Title: JAMES MARTIN HARLOW, aka THORVALDR SIGWOLF V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JAMES MARTIN HARLOW, aka THORVALDR SIGWOLF V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 12105 P.3d 1049Case Number: 04-101Decided: 02/04/2005
 
 
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 
 
                                                                                                                                   

 
 
 
 
 
 
JAMES 
MARTIN HARLOW,

aka 
THORVALDR SIGWOLF,

 
 
Petitioner,

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 

Respondent.

 
 
 
 

 
 
Representing 
Petitioner:

 
 
            
Ken Koski, Public Defender; and Marion Yoder, Senior Assistant Public 
Defender.

 
 
Representing 
Respondent:

 
 
            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Terry L. 
Armitage, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
 
 
Before 
GOLDEN and VOIGT, JJ., and SULLINS, BURKE* 
and YOUNG, D.JJ.

 
 
*  Appointed to the Wyoming Supreme Court on 
January 1, 2005

 
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from the district court's denial of James Martin Harlow's petition for 
post-conviction relief from a capital murder conviction, which denial came in 
the form of summary judgment granted to the State of Wyoming.1  We affirm.

 
 

 
 

[¶2]      The underlying 
facts of this case were set forth in detail in this Court's opinion affirming 
Harlow's conviction and sentence in his direct 
appeal, and will not herein be repeated at length.  Harlow v. State, 2003 WY 47, ¶¶ 
8-14, 70 P.3d 179, 185-87 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 970 
(2003).  Suffice it to say that on June 26, 1997, 
three Wyoming State Penitentiary inmatesBryan Collins, Richard Dowdell, and 
Harlowkilled Corporal Wayne Martinez during an escape attempt.  The three men were tried and convicted 
separately.  Collins and Dowdell 
received life sentences; only Harlow was 
sentenced to death.2  Id.  Additional facts will be noted as they 
pertain to the issues discussed below.

 
 

 
 
[¶3]      Pertinent 
portions of the Wyoming statutes provide as 
follows:

 
 

Definition 
of "this act"; commencement and conduct of proceedings.

 
 
            
. . .

 
 
            
(b)       
Any person serving a felony sentence in a state penal institution who 
asserts that in the proceedings which resulted in his conviction there was a 
substantial denial of his rights under the constitution of the 
United States or of the state 
of Wyoming, or 
both, may institute proceedings under this act.

 
 

Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-14-101 (Lexis Nexis 2003).

 
 
Claims 
barred; applicability of act.

 
 
            
(a)       
A claim under this act is procedurally barred and no court has 
jurisdiction to decide the claim if the claim:

 
 
(i)         
Could have been raised but was not raised in a direct appeal from the 
proceeding which resulted in the petitioner's conviction;

 
 
(ii)        Was 
not raised in the original or an amendment to the original petition under this 
act; or

 
 
(iii)       Was decided 
on its merits or on procedural grounds in any previous proceeding which has 
become final.

 
 
            
(b)       
Notwithstanding paragraph (a)(i) of this section, a court may hear a 
petition if:

 
 
(i)         
The petitioner sets forth facts supported by affidavits or other credible 
evidence which was not known or reasonably available to him at the time of a 
direct appeal; or

 
 
(ii)        The 
court makes a finding that the petitioner was denied constitutionally effective 
assistance of counsel on his direct appeal.  This finding may be reviewed by the 
supreme court together with any further action of the district court taken on 
the petition.

 
 

Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-14-103 (Lexis Nexis 2003).

 
 

 
 
[¶4]      Harlow's jury trial occurred during the month of October 
1998, and he was sentenced on November 5, 1998.  Final judgment was entered on December 
7, 1998.  Harlow, 2003 WY 47, 
¶ 14, 70 P.3d  at 186.  Harlow's appeal was docketed in the district court on 
February 23, 1999.  Id. at 212.  This Court's opinion affirming 
Harlow's conviction and sentence was published 
on April 14, 2003.  Id., 2003 WY 47, 
70 P.3d 179.  Harlow filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the 
district court on December 2, 2003.  
The parties' motions for summary judgment were heard on March 22, 2004, 
after which the district court issued its decision letter and order granting 
summary judgment to the State.3  On May 11, 2004, Harlow filed in this Court a petition for writ of 
certiorari or review, which petition was granted on May 25, 
2004.

 
 

 
 
[¶5]      Harlow presents the following 
issues:

 
 
            
1.         
Did the district court err in summarily denying and dismissing each of 
the following claims of federal constitutional error:

 
 
A.        Were 
Harlow's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial violated when he 
was tried in an atmosphere marked by hypersecurity, including but not limited to 
the heavy physical restraint of Harlow and of 
two of his witnesses?

 
 
B.        Were 
Harlow's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights 
to a fair trial violated when highly prejudicial and largely irrelevant 
testimony regarding uncharged misconduct, and his uncounseled statements about 
that conduct, were improperly admitted?

 
 
C.        Were 
Harlow's Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial violated 
when the prosecutor made overreaching and factually incorrect argument urging 
the jury to, among other things, impose a death sentence in order to protect 
themselves and future employees of the Department of Corrections, and trial 
counsel did not object to such improper argument, nor was it broached on 
appeal?

 
 
D.        Were 
Harlow's Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights to due process and equal treatment before the law violated when the jury 
was inadequately instructed and also was required to follow a verdict form that 
was inadequate under the United States Constitution?

 
 
E.        Were 
Harlow's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights violated when the 
State did not adduce sufficient evidence to sustain each of his convictions and 
two of the aggravating circumstances upon which his capital conviction sentence 
is based?

 
 
F.         
Were Harlow's Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights violated when he was rendered ineffective assistance of 
counsel, and such was not broached on appeal?

 
 
G.        Were 
Harlow's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights 
violated when he was rendered ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel?

 
 
H.        Were 
Harlow's Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights to trial by a fair and impartial jury violated when he was tried by an 
unqualified jury?

 
 
I.          
Were Harlow's Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
rights violated when he was not afforded access to counsel and thus gave 
uncounseled statements about the events of June 26, 1997, and about prior 
crimes, which statements were admitted against him at 
trial?

 
 
J.         
Were Harlow's Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights to a fair trial, equal protection and due process violated when 
victim impact testimony was admitted, despite the fact that no state law permits 
its introduction at capital sentencing proceedings?

 
 
K.        Were 
Harlow's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights 
violated when the constitutional errors that occurred during his capital trial 
were deemed harmless despite the fact that the State failed to carry its burden 
of disproving the harm caused by each error?

 
 
L.         
Were Harlow's Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and to be accorded 
equal treatment before the law violated when he was sentenced to death even 
though his role in the victim's death was minor in comparison to the deeds of 
his far more culpable co-defendants, both of whom received life 
sentences?

 
 
M.        Were 
Harlow's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process violated when he 
was tried and sentenced to death under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101, et seq. 
(Michie 1997), which statutes are vague on their face and as 
applied?

 
 
N.        Was 
Harlow's Eighth Amendment right to be free from 
cruel and unusual punishment violated by the cumulative constitutional errors 
that occurred at trial?

 
 
O.        Were 
Harlow's Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights to the due process guarantee of fundamental fairness violated by the 
cumulative constitutional errors that occurred at trial?

 
 
P.        Were 
Harlow's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights 
to due process and equal protection violated by the untimely disposition of his 
appeal?

 
 

2.         
Were Harlow's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and his 
state-created liberty interests, protected by Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 100 S. Ct. 2227, 65 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1980), 
violated when the district court held that capital sentencing phase errors are 
not cognizable in post-conviction relief, regardless of 
merit?

 
 

 
 

[¶6]      Our standard for 
review of summary judgments has been stated many times and need not be 
reiterated here.  See, for 
example, NuHome Investments, LLC v. Weller, 2003 WY 171, ¶ 7, 81 P.3d 940, 
944 (Wyo. 2003) and Ahrenholtz v. Laramie Economic 
Development Corp., 2003 WY 149, ¶ 16, 79 P.3d 511, 515, amended on 
reh'g, 2003 WY 149A, 82 P.3d 714 (Wyo. 2003).  In its decision letter, the district 
court did an excellent job of capsulizing our jurisprudence in regard to 
post-conviction relief:

 
 
The 
Wyoming Supreme Court has held:

 
 
"The 
right to claims for relief by petition for post-conviction relief does not 
afford the right to treat such proceedings as an appeal from the original 
trial; original trial proceedings will not be reviewed by 
post-conviction proceedings unless and until it is shown that such is necessary 
to review some claim having to do with denial of petitioner's constitutional 
rights.  Albert v. State, 
Wyo. 1970, 
466 P.2d 826, 828, reh. den. 468 P.2d 968.  
It is virtually universally recognized that post-conviction relief is not 
a substitute for an appeal and the petition will not lie where the matters 
alleged as error could or should have been raised in an appeal or in some other 
alternative manner.  24 
C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1606(9), pp. 696-705; see, West's Digest System, Criminal 
Law, Key Number 998(2).  Relief may 
be granted only in extraordinary circumstances which strongly suggest a 
miscarriage of justice."

 
 

Munoz v. 
Maschner, 590 P.2d 1352, 1354-55 (Wyo. 1979) . . ..  There is no constitutional requirement 
that a state provide any post-conviction relief action; thus, any allowed remedy 
is strictly limited to the statutory parameters set out by statute or case 
law.  And, only substantial 
violations of constitutional rights amounting to a miscarriage of justice will 
warrant relief under Wyoming's post-conviction relief 
statutes.  The burden is on a 
petitioner to show specifically what facts exist that establish a violation of 
constitutional dimension that occurred during the proceedings resulting in his 
conviction.  Relief may be granted 
only in extraordinary circumstances that strongly suggest a miscarriage of 
justice.  Munoz, 
supra.

 
 
            
Initially, a petitioner must demonstrate facts that support his claim of 
a constitutional violation and shall provide affidavits, records or other 
evidence supporting his allegations (or state why the same are not attached to 
his petition).  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-14-102 (LexisNexis 2003).  The 
petitioner carries the burden of proving that he has been denied constitutional 
safeguards.  Hoggatt v. State, 
606 P.2d 718 (Wyo.1980).

 
 
            
Additionally, relief is limited to violations that occur in the 
"proceedings which resulted in the conviction" and the Wyoming Supreme Court has 
spoke[n] to the significant limitation imposed on the scope of post-conviction 
relief available under Wyoming's statutory 
scheme:

 
 
"As 
stated, Wyoming statutes permit post-conviction relief 
only for deprivation of constitutional rights in the proceeding which 
resulted in conviction.  
Johnson v. State, Wyo., 592 P.2d 285 (1979).  Constitutional rights are limited to 
determination of whether defendant was denied the right to counsel, to have 
witnesses, and to prepare and present his defense.  Morgan v. State, Wyo., 708 P.2d 1244 
(1985).  The application for 
post-conviction relief does not allege denial of a constitutional right in 
the proceedings that resulted in his conviction as required by § 
7-14-101, supra; rather, appellant claims his sentence after conviction was 
cruel and unusual.  Conviction and 
sentencing are not synonymous.  The 
former relates to the finding of guilt, the latter to the imposition of a 
sentence after guilt determination.  
State v. Garcia, 99 N.M. 466, 659 P.2d 918 (1983).  Here it is the sentence, not the 
judgment, that is at issue.  
Appellant was represented by an attorney, obtained a plea bargain, and 
pled guilty.  He does not seek to 
have the guilt determination set aside but rather seeks relief from his 
sentence.  It is true that if his 
sentence is cruel and unusual' as he claims, it violates a constitutional 
right; but that violation did not occur in the proceeding that resulted in his 
conviction.  It occurred, if at all, 
after that proceeding was concluded and cannot be reached in post-conviction 
relief."

 
 

Whitney 
v. State, 745 P.2d 902, 903-04 (Wyo. 1987) . . ..  Accordingly, under Wyoming's post-conviction 
relief system, alleged errors occurring during the sentencing phase of a case, 
regardless of merit, are simply not cognizable.[4]

 
 
            
Errors relating to the appellate process are not reachable per se 
under this system, as the appellate process occurs after the 
proceedings that result in conviction.  
However, claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are 
statutorily recognized as the "portal" through which otherwise waived claims of 
trial-level error may be reached.  
But, a petition for post-conviction relief, under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-14-101 et seq., cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal.  That said, if the issues already were 
decided on the merits or on procedural grounds in an earlier proceeding (such as 
the direct appeal), the claim is barred and cannot be re-litigated.  Johnson v. State, 592 P.2d 285 
(Wyo. 
1979).  Second, pursuant to Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(a), claims are procedurally barred, and no court has 
jurisdiction to hear them, if the claims could have been raised in a direct 
appeal but were not.

 
 
            
Thus, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(b)(ii) provides that claims waived for 
failure to present them on direct appeal (and, thus, barred for post-conviction 
consideration under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-101(a)(i)) may be heard if the court 
finds that the claim was not raised due to ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel.  However, recognizing the 
potential for abuse of this concept, the Wyoming Supreme Court has 
developed:

 
 
"a 
concrete standard for adequate representation by appellate counsel so that we 
will not in every instance proceed contrary to the waiver rule and will not in 
every instance simply address the matter in an ad hoc way which inevitably finds 
counsel's professional decisions tested by the collective determination of the 
members of the appellate panel as to what they would have done given the same 
situation.  We conclude that the 
issue of whether counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient in light 
of Strickland v. Washington, [466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)], as invoked in Smith v. Murray, [477 U.S. 527, 106 S. Ct. 2661, 91 L. Ed. 2d 434 (1986)], and Murray v. Carrier, [477 U.S. 478, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 91 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1986)], should be analyzed in much the same way that 
this court has analyzed the concept of plain error.  In submitting a claim of deficient 
representation by appellate counsel, the petitioner in the post-conviction 
proceeding must demonstrate to the district court, by reference to the record of 
the original trial without resort to speculation or equivocal inference, what 
occurred at that trial.  The 
particular facts upon which the claim of inadequate representation by appellate 
counsel rests must be presented.  
The petitioner then must identify a clear and unequivocal rule of law 
which those facts demonstrate was transgressed in a clear and obvious, not 
merely arguable, way.  Furthermore, 
the petitioner must show the adverse effect upon a substantial right in order to 
complete a claim that the performance of appellate counsel was constitutionally 
deficient because of a failure to raise the issue on appeal.  See McDonald v. State, Wyo., 715 P.2d 209 (1986); Tompkins v. State, 
Wyo., 705 P.2d 836 (1985), cert. denied 475 U.S. 1052, 106 S. Ct. 1277, 89 L. Ed. 2d 585 (1986); Munden v. State, Wyo., 698 P.2d 621 (1985); Westmark v. State, 
Wyo., 693 P.2d 220 (1984); Hampton v. 
State, Wyo., 558 P.2d 504 (1977).  The adverse effect upon a 
substantial right in the context of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
is shown by demonstrating a * * * reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.  A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.'  Strickland v. 
Washington, supra, 466 U.S.  at 694, 104 S. Ct.  at 2068.  In this regard the test does address the 
fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings.  See Hopkinson v. State, 
Wyo., 632 P.2d 79 (1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463 (1982); Jones v. State, 
Wyo., 580 P.2d 1150 (1978).  The reasonable 
probability must be one that demonstrates a more favorable result to the 
appellant if the omitted issue had been pursued.  See Nimmo v. State, Wyo., 603 P.2d 386 
(1979).

 
 
            
The application of these objective criteria will permit a trial court 
presented with a claim for post-conviction relief to decide whether a showing of 
cause has been made sufficient to avoid the waiver rule.  The claim for relief attaching to 
inadequate representation by appellate counsel can be resolved without 
necessarily considering the substantive merit of the issues raised.  If this process is followed, petitioners 
for post-conviction relief are not permitted to evade the waiver principle by 
the device of claiming inadequate representation by appellate counsel.  Yet the petitioner who may have been 
denied adequate representation by appellate counsel is afforded a fair 
opportunity for potentially meritorious issues to be 
resolved."

 
 

Cutbirth 
v. State, 751 P.2d 1257, 1265-67 (Wyo. 1988) (footnote omitted) . . 
..

 
 
            
Finally, post-conviction relief is a statutorily created process that has 
its own statutorily mandated threshold requirements for setting out a 
claim.  Unlike a typical civil 
action, a petition for post-conviction relief is a "continuation of a criminal 
action and not a civil case."  
State ex rel. Hopkinson v. District Court, 696 P.2d 54, 61 
(Wyo. 
1985).  * * *  Mere allegations are insufficient to set 
out a claim under Wyoming's post-conviction relief process.  The Wyoming Supreme Court has 
clarified:

 
 
"there 
must be set forth in the text of the petition and the required supporting 
attachments a substantial claim plus some specificity in support of the 
claim.  Boggs v. State, 
Wyo., 484 P.2d 711 (1971).  In order to 
justify a hearing, there must be more than a naked statement of a conclusion 
unsupported by an evidentiary basis.  
Cook v. State, 220 Kan. 223, 552 P.2d 985 (1976); State v. 
Gillihan, 85 N.M. 514, 514 P.2d 33 (1973).  There must not only be verified factual 
allegations in the petition, § 7-14-101, but the statutory requirement is that 
they must be supported, likewise with some specificity, § 
7-14-102."

 
 

State ex 
rel. Hopkinson, 696 P.2d  
at 61.

 
 
(Emphasis 
in original.)

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶7]      Preliminarily, we 
will note that we do not agree with Harlow's assertions that this Court's 
analysis should be of the district court's granting of a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, that the ordinary 
rules of civil pleading govern this matter, or that this Court must accept the 
facts pleaded as true.  The district 
court, apparently without objection, treated the State's motion as a summary 
judgment motion, not as a motion to dismiss.  Harlow's own motion for summary judgment was also at 
issue.  Consequently, the rules 
governing the hearing of a W.R.C.P. 56 motion, rather than a W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) 
motion, were applicable. Furthermore, we have previously made it clear that 
post-conviction relief proceedings, while utilizing some rules of civil 
procedure, are continuations of criminal proceedings, and that, therefore, the 
petition is not comparable to a civil complaint such that notice pleading is 
sufficient, or that the contents of the petition must be taken as true.  State ex rel. Hopkinson v. District 
Court, Teton County, 696 P.2d 54, 61-62 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985).

 
 
[¶8]      Our role at this 
juncture is the same as it would be in any review of a summary judgment.  We have the same materials before us as 
did the district court.  We will 
review those materials and determine, de novo, and without any deference 
to the conclusions of the district court, whether the district court correctly 
applied the law to the facts.  We 
will do so on an issue-by-issue basis.

 
 
A.        Were 
Harlow's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial violated when he 
was tried in an atmosphere marked by hypersecurity, including but not limited to 
the heavy physical restraint of Harlow and of 
two of his witnesses?

 
 
[¶9]      Harlow characterizes the security measures taken during 
his jury trial as "hypersecurity."  
He complains of "heavy physical restraint," including the leg shackles 
and electronic stunbelt applied to him and to one of his witnesses, Richard 
Dowdell, and to the visible leg shackles, belly chains and handcuffs applied to 
another of his witnesses, his brother Anthony Harlow.  He also argues that the "prejudicial 
atmosphere" was affected by some half-dozen armed and uniformed guards stationed 
around the courtroom, with two stationed very near Harlow and his 
witnesses.  He complains that no 
pre-trial hearing was conducted to determine the need for any of these security 
measures, and that the district court made no effort to minimize their 
effect.  Finally, he notes that all 
but three of his jurors were taken from a panel that had been allowed to observe 
him fully restrained before the trial began.

 
 

[¶10]   Harlow relies on several federal cases for the proposition 
that criminal defendants, especially capital defendants, have a constitutional 
right to appear before their jury free of unnecessary restraints, and that a 
pretrial hearing to determine the necessity of restraints is required.  See Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 562-72, 106 S. Ct. 1340, 89 L. Ed. 2d 525 (1986); 
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-13, 96 S. Ct. 1691, 48 L. Ed. 2d 126 
(1976); and 
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 25 L. Ed. 2d 353 
(1970).  He also cites Asch v. State, 2003 
WY 18, ¶¶ 55-64, 62 P.3d 945, 961-65 (Wyo. 2003), 
wherein this Court relied upon these same cases in condemning the shackling of a 
defendant in the courtroom, and announced a future rule requiring 
the State, before trial, to present compelling reasons for the shackling of a 
defendant in front of the jury.  
See also Daniel v. State, 2003 WY 132, ¶¶ 11-19, 78 P.3d 205, 
211-13 (Wyo. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1476 (2004).

 
 
[¶11]   The district court denied 
post-conviction relief to Harlow on this claim 
with the following findings and conclusions:

 
 
            
Harlow contends that his trial occurred 
in a prejudicial atmosphere with unwarranted physical restraint of himself and 
two of his witnesses.  It is 
undisputed that Harlow (and two of his witnesses) was tried under physical 
restraint.  It is contended, 
however, that this Court did not specifically conduct a pre-trial, 
particularized hearing to determine the need for any restraints.  However, this Court specifically 
addressed the necessity of Harlow's restraints (before trial and during trial, 
upon objection by Harlow's trial counsel).  The Court considered the need for such 
restraints and took specific steps to diminish the impact of those restraints 
and the likelihood that the jury would see the restraints.  This Court was intimately involved in 
the security measures and precautions taken before and at Harlow's trial; these were not matters simply left to the 
discretion of the sheriff's department.  
The Court already determined that Harlow's restraints and any other 
security measures were necessary and appropriate based upon Harlow's history of violence, the seriousness of the 
alleged crimes, the potential risk to the jury and other trial attendees, and 
the risk of attempted escape.  And, 
in fact, this Court made a finding on the record that the jury had not seen 
Harlow's restraints and that the security 
measures taken were adequate and necessary.

 
 
            
In any event, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103, this Court need not 
address the merits of [this] issue because the matter that could have been 
raised in Harlow's direct appeal to the Wyoming 
Supreme Court.  Munoz v. 
[Maschner], 590 P.2d [1352] at 1354-55 [(Wyo. 1979)].  Accordingly, this Court will not 
consider the issue or grant Harlow relief based 
upon his assertions herein.

 
 

[¶12]   Our analysis of this issue will 
begin with the observation that the question of courtroom security could, 
indeed, have been raised in Harlow's direct 
appeal.  And as we have said many 
times, "[i]ssues amenable to redress through direct appeal are foreclosed from 
consideration in the context of a petition for post-conviction relief by the 
doctrine of res judicata."  
Duran v. State, 949 P.2d 885, 887 ( Wyo. 1997).  Thus, only the "portal" of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise the issue in the direct 
appeal is now available to Harlow.

 
 

[¶13]   As explained earlier herein, a 
claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in the context of 
post-conviction relief is subject to a combined Strickland test/plain 
error analysis.  Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).   In establishing the first half of 
the Strickland testthat being the deficient performance of counselthe 
petitioner must (1) show by reference to the record what occurred at trial; and 
(2) identify a clear and unequivocal rule of law that was violated in a clear 
and obvious way.5  The second half of the Strickland 
test and the last element of plain error analysisthe adverse effect upon a 
substantial rightrequires a showing that there is a likelihood that, without 
the error, the petitioner would not have been found guilty.  Johnson v. State, 592 P.2d 285, 
286 (Wyo.), 
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 932 (1979).

 
 
[¶14]   Having reviewed the record, we 
conclude that Harlow has failed to meet any 
part of the test for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in this 
context.  To begin with, the 
constitutional right to a fair trial protected by Holbrook, Estelle, and 
Allen  was not clearly 
abridged in this case.  The record 
reveals that on several occasions, the questions of courtroom security and the 
physical restraint of Harlow arose and were 
addressed by the district court, and that the district court took appropriate 
ameliorative action.6  These efforts were sufficiently timely and 
substantive.  
Furthermore, Harlow 
is unable to show that he suffered any prejudice from the courtroom security 
measures, let alone that, absent those measures, he would not have been found 
guilty.  
Harlow was a 
convicted murderer serving three consecutive life sentences.  Corporal Martinez 
was murdered during an attempted prison escape.  The jury knew that Harlow and his two 
witnessesDowdell and Harlow's brother7all were 
prison inmates at the time of the trial.  Under all the circumstances, there is no 
likelihood either that the restraint of Harlow and his witnesses contributed to 
the guilty verdict, or that, had the necessity for such restraints been more 
clearly placed on the record, the district court would have ordered the 
restraints removed or lessened.

 
 

[¶15]   The United States Constitution does not 
require that a defendant never be shackled or otherwise restrained during a 
criminal jury trial.  
Rather, the United States Constitution requires that the court balance 
the defendant's right to a fair trial and the state's interest in courtroom 
security.  That 
was done in this case.  Of course, imprisoned defendants and defense 
witnesses cannot, without proof of something more, be physically restrained in 
front of the jury without endangering the defendant's right to a fair 
trial.  But the 
particular facts of this case, including the nature of the crimes and the 
ameliorative efforts of the district court in regard to security measures, lead 
to the conclusion that post-conviction relief under the statute is not available 
because "extraordinary circumstances [that] strongly suggest a miscarriage of 
justice" simply do not exist.  Munoz v. Maschner, 
590 P.2d 1352, 1355 
(Wyo. 1979).

 
 
B.        Were 
Harlow's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial violated when 
highly prejudicial and largely irrelevant testimony regarding uncharged 
misconduct, and his uncounseled statements about that conduct, were improperly 
admitted?

 
 

[¶16]   The evidence at issue, 
characterized by Harlow as 
"404(b)-type" evidence or "prior bad acts" evidence, is what this Court recently 
has referred to as uncharged misconduct evidence.  See Gleason v. State, 
2002 WY 161, ¶ 5, 57 P.3d 332, 337 n.1 (Wyo. 
2002) and Howard v. State, 
2002 WY 40, ¶ 21, 42 P.3d 483, 490 n.2 (Wyo. 
2002).  Succinctly stated, W.R.E. 404(b) forbids the 
introduction of evidence of uncharged misconduct to prove a defendant's 
character for the purpose of showing that he acted in conformity therewith.  The specific 
evidence to which Harlow 
objects is evidence concerning his prior crimes, including victim impact 
evidence as to those crimes.  Through motions in limine and trial 
objections, Harlow 
succeeded in keeping this evidence out of the guilt phase of his trial, but he 
was not so successful in the later sentencing phase.8

 
 
[¶17]   The district court granted summary 
judgment to the State on this issue on two grounds:  (1) that the error, 
if any, occurred during sentencing proceedings, and not during the proceedings 
that resulted in Harlow's conviction; and (2) that the issue was waived when it 
was not raised in Harlow's 
direct appeal.  
Based on these two grounds, the district court declined to address the 
merits of the issue, except as an allegation of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel.  
In applying that standard, the district court found no violation of a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law and no proven prejudice.

 
 

[¶18]   We affirm inasmuch as Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-14-101(b) clearly confines the courts' role under the post-conviction relief 
act to those proceedings that result in a conviction, and not to sentencing 
proceedings.  
Schuler v. State, 771 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Wyo. 
1989); Sanchez v. State, 755 P.2d 245, 245 (Wyo.), 
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 862 (1988); Whitney v. State, 745 P.2d 902, 903 (Wyo. 
1987).  The district court is also correct that this 
issue was waived when it was not raised on direct appeal.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(a)(i); 
Munoz, 590 P.2d  at 1354.  And, because the issue is not cognizable in 
post-conviction relief, we need not determine whether counsel was ineffective in 
failing to raise it on appeal.

 
 
C.        Were 
Harlow's Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial violated 
when the prosecutor made overreaching and factually incorrect argument urging 
the jury to, among other things, impose a death sentence in order to protect 
themselves and future employees of the Department of Corrections, and trial 
counsel did not object to such improper argument, nor was it broached on 
appeal?

 
 
[¶19]   Although this issue, as stated, appears 
to relate only to the sentencing phase of the trial, Harlow actually questions portions of the 
State's closing arguments during both the guilt phase and the sentencing 
phase.  Due to 
the statutory limitations explained above, we will consider only the matters 
that concern the guilt phase.  For the same reason, the district court 
declined to address the merits of this issue as related to sentencing.  Further, the 
district court declined to address the merits of the guilt phase issues, except 
as such may have revealed ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, because 
those issues could have been raised in the direct appeal.  The district court 
concluded:

 
 
Reviewing the prosecutor's closing argument in its 
totality, this Court cannot say that the prosecutor's remarks so infected the 
trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 
process.  See Lee v. Mullin, 31 F.3d 1001, 1013 (10th Cir. 2002).

 
 
Based on that conclusion, the district court further 
concluded that appellate counsel was not ineffective in deciding against raising 
this issue in the direct appeal.

 
 
[¶20]   In his petition for post-conviction 
relief, Harlow alleges that the prosecutor "overreached" with "victim-type" 
argument during the guilt phase and "indulged in a classic prosecutor's tactic 
of improperly evoking emotion, while trying to appear not to," when he said the 
following:

 
 
I was tempted in there, face down in front of you, to hold 
up the photographs of Corporal Martinez.  You've seen them and I'm going to speculate 
myself that none of you have seen anything like that before.  It's a horrible 
thing to see, but you're not to be driven by prejudice of how much blood or how 
many injuries.  
That's a fact to you.

 
 
I'd love to be able to argue the emotion of it.  I'd love to be able 
to say this, go do this for Wayne.  I'd love to be able 
to say that to you.  
That's not the law and that's not your job.

 
 
[¶21]   That allegation of inappropriate 
argument is the only allegation in the petition directed to the prosecutor's 
closing argument during the guilt phase of the trial.  A review of the 
transcript of the hearing on the petition reveals that, not only were no 
additional guilt-phase issues raised, this particular matter was not even 
addressed.  
Nevertheless, in his appellate brief, Harlow addresses the following 
alleged guilt-phase transgressions by the prosecutor:  (1) the prosecutor 
informed the jury that Harlow and Dowdell were "going to cover each other . . . 
going to lie for each other;" (2) the emotional "gory photograph" statement 
quoted above; and (3) a "cheap shot" at defense counsel in rebuttal closing that 
"Mr. Goody grossly misrepresented the law . . .."

 
 

[¶22]   This Court will not address issues that 
were not raised below.  Davis v. City of 
Cheyenne, 2004 WY 43, ¶ 26, 88 P.3d 481, 490 (Wyo. 
2004); Yates v. Yates, 2003 WY 161, ¶ 15, 81 P.3d 184, 189 (Wyo. 
2003); Cooper v. Town of Pinedale, 
1 P.3d 1197, 1208 (Wyo. 
2000).  We do not find in this case that the issues 
numbered (1) and (3) above are jurisdictional or are of such fundamental nature 
that our general rule should be abrogated.  This is especially true where, as here, the 
matters were not only absent from the petition for post-conviction relief, 
neither were they raised on direct appeal.  Consequently, we will address only the quoted 
passage concerning the photographs of the murder victim.

 
 

[¶23]   The alleged impropriety of this portion 
of the prosecutor's closing argument was not raised in the direct appeal, 
leaving this Court now with the ability to address it only through the avenue of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  In that regard, the first element of the Strickland/plain error standard is met because it is 
clear from the record what occurred at trial.  As to the second elementthe violation of a 
clear and unequivocal rule of lawHarlow contends in his petition that the 
prosecutor's remarks violated (1) the rule of Wilks v. 
State, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 8, 49 P.3d 975, 981 (Wyo. 
2002) and Justice v. State, 
775 P.2d 1002, 1010 (Wyo. 
1989), that victim impact evidence is inadmissible during the 
guilt phase of a trial, and (2) the rule of Darden v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S. Ct. 2464, 91 L. Ed. 2d 144 (1986) and Donnelly v. 
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S. Ct. 1868, 40 L. Ed. 2d 431 
(1974),9 that a prosecutor's emotional remarks may so 
infect a trial with unfairness as to result in a denial of due process.

 
 

[¶24]   In his appellate brief, Harlow adds an argument that, because 
of the prosecutor's official capacity and unique role in the system, the jury 
may give special weight to what are, in effect, a prosecutor's "testimony" or 
statements of opinion.  See United States v. 
Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19, 105 S. Ct. 1038, 84 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985); Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1218 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Bess, 593 F.2d 749, 755 (6th Cir. 1979); and United States v. Splain, 
545 F.2d 1131, 1134 (8th Cir. 1976).

 
 

[¶25]   This Court has well-established 
standards for the review of allegedly improper closing arguments by 
prosecutors.  
As they relate to the allegation at issue, those standards include the 
following:  (1) 
the petitioner bears the burden of establishing prosecutorial misconduct; (2) 
the challenged comments are evaluated in the context of the prosecutor's entire 
argument; (3) the challenged comments are evaluated in the context of the entire 
record; (4) the prosecutor may not make an improper appeal to passion or 
prejudice, or attempt to inflame the jury; (5) the prosecutor may not urge his 
personal beliefs or opinions upon the jury, especially as to the credibility of 
the evidence; and (6) the test of prejudice is whether, absent the misconduct, 
the verdict may have been more favorable to the petitioner.  See, for example, White v. State, 2003 WY 163, ¶ 7, 80 P.3d 642, 646 (Wyo. 
2003); Burton v. State, 2002 WY 71, ¶ 11, 46 P.3d 309, 313 (Wyo. 
2002); Trujillo v. State, 2002 WY 51, ¶ 7, 44 P.3d 22, 25 (Wyo. 
2002); Sanchez v. State, 2002 WY 31, ¶ 18, 41 P.3d 531, 535 (Wyo. 
2002); Capshaw v. State, 10 P.3d 560, 567-68 (Wyo. 
2000); Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d 531, 542 (Wyo. 
2000); Leiker v. State, 994 P.2d 917, 918-19 (Wyo. 
1999); and Montoya v. State, 971 P.2d 134, 136-37 (Wyo. 
1998).

 
 
[¶26]   Application of these rules to the 
instant case leads inexorably to the conclusion that the cited passage from the 
prosecutor's closing argument is not cause for reversal.  The eight brief 
sentences of challenged argument fall near the end of thirty-seven pages of the 
prosecutor's initial closing argument.  The specific context of the challenged 
language is the question of whether the evidence supports a finding of 
premeditated murder:

 
 
And finally, I note to you first degree murder, 
premeditated murder.  
I was tempted in there, face down in front of you, to hold up the 
photographs of Corporal Martinez.  You've seen them and I'm going to speculate 
myself that none of you have seen anything like that before.  It's a horrible 
thing to see, but you're not to be driven by the prejudice of how much blood or 
how many injuries.  
That's a fact to you.

 
 
I'd love to be able to argue the emotion of it.  I'd love to be able 
to say this, go do this for Wayne.  I'd love to be able 
to say that to you.  
That's not the law and that's not your job.  The job is analyze, 
even the least of violence, you can look at them for yourself as you deliberate 
and decide for yourself whether this was a few moments of panic.  When the weapons 
are being switched because one of them wasn't any good.  When the others 
don't work, you go to something else.  And how much time went by, even if it was a 
brief time, the brief interval that Mr. Harlow had to make his decision about 
his participation in the killing.  What was clearly by then the killing of 
Corporal Martinez.

 
 
[¶27]   Toward the end of a lengthy closing 
argument, the prosecutor told the jurors to look at the photographs of the 
murder victim to help them analyze whether this was a premeditated murder.  This trial lasted 
for many days.  
There were dozens of witnesses and dozens of exhibits.  The photographs to 
which the prosecutor referred were, themselves, exhibits that went into the jury 
room.  While 
the prosecutor's use of words such as "horrible," "prejudice," "blood," and 
"emotion," is, perhaps, regrettable, we cannot say that it had any likely effect 
upon the verdict.  
Neither do we believe that the challenged comments can be characterized 
as the prosecutor's opinion or testimony, or as victim impact evidence.  Appellate counsel 
was not ineffective for failing to raise this issue in the direct appeal because 
it does not provide grounds for reversal.

 
 
D.        Were 
Harlow's Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal 
treatment before the law violated when the jury was inadequately instructed and 
also was required to follow a verdict form that was inadequate under the United 
States Constitution?

 
 
[¶28]   Harlow's petition for post-conviction relief 
suggests, without specifically identifying, numerous issues concerning both 
guilt-phase and penalty-phase instructions.  Most of the instructional issues that are 
identified relate to the penalty phase and will not be considered herein.  Furthermore, no 
issues concerning jury instructions were raised in Harlow's direct appeal, leaving any guilt-phase 
instruction issues to be considered only as questions of ineffective assistance 
of appellate counsel.  
For these reasons, the district court declined to address the merits of 
Harlow's jury instruction 
issues except as they related to the question of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel.  
The district court concluded that appellate counsel was not ineffective 
in deciding not to raise jury instruction issues in the direct appeal because 
the instructions as a whole correctly advised the jury as to the law, and 
because Harlow had shown 
no prejudice.

 
 

[¶29]   Some specific guilt-phase instructional 
issues can be gleaned from Harlow's petition and appellate brief.  In his petition, he 
notes the lack of definition of the word "escape" in Counts II and III.10  He also complains about an instruction that 
advised the jury about "awareness" in regard to conspiracy, his fear being that, 
although the instruction was in reference to the charge of conspiracy to escape, 
the jury could misinterpret the instruction to allow it to find Harlow guilty of 
first-degree murder even if he had no knowledge that a murder was going to be 
committed.11  Next, Harlow condemns Instruction No. 7A, dealing 
with aiding and abetting, because he was not charged with aiding and abetting.12  And finally, Harlow complains in his appellate brief that 
the lack of an "Enmund" instruction allowed the jury 
to "find him guilty" of felony murder without finding that he was a "major 
participant" in the underlying felony.  The thrust of Harlow's Enmund 
argument, however, is that the federal constitution bars the imposition of the 
death penalty for felony murder based solely upon a defendant's participation in 
the underlying felony, where he did not kill or intend to kill.  See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1140 (1982).13

 
 
[¶30]   Disregarding the Enmund issue, which we perceive Harlow intended only as 
a penalty phase issue,14 we are left with three jury instruction issues 
from the guilt phase of the trial:  (1) the failure to define the word "escape;" 
(2) the danger that the jury could have convicted Harlow of first-degree murder 
based on the conspiracy instruction; and (3) the giving of an aiding and 
abetting instruction.  
Curiously, while these alleged errors are mentioned in Harlow's petition for post-conviction 
relief, they are not fleshed out therein, nor in the hearing transcript, nor in 
the appellate brief.15  In harkening back to the Strickland test/plain error standard for evaluating 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, we can determine without much 
difficulty what occurred at trial, inasmuch as those instructions that were 
given, and those that were refused, are in the record.  But we do not 
intend to take it upon ourselves to provide whatever analysis and argument 
Harlow believes may 
support his assertion that the instructions mentioned above transgressed a clear 
and unequivocal rule of law in a clear and obvious way.  Neither do we 
intend to speculate as to what prejudice he might have suffered as a result.

 
 
[¶31]   Generally, we review jury instruction 
issues under the following standard:

 
 
            
We have a well-established standard for review of jury instruction 
issues:

 
 
"Jury instructions should inform the jurors concerning the 
applicable law so that they can apply that law to their findings with respect to 
the material facts, instructions should be written with the particular facts and 
legal theories of each case in mind and often differ from case to case since any 
one of several instructional options may be legally correct, a failure to give 
an instruction on an essential element of a criminal offense is fundamental 
error, as is a confusing or misleading instruction, and the test of whether a 
jury has been properly instructed on the necessary elements of a crime is 
whether the instructions leave no doubt as to the circumstances under which the 
crime can be found to have been committed."

 
 

Mueller v. State, 2001 WY 
134, ¶ 9, 36 P.3d 1151, 1155 
(Wyo.2001) (citing Schmidt v. State, 2001 WY 73, ¶ 23, 29 P.3d 76, 83 (Wyo.2001) 
and Metzger v. State, 4 P.3d 901, 908 
(Wyo.2000)).  
We analyze jury instructions as a whole and do not single out individual 
instructions or parts thereof.  Ogden v. 
State, 2001 WY 109, ¶ 8, 34 P.3d 271, 274 
(Wyo.2001).  We 
give trial courts great latitude in instructing juries and "will not find 
reversible error in the jury instructions as long as the instructions correctly 
state the law and the entire set of instructions sufficiently covers the issues 
which were presented at the trial.'"  Id. 
(quoting Harris v. State, 933 P.2d 1114, 1126 
(Wyo.1997)).

 
 

Brown v. State, 2002 WY 
61, ¶ 9, 44 P.3d 97, 100 (Wyo. 
2002).  See also Wheaton v. State, 2003 WY 56, ¶ 
20, 68 P.3d 1167, 1176 (Wyo. 
2003) and Olsen v. State, 
2003 WY 46, ¶ 134, 67 P.3d 536, 585 (Wyo. 
2003).

 
 
[¶32]   Taking each challenged instruction in 
turn, within this general standard, we find no error and, therefore, no 
deficient performance by appellate counsel in not raising these issues.

 
 

[¶33]   Harlow was charged with attempting to escape 
from official detention, conspiring to escape from official detention, and 
felony murder during an attempt to escape from official detention.  Each of those 
crimes is based upon Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-206(a) (LexisNexis 2003), which 
states that "[a] person commits a crime if he escapes from official 
detention."  
The statute does not contain a definition of the word "escape," and no 
definition was provided to Harlow's jury.  We have said that "[a] court need not give 
an instruction defining a term unless it has a technical legal meaning so 
different from its ordinary meaning that the jury, without further explanation, 
would misunderstand its import in relation to the factual circumstances.'"  Wilson v. State, 14 P.3d 912, 916 (Wyo. 
2000) (quoting Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 941 
(Wyo. 1977)); see also Lane v. State, 12 P.3d 1057, 1061 (Wyo. 
2000).  We see nothing about the word "escape" or its 
usage in this statute that suggests the word has a technical legal meaning, and 
there certainly is nothing about the factsan attempted prison escapethat would 
confuse the jury as to the word's import.16  There was no reason 
to define the word for the jury and, therefore, appellate counsel was not 
deficient in failing to raise this issue.

 
 
[¶34]   Harlow's contentions in regard to the 
conspiracy instruction can be found in his petition:

 
 
            
59.  
Before trial, defense counsel objected to State's proposed Instruction 
16, which became Jury Instruction No. 12.  . . .  That instruction, following Pattern 
Instruction No. 13.04, advised the jury about "awareness" and the requirements 
of membership in a conspiracy.

 
 
            
60.  
Petitioner had been charged only with conspiracy to escape, not 
conspiracy to commit murder.  The defense's objection was that, as there 
was no question about Petitioner's participation in the escape attempt, this 
instruction was unnecessary and that the instruction could be highly 
misleading.  
Its concern was the jury could misinterpret the instruction to allow them 
to find Petitioner guilty of first degree murder, despite the fact that 
Petitioner had absolutely no knowledge that a murder was going to be 
committed.

 
 
[¶35]   We are unable to conclude that counsel 
was ineffective in the direct appeal by not raising this issue.  It is pure 
speculation that the jury could have been or was misled by this 
instruction.  
To make such an assumption, we would further have to assume that the jury 
misread and misapplied the instructions, and we are aware of no evidence that 
such occurred.17  The conspiracy instruction followed the 
elements instruction for the charge of conspiring to escape from official 
detention, and there is nothing in the language or order of the instructions 
suggesting that the jury should apply or did apply the conspiracy concepts back 
to the earlier felony murder instructions.  Furthermore, while Harlow argues that there was no question that 
he participated in the escape attempt, making the conspiracy instruction 
unnecessary, he does not suggest that he conceded that he was guilty of 
conspiracy to escape.  
The State had the burden of proving the conspiracy charge and was 
entitled to the conspiracy instruction.  Harlow can point to no clear and unequivocal 
rule of law that was violated by inclusion of the conspiracy instruction.

 
 
[¶36]   Finally, Harlow contends that it was 
error for the district court to give Instruction No. 7A, quoted above, because 
Harlow had not been 
charged with aiding and abetting, and because aiding and abetting requires 
specific intent.  
Trial counsel objected to this instruction, but the issue was not raised 
in the direct appeal.  
Consequently, it will be reviewed here only as an allegation of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise the issue.

 
 
[¶37]   The first element of the Strickland/plain error test is satisfied because the 
record clearly reveals both that Count I did not specifically charge aiding and abetting, and 
that the instruction was, indeed, given.  But that is the full extent of Harlow's present argument in support 
of his contention.  Nowhere in his petition, in his argument to 
the district court, in his appellate brief, or in his argument to this Court, 
does Harlow identify a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law that was violated by the giving of this 
instruction.  
In fact, Harlow 
actually presents no 
factual or legal argument in regard to this instruction, including any argument 
as to how he was prejudiced.  For that reason, and because Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-1-201(b)(i) (LexisNexis 2003) allows for an accessory before the fact (aider 
and abettor) to be "informed against, tried and convicted as if he were a 
principal," we will affirm summary judgment in favor of the State on this 
issue.

 
 
E.        Were 
Harlow's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights violated when the 
State did not adduce sufficient evidence to sustain each of his convictions and 
two of the aggravating circumstances upon which his capital conviction sentence 
is based?

 
 
[¶38]   As stated, this issue questions the 
sufficiency of the evidence as to each of Harlow's convictions:  first-degree 
premeditated murder, first-degree felony murder, attempt to escape from official 
detention, and conspiracy to escape from official detention.18  Sufficiency of the 
evidence could have been, but was not raised in the direct appeal, leaving 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as the applicable standard of 
review.

 
 
[¶39]   Harlow's interrelated arguments as to the 
sufficiency of the evidence focus on the State's alleged failure to prove 
specific intent.  
Harlow contends 
that the State did not prove that he intended that Corporal Martinez, or anyone 
else, would be killed, thereby negating the specific intent element of 
first-degree premeditated murder.  Next, he argues that, at most, the evidence 
showed that he, Dowdell, and Collins intended to take over the penitentiary or 
be killed in the attempt, and that they did not intend to escape.  If there was no 
intent to escape, there was no conspiracy to escape, no attempt to escape, and 
no felony murder.

 
 
[¶40]   Harlow relies on two portions of the evidence 
as showing the failure of the State's proof.  First, he contends that Dowdell's testimony 
established Harlow's secondary role in the attack upon Corporal Martinez, and 
Harlow's lack of knowledge 
or intent that anyone would be killed.  Second, Harlow argues that inmate Edmundo Ramon was 
"far from sure" that it was Harlow who yelled "we got one of them" after 
Corporal Martinez was killed.

 
 
[¶41]   While it can be said that the record is 
clear as to what happened at trial because a transcript of witness testimony is 
available, it cannot be said that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was 
violated when the jury chose to convict Harlow based on the evidence.  Harlow's argument actually turns the 
legal standard on its head.  The essence of Harlow's argument is that the 
jury should have believed Dowdell's protestations of Harlow's relative 
innocence, and should have resolved any apparent uncertainties in Ramon's 
testimony in favor of Harlow.  But that is not the law.  This Court does not 
look to see if there is evidence that might have supported the defendant's 
position.  
Rather,

 
 
"[t]he appellate test for sufficiency of evidence is 
whether a rational trier of fact could have been sufficiently armed by the 
evidence to find the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  In 
assessing that issue, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
state, affording [it] the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn 
therefrom.  It 
is not our task, let alone our place, to reweigh the evidence or reexamine the 
credibility of the witnesses.'"

 
 

Nollen v. State, 12 P.3d 682, 684 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Rodriguez v. 
State, 962 P.2d 141, 148 (Wyo. 1998) and Curl v. 
State, 898 P.2d 369, 375 
(Wyo. 1995)).

 
 
[¶42]   In applying that standard, we will not 
detail the evidence presented during the guilt phase of Harlow's trial.  Suffice it to say that sufficient evidence 
was presented showing Harlow's participation in the concerted attack upon the 
shift command center and the murder of Corporal Martinez, of Harlow's exultant 
cry thereafter that "we got one of them," and of the trio's attempt to scale the 
razor wire fencing surrounding the penitentiary.  At the very least, the evidence showed that 
Harlow struck Corporal 
Martinez and held him down while Collins and Dowdell stabbed him to death, 
immediately before "hitting the fence."  Appropriate inferences from all the evidence 
are that Harlow intended 
that an escape would occur and intended that Corporal Martinez be killed during 
the attempted escape.19  Therefore, with knowledge of the applicable 
standard of review, it was not deficient or ineffective for appellate counsel to 
decide not to raise sufficiency of the evidence issues in the direct appeal.

 
 
F.         
Were Harlow's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights violated when he was 
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, and such was not broached on 
appeal?

 
 
[¶43]   Ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
was not raised in Harlow's 
direct appeal.  
For that reason, the district court declined to address the issue except 
as an allegation of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  The district court 
then concluded that Harlow 
had failed to show ineffectiveness under that standard because he had failed to 
show prejudice; that is, he had failed to show that the trial result likely 
would have been different absent any alleged errors.

 
 
[¶44]   We, of course, must apply the same 
review standard.  
The underlying or primary question, though, is not what appellate counsel 
did or did not do, but what trial counsel did or did not do.  It probably goes 
without saying that if trial counsel was not ineffective, appellate counsel was 
not ineffective in deciding against raising the issue.

 
 
[¶45]   We apply the following standard in 
reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel:

 
 
[O]ur paramount consideration is whether, in light of all 
the circumstances, trial counsels' acts or omissions were outside the wide range 
of professionally competent assistance.  Gleason v. State, 
2002 WY 161, ¶ 44, 57 P.3d 332, ¶ 44 
(Wyo.2002).  An 
appellant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate on the 
record that counsel's performance was deficient.  Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 
80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)).  Ordinarily, he must also demonstrate that 
prejudice resulted.  
Under this test, the inquiry is whether or not counsel rendered the 
assistance a reasonably competent attorney would have offered and, if not, 
whether his failure to do so prejudiced the defense of the case.  Id.  
This two-part test, the Strickland test, 
is the test we normally apply in reviewing ineffectiveness claims . . ..

 
 
            
We examine the conduct of defense counsel in light of all the 
circumstances in determining whether the identified acts or omissions fall 
outside the ambit of professionally competent assistance, bearing in mind the 
function of counsel is to make the adversarial testing process work in every 
case.  Dickeson v. State, 843 P.2d 606, 609 (Wyo.1992).  The benchmark for 
judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so 
undermined the proper functioning of the  adversarial process that the trial cannot be 
relied upon as having produced a just result.  Gleason, 2002 WY 161, 57 P.3d 332.  We do not evaluate 
the efforts of counsel from a perspective of hindsight but endeavor to 
reconstruct the circumstances surrounding the challenged conduct and evaluate 
the professional efforts from the perspective of counsel at the time.  Dickeson, 843 P.2d  at 609.  We invoke a strong 
presumption that counsel rendered adequate and reasonable assistance making all 
decisions within the bounds of reasonable professional judgment.  Id.  The burden is on 
the defendant to overcome this presumption that, in light of the circumstances, 
the challenged action or failure of the attorney might be considered sound trial 
strategy.  
Id.

 
 

Sincock v. State, 2003 WY 
115, ¶¶ 34-35, 76 P.3d 323, 336 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 

[¶46]   Before we address Harlow's separate 
allegations of trial counsel ineffectiveness, we must first address his 
contention that, in capital cases, the Strickland 
test has been substantially modified by Wiggins v. 
Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 156 L. Ed. 2d 471 (2003), in that the American Bar Association Guidelines for the 
Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases are now the 
benchmark for determining the objective reasonableness of counsel's 
performance.  
We have read Wiggins and we do not see that 
it represents any significant amendment of the Strickland standard.  In Wiggins, the 
United States Supreme Court reviewed the conduct of two trial attorneys in a 
death penalty case.  
In the process of finding counsel's performance both deficient and 
prejudicial, the United States Supreme Court reiterated the applicable standard 
of review.  
First, the United States Supreme Court repeated that ineffectiveness 
claims are tested under the two-part Strickland 
test, with "objective reasonableness" defined in terms of prevailing 
professional norms.  
Id. at 
521.  Next, the 
United States Supreme Court defined those "prevailing professional norms" as the 
professional standards prevailing in Maryland in 1989.  Id. at 524.  After concluding 
that counsels' performance fell short of those standards, the 
United States Supreme 
Court stated that "[c]ounsels' conduct similarly fell short of the standards for 
capital defense work articulated by the American Bar Association (ABA)standards 
to which we long have referred as guides to determining what is 
reasonable.'"  
Id. (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).  Clearly, these passages do not indicate any 
substantive departure from the Strickland test.  Furthermore, the 
inexperience of counsel in handling death penalty cases, standing alone, does 
not establish ineffectiveness.  Fields v. Gibson, 
277 F.3d 1203, 1215 n.7 
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1023 (2002); Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1198 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1191 (1994); Burden v. Zant, 903 F.2d 1352, 1361 (11th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other 
grounds, 498 U.S. 433, 437, 111 S. Ct. 862, 112 L. Ed. 2d 962 (1991); Thomas v. Gramley, 951 F. Supp. 1338, 1350 (N.D.Ill. 1996), aff'd, 144 F.3d 513 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. 
denied, 525 U.S. 1123 
(1999).

 
 
[¶47]   In his 
petition for post-conviction relief, Harlow identified four instances of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel:  (1) failure to renew a motion for judgment of 
acquittal at the close of the defense evidence; (2) failure to object to the 
manner in which Harlow and his witnesses were restrained and to the 
"hypersecurity" atmosphere in the courtroom; (3) failure to offer alternative 
and limiting instructions to ameliorate the prejudicial impact of both prior 
victim and current victim impact testimony; and (4) repeatedly violating 
W.R.Cr.P. 24, which caused the trial judge to take over voir dire and which produced a biased jury pool.  In his appellate 
brief, Harlow adds two 
more allegations:  
(5) failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct; and (6) failure to 
offer an Enmund instruction.

 
 
[¶48]   At the end of the State's case, trial 
counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal as to the first-degree premeditated 
murder count and the conspiracy to escape from official detention count.  Counsel argued that 
the State had failed to prove that Harlow had knowledge, let alone intent, that 
anyone would be killed, and had failed to prove that Harlow agreed with anyone that an escape would 
occur.  The 
district court denied the motion and it was not renewed at the close of the 
defense evidence.

 
 
[¶49]   A motion for judgment of acquittal 
alleging insufficiency of the evidence is made pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 29(a):

 
 
Motions for directed verdict are abolished and motions for 
judgment of acquittal shall be used in their place.  The court on motion 
of a defendant or of its own motion shall order the entry of judgment of 
acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment, information or 
citation after the evidence on either side is closed if the evidence is 
insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses.  If a defendant's 
motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the evidence offered by the 
state is not granted, the defendant may offer evidence without having reserved 
the right.

 
 

[¶50]   Preliminarily, we must examine the 
precise issue now before us.  Ineffective assistance of trial counsel was 
not raised in the direct appeal, so the present issue is ineffective assistance 
of appellate counsel.  
In other words, appellate counsel's performance allegedly was deficient 
because trial counsel's deficient performance was not raised.  In turn, trial 
counsel's deficient performance allegedly consisted of not renewing a motion for 
judgment of acquittal.  Two things could have happened had such a 
motion been made; it could have been granted or it could have been denied.  Had it been 
granted, the case would have been over as to those counts.  Had it been denied, 
the denial could have been appealed directly.  Further, "introducing evidence waives the 
earlier motion and only the later motion may be claimed as error."  Robinson v. State, 11 P.3d 361, 368 (Wyo. 
2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 980 (2001).  Consequently, the issue before this Court is 
not whether trial counsel's initial motion should have been granted; the issue 
is whether trial counsel should have made a similar motion after close of the 
defense evidence.

 
 
[¶51]   In the end, Harlow's argument now is that, had such a 
motion been made, the district court would have granted it or would have erred 
in denying it.  
Our standard for reviewing the denial of a motion for a judgment of 
acquittal is as follows:

 
 
            
"[W]e accept as true the evidence of the prosecution, together with all 
logical and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, leaving out entirely 
the evidence of the defendant in conflict.

 
 
A motion for judgment of acquittal is to be granted only 
when the evidence is such that a reasonable juror must have a reasonable doubt 
as to the existence of any of the essential elements of the crime.  Or, stated another 
way, if there is substantial evidence to sustain a conviction of the crime, the 
motion should not be granted.  This standard applies whether the supporting 
evidence is direct or circumstantial.'"

 
 

DeVries v. State, 909 P.2d 977, 978 (Wyo. 
1996) (quoting Apodaca v. 
State, 796 P.2d 806, 807 (Wyo. 1990)).  In turn, sufficiency of the evidence 
arguments are analyzed in the following manner:

 
 
            
"This Court assesses whether all the evidence which was presented is 
adequate enough to form the basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt to be drawn by a finder of fact when that evidence is viewed in 
the light most favorable to the State.  We will not substitute our judgment for that 
of the jury when we are applying this rule; our only duty is to determine 
whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, 
have come to the same result as the jury actually did."

 
 

DeVries, 909 P.2d at 979 (quoting Hodges v. 
State, 904 P.2d 334, 339 
(Wyo. 1995)).

 
 
[¶52]   We have already considered and rejected 
on the merits Harlow's 
sufficiency of the evidence arguments, and we will not repeat that discussion 
here.  Suffice 
it to say that, based upon all the evidence, it was not unreasonable for the 
jury to find Harlow guilty 
of all the charged offenses.  We will, however, repeat the admonition that 
a defendant at trial, and an appellant in this Court, must support a motion for 
judgment of acquittal with something more than a reference to defense evidence 
that, if believed by the jury, would have supported acquittal.

 
 

[¶53]   Had Harlow's motion for judgment of acquittal been 
renewed after presentation of the defense evidence, the motion would have been 
denied.  
Counsel is not ineffective for failing to file a motion that would not 
have been granted.  
Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 58, 43 P.3d 80, 102 (Wyo. 
2002); Herdt v. State, 891 P.2d 793, 799 (Wyo. 
1995), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 944 (2002); Dickeson v. State, 843 P.2d 606, 610 (Wyo. 
1992).  It follows, of course, that if trial counsel 
was not ineffective in this regard, neither was appellate counsel for not 
raising the issue in the direct appeal.

 
 
[¶54]   Harlow's second allegation of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel is the failure to object to the manner in which he 
and his witnesses were restrained at trial and the alleged atmosphere of 
"hypersecurity" in the courtroom.  As with the previous issue, we will simply 
note that we have already addressed the merits of this issue and have found it 
wanting.  Under 
all the facts and circumstances, the district court took reasonable ameliorative 
actions in regard to courtroom security, and Harlow was not denied a fair trial.  Furthermore, trial 
counsel adequately addressed courtroom security at trial.  Harlow has not shown that trial 
counsel was ineffective and, therefore, appellate counsel was not ineffective in 
deciding not to raise the issue.

 
 

[¶55]   Harlow's third claim of ineffective 
assistance of trial counselthe alleged failure to offer instructions concerning 
victim impact evidenceand his sixth claimthe alleged failure to offer an Enmund instructionboth concern the penalty phase of 
the trial and are not cognizable in this proceeding.  Furthermore, both 
issues were raised and decided in the direct appeal and are, therefore, 
procedurally barred from reconsideration in this proceeding.  Harlow, 2003 WY 
47, ¶¶ 38-57, 75-80, 70 P.3d  at 192-99, 203-04; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(a)(iii).  His fourth 
allegation is that trial counsel's repeated violation of W.R.Cr.P. 24 caused the 
trial judge to take over voir dire, which resulted 
in a biased jury.20  Citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103, the 
district court declined to consider this issue because the adequacy of voir dire was raised and determined on the merits in 
the direct appeal.  
We agree with that conclusion and we also decline to address the 
issue.  Stating 
the issue in terms of ineffective assistance of trial counsel does not change 
the fact that the basic issue has already been decided by this Court.21  In addition, it is clear that the focus of 
Harlow's complaint is the so-called "death qualification" process, which 
involves the penalty phase of the trial, and which is not cognizable in the 
present proceeding.  
For all of these reasons, we decline to address the voir dire issue.

 
 
[¶56]   Harlow's fifth allegation of ineffective 
assistance of trial counselfailure to object to prosecutorial misconductis not 
raised in his petition for post-conviction relief.  In his later 
appellate brief, however, Harlow complains that "counsel did not object 
to the prosecutor's misstatement of fact or offensive hyperbole in 
argument[.]"  
This complaint is not further fleshed out as a discrete allegation of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, but we can, perhaps, surmise that it 
involves the matters discussed hereinabove in reference to Harlow's issue "C."  It is also 
conceivable that the allegation was meant to encompass Harlow's argument in the 
district court hearing that, during closing argument in the penalty phase, the 
prosecutor made false statements about Harlow's prior record.

 
 
[¶57]   For several reasons, we will not 
further consider this fifth sub-issue.  To begin with, our general rule is that we 
will not decide matters not raised below.  Second, to the extent that ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel was raised on direct appeal, or could have been 
raised on direct appeal, we are statutorily foreclosed from considering it in 
post-conviction relief.  Third, matters concerning sentencing are not 
cognizable in post-conviction relief.  And fourth, we have already concluded that 
the prosecutor's guilt-phase closing argument did not constitute prosecutorial 
misconduct, so the failure to object or to raise it below was not ineffective 
assistance of counsel.

 
 
[¶58]   Having concluded that trial counsel was 
not ineffective in any of the particulars raised by Harlow, we cannot score appellate counsel for 
failing to raise the issue in the direct appeal.

 
 
G.        Were 
Harlow's Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights violated when he was rendered ineffective assistance 
of appellate counsel?

 
 
[¶59]   The allegation of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel contained in Harlow's petition for post-conviction relief is 
two-pronged.  
First, he asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing to identify, 
investigate and raise in the direct appeal those issues identified as "A" 
through "F" herein.  
Second, he contends that, "[t]o the extent that any of the issues [raised 
in the direct appeal] should or could have been decided more favorably to 
[Harlow] if presented differently, [Harlow] was denied his constitutional rights 
to due process, equal protection and the effective assistance of counsel."

 
 
[¶60]   Beyond these general complaints, 
Harlow's petition is 
almost completely devoid of any specific allegations of ineffectiveness of 
appellate counsel.  
He does contend that (1) counsel's experience in capital litigation was 
woefully short of what the ABA guidelines require; (2) counsel should have 
raised the physical restraint issue; (3) counsel should have raised the 
inadequate jury form issue; and (4) appellate counsel's manner of broaching even 
meritorious claims was calculated to alienate this Court, and may have colored 
this Court's attitude toward the case.

 
 
[¶61]   During the district court hearing on 
the petition, Harlow's present counsel emphasized appellate counsel's failure to 
raise the physical restraint issue, and added complaints that neither 
instructional issues nor ineffective assistance of trial counsel were raised in 
the appeal.  In 
particular, counsel identified proportionality/comparative sentencing and the Enmund doctrine as examples of instructional issues 
that were missed.

 
 

[¶62]   We see no purpose in addressing these 
allegations independently at this point, inasmuch as each of them has been 
addressed previously herein, within the specific context of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel.  As we have repeatedly stated herein, 
appellate counsel cannot be scored for failing to raise, or for deciding against 
raising, a non-meritorious issue.  Furthermore, Harlow has utterly failed in 
this post-conviction proceeding to show any prejudice to him from any alleged 
inexperience of appellate counsel or any alleged failure of appellate counsel to 
meet the ABA guidelines.  In truth, appellate 
counsel is a well-trained, highly respected Wyoming lawyer with considerable 
criminal law and appellate experience.  Bald assertions of deficiency do not equate 
to evidence.22  And finally, post-proceeding affidavits of 
counsel admitting ineffectiveness are suspect, at best, especially because they 
rely so heavily on the "20/20" hindsight that is not supposed to be used to 
evaluate effectiveness of counsel.  Wright v. Hopper, 
169 F.3d 695, 707 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 934 
(1999); Mills v. Singletary, 161 F.3d 1273, 1286 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1082 (2000); Walls v. Bowersox, 151 F.3d 827, 836 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1071 
(1999); Smith v. Stewart, 140 F.3d 1263, 1273 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 929 
(1998); Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1111 (1996); Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 673 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1119 
(1994).

 
 
H.        Were 
Harlow's Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to trial by a fair and 
impartial jury violated when he was tried by an unqualified jury?

 
 

[¶63]   We are statutorily foreclosed from 
considering this issue, for two reasons.  First, it is not cognizable in a 
post-conviction relief proceeding because it concerns only a sentencing issue.23  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-101(b).  Second, the issue 
was decided on the merits in the direct appeal.  Harlow, 2003 WY 47, ¶¶ 15-24, 70 
P.3d at 187-89; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(a)(iii).

 
 
I.          
Were Harlow's Fifth 
and Sixth Amendment rights violated when he was not afforded access to counsel 
and thus gave uncounseled statements about the events of June 26, 1997, and 
about prior crimes, which statements were admitted against him at trial?

 
 

[¶64]   We are statutorily foreclosed from 
considering this issue because it was decided on the merits in the direct 
appeal.  Harlow, 2003 WY 
47, ¶¶ 25-37, 70 P.3d at 189-92; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(a)(iii).

 
 
J.         
Were Harlow's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial, 
equal protection and due process violated when victim impact testimony was 
admitted, despite the fact that no state law permits its introduction at capital 
sentencing proceedings?

 
 

[¶65]   We are statutorily foreclosed from 
considering this issue because it was decided on the merits in the direct 
appeal.  Harlow, 2003 WY 
47, ¶¶ 38-57, 70 P.3d at 192-99; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(a)(iii).

 
 
K.        Were 
Harlow's Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights violated when the constitutional errors that 
occurred during his capital trial were deemed harmless despite the fact that the 
State failed to carry its burden of disproving the harm caused by each 
error?

 
 
[¶66]   A careful reading of Harlow's post-conviction relief 
petition and his ensuing appellate brief reveals that, despite reference to 
constitutional "errors," and despite the phrase "each error," this issue has a 
single focus.  
That focus is apparent in the following introductory passage from the 
petition:

 
 
The Wyoming Supreme Court determined that, despite the 
inadmissibility in this jurisdiction of victim impact testimony at capital 
sentencing proceedings, and regardless of the State's failure to even attempt to 
show the harmlessness of this (or any other error raised), the receipt of victim 
impact evidence [in] Harlow's case was "harmless error."  Harlow v. State, 2003 WY 
47, ¶¶ 38-57, 70 P.3d 179, 192-199 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶67]   Clearly, this issue is not cognizable 
in post-conviction relief.  The issue was raised and decided on the 
merits in the direct appeal.  There is not even an attempt to allege 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in regard to the issue.  Rather, the issue 
is stated as if it is an appeal from this Court's ruling in the direct appeal, 
which is not the purpose of post-conviction relief proceedings.  We will not further 
consider the matter.

 
 
L.         
Were Harlow's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from 
cruel and unusual punishment and to be accorded equal treatment before the law 
violated when he was sentenced to death even though his role in the victim's 
death was minor in comparison to the deeds of his far more culpable 
co-defendants, both of whom received life sentences?

 
 

[¶68]   We are statutorily foreclosed from 
considering this issue, for two reasons.  First, it is not cognizable in a 
post-conviction relief proceeding because it concerns only a sentencing 
issue.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-101(b).  Second, the issue 
was decided on the merits in the direct appeal.  Harlow, 2003 WY 47, ¶¶ 15-24, 70 
P.3d at 187-89; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(a)(iii).

 
 
M.        Were 
Harlow's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process violated when he 
was tried and sentenced to death under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101, et seq. (Michie 1997), which statutes are vague on 
their face and as applied?

 
 
[¶69]   Once again, Harlow's attempt to raise this issue in his 
post-conviction relief petition is nothing more than an attempt to appeal an 
adverse ruling in his direct appeal.  Despite acknowledging that adverse ruling, he 
contends that "there are enough vagaries in Wyoming's death penalty scheme . . 
. for the statute to be considered unconstitutionally vague."  He then "reasserts 
the other arguments about the infirmity of the statute which he made on appeal 
here."  
Finally, in his brief, he admits that the issues he raises, which involve 
the way in which the jury is to be instructed about aggravators and mitigators, 
"are sentencing matters."

 
 
[¶70]   We decline to consider this issue 
because it involves only sentencing matters, and it was decided on the merits in 
the direct appeal.

 
 
N.        Was 
Harlow's Eighth Amendment 
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment violated by the cumulative 
constitutional errors that occurred at trial?

 
 

[¶71]   We need not consider this issue because we have not found 
any constitutional error that is cognizable in post-conviction relief 
proceedings.  
Harlow, 2003 WY 47, ¶ 88, 70 P.3d  
at 206; Kerns v. State, 920 P.2d 632, 641 
(Wyo. 1996), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1091 
(2001).

 
 
O.        Were 
Harlow's Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to the due process 
guarantee of fundamental fairness violated by the cumulative constitutional 
errors that occurred at trial?

 
 
[¶72]   We need not consider this issue for the 
reason stated directly above.

 
 
P.        Were 
Harlow's Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection violated by the 
untimely disposition of his appeal?

 
 
[¶73]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-103(a) (Lexis 
1999) provides for automatic review of capital sentences:

 
 
The judgment of conviction and sentence of death is subject 
to automatic review by the supreme court of Wyoming within one hundred twenty 
(120) days after certification by the sentencing court of the entire record, 
unless the time is extended for an additional period not to exceed sixty (60) 
days by the supreme court for good cause shown.  Such review by the supreme court shall have 
priority over all other cases.

 
 
[¶74]   Certification of the record in the 
direct appeal in this case occurred on February 19, 1999, and the case on appeal 
was docketed four days later.  Harlow obtained a 90-day extension of time to 
file his brief.  
Briefing was completed with the filing of Harlow's reply brief on November 29, 1999.  Oral arguments were 
heard on February 17, 2000.  The opinion of this Court affirming 
Harlow's convictions and 
sentences was published on April 14, 2003.  The opinion contained the following 
explanation for this amount of time:

 
 
            
From this court's study of death penalty jurisprudence, this court 
acutely appreciates that a capital case, by its very nature, requires of a 
reviewing court the most meticulous and thoughtful consideration and 
deliberation of the issues presented.  In fulfilling that requirement in this case, 
the members of this court have had divergent views concerning the resolution of 
some of the many difficult issues presented and have expended substantial 
amounts of time working through those divergent views to achieve agreement on 
the resolution and the reasoning supporting the resolution of these issues.  In light of the 
requirement of meticulous and thoughtful consideration and deliberation, the 
working through of divergent views to achieve agreement on resolution of issues, 
the unique set of appellate responsibilities conferred by the legislature upon 
this court, the errors enumerated in this appeal, the parties' extensive 
briefing of the issues underlying these enumerated errors, and the caution that 
the punishment of death is different, Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U.S. 238, 306, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 2760, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring), this court 
has taken considerable time to reach its decision in this case and in another 
capital case submitted for review before this one and which is also decided 
today.  See Olsen v. State, 2003 WY 46, 67 P.3d 536 (2003).  Although the time 
to reach decision has been considerable, it has been necessary and unavoidable 
for the reasons stated.

 
 

Harlow, 2003 WY 47, ¶ 6, 70 P.3d  at 184.

 
 

[¶75]   In his petition, Harlow asserts four 
ways in which he was prejudiced by the length of time his case remained on 
appeal:  (1) 
several important witnesses have "all but disappeared"; (2) he had a 
"foreshortened" time in which to prepare the petition;24 (3) he has 
suffered the "anxiety and indignity" of not knowing what his fate would be; and 
(4) such delay constitutes a violation of his due process rights as per Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972); Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538 (10th Cir. 
1994); and Harris v. Champion, 938 F.2d 1062 (10th Cir. 
1991).

 
 

[¶76]   Needless to say, this "speedy appeal" 
issue did not arise out of the proceedings that resulted in Harlow's conviction.  Thus, we are 
statutorily prevented from considering it.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-101(b).  Furthermore, 
because it is not raised as an allegation of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel, that procedural bar has not been lifted by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-14-103(b)(ii).  
However, because "death is different," we will briefly note that 
application of the four-factor test from Barker, 407 U.S.  at 530, to the alleged appellate delay in this case would not 
achieve a different result for Harlow.25  Even if we assume 
that Harlow has established the first factorexcessive delaywe conclude that he 
has not established that the delay was so unreasonable as to violate his due 
process rights (factor two), or that he was prejudiced thereby (factor four).26

 
 

[¶77]   By their very nature, death penalty 
cases are uniquely and presumptively complex, and this fact must be taken into 
account for purposes of speedy trial and speedy appeal analysis.  Daniel, 2003 WY 
132, ¶ 45, 78 P.3d  at 219; State v. Coffin, 128 N.M. 
192, 991 P.2d 477, 501 
(1999); Harris, 15 F.3d  at 
1562.  Indeed, that complexity was the very reason 
given for the delay in this case, Harlow, 2003 WY 47, ¶ 6, 70 P.3d  
at 184, and Harlow has made no showing that such is 
inaccurate.  
This Court also noted in its opinion in the direct appeal that resolution 
of the issues in this case was complicated by the simultaneous need to address 
the same and similar issues in another capital case, the opinion in which was 
published on the same date.  Id.  
These complicating factors indicate that the length of delay in this 
case cannot be considered to be presumptively prejudicial.

 
 

[¶78]   And beyond that, Harlow's allegations of actual prejudice are 
not substantiated.  
For instance, even if some witnesses have "all but disappeared," 
Harlow's conviction was 
affirmed in the direct appeal, so those witnesses will not be needed.  There is no 
prejudice where the appeal has been heard and lost.  United States v. Antoine, 906 F.2d 1379, 1382 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 963 (1990); United States v. Johnson, 732 F.2d 379, 381 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1033 (1984).  Further, incarceration is not "oppressive" 
under Barker where the lack of a meritorious appeal 
establishes that the appellant was rightfully incarcerated.  Daniel, 2003 WY 
132, ¶ 49, 78 P.3d  at 220.  This would include Harlow's advancement from simple consecutive 
life sentences to death row status.

 
 
[¶79]   Harlow also complains that the delay in the 
appeal only gave him from April 14, 2003, to December 7, 2003, to prepare his 
post-conviction relief petition.  For several reasons, we do not find this 
sufficient prejudice to rise to the level of a due process violation.  First, we have not 
been shown that eight months is an inadequate time for such an endeavor.  Second, Harlow and 
his counsel surely knew "from day one" that a post-conviction relief petition is 
a likely necessity in any capital case, and they reasonably could have been 
expected to begin preparing for it long before the direct appeal opinion was 
published.  And 
third, Harlow has not 
specified how additional time would have made any difference to his presentation 
of a post-conviction case.

 
 

[¶80]   Harlow's final allegation of prejudice 
resulting from appellate delay is that he suffered from the anxiety and 
indignity of not knowing what his fate would be.  This allegation is not substantiated by any 
assertion of facts and, therefore, remains but a hollow claim.  Furthermore, we do 
not believe that such anxiety and indignity, standing alone, come even close to 
the type of "extraordinary circumstances which strongly suggest a miscarriage of 
justice" to which Wyoming's post-conviction relief statutes are directed.  See 
State ex rel. Hopkinson, 696 P.2d  at 64; Johnson, 592 P.2d  at 
286; and Munoz, 590 P.2d  at 
1355.

 
 

2.         
Were Harlow's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and his 
state-created liberty interests, protected by Hicks v. 
Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 100 S. Ct. 2227, 65 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1980), violated when the district court held that capital 
sentencing phase errors are not cognizable in post-conviction relief, regardless 
of merit?

 
 
[¶81]   This issue was not raised in the 
post-conviction relief petition because it concerns the district court's 
handling of the petition.  It was, however, appended to the end of 
Harlow's later appellate 
brief.  While 
it is not technically an issue that arose out of the proceedings leading to 
Harlow's conviction, we will address it because this Court, too, has declined to 
consider Harlow's 
sentencing phase issues.  Consequently, we do not now so much address 
an independent issue as we do explain our decisions regarding earlier issues.27

 
 

[¶82]   This issue focuses upon Hicks, 447 U.S.  at 346, which case stands for the proposition that a state may 
not deprive someone of a statutorily created liberty interest without due 
process of law.  
Harlow relates that 
legal proposition to the instant case as follows:

 
 
            
To construe Wyoming's post-conviction 
mechanism as precluding the correction of constitutional errors relating to 
sentencing, regardless of magnitude or merit, is to render it virtually 
meaningless with respect to capital cases which, by statute, are tried in two 
parts.  While 
Wyoming is not constitutionally 
required to maintain a post-conviction scheme, it has chosen to do so and, 
having so chosen, must operate that scheme fairly and evenhandedly.  Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980).  To do otherwise is 
to run afoul of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution.  
It cannot single out those sentenced capitally and deprive them of 
protections available to those convicted and sentenced for non-capital 
offenses.  To 
do so would constitute not only due process violations but would deny a capital 
defendant of the protections due under the Eighth Amendment to be free from 
cruel and unusual punishment when that very punishment is effectively shielded 
from post-appeal constitutional challenge.  Particularly where, as here, petitioner has 
been denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel guaranteed by the 
Sixth Amendment in testing the constitutional validity of that sentence, to 
preclude such an assessment under WS § 7-14-101, et seq. 
offends the notions of fairness embraced under the U.S. and Wyoming 
Constitutions.

 
 

[¶83]   While we find this to be an eloquent 
wish list, we do not find that it accurately reflects the law.  To begin with, the 
United States Constitution does not require states to provide for 
post-conviction relief.  Pennsylvania v. 
Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557, 
107 S. Ct. 1990, 95 L. Ed. 2d 539 (1987).  Further, such may be curtailed or even 
abolished without violating due process.  Liegakos v. Cooke, 
106 F.3d 1381, 1385 (7th Cir. 1997).  The ramification of these holdings is that 
the "statutorily created liberty interest" protected by Hicks is nothing more than that; in other words, the 
interest is defined by its statutory creator.  What that means in the instant case is that 
Harlow does not have a 
liberty interest in post-conviction relief review of sentencing matters, and Hicks has no application to this case.

 
 

[¶84]   The second error in Harlow's analysis of his right to 
post-conviction relief review of his death sentence is his suggestion that the 
post-conviction relief statute requires construction.  We need not 
construe the statute to determine whether it precludes review of sentencing 
matters.  It 
does so in clearly expressed words.  And we are not at liberty to construe 
statutes that are not ambiguous.  Union Pacific 
Resources Co. v. Dolenc, 2004 WY 
36, ¶ 13, 86 P.3d 1287, 1291 (Wyo. 
2004) (quoting Rodriguez v. Casey, 2002 WY 111, ¶¶ 9-10, 50 P.3d 323, ¶¶ 9-10 (Wyo. 
2002)); In re Wilson, 2003 WY 105, ¶ 6, 75 P.3d 669, 672 (Wyo. 
2003) (quoting Wyoming Dept. of Transp. v. Haglund, 
982 P.2d 699, 701 (Wyo. 
1999)).

 
 
[¶85]   The third error in Harlow's analysis of his right to 
post-conviction relief review of his death sentence is his allegation that such 
an interpretation of the statute would single out capital defendants and treat 
them differently from other criminal defendants.  This allegation is not supported by any 
citation to case law or other authority suggesting that non-capital defendants 
may have their sentencing proceedings reviewed via a petition for 
post-conviction relief.  Such is not authorized by statute and, if it 
has been done, it has been done erroneously.  Non-capital sentencing hearings, like capital 
penalty phase trials, are not subject to review in post-conviction relief 
proceedings.

 
 

[¶86]   Next, Harlow errs by contending that limiting 
post-conviction relief to non-sentencing matters will deny capital defendants 
their Eight Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.  That is simply not 
the case, because every criminal defendant has the right to address any and all 
sentencing issues in his or her direct appeal, including the question of cruel 
and unusual punishment.  Indeed, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-103(d) 
specifically directs this Court to consider sentencing issues in the automatic 
review of capital sentences.  Harlow, himself, received the benefit of just 
such a review in his direct appeal.  Harlow, 2003 WY 47, ¶¶ 75-82, 89, 
70 P.3d  at 203-05, 206.  That review included consideration of the 
proportionality and Enmund issues raised again by 
Harlow in these 
proceedings.

 
 

[¶87]   We continue to adhere to the holding of 
Whitney, 745 P.2d  at 903-04, wherein we recognized these particular limitations in the 
statutory post-conviction relief scheme.  We conclude that, because Harlow had no statutory right to 
review of his sentence via post-conviction relief, the district court's refusal 
to decide sentencing issues was not in error.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶88]   Finding no meritorious claims in 
Harlow's petition for 
post-conviction relief, we affirm the summary judgment granted to the 
State.  
Further, we order that mandate issue forthwith, that the existing stay of 
execution is vacated, and that the new date for execution of the sentence of 
death is thirty days from the date mandate issues.  See Hopkinson v. State, 704 P.2d 1323, 1330-31 
(Wyo.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1026 (1985).  The case is 
remanded to the district court for issuance of a new warrant directed to the 
director of the department of corrections to carry out the execution of the 
sentence as provided by law.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

  1Although 
post-conviction relief proceedings are a continuation of the criminal case, they 
are conducted pursuant to the rules of civil procedure.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-14-101(c) (LexisNexis 2003); State ex rel. Hopkinson 
v. District Court, TetonCounty, 696 P.2d 54, 61 
(Wyo.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985).

2Harlow was 
convicted of premeditated murder, felony murder, attempting to escape from 
official detention, and conspiring to escape from official detention.  Harlow, 2003 WY 
47, ¶ 14, 70 P.3d  at 186.

  3The 
State's motion to 
dismiss was converted to a motion for summary judgment, by the consent of the 
parties.

  4Harlow contends 
that Whitney's restraint on the application of 
post-conviction relief to sentencing matters is no longer the law, citing Engberg v. Meyer, 820 P.2d 70 (Wyo. 
1991) and State ex rel. 
Hopkinson, 696 P.2d 54.  We reiterate here, 
to the contrary, that the legislature, not this Court, limited the availability 
of post-conviction relief to the proceedings that resulted in conviction.  It is not for this 
Court to extend the availability of post-conviction relief beyond its statutory 
limits, and any past efforts in that regard were in error.

  5Harlow's 
counsel argued during the post-conviction relief motion hearing in district 
court that Strickland had been "set on its head" by 
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 156 L. Ed. 2d 471 (2003).  As discussed infra, we have concluded that Strickland's "objective reasonableness" test is alive 
and well.

  6For instance, 
Harlow appeared in civilian clothing, his handcuffs were removed in the 
courtroom, and counsel table was draped so his leg shackles were not visible to 
the jury.

  7Harlow's 
brother testified in the sentencing phase, not the guilt phase, and his physical 
restraint actually is not cognizable in this proceeding.

  8Neither 
Harlow's petition for post-conviction relief nor his appellate brief filed 
thereafter directs this Court to a specific point in the record where uncharged 
misconduct evidence was admitted during the guilt phase of the trial in 
violation of W.R.E. 404(b).

  9Ironically, the 
court in Donnelly held that, in the context of an 
entire closing argument, inappropriate prosecutorial statements may not equate 
to such unfairness as to violate due process and require a new trial.  Donnelly, 416 U.S.  at 645.

  10Count II 
alleged felony murder, with the following elements:  (1) on or about the 
26th day of June, 1997; (2) in Carbon County, Wyoming; (3) the defendant, James 
Martin Harlow; (4) while attempting to perpetrate the crime of escape; (5) 
killed a human being, Wayne Martinez.  Count III alleged attempted escape, with the 
following elements:  
(1) on or about the 26th day of June, 1997; (2) in Carbon County, 
Wyoming; (3) the defendant, James Martin Harlow; (4) intending to escape from 
official detention (the crime of escape from official detention); (5) did an act 
which was a substantial step towards committing the crime of escape from 
official detention.

  11Instruction 
No. 12 states:

 
 
To be a member of a conspiracy, a Defendant need not know 
all the other members, nor all the details of the conspiracy, nor the means by 
which the objects are to be accomplished.  Each member of the conspiracy may perform 
separate and distinct acts.

 
 
Merely associating with others and discussing common goals, 
mere similarity of conduct between or among such persons, merely being present 
at the place where a crime takes place or is discussed, or even knowing about 
criminal conduct does not, of itself, make someone a member of the conspiracy or 
a conspirator.

 
 
  12Instruction 
No. 7A states:

 
 
It is not necessary that the Defendant personally did every 
act necessary to constitute the crime of Murder in the First Degree as alleged 
in Count I.  It 
is enough if he knowingly aided and abetted someone else to commit the crime of 
Murder in the First Degree as alleged in Count I.

 
 
A person who knowingly aids or abets in the commission of 
Murder in the First Degree as alleged in Count I may be charged, tried and 
convicted as if he were a principal.

 
 
Merely being present at the scene of a crime or merely 
knowing that a crime is being committed or is about to be committed is not 
sufficient for the jury to find that the Defendant aided and abetted in the 
crime of Murder in the First Degree as alleged in Count I.  The State must 
prove that the Defendant knowingly associated himself with the crime of Murder 
in the First Degree in some way as a participantsomeone who wanted the crime to 
be committedand not as a mere spectator.

 
 

  13But see Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158, 107 S. Ct. 1676, 95 L. Ed. 2d 127 (1987), where the Enmund rule was amended to require only major 
participation in the underlying felony coupled with a reckless indifference to 
human life.

  14Indeed, Enmund forecloses imposition of the death penalty for 
felony murder where the defendant did not kill or intend to kill, but it does 
not foreclose a felony murder conviction in that circumstance.  Enmund, 458 U.S.  at 797.  Enmund involves 
the issue of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, it does 
not involve guilt or innocence.  Hopkins v. Reeves, 
524 U.S. 88, 99-100, 118 S. Ct. 1895, 141 L. Ed. 2d 76 (1998); Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 384-86, 106 S. Ct. 689, 88 L. Ed. 2d 704 (1986), abrogated on other 
grounds by Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 503 n.7, 107 S. Ct. 1918, 95 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1987).

  15During the 
summary judgment motion hearing in district court, Harlow's counsel mentioned at 
least four times that instructional issues or problems should have been raised 
in the direct appeal, but did not identify specific issues or problems from the 
guilt phase.

  16In some 
situations, although not in this one, there may be a question as to the meaning 
of the statutory phrase, "official detention."  See, for example, 
Yellowbear v. State, 874 P.2d 241, 245 (Wyo. 1994); Westmark v. State, 864 P.2d 1031, 1033 (Wyo. 
1993); Kupec v. State, 835 P.2d 359, 364 (Wyo. 
1992); Oien v. State, 797 P.2d 544, 546-50 (Wyo. 
1990); and Peper v. State, 768 P.2d 26, 29 (Wyo. 1989).  Undoubtedly, that is why "official detention" 
has a statutory definition.  See Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-5-201(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003).

  17Instruction 
No. 4 states:

 
 
The Defendant, 
James Martin Harlow, has been charged in this case with four (4) counts or 
separate crimes.  
You must consider each count, and the evidence pertaining to it, 
separately.  
The fact that you may find the Defendant guilty or not guilty as to a 
crime charged in one count should not control your verdict as to any other crime 
charged in any other count.

 
 
  18For the 
reasons repeatedly stated herein, we will not consider the penalty-phase 
issues.

  19We have said 
many times that the elements of a crime, including specific intent, may be 
proved by circumstantial evidence.  See, for example, 
Sotolongo-Garcia v. State, 2002 WY 
185, ¶ 14, 60 P.3d 687, 690 (Wyo. 
2002); Browning v. State, 2001 WY 93, ¶ 18, 32 P.3d 1061, 1068 (Wyo. 
2001); and Lopez v. State, 788 P.2d 1150, 1153 (Wyo. 1990).  Circumstantial evidence is equal to direct 
evidence and is tested for sufficiency under the same standard.  Lobatos v. State, 875 P.2d 716, 719 (Wyo. 
1994).

  20W.R.Cr.P. 
24(c) states:

 
 

Examination of jurors.  After the 
jury panel is qualified the attorneys or a pro se 
defendant shall be entitled to conduct the examination of prospective jurors, 
but such examination shall be under the supervision and control of the judge, 
and the judge may conduct such further examination as the judge deems 
proper.  The 
judge may assume the examination if counsel or a pro 
se defendant fail to follow this rule.  If the judge assumes the examination, the 
judge may permit counsel or a pro se defendant to 
submit questions in writing.  The examination shall be on the record.

 
 
            
(1)        The only 
purpose of the examination is to select a panel of jurors who will fairly and 
impartially hear the evidence and render a just verdict.

 
 
            
(2)        The court 
shall not permit counsel or a pro se defendant to 
attempt to precondition prospective jurors to a particular result, comment on 
the personal lives and families of the parties or their attorneys, nor question 
jurors concerning the pleadings, the law, the meaning of words, or the comfort 
of jurors.

 
 
            
(3)        In voir 
dire examination counsel or a pro se defendant shall 
not:

 
 
            
(A)        Ask 
questions of an individual juror that can be asked of the panel or a group of 
jurors collectively;

 
 
            
(B)        Ask 
questions answered in a juror questionnaire except to explain an answer;

 
 
            
(C)        Repeat a 
question asked and answered;

 
 
            
(D)        Instruct 
the jury on the law or argue the case; or

 
 
            
(E)        Ask a 
juror what the juror's verdict might be under any hypothetical circumstance.

 
 
            
Notwithstanding the restrictions set forth in subsections (c)(3)(A)-(E), 
counsel or a pro se party shall be permitted during voir dire examination to 
preview portions of the evidence from the case in a non-argumentative manner 
when a preview of the evidence would help prospective jurors better understand 
the context and reasons for certain lines of voir dire questioning.

  21It appears 
from Harlow's petition 
that even his own counsel does not believe there was ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  While 
suggesting that trial counsel's conduct caused the allegedly inadequate voir dire, the post-conviction relief petition 
repeatedly denies deficient conduct by trial counsel:  "Defense counsel 
tried, but failed, to query the jury on these points.  It also tried, but 
failed, to get the court to do so."  "Defense counsel repeatedly objected during 
the process itself, gave reasons for the objections, used all peremptory 
challenges and refused to pass the panel for cause."  "The constitutional 
infirmity of the voir dire was further pursued after trial with a motion for new 
trial, which was denied without hearing."  "It should be noted that defense made a 
continuing objection to the content and style of the voir dire, refused to pass 
the entire panel for cause, moved for a mistrial several times and repeatedly 
objected to the court's unwillingness to allow properly informative voir dire 
and also moved to strike the panel."  "While lead defense counsel may have often 
been far less than politic during voir dire, he did 
propose many valid voir dire questions, both verbally and in writing, many of 
which [the district court] refused."  "Though accused of having repeatedly 
violated' Rule 24 by the Wyoming Supreme Court (Harlow 
v. State, supra, 70 P.3d 179, 188) the record does not support this assertion."

  22An example 
might be suggesting that appellate counsel's manner of broaching Harlow's claims alienated this Court 
and colored its decision, without some evidence of such actually happening.

  23The issue 
raised by Harlow is not 
whether the jury was qualified to determine guilt or innocence.  The question, as in 
many capital cases, is whether the jury was properly "death-qualified"?

  24Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(d) 
provides that a post-conviction relief petition must be filed within five years 
of the date of conviction.

  25These comments 
are based upon the assumption that delay in adjudicating a state capital case 
appeal may give rise to an independent due process claim.  See Harris, 15 F.3d  at 1557.

  26It needs to be 
pointed out that not all of the time from February 17, 2000, to April 14, 2003, 
can be considered "delay."  Obviously, there is some amount of time 
required to prepare an opinion in a multiple-issue capital appeal.  Harlow has not identified what amount 
of the time that passed in this case was reasonable and what amount was 
unreasonable.

27See footnote 4 
and the related text, supra.