Title: Eric Gabriel Griffin v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC07-168 
____________ 
 
 
 
 
ERIC GABRIEL GRIFFIN, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
[April 10, 2008] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We accepted review of the decision in Griffin v. State, 946 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 
2d DCA 2007), based upon the district court’s certification that its decision on the 
assessment of costs directly conflicted with the decision in Ridgeway v. State, 892 
So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).  We have jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. 
Const.  We approve Ridgeway and quash Griffin, but only to the extent that it 
reversed the imposition of costs pursuant to the provisions of section 939.185, 
Florida Statutes (2004). 
 
- 2 - 
 
The limited issue we address is whether costs may be assessed under section 
939.185 when that statute was enacted after the date Griffin is alleged to have 
committed a criminal act.  In Ridgeway the First District Court of Appeal was 
faced with the identical issue.  Because we agree with the opinion of the First 
District we set it out here in full and adopt it as our own: 
Appellant challenges the trial court's retroactive application of 
the cost provisions of section 939.185, Florida Statutes (2004), 
arguing it violates federal and State Constitutional prohibitions against 
ex post facto laws.  We affirm. 
On July 1, 2004, pursuant to a negotiated plea, Appellant pled 
nolo contendere to an offense charged and committed in 1997. 
Coincidentally, on that same date, section 939.185, Florida Statutes 
(2004), became effective.  See 2004 Fla. Laws ch. 265. That statute, 
entitled “Assessment of additional court costs,” in pertinent part 
provides that, the “board of county commissioners may adopt an 
additional court cost, not to exceed $65, to be imposed by the court 
when a person pleads guilty or nolo contendere to, or is found guilty 
of, any felony, misdemeanor, or criminal traffic offense under the 
laws of this state.”  Id.  Over Appellant's objection, the trial court 
construed the statute to be a mandatory, non-punitive civil remedy, 
and concluded its retroactive application to Appellant's 1997 criminal 
offense would not violate ex post facto prohibitions. The trial court 
was correct. 
The constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws applies 
only to criminal legislation and proceedings.  See Goad v. Dept. of 
Corr., 845 So. 2d 880, 882 (Fla. 2003).  For ex post facto purposes, 
the categorization of legislation or proceedings as civil or criminal is a 
question of statutory construction.  See id.; see also Dept. of Corr. v. 
Goad, 754 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).  Construction of a statute is 
a question of law, reviewed de novo.  See Dixon v. City of 
Jacksonville, 774 So. 2d 763, 765 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). 
“In evaluating whether a law violates the ex post facto clause, a 
two-prong test must be applied: (1) whether the law is retrospective in 
its effect; and (2) whether the law alters the definition of criminal 
conduct or increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable.”  
 
- 3 - 
Gwong v. Singletary, 683 So. 2d 109, 112 (Fla. 1996); see also Lynce 
v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441, 117 S. Ct. 8981, 137 L. Ed. 2d 63 
(1997); Goad, 845 So. 2d at 882 (noting law violates ex post facto 
clauses of U.S. and Florida Constitutions when it increases 
punishment for criminal offense after crime has been committed). 
A statutory change operates retrospectively when it applies to 
convicted offenders whose crimes were committed prior to the 
statute's effective date.  See Gwong, 683 So. 2d at 112.  A civil 
remedy that does not constitute criminal punishment does not violate 
ex post facto prohibitions.  See Goad, 845 So. 2d at 884-885.  A 
statute is not punitive, for purposes of determining whether it violates 
the ex post facto clause, merely because it can be applied in the 
context of a criminal case.  See Goad, 754 So. 2d at 98 (concluding 
retroactive application to existing inmate population, of statute 
authorizing inmates' civil liability for costs of incarceration, does not 
violate ex post facto prohibitions). 
Moreover, monetary penalties have not been equated to 
criminal punishment.  See id.  Assessment of costs violates ex post 
facto prohibitions only when the length of an inmate's sentence can be 
increased by failure to pay the costs.  See State v. Yost, 507 So. 2d 
1099 (Fla. 1987) (noting denial of gain-time to prisoners who have not 
paid fees and court costs and imposing community service on 
indigents unable to pay the fees and costs disadvantage prisoners 
whose crimes were committed prior to the effective date of the statute, 
in violation of ex post facto prohibitions); Johnson v. State, 502 So. 
2d 1291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (holding imposition of costs of 
probation, without any increase in jail or prison time, not an 
impermissible enhancement of punishment); but see Hayden v. State, 
753 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (holding cost assessment for 
juvenile assessment center and teen court program could not be 
imposed where statutes authorizing imposition of such costs were 
enacted after date of defendant's offenses). 
Applying these principles to section 939.185, Florida Statutes, 
the statute meets the first prong of the two-part test, because it applies 
upon sentencing to convicted offenders whose offenses were 
committed prior to the statute's effective date.  However, retroactive 
application of the statute does not meet the second prong of the test, 
because it neither alters the definition of the criminal conduct nor 
increases the length of an offender's sentence.  Specifically, the statute 
does not subject a violator to criminal penalties such as additional 
 
- 4 - 
prison time or loss of gain-time for failure to pay the cost.  Since there 
is no criminal penalty, the cost does not enhance punishment.  
Because the statute lacks any punitive penalty, and monetary penalties 
that do not lengthen an offender's sentence do not constitute criminal 
punishment, retroactive application of the cost provisions of the 
statute does not violate ex post facto prohibitions.  The trial court is 
AFFIRMED. 
892 So. 2d at 539-40. 
 
Accordingly, we quash in part the decision in Griffin and approve of the 
decision in Ridgeway.  We decline to review any other issues raised by the parties. 
We remand to the district court for further proceedings in accord with this opinion. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Second District - Case No. 2D04-5199 
 
(Hillsborough County) 
 
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Brad Permar, Assistant Public 
Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Robert J. Krauss, Assistant 
Attorney General, Bureau Chief, and Timothy A. Freeland, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent