Title: Hill v. Park County By and Through Bd. of County Com'rs

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Hill v. Park County By and Through Bd. of County Com'rs1993 WY 102856 P.2d 456Case Number: 93-2Decided: 07/16/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
Carol M. HILL and Dan H. 
McDonald, Guardian for Jessica McDonald, Minor Child,

 Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

PARK COUNTY, Wyoming, By 
and Through the BOARD OF

 COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; and Thomas 
Thompson, 

Appellees 
(Defendants).

Appeal from The District 
Court, Park County, Hunter Patrick, J.

Jill E. Kucera 
of White & White, P.C., Riverton, for appellants. 

Ann M. Rochelle 
of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, Casper, for Park County, 
Wy.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., and Hugh Kenny, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for Thomas 
Thompson.

Before MACY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.

TAYLOR, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellants, Carol 
M. Hill and Dan H. McDonald (guardian for Jessica McDonald), seek reversal of 
the district court's order granting appellees, Thomas Thompson and Park County, 
Wyoming, summary judgment. Appellants filed suit against Thomas Thompson and 
Park County alleging negligence by Thomas Thompson when he encountered a horse 
which had wandered near a roadway. We affirm.

[¶2]      Appellants 
present the following issues:

A.

Whether Wyoming Statute 
Section 1-39-112 (1988) which provides an exception to governmental immunity, is 
applicable to the actions of Park County and Thomas 
Thompson?

B.

Whether Deputy Sheriff 
Thomas Thompson and Park County had a duty to keep the public roadways of the 
county clear of livestock running at large, or at least a duty to warn motorists 
of the presence of a hazardous situation on such public 
highway?

C.

Whether Wyoming Statute 
Section 11-20-119 (1989) is applicable to Deputy Sheriff Thomas Thompson's 
actions?

[¶3]      On December 5, 
1990, Deputy Sheriff Thomas Thompson (Thompson), after completing his normal 
8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. shift as an investigator for the Park County Sheriff's 
office in Cody, Wyoming, joined his wife for dinner at a restaurant in Cody. 
Following dinner, Thompson departed to return to his home, located about twelve 
miles southwest of Cody on Southfork Road. Thompson was driving an unmarked 
vehicle issued to him by the Sheriff's office which had no special lights or 
other law enforcement equipment other than a police radio.

[¶4]      Approximately 
three miles from town, Thompson noticed what appeared to be a large animal 
standing next to a fence on the side of the road. Thompson slowed his vehicle 
and pulled into a turnout to confirm his observation. Once stopped, Thompson 
observed a horse standing within the right-of-way, next to a fence, grazing on 
tall grass.

[¶5]      Thompson radioed 
the Sheriff's dispatcher to report the horse and its location. He remained at 
the scene until the dispatcher radioed back and informed him that the horse's 
owner had been located and was coming to retrieve the horse. Upon receiving this 
information, Thompson continued home.

[¶6]      Shortly after 
Thompson's departure, Carol M. Hill's vehicle collided with the stray horse 
while travelling down Southfork Road. Between the time Thompson departed and the 
time of the collision, the horse had wandered approximately 200-300 yards from 
the location where it had been observed by Thompson. After impact with the 
horse, appellants' vehicle rolled down an embankment next to the roadway. Hill 
and Jessica McDonald were ejected and suffered serious injuries which required 
both emergency and extended medical treatment.

[¶7]      On December 11, 
1991, appellants submitted a claim to the Park County Sheriff's office and the 
Board of County Commissioners of Park County seeking compensation for injuries 
caused by the collision with the horse. On April 22, 1992, appellants filed a 
complaint in the district court alleging that Thompson was negligent in failing 
to either corral the horse or warn oncoming motorists of the stray animal and 
that his negligence was the proximate cause of appellants' injuries. After 
answering the complaint by denying negligence, appellees filed a motion for 
summary judgment with attached memoranda and affidavits. In reply, appellants 
filed memoranda in opposition to appellees' summary judgment motion and filed a 
motion for partial summary judgment with an attached 
affidavit.

[¶8]      After a hearing 
on the cross motions, the district court issued an order granting appellees' 
motion. Appellants challenge this order.

I.

[¶9]      In its order, the 
district court held, in part:

3. Under the Governmental 
Claims Act, a governmental entity is entitled to immunity unless one of the 
statutory exceptions apply. There is no applicable exception. Wyoming Statutes § 
1-39-112 (Rev. 1988) only applies if peace officers are "acting within the scope 
of their duties." Thompson was off-duty and was not in the scope of any duties 
for Park County. The fact that it may be the practice of the Park County 
Sheriff's Office to assign vehicles to a specific officer, a fact this Court 
judicially noticed, does not make Thompson's actions on December 5, 1990 while 
driving that vehicle "within the scope of any duties" for Park 
County.

4. Thompson was a 
detective/investigator. Under the Law Enforcement Manual, Thompson was not 
charged with day-to-day routine law enforcement duties such as traffic 
control.

5. There is no liability 
for Thompson and for Park County as: there has been no duty established by the 
materials submitted by Plaintiffs [appellants]; there has been no showing of any 
breach of a duty by defendant Thompson; there has been no showing that any 
breach of a duty by Thompson proximately caused Plaintiffs' damages. There are 
no factual issues regarding the duty owed, breach of any duty by Thompson and 
proximate cause.

6. Wyoming Statutes § 
11-20-119 (Rev. 1989) is applicable. The statute in pertinent part 
states:

"No drover or other 
person who in good faith removes or attempts to remove livestock from any road, 
highway or right-of-way is liable for any civil damages for acts or omissions in 
good faith."

7. Officer Thompson acted 
reasonably under the circumstances.

[¶10]   Our oft-stated standard for review 
of summary judgment in negligence cases is:

[W]e examine the facts in 
the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. * * * Even in cases 
arising out of alleged negligent conduct, a summary judgment is appropriate when 
no issue of material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. * * * An issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, 
if proven, would establish or refute an essential element of the cause of action 
or defense asserted by the parties.

Brown v. Avery, 
850 P.2d 612, 614-15 (Wyo. 1993). The parties agree that there are no issues of 
material fact remaining; therefore, we need only to determine whether appellees 
are "entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id.

II.

[¶11]   Appellants raise three issues. A 
ruling by this court for appellees on any one of the issues will support the 
district court's grant of summary judgment. We choose, initially, to address 
appellants' second argument, that appellees were negligent for failing in their 
alleged duty to keep public roadways in the county clear of livestock. Because 
we find that appellants failed to demonstrate any common law or statutory duty 
imposed on appellees, we need not address the issues concerning Wyo. Stat. § 
1-39-112 (1988) and § 11-20-119 (1989).

[¶12]   "The elements of negligence are: 
(1) a duty, (2) a violation of that duty, (3) which is the proximate cause of, 
(4) injury to the plaintiff. * * * The determination of duty is a question of 
law for the court. If duty is not established, there is no actionable 
negligence." MacKrell v. Bell H[2]S Safety, 795 P.2d 776, 779 (Wyo. 1990) 
(citing Thomas by Thomas v. South Cheyenne Water and Sewer Dist., 702 P.2d 1303, 
1307 (Wyo. 1985)). 

[¶13]   A duty, which may give rise to an 
action for negligence, is created by either common law or statute. Dellapenta v. 
Dellapenta, 838 P.2d 1153, 1160 (Wyo. 1992). Therefore, we must determine 
whether common law or any statute has imposed a duty on 
appellees.

[¶14]   Appellants have not cited any 
common law duty, nor can we locate such a duty, which requires an off-duty 
police officer to corral or warn traffic of stray animals on or near a public 
roadway. However, in Wyoming, the common law of negligence creates a general 
duty "to exercise the degree of care required of a reasonable person in light of 
all the circumstances." McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408, 411 (Wyo. 
1983).

[¶15]   We believe that the evidence 
presented demonstrates that reasonable care in these circumstances did not 
require Thompson to corral the horse or to warn oncoming traffic of its presence 
near the highway. The actions he took: (1) stopping; (2) alerting the Sheriff's 
department; and (3) verifying that the owner was on his way to retrieve the 
horse, were reasonable under the circumstances. Thompson's uncontradicted 
testimony was that he was off-duty; not equipped to attempt to corral the horse; 
the horse remained well off the road, next to a fence contentedly eating grass, 
when he left the scene; and the horse had wandered approximately 200-300 yards 
between the time he departed and the time the collision 
occurred.

[¶16]   Under similar facts, the Montana 
Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the State of Montana and a 
highway department employee in Whitfield v. Therriault Corp., 229 Mont. 195, 745 P.2d 1126 (1987). In Whitfield, the wife and children of a man killed in a 
collision with a horse on a Montana highway brought a wrongful death action 
against the state and the horse owners. It was alleged that the highway 
department acted negligently after discovering horses along the highway. The 
Montana court found that the employee had no duty beyond the actions taken and 
that he acted reasonably under the circumstances when he followed the animals 
until they exited the highway surface and then continued on his way. Id. 745 P.2d  at 1127-28.

[¶17]   Appellants claim that the Wyoming 
statutes and/or the job description and law enforcement manual for the Park 
County Sheriff's office created duties which Thompson breached. Appellants cite 
several statutes which they believe impose certain duties on Thompson in these 
circumstances. First, appellants cite Wyo. Stat. § 24-1-107 (1977), which 
provides:

Whenever a dangerous 
condition is prevailing upon or so near a public highway as to create a menace 
to public health or safety, members of the Wyoming highway patrol, police 
departments or sheriff offices may close any highway to traffic when 
necessary to protect the public from such danger. Whenever such closing of a 
highway is done the governmental agency having control over said highway shall 
be immediately notified of the reason of such closing and the 
location.

(Emphasis 
added.) This statute imposes no affirmative duty on Thompson. Instead, it gives 
peace officers the authority to close roadways when they become dangerous and is 
completely discretionary.

[¶18]   Second, appellants claim that Wyo. 
Stat. § 11-24-108(c) (1989) imposes a duty on Thompson. Wyo. Stat. § 
11-24-108(c) provides, in part:

Any sheriff, deputy 
sheriff, livestock brand inspector, or officer or patrolman of the Wyoming 
highway patrol, after notification to the owner of livestock described in 
subsection (a) of this section, if known, shall within four (4) hours 
remove the livestock from the public highway * * *.

(Emphasis 
added.) Appellants are correct that this section imposes a duty upon certain law 
enforcement personnel to remove stray livestock from a public highway within 
four hours after notifying the owner of the animal's location. However, without 
reaching the issue of whether Thompson was or was not a deputy sheriff, it is 
uncontested that four hours had not elapsed from the time Thompson notified the 
Sheriff's office and the time of the collision. Therefore, Thompson did not 
breach the duty imposed by this statute.

[¶19]   Appellants also argue that the law 
enforcement manual of the Park County Sheriff's office imposes duties on 
Thompson. Nowhere in the manual, nor in Thompson's job description, is there 
mention of particular action which should be taken when faced with stray 
livestock on a roadway. Instead, the manual and the job description employ 
general discretionary language, such as:

[¶20]   General responsibilities include 
taking appropriate action to:

a. protect life and 
property;

b. preserve the 
peace;

c. prevent 
crime;

* * * * * 
*

g. respond to all public 
emergencies.

The manual does 
not impose a duty to act in a particular way under circumstances such as those 
encountered by Thompson on this occasion.

III.

[¶21]   Consequently, we affirm the 
district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Thompson and Park 
County. No issues of material fact remain and appellees are entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law since appellants failed to establish that Thompson owed any 
duty beyond the actions taken by him in response to sighting the horse.