Title: Wickes v. Kofman

State: rhode-island

Issuer: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Document:

402 A.2d 591 (1979) Carolyn P. WICKES v. Solomon KOFMAN et al. No. 78-226-Appeal. Supreme Court of Rhode Island. June 21, 1979. Saunders & Torres, Ernest C. Torres, East Greenwich, for plaintiff. Smith & Smith, Incorporated, Z. Hershel Smith, Providence, for defendants. WEISBERGER, Justice. This is an appeal from an order of the Superior Court granting certain preliminary relief to the plaintiff Carolyn P. Wickes on the basis of a partial submission of the controversy to the trial justice on a comprehensive stipulation of facts. The case originally came before us on petition for certiorari, but we have treated this petition *592 as a notice of appeal.[1] The relief granted was a mandatory injunction that "[d]efendants shall forthwith execute and deliver to Plaintiff, in a form suitable for recording, a discharge of the sales agreement between the parties dated August 30, 1977, which has been recorded in the Records of Land Evidence of the City of Warwick." The order also terminated any interest of the defendants in the real estate which was the subject of the controversy and enjoined them from trespassing on said real estate. From this order the defendants appealed. This controversy arose out of an agreement for the sale of 60 acres of land with a house and certain ancillary improvements thereon located in the city of Warwick. The parties made the following stipulations: In addition to the foregoing stipulations, counsel agreed orally before the trial justice that the parcel consisted of 60 acres and that defendants had purchased 4 or 5 undeveloped parcels of land during the past 5 or 6 years and had later subdivided and sold such parcels. On the basis of the foregoing stipulations, the trial justice made the following findings: We have enunciated on many occasions the principle that when a case is submitted to a trial justice sitting without a jury, the findings of fact will be afforded great weight and will not be set aside on appeal unless an appellant can show that the trial justice either misconceived or overlooked material evidence or that he was clearly wrong. Jakober v. E. M. Loew's Capitol Theatre, Inc., 107 R.I. 104, 265 A.2d 429 (1970). This principle is applicable to the drawing of inferences from undisputed facts as long as such inferences are reasonable. Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v. Israel, R.I., 377 A.2d 341 (1977); State v. Sprague, 114 R.I. 282, 331 A.2d 399 (1975); Smith v. DeFusco, 107 R.I. 392, 267 A.2d 725 (1970). An examination of these stipulations of fact in the framework of the pleadings in the case supports the inferences drawn by the trial justice as eminently reasonable. On appeal defendants have argued vigorously that they were unable to take *594 percolation tests during the wet season. The short answer to this contention is that no portion of the stipulation of facts indicates in any way that defendants did not have the opportunity to take such tests. The defendants have contended for the first time on appeal that they applied for permission to take percolation tests after the wet season some months after this action had been commenced and that the parties were unable to agree to the preconditions for the taking of such tests. It is a familiar principle that this court will not consider matters which have been raised for the first time on appeal. Tente v. Tente, 112 R.I. 636, 314 A.2d 149 (1974); Hawkins v. Smith, 105 R.I. 669, 254 A.2d 747 (1969); Romeo v. Cranston Redevelopment Agency, 105 R.I. 651, 254 A.2d 426 (1969); Spouting Rock Beach Association v. Garcia, 104 R.I. 451, 244 A.2d 871 (1968). Thus, on the stipulated facts, defendants, who had failed to complete the transaction by the expiration date of the sales agreement and who did not indicate any intention, immediate or prospective, to carry out the obligation to purchase this property, were holding an interest by virtue of having recorded the sales agreement. This made it impossible for plaintiff to convey the real estate, or any portion thereof, and made it more difficult for plaintiff to meet financial commitments required by the purchase of a new residence. The trial justice held that under these circumstances, plaintiff was entitled to relief. We agree. Although defendants argue that time was not of the essence in this agreement, we have previously enunciated the following rationale in respect to time on a real estate contract: We observe that nearly 7 months elapsed following the expiration date of the contract of sale before this matter was reached for hearing. The defendants here were no longer entitled under any theory to prevent alienation of this property.[3] Many of the arguments raised by the defendants on this appeal in regard to excuse for nonperformance may be asserted in the trial court by way of defense to the plaintiff's claim for damages in the event that an appropriate factual basis is established for such defenses at future hearings. On this record they cannot be considered. For the reasons stated, the defendants' appeal is denied and dismissed; the order of the Superior Court granting preliminary injunctive and declaratory relief is hereby affirmed, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings. [1] Although not a final judgment, the order has such elements of finality as would qualify it for immediate appeal under G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 9-24-7. See Johnson v. Johnson, 111 R.I. 46, 298 A.2d 795 (1973). [2] Exhibit B is a letter directed to the defendant Solomon Kofman which reads as follows: "Dear Mr. Kofman: I was very disappointed by your refusal to close the purchase of my property on Major Potter Road in Warwick within the time prescribed in our agreement of August 30. As I am sure your attorney has told you, I was relying on the proceeds from that sale to fulfill a commitment I made to purchase a replacement home in Connecticut after our agreement was executed. Without those funds, I could stand to lose both my $8,750 deposit and the property if something is not done shortly. I would like you to know that although the closing date set forth in our agreement has passed, I will continue to remain ready, willing and able to make conveyance to you until November 11. If you still refuse to close by that time, I shall then consider our agreement definitely breached and any obligation on my part terminated. I will then put the property back on the market and commence suit against you. I sincerely hope that you will reconsider your proposition before November 11. The date prescribed for execution in the agreement was October 30, 1977. [3] We note that the plaintiff seeks relief in one of the counts in the complaint by way of specific performance against these defendants. Obviously, in the event that all or a portion of this property is conveyed during the course of this litigation, this will constitute an election of remedies which would be inconsistent with the claim for specific performance and would preclude such relief from being ultimately granted.