Title: Premier Property Mgt., Inc. v. Chavez

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Opinion filed February 17, 2000.
JUSTICE BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the court:
Jose Chavez conveyed his interest in his personal residence to himself and 
his spouse, Claudia Chavez, as tenants by the entirety. Plaintiff, Premier 
Property Management, Inc. (Premier), a creditor of Jose Chavez, filed a 
complaint in the circuit court of Cook County seeking to have this conveyance 
set aside as fraudulent. Premier named Jose Chavez and Claudia Chavez as 
defendants. The circuit court dismissed Premier's complaint with prejudice. The 
appellate court reversed this dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. 
No. 1-97-4066 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We affirm the 
judgment of the appellate court.
BACKGROUND
Premier and Jose Chavez had a business relationship. In May of 1995, Premier 
filed a separate lawsuit against Jose Chavez and El Torero, Inc. At that time, 
Jose Chavez held title to his residence in his name alone.
On or around June 1, 1996, Jose Chavez conveyed his interest in the residence 
from himself, as sole owner, to himself and his wife, as tenants by the 
entirety. This conveyance was recorded on July 19, 1996. In late 1996, a 
judgment was entered in the separate lawsuit in favor of Premier and against 
Jose Chavez and El Torero, Inc., for the amount of $190,566.30.
On May 27, 1997, Premier filed the instant action to set aside the 
conveyance. Premier contended that the conveyance should be set aside as 
fraudulent pursuant to the terms of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act 
(hereinafter, Fraudulent Transfer Act) (740 ILCS 160/1 et seq. (West 
1996)).
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Premier's complaint under section 2-619 
(735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 1996)) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/1-101 
et seq. (West 1996)). Defendants argued that the tenancy by the 
entirety provision of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/12-112 (West 
1996)) protects their marital residence from being sold to pay a judgment 
entered against only one of the tenants. According to defendants, the tenancy by 
the entirety provision offers this protection regardless of whether the 
conveyance was made with fraudulent intent. In support, defendants relied on a 
decision of the Second District of the Appellate Court, E.J. McKernan Co. v. 
Gregory, 268 Ill. App. 3d 383 (1994), appeal allowed, 161 Ill. 2d 525 (1995), appeal dismissed with prejudice, No. 78487 (May 23, 
1995).
Premier filed a response to defendants' motion to dismiss. Premier maintained 
that a conveyance of property to tenancy by the entirety may be set aside where 
made with fraudulent intent. In support, Premier relied on In re Marriage of 
Del Giudice, 287 Ill. App. 3d 215 (1997), a decision of the First District 
of the Appellate Court. Premier also argued to the circuit court that it was 
required to follow Del Giudice, the decision in its district, because a 
conflict existed between Del Giudice and McKernan.
The circuit court determined that Del Giudice and McKernan 
are reconcilable on their facts. The circuit court then applied McKernan 
to the instant case, reasoning that McKernan is more factually 
analogous. Consequently, the circuit court granted defendants' motion to dismiss 
Premier's complaint with prejudice.
Premier appealed. The appellate court ruled that Del Giudice and 
McKernan are in direct conflict. No. 1-97-4066 (unpublished order under 
Supreme Court Rule 23). The appellate court further ruled that the circuit court 
was bound to follow Del Giudice, the decision in its district. The 
appellate court therefore reversed the dismissal of Premier's complaint and 
remanded the cause for additional proceedings. In doing so, the appellate court 
noted that the General Assembly had recently amended the tenancy by the entirety 
provision relied upon by defendants. We allowed defendants' petition for leave 
to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315).
ANALYSIS
Tenancy by the entirety is an estate in real property provided for by the 
Joint Tenancy Act (765 ILCS 1005/0.01 et seq. (West 1996)). Only 
spouses may hold property in this estate. 765 ILCS 1005/1c (West 1996). In 
addition, the estate is limited to homestead property. 765 ILCS 1005/1c (West 
1996).
I. Tenancy by the Entirety Provision
According to the tenancy by the entirety provision of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, holding property in tenancy by the entirety protects spouses in that 
the property cannot be sold to satisfy the debt of only one spouse. 735 ILCS 
5/12-112 (West 1998). At issue here is the extent of that protection when a 
creditor attempts to avoid a transfer of property to tenancy by the entirety, 
claiming that it was made with fraudulent intent.
When Jose Chavez conveyed his property to tenancy by the entirety on or 
around June 1, 1996, the tenancy by the entirety provision stated in pertinent 
part:
Premier asserts that Jose Chavez's conveyance was fraudulent and may be set 
aside under the Fraudulent Transfer Act. The Fraudulent Transfer Act provides in 
relevant part that a creditor may avoid a transfer "if the debtor made the 
transfer *** with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the 
debtor." 740 ILCS 160/5(a)(1) (West 1996). Our appellate court has reached 
conflicting conclusions as to whether the Fraudulent Transfer Act may be used 
against a debtor who is relying on the protection furnished by the tenancy by 
the entirety provision.
In McKernan, a husband and wife held their home in joint tenancy. A 
creditor obtained a judgment against the husband and initiated proceedings for a 
sale of the home. The husband and wife then transferred title to the home to 
tenancy by the entirety. The husband moved to restrain the sale based on the 
protection provided by the tenancy by the entirety provision. The creditor 
asserted that the transfer of title was fraudulent under the Fraudulent Transfer 
Act. McKernan, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 387-88.
The appellate court in McKernan held that the Fraudulent Transfer 
Act can never be applied to property held in tenancy by the entirety. According 
to the appellate court, the Fraudulent Transfer Act allows creditors to avoid 
transfers made with actual intent to defraud. Intent, however, "is irrelevant in 
a tenancy by the entirety conveyance because it simply cannot be fraudulent to 
engage in conduct that is specifically and unambiguously sanctioned by statute." 
McKernan, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 390. The appellate court interpreted the 
statutes relating to tenancy by the entirety as authorizing transfers like the 
one at issue. A plain reading of those statutes "makes it clear that no mental 
state is required to use the tenancy's protection." McKernan, 268 Ill. 
App. 3d at 390. Further, the appellate court reasoned that the legislature 
intended tenancy by the entirety to shield the marital homestead from the 
creditors of one spouse. McKernan, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 390-91.
The appellate court in Del Giudice declined to follow 
McKernan. In Del Giudice, a husband and wife held their home 
in joint tenancy. A creditor obtained a judgment against the husband and 
initiated proceedings for a sale of the home. The husband and wife then 
transferred title to the home to tenancy by the entirety. The husband moved to 
restrain the sale based on the protection provided by the tenancy by the 
entirety provision. The creditor asserted that the transfer of title was 
fraudulent under the Fraudulent Transfer Act. Del Giudice, 287 Ill. 
App. 3d at 216.
The appellate court held that, pursuant to the terms of the Fraudulent 
Transfer Act, a creditor can avoid a transfer of property to tenancy by the 
entirety if that transfer was made with actual intent to defraud the creditor. 
The appellate court acknowledged that the statutes concerning tenancy by the 
entirety allow married couples to effect such transfers, and that the General 
Assembly intended tenancy by the entirety to shield a marital homestead from the 
creditors of one spouse. Nonetheless, the court found no indication in those 
statutes or their legislative history that the General Assembly intended to 
include fraudulent conduct within the scope of afforded protection. According to 
the Del Giudice court, because the Fraudulent Transfer Act may be used 
to invalidate an otherwise lawful transaction made with fraudulent intent, that 
Act may be used to invalidate an otherwise lawful transfer of property to 
tenancy by the entirety if made with fraudulent intent. Del Giudice, 
287 Ill. App. 3d at 218.
After Del Giudice was filed, the General Assembly amended the 
tenancy by the entirety provision. See Pub. Act 90-514, eff. August 22, 1997; 
1997 Ill. Laws 5779. With that amendment, the tenancy by the entirety provision 
states in pertinent part:
The General Assembly also added language explaining that this amendment "is 
intended as a clarification of existing law and not as a new enactment." 735 
ILCS 5/12-112 (West 1998); 1997 Ill. Laws 5779.
Initially, we must determine whether the amended version of the tenancy by 
the entirety provision applies to Jose Chavez's conveyance. This court in 
First of America Trust Co. v. Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d 282 (1996), set 
forth the approach that Illinois reviewing courts follow in deciding whether an 
amended statute applies on appeal to "pending suits or preexisting causes of 
action." Dardeen v. Heartland Manor, Inc., 186 Ill. 2d 291, 295 (1999). 
Under Armstead, a reviewing court applies the law as it exists at the 
time of the appeal, unless doing so would interfere with a vested right. 
Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d  at 290.
Defendants argue that applying the amended version of the tenancy by the 
entirety provision to them interferes with Claudia Chavez's vested right to a 
property interest in her home. We disagree. Although not capable of precise 
definition, a vested right is an interest that is protected from legislative 
interference by our due process clause (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2), and has 
been described as "an expectation that is so far perfected that it cannot be 
taken away by legislation" or a "complete and unconditional demand or exemption 
that may be equated with a property interest." Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d  at 
290. There is, however, "no vested right in the mere continuance of a law," and 
the General Assembly "has an ongoing right to amend a statute." 
Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d  at 291.
The amendment to the tenancy by the entirety provision merely clarifies what 
protection is provided to spouses who hold property in that estate. The 
amendment clarifies that a creditor may break through that protection only where 
the property was transferred into tenancy by the entirety with the sole intent 
to avoid the payment of debts existing at the time of the transfer beyond the 
transferor's ability to pay those debts as they become due. Defendants are 
asserting, in effect, that Claudia Chavez has a vested right to the preamended 
tenancy by the entirety provision, as it was interpreted by the 
McKernan court. As noted, however, there is no vested right in the mere 
continuance of a law. Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d  at 291. Likewise, there is 
no vested right in the McKernan court's interpretation of the law at 
issue. The General Assembly has the ongoing right to amend the tenancy by the 
entirety provision to clarify what protection it intends spouses who hold 
property in that estate to have. Consequently, because no vested right is at 
stake, we must apply the law as it now exists.
Having determined that the amended tenancy by the entirety provision applies 
here, we now address the primary issue before this court: whether the Fraudulent 
Transfer Act's actual intent standard may be used to set aside a transfer of 
property to tenancy by the entirety. We hold that the answer is no, for the 
following reasons.
As amended, the tenancy by the entirety provision expressly includes its own 
standard to be used when a creditor challenges a transfer to that estate. Under 
the standard provided, property held in tenancy by the entirety cannot be sold 
to satisfy the debt of only one spouse, unless the property was transferred into 
tenancy by the entirety "with the sole intent to avoid the payment of 
debts existing at the time of the transfer beyond the transferor's ability to 
pay those debts as they become due." (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/12-112 (West 
1998). This standard governs when a creditor challenges a transfer of property 
to tenancy by the entirety. Harris Bank St. Charles v. Weber, 298 Ill. 
App. 3d 1072, 1081 (1998); In re Stacy, 223 B.R. 132, 136 (N.D. Ill. 
1998).
This sole intent standard stands in contrast to the actual intent standard of 
the Fraudulent Transfer Act. Under the Fraudulent Transfer Act, a creditor may 
avoid a transfer if the debtor made the transfer with actual intent to 
hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor. 740 ILCS 160/5(a)(1) (West 
1996). Section 5(b) of that Act lists 11 factors that may be considered in 
determining the debtor's actual intent in making the transfer. 740 ILCS 
160/5(b)(1) through (b)(11) (West 1996). If a sufficient number of the factors 
are present, the requisite actual intent may be found.
The sole intent standard of the amended tenancy by the entirety provision is 
substantially different from the actual intent standard of the Fraudulent 
Transfer Act. The sole intent standard provides greater protection from 
creditors for transfers of property to tenancy by the entirety. Under the sole 
intent standard, if property is transferred to tenancy by the entirety to place 
it beyond the reach of the creditors of one spouse and to accomplish 
some other legitimate purpose, the transfer is not avoidable. Such a transfer, 
however, would be avoidable under the actual intent standard, which only 
requires any actual intent to defraud a creditor. The General Assembly, by 
adopting the sole intent standard, has made it clear that it intends to provide 
spouses holding homestead property in tenancy by the entirety with greater 
protection from the creditors of one spouse than that provided by the Fraudulent 
Transfer Act. Accordingly, the Fraudulent Transfer Act's actual intent standard 
is not to be used to avoid transfers of property made to tenancy by the 
entirety. Harris Bank St. Charles, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 1081; In re 
Stacy, 223 B.R.  at 136.
Given that Del Giudice applied the actual intent standard of the 
Fraudulent Transfer Act, Del Giudice is not consistent with the sole 
intent standard of the amended tenancy by the entirety provision, nor is 
McKernan, which held that intent is never relevant. Hence, Del 
Giudice and McKernan are no longer correct statements of the law 
and should be disregarded. Harris Bank St. Charles, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 
1080-81.
In the present case, Premier's complaint to set aside Jose Chavez's 
conveyance relied upon the Fraudulent Transfer Act and, ultimately, Del 
Giudice. Defendants' motion to dismiss Premier's complaint relied upon 
McKernan. Applying McKernan, the circuit court granted 
defendants' motion to dismiss with prejudice. We hold, however, that the amended 
tenancy by the entirety provision governs this case, to the exclusion of the 
actual intent standard of the Fraudulent Transfer Act, Del Giudice and 
McKernan. In light of this holding, Premier must be given the 
opportunity to amend its complaint to reflect the amendment to the tenancy by 
the entirety provision. This cause is therefore remanded to the circuit court of 
Cook County. The circuit court is directed to enter an order dismissing 
Premier's complaint without prejudice and to afford Premier the opportunity to 
file an amended complaint.
II. Single Subject Rule
Defendants next contend that the amended version of the tenancy by the 
entirety provision cannot be applied to them because the General Assembly 
enacted that amendment in violation of the single subject rule. The amendment at 
issue was included within Public Act 90-514 (Pub. Act 90-514, eff. August 22, 
1997). According to defendants, Public Act 90-514 violates the single subject 
rule because it consists of two subjects: tenancy by the entirety and tax 
collector's scavenger sales.
The Illinois Constitution provides that bills "shall be confined to one 
subject." Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §8(d). The term "subject" as set forth 
therein is liberally construed in favor of upholding a legislative enactment. 
Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 187 Ill. 2d 341, 352 (1999). Although the 
single subject rule prohibits an enactment from clearly embracing more than one 
subject on its face, an enactment satisfies the rule so long as the matters 
included within it have a natural and logical connection to a single subject. 
Arangold Corp., 187 Ill. 2d  at 351, 354-55.
The General Assembly named Public Act 90-514 "AN ACT in relation to 
property." 1997 Ill. Laws 5775. The entire enactment consists of two sections. 
The first section amends the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/1-1 et seq. 
(West 1996)) regarding the frequency with which a county tax collector is 
required to offer mineral rights for sale after having filed a "Scavenger Sale 
Application" with the court and obtaining a judgment thereon. 1997 Ill. Laws 
5775-79. The second section is the amendment to the tenancy by the entirety 
provision, quoted above. 1997 Ill. Laws 5779. Both of these matters have a 
natural and logical connection to the subject of property. Therefore, 
defendants' single subject challenge is rejected.
The partial dissent asserts that an enactment must satisfy two requirements 
to satisfy the single subject provision of our constitution. The partial dissent 
is mistaken. The single subject rule provides that "[b]ills *** shall be 
confined to one subject." Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §8(d). In enforcing this 
constitutional provision, this court has always applied the same test: 
i.e., an enactment satisfies the rule so long as the matters included 
within it have a natural and logical connection to a single subject. 
Arangold Corp., 187 Ill. 2d  at 351-56 (and cases cited therein).
According to the partial dissent, a "second requirement" provides that, to 
satisfy the single subject rule, the provisions within an enactment must bear, 
beyond their relationship to a single subject, a relationship to one another. 
The partial dissent claims that this court's recent decision of People v. 
Cervantes, 189 Ill. 2d 80 (1999), "resuscitated" this so-called second 
requirement by stating that "a legislative act violates the single subject rule 
when the General Assembly 'includes within one bill unrelated provisions that by 
no fair interpretation have any legitimate relation to one another' " 
(Cervantes, 189 Ill. 2d  at 84, quoting People v. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (1999)). The partial dissent further claims that Cervantes 
thereby overruled, sub silentio, the holding in Arangold Corp. v. 
Zehnder, 187 Ill. 2d 341, 356 (1999), that this second requirement does not 
exist.
The partial dissent misconstrues the language in Cervantes. This 
language in Cervantes in no way repudiates Arangold. Language 
like that used in Cervantes has often been used in this court's 
jurisprudence when explaining the natural and logical connection test. For 
example, this court has oft repeated:
See also Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d  at 9; Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499, 515 (1997).
This court in Arangold was asked to determine whether such language 
imposes a second requirement that the provisions within an enactment be related 
to each other. After reviewing all of the applicable precedent, we clarified 
that no such second requirement had ever existed. Arangold Corp., 187 Ill. 2d  at 354-56 (and cases cited therein). We explained, "This court has never 
held that the single subject rule imposes a second and additional requirement 
that the provisions within an enactment be related to each other." Arangold 
Corp., 187 Ill. 2d  at 356, 361 (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring). 
Likewise, this court in Cervantes did not rely on any such second 
requirement in rendering that decision. Rather, we struck down the public act at 
issue there because its diverse provisions concerning crime, the civil Women, 
Infants and Children Vendor Management Act, and the Secure Residential Youth 
Care Facilities Licensing Act had no natural and logical connection to a single 
subject. Cervantes, 189 Ill. 2d  at 91-98. Accordingly, we reject the 
partial dissent's assertion that Cervantes somehow "resuscitated" this 
second requirement. This second requirement has never existed and, thus, there 
is nothing to resuscitate. Cervantes and Arangold are 
consistent.
CONCLUSION
The circuit court dismissed Premier's complaint with prejudice. For the 
reasons set forth above, we reverse that judgment. We remand this cause to the 
circuit court of Cook County with directions that Premier be afforded the 
opportunity to file an amended complaint under the amended tenancy by the 
entirety provision. Accordingly, although for different reasons than those 
expressed by the appellate court, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court, 
which reversed the judgment of the circuit court.
Appellate court judgment affirmed;
circuit court judgment reversed;
cause remanded with directions.
JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring:
I agree with the result reached by the court. I write separately, however, to 
address what I perceive to be an inconsistency in our case law concerning the 
analysis used to determine whether the amendment to section 12-112 applies to 
this case.
The court states that the approach Illinois reviewing courts follow in 
deciding whether an amended statute applies on appeal to pending suits or 
preexisting causes of action is that set forth in First of America Trust Co. 
v. Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d 282 (1996). Slip op. at 5. Under 
Armstead, the reviewing court is to apply the law as it exists at the 
time of the appeal, unless doing so would interfere with a vested right. Slip 
op. at 5, citing Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d  at 290.
In Armstead, this court declared that the principles applicable for 
determining whether a statutory amendment applies to an existing controversy on 
appeal "have not been consistently stated." Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d  at 
287-88. We noted that two different analyses had been developed in our case 
law-the "legislative intent approach" and the "vested rights approach." 
Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d  at 287-90. Under the former approach, whether an 
amendment applies retroactively turns upon the intent of the legislature. See 
e.g., People v. Fiorini, 143 Ill. 2d 318, 333 (1991) 
(acknowledging general rule that amendment will be construed as prospective, 
absent express language to the contrary). Courts that employ the legislative 
intent analysis presume an application of prospectivity; however, the 
presumption is rebuttable by either the statute's "express language or necessary 
implication." Rivard v. Chicago Fire Fighters Union, Local No. 2, 122 Ill. 2d 303, 309 (1988). Moreover, the presumption does not apply if the 
amendment is procedural in nature as opposed to substantive. Rivard, 
122 Ill. 2d  at 310. See also Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d  at 288-89 
(collecting cases).
In contrast, courts operating under the "vested rights" approach presume a 
retroactive application, based upon the general rule that a court should apply 
the law as it exists at the time of the appeal. See Bates v. Board of 
Education, Allendale Community Consolidated School District No. 17, 136 Ill. 2d 260, 268-69 (1990). The only exception to this rule exists in cases 
where the application of the change in the law would affect a vested right, that 
is, a right protected from legislative interference by the due process clause. 
Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d  at 289.
After comparing the two analyses, this court in Armstead declared 
that "the better approach is to apply the law that applies by its terms at the 
time of the appeal, unless doing so would interfere with a vested right." 
Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d  at 289. In reaching this conclusion, the court 
noted that the application of an amendment to an existing controversy does not 
necessarily constitute "retroactivity." The court defined a retroactive change 
in the law as " ' "one that takes away or impairs vested rights 
acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, 
or attaches a new disability in respect of transactions or considerations 
already past." ' " Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d  at 290, quoting 
United States Steel Credit Union v. Knight, 32 Ill. 2d 138, 142 (1965), 
quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes §412 (1953). Thus, where no vested rights 
are involved, because they have not been perfected or because the amendment is 
procedural in nature, the amended law can be applied to the existing controversy 
without any retroactive impact. Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d  at 290. Under 
this definition of retroactivity, the court reasoned that "there is little 
reason to focus on legislative intent." Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d  at 
290.
This court, having seemingly eschewed the legislative intent analysis for the 
vested rights approach in Armstead, nevertheless resurrected the 
legislative intent analysis just one year later in People v. 
Digirolamo, 179 Ill. 2d 24 (1997). In resolving whether a statutory 
amendment applied in the case, we stated the following:
Our opinion in Digirolamo does not mention Armstead nor 
does it speak of the vested rights approach in any way. Moreover, throughout our 
analysis, we referred specifically to the legislature's intent in determining 
whether the amendment should apply retroactively. See Digirolamo, 179 Ill. 2d  at 50.
As the foregoing demonstrates, this court has not charted an entirely clear 
course with respect to the analysis to be used when the retroactivity of a 
statutory amendment arises. In light of this conflicting precedent, I believe 
that we should take advantage of the opportunity that this case presents in 
order to clarify our position on this issue and to provide guidance for our 
lower courts. Indeed, at least one panel of our appellate court has raised 
questions concerning the seeming inconsistency between Armstead and 
Digirolamo, as has one federal court of appeals judge. See White v. 
Sunrise Healthcare Corp. 295 Ill. App. 3d 296, 299 (1998) (noting that 
Digirolamo did not purport to overrule Armstead in any 
respect); Kopec v. City of Elmhurst, 193 F.3d 894, 906 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(Posner, C.J., dissenting) (observing dichotomy between Digirolamo and 
Armstead and characterizing Illinois law on the question of 
retroactivity as being "in the state of some muddle"). Put simply, this is a 
problem that will not go away until this court speaks to the issue 
definitively.
Courts have traditionally been wary of statutory retroactivity and generally 
presume that statutes have prospective or forward application. The United States 
Supreme Court has recognized that "the presumption against retroactive 
legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine 
centuries older than our Republic." Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 265, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229, 252, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1497 (1994). According 
to the Court, retroactive statutes "raise particular concerns" as demonstrated 
by the fact that antiretroactivity principles are expressed in several 
provisions of the United States Constitution. Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 
266, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 252-53, 114 S. Ct.  at 1497. Nevertheless, the 
Constitution's restrictions are of a limited scope and "[a]bsent a violation of 
one of those specific provisions, the potential unfairness of retroactive civil 
legislation is not a sufficient reason for a court to fail to give a statute its 
intended scope." Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 267, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 253-54, 
114 S. Ct.  at 1498. This is so because retroactive legislation can often serve 
"benign and legitimate purposes." Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 267-68, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 254, 114 S. Ct.  at 1498. Thus, the Court has long held that "[w]ords 
in a statute ought not to have a retrospective operation, unless they are so 
clear, strong, and imperative, that no other meaning can be annexed to them, or 
unless the intention of the legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied." 
United States v. Heth, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 399, 413, 2 L. Ed. 479, 483 
(1806). See also Schwab v. Doyle, 258 U.S. 529, 534-35, 66 L. Ed. 747, 
752, 42 S. Ct. 391, 392 (1922) (declaring, "[L]aws are not to be considered as 
applying to cases which arose before their passage unless that intention be 
clearly declared. *** If the absence of such determining declaration leaves to 
the statute a double sense, it is the command of the cases, that that which 
rejects retroactive application must be selected"). In light of these 
principles, the Court noted that "a requirement that Congress first make its 
intention clear helps ensure that Congress itself has determined that the 
benefits of retroactivity outweigh the potential for disruption or unfairness." 
Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 268, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 254, 114 S. Ct.  at 1498. If 
the legislative branch has made its intent clear, while acting within the limits 
of its power, then the inquiry concludes. But if the statute lacks an 
"unambiguous directive" from the legislative branch, the court then "must look 
elsewhere for guidance" on the retroactivity question. Landgraf v. USI Film 
Products, 511 U.S. 244, 263, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229, 251, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1496 
(1994). See also Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 138 L. Ed. 2d 481, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997).
However, deciding "when a statute operates 'retroactively' is not always a 
simple or mechanical task" in the absence of express legislative directive. 
Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 268, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 254, 114 S. Ct.  at 1498. 
Interestingly enough, the Supreme Court has struggled with many of the same 
inconsistencies that have troubled this court. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. 
at 263-65, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 251-52, 114 S. Ct.  at 1496-97 (noting the "apparent 
tension between the rules we have espoused [in retroactivity cases] in the 
absence of an instruction from Congress"). Of particular concern was the maxim, 
often seen in cases involving retroactivity, that a court should " 'apply 
the law in effect at the time it renders its decision,' [citation], even though 
that law was enacted after the events that gave rise to the suit." 
Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 273, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 257, 114 S. Ct.  at 1501. 
The Court pointed out, however, that there is no conflict between that principle 
and a presumption against retroactivity when the statute in question clearly 
indicates a legislative intent that it apply retroactively. Landgraf, 
511 U.S.  at 273, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 257, 114 S. Ct.  at 1501. Nevertheless, the 
Court spoke definitively in Landgraf concerning the inquiry to be used 
when determining the application of a statutory amendment to a pending case:
A statute does not act retroactively "merely because its is applied in a case 
arising from conduct antedating the statute's enactment, [citation], or upsets 
expectations based in prior law. Rather, the court must ask whether the new 
provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its 
enactment." Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 269-70, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 254-55, 114 S. Ct.  at 1499. The Court explained that statutes which affect jurisdiction, 
injunctive relief or procedural rules normally do not fall into that definition. 
See Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 273-76, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 257-59, 114 S. Ct. 
at 1501-03.
In my view, the test enunciated by the Court in Landgraf properly 
fixes the initial focus of the inquiry on the language of the statute. The 
temporal reach of a statute is, in essence, a question of statutory 
construction, and the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain 
and give effect to the true intent of the legislature. Paris v. Feder, 
179 Ill. 2d 173, 177 (1997). The judiciary has long held that the best evidence 
of legislative intent is the "language used in the statute itself, which must be 
given its plain and ordinary meaning." Paris, 179 Ill. 2d  at 177 (and 
cases cited therein). The presumption against statutory retroactivity discussed 
in Landgraf has no force in cases where the legislature's intent is 
clear. The presumption is nothing more than a general rule for interpreting 
statutes that do not specify their temporal reach. Landgraf, 511 U.S. 
at 264, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 251, 114 S. Ct.  at 1496. Accordingly, I believe that 
this court should likewise begin any analysis of a statute's retroactivity with 
the language contained in the statute at issue. If the statute affirmatively and 
explicitly requires its application to pending cases or preexisting causes of 
action, then the court cannot deny retroactivity. When the statute is silent, 
however, this court should determine whether applying the law in effect at the 
time of our decision would constitute a retroactive application, i.e., 
"whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a 
party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to 
transactions already completed." Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 280, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 261-62, 114 S. Ct.  at 1505. If not, the amended law maybe applied. If 
applying the amended version of the law would have retroactive effect, we should 
presume the legislature did not intend that it be so applied. See 
Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 280, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 261-62, 114 S. Ct.  at 
1505.
In the present case, the first question that must be asked is whether our 
General Assembly has expressly addressed whether the provision in question 
applies to pending cases. I believe that it has. The amended act contains the 
following sentence: "This amendatory Act of 1997 (P.A. 90-514) is intended as a 
clarification of existing law and not as a new enactment." 735 ILCS 5/12-112 
(West 1998). Such a statement indicates that the legislature intended the 
amendment to have retroactive reach. See Harris Bank St. Charles v. 
Weber, 298 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 1079-80 (1998); In re Stacy, 223 B.R. 132, 136 (N.D. Ill. 1998). See also Varelis v. Northwestern Memorial 
Hospital, 167 Ill. 2d 449, 462-63 (1995). As such, this court should give 
effect to that expressed intent. See Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 267, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 253-54, 114 S. Ct.  at 1498 (noting that absent a violation of one of 
the specific constitutional antiretroactivity provisions, "the potential 
unfairness of retroactive civil legislation is not a sufficient reason for a 
court to fail to give a statute its intended scope").
Defendants argue that the application of the amended version of section 
12-112 to their case would violate rights secured to defendants by the due 
process clauses of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution 
and article I of the Illinois Constitution. After reviewing the cases cited by 
defendants in support of this contention, I am unable to discern any perfected 
interest interference with which the Constitution would prohibit.
This case presents this court with the chance to reaffirm the use of the 
traditional "presumption against statutory retroactivity," a notion "founded 
upon sound considerations of general policy and practice" and which "accords 
with long held and widely shared expectations about the usual operation of 
legislation." Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 286, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 265, 114 S. Ct.  at 1508. The reasonableness of such a rule was best expressed by the United 
States Supreme Court in Landgraf:
It is my hope that the approach I offer here will be considered in future 
cases.
JUSTICE McMORROW joins in this special concurrence.
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, concurring in part and dissenting in part: 
Under article IV, section 8(d), of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 
1970, art. IV, §8(d)), the provisions of a statutory enactment must not only 
have a "natural and logical connection" to a single subject, they must also bear 
some legitimate relation to one another. People v. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (1999); Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499, 515 (1997). Although 
our court repudiated the second of these requirements in Arangold Corp. v. 
Zehnder, 187 Ill. 2d 341, 356 (1999), we have since reaffirmed that
Under this standard, Public Act 90-514 cannot withstand defendant's 
constitutional challenge. The Act's two sections, denominated as section 5 and 
section 10, have nothing whatever to do with each other. Section 5 amends 
section 21-260 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/21-260 (West 1998)), 
dealing with the sale of property for delinquent taxes, to provide that county 
collectors need not continue to offer mineral rights for sale if those rights 
have not been sold or confirmed after 10 consecutive years of being offered for 
sale. Section 10, the provision at issue in this case, has no connection 
whatsoever with mineral rights, delinquent taxes, or the Property Tax Code. 
Section 10 merely amends the Code of Civil Procedure's rule governing execution 
of judgments against land held in tenancy by the entirety to clarify that the 
general rule prohibiting such executions is inapplicable where
Because the execution of judgments against land held in tenancy by the 
entirety is wholly unrelated to a county collector's sale of mineral rights for 
delinquent taxes, Public Act 90-514 is invalid under the single subject rule and 
should not be applied. No contrary conclusion is possible unless we alter our 
interpretation of article IV, section 8(d), of the Illinois Constitution to 
eliminate the requirement that the provisions of a bill bear a legitimate 
relation to one another. We did that once in Arangold, and it was a 
mistake. Having just resuscitated the requirement in 
Cervantes, we should not jettison it again here. Our decisions will be 
useless as precedent if we persist in changing the law with each successive 
case.
Even if I agreed with the majority's current interpretation of the single 
subject rule, I still could not endorse its application of the rule here. 
Sections 5 and 10 of Public Act 90-514 not only lack any legitimate relationship 
to one another, they have no natural and logical connection to a single subject. 
My colleagues' arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. They contend the 
provisions of the law are related to a single subject in the sense that they 
both pertain to "the subject of property." They might as well say that both 
provisions pertain to "money" or to "the law." A taxonomy so broad is useless. 
It robs article IV, section 8(d), of any real meaning.
In Feuhrmeyer v. City of Chicago, 57 Ill. 2d 193 (1974), our court 
considered the validity of a law which amended 30 statutes dealing with 
professional, vocational and occupational licensing and registration to specify 
that the power to regulate the various professions, vocations and occupations 
covered by those statutes was vested solely in the state. We held that the 
challenged law could not be construed as pertaining to a single subject. In our 
view, each of the 30 individual laws involved dealt with a separate subject. 
Accordingly, we ruled that the law violated the single subject rule under 
article IV, section 8(d), and was invalid. Fuehrmeyer, 57 Ill. 2d  at 
203-05. 
If the statutes at issue in Fuehrmeyer did not share a common 
subject, we cannot seriously contend that a common subject unites sections 5 and 
10 of Public Act 90-514. The relationship between those provisions is far more 
attenuated than the relationship between the provisions at issue in 
Fuehrmeyer. Contrary to the majority, I believe that Public Act 
90-514's inclusion of so varied and discordant a pair of provisions represents 
precisely the sort of legislative "logrolling" article IV, section 8(d), of our 
constitution was designed to prohibit.
Because Public Act 90-514 is unconstitutional, our court should decide this 
case in accordance with the law in effect prior to the statute's enactment. 
Based upon that law, I would affirm the appellate court's judgment reversing the 
dismissal of plaintiff's complaint. Although the preamendment version of section 
12-112 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/12-112 (West 1994)) provides 
that property held in tenancy by the entirety "shall not be liable to be sold 
upon judgment entered *** against only one of the tenants," the protection 
afforded by this rule is subject to the provisions of the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act (740 ILCS 160/1 et seq. (West 1994)). Accordingly, if a 
debtor has conveyed his personal residence to himself and his spouse as tenants 
by the entirety, a creditor can have the conveyance set aside if, as alleged in 
this case, the debtor made the transfer or incurred the debt "with actual intent 
to hinder, delay, or defraud" any creditor. 740 ILCS 160/5(a)(1) (West 1994). 
See In re Marriage of Del Giudice, 287 Ill. App. 3d 215 (1997).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court should be 
affirmed and the cause should be remanded for further proceedings. Because 
Public Act 90-514 is invalid, there is no need to direct the circuit court to 
afford plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended complaint under Public Act 
90-514's amendment to section 12-112 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
JUSTICE HEIPLE joins in this partial concurrence and partial 
dissent.