Title: State v. Sanders

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Sanders  (97-003); 168 Vt. 60; 716 A.2d 11

[Opinion Filed 24-Apr-1998]
[Motion for Reargument Denied 10-Jun-1998]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                            No. 97-003

State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
     v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                             Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

Mark Sanders                                 February Term, 1998

Edward J. Cashman, J.

       William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and Susan R. Harritt, Assistant
  Attorney General, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

       Robert Appel, Defender General, and Henry Hinton, Appellate Attorney,
  Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       MORSE, J.   Defendant appeals his jury conviction of aggravated
  domestic assault, 13 V.S.A. § 1043(a)(2), claiming that the court erred by
  (1) permitting the State to introduce "prior bad acts" evidence without
  giving defendant proper notice, (2) admitting evidence that defendant had
  assaulted the victim on prior occasions, and (3) allowing the State to
  question the victim about prior assaults after she recanted that they had
  occurred.  We affirm.

       The assault charge stemmed from a confrontation on March 31, 1996, in
  Burlington. The victim, defendant's live-in girlfriend, came home that
  evening with a friend, Jodi Bell.  She was surprised to find defendant home
  because he had told her earlier that day he was moving out due to problems
  in their relationship.  As the victim and her friend were getting ready to
  go out for the night, they heard defendant breaking glass and smashing
  things around the house. Frightened, the women locked themselves in the
  bathroom.  Bell then ran next door to call the police, and when she
  returned, she found defendant and the victim standing in the kitchen. 
  Bell,

 

  to protect the victim, inserted herself in between them.  Defendant then
  picked up a knife and said "someone is going to die . . . who's it gonna
  be?"  The State charged defendant with aggravated domestic assault for
  being armed with a deadly weapon and threatening to use that weapon on a
  household member.

       Over two months prior to trial, the State sent defense counsel a
  letter listing several "prior bad acts" they intended to introduce at
  trial.  Defendant brought a motion in limine to exclude the evidence, but
  the judge allowed the State to introduce two of the prior bad acts to go to
  the issue of intent.  The first was an incident that occurred on December
  30, 1995, in which the victim asked defendant to leave the apartment.  In
  response to her request, he choked her and threw her across the room,
  giving her a bloody nose.  The second was an incident that occurred on
  January 6, 1996, when defendant took victim's car without permission and
  screamed threats at her, saying he would never leave without a fight. 
  During trial, it was revealed that these incidents actually occurred on
  February 10, 1996, and February 18, 1996, respectively. However, on the
  stand, the victim recanted most of the substantive facts of these prior
  sworn statements.

       Defendant first argues that the court erred by permitting the State to
  introduce "prior bad acts" evidence without giving defendant proper notice. 
  V.R.Cr.P. 26(c) requires the State to furnish to defendant, at least seven
  days prior to trial, a written statement setting forth any evidence it
  intends to offer under V.R.E. 404(b) or V.R.E. 609.  Defendant argues that
  since the dates of the prior bad acts were wrong in the written statement,
  he did not receive sufficient notice under V.R.Cr.P. 26(c).

       The purpose of V.R.Cr.P. 26(c) is to "inform the defendant of crimes
  the State intends to introduce and allow the defendant time to respond by a
  motion in limine."  State v. Houle, 162 Vt. 41, 45,