Title: BRYANT v. WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BRYANT v. WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION2002 WY 14055 P.3d 4Case Number: 01-146Decided: 09/24/2002
April Term, A.D. 2002

 

 

ROLAND 
C. BRYANT,

 

Appellant(Petitioner) 
,

 

v.

 

STATE 
OF WYOMING, ex rel.,

WYOMING 
DEPARTMENT OF

TRANSPORTATION,

                                                                        

Appellee(Respondent) 
.

 

 

The 
Honorable Kenneth E. Stebner, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

R. 
Michael Vang of Brown, Nagel & Hiser, LLC, Laramie, 
WY.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; Rowena L. Heckert, Deputy Attorney General; and 
Mary L. Loos, Assistant Attorney General.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* and VOIGT, JJ., and BRACKLEY, 
D.J.

 

 

*Chief 
Justice at time of expedited case conference.

 

 LEHMAN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      Appellant 
Roland Chester Bryant appeals from the district court's affirmance of the Office 
of Administrative Hearing (OAH) order, which sustained the implied consent 
suspension of his driver's license as well as the disqualification of his 
commercial driver's license.  

 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      Bryant offers the 
following issues for our consideration:

 

1.  Did 
the Hearing Examiner err when she indicated that the arresting officer did not 
need to have proof that he was certified to operate an approved chemical test 
pursuant to Wyoming Statute § 31-6-105(a), because the Licensee refused a 
preliminary breath test?

 

2.  Can 
a person be considered a refusal for not taking a portable breath test (PBT), if 
the PBT is not an approved chemical test under the regular and commercial 
implied consent laws?

 

Appellee 
Wyoming Department of Transportation (WyDOT) presents its own 
issues:

 

1.  When 
Appellant has refused to submit to chemical testing under the implied consent 
statutes, must the arresting officer provide evidence of his certification to 
operate the testing device for the license suspension to be 
valid?

 

2.  Is 
there substantial evidence in the record to prove that Appellant refused 
chemical testing under the implied consent statutes for non-commercial and 
commercial drivers?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      At approximately 
10:54 p.m. on December 10, 1999, Wyoming State Highway Patrol Officer N.M. 
Bisceglia clocked a semi-truck driven by Bryant at 95 mph in a posted 75 mph 
speed zone.  As Officer Bisceglia 
turned onto the interstate to follow the truck, he observed Bryant fail to 
signal a lane change.  Officer 
Bisceglia activated his overhead lights, but it took approximately another 
one-quarter mile before Bryant reacted to the officer's flashing lights and 
pulled over.  As Bryant pulled the 
truck to the right, he ran over a delineator post and stopped with the left side 
of the truck remaining on the traveled portion of the highway.  Officer 
Bisceglia requested various documents from Bryant, including his driver's 
license, and Bryant provided all the requested documentation.  Officer Bisceglia summoned Bryant to his 
patrol car.  While Bryant was in 
Officer Bisceglia's car, Officer Bisceglia noticed an odor of alcohol on 
Bryant's breath and noted that his eyes were watery and bloodshot.  When Officer Bisceglia asked Bryant if 
he had been drinking, Bryant replied that he had consumed a bottle of Vicks 
44-D.  

 

[¶5]      Officer Bisceglia 
asked Bryant to perform standardized field sobriety tests so that he could 
assess whether Bryant was able to drive safely.  Bryant agreed to perform the Horizontal 
Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test, and when he did, Officer Bisceglia observed all three 
indicators of intoxication, specifically lack of smooth pursuit, distinct 
nystagmus prior to 45 degrees, and distinct nystagmus at maximum deviation.  When Officer Bisceglia asked Bryant to 
perform a preliminary breath test, Bryant refused, stating that he would show up 
on the test because he had consumed the Vicks 44-D.  He subsequently refused to perform any 
more sobriety tests.  He also 
refused to submit to chemical testing.  
Officer Bisceglia informed Bryant that he had reason to believe that he 
was intoxicated and placed him under arrest for driving while under the 
influence of intoxicants (DWUI).  
When Officer Bisceglia inventoried the truck's contents, he discovered a 
bottle of rum that was approximately two-thirds empty underneath the bed of the 
sleeper.  He did not find any 
bottles of cold medication.  

 

[¶6]      In his signed 
statement, Officer Bisceglia indicated under penalty of perjury that he had read 
Bryant the following advisements and that Bryant nevertheless refused to submit 
to any chemical testing:

 

Implied 
Consent Advisement: . . .

 

I 
read the Implied Consent Advisement to the driver according to W.S. 31-6-102 for 
a Non-Commercial Offense.

 

I 
read the Implied Consent Advisement to the driver according to W.S. 31-6-102 
& 31-7-307 for a Commercial Offense.

 

. . .

 

Chemical 
Test: . . .

 

The 
driver was requested to submit to the chemical test(s) prescribed by my agency 
but refused to do so.

 

Bryant 
subsequently signed a Refusal form, which provided in 
part:

 

2.  You 
have been advised by a peace officer of the requirement to submit to all 
chemical tests and that your failure to do so shall result in a 
suspension of your driver's license or your privilege to operate a motor 
vehicle.

 

[¶7]      As a result of 
Bryant's refusal to submit to chemical testing, WyDOT notified Bryant of its 
intent to suspend his driver's license for six months and to disqualify his 
commercial license for one year.  
Bryant requested a contested case hearing, and the OAH heard the case on 
March 15, 2000.  Bryant was the sole 
witness to testify, and he claimed that he did not remember being informed of 
the potential one-year penalty for refusing to consent to chemical testing under 
the commercial disqualification statute.  
He also testified that although he signed the Refusal form after he was 
arrested, he did not remember being given the specific implied consent 
advisements.   The OAH 
sustained the implied consent suspension and the commercial 
disqualification.  Bryant filed a 
timely petition for judicial review with the district court.  After analyzing the record and the 
briefs of the parties, the district court affirmed the OAH's decision, and this 
appeal followed.  

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶8]      Our review of 
proceedings that involve the suspension of a driver's license is governed by 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2001), which provides in pertinent 
part:

 

(c)  To 
the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action.  In making the 
following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts 
of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

 

. . .

 

(ii)  Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

 

(A)  Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

 

. . .

 

(E)  Unsupported 
by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

 

[¶9]      We do not afford 
any special deference to the district court's decision when we review a matter 
initiated before an administrative agency.  
Rather, this court reviews the case as if it came directly from the 
administrative agency.  Nellis v. 
Dep't of Transp., 932 P.2d 741, 743 (Wyo. 1997).  Our review must focus on the evidence 
and consider the reasonableness of the agency's exercise of judgment while 
determining if the agency committed errors of law.  Casper Iron & Metal, Inc. v. 
Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 845 P.2d 387, 392 (Wyo. 1993).  If the agency committed any errors of 
law, this court must correct them.  
State v. Bannon Energy Corp.,  999 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Wyo. 2000). 

 

[¶10]   Further, 
in appeals where both parties submit evidence at the administrative hearing, 
appellate review is limited to application of the substantial evidence 
test.  Newman v. State ex 
rel. Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶22, 49 P.3d 163, 
¶22 (Wyo. 2002).  This court is 
required to review the entire record in making its ultimate determination on 
appeal.  Newman, at ¶19 and 
¶¶24-26.  The substantial evidence 
test to be applied is as follows: 

 

In 
reviewing findings of fact, we examine the entire record to determine whether 
there is substantial evidence to support an agency's findings.  If the agency's decision is supported by 
substantial evidence, we cannot properly substitute our judgment for that of the 
agency and must uphold the findings on appeal.  Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions.  It is more than a 
scintilla of evidence.  

 

Newman, 
at ¶12 (quoting State 
ex rel. Workers' Safety and Compensation Div. v. Jensen, 
2001 WY 51, ¶10, 24 P.3d 1133, ¶10 (Wyo. 2001). 

 

[¶11]   Even when the factual findings are 
found to be sufficient under the substantial evidence test, Newman 
further concludes this court may be required to apply the 
arbitrary-and-capricious standard as a "safety net" to catch other agency action 
which prejudiced a party's substantial right to the administrative proceeding or 
which might be contrary to the other WAPA review standards.  A purely 
demonstrative listing is provided of situations which could warrant the 
consideration of the arbitrary-and-capricious standard in addition to the 
substantial evidence test.1  Newman, at ¶23.  However, this appeal presents no such 
unique circumstances.  

 

[¶12]   To answer the issues presented in 
this case, we must interpret the relevant statutes.  We endeavor to interpret statutes in 
accordance with the legislature's intent.  
We begin by making "an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious 
meaning of the words employed, according to their arrangement and 
connection."  Rasmussen v. 
Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897); see also State Dep't of 
Rev. & Taxation v. Pacificorp, 872 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wyo. 
1994).

 

When 
the court determines, as a matter of law, that a statute is clear and 
unambiguous, it must give effect to the plain language of the statute and should 
not resort to the rules of statutory construction.  If, on the other hand, the Court 
determines that a statute is ambiguous, it may use extrinsic aids of statutory 
interpretation to help it determine the legislature's 
intent.

 

State 
ex rel. Workers' Safety & Compensation Div. v. Bruhn, 
951 P.2d 373, 376 (Wyo. 1997)  
(citations omitted).  

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

A.  Proof of a Valid 
Permit

 

[¶13]   Bryant first argues that both the 
non-commercial and commercial implied consent suspensions must be vacated.  He maintains that the record contains no 
evidence that Officer Bisceglia provided any proof to demonstrate that he 
possessed a valid permit to conduct chemical testing pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 31-6-105(a) (LexisNexis 2001).  
WyDOT counters that when Bryant refused to submit to chemical testing 
under the implied consent statutes, evidence of Officer Bisceglia's 
certification to operate the testing device became irrelevant.  Bryant does not challenge any of the 
hearing examiner's findings.  We 
must, therefore, determine whether the hearing examiner's conclusions of law are 
in accordance with the law.  

 

[¶14]   Bryant relies upon Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 31-6-105(a) in making his argument.  
That section provides:

 

            
(a) Chemical analysis of the person's blood, breath or urine to be 
considered valid under this section, shall be performed according to methods 
approved by the department of health and by an individual possessing a valid 
permit to conduct the analysis.  
Permits shall be issued by the department of health for this 
purpose.  The department of health 
may promulgate and approve satisfactory methods in order to ascertain the 
qualifications of individuals permitted to conduct the analysis and shall issue 
to qualified individuals permits which are subject to termination or revocation 
by the department of health.

 

Both 
parties assert that this statute is clear and unambiguous.  We agree.  We must therefore apply its plain 
meaning. 

 

We 
read a statute so that every word, clause and sentence is given effect so, if 
possible, no part of the statute is rendered inoperative or superfluous.  In construing the statute, our main 
objective is to effecuate the intent of the legislature.  

 

Bolack 
v. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc., 
963 P.2d 237, 241 (Wyo. 1998) (citations omitted).  

 

[¶15]   While we agree with Bryant that the 
plain language of this statute requires testing to be performed by an individual 
who possesses a valid permit to conduct the analysis, we do not see where it 
requires the arresting officer to provide evidence that he or she possesses a 
valid permit as a prerequisite to testing the individual.   This is especially true when no 
tests are performed because testing is refused.  Our analysis of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-6-105(a) convinces us that the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute 
requires testing to be performed by a person who possesses a valid permit, who 
may or may not be the arresting officer, only when a chemical analysis of a 
person's blood, breath, or urine is actually performed.  Because the testing was never performed, 
the question of whether Officer Bisceglia, or whomever would have conducted the 
test, possessed a valid permit is irrelevant.

 

B.   Proof of Approved Testing 
Method

 

[¶16]   Bryant next asserts that both the 
implied consent suspension and commercial disqualification must be vacated 
because Officer Bisceglia failed to provide proof that he offered Bryant a 
chemical test approved by the department of health (DOH) pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 31-6-105(a), which is quoted in our discussion of the last issue.  Bryant does not challenge the accuracy 
of Officer Bisceglia's sworn statement, but instead focuses on the language in 
the Officer's Signed Statement, which states that "[t]he driver was requested to 
submit to the chemical test(s) prescribed by my agency but refused to do 
so."  Bryant maintains that this 
language demonstrates that Officer Bisceglia merely requested Bryant to submit 
to chemical tests prescribed by the Wyoming Highway Patrol, not necessarily 
those prescribed by the DOH.  We 
agree with Bryant that the "Officer's Signed Statement" does not indicate that 
he was specifically offered and refused tests prescribed by the DOH.  However, we have not found any law that 
requires WyDOT to demonstrate that Bryant was offered a chemical test approved 
of by the DOH in this situation.  

 

[¶17]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-102 
(LexisNexis 2001) provides authority for driver's license suspensions when 
someone has refused to submit to chemical testing:

 

(a)(i)  Any 
person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a 
public street or highway in this state is deemed to have given consent 
. . . to a chemical test or tests of his blood, breath or urine for 
the purpose of determining the alcohol concentration . . . of his 
blood.  
. . .

 

. . .

 

(ii)  For 
tests required under this act, the arrested person shall be advised 
that:

 

(A)  His 
failure to submit to all required chemical tests requested by the peace officer 
shall result in the suspension of his Wyoming driver's license or his privilege 
to operate a motor vehicle for a period of six (6) months for a first offense 
. . . 

 

. . .

 

(D)  If 
he refuses to take all required tests, he shall not be eligible for limited 
driving privileges.

 

. . .

 

(d)  If 
a person under arrest refuses upon the request of a peace officer to submit to a 
chemical test designated by the agency employing the peace officer as provided 
in subsection (a) of this section, none shall be given except in cases where 
serious bodily injury or death has resulted.  The peace officer shall submit his 
signed statement to the department.  
The statement submitted by the officer shall contain: 

 

. . .

 

(ii)  That 
the person refused to submit to a test upon the request of the peace 
officer.

 

For 
purposes of this case, the requirements under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-7-307 
(LexisNexis 2001) for commercial disqualifications are virtually 
identical.

 

[¶18]   Bryant complains that nothing in 
the record indicates what type of chemical tests Officer Bisceglia's agency 
prescribes.  What the record does 
show, however, is that Officer Bisceglia gave Bryant the implied consent 
advisement required under Wyoming law, and Bryant refused to submit to chemical 
testing as required.  Bryant cannot 
establish that any chemical analysis of his blood, breath or urine would not 
have been performed according to methods approved of by the DOH because he 
refused chemical testing.  The 
question of whether the tests were approved arises once the test is performed, 
not before.   

 

[¶19]   Finally, the Refusal form that 
Bryant signed included the following advisement:

 

You 
have been advised by a peace officer of the requirement to submit to all 
chemical tests and . . . your failure to do so shall result in a 
suspension of your driver's license or your privilege to operate a motor 
vehicle.

 

Bryant's 
refusal to submit to all chemical tests necessarily included those authorized by 
the DOH.  

 

[¶20]   We hold that substantial evidence 
supported the hearing examiner's decision to uphold the six month implied 
consent suspension of Bryant's driver's license as well as its decision to 
uphold the one-year commercial license disqualification.

 

[¶21]   Affirmed.

 

 

FOOTNOTES

1"For 
example, the administrative record may be replete with evidence supporting the 
decision, and yet the agency may have willfully discounted credible evidence, 
refused to admit certain testimony or documentary exhibits, or failed to provide 
findings of fact or conclusions of law."  
Newman, at ¶23