Title: Mcmillian v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC10-2168 
____________ 
 
JUSTIN RYAN MCMILLIAN,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[June 28, 2012] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Justin Ryan McMillian appeals his conviction and sentence for the 
premeditated first-degree murder of Danielle Stubbs.1  For the reasons stated 
below, we affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The defendant, Justin McMillian, and his victim, Danielle Stubbs, began 
dating in the spring of 2008.  On Wednesday or Thursday, January 6 or 7, 2009, 
Stubbs moved from an apartment into a nearby townhouse on Pineverde Lane in 
Jacksonville.  McMillian assisted Stubbs and her family with the move.  Friday 
                                         
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
 
 
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afternoon, Stubbs took McMillian and her mother to lunch at Olive Garden as a 
thank-you for helping with the move.  There, McMillian told Stubbs‟ mother that 
he and Stubbs were breaking up, that he was quitting his job, and that he was going 
back to Georgia spend time with and take care of his two children.   
Saturday night, Stubbs left her townhome and drove to a coworker‟s 
apartment so that the two could then be driven by Allen Morris, another coworker, 
to a beachside nightclub.  At the nightclub, Stubbs consumed several alcoholic 
beverages, became intoxicated, and, at some point, had sexual intercourse with 
Morris in the back of Morris‟ car.   
Morris, Stubbs, and the coworker left the nightclub around 2:45 a.m. on 
Sunday, January 11.  Morris first drove the coworker back to his apartment and 
had to stop a couple of times on the way to allow Stubbs to vomit.  After dropping 
off the coworker, Morris drove Stubbs home because she was too inebriated to 
drive her own car.  A few minutes from Stubbs‟ townhouse, at around 3:30 a.m., 
Morris stopped to get Stubbs something to eat in an effort to settle her stomach.  
From there, he drove Stubbs to her townhome.  Initially, and at Stubbs‟ request, 
Morris drove down Stubbs‟ street past her townhouse, and stopped for a few 
minutes to allow Stubbs to eat some food and to compose herself.  Morris then 
dropped Stubbs off in front of her townhouse, watched her walk past McMillian‟s 
 
 
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Cadillac, which was backed into Stubbs‟ driveway, and drove away after she 
waved.  Other than the defendant, Morris was the last person to see Stubbs alive. 
Stubbs had plans with her mother during the day Sunday.  When Stubbs‟ 
family could not reach her by phone throughout the morning and into Sunday 
afternoon, they became increasingly alarmed and began to actively search for her 
by calling around to her friends and going to her townhome and recently emptied 
apartment.  At one point that morning, McMillian called Stubbs‟ mother to say that 
he could not find Stubbs and to inquire as to whether the family knew where she 
was.  That evening, McMillian called again to say that he still could not find 
Stubbs.  Stubbs‟ parents and younger brother eventually called the police Sunday 
evening to report Stubbs missing and then drove to her townhome.  Upon arriving 
and finding the front door locked, Stubbs‟ father and brother went around to the 
back of the townhome while Stubbs‟ mother waited at the front door.   
Stubbs‟ brother and father discovered that the sliding glass door at the rear 
of Stubbs‟ townhome was unlocked.  Stubbs‟ brother immediately went inside, ran 
upstairs, and began screaming.  Stubbs‟ father went to the front door, unlocked the 
doorknob and the deadbolt, let his wife in, and went upstairs with her.  There, they 
found Stubbs dead in a pool of blood.  She had been shot through the arm and the 
top of the head.  Stubbs‟ parents immediately called 911and were waiting outside 
 
 
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when the police, who were already en route due to Stubbs‟ parents‟ earlier call to 
report Stubbs missing, arrived minutes later.   
The police recovered several important pieces of evidence from Stubbs‟ 
bedroom.  An unfired .45 caliber cartridge was found on the floor just inside the 
doorway to Stubbs‟ bedroom.  Further inside Stubbs‟ bedroom, at the foot of her 
bed and beside her dresser/TV stand, a fired .45 caliber shell casing was recovered.  
Another fired .45 caliber shell casing was recovered from the floor beside Stubbs‟ 
body on the side of the bed furthest from the bedroom door.  Stubbs‟ bedding was 
bloodstained and had holes in it which were consistent with being caused by fired 
bullets.  A fired .45 caliber bullet, later matched to McMillian‟s pistol, was also 
found lying on top of Stubbs‟ bedding.   
Stubbs‟ autopsy confirmed that Stubbs was shot once through the right arm 
and once in the top of the head and was alive when both shots were fired.  The shot 
to the head likely would have immediately rendered Stubbs unconscious and likely 
would have killed her within seconds, though it is possible that she survived for as 
long as a couple of minutes.  The bullet that killed Stubbs was recovered from her 
skull and was later matched to McMillian‟s gun.   
The day after the murder, McMillian called the Jacksonville Sheriff‟s Office 
(JSO) and said that his girlfriend had been found dead in her apartment and he 
wanted to speak with someone about her case.  He also said that he had been in 
 
 
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Georgia since 3 a.m. the morning of the murder.2  A detective called McMillian 
back shortly thereafter.  In that conversation, McMillian stated that he had last seen 
Stubbs around 6 the night before the murder and had last spoken to her on the 
phone around 9 p.m., before she went out with her coworkers.  McMillian also said 
that he was about to return to Jacksonville and would meet the detective at the 
station.  When McMillian failed to show, the detective contacted a special task 
force to have him brought in.   
Two days later, the task force saw McMillian and two other men leave a 
Jacksonville house in McMillian‟s Cadillac.  The task force followed McMillian, 
with an unmarked SUV initially leading several trailing task force vehicles.  
Shortly thereafter the lead was passed off from the SUV to a marked JSO K-9 unit 
so that a traffic stop could be initiated.  Once the marked unit was behind 
McMillian, it turned on its lights and siren, but McMillian continued driving as 
though nothing were happening.  After a short distance, McMillian turned onto a 
side street and abruptly stopped without pulling off the road.  As McMillian was 
coming to a stop, the two passengers opened the passenger side car doors and ran a 
short distance from the vehicle before going to the ground.  
                                         
 
2.  McMillian has given at least five different accounts of events relating to 
Stubbs‟ murder; three were made to police, recorded, and played at trial; one was 
given when McMillian testified in his own defense; one was introduced through 
the testimony of Dr. Krop during the penalty phase.  No two are wholly consistent 
with each other, and none of them can be fully reconciled with the evidence.     
 
 
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At this point, as the K-9 officer was getting out of his patrol car, McMillian 
exited his vehicle, reached behind his back, pulled a .45 caliber semi-automatic 
pistol, and began to fire at the K-9 officer.  The K-9 officer exited his patrol car 
with his dog on its leash, leading him out the door.  When he realized that 
McMillian was shooting at him, the K-9 officer took cover behind his door and 
deployed the K-9.  However, because the K-9 was facing the wrong direction when 
deployed, it ran to the rear of the patrol car and engaged another task force member 
who had been in a trailing vehicle.  The task force members returned fire at 
McMillian as he fired and fled from his car on foot.  McMillian ran a short distance 
down the street and then ran between two houses, causing the task force members 
to lose sight of him.  McMillian was found between those two houses, having 
collapsed due to multiple gunshot wounds.   
Police recovered several pieces of evidence from the scene of the shootout, 
including McMillian‟s semiautomatic .45 caliber Desert Eagle pistol, two .45 
caliber bullets which struck the JSO K-9 patrol car in the driver‟s side headlight 
and in the driver‟s door, an unfired .45 cartridge, and spent .45 shell casings.   
From the evidence collected at the scenes of the shootout and Stubbs‟ 
murder, it was determined that McMillian‟s gun was used to murder Stubbs.  
During the course of their investigation into Stubbs‟ murder, police also obtained a 
security video from a convenience store near Stubbs‟ townhome as well as phone 
 
 
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records for Stubbs‟ cell phone and the convenience store pay phone.  The video 
and records show that on the morning of Stubbs‟ murder, at around 4:05 a.m., 
McMillian entered the store, got change, and used the pay phone to make two calls, 
each of which lasted approximately one minute, to Stubbs‟ cell phone.  The records 
also show that Stubbs made a two-second long return call from her cell phone to 
McMillian at the pay phone at approximately 4:08 a.m.  
 
A couple of weeks after the shootout, two detectives from Stubbs‟ murder 
investigation went to the hospital to interview McMillian.3  Prior to going in to see 
McMillian, the detective spoke to a nurse, who stated that the only medication 
McMillian was receiving was Motrin.4  After waiving his Miranda5 rights, 
McMillian first repeated his story that the last time he saw Stubbs was on Saturday 
evening before she went out with her coworkers and that he had gone to a bar with 
his sister, left the bar around 1:30 a.m., drove his sister home, and left for Georgia 
around 2:00 a.m.  The detectives then told McMillian that their investigation had 
determined that his gun was the same gun used to kill Stubbs.  McMillian then 
admitted that he was sitting in his car in Stubbs‟ driveway when she came home 
and claimed that he went inside with her.  McMillian claimed that he and Stubbs 
                                         
 
3.  This interview was recorded and was played for the jury during trial and 
a transcript of the interview was admitted into evidence.   
 
4.  McMillian independently confirmed that he was only receiving Motrin.   
 
5. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966).  
 
 
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had intercourse on her couch and then went upstairs and got in bed.  McMillian 
then claimed that was when he “lost it” and stated that he shot Stubbs while she 
was sleeping in the bed, and then shot her again after she rolled out of the bed and 
onto the floor on the far side of the bed.  McMillian also said that he knew that 
Stubbs was dead when he left the apartment and that her body was on the side of 
the bed farthest from the bedroom door.  McMillian also stated that he did not have 
his own key to the townhome and that after shooting Stubbs, he went out the front 
door and closed it behind him.       
In his guilt phase defense, McMillian testified differently.  He stated that he 
had spent the day before the murder at a racetrack in Valdosta and returned to 
Stubbs‟ townhome around 5 p.m.  He claimed that he and Stubbs had intercourse, 
he left, and Stubbs went out with coworkers.  Later that night, he went to a bar 
with his sister and took her home around 2:30 or 3 a.m.  After dropping off his 
sister, McMillian drove to Stubbs‟ townhome because he had some belongings that 
he wanted to pick up before leaving for Georgia.  McMillian claimed that he was 
sitting in his car in Stubbs‟ driveway when Stubbs got home, that she invited him 
inside, and that they again had intercourse on her couch before going upstairs.  
McMillian claimed that, once upstairs, Stubbs got upset about his plans to leave to 
see his children in Georgia and then to return to work as a contractor in Iraq.  
McMillian claimed that Stubbs then told him that she had slept with the coworker 
 
 
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who had dropped her off earlier that night, which upset but did not anger him.  
McMillian claimed that the two lay in the bed for a while before he got up to get 
dressed and leave for Georgia.  McMillian testified that, on his way out the 
bedroom door, he grabbed his pistol from the dresser/TV stand beside the bedroom 
door and put it in his waistband.  Finally, McMillian claimed that as he was 
leaving, Stubbs said that she had known he would leave and had aborted his 
unborn child, which caused him to pull his gun and fire toward the bed in the 
darkness.  When asked about the convenience store video, McMillian claimed that 
he panicked, left out the front door, drove to the convenience store, called Stubbs 
to see if she was okay, did not get an answer, and then left for Georgia.   
On cross-examination, the State attempted to elicit further details from 
McMillian regarding how he came to shoot Stubbs.  McMillian stated that he did 
not have to load his gun before firing because he always kept it loaded and that all 
the shots were fired from the doorway.  McMillian also admitted that the first time 
he had mentioned Stubbs‟ abortion was during the trial, which was after he had 
seen a receipt for an abortion that the police recovered from Stubbs‟ purse at the 
murder scene.   
 
 
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After hearing the prosecution‟s case in rebuttal6 and closing arguments, the 
jury found McMillian of guilty of premeditated first-degree murder for the killing 
of Danielle Stubbs and of attempted second-degree murder for shooting at the K-9 
officer.   
McMillian‟s penalty phase was held June 30, 2010.  There, the prosecution 
established that, at the time of Stubbs‟ murder, McMillian was approximately one 
year into a five-year term of felony probation stemming from an incident in 
Georgia in which McMillian fled police, who were attempting to pull him over,7 at 
speeds up to 120 m.p.h. through a residential neighborhood and nearly ran over a 
child.8   McMillian‟s judgment and sentence were introduced into evidence.   
                                         
 
6.  During its rebuttal, the state played a recording of a police interview of 
McMillian, taken at McMillian‟s request, from January of 2010.  In this interview, 
McMillian claimed that he had not killed Stubbs.  Instead, McMillian claimed that 
he had returned to Stubbs‟ townhome, went inside, found her dead, saw his gun on 
the bed, took the gun, and left because he knew it would look like he killed her.    
Notably, in this interview, McMillian was able to describe where Stubbs‟ body was 
located and how it was directionally oriented within her bedroom.  This is contrary 
to the story McMillian told at trial, in which he claimed that he had fired into the 
darkness without knowing where Stubbs was and had immediately left. 
 
7.  The Georgia town‟s police knew McMillian by name and knew him to 
habitually drive with a suspended license.   
 
8.  Because police knew who McMillian was and because of the danger 
involved in chasing him through neighborhoods, they called off the chase and 
attempted to locate McMillian through other means.  Later, McMillian came to the 
police station and attempted to report his vehicle stolen.  When police threatened 
him with a charge of filing a false police report, McMillian confessed that he was 
 
 
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In mitigation, McMillian first presented Dr. Krop, a mental health expert, 
who testified that he had met with McMillian on several occasions, met with 
McMillian‟s family, read depositions related to the case, and reviewed medical and 
school records and police reports.  Dr. Krop also conducted a battery of 
psychological and neuropsychological testing on McMillian which revealed that 
McMillian had mild to moderate impairment of his frontal lobe function.    
However, Dr. Krop could not state whether these impairments predated the murder 
because they could have been caused by blood loss or a shot to the head that 
McMillian suffered in his shootout with police.  Dr. Krop also testified that there 
were records that McMillian had sustained a concussion without loss of 
consciousness in a 2006 car crash, but that CAT scans taken at the time were 
negative for physical brain damage.  He also explained that McMillian was in the 
borderline range of mental function with an IQ of 76 and had abused alcohol in the 
year leading up to the murder.  Ultimately, Dr. Krop stated that he did not believe 
that McMillian suffered from any diagnosable mental illness or psychiatric 
                                                                                                                                   
the driver and then bragged about having gotten away.  McMillian‟s stated reason 
for fleeing was that he was unlawfully in possession of a firearm and narcotics. 
 
 
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disorder,9 but did believe the shooting was caused by McMillian reacting while in a 
highly emotional state.   
On cross-examination, Dr. Krop stated that McMillian lied to him in their 
initial interview and denied responsibility for Stubbs‟ murder by claiming that he 
arrived at Stubbs‟ house, found her dead, took his gun from the bed, and fled.  
However, in a subsequent interview, McMillian gave Dr. Krop another version of 
events.  This time, McMillian explained that he had gone to Stubbs‟ house after 
dropping off his sister in order to retrieve his gun before leaving for Georgia.  
McMillian then stated that he retrieved his gun from upstairs, placed it in his 
waistband, and was outside in his car drinking and smoking marijuana when 
Stubbs came home.    He claimed that he and Stubbs argued in the driveway about 
his leaving for Georgia and that he was going to leave Stubbs‟ townhome but could 
not because Stubbs took his keys and went inside.  He then claimed that Stubbs 
called him on his cell phone and told him to come upstairs and that when he went 
upstairs, he found Stubbs on her bed and dressed in lingerie.  McMillian claimed 
that Stubbs told him that he needed to figure out what he wanted.  McMillian then 
asked Stubbs about the coworker who had dropped her off and she told him that, 
while she had slept with the coworker a couple of times, things were not serious.  
                                         
 
9.  Dr. Krop did note that McMillian was diagnosed as having ADD as a 
child, but stated that he would not diagnose McMillian as having the disorder as an 
adult.   
 
 
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McMillian claimed that, upon being told by Stubbs that she had slept with the 
coworker, he pulled his gun from his waistline, shot Stubbs while she was on the 
bed, and shot her again after she had rolled from the bed to the floor.  McMillian 
claimed that he then attempted to shoot himself, but discharged the bullet instead.   
McMillian‟s father testified that he had obtained custody of McMillian from 
McMillian‟s biological mother because she could not care for him adequately and 
that McMillian grew up feeling that his mother did not love him or care for him as 
much as she should.  McMillian‟s father also testified that, while McMillian could 
have had learning disabilities as a child, the fact was never determined 
conclusively because McMillian‟s father did not believe in them.  He also 
explained that McMillian struggled in school and that he was able to get an 
expulsion, imposed for fighting, rescinded so that McMillian could transfer to a 
Georgia high school and graduate.  Other family members and friends testified that 
McMillian is very close with and is dearly loved by his family and also is a good 
father who loves his children and who would continue to play a positive role in 
their lives from prison.  Following the defense‟s presentation of mitigation 
evidence, the jury recommended death by a vote of 10-2.   
A Spencer10 hearing was held August 27, 2010, but neither side presented 
any additional information.  On October 1, 2010, the trial court, following the 
                                         
 
10.  Spencer v. State, 615 So.  2d 688 (Fla. 1993).   
 
 
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jury‟s recommendation, sentenced McMillian to death based on its determination 
that that the two established aggravators11 outweighed one statutory mitigator12 and 
seven nonstatutory mitigators.13  This appeal followed. 
II.  ISSUES ON APPEAL 
 
On appeal, McMillian argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion 
for a judgment of acquittal for premeditated first-degree murder and that his death 
sentence is disproportionate.14  We also review whether sufficient evidence was 
                                         
 
11.  The aggravators were prior violent felony based on McMillian‟s 
conviction for attempted second-degree murder for shooting at a police officer 
(great weight) and felony probation stemming from McMillian‟s felony fleeing and 
eluding offense in Georgia (great weight). 
 
12.  The trial court found that McMillian did not have a significant history of 
prior criminal activity and gave this mitigator “little weight.”  The trial court 
explained that evidence was presented throughout both phases of the trial that 
McMillian had a history of fighting in school, was regularly in trouble with police 
for driving with a suspended license, and had a felony fleeing and eluding charge.  
The trial court stated that “the Defendant‟s prior criminal activity, while not in the 
nature of violent felony convictions, substantially reduces the weight of this 
mitigating circumstance.” 
 
13.  The trial court found that: (1) McMillian was raised in the church (very 
slight weight); (2) McMillian loves and is loved by his family and friends (little 
weight); (3) McMillian has a consistent history of employment (little weight); (4) 
McMillian‟s biological mother was not an active participant in his upbringing 
(slight weight); (5) McMillian has an IQ of 76 (little weight); (6) McMillian 
behaved appropriately during trial (slight weight); (7) McMillian suffered from 
some mental or emotional distress at the time of the murder (some weight). 
 
14.  McMillian also claims that the trial court abused its discretion by 
assigning great weight to his felony probation aggravator and that Florida‟s death 
penalty statute violates Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  We reject both 
claims as meritless.   
 
 
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presented to support McMillian‟s conviction for premeditated first-degree murder.  
As explained below, we find that McMillian is entitled to no relief.   
A.  Denial of Motion for Judgment of Acquittal 
 
At the conclusion of the prosecution‟s case, the defense moved for a 
judgment of acquittal, arguing that insufficient evidence had been presented to 
convict McMillian of either premeditated first-degree murder or first-degree felony 
murder.15  The defense then presented its case and moved again for a judgment of 
acquittal after the prosecution‟s case in rebuttal.  Both motions were denied.  
McMillian now argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment 
of acquittal because the State did not carry its burden of establishing premeditation.  
We disagree.   
Premeditation “is a fully formed conscious purpose to kill that may be 
formed in a moment and need only exist for such time as will allow the accused to 
be conscious of the nature of the act he is about to commit and the probable result 
of that act.”  Miller v. State, 42 So. 3d 204, 228 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Asay v. State, 
580 So. 2d 610, 612 (Fla. 1991)).  “Circumstantial evidence of premeditation can 
include the nature of the weapon used, the presence or absence of adequate 
                                         
 
15.  The prosecution presented two theories to support its first-degree 
murder charge: that the murder was premeditated or that the murder was a 
qualifying felony murder based on an underlying burglary and/or sexual assault.  
The jury specifically found McMillian guilty of premeditated first-degree murder. 
 
 
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provocation, previous difficulties between the parties, the manner in which the 
homicide was committed, and the nature and manner of the wounds inflicted.”  
Pearce v. State, 880 So. 2d 561, 572 (Fla. 2004) (citing Spencer v. State, 645 So. 
2d 377, 381 (Fla. 1994); Holton v. State, 573 So. 2d 284, 289 (Fla. 1990)). 
“Premeditation is a factual issue for the jury, Asay v. State, 580 So. 2d 610, 
612 (Fla. 1991), and several standards of review are applicable.”  Twilegar v. 
State, 42 So. 3d 177, 190 (Fla. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1476 (2011).  Where 
direct evidence of premeditation is presented, the “jury‟s finding of premeditation 
will be sustained if supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record.”  
Id.  However, in a case where the evidence of premeditation is entirely 
circumstantial, “not only must the evidence be sufficient to support the finding of 
premeditation, but the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
State, must also be inconsistent with any other reasonable inference.”  Id.   
Even assuming arguendo that the circumstantial evidence rule applies, we 
still conclude that McMillian has failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred.   
McMillian now claims that he snapped during a heated, emotional 
confrontation and killed Stubbs with a weapon of convenience shortly after she had 
returned home from having sexual intercourse with another man.  He further 
argues that the prosecution failed to present competent, substantial evidence that is 
inconsistent with this reasonable inference.  However, we find that competent, 
 
 
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substantial evidence which is inconsistent with McMillian‟s theory was presented.   
First, the prosecution introduced the transcript of McMillian‟s hospital confession 
and played a tape of that confession for the jury.  In that confession, McMillian 
stated that he and Stubbs were not arguing and were not fighting after she got 
home.  McMillian‟s hospital confession, therefore, is inconsistent with his asserted 
theory because it cannot be reconciled with his claim that he killed Stubbs during a 
heated, emotional confrontation.     
Additionally, McMillian‟s own guilt phase testimony is inconsistent with his 
claim of a non-premeditated murder.  During his guilt phase testimony, McMillian 
testified that he was upset, but not angry, when Stubbs admitted to him that she had 
sexual intercourse with the coworker who brought her home that night.  McMillian 
also testified that he shot Stubbs as a result of her telling him she had aborted his 
unborn child.  McMillian‟s testimony therefore is also inconsistent with his 
asserted theory because it directly contradicts both the emotional state he now 
claims to have been in regarding Stubbs sleeping with her coworker and the 
statement that Stubbs allegedly made to cause him to “snap.” 
Finally, the prosecution presented testimony that an unfired .45 caliber 
cartridge and two fired .45 shell casings were recovered in a “trail” beginning in 
Stubbs‟ bedroom doorway and ending beside Stubbs‟ body.  The “trail” formed by 
the cartridge and shell casings is also inconsistent with any other reasonable 
 
 
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inference because, contrary to McMillian‟s claim that he snapped and shot Stubbs 
from her bedroom doorway, it is evident that McMillian entered Stubbs‟ bedroom, 
first shot Stubbs through the arm, then moved around to the far side of Stubbs‟ bed 
and shot her through the top of the head.16 
We also find that competent, substantial evidence supports the jury‟s finding 
of premeditation.  Based on the crime scene evidence, the nature of Stubbs‟ 
wounds and the manner in which they would have been inflicted, the jury could 
have reasonably determined that McMillian committed premeditated murder.  See 
Pearce v. State, 880 So. 2d 561, 572 (Fla. 2004) (“Circumstantial evidence of 
premeditation can include the nature of the weapon used, the presence or absence 
of adequate provocation, previous difficulties between the parties, the manner in 
which the homicide was committed, and the nature and manner of the wounds 
inflicted.”) (emphasis added) (citing Spencer v. State, 645 So. 2d 377, 381 (Fla. 
1994); Holton v. State, 573 So. 2d 284, 289 (Fla. 1990)); see also Asay, 580 So. 2d 
at 613 (“Based on Asay‟s statements, the nature of the wound inflicted, and the 
                                         
 
16.  McMillian claims that, based on the medical examiner‟s testimony, 
there is no way to determine which shot was fired first.  McMillian misconstrues 
the testimony; the medical examiner stated that, based on the autopsy alone, he 
could not determine which shot was fired first.  When the totality of the evidence is 
considered, including McMillian‟s admissions, the bullet that passed through 
Stubbs‟ arm being recovered from her bed, and the medical examiner‟s testimony 
that Stubbs likely would have been rendered immediately unconscious and likely 
would have died within seconds of being shot in the head, it is clear that 
McMillian‟s first shot was to Stubbs‟ arm. 
 
 
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circumstances surrounding the shooting, the jury could have found that Asay made 
a conscious decision to shoot Booker . . . realizing the probable result of so 
doing.”). 
Accordingly, McMillian has failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in 
determining that the evidence was sufficient to support premeditation.   
B.  Proportionality 
 
Regardless of whether the defendant raises the issue, “[t]his Court must 
review the proportionality of a death sentence.”  Bolin v. State, 869 So. 2d 1196, 
1204 (Fla. 2004).  The death penalty is intended for those cases in which “the most 
aggravating and least mitigating circumstances exist.”  Terry v. State, 668 So. 2d 
954, 965 (Fla. 1996) (citing Kramer v. State, 619 So. 2d 274, 278 (Fla. 1983); State 
v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 7 (Fla. 1973)).  This Court‟s review “ „is not a comparison 
between the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.‟ ”  Crook v. 
State, 908 So. 2d 350, 356 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 416 
(Fla. 1998)).  Rather, this Court considers the totality of the circumstances to 
determine if death is warranted in comparison with other cases in which the death 
penalty was upheld.  Id. 
 
This case involves a premeditated shooting murder and a very serious 
attempted shooting murder of a uniformed police officer by a felon who, by the 
terms of his probation, was forbidden from possessing a firearm.  The jury 
 
 
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recommended death by a vote of 10-2.  The trial court found two aggravating 
circumstances: (1) McMillian was on felony probation at the time of the murder 
(great weight); and (2) McMillian was convicted of a prior violent felony based on 
his conviction at trial for the attempted murder of a law enforcement officer (great 
weight).  The trial court also found the following mitigators: (1) no significant 
history of prior criminal activity (little weight); (2) McMillian was raised in the 
church as a child (very slight weight); (3) McMillian loves and is loved by his 
family and friends (little weight); (4) McMillian has a consistent history of 
employment (little weight); (5) McMillian‟s biological mother was not an active 
participant in his upbringing (slight weight); (6) McMillian has an IQ of 76 (little 
weight); (7) McMillian behaved appropriately during trial (slight weight); and (8) 
McMillian suffered from some mental or emotional distress at the time of the 
murder (some weight). 
We have found the death penalty to be a proportionate sentence where the 
totality of the circumstances were similar to those present here.  For example, we 
have found death to be a proportionate sentence in cases which have similarly 
involved a shooting death following domestic disputes over sexual infidelity.  See 
Rodgers v. State, 948 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2006) (affirming death sentence for 
defendant who caught his wife cheating and fatally shot her in the head later that 
day where the trial court determined that one aggravator—prior violent felony, 
 
 
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based on a 1963 robbery and a 1979 manslaughter conviction—outweighed five 
nonstatutory mitigators, including that the defendant had borderline intelligence at 
best); Evans v. State, 838 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 2002) (affirming death sentence as 
applied to defendant who fatally shot brother‟s girlfriend in the course of an 
argument over her alleged infidelity based on the trial court‟s determination that 
two aggravators—prior violent felony and felony probation—outweighed several 
nonstatutory mitigators including a deprived childhood as a result of mother‟s 
crack addiction, exemplary work habits, and performing charitable and 
humanitarian work).  And we have upheld the death penalty as proportionate in 
cases which have involved a similar mix of one or two weighty aggravators and 
comparatively weak mitigators.  See Bailey v. State, 998 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 2008) 
(affirming death sentence as applied to a defendant who fatally shot a police officer 
during a traffic stop based on trial court‟s determination that two weighty 
aggravators (avoid arrest and felony probation) outweighed the statutory age 
mitigator (very little weight) and eight nonstatutory mitigators including low IQ, 
history of mental illness, intoxication, and coming from a broken home (little 
weight as to each)); Blackwood v. State, 777 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 2000) (affirming 
death penalty as proportionate based on a lone HAC aggravator and a mix of 
mitigators that was very similar to McMillian‟s, including the statutory mitigator 
of no significant criminal history, and nonstatutory mitigators of emotional 
 
 
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disturbance at time of murder, murder as a result of a lover‟s quarrel, low IQ, 
defendant being a good parent, and employment history); Pope v. State, 679 So. 2d 
710 (Fla. 1996) (affirming death penalty as to defendant who fatally beat and 
stabbed his girlfriend, based on the trial court‟s determination that the prior violent 
felony and pecuniary gain aggravators outweighed both statutory mental health 
mitigators and several nonstatutory mitigators, including intoxication at the time of 
the murder and fighting with the victim girlfriend just before the murder).   
McMillian argues that, because his prior violent felony resulted from a crime 
committed after Stubbs‟ murder, it should be afforded less weight.  In support, 
McMillian relies on Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1998) (striking the death 
penalty as applied to defendant who was seventeen at the time of the murder, 
whose ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct was substantially 
impaired, and who suffered extensive parental abuse and neglect and also noting, 
in a single sentence, that Urbin‟s qualifying prior violent felony was based on a 
robbery that occurred two weeks after the murder at issue).  Here, due to the 
exceedingly serious nature of McMillian‟s qualifying prior violent 
felony─McMillian, a convicted felon who was forbidden from possessing a 
firearm under the terms of his probation, attempted to murder a uniformed law 
enforcement officer with a firearm and engaged in a running shootout with the 
 
 
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police in the middle of a residential neighborhood─we find that McMillian‟s prior 
violent felony aggravator is unquestionably entitled to great weight.   
Accordingly, we find that death is a proportionate sentence in McMillian‟s 
case.   
C.  Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Regardless of whether the parties raise the issue, this Court independently 
reviews the record of a death penalty case to determine whether the evidence is 
sufficient to support the murder conviction.  See Winkles v. State, 894 So. 2d 842, 
847 (Fla. 2005).  Here, there is competent, substantial evidence to support 
McMillian‟s conviction for first-degree murder. 
 
In his hospital confession, McMillian admitted that he first shot Stubbs 
while she was in bed and then shot her again after she rolled out of bed and onto 
the floor.  Evidence from Stubbs‟ bedroom and the medical examiner‟s testimony 
is consistent with Stubbs being shot through the arm while in her bed, rolling to the 
floor on the side of the bed opposite the bedroom doorway, and then being shot 
again through the top of the head.  Further, the “trail” formed by the unfired .45 
caliber cartridge in Stubbs‟ bedroom doorway and the two shell casings found at 
the foot of the bed and right beside Stubbs‟ body could be seen as indicating that 
McMillian entered Stubbs‟ bedroom, recocked his already loaded gun so as to 
cause an unfired .45 caliber cartridge to be ejected, walked to the foot of Stubbs‟ 
 
 
- 24 - 
bed, shot her in the arm, and then moved to where Stubbs had rolled to the floor on 
the far side of the bed before shooting her again in the top of the head.  Moreover, 
the location of the fatal gunshot─to the top of Stubbs‟ head─supports a 
determination that McMillian intended to kill Stubbs.  See Pearce, 880 So. 2d at 
572 (“[C]ircumstantial evidence of premeditation can include . . . the manner in 
which the homicide was committed, and the nature and manner of the wounds 
inflicted.”). 
Based on the foregoing, we find that competent, substantial evidence 
supports McMillian‟s conviction for premeditated first-degree murder.   
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons expressed above, we affirm McMillian‟s conviction and 
sentence of death for the premeditated first-degree murder of Danielle Stubbs.   
 
It is so ordered.   
 
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.   
 
 
 
 
 
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An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County, David M. Gooding, 
Judge - Case No. 16-2009-CF-002002AX 
 
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, and Nada M. Carey, 
Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida,  
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Stephen R. White, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee