Title: State v. Guevara

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 296A96
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
ANGEL GUEVARA a/k/a JOSE ROSADO
Appeal as of right by defendant pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-
27(a) from a judgment imposing a sentence of death entered by
Jenkins, J., at the 6 May 1996 Criminal Session of Superior
Court, Johnston County, upon a jury verdict finding defendant
guilty of first-degree murder.  Defendant’s motion to bypass the
Court of Appeals as to an additional judgment for assault with a
deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury was
allowed by this Court 28 July 1997.  Heard in the Supreme Court
10 March 1998.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by William B. Crumpler,
Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by Staples
Hughes, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-
appellant.
LAKE, Justice.
The defendant was indicted for first-degree murder and
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting
serious injury.  Defendant was tried capitally to a jury at the 6
May 1996 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Johnston County,
Judge Knox V. Jenkins, Jr., presiding.  The jury found defendant
guilty of both charges.  Following a capital sentencing
proceeding, the jury recommended that defendant be sentenced to
death for the first-degree murder conviction.  On 20 June 1996,
the trial court sentenced defendant to death for the first-degree
murder conviction and to a term of 92 to 120 months’ imprisonment
for the assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill
inflicting serious injury conviction.
At trial, the State presented evidence tending to show that
on the afternoon of 2 September 1995, when the temperature was
approximately eighty-five degrees, Benjamin Becker, a security
officer, discovered an automobile parked outside North Hills Mall
in Raleigh, North Carolina, with the doors locked and windows up,
and three small children inside.  Officer Becker was
investigating the situation when defendant approached and started
screaming and pointing his fingers in the officer’s face. 
Without provocation, defendant pulled out an approximately four-
inch knife and repeatedly lunged towards the unarmed officer. 
Defendant eventually leaped back into his car and quickly drove
away.  Officer Becker obtained the license plate number and
reported the incident to the Raleigh Police Department.  Pursuant
to a license plate check, Detective Paula O’Neal determined Jose
Rosado of 39 Morehead Drive, West Johnston Mobile Home Park, in
Johnston County, to be a suspect.  Jose Rosado was also wanted
for the felony of false pretense and in an assault case.
On the morning of 11 September 1995, in response to a
request from the Raleigh Police Department, two officers with the
Johnston County Sheriff’s Department, Lieutenant Ronald Medlin
and Deputy Paul West, went to a Johnston County mobile home park
to verify the address of a man named Jose Rosado.  Upon the
officers’ arrival at 39 Morehead Drive, West Johnston Mobile Home
Park, Lieutenant Medlin knocked at the front door for several
minutes, but no one responded.  A red Mustang convertible and a
gray Dodge Ram pickup truck were parked outside.  Deputy Medlin
asked the dispatcher, Phyllis Edwards, to run a license check on
the Mustang, and the dispatcher responded that the automobile was
registered to Jose Rosado.  Lieutenant Medlin then turned around
and saw defendant, accompanied by a two- or three-year-old boy,
standing outside the mobile home’s back door.  The officers asked
defendant if he was Jose Rosado, and he informed the officers
that Rosado was not there.  After being asked for identification,
defendant handed Lieutenant Medlin a passport which contained
defendant’s picture and indicated that he was Angel Guevara.  The
officers believed that he was Rosado and that he was wanted on an
outstanding arrest warrant in North Carolina for the felony of
false pretense.  The officers further learned from the dispatcher
that Rosado was also wanted in New York City under the name of
Angel Guevara for the felony of reckless endangerment.
Lieutenant Medlin, standing near defendant’s door, used his
walkie-talkie to ask the dispatcher to check with New York
authorities as to whether defendant was still wanted.  Upon
confirmation that defendant was still wanted, Lieutenant Medlin
stated that they would take him in.  Defendant heard Lieutenant
Medlin’s words and retreated into his home and slammed the back
door.  Deputy West pushed the door open and entered the mobile
home.  Lieutenant Medlin did not lose sight of Deputy West at any
time.  In a matter of seconds, Lieutenant Medlin saw Deputy West
throw his right hand up and heard him say, “No, no, no, don’t,
don’t.”  Lieutenant Medlin heard a shot, and Deputy West fell to
the floor facedown, where he died.
Lieutenant Medlin called for assistance and headed towards
the door of the mobile home with his gun drawn.  He heard another
shot and was knocked by the bullet onto the hood of a car which
was parked nearby.  Lieutenant Medlin could see defendant inside
the mobile home and could see Deputy West lying on the floor, his
weapon still inside its holster.  Lieutenant Medlin, although
severely injured, managed to make his way back to his marked
sheriff’s car.  He heard another shot, then saw defendant come
out of the mobile home, get into his truck and speed away.  Other
officers and emergency personnel quickly arrived at the scene. 
Defendant was arrested several days later in New York City. 
Lieutenant Medlin sustained three serious wounds to the right
side of his chest and, as of the time of trial, had not been able
to return to work.  An autopsy report indicated that Deputy West
sustained a large, fatal bullet wound to the left side of his
chest; another gunshot wound to the left groin area; multiple
blunt-force injuries to his head; and severe bruises on his head,
neck, lower chest area and left shoulder.
In his first assignment of error, defendant contends that
the trial court erred in declining to suppress Lieutenant
Medlin’s eyewitness account of the shooting of Deputy West. 
Defendant argues that this testimony was the “fruit of the
poisonous tree” because Deputy West illegally entered defendant’s
home without a warrant.  We conclude that the trial court
correctly declined to suppress Lieutenant Medlin’s eyewitness
account.
We first note that under the circumstances here presented,
it is unnecessary to consider whether Deputy West lawfully
entered defendant’s home.  This Court has held that under the
exclusionary rule, “[w]hen evidence is obtained as the result of
illegal police conduct, not only should that evidence be
suppressed, but all evidence that is the ‘fruit’ of that unlawful
conduct should be suppressed.”  State v. Pope, 333 N.C. 106, 113-
14, 423 S.E.2d 740, 744 (1992) (emphasis added).  However, this
Court has further held that the exclusionary rule “must be
discerned in light of the facts in each case.  When so
considered, it is apparent that the rule does not require the
exclusion of evidence obtained after an illegal entry when that
evidence is offered to prove the murder of one of the officers
making the entry.”  State v. Miller, 282 N.C. 633, 641, 194
S.E.2d 353, 358 (1973).  As we noted in Miller, application of
the exclusionary rule to exclude evidence of crimes directed
against the person of trespassing officers “would in effect give
the victims of illegal searches a license to assault and murder
the officers involved--a result manifestly unacceptable.”  Id. 
Therefore, in the case sub judice, regardless of whether Deputy
West lawfully entered defendant’s home, Lieutenant Medlin’s
eyewitness account of the events which transpired subsequent
thereto is not barred by application of the exclusionary rule.
Although it is thus unnecessary for this Court to discuss
the legality of Deputy West’s entry, we note that his entry into
defendant’s home was indeed lawful due to the presence of exigent
circumstances.  The United States Supreme Court held in Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980), that even when
probable cause exists, a suspect may not be arrested in his home
without an arrest warrant.  However, in the presence of an
emergency or dangerous situation described as an “exigent
circumstance,” officials may lawfully make a warrantless entry
into a home to effect an arrest.  Id. at 583, 63 L. Ed. 2d at
648-49.  To determine whether exigent circumstances were present
in the case sub judice, we must consider the totality of the
circumstances.  State v. Worsley, 336 N.C. 268, 282, 443 S.E.2d
68, 75 (1994).  The United States Supreme Court has indicated
that a suspect’s fleeing or seeking to escape could be considered
an exigent circumstance.  Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 109 L.
Ed. 2d 85 (1990).  The Supreme Court there stated in reviewing
the lower court’s decision:
The Minnesota Supreme Court applied essentially
the correct standard in determining whether exigent
circumstances existed.  The court observed that “a
warrantless intrusion may be justified by hot pursuit
of a fleeing felon, or imminent destruction of
evidence, or the need to prevent a suspect’s escape, or
the risk of danger to the police or to other persons
inside or outside the dwelling.” 
Id. at 100, 109 L. Ed. 2d at 95 (quoting State v. Olson, 436
N.W.2d 92, 96 (Minn. 1989)).  In the case sub judice, the
defendant’s actions, in suddenly withdrawing into his home and
slamming the door, created the appearance that he was fleeing or
trying to escape, and this coupled with the presence of a young
child suddenly caught in such circumstances created an exigent
circumstance justifying Deputy West’s entry without a warrant. 
We note that Deputy West clearly had probable cause to arrest
defendant in light of the felony charges pending against
defendant in both North Carolina and New York.  Accordingly,
based on the circumstances in this case, we hold that Deputy
West’s entry into defendant’s home was indeed lawful.  We
conclude that the trial court correctly declined to suppress
Lieutenant Medlin’s eyewitness account of the shooting of Deputy
West.  This assignment of error is overruled.
In his second assignment of error, defendant contends that
the trial court committed reversible error by failing to exercise
discretion in determining the proper response to a jury request
with regard to the testimony of Lieutenant Medlin.  We disagree. 
The record reflects that the trial court adequately complied with
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1233(a), which governs the trial court’s duty to
respond to an inquiry from the jury.
 At trial, while the jury was deliberating, the trial court
received a paper writing from the jury inquiring about three
items:  two exhibits, including an enlargement of a 911
transcript, and a reference to “Medlin’s testimony.”  The parties
and the trial court discussed the meaning of the jury’s request,
and the trial court then decided that as to “Medlin’s testimony,”
the jury was referring to a transcript of Lieutenant Medlin’s
testimony.  The trial court stated in this regard, “Well, you
know, frequently that’s done.  All of us know that.”  Pursuant to
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1233(b), the State objected to the exhibits going
into the jury room but agreed to the jury’s reviewing the
exhibits in the courtroom.  The jurors were then returned to the
courtroom, where the 911 transcript exhibit and one of
defendant’s exhibits were re-presented to them.  The trial court
then stated, “We do not have prepared transcripts of the
testimony of each witness.  It is the duty of the jury to recall
the testimony of the witness as it was presented during the trial
of the case.”  The jurors inquired no further with regard to
Lieutenant Medlin’s testimony and resumed their deliberations. 
Defendant now asserts that the jury was not merely
requesting a transcript of Lieutenant Medlin’s testimony but,
alternatively, was requesting the opportunity to have his
testimony read back by the court reporter.  Defendant thus claims
the trial court erred because it did not exercise its discretion
in deciding whether to allow the requested review.  Assuming
arguendo that the jury’s inquiry was as defendant contends, we
find the trial court properly exercised its discretion in this
case.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1233(a) provides: 
(a) If the jury after retiring for deliberation
requests a review of certain testimony or other
evidence, the jurors must be conducted to the
courtroom.  The judge in his discretion, after notice
to the prosecutor and defendant, may direct that
requested parts of the testimony be read to the jury
and may permit the jury to reexamine in open court the
requested materials admitted into evidence.  In his
discretion the judge may also have the jury review
other evidence relating to the same factual issue so as
not to give undue prominence to the evidence requested. 
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1233(a) (1997).  “This statute imposes two duties
upon the trial court when it receives a request from the jury to
review evidence.  First, the court must conduct all jurors to the
courtroom.  Second, the trial court must exercise its discretion
in determining whether to permit requested evidence to be read to
or examined by the jury together with other evidence relating to
the same factual issue.”  State v. Ashe, 314 N.C. 28, 34, 331
S.E.2d 652, 657 (1985).  This Court has held that “[w]hen no
reason is assigned by the court for a ruling which may be made as
a matter of discretion . . . , the presumption on appeal is that
the court made the ruling in the exercise of its discretion.” 
Brittain v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 254 N.C. 697, 703, 120
S.E.2d 72, 76 (1961). 
In the case sub judice, the defendant has failed to show
that the trial court abused its discretion under N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1233(a) in declining to provide the jury a review of Lieutenant
Medlin’s testimony.  This Court has held that a trial court does
not commit reversible error by denying a jury request to review
testimony of a particular witness when “[i]t is clear from [the]
record that the trial court was aware of its authority to
exercise its discretion and allow the jury to review the expert’s
testimony.”  State v. Lee, 335 N.C. 244, 290, 439 S.E.2d 547,
571, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 891, 130 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1994). 
However, this Court has found reversible error when a trial
court’s comments indicate that the court misunderstood its
authority to allow a review of a witness’ testimony or failed to
exercise discretion in this regard.  For instance, this Court
concluded in State v. Lang, 301 N.C. 508, 272 S.E.2d 123 (1980),
that the trial court’s comment to the jury that “the transcript
was not available to them was an indication that [it] did not
exercise [its] discretion to decide whether the transcript should
have been available under the facts of this case.  The denial of
the jury’s request as a matter of law was error.”  Id. at 511,
272 S.E.2d at 125.  In the case sub judice, the fact that the
trial court considered the jury’s request and acknowledged that
it had the authority to provide the jury with Lieutenant Medlin’s
testimony is indicated by the trial court’s comment that
“frequently that’s done.”  The trial court did not say or
indicate that it could not make the transcript or review of the
testimony available to the jury.  The record therefore reflects
that the trial court considered, but in its discretion denied,
the jury’s request in compliance with the statute.  Accordingly,
this assignment of error is overruled. 
In his third assignment of error, defendant contends that
the prosecutor was improperly permitted to argue over defendant’s
objection that the jurors could find that the statutory
mitigating circumstances had no mitigating value.  Defendant
therefore contends that he is entitled to a new sentencing
proceeding.  We disagree.  When read as a whole and viewed in the
overall context in which the prosecutor’s statements were made,
we find that the jurors could not have been led to believe that
they could accord the statutory mitigating circumstances no
mitigating value.
This Court has held that a prosecutor’s statements in jury
argument “must be reviewed in the overall context in which they
were made and in view of the overall factual circumstances to
which they referred.”  State v. Penland, 343 N.C. 634, 662, 472
S.E.2d 734, 750 (1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 136 L. Ed. 2d
725 (1997).  In this case, during jury argument, the prosecutor
addressed statutory and nonstatutory circumstances.  In
concluding his argument, the prosecutor stated: 
The bottom line is I don’t see how any of these
mitigating factors have any mitigating value whatsoever
. . . with what you are talking about.  Do they reduce
the moral culpability of what was done to Paul West? 
Now, you will next move on to weighing the aggravating
and mitigating factors.  And even if one or more of you
should find that all of the mitigating factors not only
exist but also have mitigating value, I contend to you
that there is no way the mitigating factors outweigh
the aggravating factors that the State has proven to
you beyond a reasonable doubt.
In order for a prosecutor’s argument to constitute prejudicial
error, the “comments must have so infected the trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due
process.”  State v. Green, 336 N.C. 142, 186, 443 S.E.2d 14, 40,
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1046, 130 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1994).  Clearly,
the prosecutor did not categorically tell the jurors that they
could not give the statutory mitigating circumstances any
mitigating value.  In fact, the prosecutor went on to argue that
if one or more jurors found the circumstances to “have mitigating
value,” the mitigators did not outweigh the aggravators.
Even assuming arguendo that the prosecutor’s remarks did not
fully and correctly state the law in this respect, these
statements were certainly clarified by other means.  First, the
trial court correctly instructed the jury on the law regarding
mitigating circumstances from the pattern jury instructions,
making a clear distinction between statutory and nonstatutory
mitigating circumstances.  Further, the Issues and Recommendation
as to Punishment form made this distinction clear.  Second, the
trial court repeatedly and clearly instructed the jurors to
follow the law as it was given to them.  Finally, both
prosecutors and one of defendant’s attorneys, in their closing
arguments at the penalty phase, reiterated to the jurors their
duty to follow the law as given to them by the trial court.  We
presume that juries follow the trial court’s instructions.  State
v. Richardson, 346 N.C. 520, 538, 488 S.E.2d 148, 158 (1997),
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 239 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1998); State v.
Johnson, 341 N.C. 104, 115, 459 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1995).  We
therefore conclude that in light of the arguments overall and the
trial court’s correct instructions on mitigating circumstances,
the jury could not have been misled and in fact followed these
instructions.  Accordingly, this assignment of error is
overruled.
In his fourth assignment of error, defendant contends that
because Deputy West’s death occurred during his illegal entry
into defendant’s residence, the trial court incorrectly submitted
the aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed
against a law enforcement officer “while engaged in the
performance of his official duties.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(8)
(1997).  We disagree.  First, as we have noted above, Deputy
West’s entry was not illegal.  Further, we reiterate that we need
not address the legality of Deputy West’s entry into defendant’s
mobile home because even if Deputy West improperly entered
defendant’s home, defendant had no right to use deadly force
under the circumstances of this situation.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-401(f)
provides in part: 
Use of Deadly Weapon or Deadly Force to Resist Arrest.
--
(1)
A person is not justified in using a deadly weapon
or deadly force to resist an arrest by a
law-enforcement officer using reasonable force,
when the person knows or has reason to know that
the officer is a law-enforcement officer and that
the officer is effecting or attempting to effect
an arrest.
(2)
The fact that the arrest was not authorized under
this section is no defense to an otherwise valid
criminal charge arising out of the use of such
deadly weapon or deadly force.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-401(f)(1), (2) (1997).  Therefore, in accordance
with N.C.G.S. § 15A-401(f), even assuming arguendo that Deputy
West in some way improperly performed his official duties,
defendant was still not justified in using deadly force against a
law enforcement officer attempting to effect an arrest.  The
(e)(8) aggravating circumstance was thus properly submitted to
the jury.  This assignment of error is overruled.
In defendant’s fifth assignment of error, he further
contends that the trial court committed reversible error,
depriving defendant of due process of law, by failing to exclude
additional portions of the prosecutor’s closing argument for
death during the sentencing phase.  Defendant first claims in
this assignment of error that the prosecutor’s victim-impact
argument--unsworn assertions that Deputy West “was a good father,
husband, son, brother and friend”--was unsupported by the
evidence and improperly considered.  We do not agree with this
assessment.
In State v. Moody, 345 N.C. 563, 481 S.E.2d 629, cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1997), this Court noted
the United States Supreme Court held that
“if the State chooses to permit the admission of victim
impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that
subject, the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar.  A
State may legitimately conclude that evidence about the
victim and about the impact of the murder on the
victim’s family is relevant to the jury’s decision as
to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed.”
Id. at 573, 481 S.E.2d at 633 (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501
U.S. 808, 827, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 736 (1991)).  Victim-impact
statements may be admitted at a capital sentencing proceeding
unless the evidence “is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the
trial fundamentally unfair.”  Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. at
825, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 735.  “Victim impact evidence is admissible
in capital sentencing proceedings.”  State v. Robinson, 339 N.C.
263, 278, 451 S.E.2d 196, 205 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S.
1135, 132 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1995).  This Court has held that the
prosecution is allowed “some latitude in fleshing out the
humanity of the victim so long as it does not go too far.”  State
v. Reeves, 337 N.C. 700, 723, 448 S.E.2d 802, 812 (1994), cert.
denied, 514 U.S. 1114, 131 L. Ed. 2d 860 (1995).  
A review of the record reflects that the prosecutor’s
comments that Deputy West “was a good father, son, brother and
friend” were in fact supported by the evidence.  In her
testimony, the wife of Deputy West spoke about him in reference
to his family and identified a guardian angel pin which he wore
on his uniform and a photograph of him.  From Mrs. West’s
testimony, the photographs and the angel pin, the prosecutor
emphasized to the jury that Deputy West was a family man.  The
prosecutor also referred to Lieutenant Medlin’s testimony and to
Deputy West’s first words to the defendant, “hey good buddy,” to
suggest to the jury that these words reflected the kind of man
Deputy West was.
Although defendant failed to object during the prosecutor’s
closing argument, he now contends that the prosecutor improperly
stated, “I think you can tell from the size of the crowd which
had attended most of this trial,” to suggest that Deputy West was
a family man.  Although the number of people attending the trial
is an indicator of community interest and possibly esteem, this
alone was clearly not evidence as to what kind of man Deputy West
was.  We nevertheless conclude that this limited comment,
particularly in light of the other evidence, was not so grossly
improper as to require the trial court to intervene ex mero motu.
Defendant additionally contends that the prosecutor’s
victim-impact argument went too far.  The prosecutor argued: 
The second reason I say this trial is coming at a most
appropriate time is the passage of this past Sunday’s
Father’s Day.  And on that very day immediately after
winning the NBA championship and being recognized
perhaps as the greatest basketball player to ever live,
Michael Jordan felt pain, not joy.  Why?  . . . Because
he wept like a baby.
The trial court sustained defendant’s objection to this comment. 
Although this argument was improper, it was not so grossly
improper as to result in a denial of due process.  It was, in
essence, a meaningless, irrelevant aside, having nothing to do
with the defendant or the trial.  Thus, we conclude this comment
did not “stray so far from the bounds of propriety as to impede
the defendant’s right to a fair trial.”  State v. Davis, 305 N.C.
400, 422, 290 S.E.2d 574, 587 (1982).  Further, the trial court
properly sustained defendant’s objection which “advised the
jurors that they should not consider the statement.”  State v.
Larry, 345 N.C. 497, 527, 481 S.E.2d 907, 924, cert. denied, ___
U.S. ___, 139 L. Ed. 2d 234 (1997).
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor used the lyrics of
a song to improperly suggest that the cards were procedurally
stacked against the State at the sentencing phase and to exploit
or impugn defendant’s right to counsel.  The prosecutor stated:
And I can think of no better expression of this
sentiment than the words of a song, a requiem, if you
will, that I want to leave with you.
Somebody killed a policeman today and a part of America
died.  A piece of country that he swore to protect will
be buried right by his side.  The suspect who shot him
must stand up in court with counsel demanding his
rights.  While the young widowed mother must work for
her kids and cry a many a long, long night.
We do not conclude that the lyrics of this song suggest that the
cards were procedurally stacked against the State or that they in
any way implicated or impugned defendant’s right to counsel. 
Even assuming arguendo that these lyrics could be interpreted as
defendant contends, this argument is clearly not so unduly
prejudicial as to render the sentencing phase of the trial
fundamentally unfair.  Trial counsel is allowed wide latitude in
argument to the jury and may argue all of the evidence which has
been presented as well as reasonable inferences which arise
therefrom.  State v. Williams, 317 N.C. 474, 481, 346 S.E.2d 405,
410 (1986).  We further emphasize that
statements contained in closing arguments to the jury
are not to be placed in isolation or taken out of
context on appeal.  Instead, on appeal we must give
consideration to the context in which the remarks were
made and the overall factual circumstances to which
they referred.  Further, it must be remembered that the
prosecutor in a capital case has a duty to strenuously
pursue the goal of persuading the jury that the facts
of the particular case at hand warrant imposition of
the death penalty.
Green, 336 N.C. at 188, 443 S.E.2d at 41.  This Court has also
noted that although counsel is allowed wide latitude in both the
guilt-innocence and sentencing phases of trial, “‘the foci of the
arguments in the two phases are significantly different, and
rhetoric that might be prejudicially improper in the guilt phase
is acceptable in the sentencing phase.’”  State v. Bishop, 343
N.C. 518, 552, 472 S.E.2d 842, 860 (1996) (quoting State v.
Artis, 325 N.C. 278, 324, 384 S.E.2d 470, 496 (1989), sentence
vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1023, 108 L. Ed. 2d 604
(1990)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 136 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1997). 
Thus, based on these principles, we hold that the trial court did
not err in failing to exclude ex mero motu these comments by the
prosecutor.
Finally, defendant contends the prosecutor improperly argued
general deterrence.  The prosecutor argued: 
State’s exhibit number 9, it is not pleasant to look at
it.  And I know undoubtedly you feel that you’ve seen
it enough, but that’s the way Paul West was left and
his plea was answered.  You see unless the killing of a
law enforcement officer is dealt with the utmost
seriousness, then the disrespect for law and order that
is inherent in that despicable act is encouraged.
We conclude that this argument in overall context did not
constitute a general deterrence argument but merely focused the
jury’s attention on the seriousness of the crime and the
importance of the jury’s duty.  We have previously held that the
prosecutor is allowed to argue the seriousness of the crime. 
State v. Barrett, 343 N.C. 164, 181, 469 S.E.2d 888, 898, cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 136 L. Ed. 2d 259 (1996); see State v.
Jones, 339 N.C. 114, 159, 451 S.E.2d 826, 850 (1994), cert.
denied, 515 U.S. 1169, 132 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1995); State v. Artis,
325 N.C. at 329, 384 S.E.2d at 499.
We conclude that all these statements complained of did not
result in a denial of “‘that fundamental fairness essential to
the very concept of justice.’”  Donnelly v. De Christoforo, 416
U.S. 637, 642, 40 L. Ed. 2d 431, 436 (1974) (quoting Lisenba v.
California, 314 U.S. 219, 236, 86 L. Ed. 166, 180 (1941)).  We
hold that all of defendant’s complaints under this assignment of
error are not so unduly prejudicial so as to deny defendant
fundamental fairness in the sentencing proceeding.
PRESERVATION ISSUES
Defendant, in his sixth assignment of error, asserts that
the trial court violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution in not allowing him the opportunity for allocution
before the jury.  This Court has previously ruled that it is not
error for the trial court in a capital case to disallow
allocution.  State v. Wright, 342 N.C. 179, 463 S.E.2d 388
(1995).  Upon consideration of defendant’s argument and
authorities cited, we find no compelling reason for this Court to
overrule our prior holding on this issue.  This assignment of
error is overruled. 
In his seventh assignment of error, defendant asserts that
the trial court committed federal constitutional error in
submitting to the jury the (e)(11) course of conduct aggravating
circumstance, in that the jury did not mark the verdict sheet and
so did not convict defendant under the felony murder rule.  See
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(11).  We first note that the jury in this
case additionally convicted defendant of assault with a deadly
weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury. 
Furthermore, this Court has held contrary to defendant’s position
in State v. McCollum, 334 N.C. 208, 433 S.E.2d 144 (1993), cert.
denied, 512 U.S. 1254, 129 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1994).  In the case sub
judice, as in McCollum, the jury failed to answer both questions
on the verdict sheet with respect to whether defendant was guilty
on the basis of malice, premeditation and deliberation and under
the felony murder rule.  The jury’s failure to follow the trial
court’s instructions to give a “yes” or “no” answer to both
questions does not indicate that the jury found defendant
blameless under the felony murder rule.  Id. at 220-22, 433
S.E.2d at 150-51.  The jury’s affirmative response that it did
find defendant guilty of first-degree murder under one theory, on
the basis of malice, premeditation and deliberation, does not
indicate that the jury rejected conviction under another theory,
in this case the felony murder rule.  See id.  This assignment of
error is without merit.
Next, in his eighth assignment of error, defendant contends
that the trial court committed federal constitutional error in
its use of the word “may” in sentencing Issues Three and Four. 
Defendant acknowledges that this Court has previously decided
this issue adversely to defendant’s position and upheld the
constitutionality of this instruction.  State v. Lee, 335 N.C. at
286-87, 439 S.E.2d at 569-70.  We find no basis for reversing our
prior holding in this regard.  Accordingly, this assignment of
error is overruled.
In his ninth assignment of error, defendant contends that
the trial court erred by instructing the jury on nonstatutory
mitigating circumstances in a way which allowed the jurors to
reject such circumstances on the basis that they had no
mitigating value.  As defendant acknowledges, this Court has
previously found this argument to be without merit.  It is well
established under North Carolina law that the instruction given
by the trial court in this regard is correct and not in violation
of either our state or federal Constitution.  State v. Womble,
343 N.C. 667, 694, 473 S.E.2d 291, 307 (1996), cert. denied, ___
U.S. ___, 136 L. Ed. 2d 719 (1997).  As we have previously
stated, this instruction does not limit or prevent the jury’s
consideration of any relevant evidence in mitigation but merely
requires the jury to find both the existence of the nonstatutory
circumstance and that it has mitigating value.  State v.
Stephens, 347 N.C. 352, 366, 493 S.E.2d 435, 444 (1997), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, ___ L. Ed. 2d ___, 1998 WL 248880 (Oct. 5,
1998) (No. 97-8927).  We therefore reject this assignment of
error.
In his tenth assignment of error, defendant argues that the
trial court erred by instructing the jury that it must be
satisfied that any mitigating circumstance exists.  This Court
has repeatedly rejected this argument.  State v. Payne, 337 N.C.
505, 531-33, 448 S.E.2d 93, 108-09 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S.
1038, 131 L. Ed. 2d 292 (1995).  We have consistently held that
“[i]t is the responsibility of the defendant to go forward with
evidence that tends to show the existence of a given mitigating
circumstance and to prove its existence to the satisfaction of
the jury.”  State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 356, 279 S.E.2d 788,
809 (1981); see also State v. Green, 336 N.C. at 185, 443 S.E.2d
at 39; State v. Brown, 306 N.C. 151, 178, 293 S.E.2d 569, 586-87,
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1080, 74 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1982).  We find no
compelling reason to reconsider our prior holding in this regard. 
Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled. 
PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
Having found no error in either the guilt/innocence phase of
defendant’s trial or the capital sentencing proceeding, we are
required by statute to review the record and determine (1)
whether the evidence supports the aggravating circumstances found
by the jury; (2) whether passion, prejudice or “any other
arbitrary factor” influenced the imposition of the death
sentence; and (3) whether the sentence is excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,
considering both the crime and the defendant.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-
2000(d)(2).  After thoroughly reviewing the record, transcript
and briefs in the present case, we conclude that the record fully
supports the aggravating circumstances found by the jury. 
Further, we find no indication that the sentence of death in this
case was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any
other arbitrary factor.  We therefore turn to our final statutory
duty of proportionality review.
One purpose of proportionality review is to guard “against
the capricious or random imposition of the death penalty.”  State
v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 354, 259 S.E.2d 510, 544 (1979), cert.
denied, 448 U.S. 907, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1137 (1980).  Another “is to
eliminate the possibility that a person will be sentenced to die
by the action of an aberrant jury.”  State v. Holden, 321 N.C.
125, 164-65, 362 S.E.2d 513, 537 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1061, 100 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1988).  In conducting proportionality
review, we compare this case to others in the pool, as defined in
State v. Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 79-80, 301 S.E.2d 335, 355, cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 865, 78 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1983), and State v.
Bacon, 337 N.C. 66, 106-07, 446 S.E.2d 542, 563-64 (1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1159, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1083 (1995), that “are
roughly similar with regard to the crime and the defendant.” 
State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 648, 314 S.E.2d 493, 503 (1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1120, 86 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1985).  Whether
the death penalty is disproportionate “ultimately rest[s] upon
the ‘experienced judgments’ of the members of this Court.”  State
v. Green, 336 N.C. at 198, 443 S.E.2d at 47.
The sentence of death in this case is not excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases
considering both the crime and the defendant.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-
2000(d)(2).  The jury in this case found both aggravating
circumstances that were submitted.  First, the jury specifically
found that the murder was committed against a law enforcement
officer engaged in the performance of his official duties. 
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(8).  Second, the jury found that the
murder was part of a course of conduct in which defendant engaged
and which included a crime of violence against another person. 
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(11).  As Justice (now Chief Justice)
Mitchell succinctly stated in State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465, 319
S.E.2d 163 (1984):
The murder of a law enforcement officer engaged in
the performance of his official duties differs in kind
and not merely in degree from other murders.  When in
the performance of his duties, a law enforcement
officer is the representative of the public and a
symbol of the rule of law.  The murder of a law
enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his
duties in the truest sense strikes a blow at the entire
public--the body politic--and is a direct attack upon
the rule of law which must prevail if our society as we
know it is to survive.  
Id. at 488, 319 S.E.2d at 177 (Mitchell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).  The United States Supreme Court has
also recognized the importance of protecting our nation’s police
officers.  In Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 52 L. Ed. 2d
637 (1977), the Supreme Court stated:  “There is a special
interest in affording protection to these public servants who
regularly must risk their lives in order to guard the safety of
other persons and property.”  Id. at 636, 52 L. Ed. 2d at 641.
This Court has found death sentences disproportionate in
seven cases:  State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 372 S.E.2d 517
(1988); State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352 S.E.2d 653 (1987); State
v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341 S.E.2d 713 (1986), overruled on
other grounds by State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 483 S.E.2d 396,
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1997), and by
State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988); State v.
Young, 312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985); State v. Hill, 311
N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 163; State v. Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309
S.E.2d 170 (1983); State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703
(1983).  
We find the instant case distinguishable from each of these
cases.  None of these cases, with the exception of State v. Hill,
involved the first-degree murder of a police officer engaged in
the performance of his official duties.  The brutal murder in the
case sub judice was also part of a course of conduct which
included another violent crime, the severe wounding of another
police officer.  This case is distinguishable from Hill, where
the defendant was also convicted of the first-degree murder of a
police officer and sentenced to death.  There, the defendant was
convicted of first-degree murder for killing a police officer
with the officer’s own gun after the two struggled.  This Court
vacated the sentence of death because of speculative evidence
about what the defendant was doing prior to his encounter with
the officer and lack of evidence as to who drew the murder weapon
out of the officer’s holster.  We find the present case
distinguishable from Hill in several respects.  First, in the
case sub judice, defendant stood in his mobile home and used his
own rifle to kill Deputy West, including the firing of shots at
him while the officer lay on the floor facedown, his weapon still
inside its holster.  Second, defendant shot another officer,
Lieutenant Medlin, from a distance, severely wounding him. 
Third, after shooting both officers, defendant made no effort to
assist the officers but instead leapt into his truck and quickly
fled.  Fourth, the jury convicted defendant of first-degree
murder under the theory of premeditation and deliberation and
found the existence of two aggravating circumstances:  (1) the
murder was committed against a law enforcement officer in the
performance of his official duties, the (e)(8) aggravating
circumstance; and (2) the murder was part of a course of conduct
including other violent crimes, the (e)(11) aggravating
circumstance.  “The course of conduct circumstance is often
present in cases where the jury imposes death instead of life
imprisonment.”  State v. Miller, 339 N.C. 663, 694, 455 S.E.2d
137, 154, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 893, 133 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1995).
This case is similar to cases in which we have found the
death penalty proportionate.  In State v. Harden, 344 N.C. 542,
476 S.E.2d 658 (1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 137 L. Ed. 2d
483 (1997), we affirmed a sentence of death where the defendant
shot two police officers who were trying to arrest him.  The jury
there found the same two aggravating circumstances as found here. 
Similarly, in State v. Page, 346 N.C. 689, 488 S.E.2d 225 (1997),
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 L. Ed. 2d 651 (1998), we affirmed
a sentence of death where the jury found the same two
aggravators.  We thus conclude that this case is similar to cases
in which we have found the sentence of death proportionate and
not similar to any case where we have found the death penalty
disproportionate.
We hold that defendant received a fair trial and capital
sentencing proceeding, free of prejudicial error.
NO ERROR.
Justice WYNN did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
==========================
Justice FRYE concurring.
I agree that defendant received a fair trial and capital
sentencing proceeding, free of prejudicial error, and that
defendant’s sentence of death is not disproportionate.
I agree with the majority that “in the case sub judice,
regardless of whether Deputy West lawfully entered defendant’s
home, Lieutenant Medlin’s eyewitness account of the events which
transpired subsequent thereto is not barred by application of the
exclusionary rule.”  State v. Guevara, ___ N.C. ___, ___, ___
S.E.2d ___, ___, slip op. at 5 (No. 296A96, filed 6 November
1998).  However, I also agree with the majority that “it is
unnecessary for this Court to discuss the legality of Deputy
West’s entry.”  Id.  Accordingly, I would neither discuss nor
decide this issue.
Justice WHICHARD joins in this concurring opinion.