Title: State v. Davis

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Davis, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-5706.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-5706 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. DAVIS, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Davis, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-5706.] 
Evidence — Spousal testimony — Plain-error analysis required before reversing 
a conviction for Evid.R. 601(B) violation — Judgment reversed and cause 
remanded. 
(No. 2009-2208 — Submitted September 28, 2010 — Decided 
November 30, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 91324, 
2009-Ohio-5217. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
An appellate court may not reverse a conviction for plain error based on the 
admission of spousal testimony in violation of Evid.R. 601(B) unless it 
conducts a plain-error analysis pursuant to State v. Adamson (1995), 72 
Ohio St.3d 431, 650 N.E.2d 875, and determines that but for the error in 
admitting the spouse’s testimony, the outcome of the trial would have 
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been different and that reversal is necessary to prevent a manifest 
miscarriage of justice. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} The state appeals from a judgment of the Eighth District Court of 
Appeals that reversed multiple rape and gross sexual imposition convictions of 
William N. Davis. The appellate court held that the trial court had erred in 
admitting testimony from Davis’s spouse in violation of Evid.R. 601(B) because 
it did not inform her that she could choose not to testify against her husband and 
did not determine that she had elected to testify.  State v. Davis, Cuyahoga App. 
No. 91324, 2009-Ohio-5217, ¶ 29-30. 
{¶ 2} In its memorandum in support of jurisdiction and in its appellate 
brief, the state represents that the court of appeals has now recognized a new form 
of structural error that is contrary to controlling precedent of this court.  It further 
asserts that the appellate court changed the standard for plain-error review when it 
reversed Davis’s convictions without expressly stating in its opinion that the 
spousal testimony had affected the outcome of the trial.  An examination of the 
court of appeals opinion reveals that it did not rely on, or even mention, the 
structural-error doctrine in its decision, nor did it change the law regarding plain 
error.  Rather, the appellate court, relying on our decision in State v. Brown, 115 
Ohio St.3d 55, 2007-Ohio-4837, 873 N.E.2d 858, formulated a conclusory 
statement that the trial court had committed reversible plain error, but it never 
actually performed a plain-error analysis in its opinion.  We accepted 
discretionary jurisdiction over the cause.  State v. Davis, 124 Ohio St.3d 1492, 
2010-Ohio-670, 922 N.E.2d 227. 
{¶ 3} An appellate court may not reverse a conviction for plain error 
based on the admission of spousal testimony in violation of Evid.R. 601(B) unless 
it conducts a plain-error analysis pursuant to State v. Adamson (1995), 72 Ohio 
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St.3d 431, 650 N.E.2d 875, and determines that but for the error in admitting the 
spouse’s testimony, the outcome of the trial would have been different and that 
reversal is necessary to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice. 
{¶ 4} Because the court of appeals did not perform a plain-error analysis 
in this case, we reverse its judgment and remand for the court’s determination of 
whether the outcome of the trial would have been different but for the error in 
admitting the spousal testimony and whether reversal is necessary to prevent a 
manifest miscarriage of justice. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 5} Based on the trial testimony of D.T.1 and D.T.2, the record reveals 
that in 1999, William N. Davis began to sexually abuse D.T.1, the nine-year-old 
niece of his wife, Alberta Davis, by fondling her. On another occasion, Davis 
digitally penetrated her vagina.  After that incident, D.T.1.’s mother, Deshawn 
Treadwell, noticed blood on the child’s underwear, but assumed that D.T.1 had 
begun menstruating.  At that time, D.T.1 did not reveal the abuse. 
{¶ 6} When she was 10 or 11 years old, D.T.1 visited her aunt Alberta to 
help her with work around the house and with shopping.  While Alberta was 
occupied in the kitchen, Davis engaged in sexual intercourse with D.T.1 in the 
bedroom.  On more occasions over the next several years, he raped and sexually 
abused D.T.1 when she visited her aunt, with the most recent rape occurring in 
2005 when D.T.1 was 15 years old.  Around the time that Davis ended the sexual 
abuse of D.T.1, however, he fondled D.T.1’s younger sister, D.T.2, on two 
separate occasions. 
{¶ 7} In September 2006, D.T.1 told her mother that Davis had raped 
her.  Treadwell then contacted the police, and the ensuing investigation resulted in 
a 31-count indictment against Davis for rape and gross sexual imposition. 
{¶ 8} After the jury had been impaneled, a juror disclosed that she had 
been the victim of domestic violence and could not serve on the jury.  Dismissal 
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of this juror resulted in a panel of 11 jurors.  Although both the state and Davis 
agreed to proceed with only 11 jurors, the trial court discharged the jury and 
continued the trial to a later date. 
{¶ 9} At trial the next month, the state subpoenaed Alberta to testify 
against her husband in its case-in-chief.  Davis did not object to his wife’s 
testimony, and the trial court, contrary to Evid.R. 601(B)(2), neither informed her 
that she could choose not to testify against her husband nor found that she had 
voluntarily elected to testify. 
{¶ 10} During direct examination, Alberta revealed that she and her 
husband had decided to move to Columbus after the allegations of sexual abuse 
surfaced, and she admitted that Davis had left a job in Cleveland without having a 
job in Columbus. 
{¶ 11} In addition, the prosecutor asked Alberta whether she had intended 
to speak with her younger niece, D.T.2, about these allegations.  When she denied 
wanting to talk to D.T.2, the prosecutor asked her to represent that she would not 
lie to the jury.  At that point, the prosecutor played a recorded telephone 
conversation between Alberta and her husband during which she agreed to record 
a conversation with D.T.2.  The state characterized this effort as part of a plan to 
discredit the victim and exonerate Davis.  When she testified that she had only 
wanted to tape D.T.2 to remember the conversation, the state moved to treat her 
as a hostile witness, asserting that she had schemed with Davis to record 
conversations with the victim in order to undermine the child’s testimony. 
{¶ 12} The state then elicited admissions that she had lied to the jury 
about not wanting to speak to D.T.2 and that she had told Davis that they could 
move someplace where he could avoid being around children.  She also admitted 
that Davis had suggested “getting someone to whip [D.T.1.’s] ass.” 
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{¶ 13} When the state rested its case, the court dismissed eight counts of 
the indictment.  Defense counsel did not recall Alberta to testify, and Davis chose 
not to testify. 
{¶ 14} The jury returned verdicts of guilt on all counts, and the trial court 
journalized convictions for six counts of rape in violation of R.C. 
2907.02(A)(1)(b), 13 counts of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), one count 
of gross sexual imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(1), and three counts of 
gross sexual imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), sentencing Davis to 
life in prison and a $415,000 fine. 
{¶ 15} Davis appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, arguing 
that discharging the first jury and impaneling a second jury put him twice in 
jeopardy for the same offense.  The appellate court rejected this argument, 
holding that the trial court had acted within its discretion in declaring a mistrial.  
Davis, 2009-Ohio-5217, ¶ 25-26.  However, the court raised sua sponte the issue 
of Alberta Davis’s competency to testify against her husband, explaining that 
pursuant to Evid.R. 601(B), a person is incompetent to testify against her spouse 
unless, inter alia, she elects to testify.  Id. at ¶ 28.  Relying on State v. Brown, 115 
Ohio St.3d 55, 2007-Ohio-4837, 873 N.E.2d 858, and State v. Adamson (1995), 
72 Ohio St.3d 431, 650 N.E.2d 875, the appellate court stated that the failure of a 
trial court to instruct a spouse on competency and to make a finding on the record 
that the spouse voluntarily chose to testify constitutes reversible plain error.  
Davis, 2009-Ohio-5217, ¶ 28.  Because the trial court failed to give an appropriate 
instruction or to make the requisite finding of fact, the appellate court considered 
itself “compelled to remand this case for a new trial, given the mandates in Brown 
and Adamson.”  Id. at ¶ 30. 
{¶ 16} The state now appeals to this court, contending that the appellate 
court treated the trial court error as requiring automatic reversal and urging: 
“Where no objection is made to spousal testimony, a court's failure to inform the 
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spouse of competency under Evid.R. 601 is not structural error requiring reversal 
but may be noticed as plain error.” Although the state concedes that the trial court 
erred because it “did not determine whether Mrs. Davis was competent to testify 
under Evid.R. 601(B),” it argues that the court of appeals should not have 
reversed Davis’s convictions and remanded for a new trial without first 
determining “that, but for the error, the outcome at trial would be different.” 
{¶ 17} Davis does not dispute that a violation of Evid.R. 601(B) is 
reviewable only for plain error when the accused has not objected to the 
testimony of a spouse at trial.  He frames the main issue in this case as whether a 
court of appeals, in conducting a plain-error analysis, is required to expressly state 
that but for the error, the outcome at trial would have been different.  He 
maintains that the court of appeals applied a plain-error analysis and that it 
reached the correct result because the spousal testimony prejudiced his defense.  
In particular, Davis notes that his wife had been caught lying to the jury and 
testified that she would move with her husband where he could avoid being 
around children, suggesting her belief in his guilt. 
{¶ 18} Thus, we are concerned with the proper method for reviewing the 
admission of spousal testimony in violation of Evid.R. 601(B) when the accused 
fails to object: whether it is structural error requiring reversal without a showing 
of prejudice to the accused, or whether it is plain error subject to a determination 
that but for the error, the outcome of the trial would have been different. 
Competency of Spousal Testimony 
{¶ 19} Evid.R. 601 provides: “Every person is competent to be a witness 
except * * * (B) A spouse testifying against the other spouse charged with a crime 
except when either of the following applies: (1) a crime against the testifying 
spouse or a child of either spouse is charged; (2) the testifying spouse elects to 
testify.” 
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{¶ 20} Construing this rule in Brown, we explained that “ ‘a spouse 
remains incompetent to testify until she makes a deliberate choice to testify, with 
knowledge of her right to refuse. The trial judge must take an active role in 
determining competency, and must make an affirmative determination on the 
record that the spouse has elected to testify.’ ” Id., 115 Ohio St.3d 55, 2007-Ohio-
4837, 873 N.E.2d 858, at ¶ 54, quoting Adamson, 72 Ohio St.3d 431, 650 N.E.2d 
875, syllabus.  In Brown, we recognized that the failure of the trial court to 
instruct the witness on spousal competency and to make a finding on the record 
that the spouse voluntarily chose to testify “constitutes reversible plain error.”  Id. 
at ¶ 60. 
{¶ 21} Admittedly, our statement in Brown that a violation of Evid.R. 
601(B) “constitutes reversible plain error” may have been misunderstood to mean 
that the admission of incompetent spousal testimony is structural error requiring 
automatic reversal without consideration of whether the testimony prejudiced the 
accused. 
{¶ 22} We discussed the structural-error doctrine in State v. Perry, 101 
Ohio St.3d 118, 2004-Ohio-297, 802 N.E.2d 643, explaining that certain 
constitutional errors “ ‘ “defy analysis by ‘harmless error’ standards” because 
they “affect[ ] the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply 
[being] an error in the trial process itself.” ’ ”  Id. at ¶ 17, quoting State v. Fisher, 
99 Ohio St.3d 127, 2003-Ohio-2761, 789 N.E.2d 222, ¶ 10, quoting Arizona v. 
Fulminante (1991), 499 U.S. 279, 309 and 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302.  
Because structural error permeates “ ‘[t]he entire conduct of the trial from 
beginning to end’ such that the trial cannot ‘ “reliably serve its function as a 
vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence,” ’ ”  it is deemed prejudicial per 
se and requires an automatic reversal.  Perry at ¶ 17, quoting Fulminante, 499 
U.S. at 309-310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302, quoting Rose v. Clark (1986), 
478 U.S. 570, 577-578, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460.  However, courts 
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recognize structural error “only in a ‘ “very limited class of cases.” ’ ”  Perry at ¶ 
18, quoting Neder v. United States (1999), 527 U.S. 1, 8, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 
L.Ed.2d 35, quoting Johnson v. United States (1997), 520 U.S. 461, 468, 117 
S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718. 
{¶ 23} A trial court’s error in failing to comply with Evid.R. 601(B) 
neither necessarily permeates the entire trial nor prevents the trial from reliably 
serving its function as a vehicle for determining guilt or innocence.  To the 
contrary, Evid.R. 601(B) excludes evidence that is relevant to the ascertainment 
of truth.  Notably, the testimony of the spouse of the accused is not deemed 
incompetent because of its inherent unreliability, but rather to uphold “the policy 
of protecting the marital relationship from ‘dissension’ and the ‘natural 
repugnance’ for convicting a defendant upon the testimony of his or her ‘intimate 
life partner.’ ” Giannelli & Snyder, Evidence (2d Ed.2001) 387, Section 601.8, 
quoting 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton Rev.1961) 216-217, Section 2228.  
A violation of Evid.R. 601(B) therefore is not structural error requiring automatic 
reversal. 
{¶ 24} Thus, in Adamson, we applied a plain-error analysis in reviewing 
the trial court’s failure to determine the competency of the accused’s spouse to 
testify against him when that error had not been brought to the attention of the 
trial court in the first instance.  We stated: “although Adamson’s counsel failed to 
object to the error at trial, the error rises to the level of reversible plain error.  
Pursuant to the terms of Crim.R. 52(B), plain errors or defects which affect 
substantial rights may be grounds for reversal even though they were not brought 
to the attention of the trial court. ‘Notice of plain error under Crim.R. 52(B) is to 
be taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to 
prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 
7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804, paragraph three of the syllabus. ‘Plain error does 
not exist unless it can be said that but for the error, the outcome of the trial would 
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clearly have been otherwise.’ State v. Moreland (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 58, 62, 552 
N.E.2d 894, 899.”  Adamson, 72 Ohio St.3d at 434-435, 650 N.E.2d 875. 
{¶ 25} We did not overrule or limit Adamson in Brown.  Rather, the issue 
in Brown involved defense counsel’s failure to request a determination that the 
accused and a witness of the state were in fact married.  Thus, we did not apply a 
plain-error analysis because the error, if any, rested with defense counsel, not the 
trial court.  Holding that Brown received ineffective assistance of counsel, 
however, we concluded that “[he] was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to 
properly raise the issue of Wright’s competence to testify.”  (Emphasis added.)  
Brown, 115 Ohio St.3d 55, 2007-Ohio-4837, 873 N.E.2d 858, at ¶ 64. 
{¶ 26} We therefore clarify our statement in Brown that a violation of 
Evid.R. 601(B) “constitutes reversible plain error.”  Id. at ¶ 60.  An appellate 
court may not reverse a conviction for plain error based on the admission of 
spousal testimony in violation of Evid.R. 601(B) unless it conducts a plain-error 
analysis pursuant to Adamson, 72 Ohio St.3d 431, 650 N.E.2d 875, and 
determines that but for the error in admitting the spouse’s testimony, the outcome 
of the trial would have been different and that reversal is necessary to prevent a 
manifest miscarriage of justice. 
{¶ 27} Here, Alberta Davis appeared in response to a subpoena issued by 
the prosecutor and testified in the state’s case-in-chief.  As we explained in 
Adamson, “[j]ust because a spouse responds to a subpoena and appears on the 
witness stand does not mean that she has elected to testify.”  Adamson, 72 Ohio 
St.3d at 434, 650 N.E.2d 875.  Because the record does not show that the trial 
court informed her that she could choose not to testify against her husband or that 
it found that she had voluntarily elected to testify, the court committed a plain or 
obvious error in admitting her testimony.  See id. (it is “clearly error” to order a 
spouse to testify against the accused). 
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{¶ 28} However, the court of appeals did not complete a plain-error 
analysis in this case, because it did not determine whether, but for the trial court 
error in admitting spousal testimony, the outcome of the trial would have been 
different, and it did not decide that reversal is necessary to prevent a manifest 
miscarriage of justice. 
{¶ 29} Our decisions in Brown and Adamson do not require a reversal for 
plain error in all instances in which a trial court, without objection, admits spousal 
testimony in violation of Evid.R. 601(B).  Rather, before noticing plain error and 
reversing a conviction, appellate courts should conduct a plain-error analysis and 
determine that but for the error in admitting spousal testimony, the outcome of the 
trial would have been different and that reversal is necessary to prevent a manifest 
miscarriage of justice.  Because the court of appeals did not conduct a plain-error 
analysis before reversing Davis’s convictions, its judgment is reversed, and this 
matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
BROWN, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, 
LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecutor, and T. Allan Regas and 
Brent C. Kirvel, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant. 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Katherine A. Szudy, Assistant 
Public Defender, for appellee. 
______________________