Title: Landrum v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC15-1071 
____________ 
 
LAISHA L. LANDRUM,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[June 9, 2016] 
 
PARIENTE, J. 
Laisha L. Landrum was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of 
parole for a second-degree murder she committed when she was sixteen years old.  
Landrum v. State, 163 So. 3d 1261 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015).  The Second District 
Court of Appeal affirmed the sentence but expressed concerns about the 
constitutionality of Landrum’s sentence and certified a question of great public 
importance,1 which we rephrase as follows:  
                                          
 
 1.  The following question was certified by the Second District:  
 
BECAUSE THERE IS NO PAROLE FROM A LIFE SENTENCE IN 
FLORIDA, DOES MILLER V. ALABAMA, 132 S. CT. 2455 (2012), 
REQUIRE THE APPLICATION OF THE PROCEDURES 
 
 
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DOES A NON-MANDATORY LIFE SENTENCE WITHOUT 
PAROLE IMPOSED FOR SECOND-DEGREE MURDER 
VIOLATE THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT PURSUANT TO 
MILLER V. ALABAMA, 132 S. CT. 2455 (2012), AS A RESULT 
OF A SENTENCING SCHEME THAT DID NOT REQUIRE THE 
TRIAL COURT TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE 
INDIVIDUALIZED SENTENCING CONSIDERATIONS OF A 
JUVENILE OFFENDER’S YOUTH? 
 
We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.   
We answer the rephrased certified question in the affirmative, and hold that 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller applies to juvenile offenders whose 
sentences of life imprisonment without parole were imposed pursuant to a 
discretionary sentencing scheme when the sentencing court, in exercising that 
discretion, was not required to, and did not take “into account how children are 
different and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to 
a lifetime in prison.”  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.  
Even in a discretionary sentencing scheme, the sentencing court’s exercise 
of discretion before imposing a life sentence must be informed by consideration of 
the juvenile offender’s “youth and its attendant circumstances” as articulated in 
                                          
 
OUTLINED IN SECTIONS 775.082, 921.1401, AND 921.1402 
FLORIDA STATUTES (2014), TO JUVENILES CONVICTED OF 
SECOND-DEGREE MURDER AND SENTENCED TO A NON-
MANDATORY SENTENCE OF LIFE IN PRISON BEFORE THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF CHAPTER 2014-220, LAWS OF FLORIDA? 
 
Landrum, 163 So. 3d at 1263-64.  
 
 
 
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Miller and now codified in section 921.1401, Florida Statutes (2014).  See Horsley 
v. State, 160 So. 3d 393, 399 (Fla. 2015).  The sentencing court’s discretion must 
be guided by two overarching principles set forth in Miller and reaffirmed by 
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016):  The requirement that sentencing 
courts give due weight to evidence that Miller deemed constitutionally significant 
before determining that the most severe punishment possible for juvenile offenders 
is appropriate; and that under Miller, sentencing juvenile offenders to life 
imprisonment must be “rare” and “uncommon.”  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.   
Because the trial court was not required to, and did not take into account, the 
Miller factors, Landrum’s life sentence without parole is unconstitutional under the 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of the 
Florida Constitution because it is “cruel and unusual” as explained by the United 
States Supreme Court.  Our conclusion that Landrum’s sentence is unconstitutional 
is also compelled by the “precept of justice that punishment for crime should be 
graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.”  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 
(2010) (internal quotation omitted).  Upholding Landrum’s sentence would violate 
this precept, as a juvenile convicted of the lesser offense of second-degree murder 
would receive a harsher sentence than a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder.  
Just as we previously determined that Rebecca Lee Falcon, a fifteen year old 
convicted of first-degree murder, must be resentenced under the new legislative 
 
 
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sentencing scheme, see Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954 (Fla. 2015), Laisha 
Landrum, a sixteen year old convicted of the lesser offense of second-degree 
murder, must also be resentenced and given opportunity for judicial review of that 
sentence at the statutorily mandated period of twenty-five years.  See § 
921.1402(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2014).   
  We therefore quash the Second District’s decision and remand this case for 
resentencing in conformance with sections 775.082, 921.1401, and 921.1402 of the 
Florida Statutes, and disapprove Lightsey v. State, 182 So. 3d 727 (Fla. 3d DCA 
2015), Kendrick v. State, 171 So. 3d 778 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015), Lindsey v. State, 
168 So. 3d 267 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015), Lane v. State, 151 So. 3d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 
2014), Mason v. State, 134 So. 3d 499 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), and Starks v. State, 
128 So. 3d 91 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013), to the extent that they are inconsistent with this 
opinion. 
FACTS AND BACKGROUND 
Petitioner Laisha L. Landrum was sixteen years old when, in June 2004, 
Landrum and her sixteen-year-old boyfriend, Rocky Almestica, Jr., murdered 
Emily Clemmons.2  The sparse record before us does not reveal who was the more 
culpable teenage defendant.  Apparently, the motive for the killing was rooted in 
                                          
 
 
2.  Prior to Landrum’s trial, Almestica was separately tried and convicted of 
second-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison.   
 
 
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jealousy: Clemmons was Almestica’s ex-girlfriend and was competing with 
Landrum for his affection.  At the time, Landrum had a daughter whose biological 
father was co-perpetrator Almestica.  
Landrum was convicted of second-degree murder with a weapon in violation 
of sections 782.04(2) and 775.087(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2004), after the trial 
court granted a judgment of acquittal on the first-degree murder count.  Landrum, 
163 So. 3d at 1261-62.  The second-degree murder conviction was classified as a 
life felony because Landrum used a weapon during the crime.  § 775.087(1)(a), 
Fla. Stat. (2004).  Because Landrum was convicted of a life felony, she faced 
punishment for “a term of imprisonment for life or by imprisonment for a term of 
years not exceeding life imprisonment.”  § 775.082(3)(a)3., Fla. Stat. (2004).  Like 
all life imprisonment sentences imposed after 1983, a life imprisonment sentence 
under section 775.082(3)(a)3. is without parole.  See § 921.001(10)(b), Fla. Stat. 
(2004).   
Under the sentencing guidelines then in place, for her second-degree murder 
conviction3 Landrum faced at least a term-of-years sentence ranging from 22.3 
years to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.4  A sentencing judge 
                                          
 
 
3.  Landrum was also convicted of the offense of tampering with physical 
evidence.  See § 918.13, Fla. Stat. (2004).  
 
4.  See § 921.0022, Fla. Stat. (2004) (classifying second-degree murder as a 
“Level 10” offense); § 921.0024, Fla. Stat. (2004) (providing that “Level 10” 
 
 
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could depart downward from the lowest permissible sentence if mitigating 
circumstances or factors were present, although the judge would have to justify in 
writing the reasons for the departure.  § 921.00265(1)-(2), Fla. Stat. (2004).  
However, under that same statute, the sentencing judge was not required to provide 
any reasoning for imposing a life sentence.  
At sentencing, Landrum’s counsel argued for a downward departure from a 
life sentence based on two statutory mitigators: (1) The victim was the initiator, 
willing participant, or the aggressor of the incident; and (2) the crime was 
committed in an unsophisticated manner, was an isolated incident, and Landrum 
showed remorse.  See § 921.0026(2)(f) and (j), Fla. Stat. (2004).  Additionally, 
Landrum’s counsel made the following argument in opposition to a life sentence:  
Judge, how much good does a 16-year old person, living for a 
relatively short period of time in this world, how much good does that 
person have to do to keep from spending the rest of their life, and most 
probably dying, in a prison cell.  Is it enough that she was a wonderful 
mother to a five-month-old child who was her life?  Is it enough that 
she maintained employment on a regular basis until her arrest at 16?  Is 
it enough that she had virtually no contact with law enforcement?  Is it 
enough that she was a good daughter to her parents, that she got her 
                                          
 
offenses that cause the second-degree murder death of one victim result in a 
minimum sentence computation score of 22.3 years, before the defendant’s prior 
criminal record and any statutory sentencing multipliers were taken into account).  
As provided for in section 921.0024(2), the “permissible range for sentencing shall 
be the lowest permissible sentence up to and including the statutory maximum, as 
defined in s. 775.082, for the primary offense and any additional offenses before 
the court for sentencing.” 
 
 
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high school education on her own?  I think it is.  I think it is enough.  I 
think it is enough for the Court to consider her not to be a throw-away. 
 
Unfortunately, regardless of the fact that punitive measures and 
punishment is certainly the nature of the Court, if we impose the 
maximum sentence, we have deemed her a throw-away.  I believe that 
she deserves a light at the end of the tunnel.  
 
 
After Landrum’s counsel spoke, the family of the victim testified as to how 
the murder impacted them and requested the trial court sentence Landrum to the 
statutory maximum sentence of life imprisonment without parole.  Various 
members of Landrum’s family also testified during the hearing and requested a 
lesser sentence than life imprisonment so that Landrum’s daughter would have a 
chance to meet Landrum outside prison walls.  One family member testified that 
Landrum was still a child when she committed the murder: “She had a baby, but 
she still was a little girl herself.”  Landrum spoke briefly to apologize to the 
victim’s family.     
The trial court sentenced Landrum to life in prison without parole, providing 
no reasons other than stating the following: “Miss Landrum, it’s the judgment, 
order and sentence of the Court that you be adjudicated guilty of the offense of 
murder in the second degree and confined in state prison for the remainder of your 
natural life therefore.  Any questions about that?”  The trial court did not indicate 
what findings of aggravating or mitigating circumstances warranted imposition of 
the life-without-parole sentence as opposed to a term-of-years sentence, or why the 
 
 
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trial court was not imposing a guidelines sentence of 22.3 years for the second-
degree murder conviction.  
After the United States Supreme Court decided Miller, Landrum filed a 
motion in circuit court for postconviction relief in the form of resentencing in 
compliance with Miller.  The circuit court denied the motion, and on appeal the 
Second District accepted the State’s argument that because Landrum was 
sentenced under a discretionary sentencing scheme, Miller was inapplicable to 
Landrum’s life-without-parole sentence.  Nevertheless, the Second District noted 
that because of the concurrence of our decision in Horsley, which specified the 
proper remedy for a Miller-deficient sentence, and decisions of the Second District 
that held Miller inapplicable to life sentences imposed pursuant to a discretionary 
sentencing scheme, a sentencing anomaly had arisen in the district where “a 
juvenile convicted of first-degree murder enjoys the right to eventual review of his 
or her sentence without regard to the date of his or her offense while a juvenile 
convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life before the effective date 
of the new legislation does not.”  Landrum, 163 So. 3d at 1263.  Accordingly, the 
Second District certified the question of great public importance to this Court, id. 
at 1263-64, that we now address as rephrased.   
 
 
 
 
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ANALYSIS 
The issue presented by the certified question is whether a life sentence 
without parole imposed upon a juvenile for second-degree murder is 
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment based on Miller and its progeny, 
where the trial court had the discretion to impose a term-of-years sentence but was 
not required to consider, and did not take into account, the individualized attributes 
of the juvenile offender’s youth when exercising this discretion.  The issue 
presented is a pure question of law, which we therefore review de novo.  See 
Gridine v. State, 175 So. 3d 672, 674 (Fla. 2015). 
 
Under article I, section 17, of the Florida Constitution, this Court is required 
to construe the prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment” in conformity 
with decisions of the United States Supreme Court.  We thus begin our analysis by 
reviewing the United States Supreme Court’s recent juvenile sentencing decisions, 
including Miller, which have all emphasized the constitutional difference between 
adults and juveniles, and how that difference requires distinguishing at sentencing 
between the juvenile whose crime reflects “transient immaturity,” and the rare 
juvenile whose crime reflects “irreparable corruption.”  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.  
Then, we review the recent decisions of this Court, the sentencing legislation 
passed by the Legislature in 2014 that gave Miller effect, and contrast the 2014 
legislation with the sentencing scheme under which Landrum was sentenced.  
 
 
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Finally, we consider whether Landrum’s sentence of life imprisonment without 
parole is violative of the Eighth Amendment as construed by Miller and in 
accordance with subsequent juvenile sentencing precedent of this Court and the 
United States Supreme Court.  
I.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s Recent Juvenile Sentencing Jurisprudence 
In Graham, the Supreme Court held that “the Eighth Amendment forbids the 
sentence of life without parole” for juvenile offenders convicted of nonhomicide 
offenses.  560 U.S. at 74.  This holding built upon the Supreme Court’s previous 
pronouncement in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005), that juvenile 
offenders’ “diminished culpability” militated against imposing the death penalty 
because the “penological justification for the death penalty” applies to juvenile 
offenders “with lesser force than to adults.”  
 
Both Roper and Graham emphasized that a juvenile offender’s lessened 
culpability and greater capacity for change require a sentencing court to “consider 
a juvenile offender’s youth and attendant characteristics before determining that 
life without parole is a proportionate sentence.”  Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734 
(citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471).  In short, “[a]n offender’s age is relevant to the 
Eighth Amendment,” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462, and a sentencer must take the 
juvenile offender’s age into account “before imposing a particular penalty.”  Id. at 
2471.  
 
 
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In Miller, the Supreme Court considered the cases of two juvenile offenders 
convicted of homicide offenses and sentenced to life in prison without parole 
pursuant to sentencing schemes in their states that mandated the imposition of a 
life-without-parole sentence.  132 S. Ct. at 2460.  The juvenile offenders argued 
that these mandatory sentencing schemes violated the Eighth Amendment by 
running “afoul of Graham’s admonition that ‘[a]n offender’s age is relevant to the 
Eighth Amendment, and criminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants’ 
youthfulness into account at all would be flawed.’ ”  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462 
(quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75).   
 
The Supreme Court agreed, “reversed the sentences imposed and held that 
‘mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their 
crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual 
punishments.’ ”  Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 959 (quoting Miller, 130 S. Ct. at 2011).  
The Court reasoned that “Roper and Graham establish that children are 
constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.  Because 
juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform, we 
explained, ‘they are less deserving of the most severe punishments.’ ”  Miller, 132 
S. Ct. at 2464 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 68).   
While Roper established a flat rule banning the death penalty for juvenile 
offenders, and Graham established a flat rule banning the imposition of a life 
 
 
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sentence without parole for juvenile offenders who commit nonhomicide offenses, 
Miller “set out a different [rule] (individualized sentencing) for homicide 
offenses.”  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466 n.6.  Miller’s rule of individualized 
sentencing for juvenile offenders is given effect through a “hearing where ‘youth 
and its attendant characteristics’ are considered as sentencing factors,” since such a 
hearing “is necessary to separate those juveniles who may be sentenced to life 
without parole from those who may not.”  Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735 (quoting 
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460) (internal citation omitted).  As the Supreme Court has 
explained, “The hearing does not replace but rather gives effect to Miller’s 
substantive holding that life without parole is an excessive sentence for children 
whose crimes reflect transient immaturity.”  Id. (emphasis added).   
Miller, then, requires that a sentencer consider the juvenile offender’s 
“chronological age and its hallmark features” before imposing sentence.  A 
sentencer must “consider[] a juvenile’s lessened culpability and greater capacity 
for change” as compared to an adult.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460 (internal quotation 
omitted).  The sentencer must consider the juvenile offender’s “lack of maturity 
and [] underdeveloped sense of responsibility,” that lead to “recklessness, 
impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking.”  Id. at 2464 (internal quotation omitted).  
The Supreme Court’s requirement of individualized sentencing for juvenile 
offenders forbids a sentencer from “treat[ing] every child as an adult,” because 
 
 
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doing so inevitably ignores the “incompetencies associated with youth,” and 
“disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most 
suggest it.”  Id. at 2468.  As the Supreme Court recently explained in Montgomery, 
Miller:   
[D]id more than require a sentencer to consider a juvenile offender’s 
youth before imposing life without parole; it established that the 
penological justifications for life without parole collapse in light of “the 
distinctive attributes of youth.”  Id., at ––––, 132 S. Ct., at 2465.  Even if 
a court considers a child’s age before sentencing him or her to a lifetime 
in prison, that sentence still violates the Eighth Amendment for a child 
whose crime reflects “ ‘unfortunate yet transient immaturity.’ ”  Id., at ––
––, 132 S. Ct., at 2469 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S., at 573, 125 S. Ct. 
1183).  Because Miller determined that sentencing a child to life without 
parole is excessive for all but “ ‘the rare juvenile offender whose crime 
reflects irreparable corruption,’ ” 567 U.S., at ––––, 132 S. Ct., at 2469 
(quoting Roper, supra, at 573, 125 S. Ct. 1183), it rendered life without 
parole an unconstitutional penalty for “a class of defendants because of 
their status”—that is, juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the 
transient immaturity of youth.  Penry [v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 
(1989)].   
 
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734 (emphasis supplied).  In discussing the procedural 
component of the Miller decision, the Montgomery Court noted that 
“Miller requires a sentencer to consider a juvenile offender’s youth and attendant 
characteristics before determining that life without parole is a proportionate 
sentence.”  Id.  As the Court explained, just because “Miller did not impose a 
formal factfinding requirement does not leave States free to sentence a child whose 
crime reflects transient immaturity to life without parole.  To the contrary, Miller 
 
 
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established that this punishment is disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment.”  
Id. at 735.   
II.  Giving Effect to Miller: This Court’s Recent Juvenile Sentencing Decisions 
& Chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida  
 
After Miller, we were confronted with two questions regarding the effect of 
the decision in this State:  First, whether the rule announced in Miller applied 
retroactively; and second, what the proper remedy was for a Miller violation.  As 
to the first question, we concluded that “Miller constitute[ed] a ‘development of 
fundamental significance’ and therefore must be given retroactive effect.”  Falcon, 
162 So. 3d at 956.   
Regarding the proper remedy for a Miller violation, we unanimously 
adopted the individualized sentencing approach that the Florida Legislature 
provided during the 2014 Regular Session “to remedy the federal constitutional 
infirmities in Florida’s juvenile sentencing laws, as identified by the Supreme 
Court in Miller and Graham.”  Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 401.  As we explained, the 
new sentencing legislation of Chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, “address[ed] the 
concerns of Miller,” id. at 405, and provided explicit guidance for juvenile 
offenders convicted of a life felony:   
   A similar sentencing structure applies to those juvenile offenders 
convicted of life or first-degree felony homicide offenses.  Life 
imprisonment remains a possibility if the trial court conducts an 
individualized sentencing proceeding, with mandatory subsequent 
judicial review available for those juvenile offenders who “actually 
 
 
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killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill” that are sentenced to a term 
of imprisonment of more than twenty-five years.  For those offenders in 
this category who “did not actually kill, intend to kill, or attempt to kill,” 
the subsequent judicial review is available for a sentence of more than 
fifteen years.   
 
Id. at 404 (internal citations omitted).  See §§ 775.082, 921.1401, and 921.1402, 
Fla. Stat. (2014).   
Unlike the statute Landrum was sentenced under—which did not provide for, 
or much less suggest, factors a sentencing court should consider relating to the 
juvenile offender’s youth and its attendant characteristics as described in Miller—
Section 921.1401 provides for the appropriate sentencing factors a trial court must 
consider that are “relevant to the offense and the defendant’s youth and attendant 
circumstances” when determining if a juvenile offender should be sentenced to life 
imprisonment, including:   
   (a)  The nature and circumstances of the offense committed by the 
defendant. 
   (b)  The effect of the crime on the victim’s family and on the 
community. 
   (c)  The defendant’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and mental 
and emotional health at the time of the offense. 
   (d)  The defendant’s background, including his or her family, home, 
and community environment. 
   (e)  The effect, if any, of immaturity, impetuosity, or failure to 
appreciate risks and consequences on the defendant’s participation in the 
offense. 
   (f)  The extent of the defendant’s participation in the offense. 
   (g)  The effect, if any, of familial pressure or peer pressure on the 
defendant’s actions. 
   (h)  The nature and extent of the defendant’s prior criminal history. 
 
 
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   (i)  The effect, if any, of characteristics attributable to the defendant’s 
youth on the defendant’s judgment. 
   (j)  The possibility of rehabilitating the defendant. 
 
§ 921.1401(2), Fla. Stat. (2014).  Section 921.1402 additionally provides the 
relevant factors a court should consider during a “sentence review hearing to 
determine whether the juvenile offender’s sentence should be modified.”                
§ 921.1402(6), Fla. Stat. (2014).  One of those factors is “Whether the juvenile 
offender’s age, maturity, and psychological development at the time of the offense 
affected his or her behavior.”  § 921.1402(6)(f), Fla. Stat. (2014).   
None of the Miller factors as now codified in section 921.1401 existed in the 
sentencing scheme under which Landrum was sentenced, and the sentencing 
court’s discretion to impose a life sentence was without restriction.  See § 
775.082(3)(a)3., Fla. Stat. (2004).  The State, however, argues that because Miller 
held unconstitutional sentences of life imprisonment without parole imposed upon 
juveniles pursuant to mandatory sentencing schemes, and Landrum’s life 
imprisonment without parole sentence was imposed pursuant to a discretionary 
sentencing scheme, Miller does not apply.      
We disagree with the State. The basis for the violation of the Eighth 
Amendment and the prohibition in article I, section 17, of the Florida Constitution 
against “Excessive Punishments,” does not emanate from the mandatory nature of 
the sentence imposed.  Rather, the violation emanates from the United States 
 
 
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Supreme Court’s command that because children are “constitutionally different,” 
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464, the Eighth Amendment requires that sentencing of 
juvenile offenders be individualized in order to separate the “rare” juvenile 
offender whose crime reflects “irreparable corruption,” from the juvenile offender 
whose crime reflects “transient immaturity.”  Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734.  
Indeed, Justice Sotomayor recently reemphasized that “lower courts must instead 
ask the difficult but essential question whether [juvenile offenders before the court 
for sentencing] are among the very ‘rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose 
crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.’ ” Adams v. Alabama, 578 U.S., at––––, 
2016 WL 2945697, at *4 (May 23, 2016) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting 
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734).  As Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals, recently explained of Miller, “[t]he relevance to sentencing of 
‘children are different’ also cannot in logic depend on whether the legislature has 
made the life sentence discretionary or mandatory; even discretionary sentences 
must be guided by consideration of age-relevant factors.”  McKinley v. Butler, 809 
F.3d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 2016). 
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Montgomery clarified that 
the Miller Court had no intention of limiting its rule of requiring individualized 
sentencing for juvenile offenders only to mandatorily-imposed sentences of life 
without parole, when a sentencing court’s exercise of discretion was not informed 
 
 
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by Miller’s considerations.  See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735.  A contrary 
interpretation of the Miller holding would mean that sentencing juveniles to life 
imprisonment would not be, as the Supreme Court has stated in its juvenile 
sentencing precedent, “rare” and “uncommon.”  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.   
We conclude that at the heart of Miller, as further amplified in Montgomery, 
is the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of imposing certain punishments on 
juvenile offenders that fail to consider a juvenile’s “lessened culpability and 
greater capacity for change.”  Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 396 (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. 
at 2460) (internal quotations omitted).  Therefore, the exercise of a sentencing 
court’s discretion when sentencing juvenile offenders must be informed by 
consideration of the juvenile offender’s “youth and its attendant circumstances” as 
articulated in Miller and now provided for in section 921.1401.  Without this 
individualized sentencing consideration, a sentencer is unable to distinguish 
between juvenile offenders whose crimes “reflect transient immaturity” and those 
whose crimes reflect “irreparable corruption.”  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.  Failing 
to make this distinction, otherwise, would mean life sentences for juveniles would 
not be exceedingly rare, but possibly commonplace. 
III.  Landrum’s Sentence 
This case dramatically demonstrates the Eighth Amendment problem of a 
life-without-parole sentence imposed upon a juvenile offender when the 
 
 
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sentencer’s discretion is not guided by the individualized sentencing factors 
deemed constitutionally significant in Miller.  As a sixteen year old convicted of 
second-degree murder, Landrum faced a sentence of between 22.3 years and life 
imprisonment for that offense.  This was the same sentencing range she would 
have been subject to if she had been an adult.  Certainly, the sentencing court was 
aware of Landrum’s age and that her family members still considered her “a 
child,” but there is no indication that the court, when exercising its discretion to 
sentence Landrum to life imprisonment as opposed to a term-of-years sentence, 
considered the “distinctive attributes of youth” as articulated in Miller.  In fact, it 
appears just the opposite.  When sentencing Landrum, a juvenile offender, the trial 
court stated only the following: “Miss Landrum, it’s the judgment, order and 
sentence of the Court that you be adjudicated guilty of the offense of murder in the 
second degree and confined in state prison for the remainder of your natural life 
therefore.  Any questions about that?”   
Without the benefit of Miller and its progeny, the sentencing court did not 
indicate why Landrum’s crimes warranted imposition of a life-without-parole 
sentence as opposed to a term-of-years sentence, nor did the court consider that the 
juvenile offender was only sixteen years old at the time of the crimes.  Although 
the sentencing court recognized the circumstances of the crime did not warrant that 
the jury consider first-degree murder, it did not consider whether the crime itself 
 
 
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reflected “transient immaturity” rather than “irreparable corruption.”  See Miller, 
132 S. Ct. at 2469.  And most certainly, the sentencing court did not consider why, 
although a life sentence for a juvenile offender should be exceedingly “rare” and 
“uncommon,” Landrum should receive such an uncommon and exceedingly rare 
life sentence, rather than a 22.3 year guideline sentence, or even one that departed 
downward from the guideline sentence.  Moreover, at the time the sentencing court 
exercised its discretion in deciding that Landrum should never see the outside of 
prison walls for a crime she committed at age sixteen, the only guidance the 
sentencing court had in considering Landrum’s “youth and its attendant 
characteristics” was the Legislature’s directive that a sentencing court could 
consider as a mitigating circumstance when departing downward from the term-of-
years sentence that, “[a]t the time of the offense the defendant was too young to 
appreciate the consequences of the offense.”  § 921.0026(2)(k), Fla. Stat. (2004).   
This cursory acknowledgement of a juvenile offender’s youth and how its 
attendant characteristics counseled against sentencing the juvenile offender to a 
lifetime of incarceration in the sentencing scheme Landrum was sentenced under is 
vastly different from the sentencing factors Miller prescribes, and which are now 
codified in section 921.1401(2), Florida Statutes (2014).  These sentencing factors 
include consideration of the “defendant’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and 
mental and emotional health at the time of the offense,” section 921.1401(2)(c), 
 
 
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and the “effect, if any, of familial pressure or peer pressure on the defendant’s 
actions,” section 921.1401(2)(g), as well as the “effect, if any, of immaturity, 
impetuosity, or failure to appreciate risks and consequences on the defendant’s 
participation in the offense.” § 921.1401(2)(e).  Miller’s emphasis on the rarity of 
life imprisonment sentences for juvenile offenders, coupled with absence of any 
consideration of the distinctive attributes of youth by Landrum’s sentencing court, 
render Landrum’s sentence unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment as 
construed by Miller.   
Further, permitting a life-without-parole sentence for a juvenile offender 
convicted of second-degree murder that was imposed without the sentencer 
considering the “distinctive attributes of youth” would be grossly disproportionate 
when juvenile offenders convicted of the more serious charge of first-degree 
murder and sentenced to life imprisonment will receive the benefit of chapter 
2014-220, Laws of Florida (2014).  This sentencing legislation was “designed to 
bring Florida’s juvenile sentencing statutes into compliance with the United States 
Supreme Court’s recent Eighth Amendment juvenile sentencing jurisprudence.” 
Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 39; §§ 775.082, 921.1401, 921.1402, Fla. Stat. (2014).  As 
the Second District explained, “a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder enjoys 
the right to eventual review of his or her sentence without regard to the date of his 
or her offense while a juvenile convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced 
 
 
- 22 - 
to life before the effective date of the new legislation does not.”  Landrum, 163 So. 
3d at 1263.  Simply put, “[c]onsiderations of fairness and uniformity make it very 
‘difficult to justify depriving a person of his liberty or his life, under process no 
longer considered acceptable and no longer applied to indistinguishable cases.’ ”  
Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 962 (quoting Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922, 925 (Fla. 1980)).    
The sentencing scheme under which Landrum was sentenced gave the trial 
court unfettered discretion when choosing between sentencing a juvenile offender 
convicted of second-degree murder to a term-of-years sentence or a life-without-
parole sentence.  While we acknowledge the possibility that a sentencer could have 
exercised discretion under this scheme in a manner that demonstrated the sentencer 
considered the factors Miller has since deemed constitutionally significant—and 
the resulting sentence would therefore not violate Miller—this did not happen in 
Landrum’s case.  The resulting, non-individualized sentence was the likely result 
of a decision not informed by the “distinctive attributes of youth.”  Miller, 132 S. 
Ct. at 2465.  A juvenile offender convicted of the same offense today, however, 
will receive the benefit of the new sentencing legislation’s requirement of 
individualized consideration that Miller requires, as well as the expression of this 
Court and the United States Supreme Court that sentencing a juvenile offender to 
life imprisonment without parole should be “rare” and “uncommon,” and that the 
juvenile offender whose crime reflects “transient immaturity” must be given some 
 
 
- 23 - 
“hope for some years of life outside prison walls.”  Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736-
37. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s emphasis in Miller that the “distinctive attributes of 
youth,” prohibit automatically sentencing juvenile offenders to life imprisonment 
without first considering such attributes, coupled with the Supreme Court’s recent 
characterization of Miller as prescribing a “hearing where ‘youth and its attendant 
characteristics’ are considered as sentencing factors,” in order “to separate those 
juveniles who may be sentenced to life without parole from those who may not,”  
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735 (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460), leads us to 
conclude that Landrum’s sentence is unconstitutional under the Eighth 
Amendment.   
At the heart of Miller, Montgomery, and indeed the entirety of this Court’s 
and the Supreme Court’s recent juvenile sentencing jurisprudence interpreting the 
Eighth Amendment, is the axiom that “youth matters for purposes of meting out 
the law’s most serious punishments.”  Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 399.  Miller and 
Montgomery, together with Roper and Graham, require a sentencer to consider 
age-related evidence as mitigation, and permit the sentencing of a juvenile offender 
to life imprisonment only in the most “uncommon” and “rare” case where the 
 
 
- 24 - 
juvenile offender’s crime reflects “irreparable corruption.”  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 
2469 (internal quotation omitted).   
Landrum’s life sentence without parole for second-degree murder per 
section 775.082(3)(a)3., Florida Statutes (2003), violated the Eighth Amendment.  
The sentencing scheme, which predated Miller and its progeny, did not require the 
trial court to consider the “distinctive attributes of youth” when exercising its 
discretion in imposing a life sentence.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465.  Further, the 
sentencing scheme did not take into account that life sentences for youth should be 
“uncommon.”  Id. at 2469.  Landrum’s life-without-parole sentence for second-
degree murder was imposed without individualized consideration of her youth and 
its attendant characteristics that is now necessary under Miller and this Court’s 
juvenile sentencing jurisprudence.  This absence of individualized sentencing 
consideration prevented Landrum from showing that her “crime did not reflect 
irreparable corruption; and, if it did not,” that she must be given “hope for some 
years of life outside prison walls.”  Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736-37.  
We therefore quash the Second District’s decision upholding Landrum’s 
life-without-parole sentence and disapprove Lightsey v. State, 182 So. 3d 727 (Fla. 
3d DCA 2015), Kendrick v. State, 171 So. 3d 778 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015), Lindsey v. 
State, 168 So. 3d 267 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015), Lane v. State, 151 So. 3d 20 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 2014), Mason v. State, 134 So. 3d 499 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), and Starks v. 
 
 
- 25 - 
State, 128 So. 3d 91 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013), to the extent that they are inconsistent 
with this opinion.  We remand for resentencing in accordance with sections 
775.082, 921.1401, and 921.1402, Florida Statues (2014).   
It is so ordered.   
LABARGA, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, J., concurs in result. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Great Public Importance  
 
 
Second District - Case No. 2D14-2842 
 
 
(Hillsborough County) 
 
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Maureen E. Surber, Assistant Public 
Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; John M. Klawikofsky, 
Bureau Chief, Cerese Crawford Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, and Peter N. 
Koclanes, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent