Title: KEVIN FRANCIS O'BOYLE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

KEVIN FRANCIS O'BOYLE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 83117 P.3d 401Case Number: 04-125Decided: 07/28/2005
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
KEVIN FRANCIS O'BOYLE,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge

 
 

Representing Appellant:

            
Terry W. Mackey of Moriarity, Gooch, Badaruddin & Booke, LLC, 
Cheyenne, Wyoming; Scott A. Homar of Hickey & Evans, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming; 
and Shawna M. Geiger of Shawna Mackey Geiger, P.C., Greenwood Village, 
Colorado.  
Argument by Mr. Mackey.

            

Representing Appellee:

            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Georgia L. 
Tibbetts, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. Tibbetts.

 
 
 
 
Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ., and 
STEBNER, DJ., RET.

 
 
KITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, J., 
filed a specially concurring opinion.

 
 
 
 
            
KITE, Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Kevin O'Boyle was 
stopped for speeding by the highway patrol on Interstate 80 near Cheyenne.  After extensively questioning him in the 
patrol car, the trooper indicated Mr. O'Boyle was free to leave.  As Mr. O'Boyle was 
returning to his vehicle, however, the trooper spoke to Mr. O'Boyle and obtained 
his agreement to further questioning and, ultimately, to a search of his 
vehicle.  The 
trooper found approximately five pounds of marijuana in the vehicle. 

 
 
[¶2]      Prior to trial, Mr. 
O'Boyle filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized in the search, claiming 
that his rights were violated under article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution 
and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  The district court 
initially granted the motion and then upon reconsideration denied it on the 
basis of federal law.  
Mr. O'Boyle then pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a 
controlled substance in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(ii) 
(LexisNexis 2003), conditioned on his right to appeal the denial of his 
suppression motion. 

 
 
[¶3]      We hold that under all 
of the circumstances the questioning inside the patrol car was unreasonable and 
unconstitutional under article 1, § 4, of the Wyoming Constitution.  We further hold that 
Mr. O'Boyle's consent to additional questioning outside the patrol car and his 
consent to the search were not voluntary under article 1, § 4.  Analyzing the stop 
under the Fourth Amendment, we adhere to the rule established in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 903-904 (1968) that questioning during a 
traffic stop must be limited to the purpose of the stop, including a reasonable 
inquiry about travel plans, and may not be extended unreasonably beyond the 
scope of the initial stop absent valid consent, a reasonable suspicion of other 
illegal activity, or officer safety concerns.  Applying this rule, we hold the detention and 
search were unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. 

 
 
[¶4]      Reversed. 

  
                      

 

 
 
[¶5]      Mr. O'Boyle presents 
the following issue: 

 
 
Did the Trial Court err in determining that the recent cases 
interpreting the federal constitution required him to reverse his Order Granting 
Motion to Suppress rather than following the Wyoming Constitution and the case 
law in support thereof?

 
 
The State re-phrases the issue as follows:

 
 
Did the district court err in denying Appellant's motion to 
suppress the marijuana evidence discovered during a search of his vehicle? 

 
 
 
 

            

[¶6]      On February 1, 2003, 
Wyoming Highway Patrol Trooper Ben Peech stopped the rental car driven by Mr. 
O'Boyle for traveling 79 miles per hour in a 75 mile per hour zone.  Trooper Peech, armed 
and in uniform, approached Mr. O'Boyle's vehicle and asked to see his driver's 
license and the rental car agreement.  The trooper then asked Mr. O'Boyle to 
accompany him to his patrol car while he issued a warning for speeding. 

 
 
[¶7]      In the patrol car, 
Trooper Peech requested Mr. O'Boyle's criminal history from dispatch.  While waiting for 
the history, he questioned Mr. O'Boyle extensively, asking him where he was 
headed, how long he planned to stay, where he was coming from, what he did for a 
living, how long he had been doing it, who was filling in for him while he was 
gone, how long his son had been in Boston, what college his son attended, what 
courses his son was taking, whether his son lived on campus, where he would stay 
while visiting his son, why he was driving rather than flying, why the rental 
car was in his daughter's name, where his daughter was at the time, how many 
daughters he had, and the price of airfare from San Francisco to Boston.  During this phase of 
the questioning, Trooper Peech asked Mr. O'Boyle over thirty questions, most of 
which had nothing to do with the speeding violation and many of which did not 
relate to his travel plans. 

 
 
[¶8]      Also during this phase 
of the questioning, Trooper Peech called for back-up assistance, specifically 
requesting a canine unit.  The unit arrived within two minutes of the 
call and parked behind and to the right of Trooper Peech's patrol car.1  Trooper Peech continued to question Mr. 
O'Boyle until dispatch advised that Mr. O'Boyle had a criminal history and later 
advised that his history was negative for violent or drug-related offenses.2 At that point, seven minutes into the traffic 
stop, Trooper Peech handed Mr. O'Boyle his documentation and the warning and 
told him to "have a safe trip." 

 
 
[¶9]      Mr. O'Boyle got out of 
the patrol car and was passing in front of it, heading toward the rental car, 
when Trooper Peech also got out and inquired whether he could ask Mr. O'Boyle a 
few more questions.  
Mr. O'Boyle responded, "Sure, go ahead" and Trooper Peech questioned him 
for another five minutes, repeating many of the same questions Mr. O'Boyle had 
already answered. 

 
 
[¶10]   During this part of the questioning, the 
trooper and Mr. O'Boyle were standing on the edge of the interstate a few feet 
apart in front of the patrol car.  The canine unit was still parked behind and to 
the right of Trooper Peech's patrol car.3   Trooper Peech 
held a clipboard on which he appeared to be writing down Mr. O'Boyle's 
answers.   
He asked Mr. O'Boyle an additional thirty questions during this phase of 
the stop, including his son's name, date of birth, address and phone number, 
what courses his son was taking at Northeastern University, his daughter's name 
and phone number, why she rented the car, whether his son had a job, and the 
name of Northeastern University's mascot.  

 
 
[¶11]   Trooper Peech then asked Mr. O'Boyle 
whether he had anything in his vehicle that he should know about  guns, bombs, 
dead people, body parts, large amounts of cash, drugs, methamphetamines, 
heroine, cocaine or marijuana.  Mr. O'Boyle denied having any of those 
items.  Trooper 
Peech asked Mr. O'Boyle why he was so nervous, repeated his question about guns, 
bombs and body parts and asked if he could search the vehicle.  Mr. O'Boyle 
responded, "Sure, go ahead."  Trooper Peech opened the back hatch of the 
rental car, unzipped a bag located inside and discovered a vacuum-sealed bag 
containing a substance resembling marijuana underneath some clothing.  At that point, the 
dog was released to "sniff" the vehicle.  He alerted to the back of the vehicle.  Ultimately, the 
troopers recovered five such bags totaling approximately five pounds of 
marijuana.  

 
 
[¶12]   Mr. O'Boyle was charged with one count 
of possession of a schedule I non-narcotic controlled substance, marijuana, with 
intent to deliver in violation of § 35-7-1031(a)(ii). Prior to trial, he filed a 
motion to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle, asserting that "the 
illegal contact, detention, interrogation and search" violated both the state 
and federal constitutions and citing Wyoming and federal law in support of his 
claim.  The 
State filed a responsive brief in which it argued the initial traffic stop was 
legal, whether the stop was pre-textual was irrelevant, the detention inside the 
patrol car was reasonable, and the encounter and search that followed were 
consensual.

 
 
[¶13]   The district court conducted a hearing 
on the motion to suppress.  Trooper Peech was the only witness and he 
testified for several hours.  During the hearing, the district court asked 
counsel about a recent Wyoming Supreme Court opinion in which this Court 
declined to address a state constitutional claim on the ground that it was not 
adequately presented. Defense counsel was not familiar with the case and offered 
to file a supplemental brief addressing the case. 

 
 
[¶14] A couple of weeks later, Mr. O'Boyle filed a 
supplemental brief in which he discussed Fender v. 
State, 2003 WY 96, 74 P.2d 1220 (Wyo. 2003), the recent opinion issued by this Court, and re-argued and 
expanded upon his contention that the stop violated article 1, § 4 of the 
Wyoming Constitution.  
The same day, the State also filed a supplemental memorandum.  It did not address 
the state constitutional claim but, citing federal cases, focused instead on the 
argument that the Fourth Amendment was not implicated because the encounter was 
consensual.  Two 
weeks later, and before the State responded to Mr. O'Boyle's supplemental brief, 
the district court entered an order granting the motion to suppress.  In the order, the 
district court stated:

 
 
Despite the fact that O'Boyle received his paperwork back 
from Trooper Peech, the totality of the circumstances suggests that the 
investigative stop never ended, but continued after O'Boyle left the patrol 
car.

* * *

The burden lies with the State to dispel the suggestion that 
the investigative stop continued even after O'Boyle exited the patrol car. I am 
not persuaded that the State has carried this burden.

 
 
[¶15]   The following day, the State filed a 
supplemental brief on the state constitutional claim in which it argued that 
Wyoming generally has followed federal search and seizure law and the Wyoming 
case cited by Mr. O'Boyle, Tobin v. State, 36 Wyo. 368, 255 P.2d 788 (Wyo. 1927), in which this Court arguably applied a different standard 
under the Wyoming Constitution, did not change the fact that evidence seized 
after a detainee voluntarily consented to further questioning or a search is 
admissible.  
Because the evidence showed Mr. O'Boyle voluntarily consented to further 
questioning and the search, the State argued, Tobin 
did not support granting the suppression motion. 

 
 
[¶16] One week later, the State also filed a motion for 
reconsideration in which it:  1) asserted the district court erred in ruling 
on the motion before the State filed its response to Mr. O'Boyle's supplemental 
brief; 2) re-iterated its argument that Mr. O'Boyle voluntary consented; and 3) 
cited two recent decisions from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals as additional 
authority.  Mr. 
O'Boyle filed a response addressing specifically the issues raised by the State 
in its motion for reconsideration.  The district court then entered a second 
order, this time denying the motion to suppress.  In this order, the district court stated:

 
 
After the date of entry of the ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS, the State petitioned this Court for reconsideration citing newly 
released decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. 
United State v. Taverna, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 22475 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Manjarrez, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 22679 (10th Cir. 
2003).

 
 
These decisions compel me to reconsider the prior ORDER 
GRANTING MOTION TO SUPPRESS. I continue to believe that an ordinary reasonable 
person would not feel free to terminate the encounter and drive off without 
responding to the continued interrogation initiated by Trooper Peech, but I must 
temper my belief and allow it to be informed by the recent rulings cited 
above.

 
 
Accordingly, the MOTION TO SUPPRESS will be denied because 
the facts of United States v. Taverna, are 
essentially identical to the facts in this case.

 
 
[¶17]   Mr. O'Boyle entered a plea of guilty to 
the charge while reserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression 
motion.  The 
district court accepted his plea and, after a hearing, sentenced Mr. O'Boyle to 
a term of three to five years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary, which sentence 
the district court suspended, placing Mr. O'Boyle on three years supervised 
probation.  

 
 
  

 
 
[¶18]   Rulings on the admissibility of evidence 
are within the sound discretion of the trial court.  Urbigkit v. State, 2003 WY 57, ¶39, 67 P.3d 1207, ¶39 (Wyo. 
2003).  We will 
not disturb such rulings absent a clear abuse of discretion.  Id.  An abuse of 
discretion occurs when it is shown the trial court reasonably could not have 
concluded as it did.  
Hannon v. State, 2004 WY 8, ¶13, 84 P.3d 320, ¶13 (Wyo. 
2004).  Factual 
findings made by a trial court considering a motion to suppress will not be 
disturbed unless the findings are clearly erroneous.  Meek v. State, 2002 WY 1, ¶8, 37 P.3d 1279, ¶8 (Wyo. 2002).  
Because the trial court has the opportunity to hear the evidence, assess 
witness credibility, and draw the necessary inferences, deductions, and 
conclusions, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial 
court's determination.  
Id.  Whether an 
unreasonable search or seizure occurred in violation of constitutional rights 
presents a question of law and is reviewed de 
novo.  Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 480 
(Wyo. 1999).

            

 
 

 
 
[¶19]   Mr. O'Boyle contends the district court 
erred in relying solely on federal constitutional analysis and not analyzing the 
constitutionality of the search under the Wyoming Constitution, which he asserts 
provides greater protection against searches than federal law.  He further contends 
proper analysis under either the state or federal constitutions supported his 
motion to suppress.  
Lastly, Mr. O'Boyle contends the district court's finding "that an 
ordinary reasonable person would not feel free to terminate the encounter and 
drive off without responding to the continued interrogation" was a factual 
finding which this Court can reverse only if we conclude it was clearly 
erroneous.  
Giving the district court the deference it is due, he asserts, the 
finding was not clearly erroneous and the district court properly granted his 
suppression motion initially and erred in denying it upon reconsideration.

 
 
[¶20]   Responding to Mr. O'Boyle's first 
argument, the State contends this Court's approach has long been to read the 
Wyoming Constitution as consistent with the federal constitution.  The State asserts 
this Court, like the federal courts, has applied the totality of the 
circumstances test when evaluating whether consent was voluntary, focusing on 
whether the consent was the product of duress or coercion and taking into 
account subtly coercive police questioning and the subjective state of mind of 
the person giving consent. Under either state or federal analysis, the State 
asserts, the district court properly denied the suppression motion because the 
evidence clearly showed Mr. O'Boyle voluntarily consented to the search.  Responding to Mr. 
O'Boyle's final argument concerning the district court's finding that no 
reasonable person would have felt free to leave, the State asserts Mr. O'Boyle's 
argument is premised upon a selective interpretation of the district court's 
order.  The 
State argues the statement Mr. O'Boyle refers to, when read in context, clearly 
reflects the district court's recognition that denial of the suppression motion 
was in accordance with the law.

 
 
[¶21]   The district court's order on 
reconsideration is central to the issue before us.  As reflected above, 
after initially granting the motion to suppress and then reviewing the State's 
supplemental authority, the district court concluded it was compelled to 
reconsider its ruling.  
Upon reconsideration, the district court reiterated its belief that a 
reasonable person would not have felt free to terminate the encounter and leave 
without answering further questions, but concluded based solely upon the State's 
supplemental Tenth Circuit authority that it had to deny the suppression 
motion.  It is 
not apparent from the record why the district court did not address Mr. 
O'Boyle's state constitutional claim after Mr. O'Boyle presented it first in his 
initial motion and then again in his supplemental brief. What is clear is that 
the district court relied exclusively on federal law in reaching its decision. 
The district court's analysis is not controlling of our de novo review, a 
standard requiring this Court to consider the claim anew as if it had not been 
heard before, and, pursuant to Vasquez, we are required to reconsider it.  

 
 
[¶22]   In Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 485, we made 
clear that analysis under the state constitution is required whenever a party 
has raised a state constitutional claim and provided proper argument and 
briefing using a precise and analytically sound approach.  Where a party has 
met these criteria in presenting a state constitutional claim, as Mr. O'Boyle 
has done, state constitutional analysis takes primacy -- that is, the claim is 
analyzed first under our state constitution.  Id., 
fn. 4.  In the 
present case, after requesting the parties to brief the state constitutional 
claim, the district court cited exclusively federal law in reversing its earlier 
order and denying the suppression motion.  No analysis of the state constitution and its 
guarantees appears in the order.  Because Mr. O'Boyle properly raised the issue, 
such an analysis is required.  Our review is de novo, there are no factual 
disputes and we have a complete record before us, including the transcript of 
the suppression hearing and the video tape recording of the traffic stop.  Therefore, we 
proceed with the analysis.

 
 
 
 
State Constitutional Analysis

 
 
 
 

 
 
[¶23]   Our state constitution provides 
protection of individual rights separate and independent from the protection 
afforded by the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear in 
that states at a minimum must comply with its interpretations of the federal 
constitution. Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643, 654-55, 
81 S. Ct. 1684, 1691, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961). However, it also has made clear that 
states may separately interpret and apply their own constitutions. Id. In interpreting their own constitutions, 
states generally have focused upon whether their particular state constitution 
provides greater protection than the federal constitution. Mogard v. City of 
Laramie, 2001 WY 88, ¶5, 32 P.3d 313, ¶5 (Wyo. 
2001).  However, 
using federal law as a guide, states may also conclude that the scope of the 
protection provided by their constitution is the same as and parallel to that 
provided by the federal constitution.  In the context of the facts of this case, the 
result we reach is the same under article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution and 
the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  We do not consider whether our state 
constitution provides more protection than the federal constitution but conclude 
only that article 1, § 4 constitutes a separate and independent source of 
protection of the rights of Wyoming citizens.

 

[¶24]   In Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 622 (Wyo. 
1993), we identified six "non-exclusive neutral criteria"4 for 
consideration in analyzing a claim under our state constitution:  1) the textual 
language of the provisions; 2) differences in the texts; 3) constitutional 
history; 4) preexisting state law; 5) structural differences; and 6) matters of 
particular state or local concern.  Based upon the first of these, we concluded 
long ago that article 1, § 4 is stronger than its federal counterpart in that it 
requires search warrants to be supported by an affidavit.5  State v. Peterson, 
27 Wyo. 185, 194 P. 342, (1920).  See also Hall v. 
State, 911 P.2d 1364 (Wyo. 1996).  With this exception, 
however, we have found the first three Saldana criteria to be of little 
assistance in analyzing claims brought specifically under our search and seizure 
provision.  
Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 484.  Except for the affidavit requirement for 
search warrants, the text of Wyoming's search and seizure provision is substantially 
the same as the Fourth Amendment, and there is little in the way of Wyoming constitutional history to guide our 
analysis. 

 
 
[¶25]   Looking at the fourth Saldana factor, 
preexisting state law, this Court historically has interpreted Wyoming's search and seizure provision as 
forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures and has said the question of 
whether a search or seizure was reasonable was one of law to be decided from all 
the circumstances.  
Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 484, citing State v. George, 32 Wyo. 223, 239, 231 P. 683, 688 (1924); 
State v. Crump, 35 Wyo. 41, 51, 246 P. 241, 244 
(1926).  Beyond 
this general reasonableness standard, and the warrant requirement specifically 
mentioned in the text of article 1, § 4, this Court has not extensively 
considered the scope of Wyoming's provision 
independent of the protection guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.  Rather, this Court, 
like the majority of other state courts, generally has decided search and 
seizure cases on the basis of federal Fourth Amendment law.  Many of our past 
decisions have not specified whether they also applied to the state provision, 
while others have construed the state and federal constitutions together, 
treating the former as having the same scope as the latter.  Gronski v. State, 910 P.2d 561, 565-66 
(Wyo. 1996); Parkhurst v. 
State, 628 P.2d 1369, 1374 
(Wyo. 1981); Callaway v. 
State, 954 P.2d 1365, 1371 
(Wyo. 1998).

 
 
[¶26]   In Vasquez, however, we performed a 
separate state constitutional analysis and concluded that article 1, § 4 
provided greater protection than the Fourth Amendment under the particular facts 
presented.  
Specifically, we held the vehicle search at issue was permissible:  1) under the Fourth 
Amendment because it was incident to a lawful arrest; and 2) under article 1, § 
4 because it was incident to a lawful arrest and was reasonable under all the 
circumstances in that law enforcement had a reasonable suspicion that one of the 
occupants was armed. It was this requirement that the search be reasonable under 
all the circumstances as we said in Vasquez that distinguished Wyoming constitutional law from Fourth 
Amendment law.

 
 
[¶27]   Since Vasquez, we have not had the 
opportunity to consider a search and seizure claim brought specifically under 
article 1, § 4.  
In the cases in which this Court might have performed such an analysis, 
the issue either was not raised at all, or the party raising the issue failed to 
provide cogent argument or properly present the question in the trial court, or 
we simply declined to address the state constitutional claim and decided the 
case on other grounds.  
Doles v. State, 994 P.2d 315, 320 (Wyo. 1999); Putnam v. 
State, 995 P.2d 632, 640 (Wyo. 
2000); Bailey v. State, 12 P.3d 173, 177 (Wyo. 2000); Meadows v. State, 2003 WY 37, ¶21, 65 P.2d 33, ¶21 (Wyo. 2003).  As in most of the cases before Vasquez, 
therefore, our analysis since Vasquez has focused on the Fourth Amendment.  Because these 
post-Vasquez cases contain no separate, independent state constitutional 
analysis, they are not controlling of our resolution of Mr. O'Boyle's 
claim.  These 
cases are, however, instructive and relevant to our analysis.

 
 
[¶28]   With this general overview in mind, we 
turn to consideration of the specific question before us:  whether a traffic 
stop involving extensive questioning, followed by the defendant's consent to a 
second detention and more questioning, and culminating in the defendant's 
consent to a vehicle search was reasonable under all the circumstances.  We consider each 
stage of the traffic stop separately, beginning with the traffic stop and 
initial detention, moving next to the second detention and further questioning 
and concluding with Mr. O'Boyle's consent to search.  Our analysis of the 
last two stages focuses on whether Mr. O'Boyle voluntarily consented. 

 
 
 
 

 
 
[¶29]   As stated in the general overview above, 
we concluded in Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 488, that article 1, § 4 requires all 
searches and seizures to be reasonable under all of the circumstances.  We said, "only 
unreasonable searches are forbidden, and whether or not a search is reasonable 
is a question of law to be decided from all the circumstances of a case." 
Id., at 487. Looking at our early decisions in 
cases where the State asserted a search without a warrant was proper merely 
because the citizen did not resist, we concluded in Vasquez that this Court 
historically considered such contentions as a threat to our constitutional 
safeguards and "firmly disposed of the idea that a citizen's peaceful submission 
to a search amounted to a consent." Id.  In reviewing past decisions, however, we found 
that a search of an automobile without a warrant was reasonable under some 
circumstances. We concluded that warrantless automobile searches are proper 
under article 1, § 4, when incident to lawful arrest and when there is probable 
cause for believing that a vehicle is carrying contraband or illegal goods. 

 
 
[¶30] In reaching this result in Vasquez, we rejected the 
bright line rule established in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1981) that arrest justifies the search of a passenger 
compartment, including any open or closed container in it, without consideration 
of the privacy interest involved. We concluded the rationale for the Belton 
rule, i.e. the need for a bright line rule to effectively apply to the vast, 
national citizenry with which the U.S. Supreme Court must concern itself, did 
not apply in Wyoming. We found a 
narrower standard, one maintaining the requirement that a search be reasonable 
under all of the circumstances, more consistent with the historical intent of 
our search and seizure provision. Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 489. In the specific 
context presented in Vasquez, i.e. a vehicle search incident to an arrest, we 
said Wyoming's search and seizure provision 
provided greater protection than the federal provision. 

 
 
[¶31] In the broader context of searches and seizures in 
general and for purposes of considering Mr. O'Boyle's claim, which did not arise 
out of a search incident to arrest, what is important about Vasquez is our 
holding that article 1, § 4 requires that searches and seizures be reasonable 
under all the circumstances.  It is this standard of reasonableness that 
governs our analysis under the Wyoming constitution.  Thus, the 
determinative question in Mr. O'Boyle's case is the reasonableness of the 
detention under all the circumstances. 

 

[¶32] Having considered all of the circumstances, we 
conclude the detention inside the patrol car was unreasonable.  Trooper Peech's 
extensive questioning of Mr. O'Boyle while waiting for dispatch, including 
questions about what he did for a living, how long he had been doing it, who was 
filling in for him while he was gone, how long his son had been in Boston, what 
college his son attended, what courses his son was taking, whether his son lived 
on campus, where he would stay while visiting his son, why he was driving rather 
than flying, where his daughter was, how many daughters he had, and the price of 
airfare from San Francisco to Boston, was not reasonable given all of the 
circumstances.  
Mr. O'Boyle was not under arrest and the State conceded Trooper Peech did 
not have a reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity.6   Yet, four 
minutes into the stop, and before he was aware of Mr. O'Boyle's criminal 
history, Trooper Peech called for back-up assistance, specifically a canine 
unit.  The unit 
arrived just two minutes later and parked directly behind the patrol car.  By the time Trooper 
Peech returned Mr. O'Boyle's license and paperwork, issued the warning and told 
him to "have a safe trip," Mr. O'Boyle had been detained and subjected to 
persistent and sustained questioning that unreasonably expanded the scope of the 
stop far beyond the speeding offense into a full-blown drug investigation. At no 
time during this phase of the detention did Trooper Peech ask Mr. O'Boyle for 
his consent to this type of questioning or detention. Under all of the 
circumstances, the detention inside the patrol car was unreasonable and violated 
article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.

 
 
[¶33] In reaching this result, we consider not only Vasquez and the older Wyoming cases analyzing our search and seizure 
provision (George, 231 P.  at 688; Crump, 246 P. at 244), we also consider matters of local 
and state concern. Saldana, 846 P.2d  at 622. The 
State of Wyoming is bisected north and south and east 
and west by two major interstate highways. Interstate 80 provides drug 
traffickers with easy west to east access across the United States and is a well-known 
route for transporting drugs. DEA Microgram Bulletin, Vol. XXXVII, No. 9, 
September 2004; NDIC Narcotics Digest Weekly 2004; 3(35):3.  The annual average 
daily traffic on I-80 near Cheyenne, where Mr. O'Boyle 
was stopped, is over 20,000 vehicles.  2002 Wyoming Vehicle Mile Book 
(WYDOT).  
Wyoming citizens operate a 
significant number of these vehicles.  Traffic stops along I-80 are a routine part of 
the national drug interdiction program.  "Although precise figures detailing the number 
of searches conducted pursuant to consent are not  and probably can never be  
available, there is no dispute that these type of searches affect tens of 
thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of people every year." Marcy Strauss, 
Reconstructing Consent, 92 Journal of Criminal Law 
and Criminology 211, 214 (2001-2002).7 

 
 
[¶34] We previously have expressed disapproval of the use of 
traffic violations as a pretext to conduct narcotics investigations.  Damato v. State, 2003 WY 13, ¶13, 64 P.3d 700, ¶13 (Wyo. 2003).  
In Damato, we joined in another state court's 
expression of concern about sanctioning conduct "where a police officer can 
trail a targeted vehicle with a driver merely suspected of criminal activity, 
wait for the driver to exceed the speed limit by one mile per hour, arrest the 
driver for speeding, and conduct a full-blown inventory search of the vehicle 
with impunity."8 Id., citing Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771-772, 121 S. Ct. 1876, 1878, 149 L. Ed. 2d 994 (2001).  Our location along a 
nationally recognized drug trafficking corridor likely results in a 
disproportionately large percentage of Wyoming's comparatively small population 
being subjected to what have become routine requests to relinquish their privacy 
rights by detention, invasive questioning and searches -- all without reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity other than the offense giving rise to the 
stop.  While we 
acknowledge the importance of drug interdiction, we are deeply concerned by the 
resulting intrusion upon the privacy rights of Wyoming citizens.  This concern, 
considered together with Wyoming's traditional 
interpretation of article 1, § 4 as requiring reasonableness under all the 
circumstances, provides further support for our conclusion that the detention in 
this case violated the Wyoming Constitution.  

   

 
 

 
 
[¶35]   Our conclusion that the detention 
unreasonably exceeded the permissible scope of the stop does not end the 
inquiry.  After 
questioning Mr. O'Boyle inside the patrol car, Trooper Peech concluded the 
initial detention by returning his driver's license and rental papers, handing 
him the warning and telling him to "have a safe trip."  Mr. O'Boyle got out 
of the patrol car and was heading back toward his vehicle when Trooper Peech 
inquired whether he could ask him a few more questions.  Mr. O'Boyle 
responded, "sure."  
We must determine whether Mr. O'Boyle voluntarily consented to further 
questioning such that his continued detention was proper under article 1, § 
4.

 
 
[¶36]   As with our analysis of the 
constitutionality of the traffic stop, there is little in the text of article 1, 
§ 4 or our constitutional history to assist us in determining whether Mr. 
O'Boyle's consent was sufficiently voluntary to validate his continued 
detention.  
Therefore, we look to prior Wyoming cases for the standards governing our 
analysis. 

 
 
[¶37]   Most of the early cases considering 
article 1, § 4 involved premises searches rather than vehicle searches like the 
one to which Mr. O'Boyle was subjected.  See, for example, Tobin, 255 P. 788.  We conclude, 
however, that the standards invoked in those cases are no less applicable in the 
context of vehicle searches.  In fact, we find the standards this Court has 
applied in premises searches -- where the individual is on his or her own 
premises and likely feels freer to turn law enforcement away -- even more 
applicable in the context of roadside vehicle searches -- where the traveler has 
been stopped for a traffic offense and is not free to leave. 

 
 
[¶38] Thus, this Court's early interpretation of Wyoming's search and seizure provision as 
forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures applies also in the context of 
expanded detentions following a traffic stop and the question of whether such a 
detention was reasonable is one of law to be decided from all the 
circumstances.  
Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 487, citing State v. George, 32 Wyo. 223, 239, 231 P. 683, 688 (1924); 
State v. Crump, 35 Wyo. 41, 51, 246 P. 241, 244 
(1926).  This 
Court long ago rejected the assertions under article 1, § 4 that peaceful 
submission constituted consent to search and seizure and that reasonableness 
could be demonstrated merely by a citizen's failure to resist.  Tobin 255 P. 788.  We said that a 
waiver of constitutional rights under our constitution must appear by clear and 
positive testimony, and, if a search or seizure is based upon the proposition 
that consent was given, there should be no question from the evidence that 
consent was "really voluntary and with a desire to invite search [or seizure], 
and not done merely to avoid resistance."  Id. 
at 789.  
Acquiescence and nonresistance have not been deemed sufficient under 
Wyoming law to establish consent.  State v. Bonolo, 39 
Wyo. 299, 270 P. 1065 (1928).

 
 
[¶39] Pursuant to these early cases, the standards relevant 
generally to determining whether a search or seizure was constitutional under 
article 1, § 4 are:

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 
Tobin, 255 P.  at 789; Bonolo, 270 P.  at 1067.  This Court 
reaffirmed these standards in Vasquez, 990 P.2d 483; thus, they are the standards that apply in our article 1, § 4 
analysis.9        

 
 
[¶40]   As Mr. O'Boyle got out of the patrol car 
after seven minutes of questioning concerning a variety of topics relating to 
his trip, his family and himself, Trooper Peech asked if he would mind answering 
a few more questions.  
Mr. O'Boyle responded, "Sure, go ahead."  The videotape of this exchange reflects that 
there were no threats or use of force or overt coercion or intimidation.  Trooper Peech asked 
the question calmly and politely and not in an antagonistic or demanding way. 

 
 
[¶41]   However, by the time Trooper Peech asked 
Mr. O'Boyle if he could ask him a few more questions, he had already questioned 
Mr. O'Boyle for seven minutes about his trip, his activities leading up to the 
trip, his son and daughter, his occupation and other tangential topics.  He also had called 
for a canine unit, which arrived during the initial questioning and parked 
behind Trooper Peech's patrol car.  Despite these circumstances, and his later 
admission that he did not have reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. O'Boyle 
further, Trooper Peech detained Mr. O'Boyle on the edge of the interstate 
highway for another five minutes, asking him numerous questions, some of which 
he had already asked, and writing down the answers on a clipboard as though he 
were performing an official investigation.  Although Trooper Peech's questioning was not 
hostile or threatening, there is no question from the videotape that it was 
steady and sustained and did not pertain to the speeding offense.  Trooper Peech was 
dressed in uniform and armed and another trooper was at the scene with a drug 
dog.  Mr. 
O'Boyle was not informed that he did not have to answer any more questions or 
had the right to leave. The district court found that no reasonable person under 
these circumstances would have felt free to go. 

 
 
[¶42]   At the end of this inquiry, Trooper 
Peech asked Mr. O'Boyle whether he had anything in his vehicle that Trooper 
Peech should know about  guns, bombs, dead people, body parts, large amounts of 
cash, drugs, methamphetamines, heroine, cocaine or marijuana.  Mr. O'Boyle denied 
having any of those items and Trooper Peech asked why he was so nervous.  Mr. O'Boyle 
responded that he was nervous because he had been stopped.  Trooper Peech then 
inquired again whether Mr. O'Boyle had guns, bombs, or body parts and asked if 
could search the vehicle.  By this time, Mr. O'Boyle had been detained on 
the side of an interstate highway and had been subjected to twelve minutes of 
multiple, repetitive and intrusive questioning with two troopers and a drug dog 
on the scene.  
He responded, "Sure, go ahead." 

 
 
[¶43]   Considering all of the circumstances, we 
are unable to conclude the State met its burden of proving Mr. O'Boyle's consent 
to further questioning was really voluntary, given with a desire to invite 
further detention and not merely to avoid resistance.  Under article 1, § 
4, Mr. O'Boyle's acquiescence to further questioning did not constitute consent 
and was not sufficient to demonstrate the reasonableness of the search and 
seizure. We agree with the district court's finding that no reasonable person 
under those circumstances would feel free to go.  We believe the vast majority of citizens 
facing similar circumstances would simply submit to the officer's requests 
believing they had no other option.   

 
 
 
 

 
 
[¶44] We adhere to the standards for determining whether 
consent is voluntary discussed in the preceding section and hold that Mr. 
O'Boyle's acquiescence to the vehicle search did not constitute consent and was 
not sufficient to demonstrate the reasonableness of the search and seizure.  Under article 1, § 4 
of the Wyoming Constitution, we hold that the district court correctly granted 
the suppression motion in its initial ruling and erred in denying the motion 
upon reconsideration.

 
 
 
 
The Fourth Amendment

 
 
[¶45] In the circumstances of this case, we do not perceive 
any difference between the independent protection provided to Mr. O'Boyle under 
the Wyoming Constitution and that provided by the Fourth Amendment.  However, because Mr. 
O'Boyle relied on the Fourth Amendment as well as article 1, § 4, we proceed 
with Fourth Amendment analysis.

  

 
 

  

[¶46] In determining whether a traffic stop detention was 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we apply the two-part inquiry established 
in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.  at 19-20, that is: 1) was the initial stop justified, 
and 2) were the officer's actions during the detention "reasonably related in 
scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first 
instance[?]"  
Campbell, ¶11.  In making this inquiry, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has rejected bright-line rules and focused instead on a fact-specific 
reasonableness inquiry.  Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S. Ct. 417, 421, 136 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1996); Barch v. State, 2004 WY 
79, ¶8, 92 P.3d 828, ¶8 (Wyo. 
2004).  Under 
the Fourth Amendment, the government has the burden of demonstrating that a 
seizure was sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions 
of an investigative seizure.  Id.   

 
 
[¶47]   In many of our traffic stop cases (as in 
Mr. O'Boyle's case) the reasonableness of the initial stop was not challenged, 
and our focus was on the second prong of the Terry inquiry:  whether the 
officer's actions during the detention were reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances justifying the interference in the first place.  It is clearly 
established under the second part of Terry that an investigative detention must 
be temporary, lasting no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop, and the scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its 
underlying justification.  Campbell, ¶12, citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 
1325-26, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983).  Moreover,

 
 
During a routine traffic stop, a law enforcement officer may 
request the driver's proof of insurance, operating license, and vehicle 
registration, run a computer check, and issue a citation or warning.  The officer may 
detain the driver and his vehicle only for the period of time reasonably 
necessary to complete these routine matters. Once the driver has produced a 
valid driver's license and proof that he is entitled to operate the vehicle, he 
must be allowed to proceed without further delay. During the stop, an officer 
generally may not ask the detained motorist questions unrelated to the purpose 
of the stop, including questions about controlled substances, unless the officer 
has reasonable suspicion of other illegal activity.   

 
 

Campbell, ¶12 (citations omitted, emphasis added).

 

[¶48]   In the absence of the particular 
individual's valid consent, an officer may expand an investigative detention 
only where there exists an objectively reasonable suspicion that criminal 
activity has occurred or is occurring, Damato v. State, 2003 WY 13, ¶13, 64 P.3d 700, ¶13 (Wyo. 
2003), or there exists an objectively reasonable suspicion that a vehicle 
occupant is armed, Brown v. State, 944 P.2d 1168, 1172 (Wyo. 1997).  A number of courts also allow inquiry into 
travel plans during a traffic stop at least to the extent reasonably necessary 
to put the traffic violation in context.  See Wayne R. LaFave, 4 Search and Seizure 
§9.3(d), 392-395, (4th ed. 2004) and cases cited therein.  Although this Court 
has not separately considered the precise question of whether travel plan 
inquiries are permissible under the Fourth Amendment, we have mentioned such 
inquiries in the course of addressing other search and seizure issues and have 
treated them as an acceptable area of inquiry during a traffic stop.  Barch, ¶11; Meadows, 
¶21.  However, 
purposeful probing by law enforcement, amounting to a fishing expedition in the 
hope that something might turn up, is not permitted.  Campbell, ¶21.  

 
 
[¶49]   To summarize, the standards applicable 
in considering the constitutionality of traffic stops under the Fourth Amendment 
are as follows:  
An officer's actions during a traffic stop must be reasonably related to 
the purpose of the stop.  Campbell, ¶11, citing Terry. Absent valid 
consent, a reasonable suspicion of other unlawful activity or reasonable 
suspicion that a detainee is armed, an officer may not expand an investigative 
detention beyond the scope of the stop, ask questions unrelated to the stop or 
"embark on a fishing expedition in the hope that something will turn up."  Id.  The relevant question is whether the scope of 
the stop was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances, and the burden 
of proving reasonableness lies with the government.

 
 
[¶50]   These are the fundamental principles 
this Court has adhered to in the past in determining whether a traffic stop was 
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment and they are not significantly 
different than those applicable separately under article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.  
We see no reason to depart from these standards today.  In our view, 
continued application of these standards is consistent with the essential policy 
of balancing the individual right to privacy and the government's legitimate 
interests.  
Damato, ¶8; Barch, 92 P.3d  at 831.  

 
 
[¶51]   In reaffirming these standards, we are 
cognizant that some courts appear to have retreated from the Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness standard established in Terry.  To quote one recognized legal authority on the 
subject:

 
 
[W]hen it comes to traffic stops, . . . the Terry 
limitations are honored more often in the breach than in the observance. For one 
thing, the temporal limits are loosely observed, and courts even go so far as to 
state that such limits may be extended somewhat in the interest of permitting 
procedures only relevant to drug law enforcement. For another, the intensity 
limitation is treated as if it did not exist at all, so that nonsearch 
investigative procedures undertaken to uncover drugs are deemed permissible so 
long as they actually or approximately occurred within whatever temporal limits 
are being observed.

 
 
LaFave, supra, 368.  Thus, in United 
States v. Malouff, 114 Fed.Appx. 975 (10th Cir. 
2004), the court concluded: "an officer may question a traffic-stop detainee on 
any topic without reasonable and articulable suspicion so long as the 
questioning does not prolong the stop." (emphasis added).  According to the 
court, "a less-confined reasonableness standard is appropriate in this 
context."  
Id.

 
 
[¶52]   As Malouff illustrates and LaFave points 
out, Terry has been whittled away to the point that in some jurisdictions 
"routine" traffic stops are commonly turned into drug investigations through a 
variety of techniques, including "questioning about drugs, grilling about the 
minute details of travel plans, seeking consent for a full roadside exploration 
of the motorist's car, or parading a drug dog around the vehicle."  LaFave, supra, 370. 
The result, "is a far cry from a straightforward and unadorned traffic stop" 
and, in the context of a nonconsensual police-citizen encounter, "can be so 
intrusive as to affect the Fourth Amendment legality of the traffic stop." 
Id.  Moreover, as the Illinois Supreme Court has 
stated, "[a]llowing police to pose any question to the occupants of a stopped 
vehicle, even if such question is totally divorced from the purpose of the stop, 
effectively does away with any balancing of the competing interests 
involved."  
People v. Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d 260, 269 (Ill. 
2003).  

 
 
[¶53]   In the context specifically of cases 
allowing extensive inquiry into travel plans during a Terry stop, we agree with 
LaFave's characterization of such questioning as an "interrogation" consisting 
not of "social one-liners like hey, where you headed?'" but of "multi-question 
extended inquiries of vehicle occupants into the most minute details regarding 
the parts of the journey completed and lying ahead."  LaFave, supra, 
393-394. 

 
 
The objective is not to gain some insight into the traffic 
infraction providing the legal basis for the stop, but to uncover inconsistent, 
evasive or false assertions that can contribute to reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause regarding drugs. Thus, "not only are questions about travel plans 
investigatory rather than merely conversational, the ordinary traveler cannot 
reasonably be expected to decline to answer such questions, particularly if they 
are posed while an officer is holding the driver's license and other essential 
documents."

 
 

Id. at 395.  

 
 
[¶54]   These results are not consistent with 
the approach we have taken traditionally in analyzing the constitutionality of a 
traffic stop by balancing the interests of our citizens and the government's 
legitimate interests and strictly applying the Terry limits on what constitutes 
a reasonable detention during a traffic stop.  To conclude that an officer may question a 
detainee on any topic without reasonable suspicion so long as the questioning 
does not prolong the stop and that a less confined reasonableness standard is 
appropriate in the context of a routine traffic stop is in our view an 
unwarranted and a radical departure from Terry.  It is a departure we are not willing to make, 
given our traditional approach to the question of what constitutes a reasonable 
detention.  
Thus, we adhere strictly to Terry and will continue to resolve these 
cases when the federal constitution is at issue by asking whether the scope of 
the stop was reasonably related to its purpose, or was supported by a reasonable 
suspicion of other unlawful activity or valid consent.10  LaFave, supra, 
392-395.  Thus, 
under the Fourth Amendment, the State must prove the scope of the stop was 
reasonable under the totality of the circumstances, that is, that the scope of 
the stop was reasonably related to its purpose or was supported by valid 
consent, reasonable suspicion of other unlawful activity or legitimate safety 
concerns

 
 
[¶55]   Upon being stopped by Trooper Peech for 
speeding, Mr. O'Boyle was seized within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.  
Campbell, ¶3.  We must decide under the totality of the 
circumstances whether Trooper Peech's actions during the detention were 
reasonably related in scope to the speeding stop.  In making this determination, we are guided by 
the following principles:  1) a detention must be carefully tailored to 
the reason for the stop; 2) an officer may request the detainee's driver's 
license, proof of insurance, and vehicle registration or rental papers, run a 
computer check and issue a citation or warning; 3) an officer may make 
reasonable inquiry into travel plans to the extent necessary to put the traffic 
violation in context; 4) absent reasonable suspicion of other illegal activity 
or that a detainee is armed, the officer may not ask questions unrelated to the 
stop; and 5) an officer may expand the scope of the detention only with valid 
consent or a reasonable suspicion of other illegal activity or that the detainee 
is armed.  
Campbell, ¶12; Damato, ¶13.

 
 
[¶56]   Applying these standards to the facts 
presented by Mr. O'Boyle, we conclude the detention inside the patrol car went 
beyond the scope of the speeding violation giving rise to the stop.  Trooper Peech's 
extensive questioning inside the patrol car while waiting for dispatch involved 
not only legitimate questions about Mr. O'Boyle's travel plans and the rental 
car, but questions far removed from either his travel plans or the speeding 
violation. Under the totality of the particular facts presented, these questions 
constituted a multi-question investigatory interrogation into minute details 
concerning private aspects of Mr. O'Boyle's life. 

 
 
[¶57]   Additionally, considering the totality 
of the circumstances, neither the questioning nor the detention in general was 
carefully tailored to the speeding violation.  Four minutes into the stop, and before he was 
aware of Mr. O'Boyle's criminal history, Trooper Peech called for back-up 
assistance, specifically a canine unit.  The unit arrived just two minutes later and 
parked directly behind the patrol car.  By the time Trooper Peech returned Mr. 
O'Boyle's license and paperwork, issued the warning and told him "to have a safe 
trip," Mr. O'Boyle had been subjected to sustained and persistent questioning 
about matters having no relationship to his travel plans or the speeding offense 
and the scope of the detention had expanded far beyond the speeding offense into 
a full-blown drug investigation  all without Mr. O'Boyle's consent or, as 
Trooper Peech conceded in his testimony and the State has conceded throughout 
these proceedings, a reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity. 

 
 
[¶58]   The fact that some of Trooper Peech's 
questions were permissible under the Fourth Amendment as inquiry about travel 
plans does not change this result.  As was stated in United 
States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th 
Cir. 2001):

 
 
When stopped for a traffic violation, a motorist expects "to 
spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer 
checks his license and registration." At the same time, the government has a 
strong interest in ensuring that motorists comply with traffic laws. Thus, it is 
beyond dispute that an officer may ask questions relating to the reason for the 
stop. Ordinarily, this also includes questions relating to the motorist's travel 
plans. Travel plans typically are related to the purpose of a traffic stop 
because the motorist is traveling at the time of the stop. For example, a 
motorist's travel history and travel plans may help explain, or put into 
context, why the motorist was weaving (if tired) or speeding (if there was an 
urgency to the travel).

 
 
The question, however, is one of reasonableness under the 
totality of the circumstances.  Viewed in this light, the intrusive 
questioning Trooper Peech engaged in constituted unconstitutional, purposeful 
probing more akin to a fishing expedition than to a permissible expansion of an 
investigative stop supported by reasonable suspicion.   Campbell, ¶¶11-12.  

 
 
[¶59]   Moreover, we have reviewed the Fourth 
Amendment travel plan cases and found none involving facts quite like those 
presented here.   
For example, the questions were not motivated by safety concerns as 
occurred in Holt, 264 F.3d  at 1215, and were much more extensive and far 
reaching than the questions asked in United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 
2001). The questions were not prompted by or directly related to objectively 
suspicious circumstances as they were in United States v. Zabalza, 346 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 2003) (where upon first talking to the defendant, the 
officer detected the odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle); United States 
v. Oliver, 363 F.3d 1061, 1067 (10th Cir. 2004) (where upon being asked to present the 
vehicle rental agreement, the defendant opened the glove box, revealing a 
cylindrical package wrapped in brown paper which he tried to push back out of 
sight when he saw that the officer noticed it); United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548 (10th Cir. 
1993) (where the defendant was unable to provide even a general address for the 
uncle from whom he said he borrowed the vehicle he was driving); and United 
States v. Pena, 920 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir. 
1990) (where the vehicle had California plates and a punched out trunk lock and 
was being driven by an Illinois licensed driver who could not provide the 
registration).  
Few of the questions asked had anything to do with the fact that Mr. 
O'Boyle was traveling 79 miles per hour in a 75 mile per hour zone and his 
answers neither helped explain nor put into context why he was speeding.  Based upon the 
totality of the circumstances, we hold the questioning was unreasonable and was 
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.

 
 
 
 

 
 
[¶60]   Interpreting the Fourth Amendment in the 
context of deciding whether an officer had valid consent for expanding the scope 
of a traffic stop, we have said:

 
 
            
"Subject to certain exceptions, warrantless searches and seizures are per 
se unreasonable under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution. Among the 
recognized exceptions are searches and/or seizures conducted pursuant to a valid 
consent. Whether an exception exists in a particular case is a question of fact 
that may be properly resolved by a preponderance of the evidence standard in the 
light of all attendant circumstances.' When this Court reviews questions of 
fact, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. 
The burden of proving that the circumstances of a particular case fit within an 
exception is with the State."

 
 
Meadows, ¶23 (citations omitted).  Addressing 
specifically the issue of whether consent was voluntary under the Fourth 
Amendment, we have said:

 
 
"In determining whether a warrantless search was justified 
by a valid consent, we inquire into the voluntariness of the consent in light 
of the totality of the circumstances' of the particular case. Some of the 
factors that a court may consider in determining whether the consent was 
voluntary include:  
the way the law enforcement officer phrased the request for permission to 
search; whether the officer told the individual that he could refuse the 
request; and the presence of other coercive factors. We must consider all the 
circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether a reasonable person 
would have felt free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate 
the encounter.' No single factor is determinative when we are ascertaining 
whether a seizure occurred." 

 
 
"The question of whether consent to search was voluntary is 
one of fact to be determined in light of all the circumstances."

 
 
Grant v. State, 2004 WY 
45, ¶22, 88 P.3d 1016, ¶22 (Wyo. 
2004) (citations omitted).  We applied these principles in Grant to uphold 
the district court's finding that consent was voluntary based upon evidence that 
the defendant was never threatened in any way, essentially volunteered consent, 
was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained when he gave consent, was wearing a 
winter jacket while detained outside in the cold, and was cooperative.  Id.11  

 
 
[¶61]   In the context of consent given after an 
unconstitutional detention, as we have in Mr. O'Boyle's case, we have said: 

 
 
The government bears the burden of proving the voluntariness 
of consent, and that burden is heavier when consent is given after an illegal 
stop. In determining whether a detained motorist freely and voluntarily 
consented to a further detention or search after an illegal detention, we must 
consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the consent, with a focus 
upon three factors . . .: "the temporal proximity of the illegal detention and 
the consent, any intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the purpose and 
flagrancy of the officer's unlawful conduct." In other words, the State had the 
burden of establishing that Campbell's consent was 
"sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the illegal 
detention, or it must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree."

 
 

Campbell, ¶14 (citations omitted).  Applying these factors, we held in Campbell that the consent was not sufficient to 
remove the taint of the prior unconstitutional detention. 

 
 
[¶62]   In summary, the question whether consent 
to further detention was voluntary under the Fourth Amendment is determined from 
the totality of the circumstances, focusing on whether a reasonable person would 
have felt free to decline the officer's requests or otherwise terminate the 
encounter.  
Grant, ¶¶ 22-23.  We also consider the time between the 
unconstitutional detention and consent, any intervening factors and the purpose 
and flagrancy of the officer's actions.  Campbell, ¶14.  These are the standards we traditionally have 
applied and will continue to apply under the Fourth Amendment in determining 
whether consent was voluntarily given. 

 
 
[¶63] When Trooper Peech asked Mr. O'Boyle if he could ask 
him a few more questions, Mr. O'Boyle had already been subjected to repetitive 
and intrusive questioning unrelated to the speeding violation or his travel 
plans with two troopers and a drug dog on the scene.  Only a matter of 
seconds had expired since the unconstitutional detention inside the patrol car, 
no intervening circumstances had occurred and Trooper Peech was clearly fishing 
for evidence of some other illegal activity.  Mr. O'Boyle was not informed he did not have 
to answer any more questions or had the right to leave. Although not a 
controlling factor, the fact that a detained motorist is not informed that he is 
free to leave or refuse consent is a factor to be considered in determining 
whether consent was voluntary.  Campbell, ¶16; Grant, ¶22.12  Considering the 
totality of the circumstances, we agree with the district court that a 
reasonable person would not have felt free to refuse to answer further 
questions.  
Under these circumstances, Mr. O'Boyle's consent was not sufficiently 
voluntary to remove the taint of the prior unconstitutional detention. 

 
 
 
 

 
 
[¶64]   In the context of roadside consensual 
vehicle searches arising out of traffic stops:

 
 
Requesting consent has apparently become yet another part of 
the "routine" of "routine traffic stops," and it is thus not surprising that the 
cases contain acknowledgements by police about the frequency of this tactic. 
These requests result in affirmative responses in the overwhelming majority of 
cases; guilty or innocent, "most motorists stopped and asked by police for 
consent to search their vehicles will expressly give permission to search their 
vehicles", resulting in "thousands upon thousands of motor vehicle searches of 
innocent travelers each year."

* * *

Here again, the failure of most courts, when dealing with 
traffic stop consent searches, to adhere to the Terry limits on what constitutes 
a reasonable temporary detention has produced very distressful results. Consent 
searches . . . are now a wholesale activity accompanying a great many traffic 
stops, submitted to by most drivers, guilty or innocent, and resulting in 
continued interruption of their travels for a substantial period of time while 
they wait by the roadside as their vehicles are ransacked, a process which 
beyond question "is highly invasive of the dignitary interests of 
individuals."

 
 
LaFave, supra, 395-397.  This outcome is not consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment.  We 
adhere to the standards for determining whether consent is voluntary discussed 
in the preceding section and hold that Mr. O'Boyle's consent to the vehicle 
search was not sufficiently voluntary to purge the taint of the first 
unconstitutional detention.  Evidence obtained as a result of the search 
was fruit of the poisonous tree.  The district court correctly granted the 
suppression motion in its initial ruling and erred in denying the motion upon 
reconsideration.

 
 
 

 
 
[¶65]   We reaffirm that the Wyoming 
Constitution requires that searches and seizures be reasonable under all the 
circumstances.  
Under all the circumstances presented in Mr. O'Boyle's case, we hold that 
the detention and search were unreasonable and his consent was not 
voluntary.  The 
detention and search, therefore, violated article 1, § 4 and the district court 
erred in denying Mr. O'Boyle's motion to suppress.  

 
 
[¶66] In the context of the Fourth Amendment, we reaffirm 
the rule established in Terry, 392 U.S.  at 19-20 -- 
questioning during a traffic stop must be limited to the purpose of the stop and 
may not be extended unreasonably beyond the scope of the stop absent valid 
consent, a reasonable suspicion of other illegal activity, or officer safety 
concerns. Applying these standards, we hold under the totality of the 
circumstances the questioning inside the patrol car unreasonably exceeded the 
scope of the traffic stop and violated the Fourth Amendment.  Mr. O'Boyle's 
consent to additional questioning outside the patrol car and his consent to the 
search were not sufficiently voluntary to remove the taint of the initial 
unconstitutional detention.  Therefore, evidence obtained after his consent 
should have been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. 

 
 
[¶67]   The order denying the suppression motion 
is reversed, and this case is remanded to the district court to allow Mr. 
O'Boyle to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2).

            

 
 
 
 
            
VOIGT, Justice, specially concurring.

 
 

[¶68]   I agree with the rationale and result of 
the majority opinion.  
I write separately to make a couple of statements about traffic stop 
jurisprudence.  
I start with what I perceive to be the misapplication of the principles 
of Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968) to traffic stops.  In Terry, a downtown 
"beat" detective with thirty-nine years' experience observed the suspicious 
activity of three men, who appeared to be "casing" a store for a "stick up . . 
.."  Id. at 5-6.  Although he had not 
seen anything illegal, the detective approached the three men to investigate the 
situation and, upon confronting them, patted them down for weapons.  Id. at 6-7.  Terry was eventually 
convicted of carrying a concealed weapon.  Id. at 4.

 
 
[¶69]   Terry sired, or at least is the defining justification 
for, the "investigative stop" or "Terry stop" that falls somewhere short of 
arrest in the scale of police/citizen encounters.  Over the years, Terry has become 
synonymous with "investigative detention."  In fact, however, the propriety of an 
"investigative detention" was not the focus of the case:

 
 
            
The crux of this case, however, is not the propriety of Officer 
McFadden's taking steps to investigate petitioner's suspicious behavior, but 
rather, whether there was justification for McFadden's invasion of Terry's 
personal security by searching him for weapons in the course of that 
investigation.

 
 

Id. at 23.

 
 
[¶70]   The issue in Terry was not the 
constitutional reasonableness of brief citizen detentions for investigative 
purposes.  
Rather, in affirming Terry's conviction and the denial of his motion to 
suppress as evidence the revolver found in his overcoat, the United States 
Supreme Court focused on the pat-down search for weapons:

 
 
[W]e turn our attention to the quite narrow question posed 
by the facts before us:  whether it is always unreasonable for a 
policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons 
unless there is probable cause for an arrest.

 
 

Id. at 15.

 
 
[¶71]   The point is this:  Terry was a "stop 
and frisk" case; nothing more, nothing less.  By its own terms, it did not create or 
identify a special area of investigative immunity from Fourth Amendment 
principles:

 
 
Nothing we say today is to be taken as indicating approval 
of police conduct outside the legitimate investigative sphere.  Under our decision, 
courts still retain their traditional responsibility to guard against police 
conduct which is overbearing or harassing, or which trenches upon personal 
security without the objective evidentiary justification which the Constitution 
requires.  When 
such conduct is identified, it must be condemned by the judiciary and its fruits 
must be excluded from evidence in criminal trials.

 
 

Id.

 
 
[¶72]   But even if Terry did validate 
the "Terry stop" concept that the brief detention of a citizen for the purpose 
of investigating suspicious behavior is constitutionally reasonable, what does 
that have to do with a traffic stop?  In the instant case, when Trooper Peech saw 
the appellant speeding past him at seventy-nine mph in a seventy-five mph zone, 
what was there to investigate?  The purpose of the ensuing traffic stop 
certainly was not to investigate anything.  The purpose was to give the appellant a 
speeding ticket.

 
 

[¶73]   What has happened is that Terry has been 
stretched far beyond its self-declared boundaries to justify a secondary 
investigation having nothing to do with the reason for the initial 
encounter.  That 
leads me to my second point.  The majority cites to and quotes from many 
cases where various courts, both state and federal, have approved the practice 
of law enforcement officers inquiring into motorists' travel plans during 
traffic stops.  
Those courts and others have found such questioning to be reasonable 
under the circumstances.  A recent example is People v. Williams, 
472 Mich. 308, 696 N.W.2d 636 (2005), where that state's Court of Appeals had reversed Williams' 
drug conviction on the ground that, although the initial traffic stop for 
speeding eighty-eight mph in a seventy mph zone was lawful,

 
 
the trooper "unlawfully exceeded the initial stop when he 
asked defendant to step out of the vehicle" to answer questions about his travel 
plans while the officer possessed only a "generalized hunch" that criminal 
activity was afoot.  
The trooper's questions had no relevance to the traffic stop, the Court 
held, and he had no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to warrant asking 
the questions.  
The Court concluded that Trooper Varoni was acting on a "hunch," which is 
insufficient grounds for pursuing an investigatory stop.

 
 

Id. at 639-40.

 
 
[¶74]   The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the 
Court of Appeals and reinstated Williams' conviction for possession of drugs 
found during the search of his car.  In doing so, the higher court relied upon the 
two-part standard of Terry, 392 U.S. at 20:  whether the 
officer's action was justified at its inception and whether it was reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop in the first 
place.  Williams, 696 N.W.2d  
at 640.  Finding 
no dispute that the first part of the test was satisfied because the stop was 
occasioned by the appellant's speeding, the Michigan Supreme Court had this to 
say about the second part of the test:

 
 
A traffic stop is reasonable as long as the driver is detained only 
for the purpose of allowing an officer to ask reasonable 
questions concerning the violation of law and its context for a reasonable 
period.  The 
determination whether a traffic stop is reasonable must necessarily take into account the 
evolving circumstances with which the officer is faced.

 
 

Id. at 641 (emphasis added and footnote omitted).  That enunciated rule 
of law is supported by a footnote that reads as follows:

 
 
There is considerable discretion allowed an officer charged 
with enforcing the traffic laws as a member of the executive branch of 
government.  
This discretion can be exercised effectively only if an officer is 
allowed to ask reasonable 
questions concerning the context of a traffic offense.  To deny an officer 
the ability to ask reasonable questions, reasonably 
circumscribed in scope and duration, is to deny the officer the ability 
to reasonably 
exercise the officer's discretion.

 
 

Id. at 641 n.8 (emphasis added).

 
 
[¶75]   What follows in Williams is an 
explication of the stated justification for inquiry into speeding motorists' 
travel plans:

 
 
It is no violation of the Fourth Amendment for an officer to 
ask reasonable 
questions in order to obtain additional information about the underlying offense 
and the circumstances leading to its commission.  For example, in addition to asking for the 
necessary identification and paperwork, an officer may also ask questions 
relating to the reason for the stop, including questions about the driver's 
destination and travel plans.  United 
States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1267 
(C.A.10, 2001).  
Specifically, an officer may ask about the "purpose and itinerary of a 
driver's trip during the traffic stop" in order to determine whether a 
"violation has taken place, and if so, whether a citation or warning should be 
issued or an arrest made."  United 
States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 508 (C.A.5, 2004).  Such inquiries are "within the scope of 
investigation attendant to the traffic stop."  Id.

 
 

Williams, 696 N.W.2d at 641 (emphasis added and footnote omitted).

 
 
[¶76]   This is the fallacious argument, in my 
view.  To begin 
with, and the reason for all the highlighted "reasonables," in the above quotes, 
is that calling something reasonable does not make it so, even when done 
repeatedly.  It 
is simply not reasonable to ask a motorist who had the misfortune of going 
seventy-nine mph in a seventy-five mph zone in Wyoming the name of his son's college mascot, 
because the answer to that question is simply not related to the 
four-mile-per-hour excess.  In truth, the situation would be rare indeed 
where the citizen's itinerary and destination had anything whatsoever to do with 
the question of whether a speeding violation had occurred.

 
 

[¶77]   The Michigan Court of Appeals had it 
right:  Terry does not 
authorize questioning about travel plans based on a hunch that something 
criminal may be afoot.  
"Anything less [than an objective standard of reasonableness] would 
invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more 
substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has consistently 
refused to sanction."  
Terry, 392 U.S.  at 22.  
Both the United States Constitution and the Wyoming Constitution forbid 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  An unreasonable seizure occurs when a motorist 
is detained for any length of time for the purpose of an interrogation that has 
nothing to do with the traffic stop and is not based in a reasonable and 
articulable suspicion of criminal activity.  That is what happened here.

 
 
[¶78]   It is intellectually dishonest in 
writing judicial opinions to pretend that something is what it is not.  Any credible law 
enforcement officer will admit that the interrogation of motorists and their 
passengers has absolutely nothing whatever to do with the speeding violation or 
other reason for the "traffic" stop.  The purpose behind the interrogation is to 
uncover discrepancies or other information that may eventually justify a search 
of the vehicle for controlled substances.  See 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 
9.3(d)-(e) (4th ed. 2004).  These cases are not traffic cases; they are 
drug interdiction cases.  Perhaps if the appellate courts of 
America would treat them as such, the 
discussion would be less phony.  The real question should be, given the major 
drug problem facing this country and the huge amount of drugs being transported 
on our nation's highways, what investigatory steps directed at drug interdiction 
are constitutionally reasonable in a traffic stop situation.  Would that not be 
better than pretending that the name of the motorist's son's college mascot is 
somehow relevant to a speeding violation?

 
 

[¶79]   Finally, I will say this.  The majority details 
the law that has developed in this area, and it is apparent that the courts are 
"all over the board."  
Decisions range from United States v. Malouff, 114 Fed.Appx. 975, 979 (10th 
Cir. 2004) ("an officer may question a traffic-stop 
detainee on any topic without reasonable and articulable suspicion so long as 
the questioning does not prolong the stop") to State v. Carty, 170 
N.J. 632, 790 A.2d 903, 912, modified on other grounds, 174 N.J. 351, 806 A.2d 798 
(2002) (even a consent search after a traffic stop 
requires reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity).  The lure of the 
latter bright-line standard intensifies as the officer's conduct approaches that 
"overbearing or harassing" police conduct reserved for condemnation by Terry, 392 U.S.  at 15.  The litany of 
questions posed by Trooper Peech to the appellant in this case comes mighty 
close to that line.

 
 
 
 

FOOTNOTES

1Trooper Peech testified initially that the canine 
unit arrived "sometime during the time I asked for the criminal history and the 
criminal history returned. . . ."  Then he testified that he called for the 
canine unit after dispatch advised him of Mr. O'Boyle's criminal history.  On cross-examination 
by defense counsel, however, with the aid of his written report, Trooper Peech 
clarified that he called for the canine unit four minutes after he made the 
traffic stop. Thus, it is clear that Trooper Peech called for the canine unit 
before he knew about Mr. O'Boyle's criminal history.

 
 

2From the video tape recording, it is clear only that 
Mr. O'Boyle had a criminal history. It is not clear what that history 
involved.  
However, Trooper Peech testified that Mr. O'Boyle had a prior 
non-violent, non-drug-related felony conviction.

 

3On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Trooper 
Peech whether, while he was questioning Mr. O'Boyle in the patrol car, the 
second trooper got out of his car and played catch with the dog. Trooper Peech 
responded, "I don't think so" and then, "I don't know."  Thus, it is unclear 
where the second trooper and the dog were while Mr. O'Boyle was being 
questioned.

   

4We emphasize that these are 
"non-exclusive" criteria. The identification of these factors does not mean they 
are the only criteria for analyzing a state 
constitutional claim or that they all must be 
addressed in every case. As stated in State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808 (Wash. 1986), 
the case from which they were derived, these criteria are 
relevant to determining whether, in a given situation, a state constitution 
should be considered as extending broader rights to its citizens than does the 
United States Constitution. The criteria are aimed at suggesting where counsel 
might focus his or her argument in cases urging independent state constitutional 
grounds and helping to insure that when a court relies upon independent state 
constitutional grounds, the result is based upon well founded legal reasons and 
not merely the substitution of the particular court's notion of justice for that 
of duly elected legislative bodies or the United States Supreme Court. Gunwall, at 813. While state constitutional claims need 
to be thoroughly briefed and discussed and the Gunwall criteria provide an appropriate framework, those 
criteria are neither compulsory nor exclusive.    

  

5Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution provides:

§ 4.  Security against search and 
seizure.

            
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, 
particularly describing the place to be searched or the person or thing to be 
seized.

 
 

6In its brief in opposition 
to the suppression motion, the State conceded:  "While Trooper Peech was suspicious of 
Defendant, his suspicions did not rise to the level that would justify continued 
investigative detention, a fact which he made explicit by returning Defendant's 
license and paperwork, releasing him, and informing him that he was free to 
go."  Likewise, 
at the suppression hearing, the State informed the district court it was not 
contending there was reasonable suspicion of other illegal activity. Consistent 
with the State's representations, Trooper Peech testified he did not have a 
suspicion sufficient to warrant further detention or a search. 

 
 

7See also: 

 
 
Harris 
v. State, 994 S.W.2d 927, 932, n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (police officer testified that he 
asked for consent to search every car he stopped, regardless of suspicion). 
Another police officer testified that he routinely requested permission to 
search any car he stopped for a traffic violation; in one year he requested 
consent to search 786 times. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40 (1996) (Ginsberg, J., 
concurring). Another officer stated that, personally, he had searched in excess 
of 3,000 bags in nine months. Florida 
v. Kerwick, 512 So. 2d 347, 349 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). In one city, it 
was estimated that ninety-eight percent of the searches were by consent. Paul 
Sutton, The Fourth Amendment in Action:  An Empirical View of 
the Search Warrant Process, 22 Crim. L. Bull. 405, 415 (1986); Joshua 
Dressler, Understanding Criminal Procedure § 17.01, at 241 (2d ed. 1997) 
(discussing estimates that ninety-eight percent of warrantless searches are 
conducted via consent). As Professor Dressler wrote, "Put simply, there are few 
areas of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of greater practical significance than 
consent searches." 

 
 
Id. at 214, n.8. 

 

8See also State v. Retherford, 639 N.E.2d 498, 503-04 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994), where the court said: 

       

What is obviously troubling about these cases is that 
hundreds, and perhaps thousands of Ohio 
citizens are being routinely delayed in their travels and asked to relinquish to 
uniformed police officers their right to privacy in their automobiles and 
luggage, sometimes for no better reason than to provide an officer the 
opportunity to "practice" his drug interdiction technique.

While we recognize the importance of drug interdiction, we 
are shocked by what we believe to be an unjustified and egregious intrusion upon 
the privacy rights of the citizens of Ohio.

  

9In our Fourth Amendment cases, we generally have 
applied the preponderance of the evidence in determining whether consent was 
voluntary. Parkhurst, 628 P.2d  at 1378, citing Fitzgerald v. 
State, 601 P.2d 1015 (Wyo. 1979); Stamper v. State, 662 P.2d 82, 86-87 
(Wyo. 1983). However, in Stanton v. State, 692 P.2d 947, 951 
(Wyo. 1984), we cited Tobin for the rule 
that under Wyoming law the waiver of 
a constitutional right must appear by "clear and positive testimony." Thus, the 
standard for purposes of article 1, § 4 analysis is the clear and positive 
testimony standard established in Tobin and 
reaffirmed in Vasquez.

 

10We are not alone in strictly adhering to Terry. See 
State v. 
Gutierrez, 51 P.3d 461 (Id. 2002); People v. Cox, 782 N.E.2d 275 
(Ill. 2002); 
United 
States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 
2001); People v. Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d 260 (Ill. 2003); State v. Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415 (Minn. 2003).

 

11Meadows, although distinguishable, is also worth mentioning. In Meadows, ¶24, we upheld 
a district court ruling that the State satisfied its burden of proving consent 
was voluntary. In Meadows, the defendant driver 
initially denied permission to search but then agreed to the search after the 
officer told him he could not leave until a canine unit was brought to the 
scene. Meadows, 
however, is of limited significance to Mr. O'Boyle's claim 
because the claim that consent was involuntary was based in large part on the 
contention that the detention was illegal. We found the detention was legal and, 
as noted in the opinion, that finding rendered the consent issue moot. 
Id., ¶22, fn. 5. Meadows is also 
factually distinguishable in that the officer had reasonable suspicions 
justifying continued detention of the defendants after issuing citations for the 
offense giving rise to the stop because the passenger provided false 
identification and the driver could not produce a driver's license or proof of 
insurance, gave conflicting stories about why he did not have his driver's 
license, and gave a different address than the address located by dispatch.  
Id., ¶4.

 
 

12In Ingersoll v. State, 2004 WY 102, ¶22, 96 P.3d 1046, ¶22 (Wyo. 
2004), we noted in dicta that "Ingersoll gave consent to [the officer] to search 
the vehicle." The validity of Ingersoll's consent was not the issue before us. 
Rather, Ingersoll claimed that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to 
file a second suppression motion, after the first one was denied, attacking the 
validity of his consent. In addressing the ineffectiveness issue, we suggested 
the consent was voluntary, cited in dicta a Wyoming case for the proposition 
that an officer is not required to inform a driver during a traffic stop that he 
is free to leave and cited in dicta a Maryland case for the proposition that 
"even when a police officer has no basis for suspecting criminal activity beyond 
that which prompted a traffic stop, the police officer may generally ask 
questions of an individual so long as it is not conveyed that compliance with 
any requests is required."  Id., ¶23.  Because we made 
these statements in the context of determining whether Ingersoll's counsel was 
ineffective and were not asked to decide whether his consent was valid, the 
statements have little precedential value.