Title: Sandra E. Brower v. ICT Group

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). COLEMAN, J., writing for a majority Court. The issue before the Court is whether an employee, who punched out at the end of the workday and thereafter falls while descending rear stairs that lead from the street only to the injured worker's employer's offices in a multi-tenant office building, has sustained a compensable accident under the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act). Sandra Brower was employed by ICT Group as a telemarketer. She was injured on May 9, 1997 when she fell down concrete steps within a two-story multi-tenant building. ICT Group was located on the second floor of the office building. There were three ways to gain access to ICT Group's leased premises: 1) an elevator centrally located in front of the building and opening across from the main entrance to ICT Group's offices; 2) a front stairway next to the elevator; and 3) a rear stairway that opened only to ICT Group's leased premises and the basement, functioning similar to a fire escape. The rear stairway had an outside entrance on the ground level and was fully enclosed, with its top landing covered with the same carpeting as inside ICT Group's offices. There was a doorway that led directly from the top landing into ICT Group's premises. This rear stairway was used by ICT Group employees for ingress and egress to the office and to take smoking breaks. No customers or clients visited the premises and the rear stairway and top landing were cleaned by the landlord. Brower fell from the top landing of the stairway after she had punched out on the time clock and had exited through the rear doorway to the stairwell. Brower contends that the rear stairs were essentially part of ICT's leased premises and that ICT controlled the stairway within the meaning of the Act. Therefore, Brower maintains that the accident is compensable because she had not left her place of employment. ICT Group contends that based on the premises rule, the accident is not compensable because Brower had left her place of employment and the accident occurred in a place the employer did not control. The Judge of Compensation found that under both the coming and going rule and the premises rule, the accident was not compensable. The judge reasoned that the 1979 amendments to the Act represented a legislative mandate to contain the costs of workers' compensation by limiting the judicially-created exceptions to the going and coming rule. The judge was of the view that the Legislature accomplished its goal by specifically establishing a premises rule that defined when employment begins and ends. The Appellate Division affirmed, substantially for the reasons expressed by the Judge of Compensation. The Supreme Court granted Brower's petition for certification. HELD: Based on a consideration of the undisputed facts, such as the physical location and layout of the rear stairway, and the controlling legal principles and social policies advanced by the Workers' Compensation Act, Sandra Brower's accident is compensable. 1. Employment begins when an employee arrives at the employer's premises to report for work and ends when the employee leaves the employer's place of employment, excluding areas not under the control of the employer. An injury to an employee that happens going to or coming from work arises out of and in the course of employment if the injury takes place on the employer's premises. Under the Act, accidents are not compensable if they occur in areas outside of the employer's control. (Pp. 5-6) 2. The fact that Brower punched out does not preclude compensability. The dispositive factors are the site of the accident and the employer's control. Whether ICT Group leased the rear stairway is irrelevant; it is ICT Group's conduct regarding the site of the accident that is important in determining control under the premises rule. An accident is compensable if the employer has the right of control; it is not necessary to establish that the employer actually exercised that right. (Pp. 6-7) 3. ICT Group knew or should have known that its employees used the back stairway to come and go and for smoking breaks. Given that knowledge and its failure to take any action forbidding employee use of the stairway, ICT Group ratified its employees' use of the rear stairway for ingress and egress. Moreover, the physical layout and location of the rear stairway prevents it from being considered a common area. Thus, consistent with the policy of liberally interpreting the Act to favor employees, and because an employee is entitled to safe egress from the work premise, Brower's accident is compensable. Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for further proceedings. JUSTICE VERNIERO, dissenting, is of the view that, in the absence of the employer's business use or ownership of the rear stairway, an employee's idiosyncratic use does not support a finding that the stairway is an extension of the employer's premises. Further, an employer does not control a stairway merely because the employer refrains from taking action to disapprove an individual employee's selective use of that area. The plain words of the statute, prior case law, and public policy require that the judgment of the Appellate Division be affirmed. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES O'HERN, STEIN, LONG and LAVECCHIA join in JUSTICE COLEMAN'S opinion. JUSTICE VERNIERO filed a separate dissenting opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 40 September Term 1999 SANDRA E. BROWER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ICT GROUP, Respondent-Respondent. Argued March 27, 2000-- Decided July 13, 2000 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. William A. Sheehan argued the cause for appellant. Francis T. Giuliano argued the cause for respondent (Mattson & Madden, attorneys; LeRoy H. Mattson, of counsel; Michael J. Pasnik, on the brief). The opinion of the Court was delivered by COLEMAN, J. This workers' compensation case raises the issue of whether an employee, who has punched out at the end of the workday and falls while descending steps that lead from the street only to the injured worker's employer's offices in a multi-tenant office building, has sustained a compensable accident under the Workers' Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -128 (Act). The Division of Workers' Compensation (Division) and the Appellate Division held that the accident is not compensable. We granted the worker's petition for certification, 162 N.J. 486 (1999), and now reverse. The premises rule is based on the notion that an injury to an employee that happens going to or coming from work arises out of and in the course of employment if the injury takes place on the employer's premises. Cressey v. Campus Chefs, Div. of CVI Serv., Inc., 204 N.J. Super. 337, 342-43, 498 A.2d 1274 (App. Div. 1985). The premises rule limits recovery to injuries which occur on the employer's premises . . . by confining the term 'course of employment' to the physical limits of the employer's premises. Id. at 342, 498 A.2d 1274. Thus, unless one of the statutory exceptions not implicated here is triggered, an employee who is not physically on the employer's premises is not technically in the course of the employment. Livingstone v. Abraham & Straus, Inc., 111 N.J. 89, 96, 543 A.2d 45 (1988). The Legislature used the phrase excluding areas not under the control of the employer in its definition of employment because it intended to include areas controlled by the employer within the definition. That phrase was intended to make clear that the premises rule can entail more than the four walls of an office or plant. [Kristiansen v. Morgan, 153 N.J. 298, 316 (1998), modified for other reasons, 158 N.J. 681 (1999)]. The premises rule is important because as a general rule we interpret the [Act] as not allowing compensation for accidents occurring in areas outside of the employer's control. Zelasko v. Refrigerated Food Express, 128 N.J. 329, 336 (1992). The fact that petitioner had punched out on the time clock does not preclude compensability because the situs of the accident and the employer's control of that location are the dispositive factors. See Kristiansen, supra, 153 N.J. at 317 (stating an employee who punches out on the time clock at the [employer's] front entrance and is injured while walking through the plant to reach his or her car parked in a rear parking lot sustains a compensable accident); Cressey supra, 204 N.J. Super. at 343 (stating duties of maintenance do not indicate control). Thus, the premises rule determines whether petitioner's accident is compensable. The narrow issue is whether ICT Group controlled the stairway on which petitioner fell. Whether the employer leased that stairway is not a relevant consideration. 1 Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation 15.43 (1990). The employer's conduct regarding the situs of the accident, however, is an important consideration in determining control. See generally Ramos v. M & F Fashions, Inc., 154 N.J. 583, 591-93 (1998) (analyzing employer's conduct regarding a freight elevator in determining whether employer exercised control). SANDRA E. BROWER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ICT GROUP, Respondent-Respondent. VERNIERO, J., dissenting. The Court finds in favor of compensability, based on its conclusion that the stairway on which the injury occurred was tantamount to a private staircase, thereby making the area part of the employer's premises in satisfaction of the test required under the workers' compensation statute. I hold a contrary view. I believe that in the absence of the employer's business use or ownership of the stairway, an employee's idiosyncratic use does not support a finding that the stairway is an extension of the employer's premises. Further, in my view, an employer does not control a stairwell merely because the employer refrains from taking action to disapprove an employee's individual and selective use of that area. The plain words of the statute, prior case law, and public policy require that we affirm the Appellate Division. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. NO. A-40 SANDRA E. BROWER, Petitioner-Appellant v. ICT GROUP, Respondent-Respondent. DECIDED July 13, 2000 Chief Justice Poritz