Title: Gallegos v. Tinsley

State: colorado

Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court

Document:

337 P.2d 386 (1959) Jose R. GALLEGOS, Plaintiff in Error, v. Harry C. TINSLEY, Warden, Colorado State Penitentiary, Defendant in Error. No. 18707. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. March 30, 1959. Francis R. Salazar, Denver, for plaintiff in error. Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Patterson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error. *387 MOORE, Justice. Plaintiff in error, to whom we will refer as defendant, and one DeHerrera, filed a joint petition in the district court of Fremont county for a writ of habeas corpus. They alleged that they had been convicted of forcible rape in the district court of Pueblo county in May 1957; that they were sentenced to a term of not less than five nor more than ten years in the state penitentiary; and that their imprisonment by the respondent warden of the prison is illegal for the reason that at the time of the imposition of the aforesaid sentence they were under sixteen years of age. The trial court at first made the writ permanent, but upon consideration of motion filed by respondent the judgment ordering a discharge of the petitioners was set aside and the writ was discharged. DeHerrera was remanded to the custody of the warden. Defendant was permitted to remain at liberty on a one thousand dollar bond. He seeks review by writ of error directed to the judgment of the trial court which denied him release from custody in the habeas corpus proceeding. It is not disputed that at the time of imposition of sentence by the district court of Pueblo county defendant was fifteen years of age. The offense for which he was convicted is that defined by C.R.S. 1953, 40-2-25(3). Under this statute the offense was rape of the first degree, and the punishment provided by C.R.S. '53, 40-2-28 for rape in the first degree is: Several statutes exist which bear upon the status of minors in criminal cases. C.R.S. '53, 40-1-4 provides that an infant under the age of ten years shall not be found guilty of any crime or misdemeanor. C.R.S. '53, 40-1-2 provides that the element' of intention as related to criminal cases is manifested by the circumstances connected with the perpetration of the offense, and the sound mind and discretion of the person accused. C.R.S. '53, 40-1-3 provides: "A person shall be considered of sound mind who is neither an idiot, nor lunatic, nor affected with insanity, and who has arrived at the age of fourteen years, or before that age, if such person knows the distinction between good or evil." From these statutes it is clear that a minor who is over fourteen years of age is fully accountable for crimes committed by him. Unless there is a statute which makes mandatory a sentence, in the case of a minor, other than that applicable to adults, an offense committed by a minor is punishable in the same manner as though committed by an adult. 43 C.J.S. Infants § 96(g), p. 222. It is contended by counsel for defendant that the provisions of C.R.S. '53, 39-10-1, are controlling in the instant case. This section provides: "Courts having criminal jurisdiction in Colorado shall sentence to the state reformatory all male persons, and none other, duly convicted before them of felony for the first time, who at the time of sentence shall be of the full age of sixteen years and not more than twenty-one years; * * * provided, that they shall sentence to the state penitentiary at Canon City any male persons between the ages of sixteen and thirty who shall be convicted of crimes involving the penalty of imprisonment for life, or the crime of *388 murder in the first or second degrees or voluntary manslaughter." That this statute, by its express terms, is not applicable to defendant in the instant case is obvious. He was fifteen years of age when sentenced. Application of the statute is limited to those persons who are "of the full age" of sixteen years at the time of sentence. The judiciary cannot read into an act of the legislature a provision which is clearly not present. Thus we cannot, by construction, amend the statute by lowering the age limit for coverage thereunder from sixteen to fifteen upon the sole ground that the legislature should have placed the limit at the lower figure. Counsel for defendant argues: This argument might be persuasive in legislative halls if advanced in support of an amendment to the existing statute, but it is futile to present it here. It follows from the foregoing that the sentence imposed by the district court of Pueblo county was within the statutory limitations. It was neither void, as contended by counsel for defendant, nor was it erroneous within the meaning of the opinion of this court in Hart v. Best, 119 Colo. 569, 205 P.2d 787. There is yet another reason why the relief sought by habeas corpus was properly denied by the trial court. The district court of Fremont county was without jurisdiction to determine the question raised by the petition for habeas corpus. In Martin v. District Court, 37 Colo. 110, 86 P. 82, 84, petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed in the district court of Denver to determine the validity of a judgment of the district court of Otero county. In the opinion in that case this court said, inter alia: In Hart v. Best, supra, the doctrine of Martin v. District Court, supra, was reaffirmed and the function of the writ of habeas corpus thoroughly analyzed under facts comparable to those in the instant *389 case. From that opinion we quote the following pertinent language: The cases above cited are controlling under the facts in the case before us. The district court of Fremont county was without jurisdiction. The judgment is affirmed.