Title: Fenner v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Donald A. Fenner v. State of Maryland
No. 88, September Term, 2003
Headnote:
The questioning of petitioner by a District Court judge during a bail review
hearing was not “interrogation” as is meant by Miranda.  Therefore,
petitioner’s inculpatory statement, which he blurted out in response to the
District Court judge’s routine, general question, was properly admissible at
trial.
A bail review hearing is not generally a “critical stage” of criminal
proceedings and, as such, there exists no Sixth Amendment right to provided
counsel during a bail review hearing, the only purpose of which is to ascertain
the appropriateness and amount of bail pursuant to Md. Rule 4-216 (2004). 
The edited version of petitioner’s inculpatory statement was not so vague or
misleading as to have made it an abuse of discretion for the trial court to have
the statement read to the jury. 
Circuit Court for Frede rick County
Case #K-01-28360
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 88
September Term, 2003
Donald A. Fenner
v.
State of Maryland
Bell, C. J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
           Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
Filed:  April 12, 2004
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
Donald A. Fenner, petitioner, was tried by a jury in the Circuit Court for Frederick
County and was convicted of distribution of cocaine and conspiracy to distribute cocaine.
On May 9, 2002, the trial judge sentenced petitioner to twenty years of incarceration for the
distribution of cocaine conviction and a concurrent sentence of twenty years for the
conspiracy to distribute cocaine conviction.
Petitioner then filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  In an unreported
opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court’s rulings.  Petitioner filed a
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to this Court and on December 11, 2003, we granted the
petition.  Fenner v. State, 378 Md. 613, 837 A.2d 925 (2003).  In his brief, he presents two
questions for our review:
“1.  Whether inculpatory statements made at a bail review hearing by
a defendant who is unrepresented by counsel and who is not given any
Miranda[1] advisements are admissible against the defendant at trial.
“2.  Whether the trial court’s admission of a redacted version of the
statement made at the bail hearing was error where the redaction rendered the
statement vague and misleading.”  (Footnote added.)
We hold that, in the context of petitioner’s bail review hearing, the requirements of
Miranda did not apply because, although he was in custody at the time, petitioner cannot be
said to have been “interrogated” within the meaning of Miranda.  Thus, petitioner’s
inculpatory statement at the bail review hearing was properly admissible at trial.
We also hold that, because petitioner’s bail review hearing was not a “critical stage”
of the pretrial proceedings, i.e., it was not an adversary judicial criminal proceeding,
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petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to provided counsel had not yet attached.  Therefore, the
trial court did not err in allowing into evidence his inculpatory statement, which was made
at the bail review hearing when petitioner was unrepresented by counsel.
We further hold that the redacted version of the inculpatory statement, as it was read
to the jury, was not so vague and misleading as to have made its admittance a clear abuse
of discretion by the trial court.  It was unquestionably relevant and its probative value was
not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
I. Facts
On January 9, 2001, officers with the Frederick Police Department arranged to have
a confidential informant at the time, Brett Hann, make a controlled purchase of narcotics in
a “targeted area,” namely, the John Hanson Apartment Building.  After being searched to
make sure that he did not have any controlled dangerous substances in his possession, Hann
was fitted with a body wire for the purpose of recording and informing the police of any
drug transaction that might occur.  The police also gave Hann drug-purchase money and
recorded the serial numbers of that money.
Upon entering the “targeted area” at approximately 10:50 p.m., Hann first
encountered John Walter King, whom Hann knew from prior drug related matters.  King
asked Hann what he was looking for and Hann replied that he wanted fifty dollars worth of
crack cocaine.  King asked Hann to give him the purchase money, but Hann declined to do
so because the police had told Hann not to “front the money.”
2Under Md. Code (1973, 1998 Repl. Vol., 2003 Supp.), §2-607 (c) of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article, the “duties” of a District Court commissioner are, in pertinent
part:
  “(c) Duties. — (1) A commissioner shall receive applications and determine
probable cause for the issuance of charging documents.
(2) A commissioner shall advise arrested persons of their constitutional
rights, set bond or commit persons to jail in default of bond or release them
on personal recognizance if circumstances warrant . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
The “INITIAL APPEARANCE REPORT,” which was filed on the morning of
January 10, 2001, and signed by the District Court commissioner, provides the following:
“INITIAL APPEARANCE REPORT (Rule 4-213)
I hereby certify that when the above named Defendant was brought before me
(continued...)
-3-
According to Hann, King then motioned for an individual, later identified as
petitioner, to come over so that Hann could conduct a “face-to-face” deal.  Petitioner did so
but initially refused to engage in any kind of transaction until King “vouched for” Hann.
After King vouched for Hann, petitioner asked Hann what he wanted.  Hann again stated
that he wanted fifty dollars worth of crack cocaine.  Hann gave petitioner fifty dollars, and
petitioner then gave Hann three pieces of crack cocaine.  King took one of the pieces as
payment for assisting in the deal.  Following this exchange, Hann said “see you later,” which
was a prearranged code phrase used to alert the police that the transaction was complete.
Petitioner was arrested at the scene.  The officers testified, variously, that they observed
Hann, King and petitioner via binoculars and/or listened to the transaction via the body wire.
On January 10, 2001, the day after petitioner’s arrest, and after his appearance before
a District Court commissioner,2 he appeared before the Honorable Frederick J. Bower of the
2(...continued)
for his initial appearance, I:
INFORMED Defendant of each offense with which he is charged and of the
allowable penalties, including mandatory penalties, if any.
PROVIDED Defendant with a copy of the Charging Document since
Defendant did not already have one.
REQUIRED Defendant to read the Notice of Advice of Right to Counsel.
ADVISED Defendant that if he appears for trial without a lawyer, the Court
could determine that he has waived counsel and proceed to trial with
Defendant unrepresented by a lawyer.
ADVISED Defendant that he is charged with a felony that is not within the
jurisdiction of the District Court; that he has a right to have a
preliminary hearing by a request made now or within ten days; that
failure to make a timely request will result in waiver of such hearing.
Defendant requests preliminary hearing.  It is scheduled for 02/08/2001 . . .
.” 
Petitioner’s signature appears on the second page of this “INITIAL APPEARANCE
REPORT,” which is titled “Receipt.”  Petitioner indicated (by checking a box) the
following:
“I . . . had read to me the offense with which I am charged, the
conditions of release, the penalty for violation of the conditions of release, the
Notice of Advice of Right to Counsel, and I acknowledge receipt of a copy
hereof.” 
3Under Md. Rules 4-213 (a) and 4-216 (d) (2004), a District Court judge has the
power to address issues related to bail and releases on personal recognizance. 
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District Court of Maryland, sitting in Frederick County for a bail review hearing.3  At this
hearing, petitioner was read a statement concerning the charges that were pending against
him and was told that his preliminary hearing had been scheduled for February 8, 2001.
Judge Bower then asked petitioner the following question: “Is there anything you’d like to
tell me about yourself, sir?”  In response, the following exchange took place:
“[PETITIONER]: For all the yes, activities, I don’t, I don’t know what you’re
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talking about over there.  (Indiscernible.)  I ain’t gonna, I mean I gonna
(indiscernible.)  I can’t get no help on that, you know, they try to give you
help.  That’s all they going to do is call and put me in jail and (indiscernible).
I ain’t playing it with the big boy, know what I’m sayin’.  (Indiscernible),
Officer, what else is there for me to do?  Whenever I get, whenever I get
caught with a little charge they never catch a large amount of drugs on me so,
according to the amount of (indiscernible) drug (indiscernible), you know
what I’m saying, I mean (indiscernible) so I think like they just (indiscernible).
Whenever they catch, they probably catch me with one or two pills, Your
Honor, this is just for me to make ends meet, to make money for me to be able
to get by.  They never caught me that (indiscernible) amount of drugs on me.
You know what I’m sayin’.  I mean I’m not denying what happened but when
they caught me, they didn’t catch me with nothing but that $50.
THE COURT: Sir, you need to have a lawyer just as soon as you can.  I’m
going to leave the bond (indiscernible) to say I’ll allow 10% to be paid to, for
your release, okay, your preliminary hearing is February the 8th. 
[PETITIONER]: Thank you sir.”
Prior to trial, petitioner moved to suppress the statements he made during the bail
review hearing in the District Court.  At the suppression hearing before the Honorable John
H. Tisdale of the Circuit Court for Frederick County, he argued that the statements should
not be admitted at trial because they were made pursuant to a custodial interrogation without
the benefit of Miranda warnings and at a time when he was not represented by counsel.
Judge Tisdale denied petitioner’s motion, finding that although he was in custody when he
made the inculpatory statement, he was not being interrogated within the meaning of
Miranda.  Judge Tisdale then ruled that the portion of petitioner’s statement in which he
said, “I’m not denying what happened,” would be admissible, but that the remainder of the
statement (that which was discernible) would be excluded because it contained “other
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crimes” evidence.  Petitioner’s counsel and the prosecutor both expressed concern about
putting the statement, “I’m not denying what happened,” in context.  Judge Tisdale then
convened a chambers conference in an effort to have the parties craft an appropriate
stipulation pursuant to his ruling.  Eventually, while petitioner reserved his objection to any
admission, it was agreed that the statement would be admitted via this stipulation:
“The parties agree that the evidence would show that the Defendant,
Donald Fenner, appeared before the Honorable Judge Frederick J. Bower of
the District Court of Frederick County, Maryland and in response to
questioning at his bail hearing made the following statement: ‘I’m not denying
what happened.’”
Petitioner’s first trial ended in a mistrial and he was retried on March 20 and 21,
2002.  At retrial, the parties agreed that the suppression court’s prior ruling concerning the
statement petitioner made at the bail review hearing was binding.  The Honorable G. Edward
Dwyer, Jr. of the Circuit Court for Frederick County presided, with a jury, over the trial.
The final piece of evidence the State wanted to adduce at trial was the stipulation crafted
pursuant to Judge Tisdale’s ruling on the motion to suppress.  The parties agreed that Judge
Dwyer should follow Judge Tisdale’s earlier ruling, and, to preserve the issue on appeal,
petitioner reaffirmed his objection to that earlier ruling, which Judge Dwyer overruled.  The
stipulation was thereafter read to the jury.  On March 21, 2002, petitioner was found guilty
of both the charge of distribution of cocaine and the charge of conspiracy to distribute
cocaine.
-7-
II. Discussion
A. Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment Miranda Claim
Petitioner contends that inculpatory statements made by an accused at a bail review
hearing where the accused was not given any Miranda advisements should be inadmissible
at trial.  The United States Supreme Court held in Miranda v. Arizona, supra, that:
“the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates
the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-
incrimination.”
  
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612.
Thus, in order for the Miranda safeguards to take effect, there must first exist
“custodial interrogation.”  We must therefore examine whether the District Court judge’s
questions of petitioner at petitioner’s bail review hearing, at which he made inculpatory
statements, constituted a “custodial interrogation.”
“Custodial interrogation,” was described in Miranda to “mean questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom in any significant way.”  Id. (emphasis added).  In the case sub judice, it is
clear that petitioner was in custody at the time of his bail review hearing.  The real point of
contention between petitioner and respondent, however, is whether the District Court
judge’s question, “Is there anything you’d like to tell me about yourself, sir?,” can be said
to constitute an “interrogation” within the meaning of Miranda.
In Hughes v. State, 346 Md. 80, 695 A.2d 132, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 989 (1997), we
4 A judge is not a “law enforcement officer,” as such officers are contemplated in
Miranda and its progeny.
-8-
had the opportunity to examine when a question posed to a defendant by a law enforcement
officer can be said to constitute an “interrogation” in violation of Miranda.  In Hughes, we
adhered to the standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Rhode Island v.
Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), a standard focusing on whether
the law enforcement officer knew or should have known that the questioning was reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response.  We explained in Hughes that:
“Assessment of the likelihood that an otherwise routine question will evoke
an incriminating response requires consideration of the totality of the
circumstances in each case, with consideration given to the context in which
the question is asked.  The fact that the answer to a booking question assists
the prosecution in proving its case is not determinative of whether a standard
booking question, when posed, was likely to elicit an incriminating response.
A benign question in one case may amount to ‘interrogation,’ for which
Miranda warnings are required, in another case.  Therefore, ‘courts should
carefully scrutinize the factual setting of each encounter of this type,’ . . .
keeping in mind that the critical inquiry is whether the police officer, based
on the totality of the circumstances, knew or should have known that the
question was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.”
Hughes, 346 Md. at 95-96, 695 A.2d at 140 (citation omitted).
We do not find that the District Court judge’s4 question, “Is there anything you’d like
to tell me about yourself, sir?,” was reasonably likely to elicit an inculpatory response from
petitioner.  Just as an arrestee may give what turns out to be an inculpatory response to a
routine booking question, as described above in Hughes, petitioner gave what turned out to
be an inculpatory response to a routine question posed by the District Court judge at
5 Williams had made a previous statement, the “first statement,” which the trial court
suppressed.  The issue in that case related only to Williams’ second and third statements.
-9-
petitioner’s bail review hearing.
In Williams v. State, 342 Md. 724, 759, 679 A.2d 1106, 1124 (1996), Williams, after
receiving Miranda warnings, blurted out two incriminating statements as officers were
conducting his processing.5  We said:
“As the officers began to gather their papers, one of the officers told Williams
to remove his earring and Williams mumbled under his breath, ‘you can’t get
me. I’ll just say a girl gave me the card [the victim’s ATM card].’ After this
second statement, Detective Zywiolek testified that he commented that ‘[t]his
is going to work’ and reiterated to Williams that he was being charged with
the murders of Gilbert and Trias. At that point, Williams made a third
statement: ‘I know I’m never getting out.’”
In holding that the second and third statements were admissible, we held:
“Hence, the question before us is whether the police continued to interrogate
Williams after he invoked his right to remain silent and requested an attorney.
. . . 
“Thus, we must decide whether the words and actions of the detectives
were reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses from Williams. We
conclude that they were not. . . . These were routine procedures that the
officers could hardly be expected to anticipate would prompt an incriminating
statement. . . . We cannot conclude that the trial judge erred in finding that
these [the officers’] innocuous comments were not reasonably likely to elicit
an incriminating response from Williams.”
Id. at 760-61, 679 A.2d at 1124-25 (alteration added).
In our earlier case of State v. Conover, 312 Md. 33, 35-37, 537 A.2d 1167, 1168-69
(1988), we stated the issue as: 
“The question presented by this appeal is whether the actions of the police in
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reading a statement of charges to the Respondent, and handing to him copies
of the charging document and the application upon which it was based,
constituted, under the circumstances here present, the functional equivalent
of questioning, and thereby deprived Respondent of his Fifth Amendment
right to have counsel present at a custodial interrogation.
. . . 
“One of them [the police officers] read the Statement of Charges to
Respondent and handed him copies of the Statement of Charges and the
Application, suggesting that he ‘read them, look at them, if you have any
questions ask them.” . . . Respondent then asked a number of hypothetical
questions, in the vein of ‘what if’ or ‘suppose this,’ and also uttered the
statement that the State later used against him at trial: ‘you can’t put me with
that .38.’” [Alteration added.]
We answered the question, by holding:
“Prior to the decision in Innis, we considered the application of Miranda to
the routine processing of an arrested defendant, and concluded that:
‘There seems to be a general agreement . . . that Miranda does
not apply to “administrative questioning,” the routine questions
asked of all arrestees who are “booked” or otherwise
processed.’
Vines v. State, 285 Md. 369, 376, 402 A.2d 900 (1979).”
. . . 
“We infer no sinister motive from the fact that police provided
Respondent with a copy of the Application as well as a copy of the Statement
of Charges. 
. . . 
“The police acted reasonably and lawfully, and the Respondent was not
subjected to compelling influences, psychological ploys, or direct questioning.
His volunteered statement was properly admitted.”
Conover, 312 Md. at 39-45, 537 A.2d at 1170-72.            
While the present case is somewhat different from the setting in Williams and
Conover, in that the blurted statement occurred in open court in a District Court bail review
6In discussing the propriety of such a question given the circumstances with which
Schmidt was arrested, the Court of Special Appeals stated:
“In this case, when the District Court judge asked Schmidt if he knew the
alleged victim, the purpose of that question was to enable the judge to set an
(continued...)
-11-
hearing conducted by a District Court judge, the general routine question by the judge to
which petitioner responded was much less likely to elicit an incriminating statement than the
statements and actions of the officers in Conover and Williams. In the case at bar, there was
less likelihood that petitioner was subjected to “compelling influences, psychological ploys”
and he was not subjected to direct questioning in respect to the offenses for which he was
charged.
We have never directly opined on these issues in the context of routine questions, and
answers given in response to those routine questions, that occur during bail review
proceedings conducted, not by law enforcement officers, but by District Court judges.  The
Court of Special Appeals, however, has directly addressed the issue in a case in which we
denied a petition for certiorari.      
The Court of Special Appeals’ decision in Schmidt v. State, 60 Md. App. 86, 481
A.2d 241 (1984), cert. denied, 302 Md. 131, 486 A.2d 173 (1985), dealt with a defendant
making an inculpatory statement at his bail hearing.  In Schmidt, the defendant was charged
with, inter alia, second degree rape and burglary.  During his bail review hearing the judge
asked Schmidt if he knew the alleged victim and Schmidt replied, “At the time, no sir, I
didn’t.  I was drunk.  I didn’t know who it was.”6  Id. at 93, 481 A.2d at 244.  At trial,
6(...continued)
appropriate amount of bail, not to secure information for the prosecution.
Whether the victim and the accused were acquaintances or total strangers may
affect the nature and strength of the evidence against the accused.  Accused
of a serious crime and facing a potentially severe sentence if convicted, a
defendant who can be identified with certainty by the alleged victim may
represent a potential danger to the prosecuting witness or a substantial risk of
nonappearance.  These factors are clearly relevant to pretrial release.”
Schmidt, 60 Md. App. at 99, 481 A.2d at 247-48.
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Schmidt’s defense was that he knew the victim and that they had engaged in consensual
sexual intercourse.  Schmidt moved to suppress the statement, but the motion was denied.
He was thereafter convicted in the circuit court of second-degree rape, second-degree sexual
offense and burglary.
On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, Schmidt argued that inculpatory
statements made by an accused at a bail review hearing should be excluded under all
circumstances.  The intermediate appellate court disagreed and stated:
“We see no need for the per se exclusionary rule urged by appellant.  If an
accused who is represented by counsel and who is made aware of his fifth
amendment right volunteers a statement deemed helpful to his position at a
bail hearing, there is no logical reason why that statement could not be used
against him at trial.” 
Schmidt, 60 Md. App. at 95, 481 A.2d at 245.  See also United States v. Dohm, 618 F.2d
1169, 1171 (5th Cir. 1980) (“We disagree with [defendant’s] contention that statements
made by an accused while seeking bail are necessarily involuntary and coerced.”) (alteration
added).
In the alternative, Schmidt argued that his inculpatory statements were inadmissible
7The Court of Special Appeals’ opinion in Schmidt indicates that Schmidt had been
advised of his “constitutional rights” upon initially arriving at the police station prior to his
bail review hearing.
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because they were made in response to a custodial interrogation without the benefit of
Miranda warnings during the bail review proceeding.  The Court of Special Appeals agreed
that Schmidt was in custody, stating that:
“Schmidt was unquestionably in custody when he appeared before the District
Court judge for a bail hearing.  He had been arrested and charged; the very
purpose of the hearing was to determine whether or under what circumstances
he might be released from custody.  With respect to the custody aspect, the
fact that Schmidt was in a courtroom rather than the stationhouse is of no
significance.  Custodial questioning can occur in settings other than the police
station . . . .”
Schmidt, 60 Md. App. at 97-98, 481 A.2d at 246-47.
While the intermediate appellate court did agree that Schmidt was in custody, it did
not agree with Schmidt’s contention that the bail review judge’s questioning amounted to
an interrogation triggering additional Miranda safeguards.7  In explaining this view, the
court stated:
“Not all questions asked of a prisoner or suspect while he is in custody
constitute a ‘custodial interrogation’ for purposes of requiring Miranda
warnings.  As Judge Orth noted for the Court in Vines, it is generally agreed
that Miranda does not apply to ‘administrative questioning,’ the routine
questions asked of all arrestees while being processed or ‘booked.’  Such
routine questioning is conducted for purposes unrelated to evidence gathering
and prosecution, so the questions are general in nature rather than specifically
directed to any criminal offense.  Similarly, any questions asked of an arrestee
at a bail hearing should normally be general and unrelated to evidence
gathering or prosecution.”
8In Drury v. State, 368 Md. 331, 341, 793 A.2d 567, 573 (2002), a case where the
Court found that the specific actions of law enforcement officers did amount to custodial
interrogation, Judge Raker, for the Court, distinguished that case from our holdings in Vines,
supra, Conover, supra, and Williams, supra:
“Like Vines and Conover, Williams is easily distinguished from the case
before us on the basis that the police conduct in this case was not routine
police procedure nor ‘innocuous comment.’  Corporal Whaley’s actions were
aimed at invoking an incriminating remark.”
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Id. at 99, 481 A.2d at 247 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
The question asked of petitioner in the case sub judice, when compared to the
question asked in Schmidt, is considerably less pointed.  We hold that petitioner was not
subject to “interrogation” within the meaning of Miranda.  Here, the District Court judge
merely asked him if there was anything he would like to tell about himself.  There is
absolutely no indication that the District Court judge’s question was designed to elicit an
incriminating statement. As we stated, infra, this was a routine, general question not
designed to elicit any information about the specific criminal offense.   It was an innocuous
question.8  Moreover, it was a proper question to ask in determining an appropriate amount
of bail.  Maryland Rule 4-216 (2004) states, in pertinent part:
“Rule 4-216.  Pretrial release.
. . .
(d) Duties of judicial officer.  (1) Consideration of factors.  In
determining whether a defendant should be released and the conditions of
release, the judicial officer shall take into account the following information,
to the extent available:
(A) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the nature of
evidence against the defendant, and the potential sentence upon conviction;
(B) the defendant’s prior record of appearance at court proceedings or
9 Maryland Rule 4-216 (d) does not dictate the precise language that a judicial officer
should use in his or her questioning to ascertain the information sought in (A)-(I).
10Due to the rather vague and often disjointed nature of petitioner’s statement at the
bail review hearing, we are not entirely certain that petitioner’s statement was a response to
the District Court judge’s question at all.  The statement would appear to be more akin to
a voluntary blurt by petitioner.
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flight to avoid prosecution or failure to appear at court proceedings;
(C) the defendant’s family ties, employment status and history,
financial resources, reputation, character and mental condition, length of
residence in the community, and length of residence in this State;
(D) any recommendation of an agency that conducts pretrial release
investigations;
(E) any recommendation of the State’s Attorney;
(F) any information presented by the defendant or defendant’s counsel;
(G) the danger of the defendant to the alleged victim, another person,
or the community;
(H) the danger of the defendant to himself or herself; and
(I) any other factor bearing on the risk of a wilful failure to appear and
the safety of the alleged victim, another person, or the community, including
all prior convictions and any prior adjudications of delinquency that occurred
within three years of the date the defendant is charged as an adult.”
With the question, “Is there anything you’d like to tell me about yourself, sir?,” the
District Court judge was merely giving petitioner a chance to explain to the judge any
circumstances that may have some bearing on his bail that had not been already covered in
the prior questioning .9  For instance, he might have used this opportunity to explain where
he was employed, how long he had resided in the community, whether he had any family in
the area, etc.  Petitioner, in his response, however, chose to make an inculpatory statement.10
Because he was not being interrogated, the inculpatory nature of his response does not mean
that it must be excluded simply because it was not immediately preceded by Miranda
-16-
warnings.  If that were to be the case, any voluntary statement or blurt given while a person
is in custody, unless it were immediately preceded by new Miranda warnings, would be
excludable.  That is not the law.  Miranda warnings were designed to advise a defendant that
anything he said might be used against him.  
In Schmidt, the Court of Special Appeals further stated:
“Schmidt’s anxiety to be released on bail does not amount to coercion
to incriminate himself.  Indeed, he was clearly acting under far less
compulsion than if he had been subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury, a
situation that does not require Miranda warnings.  See United States v.
Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 579-80, 96 S.Ct. 1768, 1777-78, 48 L.Ed.2d 212
(1976).  In that case . . . the Court [stated]:
‘Those [Miranda] warnings were aimed at the evils seen by the
Court as endemic to police interrogation of a person in custody.
Miranda addressed extrajudicial confessions or admissions
procured in a hostile, unfamiliar environment which lacked
procedural safeguards.  The decision expressly rested on the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination; the prescribed
warnings sought to negate the “compulsion” thought to be
inherent in police station interrogation.  But the Miranda Court
simply did not perceive judicial inquiries and custodial
interrogation as equivalents.  “[T]he compulsion to speak in the
isolated setting of the police station may well be greater than in
courts or other official investigations, where there are often
impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery.”’
[Miranda], 384 U.S. at 461 [86 S.Ct. at 1621].”
Schmidt, 60 Md. App. at 100, 481 A.2d at 248 (some alterations added).  See also Roberts
v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 560, 100 S.Ct. 1358, 1364, 63 L.Ed.2d 622 (1980) (stating
that the Miranda “exception does not apply outside the context of the inherently coercive
custodial interrogations for which it was designed.”)
We hold that nothing in the setting of petitioner’s January 10, 2001 bail review
11 We would urge trial judges, however, as a matter of good practice and policy, to
advise defendants at initial bail hearings and bail review hearings that an inculpatory
statement made at that hearing may be used against him or her at trial.  The court should be
extra careful in asking questions of the defendant which may elicit incriminating responses
and should focus on questions relating solely to the pretrial release decision.
12 The question in petitioner’s certiorari petition did not clearly frame this issue
separately; it appears only in the context of the question relating to the Miranda warnings
issue.  It was, however, argued in the briefs.
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hearing can be said to have coerced him into making his inculpatory statement.  The
question posed, “Is there anything you’d like to tell me about yourself, sir?,” was a routine
question to ask in a setting such as a bail review hearing.  Questions posed to an arrestee by
a judge regarding matters relevant to bail, asked in the setting of a bail review hearing, do
not normally amount to an “interrogation” requiring that the arrestee be again advised of his
Miranda rights in order that his responses may be later admitted into evidence at his merits
trial.11  This necessarily leads us to petitioner’s next argument as to why his inculpatory
statement should have been declared inadmissible — his lack of counsel at the bail review
hearing.12
B. Petitioner’s Lack of Counsel at the Bail Review Hearing
We first note that there was no indication in the record that petitioner requested the
presence of counsel at his bail review hearing and been denied counsel.   As noted
previously, he was not being interrogated in the sense contemplated by Miranda.
Nonetheless, petitioner contends that the Circuit Court judge erred in allowing his statement
to be admissible at trial due to his lack of legal counsel at the bail review hearing.  For the
13 The Sixth Amendment provides, in pertinent part:
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”
14 Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides, in pertinent part:
“That in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right . . . to be
allowed counsel . . . .”
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reasons set forth below, we do not agree.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution,13 applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, serves “to assure aid at trial,” United States v. Gouveia,
467 U.S. 180, 188, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 2298, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984), and therefore attaches at
the commencement of adversary judicial criminal proceedings.  See McNeil v. Wisconsin,
501 U.S. 171, 175, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 2208-09, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991); see also Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1239, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977) (stating that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is triggered “at or after the time that judicial proceedings
have been initiated . . . ‘whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment,
information, or arraignment.’”) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689, 92 S.Ct. 1877,
1882, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972)).  Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights also
guarantees criminal defendants the right to assistance of counsel.14  See Harris v. State, 303
Md. 685, 695 n.3, 496 A.2d 1074, 1079 n.3 (1985) (stating “[t]his Court has not
distinguished between the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments and the right provided by Art. 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.”)  An
accused’s right to counsel, however, extends only to those “critical” proceedings in which
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“‘the accused [is] confronted, just as at trial, by the procedural system, or by his expert
adversary, or by both’ . . . in a situation where the results of the confrontation ‘might well
settle the accused’s fate and reduce the trial to a mere formality.’”  Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 189,
104 S.Ct. at 2298 (citations omitted).  
Petitioner’s appearance before a District Court judge for the purpose of setting the
appropriate amount of bail pursuant to Md. Rule 4-216 is not such a “critical” stage of the
proceedings requiring that counsel be provided.  See Hebron v. State, 13 Md. App. 134, 140,
281 A.2d 547, 550 (1971), cert. denied, 264 Md. 748 (1972) (“[w]e do not feel that the
proceeding to set bail . . . was a critical stage of the criminal proceedings within the
constitutional concept of that term contemplated by Coleman [v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90
S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed.2d 387 (1970)]. . . . We conclude that the assistance of counsel was not
constitutionally mandated.”); United States v. Hooker, 418 F. Supp. 476, 479 (M.D. Pa.
1976), aff’d mem., 547 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 950, 97 S.Ct. 1591,
51 L.Ed.2d 799 (1977) (District Court stating that “[a] bail reduction hearing is not a
‘critical stage’ of the proceedings where the defense on the merits would be impaired
without the assistance of counsel.”); Padgett v. State, 590 P.2d 432, 436 (Alaska 1979)
(“The setting of bail is . . . not an adversary confrontation wherein ‘potential substantial
prejudice’ to ‘the defendant’s basic right to a fair trial’ inheres, but rather is limited to the
issue of interim confinement.”) (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227, 87 S.Ct.
1926, 1932, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 1157 (1967)); Ex parte Stewart, 853 So.2d 901, 904 (Ala.
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2002) (holding, in the context of an initial appearance at which bail was set, that “the fact
that the court may determine or evaluate the conditions for release does not create an
adversarial proceeding or a ‘critical stage.’”)
In Coleman v. Alabama, supra, the United States Supreme Court held that the
assistance of counsel at a preliminary hearing was constitutionally mandated.  Here,
petitioner’s bail review hearing occurred on the day after his arrest (January 10, 2001), but
some two months prior to his preliminary hearing (March 20, 2001), and three months
before the criminal information was filed (April 18, 2001).
In Hebron v. State, supra, the Court of Special Appeals had the opportunity to
address the issue now before this Court, i.e., whether the constitutional right to provided
counsel applies at the bail hearing stage, an issue we have not addressed prior to the case sub
judice.  Referring to the Supreme Court’s decision in Coleman, the intermediate appellate
court held that an independent bail hearing was not, in and of itself, a “critical stage of the
criminal proceedings within the constitutional concept of that term contemplated by
Coleman.”  Hebron, 13 Md. App. at 140, 281 A.2d at 550.  In reaching its conclusion, the
Court of Special Appeals stated:
“Coleman held that the assistance of counsel at a preliminary hearing
such as conducted in Maryland was constitutionally mandated.  The rationale
of the holding was set out in the opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan in
announcing the judgment of the Court.  Noting that the principle of Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45[, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932),] and succeeding
cases requires that the Court scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the
accused to determine whether the presence of his counsel is necessary to
preserve the defendant’s basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right
-21-
meaningfully to cross-examine the witnesses against him and to have effective
assistance of counsel at the trial itself, he concluded that the guiding hand of
counsel at the preliminary hearing was essential to protect the indigent
accused against erroneous or improper prosecution.  He spelled out the
reasons, [Coleman, 399 U.S. at 9, 90 S.Ct. at 2003]:
‘First, the lawyer’s skilled examination and cross-examination
of witnesses may expose fatal weaknesses in the State’s case
that may lead the magistrate to refuse to bind the accused over.
Second, in any event, the skilled interrogation of witnesses by
an experienced lawyer can fashion a vital impeachment tool for
use in cross-examination of the State’s witnesses at the trial, or
preserve testimony favorable to the accused of a witness who
does not appear at the trial.  Third, trained counsel can more
effectively discover the case the State has against his client and
make possible the preparation of a proper defense to meet that
case at the trial.  Fourth, counsel can also be influential at the
preliminary hearing in making effective arguments for the
accused on such matters as the necessity for an early psychiatric
examination or bail.’
It was the inability of the indigent accused on his own right to realize these
advantages of a lawyer’s assistance which compelled the conclusion that the
preliminary hearing was a ‘critical stage’ of the criminal process at which the
accused is as much entitled to aid of counsel as at the trial itself.
“Except that counsel may be influential in making effective argument
as to the necessity of bail, we do not see how the other reasons set out in
Coleman apply to a hearing the purpose of which is only to set bail and at
which, as here, no witnesses were offered as to the substantive offense who
could be examined or cross-examined, either to expose a fatal weakness in the
State’s case or to fashion a vital impeachment tool at trial or to preserve
testimony favorable to the accused and no case was offered by the State for
the accused’s counsel to discover and prepare for.  We do not believe that the
absence of counsel for Hebron at the hearing derogated from his right to a fair
trial.” 
Hebron, 13 Md. App. at 138-40, 281 A.2d at 549-50 (alterations added) (citations omitted)
(footnotes omitted).
We are not prepared, in circumstances such as those existing here, to hold that a bail
15Md. Rule 4-102 (f) (2004) defines a “judicial officer” as meaning “a judge or
District Court commissioner.” 
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review hearing is a “critical stage” of criminal proceedings, at which provided counsel is
required.  Accordingly, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals’ decision in Hebron, as
it pertains to the right to counsel in the setting of a bail review hearing in the nature of that
held in the case at bar, and hold, generally, that there exists no Sixth Amendment right to
provided counsel during a bail review hearing, the only purpose of which is to ascertain the
appropriate amount of bail pursuant to Md. Rule 4-216.     
Our holding is also bolstered by the language of Md. Rule 4-213 (a), which governs
the procedure that a “judicial officer”15 must follow during an accused’s “initial
appearance.”  Petitioner’s bail review hearing occurred shortly after his initial appearance
before a District Court commissioner on the morning of January 10, 2001.  The Rule, in
respect to the duties of a District Court commissioner at an initial appearance, states, in
pertinent part:
“Rule 4-213.  Initial appearance of defendant.
(a) In District Court following arrest.  When a defendant appears
before a judicial officer of the District Court pursuant to an arrest, the judicial
officer shall proceed as follows:
. . .
(2) Advice of right to counsel.  The judicial officer shall require the
defendant to read the notice to defendant required to be printed on charging
documents in accordance with Rule 4-202 (a), or shall read the notice to a
defendant who is unable for any reason to do so.  A copy of the notice shall
be furnished to a defendant who has not yet received a copy of the charging
document.  The judicial officer shall advise the defendant that if the defendant
appears for trial without counsel, the court could determine that the defendant
16An initial appearance, which, as occurred in the case sub judice and is required by
Md. Rule 4-213 (a)(4), shall involve a “pretrial release” determination.
17 See infra note 2.
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waived counsel and proceeded to trial with the defendant unrepresented by
counsel.
. . .
(4) Pretrial release.  The judicial officer shall comply with Rule 4-
216 governing pretrial release.”  
As is made plainly clear in Md. Rule 4-213 (a)(2), while the judicial officer presiding over
the accused’s initial appearance16 shall make the accused aware of his right to counsel and
that counsel will be provided to him if he cannot afford private counsel, which the District
Court commissioner in this case presumably did,17 nothing in the Rule suggests that this right
to provided counsel attaches at either the initial appearance or a later bail review hearing.
Accordingly, we hold that petitioner was not unconstitutionally denied his Sixth Amendment
right to provided counsel when he appeared at a bail review hearing.  The bail review
hearing was not a “critical stage” of the proceedings at which the Sixth Amendment right
to provided counsel attaches.
C. Admission at Trial of the Redacted Version of the Statement
Petitioner argues that the trial court’s admission of his statement at the bail review
hearing, in which he stated, “I’m not denying what happened,” was improper because it was
“too vague and misleading to the trier of fact.”  In its decision, the Court of Special Appeals
held that “the suppression court did not err in finding that the stipulation based upon the
18 As we indicated earlier, part of petitioner’s statement was not admitted because it
was found inadmissible as its admission would have been contrary to a principle of law, i.e.,
that “other crimes” evidence is, generally, inadmissible.
-24-
edited statement was admissible at trial.  Although the statement was edited, the meaning of
the statement was not so vague or altered that the jury would be unable to understand its
meaning.”
It is well established in Maryland that the admission of relevant evidence, the
admissibility of which is not prohibited by a specific rule or principle of law, is committed
to the considerable and sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a clear abuse of discretion.  See Merzbacher v. State, 346 Md. 391, 404-05, 697 A.2d
432, 439 (1997) (stating that, “[o]nce a finding of relevancy has been made, we are generally
loath to reverse a trial court unless the evidence is plainly inadmissible under a specific rule
or principle of law or there is a clear showing of an abuse of discretion.”)18  All relevant
evidence is generally admissible.  To be relevant, evidence must have a “tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”  Md. Rule 5-401; see also
Md. Rule 5-402 (stating that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by constitutions, statutes, or
these rules, or by decisional law not inconsistent with these rules, all relevant evidence is
admissible.”) We have also stated, however, that: 
“A finding by the trial judge that a particular piece of evidence is
relevant, however, does not mean that evidence is automatically admissible.
Even relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
-25-
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. . . . As with the trial court’s
relevancy determination, a decision to admit relevant evidence over an
objection that the evidence is unfairly prejudicial will not be reversed absent
an abuse of discretion.”
Williams v. State, 342 Md. 724, 737, 679 A.2d 1106, 1113 (1996) (citations omitted).
In the case sub judice, the trial court found that petitioner’s statement, “I’m not
denying what happened,” was relevant and let it be read to the jury.  We do not believe that
this decision by the trial court amounted to an “abuse of discretion.”  Although the statement
was edited, we cannot say that the remaining portion read to the jury was so vague or
misleading as to have made the statement inadmissible at trial.  Even assuming, arguendo,
that the statement, as admitted, was in some way ambiguous, any ambiguity went to the
weight of the statement itself and not to its admissibility.  Therefore, we hold that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the stipulation containing the inculpatory
statement to be read to the jury.
III. Conclusion
We hold that the District Court judge’s question to petitioner at his bail review
hearing, asking him “Is there anything you’d like to tell me about yourself, sir?,” did not
amount to a “custodial interrogation,” and, therefore, was not in violation of the
requirements of Miranda.  The question posed to petitioner was a general question
appropriate at a bail review hearing and not designed to elicit any information from him
about the specific criminal offense.
We also hold that there existed no Sixth Amendment right to provided counsel at
-26-
petitioner’s bail review hearing.  A bail review hearing, such as the one that took place here,
is not normally a “critical stage” of trial.  We do not find that a proceeding, the purpose of
which was merely to review bail and inform petitioner of the scheduled date for his
preliminary hearing, was an “adversary judicial criminal proceeding” that would require the
aid of provided counsel.  Because petitioner’s bail review hearing was not a “critical stage”
of the merits trial, there existed no Sixth Amendment right to provided counsel at that time.
Lastly, we hold that the trial court did not err in allowing an edited segment of
petitioner’s inculpatory statement, in which he stated, “I don’t deny what happened,” to be
read to the jury.  The statement was unquestionably relevant and it was not so vague or
misleading as to be unfairly prejudicial to petitioner.  Therefore, the trial court did not
commit an abuse of discretion when it allowed the stipulation, which contained the
statement, to be read to the jury.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
OF 
SPECIAL 
APPEALS
AFFIRMED.  COSTS TO BE
PAID BY PETITIONER.