Title: Renaissance Leasing, LLC., et al., Appellants vs. Vermeer Manufacturing Company, Vermeer Great Plains, Inc., Respondents.

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Missouri 
en banc 
 
RENAISSANCE LEASING, LLC, ET AL., 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
Appellants,     
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC90258 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
VERMEER MANUFACTURING COMPANY, 
) 
VERMEER GREAT PLAINS, INC., 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
Respondents.  
 
) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY 
The Honorable Kelly Jean Moorhouse, Judge 
 
Opinion issued August 31, 2010 
I. Introduction 
Renaissance Leasing LLC, TEAM Excavating LLC, and John Uhlmann appeal the 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Vermeer Manufacturing Company and Vermeer 
Great Plains, Inc., on claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of express and 
implied warranty, and breach of contract.  All of the claims arise from the sale of a piece 
of heavy mining equipment – a T1055 terrain leveler – to a non-party, Crush Technology 
LLC.  Crush purportedly transferred ownership of the T1055 to Renaissance and then 
later distributed its liquidation assets to Uhlmann, who assigned any rights of action to 
TEAM.  Uhlmann owns both Renaissance and TEAM.   
Evidence in the record is sufficient to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact 
about transfer of the T1055 and assignment of the warranty rights.  The grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Vermeer on Renaissance’s breach of express warranty claim is 
reversed, as is the grant of summary judgment in favor of Vermeer on Uhlmann’s 
negligent misrepresentation claim.  The grant of summary judgment for all other claims 
and parties is affirmed. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. 
 
II. Facts and Procedural History 
The facts underlying this multi-party lawsuit are complicated due to the financing 
relationships among the various business entities associated with Uhlmann, which were 
formed to hold, lease, or operate the terrain leveler at issue.  In addition, the original 
purchaser of the terrain leveler and holder of the warranty rights is not a party to the 
litigation.  Crush Technology LLC (“Crush”) was formed by Jeff Hall and several others 
to quarry limestone from the Phenix Quarry near Springfield.  To that end, they acquired 
a Vermeer T1055 terrain leveler from Vermeer Great Plains (“Great Plains”), an 
independent dealer and regional distributor for Vermeer Manufacturing Company 
(“Vermeer”).  The T1055 was designed and marketed for surface mining, overburden 
removal, road construction, and soil remediation.  Before any payment or sales contract 
was made, the terrain leveler was transported to the quarry for a two-month 
demonstration period, during which Crush tested it under various conditions to see how 
well it would perform overburden crushing and rock excavation.  The T1055 performed 
well on the overburden or scrap rock but experienced problems when used to excavate 
hard limestone on the quarry floor.  Crush chose to purchase the machine after the 
demonstration period but notified Great Plains and Vermeer about its concerns. 
 
Soon after formation, Crush sought investment or financing for its business from 
John Uhlmann (“Uhlmann”) 1 and the Uhlmann Company, a Kansas City firm consisting 
of members of the Uhlmann family.  The Uhlmann Company declined investment in the 
business but agreed to make loans to Crush on the condition that Uhlmann personally 
guarantee the loans.  Uhlmann, who was impressed by Crush’s business plan and by the 
performance of the T1055, made additional loans to Crush on his own behalf.  Crush 
executed a sales contract with Great Plains for purchase of the T1055 for $670,000 on 
September 30, 2002.  The T1055 was warranted against defects by the manufacturer for a 
period of one year or 1,000 operating hours.  Even though Uhlmann was not a member of 
Crush, he participated in the decision to purchase the terrain leveler.  Using the money 
loaned by the Uhlmann Company, Crush paid $600,000 to Great Plains on October 8.  
Prior to paying the remaining $70,000 on October 25, Crush members2 and Uhlmann met 
with Vermeer representatives at Vermeer’s headquarters, where they sought and received 
assurance that the T1055 would be repaired or redesigned to function as represented.  
 
In December 2002, Uhlmann took a 92.5 percent membership interest in Crush 
after the members of Crush executed an amended operating agreement, purportedly in 
consideration for the money Uhlmann personally had loaned to the company.  At the 
                                             
 
1 Uhlmann died August 21, 2009.  Patricia Werthan Uhlmann, executrix of Uhlmann’s 
will, was substituted as a party in this action November 17, 2009. 
2 A “member” is the holder of an ownership interest in a limited liability company. 
 
3
same time, Uhlmann formed Renaissance Leasing Company LLC (“Renaissance”), with 
himself as sole member, for the purpose of owning and leasing Crush’s mining 
equipment.  Soon afterward, the terrain leveler allegedly was transferred to Renaissance – 
as security for Uhlmann’s “investment” – and then leased back to Crush.  No records 
document the transfer.  The record on appeal is silent as to whether the written limited 
warranty also was transferred to Uhlmann.  Beginning in October 2002, Great Plains and 
Vermeer performed warranty repairs on the terrain leveler.  In January 2003, the machine 
was moved from the Phenix Quarry to a highway location, where it continued to be 
operated. 
By April 2003, Uhlmann had fired Jeff Hall, Gary Watts, and Terry Watts, three of 
the founding members of Crush.  He renamed the company Mo-Kan Rock & Gravel 
Company LLC (“Mo-Kan”).  Renaissance notified Mo-Kan in August 2003 that Mo-Kan 
had defaulted on its rental payments.  At the same time, Uhlmann formed TEAM 
Excavating LLC (“TEAM”) with himself as sole member.  In September 2003, he 
dissolved Mo-Kan and, as the only remaining member with a positive capital account 
balance, received distribution of the liquidation proceeds.  In June 2004 – nearly a year 
later – Uhlmann assigned Mo-Kan’s liquidation proceeds to TEAM by written 
agreement.  Also in June, TEAM executed a lease agreement with Renaissance for the 
same equipment that previously had been leased back to Crush/Mo-Kan.  Between 
September 2003 and June 2004, TEAM used the T1055 and other Renaissance-owned 
equipment without any kind of lease agreement in place.  At no time during this series of 
transfers and leases did any of the equipment physically change hands. 
 
4
A diagram summarizing the various business entities and transactions involved in 
the underlying lawsuit is included below: 
VERMEER 
(Manufacturer) 
GREAT PLAINS 
(Dealer/Seller) 
Crush 
(Buyer) 
The Uhlmann 
Company 
(Lender) 
RENAISSANCE 
(Lessor) 
(Formed Dec. 2002) 
TEAM 
(Lessee) 
(Formed Aug. 2003)
 
JOHN 
UHLMANN
Mo-Kan
Sale of T1055 – Oct. 2002 
Guarantee of 
loan to Crush
Express 
written 
warranty 
Loan to Crush – Oct. 2002
Transfer of 
T1055 – 
Dec. 2002 
92.5% Membership in 
Crush – Dec. 2002 
Lease of 
T1055 – 
Dec. 2002 
Renamed – 
April 2003 
Liquidation Proceeds 
– Sept. 2003 
Assignment of 
Liquidation Proceeds 
– June 2004 
Lease of T1055 
– June 2004 
Default – 
July 2003
 
 
5
In May 2005, Uhlmann, Renaissance, and TEAM filed suit against Vermeer and 
Great Plains in United States district court for damages associated with the purchase of 
the T1055.  They claimed that the defendants had engaged in misleading advertising in 
violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125, as well as fraud, negligent 
misrepresentation, and breach of warranty in violation of state law.  The federal court 
dismissed the Lanham Act claim on the merits and the state claims for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
In August 2006, the plaintiffs filed the underlying action in Jackson County circuit 
court, asserting claims of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of express and 
implied warranty, and breach of contract.  Vermeer and Great Plains moved separately 
for summary judgment on several grounds, including plaintiffs’ lack of standing.  The 
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Vermeer in June 2007 and in favor of 
Great Plains in September 2007.  This appeal followed. 
 
III. Standard of Review 
The standard of review when considering an appeal from summary judgment is 
essentially de novo.  ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply 
Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993).  Summary judgment is proper when there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law.  Larabee v. Eichler, 271 S.W.3d 542, 545 (Mo. banc 2008); Rule 
74.04(c)(6).  A defending party moving for summary judgment may establish a right to 
judgment by showing facts that negate any one of the claimant’s elements.  Fetick v. 
 
6
American Cyanamid Co., 38 S.W.3d 415, 418 (Mo. banc 2001).  If the moving party 
makes a prima facie showing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the non-
moving party then has a specific burden: “A denial may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of the party's pleading. Rather, the response shall support each 
denial with specific references to the discovery, exhibits or affidavits that demonstrate 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”  Rule 74.04(c)(2).  The court 
accords the non-moving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences in the record.  ITT, 
854 S.W.2d at 376.  An order of summary judgment may be affirmed under any theory 
that is supported by the record.  Burns v. Smith, 303 S.W.3d 505, 509 (Mo. banc 2010). 
 
IV. Analysis 
As a preliminary matter, the plaintiffs’ petition attempts to establish a collective 
identity for the separate business entities and individuals involved.  In an apparent effort 
to simplify the pleadings, the petition states that the term “TEAM” when used alone 
refers to Crush, Renaissance, and TEAM collectively.  By pleading this way, the 
plaintiffs conflate the interests of a non-party – Crush – with the separate interests of 
Renaissance and TEAM.  They create confusion about which party is alleging harm for 
each count and which party is entitled to relief on a particular theory.   
Separate entities rise and fall on their own claims.  Missouri law does not 
recognize a “collective” corporate identity, so each entity must plead and prove its claims 
individually to be entitled to relief.  Uhlmann’s position as sole or majority member of 
various companies does not equate to an identity of interests between them.  Each 
 
7
company is a distinct legal entity with the right to own property, sue and be sued, 
contract, and acquire and transfer property.  See §§ 347.061, 347.063, and 347.069, 
RSMo 2000.3  The mere identity of members or officers of two companies does not result 
in an identity of interests between the two companies.  See Blackwell Printing Co. v. 
Blackwell-Wielandy Co., 440 S.W.2d 433, 437 (Mo. 1969).  This Court will interpret 
strictly the allegations and interests of each individual entity without deference to claims 
of collective identity. 
The plaintiffs raise two substantive points on appeal.4  First, they argue that 
summary judgment for Vermeer and Great Plains on the warranty and contract claims 
was improper because (a) any warranty and contract claims belonging to the original 
purchaser of the T1055 were either transferred or assigned to Renaissance and TEAM 
and (b) disputed material facts show that Vermeer breached its express written warranty 
and Great Plains breached implied warranties of merchantability and fitness.  Second, 
they argue that summary judgment for Vermeer on the misrepresentation claims was 
improper because (a) Uhlmann was harmed directly by Vermeer’s misrepresentations to 
him as an individual, (b) TEAM was assigned any misrepresentation claims belonging to 
the original purchaser, and (c) material facts exist showing that Uhlmann and TEAM can 
establish each element of their fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims.   
 
 
                                             
 
3 All statutory references are to RSMo 2000, unless otherwise noted. 
4 Plaintiffs also raise a third point, which is rendered moot by disposition of the first two 
points but will be addressed at the end of the opinion. 
 
8
A.  BREACH OF WARRANTY AND CONTRACT CLAIMS 
1.  Breach of Express Warranty
After a two-month examination period at the Phenix Quarry, Crush purchased the 
T1055 from Vermeer’s dealer, Great Plains, in October 2002.  Vermeer issued a written 
limited warranty to the owner against defects in material and workmanship for one year 
or 1,000 operating hours.5  The warranty contained numerous terms, exclusions, and 
limitations.  It provided that, during the warranty period, Vermeer was obligated to repair 
or replace (at its option) any defect in material or workmanship.6  The warranty did not 
obligate Vermeer to repair or replace any defect if the defect was caused by “other than 
normal use.”  It disclaimed all implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a 
particular purpose. 7  The warranty also purported to limit Vermeer’s liability to the 
purchase price of the T1055 8 and to exclude liability for any incidental or consequential 
                                             
 
5 “Vermeer Mfg. Company (hereinafter ‘Vermeer’) warrants each new Industrial product 
of Vermeer’s manufacture to be free from defect in material and workmanship, under 
normal use and service for one (1) full year after initial purchase/retail sale or 1000 
operating hours, whichever occurs first.” 
6 “During the Limited Warranty period specified above, any defect in material or 
workmanship in any warranted item of Vermeer Industrial Equipment not excluded 
below shall be repaired or replaced at Vermeer’s option without charge by any authorized 
independent Vermeer dealer.” 
7 “EXCLUSIONS OF WARRANTIES:  EXCEPT FOR THE WARRANTIES 
EXPRESSLY AND SPECIFICALLY MADE HEREIN, VERMEER MAKES NO 
OTHER WARRANTIES, AND ANY POSSIBLE LIABILITY OF VERMEER 
HEREUNDER IS IN LIEU OF ALL OTHER WARRANTIES, EXPRESS, IMPLIED, 
OR STATUTORY, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY WARRANTIES OF 
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.” 
8 “In no event shall Vermeer’s liability exceed the purchase price of the product.” 
 
9
damages, including loss of profits and out-of-service time.9  The warranty did not 
specifically identify the warrantee, although Crush was specified as the “owner.”  While 
it imposed responsibility for proper maintenance and periodic inspections on the “retail 
purchaser,” the warranty did not state either that it extended to subsequent purchasers or 
that it was limited to the original retail purchaser.  Moreover, no term in the warranty 
forbade the assignment of rights or obligations by any party.  
The plaintiffs claim relief for breach of express warranty on two theories.  
Renaissance argues that it holds rights under the written warranty because Crush 
transferred the T1055 and assigned its warranty to Renaissance in December 2002.  
TEAM argues that it holds Crush’s claim for breach of express warranty because all of 
Crush’s assets, including any breach of warranty claims, were assigned to TEAM by 
Uhlmann upon the dissolution of Crush/Mo-Kan in June 2004.10  Neither of the 
plaintiffs’ theories fits within the typical “remote purchaser” breach-of-warranty scenario, 
in which an original purchaser attempts to sue the manufacturer of a good rather than the 
dealer who sold the good.  Instead, in this case, Renaissance is in the position of a 
subsequent or “second-hand” buyer from the original purchaser, while TEAM is simply 
the assignee of a contract right. 
 
                                             
 
9 “Vermeer shall not be liable to any person under any circumstances for any incidental 
or consequential damages (including but not limited to, loss of profits, out of service 
time) occurring for any reason at any time.” 
10 In their petition, the plaintiffs bring a breach of express warranty claim against Great 
Plains as well as Vermeer.  In their briefs, they concede that the written warranty is only 
between Crush and Vermeer – that is, between purchaser and manufacturer, not purchaser 
and dealer – and argue the express warranty claim only against manufacturer Vermeer. 
 
10
(A)  Renaissance’s Claim for Breach of Express Warranty 
Renaissance argues that it is entitled to relief for breach of an express warranty 
that the T1055 would be free from defects in material and workmanship under normal use 
for one year or 1,000 hours after purchase.  An express warranty is created by any 
“affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods 
and becomes part of the basis of the bargain . . . that the goods shall conform to the 
affirmation or promise.”  § 400.2-313.1(a).  Here, the affirmation of fact that created the 
express warranty was included in the written limited warranty given by Vermeer to 
Crush, the original purchaser.  To bring a breach of warranty claim, therefore, 
Renaissance must show that Vermeer’s limited warranty extended to a subsequent 
purchaser or transferee of the T1055, one who was neither a party to the original sales 
contract nor a signatory of the written warranty. 
The elements for a breach of express warranty claim are: (1) the defendant sold 
goods to the plaintiff; (2) the seller made a statement of fact about the kind or quality of 
those goods; (3) the statement of fact was a material factor inducing the buyer to 
purchase the goods; (4) the goods did not conform to that statement of fact; (5) the 
nonconformity injured the buyer; and (6) the buyer notified the seller of the 
nonconformity in a timely fashion.  Stefl v. Medtronic, Inc., 916 S.W.2d 879, 882-83 
(Mo. App. 1996); §§ 400.2-313.1(a) and 400.313.2.  In Vermeer’s motion for summary 
judgment, the company attempted to establish a right to judgment as a matter of law by 
showing that Renaissance could not produce enough evidence for the jury to find it 
suffered a cognizable injury – by showing, specifically, that Renaissance was not injured 
 
11
because there was no evidence it ever owned the T1055 and its warranty.11  To defeat 
summary judgment in favor of Vermeer, therefore, Renaissance must provide sufficient 
evidence for a jury to find the existence of Renaissance’s injury.  To prove injury for this 
claim, Renaissance must show that (1) Crush – the original purchaser of the T1055 – 
transferred the machine to Renaissance, (2) Crush assigned the written limited warranty 
to Renaissance, and (3) Renaissance suffered harm through Vermeer’s alleged breach.   
 
(1)  Transfer of the T1055 to Renaissance 
  The first issue is whether the evidence supports Crush’s transfer of the terrain 
leveler to Renaissance.  Missouri law requires minimal evidence to establish ownership, 
with the exception of certificate-of-title property and real property.  Hallmark v. Stillings, 
648 S.W.2d 230, 234 (Mo. App. 1983).  Written documentation is not required for an 
LLC transfer of non-titled property.  See id.  In fact, any competent evidence may be 
introduced to establish the fact of ownership of personal property.  State v. Curry, 473 
S.W.2d 747, 749 (Mo. 1971).  Here, there is no dispute that the T1055 is not certificate-
of-title property.  When determining ownership for personal property with no formal title, 
“oral evidence from a witness with knowledge concerning ownership of such chattels is 
competent … evidence of the fact of ownership.”  Hallmark, 648 S.W.2d at 234.  
Whether the disputed personal property is a piece of heavy mining equipment or a cow is 
immaterial, so long as it is non-titled personalty.   
                                             
 
11 Although the defendants address ownership of the terrain leveler to challenge the 
plaintiffs’ standing, the real issue underlying standing is whether the party bringing the 
case is able to prove that it is harmed.  If not, then it cannot prove the affirmative element 
of injury.  The analysis can be stated either way. 
 
12
Several pieces of evidence support ownership of the T1055 by Renaissance.  First, 
Uhlmann testified that the T1055 was transferred from Crush to Renaissance in 
December 2002 and that Renaissance owned the machine following that transfer.  
Because evidence shows that Uhlmann obtained a super-majority interest12 in Crush prior 
to the transfer and was sole member of Renaissance, his testimony constitutes competent 
evidence of the fact of ownership.  Second, William Venable, former vice president and 
chief financial officer of Crush, testified that although he could not recall a specific 
document transferring the equipment to Renaissance, “there’s a list – an inventory list of 
every asset that we could find that was purchased … at an auction or outright by the 
company [Crush] that was conveyed into Renaissance Leasing,” including the T1055.  
Venable also testified that Crush “put the – aggregated the assets that were – what I 
thought were secured by promissory notes to the company, and the title was conveyed to 
Renaissance Leasing as another arm to aggregate all the assets.”  Third, the master lease 
agreement between Renaissance and Crush supports Renaissance’s ownership of the 
T1055 – and Crush’s lack of ownership – following the transfer to Renaissance.  The 
lease, signed by Venable, lists the Vermeer machine in the schedule of equipment owned 
by Renaissance and leased to Crush.  Uhlmann testified that the purpose of the lease was 
to protect the T1055 from creditors and to capitalize the loan made to Crush.  Uhlmann, 
as a majority member of Crush and sole member of Renaissance, and Venable, as vice 
                                             
 
12 According to Crush’s operating agreement, a super-majority interest is attained when a 
member holds more than 66 2/3 percent of the interests held by all members.  Uhlmann 
allegedly was granted a 92.5 percent membership interest, which gave him a super-
majority interest in the company. 
 
13
president and CFO of Crush, are each “a witness with knowledge concerning ownership 
of such chattels.”  See Hallmark, 648 S.W.2d at 234.  This testimony constitutes 
competent evidence of the fact of ownership.  It is sufficient evidence to allow a jury to 
find that the terrain leveler was transferred to Renaissance. 
 
(2)  Assignment of the Limited Warranty to Renaissance 
If evidence supports Crush’s transfer of the T1055 to Renaissance, the second 
issue is whether Crush assigned the manufacturer’s limited warranty on the T1055 to 
Renaissance at the time of transfer.  Although Missouri case law has not specifically 
addressed the assignment of express warranties under these circumstances, the majority 
view is that an express warranty of fixed duration in a sale of personal property runs with 
the property on re-sale unless the warranty clearly limits coverage to the first purchaser.  
See, e.g., Dravo Equipment Co. v. German, 698 P.2d 63 (Or. App. 1985) (holding that 
ultimate buyers of a tractor could enforce an express warranty guaranteeing the tractor 
engine for 1,500 hours even though they were not in privity with original seller and the 
agreement was silent as to transferability of the warranty); Lidstrand v. Silvercrest 
Industries, 623 P.2d 710 (Wash. App. 1981) (holding that, where a mobile home’s one-
year express warranty did not state it was limited to the original owner, the person who 
bought the defective mobile home from the original owner was not barred by privity from 
suing the remote manufacturer for breach of express warranty); see also 1 B. Clark & C. 
Smith, The Law of Product Warranties § 10:12 (2d ed., 2002) (“If a seller of goods wants 
to limit the express warranty to the first purchaser as a matter of contract, so be it.  By 
 
14
contrast, if the warranty does not contain such a limit, it should be enforced in favor of a 
second buyer who takes within the time period stated therein.”).13    
In this case, Vermeer’s written warranty states that the warranty period is for one 
full year or 1,000 operating hours, whichever occurs first.  It is undisputed that the 
warranty would have been in effect at the time it purportedly was transferred to 
Renaissance in December 2002, three months after the purchase.  Moreover, no express 
terms in the written warranty either restrict its coverage to the original retail purchaser or 
prohibit its assignment to a subsequent purchaser.  In a sale of goods under the UCC, all 
of the buyer’s rights are assignable:  
Unless otherwise agreed all rights of either buyer or seller can be assigned except 
where the assignment would materially change the duty of the other party, or 
increase materially the burden or risk imposed on him by his contract, or impair 
materially his chance of obtaining return performance. 
 
§ 400.2-210.2.  Assuming that Vermeer’s duty and burden within that time period – to 
repair or replace the T1055 in case of a defect in material or workmanship – would not be 
materially changed or increased by assignment of the limited warranty to a new party 
using the machine for the same purpose, such an assignment is permissible.14     
                                             
 
13 The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, although it covers only consumer goods (tangible 
personal property normally used for personal, family, or household purposes), is also 
instructive.  It defines a “consumer” – the person who can bring suit against the 
manufacturer for violation of the warranty – to include not only the original retail buyer 
but also “any person to whom such product is transferred during the duration of an 
implied or written warranty … applicable to the product.”  15 U.S.C. § 2301(3) (1976) 
(emphasis added).  The act’s provision about consumer products sold under written 
warranty is in agreement with majority state law about the assignment of express 
warranties of fixed duration for non-titled personal property. 
14 “Section 2-210 favors free assignability of rights and delegation of duties except where 
the rights and duties of the contracting parties are significantly altered.” 1 J. White and R. 
 
15
While no document in the record clearly purports to assign the limited warranty on 
the T1055 from Crush to Renaissance, the lack of a formal assignment is not an absolute 
bar.  An express warranty that is not limited to the first purchaser may extend to later 
purchasers even in the absence of a formal assignment.  Collins Co., Ltd. v. Carboline 
Co., 864 F.2d 560 (7th Cir. [Ill.] 1989) (holding, in response to the Illinois Supreme 
Court decision in Collins Co., Ltd. v. Carboline Co., 532 N.E.2d 834 (Ill. 1988), that an 
express warranty on a roofing system extends to a subsequent purchaser of the building).  
Moreover, Missouri case law holds that no particular form of words is necessary to 
accomplish an assignment, so long as there appears from the circumstances an intention 
on the one side to assign and on the other side to receive.  Keisker v. Farmer, 90 S.W.3d 
71, 74 (Mo. banc 2002).  The evidence supports Crush’s intention to assign the warranty 
and Renaissance’s intention to receive it.  The purported transfer of the T1055 took place 
soon after Crush’s purchase.  Crush and Uhlmann had spoken with Vermeer about the 
machine’s possible defects.  The warranty covered its repair or replacement in case of 
defects.  A reasonable inference is that both assignor and assignee intended a potentially 
defective piece of equipment to remain covered by the warranty after its transfer to a new 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Summers, Uniform Commercial Code 278 (5th ed. 2002).  Of the states that have adopted 
this version of section 2-210, only Georgia and Alabama hold that an express warranty 
may not be assigned because it significantly alters the rights and duties of the contracting 
parties.  Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 519 F. Supp. 60, 73-
74 (S.D. Ga. 1981) (interpreting Georgia law holding that “any assignment of warranties 
materially changes the risks and burdens of the original seller under the terms of [§ 2-
210].”); Barre v. Gulf Shores Turf Supply, Inc., 547 So. 2d 503 (Ala. 1989) (holding that 
a resale buyer of equipment lacks privity to support an express warranty claim for 
economic loss in the absence of evidence that the dealer intended to extend the warranty 
to a resale purchaser). 
 
16
owner.  Moreover, Renaissance continued to behave as though the T1055 were covered 
by the warranty after the purported transfer by seeking warranty repairs, and Great Plains 
continued to perform repairs as stipulated in the warranty.  There is sufficient evidence to 
allow a jury to find that the warranty was assigned to Renaissance.     
 
(3)  Renaissance’s Injury 
Even if a jury finds that Crush transferred ownership of the machine to 
Renaissance and also assigned the warranty, Renaissance still must show evidence of 
injury suffered through Vermeer’s alleged breach.  Renaissance alleges that it was injured 
by the failure of the terrain leveler to function properly.  The leasing company attempts to 
show injury by citing Uhlmann’s testimony that he lost business when the T1055 was not 
in operation: 
I was getting disheartened about the fact that this machine was not working.  I was 
losing money.  They weren’t replacing it.  Every time I was starting to use it, it 
wasn’t doing what it said it would perform.  It wasn’t even close, kept breaking 
down repeatedly.  It broke down.  I had three customers, Emery Sapp, who is the 
largest construction people in the state, one of the largest people, Clarkson, which 
is the largest in Kansas City road construction, and a Mid-States Excavating, 
which is Al Swearingen.  Again, with our own property at 250 – at 40 and 291, we 
would start, it would break down. 
 
An injury to Uhlmann, however, is not the same as an injury to the company he created to 
protect Crush’s assets from creditors; Uhlmann as an individual or as a member of Crush 
is distinct from Renaissance as a business entity.  As stated above, the mere identity of 
members of two companies does not result in an identity of interest between the two 
entities.  See Blackwell Printing, 440 S.W.2d at 437.  Each company is a distinct legal 
entity with the right to own property, sue and be sued, contract, and acquire and transfer 
 
17
property.  See §§ 347.061 and 367.063.  Likewise, each entity must independently prove 
the elements of its claim and independently establish its own damages.  Uhlmann’s 
testimony that he himself was losing money is insufficient to show injury to Renaissance. 
The record contains other evidence of injury to Renaissance, however.  The sole 
business of Renaissance, as a leasing company, is to rent the equipment it owns; 
accordingly, the primary damages Renaissance could have suffered are a loss in rental 
income or a decrease in the rental value of the T1055.  There was testimony that, from 
the moment Renaissance allegedly obtained ownership of the T1055, it had continually 
leased the machine either to Crush, Mo-Kan, or TEAM.  The record also includes two 
lease agreements: one to Crush, dated January 1, 2003, by which Renaissance leased back 
to Crush the equipment listed in an addendum, all of which purportedly was transferred 
to Renaissance in December; and a second to TEAM, dated June 3, 2004, by which 
Renaissance leased certain unspecified items to TEAM.15  An item identified as 
“Vermeer” is listed in the addendum to the first lease, but no model or description is 
included.  A reasonable inference is that “Vermeer” refers to the T1055.  The addendum 
shows that Crush would owe no monthly rent for months one through six – that is, from 
January to June 2003 – on approximately fifty vehicles, tools, and pieces of heavy 
equipment, including presumably the T1055.  Starting in July 2003, Crush would owe a 
monthly rent of $44,143.09 until the thirty-third month.     
                                             
 
15 For the second lease, there is no attached schedule or addendum indicating what 
equipment was leased by TEAM. 
 
18
There is evidence that Renaissance lost rental income because Mo-Kan – the 
renamed Crush – defaulted on its lease payments.  First, Uhlmann testified that Mo-Kan 
was dissolved because it defaulted on its lease payments to Renaissance.  Second, a letter 
notifying Mo-Kan members of a meeting to dissolve the company – dated September 2, 
2003, about two months after the six-month rent-free period expired – specifies Mo-
Kan’s default as one reason for dissolution.  Third, the document dissolving Mo-Kan 
stipulates that the company defaulted under the lease.  And fourth, the agreement by 
which Uhlmann assigned Crush/Mo-Kan’s liquidation proceeds to TEAM indicates that 
Mo-Kan defaulted on its lease payments to Renaissance.  A reasonable inference is that 
Mo-Kan failed to make payments because the T1055 did not function as warranted.16   
The facts underlying the element of injury are, therefore, controverted.  On one 
hand, Renaissance has not shown that it lost business or business opportunities by being 
unable to rent the T1055.  Nor has the company shown that it ever received any rent from 
Crush or TEAM.  On the other hand, the record supports an inference that Renaissance 
lost rental income due to Mo-Kan’s failure to pay rent because of the malfunctioning 
terrain leveler.  Accordingly, Renaissance has provided sufficient evidence of injury.  
Summary judgment on Renaissance’s claim for breach of express warranty was improper. 
                                             
 
16 For strategic reasons, the parties have pleaded and briefed this case on a somewhat 
superficial basis.  This Court is required to affirm an order of summary judgment under 
any theory supported by the record.  This Court also is required to accord the non-moving 
party the benefit of all reasonable inferences in the record.  The effect of these sometimes 
competing requirements is most evident in this opinion’s analysis of the plaintiffs’ 
injuries.  The parties may wish to amend their pleadings and more specifically address 
certain claims, defenses, and evidence prior to trial.  There may well be issues open to 
summary judgment or other type of pre-trial disposition. 
 
19
(B)  TEAM’s Claim for Breach of Express Warranty 
 TEAM, like Renaissance, asserts a breach of express warranty claim against 
Vermeer.17  It contends that, upon dissolution of Crush/Mo-Kan, Uhlmann assigned to 
TEAM his rights to Crush’s breach of express warranty claims, thereby giving TEAM the 
right to assert such claims against Vermeer.  For this claim, as for Renaissance’s claim 
for breach of express warranty, only the element of injury was contested.  To defeat 
summary judgment, TEAM must show that (1) Uhlmann had authority to assign the 
warranty claims to TEAM, (2) a valid assignment of the claims to TEAM occurred, and 
(3) the original holder of the claims – Crush – suffered harm through Vermeer’s alleged 
breach. 
 
(1)  Uhlmann’s Authority to Assign Warranty Claims to TEAM  
The first issue is whether evidence supports Uhlmann’s authority to assign any 
warranty claims belonging to Crush.  The “Amended and Restated Operating Agreement” 
for Crush indicates that Uhlmann became a 92.5 percent Crush member in 2002.  The 
terms of the operating agreement permitted Uhlmann, as the holder of a super-majority 
interest, to dissolve Crush/Mo-Kan.  On September 18, 2003, the remaining members of 
Mo-Kan agreed to dissolve the company and adopted a dissolution plan by which 
liquidation proceeds were distributed to members according to their capital account 
balances.  Uhlmann was the only member with a positive capital account balance.  Under 
                                             
 
17 The parties do not raise, and this Court does not discuss, the issues of consistent/ 
inconsistent claims, election of claims or remedies, or duplicative recovery among the 
various party plaintiffs. 
 
20
the terms of the operating agreement, all liquidation proceeds – including any rights of 
action – were distributed to Uhlmann. 
However, Vermeer disputes Uhlmann’s authority to assign any claims associated 
with the T1055.  First, the manufacturer argues that Gary and Terry Watts never signed 
the amended and restated operating agreement, so that Uhlmann was never made a 
member of Crush.  Second, it contends that the Watts brothers did not sign the dissolution 
agreement for Mo-Kan, so that Uhlmann never was entitled to receive Mo-Kan’s 
liquidation proceeds.  Vermeer points to testimony from Gary Watts that his and his 
brother’s signatures were forged.  But there is contrary testimony verifying Gary Watts’ 
signature on proxy documents.  In addition, the Wattses’ signatures would be available 
on Crush’s initial operating agreement as exemplars.  The genuineness of a contested 
signature is an issue for the jury.  See International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Formento, 
593 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Mo. App. 1979); see also § 490.640 (“Comparison of a disputed 
writing with any writing proved to the satisfaction of the judge to be genuine shall be 
permitted to be made by witnesses, and such writings and the evidence of witnesses 
respecting the same may be submitted to the court and jury as evidence of the 
genuineness or otherwise of the writing in dispute.”).  Giving plaintiffs the benefit of all 
reasonable inferences, there is evidence to support Uhlmann’s contention that he had the 
authority to assign Crush’s warranty claims to TEAM. 
 
(2)  Assignment of Warranty Claims to TEAM   
The next inquiry is whether there was a valid assignment of Crush’s warranty 
claims to TEAM.  TEAM argues that it was assigned the right to damages belonging to 
 
21
Crush – as immediate purchaser and original party to the contract – after Uhlmann 
received the right as part of Crush’s liquidation proceeds.  The difference between 
TEAM’s and Renaissance’s breach of express warranty claims is that Renaissance 
purportedly was assigned the warranty itself, with a present right of recovery for an 
existing breach, whereas TEAM was assigned Crush’s action for breach of express 
warranty, which gives a present right of recovery for a past breach.  The present question, 
then, is whether a right to damages for breach of express warranty arising from the sale of 
personal property may be assigned to a party not in privity of contract. 
Section 2-210 of the Missouri UCC authorizes the assignment of a right to 
damages for contractual breach.  The section provides, in pertinent part, as follows: “A 
right to damages for breach of the whole contract or a right arising out of the assignor's 
due performance of his entire obligation can be assigned despite agreement otherwise.”  
§ 400.2-210.2 (emphasis added).  Although Missouri courts have not addressed 
specifically whether this right to damages for contractual breach contemplates express 
warranties, the case law in other jurisdictions is persuasive.  The Illinois Supreme Court, 
interpreting a version of UCC section 2-210 identical to Missouri’s, has held that where 
warranty claims have been formally assigned to a successor buyer, an express warranty 
that is not limited to the first purchaser gives an assignee the right to sue for purely 
economic loss and consequential damages, even though original vertical privity is absent.  
Collins, 532 N.E.2d at 843.  In Collins, the original purchaser of a commercial warehouse 
received an express warranty from the roofing manufacturer against leakage for ten years.  
When the warehouse was sold to a subsequent purchaser within the warranty period, the 
 
22
owner formally assigned to the purchaser any rights and causes of action under the 
manufacturer’s warranty.  Id. at 835-36.  Here, as in Collins, there was a document 
assigning to TEAM any rights of action belonging to Crush, although the document did 
not specifically mention Vermeer’s limited warranty.  On June 3, 2004, Uhlmann, Mo-
Kan, and TEAM entered into an agreement by which Uhlmann assigned to TEAM all of 
his rights and interests in Crush/Mo-Kan’s liquidation proceeds.  Nothing in the written 
warranty prohibited assignment of the warranty claim.  Under section 400.2-210.2, 
assignments are encouraged unless the parties expressly provide otherwise.  See 1 Clark 
& Smith, The Law of Product Warranties § 10-12.  Giving TEAM the benefit of all 
reasonable inferences, the evidence is sufficient for a jury to find a valid assignment of 
Crush’s warranty claims to TEAM. 
 
(3)  TEAM’s Injury 
TEAM contends that it was assigned Crush’s – the original purchaser’s – claim for 
breach of express warranty.  The only rights or interests an assignee acquires are those 
the assignor had at the time the assignment was made.  Barker v. Danner, 903 S.W.2d 
950, 955 (Mo. App. 1995).  Because an assignee merely steps into the shoes of the 
assignor, an assignee must allege facts showing that the assignor would be entitled to 
relief.  Louisiana Farmers’ Protective Union v. Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co. of 
America, Inc., 131 F.2d 419, 423 (8th Cir. 1942); see also Adams v. Cossa, 294 S.W.3d 
101, 105 (Mo. App. 2009) (“An assignee steps into the shoes of its assignor; it acquires 
no greater rights than those held by the assignor at the time of the assignment.”).  
According to the plaintiffs, Renaissance owned the T1055 and was assigned the warranty 
 
23
on it.  TEAM never owned the T1055 but later was assigned Crush’s right of action for 
breach of express warranty.  Therefore, Renaissance must plead and prove that it suffered 
harm due to Vermeer’s breach.  TEAM, on the other hand, must plead and prove that 
Crush suffered harm due to Vermeer’s breach.  TEAM fails to do so. 
In its petition, TEAM alleges that its actual damages include lost business, lost 
business opportunities, lost profits, and expenses.  It does not plead or attempt to prove 
any injury to Crush.  Instead, it merely cites Uhlmann’s testimony about how he was 
injured.  As stated in the previous section, each entity must independently prove the 
elements of its claim and independently establish its own damages.  Uhlmann’s testimony 
that he himself was losing money is insufficient to show injury to Crush.  TEAM fails to 
show the harm Crush suffered as a result of the T1055’s alleged failure to function as 
warranted.18  Summary judgment in favor of Vermeer on TEAM’s breach of express 
warranty claim is proper.19
 
2.  Breach of Implied Warranties
In addition to their breach of express warranty claims against the manufacturer, 
Renaissance and TEAM bring breach of implied warranty claims against the dealer.20  
                                             
 
18 The difference between Renaissance’s and TEAM’s alleged injuries is that the record 
contains specific evidence of Mo-Kan defaulting on its rent payments to Renaissance.  It 
does not contain sufficient evidence to justify a reasonable inference that Crush was 
injured by the nonconforming good. 
19 TEAM could have asserted the breach of warranty claims afforded to it as a lessee 
under article 2A of the UCC but failed to allege any claims against lessor Renaissance. 
20 In their petition, the plaintiffs bring breach of implied warranty claims against Vermeer 
as well as Great Plains.  They concede in their briefs, however, that the written warranty 
 
24
They argue that Great Plains breached the implied warranties of merchantability and 
fitness for a particular purpose because the T1055 was fit neither for its ordinary purpose 
of terrain leveling nor for its particular purpose of rock excavation in a limestone quarry.  
Even though neither plaintiff was a party to the sales contract with Great Plains, they 
contend they are entitled to relief for the implied warranty claims under the same theories 
that would allow them to recover for the express warranty claims – namely, that Crush 
either transferred the T1055 and its warranty to Renaissance or later distributed its 
warranty claims to Uhlmann, who then assigned them to TEAM. 
(A)  Renaissance’s Claims for Breach of Implied Warranty 
Renaissance was not in privity with Great Plains – which sold the T1055 to Crush 
– but attempts to bring suit under the proposition that implied warranties extend to remote 
purchasers.  Under Missouri law, a remote purchaser may bring suit against the 
manufacturer for breach of implied warranties.  See Collegiate Enterprises, Inc. v. Otis 
Elevator Co., 650 F. Supp. 116, 118 (E.D. Mo. 1986); Morrow v. Caloric Appliance 
Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41, 55 (Mo. banc 1963); Ragland Mills, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 
763 S.W.2d 357, 360 (Mo. App. 1989); Groppel Co., Inc. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 616 
S.W.2d 49, 58 (Mo. App. 1981).  However, Missouri law does not permit a subsequent or 
second-hand purchaser to sue the seller in the original sale – to which the subsequent 
purchaser was not a party – for breach of implied warranty.   
                                                                                                                                                 
 
between Crush and Vermeer expressly disclaims all warranties of merchantability and 
fitness, and then they argue the implied warranty claims only against Great Plains. 
 
25
An implied warranty arises by operation of law and must be applied in a 
reasonable sense.  Horner v. David Distributing Co., 599 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Mo. App. 
1980).  Warranties are implied for each transaction according to the presumed intention 
of the parties.  Id. at 102.  In this case, it could only be implied that Great Plains would 
warrant the T1055 to be fit for its ordinary or particular purpose at the time of its sale to 
Crush.  The dealer would be incapable of warranting its fitness at the time of its 
subsequent sale to an unrelated party not in existence when Great Plains executed the 
sales contract with Crush.  It would be unreasonable to imply a warranty under this 
scenario.  Any claim that Renaissance has for breach of implied warranty would be 
against Crush, the immediate party from which it purchased or received the T1055, not 
against Great Plains.  See Worthey v. Specialty Foam Products, Inc., 591 S.W.2d 145, 
148 (Mo. App. 1979) (a claim for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability may 
be brought against the seller of a used truck).  The company’s implied warranty claims 
against Great Plains fail as a matter of law.  
(B)  TEAM’s Claims for Breach of Implied Warranty 
 
In its implied warranty claim, TEAM does not encounter the same privity problem 
as Renaissance because it seeks recovery against Great Plains on the theory that it was 
assigned Crush’s right of recovery for breach of implied warranty.  When the plaintiff has 
been assigned the warranty claims of a buyer who is in privity with the seller, an action 
for recovery of economic loss based on breach of implied warranty is not barred by lack 
of vertical privity.  See, e.g., Ashley Square, Ltd. v. Contractors Supply of Orlando, Inc., 
532 So.2d 710, 711 n.1 (Fla. App. 1988).  Crush was in privity with Great Plains, the 
 
26
seller.  As discussed above, the evidence is sufficient for a jury to find a valid assignment 
of Crush’s warranty claims to TEAM.  TEAM may bring implied warranty claims under 
the same theory of assignment discussed in the section on express warranties. 
Section 2-314 of the UCC creates an implied warranty of merchantability, which 
warrants that goods must be at least “fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods 
are used.”  § 400.2-314.2(c).  Section 2-315 creates an implied warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose, which applies “[w]here the seller at the time of contracting has reason 
to know of any particular purpose for which the goods are required and … the buyer is 
relying on the seller’s skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods.”  § 400.2-315.  
To recover for breach of either of these implied warranties, a plaintiff must prove that the 
buyer was injured by the defective nature of the goods.  Ragland Mills, 763 S.W.2d at 
360.  Here, Crush was the immediate buyer and TEAM the alleged assignee.  Because an 
assignee merely steps into the shoes of the assignor, TEAM must allege facts showing 
that Crush would have been entitled to relief.  Louisiana Farmers’ Protective Union, 131 
F.2d at 423.  As in its express warranty argument, TEAM fails either to plead or to prove 
that Crush was injured by the defective nature of the terrain leveler.  Summary judgment 
for Great Plains was proper on the implied warranty claims of both plaintiffs. 
 
3.  Breach of Contract
Renaissance and TEAM also assert that they are able to collect against Great 
Plains on a breach of contract theory.  The alleged breach of contract was premised on 
the claim that the T1055 was expected to “accomplish terrain leveling” but “would not 
 
27
perform these tasks.”  The plaintiffs assert that the breach of contract claim was owned 
by Crush – as the retail purchaser – and was transferred either to Renaissance when the 
machine was conveyed or to TEAM when Crush/Mo-Kan was dissolved and the 
liquidation assets were distributed to Uhlmann, who then transferred them to TEAM. 
Under Missouri law, remedies for economic loss sustained by reason of damage to 
or defects in products sold are limited to those under the warranty provisions of the UCC.  
Wilbur Waggoner Equipment & Excavating Co. v. Clark Equipment Co., 668 S.W.2d 
601, 602 (Mo. App. 1984).  The UCC recognizes that breach of contract and breach of 
warranty are not the same cause of action.  The remedies for breach of contract are set 
forth in section 2-711 and are available to a buyer “[w]here the seller fails to make 
delivery or repudiates or the buyer rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance.”   
§ 400.2-711.1.  The remedies for breach of warranty are set forth in section 2-714 and are 
available to a buyer who has finally accepted goods, but discovers that the goods are 
defective in some manner.  § 400.2-714; see also 1 White & Summers, UCC 702-3 (“We 
believe that only buyers who have accepted and neither rightfully rejected nor effectively 
revoked can use 2-714.”).  Here, the plaintiffs do not assert that Great Plains failed to 
make delivery or repudiated or that Crush rightfully rejected or justifiably revoked 
acceptance.  There is no dispute that Crush accepted delivery of the T1055 and notified 
Great Plains about the machine’s inability to perform terrain leveling adequately.  
Accordingly, Renaissance and TEAM cannot recover under section 400.2-711 for breach 
 
28
of contract.21  Their contract claims are subsumed by their breach of warranty claims for 
damages under section 400.2-714, which already have been addressed above.  Plaintiffs’ 
breach of contract claims fail as a matter of law.   
 
B.  FRAUD AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION CLAIMS 
In their second point relied on, Uhlmann and TEAM argue that summary 
judgment for Vermeer on the fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation claims was 
improper because (a) Uhlmann was harmed directly by Vermeer’s misrepresentations to 
him individually, (b) TEAM was assigned any misrepresentation claims belonging to the 
original purchaser, and (c) material facts exist showing that Uhlmann and TEAM can 
establish each element of their fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation claims.   
Those claims are based on two representations allegedly made by Vermeer to 
Crush and Uhlmann.  As stated in the plaintiffs’ petition, the first representation occurred 
when Vermeer – prior to Crush’s purchase of the T1055 and in order to induce the 
purchase – allegedly told Crush and Uhlmann that the T1055 would perform terrain 
leveling and surface mining.  The second representation occurred when Vermeer, after 
the purchase, allegedly told Crush and Uhlmann that the machine could be repaired or 
fixed so that it could perform terrain leveling as represented prior to sale and as 
represented in the advertising.  Because the two representations giving rise to both the 
                                             
 
21 The United States Supreme Court has noted the distinction between a breach of 
warranty and breach of contract claim: “[A] claim of a nonworking product can be 
brought as a breach-of-warranty action.  Or, if the customer prefers, it can reject the 
product or revoke its acceptance and sue for breach of contract.”  East River Steamship 
Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 872 (1986). 
 
29
fraud and the negligent misrepresentation claims are separate and distinct, each 
representation will be discussed in turn. 
1.  Fraud
The elements of fraudulent misrepresentation are: (1) a representation; (2) its 
falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker’s knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its 
truth; (5) the speaker’s intent that it should be acted on by the person in the manner 
reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearer’s ignorance of the falsity of the representation; 
(7) the hearer’s reliance on the representation being true; (8) the hearer’s right to rely 
thereon; and (9) the hearer’s consequent and proximately caused injury.  Larabee, 271 
S.W.3d at 546.  A plaintiff’s failure to establish any one of the essential elements of fraud 
is fatal to recovery.  Verni v. Cleveland Chiropractic College, 212 S.W.3d 150, 154 (Mo. 
banc 2007).  Because the reliance element is dispositive for the first representation and 
the falsity element is dispositive for the second representation, only those elements will 
be discussed. 
  
(A)  Uhlmann’s Claim for Fraud against Vermeer 
(1)  First Representation
The first representation alleged is that the T1055 would perform terrain leveling 
and surface mining.  For this representation, the reliance element is dispositive.  
Generally, whether a party has justifiably relied on a misrepresentation is an issue of fact 
for the jury to decide.  Monsanto Chemical Works v. American Zinc, Lead & Smelting 
Co., 253 S.W. 1006, 1010 (Mo. 1923).  Vermeer attempts to show that Uhlmann did not 
rely on Vermeer’s statements because he decided that Crush should purchase the T1055 
 
30
on the recommendation of Crush’s president and not on any representations by Vermeer.  
The manufacturer points to Uhlmann’s deposition testimony that, prior to the purchase of 
the terrain leveler, he did not personally have any discussions with representatives of 
either Vermeer or Great Plains.  There is evidence that he viewed a “Monster Machines” 
video produced and broadcast by The Learning Channel, not by Vermeer, and that the 
video Uhlmann viewed was copied by Jeff Hall directly from The Learning Channel.  
Moreover, there is evidence that the show was not broadcast until November 2002, after 
Crush’s purchase of the terrain leveler.  Vermeer also points to testimony that Uhlmann 
did not obtain any written promotional materials that might have constituted 
misrepresentations until after the T1055 had been purchased. 
This evidence is disputed by Uhlmann, who points to testimony that he relied on 
the truth of Vermeer’s representations before deciding to make or guarantee loans for the 
purchase of the T1055.  He testified that he saw a promotional video produced by 
Vermeer prior to the purchase date.  He testified that, while he decided to purchase the 
T1055 on the recommendation of Crush’s president, Jeff Hall, that recommendation was 
not the sole basis for his decision.  Uhlmann also stated that he picked up promotional 
materials when he visited Vermeer headquarters in October, prior to completion of the 
purchase.  This evidence shows a genuine dispute of a material fact on the reliance issue.   
Despite the general rule that reliance is a fact issue for the jury, a party who 
undertakes an independent investigation does not have the right to rely on the 
misrepresentations of another.  Brown v. Bennett, 136 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Mo. App. 2004).  
Vermeer asserts that – as a matter of law – Crush and Uhlmann waived their right to rely 
 
31
on Vermeer’s representations in deciding to purchase the machine because Crush 
conducted its own evaluation of the machine during the two-month demonstration period 
at the quarry.  Vermeer is correct.  Although there are three exceptions to the 
investigation rule, none of the exceptions applies.  The three exceptions are: (1) the 
investigating party makes only a partial investigation and relies on both the results of the 
inspection and the misrepresentation; (2) the buyer lacks equal footing for learning the 
truth, and the facts are not easily ascertainable but are peculiarly within the knowledge of 
the seller; and (3) the seller makes a specific and distinct misrepresentation.  Id.  First, 
Uhlmann and Crush made a full examination because they discovered the defect in the 
machine’s ability to excavate hard limestone prior to purchase.  Second, the fact that the 
machine experienced problems with surface mining was easily ascertainable.  Third, the 
plaintiffs do not allege that Vermeer made a specific misrepresentation distinct from the 
one at issue.  Because none of the three exceptions applies, as a matter of law Uhlmann 
cannot show that he relied on the truth of the first representation prior to purchase. 
(2) Second Representation 
The second representation alleged is that the terrain leveler could be repaired or 
fixed so that it could perform terrain leveling as represented prior to sale and as 
represented in the advertising.  For this representation, the falsity element is dispositive.  
The truth or falsity of representations for purposes of a fraud claim is judged “in the light 
of the meaning which the plaintiffs would reasonably attach to them in existing 
circumstances and the words employed must be considered against the background and in 
the context in which they were used.”  Haberstick v. Gordon A. Gundaker Real Estate 
 
32
Co., 921 S.W.2d 104, 109 (Mo. App. 1996).  Uhlmann argues that the second 
representation was false because the T1055 could not be repaired or redesigned so that it 
would cut and excavate hard rock.  “The truth or falsity of the representation must be 
determined as of the time it was made and as of the time it was intended to be, and was, 
relied upon and acted upon.”  Powers v. Shore, 248 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Mo. banc 1952).  
Vermeer’s alleged statement that it would repair or redesign the machine is a statement of 
intent.  When a fraud claim is based on a statement of intent, the plaintiff establishes 
falsity by showing that when the statement was made, the speaker did not intend to 
perform consistently with the statement.  Jacobs Mfg. Co. v. Sam Brown Co., 19 F.3d 
1259, 1263-64 (8th Cir. [Mo.] 1994).  Absent such an inconsistent intent, there is no 
misrepresentation of fact or state of mind but only a breach of promise or failure to 
perform.  Paul v. Farmland Industries, Inc., 37 F.3d 1274 (8th Cir. [Mo.] 1994).   
Numerous work order invoices and warranty claim forms document Vermeer’s 
attempts to perform consistently with this statement.  The fact that Vermeer continuously 
attempted to fix the terrain leveler over the course of the warranty period undermines the 
allegation that the manufacturer did not intend to repair or redesign the machine to 
function as advertised.  Uhlmann presents no facts or circumstances that, if believed, 
would allow a jury to find that Vermeer knew its representations were false when made.  
Uhlmann’s evidence speaks only to whether the T1055 actually was repaired or 
redesigned to cut hard rock, not – as it should have – to whether Vermeer intended to fix 
the machine at the time the representation was made.  Giving Uhlmann the benefit of all 
reasonable inferences, there is insufficient evidence for a jury to find that Vermeer’s 
 
33
alleged representation about repairing the T1055 was false when it was made.  The 
failure of performance does not establish intent.  Paul, 37 F.3d at 1277 (“It is not enough 
that for any reason, good or bad, the speaker changes his mind and fails or refuses to 
carry his expressed intention into effect.”).  Because Uhlmann failed to produce any 
evidence that Vermeer did not intend to perform consistently with its statement, there is 
no genuine issue for trial regarding the second representation.   
Uhlmann has failed to establish one of the essential elements of fraud for each of 
the alleged misrepresentations, which is fatal to recovery for a fraud claim based on 
either one.  See Verni, 212 S.W.3d at 154.  Summary judgment for Vermeer on 
Uhlmann’s fraud claim was proper. 
(B)  TEAM’s Claim for Fraud against Vermeer 
 
TEAM argues that any fraud claims capable of being asserted by Crush were 
distributed to Uhlmann upon the dissolution of Crush/Mo-Kan and then assigned by 
Uhlmann to TEAM.  An action for fraud and deceit is assignable when the injury affects 
the estate or arises out of contract.  Gremminger v. Missouri Labor & Indus. Relations 
Comm’n, 129 S.W.3d 399, 403 (Mo. App. 2004).   
The analysis for TEAM’s fraud claim is the same as the analysis for Uhlmann’s 
because any alleged misrepresentations were made simultaneously to Crush and to 
Uhlmann.  For the first representation, the reliance element is dispositive because, as a 
matter of law, TEAM cannot show that Crush relied on its truth prior to purchase.  For 
the second representation, the falsity element is dispositive because TEAM failed to 
produce any evidence that Vermeer did not intend to perform consistently with its 
 
34
statement.  TEAM, like Uhlmann, has failed to establish one of the essential elements of 
fraud for each of the alleged misrepresentations.  Its fraud claim fails.  Summary 
judgment for Vermeer on TEAM’s fraud claim was proper. 
 
2.  Negligent Misrepresentation
Uhlmann and TEAM base their negligent misrepresentation claims on the same 
two representations that gave rise to their fraud claims.  The elements of negligent 
misrepresentation are: (1) the speaker supplied information in the course of his business; 
(2) because of the speaker’s failure to exercise reasonable care, the information was false; 
(3) the information was intentionally provided by the speaker for the guidance of limited 
persons in a particular business transaction; (4) the hearer justifiably relied on the 
information; and (5) due to the hearer’s reliance on the information, the hearer suffered a 
pecuniary loss.  Dancin Development, L.L.C. v. NRT Missouri, Inc., 291 S.W.3d 739, 744 
(Mo. App. 2009).  A party must prove every element of a claim for negligent 
misrepresentation for the claim to succeed.  Id.   
(A) Uhlmann’s Negligent Misrepresentation Claim against Vermeer 
 
 
(1) First Representation 
 
For the representation that the T1055 could perform terrain leveling and surface 
mining, the analysis is the same as for Uhlmann’s fraud claim.  Because the plaintiffs 
undertook an independent investigation and no exceptions apply, Uhlmann cannot satisfy 
the element of reliance as a matter of law. 
 
 
 
35
(2) Second Representation
Vermeer challenges three elements of the negligent misrepresentation claim based 
on its statement that the T1055 could be repaired or redesigned to perform terrain 
leveling: falsity, particular business transaction, and reliance.  A claim for negligent 
misrepresentation, unlike one for fraud, does not involve a question of intent.  Rather, 
such a claim is premised on the theory that the speaker believed the information supplied 
was correct but was negligent in so believing.  Colgan v. Washington Realty Co., 879 
S.W.2d 686, 689 (Mo. App. 1994).  To establish falsity, Uhlmann must show that the 
statement that the T1055 could be repaired or redesigned to perform terrain leveling was 
false because of Vermeer’s failure to use reasonable care. 22  The fact that the terrain 
leveler was not successfully repaired or redesigned is amply documented by the work 
order invoices and warranty claim forms over the course of the warranty period.  In 
addition, the plaintiffs’ engineering expert testified that the machine was defective 
because it was subject to excessive vibration and permanent deformation when used to 
cut hard rock.  He testified that 44 percent of all Vermeer terrain levelers were 
discontinued or “scrapped out,” while the norm for off-highway vehicles is 0.5 percent 
per year.  The expert concluded that Vermeer failed to conduct adequate testing on the 
design of the T1055 prior to selling it.  This evidence, if believed, is sufficient to show 
                                             
 
22 The falsity element of fraud relates to a speaker’s reckless disregard of the truth or 
falsity of the statement as opposed to a speaker’s negligent failure to exercise reasonable 
care or competence to ensure that truthful information is being relayed. See Huttegger v. 
Davis, 599 S.W.2d 506, 514 (Mo. banc 1980) (Welliver, J., dissenting). 
 
36
that the statement that the T1055 could be repaired or redesigned to perform terrain 
leveling was false because of Vermeer’s negligence. 
As to the second challenged element, Vermeer argues that it did not provide 
information for plaintiffs’ guidance because the only business transaction in which it was 
involved related to its sale of the T1055 to its distributor Great Plains and that this 
transaction was completed prior to any alleged misrepresentations.  However, privity is 
not required to establish a negligent misrepresentation claim.  Miller v. Big River 
Concrete, LLC, 14 S.W.3d 129, 134 (Mo. App. 2000).  Rather, the plaintiffs must 
establish that they were part of a limited group for whose guidance the information was 
provided.  Id.  Here, Crush and Uhlmann were part of the limited group considering 
whether to purchase the T1055.  There is evidence that Uhlmann and members of Crush 
met not only with Great Plains salespeople but also with Vermeer representatives 
regarding the sale of the T1055, both before the sales contract was executed and before 
the final payment was made.  The sale of the terrain leveler constitutes a “particular 
business transaction.”  Moreover, there is evidence to support a finding that Vermeer 
knew Uhlmann and Crush were relying on their representations, including those made at 
Vermeer headquarters before the final payment for the T1055, and could foresee the harm 
to them if the statements were inaccurate.  Privity is not necessary under these 
circumstances.  The evidence is sufficient to show that Vermeer made representations to 
Uhlmann and Crush about the capabilities of the T1055 in the context of the “particular 
business transaction” of the machine’s sale, even if the sales order was executed with 
Great Plains alone.   
 
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Uhlmann also must establish his reliance on Vermeer’s statement that the T1055 
could be repaired or redesigned.  Uhlmann’s testimony that the final payment of $70,000 
was conditioned on this statement shows a genuine issue of material fact for this element.  
Moreover, as a matter of law, Uhlmann and Crush did not waive their right to rely on 
Vermeer’s second representation by observing the T1055 during the demonstration 
period.  The first two exceptions to the inspection rule apply.  First, there is sufficient 
evidence for a jury to conclude that the demonstration in the quarry was only a partial 
inspection because it failed to reveal conclusively whether the terrain leveler could be 
repaired or redesigned to perform terrain leveling.  Second, there is sufficient evidence 
for a jury to conclude that Uhlmann and Crush lacked equal footing for learning the truth 
of whether the terrain leveler could be repaired or redesigned to perform terrain leveling 
because this fact was not easily ascertainable and was peculiarly within the knowledge of 
the machine’s manufacturer, a company that specialized in heavy mining and rock-
cutting equipment.  A genuine dispute exists about whether Uhlmann relied on the truth 
of Vermeer’s second representation. 
Uhlmann has provided sufficient evidence to establish each of the challenged 
elements for his negligent misrepresentation claim.  Summary judgment for Vermeer on 
this claim was improper.   
(B) TEAM’s Negligent Misrepresentation Claim against Vermeer 
 
As with its warranty claims, TEAM fails either to plead or to prove that Crush was 
injured due to its reliance on Vermeer’s second representation.  Accordingly, it is unable 
 
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to establish all of the essential elements of negligent misrepresentation.  Vermeer is 
entitled to summary judgment on TEAM’s claim.   
 
C.  EXCESSIVE COSTS 
In their third point relied on, the plaintiffs dispute the trial court’s grant of 
excessive costs to the defendants under Rule 57.03(c)(6).  Because the case is remanded, 
there is no final grant of costs.  
 
V. Conclusion 
The grant of summary judgment in favor of Vermeer on Renaissance’s breach of 
express warranty claim is reversed, as is the grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Vermeer on Uhlmann’s negligent misrepresentation claim.  The judgment with respect to 
costs is vacated.  In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.  The case is remanded. 
 
_________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WILLIAM RAY PRICE, JR., CHIEF JUSTICE 
 
 
All concur. 
 
 
 
 
 
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