Title: Wakole v. Barber

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
BILLY T. WAKOLE, SR. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 102176 
JUSTICE CLEO E. POWELL 
 
 
 
March 2, 2012 
NARMINA BARBER 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
R. Terrence Ney, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we address whether the circuit court erred 
in 1) allowing counsel for Narmina Barber, a personal injury 
plaintiff in an action arising from an automobile accident, to 
argue in his closing that each item of damage was separate and 
had a fixed numerical value, and 2) permitting Barber's counsel 
to enumerate each item of damages to the jury during closing 
argument.1  We conclude that the argument made by Barber for 
specific amounts for various types of damages did not invade the 
province of the jury nor did it violate Code § 8.01-379.1.  
Therefore, we will hold that the trial court did not err in 
                     
 
1 The defendant driver of the other vehicle, Billy T. 
Wakole, Sr., also argues that the circuit court erred by 
allowing Barber's attorney to argue his personal opinions to the 
jury regarding the amount that ought to be awarded for each item 
of damages.  On appeal, Wakole specifically challenges Barber's 
counsel's statement that "[Barber] is the most reasonable woman 
you could ever meet.  I submit to you that this is a modest 
sum."  However, Wakole failed to argue to the circuit court that 
Barber's counsel was injecting his personal opinion into his 
closing argument and therefore, the circuit court never ruled on 
this issue.  As such, we will not address this argument as a 
basis for appeal.  Rule 5:25.  However, this type of argument 
may be interpreted as stating a personal opinion.  We caution 
against argument that expresses a personal opinion about the 
justness of a cause, credibility of a witness, or culpability of 
a civil litigant.   
 
2 
denying Billy T. Wakole, Sr.'s motions to prohibit such 
argument. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
 
On November 10, 2006, Barber was a passenger in an 
automobile driven by her husband when Wakole made a sudden left 
turn in front of their vehicle hitting the passenger side of the 
Barber's vehicle.  Although Barber felt pain at the time of the 
accident, she declined to go to the hospital but later sought 
several types of treatment with limited success for headaches 
and neck pain. 
 
Prior to the accident, Barber was “always full of energy, 
ready to work, ready to clean the house, ready to go out and 
party, just always go, go, go.”  Since the accident, she has 
often been irritable because of the pain and the limitations 
that the pain places on her activities with family and friends.  
She periodically has had to hire people to assist her with 
thoroughly cleaning her home.  Her friends now describe her as 
depressed and without energy. 
As a result of her injuries, Barber brought this action 
against Wakole, who admitted liability for the accident but 
disputed the extent of Barber's damages.  At trial, Barber 
entered two exhibits of her medical expenses – one for $948 and 
one for $4,173.  In her complaint, Barber requested $50,000 in 
damages. 
 
3 
 
Prior to closing argument, Wakole objected to any argument 
by Barber that would amount to using Civil Model Jury 
Instruction 9.000 as a mathematical formula utilizing each type 
of damage as a line item.  Wakole’s counsel argued that this 
Court’s decision in Certified T.V. & Appliance Co, Inc. v. 
Harrington, 201 Va. 109, 109 S.E.2d 126 (1959), prohibited such 
an argument because that case held that counsel may not propose 
a method to the jury by which the jury ought to calculate 
damages.  Counsel did not dispute that Barber put on evidence of 
pain, suffering, and inconvenience but argued that assigning a 
monetary value to each category would amount to nothing more 
than speculation.  The court overruled Wakole’s objection. 
 
During Barber’s closing argument, she presented a chart 
from which the jury could calculate damages, which she called a 
formula, and argued for $50,000 in damages, including 
compensation for medical bills, past inconvenience, "full and 
fair compensation for the injuries she sustained," future 
medical expenses, past pain and suffering, and her pain and 
limitations that she will have for the remainder of her life.2  
Barber argued to the jury that the law recognizes "human losses" 
                     
 
2 Barber's counsel initially sought damages in excess of 
$50,000, but Wakole objected and argued that Barber could not 
ask the jury for an amount in excess of the amount she sought in 
her complaint.  The circuit court agreed.  Counsel for Wakole 
made no other objections. 
 
 
4 
and asserted that three years and nine months after the 
accident, she still suffered from headaches and neck pain for 
which medical treatment afforded little relief.  She also argued 
that she has been greatly inconvenienced by this accident in 
terms of her daily life and her relationships with others.  The 
jury returned a verdict for $30,000 in damages. 
II. ANALYSIS 
CERTIFIED T.V. IS NOT DISPOSITIVE 
 
"[T]he purpose of closing argument is to draw the jury's 
attention to the body of evidence that has been admitted into 
the record and to argue reasonable inferences that may be drawn 
from that evidence."  Graham v. Cook, 278 Va. 233, 250, 682 
S.E.2d 535, 544 (2009).  We have often said that "determinations 
regarding the propriety of argument by trial counsel are matters 
left to the sound discretion of the circuit court."  Id. at 249, 
682 S.E.2d at 544.  We will not reverse a circuit court's ruling 
unless such ruling was an abuse of discretion and the rights of 
the complaining litigant have been prejudiced.  Id. 
 
Here, Wakole argues that the circuit court erred in 
allowing Barber to use a chart during her closing argument to 
request specific amounts from the jury for certain categories of 
damages.  To support this argument, Wakole relies upon our 
holding in Certified T.V..  Such reliance, however, is 
misplaced. 
 
5 
 
In Certified T.V., we held that allowing plaintiff's 
counsel to make an argument to the jury based upon a "daily or 
other fixed basis" would permit the plaintiff to present that 
which is not in evidence and invade the province of the jury.  
201 Va. at 114-15, 109 S.E.2d at 131.  "Verdicts should be based 
on deductions drawn by the jury from the evidence presented and 
not the mere adoption of calculations submitted by counsel."  
Id. at 115, 109 S.E.2d at 131.  What amounted to putting 
information not in evidence before the jury and thereby invading 
its province in Certified T.V. was "the use by plaintiff's 
counsel of a mathematical formula setting forth on a blackboard 
the claim of pain, suffering, mental anguish, and the percentage 
of disability suggested by him on a per diem or other fixed 
basis . . . ."  Id.  We concluded that doing so was "speculation 
of counsel unsupported by evidence, amounting to his giv[ing] 
testimony in his summation argument, and that it was improper 
and constituted error."  Id. (citations omitted).  The specific 
argument in Certified T.V. that was objected to and ruled to be 
inappropriate by this Court was as follows: 
permanent phlebitis $5,475.00, traumatic arthritis at 
50 cents – $5,475,00, mental anguish, re: pregnancy, 
five months – $750.00, seven weeks on crutches at 
$10.00 daily – $490.00 
 
Id. at 113, 109 S.E.2d at 130.  In passing on the impropriety of 
the argument, we stated: 
 
6 
 
The suggested amount for permanent phlebitis is 
the sum of $5,475.00, and, while the record does not 
show how counsel arrived at that figure, it can be 
assumed that it was fixed by calculating so many days 
of the ailment at 50 cents per day, since the next 
item listed is traumatic arthritis at 50 cents – 
$5,475.00. The next items, mental anguish, re: 
pregnancy, five months – $750.00, seven weeks on 
crutches at $10.00 per day – $490.00, and inability 
to wear shoes, dance, etc. – $5,000.00, appear to 
have been calculated on a basis of a fixed amount to 
be allowed each day for so many days. 
 
Id. at 114, 109 S.E.2d at 130.  The danger against which the 
Court sought to guard was an argument placed before the jury 
that was not based on the evidence and further was based on a 
flawed premise that pain and suffering is constant from 
individual to individual and the degree of pain is the same 
daily.  Id. at 115, 109 S.E.2d at 131. 
 
These are not the facts of the present case.  Here, 
Barber's counsel presented the jury with a chart detailing 
various amounts sought for different categories of damages.  At 
one point, counsel argued that Barber hoped to live an 
additional thirty-five to forty years but did not assign a per 
diem rate to this expectation.  What Barber did was ask for a 
fixed dollar amount for each category of damages.3 
                     
 
3 Contrary to the argument made by the dissent that the 
court erred in allowing counsel to assign value and to testify 
in the guise of making argument, counsel was conveying to the 
jury the values that Barber had placed on her pain and 
suffering.  Indeed, counsel at one point argued that "Barber 
suggests [$15,000] as full and fair compensation for the 
injuries she sustained[.]"  Because they were the amounts sought 
 
7 
 
There is no question that a plaintiff is allowed to ask for 
a total fixed dollar amount for any provable, non-economic 
damages to include bodily injury, physical pain, mental anguish 
(past and future), and inconvenience (past and future).  There 
is no question that the lump sum amount requested, unlike 
medical bills or lost wages, is based on intangibles for which 
there is no specific evidence of monetary value in the record.  
The only limitations on a request for a lump sum are that the 
amount be supported by the evidence and be an amount that will 
fully and fairly compensate the plaintiff for damages suffered 
as a result of the defendant's negligence. 
 
Tellingly, because a plaintiff can request one lump sum for 
all of the provable elements of damage combined, if a plaintiff 
suffered only one non-economic loss, i.e., bodily injury, any 
amount sued for above the economic loss would be an amount that 
counsel should be able to request by amount.  Consequently, just 
as counsel can argue for a total amount requested by the 
plaintiff, there is no principled reason why a plaintiff should 
not be able to request a specific amount for each element of 
damages sought as long as there is evidence in the record to 
                                                                  
by Barber, the values placed upon the damages as broken down 
should no more be disallowed as "estimates of counsel", than the 
total amount requested in the ad damnum and conveyed to the jury 
during closing argument. 
 
8 
support each element of damages claimed and the total requested 
is no more than the ad damnum. 
 
It has long been recognized that plaintiff is allowed to 
ask for a "fixed amount" for non-economic loss caused by the 
defendant's negligence.  Today, we hold that, as long as there 
is evidence to support an award of non-economic damages, 
plaintiff is allowed to break the lump sum amount into its 
component parts and argue a "fixed amount" for each element of 
damages claimed as long as the amount is not based on a per diem 
or other fixed basis.  
 
Here, because the defendant concedes that there was 
evidence to support the plaintiff's non-economic damages, we 
hold that the trial court did not err in allowing Barber to 
request a fixed amount for each element of damages claimed.4 
CODE § 8.01-379.1 DOES NOT PREVENT A PLAINTIFF FROM 
 REQUESTING SPECIFIC AWARDS FOR DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF 
 DAMAGES WHEN SUCH ARGUMENT IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
 
 
Next, Wakole argues that by allowing Barber's counsel to 
enumerate each item of damages, the trial court violated Code 
§ 8.01-379.1.  Essentially, Wakole contends that because the 
                     
 
4 Although Barber's counsel referred to using a formula to 
calculate damages, this term is misleading.  The means by which 
Barber presented her sought for damages to the jury was not "a 
per diem or other fixed basis."  Certified T.V., 201 Va. at 115, 
109 S.E.2d at 131; Reid v. Baumgardner, 217 Va. 769, 772, 232 
S.E.2d 778, 780 (1977).  It is clear from reading the record 
that the formula to which counsel referred was derived from 1 
Virginia Model Jury Instructions – Civil, No. 9.000. 
 
 
9 
statute allows the parties to inform the jury of the amount of 
damages sought, it limits the party to arguing only one total 
amount. 
 
Issues of statutory interpretation are pure questions of 
law that we review de novo.  Conyers v. Martial Arts World of 
Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007).  
"When the language of a statute is unambiguous, we are bound by 
the plain meaning of that language.  Furthermore, we must give 
effect to the legislature's intention as expressed by the 
language used unless a literal interpretation of the language 
would result in a manifest absurdity."  Id. (internal citations 
omitted). 
 
The Code does address what a jury may be told about the 
amount a plaintiff sues for: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any party 
in any civil action may inform the jury of the amount 
of damages sought by the plaintiff in the opening 
statement or closing argument, or both. The plaintiff 
may request an amount which is less than the ad damnum 
in the motion for judgment. 
 
Code § 8.01-379.1.  Nothing in this provision states that when 
addressing the jury regarding the total amount sought, the 
plaintiff may only do so in terms of one lump sum.  "Courts 
cannot 'add language to the statute the General Assembly has not 
seen fit to include.' "  Jackson v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 269 
Va. 303, 313, 608 S.E.2d 901, 906 (2005) (quoting Holsapple v. 
 
10 
Commonwealth, 266 Va. 593, 599, 587 S.E.2d 561, 564-65 (2003)).  
To take Wakole's argument to its logical conclusion, a plaintiff 
would be precluded from presenting separate amounts for 
quantifiable losses like medical expenses and lost wages as well 
as those from non-economic losses, e.g., pain and suffering.  
This interpretation would read into the statute language that is 
not there.  Thus, we hold that the trial court did not err in 
allowing Barber's argument.   
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
trial court. 
Affirmed. 
JUSTICE McCLANAHAN, dissenting. 
The dangers against which this Court sought to guard in 
Certified T.V. were allowing counsel to use closing argument to 
introduce evidence that was not before the jury and allowing 
counsel to invade the province of the jury by suggesting a 
calculation for damages.  The circuit court allowed both in 
permitting Barber's counsel to introduce estimates of value for 
each element of intangible damages and place those values into 
what counsel referred to as "the formula" given by the court.  
In concluding that Certified T.V. is not dispositive, the 
majority ignores the ratio decidendi for the Court's holding. 
 
11 
Prior to closing arguments, Wakole objected to the use of a 
formula with fixed values for elements of pain, injuries, and 
inconvenience.  As Wakole explained to the circuit court, 
Barber's counsel planned to use 
the [model] damages instruction 9.00 and take 
each factor which the jury is instructed to consider 
and set it up in a mathematical equation as individual 
line items. 
 
For instance, a line item for pain and suffering, 
a line item for inconvenience, and so forth.  And what 
I understand they intend do in their closing is assign 
a value to each of those factors, and then at the 
bottom come up with a sum, as if they have added them 
all together in a mathematical equation. 
 
Wakole asserted such argument was improper since it would 
"suggest a method to the jury as to how they are to go about 
coming up with a number" and because "the numbers that are 
assigned to each individual factor are entirely arbitrary."  
Overruling Wakole's objection, the circuit court agreed with 
Barber that Certified T.V. only prohibits a "per diem argument." 
 
During closing argument, Barber's counsel utilized a poster 
board containing a chart that counsel represented as the law the 
judge "just read to you."  Telling the jury that "[t]his is the 
formula," counsel displayed a chart containing an itemization of 
intangible damages that included blank lines for past 
inconvenience, future inconvenience, injuries, past pain and 
suffering, and future pain and suffering.  Counsel proceeded to 
complete the chart with a black marker by assigning a numerical 
 
12 
value to each item.  Counsel itemized the following elements of 
intangible damages: past inconvenience from November 2006 
through the date of trial - $5,000; future inconvenience - 
$2,000; injuries and effect on health - $15,000;
1 past pain from November 2006 or "three years and nine months" - 
$20,000; future pain - $25,000.2  Counsel argued, "If you add 
those up, it would be pretty reasonable." 
 
By allowing counsel to introduce values representing each 
element of intangible damages into a calculation Barber 
represented as "the formula" based on the instruction given to 
the jury, the circuit court permitted Barber's counsel "to 
invade the province of the jury and to get before it what does 
not appear in the evidence."  Certified T.V. & Appliance Co., 
Inc. v. Harrington, 201 Va. 109, 115, 109 S.E.2d 126, 131 
(1959).  The values placed upon the elements of intangible 
damages were "estimates of counsel" that "instill[ed] in the 
minds of the jurors impressions not founded on the evidence."  
Id.  In fact, "an expert witness would not be permitted to 
                     
1 In discussing injuries and effect on health, counsel told 
the jury that "the law doesn't break that out for some reason" 
but the judge "instructed you on it" and "that's the law in 
Virginia." 
2 Because the numerical values assigned by Barber's counsel, 
added together, exceeded the amount sought in Barber's 
complaint, Wakole objected.  After the circuit court sustained 
the objection, Barber's counsel told the jury that "if you add 
those up, it comes right over $50,000" but "[a]ll we are asking 
for today is $50,000." 
 
13 
testify as to the market value of pain and suffering."  Id.  
Thus, counsel's use of these fixed values was "speculation" that 
was "unsupported by evidence, amounting to his giv[ing] 
testimony in his summation argument."  Id.  Although wide 
latitude is generally given by the court during closing 
argument, "[c]ounsel has no right to testify in the guise of 
making argument, nor to assume the existence of evidence that 
has not been presented."  Graham v. Cook, 278 Va. 233, 250, 682 
S.E.2d 535, 544 (2009).3  The circuit court's error in allowing 
                     
3 I disagree with the majority that Wakole made any 
concession that would permit Barber's counsel to introduce into 
his argument estimates of value as to each item of intangible 
damages.  The majority concludes that "because the defendant 
concedes that there was evidence to support plaintiff's non-
economic damages, we hold that the trial court did not err in 
allowing Barber to request a fixed amount for each element of 
damages claimed."  That Wakole acknowledged Barber introduced 
evidence to support her claim of pain, suffering, and 
inconvenience is beside the point since Wakole did not contend 
the jury instruction including these items was improper.  
Rather, Wakole argued there was no evidence to support the 
estimates of value given to these items by Barber's counsel: 
 
I do not dispute that the plaintiff has put on 
evidence of pain, and suffering, and inconvenience.  
But they have no evidence whatsoever to suggest that 
those intangible things – nor can they have any 
evidence that those intangible things have a specific 
value. 
And if they offer a value, an arbitrary value, 
they are invading the province of the jury, who has 
the sole responsibility for determining the amount of 
the verdict. 
 
Wakole's argument did not constitute a concession that 
would open the door for allowing counsel to introduce, in 
 
14 
counsel to assign values to the elements of damages was 
compounded in allowing counsel to insert these values into a 
calculation to be used by the jury in arriving at Barber's 
damages.  "[T]he use by plaintiff's counsel of a mathematical 
formula" setting forth the claim of intangible damages on any 
"fixed basis" is improper.  Certified T.V., 201 Va. at 115, 109 
S.E.2d at 131.  "Verdicts should be based on deductions drawn by 
the jury from the evidence presented and not the mere adoption 
of calculations submitted by counsel." Id. 4 
                                                                  
his closing argument, evidence of the values assigned to 
these elements of damage. 
 
4 Because Code § 8.01-379.1 permits a party to "inform the 
jury of the amount of damages sought by the plaintiff," the 
majority reasons "there is no principled reason why a plaintiff 
should not be able to request a specific amount for each element 
of damages sought."  I cannot accept this expansion of the plain 
language of the statute, nor can I accept the proposition that 
by making a "request" for each element of intangible damages, 
counsel's assignment of value to each such element is 
transformed from impermissible testimony into permissible 
argument.  Informing the jury of the amount sought in 
plaintiff's ad damnum is not the same as allowing counsel to 
introduce evidence as to the value of individual elements of 
intangible damages in his closing argument.  While the jury may 
be told of the amount plaintiff seeks to recover, it should not 
be told by counsel how to calculate this total or what figures 
to use in its calculation.  "[T]here is no fixed rule or 
yardstick by which to measure with mathematical precision the 
definite amount of damages for physical pain, suffering and 
mental anguish endured in personal injury cases," so it must 
remain "within the sound discretion of the jury to determine 
from the evidence what is fair and reasonable compensation."  
Certified T.V., 201 Va. at 114, 109 S.E.2d at 130.  The fact 
that, in some cases, the jury can deduce for itself the value 
plaintiff assigns to a claim for intangible damages solely from 
the amount of damages sought without the necessity of counsel 
 
15 
 
In my view, allowing Barber's counsel to introduce, in his 
closing argument, values for each of the elements of past 
inconvenience, future inconvenience, injuries, past pain, and 
future pain and incorporate them into a formula given to the 
jury was patently improper and constituted error. 
                                                                  
supplying that value to the jury is not justification for 
allowing counsel to supply values for each element of intangible 
damages when no such deduction can be made.