Title: In re Anastasia M.

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2017 ME 213 
Docket: 
Yor-17-202 
Submitted 
    On Briefs: October 24, 2017 
Decided: 
November 2, 2017 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE ANASTASIA M. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
 
[¶1]  The mother of Anastasia M. appeals from a judgment of the 
District Court (Springvale, Foster, J.) terminating her parental rights to the child 
pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii) (2016).1  She 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support both the court’s finding of 
parental unfitness and its determination that termination is in Anastasia’s best 
interest.  Because the evidence supports the court’s factual findings and 
discretionary determination, we affirm the judgment. 
 
[¶2]  Based on competent evidence in the record, the court found by clear 
and convincing evidence that the mother (1) is unwilling or unable to protect 
the child from jeopardy within a time reasonably calculated to meet her needs, 
                                         
1  The father’s parental rights to Anastasia were also terminated when he failed to secure new 
counsel after asking the court to remove his previous attorney and subsequently failed to appear for 
docket call or the termination hearing.  The court found that the father had abandoned the child, and 
he is not a party to this appeal. 
 
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and (2) is unwilling or unable to take responsibility for her within that 
timeframe.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii).  The court also found that 
termination of the mother’s parental rights is in Anastasia’s best interest.  See 
22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a).  We review the factual findings supporting the 
unfitness determination for clear error, see In re Logan M., 2017 ME 23, ¶ 3, 
155 A.3d 430, and apply the same standard to the factual findings supporting 
the best interest determination, although we review the court’s ultimate 
conclusion that termination is in the child’s best interest “for an abuse of 
discretion, viewing the facts, and the weight to be given them, through the trial 
court’s lens,” and giving the court’s judgment “substantial deference,” 
In re Caleb M., 2017 ME 66, ¶ 33, 159 A.3d 345 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶3]  The court based its determinations on the following findings of fact: 
 
One of the most difficult sources of jeopardy to rectify in child 
protection proceedings is the risk posed by domestic violence.  In 
those cases, often one parent is the victim of the other.  The 
dynamics of domestic violence, the interplay of power and control 
between the parties, and internal and external pressures to reunify 
as a family can undermine and delay reunification efforts.  In a 
process where time frames are tied to those reasonabl[y] 
necessary to meet a child’s needs, that delay may be fatal to even 
good-faith efforts to resolve jeopardy.  [The mother] has an 
intimate knowledge of domestic violence. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
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Throughout this case, and particularly at trial, [the mother] 
minimized her substance abuse.  Although initially confirming in 
her testimony that the issues presented in this matter were alcohol 
abuse and domestic violence, minutes later she insisted that her 
own use of alcohol was an issue for a “short period” of her life. . . . 
Although she agreed at trial that she has a problem with alcohol, 
[the mother] quickly added that she simply stays away from it. 
 
 
But she doesn’t.  She tested positive for the presence of 
alcohol in January, June and September of 2016.  The court does not 
find [her] explanation, that the January and September tests were 
attributable to her use of Nyquil, believable. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
Then there is the issue of misuse of other substances.  [The 
mother] has used marijuana regularly during this case. . . . [She] 
mentioned that there had been discussion at one point of using a 
prescribed benzodiazepine instead of the marijuana.  Before her 
prescriber was willing to do so, however, [the mother] needed to 
go a month without using marijuana; she was unable to do so.  She 
was diagnosed with cannabis use disorder, moderate. [The 
mother's medication-management provider’s] notes indicate she 
had encouraged her client to stop using marijuana, to no avail. 
 
 
[The mother] insists she has had no contact with [the father] 
since early November of 2016. . . . As [the DHHS caseworker] noted 
at trial, she has been told before by [the mother] that she and [the 
father] have separated, only to discover that was not the case or 
that the couple had reunited.  As recently as December of 2016, [the 
mother] received a text message from [the father] with a picture of 
Anastasia.  She admitted to [a visit supervisor] that she and [the 
father] continued to communicate by telephone, although she did 
not share that information with [the caseworker]. 
 
 
When asked what it would take for her to resolve the issue of 
domestic violence in her relationship, [the mother] responded it 
would require [the father] staying away from her. 
 
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. . . . 
 
 
[The father] is not the only individual who has been abusive 
to [the mother]. . . . [Her current therapist]’s preliminary treatment 
plan recites that [the mother] “has been involved in multiple 
relationships that have involved domestic violence.”  He noted that 
[the mother] would need to develop skills to establish and maintain 
healthy boundaries in her relationships to successfully address this 
issue.  It is not simply a matter of [the father] staying away.  [The 
mother] has to decide to keep him away, acquire the ability to do 
that, and then exercise that ability, both with [the father] and 
others.  Unfortunately, she has waited too long to do so. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
The Department did use reasonable efforts to reunify 
Anastasia with her parents.  [The caseworker] negotiated 
reasonable reunification plans with each parent . . . . She made 
referrals for services and transportation.  She arranged regular 
visitation between Anastasia and each parent.  She convened 
regular Family Team Meetings to review the status of reunification 
and address issues . . . . 
 
 
Anastasia remains in [her second] foster home, where she 
was placed in April of 2016.  She is a happy, healthy child with no 
discernable developmental delays.  She is closely and appropriately 
bonded to the foster family, and they to her. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
[T]ime is a pivotal factor in this matter.  Anastasia has been 
out of her parents’ care for twenty months, a lifetime for a child 
who is only two years old.  [The mother] is, essentially, only 
beginning the work she needs to do on her relationships and her 
substance abuse.  It is unclear if she will be successful in that 
effort. . . . Neither parent can assume responsibility for Anastasia, 
 
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or address the risks they present to their daughter, within a time 
frame necessary to meet her needs. 
 
 
[¶4]  Given these findings and the court’s other extensive, specific 
findings of fact, all of which are supported by competent evidence in the record, 
the court did not err in its determination of unfitness nor did it err or abuse its 
discretion in determining that termination of the mother’s parental rights, with 
a permanency plan of adoption, is in the child’s best interest.  See In re Logan M., 
2017 ME 23, ¶ 3, 155 A.3d 430; In re Thomas H., 2005 ME 123, ¶¶ 16-17, 
889 A.2d 297. 
 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Julie-Anne Blanchard, Esq., The Law Office of Julie-Anne Blanchard, LLC, 
Biddeford, for appellant mother 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Hunter C. Umphrey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office 
of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
 
Springvale District Court docket number PC-2015-35 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY