Title: People v. Canizales

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
MICHAEL RAFAEL CANIZALES et al., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
 
S221958 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division Two 
E054056 
 
San Bernardino County Superior Court 
FVA1001265 
 
 
June 24, 2019 
 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye authored the opinion of the court, 
in which Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, Kruger and 
Groban concurred. 
 
 
 
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
S221958 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
This case concerns whether the trial court properly 
instructed the jury on the so-called kill zone theory, under which 
a defendant may be convicted of the attempted murder of an 
individual who was not the defendant’s primary target.  As we 
shall explain, we conclude that a jury may convict a defendant 
under the kill zone theory only when the jury finds that:  (1) the 
circumstances of the defendant’s attack on a primary target, 
including the type and extent of force the defendant used, are 
such that the only reasonable inference is that the defendant 
intended to create a zone of fatal harm — that is, an area in 
which the defendant intended to kill everyone present to ensure 
the primary target’s death — around the primary target; and 
(2) the alleged attempted murder victim who was not the 
primary target was located within that zone of harm.  Taken 
together, such evidence will support a finding that the 
defendant harbored the requisite specific intent to kill both the 
primary target and everyone within the zone of fatal harm. 
We caution, however, that trial courts must be extremely 
careful in determining when to permit the jury to rely upon the 
kill zone theory.  The kill zone theory permits a jury to infer a 
defendant’s intent to kill an alleged attempted murder victim 
from circumstantial evidence (the circumstances of the 
defendant’s attack on a primary target).  But, under the 
reasonable doubt standard, a jury may not find a defendant 
acted with the specific intent to kill everyone in the kill zone if 
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
2 
the circumstances of the attack would also support a reasonable 
alternative inference more favorable to the defendant.  (See 
CALCRIM No. 225.)  Permitting reliance on the kill zone theory 
in such cases risks the jury convicting a defendant based on the 
kill zone theory where it would not be proper to do so.  As past 
cases reveal, there is a substantial potential that the kill zone 
theory may be improperly applied, for instance, where a 
defendant acts with the intent to kill a primary target but with 
only conscious disregard of the risk that others may be seriously 
injured or killed.  Accordingly, in future cases trial courts should 
reserve the kill zone theory for instances in which there is 
sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that the only 
reasonable inference is that the defendant intended to kill (not 
merely to endanger or harm) everyone in the zone of fatal harm.  
In the present matter, defendants Michael Canizales and 
KeAndre Windfield were jointly charged and tried before a 
single jury on counts including first degree murder and two 
attempted murders.  The trial court gave a kill zone instruction 
in connection with one of the two alleged attempted murder 
victims.  The Court of Appeal concluded that the jury was 
properly instructed on that theory, and upheld defendants’ 
attempted murder convictions.  We conclude there was not 
sufficient evidence in the record to support an instruction on the 
kill zone theory, and that the error requires reversal of the 
attempted murder convictions at issue because those convictions 
may have been based on the kill zone theory even though that 
theory was not properly applicable.     
Defendants raise the additional argument that instructing 
pursuant to CALCRIM No. 600, the current standard 
instruction regarding attempted murder, violated defendants’ 
federal constitutional rights to due process because it led the 
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
3 
jurors to believe they could convict defendants of the attempted 
murder of one victim without finding the requisite intent to kill.  
In light of our conclusion that the judgment must be reversed 
because the evidence was insufficient to support an instruction 
on the kill zone theory, we need not address defendants’ 
constitutional challenge to CALCRIM No. 600.   
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The convictions in this case arose from a gang-related 
shooting at a neighborhood block party on West Jackson Street 
in Rialto.  Travion Bolden and Denzell Pride, the alleged 
attempted murder victims, both lived in apartments on West 
Jackson and were members of the Hustla Squad Clicc, a large 
Rialto-based criminal street gang.  Defendants Canizales and 
Windfield were members of a smaller gang called Ramona Blocc 
that was also based in Rialto.  The two gangs were rivals, and 
shootings between them were commonplace.   
Around noon on July 18, 2008, Bolden and Pride saw 
Canizales at a fast-food restaurant near West Jackson.  The 
encounter led to a brief argument between Pride and Canizales 
over Canizales’s female companion.     
Later that same day, Bolden had his own confrontation 
with Canizales after one member of a group of female friends 
with whom Bolden was socializing outside his apartment called 
out to Canizales to join them as he was passing by.  Canizales 
approached and, in what one witness described as a somewhat 
aggressive manner, asked Bolden “what’s up” and where he was 
from.  When Bolden responded that he “didn’t bang,” Canizales 
walked away.  Bolden provided a somewhat different account to 
an investigating officer, saying that he believed Canizales was 
challenging him to a fight, that Bolden responded to that 
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
4 
challenge by removing his shirt and approaching Canizales to 
fight him, and that Canizales walked away once Bolden took off 
his shirt.  According to Bolden’s trial testimony, he felt that 
Canizales had disrespected him and that, once Canizales had 
left, Bolden immediately went to find Pride to tell him what had 
happened.  Pride quickly took off running after Canizales, with 
Bolden following at a slower pace behind him.  The pursuit was 
cut short, however, when Pride’s mother yelled at him to stop 
and he returned to where he and Bolden had been talking.    
After the encounter with Bolden, Canizales walked to a 
nearby grocery store, from where he sent someone to summon 
Ramona Blocc gang leader Windfield.  About 8:35 p.m., after 
joining Canizales outside the grocery store, Windfield spoke 
briefly with the driver of a vehicle that had pulled up next to 
them, then patted the car’s trunk and said “Jackson Street” as 
the car drove away.  Moments later, Windfield and Canizales 
headed toward West Jackson, skipping and strutting, throwing 
gang signs, and yelling “Ramona Blocc.”   
Meanwhile, people had begun to congregate on the 300 
block of West Jackson to prepare for the neighborhood block 
party that night.  By nightfall, there were approximately 10 to 
30 or more people outside on the sidewalks and in the street, 
talking, dancing, and partying.  Twenty-six-year-old Leica 
Cooksey was with a group of young women who had gathered 
around her parked car, dancing to the music on the car’s radio.   
The testimony at trial showed slightly different accounts 
of where the victims were located prior to the shooting.  For 
example, Bolden testified that he and Pride were standing in the 
street in front of Pride’s apartment on the same side of the street 
as Cooksey and her friends, who were about 20 feet away.  Other 
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
5 
testimony indicated that Cooksey’s group was on the side of the 
street opposite Pride’s apartment.  
Bolden testified that as he talked with Pride he noticed 
that an unfamiliar car had passed them several times and then 
parked on Willow Avenue, which runs perpendicular to the east 
side of West Jackson’s 300 hundred block.  Bolden and Pride 
then saw five or six men, including Canizales and Windfield, 
line up shoulder to shoulder near a manhole cover at the 
intersection between West Jackson and Willow, facing West 
Jackson.   
The evidence at trial provided somewhat different 
versions of what happened next.  Bolden testified that he 
observed Windfield pull a gun out of his waistband and 
attempted to pass it to Canizales, who did not take it.  Bolden 
then heard Windfield first say either, “That’s that little nigga,” 
or, “There goes those little niggas right there,” and then “Bust.”1  
Sparks and the sound of gunfire followed.  According to Bolden, 
after Windfield had fired the first shot, Pride grabbed Bolden 
and they ran away from the direction of the gunfire.  Pride 
testified, however, that he was standing in front of his 
apartment when the first shot was fired, and that he ran to his 
young nieces and hurried them inside for safety.   
Bolden had provided still another version of the shooting 
in a recorded interview by Detective Williams that occurred two 
years after the shooting and about one year prior to trial.  In 
that account, Bolden told the officer he was standing inside a 
West Jackson apartment building’s front yard gate smoking 
marijuana with some neighbors when he noticed an unfamiliar 
                                        
1  
“Bust” is a slang term for “shoot.” 
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
6 
car pass by several times.  When the car’s occupants got out of 
the vehicle on Willow Avenue and started walking, he heard 
Windfield say, “That’s the little nigga right there.”  The officer 
asked Bolden whether Windfield was referring to him (Bolden).  
Bolden replied that they had seen Pride because Pride “gave it 
away when he started runnin’ ” and that was when the 
“gunshots came on.”  Pointing to a location on the investigator’s 
map, Bolden said that Pride had been talking on his phone while 
standing near a parked car that was about four car lengths away 
from him, closer to Willow.  When Bolden heard someone yell 
“bust,” he came out from the gate to find Pride.  Moments later, 
Bolden saw a gunshot flash and started running.   
Bolden further testified that once the shooting had begun, 
he ran away along the sidewalk in a straight line but that Pride 
zig-zagged back and forth across the street, at one point running 
behind a bus that was parked on the same side of the street 
where Cooksey and her friends were dancing to her car’s radio.  
Bolden could hear the gunfire coming their way, with bullets 
flying by them and “tingling through the gates.”  Bolden also 
believed, however, that Windfield could not control his gun, and 
he described the bullets as “going everywhere.”  When Windfield 
stopped shooting, he and Canizales ran down Willow Avenue, 
away from the scene.   
Neither Pride nor Bolden was hit by gunfire, but one of the 
shots struck Cooksey in the abdomen and she later died as a 
result of that injury.  Investigators found five expended 
cartridge casings at the corner of West Jackson and Willow, 
approximately 100 feet from where Cooksey was shot.  The 
casings were nine millimeter and all of them had been fired from 
a single semi-automatic gun.  A defense investigator determined 
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
7 
that the distance from the manhole cover on Willow to where 
Pride and Bolden stood when the shooting began was 160 feet.   
Detectives spoke with Canizales and Windfield shortly 
after the shootings but the investigation stalled and no charges 
were filed.  Meanwhile, Pride and Bolden had left the area and 
could not be located.  About one year after the incident, however, 
Windfield told a family friend that he and Canizales had gone to 
West Jackson to shoot the Hustla Squad member who had killed 
his cousin.  Windfield explained that a girl got in the way of his 
gunfire while the person he was shooting at ran away.  Four 
months after that conversation, Windfield’s friend reported the 
confession to police, and the investigation reopened.  Although 
officers had difficulty locating Bolden and Pride, they eventually 
obtained statements from them describing the incident and 
implicating Canizales and Windfield in the shooting.  
Canizales and Windfield were charged by amended 
information with the deliberate, premeditated murder of 
Cooksey, the deliberate, premeditated attempted murders of 
Bolden and Pride, and street terrorism.  (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 
subd. (a); 664, subd. (a) and 187, subd. (a); 186.22, subd. (a).)2  
The amended information also alleged that Canizales and 
Windfield committed the crimes to benefit a street gang, and 
that a principal personally discharged a firearm causing death, 
within the meaning of sections 186.22, subdivision (b), and 
12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), (d), and (e)(1).  Neither Canizales 
nor Windfield testified at trial.  At the close of evidence, the 
                                        
2  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code 
unless otherwise indicated.  
 
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
8 
court dismissed the street terrorism charge and several of the 
firearm enhancements in the interest of justice.     
The court instructed the jury on attempted murder using 
CALCRIM No. 600.3  During closing argument, which occurred 
after the court had given its instructions, the prosecutor offered 
two theories of defendants’ liability for the attempted murder of 
Bolden.  She argued first that the evidence showed Windfield 
was shooting at, and attempting to kill, both Pride and Bolden, 
presumably because they were members of the Hustla Squad 
gang.  She then described the concept of the kill zone.  The 
prosecutor told the jury that “[i]f they’re shooting at someone 
and people are within the zone that they can get killed, then 
you’re responsible for attempted murder as to the people who 
are within the zone of fire.  Okay.  So there were times when 
[Bolden] told you that he was with [Pride], near [Pride], close 
proximity to [Pride].  So they’re both within the zone of fire, the 
range [of] the bullets that are coming at them.”   
                                        
3  
The instruction provided, as relevant here, that the 
prosecution had to prove two elements to prove attempted 
murder:  “1.  The defendant took a direct but ineffective step 
toward killing another person; and 2. The defendant intended to 
kill that person [¶]  . . .  [¶]  A person may intend to kill a 
particular victim or victims and at the same time intend to kill 
everyone in a particular zone of harm or ‘kill zone.’  In order to 
convict a defendant of the attempted murder of . . . Bolden, the 
People must prove that the defendant not only intended to 
kill . . . Pride but also either intended to kill . . . Bolden, or 
intended to kill everyone within the kill zone.  If you have a 
reasonable 
doubt 
whether 
the 
defendant 
intended 
to 
kill . . . Pride by killing everyone in the kill zone, then you must 
find the defendant not guilty of the attempted murder.”   
 
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
9 
As relevant here, the jury found both defendants guilty of 
the first degree murder of Cooksey and the premeditated 
attempted murders of Bolden and Pride, and found as to all 
three counts that the offenses were committed for the benefit of 
a criminal street gang.  The Court of Appeal reversed 
Canizales’s first degree murder conviction of Cooksey in light of 
this court’s decision in People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155 
(Chiu),4 but otherwise affirmed the judgments.  In upholding the 
attempted murder convictions, the Court of Appeal expressly 
disagreed with the formulation of the kill zone theory’s 
requirements 
set 
forth 
in 
People 
v. 
McCloud 
(2012) 
211 Cal.App.4th 788 (McCloud).   
We granted review in light of the conflict in the Courts of 
Appeal regarding the evidentiary basis for applying, and 
instructing on, the kill zone theory for establishing the intent to 
kill element of attempted murder.   
II. DISCUSSION 
A.  The kill zone theory of attempted murder 
liability  
To prove the crime of attempted murder, the prosecution 
must establish “the specific intent to kill and the commission of 
a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended 
killing.”  (People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 623.)  When a 
                                        
4  
Chiu held that an aider and abettor’s liability for first 
degree premeditated murder cannot be based on the natural and 
probable consequences doctrine.  (Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at 
pp. 158-159.)  In reversing Canizales’s conviction, the Court of 
Appeal explained that it was unable to conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the jury based its first degree murder 
verdict on the legally valid theory that he aided and abetted 
premeditated murder.   
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
10 
single act is charged as an attempt on the lives of two or more 
persons, the intent to kill element must be examined 
independently as to each alleged attempted murder victim; an 
intent to kill cannot be “transferred” from one attempted murder 
victim to another under the transferred intent doctrine.  (People 
v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 327-328 (Bland).)   
Direct evidence of intent to kill is rare, and ordinarily the 
intent to kill must be inferred from the statements and actions 
of the defendant and the circumstances surrounding the crime.  
(People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 457; People v. Smith 
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 741 (Smith); People Lashley (1991) 
1 Cal.App.4th 938, 945-946.)   
In Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th 313, this court expressly 
embraced the concept of a concurrent intent to kill as a 
permissible theory for establishing the specific intent 
requirement of attempted murder.  Under that theory, which 
was first articulated by the Maryland high court in Ford v. State 
(Md. 1993) 625 A.2d 984 (Ford), the nature and scope of the 
attack directed at a primary victim may raise an inference that 
the defendant “ ‘intended to ensure harm to the primary victim 
by harming everyone in that victim’s vicinity.’ ”  (Bland, at 
p. 329, quoting Ford, at p. 1000.)  Quoting extensively from 
Ford, the Bland decision illustrated the notion of a concurrent 
intent to kill with a hypothetical scenario in which the 
defendant “ ‘escalated his mode of attack from a single bullet 
aimed at A’s head to a hail of bullets or explosive device.’ ”  
(Bland, at p. 330, quoting Ford, at p. 1001.)  On such facts, “ ‘the 
factfinder can infer that, whether or not the defendant 
succeeded in killing A, the defendant concurrently intended to 
kill everyone in A’s immediate vicinity to ensure A’s death.’ ”  
(Ibid.)  Again quoting from Ford, we explained that “ ‘[w]here 
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
11 
the means employed to commit the crime against a primary 
victim create a zone of harm around that victim, the factfinder 
can reasonably infer that the defendant intended that harm to 
all who are in the anticipated zone.’ ”  (Ibid.)   
Bland applied what is now commonly referred to as the 
“kill zone” theory to uphold the attempted murder convictions in 
that case.  The record there showed that the defendant and a 
fellow gang member approached a car in which a rival gang 
member was sitting in the driver’s seat and opened fire with a 
.38-caliber handgun, shooting numerous rounds both into the 
vehicle and at the vehicle as it drove away.  The driver was killed 
and his two passengers, who were not gang members, were 
wounded.  (Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 318.)  We concluded 
that the evidence “virtually compelled” a finding that even if the 
defendant primarily intended to kill the rival gang member, he 
also, concurrently, intended to kill the passengers in the car, or, 
at the least, intended to create a zone of fatal harm.  (Id. at 
p. 333.)   
Bland’s adoption of the kill zone theory meant that a 
prosecutor charging attempted murder in a multi-victim case 
had an additional, alternative ground by which to prove the 
requisite intent to kill.  Under appropriate facts, the prosecutor 
could attempt to show either that the defendant’s intent to kill 
one or more alleged victims arose independently of his actions 
toward any other victim, or that the defendant’s intent to kill an 
untargeted victim arose concurrently with his intent to kill a 
primary target.   
After the opinion in Bland, this court issued a series of 
decisions in which the defendant had been convicted of one or 
more counts of attempted murder based on the act of shooting a 
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
12 
single bullet in the direction of two or more individuals.  In each 
of these cases, we had occasion to discuss the application of the 
kill zone theory and found it either irrelevant or inapplicable to 
the facts presented.   
Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th 733, declined to analyze the 
defendant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim under the kill zone 
rationale, finding no merit to the defendant’s assertion that all 
single-bullet cases involving more than one victim must be 
assessed under that theory.  Examining the totality of the 
circumstances shown by the evidence, our decision in Smith 
concluded instead that the defendant was properly convicted of 
two counts of attempted murder for having fired at close range 
a single bullet at a former girlfriend seated in the front seat of 
her car and the infant who was in a car seat immediately behind 
her, both of whom were in his direct line of fire.  (Id. at pp. 744-
746.)   
In a dissenting opinion in Smith, Justice Werdegar 
disagreed that the evidence was sufficient to uphold the 
conviction for the attempted murder of the infant.  The dissent 
concluded that the record did not support the Attorney General’s 
argument that the defendant’s firing of a single bullet in the 
direction of his former girlfriend created a zone of fatal harm 
around her such that it might be inferred that he intended to 
ensure her death by killing the infant as well.  (Id. at pp. 755-
757 (dis. opn. of Werdegar, J.).)   
Subsequently, in People v. Stone (2009) 46 Cal.4th 131 
(Stone), this court agreed with the Court of Appeal that the trial 
court should not have instructed on the kill zone theory because 
that theory was not implicated in that case.  There, the 
defendant had been charged with only a single count of 
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
13 
attempted premeditated murder for shooting at someone who 
was standing in a group of 10 rival gang members about 60 feet 
away from the defendant.  (Id. at pp. 135, 138.)  We found the 
instructional error on the theory harmless, however, and upheld 
the 
attempted 
murder 
conviction, 
notwithstanding 
the 
prosecutor’s concession that he had not proved that the 
defendant specifically intended to kill the victim named in the 
charging document.  In affirming the judgment, we held that a 
defendant who fires into a group of people intending to kill one 
of them, but not knowing or caring which one he or she kills, can 
be convicted of attempted murder because there is no 
requirement that a defendant intend to kill a specific target, so 
long as he or she intended to kill someone.  (Id. at pp. 139-140.)  
We noted that although “difficulties can arise . . . regarding how 
many attempted murder convictions are permissible” in some 
cases, we were not required to confront that difficulty in Stone 
because the defendant there was charged with only one count of 
attempted murder.  (Id. at pp. 140-141, citing Bland, supra, 
28 Cal.4th at pp. 328-329.)   
Finally, in People v. Perez (2010) 50 Cal.4th 222 (Perez), 
this court reversed seven of the defendant’s eight attempted 
murder convictions that were based on his firing a single shot 
from 60 feet away into a group comprised primarily of police 
officers who were standing in close proximity to one another.  In 
examining the defendant’s challenge to his convictions, Perez 
considered whether the kill zone theory applied.  We concluded 
that the nature and scope of the defendant’s attack on the group 
had not created a zone of fatal harm around them and that 
Bland did not apply.  (Id. at p. 232.)   
In the course of concluding that the kill zone theory was 
not supported by the evidence adduced at trial, our decisions in 
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
14 
Stone and Smith briefly summarized the kill zone theory of 
attempted murder liability.  Stone explained, for example, that 
the kill zone theory “addresses the question of whether a 
defendant charged with the murder or attempted murder of an 
intended target can also be convicted of attempting to murder 
other, nontargeted, persons.”  (Stone, supra, 46 Cal.4th at 
p. 138.)  For its part, Smith pointed out that “Bland simply 
recognizes that a shooter may be convicted of multiple counts of 
attempted murder on a ‘kill zone’ theory where the evidence 
establishes that the shooter used lethal force designed and 
intended to kill everyone in an area around the targeted victim 
(i.e., the ‘kill zone’) as the means of accomplishing the killing of 
that victim.  Under such circumstances, a rational jury could 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the shooter intended 
to kill not only his targeted victim, but also all others he knew 
were in the zone of fatal harm.”  (Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at 
pp. 745-746.)   
As previously explained, the kill zone theory embraced by 
Bland originated from the concept of concurrent intent first 
articulated by the Maryland Court of Appeals in Ford, supra, 
625 A.2d 984.  Ford’s discussion of the concurrent intent theory 
was not the basis on which the court resolved the issue 
presented in that case, however.  Rather, it was dictum in a 
discussion eschewing reliance on a transferred intent theory of 
liability for inchoate crimes.  An earlier decision by the same 
court, State v. Wilson (Md. 1988) 546 A.2d 1041 (Wilson), had 
applied transferred intent to uphold a conviction for the 
attempted murder of a bystander who was shot during the 
defendants’ attempt to kill a targeted victim.  Ford disapproved 
the reasoning of Wilson.  But the court in Ford justified Wilson’s 
result on the ground that the convictions in Wilson could be 
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
15 
upheld on a theory of concurrent intent.  That is, the record 
supported an inference of the defendants’ concurrent intent to 
kill both the primary victim and the bystander based on 
evidence that the defendants had fired numerous shots toward 
both victims.  (Ford, at p. 1001.)  As Ford explained, the 
factfinder could conclude that by attempting to kill their target 
by firing multiple bullets from two handguns, the defendants 
intended to create a “ ‘kill zone’ ” around the target from which 
it could be inferred that the defendants intended to kill everyone 
in the direct path of their bullets.  (Ibid.)  Ford found that the 
bystander was “obviously” in the “direct line of fire and the 
evidence permitted finding concurrent intent to kill everyone in 
the path of the bullets.”  (Ibid.)   
In concluding that Wilson correctly upheld the defendants’ 
attempted murder convictions, the Ford decision spoke in terms 
of the victims being in the “direct line of fire.”  (Ford, supra, 625 
A.2d at p. 1001.)  But its description of the concurrent intent 
theory, generally, was not so limited.  Ford explained that when 
“[t]he defendant has intentionally created a ‘kill zone’ to ensure 
the death of his primary victim, . . . the trier of fact may 
reasonably infer from the method employed an intent to kill 
others concurrent with the intent to kill the primary victim.”  
(Ibid.)   
A decade after Ford’s dictum, in Harrison v. State (Md. 
2004) 855 A.2d 1220 (Harrison), the Maryland Court of Appeals 
expressly adopted the concurrent intent theory as a basis of 
liability for crimes such as attempted murder.  Drawing on 
language in Ford, the Harrison decision observed that the 
“essential questions” in a concurrent intent analysis focus “on 
the ‘means employed to commit the crime [against the primary 
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
16 
victim]’ and the ‘zone of harm around [that] victim.’ ”  (Harrison, 
at p. 1230.)   
Justice Werdegar’s dissenting opinion in Smith, supra, 
37 Cal.4th 733, applied Harrison’s two-part inquiry to reject the 
Attorney General’s argument that the conviction for the 
attempted murder of the infant in the car seat could be upheld 
under the kill zone theory.  Slightly rephrasing that test, the 
dissenting opinion asked “(1) whether the fact finder can 
rationally infer from the type and extent of force employed in 
the defendant’s attack on the primary target that the defendant 
intentionally created a zone of fatal harm, and (2) whether the 
nontargeted alleged attempted murder victim inhabited that 
zone of harm.”  (Smith, at pp. 755-756.)   
Harrison’s two-part inquiry, as rephrased in the 
dissenting opinion in Smith, accurately reflects this court’s 
decision in Bland and the underpinnings of the kill zone theory.  
As previously noted, Bland quoted extensively from the Ford 
decision, on which Harrison was likewise based.  And Harrison’s 
inquiry is consistent with the only decision by this court 
subsequent to Bland that analyzed the record under the kill 
zone theory.  In concluding that the kill zone theory did not 
apply, we observed in Perez, supra, 50 Cal.4th 222, 232, that 
“Bland’s kill zone theory of multiple attempted murder is 
necessarily defined by the nature and scope of the attack.”   
The two-part standard for application of the kill zone 
theory set forth in Justice Werdegar’s dissenting opinion in 
Smith thus provides a helpful basis for a clear and workable 
test.  But the potential for the misapplication of the kill zone 
theory, as evidenced by prior appellate cases, illustrates the 
importance of more clearly defining the kill zone theory in future 
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
17 
cases.  The kill zone theory looks to circumstantial evidence to 
support a permissive inference regarding a defendant’s intent.  
This is not unusual.  As we have described on many occasions, 
intent to kill often must be inferred from circumstantial 
evidence surrounding the crime.  (See, e.g., People v. Sanchez, 
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 457.)  And when the prosecution’s theory 
substantially relies on circumstantial evidence,  a jury must be 
instructed that it cannot find guilt based on circumstantial 
evidence when that evidence supports a reasonable conclusion 
that the defendant is not guilty.  (People v. Bender (1945) 
27 Cal.2d 164, 175, abrogated on another ground by People v. 
Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 110; see also CALCRIM No. 225 
[directing jury that circumstantial evidence may support 
required intent if “the only reasonable conclusion supported by 
the circumstantial evidence” is that defendant had the required 
intent, and that jury must conclude intent was not proved when 
there are “two or more reasonable conclusions from the 
circumstantial 
evidence, 
and 
one 
of 
those 
reasonable 
conclusions supports” a determination that defendant did not 
have the required intent].)  As past cases demonstrate, however, 
even when a jury is otherwise properly instructed on 
circumstantial evidence and reasonable doubt, the potential for 
misapplication of the kill zone theory remains troubling.   
   We therefore conclude that the kill zone theory for 
establishing the specific intent to kill required for conviction of 
attempted murder may properly be applied only when a jury 
concludes:  (1) the circumstances of the defendant’s attack on a 
primary target, including the type and extent of force the 
defendant used, are such that the only reasonable inference is 
that the defendant intended to create a zone of fatal harm — 
that is, an area in which the defendant intended to kill everyone 
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
18 
present to ensure the primary target’s death — around the 
primary target; and (2) the alleged attempted murder victim 
who was not the primary target was located within that zone of 
harm.  Taken together, such evidence will support a finding that 
the defendant harbored the requisite specific intent to kill both 
the primary target and everyone within the zone of fatal harm.   
In determining the defendant’s intent to create a zone of 
fatal harm and the scope of any such zone, the jury should 
consider the circumstances of the offense, such as the type of 
weapon used, the number of shots fired (where a firearm is 
used), the distance between the defendant and the alleged 
victims, and the proximity of the alleged victims to the primary 
target.  Evidence that a defendant who intends to kill a primary 
target acted with only conscious disregard of the risk of serious 
injury or death for those around a primary target does not 
satisfy the kill zone theory.  As the Court of Appeal recently 
explained in People v. Medina (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 146, at 
page 156 (Medina), the kill zone theory does not apply where 
“the defendant merely subjected persons near the primary 
target to lethal risk.  Rather, in a kill zone case, the defendant 
has a primary target and reasons [that] he cannot miss that 
intended target if he kills everyone in the area in which the 
target is located.  In the absence of such evidence, the kill zone 
instruction should not be given.”  We believe our formulation of 
the kill zone theory here guards against the potential 
misapplication of the theory, and is consistent with Bland and 
the general principles discussed above regarding circumstantial 
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
19 
evidence and the prosecution’s burden of proving each element 
of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt.5            
We emphasize that going forward trial courts must 
exercise caution when determining whether to permit the jury 
to rely upon the kill zone theory.  Indeed, we anticipate there 
will be relatively few cases in which the theory will be applicable 
and an instruction appropriate.  Trial courts should tread 
carefully when the prosecution proposes to rely on such a theory, 
and should provide an instruction to the jury only in those cases 
where the court concludes there is sufficient evidence to support 
a jury determination that the only reasonable inference from the 
circumstances of the offense is that a defendant intended to kill 
everyone in the zone of fatal harm.  The use or attempted use of 
force that merely endangered everyone in the area is insufficient 
to support a kill zone instruction.     
Relying on language in Stone, supra, 46 Cal.4th 131, the 
Attorney General and amicus curiae assert that for the kill zone 
theory to apply it is not necessary that the defendant have a 
                                        
5  
Past appellate court opinions articulating the kill zone 
theory are incomplete to the extent that they do not require a 
jury to consider the circumstances of the offense in determining 
the application of the kill zone or imply that a jury need not find 
a defendant intended to kill everyone in the kill zone as a means 
of killing the primary target, even if their description of the 
theory is otherwise consistent with our opinion here.  (See, e.g., 
Medina, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 170; People v. Stevenson 
(2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 974, 985-987; People v. Windfield (2016) 
3 Cal.App.5th 739, 754-761; People v. Falaniko (2016) 
1 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1243-1244; People v. Cardona (2016) 246 
Cal.App.4th 608, 614-615; McCloud, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at 
pp. 798-800.)     
 
 
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
20 
primary target.  They have misread our decision.  Stone does say 
that “[a]lthough a primary target often exists and can be 
identified, one is not required.”  (Id. at p. 140.)  In making that 
observation, however, our opinion in Stone was not referring to 
the kill zone theory.  Indeed, we concluded that the jury there 
should not have been given a kill zone instruction because that 
theory “addresses the question of whether a defendant charged 
with the murder or attempted murder of an intended target can 
also be convicted of attempting to murder other, nontargeted, 
persons.”  (Id. at p. 138, italics added and omitted.)  In Stone, 
the intent-to-kill element of the attempted murder charge was 
established because the evidence supported an inference that 
the defendant intended to kill someone in the group.  In Smith, 
supra, 37 Cal.4th 733, evidence that the defendant discharged a 
lethal firearm at two victims who were seated directly in his line 
of fire supported an inference that he acted with intent to kill 
both victims.  (Id. at p. 743.)   
Stone and Smith do make clear there are evidentiary 
bases, other than the kill zone theory, on which a factfinder can 
infer an intent to kill for purposes of attempted murder liability 
that do not depend on a showing that the defendant had a 
primary target (for example, when a terrorist places a bomb on 
a commercial airliner intending to kill as many people as 
possible without intending to kill a specific individual).  (Stone, 
supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 140; Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 743.)  
When the kill zone theory is used to support an inference that 
the defendant concurrently intended to kill a nontargeted 
victim, however, evidence of a primary target is required.  As we 
stated in Bland, the kill zone theory is one of concurrent intent 
based on a reasonable inference a jury may draw under the facts 
of a particular case.  (Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 330-331, 
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
21 
331, fn. 6.)  As the Court of Appeal correctly observed in Medina, 
supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at page 155, “[w]ithout a primary target, 
there cannot be concurrent intent because there is no primary 
intent to kill as to which the intent to kill others could be 
concurrent.”      
Defendant Windfield asserts that CALCRIM No. 600, the 
standard instruction on attempted murder that was given in the 
case, does not adequately explain the kill zone theory.  We agree 
that, when a kill zone instruction is legally warranted and in 
fact provided, the standard instruction should be revised to 
better describe the contours and limits of the kill zone theory as 
we have laid them out here.           
1.  The kill zone instruction was not sufficiently 
supported in the present matter 
As we shall explain, we conclude that the evidence in this 
case was insufficient to warrant the trial court's instruction on 
the kill zone theory in connection with the count charging the 
attempted murder of Bolden.     
“ ‘It is an elementary principle of law that before a jury can 
be instructed that it may draw a particular inference, evidence 
must appear in the record which, if believed by the jury, will 
support the suggested inference.  [Citation.]’  [Citation.]”  
(People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 681; accord People v. 
Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 605.)   
Here, there was substantial evidence in the record from 
which it could be inferred that Pride was defendants’ primary 
target in the shooting, and no party argues otherwise.  Pride was 
a known member of Hustla Squad, and Windfield had admitted 
to a family friend that on the night in question he and Canizales 
had gone to West Jackson to “get a Hustla Squad” gang member 
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
22 
who had killed his cousin.  Moreover, Pride and Canizales had 
engaged in a verbal altercation around noon on the day of the 
shooting.  Finally, the evidence showed that after defendants 
and their companions had lined up along Willow Avenue facing 
West Jackson Street, where Pride and Bolden were standing 
together on the sidewalk, Winfield yelled, “That’s that little 
nigga.  Bust” — and then opened fire.   
But an instruction on the kill zone theory would have been 
warranted in this case only if there was substantial evidence in 
the record that, if believed by the jury, would support a 
reasonable inference that defendants intended to kill everyone 
within the “kill zone.”  To qualify, the record would need to 
include (1) evidence regarding the circumstances of defendants’ 
attack on Pride that would support a reasonable inference that 
defendants intentionally created a zone of fatal harm around 
him, and (2) evidence that Bolden was located within that zone 
of fatal harm.  Taken together, such evidence would permit a 
finding that defendants harbored the requisite intent to kill 
Bolden because he was within the zone of fatal harm that 
defendants intended to create around Pride.   
The Attorney General argues the evidence is sufficient to 
support a reasonable inference that defendants intentionally 
created a zone of fatal harm around Pride because, like in Bland, 
the five shots Windfield fired at Pride (the primary target) were 
enough to kill everyone in that zone.  We conclude, however, that 
the evidence concerning the circumstances of the attack 
(including the type and extent of force used by Windfield) was 
not sufficient to support a reasonable inference that defendants 
intended to create a zone of fatal harm around a primary target.   
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
23 
The Attorney General is correct that in Harrison 
Maryland’s high court observed that “courts have permitted an 
inference that the defendant created a kill zone when a 
defendant . . . fired multiple bullets at an intended target.”  
(Harrison, supra, 855 A.2d at p. 1231.)  For that proposition, 
Harrison described the facts of a number of multiple-shot cases 
that involved application of the kill zone theory.  For example, 
Harrison pointed out that in Wilson, supra, 546 A.2d at page 
1042, the defendants had fired “ ‘multiple bullets’ ” from two 
handguns.  (Harrison, at p. 1231.)  Likewise in Bland, supra, 
28 Cal.4th at page 331, Harrison observed, the defendant and 
his cohort had fired a “ ‘flurry of bullets’ ” at the fleeing car.  
(Harrison, at p. 1231.)   
But a closer examination of the decisions relied upon by 
Harrison to illustrate its point reveals that the number of shots 
fired, although relevant to the inquiry, is not dispositive.  
Rather, the number of shots fired is simply one of the 
evidentiary factors to consider when assessing whether the type 
and extent of the defendant’s attack supports instruction on the 
kill zone theory.  (See People v. Vang (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 554, 
564 [the placement of the shots, the number of shots, and the 
use of high-powered wall-piercing weapons created a reasonable 
inference that the defendants intended to kill every living being 
inside the residences at which they shot]; see also Washington 
v. United States (D.C. Ct.App. 2015) 111 A.3d 16, 24 [the court’s 
concurrent intent instruction was supported by evidence that 
the defendant stood 21 feet away and fired 10 gunshots at four 
people in close proximity to one another, hitting three of them].)   
Notably, in each of the multi-shot cases cited in Harrison, 
the defendants opened fire while in close proximity to the area 
surrounding their intended target.  In Bland, for example, the 
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
24 
defendant approached the driver’s side of the victims’ car and 
started shooting into the vehicle, then fired at the car as it 
started to drive away.  (Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 318.)  
Similarly, in Wilson, the defendants engaged in a heated verbal 
argument with a man.  After threatening to pistol whip him, the 
defendants then drew their handguns and opened fire on their 
target, missing him but hitting a bystander who was near both 
defendants and their target.  (Wilson, supra, 546 A.2d at 
p. 1042.)   
By contrast, here the evidence at trial showed that 
Windfield attacked his target by firing five bullets from a nine-
millimeter handgun at a distance of either 100 or 160 feet away.  
Moreover, the attack occurred at a block party on a wide city 
street, not in an alleyway, cul de sac, or some other area or 
structure from which victims would have limited means of 
escape.  As Bolden described it, the bullets were “going 
everywhere” and “tingling through the gates” as he and Pride 
ran down the street away from the gunfire after the first shot 
was fired.  
Even accepting as more credible the prosecution’s 
evidence that Windfield was 100 feet rather than 160 feet away 
from Pride and Bolden when he first fired in their direction, we 
conclude that a factfinder could not reasonably infer defendants 
intended to create a zone of fatal harm around Pride based on 
the record in this case.  The evidence presented here showed 
that from a substantial distance Windfield shot five bullets in 
the direction of a target who immediately ran down a city street 
after the first shot was fired.  This evidence was insufficient to 
support instruction on the kill zone theory.   
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
25 
We 
emphasize 
that 
the 
determination 
whether 
substantial evidence supports instruction on the kill zone theory 
is based on evidence regarding the circumstances of the attack 
on the primary target, from which the defendant’s intent to 
create a zone of fatal harm may be inferred.  Such a 
determination 
does 
not 
turn 
on 
the 
effectiveness 
or 
ineffectiveness of the defendant’s chosen method of attack.  But 
whether the inference reasonably could be drawn in this 
particular case is at least informed by evidence that neither 
Pride nor Bolden was hit by any of the shots fired by Windfield.  
This evidence — when viewed in conjunction with evidence 
regarding the limited number of shots fired, defendants’ lack of 
proximity to Pride, and the openness of the area in which the 
attack occurred — further diminishes any inference that 
defendants intended to create a zone of fatal harm around Pride.   
Because we conclude that the evidence here is insufficient 
to support a finding that defendants intended to create a zone of 
fatal harm, we have no occasion to determine the scope of any 
such zone given these facts.  In cases where substantial evidence 
exists to support a finding that the only reasonable inference is 
that a zone of fatal harm has been created, the jury is to consider 
the circumstances of the attack, including the type and extent of 
force used during the attack, to determine the scope of that zone 
and whether the alleged victim was within the zone.6   
                                        
6  
Defendant Canizales additionally argues that an aider 
and abettor cannot be held liable for attempted murder under 
the kill zone theory because doing so would improperly require 
the jury to attribute the shooter’s intent to create a zone of fatal 
harm to the aider and abettor.  Because Canizales did not raise 
this claim until he filed his notice of supplemental authorities, 
 
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
26 
2.  The error in instructing on the kill zone theory was 
prejudicial 
We have concluded above that there was insufficient 
evidence in the record to support the trial court’s instruction on 
the kill zone theory.  For the reasons provided below, we 
conclude that the court’s error in instructing on that theory 
requires reversal.   
As previously discussed, the jury was instructed on two 
theories of liability in connection with the count charging the 
attempted murder of Bolden.  The jury was told that it could 
return a verdict of guilt on that count if it found either (1) that 
defendants intended to kill Bolden specifically, or (2) that 
defendants intended to kill Pride and at the same time intended 
to kill everyone “in a particular zone of harm or ‘kill zone.’ ”  The 
Attorney General argues that because the jury could properly 
have based the attempted murder convictions of Bolden on the 
first theory, the circumstance that the trial court should not 
have instructed on the “kill zone” theory because there was 
insufficient evidence to support that theory does not warrant 
reversal of those attempted murder convictions.  The Attorney 
General maintains that under this court’s decision in People v. 
Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1130 (Guiton), the applicable 
harmless error standard that applies in this setting is the 
ordinary, less demanding standard set forth in People v. Watson 
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836-837, and that under that standard the 
trial court error was not prejudicial.  
In support of the application of the Watson standard, the 
Attorney General points to our observation in Guiton that when 
                                        
and because we reverse his attempted murder conviction on 
other grounds, we do not address his claim here.   
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
27 
a trial court instructs the jury on an alternative theory that is 
improper simply because that alternative theory is not factually 
supported by the evidence adduced at trial, the factual 
inadequacy is generally something that “the jury is fully 
equipped to detect.”  (Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1129.)  For 
this reason, we stated in Guiton that “instruction on an 
unsupported theory is prejudicial only if that theory became the 
sole basis of the verdict of guilt; if the jury based its verdict on 
the valid ground, or on both the valid and the invalid ground, 
there would be no prejudice, for there would be a valid basis for 
the verdict. . . .  [T]he appellate court should affirm the judgment 
unless a review of the entire record affirmatively demonstrates 
a reasonable probability that the jury in fact found the 
defendant guilty solely on the unsupported theory.”  (Id. at 
p. 1130.)   
At the same time, however, we also explained in Guiton 
that a different prejudice inquiry applies in cases “in which ‘a 
particular theory of conviction . . . is contrary to law,’ or, phrased 
slightly differently, cases involving a ‘legally inadequate 
theory’ . . . .” (Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1128.)  In 
determining whether a legally inadequate theory was conveyed 
to the jury here, we must ask whether there is a “ ‘reasonable 
likelihood’ ” that the jury understood the kill zone theory in a 
legally impermissible manner.  (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 
495, 525, quoting Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72.)  In 
doing so, we consider the instructions provided to the jury and 
counsels’ argument to the jury.  (See, e.g., People v. Nelson 
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 545.)   
In light of the instruction provided to the jury regarding 
the attempted murder of Bolden and the prosecutor’s closing 
argument, the error here cannot be described merely as the 
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
28 
presentation of a factually unsupported theory.  In relevant 
part, the instruction informed the jury that to convict 
defendants of attempted murder it must find “[t]he defendant 
took a direct but ineffective step toward killing another person” 
and “intended to kill that person.”  It further explained that “[a] 
person may intend to kill a particular victim or victims and at 
the same time intend to kill everyone in a particular zone of 
harm or ‘kill zone.’ ”  The instruction indicated that the People 
must prove “that the defendant[s] not only intended to kill 
Denzell Pride but also either intended to kill Travion Bolden, or 
intended to kill everyone within the kill zone.”  Finally, the 
instruction directed the jury that if it had “a reasonable doubt 
whether the defendant[s] intended to kill Travion Bolden or 
intended to kill Denzel Pride by killing everyone in the kill 
zone,” it must return verdicts of not guilty.  Beyond its reference 
to a “particular zone of harm,” the instruction provided no 
further definition of the term “kill zone.”  Nor did the instruction 
direct the jury to consider evidence regarding the circumstances 
of defendants’ attack when determining whether defendants 
“intended to kill Denzel Pride by killing everyone in the kill 
zone.”  
The prosecutor’s description of the kill zone theory given 
during closing argument substantially aggravated the potential 
for confusion.  The prosecutor told the jury that under the kill 
zone theory, when a defendant is “shooting at someone and 
people are within the zone that they can get killed, then [the 
defendant] is responsible for attempted murder as to the people 
who are within the zone of fire.”  Pointing to Bolden’s testimony 
that he was at times in close proximity to Pride, the prosecutor 
argued that they were “both within the zone of fire, the range 
[of] the bullets that are coming at them.”  The prosecutor’s 
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
29 
definition of the kill zone as an area in which people “can get 
killed” or are in a “zone of fire” was significantly broader than a 
proper understanding of the theory permits.  Indeed, it 
essentially equated attempted murder with implied malice 
murder.  (See Medina, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 155 [holding 
that allowing the kill zone instruction based on an asserted 
natural and probable consequence that anyone within a zone of 
harm could die “replaces the specific intent/express malice 
required for an attempted murder conviction with conscious 
disregard for life/implied malice, which Bland makes clear 
cannot support an attempted murder conviction”].)  Thus, the 
prosecutor’s argument had the potential to mislead the jury to 
believe that the mere presence of a purported victim in an area 
in which he or she could be fatally shot is sufficient for 
attempted murder liability under the kill zone theory.  So 
misled, the jury might well have found factual support for what 
was effectively an “implied malice” theory of attempted murder 
without detecting the legal error.  (See Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th 
at p. 1128.)    
In light of these facts, we conclude that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the kill zone 
instruction in a legally impermissible manner.  The court’s error 
in instructing on the factually unsupported kill zone theory, 
combined with the lack of any clear definition of the theory in 
the jury instruction as well as the prosecutor’s misleading 
argument, could reasonably have led the jury to believe that it 
could find that defendants intended to kill Bolden based on a 
legally inaccurate version of the kill zone theory — that is, that 
defendants could be found guilty of the attempted murder of 
Bolden if Windfield shot at Pride knowing there was a 
substantial danger he would also hit Bolden.  
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
30 
These circumstances make this case similar to People v. 
Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1 (Green), a case discussed and analyzed 
in some detail in this court’s decision in Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th 
at pages 1121-1122, 1128-1129.  In Green, the defendant was 
convicted of charges including first degree murder, kidnapping, 
and a kidnapping special circumstance.  (Green, at pp. 11-12.)  
Under the jury instructions provided, the jury could have based 
its kidnapping verdict on any one of three distinct segments of 
asportation, including one incident where the victim travelled 
only 90 feet.  (Id. at pp. 62-63.)  In instructing the jury on the 
elements of kidnapping, the trial court informed the jury only 
that asportation must be “ ‘for a substantial distance, that is, a 
distance more than slight or trivial.’ ”  (Id. at p. 68.)  This court 
in Green, after determining that the 90-foot asportation was 
“insufficient as a matter of law” to support the kidnapping 
conviction (id. at p. 67), held that the instructional error in 
permitting the jury to base its verdict on that asportation was 
prejudicial and required reversal of the kidnapping conviction 
and the related kidnapping special circumstance (id. at p. 74).   
In explaining the reasoning underlying the reversal of the 
kidnapping conviction in Green, we observed in our subsequent 
decision in Guiton that whereas “a jury would be well equipped 
to analyze the evidence and determine whether the victim had 
been asported, and to determine the distance of the 
asportation[,] [t]he jury would, however, not be equipped to 
determine whether, as a matter of law, 90 feet is insufficient.  A 
reasonable jury, given no specific guidance regarding the 
required distance [citation], could have found 90 feet to be 
sufficient, and could have relied on that segment of asportation 
in its verdict.  That being the case, reversal was appropriate.”  
(Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1128.)   
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
31 
Here, as in Green, the jury was provided an instruction 
regarding the kill zone theory but no adequate definition to 
enable the jury to determine whether the theory was properly 
applicable.  This error was one of federal constitutional 
magnitude.  (See People v. Lee (1987) 43 Cal.3d 666, 672.)  In 
Guiton, we did not establish the precise standard of review for 
cases governed by Green.  (Guiton, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 1130-1131.)  
Although we observed that in cases like Green “the general rule 
has been to reverse the conviction because the appellate court is 
‘ “unable to determine which of the prosecution’s theories served 
as the basis for the jury’s verdict” ’ ” (Guiton, at p. 1130), we also 
noted that “even this rule has not been not universal.”  (Ibid.)  
We currently are considering in People v. Aledamat, review 
granted July 5, 2018, S248105, whether the appropriate 
standard for prejudice in this setting is the test established in 
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman), or an 
even more stringent test requiring reversal unless there is a 
basis in the record to find that the jury actually relied on the 
valid theory.   
 
Here, we need not resolve the question posed in Aledamat 
because we conclude that the error in this case was prejudicial 
under even the Chapman standard.  Applying that test, we ask 
“whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a reasonable 
jury would have rendered the same verdict absent the error.”  
(People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 831, citing Neder v. 
United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 18.)  In making that 
determination, we examine the entire record.  (See Green, supra, 
27 Cal.3d at p. 71.)  Considering the evidence regarding the 
shooting, the prosecutor’s argument, and the jury’s questions 
during deliberation, we conclude that the attempted murder 
convictions as to Bolden must be reversed.   
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
32 
First, although there was strong evidence that Pride was 
defendants’ primary target, there was conflicting evidence 
regarding whether defendants also intended to kill Bolden 
specifically.  On the one hand, Detective Williams testified that 
Pride indicated to him during a pretrial interview that the 
shooter was targeting Bolden, not him.  Detective Williams’s 
interview with Bolden, when Bolden described his earlier 
confrontation with Canizales, likewise suggested that Bolden 
believed Windfield was shooting at him.  The evidence also 
showed Bolden was a member of a rival gang and that 
defendants, who were members of the Ramona Blocc gang, were 
seeking to retaliate against the Hustla Squad gang for the fatal 
shooting of Windfield’s cousin.  Taken together, this evidence 
indicates that the jury could have concluded that defendants 
had the requisite intent to kill Bolden specifically.   
But other evidence leads us to conclude that it is not clear 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a reasonable jury would have 
come to that determination.  Bolden told Detective Williams and 
testified at trial that Windfield was not talking about him when 
he said, “There goes that little nigga,” because Windfield did not 
know him, and that defendant saw Pride, who “gave it away” by 
running.7  Bolden testified he thought Windfield was shooting 
                                        
7 
The exchange between Detective Williams and Bolden 
further supports this conclusion:  “[Det. Williams]: They was 
talkin’ about you?  [¶]  [Bolden]:  They saw Denzel [Pride].  
’Cause he the one . . . he was the first one to run!  [¶]  . . .  [¶]  
[Det. Williams]:  Okay, so you start lookin’ then when you 
realized it was them, it was too late for you to tell them [Pride 
and the others] . . .  [¶]  [Bolden]:  And plus . . . and plus Denzel 
already gave it away when he start runnin’.  That’s why 
everybody was lookin’ like why he runnin’.  And . . .  [¶]  [Det. 
 
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
33 
at Pride because Bolden “would have got hit first” if Windfield 
was shooting at him.  When Bolden described the gunshots he 
stated the bullets were “tingling through the gates” and “going 
everywhere” because Windfield could not control his gun.  There 
was also testimony at trial that Windfield later admitted to a 
family friend that “the guy he was shooting at ran and the girl 
got in the way.”  Based on the evidence alone, then, it is not clear 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a reasonable jury would 
conclude defendants intended to kill Bolden specifically.   
Next, the jury instructions and the prosecutor’s argument 
further support a finding of prejudice.  As detailed, both the 
prosecutor’s closing argument and the attempted murder 
instruction given in connection with the charge involving Bolden 
had the potential to cause confusion regarding the application 
of the kill zone theory.  To be sure, the instructions made clear 
there were two theories for finding criminal liability with regard 
to the attempted murder of Bolden and plainly informed the jury 
that defendants could be liable if they intended to kill Bolden 
specifically.  The prosecutor also emphasized both theories in 
her argument, and strenuously argued the theory that 
defendants specifically targeted both Bolden and Pride.  That 
portion of her argument emphasized that Bolden and Pride’s 
gang affiliation provided the motive for the shooting because 
defendants were “trying to kill Hustla Squad.”  She also 
emphasized Bolden’s pretrial statements to Detective Williams 
that Windfield was shooting at him as evidence that showed 
                                        
Williams]:  So how did Denzel . . . ?  [¶]  [Bolden]:  . . . that’s 
when the gunshots come on.” 
 
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
34 
defendants had in fact “shot at both of them.”8  But this does not 
overcome the potential for confusion created by the attempted 
murder instruction in combination with the prosecutor’s 
argument.  Taken together, it cannot be said beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a reasonable jury would conclude 
defendants targeted Bolden specifically.     
The jury’s questions during deliberations are also 
instructive.  The jury here did not ask questions directed solely 
to the kill zone theory or that otherwise suggested it had relied 
solely on the kill zone theory to find defendants guilty of the 
attempted murder of Bolden.  (Cf. In  re Martinez (2017) 
3 Cal.5th 1216, 1227 [jury’s mid-deliberations note seeking 
clarification of the standard instruction on aider and abettor 
liability, and the court’s response to that inquiry, suggested that 
the jury may have found the defendant guilty of murder based 
on the invalid theory that the murder was a natural and 
probable consequence of the assaults that preceded the 
shooting].)  But, as defendants point out, the jury did request a 
readback of Bolden’s testimony to the effect that “[t]hey weren’t 
shooting at me.”  In the portion of Bolden’s testimony that the 
                                        
8  
The prosecutor argued in full:  “Attempt murder goes to 
both Count 2 and 3.  They tried to kill someone, but they weren’t  
successful. . . .  And they intended to kill that person.  Well, 
they’re both Hustla Squad.  You have a motive of why they’re 
out there.  They are trying to kill Hustla Squad, right?  [¶]  Now 
[Bolden] told you very clearly they were shooting at [Pride] but 
[Pride] turned around and ran and they’re shooting at him.  And 
then at one point [Bolden] tells you he runs out and they’re 
shooting at him.  And you see that in his video statement with 
Detective Williams.  So they shot — [defendant Windfield] shot 
at both of them.  That’s why you have a count for each one of the 
attempts.”   
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
35 
jury asked to rehear, the prosecutor asked Bolden whether 
Windfield was shooting at him.  Bolden answered, “To be honest, 
I don’t feel he was shooting at me because I was in front of 
[Pride]. . . .  But he was shooting our way.”  When asked to 
confirm that he had told Detective Williams in a pretrial 
interview that Windfield was shooting at him, however, Bolden 
said he “couldn’t remember that part” but that he “probably did.”  
The request for a readback is not dispositive, but it suggests the 
jurors at one point were focused on testimony that would have 
supported the theory that defendants did not target Bolden 
specifically.   
 
The 
jury’s 
findings 
on 
sentencing 
enhancement 
allegations are also relevant to our consideration.  The Attorney 
General asserts that the jury’s true findings as to the allegation 
that defendants acted willfully, deliberately, and with 
premeditation in attempting to murder Bolden (see §§ 664, subd. 
(a) and 187, subd. (a)) show the jury necessarily determined that 
defendants acted with the specific intent to kill.  The jury could 
not have found premeditation and deliberation without also 
having determined that defendants had formed the intent to 
kill.  (See People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 151.)  We agree 
with Windfield, however, that the true findings regarding the 
allegation that defendants acted with deliberation and 
premeditation in attempting to murder Bolden do not affect our 
determination.  As we explained ante, the kill zone theory 
permits the jury to infer that the defendant harbored the 
requisite specific intent to kill the primary target and everyone 
within the zone of fatal harm.  Thus, the jury would have found 
a specific intent to kill were it to have relied solely on the kill 
zone theory of attempted murder liability.   
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
36 
Nor are we persuaded that the jury’s true findings 
concerning 
the 
separate 
gang 
enhancement 
allegation 
necessarily leads to the conclusion that the jury did not rely on 
the kill zone theory.  The jury determined that defendants 
committed the attempted murder of Bolden to benefit the 
Ramona Blocc gang.  Those findings could suggest that the jury 
accepted the prosecutor’s alternate theory that defendants 
intended to kill both Pride and Bolden because they belonged to 
the Hustla Squad gang.  But the findings could also suggest 
that, relying on the kill zone theory, the jury found that 
defendants created a zone of fatal harm in which they intended 
all persons would be killed for the benefit of the gang.   
Having examined the entire record, we conclude that it is 
not clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a reasonable jury 
would have returned the same verdict absent the error.  
Reversal is required on the attempted murder counts regarding 
Bolden. 
B.  Defendants’ challenges to CALCRIM No. 600  
Defendants argue that the paragraph relating to the kill 
zone theory in CALCRIM No. 600, the standard instruction 
regarding attempted murder given in their case, erroneously 
permitted the jury to return a verdict of guilt on the count 
charging the attempted murder of the nontargeted victim 
without a finding of the requisite element of intent to kill, in 
violation of their right to due process.  Because we conclude that 
the instruction should not have been given and that doing so 
prejudiced defendants, we need not reach this separate 
constitutional challenge.   
PEOPLE v. CANIZALES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
37 
III.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed as to the 
attempted murder convictions regarding Bolden.       
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
 
We Concur: 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Canizales 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 229 Cal.App.4th 820 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S221958 
Date Filed: June 24, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Bernardino 
Judge: Steven A. Mapes 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Christine Vento, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant Michael Raphael 
Canizales. 
 
David P. Lampkin, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant KeAndre Dion 
Windfield. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette and Gerald A. Engler, Chief 
Assistant Attorneys General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Steven T. Oetting, Deputy State 
Solicitor General, Andrew Mestman, Lise Jacobson and Paige B. Hazard, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Mitchell Keiter as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Christine Vento 
P.O. Box 691071 
Los Angeles, CA  90069-9071 
(323) 936-5113 
 
David P. Lampkin 
P.O. Box 2541 
Camarillo, CA  93011-2541 
(805) 389-4388 
 
Paige B. Hazard 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2166