Title: GLENN v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

GLENN v. STATE2003 WY 461 P.3d 389Case Number: 01-153Decided: 01/15/2003
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                            

 

THOMAS 
AVERY GLENN,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Domonkos.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, and Yvonne A. 
Manske, Student Intern, of the Prosecution Assistance Program.  Argument by Ms. 
Manske.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN*, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]           
After 
two altercations with his pregnant girlfriend, Appellant Thomas Glenn was 
convicted of two counts of aggravated assault on a pregnant woman and one count 
of assault on another woman who had tried to defend her.  He challenges those convictions on 
grounds that the State produced insufficient evidence of pregnancy, and the 
evidence did not support instructing the jury it could consider his attempts to 
intimidate witnesses as evidence of guilt.  
We hold that the trial court properly ruled that the State could prove 
pregnancy by the victim's testimony, and that intimidation was sufficiently 
proved to permit an instruction that it was evidence of guilt.    We 
affirm.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]           
Glenn 
presents the following statement of the issues with which the State 
agrees:

 

I. 
Whether the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt two essential 
elements of aggravated assault on a pregnant woman?

 

II. 
Whether the court erred when it gave an intimidation instruction which was not 
supported by the evidence?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]           
On 
August 31, 2000, Glenn's girlfriend, Colleen Brown, was visiting friends when 
she was angrily confronted by Glenn who believed she was drinking while 
pregnant.  A witness observed Glenn 
holding Brown by her throat against a wall, saw Glenn strike Brown, and heard 
Brown scream and tell Glenn to stop because he was hurting her.  Others came to Brown's rescue, and Glenn 
left.  Later that night, Glenn and 
two others returned and fought with Jeremy Hopkins and Derek Stone while Brown 
escaped to another apartment.  
During a violent confrontation, Stone was stabbed, and Glenn was treated 
at the emergency room for a severe eye injury.  

 

[¶4]           
On 
September 8, 2000, Brown visited Glenn at his home, and the two again had a 
physical altercation that the State alleged caused injuries to Brown.  Brown's brother and a friend went to 
Glenn's home, and he met them at the door with a knife.  Police investigated and observed that 
Brown suffered a bloody nose, bruising, and scrapes, but she would tell them 
only that Glenn had shoved her, and, later at trial, she testified that, as she 
ran away, she had fallen but did not know how she received injuries because she 
had "blanked out." 

 

[¶5]           
Glenn 
was charged with two counts of aggravated assault on a pregnant woman, two 
counts of aggravated assault with a drawn deadly weapon, and one count of 
battery.  Brown suffered a 
miscarriage in October and was not pregnant at the time of trial.  Brown testified against Glenn but was 
vague on whether he caused her bodily injuries.  Other witnesses who had personally 
observed Glenn's and Brown's actions and heard Brown's statements testified that 
Glenn had inflicted the bodily injuries that she had received.  

 

[¶6]           
During 
trial, several witnesses testified that Glenn had contacted them before trial 
and scared them when he told them not to testify.  Over objection, the trial court 
permitted the jury to be instructed that this could be considered evidence of 
guilt.  At the close of evidence the 
trial court granted defense's motion of judgment of acquittal on one count of 
aggravated assault with a drawn deadly weapon but denied that motion as to the 
other four counts.  Those charges 
went to jury which convicted Glenn on two counts of aggravated assault on a 
pregnant woman and one count of battery, but acquitted him on the other charge 
of aggravated assault with a drawn deadly weapon.  This appeal 
followed.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

 

[¶7]           
Our 
standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence claims requires that this 
Court assess whether all the evidence which was presented is adequate enough to 
form the basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to 
be drawn by a finder of fact when that evidence is viewed in the light most 
favorable to the State.  We will not 
substitute our judgment for that of the jury when we are applying this rule; our 
only duty is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational 
individuals would, or even could, have come to the same result as the jury 
actually did.  Robinson v. 
State, 11 P.3d 361, 368 (Wyo. 2000). 

 

[¶8]           
Glenn 
first contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt two 
elements of the crime of aggravated assault on a pregnant woman when it used 
hearsay evidence as proof that he inflicted bodily injury on Brown, and then 
failed to introduce any medical evidence of pregnancy, instead relying solely 
upon Brown's and other witnesses' testimony to prove that she was pregnant.   The statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-502(iv) (LexisNexis 2001), provides:

 

(a) 
A person is guilty of aggravated assault and battery if 
he:

 

* 
* * *

(iv) 
Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to a woman whom he 
knows is pregnant.

 

[¶9]           
Glenn 
asserts that this Court has previously ruled, in Longstreth v. State, 832 P.2d 560 (Wyo. 1992), that an element of a charged offense cannot be proved with 
hearsay testimony and it is reversible error to do so.  Quoting the prosecutor's closing 
argument, Glenn claims that the State relied upon one witness' inadmissible, 
unreliable hearsay statement that Brown had told Glenn "stop it, you're hurting 
me" as proof of bodily injury.  The 
State contends that Longstreth is distinguishable because the hearsay 
involved here is admissible under the present sense impression exception to the 
hearsay rule found at W.R.E. 803(1) and is reliable.  

 

[¶10]      
The 
record shows that, although Brown did not specifically testify that Glenn had 
injured her, several other witnesses testified that they personally observed 
Glenn striking her and described Brown's reactions during the incident.  The hearsay testimony was not objected 
to by the defense and can therefore be considered substantive evidence unless 
its admission is plain error.  
Kolb v. State, 930 P.2d 1238, 1246 (Wyo. 1996) (discussing effect 
of when a present sense impression is offered as substantive evidence); 
Beartusk v. State, 6 P.3d 138, 145 (Wyo. 2000).  

 

[¶11]      
This 
factual situation is in contrast to Longstreth, where hearsay was 
admitted over objection on grounds that it was not substantive evidence, yet was 
the only evidence of an essential element of the crime.  This Court, therefore, reversed the 
conviction for insufficient evidence.  
Longstreth does not require the same result in this case.  

 

[¶12]      
Without 
offering a plain error analysis, Glenn contends that the hearsay testimony is 
unreliable because Brown contradicted the statement when she testified that 
Glenn did not hit or push her and she had fallen against the building, and 
without its admission the evidence is insufficient for a conviction.  However, the statement falls under the 
present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule and was properly 
admitted.  Kolb, 930 P.2d  at 
1246.  

 

[¶13]      
Next, 
Glenn contends that witness testimony that Brown was pregnant was insufficient 
to prove the pregnancy element of the crime.  Brown testified that she learned that 
she was pregnant from her doctor, had told Glenn that she was pregnant, and, on 
the night of the first assault, he believed that she was drinking while pregnant 
and this initiated his violent behavior towards her.  In cross-examination, defense counsel 
questioned whether Brown had medical documents as evidence of pregnancy and, 
although she claimed that she had medical documents proving both the pregnancy 
and the miscarriage,  she did not 
produce any documents.  

 

[¶14]      
Our 
general rule states that the jury is entitled to draw any reasonable inference 
from the evidence presented, and it is the responsibility of the jury to resolve 
conflicts in the evidence if the evidence supports its verdict.  See Willis v. State, 2002 WY 79, 
¶15, 46 P.3d 890, ¶15 (Wyo. 2002).  
Glenn has not provided any authority that the jury was not entitled to 
infer that this evidence proved Brown's pregnancy, and we hold that the element 
was proved by sufficient evidence.

 

[¶15]      
As 
his final issue, Glenn contends that the district court improperly gave a jury 
instruction offered by the State regarding intimidation of a witness.  He does not claim that the instruction 
is improper, but rather contends that the instruction was misleading to the jury 
and insufficient evidence precluded giving the instruction.  That instruction was taken virtually 
verbatim from WPJIC 6.06, "Efforts by Defendant to Alter Evidence"1 and stated:

 

YOU 
ARE INSTRUCTED THAT if you find that the Defendant attempted to persuade a 
witness to testify falsely or attempted to intimidate a witness, then you may 
consider that fact in determining the question of whether the Defendant is 
guilty or not guilty. 

 

[¶16]      
This 
Court approved a similar instruction in State v. Hines, 79 Wyo. 65, 79, 
331 P.2d 605, 610 (1958), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 972 (1961)."   In 1989, we determined that this 
well-settled principle of law survived the enactment of the Wyoming Rules of 
Evidence and was an appropriate instruction if supported by the evidence.  King v. State, 780 P.2d 943, 962 
(Wyo. 1989) (citing United States v. Reamer, 589 F.2d 769 (4th Cir.1978), 
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 980 (1979); People v. Crandell, 760 P.2d 423 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1037 (1989); State v. 
Clark, 682 P.2d 1339 (Mont. 1984); State v. Van Alcorn, 665 P.2d 97 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); Bradley v. State, 561 P.2d 548 (Okla.Cr.1977); 1 
L. Sand, J. Siffert, W. Loughlin & S. Reiss, Modern Federal Jury 
Instructions ¶ 6.05, Instruction 6-16 (1989)).

 

[¶17]      
Glenn 
contends that the instruction was not supported by evidence because it showed 
only that when Glenn told them not to testify, the witnesses felt frightened, 
and the evidence indicated that any fear was caused by witness timidity.  He argues that his mere statements did 
not rise to the level of intimidation when properly understood to mean that, by 
a threat, any witness is put in fear that Glenn would inflict bodily harm for 
testifying.  The record shows that 
Glenn did not specifically threaten any complaining witness with bodily harm, 
but that all testified that Glenn's behavior was menacing and frightening.  Several of these witnesses were also 
victims of Glenn's violence, and their intimidation testimony permitted the jury 
to infer that Glenn had menaced them in an attempt to keep them from 
testifying.    

 

[¶18]      
The 
trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on the general principles applicable 
to the case, and it is our general rule in reviewing questions involving 
instructions that the trial judge is afforded latitude to tailor the 
instructions to the facts of the case, and reversible error will not be found as 
long as the instructions when viewed as a whole and in the context of the entire 
trial fairly and adequately cover the issues.  King, 780 P.2d  at 961-62.  Defense counsel objected to this 
instruction, and the trial court determined that the evidence justified it.  We affirm that decision.  

 

[¶19]      
The 
order of judgment and conviction is affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

1Wyoming Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction 6.06 states in relevant 
part:  "If you find that the 
defendant attempted to persuade a witness to testify falsely or intimidate a 
witness, then you may consider that fact in determining the question whether the 
defendant is guilty or not guilty."