Title: Rohrer v. Rohrer

State: pennsylvania

Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Document:

345 Pa. Superior Ct. 469 (1985) 498 A.2d 919 Robert C. ROHRER, Appellant, v. Loretta L. ROHRER. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted June 13, 1985. Filed September 13, 1985. *471 Arthur L. Gutkin, Philadelphia, for appellant. Bruce Goldenberg, Philadelphia, for appellee. Before MONTEMURO, POPOVICH and WATKINS, JJ. POPOVICH, Judge: This is an appeal from an order of the trial court which denied the petition to confirm custody which was filed by appellant-father, Robert C. Rohrer, against his former spouse, appellee-mother, Loretta L. Rohrer. We affirm. The basic facts are undisputed and were set forth adequately by the trial court as follows: The parties were married in St. Petersburg, Florida, on August 31, 1979. Two children were born during the marriage; Mya, on January 9, 1981, and Joshua, on March 15, 1983. The parties lived in St. Petersburg from the date of the marriage until May 7, 1984, when appellant left without notice and took the children with him to reside with his parents in Ardsley, Pennsylvania. On May 29, 1984, appellee filed for divorce in Florida. Service was made on appellant shortly thereafter. However, appellant did not enter an appearance in the action. Pursuant to an order of the court in Florida, the marriage was dissolved and appellee was awarded custody on July 31, 1984. On July 17, 1984, appellant filed the instant action to confirm custody. Appellee traveled from Florida to attend a hearing before a custody conciliator on September 12th. At that time, appellee also requested a hearing on the issue of jurisdiction. The trial court held a hearing that same day "since the issue of jurisdiction appeared to have merit"[1] under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. See the Act of October 5, 1980, P.L. 693, No. 142, § 201(a), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5341, et seq. The trial court concluded that jurisdiction was vested in the courts in Florida and ordered *472 the father to return the children to the mother's custody in Florida. This appeal followed. Appellant raises the following two issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in not requesting the appellee to file responsive pleadings and thereafter allow the appellant time for discovery as requested so that the court may determine properly all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the welfare of the children; and (2) whether the trial court erred in ruling that jurisdiction was proper in the state of Florida rather than in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and also in directing that the mother should be awarded custody of the children per the Florida court order. We must reject appellant's contentions. With respect to appellant's contention that the court should have granted him time for discovery, Pa.R.C.P. 4001 provides for the following: Additionally, the explanatory comments to Rule 4001 state: Thus, it is clear that appellant is not entitled as of right to discovery in this action. Appellant contends, however, that the trial court erred because "without responsive pleadings being filed by Appellee in the Court below, there is no way upon which issues can be framed by the appellant nor for this Court to make a proper determination." Brief for Appellant at 9. We must disagree. Under Section 5366 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, "reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given to the contestants. . . ." Additionally, when a "question of existence or exercise of jurisdiction" is raised, that case "shall be given calendar priority and handled expeditiously." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5366. Although a different rule states that "[a] party must raise any question of jurisdiction of the person or venue by preliminary objection filed within twenty days,"[2] we find that the trial court's waiver of this particular rule was not an abuse of discretion since the question of jurisdiction was a matter of importance which had priority. See Cynthia H. v. Milton M., 328 Pa.Super. 332, 337, 476 A.2d 1357, 1359 (1984) ("a lower court will not be reversed either for waiving or refusing to waive noncompliance with procedural rules in the absence of showing of an abuse of discretion which has caused manifest and palpable injury to the complaining *474 party.") Additionally, appellant has failed to allege how he was prejudiced by the lack of responsive pleading other than to state in the abstract that "there is no way upon which issues can be framed by the appellant nor for this Court to make a proper determination." Brief for Appellant at 9. Finally, a review of the record establishes that appellant and appellee were able to present witnesses in order to ascertain whether jurisdiction existed in the courts in Pennsylvania. Appellant next argues that jurisdiction was proper in the state of Pennsylvania and that the trial court erred in deciding that the Florida courts had jurisdiction of the case. We disagree. Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, the question of jurisdiction is based upon the following factors: Additionally, the "home state" has been defined in the following manner: Briefly, these bases for jurisdiction have been characterized as "(1) `home state' jurisdiction, (2) jurisdiction founded upon `significant contacts' among the parties to the custody action and the locale in which the action has been brought, and (3) `parens patrie' jurisdiction for those situations where a child is abandoned, abused or dependent. Warman v. Warman, 294 Pa.Super. 285, 293, 439 A.2d 1203, 1207 (1982)."[3]Tettis v. Boyum, 317 Pa.Super. 8, 13-14, 463 A.2d 1056, 1059 (1983) (footnote omitted). In the instant case, the trial court made the following conclusions: Against this background, we must examine the record below. During the evidentiary hearing, appellee's attorney articulated the following position: At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated that he agreed with appellee's attorney that "this is the precise purpose of this Act, to avoid this kind of thing." Id. at 50. Under the law, a trial court need not exercise jurisdiction under the following circumstances: Because the record indicated that appellant removed the children without the consent of appellee who had been granted custody under Florida law, the trial court in Pennsylvania acted properly in not exercising jurisdiction in this case. Additionally, even appellant admitted at the hearing that appellee "took care of the children." Evidentiary *480 Hearing at 37. Thus, under these circumstances, appellant is not entitled to relief. Appellant essentially contends that because significant contacts with the state of Pennsylvania existed, the case of Tettis v. Boyum, 317 Pa.Super. 8, 463 A.2d 1056 (1983) controls the instant appeal. In Tettis, two parties were married while both were in military forces. Two children, a daughter and son, were born to them. The parties were stationed in San Angelo, Texas in September of 1979. The wife left the family residence and established another residence in that city, and the husband received primary custody of the children. The wife visited them daily for over a year until she returned to her hometown in Elk County, Pennsylvania. The father had departed from Texas to live in California. One time, the father had delivered the children to the mother for two extended visits, once in 1981 and for four months in April, 1982. Before returning the children from their planned visit, the mother filed a custody petition under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. This Court stated that "[t]his is not the first instance where this Court has been caught between two states with colorable reason to exercise jurisdiction." 317 Pa.Super. at 19-20, 463 A.2d at 1062. However, we held that it was in the best interest of the children to exercise jurisdiction in Pennsylvania because of the following: Additionally, we concluded that the children were not retained improperly after a visit with their mother. However, in the instant appeal, the facts of Tettis are distinguishable. Neither of the parties in this case are active in the military forces and subject to frequent moves. Also, we note that but for the appellant's actions in improperly retaining the children after a visit in Pennsylvania, the state of Florida would have substantial connections with the children. Accordingly, jurisdiction was declined properly by the trial court because the record showed that appellant's actions in improperly retaining the children were incongruous with the express purpose of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. Under these circumstances, we must affirm the order of the trial court. Order is affirmed. [1] Trial Court's Opinion at pg. 2. We note that appellee has not filed a brief in the instant case with this Court. [2] Pa.R.C.P. 1915.5(a). [3] The third basis for jurisdiction is not at issue in this case. [4] Section 5342 reads as follows: § 5342. Purposes and construction of subchapter (a) Purposes. The general purposes of this subchapter are to: (1) Avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other states in matters of child custody which have in the past resulted in the shifting of children from state to state with harmful effects on their well-being. (2) Promote cooperation with the courts of other states to the end that a custody decree is rendered in that state which can best decide the case in the interest of the child. (3) Assure that litigation concerning the custody of a child takes place ordinarily in the state with which the child and his family have the closest connection and where significant evidence concerning his care, protection, training, and personal relationships is most readily available, and that courts of this Commonwealth decline the exercise of jurisdiction when the child and his family have a closer connection with another state. (4) Discourage continuing controversies over child custody in the interest of greater stability of home environment and of secure family relationships for the child. (5) Deter abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken to obtain custody awards. (6) Avoid relitigation of custody decisions of other states in this Commonwealth insofar as feasible. (7) Facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other states. (8) Promote and expand the exchange of information and other forms of mutual assistance between the courts of this Commonwealth and those of other states concerned with the same child. (b) Construction. This subchapter shall be construed to promote the general purposes stated in this section. [5] See infra at pp. 478-480.