Title: In re Disqualification of Donofrio

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as In re Disqualification of Donofrio, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2012-Ohio-6338.] 
 
 
IN RE DISQUALIFICATION OF DONOFRIO ET AL. 
STATE EX REL. PATEL v. CRAWFORD. 
[Cite as In re Disqualification of Donofrio, 
 ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2012-Ohio-6338.] 
Judges—Affidavits 
of 
disqualification—R.C. 
2701.03—Disqualification 
of 
appellate panel not warranted—Allegations of erroneous rulings cannot 
be litigated in disqualification proceeding—Affiant has failed to prove 
prejudice or bias. 
(No. 12-AP-134—Decided December 17, 2012.) 
ON AFFIDAVIT OF DISQUALIFICATION in the Court of Appeals for Belmont County, 
Case No. 12-BE-28. 
__________________ 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
{¶ 1} Petitioner Arvind Patel has filed an affidavit with the clerk of this 
court under R.C. 2501.13 and 2701.03 seeking to disqualify Judge Gene 
Donofrio, Judge Joseph J. Vukovich, and Judge Mary DeGenaro from presiding 
over case No. 12-BE-28, now pending on Patel’s petition for a writ of mandamus 
in the Seventh District Court of Appeals. 
{¶ 2} Patel alleges that Judge Donofrio, Judge Vukovich, and Judge 
DeGenaro should be disqualified from hearing his underlying writ action because 
in a different case filed by him, Patel v. Bellaire, 7th Dist. No. 10-BE-27, 2012-
Ohio-4348, they issued a biased opinion that violated his constitutional rights.  
Specifically, Patel argues that the panel included false statements in the Patel 
opinion, ignored “undeniable facts and evidence,” and “maliciously and 
wrongfully” affirmed the trial court’s judgment against him.  As a result, Patel 
claims that this panel of judges is “incapable” of adjudicating the underlying writ 
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action and “will again deprive Patel of his Constitutional Right to due process due 
to his race and religion.” 
{¶ 3} For the following reasons, no basis has been established to order 
the disqualification of Judge Donofrio, Judge Vukovich, or Judge DeGenaro. 
{¶ 4} First, the gravamen of Patel’s affidavit is that the Seventh District 
violated his constitutional rights in the separate Patel case.  However, whether the 
appellate court erred in that case cannot be litigated in an affidavit-of-
disqualification proceeding.  It is well established that an affidavit of 
disqualification “is not a vehicle to contest matters of substantive or procedural 
law.”  In re Disqualification of Solovan, 100 Ohio St.3d 1214, 2003-Ohio-5484, 
798 N.E.2d 3, ¶ 4.  And a party’s disagreement or dissatisfaction with a court’s 
legal rulings, even if those rulings may be erroneous, is not grounds for 
disqualification.  See In re Disqualification of Floyd, 101 Ohio St.3d 1217, 2003-
Ohio-7351, 803 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 4; In re Disqualification of Light, 36 Ohio St.3d 
604, 522 N.E.2d 458 (1988) (“alleged errors of law or procedure are legal issues 
subject to appeal and are not grounds for disqualification”).  Therefore, Patel’s 
disagreement with the Seventh District’s Patel opinion does not demonstrate bias 
or prejudice and is not grounds for disqualification in the underlying writ action.  
The remedy for these and other legal claims, if any, lies on appeal, not through the 
filing of an affidavit of disqualification.  In re Disqualification of Russo, 110 Ohio 
St.3d 1208, 2005-Ohio-7146, 850 N.E.2d 713, ¶ 6. 
{¶ 5} Second, Patel has failed to substantiate his claim of racial or 
religious bias.  Allegations of such bias strike at the very heart of the judiciary and 
are among the most serious and damaging that can be directed at a judge.  As a 
result, such claims must be proven by clear evidence establishing the existence of 
bias.  In re Disqualification of Cunningham, 100 Ohio St.3d 1216, 2002-Ohio-
7470, 798 N.E.2d 4, ¶ 2.  Here, Patel has submitted documents, transcripts, and 
affidavits from the Patel record in an attempt to show that the appellate court 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
erred by misinterpreting the relevant evidence.  However, he provides no 
evidence, beyond speculation, to support his assertion that the alleged errors were 
the product of bias—racial or otherwise.  Vague or unsubstantiated allegations are 
insufficient to establish bias or prejudice.  In re Disqualification of Walker, 36 
Ohio St.3d 606, 522 N.E.2d 460 (1988); In re Disqualification of Flanagan, 127 
Ohio St.3d 1236, 2009-Ohio-7199, 937 N.E.2d 1023, ¶ 4 (“Allegations that are 
based solely on hearsay, innuendo, and speculation * * * are insufficient to 
establish bias or prejudice”). 
{¶ 6} Finally, because the appellate panel has been the target of his 
personal criticism, Patel suggests they should be disqualified because the 
probability of their bias is now “too high to be Constitutionally tolerable.”  Patel 
cites Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 91 S.Ct. 499, 27 L.Ed.2d 532 
(1971), and Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 
(1975).  As an initial matter, neither Mayberry nor Withrow support 
disqualification here.  Mayberry involved the narrow issue of whether a judge 
should hear the criminal-contempt trial of a defendant where the same judge was 
the one reviled by the contemnor, and Withrow involved whether an 
administrative agency’s combination of investigative and adjudicative functions 
created an unconstitutional risk of bias.  Mayberry at 466; Withrow at 47.  The 
issue here is much broader:  whether judges on an appellate court should be 
removed from a case involving a litigant who has previously criticized the court’s 
judicial opinions and lodged personal attacks against the judges. 
{¶ 7} In general, absent some indication that the criticism was so great 
that no reasonable judge could be expected to remain unaffected, personal attacks 
on a judge—even serious allegations of racism, such as here—will not lead to the 
judge’s disqualification.  See Flamm, Judicial Disqualification, Section 21.8 (2d 
Ed.2007).  As the United States Supreme Court stated in Mayberry, “[a] judge 
cannot be driven out of a case.”  Id. at 464; see also Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. 
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Sweeney, 136 F.3d 216, 219 (1st Cir.1998), quoting 13A Wright, Miller & 
Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure, Section 3542, 577-578 (2d Ed.1984) (“ ‘A 
party cannot force disqualification by attacking the judge and then claiming that 
these attacks must have caused the judge to be biased against [her]’ ” [brackets 
sic]).  “A judge is presumed to follow the law and not to be biased, and the 
appearance of bias or prejudice must be compelling to overcome these 
presumptions.”  In re Disqualification of George, 100 Ohio St.3d 1241, 2003-
Ohio-5489, 798 N.E.2d 23, ¶ 5.  Those presumptions have not been overcome in 
this case.  Nothing in the record suggests that Patel’s accusations against the 
Seventh District judges have affected or would affect their conduct in the 
underlying case.  See, e.g., In re Disqualification of O’Neill, 100 Ohio St.3d 1232, 
2002-Ohio-7479, 798 N.E.2d 17, ¶ 17.  Accordingly, the fact that this panel of 
judges has been the target of Patel’s criticism is insufficient to warrant their 
disqualification. 
{¶ 8} For the reasons stated above, the affidavit of disqualification is 
denied.  The case may proceed before Judge Donofrio, Judge Vukovich, and 
Judge DeGenaro of the Seventh District Court of Appeals. 
______________________