Title: People v. Trinh

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

Filed 6/5/14 
 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S115284 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
   
DUNG DINH ANH TRINH, 
) 
 
) 
Orange County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 99NF2555 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
A jury convicted defendant Dung Dinh Ahn Trinh (Trinh) of three counts 
of first degree murder with a multiple-murder special circumstance, one count of 
attempted murder, and various firearm enhancements for the shootings and 
attempted shooting of four staff members at an Anaheim hospital.  (Pen. Code, 
§§ 187, 189, 190.2, subd. (a)(3), 664.)1  Trinh’s first two penalty trials resulted in 
hung juries, but the third penalty jury returned a death verdict.  On automatic 
appeal, we affirm the judgment in its entirety. 
                                              
1  
All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
2 
I.   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A.   GUILT PHASE TRIAL 
1.   Prosecution Evidence 
On the morning of September 14, 1999, Trinh’s mother, Mot Trinh (Mot) 
died of cardiac arrest.  A few hours later, shortly after 10:30 a.m., Trinh entered 
the West Anaheim Medical Center (West Anaheim), where Mot had been a patient 
in May and June 1999.  He was armed with two .38-caliber handguns and more 
than 100 rounds of ammunition. 
Hospital employees saw Trinh walk down a second-floor hallway and turn 
into the office of nursing supervisor Mila Salvador.  Salvador was in conversation 
with a nurse’s aide, Marlene Mustaffa.  Trinh shot Mustaffa in the head from a 
foot away.  He then pointed a gun at Salvador and fired but missed.  Trinh 
immediately left.  Salvador barred the door to her office, attempted to resuscitate 
Mustaffa, failed, and called 911. 
The firing of shots triggered a “code gray” announcement over the hospital 
public address system, a warning that generally signaled the presence of an unruly 
patient.  The announcement directed male personnel to respond immediately to the 
progressive care unit on the second floor.  Andrew Armenta, working on the first 
floor, saw Vincent Rosetti running toward a stairwell leading to the second floor 
and ran behind Rosetti to the stairwell.  At the bottom of the stairs, he heard three 
shots, stopped, and retreated.  Rosetti’s body was later found in the stairwell; he 
had been shot in the head and neck from a foot or two away. 
Staffers Norman Bryan and Ronald Robertson also responded to the code 
gray from the first floor.  As Bryan and Robertson approached the stairwell to the 
second floor, they heard a gunshot.  Bryan turned to evacuate employees, while 
Robertson ran to close off the first-floor lobby doors.  As Robertson was trying to 
3 
close the doors, Trinh approached him and shot him in the chest.  Robertson 
grabbed Trinh and they fell to the ground.  Trinh shot Robertson again.  Staffer 
John Collins and patient Joseph Nuzzo joined in and together pinned down Trinh.  
While he was being held, Trinh said twice, “They killed my mother” or “You 
killed my mother.”  Two handguns, a pouch, and bullets were scattered across the 
floor; staffer George Wilhelm picked up the guns and locked them in an office.  
Robertson was taken to the emergency room, where he died. 
Police responding to the scene took Trinh into custody.  After being placed 
in the back of a patrol car, Trinh stated angrily, “You American people kill my 
mother.  Now I kill you.  You kill my people.  I kill you.  You know, you just kill 
my mother.  Right now she lay at Martin Luther Hospital by herself.  You kill 
her.” 
A search of Trinh’s truck revealed a map with Martin Luther Hospital 
circled on it and empty boxes of ammunition.  Examination of the handguns and 
ammunition captured inside West Anaheim showed that one .38-caliber handgun 
contained spent casings while the other was fully loaded.  The pouch Trinh had 
been carrying contained more than 100 additional rounds of .38-caliber 
ammunition. 
2.   Defense Evidence 
The defense conceded Trinh had shot and killed Mustaffa, Rosetti, and 
Robertson, and had attempted to shoot Salvador, but presented evidence regarding 
stressors in Trinh’s life that it argued mitigated Trinh’s culpability to less than first 
degree murder. 
Trinh and his mother Mot immigrated from Vietnam in 1975, when Trinh 
was roughly 18.  As of 1999, Trinh and his mother had lived together in an 
apartment in Anaheim for a long time. 
4 
In late May 1999, Mot, then 72, collapsed and lost consciousness while 
Trinh was taking her to the bathroom.  She was transported to West Anaheim and 
stayed there approximately one month.  During that time, she underwent hip 
replacement surgery and on several occasions spent time in intensive care after 
becoming nonresponsive.  Trinh was frequently with Mot at the hospital and fed 
her, assisted in her care, and acted as her interpreter with staff. 
Thereafter, Mot was transferred to La Palma Intercommunity Hospital (La 
Palma) for an additional month of care and rehabilitation.  Trinh was again with 
her on a daily basis, translating for her and learning how to assist her with basic 
tasks.  In August, following Mot’s discharge, Trinh quit his job to care for her full 
time.  Weeks later, he declared bankruptcy. 
Around 5:40 a.m. on the morning of September 14, Trinh called 911 and 
reported that Mot had stopped breathing and had blood coming from her mouth.  
Trinh received instructions on CPR and paramedics arrived shortly to find him 
attempting to revive his mother.  The paramedics told Trinh his mother’s condition 
was very serious and gave him an address and directions to Martin Luther 
Hospital, where they were transporting her by ambulance.  The directions were 
correct but the address was wrong; when Trinh arrived at 8:00 a.m., Mot had 
already died of cardiac arrest.  Trinh became very distraught.  Asked if anyone 
needed to be called, Trinh replied that everyone was still in Vietnam. 
The defense presented extensive expert testimony concerning Vietnamese 
family structure, Vietnamese distrust of Western medicine, the need for medically 
and culturally knowledgeable interpreters to explain procedures, the nature of 
caregiver burnout, depression among Vietnamese immigrating to the United States 
in the 1970’s, and the grieving process. 
5 
3.   Charges and Guilt Phase Verdict 
Trinh was charged with three counts of first degree murder with special 
circumstances (multiple murder and lying in wait) and one count of attempted 
murder.  (§§ 187, 189, 190.2, subd. (a)(3), (15), 664, subd. (a).)  He was 
additionally charged with firearm use enhancements for each count.  (§§ 12022.5, 
subd. (a), 12022.53, subds. (c), (d).)  Before trial, the court dismissed the lying-in-
wait special circumstance on the prosecution’s motion. 
A jury convicted Trinh on all first degree and attempted murder counts and 
found the multiple-murder special circumstance true.  It also found the firearm use 
enhancements true. 
B.   PENALTY PHASE TRIALS 
Trinh’s first jury was unable to reach a verdict on penalty, hanging 10 to 2 
in favor of life.  A second jury hung as well, 11 to 1 in favor of death. 
1.   Prosecution Evidence at the Third Penalty Trial 
In the third penalty trial, the People relied on the circumstances of the crime 
and victim impact evidence. 
Because the jury had not heard the guilt phase evidence, the prosecution 
presented anew testimony concerning the shootings.  It supplemented that 
evidence by reading back Trinh’s testimony from the second penalty phase trial.  
In that testimony, Trinh testified that he entered the hospital with a clear mind and 
a plan, executed three people, felt no remorse, would not apologize, and accepted 
the consequences.  The people he killed, he killed because they looked familiar or 
got in his way.  He originally made his plans when he checked his mother out of 
La Palma in July, but did not act then because he needed to continue to care for 
her.  Once paramedics took his mother away on the morning of September 14, he 
knew she would die, so he retrieved his ammunition, loaded his guns, and drove to 
Martin Luther Hospital and then to West Anaheim.  Had he not been stopped at 
6 
West Anaheim, he would have driven on to La Palma and killed people there, then 
committed suicide.  He wished to be sentenced to death because he had no reason 
left to live and wanted to join his mother in the next life. 
The prosecution also introduced victim impact evidence from Mustaffa’s 
husband, Rosetti’s mother, siblings, and daughters, Robertson’s wife and son, and 
Mila Salvador herself. 
2.   Defense Evidence at the Third Penalty Trial 
The defense re-presented its guilt phase expert testimony concerning 
Vietnamese family structure, Vietnamese distrust of Western medicine, the need 
for medically and culturally knowledgeable interpreters to explain procedures, the 
nature of caregiver burnout, depression among Vietnamese immigrating to the 
United States in the 1970’s, and the grieving process. 
A witness who knew Trinh growing up testified that in Vietnam he had few 
friends and family aside from Mot.  Trinh and Mot were placed in a refugee camp 
in Guam in 1975 and immigrated to the United States from there.  Witnesses 
testified that after immigrating, Trinh had few if any friends and no family in the 
United States, spent all his spare time with his mother, and never married because 
his entire focus was on taking care of her.  Trinh was described as a reliable tenant 
and as an excellent employee at the various restaurants where he worked. 
Trinh testified on his own behalf, as he had at each of the penalty phase 
trials.  In a statement to the jury, he declared he entered West Anaheim intending 
to execute people, had no excuses, regrets or remorse, would do it again if he 
could, and accepted full responsibility.  He tried to testify that American citizens 
had supported genocide in Vietnam and denounce the United States government 
and capitalism, though his statements were stricken; without objection, he 
explained he was doing his duty as a Vietnamese son, citizen and comrade by 
7 
executing Americans.  As Trinh was leaving the stand, he told the jury to “Do 
your job, thank you.” 
Counsel contrasted this testimony with taped interviews of Trinh on the day 
of the shootings and during the first penalty phase trial.  In the taped interviews, 
Trinh explained that when Mot was hospitalized, some nurses gave her poor care 
and laughed at her, so after Mot’s release from La Palma, he formed a plan to kill 
those nurses at West Anaheim and La Palma.  He waited to carry the plan out 
because he still needed to take care of Mot. 
On September 14, Trinh loaded his guns and placed them and ammunition 
in his truck before driving to Martin Luther Hospital because he knew Mot was 
going to die.  When he arrived at Martin Luther, he did not shoot anyone because 
he did not hold them responsible for his mother’s condition.  He stayed with his 
mother’s body for about one hour.  Upon leaving Martin Luther, he drove to West 
Anaheim; his mother had died, and those who had mistreated her would have to 
pay.  Upon arriving, he walked into the hospital looking for staff he recognized 
who had mistreated or laughed at his mother.  Seeing no one he recognized and 
not wanting to kill innocent people, he walked out and sat in his truck, then 
walked in a second time and, when he recognized Mustaffa and Salvador, shot at 
them.  He retreated the way he had come, taking the stairs because he thought the 
elevators might be shut down.  He shot Rosetti and Robertson only because they 
were preventing him from escaping; he wanted to leave and get to La Palma, 
carjacking someone if necessary because he believed his truck’s description would 
be broadcast.  As he was being subdued, Trinh said, referring to the second-floor 
staff, “Your guy[s] kill my mother.” 
Trinh expressed extreme regret for shooting Rosetti and Robertson and 
hoped they would survive.  He asked for forgiveness if they died because he did 
8 
not intend to kill them.  Trinh did intend to kill Mustaffa, however, and expressed 
no regret at shooting at her or Salvador. 
Trinh’s first penalty phase testimony was also read.  Trinh said nothing he 
could say would bring anyone back.  He walked into West Anaheim with a plan, 
took three innocent lives, and accepted the consequences for his actions.  Trinh 
closed his narrative:  “To all of you folks, the famil[ies] who lost your loved 
one[s] because of me, I am willing to pay back everything I got, that is, my life.  
Life for life, eyes for eyes.  I owe you my life because of their death.  And that is 
also my duty because I pay my debt to you. . . . I accept the death penalty.  And 
not because I say I am sorry to you, to those family who lost your loved ones 
because of me.  And I know . . . what I did hurt all your feeling[s].  And not only I 
insult you, but I hurt your family.  And to me, I bow my head before all of you and 
apologize.  And I am sorry for that.”  On cross-examination during the first 
penalty phase, Trinh explained that he shot at Mustaffa and Salvador because he 
thought he recognized them, but realized too late he had misidentified them and 
they had nothing to do with him.  He walked out of West Anaheim the first time 
because he saw no familiar faces, but went in a second time because he had 
nothing left to go back to; he planned to kill himself afterward.  He did not want to 
kill every nurse, only those he blamed for mistreating his mother.  At the close of 
his first penalty phase testimony, Trinh addressed the jury, again apologized,  and 
told them to do the right thing and sentence him to death, as he deserved. 
3.   Third Penalty Trial Verdict 
After two hung juries, Trinh’s third penalty phase jury returned a verdict of 
death. 
9 
II.   DISCUSSION 
A.   PRETRIAL:  DENIAL OF MOTION TO RECUSE THE DISTRICT 
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE 
The day after the Anaheim shootings, a man entered a church in Fort 
Worth, Texas, and shot 14 people, killing seven of them, before committing 
suicide.  These two incidents followed by less than five months the Columbine 
High School shootings, in which two students killed 13 people and injured roughly 
two dozen more before committing suicide.  (See Cullen, Columbine (2009) pp. 
4–5, 349–353, 372.)  On September 16, 1999, two days after the Anaheim 
shootings and one day after the Fort Worth shootings, Orange County District 
Attorney Tony Rackauckas announced a new charging policy for public rampage 
killings.  Where formerly the decision whether to charge special circumstances 
had been made after review by a district attorney’s office committee, including 
potentially input from defense counsel regarding mitigating circumstances, 
Rackauckas announced public rampage killings would automatically be charged as 
special circumstance cases.  Pursuant to this policy, Trinh was charged with 
special circumstances murder without a special circumstance committee 
convening. 
Trinh moved to recuse the entire Orange County District Attorney’s Office.  
(§ 1424.)  Trinh argued that Rackauckas was personally invested in the case 
because his father had recently been hospitalized at, and had just a few days before 
been released from, the hospital where the shootings occurred, and the decision to 
single out Trinh for special and unfavorable treatment was a product of this 
conflict of interest.  The trial court denied the motion, finding that Trinh had 
shown neither an actual conflict nor any appearance of conflict that would render a 
fair trial unlikely.  Trinh sought writ relief; the Court of Appeal summarily denied 
his petition.  Trinh thereafter renewed his recusal motion before the second and 
10 
third penalty trials, but the renewed motions were likewise denied.  Trinh argues 
these denials were an abuse of discretion, in violation of section 1424 and various 
federal and state constitutional guarantees.  (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 14th 
Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15, 17.)  We conclude it was not an abuse of 
discretion to permit the Orange County District Attorney’s Office to charge and 
prosecute Trinh for capital murder. 
Under section 1424, a motion to recuse a prosecutor “may not be granted 
unless the evidence shows that a conflict of interest exists that would render it 
unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial.”  (Id., subd. (a)(1).)  “The 
statute ‘articulates a two-part test: “(i) is there a conflict of interest?; and (ii) is the 
conflict so severe as to disqualify the district attorney from acting?” ’ ”  
(Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711.)  The defendant 
“bear[s] the burden of demonstrating a genuine conflict; in the absence of any 
such conflict, a trial court should not interfere with the People’s prerogative to 
select who is to represent them.”  (Id. at p. 709.)  That burden is especially heavy 
where, as here, the defendant seeks to recuse not a single prosecutor but the entire 
office.  (People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 361; People v. Hamilton 
(1988) 46 Cal.3d 123, 139.)  We review the trial court’s decision for abuse of 
discretion.  (Gamache, at p. 361; Hollywood v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 
721, 728–729.) 
While Trinh asserts he has established numerous circumstances giving rise 
to a conflict of interest, our review of the briefs and record discloses only one 
alleged conflict:  District Attorney Rackauckas’s father was a former patient at 
West Anaheim, the hospital where the shootings occurred.  This happenstance, 
Trinh argues, rendered Rackauckas emotionally invested in the case and was the 
true reason for his decision to depart from past practice in deciding this case 
should automatically be charged as a death case.  Trinh’s remaining allegations, 
11 
e.g., that Rackauckas failed to exercise discretion by adopting an automatic death 
policy, that he acted out of personal animus toward Trinh, and that he could be 
vindictive toward those in his office who disagreed with him on the 
implementation of the new policy, do not show any independent conflict but are 
instead supposed consequences flowing from Rackauckas’s anger over the 
location of the shootings. 
That Rackauckas’s father was hospitalized at West Anaheim, but released 
before the shootings, is undisputed.  The issue is whether this circumstance created 
“ ‘a reasonable possibility that the DA’s office may not exercise its discretionary 
function in an evenhanded manner’ ” and thus was the sort of conflict that would 
render it unlikely Trinh could receive a fair trial.  (Haraguchi v. Superior Court, 
supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 713.)  The trial court concluded it was not. 
Substantial evidence supports that determination.  Rackauckas submitted a 
declaration denying any connection between his father’s hospitalization and his 
treatment of Trinh:  “My decision to exercise my prosecutorial discretion [by 
adopting a blanket policy for mass public killings] was entirely unaffected by the 
fact that I had visited my father at West Anaheim Medical Center a few days 
before the killings.  My father was discharged from the hospital before the day of 
the shooting and, to my knowledge, neither of us knew any of the victims.  The 
crime was no more upsetting to me than it would have been had my father never 
been a patient at the hospital.”  Instead, Rackauckas viewed it as his duty to deter 
the indiscriminate shooting of strangers in public places and adopted the automatic 
policy as a result.  The trial court was entitled to credit Rackauckas’s sworn 
12 
statements.2  At the time he adopted the new policy, Rackauckas was a first-year 
district attorney; it was eminently plausible that, in the wake of the mass killings at 
Columbine High School and other like incidents, he might have felt no loyalty to 
policies adopted by his predecessors and instead have chosen to treat the mass 
killing of strangers as an act uniquely suited to categorical special circumstances 
treatment by his office.  Nor, in the abstract, is the happenstance of a relative 
having some distant connection to a tragic event the sort of connection that might 
cast doubt on a prosecution’s ability to act fairly and evenhandedly.  (Cf. People v. 
Gamache, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 362 [victim employed by district attorney’s 
office created “paradigmatic conflict”]; People v. Conner (1983) 34 Cal.3d 141, 
148 [that deputy district attorney was witness and potential victim created 
conflict]; People v. Superior Court (Greer) (1977) 19 Cal.3d 255, 269–270 
[victim’s mother employed by district attorney’s office created conflict].) 
In response, Trinh points to evidence he submitted that he claims renders it 
more likely Rackauckas truly was motivated to intercede by his father’s 
hospitalization.  The record includes a declaration from a former assistant district 
attorney stating that Rackauckas was particularly upset by the killings at West 
Anaheim because his father had been hospitalized there; he expressed concern 
about what the media would do if it discovered his father had been a patient there; 
he hid the fact of his father’s stay at West Anaheim for a year after charging Trinh, 
despite memos from attorneys in his office urging the relevancy of that 
information and the need to disclose it; he accused deputies of insubordination for 
disagreeing with his new policy of seeking capital punishment for all public 
                                              
2  
As we have noted before, “that the trial court’s findings were based on 
declarations and other written evidence does not lessen the deference due those 
findings.”  (Haraguchi v. Superior Court, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 711, fn. 3.) 
13 
rampage killings; and he reassigned and then terminated the assistant district 
attorney who had disagreed with his policy change and had urged him to disclose 
his father’s hospitalization.  In deciding whether the trial court abused its 
discretion, however, we are prohibited from reweighing the evidence; if credible 
evidence supports a trial court’s findings, our review is at an end.  (People v. 
Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 882–883; People v. Hill (1984) 37 Cal.3d 491, 
499.) 
When renewing his recusal motion before the second penalty phase trial, 
Trinh submitted a new grand jury report highly critical of various aspects of 
Rackauckas’s conduct in office.  None of the criticisms shed new light on 
Rackauckas’s involvement in the prosecution of Trinh.  The trial court expressly 
recognized as much, and its decision to again deny recusal was not an abuse of 
discretion.  Before the third penalty trial, Trinh orally renewed his motion without 
submitting additional evidence; accordingly, the third denial must be upheld for 
the same reasons as the first two denials. 
Section 1424’s standards are “prophylactic” (People v. Gamache, supra, 48 
Cal.4th at p. 366) and are designed “to prevent potential constitutional violations 
from occurring” (People v. Vasquez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 47, 59).  It follows that 
because the trial court’s denial of the recusal motion was not an abuse of 
discretion under section 1424, Trinh also suffered no violation of his constitutional 
rights.  (Gamache, at p. 366.) 
B.   GUILT PHASE ISSUES 
1.   Refusal of Pinpoint Instruction on Provocation and Heat of Passion 
Trinh presented a heat of passion defense, claiming he acted upon 
provocation sufficient to reduce his culpability from first degree murder to second 
degree murder or manslaughter.  (See People v. Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263, 
14 
1306.)  The parties agreed the trial court would instruct the jury with the standard 
instruction on provocation and heat of passion.  The People requested an 
additional special instruction clarifying that any relevant provocation must come 
from, or reasonably be believed to come from, the victim.  (See People v. Moye 
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 549–550.)  For his part, Trinh sought a pinpoint instruction 
emphasizing that the jury need not find a provocation sufficient to rouse a 
reasonable person to kill, but only a provocation sufficient to trigger actions out of 
passion rather than judgment.3  After extended discussion, the trial court denied 
Trinh’s proposed instruction as argumentative, duplicative, and incorrect.  The 
court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 8.42 and the People’s special 
instruction instead.4  Trinh contends this was an abuse of discretion and violated 
                                              
3  
Trinh’s proposed instruction read:  “By saying that a defendant is not 
permitted to set up his own standard of conduct, the court is not instructing you 
that the question to answer is whether or not a reasonable person would commit 
the act of killing another because of the provocation that the defendant believed he 
was under.  [¶] Rather the question is whether the provocation was such that a 
reasonable person would commit any act rashly and from passion rather than 
judgment because of it.” 
4  
The jury was instructed with a slightly modified version of CALJIC No. 
8.42: 
 
“To reduce an unlawful killing from murder to manslaughter upon the 
ground of sudden quarrel or heat of passion, the provocation must be of the 
character and degree as naturally would excite and arouse the passion, and the 
assailant must act under the influence of that sudden quarrel or heat of passion. 
 
“The heat of passion which will reduce a homicide to manslaughter must be 
such a passion as naturally would be aroused in the mind of an ordinarily 
reasonable person in the same circumstances. 
 
“A defendant is not permitted to set up his own standard of conduct and to 
justify or excuse himself because his passions were aroused unless the 
circumstances in which the defendant was placed and the facts that confronted him 
were such as also would have aroused the passion of the ordinarily reasonable 
person faced with the same situation. 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
15 
his rights to due process and to have the court instruct the jury on his theory of the 
case.  (U.S. Const., 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15–17.) 
As the People concede, Trinh’s proposed instruction was not substantively 
incorrect.  It accurately reflected the law relating to provocation and heat of 
passion.  We recently reaffirmed that to reduce murder to manslaughter, 
provocation must be such as would “render an ordinary person of average 
disposition ‘liable to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection, and 
from this passion rather than from judgment’ ” (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 
Cal.4th 935, 957), while repudiating the argument urged by the prosecution in the 
trial court here that provocation must be such as would move an ordinary person to 
kill (id. at p. 938). 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
“Legally adequate provocation may occur in a short or over a considerable 
period of time, as a result of a single event or a series of events. 
 
“No specific type of provocation is required, and the passion aroused may 
not be anger or rage, but can be any violent, intense, high wrought or 
[enthusiastic] emotion. 
 
“The question to be answered is whether or not at the time of the killing the 
reason of the accused was obscured or disturbed by passion to such an extent as 
would cause the ordinarily reasonable person of average disposition to act rashly 
and without deliberation and reflection and from passion rather than from 
judgment. 
 
“If there was provocation, whether of short or long duration, but of a nature 
not normally sufficient to arouse passion, or if sufficient time elapsed between the 
provocation and the fatal blow for passion to subside and reason to return, and if 
an unlawful killing of a human being followed the provocation and had all the 
elements of murder as I have defined it, the mere fact of slight or remote 
provocation will not reduce the offense to manslaughter.” 
 
The court followed with the People’s special instruction:  “The provocation 
which incites the killer to act in the heat of passion must be caused by the decedent 
or reasonably believed by the accused to have been engaged in by the decedent.  
The provocation must be such as to cause an ordinary person of average 
disposition to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection.” 
16 
Nor was the proposed instruction duplicative.  Until our decision in Beltran 
“clarif[ied] what kind of provocation will suffice to constitute heat of passion and 
reduce a murder to manslaughter” (People v. Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 938), 
whether the provocation must be such as to cause an ordinary person of average 
disposition merely to act rashly or to kill was uncertain.  The instructions read to 
the jury did not specifically address that point. 
Finally, the proposed instruction was not argumentative.  In its entirety, the 
instruction attempted only to clarify that Trinh need not prove provocation such as 
would cause a reasonable person to kill, but only provocation such as would cause 
a reasonable person to act rashly and from passion rather than judgment.  It thus 
focused the jury on Trinh’s theory of the case—that a defendant who was 
provoked to act rashly by preceding events could have his culpability mitigated—
without impermissibly focusing the jury on any particular evidence or demanding 
favorable inferences from particular facts in the record.  Consequently, Trinh was 
entitled to have the instruction given.  (See People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 
641, 720.) 
However, the error was unquestionably harmless.  As the People’s special 
instruction appropriately highlighted, a heat of passion defense must arise from 
provocation supplied, or reasonably believed to have been supplied, by the victim 
or victims.  (People v. Moye, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 549–550.)  There was no 
evidence Vincent Rosetti or Ronald Robertson had any role in Trinh’s mother’s 
care—they simply had the misfortune of coming between Trinh and escape.  Even 
as to nurse Mila Salvador and nurse’s aide Marlene Mustaffa, there was no 
evidence at the guilt phase they had any role, or were believed by Trinh to have 
had any role, in his mother’s care.  Consequently, there was no reasonable 
probability the giving of the requested pinpoint instruction would have led to a 
more favorable verdict. 
17 
2.   Failure to Provide the Jury with Written Copies of Two Instructions 
The trial court and parties agreed to instruct the jury with CALJIC Nos. 
2.60 and 2.61, prohibiting the jurors from drawing any inferences from or 
attaching evidentiary significance to Trinh’s election not to testify.  The court 
thereafter read both instructions to the jury.5  Inadvertently, however, the two 
instructions were not included in the packet of written instructions delivered to the 
jury room for reference during deliberations.  Trinh contends this omission 
violated his privilege against self-incrimination, his right to due process, assorted 
other state and federal constitutional rights, and his state statutory rights.  (U.S. 
Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 1, 7, 15–17; Pen. 
Code, § 1093, subd. (f).)  We conclude no constitutional error occurred.  
Additionally, while the failure to provide the jury written copies of the two 
instructions was statutory error, it was harmless. 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
guarantee a criminal defendant, as part of the privilege against self-incrimination, 
the right to require that the trial court instruct the jury not to speculate or draw 
adverse inferences from the failure to testify.  (Carter v. Kentucky (1981) 450 U.S. 
288, 305; People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1424–1425.)  Contrary to 
Trinh’s contention, however, no Carter error occurred here.  Trinh sought the 
                                              
5  
The jury was instructed:  “A defendant in a criminal trial has a 
constitutional right not to be compelled to testify. You must not draw any 
inference from the fact that a defendant does not testify.  [¶] Further, you must 
neither discuss this matter nor permit it to enter into your deliberations in any way.  
[¶] In deciding whether or not to testify, the defendant may choose to rely on the 
state of the evidence and upon the failure, if any, of the People to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt every essential element of the charge against him.  [¶] No lack of 
testimony on defendant’s part will make up for a failure of proof by the People so 
as to support a finding against him on any such essential element.” 
18 
giving of CALJIC Nos. 2.60 and 2.61, as was his right, and the trial court agreed 
and delivered the requested instructions.  The subsequent omission of these 
instructions from the written packet provided the jury does not vitiate the oral 
instructions.  Neither the United States Supreme Court nor we have ever held that 
oral jury instructions are ineffectual unless augmented by written copies of the 
same instructions; to the contrary, we have established that neither the state nor the 
federal Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the delivery of written 
instructions in addition to oral ones.  (People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 
674; People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 447; People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 
Cal.4th 795, 845 [“the provision of written instructions to the jury (although 
generally beneficial and to be encouraged) is not guaranteed by, and therefore 
does not implicate, any provision of the state or federal Constitution”].)  The 
failure to provide written instructions is not tantamount to giving no instructions at 
all. 
To controvert these holdings, Trinh relies on People v. Osband (1996) 13 
Cal.4th 622, 686–688, which stands for the unexceptional proposition that correct 
written instructions may cure any oral misreading of the instructions.  That the 
omission of written instructions nullifies orally read instructions accurately stating 
the law—as Trinh concedes the oral instructions did here—does not follow. 
While the omission of a written instruction is not an error of constitutional 
dimension, the Legislature has seen fit to ensure as a statutory matter that 
defendants and juries have the benefit of written instructions upon request.  
(§ 1093, subd. (f); People v. Ochoa, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 447.)6  The People and 
                                              
6  
We also have indicated that provision of a full set of written instructions, 
whether requested or not, is the better practice, especially in capital cases.  (People 
v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 190, fn. 3; id. at p. 260 (dis. opn. of Kennard, 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
19 
Trinh disagree over whether any formal request was made, but the record reflects 
counsel and the court intended the jury to receive a full set of instructions, and the 
omission of CALJIC Nos. 2.60 and 2.61 arose not because Trinh failed 
specifically to request their inclusion but because the trial court inadvertently 
omitted them when compiling the written jury instructions.  However 
unintentional, this omission deprived Trinh of his statutory right to have a written 
copy of these two instructions delivered to the jury. 
On this record, however, that error was harmless.  The jury received the 
requested instructions orally.  We presume they heard and followed them.  (People 
v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 414; People v. Whalen (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1, 88; 
People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 867.)  Trinh has pointed to nothing in the 
record—no evidence of confusion or indications this jury failed to understand or 
apply the instructions read to it—that would establish a reasonable probability of a 
more favorable outcome had the jury received written copies of CALJIC Nos. 2.60 
and 2.61.  (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836; People v. Seaton, supra, 
26 Cal.4th at p. 674; People v. Cooley (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1399–1400; 
People v. Blakley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1019, 1023–1024.) 
C.   PRE-PENALTY-TRIAL ISSUES 
1.   Denial of Motion to Sentence Trinh to Life Without Possibility of 
Parole 
Trinh’s first two penalty phase trials ended in mistrials with the jury 
deadlocked.  Before a third penalty trial, Trinh moved to have the trial court 
impose a sentence of life without possibility of parole.  (§ 190.4, subd. (b); see 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
J.); People v. Seaton, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 673–674; People v. Ochoa, supra, 
26 Cal.4th at p. 447; People v. Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 845.) 
20 
People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 177.)  The trial court denied the 
motion.  Trinh contends this was an abuse of discretion and thus a denial of due 
process and other constitutional guarantees.  (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 14th 
Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 1, 7, 13, 15–17.)  We disagree. 
Under section 190.4, subdivision (b), following a hung jury, the trial court 
must conduct a retrial.  (People v. Thompson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 176–177.)  
Following a second hung jury, however, “the court in its discretion shall either 
order a new jury or impose a punishment of confinement in state prison for a term 
of life without the possibility of parole.”  (§ 190.4, subd. (b).)  Notably, the statute 
neither mandates that the trial court set out the reasons for its exercise of discretion 
nor compels the court to rely on any particular considerations in choosing between 
a life sentence and another retrial.  The Legislature has thus chosen to vest 
considerable discretion in the trial judge, a judge who ordinarily will have had the 
benefit of presiding over the defendant’s previous trials, as was the case here.  Our 
examination of the trial court’s ruling is correspondingly narrow.  We review the 
trial court’s legal conclusions de novo and its findings of fact for substantial 
evidence, but in the absence of either—as will typically be the case with a decision 
under section 190.4, subdivision (b)—we consider only whether the trial court’s 
decision to proceed with retrial was arbitrary and capricious.  (Haraguchi v. 
Superior Court, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 711–712.) 
Trinh’s motion argued that a life sentence was the appropriate punishment 
based on the same factors a jury would consider, including Trinh’s life history and 
demonstrated character and the role that extreme emotional grief played in the 
shootings.  The motion also argued that Trinh had fabricated testimony in the 
second penalty trial to increase the chance of a death sentence and would do so 
again in a third trial.  Finally, counsel stressed that the original jury hung 10 to 2 in 
favor of life and the second jury was divided only 8 to 4 in favor of death until, 
21 
allegedly, numerous jurors engaged in misconduct and swung the final division to 
11 to 1. 
The trial court confirmed the People desired a retrial.  It then framed the 
central question before it as “whether or not 12 reasonable citizens will reach a 
unanimous verdict”—in other words, whether the evidence in the case was such 
that a verdict would ever be reached, or whether there was a significant risk retrial 
would yield only another hung jury.  Against those probabilities the trial court 
weighed the cost to the families of the victims.  Ultimately acknowledging that the 
matter required a “[v]ery hard decision,” the trial court ordered a retrial. 
Trinh finds two faults in the trial court’s decisionmaking process.  First, he 
contends the court failed to consider Trinh’s mitigating evidence.  However, the 
record reflects the trial court’s consideration of all relevant factors, including the 
mitigating evidence.  Trinh’s counsel argued mitigation both in his papers and 
orally, and expressly acknowledged in the course of argument that the trial court 
had “read and considered our brief.”  The trial court’s focus was on the likelihood 
of a future unanimous verdict.  Its assessment of that likelihood was necessarily 
informed not only by the empirical results of the first two juries’ votes, but also by 
the trial court’s own sense of all the evidence it had heard, both mitigating and 
aggravating, in the course of presiding over one guilt phase and two penalty phase 
trials. 
Second, Trinh argues that the second jury’s ultimate 11-to-1 division in 
favor of death was the product of juror misconduct, and the trial court failed to 
account for that fact when weighing the jury’s vote as evidence in favor of 
possible unanimity the next time around.  However, the trial court was well aware 
of Trinh’s allegations of misconduct; they were fleshed out at length in Trinh’s 
moving papers and oral argument.  Indeed, before ruling, the court expressly 
acknowledged the misconduct allegations were relevant to its decision.  It simply 
22 
did not find them dispositive on the ultimate question before it, which was not 
whether a past juror or jurors had engaged in misconduct, but whether a future 
jury, properly instructed and warned against similar acts, might arrive at a 
unanimous verdict, and whether the likelihood of such a verdict was sufficient to 
justify further costs to the judicial system and to all involved.  The trial court’s 
determination that a unanimous verdict was sufficiently likely to warrant a third 
penalty trial was neither arbitrary nor capricious. 
2.   Constitutionality of Allowing a Third Penalty Trial 
In addition to seeking a favorable exercise of discretion against retrial, 
Trinh argued to the trial court before both his second and third penalty phase trials 
that permitting a retrial would be unconstitutional.  His motions were denied.  
Trinh renews his constitutional objections here, arguing that retrial violated his 
rights to due process and equal protection and the prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment.  (U.S. Const., 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, 
§§ 1, 7, 15–17.) 
Trinh correctly notes that the Legislature’s authorization of a penalty phase 
retrial, and especially its authorization of more than one penalty phase retrial, is 
rare.  (See § 190.4, subd. (b); Ala. Code § 13A-5-46(g) (2013) [only other state 
statute authorizing more than one retrial].)  Rarity of itself does not equate to 
unconstitutionality, however, and we have consistently rejected the claim that the 
rarity of California’s retrial statute renders it inconsistent with “evolving standards 
of decency” (Trop v. Dulles (1958) 356 U.S. 86, 101) in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment to the federal Constitution (People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 
Cal.4th 254, 311; People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 633–634; see People v. 
McDowell (2012) 54 Cal.4th 395, 411–416 [conducting second and third penalty 
trials, even after 15-year delay, does not violate 8th Amend. or due process]).  
23 
Trinh differs from previous defendants raising this challenge in that his penalty 
phase juries hung twice, and his death sentence verdict was issued by a third jury, 
but that distinction is not constitutionally significant.  Trinh has not gone beyond 
the raw numbers to establish that other states’ decisions not to authorize multiple 
penalty retrials reflect a moral consensus, as opposed to cost-benefit judgments 
about the value of continuing to allocate resources toward seeking the death 
penalty in a particular case.  While the United States Supreme Court has made 
clear that the Eighth Amendment embodies collective moral judgments about the 
standards of decency in a civilized society (e.g., Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 
U.S. 551, 560–561; Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 428 U.S. 153, 172–173; Trop, at pp. 
100–101), those collective judgments do not constrain state legislatures from 
arriving at differing conclusions concerning the societal benefits of seeking a 
death sentence at all (Gregg, at pp. 186–187) or, as here, the societal benefits of 
seeking a death sentence multiple times. 
Trinh argues as well that even if not facially unconstitutional, the penalty 
phase retrial statute is unconstitutional as applied to him.  He contends the trial 
court should have known a third penalty phase would not be “free of serious 
error,” and that in fact his penalty retrial was not.  However, as will appear, we 
reject Trinh’s specific claims of penalty phase error (post, at pp. 32–39), and he 
identifies no errors beyond these that would render retrial unconstitutional.  His 
as-applied challenge thus fails as well. 
Lastly, Trinh argues that the provision authorizing a trial court to allow a 
second retrial or impose life without possibility of parole violates equal protection 
and due process because it contains no explicit standards governing the exercise of 
discretion.  (See § 190.4, subd. (b).)  Considering the role this provision plays in 
California’s current death penalty scheme, we conclude the omission of standards 
24 
for deciding whether to forgo a third penalty trial does not violate the state or 
federal Constitutions. 
Both Trinh and the People focus initially on In re Anderson (1968) 69 
Cal.2d 613, 621–628, in which we considered equal protection and due process 
challenges to an earlier version of California’s death penalty scheme and found 
them without merit, explaining that as with any number of other portions of the 
Penal Code granting trial judges unfettered discretion, a “statute mitigating capital 
punishment is not essentially unfair to the wrongdoer for failure to specify 
standards for the exercise of that discretion.”  (Id. at p. 625.)  We agree with Trinh 
that Anderson cannot alone dispose of his challenge; the United States Supreme 
Court in the decade that followed that decision made clear that standardless 
selection between life and death is unconstitutional (Furman v. Georgia (1972) 
408 U.S. 238; Gregg v. Georgia, supra, 428 U.S. at pp. 189–195), and the scheme 
In re Anderson upheld would not today pass constitutional muster. 
It does not follow, however, that the retrial statute is unconstitutional for 
failing to articulate standards a trial court should apply.  The statute comes into 
play only after a jury has determined a defendant is death eligible by finding true 
beyond a reasonable doubt one or more special circumstances, and before a jury 
has resolved whether death or life is the more appropriate penalty based on careful 
consideration of a wealth of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  (§§ 190.2, 
190.3.)  These twin safeguards—a careful narrowing of the eligible pool, followed 
by identification of those deserving death through the application of guided 
discretion—have consistently been held sufficient to render California’s death 
penalty scheme constitutional, by both the United States Supreme Court and this 
court.  (E.g., Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 971–980; People v. 
Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165, 201.)  Section 190.4, subdivision (b), implicates 
neither the initial eligibility question nor the ultimate question whether death must 
25 
be imposed.  Instead, it affords some death-eligible defendants, those whose 
penalty phase trials have twice ended in hung juries or mistrials, the opportunity to 
have a trial judge remove them from the death-eligible pool.  No constitutional 
provision guarantees any death-eligible defendant such a right; the Legislature 
could have, as it did for defendants whose juries had hung only once, made retrial 
a matter of course. 
In this limited context, we conclude In re Anderson’s views on the 
permissibility of discretion in the criminal justice system in general, and capital 
punishment in particular, still have relevance and merit.  Countless provisions in 
the Penal Code reflect institutional modesty on the part of the Legislature—a 
recognition that it, in the abstract, cannot set down with precision every factor that 
should determine what, in a given case, will amount to the dispensation of justice.  
(See §§ 17, 496 & 524; In re Anderson, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 626.)  The 
Legislature rationally could conclude that a trial court would be better positioned 
to make a holistic decision whether a third penalty trial was warranted on a case-
by-case basis, and that enactment of an abstract checklist would not advance the 
decisionmaking process.  Trinh and others in his shoes are treated equally under 
the statute, and are better off than they would be if the Legislature had made retrial 
mandatory.  Accordingly, we hold his retrial, as permitted by section 190.4, 
subdivision (b), violates neither equal protection nor due process. 
3.   Wheeler-Batson Motion 
During jury selection for Trinh’s third penalty trial, the prosecution 
exercised a peremptory challenge against a Vietnamese-American prospective 
juror, N.V.  Trinh challenged this exercise of a peremptory as race based.  The 
trial court ruled Trinh had made out a prima facie case of discrimination:  N.V. 
“voir dired very well,” gave answers “similar to those offered by other jurors,” and 
26 
shared an ethnicity with Trinh.  After hearing the prosecutor’s reasons and 
affording Trinh an opportunity to argue, however, the trial court denied the 
motion.  The jury as seated included no Vietnamese-Americans.  Trinh renews his 
objection on appeal, arguing that he was deprived of the right to equal protection 
and trial by a representative jury.  (U.S. Const., 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.; Cal. 
Const., art. I, §§ 7, 16.)  We find no error. 
a.   Legal Principles 
Peremptory challenges may not be used to exclude prospective jurors based 
on race.  (Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 97; People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 
Cal.3d 258, 276; Code Civ. Proc., § 231.5.)  “The prosecution’s use of peremptory 
challenges to remove prospective jurors based on group bias, such as race or 
ethnicity, violates a defendant’s right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative 
cross-section of the community under article I, section 16 of the California 
Constitution and his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.”  (People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 801.) 
“ ‘There is a rebuttable presumption that a peremptory challenge is being 
exercised properly, and the burden is on the opposing party to demonstrate 
impermissible discrimination.’  [Citation.]”  (People v. Dement (2011) 53 Cal.4th 
1, 19; see also Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514 U.S. 765, 768.)  Under a now-familiar 
three-step process, to carry this burden a defendant must first “make out a prima 
facie case ‘by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an 
inference of discriminatory purpose.’  [Citation.]  Second, once the defendant has 
made out a prima facie case, the ‘burden shifts to the State to explain adequately 
the racial exclusion’ by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the 
strikes.  [Citations.]  Third, ‘[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial 
court must then decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike has proved 
27 
purposeful racial discrimination.’ ”  (Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 
168, fn. omitted.)  The defendant’s ultimate burden is to demonstrate that “it was 
more likely than not that the challenge was improperly motivated.”  (Id. at p. 170.)  
The same rules apply to state constitutional claims.  (People v. Taylor (2009) 47 
Cal.4th 850, 886.) 
Because the trial court found Trinh made a prima facie case of group bias 
and denied Trinh’s motion only after evaluating the prosecution’s stated reasons 
for exercising a peremptory challenge against Prospective Juror N.V., we proceed 
directly to the final stage of the Batson/Wheeler analysis and the ultimate question 
posed by Trinh’s challenge: whether it is more likely than not that the prosecutor 
struck Prospective Juror N.V. because of his ethnicity.  The focus at this point “ ‘is 
on the subjective genuineness of the race-neutral reasons given for the peremptory 
challenge, not on the objective reasonableness of those reasons.’  [Citation.]  
‘ “[E]ven a ‘trivial’ reason, if genuine and neutral, will suffice.” ’ ”  (People v. 
Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 917; see Purkett v. Elem, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 769.) 
b.   Juror N.V. 
The prosecutor explained his decision to strike N.V. as based on three 
considerations.  First, N.V. had reached middle age without ever marrying or 
having children.  Second, he was a postal worker.  Third, N.V.’s questionnaire 
revealed no opinions on the death penalty, and in voir dire the prosecutor was 
unable to get him to elaborate.   
Challenging these reasons as pretextual, Trinh asks us to conduct a 
comparative analysis with seated jurors Trinh contends shared these 
characteristics.  (See People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 622.)  We have 
explained:  “ ‘[T]he trial court’s finding is reviewed on the record as it stands at 
the time the [Batson/Wheeler] ruling is made.’  (Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at 
28 
p. 624.)  ‘If the defendant believes that subsequent events should be considered by 
the trial court, a renewed objection is required to permit appellate consideration of 
these subsequent developments.’  (Ibid.)”  (People v. Chism (May __, 2014, 
S101984) __ Cal.4th ___, ___ [p. 59].)  Eight of the 12 jurors (Nos. 1–5, 8, 10 & 
11) and all four alternates were voir dired and seated after the Batson/Wheeler 
motion was denied.  If Trinh believed the postruling responses of these jurors were 
relevant, he should have renewed that motion to avoid forfeiture.  (Chism, at 
p. ___ [p. 59].) 
Nevertheless, as in People v. Chism, supra, __ Cal.4th ___, we have 
examined the entire record, including conducting a comparative analysis with all 
seated jurors.  We have also looked at other prospective jurors the prosecution 
chose to strike.  (See Snyder v. Louisiana (2008) 552 U.S. 472, 478 [court may 
consider other strikes in evaluating whether racial animus underlay a particular 
strike].)  We conclude the record supports the prosecutor’s assertion that his 
proffered considerations distinguish N.V.  It was, accordingly, not erroneous for 
the trial court to conclude the prosecutor’s stated reasons were bona fide and that 
Trinh had not carried his burden of showing ethnicity was the real reason for 
N.V.’s elimination from the jury. 
The combination of age, marital status and parental status.  The prosecutor 
did not suggest that N.V.’s age or unmarried, childless status alone disqualified 
him, but that the combination was an issue:  a juror who was 45 and single and had 
never been married or had children was “not the type of juror I would keep.”  (See 
People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 189 [“a party may decide to excuse a 
prospective juror for a variety of reasons, finding no single characteristic 
dispositive”].)  Indeed, these demographics distinguished N.V. from every other 
member of the jury.  Among the 16 jurors and alternates, 15 had married, 10 were 
married with children, and the lone unmarried and childless juror was much 
29 
younger—22—and had had correspondingly less time to decide whether to have a 
family.  The explanation is also consistent with the prosecutor’s use of other 
strikes:  the prosecutor used peremptories to remove two other middle-aged, 
unmarried, and childless prospective jurors. 
Occupation.  The prosecutor also explained that N.V.’s occupation as a 
postal worker made him “not the type of juror I would keep.”  The trial court 
expressed doubt about the wisdom of using occupations to exclude jurors but 
indicated that in its experience both this prosecutor and others in fact did so—that 
is, that the proffered explanation was bona fide, not a pretext.  This was the issue 
for the trial court, and for us—the genuineness of the proffered basis, not its 
validity as a means of identifying preferable jurors.  (People v. Jones, supra, 57 
Cal.4th at p. 917; Purkett v. Elem, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 769.)  Whether a 
prosecutor’s generalizations about a given occupation have any basis in reality or 
not, a prosecutor “surely . . . can challenge a potential juror whose occupation, in 
the prosecutor’s subjective estimation, would not render him or her the best type 
of juror to sit on the case for which the jury is being selected.”  (People v. Reynoso 
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 925.) 
No other seated jurors had connections to the postal service.  Trinh 
correctly notes that one of the alternates, Alternate Juror No. 4, was also a postal 
employee.  However, in examining the four alternate jurors, the prosecutor took a 
markedly different approach than when selecting the first 12 jurors, engaging them 
in a much more cursory voir dire and failing to exercise any strikes, in contrast to 
using 17 peremptories in the selection of the main jury.  As well, the other factors 
expressly relied upon by the prosecutor distinguished N.V. from Alternate Juror 
No. 4.  Unlike N.V., Alternate Juror No. 4 was married with two children.  Also 
unlike N.V., Alternate Juror No. 4 expressly “support[ed] the death penalty in 
30 
cases where it is appropriate” and felt the “appeals process is too long” and that 
“[j]ustice delayed is justice denied.” 
Death penalty views.  As a third basis for excusing N.V., the prosecutor 
explained that N.V.’s questionnaire revealed no opinion about the death penalty, 
and he was unable in subsequent voir dire to extract any further opinion.  The 
record supports this explanation.  Asked his general feelings about the death 
penalty, N.V. wrote, “None.”  Asked more specifically whether the death penalty 
was used too often, too seldom, or randomly, N.V. wrote, “I don’t have any 
opinion, I don’t really pay attention [to] the death penalty.”  To every other one of 
the dozen or so questions that called for an opinion about the death penalty, N.V. 
answered summarily “yes” or “no.” 
In voir dire, the prosecutor noted N.V.’s stated lack of an opinion about the 
death penalty and that N.V. had not really thought about it, and asked if N.V. had 
“been able to think about [his views on the death penalty] since last week?”  N.V. 
replied, “No, sir.”  The prosecutor again asked if N.V. had any feelings about the 
death penalty.  N.V. replied, “No, I mean I don’t have any strong opinion to give 
the death penalty or life in prison without parole, neither is more severe than the 
other.”  Asked then to confirm that he saw death and life without parole as “the 
same,” N.V. said, “I did not think about it.”  Asked whether he had ever discussed 
the death penalty with others, N.V. replied, “No, sir.”  The trial court agreed that 
N.V. “was really just quick to give a yes or no answer to satisfy the question,” 
rather than offering a more detailed explication of his views.  He found true the 
prosecutor’s perception that N.V. was unwilling to offer an opinion about the 
death penalty:  “And you questioned him quite a bit, he had no opinions about the 
death penalty.”  A prospective juror’s unresponsiveness concerning opinions about 
the death penalty is a valid nondiscriminatory basis for striking a juror.  (People v. 
Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 176–180.) 
31 
Trinh points to five other jurors and one alternate he contends were equally 
reticent about their death penalty views, but the record does not support his claim.  
Unlike N.V., none of the five seated jurors responded exclusively with one-word 
answers, and each at one point or another provided far more insight into their 
actual thinking.  Juror No. 1 confirmed that in “the appropriate circumstances [the 
death penalty] has its place” and later, in denying any conscientious objection, 
affirmed that the death penalty “has merit in the right circumstances.”  She also 
identified crimes for which she thought death should be automatic.  Juror No. 2 
indicated that “[i]n some cases, the death penalty is absolutely warranted” and 
listed examples.  Juror No. 3 offered questionnaire answers indicating she had 
thought about the death penalty and described the types of crimes she thought 
deserved automatic death.  In voir dire, she explained that she thought of the death 
penalty as a “harsher” punishment than life without parole and would treat it as 
such in deliberations.  Juror No. 8 expressly “support[ed] the death penalty in 
heinous crime cases” and indicated death was appropriate for mass murderers.  
While the death penalty was imposed too frequently in some places, such as 
Texas, it was not imposed too frequently in California.  Finally, Juror No. 12 
indicated her belief that the death penalty should “exist as an option to be imposed 
when a jury feels it is appropriate” and added a lengthy paragraph detailing her 
thoughts about the frequency with which death was imposed and the imperfect 
correlation between cases where it was imposed and cases where it should be 
imposed.  In voir dire, she offered that she had “always believed in the death 
penalty all [her] life.” 
Trinh is correct that Alternate Juror No. 1’s responses concerning the death 
penalty were nearly as sparse as those of N.V., but unlike N.V., the alternate did 
offer her affirmative belief that death should be “an option” for some cases.  
Moreover, as indicated, the prosecutor invested much less energy in vetting the 
32 
alternates.  Alternate Juror No. 1 was the last juror chosen; Trinh’s counsel joked 
at the start of the very brief voir dire both sides conducted, “Do you [Alternate 
Juror No. 1] have any idea how many people are going to buy you lunch if we just 
accept you?”  That the prosecutor accepted Alternate Juror No. 1, a married 
mother of two, does not cast doubt on the nondiscriminatory reasons he gave for 
choosing to strike N.V. 
In the trial court, Trinh offered only the bare fact of N.V.’s ethnicity to 
rebut the genuineness of the prosecutor’s proffered nondiscriminatory reasons.7  
The comparisons to other jurors he presents on appeal do not establish the trial 
court erred in accepting as genuine those proffered reasons.  “[T]he ultimate 
burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, 
the opponent of the strike.”  (Purkett v. Elem, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 768.)  We 
conclude Trinh has not carried that burden. 
D.   PENALTY TRIAL ISSUES 
1.   Admissibility of the Prosecution’s Victim Impact Evidence 
Before the third penalty trial, Trinh moved to limit both the scope of the 
People’s victim impact evidence and the number of witnesses per victim.  The trial 
court granted Trinh’s motion in part, precluding the prosecution from asking 
certain forms of questions it concluded, based on the second penalty trial, were too 
likely to elicit irrelevant or inflammatory responses, but otherwise denied the 
motion.  Thereafter, over the course of part of one morning, the People presented 
                                              
7  
After the prosecutor spelled out his reasons, defense counsel replied, “Well, 
I just think that is insufficient.  Your Honor, I will submit on that.”  After the trial 
court indicated its preliminary view that the prosecutor had rebutted any inference 
of discrimination, the court gave Trinh a second chance to highlight reasons to 
think N.V.’s removal from the jury was based on race.  Trinh declined the 
opportunity and again simply submitted the matter. 
33 
the testimony of nine victim impact witnesses, a reduction from the 11 who 
testified at the second penalty trial.  Trinh contends the ensuing victim impact 
testimony included inflammatory, irrelevant, and prejudicial matters, in violation 
of his due process and other rights.  (U.S. Const., 5th, 8th & 14th Amends.; Cal. 
Const., art. I, §§ 15, 17.)  Having reviewed the testimony, we conclude no error 
occurred. 
The admission of victim impact evidence in a capital trial does not violate 
the Eighth Amendment per se (Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 827; 
People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1030) and, insofar as it demonstrates “the 
specific harm caused by the defendant, including the impact on the family of the 
victim,” is admissible under section 190.3, factor (a) (People v. Edwards (1991) 
54 Cal.3d 787, 835; see Tully, at p. 1031; People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 
1274–1275).  There are limits:  victim impact evidence is inadmissible under state 
law to the extent it “invites a purely irrational response,” and is precluded under 
the federal Constitution “if it is so unduly prejudicial as to render the trial 
fundamentally unfair.”  (People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 190; accord, 
People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1203.)  We review the trial court’s 
admission of victim impact evidence for abuse of discretion.  (People v. Vines 
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 887–888; People v. Murtishaw (2011) 51 Cal.4th 574, 
595–596.) 
First, Trinh argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to limit the 
number of witnesses testifying in connection with each victim.8  In the trial court, 
                                              
8  
Attempted murder victim Mila Salvador testified on her own behalf.  
Murder victim Marlene Mustaffa’s husband testified.  Murder victim Vincent 
Rosetti’s mother, brother, sister, and two daughters testified.  Finally, murder 
victim Ronald Robertson’s wife and son testified. 
34 
Trinh sought a limit of two witnesses per victim; here, he argues that no more than 
one should have been allowed.  We decline to impose such an arbitrary bar.  
(People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 883–884 [victim impact testimony need 
not be limited to a single witness]; People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 
690 [same]; see, e.g., People v. Pearson, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 467 [concluding 
“[t]he overall number of victim impact witnesses was not excessive” where eight 
testified concerning one murder victim and five testified concerning another].)  
The number of witnesses sufficient to accurately portray the effects of a 
defendant’s actions will vary from case to case, and the trial court is vested with 
discretion to control any excesses by excluding cumulative as well as irrelevant 
testimony.  (Evid. Code, §§ 350, 352.)  Nor do we agree with Trinh’s contention 
that even apart from the number of witnesses, the witnesses’ testimony here was 
unduly cumulative.  If they choose, “[t]he People are entitled to present a 
‘ “complete life histor[y] [of the murder victim] from early childhood to death” ’ ”  
(People v. Garcia (2011) 52 Cal.4th 706, 751), subject to the trial court’s exercise 
of discretion under Evidence Code section 352.  It is inevitable the description of 
the victim by multiple witnesses will overlap to some extent.  That such overlap 
occurred with the testimony by the families of Vincent Rosetti and Ronald 
Robertson did not render the trial fundamentally unfair or invite the jury to decide 
based on an irrational response. 
Second, Trinh argues the testimony actually given should have been 
restricted to discussions of the effect of the crimes on the victims’ immediate 
family and those present at the crime scene, not the victims’ friends or the 
community at large.  Neither the United States Supreme Court nor this court has 
ever identified a constitutional or statutory basis for so constraining the 
permissible scope of victim impact testimony (see Payne v. Tennessee, supra, 501 
U.S. at pp. 822–823 [prosecution may be permitted to show the loss to the 
35 
community as a whole]; id. at p. 830 (conc. opn. of O’Connor, J.) [same]; People 
v. Pearson, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 466–467; People v. Thomas (2011) 51 Cal.4th 
449, 507–508; People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 792–793), and because 
Trinh offers no persuasive reasons that would render these authorities inapposite, 
we again decline to do so here. 
Third, Trinh contends victim impact testimony should have been confined 
to effects that were known or reasonably should have been known by Trinh at the 
time of the crimes or were part of the proof of the underlying charges.  We have 
repeatedly rejected this limit as neither constitutionally nor statutorily warranted.  
(People v. Tully, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1031; People v. Thomas (2012) 54 Cal.4th 
908, 941; People v. Myles (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181, 1219; People v. McKinnon, 
supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 690.)  Trinh offers no cogent arguments for reconsidering 
these cases, and we reject the proposed limit again. 
Finally, Trinh objects that allowing victim impact testimony exposed the 
jury to an outburst by one of the witnesses, Suzanne Robertson, in response to a 
defense counsel objection,9 as well as Robertson’s attempt at the close of her 
testimony to directly address Trinh in a foreign language, perhaps Vietnamese.  
The trial court sustained the objection that provoked the witness’s original 
outburst and later struck from the record her attempt to address Trinh directly and 
admonished the jury to disregard it.  Only one juror heard Robertson’s remarks—
but did not understand them—and in any event, we presume the jurors followed 
the court’s admonishment to disregard them (People v. Pearson, supra, 56 Cal.4th 
                                              
9  
During Robertson’s testimony, defense counsel objected to the form of a 
question posed to her.  Before the trial court could sustain the objection, Robertson 
told Trinh’s counsel:  “This is a never-ending story.  [¶] I am real tired of your 
objections.” 
36 
at pp. 434–435; People v. Gonzales and Soliz, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 292).  There 
was no prejudice from either incident. 
2.   Prosecutorial Misconduct 
As part of his motion before the third penalty trial to limit the scope of 
victim impact evidence, Trinh identified particular questions he thought were 
unduly likely to prompt irrelevant or inflammatory responses.  The trial court 
agreed, noting that questions such as “ ‘How did you learn of the murder?,’ ” 
“ ‘What happened at the funeral?,’ ” “ ‘What was the hardest thing to do after you 
found out he was murdered?,’ ” and “ ‘Anything else you need to tell us?’ ” had 
consistently yielded irrelevant or improper responses during the second penalty 
trial, and defense objections to these questions would be sustained. 
When it came time to introduce victim impact evidence, the prosecutor 
disregarded the foregoing admonition and proceeded in short order to ask each of 
the first five witnesses, and six of the first seven, versions of one or more of the 
foreclosed questions.  Each time, Trinh’s counsel objected.  Each time, the 
objection was sustained.10  The last time finally resulted in the aforementioned 
                                              
10  
Direct examination of Dave Mustaffa: 
 
“Q.: Where were you when you learned she had been killed? 
 
“A.: I was at work, and they called me on the radio and told me to come up 
to the office, that they needed to talk to me.  And when I got up— 
 
“[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I would respectfully object. 
 
“A.: —They took me into the back. 
 
“The Court: The objection is sustained. 
 
“Q.: After you learned that your wife was killed, what was the hardest thing 
for you to do initially? 
 
“[Defense Counsel]: I would object, Your Honor.  I am sorry.  But I think 
that is an improper form. 
 
“The Court: Rephrase your last question. 
 
“Q.: Tell us how your wife’s death has impacted you.” 
 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
37 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
Direct examination of Debbie Marshall: 
 
“Q.: After you learned of Vince’s death, what was the hardest thing for 
you? 
 
“[Defense Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor, improper form. 
 
“The Court: Sustained. 
 
“Q.: What was the impact of his death on you?” 
 
 
Direct examination of Michael Rosetti: 
 
“Q.: After you learned of his death, what was the hardest thing for you? 
 
“[Defense Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor, improper form. 
 
“The Court: Sustained. 
 
“Q.: Tell us how your brother’s death impacted you.  [¶] . . . [¶]  
 
“Q.: Is there anything else that you need to tell us? 
 
“[Defense Counsel]: Objection, improper form. 
 
“The Court: Sustained. 
 
“Q.: Thank you very much, Sir.” 
 
 
Direct examination of Angela Rosetti-Smith: 
 
“Q.: Initially what was the hardest thing for you after your dad was killed? 
 
“[Defense Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor, improper form. 
 
“The Court: Sustained. 
 
“Q.: Tell us how your dad’s murder impacted you.” 
 
 
Direct examination of Becky Rosetti: 
 
“Q.: Initially after your dad was killed, what was the hardest thing for 
you— 
 
“[Defense Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor, improper form. 
 
“The Court: Sustained. 
 
“Q.: Tell us about the impact of your dad’s murder on yourself.” 
 
 
Direct examination of Suzanne Robertson: 
 
“Q.: What is the hardest thing for you now? 
 
“A.: I think that— 
 
“[Defense Counsel]: Objection— 
 
“The Witness: This is a never-ending story.  [¶] I am real tired of your 
objections. 
 
“Q.: Ma’am— 
 
“The Court: Sustained. 
 
“Q.: Suzanne, tell us how this has impacted your family.” 
38 
outburst from witness Suzanne Robertson.  (See ante, at p. 35 & fn. 9, pp. 36–37, 
fn. 10.)  Trinh contends the prosecutor’s actions deprived him of due process.  
(U.S. Const., 8th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15.) 
We agree with Trinh that it was misconduct for the prosecutor repeatedly to 
ask questions in a form the court had prophylactically barred the prosecution from 
using because of the risk of yielding improper responses, and to which the court 
thereafter time and again sustained objections.  “ ‘It is, of course, misconduct for a 
prosecutor to “intentionally elicit inadmissible testimony.”  [Citations.]’  
[Citation.]  Such misconduct is exacerbated if the prosecutor continues to attempt 
to elicit such evidence after defense counsel has objected.”  (People v. Smithey 
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 960; accord, People v. Tully, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1035; 
People v. Abel (2012) 53 Cal.4th 891, 925.)  At the outset, and certainly before the 
fifth time, it should have been apparent to the prosecutor that asking a witness 
what, in the wake of a loved one’s murder, was the hardest thing for him or her 
was a form of question the trial court would not permit.  (Cf. Tully, at p. 1037 
[holding it would be misconduct for the prosecutor to repeatedly violate a standing 
court order as to the form of questions directed to victim impact witnesses, but 
finding no misconduct in the absence of such an order].)  As Trinh notes, by 
repeatedly pursuing this line of questioning, the prosecution offered defense 
counsel the Hobson’s choice of alienating witnesses and losing the sympathies of 
the jury by interrupting emotionally fraught testimony or forgoing objection to 
questions the trial court had already established were likely to yield irrelevant or 
inflammatory responses.   
However, Trinh has not shown the misconduct resulted in prejudice.  
Generally, there is no prejudice where an objection is made and sustained.  
(People v. Pearson, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 427; People v. Tully, supra, 54 Cal.4th 
at p. 1038; People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 687; People v. Dykes (2009) 
39 
46 Cal.4th 731, 764.)  Because the trial court sustained each objection, no 
inadmissible testimony was heard by the jury.  Nor do we agree with Trinh’s 
contention that the posing of these questions alone implied to the jury that the 
prosecutor possessed additional information about unspecified, undisclosed 
devastating impacts from Trinh’s acts.  Although the repeated asking of these 
questions was clear misconduct, the consequences of the improper questions fell 
far short of “infect[ing] the trial with such unfairness as to render the subsequent 
conviction a denial of due process” (People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 711), 
and there is no reasonable probability they influenced the verdict (see People v. 
Turner (2004) 34 Cal.4th 406, 433). 
E.   POSTTRIAL ISSUES 
1.   Denial of Motion for New Trial 
Before sentencing, Trinh moved for a new trial on various grounds.  (See 
§ 1181.)  The trial court denied the motion.  On appeal, Trinh renews his argument 
with respect to three of these grounds.  We review for an abuse of discretion 
(People v. Homick, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 894) and conclude the trial court did not 
err. 
Two of the three bases for a new trial we have already addressed.  Trinh 
contends a new trial was required because of intentional prosecutorial misconduct, 
but the misconduct was not prejudicial.  (Ante, at pp. 36–39.)  Trinh also argues 
that a new trial was required because subjecting him to a third penalty trial was 
unconstitutional.  Section 190.4, subdivision (b), authorizing third penalty trials, is 
constitutional both on its face and as applied to Trinh.  (Ante, at pp. 22–25.)  
Moreover, any problems with permitting a third penalty trial to go forward would 
not have been cured by subjecting Trinh to a fourth penalty trial, the only relief 
available.  (§ 1181.) 
40 
Trinh’s remaining new trial claim rests on an incident of spectator 
misconduct.  As has been mentioned, during direct examination, victim impact 
witness Suzanne Robertson, the widow of Ronald Robertson, responded directly to 
a defense counsel objection:  “This is a never-ending story.  [¶] I am real tired of 
your objections.”  According to a defense investigator’s declaration, Derek 
Robertson, Ronald and Suzanne’s son, also called out from the audience, “ ‘[S]hut 
up, bitch.’ ”  In the investigator’s opinion, the remark was directed at the male 
cocounsel for Trinh who interposed the objection. 
“[I]n general, a party promptly should object to audible comments from 
spectators that have the potential to prejudice the jury, thereby enabling the trial 
court to correct the problem at the outset.”  (People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 
50, 87, fn. 8.)  The “ ‘failure to object to and request a curative admonition for 
alleged spectator misconduct waives the issue for appeal if the objection and 
admonition would have cured the misconduct.’ ”  (People v. Chatman (2006) 38 
Cal.4th 344, 368.)  As the trial court noted in denying Trinh’s new trial motion, 
Trinh did not object to Derek Robertson’s comment.  Trinh responds that when the 
trial court observed angry facial expressions from Derek during Suzanne 
Robertson’s testimony and thereafter expressed concerns that if called as a witness 
Derek would prove uncontrollable, Trinh’s attorneys indicated they had heard a 
remark from Derek, but this observation constitutes neither an objection nor a 
request for redress.  Trinh’s counsel did not specify at the time what they had 
heard Derek say, nor did they seek any remedial action from the trial court.  
Neither the trial court nor the prosecutor heard the remark; the trial court thus had 
no opportunity to admonish the jury and ameliorate any prejudice.11 
                                              
11  
Counsel could rationally have concluded that pursuing the matter further 
with the jury would only serve to highlight and give weight to a heckle that many, 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
41 
Trinh contends the trial court should in any event have investigated sua 
sponte whether the jury had heard Derek Robertson’s comment once the court 
learned of it.  However, the court reasonably could have decided the single three-
word remark was so de minimis that even if the jury had heard it, there simply was 
no possibility it would affect the verdict and prejudice Trinh.  (People v. Myles, 
supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1215 [spectator misconduct will not warrant a mistrial 
unless it could influence the verdict]; People v. Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th at 
p. 87 [trivial and innocuous spectator comments are an insufficient basis for a new 
trial].)  This is so even if we consider the remark in combination with Suzanne 
Robertson’s comment from the witness stand (see ante, at p. 35 & fn. 9, p. 37, 
fn. 10), as Trinh asks us to.  Taking into account the entirety of the evidence 
admitted at the penalty phase, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
determining the incident was inconsequential and denying the motion for a new 
trial.  (See Cornwell, at p. 87 [“the trial court must be accorded broad discretion in 
evaluating the effect of claimed spectator misconduct” because it typically is 
present and “in the best position to evaluate the impact of such conduct on the 
fairness of the trial”].)12 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
most, or all jurors might not have even heard.  (See People v. Hinton (2006) 37 
Cal.4th 839, 898–899.) 
12  
For additional support, Trinh cites the same constellation of out-of-state 
spectator misconduct cases we considered and distinguished in People v. Lucero 
(1988) 44 Cal.3d 1006, 1023–1024 and People v. Myles, supra, 53 Cal.4th at page 
1216.  They are no more persuasive here; like Lucero, this case involves a “single 
isolated outburst” (Lucero, at p. 1023), not the repeated misconduct sometimes 
found sufficient to warrant reversal by various sister state courts. 
42 
2.   Denial of Postverdict Motion for Life Without Possibility of Parole 
Sentence 
Following the third penalty phase trial and before sentencing, Trinh moved 
on constitutional grounds to have the trial court set aside the death verdict and 
impose a sentence of life without parole.  Counsel argued that over the course of 
three trials, Trinh had learned how best to tailor his testimony to ensure the jury 
would return his desired verdict, death, and accordingly the verdict was a product 
of Trinh’s fabrications and an unreliable and unfair trial.  The People opposed the 
motion as baseless, and the trial court summarily denied it.  Trinh argues this was 
error, in violation of his rights to due process and a fair and reliable trial.  (U.S. 
Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 1, 7, 13, 15–17, 22.) 
A defendant has the fundamental right to testify, even over the objections 
of counsel.  (Rock v. Arkansas (1987) 483 U.S. 44, 49–53; People v. Nakahara 
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 717.)  A defendant may exercise that right to plead with a 
jury for a death sentence.  (Nakahara, at p. 719; People v. Bradford (1997) 15 
Cal.4th 1229, 1364; People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 617.)  Doing so does 
not render the penalty trial unconstitutionally unreliable, particularly where the 
jury is given a limiting instruction reminding it that the responsibility for deciding 
the appropriate penalty remains the jurors’ and should be based solely on their 
evaluation of the relevant aggravating and mitigating evidence.  (Nakahara, at 
p. 719; People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494, 534–535; People v. Guzman (1988) 
45 Cal.3d 915, 961–963.) 
These principles apply fully here.  Granting Trinh’s counsel’s contention 
that Trinh’s testimony at the third penalty trial was calculated to persuade the jury 
to vote for death, we note that the jury was expressly instructed not to abdicate its 
43 
responsibilities and simply accede to Trinh’s wishes.13  We assume the jury 
followed this instruction (People v. Pearson, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 414; People v. 
Whalen, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 88; People v. Homick, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 867) 
and independently evaluated the aggravating and mitigating evidence. 
Trinh argues the trial court erred by failing to address the merits of his 
motion, but the court was not obligated to explain in any detail the reasons for its 
ruling, which was manifestly correct under settled precedent that bound it.  The 
court afforded counsel an opportunity to argue the motion; when counsel declined 
and submitted on the papers, the court’s summary denial was sufficient to dispose 
of the motion (see In re Podesto (1976) 15 Cal.3d 921, 937 [recognizing that the 
requirement of a statement of reasons from a trial court is the exception rather than 
the rule]; cf. People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 112–117 [discussing the 
contrasting constitutional requirement that appellate courts state their reasons 
when disposing of a cause]). 
Trinh also argues that People v. Webb, supra, 6 Cal.4th 494, and People v. 
Guzman, supra, 45 Cal.3d 915, are distinguishable because Trinh’s testimony was 
more inflammatory than in those cases and tantamount to a waiver of his right to a 
fair trial, and because the trial court was on notice from the previous penalty trials 
that Trinh would seek to inject irrelevant and untrue statements into his testimony 
and should have barred retrial to stop him.  We find no basis for a distinction.  
True, Trinh implicitly asked the jury for a death sentence, saying that he 
“execute[d] three of your fellow U.S. citizen[s]” and “accept[ed]” the same in 
                                              
13  
The trial court read a modified version of CALJIC No. 8.85 to the jury, 
advising the jurors in part:  “Despite the testimony of Mr. Trinh, the defendant in 
this case, it remains your obligation to decide for yourself, based on the statutory 
factors that I have read to you, whether death is appropriate.” 
44 
return and telling the jury to “[D]o your job.”  But this is little different from the 
testimony in Webb and Guzman, in which the defendants went so far as to 
explicitly ask for death.  (Webb, at p. 513; Guzman, at pp. 929–933.)  Trinh’s 
counsel presented a full case in mitigation.  Trinh’s testimony did not amount to a 
waiver of a fair trial and deprive the state of its interest in a reliable penalty 
determination.  (See Guzman, at p. 962.)  Moreover, the trial court, alerted to 
Trinh’s possible intentions, exercised control over Trinh’s testimony, barring him 
from testifying about newly invented political motivations for the killings and 
repeatedly striking Trinh’s answers when Trinh tried to disregard questions and 
extemporize to the jury.14  Contrary to Trinh’s assertions, the third penalty trial 
was not infused with irrelevancies and falsehoods. 
Consequently, we adhere to our prior rulings in People v. Webb, supra, 6 
Cal.4th 494, and People v. Guzman, supra, 45 Cal.3d 915, that a defendant’s 
request for death does not irremediably undermine the reliability of the penalty 
phase trial.  Indeed, to conclude otherwise would create a perverse “Catch-22” in 
which a defendant, by testifying in an inflammatory fashion in a way superficially 
intended to ensure a death sentence, could thereby become entitled to a life 
                                              
14  
In the wake of the shootings and at the first penalty trial, Trinh made clear 
his sole motivation was to avenge perceived hospital mistreatment of his mother 
and expressed remorse.  At the second penalty trial, Trinh denied remorse and 
tried for the first time to claim he was killing Americans as revenge for United 
States actions in Vietnam.  Before the third penalty trial, the court made clear it 
would exclude any attempt by Trinh to inject United States–Vietnam issues into 
the trial as irrelevant and, even if marginally relevant, as more prejudicial than 
probative because of the high military presence and pro-military sentiment in 
Orange County.  As the court put it:  “Trinh doesn’t want a fair trial.  I am going 
to do my best to give him one.  That’s all I can do.  I think that’s what this 
government is all about.” 
45 
sentence.  The trial court did not err in refusing Trinh’s request to substitute a 
sentence of life without possibility of parole in place of the jury’s death verdict. 
3.   Cumulative Prejudice from Errors 
Trinh contends that even if we do not conclude any individual error during 
the pretrial, guilt, or penalty phases mandates reversal, the cumulative effect of the 
alleged errors denied him due process and compels reversal.  We disagree.  The 
refusal of a heat of passion pinpoint instruction, the failure to provide the jury with 
copies of CALJIC Nos. 2.60 and 2.61, and the prosecutor’s repetition of improper 
questions did not prejudice Trinh when considered in combination any more than 
they did when considered individually.  Consistent with our review of defendant’s 
individual claims, we find no cumulative error occurred. 
4.   Constitutionality of California’s Death Penalty 
Finally, Trinh raises a series of challenges to the constitutionality of 
California’s death penalty.  We have rejected each before, and because Trinh 
offers no compelling arguments in favor of reconsidering these rulings, we do so 
again. 
California’s special circumstances (see § 190.2) adequately narrow the 
class of murderers eligible for the death penalty.  (People v. Williams, supra, 56 
Cal.4th at p. 201; People v. Homick, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 903; People v. Tully, 
supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1067; People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 731.)  Nor 
does section 190.3, factor (a), which permits the jury to consider the circumstances 
of the crime in deciding whether to impose the death penalty, license the arbitrary 
and capricious imposition of the death penalty.  (Tuilaepa v. California, supra, 
512 U.S. at pp. 975–976; Williams, at p. 201; People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 
82, 179; People v. Thomas, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 949.) 
46 
Neither the failure to impose a burden of proof on the ultimate question of 
life or death, nor the absence of an instruction that there is no burden of proof, is 
unconstitutional.  (People v. Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1215; People v. 
McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 698; People v. Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at 
p. 658.)  Nothing in the state or federal Constitution requires that the penalty jury 
(1) issue written findings, (2) unanimously agree on any particular aggravating 
circumstances, or (3) find that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  (People v. Homick, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 902–903; 
People v. Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 179–180; People v. Gamache, supra, 48 
Cal.4th at pp. 406–407.)  We have concluded as well that Apprendi v. New Jersey 
(2000) 530 U.S. 466, Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, Blakely v. Washington 
(2004) 542 U.S. 296, and Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, cases 
which impose procedural constraints on factfinding in criminal trials, do not 
require re-examination of these conclusions:  “[T]he ultimate determination of the 
appropriateness of the penalty and the subordinate determination of the balance of 
the evidence of aggravation and mitigation do not entail the finding of facts that 
can increase the punishment for murder of the first degree beyond the maximum 
otherwise prescribed.  Moreover, those determinations do not amount to the 
finding of facts, but rather constitute a single fundamentally normative assessment 
[citations] that is outside the scope” of Apprendi and its progeny.  (People v. 
Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 595; see People v. Lightsey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at 
p. 731; People v. McDowell, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 443; People v. Jones, supra, 
54 Cal.4th at p. 86.) 
“CALJIC No. 8.88’s use of the words ‘so substantial,’ its use of the word 
‘warrants’ instead of ‘appropriate,’ . . . and its failure to instruct the jury on a 
‘presumption of life’ does not render the instruction invalid.”  (People v. Rountree 
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 823, 862–863; see People v. Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at 
47 
p. 1211; People v. Homick, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 904.)  Nor is CALJIC No. 8.85 
flawed because it may include inapplicable aggravating or mitigating factors; the 
trial court was under no obligation to omit these.  (People v. Williams, supra, 56 
Cal.4th at p. 698; People v. Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 180; People v. 
McDowell, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 444.) 
Neither the state nor the federal Constitution requires intercase 
proportionality review, also known as comparative proportionality review.  
(People v. Homick, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 903; People v. Valdez, supra, 55 
Cal.4th at p. 180; People v. Tully, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1068.)  Nor does the 
equal protection clause require California to include in its capital sentencing 
scheme every procedural protection provided noncapital defendants.  (Valdez, at 
p. 180; Tully, at p. 1069; People v. Thomas, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 949.) 
Trinh’s argument that California’s regular use of capital punishment 
violates international norms of human decency and thus the Eighth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution fails “because California does not employ capital 
punishment in such a manner.  The death penalty is available only for the crime of 
first degree murder, and only when a special circumstance is found true; 
furthermore, administration of the penalty is governed by constitutional and 
statutory provisions different from those applying to ‘regular punishment’ for 
felonies.  (E.g., Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11; §§ 190.1-190.9, 1239, subd. (b).)”  
(People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 43–44; see People v. Homick, supra, 
55 Cal.4th at p. 904; People v. Tully, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1070; People v. 
Thomas, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 950.)  His argument that application of the death 
penalty in this particular case violates international law fares no better; it hinges 
on his previous assertions that his trial was infused with prejudicial constitutional 
violations.  As his trial was not, the conclusion that international norms were also 
48 
violated fails.  (People v. Nunez and Satele (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1, 62; People v. 
Lopez (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1028, 1084; Homick, at p. 904; Tully, at p. 1070.) 
III.   DISPOSITION 
We affirm the trial court’s judgment in its entirety. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KENNARD, J.*
                                              
*  
Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, assigned by the Chief 
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.   
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY LIU, J. 
 
The court properly rejects defendant’s claim that the prosecutor’s strike of 
Prospective Juror N.V. was motivated by discriminatory intent.  (See Batson v. 
Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson).)  I reach this conclusion based on an 
independent review of the record; as explained below, deference to the trial court’s 
ruling is not appropriate in this case. 
As today’s opinion explains, the prosecutor gave credible, race-neutral 
reasons for dismissing N.V.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 27–32.)  However, in denying 
defendant’s Batson motion, the trial court relied not only on the prosecutor’s 
stated reasons but also on its own assumption that it was “suspicious” and “very 
odd” for a person of Vietnamese descent not to have taken a special interest in a 
murder case involving a Vietnamese defendant.  Clearly, that type of explanation 
for striking prospective jurors, which is based on “assumptions . . . which arise 
solely from the jurors’ race,” would be impermissible if proffered by the 
prosecutor.  (Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 98; see, e.g., Kesser v. Cambra (9th Cir. 
2006) 465 F.3d 351, 362 (en banc) (lead opn. of Bybee, J.) [Native American 
prospective juror who worked for her tribe could not be dismissed based on 
prosecutor’s assumption that such individuals are “more likely to ‘associate 
themselves with the culture and beliefs of the tribe’ ”].)  This is the second time in 
the past year that we have decided a capital case where the trial court, in denying a 
Batson claim, voiced its own assumptions about a protected group.  (See People v. 
 
2 
 
Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 630, 652 (Williams) [in upholding prosecutor’s strikes 
against five black women, trial judge said that in her experience “ ‘[B]lack women 
are very reluctant to impose the death penalty; they find it very difficult no matter 
what it is’ ”].)  We cannot accord deference to Batson rulings informed by such 
impermissible generalizations.  (See Williams at p. 699 (dis. opn. of Werdegar, J.); 
id. at p. 717 (dis. opn. of Liu, J.).) 
Here is the entirety of what the trial court said in analyzing the prosecutor’s 
reasons for striking N.V.:  “Like another juror that [the prosecutor] excused, 
[N.V.] seemed to be very anxious to sit on this case.  One thing that [the 
prosecutor] didn’t mention that I thought very odd was [N.V.] read about the case 
in the paper, and didn’t give it any thought.  Which is very striking to me, he is 
Vietnamese, a little younger than Mr. Trinh, but single like Mr. Trinh.  I’m not so 
sure, in fact there is no evidence that he is taking care of his mother or anything 
like that.  I am concerned about excusing postal workers, that just once you start 
picking on occupations, I think we are all over the place.”  “When [the prosecutor 
said that N.V. was] ‘nonresponsive,’ he was really just quick to give a yes or no 
answer to satisfy the question.”  “And you [the prosecutor] questioned him quite a 
bit, he had no opinions about the death penalty.  He did say no strong feelings for 
either penalty.”  “I agree [with the prosecutor], I even went beyond not only that 
he was overly eager to serve, I just find that strange he didn’t take an interest in 
this case, very, very unusual.  In the Lisa Peng case, that entire community was 
talking, reading the paper, and on and on and on about the case.  Maybe he is just 
unique.  But if I were the prosecutor, I would be suspicious of a person who says 
no interest in the case after reading about it.” 
The trial court’s mention of “the Lisa Peng case” appears to be a reference 
to the high-profile case of Lisa Peng, a Taiwanese woman living in Orange County 
who was tried three times for murdering her husband’s Chinese mistress and their 
 
3 
 
infant son in 1993.  (See Pfeifer & Morin, Jury Deadlocks in 3rd Double-Murder 
Trial:  Court:  A mistrial is declared for Taiwanese tycoon’s wife accused of 
killing his mistress, son, L.A. Times (June 19, 2001) p. B-1.) 
Of the 24 lines of transcript comprising the trial court’s analysis quoted 
above, 15 are devoted to its observation that it was “very odd” and “suspicious” 
for N.V., a Vietnamese-American, not to take special interest in defendant’s case 
after reading about it in the newspaper.  These assumptions were compounded by 
the trial court’s statement, unsupported by any evidence, that “that entire 
community” (presumably Chinese Americans or Asian Americans) “was talking, 
reading the paper, and on and on and on about the [Lisa Peng] case.”  To his 
credit, the prosecutor immediately and clearly disavowed any reliance upon the 
trial court’s observations.  But it is clear that these observations influenced the trial 
court’s assessment of the credibility of the prosecutor’s explanation that N.V.’s 
unresponsive views on the death penalty were suspect. 
As today’s opinion holds, defendant did not carry his burden of showing 
that the prosecutor’s motives were based on N.V.’s race.  But a “trial court’s 
Batson rulings are not entitled to deference on appeal” where, as here, the ruling is 
informed by the trial court’s own assumptions about a particular racial or ethnic 
group.  (Williams, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 717; see Schuette v. Coalition to Defend 
Affirmative Action (2014) 572 U.S. __, __ [188 L. Ed. 2d 613; 2014 U.S. LEXIS 
2932 at p. *30] (plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.) [“this Court has rejected the assumption 
that ‘members of the same racial group—regardless of their age, education, 
economic status, or the community in which they live—think alike . . . .’ ”].) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
 
1 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Trinh 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S115284 
Date Filed: June 5, 2014 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Orange 
Judge: John J. Ryan 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Gary D. Garcia, 
Deputy State Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, 
Assistant Attorney General, Holly D. Wilkens and Lynne G. McGinnis, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Gary D. Garcia 
Deputy State Public Defender 
221 Main Street, Tenth Floor 
San Francisco, CA  94105 
(415) 904-5600 
 
Lynne G. McGinnis 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West A Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2205