Title: State ex rel. Citizen Action for a Livable Montgomery v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Citizen Action for a Livable Montgomery v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of 
Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 437, 2007-Ohio-5379.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. CITIZEN ACTION FOR A LIVABLE MONTGOMERY 
v. HAMILTON COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Citizen Action for a Livable Montgomery v. Hamilton Cty. 
Bd. of Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 437, 2007-Ohio-5379.] 
Municipal initiative petition — Laches —Administrative ordinances cannot be 
enacted by initiative — Administrative and legislative actions 
distinguished — Claim that proposed ordinance would violate charter 
cannot prevent vote on initiative — Writ granted to compel placement of 
initiative on ballot. 
(No. 2007-1732 ─ Submitted October 2, 2007 ─ Decided October 8, 2007.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an expedited election action for a writ of mandamus to 
compel a board of elections to include an ordinance proposed by initiative petition 
on the November 6, 2007 general election ballot.  Because the board of elections 
abused its discretion in determining that the proposed ordinance constituted 
administrative action, we grant the writ. 
{¶ 2} Relator, Citizen Action for a Livable Montgomery, is a group of 
citizens of the city of Montgomery, Ohio.  Citizen Action was formed to place a 
proposed ordinance known as the Natural Parkland Initiative on the November 6, 
2007 election ballot. 
{¶ 3} The proposed ordinance directs the acquisition, purchase, 
establishment, and maintenance of natural parkland along the Montgomery Road 
corridor in the city and allows for the allocation of money from the city general 
fund reserve balance to accomplish these objectives: 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
{¶ 4} “Section I.  Acquisition of Nature Park Land. The real estate 
described in Exhibit A shall be acquired and maintained by the City of 
Montgomery for park, recreational, and green space preservation purposes.  The 
City of Montgomery shall acquire this land by purchase, and in doing so shall 
comply with all appropriate procedures and law of Ohio. 
{¶ 5} “Section II.  Purpose of the Acquisition.  The land shall be 
preserved as a passive park, recreational area, and nature preserve.  Construction 
of facilities within the park shall be limited, with the intent to preserve as much 
natural vegetation as possible.  Such limited construction may include walking 
paths, bicycle paths, access to the land from the Safety Center/Montgomery Pool 
parking area, and a walkway or bridge over the stream. 
{¶ 6} “Section III.  Name of the Nature Park.  The Montgomery Parks 
and Recreation Commission shall name the Nature Park. 
{¶ 7} “Section IV.  Maintenance of the Nature Park.  The Montgomery 
Parks and Recreation Commission shall direct the construction of facilities and 
maintenance of the Nature Park.  The City of Montgomery, upon the 
recommendation of the Montgomery Parks and Recreation Commission, is 
empowered to establish a trust for the purpose of holding and maintaining the 
Nature Park and any other City of Montgomery Park. 
{¶ 8} “Section V.  Establishing an Endowment Fund for the Nature Park.  
The City of Montgomery, through its actions authorized by Section VI, shall 
ensure that, in addition to the acquisition of the Nature Park land and 
establishment of the Nature Park and its basic features and facilities, an 
endowment is created for the purpose of maintaining the Nature Park.  The City 
Council, upon considering recommendations of the Parks and Recreation 
Commission, shall determine the size and character of this endowment. 
{¶ 9} “Section VI.  Funding the Acquisition, Establishment, and 
Maintenance of the Nature Park.  The City Council shall immediately create and 
January Term, 2007 
3 
implement a plan to designate funds to accomplish the objectives of this Initiative.  
The City Council shall use all appropriate means to comply with this provision, 
including, but not limited to, the general fund reserve balance, grants, and 
contributions from government, institutions, citizens, groups, and businesses. 
{¶ 10} “Section VII.  Expiration of the Funding.  The City of 
Montgomery shall cause the expenditure of funds for this Initiative to expire when 
it has acquired this land, developed natural pathways, constructed facilities, and 
established an endowment sufficient to maintain the land as a passive park, nature 
preserve, and recreational area. 
{¶ 11} “Section VIII.  Repeal by Electors Only.  This ordinance cannot be 
repealed except by vote of a majority of the electors in a general election to the 
extent allowed by law. 
{¶ 12} “Section IX.  Immediate Implementation.  The City Council shall 
immediately take all steps necessary to implement the provisions of this initiative. 
{¶ 13} “Section X.  Severability.  If any provision in this Initiative is 
found to be invalid, unlawful, or unenforceable, the remaining provisions shall 
continue to be valid and enforceable.” 
{¶ 14} On June 6, in accordance with Section 8.02 of the Montgomery 
Charter, Citizen Action filed a copy of an initiative petition concerning the 
proposed ordinance with the Montgomery clerk of council.  Citizen Action 
circulated the petition, and on July 13, it filed the petition, which contained 854 
signatures, with the clerk of council.  The clerk of council sent the petition to 
respondent, Hamilton County Board of Elections, for signature verification.  The 
board of elections verified that the petition contained 754 valid signatures, which 
is more than the required number of signatures for placement of the initiative on 
the election ballot. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
{¶ 15} On August 22, the Montgomery City Council determined that the 
initiative was sufficient and valid and sent the proposed ordinance to the board of 
elections for placement on the November 6, 2007 ballot. 
{¶ 16} Eugene Droder III, a resident of Montgomery, chair of the 
Montgomery Parks and Recreation Commission, and an attorney who represents 
the city in labor law matters, filed with the board of elections a written protest 
against the initiative on behalf of himself and others on September 4.  The 
protesters claimed that the initiative should not be placed on the November 6, 
2007 general election ballot because it contained more than one subject and 
deprived the city of its legislative authority. 
{¶ 17} Less than a week later, the protesters filed a supplemental brief in 
which they claimed that the proposed ordinance constituted an administrative 
action, rather than a legislative action, and was thus not subject to initiative.  The 
city submitted a brief in support of the protest based on the same grounds.  Citizen 
Action submitted memoranda in opposition to the protest. 
{¶ 18} On September 11, the board of elections conducted a hearing on 
the protest.  At the hearing’s conclusion, the board voted to not place the proposed 
ordinance on the ballot.  Upholding the protest, the board of elections determined 
that the initiative constituted administrative action, which was not a proper subject 
for initiative. 
{¶ 19} On September 18, Citizen Action filed this expedited election 
action for a writ of mandamus to compel the board of elections to include the 
Natural Parkland Initiative on the November 6, 2007 election ballot.  The board 
submitted a response, and the parties filed evidence and briefs pursuant to the 
accelerated schedule set forth in S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9).  After Citizen Action filed a 
reply brief to the board’s merit brief, the city filed a motion to intervene, a merit 
brief in support of the board, and evidence, and Residents for a Responsible 
January Term, 2007 
5 
Montgomery filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the board.  On October 1, 
Citizen Action filed a revised reply brief. 
{¶ 20} This cause is now before the court upon the merits. 
Motion to Intervene 
{¶ 21} The city of Montgomery seeks to intervene as a respondent in this 
expedited election case. 
{¶ 22} We deny the city’s motion and strike its evidence.  The city did not 
file any pleading with its motion.  Tatman v. Fairfield Cty. Bd. of Elections, 102 
Ohio St.3d 425, 2004-Ohio-3701, 811 N.E.2d 1130, ¶ 11 (“Civ.R. 24(C) requires 
that any * * * motion [to intervene] be accompanied by a pleading ‘setting forth 
the claim or defense for which intervention is sought’ ”); see, also, State ex rel. 
Wilkinson v. Reed, 99 Ohio St.3d 106, 2003-Ohio-2506, 789 N.E.2d 203, ¶ 12, fn. 
1, and cases cited therein.  In addition, the city’s motion was not timely filed, 
because, although the city should have known of the filing of this case, it waited 
until after the parties filed their evidence and briefs before requesting 
intervention.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Mason v. Griffin, 104 Ohio St.3d 279, 2004-
Ohio-6384, 819 N.E.2d 644, ¶ 10 (motion to intervene in writ case denied as 
untimely when prospective intervenor waited until after parties had filed evidence 
and initial briefs before attempting to intervene). 
{¶ 23} Because the city is not entitled to intervene, it is also not entitled to 
file evidence.  See S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9), authorizing only parties to file evidence in 
expedited election cases. 
Amicus Curiae Briefs 
{¶ 24} Although we have denied the city’s motion to intervene for the 
reasons previously set forth, the city is entitled to file an amicus curiae brief 
without leave of court.  See Tatman, 102 Ohio St.3d 425, 2004-Ohio-3701, 811 
N.E.2d 1130, ¶ 12, citing State ex rel. Youngstown v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of 
Elections (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 69, 70, 647 N.E.2d 769 (court considers amicus 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
curiae brief of a candidate whose motion to intervene in an election case was 
denied because of his failure to comply with Civ.R. 24(C)).  We will therefore 
treat Montgomery as an amicus curiae.  In addition, Residents for a Responsible 
Montgomery (“Residents”), which proclaims itself to be a group of city residents 
opposed to the Natural Parkland Initiative and whose members include some of 
those who filed the protest against the initiative, filed an amicus curiae brief in 
support of respondent. 
{¶ 25} The amici curiae failed to coordinate the filing of their briefs with 
the brief of the board of elections.  As a result, their amicus curiae briefs were 
filed after Citizen Action filed its reply brief to the board’s merit brief, which was 
filed one day before it was due.  This unique set of circumstances necessitated 
affording Citizen Action an additional four days to file a response to these amicus 
briefs and essentially guaranteed that this case would not be resolved before the 
absentee-ballot deadline.  Nevertheless, because S.Ct.Prac.R. VI(6) and X(8) 
authorize amicus curiae briefs on behalf of a respondent to be filed within the 
respondent’s filing time and the amici complied by filing on September 27, their 
briefs were properly submitted. 
{¶ 26} Concerning the particular arguments in the amicus briefs, 
Residents raises an issue that is raised neither by the parties in this case nor by the 
protesters in the proceedings before the board of elections, i.e., that the city failed 
to comply with its charter duties regarding the initiative petition.  Courts have 
generally held that “[a]mici curiae are not parties to an action and may not, 
therefore, interject issues and claims not raised by parties.”  Lakewood v. State 
Emp. Relations Bd. (8th Dist. 1990), 66 Ohio App.3d 387, 394, 584 N.E.2d 70; In 
re B.B.M. (Dec. 10, 1997), 4th Dist. No. 97CA2274, 1997 WL 773041, *4, fn. 2; 
Cruickshanks v. Haines (Nov. 18, 1994), 11th Dist. No. 94-L-039, 1994 WL 
660629, *2; State v. D. M. Pallet Serv., Inc. (Nov. 15, 1994), 10th Dist. No. 
94APC02-195, 1994 WL 649982, *1. 
January Term, 2007 
7 
{¶ 27} In fact, Residents could have raised this issue in the protest, since 
some of its members were already before the board of elections.  Instead, 
Residents chose to present the allegation of failure to comply with the charter as 
an 11th-hour amicus claim after Citizen Action had already submitted a reply 
brief to the board’s merit brief.  Residents thus did not exercise the diligence 
required in election cases and has prevented Citizen Action from presenting 
evidence to rebut this new claim.  See State ex rel. Commt. for Charter 
Amendment, City Trash Collection v. Westlake, 97 Ohio St.3d 100, 2002-Ohio-
5302, 776 N.E.2d 1041, ¶ 16 (“Extreme diligence and promptness are required in 
election-related matters”).  In fact, Citizen Action attempts to submit additional 
evidence responding to this argument in its amended reply brief.  Under these 
circumstances, we will not address this claim, because it is not properly before us. 
{¶ 28} However, in the exercise of our discretion, we will consider the 
remaining amicus arguments with the merits because they are either raised by the 
board of elections in its merit brief or were fully litigated in the protest 
proceedings before the board. 
Laches 
{¶ 29} The board claims that Citizen Action’s claim is barred by laches 
because of the seven-day delay in filing the mandamus action after the board 
upheld the protest against the initiative. 
{¶ 30} Although we have held that a delay as brief as nine days can 
preclude our consideration of the merits of an expedited election case based on 
laches, see, e.g., Paschal v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 
141, 656 N.E.2d 1276, we have not held that a shorter delay as under the 
circumstances here is unreasonable.  The six-day delay noted by respondents in 
State ex rel. Cooker Restaurant Corp. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections 
(1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 302, 308-309, 686 N.E.2d 238, was in addition to an 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
approximately three-month delay in filing protests.  Here there was no additional 
delay. 
{¶ 31} Moreover, there is no discernible prejudice from Citizen Action’s 
delay.  Even if it had filed this action three days after the board upheld the protest, 
this still would have been an expedited election case, and the board does not claim 
that its ability to defend against the claim has been prejudiced.  In addition, this 
case was fully briefed before the expiration of the absentee-ballot deadline, and 
even had the case been filed a few days earlier, this case would not necessarily 
have been decided before the passage of that deadline.  Cf. cases cited in Mason 
City School Dist. v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Elections, 107 Ohio St.3d 373, 2005-
Ohio-5363, 840 N.E.2d 147, ¶ 20 (statutory absentee-ballot deadline passed 
before election cases were filed). 
{¶ 32} Therefore, laches does not bar us from considering the merits of 
Citizen Action’s mandamus claim. 
Mandamus 
{¶ 33} To be entitled to the writ, Citizen Action must establish a clear 
legal right to certification of the Natural Parkland Initiative on the November 6, 
2007 general election ballot, a corresponding clear legal duty on the part of the 
board of elections to certify the initiative issue, and the lack of an adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Gemienhardt v. Delaware 
Cty. Bd. of Elections, 109 Ohio St.3d 212, 2006-Ohio-1666, 846 N.E.2d 1223, ¶ 
29.  Because of the proximity of the November 6 election, Citizen Action has 
established that it lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  State 
ex rel. Canales-Flores v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 108 Ohio St.3d 129, 2005-
Ohio-5642, 841 N.E.2d 757, ¶ 10. 
{¶ 34} For the remaining requirements, “[i]n extraordinary actions 
challenging the decision of a board of elections, the applicable standard is 
whether the board engaged in fraud, corruption, abuse of discretion, or clear 
January Term, 2007 
9 
disregard of statutes or pertinent law.”  State ex rel. Valore v. Summit Cty. Bd. of 
Elections (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 144, 145, 718 N.E.2d 415.  Citizen Action 
contends that the board abused its discretion and clearly disregarded applicable 
law in its determination that the initiative constitutes administrative action, which 
is an inappropriate subject for initiative or referendum. 
Legislative or Administrative Act 
{¶ 35} Section 1f, Article II of the Ohio Constitution authorizes initiative 
and referendum power only on those questions that municipalities “may now or 
hereafter be authorized by law to control by legislative action.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  “Conversely, ‘[p]ursuant to Section 1f, Article II of the Ohio 
Constitution, actions taken by a municipal legislative body, whether by ordinance, 
resolution, or other means, that constitute administrative action, are not subject to 
[initiative or] referendum proceedings.’  (Emphasis added.)”  State ex rel. Oberlin 
Citizens for Responsible Dev. v. Talarico, 106 Ohio St.3d 481, 2005-Ohio-5061, 
836 N.E.2d 529, ¶ 22, quoting Buckeye Community Hope Found. v. Cuyahoga 
Falls (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 539, 697 N.E.2d 181, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 36} “The test for determining whether the action of a legislative body 
is legislative or administrative is whether the action taken is one enacting a law, 
ordinance or regulation, or executing or administering a law, ordinance or 
regulation already in existence.”  Donnelly v. Fairview Park (1968), 13 Ohio 
St.2d 1, 42 O.O.2d 1, 233 N.E.2d 500, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 37} After applying this test to the Natural Parkland Initiative, we find it 
evident that the proposed ordinance is one that would enact a new law instead of 
one that would merely administer existing law.  The new law would direct the 
acquisition of property and its permanent maintenance for use as a park, for 
recreation, and for preservation of green space. 
{¶ 38} The board granted the protest against the initiative because the 
proposed ordinance “would be an administrative act, exercising the [eminent] 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
domain laws in the State of Ohio.”  The protesters and the city had cited that 
portion of the initiative that directed that the city shall acquire land by purchase 
“and in doing so shall comply with all appropriate procedures and law of Ohio.” 
{¶ 39} As Citizen Action observes, however, a holding that an ordinance 
is administrative simply because it contains language directing that Ohio law 
should be followed would result in the extinction of “virtually all legislative 
actions.”  Manifestly, an ordinance can create a law but still provide that its 
implementation be in accordance with existing law. 
{¶ 40} Moreover, notwithstanding the board’s and amici’s arguments to 
the contrary, the initiative does not expressly direct the city to appropriate 
property.  It merely directs the city to acquire the land by purchase.  Courts have 
specifically held that ordinances providing for acquisition of private property are 
legislative in nature and thus subject to initiative and referendum.  State ex rel. 
Malone v. Jacobs (1932), 135 Kan. 513, 11 P.2d 739 (ordinance providing for 
condemnation and appropriation of private property for the purpose of widening a 
street was held to be legislative in nature and thus subject to referendum); Reagan 
v. Sausalito (1962), 210 Cal.App.2d 618, 26 Cal.Rptr. 775 (resolution declaring 
city’s policy to acquire certain property for park purposes was a legislative act 
subject to referendum); see, also, State ex rel. Hazel v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of 
Elections (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 165, 169, 685 N.E.2d 224 (proposed ordinance 
concerning acquisition, construction, and regulation of penal facilities constituted 
legislative action subject to initiative).  Similarly, the Natural Parkland Initiative 
proposes a new law under which the city will acquire private property for park 
purposes. 
{¶ 41} Insofar as the initiative might require the appropriation of property, 
the right of eminent domain belongs to the sovereign power.  Ellis v. Ohio 
Turnpike Comm. (1954), 162 Ohio St. 86, 92, 54 O.O. 27, 120 N.E.2d 719; 
Norwood v. Horney, 110 Ohio St.3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 N.E.2d 1115, ¶ 
January Term, 2007 
11 
48.  That is, the power of eminent domain involves the exercise of legislative 
authority.  See, e.g., Kelo v. New London (2005), 545 U.S. 469, 480, 125 S.Ct. 
2655, 162 L.Ed.2d 439 (court defines “public purpose” for takings analysis 
broadly, “reflecting our longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments 
in this field” [emphasis added]); Pontiac Improvement Co. v. Cleveland Metro. 
Park Dist. Bd. of Commrs. (1922), 104 Ohio St. 447, 458, 135 N.E. 635 (express 
legislative power is needed for appropriation of private property).  And 
ordinances directing the appropriation of property have been held to be legislative 
and subject to initiative and referendum.  See, e.g., Malone, 135 Kan. 513, 11 
P.2d 739.  The board and amici curiae cite no pertinent authority to the contrary. 
{¶ 42} Nor does the mere fact that certain public agencies are authorized 
by statute to appropriate property by virtue of a delegation of this authority by the 
General Assembly necessarily mean that the power is administrative rather than 
legislative.  Insofar as the city argues this, it cites no precedent. 
{¶ 43} There is also no indication ─ as the board appears to imply ─ that 
the initiative would compel the city to bypass the statutory procedures for 
appropriation should it become necessary to acquire the property.  As noted 
previously, the initiative specifies that in acquiring the property, the city “shall 
comply with all appropriate procedures and law of Ohio.”  In fact, insofar as the 
board’s claim could be construed as a challenge to the constitutionality or 
illegality of the substance of the initiative, that challenge is premature before the 
proposed legislation is enacted by the electorate.  See, e.g., State ex rel. DeBrosse 
v. Cool (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 1, 6, 716 N.E.2d 1114 (“Any claims alleging the 
unconstitutionality or illegality of the substance of the proposed ordinance, or 
actions to be taken pursuant to the ordinance when enacted, are premature before 
its approval by the electorate”). 
{¶ 44} Moreover, “[a]ctions relating to subjects of a permanent and 
general character are usually regarded as legislative, and those providing for 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
subjects of a temporary and special character are regarded as administrative.”  5 
McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations (3d Rev.Ed.2004) 407, Section 
16:54.  In addition, “an act or resolution constituting a declaration of public 
purpose and making provision for the ways and means of its accomplishment is 
generally legislative as distinguished from an act or resolution which merely 
carries out the policy or purpose already declared by the legislative body.”  Id. at 
411. 
{¶ 45} The Natural Parkland Initiative is of a permanent and general 
nature; if enacted, it would result in the acquisition and maintenance of land for a 
park.  The initiative also declares a purpose of preserving the land as a passive 
park, recreational area, and nature preserve and provides the means to accomplish 
that objective.  In effect, the initiative makes the legislative decision whether to 
undertake the project of acquiring and preserving land for the stated reasons.  See 
Convention Ctr. Referendum Commt. v. Dist. of Columbia Bd. of Elections & 
Ethics (D.C.App.1981), 441 A.2d 889, 908 (“Courts, however, have called 
initiatives ‘legislative’ when they have addressed the basic policy question 
whether or not to undertake a capital project, even after the project has begun”); 
Duran v. Cassidy (1972), 28 Cal.App.3d 574, 582, 104 Cal.Rptr. 793 (the people 
have the right to propose initiative halting development of golf course as part of 
city park even after construction of course has begun). 
{¶ 46} The initiative does not simply execute any preexisting ordinance 
expressing a municipal plan to acquire the property for these purposes.  This case 
is thus distinct from those in which the court has held that an enacted ordinance is 
administrative rather than legislative.  Cf. Oberlin Citizens, 106 Ohio St.3d 481, 
2005-Ohio-5061, 836 N.E.2d 529 (ordinance adopting a development agreement 
for the construction of improvements attendant to proposed development); 
Buckeye Community, 82 Ohio St.3d 539, 697 N.E.2d 181 (ordinance approving 
January Term, 2007 
13 
site plan for proposed development); Donnelly, 13 Ohio St.2d 1, 42 O.O.2d 1, 233 
N.E.2d 500 (action of city council in failing to approve resubdivision of land). 
{¶ 47} Therefore, under the court’s well-established test for determining 
whether an ordinance is legislative or administrative, the Natural Parkland 
Initiative is legislative in nature because it creates a new law directing the 
acquisition of property and its permanent maintenance for use as a park, for 
recreation, and for preservation of green space; the ordinance does not implement 
any previous ordinances enacted for these purposes. 
{¶ 48} Consequently, the board of elections abused its discretion and 
clearly disregarded applicable law by concluding that the Natural Parkland 
Initiative is an administrative action that is not the proper subject of municipal 
initiative.  This holding is “consistent with our duty to liberally construe 
municipal initiative provisions to permit the exercise of the power of initiative.”  
State ex rel. N. Main St. Coalition v. Webb, 106 Ohio St.3d 437, 2005-Ohio-5009, 
835 N.E.2d 1222, ¶ 47. 
Other Grounds for the Protest 
{¶ 49} The protesters and the city raised other grounds for the protest, i.e., 
that the initiative petition violates R.C. 3519.01 and Section 7.01 of the 
Montgomery Charter because it contains more than one subject or proposal of law 
and that the initiative petition deprives the city of its legislative authority by 
forbidding repeal of the proposed ordinance except by a majority vote at a general 
election.  The city repeats these grounds in its amicus curiae brief.  If either of 
these grounds is correct, the board’s decision to uphold the protest should not be 
vacated even if the decision was based on the board’s erroneous determination 
that the proposed ordinance was administrative.  Cf. State ex rel. McGrath v. Ohio 
Adult Parole Auth., 100 Ohio St.3d 72, 2003-Ohio-5062, 796 N.E.2d 526, ¶ 8 
(“Reviewing courts are not authorized to reverse a correct judgment on the basis 
that some or all of the lower court’s reasons are erroneous”). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
{¶ 50} These additional claims lack merit.  Although R.C. 3519.01 
requires that “[o]nly one proposal of law or constitutional amendment to be 
proposed by initiative petition shall be contained in an initiative petition to enable 
the voters to vote on that proposal separately,” the court has “consistently 
recognized that R.C. Chapter 3519 applies only to statewide initiative and 
referendum petitions.”  State ex rel. Sinay v. Sodders (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 224, 
228, 685 N.E.2d 754.  The initiative here is not a statewide petition.1   
{¶ 51} Section 7.01 of the Montgomery Charter provides, “No ordinance 
or resolution shall contain more than one subject which shall be expressed in its 
title.”  See, also, R.C. 731.19 (“No ordinance, resolution, or bylaw shall contain 
more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title”). 
{¶ 52} These provisions, however, could invalidate the Natural Parkland 
Initiative only if it is enacted.  Therefore, as noted previously, until the ordinance 
is passed by the electorate, this claim is premature.  N. Main St. Coalition, 106 
Ohio St.3d 437, 2005-Ohio-5009, 835 N.E.2d 1222, ¶ 38, citing DeBrosse, 87 
Ohio St.3d at 6, 716 N.E.2d 1114.  In fact, we have specifically held that an 
initiative petition is not invalid based on the claim that the proposed ordinance 
violates the R.C. 731.19 one-subject rule.  Hazel, 80 Ohio St.3d at 169, 685 
N.E.2d 224. 
{¶ 53} Similarly, the protesters’ and the city’s last protest contention ─ 
that the proposed ordinance is invalid because one of its sections specifies that it 
can be repealed only “by vote of a majority of the electors in a general election” ─ 
is also premature.  Even if that section were later found to be unlawful, the 
                                                 
1.  Citizen Action’s argument that the protest was not timely filed under R.C. 3519.16 must 
likewise fail.  See State ex rel. Commt. for the Charter Amendment Petition─The Milliken Woods 
Preservation Assn. v. Hamilton (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 508, 510, 757 N.E.2d 294 (“R.C. 3519.16 is 
restricted to statewide initiative and referendum petitions, which this case does not involve” 
[emphasis sic]). 
January Term, 2007 
15 
proposed initiative petition specifies that “the remaining provisions shall continue 
to be valid and enforceable.” 
{¶ 54} Therefore, the other grounds for the protest do not support the 
board’s decision to invalidate the initiative petition. 
Attorney Fees 
{¶ 55} Citizen Action requests an award of attorney fees.  “In Ohio, the 
general rule is that absent a statute allowing attorney fees as costs, the prevailing 
party is not entitled to an award of attorney fees unless the party against whom the 
fees are taxed acted in bad faith.”  State ex rel. Maloney v. Sherlock, 100 Ohio 
St.3d 77, 2003-Ohio-5058, 796 N.E.2d 897, ¶ 55; Pegan v. Crawmer (1997), 79 
Ohio St.3d 155, 156, 679 N.E.2d 1129. 
{¶ 56} Citizen Action is not entitled to an award of attorney fees, because 
it cites no pertinent statute in support of its request and there is no evidence that 
the board of elections acted in bad faith when it upheld the protest against the 
initiative.  Although Citizen Action also cites R.C. 733.61 and election cases 
involving R.C. Chapter 733 taxpayer actions against municipal officials, see N. 
Main St. Coalition, 106 Ohio St.3d 437, 2005-Ohio-5009, 835 N.E.2d 1222, ¶ 48, 
this is not such an action.  The board of elections is not a municipal official. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 57} Citizen Action has established its entitlement to the requested 
extraordinary relief.  The board of elections abused its discretion and clearly 
disregarded applicable law in upholding the protest and refusing to certify the 
initiative on the general election ballot, and Citizen Action lacks an adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of law.  Therefore, we grant a writ of mandamus to 
compel the board of elections to place the Natural Parkland Initiative on the 
November 6, 2007 election ballot. 
Writ granted. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Webb & Pillich, L.L.C., and Constance M. Pillich, for relator. 
 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and David T. 
Stevenson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent. 
 
Donnellon, Donnellon & Miller and Terrence M. Donnellon, urging denial 
of the writ for amicus curiae city of Montgomery. 
 
Langdon & Hartman, L.L.C., and David R. Langdon, urging denial of the 
writ for amicus curiae Residents for a Responsible Montgomery. 
______________________