Title: In re J.C.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

In re J.C.  (98-275); 169 Vt. 139; 730 A.2d 588

[Filed 12-Mar-1999]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter  of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 98-275

In re J.C. and N.C. (Adoption)	              Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
     		                              Hartford Probate Court

November Term, 1998

Ronald H. Bean, J.

       Maryann Zavez, Alexander W. Banks, Linda Joyce, Russell E. Owens and
  James Tucker, Legal Interns, South Royalton Legal Clinic, South Royalton,
  for Appellant.

       Peter M. Nowlan of Nowlan & Meyer, Randolph, for Appellees.

       Mark E. Furlan, Randolph, for Children.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       AMESTOY, C.J.   Perley E. Smith, the guardian of minors N.C. and J.C.,
  appeals from  an order of the probate court denying his petition to
  terminate the parental rights of respondents,  the minors' natural parents. 
  Smith contends the court erred as a matter of law in: (1) concluding  that
  the existence of Smith's guardianship constituted good cause for
  respondents' non-support of  the minors; and (2) failing to consider the
  requisite statutory criteria in ruling that termination was  not in the
  minors' best interests.  We conclude that the appeal is not within the
  jurisdiction of this  Court because it does not present a pure question of
  law capable of resolution without reliance  upon the factual record. 
  Therefore, we transfer the appeal to the superior court.

       Smith is the childrens' grandfather, the father of their natural
  mother, M.C.  In January  1993, Smith and his wife were appointed guardians
  of the minors with the consent of the mother  and the childrens' natural
  father, D.C.  At that time, the children were less than three and five 
  years old.  Respondents moved unsuccessfully to terminate the guardianships
  in November 1993 

 

  and January 1995.  The Smiths filed a petition to adopt in December 1994,
  and subsequently filed  a petition to terminate parental rights in May
  1997.  Smith's wife died prior to the hearing on the  motion to terminate,
  and Smith continued to serve as guardian.

       Under Vermont's Adopton Act, 15A V.S.A. §§ 3-101 - 3-802 (Cum. Supp.
  1998),  grounds for the termination of a parental relationship with a minor
  over the age of six months  exist where the court finds, upon clear and
  convincing evidence, that the respondent parent "did  not exercise parental
  responsibility for a period of at least six months immediately preceding
  the  filing of the petition," id. § 3-504(a)(2), and that termination is in
  the best interests of the minor.  See id. § 3-504(a).  In determining
  whether the respondent parent has exercised parental  responsibility, the
  court must consider "all relevant factors," including the parent's failure
  to: 

     (A) make reasonable and consistent payments, in accordance with 
   his or her financial means, for the support of the minor, although 
   legally obligated to do so;

     (B) regularly communicate or visit with the minor; or 
 
     (C) during any time the minor was not in the physical custody of 
   the other parent, to manifest an ability and willingness to assume 
   legal and physical custody of the minor.

  Id. § 3-504(a)(2).

 
       The Act provides further that if the respondent establishes by a
  preponderance of the  evidence "good cause" for not exercising parental
  responsibility, the court may not terminate  parental rights except upon a
  finding by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) certain additional 
  grounds exist, e.g. that given the opportunity the parent would not have
  the ability and disposition  to provide the child with love, affection and
  guidance, adequate food and clothing, or a safe  environment; and (2) that
  termination is in the best interests of the minor.  See id. § 3-504(b). 
  The Act additionally provides that "the court shall consider the best
  interests of the child in  accordance with" four specific criteria,
  including: (1) the likelihood that respondent will be able  to resume
  parental responsibilities within a reasonable period of time; (2) the
  child's adjustment  to his or her home, school and community; (3) the
  interaction of the child with 

 

  parents, siblings, and others who may affect the child's best interests;
  and (4) whether the parent  has played, and continues to play, a
  constructive role in the child's welfare.  See id. § 3-504(c).

       Following an evidentiary hearing on the termination petition, the
  probate court found that  although Smith was in failing health, the
  children were adequately provided for, partly as a result  of the
  assistance Smith received from two older grandchildren who also lived with
  him.  The court  further found that respondents had no parenting skills,
  had not completed any parenting classes,  and had maintained only sporadic
  contact with the children.  Thus, the court concluded that Smith  had shown
  by clear and convincing evidence that respondents had not supported the
  minors, and  had not manifested an ability or willingness to assume custody
  of the children for the six months  preceding the filing of the petition.   

       The court went on to conclude, however, that respondents had
  established good cause for  their failure to exercise parental
  responsibility by virtue of the existence of the guardianship.  As  the
  court explained: 

     The guardianship does not require the respondents to support the 
     boys, and it does not allow them to take back custody.  Thus, the 
     shifting burden of proof imposed by 15A VSA 3-504 ends with the 
     respondents showing that the guardianship, still in existence, is their 
     reason for not supporting their sons, or pressing to regain legal 
     custody.

       The court then addressed the best-interests component, observing that
  a  termination of parental rights would not "change much of anything" 
  other than the nature of the parties' formal relationship with the 
  children.  The children would continue to reside with Smith  regardless of
  the outcome of the termination proceeding; hence, the  court concluded that
  the petition was "superfluous" and denied it.  Smith thereupon appealed to
  this Court pursuant to 12 V.S.A. §  2551, which provides for Supreme Court
  jurisdiction over  "questions of law" arising out of the probate court. 
  The probate  court certified the following question to be determined by
  this  Court: 	
 	
     Is the shifting burden of proof set out in 15A V.S.A. § 3-504 
     satisfied by a respondent showing that he has good cause for not 
     complying with the subdivision (a)(2) requirement of exercising 
     parental responsibility by reason of the fact that the children are 

 

 

     under guardianship and not under his control, in the absence of any 
     showing that the children's best interests would be served by  
     terminating parental rights? 

  See V.R.A.P. 13(c) (in appeals from probate court to Supreme Court, record
  shall consist of  certified copy of proceedings, setting forth questions of
  law to be decided by Court).

                                     I.

       In In re Estate of Johnson, 158 Vt. 557, 559, 613 A.2d 703, 704
  (1992), this Court held  that in direct appeals from probate court, we
  "review only `pure' questions of law, the resolution  of which do not
  depend upon factual distinctions and do not require review of the record."  
  We  reached this conclusion because the superior court has "appellate
  jurisdiction of matters originally  within the jurisdiction of the probate
  court," 12 V.S.A. § 2553, and sits as a higher court of  probate,
  considering the case anew as if no prior proceeding had occurred in the
  probate court,  see Whitton v. Scott, 120 Vt. 452, 457-58,