Title: McLemore v. Alabama Power Company

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

228 So. 2d 780 (1969)
Laura E. McLEMORE et al.
v.
ALABAMA POWER COMPANY.
5 Div. 829.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
April 10, 1969.
Rehearing Denied November 20, 1969.
*782 Howard & Dunn, Wetumpka, for appellants.
Martin Balch, Bingham, Hawthorne & Williams and Jesse S. Vogtle, Birmingham, Holley, Milner & Holley and Reneau & Reneau, Wetumpka, for appellee.
COLEMAN, Justice.
The landowner appeals from a judgment awarding compensation and damages for lands condemned and acquired in connection with the construction, operation, and maintenance of a proposed dam, canal, and electric power plant on the Coosa River in Elmore County.
As we understand it, the owner's parcel of land before the taking contained 178.9 acres and after the taking contained 78.3 acres. On the basis of these figures, the condemnor acquired approximately 100 acres. We understand that about 47 acres of the land taken was woodland and the remainder was open land.
The probate court awarded the owner $45,441.00. The condemnor appealed to the circuit court. The cause was tried by a jury which awarded the owner $24,970.00. Judgment was entered accordingly.
The condemnor made bond as provided by statute and took possession of the premises on April 4, 1964. The jury returned their verdict on August 26, 1964. After her motion for new trial had been overruled, the owner appealed to this court.
The owner asserts that the court erred in refusing to give to the jury her requested written charge to effect that the jury should determine the amount of compensation to which she was entitled, then compute interest on the compensation from the date condemnor took possession until the date of the trial, and add the interest so computed to the compensation and bring in a verdict for the total amount.[1]
*783 The landowner also asserts that the court erred in charging the jury orally as follows:
The insufficiency of the verdict for failure to allow interest is also made grounds of the motion for new trial.
Appellant states the proposition of law for which she contends as follows:
By requesting charge 3, appellant properly raised the question.[2] The question is whether the owner is entitled to interest from the time the condemnor takes actual physical possession of the land until the date of the jury verdict. This court answered this question in the affirmative in 1958 by our decision in Jefferson County v. Adwell, 267 Ala. 544, 103 So. 2d 143.
In Adwell, the court determined and fixed the amount of the owner's compensation and damages without the intervention of a jury. The judgment, as shown in the original record in Adwell, recites in pertinent part as follows:
Attached to the judgment in Adwell is the opinion of the learned trial judge which, as here pertinent, recites:
The condemnor in Adwell strenuously objected to the allowance of interest in that case.[3] The transcript of evidence in Adwell closes with the following colloquy between court and counsel, to wit:
On original deliverance in Adwell, June 30, 1956, the majority of this court held that ".... the `taking' for the purpose of fixing the amount of damages and compensation is when the commissioners make their report ...." (267 Ala. at 548, 103 So.2d at 145) Justices Lawson and Spann dissented. On rehearing, the dissenting opinion by Justice Lawson became the majority opinion and fixed the valuation date as "the date of the filing of the application ...." to condemn in the probate court. With respect to the allowance of interest, Justice Lawson said:
The instant writer was not a member of this court at the time of original deliverance in Adwell, but did participate in the decision on rehearing. So far as the writer recalls, the only question on which the justices expressed different opinions on rehearing was the valuation date. The opinions do not reflect and the writer does not recall that any of the justices disagreed with Justice Lawson's holding as to the allowance of interest.
The writer concurred in the result on rehearing in Adwell. To lay at rest any doubt as to the holding of the court, we say now that we are of opinion that the valuation date is the date of filing the application to condemn in the probate court.
We are also of opinion that the rule of Adwell is correct in allowing interest from the day on which condemnor takes possession of the condemned property until the day of the judgment in the circuit court.
Subsequent to Adwell, this court has held and we approve the holding that, under the present statutes, the owner is not entitled to interest, on a judgment of the circuit court, awarding compensation, from the date of the judgment to the date of affirmance by this court on appeal. State v. Moore, 269 Ala. 20, 110 So. 2d 635; Southern Electric Generating Co. v. Lance, 269 Ala. 25, 110 So. 2d 627.
The condemnor relies on Ex parte Lance, 267 Ala. 639, 103 So. 2d 753, as authority that the owner is not entitled to interest as was allowed in Adwell. Adwell was finally disposed of June 12, 1958. Ex parte Lance was finally disposed of June *786 26, 1958. Five justices, who participated in Adwell, participated in Ex parte Lance in which there was no dissent. The court did not consider whether any party was or was not entitled to interest. Adwell is not mentioned in the opinion. The court did decide in Ex parte Lance that a landowner was not entitled to a writ ordering the circuit judge to order a distribution of the condemnation award to the owners before the appeal to this court had been determined.
The author of the final opinion in Adwell was one of the five justices who concurred in the opinion in Ex parte Lance. It is hardly reasonable to suppose that five members of the same court, who had concurred in an opinion awarding interest just two weeks before, would concur in an opinion denying such interest two weeks later without making some mention of their reasons for changing their minds. Ex parte Lance is not contrary to Adwell as to the holding on interest.
There are many cases dealing with allowance of interest to the landowner cited in 96 A.L.R. 150 and 36 A.L.R.2d 413. The general rule is stated as follows:
The following Alabama cases are cited: Jones v. New Orleans & S. R. Co. & Im. Asso., 70 Ala. 227; Mobile & Ohio R. Co. v. Hester, 122 Ala. 249, 25 So. 220; Southern Railway Co. v. Cowan, 129 Ala. 577, 29 So. 985; United States v. Goodloe, 204 Ala. 484, 86 So. 546; Hays v. Ingham-Burnett Lbr. Co., 217 Ala. 524, 116 So. 689; Southern R. Co. v. Clark, 220 Ala. 555, 126 So. 855.
The condemnor argues that the cited Alabama cases do not apply here because in those cases the condemnor entered and took possession prior to the institution of condemnation proceedings. The condemnor's argument is to effect that, where the condemnor enters without a judgment of condemnation, the condemnor should be required to pay interest as a sort of penalty or punitive damages. We do not understand that the opinions of this court or of any other court have made this distinction in awarding interest. The better view seems to be that the award of interest, where the condemnor has occupied the property, is to compensate the owner for his loss resulting during the time and from the fact that, during the interest period, he had been deprived of both his property and his payment in money for the property. The annotator expresses it this way:
". . .
A good statement of the reason for allowing interest is as follows:
During the time between the condemnor's taking actual possession and the jury's award, the owner is deprived of the use of his land and also of the use of the money due him for the land. The condemnor is also deprived of the use of the money it has paid into court but the condemnor does have the use of the land. When a loss must fall on one or the other of two parties and neither has been guilty of unlawful conduct, it is just that the loss should fall on the party who initiated the proceedings which caused the loss instead of on the party who is wholly without fault and did not initiate the proceedings.
In Adwell, the award for compensation and damages was fixed by the court and in the instant case by the jury. There is no other difference. If the landowner is entitled to interest when the award is fixed by the court, the landowner is equally entitled to interest when the award is fixed by the jury. There is no sound reason to award interest in the one case and deny it in the other, or vice versa.
We are of opinion that the owner is entitled to interest from the date condemnor takes actual possession until the date of the jury's verdict and that the court erred in refusing the owner's requested charge 3 and in giving the oral charge to which the owner excepted.
Appellant's assignment 43 recites:
The court sustained objection as follows:
We think it is clear beyond question that the landowner had the right to show the value of the timber and pulpwood on the land taken. Long Distance Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Schmidt, 157 Ala. 391, 47 So. 731.
We are not persuaded, however, that defendant had a right to show the value of timber and pulpwood on the remaining land unless the owner proposed also to show that the trees on the remaining land would be damaged or destroyed by the taking. We do not understand appellant to say that the trees on the remaining land would be damaged, destroyed, or diminished in value by the taking.
The court pointed out that objection was sustained to the showing "in that form."
We will not put the court in error for sustaining objection to an offer to show jointly admissible and inadmissible evidence.
In assignments 41 and 42, appellant assigns for error the action of the court in *788 sustaining objections to two questions propounded to the witness Collier asking him to describe his experience in buying and selling timber and pulpwood.
Collier is the witness by whom appellant proposed to prove the matters offered to be shown in assignment 43. Appellant had the right to qualify this witness in order to show the value of the timber and pulpwood on the land taken. As we have already said, however, the court did not err in sustaining objection to the offer to show. Appellant makes the same argument to support assignments 41 and 42 as she makes to support 43. For the same reason we will not reverse on 41 and 42.
In assignments 40 and 49, appellant assigns for error the action of the court in sustaining objection to admission in evidence of an aerial photograph. Appellant undertook to lay a predicate for its introduction by two witnesses. The testimony of the witness Till is as follows:
The testimony of the witness Storrs is as follows:
Appellee appears to recognize that the reasons stated by the court were not sufficient to sustain objection to the photograph, but says it "was not properly shown to illustrate the condition of appellant's lands as of the date of taking," and the photograph showed land under cultivation whereas the undisputed evidence was that the "land was not cultivated in the year in which it was taken."
The witness Till testified that the photograph accurately portrayed the McLemore land "As of the time that the application was filed."
When counsel for appellant asked the reason for the court's ruling, and if the reason was because "it's prejudicial, or improper predicate," the court said "No, that's not the reason. The reason for my ruling is because the map, on its face, shows that it's not like it was at the time of the taking."
The witness Till testified that the photograph did portray the land "As of the time that the application was filed." It was for the jury to decide whether Till or the other witnesses spoke the truth.
Sustaining objection to the appellant's Exhibit 2 was error.
Appellant has argued a number of other assignments of error but those matters will probably not arise on another trial.
For the errors pointed out, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and LAWSON, SIMPSON, MERRILL, HARWOOD, and BLOODWORTH, JJ., concur.
BLOODWORTH, Justice.
All the justices are of opinion that the application for rehearing should be overruled.
Due to earnest insistence of counsel that we ought to review other rulings of the trial court since they are likely to occur on a retrial, we consider the following assignments of error not treated in our original opinion. Since three of the justices do not concur in some of the conclusions reached, the concurrence or dissent of each justice appears at the end of each group of assignments of error (I-IV, inclusive).
As we understand it, the question raised by these assignments is whether in testimony given on direct examination by a real estate expert, he may state the sales prices of "comparable lands" when his testimony is obtained from hearsay sources.[1]
We are of the opinion that an expert should be permitted on direct examination to state the sales prices of "comparable lands" even though his knowledge of such sales prices is obtained from, or is founded upon, hearsay, for the reason that he should be permitted to show the basis for his opinion of the value of the land in question.
Our court has long recognized that, in part, opinions as to value by expert witnesses may be based on hearsay. In Alabama Consolidated Coal & Iron Co. v. Turner (1906), 145 Ala. 639, 652, 39 So. 603, 606, 117 Am.St.Rep. 61, in a suit by a riparian owner against a mill owner for taking water from, and polluting, a stream, our court said:
As aptly stated in International Paper Co. v. United States, 227 F.2d 201 (5 Cir. 1955):
That there are four views in this country as to the admissibility of such evidence seems clear. See, Annotation at 12 A.L.R.3d 1064, "ADMISSIBILITY OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE AS TO COMPARABLE SALES OF OTHER LAND AS BASIS FOR EXPERT'S OPINION AS TO LAND VALUE"; State ex rel. Herman v. Wilson (1967), 4 Ariz.App. 420, 420 P.2d 992; 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 3d Ed., §§ 18.4, 18.42, 18.45.
One view strictly applies the hearsay rule; the second holds the evidence admissible for the limited purpose of showing the basis of the witness' opinion (the so-called "Texas Rule"); the third holds the admission of such evidence is discretionary with the trial court; and, the fourth that such evidence may be admitted for general purposes.
We think the more recent and better reasoned cases follow the "Texas Rule." As a matter of practice, in the trials of most condemnation cases neither party is too concerned with "comparable sales" as hearsaywhat the opposing parties are concerned about, and that at which they direct their attacks, is the question of comparability of the respective tracts of land.
See, jurisdictions which follow the "Texas Rule" listed at 12 A.L.R.3d 1068. See also, State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Bloomfield Tractor Sales, Inc., 381 S.W.2d 20 (Mo.Ct.App.1964); State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Barron, 400 S.W.2d 33 (Mo.1966); State Highway Commission v. Fisch-Or, Inc., 406 P.2d 539 (Or.1965); Cohn v. State, 438 S.W.2d 860 (Civ.App.Texas, 1969); Forest Preserve District of Du Page County v. Harris Trust and Savings Bank, 108 Ill.App.2d 65, 247 N.E.2d 188 (1969).
Some of the reasons for following the "Texas Rule" are enumerated in United States v. 60.14 Acres of Land, etc., 362 F.2d 660 (3 Cir. 1966), viz:
LAWSON, SIMPSON, MERRILL, HARWOOD and MADDOX, JJ., concur.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., COLEMAN and McCALL, JJ., dissent.
As we understand it, these assignments raise the issue whether certified copies of deeds of allegedly "comparable lands" offered to show the sales prices are admissible, although this evidence is hearsay.
We are of the opinion that an expert "may take into consideration the consideration stated in a deed" as one of his sources of information, just as he could consider oral statements of the sales price made to him by persons familiar with the transaction stating the sales price, as we have already indicated we hold. State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Bloomfield Tractor Sales, Inc., 381 S.W.2d 20, 24 (Mo.Ct.App.1964), supra. We can see no good reason why a party should not be permitted to introduce in evidence certified copies of deeds solely for the purpose of showing the basis for the opinion of the real estate expert as to the value of the land in question although such evidence is not considered as primary evidence of the sales price of the property. When such evidence is allowed, the other party would be entitled to a limiting instruction to the jury.
LAWSON, MERRILL, HARWOOD, MADDOX and McCALL, JJ., concur.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., SIMPSON and COLEMAN, JJ., dissent.
These assignments charge error on the part of the trial court with respect to several questions relating to "comparables" addressed to an expert real estate witness. If there is another trial, it is not likely these questions will arise again in their present forms. We do not, therefore deem it appropriate to deal with these evidentiary questions at this time.
All the Justices concur.
With respect to assignment of error 35, it appears that during direct examination of appellee's expert real estate witness, and prior to his testifying what his investigation disclosed as to a sale of certain other land, appellant made a request to "cross-examine" (examine on "voir dire") the witness with respect to certain matters the witness had found in his investigation. The trial court overruled this request saying to appellants' counsel that he would have ample time "to do it" on counsel's cross-examination of this witness.
*794 We are of the opinion that such request for "voir dire" examination addressed itself to the discretion of the trial court and that no abuse of discretion is shown in this instance. State v. Wilbanks, 5 Div. 869 [MS] (Oct. 9, 1969). We suggest that the better practice in such a situation would be to allow examination on "voir dire."
In assignment of error 21, appellants complain of the giving of appellee-condemnor's written requested charge No. P-4, the pertinent portions of which instructed the jury that "the measure of the compensation and damages to be awarded the landowners in this case for the taking of this property is the difference in the fair cash market value of the landowners' entire tract of land immediately prior to and at the time of the taking of such property and the fair cash market value of the tract of land remaining to the landowners immediately after the time of taking of such property * * *."
Appellants say that giving this charg is reversible error because it fails to mention that "enhancement" in value to remaining lands shall not reduce the compensation for the land taken. Appellants contend this omission leaves the jury to consider "enhancement" in value to the remaining lands due to construction of the canal which appellee proposed to build. Appellants admit there was no evidence from the witness stand to show "enhancement" but they say the jury "viewed" the property and could have considered the prospects of industrial sites along the canal which they may have felt enhanced the value of the remaining tract. Appellants say, therefore, the charge is in conflict with Title 19, § 14, Code of Alabama 1940[2] which provides in effect that "enhancement" to remaining lands (except in highway condemnations) shall not reduce the compensation for the taking.
We hold that omission of a statement of the law regarding "enhancement" from the charge No. P-4 did not make the giving of the charge error for the reason that there was no evidence from the witness stand as to "enhancement." We will not presume that the jury's viewing the premises supplied evidence of "enhancement" which is otherwise lacking.
We do not decide whether there may be other reasons for holding that the charge was given without error.
All the Justices concur.
Opinion extended and application for rehearing overruled.
All the Justices concur.
COLEMAN, Justice (dissenting in part):
I dissent from the majority with respect to certain errors as indicated below.
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in admitting, over objection, testimony that similar land had been sold for a certain price.
Appellee's expert witness, a land appraiser, was permitted to testify on direct examination that certain allegedly similar and comparable tracts of land had been sold for certain prices. For example, the witness testified that, in his appraisal of the lands of appellant, the witness had considered a sale of other land, one hundred acres, sold in 1961 by Mary Catherine *795 Storrs Jackson, grantor, to Ralph Bryant and E. C. Mercer, grantees. The evidence is clear that the witness did not participate in the sale and his only knowledge of the price paid by the grantees is derived from what someone told the witness or what the witness learned by looking at the record where the deed from Jackson to Bryant and Mercer is recorded in the office of the judge of probate.
The ruling complained of in Assignment 25, which relates to the Jackson sale, appears in the transcript as follows:
The condemnor argues that the hearsay testimony as to sales price is admissible because a party should be permitted to show by the expert witness the basis on which he arrived at his opinion of value. Under the so-called Texas rule, some courts so hold. Some of the federal circuits appear to hold that the trial court has discretion to admit hearsay sales price testimony. A most helpful annotation on the question appears in 95 A.L.R.2d 1218.
A further objection to hearsay is the absence of opportunity to cross-examine the person who allegedly made the hearsay statement.
A number of courts have held that testimony by an expert witness stating the sales price of comparable land is not admissible *796 on direct examination where the testimony is founded on hearsay.
An Ohio court said:
The Supreme Court of Colorado has said:
The Georgia Court of Appeals said:
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts said:
I am of opinion that the holding of the courts whom I have quoted is supported by the better reasoning.
We are not here concerned with testimony of an expert trading in a fungible commodity such as cotton, as in Burks v. Hubbard, 69 Ala. 379.
There is a statement near the end of the opinion in State v. Sharp, 278 Ala. 668, 670, 180 So. 2d 264, 266, that ".... we have held that on the question of admissibility of evidence of the sales prices of other lands voluntarily sold and the question of similarity, much must be left to the discretion of the trial court. Popwell v. Shelby County, 272 Ala. 287, 130 So. 2d 170, 87 A.L.R.2d 1148."
Sharp cannot be authority that hearsay sales price evidence is admissible because only one assignment of error was argued in Sharp, that assignment was that the trial court erred in sustaining objection to an exhibit offered by appellant, and this court affirmed.
In Popwell, no question was presented as to the admissibility of hearsay sales price evidence. This court, citing Southern Electric Generating Co. v. Leibacher, 269 Ala. 9, 110 So. 2d 308, did say ".... that on the question of similarity much must be left to the discretion of the trial court ...." (272 Ala. at 292, 293, 130 So.2d at 175), but nothing was said relating to the admissibility of evidence to prove the actual price for which similar lands had been sold.
In Leibacher, the court held in paragraphs [19, 20] and [24] that the trial court was not in error in sustaining objection to questions, propounded to the condemnee and his wife, seeking to show the price that the condemnee had paid for the condemned property ten years prior to the taking. Leibacher is not contrary to what I have said here.
*798 I am of opinion that the rulings complained of in Assignments 25, 27, 30, and 34 were error.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and McCALL, J., concur.
Over appellant's objection, the court permitted appellee to introduce into evidence a copy of the record of the deed executed by Mary Catherine Storrs Jackson to Bryant and Mercer in the sale mentioned above, and also a copy of the record of another deed showing a sale of other allegedly similar land by strangers to this suit. The judge of probate certified that these exhibits were true and correct copies of the records in his office.
In a Rhode Island tax assessment case, the value of certain land was the point in issue. On this issue, the trial judge considered evidence as to the amount of revenue stamps placed on certain deeds evidencing sales of other tracts of similar land. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that this was not reversible error because, in respect to four of the sales, the broker who conducted them testified of his own knowledge as to the amount of the consideration in each case and the testimony as to the revenue stamps did not sufficiently prejudice appellant so as to require reversal. The court did hold that considering the evidence as to revenue stamps was erroneous and had this to say:
In the instant case, the recital of the consideration in the copy of the deed received in evidence is nothing more than a statement by the party signing the deed that the consideration was the recited number of dollars. The parties to the deed are not parties to this suit nor in privity with the appellant. The party signing the deed was not available for cross-examination by appellant. I have already undertaken to show that testimony, to the effect that a person not present in court had made oral statements stating the sales price, is hearsay and not admissible. It would not have been permissible for appellee's witnesses to testify as to the ex parte oral statements of the parties who signed the deeds ".... and `a statement otherwise objectionable as hearsay does not become competent because it has been reduced to writing.' 31 C.J.S. Evidence, § 194, page 930; Ex parte McLendon, 239 Ala. 564, 195 So. 733; Southern Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Williams, 230 Ala. 681, 163 So. 321." Thornton v. City of Birmingham, 250 Ala. 651, 655, 35 So. 2d 545, 547, 7 A.L.R.2d 773.
I am of opinion that admission of the copies of the deeds was error.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and SIMPSON, J., concur.
[1]  The landowner's requested charge recites:

"Defendant's Charge No. 3
"Gentlemen of the Jury, the landowners are entitled to just compensation by reason of their land being taken. In order to arrive at the just compensation in this case, you should, based on all the evidence, award the landowners the fair market value of the land actually taken plus the decrease in value, if any, to the remaining lands. These values should be determined from all the evidence as of the time when the application for condemnation was filed by the condemnor. Then you should compute interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the sum of said values, from the time of the actual appropriation of the land by the condemnor until the present time and add such interest to said values in order to arrive at one lump sum as a just compensation....."
[2]  This court has said:

"If it should be thought that interest is a proper element of compensation, the trial court should be requested to so instruct the jury. In that way a clear-cut issue would be presented as to the propriety of the jury considering interest as an element of compensation, thus avoiding any doubt as to whether the jury, in any particular case, did or did not include interest in their award." State v. Jones, 271 Ala. 227, 228, 229, 123 So. 2d 107, 109.
[3]  The appellant (condemnor) in Adwell made the following assignments of error:

"19. The Court erred in awarding any interest on the amount of the award in eminent domain proceedings prior to the date of the order of condemnation in the Circuit Court where the trial was de novo by statute (R. 16-19).
"20. The Court erred in retroactively awarding interest on an award in eminent domain proceedings from a date prior to the order of condemnation in the Circuit Court (R. 16-19).
"21. The Court erred in awarding and ordering to be paid any interest on an award in eminent domain proceedings (R. 16-19).
"22. The Court erred in awarding interest as a part of the damages and compensation to which the owner was held to be entitled in eminent domain proceedings (R. 16-19)."
[1]  The question of admissibility of profferred testimony as to "comparable" lands is, under our decisions, a matter for determination by the trial court. Popwell v. Shelby County, 272 Ala. 287, 130 So. 2d 170, 87 A.L.R.2d 1148; Southern Electric Generating Co. v. Leibacher, 269 Ala. 9, 110 So. 2d 308.
[2]  "The amount of compensation to which the owners and other parties interested therein are entitled must not be reduced or diminished because of any incidental benefits which may accrue to them, or to their remaining lands in consequence of the uses to which the lands to be taken, or in which the easement is to be acquired, will be appropriated; provided that, in the condemnation of lands for ways and rights of ways for public highways, the commissioners may, in fixing the amount of compensation to be awarded the owner for lands taken for this use, take into consideration the value of the enhancement to the remaining lands of such owner that such highway may cause."