Title: Fitzpatrick v. McCrary

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2018 ME 48 
Docket: 
Aro-17-330 
Submitted 
On Briefs: January 11, 2018 
Decided: 
April 5, 2018 
 
Panel: 
ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
ERIC N. FITZPATRICK 
 
v. 
 
ARLENE MCCRARY 
 
 
JABAR, J.  
[¶1]  Eric N. Fitzpatrick appeals from a judgment entered by the District 
Court (Houlton, O’Mara, J.) denying his M.R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for relief from 
judgment after the court granted Arlene McCrary’s motion to modify a 
parental rights and responsibilities order regarding their son.  We affirm the 
judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  Fitzpatrick and McCrary are the parents of a child, born June 15, 
2013.  In November 2013, Fitzpatrick filed a complaint seeking a 
determination of parental rights and responsibilities.  The District Court 
(Daigle, J.) entered a judgment and ordered shared parental rights with 
primary residence awarded to McCrary.  Several years later, on January 28, 
 
2 
2016, the District Court (Soucy, J.) granted Fitzpatrick’s subsequent motion to 
modify after the parties agreed to an order changing primary residence from 
McCrary to Fitzpatrick.   
[¶3]  On April 14, 2016, McCrary filed a motion for contempt against 
Fitzpatrick, alleging that Fitzpatrick failed to comply with the modified 
parental rights and responsibilities order.  Twelve days later, on April 26, 
2016—while that motion was “out” for service—Fitzpatrick filed a complaint 
in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, seeking an 
order to confirm that he had legal custody of the child.1  Less than two months 
later, on June 24, 2016, before her contempt motion was served on 
Fitzpatrick, McCrary filed a motion to modify the parental rights and 
responsibilities order in the District Court in Houlton.  On August 3, 2016, the 
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas entered an “interim order” that 
purported to “supersede[] all prior Orders in any jurisdiction” and provided 
that “[j]urisdiction of this matter . . . and the child shall remain with [the 
Pennsylvania Court] until further Order of Court.”   
[¶4]  After he was finally served with McCrary’s motions early in 
August, Fitzpatrick filed a motion to dismiss McCrary’s motion to modify in 
                                         
1  In his M.R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for relief from the Houlton District Court judgment, Fitzpatrick 
alleged that he had been living with the child in Pennsylvania since October 23, 2015.    
 
3 
the District Court in Houlton, arguing that Maine lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over the matter because “the Pennsylvania court has assumed full 
jurisdiction over the matter, [and] superseded the Order of the State of 
Maine.”  Fitzpatrick’s motion to dismiss contained factual assertions—without 
any accompanying affidavits—and legal arguments.  After a pretrial/status 
conference on the issue of jurisdiction, the court (O’Mara, J.) denied that 
motion, determining, in relevant part, that 
once “Home State” jurisdiction is established, no other state may 
simply “assume full jurisdiction” such that its orders “supersede” 
orders of the “Home State,” unless the parties and the child have 
all left the “Home State.”  Here, while [Fitzpatrick] and the child 
have moved to Pennsylvania, [there] is not even an allegation that 
[McCrary] no longer lives in Maine, or has left this immediate 
area. 
 
Fitzpatrick filed a motion to reconsider, which included further factual 
assertions—again, 
without 
any 
accompanying 
affidavits—and 
legal 
arguments.  The court denied that motion in an order dated February 21, 
2017.  On the same date, following a hearing where Fitzpatrick failed to 
appear, the court granted McCrary’s motion to modify, awarding her primary 
residence of the child.2    
                                         
2  The court found that although McCrary had agreed to the January 28, 2016, order changing 
primary residence from herself to Fitzpatrick “[d]ue to problems maintaining her sobriety,” she was 
“now . . . sober in excess of nine months,” and had “maintained steady employment, maintained her 
own home, and maintained her sobriety . . . despite challenges including the death of her father and 
 
4 
[¶5]  Several weeks later, on March 8, 2017, the court had a telephone 
conference with the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas judge who had 
issued the “interim order” in August 2016, regarding home state jurisdiction.  
As a result of that conference, the Pennsylvania court entered an order 
“relinquish[ing] jurisdiction of this case and find[ing] that jurisdiction lies 
with the Maine District Court.”   
[¶6]  On April 3, 2017, Fitzpatrick filed in the Maine District Court a 
motion for relief from judgment and requested a hearing regarding that 
motion.  See M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4).  The court denied that motion on June 7, 
2017.  Fitzpatrick then filed a motion for findings of fact, which the court 
denied.  See M.R. Civ. P. 52(b).  This appeal followed.  See 14 M.R.S. § 1901(1) 
(2017); M.R. App. P. 2(b)(3) (Tower 2016.))3 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶7]  On appeal, Fitzpatrick argues that the court erred in denying his 
M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) motion because, after Pennsylvania assumed jurisdiction 
over the child custody matter, Maine necessarily lost jurisdiction over that 
                                                                                                                                   
lack of meaningful contact with [the child].”  Furthermore, the court found that McCrary had 
“encountered great difficulty seeing [the child], or even learning about [the child], due to 
[Fitzpatrick’s] actions,” and that “[d]espite traveling to Pennsylvania, [McCrary] has seen [the child] 
only twice in 18 months.” 
3  The restyled Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure do not apply because this appeal was filed 
before September 1, 2017.  See M.R. App. P. 1 (restyled Rules). 
 
5 
matter.  Fitzpatrick also contends that the court erred, pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. 
§ 1740, by not allowing him to “present facts and legal arguments [to the 
court] before a decision on jurisdiction was made.”  We address each of these 
arguments in turn. 
A. 
Jurisdiction 
[¶8]  “A Maine trial court’s ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion is ordinarily 
subject to the deferential abuse of discretion standard on appeal.”  Reliable 
Copy Serv., Inc. v. Liberty, 2011 ME 127, ¶ 8, 32 A.3d 1041.  However, that 
standard differs when “a party seeking relief from a judgment alleges a 
jurisdictional defect . . . pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) that would render the 
judgment void.”  Id.  Thus, “[i]f the judgment is void, there is no room for the 
court to exercise discretion—the judgment must be set aside.”  Id. (alteration 
omitted) (quotation marks omitted).  
[¶9]  Jurisdictional questions regarding determinations of parental 
custody are governed by both the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), 19-A M.R.S. §§ 1731-1783 (2017), and the 
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C.S. § 1738A (LEXIS 
through Pub. L. No. 115-137).  Barclay v. Eckert, 2000 ME 10, ¶ 8, 743 A.2d 
1259.  In the event of a conflict, the PKPA preempts the UCCJEA.  Id.  
 
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“Otherwise, the statutes are considered in conjunction with one another.”  
Cole v. Cushman, 2008 ME 72, ¶ 6, 946 A.2d 430.   
[¶10]  The PKPA provides for the continuing jurisdiction of the state 
that initially enters a child custody order: 
The jurisdiction of a court of a State which has made a child 
custody or visitation determination consistently with the 
provisions of this section continues as long as the requirement of 
subsection (c)(1) of this section [requiring that the State have 
jurisdiction under its own laws] continues to be met and such 
State remains the residence of the child or of any contestant. 
 
28 U.S.C.S. § 1738A(d).  Pursuant to the UCCJEA, Maine has initial child 
custody jurisdiction if it is  
the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of 
the proceeding or was the home state of the child within 6 months 
before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is 
absent from [Maine] but a parent or person acting as a parent 
continues to live in [Maine].   
 
19-A M.R.S. § 1745(1)(A).  Maine has “exclusive, continuing jurisdiction” over 
a child custody order pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 1746(1)(A), (B), which states, 
in relevant, 
1.  
Exclusive, 
continuing 
jurisdiction.  Except 
as 
otherwise provided in section 1748, a court of this State that has 
made a child custody determination consistent with section 1745 
or 1747 has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the 
determination until: 
 
 
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A.  A court of this State determines that neither the child, 
nor the child and one parent, nor the child and a person 
acting as a parent have a significant connection with this 
State and that substantial evidence is no longer available in 
this State concerning the child’s care, protection, training 
and personal relationships; or 
 
B.  A court of this State or a court of another state 
determines that the child, the child’s parents and any 
person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this 
State. 
 
 
[¶11]  Pursuant to the above-cited statutes, Maine maintains 
jurisdiction over a custody matter as long as (1) it had initial child custody 
jurisdiction; (2) it remains the residence of the child or any contestant; and 
(3) a court has not made any of the determinations provided in 19-A M.R.S. 
§ 1746(1)(A) or (B).  28 U.S.C.S. § 1738A(d); 19-A M.R.S. §§ 1745, 1746.  
 
[¶12]  Here, Fitzpatrick does not dispute that Maine had initial child 
custody jurisdiction.  However, he argues that the Pennsylvania court 
“implicit[ly]” determined, pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 1746(1)(B), that McCrary 
no longer lived in Maine.   
 
[¶13]  This argument is without merit.  In its interim order, the 
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas did not acknowledge McCrary’s state of 
residence, let alone make a finding that she no longer resided in Maine.  
Moreover, in his complaint to confirm custody, Fitzpatrick twice averred that 
 
8 
McCrary lived in Houlton, Maine.  Accordingly, even assuming the 
Pennsylvania court could make such an “implicit finding,”4 there is no 
competent record evidence to support that finding.  For this reason, Maine 
maintained exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the child custody matter 
pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 1746(1), and the court therefore did not err in 
denying Fitzpatrick’s Rule 60(b) motion. 
B. 
Communication Between Courts 
[¶14]  Fitzpatrick next argues that, pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 1740, the 
court erred by not permitting him to “present facts and legal arguments 
before a decision on jurisdiction was made.”  Because Fitzpatrick’s argument 
here is not jurisdictional, the court’s handling of its communication with the 
Pennsylvania court is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  See Town of 
Wiscasset v. Mason Station, LLC, 2015 ME 59, ¶ 6, 116 A.3d 458.  However, we 
review the interpretation of the UCCJEA de novo.  Cole, 2008 ME 72, ¶ 8, 
946 A.2d 430.   
[¶15]  Section 1740(1) provides, “A court of this State may 
communicate with a court in another state concerning a proceeding arising 
                                         
4  Because one of the UCCJEA’s purposes was to “enunciate[] a standard of continuing 
jurisdiction and clarif[y] modification jurisdiction,” L.D. 432, Prefatory Note (119th Legis. 1999), we 
express deep apprehension at the notion that a court, pursuant to the UCCJEA, could assume 
jurisdiction by making an implicit finding on such an important issue as a parent’s state of 
residence. 
 
9 
under this chapter.”  19-A M.R.S. § 1740(1) (emphasis added).  Section 
1740(2) then provides that “[t]he [Maine] court may allow the parties to 
participate in the communication.  If the parties are not able to participate in 
the communication, they must be given the opportunity to present facts and 
legal arguments before a decision on jurisdiction is made.”  19-A M.R.S. 
§ 1740(2) (emphasis added).   
 
[¶16]  The Legislature’s use of “may” rather than “shall” in sections 
1740(1) and (2) is significant.  See Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 240 (2001).  
“In general, the word ‘may,’ used in statutes, will be given ordinary meaning, 
unless it would manifestly defeat the object of the statute, and when used in a 
statute is permissive, discretionary, and not mandatory.”  Collins v. State, 
161 Me. 445, 449, 213 A.2d 835 (1965) (quotation marks omitted).  
Accordingly, because the word “may” in sections 1740(1) and (2) is 
permissive rather than mandatory, we conclude that it is left to the trial 
court’s sound discretion both whether to communicate with a court from 
another state and whether to allow parties to participate in that 
communication.   
 
[¶17]  Our construction of section 1740 is bolstered by the Legislature’s 
language in the second sentence of section 1740(2), which provides, “If the 
 
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parties are not able to participate in the communication, they must be given 
the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a decision on 
jurisdiction is made.”  19-A M.R.S. § 1740(2) (emphasis added).  In contrast to 
the permissive language contained in section 1740(1) and in the first sentence 
of section 1740(2), the Legislature’s use of the mandatory verb “must” plainly 
provides that if the court allows the parties to participate in its 
communication with an out-of-state court—but the parties are not able to 
participate in that conversation—the court is then required to provide those 
parties an opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a decision 
on jurisdiction is made.   
[¶18]  Here, consistent with the plain language of section 1740(2), the 
court exercised its discretion and declined to allow the parties to participate 
in its communication with the Pennsylvania court.  Having done so, the court 
was not then required to give Fitzpatrick an opportunity to present facts and 
legal arguments regarding jurisdiction before a decision on that issue was 
made.5  Accordingly, because the court acted within the confines of section 
1740(2), and because Fitzpatrick had already presented facts and legal 
                                         
5  The better practice may have been, before making a decision regarding jurisdiction, to 
communicate with the out-of-state court and allow the parties to present facts and arguments on 
that issue.  However, 19-A M.R.S. § 1740 (2017) does not require the court to do so. 
 
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arguments regarding jurisdiction on two occasions—first in his motion to 
dismiss and then in his motion to reconsider—we cannot say that the court 
abused its discretion in denying Fitzpatrick a third opportunity to address the 
matter. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
James M. Dunleavy, Esq., Currier & Trask, P.A., Presque Isle, for appellant Eric 
N. Fitzpatrick 
 
Arlene McCrary, appellee pro se 
 
 
Houlton District Court docket number FM-2013-121 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY