Title: Amoco Production Co. v. Board of Com'rs of Carbon County

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Amoco Production Co. v. Board of Com'rs of Carbon County1994 WY 68876 P.2d 989Case Number: 93-63Decided: 06/23/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
AMOCO PRODUCTION COMPANY,

Appellant 
(Petitioner),

v.

BOARD 
OF COMMISSIONERS OF CARBON COUNTY,

Appellee 
(Respondent)

and

AMOCO 
PRODUCTION COMPANY,

Appellant 
Petitioner,

v.

BOARD 
OF COMMISSIONERS OF SWEETWATER COUNTY,

Appellee 
(Respondent).

Appeal 
from District Court of Carbon County, Larry L. Lehman, 
J.

Representing 
Appellant:

Algirdas 
M. Liepas and Alvin Wiederspahn, Wiederspahn, Lummis & Liepas, P.C., 
Cheyenne.

Representing 
Appellees:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Herschler, Freudenthal, Salzburg, Bonds & Rideout, P.C., 
Cheyenne.

Brent 
R. Kunz and Rebecca Hellbaum, Hathaway, Speight, Kunz & Trautwein, Cheyenne, 
for amici curiae, Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n, acting through its 
Wyoming Division, Petroleum Ass'n of Wyoming, and Wyoming Taxpayers 
Ass'n.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The issue in this 
case is whether a company that produces oil and gas is entitled to a refund of 
taxes when the assessed valuation has been reduced by the Wyoming State Board of 
Equalization (Board). The Board of County Commissioners, in both Carbon and 
Sweetwater Counties, denied any refund for taxes that had been overpaid in light 
of the reduced assessment even though the counties accepted the benefit of 
additional taxes determined to be due because of the increase in assessed 
valuations arising out of the same audit process. Review was pursued in the 
District Court of the Second Judicial District where the taxes were determined 
not to be "erroneous or illegal" taxes within the meaning of WYO. STAT. § 
39-4-101(b) (Supp. 1992). The court then affirmed the denial of the refund by 
the respective counties. We hold the reach of this statute is not limited simply 
to illegal taxes, i.e., those which the taxing authorities had no justification 
for imposing, and when the assessing authority determines that the correct value 
of the taxable property was lower than the value on which the taxes were 
originally paid, the taxpayer is entitled to refund of the erroneous taxes. The 
decision of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded for entry 
of an order requiring both Sweetwater and Carbon Counties to refund the taxes 
paid in error.

[¶2]      Amoco Production 
Company (Amoco) sets forth the issues in its Brief of Appellant as 
follows:

A. 
What is the effect, for ad valorem purposes, of Special Directives (and 
Notices of Changed Valuation) issued to the Appellees by the State which give 
Notice of a change in the valuation of State assessed 
property?

B. 
Are the Appellees obligated to follow Special Directives or Notices of Changed 
Valuation as they pertain to state assessed property?

C. 
Did the District Court commit reversible error by finding that Appellant's 
overpayments of ad valorem taxes were not "erroneous" taxes within the 
meaning of W.S. § 39-4-101(b)?

D. 
Did the District Court commit reversible error by finding that Appellant's 
overpayments of ad valorem taxes were not "illegal" taxes within the 
meaning of W.S. § 39-4-101(b)?

E. 
Did the District Court commit reversible error by finding that Appellant's 
overpayments of ad valorem taxes were not "excess taxes" within the 
meaning of W.S. § 39-4-101(b)?

F. 
Did the District Court commit reversible error by finding that ad valorem 
taxes retained by the Appellees in violation of Appellant's rights under the 
United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Wyoming were not 
"illegal" taxes within the meaning of W.S. § 39-4-101(b)?

In 
a Joint Brief of Amici Curiae, Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association, acting 
through its Wyoming Division, Petroleum Association of Wyoming, and Wyoming 
Taxpayers Association in Support of Appellant Amoco Production Company, the 
issue presented is stated to be:

Whether 
Special Directives issued by the State of Wyoming on state assessed property 
require Counties to increase or reduce valuation, and correspondingly collect 
underpayments and refund or credit overpayments of ad valorem 
taxes?

In 
the Brief of Appellees, the Board of Commissioners of Carbon County and the 
Board of Commissioners of Sweetwater County (Counties), articulate the principal 
issue including three sub-issues in this way:

Whether 
a mineral taxpayer is entitled to a refund of ad valorem taxes paid in prior 
years merely because it has amended its reports to correct errors in its 
original reports, absent a showing that the taxes were "erroneous or illegal" or 
"excess tax" pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 39-4-101(b)?

(1) 
Whether a special directive (now called a notice of valuation change) issued by 
the State Department of Revenue constitutes an "order" to the counties to refund 
ad valorem taxes paid?

(2) 
Whether, when a taxpayer amends its originally reported production volume and 
value, decreasing the same, and the State issues a special directive reflecting 
the amended report, the tax paid on the difference is rendered "erroneous or 
illegal" or "excess tax" pursuant to the refund statute?

(3) 
Whether, in the circumstances of this case, the denials of the refund requests 
constitute an unconstitutional result?

[¶3]      The facts against 
which the statute is to be applied are clear. Amoco is the lessee of a number of 
oil and gas leases situated in Carbon and Sweetwater Counties. Gross production 
from these leases is subjected to ad valorem tax by Article 15, § 11 of 
the Constitution of the State of Wyoming.1 Amoco, in accordance with the 
practice of similar producers of oil and gas, furnishes production reports to 
the Wyoming Department of Revenue (Department). The Department requires those 
reports be updated when additional information becomes available. The Board 
values oil and gas production, based upon information provided by producers, and 
the Counties then calculate and collect the ad valorem taxes owed by 
producers. The essence of this statutory scheme is that the Board furnishes the 
assessing function for such taxes.

[¶4]      Following an 
internal audit, Amoco filed amended reports with the Board in 1985 relating to 
production from its leases during the years 1980 through 1984. Based upon 
information in the amended reports, the Board issued a special directive 
increasing the assessed valuation of Amoco's production, and Amoco then paid 
additional ad valorem taxes to both Carbon and Sweetwater Counties. 
Subsequently, Amoco filed another set of amended reports "to cure various 
inaccuracies contained in the 1985 amended returns." The processing of these 
reports by the Board was suspended temporarily during the continuation of an 
internal audit of production by Amoco.

[¶5]      By December of 
1990, the Board had resumed processing this second set of reports, even though 
the internal audit still was incomplete. In 1991, the Board issued additional 
special directives that had the net effect of reducing the assessed valuation of 
Amoco's production for the relevant tax years. Amoco then requested a refund of 
$1,879,106.77 from Carbon County and $186,592 from Sweetwater County. Carbon 
County denied Amoco's request for a refund by a letter dated July 24, 1992, and 
on August 4, 1992, Sweetwater County sent a letter denying a similar request for 
refund. At this juncture, the stance of the Counties much resembled the old 
coin-flipping saw, "Heads I win - tails you lose!"

[¶6]      In their letters 
denying the refunds, both Counties relied upon WYO. STAT. § 39-2-201(d),2 and pointed out that the time for 
protesting assessments on production of oil and gas had lapsed. The Counties 
also asserted Amoco had not paid an "illegal" tax under the provisions of WYO. 
STAT. § 39-4-101(b).3 In addition, the Counties contended 
neither the statutory law nor the special directives themselves created a right 
to refund whenever a producer files an amended return.4

[¶7]      Amoco filed 
petitions for review of the administrative actions of the Counties, which were 
consolidated for hearing in the district court of the Second Judicial District. 
In a decision letter written on January 8, 1993, the district court affirmed the 
refusal of the Counties to refund any tax payments to Amoco and 
stated:

In 
addressing the bulk of Amoco's claims, the Court generally finds that Amoco 
failed to show that the alleged overpayments of ad valorem taxes were 
"erroneous or illegal" pursuant to W.S. § 39-4-101(b) and persuasive case law. 
In reaching its result, the Court agrees with the counties that the State's 
Special Directives do not have the effect of "ordering" the counties to refund 
ad valorem tax overpayments. Thus, with the noted exceptions, the Court 
concludes that the counties applied relevant law correctly to the facts and 
circumstances of this case.

The 
determinations of the district court articulated in its decision letter were 
formalized by a judgment entered February 2, 1993, and Amoco appealed that 
judgment to this court.

[¶8]      While separately 
stated as issues, Amoco's primary contention is that the district court erred in 
refusing to order a refund of its net overpayment of ad valorem taxes because 
that overpayment was either "erroneous," "illegal," or "excess" within the 
meaning of WYO. STAT. § 39-4-101(b). We focus upon the first sentence of that 
statutory section which reads:

If 
any person pays any tax, or portion thereof, found to have been erroneous or 
illegal, the board of county commissioners shall direct the county treasurer to 
refund the erroneous or illegal payment to the taxpayer. (Emphasis 
added.)

The 
succeeding parts of this statutory provision pertain to those situations in 
which an increase in the value of a product is subject to the approval of the 
federal or state government and address, in the alternative, the situation in 
which an increase is disapproved after the tax on the higher value has been 
paid. This situation results in an excess tax under the statute, but we are 
satisfied the circumstances disclosed by this record do not demonstrate an 
"excess tax" within the meaning of this statutory 
provision.

[¶9]      Over the years, 
this court has had occasion to define the term "illegal," as used in the 
statute. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Sweetwater 
County, 569 P.2d 1267 (Wyo. 1977); Bunten v. Rock Springs Grazing 
Ass'n, 29 Wyo. 461, 215 P. 244 (1923); Kelley v. Rhoads, 7 Wyo. 237, 
51 P. 593 (1898); and Bd. of Comm'rs of Johnson County v. Searight Cattle 
Co., 3 Wyo. 777, 31 P. 268       (1892). We never have interpreted separately the 
meaning of the term "erroneous" in the statute. In Atlantic Richfield 
Co., the phrase "erroneous or illegal" appears consistently throughout the 
opinion, but it is clear from the holding that the court considered the tax 
there to be an illegal tax. The Counties rely upon Atlantic Richfield Co. 
to support the conclusion that the phrase "erroneous or illegal" is a term of 
art and describes only those taxes that are illegal in the sense that there was 
no property for the taxing power to reach. That interpretation is not supported 
by any of the prior cases. See also Hudson Oil Co. v. Bd. of Comm'rs of 
Fremont County, 49 Wyo. 1, 52 P.2d 683, 689 (1935); Carton v. Bd. of 
Comm'rs of Uinta County, 10 Wyo. 416, 69 P. 1013 (1902); 
Kelley.

[¶10]   The contention that the word "or" 
should be read as conjunctive rather than alternative in the context of this 
statute is contrary to the rule of statutory construction generally espoused by 
this court. The word "or" usually is used in a disjunctive sense and can be 
interchanged with the word "and" only when necessary to harmonize the provisions 
of a statute. Basin Elec. Power Co-op. v. State Bd. of Control, 578 P.2d 557 (Wyo. 1978); Matter of Voss' Adoption, 550 P.2d 481 (Wyo. 1976); 
Smith v. City of Casper, 419 P.2d 704 (Wyo. 1966). We perceive a clear 
policy justification for the legislature wishing to provide for a refund of 
either an erroneous or illegal payment by the taxpayer. The statutory scheme 
obviously relies upon reporting by the taxpayers. There must be some incentive 
for the taxpayer to correct reports discovered to be erroneous. No such 
incentive is present if the only effect of reporting errors in the original 
report would be to increase taxes without any opportunity for a refund. 
Consequently, we are satisfied the legislature intended the disjunctive in this 
statutory phrase.

[¶11]   In interpreting the word "illegal," 
we held a tax imposed on federal property was an illegal tax and not simply an 
overassessment. Atlantic Richfield Co. Similarly, when a county assessed 
and attempted to collect property tax on property later discovered subject to 
assessment only in another county, the tax was illegal because the county had no 
jurisdiction to impose it. Searight Cattle Co. A tax imposed by a county 
on property is not illegal merely because the property was overvalued or 
overassessed by the state. Searight Cattle Co.

[¶12]   The taxpayer's remedy for 
overvaluation or overassessment is to appeal the assessment pursuant to the 
procedure outlined in WYO. STAT. § 39-2-201(d):

(d) 
Following determination of the fair market value of property the department 
shall notify the taxpayer by mail of the assessed value. The person assessed may 
file written objections to the assessment with the board within thirty (30) days 
of the date of postmark and appear before the board at a time specified by the 
board. * * *

If 
the dispute is over the amount of the assessment, the taxpayer can object 
within thirty days and receive a hearing before the Board. The assessment stands 
until the taxpayer is successful in persuading the Board that the value is too 
high, and the value is then adjusted accordingly. Once that adjustment is made 
by the Board, following the hearing, or upon review of the Board's ruling, the 
correction reflects a new, accurate valuation. The tax is not illegal because 
there was no taxation of property over which the taxing authority had no 
jurisdiction. 

[¶13]   In an instance such as this, 
however, without the necessity for an attack by the taxpayer, the Board 
acknowledges the error of a prior valuation when it revises that valuation in 
accordance with the amended reports by the taxpayer. This concession of 
overvaluation serves to distinguish this situation from the persuasive authority 
cited by the Counties. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals of 
State of Colorado, 770 P.2d 1207 (Colo. 1989); Coquina Oil Corp. v. 
Larimer County Bd. of Equalization, 770 P.2d 1196 (Colo. 1989). In addition, 
it appears there are significant differences in the statutory scheme in 
Colorado. Still, the district court that first reviewed the proceedings in 
Colorado may well have been correct in its perception, under their statute, that 
"it would be a denial of due process for the government to be able to recover an 
underpayment of property tax when the taxpayer erred in his favor without 
permitting the taxpayer to recover an overpayment when the taxpayer erred to its 
detriment." Coquina Oil Corp., 770 P.2d  at 1197.

[¶14]   As this case unfolded, Amoco could 
not avail itself of the remedy provided in WYO. STAT. § 39-2-201(d). The 
discrepancies in the valuations were not discovered until more than thirty days 
after Amoco received notice of the assessed value. Many valid reasons exist for 
a taxpayer to amend its report subsequent to the thirty day period. Examples of 
those grounds called to our attention included adjustment of interest owners' 
values and volumes; adjustment of gross sales volumes; and elimination of 
duplicate reporting.

[¶15]   It was to address exactly such a 
situation that we pointed out in Atlantic Richfield Co., 569 P.2d  at 
1273, that the thirty-day proscription did not control, and we stated 
there:

Section 
39-113 [WYO. STAT. § 39-4-101(b)], supra, is intended to remedy a 
different malady. The word "thereafter" is significant. The statute provides in 
part that the refund will be made when a tax has been paid which 
"thereafter" is found to be illegal or erroneous. This connotes timely 
payment and a later discovery of an illegal or erroneous tax. The further 
meaning of this language is that the legislature has determined it would be 
unreasonable to expect a taxpayer to protest a tax at a time when it is without 
knowledge, and is not chargeable with knowledge, of the illegal or erroneous 
nature thereof. Therefore, the taxpayer is entitled, under § 39-113, 
supra, to pursue a refund of tax which is later determined by the 
commissioners, a district court, or "by some other authorized proceeding" * * * 
to be illegal or erroneous. Under both statutes [WYO. STAT. §§ 39-4-101(b) and 
39-3-203], the legislature has determined that the taxpayer is entitled to a 
remedy - a remedy which will recover for the taxpayer those taxes which were not 
justly or equitably due from him and - at the same time - will avoid an unjust 
enrichment of the particular taxing entity.

This 
language emphasizes the fact that it is impossible for a taxpayer to protest a 
tax at a time when it has no knowledge nor is it chargeable with knowledge that 
the amount of the tax is erroneous. It follows, when WYO. STAT. § 39-4-101(b) is 
applicable, there is no requirement for a protest to be presented within thirty 
days of the assessment. Such a requirement would demand every taxpayer protest 
every tax assessment even though there was no reason at the time of the 
assessment to assume the tax was either illegal or 
erroneous.

[¶16]   This case is similar to the 
Atlantic Richfield Co. case. Amoco filed amended reports based on 
information acquired subsequent to the thirty-day period for protesting the 
assessments. The Board did not reject the amended reports but, instead, adjusted 
the assessed valuation of Amoco's production based on those reports. Those 
adjustments were articulated in the form of special directives the Board issued. 
Those directives set the production valuation for the periods in question, and 
directives demonstrating an increase in valuation resulted in the assessment of 
additional tax, which Amoco paid. The Counties had full advantage of corrections 
of the reporting errors that led to an enhancement of the assessed 
value.

[¶17]   Justice demands taxpayers should 
have an equivalent advantage with respect to adjustments which reduce the amount 
of taxes. In either instance, the original tax payment was "erroneous." The 
procedure articulated in WYO. STAT. § 39-2-201(d) is designed to permit the 
taxpayer to challenge an erroneous assessment prior to paying the tax and is 
useful only when the taxpayer has information at its disposal to demonstrate 
error. Conversely, WYO. STAT. § 39-4-101(b) is invoked, as Atlantic Richfield 
Co. demonstrates, when the tax has been paid and, subsequently, a 
determination is made that the tax paid was illegal or 
erroneous.

[¶18]   In this instance, the Board relied 
on the amounts set forth in Amoco's original reports, and it then relied on 
amended reports to adjust valuations of Amoco's production in the special 
directives. Essentially, the Board recognized the tax previously paid was 
erroneous, and we hold this process leads to appropriate adjustments both in 
favor, and to the disadvantage, of the taxpayer. To achieve that result, the tax 
paid does not have to be illegal. It is sufficient if it was erroneous as the 
Board had determined. In arriving at the meaning of the term "erroneous" in this 
case, it suffices to consult the plain and ordinary meaning articulated in 
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 772 (1993) (emphasis 
added):

2: 
deviating from what is true, correct, right, or wise: a: being or containing an 
error: fallacious, mistaken, inaccurate b: characterized by error: 
erring .

We 
hold, when the Board adjusts the valuations for the purpose of mineral 
production taxes based upon a taxpayer's amended reports, the valuations upon 
which the tax was paid are demonstrably erroneous. The erroneous valuation is 
established by issuance of the special directive or notice of valuation change 
for purposes of the application of WYO. STAT. § 39-4-101(b). The fact the 
erroneous valuations were relied upon by the Counties to assess and collect 
taxes due does not demonstrate the taxes were "illegal." The Counties are 
invested with the authority to assess and collect such taxes. When adjusted 
valuations are adopted by the Board and special directives issued to the 
Counties, the fact that the calculations relied upon by the Counties were 
incorrect establishes, as a matter of law, that the taxes were "erroneous." 
Under the statute, the taxpayer then is entitled either to a refund or a credit 
against future taxes, at the discretion of the county 
commissioners.

[¶19]   We noted above these taxes were not 
"excess" taxes under this statute. We do not reach the constitutional issues in 
this instance because we hold the correct interpretation of WYO. STAT. § 
39-4-101(b) is that it relates to "illegal" and also "erroneous" 
taxes.

[¶20]   The decision of the trial court is 
reversed, and the case is remanded for entry of an order requiring the Counties 
to either refund the amount of the erroneous taxes to Amoco or to afford it 
credit for those taxes against future assessments.

MACY, 
C.J., files an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in 
part.

MACY, 
Chief Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

[¶21]   I concur in the portion of the 
majority opinion which concerns "excess" taxes. I disagree with, and dissent 
from, that portion of the majority opinion which holds that Amoco is entitled to 
receive a tax refund because the taxes it paid were "erroneous or illegal" 
taxes. I do not believe that Amoco's constitutional rights were violated. I 
would, therefore, affirm the district court's decision.

[¶22]   This Court has ruled: "[T]ax 
refunds are a matter of legislative grace, and the right to such a refund does 
not exist in the absence of statutory authorization." Black v. Teton County 
Board of County Commissioners, 775 P.2d 484, 487 (Wyo. 1989). See also 
Meridian Aggregates Company v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 827 P.2d 375 (Wyo. 1992). We must strictly construe statutes which provide for refunds of 
excess property taxes. Black, 775 P.2d  at 487.

[¶23]   The majority holds that Amoco is 
entitled to receive a tax refund under the provisions of WYO. STAT. § 
39-4-101(b) (Supp. 1993).1 Specifically, the Court 
rules that the taxes were "erroneous" and that under the statute "erroneous" has 
a meaning separate and distinct from "illegal."

[¶24]   I believe that a careful reading of 
Wyoming case law interpreting the "erroneous or illegal" language reveals that 
the language has become a term of art which means illegal. In Atlantic 
Richfield Company v. Board of County Commissioners of County of Sweetwater, 
569 P.2d 1267 (Wyo. 1977), this Court interpreted the statutory language. 569 P.2d  at 1273-75. The Court approvingly quoted an Arkansas 
case:

"In 
the case of Clay County v. Brown Lumber Co., 90 Ark. 413, 119 S.W. 251, 253 
[(1909)], it was said that `the term "erroneous assessment," as there used, 
refers to an assessment that deviates from the law and is therefore invalid, and 
is a defect that is jurisdictional in its nature, and does not refer to the 
judgment of the assessing officers in fixing the amount of the valuation of the 
property.'"

569 P.2d  at 1273-74 (quoting Ritchie Grocer Co. v. City of Texarkana, 182 
Ark. 137, 30 S.W.2d 213, 214-15 (1930)).

[¶25]   That statement was consistent with 
earlier Wyoming case law. In Board of Com'rs of Johnson County v. Searight 
Cattle Co., 3 Wyo. 777, 783-87, 31 P. 268 (1892), overruled on other grounds 
by Kelley v. Rhoads, 7 Wyo. 237, 51 P. 593 (1898), this Court held that 
the "erroneous or illegal" language did not provide a vehicle for recovering 
excess taxes which were collected as a result of an overassessment. 3 Wyo. at 
783-87, 31 P. 268. In holding that "erroneous" has a meaning separate from 
"illegal," the majority fails to distinguish these cases.

[¶26]   I would hold that, under the plain 
and unambiguous language of the statute, the taxes which were paid in this case 
were not erroneous or illegal. Parker Land and Cattle Company v. Wyoming Game 
and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042-43 (Wyo. 1993). This case presents 
a classic incident of overassessment. The excess taxes were collected because 
the State Department of Revenue used incorrect information which was provided by 
Amoco to calculate the assessments. The taxes were not illegal, and the County 
Commissioners properly denied Amoco's requests for 
refunds.

[¶27]   Amoco had a remedy for the 
overassessments. WYO. STAT. § 39-2-201(b) (Supp. 1993) requires persons with 
gross products from mines and mining claims to submit information to the State 
Department of Revenue about their production so that the department may assess 
the property. After the department determines the value of the product on the 
basis of the information submitted by the taxpayer, the department must give the 
taxpayer notice of the assessed valuation. The taxpayer has thirty days in which 
to protest the assessment. WYO. STAT. § 39-2-201(d) (Supp. 1993). See also AT 
& T Communications of the Mountain States, Inc. v. State Board of 
Equalization, 768 P.2d 580 (Wyo. 1989). Amoco did not protest most of the 
assessments in this case.2 

[¶28]   A subsequent discovery of error by 
the taxpayer or the agency is irrelevant under the current statutory scheme 
because no authority exists for a refund of overassessed taxes to be made after 
the protest period has expired. Under the plain language of the statute, the tax 
itself must be erroneous or illegal in order to establish the basis for a 
refund. In this case, the tax was not illegal. Instead, it was the assessment or 
payment which was improper. Searight Cattle Co., 3 Wyo. at 787, 31 P. 268.

[¶29]   Since the right to receive a refund 
of taxes is a matter of legislative grace and exists only by the virtue of a 
statute, neither the state nor the county authorities can be compelled to grant 
refunds which are not provided for by law. The special directives under the 
facts of this case did not, and indeed could not, serve as orders to the 
counties to refund the overpaid ad valorem taxes.

[¶30]   Amoco contends that it cannot 
always supply complete and accurate information for assessment purposes at the 
time that the initial reports must be filed with the state or within the 
thirty-day protest period. While I understand Amoco's plight and that of other 
similarly situated taxpayers, it is not this Court's duty to correct the 
problem. The Court's role is limited to interpreting the relevant statutes. If 
reporting within the time provided by the statutes is not possible, the 
Legislature is the proper forum in which taxpayers should air their grievances. 
Enron Oil & Gas Company v. Freudenthal, 861 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Wyo. 
1993); Amoco Production Company v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 
797 P.2d 552, 555 n. 6 (Wyo. 1990).

Footnotes

1 Article 15, § 11 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming provides, 
in pertinent part:

(a) All property, except as in this constitution otherwise provided, 
shall be uniformly valued at its full value as defined by the legislature in 
three (3) classes as follows:

(i) Gross production of minerals and mine products in lieu of taxes on 
the land where produced;

* * * * * *

(d) All taxation shall be equal and uniform within each class of 
property. The legislature shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a 
just valuation for taxation of all property, real and 
personal.

2 WYO. STAT. § 39-2-201(d) (Supp. 1992) 
provides:

(d) Following determination of the fair market value of property the 
department shall notify the taxpayer by mail of the assessed value. The person 
assessed may file written objections to the assessment with the board within 
thirty (30) days of the date of postmark and appear before the board at a time 
specified by the board. The person assessed shall also file a copy of the 
written objections with the county treasurer of the county in which the property 
is located, who shall notify the county assessor and the board of county 
commissioners, with an estimate of the tax amount under appeal based upon the 
previous year's tax levy.

3 WYO. STAT. § 39-4-101(b) (Supp. 1992) provides as 
follows:

(b) If any person pays any tax, or portion thereof, found to have been 
erroneous or illegal, the board of county commissioners shall direct the county 
treasurer to refund the erroneous or illegal payment to the taxpayer. When an 
increase in the value of any product is subject to the approval of any agency of 
the United States of America or the state of Wyoming, or of any court, the 
increased value shall be subject to property taxation. In the event the increase 
in value is disapproved, either in whole or in part, then the amount of tax 
which has been paid on the disapproved part of the value shall be considered 
excess tax. Within one (1) year following the final determination of value, any 
person who has paid any such excess tax may apply for a refund, and the board of 
county commissioners shall refund the amount of excess tax paid. Any refund may, 
at the discretion of the board of county commissioners, be made in the form of 
credit against future tax payments for a period not to exceed five (5) years. 
Unless otherwise agreed to by the taxpayer, refunds in the form of credit 
against future tax payments shall be made in no less than equal annual amounts. 
The board of county commissioners shall not provide a credit for interest on the 
excess tax paid unless the taxes are paid under protest due to an appeal pending 
before the state board of equalization and the taxpayer prevails in the 
appeal.

4 Each of the special directives did contain these instructions addressed 
to the Counties:

WHEREAS, in accord with the premises

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, the county assessor of each said county increase or 
reduce each year valuation by the amounts indicated in this directive, and so 
notify the county treasurer, county commissioners, and taxpayer of such action 
within thirty (30) days of the date of this 
directive.

Footnotes 
for the Dissent

1 Section 39-4-101(b) provides in relevant 
part:

(b) If any person pays any tax, or portion thereof, found to have been 
erroneous or illegal, the board of county commissioners shall direct the county 
treasurer to refund the erroneous or illegal payment to the 
taxpayer.

2 Amoco asserts in its reply brief to this Court that it protested some of 
the assessments and that those protests resulted in special directives which 
were ignored by the County Commissioners. Amoco refers to a number of special 
directives which, although they are not completely clear in this regard, suggest 
that they resulted from Amoco's protests of the assessments. Most of these 
special directives resulted in increases in Amoco's taxable valuation and are of 
no consequence concerning Amoco's right to receive a refund. A few special 
directives, however, resulted in decreased taxable 
valuations.

I note that using a reply brief to the Supreme Court is not the proper 
means for presenting an issue for disposition. See W.R.A.P. 7.01 and 7.03. 
Because the question of what effect a proper protest would have had on the 
outcome of this case was not specifically presented to the County Commissioners 
or to the district court, we should not consider it on appeal. Oatts v. 
Jorgenson, 821 P.2d 108, 111 (Wyo. 1991); Wyoming Bank & Trust 
Company of Buffalo v. Bonham (In re State Bank Charter Application of Security 
Bank, Buffalo), 606 P.2d 296, 300 (Wyo. 1980). The special directives 
contain the only evidence in the record concerning the protests. They are not 
clear as to the basis of the protests or the procedural history. This Court 
requires parties to present their specific arguments to the agency, if 
appropriate, and then to the district court so that a clear and comprehensive 
record may be developed to support their respective positions. Without that 
record development, we are left to guess at the facts and proceedings 
below.