Title: SCHMIDT v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 
 
No. 15–1408 
 
Filed March 23, 2018 
 
 
JACOB LEE SCHMIDT, 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF IOWA, 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 
 
 
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Edward 
A. Jacobson, Judge. 
 
A defendant seeks further review of a court of appeals decision 
affirming summary dismissal/summary judgment of his postconviction-
relief action.  DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED. 
 
 
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Martha J. Lucey, 
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant. 
 
 
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sheryl Soich, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee. 
 
 
2 
 
 
Erica A. Nichols Cook of the State Public Defender’s Office, 
Des Moines, for amicus curiae Exoneration Project at the University of 
Chicago Law School. 
 
Lance W. Lange, Jesse Linebaugh, and Mitch G. Nass of Faegre 
Baker Daniels, LLP, Des Moines, for amici curiae The Innocence Network 
and The Innocence Project of Iowa. 
 
 
3 
 
WIGGINS, Justice. 
An applicant filed a postconviction-relief action claiming he was 
actually innocent although he knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty to 
the charged crimes.  He based his actual-innocence claim on a 
recantation by the victim.  The district court granted the State’s motion 
for summary dismissal/summary judgment, ruling the applicant cannot 
use the recantation to attack his knowing and voluntary guilty pleas 
because the recantation was extrinsic to the pleas.  The applicant 
appealed, and we transferred the case to our court of appeals.  The court 
of appeals affirmed.  The applicant sought further review, which we 
granted. 
On further review, we overrule our cases holding that defendants 
may only attack the intrinsic nature—the voluntary and intelligent 
character—of their pleas.  We now hold the Iowa Constitution allows 
freestanding claims of actual innocence, so applicants may bring such 
claims to attack their pleas even though they entered their pleas 
knowingly and voluntarily.  Accordingly, we adopt a freestanding claim of 
actual innocence that applicants may bring under our postconviction-
relief statute.1  Therefore, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals, 
reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand the case to the 
district court for further consideration consistent with this opinion. 
I.  Background Facts and Proceedings. 
On December 19, 2006, the State filed a trial information charging 
Jacob Lee Schmidt with sexual abuse in the third degree in violation of 
                                      
 
1We do not think Class v. United States, 583 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 798 (2018), 
affects our decision today.  In that case, the United States Supreme Court held a guilty 
plea does not bar a federal criminal defendant from challenging on direct appeal the 
constitutionality of the statute of conviction.  Id. at ___, 138 S. Ct. at 803–05.  Our 
decision involves an actual-innocence claim under the Iowa Constitution based on 
newly discovered evidence. 
 
4 
 
Iowa Code section 709.4(1) (2005).  On March 23, 2007, the State moved 
to amend the trial information to charge Schmidt with two additional 
counts of sexual abuse in the third degree in violation of section 
709.4(2)(b) (counts II and III) and one count of incest in violation of 
section 726.2 (count IV).  The district court granted the motion. 
The minutes of testimony attached to the original trial information 
and the police offense report reveal that witnesses would provide the 
following testimony.  On February 25, 2006, Schmidt, then age 
seventeen, visited the home of his stepfather, Peter, and his newly turned 
fourteen-year-old half-brother, B.C., with whom Schmidt shares the 
same mother.  Peter is B.C.’s father.  Peter left Schmidt and B.C. alone at 
the house to visit his girlfriend.  Upon Peter’s departure, Schmidt ordered 
B.C. into the bedroom and forced him to get on his knees on the 
mattress with his pants down.  B.C. complied.  Schmidt then removed 
his own pants, got on his knees behind B.C., and attempted anal sex. 
Peter realized he had forgotten his cigarettes and went back home 
to retrieve them.  Once inside, he saw neither Schmidt nor B.C. in the 
living room, where they had been up until his departure.  Peter thought 
this was strange, so he looked around the home and eventually opened 
the bedroom door and saw Schmidt attempting to penetrate B.C. anally.  
Peter yelled, “What the hell are you doing!” and told Schmidt to “get the 
hell out of the house.”  Schmidt left the house, and Peter called the 
police. 
Officers Todd Ferry and Kevin Heineman responded.  Officer Ferry 
took Peter out to the squad car to interview him while Officer Heineman 
spoke to B.C. inside the home.  Because Peter could not write or spell 
well, Officer Ferry used the in-car camera to record Peter’s interview. 
 
5 
 
Meanwhile, B.C. recounted what had happened to Officer 
Heineman.  B.C. stated he was “not afraid,” and Schmidt had only 
threatened him on a previous occasion when Schmidt actually 
penetrated him approximately two or three months ago.  Schmidt had 
told B.C. not to tell anyone unless B.C. wanted to get hurt.  B.C. defined 
“penetrate” as “when he actually went inside his anal area.”  B.C. stated 
he was “positive” Schmidt did not penetrate him this time and “no part of 
his body hurt.”  All B.C. wanted was for the police to arrest Schmidt.  
Officer Heineman asked B.C. to fill out a witness statement and realized 
B.C. had difficulty with spelling and writing.  Officer Heineman did not 
have B.C. continue writing the witness statement after B.C. had written 
three or four words. 
Peter’s home landline phone rang, and Officer Heineman answered 
it.  Shanna, Schmidt and B.C.’s mother, was on the other end of the 
phone.  She stated Schmidt had come to her home and she was going to 
take him to Mercy Hospital because he was having suicidal thoughts.  At 
the hospital, Shanna advised Officer Ferry that Schmidt said Peter was 
lying about the whole incident. 
Officer Christopher Groves followed up on the case.  He asked to 
interview Schmidt who declined on the advice of his lawyer.  Officer 
Groves described B.C. as “lower functioning” and stated he did not 
interview him because it was “very evident” he could “lead him [to] 
answers.”  Officer Groves thus scheduled B.C. for an interview with the 
Child Advocacy Center, which conducted a videotaped interview on 
March 2. 
During the March 2 interview, B.C. told the interviewer “[Schmidt] 
tried to molest him.”  B.C. stated Schmidt had penetrated him on at least 
one occasion, and “it hurt and he tried to escape.”  He was thirteen at the 
 
6 
 
time.  B.C. stated he had sucked Schmidt’s penis before but could not 
say how many times this occurred. 
On April 2, 2007, Schmidt entered into a plea agreement.  He 
agreed to plead guilty to assault with intent to commit sexual abuse, an 
aggravated misdemeanor in violation of Iowa Code section 709.11 
(amended count I) and incest (count IV).  The State agreed to dismiss the 
two other counts of sexual abuse in the third degree (counts II and III) 
given the district court sentenced Schmidt according to the plea 
agreement. 
That same day, during the combined plea and sentencing hearing, 
the court reviewed the consequences of pleading guilty with Schmidt.  
Schmidt informed the court he understood the rights he was giving up 
and wished to plead guilty to the charges.  Schmidt acknowledged the 
minutes of testimony accurately described what he did.  The court 
reviewed the factual basis for each count, and Schmidt confirmed he 
understood.  The court accepted Schmidt’s pleas and convicted him of 
assault with intent to commit sexual abuse and incest.  Pursuant to the 
plea agreement, the court entered sentences of incarceration to run 
consecutively for a total term not to exceed seven years.  Schmidt did not 
appeal this decision. 
On June 23, 2014, Schmidt filed an application for postconviction 
relief under Iowa Code section 822.2(1)(d) (2014).  In support of his 
application, he contended B.C. recanted his story by “com[ing] forward 
with the truth.”  Schmidt further claimed, “I was not guilty.  I was scared 
so I pled guilty [be]cause I was fac[ing] over [fifty] years.”  Schmidt alleged 
the victim’s recantation was new evidence supporting postconviction 
relief.  In its answer, the State denied “each and every ground for 
postconviction relief.” 
 
7 
 
On May 14, 2015, the State filed a motion for summary 
dismissal/summary judgment, making two arguments.  First, the State 
argued the three-year statute of limitations pursuant to Iowa Code 
section 
822.3 
procedurally 
barred 
Schmidt’s 
postconviction-relief 
application. 
Second, on the merits, the State asserted Schmidt’s “application 
[was] in direct contradiction to the record as well as in direct 
contradiction to his voluntary and knowing plea[s] of guilty.”  It claimed 
Schmidt pled guilty after an extensive colloquy, knowing his involvement 
or noninvolvement in the alleged sexual act and the evidence against 
him.   
On May 28, Schmidt filed a resistance, arguing B.C.’s recantation 
was “new evidence [that] prevented earlier filing [of his postconviction-
relief application] and [that] establishes actual innocence.”  Schmidt 
included B.C.’s affidavit.  In his affidavit, B.C. stated under oath, 
When I was 21 years old, I told other people that [Schmidt] 
had never touched me in a sexual way or sexually abused 
me.  I didn’t tell anyone before that date that nothing had 
really happened, and so [Schmidt] couldn’t have known 
before then.  I decided to tell people when I turned 21 since I 
was a full adult at that time. 
On July 30, the district court granted the State’s motion for 
summary dismissal/summary judgment.  It did not rule on the statute of 
limitations.  Rather, relying on an unpublished court of appeals decision, 
it stated that “newly discovered exculpatory evidence does not provide 
grounds to withdraw a guilty plea unless intrinsic to the plea itself.”  In 
other words, the court decided Schmidt waived his claim of actual 
innocence by pleading guilty.  Schmidt appealed. 
We transferred the case to the court of appeals.  Affirming the 
district court’s grant of summary dismissal/summary judgment, the 
 
8 
 
court of appeals reasoned the alleged recantation was not intrinsic to 
Schmidt’s guilty pleas.  It therefore concluded, “[B]ecause Schmidt’s 
convictions were entered following his guilty pleas, he cannot challenge 
those convictions in a [postconviction-relief] action on the basis of newly 
discovered evidence in the form of his alleged victim’s recantation.”  
Schmidt filed an application for further review, which we granted. 
II.  Scope of Review. 
“[T]he principles underlying [a] summary judgment procedure 
apply to motions of either party for disposition of an application for 
postconviction relief without a trial on the merits.”  Manning v. State, 
654 N.W.2d 555, 560 (Iowa 2002).  In other words, for a summary 
disposition to be proper, the State must be able to prevail as if it were 
filing a motion for summary judgment in a civil proceeding.  Castro v. 
State, 795 N.W.2d 789, 793 (Iowa 2011) (“The standards for summary 
judgment in postconviction[-]relief actions are analogous to summary 
judgment in civil proceedings.”). 
We review summary dismissals of postconviction-relief applications 
for errors at law.  Id. at 792.  Applying summary judgment principles, 
summary disposition is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show . . . there is no genuine issue of material fact and . . . the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”  Davis v. 
State, 520 N.W.2d 319, 321 (Iowa 1994) (quoting Iowa R. Civ. P. 237(c), 
now r. 1.981(3)).  The moving party bears the burden of showing that no 
material fact exists.  C & J Vantage Leasing Co. v. Wolfe, 795 N.W.2d 65, 
73 (Iowa 2011).  We view the record in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party.  Eggiman v. Self-Insured Servs. Co., 718 N.W.2d 754, 
758 (Iowa 2006).  We also draw all legitimate inferences from the 
 
9 
 
evidence in favor of the nonmoving party.  C & J Vantage, 795 N.W.2d at 
73. 
III.  Analysis. 
A.  Whether Schmidt’s Guilty Pleas Preclude Him from 
Pursuing His Actual-Innocence Claim.  The broad issue we must 
decide is whether Schmidt’s pleas preclude him from pursuing a 
postconviction-relief action.  The narrow issue we must address is 
whether Schmidt’s pleas preclude him from bringing his actual-
innocence claim because such a challenge is extrinsic to his pleas. 
Under our current law, 
[w]hen a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open 
court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is 
charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims 
relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that 
occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.  He may only 
attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty 
plea . . . . 
State v. Utter, 803 N.W.2d 647, 651 (Iowa 2011) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 1608 
(1973)).  It is on this basis the district court dismissed and the court of 
appeals affirmed the dismissal of Schmidt’s postconviction-relief action.  
The time has come to reevaluate this law in regards to an actual-
innocence claim.  We now turn to the first issue and begin our analysis 
by examining our postconviction-relief statute. 
Iowa Code section 822.2 provides, “Any person who has been 
convicted of, or sentenced for, a public offense and who claims any of the 
following may institute, without paying a filing fee, a proceeding under 
this chapter to secure relief.”  Iowa Code § 822.2(1). 
 
10 
 
We have previously discussed the meaning of the term “conviction” 
under section 822.2 in Daughenbaugh v. State, 805 N.W.2d 591, 597–99 
(Iowa 2011).  There we said, 
We begin our discussion of Iowa law by examining our 
approach to statutory interpretation of the term “conviction.”  
Like many other jurisdictions, we have emphasized that 
“conviction” has an “equivocal meaning” that depends upon 
the context in which it is used.  Like many other states, we 
have said that, when the word is used in its general and 
popular sense, conviction means the establishment of guilt 
independent of judgment and sentence.  On the other hand, 
when the term “conviction” is used in its technical legal 
sense, it requires a formal adjudication by the court and the 
formal entry of a judgment of conviction. 
Id. at 597 (citations omitted).  We then stated our postconviction statute 
uses the word conviction in its “ ‘strict legal sense’ and not in its broader 
popular context.”  Id. at 598–99.  Thus, the technical legal sense of the 
word conviction requires adjudication of guilt and the entry of a 
judgment.  Id. at 599. 
In another case, we stated the acceptance by the court of a 
defendant’s plea “constitutes a conviction of the highest order” and 
authorizes the court to sentence the defendant as though the factfinder 
returned a guilty verdict.  State v. Kobrock, 213 N.W.2d 481, 483 (Iowa 
1973).  That is what happened here: Schmidt entered his pleas, the court 
accepted his pleas, and sentenced him accordingly.  In doing so, the 
court adjudicated him guilty and entered judgment.  Adjudication and 
entry of judgment constitute conviction, and conviction is a requirement 
for filing a postconviction-relief action under section 822.2.  See 
Daughenbaugh, 805 N.W.2d at 599.  Thus, Schmidt’s pleas do not 
preclude him from filing a postconviction-relief action. 
 
11 
 
The second issue is whether Schmidt faces any other barriers to 
filing his postconviction-relief action after pleading guilty.  Specifically, 
the issue is whether Schmidt may attack his pleas by bringing an actual-
innocence claim even though such a challenge is extrinsic to his pleas.  
First, we discuss the current state of our caselaw regarding challenges to 
pleas.  Second, we examine the implication of State v. Alexander, 
463 N.W.2d 421 (Iowa 1990), on the possibility of challenging a plea in a 
postconviction-relief action based on newly discovered evidence.  Third, 
we discuss the phenomenon of pleading guilty despite actual innocence.  
Lastly, we examine our legislature’s codification of section 81.10, which 
allows postconviction-DNA testing. 
A valid plea “waive[s] all defenses and the right to contest all 
adverse pretrial rulings.”  State v. Morehouse, 316 N.W.2d 884, 885 (Iowa 
1982), overruled on other grounds by State v. Kress, 636 N.W.2d 12, 20 
(Iowa 2001).  However, the defendant may attack his or her plea when 
the plea itself contains intrinsic irregularities or the trial information 
charges no offense.  See State v. Mattly, 513 N.W.2d 739, 740–41 (Iowa 
1994); Morehouse, 316 N.W.2d at 885. 
We fashioned the general rule precluding extrinsic challenges to 
pleas on the premise that “[a] defendant plead[s] guilty in open court, 
with assistance of counsel, knowingly and understandingly.” State v. 
Delano, 161 N.W.2d 66, 73 (Iowa 1968).  Thus, the defendant waives his 
or her rights “with respect to conduct of criminal prosecution and any 
objection to prior proceedings which may include a violation of his [or 
her] rights.”  Id.  This waiver could preclude certain postconviction-relief 
actions under section 822.2(1)(a), which provides relief for a “conviction 
or sentence [that] was in violation of the Constitution of the United 
States or the Constitution or laws of this state.”  Iowa Code § 822.2(1)(a). 
 
12 
 
It does not preclude relief under section 822.2(1)(d), which 
provides relief when “[t]here exists evidence of material facts, not 
previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction 
or sentence in the interest of justice.”  Id. § 822.2(1)(d); accord Alexander, 
463 N.W.2d at 423 (referring to Iowa Code section 663A.2(4) (1989), now 
codified at section 822.2(1)(d) (2014)). 
In Alexander, the defendant pled guilty to going armed with a 
dangerous weapon.  463 N.W.2d at 421.  After his plea and sentencing, 
the defendant filed a motion for new trial based on newly discovered 
evidence in the form of witness testimony supporting a theory of 
justification or self-defense.  Id. at 422.  We examined then rule 23(2)(a) 
of our rules of criminal procedure.  That rule stated,  
The application for a new trial . . . shall be made not later 
than forty-five days after plea of guilty [or] verdict of 
guilty, . . . but in any case not later than five days before the 
date set for pronouncing judgment, but where based upon 
newly discovered evidence may be made after judgment as 
well. 
Id. (quoting Iowa R. Crim. P. 23(2)(a), now r. 2.24(2)(a) (emphasis added)). 
We reasoned “[l]ogic would suggest that the concept of new trial 
should have as its predicate the existence of a former trial.”  Id.  Based 
on the legislative history, we then concluded inclusion of the phrase 
“plea of guilty” in rule 23(2)(a) was inadvertent and erroneous, and 
therefore held rule 23(2)(a) as written did not allow for a new trial 
following a guilty plea.  Id. at 422–23.  We buttressed this conclusion by 
stating,  
We are confident that the legislature did not intend to 
give admittedly guilty persons the unfettered right to recant 
their admission and proceed to trial on the ground of newly 
discovered evidence or any other ground not intrinsic to the 
plea.  
 
13 
 
Id. at 423. 
We reasoned “[n]otions of newly discovered evidence simply have 
no bearing on a knowing and voluntary admission of guilt.”  Id.  
However, we noted the defendant was not without a remedy.  Id.  We 
stated the remedy the defendant sought was available under Iowa Code 
section 663A.2(4) (1989), now codified at section 822.2(1)(d) (2014), when 
challenging his plea based on newly discovered evidence.  Id.  Thus, in 
Alexander, we left the door open for challenging a plea in a 
postconviction-relief action based on newly discovered evidence. 
We now examine the phenomenon of actually innocent people 
pleading guilty.  The National Registry of Exonerations reported that 
seventy-four exonerations in 2016 arose from pleas.  The National 
Registry 
of 
Exonerations, 
Exonerations 
in 
2016 
2 
(2017), 
www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations_in_2
016.pdf. 
We have stated “criminal cases in general, and guilty pleas in 
particular, are characterized by considerable uncertainty[.]”  State v. 
Carroll, 767 N.W.2d 638, 642 (Iowa 2009). 
[T]he decision to plead guilty before the evidence is in 
frequently involves the making of difficult judgments.  All the 
pertinent facts normally cannot be known unless witnesses 
are examined and cross-examined in court.  Even then the 
truth will often be in dispute.  In the face of unavoidable 
uncertainty, the defendant and his counsel must make their 
best judgment as to the weight of the State’s case.  Counsel 
must predict how the facts, as he understands them, would 
be viewed by a court.  If proved, would those facts convince a 
judge or jury of the defendant’s guilt?  On those facts would 
evidence seized without a warrant be admissible?  Would the 
trier of fact on those facts find a confession voluntary and 
admissible?  Questions like these cannot be answered with 
certitude; yet a decision to plead guilty must necessarily rest 
upon counsel’s answers, uncertain as they may be.  Waiving 
trial entails the inherent risk that the good-faith evaluations 
 
14 
 
of a reasonably competent attorney will turn out to be 
mistaken either as to the facts or as to what a court’s 
judgment might be on given facts. 
Id. (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769–70, 90 S. Ct. 
1441, 1448 (1970)). 
Pleading guilty despite actual innocence is not limited to 
uncertainty.  One of our recent cases recognizes that actually innocent 
people plead guilty for many different reasons.  See Rhoades v. State, 
880 N.W.2d 431, 436–38 (Iowa 2016). 
People have been known to confess to crimes they did not commit 
during police interrogations2 and such confessions bleed into their 
decisions to plead guilty.  “A false coerced confession may undermine the 
accuracy of a guilty plea . . . .”  Kevin C. McMunigal, Guilty Pleas, Brady 
Disclosure, and Wrongful Convictions, 57 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 651, 656 
(2007).  Because such a confession increases the chances of conviction 
at trial, defendants face pressure to plead guilty even when they are 
actually innocent.  Id.; see also Rodney Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent: 
Aberration or Systemic Problem?, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 739, 796 (2006) 
[hereinafter Uphoff] (“The difficulty of overcoming so-called confessions 
and of successfully attacking a positive eyewitness identification are just 
two of a host of factors that may push a defendant into a guilty plea 
regardless of his or her actual innocence.”). 
Moreover, innocent defendants plead guilty for reduced charges 
and shorter sentences.  Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the 
Criminal Law, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 989, 1034 (2006) [hereinafter Barkow]; 
                                      
 
2A number of factors contribute to a false confession, such as “duress,” 
“coercion,” “intoxication,” “diminished capacity,” “mental impairment,” “ignorance of the 
law,” “fear of violence,” “the actual infliction of harm,” “the threat of a harsh sentence,” 
[and] “misunderstanding the situation.”  Innocence Project, False Confessions or 
Admissions, https://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/false-confessions-admissions/ 
[https://perma.cc/66JM-T4L9]. 
 
15 
 
see also Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 
101 Yale 
L.J. 
1909, 
1912 
(1992) 
[hereinafter 
Scott 
& 
Stuntz] 
(“Defendants accept bargains because of the threat of much harsher 
penalties after trial; they are thus forced to give up the protections that 
the trial system’s many formalities provide.”).  The reality of plea 
bargaining is that “[defendants] who do take their case to trial and lose 
receive longer sentences than even Congress or the prosecutor might 
think appropriate, because the longer sentences exist on the books 
largely for bargaining purposes.”  Barkow, 58 Stan. L. Rev. at 1034. 
Simply put, in economic terms, defendants engage in a cost–benefit 
analysis.  Entering into a plea agreement is not only rational but also 
more attractive than dealing with the uncertainty of the trial process and 
the possibility of harsher sentences.  Indeed, “even with competent 
counsel, going to trial can be incredibly risky business.”  Uphoff, 
2006 Wis. L. Rev. at 799.  We stated in Rhoades that “[w]hen the deal is 
good enough, it is rational to refuse to roll the dice, regardless of whether 
one believes the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and regardless of whether one is factually innocent.”  880 N.W.2d at 
436–37 (alteration in original) (quoting Russell D. Covey, Longitudinal 
Guilt: Repeat Offenders, Plea Bargaining, and the Variable Standard of 
Proof, 63 Fla. L. Rev. 431, 450 (2011)); accord Jed S. Rakoff, Why 
Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. Rev. Books (Nov. 20, 2014), 
www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-
guilty/ [https://perma.cc/LT8T-XKAV] (“If [the defendant’s] lawyer can 
obtain a plea bargain that will reduce his likely time in prison, he may 
find it ‘rational’ to take the plea.”). 
 
16 
 
A plea does not weed out the innocent.  Rather, a plea is an explicit 
agreement3 between the prosecutor and the defendant that “establishes a 
‘going rate.’ ”  John L. Kane, Plea Bargaining and the Innocent, The 
Marshall 
Project 
(Dec. 
26, 
2014, 
1:05 
PM), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/12/26/plea-bargaining-and-
the-innocent 
[https://perma.cc/R5FU-Y3T4]. 
 
Specifically, 
“[t]he 
anticipated sentence is the central concern in the negotiation[,]” but 
“[t]he problem . . . is that both innocent and guilty defendants are placed 
in the same pot and the goal is to achieve the appearance of justice, not 
the realization of it.”  Id.; see also Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144, 
132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (“In today’s criminal justice system . . . the 
negotiation of a plea bargain, rather than the unfolding of a trial, is 
almost always the critical point for a defendant.”).  Pleading guilty does 
not automatically mean the defendant is actually guilty.  Sometimes, an 
innocent defendant is choosing the lesser of two evils: pleading guilty 
despite his or her actual innocence because the odds are stacked up 
against him or her, or going to trial with the risk of losing and the 
prospect of receiving a harsher sentence. 
Innocent defendants may also plead guilty in the face of pressure 
from prosecutors and even their own defense counsels.  Today, “our 
criminal justice system is almost exclusively a system of plea bargaining, 
negotiated behind closed doors and with no judicial oversight.”  Jed S. 
Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. Rev. Books (Nov. 20, 
2014).  Behind these closed doors, prosecutors have broad discretion: 
“the prosecutor-dictated plea bargain system, by creating such 
inordinate pressures to enter into plea bargains, appears to have led a 
                                      
 
3Two scholars have gone as far to describe the plea bargaining process as “horse 
trading.”  Scott & Stuntz, 101 Yale L.J. at 1912. 
 
17 
 
significant number of defendants to plead guilty to crimes they never 
actually committed.”  Id.; see also Innocence Project, Why Are People 
Pleading Guilty to Crimes They Didn’t Commit? (Nov. 25, 2015), 
https://www.innocenceproject.org/why-are-people-pleading-guilty-to-
crimes-they-didnt-commit/ [https://perma.cc/3CEX-WEW2]. 
H. Lee Sarokin, a former federal judge, described the plea 
bargaining process as involving “intimidation by the prosecution and 
incompetence by the defense.”  H. Lee Sarokin, Why Do Innocent People 
Plead 
Guilty?, 
HuffPost 
(May 
29, 
2012, 
4:39 
PM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/judge-h-lee-sarokin/innocent-people-
guilty-pleas_b_1553239.html 
[https://perma.cc/6PSQ-6QW4]. 
 
He 
illustrated, 
The defendant, frightened, most often poor, uneducated, a 
minority member is advised that a trial is likely to end with a 
conviction and a long sentence, whereas a plea will 
guarantee 
a 
much 
shorter 
sentence. 
 
Despite 
his 
protestations of innocence, the defendant seeks guidance 
frequently from an over-worked, underpaid defense lawyer 
who would much prefer a quick deal rather than a long 
drawn out trial.  Of course, not all defense counsel fit that 
description.  Many do not, but even the best and most 
devoted are required to put this draconian choice to their 
clients—a guaranteed short sentence versus a potentially 
long one—possibly life in prison. 
Id.  We again emphasize the prosecutor’s promise of a shorter sentence is 
more attractive than going to trial and possibly losing.  Defendants, even 
those who are actually innocent and especially those who are indigent, 
have more to lose by going to trial than by pleading guilty. 
Finally, we review the current legislative policy regarding guilty 
pleas and actual innocence.  In 2005, in passing Iowa Code section 
81.10, the legislature recognized a person who pleads guilty could be 
actually innocent.  See 2005 Iowa Acts ch. 158, § 10 (codified at Iowa 
 
18 
 
Code § 81.10).  Section 81.10 allows a convicted defendant to make a 
motion that, if granted, would require DNA testing “on evidence collected 
in the case for which the person stands convicted.”  Iowa Code § 81.10 
(2014).  The motion must state the following: 
b.  The facts of the underlying case, as proven at trial 
or admitted to during a guilty plea proceeding. 
. . . . 
h.  The type of inculpatory evidence admitted into 
evidence at trial or admitted to during a guilty plea 
proceeding. 
. . . . 
l.  Why the DNA evidence would have changed the 
outcome of the trial or invalidated a guilty plea if DNA 
profiling had been conducted prior to the conviction. 
Id. § 81.10(2)(b), (h), and (l) (emphases added). 
After the convicted defendant files the motion and the county 
attorney files an answer to the motion, the court may order a hearing on 
the motion.  Id. § 81.10(3), (6).  The court must grant the motion if all of 
the requirements of section 81.10(7) apply.  One of the requirements 
recognizes the applicability of DNA exoneration to pleas.  Id. 
§ 81.10(7)(d).  Section 81.10(7)(d) provides, “The evidence subject to DNA 
analysis is material to, and not merely cumulative or impeaching of, 
evidence included in the trial record or admitted to at a guilty plea 
proceeding.”  Id. (emphasis added).  This legislation reaffirms the fact 
that even actually innocent persons do in fact plead guilty and should 
have a chance for exoneration. 
In light of these recent developments, we hold convicted 
defendants can attack their pleas when claiming actual innocence even if 
the attack is extrinsic to the pleas.  We know people plead guilty for all 
 
19 
 
sorts of reasons.  Many of these reasons are unrelated to whether the 
defendant actually committed the crime.  Additionally, the legislature has 
set the policy that the state should not incarcerate actually innocent 
people if DNA evidence exonerates them, regardless of their pleas.  We 
see no reason why we should treat people exonerated by DNA evidence 
differently from people exonerated by other reliable means.  For example, 
when the court determines the police planted evidence, such as drugs, 
why should that defendant remain in prison simply because he or she 
pled guilty to a reduced charge in light of the overwhelming evidence of 
his or her guilt? 
What kind of system of justice do we have if we permit actually 
innocent people to remain in prison?  See Engesser v. Young, 856 N.W.2d 
471, 484 (S.D. 2014) (“Punishment of the innocent may be the worst of 
all injustices.”  (quoting Jenner v. Dooley, 590 N.W.2d 463, 471 (S.D. 
1999))); see also In re Kaufmann, 157 N.E. 730, 733 (N.Y. 1927) (noting 
that in circumstances in which a convicted individual establishes his 
innocence, “the administration of justice would be subject to reproach if 
an implacable law of remedies were to close the door forever upon the 
hope of vindication”).4  It is time that we refuse to perpetuate a system of 
justice that allows actually innocent people to remain in prison, even 
those who profess guilt despite their actual innocence. 
Accordingly, we overrule our cases that do not allow defendants to 
attack their pleas based on extrinsic grounds when they claim actual 
                                      
 
4We acknowledge these two cases involved defendants who went to trial.  We 
discuss this distinction later in the opinion.  In any event, we believe the principles 
reflected in Engesser and In re Kaufmann apply equally to defendants who claim actual 
innocence following trial and those who claim actual innocence following a guilty plea 
proceeding. 
 
20 
 
innocence.  Therefore, we hold Schmidt’s pleas do not preclude his 
actual-innocence claim merely because he pled guilty to the charges. 
B.  An Actual-Innocence Claim Under Iowa Law.  We have never 
addressed whether, under our postconviction-relief statute, a claim of 
actual innocence constitutes a gateway claim or a freestanding claim 
implicating the Iowa Constitution.  Additionally, we have neither 
discussed the standard courts must apply when confronted with actual-
innocence claims nor the vehicle defendants may use to bring such 
claims. 
1.  Freestanding claim versus gateway claim.  In the federal system, 
a habeas petitioner may overcome a procedural bar to habeas review by 
bringing a gateway claim of actual innocence such that the petitioner 
may obtain review of the underlying constitutional merits of his or her 
procedurally defaulted claim.  Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404, 
113 S. Ct. 853, 862 (1993); see also In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952, 955, 
130 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  “Federal habeas review of 
state convictions has traditionally been limited to claims of constitutional 
violations occurring in the course of the underlying state criminal 
proceedings.”  Herrera, 506 U.S. at 416, 113 S. Ct. at 869.  The United 
States Supreme Court has declined to stretch the reach of federal habeas 
review to freestanding claims of actual innocence when there is a state 
avenue to provide for pardons.  Montoya v. Ulibarri, 163 P.3d 476, 482 
(N.M. 2007); People v. Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d 477, 484 (Sup. Ct. 2003). 
To overcome a procedural bar to federal habeas review, a petitioner 
must generally show “cause for the default and prejudice from the 
asserted error.”  House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2076 
(2006).  “Cause” turns on the question of “whether the prisoner can show 
that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s 
 
21 
 
efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.”  Murray v. Carrier, 
477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2645 (1986).  The United States 
Supreme Court has vaguely defined “prejudice” but “prejudice” at least 
entails an “actual prejudice” standard that requires a showing that “is 
‘greater than the showing required to establish plain error on direct 
appeal.’ ”  Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134–35, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1575 
(1982) (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154, 97 S. Ct. 1730, 
1736–37 (1977)). 
Absent the showing of cause and prejudice, 
a court may not reach the merits of: (a) successive claims 
that raise grounds identical to grounds heard and decided 
on the merits in a previous petition, . . . ; (b) new claims, not 
previously raised, which constitute an abuse of the writ, . . . ; 
or (c) procedurally defaulted claims in which the petitioner 
failed to follow applicable state procedural rules in raising 
the claims[.] 
Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 338, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2518 (1992) 
(citations omitted). 
The procedural default doctrine arises from the principles of comity 
and finality, and the conservation of judicial resources.  House, 547 U.S. 
at 536, 126 S. Ct. at 2076.  However, in certain circumstances, such 
principles “must yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally 
unjust incarceration.”  Id. (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 495, 106 S. Ct. at 
2649); see Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S 436, 454, 106 S. Ct. 2616, 2627 
(1986) (holding the miscarriage-of-justice exception allows successive 
claims given the petitioner shows “under the probative evidence he has a 
colorable claim of factual innocence”); Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S. 
Ct. at 2649 (holding “in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional 
violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually 
innocent,” the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim could be reached).  
 
22 
 
For purposes of this appeal, we focus on the fundamental-miscarriage-of-
justice, or actual-innocence, exception. 
In Schlup v. Delo, in considering a petitioner’s actual-innocence 
claim accompanied by an assertion of constitutional violations at trial, 
the Supreme Court explained what constitutes a gateway claim and 
articulated the gateway standard.  513 U.S. 298, 315–17, 326–27, 115 
S. Ct. 851, 861–62, 867 (1995).  The Court defined the petitioner’s 
gateway claim of actual innocence as “not itself a constitutional claim, 
but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to 
have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.”  
Id. at 315, 115 S. Ct. at 861 (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404, 113 S. Ct. 
at 862).  In other words, the petitioner’s claim of actual innocence does 
not alone provide a basis for a court to vacate his conviction.  See id.  
Rather, his claim of actual innocence depends on the validity of his 
underlying constitutional claims.  See id. 
Schlup held a petitioner asserting a gateway claim must 
demonstrate that in light of all the evidence, including the new evidence, 
“it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found 
petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 327, 115 S. Ct. at 
867 (adopting “the Carrier ‘probably resulted’ standard”); accord Kenfield 
v. State, 377 P.3d 1207, 1211–12 (Mont. 2016); Berry v. State, 363 P.3d 
1148, 1155 (Nev. 2015); In re Personal Restraint of Weber, 284 P.3d 734, 
740 (Wash. 2012) (en banc).  This more-likely-than-not standard 
“ensures that petitioner’s case is truly ‘extraordinary,’ . . . while still 
providing petitioner a meaningful avenue by which to avoid a manifest 
injustice.”  Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327, 115 S. Ct. at 867 (quoting 
McCluskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1470 (1991)).  
The petitioner does not need to establish with absolute certainty that he 
 
23 
 
or she is innocent.  House, 547 U.S. at 538, 126 S. Ct. at 2077.  In 
declining to adopt a clear and convincing standard, the Court stated that 
actual-innocence claims “pose less of a threat to scarce judicial resources 
and to principles of finality and comity than do claims that focus solely 
on the erroneous imposition of the death penalty.”  Schlup, 513 U.S. at 
324, 115 S. Ct. at 865. 
Based on the foregoing, we carefully distinguish between the two 
forms of an actual-innocence claim: a gateway claim of actual innocence 
with an underlying constitutional challenge and a freestanding claim of 
actual innocence that is itself the substantive basis for relief. 
2.  Freestanding claims of actual innocence in Iowa.  Schmidt 
argues the “in the interest of justice” language of Iowa Code section 
822.2(1)(d), unlike federal habeas, gives a substantive basis for actual-
innocence claims.  Schmidt states section 822.2(1)(a) also provides a 
means to raise a freestanding claim of actual innocence because “[i]f a 
person is convicted of a crime he did not commit[,] such a conviction 
violates the Iowa Constitution.”  Thus, Schmidt contends, because his 
claim of actual innocence is itself a substantive claim, it does not need to 
pass through the actual-innocence gateway. 
The federal circuit courts of appeals remain unsettled on the 
question of whether a freestanding claim of actual innocence exists.  
John M. Leventhal, A Survey of Federal and State Courts’ Approaches to a 
Constitutional Right of Actual Innocence: Is There a Need for a State 
Constitutional Right in New York in the Aftermath of CPL § 440.10(1)(G-1)?, 
76 Alb. L. Rev. 1453, 1464–65 nn.83–95 (2013) (citing cases).  If a 
freestanding claim of actual innocence exists, it would have to overcome 
an “extraordinarily high threshold.”  Id. at 1464 & n.85 (collecting cases); 
see also Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 476 (9th Cir. 1997) 
 
24 
 
(“Requiring affirmative proof of innocence is appropriate, because when a 
petitioner makes a freestanding claim of innocence, he is claiming that 
he is entitled to relief despite a constitutionally valid conviction.”). 
At the state level, a number of jurisdictions acknowledge 
freestanding claims of actual innocence.  Engesser, 856 N.W.2d at 481 
n.3 (collecting cases and statutes that allow freestanding claims of actual 
innocence).  States that do recognize freestanding claims of actual 
innocence apply varying standards.  Compare People v. Washington, 
665 N.E.2d 1330, 1337 (Ill. 1996) (holding the defendant must present 
new evidence that is “ ‘of such conclusive character’ as would ‘probably 
change the result on retrial’ ” (quoting People v. Silagy, 507 N.E.2d 830, 
834 (Ill. 1987))), with State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 548 
(Mo. 2003) (en banc) (holding the petitioner must “make a clear and 
convincing showing of actual innocence that undermines confidence in 
the correctness of the judgment”). 
In Washington, the Illinois Supreme Court explicitly addressed 
whether a freestanding claim of actual innocence based on new evidence 
implicated the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution.  
665 N.E.2d at 1335–37.  In regards to procedural due process, the court 
reasoned “to ignore such a claim would be fundamentally unfair.”  Id. at 
1336. 
In 
terms 
of 
substantive 
due 
process, 
the 
court 
stated 
“[i]mprisonment of the innocent would also be so conscience shocking as 
to trigger operation of substantive due process.”  Id.  It stated, “The 
[United States] Supreme Court rejected substantive due process as 
means to recognize freestanding innocence claims because of the idea 
that a person convicted in a constitutionally fair trial must be viewed as 
guilty.”  Id.  In declining to adopt the reasoning of the United States 
 
25 
 
Supreme Court, the court stated, “The stronger the claim—the more 
likely it is that a convicted person is actually innocent—the weaker is the 
legal construct dictating that the person be viewed as guilty.”  Id.  
Because “no person convicted of a crime should be deprived of life or 
liberty given compelling evidence of actual innocence[,]” the court held 
the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution gives credence to 
freestanding claims of actual innocence and affords convicted defendants 
additional process.  Id. at 1336–37. 
In Montoya, the New Mexico Supreme Court held the New Mexico 
Constitution, specifically the due process clause and the prohibition 
against infliction of cruel and unusual punishment, provides protection 
to actually innocent people.  163 P.3d at 484.  The court reasoned it 
would be “fundamentally unfair” to convict, incarcerate, or execute an 
innocent person.  Id.  The court further reasoned “the incarceration of an 
innocent person [fails to] advance[] any [acceptable] goal of punishment, 
and . . . the punishment is indeed grossly out of proportion to the 
severity of the crime.”  Id. 
We now turn to the Iowa Constitution.  First, we note the Iowa 
Constitution vests authority to grant pardons with the Governor.  Iowa 
Const. art. IV, § 16; State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 118 (Iowa 2013).  
Thus, the incarceration of an actually innocent person in Iowa does not 
violate the Federal Constitution.  See Montoya, 163 P.3d at 482; Cole, 
765 N.Y.S.2d at 484.  We therefore address the possibility of a 
freestanding claim of actual innocence pursuant to Iowa constitutional 
jurisprudence. 
The Iowa Constitution affords individuals greater rights than does 
the United States Constitution.  See, e.g., State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 
395 (Iowa 2014) (noting “we expanded the reach of the Supreme Court’s 
 
26 
 
reasoning in a trilogy of juvenile justice cases decided under the Iowa 
Constitution”).  Moreover, we have discretion to construe the Iowa 
Constitution in such a way as to “provid[e] greater protection for our 
citizens’ constitutional rights.”  Nguyen v. State, 878 N.W.2d 744, 755 
(Iowa 2016).  Because we “jealously” safeguard our authority to interpret 
the Iowa Constitution on our own terms, we do not employ a lockstep 
approach in following federal precedent although United States Supreme 
Court cases are “persuasive.”  See State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 267 
(Iowa 2010). 
Article I, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution prohibits the 
deprivation of liberty without due process of law.  Iowa Const. art. I, § 9 
(due process clause).  We have enforced “the due process clause of article 
I, section 9 . . . in a wide variety of settings.”  Godfrey v. State, 
898 N.W.2d 844, 871 (Iowa 2017).  In fact, “[t]he Iowa constitutional 
provision regarding due process of law is . . . not a mere hortatory 
command, but it has been implemented, day in and day out, for many, 
many years.”  Id.  We see no reason why article I, section 9 would not be 
enforceable for purposes of vindicating defendants who prove they are 
factually innocent and believe their incarceration triggers the due 
process clause. 
An innocent person has a constitutional liberty interest in 
remaining free from undeserved punishment.  Holding a person who has 
committed no crime in prison strikes the very essence of the 
constitutional guarantee of substantive due process.  See Cole, 
765 N.Y.S.2d at 485 (holding “the conviction or incarceration of a 
guiltless person violates elemental fairness, deprives that person of 
freedom of movement and freedom from punishment[,] and thus runs 
afoul of the due process clause of the [New York] State Constitution”). 
 
27 
 
Even if defendants allege substantive due process violations, they 
must meet the demanding actual-innocence standard to prove the 
validity of their actual-innocence claims—a standard we articulate in the 
next section.  Thus, there are limits on actual-innocence claims. 
Moreover, actually innocent people should have an opportunity to 
prove their actual innocence.  Montoya, 163 P.3d at 484 (holding “the 
conviction, incarceration, or execution of an innocent person violates all 
notions of fundamental fairness” and thus actually innocent people 
“must be permitted to assert a claim of actual innocence”).  The 
incarceration of actually innocent people therefore implicates procedural 
due process. 
Article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution prohibits cruel and 
unusual punishment.  Iowa Const. art. I, § 17 (cruel and unusual 
punishment).  This prohibition “embraces a bedrock rule of law that 
punishment should fit the crime.”  Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 384 (quoting 
State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009)); accord Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1190 (2005) (“[T]he Eighth 
Amendment guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to 
excessive sanctions.”).  Applying this bedrock principle, we believe 
“punishing an actually innocent person is disproportionate to the crime 
(or lack of crime) committed and violates the cruel and inhuman 
treatment clause.”  Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 485; accord Herrera, 506 U.S. 
at 431, 113 S. Ct. at 876 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting punishment 
“grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime” is unconstitutional 
and excessive (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592, 97 S. Ct. 
2861, 2866 (1977) (plurality opinion))). 
Furthermore, we agree with Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Herrera 
that “it is crystal clear that the execution of an innocent person is ‘at 
 
28 
 
odds with contemporary standards of fairness and decency.’ ”  506 U.S. 
at 431, 113 S. Ct. at 876 (quoting Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 465, 
104 S. Ct. 3154, 3165 (1984), overruled on other grounds by Hurst v. 
Florida, 577 U.S. ___, ___, 136 S. Ct. 616, 621 (2016)).  We believe 
Justice Blackmun’s reasoning also applies to the conviction and 
incarceration of an innocent person because “the basic concept 
underlying the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment ‘is 
nothing less than the dignity’ of humankind.”  Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 384 
(quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100, 78 S. Ct. 590, 597 (1958)). 
We reject the notion that the rationale used in cases involving 
trials cannot be applied to those involving pleas.5  We find these cases 
informative because the same policy reason informs convictions based 
after trials as those based on pleas.  See Ex parte Tuley, 109 S.W.3d 388, 
391–92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); see also People v. Tiger, 48 N.Y.S.3d 685, 
700–01 (App. Div. 2017) (citing Ex parte Tuley, 109 S.W.3d at 393) 
(holding a defendant’s plea does not bar the defendant from bringing a 
freestanding claim of actual innocence).  This policy reason is protecting 
against violations of constitutional principles. 
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals permits freestanding claims 
of actual innocence even if the applicant pled guilty.  Ex parte Tuley, 
109 S.W.3d at 393.  In Tuley, the applicant pled guilty to aggravated 
sexual assault.  Id. at 390.  Years later, the applicant pursued 
postconviction relief when the complainant recanted her allegation.  Id.  
The court sought to answer the question of whether the applicant’s plea 
precluded his freestanding actual-innocence claim.  Id.  It reasoned the 
                                      
 
5For example, the following cases involved convictions after trials: Washington, 
665 N.E.2d at 1331; Montoya, 163 P.3d at 478; In re Kaufmann, 157 N.E. at 731; 
Engesser, 856 N.W.2d at 473. 
 
29 
 
policy behind allowing freestanding actual-innocence claims was to 
protect innocent individuals from punishment.  Id. at 390–91.  
Specifically, the court reasoned, this policy “is the same for an applicant 
regardless of whether his case was heard by a judge or jury or whether 
he [pled] guilty or not guilty.”  Id. 
The court further reasoned that “[c]onvicting courts should . . . give 
great respect to knowing, voluntary, and intelligent pleas of guilty.”  Id. at 
391.  However, “we should not foreclose relief because a defendant [pled] 
guilty when the policy behind granting relief on a bare innocence claim is 
the same.”  Id.  Moreover, “[t]here is nothing equitable about permitting 
an innocent person to remain in prison when he produces new evidence 
that unquestionably shows that he did not commit the offense for which 
he is incarcerated.”  Id. at 392.  Thus, the court held an applicant must 
“show[] by clear and convincing evidence that, despite the evidence of 
guilt that supports the conviction, no reasonable juror could have found 
the applicant guilty in light of the new evidence.”  Id.  We agree with the 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals that the same rudimentary policy 
reason—safeguarding 
against 
violations 
of 
due 
process—form 
a 
substratum for claims of actual innocence, regardless of whether 
defendants pled guilty or went to trial. 
Therefore, we now find the Iowa Constitution permits freestanding 
claims of actual innocence.  Furthermore, freestanding claims of actual 
innocence permitted by the Iowa Constitution are available to applicants 
even though they pled guilty. 
3.  The standard to apply to freestanding actual-innocence claims.  
States that have adopted freestanding actual-innocence claims require a 
higher burden than that of a gateway claim for an applicant to succeed.  
We again note the United States Supreme Court adopted a more-likely-
 
30 
 
than-not standard in proving gateway claims of actual innocence.  
Schlup, 513 U.S at 327, 115 S. Ct. 851 at 867. 
In Jamison v. State, a case involving newly discovered evidence 
that would allegedly support an applicant’s self-defense theory, the 
South Carolina Supreme Court adopted a stringent standard.6  765 
S.E.2d 123, 130 (S.C. 2014). 
There the court held, 
[W]hen a [postconviction-relief] applicant seeks relief on the 
basis of newly discovered evidence following a guilty plea, 
relief is appropriate only where the applicant presents 
evidence showing that (1) the newly discovered evidence was 
discovered after the entry of the plea and, in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered prior to 
the entry of the plea; and (2) the newly discovered evidence is 
of such a weight and quality that, under the facts and 
circumstances of that particular case, the “interest of justice” 
requires the applicant’s guilty plea to be vacated. In other 
words, a [postconviction-relief] applicant may successfully 
disavow his or her guilty plea only where the interests of 
justice outweigh the waiver and solemn admission of guilt 
encompassed in a plea of guilty and the compelling interests 
in maintaining the finality of guilty-plea convictions. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
We believe the standard the South Carolina Supreme Court has 
adopted is not only amorphous but also impractical.  What does it mean 
for the “interests of justice” to outweigh the guilty plea waiver?  The 
permutations are endless.  The standard set by the South Carolina 
Supreme Court does not appear to be any different from altogether 
barring an applicant’s postconviction-relief action. 
Similarly, the California Supreme Court requires applicants to 
meet a high burden such that the evidence “undermine[s] the entire 
                                      
 
6We realize this case did not involve an actual-innocence claim but rather a self-
defense theory.  We think it is nevertheless informative in constructing a standard for 
freestanding actual-innocence claims in Iowa.  
 
31 
 
prosecution case and point[s] unerringly to innocence or reduced 
culpability.”  In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729, 739 (Cal. 1993); accord In re Bell, 
170 P.3d 153, 157 (Cal. 2007). 
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals originally adopted a very 
burdensome standard, requiring applicants claiming actual innocence to 
demonstrate “based on the newly discovered evidence and the entire 
record before the jury that convicted him, no rational trier of fact could 
find proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State ex rel. Holmes v. 
Honorable Ct. of Appeals, 885 S.W.2d 389, 399 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) 
(en banc), overruled by Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 206 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1996) (en banc).   
However, in lowering the burden of proof, the court in Ex parte 
Elizondo stated the Holmes standard was too high because it would be 
“theoretically impossible” to attain relief.  Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 
at 205.  The court reasoned “exculpatory evidence can never outweigh 
inculpatory evidence under [the] standard” set in State ex rel. Holmes.  Id.  
Thus, the court adopted a clear and convincing standard requiring “the 
petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable 
juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.”  Id. at 209. 
A number of states apply the Elizondo clear and convincing 
standard.  See, e.g., Roper, 102 S.W.3d at 548; Montoya, 163 P.3d at 
486; Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 486; Miller v. State, 340 P.3d 795, 796 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2014) (per curiam); see also Miller v. Comm’r of Corr., 700 A.2d 
1108, 1130–31 (Conn. 1997) (adopting a clear and convincing standard 
and also requiring the petitioner to show that “no reasonable fact finder 
would find the petitioner guilty”). 
Other jurisdictions have codified freestanding claims of actual 
innocence.  The Maryland statute uses a standard of “substantial or 
 
32 
 
significant possibility that the result may have been different.”  Md. 
Code. Ann., Crim. Proc. § 8-301(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through ch.1–4 
2018 Reg. Sess.).  The statute gives the court discretion to “set aside the 
verdict, resentence, grant a new trial, or correct the sentence.”  Id. § 8-
301(f)(1).  The Maryland Court of Special Appeals, however, held a 
defendant who has pled guilty could not petition for a writ of actual 
innocence.  Yonga v. State, 108 A.3d 448, 460 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015), 
aff’d 130 A.3d 486, 492 (Md. 2016). 
In discussing freestanding claims of actual innocence, the District 
of Columbia statute explicitly assigns different remedies upon meeting 
the respective standards.  D.C. Code Ann. § 22-4135 (West, Westlaw 
through Feb. 20, 2018).  If the court determines “it is more likely than 
not that the movant is actually innocent of the crime,” the remedy is to 
grant a new trial.  Id. § 22-4135(g)(2).  If the court determines “by clear 
and convincing evidence that the movant is actually innocent of the 
crime,” the remedy is to vacate the conviction.  Id. § 22-4135(g)(3).  Thus, 
the District of Columbia statute requires a more stringent standard to 
vacate a conviction but fashions this stronger remedy upon the movant 
meeting his or her burden of proof.  Moreover, “[i]f the conviction resulted 
from a plea of guilty, and other charges were dismissed as part of a plea 
agreement, the court shall reinstate any charges of which the defendant 
has not demonstrated that the defendant is actually innocent.”  Id. § 22-
4135(g)(4).  Thus, the District of Columbia statute minimizes unfairness 
to the government by counterbalancing the movant’s interest—vacating a 
wrongful conviction and ensuring a factually innocent person is not 
incarcerated—and the government’s interest—allowing reinstatement of 
charges the government otherwise would have pursued if the movant had 
not pled guilty. 
 
33 
 
After reviewing the differing standards our sister states have 
adopted, we find that after pleading guilty, applicants claiming actual 
innocence must meet the clear and convincing standard.  We reach this 
conclusion for a number of reasons.  In House, the United States 
Supreme Court mentioned the required proof to establish actual 
innocence as a freestanding claim is greater than that required to 
establish a gateway claim of actual innocence.  547 U.S. at 555, 
126 S. Ct. at 2087; accord In re Weber, 284 P.3d at 741 (“[A]ny standard 
by which a free-standing actual innocence claim must be proved will be 
higher than that applied in the gateway context.”). 
In light of House, a clear and convincing standard is the 
appropriate burden of showing a freestanding claim of actual innocence.  
This standard is heavier than the more-likely-than-not standard 
governing gateway claims of actual innocence.  It makes sense to have a 
lower standard for gateway claims because such claims have underlying 
claims that allege constitutional defects in the trial or plea colloquy.  
However, an applicant bringing a freestanding claim of actual innocence 
is claiming he or she is factually and actually innocent, despite a fair, 
constitutionally compliant trial or plea colloquy free of constitutional 
defects. 
Additionally, a clear and convincing standard balances the interest 
of an innocent defendant and that of the state.  Although the interests of 
both parties are important, we believe “it is far worse to convict an 
innocent person than to acquit a guilty one” such that “the scale tips in 
favor of the [defendant’s] interest.”  Miller, 700 A.2d at 1133.  Thus, we 
simultaneously vindicate this principle and recognize the interest of the 
state in finality of criminal litigation by adopting a clear and convincing 
standard. 
 
34 
 
Finally, the higher burden answers the problems posed by the 
Colorado Supreme Court regarding claims of newly discovered evidence 
after a defendant has pled guilty.  In People v. Schneider, the court 
stated, 
In the circumstance in which there never was a trial on the 
charges, the trial court is hampered in that assessment.  
Furthermore, there must be some consequence attached to 
the decision to plead guilty.  A defendant who voluntarily and 
knowingly enters a plea accepting responsibility for the 
charges is properly held to a higher burden in demonstrating 
to the court that newly discovered evidence should allow him 
to withdraw that plea. 
25 P.3d 755, 761–62 (Colo. 2001) (en banc) (emphasis added).  However, 
by adopting a higher burden of proof—a clear and convincing standard—
we account for the differences. 
We now adopt the clear and convincing standard to prove a 
freestanding actual-innocence claim.  For an applicant to succeed on a 
freestanding actual-innocence claim, the applicant must show by clear 
and convincing evidence that, despite the evidence of guilt supporting the 
conviction, no reasonable fact finder could convict the applicant of the 
crimes for which the sentencing court found the applicant guilty in light 
of all the evidence, including the newly discovered evidence. 
4.  Vehicle to bring freestanding actual-innocence claims.  We now 
address whether our postconviction-relief statute provides a means to 
raise a freestanding claim of actual innocence.  Outside of our current 
statutory scheme in chapter 822, we need not decide or specify other 
vehicles applicants may use to bring their freestanding actual-innocence 
claims as independent actions.  We emphasize sections 822(1)(a) and (d) 
are not the exclusive vehicles to bring freestanding actual-innocence 
claims because applicants may file such claims independently of chapter 
 
35 
 
822.  However, at this point, the legislature has provided the present, 
appropriate vehicle in chapter 822.  The Code provides, 
1.  Any person who has been convicted of, or 
sentenced for, a public offense and who claims any of the 
following may institute, without paying a filing fee, a 
proceeding under this chapter to secure relief: 
a.  The conviction or sentence was in violation of the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws 
of this state. 
. . . . 
d.  There exists evidence of material facts, not 
previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the 
conviction or sentence in the interest of justice. 
Iowa Code § 822.2(1)(a), (d). 
The Iowa Constitution gives a floor to bring freestanding claims of 
actual innocence under our postconviction-relief statute, specifically 
sections 822.2(1)(a) and (d).  Cf. Washington, 665 N.E.2d at 1337 
(holding the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution provides a 
footing to assert freestanding actual-innocence claims based on newly 
discovered evidence under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act).  A 
conviction of an innocent person violates the Iowa Constitution, 
specifically the due process clause and the prohibition against infliction 
of cruel and unusual punishment.  Thus, section 822.2(1)(a) is one 
vehicle to bring an actual-innocence claim.  Additionally, conviction of an 
innocent person infringes upon the “interest of justice” precisely because 
it violates the Iowa Constitution.  Therefore, section 822.2(1)(d) is 
another vehicle to assert an actual-innocence claim. 
In sum, we hold subsections 822.2(1)(a) and (d) provide avenues 
for freestanding actual-innocence claims.   
 
36 
 
IV.  Application of Legal Principles. 
We first address the statute of limitations issue and then the 
question of how to proceed under our new standard. 
A.  Statute of Limitations.  Our postconviction-relief statute 
specifies its own limitations of action.  The Iowa Code provides in 
relevant part, 
All . . . applications must be filed within three years from the 
date the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an 
appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo is issued.  
However, this limitation does not apply to a ground of fact or 
law that could not have been raised within the applicable 
time period. 
Iowa Code § 822.3. 
Thus, to avoid the three-year statute of limitations contained in 
section 822.3, an applicant must show he or she could not have raised 
the ground of fact within the applicable time period.  Additionally, “a 
postconviction-relief applicant relying on the ground-of-fact exception 
must show the ground of fact is relevant to the challenged conviction.”  
Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 521 (Iowa 2003).  This is the nexus 
requirement.  Id. at 520.  We made it clear a ground of fact is “relevant” if 
it is the type of fact “that has the potential to qualify as material evidence 
for purposes of a substantive claim under section 822.2.”  Id. at 521. 
We explicitly and “specifically reject[ed] any requirement that an 
applicant must show the ground of fact would likely or probably have 
changed the outcome of the underlying criminal case in order to avoid a 
limitations defense.”  Id.  The ultimate determination as to whether the 
applicant is entitled to relief “must await an adjudication, whether in a 
summary proceeding or after trial, on the applicant’s substantive claim 
for relief.”  Id.  In other words, we do not reach the merits of a claim 
 
37 
 
based on a new ground of fact in deciding whether the exception to the 
three-year statute of limitations applies. 
Here, B.C.’s recantation was not available to Schmidt within the 
three-year period following the date of his conviction and Schmidt could 
not have discovered the recantation earlier than he did in the exercise of 
due diligence.  Additionally, the recantation has the potential to qualify 
as material evidence that probably would have changed the outcome of 
Schmidt’s case.  See id. at 521 (holding the undisclosed police reports 
and the recantations “are the type of facts having the potential to qualify 
as material evidence that probably would have changed the outcome of 
[the defendant’s] trial”). 
We ultimately decided Harrington based on the withheld police 
reports in order to resolve the due process issue of whether the 
prosecution suppressed material evidence that was favorable to the 
defendant.  Id. at 521–25.  As for the statute-of-limitations analysis, we 
held both the recantation evidence and the police reports were sufficient; 
and thus, the defendant was not time barred from bringing his action.  
Id. at 521. 
Based on the foregoing, section 822.3 does not time bar Schmidt’s 
freestanding claim of actual innocence. 
B.  Application of Standard Regarding Schmidt’s Freestanding 
Actual-Innocence Claim.  The district court ruled on Schmidt’s case 
after the State filed a motion for summary dismissal/summary judgment.  
Section 822.6 allows for a summary disposition.  The statute states in 
relevant part, 
The court may grant a motion by either party for 
summary disposition of the application, when it appears 
from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any 
 
38 
 
affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. 
Iowa Code § 822.6. 
At the time the court ruled on the State’s motion, it decided the 
case as a matter of law relying on our jurisprudence that defendants who 
knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty cannot attack their pleas with 
challenges extrinsic to the pleas.  Today, we have reversed this line of 
cases and created a new standard for freestanding actual-innocence 
claims. 
Generally, when we create a new standard, we remand the case to 
the district court to apply the standard.  See McQuistion v. City of Clinton, 
872 N.W.2d 817, 819–20 (Iowa 2015) (adopting a new standard for the 
evaluation of a pregnancy claim and remanding the case to the district 
court to apply that standard); cf. State v. Ary, 877 N.W.2d 686, 707 (Iowa 
2016) (remanding the case to the district court to apply the appropriate 
standard when it initially applied the wrong standard). 
Here, we have created a new standard.  Thus, the proper result is 
to remand the case to the district court to apply the standard to the 
State’s motion for summary dismissal/summary judgment.  The court 
should allow the parties to supplement the record, if a party so desires, 
to provide other evidence or affidavits to support their respective 
positions.  See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(5) (setting forth the methods to 
present evidence in a summary judgment proceeding). 
We are not commenting on the merits of Schmidt’s claim.  
Contrary to the other opinions filed in this case, both parties are entitled 
to their day in court to litigate their positions under the new standard we 
have adopted today.  We will address any unanswered questions when a 
party presents the court with actual cases raising those issues.  That is 
 
39 
 
how the law progresses in this state.  We do not issue advisory opinions.  
See Linn v. Montgomery, 903 N.W.2d 337, 344 (Iowa 2017). 
It is for the district court to determine whether the recantation, in 
light of any other evidence that meets the requirements of rule 1.981, 
creates a genuine issue of material fact.  We are not in a position to 
decide the merits of this case by assuming that certain evidence, which 
may or may not comply with the requirements of rule 1.981, shows there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact in order to affirm the 
summary disposition in favor of the State.  Prohibiting the parties here 
from the benefit of the procedural processes provided to litigants is no 
better than incarcerating an innocent person. 
Only after the parties develop a record in a summary proceeding 
can the court decide if a genuine issue of material fact exists.  If it does, 
then a trial may be necessary to resolve Schmidt’s claim.  
V.  Disposition. 
We vacate the decision of the court of appeals and reverse the 
judgment of the district court granting the State’s motion for summary 
dismissal/summary judgment.  We remand the case to the district court 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT 
COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED. 
Cady, C.J., Hecht and Appel, JJ., join this opinion.  Cady, C.J., 
files a special concurrence.  Waterman, J., files a dissenting opinion in 
which Mansfield and Zager, JJ., join.  Mansfield, J., files a separate 
dissenting opinion in which Waterman and Zager, JJ., join. 
 
 
 
40 
 
 
#15–1408, Schmidt v. State 
CADY, Chief Justice (concurring specially). 
 
The process of justice must always be fair.  This case stands tall as 
the embodiment of this fundamental principle of law.  It is a substantial 
step forward in our constitutional march to become better.  Innocent 
people should always have a forum to prove their innocence.  I fully 
concur in the opinion of the court.   
 
Yet, the actual process of justice available to Schmidt to now 
pursue the new claim given to him must also be fair.  This fairness is the 
reason the case must be remanded to the district court for it to decide if 
summary adjudication should be granted.  I write separately only to 
explain this important part of the case more fully and why the actual-
innocence claim cannot now be decided on appeal.   
 
Going forward, when an actual-innocence claim based on the 
recantation of a witness is brought in our courts, summary judgment will 
remain a viable procedural vehicle for the state to ask the court to 
resolve the claim.  Consistent with all summary judgment proceedings, 
the legal issue will be whether the moving party is entitled to summary 
judgment, under a set of facts assumed to be undisputed for the 
purposes of the motion, because a reasonable juror could still conclude 
the defendant is guilty of the crime.  For purposes of summary 
adjudication of witness recantation claims, the undisputed facts needed 
to support the motion will normally center on the remaining evidence of 
guilt from other witnesses found in the minutes of testimony.  In many 
cases, the remaining evidence may support summary judgment, as a 
reasonable juror could still convict the defendant based on the surviving 
evidence.   
 
41 
 
In this case, the assumed undisputed facts, at this time, may 
support 
summary 
judgment. 
 
In 
his 
plea 
colloquy, 
Schmidt 
acknowledged the minutes of testimony were true and accurate.  
Significantly, the minutes included a witness who was an eyewitness to 
the assault.  With only the recantation evidence offered by Schmidt at 
this point to prove his innocence, a reasonable fact finder could still 
conclude Schmidt committed the crime.    
 
Nevertheless, it would be unfair to Schmidt for us to apply the new 
standard to the existing record to decide the actual-innocence claim now 
on appeal.  At the time the State brought its motion for summary 
judgment in this case, it argued Schmidt’s claim was barred by the 
three-year statute of limitations under Iowa Code section 822.3 (2014) 
and the recantation evidence identified in his petition for postconviction 
relief was discoverable within the limitation period.  Thus, at the time 
Schmidt resisted the summary judgment motion, the legal issue before 
the court was whether the recantation was discoverable within the three-
year period.  The district court granted the summary judgment after 
concluding the exculpatory evidence was extrinsic to the plea and could 
not be grounds for relief.   
 
Although Schmidt claimed his actual innocence in the summary 
judgment proceedings, the legal issue he was responding to was whether 
the recantation evidence was discoverable within the three-year statute 
of limitations.  He was not responding to a substantive claim by the State 
that his recantation evidence would still be insufficient as a matter to law 
to support a claim of actual innocence.  In fact, recantation as a claim of 
innocence has still not been teed up by the State, and Schmidt has not 
been alerted to the requirement to submit all evidence of innocence in 
direct response to such claim.  Thus, the record does not show Schmidt 
 
42 
 
has had a full and fair opportunity to present all new evidence to resist 
summary judgment.   
 
Likewise, the State has not had a full and fair opportunity to 
specifically identify its evidence to support summary adjudication under 
the actual-innocence standard.  See Iowa Code § 822.6.  Even though the 
state asked the district court in the summary judgment proceedings to 
take judicial notice of the complete record in the case, the state must still 
identify those portions of the record it relies on to support summary 
judgment.  See id.   
 
The case needs to be remanded to the district court so the State 
can amend its motion for summary judgment to claim Schmidt has failed 
to bring a claim of actual innocence that survives summary adjudication.  
The district court needs to consider the motion after Schmidt has filed an 
amended response.  This procedure is required to ensure the process of 
justice is fair.   
 
 
 
43 
 
 
#15–1408, Schmidt v. State 
WATERMAN, Justice (dissenting). 
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the district court’s 
summary judgment and the court of appeals decision affirming it under 
our long-standing precedent enforcing the legal effect of guilty pleas.  I 
join Justice Mansfield’s separate dissent.  This year, the United States 
Supreme Court resoundingly reiterated a fundamental legal tenet: a valid 
guilty plea waives the defendant’s constitutional right to trial and right to 
confront witnesses and “relinquishes any claim that would contradict the 
‘admissions necessarily made upon entry of a voluntary plea of guilty.’ ”  
Class v. United States, 583 U.S. ___, ___, 138 S. Ct. 798, 805 (2018) 
(quoting United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 573–74, 109 S. Ct. 757, 
764 (1989)).  A guilty plea precludes a defendant from a later challenge in 
which he would “deny that he engaged in the conduct to which he 
admitted.”  Id.  All nine justices agreed with that proposition.  See id. at 
___, 138 S. Ct. at 815 (Alito, J., dissenting).7  When Schmidt confessed in 
open court and pled guilty, he closed the door to his subsequent claim 
that he is factually innocent, that is, that he really did not do what he 
admitted doing.  The majority today errs by relying on cases in which the 
defendant steadfastly maintained his or her innocence through trial and 
all subsequent appeals.   
                                      
 
7The Class Court held the defendant’s guilty plea alone did not bar his challenge 
to his conviction on grounds the statute of conviction was unconstitutional.  ___ U.S. at 
___, 138 S. Ct. at 803 (majority opinion).  Iowa appears to recognize the same exception 
because we allow the defendant who pled guilty to later assert that the indictment or 
information charges no offense.  See, e.g., State v. Burgess, 639 N.W.2d 564, 567 (Iowa 
2001).  This is a matter intrinsic to the plea because it does not require resort to 
anything other than the trial information and the plea of guilty.   
Schmidt makes no such constitutional challenge to the statutes he pled guilty to 
violating.  The Class Court made clear that a defendant who pleads guilty waives any 
right to later contest his factual guilt, challenge the evidence against him, or retreat 
from factual admissions in the guilty plea.  583 U.S. at___, 138 S. Ct. at 804, 805–06; 
id. at ___, 138 S. Ct. at 812–13 (Alito, J., dissenting.   
 
44 
 
I would also affirm summary judgment based on the statute of 
limitations because Schmidt knew what really happened in the bedroom 
and knew when he pled guilty whether his victim, B.C., and the 
eyewitness, Peter, were lying.  Schmidt knowingly and voluntarily waived 
his right to challenge their allegations when he pled guilty in a detailed 
colloquy with the court while represented by effective defense counsel.  
Iowa law has always provided innocent people a forum to prove their 
innocence—through a trial.  Schmidt is an admittedly guilty man who 
chose to give up his right to trial.   
The majority undermines the finality of guilty pleas and eviscerates 
the three-year statute of limitations for postconviction-relief (PCR) 
actions.  Today’s decision will have bad consequences, as counsel for the 
State warned, including fewer plea bargains, renewed turmoil for victims 
and their families years after the crime, and a flood of PCR applications.  
The majority, by remanding this case instead of itself applying its new 
standard on the existing record, needlessly leaves district courts in the 
dark on whether evidentiary hearings or new trials will be required 
whenever a victim or other witness recants years after a defendant, ably 
represented by competent counsel, formally confessed to the crime in 
open court through a guilty plea devoid of legal error.  Soon, we will see 
PCR applications by defendants who pled guilty to domestic assault and 
now bully the survivors into recanting.   
 
Courts 
appropriately 
regard 
recantations 
with 
the 
utmost 
suspicion—especially those involving intrafamily sexual abuse.  In my 
view, summary judgment can and should be affirmed on the existing 
record after remand under the majority’s newly adopted test for actual 
innocence.  This is because Schmidt cannot show, despite B.C.’s 
“recantation,” that no reasonable juror could convict him based on 
 
45 
 
Peter’s unrecanted eyewitness account of catching Schmidt in the act 
and 
B.C.’s 
contemporaneous 
statements 
and 
forensic 
interview 
describing the sexual assault.  Indeed, Iowa juries, even without 
eyewitness testimony, have convicted defendants charged with domestic 
abuse based solely on what the victim said happened right after the 
abuse, disbelieving the victim’s subsequent recantation at trial.8  B.C.’s 
quasi-recantation essentially can be paraphrased as, “I said it happened 
back then, but now that my much bigger brother is getting out of prison 
I’m telling people it didn’t happen—you guess which story is true.”  This 
equivocal recantation should be insufficient to vacate Schmidt’s guilty 
plea.  I would wait for a better test case to adopt a standard for relief 
under an actual-innocence theory.   
 
I.  The District Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment 
Based on Schmidt’s Guilty Plea.   
The majority is unable to find fault with the manner in which 
Schmidt pled guilty.  Schmidt raises no claim that his counsel was 
ineffective and alleges no defect or constitutional infirmity in connection 
with his guilty plea.  The majority, nevertheless, allows Schmidt, and 
presumably any other convicted offender, to belatedly challenge a guilty 
plea based solely on someone’s subsequent recantation.  The majority 
thereby upends Iowa law on the finality of guilty pleas and does so 
without acknowledging the many built-in protections our legal system 
employs to ensure the validity of plea-based convictions and without 
quoting Schmidt’s in-court colloquy showing those safeguards were 
followed to the letter in his case.   
                                      
 
8See, e.g., State v. Smith, 876 N.W.2d 180, 183–84, 190 & n.4 (Iowa 2016).   
 
46 
 
Until today, it had been “well settled that a plea of guilty ‘waives all 
defenses or objections which are not intrinsic to the plea itself.’ ”  State v. 
Alexander, 463 N.W.2d 421, 422 (Iowa 1990) (quoting State v. 
Morehouse, 316 N.W.2d 884, 885 (Iowa 1982), overruled on other grounds 
by State v. Kress, 636 N.W.2d 12, 20 (Iowa 2001)).  I would honor stare 
decisis and affirm Schmidt’s conviction under the foregoing precedent.   
 
Generally, a criminal defendant waives all defenses 
and objections to the criminal proceedings by pleading guilty 
. . . .  One exception to this rule involves irregularities 
intrinsic to the plea—irregularities that bear on the knowing 
and voluntary nature of the plea.   
Castro v. State, 795 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Iowa 2011) (citation omitted) 
(addressing when ineffective assistance of counsel constitutes an 
irregularity intrinsic to the plea by rendering it involuntary or 
unknowing).  Schmidt does not dispute the district court’s finding that 
his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, and he has never alleged 
ineffective assistance of counsel.   
“A plea colloquy that covers the specific ground subsequently 
raised in a postconviction relief application would normally support 
summary judgment on those grounds.”  Id. at 795.  The district court 
properly considered Schmidt’s admissions in his plea colloquy and the 
legal effect of his guilty plea in granting the State’s motion for summary 
disposition of the PCR action.  See id.  Schmidt was not entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing on the veracity of B.C.’s recantation without first 
establishing that his guilty plea was unknowing or involuntary.  It is 
undisputed that Schmidt pled guilty and admitted to the crimes in the 
plea colloquy.  The legal effect of his guilty plea is a question of law the 
district court correctly decided by summary judgment on the existing 
PCR record.  See id. at 793, 795–96.   
 
47 
 
Nothing B.C. says now or said in 2006 may be regarded as an 
irregularity intrinsic to Schmidt’s guilty plea.  “Any subsequently-
discovered deficiency in the State’s case that affects a defendant’s 
assessment of the evidence against him, but not the knowing and 
voluntary nature of the plea, is not intrinsic to the plea itself.”  State v. 
Speed, 573 N.W.2d 594, 596 (Iowa 1998).  “Notions of newly discovered 
evidence simply have no bearing on a knowing and voluntary admission 
of guilt.”  Alexander, 463 N.W.2d at 423.  New exculpatory evidence does 
not alter “a defendant’s understanding of what a plea means.”  Speed, 
573 N.W.2d at 596 (distinguishing the “defendant’s tactical rationale for 
pleading guilty”).  Thus, “[a] guilty plea is normally understood as a lid 
on the box, whatever is in it, not a platform from which to explore further 
possibilities.”  Kyle v. State, 322 N.W.2d 299, 304 (Iowa 1982) (quoting 
United States v. Bluso, 519 F.2d 473, 474 (4th Cir. 1975)).  I would keep 
the proverbial lid on the box.  When a tenable claim of actual innocence 
comes along, we will know it.  This is not such a case.   
The majority upends our long-standing precedent on guilty pleas.  
I find it astounding that neither the majority nor the special concurrence 
ever mentions stare decisis, the doctrine that provides stability, 
predictability, and legitimacy to our law.  Just months ago, our court 
unanimously reiterated, “From the very beginnings of this court, we have 
guarded the venerable doctrine of stare decisis and required the highest 
possible showing that a precedent should be overruled before taking 
such a step.”  State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 902 N.W.2d 811, 817 (Iowa 2017) 
(quoting McElroy v. State, 703 N.W.2d 385, 394 (Iowa 2005)); see also Bd. 
of Water Works Trs. v. Sac Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 890 N.W.2d 50, 61 
(Iowa 2017) (“Legal authority must be respected . . . because it is 
important that courts, and lawyers and their clients, may know what the 
 
48 
 
law is and order their affairs accordingly.” (quoting State v. Liddell, 672 
N.W.2d 805, 813 (Iowa 2003))).  We may overrule a decision found to be 
“clearly erroneous” when “compelling reasons exist” to do so.  State v. 
Williams, 895 N.W.2d 856, 859–60 (Iowa 2017) (overruling State v. Wing, 
791 N.W.2d 243 (Iowa 2010)).  In Wing, a divided court had overturned 
long-standing Iowa precedent and adopted a new interpretation of the 
speedy indictment rule that proved unworkable in practice; by overruling 
Wing, our court restored the prior long-standing Iowa rule that worked 
well.  See id. at 867–68 (Mansfield, J., specially concurring).  The 
Williams majority devoted a section of the opinion to stare decisis.  See 
id. at 859–60 (majority opinion).  The dissent lectured about the 
importance of the doctrine and pointedly “call[ed] for the restoration of 
the principle of stare decisis in Iowa jurisprudence.”  Id. at 870 (Wiggins, 
J., dissenting).  Yet today the same members of this court say nothing 
about stare decisis and overrule countless decisions without showing 
that our guilty plea precedent was clearly erroneous or unworkable.   
 
Iowa law requires a detailed guilty plea colloquy to satisfy the court 
that the defendant’s plea is knowing and voluntary and that there is a 
factual basis for the crime.  See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b); see also Diaz 
v. State, 896 N.W.2d 723, 732–34 (Iowa 2017) (vacating guilty plea based 
on ineffective assistance of counsel because plea colloquy failed to 
address 
the 
postdeportation 
immigration 
consequences 
of 
the 
conviction).  Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8 requires the court to 
determine “the plea is made voluntarily and intelligently and has a 
factual basis.”  Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b).  Before accepting a plea, the 
court must address the defendant in open court and determine if he or 
she understands  
 
49 
 
(1)  The nature of the charge to which the plea is 
offered.   
(2)  The mandatory minimum punishment, if any, and 
the maximum possible punishment provided by the statute 
defining the offense to which the plea is offered.   
(3)  That a criminal conviction, deferred judgment, or 
deferred sentence may affect a defendant’s status under 
federal immigration laws.   
(4)  That the defendant has the right to be tried by a 
jury, and at trial has the right to assistance of counsel, the 
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against the 
defendant, the right not to be compelled to incriminate 
oneself, and the right to present witnesses in the defendant’s 
own behalf and to have compulsory process in securing their 
attendance.   
(5)  That if the defendant pleads guilty there will not be 
a further trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty the 
defendant waives the right to a trial.   
Id.  The court also must inquire “whether the defendant’s willingness to 
plead guilty results from prior discussions between the attorney for the 
state and the defendant or the defendant’s attorney” and disclose the 
plea agreement on the record.  Id. r. 2.8(2)(c).  Schmidt alleges no 
violation of rule 2.8 in this PCR action.   
 
Here, the district court fully complied with rule 2.8 in accepting 
Schmidt’s guilty plea.  The district court described the legal rights 
Schmidt would have if he withdrew the plea and went to trial, and 
Schmidt informed the court he understood his rights and wished to plead 
guilty to the charges.  The court reviewed the factual basis for each 
count.  The prosecutor recited the elements of assault with intent to 
commit sexual abuse and the maximum and minimum penalties for that 
offense.  After confirming Schmidt understood, the court inquired 
whether the minutes of testimony were accurate concerning this offense:  
 
THE COURT: . . . What I am trying to find out is with 
regard to the elements of this crime, I’m talking about 
assault with intent to commit sexual abuse, and we have 
described those elements to you, in connection with those 
 
50 
 
elements, do the Minutes of Testimony, that is what the 
witnesses would say at trial, do they accurately and 
truthfully tell us what you did?   
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.   
 
. . . .   
 
THE COURT: Just tell me what you did that makes 
you think you are guilty.   
 
THE DEFENDANT: I grabbed a child and tried to 
perform a sex act against his will.   
 
. . . .   
 
THE COURT: Is [B.C.] the person you tried to commit a 
sex act with?   
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.   
 
THE COURT: Did 
this 
occur 
on 
or 
about 
February 25th, 2006, in Woodbury County, Iowa?   
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.   
 
THE COURT: Do you understand that by grabbing 
him, the state alleges you assaulted him by that grabbing?  
Do you understand that?   
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.   
 
THE COURT: The state claims that by grabbing him 
and making this attempt, that this was offensive to [B.C.].  
Do you agree that [B.C.] could have found this grabbing 
offensive?   
 
THE DEFENDANT: Probably, sir.   
 
THE COURT: The state claims that when you grabbed 
him, you did so with the specific intent to commit a sex act, 
and you said that you did grab him in an attempt to commit 
a sex act; is that correct?   
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.   
 
THE COURT: So was that your specific intent? That 
was your intention at the time?   
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.   
 
THE COURT: Now, a sex act in this case, the state 
alleges that you were attempting to make contact between 
your penis and anus of [B.C.].  That’s what they are 
claiming.  Is that what happened?   
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.   
 
. . . .   
 
THE COURT: Mr. Schmidt, are you telling me you are, 
in fact, guilty to this crime of assault with intent to commit 
sexual abuse?   
 
51 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.   
 
Next, the prosecutor recited the elements of incest and the 
maximum 
and 
minimum 
penalties. 
 
After 
confirming 
Schmidt 
understood, the court engaged in another colloquy:  
 
THE COURT: . . . With regard to the elements of this 
crime of incest, do these summaries of what the witnesses 
would say with regard to the elements of that crime, 
truthfully and accurately describe what you did?   
 
THE DEFENDANT: Okay. I performed the sex act—Yes, 
sir.  Those are accurate.   
 
. . . .   
 
THE COURT: Now I need to have you tell me in your 
own words what you did that makes you think that you are 
guilty of this charge.   
 
THE DEFENDANT: I performed a sex act on a minor 
child.   
 
. . . .   
 
THE COURT: The state claims that the sex act that 
you performed was contact between your penis and [B.C.’s] 
anus.  Do you agree that that was the contact that was 
performed?   
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.   
 
. . . .   
 
THE COURT: Do you agree that at the time that you 
performed the sex act upon [B.C.] that he was your brother?   
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.   
 
Schmidt told the court he was satisfied with the services of his 
counsel.  The court accepted Schmidt’s guilty plea, finding the plea was 
“made voluntarily and intelligently” and Schmidt “underst[ood] the legal 
rights that he [was] giving up by pleading guilty to each of these two 
charges.”  Schmidt does not challenge those findings, which the district 
court and court of appeals correctly determined required the summary 
dismissal of his PCR action.   
 
A plea must “be a genuine one, by a defendant who is guilty; one 
who understands his situation, his rights, and the consequences of the 
 
52 
 
plea, and is neither deceived nor coerced.”  State v. Hinners, 471 N.W.2d 
841, 843 (Iowa 1991) (quoting State v. Whitehead, 163 N.W.2d 899, 902 
(Iowa 1969)).  A guilty plea is effectively a confession of committing the 
crime made under judicial oversight with representation by defense 
counsel.  See Woods v. State, 379 P.3d 1134, 1141 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016).  
That is what we have here.  As the United States Supreme Court has 
held, “A plea of guilty is more than a voluntary confession made in open 
court.  It also serves as a stipulation that no proof by the prosecution 
need b[e] advanced . . . .  It supplies both evidence and verdict, ending 
controversy.”  Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 n.4, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 
1712 n.4 (1969) (alteration in original) (quoting Woodard v. State, 171 
So. 2d 462, 469 (Ala. Ct. App. 1965)); see also Class, 583 U.S. at ___, 
138 S. Ct. at 804 (majority opinion) (“The plea of guilty is, of course, a 
confession of all the facts charged in the indictment, and also of the evil 
intent imputed to the defendant.” (quoting Commonwealth v. Hinds, 101 
Mass. 209, 210 (1869))).  For this reason, the United States Supreme 
Court and, until today, our court has upheld knowing and voluntary 
guilty pleas.  See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757, 90 S. Ct. 
1463, 1473 (1970) (“A defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea 
merely because he discover[ed] long after the plea has been accepted that 
his calculus misapprehended the quality of the State’s case or the likely 
penalties attached to alternative courses of action.”); Speed, 573 N.W.2d 
at 597 (“The fact that an accused may elect to plead guilty to a lesser 
offense when he is also charged with a more serious offense does not 
make his plea coerced.” (quoting State v. Lindsey, 171 N.W.2d 859, 865 
(Iowa 1969))).   
 
Schmidt relies on People v. Whirl, which allowed postconviction 
claims to proceed to challenge a conviction resulting from a guilty plea 
 
53 
 
following a confession coerced by police torture.  39 N.E.3d 114, 117 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2015).  That case is inapposite because Schmidt claims no 
torture, coercion, or other constitutional violation in connection with his 
guilty plea.   
[W]hen a defendant pleads guilty, the case is effectively 
closed.  The [prosecutor] believes that he or she will no 
longer need to develop the case for presentation to a jury, 
and 
investigation 
and 
witness 
identification 
ceases.  
Similarly, victims believe that the case is over.  Unlike a 
conviction by trial, which the defendant can appeal and 
continue to contest vigorously, when a defendant enters a 
plea, he or she admits wrongdoing.   
People v. Schneider, 25 P.3d 755, 760 (Colo. 2001) (en banc); see also 
Commonwealth v. Martinez, 539 A.2d 399, 401 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) 
(“After a defendant has entered a plea of guilty the only cognizable issues 
in a [postconviction] proceeding are the validity of the plea of guilty and 
the legality of the sentence.”).  The State should be able to rely on the 
finality of guilty pleas such as Schmidt’s entered in compliance with Iowa 
law.  As Justice Alito observed, “Roughly 95% of felony cases in the 
federal and state courts are resolved by guilty pleas.  Therefore it is 
critically important that defendants, prosecutors, and judges understand 
the consequences of these pleas.”  Class, 583 U.S. at___, 138 S. Ct. at 
807 (Alito, J., dissenting).   
The majority’s holding undermines the value of guilty pleas.  “One 
of the benefits to the state from a plea bargain is finality.”  Rhoades v. 
State, 880 N.W.2d 431, 447–49 (Iowa 2016) (holding guilty plea barred 
recovery for wrongful imprisonment).  Other “factors favoring pleas 
include risk avoidance, conservation of prosecution and court resources, 
efficiency, and timeliness of disposition.”  Id. at 449.  The State (and 
victims) can no longer rely on the finality of guilty pleas.  If Schmidt had 
gone to trial in 2007, the State presumably would have proven its case 
 
54 
 
then, and trial testimony would have been preserved for any retrial.  Not 
so when trial preparation is short-circuited by a guilty plea and no trial 
takes place.  See id. (noting the lack of a trial record when the defendant 
pleads guilty).   
The majority fails to confront the proof problems that arise when a 
defendant is allowed to renege on a guilty plea years later and there is no 
prior trial record because of his guilty plea.  Other courts avoid such 
problems by enforcing the guilty plea.  See Weeks v. Bowersox, 119 F.3d 
1342, 1355 (8th Cir. 1997) (Loken, J., concurring) (acknowledging the 
“inherent paradox in the notion that someone who has stood in open 
court and declared, ‘I am guilty,’ may turn around years later” and claim 
postconviction relief); Norris v. State, 896 N.E.2d 1149, 1153 (Ind. 2008) 
(noting the difficulty in “harmoniz[ing] th[e] new position taken by the 
defendant with the fact that he originally admitted to committing the 
crime by his guilty plea,” given that “[b]oth his confession and his new 
claims cannot be true”); Yonga v. State, 108 A.3d 448, 461–63 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 2015) (explaining that new evidence cannot be compared to a 
nonexistent trial record), aff’d 130 A.3d 486, 492 (Md. 2016) (concluding 
“that a person who has pled guilty may not later avail himself or herself 
of the relief afforded by the Petition for a Writ of Actual Innocence”).   
The district court correctly granted the State’s motion for summary 
judgment.  Relying on the court of appeals recent decision in Walters v. 
State, the district court found that “newly-discovered exculpatory 
evidence does not provide grounds to withdraw a guilty plea ‘unless it is 
intrinsic to the plea itself.’ ”  No. 12–2022, 2014 WL 69589, at *3 (Iowa 
Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2014) (quoting Speed, 573 N.W.2d at 596).  The court of 
appeals correctly affirmed the district court’s summary judgment 
dismissing Schmidt’s PCR action.  The court of appeals found “the 
 
55 
 
analysis and reasoning in Walters to be spot-on” and held that “because 
Schmidt’s convictions were entered following his guilty pleas, he cannot 
challenge those convictions in a PCR action on the basis of newly 
discovered evidence in the form of his victim’s alleged recantation.”  I 
agree.   
 
Nothing in today’s majority opinion should preclude the State from 
introducing Schmidt’s guilty plea colloquy into evidence at the 
postremand hearing.  In my view, Schmidt’s admissions of guilt in 2007 
entitle the State to summary dismissal of his PCR claims.  See Castro, 
795 N.W.2d at 795.   
 
II.  B.C.’s “Recantation” Is Insufficient to Vacate Schmidt’s 
Guilty Plea.   
 
We have never vacated a guilty plea based on the victim’s 
recantation.  The majority fails to mention that “[w]e have repeatedly held 
that a witness’ recantation testimony . . . is looked upon with the utmost 
suspicion.”  Jones v. State, 479 N.W.2d 265, 275 (Iowa 1991).  Our 
skepticism of recantations is widely shared.  Haouari v. United States, 
510 F.3d 350, 353 (2d Cir. 2007) (“It is axiomatic that witness 
recantations ‘must be looked upon with the utmost suspicion.’ ” (quoting 
Ortega v. Duncan, 333 F.3d 102, 107 (2d Cir. 2003))); see also Yonga, 
108 A.3d at 475 (noting “post-trial recantation[s] of witnesses are looked 
on with the utmost suspicion” (quoting Carr v. State, 387 A.2d 302,  
305–06 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978), rev’d on other grounds, 397 A.2d 606 
(Md. 1979))); Addai v. State, 893 N.W.2d 480, 483 (N.D. 2017) (“This 
Court reviews recanting testimony with suspicion and disfavor.”).   
This is because recantations “upset[] society’s interest in the 
finality of convictions, [are] very often unreliable and given 
for suspect motives, and most often serve[] merely to 
impeach cumulative evidence rather than to undermine 
confidence in the accuracy of the conviction.”   
 
56 
 
Haouari, 510 F.3d at 535 (alterations in original) (quoting Dobbert v. 
Wainwright, 468 U.S. 1231, 1233–34, 105 S. Ct. 34, 36 (1984) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)).   
 
Our distrust is heightened when the recanting victim is a child 
sexually abused by a family member.  See, e.g., State v. Kostman, 585 
N.W.2d 209, 210 (Iowa 1998) (per curiam) (“The victim further admitted 
he once recanted the allegations because he and Kostman ‘went camping 
together and always had fun and [he] didn’t want to see nothing happen 
to him and it was just—[he] was just kind of scared.’ ” (Alteration in 
original.)).  In State v. Tharp, the defendant’s stepdaughter recanted her 
testimony that he had sexually abused her.  372 N.W.2d 280, 282 (Iowa 
Ct. App. 1985).  The district court denied his motion for new trial.  Id.  
The court of appeals affirmed, observing,  
 
A witness’ recantation of her testimony is looked upon 
with the utmost suspicion, and does not necessarily entitle 
the defendant to a new trial.  The trial court must make its 
decision based on the facts of the whole trial and those in 
conjunction with the motion.  The victim was a 15 year old 
stepdaughter of defendant.  In cases of this type, where 
families are torn apart, there is great pressure on the child to 
“make things right.”   
Id. (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).   
This view too is widely shared.  See United States v. Provost, 969 
F.2d 617, 621 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Recantation is particularly common when 
family members are involved and the child has feelings of guilt or the 
family members seek to influence the child to change her story.”); Myatt 
v. Hannigan, 910 F.2d 680, 685 n.2 (10th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he child’s 
recanting of her statement to family members is not atypical in sex abuse 
cases.”); Schneider, 25 P.3d at 763 (“Skepticism about recantations is 
especially applicable in cases of child sexual abuse where recantation is 
a recurring phenomenon.”); State v. Gallagher, 554 A.2d 221, 225 (Vt. 
 
57 
 
1988) (allowing hearsay exception for child victims of sex crimes because 
of “the high probability of a child victim recanting a statement about 
being abused sexually”); see also Norris, 896 N.E.2d at 1155 (Boehm, J. 
concurring) (viewing recantation of victim’s mother as “inherently 
somewhat suspect, coming as it does after the fact and from [a] relative[] 
of the defendant”).9   
Recantations are especially common with victims of domestic 
violence.  See State v. Smith, 876 N.W.2d 180, 187–88 (Iowa 2016) (citing 
authorities concluding many victims of domestic violence recant); id. at 
194 (Waterman, J., dissenting) (“The rate of recantation among domestic 
violence victims has been estimated between eighty and ninety percent.”).  
After today, we can expect that offenders who already pled guilty will try 
to pressure their victims to recant.   
 
Mindful of the law’s appropriate distrust of recantations by victims 
of child sex abuse, I conclude B.C.’s fainthearted “recantation” is 
                                      
 
9One study showed twenty-two percent of children recant allegations, but 
ninety-two percent of those who recanted eventually reaffirmed the abuse.  Teena 
Sorensen & Barbara Snow, How Children Tell: The Process of Disclosure in Child Sexual 
Abuse Cases, 70 Child Welfare 3, 11 (1991).  The influence of family pressure and 
familial relationships outweighs other factors in the victim’s likelihood to recant.  
Margaret H. Shiu, Unwarranted Skepticism: The Federal Courts’ Treatment of Child 
Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 18 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 651, 674 (2009); cf. 
Lindsay C. Malloy et al., Filial Dependency and Recantation of Child Sexual Abuse 
Allegations, 46 J. Am. Acad. Child & Adolescent Psychiatry 162, 167 (2007) 
(“Recantation appears to reflect susceptibility to pressures from influential adults, a 
pattern that complements and extends decades of research on children’s suggestibility.  
However, whereas the latter research emphasizes the dangers of false allegations of 
abuse that can result from external pressures, our study suggests that pressures can 
lead truly abused children to recant.”).  A victim may also recant to avoid confronting 
his or her abuser in the legal system.  See Anoosha Rouhanian, A Call for Change: The 
Detrimental Impacts of Crawford v. Washington on Domestic Violence and Rape 
Prosecutions, 37 B.C. J.L. & Soc. Just. 1, 37 (2017) (“[A] rape victim may recant for any 
number of reasons other than because they were lying about the rape itself. . . .  [R]ape 
victims might recant . . . because they fear confronting their attackers, whether directly 
or indirectly, through legal proceedings.”).   
 
58 
 
insufficient to vacate Schmidt’s guilty plea.  B.C.’s affidavit stated in its 
entirety:  
 
I, [B.C.], being first duly sworn hereby depose and 
state as follows:  
 
I was the victim in Woodbury County Criminal Case 
FECR054257, State of Iowa vs. Jacob Schmidt.  Jacob 
Schmidt is my brother.  I am currently 23 years of age, but 
was a child at the time of the criminal case.  At the time of 
the original criminal case, I had told various people that 
Jacob had sexually abused me.  When I was 21 years old, I 
told other people that Jacob had never touched me in a 
sexual way or sexually abused me.  I didn’t tell anyone 
before that date that nothing had really happened, and so 
Jacob couldn’t have known before then.  I decided to tell 
people when I turned 21 since I was a full adult at that time.  
I want to see my brother and tell him I am sorry that I 
couldn’t tell anyone before then.   
Notably, B.C. never stated under oath which story he told is true.  Nor 
did B.C. claim that police or his family induced him to lie in 2007.  The 
timing of B.C.’s new story seven years later coincides with Schmidt’s 
expected release from prison.  On February 25, 2006, the night Peter 
caught Schmidt in the act of attempting to rape B.C., Schmidt stood six 
foot, three inches tall and weighed between 350 and 400 pounds.  B.C., 
who had just celebrated his fourteenth birthday, was four feet, six inches 
tall and weighed between seventy-five and ninety pounds.  While B.C. 
may have added some pounds and inches since then, I can understand 
his motivation to make peace with his much larger half-brother before 
Schmidt’s release from prison.   
 
Perhaps an evidentiary hearing on remand will bring this matter to 
a swift conclusion.  “The trial court is not required to believe the 
recantation . . . .”  State v. Compiano, 261 Iowa 509, 517, 154 N.W.2d 
845, 849 (1967).  To the contrary, if the court believes the recantation is 
false,  
 
59 
 
and is not reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given 
by the witness [at] trial was false, . . . it is not at liberty to 
shift upon the shoulders of another jury the responsibility to 
seek out the truth of that matter.   
Id.   
We 
have 
repeatedly 
affirmed 
denials 
of 
applications 
for 
postconviction relief based on witness recantations.  See Jones, 479 
N.W.2d at 275 (affirming district court’s denial of application for PCR 
because “Jones’ entire claim is based upon an assumption that 
Coleman’s trial testimony was in fact false,” but “[t]he postconviction 
court is certainly not required to believe the recantation”); State v. Folck, 
325 N.W.2d 368, 377 (Iowa 1982) (“Recantation of trial testimony is 
viewed with suspicion, and the trial court has broad discretion in looking 
to the whole record to determine if defendant had a fair trial.”); see also 
State v. Frank, 298 N.W.2d 324, 329 (Iowa 1980) (noting testimony later 
recanted still had probative value); State v. Taylor, 287 N.W.2d 576, 578 
(Iowa 1980) (affirming denial of motion for new trial because a 
recantation is “not really based on newly discovered evidence”); State v. 
Jackson, 223 N.W.2d 229, 234 (Iowa 1974) (“The general rule is a 
witness’ recantation should be looked upon with utmost suspicion.”).   
When the witness’s original testimony is corroborated by other 
evidence supporting the conviction following a jury trial, a subsequent 
recantation seldom warrants relief.  See Adcock v. State, 528 N.W.2d 
645, 648 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (affirming district court’s denial of 
postconviction relief when witness recanted because “there was other 
evidence connecting Adcock to the crime”); see also Frank, 298 N.W.2d at 
329–30 (affirming conviction when independent evidence corroborated 
witness’s original testimony that she later recanted).  Peter’s unrecanted 
eyewitness account corroborates B.C.’s original contemporaneous report 
 
60 
 
to the police and forensic interviewer.  Schmidt therefore is not entitled 
to relief from his conviction. 
III.  Schmidt’s PCR Action Is Untimely.   
I would also affirm the summary judgment because Schmidt’s 
PCR—filed seven years after his conviction—is time-barred under Iowa 
Code section 822.3’s three-year statute of limitations.  The majority holds 
it is not time-barred because Schmidt could not know within the 
limitations period that B.C. would later recant.  But Schmidt did know 
what happened in the bedroom in 2006 and knew then whether the 
allegations made by Peter and B.C. were false.   
PCR actions “must be filed within three years from the date the 
conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an appeal, from the date 
the writ of procedendo is issued.”  Iowa Code § 822.3 (2014).  An 
exception is made for applications claiming “a ground of fact or law that 
could not have been raised within the applicable time period.”  Id.  The 
three-year time-bar “limit[s] postconviction litigation in order to conserve 
judicial resources, promote substantive goals of the criminal law, foster 
rehabilitation, and restore a sense of repose in our system of justice.”  
Wilkins v. State, 522 N.W.2d 822, 824 (Iowa 1994) (quoting State v. 
Edman, 444 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989)).  A corollary purpose 
is “ ‘to reduce injustices occurring as a result of lost witnesses’ necessary 
to resolve factual issues arising in postconviction proceedings and upon 
retrial of cases where convictions have been overturned.”  Dible v. State, 
557 N.W.2d 881, 885 (Iowa 1996) (quoting Brewer v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 395 
N.W.2d 841, 843 (Iowa 1986)), abrogated on other grounds by Harrington 
v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 521 (Iowa 2003).   
To further those goals, the exception to the three-year time-bar in 
section 822.3 is limited to claims in which the applicant had “no 
 
61 
 
opportunity to test the validity of the conviction in relation to [the ground 
of fact or law that allegedly could not have been raised within the time 
period].”  Wilkins, 522 N.W.2d at 824 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Edman, 444 N.W.2d at 106).  An applicant may not assert a claim he or 
she has “at least been alerted to” in the prior action.  Id.  This promotes 
repose and conserves judicial resources.  See id. (holding second 
application for relief was time-barred when applicant should have been 
alerted to “ground of fact” in prior postconviction application); see also 
Dible, 557 N.W.2d at 886 (barring action when applicant was aware of 
ground of fact because “[a]ny other decision would result in an endless 
procession of postconviction actions, and the legislature’s hope to avoid 
stale claims and to achieve a sense of repose in the criminal justice 
system would not be realized”).   
 
The State filed a two-pronged motion for summary judgment to 
dismiss Schmidt’s PCR action, arguing that his (1) guilty plea barred 
relief and (2) PCR application was barred by the three-year statute of 
limitations.  The State correctly argued B.C.’s statements were not “new 
evidence” that could not have been discovered through the exercise of 
due diligence:  
 
Here, by the very nature of the case and the sexual 
abuse claims leveled against the applicant by his younger 
family member, there can be no doubt that he would have 
known about his own involvement or non-involvement in the 
alleged sexual acts against his family member.  He would 
have known what the victim or any other witness would or 
would not testify to if the case were to proceed to jury trial.  
He would have known that the victim’s father was prepared 
to testify that he caught the applicant in the act with his 
pants down, penis exposed, and kneeling right behind the 
bare anus of the victim in the bedroom.  He would have 
known that the victim had given a recorded interview to 
Mercy CAC stating that the sexual acts did in fact occur.  All 
of this would have been readily available to the applicant at 
the time of his plea of guilty and subsequent conviction and 
 
62 
 
as such he would have known about the veracity of said 
statements.   
I agree.   
 
“[T]he objective of the escape clause of section 822.3 is to provide 
relief from the limitation period when an applicant had ‘no opportunity’ 
to assert the claim before the limitation period expired.”  Cornell v. State, 
529 N.W.2d 606, 611 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Wilkins, 522 N.W.2d 
at 823–24).  “[T]he focus of our inquiry has been whether the applicant 
was or should have been ‘alerted’ to the potential claim before the 
limitation period expired.”  Id. (quoting Wilkins, 522 N.W.2d at 824).10  
Schmidt was alerted to his own actual-innocence claim and chose to 
abandon it by pleading guilty.  He knew when he entered his plea 
whether Peter and B.C. were telling the truth and gave up his right to a 
trial to cross-examine them.   
This is not a case in which a new, disinterested witness has come 
forward.  See State v. Burgess, 237 Iowa 162, 164–65, 21 N.W.2d 309, 
310 (1946) (allowing new trial based on subsequent discovery of 
disinterested alibi witness, a train conductor, when the defendant “was 
the only witness who testified at the trial that he was on the train at the 
time the state’s witnesses testified the crime was committed [elsewhere, 
because c]learly the evidence of the conductor of the train, placing the 
                                      
 
10Exculpatory evidence known but unavailable to the defendant at the time of 
his original conviction is not considered “newly discovered” when it becomes available 
years later.  See Jones v. Scurr, 316 N.W.2d 905, 910 (Iowa 1982).  In that case, one 
codefendant took the Fifth Amendment and another was a fugitive when Rubin Jones 
was convicted of first-degree murder in a jury trial in 1976.  Id. at 906–07.  Years later, 
both codefendants came forward with exculpatory evidence.  Id.  The district court 
denied postconviction relief, and we affirmed, holding the codefendants’ exculpatory 
statements “although unavailable, [were] known to defendant, and cannot be 
considered newly discovered.”  Id. at 910.  We noted Jones had failed to exercise due 
diligence to secure their testimony at his trial.  Id. at 910 n.1.  Similarly, Schmidt knew 
what B.C. knew and could have gone to trial and cross-examined B.C. but chose not to 
do so.   
 
63 
 
[defendant] on the train at the time of the commission of the crime, was 
not cumulative”).  And this is not the case of a mere he-said, he-said 
account without another witness to the incident.11  Peter walked in on 
and witnessed Schmidt’s attempted assault on B.C.   
Nor has Schmidt come forward with new physical evidence or new 
scientific developments that were previously undiscovered.12  See More v. 
State, 880 N.W.2d 487, 508 (Iowa 2016) (considering as newly discovered 
evidence FBI announcement that previous testimony on bullet 
identification was “not scientifically supportable”).   
B.C.’s recantation is “not new evidence in the real sense.”  
Compiano, 261 Iowa at 517, 154 N.W.2d at 849.  “On the contrary, it is 
but an assertion by affidavit that the former testimony given by the 
                                      
 
11By contrast, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court ruling allowing 
the defendant to withdraw his Alford plea in an unwitnessed sexual assault based on 
the victim’s recantation, which the trial court found credible in an evidentiary hearing.  
State v. Fritz, 755 P.2d 444, 446 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).  “[T]he victim stated that he had 
lied about his accusations and had acted under duress from someone seeking revenge 
against the defendant.”  Id.  The appellate court noted that “[i]f the sole basis for the 
strength of the state’s case is the credibility of the victim, as is usually the case in non-
witnessed sexual assaults . . . the trial court does not abuse its discretion by allowing a 
plea to be withdrawn [so] that the victim’s credibility [can] be tested in the crucible of 
trial.”  Id.   
12When new DNA evidence is discovered, the defendant may proceed under Iowa 
Code section 81.10, which provides in relevant part,  
1.  A defendant who has been convicted of a felony or aggravated 
misdemeanor and who has not been required to submit a DNA sample 
for DNA profiling may make a motion to the court for an order to require 
that DNA analysis be performed on evidence collected in the case for 
which the person stands convicted.   
. . . .   
9.  Results of DNA analysis conducted pursuant to this section 
shall be reported to the parties and to the court and may be provided to 
the board of parole, department of corrections, and criminal and juvenile 
justice agencies, as defined in section 692.1, for use in the course of 
investigations and prosecutions, and for consideration in connection with 
requests for parole, pardon, reprieve, and commutation.   
Id. § 81.10(1), (9).   
 
64 
 
witness was false.”  Id.; see also Taylor, 287 N.W.2d at 578 (same).  As 
the Kansas Court of Appeals stated,  
By entering a plea of guilty, Woods was well aware of the 
facts of the case.  In fact, he knew the extent of his 
involvement in the events of the evening better than anyone 
else.  Based on the preliminary hearing, the pretrial motions 
filed with the court, and the documents exchanged by the 
parties, Woods knew that at least on the planned day of trial 
. . . some witnesses were going to testify on his behalf and 
some were not.  He freely and voluntarily chose not to take 
his chances with a trial.  The fact that at some point on or 
after [the trial date], some—though not all—witnesses appear 
to have recanted previous incriminating statements or 
returned to original statements does not change the fact that 
Woods decided not to risk the consequences of facing a trial 
. . . .   
Woods, 379 P.3d at 1141.   
 
Our decision in Harrington, 659 N.W.2d 509, does not require a 
different result.  In Harrington, we stated that newly discovered, 
previously undisclosed police reports together with recantations by three 
trial witnesses qualified as a ground of fact that could not have been 
raised within the three-year window.  659 N.W.2d at 521.  A jury found 
Terry Harrington guilty of murder in 1978.  Id. at 514.  Harrington had 
presented an alibi defense at trial that was undermined by several 
witnesses who placed him with accomplices on the night of the murder.  
Id. at 515.  Over twenty years later, Harrington filed an application for 
postconviction relief.  Id.  Three witnesses had come forward, recanting 
their trial testimony that placed him with accomplices.  Id. at 516–17.  
One recanting witness “claim[ed] he gave a contrary story at trial because 
he was pressured by the prosecutors and police.”  Id. at 517.  Another 
“said he lied [at trial] to obtain a $5000 reward . . . and to avoid being 
charged with the crime.”  Id.  Harrington’s counsel also discovered Brady 
violations—eight police reports containing exculpatory information 
 
65 
 
withheld by the state.13  Id. at 518–19.  “Harrington argued this newly 
discovered evidence warranted vacation of his conviction.”  Id. at 518.  
Concluding we were bound by the district court’s factual findings, we 
stated,  
With respect to both the undisclosed police reports and the 
recantation evidence, the [district] court held, in ruling on 
Harrington’s substantive claims, that he had proved they 
were discovered after the verdict in his criminal trial and 
that they could not have been discovered earlier than they 
were discovered in the exercise of due diligence.  These 
findings are clearly supported by substantial evidence, which 
we have reviewed above, and so are binding under the 
standard of review applicable to the statute-of-limitations 
issue.   
Id. at 521.  We concluded Harrington’s PCR application was not time-
barred, see id., but went on to determine the Brady violations alone 
entitled him to a new trial, id. at 525.   
 
Harrington is distinguishable.  Schmidt alleges no Brady violations.  
No unrecanting eyewitness caught Harrington in the criminal act.  The 
district court made no finding B.C.’s recantation was newly discovered 
evidence.  And B.C. makes no claim he was paid or pressured to testify 
falsely when Schmidt was charged.  Most significantly, unlike Schmidt, 
Harrington did not plead guilty but steadfastly maintained his innocence.  
Id. at 523 & n.10.   
IV.  Schmidt’s Actual-Innocence Claim Fails. 
 
The majority today adopts for the first time a freestanding actual-
innocence claim for postconviction relief.  Under this new standard,  
[f]or an applicant to succeed on a freestanding actual-
innocence claim, the applicant must show by clear and 
convincing evidence that, despite the evidence of guilt 
supporting the conviction, no reasonable fact finder could 
convict the applicant of the crimes for which the sentencing 
                                      
 
13See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1196–97 (1963).   
 
66 
 
court found the applicant guilty in light of all the evidence, 
including the newly discovered evidence.   
In my view, Schmidt fails to meet this standard as a matter of law.   
The Supreme Court has stated that an applicant claiming actual 
innocence 
must 
present 
“new 
reliable 
evidence—whether 
it 
be 
exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or 
critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.”  Schlup v. 
Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324, 115 S. Ct. 851, 865 (1995).  Requiring new 
reliable evidence significantly reduces “[t]he threat to judicial resources, 
finality, and comity posed by claims of actual innocence.”  Id. at 324, 115 
S. Ct. at 866.  Assessing reliability, “the court may consider how the 
timing of the submission and the likely credibility of the affiants bear on 
the probable reliability of that evidence.”  Id. at 332, 115 S. Ct. at 869.   
Moreover, to succeed on an actual-innocence claim, the applicant 
also must show that “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in 
the conviction of one who is actually innocent.”  Murray v. Carrier, 477 
U.S. 478, 496, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986).  The court must therefore 
assess the merits of the claim, considering “ ‘all the evidence,’ old and 
new, incriminating and exculpatory, without regard to whether it would 
necessarily be admitted under ‘rules of admissibility that would govern at 
trial.’ ”  House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2077 (2006) 
(quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327–28, 115 S. Ct. at 867).  Most 
importantly, the applicant must show it is “more likely than not that no 
reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new 
evidence.”  Id. at 556, 126 S. Ct. at 2087 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327, 115 S. Ct. 
at 867).  This requires more than a showing that “reasonable doubt 
exists in the light of the new evidence.”  Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329, 115 
 
67 
 
S. Ct. at 868.  Rather, the applicant must prove “no juror, acting 
reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  Id.  This standard is “demanding and permits review only in the 
‘extraordinary’ case.”  House, 547 U.S. at 538, 126 S. Ct. at 2077 
(majority opinion) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327, 115 S. Ct. at 867).  
Because the inquiry “involves evidence the trial [court] did not have 
before it, the inquiry requires the . . . court to assess how reasonable 
jurors would [have] react[ed] to the overall, newly supplemented record.”  
Id. at 538, 126 S. Ct. at 2078.   
Schmidt cannot show it is more likely than not in light of B.C.’s 
recantation that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.  Peter 
personally witnessed Schmidt’s attempt to sexually assault B.C., literally 
catching 
them 
with 
their 
pants 
down. 
 
Police 
officers 
took 
contemporaneous statements from Peter and B.C. at the scene within 
minutes of the incident.  The police officers could have testified as to 
what B.C. and Peter described minutes after the incident under the 
excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.  See Iowa R. Evid. 
5.803(2) (defining excited utterance as “[a] statement relating to a 
startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the 
stress of excitement that it caused”); see also State v. Richards, 809 
N.W.2d 80, 95 (Iowa 2012) (holding domestic violence victim’s statement 
to daughter about choking while victim’s neck was still red was 
admissible as an excited utterance).  Moreover, B.C. gave a recorded 
forensic interview five days later in which he detailed the events of the 
night and disclosed Schmidt’s past assaults.  That video, recorded while 
his memory was fresh, could be used to impeach his subsequent 
recantation.  See Iowa R. Evid. 5.613(b) (“Extrinsic evidence of a 
witness’s prior inconsistent statement is admissible only if the witness is 
 
68 
 
given an opportunity to explain or deny the statement and an adverse 
party is given an opportunity to examine the witness about it, or if justice 
so requires.”); see also State v. Austin, 585 N.W.2d 241, 243–44 (Iowa 
1998) (concluding district court properly admitted videotape of child 
victim describing sexual abuse recorded shortly after it occurred, when 
defense counsel opened the door by cross-examining the child about 
inconsistent statements); Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1991) (en banc) (allowing jury to consider recorded statement 
of child discussing abuse despite child’s recantation at trial); State v. 
Church, 708 A.2d 1341, 1342 (Vt. 1998) (allowing state to present 
rehabilitating testimony from witness whom child told she had been 
abused after defendant attempted to show child had recanted her 
testimony).   
Schmidt’s claim of actual innocence in this PCR action must be 
evaluated in light of that evidence and, as the special concurrence 
acknowledges, Schmidt’s guilty-plea colloquy in which he admitted to the 
facts in the minutes of testimony establishing his crimes.  See Castro, 
795 N.W.2d at 795 (approving use of plea colloquy in summary 
disposition).  Schmidt cannot succeed on his actual-innocence claim 
based solely on B.C.’s recantation; he cannot show no reasonable juror 
would convict him.  I would hold that the district court properly granted 
the State’s motion for summary dismissal of Schmidt’s petition for 
postconviction relief.   
This case falls outside the typical categories of cases of actual 
innocence.  In Rhoades, we reviewed a growing body of scholarship on 
wrongful convictions.  880 N.W.2d at 434–39.  Retrospective studies of 
cases following DNA exonerations found the wrongful convictions “were 
frequently based upon false confessions obtained from the defendant 
 
69 
 
[during police interrogations], eyewitness identification that proved to be 
unreliable, failure of the state to turn over exculpatory evidence, use of 
unreliable informant testimony, and ineffective assistance of counsel.”  
Id. at 435–36 (footnotes omitted).  Schmidt alleges none of those.   
Most wrongful convictions followed trials in which the defendant 
(unlike Schmidt) steadfastly maintained his or her innocence.14  Yet 
“[t]hirteen percent of all wrongful convictions listed in the National 
Registry of Exonerations are the result of guilty pleas.”  Id. at 437.  We 
stated, 
“Many 
scholars 
now 
recognize 
that 
at 
least 
in 
some 
circumstances, an innocent person may rationally decide to plead guilty.”  
Id. at 436.  Several of those circumstances are inapplicable to Schmidt: 
pleas to obtain immediate release for time served or pleas based on 
misunderstanding the elements of the crime or facts alleged.  See id. at 
437.  Rather, Schmidt claims he pled guilty to avoid the risk of a thirty-
five-year prison sentence.  See id. at 436 (“[W]hen the deal is good 
enough, it is rational to refuse to roll the dice . . . regardless of whether 
                                      
 
14See David L. Strauss, Barbarous Souls (2010) [hereinafter Strauss], for a 
chilling example of a life ruined by a pre-Miranda interrogation.  The book chronicles 
the story of Darrel Parker, who came home from work in Lincoln, Nebraska, on 
December 14, 1955, to find his wife, Nancy, strangled in their bed.  Police had reason to 
suspect an ex-convict, Wesley Peery, who had installed a fence at the Parker home the 
preceding week.  Id. at 34–35, 98.  Nevertheless, police investigator, John Reid, was 
brought in from Chicago and interrogated the grieving Mr. Parker for hours, using 
manipulative psychological techniques until he confessed.  He recanted the next day 
and steadfastly maintained his innocence thereafter, but was convicted at trial based on 
his confession.  See Parker v. Sigler, 413 F.2d 459, 465–66 (8th Cir. 1969) (holding 
confession involuntary), overruled on procedural grounds by Sigler v. Parker, 396 U.S. 
482, 90 S. Ct. 667 (1970).  Parker was released in 1970 after serving thirteen years in 
prison.  Strauss, at 216.  Peery ultimately confessed to the Nancy Parker murder.  Id. at 
224.  Parker is now an eighty-seven-year-old resident of Moline, Illinois.  Id. at 245.   
The Reid interrogation techniques that prompted his false confession in 1955 
are described in the Eighth Circuit decision holding Parker’s confession to be 
involuntary, see Parker, 413 F.2d at 465, and discussed at length by the Miranda 
Court, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 449–58, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1614–19 (1966).  
Jacob Schmidt is no Darrel Parker, and today’s decision involves no counterpart to 
John Reid.   
 
70 
 
one is factually innocent.” (quoting Russell D. Covey, Longitudinal Guilt: 
Repeat Offenders, Plea Bargaining, and the Variable Standard of Proof, 63 
Fla. L. Rev. 431, 450 (2011))).  But, we previously made clear the 
pressure a defendant faces to plea bargain to avoid a much longer prison 
sentence does not render his guilty plea involuntary or justify 
withdrawing a plea based on newly discovered exculpatory evidence.  See 
Speed, 573 N.W.2d at 597 (“Speed’s concern that he must choose 
between trial on a murder charge and pleading guilty to a lesser charge 
has no bearing upon the voluntariness of his plea.”).  Schmidt’s is a poor 
test case to adopt an actual-innocence pathway to vacating a 
constitutionally valid guilty plea.   
 
Accordingly, I would not use this case to decide whether to 
recognize a freestanding or gateway actual-innocence claim under the 
Iowa Constitution for postconviction-relief actions because under any 
such test, Schmidt cannot satisfy the showing required for procedural or 
substantive relief from his guilty plea.  Our court should exercise 
restraint today rather than trying to set the table now for a meritorious 
actual-innocence claim that may come to us in the future.  As we stated 
in State v. Keeton, “fundamental principles of judicial restraint limit our 
role to deciding each case on the issues presented, and we refrain from 
deciding issues not presented by the facts.”  710 N.W.2d 531, 533–34 
(Iowa 2006).  I would wait for a case presenting compelling proof of 
actual 
innocence 
before 
deciding 
the 
parameters 
for 
allowing 
postconviction challenges to defect-free guilty pleas.  As our court 
unanimously reiterated in Keeton,  
[w]e recognize the law to be an evolving process that often 
makes the resolution of legal questions a composite of 
several cases, from which appellate courts can gain a better 
view of the puzzle before arranging all the pieces.  The 
 
71 
 
wisdom of this process has been revealed time and again, 
and we continue to subscribe to it today.   
Id. at 534 (quoting State v. Williams, 695 N.W.2d 23, 30 (Iowa 2005)).   
For all these reasons, I dissent.   
 
Mansfield and Zager, JJ., join this dissent. 
 
 
 
72 
 
 
#15–1408, Schmidt v. State 
MANSFIELD, Justice (dissenting). 
 
I respectfully dissent.  Constitutional interpretation is not 
Darwinian evolution, and a decision of this court today is not superior to 
the decisions that preceded it just because it is more recent.  Whether 
this court is on a “constitutional march to become better” should be 
determined by others, not by ourselves. 
While it is tempting to agree that “[i]nnocent people should always 
have a forum to prove their innocence,” the realities of any criminal 
justice system are more complex.  Even the majority does not take this 
statement literally.  For example, even the majority accepts for now the 
limits in Iowa Code chapter 822 on claims brought by those who say they 
are actually innocent. 
 
I join Justice Waterman’s dissent, and write separately only to 
highlight several points. 
First, this case does not involve an actual recantation. 
 
Second, the rule that a guilty plea waives all defenses and 
objections which are not intrinsic to the plea is both long-standing and 
sound. 
 
Third, the court has provided no doctrinal basis for grounding an 
actual-innocence claim in the Iowa Constitution. 
Fourth, the court leaves many questions unanswered that will 
have to be sorted out by our district judges in the coming years. 
I.  The Supposed Recantation Is Not a Recantation. 
 
Here is the so-called recantation that is launching a thousand 
ships:  
I was the victim in [case number].  Jacob Schmidt is my 
brother.  I am currently 23 years of age, but was a child at 
the time of the criminal case.  At the time of the original 
 
73 
 
criminal case, I had told various people that Jacob had 
sexually abused me.  When I was 21 years old, I told other 
people that Jacob had never touched me in a sexual way or 
sexually abused me.  I didn’t tell anyone before that date 
that nothing had really happened, and so Jacob couldn’t 
have known before then.  I decided to tell people when I 
turned 21 since I was a full adult at that time.  I want to see 
my brother and tell him I am sorry that I couldn’t tell anyone 
before then. 
This is hardly a recantation.  Nowhere does Schmidt’s brother deny that 
the sexual assault actually occurred.  He merely states that he has 
recently been telling people it didn’t occur.  Nor does the brother explain 
why he changed his story. 
Just two years ago, in Estate of Gray ex rel. Gray v. Baldi, we 
applied the “contradictory affidavit rule.”  880 N.W.2d 451, 463–64 (Iowa 
2016).  Under this rule, an affidavit that contradicts prior sworn 
testimony does not create an issue of fact if it “clearly and 
unambiguously contradicts [the] earlier sworn testimony” unless the 
affiant offers “a reasonable explanation for any apparent contradiction.”  
Id.  Since the court purports to be applying civil summary judgment 
standards, Estate of Gray may well indicate that there is no issue of fact 
here, even if a change in our long-standing law on guilty pleas were 
appropriate. 
II.  We Should Stand by Our Existing Law on the Finality of 
Guilty Pleas. 
A change in the law is not needed.  Our court should adhere to its 
long-standing rule that “a defendant’s guilty plea waives all defenses and 
objections which are not intrinsic to the plea.”  State v. Carroll, 767 
N.W.2d 638, 641 (Iowa 2009). 
A.  Our Precedent Is Clear and Well-Settled.  In Carroll, we 
accurately said that this rule is “well-established.”  Id.  I would not 
abandon our settled precedent, unanimously reaffirmed eight years ago 
 
74 
 
in Carroll and two years after that in State v. Utter.  See State v. Utter, 
803 N.W.2d 647, 651 (Iowa 2011) (quoting Carroll with approval and 
explaining its significance); see also Castro v. State, 795 N.W.2d 789, 792 
(Iowa 2011) (“Generally, a criminal defendant waives all defenses and 
objections to the criminal proceedings by pleading guilty.”); State v. 
Mattly, 513 N.W.2d 739, 740–41 (Iowa 1994) (stating that “a valid guilty 
plea waives all defenses and objections (except that the information or 
indictment charges no offense or any irregularities intrinsic in the plea 
itself)”); State v. Garner, 469 N.W.2d 698, 699 (Iowa 1991) (“By pleading 
guilty . . . , Garner waived the right to challenge those convictions on any 
ground not intrinsic to the pleas.”); State v. Everett, 372 N.W.2d 235, 237 
(Iowa 1985) (“[A] guilty plea would have waived all defenses or objections 
which were not intrinsic to the plea itself.”); State v. Boge, 252 N.W.2d 
411, 413 (Iowa 1977) (“[B]y entering a plea of guilty, defendant waived 
any defense or objection which is not intrinsic to the plea itself.”). 
 
What does “intrinsic to the plea” mean?  It means a defendant who 
pleads guilty can later argue that the plea was “unintelligent or 
involuntary.”  Carroll, 767 N.W.2d at 642–44.  This includes the situation 
where the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel “in 
connection with the plea.”  Id. at 642.  All such matters are intrinsic to 
the plea.  But later-discovered evidence—by definition—is extrinsic to the 
plea. 
 
In State v. Speed, 573 N.W.2d 594 (Iowa 1998), we specifically held 
that new exculpatory evidence is not intrinsic to the plea and cannot be 
used to challenge a guilty plea.  We explained,  
 
Speed asserts new exculpatory evidence bears upon a 
defendant’s plea because the amount of evidence the State 
has against a defendant affects the defendant’s decision to 
plead guilty.  This argument fails to distinguish between a 
 
75 
 
defendant’s tactical rationale for pleading guilty and a 
defendant’s understanding of what a plea means and his or 
her choice to voluntarily enter the plea.  Any subsequently-
discovered deficiency in the State’s case that affects a 
defendant’s assessment of the evidence against him, but not 
the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea, is not intrinsic 
to the plea itself.   
Id. at 596. 
 
State v. Alexander, 463 N.W.2d 421 (Iowa 1990), likewise reiterated 
that “a plea of guilty ‘waives all defenses or objections which are not 
intrinsic to the plea itself.’ ”  Id. at 422 (quoting State v. Morehouse, 316 
N.W.2d 884, 885 (Iowa 1982), overruled on other grounds by State v. 
Kress, 636 N.W.2d 12, 20 (Iowa 2001)).  In Alexander, we relied on this 
rule to hold that a motion for new trial based on newly discovered 
evidence was not available for a defendant who had pled guilty.  Id. at 
422–23.  We said, “Notions of newly discovered evidence simply have no 
bearing on a knowing and voluntary admission of guilt.”  Id. at 423. 
 
It is true that Alexander contains the following enigmatic sentence 
at the end of the opinion: “The remedy Alexander seeks is available to 
him in the form of postconviction relief.  See Iowa Code § 663A.2(4) 
(1989) [now Iowa Code § 822.2(1)(d) (2014)].”  Id.  The majority seizes on 
this single sentence to find that a defendant who pleads guilty can attack 
his or her guilty plea in postconviction-relief proceedings under Iowa 
Code section 822.2(1)(d) based on newly discovered evidence. 
 
I am not persuaded.  The one-sentence dictum from Alexander 
cannot be right and, indeed, is inconsistent with the rest of the 
Alexander opinion.  See 463 N.W.2d at 422.  One can attack a guilty plea 
on grounds extrinsic to the plea or one cannot—the case cannot stand 
for both propositions.  Given our many other decisions upholding the 
rule against extrinsic attacks on a plea, including not just Alexander but 
also decisions that preceded and followed Alexander, the stray sentence 
 
76 
 
from Alexander must be regarded as an error.  Certainly, it has been 
treated as a legal dead end.  In the nearly thirty years since we decided 
Alexander, that sentence has never been quoted or cited by our court.  
Instead, for decades, until today, we have consistently followed the rule 
that a guilty plea waives all defenses and objections which are not 
intrinsic to the plea. 
Westlaw will be busy tracking down and flagging the decisions of 
our court that, after today, are no longer good law. 
B.  Our Precedent Is Sound.  The rule limiting challenges to guilty 
pleas is not just our precedent, it is the correct precedent, especially 
when one considers the interests of both defendants and the state.  
Although the majority in my view unfairly disparages plea agreements, 
painting the whole process as predatory, plea negotiations are a vital 
element of our justice system, and they ultimately benefit—and protect—
defendants.  See Susan R. Klein et al., Waiving the Criminal Justice 
System: An Empirical and Constitutional Analysis, 52 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 
73, 114 (2015) (noting “that plea agreements are an integral part of the 
criminal justice system, conserving judicial resources and providing 
defendants the opportunity to obtain often much-needed reductions in 
sentences or dismissal of charges in return for a plea and the waivers of 
all trial rights”). 
I acknowledge that in the real world, defendants do at times plead 
guilty to offenses which, in a final reckoning, they did not commit.  
Typically, there are two reasons why this occurs.  One is a strategic 
decision by the defendant to avoid other, more serious convictions or 
additional, more severe penalties that would result from going to trial.  
See, e.g., State v. Ceretti, 871 N.W.2d 88, 89 (Iowa 2015) (noting that the 
defendant was charged with first-degree murder but pled guilty to 
 
77 
 
voluntary manslaughter, attempted murder, and willful injury causing 
serious injury).  The other is when the defendant committed a crime to 
which she or he intended to plead guilty but the wrong crime was 
charged by mistake.  See, e.g., State v. Nall, 894 N.W.2d 514, 525 (Iowa 
2017) (“Under these facts, a factual basis may exist for a charge under 
section 714.1(6) (theft by check), but not under section 714.1(1).”).  
Neither of these scenarios calls for the drastic change in the law that the 
majority has announced today. 
The majority cites one case from South Dakota and one case from 
New York before asking, rhetorically, “What kind of system of justice do 
we have if we permit actually innocent people to remain in prison?”  
Despite this sloganeering, the fact remains that both cases involved 
defendants who went to trial.  See In re Kaufmann, 157 N.E. 730, 730–31 
(N.Y. 1927); Engesser v. Young, 856 N.W.2d 471, 473 (S.D. 2014). 
Before a defendant pleads guilty, the law protects that defendant in 
several ways.  First, a detailed colloquy is required.  See Iowa R. Crim. P. 
2.8(2)(b).  The defendant is informed he or she is giving up the right to a 
trial and there will not be a further trial of any kind.  Id. r. 2.8(2)(b)(4)–
(5).  Until today, those were true statements. 
Second, the record must show a factual basis for each charge to 
which the defendant is pleading guilty.  See, e.g., Nall, 894 N.W.2d at 
525; Rhoades v. State, 848 N.W.2d 22, 33 (Iowa 2014); State v. Gines, 
844 N.W.2d 437, 441 (Iowa 2014). 
Third, as discussed above, the plea must be voluntary and 
intelligent, and if counsel was ineffective in some manner that rendered 
the plea involuntary or unintelligent, that can be raised.  See Castro, 795 
N.W.2d at 793–94; Carroll, 767 N.W.2d at 642–43. 
 
78 
 
In my view, these safeguards serve their intended purpose.  “Once 
a defendant has waived his right to a trial by pleading guilty, the State is 
entitled to expect finality in the conviction.”  State v. Mann, 602 N.W.2d 
785, 789 (Iowa 1999); see also State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 138 (Iowa 
2006). 
While I expect today’s decision to lead to a new wave of 
applications for postconviction relief, and more work for appointed 
counsel, prosecutors, and the courts, I do not see the need.  Why are the 
legal grounds already established by this court and the legislature for 
relief from guilty pleas not enough?15  Certainly, the present case—
involving a fishy nonrecantation by the victim (and no recantation at all 
by the eyewitness father)—doesn’t demonstrate the need. 
The 
majority 
underplays 
the 
critical 
distinction 
between 
defendants who claim actual innocence following a jury trial conviction 
and those who claim actual innocence following a guilty plea.  Most of 
the decisions cited by the majority involve a defendant who was 
convicted after a trial.  See Miller v. Comm’r of Corr., 700 A.2d 1108, 
1110–11 (Conn. 1997); People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330, 1331 (Ill. 
1996); State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 543–44 (Mo. 2003) 
(en banc); Montoya v. Ulibarri, 163 P.3d 476, 478 (N.M. 2007); In re 
Kaufmann, 157 N.E. at 730–31; Engesser, 856 N.W.2d at 473.  In 
                                      
 
15The majority observes that in 2005, the general assembly enacted legislation 
that appears to authorize a defendant who has pled guilty, as well as a defendant who 
was convicted after trial, to seek a court order requiring DNA analysis to be performed 
on evidence.  See 2005 Iowa Acts ch. 158, § 10 (codified at Iowa Code § 81.10).  Yet the 
legislation nowhere indicates that a defendant who pled guilty would have a 
postconviction-relief remedy based on the outcome of such analysis.  See id.  To the 
contrary, this law was enacted when our precedent on finality of guilty pleas was 
already well-established.  I trust in our executive branch to do the right thing in the 
event a person who pled guilty were to be fully exonerated by DNA evidence.  I presume 
the legislature in 2005 had the same level of trust.  This is a far cry from allowing a 
nonrecanting recantation to disturb a guilty plea. 
 
79 
 
Jamison v. State, 765 S.E.2d 123, 130 (S.C. 2014), the Supreme Court of 
South Carolina did open the door to actual-innocence claims by persons 
who had pled guilty but it established a very high burden for them—one 
the majority characterizes as “too stringent.”  Also, in People v. Tiger, 48 
N.Y.S.3d 685, 700–01 (App. Div. 2017), the court recognized an actual-
innocence claim by a defendant who had pled guilty, although New 
York’s highest court has clearly not gone that far, see People v. Plunkett, 
971 N.E.2d 363, 366 (N.Y. 2012) (“Consistently, we have deemed 
appellate claims challenging what is competently and independently 
established by a plea forfeited.”); see also People v. DePerno, 51 N.Y.S.3d 
641, 643 (App. Div. 2017) (finding by a different department of the 
appellate division that an actual-innocence claim after a guilty plea was 
foreclosed).  The majority also discusses Ex parte Tuley, 109 S.W.3d 388, 
393 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002), a 5–4 Texas decision that opened the door to 
actual-innocence claims following a guilty plea, and People v. Schneider, 
25 P.3d 755, 757 (Colo. 2001) (en banc), a Colorado decision that did the 
same. 
Iowa is not alone in giving finality to guilty pleas notwithstanding 
claims of actual innocence.  See, e.g., Williams v. State, 530 S.W.3d 844, 
846 (Ark. 2017) (“Williams’s argument that he is actually innocent of the 
offense to which he pleaded guilty does not establish a ground for the 
writ because it constitutes a direct attack on the judgment.”); Norris v. 
State, 896 N.E.2d 1149, 1153 (Ind. 2008) (rejecting an actual innocence 
claim and stating that “[a] plea of guilty thus forecloses a post-conviction 
challenge to the facts adjudicated by the trial court’s acceptance of the 
guilty plea and resulting conviction”); Woods v. State, 379 P.3d 1134, 
1142 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016) (stating that a claim of actual innocence is 
“insufficient to override the longstanding rule that a freely and 
 
80 
 
voluntarily entered guilty plea bars a collateral attack on the sufficiency 
of the evidence”). 
One should also read the articles cited by the majority.  One of the 
articles is written by a senior federal judge and another by a former 
federal judge.  Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. Rev. 
Books (Nov. 20, 2014), www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-
innocent-people-plead-guilty/[https://perma.cc/LT8T–XKAV]; 
H. 
Lee 
Sarokin, Why Do Innocent People Plead Guilty?, Huffington Post (May 29, 
2012, 
4:39 
PM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/judge-h-lee-
sarokin/innocent-people-guilty-pleas_b_1553239.html/[https://perma. 
cc/6PSQ–6ZW4].  As participants in the system, the views of these two 
authors deserve our consideration.  Yet neither of these authors 
recommends today’s solution—i.e., a freestanding claim of innocence as 
a way to challenge guilty pleas.  To the contrary, Judge Rakoff advocates 
“involving judges in the plea-bargaining process,” while Mr. Sarokin 
insists “[t]he only solution is vigilance by all involved.” 
Reexamining a guilty plea years after the fact is far different from 
reviewing a trial.  Unlike with a case that actually went to trial, no trial 
transcript can be relied on if the witnesses no longer are around, have 
forgotten the events, or no longer are motivated to remember them.  See 
Rhoades, 880 N.W.2d at 449 (acknowledging the difficulty in accurately 
determining a claim of actual innocence when there has been a plea 
bargain and no trial record exists). 
 
Under Maryland law, convicted persons may not petition for a writ 
of actual innocence if they have pled guilty.  Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. 
§ 8–301 (West, Westlaw through ch. 1–4 2018 Reg. Sess.).  The Maryland 
Court of Special Appeals has noted,  
 
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Under most circumstances, the facts alleged in a petition for 
postconviction relief will necessarily, in part, be drawn from 
the trial record.  However, when there was a guilty plea, 
there is no detailed trial record, no witness testimony, and 
often there is only a minimal factual investigation on the 
part of the State and defense counsel.  Thus, both the 
defense’s factual quest to establish innocence as well as the 
State’s attempt to refute innocence are hindered by the 
inherent gaps available in evidence in cases in which the 
petitioner pled guilty.  Petitions stemming from a conviction 
following a guilty plea should thus be denied.   
Yonga v. State, 108 A.3d 448, 461 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015) (emphasis 
omitted) 
(quoting 
Nicholas 
Phillips, 
Comment, 
Innocence 
and 
Incarceration: A Comprehensive Review of Maryland’s Postconviction DNA 
Relief Statute and Suggestions for Improvement, 42 U. Balt. L.F. 65, 93–
94 (Fall 2011) (footnotes omitted)), aff’d, 130 A.3d 486 (Md. 2016). 
Changes in the law intended to benefit defendants can end up 
harming them.  Now that we have allowed guilty pleas to be set aside 
based on newly discovered evidence, the state has a powerful incentive 
not to accept such pleas, despite the benefits to defendants discussed 
above.  The advantages of a plea from the state’s perspective are that it 
provides certainty, closure, and finality.  See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 
U.S. 63, 71, 97 S. Ct. 1621, 1627–28 (1977).  That is why the state is 
often willing to bargain down the original charges as part of a deal.  Take 
away those advantages, and more cases may go to trial on more charges.  
See id. (noting that the advantages of plea negotiations to judges, 
prosecutors, and defendants “can be secured . . . only if dispositions by 
guilty plea are accorded a great measure of finality”).   
III.  Grounding an Actual-Innocence Claim in the Iowa 
Constitution Is Highly Problematic. 
The majority maintains that an actual-innocence claim for those 
who plead guilty is required by the Iowa Constitution, specifically 
article I, section 9 and article I, section 17.  It is noteworthy that Schmidt 
 
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barely argues Iowa constitutional law at all and then only in the 
supplemental brief which we invited. 
The majority’s constitutional reasoning is thin and, to me, 
unpersuasive.  I begin with article I, section 9, the Iowa due process 
clause.  The majority initially asserts that convicting an actually innocent 
person violates article I, section 9’s constitutional guarantee of 
substantive due process.  According to the majority, it is a matter of 
substantive due process because the violation consists of the mere fact 
an innocent person has been convicted. 
But the majority can’t literally mean that—otherwise there would 
be no limits on actual-innocence claims.  Thus, the majority shifts to the 
position that innocent people need to have an opportunity to prove they 
are innocent.  That’s a matter of procedural due process.  Yet our justice 
system already has many procedures in place to protect innocent people 
from being convicted.  These include the trial, the guilty plea colloquy, 
the right to counsel, and so forth. 
So what the majority is really saying is that the Iowa due process 
clause requires one more procedure, i.e., the one devised today, to protect 
the innocent from being convicted.  Why?  Why is one more procedure so 
important as to be of constitutional dimension?  The majority does not 
explain. 
Weaker still is the majority’s invocation of article I, section 17.  
This section prohibits cruel and unusual punishments.  Yet the issue 
before this court is not the punishment for Schmidt’s crime, but whether 
Schmidt should have a new opportunity to prove he didn’t commit that 
crime.  Unless we are going to ignore the fundamental distinctions 
among the different rights within our own constitution, article I, section 
17 has no bearing on today’s case. 
 
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IV.  The Majority Opinion Results in Many Unanswered 
Questions. 
Having demonstrated enough self-confidence to tear up an 
established rule of law, the majority now claims to be too modest to tell 
us what today’s decision means.  That’s not good enough.  One way to 
test the soundness of a decision is to consider the implications of that 
decision. 
Here are a few questions raised by today’s decision. 
What does “actual innocence” mean?  The majority opinion is 
unclear and inconsistent concerning the meaning of “actual innocence.”  
At the end the majority states,  
[T]he applicant must show by clear and convincing evidence 
that, despite the evidence of guilt supporting the conviction, 
no reasonable fact finder could convict the applicant of the 
crimes for which the sentencing court found the applicant 
guilty in light of all the evidence, including the newly 
discovered evidence. 
Yet earlier, the majority says, “Holding a person who has 
committed no crime in prison strikes the very essence of the 
constitutional guarantee of substantive due process.”  The two 
statements do not line up.  Where are we? 
Obviously, at a minimum, the defendant must prove he or she did 
not commit the crime to which he or she pled guilty.  Must the defendant 
also prove his or her conduct does not amount to a different crime (even 
a much less serious one)?  And what if the defendant pled guilty to 
several charges at once?  Must the defendant establish that none of the 
incidents involve a crime committed by that defendant?  
What is “evidence” at the summary judgment stage?  The court 
directs the parties to provide “other evidence or affidavits” in support of 
their positions, before the district court rules on the State’s motion for 
summary judgment.  What is evidence?  The majority indicates that the 
 
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requirements of rule 1.981 apply.  In that event, do minutes of testimony 
count as evidence, even if the defendant did not previously acknowledge 
they were true?  The special concurrence seems to indicate that the 
minutes are treated as evidence. 
What is “evidence” at the trial stage?  If a claim of actual 
innocence gets past summary judgment, must all evidence used at the 
postconviction-relief trial comply with the rules of evidence?  Again, 
what’s the status of minutes of testimony? 
If the normal rules of evidence for summary judgment and 
trial proceedings do not apply, how does the district court handle 
the resulting apples-to-oranges comparisons?  If minutes of testimony 
are allowed as evidence, what weight are they given?  How are they 
compared to affidavits and live testimony? 
Does a defendant need to do anything other than deny his or 
her guilt to raise an actual-innocence claim and start the process?  
According to the court, a freestanding actual-innocence claim can be 
brought under Iowa Code section 822.2(1)(a).  But if a claim of innocence 
by itself is enough, the defendant doesn’t need a recantation or other 
allegedly new evidence, unless the three-year time bar has passed.  See 
Iowa Code § 822.3.  A mere denial of guilt is enough to get new counsel 
appointed and get the ball rolling. 
What is the role of the defendant’s guilty plea counsel?  
Typically, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel waives the attorney–
client privilege.  See Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.6(b)(5).  So, when the 
defendant claims to have received ineffective assistance in connection 
with a plea, former counsel can testify about his or her communications 
with the defendant concerning the plea.  These communications may 
have information bearing on the defendant’s actual innocence.  Is such 
 
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testimony now off-limits, since the defendant can challenge the guilty 
plea without having to argue ineffective assistance of counsel? 
What about Alford pleas?  An Alford plea “was designed to permit 
a defendant to make a voluntary and intelligent decision to plead guilty 
to a crime without admitting participation in the underlying facts which 
constitute the crime.”  State v. Klawonn, 609 N.W.2d 515, 520 (Iowa 
2000) (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37–38, 91 S. Ct. 160, 
167–68 (1970)).  With an Alford plea, the defendant “claim[s] innocence” 
but makes a “cost–benefit analysis of avoiding the risks associated with a 
trial.”  Id. at 520–21.  After today, does someone who made an Alford plea 
now get to raise an actual-innocence claim?  That seems strange.  After 
all, nothing has changed.  Such a defendant always maintained he or she 
was innocent.  Or are Alford pleas now unconstitutional in light of 
today’s decision? 
If the defendant succeeds, can other charges be reinstated?  
Part of the established remedy when setting aside a guilty plea is to 
reinstate all charges dismissed as part of any plea bargain.  See State v. 
Weitzel, 905 N.W.2d 397, 411 (Iowa 2017) (allowing the state to “reinstate 
any charges dismissed in contemplation of a valid plea bargain”); Gines, 
844 N.W.2d at 442 (“[W]e must put the State back in the position it was 
in before making the plea agreement.”); see also Ceretti, 871 N.W.2d at 
97; State v. Allen, 708 N.W.2d 361, 369 (Iowa 2006).  So, if the defendant 
establishes actual innocence and there was a plea bargain, does the state 
get to reinstate other charges that were dismissed? 
The majority refuses to consider issues like these because it 
doesn’t want to get into the merits of the case.  But none of these matters 
goes to the actual merits.  Some of them were discussed in the 
supplemental briefing invited by this court.  If our court is going to 
 
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change the law, it should clarify the change as much as possible and not 
leave it to district courts to play a game of twenty questions.  In other 
decisions, we have given “protocols” to our district courts.  See, e.g., 
State v. Harrington, 893 N.W.2d 36, 45–46 (Iowa 2017) (describing a 
“protocol” to use in the future); State v. Dahl, 874 N.W.2d 348, 353 (Iowa 
2016) (same); Fagen v. Grand View Univ., 861 N.W.2d 825, 828 (Iowa 
2015) (plurality opinion) (same); State v. Cashen, 789 N.W.2d 400, 403 
(Iowa 2010) (same), superseded by statute, 2011 Iowa Acts ch. 8, § 2 
(codified at Iowa Code § 622.10). 
V.  Conclusion. 
From the State’s perspective, I am guessing it would have simply 
preferred to try Schmidt all those years ago.  In the long run, I am 
doubtful today’s decision will benefit defendants.  More importantly, 
today’s decision needlessly overturns an established rule of law that was 
fair to all parties and worked well. 
Waterman and Zager, JJ., join this dissent.