Title: SCHAFER v STATE

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 14491 I N THE S U P R E M E C O W O F THE STATE O F M 3 N T A N A 1979 ScHAFER and DONNA SCHAFER, Parents and natural guardians of BETTY MAE SCHAFER, Plaintiffs and Appellants, STATE O F l D N T A N A , DEPARTMENT OF rnSrITUTIONS, m u J Y T A I N VIEW SCHOOL, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal froan: D i s t r i c t Court of the Second Judicial District, Honorable J a m e s D. Freeborn, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Jack M. Scanlon, Anaconda, mntana Garrity, Keegan and Brown, Helena, mntana For Respondents: Garlington, I;ohn and Robinson, Missoula, Mntana Suldtted on briefs: January 24, 1979 Decided: MAT! 2 1 im . - " k?' , j g & Filed : M r . ~ u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. P l a i n t i f f s A l b e r t and Donna Schafer brought t h i s a c t i o n on ~ p r i l 15, 1977, as p a r e n t s and n a t u r a l guardians of Betty M a e Schafer (Betty Mae) f o r personal i n j u r i e s a r i s i n g o u t of a n automobile accident. The S t a t e Department of I n s t i t u - t i o n s ( t h e S t a t e ) answered, a l l e g i n g a f f i r m a t i v e defenses of c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence and supervening cause i n a d d i t i o n t o general d e n i a l s of negligence and causation. On completion of discovery, t h e S t a t e f i l e d a motion f o r summary judgment on t h e primary b a s i s t h a t , a s a matter of law, none of t h e a c t s of t h e S t a t e w e r e n e g l i g e n t nor d i d they c o n s t i t u t e t h e proximate cause of Betty Mae's i n j u r i e s . On August 1, 1978, t h e District Court of t h e Second J u d i c i a l District, S i l v e r Bow County, granted summary judgment i n favor of t h e S t a t e . Schafers appeal from t h i s order. The f a c t s underlying t h i s appeal begin i n March 1973. A t t h a t t i m e , Betty Mae, t h e t r u e p l a i n t i f f i n i n t e r e s t , was committed t o t h e Mountain V i e w School f o r G i r l s under o r d e r of t h e District Court of t h e Third J u d i c i a l District. She w a s then t h i r t e e n y e a r s o l d . Both Mountain V i e w School and t h e A f t e r c a r e Services Bureau, responsible f o r supervising a c h i l d a f t e r r e l e a s e from Mountain V i e w , a r e i n t h e Correc- t i o n s Division of t h e S t a t e Department of I n s t i t u t i o n s . Unfortunately, Betty Mae was n o t an i d e a l p a r t i c i p a n t i n e i t h e r t h e Mountain V i e w o r Aftercare programs. She repeatedly r a n away from Mountain V i e w . When placed i n a f o s t e r home i n Harlem pursuant t o a formal Aftercare agree- ment, she r a n away and was, i n f a c t , "kicked out" of t h a t home, r e t u r n i n g t o Mountain V i e w i n October 1974. A 1975 placement i n a Job Corps program i n Oregon was a l s o unsuc- c e s s f u l because Betty M a e r a n away. I n January 1976, Betty Mae w a s again t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e f o s t e r home i n H a r l e m . This time, while she had some prob- l e m s , Betty Mae d i d o b t a i n a job and, according t o A f t e r c a r e personnel, her o v e r a l l behavior improved. I n September 1976, she requested and received an authorized leave f o r a home v i s i t t o Anaconda f o r t e n days. According t o her deposition, Betty M a e had made such v i s i t s previously with- o u t i n c i d e n t , always r e t u r n i n g when she w a s supposed t o . This t i m e , however, Betty Mae decided t o s t a y i n Ana- conda and f i n d a job. She contacted t h e l o c a l Aftercare counselor f o r an extension of her l e a v e f o r an a d d i t i o n a l week u n t i l she found a job. The counselor gave her per- mission t o do t h a t . Betty Mae d i d f i n d a job, b u t apparently a d e c i s i o n had n o t y e t been made a s t o t h e wisdom of allowing Betty Mae t o remain i n Anaconda. Her p a r e n t s saw no problem, b u t both t h e Deer Lodge County truancy o f f i c e r and t h e Anaconda C i t y P o l i c e juvenile o f f i c e r w e r e opposed. N o formal modification of t h e o r i g i n a l Aftercare agreement t r a n s f e r r i n g Betty Mae t o Harlem was executed. Betty Mae's a c t i v i t i e s during t h i s home v i s i t a r e disputed by t h e p a r t i e s . I t appears she stayed with her p a r e n t s f o r a few days b u t eventually moved i n t o her s i s t e r ' s apartment. There i s a l s o some i n d i c a t i o n i n t h e record t h a t she frequented l o c a l taverns, although t h e Aftercare workers deny any knowledge of t h e s e a c t i v i t i e s . I t does appear undisputed t h a t Betty M a e d i d a t t e n d p a r t i e s a t which she consumed l i q u o r and used drugs. It w a s following such a p a r t y t h a t t h e automobile a c c i d e n t giving rise t o t h e i n s t a n t l i t i g a t i o n occurred. On October 18, 1976, a f t e r leaving a p a r t y , Betty ~ a e was a passenger i n a c a r driven by Mark Stigen. Stigen was d r i v i n g from Anaconda t o Butte a t n i g h t on an i c y highway a t a speed i n excess of 80 m i l e s per hour. H e l o s t c o n t r o l of h i s vehicle, and it r o l l e d , throwing Betty Mae out. Stigen has admitted driving i n a careless and negligent manner. This a c t i o n was then brought seeking damages f o r t h e i n j u r i e s sustained by Betty Mae. I n i t s simplest form t h e i s s u e presented f o r review i s whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t properly granted summary judgment i n favor of t h e S t a t e . The Schafers' theory of t h e case, and t h e reason s u i t w a s brought a g a i n s t these defendants, i s t h a t t h e S t a t e was negligent i n f a i l i n g t o properly supervise Betty Mae i n allowing her t o remain i n Anaconda and eventually t o be injured i n t h e automobile accident. I n support of t h i s theory, Schafers repeatedly c i t e t o Betty Mae's p a s t behavior, t o t h e o f f i c i a l r e p o r t s and recommendations t h a t she be c l o s e l y supervised a t a l l t i m e s , and t o t h e f a i l u r e of Aftercare t o e x e r c i s e t h i s supervision during t h e days immediately p r i o r t o t h e accident. From t h i s sequence of events, Schafers would hold t h e S t a t e l i a b l e f o r t h e in- j u r i e s Betty Mae suffered. While w e agree t h a t Betty Mae had a h i s t o r y of irrespon- s i b l e behavior which t h e S t a t e was charged t o c o n t r o l , w e cannot agree t h a t t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o r l i a b i l i t y of t h e S t a t e extends t o t h e i n c i d e n t involving o r i n j u r i e s incurred by Betty Mae under t h e circumstances. The crux of t h i s case is the element of negligence known a s f o r e s e e a b i l i t y . This element serves as a l i m i t on l i a b i l i t y f o r a c t s which might, under other circumstances, be negligent. The substance of f o r e s e e a b i l i t y a s it relates t o negligence is t h a t a defendant who could n o t foresee any danger of i n j u r y from h i s conduct o r any r i s k from an i n t e r - vening f o r c e i s n o t negligent. Mang v. Eliasson (1969), 153 Mont. 431, 436, 458 P.2d 777, 780. Absent f o r e s e e a b i l i t y , t h e r e i s no duty; absent duty, t h e r e i s no negligence. F o r e s e e a b i l i t y i s measured on a s c a l e of reasonable- ness; it i s n o t measured a b s t r a c t l y . Ford v. Rupple (1972), 161 Mont. 56, 64, 504 P.2d 686, 691. The perspective i s from t h e time of t h e a l l e g e d l y negligent a c t : ". . . i n weighing t h e likelihood of harm, t h e seriousness of i n j u r y and t h e value of t h e i n - terest t o be sacrificed--the law judges t h e a c t o r ' s conduct i n t h e l i g h t of t h e s i t u a t i o n a s it would have appeared t o t h e reasonable man i n h i s shoes a t t h e time of t h e a c t o r omission complained o f . Not what a c t u a l l y happened, b u t what t h e reasonably prudent person would then have foreseen as l i k e l y t o happen, i s t h e key t o t h e question o f r e a s o n a b l e n e s s . . ." Mans v. ~ l i a s s o n , 153 Mont. a t 436-37, 458 P.2d at-781. (Emphasis i n o r i g i n a l . ) A s t h e law i s n o t concerned with what a c t u a l l y happened, n e i t h e r i s it concerned with m e r e p o s s i b i l i t i e s : ". . . Negligence carries with it l i a b i l i t y f o r consequences which i n t h e l i g h t of a t t e n d a n t circumstances could reasonably have been a n t i - c i p a t e d by a prudent man, b u t n o t f o r c a s u a l t i e s which, though p o s s i b l e , w e r e wholly improbable." Jackson v. William Dingwall Co. (1965), 145 Mont. 127, 135, 399 P.2d 236, 240. Applying t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s t o t h e f a c t s of t h e c a s e a t hand, w e a r e unable t o see how t h e S t a t e could have possibly foreseen t h e sequence of events leading t o Betty Mae's i n j u r i e s . The intervening f a c t o r s of (1) a possibly i n t o x i - cated t h i r d person (2) d r i v i n g a t n i g h t ( 3 ) too f a s t ( 4 ) on an i c y road r e s u l t i n g i n i n j u r i e s t o Betty M a e , who volun- t a r i l y chose t o be a passenger i n t h e automobile, completely sever any l i a b i l i t y f o r any a l l e g e d negligence on t h e p a r t of t h e S t a t e . To s t r e t c h t h e concept of f o r e s e e a b i l i t y t o t h i s e x t e n t i s t o do away with t h e element e n t i r e l y and make t h e S t a t e t h e absolute i n s u r e r of any person under i t s supervision. Furthermore, with regard t o t h e f o r e s e e a b i l i t y of t h e a c t s of t h i r d persons, t h i s Court s t a t e d i n Lencioni v. Long (1961), 139 Mont. 135, 139, 361 P.2d 455, 457: " I . . . Wrongful a c t s of independent t h i r d per- sons, n o t a c t u a l l y intended by t h e defendant, a r e n o t regarded by t h e law a s n a t u r a l conse- quences of h i s wrong, and he i s n o t bound t o a n t i c i p a t e t h e general p r o b a b i l i t y of such a c t s , any more than a p a r t i c u l a r a c t by t h i s o r t h a t i n d i v i d u a l . . . 1 11 This statement a p p l i e s t o t h e f o r e s e e a b i l i t y by t h e S t a t e of S t i g e n ' s negligent d r i v i n g . Schafer r e l i e s on t h e s i m i l a r cases of Gibson v. United S t a t e s (3rd C i r . 1972), 457 F.2d 1391, and Bjornemo v. United S t a t e s (D. Mont. 1976), No. CV-75-73-BU. These cases a r e d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e on t h e i r f a c t s . I n both cases, a Job Corps e n r o l l e e i n j u r e d a t h i r d person: i n Gibson, by plunging a screwdriver through t h e temple of a Job Corps i n s t r u c t o r ; i n Bjornemo, by smashing a s t o l e n t a x i i n t o another v e h i c l e a t a n i n t e r s e c t i o n . I n both cases t h e United S t a t e s was held negligent f o r f a i l i n g t o properly supervise and r e s t r a i n t h e e n r o l l e e s who were known t o have behavior problems. I n t h e i n s t a n t case, however, it was n o t Betty Mae who, because of lack of r e s t r a i n t , i n j u r e d a t h i r d party. In- s t e a d , she was a "passive" p a r t i c i p a n t i n an automobile a c c i d e n t , an event which e a s i l y could have occurred no matter what type of supervision t h e S t a t e exercised over her, s h o r t of locking her i n a room somewhere. Such r e s t r i c - t i v e d e t e n t i o n i s n o t t h e goal of our juvenile i n s t i t u t i o n s and programs. See s e c t i o n 80-1410, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 53-30-202 MCA. Nor do t h e s t a t u t e s governing t h e s e programs impose such a duty upon them. See s e c t i o n s 80-1401, -1410, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n s 53-1-201, 53-30-202 MCA. I n s h o r t , t h e f a c t t h e accident occurred as it d i d had no r e l a t i o n t o t h e S t a t e ' s course of a c t i o n immediately p r i o r t o t h e accident. Betty Mae w a s showing an apparent improvement i n her behavior, had secured proper permission t o come t o Anaconda f o r a home v i s i t , and once i n Anaconda had received permission t o remain and look f o r a job which she found. Under t h e circumstances t h e S t a t e could not be c a l l e d negligent, e s p e c i a l l y when t h e purpose of t h e After- c a r e program i s t o e a s e t h e t r a n s i t i o n from i n s t i t u t i o n t o community. Section 80-1414, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 53-30- 226 MCA. Indeed, t h e type of accident i n which Betty M a e was involved could have happened a s e a s i l y i n Harlem with her f o s t e r p a r e n t s d r i v i n g as i n Anaconda with Mark S t i g e n d r i v i n g . F i n a l l y , Schafers argue t h a t t h e element of foresee- a b i l i t y always c r e a t e s an i s s u e f o r t h e jury and quote t h e following excerpt from 57 Am.Jur.2d Negligence 5205 a t 579: "Where it is claimed t h a t t h e defendant's a c t was n o t t h e proximate cause of t h e i n j u r y be- cause t h e r e s u l t could n o t reasonably have been foreseen, it i s o r d i n a r i l y a question f o r t h e jury whether t h e r e s u l t should reasonably have been foreseen. Even though t h e f a c t s are not disputed, i f t h e r e ---- i s room f o r a reasonable d i f f e r e n c e o f opinion a s t o whether an i n t e r - vening a c t w a s negligent and foreseeable, t h e question i s one f o r t h e jury." (Emphasis added.) Accord, Stenberg v. Beatrice Foods Co. (1978), Mont . , 576 P.2d 725, 727, 35 St.Rep. 294, 296. The empha- s i z e d p o r t i o n s of t h i s quote p o i n t o u t t h e weakness of Schafers' argument. W e conclude, a s d i d t h e D i s t r i c t Court, t h a t t h e r e i s no "room f o r a reasonable d i f f e r e n c e of opinion a s t o whether [ t h e S t a t e ' s ] a c t was n e g l i g e n t and foresee- able." I f w e w e r e t o adopt Schafers' p o s i t i o n , every negli- gence c a s e would have t o go t o t h e jury, thus eliminating t h e summary judgment procedure which i s a p a r t of our l e g a l process. The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i s affirmed. W e concur: Chief J u s t i c e