Title: Esquibel v. Esquibel

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Esquibel v. Esquibel1996 WY 78917 P.2d 1150Case Number: 95-253Decided: 06/03/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
John E. ESQUIBEL,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

Stacey 
E. ESQUIBEL,

 Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal 
from the District Court, Fremont County, Nancy Guthrie, 
J.

 

Vance 
Countryman of Hooper Law Offices, Riverton, for 
Appellant.

Nyla 
A. Murphy, Laramie, for Appellee.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      We review an 
order of the district court granting a default decree of divorce. Appellant John 
E. Esquibel (Father) contends the district court erred in excluding the 
provisions of the parties' stipulation providing for visitation. Appellee Stacey 
E. Esquibel (Mother) contends that determination is within the sound discretion 
of the district court and the district court did not abuse its 
discretion.

[¶2]      We reverse that 
portion of the divorce decree providing for visitation.

[¶3]      Mother filed a 
complaint for divorce. Father answered and counterclaimed. On March 15, 1995, 
Mother petitioned for, and the district court issued, a temporary restraining 
order to protect the marital estate, to prevent the parties from annoying or 
harassing the other, and to prevent the removal of the child from the state 
without permission of both parties and the court. On July 13, 1995, Mother filed 
an affidavit advising of a phone call wherein Father threatened to take the 
parties' infant child, with Mother never again to see him or the child, and 
stating Mother's belief that Father was threatening to kill the child. On that 
same date, the district court entered a second ex parte temporary restraining 
order, again ordering the parties not to remove the child from the state without 
permission of the other and the district court.

[¶4]      On July 19, 1995, 
Father withdrew his answer and counterclaim, gave notice of the settlement 
agreement and consented to a default hearing, incorporating the parties' child 
custody and property settlement agreement. The agreement provided that Mother 
would have primary care, custody and control of the child and provided for 
detailed access to records and structured visitation for Father. In all, the 
settlement was 11 pages long.

[¶5]      On August 23, 
1995, the district court entered its default judgment and decree of divorce. The 
trial court did not approve the provisions of the settlement pertaining to 
visitation but instead provided:

VISITATION 
shall be only reasonable visitation. Reasonable visitation does not include any 
threats regarding visitation. The Defendant [husband] is not permitted to remove 
the minor child from the jurisdiction of this Court, without the prior written 
consent of both parties or the permission of the Court, and the child shall be 
returned to the Plaintiff [wife] after each visitation. Visitation shall be only 
that which is in the best interests of the minor child.

[¶6]      Father filed a 
motion for hearing and objection to the modification of the visitation 
provisions of the settlement on August 25, 1995. A Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment and second objection was filed on August 28, 1995, which included an 
assertion that Father was not given the benefit of approving the decree as 
provided in W.R.C.P. 58. Father asked that his motions be set for hearing. 
Mother filed a traverse on August 29, 1995. No action was taken on Father's 
motions, and a notice of appeal was filed September 21, 
1995.

Stipulation 
Involving Child Custody and Visitation

[¶7]      It is well 
settled that the district court is not bound to accept a stipulation of the 
parties and that the court's major consideration in determining custody of minor 
children is the welfare of those children. Forbes v. Forbes, 672 P.2d 428, 429 
(Wyo. 1983). Though a trial court need not conduct an evidentiary hearing to 
determine the best interests of a child if that is stipulated to by the parties, 
Luhman v. Beecher, 144 Wis.2d 781, 424 N.W.2d 753, 755 (App. 1988), in instances 
of modification of visitation, such modification must be based upon evidence 
conspicuous in the record. Wolfe v. Wolfe, 899 P.2d 46, 48 (Wyo. 1995). See also 
Barbour v. Barbour, 146 Vt. 506, 505 A.2d 1217, 1219 (1986) (since facts 
essential to the disposition of the custody issue had not been stated, that 
portion of the order dealing with custody reversed and remanded); Lautenschlager 
v. Lautenschlager, 201 Neb. 741, 272 N.W.2d 40, 42 (1978) (where court does not 
approve stipulation, opportunity should be given to parties to secure and 
present evidence regarding custody and bests interests of the 
child).

[¶8]      In our statement 
of the facts, we have set out the record extant in this case in detail. The 
record includes Mother's affidavit in support of a restraining order and the 
issuance of mutual orders of restraint, followed by a stipulation and subsequent 
decree which amended the stipulation. There exists no evidence to suggest a 
general visitation provision, as included in the decree, is more conducive to 
the child's welfare than the specific provision included in the settlement 
agreement. The lack of evidence is the result of an unreported hearing without 
Father's presence.

Default 
Judgments Involving Child Custody and Visitation

[¶9]      In this action 
Father agreed to a default judgment based upon the stipulation the parties 
executed and presented to the court. While default judgments are appropriate in 
some instances involving child custody and visitation, the best interests of the 
child may not necessarily be served by the strictest application of the default 
provisions. In Lake v. Lake, 63 Wyo. 375, 182 P.2d 824 (1947), a default 
judgment was entered in a divorce proceeding where custody of the couple's minor 
child was at issue. This court reversed the entry of default, not because 
default was unavailable under the circumstances, but rather because the father 
had shown "good cause." Likewise, in Lantz v. Bowman, 881 P.2d 1079 (Wyo. 1994), 
the mother failed to file an answer within the required time frame and default 
was entered against her. The district court set aside the entry of default for 
"good cause" since the mother had appeared and generally denied the allegations 
asserted by the father in his petition. We affirmed the actions of the district 
court and said:

While 
willful neglect or intentional failure to answer may, even in child custody 
proceedings, justify the entry of default, here we have not been given even so 
much as a suggestion that [the mother's] failure to answer was the result of 
neglect or intentional indifference.

Id., 
at 1081-82. See Vanasse v. Ramsay, 847 P.2d 993, 998 (Wyo. 1993) (good cause 
determination standard).

[¶10]   The development of cases in Wyoming 
recognizes that a willful neglect or intentional failure to answer may result in 
default judgments in custody cases. However, when the parties do not 
intentionally ignore the process involving the future of their child, default is 
not favored when the issue of child custody or visitation is before the court. 
In this instance, we are unable to find that Father willfully neglected or 
intentionally failed to appear. His pleadings were timely, and he agreed to the 
default based only upon the court's adoption of the stipulation. His objection 
to the decree entered was to assertions made in Mother's affidavit in support of 
a restraining order. Upon these facts, we find Father has good cause in setting 
aside the default judgment as it relates to visitation.

[¶11]   The order of the district court is 
reversed as to its provisions for visitation and is otherwise affirmed in all 
respects. Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.