Title: ODHINN v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ODHINN v. STATE2003 WY 16982 P.3d 715Case Number: 02-281Decided: 12/30/2003
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                

 

 

JANVIRGO 
THUNOR AKIHOKA ODHINN,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal from the District Court of Albany County

The Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

 

Representing Appellant:

            
Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender; and Donna D. Domonkos, 
Appellate Counsel.

 

Representing Appellee:

H.M. Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy 
Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 
and Daniel M. Fetsco, Assistant Attorney General.

 

 

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 

KITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court; GOLDEN, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

 

            
KITE, Justice.

 

[¶1]      Janvirgo Thunor 
Akihoka Odhinn appeals a district court's order denying his motion to dismiss 
criminal charges filed against him in Wyoming based upon alleged violations of 
the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD).  He claims his statutory and constitutional 
rights to a speedy trial were violated when he was not brought to trial within 
180 days of the date Wyoming received notification of his request for final 
disposition of the charges.  We hold Mr. Odhinn's right under the IAD to 
final disposition within 180 days was violated and reverse the district court's 
order.

 

 

 

[¶2]      Mr. Odhinn presents 
the following issues:

 

ISSUE I

 

            
Whether the State of Wyoming denied Appellant his right to speedy trial 
under Article III of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD)?

 

 

            
Whether the State of Wyoming denied Appellant his right to speedy trial 
as guaranteed by the 6th Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution and by Article I, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution by the failure 
of the Nebraska Detainer Administrator to promptly send Appellant's Interstate 
Agreement on Detainer (IAD) demand for a speedy trial to Wyoming and/or as a 
result of the inaction by the State of Wyoming under the Interstate Agreement on 
Detailers?

 

 

 

[¶3]      In 1997, Mr. Odhinn 
was sentenced to two terms of two to four years in the Nebraska Department of 
Corrections on two convictions for theft.  He escaped from the Nebraska facility in 
1998.  In 
August of 1999, the county attorney's office in Albany County, Wyoming filed an 
information alleging that Mr. Odhinn committed two counts of larceny in Laramie, 
Wyoming.  The 
Albany County circuit court issued an arrest warrant and Mr. Odhinn was arrested 
in Utah on August 10, 1999.  He was then extradited to Nebraska to 
complete his sentences on the theft charges and face prosecution for the 
escape.  

 

[¶4]      On May 18, 2000, the 
Albany County sheriff's office notified Nebraska that Mr. Odhinn was wanted in 
Wyoming on larceny charges and requested a detainer.1  Mr. Odhinn was 
served with notice of the Wyoming charges on June 6, 2000.  The notice informed 
him of his right to request final disposition of the Wyoming charges and be 
brought to trial in Wyoming within 180 days of delivery of his request to the 
Albany County prosecutor and court.  That same day, Mr. Odhinn signed IAD Form II 
requesting final disposition of, and expressly waiving extradition with respect 
to, the Wyoming charges.  At that time, Nebraska authorities did not 
advise Wyoming of Mr. Odhinn's request and waiver. 

 

[¶5]      On June 20, 2000, 
Nebraska notified the Albany County sheriff's office that Mr. Odhinn was due to 
be discharged on July 16, 2000.  Prior to his release, the Nebraska county 
court presented him with another waiver of extradition form on July 3, 2000, 
which he refused to sign.  Neither the record nor the parties' briefs 
indicate why Mr. Odhinn was asked to sign a second waiver after having waived 
extradition just two weeks before by signing IAD Form II.

 

[¶6]      On July 10, 2000, 
officials in Nebraska informed Wyoming authorities that on July 5, 2000, Mr. 
Odhinn was sentenced to serve an additional one to two years in Nebraska on the 
escape charge and would not be available for release to Wyoming on July 16 after 
all.  The 
record does not indicate and the parties offer no explanation as to why Mr. 
Odhinn was not available for release to Wyoming after being sentenced on the 
escape charge.    From the record, it would appear 
that as of July 5, 2000, Mr. Odhinn had entered upon a term of imprisonment in 
Nebraska while charges upon which a detainer had been filed were pending in 
Wyoming, the very circumstances contemplated by the IAD for releasing him to 
Wyoming for disposition of the charges pending in this state.

 

[¶7]      Mr. Odhinn remained 
in custody in Nebraska and four months later, on November 16, 2000, filed a 
grievance, asserting a violation of his right to final disposition of the 
Wyoming charges within 180 days.  Nebraska responded to Mr. Odhinn's grievance 
by stating that when he requested final disposition of the Wyoming charges in 
June of 2000, his expected release date in Nebraska was not until July making 
his request inappropriate; he refused to sign a waiver of extradition in July of 
2000, necessitating procurement of a warrant signed by the governor of Nebraska; 
and he was not sentenced on the escape charge in Nebraska until July of 2000, 
preventing trial in Wyoming at that time.  By letter dated November 17, 2000, Nebraska 
advised the Albany County attorney of Mr. Odhinn's June request for final 
disposition of the Wyoming charges.  The Albany County prosecutor received the 
letter on November 27, 2000, nearly six months after Mr. Odhinn's request.  This letter was the 
first notice Wyoming had that Mr. Odhinn had formally requested speedy 
disposition of the Wyoming charges pursuant to the IAD.  

 

 [¶8]     For the next several 
months, Mr. Odhinn remained incarcerated in Nebraska.  On April 11, 2001, 
Nebraska advised Wyoming that Mr. Odhinn was scheduled to be released on May 16, 
2001, but was refusing to sign a waiver of extradition to Wyoming.  Despite Mr. 
Odhinn's June 6, 2000 waiver, Nebraska further advised that Wyoming would need 
to obtain a warrant from Nebraska's governor in order to secure his 
release.  

 

[¶9]      On May 15, 2001, 
Nebraska released Mr. Odhinn, but he was immediately taken into custody by the 
Lancaster County, Nebraska sheriff's office until Wyoming could obtain a 
governor's warrant.  
By letter to the Albany County circuit court dated June 3, 2001, Mr. 
Odhinn again requested dismissal of the Wyoming charges on the basis of speedy 
trial violations under the IAD and the Wyoming and United States 
Constitutions.  
In the letter, he specifically referenced his recent refusal to sign a 
waiver of extradition form, stating that his earlier signature on IAD Form II 
constituted a direct waiver of extradition to Wyoming making any additional 
waiver unnecessary.  

 

[¶10]   Meanwhile, despite Mr. Odhinn's letter 
stating he had already waived extradition, Wyoming authorities proceeded with 
obtaining a governor's warrant for his release.  The governor of Nebraska signed the warrant on 
June 26, 2001, and sent it on to the Lancaster County, Nebraska sheriff's office 
where it was received on June 29, 2001.  Although no longer serving any sentence in 
Nebraska, Mr. Odhinn remained in custody in the Lancaster County jail throughout 
this time.  At 
some point that is not identified by the parties and does not appear in the 
record, Mr. Odhinn filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Lancaster 
County district court in which he again asserted a violation of his right to 
speedy trial in Wyoming.2  The district court held a hearing on the 
motion on July 24, 2001, and, by order dated July 26, 2001, denied the petition, 
holding that the Nebraska courts had no jurisdiction to address whether Mr. 
Odhinn's speedy trial right was violated in Wyoming.  The district court 
ordered the Lancaster County sheriff's office to deliver Mr. Odhinn to Wyoming 
authorities.  

 

[¶11]   On August 2, 2001, fourteen months 
after Mr. Odhinn's request for final disposition of the Wyoming charges, 
sheriff's deputies from Albany County, Wyoming arrived in Nebraska to take Mr. 
Odhinn into custody and return him to Wyoming for trial.  They were informed 
Mr. Odhinn was scheduled for a hearing the next day and could not be 
released.  At 
the hearing, the Nebraska district court stayed its order of July 26 and ordered 
Nebraska authorities to hold Mr. Odhinn until disposition of his appeal from the 
denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus.  At some point, the Nebraska Supreme Court 
dismissed the appeal and, on December 26, 2001, Nebraska notified Wyoming that 
Mr. Odhinn was available for release to Wyoming authorities.  Officers were 
dispatched to Nebraska on December 27, 2001, and returned to Wyoming with Mr. 
Odhinn the following day, more than a year and a half after he requested final 
disposition of the Wyoming charges.  

 

[¶12]   On March 15, 2002, Mr. Odhinn filed a 
motion in district court in Albany County seeking dismissal of the Wyoming 
charges on the ground that his speedy trial rights were violated.  The district court 
held an evidentiary hearing on the motion and, on April 24, 2002, issued a 
decision letter in which it concluded no violation occurred because:  1) the delay in 
bringing Mr. Odhinn to trial resulted from his refusal to sign the waiver of 
extradition in April of 2001 and filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, 
and 2) Mr. Odhinn's "self-imposed delays" constituted good cause to continue the 
date for computing the 180 days from November 27, 2000 to December 26, 
2001.  The 
district court entered an order denying the motion to dismiss on April 29, 
2002.  Mr. 
Odhinn entered a guilty plea conditioned upon his right to appeal the denial of 
his motion to dismiss and, on October 3, 2002, the district court sentenced him 
to not less than three nor more than nine years in the state penitentiary.  Mr. Odhinn then 
appealed from the order denying his motion to dismiss.

 

 

 

[¶13]   To the extent the issue raised is a 
question of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo.  Wyodak Resources Development Corporation v. Wyoming 
Department of Revenue, 2002 WY 181, ¶ 9, 60 P.3d 129, ¶ 9 (Wyo. 2002).  
When a matter has been the subject of a bench trial (or evidentiary 
hearing) before the district court, we review the factual determinations under a 
clearly erroneous standard and the legal conclusions de novo.  Union Pacific Railroad v. Trona Valley Federal Credit 
Union, 2002 WY 165, ¶ 7, 57 P.3d 1203, ¶ 7 (Wyo. 
2002).

 

[¶14]   In construing statutes, our aim is to 
effectuate legislative intent.  Director of Office of 
State Lands & Investments v. Merbanco, Inc., 2003 WY 73, 70 P.3d 241 (Wyo. 
2003).  If the 
language is sufficiently clear, we do not resort to rules of construction.  Id.  We apply our general rule that we look to the 
ordinary and obvious meaning of a statute when the language is unambiguous.  Id.  We also construe a statute so as to give 
effect to all of its provisions.  Id. 

 

[¶15]   With regard to the IAD specifically, it 
is a federal law subject to federal construction.  Knox v. Wyoming 
Department of Corrections State Penitentiary Warden, 34 F.3d 964, 966 (10th Cir. 1994).  United States Supreme Court interpretations 
of the IAD are thus binding on state courts.  State v. Reed, 2003 Neb. LEXIS 145.  The IAD is a remedial statute and should be liberally 
construed to achieve its purposes, including a speedy trial and the expeditious 
and orderly disposition of charges.  Corbin v. Superior 
Court of the State of Arizona, 746 P.2d 937, 939 (Ariz. 1987).  However, it also has strict procedural 
requirements that must be followed.  Id.  

 

 

 

1.                  
Right to speedy trial under the IAD

 

[¶16]   Mr. Odhinn claims his right to speedy 
trial under the IAD was violated in that he was not brought to trial within 180 
days of his request for final disposition as required.  He asserts, and the 
state agrees, the time commenced to run on November 27, 2000, the date the 
Albany county prosecutor received his request for final disposition of the 
Wyoming charges.  
He claims Wyoming had until May 27, 2001, to bring him to trial.  Given that he was 
not even returned to Wyoming until December 27, 2001, seven months after the 
asserted May 27, 2001 deadline, Mr. Odhinn claims the IAD was violated.  The state argues 
the delay in bringing Mr. Odhinn to trial in Wyoming resulted from his actions 
in refusing to sign a waiver of extradition in April of 2001 and appealing the 
denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus.  The state asserts the district court properly 
held Mr. Odhinn was unable to stand trial in Wyoming during these periods and 
good cause existed for continuing the speedy trial date from November 27, 2000 
to December 27, 2001.

 

[¶17]   The IAD is a compact among forty-eight 
states, the federal government and the District of Columbia creating uniform 
procedures for lodging and executing detainers.  Alabama v. 
Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 148 (2001).  
Wyoming and Nebraska are participating states.  Wyoming's version 
of the IAD is promulgated in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-15-101 (LexisNexis 2003).  The Act provides a uniform procedure whereby 
persons who are serving prison sentences in one state, and who are also charged 
with crimes in another state, can be tried for the pending charges while they 
are serving their current sentences.  Reed, 2003 Neb. LEXIS 145.    It is intended to provide for 
expeditious delivery of the prisoner to the receiving State for trial prior to 
the termination of his sentence in the sending State and seeks to minimize the 
consequent interruption of the prisoner's ongoing prison term.  Alabama, 533 U.S.  at 148.  As stated in 
Article I of the Act:

 

            
The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, 
detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and 
difficulties in securing speedy trials of persons already incarcerated in other 
jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner 
treatment and rehabilitation.  Accordingly, it is 
the policy of the party states  and the purpose of  this agreement 
to   
encourage   the 

expeditious and orderly disposition of such 
charges and determination of the proper status of any and all 
detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints. 

 

Section 7-15-101 (emphasis added).  Because the IAD is 
a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact, it is a federal law subject to 
federal construction.  Knox, 34 F.3d  at 966.   United States 
Supreme Court interpretations of the Agreement are thus binding on state 
courts.  Reed, 2003 Neb. LEXIS at 646.  The Act itself requires that it "shall be 
liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes."  Section 7-15-101, 
Art. IX.

 

[¶18]   The IAD contains two procedures for 
effectuating expeditious prosecution of charges filed in one state while a 
person is serving a sentence in another state.  The first, contained in Article III, allows a 
prisoner against whom a detainer is lodged to initiate the process for 
disposition of charges outstanding in another state.  The second, 
contained in Article IV, allows the authorities in the state where the charges 
are pending to initiate the process for returning a prisoner to that state for 
trial.  In this 
case, Mr. Odhinn initiated the process for final disposition of the Wyoming 
charges by signing IAD Form II.  Therefore, our review focuses on the Article 
III procedure.    

 

[¶19]   Article III of the Wyoming IAD provides 
in relevant part as follows:

 

 

(a)               
 Whenever a person has entered upon a term of 
imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and 
whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in 
any other party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the 
basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial at the 
next term of court after he shall have caused to be delivered to the 
prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's 
jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for 
final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint; 
provided that for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel 
being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any 
necessary and reasonable continuance. . . .

 

 

(b)               
The written notice and request for final disposition 
referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, commissioner of corrections or other official 
having custody of him, who shall promptly forward it 
together with the certificate to the appropriate 
prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail.    

 

. . . 

 

(e) Any request for final 
disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to paragraph (a) hereof shall also be deemed to be a waiver of extradition with respect to 
any charge or proceeding contemplated thereby . . . .  The request for 
final disposition shall also constitute a consent by the prisoner to the 
production of his body in any court where his presence may be required in order 
to effectuate the purpose of this agreement  . . . .

 

Section 7-15-101 (emphasis added).  We have previously 
noted that Article III of Wyoming's statutory provision is identical to the 
federal act in all but one respect  Article III (a) of the Wyoming statute 
requires final disposition "at the next term of court" after delivery of the 
defendant's request.  
Green v. State, 784 P.2d 1360, 1362 (Wyo. 
1989).  The 
federal act and the statutes of all other party states require disposition 
"within 180 days" after delivery of the request.  18 U.S.C. Appx.  Faced with this 
difference in Green, we applied the federal 180-day 
requirement.  
We do so again now in order to effectuate the Act's intent to provide 
uniform procedures and comport our decision with controlling federal law. 

 

[¶20]   As noted earlier in this opinion, the 
parties agreed the 180-day period began to run on November 27, 2000, the date 
Mr. Odhinn's request for final disposition of the Wyoming charges was delivered 
to authorities in Albany County.  In Fex v. 
Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 53 (1993), 
the Court held the 180 days provided for in the IAD did not commence until the 
prisoner's request for final disposition was delivered to the court and 
prosecuting officer of the jurisdiction that lodged the detainer against 
him.  Thus, the 
parties are correct that November 27, 2000 is the appropriate date from which to 
begin the 180 days.  
One hundred and eighty days from November 27, 2000 is May 26, 2001.  Given that Mr. 
Odhinn was not returned to Wyoming until December 26, 2001, seven months later, 
the charges against him clearly were not finally disposed of within 180 
days.  We must 
decide whether, under the facts presented, other provisions of the Act support 
the district court's determination that the IAD was not violated.  Before focusing on 
that question, however, we address another concern touched on only briefly by 
Mr. Odhinn.

 

[¶21]   Article III (b) of the IAD requires the 
official having custody of the prisoner to "promptly" forward the prisoner's 
request for final disposition to the appropriate prosecuting official and 
court.  
Pursuant to this provision, Nebraska was required to promptly forward Mr. 
Odhinn's request to the Albany County court and prosecutor.  The word "prompt" 
means "1: ready and quick to act as occasion demands: responding instantly 2: 
performed readily or immediately: given without delay or hesitation.    
(Websters New International Dictionary, (3d ed. 1961)).  Here, nearly six 
months passed after Mr. Odhinn signed the request and before Albany County 
officials received it.  As we noted earlier, the reason for the 
lengthy delay is not apparent from the record or the parties' briefs.  Although Nebraska 
claimed later in responding to Mr. Odhinn's grievance that his June 2000 request 
was not appropriate due to his July release date, he refused to sign a second 
waiver of extradition and he was not sentenced on the escape charge until July 
of 2000, none of these claims have any bearing on Nebraska's obligation to 
promptly forward Mr. Odhinn's request.  They also provide no explanation as to why 
his request still was not forwarded in the months following July.  Nebraska had an 
unequivocal obligation to promptly notify Albany County of Mr. Odhinn's request 
and for reasons largely left unexplained failed to do so.  

 

[¶22]   One legal analyst has addressed the 
consequences of a custodian's failure to comply with the prompt notification 
provision as follows: 

 

What are the consequences of a less than prompt delivery of 
the inmate's request for final disposition by the custodian to the 
prosecutor?  
Some courts have held that an inmate has only one obligation under the 
IAD  to advise the custodian in writing of the request for final disposition of 
the charges.  
If an inmate satisfies that requirement, he is entitled to the benefits 
of the IAD.  
After all, the inmate has no power of supervision over prison 
officials.  If 
the delay does not meet the language of the IAD, the inmate is entitled to 
dismissal of the charge without having to show prejudice or misconduct if the 
initial trial date is not within 180 days of the request to the warden for final 
disposition.  
[People v. Wilson, 138 Cal. Rptr. 259, 262 
(1977)]

 

Why should the prosecuting officials of the charging state 
bear the brunt of another jurisdiction's failure to comply with IAD?  The answer seems to 
be that, as between the prosecutor and the inmate, the prosecutor is "better 
situated than the inmate to see that the requirements of the law are met."  [Wilson, 138 Cal.Rptr. at 262]  A prisoner should 
not be penalized if the prison officials fail to carry out their duties under 
the IAD.  [People v. Marshall, 428 N.W.2d 39, 42 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989)]

 

 

L. Abramson, The Interstate Agreement on Detainers:  Narrowing its 
Availability and Application, 21 New England Journal on Criminal and Civil 
Confinement 1 (1995), 22.  Based upon this reasoning, the court in Wilson remanded the case for hearing to permit the 
state to show the reasonableness of a two-month delay between the prisoner's 
request and receipt of his request by the receiving state.  Wilson, 138 Cal. Rptr.  at 262.  Other courts 
likewise have imposed the burden on the custodial official, rather than the 
inmate, to ensure compliance with the provision of the Act requiring prompt 
notification of the charging state.  Pittman v. State, 
301 A.2d 509 (Del. 1973); People v. Esposito, 201 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1960); Rockmore v. State, 519 P.2d 877 (Ariz. App. 1974); Burns v. State, 578 S.W.2d 650 (Tenn. 1978).

 

[¶23]   We are aware that other courts have 
held the custodial official's failure to comply with the prompt notification 
provision is not grounds for dismissing charges pending in another state.  Welch v. State, 528 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. Ct. App. 1988); Parrott v. State, 427 S.E.2d 276 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); 
State v. Moore, 774 S.W.2d 590 (Tenn. 1989).  However, the effect 
of adopting the position of these courts would be to leave Mr. Odhinn in a 
"catch-22".  
His petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied in Nebraska on the 
ground that Nebraska courts had no jurisdiction to address whether Wyoming 
violated Mr. Odhinn's speedy trial right.  A holding by Wyoming that Nebraska's failure 
to comply with the IAD does not affect the Wyoming charges is tantamount to 
holding we have no jurisdiction to address whether Nebraska violated his speedy 
trial right.  
This leaves Mr. Odhinn with no remedy for what we view as a clear failure 
on the part of officials to carry out the intent of the IAD.  We conclude Mr. 
Odhinn's request was not promptly forwarded as required by the IAD.  However, because 
the request was forwarded within the 180 day time period, we conclude that 
failure alone is insufficient to warrant dismissal of the Wyoming charges.  We turn to the 
issue of whether Mr. Odhinn's rights were violated because the charges were not 
disposed of within 180 days.  

 

[¶24]   Article VI of the IAD provides:

 

Article VI

 

(a)  In determining the duration and expiration 
dates of the time periods provided in Articles III and IV of this agreement, the running of said time periods shall be tolled whenever 
and for as long as the prisoner is unable to stand trial, as determined by 
the court having jurisdiction of the matter.

 

Section 7-15-101 (emphasis added).  

 

Pursuant to this provision, we must determine whether the 
time period was tolled because Mr. Odhinn was "unable to stand trial" within the 
meaning of Article VI for any period after November 27, 2000.              

 

 

[¶25]   We have said periods in which a 
defendant is detained for trial in another jurisdiction toll the time for 
determining the number of days between his request and trial.  Green, 784 P.2d  at 1363.  Thus, in Green, 
we held a delay of 236 days between the defendant's request for final 
disposition and trial did not constitute a speedy trial violation given that he 
was unavailable for trial for 133 of those days while preparing for and standing 
trial in another jurisdiction.  We also have held the time period is tolled 
when a defendant challenges for cause the judge assigned to the case and files 
multiple motions.  
Jones v. State, 813 P.2d 629, 632 (Wyo. 
1991).  In Jones, we concluded the defendant was unable to stand 
trial and the time limit was tolled for almost three months as a result of the 
challenge for cause and other defense motions.  Other courts have likewise construed the 
phrase "unable to stand trial" in the IAD to include periods in which the 
defendant was facing pending charges in another state, Reed, 2003 Neb. LEXIS, 655; United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628, 633 (7th Cir. 1987); Ohio v. Ferguson, 535 N.E.2d 708, 714 (Ct. of App. Oh. 
1987); State v. Walton, 734 S.W.2d 502, 503 (Mo. 
1987); Iowa v. Wood, 241 N.W.2d 8, 14 (Iowa 1976), 
or defense motions were pending.  United States v. 
Nesbitt, 852 F.2d 1502, 1516 (7th Cir. 
1988); State v. Bernson, 807 P.2d 309 (Ore. 1991); State v. Millett, 639 A.2d 352 
(N.J. Sup. Ct. 1994).  

 

[¶26]   In the present case, the district court 
concluded Mr. Odhinn was unable to stand trial from April 11, 2001, when 
Nebraska officials asked him a third time to sign a waiver of extradition and he 
refused, until July 2, 2001, the date the governor's warrant allegedly 
necessitated by his refusal was received in Lancaster County where he was being 
held.  The 
district court also concluded Mr. Odhinn was unable to stand trial from August 
3, 2001, the date Nebraska refused to allow Wyoming authorities to take custody 
of Mr. Odhinn because of a pending hearing, to December 26, 2001,3 when Nebraska notified Albany County Mr. 
Odhinn's appeal had been dismissed by the Nebraska Supreme Court.  We address these 
time periods sequentially.

 

[¶27]   In ruling the Article III time period 
was tolled from April 11, 2001 to July 2, 2001, the district court relied on People v. Garner, 274 Cal. Rptr. 298 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1990) and People v. Uplinger, 370 N.E.2d 1054 (Ill. 
1977).  The 
latter decision is distinguishable and not helpful to our resolution of the 
issue in the present case.  Unlike Mr. Odhinn, the defendant in Uplinger did not make a request for final disposition 
and thereby waive extradition as provided in Article III of the IAD.  Therefore, his 
later refusal to sign a waiver of extradition "manifested the clear intent to 
prevent his return for trial in Illinois."  There was no question, as there was in Mr. 
Odhinn's case, of the effect of a subsequent refusal to waive extradition on an 
earlier waiver.  
Id. at 1058.  However, Garner, 
274 Cal. Rptr. 298, the other case relied on by the district court, is directly 
on point.  Mr. 
Garner signed the IAD forms requesting final disposition of charges filed 
against him in San Diego, California and waiving extradition.  Some months later, 
when he was available to stand trial on the California charges, Nevada 
authorities where he was being held presented him with a second waiver of 
extradition, which Mr. Garner refused to sign.  The California court stated:

 

Here, the Nevada authorities allowed Garner to either 
reaffirm his request for disposition of the San Diego detainer or withdraw his 
request and waiver of extradition.  Garner chose not to reaffirm his request and 
to withdraw his waiver of extradition.  By refusing to reaffirm his waiver, Garner 
then made himself unavailable for transfer to San Diego.  Garner, not 
California or Nevada officials, caused the delay.  Under these circumstances, the 180-day period 
was tolled until Garner consented to extradition and again sought final 
disposition of the San Diego charges.

 

Id. at 304.  

 

[¶28]   The district court was persuaded that 
Mr. Odhinn's refusal to sign the waiver in April of 2001 warranted tolling the 
180 days.  We 
disagree.  
Pursuant to the clear language of Article III (e), Mr. Odhinn's request 
for final disposition of the charges pending in Wyoming constituted a "waiver of 
extradition" and "consent to the production of his body" in court in Albany 
County, Wyoming.  
Once Mr. Odhinn signed the form on June 2, 2000, no other waiver was 
necessary.  To 
say that a prisoner can circumvent his extradition to another state by refusing 
to sign a waiver after he has already waived extradition renders meaningless the 
clause in Article III (e) stating the request for final disposition is deemed to 
be a waiver.  
We think the better rule is stated in Franks v. 
Johnson, 401 F.Supp 669, 672 (E.D. Mich 1975), wherein the court held the 
prisoner's refusal to sign a waiver after requesting final disposition of 
charges was without effect because, under the IAD, the request is deemed to be a 
waiver.  See 
also Tungate v. Thoms, 199 F. Supp. 2d 608 (E.D. Ky. 
2002) where, after signing a request for final disposition, the defendant denied 
waiving extradition and the court upheld as effective and continuing the 
language of the request stating that it was "deemed to be a waiver of 
extradition."      

 

[¶29]   With regard to the waiver issue, we 
also reiterate that the prosecutor is in a better position than the prisoner to 
see that the requirements of the law are met.  Here, when Mr. Odhinn was presented with the 
third waiver on April 11, 2001, officials in Wyoming and Nebraska already had 
the request for final disposition of the Wyoming charges signed by Mr. Odhinn on 
June 6, 2000.  
That document clearly states "I . . . agree that this request shall be 
deemed to be my waiver of extradition with respect to the [Wyoming 
charges]."  We 
simply are not willing to say that Mr. Odhinn's refusal to sign a form presented 
to him unnecessarily by Nebraska officials excuses the party states from 
complying with the 180 day time period.  The IAD contains no provision requiring an 
inmate to "reaffirm" an already effective waiver and we are not willing to read 
such a requirement into the Act.  The district court incorrectly held the 
180-day period was tolled from April 11, 2001, until the governor's warrant was 
received eighty-three days later on July 2, 2001.  Adding this period of time back into the 
calculation, the 180 days ended May 27, 2001, seven months before Mr. Odhinn was 
returned to Wyoming for trial.  

 

[¶30]   The dissent cites several cases for the 
proposition that the IAD's speedy trial provision did not apply to Mr. Odhinn on 
May 27, 2002, when the 180 days expired because he was released by Nebraska 
authorities on May 15, 2001.  We note first that none of those cases 
involved a situation where, like here, despite his request for speedy 
disposition the defendant thereafter remained incarcerated in the sending state 
for another twelve months until his sentence was completed.  Additionally, Mr. 
Odhinn was never really "released" because Nebraska authorities immediately took 
him into custody and held him for another seven months while Wyoming sought the 
governor's warrant and his habeas petition was resolved.  Moreover, § 
7-15-101(a) applies "whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment . 
. . and during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in 
any other party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the 
basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner."  Mr. Odhinn had 
entered upon a term of imprisonment in Nebraska and during the continuance of 
that term an untried information was pending in Wyoming on the basis of which a 
detainer was lodged in Nebraska.  Giving the statutory language its plain and 
ordinary meaning, we are persuaded the IAD applied even though Mr. Odhinn's 
sentence in Nebraska ended on May 15, 2001.  Accord Commonwealth 
v. Davis, 575 A.2d 959, 962 (Pa. Super. 2000).

 

[¶31]   Having concluded that the 180 days 
expired on May 27, 2001, the question of whether the 180 days was tolled by Mr. Odhinn's 
later appeal of the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus is 
irrelevant.  We are left to consider one final issue 
arising from the district court's order.  Even under the district court's calculation, 
excluding the time periods from April 11, 2001 to July 2, 2001 and August 3, 
2001 to December 26, 2001, Mr. Odhinn was not returned to Wyoming within 180 
days.   
Faced with this result, the district court looked to the language of 
Article III stating:  
"for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being 
present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or 
reasonable continuance."  Section 7-15-101 (a).  Citing this 
provision, the district court held Mr. Odhinn's "self-imposed delays provide 
this Court the grounds with which to grant a necessary and reasonable 
continuance in this matter to December 26, 2001, the date that [he] was finally 
made available to the [Albany County sheriff's office] for transport to 
Wyoming."  The 
district court thus brought final disposition of the charges against Mr. Odhinn 
back within the 180 days in which trial was to occur under the IAD.

 

[¶32]   The difficulty with the district 
court's approach is that the self-imposed delays referred to as support for a 
retroactive continuance, i.e., Mr. Odhinn's refusal to sign a second waiver of 
extradition and filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, were accounted for 
already by the district court in computing the IAD time period.  That is, they were 
factored in as periods during which Mr. Odhinn was "unable to stand trial", 
thereby tolling the 180-day period.  To factor them in a second time as a basis 
for granting a court initiated, retroactive continuance gives us pause.

 

[¶33]   Another difficulty with the district 
court's approach is that it is contrary to the rule adopted by several courts 
that a continuance of a defendant's trial must be requested and granted before 
the 180 days expires.  
State v. Willoughby, 927 P.2d 1379, 1387 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996) (calling this the "majority rule"); Dennett v. 
State, 311 A.2d 437, 440 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1973); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 301 A.2d 605, 607 (Pa. 1973); State v. Patterson, 256 S.E.2d 417, 418 (S.C. 
1979).  
The United States Supreme Court expressly declined to address this rule 
in Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, fn. 5, and 
there is at least one case upholding the grant of a continuance after expiration 
of the 180 days on the ground that the language of the IAD does not expressly 
state any continuance must be granted before the time expires.  State v. Lippolis, 257 A.2d 705, 711 (N.J. 1970) (per 
curiam) (reversing on reasoning of dissent in Appellate Division).  However, most 
courts that have addressed the issue have concluded continuances under the IAD 
must be granted prior to expiration of 180 days.  They have done so in order to promote the 
IAD's express purpose to "encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition" of 
charges pending in one state against a person incarcerated in another 
state.  Willoughby, 927 P.2d  at 1387; State v. Patterson, 256 S.E.2d  at 418; Fisher, 
301 A.2d  at 607.  
Particularly under the facts presented here -- where Mr. Odhinn requested 
final disposition and waived extradition months before he was returned to 
Wyoming, Nebraska was aware of his request and waiver and yet sought additional 
waivers and advised Wyoming to obtain a governor's warrant, and months went by 
when authorities apparently took no action to comply with the IAD -- we cannot 
agree that good cause existed to grant a continuance nearly a year after the 180 
days had passed.  
We reverse the district court order and remand for entry of an order 
granting Mr. Odhinn's motion to dismiss.  

 

[¶34]  We do not reach this result easily.  Dismissal of 
charges pending in Wyoming is not a desirable outcome.  However, the clear 
intent of the IAD leaves us no reasonable alternative.  In light of our 
holding that Mr. Odhinn's right to speedy trial under the IAD was violated, it 
is not necessary to address Mr. Odhinn's constitutional claim.         

 

[¶35]   Reversed.  

 

 

GOLDEN, Justice, dissenting.

 

[¶34]      I respectfully dissent.  The 180-day speedy trial period under the 
Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) was to expire on May 26, 2001.  Nebraska released 
Odhinn from imprisonment, however, on May 15, 2001, before expiration of the 
180-day speedy trial period.  The "majority rule," acknowledged by Odhinn's 
appellate defense counsel, holds that if the sending state (Nebraska) releases 
the accused (Odhinn) within the 180-day period, then the accused (Odhinn) is, 
under the plain language of the IAD, no longer a "prisoner" to whom the IAD 
provisions apply; therefore, the IAD's speedy trial provision no longer applied 
to the released Odhinn.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628, 633 (7th Cir. 1987); Cunningham 
v. State, 14 S.W.3d 869, 871-72 (Ark. 2000); Womble 
v. State, 957 S.W.2d 839, 843-44 (Tenn. Cr. App. 1997); State v. Holley, 571 A.2d 892, 894-96 (Md. App. 1990); 
State v. Julian, 765 P.2d 1104, 1106-08 (Kan. 1988); and State v. 
Tarango, 734 P.2d 1275, 1278 (N.M. 
App. 1987).

 

[¶35]      Addressing Odhinn's garden-variety constitutional speedy 
trial claim, I agree with the State's position that Odhinn failed to raise that 
issue below, and it is deemed waived.  Even on the merits, the claim fails because 
Wyoming received Odhinn on December 28, 2001, and he entered a conditional 
guilty plea on June 4, 2002.  That period between those two dates fails to 
trigger a speedy trial claim analysis.

 

FOOTNOTES

1A detainer is "'a notification filed with the institution 
in which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face 
pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction.'"  Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433 (1981), quoting United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978) and H. R. Rep. No. 91-1018, p. 2 (1970); S. Rep. No. 91-1356, p. 
2 (1970).   

      

2The date upon which the 
petition was filed is important because if Mr. Odhinn filed it prior to May 27, 
2001, it would toll the 180 days from the date it was filed until its denial  a 
period which might well defeat Mr. Odhinn's claim.  We cannot consider 
this issue, however, because the date the petition was filed does not appear in 
the record or the parties' briefs.

  

3The district court's 
decision letter states "November 26, 2001."  That date has no significance in the record 
and we assume the district court meant to say "December 26, 2001"- the date 
Nebraska officials informed Wyoming Mr. Odhinn's appeal was dismissed.