Title: Henry v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CLIFFORD HENRY, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 207, 2003 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. ID. No. 0103020811 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  Cr. A. No. PN01-04-0861R1 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  September 9, 2003 
Decided:  October 7, 2003 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and STEELE, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 7th day of October 2003 upon consideration of the parties’ briefs, it 
appears to this Court that: 
1. 
In June 2001, a New Castle County Grand Jury indicted Clifford 
Henry on a single felony count of Theft by False Pretense.1  Henry had received 
money from Joseph Madison for the purchase and resale of property.  Henry 
signed a mortgage to secure payment to Madison but never recorded it.  Henry 
resold the property for a profit but Madison did not receive any of the proceeds as 
promised nor was he repaid the loan amount.   
 
                                                 
1 11 Del. C. § 843 
 
2
2. 
On the morning of his trial, Henry entered into a plea agreement 
whereby he agreed to plead nolo contendere to the lesser-included offense of 
misdemeanor Theft by False Pretense, and the State agreed to recommend 
probation.  The agreement also called for a restitution hearing.  The court accepted 
the plea and sentenced Henry to probation for one year.  The court later ordered 
Henry to pay $142,000.00 in restitution.  Henry did not appeal the restitution order. 
3. 
On October 16, 2002, the State Banking Commissioner issued a 
Notice of Temporary License Suspension to Henry indicating that his Mortgage 
Loan Broker License would be revoked as a result of being adjudged guilty of 
Theft by False Pretense.   
4. 
Henry filed a postconviction motion to withdraw his nolo contendere 
plea based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  The trial court denied 
Henry’s motion after finding that his trial counsel’s failure to inform him of the 
possible revocation of his Mortgage Loan Broker License did not fall below an 
objective standard of reasonable conduct because it was a collateral consequence 
of his nolo contendere plea.  Henry appealed. 
5. 
A successful claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a 
showing that the trial counsel’s conduct fell below reasonable professional 
standards and that the conduct caused actual prejudice. 2  Henry argues that the trial 
                                                 
2 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 
3
judge abused his discretion by denying the application for postconviction relief.  
Specifically, Henry contends that his trial counsel acted unreasonably by failing to 
inform him of his legal rights when he entered the plea.  He further claims that his 
lack of knowledge of his rights affected the validity of the plea and ultimately 
caused him actual prejudice when the Commissioner revoked his professional 
license. 
6. 
Henry has failed to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  First, although Henry did testify that his trial counsel said that the plea 
should not affect his Mortgage Loan Broker License, Henry could not deny that his 
trial counsel may have advised him that a nolo contendere plea would result in a 
finding of guilt.  It is clear, as noted below, that he was present when the trial judge 
entered a finding of guilt.  Second, Henry suffered no actual prejudice because the 
trial court correctly classified the possible revocation of his Mortgage Loan Broker 
License as a collateral consequence.  A collateral consequence "is one that is not 
related to the length or nature of the sentence imposed on the basis of the plea."3   
When denying the postconviction motion, the trial judge properly held that trial 
counsel’s failure to inform Henry of this collateral consequence of his plea did not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 
                                                 
3 Barkley v. State, 724 A.2d at 560 (Del. 1999) (quoting United States v. Romero-Vilca, 3d Cir., 
850 F.2d 177, 179 (1988)). 
 
4
7. 
Henry claims that his trial counsel failed to inform him of the nature 
of, and therefore, the consequences of the plea.  However, competent evidence in 
the record demonstrates that Henry was fully aware of the effect of a nolo 
contendere plea.  First, the following exchange occurred at the end of the plea 
colloquy: 
THE COURT:  Okay.  It’s your desire to enter the no contest plea at 
this time? 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, your Honor. 
 
THE COURT:  Court finds that the plea is knowingly, intelligently 
and voluntarily made.  I direct that a finding of guilt be entered.4 
 
Henry made no objection at that time.  Second, before confirming in open court 
that he wished to plead “no contest,” Henry had signed both the Plea Agreement 
and the Truth-In-Sentencing Form that indicated he would be adjudged guilty of a 
misdemeanor.  Although the heading of the Truth-In-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form 
was changed to read “Truth-In-Sentencing Nolo Contendere Plea Form,” the rest 
of the document remained unaltered.  In order to support his claim that he did not 
understand the nature of his plea in July 2002, he stated that he had never 
discussed the meaning of a nolo contendere plea with anyone in the criminal 
justice system.  However, the record reflects that in May 2001, Henry pleaded nolo 
contendere to three violations before a Justice of the Peace in Court 20.   
                                                 
4 Appendix at A-10 
 
5
8. 
There is no merit to Henry’s claim that his entry of a nolo contendere 
plea resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel and that he suffered actual 
prejudice as a consequence.  Accordingly, the trial judge did not err as a matter of 
law by denying Henry’s application for postconviction relief.5 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Although Henry alleges an abuse of discretion by the trial judge in denying postconviction 
relief, see infra para. 5, the proper standard of review is for an error of law.