rule 5-804(b)(5), we need to
examine those cases.
Doris Foster was sentenced to death for murdering the manager
- 14 -
of a motel in which Foster and her husband resided.  At trial, she
attempted to show that her husband may have committed the murder.
The husband testified that he had had several confrontations with
the victim over nonpayment of rent.  On cross-examination, he was
asked whether, on a particular occasion a few weeks before the
murder, he had threatened the victim in response to her asking for
payment of past-due rent, and he denied having done so.  Foster
then offered testimony from a friend of the victim that the victim
had called her around that time in an agitated state, complained
that she was in fear of her life, and asserted that the husband had
threatened to kill her.  The court, though finding that there was
"a necessity" for the hearsay testimony, nonetheless sustained the
State's objection on the ground that it was not sufficiently
reliable.
On appeal, the defendant contended, not that the testimony was
admissible under some exception to the hearsay rule, but rather
that "the application of the hearsay rule, which prevented her from
presenting a portion of her defense, rendered her trial
fundamentally unfair and deprived her of due process of law."  Id.
at 202.  In an opinion authored by Judge Davidson, which was
initially filed as an opinion of the Court (four judges joining),
but which, on reconsideration, became a plurality opinion joined in
by only three judges, this Court, relying upon Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S. Ct. 1038 (1973) and Green v.
Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 99 S. Ct. 2150 (1979), found merit in
- 15 -
Foster's complaint.
Judge Davidson's opinion does not purport to recognize any
form of residual exception to the hearsay rule.  Indeed, she made
clear that the Court was not considering "whether under Maryland
law the hearsay rule would exclude such testimony . . . ."  Foster,
supra, 297 Md. at 210, 464 A.2d at 996.  Rather, the opinion
expressed the view that "[r]egardless of whether the proffered
testimony is inadmissible because of Maryland's hearsay rule, under
the facts of this case, its exclusion deprived the accused of a
fair trial in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."  Id.  The clear thrust of the opinion was a recognition
that the evidence was, indeed, barred by the common law hearsay
rule, despite the reliability and trustworthiness that the judges
joining that opinion accorded it, id. at 211, but that, under the
circumstances, that common law bar was trumped by the supervening
requirement of due process.
Upon the filing of the opinion in Foster, the State moved for
reconsideration.  The motion was summarily denied, but Judge
Eldridge filed an opinion concurring in the denial.  In that
opinion, he expressed the view that the decision should not have
rested on a Constitutional basis and that the proffered evidence
should have been admitted under State common law.  In that regard,
he cited G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Pub. Co., 207 F. 515 (2d
Cir. 1913), appeal dismissed, 237 U.S. 618, 35 S. Ct. 708 (1915),
- 16 -
and Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., supra, 286
F.2d 388, for the proposition that hearsay evidence that is
necessary, trustworthy, relevant, and material may be admissible
even if it does not fall within one of the recognized categorical
exceptions.  He was careful, however, not to embrace Fed. R. Evid.
803(24) which, he observed, had "led to some excesses with which I
could not agree" but simply declared that "the type of hearsay
evidence involved in this case" was admissible.  Id. at 234.
Merriam and Dallas County were mentioned again, for the same
proposition, in Brown v. State, supra, 317 Md. 417, 564 A.2d 772.
That case involved the revocation of Brown's probation based on a
finding that, in violation of a condition of his probation, he
possessed two guns.  The State's knowledge that Brown had been in
possession of the guns came from one Robin Bruce, who had them in
his car when he was arrested.  Bruce was charged with their
possession, pled guilty, and, when facing sentencing and asked by
the judge where he had obtained the guns, he implicated Brown.
When later called as a defense witness in the trial of one
Williams, who had been a passenger in the car, Bruce testified more
precisely that Brown had given him the guns and asked that he hold
them until Brown could sell them.
Bruce was called as a witness at Brown's revocation hearing,
but he declined to testify.  The State then succeeded in having
admitted into evidence the transcripts of Bruce's statement at his
guilty plea and sentencing proceeding and his testimony at
- 17 -
Williams's trial.  The issue on appeal was whether that constituted
error.
The statements recorded in the transcripts constituted
hearsay, and Brown objected on both State hearsay and Federal
confrontation grounds.  In State v. Fuller, 308 Md. 547, 520 A.2d
1315 (1987), this Court had held that, in probation revocation
proceedings, the formal rules of evidence were not applicable and
that reasonably reliable hearsay may be received.  It was not
necessary, therefore, against a hearsay objection, to find a
recognized exception — either categorical or residual.  Against a
confrontation challenge, however, the court had to engage in a
multi-level inquiry.  It needed to determine, first, whether the
evidence fell within any of the exceptions to the hearsay rule,
and, if it did, whether the exception and the evidence satisfied
the criteria of the Confrontation Clause.  If the evidence was not
admissible under the rules applicable to revocation proceedings or
the Confrontation Clause, it could not be admitted "unless it
satisfies the standard of reasonable reliability and the trial
judge makes, and states in the record, a specific finding of good
cause."  Id. at 553.
Brown simply applied that approach to the circumstances.
Bruce's statements, we concluded, could not be admitted as a
declaration against penal interest — the only hearsay exception
offered — because, given the context in which they were made, they
possessed little indicia of reliability, a prerequisite established
- 18 -
in State v. Standifur, 310 Md. 3, 526 A.2d 955 (1987).  We turned,
then, to whether the evidence was admissible under the relaxed
standards applicable to revocation proceedings and the "good cause"
exception to the ordinary requirements of confrontation.  It was in
that context that we observed, at 426:
"The proposition that hearsay evidence may be
sufficiently reliable to justify its admission
where necessary to further the cause of
justice, even though it does not fall within a
recognized exception is not new. [citing
Merriam and Dallas County.]  This general
principle has now achieved recognition in the
Federal Rules of Evidence.  See Fed. R. Evid.
803(24) 
and 
804(b)(5). 
 
The 
rule 
that
reasonably reliable hearsay evidence may be
admitted in probation revocation hearings is a
logical extension of that proposition."
The 
Court 
went 
on 
to 
declare 
that 
the 
concept of
reasonableness "embraced in the relaxed rule of admissibility of
`reasonably reliable' hearsay evidence" includes a consideration of
whether the evidence addressed only a technical matter that must be
proved or went to the heart of the defendant's conduct.  Id.
(emphasis added).  The indicia of reliability that would support
the former might not suffice to support the latter.  In the Brown
case, we held that the hearsay evidence was not peripheral but went
to the heart of Brown's culpability and that it was not
sufficiently reliable to warrant admission, even under the relaxed
standards applicable to revocation proceedings.  Id. at 427.
Compare Bailey v. State, 327 Md. 689, 612 A.2d 288 (1992), applying
the same analysis but finding the disputed hearsay evidence
- 19 -
sufficiently reliable to be admitted under the relaxed standards
applicable to a probation revocation proceeding; and cf. Bergstein
v. State, 322 Md. 506, 588 A.2d 779 (1991), allowing the use of
reliable hearsay at a conditional release proceeding.
As is our view with respect to Foster, we find nothing in
Brown (or Bailey or Bergstein) even remotely suggesting the
adoption by this Court of a residual hearsay exception equivalent
to our current Rule 5-803(b)(24) or 5-804(b)(5).  Nor did we adopt
any such rule in Tyler v. State, supra, as the State contends.
In Tyler, Tyler and Eiland had been charged with murdering
James Bias.  They were initially tried together and each was
convicted — Tyler of first degree murder, Eiland of second degree
murder.  Those convictions were reversed because of an improper use
of peremptory challenges by the State.  Tyler v. State, 330 Md.
261, 623 A.2d 648 (1993).  On remand, the defendants succeeded in
having their cases severed, even though the Court of Special
Appeals, in the earlier appeal, had held that severance was not
necessary.  Eiland v. State, 92 Md. App. 56, 73-74, 607 A.2d 42, 51
(1992).  Eiland was tried first; he placed all of the blame on
Tyler and was acquitted.  At Tyler's trial, the State called Eiland
as a witness but, contemptuously, he refused to testify.  The State
then succeeded in having a transcript of Eiland's testimony at his
second trial admitted, and Tyler was again convicted of first
degree murder.
A majority of the Court of Special Appeals, hearing the case
- 20 -
in banc, affirmed, justifying admission of Eiland's recorded
testimony as an inconsistent statement and as an extrajudicial
identification.  Tyler v. State, 105 Md. App. 495, 666 A.2d 986
(1995).  We reversed, holding that the hearsay statement was not
inconsistent with any testimony given by Eiland and did not
constitute an extrajudicial identification.  Tyler v. State, supra,
342 Md. at 776, 779, 679 A.2d at 1132, 1133.  In this Court, the
State, for the first time, also attempted to justify admission of
the statement under a "residual hearsay exception."  Because that
issue had not been raised below, we expressly did not decide it
but did note that, even if the issue had been raised below,
Eiland's testimony would not have been admissible because it did
not possess the sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness required
by that exception.  Id. at 780-81.  That is hardly a holding
incorporating into our common law a residual exception equivalent
in scope and content to Md. Rule 5-804(b)(5).
None of this is to say, of course, that the common law of
evidence, either before or since the adoption of title 5 of the
Maryland Rules, was entirely static, for it was, and is, not.  The
essence of the common law — indeed the heart of its enduring value
and majesty — is its flexibility, its potential and allowance for
development and growth, and that is as much the case with respect
to the law of evidence, and the hearsay rule in particular, as it
- 21 -
      Md. Rule 5-102 now explicitly articulates that principle,
4
directing that the rules of evidence be construed, among other
things, to "promote the growth and development of the law of
evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and
proceedings justly determined."
is in other areas of the law.  
4
The hearsay rule itself was a common law rule, born in the
1500's and nurtured, at least in part, by concern over the effect
of its absence.  See LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 801.1 (1987 &
Supp. 1995); Howard S. Chasanow and José Felipé Anderson, The
Residual Hearsay Exceptions: Maryland's Lukewarm Welcome, 24 U.
BALT. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1994).  The exceptions that were created over
time were also the product of common law development, and it has
never been reliably suggested that this Court is without authority
to craft new exceptions or to modify or abrogate existing ones as
the need might arise to do so.  The point simply is that, prior to
the adoption of the Title 5 rules of evidence, we had not,
decisionally, adopted a residual exception equivalent to Rule 5-
803(b)(24) or Rule 5-804(b)(5).  We had, in a few opinions, cited
or discussed Fed. R. Evid. 803(24) and 804(b)(5) and cases such as
Dallas County that applied a judicially-fashioned residual
exception, but we had not formally embraced them as part of
Maryland law.
(2) Development of Rules 5-803(b)(24) and 5-804(b)(5)
The development of these rules, containing a residual
- 22 -
      For purposes of this analysis, we are using 1961, when the
5
Chief Justice appointed a committee to study the feasibility and
advisability of drafting a code of evidence for use in Federal
courts, as the beginning point.  As pointed out by the
Commissioners on Uniform Laws in their prefatory note to the 1974
revision of the Uniform Rules of Evidence (with 1986 Amendments),
there is a much longer history.  UNIF. RULES OF EVID., 13A U.L.A. 3
(1994 & Supp. 1996) (prefatory note).  In 1923, the American Law
Institute considered the possibility of "restating" the law of
evidence but decided against the project at that time.  In 1938,
upon the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 21 of
which dealt with evidentiary matters, the Attorney General of the
United States suggested the formulation of rules of evidence for
adoption by the Supreme Court.  In 1942, under the guidance of
such luminaries as Edmund Morgan and John Wigmore, a Model Code
of Evidence was promulgated by the American Law Institute.  Using
that model code as a guide, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, in 1953, published the
Uniform Rules of Evidence, versions of which were adopted in
Kansas, California, and New Jersey.  Id. at 3-5.  As indicated in
the text of this opinion, however, and as acknowledged in the
Commissioners' prefatory note, the real impetus for the
development of evidence codes in the various States came when the
Federal Rules of Evidence were drafted and ultimately adopted by
Congress.
exception to the hearsay rule, has at least a 33-year history.  The
first 14 years were taken up with the development of the Federal
Rules of Evidence; State development consumed the remaining 19
years.5
A skeletal history of the Federal effort is provided in
Senate Judiciary Committee Report No. 93-1277, accompanying H.R.
5463.  1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7051.  That history
commenced in 1961, when the Judicial Conference of the United
States authorized the Chief Justice to appoint a committee to study
the advisability and feasibility of uniform rules of evidence for
use in Federal courts.  The committee was appointed; it recommended
that such rules be developed; and, in 1965, another committee — the
- 23 -
Advisory Committee — was appointed to draft the rules.  
The first draft emanating from the Advisory Committee was
published in 1969.  Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence
for the United States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D.
161 (1969).  In proposed Rule 8-03, the Committee took the position
that "under appropriate circumstances a hearsay statement is
inherently superior to, or at least as good as, testimony given by
the declarant in person at the trial . . . ."  Id. at 350 (Advisory
Committee's Note to proposed Rule 8-03).  Thus, the proposed rule
on hearsay exceptions was framed in terms of general conditional
admissibility, rather than in terms of general inadmissibility
subject to categorical exceptions.  Section (a) of the proposed
rule provided:
"A statement is not excluded by the hearsay
rule 
if 
its 
nature 
and 
the 
special
circumstances under which it was made offer
assurances of accuracy not likely to be
enhanced by calling the declarant as a
witness, even though he is available."
The rest of the proposed rule codified the recognized
categorical exceptions to the hearsay rule, not, however, as
exceptions to an exclusionary rule but as "illustrations" of
statements that would be admissible under section (a).  The
Advisory Committee cited Dallas County as support for its approach.
Id. at 351.
Following the consideration of comments received on that first
draft, a second draft was published in 1971.  Revised Draft of
- 24 -
Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and
Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971).  That draft took a very
different approach.  The Advisory Committee noted that the
traditional view of the common law was generally to exclude
hearsay, subject to numerous exceptions that were supposed to
furnish guarantees of trustworthiness, but that that scheme had
been criticized as bulky and complex, as failing to screen good
from bad hearsay realistically and as inhibiting the growth of the
law of evidence.  The Advisory Committee reported that it had
considered three options:  (1) abolishing the hearsay rule
altogether and admitting all hearsay; (2) admitting hearsay
possessing "sufficient probative force, but with procedural
safeguards;" and (3) revising the existing system of categorical
exceptions.  Id. at 409-11.
The Committee rejected the first approach, largely because the
Confrontation Clause would fill the void in criminal cases and
create a schism between criminal and civil cases.  It rejected the
second approach, which would have abolished categorical exceptions
in favor of "individual treatment in the setting of the particular
case," as "involving too great a measure of judicial discretion,
minimizing 
the 
predictability 
of 
rulings, 
enhancing 
the
difficulties of preparation for trial, adding a further element to
the already over-complicated congeries of pre-trial procedures, and
requiring substantially different rules for civil and criminal
cases."  Id. at 410.  It therefore opted for the traditional common
- 25 -
      Congress eventually eliminated the exception comprising
6
Rule 804(b)(5), so the residual exception, proposed as section
(b)(6), became section (b)(5).
law approach of a general exclusion of hearsay, subject to a list
of exceptions, and embodied that view in proposed Rules 803 and
804.  The first 23 exceptions to proposed Rule 803 and the first
five to Rule 804(b) were the familiar categorical ones.  The
Committee added as exception (24) to proposed Rule 803 and as
exception (6) to Rule 804(b), "[a] statement not specifically
covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having comparable
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness."  Id. at 422, 439.6
It explained, in relevant part, that the categorical exceptions
were designed to take advantage of the "accumulated wisdom and
experience of the past" but that
"[i]t would . . . be presumptuous to assume
that all possible desirable exceptions to the
hearsay rule have been catalogued and to pass
the hearsay rule to oncoming generations as a
closed system.  Exception (24) and its
companion provision in Rule 804(b)(6) are
accordingly included.  They do not contemplate
an unfettered exercise of judicial discretion,
but they do provide for treating new and
presently 
unanticipated 
situations 
which
demonstrate a trustworthiness within the
spirit of the specifically stated exceptions.
Within this framework, room is left for growth
and development of the law of evidence in the
hearsay area, consistently with the broad
purposes expressed in Rule 102."
Id. at 437 (emphasis added).
In November, 1972, after considering further comment and over
a dissent by Justice Douglas, who questioned the authority of the
- 26 -
      The draft contained 13 proposed rules on privileges.  Rule
7
501 provided that, except as required by the Constitution or
authorized by statute or the rules, a person had no privilege to
refuse to be a witness, refuse to disclose any matter, refuse to
produce an object or writing, or prevent another from being a
witness, disclosing a matter, or producing an object or writing. 
Ensuing rules codified privileges for communications between
lawyer and client, psychiatrist and patient, and husband and
wife, communications to clergymen, political votes, trade
secrets, state secrets, and identity of informers.
Court to adopt rules of evidence and the propriety of serving as a
conduit of them to Congress, the Supreme Court promulgated the
rules, with the residual exceptions articulated in the 1971 draft,
to take effect July 1, 1973.  Rules of Evidence for United States
Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972).  The Advisory
Committee Note to those exceptions, as quoted above, remained in
the draft.
Congress promptly suspended the effectiveness of the rules to
give it time to study them.  Act of March 30, 1978, Pub. L. No. 93-
12, 1973 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News (87 Stat. 9) 11.  The main
concern expressed at that time was not with the hearsay rule, but
with the proposed rules codifying certain privileges.   See S. Rep.
7
No. 93-1277, 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, supra, at 7052-54.
Indeed, the proposed rules on specific privileges were rejected by
Congress in favor of case-by-case development.  Id. at 7058-59.
The residual exception, as written in proposed Rules 803(24)
and 804(b)(6), was rejected by the House of Representatives on the
ground that it injected too much uncertainty into the law of
evidence and impaired the ability of practitioners to prepare for
- 27 -
trial.  The House believed that proposed Rule 102, directing the
courts  to construe the rules to  promote growth  and development,
- 28 -
would provide sufficient flexibility to admit hearsay in
appropriate cases under various factual situations that might
arise.  H.R. Rep. No. 93-650, 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News,
supra, at 7079.
The Senate disagreed.  It concluded that, absent a residual
exception, the categorical exceptions might become "tortured beyond
any reasonable circumstances which they were intended to include
. . ." and that, in any event, those exceptions "may not encompass
every situation in which the reliability and appropriateness of a
particular piece of hearsay evidence make clear that it should be
heard and considered by the trier of fact."  Id. at 7065.  Citing
Dallas County, supra, as an example, the Senate Judiciary Committee
expressed the belief that "there are certain exceptional
circumstances where evidence which is found by a court to have
guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to or exceeding the
guarantees reflected by the presently listed exceptions, and to
have a high degree of probativeness and necessity could properly be
admissible."  Id.
Though acknowledging the utility of a residual exception, the
Senate was unwilling to accept the broad version submitted by the
Supreme Court, which, it concluded, "could emasculate the hearsay
rule and the recognized exceptions or vitiate the rationale behind
codification of the rules."  Id. at 7066.  It approved, instead, a
residual exception "of much narrower scope and applicability."  Id.
To qualify for admission, a hearsay statement not covered by one of
- 29 -
the categorical exceptions would have to satisfy at least four
conditions:  (1) it must have "equivalent circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness"; (2) it must be offered as evidence of a
material fact; (3) the court must determine that the statement "is
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable
efforts"; and (4) the court must determine that the general purpose
of the rules and the interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement.  Id.
With those conditions, the Senate observed:
"It is intended that the residual hearsay
exceptions will be used very rarely, and only
in exceptional circumstances.  The [Judiciary]
committee does not intend to establish a broad
license for trial judges to admit hearsay
statements that do not fall within one of the
other exceptions contained in rules 803 and
804(b).  The residual exceptions are not meant
to authorize major judicial revisions of the
hearsay 
rule, 
including 
its 
present
exceptions.  Such major revisions are best
accomplished by legislative action.  It is
intended that in any case in which evidence is
sought to be admitted under these subsections,
the trial judge will exercise no less care,
reflection and caution than the courts did
under the common law in establishing the now-
recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule."
In concluding its discussion of the residual exception, the
Senate added an additional cautionary note:
"In 
order 
to 
establish 
a 
well-defined
jurisprudence, 
the 
special 
facts 
and
circumstances which, in the court's judgment,
indicates 
that 
the 
statement 
has 
a
sufficiently high degree of trustworthiness
and necessity to justify its admission should
- 30 -
be stated on the record.  It is expected that
the court will give the opposing party a full
and adequate opportunity to contest the
admission of any statement sought to be
introduced under these subsections."
The Conference Committee accepted the Senate version, although
it added to the text of the rule, as the fifth condition of
admissibility, the Senate "expectation" that a party seeking to
have evidence admitted under the residual exception notify adverse
parties in advance of its intention to do so and required that the
trial court make an actual finding that the evidence was of a
material fact and that the general purpose of the rules and the
interests of justice would best be served by admission of the
statement.  H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1597, 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News, supra, at 7105-06.
With those changes, Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) took effect,
along with the rest of the Federal Rules of Evidence, on July 1,
1975.
The Federal rules were designed, of course, for use in the
Federal courts.  Twenty-two years earlier, in 1953, a first draft
of Uniform Rules of Evidence was published.  UNIF. RULES OF EVID.,
supra, note 5, at 4.  That draft was revised in 1974 based on the
version of the proposed Federal rules approved by the Supreme Court
and submitted to Congress in 1972, and, once the Federal rules were
adopted, a number of States began to adopt evidence codes based on
the Federal and revised Uniform rules.  Uniform Rules 803(24) and
804(b)(5), as so revised, were nearly identical to their Federal
- 31 -
counterparts.  Id. at 5.
In 1976, a special subcommittee of this Court's Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, under the leadership
of Judge Lawrence F. Rodowsky, then a lawyer-member of the
Committee, began work on a code of evidence for Maryland.  In
February, 1977, the subcommittee completed work on draft rules.
Although they were based largely on the recently enacted Federal
rules, the subcommittee rejected the residual exception as
"creating too much uncertainty."  REPORT OF THE EVIDENCE RULES
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 91-
92, 94 (Feb. 1977).
In June, 1977, the Rules Committee asked whether this Court
desired the full Committee to proceed with the project.  We
answered in the negative, in part because of a concern over the
expansive manner in which some Federal courts had been construing
the residual exception.  It was not until October, 1988, by which
time approximately 35 States had adopted evidence codes based
largely on the Federal rules, that this Court authorized the Rules
Committee to proceed again to draft a code of evidence.  The letter
from Chief Judge Murphy noted, however, the Committee's assurance
that it had no predisposition simply to recommend adoption of the
Federal rules without some modifications.
After three years of work, the Evidence Subcommittee of the
Rules Committee produced a draft code of evidence for public
comment and consideration by the full Committee.  That draft did
- 32 -
not contain a residual exception, which was rejected by the
subcommittee.  See PROPOSED TITLE 5 OF THE MARYLAND RULES OF PROCEDURE:
EVIDENCE, SUBCOMMITTEE DRAFT, STANDING COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE (Spring, 1992).  After much discussion, the full Rules
Committee was evenly split on the advisability of a residual
exception.  In its 125th Report to this Court, transmitting
proposed title 5, the Committee advised that there was "no
sentiment" for a residual exception without limiting language and
a Committee Note, and that half of the Committee voted not to have
the exception at all.  125TH REPORT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 124 (July, 1993).  Those who favored the
exception did so on the condition that the text of the rule make
clear that any residual exception was to be used only "[u]nder
exceptional circumstances" and that the sentiments expressed by the
U.S. Senate in its Judiciary Committee Report, with some restyling,
be appended as a Rules Committee Note.
This Court agreed with those on the Rules Committee who opted
for a carefully limited residual exception.  We adopted the Federal
language but introduced it with the caveat that "[u]nder
exceptional circumstances" statements otherwise allowed under the
rule may be admitted.  We also approved an extensive Committee Note
expressing (1) our view that the residual exception was to "provide
for treating new and presently unanticipated situations" which
demonstrate a trustworthiness within the spirit of the specifically
stated exceptions, and (2) our intent that the residual exception
- 33 -
      This is not a requirement under Md. Rule 5-803(b)(24).
8
       In his dissent, Judge Chasanow argues that this is not a
9
condition to admissibility under the residual exception but is
merely descriptive.  His concern seems to be that, if regarded as
a condition, this element would preclude admission under
alternative theories.
Rules 5-803(b)(24) and 5-804(b)(5) seem quite clear.  The
only kind of statement that is subject to admission under those
rules is "[a] statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions . . . ."  We read that language as meaning
that, if the statement is specifically covered by another
exception, it does not qualify for admission under the residual
exception, for the very good reason that admission under that
exception would be unnecessary.  At the very least, it is hard to
imagine that there could be an "exceptional circumstance"
justifying admission under the residual exception if the evidence
is admissible under another exception.
Regarding this element as a prerequisite does not
necessarily preclude a court from admitting evidence under
"will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances."
Md. Rule 5-803(b)(24) (emphasis added).
C. Application Of The Rule
(1) Analytical Framework
From the foregoing discussion and a simple parsing of Rule 5-
804(b)(5), it is apparent that six conditions need to be satisfied
for evidence to be admissible under that rule:
(1) the witness must be "unavailable," as defined in
§ (a) of the rule;
(2) there must be "exceptional circumstances";8
(3) the statement must not be specifically covered by any
of the other exceptions;9
- 34 -
alternative theories, as feared by Judge Chasanow.  Without
becoming mired in the debate over "near misses," which we
expressly refrain from doing in this case, we think that it may
be possible for evidence potentially to qualify for admission
under a categorical exception, but for there to be a legitimate
dispute over whether, as a matter of law, as opposed to a matter
of fact, that exception applies, and for the court properly to
determine that, if the evidence does not legally qualify for
admission under the categorical exception, it would clearly
qualify under the residual exception.  If the court resolves the
legal issue in favor of coverage, it could admit the evidence
under the categorical exception but find that, should an
appellate court conclude that the evidence was legally
inadmissible under that exception, it would then be admissible
and would have been admitted under the residual exception.  This
kind of situation is not likely to arise very often, and, if it
does arise, the court would have to make all of the other
requisite findings necessary to justify admission under the
residual exception.  In that circumstance, if an appellate court
were, indeed, to conclude that the categorical exception did not
apply, it could affirm admission under the residual exception,
for the "otherwise specifically covered" condition would then be
satisfied.
- 35 -
(4) it must have "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness";
(5) the court must determine that (i) the statement is
offered as evidence of a material fact, (ii) the statement is more
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can produce through reasonable
efforts, and (iii) the general purposes of the rules and the
interests of justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence; and
(6) the proponent of the statement has given the
requisite advance notice of its intention to use the statement.
There is no dispute in this case over elements (1), (3), and
(6).  Ms. Walker was "unavailable" to the State as a witness; the
State never suggested that her statement was specifically covered
by any of the categorical exceptions; and respondent never
complained that he did not have sufficient advance notice of the
State's intention to offer the statement under Rule 5-804(b)(5).
The record indicates, moreover, that the court did make the three
findings required in element (5), and no specific challenge to
those findings was made by respondent in this Court or in the Court
of Special Appeals.  The issues, therefore, concern elements (2)
and (4) — whether an "exceptional circumstance" existed and whether
the statement had "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness," although necessarily implicit in those issues is
whether the court erred in concluding that the general purpose of
- 36 -
the rules and the interests of justice would best be served by
admission of Ms. Walker's statement.
In examining these issues, two threshold questions need to be
addressed:  what, if any, findings must the trial court make when
allowing or disallowing evidence under a residual exception, and
what standard of review do we apply when we consider the court's
ruling?  Those questions are obviously related.
The Court of Special Appeals, relying on Huff v. White Motor
Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 291 (7th Cir. 1979), the U.S. Senate Judiciary
Committee Report, supra, and an article in the University of
Baltimore Law Forum, concluded that the trial court "must state on
the record findings supporting the satisfaction of all of Rule 5-
804(b)(5)'s requirements."  Walker v. State, supra, 107 Md. App. at
527 n.11, 668 A.2d at 1002 n.11.  In particular, the Court held
that, if the judge finds the presence of exceptional circumstances,
he or she must "state on the record the factual findings supporting
his [or her] conclusion."  Id. at 527.  It also held that appellate
review of a trial judge's decision should be on a de novo basis —
whether the judge erred as a matter of law.  Id. at 518.
The State takes exception to both of those holdings.  It
acknowledges that the rule requires specific findings on element
(5) but asserts that no specific findings are required with respect
to whether exceptional circumstances exist or whether the statement
at issue has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness.  With some equivocation, the State accepts that a de novo
- 37 -
standard of review may be appropriate in examining whether
exceptional circumstances exist, as the legislative history of the
Maryland rule suggests a "policy concern" over that element, but it
maintains that a finding of "equivalent circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness" should be reviewed on either an abuse of
discretion basis or by examining whether that finding, which it
regards as being factual in nature, is clearly erroneous.
Respondent supports the Court of Special Appeals' conclusions that
findings are required and that they are to be reviewed on a de novo
basis.
We need to be careful, in considering the issue of required
findings, to make clear what findings we are addressing.  In all
events, it is necessary for the court to record whether it is, in
fact, admitting evidence under a residual exception.  There can be
no effective appellate review unless that much is done.
Accordingly, prejudicial evidence admitted over a timely and proper
objection will not be sustained on the basis of its admissibility
under a residual exception unless the trial court has made clear
that the evidence was admitted under that exception.  See United
States v. Nixon, 779 F.2d 126, 134 (2d Cir. 1985); U.S. v. Pelullo,
964 F.2d 193, 202-03 (3d Cir. 1992) (and cases cited therein),
reh'g denied, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 17,370 (July 27, 1992), appeal
after remand, 14 F.3d 881 (1994), and reh'g en banc denied, 1994
U.S. App. LEXIS 5413 (Mar. 22, 1994); United States v. Guevara, 598
F.2d 1094, 1100 (7th Cir. 1979); U. S. v. Hogan, 763 F.2d 697, 703
- 38 -
(5th Cir. 1985).  See also n.9, ante.
Beyond that, and notwithstanding that the actual text of the
rule purports to require findings by the trial court only with
respect to element (5), we believe that, when the rule is read in
light of its purpose and legislative history, it is incumbent on
the trial court to make a specific finding, on the record, as to
each conditional element.  Evidence is not admissible under the
residual exception unless each of the stated conditions is
satisfied.  Those conditions are in the nature of "[p]reliminary
questions concerning the . . . admissibility of evidence" under Md.
Rule 5-104(a), and it is necessary that the record reflect the
court's determination of them.  See Huff v. White Motor Corp.
supra, 609 F.2d at 291; United States v. Popenas, 780 F.2d 545, 548
(6th Cir. 1985); State v. Horsley, 792 P.2d 945, 952-53 (Idaho
1990); State v. Brown, 341 N.W.2d 10, 14 (Iowa 1983); Cummins v.
State, 515 So. 2d 869, 873-75 (Miss. 1987); State v. Deanes, 374
S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1101, 109 S.
Ct. 2455 (1989); State v. James Edward S., 400 S.E.2d 843, 850 (W.
Va. 1990); In Interest of C. B., 574 So. 2d 1369, 1373 (Miss.
1990).
The record indicates that the trial court considered the six
conditions and found that each was satisfied.  We therefore need
not determine here the consequences of a failure to touch that
- 39 -
      A number of courts have reversed or vacated judgments in
10
the absence of such findings.  See, for example, United States v.
Popenas, supra, 780 F.2d at 548; State v. Dammons, 464 S.E.2d 486
(N.C. App.), stay denied, writ denied, 465 S.E.2d 547 (N.C.
1995).  Others have proceeded either to determine for themselves
whether the evidence was admissible (State v. Daughtry, 459
S.E.2d 747 (N.C. 1995), cert. denied, Daughtry v. North Carolina,
___ U.S. ___, 116 S. Ct. 789 (1996); State v. Swindler, 450
S.E.2d 907 (N.C. 1994)) or have concluded that the lack of
findings was harmless error (People v. Fuller, 788 P.2d 741
(Colo.), reh'g denied, 1990 Colo. LEXIS 235 (Colo. App. 1990)). 
base.10
The principal concern expressed by the Court of Special
Appeals was not that the trial court failed to announce these
requisite findings but that it failed explain on the record how it
arrived at them — what factors it considered, what weight it gave
to those factors, and the reasoning process it employed.  Although
there is some authority for the proposition that trial courts must
make such a record, we do not believe that the failure to do so
necessarily requires remand or reversal.
As we indicated, in approving a residual exception (and
restoring it to the bill after its deletion by the House of
Representatives), the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee noted
that "[i]n order to establish a well-defined jurisprudence, the
special facts and circumstances which, in the court's judgment,
indicates that the statement has a sufficiently high degree of
trustworthiness and necessity to justify its admission should be
stated on the record."  S. Rep. No. 93-1277, 1974 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News, supra, at 7066.  Some of the commentators on the
- 40 -
Federal rules have echoed the sentiment of the Senate Judiciary
Committee and urged that the trial courts make specific findings,
although they seem, for the most part, to be speaking of findings
as to the constituent conditions, not to a recitation of subsidiary
findings or the court's reasoning process.  See, for example, 4
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER AND LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 474, at
675 (2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 1996) ("When a statement is admitted under
the catchall, the court should make an on-the-record finding that
the requirements have been satisfied."); 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN AND
MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE ¶ 803(24)[01], at 803-428 to
-429 (1996) ("Rule 803(24) requires five findings by the trial
court.  They should be made explicitly on the record . . . ."); 2
MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 803.24, at 559 n.5 (1996
& Supp. 1997). 
A number of Federal and State appellate courts have required
more detailed findings to be made by the trial court, but,
generally, when faced with a lack of such recorded detail, they
have proceeded to examine the record and determine for themselves
whether the disputed evidence was admissible.  See, for example,
Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner and Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1551-54
(9th Cir. 1990); Mutuelles Unies v. Kroll & Linstrom, 957 F.2d 707,
713-14 (9th Cir. 1992); F.T.C. v. Figgie Intern., Inc., 994 F.2d
595, 608-09 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1110, 114 S.
Ct. 1051 (1994); U.S. v. Bachsian, 4 F.3d 796, 798-99 (9th Cir.
1993); Huff v. White Motor Corp., supra, 609 F.2d at 291-95; United
- 41 -
States v. Hinkson, 632 F.2d 382, 385-86 (4th Cir. 1980).  Compare
State v. Nelson, 777 P.2d 479, 482 (Utah 1989), reversing for
failure of the trial court to "make findings detailing its
reasoning in admitting a statement . . . ."
It is, of course, helpful to both the parties and any
reviewing appellate court to know what factors the trial court
relied on in making its findings and conclusions.  A reasoned
explanation may suffice to forestall an appeal, but even if an
appeal is taken, a more detailed record will serve to focus the
arguments and discussion and possibly alert the appellate court to
important factors that might otherwise be overlooked.  We do not
agree, however, that the failure to announce subsidiary findings
and conclusions necessarily requires reversal.  It may, if the
record is insufficient to permit the appellate court to undertake
effective review, but it need not in every case.
This leads us to consider what the appropriate standard of
review is of a decision to admit or exclude evidence under a
residual exception.  A number of Federal appellate courts have
expressed the view that the decision is a discretionary one, much
like the decision of a Federal trial court to admit or exclude
evidence generally, calling for a restrictive standard of review.
A common one applied by some of the courts is that the decision
will not be disturbed "absent a definite and firm conviction that
the court made a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it
reached based upon a weighing of the relevant factors."  Page v.
- 42 -
Barko Hydraulics, 673 F.2d 134, 140 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Huff,
supra).  See also Balogh's of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Getz, 798 F.2d
1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc); U.S. v. North, 910 F.2d 843,
909 (D.C. Cir. 1990); U.S. v. Costa, 947 F.2d 919, 923 (11th Cir.
1991).  As we have observed, other appellate courts have proceeded
to review the record and draw their own conclusions as to whether
the disputed evidence was admissible.  See Hal Roach Studios,
supra, 896 F.2d 1551-54; Mutuelles v. Unies, supra, 957 F.2d at
713-14; Figgie Intern., Inc., supra, 994 F.2d at 608-09; Bachsian,
supra, 4 F.3d at 798-99; Huff, supra, 609 F.2d at 291-95; Hinkson,
supra, 632 F.2d at 385-86.
There are many rulings on the admission or exclusion of
evidence that involve the exercise of discretion on the part of the
trial court, and the exercise of that discretion will ordinarily
not be disturbed on appeal.  We are unwilling, however, to accord
the same broad discretion to the ultimate decision to admit
evidence under the residual exception.  As the Committee Note to
Rule 5-803(b)(24) makes clear, the residual exceptions "do not
contemplate an unfettered exercise of judicial discretion" and do
not "establish a broad license for trial judges to admit hearsay
statements that do not fall within one of the other exceptions
contained in Rules 5-803 and 5-804(b)."  The intent was that they
would be used "very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances."
Id.  We desired that the development of new hearsay exceptions be
- 43 -
tightly controlled by us, and that is not feasible under an abuse
of discretion standard of review.  Such a loose and flexible
standard of review would allow flatly inconsistent decisions, each
being sustainable under an abuse of discretion standard, to stand,
which would hardly achieve the goal, expressed by the Senate, of a
"well-defined jurisprudence."
Some of the subsidiary determinations made by a trial court in
arriving at its findings and conclusions may well be purely factual
or discretionary ones, and, as to them, we will continue to apply
a clearly erroneous or abuse of discretion standard.  As to the
conclusion itself, however, we shall apply a de novo standard of
review.  Only in that way can we be faithful to the limitations and
caveats expressed in the rule and the Committee Note and assure a
"well-defined jurisprudence."
(2) Exceptional Circumstances
The first prerequisite to admissibility under the Maryland
residual exception, and the one that is determinative in this case,
is that there be "exceptional circumstances."  As we have observed,
that is a condition that we added to the text of the rule; it is
not in the text of the Federal rule or the rules adopted in most of
the States.  Following the view of the Federal Advisory Committee
and the U.S. Senate, we made clear in our endorsement of the
Committee Note to Rule 5-803(b)(24) what we meant by "exceptional
circumstances" — "new and presently unanticipated situations
- 44 -
. . . ."
Judge Chasanow has expressed concern that, in using "new and
presently 
unanticipated 
situations" 
as 
the 
benchmark 
for
determining whether exceptional circumstances exist, we are being
too restrictive.  He complains that we have not indicated what
would constitute such circumstances.  That is true, but it is
necessarily so.  If this Court had a crystal ball and could have
identified and defined those circumstances in which hearsay
evidence not otherwise admissible should be admissible, we could
have written an exception to cover those circumstances.  The
residual exceptions, limited by the "exceptional circumstances"
condition, were intended for those rare situations that were not
anticipated.  This does not mean, as he supposes, that, if evidence
is admitted once under the residual exception, upon a finding of
exceptional circumstances, those circumstances could never again be
found exceptional.  The unanticipated circumstance can occur more
than once and be found equally exceptional the second time.
Naturally, if that circumstance becomes a frequent recurrence, we
would likely consider creating a new categorical exception for it;
that, indeed, is essentially how the existing categorical
exceptions came into being.
What Judge Chasanow, in effect, proposes, although he seems
reluctant to say it directly, is to ignore the "exceptional
circumstances" condition that this Court deliberately added to the
Federal language, with the clear knowledge that, in doing so, we
- 45 -
were departing from that language.  He would, essentially, construe
the rule as it was originally proposed by the Advisory Committee
and the Supreme Court, which a number of Federal courts seem
effectively to have done, but which this Court, aware of that
experience, expressly chose not to do.  The fact that the evidence
at issue may have equivalent, or even superior, circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness does not alone suffice to warrant
admission under the Maryland residual exception.
The State, in its brief, pays scant attention to this
requirement, other than to argue that specific findings with
respect to it are not required.  The only circumstance that has
even been suggested as being exceptional in this case is the fact
that Ms. Walker married respondent after she spoke to the
detectives and then invoked her privilege not to testify against
him.  No one has offered any other circumstance as being
exceptional, or even relevant; nor can we discern one.  We
therefore must determine whether that circumstance qualifies as
"exceptional."
There are two statutory exclusionary rules in Maryland
governing testimony by a spouse.  Section 9-105 of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings article declares a spouse "not competent" to
disclose any confidential communication between the spouses
occurring during their marriage.  That provision — generally
regarded as a disqualification rather than a privilege — has been
a part of Maryland law since at least 1864.  See 1864 Md. Laws, ch.
- 46 -
109.
Section 9-106 — the statute invoked by Ms. Walker — declares
that, except when the defendant is charged with child abuse or
assault and battery on his or her spouse, the spouse of a person on
trial for a crime may not be compelled to testify as an adverse
witness.  That provision is regarded as a privilege, exercisable by
the witness.  The spouse is not incompetent to testify, and, save
for confidential communications shielded by § 9-105, the defendant
may not prevent the spouse from testifying as an adverse witness if
the spouse chooses to do so.  See MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra, at
§ 505.1; JOSEPH F. MURPHY, JR., MARYLAND EVIDENCE HANDBOOK § 903(A) (2d
ed. 1993 & Supp. 1996).
Section 9-106 has been part of Maryland law since 1965.  1965
Md. Laws, ch. 835.  Prior to its enactment, various rules regarding
spousal testimony had, at different times, been in effect — ranging
from making a person incompetent as a witness if his or her spouse
was a party to the case, to allowing a person to testify for, but
not against, his or her spouse, to abrogating the disqualification
entirely and making spouses both competent and compellable, to
affording a criminal defendant a privilege to preclude his or her
spouse from testifying adversely, to adding to the defendant's
privilege a privilege of the spouse to refuse to testify.  See
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 43-46, 100 S. Ct. 906, 909-
10 (1980).
Each of these rules, as well as the current statute, was based
- 47 -
      By 1864 Md. Laws, ch. 109, the Legislature made parties
11
and their spouses competent witnesses in civil cases but retained
their disqualification in criminal cases.  It declared, in
relevant part, that a criminal defendant was not "competent or
compellable to give evidence for or against himself," that a
husband was not competent or compellable to give evidence for or
against his wife, and that a wife was not competent or
compellable to give evidence against her husband, "except as now
allowed by law . . . ."  It was not until 1876 that criminal
defendants were permitted to testify in their own defense.  1876
Md. Laws, ch. 357.  By 1888 Md. Laws, ch. 545, the Legislature
made spouses competent to testify in criminal cases, with the
proviso that they were not competent, in a criminal or civil
case, to disclose any confidential communication made by one to
the other during the marriage.
on public policy.  The early disqualification, dating back to the
1600's, was premised on the identity of interest between spouses:
the party was incompetent as a witness because of his or her
interest in the case and, as husband and wife were regarded as one,
the spouse was tarred with the same presumed unreliability.
Abrogation of the disqualification was presumably based on the
notion that even interested persons should be allowed to testify,
so that the trier of fact, in fulfilling its truth-seeking mission,
can have as much relevant evidence as possible.  As noted by the
Trammel Court, "[t]estimonial exclusionary rules and privileges
contravene the fundamental principle that `the public . . . has a
right to every man's evidence.'"  Id. at 50, quoting from United
States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331, 70 S. Ct. 724, 730, reh'g
denied, 339 U.S. 991, 70 S. Ct. 1018 (1950).   The mutual
11
privileges limiting spousal testimony implemented the precept that
permitting a person to testify against his or her spouse would be
- 48 -
destructive to the marriage and that the preservation of marriage
was a greater social good than having the testimony.
Section 9-106 obviously represents a compromise among these
competing social and jurisprudential policies — the same compromise
reached 14 years later by the Supreme Court in Trammel.  Subject to
the exclusion of confidential communications, the statute allows a
married person to testify, even over the objection of his or her
spouse, but it does not compel the testimony.  With the currently
engrafted exceptions permitting the compulsion of spousal testimony
in cases involving child or spousal abuse, we may fairly assume
that, if the spouse exercises the privilege and refuses to testify,
it is because he or she regards the marriage as important and
enduring and does not wish to jeopardize it, in which event the
policy behind the privilege is fully and properly implemented.  If
the spouse chooses to testify adversely, that policy is not harmed,
for the likelihood then is that the marriage is already in serious
jeopardy.  See Trammel, supra, 445 U.S. at 52, 100 S. Ct. at 913:
"When one spouse is willing to testify against the other in a
criminal proceeding — whatever the motivation — their relationship
is almost certainly in disrepair; there is probably little in the
way of marital harmony for the privilege to preserve."  By vesting
the privilege in the witness/spouse, the law "furthers the
important public interest in marital harmony without unduly
burdening legitimate law enforcement needs."  Id. at 53.
The privilege itself does not preclude the admission of out-
- 49 -
of-court statements made by the spouse prior to the marriage.  It
affords protection only against being compelled to testify.  That
aspect of Metz v. State, supra, 9 Md.App. 15, 282 A.2d 331, we
think is correct.  That does not mean, however, that the existence
of the privilege is not relevant, for it certainly is.  As we have
indicated, to warrant admission of the statement under Rule 5-
804(b)(5) against a hearsay objection, the proponent must show an
exceptional circumstance, not anticipated when the rule was
adopted, and we fail to see how the exercise of a privilege based
on legislatively declared public policy that predated the rule by
nearly 30 years can constitute such an exceptional circumstance.
There is nothing "unique" or exceptional about a spouse invoking
his or her statutory privilege.
Lurking here, perhaps, is some discomfort with the fact that
respondent and Ms. Walker married after she made her statement but
before trial.  There have, to be sure, been cases in which the
defendant and the witness have entered into a marriage immediately
prior to trial, the inference being that the marriage was a sham,
arranged solely to preclude the witness from testifying or having
to testify.  Most of those cases seem to have arisen under the
common law rule that either made the spouse incompetent as a
witness or allowed the defendant to preclude the testimony.  See
Michael G. Walsh, Existence of Spousal Privilege Where Marriage Was
Entered Into For Purpose of Barring Testimony, 13 A.L.R. 4th 1305
(1982).  Some courts, in that circumstance, have refused to apply
- 50 -
the privilege, although the prevailing rule seems to be, even in
that circumstance, that the privilege applies.  Id. at 1308. 
That problem is not before us in this case, however.  The
State has not contended that the marriage between respondent and
Ms. Walker was a sham.  Nor was there any evidence, much less any
finding, that it was a sham, or was entered into merely to allow
her to invoke the privilege.  The couple had been living together,
intermittently, since 1989; they had children together; they
married in early September, more than four months before trial.
Accordingly, even if an unexpected sham marriage between a
defendant and a material witness, arranged solely to preclude the
State from offering relevant and important evidence, could arguably
constitute 
an 
exceptional 
circumstance 
under 
the 
residual
exception, this is not such a case.
III.  CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in admitting Ms. Walker's statement, and
the testimony of the detectives regarding it, because there was no
exceptional circumstance justifying admission under the residual
exception provided for in Rule 5-804(b)(5).  In light of that
conclusion, we need not consider whether the statement possessed
equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness, for, even if it did, the
evidence would still have been inadmissible.  For that reason, we
shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.  
-1-
JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.
Dissenting Opinion follows next page:
Dissenting Opinion by Chasanow, J.:
I respectfully dissent.  This case presents a textbook example
of the kind of hearsay evidence that should be admitted under the
Maryland residual exception for "unavailable" witnesses.  Maryland
Rule 5-804(b)(5).  That rule provides:
"(5) 
 
Other 
Exceptions 
-- 
Under
exceptional circumstances, the following are
not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though
the declarant is unavailable as a witness:  A
statement not specifically covered by any of
the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness,
-2-
if the court determines that (A) the statement
is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B)
the statement is more probative on the point
for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts; and (C) the
general purposes of these rules and the
interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence.  A
statement may not be admitted under this
exception unless the proponent of it makes
known to the adverse party, sufficiently in
advance of the trial or hearing to provide the
adverse party with a fair opportunity to
prepare to meet it, the intention to offer the
statement and the particulars of it, including
the name and address of the declarant."
This hearsay exception and its counterpart, Md. Rule 5-803(b)(24),
which is identically worded but leaves out the requirement that the
hearsay declarant be "unavailable," will be collectively referred
to as the residual exceptions.  When residual exception is referred
to in the singular, I will be referring to the residual exception
at issue in the instant case, Md. Rule 5-804(b)(5).
The majority opinion acknowledges that the trial judge found
-3-
the hearsay statement at issue to be admissible under the residual
exception after he "considered the six conditions [that are
required for admissibility under the residual exception] and found
that each was satisfied."  ___ Md. ___, ___, ___ A.2d ___, ___
(1997)(Majority Op. at 34).  That finding was clearly supported and
should be affirmed.  As the majority concedes, the trial judge does
not have to explain on the record how he or she arrived at these
findings or the reasoning process employed.  Even if the trial
judge gave the wrong reason for admitting the hearsay, this Court
would affirm if the evidence was admissible.  Robeson v. State, 285
Md. 498, 502, 403 A.2d 1221, 1223 (1979)(stating "where the record
in a case adequately demonstrates that the decision of the trial
court [admitting evidence] was correct, although on a ground not
relied upon by the trial court and perhaps not even raised by the
parties, an appellate court will affirm.  In other words, a trial
court's decision may be correct although for a different reason
than relied on by that court."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1021, 100
S.Ct. 680, 62 L.Ed.2d 654 (1980).
APPELLATE REVIEW
It is interesting to note that the Evidence Subcommittee of
the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Rules
Committee) apparently rejected the residual exceptions not because
they might have let in too much unreliable hearsay, but because
they might have kept out too much reliable hearsay.  In the final
-4-
Evidence Subcommittee Draft dated Spring, 1992, and sent to the
Rules Committee, as well as to each judge of the Court of Appeals,
the Reporter's Note states:  
"In recommending against these [residual]
exceptions the Subcommittee is in agreement
with 
the 
Rodowsky 
Committee, 
which 
was
concerned that the `catchalls’ might be too
restrictive.  Because of the high substantive
standard set by the Rule, as well as the
rather elaborate procedural requirements, the
Rodowsky Committee opined that `it could be
argued that this Rule will actually limit the
authority 
of 
judges 
to 
admit 
reliable
hearsay.'"
Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, Proposed Title 5 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure:
Evidence, Subcommittee Draft, Spring 1992.
When a trial judge is asked to make a determination of
admissibility of hearsay under the residual exceptions, Md. Rule 5-
104(a) is applicable.  That rule governs the trial judge in making
factual findings and resolving questions relating to the
admissibility of evidence.  It provides that, in making fact
findings necessary to resolve issues on admissibility of evidence,
the judge "may, in the interest of justice, decline to require
strict application of the rules of evidence, except those relating
to privilege and competency of witnesses."  Md. Rule 5-104(a).  The
preliminary fact findings made by the trial judge, in resolving
whether residual exception hearsay is admissible, should be
affirmed unless clearly erroneous.  On the other hand, any decision
to admit residual exception hearsay involves some weighing and
-5-
determinations that, in effect, create new hearsay exceptions by
serving as precedent or persuasive authority for admitting hearsay
not within the traditional exceptions.  These policy aspects of the
decision to admit residual exception hearsay deserve heightened
appellate scrutiny.  I agree with the majority at least to the
extent that they seem to require de novo appellate review of such
factors as whether there are exceptional circumstances and
equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness.  These factors need de
novo review because of their precedential effect, as well as the
need for uniformity and predictability in the admission of residual
exception hearsay.  Other factors, such as weighing the materiality
and relative probative value of the proffered hearsay, should be
accorded more deferential review because of the trial judge's
superior position to view the witnesses and gauge the relative
impact and materiality of the evidence.
Federal appellate reluctance to reverse a trial judge's
decision to admit residual exception hearsay may be a reason for
the opinion expressed by several members of the Rules Committee
that too much unreliable hearsay is being admitted in some federal
courts.  Federal appellate courts accord trial judge's great
deference in decisions to admit hearsay under the residual
exception.  See, e.g., U.S. v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 909 (D.C. Cir.
1990)("We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that an appellate court
should be `particularly hesitant to overturn a trial court's
admissibility ruling under the residual hearsay exception absent a
-6-
"definite and firm conviction that the court made a clear error of
judgment in the conclusion it reached based upon a weighing of the
relevant factors."'  Balogh's of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Getz, 798
F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1986)(en banc)(quoting Page v. Barko
Hydraulics, 673 F.2d 134, 140 (5th Cir. 1982)."); S.E.C. v. First
City Financial Corp., Ltd., 890 F.2d 1215, 1225 (D.C. Cir.
1989)("Since the residual hearsay exception depends so heavily upon
a judgment of reliability, typically we would be particularly
deferential to the trial court's determinations under Rule
803(24)."); Page v. Barko Hydraulics, 673 F.2d 134, 140 (5th Cir.
1982)(holding that the trial judge's "considerable discretion" in
applying Rule 803(24) will not be disturbed absent a "clear error
of judgment"); Doe v. U.S., 976 F.2d 1071, 1076-77 (7th Cir.
1992)(quoting Littlefield v. McGuffey, 954 F.2d 1337, 1342 (7th
Cir. 1992, in turn quoting Geitz v. Lindsey, 893 F.2d 148, 150-51
(7th Cir. 1990)(citations omitted, emphasis in original))("The
relevant benchmark is not how we would have ruled had we been
standing in the trial judge's shoes, but rather, `whether any
reasonable person could agree with the district court.'"), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 812, 114 S.Ct. 58, 126 L.Ed.2d 28 (1993).  The
federal appellate abuse of discretion standard of review and
reluctance to reverse a trial judge's decision to admit residual
exception hearsay could have the effect of greatly expanding the
use of the residual exception hearsay.  With Maryland's increased
-7-
appellate scrutiny, there should be little danger that the residual
exceptions will be abused or will swallow up the general hearsay
prohibition.
FACTORS FOR ADMISSIBILITY
The six or seven conditions that must be satisfied in order to
admit hearsay under the residual exceptions are:
(1) There must be exceptional circumstances that warrant the
application of the residual exceptions;
(2) there must be trustworthiness surrounding the making of
the hearsay statement equivalent to the trustworthiness of other
enumerated hearsay exceptions.  This is the most significant
requirement and one which, on appeal, should always be reviewed de
novo;
(3) there must be necessity for the hearsay established by a
showing that the statement is more probative on the matter for
which it is offered than any other evidence that could reasonably
be procured by the proponent;
(4) the hearsay statement must be offered to prove a fact
material to the litigation;
(5) the general purposes of the rules of evidence and the
interests of justice must be best served by the introduction of the
hearsay;
(6) reasonable advance notice of the intent to offer residual
exception hearsay must be given; and
-8-
(7) the witness must be unavailable for Md. Rule 5-804(b)(5)
to apply, although this is not necessary for Md. Rule 5-803(24) to
apply.
My analysis differs from the majority's primarily in my
elimination of the majority's requirement that "the statement must
not be specifically covered by any of the other exceptions."  ___
Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (Majority Op. at 30).  The reference in
the residual exception rules from which this is taken is meant as
a description, not a limitation.  There can be hearsay statements
that overlap and fit within an existing hearsay exception and,
because of the exceptional circumstances and additional factors
enhancing its reliability, could also fit within the residual
exception; the two need not be mutually exclusive.  Trial judges or
lawyers should not have to choose, at their peril, whether to use
an existing exception or the residual exception.  We should not
prohibit hearsay from being offered and/or admitted by a trial
judge under both theories.
The intermediate appellate court held that the trial judge
erred in admitting the hearsay statements at issue because he
failed to make a clear finding that there were exceptional
circumstances and failed to consider all factors bearing on the
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.  Walker v. State, 107
Md. App. 502, 526, 668 A.2d 990, 1002 (1995).  This Court holds
that there are no "exceptional circumstances" and, therefore, does
not address the "equivalent guarantees" of trustworthiness.  I
-9-
     Technically the issue in the instant case involves double
1
hearsay.  Mr. Walker's confession of the armed robbery was an
admission by a party-opponent under Maryland Rule 5-803(a)(1). 
Ms. Walker's hearsay statements were offered under Md. Rule 5-
804(b)(5).  Mr. Walker's admission by a party-opponent was
clearly admissible if Ms. Walker's statement was admissible under
the residual exception.  See Md. Rule 5-805 (a hearsay statement
containing another hearsay statement is admissible if both fall
within any hearsay exception).
believe there are both exceptional circumstances and equivalent
guarantees of trustworthiness justifying the admission of the
residual exception hearsay offered in the instant case.1
FACTS
On June 10, 1994, Mr. Jose Iraheta, an Hispanic male who
speaks no English, was riding his bicycle to work along Twinbrook
Parkway in Montgomery County, Maryland.  Mr. Iraheta was accosted
by a black male wearing a green, hooded shirt with the hood pulled
tightly over his head.  The man pushed Mr. Iraheta down and robbed
him at knife point of $60.00.  Mr. Iraheta reported the robbery to
the police, but told the officers he did not see the face of his
assailant because of the hood and because Mr. Iraheta kept his head
down during the robbery.
The next day, June 11, 1994, Robin Hammond, who was later to
become Robin Walker (hereinafter Ms. Walker), was walking along
Twinbrook Parkway in the same area as the robbery with her friend,
Mr. Walker, and their daughter.  A police car drove past and Mr.
Walker "hung his head down ... to hide his face."  When questioned
about this odd behavior, Mr. Walker told his companion that he had
-10-
robbed an Hispanic male of $60 the night before in the same area.
Mr. Walker also indicated that he had discarded the green shirt he
was wearing at the time of the robbery.  Later, in Ms. Walker's
presence, Mr. Walker retrieved a green, hooded sweatshirt, which he
identified as the shirt he wore during the robbery; he then threw
the shirt in a dumpster.
On June 15, 1994, Ms. Walker, nee Hammond, contacted the
police and related Mr. Walker's confession to two detectives.  Her
statement was reduced to writing by each detective, and she signed
both writings.  Ms. Walker also indicated to the police that Mr.
Walker was the father of her children and that she and Mr. Walker
had lived together "intermittently" since 1989, but that about
March 9, 1994, because of Mr. Walker's escalating drug use, she
moved out of the residence they shared and moved into a shelter.
Five days later, on June 20, 1994, Mr. Walker was arrested and
jailed in default of bond.  The application for the statement of
charges indicated that on June 10, 1994, Jose Iraheta was robbed of
$60 by a black male wearing a green, hooded sweatshirt pulled
tightly over his head.  The probable cause for the application was
that on June 15, 1994, a "confidential source" heard Mr. Walker
admit that he had robbed an Hispanic male of $60 and that during
the robbery he was wearing a green, hooded sweatshirt.  On August
3, 1994, Mr. Walker, through defense counsel, filed several motions
including a request for discovery, which included a request for the
identity of any confidential informant, a motion to suppress
-11-
evidence, a motion to sever counts, and a motion for "marriage
leave" from the jail.  The motion for marriage leave was denied.
Immediately before Mr. Walker's robbery case was called for
trial on January 12, 1995, a pre-trial hearing was held at which
Ms. Walker produced a marriage license showing that she and Mr.
Walker were married by the Clerk of the Court on September 1, 1994,
apparently without "marriage leave."  Ms. Walker also told the
State's Attorney that she refused to testify against her new
husband.  At that hearing, the judge found that Ms. Walker's
hearsay statements to the police in which she related Mr. Walker's
confession were admissible under the residual exception, Md. Rule
5-804(b)(5).  In his findings, the trial judge concluded that one
of the reasons that Ms. Walker's statements were reliable was that
they were made by Ms. Walker to police in order to get Mr. Walker
help for his drug problem.  This finding was based on a proffer by
defense counsel that "[i]t is my understanding that when the
statements were made Ms. Hammond also at the time indicated or Ms.
Walker indicated at the time that she was doing this because she
wanted Mr. Walker to get some help for his drug problem."  The
State's Attorney agreed with the proffer stating:  "I believe that
is accurate."
Walker was convicted by a jury of robbery with a dangerous and
deadly weapon, and because of his "major" prior record, he was
sentenced to 15 years incarceration.
-12-
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
In ordinary circumstances, hearsay is only admitted if it
falls within one of our codified hearsay exceptions in Md. Rule 5-
803 and Md. Rule 5-804.  These codified exceptions are categories
or pigeonholes that cover the generally encountered forms of
trustworthy and necessary hearsay.  Ordinarily, if hearsay does not
fall within our codified hearsay exceptions, it is not trustworthy
and not admissible.  The codified hearsay exceptions are generally
adequate to admit all trustworthy and necessary forms of hearsay.
The residual hearsay exceptions in Md. Rules 5-803(b)(24) and
5-804(b)(5) require "exceptional circumstances."  This was made
explicit by this Court when we expressly added the phrase "under
exceptional circumstances" to our residual exception rules.  A
significant number of federal cases hold that "exceptional
circumstances" is also a requirement of the residual exceptions in
the federal rules based on the legislative history of the federal
rules.  The Senate Judiciary Committee, in its report to Congress,
stated:
"It is intended that the residual hearsay
exceptions will be used very rarely, and only
in exceptional circumstances."
Senate Comm. on Judiciary, Fed. Rules of Evid., S. Rep. No. 93-
1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1974); 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7066.
Some of the cases recognizing that the residual exceptions can only
be used in exceptional circumstances are:  United States v. Kim,
595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1979)("The legislative history of this
-13-
exception makes it very clear that this was intended to be a narrow
exception to the hearsay rule, applying only in exceptional
cases."); Unites States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299-300 (4th Cir.
1984)("The legislative history of the rules puts it more strongly:
`It is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used
very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.'  Fed.R.Evid.
803 Senate committee note (quoted in United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d
755, 765 [(D.C. Cir. 1979)])"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1105, 105
S.Ct. 776, 83 L.Ed.2d 772 (1985); United States v. Williams, 809
F.2d 1072, 1083 (5th Cir.)("Rule 804(b)(5) is `to be used only
rarely, in truly exceptional circumstances.'  United States v.
Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 629 (5th Cir.)(footnote omitted), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 825, 103 S.Ct. 57, 74 L.Ed.2d 61 (1982)"), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 896, 108 S.Ct. 228, 98 L.Ed.2d 187, cert. denied,
484 U.S. 913, 108 S.Ct. 259, 98 L.Ed.2d 216, and cert. denied,
Orellana v. United States, 484 U.S. 987, 108 S.Ct. 506, 98 L.Ed.2d
504 (1987); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 756
F.2d 411, 415 (5th Cir. 1985)("We sounded a note of caution in the
use of this hearsay exception in United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d
616, 629 (5th Cir. 1982), observing that the language of the rule
and the legislative history left no doubt of Congress' intent `that
the 804(b)(5) residual exception was to be used only rarely, in
truly exceptional circumstances.'"); U.S. v. Collins, 66 F.3d 984,
986-87 (8th Cir. 1995)("This rule applies only in `rare and
-14-
exceptional circumstances.' Stokes v. City of Omaha, 23 F.3d 1362,
1366 (8th Cir. 1994)."); Stokes v. City of Omaha, 23 F.3d 1362,
1366 (8th Cir. 1994)("After reviewing the contents of and
circumstances surrounding Swanson's affidavit, we do not find that
it falls within the rare and exceptional circumstances required by
our cases applying Rule 804(b)(5)."); U.S. v. Gaines, 969 F.2d 692,
697 (8th Cir. 1992)("Rule 804(b)(5) is to be used rarely, and only
in exceptional circumstances.")(internal quotations omitted;
citations omitted); United States v. Love, 592 F.2d 1022, 1026 (8th
Cir. 1979)("The intent of Congress was that Rule 804(b)(5) would be
used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances."); U.S. v.
Fernandez, 892 F.2d 976, 982 (11th Cir. 1989)(quoting United States
v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 629 (5th Cir.)(footnote omitted), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 825, 103 S.Ct. 57, 74 L.Ed.2d 61 (1982))("`The
Senate Judiciary Committee's report on the Federal Rules of
Evidence stated that the 804(b)(5) residual exception was to be
used only rarely, in truly exceptional circumstances.'")); contra
United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 427 F.Supp. 859, 865-66
(S.D.N.Y.1977)("Neither the Rule, nor the cases in this Circuit
interpreting the Rule, however, impose any express limitation
concerning exceptional cases.").
The exceptional circumstances requirement should not be read
as a bar to all hearsay except hearsay statements made under
bizarre, unique, and never previously contemplated situations.  The
-15-
majority does not really tell us what could constitute exceptional
circumstances or even what factors should be used to determine
exceptional circumstances.  We are only told that there are no
exceptional circumstances in the hearsay statements offered in the
instant case.  Surely the kind of exceptional circumstances
envisioned by the majority are not things like the hearsay
declarant had natural green hair and spoke fifteen languages.
Exceptional circumstances should be the threshold for, and related
to, our analysis of all of the other factors required under the
residual exceptions.
Exceptional circumstances, however, cannot be determined
theoretically or out of context.  When we speak of exceptional
circumstances, we mean exceptional circumstances that justify
making the proffered hearsay an exception to the prohibition
against hearsay, even if it does not fit into the traditional
exceptions.  This requires some familiarity with what justifies the
creation of a hearsay exception.
As Judge Learned Hand noted: "[T]he requisites of an exception
of the hearsay rule [are] necessity and circumstantial guaranty of
trustworthiness."  G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Pub. Co., 207
F. 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1913)(citing WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1421, 1422 and
1690).  Occasionally there are forms of hearsay that do not fit
within the codified hearsay exceptions or pigeonholes but that
should be admitted in the interests of justice and because the
hearsay has at least the same circumstantial guarantees of
-16-
trustworthiness and the same necessity inherent in the codified
exceptions.  In these exceptional circumstances, we compare the
proffered hearsay to the reasons for creating a hearsay exception,
which we have identified as the requirements for the residual
exceptions; if those requirements are met, the hearsay may be
admitted.  The broad categories or pigeonholes of the codified
hearsay exceptions are not meant to be a closed system; the
residual exceptions are our recognition that there are equally
reliable, equally necessary forms of hearsay that are too unique
and too sui generis to be codified.  The admission of hearsay
statements under the residual exceptions is generally fact-specific
and depends on the unique context surrounding the making of the
statements that makes the statements especially reliable, as well
as the unique necessity for the statement in the particular
litigation.  We cannot expect to have a separate hearsay exception
for each unique, exceptional, and fact-specific circumstance that
has occurred or could conceivably occur; instead, we have the
residual exceptions.
Exceptional circumstances should include new and presently
unanticipated situations, but should not be limited to those
situations exclusively.  Congress and this Court, by providing that
the residual exceptions are appropriate for new and unanticipated
situations did not intend that, in any recurring situation,
residual exception hearsay could only be used once, and thereafter,
it must be added to our codified evidence rules because if that
-17-
situation occurs a second time, it is not new and presently
unanticipated.  There are a few emerging, general areas where the
residual exceptions have been used in repeated instances based on
the facts of the case and the particular indicia of trustworthiness
surrounding the statement.  For example, in several cases the grand
jury testimony of particularly reliable independent witnesses who
have been murdered after appearing before the grand jury, but
before the trial, has been admitted under the residual exception.
Federal Rule 804(b)(5).  See, e.g., U.S. v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 6
(1st Cir.)(citing cases from other circuits), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1082, 110 S.Ct. 1814, 108 L.Ed.2d 944 (1990).  This form of
residual hearsay should not be rejected merely because it has been
admitted in prior cases, and therefore, it is no longer new and
presently unanticipated.
  
Turning to the exceptional circumstances in the instant case,
the majority states, "[t]he only circumstance that has even been
suggested as being exceptional in this case is the fact that Ms.
Walker married respondent after she spoke to the detectives and
then invoked her privilege not to testify against him.  No one has
offered any other circumstance as being exceptional, or even
relevant; nor can we discern one."  ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___
(Majority Op. at 40)(emphasis added).  If the majority could not
discern other exceptional circumstances in the instant case, it
certainly did not look very hard.
The Walker marriage is the only arguably exceptional
-18-
circumstance discerned by the majority, but that event is probably
not an exceptional circumstance, because it is merely the fact that
makes Ms. Walker unavailable to the State and does nothing to
enhance the trustworthiness of Ms. Walker's hearsay statements.
If, however, "exceptional circumstances" are not meant to be
interrelated to the reasons for creating any hearsay exception,
perhaps the Walker marriage might be an exceptional circumstance.
Although living together "intermittently" for approximately six
years and having children together had not motivated Mr. and Ms.
Walker to marry, approximately six weeks after Mr. Walker was
arrested and jailed as the result of information provided to police
by Ms. Walker, Mr. Walker sought "jail leave" to marry Ms. Walker.
As a result of Mr. Walker's marriage to the police informant, whose
information resulted in Mr. Walker's incarceration, the informant
was able to avoid testifying against her new husband.  This is an
unusual and unique marriage, but, because the marriage does not
make 
Ms. 
Walker's 
pre-marital 
statements 
exceptional 
or
trustworthy, I do not think it is what the Senate or this Court
meant as an exceptional circumstance that would qualify for the
residual exception.
If a Maryland appellate court is going to review a trial
judge's decision to admit residual exception hearsay de novo, the
appellate court has an obligation to, at least, give some deference
to the trial judge's superior position to view the case.  Before an
appellate court reverses a trial judge because it discerns no
-19-
     Mr. Walker has continued to acknowledge that Ms. Walker's
2
motives in reporting Mr. Walker's confession to the police were
to get him help.  In Mr. Walker's certiorari petition he states: 
"The parties agreed that Ms. Walker gave the statements for the
express purpose of getting [Mr.] Walker `some help for his drug
problem.'"  Despite the stipulation concerning Ms. Walker's
motives that led to the trial judge's findings, the majority
seems to dispute the stipulation by counsel, for which it finds
"no evidence," and the majority refers to "the possibility that
her personal problems with respondent may have motivated her to
fabricate a story out of anger or for some other purpose."  ___
Md. ___, ___, ___ A.2d ___, ___ (1997)(Majority Op. at 8).
exceptional 
circumstances 
or 
no 
equivalent 
guarantees 
of
trustworthiness, the appellate court should diligently search for
those factors that support the trial judge's ruling.  The
circumstances that, collectively, make Ms. Walker's hearsay
statements exceptional, trustworthy, and deserving of admission
even though they do not fall within any of the other codified
hearsay exceptions are:
(1) As stipulated by counsel and found by the trial judge, Ms.
Walker's motive in recounting Mr. Walker's confession was to get
help for Mr. Walker; her motives were not to hurt Mr. Walker.  Her
motive should inspire her to tell the truth to the police.   
2
(2) It is reasonable to assume that Ms. Walker knew or was
told by the police that a false statement to the police about the
identity of a person who committed a crime could be punishable by
a jail penalty.  See Maryland Code, (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.),
Article 27, § 150.  Knowing or even suspecting that you could be
prosecuted and jailed for a false statement adds unique
trustworthiness.
-20-
(3) Ms. Walker knew that, if she lied about the identity of
the robber, her lie would almost certainly be revealed because the
victim would tell the police that Mr. Walker was not the robber.
The fact that her lie should be immediately brought to light when
the victim and Mr. Walker meet is a unique circumstance inspiring
truthfulness.
(4) The self-verifying details about the robbery in Ms.
Walker's statements uniquely established the trustworthiness of her
information.  She related extensive details of this street robbery,
which was not witnessed by anyone but the robber and the victim and
was certainly not reported in the media.  Ms. Walker recounted that
the victim was an Hispanic male; $60 dollars was taken in the
robbery; the robber wore a green, hooded shirt, which Ms. Walker
saw and could describe; the robbery occurred on June 10, 1994; and
the robbery occurred in a designated area on Twinbrook Parkway.
This information conclusively indicates that Ms. Walker must have
talked to the robber or the victim.  Ms. Walker could not have
gotten these details from the victim because he did not speak
English.  She must have either been the robber or been extensively
confided in by the robber.  The robber was a male, therefore, the
only remaining possibility is that the robber confessed in great
detail to Ms. Walker.  Her statements about Mr. Walker's
confession, accompanied by the self-verifying details and the other
circumstances surrounding the making of her hearsay statements to
the 
police, 
certainly 
support 
a 
finding 
of 
exceptional
-21-
circumstances, as well as trustworthiness.
(5) Although Ms. Walker is unavailable to the State, she was
present at the trial and could be called by and examined by Mr.
Walker.  Md. Code (1974, 1995 Repl. Vol.), Courts & Judicial
Proceedings Art., § 9-106 provides that, with exceptions not
relevant to this case, "[t]he spouse of a person on trial for a
crime may not be compelled to testify as an adverse witness...."
(Emphasis added).  If Ms. Walker's hearsay statements were admitted
into evidence, Mr. Walker, her husband, could call her to refute
the statements if they were untruthful or inaccurately recorded by
the police.  At the hearing in the instant case, the State's
Attorney pointed out that Ms. Walker "is only unavailable because
she has made herself unavailable to the State, not to the defense.
She is and has always been available to the defense to proceed."
This case presents the exceptional circumstance of trustworthy
hearsay offered under the residual exception for unavailable
witnesses where the hearsay declarant becomes unavailable to only
one side, but the declarant is available to, and may be immediately
called to contradict or explain her hearsay statement by, the
opposing side.
These five circumstances, collectively, unquestionably justify
the trial judge's decision to admit this 5-804(b)(5) residual
hearsay.  The two factors the majority found missing, (1)
exceptional circumstances and (2) equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness, certainly seem to have been
-22-
satisfied in the circumstances presented in the instant case;
indeed, I have been unable to hypothecate a better case for the
residual exception.
Because this case involves exceptional circumstances, it is
difficult to find very much authority directly on point.  There is,
however, one closely analogous case, State v. Bailey, 365 S.E.2d 46
(W.Va. 1987).  Bailey was a murder trial.  The defendant was
involved in an affair with the victim's wife at the time he came to
the victim's house and shot the victim.  Immediately after the
shooting, the wife/widow gave a statement to a deputy sheriff
containing her account of the shooting and of earlier threats made
by the defendant to the victim.  Less than one week before trial,
the victim's widow and the defendant were married.  At trial, the
new wife of the defendant exercised the privilege against adverse
spousal testimony.  Bailey, 365 S.E.2d at 47-48.  The prosecution
was permitted to use the wife's hearsay statement to the deputy
sheriff under the residual exception.  That ruling was affirmed on
appeal.  Bailey, 365 S.E.2d at 48-50.  The West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals held that all of the criteria for admissibility
under the residual exception were satisfied.  The Court found that,
because the wife was involved in an affair with the defendant at
the time of the shooting and married him shortly thereafter, her
statement had some of the trustworthiness of a declaration against
her interest; the fact that the statement was given to police
shortly after the shooting and she verified that it was accurate
-23-
     Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d
3
638 (1990), held that the Confrontation Clause does not preclude
hearsay from being admitted under the residual exception against
a defendant in a criminal trial.  In Wright, the Supreme Court
made it clear that because the residual exceptions are not
"firmly rooted hearsay exceptions," particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness must be demonstrated.  The Supreme Court also
indicated that, although particular guarantees may be shown from
gave it added trustworthiness, as did the corroborative evidence
that the defendant did come to the house as related in the
statement.  Bailey, 365 S.E.2d at 49-50.  The Court also stated:
"The trustworthiness of the statement is demonstrated further by
[defendant's] failure to challenge the statement on cross-
examination."  Bailey, 365 S.E.2d at 50 n.4.  Thus, the right of
the defendant to have his new wife testify about her statement,
even if she couldn't be called by the prosecutor, was a factor
favoring the admissibility of the statement.  Admittedly, most
cases under the residual exception are unique to their own facts,
and neither Bailey nor any other case is directly on point, but
Bailey is persuasive.
I trust the majority is not inadvertently showing an
inclination to be more restrictive when the State offers residual
exception hearsay evidence than when any other litigant offers such
evidence, and is not inadvertently confusing the Confrontation
Clause with the rules of evidence.  No Confrontation Clause
argument is raised in the instant case, and because of Mr. Walker's
right to examine and impeach Ms. Walker, it is doubtful that the
Confrontation Clause is even implicated.   The instant case is a
3
-24-
the totality of circumstances, the relevant circumstances are the
intrinsic circumstances that surround the making of the statement
and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief.  The
Court rejected consideration of extrinsic corroboration of the
truth of facts contained in the statement.  Perhaps this is
because such extrinsic corroborative circumstances are not
relevant to  admissibility of other hearsay exceptions.
criminal case where the hearsay was offered by the State against a
criminal defendant, but the residual exceptions do not make any
distinctions among classes of litigants.  The residual exceptions
and this Court's construction of them should be uniformly applied
to the State, to criminal trial defendants, and to plaintiffs and
defendants in civil cases.  If the Court is reading the residual
exceptions one way for criminal defendants and another way for all
other litigants, the Court is perpetrating a great injustice on the
State and is creating a baseless evidentiary distinction in order
to favor criminal defendants over all other litigants.  If the same
unattainable standard for "exceptional circumstances" applied in
the instant case is going to be applied in civil cases and whenever
criminal defendants try to admit residual exception hearsay, then
Maryland has no residual exceptions.  I would affirm the
evidentiary ruling of the trial judge.