Title: Bizzett v. Brewer

State: iowa

Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court

Document:

262 N.W.2d 273 (1978) Darrell E. BIZZETT, Appellant, v. Lou E. BREWER, Appellee. No. 60551. Supreme Court of Iowa. February 22, 1978. Shuminsky & Shuminsky, Sioux City, for appellant. Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Mark S. Beckman, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Zigmund Chwirka, Woodbury Co. Atty., for appellee. Considered by MOORE, C. J., and MASON, RAWLINGS, REES, and UHLENHOPP, JJ. *274 UHLENHOPP, Justice. In this appeal we pass upon the merits of the application for postconviction relief of Darrell E. Bizzett, whom we will refer to as defendant. Code 1977, § 663 A. 9. While our review is on error, Benton v. State, 199 N.W.2d 56 (Iowa), where a basic constitutional safeguard is involved we independently review the totality of the circumstances. State v. Cullison, 227 N.W.2d 121 (Iowa). Two trials are involved, the original homicide trial in 1971 and the instant postconviction trial in 1976. In the homicide trial a jury convicted defendant. He then appealed, and we affirmed. State v. Bizzett, 212 N.W.2d 466 (Iowa). Defendant's then attorney was Mr. Daniel C. Galvin. In the postconviction action the trial court tried the case on the merits and then dismissed the application. Defendant Bizzett again appealed, and that is the proceeding now before us. Perhaps the substantive facts can most readily be related by quoting from page 467 of our opinion in State v. Bizzett, supra: In this postconviction proceeding defendant urges that his homicide conviction should be set aside for several reasons which he summarizes in the conclusion of his brief: (1) he did not have effective counsel because of a conflict of interest on the part of his then attorney and because of his attorney's failure to take discovery depositions or statements; (2) a detective violated *275 defendant's Miranda rights; (3) after trial defendant discovered new evidence which would exculpate him; and (4) the police unconstitutionally seized his shoes. I. Effective Counsel. We first consider the contention regarding conflict of interest. Defendant had an undoubted right to an attorney with undivided loyalty, dedicated to the protection of defendant's interests. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799. Defendant's principal contention in this connection is that Mr. Galvin also represented Willie Earl Rucker, helped Rucker secure immunity in return for testifying, and therefore treated Rucker lightly on cross-examination in the homicide trial. Due to the gravity of this charge we have examined it with special care. In the homicide trial Rucker gave damaging testimony for the State which we summarized in the prior appeal on page 470. Defendant arrives at his conclusion that Mr. Galvin represented both Rucker and defendant mainly from the following testimony by Mr. Galvin at the postconviction trial: Like the trial court, from Mr. Galvin's testimony and the remaining record we arrive at a conclusion contrary to defendant's view. Mr. Galvin's first contact with the case came from Rucker's call. Rucker told his story to Mr. Galvinand the story *276 matched Rucker's later testimony. Mr. Galvin properly inquired, as attorneys not infrequently must do, whether Rucker was accusing "someone known to me, perhaps a client or a friend. . . ." When Rucker responded affirmatively, Mr. Galvin promptly recommended someone else as attorney for Rucker, and departed. The record of the homicide trial certainly does not indicate Mr. Galvin "threw" the case. Naturally defendant is bitter toward Rucker. But it is very easy to second-guess trial counsel, to read a trial transcript and say that this or that could have been done differently. Mr. Galvin had a very difficult case on his hands; the State's eyewitnesses made the defense an uphill battle all the way; the evidence disclosed a cruel and heinous crime; and Mr. Galvin appears to have struggled manfully to preserve and protect defendant's rights in an unpopular cause. At the conclusion of the homicide trial, the experienced Judge Stilwill stated to counsel: Upon review of the record, we conclude that defendant's charge of divided loyalty is not substantiated. A very similar case is United States v. Donatelli, 484 F.2d 505 (1 Cir.). We next consider the ineffective counsel contention based on insufficient pretrial preparation, particularly with reference to absence of discovery depositions and witnesses' statements. As to the applicable standard of competence, see State v. Lemburg, 257 N.W.2d 39 (Iowa); Long v. Brewer, 253 N.W.2d 549 (Iowa); and Wycoff v. State, 226 N.W.2d 29 (Iowa). See also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342; Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 96 S. Ct. 1330, 47 L. Ed. 2d 592; Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 36 L. Ed. 2d 235; Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 90 S. Ct. 1458, 25 L. Ed. 2d 785; McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763; Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747. Again Mr. Galvin's performance is not to be judged by hindsight. At the time of the homicide prosecution, discovery depositions were unavailable to defendants in criminal cases. State v. District Court in and for Delaware County, 253 Iowa 903, 114 N.W.2d 317. Not until 1974 did this court change the rule, in State v. Peterson, 219 N.W.2d 665 (Iowa). Moreover, we do not intimate that "competency" of counsel necessarily means the witnesses must always be deposed; in a given situation depositions may be unnecessary or bad strategy or be inadvisable for other reasons. The same may be said of statements. The record shows that Mr. Galvin engaged in energetic trial preparation, and he had the additional problem, not uncommon with defense counsel, of hostile witnesses. Defendant criticizes Mr. Galvin's handling of the defense in other ways. Our examination of the case persuades us again that his conduct was within the realm of normal competency, considering the case he had to work with. He is an attorney with extensive criminal defense experience. Some of the additional criticisms of his work in the homicide case constitute further second guessing. For example, defendant would have had Mr. Galvin cross examine some witnesses in greater detail. Lay defendants quite often want their attorney to cross examine a hostile witness more fully, evidently thinking that somehow the witness will magically change his testimony favorably to the defensewhereas counsel knows that lengthy cross-examination will only drive home the witness' original testimony for the State. We conclude from the record that Mr. Galvin's performance was reasonably competent. II. Miranda. Defendant contends a detective obtained statements from him without a Miranda warning. No such warning *277 was given on the occasion involved. The question is whether defendant in custody or deprived of freedom in any significant way. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1630, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 726, reh. den. 385 U.S. 890, 87 S. Ct. 11, 17 L. Ed. 2d 121. The Court there stated, "To summarize, we hold that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized." The Court also stated, however, "Our decision is not intended to hamper the traditional function of police officers in investigating crime." 384 U.S. at 477, 86 S. Ct. at 1629, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 725. See State v. McDonald, 190 N.W.2d 402, 404 (Iowa). On the night of the homicide, which occurred at some distance from the 711 Club, defendant was a bartender at that club. Lt. Robert Worden, a detective, subsequently investigated the crime. He thought that Dr. Stukel had been at the club. He called defendant to the station house and interviewed him, after which defendant left. The inquiry had not then narrowed on defendant, nor was defendant arrested. Lt. Worden testified at the homicide trial: Also: We hold that this questioning comes within the legitimate investigative function when the interviewee has not been taken into custody or deprived of freedom in any significant way. Similar cases are Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S. Ct. 711, 50 L. Ed. 2d 714; and Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 96 S. Ct. 1612, 48 L. Ed. 2d 1. See also, State v. McDonald, 190 N.W.2d 402, 404 (Iowa) (quoting Miranda: "`The limits we have placed on the interrogation process should not constitute an undue *278 interference with a proper system of law enforcement. As we have noted, our decision does not in any way preclude police from carrying out their traditional investigatory functions.'"); South Dakota v. Long, 465 F.2d 65 (8 Cir.), cert. den. 409 U.S. 1130, 93 S. Ct. 951, 35 L. Ed. 2d 263; United States v. Tobin, 429 F.2d 1261 (8 Cir.); Hicks v. United States, 127 U.S.App. D.C. 209, 382 F.2d 158; Evans v. United States, 377 F.2d 535 (5 Cir.). Lt. Worden did not violate the Miranda rule. III. New Evidence. Section 663A.2(4) of the Code provides for postconviction relief where "[t]here exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice. . . ." We have examined the items of evidence which defendant contends require vacation of the conviction in the interest of justice, but do not find them to be of a "material" nature. Defendant emphasizes one item in particular relating to State's witness Debra Eggers. Tom Farmer testified by deposition in the postconviction proceeding that Eggers was a prostitute who had agreed to sell herself to Dr. Stukel after she overheard defendant and Farmer planning to "roll" Stukel. We have striven to see how this item would be material or change the result. Certainly the homicide jury must not have thought that Eggers, who with several men in the middle of the night was strolling the street and drinking whiskey at a playground, was one of the city's respected matrons. We arrive at the same conclusion as the trial court that the new evidence is not of a nature warranting vacation of the conviction in the interest of justice. In nearly every case additional pieces of evidence of one kind or another can be found post-trial. See State v. Sims, 239 N.W.2d 550 (Iowa). IV. Seizure. Finally defendant contends the police unconstitutionally took his shoes from him when he was in custody at the station house following his arrest on the homicide charge. The police acted constitutionally. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 94 S. Ct. 1234, 39 L. Ed. 2d 771; Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 93 S. Ct. 2000, 36 L. Ed. 2d 900; State v. Morris, 227 N.W.2d 150 (Iowa); State v. Salazar, 213 N.W.2d 490 (Iowa). We hold that the trial court properly dismissed the postconviction application. AFFIRMED.