Title: Podieh v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Yaw Poku Podieh v. State, No. 31, September Term, 2019 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL — 
ACTUAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST — PRESUMPTION OF PREJUDICE — The 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights guarantee criminal defendants the right to effective assistance of 
counsel.  Effective assistance of counsel includes conflict-free representation.  In this case, 
where defense counsel is personally involved in litigation, and a witness to that proceeding 
is also the arresting officer in counsel’s client’s unrelated criminal case, a conflict of 
interest exists.  Under Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), an actual conflict of interest 
that adversely affects the representation is presumptively prejudicial.  In Taylor v. State, 
428 Md. 386 (2012), we adopted the three-prong test from Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d 348 
(4th Cir. 2001), to determine when a conflict of interest satisfies the Sullivan rule.  To 
satisfy the Mickens test, a petitioner must prove: (1) that there was a plausible alternative 
defense strategy that defense counsel might have pursued; (2) which was objectively 
reasonable under the facts of the case known to defense counsel; and (3) that defense 
counsel’s failure to pursue the strategy was linked to the conflict of interest.  As a matter 
of first impression, the Court holds that to determine when a link exists under the third 
prong of Mickens, a petitioner must demonstrate that the alternative defense strategy was 
inherently in conflict with counsel’s other loyalties or interests or that the alternative 
defense was forgone due to those other loyalties or interests.  The Court holds that 
Petitioner satisfied his burden under Mickens and demonstrated that his defense counsel 
labored under an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected the representation.
 
Circuit Court for Frederick County  
Case No. 10-K-15-057002 
Argued:  December 10, 2019 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 31 
 
September Term, 2019 
 
 
 
YAW POKU PODIEH 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
 
 
Barbera, C.J., 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty 
Booth 
Adkins, Sally D., 
 (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) 
 
 
               JJ. 
 
 
 
                 Opinion by Barbera, C.J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Filed: August 14, 2020 
 
 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act  
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document 
is authentic.
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk  
Suzanne Johnson
2020-08-14 10:43-04:00
 
We consider in the present case what combination of facts and circumstances, and 
actions or inactions on the part of counsel while representing a defendant in a criminal 
matter, constitute a conflict of interest that is presumed prejudicial, thereby entitling the 
defendant to a new trial.  The test for determining such a conflict is found in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  Under Strickland, a criminal defendant may receive a 
new trial based on an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel.  In the typical case 
involving such a challenge, the defendant is required to demonstrate both that counsel’s 
performance was deficient and that such performance prejudiced the defense.  Id. at 687.  
This general rule, however, has an exception: “The defendant is excused from proving the 
prejudice prong of the Strickland test upon a showing that counsel was ‘burdened by an 
actual conflict of interest,’ that is, the conflict is one that ‘actually affected the adequacy 
of [defense counsel’s] representation.’”  Taylor v. State, 428 Md. 386, 391 (2012) (quoting 
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349–50 (1980) (internal citation omitted)).  If the 
defendant carries that burden, then “prejudice to the outcome of trial is presumed.”  Id. 
Following Strickland, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
articulated a three-part test to determine when a conflict of interest of the sort identified in 
Sullivan is both “actual” and has an “adverse impact” upon the defendant’s constitutional 
entitlement to effective assistance, therefore satisfying the Sullivan rule.  See Mickens v. 
Taylor, 240 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2001), aff’d, Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002).  Under 
the Fourth Circuit’s test in Mickens, the defendant must establish: (1) a plausible alternative 
defense tactic that counsel could have pursued; (2) that the tactic was objectively 
reasonable under the circumstances; and (3) that there exists a link between the conflict 
2 
 
and the failure to pursue the tactic.  Id. at 361.  This Court adopted the Mickens three-prong 
test in Taylor v. State, 428 Md. 386 (2012).  The question asked in the matter now before 
us is whether the third prong of the Mickens test is satisfied if the convicted defendant 
establishes either: that the alternative defense strategy was inherently in conflict with 
counsel’s other loyalties or interests; or that the alternative defense was forgone due to 
those other loyalties or interests.   
This case arises from a petition for post-conviction relief filed by Petitioner, Yaw 
Poku Podieh, in the Circuit Court for Frederick County.  Petitioner asserted that he did not 
receive effective assistance of counsel as required by the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  The petition was 
based on, among other things, two issues now before this Court: (1) defense counsel’s 
alleged conflict of interest with a police officer involved in the case; and (2) counsel’s 
failure to inform Petitioner about the immigration consequences of pleading guilty to 
possession of heroin with intent to distribute.  The post-conviction court granted Petitioner 
relief based on that court’s finding an actual conflict of interest but denied relief on all 
other grounds.  The State appealed the grant of relief on the conflict of interest issue, and 
Petitioner appealed the denial of relief on the immigration consequences issue.  Reversing 
in part and affirming in part, the Court of Special Appeals held in an unreported opinion 
that neither the asserted conflict of interest nor the immigration advice amounted to 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  We issued a writ of certiorari and now hold that defense 
counsel’s conflict of interest rendered his representation of Petitioner constitutionally 
3 
 
deficient under the Sixth Amendment and Article 21.  Because we hold that Petitioner’s 
counsel rendered ineffective assistance based on the conflict of interest, we need not, and 
consequently do not, address whether the immigration advice given to Petitioner was also 
constitutionally deficient. 
I. 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
Three cases form the foundation of the petition for post-conviction relief.  Two are 
interrelated criminal cases stemming from a traffic stop of Petitioner and a subsequent 
search of his girlfriend’s residence.  The third is a civil suit against Petitioner’s defense 
counsel that was related to a divorce proceeding involving the police officer who initiated 
the traffic stop. 
A.   Underlying Cases 
1.   The Traffic Stop Case 
On February 10, 2015, Deputy Sheriff Michael David Ensor (“Deputy Ensor”) 
stopped Petitioner for exceeding the posted speed limit.  Upon approaching the vehicle, 
Deputy Ensor detected the odor of marijuana.  Deputy Ensor asked Petitioner if he was in 
possession of marijuana, and Petitioner admitted to having “a little weed” in his pocket.  
Based on the odor and Petitioner’s statement, Deputy Ensor conducted a search of 
Petitioner and the vehicle.  The search revealed marijuana on Petitioner’s person, two 
cellphones, and four small bags of heroin in the vehicle’s center console.  Deputy Ensor 
arrested Petitioner, and he was charged with possession of a controlled dangerous 
4 
 
substance and possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute.  
Petitioner hired John R. Discavage, Esquire, to represent him. 
Following the traffic stop, Deputy Sheriff Brian Elliot (“Deputy Elliot”) obtained a 
search warrant for the cellphones recovered from the vehicle search.1  Text message 
exchanges on the cellphones indicated to Deputy Elliot that Petitioner was engaged in 
narcotics distribution.  Additionally, Petitioner placed phone calls while he was detained 
in jail following the traffic stop, and recordings of those phone calls captured Petitioner 
discussing drugs, which Deputy Elliot believed to be either marijuana or heroin.  
Following Petitioner’s release from detention, Deputy Elliot obtained a GPS warrant 
for Petitioner’s vehicle and tracked his whereabouts.  On July 8, 2015, Deputy Elliot 
observed Petitioner dispose of garbage and conducted a “trash pull.”2  Deputy Elliot 
“recovered a small blunt containing suspected marijuana, an altered freezer bag that is 
commonly used to package narcotics, two calling cards which are also common with 
individuals using disposable ‘[d]rop’ phones for purposes of distributing narcotics, and 
loose cigar guts located throughout the bag of trash.”  A field test of the blunt returned 
                                              
1 It is not clear from the record whether Deputy Ensor was involved in Deputy 
Elliott’s obtaining and executing the warrants in the search warrant case.  We are left to 
surmise that the traffic stop performed by Deputy Ensor precipitated the subsequent 
searches performed by Deputy Elliott.  If either or both of Petitioner’s criminal cases had 
gone to trial, Deputy Ensor would likely have been called to testify about his encounter 
with Petitioner at the traffic stop. 
 
2 Garbage left in public or beside a street is not protected against warrantless 
searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment.  See California v. Greenwood, 486 
U.S. 35, 40 (1988). 
5 
 
positive for marijuana.  On July 16, 2015, Deputy Elliot conducted a second trash pull at 
the residence of Brittney Sewell, Petitioner’s girlfriend, and more evidence of marijuana 
possession was recovered.  Deputy Elliot applied for a search warrant for Ms. Sewell’s 
residence, where Petitioner spent his nights, and described the traffic stop case, electronic 
communications, and trash pulls in his affidavit.   
2.   The Search Warrant Case 
On July 17, 2015, Deputy Elliot obtained a warrant to search Ms. Sewell’s 
residence, and on July 21, 2015, he conducted the search.  The search produced 
approximately ten grams of heroin in ten individually-wrapped bags, 4.1 grams of 
marijuana, a marijuana grinder, a digital scale, and $654 located throughout the residence.  
Petitioner was subsequently charged with possession of a controlled dangerous substance, 
possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute, possession of drug 
paraphernalia, and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.  Petitioner hired Mr. 
Discavage to represent him in the search warrant case, as well as the traffic stop case. 
3.   The Civil Lawsuit Involving Mr. Discavage 
Deputy Ensor and his then-wife, Ms. Ensor, divorced in 2012.  Mr. Discavage 
jointly represented the Ensors in their divorce proceedings and handled their settlement 
agreement.  Ms. Ensor filed a lawsuit against Mr. Discavage in March 2015 for negligence, 
breach of fiduciary duty, intentional misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation 
related to Mr. Discavage’s handling of their divorce.  The complaint alleged that Mr. 
Discavage favored Deputy Ensor in the divorce proceedings by understating Deputy 
6 
 
Ensor’s income or failing to verify his income.  Ms. Ensor sought approximately $75,000 
in damages.  Discovery in the civil suit continued through early 2016, and the case was 
dismissed by stipulation on March 14, 2016.  
B.   Circuit Court Proceedings 
Petitioner’s traffic stop case was set for pre-trial conference on July 10, 2015.  Mr. 
Discavage requested a continuance to resolve some of the immigration issues because 
Petitioner is not a United States citizen.  The case was continued to August 7, 2015.  On 
August 7, 2015, Mr. Discavage requested a second continuance in light of the search 
warrant case and attendant charges.  The traffic stop case resumed on September 25, 2015, 
and Mr. Discavage and the Assistant State’s Attorney in that case, Ms. Roldan, jointly 
requested that a plea hearing on the traffic stop case be set for the same day as the pre-trial 
conference for the search warrant case.  The circuit court granted the request. 
The traffic stop case resumed on November 16, 2015.  At that time, Mr. Discavage 
requested another continuance because he and Mr. Craven, the Assistant State’s Attorney 
in the search warrant case, were in the process of negotiating “some type of global 
agreement” on the traffic stop case and the search warrant case.   
On November 23, 2015, Petitioner entered a conditional Alford plea in the traffic 
stop case to possession of a controlled dangerous substance, which was contingent upon a 
global resolution of both the traffic stop case and the search warrant case.  It was 
contemplated that if Petitioner and the State reached a global resolution of the two cases, 
Petitioner would withdraw his Alford plea and the State would enter nolle prosequi on the 
7 
 
charges from the traffic stop case.  The State set forth the facts it would have proven had 
the traffic stop case gone to trial.  Deputy Ensor would have been called to testify about 
initiating the traffic stop, detecting the odor of marijuana, searching Petitioner and the 
vehicle, and recovering four bags of heroin.   
The sentencing hearing on the traffic stop case was scheduled to occur on January 
8, 2016.  A few days before that scheduled hearing, Mr. Discavage received a plea offer 
and additional discovery materials from the State, prompting him to request a continuance 
of the sentencing hearing.  At that time, Mr. Discavage explained to the court that the 
continuance was necessary because the global plea was still being negotiated and there was 
a “potential conflict.”  Assistant State’s Attorney Craven was not at the sentencing hearing.  
The following colloquy occurred out of Petitioner’s earshot: 
The Court: 
 
What’s the other case? 
 
Mr. Discavage: 
The other case is . . . where’s the case number, it’s . . . 
57002. 
 
The Court:     
Five seven? 
 
Mr. Discavage:    
Zero, zero, two.  Because the additional discovery poses 
a potential conflict.  I don’t know that I need to deal with 
that, but . . . 
 
The Court:     
Not without Mr. Craven here. 
 
Mr. Discavage:    
A personal conflict, a personal conflict with one of the 
witnesses that’s involved in this case.  So I’d, that’s the– 
 
The Court:     
Well, let’s– 
 
Mr. Discavage:   
–additional . . . 
 
8 
 
The Court:     
Why don’t you and Mr. Craven go talk? 
 
Mr. Discavage:    
Yeah.  We’re gonna intend, we’re gonna keep talking  
 
 
 
between now and Monday and hopefully we– 
 
The Court:     
And about the problem too– 
 
Mr. Discavage:    
–can come to some type of resolution. 
 
The Court:     
All right. 
 
There is no indication in the record that Mr. Discavage informed Mr. Craven about the 
“potential” conflict of interest or took any further action on the matter.  
On January 12, 2016, Petitioner pleaded guilty in the search warrant case (case 
number 57002) to possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance.  
As a result, the conditional Alford plea was withdrawn, and the State entered nolle prosequi 
on all the other charges from both the traffic stop case and the search warrant case.  
Petitioner was sentenced to ten years’ incarceration with all but 179 days suspended.  
Once convicted and sentenced, Petitioner became automatically deportable.  See 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a) (“Any alien . . . in and admitted to the United States shall, upon the order 
of the Attorney General, be removed if the alien … [has been] convicted of an aggravated 
felony at any time after admission . . .”).  To avoid deportation during the pendency of his 
post-conviction proceedings, Petitioner filed a motion for modification of sentence.  The 
court granted the motion and sentenced Petitioner to ten years’ incarceration with all but 
eighteen months suspended.  
9 
 
C.   Post-Conviction Proceedings and Appeal 
Petitioner, through new defense counsel, Ms. Michelle Martz, filed a petition for 
post-conviction relief on August 1, 2016.  Petitioner alleged seven grounds in support of 
the claim that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel, two of which he raises 
here: (1) Mr. Discavage and Petitioner’s separate immigration counsel, Mary Ann Shoff, 
misadvised him of the immigration consequences of his plea agreement; and (2) Mr. 
Discavage failed to disclose a personal conflict of interest. 
On January 18 and 19, 2017, the Circuit Court for Frederick County held a hearing 
on the petition for post-conviction relief.  Petitioner first testified about the immigration 
advice he was given.  Petitioner claimed that neither Mr. Discavage nor Ms. Shoff advised 
him that pleading guilty to possession with intent to distribute heroin is an aggravated 
felony.  Aggravated felonies lead to automatic deportation without the opportunity to have 
a hearing.  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (“The Attorney General may cancel removal in the case 
of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien . . . has not 
been convicted of an aggravated felony.”).  
Petitioner then testified about Mr. Discavage’s alleged conflict of interest.  
Petitioner testified that Mr. Discavage had disclosed to the circuit court at the anticipated 
sentencing hearing on January 8, 2016, that there was a potential conflict of interest in 
Petitioner’s case.  However, Mr. Discavage did not inform Petitioner of that conflict.  It 
was not until Petitioner received a copy of the circuit court transcripts that he became aware 
10 
 
of the conflict.  Petitioner averred that the conflict of interest prevented Mr. Discavage 
from providing effective assistance of counsel.   
At the post-conviction hearing, Mr. Discavage revealed for the first time that the 
conflict of interest involved Deputy Ensor, the arresting officer in the traffic stop case.3  
The following transpired on direct examination: 
Ms. Martz: 
What was your reasoning for, what was the conflict 
when you told Mr., when you told the judge that there 
was a personal conflict? 
 
Mr. Discavage: 
Conflict with a witness in a case that was being nolle 
prossed or that the State was dismissing.  They were not, 
that was the, that was the conflict.  It was a, it was a 
separate case, separate and apart from this case. 
 
Ms. Martz: 
But who was the person that you had a conflict with that 
you determined wasn’t a conflict? 
 
Mr. Discavage: 
The pers – who is the person that I was considering  
 
 
 
 
potentially– 
 
Ms. Martz: 
 
Mmm-hmm– 
 
Mr. Discavage: 
–to be a conflict?  Deputy Ensor. 
 
Ms. Martz: 
Deputy Ensor.  And Deputy Ensor was a, was a witness 
for the State? 
 
Mr. Discavage: 
Correct. 
 
Ms. Martz: 
And was the arresting officer in the car stop case, 
correct? 
 
Mr. Discavage: 
Correct. 
                                              
3 During her opening remarks, Petitioner’s new defense counsel explained that 
“Discavage still hasn’t really told me [what the conflict was], except that I believe 
inferentially he had . . . an interest in representing the seizing officer in this case.” 
11 
 
 
When questioned about the conflict of interest, Mr. Discavage posited that his 
relationship with Deputy Ensor posed a potential conflict, but the conflict never manifested 
because the traffic stop case did not go to trial.  In his recitation of events, he testified that 
the plea offer in the search warrant case was received on January 5, 2016, and that three 
days later he informed the circuit court that additional discovery materials transmitted with 
the plea offer posed a personal conflict.  Mr. Discavage further testified that he did not 
discuss the conflict with the court after the sentencing hearing on January 8, 2016.  Mr. 
Discavage also acknowledged that he never mentioned to Petitioner that he had a personal 
conflict of interest involving Deputy Ensor.   
In describing the nature of the relationship, Mr. Discavage explained that he 
represented Deputy Ensor in a divorce case several years prior to his representation of 
Petitioner.  Although the divorce was finalized, “there was still potential litigation with the 
parties to that case” at the time Petitioner hired Mr. Discavage.  The circuit court pressed 
Mr. Discavage on the issue: 
The Court: 
. . . But anyway, the bottom line is you, you thought 
there was a conflict, you mentioned it.  But that case 
where he was a witness got nolle prossed and therefore 
your belief was the conflict ended. 
 
Mr. Discavage: 
As, correct.  As well as the civil case that was pending 
that was being dismissed. 
 
The Court: 
Oh, really?  So, okay, so the civil case got dismissed, 
the other one got nolle prossed.  Conflict ends. 
 
Mr. Discavage: 
Correct– 
 
12 
 
The Court: 
 
In your opinion.  
 
 
Petitioner’s counsel questioned Mr. Discavage regarding his failure to inform 
Petitioner of the conflict.  Mr. Discavage responded that if the traffic stop case went to 
trial, he would have brought the conflict to Petitioner’s attention.  Mr. Discavage explained 
that because “the case was dismissed it wasn’t an issue that [they] had to deal with.”  Mr. 
Discavage also testified that the search warrant case―in which Deputy Ensor was not 
directly involved―was at the forefront of the plea negotiations.  Additionally, Deputy 
Ensor was not a party to the separate civil suit against Mr. Discavage.  
Because the conflict of interest issue was not exposed until the post-conviction 
hearing, the court reserved making a ruling on the issue to allow the parties to investigate 
the conflict.  The post-conviction hearing resumed on February 21, 2017.  The investigation 
revealed that Deputy Ensor’s ex-wife, Sarah Ensor, sued Mr. Discavage on March 17, 
2015, for issues arising from Mr. Discavage’s representation of the Ensors in their divorce 
proceedings.  Discovery in the lawsuit against Mr. Discavage overlapped with Mr. 
Discavage’s representation of Petitioner and was ongoing as late as January 2016. 
Additionally, prior to filing the case against Mr. Discavage, Ms. Ensor filed a 
Petition to Modify Custody and Child Support on June 11, 2014.  Deputy Ensor retained 
Mr. Discavage to represent him in that proceeding on July 31, 2014.  Ms. Ensor, through 
counsel, objected to Mr. Discavage representing Deputy Ensor in the custody and child 
support proceeding.  Ms. Ensor argued that Mr. Discavage’s having previously represented 
the Ensors in their divorce created a conflict of interest.  Mr. Discavage withdrew from 
13 
 
representation.  Privilege logs divulge, however, that Mr. Discavage remained in contact 
with Deputy Ensor and his subsequent counsel at least through March 31, 2015.  Petitioner 
retained Mr. Discavage in February 2015.  
D.   The Post-Conviction Court’s Decision   
In a written order dated April 4, 2017, the court granted Petitioner post-conviction 
relief.  The court based its decision on its finding that Mr. Discavage had labored under a 
conflict of interest resulting from, at the pertinent time, his simultaneous involvement in 
two separate matters, both of which involved Deputy Ensor.  The court found that at the 
same time Mr. Discavage was the named defendant in Ms. Ensor’s then-pending 
lawsuit―in which Deputy Ensor likely would have been a fact witness―he was also 
Petitioner’s defense counsel in the two criminal cases.  The court reasoned that, but for the 
“global resolution” of those cases, it was virtually inevitable that Mr. Discavage would 
have filed both a motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the traffic stop case and a 
similar motion in the search warrant case.  
In comparing the timeline of the civil suit against Mr. Discavage to the timeline in 
Petitioner’s criminal cases, the court found that key events in those cases overlapped.  For 
example, Ms. Ensor’s complaint against Mr. Discavage was filed in March 2015, and the 
traffic stop case was transferred to circuit court from district court in May 2015 following 
a jury trial prayer.  In October 2015, the court in the civil suit issued a scheduling order.  
The following month, Petitioner entered a conditional plea in the traffic stop case.  On 
January 7, 2016, Ms. Ensor filed a Motion to Quash Subpoena and for Protective Order.  
14 
 
The next day, Mr. Discavage alluded to the court at Petitioner’s sentencing hearing on the 
traffic stop case that there was “a potential conflict.”  Petitioner accepted the global plea in 
the traffic stop case and search warrant case on January 12, 2016, and the civil suit was 
dismissed by stipulation two months later. 
Based on the foregoing, the post-conviction court found that an actual conflict of 
interest existed.  The court emphasized that the ongoing relationship between Mr. 
Discavage and Deputy Ensor formed the foundation of the conflict of interest: Deputy 
Ensor was subpoenaed to produce documents and give a deposition in the civil suit and 
likely would have been a fact witness.  The court found that “during the time Mr. Discavage 
was representing Petitioner, Mr. Discavage was engaged in litigation where maintaining a 
positive [rapport] with Deputy Ensor was in Mr. Discavage’s best interest.”  The court 
further found that because of that conflict, Mr. Discavage did not inform Petitioner about 
his connection to Deputy Ensor, nor did he present Petitioner with the opportunity to waive 
the conflict. 
The post-conviction court then turned to whether Petitioner was entitled to relief 
based on the conflict.  The court cited Sullivan, pertinent language from which the Supreme 
Court repeated in Strickland.  The post-conviction court also looked to this Court’s decision 
in Taylor v. State, 428 Md. 386, 410 (2012).  The court noted the presumed prejudice 
exception described in Sullivan, Strickland, and Taylor and understood from those cases 
that prejudice is presumed when a defendant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel based 
on an attorney’s personal conflict of interest, and that conflict affected the attorney’s 
15 
 
performance.  The court further noted that this Court, in Taylor, adopted the three-part test 
set forth by the Fourth Circuit in Mickens v. Taylor to determine if the conflict of interest 
had an adverse impact on the representation, thus warranting a presumption of prejudice.  
240 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2001). 
Under Mickens, the petitioner must establish: (1) “a plausible alternative defense 
strategy or tactic that his defense counsel might have pursued;” (2) “that the alternative 
strategy or tactic was objectively reasonable under the facts of the case known to the 
attorney;” and (3) “that the defense counsel’s failure to pursue that strategy or tactic was 
linked to the actual conflict.”  Id. at 361.  If that test is satisfied, then the petitioner is 
entitled to a presumption of prejudice.   
The post-conviction court found in the present case that Petitioner established those 
three elements.  First, Mr. Discavage failed to file a motion to suppress evidence in either 
of Petitioner’s criminal cases.  Filing such a motion was an alternative, available tactic, 
thus satisfying the first element.  Second, filing a motion would have been reasonable under 
the circumstances because such filings are the standard practice when a defendant is 
charged with drug possession.4 
With regard to the third element of the Mickens test, the post-conviction court found 
that Mr. Discavage’s failure to file a suppression motion was linked to his conflict with 
                                              
4 As we shall see later in this opinion, the parties appear not to quarrel seriously over 
the court’s determination of the first and second Mickens prongs.  It is therefore upon the 
third prong of the Mickens test and its application to the instant matter that we devote our 
attention.   
16 
 
Deputy Ensor.  The inherent conflict existed in simultaneously challenging the underlying 
traffic stop in the criminal case and relying on Deputy Ensor as a fact witness in Ms. 
Ensor’s civil suit against Mr. Discavage.  The court reasoned that in the two criminal cases 
against Petitioner, Mr. Discavage’s filing suppression motions almost invariably would 
have led, at a subsequent hearing, to Deputy Ensor testifying for the State and being 
subjected to cross-examination by Mr. Discavage.  “Deputy Ensor was a witness in the 
case against Mr. Discavage, where Mr. Discavage would be counting on the very things he 
would place in question during cross-examination,” such as “his recollection of events, his 
judgments, and potentially his character.”  Having determined that a conflict of interest 
existed, and that Petitioner met his burden under Mickens, as adopted in Taylor, the court 
granted the petition for post-conviction relief.5 
E.   The Court of Special Appeals’ Decision 
In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the decision of the 
post-conviction court and held that the conflict of interest was merely potential, not actual.  
State v. Podieh, No. 560, Sept. Term 2017, 2019 WL 1643777 (April 16, 2019).  The 
intermediate appellate court determined that the conflict of interest was only potential, and 
therefore not entitled to a presumption of prejudice, because no evidence supported the 
finding that Mr. Discavage needed to maintain a positive rapport with Deputy Ensor.  Id. 
at *9.  Rather, the circuit court’s finding that an actual conflict of interest existed was 
conclusory.  Id. at *10.  The Court of Special Appeals reiterated that “a ‘mere theoretical 
                                              
5 The court denied the six remaining grounds for relief in the petition. 
17 
 
conflict of interest’ does not violate a defendant’s right to counsel.”  Id. (quoting Catala v. 
State, 168 Md. App. 438, 460 (2006)). 
The Court of Special Appeals further held that even if there was an actual conflict 
of interest, Petitioner did not satisfy the third prong of Mickens—that the alternative 
defense strategy and the conflict of interest were linked.  Id.  Contrary to the circuit court’s 
ruling, the Court of Special Appeals determined that refraining from filing a motion to 
suppress, or from pursuing any other defense strategy proposed by Petitioner during the 
post-conviction process, may have been a reasonable course of conduct under the 
circumstances.  Id. at *11.  The Court of Special Appeals reasoned that there was 
insufficient evidence in the record from which to infer that Mr. Discavage was concerned 
about Deputy Ensor providing damaging testimony as a fact witness in the civil suit, such 
that Mr. Discavage would avoid cross-examining Deputy Ensor in the traffic stop case.  Id. 
at *9.  Therefore, Petitioner did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a conflict 
of interest between Mr. Discavage and Deputy Ensor was linked to Mr. Discavage’s 
defense tactics.  Id. at *12. 
We issued a writ of certiorari to address Petitioner’s claims of error on the part of 
the Court of Special Appeals, and hereby reverse the decision of that court.   
II. 
Standard of Review 
A post-conviction court’s finding on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim poses 
a mixed question of law and fact.  State v. Syed, 463 Md. 60, 73 (2019).  The factual 
18 
 
findings are reviewed for clear error, and the legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.  
Newton v. State, 455 Md. 341, 351–52 (2017).   
III. 
Discussion 
To resolve the ineffective assistance of counsel claim in this case, we must 
determine if there was an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected Mr. Discavage’s 
representation of Petitioner in the two criminal cases, thereby rendering constitutionally 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Criminal defendants are guaranteed the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.6  
The right to counsel means “the right to effective assistance of counsel.”  Duvall v. State, 
399 Md. 210, 221 (2007) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
                                              
6 The Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”  The right is 
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335, 343–44 (1963).   
 
Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights declares:  
 
That in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right to be informed of 
the accusation against him; to have a copy of the Indictment, or charge, in 
due time (if required) to prepare for his defence; to be allowed counsel; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have process for his witnesses; 
to examine the witnesses for and against him on oath; and to a speedy trial 
by an impartial jury, without whose unanimous consent he ought not to be 
found guilty. 
19 
 
A.   Presumption of Prejudice Under Strickland and Sullivan 
In the seminal case Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme 
Court set forth a two-part test to determine when counsel’s actions violate a defendant’s 
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.  First, the defendant bears the burden 
of showing “that counsel’s performance was deficient.” Id. at 687.  To prevail on the 
“performance” prong, the defendant must demonstrate “that counsel made errors so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment.”  Id.  Counsel performs deficiently when “the facts of the particular case, 
viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct,” reveal that counsel’s acts or omissions fell 
“outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.”  Id. at 690.   
Under the second prong of the Strickland test, “the defendant must show that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defense.”  Id. at 687.  The second, “prejudice” prong 
is satisfied upon a showing “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Id. at 694.   
The Strickland Court recognized an exception to the two-prong test when the 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is premised on an actual conflict of interest.  The 
Strickland Court explained:  
Actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is legally 
presumed to result in prejudice. So are various kinds of state interference 
with counsel’s assistance.  Prejudice in these circumstances is so likely that 
case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is not worth the cost.  Moreover, such 
circumstances involve impairments of the Sixth Amendment right that are 
20 
 
easy to identify and, for that reason and because the prosecution is directly 
responsible, easy for the government to prevent. 
 
One type of actual ineffectiveness claim warrants a similar, though 
more limited, presumption of prejudice.  In Cuyler v. Sullivan,  . . . the Court 
held that prejudice is presumed when counsel is burdened by an actual 
conflict of interest.  In those circumstances, counsel breaches the duty of 
loyalty, perhaps the most basic of counsel’s duties.  Moreover, it is difficult 
to measure the precise effect on the defense of representation corrupted by 
conflicting interests.  Given the obligation of counsel to avoid conflicts of 
interest and the ability of trial courts to make early inquiry in certain 
situations likely to give rise to conflicts, . . . it is reasonable for the criminal 
justice system to maintain a fairly rigid rule of presumed prejudice for 
conflicts of interest.  Even so, the rule is not quite the per se rule of prejudice 
that exists for the Sixth Amendment claims mentioned above.  Prejudice is 
presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel actively 
represented conflicting interests and that an actual conflict of interest 
adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.  
 
Id. at 692 (citations and quotations omitted). 
The Strickland Court looked to Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), in 
recognizing the “presumed prejudice” exception to the prejudice prong.  Id.  Sullivan 
involved an alleged conflict of interest arising from the representation of three separately-
tried co-defendants by two private attorneys.  446 U.S. at 337–38.  The Court was asked to 
decide if the possibility of a conflict of interest establishes that the defendant was denied 
the right to effective assistance of counsel.  Id. at 345.  Answering in the negative, the 
Sullivan Court explained that when the defendant raises no objection at trial to the conflict,7 
                                              
7 There is a separate standard when the defendant notifies the court in a timely 
manner about a possible conflict of interest.  That factual scenario was addressed by this 
Court in Lettley v. State, 358 Md. 26, 38–39 (2000): 
 
 
21 
 
the defendant is charged with “demonstrat[ing] that an actual conflict of interest adversely 
affected his lawyer’s performance.”  Id. at 348.  The Sullivan Court held that “a defendant 
who shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation 
need not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief.”  Id. at 349–50.   
Sullivan left open the question of the defendant’s burden of proof including, 
specifically, whether the defendant must demonstrate an adverse effect on counsel’s 
representation in addition to the existence of the conflict.  That question was answered in 
Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002).  The Supreme Court held that an actual conflict 
of interest is not “something separate and apart from adverse effect.”  Id. at 172 n.5.  The 
precise question before the Mickens Court focused on “the effect of a trial court’s failure 
to inquire into a potential conflict upon the Sullivan rule that deficient performance of 
counsel must be shown.”  Id. at 174. 
This Court adopted, in Taylor v. State, 428 Md. 386 (2012), the Fourth Circuit’s 
three-part standard from Mickens to determine the existence of an adverse effect.  This 
standard is discussed in greater detail below. 
                                              
[When] the trial court is not advised of the conflict in a timely manner, the 
[Sullivan] standard applies.  In order to establish a violation of the Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show 
that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s 
performance.  On the other hand, when the defendant advises the trial court 
of the possibility of a conflict of interest, the Glasser/Holloway standard 
applies.  “[A] court confronted with and alerted to possible conflicts of 
interest must take adequate steps to ascertain whether the conflicts warrant 
separate counsel.”  Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160, 108 S.Ct. 
1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). 
 
22 
 
B.   Actual Conflict and Adverse Impact Under Mickens and Taylor 
While Mickens principally addressed an issue not relevant to the instant case, the 
Supreme Court remarked that “the Sullivan standard is not properly read as requiring 
inquiry into actual conflict as something separate and apart from adverse effect.  An ‘actual 
conflict,’ for Sixth Amendment purposes, is a conflict of interest that adversely affects 
counsel’s performance.”  Mickens, 535 U.S. at 172 n.5.  The presumption of prejudice will 
not arise unless the defendant establishes that “the conflict has significantly affected 
counsel’s performance.”  Id. at 173. 
The presumption of prejudice when an actual conflict of interest exists, as detailed 
in Sullivan, Strickland, and in both Mickens decisions, was evaluated by this Court in 
Taylor v. State.  In Taylor, the defendant raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
on collateral review premised on a conflict of interest.  428 Md. at 396.  The alleged conflict 
resulted from the defendant’s lawyer suing his client—the defendant—for unpaid legal fees 
during the representation without obtaining the client’s informed consent.  Id.  We held 
that a conflict of interest arises where counsel sues his client for unpaid legal fees 
concomitantly with the representation.  Id. at 410.  By suing the client while the 
representation was on-going, the relationship between counsel and client became 
adversarial.  Id.  That type of conflict prompted the same concerns surrounding conflicts 
arising from the representation of multiple clients, and thus similarly warranted a 
presumption of prejudice.  Id.  “This is because the precise degree of prejudice to the 
outcome of the trial that could result from an actual attorney-created conflict is too difficult 
23 
 
to determine, and the right to effective assistance of counsel, pursuant to both the Sixth 
Amendment and Article 21, remains too fundamental to risk.”  Id.  Having determined that 
the type of conflict in Taylor may be entitled to a presumption of prejudice, we were then 
left to decide whether the defendant met his burden of proof.  Id. at 411.   
The defendant needed to establish “that there was an actual conflict of interest in 
order for prejudice to the defense to be presumed.”  Id.  We looked to Mickens for the 
definition of actual conflict: a conflict that adversely affects counsel’s representation of the 
defendant.  Id. (citing Mickens, 535 U.S. at 172 n.5).  That is a circumstance-specific 
inquiry.  Id. at 413.  In its opinion, the post-conviction court relied upon the Maryland 
Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7 in concluding that a conflict of interest 
existed.8  Id. at 411, 415.  But, because the post-conviction court did not analyze the case-
specific facts to determine whether the conflict had an adverse impact on the 
representation, the case was remanded for further proceedings.  Id. at 415–16.  We directed 
the court to utilize the three-prong test set forth in Mickens to determine if the conflict of 
interest adversely affected counsel’s performance.  Id. at 416.  Under that test, the 
defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence: 
(1) a plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic that his defense counsel 
might have pursued; 
 
(2) that the alternative strategy or tactic was objectively reasonable under the 
facts of the case known to the attorney; and 
 
                                              
8 On July 1, 2016, the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct were 
renamed the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) and were 
recodified, without substantive changes, to Title 19 of the Maryland Rules. 
24 
 
(3) that the defense counsel’s failure to pursue that strategy or tactic was 
linked to the actual conflict. 
 
Id. (quoting Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d 348, 361 (4th Cir. 2001), aff’d without 
consideration of this point, 535 U.S. 162 (2002)) (quotation marks removed).  
C.   The Instant Matter 
Petitioner argues that Mr. Discavage’s performance amounted to ineffective 
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment and Article 21 of the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights.  According to Petitioner, the deficient performance stemmed from 
Mr. Discavage’s on-going relationship with Deputy Ensor, which created a conflict of 
interest.  Petitioner asserts that a presumption of prejudice arose under the Sullivan rule—
thus warranting relief on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim—because there existed 
an actual conflict which adversely affected the representation, in satisfaction of the three-
prong Mickens test.  In response, the State argues that there is insufficient evidence 
supporting the inference that a conflict of interest existed, and even if a conflict existed, 
Petitioner did not establish a link between the conflict and Mr. Discavage’s deficient 
performance as required under the third prong of Mickens. 
For the presumption of prejudice to arise, Petitioner must prove that counsel labored 
under an actual conflict of interest.  See Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 349–50.  An actual conflict 
of interest is one that adversely affected counsel’s performance.  Mickens, 535 U.S. at 172 
n.5.  Whether a conflict of interest adversely affected counsel’s performance is determined 
by applying the test promulgated by the Fourth Circuit in Mickens.  240 F.3d at 361.   
25 
 
We begin by exploring whether Mr. Discavage labored under an actual conflict of 
interest.  Next, we evaluate whether that conflict adversely affected Mr. Discavage’s 
performance.  For reasons set forth below, we hold that Mr. Discavage’s on-going 
relationship with Deputy Ensor amounted to a conflict of interest, and that conflict 
adversely affected Mr. Discavage’s representation of Petitioner.  Therefore, Petitioner was 
denied effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment and Article 21. 
1.   Actual Conflict of Interest 
A conflict of interest arises when counsel is embroiled as a defendant in on-going 
litigation and one of the witnesses in that litigation is also the arresting officer in an 
unrelated criminal case involving counsel’s client.  This Court has repeatedly made clear 
that ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not exclusive to conflicts of interest 
stemming from the representation of multiple clients.  See Taylor, 428 Md. at 408–09; 
Duvall, 399 Md. at 237; and Lettley, 358 Md. at 34.  In Lettley, we explained that “the 
defendant’s right to conflict-free representation is not limited to situations involving 
multiple representation, but extends to any situation in which defense counsel owes 
conflicting duties to the defendant and some other third person.”  358 Md. at 34.  “Although 
conflicts of interest usually occur when an attorney represents multiple clients, . . . a 
conflict may also exist between an attorney’s private interests and those of the client.”  
United States v. Magini, 973 F.2d 261, 264 (4th Cir. 1992). 
The parties rely on the Fourth Circuit’s Mickens decision and the three-part test set 
forth therein.  In affirming the Fourth Circuit’s en banc decision, however, the Supreme 
26 
 
Court did not explicitly embrace the three-prong test outlined by the lower federal court.  
Instead, the Supreme Court clarified that “the Sullivan standard is not properly read as 
requiring inquiry into actual conflict as something separate and apart from adverse effect.  
An ‘actual conflict,’ for Sixth Amendment purposes, is a conflict of interest that adversely 
affects counsel’s performance.”  Mickens, 535 U.S. at 172 n.5.  The Supreme Court further 
noted that, under Sullivan, “the rule [to be] applied when the trial judge is not aware of the 
conflict (and thus not obligated to inquire) is that prejudice will be presumed only if the 
conflict has significantly affected counsel’s performance—thereby rendering the verdict 
unreliable, even though Strickland prejudice cannot be shown.”  Id. at 172–73. 
Petitioner argues that Mr. Discavage rendered ineffective assistance of counsel 
because Mr. Discavage labored under a conflict of interest as a result of Deputy Ensor’s 
involvement in Ms. Ensor’s civil suit against Mr. Discavage.  Mr. Discavage’s concurrent 
relationship with Deputy Ensor as a witness in both the civil suit and Petitioner’s criminal 
cases, at minimum, created a potential ethical conflict of interest under MARPC 19-301.7.  
We acknowledged in Taylor that an ethical violation premised on a conflict of interest does 
not conclusively establish that an actual conflict of interest existed for Sixth Amendment 
and Article 21 purposes.  428 Md. at 412.  It is, however, indicative of at least a potential 
conflict of interest.  The Rule states: 
(a) Except as provided in section (b) of this Rule, an attorney shall not 
represent a client if the representation involves a conflict of interest. A 
conflict of interest exists if: 
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another 
client; or 
27 
 
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more 
clients will be materially limited by the attorney’s responsibilities 
to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal 
interest of the attorney. 
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a conflict of interest under section (a) 
of this Rule, an attorney may represent a client if: 
(1) the attorney reasonably believes that the attorney will be able to 
provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client; 
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law; 
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one 
client against another client represented by the attorney in the same 
litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and 
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. 
 
MARPC 19-301.7 (emphasis added). 
Ms. Ensor’s civil suit alleging that Mr. Discavage favored Deputy Ensor in their 
divorce commenced in March 2015.  Mr. Discavage noted his appearance in the traffic stop 
case—in which Deputy Ensor was the arresting officer—in circuit court in May 2015 
following a jury trial prayer.  Petitioner entered his conditional plea in the traffic stop case 
in November 2015, and his global plea in the search warrant case in January 2016.  Ms. 
Ensor’s civil suit against Mr. Discavage did not end until March 2016.  Mr. Discavage 
never informed Petitioner about the civil suit and Deputy Ensor’s involvement as a witness 
in it even though the civil suit and criminal cases occurred simultaneously.  Despite 
MARPC 19-301.7 prohibiting counsel from representing a client when counsel’s personal 
conflict of interest poses a “significant risk that the representation . . . will be materially 
limited,” Mr. Discavage nonetheless represented Petitioner without his informed consent. 
More saliently, Mr. Discavage admitted to the trial court at the sentencing hearing 
on January 8, 2016, and at the subsequent post-conviction hearing that he had a conflict of 
28 
 
interest.  Yet, at the subsequent post-conviction hearing, Mr. Discavage testified that he 
believed the conflict of interest did not mature from a potential conflict to an actual conflict 
because the traffic stop case never went to trial. 
The global plea in the search warrant case did not absolve Mr. Discavage of the 
conflict of interest.  As the Supreme Court stated in Strickland, “[t]he purpose of the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary 
to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding.”  466 U.S. at 691–92; see also Mosley 
v. State, 378 Md. 548, 557 (2003) (“When a defendant is denied effective assistance of 
counsel, it is the integrity of the adversarial process that is compromised.”).  Mr. 
Discavage’s conflict of interest with Deputy Ensor casts doubt upon the integrity of the 
plea negotiations in both the traffic stop case and the search warrant case.  Deputy Ensor 
was subpoenaed as a fact witness and to produce documents in the civil suit against Mr. 
Discavage.  That created a concurrent conflict of interest because Mr. Discavage’s 
interactions with Deputy Ensor in Petitioner’s criminal cases could bleed into the civil suit 
and impact Mr. Discavage personally.  As such, Mr. Discavage’s loyalties were divided 
between his personal interests and those of Petitioner. 
The State argues that if there existed an actual conflict, it inhered only in the traffic 
stop case, and that case was dismissed.  The State’s argument is unavailing.  There was a 
global plea agreement encompassing both the traffic stop case and the search warrant case.  
Dismissal of the traffic stop case was contingent upon the plea in the search warrant case.  
As discussed above, there was a conflict in the traffic stop case, and that case would not 
29 
 
have been dismissed but for the plea in the search warrant case now challenged by 
Petitioner. 
The State attempts to minimize Mr. Discavage’s conflict of interest by noting that 
the conflict likely could have been waived by Petitioner.  The conflict of interest, however, 
was not brought to Petitioner’s attention; Mr. Discavage never gave Petitioner the 
opportunity to waive the conflict.   
Based on Mr. Discavage’s ethical conflict of interest and admission to the conflict, 
the post-conviction court was not clearly erroneous in finding that there existed a conflict 
of interest for Sixth Amendment and Article 21 purposes.  Mr. Discavage owed a duty to 
represent Petitioner zealously in Petitioner’s criminal cases. 
If Mr. Discavage’s relationship with Deputy Ensor had been grounded exclusively 
in the 2012 divorce proceedings, no conflict of interest rising to the level of ineffective 
assistance of counsel would likely exist.  Mr. Discavage labored under a conflict of interest 
not because of his successive representation of Deputy Ensor followed by Petitioner, but 
because of the concurrent nature of Ms. Ensor’s civil suit and Petitioner’s criminal cases—
both of which significantly involved Deputy Ensor.  Mr. Discavage had a personal stake in 
the outcome of the civil suit, and as such, had his loyalties divided between himself and 
Petitioner. 
2.   Presumption of Prejudice 
To be entitled to a presumption of prejudice under the Sullivan rule, Petitioner must 
prove that Mr. Discavage’s conflict of interest adversely affected the representation.  As 
30 
 
we explained in Taylor, whether counsel’s conflict of interest had an adverse effect on 
representation is a circumstance-specific inquiry.  428 Md. at 415.  The Mickens test guides 
our determination.  To satisfy that test, Petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence: (1) an alternative defense strategy or tactic that defense counsel might have 
pursued; (2) that the alternative strategy or tactic was objectively reasonable under the facts 
of the case known to the attorney; and (3) that the defense counsel’s failure to pursue that 
strategy or tactic was linked to the actual conflict.  Mickens, 240 F.3d at 361.  
 The parties contest the analysis of the third prong.  Petitioner urges this Court to 
adopt United States v. Nicholson, 611 F.3d 191, 212 (4th Cir. 2010), which set forth two 
alternative methods of satisfying Mickens’s third prong.  The State cautions against 
adopting Nicholson and counters that insufficient evidence supports the post-conviction 
court’s conclusion that the conflict of interest was linked to an adverse effect on the 
representation. 
Alternative Methods of Proving the Third Prong of the Mickens Test 
 
In Nicholson, the defendant asserted an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
premised on his counsel’s failure to file a downward departure motion based on self-
defense during the sentencing proceedings.  611 F.3d at 194.  Nicholson pleaded guilty to 
possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon, which he repeatedly asserted was for 
protection against Lorenzo Butts.  Id. at 194–95.  Following his conviction, Nicholson 
learned that his defense counsel simultaneously represented Butts.  Id. at 195.  In a prior 
proceeding, the Fourth Circuit held that counsel’s representation of Nicholson and Butts 
31 
 
was a conflict of interest.  Id. at 196.  Before the Fourth Circuit a second time, the court 
applied its test from Mickens to determine if the conflict adversely affected the 
representation of Nicholson.  Id. at 206.   
In doing so, the Nicholson court was tasked with clarifying how the third prong 
should be analyzed.  The court looked to Freund v. Butterworth, 165 F.3d 839, 860 (11th 
Cir. 1999), which outlined two alternative tests used to determine the existence of a link 
between the conflict and alternative defense strategy.  Id. at 212.  The court stated: 
With respect to the third prong—that counsel’s failure to pursue the 
objectively reasonable defense strategy was linked to the conflict—the 
Freund court explained that the petitioner is entitled to prove such a link in 
either of two ways: (1) by “establish[ing] that the alternative defense was 
inherently in conflict with . . . the attorney’s other loyalties or interests” . . . 
, or (2) by otherwise showing that the alternative defense was “not 
undertaken due to” those other loyalties or interests[.] 
 
Id.  
The Fourth Circuit held that defense counsel’s filing of a downward departure 
motion in his client’s case was inherently in conflict with counsel’s representation of Butts.  
Id. at 216.  “[A]n alternative defense and the lawyer’s other loyalties or interests are 
‘inherently in conflict’ if they are ‘inconsistent’ with each other.”  Id. at 213.  The court 
found that if counsel filed the motion, counsel “would act contrary to (and disloyal to) the 
interests of client Butts by portraying him as a murderer, thus potentially jeopardizing 
Butts’s position on appeal and in any future prosecutions.”  Id. at 215.  Because the conflict 
was “inextricably woven into” the failure to file the motion, Nicholson satisfied the third 
prong of Mickens.  Id. at 216.  The court acknowledged that the conflict did not manifest 
32 
 
in alternative defense strategies—just the strategy that placed the interests of counsel’s 
clients at odds.  Id. (explaining that “the competing interests of Nicholson and Butts were 
plainly stuck to [counsel’s] tactical considerations with respect to the self-defense 
departure motion” as opposed to alternative tactics).   
With our decision in Taylor, 428 Md. at 416, we formally adopted the three-prong 
test that the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, established in Mickens.  
The tests outlined in Nicholson and Freund are the most appropriate methods for analyzing 
Mickens’s third prong.  The Fourth Circuit decided both Mickens and Nicholson.  
Additionally, a majority of the federal courts of appeal utilize the alternative tests that we 
now adopt.  See e.g., United States v. Arrington, 941 F.3d 24, 41 (2d Cir. 2019) (requiring 
defendant to demonstrate a “plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic [that] might 
have been pursued, and that the alternative defense was inherently in conflict with or not 
undertaken due to the attorney’s other loyalties or interests.”); Nicholson, 611 F.3d at 212; 
Hammon v. Ward, 466 F.3d 919, 930 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[D]efense counsel’s performance 
[is] adversely affected by an actual conflict of interest if a specific and seemingly valid or 
genuine alternative strategy or tactic was available to defense counsel, but it was inherently 
in conflict with his duties to others or to his own personal interests.”) (quoting United States 
v. Bowie, 892 F.2d 1494, 1500 (10th Cir. 1990)) (alterations in original); United States v. 
Wells, 394 F.3d 725, 733 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]o show adverse effect, a defendant need not 
demonstrate prejudice . . . but only that some plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic 
might have been pursued but was not and that the alternative defense was inherently in 
33 
 
conflict with or not undertaken due to the attorney’s other loyalties or interests.”) (internal 
quotations omitted); United States v. Sotomayor-Vazquez, 249 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2001) 
(same test); Freund, 165 F.3d at 860 (same test); United States v. Gambino, 864 F.2d 1064, 
1070 (3d Cir. 1988) (same test).  But see McFarland v. Yukins, 356 F.3d 688, 707 (6th Cir. 
2004) (finding adverse effect “where counsel fails to pursue a strong and obvious defense, 
when pursuit of that defense would have inculpated counsel’s other client, and where there 
is no countervailing benefit to the defendant from foregoing that defense or other 
explanation for counsel’s conduct”). 
Application of the Mickens Test 
The post-conviction court correctly determined that Petitioner satisfied the first 
prong of the Mickens test.  The court found that Mr. Discavage did not file motions to 
suppress in either of Petitioner’s cases.  The court was unequivocal in declaring that filing 
a motion to suppress in a plain-smell, drug possession case “is fairly standard practice in 
criminal cases.  Where the Defendant is charged with possession of drugs, has made 
statements to police, or where the grounds for the search warrant are in question in any 
way, this Court feels strongly a motion to suppress should have been filed.”  There existed 
a plausible alternative defense strategy that Mr. Discavage could have pursued: he could 
have filed a motion to suppress the drugs discovered as a result of the traffic stop.  If the 
motion was successful, the charges arising from the traffic stop would have been dropped 
and the affidavit supporting the search warrant would have been undermined.   
34 
 
The second Mickens prong is a question of law.  We agree with the post-conviction 
court that filing a motion to suppress in a plain-smell, drug possession case is objectively 
reasonable, if not expected.  See Nicholson, 611 F.3d at 206–07 (“[A]lthough the second 
Mickens prong requires findings on the facts known to the lawyer at the time of his tactical 
decision, the ultimate question involves a conclusion of law reached under an objective 
standard: whether, considering the facts known to the lawyer, the alternative defense 
strategy was ‘objectively reasonable.’”) (quoting Mickens, 240 F.3d at 361).  Petitioner is 
required only to establish that the alternative tactic would have been objectively reasonable 
under the circumstances, not that it would have been successful.  See Mickens, 240 F.3d at 
361.   
Under the facts known to Mr. Discavage while representing Petitioner, filing a 
suppression motion remained objectively reasonable throughout the representation.  
Following the traffic stop in February 2015, Petitioner faced single counts of possession of 
a controlled dangerous substance and possession with intent to distribute a controlled 
dangerous substance.  Those charges occurred as a result of Deputy Ensor’s alleged 
detection of the odor of marijuana.  No other evidence indicated that Petitioner possessed 
drugs until Deputy Ensor questioned Petitioner about the marijuana.  Filing a motion to 
suppress under those circumstances was the objectively reasonable course of action for two 
primary reasons.  First, the drugs would have been inadmissible in the traffic stop case if 
Petitioner prevailed on the motion.  Second, Petitioner is a non-citizen, and Mr. Discavage 
was aware of that from the onset of the representation.  Mr. Discavage was also aware that 
35 
 
criminal proceedings against Petitioner posed immigration consequences for him.  As 
Petitioner’s immigration counsel explained, “unless Petitioner was able to negotiate a plea 
to Possession of Marijuana – less than 30 grams, Petitioner was ‘screwed.’”  Under those 
circumstances, Mr. Discavage should have challenged the traffic stop in an attempt to 
subvert his client’s criminal charges, and therefore prevent potential immigration issues.  
Nothing in the record explains why a motion to suppress was not filed.  See Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787 (1973) (“[L]awyers, by training and disposition, are advocates 
and bound by professional duty to present all available evidence and arguments in support 
of their clients’ positions and to contest with vigor all adverse evidence and views.”).  
As for the third prong of Mickens, Petitioner argues that the failure to file a motion 
to suppress was linked to Mr. Discavage’s conflict of interest.  We agree and affirm the 
post-conviction court’s finding that filing a motion to suppress in the traffic stop case was 
inherently in conflict with Mr. Discavage’s relationship with Deputy Ensor.  Had Mr. 
Discavage filed a motion to suppress in the traffic stop case, Deputy Ensor would have 
been called to testify.  In that situation, Mr. Discavage would have cross-examined Deputy 
Ensor and questioned his recollection and attacked his credibility, i.e., questioned whether 
Deputy Ensor genuinely detected the odor of marijuana and properly conducted the traffic 
stop and arrest.  Such a confrontation between defense counsel and the arresting officer 
called as the State’s witness is innately adversarial.   
In juxtaposition, Deputy Ensor would likely have been a fact witness in the civil 
case, the very subject of which related to the allegation that Mr. Discavage improperly 
36 
 
favored Deputy Ensor in his divorce from Ms. Ensor.  Mr. Discavage would undoubtedly 
be better served by a friendly witness—one who was at the center of the controversy—than 
one that is hostile or ornery.  In the criminal cases, Mr. Discavage would impugn Deputy 
Ensor; in the civil case, Mr. Discavage would rely on Deputy Ensor to absolve Mr. 
Discavage of wrongdoing.  Maintaining a positive rapport with Deputy Ensor for the sake 
of a positive outcome in the civil case was inherently in conflict with cross-examining 
Deputy Ensor in Petitioner’s criminal cases. 
Accordingly, we hold that Petitioner satisfied his burden of proof in establishing 
that the failure to file a motion to suppress was linked to Mr. Discavage’s on-going 
relationship with Deputy Ensor.  Petitioner established that Mr. Discavage labored under a 
conflict of interest and satisfied all three prongs of the Mickens test.  Because counsel had 
a conflict of interest that adversely affected the representation, the Sullivan rule is met, and 
Petitioner is entitled to a new trial with conflict-free representation. 
We caution against broadly interpreting the conclusion reached today beyond the 
facts presented in the case sub judice.  Applying the Mickens test requires a case-by-case 
analysis, and the facts presented here lead to the determination that an actual conflict of 
interest exists in the instant matter.  Specifically, Mr. Discavage operated under a 
concurrent conflict of interest whereby his loyalties were divided between himself and 
Petitioner because Petitioner’s criminal cases and Ms. Ensor’s civil suit against Mr. 
Discavage occurred simultaneously.  We are not holding that a conflict of interest exists 
automatically where there is successive representation by defense counsel of a former 
37 
 
client who later becomes a witness for the State against a current client in an unrelated 
matter.  Nor do we take a position on whether Petitioner could have waived Mr. 
Discavage’s conflict of interest. 
IV. 
Conclusion 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights guarantee criminal defendants the right to conflict-free 
representation.  Where counsel labors under an actual conflict of interest, the client is 
entitled to post-conviction relief if that conflict adversely affected the representation.  See 
Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 349–50.  The three-part test set forth in Mickens determines whether 
the conflict adversely affected the representation.  240 F.3d at 361.  To answer the third 
prong of the Mickens test, we adopt the alternative tests set forth in Nicholson.  611 F.3d 
at 212.  In applying those tests, we hold that Petitioner was denied effective assistance of 
counsel. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL 
APPEALS REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED 
TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS 
TO AFFIRM THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR 
FREDERICK COUNTY.  COSTS TO BE 
PAID BY THE STATE.