Title: May v. Estate of McCormick By and Through Swallow

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

May v. Estate of McCormick By and Through Swallow1989 WY 54769 P.2d 395Case Number: 88-319Decided: 02/27/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
MARIE B. 
MAY, APPELLANT (PETITIONER),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE ESTATE 
OF ROY McCORMICK, BY AND THROUGH LAURENCE SWALLOW, ADMINISTRATOR, APPELLEE 
(RESPONDENT).

 
 
Appeal from 
the DistrictCourtofPlatteCounty, William A. Taylor, 
J.

 
 
Steven M. 
Avery, Riverton, and John R. Vincent of Hettinger, Leedy & Vincent, 
Riverton, for 
appellant.

 
 
Rex E. 
Johnson of Sherard, Sherard & Johnson, Wheatland, for appellee.

 
 
Before THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., and 
ROONEY, Retired J.

 
 

ROONEY, Retired 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Roy McCormick 
(hereinafter referred to as "McCormick") died May 6, 1988. An administrator of 
his estate was appointed upon the allegation that he died intestate. Then, 
appellant filed a petition to admit to probate a will of McCormick dated October 
26, 1982. This appeal is from an order denying such 
petition.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellant, a 
stepdaughter of McCormick, was sole beneficiary under the October 26, 1982 will. 
On January 20, 1983, McCormick executed a new will under which Gary Peterson, 
his nephew, was sole beneficiary. It provided in part that "all other former 
wills and codicils to wills heretofore made by me" were revoked. In March 1983, 
McCormick destroyed the January 20, 1983 will.1

 
 

[¶4.]     Appellant argued that 
the October 26, 1982 will was revived through destruction of the January 20, 
1983 will. The law relative thereto was set forth by this court in In re 
Wilson's Estate, 397 P.2d 805, 809 (Wyo. 1964), reh. denied 
399 P.2d 1008 (Wyo. 1965):

 
 
"[C]ourts 
have accepted the theory that, in the absence of statutes, the subsequent 
destruction of a revoking will does not have the effect of reviving the former 
will unless there is evidence that it was the intention of the testator to 
revive the former will. The principle was accepted that the question of revival 
is one of pure intention without there being any presumption either for or against 
revival arising by virtue of the destruction of the revocatory 
will."

 
 
Since there 
is no evidence in the record indicating any intention on the part of McCormick 
to revive a former will, this matter should be concluded with the determination 
that McCormick died intestate.

 
 

[¶5.]     Appellant argues that 
McCormick lacked testamentary capacity2 to make the January 20, 1983 will 
which revoked the October 26, 1982 will. Of course, this argument is in 
contradiction to appellant's argument that the destruction of the January 20, 
1983 will revived the October 26, 1982 will. If the January 20, 1983 will was 
invalid, it was ineffective from its inception, and its destruction could not 
have any legal effect. In any event, there was no evidence directed specifically 
to McCormick's lack of testamentary capacity on January 20, 1983. There was 
testimony by the scrivener of the October 26, 1982 will and by the witnesses to 
it, that McCormick was specifically interrogated with reference to each of the 
elements necessary for testamentary capacity, and his responses indicated that 
he had such.

 
 

[¶6.]     The district court 
noted that there was only a few months between October 26, 1982 (the date of the 
will offered by appellant for probate and the date upon which she therefor 
acknowledged testamentary capacity) and January 20, 1983 (the date at which she 
challenged the existence of such capacity). There was no evidence of a change in 
McCormick's testamentary capacity between the two dates.

 
 

[¶7.]     On February 16, 1983, 
McCormick did execute a voluntary petition for appointment of a guardian of his 
person and estate. It was filed March 30, 1983, and an order appointing a 
guardian was entered on April 25, 1983.

 
 

[¶8.]     On June 8, 1983, the 
October 26, 1982 will was brought to McCormick, and he physically destroyed it. 
Appellant argues that McCormick then lacked testamentary capacity necessary to 
destroy the will.3 Since the will had already been 
revoked, the later destruction or non-destruction of it would have no effect 
upon its validity. In any event, the testimony of the witnesses to the 
destruction was to the effect that McCormick was specifically interrogated with 
reference to each of the elements necessary to determine testamentary capacity, 
and his responses indicated the existence of such capacity. Thus, there was 
evidence upon which the trial court could base its determination that McCormick 
had sufficient testamentary capacity to destroy the will on June 8, 1983.4 We have often said that, on appeal, 
we assume the truth of the evidence in favor of the successful party, ignore 
that of the unsuccessful party in conflict therewith, and give that of the 
successful party every favorable inference which may be reasonably drawn 
therefrom. E.g. Goggins v. Harwood, 704 P.2d 1282, 1284 (Wyo. 1985); Stockton v. 
Sowerwine, 690 P.2d 1202, 1205 (Wyo. 1984); In re Merrill's Estate, 341 P.2d  
at 508; and cases cited therein.

 
 

[¶9.]     
AFFIRMED.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 McCormick had made 
two wills prior to the October 26, 1982 will. On February 22, 1982, he executed 
a will under which appellant was sole beneficiary. In March 1982, he executed a 
will in which appellant shared in the estate. He also executed a deed on October 
26, 1982, conveying real estate to himself and appellant as joint tenants. A 
contest over the deed was before this court on appeal of a summary judgment. We 
reversed and remanded the case for trial. May v. McCormick, by and through 
Swallow, 704 P.2d 709 (Wyo. 1985). The parties then settled the 
matter by agreeing to a division of the property.

 
 

2 Quoting from 1 Page 
on Wills, § 12.21, pp. 606-08 (1960), this court set forth the elements of 
testamentary capacity in In Re Estate of Morton, 428 P.2d 725, 729 (Wyo. 
1967):

 
 
"`Testator must have 
sufficient strength and clearness of mind and memory, to know, in general, 
without prompting, the nature and extent of the property of which he is about to 
dispose, and nature of the act which he is about to perform, and the names and 
identity of the persons who are to be the objects of his bounty, and his 
relation towards them. He must have sufficient mind and memory to understand all 
of these facts, and to comprehend these elements in their relation to each 
other, and a charge, in negative form, that capacity is lacking if testator is 
not able to know all of these facts, is erroneous, since he lacks capacity if he 
is unable to understand any one of them. He must be able to appreciate the 
relations of these factors to one another, and to recollect the decision which 
he has formed.'"

 
 

3 With reference to the 
effect of a guardianship on testamentary capacity, this court said in In Re 
Merrill's Estate, 80 Wyo. 276, 341 P.2d 506, 510 (1959):

 
 
"Although the record 
of a guardianship has been held to be competent evidence in a proceeding to 
determine the validity of a will, a showing of the appointment of a guardian 
does not make out a prima facie case of incompetency, raises no presumptions of 
insanity, and has often been held to be entitled to little or no weight. See 2 
Page on Wills, 3 ed., § 805; Thompson on Wills, 3 ed., § 70; and generally see 
94 C.J.S. Wills §§ 46, 64; 57 Am.Jur. Wills §§ 110, 135.

 
 
"`* * * An order 
having a guardian appointed would not necessarily be inconsistent with 
testamentary capacity because guardianship may only indicate an inability to 
manage property or business affairs. * * *' 36 Tex. L.Rev. 18.

 
 
"Most of the cases to 
which reference is made in these authorities are limited in the assistance they 
provide since they relate to cases dealing with wards who admittedly have had 
mental difficulties, sometimes having been found to be insane. Even in such 
cases, courts have been very careful to say that the adjudication in a 
guardianship or insanity matter is not one which can be carried over into the 
finding as to the validity of a will."

 
 
            
The guardianship order in this case recited in part that the court "does 
find that Roy McCormick is incompetent and unable, unassisted, to properly 
manage and care for his property as a result of infirmities and physical 
disability." (Emphasis added.) And see Matter of Estate of Roosa, 753 P.2d 1028 
(Wyo. 
1988).

 
 

4 Appellant's expert 
witness testified that in his opinion McCormick did not have testamentary 
capacity on June 8, 1983.