Title: State v. Starsky

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

106 Ariz. 329 (1970) 475 P.2d 943 STATE of Arizona, Plaintiff, v. Morris STARSKY, Defendant. No. 2091. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. October 22, 1970. *330 Moise E. Berger, County Atty. by William Carter, Phoenix, for plaintiff. Dushoff, Sacks & Corcoran by Jay Dushoff, LeRoy L. Miller, Phoenix, for defendant. McFARLAND, Justice. On May 27, 1968, Morris Starsky, hereinafter referred to as defendant, was charged in Justice Court, Tempe Precinct, County of Maricopa with violation of A.R.S. § 13-371, Arizona's disorderly conduct statute. Following his conviction in Justice Court defendant appealed to Maricopa County Superior Court under A.R.S. § 22-371. Defendant moved in Superior Court to dismiss the complaint upon the grounds that A.R.S. § 13-371 is unconstitutional. The court granted the motion to dismiss with leave on the part of the state to refile. The County Attorney then filed an Amended Criminal Complaint which is the subject of these proceedings. The Amended Complaint charges that defendant, on the 9th day of April, 1968, in Tempe Precinct, County of Maricopa, State of Arizona, did "maliciously disturb the peace or quiet of a neighborhood, family, or person by tumultuous or offensive conduct or by applying violent, abusive or obscene epithets to another, all in violation of A.R.S. § 13-371." The defendant moved to quash the complaint on the grounds that it did not charge the defendant with a commission of an offense in that the statute upon which the complaint is predicated, A.R.S. § 13-371, subsections A, par. 2 and A, par. 4, is unconstitutionally void for vagueness and that the statute is an unconstitutional limitation on the defendant's freedom of speech. Upon the agreement of the defendant and the State, the following question has been certified to this Court pursuant to Rule 346, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S.: The question certified to this court deals solely with the validity of A.R.S. § 13-371; no facts concerning the events were submitted. A.R.S. § 13-371 reads as follows: Defendant first contends that A.R.S. § 13-371 is unconstitutionally void for vagueness stating that it does not give the defendant fair warning of the proscribed conduct. In State v. Locks, 97 Ariz. 148, 397 P.2d 949, this court held: It is a doctrine well recognized by this court that for a criminal statute to be unconstitutional for vagueness it must be so vague as to fail to give a citizen notice of what conduct on his part will lead to its violation. But the standards of definiteness and certainty cannot be so extended as to impose an impossible burden on the drafters of legislation. The statute here clearly apprises a person that certain conduct, when done maliciously and wilfully, is punishable and it does so in words easily understood and definable. It has been the law of this State, in substantially the same form, for sixty-nine years. (Laws of 1901, § 379) and before that, its progenitor was the law in California for another fifty-one years (West's Ann.Penal Code § 415; Cal.Stats. 1850, Ch. 99, § 112). Concededly the ancientness of a statute is not dispositive of its constitutionality but it is a fact to be considered in determining the public's awareness of its existence and general knowledge of the conduct which it proscribes. The California Supreme Court, although negating a petitioner's conviction on the grounds of faulty jury instructions, upheld that state's statute against the same charges as are here levelled at our statute: Of course the principle of "Fairplay" underlying the Due Process Clause will not condone the drafting of a penal law which is so vague and uninformative that the general public cannot glean what evil the legislature intended to guard against; or only guess at what conduct falls within the pale of its prohibition. On the other hand *332 to enunciate the statute with the degree of definiteness sought by the defendant would require specific definitions of each term which would no doubt necessitate further definitions of the definitions, ad infinitum so that each section of the criminal code would be a thesaurus of definitions, synonyms and examples. Neither the United States Constitution, the constitutions of the several states, nor even the Magna Carta could withstand the severity of this test. In conjunction with the claim that the statute is vague and overbroad, the defendant contends that it also "brings within its scope speech which is constitutionally protected" by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. He places particular emphasis on the term "obscene" which has stubbornly resisted a scientific definition for decades.[1] But we are not here faced with the complexities of the sexual connotation of "obscene" as used in obscenity statutes and applied to literature or the theater. Here the term is used to describe a type of "epithet"; in other words an obscene adjective, a vulgarity, a profanity or, in plain terms "cuss words". It would be inane to apply the constitutional standard of Roth, infra, Footnote 1, to determine if it appealed to prurient interests and even more ridiculous to seek in such activity a redeeming social value, much less any intellectual support for a protagonist's argument. The value of such speech and its exclusion from constitutional protection were set forth in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S. Ct. 766, 769, 86 L. Ed. 1031, 1035: It is with equal disbelief that we treat the argument that the other enumerated disorderly acts in A.R.S. § 13-371 have the blessing and encouragement of the Constitution. It is inconceivable that the First Amendment grants to anyone an "inalienable right" to wilfully and maliciously traverse the peace and quiet of his fellow citizens, by conduct which to name but a few is described by the statute as "loud, offensive, threatening, fighting" or by use of words which are "violent, abusive or obscene epithets." Actions such as these are not an exercise of rights but rather are an abuse of rights and entails a gross lack of understanding or calloused indifference to the simple fact that the offended parties also have certain rights under the same Constitution. The proponents of new ideals, social changes and radical concepts of conduct may not employ methods of advancing their arguments by means which do violence to our concepts of government by the people rather than by anarchy. It is not impossible that their ideas may have some merit, but their methods leave so much to be desired that the principles they advocate are tainted by their means of bringing it to the attention *333 of the responsible public. Quoting from Professor Thomas I. Emerson: This court need not marshal an array of authorities for the statement that the right of freedom of expression must be jealously guarded. But safeguarding one right does not justify absolute permissiveness, particularly by the judiciary, to the extent that the exercise of such right is done at the expense of infringement upon the rights of others. When a person, or group of persons, inextricably weave their concepts into a web of violent conduct, masquerading as constitutional persuasion, the remainder of society is forced to either reject their ideas or to accept their methods. Since the former is more acceptable, the result is usually greater limitations on freedom of speech. Somewhere a point must be reached where courts must draw a line between free and proper use of expression and an unrestrained abuse of the rights of others under the guise of constitutionally protected speech. We have here reached that point. *334 John Jay, who was first Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court and prominent in formulating the principles of our government, in a charge to a grand jury as a federal judge, stated: This court does not recognize the right of people to do as they please regardless of the rights of others. Accordingly we are of the opinion that A.R.S. § 13-371 is not an unconstitutional infringement of rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. Therefore the question certified; "Does the amended complaint charge the defendant with an offense?" is answered in the affirmative. LOCKWOOD, C.J., STRUCKMEYER, V.C.J., and UDALL and HAYS, JJ., concur. [1] See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S. Ct. 1304, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1498.