Title: Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Huron Rd. Hosp.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

Motorists Mutual Insurance Company et al., Appellants, v. 
Huron Road Hospital et al., Appellees. 
[Cite as Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Huron Rd. Hosp. (1995), --
- Ohio St.3d ---] 
Negligence -- Aggravation of original injury by medical provider -- 
R.C. 2307.31 creates right of contribution between tortfeasor 
and medical provider -- Mere filing of a complaint does not 
constitute an attempted commencement of an action for 
purposes of R.C. 2125.04. 
1. When a medical provider’s negligent treatment of bodily 
injuries caused by a tortfeasor results in further injury or 
aggravation of the original injury, R.C. 2307.31 creates a right of 
contribution between the tortfeasor and the medical provider as to 
indivisible injuries. (Travelers Indemn. Co. v. Trowbridge [1975], 
41 Ohio St.2d 11, 70 O.O.3d 6, 321 N.E.2d 787, paragraph one of 
the syllabus, overruled.) 
 
2
2. The mere filing of a complaint does not constitute an 
attempted commencement of an action for purposes of R.C. 
2125.04. 
(No. 94-873 -- Submitted May 24, 1995 -- Decided August 30, 
1995.) 
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 
64585. 
On October 12, 1986, Randy Roulette (“Roulette”) negligently 
caused an automobile accident in which James T. Ross was 
seriously injured.  Ross was taken to the emergency room of Lake 
County Hospital, where appellants claim that necessary medical and 
surgical treatment was negligently omitted or delayed.  Ross was 
eventually transferred to Huron Road Hospital, where appellants 
claim that Ross was again negligently subjected to delay in medical 
and surgical treatment.  Ross died on October 13, 1986. 
Appellant Frances D. Ross, the executor of Ross’s estate, filed 
suit against Roulette and Roulette Pontiac, alleging that Roulette 
negligently caused the collision which caused Ross’s mortal 
 
3
injuries.  She sought damages suffered by Ross prior to his death 
and additional damages for wrongful death.  She made no 
allegations regarding the alleged negligence of any medical 
providers in the suit against Roulette.   
Appellant Motorists Mutual Insurance Company (“Motorists”) 
was the insurer of Roulette and Roulette Pontiac.  Motorists 
eventually settled the lawsuit against its insureds, paying over 
$1,300,000 in damages.  Ross’s estate agreed to release and 
discharge only Roulette and Roulete Pontiac from further liability.  
None of the appellees was notified about the settlement prior to its 
execution. 
On October 13, 1988, all the appellants, except Motorists, 
filed a wrongful death complaint against all the appellees in the 
Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court.  Appellants alleged that the 
appellees provided substandard medical care and tortiously delayed 
providing the emergency treatment which Ross required, causing 
Ross’s death the day after the accident. 
 
4
According to appellants’ brief, after the case was filed, the 
clerk issued summonses, and the court granted the request of one of 
appellants’ attorneys to himself be permitted to serve the appellees. 
The attorney designated to make service intentionally did not make 
service due to a dispute between the executor and the other next of 
kin.  On October 10, 1989, several days before the expiration of one 
year from the date of filing, with service still not attempted, 
appellants voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice under 
Civ.R. 41(A)(1). 
On October 4, 1990, appellants, including Motorists, filed the 
instant action in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas.  In 
count one of that complaint, Motorists, asserting its subrogation 
rights from its insureds, alleged that appellee health care providers 
had negligently treated Ross following the automobile collision and 
that Motorists had paid over one million dollars more in damages 
than it otherwise would have had to pay because of appellees’ 
negligence.  Motorists alleged that it thus had a “right of common 
law indemnity” against all the appellees. 
 
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Count two of the complaint was identical to the wrongful 
death action against appellees which had been “voluntarily 
dismissed” on October 10, 1989.  Count two designates Frances D. 
Ross, executor of Ross’s estate, as an involuntary party plaintiff 
pursuant to Civ.R. 19(A) “because of her refusal despite being 
requested to timely file this action and because she is a necessary 
party plaintiff who should join as a plaintiff and in whose name this 
action for wrongful death must be brought.”  The remaining 
plaintiffs were Ross’s parents, Ann Dorothy Ross and the estate of 
Lloyd D. Ross, Sr., and siblings, Lloyd D. Ross, Jr. and Rita Ann 
Ross Knapic. 
Eventually, as of October 28, 1992, the trial court awarded all 
the appellees summary judgment on both counts.  The appellants 
appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals.  The appellate 
court affirmed the trial court.  As to count one, the court found that 
as a subrogee of an alleged joint tortfeasor with the medical 
providers, Motorists had a claim for contribution, not indemnity, 
that was controlled by R.C. 2307.31 and 2307.32.  The court found 
 
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that Motorists failed to comply with the statutory requirements 
governing its right of contribution, nullifying any recovery against 
the appellees. 
As for count two, the court found that the appellants failed to 
meet the statute of limitations for wrongful death actions.  While 
the first complaint was filed in a timely fashion, appellants never 
attempted service.  While the appellants refiled their lawsuit within 
one year after voluntarily dismissing it, the savings statute for 
wrongful death actions failed to apply, since the original action had 
never been commenced or attempted to have been commenced. 
This action is before this court upon the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
__________ 
Spero & Rosenfield Co., L.P.A., and Keith E. Spero; Donald 
D. Weisberger and Marian Rose Nathan, for appellants. 
Reminger & Reminger Co., L.P.A., Stephen E. Walters and 
Nancy F. Zavelson, for appellees Huron Road Hospital, Keith 
Perrine, M.D., Craig Carter, M.D., and Raymond Malackany, M.D. 
 
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Reminger & Reminger Co., L.P.A., John R. Scott and Nancy F. 
Zavelson, for appellees Modesto Peralta, M.D., and Donna J. Waite, 
M.D. 
Reminger & Reminger Co., L.P.A., and Nancy F. Zavelson, for 
appellees Lake Hospital Systems, Inc., Lake County Hospital East, 
and Ann Klein Takacs. 
Jacobson, Maynard, Tuschman & Kalur and Janis L. Small, for 
appellees Daniel P. Guyton, M.D., Nandalike S. Shetty, M.D., 
Claudio Gallo, M.D., Lake County Emergency Services, Dennis 
Dolgan, M.D., John P. Ferron, M.D., Drs. Hill & Thomas Company, 
David A Steiger, M.D., Arthur M. Thynne, M.D., and Euclid Clinic 
Foundation. 
Martindale & Brzytwa, Harry T. Quick and Daniel F. 
Petticord; and Richard G. Waldron, for appellee Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield of Northern Ohio, d.b.a. HMO Health Ohio. 
__________ 
PFEIFER, J.  The two issues in this case are: (1) whether a 
common-law right of indemnity or a statutory right of contribution 
 
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controls the relationship between a tortfeasor and a medical 
provider, when the medical provider negligently causes further 
injury or aggravates the original injury caused by the tortfeasor; 
and (2) whether the savings statute for wrongful death cases applies 
to a case in which a complaint has been filed but in which service 
has not been attempted. 
I 
Motorists argues that the common-law right of indemnity 
created by this court in Travelers Indemn. Co. v. Trowbridge 
(1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 11, 70 O.O.2d 6, 321 N.E.2d 787, controls its 
relationship with the other appellees, rather than R.C. 2307.31, 
which provides a right of contribution among joint tortfeasors. 
As this court has long recognized, the substance of the subject 
matter of a case is determinative, not the form under which a party 
chooses to bring it. Love v. Port Clinton (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 98, 
524 N.E.2d 166.  The substance of Motorists’ claim is one for 
contribution. 
 
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Motorists’ insureds and the appellees, if negligent, were 
concurrently negligent.  “Concurrent negligence consists of the 
negligence of two or more persons concurring, not necessarily in 
point of time, but in point of consequence, in producing a single 
indivisible injury.” Garbe v. Halloran (1948), 150 Ohio St. 476, 38 
O.O. 325, 83 N.E.2d 217, paragraph one of the syllabus.  Though 
separate in time, the negligence of Motorists’ insureds led to the 
alleged negligence of the appellees, and combined with the 
appellees’ alleged negligence to cause Ross’s death, the single 
indivisible injury. 
Motorists admits that it, through its insureds, was actively 
negligent.  As such, it has no right to indemnity.  “Indemnification 
is not allowed when the two parties are joint or concurrent 
tortfeasors and are both chargeable with actual negligence.” 
Reynolds v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Ohio (1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 14, 
16, 623 N.E.2d 30, 31-32. 
Motorists’ claim has none of the indicia of indemnity.  
Implied contracts of indemnity are reserved for those “situations 
 
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involving related tortfeasors, where the one committing the wrong 
is so related to a secondary party as to make the secondary party 
liable for the wrongs committed solely by the other. * * * 
Relationships which have been found to meet this standard are the 
wholesaler/retailer, abutting property owner/municipality, 
independent contractor/employer, and master/servant.” Id. at 16, 
623 N.E.2d at 31. 
Even the nature of the relief Motorists seeks points to 
contribution rather than indemnity.  Motorists seeks proportionate 
reimbursement from appellees; an action for indemnity, on the other 
hand, requires complete reimbursement. Travelers, 41 Ohio St.2d at 
13-14, 70 O.O.2d at 8, 321 N.E.2d at 789. 
Motorists points to the Travelers decision for salvation, but it 
offers none.  In Travelers, an employee was injured due to his 
employer’s negligence.  The employee’s treating physician 
aggravated the injury.  The employee’s lawsuit against his employer 
was settled, and the employer’s insurer then instituted an action 
against the physician “seeking indemnity from [the physician] for 
 
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that portion of the settlement attributable solely to the [physician’s] 
alleged independent negligent acts * * * .” Travelers, 41 Ohio St.2d 
at 12, 70 O.O. 2d at 7, 321 N.E.2d at 788. 
The court decided Travelers in a time when the status of the 
law was that “ordinarily there is no contribution or indemnity 
between joint or concurrent tortfeasors.” Travelers, 41 Ohio St.2d 
at 14, 70 O.O.2d at 8, 321 N.E.2d at 789.  The court noted that an 
exception existed “where a person is chargeable with another’s 
wrongful act and pays damages to the injured party as a result 
thereof.” Id.  In such a situation, the secondarily liable party had a 
right of indemnity against the primarily liable party. 
Painting with its broadest equitable brush, this court found 
that the particular relationship between tortfeasors in its case did 
not fall clearly into the category of concurrent tortfeasors, nor into 
a situation where primary and secondary liability existed.  However, 
the court found that the relationship “[fell] closer, and more 
equitably, into the latter category than the former.” Travelers, 41 
Ohio St.2d at 16, 70 O.O.2d at 9, 321 N.E.2d at 790.  Thus, the 
 
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court found that a tortfeasor had a right to indemnity from a 
physician who negligently caused a new injury or aggravated the 
existing injury during the course of his treatment of the injury 
caused by the tortfeasor.   
The Travelers court was well intentioned, and crafted a fair 
result.  The decision provided an equitable stopgap prior to the 
legislature’s creation of a right of contribution between concurrent 
tortfeasors. Good intentions, however, like bad facts, sometimes 
make bad law.  Travelers terms a right of contribution a right to 
indemnity, and to that extent we accordingly overrule that decision.  
The correct statement of the law is as follows: 
When a medical provider’s negligent treatment of bodily 
injuries caused by a tortfeasor results in further injury or 
aggravation of the original injury, R.C. 2307.31 creates a right of 
contribution between the tortfeasor and the medical provider as to 
indivisible injuries.   
R.C. 2307.31 provides, in part: 
 
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“(A) * * * [I]f two or more persons are jointly and severally 
liable in tort for the same injury or loss to person or property or for 
the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among 
them even though judgment has not been recovered against all or 
any of them.  The right of contribution exists only in favor of a 
tortfeasor who has paid more than his proportionate share of the 
common liability * * * .” 
Ohio’s contribution statutes govern the relationship between 
Motorists and the appellees.  Motorists’ failure to follow the 
statutory dictates extinguished any contribution rights it may have 
had.  R.C. 2307.31(B) provides that “a tortfeasor who enters into a 
settlement with a claimant is not entitled to recover contribution 
from another tortfeasor whose liability for the injury * * * is not 
extinguished by the settlement * * * .”  Since Motorists’ settlement 
extinguished only the liability of its insureds, it is not entitled to 
contribution from the appellees. 
 
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Further, Motorists failed to comply with the dictates of R.C. 
2307.32 (C), which require a tortfeasor to seek contribution within 
one year of settling with a claimant. 
Since Motorists never had a right of indemnity against the 
appellees, and since its right of contribution was nullified by its 
failure to follow statutory dictates, we affirm the judgment of the 
appellate court on this issue. 
II 
For a wrongful death action to be considered timely, it must 
be commenced within two years of the decedent’s death. R.C. 
2125.02(D).  Civ.R. 3(A) defines what constitutes 
“commencement”: 
“A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the 
court, if service is obtained within one year from such filing upon a 
named defendant * * * .” 
Therefore, if a plaintiff fails to file a complaint within the 
two-year statutory period, or fails to obtain service over a 
 
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defendant within a year of that filing, the complaint must be 
considered untimely for failure of commencement. 
It has always been the desire of the courts and the General 
Assembly to have issues determined upon their merits rather than 
extinguished because of procedural constraints.  Savings statutes 
have been created to afford plaintiffs an opportunity to bring a new 
action after the running of the limitations period when an effort to 
bring the original action in a timely manner fails otherwise than on 
its merits.  For wrongful death actions, R.C. 2125.04 governs: 
“In every action for wrongful death commenced or attempted 
to be commenced [within the statute of limitations] * * *, if the 
plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits, and the [statute of 
limitations] * * * has expired at the date of such * * * failure, the 
plaintiff * * * may commence a new action within a year of such 
date.” 
Appellants filed their complaint on October 13, 1988, two 
years after Ross’s death.  Accordingly, they had until October 13, 
1989 to obtain service on appellees.  That this was not done, or 
 
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even attempted, is uncontroverted.  Rather, the appellants 
voluntarily dismissed their claim pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(1) three 
days before the one-year period for service expired.  Appellants 
refiled their wrongful death action on October 4, 1990. 
Appellants need the protection of the savings statute in order 
for their action to survive.  The wrongful death savings statute has 
two requirements: (1) the commencement or attempted 
commencement of the action before the expiration of the statute of 
limitations, and (2) a failure otherwise than upon the merits.   
The mere filing of a complaint does not constitute an 
attempted commencement of an action for purposes of R.C. 
2125.04.  Service is too vital a part of commencement of a lawsuit 
for a party to be deemed to have attempted commencement without 
even attempting service. See Civ.R 3(A) and. 4(E). 
A savings statute is not to be used as a method for tolling the 
statute of limitations. See Lewis v. Connor (1986), 21 Ohio St.3d 1, 
21 OBR 266, 487 N.E.2d 285.  Although this court has held that 
savings statutes should be liberally construed, the criteria of the 
 
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statutes must be satisfied in order to prevent circumvention of the 
statute of limitations and unfairness to defendants never put on 
notice.   
Since the appellants never commenced their first action, the 
protection provided by R.C. 2125.04 never attached.  Thus, when 
appellants filed their complaint on October 4, 1990, they were 
nearly two years beyond the applicable statute of limitations.  We 
therefore affirm the court of appeals’ judgment on this issue. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER 
and COOK, JJ., concur.