Title: State v. Crannell

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Crannell (97-086); 170 Vt. 387; 750 A.2d 1002

[Opinion Filed 28-Jan-2000]
[Motion for Reargument Denied 14-Mar-2000]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of  Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 97-086

State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 2, Rutland Circuit

Charles Crannell	                         November Term, 1999

Francis B. McCaffrey, J.

William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and David Tartter, Assistant
  Attorney General, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Robert R. Bent of Zuccaro, Willis and Bent, St. Johnsbury, Robert
  Appel, Defender General, and William A. Nelson, Appellate Attorney,
  Montpelier, and Charles A. Crannell, pro se, Jarratt, Virginia, for
  Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Dooley, Morse, Johnson, Skoglund, JJ.,and Teachout, S.J.,
          Specially Assigned.

       JOHNSON, J.   Defendant appeals from a conviction for first-degree
  murder.  He claims  that the trial court erred in failing to suppress
  evidence seized in a consent search after he had  invoked his right to
  counsel and to remain silent.  He also argues that the evidence should have 
  been suppressed because the search warrant was based on privileged
  statements and because the  police executed the warrant improperly.   He
  challenges the admission of two statements he made  and the testimony of
  his ex-wife concerning a prior crime as impermissible character evidence. 
  In  addition, he claims that the trial court improperly disregarded a pro
  se motion he filed, denied his  motion for 

 

  acquittal, and denied him a speedy trial.  Lastly, he claims he was
  improperly permitted to waive an  instruction on lesser-included offenses. 
  We find no error in the trial court's rulings and affirm.

       In the early hours of October 19, 1992, the fire department reported
  to the scene of a fire at  John Kenworthy's house in Castleton, Vermont.
  While investigating the area, the body of John  Kenworthy was discovered
  about twenty-five feet from the house, with his arms bound behind him  and
  an oil-soaked shirt wrapped around one arm.  He had been stabbed
  approximately sixty to  seventy times, his left hand had been fractured,
  and he had been hit in the head with a blunt  instrument like a hammer or
  baseball bat.  

       Police investigating the homicide learned that Kenworthy had been
  married to Sandra  Crannell from 1980 to 1982.  Sandra had recently been
  divorced from defendant, Charles Crannell.  Defendant lived in Johnstown,
  Pennsylvania, and had been attempting to reconcile with Sandra.   He drove
  a 1985 two-tone Corvette that several witnesses reported seeing in
  Castleton during the  hours immediately before and after the murder.  One
  witness saw the car as well as defendant and  described defendant as
  wearing a "watch cap."  Such a cap was discovered near the crime scene.  
  Police learned from Sandra that she had obtained a restraining order to
  keep defendant away from  her house and that he had threatened to beat up
  anyone she was dating.  Sandra also told police that  defendant refused to
  acknowledge the divorce and was depressed.   Based on this and additional 
  information, the Vermont State Police coordinated their investigation with
  Pennsylvania State  Police, and arrested defendant at his home in Johnstown
  on October 21, 1992.  

       After lengthy pretrial proceedings, a jury trial was held in October
  1995.  Defendant was  convicted of the first-degree murder of John
  Kenworthy.  After additional post-trial proceedings,  defendant appealed. 
  On appeal, defendant is represented by counsel and also filed a pro se
  brief.  

 

  Some sections of the pro se brief repeat the arguments capably made by
  counsel, and others are  inadequately briefed.(FN1)  We therefore consider
  the seven issues raised in counsel's brief along  with those issues that
  were adequately briefed by defendant.  

       Defendant, through counsel, argues that the trial court erred by: (1)
  failing to suppress  evidence obtained pursuant to a consent search of his
  home and vehicles in Pennsylvania; (2)  failing to suppress evidence
  obtained in violation of the "knock-and-announce" rule; (3) not 
  suppressing evidence obtained pursuant to the search warrant because it
  included information  subject to a marital privilege; (4) admitting
  evidence of a prior bad act and two statements related to  prior bad acts;
  (5) declining to consider defendant's pro se motion of August 1995; (6)
  failing to  grant defendant's motion for acquittal; and (7) failing to
  grant defendant's speedy-trial motion.   Additionally, in his pro se brief
  defendant claims that the court erred by: (1) failing to suppress the 
  fruits of the Pennsylvania search because police improperly elicited an
  incriminating response; (2)  failing to suppress the fruits of the
  Pennsylvania search because the warrant application contained  false and
  inaccurate information; (3) failing to suppress the fruits of the
  Pennsylvania search  because the identifications supporting the warrant
  application were obtained by a suggestive  procedure; (4) failing to excise
  all Sandra Crannell statements from the search warrant application  because
  the marital privilege applied between August 1992 and 1995; (5) failing to
  grant  defendant's motion for a new trial based on evidence that another
  person admitted to writing some  letters; and 

 

  (6) permitting him to waive an instruction on lesser-included offenses.  We
  address each of these  issues in turn.  (7)  

                            I. The Consent Search

       Defendant first contends that his consent to search his pick-up truck
  on October 21, 1992,  was obtained in violation of his rights under Miranda
  v. Arizona,