Title: Gilmer v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Anthony Gilmer v. State of Maryland, No. 14, September Term, 2005.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – NOLLE PROSEQUI:
Petitioner sought review of a judgment of the Court of Special Appeals affirming the Circuit Court’s
refusal to give him credit for time served for charges unrelated to those for which he was being
sentenced, that the State, without a plea bargain, had nolle prossed prior to sentencing.  The Court
of Appeals held that, under the circumstances of the case sub judice, a nolle prosequi entered outside
of a plea agreement constitutes a dismissal for the purpose of receiving credit for time served under
Section 6-218 (b)(2) of the Criminal Procedure Article.  
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 14 
September Term, 2005
ANTHONY GILMER
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Harrell, J., dissents
Filed:   December 7, 2005
1
Maryland Code (2002), Section 6-218(b)(2) of the Criminal Procedure Article, states:
If a defendant is in custody because of a charge that results in a
dismissal or acquittal, the time that would have been credited if
a sentence had been imposed shall be credited against any
sentence that is based on a charge for which a warrant or
commitment was filed during that custody.
2
We have defined the term nolle prosequi as “an official declaration by the State,
announcing that it will not pursue the charges in a particular charging document.”  In re
Anthony W., 388 Md. 257, 258 n.3, 879 A.2d 717, 720 n. 3 (2005).  A nolle prosequi is often
shortened and referred to as a nolle prosse or nol pros.  See State v. Price, 385 Md. 261, 272,
868 A.2d 252, 258 (2005); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1074 (8th ed. 1999) (explaining
that a nolle prosequi is “often shortened to nolle pros; nol -pros; nol pro.”)
Petitioner, Anthony Gilmer,  pursuant to Maryland Code (2001), Section 6-218(b)(2)
of the Criminal Procedure Article,1 seeks review of a judgment of the Court of Special
Appeals affirming the Circuit Court’s refusal to give him credit for time served for charges
unrelated to those for which he was being sentenced, that the State, without a plea bargain,
had nolle prossed2 prior to sentencing. The specific question presented by Gilmer is:
Is a nolle prosequi the equivalent of a “dismissal” for purposes
of Criminal Procedure Article Section 6-218 (b)(2) which
requires a trial court to give credit at sentencing for pre-trial
custody on an unrelated offense that results in a “dismissal or
acquittal” where a warrant or commitment for the convicted
offense was filed during that custody?
Gilmer v. State, 387 Md. 122, 874 A.2d 917 (2005).  We hold that, under the circumstances
of this case, a nolle prosequi is the equivalent of a “dismissal” for the purpose of Section 6-
218(b)(2) of the Criminal Procedure Article.
I.  Background
On September 1, 2002, Anthony Gilmer was in pretrial detention at the Baltimore City
3
Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Rep. Vol.), Section 411A(b) of Article 27, stated in
relevant part:
(b) Murder in the first degree. – A person who attempts to
commit murder in the first degree is guilty of a felony and on
conviction is subject to imprisonment for not more than life.
Section 411A has been recodified without substantive changes as Maryland Code (2002),
Section 2-205 of the Criminal Law Article.
4
Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Rep. Vol., 2001 Supp.), Section 12A-1 of Article 27,
stated:
(a) Serious physical injury; use of a firearm. – (1) A person may
not intentionally cause or attempt to cause serious physical
injury to another.
(2) A person may not commit an assault with a firearm,
including:
-2-
Detention Center on a charge of attempted murder and had been at the Center since July 2,
2001, a period of 426 days.  On September 1, 2002, Gilmer had an altercation with a fellow
detainee, Jonathan Blue, over whose turn it was to use the telephone during “passive
recreation” time in the “day room,” a place where detainees are permitted to engage in
activities such as playing cards, watching television, and using the telephone.  Gilmer and
Blue were separated but then permitted to return to the day room, where Gilmer and Blue
continued to argue, and Gilmer, thereafter, repeatedly stabbed Blue with a silver lock blade
knife. 
Gilmer was charged with attempted first degree murder in violation of Maryland Code
(1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Section 411A (b) of Article 27,3 first-degree assault in violation of
Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Section 12A-1 of Article 27,4 openly wearing and
(i) A handgun, antique firearm, rifle, shotgun, short-barreled
shotgun, or short-barreled rifle, as those terms are defined in  §
36F of this article;
(ii) An assault pistol, as defined in § 36H-1 of this article;
(iii) A pistol, revolver, or antique pistol or revolver, as those
terms are defined in § 441 of this article; and
(iv) A machine gun, as defined in § 372 of this article.
(b) Penalty. – A person who violates this section is guilty of the
felony of assault in the first degree and on conviction is subject
to imprisonment for not more than 25 years.
Section 12A-1 has been recodified without substantive change as Maryland Code (2002),
Section 3-202 of the Criminal Law Article. 
5
Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Section 36 of Article 27, in relevant part
stated:
(a) In general. – (1) Every person who shall wear or carry any
dirk knife, bowie knife, switchblade knife, star knife, sandclub,
metal knuckles, razor, nunchaku, or any other dangerous or
deadly weapon of any kind, whatsoever (penknives without
switchblade and handguns, excepted) concealed upon or about
his person, and every person who shall wear or carry any such
weapon, chemical mace, pepper mace, or tear gas device openly
with the intent or purpose of injuring any person in any unlawful
manner, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction,
shall be fined not more than $1,000 or be imprisoned in jail, or
sentenced to the Maryland Department of Correction for not
more than three years.
Section 36 has been recodified without substantive change as Maryland Code (2002), Section
4-101(c) of the Criminal Law Article.
-3-
carrying a dangerous and deadly weapon with the intent of causing injury in an unlawful
manner in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Section 36 of Article 27, 5
reckless endangerment in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Section 12A-
6
Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.), Section 12A-2 of Article 27, in
relevant part stated:
(a) Creation of substantial risk of death or serious physical
injury; penalties. – (1) Any person who recklessly engages in
conduct that creates a substantial risk of death or serious
physical injury to another person is guilty of the misdemeanor
of reckless endangerment and on conviction is subject to a fine
of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment for not more than 5
years or both.
Section 12A-2(a)(1) has been recodified without substantive change as Md. Code (2002),
Section 3-204(a) of the Criminal Law Article.
7
Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Section 12A of Article 27, stated:
(a) General prohibition. – A person may not commit an assault.
(b) Violation; penalties. – A person who violates this section is
guilty of the misdemeanor of assault in the second degree and on
conviction is subject to a fine of not more than $2,500 or
imprisonment for not more than 10 years or both.
Section 12A has been recodified without substantive change as Maryland Code (2002),
Section 3-203 of the Criminal Law Article. 
8
Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Section 411A (a) of Article 27, stated in
relevant part:
(a) Murder in the second degree. – A person who attempts to
commit murder in the second degree is guilty of a felony and on
conviction is subject to imprisonment for not more than 30
years.
-4-
2 of Article 27,6 second-degree assault in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.
Vol.), Section 12A of Article 27,7 and attempted second-degree murder in violation of
Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Section 411A (a) of Article 27.8
Section 411A(a) has been recodified without substantive change as Maryland Code (2002),
Section 2-206 of the Criminal Law Article.
9
The voir dire question issue is not before us as Gilmer did not raise it in his Petition
for Writ of Certiorari.
10
Maryland Code, Section 6-218(b)(3) of the Criminal Procedure Article, states:
In a case other than a case described in paragraph (2) of this
subsection, the sentencing court may apply credit against a
sentence for time spent in custody for another charge or crime.
-5-
On June 13, 2003, a jury found Gilmer guilty of first and second-degree assault.  At
sentencing the Circuit Court judge merged the second degree assault into the first degree
assault and sentenced Gilmer to fifteen years incarceration.  The judge, however, refused to
credit the 426 days of confinement that Gilmer had already served on the attempted murder
charges that had been nolle prossed by the State prior to sentencing.  Gilmer filed an
unsuccessful motion for a new trial prior to noting an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.
Before the Court of Special Appeals, Gilmer contended that the Circuit Court erred
in refusing to give him credit for the time he had served in detention for the attempted murder
charge, pursuant to Section 6-218(b)(2) of the Criminal Procedure Article and that it also
erred in refusing to ask a voir dire question that he had proposed.9  Gilmer v. State, 161
Md.App. 21, 24, 866 A.2d 918, 920 (2005).  The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the
denial of the time served credit decision of the trial court and held that a nolle prosequi is not
a dismissal under the plain meaning of Section 6-218(b)(2), and therefore, Section 6-
218(b)(3)10 was applicable, and that, pursuant to Section 6-218(b)(3), which allows the court
to exercise its discretion in determining whether to grant credit, the judge did not abuse his
-6-
discretion. Id. at 31, 866 A.2d at 924.  To hold otherwise, it noted, could potentially result
in double credit received by Gilmer for time served were he later prosecuted for the
attempted murder charges.  Id. at 29, 866 A2d. at 923. 
II.  Standard of Review
The construction of Sections 6-218(b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Criminal Procedure Article
implicate a de novo review.  Cain v. State, 386 Md. 320, 327, 872 A.2d 681, 685 (2005).  Our
goal, when interpreting statutes, is to "identify and effectuate the legislative intent underlying
the statute(s) at issue.”  Id.; Serio v. Baltimore County, 384 Md. 373, 863 A.2d 952, 962
(2004), quoting  Drew v. First Guaranty Mortgage Corp., 379 Md. 318, 327, 842 A.2d 1, 6
(2003), in turn quoting Derry v. State, 358 Md. 325, 335, 748 A.2d 478, 483 (2000)); Pete
v. State, 384 Md. 47, 57-58, 862 A.2d 419, 425 (2004); Graves v. State, 364 Md. 329, 346,
772 A.2d 1225, 1235 (2001).  The best source of legislative intent is the statute’s plain
language, and when the language is clear and unambiguous, our inquiry ordinarily ends there.
Cain, 386 Md. at 327, 872 A.2d at 685; Serio, 384 Md. at 373, 863 A.2d at 962; Pete, 384
Md. at 57-58, 862 A.2d at 425; Drew, 379 Md. at 327, 842 A.2d at 6; Beyer v. Morgan State
University, 369 Md. 335, 349, 800 A.2d 707, 715  (2002); Whack v. State, 338 Md. 665, 672,
659 A.2d 1347, 1350 (1995).  When there is more than one reasonable interpretation of a
statute, however, the statute is ambiguous.  Moore v. State, 388 Md. 446, 453, 879 A.2d
1111, 1114 (2005); Melton v. State, 379 Md. 471, 476-77, 842 A.2d 743, 746 (2004).  When
the statutory language is ambiguous, we resolve that ambiguity in light of the legislative
intent, considering the legislative history, case law, and statutory purpose. See Moore, 388
11
“Banked time” is a “reserve of time established when a defendant spends time in
custody that is not yet but may be credited against a valid sentence.”  Fleeger v. State, 301
Md. 155, 163, 482 A.2d 490, 494 (1984).
12
“Dead time” is “time spent in custody that will not be credited to any valid sentence.”
Fleeger, 301 Md. at 165, 482 A.2d at 495.
-7-
Md. at 453, 79 A.2d at 1114; Deville v. State, 383 Md. 217, 223, 858 A.2d 484, 487 (2004);
Melton, 379 Md. at 476-77, 842 A.2d at 746.  We consider not only the ordinary meaning of
the words, but also how that language relates to the overall meaning, setting, and purpose of
the act.”  Moore,  388 Md. at 453, 79 A.2d at 1114; Deville, 383 Md. at 223, 858 A.2d at
487. The statute’s provisions must be read in “a commonsensical perspective to avoid a
farfetched interpretation.” Cain, 386 Md. at 328, 872 A.2d at 685, Serio, 384 Md. at 373, 863
A.2d at 962; Graves, 364 Md. at 346, 772 A.2d at 1235; Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137,
647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994); Dickerson v. State, 324 Md. 163, 171, 596 A.2d 648, 652 (1991).
We construe the statute as a whole so that no word, clause, sentence, or phrase is rendered
surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory. Moore,  388 Md. at 453, 79 A.2d at 1115;
Comptroller v. Phillips, 384 Md. 583, 865 A.2d 590 (2005).
III.  Discussion
Gilmer contends that Section 6-218(b)(2) is ambiguous because it does not define the
term “dismissal.”  He contends that, based on the two purposes set forth by the Legislature
in enacting Section 6-218 of the Criminal Procedure Article, namely to avoid “banked time”11
and to eliminate “dead time,”12 it is only proper that the word “dismissal” in Section 2-
618(b)(2) of the Criminal Procedure Article be interpreted to include disposition of a case
13
A “liberty interest” is an interest that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment which cannot be arbitrarily denied without due process. U.S. v.
Ramos, 401 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 2005).
-8-
by nolle prosequi, even in the absence of a plea bargain relating to the charge, so that the trial
judge was required to give him credit for the time he served in pre-trial detention for
attempted murder.  Additionally, he argues, Maryland Rule 4-247 makes clear that a nolle
prosequi is a dismissal, and, the fact that a charge or charges can still be prosecuted after
being nolle prossed is not dispositive because a dismissal also may permit prosecution.  By
enacting Section 2-618(b)(2), Gilmer asserts that Maryland created a liberty interest13 for him
to obtain credit for his time served and that denying him credit for time served is denying a
right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The State, conversely, contends that the Circuit Court properly exercised its discretion
under Section 6-218(b)(3) in refusing to award Gilmer credit for his time served on the nolle
prossed attempted murder charge because the plain meaning of Section 6-218(b)(2) refers
only to an acquittal or dismissal, whereas Section 6-218(b)(3) refers to any case “other than
a case described in paragraph (2).”  The State argues that only a nolle prosequi entered as
part of a plea agreement is the equivalent of a dismissal because the nolle prosequi then has
the effect of precluding future prosecution and that to allow any nolle prosequi to constitute
a dismissal could create a windfall of double credit for the defendant if he or she were ever
convicted of the initial offense which was originally nolle prossed.  The State asserts that
Section 6-218(b)(2) is clear; it does not list nolle prosequi, and thus, to interpret the word
“dismissal” to include nolle prosequi would thereby render Section 6-218(b)(3) a nullity.
-9-
A.  Section 6-218 (b)(2) & (3)
The precursor of Sections 6-218 (a) and (b) was Section 638C(a) of Article 27, which
was enacted by the General Assembly in 1974, and provided:
Any person who is convicted and sentenced shall receive credit
against the term of a definite or life sentence or credit against
the minimum and maximum terms of an indictment sentence for
all time spent in the custody of any state, county or city jail,
correctional institution, hospital, mental hospital or other agency
as a result of the charge for which sentence is imposed or as a
result of the conduct on which the charge is based, and the term
of a definite or life sentence or the minimum and maximum
terms of an indeterminate sentence shall be diminished thereby.
In any case where a person has been in custody due to a charge
that culminated in a dismissal or acquittal, the amount of time
that would have been credited against a sentence for the charge,
had one been imposed, shall be credited against any sentence
that is based upon a charge for which a warrant or commitment
was lodged during the pendency of such custody.  In all other
cases, the sentencing court shall have the discretion to apply
credit against a sentence for time spent in custody for another
charge or offense.
1974 Md. Laws, Chap. 735, § 1 (emphasis added).  The preamble for the Bill established that
its purpose was “for providing that under certain circumstances persons shall receive credit
against their sentences for any time spent in custody.”  1974 Md. Laws, Chap. 735, § 1.  
In 1981 legislation was enacted to clarify that “the concept of giving credit against
sentence for time spent in custody does not apply to a parolee who commits a subsequent
offense and is incarcerated prior to the date on which he is sentenced for the subsequent
offense.”  1981 Md. Laws, Chap. 721.   The language added to the end of Section 638C (a)
read:
-10-
This section does not apply to a parolee who is returned to the
custody of the Division of Correction as a result of a subsequent
offense and is incarcerated prior to the date on which he is
sentenced for the subsequent offense.
1981 M d. Laws, Chap. 721.  
In Fleeger v. State, 301 Md. 155, 482 A.2d 490 (1984), we recognized that one
purpose for Section 638C (a) was to avoid “banked time,” a “reserve of time established
when a defendant spends time in custody that is not yet but may be credited against a valid
sentence.”   Id. at 163, 482 A.2d at 494.  Another purpose for enacting Section 638C(a) was
to eliminate “dead” time, “time spent in custody that will not be credited to any valid
sentence.”  Id. at 165, 482 A.2d at 495.  We explained that Section 638C addressed the
problem of “dead” time
by authorizing mandatory credit for any time spent in custody
while awaiting trial on an offense for which the defendant is
ultimately convicted.  The statute also seeks to eliminate dead
time that results when a defendant is in custody on one crime but
is ultimately convicted of another.  By enacting § 638C(a), the
General Assembly sought to ensure that a defendant receive as
much credit as possible for time spent in custody as is consistent
with constitutional and practical considerations.  An obvious
corollary is that the General Assembly sought to minimize the
amount of dead time.  Simply stated, we believe that no
legitimate legislative policy is advanced by maximizing dead
time or by withholding credit that is due a defendant under the
crediting statute.
Id. at 165, 482 A.2d at 495 (emphasis added).
In 2001, Section 638C (a) was recodified as Sections 6-218(a) and (b) of the Criminal
Procedure Article,  2001 Md. Laws, Chap. 10, § 2, which now provide:
-11-
(a) This section does not apply to a parolee who is returned to the
custody of the Division of Correction because of a subsequent
crime and is confined before being sentenced for the subsequent
crime.
(b)(1) A defendant who is convicted and sentenced shall receive
credit against and a reduction of the term of a definite or life
sentence, or the minimum and maximum terms of an
indeterminate sentence, for all time spent in the custody of a state
correctional facility, local correctional facility, hospital, facility
for persons with mental disorders, or other unit because of:
(i) the charge for which the sentence is imposed; or
(ii) the conduct on which the charge is based.
(2)  If a defendant is in custody because of a charge that results
in a dismissal or acquittal, the time that would have been credited
if a sentence had been imposed shall be credited against any
sentence that is based on a charge for which a warrant or
commitment was filed during that custody.
(3)  In a case other than a case described in paragraph (2) of this
subsection, the sentencing court may apply credit against a
sentence for time spent in custody for another charge or crime.
The issue before us is whether, like the Court of Special Appeals, we adopt a plain
meaning analysis of Section 6-218(b)(2) and determine that the mandatory credit for time
served does not apply because the term “nolle prosequi” is absent, or, whether we construe
Section 6-218(b)(2) as ambiguous.  The decision whether to utilize a plain meaning analysis
or an analysis based upon the ambiguity of a statute is made first by looking to see whether
the Legislature has provided a definition for the term in question.  Deville, 383 Md. at 229,
858 A.2d at 491 (“the legislative history of [the statute]  fails to provide an actual
definition.”); Melton, 379 Md. at 489, 842 A.2d at 753 (holding that the statute was
ambiguous because it “provides no definition of the term ‘violation,’ and provides no specific
direction as to the proper unit of prosecution.”).  If there is no definition, we then ask whether
-12-
there is more than one reasonable interpretation of the statutory language.  If there is, the
statutory language is ambiguous. Moore, 388 Md. at 453, 79 A.2d at 1114 (“When there is
more than one reasonable interpretation of the statute, the statute is ambiguous.”); Deville, 383
Md. at 223, 858 A.2d at 487 (“A statute is ambiguous when there are two or more reasonable
alternative interpretations of the statute.”); Melton , 379 Md. at 476-77, 842 A.2d at 746 (“We
have said that ambiguity exists within a statute when there are ‘two or more reasonable
alternative interpretations of the statute.’”) (quoting Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 387, 835
A.2d 1221, 1226 (2003)).
In this case, Section 6-218(b)(2) provides no definition for the term “dismissal.”
Moreover, the term “dismissal” has different meanings, depending on whether the dismissal
is entered with or without prejudice as explicated by the Court of Special Appeals in Parks
v. State, 41 Md.App. 381, 397 A.2d 215 (1979), aff’d, 287 Md. 11, 410 A.2d 597 (1980):
The words ‘with prejudice,’ when used in that context, have, of
course, a well-established meaning in the law.  They signify that
the dismissal is final, that the controversy is concluded and
cannot be reopened by a new or subsequent action.  A dismissal
‘with prejudice’ has been held to be as conclusive of the rights of
the parties as if the action had been prosecuted to a final
adjudication on the merits adverse to the complainant.
Parks, 41 Md.App. at 386, 397 A.2d at 215 (citations omitted).  Later in the opinion,
reflecting upon a change in the law under consideration from a dismissal with prejudice to a
dismissal without prejudice, the court noted:
[T]he General Assembly has made clear its intent that such a
dismissal for failure to comply with the requirements of the Act
should serve only to terminate that particular action and not to
-13-
preclude another.  That is what is meant by the phrase ‘without
prejudice.’
Id. at 388, 397 A.2d at 217 (citations omitted).  
The term “dismissal” in Section 6-218(b)(2), therefore, absent qualifying language of
with or without prejudice, reasonably can be interpreted in either of two ways: one in which
the unrelated offense may not be re-prosecuted, or the other in which the unrelated offense
subsequently may be prosecuted.  As a result, Section 2-618(b)(2) is ambiguous insofar as
what constitutes “dismissal.”
B.  Nolle Prosequi
Section 1-101 (k) of the Criminal Procedure Article provides:
"Nolle prosequi" means a formal entry on the record by the State
that declares the State's intention not to prosecute a charge.
Rule 4-247 of the Maryland Rules entitled “Nolle Prosequi” governs the disposition of
charges by nolle prosequi and its effect, and provides:
(a) Disposition by Nolle Prosequi.  The State’s Attorney may
terminate a prosecution on a charge and dismiss the charge by
entering a nolle prosequi on the record in open court.  The
defendant need not be present in court when the nolle prosequi
is entered, but in that event the clerk shall send notice to the
defendant, if the defendant’s whereabouts are known, and to the
defendant’s attorney of record.
(b) Effect of Nolle Prosequi.  When a nolle prosequi has been
entered on a charge, any conditions of pretrial release on that
charge are terminated, and any bail posted for the defendant on
that charge shall be released.  The clerk shall take the action
necessary to recall or revoke any outstanding warrant or detainer
that could lead to the arrest or detention of the defendant because
of that charge.
-14-
We had the opportunity to review the history of nolle prosequi in Ward v. State, 290
Md. 76, 82-4, 427 A.2d 1008, 1012-14 (1981), in which Judge John C. Eldridge wrote for the
Court:
Apparently the first reported case discussing the entry of a nolle
prosequi in a criminal prosecution was Stretton and Taylors
Case, 1 Leon. 119, 74 Eng. Rep. 111 (K.B. 1588), where the
Attorney General entered a ‘non vult prosequi’ for purpose of
preventing a private prosecution.  Since that time, the nolle
prosequi has been a means whereby the government exercises
control over pending criminal cases.  Thus . . . a ‘Nolle prosequi
in criminal practice (for it pertains also to civil), is a declaration
of record from the legal representative for the government, that
he will no further prosecute the particular indictment or some
designated part thereof.’  It is ‘an abandonment of the
prosecution,’ or a ‘discontinuance of a prosecution by the
authorized attorney’ for the state. 
* * *
It has been settled since at least the opinion of Chief Justice Hold
in Goddard v. Smith, 6 Mod. 262, 2 Salk 456 (1704), that while
a nolle prosequi discharges the defendant on the charging
document or count which was nolle prossed, and while it is a bar
to any further prosecution under that charging document or
count, a nolle prosequi is not an acquittal or pardon of the
underlying offense and does not preclude a prosecution for the
same offense under a different charging document or different
count.  More than one hundred years ago, this Court stated in
State v. Morgan, 33 Md. 44, 46 (1870):
‘It is well settled by the authorities that a nolle
prosequi ordinarily does not operate as a pardon;
but that the accused remains subject to be
proceeded against by another indictment for the
same offense.’
Later, in Barrett v. State, supra, 155 Md. 636, 142 A. 96 (1930),
the Court reiterated that when an indictment was nolle prossed or
abandoned, ‘the case was terminated . . . and there can be no
further prosecution under that indictment,’ but that the
discontinuance by the prosecuting attorney was not the equivalent
of ‘confessing a plea of not guilty.’
-15-
(citations omitted) (alterations added).  Obviously the type of nolle prosequi which does not
bar future prosecution under another charging document has the same effect as a dismissal
without prejudice.  
We also have explored circumstances within which entry of a nolle prosequi  precludes
future prosecution.  Under circumstances where conditions have been attached to the nolle
prosequi requiring actions by the defendant, and those conditions have been met, the nolle
prosequi has the same effect as a dismissal with prejudice.  The underlying facts in State v.
Morgan, 33 Md. 44, 46 (1870), involved the entry of a nolle prosequi by the  Governor on
behalf of the defendant in exchange for payment of costs accrued.  33 Md. at 45.  We held that
after the Governor’s terms were met, and the costs were paid, the defendant was “expressly
saved from all further prosecution for or on account of the same offense” and the discharge
by nolle prosequi was a final “end and determination” of the suit.  Id. at 416.  In State v.
Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 700, 357 A.2d 376, 384 (1976), we held that the State was precluded
from withdrawing its plea agreement where the defendant had already substantially performed
the terms of the agreement and that the defendant could elect to have the charges nolle
prossed without any reprosecution.  We reinforced our Brockman holding in Fleeger, where
we noted that, provided the defendant complied with the terms of the plea agreement, the
State could not reinstitute the original, nolle prossed charges.  Fleeger, 301 Md. at 162, 482
A.2d at 494.  We held in Fleeger that a nolle prosequi constitutes a dismissal under Section
638C (a) when it is entered into pursuant to a plea agreement, so that the defendant was
entitled to credit served for time served under the nolle prossed charges.  Id. at 162, 482 A.2d
-16-
at 494. 
We have also found that a nolle prosequi can function as an acquittal if jeopardy has
attached.  In Blondes v. State, 273 Md. 435, 330 A.2d 169 (1975), the State entered a nolle
prosequi on all charges under the indictment after it had asked for a ruling on admissibility
of the chief documentary evidence against the defendant and offered other documentary
evidence against the defendant and testimony of a witness in a non-jury case.  Id. at 446, 330
A.2d at 175.  In finding that jeopardy had attached at the time that the nolle prosequi was
entered, Judge Eldridge, again writing for the Court, explained:
One aspect of the double jeopardy prohibition which is firmly
settled in this state as a common law principle, is that the entry of
a nolle prosequi, without the defendant’s consent, and after
jeopardy has attached, operates as an acquittal and precludes
further prosecution for the same offense . . .
On the other hand, where a nolle prosequi is entered before
jeopardy attaches, the State is only precluded from prosecuting
the defendant further under that indictment, but the defendant
may be proceeded against for the same offense by another
indictment or information.  
Id. at 443-44, 330 A.2d at 173 (citations omitted); see also Hooper v. State, 293 Md. 162, 169
n.3, 443 A.2d 86, 90 n.3 (1982) (“[I]f jeopardy had attached at the trial, the nol pros on appeal
will ordinarily operate as an acquittal of the underlying charges because of double jeopardy
principles.”);  Ward, 290 Md. at 91, 427 A.2d at 1017 (“[A] nolle prosequi, without the
defendant’s consent and after jeopardy attaches, ‘amounts to an acquittal’ of the underlying
offense.”); Friend v. State, 175 Md. 352, 356, 2 A.2d 430 (1938) (“The nolle prosequi entered
without the consent of the accused . . . placed this defendant in double jeopardy.”); cf. Bynum
14
Section 264 (e)(4) was recodified in 2001 to Section 13-109 of the Criminal Procedure
Article.  2001 Md. Laws, Chap. 10, § 2.
-17-
v. State, 277 Md. 703, 709, 357 A.2d 339, 342 (1976) (holding that, although double jeopardy
prohibited subsequent prosecution for offenses charged in counts dismissed by a nolle
prosequi entered without the consent of the accused after jeopardy has attached, it had no
application in the context of the same prosecution which continues on other counts).
C.  Nolle Prosequi as Dismissal
The State contends that, based on our interpretation of the word “dismissal” in 
Director
of Finance of Prince George’s Co. v. Cole, 296 Md. 607, 465 A.2d 450 (1983), a nolle
prosequi does not constitute a dismissal.  In Cole, we addressed the meaning of the word
“dismissal” in a forfeiture statute, Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Rep.Vol.), Article 27, Section
264(e)(4),14 which provides:
This Section does not prohibit the trial judge after an acquittal or
dismissal from ordering immediate return of all property seized.
We recognized in Cole that Section 264 was originally enacted in 1951 as Article 27, Section
307A, 1951 Md. Laws, Chap. 299 and was significantly amended in 1974 at which time the
word “dismissal” was substituted for the phrase “other final determination of such
proceedings in favor of the person or persons so arrested,” 1974 Md. Laws, Chap. 666,
thereby referring to a dismissal with prejudice.  We noted in Cole that through its amendment
the Legislature explicitly eliminated “other arguably favorable dispositions” such as a nolle
prosequi.  Cole, 296 Md. at 624, 465 A.2d at 460.  There is no comparable legislative history
in the case sub judice limiting the term “dismissal” to only one of a final determination.
-18-
The State also underscores the reasoning underlying the Court of Special Appeals’s
holding that the General Assembly was aware of the existence of disposition of a case by nolle
prosequi in 1974 when Section 638C(a) was enacted and, therefore, it would have included
nolle prosequi in the statute had it so intended.  This argument neglects the fact that the
Legislature, had it wanted only dismissals with prejudice to trigger the mandatory provisions
of Section 638C(a), could have done so by using the term “dismissal with prejudice” in 1974
when it was enacted.  We know that the Legislature knew of the term dismissal with prejudice
at that time because it used the term in its 1965 enactment of the Interstate Detainer Act,
specifically in Article 27, Section 616A(c), which read:
If action is not commenced on the matter for which request for
disposition was made, within the time limitation set forth in
subsection (a) and above, the court shall no longer have
jurisdiction thereof, and the untried indictment shall have no
further force or effect; and in such case the court shall enter an
order dismissing the untried indictment with prejudice.
1965 Md. Laws, Chap. 628 (emphasis added).
Furthermore, when Section 616A(c) of the Interstate Detainer Act was recodified in
1976 as Article 27, Section 616S(e), it read:
If the untried indictment, information, warrant, or complaint, for
which request for disposition is made, is not brought to trial
within the time limitation set forth in subsection (b) of this
section, the court no longer has jurisdiction, and the untried
indictment, information, warrant, or complaint has no further
force or effect.  In that case, the court upon request of the
prisoner or his counsel shall enter an order dismissing the untried
indictment without prejudice.
15
Section 616S(e) was recodified in 1999 as Section 8-503 of the Correctional Services
Article and now reads:
(e) Dismissal. – If the untried indictment, information, warrant,
or complaint for which request for final disposition is made is
not brought to trial within the time limitation established under
§ 8-502 of this subtitle:
(1) the untried indictment, information, warrant,
or
complaint has no further force or effect; and
(2) the court, on request of the inmate or the 
inmate’s counsel, shall enter an order dismissing the 
untried indictment, information, warrant, or complaint without 
prejudice.
Md. Code (1999), §8-503 (e) of the Correctional Services Article.
-19-
Md. Code (1957, 1996 Rep. Vol.), Art. 27, § 616S(e) (emphasis added). 15 Therefore, in 2001,
when Section 6-218(b)(2) was recodified, the General Assembly clearly knew the distinction
between with and without prejudice and could have drawn that distinction in the statutory
language at issue in this case. 
When faced with circumstances where the Legislature was familiar with certain
language and did not entertain it, we look to the purpose of the statute.  See State v.
Thompson, 332 Md. 1, 19, 629 A.2d 731, 740-41 (1993) (holding that, based on the statute’s
purpose and its legislative history, the legislature would have included specific language
regarding drug rehabilitation if it had meant to include it.).  As we stated earlier, the purpose
for enacting Section 6-218 was to ensure that a defendant “receive as much credit as possible
for time spent in custody.”  Fleeger,  301 Md. at 165, 482 A.2d at 495. Viewed in this light,
16
A stet is defined in Maryland Rule 4-248 which, in relevant part, provides:
(a) Disposition by Stet: On motion of the State’s Attorney, the
court may indefinitely postpone trial of charge by marking the
charge “stet” on the docket.  The defendant need not be present
when a charge is stetted but in that event the clerk shall send
notice of the stet to the defendant, if the defendant’s
whereabouts are known, and to the defendant’s attorney of
record.  A charge may not be stetted over the objection of the
defendant.  A stetted charge may be rescheduled for trial at the
request of either party within one year and thereafter only by
order of court for good cause shown.
-20-
the term “dismissal,” as used in Section 6-218 (b)(2), must be interpreted to include dismissal
with or without prejudice, including disposition by nolle prosequi.
The State relies on Roberts v. State, 56 Md.App. 562, 468 A.2d 410 (1983), cert.
denied, 299 Md. 426, 474 A.2d 219 (1984), for its argument that a nolle prosequi, not entered
into pursuant to a plea agreement, lacks the finality of a dismissal or acquittal.  In Roberts, the
defendant challenged denial of credit for time he had served on handgun charges that had been
stetted during sentencing for larceny convictions, credit which he argued was owed pursuant
to Section 638C(a).  Id. at 565, 468 A.2d at 412.16  The Court of Special Appeals explained
in Roberts that:
The purpose of the language in question in § 638C (a) is to give
credit for time spent in custody when there is no other way to
credit that time.  If an accused is acquitted of a charge for which
he had been incarcerated, or if such charge is dismissed, he can
never be credited with the time spent in custody against his
sentence for that offense because there will be no sentence.  But
if, while he is incarcerated under one charge, another charge is
lodged against him, in the event of an acquittal under the first
-21-
charge, time spent in custody thereunder can be credited against
any sentence imposed on the second.
The situation for which the statute was designed to provide relief
does not exist when the first charge is merely stetted because that
charge may be eventually tried and may result in conviction and
sentence.  In such case, the accused will then be credited with the
time spent in custody as a result of that charge.  If appellant’s
reading of the statute were correct, should the handgun charge
ever be tried and result in a conviction and sentence, he would be
entitled to receive credit for time in custody thereon against the
sentence that was re-imposed for violation of probation.  We do
not believe the General Assembly intended such a result.
Id. at 566-67, 468 A.2d at 412 (footnote omitted).  This Court has stated many times before,
however, that:
In Maryland, unlike some other jurisdictions, we have
consistently drawn a sharp distinction between a nolle prosequi
and a stet.  Although a stet permits an accused to be proceeded
against at a later date under the same charging document, a nolle
prosequi does not. The nol pros of a charging document or of a
count is ‘a final disposition’ of the charging document or count;
‘there can be no further prosecution under’ the nol prossed
charging document or count; the matter is ‘terminated’ at that
time; and the accused may be proceeded against for the same
offense only under a new or different charging document or
count. 
State v. Moulden, 292 Md. 666, 673, 441 A.2d 699, 702-03 (1982) (citations omitted).
Whereas a stet is a mere suspension of the charges which can be freely brought again by the
prosecution within one year, a nolle prosequi “leaves the prosecution just as though no such
count had ever been inserted in the indictment,” id., and removes the accused from “under the
imputation of guilt.”  Barrett,  155 Md. at 638, 142 A. at 97.  Accordingly, the analysis of the
Court of Special Appeals in Roberts is not applicable in the case sub judice because it is clear
17
The State also contents that if Section 6-218 (b)(2)’s use of the word “dismissal” is
interpreted to include disposition of a case by nolle prosequi, Section 6-218 (b)(3) would be
rendered nugatory.  This is an inaccurate proposition, as Section 6-218 (b)(3), which applies
to “a case other than a case described in paragraph (2) of this subsection,” may be applicable
to cases stetted.
-22-
that a nolle prosequi, unlike a stet, can act with the finality of a dismissal or acquittal.
The State also asserts that if a nolle prosequi is included in the purview of dismissal
for purposes of Section 6-218(b)(2), Gilmer could be awarded a potential windfall of double
credit for time served on the nolle prossed charges were he prosecuted and convicted on them
and again credited for the time served. Double credit, however, is not in issue because
receiving credit for time served for the attempted murder can only occur once under the
statute.  More importantly, denying a defendant credit for time served on nolle prossed
charges is not consistent with the legislative purpose for enacting Section 6-218, to ensure that
“a defendant receive as much credit as possible for time spent in custody.” Fleeger, 301 Md.
at 165, 482 A.2d at 495.  The risk of double credit can be easily avoided administratively,
whereas the elimination of “dead time” is an essential attribute of Section 6-218(b)(2).  The
State’s argument about double credit is not persuasive.17
Conclusion
Accordingly, we hold that a nolle prosequi entered outside of a plea agreement
constitutes a dismissal for the purpose of receiving credit for time served under Section 6-218
(b)(2), and the Circuit Court erred in denying Gilmer credit for the time served for the nolle
18
Because we find that a nolle prosequi constitutes a dismissal for purposes of Section
6-218 (b)(2), it is not necessary for us to reach Gilmer’s argument that Section 6-218 (b)(2)
created a “liberty interest” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
-23-
prossed charge.18
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS VACATED AS TO THE SENTENCE
IMPOSED ON THE CONVICTION FOR FIRST-
DEGREE ASSAULT, AND CASE REMANDED TO
THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS WITH
INSTRUCTIONS TO VACATE THE SENTENCE
IMPOSED BY THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
BALTIMORE CITY ON THE FIRST-DEGREE
ASSAULT CONVICTION AND REMAND THE
CASE TO THAT COURT FOR RESENTENCING
PROCEEDINGS 
CONSISTENT 
WITH 
THIS
OPINION.  COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY
THE 
MAYOR 
AND 
CITY 
COUNCIL 
OF
BALTIMORE.
-24-
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 14
September Term, 2005
ANTHONY GILMER
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
-25-
Bell, C.J.
                    Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by Harrell, J.
Filed:   December 7, 2005
-2-
I dissent.  The Majority opinion errs when it declares ambiguous the use of
“dismissal” in § 6-218 (b)(2) based only on consideration of that word in isolation.  Though
it pays lip service to considering the need to “construe the statute as a whole” (Maj. slip op.
at 7), the Majority opinion thereafter confines its analysis to (b)(2) and fails to give
meaningful consideration to the place “dismissal” occupies within the complete structure of
the Legislature’s scheme in the larger statutory sub-section of which (b)(2) is but a part.  See
Johnson v. Mayor & City Council, 387 Md. 1, 11-12, 874 A.2d 439, 446 (2005) (“the
commonsensical approach to interpreting statutes includes a review of the general statutory
scheme in which the statute in question is found,” citing to Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137-
38, 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994)); Forbes v. Harleysville Mutual, 322 Md. 689, 697-99, 589
A.2d 944, 947-48 (1991) (stating that we do not read statutory language “in insolation or out
of context [but construe it] in light of the Legislature’s general purpose and in the context of
the statute as a whole.”). When considered in the clear hierarchy established within the
totality of § 6-218 (b), the claimed ambiguity in (b)(2) disappears.
Section 6-218 (b) of the Criminal Procedure Article provides in relevant part:
§ 6-218.  Credit against sentence for time
*               *               *               *               *
     (b) (1) A defendant who is convicted and sentenced
shall receive credit against and a reduction of the
term of a definite or life sentence, or the
minimum 
and 
maximum 
terms 
of 
an
indeterminate sentence, for all time spent in the
custody of a correctional facility, hospital, facility
-3-
for persons with mental disorders, or other unit
because of:
(i)
The charge for which the sentence
is imposed; or
(ii)
The conduct on which the charge is
based.
     
(2) If a defendant is in custody beca use of a
charge that results in a dismissal or acquittal, the
time that would have been accredited if a sentence
had been imposed shall be credited against any
sentence that is based on a charge for which a
warrant or commitment was filed during that
custody.
    
(3) In a case other than a case described in
paragraph (2) of this subsection, the sentencing
court may apply credit against a sentence for time
spent in custody for another charge or crime.  
(Emphasis added).
It is clear to me from this language that the Legislature intended that trial judges are obliged
to grant credit against time served where the relevant charge was disposed of by literal
dismissal or acquittal only.  In all other cases and by whatever the descriptive name given for
the particular disposition, other than by dismissal or acquittal, discretion was granted to
judges whether to grant such credit.  The only situation in which an ambiguity in the intent
of the Legislature might arise would be where a trial court labels a disposition, other than
dismissal or acquittal, with a description that constitutes a novelty or gibberish not previously
recognized by statute, rule, or common law.  Then, and only then, would the functional
equivalency type of analysis engaged in here by the Majority be merited.  See State v. Glass,
386 Md. 401, 410, 872 A.2d 729, 734 (2005) (a court’s analysis “must be undertaken from
-4-
a commonsensical rather than a technical[ ] perspective, always seeking to avoid giving the
statute a strained interpretation.”) (citations omitted).
The Court of Special Appeals was correct in this case, in my view, when it said:
Our decision is in accord with the plain language of § 6-
218 (b).  Subsection (b)(2) uses the terms dismissal and
acquittal, not nolle prosequi.  We are bound to give these terms
their ordinarily understood meaning.  See Gillespie v. State, 370
Md. 219, 222 (2002).  Certainly, the General Assembly could
have mandated that credit be given for time served on charges
that result in a nolle prosequi.  That the legislature chose not to
do so when it enacted the credit provision thirty years ago, see
1974 Maryland Laws, Ch. 735 § 1, and has taken no steps since
then to mandate credit for incarceration on charges that are nol
prossed in the ordinary course (as opposed to part of a plea
bargain), reflects the legislative will to limit the applicability of
that subsection.  Any effort on our part to overread the statute
would be to venture impermissibly into territory that is under the
exclusive control of the General Assembly.  See Price v. State,
378 Md. 378, 388 (2003) (“‘[w]e cannot assume authority to
read into the Act what the Legislature apparently deliberately
left out’”) (citation omitted).
In sum, like the stet discussed in Roberts, [v. State, 56
Md. App. 562 (1984)] a nolle prosequi entered before trial and
not tied to a plea bargain comes within the purview, not of § 6-
218 (b)(2), but of subsection (b)(3), because it is “a case other
than a case described in paragraph (2) of this subsection.”  In
that instance, subsection (b)(3) gives the court discretion to
“apply credit against a sentence for time spent in custody for
another charge or crime.”
Here, the sentencing court exercised its discretion not to
award appellant credit for the time he was incarcerated on the
nol prossed charged.  Appellant suggests no abuse of discretion
in this regard, and we find none.  We shall not disturb that
sentencing decision.
Gilmer v. State, 161 Md. App. 21, 31, 866 A.2d 918, 924 (2005).
-5-
To reason as this Court’s Majority does, in my view, is to render § 6-218 (b)(3)
surplusage.  See Montgomery County v. Buckman, 333 Md. 516, 524, 636 A.2d 448, 452
(1999) (we read the statute so that “no word, phrase, clause or sentence is rendered
surplusage or meaningless.”).  Section 6-218 (b)(3) is intended to operate as a catchall default
provision for any disposition other than a literal dismissal or acquittal.  To construe, through
forced elaboration, a nolle prosequi entered outside of a plea agreement as the functional
equivalent of a “dismissal” under (b)(2) is to deprive (b)(3) of its intended significance.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgments of the Court of Special Appeals and the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City.