Title: Harold Umansky v. ABC Insurance Co.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2009 WI 82 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP385 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Harold Umansky, Individually and as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Richard Umansky 
and Thelma Umansky, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-
Respondents, 
     v. 
ABC Insurance Company, 
          Defendant, 
Barry Fox, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant-
Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2008 WI App 101 
Reported at: 313 Wis. 2d 445, 756 N.W.2d 601 
(Ct. App. 2008-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 17, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 4, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
John C. Albert   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
CROOKS, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
PROSSER, J., joins concurrence. 
 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
CROOKS, J., joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
ZIEGLER, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ROGGENSACK and GABLEMAN, JJ., join the dissent. 
   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-cross-appellant-petitioner the cause was 
argued by John J. Glinski, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants cross-appellants there was a 
brief filed by J. Michael Riley, Timothy M. Barber, and Axley 
Brynelson, LLP, Madison, and oral argument by J. Michael Riley. 
 
 
2 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by James Olson and Lawton 
& Cates, SC, Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Association for 
Justice. 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 82
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP385  
(L.C. No. 
2005CV864) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Harold Umansky, Individually and as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Richard 
Umansky, and Thelma Umansky, 
 
       Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
ABC Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendant, 
 
Barry Fox, 
 
       Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant- 
       Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 17, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of a 
published court of appeals decision1 that reversed a grant of 
summary judgment for the petitioner and remanded the case to the 
circuit court.  This wrongful death case concerns a claim by 
                                                 
1 Umansky v. ABC Ins. Co., 2008 WI App 101, 313 Wis. 2d 445, 
756 N.W.2d 601. 
No. 
2007AP385   
 
2 
 
cross-respondents (the Umanskys) that Barry Fox (Fox), the 
director of facilities for Camp Randall Stadium, negligently 
caused the death of Richard Umansky (Umansky) by failing to 
enforce a specific safety regulation at Camp Randall.  Umansky 
was a television cameraman for ABC, Inc.  He fell approximately 
eight feet to his death from a four-foot by eight-foot platform 
supplied by the University.  There was no railing on Umansky's 
platform at the time.  The Wisconsin legislature has adopted 
federal safety regulations and made them applicable for all 
public buildings, and such regulations require that railings be 
installed on platforms like the one from which Umansky fell. 
¶2 
As a state employee, however, Fox enjoys immunity from 
liability unless, under the circumstances, at least one of the 
limited exceptions to immunity applies.  We must address whether 
Fox's obligation pursuant to statute to act to ensure that Camp 
Randall Stadium complies with the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) regulation requiring a railing on certain 
types of platforms creates a ministerial duty exception to the 
standard rule of state employee immunity.  Specifically, the 
narrow question we address is whether Fox had a ministerial duty 
under 29 C.F.R. § 1910.23(c)(1), incorporated by Wis. Admin. 
Code §§ Comm 32.15 and 32.50 (Aug. 2004),2 to have a rail on the 
platform from which Umansky fell.  Finding that no exception 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Administrative 
Code are to the August 2004 version unless otherwise indicated.  
The relevant language in the sections cited herein has remained 
unchanged since it took effect on March 1, 1999. 
No. 
2007AP385   
 
3 
 
applied, the Dane County Circuit Court, the Honorable John C. 
Albert presiding, granted summary judgment for Fox.  The 
Umanskys appealed.  The court of appeals reversed, making a 
number of rulings favorable to the Umanskys related to the issue 
of whether Fox had a ministerial duty and is thus unable to 
claim immunity.  
 
¶3 
However, the court of appeals declined to address one 
of Fox's arguments, newly made on appeal, deeming it waived.  
Because of the potential impact of the new argument3 on a 
determination of whether Fox's employer was required by state 
law to comply with the applicable regulation, the court of 
appeals stopped short of holding that the regulation applied to 
Fox's employer, leaving that determination to be made on remand 
to the circuit court.  The court of appeals thus made a number 
of rulings4 with which we agree and which we adopt and ultimately 
                                                 
3 The new argument was that Fox was entitled to summary 
judgment because the plaintiff had not alleged facts showing 
that the platform was a workspace for public employees, and thus 
had made no showing that Fox's employer had a duty of any sort 
with respect to the platform.  In other words, the argument was 
that any duty to ensure the safety of the platform would have 
belonged to the employer of the private employee who used it.  
Here the argument by the petitioner has brought into sharp focus 
the issue as to whether the regulations apply to public 
buildings of a public employer such as Fox's employer.  
4 The court of appeals stated:  
[W]e 
make 
a 
number 
of 
rulings 
related 
to 
the 
exception. 
 First, the nondelegability to third 
parties of an employer's duty under the safe place 
statute does not prevent suit against a state employee 
for failure to comply with a safety regulation adopted 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 101.055(3) 
(2001-02).  
Second, 
the 
"law" 
that 
is 
the 
source 
of 
the 
No. 
2007AP385   
 
4 
 
concluded that Fox was not entitled to summary judgment on the 
ground of immunity:   
[W]e conclude Fox was responsible for compliance with 
state and federal safety regulations and this job 
responsibility is sufficient to impose on him the duty 
to comply with 29 C.F.R. § 1910.23(c)(1) insofar as 
the regulation applies to his employer.  We further 
conclude that, given the height and structure of the 
platform 
from 
which 
Umansky 
fell, 
Fox 
had 
a 
ministerial duty to have a standard railing or an 
alternative as specified in 29 C.F.R. § 1910.23(c)(1) 
on the open side or sides of the platform, if Fox's 
employer was required by state law to comply with this 
regulation as to this platform. 
Umansky v. ABC Ins. Co., 2008 WI App 101, ¶3, 313 Wis. 2d 445, 
756 N.W.2d 601.  Fox petitioned for review and we granted his 
petition. 
¶4 
We now adopt and affirm those court of appeals' 
rulings listed above.  We conclude that Fox had a ministerial 
duty here.  His job description provided that he was responsible 
for compliance with state and federal safety regulations, 
                                                                                                                                                             
ministerial 
duty 
need 
not 
specify 
the 
employee 
position responsible for carrying out the duty; it is 
sufficient if the "law" imposes a duty that is 
ministerial and other evidence establishes that a 
particular employee is responsible for carrying out 
that duty.  Third, a regulation that otherwise imposes 
a ministerial duty is not discretionary simply because 
the supervisory employee responsible for compliance 
with the regulation has discretion with respect to 
assigning tasks to carry out that duty.  Fourth, 29 
C.F.R. § 1910.23(c)(1), incorporated by Wis. Admin. 
Code §§ Comm 32.15 and 32.50, imposes a ministerial 
duty to have a railing meeting the specifications of 
the 
regulation 
on 
a 
platform 
that 
meets 
the 
requirements of the regulation.   
Umansky, 313 Wis. 2d 445, ¶2. 
No. 
2007AP385   
 
5 
 
including 29 C.F.R. § 1910.23(c)(1). "[G]iven the height and 
structure of the platform from which Umansky fell, Fox had a 
ministerial duty to have a standard railing or an alternative as 
specified in 29 C.F.R. § 1910.23(c)(1) on the open side or sides 
of the platform . . . ."  Umansky, 313 Wis. 2d 445, ¶3.  
Further, because we reach and ultimately reject the argument 
that the regulation at issue does not apply to Fox's employer, 
our holding resolves the remaining question from the court of 
appeals' rulings.  We thus remand to the circuit court, having 
answered the threshold question concerning Fox's immunity from 
suit by concluding that Fox had a ministerial duty to perform 
the act of ensuring that the platform complied with the 
applicable regulation.  The focus of the circuit court must be 
on breach, causation, comparison of fault, and damages, not on 
the question of by whom the deceased was employed.  We remand 
for a trial on the Umanskys' negligence claim.   
¶5 
We first set forth the factual background and the 
applicable legal framework in Parts I and II.  In Part III, we 
address the specific regulation that creates the ministerial 
duty exception here.  In Part IV, we discuss the applicability 
of the regulation to all public buildings of a public employer.  
In Part V, we discuss the inapplicability of the Safe Place 
Statute to this case.   
I. 
BACKGROUND 
¶6 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
set 
forth 
the 
facts 
and 
procedural history as follows: 
No. 
2007AP385   
 
6 
 
Umansky was employed as a cameraman by ABC Inc.  On 
November 21, 2003, he was found lying unconscious 
beneath a platform from which he had been working at 
the University of Wisconsin's Camp Randall Stadium.  
He later died as a result of injuries sustained from 
falling from the platform to the concrete walkway 
below. 
Umansky's parents and the Estate of Richard Umansky 
filed this action against Fox, claiming that Umansky's 
fall was caused by Fox's negligence.  The amended 
complaint alleged that Fox was responsible for the 
safety of Camp Randall Stadium, including compliance 
with state and federal safety regulations, and that he 
was negligent in failing to ensure that the platform 
was reasonably safe and in failing to comply with the 
applicable regulations, including failing to provide 
railings on the platform in violation of 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1910.23(c)(1). 
. . . .  
[After a motion to dismiss was denied,] Fox moved for 
summary judgment based on discretionary act immunity 
for public employees.  He submitted his affidavit in 
which he averred that the platform from which Umansky 
fell 
had 
been 
in 
use 
by 
ABC 
Inc. 
and 
other 
broadcasting companies for several years prior to the 
accident, and no one had indicated to him that the 
platform 
was 
not 
safe 
or 
did 
not 
comply 
with 
applicable 
regulations. 
 
Umansky's 
submissions 
included Fox's deposition, the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) accident investigation 
report, and a citation and notification of penalty to 
ABC Inc. for a violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.23(c)(1). 
The regulation provides: "Every open-sided floor or 
platform 4 feet or more above adjacent floor or ground 
level shall be guarded by a standard railing (or the 
equivalent as specified in paragraph (e)(3) of this 
section) on all open sides except where there is 
entrance to a ramp, stairway, or fixed ladder. . . ." 
Umansky, 313 Wis. 2d 445, ¶¶6-9. 
¶7 
As noted above, the circuit court granted Fox's motion 
for summary judgment, reasoning that neither the ministerial 
No. 
2007AP385   
 
7 
 
duty exception nor the known danger exception applied in this 
case; because it found no applicable exception, the circuit 
court found that Fox's immunity as a state employee barred a 
suit.  As noted above, the court of appeals reversed. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND RELEVANT LAW 
¶8 
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo.  See 
Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 315, 401 N.W.2d 
816 (1987).  Summary judgment is proper when there are no 
genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.  See Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) 
(2001-02)5. 
¶9 
Immunity for public officers and employees is grounded 
in common law, Kimps v. Hill, 200 Wis. 2d 1, 9, 546 N.W.2d 151 
(1996), and is based largely on "public policy considerations 
that spring from an interest in protecting the public purse and 
a preference for political rather than judicial redress" for 
actions.  Lodl v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 71, 253 Wis. 
2d 323, ¶23, 646 N.W.2d 314. 
¶10 The general rule is that state officers and employees 
are immune from personal liability for injuries resulting from 
acts performed within the scope of their official duties.  
Kimps, 200 Wis. 2d at 10.  The rule, however, is subject to 
exceptions, representing a "judicial balanc[e] [struck between] 
the need of public officers to perform their functions freely 
                                                 
5 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-02 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2007AP385   
 
8 
 
[and] the right of an aggrieved party to seek redress."  Lister 
v. Bd. of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 300, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976).  
The exception at issue in this case is that a state employee "is 
not shielded from liability for the negligent performance of a 
purely ministerial duty."  Kimps, 200 Wis. 2d at 10. 
¶11 The 
definition of ministerial duty has remained 
substantially the same since it was adopted in 1955 in Meyer v. 
Carman, 271 Wis. 329, 73 N.W.2d 514 (1955): "'A . . . duty is 
ministerial only when it is absolute, certain and imperative, 
involving merely the performance of a specific task when the law 
imposes, prescribes and defines the time, mode and occasion for 
its performance with such certainty that nothing remains for 
judgment or discretion.'"  C.L. v. Olson, 143 Wis. 2d 701, 711-
12, 422 N.W.2d 614 (1988) (quoting Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 301). 
¶12 The defense of discretionary act immunity for public 
officers and employees assumes negligence and focuses on whether 
the action or inaction upon which liability is premised is 
entitled to immunity.  Lodl, 253 Wis. 2d 323, ¶17.  The proper 
scope of the common law doctrine of discretionary act immunity, 
when there are no disputed facts, is a question of law.  
Bicknese v. Sutula, 2003 WI 31, ¶15, 260 Wis. 2d 713, 660 N.W.2d 
289. 
III. THE MINISTERIAL DUTY EXCEPTION 
¶13 We begin by setting the question we are to answer into 
context.  The Umanskys' claim is that Fox negligently caused the 
death of Umansky.  The amended complaint alleges: 
No. 
2007AP385   
 
9 
 
At all times pertinent to this action [Fox] was 
responsible for the condition of the Camp Randall 
Stadium where Richard Umansky was killed, and was 
specifically 
responsible 
for 
the 
safety 
of 
the 
facility, including compliance with the state and 
federal regulations. 
. . . . 
On information and belief, the incident was caused by 
the negligence of Barry Fox . . . in failing to ensure 
the platform from which Richard Umansky fell was 
reasonably 
safe, 
failing 
to 
comply 
with 
OSHA 
regulations, failing to comply with Wisconsin safety 
regulations 
for 
similar 
structures, 
failing 
to 
establish appropriate guidelines and practices to 
ensure 
compliance 
with 
OSHA 
and 
State 
safety 
regulations, failing to provide and maintain a safe 
environment within Camp Randall Stadium, failing to 
provide railings on the platform from which Richard 
Umansky 
fell 
in 
violation 
of 
29 
CFR 
1910.23(c)(1). . . .  
¶14 Of course, before the Umanskys can proceed to attempt 
to prove their negligence case, they must first defeat Fox's 
defense of immunity, to which he is entitled as a state employee 
unless an exception applies.6  The Umanskys argue that the 
                                                 
6 The Umanskys suggest that this court should use this case 
to state a new rule limiting the discretionary immunity doctrine 
to those state employees involved in legislative or judicial 
policymaking.  Under such an approach, they argue, Fox would 
have no immunity.  We decline to do so. 
No. 
2007AP385   
 
10 
 
ministerial duty exception applies to defeat Fox's immunity.7  As 
discussed above, "a public officer or employee is not shielded 
from liability for the negligent performance of a purely 
ministerial duty."  Kimps, 200 Wis. 2d at 10.  We turn, then, to 
this preliminary question.  To answer it, we will consider the 
relevance of safety regulations applicable to the platform under 
state law for the limited purpose of establishing whether the 
regulations satisfy the definition of a ministerial duty and 
therefore constitute an exception to the rule giving Fox 
immunity from liability. 
¶15 If Fox was subject to a "purely ministerial duty" to 
have a railing installed on the platform, he is not immune from 
liability.  As we noted previously, a duty is a "purely 
ministerial duty" if it is "absolute, certain and imperative, 
involving merely the performance of a specific task when the law 
imposes, prescribes and defines the time, mode and occasion for 
its performance with such certainty that nothing remains for 
                                                 
7 The Umanskys argue that another exception, the "known 
danger" exception, applies as well.  That exception, set forth 
in Cords v. Anderson, 80 Wis. 2d 525, 259 N.W.2d 672 (1977), is 
present where "the nature of the danger is compelling and known 
to the officer and is of such force that the public officer has 
no discretion not to act."  C.L. v. Olson, 143 Wis. 2d 701, 715, 
422 N.W.2d 614 (1988).  In regard to that exception, we agree 
with the court of appeals that it is not clear from the amended 
complaint that "the platform presents the type of compelling 
danger that warrants an exception to immunity."  Umansky, 313 
Wis. 2d 445, ¶69.  The known danger exception "has been reserved 
for situations that are more than unsafe, where the danger is so 
severe and so immediate" that a response is demanded.  Id., ¶70.  
There is no need for us to address that exception any further 
here.  
No. 
2007AP385   
 
11 
 
judgment or discretion."  C.L., 143 Wis. 2d at 711 (citing 
Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 301). 
¶16 We first need to determine whether a source of law 
"imposes, prescribes and defines the time, mode and occasion for 
[the] performance [of a specific task]."  C.L., 143 Wis. 2d at 
711.  At the beginning of its analysis, the court of appeals 
identified the specific act at issue and the law which requires 
it: 
[T]he allegation of a failure to provide railings in 
violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.23(c)(1) does allege a 
specific act Fox failed to perform, and this, the 
plaintiffs assert, is the source of his ministerial 
duty. 
29 C.F.R. § 1910.23(c)(1) provides: (c) Protection of 
open-sided floors, platforms, and runways.  (1) Every 
open-sided floor or platform 4 feet or more above 
adjacent floor or ground level shall be guarded by a 
standard railing [defined in paragraph (e)(1)8] (or the 
equivalent as specified in paragraph (e)(3)9 of this 
section)[.] 
                                                 
8 29 C.F.R. § 1910.23(e)(1) provides: 
A 
standard 
railing 
shall 
consist 
of 
top 
rail, 
intermediate rail, and posts, and shall have a 
vertical height of 42 inches nominal from upper 
surface of top rail to floor, platform, runway, or 
ramp level. The top rail shall be smooth-surfaced 
throughout the length of the railing. The intermediate 
rail shall be approximately halfway between the top 
rail and the floor, platform, runway, or ramp. The 
ends of the rails shall not overhang the terminal 
posts except where such overhang does not constitute a 
projection hazard. 
9 29 C.F.R. § 1910.23(e)(3)(v) provides:  
Other 
types, 
sizes, and arrangements of railing 
construction are acceptable provided they meet the 
following conditions: (a) A smooth-surfaced top rail 
No. 
2007AP385   
 
12 
 
. . . . 
OSHA 
regulations 
in 
general, 
and 
this 
one 
in 
particular, do not apply directly to the University of 
Wisconsin because a state and its subdivisions are 
excluded from the definition of "employer."  Williams-
Steiger Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 
Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 3(5), 84 Stat. 1590, 1591 
(1970); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.2(c).  However, Wis. Admin. 
Code § Comm 32.15 provides, with certain exceptions 
not applicable here, that "all places of employment 
and public buildings of a public employer shall comply 
with the federal [OSHA] requirements adopted under s. 
Comm 32.50."  Wisconsin Admin. Code § Comm 32.50(2) 
adopts 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910, thus making § 1910.23 
applicable to places of public employment and to 
public buildings. 
Umansky, 313 Wis. 2d 445, ¶¶25-27. 
¶17 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
examined 
29 
C.F.R. 
§ 1910.23(c)(1) and observed, "The regulation does not allow for 
the option of no railing in these circumstances and the 
regulation is very specific as to what type of railing is 
required.  The duty to have a railing meeting the regulation's 
requirements is imposed by law, it is absolute, certain and 
imperative, and it requires performance in a specified manner 
and upon specified conditions that are not dependent upon the 
exercise of judgment or discretion."  Id., ¶48.  In addition, 
the court of appeals noted that Fox, in his deposition 
                                                                                                                                                             
at a height above floor, platform, runway, or ramp 
level of 42 inches nominal; (b) A strength to 
withstand at least the minimum requirement of 200 
pounds top rail pressure; (c) Protection between top 
rail and floor, platform, runway, ramp, or stair 
treads, equivalent at least to that afforded by a 
standard intermediate rail . . . . 
No. 
2007AP385   
 
13 
 
testimony, had stated that regarding oversight of facility 
safety, the "day-to-day single responsibility does lie with me" 
and that the platform's compliance with OSHA requirements 
"ultimately . . . would have been my decision."  Id., ¶50. 
¶18 That determination by the court of appeals——that the 
highly specific safety regulation in force under Wisconsin law 
for railings on platforms created a ministerial duty such that 
there is an exception to the ordinary rule of immunity——was the 
basis for the court of appeals' reversal of the grant of summary 
judgment.  We agree with the court of appeals that because 29 
C.F.R. § 1910.23(c)(1) "imposes, prescribes and defines the 
time, mode and occasion . . . with such certainty that nothing 
remains for judgment or discretion" and because Wis. Admin. Code 
§ Comm 32.50(2) makes it applicable to public buildings of a 
public employer, Fox was under a ministerial duty to act to 
ensure a railing was on the platform. 
IV. FOX ARGUES THAT ANY DUTY RUNS ONLY TO PUBLIC 
EMPLOYEES OR ONLY TO A PLATFORM ON  
WHICH PUBLIC EMPLOYEES WORK 
¶19 First, Fox contends that the duty created by the OSHA 
regulation pursuant to administrative code provisions, which in 
turn are pursuant to statute,10 is a duty only to public 
employees.  Because Umansky was not a public employee, Fox 
argues, the duty does not run to him.  The basis for this 
argument is that the relevant administrative code provision 
notes that its purpose is to create work safety standards for 
                                                 
10 Wis. Stat. § 101.055(3)(a).  See infra, ¶26 n.18 
No. 
2007AP385   
 
14 
 
public employees,11 and the underlying statute has the stated 
purpose of giving public employees workplace safety protections 
equivalent to those afforded to private employees under OSHA.12  
We therefore turn our attention from the specific regulation 
that creates a ministerial duty here to the statute and 
administrative code sections that authorized it.  The stated 
purpose of the statute is to offer equivalent occupational 
safety protections.  That purpose is turned on its head by Fox's 
reading that argues for a divided, haphazardly applicable 
ministerial duty to comply with the explicit OSHA regulation 
requiring a railing on a platform.  That such an approach is 
unworkable 
is 
readily 
apparent 
given 
the 
nature 
of 
the 
ministerial duty created by this regulation.  The regulation, 29 
C.F.R. § 1910.23(c)(1), incorporated by Wis. Admin. §§ Comm 
32.15 and 32.50, created a ministerial duty to comply with the 
safety regulation requiring railings on platforms such as the 
one involved here.  Fox urges the peculiar conclusion that even 
                                                 
11 Wis. Admin. Code § Comm 32.001: "Purpose.  This chapter 
establishes minimum occupational safety and health standards for 
public employees." 
12 Wis. Stat. § 101.055(1): 
Intent.  It is the intent of this section to give 
employees of the state, of any agency and of any 
political 
subdivision 
of 
this 
state 
rights 
and 
protections relating to occupational safety and health 
equivalent to those granted to employees in the 
private sector under the occupational safety and 
health act of 1970 (5 USC 5108, 5314, 5315 and 7902; 
15 USC 633 and 636; 18 USC 1114; 29 USC 553 and 651 to 
678; 42 USC 3142-1 and 49 USC 1421). 
No. 
2007AP385   
 
15 
 
though the administrative code adopted pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 101.055 admittedly requires the necessary safety provisions in 
"all places of employment and public buildings,"13 the statute's 
stated purpose of protecting public employees somehow justifies 
allowing the breach of a ministerial duty with impunity, so long 
as the person injured or killed happens not to be a public 
employee.   
¶20 There 
is 
nothing 
in 
the 
statute 
or 
in 
the 
administrative code provisions which says that compliance with 
29 C.F.R. § 1910.23(c)(1) is intended, and is relevant, only 
when a public employee is injured or killed.  Since OSHA does 
not apply to public employees,14 there was a need to adopt a 
Wisconsin OSHA to include those employees.  There is nothing to 
indicate that the legislature intended to create different 
safety standards for public and private employers and employees; 
rather, as we noted previously, the intent was to create 
identical safety standards.15   
¶21 There is no dispute that the legislature required all 
public buildings to be brought into compliance with OSHA minimum 
standards.  There is no dispute that Camp Randall Stadium is a 
public building, and there is no dispute that the University of 
                                                 
13 Wis. Admin. Code § Comm 32.002. 
14 29 U.S.C.A. § 652(5) (defining an employer governed by 
the regulations as "not includ[ing] the United States (not 
including the United States Postal Service) or any State or 
political subdivision of a State"). 
15 See Wis. Stat. § 101.055(1), supra, ¶19 n.12 
No. 
2007AP385   
 
16 
 
Wisconsin is a public employer.  It was Fox's responsibility, as 
director of facilities for Camp Randall Stadium, to be sure that 
the Stadium complied with OSHA regulations.  Period.  The OSHA 
regulation at issue in this case created a ministerial duty, and 
nothing in our case law on ministerial duty supports the 
proposition that such a duty can be limited by reference to 
whether only a particular person is owed that duty. 
¶22 As we noted earlier in this opinion, the court of 
appeals deemed a new argument Fox raised at oral argument before 
it waived and declined to address it though the court left open 
the possibility that the argument could be pursued on remand to 
the circuit court.  Before this court, Fox made a similar 
argument.  The argument overlaps considerably with the argument 
just discussed; Fox contends that the question is not whether 
the platform was generally required to have a railing, but 
whether the platform was required to have a railing at the time 
Umansky fell.  Fox submits that because there has been no 
evidence submitted that a public employee was using the platform 
at the time Umansky fell,16 the Umanskys have failed to allege 
                                                 
16 At the court of appeals, the argument was presented 
slightly differently: "Fox asserts that the regulation did not 
apply because there is no evidence this platform was ever used 
by a public employee as a workspace."  Umansky, 313 Wis. 2d 445, 
¶63.  However, Fox abandoned that version of the argument before 
this court.  In his brief, he instead stated a more limited 
argument:  
The question is not whether 29 C.F.R. § 1910.23(c)(1) 
required the platform to have a railing at all times 
but whether Wis. Admin. Code §§ Comm 32.15 and 32.50 
required the platform to have a railing at the time 
decedent fell. And the answer is no because there is 
No. 
2007AP385   
 
17 
 
facts that would establish a ministerial duty and that summary 
judgment should therefore be granted in his favor.  This is a 
variation on his earlier argument.  The first, addressed above, 
turns on the identity of the person injured (i.e., if two 
persons were on the platform and both fell, no ministerial duty 
exception could apply as to the private employee, and a claim by 
that person's representative would be barred by immunity).  This 
argument focuses on the platform itself, and the use of the 
platform by a public employee at the relevant time (i.e., only 
if it were alleged that a public employee was occupying the 
platform 
at 
the 
moment 
the 
private 
employee 
fell, 
the 
ministerial duty exception would apparently apply, and a claim 
by the private employee's representative would not be barred by 
immunity).  
                                                                                                                                                             
no evidence that any public employees were using the 
platform at that time." (Emphasis added.) 
At oral argument, Fox argued, somewhat inconsistently with 
the brief, that such facts  
would not make any difference as a practical matter 
because even if public employees had been using the 
platform at the time Mr. Umansky fell, there would 
still be no duty on the part of the State that could 
be delegated to Fox that would run to Mr. Umansky 
[because] he was a private employee.   
Contrary to the dissent's assertion, before this court, Fox 
sought only to reverse the court of appeals and made no request 
in the alternative for a remand for additional fact-finding 
related to the question of the platform's use by public 
employees.  Justice Ziegler's dissent, ¶¶105-07 
No. 
2007AP385   
 
18 
 
¶23 As noted previously, the court of appeals deemed this 
argument waived but noted that this argument could be developed 
further at the circuit court.  We disagree.  Since the issue was 
raised again here, we exercise our discretion to reach it, 
rather than deem it waived.17  Fox's argument to this court was 
that the material facts——that no public employee was on the 
platform at the time Umansky fell and that Umansky himself was 
not a public employee——were undisputed.  Because Fox argues that 
at least one of those conditions would have to be met in order 
to establish a ministerial duty, he contends that absent such 
evidence, summary judgment in his favor is appropriate.   
¶24 Since we have established that a ministerial duty 
exception arises from 29 C.F.R. § 1910.23(c)(1), incorporated by 
Wis. Admin. Code §§ Comm 32.15 and 32.50, and Fox's role as the 
person responsible for acting to ensure that the facilities 
comply with the regulations, and because we have already 
rejected Fox's argument that the statute's purpose limits the 
applicability of the duty to public employees, we view any 
argument as to other people occupying or not occupying the 
platform as not material and therefore not necessary to our 
holding as set forth herein. 
                                                 
17 State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 609, 563 N.W.2d 501 
(1997) ("The rule of waiver is one of judicial administration 
and does not limit the power of an appellate court in a proper 
case to address issues not raised in the circuit court.  Wirth 
v. Ehly, 93 Wis. 2d 433, 444, 287 N.W.2d 140 (1980).  This court 
has the power in the exercise of its discretion, to consider 
issues raised for the first time on appeal.") 
No. 
2007AP385   
 
19 
 
¶25 We therefore answer in the affirmative the narrow 
question presented and conclude that the Umanskys can proceed to 
trial in the circuit court on their claim of negligence.  The 
questions of breach, causation, comparison of fault, and damages 
will of course need to be addressed by the trier of fact. 
V. 
THE SAFE PLACE STATUTE 
¶26 In addition, Fox argues that the OSHA regulations in 
force pursuant to Wis. Admin. Code §§ Comm 32.15 and 32.50 and 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 101.055(3)(a)18 articulate the standard 
under the safe place statute, Wis. Stat. § 101.11.19  The statute 
                                                 
18 Wis. Stat. § 101.055(3) Public employee safety and 
health: 
(a) The department shall adopt, by administrative 
rule, standards to protect the safety and health of 
public 
employees. 
 
The 
standards 
shall 
provide 
protection at least equal to that provided to private 
sector employees under standards promulgated by the 
federal 
occupational 
safety 
and 
health 
administration[] . . . . 
19 Wis. Stat. § 101.11  Employer's duty to furnish safe 
employment and place: 
(1) Every employer shall furnish employment which 
shall be safe for the employees therein and shall 
furnish a place of employment which shall be safe for 
employees therein and for frequenters thereof and 
shall furnish and use safety devices and safeguards, 
and 
shall 
adopt 
and 
use 
methods 
and 
processes 
reasonably adequate to render such employment and 
places of employment safe, and shall do every other 
thing 
reasonably necessary to protect the life, 
health, safety, and welfare of such employees and 
frequenters.  Every employer and every owner of a 
place of employment or a public building now or 
hereafter constructed shall so construct, repair or 
maintain such place of employment or public building 
as to render the same safe. 
No. 
2007AP385   
 
20 
 
adopting OSHA standards for public employees is therefore 
properly read, Fox asserts, in tandem with the safe place 
statute.  Fox then points to case law that holds that the 
obligations the safe place law imposes on employers cannot be 
delegated.  See, e.g., Dykstra v. Arthur G. McKee & Co., 100 
Wis. 2d 120, 132, 301 N.W.2d 201 (1981) ("[T]he person who has 
that duty cannot assert that another to whom he has allegedly 
delegated the duty is to be substituted as the primary defendant 
in his stead for a violation of safe place provisions."); 
Pitrowski v. Taylor, 55 Wis. 2d 615, 627, 201 N.W.2d 52 (1972) 
("[T]he duty of complying with [the safe place statute] is on 
the employer[.] . . .  It cannot be delegated to or placed 
upon . . . officers or employees."). 
¶27 We are, of course, not dealing here with a claimed 
violation of the safe place statute at all.  The complaint of 
the Umanskys makes it clear that the claim underlying the 
questions we address here as to immunity is one of common law 
negligence.  We agree with the court of appeals that there is 
"no logical connection between an employer's inability to shift 
its liability for a safe place violation to a third party and 
its ability to delegate to an employee the duty to comply with 
applicable safety regulations."  Umansky, 313 Wis. 2d 445, ¶31.  
This is not a safe-place statute case, and the rules concerning 
such claims do not govern here. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
¶28 We now adopt and affirm those court of appeals' 
rulings listed above.  We conclude that Fox had a ministerial 
No. 
2007AP385   
 
21 
 
duty here.  His job description provided that he was responsible 
for compliance with state and federal safety regulations, 
including 29 C.F.R. § 1910.23(c)(1). "[G]iven the height and 
structure of the platform from which Umansky fell, Fox had a 
ministerial duty to have a standard railing or an alternative as 
specified in 29 C.F.R. § 1910.23(c)(1) on the open side or sides 
of the platform . . . ."  Umansky, 313 Wis. 2d 445, ¶3.  
Further, because we reach and ultimately reject the argument 
that the regulation at issue does not apply to Fox's employer, 
our holding resolves the remaining question from the court of 
appeals' rulings.  We thus remand to the circuit court, having 
answered the threshold question concerning Fox's immunity from 
suit by concluding that Fox had a ministerial duty to perform 
the act of ensuring that the platform complied with the 
applicable regulation.  The focus of the circuit court must be 
on breach, causation, comparison of fault, and damages, not on 
the question of by whom the deceased was employed.  We remand 
for a trial on the Umanskys' negligence claim.     
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for a 
trial on the claim of negligence. 
 
No.  2007AP385.npc 
 
1 
 
¶29 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
majority opinion, but I write separately to highlight the fact 
that courts in other jurisdictions have taken positions similar 
to the reasoning of the majority in this case. 
¶30 The approach that is most logical and remains true to 
the intent of the statute and the administrative code, is one 
that 
applies 
the 
safety 
regulation 
to 
the 
workplace, 
irrespective of whose employees are working there.  
¶31 As 
noted, 
courts 
from 
other 
jurisdictions 
have 
consistently endorsed the idea that state statutes incorporating 
federal safety regulations apply to places, not people.  Teal v. 
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 728 F.2d 799, 805 (6th Cir. 1984) 
("[O]nce an employer is deemed responsible for complying with 
OSHA regulations, it is obligated to protect every employee who 
works at its workplace."); Hargis v. Baize, 168 S.W.3d 36, 44 
(Ky. 2005) (where defendant's violation of specific OSHA-derived 
regulation caused death, the deceased plaintiff was "no less 
entitled to [state safety regulations'] protections" based on 
the fact that he was not the defendant's employee); Goucher v. 
J.R. Simplot Co., 709 P.2d 774, 780 (Wash. 1985) ("WISHA 
regulations 
should 
be 
construed 
to 
protect 
not 
only 
an 
employer's own employees, but all employees who may be harmed by 
the employer's violation of the regulations.").  One court 
stated the rationale for refusing to quibble, where OSHA safety 
regulations are concerned, about whether the worker injured or 
killed was owed a particular duty at the site involved:   
[T]he point of this "multi-employer" gloss is that 
since the contractor is subject to OSHA's regulations 
No.  2007AP385.npc 
 
2 
 
of safety in construction by virtue of being engaged 
in the construction business, and has to comply with 
those regulations in order to protect his own workers 
at the site, it is sensible to think of him as 
assuming the same duty to the other workers at the 
site who might be injured or killed if he violated the 
regulations.  
United States v. MYR Group, Inc., 361 F.3d 364, 366 (7th Cir. 
2004) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).  
¶32 Rulings based on the idea that safety regulations are 
promulgated to apply to a place, not a person, are eminently 
sensible.  Here, the relevant regulations mandate compliance 
with protections concerning occupational safety equivalent to 
federal OSHA requirements for "all places of employment and 
public buildings[.]"  Once it has been determined that a statute 
or regulation imposes a ministerial duty, as we determine here 
in agreement with the court of appeals, the inquiry should be at 
an end.  The employment status (public or private) of the person 
injured or killed as a result of a failure to comply with that 
duty is simply irrelevant to the analysis. 
¶33 We find in Wis. Stat. § 101.055 and Wis. Admin. Code 
§§ Comm 32.001, 32.002, 32.15 and 32.50 no indication that the 
legislature intended any limitation when it adopted the measure 
extending OSHA safety regulations to "all public buildings"; a 
holding to the contrary would result in unwarranted disparate 
treatment for similarly situated injured or deceased persons and 
would simply be unfair.   
¶34 A public building that is safe for public employees 
must be safe for everyone, including employees of a private 
firm. 
 
Indeed, 
the 
statute 
also 
provides 
that 
"[t]he 
No.  2007AP385.npc 
 
3 
 
department . . . shall plan and conduct comprehensive safety and 
health 
loss 
prevention 
programs 
for 
state 
employees 
and 
facilities."  Wis. Stat. § 101.055(9) (emphasis added).  It 
would seem to go without saying that the legislature intended 
for public buildings and facilities to be safe for the public, 
including public employees and employees of a private employer 
as well.  To say otherwise flies in the face of common sense. 
¶35 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.   
¶36 I am authorized to state that Justice DAVID T. PROSSER 
joins this concurrence. 
 
 
No.  2007AP385.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶37 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  The overarching 
issue in this case is whether an employee of the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison who was responsible for safety at Camp Randall 
Stadium, including compliance with applicable state and federal 
safety regulations, is immune from tort liability for the death 
of a privately employed television cameraman working at the 
stadium, after the University employee knowingly failed to 
comply with an applicable state and federal safety regulation 
and his non-compliance was a substantial factor in causing the 
cameraman's death. 
¶38 The issue is stated bluntly so that there can be no 
mistake about the challenge that confronted this court.  The 
majority concludes that the University employee is not immune in 
the narrow circumstances of this case.  In my view, the decision 
represents a small but very welcome correction in the course 
this court has followed for many years, and I join the majority 
opinion in full. 
¶39 I write separately because I believe more change is 
necessary.  This concurrence will attempt to explain how 
Wisconsin law on government responsibility for torts has come to 
be what it is. 
I 
¶40 It has not been easy to sue state government in tort.  
Since 1848, the Wisconsin Constitution has erected procedural 
barriers to direct action against the state without legislative 
consent.  Article IV, Section 27 of the constitution provides, 
No.  2007AP385.dtp 
 
2 
 
"The legislature shall direct by law in what manner and in what 
courts suits may be brought against the state." 
¶41 Immunity from substantive liability is different from 
the procedural immunity embodied in Article IV, Section 27 of 
the constitution.  City of Milwaukee v. Firemen Relief Ass'n of 
Milwaukee, 42 Wis. 2d 23, 34, 165 N.W.2d 384 (1969).  As this 
court observed in 1915, "nonliability for torts arising out of 
the prosecution of governmental functions is based upon grounds 
of public policy distinct from the immunity of the sovereign 
from suit . . . .  No doubt such policy may originally have 
sprung in a large measure from the conception that the sovereign 
can do no wrong."  Apfelbacher v. State, 160 Wis. 565, 575, 152 
N.W. 144 (1915). 
¶42 Over the years, the intellectual underpinnings of the 
court-created doctrine of substantive governmental immunity from 
tort liability were severely criticized.  In 1962, this court 
reacted to that criticism in a landmark decision.  In Holytz v. 
City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962), the 
court unanimously "disavowed its past decisions and abrogated 
the principle of governmental immunity."  Scott v. Savers Prop. 
& Cas. Ins. Co., 2003 WI 60, ¶76, 262 Wis. 2d 127, 663 
N.W.2d 715 (Prosser, J., dissenting).  It declared in the 
clearest 
possible 
terms 
that 
"henceforward, 
so 
far 
as 
governmental responsibility for torts is concerned, the rule is 
liability——the exception is immunity."  Holytz, 17 Wis. 2d at 39 
(emphasis added). 
No.  2007AP385.dtp 
 
3 
 
¶43 The court went on: "This decision is not to be 
interpreted as imposing liability on a governmental body in the 
exercise of its legislative or judicial or quasi-legislative or 
quasi-judicial functions."  Id. at 40.  For this proposition, 
the court cited Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 
133 (Fla. 1957).1 
¶44 The court also explained that if "the legislature 
deems it better public policy, it is, of course, free to 
reinstate 
immunity." 
 
Holytz, 
17 
Wis. 2d at 
40. 
 
"The 
legislature may also impose ceilings on the amount of damages or 
set up administrative requirements which may be preliminary to 
the commencement of judicial proceedings for an alleged tort."  
Id. 
¶45 The Wisconsin Legislature did not deem it better 
public policy to go back to nineteenth century theories of 
immunity.  In 1963, it enacted Wis. Stat. § 331.43 (1963-64), 
entitled 
"Tort 
actions 
against 
political 
corporations, 
governmental subdivisions or agencies and officers, agents or 
employes; notice of claim; limitation of damages and suits."  
                                                 
1 In Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 131 
(Fla. 1957), a widow sued a municipality for damages for the 
alleged wrongful death of her husband who died of smoke 
suffocation after being locked in a jail that was left 
unattended by a municipal jailer.  The Florida Supreme Court 
held that the widow could maintain an action against Cocoa Beach 
for the alleged negligence of its police officer acting in the 
course of his employment.  Id. at 133-34.  The court said the 
issue was "whether a municipal corporation should continue to 
enjoy immunity from liability for the wrongful acts of police 
officers."  Id. at 131. 
No.  2007AP385.dtp 
 
4 
 
This statute is now Wis. Stat. § 893.80 (2007-08),2 and it must 
be put in context. 
¶46 The Holytz facts involved the governmental immunity of 
a municipality, the City of Milwaukee.  Holytz, 17 Wis. 2d at 
28-29.  That is why 1963 Senate Bill 283, the bill that created 
Wis. Stat. § 331.43 (1963-64), was requested by the Wisconsin 
County 
Boards 
Association, 
the 
Wisconsin 
Town 
Boards 
Association, and the League of Wisconsin Municipalities.  But 
the Holytz decision was not confined to the abrogation of 
municipal government immunity.  Again, the court was clear: 
[W]e consider that abrogation of the doctrine [of 
governmental immunity] applies to all public bodies 
within 
the 
state: 
The 
state, 
counties, 
cities, 
villages, towns, school districts, sewer districts, 
drainage 
districts, 
and 
any 
other 
political 
subdivisions 
of 
the 
state——whether 
they 
be 
incorporated or not.  By reason of the rule of 
respondeat superior a public body shall be liable for 
damages for the torts of its officers, agents, and 
employees occurring in the course of the business of 
such public body. 
 
So far as the state of Wisconsin and its various 
arms is concerned, a careful distinction must be made 
between the abrogation of the immunity doctrine and 
the right of a private party to sue the state.  The 
difference between governmental immunity from torts 
and the sovereign immunity of the state from suit was 
recognized in Apfelbacher. . . .  
 
Henceforward, there will be substantive liability 
on the part of the state, but the right to sue the 
state is subject to [Section] 27, [Article] IV of the 
Wisconsin [C]onstitution . . . .  The decision in the 
case 
at 
bar 
removes 
the 
state's 
defense 
of 
nonliability for torts, but it has no effect upon the 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2007AP385.dtp 
 
5 
 
state's sovereign right under the constitution to be 
sued only upon its consent. 
Holytz, 17 Wis. 2d at 40-41 (emphasis added) (internal citations 
omitted). 
¶47 When Holytz abrogated governmental immunity, municipal 
governments acted quickly to enact some limitations on their new 
liability in tort.  The Wisconsin statute that is now § 893.80 
was their answer.  However, this statute was not intended to 
apply to the state.3  Thus, the state was required to enact other 
legislation or to look elsewhere for limits on liability or 
barriers to suit. 
¶48 The court discussed these principles in Forseth v. 
Sweet, 38 Wis. 2d 676, 158 N.W.2d 370 (1968).  In Forseth, the 
court explained the meaning of Holytz: Since Holytz, it said, 
"there is substantive liability imposed upon the state when its 
agents, in the course of their employment, commit a tort."  
Id. at 679.  It added that, prior to Holytz, two reasons 
supported the state's immunity from suit:  
(1) The sovereign immunity [or governmental immunity] 
of the king can do no wrong, implemented by denying 
the doctrine of respondeat superior where an agent of 
the state was guilty of tortious conduct, and (2) the 
lack of the procedural implementation of Article IV, 
Section 27.  Holytz removed only the first barrier. 
Id. at 684. 
¶49 The issue in Forseth was whether the victim of a state 
employee's negligence could bring a direct action against the 
state.  Id. at 679-81.  The answer was no.  See id. at 681.  But 
                                                 
3 Townsend v. Wis. Desert Horse Ass'n, 42 Wis. 2d 414, 423, 
167 N.W.2d 425 (1969). 
No.  2007AP385.dtp 
 
6 
 
there was no dispute that the state would be responsible for a 
damage judgment against a state employee if the state employee's 
negligence, in the course of his employment, caused injury to 
Forseth.  Id. at 679, 681.  The court pointed to then-Wis. Stat. 
§ 270.58 (1965-66),4 which is now Wis. Stat. § 895.46.5  Id. at 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 270.58(1) (1965-66) reads as follows: 
 
State and political subdivisions thereof to pay 
judgments taken against officers.  (1)  Where the 
defendant in any action or special proceeding is a 
public officer or employe and is proceeded against in 
his official capacity or is proceeded against as an 
individual because of acts committed while carrying 
out his duties as an officer or employe and the jury 
or the court finds that he acted in good faith the 
judgment as to damages and costs entered against the 
officer or employe shall be paid by the state or 
political subdivision of which he is an officer or 
employe.  Regardless of the results of the litigation 
the governmental unit shall pay reasonable attorney's 
fees and costs of defending the action, unless it is 
found by the court or jury that the defendant officer 
or employe did not act in good faith, when it does not 
provide legal counsel to the defendant officer or 
employe.  Deputy sheriffs in those counties where they 
serve not at the will of the sheriff but on civil 
service basis shall be covered by this subsection, 
except that the provision relating to payment of the 
judgment shall be discretionary and not mandatory.  In 
such counties the judgment as to damages and costs may 
be paid by the county if approved by the county board. 
(Emphasis added.)   
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.46(1) reads, in part, as follows: 
 
State and political subdivisions thereof to pay 
judgments taken against officers.  (1)(a)  If the 
defendant in any action or special proceeding is a 
public officer or employee and is proceeded against in 
an official capacity or is proceeded against as an 
individual because of acts committed while carrying 
out duties as an officer or employee and the jury or 
the court finds that the defendant was acting within 
No.  2007AP385.dtp 
 
7 
 
681.  This statute directs governmental bodies, including the 
state, to pay judgments against public officers and employees in 
most situations.  See Wis. Stat. § 895.46(1). 
¶50 The Forseth court was unusually candid in summing up 
the situation: 
 
This court has made the public policy decision in 
Holytz that it is in the interest of justice to 
abolish the court-made rule of sovereign immunity[, 
i.e., governmental immunity]. . . .  It is apparent 
that the present statutory structure gives the state 
scant protection, for by sec. 270.58 [(1965-66)], 
Stats., it has made itself fully liable for a judgment 
when it has no right to control the litigation leading 
to the judgment.  The present system imposes great 
handicaps upon the legal officers of the state in 
defending the treasury, while leaving the treasury 
exposed to liability. 
Forseth, 38 Wis. 2d at 690.  The court speculated that "possibly 
there was a failure [in the legislature] to appreciate the 
potential exposure to liability that was to flow from the 1965 
amendment that included the state in sec. 270.58 [(1965-66)] as 
                                                                                                                                                             
the scope of employment, the judgment as to damages 
and costs entered against the officer or employee in 
excess of any insurance applicable to the officer or 
employee shall be paid by the state or political 
subdivision of which the defendant is an officer or 
employee.  Agents of any department of the state shall 
be covered by this section while acting within the 
scope of their agency.  Regardless of the results of 
the litigation the governmental unit, if it does not 
provide legal counsel to the defendant officer or 
employee, shall pay reasonable attorney fees and costs 
of defending the action, unless it is found by the 
court or jury that the defendant officer or employee 
did not act within the scope of employment. 
(Emphasis added.) 
No.  2007AP385.dtp 
 
8 
 
a backstop for any judgment that might be taken against its 
tortiously culpable employees."  Id. at 681. 
¶51 The legislature later amended § 270.58 (1965-66) to 
permit the attorney general to defend state officers and 
employees in tort suits (such as the present case). 
¶52 This was Wisconsin law in the late 1960s.  In his 
Handbook of the Law of Torts, Professor William L. Prosser cited 
Florida's decision in Hargrove and observed the following: 
[The rationale of Hargrove] was followed two years 
later by Illinois, holding a school district liable 
when a child was injured by the negligent operation of 
a school bus.  These examples have touched off, during 
the succeeding four years, a minor avalanche of 
decisions 
repudiating 
municipal 
immunity, 
in 
California, Michigan, Wisconsin, Arizona, Minnesota, 
and 
Alaska . . . . 
 
The 
decisions 
in 
Arizona, 
California and Wisconsin also abolished the immunity 
of the state . . . . 
William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 1012 (3d ed. 
1964) (emphasis added) (internal footnotes omitted). 
¶53 Against this background, we read in the majority 
opinion the following statement: "The general rule is that state 
officers and employees are immune from personal liability for 
injuries resulting from acts performed within the scope of their 
official duties."  Majority op., ¶10.   
¶54 How does this square with the decision in Holytz?  
II 
¶55 In Lister v. Board of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 300, 
240 N.W.2d 610 (1976), this court stated as follows: "The 
general rule is that a public officer is not personally liable 
to one injured as a result of an act performed within the scope 
No.  2007AP385.dtp 
 
9 
 
of his official authority and in the line of his official duty."  
The court did not cite any Wisconsin precedent for this 
statement.  Instead, it cited 63 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Officers 
and Employees, Section 288 (1972).6  Id. at 300 n.17.  The 
principle stated in Am. Jur. 2d was indisputably intended to 
apply to both state and municipal public officers. 
¶56 Twenty years later, Kimps v. Hill, 200 Wis. 2d 1, 10, 
546 N.W.2d 281 (1996) (citing Lister 72 Wis. 2d at 300), 
expanded the rule announced in Lister: "Under the general rule 
as applied in Wisconsin, state officers and employees are immune 
from personal liability for injuries resulting from acts 
performed within the scope of their official duties."  (Emphasis 
added.)  This sweeping statement was and is broad enough to 
cover all state employees.  In a footnote, however, Kimps 
narrowed the Lister rule with respect to municipalities: "The 
general rule of immunity for state public officers stands in 
contrast to that for municipalities where, 'the rule is 
liability——the exception is immunity.'"  Id. at 10 n.6 (quoting 
Holytz, 17 Wis. 2d at 39) (emphasis added).  "The common law 
immunity for municipalities was abrogated by this court in 
Holytz . . . ."  Id. (emphasis added).   
                                                 
6 "As a rule, a public officer, whether judicial, quasi-
judicial, or executive, is not personally liable to one injured 
in consequence of an act performed within the scope of his 
official authority, and in the line of his official duty."  63 
Am. Jur. 2d, Public Officers and Employees, § 288, at 798 
(1972). 
No.  2007AP385.dtp 
 
10 
 
¶57 These passages are not an accurate statement of the 
holding in Holytz, and they did not anticipate the immunity that 
courts would continue to bestow upon municipal employees. 
¶58 The 
Kimps 
court, 
after 
establishing 
the 
broad 
immunity, also stated an exception: "a public officer or 
employee is not shielded from liability for the negligent 
performance of a purely ministerial duty."  Id. at 10 (citing 
Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 300-01). 
¶59 Today, Lister and Kimps provide the framework for 
analyzing government torts in Wisconsin.  Actions by government 
employees within the scope of their official duties are 
generally seen as immune from liability.  Liability may be found 
only 
in 
narrow 
exceptions 
to 
general 
immunity. 
 
Thus, 
governmental immunity has been supplanted by an extremely broad 
public employee immunity created by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 
III 
¶60 Public officer immunity goes back a long way, and to 
some extent, it is separate from governmental immunity.  We all 
understand the principle that a public officer should not be 
held liable for doing her job in a proper manner, because we 
know that even perfect performance, fully authorized by law, may 
generate litigation from those who are hurt or disadvantaged by 
public action or policy. 
¶61 Professor Prosser explained public officer immunity in 
1964 in his Handbook of the Law of Torts: 
 
The 
complex 
process 
of 
legal 
administration 
requires that officers shall be charged with the duty 
of making decisions, either of law or of fact, and 
acting 
in 
accordance 
with 
their 
determinations.  
No.  2007AP385.dtp 
 
11 
 
Public 
servants 
would 
be 
unduly 
hampered 
and 
intimidated in the discharge of their duties, and an 
impossible burden would fall upon all our agencies of 
government, if the immunity to private liability were 
not extended, in some reasonable degree, to those who 
act improperly, or exceed the authority given. 
Prosser, supra, at 1013-14. 
 
¶62 The key words in this passage are "private liability."  
Public officer immunity made great sense when state and 
municipal governments had governmental immunity and were able to 
disavow any liability for the torts of their officers and 
employees.  Public officer immunity still makes good sense when 
public officers and employees are acting in a legislative or 
judicial or quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial capacity, where 
the exercise of discretion is essential.   
¶63 Public employee immunity does not make good sense 
under the following circumstances: (1) substantive governmental 
immunity has been abrogated; (2) governments have accepted a 
respondeat superior relationship with their employees; and (3) 
public employee immunity is being used to evade liability for a 
public employee's obvious breach of a known standard of care. 
¶64 The 
current 
problem 
is 
bound 
up 
in 
the 
term 
"ministerial duty."  Wisconsin courts have taken the principle 
of "ministerial duty" from a context in which it was valuable 
and necessary and employed it in a context in which it is unfair 
and absurd. 
IV 
¶65 In 1951, Eugene Meyer, 14, a student at Hawthorne 
Junior High School in Wauwatosa, fell from a five-foot retaining 
wall on school grounds and sustained injuries.  Meyer v. Carman, 
No.  2007AP385.dtp 
 
12 
 
271 Wis. 329, 331, 73 N.W.2d 514 (1955).  His guardian ad litem, 
Patrick T. Sheedy, and his father, Alvin Meyer, filed a tort 
action in Eugene's behalf against the eight members of the 
Wauwatosa board of education individually.  Id. at 330-31.  When 
the case came to the supreme court, the issue was whether Eugene 
could recover from the school board members individually for 
"failure to erect and maintain guardrails or other safety 
devices on the retaining wall."  Id. at 331.  The circuit court 
had concluded that recovery was possible because the school 
board members had a ministerial duty under Wis. Stat. § 40.29(2) 
(1953-54) to "keep the buildings and grounds in good repair, 
suitably equipped and in safe and sanitary condition at all 
times."  Id. (quoting Wis. Stat. § 40.29(2) (1953-54)).  The 
circuit court "applied the rule of law that a public officer who 
knowingly or negligently fails to do a ministerial act which the 
law requires him to do may be compelled to respond in damages to 
an injured party."  Id. (citing 43 Am. Jur. Public Officers 
§ 278, at 90 (1942)). 
¶66 The supreme court reversed, rejecting Eugene's claim 
for two reasons.  First, the court determined the cited statute 
imposed duties on the board.  Id. at 333-34.  "Any action taken 
under the statute must of necessity be an official action of the 
board. . . .  [A]ny failure to take action is the neglect of the 
board, 
and 
no 
responsibility 
therefor 
devolves 
upon 
the 
individual members."  Id.  Second, and more important for our 
purposes, the court stated that the "duty" to act, upon either 
No.  2007AP385.dtp 
 
13 
 
the board or its members, was not "ministerial."  Id. at 331-32.  
The court stated as follows: 
 
At first blush it might appear that the duty to 
keep the school grounds "safe" is ministerial in 
character, but it is apparent on closer analysis that 
a great many circumstances may need to be considered 
in deciding what action is necessary to do so, and 
such decisions involve the exercise of judgment or 
discretion rather than the mere performance of a 
prescribed task.  As stated in 18 McQuillin, Mun. 
Corp. (3d ed.), p. 225, sec. 53.33: 
"Official action . . . is ministerial when it is 
absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely 
the execution of a set task, and when the law which 
imposes it prescribes and defines the time, mode, and 
occasion for its performance with such certainty that 
nothing remains for judgment or discretion." 
Id. (ellipsis in original). 
¶67 The court also quoted a Florida case, First National 
Bank v. Filer, 145 So. 204, 207 (Fla. 1933), which stated that: 
[A] duty is to be regarded as ministerial, when it is 
a duty that has been positively imposed by law, and 
its performance required at a time and in a manner, or 
upon conditions which are specifically designated the 
duty to perform under the conditions specified, not 
being 
dependent 
upon 
the 
officer's 
judgment 
or 
discretion. 
Meyer, 271 Wis. at 332. 
¶68 In examining the Meyer case in retrospect, it should 
be remembered that both governmental immunity and public officer 
immunity were still in full flower.  The court was disturbed 
that a plaintiff, however sympathetic, was attempting to extract 
money damages from individual members of the Wauwatosa school 
board.  Because existing governmental immunity rejected the 
principle of respondeat superior, the court knew that school 
No.  2007AP385.dtp 
 
14 
 
board members found liable individually in tort had no assurance 
that the judgment against them would be covered by the school 
district.  The opinion recognized the possibility of personal 
liability in extreme cases, but it limited those cases to 
violations of a narrowly defined "ministerial duty" exception. 
V 
¶69 Meyer reappeared in the case of Chart v. Dvorak, 57 
Wis. 2d 92, 203 N.W.2d 673 (1973).  Chart is instructive in 
showing how we have retreated from state liability in tort. 
¶70 Penelope Chart was a passenger in a car that failed to 
negotiate a sharp curve at an intersection on a state highway in 
Vilas County.  Id. at 94.  The car crashed into a power pole, 
and Chart was severely injured.  Id.  She sued Carl Dvorak, the 
chief maintenance engineer of District Seven of the State 
Highway Commission, and Martin Varekois, the district traffic 
supervisor for that district.  Id. at 95.  She claimed that the 
two defendants were causally negligent in: (a) failing to place 
critical highway warning signs far enough in advance of the 
intersection to provide an adequate warning to approaching 
traffic; and (b) "placing the warning sign[s] at a distance from 
the intersection so as to make it impossible for a driver 
traveling at a legal rate of speed to negotiate the corner 
safely."  Id.  There was no dispute that the two defendants had 
no role in the actual placement of the warning signs and did not 
supervise their placement.  Id. at 96. 
¶71 The court rejected the defendants' arguments.  The 
court's opinion included the following statements: 
No.  2007AP385.dtp 
 
15 
 
The alleged wrongful act . . . is an insufficient 
warning of a known highway hazard.  As both Dvorak and 
Varekois had official, nondelegable authority and 
responsibility for the placement of such highway 
warning 
signs, 
they 
are 
the 
proper 
parties 
defendant.[7] 
 
. . . .  
 
Appellants' second argument is that the placement 
of a highway warning sign is a legislative or quasi-
legislative 
decision 
and . . . cannot 
predicate 
liability for an accident resulting from its location.  
In 
this 
respect 
we 
think 
the 
trial 
court 
correctly . . . conclu[ded] that once appellants made 
the legislative or quasi-legislative decision to place 
the highway warning sign, they had a duty to place it 
and maintain it without negligence. 
 
. . . .  
 
Appellants' final contention is that the trial 
court ought to have granted their motion for summary 
judgment because they cannot be individually liable in 
tort even if they did not place the highway warning 
signs 
in 
conformity 
with 
the 
state 
highway 
commission's 
legislative 
directive. 
 
Here 
again 
appellants advance two arguments . . . .  The first is 
that since the appellants were agents of the state 
highway commission . . . their acts were the acts of 
such commission and, therefore, they are entitled to 
partake of the governmental immunity enjoyed by the 
commission.  Appellants cite no authority for this 
proposition.  There is none.  It is obvious that the 
state is immobile absent employees or agents to carry 
on its functions.  All state employees are, therefore, 
agents of the state when performing those tasks 
entrusted to them.  [To agree with appellants' 
position 
that 
they, 
as 
agents 
of 
the 
highway 
commission, ought to be allowed to partake of the 
governmental immunity enjoyed by that commission, this 
                                                 
7 Accord Seward v. Town of Milford, 21 Wis. 491 (*485), 494 
(*488) (1867) (affirming judgment of negligence against the town 
for its failure to make a damaged roadway safe for travel by 
either 
"repair[ing 
the 
roadway] 
at 
once, 
or 
at 
least . . . keep[ing] 
up 
some 
suitable 
guards 
to 
prevent 
travelers from going over the dangerous track"). 
No.  2007AP385.dtp 
 
16 
 
court would have to overlook the long settled law of 
this state, embodied in sec. 270.58 [(1965-66)], that 
public officers or employees may be proceeded against 
in 
their 
official 
capacities.] 
 
We 
conclude, 
therefore, that appellants, as public officials, may 
be proceeded against for dereliction of their duties 
resulting in injury to another. 
 
. . . .  
. . .  Here, the appellants were responsible for the 
proper sign placement and, therefore, are the proper 
parties defendant. 
Id. at 98, 100-01, 102-04, 105 (emphasis added) (internal 
footnotes omitted and outer brackets in original). 
¶72 This 
ruling spooked the Wisconsin Department of 
Justice, which moved for reconsideration and caused the court to 
clarify the bracketed sentence from page 103 of the opinion.  
The court's clarification stated the following: 
 
The opinion refers to sec. 270.58, Stats. [(1965-
66)], as embodying "the long settled law . . . that 
public officers or employees may be proceeded against 
in their official capacities."  On rehearing, it has 
been called to our attention that the quoted portion 
of the statement could be construed as a rule of 
liability.  It was not so intended; and were it given 
that blanket interpretation, it would be incorrect.  
Sec[tion] 270.58 [(1965-66)] imposes an obligation on 
the state or municipality only if a judgment has been 
secured against the officer or employee.  As stated in 
the opinion, the duty of the defendants herein was of 
a nondelegable, ministerial nature.  These facts, if 
proved on trial, would impose liability not on the 
basis of sec. 270.58, but rather on the rationale of 
Meyer v. Carman. 
Id. at 105 (emphasis added). 
¶73 The court turned to Meyer again in Cords v. Ehly, 62 
Wis. 2d 31, 214 N.W.2d 432 (1974).  In this case, three young 
women fell into a gorge at a state park in Sauk County.  Id. at 
33.  The plaintiffs sued seven state employees for negligence 
No.  2007AP385.dtp 
 
17 
 
"in allowing the park to be open during hours of darkness, in 
failing to guard the trails which run along the very edge of the 
cliffs above the gorge, and in failing to give any warning of 
the naturally hazardous nature of the terrain."  Id.  The 
supreme court rejected the state's contention that the employees 
were immune from suit: 
[T]he 
defendant 
employees 
are 
sued 
as 
private 
individuals for damages alleged to have resulted from 
their negligent conduct.  The alleged conduct occurred 
within 
the 
scope 
of 
their 
employment 
by 
the 
state . . . . 
 
. . . .  
 
The individual state employee defendants in this 
case contend that sec. 270.58, Stats. [(1965-66)], 
automatically transforms any suit against a state 
employee into a suit against the state because the 
state is potentially liable on the judgment.  However, 
if sec. 270.58 [(1965-66)] is read to provide that 
suits in tort against state employees are to be 
treated as suits in tort against the state, and if the 
legislature has not by that statute consented to suits 
in tort against the state, then no damage judgments 
could be obtained in suits against state employees, 
and the provision in sec. 270.58 [(1965-66)] for the 
payment of such damages out of state funds would be 
meaningless. 
 
Quite the contrary, it is clear that in enacting 
sec. 
270.58 
[(1965-66)], 
Stats., 
the 
legislature 
contemplated that state employees were subject to suit 
in tort under the law of Wisconsin and wished 
gratuitously to shield them from monetary loss in such 
suits. 
 
. . . .  
 
In Forseth v. Sweet, this court said that "[n]o 
new exposure to substantive liability was contemplated 
by this statute."  The most recent case to discuss 
sec. 
270.58 
[(1965-66)], 
Stats., 
was 
Chart 
v. 
Dvorak. . . .  
No.  2007AP385.dtp 
 
18 
 
 
. . . .  
. . .  Any liability of state employees is governed by 
the common law as adopted in this state by the supreme 
court.  If the defendants are liable under the 
applicable doctrines, then sec. 270.58 [(1965-66)] 
provides that the state will pay the judgment if the 
action or inaction giving rise to the liability was 
done 
in 
good 
faith 
within 
the 
scope 
of 
state 
employment.  Sec[tion] 270.58 [(1965-66) does not 
become applicable until after a judgment of liability 
is entered. 
 
. . . .  
 
The defendants call this court's attention to the 
case of Meyer v. Carman. . . .  
 
The cases of Meyer v. Carman and Chart v. Dvorak 
are distinguishable and not contradictory.  The Meyer 
[c]ase, confined to its facts, concerns the absence of 
personal liability of school board members, where they 
are considered to be performing discretionary duties.  
Chart involves the alleged performance of ministerial, 
nondiscretionary duties. 
 
. . . .  
 
The Meyer [c]ase reiterates the general rule that 
"a public officer who knowingly or negligently fails 
to do a ministerial act which the law requires him to 
do may be compelled to respond in damages to an 
injured party."  In Chart v. Dvorak the court, 
applying 
the 
ministerial/discretionary distinction, 
held that highway commission engineers could not be 
held liable for the decision as to whether or not to 
locate a traffic sign at a particular place, but that 
once the decision was made, the signs were to be 
placed in accord with standards developed by the 
highway commission.  Therefore, the actual placement 
of the signs was ministerial.  This court held that a 
question of fact was presented as to whether the signs 
in question had been properly placed.  The court also 
concluded 
that 
the 
named 
defendants 
had 
the 
nondelegable duty to see that the signs were properly 
placed. 
 
A different question of fact is presented here as 
to 
whether 
the 
alleged 
negligence 
is 
in 
the 
No.  2007AP385.dtp 
 
19 
 
performance of ministerial duties by the individual 
defendants.  It cannot be said on the basis of the 
complaint that the plaintiffs will be unable to prove 
any set of facts in support of their claim which would 
entitle them to relief. 
Cords, 62 Wis. 2d at 35-41 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
¶74 This brings us back to Lister, where the court stated 
as follows: 
 
The general rule is that a public officer is not 
personally liable to one injured as a result of an act 
performed within the scope of his official authority 
and in the line of his official duty.  The various 
exceptions to this rule are determined by a judicial 
balancing of the need of public officers to perform 
their functions freely against the right of an 
aggrieved party to seek redress. 
 
The most generally recognized exception to the 
rule of immunity is that an officer is liable for 
damages resulting from his negligent performance of a 
purely ministerial duty.  A public officer's duty is 
ministerial only when it is absolute, certain and 
imperative, involving merely the performance of a 
specific task when the law imposes, prescribes and 
defines 
the 
time, 
mode 
and 
occasion 
for 
its 
performance with such certainty that nothing remains 
for judgment or discretion. 
Lister, 
72 
Wis. 2d at 
300-01 
(emphasis 
added) 
(citations 
omitted). 
 
¶75 Lister shifted the focus from liability to immunity, 
and it severely limited the exception to immunity by defining 
ministerial 
duty 
with 
words 
like 
"absolute, 
certain 
and 
imperative" 
that 
had 
been 
used 
many 
years 
before 
when 
governmental immunity, including municipal immunity, was still 
in 
full 
force. 
 
This 
rigid, 
inflexible 
formulation 
was 
inconsistent with cases like Chart and Cords.  Lister never 
No.  2007AP385.dtp 
 
20 
 
mentioned Holytz.  None of the Lister justices had participated 
in the Holytz decision. 
 
¶76 In 1977, in Lifer v. Raymond, 80 Wis. 2d 503, 259 
N.W.2d 537 (1977), the supreme court rewrote history as it 
firmed up the effective restoration of governmental immunity.  
Rebutting an accident victim's exaggerated argument that under 
Holytz there should be no distinction between the liability of a 
state employee and the liability of a private citizen, the court 
stated as follows: 
That is not what Holytz says or means.  Holytz dealt 
with the doctrine of sovereign immunity in an action 
against a governmental body, not a public officer. 
 
. . . .  
 
Although 
the 
plaintiff 
contends 
that 
the 
defendant is immune from suit only for acts which are 
legislative, judicial, quasi-legislative or quasi-
judicial, we base our contrary conclusion on the 
principles of official immunity set out in Lister that 
the defendant is not liable for his discretionary 
acts.  To so hold is not to imply that the test for 
the immunity of a state officer set out in Lister is 
different from the test for the immunity of a 
municipal officer under sec. 895.43(3), Stats.  A 
quasi-legislative 
act 
involves 
the 
exercise 
of 
discretion or judgment in determining the policy to be 
carried out or the rule to be followed.  A quasi-
judicial act involves the exercise of discretion and 
judgment in the application of a rule to specific 
facts.  Acts that are "legislative, quasi-legislative, 
judicial 
or 
quasi-judicial 
functions," 
are, 
by 
definition, nonministerial acts.  As applied, the 
terms 
"quasi-judicial 
or 
quasi-legislative" 
and 
"discretionary" are synonymous . . . . 
Lifer, 80 Wis. 2d at 510-12 (citations omitted). 
¶77 This pronouncement, unsupported by authority, changed 
the course of Wisconsin tort law.  For, as Professor Prosser 
No.  2007AP385.dtp 
 
21 
 
noted in his treatise, "It would be difficult to conceive of any 
official act, no matter how directly ministerial, that did not 
admit of some discretion in the manner of its performance, even 
if it involved only the driving of a nail."  Prosser, supra, at 
1017 (quoting Ham v. Los Angeles County, 189 P. 462, 468 (Cal. 
App. 1920)). 
¶78 Lister, Lifer, and Kimps have become the hallmark 
decisions that define the militantly unprogressive state of 
Wisconsin law.  So far as government responsibility for torts is 
concerned, immunity has become the rule and liability has become 
the rare exception.  Justice has been confined to a crawl space 
too narrow for most tort victims to fit. 
VI 
¶79 In the case at hand, the court of appeals was forced 
to deal with these decisions.  Umansky v. ABC Ins. Co., 2008 WI 
App 101, 313 Wis. 2d 445, 756 N.W.2d 601.  The opinion of Judge 
Vergeront is scholarly, well-reasoned, and highly persuasive.  
Fortunately, it is being adopted by the majority in an excellent 
opinion by Justice Crooks.  Sooner or later this court will 
realize that accountability is the price of justice. 
¶80 For the reasons stated, I respectfully concur. 
¶81 I am authorized to state that JUSTICE N. PATRICK 
CROOKS joins this concurrence. 
 
 
No.  2007AP385.akz 
 
1 
 
¶82 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J. (dissenting).  The issue 
before the court is whether Barry Fox, an individual employee of 
the state of Wisconsin, is immune from liability for an accident 
to an ABC, Inc. employee who was working at Camp Randall 
Stadium.  I must dissent from the majority opinion because the 
majority ignores the plain language of the Wisconsin statutes 
and administrative code and instead improperly relies on OSHA 
provisions to create a ministerial duty where none exists.   
¶83 As a result of the majority decision, a windfall 
recovery is potentially created for any non-state employee who 
can obtain both worker's compensation and a recovery against the 
state employee, while an injured state employee under the same 
circumstances would be limited to a worker's compensation 
recovery.  The majority opinion also opens the door to allow any 
injured frequenter recovery against the state or a state 
employee.  Until today, the state was treated by the legislature 
differently than a private employer in order to protect the 
public fisc.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
I. MINISTERIAL DUTY IMPOSED BY LAW 
¶84 "Under the general rule as applied in Wisconsin, state 
officers and employees are immune from personal liability for 
injuries resulting from acts performed within the scope of their 
official duties."  Kimps v. Hill, 200 Wis. 2d 1, 10, 546 N.W.2d 
151 (1996) (citing Lister v. Bd. of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 
300, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976)).  For public officers, immunity is 
the rule and liability is the exception, unlike municipalities, 
where liability is the rule and immunity is the exception.  Lodl 
No.  2007AP385.akz 
 
2 
 
v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 71, ¶22, 253 Wis. 2d 323, 
646 N.W.2d 314.  Immunity for public officers and employees of 
the state "is based largely upon public policy considerations 
that spring from the interest in protecting the public purse and 
a preference for political rather than judicial redress for the 
actions of public officers."  Id., ¶23 (setting forth a number 
of policy considerations). 
¶85 This doctrine of immunity, however, is not without 
exceptions.  Id., ¶24.  There is no immunity against liability 
associated with: "1) the performance of ministerial duties 
imposed by law; 2) known and compelling dangers that give rise 
to ministerial duties on the part of public officers or 
employees; 3) acts involving medical discretion; and 4) acts 
that are malicious, willful, and intentional."  Id.   
¶86 "The ministerial duty exception is not so much an 
exception as a recognition that immunity law distinguishes 
between discretionary and ministerial acts, immunizing the 
performance of the former but not the latter." Id., ¶25. "A 
ministerial 
duty 
is 
one 
that 
'is 
absolute, 
certain 
and 
imperative, involving merely the performance of a specific task 
when the law imposes, prescribes and defines the time, mode and 
occasion for its performance with such certainty that nothing 
remains for judgment or discretion.'"  Id. (citing Lister, 72 
Wis. 2d at 301). 
¶87 To 
assist 
in 
determining 
whether 
an 
act 
is 
discretionary or ministerial, this court has traditionally 
examined such things as a statute, the administrative code, or 
No.  2007AP385.akz 
 
3 
 
other materials that are unique to a specific case, such as job 
descriptions or policy manuals.   
¶88 For example, in Lister, the court was asked to decide 
if the registrar's classification of students for tuition 
purposes was ministerial in nature.  Id. at 300.  The plaintiffs 
argued that when the registrar determines a student's residency 
status, which could entitle the student to lower tuition costs, 
the determination was ministerial.  Id.  The relevant statute 
provided in part,  
(1)(a) Any adult student who has been a bona fide 
resident of the state for one year next preceding the 
beginning of any semester for which such student 
registers at the university . . . shall while he 
continues a resident of the state be entitled to 
exemption from nonresident tuition . . . .   
. . . .  
(3) In determining bona fide residence, filing of 
state income tax returns in Wisconsin, eligibility for 
voting in this state, motor vehicle registration in 
Wisconsin, 
and 
employment in Wisconsin shall be 
considered. . . . 
Wis. Stat. § 36.16 (1969-70). 
¶89 The court concluded that "[t]he statute did not 
prescribe the classification process with such certainty that 
nothing remained for the administrative officer's judgment and 
discretion."  Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 301.  The court stated that 
"[i]t must be conceded that an officer charged with the 
administration and application of the standards set forth in 
[§] 36.16 [] could make mistakes in judgment which would result 
in an erroneous classification."  Id. at 302.  As a result, the 
court concluded that "the policy considerations underlying the 
No.  2007AP385.akz 
 
4 
 
immunity principle require that the officer be free from the 
threat of personal liability for damages resulting from mistakes 
of judgment."  Id. 
¶90 In Kimps, the plaintiff was injured at the University 
of Wisconsin-Stevens Point while moving a "volleyball standard."  
Kimps, 200 Wis. 2d at 6.  As she was moving the "standard," "the 
metal base separated from the pole and fell onto her foot."  Id.  
The plaintiff asserted that the safety director was liable 
because he breached a ministerial duty set forth in the safety 
director's job description.  Id. at 14.  The job description 
provided in relevant part: "Investigate all incidents and take 
action to correct the condition or procedure that caused the 
accident."  Id.  The plaintiff argued that because a maintenance 
worker was similarly injured two years earlier, the safety 
director should have personally tightened the set screws or 
directed someone to tighten the set screws in order to prevent 
another accident.  Id.  The court concluded that the safety 
director's job description did not create a ministerial duty 
because the "'time, mode and occasion' for performing an 
investigation 
of 
the 
maintenance 
worker's 
accident 
and 
determination of the appropriate corrective action to be taken 
remained totally within [the safety director's] judgment and 
discretion."  Id. at 15. 
¶91 In Lodl, the plaintiff asserted that the police 
officer had a ministerial duty to manually control traffic at an 
intersection where traffic control lights were no longer 
working.  Lodl, 253 Wis. 2d 323, ¶¶6-8, 27.  This court 
No.  2007AP385.akz 
 
5 
 
concluded 
that 
the 
applicable 
statute 
and 
the 
police 
department's policy did not confer a ministerial duty on the 
police officer to manually direct traffic.  Id., ¶¶27-28.  The 
statute at issue did not direct the officer to perform manual 
traffic control in any specific situation, and the policy 
described manual traffic control procedures only if the officer 
decided to manually control traffic.  Id.  Neither the statute 
nor the policy eliminated the officer's discretion as to when or 
where to undertake manual traffic control.  Id., ¶¶28-31. 
¶92 In 
Noffke 
v. 
Bakke, 
a 
plaintiff 
asserted 
that 
cheerleading spirit rules established a ministerial duty that 
required the coach to provide a spotter and mats for a 
cheerleading stunt.  2009 WI 10, ¶45, 315 Wis. 2d 350, 760 
N.W.2d 156.  We concluded that the spirit rules were more 
appropriately characterized as "guidelines" and did not include 
mandatory language dictating a specific action.  Id., ¶45-47.  
For example, the spirit rules provided in part that "[a]ll 
spirit activities should be held in a location suitable for 
spirit activities with the use of mats, free of obstructions, 
and away from excessive noise or distractions."  Id., ¶46.  As a 
result, we determined that the spirit rules did not set forth a 
ministerial duty, but rather, they provided the cheerleading 
coach with significant discretion.  Id., ¶51. 
¶93 In the case at hand, the majority concludes that a 
ministerial duty imposed by law precludes immunity in this case.  
I, however, disagree that Fox has a ministerial duty imposed by 
law under the facts of this case.  The Umanskys and the majority 
No.  2007AP385.akz 
 
6 
 
focus their attention on the federal OSHA regulations that have 
been incorporated into the Wisconsin Administrative Code.  They 
argue that Fox individually had a ministerial duty to ensure 
that the platform's front side had a railing.  A proper 
analysis, however, begins with a plain reading of Wis. Stat. 
§ 101.055 and then the Wisconsin Administrative Code, rather 
than beginning with the language of the federal regulations.   
A. Wisconsin statutes and administrative code     
¶94 In order to determine if Fox had a ministerial duty in 
the case at hand, it is necessary to review the Wisconsin 
statutes 
as 
well 
as 
the 
administrative 
code, 
which 
has 
incorporated by reference a portion of the federal regulations.   
¶95 "[T]he purpose of statutory interpretation is to 
determine what the statute means so that it may be given its 
full, proper, and intended effect."  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110.  This court begins statutory interpretation with 
the language of the statute.  Id., ¶45.  If the meaning of the 
statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry and give the 
language its "common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except 
that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given 
their technical or special definitional meaning."  Id. 
¶96 Context and structure of a statute are important to 
the meaning of the statute.  Id., ¶46.  "Therefore, statutory 
language is interpreted in the context in which it is used; not 
in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language 
of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to 
No.  2007AP385.akz 
 
7 
 
avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id.  Moreover, the 
"[s]tatutory language is read where possible to give reasonable 
effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage."  Id.  "A 
statute's purpose or scope may be readily apparent from its 
plain language or its relationship to surrounding or closely-
related statutes——that is, from its context or the structure of 
the statute as a coherent whole."  Id., ¶49.  "'If this process 
of analysis yields a plain, clear statutory meaning, then there 
is no ambiguity, and the statute is applied according to this 
ascertainment of its meaning.'" Id., ¶46 (citation omitted).  If 
statutory language is unambiguous, we do not need to consult 
extrinsic sources of interpretation.  Id. 
¶97 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 101.055 
(2001-02)1 
provides 
in 
relevant part:  
(1) INTENT. It is the intent of this section to 
give employees of the state, of any agency and of any 
political 
subdivision 
of 
this 
state 
rights 
and 
protections relating to occupational safety and health 
equivalent to those granted to employees in the 
private sector under the occupational safety and 
health act of 1970 (5 USC 5108, 5314, 5315 and 7902; 
15 USC 633 and 636; 18 USC 1114; 29 USC 553 and 651 to 
678; 42 USC 3142-1 and 49 USC 1421). 
. . . .  
(3) STANDARDS. (a)  The department shall adopt, 
by administrative rule, standards to protect the 
safety and health of public employees. The standards 
shall provide protection at least equal to that 
provided to private sector employees under standards 
promulgated by the federal occupational safety and 
health administration . . . . 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-02 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2007AP385.akz 
 
8 
 
¶98 Pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 101.055, the Wisconsin 
Administrative Code, Ch. Comm 32, Public Employee Safety and 
Health, provides in relevant part: 
Comm 32.001 Purpose. This chapter establishes 
minimum occupational safety and health standards for 
public employees. 
Comm 32.002 Scope. The provisions of this chapter 
apply to all places of employment and public buildings 
of a public employer. 
. . . .  
Comm 32.01 Definitions. . . .  
. . . .  
(5) "Public employee" or "employee", as defined 
in s. 101.055(2)(b), Stats., means any employee of the 
state, of any state agency or of any political 
subdivision of the state. 
. . . .  
Comm 32.15 OSHA Safety and health standards.  
Except as provided in s. Comm 32.16 and subch. IV, all 
places of employment and public buildings of a public 
employer shall comply with the federal Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requirements 
adopted under s. Comm 32.50. 
¶99 Wisconsin Admin. Code § Comm 32.50 incorporates by 
reference 29 C.F.R. Part 1910, which provides in relevant part 
at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.23(c)(1): 
Every open-sided floor or platform 4 feet or more 
above adjacent floor or ground level shall be guarded 
by a standard railing (or the equivalent as specified 
in paragraph (e)(3) of this section) on all open sides 
except where there is entrance to a ramp, stairway, or 
fixed ladder. . . . 
¶100  When reading the text of the relevant Wisconsin 
statute and administrative code provision, it becomes clear that 
No.  2007AP385.akz 
 
9 
 
Fox did not have a ministerial duty to install a railing in this 
case for the following four reasons. 
¶101 First, both Wis. Stat. § 101.055 and Wis. Admin. Code 
§ Comm 32.001 plainly state that the standards adopted pursuant 
to these provisions are meant to protect the safety and health 
of public employees.  "Public employee or employee" "means any 
employee of the state, or any state agency or of any political 
subdivision of the state."  Wis. Admin. Code § Comm 32.01(5).  
Thus, to the extent that a ministerial duty may arise out of 
these provisions, that ministerial duty is owed to public 
employees.  Umansky, however, was a private employee of ABC, 
Inc.  Because the relevant provisions address only a duty to 
public employees, any action Fox could have taken that would 
have 
benefitted 
Umansky 
was 
discretionary 
rather 
than 
ministerial. 
¶102 Second, the legislature's decision to reference public 
employees only and thus limit the provision's applicability must 
be respected because the provisions could have been drafted more 
broadly.  See C. Coakley Relocation Sys., Inc. v. City of 
Milwaukee, 2008 WI 68, ¶24 n.10, 310 Wis. 2d 456, 750 N.W.2d 900 
(stating that courts must presume that the legislature says what 
it means in a statute; the legislature's omissions must be 
respected; and it is generally not acceptable for courts to 
insert words into the statute).  If the legislature meant for 
this statute to apply to more than just public employees, it 
could 
have 
included 
other 
verbiage, 
such 
as 
the 
word 
"frequenters."  For example, Wis. Stat. § 101.11(1), Employer's 
No.  2007AP385.akz 
 
10 
 
duty to furnish safe employment and place, provides that 
"[e]very employer shall furnish employment which shall be safe 
for the employees therein and shall furnish a place of 
employment which shall be safe for employees therein and for 
frequenters thereof and shall furnish and use safety devices and 
safeguards . . . ." 
(Emphasis 
added.) 
 
In 
contrast, 
the 
legislature used no such language to expand coverage beyond 
public employees in the provisions now at issue.  The majority 
opinion today, however, makes the state a deep pocket for any 
frequenter of a state building despite the fact that the term 
"frequenter" is absent from the relevant statutes and codes. 
¶103 Third, unlike in Lister, Kimps, Lodl, and Noffke where 
the controlling documents contained no restrictions as to whom a 
ministerial duty could be owed, the statute and code in this 
case do contain a restriction as to whom a ministerial duty may 
be owed——a public employee.  We must respect the legislature's 
decision.  When the legislature enacted protective provisions, 
it limited that protection to public employees.  This, however, 
does not provide a public employee with more protection than a 
private employee because 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.2 and 1910.23 on 
their face protect private employees.  Therefore, private 
employees are not without protection; they are protected by the 
OSHA provisions and the duty that their employer owes them. 
¶104 Fourth, the foregoing interpretation is consistent 
with the principle that an administrative rule may not be read 
so as to provide protection broader than that contemplated by 
its authorizing statute.  Josam Mfg. Co. v. State Bd. of Health, 
No.  2007AP385.akz 
 
11 
 
26 Wis. 2d 587, 600-01, 133 N.W.2d 301 (1965).  The authorizing 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 101.055, clearly sets forth that the 
protections belong specifically to public employees.  If we 
conclude that the provisions at issue here could establish that 
Fox had a ministerial duty to Umansky, we would be reading the 
provisions well beyond the stated purpose of protecting public 
employees. 
¶105 While I conclude there is no ministerial duty in this 
case, I further note that the majority does not completely 
address Fox's argument with regard to whether public employees 
worked on the platform in question.  Majority op., ¶22 & n.16.  
Though it is true that Fox argues that Umansky needed to prove 
that a public employee was working on the platform at the time 
Umansky fell, an argument which the majority does address, id., 
Fox argues in the alternative that it was at least necessary to 
show that public employees in the course of their employment had 
worked on the platform in question at some point in time.  If no 
public employees ever worked on the platform, then it would not 
have been a regulated "platform" under 29 C.F.R. § 1910.21(a)(4) 
from the state's perspective, and Fox could have been under no 
obligation to have a railing in place.  The court of appeals 
discussed this argument as follows, and expressly left the 
question open on remand for Fox to present evidence: 
Fox asserts that the regulation did not apply because 
there is no evidence this platform was ever used by a 
public employee as a workspace. . . .  Fox points out 
that the definition of "platform" in 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1910.21(a)(4) is "A working space for persons, 
elevated above the surrounding floor or ground; such 
as a balcony or platform for the operation of 
No.  2007AP385.akz 
 
12 
 
machinery and equipment."  As we understand Fox's 
position, because the purpose of Wis. Admin. Code ch. 
Comm 32 is to establish "minimum occupational safety 
and health standards for public employes," Wis. Admin. 
Code 
§ Comm 
32.001 
(Mar. 
1999), 
29 
C.F.R. 
§ 1910.23(c)(1) does not apply to the platform from 
which Umansky fell unless it was the work space of a 
public employee.  Apparently in Fox's view, ABC Inc. 
(and perhaps other commercial stations as well) was 
responsible for complying with the federal regulation 
regarding this particular platform and the University 
had no obligation to do so under Wis. Admin. Code ch. 
Comm 32. . . .  
. . . [T]he factual record is not fully developed, as 
it likely would have been had Fox raised this argument 
in the circuit court.  That is, while the evidence at 
present 
indicates 
no 
state 
employees 
used 
this 
platform, we do not know what the evidence would show 
had there been further exploration of the use of the 
platform. . . .  
 
Although we apply the waiver rule on this appeal, 
nothing in our opinion prevents the circuit court from 
permitting Fox to raise this argument on remand to the 
circuit court.  So as not to suggest we are resolving 
this issue on this appeal, we phrase our rulings in 
the following paragraph with italicized caveats. 
 
Based on the undisputed facts and the developed 
arguments presented to us, we conclude: (1) Fox was 
responsible for compliance with state and federal 
safety regulations and this job responsibility is 
sufficient to impose on him the duty to comply with 29 
C.F.R. 
§ 1910.23(c)(1) 
insofar 
as 
the 
regulation 
applies to his employer. (2) Given the height and 
structure of the platform (including the upper and 
lower platforms) and at least one open side, Fox had a 
ministerial duty to have a standard railing or an 
alternative as specified in 29 C.F.R. § 1910.23(c)(1) 
on the open side or sides of the upper platform, if 
Fox's employer was required by state law to comply 
with this regulation as to this platform. 
Umansky v. ABC Ins. Co., 2008 WI App 101, ¶¶63-66, 313 Wis. 2d 
445, 756 N.W.2d 601 (footnotes omitted; emphasis in original).  
The majority makes short shrift of this argument by conflating 
No.  2007AP385.akz 
 
13 
 
it with Fox's argument that a public employee needed to be on 
the platform at the same time Umansky fell, majority op., ¶22 & 
n.16; however, it is an analytically distinct argument and 
necessitates that this factual question be left open on remand. 
¶106 Under 
29 
C.F.R. 
§ 1910.21(a)(4), 
a 
regulated 
"platform" is defined as "[a] working space for persons, 
elevated above the surrounding floor or ground; such as a 
balcony 
or 
platform 
for 
the 
operation 
of 
machinery 
and 
equipment."  Wisconsin Admin. Code Ch. Comm 32 establishes 
"minimum occupational safety and health standards for public 
employees."  Wis. Admin. Code § Comm 32.001 (emphasis added).  
If no public employees ever worked on the platform in question, 
then it was not a regulated "platform" under § 1910.21(a)(4) 
from the perspective of the state administrative code, and 
therefore Fox was under no obligation to maintain a railing.  
Were that found to be the case, the only employer who would have 
had an obligation to maintain a railing would be ABC, Inc., 
Umansky's 
actual 
employer——the 
only 
employer 
from 
whose 
perspective this platform was in fact a "platform" under OSHA. 
¶107 However, as the court of appeals noted, "the factual 
record is not fully developed" with respect to this issue.  
Umansky, 313 Wis. 2d 445, ¶64.  At the very least, this court 
should follow the court of appeals' lead and leave this question 
open for further fact-finding on remand before concluding as a 
matter of law that Fox was required to maintain a railing on the 
platform in question.  If no public employees ever worked on the 
platform, it was beyond the scope of Fox's obligations.   
No.  2007AP385.akz 
 
14 
 
¶108 The problem with a contrary holding is obvious.  The 
majority cannot seriously intend to suggest that the burden of 
maintaining 
a 
railing 
around 
every 
single 
architectural 
structure which might be used by third parties as a platform at 
Camp Randall Stadium should be placed on Fox.  Certainly, there 
must be a limit on the scope of his duties, even under the 
majority's view.  That limit is apparent from the language of 
Wis. Admin. Code § Comm 32.001, which requires state employers 
to conform to "minimum occupational safety and health standards 
for public employees" (emphasis added).  Private employers are 
responsible for their employees' safety under OSHA.  Contrary to 
the majority's conclusions, Fox should not be expected to be 
everybody's keeper. 
¶109 The 
Umanskys 
and 
the 
majority 
argue 
that 
the 
ministerial nature of Fox's duty cannot depend on the status of 
the person who is injured by Fox's negligence.  The Umanskys 
assert that such a distinction is contrary to the text of the 
relevant provisions.  Injury at a public place of employment, 
the Umanskys argue, is the determining factor in this case and, 
thus, the distinction between public and private employees is 
irrelevant under their theory.  For the following three reasons, 
I disagree with the reliance on where the injury takes place and 
disregard for the employee's status as a public or private 
employee. 
¶110 First, this argument ignores the full text of the 
Wisconsin Administrative Code.  While Wis. Admin. Code § Comm 
32.002 states that "[t]he provisions of this chapter apply to 
No.  2007AP385.akz 
 
15 
 
all places of employment and public buildings of a public 
employer," the administrative code also states in § Comm 32.001 
that "[t]his chapter establishes minimum occupational safety and 
health standards for public employees."  As a result, when read 
together, these provisions protect public employees in public 
places.  The Umanskys' argument ignores the text of the relevant 
administrative code provisions. 
¶111 Second, such an interpretation does not, as the 
Umanskys argue, lead to more protection for public employees 
than for private employees.  Both private and public employees 
are equally protected when working on the platform at issue in 
this case.  On their face, the OSHA regulations apply to protect 
a private employee.  See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.1, 1910.2, 1910.5.  
In this case, ABC, Inc. was fined $7,000 for failing to ensure 
that a railing guarded the front side of this platform.2  The 
administrative 
code 
protects public employees through the 
incorporation by reference of OSHA provisions.  See Wis. Admin. 
Code §§ Comm 32.15 and 32.50.  Both the private employee and the 
public 
employee 
are 
protected 
under 
Wisconsin's 
Worker's 
Compensation provisions.  See generally Wis. Stat. ch. 102; see 
Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2) (stating that the right to recovery under 
this chapter is "the exclusive remedy against the employer").   
¶112 Third, it is not that the ABC employee is without 
recourse, but rather, the proper recourse is not against Fox 
                                                 
2 In fact, in 1999, it was ABC, Inc. and a camera technician 
for ABC, Inc. that requested the railing be removed because the 
camera technician stated he could not "pan the camera" when the 
railing was in place. 
No.  2007AP385.akz 
 
16 
 
individually.  A private employee has recourse against his 
employer.  Under the Umanskys' logic, Umansky, unlike a state 
employee, is entitled to a windfall.  Unlike a state employee, 
the ABC employee can obtain one recovery against his employer 
and one recovery against a public employee.  However, a public 
employee would be limited to just one recovery.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.04(1) (The state is subject to worker's compensation.). 
¶113 I conclude that a reading of the relevant authorities 
consistent with their plain language provides that Fox did not 
have a ministerial duty to install a railing for the benefit of 
Umansky.  Accordingly, I would hold that Fox did not violate any 
ministerial duty imposed by law. 
B. OSHA 
¶114 The majority's use of the OSHA provisions to create a 
ministerial duty is improper.  The Umanskys are suing Fox, an 
employee of the state, rather than Fox's employer.  The reasons 
for this are obvious.  Were the Umanskys to sue the state 
directly, the state would be shielded from liability under the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity.  German v. DOT, 2000 WI 62, ¶17, 
235 Wis. 2d 576, 612 N.W.2d 50 ("It is axiomatic that the state 
cannot be sued without the express consent of the legislature.") 
(citing Lister, 72 Wis.2d at 291; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. 
State, 53 Wis. 509, 512-13, 10 N.W. 560 (1881); Bahr v. State 
Inv. Bd., 186 Wis. 2d 379, 521 N.W.2d 152 (Ct. App. 1994)).  
¶115 It is also telling that the Umanskys have gone out of 
their way to avoid having the claim characterized as being 
brought under Wisconsin's Safe Place Statute, despite the fact 
No.  2007AP385.akz 
 
17 
 
that many of their allegations, at first glance, would seem to 
state the type of claim that should be brought under that 
statute.  See Wis. Stat. § 101.11 (requiring every employer to 
"furnish a place of employment which shall be safe for employees 
therein and for frequenters thereof and shall furnish and use 
safety devices and safeguards, and shall adopt and use methods 
and processes reasonably adequate to render such employment and 
places of employment safe, and shall do every other thing 
reasonably necessary to protect the life, health, safety, and 
welfare of such employees and frequenters").  The majority 
opinion follows the Umanskys' lead.  Majority op., ¶26. 
¶116 The reasons for the majority opinion's avoidance of 
the safe place statute are obvious.  First, the duty imposed 
under the safe place statute is discretionary and cannot form 
the basis for a ministerial duty.  Spencer v. County of Brown, 
215 
Wis. 2d 641, 
651, 573 N.W.2d 222 (Ct. App. 1997).  
Therefore, Fox, who is a state employee, is shielded from 
liability for a violation of the safe place statute by public 
officer immunity, 
which precludes liability against state 
employees for discretionary acts negligently undertaken.  Id.     
¶117 Second, the duty imposed by the safe place statute is 
a duty imposed on the employer or owner of the facility in 
question, not the employees.  Employees cannot be sued for a 
violation of the safe place statute, nor can the duty imposed 
under that statute be delegated by the employer or owner to the 
employees in a manner allowing the employer or owner to avoid 
liability.  Pitrowski v. Taylor, 55 Wis. 2d 615, 624, 201 N.W.2d 
No.  2007AP385.akz 
 
18 
 
52 (1972) ("[A] safe-place action can be brought only against an 
employer corporation and not against an employee of the 
corporation. . . .  [A]s to the safe-place statute, '. . . it is 
the employer who is liable, rather than an agent of the 
employer. . . .'" (quoting Wasley v. Kosmatka, 50 Wis. 2d 738, 
744, 184 N.W.2d 821 (1971)); see also Dykstra v. Arthur G. McKee 
& Co., 100 Wis. 2d 120, 130, 301 N.W.2d 201 (1981) ("It is, of 
course, clear that the duty of an owner or employer under the 
safe place statute is nondelegable.").  Accordingly, even if the 
safe place statute imposed a ministerial duty, which it does 
not, Fox, an employee, could not be sued for a violation of its 
provisions.  See Pitrowski, 55 Wis. 2d at 624. 
¶118 Although Fox cannot be sued for a violation of the 
safe place statute, significant contrasts can be drawn between 
the safe place statute and the OSHA regulations the majority 
uses to manufacture a ministerial duty for Fox.   
¶119 First, although the duty imposed by OSHA regulations 
is a duty imposed not just on employers, but on employees as 
well, 29 U.S.C.A. § 654(b), sanctions for noncompliance with 
OSHA regulations by either an employer or employee rest solely 
on the shoulders of the employer; employees cannot be sanctioned 
for OSHA violations.  See United States v. Doig, 950 F.2d 411, 
413 (7th Cir. 1991) (concluding that, despite § 654(b)'s 
directive, OSHA does not permit sanctioning of employees for 
their own violations of OSHA; only employers can be sanctioned); 
Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. OSHRC, 534 F.2d 541, 553 (3d 
Cir. 1976) (same); see also Minichello v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 756 
No.  2007AP385.akz 
 
19 
 
F.2d 26, 29 (6th Cir. 1985) ("OSHA regulations pertain only to 
employers' conduct.") (citing 29 U.S.C. § 654; McKinnon v. Skil 
Corp., 638 F.2d 270, 275 (1st Cir. 1981)).  As a result, the 
duty to comply with OSHA regulations is, in a manner of 
speaking, nondelegable, because employers cannot avoid sanctions 
for noncompliance by arguing that it was the employee's, not the 
employer's, responsibility to comply with the duty imposed. 
¶120 Second, under 29 U.S.C.A. § 653(b)(4), violations of 
OSHA cannot be used as a basis for expanding or diminishing 
common law civil liability; that is, OSHA does not create a 
private right of action that did not already exist at common 
law.  Minichello, 756 F.2d at 29; see also Russell v. Bartley, 
494 F.2d 334, 336 (6th Cir. 1974) ("[T]here is no legislative 
history or case law to support [the] proposition that OSHA 
created a private civil remedy and the clear language of [29 
U.S.C.A.] 
§ 653(b)(4) 
. . . 
specifically 
evidences 
a 
congressional intention to the contrary."). 
¶121 Having set forth these principles, the flaw in the 
majority opinion's analysis becomes apparent.  The majority is 
using OSHA regulations, which do not impose a sanctionable duty 
on employees, Doig, 950 F.2d at 413, and which do not create a 
private civil remedy, Russell, 494 F.2d at 335, to create a 
civil claim against an employee where there would not otherwise 
be a claim because it would be precluded by public officer 
immunity.  That is, by using OSHA regulations as the basis for 
creating a ministerial duty, OSHA is being used to expand 
No.  2007AP385.akz 
 
20 
 
liability where it would not otherwise exist.  This is directly 
contrary to one of OSHA's express congressional directives:   
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed 
to . . . enlarge or diminish or affect in any other 
manner the common law or statutory rights, duties or 
liabilities of employers and employees under any law 
with respect to injuries, diseases or death of 
employees arising out of, or in the course of, 
employment. 
29 U.S.C.A. § 653(b)(4).   
¶122 The majority opinion is improperly using OSHA to 
create a new civil claim.  Although one could use OSHA 
regulations as evidence that the duty to exercise ordinary care 
has been breached, see, e.g., Elliott v. S.D. Warren Co., 134 
F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1998), the majority opinion goes further, 
using OSHA regulations to establish a ministerial duty for Fox, 
a state employee.  The problem with this is demonstrated by the 
following discussion.   
¶123 The distinction between the duty of ordinary care and 
a ministerial duty is critical to understand.  A ministerial 
duty requires something more than the exercise of ordinary care.  
See Kimps, 200 Wis. 2d at 11 ("Just because a jury can find that 
certain conduct was negligent does not transform that conduct 
into a breach of a ministerial duty."); id. at 12 n.8 ("The 
existence of a duty of care to another does not necessarily 
imply that the duty was ministerial.").  Accordingly, when 
public officer immunity is asserted as a defense, and a 
ministerial duty is asserted as an exception to that defense, 
negligence is assumed.  Noffke, 315 Wis. 2d 350, ¶57 ("The 
immunity defense assumes negligence." (citing Lodl, 253 Wis. 2d 
No.  2007AP385.akz 
 
21 
 
323, ¶17)).  Therefore, if it can be shown that Fox had a 
ministerial duty that he failed to perform, which the majority 
concludes is presented here, the sole question will be whether 
Fox's failure to perform that ministerial duty was a cause of 
Umansky's injuries.  Id. 
¶124 In creating a ministerial duty for Fox based on OSHA 
regulations, the majority eviscerates the express directive of 
29 U.S.C.A. § 653(b)(4).  Stated otherwise, the majority uses 
OSHA regulations to create a cause of action where no cause of 
action would otherwise exist.  Furthermore, this cause of action 
will now be even easier to prove than ordinary negligence. 
¶125 The effect of the majority's analysis is not just to 
disregard 29 U.S.C.A. § 653(b)(4), however.  By giving the 
Umanskys a cause of action on these facts and based on the 
allegations they have set forth, the majority is permitting the 
Umanskys to pursue what is essentially an action under the safe 
place statute, while allowing them to avoid the inconvenient 
case law stating that (1) the duty imposed by the safe place 
statute is discretionary, not ministerial, and therefore cannot 
create an exception to public officer immunity, Spencer, 215 
Wis. 2d at 651; and (2) only an employer or owner can be sued 
for a violation of the safe place statute, Pitrowski, 55 Wis. 2d 
at 624; Wasley, 50 Wis. 2d at 744.  The majority has allowed the 
Umanskys' creative lawyering to result in the manufacture of a 
new cause of action heretofore unheard of under Wisconsin law.  
It has abandoned all protections of the public fisc that 
governmental immunity is intended to provide. 
No.  2007AP385.akz 
 
22 
 
II. CONCLUSION 
¶126 This case requires a straightforward analysis of the 
Wisconsin statutes and administrative code in order to determine 
whether Fox was immune from liability arising out of an incident 
that occurred at Camp Randall Stadium.  The majority disposes of 
this case by ignoring the plain language of the Wisconsin 
statutes and administrative code and instead improperly relies 
on OSHA provisions to create a ministerial duty where none 
exists.  Because Fox had no ministerial duty in this case, there 
is no exception to the rule of immunity.  As a result, I would 
conclude that Fox is immune from liability, and therefore, I 
respectfully dissent. 
¶127 I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this dissent. 
No.  2007AP385.akz 
 
 
 
1