Title: Fountain v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MARTIN E. FOUNTAIN, 
 
 
Defendant-Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff-Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 201, 2014 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below:  Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  Cr. ID 0209005515 
§ 
§   
 
Submitted:  June 10, 2014 
Decided:  August 19, 2014 
Revised:  August 26, 2014 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 26th day of August 2014, upon consideration of the appellant’s opening 
brief, the State’s motion to affirm, and the record below, it appears to the Court 
that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Martin Fountain, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s order, dated March 28, 2014, denying his motion for correction of 
sentence.  The State filed a motion to affirm the judgment below on the ground that 
it is manifest on the face of Fountain’s opening brief that his appeal is without 
merit.  We agree and affirm.  
 
2
(2) 
A Superior Court jury convicted Fountain in March 2003 of nine 
criminal offenses, including two counts of Delivery of Cocaine under 16 Del. C. 
§ 4751.  Fountain had been convicted before for an offense under Chapter 16.  At 
the time Fountain was convicted in March 2003, 16 Del. C. § 4763(a)(3) contained 
a provision enhancing the mandatory minimum sentence for violation of § 4751 for 
defendants who had previously been convicted of an offense under Chapter 16: 
In any prosecution for violation of § 4751 or 4761(a)(1) where a 
defendant has previously been convicted of any offense under this 
chapter … the minimum term of imprisonment shall be 30 years and 
the maximum term for such conviction shall be 99 years and 15 years 
of such minimum term shall be a mandatory minimum term of 
imprisonment and shall not be subject to suspension and no person 
shall be eligible for probation or parole during such portion of such 
minimum term.1  
 
Subsection (d) of § 4751 itself also contained a provision increasing the mandatory 
minimum sentence under that section if the defendant was not an addict.2 
(3) 
Following a presentence investigation, the Superior Court sentenced 
Fountain to serve a total period of 103 years at Level V incarceration, to be 
suspended after serving thirty years and nine months in prison for decreasing levels 
of supervision.  This Court affirmed Fountain’s convictions and sentences on direct 
                                                 
1 16 Del. C. 4763(a). 
2 16 Del. C. 4751(d) (increasing the mandatory minimum sentence for a defendant 
determined to be a non-addict to 6 years for the first violation and 12 years for the 
second or subsequent violation of this section). 
 
3
appeal.3  Thereafter, Fountain moved for postconviction relief, which the Superior 
Court denied.  We affirmed that denial on appeal.4  In September 2013, Fountain 
filed a motion for correction of illegal sentence under Superior Court Criminal 
Rule 35(a).  The Superior Court denied his motion.  This appeal followed. 
(4) 
We review the Superior Court’s denial of a motion for correction of 
sentence under Rule 35(a) for abuse of discretion, although questions of law are 
reviewed de novo.5  Relief under Rule 35(a) is available when the sentence 
imposed exceeds the statutorily authorized limits, violates double jeopardy, is 
ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is 
internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is 
uncertain as to substance, or is a sentence that the judgment of conviction did not 
authorize.6   
(5) 
In this case, Fountain argues that both of his 15-year mandatory 
minimum sentences for Delivery of Cocaine are illegal under Alleyne v. United 
States.7  In Alleyne, the United States Supreme Court held that any fact that 
increases the mandatory minimum sentence for a crime is an element of the crime, 
not just a sentencing factor, and must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a 
                                                 
3 Fountain v. State, 2004 WL 1965196 (Del. Aug. 18, 2004). 
4 Fountain v. State, 2009 WL 189888 (Del. Jan. 12, 2009). 
5 Williams v. State, 2012 WL 4663065, *1 (Del. Oct. 2, 2012). 
6 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 
7 133 U.S. 2151 (2013).   
 
4
reasonable doubt.  Fountain’s argument contains three parts.  First, Fountain 
asserts that his sentence is illegal because the State was required to prove to a jury 
that he was a non-addict in order for him to receive a mandatory minimum 
sentence of 15 years for Delivery of Cocaine under § 4751(d).  Because Fountain 
contends that proof of non-addiction is a fact that increases the statutory minimum 
penalty, he argues that under Alleyne, a jury was required to find him a non-addict.  
Second, Fountain contends that his sentence is also illegal under Alleyne because 
the State was required to prove to the jury that he had a prior conviction of an 
offense under Chapter 16 for him to receive a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 
years under § 4763(a)(3).  Finally, Fountain asserts that his case is not a simple 
enhanced sentencing based on a prior conviction.  Instead, Fountain contends that 
§ 4763(a)(3) so greatly increased the sentencing range for his offense, that his 
offense was reclassified de facto to a more serious level felony. 
(6) 
We find no merit to these contentions.  As to his initial argument, 
Fountain concedes that this Court previously held in Campbell v. State8 that, for 
offenses committed on or before June 30, 2003,9 the Delaware criminal statutes 
provided for two alternative sentencing enhancement schemes for any defendant 
                                                 
8 2004 WL 1535805 (Del. June 18, 2004). 
9 See Seeney v. State, 2004 WL 2297394, *1 n.3 (Del. Oct. 4, 2004) (holding that 
House Bill 210, which reduced the 15-year minimum mandatory prison term under 
§ 4763(a)(3), applied only to offenses committed after June 30, 2003, the date the 
bill was passed, and was not retroactively applicable).  
 
5
convicted under § 4751.10  The State could either establish under § 4751(d) that the 
defendant was a non-addict or under § 4763(a)(3) the State could demonstrate that 
the defendant had been convicted of an offense under Chapter 16 for the second 
time.11  Fountain was convicted and sentenced as a subsequent offender under 
§ 4763(a)(3), which did not require proof that he was a non-addict.  Fountain was 
not sentenced under § 4751(d), which hinges on non-addict status.  Because his 
sentence did not turn in any way on whether he was a non-addict under § 4751(d), 
Fountain’s argument is based on a factual error and has no merit.  And, 
notwithstanding Fountain’s argument to the contrary, we find no basis to overturn 
our decision in Campbell. 
(7) 
Next, Fountain argues that his sentence is illegal because the State 
was required to prove his prior conviction to a jury.  But, in Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, the United States Supreme Court specifically held that, “[o]ther than the 
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”12  Thus, we have held that, under Apprendi, a defendant’s prior 
criminal record does not have to be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a 
                                                 
10 Campbell v. State, 2004 WL 1535805, *1 (Del. June 18, 2004). 
11 Id. 
12 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 
6
reasonable doubt.13  Apprendi sensibly does not require a second jury to determine 
for itself that a defendant was previously convicted of an offense that increases the 
statutory maximum.  Instead, the official record of that prior valid conviction is 
sufficient.   
(8) 
Lastly, Fountain’s attempt to distinguish Apprendi by contending that 
§ 4763(a)(3) did not merely enhance his sentence based on his prior conviction but 
essentially changed the crime for which he was charged into a more serious level 
felony is unpersuasive.  The increase in punishment level because of a prior 
offense does not change Fountain’s convictions for Delivery of Cocaine into 
convictions for a different offense.14  Rather, the prior conviction is solely a fact 
that increased the mandatory minimum sentence for Delivery of Cocaine.  In any 
event, as indicated, Apprendi does not require a second jury to make a finding that 
Fountain had been convicted validly on a prior occasion. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
                                                 
13 Johnson v. State, 2008 WL 5191835, *1 (Del. Dec. 11, 2008). 
14 See Talley v. State, 2003 WL 23104202, *2 (Del. Dec. 29, 2003) (rejecting 
defendant’s contention that, under Apprendi, his prior conviction for DUI had to be 
proven to a jury because the fact of his prior conviction changed a misdemeanor 
offense into a felony).