Title: Toston v. State

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

on ae

 

427 Nev, Advance Opinion 7
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

ANTHONY TOSTON, No. 58853

Apel, FILED

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent. bee 29 2011
.

Proper person appeal from an order of the district court
denying a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Eighth
Judicial District Court, Clark County; David B. Barker, Judge.

in part, reve ded.

Anthony Toston, Indian Springs,
in Proper Person.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; David J. Roger,
District Attorney, and Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy District Attorney,
Clark County,

for Respondent.

BEFORE DOUGLAS, HARDESTY and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ,

OPINION
PER CURIAM:

Appellant Anthony Toston pleaded guilty to first-degree
kidnapping and robbery. In a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas
corpus challenging the judgment of conviction he alleged that his trial
counsel provided ineffective assistance by misadvising him about the right
to appeal from a judgment of conviction based on a guilty plea and failing

M- 39945

 
a

to file an appeal when Toston expressed dissatisfaction at the sentencing
hearing.

In this appeal from the district court's order denying the
habeas petition, we address trial counsel's duty to provide information
about the right to a direct appeal and duty to file an appeal when a
conviction stems from a guilty plea. Although trial counsel is not
constitutionally required to inform a defendant of the right to appeal when
the conviction stems from a guilty plea absent the defendant's inquiry
about the right to appeal or the existence of a direct appeal claim that has
a reasonable likelihood of success, we clarify that trial counsel has a duty
not to provide misinformation about the availability of a direct appeal.
Accordingly, we hold that counsel's affirmative misinformation about the
right to appeal from a judgment of conviction based on a guilty plea may
fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and therefore be
deficient. We further take this opportunity to clarify the circumstances in
which a defendant has expressed dissatisfaction with his conviction such
that trial counsel is obligated to file a direct appeal. We hold that trial
counsel has a duty to file an appeal when, based on the totality of the
circumstances, the defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he
was interested in challenging his conviction or sentence. Because Toston’s
petition alleged that trial counsel misinformed him regarding his right to
appeal and that he had expressed dissatisfaction with the conviction and
sentence such that counsel reasonably should have filed an appeal, and
those allegations are not belied by the record and would entitle Toston to

relief if true, we reverse the district court's order as to this claim of

 
ineffective assistance of counsel and remand for an evidentiary hearing.
We affirm the district court's order in all other respects.*
FACTS

Toston was originally charged with two counts of first-degree
kidnapping with the use of a deadly weapon, two counts of robbery with
the use of a deadly weapon, and one count of conspiracy to commit
robbery. Toston entered a guilty plea to one count each of first-degree
kidnapping and robbery in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining
counts and the dismissal of an additional case. In addition, the parties
stipulated to Toston receiving a sentence of 5 to 15 years for kidnapping
and a consecutive sentence of 2 to 5 years for robbery. Toston was
informed in the written guilty plea agreement of the potential maximum
penalties he faced by entry of his guilty plea, as well as his limited right to

"Toston raised several other claims in his habeas petition. Having
reviewed the record, we conclude that the district court did not err in
denying those claims without an evidentiary hearing. First, Toston
claimed that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by advising him
to plead guilty without a guaranteed sentence. Toston, however, failed to
demonstrate prejudice, see Hill v, Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985);
Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 988, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996),
considering the substantial benefit he received in pleading guilty. Second,
Toston claimed that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by
standing silent during sentencing. But Toston’s claim is belied by the
record, which shows that counsel argued in favor of the stipulated
sentence, and in any event, Toston cannot demonstrate a reasonable
probability of a different outcome had counsel presented further
arguments given the arguments that were presented and Toston's own
pleas for leniency during sentencing. Finally, Toston claimed that the
prosecutor committed misconduct and the district court abused its
discretion, Those claims, however, are outside the scope of claims that
may be raised in a post-conviction habeas petition challenging a convietion
that is based on a guilty plea, see NRS 34.810(1)(a), and therefore were
properly denied.

 

 
oe

 

appeal the conviction. Additionally, Toston was informed in the written
guilty plea agreement that the district court was not obligated to accept
the recommended sentence.

On the date for sentencing, Toston asked the district court to
allow him to withdraw his guilty plea, and Toston later asked to dismiss
his appointed counsel. Both of these oral motions were made in proper
person. Toston's trial counsel informed the district court that he felt that
there was no basis for the request to withdraw the guilty plea, Lacking a
transcript of the plea canvass and out of a sense of caution, the district
court continued the matter for the transcript to be prepared and reviewed.

When the matter next came before the court, the district court
denied the motion to withdraw the plea and the motion to dismiss counsel.
‘The State argued for a greater sentence than that stipulated to because
‘Toston had committed a violent crime against his cellmate while awaiting
sentencing in this case. Although Toston and his trial counsel both argued
that the district court should impose the sentence that the parties
stipulated to receiving in the plea negotiations, the district court imposed
a sentence of life with the possibility of parole after 5 years for kidnapping
and a consecutive sentence of 2 to 10 years for robbery.

‘Toston continued to discuss his case with the district court
after the imposition of sentence, explaining the incident with his cellmate
and referring to errors in his criminal record set forth in documents he
labeled “discovery.” The district court maintained that it felt the sentence
imposed was appropriate given Toston’s criminal history and the violence
committed in the instant case. ‘The district court, observing Toston’s
distress, made the following comments to Toston and his trial counsel:

THE COURT:...and, Mr. Nobles [trial
counsel], the defendant has indicated on the
record by his words that he wishes to appeal this
decision, You remain as counsel of record, and you

4

 
enna

mow what you need to do in terms of filing that
notice of appeal—

‘THE DEFENDANT: He told me he wasn't
gonna file it.

THE COURT: Well, now he’s—now you've
indicated that you wish him to do so on the record.

MR. NOBLES: Judge, I think he's referring
to a motion to withdraw his plea.

THE COURT: Well, I think he’s dissatisfied
with the decision made. The appropriate—you
make the appropriate decision on whether you
seek to withdraw plea formally, or readdress the
sentence for whatever, on a motion to correct
sentence, or file an appeal.

MR. NOBLES: Okay.
No direct appeal was taken. No post-conviction motions were filed on
‘Toston's behalf by counsel. Toston filed a timely post-conviction petition
for a writ of habeas corpus in proper person. The district court denied the
petition without an evidentiary hearing,
DISCUSSION

Toston’s petition included a claim that he was deprived of his

 

right to a direct appeal due to ineffective assistance of counsel. In
particular, Toston alleged that trial counsel misadvised him about the
right to appeal from a judgment based on a guilty plea and failed to file an
appeal even though he had observed Toston’s dissatisfaction at the
sentencing hearing.

‘To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must

 

demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below

an objective standard of reasonableness and resulting prejudice such that

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the outcome

of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Warden v, Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432-33, 683 P.2d

5

 

 
504, 505 (1984) (adopting the test in Strickland). Generally, both
‘components of the inquiry must be shown, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, but

 

in some instances, such as when the petitioner has been deprived of the
right to appeal due to counsel's deficient performance, the second
component (prejudice) may be presumed, Lozada v. State, 110 Nev. 349,
357, 871 P.2d 944, 949 (1994). The petitioner must demonstrate the
underlying facts by a preponderance of the evidence, Means v. State, 120
Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004), and he is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing if he raises claims supported by sufficient factual
allegations that, if true, would entitle him to relief and that are not belied
by the record, Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502-03, 686 P.2d 222, 225
(19834).

‘The specific claim here is that ‘Toston was deprived of his right
to a direct appeal due to ineffective assistance of counsel. ‘The deficiency
prong of such a claim has two separate, but related, components: counsel's
duty to inform and consult with the client regarding the right to appeal
and counsel's duty to file an appeal.

Duty to accurately inform and consult about the right to appeal

We have held that trial counsel does not have a constitutional
duty to always inform his client of, or consult with his client about, the
right to a direct appeal when the client has been convicted pursuant to a
guilty plea® ‘Thomas v, State, 115 Nev. 148, 150, 979 P.2d 222, 223
(1999); see also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 479-80 (2000). ‘That

*In contrast, when a defendant has been convicted pursuant to a
jury verdict, trial counsel has a constitutional duty to inform his client of
the right to appeal; that duty includes “informing the client of the
procedures for filing an appeal as well as the advantages and
disadvantages of filing an appeal.” Lozada, 110 Nev. at 356, 871 P.2d at
948.

 

 
 

duty arises in the guilty-plea context only when the defendant inquires
about the right to appeal or in circumstances where the defendant may
benefit from receiving advice about the right to a direct appeal, “such as
the existence of a direct appeal claim that has reasonable likelihood of
success.” Thomas, 115 Nev. at 150, 979 P.2d at 223. In those limited
circumstances, trial counsel has a constitutional duty to inform a client
who has pleaded guilty about a direct appeal and consult with the client
about the procedures for and advantages and disadvantages of an appeal,
and counsel's failure to do so is deficient performance for purposes of
proving an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.
at 477-81; Thomas, 115 Nev. at 150, 979 P.2d at 223: Davis v, State, 115
Nev. 17, 20, 974 P.2d 658, 659-60 (1999),

In this case, Toston did not claim that counsel had a duty to
inform him of his right to appeal and failed to do so; instead, he indicated
that counsel misinformed him about his appeal rights. Specifically, Toston
claimed that trial counsel informed him that he was not permitted to file a
direct appeal because his conviction stemmed from a guilty plea. That
information is not correct: a defendant who has pleaded guilty has a right
to appeal from the judgment of conviction, NRS 177.015(4); see also
Franklin v. State, 110 Nev. 750, 751-52, 877 P.24 1058, 1059 (1994),
‘overruled on other grounds by Thomas, 115 Nev. at 150, 979 P.2d at 223-
24, unless he knowingly and voluntarily waives that right, Cruzado v,
State, 110 Nev. 745, 879 P.2d 1195 (1994), overruled on other grounds by
Lee v. State, 115 Nev. 207, 985 P.2d 164 (1999). Although the appeal is
limited in scope to “reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional or other
see NRS

 

grounds that challenge the legality of the proceeding:
177.016(4), and those grounds reserved in writing pursuant to NRS
174.035(8), it is

 

 

still available despite the guilty plea. ‘Thus, if counsel
informed Toston that he had no appeal rights as alleged in the petition, he
7

 

 
 

affirmatively misinformed Toston regarding those rights. The question
then is whether the alleged affirmative misinformation falls below an
objective standard of reasonableness such that counsel’s performance was
deficient. We conclude that it does.

We explained in Lozada v. State the impact that the failure to
inform a client of the client's appeal rights has on the exercise of the right
to appeal and the right to effective counsel on appeal. 110 Nev. at 355-56,
871 P.2d at 947-48, Similarly, misinformation about the client’s appeal
rights may render the right to appeal and to counsel on appeal
meaningless by deterring a client from requesting a direct appeal,
inquiring into the procedures for a direct appeal, or filing an appeal. Here,
‘Toston alleges that trial counsel told him that he had no right to appeal
because he had pleaded guilty. Although Toston was correctly informed of
his limited right to a direct appeal in the written guilty plea agreement,
see Davis, 115 Nev. at 19, 974 P.2d at 659, the record is not sufficient to
belie his allegation that he did not pursue an appeal due to the alleged
misinformation from counsel. Because Toston’s allegations are not belied
by the record on appeal and, if true, it would entitle him to relief because
prejudice would be presumed under Lozada, we cannot affirm the decision
of the district court denying Toston’s claim in the absence of an
evidentiary hearing.

Duty to file an appeal

Related to the duty to inform or consult about an appeal is
trial counsel's duty to file an appeal on behalf of his client. We have stated
that trial counsel has a constitutional duty to file a direct appeal in two
‘circumstances: when requested to do so and when the defendant expresses
dissatisfaction with his conviction, and that the failure to do so in those
circumstances is deficient for purposes of proving ineffective assistance of
counsel. Lozada, 110 Nev. at 954-57, 871 P.2d at 947-49; Davis, 115 Nev.

8

 

 
at 20, 974 P.2d at 660. The second circumstance triggering the duty to file
a direct appeal—when the client expresses dissatisfaction with a
conviction—has the potential for mischief, as it is by no means unusual for
a criminal defendant to express dissatisfaction after having been convicted
and facing a prison term or a period of supervised release.

Our caselaw fails to provide meaningful guidance to
practioners in fulfilling their duty to file an appeal and to the courts in
evaluating appeal-deprivation claims that are based on counsel's failure to
file an appeal where the client claims to have expressed dissatisfaction
with the conviction, Considering that dissatisfaction with a criminal
conviction or sentence is not uncommon, the goal is to discern those clients
who truly desire to appeal their conviction from those defendants who are
disappointed with their lot. This is particularly important given that
“{tJhe burden is on the client to indicate to his attorney that he wishes to
pursue an appeal.” Davis, 115 Nev. at 20, 974 P.2d at 660; see also Downs
v. Warden, 93 Nev. 475, 478, 568 P.2d 575, 576-77 (1977) (determining

that counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal where

 

the client never expressed a desire to appeal and seemed satisfied with the
outcome of his case). Recognizing the need for more guidance, we hold
that trial counsel has a duty to file a direct appeal when the client's desire
to challenge the conviction or sentence can be reasonably inferred from the
totality of the circumstances, focusing on the information that counsel
knew or should have known at the time.* Cf Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at
480 (discussing circumstances in which counsel must consult with a client
regarding an appeal). In determining whether counsel knew or should

8Of course, counsel is no longer obligated to file the appeal if the
client consents not to file the appeal after consultation with counsel.

 

me
have known that his client wanted to appeal the conviction, the courts
may consider whether the conviction arose from a jury trial or a guilty
plea, “both because a guilty plea reduces the scope of potentially
appealable issues and because such a plea may indicate that the
defendant seeks an end to judicial proceedings.” Id. When the defendant
has pleaded guilty, relevant circumstances may include whether the
defendant received the sentence he bargained for as part of the plea (it
would be reasonable to conclude that a defendant who received the
bargained-for sentence would be satisfied with that sentence), whether the
defendant reserved certain issues for appeal (the reservation of an issue
for appeal reasonably indicates the defendant's desire to appeal), whether
the defendant indicated a desire to challenge his sentence within the
period for filing an appeal, and whether the defendant sought relief from

 

‘In Franklin v, State, 110 Nev. at 752, 877 P.2d at 1059, this court
recognized that available direct appeal claims when the convietion stems
from a guilty plea could include:

a challenge to the constitutional validity of the
statute on which the conviction was based; a
challenge to the sentence imposed on
constitutional or other grounds; a claim that the
state breached the plea agreement at sentencing;
a challenge to the procedures employed that led to
the entry of the plea, if that challenge does not
address the voluntariness of the plea; and a claim
that the district court entertained an actual bias
or that there were other conditions that rendered
the proceedings unfair.

Additional claims that could be raised on direct appeal include a claim for
additional presentence credits, Johnson v. State, 120 Nev. 296, 298, 89
P.3d 669, 670 (2004), and challenges to errors in the presentence
investigation report. Stockmeier v. State, Bd. of Parole Comm'rs, 127 Nev.
__, _, 265 P.8d 209, 214 (2011).

 

 
the plea before sentencing (the filing of a presentence motion to withdraw
a plea reasonably indicates dissatisfaction with the conviction).®

In the instant case, the totality of the circumstances
demonstrates Toston's desire to challenge his conviction and sentence.
Toston’s outbursts at sentencing indicate he was dissatisfied with the
proceedings in general and his sentence in particular as it was not the
sentence that he bargained for. In fact, the sentencing judge observed how
upset Toston was and instructed trial counsel to make an appropriate
decision about what to do next, which could include filing a motion to
withdraw the plea, filing a motion to correct the sentence, or filing an
appeal. As none of these actions were taken in this case, it is not clear if
trial counsel followed up with Toston as contemplated by the judge.
Because it is not clear what amount of communication trial counsel had
with his client after sentencing and because Toston’s dissatisfaction and
desire to challenge the conviction and sentence was evident from the
record, we cannot affirm the decision of the district court to deny this
claim without an evidentiary hearing.

CONCLUSION

We reverse the district court order to the extent that it denies
Toston's appeal-deprivation claim and remand this case for the district
court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on that claim consistent with this
opinion. Upon remand, the district court may consider whether to appoint
counsel to represent Toston. NRS 94.760(1). If the distriet court
determines that Toston was deprived of a direct appeal due to ineffective

assistance of counsel, the district court shall provide Toston with the

This list is meant to be illustrative, rather than exhaustive.

 

 
remedy set forth in NRAP 4(c). We affirm the district court's order to the
extent it denies the remainder of Toston’s claims.*

Douglas
phe 4,
Hpzdesty

3.
Parraguirre

 

“This appeal has been submitted for decision without oral argument,
NRAP 34(f(3), and we conclude that the record is sufficient for our review
and briefing is unwarranted. See Luckett v. Warden, 91 Nev. 681, 682,
541 P.2d 910, 911 (1975). This opinion constitutes our final disposition of
this appeal. Any subsequent appeal shall be docketed as a new matter.