Title: Butler v. Southern States Cooperative, Inc.

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
MICHELLE M. BUTLER 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 050022 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
November 4, 2005 
SOUTHERN STATES 
 COOPERATIVE, INC., ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY 
J. Howe Brown, Jr., Judge Designate 
 
In this appeal, the dispositive issue is whether the 
Circuit Court of Loudoun County (trial court) erred in 
sustaining special pleas in bar to a motion for judgment filed 
by an employee against her co-employee and employer on the 
ground that the assault for which damages were sought was an 
injury by accident that arose out of and in the course of the 
employment.  Based on the facts as alleged in the motion for 
judgment, the trial court ruled that the employee’s common-law 
action is barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ 
Compensation Act provided by Code § 65.2-307, and that the 
exceptions to that exclusivity provision provided by Code 
§ 65.2-301 do not apply. 
BACKGROUND 
The trial court heard no evidence in support of the special 
pleas in bar.  Thus, we consider the allegations in the motion 
for judgment to resolve the issue presented and take the facts 
as alleged therein as true.  See Safeway, Inc. v. DPI 
 
 
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Midatlantic, Inc., 270 Va. 285, 286 n.1, 619 S.E.2d 76, 77 n.1 
(2005); Niese v. City of Alexandria, 264 Va. 230, 233, 564 
S.E.2d 127, 129 (2002).  The following recitation of the 
pertinent facts adheres to this rule of appellate review. 
In May 2000, Michelle M. Butler began working at the 
Middleburg, Virginia retail store of Southern States 
Cooperative, Inc. (Southern States), a business cooperative that 
specializes in selling agricultural supplies.  Butler’s 
responsibilities included operating the cash register, 
scheduling and making deliveries, opening and closing the store, 
performing inventory checks, making flyers and pricing signs, 
ordering supplies, filing and other general duties.  Butler’s 
immediate supervisor and manager of the store was Dan Virts. 
In July 2003, Clarence W. Allen was employed by Southern 
States to work at the Middleburg store as a delivery person.  
Southern States was aware at the time it hired Allen that he had 
been convicted of felony rape and had a felony parole violation 
on his criminal record.  Allen frequently made personal comments 
to Butler, including comments that he wanted “to date” her and 
that he “always got what he wanted.” 
On August 11, 2003, owing to the heavy volume of business 
that day, Butler was required to assist Allen in making a 
delivery of feed to a customer.  When Butler entered the cab of 
 
 
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the delivery truck, she tucked her uniform shirt, which was 
missing two buttons, into her pants.  Butler was wearing a 
t-shirt under her uniform shirt.  Allen offered to fix Butler’s 
shirt for her.  When Butler declined, Allen told her that she 
was “getting him all excited” and he pointed to a “bulge” in his 
pants as proof of his excitement.  Allen then ran his hand 
through Butler’s hair, slowed down the truck, and leaned over 
and licked Butler’s ear.  Ultimately, Allen stopped the truck, 
removed his seatbelt, leaned in, and grabbed Butler’s face with 
his hands.  He then attempted to kiss Butler on the lips, 
holding onto her face the entire time.  Butler was frightened 
and protested.  Allen told her, “well, you know what I want.”  
Butler continued to pull away and resist until Allen ceased his 
advances.  During this incident Allen told Butler that “you just 
don’t know me like that yet.” 
Upon returning to the store, Butler continued to be 
frightened and nervous and began to feel ill.  She left the 
store and walked to a nearby bank where her mother was employed.  
On her mother’s advice, Butler reported the incident to the 
police.  Subsequently, as a result of his actions, Allen was 
convicted of misdemeanor assault and battery pursuant to Code 
§ 18.2-57(A). 
 
 
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On April 29, 2004, Butler filed a motion for judgment in 
the trial court against Southern States and Allen.  Butler 
sought to recover damages from Southern States under claims of 
negligent hiring and retention of Allen, respondeat superior 
liability for Allen’s assault and battery, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.  She sought damages from Allen 
under claims of assault and battery and intentional infliction 
of emotional distress. 
Allen and Southern States filed grounds of defense denying 
the allegations contained in Butler’s motion for judgment.  
Southern States also filed a special plea in bar asserting that 
the exclusivity provision of the Virginia Workers’ Compensation 
Act, Code § 65.2-307, barred Butler’s claims because her alleged 
injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment.  Allen 
also filed a similar special plea in bar.1 
                     
1 Southern States also filed a demurrer challenging the 
claims for negligent hiring and retention and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.  Allen also demurred to the 
emotional distress claim.  The trial court overruled the 
demurrers.  Southern States and Allen noted their objections to 
this ruling on the final order.  In its brief in opposition to 
Butler’s petition for appeal, Southern States assigned cross-
error to the overruling of the demurrer with respect to the 
emotional distress claim.  Allen in his brief purported to adopt 
Southern States argument on that issue, though he failed to make 
an express assignment of cross-error.  In the order awarding 
Butler an appeal, this Court refused Southern States’ assignment 
 
 
 
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Butler filed two pre-argument briefs in the trial court 
opposing the special pleas in bar.  In the first brief, Butler 
contended that the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ 
Compensation Act did not apply on the facts of her case because 
Allen’s assault upon her was personal in nature and, thus, she 
contended that her injury did not arise out of her employment with 
Southern States.  In the second brief, Butler also contended that 
Code § 65.2-301 would have application on the facts of her case. 
In relevant part, Code § 65.2-301 provides: 
A. Any employee who, in the course of employment, 
is sexually assaulted, as defined in §§ 18.2-61 
[Rape], 18.2-67.1 [Forcible Sodomy], 18.2-67.3 
[Aggravated Sexual Battery], or § 18.2-67.4 [Sexual 
Battery], and promptly reports the assault to the 
appropriate law-enforcement authority, where the 
nature of such employment substantially increases the 
risk of such assault, upon a proper showing of damages 
compensable under this title, shall be deemed to have 
suffered an injury arising out of the employment and 
shall have a valid claim for workers’ compensation 
benefits. 
 
B. Notwithstanding the provisions of this title, 
an employee who is sexually assaulted and can identify 
the attacker may elect to pursue an action-at-law 
against the attacker, even if the attacker is the 
assaulted employee’s employer or co-employee, for full 
damages resulting from such assault in lieu of 
pursuing benefits under this title, and upon repayment 
of any benefits received under this title. 
                                                                  
of cross-error.  Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court 
overruling the demurrers is not at issue in this appeal and 
remains undisturbed. 
 
 
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On September 9, 2004, the trial court conducted a hearing on 
the special pleas in bar.  After hearing argument of counsel, the 
trial court ruled from the bench that “[Code §] 65.2-301 has no 
application to this case.  This is not a sexual assault as defined 
by those [criminal code sections] particularly mentioned [in the 
statute.]”  The trial court further ruled that “[t]his is a 
classic example of a Workers’ Compensation Act situation.”  Butler 
sought leave of the trial court to file an amended motion for 
judgment.  The trial court denied the motion. 
In a final order dated October 4, 2004, the trial court, 
adopting by reference its ruling made during the September 9, 2004 
hearing, sustained the special pleas in bar and dismissed Butler’s 
motion for judgment with prejudice.  We awarded Butler this 
appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
Butler asserts error in the judgment of the trial court 
sustaining the special pleas in bar on two grounds.  First, she 
contends that the trial court erred in finding that Allen’s 
assault upon her is an injury by accident arising out of and in 
the course of her employment bringing her cause of action within 
 
 
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the ambit of the exclusivity provision of Code § 65.2-307.2  
Second, she contends that even if her injury is otherwise 
compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, the trial court 
erred in finding that the statutory exceptions to Code § 65.2-
307 found in Code § 65.2-301 permitting an election of remedies 
do not apply on the facts of this case.  Because Butler’s first 
contention is dispositive of the question whether the trial 
court erred in sustaining the special pleas in bar, we confine 
our discussion to that issue.3 
Our resolution of the dispositive issue in this case is 
guided by well-established principles such that a comprehensive 
review and recitation of our numerous prior cases is 
unnecessary.  The Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act applies to 
                     
2 Code § 65.2-307(A) provides that: 
The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee 
when his employer and he have accepted the provisions 
of this title respectively to pay and accept 
compensation on account of injury or death by 
accident shall exclude all other rights and remedies 
of such employee, his personal representative, 
parents, dependents or next of kin, at common law or 
otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service 
or death. 
 
3 Butler also assigned error to the trial court’s denial of 
her motion for leave to file an amended motion for judgment.  In 
light of our resolution of the principal issue presented in this 
appeal, the failure to permit the filing of the amended motion 
for judgment is moot, and we need not address that issue. 
 
 
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injuries by accident “arising out of and in the course of” an 
individual’s employment.  Code § 65.2-300.  When an employee 
sustains such an injury, the Act provides the sole and exclusive 
remedy available against the employer.  Rasnick v. The Pittston 
Co., 237 Va. 658, 660, 379 S.E.2d 353, 354 (1989).  To the 
extent that an employee’s injury does not come within the ambit 
of the Act, the employee’s common-law remedies against his 
employer are preserved unimpaired.  Adams v. Alliant 
Techsystems, Inc., 261 Va. 594, 599, 544 S.E.2d 354, 356 (2001); 
Griffith v. Raven Red Ash Coal Co., 179 Va. 790, 798, 20 S.E. 
530, 534 (1942).  An injury comes within the ambit of the Act 
only if the injury satisfies both the “arising out of” and the 
“in the course of” prongs of the statutory requirements of 
compensability.  With regard to the “arising out of” prong, we 
apply the “actual risk” test rather than the “positional risk” 
test, where simply being injured at work is sufficient to 
establish compensability, to determine whether a particular 
injury satisfies these statutory requirements of compensability.  
County of Chesterfield v. Johnson, 237 Va. 180, 185, 376 S.E.2d 
73, 75-76 (1989). 
In the present case, it is beyond question in the context 
of determining compensability under the Act that, as alleged in 
her motion for judgment, the physical assault upon Butler arose 
 
 
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“in the course” of her employment with Southern States.  When 
the assault occurred she was in the process of making an 
authorized delivery of feed for her employer.  The dispute 
between the parties and consequently the necessary focus of our 
analysis is whether that assault also arose “out of” Butler’s 
employment. 
“A physical assault may constitute an ‘accident’ within the 
meaning of the Act when it appears that it was the result of an 
actual risk arising out of the employment.”  Reamer v. National 
Service Industries, 237 Va. 466, 470, 377 S.E.2d 627, 629 
(1989).  And we have held that such an accident arises out of 
the employment if there is a causal connection between the 
employee’s injury and the conditions under which the employer 
requires the work to be done.  See, e.g., Plummer v. Landmark 
Communications, Inc., 235 Va. 78, 87, 366 S.E.2d 73, 77 (1988); 
R & T Investments, Ltd. v. Johns, 228 Va. 249, 255, 321 S.E.2d 
287, 290-91 (1984); Lynchburg Steam Bakery v. Garrett, 161 Va. 
517, 522-23, 171 S.E. 493, 495 (1933). 
Southern States principally relies upon this line of cases 
to assert essentially that Butler’s allegations establish that 
by hiring Allen in light of his prior criminal convictions, 
Southern States had knowingly exposed all of its female 
employees to a safety risk and, therefore, there was a causal 
 
 
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connection between Butler’s injury and the conditions under 
which Butler was required to work.  This reliance is misplaced. 
We have consistently held that when an assault “is personal 
to the employee and not directed against [her] as an employee or 
because of [her] employment, the injury does not arise out of 
the employment.”  Richmond Newspapers v. Hazelwood, 249 Va. 369, 
373, 457 S.E.2d 56, 58 (1995); see also Reamer, 237 Va. at 471, 
377 S.E.2d at 630; Metcalf v. A. M. Express Moving Systems, 
Inc., 230 Va. 464, 470, 339 S.E.2d 177, 181 (1986); City of 
Richmond v. Braxton, 230 Va. 161, 165, 335 S.E.2d 259, 262 
(1985). 
In the present case, Butler’s allegations, taken as true 
for purposes of our review, clearly establish that Allen’s 
assault on Butler was personal to Butler and not directed 
against her as an employee or because of her employment.  
Allen’s actions were the result of his asserted personal 
attraction to Butler.  Allen’s actions were in no way in 
furtherance of Southern States’ business and, therefore, 
Butler’s injury cannot fairly be traced to her employment as a 
contributing proximate cause.  Our prior decisions regarding 
personal assaults dictate the conclusion that the assault on 
Butler did not arise “out of” her employment in the context of 
the Workers’ Compensation Act. 
 
 
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Southern States maintains that Butler’s allegations of 
respondeat superior liability in her motion for judgment 
necessarily cause her claim to be barred under the Act.  We 
disagree.  To plead respondeat superior liability, a plaintiff 
must allege that the injury caused by the act of an employee, 
such as Allen in this case, occurred within the scope of the 
employment relationship.  This is directly analogous to an 
injury “in the course of” an individual’s employment for 
purposes of the exclusivity analysis under the Act.  However, 
this is only one prong of that analysis.  The exclusivity 
provision of Code § 65.2-307 applies only to an injury both 
“arising out of” and “in the course of” an individual’s 
employment.  Code § 65.2-300.  These requirements for 
compensability of a claim and, in turn, for the exclusivity of 
the remedy under the Act, are not synonymous.  R & T 
Investments, 228 Va. at 252, 321 S.E.2d at 289. 
As we have demonstrated, the allegations in Butler’s motion 
for judgment, taken as true, would establish that Allen’s 
assault did not arise “out of” the employment.  Consequently, 
Butler did not plead herself into the bar of Code § 65.2-307 by 
her allegations of respondeat superior liability against 
Southern States.  Accordingly, we hold that in the procedural 
posture of this case, the trial court erred in sustaining the 
 
 
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special pleas in bar and dismissing Butler’s motion for judgment 
with prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
trial court sustaining the special pleas in bar and remand the 
case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with 
the views expressed in this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded.