Title: Ayers v. Shaffer

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Kinser, C.J., and Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, Mims, 
and Powell, JJ., and Koontz, S.J. 
 
SHARA AYERS, ET AL. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v. Record No. 122043 
SENIOR JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
September 12, 2013 
TONI L. SHAFFER, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF BRISTOL 
Sage B. Johnson, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court 
erred in sustaining a demurrer to an amended complaint 
alleging that certain inter vivos financial transfers, which 
significantly reduced a decedent's estate, were the result of 
undue influence exercised by persons in confidential 
relationships with the decedent during her lifetime. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Familiar principles of appellate review guide our 
resolution of this appeal.  This case was decided on demurrer.  
"A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly 
pleaded.  Under this rule, the facts admitted are those 
expressly alleged, those which fairly can be viewed as 
impliedly alleged, and those which may be fairly and justly 
inferred from the facts alleged."  Rosillo v. Winters, 235 Va. 
268, 270, 367 S.E.2d 717, 717 (1988); see also Runion v. 
Helvestine, 256 Va. 1, 7, 501 S.E.2d 411, 415 (1998).  "A 
demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of facts alleged in the 
 
2 
pleadings, but not the strength of proof.  Because the 
decision whether to grant a demurrer is a question of law, we 
review the circuit court's decision de novo."  Kaltman v. All 
Am. Pest Control, Inc., 281 Va. 483, 489, 706 S.E.2d 864, 867-
868 (2011) (citation omitted).  "Additionally, when, as here, 
a circuit court sustains a demurrer to an amended complaint 
that does not incorporate or refer to any of the allegations 
that were set forth in a prior complaint, 'we will consider 
only the allegations contained in the amended pleading to 
which the demurrer was sustained.'"1  Lewis v. Kei, 281 Va. 
715, 719, 708 S.E.2d 884, 888 (2011) (quoting Yuzefovsky v. 
St. John's Wood Apartments, 261 Va. 97, 102, 540 S.E.2d 134, 
136 (2001)). 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The original complaint in this action was filed in the 
Circuit Court of the City of Bristol on November 7, 2011, and 
an amended complaint was filed by leave of court on February 
27, 2012.  We will consider the allegations in the amended 
complaint under the standard of review cited above. 
                     
1 Although the amended complaint did not expressly 
incorporate any of the allegations of the original complaint, 
it did reference exhibits attached to the original complaint.  
Accordingly, those exhibits, which were already a part of the 
record, are properly considered part of the amended complaint 
for purposes of resolving the demurrer.  See Rule 3:4(b). 
 
3 
When so viewed, the amended complaint established that 
the plaintiffs, Shara Ayers and Ryan Riley, are the great 
grandchildren of Elsie R. Smith ("Elsie") and legatees to one 
half of her residuary estate under a will dated August 3, 
2004.  This will was admitted to probate following Elsie's 
death on March 22, 2010.  The defendants are Audrey Wingo 
("Audrey"), Elsie's sister and legatee to the remaining half 
of her residuary estate, Toni Lynn Shaffer ("Toni"), her 
husband Bruce Shaffer ("Bruce"), and their son Michael T. 
Shaffer ("Mike").  Elsie's will nominated Toni as executrix, 
and she qualified as executrix of Elsie's estate on April 14, 
2010. 
Ayers and Riley acknowledge that Elsie had become 
estranged from their mother, Elsie's only living grandchild 
and nearest living lineal descendent, and that they had lived 
with their mother in Colorado "for a number of years."  During 
this time, Elsie and her husband, Charles Smith ("Charles"), 
lived on their farm in Washington County.  In 2004, both Elsie 
and Charles were in poor health and no longer able to care for 
themselves and manage their property and affairs without 
assistance.  Beginning April 1, 2004, Toni and Bruce, who 
lived nearby, began providing assistance to the Smiths. 
Charles died on April 23, 2004.  Elsie, who was then 80 
years old and suffered from diabetes, dementia and other 
 
4 
medical problems, suffered a rapid decline in her mental and 
physical health following Charles' death.  The Shaffers 
continued providing care to Elsie, assisting her with the 
daily activities of living as well as managing her property 
and affairs. 
On May 13, 2004, Elsie went to the office of attorney 
H.G. Peters where she executed a durable power of attorney 
("DPOA") naming Toni as her agent and attorney-in-fact and 
Bruce as alternate agent and attorney-in-fact.  The amended 
complaint expressly alleges that "at least [from] the time 
when Toni Shaffer became [Elsie]'s agent under the DPOA, and 
until her death, [Elsie] lacked the mental and physical 
capacity . . . to seek and obtain independent advice on her 
own; to fully understand the complexities and effects of most 
financial transactions."  However, the amended complaint 
further alleges that this lack of capacity did not impair 
Elsie's ability "to decide whom she wished her assets to pass 
to upon her death, and to express those wishes in her Will." 
On August 3, 2004, Elsie, Toni, and Bruce returned to 
Peters' office where Elsie executed her last will and 
testament.  Article VI of the will references a "contract with 
Toni Shaffer and her husband, Bruce Shaffer" which was 
executed in Peters' office that day.  The contract stated that 
Toni and Bruce would provide "needed care" for Elsie for which 
 
5 
they would be paid $500 per week.  Additionally, Toni and 
Bruce were to receive $8000 for the assistance given to Elsie 
and Charles since April 2004.  The agreement further provided 
that Toni and Bruce would "be paid the monies owed by [Elsie] 
from [her] estate," rather than during her lifetime.  
Likewise, the will directed "payment of any and all sums due 
pursuant to [this] contractual agreement," but otherwise made 
no bequest to Toni or Bruce.  The amended complaint expressly 
acknowledges that Toni and Bruce provided care under the 
agreement over the next three years, during which time Elsie 
became "increasingly disoriented, calling [Toni and Bruce] 
several times daily, and at nights." 
On October 29, 2007, Elsie began residing in an assisted 
living facility in Bristol, Tennessee, where her daily needs 
became the responsibility of the staff.  In July 2008, she was 
admitted to a local hospital and then moved to a nursing home, 
where she received round-the-clock care from the staff.  
During this time, under the authority of the DPOA, Toni sold 
Elsie's home and the farm.  Accordingly, the amended complaint 
alleges that after October 2007 the need for any assistance 
from the Shaffers in caring for Elsie and managing her 
property and affairs was greatly diminished or eliminated 
entirely. 
 
6 
Following Elsie's death on March 22, 2010, an initial 
accounting of her estate filed by Toni in her capacity as 
executrix showed that at the time of her death Elsie had cash 
assets in excess of $1,000,000.  However, as a result of 
certain inter vivos financial transactions which included 
survivorship or pay on death provisions, the probate estate 
was less than $600,000.  The amended complaint alleges that 
these inter vivos transactions occurred after Toni was made 
Elsie's agent and attorney-in-fact under the DPOA, and were 
the result of Elsie's "complete dependence upon, and justified 
trust in Toni" and the "strong confidential relationship" that 
existed between Elsie and Toni and Bruce, under which they 
"owed [Elsie] the highest degree of fidelity." 
The general background allegations of the amended 
complaint conclude with the assertion that it "relates to 
activities and conduct by Toni Shaffer, after being appointed 
as agent for [Elsie] under the DPOA, and that of [Elsie]'s 
sister, Audrey Wingo, from 2004 until shortly after [Elsie]'s 
death in 2010."  Other than to reference her relationship to 
Elsie and identify her as a residuary legatee of Elsie's will, 
no other allegations concerning Audrey are found in the 
general allegations of the amended complaint. 
The amended complaint then lists a series of "financial 
transactions involving Toni Shaffer while serving as [Elsie]'s 
 
7 
agent under the durable power of attorney."  Despite this 
description, however, it is not alleged that any of the 
transactions were accomplished using the authority of the 
DPOA.  These transactions may be summarized as follows: 
• On May 21, 2004, Elsie signed a customer access agreement 
for an account at Wachovia Bank.  Sometime prior to March 
2009, the account was redesignated as "Elsie R. Smith and 
Toni Shaffer, POA."  Following Elsie's death, the final 
statement of the account showed only Elsie as the owner 
and indicated that the balance of $83,467.89 was 
withdrawn from the account by a cashier's check payable 
to Audrey directly, rather than to Elsie's estate. 
• On June 22, 2004, Elsie, accompanied by Toni and Audrey, 
transferred the balance of an account at First Tennessee 
Bank titled solely in her name into a certificate of 
deposit of $80,500.00 titled jointly with Toni and Audrey 
with right of survivorship.  Toni and Audrey received the 
proceeds from this account following Elsie's death. 
• On November 23, 2004, Elsie, accompanied by Toni and 
Audrey, transferred the balance of a certificate of 
deposit at Highlands Union Bank titled solely in her name 
into a certificate of deposit of $75,018.13 titled 
jointly with Toni and Audrey with right of survivorship.  
When the certificate matured in November 2008, Toni, 
acting as a joint holder of the account, received a 
cashier's check for $87,769.85, with which she opened a 
certificate of deposit at Wachovia Bank in the name of 
Elsie, herself, and Bruce and a pay on death designation 
in favor of Audrey and Benjamin Shaffer ("Benjamin"), the 
Shaffers' grandson.  Following Elsie's death, Mike, 
Benjamin's father, received half the proceeds of the 
certificate as custodian for Benjamin, and Audrey 
received the remainder. 
• On September 7, 2007, Toni redeemed certificates of 
deposit at TruPoint Bank and Wachovia Bank for $97,260.56 
and $53,766.84 respectively and deposited these funds 
into an account at Wachovia Securities titled jointly 
with right of survivorship in Elsie's and her names.  
Following Elsie's death, Toni withdrew the account 
balance of $156,976.08 and deposited these funds into an 
 
8 
account titled in her name only.  This account was later 
retitled in the Shaffers' names jointly. 
The amended complaint sets out 11 counts which can be 
summarized as follows: Counts 1, 2 and 3 allege breach of a 
"duty as an agent on a joint bank account" by Audrey, Bruce 
and Toni respectively and seek to recover funds for inclusion 
in Elsie's estate.  Counts 4, 5 and 6 seek to set aside all 
transactions that directly or indirectly benefited Toni, Bruce 
and Audrey respectively in that they were "procured by undue 
influence" and to recover those funds for inclusion in Elsie's 
estate.  Counts 7 and 8 seek to remove Toni as executrix of 
Elsie's estate and to assess damages against her for waste of 
the estate's assets.  Counts 9 and 11 are alleged to be 
"against all defendants," but make no express allegations 
against Mike, the Shaffers' son, and seek a declaratory 
judgment concerning Elsie's testamentary intent and 
establishing a constructive trust for any unjust enrichment of 
the defendants.  Count 10 seeks a declaratory judgment against 
Toni and Bruce with respect to their contract for personal 
services with the Smiths to determine the amount of 
compensation, if any, they are due from the estate. 
As relevant to this appeal, within the various counts the 
amended complaint repeatedly asserts that Toni, Bruce and 
Audrey each had a confidential relationship with Elsie and 
 
9 
that "[w]here one standing in a confidential relationship to 
another person receives a benefit from that person without an 
exchange of full and fair compensation, a presumption arises 
that the benefit resulted from the exercise of undue 
influence.  This presumption is sufficient to satisfy 
Plaintiffs' burden of establishing a prima facie case of undue 
influence." 
On March 19, 2012, the defendants jointly filed a 
demurrer to the amended complaint.  The defendants alleged 
that the amended complaint as a whole fails to state any cause 
of action because it asserts that Elsie had testamentary 
capacity.  They contended, therefore, that Elsie was likewise 
competent to undertake the financial transactions in which she 
personally participated.  Moreover, they contended that since 
Elsie personally participated in these transactions, Toni's 
role as agent and attorney-in-fact are not relevant to 
establishing whether she had a confidential relationship with 
Elsie as to these transactions. 
The defendants further contended that the amended 
complaint fails to allege "facts, as opposed to legal 
conclusions, sufficient to establish that the defendants 
abused their confidential relationship with Elsie Smith."  
This was so, they contended, because Ayers and Riley are 
"rely[ing] upon an evidentiary presumption in order to . . . 
 
10 
circumvent their pleading requirements."  Finally, the 
defendants generally denied that the amended complaint 
adequately states grounds for the declaratory relief sought, 
for the establishment of a constructive trust, or for removing 
Toni as executrix of the estate and charging her with waste. 
As relevant to this appeal, Ayers and Riley responded to 
the demurrer by asserting that Elsie's capacity to personally 
participate in some of the financial transactions did not 
negate the possibility that she engaged in those transactions 
as a result of the undue influence of the defendants.  
Moreover, they contended that it was not necessary that Toni 
act directly in her capacity as Elsie's agent and attorney-in-
fact for the confidential relationship implied by that role to 
give rise to an inference of undue influence, especially where 
she benefited disproportionately from the transactions.  Ayers 
and Riley further responded that the facts alleged in the 
amended complaint support the evidentiary presumption, that 
the circuit court was required to accept these allegations as 
true and, thus, also that the presumption would apply.  
Similarly, they contended that the allegations of the 
complaint as a whole support the claims for equitable relief 
to restore a portion of Elsie's estate. 
The circuit court conducted a hearing on the demurrer to 
the amended complaint on July 25, 2012.  The parties presented 
 
11 
arguments in accord with their positions stated above.  At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the court opined that the demurrer 
would be sustained because the amended complaint was "devoid 
of any allegation that [Toni] took any specific act under her 
Durable Power of Attorney to include herself on any account 
that [Elsie] had titled solely in her name."  In the court's 
view, the existence of the DPOA was irrelevant to whether any 
action taken personally by Elsie was the result of undue 
influence, because the confidential relationship implied by 
the existence of a power of attorney was relevant only to 
transactions accomplished by virtue of a party acting as an 
attorney-in-fact. 
In a final order entered August 21, 2012, the circuit 
court found that 
the Amended Complaint merely alleges that the 
defendant, Toni Shaffer, transported and accompanied 
[Elsie] when [Elsie] signed various documents 
including her will, general power of attorney, and 
various bank documents adding Ms. Shaffer and others 
as joint owners of various accounts.  Significantly, 
the Amended Complaint fails to state facts that 
allege that Toni Shaffer, while acting as an agent 
under the power of attorney, arranged for [Elsie]'s 
assets to pass at death to Toni Shaffer or the other 
named defendants.  To the contrary, the exhibits 
attached to plaintiffs' Amended Complaint indicate 
that the assets in question were retitled by [Elsie] 
personally. 
The plaintiffs argued that the fact that 
[Elsie] executed a power of attorney naming Mrs. 
Shaffer as an agent calls into question the validity 
of any subsequent transfer from the principal to the 
agent.  The plaintiffs' assertion is not the law in 
 
12 
Virginia.  Additionally, plaintiffs continue to rely 
upon the evidentiary presumption that where an agent 
acts under a power of attorney to consummate a 
transaction to the benefit of the agent, the act is 
presumptively fraudulent. . . . [P]laintiffs' 
reliance is misplaced inasmuch as there is no 
allegation in the Amended Complaint that Mrs. 
Shaffer acted under the power of attorney to 
consummate any transaction to the benefit of the 
agent. 
The circuit court further found that "the plaintiffs' 
remaining pleadings which attempt to set forth various 
theories of recovery against the defendants fail to allege 
facts sufficient to state a cause of action."  The court 
neither addressed nor made any express ruling with regard to 
the defendants' argument that the amended complaint fails to 
adequately plead that Elsie could have been subject to undue 
influence by Toni or others because it also alleges that she 
had testamentary capacity to make her will.  Ayers and Riley 
filed written exceptions to the court's judgment, and this 
appeal followed. 
DISCUSSION 
At the outset, we will clarify what aspects of the 
amended complaint are before us in this appeal.  In their 
assignments of error addressing the sustaining of the 
demurrer, Ayers and Riley expressly identify Counts 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5 and 6 of the amended complaint as having been erroneously 
dismissed by the circuit court.  As the court's order 
 
13 
sustained the demurrer as to all 11 counts, we hold that Ayers 
and Riley have abandoned Counts 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 by failing 
to make these claims the subject of an assignment of error.  
WBM, LLC v. Wildwoods Holding Corp., 270 Va. 156, 164, 613 
S.E.2d 402, 407 (2005).  Because only Counts 9 and 11 assigned 
liability to "all defendants" and no other count predicated 
any liability against the Shaffers' son Mike, we further hold 
that the court's judgment is final as to him. 
We clearly and concisely stated the law of undue 
influence in the formation of contracts in Parfitt v. Parfitt, 
277 Va. 333, 672 S.E.2d 827 (2009).  What we said there bears 
repeating here. 
A court of equity will not set aside a contract 
because it is "rash, improvident or [a] hard 
bargain" but equity will act if the circumstances 
raise the inference that the contract was the result 
of imposition, deception, or undue influence.  To 
set aside a deed or contract on the basis of undue 
influence requires a showing that the free agency of 
the contracting party has been destroyed.  Because 
undue influence is a species of fraud, the person 
seeking to set aside the contract must prove undue 
influence by clear and convincing evidence. 
Direct proof of undue influence is often 
difficult to produce.  In the seminal case of 
Fishburne v. Ferguson, 84 Va. 87, 111, 4 S.E. 575, 
582 (1887), however this Court identified two 
situations which we considered sufficient to show 
that a contracting party's free agency was 
destroyed, and, once established, shift the burden 
of production to the proponent of the contract.  The 
first involved the mental state of the contracting 
party and the amount of consideration: 
 
14 
[W]here great weakness of mind concurs 
with gross inadequacy of consideration, or 
circumstances of suspicion, the 
transaction will be presumed to have been 
brought about by undue influence. 
. . . . 
The second instance Fishburne identified arises when 
a confidential relationship exists between the 
grantor and proponent of the instrument: 
[W]here one person stands in a 
relationship of special confidence towards 
another, so as to acquire an habitual 
influence over him, he cannot accept from 
such person a personal benefit without 
exposing himself to the risk, in a degree 
proportioned to the nature of their 
connection, of having it set aside as 
unduly obtained. 
277 Va. at 339-40, 672 S.E.2d at 829 (quoting Bailey v. 
Turnbow, 273 Va. 262, 267, 639 S.E.2d 291, 293 (2007)). 
Thus, "the presumption of undue influence arises and the 
burden of going forward with the evidence shifts [to the 
defendant] when weakness of mind and grossly inadequate 
consideration or suspicious circumstances are shown or when a 
confidential relationship is established."  Friendly Ice Cream 
Corp. v. Beckner, 268 Va. 23, 33, 597 S.E.2d 34, 39 (2004) 
(emphases in original); accord Parfitt, 277 Va. at 340, 672 
S.E.2d at 829.  Such a confidential relationship is "not 
confined to any specific association of the parties; it is one 
wherein a party is bound to act for the benefit of another, 
and can take no advantage to himself.  It appears when the 
circumstances make it certain the parties do not deal on equal 
 
15 
terms, but, on the one side, there is an overmastering 
influence, or, on the other, weakness, dependence, or trust, 
justifiably reposed; in both an unfair advantage is possible."  
Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 268 Va. at 34, 597 S.E.2d at 39-40 
(internal citation omitted); accord Parfitt, 277 Va. at 341, 
672 S.E.2d at 830. 
We have further explained that "[t]rust alone, however, 
is not sufficient.  We trust most men with whom we deal.  
There must be something reciprocal in the relationship before 
the rule can be invoked.  Before liability can be fastened 
upon one there must have been something in the course of 
dealings for which he was in part responsible that induced 
another to lean upon him, and from which it can be inferred 
that the ordinary right to contract had been surrendered."  
Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 268 Va. at 34, 597 S.E.2d at 40. 
"We have identified several particular classes of 
relationships that may give rise to a presumption of undue 
influence.  Among them . . . is when one person is an agent 
for the other."  Parfitt, 277 Va. at 341, 672 S.E.2d at 830 
(citing Bailey, 273 Va. at 268, 639 S.E.2d at 293).  
Undeniably, one such relationship is that between a principal 
and a person authorized to act as her agent and attorney-in-
fact.  Grubb v. Grubb, 272 Va. 45, 53, 630 S.E.2d 746, 751 
(2006).  Importantly, in such cases, the presumption of undue 
 
16 
influence will "arise[] independently of any evidence of 
actual fraud, or of any limitations of age or capacity in the 
other party to the confidential relationship, and is intended 
to protect the other party from the influence naturally 
present in such a confidential relationship."  Id. at 54, 630 
S.E.2d at 751 (emphasis added). 
A confidential relationship "springs from any fiduciary 
relationship, and when such relationship is found to exist, 
any transaction to the benefit of the dominant party and to 
the detriment of the other is presumptively fraudulent."  
Nicholson v. Shockey, 192 Va. 270, 278, 64 S.E.2d 813, 817. 
(1951)(emphasis added).  Thus, whenever a fiduciary 
relationship exists between parties, the existence of one or 
more transactions which benefit the party who owes a fiduciary 
duty to the other shifts the burden of proving the bona fides 
of the transaction to the party owing the duty.  Id. at 277, 
64 S.E.2d at 817.  It is not necessary that the transaction be 
accomplished directly as a result of the fiduciary 
relationship, but rather, it is the fact that "a confidential 
relationship existed between the parties at the time of the 
transaction" that gives rise to the presumption and the 
shifting of the burden of going forward with the evidence.  
Diehl v. Butts, 255 Va. 482, 489, 499 S.E.2d 833, 838 (1998); 
Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 268 Va. at 33, 597 S.E.2d at 39. 
 
17 
From this summary of the law, it is clear that to survive 
a demurrer, a complaint seeking to set aside a contract or 
other transaction favorable to a defendant or her interests 
because of undue influence by the defendant must allege either 
that because of great weakness of mind of the other party the 
defendant obtained the bargain for grossly inadequate 
consideration or under some other circumstance of suspicion, 
or alternately that a confidential relationship existed 
between the parties at the time of a transaction beneficial to 
the defendant, even in the absence of other suspicious 
circumstances.  Both allegations will support a finding of 
undue influence resulting in a fraudulent transaction, and may 
be pled independently or in the alternative. 
Because the two circumstances that will suffice to allege 
undue influence are not interdependent, the capacity, or lack 
thereof, of the party allegedly defrauded by the defendant to 
conduct her own business is not relevant to establishing a 
presumption of undue influence based upon the existence of a 
confidential relationship.  Likewise, the absence of an 
allegation of a confidential relationship alone would not 
defeat a claim that the undue influence arose from the 
defendant taking advantage of the other party's diminished 
capacity.  In short, while it may frequently be the case that 
a claim of undue influence may be supported by allegations 
 
18 
that the defendant both overbore the will of the other party 
through weakness of mind and also took advantage of a 
confidential relationship, in considering a demurrer to such 
claims the trial court must evaluate the sufficiency of each 
theory independently. 
Although the amended complaint in this case contains 
allegations that the defendants exercised undue influence over 
Elsie both through her diminished capacity and as a result of 
confidential relationships, it is clear that the circuit 
court's determination to grant the demurrer was premised only 
on its determination that there was no confidential 
relationship between Elsie and Toni.  The court concluded that 
because the transactions were conducted by Elsie personally, 
or by Toni as a joint account holder, no confidential 
relationship between Elsie and Toni arose by virtue of the 
DPOA, which in the court's view precluded any presumption of 
undue influence.  Without elaborating further, the court 
summarily concluded that the amended complaint also failed to 
allege facts sufficient to find that a confidential 
relationship existed between Elsie and either Bruce or Audrey.2 
                     
2 The circuit court made no express ruling on whether the 
amended complaint adequately pled facts to support a finding 
that one or more of the defendants exercised undue influence 
over Elsie because of her weakness of mind in obtaining a 
benefit for inadequate consideration or under other suspicious 
circumstances, and neither party has addressed that issue in 
 
19 
Ayres' and Riley's first assignment of error challenges 
the circuit court's ruling that there was no confidential 
relationship between Elsie and Toni because the transactions 
at issue did not require Toni to exercise her powers under the 
DPOA.  Unquestionably, the amended complaint pleads that Toni 
was in a position of trust and exercised habitual influence 
over Elsie, as evidenced by Elsie having entrusted the 
management of her property and affairs to Toni though the 
DPOA, such that a confidential relationship existed between 
Elsie and Toni.  Contrary to the court's ruling and the 
position urged by the defendants below and in this appeal, it 
was not necessary under the allegations of the amended 
complaint for Toni to have exercised her authority under the 
DPOA to accomplish the transactions that benefited her or 
others close to her for the presumption of undue influence to 
apply.  Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court erred in 
ruling that no confidential relationship could arise between 
Elsie and Toni solely because Toni may not have exercised her 
powers under the DPOA with respect to the challenged 
transactions. 
                                                                
this appeal.  Accordingly, we express no opinion on whether 
the amended complaint would have supported a cause of action 
based on the alternate method of proving undue influence. 
 
 
20 
We now consider the issue raised by Ayers and Riley in 
their second assignment of error challenging the sustaining of 
the demurrer as to Counts 1, 2 and 3.  In each of these 
counts, the amended complaint alleges that a confidential 
relationship existed between Elsie and Audrey, Toni, and Bruce 
respectively because they were each parties to a joint account 
with Elsie for which she provided all the assets. 
Code § 6.2-619(A) provides that "[p]arties to a joint 
account in a financial institution occupy the relation of 
principal and agent as to each other, with each standing as a 
principal in regard to his ownership interest in the joint 
account and as agent in regard to the ownership interest of 
the other party."  In Parfitt we explained that where, as in 
this case, a joint account is established between two parties 
under which all the assets are contributed by one party, the 
second party becomes "an agent with regard to the entire 
account.  By statute, a confidential relationship was 
established creating a fiduciary duty [and] a presumption that 
the self-dealing transactions were unduly obtained."  277 Va. 
at 342, 672 S.E.2d at 830 (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted).  Under such circumstances, it need not be 
alleged or proven that the defendant procured the creation of 
the joint account by undue influence.  Rather, the existence 
of the account itself imposes a fiduciary duty on the 
 
21 
defendant and with regard to a subsequent transaction creates 
the presumption of undue influence which shifts to the 
defendant the burden of proving the bona fides of the 
transaction.  Id.; Nicholson, 192 Va. at 277, 64 S.E.2d at 
817. 
Because the amended complaint alleges that Audrey, Toni, 
and Bruce were each made co-owners of one or more accounts 
with Elsie for which Elsie provided all the funds, under Code 
§ 6.2-619(A) a confidential relationship existed between each 
of the three and Elise as a matter of law with respect to 
those accounts, and the burden would fall upon each of them to 
rebut the presumption that the transactions were the result of 
undue influence.3  Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court 
erred in sustaining the demurrer as to Counts 1, 2 and 3. 
In their third assignment of error, Ayers and Riley 
challenge the circuit court's sustaining the demurrer as to 
                     
3 Because this case was decided on a demurrer, we are not 
here concerned with what quantum of evidence the defendants 
would need to present to rebut the presumption of fraud 
arising from the statutorily-imposed confidential relationship 
between joint owners of an account.  Indeed, it is self-
evident that such evidence will be case specific and, thus, 
should be decided by a trier-of-fact on evidence adduced at 
trial.  It is also self-evident, however, that these 
transactions clearly reduced Elsie's estate, that neither Toni 
nor Bruce are legatees under Elsie's will, and that, as she is 
a residuary legatee under the will, Audrey's share of the 
estate could be increased if funds were to be recovered for 
the estate as a result of this litigation. 
 
 
22 
Counts 4, 5 and 6, which respectively asserted that Toni, 
Bruce and Audrey each had a confidential relationship with 
Elsie apart from that implied by the creation of the joint 
accounts.  We have already determined that the court erred in 
finding that no confidential relationship arose between Toni 
and Elsie because of the DPOA.  Moreover, even without the 
existence of the DPOA, the amended complaint contains 
allegations that would support a finding that a confidential 
relationship developed between Elsie and Toni.  Specifically, 
it is alleged that Elsie was "dependent on Toni . . . for both 
physical and mental/intellectual assistance" calling upon her 
both day and night.  Likewise, in Count 5, the complaint 
alleges that "[e]ven without the confidential relationship 
arising . . . from the multi-owner bank account, a 
confidential relationship existed between [Elsie] and . . . 
Bruce . . . because of the aid Mr. and Mrs. Smith needed and 
requested" from him. 
A confidential relationship will not necessarily arise in 
every case where a person requests or receives regular aid 
from another.  Nonetheless, when the amended complaint is 
viewed as a whole, it is clear that Elsie was alleged to have 
relied almost exclusively on Toni and Bruce to maintain her 
property and for most of her daily needs and activities until 
October 2007, and a reasonable inference can be made that 
 
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Elsie was dependent on Toni and Bruce to such an extent that a 
confidential relationship existed between them.  Given the 
standard of review applicable to a demurrer, we hold that the 
circuit court erred in sustaining the demurrer as to Counts 4 
and 5. 
With respect to Audrey, the amended complaint alleges in 
Count 6 that a confidential relationship between her and Elsie 
was demonstrated by the fact that Audrey "collaborated with 
Toni Shaffer in the handling of [Elsie]'s financial affairs, 
and especially in the process of persuading [Elsie] to sign 
documents to accomplish many of the . . . transactions which 
Toni Shaffer proposed, advised, or persuaded [Elsie] to 
participate in," and that when Elsie was accompanied by Audrey 
to the banks to conduct these transactions, "[s]he was 
completely under the influence of, and dependent upon Toni 
Shaffer and/or her sister, Audrey Wingo.  This was especially 
true in regard to the management of her financial affairs."  
Additionally, there are allegations that the familial 
relationship between Elsie and Audrey was of a confidential 
nature "especially after certain events caused [Elsie] to 
distrust her granddaughter (Plaintiffs' mother)." 
While these allegations are less specific than those 
concerning Toni and Bruce, they nonetheless constitute facts 
and reasonable inferences which, taken as true, give rise to 
 
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the existence of a confidential relationship and the 
consequent presumption of undue influence upon Elsie in those 
transactions that benefited Audrey.  Accordingly, we hold that 
the circuit court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the 
amended complaint with respect to Count 6.4 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the 
circuit court sustaining the demurrer to the amended complaint 
as to Counts 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11, and the dismissal of Michael 
T. Shaffer as a defendant.  We will reverse the judgment of 
the circuit court sustaining the demurrer to the amended 
complaint as to Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, and remand the 
case to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent 
with the views expressed in this opinion. 
                     
4 We will briefly address an issue raised by Ayers' and 
Riley's fourth assignment of error.  As framed, this 
assignment of error asserts that the circuit court erred in 
determining that Toni was entitled to reimbursement of her 
costs in defending the suit as executrix of the estate.  Ayers 
and Riley contend that this was error because the suit was 
filed against Toni only in her personal capacity.  While the 
court stated from the bench that it would allow reimbursement 
of costs incurred by Toni on behalf of the estate, neither the 
final order nor any other order entered by the court 
memorialized an award of costs and, thus, there is no ruling 
on this issue to review.  However, because we will remand the 
case for further proceedings, the court may revisit the 
question of whether Toni is entitled to reimbursement of any 
costs of this litigation if they were incurred in her capacity 
as executrix. 
 
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Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
and remanded.